Expansion of Transitional Justice Measures - A Comparative Analysis of Its Causes

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Expansion of Transitional Justice Measures A Comparative Analysis of Its Causes

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA BY

HunjoonKim

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

Kathryn A. Sikkink

August 2008

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© Hunjoon Kim 2008 All Rights Reserved

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Acknowledgements

First of all, I give special thanks to Kathryn Sikkink for her guidance, support, and inspiration throughout my dissertation research. continuously encouraged me to Think!

I also thank Mary Dietz who

I must admit that Kathryn and Mary are my

intellectual mothers and set a great role model as a scholar, teacher, thinker, and human being.

I also thank my committee members - Michael Barnett, John Freeman, and

Helga Leitner - for their guide and help in dissertation writing.

Michael's advice nine

years ago led me to pursue a graduate degree; John introduced me to the new world of quantitative research methods; and Helga with her enthusiasm assured me that I work on an interesting and important topic.

I also thank Raymond Duvall for supporting my

final year of dissertation writing with the Sawyer dissertation fellowship.

I also thank

the Department of Political Science to accept me to the program and financially supporting throughout seven years of graduate study.

I thank faculty members and

staffs in the program for their education and support for seven years.

I also thank my

dissertation group members for their friendship and support.

I thank my parents and in-laws for their endless love, trust, support, and prayer and also thank my grandmothers for their love and ceaseless prayer for me and my family. thank my brother and his family and my sister-in-law for their love and prayer.

I also I thank

my wife Ha Young, a nine-months-old daughter Yejin, and a baby boy soon to be born in January for their love, trust, and support.

Above all, I thank and praise God for His greatest Love, Grace, and Blessings.

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Abstract

Scholars have paid increasing attention to the global spread of human rights norms. One of the most important manifestations of such norms is the growing adoption of transitional justice measures. The number of states using human rights trials and truth commissions has dramatically increased since the well-known case of Argentina in the 1980s: by 2004, 52 of 100 countries that had transitioned to democracy had employed either trials or truth commissions to address past human rights abuses. the spread of transitional justice measures?

What explains

Why do past violations lead to effective

demands for truth and justice against powerful state officials in some post-transitional settings but not others?

My dissertation provides the first broadly comparative. answer

to these questions, using both cross-national quantitative analysis and an in-depth exploration of a critical case, the South Korean truth commission.

Conventional

scholarly wisdom suggests that transitional justice measures will be adopted either immediately after a transition or never.

Yet my findings support different conclusions.

First, my global analysis shows that transitional justice measures are more likely to be used after a country becomes a consolidated democracy, not immediately after a transition.

Second, the adoption of transitional justice measures is driven by the

persistence of strong civil society movements.

Strong and persistent advocacy by

students, mass media, and cultural activists motivated by the sense of justice and pursuit of the truth was the most important factor in establishing a truth commission in Korea. This finding confounds the received view that demands for truth and justice would diminish over time, and be ineffective and even counter-productive if persistent.

Third,

I find strong evidence of a diffusion effect: states are more likely to use transitional 11

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justice measures if their neighbors have already used such measures.

However, I also

find that the impact of a neighbor's experience matters most in the year of the democratic transition and diminishes over time.

This finding bolsters my argument that endogenous

political factors such as domestic advocacy and democratic consolidation are of critical importance in determining whether countries employ transitional justice measures or not.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

1

1.1. Research Question 1.2. Definition 1.3. Theories of Transitional Justice Measures 1.4. A Theoretical Framework 1.5. Methods 1.6. Structure

Global Analysis

2. The Use of Human Rights Trials in Transitional States

37

2.1. Introduction 2.2. Data and Hypotheses 2.3. Data Analysis 2.4. Conclusion

3. The Establishment of Truth Commissions in Transitional States

69

3.1. Introduction 3.2. Data and Hypotheses 3.3. Data Analysis 3.4. Conclusion

Case Study - Korea 4. Korea and Jeju 4.3 Events

96

4.1. Introduction 4.2. Hypotheses and Data 4.3. Korea, 1945-1948: Historic Background IV

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4.4. Jeju 4.3 Events

5. Suppressed yet Stubborn Truth

126

5.1. Human Rights Violations 5.2. Overview of the Transitional Justice Advocacy 5.3. Initial Transitional Justice Attempts

(1954~1961)

5.4. Total Suppression under Park Jung Hee

(1961~1979)

5.5. Transitional Justice Movement before 1987 5.6. Conclusion

6. From Oblivion to Social Attention

168

6.1. Before June 1987 6.2. Background and Overall Atmosphere 6.3. Major Activities,

(1987~1992)

1987~1992

6.4. Excavation of the Darangshi Cave 6.5. Conclusion

7. The Struggle of the Periphery,

1993~ 1997

207

7.1. Introduction 7.2. The Provincial 4.3 Special Committee 7.3. United Memorial Service, 1994 7.4. The Petition Movement 7.5. Yet another Suppression 7.6. Conclusion

8. The Establishment of the 4.3 Committee

238

8.1. Seeing Hope 8.2. The Enactment Movement 8.3. Legislation of the 4.3 Special Act 8.4. Legislation of the 4.3 Ordinance and the 4.3 Provincial Ordinance 8.5. Establishment ofthe 4.3 Committee v

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8.6. Conclusion

9. Conclusion

276

9.1. Introduction 9.2. Findings from Global Analysis 9.3. Findings from Case Study, Part 1: Commonality 9.4. Findings from Case Study, Part 2: Uniqueness 9.5. Further Research Projects

Bibliography

310

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List of Tables

Table 1-1. Countries with Truth Commissions and Transitional Trials,

1974~2004

2

Table 1-2. The Number of Countries with Trials and Truth Commissions by Continent 27 Table 2-1. Countries with Transitional Human Rights Trials

40

Table 2-2. List of Transitional States and Types of Transitions

44

Table 2-3. Summary Statistics

51

Table 2-4. Effects on the Initial Adoption of Transitional Human Rights Trials

55

Table 2-5. Effects on the Repeated Use of Human Rights Trials

56

Table 3-1. Truth Commission in the World,

1982~2004

Table 3-2. A List of Truth Commission in the World,

70

1982~2004

75

Table 3-3. Summary Statistics

79

Table 3-4. Effects on the Establishment of Truth Commissions in Transitional States

81

Table 3-5. Effects on the Establishment of Truth Commissions (AI)

90

Table 4-1. Interviewees and the Organizations Covered

103

Table 4-2. Categories and List of Documentation Examined

105

Table 4-3. Political Parties in 1945 South Korea

110

Table 5-1. Five Phases of Transitional Justice Movement,

1954~1999

133

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List of Figures

Figure 1-1. Cumulative Number of States with Transitional Justice Measures

1

Figure 2-1. The Number of Countries with Trials by the Year ofIts Initiation

42

Figure 2-2. Comparison of Geographic and Cultural Neighbors of Argentina

46

Figure 2-3. Changes in Hazard of Trial Use by the Percentage of Cultural Neighbors

58

Figure 2-4. Effect of Democracy over Time on the Use of Human Rights Trials

61

Figure 2-5. Effect of Domestic Advocacy Groups on the Use of Human Rights Trials

63

Figure 2-6. Outlier Plots for Trial Initiation and the Repeated Trial Use

65

Figure 3-1. Cumulative Number of Transitional States using Truth Commissions

70

Figure 3-2. The Number of Countries with Commissions by the Year of Establishment 77 Figure 3-3. Changes in Hazard by Neighbors' Truth Commission Experience and Year 84 Figure 3-4. Changes in Hazard of Truth Commission over Time by Precedents

85

Figure 3-5. Effect of Domestic Advocacy Groups on Truth Commission Establishment 87 Figure 3-6. Effect ofInternational Nongovernmental Actors (Amnesty International)

91

Figure 3-7. Outlier Plot for Truth Commission Establishment

92

Figure 4-1. Map of Korea and Jeju Island

117

Figure 5-1. Distribution of Victims of the Jeju 4.3 Events by Age Groups

128

Figure 5-2. Display saying "Remains of a Monument tom down by the Park's Regime" 152

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1. Introduction

1.1. Research Question

Over the last three decades, more and more states have experienced political transition either from nondemocratic regimes to democracy or from armed conflicts to peace. Between 1974 and 2004, 100 countries have experienced such political transition. One of the novel features of this transition is that states are increasingly expected to address gross and systemic human rights violations committed by the members of the past regimes. The number of states addressing past violations is increasing ever since the well-known case of trials and a truth commission in Argentina in the mid 1980s. By 2004, 52 out of 100 transitional countries used human rights trials and truth commissions.

100

- - Countries with Transition - - - Countries with Transitional Trials ...••.••.• Countries with Truth Commissions

80

....Q) .0

E ::J

Z

60

~

~ :; E

40

::J ()

,. ...

-_

.... ........ ........

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20

o ______.....".-:r.~:::::::::..::::.:::::::::.:::::.~.......... 1974

1977

1980

1983

1986

1989 Year

1992

1995

1998

2001

Figure 1-1. Cumulative Number of States with TransitionalJustice Measures,

2004

1974~2004

1

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Figure 1-1 provides a trend in global expansion of human rights trials and truth commissions. The solid line shows the cumulative number of countries experiencing transition between 1974 and 2004. We can examine a steady increase in the number before 1989 and a sudden rise between 1989 and 1992 reflecting the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European regimes. The lower dotted line shows the steady increase of states using truth commissions and the middle dashed line shows the increase in states using domestic human rights trials. By 2004, 28 countries had established a truth commission, 41 had used trials, and 16 had used both measures. Table 1-1 shows the list of 52 countries that have used either truth commissions or trials.!

Table 1-1. Countries with Truth Commissions and Transitional Trials, 1974-2004 Truth Commission (11 Countries)

Both Measures (17 Countries)

Transitional Trials (24 Countries)

Central African Republic, Chad, Dem Rep of Congo, Timor Leste, Germany, Ghana, Liberia, Nepal, Nigeria, Philippines, Uganda

Argentina, Bolivia, Burundi, Chile, Ecuador, EI Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Indonesia, Rep of Korea, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Uruguay

Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Rep, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Honduras, Hungary, Iraq, Lithuania, Malawi, Mali, Mexico, Namibia, Nicaragua, Niger, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Spain, Thailand, Turkey

1 I am indebted to Hayner's (2002) primary research for the list of truth commissions and also thank Kathryn Sikkink and Carrie B. Walling for providing me with their Human Rights Trials Dataset.

2

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Despite their popularity, however, truth commissions and human rights trials are not an exhaustive list of options. Some countries choose policies like amnesty/pardon, reparation/restitution, or purge/lustration/vetting. Others support societal projects of establishing monuments, museums, and/or research institutions. Still others establish foundations and memorial parks, engage in public education and rewriting of history textbooks, and proclaim a national commemoration day at the same time. These countries are distinguished from those states who decide to do nothing, keep silent, and suppress past memories. All these governmental efforts are transitional justice measures, which are (re)interpretive, retributive, (re)distributive, and/or rectificatory governmental responses to past human rights violations with a view toward future objectives such as reconciliation, peace, coexistence, human rights, and democracy.2

Transitional justic.e got attention in the mid 1980s when students of comparative politics started to explore the "third wave" of democratization in Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe. 3 Trials and truth commissions were a peripheral concern to these scholars who focused on securing nascent democracies by minimizing the possible causes of disruption. Scholars thought that trials and truth commissions would be less likely in newly democratized states and, if adopted, would cause political instability (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 56; Huntington 1991:

228~231).

For example,

Huntington (1991: 215) observed that no effective prosecution and punishment occurred I am deeply indebted to Mary G. Dietz for clarifying the concept of transitional justice measures. Transitional justice measure is the central concept of my dissertation. Trials and truth commissions are often referred to as 'transitional justice,' but this usage is problematic. The concept of transitional justice should not be confounded with policies, judicial activities, or political institutions designed to achieve transitional justice. For discussion of the concept of transitional justice, see Teitel (2000) and Kritz (2004). 3 Huntington (1991: 16~21) distinguishes the third wave democratization from previous waves of democratization. The first wave occurred in 19 th century Europe and North America following the French Revolution and the American Revolution and the second began immediately after the end of the Second World War with decolonization. 2

3

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in most countries. Based on this observation, he concluded, "The popular support and indignation necessary to make justice a political reality fade; the discredited groups associated with the authoritarian regime reestablish their legitimacy and influence. In new democratic regimes, justice comes quickly or it does not come at all (Huntington 1991: 228)." O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 29) confirmed this idea with their example of Spain where, they argued, the bitterness of memories attenuated with the passage of time. Nino (1996: 122), also using the Spain example, concluded, "The more time that passes, the more difficult it will be for retroactive justice to succeed." In sum, scholars agreed that, over time, the demand for truth and justice would diminish and truth commissions and prosecutions would be less likely. In addition, scholars of international relations did not anticipate the demand for human rights standards and accountability against powerful state actors would prevail and even be successful. It was more puzzling since the demand usually came from weak actors against powerful state actors. This gloom prediction came not only from those realist scholars who believed in power politics and different morals for an act of state but also from more progressive and liberal scholars such as Bull (1977: 152) who stated: "The doctrine of human rights and duties under international law is subversive of the whole principle and mankind should be organized as a society of sovereign states. For if the rights of each man can be asserted on the world political state over and against the claims of his state, and his duties proclaimed irrespective of his position as a servant or a citizen of that state, then the position of the state as a body sovereign over its citizens, and entitled to command their obedience, has been subject to challenge, and the structure of the society of sovereign states has been placed in jeopardy."

Contrary to these expectations, the number of countries using human rights trials and truth commissions increased. What explains the global spread of human rights trials 4

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and truth commissions in recent decades? Why and when do countries seek to address past history of human rights violations using transitional justice measures? Why do past human rights violations lead to effective demands for truth and justice against powerful state officials who have traditionally been protectedfrom accountability? This is my research question and I considered two important variations: (1) variation in transitional justice measures and (2) variations in timing. On the one hand, some states use truth commissions, others trials, and still others both measures. In many cases, states decide to do nothing and maintain a policy of silence and suppression. On the other hand, some hold trials and establish a truth commission immediately after transition, others wait several years, and still others never adopt these measures.

1.2. Definition 1.2.1. Transitional Justice Measures By its definition, transitional justice measures should meet four conditions. First, a state must have gone through a transition. Second, actions must have been taken by the responsible bodies of new government. Third, actions must address human rights violations committed by or with connivance of former governing bodies. Fourth, actions contain (re)interpretative, retributive, (re)distributive, or rectificatory response. First, a transition refers to a regime change towards democracy, stability, and autonomy. Genuine transitional justice measures appear after these transitions. There are a few cases where a country uses similar measures during military or authoritarian regimes but many doubt their genuineness. For example, the Commission of Inquiry into the Disappearances of People in Uganda Since 25 January, 1971 was established in 1974 5

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under President Idi Amin before transition but the commissioners were threatened and one had to flea into exile for fear of his life and a report was never published (Hayner 2002: 51-52). In addition, in many authoritarian regimes, what might appear on the

surface to be a human rights trial might instead be a show trial or a trial through which the leader punishes political opponents. Transitions usually mean democratic transition. It refers to a situation when a state changes from a repressive and closed regime such as military, authoritarian, oneparty dictatorships, or communist regimes into a more open and decentralized government. Usually, the evident indicator of democratic transition is a free, fair, secret, and direct national election for major government offices including head of the state. 4 A democratic election does not necessarily guarantee substantial democracy but allows room for development by setting up basic democratic procedures. Other forms of transition occur when countries recover from instability and turmoil of civil wars like Rwanda, which some would refer to as state failure. Transition is made either by a surrender of one party or by a signed peace accord. Finally, states experience transition when a state is created by independence (East Timor), collapse of former unions (Russia), or reunion (Germany). In sum, democratic transition, transition from state failure, and transition by state creation or transformation constitute transition. Second, actions must be taken by the legitimate and responsible bodies of the government established after transition such as president, prime minister, congress, courts, or prosecutor's office. Transitional justice measures are official state actions to a crime

4 Huntington

(1991: 7), following Schumpeter, defined political system as "democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, hones, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote,"

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committed by a state. Thus, measures adopted by nonstate actors (e.g. the 1985 Brazilian truth commission established by the archbishop of Sao Paolo and World Council of Churches) or international actors in exclusion of the relevant government (1993 Rwandan truth commission established by four international nongovernmental organizations (NOOs)) do not constitute transitional justice measures for the purposes of this study. Third, actions must address past human rights violations, which are mostly committed by the members of the government but also by the members of paramilitary groups backed up by the government officials. The U.N. definition of human rights violations is a good starting point - "a governmental transgression of the rights guaranteed by national, regional, and international human rights law and acts and omissions directly attributable to the state involving the failure to implement legal obligations derived from human rights standards." However, this is too broad for . defining violations dealt with by transitional justice measures since such measures mainly address violations of a right to physical or bodily integrity, such as the right to life and the right to be free from torture. These are referred to as non-derogable rights which cannot be suspended even in exceptional circumstances or emergencies. In this study, I used Cingranelli and Richards' (1999: 407) concept of physical integrity rights as "the entitlements individuals have in international law to be free from arbitrary physical harm and coercion by the government which include extrajudicial killing, torture, disappearance, and political imprisonment."s Finally, actions must contain (re)interpretative, retributive, (re)distributive, or 5 See the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 4 (2) for non-derogable rights. In addition, disappearance is not in the ICCPR, and the prohibition on arbitrary imprisonment (Article 9) is not one of the non-derogable rights. Thus, not all physical integrity rights, as defined by Cingranelli and Richards are non-derogable.

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rectificatory responses. Transitional justice measures take diverse forms of policy measures including political, economic, social, cultural, or judicial activities. They also have a variety of futuristic objectives including peace, coexistence, reconciliation, national unity, prevention of future atrocity, reparation, restoration of the dignity of the victims, and personal satisfaction and healing. These goals are stated in official documents such as preambles of the law, judicial rulings, or mission statements of truth commissions. At its core, transitional justice measures contain at least one of the four abovementioned elements. Reinterpretation includes a reestablishment of suppressed and distorted facts and rewriting new official narratives in official documents and history textbooks. Redistribution usually refers to economic activities and includes reparation or compensation for the loss of the past. Rectification is the restoration of the prior political and social status of the victims and their family members by restitution or rehabilitation. Retribution is manifested in the judicial activities such as criminal or civil prosecutions and punishments which exact certain costs to perpetrators.

1.2.2. Transitional Human Rights Trials and Truth Commissions Transitional human rights trials are the preeminent retributive measures and take the form of a prosecution of individual perpetrators on the charge of past human rights violations. Criminal prosecutions in a domestic court have been most widely used since 1980 but states increasingly adopt other forms. These include prosecution in (1) foreign or regional courts like Pinochet case, (2) ad hoc international criminal tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and (3) the International Criminal Court (ICC). 8

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Recently, states like East Timor and Sierra Leone used innovative criminal prosecutions in the hybrid - some combination of domestic, foreign, and international - courts. Specialized studies are emerging on these new forms of trials and I limit my focus on the most prevalent form - domestic transitional human rights trials. 6 Domestic transitional human rights trials (which I will refer 'transitional trials', 'human rights trials', or 'trials') mostly take the form of a criminal prosecution ofthe members of the former regime - mostly military and police - in domestic courts on the charge of human rights violations. Good examples are trials of junta leaders in Argentina in 1985 and the 1996 trials of two former Korean presidents on the charges of their involvement in the 1980 Kwangju massacre. These trials seek for individual criminal accountability and criminal charges are filed against an individual to seek criminal responsibilities for human rights violations during his term in public office. Some of trials involve former heads of state and high level officials, but there are also trials of lower level officials including police officers and prison guards. Trials impose substantial costs on individuals, including the financial costs of litigation, the lost income during preventive detention, and importantly for elites, a loss of prestige and legitimacy. Not only a formal trial itselfbut also the judicial activities leading up to or following a trial such as indictment, arrest, detention, or an extradition request are important processes of human rights trials (Sikkink and Walling 2007). A truth commission is an official government body temporarily set up to investigate a past history of human rights violations and to submit an official report (Hayner 2002). Famous examples are the National Commission on the Disappearance of

6

For more details on other types, see Roht-Arriaza (2005), Kritz (2004; 2002), and Bass (2000).

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Persons (CONADEP) in Argentina (1983) and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa (1995). However, there are lesser known truth commissions such as the National Committee for Investigation of the Truth about the Jeju April 3rd Events in Korea (2000) and the Bolivian National Commission ofInquiry into Disappearances (1982). Truth commissions issue an official report showing the (re)interpretative aspect of transitional justice measures. Truth commissions, however, do not confine their goals to reinterpretation and proclaim other goals, which include: (1) to discover, clarify, and formally acknowledge past abuses; (2) to restore the dignity and facilitate the victim's right to know; (3) to contribute to justice and accountability; (4) to outline governmental responsibility and recommend reforms; (5) to promote reconciliation and reduce conflict; and (6) to establish the legitimacy of the new regime (Minow 1998: 88; Hayner 2002: 98). Truth commissions usually have a mandate of six months to two years and the mandate is set in advance with the possibility of an extension. The commissions are headed by one or several commissioners and are composed of staff members. Truth commissions can be established by a president, congress, or peace accords. Some truth commissions are empowered with certain rights and privilege such as subpoena, search and seizure, or witness protection and all are endowed with resources and independent legal status. 7 Other transitional justice measures exist besides trials and truth commissions. Amnesties and pardons can be adopted by presidential decree, parliamentary legislation, or peace accords (Kritz 1995; Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003). Lustration, purge, and vetting have been adopted by several post-Communist governments in Europe. This measure takes the form of adopting laws which bar former government officials and party 7 For details on the variations across truth commissions, see my recent work, which introduces the most comprehensive truth commission database (Kim, Brahm, and Dancy 2008).

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members from public employment (Ellis 1996; Schwartz 1994; Lynch 2008). Reparation is to "render justice by removing or redressing the consequences of the wrongful acts and by preventing and deterring violation (van Boven 1993)" and restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition are included (Minow 1998; Elster 2006; De Greiff 2006).

1.3. Theories of Transitional Justice Measures 1.3.1. Earlier Studies As mentioned, international relations theory could not provide a tool to understand the increasing use of transitional justice measures. No one anticipated the dramatic increase in the demand for truth and justice against state actors. Mainstream international relations theories were not capable of predicting and explaining this global change and challenge to state sovereignty. A few scholars of the third wave of democratization in comparative politics provided an explanation but only in exceptional circumstances. Because Huntington believed that transitional justice measures would be less likely over time, his explanation of their adoption was limited to a short period of time after transition. Thus, for him, the most important causal factor was the balance of power between the old and new elites, which was determined by the characteristics of transition. His logic is revealed in his evaluation of various normative and legal arguments for and against the use of transitional justice measures: Such, in summary, were the arguments for and against prosecution of authoritarian crimes in third wave countries. In actual practice what happened was little affected by moral and legal consideration. It was shaped almost exclusively by politics, by the nature of the democratization process, and by distribution of political power during and after the transition (Huntington 1991: 215). 11

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Later researchers based their arguments on Huntington's observation. Although Huntington provided an insightful and parsimonious theory within the bounds of shortterm adoption, his theory needs serious alteration to explain delayed but ever-increasing adoption of transitional justice measures. There have been three additional studies explaining the adoption of transitional justice measures. Pion-Berlin (1994) asked why human rights trials against the former military leaders were held in Argentina but not in Uruguay and Chile. He started with six hypotheses - state terror, balance of power between old and new elites, leadership preference, strategic calculation of the leader, mass pressure, and contagion effect of neighbor's trials - and concluded that the decision was made by individual leaders based on their commitments, perceptions, and calculations within the political boundary created .by the legacy of authoritarianism, the terms of transition to democratic rule, and the resultant balance of power between soldiers and civilians (Pion-Berlin 1994: 129). He further argued that the human rights lobbies had a "negligible impact" on government policy in the Southern Cone and the contagion effect of Argentine trial experience was weak (Pion-Berlin 1994: 126). Huyse (1995) explored three contextual circumstances which would account for policy differences in European countries. Based on his comparative observation of Belgium, France, and Holland on the one hand and Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, on the other, he generated three hypotheses: (1) the legacy of the past (characteristic of outgoing regime, level of societal collaboration, duration of the regime, and past history of transitional justice); (2) international context at the time of transition; and (3) mode of transition and the resulting balance of power between old and new elites. Although both

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Pion-Berlin and Huyse provided useful and testable hypotheses, their analyses were limited in their country cases and periodization by focusing on a certain region of the world in a time period prior to early 1990s. Skaar (1999) tried to overcome these limitations by studying why some countries used truth commissions or trials in 30 newly-elected democratic governments in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Primarily based on Huntington and Pion-Berlin, she made an argument that the government's choice of policy depends on the relative strength of credible demand for truth and justice from the public and the demand for amnesty and impunity from the outgoing regime (Skaar 1999: 1124). She further argued that because the newly elected democratic government is primarily concerned with political survival, it is prudent in its policy choices and will do less rather than more to resolve the problem of human rights violations. However, even in her studies, only 15 countries with either trials or truth commissions were examined, which constitutes only 30 percent of total trials and truth commissions in the world. Three conclusions can be drawn from these early studies. First, the adoption of transitional justice measures is mainly a function of domestic politics and it is especially a function of the balance of power between the outgoing and new regime. Other scholars in 1990s whose concern was not exclusively on the adoption question also followed the power balance explanation (Correa Sutil1997; Herz 1982; Nino 1996: 118; Zalaquett 1992). Second, the new governments are reluctant to hold the past regimes accountable for human rights violations because of their concern for survival or stability and when states do, they usually hold a trial or establish a truth commission shortly after transition. Third, demand for truth and justice is at its peak immediately after transition but would 13

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diminish over time, if the demand is unanswered by the new regime. The last conclusion shows that scholars depreciated the persistence and irreplaceableness of the truth and its potential for political action, observed by political philosophers (Arendt 1993).

1.3.2. Recent Studies However, since the mid 1990s, scholars noticed more and more states willingly adopt trials and truth commissions and witnessed the demand for truth and justice become increasingly effective over time (Orentlicher 1995; Bassiouni 2002; Roht-Arriaza 1995; Mendez 1997; Kritz 1995). Interesting and important contributions are made from diverse disciplines including law, political science, sociology, psychology, philosophy, and history.8 Although scholars are mainly concerned with the impact of transitional justice measures, rich details, processes, and history of transitional justice measures are also explored in their work. 9 This new trend in transitional justice measures has even been conceptualized as "the justice cascade (Lutz and Sikkink 2001)" or "a revolution in accountability (Sriram 2003)." Justice and accountability processes do not confine to

8 The Transitional Justice Database Project at the University of Wisconsin compiled about 2,000 monographs, journal articles, and conference papers on the theme of transitional justice. This includes topics such as theoretical consideration, trials, truth commission, amnesty and pardons, lustration, vetting, and banning, reparation, memorials and monuments, local or indigenous forms of justice, religion an,d transitional justice, gender in transitional justice, transitional justice and the construction of history, concept of reconciliation, universal jurisdiction, Pinochet case, international criminal court, and physical and psychological trauma and the healing process. The subcategories represent the breadth of scholarly works. Around 73 percent of the works were done since 1995 and only 27 percent are works published between 1945 and 1994, which proves that scholarly interests exploded in 1990s. This can also be supported by the publication of new academic journal, International Journal of Transitional Justice by the Oxford

University Press in 2004.

The Transitional Justice Database Project categorized the debate on the impact of transitional justice measures using three categories: "maximalist approach", "minimalist approach", and "moderate or pragmatic approach" (Payne et al. 2007). Scholars with a maximalist approach advocate the use of transitional justice measures for their moral superiority and practical usefulness. In contrast, scholars with a minimalist approach stress the possible danger of such measures and oftentimes promote amnesties and pardon as a means of reassuring former regime forces. Others who are both cautious of both approaches and take a pragmatic stance are categorized under moderate or pragmatic approaches. 9

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criminal prosecutions. Roht-Arriaza (2002: 97), for example, included a wide range of measures such as truth-telling, judicial reform, prosecution, exhumations and reburials, memorialization, reparations, lustration of police and security forces, and other guarantees of non-repetition to these conceptual categories. Scholars and practitioners generally agree that three factors in the early and mid 1990s played a central role in this change. The first factor is the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the subsequent establishment of two ad hoc international criminal tribunals. The second factor is the establishment of an exemplary South African TRC followed by the conferment of the Nobel peace prize to Nelson Mandela and Frederik Willem de Klerk. The third element is the development of international human rights and the growth in the number, effectiveness, and power of both domestic and international human rights NGOs. In these recent studies, explanations are rarely made focusing on the balance of power between the old and new regimes. More attention is given to the role of domestic or international advocacy groups demanding truth and justice (Bleeker and Sisson 2004; Backer 2003; Sieff and Wright 1999), development of international human rights and accountability norms (Lutz and Sikkink 2001), and the characteristics of the government such as democracy and its consolidation, commitment to domestic or international human rights, or political economy. Scholars are moving away from the balance of power between the old and new regime explanation because it loses its explanatory power when it comes to the belated trial or truth commission cases where the power balance variable becomes less significant and somewhat constant, not varying, factor. In other words, although it may be an important factor shortly after transition, the power balance becomes less and less 15

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meaningful over time. Thus, scholars started to search for other causal factors beyond the power balance variable. Scholars, at the same time, witnessed that the demand for truth and justice has not diminished over time as predicted by previous researches. In contrast, countries face stronger demands from both domestic and international advocates for truth-telling and accountability. States are not only under pressure from their own people but also from demands from international community.

1.4. A Theoretical Framework We need a new theoretical framework in order to incorporate both the immediate and belated adoption and to bridge the findings of earlier and recent studies. Since the adoption of transitional justice measures is mainly domestic political processes with an influence of international factors, both theories of comparative politics and international relations are relevant. The basic skeleton of the framework is based on social movement theory and transnational advocacy networks approach. Both theories provide useful conceptual frameworks to capture the processes of transitional justice measure adoption since the demand for truth and justice usually takes the form of advocacy or movement. A synthesis between social movement theory and transnational advocacy networks approach is feasible for three reasons. First, both share the ontological ground of Gidden's meta-theory of structuration and epistemology of intersubjectivivity. Second, both focus on the complex interactions between the agency and structure around meaning, identity, and interests, which is referred to as framing process. Third, although social movement theorists have traditionally focused on the domestic settings, some have started to integrate international dimensions into their analysis (Smith, Chatfield, and

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Pagnucco 1997; Sikkink, Khagram, and Riker 2002). Three broad sets of factors have been emphasized in social movement theory: (1) the forms of organization (mobilizing structure); (2) the structure of political opportunity and constraints confronting the movement (opportunities structure); and (3) collective processes of interpretation, attribution, and social construction that mediate between opportunity and action (framing processes) (McAdams, McCarthy, and Zald 1996: 2). Two substantial corrections should be made by the help of international relations theory due to the social movement theorists' orientation to the domestic processes and social movement form of advocacy. First, the opportunity structure, which has been confined to the domestic processes should extend to include the international environment as noted by Sikkink, Khagram, and Riker (2002:17~20). Second, the possibility that the international factors affect the movement structure and its interactions with opportunity structure should be considered (Sikkink 2005). For this purpose, "transnational advocacy networks" in international relations theory provide a better conceptual tool to capture the nature of advocacy compared to "(transnational) movement organizations" used in social movement theory. In sum, four concepts are important: advocacy networks, domestic opportunity structure, international opportunity structure, and framing processes. By using a new framework, I tum away from the decision making models of political elites, which earlier scholars used. This tradition was revived in the recent study of Dancy and Poe (2006) who used Sprout's (1969) decision-making model to explain the adoption of truth commissions. Snyder and Vinjamuri (2003) also started from an assumption that transitional justice measures are policy choices. This approach looks at the decision-making process of a few elites and treats the demand for truth and justice as 17

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one of many elements affecting their decision-making process. However, by focusing on the decision-makers, this perspective misses the dynamic and history of transitional justice advocacy per se and cannot properly explain how the demand for truth and justice becomes effective. Moreover, since the elite characteristics are idiosyncratic, studies are often reduced to the study of political environment the leaders face in decision making. In addition, a decision-making model sets the a priori goal of decision-makers as stability, power (survival), or peace, and approaches transitional justice measures focusing on their instrumental value for achieving or obstructing these objectives. Thus, there is a danger that the intrinsic value of transitional justice measures and the voices of advocacy groups and victims may easily be disregarded. Therefore, my new framework not only bridges the earlier and recent approaches but also provides an empirically and ethically better understanding of transitional justice measures.

1.4.1. Advocacy Networks Advocacy networks are forms of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication exchange and fluid and open relationship among committed and knowledgeable actors working in specialized issues and promote causes, principled idea, and norms (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 8). Their goals are to change the policy or behavior of states and the motives of action are their value and beliefs such as empathy, altruism, or ideational commitment, which are far from rational or material interests or the pursuit of power (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Advocacy networks includes: (1) international and domestic nongovernmental research and advocacy organizations; (2) local social movements; (3) foundations; (4) the media; (5) 18

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churches, trade unions, consumer organizations, and intellectuals; (6) parts of regional and international intergovernmental organizations; and (7) parts of the executive andlor parliamentary branches of government (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 9). Scholars of transitional justice reached a consensus that there is a demand for truth and justice for past human rights violations after transition. Huntington (1991: 211212) and Nino (1996) correctly observed that human rights violations in transitional countries are usually widespread, gruesome, and cruel and affect a great amount of people. Thus, the demand for truth and justice from the affected population is always present and this is what all scholars agree with. However, the demand of victims has not always been a politically effective advocacy for institutionalized truth-telling and judicial accountability. Therefore, advocacy or movement alone is not a sufficient cause for the adoption of transitional justice measures. It should be explained by exploring a wide array of social and political actors and their actions and relationships in the domestic and international environment. Thus, activities and motives of victims, domestic and international human rights NGOs, social movement groups, media, intellectuals, intergovernmental organizations, and the branches of government will be examined.

1.4.2. Domestic Opportunity Structure The opportunity structures are "those consistent dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for or constraints on people undertaking collective action (Tarrow 1998)." This environment constitutes a powerful set of constraints and opportunities affecting the movement, which is often understood in a continuum of openness and closure of the structure. The open structure facilitates the formation and 19

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development of the social movement while the close structure limits the movement. However, as scholars have observed, the opportunity structure is not a fixed entity but is constantly changed and created by the advocacy itself (Sikkink, Khagram, and Riker 2002: 17). The opportunity structure is relevant for my research because scholars explained the adoption of transitional justice measures using concepts as "constraints" or "opportunities" (Zalaquett 1992; Huyse 1995; Elster 2004). In previous studies, scholars have suggested six domestic factors affecting the opportunity structure of transitional justice advocacy: (1) democracy and its consolidation, (2) government's respect for human rights, (3) characteristic of transition and the subsequent balance of power between old and new elites, (4) societal support for the previous regime, (5) history of transitional justice and (6) economic condition of the new government. Democracy Two arguments are made about the impact of democracy. On the one hand, democratic regimes after transition are more likely to hold trials or establish a truth commission because democracies are more open to and effectively channel the people's demands for truth and justice (Herz 1982). Skaar (1999) also argue that the government may become willing to implement stronger transitional justice measures with democratic consolidation. In social movement theory, the positive relationship between the openness of democracy and the effectiveness of social movement has long been discussed. On the other hand, Moravcsik (2000) argues that newly established democracies tend to lock themselves into binding human rights treaties in order to protect their fledging democracy from domestic challengers. If this argument is generalized, as he suggested, it is probable that new democracies are more open to advocacy because new leaders use trials and truth 20

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commissions to overcome their instability and gain legitimacy and support. This argument is plausible because scholars believe that these measures partly achieve those goals in new regimes (Hayner 2002: 24; Minow 1998: 88). The first argument is based on the innate characteristic of democratic regimes while the second one is base on the strategic calculation of the leaders in new democracy. But, both hypotheses suggest that we should be examining the higher probabilities of success of transitional justice advocacy in more democratic countries. Respect for Human Rights Since the main purpose of trials and truth commissions is to address past human rights violations, many argue that a state's respect for human rights standards in general provides an opportunity for transitional justice advocacy. It is also consistent with the argument of Keck and Sikkink (1998: 26) where issue resonance with existing national agendas is a key determinant of the effectiveness of advocacy. Three dimensions are relevant: (1) the actual practice of human rights protection (state terror or repression), (2) a state's commitment to human rights, and (3) leader's belief in human rights. First, the continuing high level of governmental repression after transition will decrease or postpone the use of transitional justice measures (Pion-Berlin 1994; Huyse 1995). Ifpeople are still oppressed under a new regime, it is less likely for people to effectively and actively demand transitional justice. The high level of repression shrinks the opportunity structure for the formation and development of transitional justice advocacy. Not all states that have gone through transition experience a substantial improvement in human rights protection. Some intentionally maintain the past level of repression and others do not have a capacity or resource to protect human rights. Second,

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states with stronger commitments to human rights are more likely to use trials and truth commissions. While this may sound like a tautology, there is a difference between a state's legal commitment to human rights and its decision to use transitional justice measures, and there is always a time gap between a state's commitment and practice (Hathaway 2002). Finally, the human rights commitment and orientation of the leader are important in the development of transitional justice advocacy (Nino 1996: 125; PionBerlin 1994). Characteristic of Transition and the Power Balance Scholars argue that the characteristics of transition and the subsequent balance of power between the outgoing regime and new regime or civil society would affect the process of transitional justice advocacy. Huntington (1991) argued that the characteristics of the transition - transformation, transplacement, and replacement affect the cohesion among security forces and the power structure of transitional countries. Thus, military defeat or other dramatic breaks within the old order, which leads to replacement of the old regime, might work positively for holding those responsible accountable. However, in either transformation where old elites decide to adopt democracy or transplacement where old and new elites negotiate transition, accountability is less likely. Different scholars used different typologies but reached a similar conc1usion. lO Similarly, many recently found that transitional justice practice varies across different types oftransition (Correa Sutil1997; Nino 1996: 118; Zalaquett 1992). States getting out of civil wars are increasingly accompanied by an agreement to use a truth 10 Scholars categorize the characteristics of transition somewhat differently. Skaar (1999: 1115-6) used pact, ' collapse, and peace agreement; and Elster (2006: 8-9) used negotiation, defeat, collapse, or abdication.

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commission in their peace accord and countries experiencing transition in the form of state creation or reunification usually adopt purge, lustration, and vetting policies.

Societal Support for Previous Regime Scholars not only consider political factors but also give attention to the socioeconomic dimension of the opportunity structure. The demand for truth and justice is more likely to be obstructed if the previous dictatorship or authoritarian regime has endured relatively long and many have conformed to or privileged under its leadership (Barahona de Brito, Gonzalez-Enriquez, and Aguilar 2001; Huyse 1995). Under this circumstance, consistent and high-level public support for, and identification with the previous regime would prevail and would hinder the transitional justice process (Nino 1996: 124). In these societies, there may also be a widespread complicity within the civil society behind past human rights violations (Holmes 1994). If there has been a wide array of people who have either been privileged by the authoritarian rule or even benefited by the atrocity, transitional justice advocacy would face more domestic constraints. Moreover, there is more active and organized obstruction of transitional justice advocacy by the so-called "spoilers" (Acuna and Smulovitz 1997; Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003) in these societies.

History o/Transitional Justice The transitional justice process is influenced by a state's history of dealing with the previous regimes (Huyse 1995). Transitional justice measures are less likely in a state with a history of failed transitions or unsuccessful transitional justice processes in the past. We would expect to see much delayed adoption of such measures inthose countries. A past experience of regime reversions or coups after transition would close the

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opportunity structure for the current movement by limiting the activities of and popular support for advocacy groups. In contrast, any successful transitional justice processes in that country's history may facilitate and open another possibility for trial or truth commission after transition. A success story of the past would encourage activists and victims to actively pl;1rsue such measures and enable them to take lessons and strategies from the previous efforts.

Economic Conditions Scholars started to examine an overlooked dimension of transitional justice measures - the economy. Elster (2004), for example, argues that transitional justice measures would be less likely if pressing economic concerns prevail and new regimes face hard economic constraints. Olsen, Payne, and Reiter (2007) support his argument by a cross-national statistical analysis. Both argue that economic resources are scarce and often needed elsewhere to address more pressing concerns after transition. The logic can be found in Elster's (2004: 213) argument: "Funds, personnel, and political attention may be channeled into such forward-looking tasks as constitution making, economic reconstruction, or economic transformation, rather than in to the backward-looking tasks of trials and purges."

1.4.3. International Opportunity Structure The international opportunity structure is not an additional element of the domestic structure. It is an independent element and it interacts not only with advocacy networks but also with domestic opportunity structure, as observed by Sikkink, Khagram, and Riker (2002). Advocacy networks emerge and deVelop in interaction with both 24

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domestic and international environment. As with the domestic structure, international structure is constantly created and changed by advocacy networks. In tum, international structures intentionally shape and change both advocacy networks and the domestic structure (Sikkink 2005). Often, domestic and international structure transforms each other as in the case of boomerang effect (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Three elements in international environment have been stressed by transitional justice scholars: (1) the development and effect of international norms, (2) diffusion of neighbor's experience, and (3) international organizations. International Norms Constructivists in international relations have studied international norms, which are standards of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity (Katzenstein 1996). Scholars suggest that there is a growing norm of accountability and institutionalized truth-telling for past wrongdoings (Roht-Arriaza 2002: 97; Lutz and Sikkink 2001; Sikkink and Walling 2007; Sriram 2003). This norm is closely related to the development of international human rights norms since accountability and truth-telling are directed toward the past human rights violations committed by state actors. In a sense, the development of transitional justice norm is a good example of "grafting" of new norms into existing norms (Price 1998). However, one must notice that transitional justice norms have developed in confrontation with norm of sovereignty, which has traditionally protected an act of state. Thus, transitional justice norms are a compromise between two conflicting but equally powerful norms in international relations: an emerging norm of human rights and a traditional norm of state sovereignty. The existence and influence of international norms change both advocacy 25

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networks and domestic structure. On the one hand, emerging norms help advocacy networks set agendas with clear and specific language, which is a precondition for effective advocacy (Keck and Sikkink 1998). International norms empower advocacy networks by providing legitimacy and helping to form alliances in the domestic or international settings (Kaufmann and Pape 1999). On the other hand, international norms exert their influence on domestic politics in two ways. First, in the earlier stage of the norm cycle, international norms usually pressure the government either in the form of or in collaboration with domestic advocacy. However, in the cascade stage, international norms have an independent impact by a "combination of pressure for conformity, desire to enhance international legitimation, and the desire of sate leaders to enhance their selfesteem (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 895)." In addition, international norms oftentimes directly shape national interests and identities of the state (Finnemore 1996). Diffusion The transitional justice advocacy in one country is affected by the trial and truth commission experience of neighbors (Pion-Berlin 1994: 123). There is an overlap between the effect of international norms and diffusion because diffusion is one of mechanisms through which international norms affect state behavior. The practice of neighbors has a positive influence either on advocacy networks or on the domestic political structure. First, neighbor's experience could empower advocacy groups not only by providing the precedents and strategies but also by giving activists and victims some hope. Second, with the same logic of the norm cascade, the adoption of transitional justice measures would exert peer pressure on other governments, and thereby, open the opportunity structure for the movement. This positive effect is amplified when two 26

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countries have a similar history, political system, international context, or cultural background.

Table 1-2. The Number of Countries with Trials and Truth Commissions by Continent Africa

Oceania

Asia

Europe

Latin America

Number of Transitional States

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2

25

24

17

Transitional Trials (Adoption Rate)

11 (34%)

0 (0%)

5 (20%)

11 (46%)

14 (82%)

Truth Commissions (Adoption Rate)

10 (31%)

0 (0%)

5 (20%)

2 (8%)

11 (65%)

There are two pathways through which transitional justice measures diffuse:

geographic proximity and cultural similarity. First, there are strong agreement in policy diffusion and treaty ratification studies that geographic proximity is the most important determinant of diffusion (Simmons 2000; Berry and Berry 1990; Mooney 2001; Gray 1973; Walker 1969). This hypothesis is applicable to transitional justice measures since the pattern of adoption shows a regional clustering as seen in Table 1-2. It shows that 82 percent of transitional countries in Latin America held trials while only 20 percent had trials in Asia. Similarly, truth commissions are concentrated in Latin America and Africa while they are a rare event in Asia and Europe. Second, states are not only influenced by near neighbors but also by culturally similar neighbors. Scholars also suggested a novel role of the Catholic Churches in the third world democratization (Huntington 1991). Since many of the countries adopting transitional justice measures are those involved in the third wave of democratization,

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religion may also playa role in helping to explain the adoption of such measures. A clustering pattern of trials and truth commissions in Table 1-2 may suggest a clustering by religion. A strong pattern in Latin America could be interpreted both as a regional clustering and a clustering around the Catholic religion. International Organizations International organizations are integral part of international opportunity structure and are increasing in their number and effectiveness. Scholars noticed the role of growing support from and involvement of international governmental and nongovernmental organizations in transitional justice processes. This observation is consistent with international relations theories and two actors are relevant in case of transitional justice measures - the U.N. and international human rights NGOs. First, the lead role of the U.N. in promoting transitional justice has long been observed (BuergenthaI1994; Guest 1995; Bongiorno 2001-2002; Bassiouni 2002). Second, scholars focus on the activities of international NGOs (Cassel 1993: 323; Minow 1998: 54~5;

Hayner 2002: 218; Buergenthal1994: 504). Many old and new international

NGOs such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, or International Center for Transitional Justice (lCTJ) are promoting trials and truth commissions. For example, the ICTJ has worked in more than 30 countries since 2001 "providing assistance to justice and truth-seeking institutions, civil society organizations, governments, and international organizati ons."

1.4.4. Interactions between Advocacy and Structures Finally, we have to consider the interactions between advocacy and opportunity

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structures, which usually are conceptualized as framing processes, which is defined as a collective process of interpretation, attribution, and social construction of shared meanings and definitions (McAdams, McCarthy, and Zald 1996: 5). Here, the role of ideas, meaning, and culture become important and within this context occur "the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action (McAdams, McCarthy, and Zald 1996: 6)." These collective activities of interpretation, attribution, and social construction are manifested in the strategies the advocacy networks use in order to pursue their goals. Strategies contain people's understanding of the opportunity structures, expected outcome of their actions, and the rational and causes of the action. , Keck and Sikkink (1998: 16) provide a useful categorization of interactions used by advocacy networks: information politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics, and accountability politics. Information politics is the ability to quickly and credibly generate politically useful information and move it to where it will have the most impact; symbolic politics is the ability to call upon symbols, actions, or stories that make sense of a situation for an audience; leverage politics is the ability to call upon powerful actors to affect a situation where weaker members of a network are unlikely to have influence; and accountability politics is the effort to hold powerful actors to their previously stated policies or principles.

1.5. Methods In order to answer my research question, I employed both quantitative and qualitative research designs in my dissertation. This multi-methods approach was applied

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to reach persuasive conclusions by using both methods in triangulation and overcoming each method's limitations. In the global analysis, I examined 100 transitional countries over a 30 year period between 1974 and 2004 to understand the overall global trend in the causes of trial and truth commission adoption. This is the first systematic and comparative analysis of the causes of transitional justice measure adoption at a global level. In the case study, I studied the unexplored transitional justice processes in South Korea focusing on the causes and processes of establishment of the National Committee for Investigation of the Truth about the J eju April 3rd Events (4.3 Committee). 11 Between 1948 and 1954, a communist-led uprising in Jeju Island, Korea and the subsequent counterinsurgency campaign by the anticommunist government resulted in an estimated 15,000 to 30,000 deaths. After fifty long years, the government finally established its first truth commission in 2000 to investigate the massacre and restore the dignity of civilian victims and their family members. 12

11 An official translation of the 4.3 Committee is "the National Committee for Investigation of the Truth about the Jeju April 3rd Incident." (See http://www.jeju43.go.kr/for Korean homepage of the 4.3 Committee and http://www.jeju43.go.kr/englishl for English homepage.) The use of 'incident (sagun)' is a mistranslation since it reduces the scope and duration not only of the guerrilla warfare and the counterinsurgency campaign over seven years but also of the grave and systemic human rights violations. In Korean, sagun literally means an event which causes social problem and attracts social attention and does not have an English connotation of a minor, trivial, or subordinate event. It is most appropriate to understand sagun as 'an event' in this context and I decided to use "events" throughout my dissertation. In addition, an official translation itself is not entirely accurate since a full translation of the Korean title would be the National Committee ofInvestigation of the Truth and Recovering the Honor o/Victims. Throughout my dissertation, I used the "Jeju 4.3 events", "Jeju April3 rd events", and "4.3 events" interchangeably. In Korea, major historic events are oftentimes remembered by their date of occurrence. For example, the Korean War which broke out on June 25, 1950 is mainly mentioned as the "6.25 War" or simply"6.25." Similar practices can be found in the 3.1 Movement, 4.19 Revolution, 5.16 Military Coup, 12.12 Military Coup, and 5.18 Kwangju Democracy Movement. Within this tradition, the armed conflict in 1948 Jeju is referred to as the Jeju 4.3 events. When the date is use to refer to the historic event, usually the numbers are read as it is. Thus, in Korean, the Jeju 4.3 events is read as "Jeju Sa Sam (Four Three) events", not as "Jeju Sa-Wol Sam-II (April3 rd) events." 12 The 4.3 Committee was established in the same year as the Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths in 2000. However, the 4.3 Committee marked the first efforts both in the enactment of the special act and in the establishment of the commission. The Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Death was established on October 17, 2000 and worked until 2002 during the Kim Dae Jung administration. It

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1.5.1. Global Analysis Most previous studies on trials and truth commission focus on an individual case (BuergenthaI1994; Weissbrodt and Fraser 1992; Tomuschat 2001). Others compare two country cases with the same measures (Quinn and Freeman 2003; Ensalaco 1994). Still others examine several country cases in comparison (Skaar 1999; Barkan 2000; Chapman and Ball 2001). However, I first moved away from either single country case studies or even well-chosen multiple cases studies and instead moved toward a cross-national study. I included all states which have experienced a transition between 1974 and 2004, including both states that have used transitional justice measures and those that have not. Neither all the countries in the world nor only 52 countries with trials or truth commissions would be an appropriate sample. The former would lead one to include many irrelevant cases without transitions and the latter would exclude many important cases which did not use transitional Justice measures although they had a high probability of doing so. I used the Cox proportional hazards models and existing datasets and datasets I created with my advisor provided sufficient data for the research. 13 I tested hypotheses drawn from my theoretical construct and identified valid explanations which were supported by statistical evidence. The global analysis contributes to my dissertation in three major ways. First, the results helped me to was legally based on the Special Act for the Investigation of Suspicious Deaths enacted on January 15, 2000. It was designed to investigate the cause of deaths suspected to be carried out by government officials

regarding the pro-democracy movement in Korea after August 7,1969 when the President Park Chung Hee dictatorship was officially started by amending the Constitution to allow the current President to run for three consecutive terms. During its two-year term, the commission investigated 82 cases of suspicious deaths. It started its second term in July 2003 and finished its work in 2005. 13 I used the Polity IV Data, U.N. Common Database, Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Database, PRIOlUppsala Armed Conflict Dataset, World Bank database, Transitional Human Rights Trial Dataset, and Truth Commission in the World Dataset.

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conduct more focused analysis in my cases study. Second, factors which were statistically not significant were used to refute existing claims about the causes of trial and truth commission adoption. Through the global analysis, I was able to evaluate hypothesis based on their statistically significant correlation, which is a necessary condition for causality, between the transitional justice measures and asserted causes. Finally, statistical analysis combined with regression diagnostics helped me identify outliers that deviated from the prediction of the models. It also helped me to situate my Korea case within a broader global context.

1.5.2. Case Study I also examined the 4.3 Committee in Korea, which was inaugurated on April 28, 2000 legally based on the Article 3 of the Special Act for the Investigation of the Jeju rd

April3 Events and Recovering the Honor of Victims (4.3 Special Act). The 4.3 Committee was designed primarily to collect and analyze domestic and foreign evidence to investigate the Jeju 4.3 events and publish a report and establish archives and second, to identify and honor the victims and their family members. The final report was officially approved on October 15, 2003 and 14,373 victims were registered by March 31, 2004. The 4.3 Special Act and the 4.3 Committee were designed under President Kim Dae Jung but its work has continued under President Rho Moo Hyun. Two symbolic events occurred during President Roh's incumbency when he made an official apology in 2003 and participated in a memorial service for the victims in 2006. In order to achieve more complete analysis of the truth commission establishment, I have done a case study based on my field research in Korea. I conducted 32

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3 months of preliminary field research and 11 months of field research where I collected complete archives and interviewed around fifty activists, scholars, government officials, and victims and their family members. Although studies on the Jeju 4.3 events have been steadily increasing in Korea since the democratic transition in 1987, most studies focus on the processes, characteristics, and implications of the Jeju 4.3 events itself. In other words, the communist armed uprising and the subsequent government suppression, not the resulting transitional justice processes, were major concerns. Until now, almost no scholarly attention has been given to the processes of truth commission establishment and thus, my case study required an extensive and in-depth primary field research. The case study contributed to my dissertation in three ways. First, a case study provided a ground for cross-checking my findings and conclusions drawn from the global analysis. I compared the empirical findings of my global analysis to the specific evidence discovered from my case study. Second, although statistically significant factors could have been identified in the global analysis, the causal story that links these various hypotheses could not be specified. My case provided a historical and geographic context where I could formulate a causal story based on the significant factors drawn from the statistical analysis. Th,ird, there were factors that are not easily quantifiable in my global analysis and the case study enabled me to examine hypotheses that could not be easily operationalized with quantitative measures such as history, culture, and meaning. The transitional justice processes of Korea provided an ideal ground for my dissertation project in three aspects. First, the study of transitional justice measures increased noticeably in the fields oflaw, sociology, and political science over last 20

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years. Although much work has been done on the African and Latin American cases, almost none has been done on the Asian cases in general and the Korean transitional justice processes in particular. This, in part, reflects the fact that there are only a handful of transitional justice cases in Asia but also suggests a lack of awareness and interests in those cases that are not readily accessible. If the latter were to be true, the problem is more serious because our research questions, analyses, and conclusion could be culturally biased due to the disproportionate case selection process. Therefore, my study illuminates an interesting yet less studied Asian experience. Second, a study of the Korean processes leads us to consider and answer one of important debates in transitional justice literatures around the timing - i.e. how soon to start a truth commission? (Hayner 2002: 221) Unlike many prominent commissions which were established immediately after transition, it took 13 years after its transition and 52 years after the events for Koreans to establish the first truth commission in 2000. In the field of transitional justice, the question of "how soon" is an unresolved and controversial one among human rights NGOs and practitioners. A study and assessment of the delayed Korean transitional justice processes would help resolving these debates by providing evidence for or against the effectiveness of a belated truth commission. Third, because of these factors, it appeared that a truth commission in Korea was rather peculiar compared to other transitional countries. This was substantiated by my global analysis where the establishment of a truth commission in Korea turned out to be an outlier deviating from the model of general and global truth commission establishment. Thus, my case study would be an example of deviant case analysis which have great theoretical value (Lijphart 1971: 692; Gerring 2007). 34

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1.6. Structure

My dissertation is divided into two parts by the methods I used. The first part is composed of two chapters of statistical analyses on the causes of transitional trial and truth commission adoption. In Chapter 2 and 3, I examine the question of why and when states use trials and truth commissions by using Cox proportional hazards models to test key hypotheses. I use a cross-national analysis of 100 transitional countries in order to understand a general trend in the adoption of trials and truth commissions. I further examine country cases that deviated from the prediction of the models. The second part comprises five chapters exploring the transitional justice processes in Korea regarding the Jeju 4.3 events using data gathered through interviews and archival research from my field work. In Chapter 4, I introduce the overall research design and methods for my case study. I provide the historic background of Korea in general and the processes ofthe Jeju 4.3 events and detailed description of human rights violations. In Chapter 5, I focus on the earlier transitional justice attempts made by small number of individuals in the midst of governmental suppression covering a 33 year period from the end of the event in 1954 to the democratic transition in 1987. An examination of this period is crucial because it allows us to examine the role of history in transitional justice advocacy. I also examine how a massacre of such magnitude could be concealed from the general public under the consecutive military regimes. In Chapter 6, I study the early period of the mass transitional justice advocacy after the democratic transition in 1987. I trace the processes of the forgotten massacres slowly gaining local attention by the activism of three actors - social movement groups, 35

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mass media, and students and scholars. In this chapter, I explore the period between 1987 and 1992 which is the initial stage of a public movement. In Chapter 7, I examine the transitional justice advocacy led by the Provincial 4.3 Committee under the Jeju Provincial Council focusing on three key activities - investigating the massacres, mediating the united memorial service, and leading the petition movement. However, activism between 1993 and 1998 under the Kim Young Sam administration was confined to the J eju Island. In Chapter 8, I examine the final stage of the political processes of the enactment of the 4.3 Special Act and the establishment of the 4.3 Commission under President Kim Dae Jung. The main location of my analysis in this chapter is now moved to Seoul and the interaction between local activists and politicians at the center became more important. In Chapter 9, I provide conclusions drawn from the two parts of my dissertation. Since I have two parts in my research design, I meaningfully link the findings from my global analyses with those from the Korean cases study. A part of my concluding chapter is also devoted to future research questions on the impact of transitional justice measures.

36

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2. The Use of Human Rights Trials in Transitional States

2.1. Introduction The number of states addressing past violations using criminal prosecution in domestic courts has been increasing. Although students have studied various dimensions of transitional trials, the main focus was on the impact of such trials and few paid attention to the variation in a state's choice to hold trials and the causes of this variation. Two variations are important - first, variation in a state's decision and, second, variation in timing. Not all countries hold trials against former government officials on the charge of human rights violations after transition and there are more variations in timing of such trials. Many states hold trials immediately after transition but others have delayed justice like Korea which had its first human rights trial 9 years after transition and Uruguay, which waited 17 years. The purpose of this chapter is to answer why and when states hold trials offormer government officials after transition on the charge of human rights violations under the previous regime. This chapter provides the first systematic and global analysis to this question. In this chapter, eight key hypotheses were tested to explain the variations in a state's use of transitional trials and the timing: diffusion, democracy, respect for human rights, domestic advocacy groups, legal tradition, types of transition, truth commission experience, and domestic economy. An event history dataset for 100 transitional states between 1974 and 2004 were constructed and the Cox proportional hazards model and a conditional gap time model for the repeated events were used (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). 37

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Strong evidence for the diffusion of transitional human rights trials was found and cultural similarity rather than geographic proximity was a medium of diffusion process. In my analysis, a pattern that states follow trial experience in culturally similar neighbors was examined. Second, trials were more likely in more democratic countries after transition and the chance of holding trials increased with democratic consolidation. Third, domestic advocacy groups for transitional justice were a key factor that guaranteed persistent and frequent human rights trials after transition. Thus, among many internal factors, mature democracy and active civil society were proven to be two key guarantors of the success of transitional justice processes.

2.2. Data and Hypotheses 2.2.1. Operationalization: Transitional Human Rights Trials While information is readily available on the relatively small number of trials in international tribunals (Bass 2000; Roht-Arriaza 2005; Akhaven 2001), the data on domestic human rights trials is decentralized and difficult to quantify. To address this problem, Sikkink and Walling (2007) have created a new database of domestic transitional human rights trials by coding from the U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for all countries from 1979 to 2004. They argue that, in order for judicial activities to be coded as a transitional trial, three conditions must be met. First, it must be judicial activities that occurred or initiated in domestic institutions - e.g. courts, judge, prosecutor's office, or police. Second, judicial activities must inflict some cost on the former government agents accused of haVing individual criminal responsibility for human rights violations, including the financial costs of litigation, the

38

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lost income during preventive detention, or constraint on domestic or international travel, for example. Third, these activities must take place in transitional countries. They found evidence of transition from the Human Rights Country Reports itself. However, I had a slight different approach mid coded transitional countries from a different source - the Polity IV Project. Most transitional countries overlap with my transitional country cases except four countries, which were not included in my analysis. 14 In the coding of human rights trials, not only a formal trial itselfbut also the judicial activities leading up to or following a trial were coded as domestic transitional human rights trials. Thus, "indictment, arrest, detention of a suspect, an extradition request that is being actively pursued, the existence ofInterpol arrest warrant, the initiation of a trial, or the continuance of a trial so long as there is active progress being made in the case, a ruling in a trial, activity of the high court regarding current and future human rights trials including rulings that reverse earlier amnesties, determine amnesties to be void or inapplicable to certain crimes or defendants, the denial of appeals, or the creation of new laws that deal with past human rights abuses" were all considered as transitional human rights trials (Sikkink and Walling 2007). When the Human Rights Country Reports mentioned a judicial proceeding that met the above criteria, a country is coded "1" for having transitional trials in a given year and if there was no mention of a trial, a country was coded "0" for that year. This binary time-series cross-national dataset was converted into an event history data where the

14 Four countries have no sign of transition but have recorded to have used trials in the Transitional Human Rights Trial Database. These countries are India (1997), Papua New Guinea (1995), Sri Lanka (1990, .1992), and Venezuela (1991, 1994, 1995). In my coding, theses countries were recorded to have a minor regime change. These country cases suggest that countries with minor regime change may also use transitional justice measures. Sri Lanka, for example, was a democratic state throughout years of civil war and the government was in a good control of most of territories (Spiram 2002). 39

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hazard of using trials was measured as the dependent variable. This measure of a country trial year has a potential danger of masking the complex reality of trials which vary in the rank of the accused, level of courts, charges, or social attention. Nevertheless, despite the loss of information, a binary measure still captures important aspects of which states used trials and when. Data shows that 41 countries have held trials since 1974 with a mean . duration of 8 years after transition and the standard deviation of 5.5 years. A complete list of human rights trials by country and years along with the total number of years involved in trials between 1980 and 2004 is listed in Table 2-1.

Table 2-1. Countries with Transitional Human Rights Trials Country Argentina Benin Bolivia Bosnia-Herzegovina Bulgaria Burundi Chile Croatia Czech Republic Ecuador EI Salvador Eritrea Ethiopia Guatemala Haiti Honduras Hungary

Years

1988, 1991~1994, 1996~2003 1986, 1987, 1989, 1995~1997 1992,1993,1996,1997,1999-2002,2004 1993,1999,2000,2001

Indonesia

2000~2004

Iraq Korea, Republic of Lithuania Malawi Mali

2004 1996

1983~1990, 1993~1996, 1998~2004

1991~1993

1983,9195 1995, 1999~2004 1993, 1994, 1996 1996 1986, 1991~2004 1992~1994, 1998~2004

1997,1998,2001 1992~1995, 1997 1990~1992, 1998 1991, 1993 1991~1992, 1994~2003

1997~2002

1995 1991, 1993

Total Years 19 3 2 7 3 1 15 10 3 5 4 2 12 13 6 9 4 4 1 1 6 1 2

40

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Mexico Namibia Nicaragua Niger Panama Paraguay Peru Poland Portugal Romania Rwanda Serbia and Montenegro Sierra Leone South Africa Spain Thailand Turkey Uruguay

1992, 1990

1993,2002~2004

1992~1996

1992 1991~1999,2002,2004

1989,1991, 1992, 1994~1999,2002~2004 1985, 1990, 1993~1995,2001~2004 1990, 1993, 1994, 1996~2001 1980 1990 1994~2004 2001~2004

1998 1992 1982 1998 1983 2002

5 1 5 1 11 12 9 9 1 1 11 4 1 1 1 1 1 1

Table shows that while many countries have only one year experience of human rights trials, some countries like Argentina, Chile, and Guatemala have more than ten years of trials after transition. Although the total years do not actually display the number of trials per se, it is still a good indicator of the persistence of transitional justice efforts in that country. Figure 2-1 demonstrates the variations in the timing of when states use trials for the first time after transition. Among 41 transitional states, 12 held trials . immediately after transition and about 70 percent of countries had trials within three years of transition. However, about 15 percent of countries, on the contrary, had their first human rights trials after a decade and a few even had much delayed justice after 15 years of transition.

41

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12 10 I/)

Q)

"I:

.....C

::J

8

'0 ....

6

0 () Q)

.0

E ::J

Z

4 2 0 0

5

10 Year since Transition

15

20

Figure 2-1. The Number of Countries with Transitional Trials by the Year of Its Initiation

2.2.2. Case Selection One novel aspect of my cross-national analysis is the case selection. I decided to include all transitional countries in the world between 1974 and 2004 including three types of transitions - democratic transition, transition from civil war, and transition by state creation. Two alternative case selection methods exist, but neither examining all the countries in the world nor examining only countries with transitional trials is a proper case selection. The former will include many irrelevant cases where there were neither serious human rights violations nor political transitions. This may be equivalent to studies in democratic peace literatures where many irrelevant dyads are included, which

cause heterogeneity in the sample. On the other hand, the latter way will exclude many interesting cases which did not use transitional trials but have a high probability of doing 42

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so. An exclusion of these cases wi11lead to a selection bias since it would be an example of selecting on the dependent variable (Geddes 1990). I determined my sample using the Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions Dataset of the Polity IV Project (Marshall and Jaggers 2005) and found 100 transitional countries. The regime transition variable (Regtrans), which was derived from the yearly changing values of the Polity score, was examined. I began with all 193 countries in the world in 2004 and excluded seven countries with population less than 500,000. 15 I went through three steps to determine states with transition. First, the Regtrans is a 6-point scale regime change variable, which '+3' indicating a major democratic transition, '+2', a minor democratic transition, and so forth until '-2', an adverse regime transition. Regtrans was coded considering both the Polity score changes and duration of the change. States with '+3' and '+2' scores in Regtrans were examined and I found 68 countries with democratic transition. Second, state failure, which indicates instability and turmoil of civil wars or armed conflicts, is coded as '-77' in Regtrans and states were categorized to have experienced a transition from civil war if that country has exited from the state failure period by a regime change ('0' or '1 '), interruption ('-66'), or transition ('-88') and found 16 countries. Third, state creation was recorded as state creation ('99') or state transformation ('97') and found 28 countries. Three points should be noted. First, 12 states have experienced multiple types of transitions during the period between 1974 and 2004 and all transitions in a chronological

15 These countries are Cape Verde, Grenada, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Suriname, and Tonga. It is controversial to exclude these countries in my analysis but there are two justifications for this. First, I followed the practice of previous examples of cross-n'l:itional statistical analyses (Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999) and second, it was a practical concern because no data were available on these countries in other databases I used, which would cause missing data problem.

43

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order were included in my sample. Second, some countries had democratic transitions but experienced autocratic regime reversion thereafter. 16 Autocratic reversion is indicated by adverse regime transition ('-2' in Regtrans) or negative regime change ('-1 '). In a sense, these states did not achieve a successful transition since they failed in democratic consolidation. However, all these transitional countries with "democratic moments" were included because some countries - Haiti and Niger, for example - used transitional justice measures during their democratic moments. All the countries and years for the countries with a democratic moment were included. Third, with these criteria, other countries were excluded because either because a stable democracy was established before 1974 (United States, Canada) or states have not experienced transition (North Korea, Saudi Arabia). A complete list of transitional countries is in Table 2-2.

Table 2-2. List of Transitional States and Types of Transitions Types of Transition

Number

Country and Years included PortugaI1974~;

Democratic Transition

68

Greece 1974~; Spain 1975~; Thailand 1977~1991, 1992~; Burkina Faso 1977~1980; Peru 1978~1992, 1993~; Ghana 1978~1981, 1996~; Dominican Republic 1978~; Nigeria 1978~ 1984, 1998~; Uganda 1979~1985; Ecuador 1979~; EI Salvador 1979~; Honduras 1980~; Bolivia 1982~; Argentina 1983~; Turkey 1983~; Guatemala 1984~; Brazil 1985~; Uruguay 1985~; Haiti 1986~1991, 1994~; Philippines 1986~; Republic of Korea 1987~; Hungary 1988~; Chile 1988~; Cambodia 1988~1997; Pakistan 1988~1999; Poland 1989~; Paraguay 1989~; Czechoslovakia 1989~ 1992; Panama 1989~; Romania 1989~; Benin 1990~; Nicaragua 1990-; Comoros 1990~1995, 1996~; Bulgaria 1990~; Fiji 1990~; Mongolia 1990~; Nepal 1990~2002; Albania 1990~ 1996, 1997~; Republic of Congo 1991~1997; Mali 1991~; Central African

16 These countries are Burkina Faso, Uganda, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Cote d'Ivoire, Haiti, Cambodia, Nepal, Niger, and Pakistan.

44

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Transition from Civil War

16

Transition of State Creation

28

Republic 1991-2003; Niger 1991-1996, 1999-; Bangladesh 1991-; Madagascar 1991-; Zambia 1991-1996; GuineaBissau 1991-1998, 1999-; Azerbaijan 1992-; Guyana 1992-; South Africa 1992-; Taiwan 1992-; Lesotho 1993-1998, 1999-; Malawi 1993-; Mexico 1994-; Mozambique 1994-; Sierra Leone 1996-1997,2001-; Iran 1997-2004; Armenia 1998-; Indonesia 1998-; Djibouti 1999-; Cote d'lvoire 1999-2002; Senegal 2000-; Serbia and Montenegro 2000-; Kenya 2002-; Macedonia 2002-; Algeria 2004Chad 1984-; Lebanon 1990-; Ethiopia 1991-; Angola 1993-; Rwanda 1994-; Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995-; Burundi 1996-; Comoros 1996-; Liberia 1996-; Afghanistan 1996-; Guinea-Bissau 1999-; Lesotho 1999-; Sierra Leone 2001-; Iraq 2003-; Democratic Republic of Congo 2003-; Solomon Island 2003Namibia 1990-; Yemen 1990-; Germany 1990-; Georgia 1991-; Croatia 1991-; Slovenia 1991-; Serbia and Montenegro 1991-; Belarus 1991-; Moldova 1991-; Azerbaijan 1991-; Kyrgyzstan 1991-; Uzbekistan 1991-; Estonia 1991-; Latvia 1991-; Lithuania 1991-; Tajikistan 1991-; Macedonia 1991-; Armenia 1991-; Turkmenistan 1991-; Ukraine 1991-; Kazakhstan 1991-; Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992-; Russia 1992-; Czech Republic 1993-; Slovakia 1993-; Ethiopia 1993-; Eritrea 1993~; East Timor

2002-

2.2.3. Hypotheses and Operationalization Diffusion States adopt the new practice of human rights trials ifthose trials were already used by neighbors. Although there are many theories of diffusion process, I tested two explanations: geographic proximity and cultural similarity. First, a state is more likely to hold a human rights trial after transition if many of its near - geographically proximate neighbors already have adopted transitional trials. Second, a state is more likely to hold a trial if many of its cultural - culturally similar - neighbors already have used such trials. The percentage oftransitional states having used a trial within a state's geographic 45

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neighbors and cultural neighbors were used to measure neighbor's trial impact. First, I used the U.N. Statistics Division's sub-regional division of the world to define a state's geographic neighbors. 17 Second, to define cultural neighbors, each state was first divided into five religion categories (Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox, Muslim, or Buddhism) if more than 50 percent of populations believed in it using the CIA World Factbook. Then, a state's cultural neighbors were defined as those countries that have a same religion within a same continent. Thus, not only cultural aspect (religion) but also geographic aspect (continent) was considered to define cultural neighbors. 18

(a) Geographic Neighbors

(b) Cultural Neighbors

Figure 2-2. Comparison of Geographic and Cultural Neighbors of Argentina

17 The divisions are Eastern, Northern, Western, Southern, Middle Africa, Caribbean, Central, South, Northern America, Central, East, Southern, Southeastern, Western Asia, Eastern, Northern, Southern, Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand, Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia. 18 Religion and language are two core elements representing culture. Both religion and language were considered but religion was chosen over language for three reasons. First, although language provides a better indicator of an information flow between states, religion grasps the fundamental value system of culture. Second, language is more diverse than religion and overestimates the diversity rather than the commonality of culture. Third, the statistical results were not different regardless of using either indicator.

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Two conceptualizations of a neighbor differ as we can see in the example of Argentina in Figure 2-2. Argentina is in the South America category of the U.N. subregional divisions. Using the geographic concept, trial experience in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay are relevant. When the cultural concept is used, trials in Guyana is no longer relevant but trial experience in Dominican Republic, EI Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, and Nicaragua additionally matter since these are Latin American and Catholic states. Another example with a more dramatic change in two concepts is the Democratic Republic of Congo, which is in the Middle Africa category in the U.N. sub-regional divisions. By the geographic concept, trials in Angola, Central African Republic, Chad, and Republic of Congo are relevant. However, when the cultural concept is used, trials in Burundi, Eritrea, and Rwanda matter since these are African and Catholic countries. Hypothesis 2. Democracy Two somewhat different arguments are made on the i~pact of democracy. On the one hand, democratic regimes after transition are more likely to hold trials because new regimes face a strong demand from people and democracies effectively channel those demands (Herz 1982). On the other hand, it is probable that leaders in nascent democracies use trials to overcome their political instability and to gain legitimacy and support. If the latter argument of Moravcsik's (2000) is valid, we should be examining the higher probabilities of trials in a relatively earlier period in new democracies. Two arguments are undistinguishable regarding the effect of democracy since both argue that trials will be more likely under democracy but the contestation is about the timing. Thus,

47

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in order to test the validity of two arguments, I not only included democracy variable but also its time interaction terms. The current level of democracy was measured using the

Polity score from the Polity IV Project. In addition,to measure the effect of democratic consolidation and the timing, the Polity score was interacted with the duration of the regime. Thus, I was able to test whether the level of democracy and its consolidation among all the transitional countries affect the likelihood of the trial use. Hypothesis 3. Respect for Human Rights Two aspects of governmental respect for human rights were examined. First, the high level of repression (i.e. lack of governmental respect for human rights) will decrease or postpone the use of trials. The current level of repression was measured using the physical integrity rights index of the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Database (2004). Second, states with stronger commitment to human rights standards are more likely to use trials. Ball (2000) found that a state's commitment to international human rights treaties has a positive impact on domestic human rights movements. The commitment to international standards was measured based on a state's ratification records of three major conventions - International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention). Although treaties mention judicial remedy and punishment of perpetrators, the ratification of treaties and decision to hold trials are two separate spheres of decision making. A state's ratification records were examined and coded into a 4-point scale with '3' indicating ratification of all three conventions and '0' none. 48

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Hypothesis 4. Domestic Advocacy Groups The role of domestic advocacy groups is the most important element in my theoretical framework. Scholars believe that the efforts of the association for the victims' families, human rights NOOs, student activists, and human rights lawyers are the key determinant (Pion-Berlin 1994; Skaar 1999; Backer 2003; Bleeker and Sisson 2004). Among many actors, I used domestic human right NOOs to represent overall advocacy groups for transitional justice. It is plausible because, in many cases, victims are represented by human rights NOOs or individual lawyers representing those NOOs. The number of domestic human rights NOOs was measured using Mosley and Uno's (2007) Human Rights NOOs Dataset, which was coded from the Human Rights Internet Master List. This is believed to be the most comprehensive data available up to date. 19 Hypothesis 5. Legal Tradition A decision to have trials is a judicial activity and is ll;ffected by a state's legal tradition. In the study of human rights treaty ratification, Simmons (2008) shows that the British legal heritage is negatively associated with international treaty ratification. In addition, the British colonial experience and legal tradition is proven to be connected with the relatively fewer human rights abuses (Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). In both studies, legal tradition has an impact on a state's decision in human rights policies. It is expected that states with civil law tradition are more likely to hold trials compared to those with common law tradition. In their study of Latin America, Sikkink and Walling (2005) suggested that private prosecutor provisions in many civil law systems might be one explanation for the prevalence of human rights trials in Latin America since private

19

Recently, Hathaway (2007) collected the same data from the same source.

49

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prosecutor provisions permit human rights groups, often acting on behalf of victims, to file criminal human rights cases in the courts. The legal tradition variable was measured from the Global Development Network Growth Database. Hypothesis 6. Types of Transition The power balance at transition between the outgoing regime and new regime (or civil society) is an important factor affecting the choice of transitional justice measures. However, the balance is not easily quantifiable and there are no reliable data available to measure this strong theory. In my project, I tried to capture this aspect of balance of power using the types of transition and domestic advocacy groups. As Skaar (1999) . suggested, there are correlations between the types of transition and the power of outgoing regimes. In addition, the number of domestic human rights NGOs captures some aspects of the strength of the civil society after transition. The types of transition were measured using the Polity IV Project and dummy variables for transition from civil war and transition by state creation were included. Hypothesis 7. Truth Commission Experience A truth commission is used widely next to human rights trials in transitional societies. By 2004, 28 countries had established a truth commission to find the truth of state violence and human rights abuses of the past. Truth commissions are becoming even more popular after the success and publicity of the South African TRC (1995). Some argue that human rights trials will be less likely if a truth commission has already been established in that country. This argument is based on the fact that states after transition have limited resource to pursue transitional justice and two measures are in competition both for policymakers and civil society. On the contrary, Sikkink and 50

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Walling (2007) made an argument that states with one form of transitional justice measure are more likely to use the other from their observation of the Latin American countries. They argue that truth commissions and trials are not a competitive measure but a complimentary one in many states in Latin America. A state willing to prosecute individuals on the basis of human rights violations or establish a truth commission to unearth the dark history has a political will to pursue alternative measures in the future. The truth commission variable was measured using my Truth Commission Database.

Hypothesis 8. Domestic Economy It can be argued that more affluent states are more likely to hold human rights

trials after transition. Economically well-off states can devote their political focus on the issue of past human rights violations compared to others where economic development is the foremost priority (Elster 2006). Often, a discourse of transitional justice is criticized as backward-looking and easily buried under a discourse of development and advancement. The GDP per capita and the annual rate of GDP growth was used to measure economic standing and development (United Nations Common Database). The summary statistics are in Table 2-3.

Table 2-3. Summary Statistics Modell. Trial Initiation

Variable Dependent Variable Year until"trial initiation

N

Mean

SD

Min

Max

991

7.88

5.47

1

25

Independent Variable Precedents in geographic neighbors Precedents in cultural neighbors

991 991

0.30 0.22

0.30 0.27

0 0

1 1 51

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Democracy Democracy x Time State repression International commitment Domestic advocacy groups (logged) British legal law tradition Transition from civil war Transition of state creation Truth commission experience GDP per capita (logged) Annual rate of GDP growth

964 964 916 991 948 991 991 991 991 986 987

3.04 23.41 3.61 1.90 1.79 0.22 0.09 0.28 0.13 6.74 2.27

5.72 58.61 2.23 1.08 1.19 0.41 0.29 0.45 0.33 1.20 8.79

-9 -126 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.02 -50.20

10 250 8 3 5.35 1 1 1 1 10.41 106.30

Model2. Repeated Use of Trials Variable Dependent Variable Year until trial use

N

Mean

SD

Min

Max

1475

9.03

5.79

1

25

Independent Variable Precedents in geographic neighbors Precedents in cultural neighbors Democracy Democracy x Time State repression International commitment Domestic advocacy groups (logged) British legal law tradition Transition from civil war Transition of state creation Truth commission experience GDP per capita (logged) Annual rate of GDP growth

1475 1475 1434 1434 1393 1475 1432 1475 1475 1475 1475 1470 1471

0.35 0.31 4.08 41.51 3.41 2.06 1.98 0.18 0.08 0.22 0.18 6:92 2.71

0.30 0.32 5.50 65.78 2.20 1.04 1.15 0.38 0.28 0.41 0.38 1.27 7.99

0 0 -9 -126 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.02 -50.20

1 1 10 250 8 3 5.35 1 1 1 1 10.41 106.30

2.3. Data Analysis 2.3.1. Cox Proportional hazards Model Two Cox proportional hazards models were used to explain both the initial adoption (Modell) and the repeated use of human rights trials (Model 2). As other proportional hazards models, the Cox model provides the prediction of the hazard rates 52

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hi(t), which is the rate at which a state i holds trials at time t given that the state did not

have a trial until time t (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 13). By estimating the hazard rates, not only whether or not a state had trials but also when it did is considered since the rate is conditional on the duration. Unlike other parametric or logit models, the Cox model provides the estimates of the coefficients without making any assumption about the baseline hazard function, which is an advantage of the Cox model. In addition, the Cox model shares many of asymptotic properties such as consistency, efficiency, and normality associated with other maximum likelihood estimates and provides useful diagnostics (Singer and Willett 2003: 516). Modell examines why and when states hold human rights trials for the first time after transition. It is plausible that the causes of the initial adoption and the repeated use of trials differ. The Cox proportional hazard models with exact partial likelihood to handle tied observations were used,z° The functional form for Model I is:

where ho(t) is an unspecified baseline hazard function and {J'X is the regression parameters and covariates. Model 2 examines the repeated use of transitional trials after the first use. Many states have used human rights trials repeatedly over years after transition. Among41 countries with trial experience, 27 countries (66%) had two or more years of transitional trials. It indicates that states experienced at least one new trial in different years, which can be counted as a new event. This model was introduced under the assumption that the The Cox proportional hazards model with exact partial likelihood to handle tied observations is equivalent to "a conditional (fixed-effect) logit model with observations grouped by the risk set at the ordered failure times (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 58)." I also estimated logit models with time dependence addressed with cubic spline (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). The same results were obtained.

20

53

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independent variables may have different effects when the use of trials beyond the initial use is additionally considered. I used a conditional gap time model estimated by the stratified Cox model to address statistical problems of event dependency and heterogeneity (Box-Steffensmeier and De Boef2006).Zl The functional form for Model 2 is:

where fiX is the regression parameters and covariates and

hOk (t)

is an unspecified

baseline hazard function estimated for each kth event sequence. For each model, the correlations among the independent variables were checked for multicollinearity and three diagnostics were used to check my models: (1) a test for the proportional hazards assumption using the rescaled Schoenfeld residuals, (2) a test for an appropriate functional form of the covariates using the Martingale residuals, and (3) a test for general model fit using the Cox-Snell residuals (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). Grambsch and Themeau's tests were conducted and the global test did not yield a significant test statistics for both models, suggesting that there is no violation of the proportional hazards assumption (p = 0.427 for Modell; p

= 0.872 for Model 2),zz

A conditional gap time model is a variance corrected models which "directly model event dependence through stratification, while attempting to account for heterogeneity with ex post fixes to the standard errors (Box-Steffensmeier and De Boef2006: 3532)." This model uses gap time, which is the time-interval between successive repeated events, and the use of gaE time is based on the assumption "that an observation is not at risk for the J(h event until the k-l event has occurred (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 159)." A stratified Cox model stratifies estimation on the event sequence and allows the baseline hazard function to vary within each sequence. An alternative to using gap time is to use elapsed time. Instead of using the time-interval between successive repeated events, an elapsed time model uses time since transition based on the assumption that all repeated events are developing simultaneously. Both assumptions are plausible for my case and I estimated both models. No major differences in statistical results were observed and the result using elapsed time is available upon request. 22 The results of Grambsch and Therneau's nonproportionality tests; correlation tables, Schoenfeld residual plots against survival times, Martingale residual plots against the value of independent variables, and CoxSnell residual plots are all available upon request. 21

54

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Missing values for some of the explanatory variables limit the number of observation under investigation for 91 to 94 countries.

2.3.2. Analysis

Table 2-4. Effects on the Initial Adoption of Transitional Human Rights Trials

Variable Diffusion Geographic Neighbors Cultural Neighbors Democracy Democracy Democracy x Time Respect for Human Rights State repression International HR commitment Domestic Advocacy Groups Domestic HR NGOs (In) Legal Tradition British legal tradition Types of Transition Transition from civil war Transition of state creation Truth Commission Truth Commission Experience Domestic Economy GDP per capita (In) Annual rate ofGDP growth Time at risk Number of subjects Number of events Log pseudo likelihood Waldi p-value

Coefficient

Modell {Trial Initiation} Std. Err. .e-value

-0.29 1.96***

0.73 0.71

0.691 0.006

-0.04 0.03

0.07 0.02

0.558 0.103

0.04 -0.35

0.09 0.24

0.662 0.144

0.23

0.18

0.218

-1.12

0.68

0.101

-0.21 -0.89

1.08 0.64

0.848 0.163

0.36

0.54

0.515

0.03 -0.02

0.21 0.02

0.866 0.495

865 91 35 -94.34 33.81 0.0013

Note: The coefficients are from the Cox model with an exact partial likelihood method to handling ties and standard errors were adjusted for the correlation within the same units (STATA 9.2). Significant levels: ••• p
55

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Table 2·5. Effects on the Repeated Use of Human Rights Trials

Variable Diffusion Geographic Neighbors Cultural Neighbors Democracy Democracy Democracy x Time Respect for Human Rights State repression International HR commitment Domestic Advocacy Groups Domestic HR NGOs (In) Legal Tradition British legal tradition Types of Transition Transition from civil war Transition of state creation Truth Commission Truth Commission Experience Domestic Economy GDP per capita (In) Annual rate of GDP growth Time at risk Number of subjects Number of events Log pseudo likelihood Waldi p-value

Model 2 (Reeeated Use of Trials~ Std. Err. Coefficient E-value 0.39 0.39

0.952 0.002

-0.003 0.01 *

0.04 0.01

0.938 0.070

0.09* -0.06

0.05 0.14

0.096 0.660

0.35***

0.13

0.008

-1.56***

0.55

0.004

0.02 -0.19

0.45 0.34

0.962 0.588

-0.09

0.25

0.711

0.06 -0.01

0.09 0.01

0.522 0.274

0.02 1.24***

1333 94 193 -257.94 72.59 < 0.0001

Note: The coefficients are from the stratified Cox model with Efron method to handling ties and standard errors were adjusted for the correlation within the same units (STATA 9.2). Significant levels: ••• p < 0.01; •• p < 0.05; • P < 0.1.

Table 2-4 reports the results assessing the effects of the independent variables on the initial use of human rights trials after transition and Table 2-5 on the repeated use of trials. The coefficients measure the impact of the variables on the hazard of having a trial 56

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in each model. The positive (negative) coefficients imply that the hazard of holding a trial increases (decreases) as an independent variable increases. The significance of each variable was measured by two-tailed tests. The results show that diffusion, democracy, domestic advocacy groups, and legal tradition are relevant while the respect for human rights, types of transition, truth commission experience, and domestic economy are statistically not significant. 23 Diffusion The diffusion hypothesis is the only theory that is valid in explaining both the initial and repeated use of human rights trials. A state is more likely to initiate and repeatedly use human rights trials if trials were already held in its neighbors. Between the two mechanisms of diffusion, cultural similarity, rather than simple geographic proximity, determines the diffusion of trials. Contrary to the findings from the previous studies of policy diffusion and treaty ratification (Simmons 2000; Berry and Berry 1990; Mooney 2001; Simmons 2008), a state's decision to use trials is not affected by the practices of neighbors simply defined as near countries. The result shows that when controlled for cultural neighbor's experience, the impact of trials experience in geographically proximate countries is undistinguishable from zero. It is rather the trial precedents in neighbors who share a common cultural aspect such as religion that matters. I, in my current project (Kim and Sikkink 2007), provided empirical evidence that human rights trial experience in neighbors affect a country's level of repression,

The respect for human rights variables jointly are not significant for both trial initiation (X2=2.19, df=2, p=0.335) and the repeated use (X2=3.l2, df=2, p=0.21 0). The types of transition variables jointly are not significant for both trial initiation (X2=1.96, df=2, p=0.375) and the repeated use (X2=0.29, df=2, p=0.863). The domestic economy variables jointly are not significant for both trial initiation (X2=0.48, df=2, p=O. 788) and the repeated use (X2=1.53, df=2,p=0.465). 23

57

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suggesting a possible deterrence effect of trials beyond borders. My finding here supports our argument by suggesting that the diffusion of trials may be one of many mechanisms of beyond border deterrence effect. A decision to use human rights trials in a country may affect its neighbors' decision to have similar trials which would deter the future violations in those countries. We can draw one possible path of cross-border deterrence when the two findings are combined. For two neighboring countries with a similar culture - country A and country B - a decision of country A to use human rights trials positively affect country B's decision to hold trials and this, in tum, improves country B's human rights conditions. Thus, country A's transitional justice practice has an indirect positive impact on human rights situations in country B.

Trial Initiation 8 -

95% confidence interval Hazard ratio

Repeated Use of Trials 8 -

6

6

2

2

O~

0%

95% confidence interval Hazard ratio

__~__~__~____r -__T 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Percentatge of Cultural Precedents(%)

0%

20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Percentatge of Cultural Precedents(%)

Figure 2-3. Changes in Hazard of Trial Use by the Percentage of Cultural Neighbors

58

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Figure 2-3 illustrates the changes in hazard of holding human rights trials after transition as the percentage of cultural neighbors with trial experience increases. My model predicts that, for each additional 10 percent increase, the hazard of using a human rights trial for the first time increases by 22 percent, holding all other variables constant (ModeI1)?4 When the repeated use of trials beyond the first use is considered, the hazard still increases as the percentage of cultural neighbors with trials increases. The same 10 percent increase would bring about a 13 percent increase in the hazard (Model 2). Thus, neighbors' trial experience has a positive impact not only on a state's decision to adopt such trials in the first place but also on a state's transitional justice practice in general. If a hypothetical state with all of its cultural neighbors already having held human rights trials is compared to a state with no such neighbors at all, the hazard of initiating a trial is 7 times greater and the hazard of repeatedly having trials are about 3.5 times greater for the former. The result provides empirical evidence that cultural similarity, not geographic proximity, is a medium of diffusion process in transitional human rights trials. It has a broader implication for international relations, especially in the field of international norms and institutions. A transitional human rights trial is a new judicial model of transitional justice that innately holds the norms of individual criminal accountability (Lutz and Sikkink 2001) and international human rights. My finding shows that the diffusion of the norm of accountability and human rights cannot be explained by simple

The hazard ratio is an exponential of the original coefficient. If hazard ratio is greater (less) than 1, it indicates an increase (decrease) in the hazard and the chances of having trials increases (decreases) with the positive changes in the covariates. The effect of 10 percent increase can be calculated by multiplying 0.1 by the original coefficients (1.96) and take an exponential of it. The increase in hazard ratio is proportional. Thus, the hazard ratio of a state with 20 percent of cultural neighbors with trials is 1.48 (1.22 x 1.22 = 1.48). 24

59

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geographic proximity, which seems to explain the diffusion of other policy measures or treaty ratification well. It is probable that at least two diffusion mechanisms of international norms exist and function differently depending on the content ofthe norm. Democracy The level of democracy and its consolidation does not affect a state's decision to initiate a human rights trial as seen in Table 2-4. However, my second model predicts that democracy factor has a significant impact on a state's use of human rights trials in general. Although the coefficients of the democracy variable and its time-interaction effects in Table 2-5 are by themselves statistically not different from zero, their joint effect (i=8.46, df=2, p=O.015) and linear combination (b Democracy + b

Democracy x Time)

are

highly significant. This result suggests that although the level of democracy does not have a significant impact on the hazard of human rights trials until 5 years of transition, it would have a significant and positive impact on the hazard after 6 years of transition. It is probable that this five year interval represents average time for a procedural democracy to be substantially effective or mature in newly transitional societies. It is also possible that the democratic institutional reforms in transitional countries would take time before being substantially effective.

60

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15

10

5 Polity Score = 5

Polity Score Polity Score

=0

=·10

o ~--------r--------.---------.--------r---------r 5 10 o 15 20 25 Duration: Year

Figure 2-4. Effect of Democracy over Time on the Use of Human Rights Trials

Figure 2-4 presents the impact of democracy on the hazard of using human rights trials after transition. Two findings are important. First, the hazard is significantly different across the different levels of democracy after sixth year of transition. This suggests that democracy is an important factor determining the persistent use of human rights trials. Generally speaking, democracy guarantees the continuation of transitional justice efforts represented by human rights trials. Second, the hazard increases as time passes in a democracy. In a fully democratic country (Polity score = 10), the hazard of using human rights trials increases by 11 percent in a year, suggesting that human rights trials are more likely as democratic consolidation continues.

This finding provides one ground for explaining the existence of delayed human rights trials in some democratic states (Uruguay, Korea). It also gives counterevidence to 61

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the possible generalization of Moravcsik's argument (2000: 244) that the leaders in fledging democracies may use transitional human rights trials as a lock-in device for democracy immediately after transition. Empirically, more democratic and more consolidated countries have higher hazard of using trials, not the other way around. Although Moravcsik's theory provides a persuasive theory for explaining the signing of the European Court of Human Rights, my finding demonstrates that it cannot be generalized into other realms of human rights decision of states as suggested in his article. This finding also has policy implications for newly transitioned states. Policymakers and human rights practitioners have been asking important questions regarding the priority of building democracy as opposed to restoring justice by holding previous government officials accountable after transition. Certainly, these two are not incompatible goals at all, but often the priority and focus matters due to the limited resources and energy of the new society. My study shows that, empirically, transitional justice can be, and is more likely to be, achieved after a country becomes a more consolidated democracy. Thus, elapse of time in transitional democracies is not always a negative sign for restoring justice and holding past perpetrators accountable. Domestic Advocacy Groups Contrary to a conclusion drawn from many case studies, I could not find a statistical evidence for the role of domestic advocacy groups in initiating human rights trials as seen in Table 2_4?5 However, the domestic advocacy groups do have a positive and statistically significant effect on the repeated use of trials. Figure 2-5 shows that a

25 It is probable that the measure of human rights NGOs itself is not reliable. Although I used the most comprehensive dataset that are available but it still is imperfect measure with intra- and extrapolation of sparse data points.

62

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state with more advocacy groups for transitional justice has a higher probability of repeatedly using human rights trials after transition. In other words, domestic advocacy groups are a significant factor affecting the persistent and frequent use of human rights trials after transition.

10

95% confidence interval -

Hazard ratio

8

o

~

6

N ell

4

"E ell I

2

o ~--------~~---------r----------~--------~~ o 100 50 150 200 Number of Human Rigths NGOs

Figure 2-5. Effect of Domestic Advocacy Groups on the Use of Human Rights Trials

This empirical finding is important because it shows that in addition to outside factors such as neighbor's experience, endogenous efforts such as domestic advocacy groups are an important determinant of transitional justice processes. It suggests that although domestic advocacy groups are empirically not relevant in explaining the launch of transitional human rights trials, it is critical in making transitional justice efforts persist over time. This finding supports the observations from the field regarding the critical role

63

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of domestic groups in determining the success of transitional justice processes (Kritz 2004: 23; Hayner 2004: 45,47). It also supports my theoretical framework, which is a combination of social movement theory and transnational advocacy networks approach. Legal Tradition

A state with the British legal tradition is less likely to use transitional human rights trials. Having a common law system decreases the hazard of using trials by 79 percent, holding all other variables constant. In other words, the hazard of a state with the Continental civil law system using human rights trials is 7 times greater than that of a state with a common law system. Although this finding differs from Poe and Tate's (1994) finding that countries with a common law system have better human rights practice, it still is consistent with Simmons' (2008) recent finding of the negative impact of the British legal tradition on international human rights treaty ratification. When combined with Simmons' finding, states with the British legal tradition, when controlled for all other relevant factors as democracy and repression, are less likely to pursue human rights policies domestically and internationally. This is an interesting finding and needs further examination of the impact ofthe British legal tradition on human rights practices in general. However, I do not have plausible causal stories linking these two. elements yet and need further research. One possible explanation is Sikkink and Walling's (2007) argument that the presence of private prosecutor provisions in some civil law system would make a difference.

2.3.3. Diagnostics

64

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Repeated Trial Use

Trial Initiation • Peru 2004

3 • Croatia1992

2

u@

0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0

0

§ o 0

0 0 0

0 0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

o}

0 0

-1

2

0

0

0 °

°0 °

~

0 008 00

ooClb

80 °

o

0

0 •

0

cP

°

0

0 0

-1

° 0 0

0

°0

°

° 0

0

0

-2

-2

• Brazil

o

200

400 600 Country 10 Number

800

1000

0

f

0 °

!'8 ~ ~o 800 00°0 0

e

00 0

CID

8

0

0

0

• Portugal eMail eBrazii

o

200

400 600 Country 10 Number

800

1000

Figure 2-6. Outlier Plots for Trial Initiation and the Repeated Trial Use

One of many advantages of the Cox models is its diagnostics for the deviant cases based on regression residuals. I found several country cases which defy the predictions of my models. For trial initiation, two outliers - Croatia and Brazil- were found. Croatia had its first human rights trial in 1992 against the prediction and Brazil has not used a transitional trial even though my model strongly predicts that it should have. For the repeated use of trials, four outliers - Portugal, Brazil, Mali, and Peru - were found. These are the country cases which my models and existing hypotheses cannot easily explain and need further exploration with country experts and field researchers. These are either countries that have never used trials (Brazil) or states that have not used trials for a long time even though all the conditions predict that they should have used it 65

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sooner.26 Brazil is an interesting outlier since all of its neighbors in Latin America had human rights trials and the country shares many common attributes with those other countries. My models predict Brazil should have used a human rights trial since 93 percent of its cultural neighbors already held trials in 2004, its level of democracy and consolidation is relatively high (Polity score = 8), and it had active human rights NGOs working. Portugal is also an interesting case since it has not used human rights trials since its initial trial in 1980. My model strongly predicts that Portugal should have had another trial sooner since 71 percent of its cultural neighbors had trials and it is consolidated democracy (Polity score = 10). However, contrary to the prediction, Portugal did not have another trial in 24 years. The experience of Portugal suggests that we may need different theory for the pioneers of human rights trials since Portugal was the first country that held human rights trials and cannot be easily explained with the current model. 27 A careful examination is needed to test the relevance of existing hypotheses and even to formulate a new hypothesis based on a case study in these unique countries.

2.4. Conclusions

26 Portugal has not used trials in 24 years since 1980 and Mali has not used trials in 11 years since 1993. In part, the Portugal case is a database problem since the Transitional Trials Database coded from 1980 and

Portugal had trials in 1974, 1975, and 1978. In addition, Peru had human rights trials in 2004 against the

prediction of my model but a similar problem lies with Peru since it had a human rights trial in 1978. 27 Due to the initial design of the Transitional Trials Database, the pattern of transitional trials between 1974 and 1978 could not be observed due to the periodization. Therefore, I have a problem ofleft truncation because a few states turned out to have used human rights trials between 1974 and 1978 even before the case in Portugal. There were human rights trials of the Greek junta leaders in 1974 and 1975 and also there were human rights trials in Peru in 1978. Nevertheless, my analysis is not too much distortion since the overall trends in transitional trials suggest that number of state using trials has been growing since 1980.

66

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In sum, very strong evidence for the diffusion of transitional human rights trials was found. Between two mechanisms, it is cultural similarity, rather than geographic proximity, that determined the diffusion of human rights trials. Not only the hazard of initiating a trial but also that of continuously using trials increases as trial experience increased in a country's cultural neighbors. In addition, three factors were proven to be important in affecting the likelihood of persistent and frequent human rights trials in transitional countries - democracy and its consolidation, domestic advocacy groups, and legal tradition. First, transitional human rights trials were more likely to be used by more democratic countries and the probability increased with democratic consolidation. Thus, not only the level of democracy but also the level of consolidation is an important determinant in transitional justice practices. This finding has a significant practical implication for activists by suggesting an importance of timing in transitional trials. Often, victims and activists quest for immediate justice after transition but my study shows that, empirically, belated transitional justice is not only possible but also more likely as democracy consolidates. Second, domestic advocacy groups for transitional justice, especially domestic human rights NOOs, were a key factor that guaranteed persistent and frequent human rights trials after transition. Thus, mature democracy and active civil society are two key guarantors of the success of transitional justice processes. Finally, human rights trials are less likely to be observed in states with the British common law tradition. This finding gave us another research question regarding the influence of the British legal traditions in a state's human rights practices in general. On the other hand, hypotheses on the effect of a state's respect for human rights, 67

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types of transition, truth commission experience, and domestic economy were empirically not supported in my research. In other words, these factors may be an important element in explaining single or multiple country cases, but their validity does not extend to global sample of all transitional countries.

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3. The Establishment of Truth Commissions in Transitional States

3.1. Introduction· Between 1982 and 2004, 28 countries have established a truth commission to investigate past history of state violence and human rights violations. The number of the commissions itself increases if countries like Uruguay and South Korea which have established more than one commission are aqditiona1ly considered. Uruguay established truth commissions both in 1985 and in 2002?8 The Korean government, under President Kim Dae Jung, a Nobel peace prize laureate, established both the 4.3 Committee and the Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths in 2000. Scholars additionally identified a couple of countries which have established the commission after 2004 (Fiji, Solomon Islands, Liberia) and many countries are considering establishing a truth commission (Kenya, Mexico, Poland, Bosnia and Herzegovina). The sheer number of truth commissions and countries considering the adoption reveal the increasing importance of a truth commission. Some truth commissions - e.g. Argentina, Chile, and South Africa - are well-known and more influential than others. Many are less prominent and some even could not finish their mandates and even disbanded halfway (Bolivia, Ecuador). However, the increasing adoption of a truth commission in transitional societies itself is a significant phenomenon regardless of their success and failure. Figure 3-1 demonstrates the increase of truth commissions in the

28 Uruguay established the Investigative Commission on the Situation of Disappeared People and Its Causes in 1985 to investigate human rights violations occurred between 1973 and 1982. The commission worked for seven months and published its final report in the same year. Uruguay also established the Peace Commission in 2000 by presidential decree to examine human rights violations between 1973 and 1985. The Commission published its final report in 2002.

69

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world since 1982. The number of countries using a truth commission steadily increased after the well-known case of 1983 Argentine National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP). The graph also shows that the adoption rate slightly increased after the prominent example ofthe South African TRC. For the list of countries with truth commissions, see Table 3-1.

30

I

I

I I

I

Arg$tina

I South:Africa

I I

I I

CONA\DEP ~

<1> .0

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20

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()

TIRC

I I

10

I

I I I I

0 1980

1983

1986

1989

1992 Year

1995

1998

2001

2004

Figure 3-1. Cumulative Number of Transitional States using Truth Commissions

Table 3-1. Truth Commission in the World, Year 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988

Countries Bolivia Argentina Uruguay Philippines Uganda

1982~2004

Numbers 1 1 0 1 2 0 0

Cum. Number 1 2 2 3 5 5 5 70

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1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

0 Nepal Chile Chad Germany El Salvador

Haiti Burundi South Africa Ecuador Guatemala Nigeria Indonesia Republic of Korea Panama Peru Timor-Leste Serbia and Montenegro Ghana Sierra Leone Central African Republic Liberia Paraguay Democratic Republic of Congo

5

3

8

0 2 0 0

8 10

3

13

1 1 0 2 1

14 1515 17 18 21 24 27 28

3 3

3 1

10

10

This chapter was designed to answer why and when states establish a truth

commission after transition to investigate human rights violations occurred in previous regimes. Although Dancy and Poe (2006) recently started to examine the political factors that lead to the decision to establish truth commissions by applying quantitative methods, my project, which started in 2004, is the first systematic and global analysis to this question. Both studies agree that there was no previous quantitative research on the establishment of truth commission (Dancy and Poe 2006: 7). In this chapter, eight hypotheses are tested: diffusion, democracy, respect for human rights, domestic advocacy groups, international actors, types of transition, human rights trial experience, and domestic economy. An event history dataset were constructed and the Cox proportional hazards model was used. I found strong evidence for the diffusion of truth commissions. Contrary to the diffusion of human rights trials in the previous chapter, geographic proximity rather than cultural similarity turned out to be a medium of diffusion. In addition, the impact of truth 71

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commission experience in neighbors was most effective in the year of transition and diminished over time. Second, domestic advocacy groups for transitional justice were an important factor affecting the establishment of truth commissions. Third, international actors measured by U.N. peacekeeping operations turned out to be a highly significant element. Thus, my study shows that not only domestic factors like active civil society but also international elements such as the truth commission experience in neighbors and the U.N. involvement affects the establishment of truth commissions.

3.2. Data and Hypotheses 3.2.1. Operationalization: Truth Commission In her seminal work, Hayner states that except for two or three well-known cases, truth commissions have been relatively less studied despite their increasing popularity. She argues that no definition have been identified in previous research (Hayner 1994). Many studies on truth commission developed their arguments without even examining the definition or some distinct features of truth commissions, as noted by a few critics (Skaar 1999; Ensalaco 1994). This is partly due to the fact that most studies have been done by law scholars who were mainly interested injunctions and effects oftruth commissions to achieve transitional justice and restore the rule of law than truth commissions themselves. However, it is necessary to define the function, characteristics, and elements of truth commissions because the diverse forms and names of commissions are highly complicated (Brahm 2005). I defined a truth commission as an official government body temporarily set up to investigate a past history of human rights violations and to submit an official report. 72

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This definition is my modification of Hayner's definition. She defined a truth commissions as "a body set up to investigate a past history of violation of human rights in a particular country - which can include violations by the military or other governmental forces or by armed opposition forces (Hayner 1994)." I decided to use my definition because temporariness of the commission is a key aspect that distinguishes a truth commission from other forms of human rights agencies. In addition, I believe that the intention of writing a report, which is a manifest example ofreinterpretative aspects of transitional justice measures, is essential. Hayner argued that four characteristics are distinct. Truth commissions "focus on the past; investigate a pattern of abuses over a period of time, rather than a specific event; are a temporary body, typically in operation for six months to two years, and completing its work with the submission of a report; and are officially sanctioned, authorized, or employed by the state." The purpose of the commission is described well in Pasqualucci' s (1994) statement that the purpose is "to issue official reports which would reveal once and for all that which had been so long hidden in secrecy: the truth." The goal ofthe commission can be summarized into six elements as suggested by scholars: (1) to discover, clarify, and formally acknowledge past abuses; (2) to respond to specific needs of victims such as facilitating a victim's right to know, promoting psychological healing, and restoring the dignity of victims; (3) to contribute to justice and accountability; (4) to outline institutional responsibility and recommend reforms; (5) to promote reconciliation and reduce conflict over the past; and (6) to support the legitimacy and stability of the new regime following the atrocity (Hayner 2002; Minow 1998; Mendez 1997; Pasqualucci 1994). Not all commissions purport to achieve all six goals but most commissions 73

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include some combinations of these six goals in their preambles and a mission statement. Truth commissions are headed bY-one or several commissioner(s). In an extreme case, 21 commissioners were appointed in case of Democratic Republic of Congo in 2004. The number of staff also varies from three (Guatemala) to three hundred (South Africa). Truth commissions are established by a president (Argentina, Chile), national congress (South Africa, South Korea), or peace accords (EI Salvador, Guatemala). Because truth commissions are temporary bodies, their length is set in advance with the possibility of an extension. The length of operation also varies from six weeks (Central African Republic) to eight years (Korea). Some commissions are empowered with certain rights and the privilege such as subpoena, search and seizure, witness protection, and/or personal amnesty. All commissions are endowed with funds, resources, and legal status. They are given mandates - not only temporal and spatial jurisdiction but also mandates regarding the parties and issues to be investigated. Finally, truth commissions submit a report on the issues involved with some policy recommendations. I created a Truth Commission in the World Database. 29 For my dissertation project, I created a binary measure of whether a country has adopted truth commissions

I started to create a database based on Hayner's (2002) research in 2004. I also examined the United States Institute for Peace Truth Commission Digital Collection, U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practice, and annual reports and weekly newsletter of the International Center for Transitional Justice. I additionally surveyed other articles and monographs on truth commissions. Finally, I consulted ongoing database projects - Sikkink and Walling (2007), Brahm (2005), and Dancy and Poe (2006) - in order to crosscheck my samples. The most updated list of truth commissions in the world can be found in my recent joint work (Kim, Brahm, and Dancy 2008). We started this project based on our agreement that there is a lack of consensus as to what constitutes the universe of truth commission. This project was designed, first to define a truth commission, and second, to create a database that could address many relevant factors of truth commission including name of the commission, types of transition, date and duration of a commission, temporal and geographic mandate, privileges and limitation, personnel composition and budget of a commission, final reports, policy recommendations, scope of mandate, international involvement, and the existence of alternative transitional justice measures. 29

74

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and when. 3o Data shows that 28 countries have established truth commissions by 2004 with a mean duration of 8 years after transition and the standard deviation of 5.4 years. I am aware of the dangers of a binary measure, which would mask a complexity of truth commissions. A binary measure treats effective and powerful commissions and ineffective and weak ones as the same despite the fact that truth commissions vary i~ their nature, size, composition, power, and effectiveness. However, my focus on the decision to establish a truth commission is important regardless of the effectiveness of truth commissions. A ful1list of truth commissions in the world is Table 3_2. 31

Table 3-2. A List of Truth Commission in the World, Country 'Bolivia Argentina Uruguay

Philippines Uganda Nepal

Chile Chad

Truth Commission National Commission of Inquiry into Disappearance National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons Investigative Commission on the Situation of Disappeared People and Its Causes Presidential Committee on Human Rights Commission of Inquiry into Violation of Human Rights Commission ofInquiry to Locate the Persons Disappeared during the Panchayet Period National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Inquiry on the Crimes and Misappropriations

Created President

1982~2004

Duration

Mandate

1982-1984 (24 months) 1983-1984 (9 months) 1985 (7 months)

1967-1982

President

1986-1987

1972-1986

President

1986-1995

1962-1986

President Parliament

1976-1983

Report No Yes

1985 1973-1982

Yes

1985 No Yes

1994 Prime Minister

1990-1991

President

1990-1991 (9 months) 1990-1992

President

1961-1990

Yes

1991 1973-1990

Yes

1991 1982-1990

Yes

1992

30 This binary time-series cross-national dataset was also converted into an event history dataset where the hazard of establishing truth commissions was measured as the dependent variable. 31 Some of truth commissions are controversial. For example, Skaar includes Brazil (1985) into her study of truth commissions which Hayner categorizes as an "independent truth commission-like project." The case of South Korean Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths (2000) and Uruguay Peace Commission (2000) are also controversial due to their limited scope of inquiry. Hayner (2004) argues against including them into the truth commission category due to its focus on individuals rather than a systemic pattern (South Korea) and its limited power and the number of personnel (Uruguay). Hayner herself is undecided on the cases of the Philippines (1986) and Rwanda (1992), which she finally excluded in her later work.

75

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Germany

El Salvador Haiti Burundi South Africa Ecuador Guatemala

Nigeria

Indonesia Uruguay

Committed by the Ex-President Habn\ His Accomplices and/or Accessories Commission of Inquiry for the Assessment of History and Consequences of the SED Dictatorship in Germany Commission on the Truth for El Salvador National Commission for Truth and Justice International Commission of Inquiry Truth and Reconciliation Commission Truth and Justice Committee Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence That Have Caused the Guatemalan People to Suffer Commission of Inquiry for the Investigation of Human Rights Violations Commission for Human Rights violations in East Timor Peace Commission

Parliament

1992-1994

1949-1989

Yes

1994 Peace accord President UNSC

1992-1993 (8 months) 1995-1996 (10 months) 1995-1996

1980-1991

Yes

1993 1991-1994

Yes

1997 1993-1995

Yes

1996 Parliament

1995-2000

1960-1994

Yes

1998 1979-1996

Peace accord

1996-1997 (5 months) 1997-1999 (19 months)

President

1999-2001

1966-1999

Ministry

1962-1996

No Yes

1999

Yes

2002 1999

1999

Yes

2000 President

2000-2001

1973-1985

Yes

2002 South Korea South Korea Panama Peru Timor Leste Serbia and Montenegro Ghana Sierra Leone Central African Republic Liberia Paraguay

National Committee for Investigation of the Truth about the Jeju April 3rd Event Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths Truth Commission Truth and Reconciliation Commission Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Truth and Reconciliation National Reconciliation Commission Truth and Reconciliation Commission Truth and Reconciliation Commission Truth and Reconciliation Commission Truth and Justice Commission

Parliament

2000-

1947-1954

Yes

2004 President

2000-2002

1961-1990

Yes

2002 President President UNTAET

2001-2002 (15 months) 2001-2003 (24 months) 2001-

1968-1989

Yes

2002 1980-2000

Yes

2003 1974-1999

Oct.

2005 President

2002-2003

1991-2001

2002-2004

1957-2001

No Yes

2004 Peace accord

2002-

Yes

2004 2003 (6 weeks)

Peace accord Parliament

1991-1999 1960-2003

20032003-

1954-1989

76

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Democratic Republic of Congo

Truth and Reconciliation Commission

Peace accord

2004~

In addition to the variation in a state's·choice of truth commissions, there is also an important variation in the timing of establishment. Popular belief is that that states establish truth commission immediately after transition since many prominent truth commissions in Latin America and Africa were established immediately after transition (Argentina, Chile, South Africa, Guatemala). A few would argue that South Africa is not a good model since it took 18 months to establish the TRC. However, these 18 months were the period spent in designing and debating a desirable format of a truth commission rather than being a period of a struggle for the establishment of a truth commission.

8

U) Q)

-

6

.t: t: ::l

0

()

'0 ....Q)

4

.0

E ::l

Z

2

o

o

5

10

15

20

Year since Transition

Figure 3-2. The Number of Countries with Commissions by the Year of Establishment

77

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However, there is genuine variation in the timing of establishment as summarized in Figure 3-2. As expected, 12 countries (43%) established truth commissions within three years oftransition. However, there are 11 countries (39%) that decided to establish their first truth commissions after ten years oftransition. For example, Korea had its first commission in 2000, thirteen years after the democratic transition in 1987. Other countries like Paraguay, Ghana, and Peru established their first commission more than fifteen years after transition. This graph supports my previous argument that Huntington's model, which only explains a half oftotal establishment, is not an adequate theory.

3.2.2. Case Selection, Hypotheses, and Operationalization Since both truth commissions and transitional trials are transitional justice measures, the same criterion was used for case selection. For the complete list of transitional countries included, see Table 2-2. In addition, there is overlap in the hypotheses that are tested in both chapters. The hypotheses of diffusion, democracy, respect for human rights, domestic advocacy groups, types of transition, and domestic economy were also tested in this chapter. To avoid duplication, I will not explain in detail these hypotheses and their operationalization. There are three differences in the hypotheses tested between two chapters. First, the legal tradition hypothesis was not examined in truth commission establishment. Although scholars suggest the possible effect of legal tradition on the use of human rights trials, few made similar arguments on the establishment of truth commissions. This hypothesis was also not considered relevant in other research on the adoption of truth 78

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commissions (Dancy and Poe 2006). Second, since a major alternative to truth commissions are trials, I used the trial experience as an indicator of the existence of alternative transitional justice measures. Finally, one important hypothesis international actors - was tested in this chapter. The role of the U.N. in promoting truth commission has been strongly argued by many scholars (BuergenthaI1994; Guest 1995; Bongiorno 2001-2002; Bassiouni 2002; Matheson 2006). The involvement of the U.N. was measured by the U.N. peacekeeping operations in the country following Dancy and Poe (2006).32 The summary statistics are in Table 3-3.

Table 3-3. Summary Statistics

Variable Dependent Variable Year until truth commission

N

Mean

SD

Min

Max

1239

8.29

5.40

1

25

1239 1239 1239 1203 1215 1239 1238 1239 1239 1239 1239 1234 1236

0.11 1.13 0.08 3.77 2.67 1.98 1.76 0.12 0.08 0.25 0.32 6.88 2.56

0.16 2.30 0.15 5.56 1.09 1.05 0.88 0.33 0.27 0.43 0.47 1.23 8.53

0 0 0 -9 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.02 -50.20

1 15.56 1

Independent Variable Precedents in geographic neighbors Geographic precedents x Time(ln) Precedents in cultural neighbors Democracy State repression International commitment Domestic advocacy groups (In) UN Peacekeeping Operation Transition from civil war Transition of state creation Trial experience GDP per capita (In) Annual rate of GDP growth

10 5 3 4.51 1 1 1 1 10.16 106.30

32 Data was collected using the document in the official website of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (http;//www.un.orgfDepts/dpko/dpko/home.shtml).

79

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3.3. Analysis 3.3.1. Cox Proportional hazards Model

In line with the previous chapter, a Cox model was used. I decided not to have another model for the repeated establishment of truth commissions since the number of cases is too small (only Korea and Uruguay) to extend my analysis. The Cox models with exact partial likelihood to handle tied observations and robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by country were used. 33 The functional form is:

where ho (t) is an unspecified baseline hazard function and

fJ'X is the regression

parameters and covariates. The correlations among the independent variables were checked and the same diagnostics were used. Grambsch and Themeau's tests were conducted and the global test did not yield a significant test statistics suggesting that there is no overall violation of the proportional hazards assumption (p

= 0.281).

However, the truth commission

experience in geographic neighbors variable violated the assumption in variable-specific tests and I included variables measuring linear time-interaction effects (BoxSteffensmeier and Zorn 2001: 978).34 Missing values for some of the explanatory variables limit the number of observation under investigation to 94 country cases.

I also estimated logit models with time dependence addressed with cubic spline (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). The results were same without major differences. 34 Various specifications of time interactions terms were used and evaluated in the models including loglinear time effect, square terms, and cubic terms. As expected, a linear time interaction term yielded the best result and was included in the model. The results of Grambsch and Themeau's nonproportionality tests, correlation tables, Schoenfeld residual plots against survival times, Martingale residual plots against the value of independent variables, and Cox-Snell residual plots are available upon request. 33

80

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3.3.2. Analysis

Table 3-4. Effects on the Establishment of Truth Commissions in Transitional States

Variable Diffusion TC in geographic neighbors TC in geographic neighbors x Time TC in cultural neighbors Democracy Democracy Respect for Human Rights State repression International commitment Domestic Advocacy Groups Domestic HR NGOs (In) International Involvement UN Peacekeeping Operation Types of Transition Transition from civil war Transition of state creation Alternative Measures Transitional Human Rights Trials Domestic Economy GDP per capita (In) Annual rate of GDP growth Time at risk Number of subjects Number of events Log pseudo likelihood X2 p-value

Coef.

Truth Commission Establishment Std. Err. ,e-value Joint Significance X2=17.83 (p<0.001)

11.49'" -0.61'"

2.75 0.19

<0.001 0.002

1.92

1.62

0.236

0.10

0.07

0.189

X2=2.06 (p=0.357) 0.06 -0.42

0.29 0.29

0.842 1.151

0.87*'

0.38

0.021

1.60"

0.69

0.021

1.94' -1.19

1.09 2.00

0.075 0.554

0.73

0.51

0.148

-0.44 -0.02

0.28 0.03

0.113 0.528

i=3.67 (p=0.159)

i=2.80 (p=0.247)

1170 94 25 -54.41 64.19 <0.0001

Note: The coefficients are from the Cox model with an exact partial likelihood method to handling ties and the coefficients and standard errors were adjusted for the correlation within the same units (STATA 9.2). Significant levels: ••• p < 0.01; " p < 0.05; p < 0.1.

Table 3-4 reports the results assessing the effects of the independent variables on the establishment of truth commissions. The result provides strong support for hypotheses on diffusion, domestic advocacy groups, and international actors. On the 81

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contrary, hypotheses on democracy, respect for human rights, types of transition, human rights trial experience, and domestic economy were statistically not significant.

35

Diffosion A state is more likely to establish a truth commission if truth commissions have already been used in its neighbors. This is consistent with the findings from the use of human rights trials. Therefore, I can make a general statement that transitional countries are more likely to use transitional justice measures if such measures have already been used by neighbors. In both trials and truth commissions, the precedents in neighbors were a key factor affecting the likelihood and timing of the adoption. This finding strongly confirms the diffusion theory derived from policy studies and international norms literatures. When controlled for many relevant domestic factors, neighbors' transitional justice experience is still highly significant. It also confirms the existence of the international opportunity structure for the transitional justice advocacy. Although it still is difficult to understand the exact mechanism through which neighbor's experience affect the domestic structure, my analysis proves that it has a significant effect. I also tested two possible diffusion paths of a truth commission by including two concepts of neighbors. Contrary to my finding from transitional trial adoption, geographic proximity, rather than cultural similarity, determined the diffusion oftruth commissions. 36 Table 3-4 shows that when controlled for geographic neighbor's truth commission experience, the impact of truth commissions in culturally similar neighbors The respect for human rights variables jointly are not significant (X2=2.06, df=2, p=0.357) and the domestic economy variables jointly are not significant (X2=2.80, df=2,p=0.247). 36 A test for the joint impact of the precedents in geographically proximate neighbors variable and its timeinteraction effects was statistically highly significant (X2=17.83, df=2, p=O.OOI). The test of their linear combination (b Regional Precedents + b Regional Precedents x Time) was also significant at the 0.05 level but became statistically undistinguishable from zero in 14 years after transition. This was calculated using the test and lincom commands in STATA 9.2. 82 35

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is undistinguishable from zero. This difference indicates that more than a single diffusion mechanism work within the diffusion process of transitional justice norms. This finding refutes an idea that there is a single diffusion mechanism for a particular norm. My study shows that even a single norm of transitional justice could have at least two different mechanisms of diffusion depending on the measures. A next step would be exploring the exact diffusion paths of trials and truth commissions using case study and also discover underlying causes of diffusion. For example, when South Africa was considering TRC, experts from Argentina and Chile were invited to share their experience. In the Korean case, activists and politicians visited Taiwan to learn their transitional justice processes. In addition, the negative sign and significance of the coefficients of the time interaction terms suggest that the impact of neighbor's truth commission experience decreases as time passes in transitional societies. This diminishing impact over time was not present in case of transitional trial use. The impact of neighbors' truth commissions, which reduces over time, is statistically significant until 13 years of transition but become undistinguishable from zero after 14 years. In other words, the impact of truth commission experience in near neighbors is at its apex in the year of transition and decrease as time passes in transitional societies. It also suggests that if a country established a truth commission long after the transition, other factors like domestic advocacy groups and international actors may become more important than neighbor's experience. In truth commission establishment, diffusion is a factor which explains the immediate adoption rather than delayed adoption of a truth commission. This can be represented in two figures drawn from my model.

83

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Immediately after Transition 200

_

5 Years after Transition 200

Hazard ratio

_

Hazard ratio 95% confidence interval

95% confidence interval

150

150

o

o

"" ~

~

~

~

'E 100

'E 100

~

50

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% Percentatge of Regional Precedents(%)

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% Percentatge of Regional Precedents(%)

Figure 3-3. Changes in Hazard by Neighbors' Truth Commission Experience and Year

Figure 3-3 shows the changes in hazard of establishing a truth commission after transition as the percentage of neighbors with truth .commissions increases from 0 to 40 percent. The left panel shows the changes in the hazard in the year of transition and the right panel shows the changes of the hazard in the fifth years of transition. (The line which displays the changes in the hazard becomes even flatter if years beyond fifth years are considered.) The hazard of establishing truth commissions increases more dramatically in the left panel, which suggests that the impact of neighbor's experience is most effective in the year of transition. My model predicts that, for each additional 10 percent increase, the hazard of establishing a truth commission increases by 215 percent in the year oftransition while the same 10 percent increase would bring only about an 18 percent increase in the fifth year of transition. 84

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Latin America (Mean=30%)

Asia (Mean=10%) 60

-

60

Hazard ratio 95% confidence interval

-

Hazard ratio 95% confidence interval

40

40 0

0

~ N '"

.~

ro

0:::

'E

'E

'" '"

N

'"

J:

J:

20

20

o

O~---r---r---T--~----r 5

15 10 20 Year since Transition

25

o

5

15 20 10 Year since Transition

25

Figure 3-4. Changes in Hazard of Truth Commission over Time by Precedents

Figure 3-4 tells the same story from a different viewpoint. It shows the changes in the hazard as time passes in transitional societies. The left panel shows the changes in hazard of a hypothetical country whose 10% of neighbors used truth commissions at the time of transitions and the right panel shows that ofa state with 30% of such neighbors. Each panel represents a certain region of the world since the mean percentage of countries with a truth commission in Asia is about 10% and that of Latin America is about 30%. The figure shows that the hazard of establishing truth commissions decreases in both panels as time passes after transition. Thus, truth commission experience in neighbors has a substantial impact on the hazard of newly transitioned countries in its earlier period. This suggests the importance of both location and timing in truth 85

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commission establishment. For example, if 20 percent of a state's neighbors have already used truth commissions at the time of its transition, the hazard is 2.5 times greater than that of a state whose 20 percent of its neighbors 'ending up establishing commissions by the fifth year of transition. 37 What factor would properly explain this decreasing impact of neighbor's truth commission experience, which was not present in the human rights trial case? The answer could be pursued from two angles - from a supply side and from a demand side. First, truth commissions are temporary bodies with a mean duration of about 2 years. Thus, it is possible that the cross-border effect of truth commissions is at its peak during the tenure - either upon the inauguration or upon publishing a report - and decreases as time passes. Second, from a demand side, it is possible that the neighbor's truth commission precedents are mostly sought immediately after transition when a society actively seeks and debates among diverse transitional justice measures. My finding of diminishing impact of neighbor's experience suggests that impetus of diffusion of truth commission is in countries adopting truth commissions. Domestic Advocacy Groups The existence of active and strong advocacy groups for transitional justice was a significant factor affecting a state's decision to establish a truth commission. Figure 3-5 shows that the hazard of establishing a truth commission increases as the number of domestic human rights NGOs increases from 0 to 100. This finding is consistent with the observations drawn from scholars and practitioners concerning the role of civil society. When combined with my finding from the previous chapter, it can be generally stated that This was calculated by dividing the hazard ratio of a state with 20% regional precedents in the year of transition (9.95) by the hazard ratio of a state with 20% cultural precedents in the fifth year (3.72).

37

86

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strong advocacy groups are necessary for the adoption and continued use of transitional justice measures.

150

0

95% confidence interval - - Hazard ratio

100

+:

III

0:::

"E

isIII

J:

50

o ~--------r-------~--------~--------r-------~ o

20

40 60 Number of Human Rigths NGOs

80

100

Figure 3-5. Effect of Domestic Advocacy Groups on Truth Commission Establishment

In sum, domestic activism matters in finding the truth and restoring justice in transitional societies. It not only matters for the onset of the transitional justice process but also for the continuation of the process. My finding is significant because the previous argument on the role of domestic advocacy groups based on case studies is now additionally confirmed by cross-national studies. However, there is one difference that should be noted. The hypothesis on the effect of domestic advocacy groups was not supported in case of human rights trial initiation. The variable measuring the number of domestic human rights NGOs was statistically significant in both truth commission 87

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establishment and the repeated use of trials but not in the trial initiation. Why was the role of domestic advocacy groups not effective in trial initiation? One possible answer is that human rights trials in most cases do not require the same level of activism needed to establish truth commissions or make transitional trials persistent. It is possible for a few plaintiffs to file a lawsuit against the former government officials on the charge of human rights violations. In contrast, establishing a truth commission, which is usually done by presidential decree or Congressional legislation, requires more activism and support from civil society. It is also the case for the continuation of human rights trials in transitional countries. My conjecture can also be supported by another difference between trials and truth commissions. The level of democracy, which was highly significant in case of trial initiation, was not a relevant factor in truth commission establishment. It is probable that the level of democracy which highly correlates with the rule oflaw in the country is more important for trial initiation than truth commission establishment. 38 If a state has a fully functioning rule of law system, it is possible for a few victims and lawyers to bring former government agents to a court. The same may not apply to the establishment of a truth commission. Truth commissions are usually established by a presidential decree,

-

legislation, or peace accord. More organized activism is required to affect the decision of the president or the majority of congresspersons. International Actors

The rule of law could be a relevant factor affecting transitional human rights trials. However, I could not include this variable in my analysis due to a lack of credible measure. There are two measures available: Development Research Group and World Bank Institute's Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002 and Political Risk Services Group's Time Series of International Country Risk Guide Data, 1982-1995. 38

88

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The involvement of international actors measured by the presence of a U.N. peacekeeping operation at a country in a given year was a highly significant factor affecting the government's decision to establish a truth commission. This finding is also consistent with the conclusions drawn from Dancy and Poe (2006). My model predicts that that the hazard of establishing truth commissions increases by a factor of 4.95 when there was an involvement of international actors. In other word, a probability of having a truth commission is about five times greater ifthere is an international involvement. My finding strongly supports the arguments made by many scholars and specifically supports the position of scholars who maintain the lead role of the U.N. However, it is also important to test whether international nongovernmental actors are also important since the activities of these groups promoting truth commissions recently increased. Although the data is not available on these variables, a preliminary investigation is possible with limited data. Table 3-5 reports the result from a model designed to test the role of international NOOs in truth commission establishment. I used a different measure - the number of Amnesty International press releases. Ramos, Ron, and Thoms (2007) collected the data from 1986 to 2000 arguing that press releases are an excellent measure of Amnesty's advocacy. Due to the limited case selection and periodization of the original data, the result only account for about 60 percent of my sample. Thus, the result does not provide solid evidence to support the role of international human rights NOOs in truth commission establishment. Nevertheless, the result shows that the impact of international NOOs is still positive and statistically significant at the 0: 1 level.

89

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Table 3-5. Effects on the Establishment of Truth Commissions (Amnesty International)

Variable Diffusion TC in geographic neighbors TC in geographic neighbors x Time TC in cultural neighbors Democracy Democracy Respect for Human Rights State repression International commitment Domestic Advocacy Groups Domestic HR NGOs (In) International Involvement Amnesty International News Releases Types of Transition Transition from civil war Transition of state creation Alternative Measures Transitional Human Rights Trials Domestic Economy GDP per capita (In) Annual rate of GDP growth Time at risk Number of subjects Number of events Log pseudo likelihood 2

X

p-value

Truth Commission Establishment p-value Coef. Std. Err. 12.98'" -0.67*'

4.26 0.31

0.002 0.032

2.73

2.35

0.245

0.10

0.09

0.276

0.19 -0.65

0.42 0.40

0.653 0.106

0.90'

0.49

0.067

0.09*

0.49

0.091

2.30 -0.17

1.48 2.21

0.120 0.939

0.61

0.68

0.368

-0.84' -0.01

0.49 0.04

0.082 0.899

772 85 15 -27.67 44.52 <0.0001

Note: The coefficients are from the Cox model with an exact partial likelihood method to handling ties and the coefficients and standard errors were adjusted for the correlation within the same units (STATA 9.2). Significant levels: ". p < 0.01; ,. P < 0.05; P <: 0.1.

90

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95% confidence interval

100

o

- - Hazard ratio

~

o

________.-______-.________.-________.-______ 10 20 30 40 Number of Amnesty International Press Releases

~

50

Figure 3-6. Effect of International Nongovernmental Actors (Amnesty International)

Figure 3-6 demonstrates the effect of international NGOs on the hazard of truth commission establishment when the number of Amnesty International press releases changes from minimum (0) to maximum (50). The original data shows that although many transitional countries have not been a target of Amnesty International's advocacy, some - Serbia and Montenegro in 1999 (50 press releases), Indonesia in 1999 (35), Russia in 2000 (26), and Sierra Leone in 2000 (24) - received much focus after transition. An increase in the number of press releases by ten increases the hazard of establishing a truth commission by a, factor of2.45. In sum, my study shows that the involvement of international actors, either intergovernmental organizations as the U.N. or nongovernmental organizations as Amnesty International would contribute to the establishment of a truth commission. 91

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3.3.3. Diagnostics

Truth Commission Establishment 3

Serbia and MontenegrOU~anda

2002

2

Korea, R1fcUbIiC of

986

•

•

20 0

•

0

~

0

0

0

0

&

0

0 0

0 0

0

o

o

-1

0

00 0

-2

8

0

0

oo?

0

QJ 0 ~8 "0 '0 0 0

" ~ 0 0

000

'0 0

0

o0

•

Brazil

-3

o

200

400

600

800

1000

Country ID Number

Figure 3-7. Outlier Plot for Truth Commission Establishment

I found four country cases which defy the prediction of my model using deviant residuals. Again, I found that Brazil is an outlier which has not established a truth commission even though the model strongly predicts that it should have. My model predicted that Brazil should have established a truth commission since 78 percent of its neighbors already had truth commissions in 2004 and the country had active human rights NOOs. (The number of domestic human rights NOOs in Brazil 2004 is at 99 percentile in the whole sample.) Thus, throughout my three models of trial initiation,

trial use, and truth commission establishment, Brazil is a representative outlier. Some may argue that the 1985 truth commission established by the archbishop of Sao Paolo and 92

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World Council of Churches could be counted as a truth commission but it was not an official governmental effort. Exploring the Brazilian case of transitional justice in the future would make an important contribution in transitional justice literature. I also found three countries that have established a truth commission against the prediction of my model: Uganda (1986), Korea (2000), and Serbia and Montenegro (2002). Uganda established the Commission of Inquiry into Violation of Human Rights in 1986 by President Museveni. This commission was inaugurated in 1986 and finished its report in 1994. Scholars argued that, although it operated for eight years, the commission did not function properly (Quinn 2004). The Commission for Truth and Reconciliation in Serbia and Montenegro was also ineffective. The commission could not finish the report and it was effectively dismantled in 2003. In other words, there is not much objections to an argument that the truth commission cases in Uganda and Serbia and Montenegro are not successful cases. However, the 4.3 Committee in South Korea is somewhat different. It started its work in 2000, and finished, submitted, and published its report and ten volumes of archives in 2003. The final report was sanctioned by the Prime Minister after six months of scrutiny. President Roh Moo Hyun made an official apology in 2003 and participated in a memorial service in 2006. The commission is still effectively functioning screening the victims and engaging in a project of reparation and commemoration. It was also an exemplary precedent which contributed to two additional truth commissions in Korea Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths (2000) and Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2006). Active members of the 4.3 Committee were frequently invited and presented their views at the conference designed to help organize 93

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the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2006). Thus, the South Korean truth commission is a poorly predicted case that turned out to be successful.

3.4. Conclusion I have two suggestions for future research based on my cross-national statistical analyses of the adoption of transitional justice measures. First, a dialogue between nascent quantitative research and traditional qualitative research should take place in order to construct a theory of transitional justice measures. I found two junctures where researchers with different approaches can collaborate. The first juncture is theorybuilding. I found empirical evidence that the diffusion, democracy, domestic advocacy groups, international actors, and legal tradition are relevant. Some of my findings democracy, domestic advocacy groups, and international actors - are explained well by existing studies and supported by many field observations. However, other two empirical findings - diffusion and legal traditions - still lack plausible theories or causal stories. Further research is needed to explore what aspects of geographic proximity and cultural similarity playa key role in the diffusion process and how. It also is necessary to find out the source of diminishing impact of neighbor's truth commission experience. It is important to find out what aspects of the British legal tradition diminish the ability or willingness of states to hold past officials who committed human rights violations accountable and how. In addition, in conjunction with Simmons' (2008) finding, it is also important to study why and how the common law tradition negatively affects a state's domestic and international human rights policies. The second juncture is an outlier. Throughout my models, I found several outliers which cannot be easily explained with

94

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current models: Brazil, Croatia, Peru, Portugal, Mali, Uganda, Serbia and Montenegro, and South Korea. Since these are countries that cannot easily be understood with established models and hypotheses, detailed case studies are needed and I explore one of those outliers in following chapters. My second suggestion is for the improvement of quantitative research. The development of new databases and measurements is much needed. First, although students recently started to gather and create the data on truth commissions and trials, the field still lacks credible data on other important measures such as amnesty, reparation, or lustration. 39 In addition, the collaboration of creating, improving, and refining the existing data is also needed. Second, new variables measuring the diverse social and political phenomena that may affect or be affected by transitional justice measures should also be developed. For example, variables measuring international NOOs, actual demand for transitional justice, and the power balance between the outgoing and new regimes are necessary for future research.

39 The amnesty and pardon database, which is not yet available, is under construction by Louise Mallinder at the Queen's University Belfast and a comprehensive study of vetting which incorporates purge and lustration has recently started by Moira Lynch at the University of Minnesota.

95

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4. Korea and Jeju 4.3 Events

4.1. Introduction In Chapter 2 and 3, I answered the question of why transitional states use trials and truth commissions by using cross-national analyses. I found that neighbor's experience, advocacy groups, international actors, democracy and its consolidation, and legal tradition affect the adoption of transitional justice measures. In the following five chapters, I answered the same question using another research method - a case study. A case is "a spatially delimited phenomenon (a unit) observed at a single point in time or over some period of time (Gerring 2007: 19)." My case is the unexplored transitional justice process from 1948 to 2000 in South Korea focusing on the process toward the establishment of the 4.3 Committee. My research question is why did the Korean government establish the 4.3 Committee after 50 years since the end of the events and about 13 years after democratic transition?

My case study contributed to my dissertation in three aspects. First, a case study provided ground for cross-checking my conclusions drawn from the statistical analyses. I additionally evaluated the relative importance among various relevant factors. Second, I examined hypotheses that are not easily quantifiable such as history, culture, meaning, and power balance in my case study. These hypotheses were relevant but could not be included in my statistical analyses. Third, I created a causal story by linking relevant factors explaining the adoption of transitional justice measures using the Korean case. Although the causal effects were tested in my previous chapters, the causal mechanisms

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could not be explored. My case provided a historical context where I can explain how relevant factors work and work together. The 4.3 Committee was launched on April 28, 2000, the report was officially approved on October 15, 2003, and 15,095 victims have been registered. Although studies on the 4.3 events have been steadily increasing since the democratic transition, most studies have been focused on the process, characteristic, and implication ofthe 4.3 events (Yang 1988; 4.3 Research Institute 1999; Park 1988; Ko 1989; Yang 1995; Kang 2002; Huh 2003) and not on the transitional justice process. Only two documents exist which examine the transitional justice processes: one is a chapter written by Kim Jong Min (1999) titled "50 Years after 4.3" and the other is an unpublished manuscript by Kang Duk Hwan (unpublished) titled "Overview of the 4.3 Movement." These are important documents that have compiled transitional justice history from a journalistic viewpoint. 4o However, my dissertation provides the first academic analysis of the process both in Korean and international scholarship. Since no scholarly attention has given to the process of transitional justice, I conducted three months of preliminary field research in the summer of 2004 and eleven months of field research between September 2005 and July 2006 where I collected complete archives and interviewed over fifty activists, scholars, government officials, and victims and their family members. My case study is composed of five chapters. In Chapter 4, I layout my research design and provide historic background by examining not only modem history of Jeju Island but also that of the Korean peninsula. I also examine the detailed nature and Kim Jong Min was a fonner reporter in a local newspaper Jemin Ilbo and currently a senior staff member of the Task Force for the Report in the 4.3 Committee and Kang Duk Hwan was a fonner reporter in a local magazine Monthly Jeju and currently a director of the Office of the Victim Registration of the Jeju 4.3 under the Provincial 4.3 Special Committee. 40

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characteristics of human rights violations. In Chapter 5, I examine the earlier transitional justice attempts made by a few courageous individuals under the harsh suppression between 1954 and 1987. My focus is both on the transitional justice activism during this period and on the nature of the governmental suppression. In Chapter 6, I study the early period of the mass movement where the forgotten memories of massacres slowly gained local attention by the efforts of activists, scholars, and journalists. I examine transitional justice activism of each sector - social movement groups, media, and research - and then explain how separate activisms exerted an enormous influence on the whole Jeju society when their respective efforts were converged and concentrated in case of the excavation of the Darangshi cave in 1992. In Chapter 7, I examine the transitional justice process led by the Provincial 4.3 Committee focusing on their three core activities between 1993 and 1997 - investigation, mediation of ideologically opposed groups, and the petition movement. During this period, activism was mostly confined in Jeju and their voices could not be heard by politicians and lawmakers in the center. Finally, in Chapter 8, I examine the political processes of the enactment of the 4.3 Special Act which provided a legal basis of the 4.3 Committee. I further explored the process of creating a committee base on the law because the enactment of the law was not the end of the struggle for activists and victims. Throughout five chapters, I carefully examine relevant factors and reach the following conclusions. First, a constant transitional justice activism by students, activists, victims, scholars, and human rights NOOs was the single most important factor. Second, the development of democracy and its consolidation was an important precondition. The role ofthe Provincial 4.3 Committee was central and this institution would not have been

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instituted if it were not for the decentralization and localization of political power in early 1990s. Third, the Taiwanese experience played a key role in the course of transitional justice activism in Jeju, which again provides evidence for diffusion theory. Fourth, the transitional justice advocacy was a struggle to find indisputable evidence. Not only the discovery of evidence but also its timely release was crucial in making breakthroughs. Thus, discovering evidence and strategically using the information, which is a good example of information politics, was important. Fifth, the role of a significant political figure and his commitment to truth and justice was an indispensable factor. It is difficult to explain the establishment ofthe4.3 Committee without considering the role of Kim Dae Jung. Both his commitment to human rights and activists' strategy to hold him to his previous commitment (i.e. accountability politics) were essential. Sixth, activists and victims made efforts to rename, redefine, and reframe the 4.3 events and civilian massacres in order to move forward and achieve certain desired goals of the movement. This framing process occurred throughout a series of debates and events and the concept of human rights played a significant role. Seventh, the role of the cultural sector was extremely important not only in bringing the hidden and suppressed 50-year-old issue to light but also in educating the 4.3 events to the general public.

4.2. Hypotheses and Data 4.2.1. Hypotheses The relevant hypotheses which were strongly supported in my statistical analyses - neighbor's experience, advocacy groups, international actors, and democracy and its consolidation - were examined. In addition, factors which were not quantifiable such as 99

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history, relationship and network between various actors, and role of language, meaning, and culture were closely explored. Moreover, the complex interaction between the advocacy and domestic/international opportunity structure was closely followed. Hypothesis 1. Diffusion Truth commission experience in neighbors had a positive impact on a state's decision and geographic proximity was a key determinant. The impact of neighbor's experience was at its climax in the year of transition and decreased over time. I expect to find the evidence of geographic diffusion in my case study. Any indication of the impact of transitional justice precedents in Korea's immediate region, i.e. East Asian countries (North Korea, Japan, China, and Taiwan) was carefully examined. If there is any indication of these countries' impact, I explore the specific diffusion paths and processes. In addition, a diminishing impact over time can be examined since it took 13 years to establish a truth commission. If there is any indication that neighbor's impact decreases over time, it will support my findings. Moreover, it is possible to explore the underlying causes and mechanisms of the diminishing effect. Hypothesis 2. Domestic Advocacy Groups I examine domestic advocacy groups more in detail by focusing on the activities of a wide array of advocacy networks, suggested in Chapter 1. Five actors are relevant: victims and their family members, human rights research and advocacy organizations, mass media, students and intellectuals, and local council. Existing theories direct our attention to three types of motives: beliefs/values (constructivism), self interests (liberalism), or power (realism). It is important to study why and how these actors playa certain role in activism. Moreover, it is probable that the influence of these actors varies 100

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over time in 50 years of transitional justice process. Therefore, a broad array of the activities, strategies, and motives of advocacy networks is closely examined.

Hypothesis 3. Leader and Political Party The advocacy networks do not promote transitional justice in a political vacuum.

It is certain that political actors - local and central governments, political parties, and leaders like the president and individual members of congress - have a significant role. It is necessary to examine the interaction between societal and political actors and evaluate the relative importance of different actors over time. There are also differences in the relative importance of each actor in different phases of the transitional justice process.

Hypothesis 4. International Actors In previous chapters, the engagement and promotion of international actors such as the U.N. and human rights NGOs was a key determinant. In the Korean case, it is difficult to find the role of the U.N. even from the glimpse of transitional justice trajectory. Although the Korean War in 1950 is the first case where the U.N. took military action based on the collective security article, there is no hint of the role of the U.N. in the transitional justice process. The focus should be on any evidence of an impact of international human rights NGOs or epistemic communities. Throughout hypothesis 1 to 4, various actors were identified including neighbors (diffusion), advocacy networks (victims, activists, media, intellectuals, and local leaders), political actors (local and central governments, political parties, and individual leaders), and international actors (human rights NGOs). I evaluate the relative importance of each actor's role in different phases ofthe transitional justice process and also explored any evidence of network, solidarity, and cooperation among these various actors.

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Hypothesis 5. Democracy Democracy and its consolidation positively affected a state's decision to use human rights trials. Although democracy was not a relevant factor in explaining truth commission establishment, it still is important to examine its relevance in my case study. Moreover, Dancy and Poe (2006) found strong evidence that democracy positively affect the onset of truth commissions. It is probable that democracy and its consolidation are important since the 4.3 Committee was established after a substantial improvement in democracy. I hypothesize that democracy provide open structure for truth commission establishment by effectively channeling demands for truth and justice. A bill or directive to establish a truth commission can be more easily designed if promoted under a more democratic and more consolidated regime. Hypothesis 6. Political History A state is less likely to establish a truth commission if the state had a history of failed transitions or unsuccessful transitional justice processes. It is more plausible in the Korean case because Korea, which had democratic transition in 1987, had experienced a failed democratization and transitional justice attempts in 1960s. On the other hand, any success stories would facilitate transitional justice activism by encouraging victims and activists to act upon the issues. In Korea, there were four important transitional justice processes advanced prior to or in parallel with the Jeju cases: investigation of civilian massacres during the Korean War, Geochang massacre, Kwangju massacre, and suspicious deaths during military and authoritarian regimes.

4.2.2. Data 102

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Two qualitative methods - interviews and archival research - were conducted to collect data in Jeju and Seoul. Jeju is the place where the events occurred and Seoul is where both the central government and the 4.3 Committee is located. First, I conducted primary document research to identify important individuals and organizations. I studied Kim Jong Min's (1999) record of the 4.3 advocacy history and explored the national and local newspaper archives. 41 In addition, the news archives, periodic reports, and newsletters publish and distributed by the 4.3 Research Institute (2002; 2002; 2003) and the 4.3 Committee (2002; 2001; 2001) were examined. I expanded my list by including persons whose names were mentioned during the interviews. In sum, I identified 117 key figures of the movement and interviewed 44 persons (38%). In these interviews, activities of 51 organizations, out of 99 key organizations, were covered. Table 4-1 shows the composition of my interviewees and the organizations covered.

Table 4-1. Interviewees and the Organizations Covered a. Interviewee

Main sphere Military Social Mass of activity Art & Victims Politicians Academia & of Culture movement media Police interviewee Number of 34 19 14 26 11 5 8 key activists Number of 2 13 3 7 4 13 2 interviewees Percentage 25% 38% 60% 37% 29% 50% 18% represented

Total

117 44 38%

41 Although there were two documentations on the transitional justice history, I acquired Kang Duk Hwan's unpublished manuscript during my interview with him on March 21, 2006. I examined the following newspaper sources: (1) national newspaper- the Donga Ilbo, Chosun nbo, Hankook nbo, Hankyorye, Kyunghyang Shinmoon, and Kookmin nbo; (2) local newspaper - the Jeju Shinmoon, Jemin nbo, and Halla nbo; (3) Internet news sources: Korean CBS No-Cut News, Oh My News, Pressian, Voice of Jeju, and Jeju Today; and (4) periodicals: Sisa Journal and Digital Mal.

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b 0 rgamza . l'Ions

Main sphere of activity of . Organization Number of key organization Number of organization covered Percentage represented

Mass media

Victims

Culture

Social move ment

15

41

3

9

22

60%

54%

Art &

Military

Political organization

Research

14

14

2

10

99

2

7

6

1

4

51

67%

50%

43%

50%

40%

52%

&

Total

Police

Interviews were mainly conducted within a four months period between January and April 2006. Most interviews were conducted in interviewee's office, house, or cafe and lasted no longer than three hours. But, in a few cases, interviews lasted longer than four hours and one interview even lasted for seven hours. 42 I conducted several followup interviews and additional emails or phone calls were frequent. Interviews were neither open-ended nor structured but a focused interview where I used my pre-designed questions with key topics listed but in no fixed order. Archival research was conducted by collecting and reading any written or recorded materials. Three libraries were explored - the National Assembly Library, Yonsei University Central Library, and Jeju National University Local Archives. I also collected documents from organizations such as the 4.3 Research Institute, Pan National Committee, and 4.3 Committee. I additionally acquired rare documents from individuals or former leaders of organizations. For example, I obtained the confidential documents Ko, Chang Hoon, a professor in the Department of Public Administration in the Jeju National University and former director of the 4.3 Research Institute. 2006. Interview by author, March 24, Jeju. Transcript.

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of the Jeju National University Student Association from former presidents who wanted to remain anonymous. I also acquired rare documents like a diary and notes from a professor's personal collection. In total, I was able to collect approximately 500 written and recorded documents as shown in Table 4-2.

Table 4-2. Categories and List of Documentation Examined Categories Government Documents

Documents Minutes and stenographic notes (National Assembly, Jeju Provincial Council), white papers (Jeju Provincial Government), police or military history documentation, court history documentation including major verdicts, election history documentation, congress history documentation, public hearings, public debate documentation, legal documents Organization Brochures, reports, newsletters, minutes, petition, church or parish Documents history documentation, memorial service program and flyers, memorial service addresses, epitaphs, evaluation reports Academic Dissertation, journal articles, monographs, conference proceedings, Documents lecture notes Mass media magazine, journal, newspaper, news coverage, editorial, opinion piece, Documents broadcast company history documentation including program. archives, documentary, short films, picture books Personal diary, personal notes, personal petition, personal testimonies, memoir, Documents journals, autobiography Literature novel, poem, play scripts, song lyrics

4.3. Korea, 1945-1948: Historic Background The modem history of Korea started with the liberation from 35 years ofthe repressive Japanese colonial rule in 1945. Korean history between 1945 and 1950, which has been referred to as "politics of the vortex (Henderson 1968)," is a critical period to understand the 4.3 events which occurred in 1948. On August 15, 1945, Korea was liberated when the Japanese emperor surrendered to the Allied Forces. Partly because 105

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independence movements were divided along ideological lines and partly because liberation was unexpectedly given, there was no single group that could exert power and authority, concentrate all political forces, and represent Koreans to the international community. No iconic political figures to unite various political forces existed in the Korean mainland because most independent movements were based in China, United State, and Manchuria by the time of the Japanese surrender due to the harsh and oppressive colonial rule during World War II. After the surrender, the Japanese authority, which still held military and police forces but feared losing the life and property of its own people in Korea, approached Korean leaders - Yo Un Hyung, Ahn Jae Hong, and Song Jin Woo - for protection. The Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI) was founded by cooperation between Yo and Ahn to maintain law and order before the arrival of the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) from China. The KPG, led by President Kim Gu, an icon of the independence movement, was established in 1919 immediately after the first national independent movement (March 1st Movement or 3.1 Movement) and was believed to be a legitimate governing body of the Korean people (Oh 2002). However, the 24th Corps of the United States Tenth Army with 77,000 personnel led by lieutenant General John R. Hodge arrived on September 8, 1945 and the CPKI hurriedly established the Korean People's Republic (KPR) and the local People's Committee (PC) two days before the U.S. Army's arrival to represent the Korean people. The KPR was equivalent to the administrative branch of the state and the CP was the quasi-legislative body. The U.S. Army first refused to recognize the KPR and eventually outlawed it. 106

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Many agree General Hodge was ignorant of Korea and was filled with anticommunist ideology. Before his arrival in Korea, he was admonished by the Japanese authorities that KPR leaned toward Soviet ideology and was inciting nationalistic and communistic agitation (Matray 1995). General Hodge's primary duty was to accept the surrender of the Japanese military forces and to demobilize and repatriate them. He was ready for the military operation, but not for ruling the Korean people (McCune 1946: 33). Cumings, a notable revisionist scholar, criticizes Hodge not only because he was ignorant but also because he was biased and misunderstood Koreans due to his strong anticommunist ideology. Cumming (1974: 47) argues that, for General Hodge, a Korea wholly in Soviet hands was seen as a threat to the U.S. security and it was imperative for him to build a bulwark against communism. 43 The U.S. Army set up a formal U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK or AMG) and officially ruled until the establishment of the South Korea Interim Government (SKIG) on June 3, 1947. However, the interim government was a titular one which was under control of the U.S. military government. Some further argue that although Korea was independent and established the Republic of Korea on August 15, 1948, it was still under great influence of the United States. It is generally agreed among scholars that the United States had a direct military rule from September 8, 1945 to August 15, 1948 (Park 2002; Song 1989). This three year period is important for Korean history in general and for the 4.3 events in particular. Many major decisions and events

43 This view coincides with other observations made during the U.S. military rule. McCune (1946: 33) stated that the U.S. policy toward Korea tended "to drift without definitive direction." Taylor described that the situation of the U.S. Armed Forces as "almost a complete lack of training and preparation for military government in Korea," and there was "no directives, no plans, no trained military government personnel, and less than a month to prepare for the accomplishment of it mission (Taylor 1948: 356)."

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took place under the U.S. military rule: the illegalization of endogenous state-building attempts such as the KPR and PC; return of the exiled KPG; illegalization of the Korean Communist Party (KCP); suppression of progressive social movements including labor and farmers unions; suppression of popular uprisings; and establishment of the interim administration (SKIG) and legislature (South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly, SKILA). This series of events critically shaped the modem political topography and are believed to be responsible for later events such as the outbreak of the 4.3 events and the Korean War, division ofthe peninsula, and dictatorships in North and South.44 Immediately after the liberation, the Korean society exploded with various social and political activities and many progressive and revolutionary groups came out to the surface. A general atmosphere leaned toward change, reform, and revolution and leftist groups were supported by the general public (Kim 1993: 68). Cummings (1974: 53) described that major discourses of the days were the "demands for land distribution, labor reforms and labor unions, political participation and power, national independence and self-determination." Furthermore, in contrast to the rightist groups who collaborated, hid, or fled under the colonial rule, people sincerely admired leftist groups for their ceaseless underground resistance. Cumings (1974: 53) further argues that, by this time, "the leftism became almost synonymous with opposition to Japan and it made the Korean masses highly sympathetic to left." In 1945, five major political parties existed, covering

The role of the U.S. military government is explored in the study of the 4.3 events (Huh 2003; Park 1988), Korean War (Cumings 1981), division of Korean peninsula (Henderson 1968), and KoreanAmerican diplomatic relationship (Cho 1967; Baldwin 1974; Matray 1985). There are two distinctive interpretations about the role of the U.S. military government - an orthodox (conservative) interpretation and revisionist one. The former emphasizes the Soviet's responsibility in the outbreak of Korean War and the division of the Korean peninsula by blaming the Soviet's expansionist policy. The latter emphasizes the U.S. responsibility. 44

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all ideological spectra and heavily depending upon personalleadership.45 Kil (1993: 203) provides four criteria to distinguish political parties by their ideological platforms. First, the rightist groups tended to be more generous to collaborators and traitors during the colonial rule while the leftist were harsher. Second, the rightist groups were pro-American and anti-Soviet, while the leftist groups, the opposite. Third, the rightists were more reluctant to carry out a revolutionary land reform while the leftists, active and supportive. Fourth, the rightists pursued liberal democracy and the leftists, proletariat dictatorship. Other scholars suggest additional indicators: the rightists supported KPG and leftists, KPR; the rightists opposed the Moscow Agreement while the leftists supported; and finally, the extremists (either the right or left) were reluctant to support the left-right coalition movement, while the moderates were active in their support.

46

Table 4-3 summarizes the overall political configurations represented by

political parties immediately after the liberation. Sarafan (1946: 349) identifies four major parties - two rightist parties (Nationalist Party and Korean Democratic Party) that supported the KPG and two leftist parties (People's Party and Communist Party) that supported the KPR. McCune (1946: 33) distinguishes four major parties - New People's Party, Communist Party (left)/ Nationalist Party/ Democratic Party (right). Sim Ji Yeon (1984) identifies the existence of five major parties. Table 4-3 was created on the basis of these studies. 46 The Moscow Agreement was made by three foreign ministers of the United States, Soviet Union, and Great Britain in December 1945 where Korea issue was discussed (Cho 1967: 102-3; Hoag 1970: 340-1). Koreans were informed of the content of the Moscow Agreement even before an official text was received by the military government. Korean newspapers only reported a part of the agreement - the possibility of "trusteeship." For Koreans, who were eagerly expecting a prompt independence after 33 years of the colonial rule, trusteeship was regarded as another colonial rule by three great powers. All the country was emotionally enraged, and it was the rightist groups, who seriously lacked a firm foothold in politics, that mobilized this opportunity to acquire and secure the public support by taking advantage of public sentiment and vehemently opposing the agreement. On the other hand, the leftists also opposed the agreement immediately after receiving the news report, but later realized that newspapers, which were mostly inclined toward the rightists, focused only on a portion of the agreement. The leftists later emphasized the first provision of the Agreement - "a creation of provisional Korean democratic government" - and supported the Moscow Agreement. However, the public, who were already emotionally aroused, turned their backs on the leftists. This is a major event in modern Korean history when the leftist groups lost their public support. The difference between the right and left is revealed in their slogans. Leftists agitated that they "support the Moscow Agreement totally" while the rightists agitated that they "oppose the trusteeship." The Moscow Agreement made a deep chasm between the rightists and the leftists in modern Korean politics and gravely changed the political topology of Korea.

45

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Table 4-3. Political Parties in 1945 South Korea

Party

Korean Communist Party

Korean People's Party (KPP)

Korean Nationalist Party

Korean Independence Party

Korean Democratic Party

.------- ------------------------------------ __________(~~~1________ .---------------------------- ________J~?t _______ _________J~~l__________ ---------(KDPl

Leader

Park Hun Young

Yo Un Hyung

Ahn Jae Hong KimKyu Sicd

KimGu

Rhee Syng Mane

In supportive of

KPR

KPR

KPG

KPG

KPG

Relationship with the AMG

Cooperative in earlier period but eventually hostile and violent

Conflictive

Relatively amicable

Amicable but eventually conflictive

"Honeymoon"

Moscow Agreement

Supportive

Supportive

Oppositional but later, supportive

Oppositional

Oppositional

Left-right coalition

Passive

Active

Active

Opposed and not participated

Opposed and not participated

Japanese collaborators and traitors

Strict measure and severe punishment

Relatively strict measure and punishment

Relatively strict measure and punishment

Strict measure but later, more tolerant

Passive and very generous

Attitude toward the United States and Soviet Union

Pro-Soviet and anti-American (Dependent)

Critical to both U.S. and Soviet (Independent)

Relatively pro-American (Independent! Nationalistic)

Anti-Soviet but not pro-U.S. (Independent! Nationalistic)

Pro-American and Anti-Soviet (Dependent)

Land Reform

Revolutionary land reform (Confiscation without compensation! redistribution without payment)

Revolutionary land reform (Confiscation without compensation! redistribution without payment)

Relatively revolutionary land reform

Principle of state ownership of the land! primary redistribution to the poor peasants

Passive to land reform (Confiscation with compensation! redistribution with payment or long-term installment)b

Visions for the New State

Economically egalitarian society/ Politically proletariat dictatorship

Liberal democracy

State without class/ideological conflict (Opposed to proletariat dictatorship)

So-called "Liberal democracy"

Ideological Spectrum

Extreme Left (Revolutionary)

State governed by peoples (Economically egalitarian! Politically liberalism) Moderate Left (Social Democratic)

Moderate Right

Extreme Right (Nationalistic)

Extreme Right ("UltraConservative"C)

Note: a.

It is interesting to note that KDP's initial platforms and programs consisted of vague and general

ideas, and omitted two major demands, which was very popular and urgent in Korea - issues

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b. c. d. e.

relating to the punishment of the collaborator and land refonn (Song 1989: 143). Sim (1984: 338-41) McCune (1946: 35) Kim Kyu Sic had no fonnal affiliation with the KNP. Rhee Syng Man was not fonnally affiliated with the KDP.

Eventually, two groups, which were at the both extremes, remained at the center of the Korea politics. At the extreme left, Park Hun Young led the Korean Communist Party (KCP), which later became the South Korean Communist Party (SKCP) and, at the opposite end, Rhee Syng Man and the Korean Democratic Party (KDP) formed a strong coalition based on their interests in maintaining the political and economic status quo. Although moderate leaders were much respected by the general public, their moderate positions could not survive in the middle of violent changes. For instance, Yo Un Hyung and Kim Gu were both assassinated by the extremists. By 1947, three political forcesextreme left, extreme right, and the United States - were at the center of Korean politics. The U.S. military government favored the rightist groups and founded the interim administration, interim legislature, and eventually the Republic of Korea (ROK) in collaboration with these groups headed by Rhee Syng Man. On the other hand, the U.S. military government suppressed any hint of socialist, leftist, or communist activities by applying four measures: suppression of any endogenous state building efforts; revival of the repressive and exploitative colonial state apparatus; privileging the previous elites under the colonial rule; and favoring these groups in the course of important socioeconomic policies such as distribution of U.S. aid or distributing vested land and factories (Kim 1993:

74~75;

Kang 1970; Park 2002; Song 1989).

First, the military government made the KPR illegal and dissolved the local pes. In October 1945, Governor Arnold declared, "There is only one government in the

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southern part of Korean peninsula ... The so-called Korean People's Republic is entirely without any authority, power or real entity.,,47 In addition, in December, General Hodge declared that the KPR is not a government but a party and it has no right and authority to proclaim itself as a republic. He again asserted that the U.S. military government was the only and legitimate government. He further declared that if any party pretended and asserted to be a government or republic, the military government would treat it as an illegal act. This clearly reveals General Hodge's view of the KPR as "the southern branch of the same Communist People's Committee government that was established in North Korea by the Russians (Cumings 1981: 441).,,48 Second, the military government revived the three most hated colonial state apparatus - police, military, and judicial system - and used them as a means to control Koreans and suppress any leftist movement (Song 1989). The police was the most notorious agency of the colonial rule and was a frequent target of terrorism. Koreans in the colonial police were even more hated because they were viewed as a distinct example of traitors (Cumings 1974: 57). Nevertheless, by September 1947, about 80 percent of the former colonial Korean policemen were reemployed by the U.S. military government, which was a grave mistake resulting from ignorance and expediency (Song 1989: 131;

Maeil Shinbo (Maeil Newspaper), October 10, 1945 However, many point out that the KPR was neither a communist organization nor organization controlled by the Soviet Union. Song (1989: 107) argues that the CPKI represented the united forces of all antiJapanese groups, excluding only the former pro-Japanese groups and was the only political organization with overwhelming support. He further argues that the KPR and CPKI had representative power of the Korean people because it had legitimacy from the Korean independence movement. Since many movement groups dispersed, collaborated, or fled, Yo Un Hyung's organization, the League for the Korean Independence and Ahn Jae Hong's organization New Korean Society was a few organization in Korea. Cho (1967: 69) argues that the KPR was composed of "all shades of political opinion" and Cumings (1974: 54) argues that the composition of the CPKI and KPR was highly eclectic because a political vacuum existed in Korea and everyone was scrambling into it. In conclusion, the KPR and CPKI was not simply a minority or a faction controlled by communist as Rhee, the KDP and the AMG later argued. 47 48

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Department of States 1947: 802). Third, most positions in the administration were filled with the previous elites during the colonial rule. General Hodge declared that the one of the mission of the military government was to "protect Korean people from the abuses of wrong leadership

a

and guide them into right path.,,49 The United States, without considering the desire of Koreans, assertively decided that the leftists are wrong and the rightists are right. 50 By

1947,80% of the military government's major positions were filled with the members of the Korean Democratic Party. 51 Above all, the policy favoring the rightist groups who . were mostly pro-Japanese collaborators against much respected moderate leaders led to the general dissatisfaction with the U.S. military government. Fourth, two main socioeconomic resources existed for the military government first, the vested properties of Japanese and, second, the U.S. foreign aid (Lee 1996: 5). The portion of Japanese property in Korea was enormous. According to one study, 80 percent of real and industrial property was owned by the Japanese colonial government

Joong Ang Shinmoon (Joong Ang Newspaper), November 16, 1945 This view of the military government is also summarized in General Hodge's political advisor Benninghoff's report to Washington (Department of States 1945: 1061,1070-1071). Here are few examples of his statements which clearly reveal this perspective: "The most encouraging single factor in the political situation is the presence in Seoul of several hundred conservatives among the older and better educated Koreans. Although many of them have served with the Japanese, that stigina ought eventually to disappear"; "They are educated in the United States or in American missionary institute in Korea. In their aims and policies they demonstrate a desire to follow the western democracies."; "The conservative groups are willing to cooperate with Military Government. Many of them have stated that they realize that their county must pass through a period of tutelage, and that they would prefer to be under American rather than Soviet guidance." 51 In the fall of 1945, the former Japanese colonial bureaucrats found allies in the KDP and the AMG, and the KDP leaders came to control key elements of the AMG bureaucracy (Cho Byung Ok, director of the Korean National Police; Chang Taek Sang, chief of the Seoul Metropolitan Police; Kim Yong Mu, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; and Yi In, Chief Prosecutor). Four men held their position until 1948 and became dominant figures in suppressing the revolutionary nationalists. Moreover, other key organizations - the Department of Agriculture, Communication, Education, Justice, and Public Health, seven bureaus in the Judiciary Department, eight bureau and sections in the Police Department, bureaus of Foreign Affairs, Price Administration, and Personnel, and also in many key positions in provinces - were also filled in with these groups (Song 1989: 147). 49

50

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by 1945 (McCune 1946: 35). The military government, which was already in control of the U.S. foreign aid, eventually gained control of the vested properties through the Ordinance No.2 and Ordinance No. 33. 52 The main administrators and distributors of the U.S. economic resources were the bureaucrats who were from the KDP members and it provided an economic basis of the rightist groups. From May 1946, the anti-communist and anti-Soviet policy of the U.S. military government became more explicit. The watershed event happened on May 15, 1946 when the government smashed the counterfeiting rings in which sixteen communist party members were allegedly involved. This event is still an unresolved mystery but scholars view this event as a manipulated one with an intention to suppress the leftists (Suh 1999).53 Three days later, an official newspaper of the Korean Communist Party, the Haebang Ilbo was suspended from publication for an indefinite period. In addition, three major leftist newspapers were suspended in September 1946. The military government additionally issued the warrant for the arrest of major communist party officials including the leader, Park Hun Young. Park's communist party had set a principle of cooperating with the military government in its earlier period, but with these events and subsequent suppression, Park ordered a "New Strategy," which is summarized its motto - "offense by 52 The U.S. Armed Forces announced the Ordinance No.2 (Freezing of All the Japanese Properties) on their arrival proclaiming that all Japanese properties should be frozen. The military government later announced the Ordinance No. 33 on December 6, 1945 declaring that every property of Japanese by September 25, 1945 should be possessed by the U.S. military government. The AMG further proclaimed that that any act that seizes, runs, and manages these frozen properties, without permission of the AMG, is illegal. 53 The crackdown had begun a few days after the announcement of the Ordinance No. 72 on May 4, 1946. The Ordinance No.72 stated, "Acts or conduct in support of, or participating in the formation of, any organization or movement dissolved or declared illegally by, or contrary to the interest of, the occupation forces; Publishing, importing or circulating printed, typed or written matter which is detrimental or disrespectful to the occupying forces; Organizing, promoting, publicizing, aiding or attending any public gathering, parade, or demonstration for which no permit had been granted." This was very broad and vague law and used as a tool to oppress the leftists throughout the rule of the U.S. military government. Song (1989: 175-176) argues that the ordinance provides "the legal framework for the Korean National Police to search out and arrest revolutionary Korean nationalists or leftists and to dissolve their organization."

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way of a self-defense" in 1946. Song (1989: 157) suggests a reason for the confrontation between the Korean communist party and the U.S. military government. He argues that there was a contradiction in each party's basic goals and visions in state-building. The military government aimed at building an anti-communist bulwark based on the support ofthe conservative Korean allies who were former collaborators to the colonial rule. In the course, the military government was in opposition to not only the leftist political groups but also the revolutionary Korean nationalists. However, the communist party aimed at building a united Korean state independent from any foreign interventions, which represents interests of the workers and the peasants, but not those of former collaborators. There was no room for compromise between these two visions of state-building. Two major resistances against the military government's suppression occurred during the fall of 1946: the September strike and the October protest. The U.S. military government believed that both were instigated by the communist party which was the puppet of the North and the Soviet Union. The government used the police, military, and the rightist youth groups to suppress these uprisings. But, many view that they were not a subversive act of the communist ideology but merely a fight for food and wages. It was an uprising of people deeply discontented with major policies of the military government (Jung 1989). These were also an uprising out of people's discontent with the major political and socioeconomic policies of the military government. People were distressed with the AMG's policy to give important positions to the former collaborators and reappointment of the former police officers. It is not a coincidence that, in many parts of the provinces, former police officers were major targets of terrorism. The September 115

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strike and October protest were successfully quelled and resulted in the dissolution of the communist party in the southern part of Korean peninsula. The suppression of the leftists continued as the military government now veered into repressing the moderate leftist political forces. The Democratic National Front (DNF) was a moderate leftist coalition which was "supported by a large number of genuinely patriotic Koreans with progressive leanings whose participation in Korean politics would be most desirable (Department of States 1946: 687-688)." The anticommunist policy of the military government was almost completed during the summer of 1947, by a national event called the Red Purge. The government was actively involved in the search of any leftists within all levels of government, media, and schools and removed them from offices. It was equivalent to McCarthyism in the United States and most leftists fled to the North or went totally underground.

4.4. Jeju 4.3 Events 4.4.1. Jeju Island Jeju is the largest island in Korea and located at the southernmost part (See Figure 4-1). Jeju is a volcanic island dominated by the Halla Mountain, which is the highest mountain (6,398 ft) in South Korea, in the middle of the island. Due to its location and the Mt. Halla, Jeju was believed to be a secluded, isolated, and mystic island (Jeju Provincial Government 1993). For a long time, Jeju had been a place where government officials in Seoul were sent to be exiled. Jeju is located in equidistance from Korea, Japan, and China and regarded as a place of strategic importance in Northeast Asia. During World War II, both Japan and the Allied Forces saw Jeju as an important 116

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location for the victory in the war. Japan under its colonial rule built three military air bases and fortified the entire island and the U.S. also considered building a naval base in Jeju in 1950s (Jeju Provincial Council 2000) .

Figure 4-1. Map of Korea and Jeju Island

Since the launch of a passenger boat between Jeju and Osaka, Japan in 1918, people in Jeju were able to work, trade, and study in Japan (4.3 Committee 2003: 45-46). The new culture and products were easily imported from Japan because of its location. 117

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Many Koreans returned from Japan in 1945 and Jeju recorded the highest rate of population mobility among other provinces. The population of Jeju before 1945 was estimated 220,000 but it reached to 280,000 after 1946 (4.3 Committee 2003). Many among the returnees had higher education and this led to an ardent desire for education. Schools and local newspapers were founded earlier in J eju compared to other regions. Political movement toward a newly independent state after liberation occurred in Jeju within these social and cultural contexts. The Jeju CPKI, which later turned into the Jeju People's Committee (JPC), was established on September 10, 1945 at the auditorium of the Jeju Agricultural School by approximately one hundred representatives from each town and county in Jeju Island (Yang 1999: 55). The overall political and social atmosphere was similar in Jeju and the dissatisfaction with the policies of the U.S. military government grew over time. To make matters worse, there were additional conditions which exacerbated the situation in Jeju. First, Jeju Island, which had long been a subordinate administrative unit under South Cholla province, acquired an independent provincial status in 1946. However, this decision of independence was made despite the objection of many people in J eju and especially, political leaders (4.3 Committee 2003: 62). As a consequence, many changes were made and the most visible changes were the reorganization of the local police and th

the arrival of the 9 Regimen of the Korean Army. In addition, the economy of Jeju was going downhill because the trading relationship with Japan had been entirely disconnected; an epidemic of cholera had also been widespread throughout the island; and the dry crops such as barley, millet, and sweet potato, which were main staples, had failed (4.3 Committee 2003: 78). 118

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All underlying political and socioeconomic tensions exploded on March 1, 1947 th

when the leftist groups in Jeju organized a political rally for the 28 anniversary of the March 1st Movement. March 1st is a historic day because of the 3.1 Independence Movement occurred in 1919 under the colonial rule. This was a nationwide peaceful independence movement inspired by the self-determination principle of President Woodrow Wilson at the Paris Peace Conference. It was the first national independence movement after nine years of the repressive and militaristic colonial rule. Thirty three representatives declared the independence and the Korean Provisional Government was established based on the Declaration of Independence. It was not only a movement of a few political elites but also a national public movement. This national movement dramatically changed the colonial policy from the repressive and militaristic rule to the appeasement and inclusive rule. A ceremony began around 11 AM and was crowded with 25,000 to 30,000 people. Around 2 PM, a street demonstration, which was not permitted by the Jeju provincial military government, started and police opened fire severely injuring 6 and killing 6 including a I5-year-old student and a 21-year-old mother with a nursing baby. This event led to a general strike throughout Jeju Island beginning March 10, 1947 which was backed up by the local branch of the communist party (4.3 Committee 2003: 96). Although the strike was supported by the communist party, it was rather a protest against the unjustifiable act of opening fire on unarmed demonstrators (Jung 1999: 194). The general strike was unprecedented because people in the public sectors including schools, the J eju provincial government, post offices, and township offices participated. An official report confirms that even local police officers participated in the strike, which 119

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shows the popularity and scope of the general strike. Several small and large scale conflicts between the provincial military government and people in Jeju existed thereafter including a torture that led to death of three students (4.3 Committee 2003: 149-52). Through a series of major and minor conflicts, the provincial government and the local police drastically lost support of the general public in Jeju. In addition, an official report found that another cause ofthe hostility between the police and islanders was the traditional hostility between J eju islanders and people on the mainland. The report closely traces the composition of the Jeju local police and reports that the proportion of the policemen from the mainland dramatically increased ever since 1945. Islanders tend to despise and distance themselves from the reinforced policemen from the mainland, and the police, in turn, viewed islanders as riotous people (4.3 Committee 2003: 138). Under this situation, several leaders of the local branch of the South Korean Communist Party planned an armed protest against the military government, police, and rightist political groups.

4.4.2. Jeju 4.3 Events The major event 1?roke out on 2 AM of April 3, 1948. The armed uprising against the U.S. military government and interim Korean government (SKIG) occurred under the leadership of the South Korean Communist Party Jeju Committee. Around 350 armed leftist guerillas simultaneously attacked police stations and houses of the prominent rightist political figures and their family members around Jeju Island. Three points were proclaimed in the leaflets they handed out (Kim and Kim 1963): "We will resist if the police and the rightist youth groups continued to suppress the leftists"; "We 120

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oppose two separate elections and two governments in the Korean peninsula"; and "We resist the rule of the U.S. military government." The second point was made regarding the political situation of Korea. By November, 1947, the issue ofthe Korean independence was transferred to the U.N. and the U.N. passed a resolution to have a U.N. monitored election in both North and South Korea and then to establish one independent government. The decision was transferred to the U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) due to the failure ofthe Moscow Agreement. 54 However, since the Soviet Union opposed the resolution made by the U.N., it was clear that two separate governments would be established in the Korean peninsula (Cho 1967:

102~103;

Hoag 1970:

340~341).

The U.N. monitored national election was held on May 10, 1948 and the Republic of Korea was established in the southern part of the Korean peninsula based on the result. However, because ofthe armed conflict, Jeju province was the only place where national election was not able to be held. Some scholars and activists even argue that the communist uprising in Jeju is the first unification movement because Jeju people did not participated in the election that divided the North and South (Ko 1989). This was later brought up in 1998 when the Republic of Korea was celebrating its 50th anniversary. The independence of Korea reached an agreement between foreign ministers of the United States, Soviet Union, and Great Britain in the Moscow Agreements. According to the agreement, "a joint commission consisting of representatives of the United States command in Southern Korea and the Soviet Union command shall consult with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations." The first joint commission was held in March 1946 only to be adjourned in May without any agreement between the U.S. and Soviet Union. It reopened about a year after in May 1947, but again failed. Finally, the Moscow Agreement failed and the issue of Korean independence was transferred to the U.N. A failure was mainly resulted from the disagreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in selecting the democratic parties and social organizations to be participated in provisional Korean government. In order to follow the Moscow Agreement, the selection of the political parties and social organizations to discuss the formation of the provisional Korean government was essentia1. The U.S. wanted to include as many rightist political groups as possible and proposed 20 political parties and organizations, among which 17 were the rightist and only 3 were the leftist and moderate political groups. However, the Soviet Union disagreed on the basis that the rightist political groups, especially the KDP, opposed to the Moscow Agreement. 54

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Activists and victims also tried to show the other side of the nation-building - the 4.3 events and civilian massacres. The interim government, which was under the auspices of the United States, initially underrated the armed uprising and sent only one hundred police reinforcement forces from the Cholla province, which was not sufficient to quell the situation. The director of the Korean National Police, Cho Byung Ok additionally asked various paramilitary youth organizations to send their members to J eju. These youth groups were engaged in politics using violence in favor of the rightist political leaders and were powerful under the protection of the military government (Cumings 1974: 85). The most representative group was a brutal young men's club called the Young Northwesterners

(Subook Chungnyundan). It was initially organized by the people in the North who th

crossed the 38 parallel into South Korea escaping from the communists. Many ofthem were classified as bourgeoisie in the North and were deprived of their possessions and often lost their family members. Hence, most of them had a loathing toward the communists and their followers (Imm 1999). This ultra-rightist group was extremely powerful since it was financially supported and mobilized by Rhee Syng Man and his followers. 55 However, the armed resistance became uncontrollable and some major responsibilities were transferred to the military. On April 28, 1948, a peace negotiation between Colonel Kim Ik Ryul of the 9th

The Young Northwysterners was active in brutal counterinsurgency strategy against the armed guerrillas in Jeju. Most voluntarily participated in the counterinsurgency campaign and sustained their living On plundering a village. Many testified before the 4.3 Committee of the brutality and atrocity of the Young Northwesterners including killing, plunder, and rape (Imm 1999; 4.3 Committee 2003). The other group was the Korean National Youth (Daedong Chungnyundan), which engaged in political activity and violence in favor of the rightist political leaders, and became the most powerful youth group under the protection of the U.S. military government. Cumings (1974: 85) argues that General Hodge and the military government even granted 5 million won to equip and establish training facilities for his Korean National Youth. 55

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Regiment of the Korean Army, which was in charge of J eju, and the leader of anned guerilla forces Kim Dal Sam was started and resulted in a peace accord. According to the report, peace negotiation actually was "a fork of the road in the 4.3 events (4.3 Committee 2003: 186)." Nevertheless, a mysterious incident occurred a few days later in Ora village. Several rightist youth group members first attacked the village and set the houses of the leftists on fire and then the leftist guerrillas counterattacked. Although it is still debated, the interim government and the U.S. military government regarded the Ora incident as a serious breach of a peace accord by the leftist guerillas and swerved its path toward harsh suppression. 56 The government decided to launch an all-out attack on the anned guerrillas on May 3, 1948 and Colonel Kim Ik Ryul was replaced by a strong anticommunist Colonel Park Jin Kyung. The United States and the nascent Korean government headed by President Rhee Syng Man decided to quell the situation in a short time by harsh suppression. This decision was made within both national and international constraints. In 1948, Korea was finally divided and the Soviet-influenced communist regime was established under the leadership of Kim II Sung in the north. For the nascent South Korean government, the communist rebellion in Jeju meant that it had to face double confrontation with communist ideology both north and south. The international context is also important because it is critical to understand the United States' full support for President Rhee. The United States after World War II faced a threat from the Soviet Union and the threat

56 Mysteriously, the attack and the counterattack were filmed by the U.S. aircraft from the air. This film titled, May Day on Cheju-Do still remains in the U.S. National Archive (Suh 1999: 132). Interestingly, this film was edited in a way to show that the leftist first attacked the village. It is still debated why and how the U.S. was able to film this critical incident in time and what the U.S. intention was in editing the film. For more details, see the works of a few scholars and journalists (Yang 1999; Kim 2003).

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become more visible by the experience not only in Berlin but also in Greece and Turkey. The idea of a domino theory was increasingly used in the U.S. foreign policy discourses and the "red-hunt" in the U.S. politics and society was initiated by Senator McCarthy. The 4.3 events refer to a series of armed uprisings and a counterinsurgency that occurred between March 1, 1947 and September 21, 1954 in J eju Island, Korea. There are two debates regarding the label and definition of the 4.3 events. The first debate is around the name and characteristics of the event and the second debate is around the periodization. Here I use the label adopted by the 4.3 Committee - Jeju 4.3 events, rather than ideologically-inclined labels such as "communist rebellion (kongsan pokdong)" or "popular uprising (minjoong hangjaeng)." Ko (1988; 1989), a scholar who closely studied the 4.3 events finds that there are at least 12 labels for the event and many are proposing to find the "proper name" for the events (Yang 1993). Before the enactment ofthe 4.3 Special Act, the 4.3 events were referred to as a communist rebellion by all official documents without any hesitation (Korean Military Academy 1967; Committee on Korean Police History 1972). However, recently, activists, victims, and scholars are promoting the name - democratic movement or popular uprising (Yang 1995; Park 1988; Ko 1989). Interestingly, some even refer to only its date of occurrence, "4.3 (sa sam)" without defining its characteristics at all. A good example is the Provincial 4.3 Committee instituted under the Jeju Provincial Council in 1993 and the title of a weekly special report published by the J emin Ilbo (Jemin Ilbo) since 1990 -

4.3'Speaks. There is also debate around how to define the 4.3 events focusing on the periodization. Traditional understanding was that it all started on April 3, 1948 when the

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anned communist riots attacked various police stations and killed prominent rightist political figures. The revisionist argument, which was promoted by activists, victims, and journalist, is that it all started on March 1, 1947. This perspective was later adopted by the 4.3 Special Act and 4.3 Committee. March 1, 1947 is a date when the dissatisfaction with the U.S. military government's policy exploded with the unjustifiable shooting of the local police. According ~o this perspective, an armed uprising on April 3, 1948 is a mere response to the brutal policy and misrule of the U.S. military government represented by the 3.1 incident (4.3 Committee 2003; 4.3 Reporting Team 1994). The debate around the periodization is closely related to a debate around the responsibilities for the 4.3 events and civilian massacres. Many argue that the communist guerrillas were responsible for all the disruption including massacres and human rights violations (lung 2000). In contrast, others recently argue that the anned protest was a mere response to the oppressive rule of the U.S. military government and the interim Korean government (Ko 2004; Cumings 1988; 4.3 Reporting Team 1997:

354~365).

This position asks about the government's responsibility for the massacres and human rights violations. Furthermore, a few scholars even argued that the U.S. military government in Korea and the U.S. government itself was mainly responsible for the outbreak of the 4.3 events and civilian massacres (Jung 1999: 183). Activists and victims even maintain that the U.S. government should apologize to the victims. Nevertheless, many object to this argument based on the fact that he Korean Army was mainly. responsible for the massacre that occurred after the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1945 (4.3 Reporting Team 1994: 399).

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5. Suppressed yet Stubborn Truth

"The hallmark of factual truth is that its opposite is neither error nor illusion nor opinion, no one of which reflects upon personal truthfulness, but the deliberate falsehood, or lie ... All these lies, whether their authors know it or not, harbor an element of violence; organized lying always tends to destroy whatever it has decided to negate, although only totalitarian governments have consciously adopted lying as the first step to murder ... The facts are not secure in the hands of power is obvious, but the point here is that power, by its nature, can never produce a substitute for the secure stability of factual reality, which, because it is past, has grown into a dimension beyond our reach (Arendt 1993)."

5.1. Human Rights Violations The armed uprisings and the brutal counterinsurgency strategy led to a prolonged confrontation of the guerrilla warfare in the rugged and precipitous region of Mt. Halla until September 21, 1954. Although the Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950 and ended in an arms truce in 1953, Jeju and South Kyongsang province were not under the control of the North Korean army during the war. The counterinsurgency strategy was extremely brutal, including mass arrest and detention, forced relocation, torture, rape, indiscriminate killing, and many large-scale massacres of civilians. The estimated deaths and missing were between 15,000 and 30,000 and accounted for 10 percent oftotal population of Jeju in 1947 (Provincial 4.3 Committee 1997). Most local elites either with rightist or leftist ideological inclination were killed, disappeared, or fled, and this created a self-mocking saying in Jeju that "smart ones who were literate were all killed during the events and only illiterate persons like me survived (Kim 1999)." In addition, hundreds of villages were razed when residents were suspected of providing food and shelter to the armed guerrillas and many villages were systematically burned and people were forcibly

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relocated. 57 A gross and systemic human rights violation and the brutal operation were justified under the anticommunist ideology of President Rhee Syng Man and the U.S. military government. Within the seven years of confrontation, an enormous number of civilians was killed, disappeared, and injured. Most severe human rights abuses induding mass killing and disappearance were concentrated in the earlier period between May 1948 and March 1949. According to the 4.3 Committee, 15,095 registered victims were identified, among which 10,734 (71 %) were deceased, 3,921 (26%) missing, 207 (1 %) injured, and 233 (1 %) imprisoned. Among 15,095 victims, 79 percent were male victims and 21 percent were female. The 4.3 Committee additionally identified 31,593 family members of the victims in 2008. If the total population of Jeju in 1948, which was around 28,000, is considered, the 4.3 events affected almost every family in Jeju. 58 Of all the individual human rights violation cases, 78 percent were attributed to state agents such as police, military, and rightist paramilitary youth organizations such as the Young Northwesterners and the Korean National Youth. The report also address the abuses by the armed left (12%) and by the unidentified (9%). Most victims were recorded to have experienced atrocity between 1948 (53%) and 1949 (34%), within two years of the outbreak of the armed uprising. 57 Among many villages that were razed during the military operation, 84 villages have not recovered after the conflict because either villagers were all killed or villagers would not return to their original addresses (4.3 Committee 2003). One of the 4.3 Committee's current commemoration work is to find out these "lost

villages" and build up a stone monument inscribed with the names and addresses of villagers and their

stories to commemorate the 4.3 events. 58 This finding of the 4.3 Committee is consistent with the findings of the investigation of the Provincial 4.3 Committee of the Jeju Provincial Council. In their report, 12,243 registered victims were identified by 2002, among which 78.7 percent were men and 21 percent were women. In addition, 84 percent were attributed to state agents, 11.1 percent by armed guerillas, and 1.7 percent by the unidentified. The provincial council also found out that about 11 percent of victims were civilians under 10-years-old or above 60-years-old (Provincial 4.3 Committee 1997).

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6000 r····. ··•·....··. ··-· . ·_. ·..•......·..·. - . ·_....·_. ·..............·.............................................................................................................._ ........._ ............................................................................................................................................................................·................·......···. 1

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4000 f - - - - - - - - - -

~ 3000 f - - - - - -

z"

2000+-----

1000 f - - - - f l 9 4 _ - -

o Below 10

11-20

21-30

31-40

41-50

51-60

Above 60

Age of Victims

Figure 5-1. Distribution of Victims of the Jeju 4.3 Event by Age Groups Figure 5-1, which was created based on the report of the 4.3 Committee, describes the distribution of victims by age groups. Most victims were in their teens and twenties but 10 percent of the total victims were civilians under 10-years-old or above 60-years-old, which is an indication of the indiscriminate killing. An official report also identifies material damages in three categories: razed villages, destruction of public institutions, and destruction of industry. About three hundred villages were razed, 20,000 houses were destroyed, and Jeju had a record high unemployment rate of28.8% in 1949 (4.3 Committee 2003). Testimonies and evidence of human rights violations were collected and organized into four categories in the report: massacre, imprisonment, torture, and suffering related to the guilt-by-association system. The committee documented human 128

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rights violations by reading 14,000 applications for victims and collecting 500 testimonies from victims and their family members, police and military personnel, armed guerrillas, scholars, lawyers, and other experts. The 4.3 Committee confirmed systemic massacre of civilians committed by military and police in Jochun (25 victims), Jeju Agriculture School (47), Aewol (25), Wondong (34), Pyosun (148), and Bookchon (300). The committee additionally found evidence of the indiscriminate arrest, illegal detention, and summary executions. Many were arrested and illegally detained in various locations in J eju and the military prisons all over the country. Detainees were usually sentenced to death or to life in martial courts. The committee found examples of illegal and sweeping arrest of civilians and evidence of tortures, which was used to extract a confession that later used as a justification of summary execution and illegal detention. One crucial aspect of the report is that it included the fourth category - suffering related to the guilt-by-association system. The guilt by association system or the involvement system had long been used to punish grave violations such as treason or rebellion in traditional Korean society. It had been abolished in 1894 but revived under the Japanese colonial rule. Since then, it had been existed in Korea under the consecutive military and authoritarian regimes until democratic transition in 1987. The committee filed several cases where the family members of victim were given an unfair treatment in employment, promotion, state examinations, or international travels. Many examples revealed how the past abuse and state violence could also haunt the present and even the future. Although it is not explicitly stated, the committee showed that a tragedy can be reproduced over time and the 4.3 events are not temporally limited to the suffering occurred between 1947 and 1954.

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5.2. Overview of the Transitional Justice Advocacy Although the enonnous civilian deaths in the 4.3 events were unprecedented in Korean history (Kim 2000; Suh 1999), the truth had been totally suppressed by the consecutive military and authoritarian regimes until 1987, and to some extent until 1993. The first civilian government entered with an inauguration of President Kim Young Sam in 1993. President Rho Tae Woo, who was elected as president through a direct presidential election in 1987, was a fonner general who entered in politics with the former general and authoritarian leader Chun Doo Hwan by way of a military coup in 1979 and the subsequent bloody suppression of the Kwangju democratic movement. Although Roh Tae Woo was the first president elected after democratic transition, he later was convicted for his role in the coup and the massacre. 59 It took a long time and efforts to enact the 4.3 Special Act in December, 1999,

which became th,e legal basis of the 4.3 Committee. A path toward the establishment of a truth commission was a long and painstaking journey as an official report stated, "The transitional justice movement for the Jeju 4.3 events has been advanced in conjunction with the development of democracy in Korea (4.3 Committee 2003: 15)." It took 52 years after the occurrence of the event in 1948 and 13 years after democratic transition in 1987 until victims and family members even cautiously opened up their story. I first divided the advocacy into three stages based on the characteristic of the advocacy. The first stage is from 1954 to 1987 when the memory of the 4.3 events was

Some further argue that genuine civilian government started with an inauguration of President Kim Dae Jung in 1998 because Kim Young Sam gained power by a historic merge of his party with Roh Tae Woo's party to form a conservative majority party in 1990, 59

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suppressed by the consecutive dictatorial and military regimes until 1987. During this time, courageous individual victims and activists made sporadic attempts to question, remember, and bring justice to the unjustifiable state violence. The second stage is from 1987 to 1998 when the 4.3 events slowly gained local and national attention by the efforts of activists and local social movement organizations. The 4.3 advocacy became more collective and public in nature as a result of the efforts of various groups such as students, media, provincial council, movement organizations, and associations for the victims. The final stage is from 1998 to 2000 when victims and activists pursued the enactment of the 4.3 Special Act and finally established the 4.3 Committee in 2000. The main location of the activism was moved from Jeju to Seoul, the center of national politics, and the transitional justice advocacy received the support of many outside sympathizers. I additionally divided these three stages into five phases of movement and two periods of governmental suppression. In this chapter, I examine the first stage which comprised two phases of the early transitional justice attempts and governmental suppression immediately after the events. The Rhee Syng Man's dictatorship, which was primarily responsible for the operation and massacres, lasted six more years after the events until ousted out in 1960. Although a short-lived democracy was followed, it was soon overthrown by the coup of General Park Chung Bee in 1961. Individuals who enthusiastically started to find the truth soon saw the Dark Age with the introduction of Park's military dictatorship. Many stated, ''No one publicly spoke a word on the Jeju 4.3 events under Park's military regime for eighteen years.,,60 The governmental suppression

Yang, Jo Hoon, a former editor-in-chief of the Jemin Ilbo and the chief staff of the Task Force for the Report of the 4.3 Committee. 2006. Interview by author. March 15, Seoul. Tape recording; This was also confIrmed by the interview with Ko Chang Hoon, Kim Jong Min, Park Chan Sik, Oh Seung Kook, and

60

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continued when General Chun Doo Hwan seized power by a similar coup after President Park was assassinated in 1979. The Chun's authoritarian regime lasted until 1987 when his proclaimed successor Roh Tae Woo agreed to have a direct democratic presidential election. Between 1979 and 1987, a few courageous pioneers started to cautiously bring the 4.3 events to light despite obvious disadvantages, surveillance, and threat. The analysis of the second stage of the movement is divided into two chapters. In Chapter 6, I explore the activism between 1987 and 1992 under the Roh Tae Woo administration when activists, media, and victims first openly advocated transitional justice. The movement mainly focused on finding an alternative memory and discourse, opening the tightly sealed mouths of the victims, and finally bringing local and national public attention and awareness. The efforts made by activists, journalists, and students and intellectuals reached its climax in December 1992 when 11 skeletal remains were excavated from the Darangshi cave and provided decisive evidence of the massacre. With all these efforts, the transitional justice advocacy entered into local politics. In 1993, the Provincial 4.3 Committee was created under the Jeju Provincial Council and led the movement afterwards. The creation of the Provincial 4.3 Committee is a key moment in transitional justice history because it was first time when any branch of government started to discuss the 4.3 events. The Provincial 4.3 Committee led the movement focusing on three projects: the investigation, united memorial service, and petition movement. I address the contribution of the Provincial 4.3 Committee as well as other activism between 1993 and 1998 in Chapter 7. In Chapter 8, I explore the last stage when all previous efforts and power were

many others.

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concentrated into two large-scale movements: the commemoration project in 1998 and enactment movement in 1999. The year 1998 was significant in the 4.3 advocacy since President Kim Dae lung, who consistently promised to seek truth and restore the honor of . the victims, was inaugurated. In addition, it was a year of the 50th anniversary of the 4.3 events and activists and victims believed that they cannot delay the establishment of the law to 21 st century. People believed that visible achievement should be made within Kim Dae Jung's tenure and, after two years of struggle in Seoul and Jeju, the 4.3 Special Act was finally enacted in 1999. Table 5-1 summarizes the periodization, main actors (with major actors in bold), and major activities of transitional justice process.

Table 5-1. Five Phases of Transitional Justice Advocacy, 1954-1999

Stage I

1-7""'"~==~~"""",,""""'-"'--.,...,..,,-~-;-~~.,...,..,,"""'----+"';"";'~"':"';';"""'.,...,..,,~-----I

Phase 2 (1979~1987)

Chun Doo Hwan

Writer; social/cultural activists; students and intellectuals Korean-Japanese ori inally from Je"u

Stage II

4.3 Research Institute; Jeju Cultural Movement Association; local media (Jemin I1bo) Phase 3 (1987~1992)

RohTaeWoo Students, victims, social movement groups, local broadcastin

Underground memorial activities and study groups b students and activists April memorial service; Jemin Ilbo's 4.3 Speaks; research and discovery of the evidence; Excavation of the Darangshi cave Private investigation of the massacre and victims

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(MBC) Provincial 4.3 Committee

Phase 4 (1993-1998)

Stage III

Phase 5 (1998-2000)

Kim Young Sam

KimDae Jung

Advocacy networks (4.3 Research Institute, Jeju Korean People Artist Federation); students; media; association for victims and their families Pan National Committee (Seoul); 50th Anniversary Commemoration Committee (Provincial Solidarity) (Jeju)

Official investigation by the Jeju Provincial Council; United memorial service; petition movement

50to anniversary commemoration projects; enactment movement

5.3. Initial Transitional Justice Attempts (1960-1961) This part covers the first two periods - total suppression of the Rhee Syng Man regime and the initial transitional justice efforts made in early 1960s during a short democratic moment. It was difficult to study this portion of the history compared to the post-1987 era because documentation was insufficient and relevant persons had already been deceased without leaving any records. One of my interviewee who led student movement in this period explained, "There is no documentation on this highly important period in transitional justice history of the 4.3 events.,,61 The first movement occurred when Korea experienced its first transition from a dictatorship to an ephemeral democracy in April 1960. In April 1960, the Rhee Syng Man regime, which was primarily responsible for the massacres not only in Jeju but throughout nations during the Korean War, wasovertumed by student-led democracy demonstration which was directly caused by a corruption occurred in the election ofthe prime minister. To make matters worse, a student protestor's body was found with a tear Lee, Moon Kyo, a former leader of the Jeju National University's student-led transitional justice movement in 1960. 2006. Interview by author, Apri122, Jeju. Tape recording

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gas grenade stuck in his head. Not only students but also professors and ordinary citizens participated in the protest against Rhee's dictatorship, and Rhee finally stepped down. The 12-year-old patriarchic dictatorship, which was characterized by the "defeat communism" spirit, corruption, and the legacy of the colonial rule, was ended and people were eager to have a substantial democracy. A series of political events in April 1960 is referred to as the 4.19 Revolution. Various political and social groups raised their voices and took parts in the dramatic change. Many progressive groups who were suppressed under the previous regime started to actively participate in politics and raise their voices. It was virtually a period of a revolutionary change and, as it often is, it was also a period with some level of confusion and disorder. Among many groups who raised their voices were groups of people whose family members were murdered by the police and military during the Korean War between 1950 and 1953. Several massacres existed during the Korean War period. The most distinct one is a systemic - nationwide and simultaneous - massacre of civilians occurred immediately after the outbreak of the war. It started with protective arrests of civilians who were suspected of being a communist or to have any family members or relatives with such ideological disposition. Most of them were executed without due process and researchers estimate at least 300,000 death,s in a three month period between June and September of 1950 (Suh 1999; Kim 2002; Han 1996). In addition, several massacres of unarmed villagers by the Korean army were recorded. How could such atrocities be hidden for over a decade? On the one hand, we can find an answer from the leader and regime characteristic. During his tenure, Rhee was reluctant to address the atrocities done by the Korean police and military. The 135

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government suppressed victims' entreaties by claiming that the dead were either communists or aligned with communists. For example, seven hundred villagers in Geochang were murdered by the 9th Regimen of the Korean army during the Korean War (Geochang County Council 2003) and the family members petitioned for the thorough investigation of the massacre and the restoration of the honor of victims. Nevertheless, Rhee concealed the truth and those who were in charge of the murder, although found guilty under the military court, held important positions such as the Director of the National Police (Kim Jong Won). Under this unfavorable situation, victims collected the remains of the dead after three long years and buried them in a common burial ground since it was impossible to identify and separate the remains of the dead. However, a burial ground and the victims were under a constant threat of the authority under the Rhee's dictatorship. There was an incident when unidentified soldiers cut a stone monument with a chisel and the governor of the South Kyongsang province openly asked to remove the burial ground. Under the Rhee's ultra-anticommunist regime, any activities or disgraceful plea against t~e military or police were regarded as acts benefiting the enemy state, i.e. North Korea. The National Security Act, which was legislated immediately after the establishment of the Republic of Korea, provided a ground for the punishment of anyone whose acts may endanger national security by benefiting North Korea (Park 1994). The act had been criticized of its arbitrariness and the possibility of political manipulation. Many who made a plea for the dead became an easy prey of the National Security Act and were detained or imprisoned during the Rhee's tenure (Kim 2002). This policy was, in a sense, a continuation of Rhee's unwillingness to address

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past wrongdoings ofthe collaborators under the Japanese colonial rule. Rhee's disposition was clearly shown in the failure of the Special Committee for Investigation of the Pro-Japanese Collaborators. The committee was established immediately after the establishment ofthe Republic of Korea based on the special act enacted in the National Assembly. It was designed to clear the disgraceful history filled in by many treacherous actions of pro-J apanese collaborators. The special act was the third law passed by the first National Assembly, which reveals the urgency and consensus among people on this issue. The committee was established in October 1948 based on the special law with ten committee members and its own enforcement units. The punishment was heavy including the death penalty and sentence to life for the people who actively joined and supported the colonial power. However, in some sense, the committee was doomed to fail because the new government itself was mainly composed of the ruling elites ofthe colonial rule who survived under the protection of the U.S. military government and aligned with Rhee Syng Man. In addition, former collaborators kept criticizing the activities of the committee as a pro-communist act since the activities disturbed the feelings of the people by retroactively evaluating the historical events (Jung 1999: 14-15). To make matters worse, Rhee was actively protecting those former collaborators who were currently in the administration and even publicly criticized the committee. The activity of the special committee was obstructed by police and rightist youth groups and committee members were frequently attacked. The law went through three degenerative revisions proposed by President Rhee and was finally annulled on February 14, 1951. 62

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For more details, see works of Lee Kang Soo (2003)and Huh long (2003).

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On the other hand, we can also find a cause in victims who were directly and indirectly affected by the Rhee's past and current policies. Many did not even think about complaining about the death of their family members. Kim Jong Min (1999), a reporter who closely followed victims for over ten years finds two reasons. First, a very strict self-constraint mechanism was in work since the dead were associated with communism, which was a strong social taboo. Hunting for communists and resident spies among nationals was a frequent political topic in Korean society under Rhee Syng Man. Suh (1999: 713) supports this view by arguing that the Rhee's ultra-anticommunist system was founded through a medium of the mass killing, which instigated and diffused terror throughout Korean society. Second, there was also defeatism - or nihilism among victims knowing that the perpetrlltors are still in power and there is nothing much can be done. With the 4.19 Revolution, millions who had held back their voices and endured unfair treatments started to speak out publicly. A core concern was to restore the honor of the dead by clearing the false accusation of being a communist. This was the first time when victims formed associations to create organized power and represent collective demands. Most relatives and family members were still alive and actively participated in the process since it had only been a decade since the events. People were no longer afraid of the government because victims believed that they were doing the right thing and "a new era has come.,,63 Not only victims but also political leaders like congresspersons believed that the state should redress people's grievances. In some places like Pusan, leaders of victims were able to meet Prime Minister through the good

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Lee, Moon Kyo. 2006. Interview by author, April 22, Jeju. Tape recording

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office of district congressman and receive a large amount of condolence money to be used to have a memorial service (Kim 2002: 119). Eventually, the 4th National Assembly took the initiative and decided to investigate the civilian massacres that occurred under Rhee's regime and the Congressional Special Committee for Investigation of Civilian Deaths (Congressional Special Committee) was installed in May 1960. However, to Jeju people's disappointment, the massacres during the 4.3 events were excluded from the subject of investigation. The committee originally limited its mandate on the civilian massacres occurred during the Korean War such as Geochang, Hampyoung, and systemic massacres in the early period. It was three congressmen from Jeju - Koh Dam Ryong, Hyun Oh Bong, and Kim Doo Jin - who made an effort to bring the 4.3 events into the agenda of the committee (Kang 2003). Although three congresspersons were from different parties, they worked together to represent the demands of Jeju people. The voices for the truth and justice for the massive and indiscriminate killings in J eju were raised within these national contexts. During this period, the suppressed memories of the 4.3 events started to slowly float above the surface. 64 Students of the Jeju National University under the leadership of Lee Moon Kyo (sophomore and law major) were the first ones who had the courage to publicly investigate civilian massacres. Lee Moon Kyo and six other students created an organization called the Student Association for Investigating the Truth of the 4.3 Events (4.3 Jinsang Kyumyung

Dongjihoe) on May 26, 1960 and started to investigate and record the mass killings by 64 A good example is a newspaper opinion piece contributed by Ko Chang Moo in a national and conservative newspaper Chosun Ilbo in July 1960. Here, Ko strongly argued that Jeju people were not the "reds" and asked a thorough investigation of the civilian massacre during the 4.3 events (Chosun Ilbo, July 16 and July 17,1960).

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on-the-spot investigations around the Jeju Island. Students published a statement in the most popular local newspaper, the Jeju Shinbo, and this statement was the first public transitional justice attempt recorded after the end of the events in 1954. Here they stated that "the time has arrived when we have to appease the souls of millions murdered by barbaric guns and swords by testifying their innocence." They further proposed that "after establishing the truth, the punishment for perpetrators who murdered civilians and committed arson should follow." Student's action first invoked the suspicions of the police, security, and counterespionage agents. Lee remembered both threat and conciliatory measures made by the local police through the medium ofhis parent and teachers. However, in some sense, time had actually changed and even the chief of the Jeju police cautiously agreed to the basic purpose of the students' activity while being on "a strict guard against communist activities.,,65 Student's efforts were purely out of a "strong sense of justice," according to Lee, . a leader of the student association. When asked why he initiated the movement despite the foreseeable danger, Lee who now is his 70s answered: "Why? Umm.... I was a student. Students have courage; they don't calculate; Students take an action when they believe it is right to do so. In addition, I studied law as an undergraduate and law, in a nutshell, is a pursuit of justice. Justice was and still is really important to me. I was not scared.... I was young. I was not scared of police, military, or counterespionage agents because I did the right · ,,06 thmg ....

Students traveled walking around the Jeju Island at their own expense and lodged in their relatives' houses in tum. They met leaders of villages and collected information on any mass killings of tens or hundreds. Lee recollected that they were able to gather 65 66

Jeju Shinbo, May 28, 1960 Lee, Moon Kyo, 2006. Interview by author, April 22, Jeju. Tape recording

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information in the amount of "five university notebooks", but Lee's mother later took precaution and burnt them all when Lee was arrested on the day after the coup in 1961. However, investigation was not an easy process, according to Lee. Around 30 to 40 percents of village elders did not want to talk about the events due to a fear associated with twelve years of repression. Lee stated that "people turned their heads away from us immediately when the word '4.3' was uttered from our mouths.,,67 This was the first organized transitional justice effort for the 4.3 events. It is not surprising that students took the initiative since the dictatorship was also pulled down by student activism. Students were proud of the fact that the corrupt and resilient dictatorship was took down by their efforts. Since then, the role of student movement played an important role not only in Korean politics in general but also in the transitional justice advocacy of the 4.3 events. Ever since 1960s, students were at the center of the 4.3 advocacy and they acted first even under the military and authoritarian regimes despite obvious threats and repression. In general, an initial action of students often inspired others and laid foundation of further activism. Inspired by the student's activism, a local newspaper, Jeju Shinbo and its owner and managing director Shin Doo Bang started to investigate the massacre on June 2, 1960 to help the Congressional investigators. The Jeju Shinbo hosted the first conference on the theme of seeking the truth and restoring justice about the elite massacre occurred in the early period of the 4.3 events. 68 In addition, the newspaper printed out and distributed

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Lee, Moon Kyo, 2006. Interview by author, April 22, Jeju. Tape recording

6~ A massacre of influential persons occurred around the fall of 1948. The massacre distinguished itself

from others since mostly local elites were detained in the Jeju Agricultural School and some of them were later executed. Local elites who were the leaders oflegal, administration, education, and journalism professions were detained on the charge of being a communist. An official reports listed about fifty names of people who were detained and murdered. An owner and managing director Shin Doo Bang himself was

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the application forms for victim registration. The application form was designed to record personal information of victims and family members, the date and place of the killing, perpetrator, ifknown, whereabouts of corpses, and so on. This was the first province-wide investigation of civilian victims related to the 4.3 events conducted by private - or quasi-public - actor. If students were the first ones who took courage and started the movement, the efforts of the Jeju Shinbo and Shin Doo Bang was the one who put transitional justice advocacy in 1960 in a high gear. The newspaper reported that 1,259 applications were received and 1,457 victims were identified. 69 Among 1,457 victims, 1,172 (80%) were male victims and 285 (20%) were female. The newspaper also identified 588 cases (40%) of killing done by military, 439 (30%) by police, and 430 cases (30%) unidentified. Although the total number of victims only constitutes 10 percent of the number of victims in 2007 official registration of the 4.3 Committee (15,095), the proportion of male and female victims is exactly consistent. In addition, 1960 investigation already showed that over 70 percent of killings were committed by the military and police. Thus, although the total number of victims registered in 1960 was much smaller, they represented the universe of victims well. The total number of victims indirectly shows that people who were suppressed under the Rhee Syng Man regime were still reluctant to talk about the 4.3 events. The number of applicants is only one tenth of total victims registered today. Along with these major efforts, victims and their family members started to form associations. The first association of victim's family members was organized in June by eight people whose family members had been killed or disappeared in Daejung. This as also one of detainee at the Jeju Agricultural School. Jeju Shinbo, June 13, 1960

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association was active since the first street demonstration for transitional justice in Jeju occurred in Daejung with 60 villagers. 7o Protestors declared their will to investigate the truth about civilian deaths during the 4.3 events. In addition, the transitional justice attempts not only remained in private realms such as students, local media, and victims but also spilt over to public realm such as local governments and councils. The Jeju City Council decided to investigate the massacre and the Jeju Provincial Council was also reported to have decided to launch an investigation. However, I was not able to find evidence that these local governmental bodies actually took any action in 1960s. Within this overall excitement and hope arrived three investigators from the Congressional Special Committee - Congressman Choi Chun, Cho II Jae, and Park Sang Kil - who stayed for two days in J eju and spent one day for the investigation. All previous efforts made by students, local newspaper, victims, and lo.cal councils focused on assisting the official investigation of the committee. However, time and resource were insufficient to do full-scale fact-finding and reach any substantial conclusion. Investigators spent most of time hearing previous investigations done by students and the J eju Shinbo. According to the stenographic record of the committee, investigators had one public hearing with seven witnesses: one ofthem was Ko Soon Hwa representing the student association, the other was Shin Doo Bang, a managing director of the Jeju Shinbo, and five others were victims and their family members (4.3 Committee 2002). Investigators participated in the general meeting of the Congressional Special Committee in Seoul but decided not to report their investigation of civilian deaths during

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Jeju Shinbo, May 31, 1960

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the 4.3 events at the plenary session. 71 As a result, one day investigation in Jeju only left 18 pages of stenographic record in the congressional archives. An ostensible reason of not reporting it to the plenary session was "insufficient evidence and lack of preparation." Nevertheless, more substantial reasons can be found in the innate limitation of 4th National Assembly and a lack of political will of the national elites. One answer to why the investigation of the committee could not achieve further political action could be found in the situation of the 4th National Assembly. The 4th Assembly was instituted under the Rhee's dictatorship in 1958 and many were either former or current allies of Rhee. People, after the 4.19 Revolution, constantly demanded the dissolution and reinstitution of the assembly and it dissolved itself on July 28, 1960, a month after the investigation. Thus, although the members ofthe National Assembly created the committee to meet people's strong urge for transitional justice after the 4.19 Revolution, it already had a birth defect. For example, in an interview with a newspaper, the chair of the special committee, Congressman Choi Chun stated: "A full-scale investigation of the massacre nationwide in a week is very difficult and I do not believe that the 4th National Assembly can complete the investigation. Maybe more complete investigation is possible in the 5th National Assembly .... The current Special Committee's aim is to give a policy recommendation to the government to punish those whose acts have supporting evidence and to make reparation to the family members of the civilian victims."n

Based on this statement, it is clear that the Congressional Special Committee did not have enough time and resources to investigate the massacres (Kang 2003: 63). It is also highly doubtful whether the members of the

4th

National Assembly had

a resolute will for transitional justice. For example, Congressman Choi Chun who visited 71 72

Jeju Shinbo, June 18, 1960 Jeju Shinbo, June 1, 1960

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Jeju as an investigator and was also a chair of the committee was a former chief of Jeju Provincial Police during the 4.3 events. If thoroughly investigated, Choi himself was not completely free from responsibilities for the massacres. Evidence can be found in the congressional record of the public hearing. After spending four hours in listening to painful story of the massacres, Choi made his concluding n~mark. In his remark, Choi mentioned the statute oflimitations which provoked most participants: "We [Investigators] reached a conclusion that, in principle, the government should make reparation to civilian victims. However, the Jeju 4.3 events are not a matter of concern here because in our criminal law, aiding and abetting a murder has a 10 year statue oflimitations. The 4.3 events are now over 10 years .. " I am letting you know of this fact for your own information .. " And, Jeju was under great influence of communist activities. I remember that I also made an order based on my judgment that ifnot controlled, a huge rebellion would start from Jeju .... We have to think hard about how to distinguish civilians from those who were not civilians .. " (4.3 Committee 2002)"

Here we find a lack of will for transitional justice of those who were responsible for redressing past state violence. Here, Choi argues that the 4.3 events are beyond the statute of limitation in criminal law. However, even in Korean criminal law, the statute of limitations for a murder, not aiding and abetting a murder, is fifteen years, which was still effective when he made the remark. His selective understanding and interpretation of the law clearly reveals a lack of his will. In addition, Choi's statement represented the viewpoint of those who led a country: Jeju was and still is an island full of communists and there is no room for doubt that the 4.3 events were a communist rebellion. Moreover, there is also a justification used by the opponents of transitional justice: it is almost impossible to distinguish innocent civilians (yangmin) from rebels (pokdo). To make matters worse, other member Congressman Kim Vi Taek was also a policeman during the massacres and many congressmen were affiliated with Rhee Syng Man and were not free

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from responsibility. 73 The failure of the Congressional Special Committee in 1960 provides an important lesson about the importance oftiming and the danger of premature measures. It shows one case where the prompt establishment of a commission led to an undesirable

outcome. First, it is important to examine the tenure of the superior body of the commission. If the body which commissioned the investigation - congress, president, or prime minister - is left with a limited tenure, there is a high chance that the commission's work would be less effective and discontinued. Although a truth commission is an independent body, the life and effectiveness of the commission is closely linked to the body which commissions the investigation. Second, if people who were involved in the past abuses directly or indirectly are a member of the superior body, the commission is less likely to accomplish its task. If a truth commission is established immediately after transition, there is a high probability that spoilers are still powerful and hold offices in various positions. In the Korean case, perpetrators were still in important positions even after the fall ofthe Rhee Syng Man regime and exerted an influence from outside the commission. It would be the worst scenario if opponents are also inside the commission itself or the higher body which commissioned the task. Thus, it is important to closely examine the composition of members in the body which commissions. There always is a possibility of an intense confrontation over the composition of the committee itself as in case of the 4.3 Committee. However, it is a different matter if the commissioning body is already occupied with majority of members opposing the truth commission. It was also confirmed by an interview with Congressman Park Sang Kil, one of investigators who visited Jeju (Kim 2002: 274).

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Third, if an investigatory commission is once instituted and ended without any substantial outcome, there is a danger that the failed experience could make the future transitional process more difficult. There are two ways that failed attempts in the past can undermine the future ones. On the one hand, a failed attempt could give an indulgence to perpetrators by giving a false justification that the matter had already been investigated. Incomplete investigation of the past can be used as an excuse not to pursue a full-scale and thorough investigation in the future. On the other hand, a failed attempt can also provide a wrong impression to the general public that the investigation was done and there actually is not much to be revealed. However, there is also a possibility that any past attempts could help the future process by leaving a precedent and legacy of an official investigation. In the Korean case, it is difficult to test the exact impact of the failed attempt on the future process because the impact of the failed attempt in Korea is intertwined with that of the 1961 military coup and the subsequent brutal suppression. Although the congressional investigations were halted within two weeks of its initiation, transitional justice advocacy by students, local newspaper, victims, and local elites continued. Students organized a rally in front of the National Assembly and related ministry buildings asking for thorough investigation and punishment of the perpetrators. Students established an organization representing students in Seoul and Jeju and decided to have a full scale investigation during the summer of 1960. In addition, victims, and especially those who were local elites, took a judicial action by filing a complaint in a Jeju District Court. Under Korean criminal law, a complaint is the first step to move prosecutors to investigate and indict the accused. The first action was taken by Shin Doo Bang who filed a compliant of the case of mass murder of 10 civilians based on the

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applications received to the Jeju Shinbo. This was the first complaint filed on the charge of mass murder during the 4.3 events against two perpetrators - Lieutenant Kim Byung Chae and policeman Lee Yoon Do. In a filed complaint, a detailed information of the massacre were described including the name and address of the victims, bereft family members, detained date and location, person who ordered the detention, date of the last interview, perpetrator and location, circumstance of murder, and the names and address of witnesses (Lee 1997). Shin Doo Bang stated the reason of filing a complaint in the Jeju Shinbo and here I introduce the full text of his remark: "Even under the martial law, there is no precedent in history to kill ten members of one household from 67-year-old senior to lO-day-old infant in one place at the same time. It is never justifiable to kill them all with bamboo spears and swords. There is no such punishment in world history. This tragic death of one family had been reported in one of applications our newspaper received. Survived members of the family have kept silence for over ten years only because of fear grown in the former regime. I have no intention of any political motives and I do not want my action to cause any social dissension. I act on behalf of the family members only because my heart was broken while reading the application and really wanted to know whether the dead deserved that kind of death by bamboo spears and swords in the 20th century world.,,74

Here, we can find a similar motivation of a courageous act to those of students. Shin filed a complaint because his heart was broken while reading the application and wanted to know whether the dead deserved that kind of death. Therefore, we can find a very similar motive of action from two key actors who initiated and led transitional justice advocacy - Lee Moon Kyo and Shin Doo Bang - which can be summarized as a sense (consciousness) of justice, emotion, and pursuit of truth. In addition, it was not victims but other brave actors who first took an action. Although Shin was a victim himself, he did not file a complaint on his case but for others. Shin wanted this complaint to be a 74

Jeju Shinbo, June 24, 1960

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"model case" and, as expected, the second one was filed by Kang Hee Chul against Shin HyunJoon, a retired lieutenant general of the Marine Corps on the charge of killing his father. 75 A Jeju district court started to investigate these two cases in January 1961 but no further complaints or actions taken by the court is recorded. Continual efforts were also made by local congressmen. Five congressmen three in the Lower House (Ko Dam Ryong, Hong Moon Joong, and Kim Sung Sook) and two in the Upper House (Kang Jae Ryang, Kang Kyung Ok) - gathered to discuss the ways to address the investigation of the civilian massacres during the 4.3 events. On January 26, 1961, Congressman Kim Sung Sook submitted a proposal to the 5th National Assembly to investigate "civilian deaths occurred in Jeju which account for around 40,000 to 50,000 deaths.,,76 All these initial attempts to bring the 4.3 events were fully stopped by the military coup of Park Chung Hee on May 16, 1961 (5.16 Military Coup). The initial transitional justice efforts lasted about 13 months from April 1960 to May 1961. A few argued that transitional justice movement in 1960s was a total failure (Kang 2003: 53). It is a valid argument for the case of the Congressional Special Committee but cannot and should not be extended to other local initiatives. The existence of this brief period is highly important in overall transitional justice history. The embryo of the transitional justice movement after the democratic transition was already fully conceived during this period. The initial activities of students, local media, victims, local elites, and local councils reach their full forms and functions after democratization. In later period, these actors became key actors achieving the first truth commission in Korea. If the efforts in 75

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Jeju Shinbo, June 25, 1960 Jeju Shinbo, January 26, 1961

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this period were absent, the efforts after 1987 would have been more difficult and much slower.

5.4. Total Suppression under Park Chung Bee (1961--1979)

A short period of democracy between 1960 and 1961 failed due to the inability of the Second Republic to control civil unrest. To make matters worse, people's discontent grew as they experienced economic decline as a result of political instability. General Park Chung Hee took over the incompetent government by a military coup on May 16, 1961. Under Park's military dictatorship between 1961 arid 1979, he pursued anticommunism, economic growth policy based on exportation, and suppression of civil and political liberty. This period in the transitional justice advocacy is marked by seventeen years of total suppression and absolute silence. Following the path of Rhee's patriarchic dictatorship, Park also treated any attempts to investigate and redress civilian massacres committed by the military and police as acts of communists. Many who led previous movement nationwide were arrested and sentenced to prison over ten years or even to death in the Revolutionary Courts (Committee on the History ofthe Revolutionary Court 1962). For example, the president ofthe national association for the victims - Roh Hyun Sup - and many local leaders were arrested two days after the coup and executed (Lee 2000; Kim 2002). In many places, any evidence of massacre such as common burial grounds, monuments, or any written documents were completely destroyed by local police and military police. In Daegoo, for example, a massacre ground discovered by the victims was buried under deep water by constructing a dam immediately after the coup. In many places, the local 150

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leaders of victim's association were arrested under the National Security Act and police destroyed a stone monument using hammers, dug up the remains of the dead under a common burial ground, and destroyed all of them by fire (Kim 2002: 282). Similar strict measures were taken immediately after the coup by the Jeju local police and military. A good example is an incident that occurred in Daejung where 132 villagers were murdered during the early period of the Korean War. Immediately after the massacre, the military proclaimed the murder site a restricted area for civilians and would not allow burying the remains of the dead. 77 Although the victims strongly asked for the bodies, it took six long years under President Rhee. In 1959, family members of the victims formed an association, created a common burial ground, and set up a stone monument to remember the tragic deaths of their parents. Since the police and military killed 132 villagers in a local ammunition depot and secretly buried the bodies, it was difficult to identify the remains of the dead. The descendents decided to create a common burial ground and name their association as an "Association of One Hundred Ancestors but One Descendent (Baekjo Ilson Yujokhoe )," reflecting the fact that their parents were one hundred individuals but became one by brutal and barbaric state violence, which led them to become descendents of one ancestor (Lee 2000). A month after the coup, local police chiefKang Kyu Ha came with his subordinates carrying hammer, shovel, and gasoline. A stone monument was tom down, broken, and thrown away by the order of police chief. He further tried to dig up the remains of the dead and destroy them by fire but faced a vehement resistance from the According to the testimony, the murder site was "fenced around, locked tightly, and guarded by soldiers for six years and eight months." Ko Young Woo, a vice president of the Association of One Hundred Ancestors but One Descendent and son ofKo Jung Ha, a former president of the association. 2005. Interview by author, October 26. Jeju. Tape recording

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victims' families. For a long time, victims "almost lived - eat and sleep - at the burial ground to guard the remains of the dead from police and military.,,78 However, in the end, each person had to exhume and bury a portion ofthe total remains of 132 due to a threat from authority. The exact same incident occurred on the same day, June 15, 1961, at another place in the mainland, Geochang, which provides evidence that an order to dismantle transitional justice movement came from somewhere in the higher levels of the government.

Figure 5-1. Display saying "Remains of a Monument tom down by the Park's Regime"

However, as shown in Figure 5-1, parts of broken pieces were found by victims and kept by family members and displayed as historic evidence after democratization. In

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addition, victims re-erected a new stone monument to commemorate not only the original massacre that occurred in 1950 but also the second state violence of the Park Chung Hee administration in 1960. It is one example of a stubbornness of truth even under coercion and repression. The re-erection of the stone monument and display of the previously broken monument was not something Park Chung Hee and his subordinates even imagined when they tore down the monument in 1960s. Not only the massacre of 132 villagers but also the second massacre of the truth, which is represented by the broken monument, is remembered by the descendents. Two student leaders - Lee Moon Kyo and Park Kyung Koo - were arrested by the local police on the very next day of the coup. Lee clearly remembered that he was arrested in the evening of May 17th on the charge of benefiting the communist North by causing social unrest using the 4.3 events. Both police and counterespionage agents tortured and interrogated him for two months and transferred him to a detention center in Seoul. He spent six months being suspicious of a "watermelon communist" and was released when authorities decided to suspend the indictment on November 10, 1961.

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Lee told me that his nickname was a ''watermelon communist" around government agents because of his tenacious denial of being a communist despite the torture. Lee kept insisting that he led the movement only because of his pursuit of the truth and justice. Since interrogators could not find any evidence of him being a communist but had a strong belief that he was, they called him a watermelon communist metaphorically insinuating that Lee is a core communist (red, inside) in a perfect disguise (green,

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Hankook Ilbo, November 11, 1961

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outside).80 Shin Doo Bang, a managing director of the Jeju Shinbo who had actively led the movement by distributing and accepting victims' applications and filing the first complaint in a court, was also arrested on the same day. He was arrested on the charge of instigating students to cause social dissension with a subversive political intention. Since students and local newspaper were two major actors of the transitional justice advocacy, the police and military continuously tried to link those two groups by counterfeiting a link between Lee and Shin. In contrast to the students whose indictment was suspended, Shin was indicted and imprisoned. Lee Moon Kyo was summoned as a witness in Shin's open trial in a revolutionary court and testified that the student's initiative was not ordered by Shin. In addition, people from Daejung who first created the victims association and organized a rally were also arrested (Kim 1999). Due to a harsh repression and a few exemplary cases of severe punishment like Lee and Shin, all discourses and transitional justice attempts for the 4.3 events were again totally repressed. The experience of severe repression by the Park administration made people more reluctant to memorize the 4.3 events who had already been terrified under the Rhee's dictatorship. Park's harsh punishment of the movements reminded victims that they should be extremely cautious in bringing the 4.3 events. What actually was the mechanism of a total silence for seventeen years under the Park Chung Hee regime? I found three main pillars that sustained the total silence - state, victims, and society. First, the military dictatorship of Park constantly kept eyes on any suspicious activities of the transitional justice advocacy. The suppression and surveillance was

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conducted within a broader context of the suppression of civil and political freedom. For instance, Lee who served in the army after his release remembered frequent visits from the members of the military police once a month to check his "situation.,,81 The leaders of victims were also constantly followed by police and oftentimes arrested and tortured whenever the police found suspicious acts. Ko Jung Ha, a founding member and leader of the Association of One Hundred Ancestors but One Descendent, was followed by police even ''when he went to his field to work.,,82 He was annually arrested when he visited the murder site to have a memorial service of his deceased father. He was beaten, tortured, and labeled as a resident spy, which in tum made a local policeman a hero who captured a spy annually. Yang Bong Chun, who started to organize the victims in Uigui in 1970s, also testified that whenever he had a meeting with other victims, police visited his office the next day investigating the details of the meeting - members, agenda, and the purpose of the meeting. 83 Through all these inspections and surveillance, the government wanted to strictly define the 4.3 events as "a rebellion of the South Korean Communist Party to obstruct the state building process of the legitimate Republic of Korea," as stated in the History of

Korean War published by the Department of Defense (1967). It also had a broader implication for the military government. The government could also protect itself from any suspicion of the indiscriminate mass killings of the past, not only in Jeju but also nationwide. The governmental surveillance was actually effective since many victims of the 4.3 events denied that they were the victims when asked and others told them that Lee, Moon Kyo, 2006. Interview by author, April 22, Jeju. Tape recording Ko Young Woo, a son ofKo Jung Ha. 2005. Interview by author, October 26, Jeju. Tape recording 83 Yang Bong Chun, a president ofHyun Vi Association for the Victims. 2005. Interview by author, October 19, Jeju. Tape recording 81

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they would not participate in any activities related to the 4.3 events because of the police surveillance. 84 Second, the level of self-censorship became even higher because victims were hit hard by the autocratic regime reversion after a short-lived democracy. The victims became more cautious of any movement toward truth and justice because they witnessed how fragile a democratic regime is in the face of the military coup. The victims became more aware of the fact that there is always a chance for an anticommunist military regime to rise in the Korean peninsula as long as the confrontation between the North and the South lasts. Still in 2008, there are many who are afraid of admitting that they are the victims of the 4.3 events. Many agreed that this is one reason why the number of total victims reported by the 4.3 Committee is about only a half of what scholars estimated. Many experts admitted that the total number of victims reported by the 4.3 Committee (15,095) is actually only a half of actual number of victims (30,000).85 Recently, their

concern is proven to be valid when the government ofthe newly elected President Lee Myung Bak announced that there is a high likelihood that the support for the 4.3 Committee would be discontinued. 86 Finally, society - Jeju society in particular and Korean society in generalblindly received the government's dominant discourse of the 4.3 events partly due to a fear and partly due to its inability to contemplate on the grave consequences as in the Eichmann case (Arendt 1963). For the comparison, I would like to introduce Arendt's

Ko Young Woo. 2005. Interview by author, October 26, Jeju. Tape recording My interview with Yang Jo Hoon, Yang Dong Yoon, Kang Duk Hwan, Kim Jong Min, and Byun Young Sang who were actively involved in the investigation at the 4.3 Committee, 4.3 Working Committee, and the Provincial 4.3 Committee all suggested this viewpoint. 86 Yonhap News, April 16, 2008 84 85

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postscript of her observation of the Eichmann trial: "Except for an extraordinary diligence in looking out for his personal advancement, he had no motives at all. And this diligence in itself was in no way criminal; he certainly would never have murdered his superior in order to inherit his post. He merely, to put the matter colloquially, never realized what he was doing .... He was not stupid. It was sheer thoughtlessness - something by no means identical with stupidity - that predisposed him to become one of the greatest criminals of that period (Arendt 1963: 287"-'288)."

During my research, I realized that the so-called "elites" were more responsible for thoughtlessly accepting the dominant discourse and blindly moved forward. One good example is a history professor who wrote a high school history textbook on the 4.3 events as a communist rebellion instigated by the North. When tenaciously asked the source of his definition by reporters, he admitted, "Well .... I really have not studied much on the Jeju 4.3 events. My concentration is the period of the Japanese colonial rule, not of the modem and contemporary Korean history. I wrote both parts of history for expediency .... I simply used the existing textbooks and available governmental materials to write additional part that extended from the part I wrote with my specialty (4.3 Reporting Team 1994: 413)."

Here is a clear example of high mind that lost an ability to think through both immediate and long-tenn consequences of his simple additional writing for "expediency." Another example is local elites - usually, public servants in government agencies such as provincial government and the local offices and socially notable persons - whose parents were victims of state violence during the 4.3 events. Many testified that those were and still are the representative group of people who deny their identity as a victim of the 4.3 events for fear oflosing their current "high level" social positions (Suh 1999: 715; Kim 1999: 317). Thus, victims could not speak up due to the social and political stigma associated 157

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with being the "reds (ppalgaengi)" and this led to very strict self-restraint against bringing the 4.3 events into politics (Hwang 1999: 326). This is also confirmed by many interviews with anonymous victims and their family members. A victim whose father was killed during the events mentioned, "It ["The reds"] continuously followed me throughout my 60 years of life. ,,87 A medical doctor also supports this view by observing, "In 1950s and 1960s, many patients who visited their psychiatrists complained that someone is trying to falsely accuse them of being a communist or the reds are following me (Hwang 1999: 326).' The level of a collective self-censorship was much higher and Jeju changed its identity from a land of communist rebellion to a "Hawaii of Korea" with the development in its travel industry. For seventeen years, no one ever mentioned finding the truth of the 4.3 events and recovering the honor of the dead by clearing their false accusation of being communists. There are sporadic records of attempts during these periods that are listed in a historic record or personal memoirs and autobiography of politicians. For instances, (1) a director of the Jeju prosecutor's office a certain Song suggested a transitional justice movement on August 8, 1961; (2) Congressman Kim Sung Sook made a report of civilian deaths and submitted to the 5th National Assembly asking for investigation and building a memorial monument in December 1961; (3) Congressman Hyun Oh Bong's office had a bull session with people and Lee Sung Chul suggested rebuilding a stone monument destroyed by police in Daejung on January 12, 1966 but was treated as "crazy man"; and (4) Kang Chang 11, who is now a congressman and then a student, organized students in J eju to investigate the massacres. However, general agreement is that there was no

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Anonymous. 2006. Interview by author, April 2, Jeju. Interview note

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activism for transitional justice.

5.5. Transitional Justice Movement before 1987 The most important breakthrough occurred in 1978 when a writer from Jeju Hyun Ki Young published his short story titled Aunt Sooni (soonisamchon) in a progressive and prominent academic journal on literatures. In 1979, he even edited his short stories on the theme of the 4.3 events into a book and published it, which later was banned by the government (Hyun 1979). This was the first attempt to publicly mention the 4.3 events after two decades of total silence under the Park Chung Hee dictatorship. Almost all activists who were heavily involved in the transitional justice movement testified that this was the key moment in transitional justice history and many described Hyun's short story as an incident of a "hole in a dam" in the 4.3 movements (Kim 1999) The story is a first person narrative in which the main character tells his story in monologue as he flies back to Jeju for his grandfather's memorial service. The short story contains two stories - one story of the dead (the narrator's grandfather and many other villagers whose descendents are having a memorial service on the same day) and the other story of the living (Sooni). The story begins with the news that Sooni, who is a distant relative of a narrator, committed suicide in her sweet potato field by poisoning herself. On the very same day, a narrator learned that a massacre of villagers occurred and the village was set on fire by the military and police about 30 years ago during the 4.3 events. A narrator's grandfather and many residents were murdered on the same day, . which is the reason why memorial services have been held on the same day every year. The only survivor of the massacre was Sooni. A massacre occurred at her sweet 159

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potato field and she lost her consciousness as the police and military opened fire and when she regained, she found out her two daughters were already dead. Since then, Sooni lived by herself working at her sweet potato field picking the remains of the dead and empty carriages. She lived a miserable life suffering from nervous prostration and auditory hallucinations and finally committed suicide in her field. A narrator ends his story saying, "Aunt Sooni's death is not a recent one but a thirty-years-old death. Although she survived for thirty some years after the massacre, aunt Sooni had been already dead at her sweet potato field with her two daughters thirty years ago," suggesting that there is only one tragic story of the 4.3 events - a story ofthe dead. 88 This powerful short story was the epochal event in the transitional justice movement. Hyun's short story not only got attention of people in Jeju but also readers and critics nationwide highly evaluated the piece. Hyun himself was surprised by an unexpected attention given to his work and admitted that he was very afraid to find out that his short story is gaining popularity. He was scared that he will be arrested since he wrote on a "such provocative and revolutionary subject (Hyun 1993: 167)." He admitted that he was so afraid and thought himself, "I will never write on the topic of the 4.3 events, only if, for God's sake, this time passes without causing any social trouble (Hyun 1993: 167)." Although the Park Chung Hee's dictatorship was slowly declining in 1978, no one had courage to publicly mention the 4.3 events and the civilian massacre from a

88 One reviewer wrote that the short story shows that "although people - narrator and Sooni - tried so hard to escape from the memory and fear of the massacre occurred during the 4.3 events, but never succeed but haunted by it (Kim 1999: 277)." The reason why the reviewer argues that not only Sooni but also narrator himself tried to escape the memory is because the narrator is described as typical elite in Seoul who tried to climb the social ladder by hiding his hometown because of the dark history associated with the 4.3 events.

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perspective that is different from an official narrative. Immediately after the assassination of President Park by one of his subordinates in October 1979, General Chun Doo Hwan took over the transitional government led by interim President Choi Kyu Ha by the December lih military coup with Roh Tae Woo (12.12 Military Coup). Under Chun's rule, state power and surveillance was still at the high level of Park's military regime. Chun pursued anticommunist, repressive, and authoritarian rule, which is represented by the bloody armed suppression of the 1980 democracy movement in Kwangju. Immediately after the publication of his edited book, Hyun Ki Young was arrested by the government agents. Hyun remembered that he was severely beaten in a torture room under one of government agency for three days and locked up for another twenty days or so until his bruises disappear (Hyun 1993). Hyun described three days in an interrogation room as the following: "I was like a dog in an interrogation room on the basement of the building. I still am very nervous if I think about a brutal and inhumane beating and whipping that filled my whole body with ink-colored bruises. Although the pain and bruises were gone in about two weeks, I still suffer from the mental scar that tries to haunt me ever since (Hyun 1993: 168)."

Hyun was released after spending about three weeks in the agency but a few months later, he was again arrested by a local police and counterespionage agents on the charge of violation of the National Security Act. Hyun was locked in five days spending time in all-night interrogation. Although Hyun was released without any charges, his edited book soon was banned by the government censorship. The publication and ban ofHyun Ki Young's Aunt Sooni had a significant impact on the underground student movement circles and social activists. A secret and private 161

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memorial service of the 4.3 events was first held at Pastor Lee Jong Won's house in Seoul in April 1979 with students (Kang Chang 11), writers (Hyun Ki Young, Kim Myung Sik), and activists, all from Jeju (Hyun 1993). This secret and private meeting suggests that a few people underground who sympathized with Hyun started to initiate action inspired by Hyun's courageous deed. Hyun remembered that after his publication in 1978, he was able to "meet many young elites and activists from Jeju who were highly conscious of social issues (Hyun 1993)." Hyun and his short story was actually an igniter of the second round of the transitional justice advocacy of the 4.3 events. It also shows the persistence and potential of the truth even under the severe suppression. The time between 1978 and 1987 was a period of preparation for the 4.3 advocacy. The lost memories and repressed discourses slowly were rediscovered by underground activists. Students and activists themselves realized how distorted the dominant narrative was and how important it is to find the truth of the 4.3 events and human rights violations. Although there were no manifest action and tangible advancement, this nine year period was a time of a great change in activists' perception of the 4.3 events. Consequently, this was also a period of preparing and training human resources and manpower of the later advocacy. Many activists and students both in Seoul and Jeju studied the 4.3 events during this period and later became key actors in 1990s. Oh Seung Kook, who is a secretary general ofthe 4.3 Research Institute, remembered reading Hyun's prohibited novel among his underground circle in the Jeju National University in early 1980s. 89 A professor and activist Ko Chang Hoon also told me that he

Oh, Seung Kook, a secretary general of the 4.3 Research Institute and a former president of the Jeju Cultural Movement Association. 2006. Interview by author, April 7, Jeju. Tape recording

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decided to get involved in the 4.3 movement around this period. 9o He stated that when he first encountered the 4.3 events from Hyun's short story, it was both "shocking and shameful" - shocking, because of the severity of the atrocities, and shameful, because nothing had been done to find the truth and restore the honor ofvictims. 91 Student who started to read and study the 4.3 events relied heavily upon one source - Hyun Ki Young's prohibited short story. Two years after the publication of Hyun's short story, an academic article was first published in the Journal ofKorean Studies by John Merrill titled "Cheju-Do Rebellion" (Merrill 1980). This article for the first time provided a historic analysis ofthe 4.3 events and human rights violations based on the U.S. government documents. The article was first read by a few students and activists and become more widely read when the piece was translated and included in an edited volume on the 4.3 events after democratization. Thus, for a long time, only source for the 4.3 events was Hyun's short story. Many activists, who were university students by then, testified that they read Hyun's novel in order to learn about the 4.3 events and this was the only source. This suggests one very important point. The first breakthrough from the absolute silence and total oblivion of the past violations took place from a cultural realm of the society, especially in literature. A similar example existed before democratization. In 1986, a year before transition, Lee San Ha appealed to mass student population regarding the 4.3 events with another genre of the literature - poetry. Lee published an epic poem titled Mountain Halla (Hallasan) which made the 4.3 events a popular theme among Ko, Chang Hoon, a professor in the Department of Public Administration at the Jeju National University and a former director of the 4.3 Research Institute. 2006. Interview by author, March 24, Jeju. Tape recording 91 Ko, Chang Hoon. 2006. Interview by author, March 24, Jeju. Tape recording

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students and activists nationwide (Lee 1987). Lee was arrested on the charge of a violation ofthe National Security Act and his poem was also banned by the government. In a sense, awareness and re-memorization of the events and massacres first sprang up from a cultural realm where the official state power was relatively sparsely presented compared to other political and social realms. The cultural sphere had a decisive role in leading the movement in the next twelve years. Compared to other transitional justice processes in Korea, the power of culture was much stronger in the Jeju case, especially in bringing the lost and repressed memories and discourses back into the society. Since the political and social realms were completely suppressed and kept under close surveillance, culture was the most available public sphere where activists had the most leverage of activism. Many acknowledged the role of culture, especially literatures such as poem, novels, and traditional plays called madang nori, to "open up the mouth of the victims," which was a key element in the case of J eju where the truth had been suppressed more than thirty years. 92 The power of the culture is not explicit but it is "accumulated over time among victims and the general public.,,93 Besides Hyun's short story and Lee's epic poem, literature also played a lead role in the 4.3 movement in a different setting - Japan. Jeju is located in equidistance from Korea and Japan, and historically people in Jeju were able to have a close relationship with Japan. For this reason, many people migrated legally and illegally before and during the 4.3 events escaping from violence of either anned guerrillas or the state. In 1957, Kim Suk Bum, a Korean-Japanese originally from Jeju, published a novel titled, A Death

Oh, Seung Kook. 2006. Interview by author, April 7, Jeju. Tape recording Kim, Kyung Hoon, a poet and play writer on the 4.3 events and a current staff member of the 4.3 Working Committee. 2006. Interview by author, April 5, Jeju. Tape recording

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of the Crow based on the 4.3 events. He later wrote a novel titled, Volcanic Island (Hwasando) which appeared serially in the Japanese newspaper for about 20 years (Kim 1999). Kim constantly wrote on the theme of Jeju and the 4.3 events and his works were widely read by a large Korean-Japanese. In addition, Kim's works were translated and gained popularity in Jeju after democratization. Many studies were done in literature on his works and his works also become at the center of the debate when a local magazine Monthly Travel Jeju - raised a suspicion of him being a core communist. However, it is undeniable that his works were the only popular voice on the 4.3 events in Japan and this later led to a small but significant transitional justice advocacy in Japan, which supported the enactment movement in 1999. Another important book was published in Japan in 1963 by Kim Bong Hyun and Kim Min Joo titled, A History ofJeju People So 4.3 Armed Struggle. The authors, who were armed protestors of the 4.3 events, documented detailed processes of the events based on expansive interviews with participants of the 4.3 events who took refugee in Japan.

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The 4.3 Reporting Team who closely interviewed Kim Min Joo argued that it is

rather an ideological propaganda than a study strictly based on the fact. 95 Nevertheless, it was the only historic document written by the participants of the 4.3 events in a relatively early period. In addition, in contrast to the previous fictions by Hyun Ki Young and Kim Suk Burn, it was the only nonfiction written about the 4.3 events before 1987. This book was introduced by two important edited volumes on the 4.3 events published immediately

According to an official report, Kim Bong Hyun was a history teacher at the Ohyun Middle School and was a staff member of the Democratic National Front (DNF) Jeju Committee, a moderate leftist coalition. Kim Bong Hyun left Jeju immediately after the outbreak ofthe4.3 events. Kim Min Joo was a student at the Jochun Middle School and actively participated in the armed uprising (4.3 Committee 2003: 156). 95 Yang, Jo Hoon. 2006. Interview by author. March 15, Seoul. Tape recording 94

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after democratization (Ararl Research Institute 1988; Roh 1988) and frequently cited by students and scholars. In this example, I found not only another crucial role of the literature but also the importance of another location - Japan. Koreans in Japan, especially those from Jeju, played a key role in the overall transitional justice movement by publicly speaking and thus storing an alternative memory of the 4.3 events. A period between 1954 and 1979 was the Dark Age for the 4.3 advocacy because of the consecutive anticommunist regimes in Korea. However, people in Japan were somewhat free from the repression of the Korean government, and served as a reservoir of an alternative memory, which later was discovered and introduced to Koreans after democratic transition. This is the first example of the role of Korean-Japanese and their role became more apparent when they initiated the first official public gathering to commemorate the 4.3 events in 1987.

5.6. Conclusion In this chapter, I mainly examined a period from 1954 to 1987, which was the darkest period of the transitional justice advocacy. Rhee's dictatorship, a perpetrator of the massacres, lasted for 12 years and the Park's military regime which harshly repressed the movement lasted for 18 years. In addition, Park's regime was followed by a similar anticommunist and repressive Chun's regime. Under these regimes, victims' voices for truth and justice were systemically suppressed and socially stigmatized. Victims were asked to remain intimidated, submissive, and silent. To these effects, victims themselves remained very much passive in the advocacy. On the other hand, the society - Jeju, in particular, and whole Korean society, in general- were asked to uncritically accept an 166

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official understanding of the 4.3 events as a communist rebellion and of the victims as communists or people who were instigated by communists. However, even under the harsh repressions and manifest threat, the truth was persistent. It was impossible for the government and society to suppress the truth totally. Whenever there were opportunities, there was at least one person who brought up the dark and unresolved history of state violence. Lee Moon Kyo, Shin Doo Bang, Ko Jung Ha, ,and Hyun Ki Young are exemplary figures of courageous individuals in the early 4.3 advocacy. In most cases, it was not victims themselves but others who sympathized with victims or who were inspired by a sense of justice, truth, and historic consciousness initiated action. It was power of individuals with ideals such as a sense of justice, pursuit of truth, and compassion that made a difference in the transitional justice process. The truth actually was stubborn in a sense that the lie was not stable at all as shown in case of the tom-down pieces of the stone monument which later was displayed as a mockery of organized lies. Actors from three social realms - students, mass media, and culture - were especially important in early advocacy. For the first period 1960s, it was students and local newspaper which led the movement and assisted the activities of the Special Congressional Committee. Their leading role is more important because it was also students and local media who were at the center in transitional justice advocacy in 1990s. On the other hand, it was a literature that broke twenty years of silence after Park's military coup. Since the release of Hyun's short story, a new phase of transitional justice advocacy began and it become out in the surface with democratic transition in 1987.

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6. From Oblivion to Social Attention

. "Truthfulness has never been counted among the political virtues, because it has little indeed to contribute to that change of the world and of circumstances which is among the most legitimate political activities. Only where a community has embarked upon organized lying on principle, and not only with respect to particulars, can truthfulness as such, unsupported by the distorting forces of power and interest, become a political factor of the first order. Where everybody lies about everything of importance, the truthteller, whether he knows it or not, has begun to act; he, too, has engaged himself in political business, for, in the unlikely event that he survives, he has made a start toward changing the world (Arendt 1993)."

6.1. Before June 1987 The transitional justice advocacy ofthe 4.3 events started a new era with democratic transition in 1987. After the publication ofHyun's short story in 1978, a small number of people in Jeju, Seoul, and even Japan started to take an action on the 4.3 events and civilian massacres. Most activities were underground activities such as regular study groups or annual secret memorial services by students, activists, writers, and intellectuals. Although it was an underground activity, it was important in changing perceptions, creating alternative narratives on the 4.3 events, and training and acquiring manpower for the post-1987 activism. However, four open and public actions were initiated in a period between 1978 and June of 1987. These activities are important because they are pioneer efforts which occurred even before democratic transition and they provide evidence for and against my hypotheses. The first activity is the publication of literatures and memoirs in Japan. The second point is the emergence of an alternative narrative derived from the dominant traditional and anticommunist perspective on the 4.3 events. Third, in a few places, a 168

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small number of victims cautiously started to act by purchasing and preserving the mass murder sites. Finally, students in Jeju started to speak up even before democratic transition. Since I explained the early activism in Japan in the previous chapter, I will focus on the latter three. Second, an alternative narrative, which is a variation of the traditionally dominant narrative of the anticommunist regime, emerged during this period. This newly developed perspective is represented in the chapter titled "Communist Rebellion and Massacre of Civilians" in Kang Yong Sam and Lee Kyung Soo's (1984) One Hundred Years of the History ofJeju.

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As the title suggests, authors did not change their

perspective that the 4.3 events is basically a communist rebellion. Nevertheless, authors shifted one step back and reluctantly admitted that there were massacres and human rights abuses of unarmed residents mainly committed by the communist guerrillas and in a few inevitable cases, by the police and military. This new variant of the traditional perspective obstructed and delayed the transitional justice efforts. Although the new perspective addressed human rights violations and massacres, it strengthened a traditional anticommunist viewpoint by arguing the existence of and by finding examples of the atrocities committed by the leftist armed guerrillas, which constituted 12 percent of the total violations. This perspective was later taken by Park Seo Dong, a chief editor of the Monthly Travel Jeju, a local magazine which first initiated the investigation immediately after democratization and published a regular special reports titled, 4.3 Our Everlasting Pain. Many testified that

96 The main author of the book, Kang Yong Sam was a former chief editor of the local rightwing newspaper, the Halla Ilbo, under the authoritarian regime. This chapter was written based on his interviews with the former police, military, and rightist political group members (Kim 1999: 364).

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his efforts to address the 4.3 events heavily leaned toward the ''ultra rightist ideology" and was very "narrow minded.,,97 Some even told me that he was a secret agent of the state intelligence agency but could not be confirmed. However, it was certain that the magazine was an outlet for the former police, military, and rightists youth organizations (2005: 17).98 A similar perspective can also be found in other writings ofCho Nam Soo, Ko Moon Seung, and Cho Nam Hyun. Third, even under the Chun's repressive regime, a small number of individuals whose family members had been murdered in Uigui area publicly started to take an action. This act was first started in 1964 by secretly purchasing a mass murder site by a few villagers under the leadership of Yang Bong Chun whose father was buried under the site.

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Yang and others had secretly taken care of the murder site by creating a fence and

covered the site with turf in 1976. In 1983, Yang decided to raise the stone monument to publicly commemorate the death of around eighty innocent villagers by the military. It was the first public action taken by the victims' family members before democratic transition after the 5.16 Military Coup. Many objected and tried to obstruct the process but Yang persistently pursued and raised a monument written, "A Monument to the Illustrious Memory of the Righteous (hyunui hapjangmyo)." When asked how he was able to think about purchasing the site and raising the monument under the repressive regime, Yang, who was 59-years-old said, "My father and my brother were killed during the 4.3 events by the hand of the 97 Lee, Moon Kyo. 2006. Interview by author, April 22, Jeju. Tape recording; Yang, Jo Hoon. 2005. Interview by author, November 24, Seoul. Tape recording 98 I tried to interview Park Seo Dong but he rejected saying that he is very busy these days. I consistently asked for an interview and he uttered a few words before he abruptly hung up the phone, which I think is significant. He said, "Isn't it of no use to talk about it any more? I am busy. I am sorry." 99 Yang Bong Chun, a president ofHyun Ui Association for the Victims. 2005. Interview by author, October 19, Jeju. Tape recording

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military. I was the only one survived. I thought someone should do something about it. . .. Someone should appease the innocent souls. I had a vision that the 4.3 events and the mass killing of the innocent will become historically significant in the future. That's why I voluntarily started this. Anyone should have done anything.... Of course, there were objections from people. I persuaded them. I persuaded them by assuring them that I will take all the responsibilities if things tum ugly. If someone should be beaten and arrested, I will be beaten and arrested .... " 100

In his remarks, I found another motivation for his courageous act under repression. It was Yang's consciousness of history, a sense of duty as a survivor, and the beliefthat the dead were innocent residents that made his courageous act possible. I found an additional motivation for action which I was not able to find in other actors. Victims were driven by a sense of duty to appease the soul as a surviving member of the family. Ko Young Woo also confirmed this while explaining his father's motivation and said, "Because he believed that his father was innocently killed by false accusation. Because, it was too much of regrettable death and it is a filial duty to take care of his father after death ... ,,101 Finally, the first important action after Hyun Ki Young's novel in 1978 was taken by students in Jeju. The Jeju National University Student Association put posters around the campus asking for the investigation of the truth about the 4.3 events in April 1987. This was a courageous act since the authoritarian government of Chun Doo Hwan was still powerful and there were no clear precursors of democratic transition at this time. 102 The posters were posted with names of students leaders; and one of them - Song Young Ran, a president of the women student association - was arrested. It is consistent with an Yang Bong Chun. 2005. Interview by author, October 19, Jeju. Tape recording Ko Young Woo. 2005. Interview by author, October 26, Jeju. Tape recording 102 Kim, Hyo Chul, a former vice president of the Jeju National University Student Association. 2006. Interview by author. March 23, Jeju. Tape recording 100 101

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earlier phenomenon where students took the initiative in the movement in 1960. One former president of the association even argued that the "student activism was a starting point and basis of the transitional justice movement."I03 What made students initiate the movement when conditions seemed unfavorable and even dangerous? There can be many personal reasons as

~ee

Moon Kyo suggested

in his interview: a sense of justice, fearlessness, and less calculating profits and losses, and so on. While examining the documents of student activism in transitional justice, I found additional advantages of the student movement. There is less of a fear associated with the past repression of the government due to the faster generational change compared to other movement organizations. Every year, when a new leadership is elected either in a single university level or higher regional level, a new action plan is decided and carried out. When there are unresolved issues like the transitional justice movement, then various new plans are introduced, tried, and tested. Although it can also be a disadvantage since there is no continuity in activism, it has a great advantage in providing a new impetus to the overall transitional justice advocacy. For example, it was students who first carried out province-wide campaign to get signatures from the general public in order to submit a petition to the National Assembly in 1996.

6.2. Background and Overall Atmosphere (1987-1992) After his seven-year-Iong presidency, Chun Doo Hwan went down the same path as Park Chung Hee and Rhee Syng Man for a long-term seizure of power. Chun tried to amend the constitution and obstruct the formation of the opposition party of Kim Young 103 Kim, Nam Hoon, a former president of the Jeju National University Student Association in 1999. 2006. Interview by author, Jeju. March 23. Tape recording.

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Sam and Kim Dae Jung. This move toward dictatorship caused social activists to unite and organize to stop the constitutional amendment. To make matters worse, the Catholic Priest Association for Justice found out and announced that a Seoul National University student Park Jong Chul was tortured to death during the interrogation accompanied by the drowning-in-the-bathtub torture by the secret agents. This incident made people even angrier when people found out that government initially tried to conceal the truth by announcing that his death was caused by shock. Similar to the 4.19 Revolution, the pro-democracy demonstration originally initiated by students and politicians in opposition, spread to the general public. Concerned citizens and ordinary white-collar workers known as the "necktie corps" started to actively participate in street demonstrations. Roh Tae Woo, a proclaimed successor of Chun Doo Hwan, announced the 6.29 Declaration agreeing to have a direct democratic presidential election in which he himself was a candidate. The 6.29 Declaration marked the beginning of institutional democracy in Korea. However, Roh Tae Woo, a remnant of the previous military and authoritarian regime, became a president since opposing power was not able to achieve a united candidacy. The opposing power was split into Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung who had strong regional platforms in two historically antagonistic southern provinces - Kyongsang and Cholla province. Therefore, although Korea had its first direct and secret presidential election, the overall political and social atmosphere was not amenable to the 4.3 movement. The police, military, counterespionage, and secret intelligence agency were as powerful and obtrusive as during the previous regimes and the very same persons were holding the office. People in Jeju who had high expectations for transitional justice after 173

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democratization had now experienced a "huge disappointment.,,104 One activist even described the period as a "dark and depressed" period. lOS People and organizations actively participated in .street demonstrations against the Chun's authoritarian regime in "hope for a new society but ended up seeing an old society again.,,106 The level of governmental and social repression was as high as the previous Chun Doo Hwan's regime (Kim 2004: 35). A couple of examples in both state and society demonstrate the general atmosphere. First, the Jeju local police and counterespionage agents continuously kept surveillance and obstructed any movements toward the truth and justice. During five years under the Roh's administration, there was only one year - 1992 - when local police permitted the public gathering for April memorial service. For example, a public memorial service in 1991, which was not permitted by the authority, ended up as a violent protest by students and activists, which led to an indiscriminate arrest of 400 people in one day.107 In addition, most activities and meetings of victims and activists were accompanied by local policemen or government agents. 108 This constant repression and surveillance was deeply rooted in the unchanging understanding of the 4.3 events by the Jeju police as a communist rebellion. Second, any entreaty to find the truth and restore justice on the 4.3 events was easily dismissed without any consideration and even without much justification. For

104 Yang, Jo Hoon, a fonner editor of the Jemin Ilbo and the chief staff of the Task Force for the Report under the 4.3 Committee. 2005. Interview by author. November 24, Seoul. Tape recording 105 Oh, Seung Kook, a secretary general of the 4.3 Research Institute and a fonner president of the Jeju Cultural Movement Association. 2006. Interview by author, April 7, Jeju. Tape recording 106 Yang, Dong Yoon, a fonner chairperson of the Provincial Solidarity and current president of Jeju People's Association. 2005. Interview by author. October 1, Jeju. Tape recording 107 Jemin Ilbo, April 3, 1991 \08 It was also confinned by a leader of victims' family members (Ko Young Woo) and activists who were involved in founding the 4.3 Research Institute (Kim Chang Hoo). Ko Young Woo. 2005. Interview by author, October 26, Jeju. Tape recording. Kim Chang Hoo, a fonner director and a current senior researcher of the 4.3 Research Institute. 2006. Interview by author, April 12, Jeju. Tape recording

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example, several congresspersons raised the issue of investigating the 4.3 events during the inspection of the administration (e.g. Hwang Myung Soo and Kang Bo Sung in 1988; Kang Bo Sung and Choi Kee Sun 1989). In 1991, the Minister of the Internal Affairs, Ahn Eung Mo simply dismissed their questions by stating, "Jeju 4.3 events are legally conCluded events and the investigation by the government is not desirable.:' Here, we can find a repetition of history. When Ahn mentioned the 4.3 events as "legally concluded events," what he had in mind is the statute of limitations. Furthermore, the government arrested and convicted Kim Myung Sik who published an important edited volume titled, Jeju People s Movement which introduced Kim Min Joo and Kim Bong Hyun's A History ofJeju People s 4.3 Armed Struggle for the first time. Kim was arrested on the charge of violation of the National Security Act and sentenced to imprisonment. In addition, it was not only the government but also the society which maintained its suppression and stigmatization of the 4.3 events and the victims. Third, the first association for the victim's families was established in 1988. However, the title of the . organization was the Anticommunist Association for the Civilian Victims' Family Members of the Jeju 4.3 Events. As the inclusion of "anticommunism" suggests, the association was organized and led by the victims whose family members were killed by the leftist guerrillas. The first president Song Won Hwa was a former policeman who was injured during the 4.3 events and whose father was murdered by the guerrillas. Despite the fact that the victims who were killed by military and police constituted a majority in this group, they could not raise their voices because of the stigma related to being a communist and "followed the leadership of the small number of people in hope

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for the truth and justice.,,109 Ko Sung Man who studied the discourse on the 4.3 events argued that this association played an important role in reaffirming and disseminating the traditional and dominant narrative that the 4.3 events are a communist rebellion (Ko 2005: 15). This view is supported by the testimony of Yang Dong Yoon, a social movement activist and the chair of the Provincial Solidarity, who speculated that the association was "a government-patronized one, which was established in order to counterattack the transitional justice movement after democratization.,,110 This association, although renamed by eliminating "anticommunism' in June 1990, kept its characteristic until year 2000.111 This characteristic of the association changed when the existing association was merged with the Association for the Victims of the Disappeared in 2000. Fourth, producers of the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) made a documentary film on the 4.3 events in February 1990. The KBS producers visited the local newspaper to get information and seek advice in creating a documentary on an unexplored issue (Kim 1999). The KBS publicized the program and also confirmed the broadcast. However, the program was cancelled without any explanation and one newspaper reported that "a few phone calls from outside" was the reason of the cancellation. 112 Kim Jong Min interviewed the producers and found out that it was cancelled by the board of directors despite the opposition of producers (Kim 1999). This event triggered the strike of the KBS labor union in 1991, which was a start of the

109 Anonymous.

2006. Interview by author, April 2, Jeju. Interview note Yang, Dong Yoon. 2005. Interview by Author. October 1, Jeju. Transcript 111 It can be confirmed by the composition of the staff members of the renamed organization. A president (Kim Byung Un) and a secretary general (Park Seo Dong) of the association were both victims of the leftist armed guerillas. il2 Hankyorye, February 13, 1990 110

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democratization movement within the mass media. l13 As we can see in these four examples, the 4.3 events were still a communist rebellion and victims were understood as communists not only by the administration but also by the society. Thus, the democratization does not necessarily change the dominant perspective which survived for more than 35 years. Moreover, if a new administration is headed by the remnants of the previous authoritarian regimes, the change in the perspective would be much slow. The Korean democratization is usually understood as transplacement where old and new elites negotiate democratic transition. Under this situation, Huntington argued that accountability is less likely and the demand for truth and justice would decrease over time. However, Huntington's prediction was wrong in my case and important breakthroughs in the movement were made in its earlier period of negotiated democratization.

6.3. Major Activities, 1987-1992 Even under such hostile circumstances, three critical activities were initiated based on the power and resources concentrated during pro-democracy movement. As a president of one organization shrewdly observed, "People and organization who work for democracy in Jeju can never go around the 4.3 events.,,114 Power, resources, and networks of the local democracy movement in 1987 were directly transferred to the transitional justice advocacy afterwards. With three major activities and a few scattered

Yang, 10 Hoon. 2006. Interview by author. March 15, Seoul. Tape recording Yang, Dong Yoon. 2005. Interview by Author. October 1, Jeju. Tape recording. This is supported by my interview with Kim Eun Hee, a senior researcher of the 4.3 Research Institute who stated, "All social movement organizations in Jeju have been working on the 4.3 issue, but there are four organizations who exclusively work on the 4.3 events and the 4.3 Research Institute is one of them." (Kim, Eun Hee. 2006. Interview by Author. May 21, Jeju. Interview note.) 113

114

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efforts, a very important and symbolic event occurred in April 1992 - an excavation of the Darangshi cave, a civilian massacre site, which brought the 4.3 events into national attention for the first time in history.

6.3.1. April Memorial Service and 4.3 Art Fest The most significant move was the beginning of April memorial service prepared by the 4.3 Research Institute, Jeju Cultural Movement Association (a former body of Jeju branch ofthe Korean People Artist Federation), student associations, and other social movement organizations actively involved in the local democratic movement. In Jeju, many organizations and institutions were created during and after democratic transition with diverse goals such as labor rights, national unification, environment, farmer's rights, women's rights, political reform, and the 4.3 events. Many who founded these organizations had been the members of underground study groups and student groups who secretly studied the 4.3 events. One local social movement activist viewed a period between June 1987 and April 1989 as "a period of building organizations.,,115 Thus, partly due to the peculiar situation of Jeju where every activist could not avoid the 4.3 events and partly due to close personal relationships and networks, social movement organizations, activists, and students "naturally" planned to hold a public memorial service in April 3, 1988. 116 However, the preparation for the first memorial service was interfered and obstructed by the local police and security agency. Therefore, only two small commemorations occur in Jeju and Japan onApril3 rd of 1988: one by the

Yang, Dong Yoon. 2006. Interview by Author. March 22, Jeju. Tape recording Park, Chan Sik, a senior researcher and a former secretary general of the 4.3 Research Institute. 2006. Interview by author. April 6, Jeju. Tape recording 115

116

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J eju Student Associations, and the other, by the Korean migrants in Japan. First, the Jeju Student Association, an umbrella organization of all individual university's student council in Jeju, decided to carry out their original plan to have an open and public memorial service despite suppression and obstruction. The Jeju Student Association proclaimed a week of commemoration and held a memorial service and a rally demanding an investigation of the truth of the 4.3 events. This was the first studentled rally which exclusively demanded transitional justice after democratization. The commemoration and political rally later became a yearly tradition. Based on the experience, the next year marked "a new era of student 4.3 movement" by actively participating in a large-scale social movement. 117 At the same time, a small gathering of one hundred Koreans took place in Tokyo to commemorate the events. I 18 Immediately after democratization, Kim Suk Bum, a novelist and Kim Min Joo, a former member of armed guerillas, and others like Moon . Kook Ju, Hyun Kwang Soo, and Kim Kyu Chan created an organization titled, the Association of People Remembering the Jeju 4.3. The association first held a public memorial service on April 3, 1988 in Tokyo, which later became an annual event. The impact of their activity and the link between people in Japan and Korea is not explicit. However, two contributions of the Korean community in Japan can be noted in addition to being a reservoir of an alternative memory and narrative. First, it is certain that two students who had been in exile and studied in Japan participated in the memorial service and they later became leaders of the movement in

117 Kim Hyo Chul, a former vice president of Jeju National University Student Association in 1989. 2006. Interview by author. March 23, Jeju. Tape recording 118 Yang, Jo Hoon. 2005. Interview by author. November 24, Seoul. Tape recording

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Korea. Kang Chnag II served as a director of the 4.3 Research Institute is a congressman representing Jeju province and Kim Myung Sik was also a founding member of the 4.3 Research Institute and later arrested and convicted on the charge of the violation of the National Security Act. . Second, members of the association later became active in 1998 and organized a public lecture of Bruce Cumings, a renowned historian of the contemporary Korea, conferences, and memorial musical concerts to help publicize the 4.3 events not only to Korean Japanese but also to Japanese. Their efforts helped the transitional justice activism in Korea. Although an attempt to have a public ceremony was forestalled by the authority, the first April memorial service was held in the Jeju Citizen's Hall next year by twelve social movement organizations. 119 It was a time when the power of social movement organizations which had been created between 1987 and 1988 "first become manifested.,,120 Since then, a public memorial service has been held every year in Jeju hosted by social movement organizations and students. Since 1994, the Jeju provincial government took charge of hosting an annual memorial service and it became an official annual tradition in Jeju. Nevertheless, police and secret agents still.tried to obstruct transitional justice attempts under the Roh Tae Woo administration. For instance, illustrated poems on the 4.3 events were exhibited by the Young Jeju Literary Society in front of the Jeju Citizens' Hall where first memorial service was held. On the next day, police arrested the

119 However, finding the venue and renting the Jeju Citizen's Hall was not an easy process for activists. Hong Man Kee who was a founding member of the 4.3 Research Institute recollected that the mayor would not meet them in order not to allow them to use the place. Nevertheless, Hong Man Kee, Oh Ok Man, and other ten activists continuously visited the mayor's office and achieved the promise (Ko 2005: 25). 120 Yang, Dong Yoon. 2006. Interview by Author. March 22, Jeju. Tape recording

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president of the society, Oh Seung Kook for displaying a poem that mentioned the name of guerrilla leader. 121 In addition, five members of the executive committee for the preparation of the memorial service were constantly shadowed and exposed to frequent unexpected visits by secret agents. 122 Under Roh's presidency, police annually took preemptive measures of not permitting a meeting related to the 4.3 events in April. 123 A memorial service was more than a mere one day ceremonial event for those who prepared. Every year, the Common Preparation Committee for April Memorial Service, a temporary organization was composed in February with delegates sent from various organizations. Thus, almost every social movement organization spent at least two months to prepare and discuss the 4.3 events. Kang Duk Hwan (unpublished), a former journalist who traced the transitional justice history stated, "The year 1989, with the first April memorial service, was the first year of mass transitional justice movement for the 4.3 events." It is also supported by an activist who stated, "Before 1989, the 4.3 movement was mainly led by individuals with ideals. But with the first memorial service, the movement became a popular mass movement.,,124 Not only the memorial service itself but also the preparation for the event was significant in the overall transitional justice process. This provided a place where diverse activists from various organizations could meet and discuss the characteristic of the 4.3 events and effective strategies to achieve transitional justice. This network among

121 Oh remembered that he was arrested and investigated by the police for two days on the charge of violation of the Article 8 of the National Security Act. He cleared remembered that he was beaten during interrogation. (Oh, Seung Kook. 2006. Interview by author. April 7, Jeju. Tape recording) 122 Park, Kyung Hoon, a former member of the executive committee of the Common Preparation Committee for April Memorial Service. 2006. April 5, Jeju. Interview by author. Tape recording 123 Yang, Dong Yoon. 2006. Interview by Author. March 22, Jeju. Tape recording 124 Oh, Seung Kook. 2006. Interview by author. April 7, Jeju. Tape recording; Park, Chan Sik. 2006. Interview by author. April 6, Jeju. Tape recording

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organizations became an important asset of the transitional justice advocacy for next ten years. The 4.3 Research Institute and Jeju Cultural Movement Association played a lead role among many organizations. These two organizations were the only organizations working exclusively on the 4.3 events and others heavily relied on their leadership. 125 Preparation for memorial services since 1989 led to a sharing of human resources, expertise, information, tactics and strategies. This collaboration history also created "a common identity for the social movement groups and enhanced further collaboration and communication among groupS.,,126 The April memorial service was an event that brought diverse and separated social groups together and empowered them as a whole. Furthermore, the April memorial service was always accompanied by an annual art fest on the 4.3 events by local artists and cultural activists, which made a significant contribution in making the event and massacre known to the general public. Previously scattered exhibitions and performances of various cultural movement groups turned into an annual April Culture and Art Festival by the Jeju Korean People Artist Federation in 1994.

127

A month long performance and exhibition exclusively on the 4.3 events and the

victims was held before and after the April memorial service (Kim 2004: 59). The art fest was consists of art and picture exhibition, plays, literature night, testimony hearings, film and documentary exhibition, musical concerts, and a ceremony of traditional exorcism. As seen in the case of literatures, efforts of the cultural movement sector were

125 Park, Chan Sik. 2006. Interview by author. April 6, Jeju. Tape recording 1260h, Seung Kook. 2006. Interview by author. April 7, Jeju. Tape recording. In addition, I learned during my field work that social movement activists and organizations in Jeju were closely connected to each other and most people knew each other well. For instance, I could not schedule an interview with anyone for. three days because of the death of a labor activist. Most activists in social movement organizations were attending a three day funeral. 127 In its founding statement, the Jeju branch clearly stated that the most important task is to recreate the 4.3 events through art and culture (Oh, Seung Kook. 2006. Interview by author, April 7, Jeju. Tape recording).

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highly significant in bringing out the truth and justice. The cultural movement enhanced public awareness and educated the general public. Scholars who examined the cultural movement found that the transitional justice advocacy in a cultural sector was a "struggle for alternative (or opposing) memory (Kim 2004; Kwon 2003)." In addition, a certain messages or value systems that could not be explicitly told or communicated in a formal political or education settings can more easily be represent in the form of art and culture. 128 Many agreed that it was the role of art and culture that drew the 4.3 events near to the general public. In addition, the role of the cultural sector became even more significant when the movement became national and tried to earn the, hearts and mind of the national audience.

6.3.2. Mass Media In addition to the activities of local movement organizations focusing on April memorial service, the mass media played a key role in discovering, recreating, and popularizing an alternative discourse of the 4.3 events. Together with the efforts made by cultural activists, the mass media was especially effective in opening the tightly sealed mouths of the victims who were still afraid of state repression and social stigmatization. The Jemin Ilbo, a widely subscribed"local newspaper with a progressive perspective, was the most important actor. A brief history of the Jemin Ilbo should be addressed in order to understand the characteristic and status of the newspaper in J eju. Under the Chun's authoritarian regime, only one local daily newspaper existedthe Jeju Shinmoon. It was due to Chun's media policy of total abolition and

128

Park Kyung Hoon. 2006. April 5, Jeju. Interview by author. Tape recording

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amalgamation. As the name of the policy suggests, Chun preferred a small number of mass media in the nation for more convenient control. Under this policy, local newspapers were under pressure to have "one newspaper in one province (Lee 1997)." A number of reporters and staff in the Jeju Shinmoon decided to write a serial special report on the 4.3 events and published it on April 3, 1989 after a year long investigation. The original plan of the 4.3 Reporting Team was to "collect news materials for a month and publish in April 1988 following a routine of the news coverage.,,129 But, after investigation, the team decided to postpone its publication for a year because of the breadth and depth of the 4.3 events and massacres which members of the team could not even imagine. The 4.3 Reporting Team was organized with six reporters under the leadership of Yang Jo Hoon, a director of the social affairs and 57 reports, under title of the Testimonies of the 4.3 have been published until December 1989. 130 For the first year of its publication, the 4.3 Reporting Team and its director Yang were constantly watched by police and secret agents. Yang remembered that he was constantly dissuaded by his friends, colleagues, and family members from taking the leading position. 131 Nevertheless, Yang decided to take the charge of the 4.3 Reporting Team. He confessed that invisible powers had been working in making his decision. For a month, Yang suffered nightmares every night and was haunted by the ghosts who tried to choke him every night. After a month, in one of his dreams, he had a mysterious experience of "the rumbling of the earth." So terrified, he shouted, "I will do it" and fell

129 Yang, Jo Hoon, a director of the Department of Social Affairs under the Jeju Shinmoon in 1987. 2006. Interview by author. March 15, Seoul. Transcript 130 One important aspect is the title of the series - The Testimonies of the 4.3. This tradition of not labeling the 4.3 events was followed when the 4.3 Reporting Team was transferred to the Jemin Ilbo. Instead, they changed the title to 4.3 Speaks. 131 Yang, Jo Hoon. 2006. Interview by author. March 15, Seoul. Transcript

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on the floor from his bed. Since then, there were no more nightmares and Yang never had a dream about the 4.3 events in his 20 years of activism. Yang firmly believe that it was supernatural experience that the ghost of the 4.3 victims were involved (Yang 1994: 340). This episode clearly shows the importance of (people's belief about) the ghosts in the transitional justice process. Immediately after the first report was published in April 3, 1989, the police and secret agencies started to "pressure the board of directors arguing that the reportage disturbs social stability by bringing already concluded issues.,,132 In addition, after every publication of the report, police visited the village and asked persons who testified whether the information published in the newspaper was correct. Yang believed that if any misinformation were to be found, then the police would sue the reporting team on the charge of libel. This was a popular strategy of the local police to obstruct the movement and can also be examined in interfering with the investigation of the Provincial 4.3 Committee.133 Ironically, this obstruction and interference ultimately helped making more objective, reliable, and fact-based reportage. Yang remembers, "Only 10 percent of materials which we have collected by interviews were able to be published because we had to go through very strict cross-validation before writing a report. What we have published was only a tip of an iceberg. The rest 90 percent of fact findings and testimonies buttressed what we have published. I think this is one reason why the authority could not easily interfere with our project. Our reportage was firmly and strictly fact-based,,134

The governmental repression, although extremely irksome, was not the most difficult obstacle in their work, Yang recollected. The tightly sealed mouths of victims, Yang, Jo Hoon. 2006. Interview by author. March 15, Seoul. Transcript Kang Duk Hwan, a secretary of the Office of 4.3 Victims Registration under the Provincial 4.3 Committee. 2006. Interview by author, March 21, J eju. Tape recording 134 Yang, Jo Hoon. 2006. Interview by author. March 15, Seoul. Transcript 132

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which Yang saw as the result ofthe "red complex", were the single most difficult impediment. This is most clearly revealed in Yang's statement: "It was difficult to find witnesses who actually were alive and have seen the massacres and abuses. To make matters worse, it was extremely difficult to find those witnesses who were willing to testify. No one was willing to testify. They would not let us take our shoes off in front of their houses. Sometimes, elders in the village were willing to testify and start to talk about it, and suddenly their spouses interrupted and dissuaded them from uttering a word on the 4.3 events, arguing that he may be arrested by doing so. In some cases, we found an elderly witness and heard testimonies, but later found out that he testified the mass murder in the village excluding his own story.,,135

In many cases, villagers ate their words and reversed their testimonies after the publication. For example, a resident in a certain village testified that the people were murdered by the police and military but later changed and argued that the perpetrators were leftist guerrillas. This occurred when the witness experienced a sudden cut-off of a governmental subsidy. What he did not know was that victims including his parents were reported to have been killed by leftist guerrillas, not by military and police, and had been received a governmental subsidy as bereft family members. However, all these initial efforts under the Jeju Shinmoon halted with the Jeju Shinmoon Crisis in 1990 (Lee 1997). In January 1990, one hundred and ten reporters and staff, who were involve in creating a labor union and protested against the board of directors, were fired from the company. All members ofthe 4.3 Reporting Team were fired and the reports could not be continued. The J emin Ilbo was created based on 110 fired members of the Jeju Shinmoon by soliciting contributions both from the general public in Jeju and journalists nationwide. The Jemin Ilbo was founded with 3,500 small stockholders nationwide constituting 1.7 billion won ($ 250,000,000). It was a historic 135

Yang, Jo Hoon. 2006. Interview by author. March 15, Seoul. Transcript

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event since in other provinces, 80 to 90 percent of reporters who protested against the board of directors returned to their workplaces and the rest 10 to 20 percent were remain fired. The whole process of the separation, which triggered a nationwide media liberation movement, was viewed asa leading democratic movement of the mass media. The Jemin Ilbo was awarded with a prize from the National Reporter's Association for their contribution to the democratization of the media. This much respected local newspaper again started to publish a weekly special report on the 4.3 events since June 30, 1990 under a new title, 4.3 Speaks. The reporting team and a director were relieved because they were able to start their report all over again and overcome the limitations they realized during one year of reportage under the Jeju Shinmoon. One of the limitations was the periodization because, in previous coverage, the 4.3 reporting team started from April 3, 1948, a date of the outbreak of the armed uprising. However, as they proceeded, the team realized that they had to go back over and over again to explain the background of the outbreak. This time, the team decided to start their analysis from the liberation of Korea in 1945, which provide a more comprehensive story of the 4.3 events.

It is important to examine the title of the special reports - 4.3 Speaks. The characteristic of the 4.3 events is widely debated in Korea and the debate is represented in the label that follows the number 4.3. The fault line is between those who argue that the 4.3 events were a communist rebellion and those who argue that it was democratic and resistance uprising of the people. Yang testified that a few members of the 4.3 Reporting Team maintained that 4.3 should be defined as a democratic uprising and title should be reflecting their views. However, Yang objected to the idea because he believed that the 187

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definition of the 4.3 events should come last and come after finding the facts. 136 Thus, the reporting team decided to use "4.3" to represent their neutral and ideologically balanced perspective. In addition, they used the "4.3" as a subject and not as an object in the sentence suggests the fact that reporters wanted the facts of the 4.3 events themselves could define the characteristic of the events, not reporters themselves (Kim 1996). The report lasted for about 9 years and 456 series were published weekly or biweekly by interviewing as many as 3,000. The report was highly important in publicizing the 4.3 events into the Jeju societies and setting the 4.3 events as key social agenda. It is impossible to explain the transitional justice advocacy without considering the 4.3 Reporting Team. Even though almost everyone in Jeju was affected by the 4.3 events, forty years were a long time for people to forget and desensitized about the events and massacres. The general public in Jeju now saw that the stories which have been concealed for more than 40 years are now told again and reported by the famous and respected regional newspaper. The Jemin Ilbo and the Reporting Team later were awarded by the National Journalist Association and two reporters - Yang Jo Hoon and Kim Jong Min - played a key role in writing an official report of the 4.3 Committee. The Jeju Moonhwa Broadcast Company (MBC) was also active in reporting and publicizing the 4.3 events. Lee Moon Kyo, a student leader of the transitional justice movement in 1960s, was the news chief and planned a special documentary on the 4.3 events in 1989. Lee planned a documentary film with the help of two reporters who later specialized in the 4.3 events.137 The first broadcast on the 4.3 events was aired on April 2, 1989 titled, The Big Pain o/the Contemporary History: The Jeju 4.3 Events. Since then, 136 137

Yang, Jo Hoon. 2006. Interview by author. March 15, Seoul. Transcript Lee, Moon Kyo. 2006. Interview by author, April 22, Jeju. Tape recording.

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the 4.3 specials were aired every year and the MBC was "the major producer of the TV image of the 4.3 events (Kwon 2003: 103). The rival broadcast system KBS, although it aired a documentary once in 1999, had not addressed the 4.3 events until 2000 when the 4.3 events became a public issue. With all these reconstruction and revival of the long forgotten 4.3 discourse, people slowly started to open their mind to the idea of transitional justice which was the absolute taboo before. The level of testimonies, the level of openness, and the level of welcome gradually increased among the general public as the newspaper published the new reports and media covered the 4.3 events and massacres. The media coverage and people's involvement and victim's testimonies had a joint escalating effect. The media coverage became more and more accurate and factual as the testimonies and people who were willing to talk increased. If a certain detail of the events is once revealed, people were more willing to talk to that level since they think it is permissible for them to talk because it is already publicly issued in a newspaper. 138 As the reportage of the 4.3 events by the J emin Ilbo and MBC got attention of the general public, other media - newspapers, magazine, and broadcast companies cautiously started their stories with somewhat different perspectives. In J eju, three main daily newspapers exist - Jeju Shinmoon, Jemin Ilbo, and Halla Ilbo. Jemin Ilbo is the only progressive newspaper and other two are conservative ones which characterized as "pro-ruling party newspapers (Lee 1997)." Kim Jong Min remembered that these newspapers maintained anticommunist perspective and competed with the Jemin Ilbo.

138 Kim, Jong Min, a former reporter ofJemin Ilbo and the staff of the Task Force for the Report under the 4.3 Commission. 2006. Interview by author. March 25, Seoul. Transcript

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Various measures were used to set a "backfire" to the efforts of the Jemin Ilbo. 139 First, these newspapers carried an advertisement of the rightist or anticommunist organizations - e.g. the Retired Police Associations and Democratic Association for Protection of Freedom - objecting to the transitional justice movement. Second, they published objection contributions to the reports published in the Jemin Ilbo. Finally, they had their own special or serial reportage where they concentrated on the murder and human rights abuses of leftist armed guerillas. The last strategy was not new but already existed in a local magazine as seen in the case of Park Seo Dong and Monthly Travel Jeju.

6.3.3.4.3 Research Institute Research of the 4.3 events and the massacres was crucial since almost a half a century has been passed. Initial underground activities in early 1980s were all started from study groups reading Hyun's short story by a few activists and students. In the course of the 4.3 advocacy, research on the 4.3 events in general and the 4.3 Research Institute in specific played a decisive role. One newspaper article clearly showed the status of the Research Institute by stating, "It is actually impossible to discuss the 4.3 movement without mentioning the 4.3 Research Institute.,,140 A group of people in Seoul, who were originally from Jeju and had a continuous concern for the 4.3 events, created an association, the Research Group for the Issues in Jeju Society immediately after democratic transition (Kim 2004: 36).141 These persons were so-called "successful Jeju elites in Seoul who also had a historical Kim Jong Min. 2006. Interview by author, March 25, Seoul. Transcript Jemin IIbo, April 3, 2003 141 Jung Un Hyung (a professor), Hyun Ki Young (a writer), Kim Myung Sik (a poet and social activists), Koh Hee Bum (a journalist), and Kang Chang II (a student) were the main participants. 139

140

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consciousness.,,142 The first public lecture and seminar was hosted by the association on April 3, 1988 in Seoul. A few national newspapers covered the conference and one journalist even asked for a governmental investigation. 143 Immediately after the conference, people in the Research Group proposed founding a specialized private research institute focusing on the 4.3 events. In Jeju, a few local historian, teachers, and social activists had been secretly studying the 4.3 events under the authoritarian regime. 144 The 4.3 Research Institute was created based on material and human resource, expertise, and devotion of these two groups. Kim Chang Hoo, who has been involved in the activities of the 4.3 Research Institute for over twenty years and was a former director, testified that people in Seoul contributed with seed money for the institution and people in Jeju did most of ground works. Although people in Seoul proposed and initiated the creation of the Research Institute, it was local activists who maintained and developed the organization. Kim remembered that it was difficult to pay for personnel expenses (although there was only one paid employee), office supplies, publishing costs, and rent. For example, every December, activists had to "visit their friends" asking for money to pay the rent. 145 Thus, the Research Institute, which was a key institution of the 4.3 movement, was created and maintained by people from and in J eju who were concerned with the 4.3 events long before democratization. Most of them had careers as teachers, civil servants, or company employees and voluntarily worked for the Research Institute

Kim Chang Hoo. 2006. Interview by author, April 12, Jeju. Tape recording. Donga Ilbo, Apri16, 1988 144 Moon Moo Byung (a local historian), Kim Chang Hoo, Lee Sung Moon (teachers), and Yang Sung Ja were active participants. 145 In Jeju, rent is paid annually by the end of the year (Kim Chang Hoo. 2006. Interview by author, April 12, Jeju. Tape recording). Kim Eun Hee who worked in the Research Institute in 1990 also remembered that office was empty in December since everyone went out to ask for some money (Kim, Eun Hee. 2006. Interview by Author. May 21, Jeju. Interview note). 142

143

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during weekends. 146 With one year of preparation, the 4.3 Research Institute was founded in May 10, 1989 immediately after the first April memorial service. With the foundation, the Research Institute published two volumes of victims' testimony titled, Now I Speak (4.3 Research Institute 1990, 1993). In 1988, there was almost no information or written records on the 4.3 events and the Research Institute heavily depended upon testimonies of victims and witnesses. Kim remembered the creation of the book: "It took a year to finish two volumes of testimonies. It was extremely difficult to collect testimonies from elders in the village. We had to spend long hours of chat on other issues such as politics, econom1" weather, society, and so on in order to get a few sentences about the 4.3 events.,,14

The main goal of the Research Institute was to find information on the 4.3 events and massacres and disseminate their findings through monthly newsletters, articles, books, and archives. The members actively engaged in finding any documents and records of the 4.3 events, which led to finding highly significant evidence including a copy of the Jeju Shinbo in 1940s, a U.S. military documentary film, pictures, and fliers used during the 4.3 events. The Research Institute offered history classes and organized annual seminars and conferences. An annual two-day trip to the historic places and mass murder sites was also organized by the institute. Besides its main activities of research, the Research Institute was also actively engaged in the 4.3 movement as a movement organization. Ever since the creation of the institute, a debate existed around the scope of activism. One group proposed that the

146 Kim, Eun Hee. 2006. Interview by Author. May 21, Jeju. Interview note; Oh, Seung Kook. 2006. Interview by author. April 7, Jeju. Tape recording 147 Kim Chang Hoo. 2006. Interview by author, April 12, Jeju. Tape recording

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Research Institute should focus exclusively on research and not on the activism while the others consistently argued that the research on the 4.3 events cannot be separated from activism and movements on various issue areas including labor rights, women's rights, unification, or the environment. This debate was resolved at the point where the Research Institute decided to only focus on the transitional justice movement. 148 The other related debate was around its title of the 4.3 Research Institute. Due to governmental repression and surveillance, a few members proposed changing the title of the institution to the Jeju Research Institute or Research Institute on Jeju History, which did not contain the word "4.3." It was a strategic move in order to escape from the governmental repression by removing the 4.3 events from the title and use broader concepts such as Jeju or Jeju history where the 4.3 event could still be pursued. However, the majority objected to this proposal and the institute was able to maintain its name. Through the debates, the Research Institute was able to focus not only on research but also activism and maintained its lead role in the transitional justice advocacy. By only focusing on transitional justice and not others, the Research Institute was able to be at the center of network of various social movement groups. All of three major activities of early movement - the April memorial service and the 4.3 art fest, mass media, and research - were closely connected, buttressed each other, and allowed a synergy effect. For example, the Research Institute was the most important participant of the Common Preparation Committee for April Memorial Service and the local media reported on the April memorial service, the 4.3 art fest, and research activities. Especially, the relationship between media and the Research Institute was

148

Kim Chang Hoo. 2006. Interview by author, Apri112, Jeju. Tape recording

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close because those were two major sources of information. 149 The media and the research institute were interdependent on each other. For example, in March 1991, the Research Institute discovered and published copies of the Jeju Shinbo from January 1947 to April 1948. It was extremely helpful for the 4.3 Reporting Team who struggled hard to find background history of the 4.3 events. Many agree that it was a significant contribution made by the Research Institute since there were no local newspaper archives. It was especially important in defining the 4.3 events by providing information ofthe

overall situation of Jeju before the outbreak of the armed conflict in April 1948. However, the most important contribution of the Research Institute was the discovery of the Darangshi cave and 11 bodies in 1992 in the course of their research trips.

6.3.4. Others Activities In addition to these major activities, there were three important factors that facilitated the transitional justice process - private and village-level investigation of the massacres, the Special Committee for Investigation of the May 18th Democratic Movement (5.18 Committee), and a popular TV series which covered the 43 events for the first time in 1992. First, private investigations by either conscious writers or victims themselves began in this period. The initial effort was made by residents of the Kasi village in Pyosun. In 1988, immediately after democratization, elders in the village decided to investigate the victims of massacre and announced that 374 were deceased and 12

149 Kim Jong Min. 2006. Interview by author, March 25, Seoul. Transcript; Yang, Jo Hoon. 2006. Interview by author, March 25, Seoul. Transcript; Kim, Eun Hee. 2006 .. Interview by Author. May 21, Jeju; Kim Chang Hoo. 2006. Interview by author, Apri112, Jeju. Tape recording

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missing. They kept this record in the village newsletter - Kaseurum - in order to "pass the exact record to the descendents."lso Similar but individual activities existed. For example, in Tosan village, Kim Yang Hak gathered information of the dead and the missing during the 4.3 events and a certain Moon also kept a record of one hundred victims in Josoo village in Hankyung (Oh 1988). Villagers in Bookchon also made a petition to the Minister of Internal Affairs (4.3 Research Institute 1993: 249-251). In addition, writers such as Oh Sung Chan (1988) and Han Lim Hwa (1989) interviewed victims and published their interviews. In a few places, victims even filed a civil lawsuit to claim the lost forests and fields of their parents who were murdered during the events. The Wondong village in Aewol was one of the many razed villages in the counterinsurgency operation. Although the villagers were murdered by the police and military, their descendents who were seven or eight by then survived. In 1990, bereft family members gathered in the site of the former village in order to appease the souls by a practice of a traditional exorcism. Victims found out that the forest and field which was under joint possession of their 9 ancestors were now transferred to a certain Shin and filed a case in September 1990. The case was decided partly in favor of the plaintiffs in Jeju District Court and the court finally decided to return the forest and field to the villagers. This was the first civil case filed regarding the 4.3 events. lSI Second, immediately after democratization, a nationwide focus was given to the 1980 massacre of pro-democracy demonstrators in Kwangju for which President Chun and Roh bore responsibility. Despite the fact that Roh was still an incumbent president in 150 151

Jeju Shinmoon, October 25, 1988 Jemin Ilbo, April 8, 1994; Monthly Jeju, May 1990; July 1990; August 1990

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1988, the National Assembly quickly established the 5.18 Committee and held congressional hearings by summoning relevant persons including Chun Doo Hwan where he constantly stated, "I cannot recall ... " over and over again. Still, it was the first time in Korean history when a former president was brought into public hearing and interrogated by the members of the National Assembly on public television. 152 During the public hearing, victims were also invited and answered questions regarding deaths, losses, and damages. All national media broadcast the tragic stories of K wangju and victims. The activities of the 5.18 Committee and the public hearing which drew national attention had very different meaning to people in Jeju. Kim Jong Min remembered the public hearing was a very important factor that opened the mouths of victims in Jeju. He heard so many victims begin their stories by saying, "Kwangju is nothing compared to Jeju ... " while he was conducting interviews. 153 It clearly shows a positive effect of other transitional justice processes. Although the majority of victims were still reluctant and afraid to talk about the 4.3 events, a small number of inspired victims who started to share their stories are the one who made the initial media efforts possible and fruitful. Third, the 4.3 events, which had been a taboo, were addressed for the first time in a very popular TV drama series, The Eye of the Dawn in January 1992. Many told me that this was a "highly sensational incident" in Jeju. I54 It was sensational in three aspects. First, the TV series aired by the MBC was the most popular one which constantly had an

152 Both Chun and Roh were indicted in 1995 under the special act on the corruption charges as well as for their roles in the 1979 military coup and in the 1980 massacre in Kwangju. Both were sentenced to life in prison in 1996 but pardoned immediately by President-elect Kim Dae Jung as a gestUre of reconciliation. 153 Kim, Jong Min. 2006. Interview by author. March 25, Seoul. Transcript 154 Park, Chan Sik, a senior researcher and a former secretary general of the 4.3 Research Institute. 2006. Interview by author. April 6, Jeju. Tape recording

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audience rating of 50 percent or more. ISS Second, the 4.3 events were the main theme of the drama for four episodes, which is about a two-week period. Third, the interpretation ofthe 4.3 events was not that of the dominant and anticommunist perspective but rather a screenwriter had tried to be equally fair to both left and right ideology. In other words, not only the interpretation of the 4.3 events as a communist rebellion but also as human rights abuses and democratic and resistance uprising were indirectly included through the narratives ofthe actors. For example, the following lines were read by a few Jeju residents in the drama: "We in a position of either starving to death or being beaten to death. Even a worm will tum"; "Why do the members of the rightist youth group use violence against us? The police are protecting and using them and there is an American at the top"; "Will the government treat 300,000 Jeju residents as enemies to destroy a few communists?" These words reflect the viewpoint which has not been introduced in public arena such as in politics, media, or education. IS6 How was this possible? One answer can be found in screenwriter Song Jee Na who was not a native of Jeju but spent her high school years in Jeju for about 4 years. In an interview with a local newspaper, Song stated that she had a desire to address the 4.3 events as a screenwriter but thought it would be impossible to have a separate drama exclusively on the 4.3 events. She, and later the producer, admitted that the flow of the drama became less smooth because she included the 4.3 events which were not in the original novel. Nevertheless, both the screenwriter and the producer decided to compensate artistic value of the drama in order to reveal historic injustice. IS? This is

Seoul Shinmoon, February 8, 1992 Jemin Ilbo, January 10, 1992 IS7 Jemin Ilbo, November 7, 1991 ISS

IS6

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clearly represented in Song's interview: "People criticized me why I was raking up the tragic past. However, I thought that it is my duty as a screenwriter to address the past history of injustice, ifit really existed. I believe the only way to prevent the wrong history from repeating itself over and over again in the future is through the investigation and thorough study of what went wrong."

However, her will, vision, and desire were not a sufficient cause for this sensational incident. Song admitted that it would not have been possible if it were not for the efforts made by the 4.3 Reporting Team in the Jemin Ilbo who provided an objective fact on the 4.3 events. ISS Thus, it was a collaborative work between the efforts oflocal mass media and one courageous visionary.

6.4. Excavation of the Darangshi Cave, 1992 The most important event occurred in April 1992 - the excavation of eleven bodies in the Darangshi cave. The cave was discovered by a team of the 4.3 Research Institute who was on a research trip to find razed villages and collect testimony. 159 In addition, researchers have heard rumors that the remains of bodies during the 4.3 events still existed in some places like natural caves. Jeju Island was created by volcanic activities and natural caves were prevalent not only in the mountain area but also in coastal areas. These caves were used as refuge during the 4.3 events to escape the violence of either leftist armed guerrillas or police and military. Kim Eun Hee, who was with the team and witnessed the discovery, testified that researchers were interested in finding those places and were in hope for finding evidence. Therefore, although the

158 159

Jemin Ilbo, February 7, 1992 Kim, Eun Hee. 2006. Interview by Author. May 21, Jeju. Interview note

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discovery can be regarded as a coincidence, there was also an ardent desire of activists to find evidence which made the research trip possible in the first place. In addition, the discovery was possible due to the help of the ghosts, as many believed. People who first discovered the cave were accompanied by an eyewitness who said he knew the location. However, after hours of search, he gave up finding the cave and went back home. The members of the team were also tired and took rest in one place. One member wandered to find a place to smoke a cigarette and found a small entrance of the cave. Members thought that it was so mysterious and it would not have been possible if it were not for the help of ghosts since the witness himself was not able to find the place (Kim and Kim 2002). It was not the first time when people mentioned the help of the ghosts. Yang, who led the 4.3 Reporting Team, made his decision after experiencing a mysterious dream. A similar experience existed for Ko Chang Hoon who was a director of the 4.3 Research Institute by the time of the discovery. Ko got a phone call from his mother one day saying that she had a mysterious dream where Ko was marching with his face covered by a piece of cloth followed by several coffins. She knew that this was ominous dream alerting her either to Ko's death or being unjustly accused. The next day, Ko's mother had the exactly same dream but the cloth that covered Ko's face was lifted up and she was able to see the eyes of Ko, which she thought suggested that her son will barely escape the death (Ko unpublished). The cave was first found by the 4.3 Research Institute on December 22, 1991 but the members were extremely cautious not to make it public (Kim 2002: 266). The research team from the institute investigated the cave two days later and found that there existed 11 skeletal remains. After a three·month·long deliberation, the Research Institute

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started to conduct three full scale investigations of the cave, first, by themselves (March 22, 1992), second, with the 4.3 Reporting Team of the Jemin nbo (March 29, 1992), and third, with other experts such as a doctor, a lawyer, and a director of the Jeju National Museum and additional reporters including national media - the Donga nbo, Hankyorye, MBC, and KBS (April 2, 1992). Ironically, this great and much anticipated discovery of the evidence of the 4.3 events was not easy to push forward in action when it actually appeared in front of activists. Ko Chang Hoon remembered that after the last investigation, he was excited by the anticipation that the truth will soon be revealed and justice will be restored. However, on the other side, he also had mixed feelings that he might be in a big trouble (Ko unpublished: 4). Ko remembered that he had sleepless nights during a three month period and was able to sleep only by the help of strong alcohol. 160 The following paragraph in his personal diary clearly reveals this: "I struggled so hard after discovering the Darangshi cave. Four questions kept haunting me everyday and every moment. First, are the skeletal remains we found in the cave victims who died during the 4.3 events? Second, will it be possible to accomplish an objective inspection of the scene? Third, if the first two were possible, will it be possible to find someone who can support and testify our findings? Fourth, will the family members of the victims be found? (Ko unpublished: 10)"

According to the Research Institute and the Jemin nbo, who went through a thorough expert investigation and collected testimony from villagers and persons who were at the scene of the massacre, nineteen civilians who took the refuge in the cave were

160 Kim Eun Hee and Kim Chang Hoo who were the members of the institution confIrmed that they were "terrified after fInding the Darangshi cave." Kim additionally explained that the fear was the reason that they decided to get help from media and other experts to make sure (Kim Chang Hoo. 2006. Interview by author, April 12, Jeju. Tape recording)

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murdered by the joint operation of the military and police. People were killed by suffocation with smoke since the police and military set a fire with dried grass in front of the cave and closed the exits. The findings were verified by a witness who actually lived in the cave with the dead before the operation and arranged the corpses in an orderly manner (Kim 2002: 269). Based on the testimonies, the dead were composed ofthree who were under 10-years-old, three who were over 50, four women, and nine young men. Various sources including the family members of the dead confirmed that these were civilians and members of family who were far from being armed guerrillas. Immediately after the last investigation, the Research Institute and media publicized the existence of the Darangshi cave and eleven skeletal remains. This was the first time when the 4.3 events were significantly covered by national newspapers ever since the outbreak of the events in 1948. The remains of the dead along with those of children, women, and seniors provided sufficient evidence of indiscriminate mass killing by the police and military. It was the first time when the visual evidence of the 4.3 events and civilian massacres was vividly shown in the eyes of the general public. Many including those who discovered the cave were shocked at the scene (Ko unpublished). The 50-year-old event which was almost forgotten and barely remained in the document now got its life back and alive in the bones and remains of the bodies left in the cave. It is important to follow the reactions of the authority represented by police and

intelligence agency who were hit hard by the secret excavation of the cave and media reportage. 161 It actually was an event that "put 2,500 Jeju police to shame" as the chief of

161 The 4.3 Research Institute and media kept the Darangshi cave secret and wanted to disclose the cave on April 3, 1992 as a symbolic gesture. However, it was reported a day before because words started to spread out. However, the police had no idea about the Darangshi cave until professor Ko informed it to the Jeju

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Jeju Police said in his private conversation with Ko (Ko unpublished: 6). The police hurriedly announced that there were possibilities that these people were part of a family suicide pact who killed themselves by suffocation. However, the J emin Ilbo found a witness who actually lived in the cave and took care of the corpse in 1948 and reported that they were killed by the joint operation of the police and military. Then, the police changed the word and announced that the cave was a hiding place of the armed guerrillas of the Communist Party. 162 The next steps for both activists and the authority were clear. The first round of the game was a complete defeat of the authority by activists as admitted by the chief of J eju Police. However, the authority had a relative advantage in the second round. The activists first tried to find and organize the victims, then have a public funeral hosted by the provincial government, and then create a common burial ground and erect a stone monument to commemorate the dead. On the other side, the authority also had a clear plan: they wanted all the process to be over as quickly as possible, no public funeral of any kind, and any discussion on the Darangshi cave and the 4.3 events should be stopped immediately. All these steps were taken when the police sealed the entrance of the cave with cement and declared the place as a restricted area in six days. Then, despite the victims' desire to bury the remains in a grave, the police and administration made them cremate the remains and sprinkle the ashes in the ocean. 163 This decision was made by

police on the eve of the April 2, 1992 for "courtesy" since, in Korean criminallaw, there was no obligation of reporting a dead body if the corpse was more than 10 years old (Ko unpublished). 162 Halla Ilbo, April 4, 1992 163 It is supported by the interview of one family member of the victims whose father was murdered in the cave. The police and administration disregarded his entreaty to have "only one piece of the bone so that he could have a tomb" of his father. The same person also had an interview with the 4.3 Reporting Team and stated, "I told them, 'if you must cremate the remains, please allow me one tenth of the ashes.' But they would not listen ... (Jemin Ilbo, May 16, 1992)."

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the victim's family meeting, which was composed of four persons from the local administration, two elders of the village, and two representatives of the victims. One reporter wrote that every process of cremation and sprinkling the ashes into the ocean were preceded hastily just like it was pushed by an "invisible hand.,,164 In response to the manipulative interference of the authority, activists and social movement organizations tried to organize a political rally commemorating the death of the victims. However, this attempt was also forestalled by the police and a limited campus gathering was substituted for the original plan. The following threat was made by the chief of Jeju Police to dissuade Ko from organizing a public rally: "Would you please stop acting on the Darangshi cave and eleven s~eletal remains? Haven't you already done more significant work than writing one hundred books and organizing one hundred rallies? Please don't go further this time .... please. I really have to arrest you if you insist on acting on this .... And, you will suffer a lot, I guarantee it .... Please cancel the event (Ko unpublished: 22~23)."

In his threat, the importance of the cave is revealed by the mouth of the police chief himself. It actually had a more significant impact on the 4.3 movement than one hundred books and one hundred rallies. The excavation and national coverage of the Darangshi cave was certainly the most epochal event in the transitional justice advocacy since Hyun's short story. Kim Dong Man who discovered the cave and followed the whole process as a secretary general of the Research Institute stated that the Darangshi cave brought the transitional justice advocacy into "another level (Kim 2002)." I believe this upgrade occurred in various aspects. First, it upgraded the

advocacy from that of social activists, victims, and students to a public or publicly supported advocacy by revealing evidence of real, brutal, and gruesome state violence. 164

Jemin Ilbo, May 16, 1992

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In my interview, Kim summarized, "Since the 4.3 events and civilian massacres have been a taboo, there was no evidence to show the 4.3 events and the Darangshi cave showed the reality of the 4.3 events.,,165 Before the Darangshi cave, ordinary people in Jeju did not know and were not interested in the 50-year-old Jeju 4.3 events. Now the 50year-old events which were almost forgotten are alive in front of their eyes and became an issue in Jeju for about a month. The support of these ordinary citizens was an indispensable element of the two significant movements that directly led to the enactment of the special act in 1999 - first, the activities of the Provincial 4.3 Committee, and second, the petition and enactment movement. Second, the Darangshi cave not only affected the ordinary people but also had a significant effect on a.ctivists themse1ves. 166 The Darangshi cave was the concrete evidence of brutal massacre and it was activists themselves who were in shock (Kim 2002). The Darangshi cave was an event that empowered the major actors of the transitional justice advocacy which had been created in the early 1980s. It strengthened the belief, commitment, and voices of the 4.3 activists. Ko further argued that it is the excavation of the Darangshi cave that bridges the transitional justice efforts made by societal actors and the activities of the first official efforts by the Jeju Provincial Council: "A very important breakthrough occurred in 1992 and 1993. The first one is the excavation of the Darangshi cave in April 1992 and the second one is the establishment of the Provincial 4.3 Committee in the Jeju Provincial Council, which symbolized the fact that the power concentrated at a societal level now entered into an official, i.e. governmental level. The Darangshi cave is the very significant medium! "" And, after the establishment ofthe Provincial 4.3

Committee, politicians - congresspersons and the members of the municipal and

165 Kim, Dong Man, a fonner secretary general of the 4.3 Research Institute and a current professor at the Halla College. 2006, Interview by author, April 12, Jeju. Tape recording 166 Ko, Chang Hoon. 2006. Interview by author, March 24, Jeju. Tape recording

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provincial council alike - were able to freely speak the Jeju 4.3 events.,,167

Third importance ofthe Darangshi cave can be found in its symbolic significance, which many activists - especially, artists - pointed out. Kim Dong Man (2002) argued that the cave represented and symbolized the current status of the 4.3 events: "50-year-old corpses still lying in the cold Darangshi cave unattended .... This is exactly the same as the 4.3 events which has been suppressed~nd forgotten for fifty years. The corpse in the Darangshi cave is a symbol that showed the 4.3 events are not resolved and it should be settled .... "

In addition, many have also argued that the process after the excavation of the cave government concealment and hasty measures to spread the words - also resembles the current status of the 4.3 movement. In sum, due to its importance as a symbol of the 4.3 events and transitional justice advocacy, the replica ofthe Darangshi cave is located at the very center ofthe 4.3 Memorial Park which is under construction. 168

6.5. Conclusion In this chapter, I examined a period of the transitional justice advocacy between 1987 and 1992. This period is marked by the initial stage of a public or mass movement. The power and resources that had been accumulated underground now came up into the surface. However, due to the continuation of the authoritarian regime by the successor Roh Tae Woo, the general atmosphere was not amenable to the movement and the level of repression and surveillance were somewhat constant. However, actors gathered

Ko, Chang Hoon. 2006. Interview by author, March 24, Jeju. Tape recording Park, Kyung Hoon, a chief designer of the 4.3 Memorial·Park. 2006. Interview by author, April 5, Jeju. Tape recording. 167 168

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around three major activities - the April memorial service and art festival, mass media coverage of the 4.3 events, and the thorough research ofthe subject. The major actorsactivists and social movement organizations, mass media, and academia had exemplary coordination and division of the labor. One activist pointed out that one reason ofthe success is this well-coordinated division oflabor among various actors in the transitional justice advocacy.

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These major activities were also facilitated by a few events that

helped the movement - the individual- and village-level investigation of the massacres, appearance of the Jeju 4.3 events in a nationally popular TV drama series, and activities and national coverage of the 5.18 Committee. All these major and minor efforts to achieve truth and justice reached at its climax with the excavation of the Darangshi cave and discovery of the skeletal remains of eleven corpses. Although it was the 4.3 Research Institute which discovered the cave for the first time, the whole process was a collaboration of all the societal actors who worked for the transitional justice advocacy - activists and social movement organizations, the research institute, and mass media. The Darangshi cave had an enormous impact both on the Jeju society as a whole and on the individual victims and their family members .. The transitional justice advocacy achieved another level of activism with two visible changes in 1993. The establishment of the Provincial 4.3 Committee in the J eju Provincial Council and the inauguration of Kim Young Sam, the first civilian president in thirty years since the military coup of Park Chung Hee in 1960.

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Kim Chang Roo. 2006. Interview by author, April 12, Jeju. Tape recording

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7. The Struggle ofthe Periphery, 1993-1997

7.1. Introduction Since the democratic transition in 1987, demand for decentralization of the state power, which became highly centralized during thirty-one consecutive years of the rule by the former military generals, had been increased. First, civil society and the opposition party constantly demanded substantial separation of legislative, administrative and judicial authority. Second, they demanded transfer of decision making power of the central government to provincial and local governments and councils. To meet these demands, President Roh Tae Woo revived the Regional Self-governing Political System in December 1992, which had been discontinued since the military coup of Park Chung Hee in 1961. It was an important advancement in democracy and the local issues such as the 4.3 events slowly started to be at the center oflocal politics. The self-governing system started to fully function after the inauguration of Kim Young Sam. The first civilian government was established in 1993 after 33 years of the consecutive military rule - Park Chung Hee, Chun Doo Hwan, and Roh Tae Woo. But, the Kim Young Sam administration had its own defect by birth since Kim gained power by a historic merge of his existing party with Roh Tae Woo's ruling party in 1990. As if reflecting this defect, the 4.3 movement under the Kim's regime advanced mainly within the boundary of Jeju - a periphery in Korean politics. Although a few sporadic attempts were made to push the issue into national politics, most attempts were frustrated by a lack of the political will of elites in the center. To make matters worse, governmental policy, by the end of Kim's tenure, even receded and actively suppressed the movement by 207

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arresting notable activists and students. Nevertheless, victims and activists had hope in the advancement of democracy and prepared for the year 1998 when the 4.3 events had their 50th anniversary. Between 1993 and 1997, actors who were engaged in the public advocacy since 1987 - activists, media, and research groups - continued their parts. In addition, there were three notable changes in terms of actors. First, the association for the victims' family members, which had been relatively inactive under the Roh Tae Woo regime, started to raise their voices and took part in the advocacy. Second, a highly influential new actor - the Provincial 4.3 Committee in the J eju Provincial Council - entered the movement in 1993. Third, the activism of students evolved somewhat separately from others and took the form of more specific actions such as aligning with the national association of university students or leading the petition movement. During this period, the Provincial 4.3 Committee was at the center of the movement by conducting the first official investigation, mediating ideologically opposed social groups to achieve a united memorial service, and leading the province-wide petition movement. In this chapter, my analysis will mainly focus on these three main activities which occurred in Jeju between 1993 and 1997. I will also illuminate the conditions and events that either obstructed or facilitated these major movements. It is important to examine the vestiges of governmental suppression and surveillance during this period. Thus, I examined the explicit suppression of the government, which was represented by the arrests of activists under the National Security Act. On the other hand, I studied resilient social barriers and prejudices by focusing on two events: first, a civil law case filed by an adopted son ofRhee Syng Man against the Jemin Ilbo, and second, 208

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scholarly and social debate around modem and contemporary Korean politics occurring in the course of revising history textbooks in 1994.

7.2. The Provincial 4.3 Special Committee 7.2.1. The Establishment of the Committee With the revival of the regional self-governing system, the 4th Jeju Provincial Council was summoned in December 1991. The 4.3 events came up in the very first meeting, which confirms a keen observation of one activist - "People and organization who work for democracy in Jeju can never escape the issue of the 4.3 events.,,170 The provincial council was no exception. In the very first meeting (69 th plenary session), a member of the council and victim Yang Keum Suk questioned the governor's view on possible solutions to restore the honor of the victims of the 4.3 events and to reconcile the Jeju society. 171 The Governor of Jeju Province Woo Keun Min's reply contained both hope and despair for the transitional justice movement: "We are in a new political era of regional self-governing system and recently the provincial council had also been summoned. Thus, I personally think that it may be possible for the Jeju provincial government to support the activities of harmony and conciliation if the provincial council or any other reliable private organizations can lead those activities."l72

We can find a hope that actually a new era had come due to the localization and decentralization of state power since the 4.3 events were brought up in an official body of the government. However, the Jeju provincial government was still headed by an

Yang, DongYoon. 2005. Interview by Author. October 1, Jeju. Tape recording The Office of the Secretariat of the Jeju Provincial Council (OSJPC). December 11,1991. A Minute of the 69 th Plenary Session (No.3) th 172 OSJPC. December 11, 1991. A Minute of the 69 Plenary Session (No.3) 170

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appointed governor who had neither any concern nor political will to resolve the pain of the 4.3 events. It was clearly revealed in his emphasis that it was his personal opinion, which suggests that it is not an official position of the provincial government. However, members of the council were more sensitive to people's demands since all were elected members representing each city and county. People's demand for truth and justice were more effectively channeled through the members of the provincial council. The creation of the Provincial 4.3 Committee occurred within this political setting. A consensus was made among council members to institute a special committee on April 2, 1992, which is the day when the local newspapers and broadcasting media cracked the headlines with the excavation of the Darangshi cave. The council created an interim committee for the preparation of the special committee and, after a six-monthlong preparation, the council decided to create a special committee on March 20, 1993. 173 The establishment of the Provincial 4.3 Committee transferred the focus of the transitional justice advocacy from a societal realm into a political realm. The establishment of an official committee to address the 4.3 events within the Jeju people's representative body was an important change. The members of council knew the importance when Kim Young Hoon proposed the bill stressing that "the provincial council which is a representative body of the Jeju people should lead the movement.,,174 Many who had been involved in the movement saw an important transformation. More than anything else, it was a powerful action since a branch of government body with public confidence now started to address the forbidden issue of the 4.3 events. The

1730SJPC. 1992. A Minute of the nnd Extraordinary Session (No.1); OSJPC. 1993. A Minute of the 81 sl Extraordinary Session (No.1); OSJPc. 1993. A Minute of the 82 nd Extraordinary Session (No.2) 1740SJPC. 1993. A Minute of the 82 nd Extraordinary Session (No.2)

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council members named the committee as the Provincial 4.3 Committee without defining and labeling the events in order to proclaim their objective and neutral position without any ideological bias. 175 The Provincial 4.3 Committee was composed of seven members of the provincial council and the first committee was chaired by Kim Young Hoon whose role becomes more significant in later advocacy. The committee set the goal as "first, to find the historic truth of the 4.3 events, and then take appropriate measures such as erecting a memorial monument or urging the national government and congress to act, and eventually achieve the unity of the province.,,176 This proclaimed goal reveals that the members knew that their activities should not be the final stop but further measures at a national level should be followed. The committee proposed three steps of action plan: (1) investigation, (2) defining the characteristic of the 4.3 events, and (3) taking reconciliatory measures (Provincial 4.3 Committee 1997: 16).177 In order to carry out their action plan, the committee first created an advisory broad with twenty board members including journalists, scholars, activists, and victims who have been active so far. It was a significant move for later developments in the 4.3 advocacy since it provided an arena where leaders and activists with diverse ideological background could meet and communicate. In addition, the committee frequently hosted an informal meeting where congresspersons and the members of local - provincial, municipal, and county level - council members discussed the 4.3 events. The Provincial 4.3 Committee functioned as a bridge connecting and communicating politicians who had

1750SJPC. 1992. A Minute of the nod Extraordinary Session (No.1) 176 0 SJPC. 1993. A Minute of the 820d Extraordinary Session (No.2) 1770SJPC. 1993. A Minute of the 83 rd Extraordinary Session (No.1)

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similar concerns in the 4.3 events. Thus, activists, victims, scholars, and politicians were able to gather together under the leadership of the provincial council, and this later became a great asset for the transitional justice advocacy in late 1990s. However, the creation of the Provincial 4.3 Committee was not an easy and smooth process. Kim Young Hoon, the first chair of the committee, remembered that the situation in 1993 was not amenable even for the elected and prestigious members of the council. Many complained about their activities arguing that it is of no use to bring the painful past back. In some extreme cases, a rightwing group member threatened the members saying, "I will someday cut the throat of all the committee members with an axe.,,178 Partly due to a constant threat and objection and partly due to the difficulties of the task itself, "most members were under severe stress.,,179 Kim testified that council members were reluctant to be included among the seven committee members and had hard time recruiting the members. Even though most members of the council supported the creation of the special committee but did not themselves want to be involved in it. 180 However, the committee's work had been continued and renewed twice until the enactment of the Special Act in 1999. It was, in part, possible because of the support from the general public including victims and their family members. The seven committee members in the first term were all reelected and this fact empowered the activities and status of the Provincial 4.3 Committee. In their second term, it was not difficult to appoint committee member at all since many voluntarily participated in the

178 Kang Duk Hwan, a secretary of the Office of 4.3 Victims Registration under the Provincial 4.3 Committee. 2006. Interview by author, March 21, Jeju. Tape recording 179 Kim Young Hoon, a former chair of the Provincial 4.3 Special Committee. 1993. Interview by Jemin Ilbo, March 22, Jeju 180 Kim Young Hoon, a former chair of the Provincial 4.3 Committee and current mayor of the Jeju City. 2006. Interview by author, April 7, Jeju. Tape recording

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committee.l8l In sum, it was the support of the Jeju people that made the committee's activities possible and it was democratization in a broad sense and the localization and decentralization of political power in specific that provided a condition for this close relationship between people and governmental body.

7.2.2. Investigation The first step of the committee's action plan was to investigate the truth. Among many aspects of the truth, the most important one was the number of victims, which had been estimated from 15,000 to 65,000. It was planned in order to respond to people who argued that not many had been killed. Members believed that the investigation was a necessary step before submitting a petition to the National Assembly since many in Seoul have questioned, "How many?" but the members did not have a definite number. In addition, committee members thought that it was crucial to examine the composition of perpetrators in order to define the 4.3 events. The Office of 4.3 Victims Registration was instituted under the committee to receive applications from victims. The speaker of the provincial council made an announcement of the official investigation and 17 investigators were appointed to conduct on-the-spot investigation. 182 Based on a year long investigation, the Provincial 4.3 Committee published the first official report in May 1995 and announced a list of 14,125 victims. The investigation continued under the 5th provincial council and the revised and supplemented report was published in February 1997 and announced a list of

Kang Duk Hwan. 2006. Interview by author, March 21, Jeju. Tape recording The provincial council itself was consisted of 17 constituencies - cities and counties. Seventeen investigators were appointed with the recommendation from 17 members of the provincial council. 181

182

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14,504 victims among which 12,243 were reported victims and 2,598 were identified ones (Provincial 4.3 Committee 1997). Reported victims were those whose names were addressed in victim registration forms and identified victiI:ns were thqse who were found by the investigators. The investigation continued until February 2000 and ended with the establishment of the national 4.3 Committee. The provincial committee had its second revised and supplemented report. Among 12,243 reported victims, 78 percent were male victims, 21 percent were female, and 1 percent were unidentified; 9,987 (81.6%) were murdered, 1,225 (10%) were disappeared, and 1,031 (8.4%) were initially imprisoned but later disappeared. In addition, 84 percent of individual cases were attributed to state agents (police, military, punitive force, or the rightist youth group members) and 11.1 percent to the leftist armed guerillas, and 1.7 percent to the unidentified. The Provincial 4.3 Committee also found out that about 11 percent of victims were civilians under lO-years-old (5.52%) or above 60-years-old (5.77%) (Provincial 4.3 Committee 1997:

58~61)

An official investigation by the provincial council, which ended up in a 585 pages of the report, was a landmark in the 4.3 movement. It was an epochal work in four aspects. First, the investigation was conducted by the branch of government body with public confidence. Second, the investigation was different from any previous investigations - e.g. investigation by the Jeju Shinbo or by the Congressional Special Committee under the 4th National Assembly in 1960 - in its length of investigation and the completeness of the report. Third, the investigation provided an exact number of victims based on an empirical inspection. It was no longer approximately 15,000 or 30,000 but "at least 14,504." Finally, it provided the first analysis of the characteristic of

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abuses and the composition of perpetrators. Among 14,504, 82 percent were dead and 12 were disappeared; 84 percent were killed by state agents and 11 percent by leftist guerrillas. Human rights violations and state violence is now no longer a murky concept in the mind of victims, activists, and the public. It now is understood with a clear number of victims and clear percentage of perpetrators that revealed the characteristic of the events. This report later became a stepping stone to achieve the first national truth commission in Korea. It first helped the transitional justice advocacy by providing an official and reliable evidence of state violence and civilian sacrifice during the 4.3 events. In the course of later advocacy, activists and victims encounter many who argue that less than one thousand were dead amidst the 4.3 events. The report was manifest counterevidence to their argument. 183 The report and its findings were present whenever there was an activism. An official report was widely distributed in the course of enactment movement and many scholars and activists referred to the report. Second, it practically helped the activities ofthe 4.3 Committee by laying down a ground work for the national investigation (4.3 Committee 2003: 383-385). One-year-Iong investigation and continued revisions clearly illustrated that the official investigation by a national committee will not be an easy process. It actually was a "great accomplishment which the central government even could not easily make.,,184 However, the investigation was only one of many activities which the Provincial 4.3 Committee had originally planned and the committee played an important role in two additional efforts: united memorial

Kang Duk Hwan. 2006. Interview by author, March 21, Jeju. Tape recording This is the word came out from the Speaker of the National Assembly when the members of the Provincial 4.3 Committee visited in order to transmit a copy of the report to the National Assembly. 183

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service and the petition movement.

7.3. United Memorial Service, 1994 7.3.1. Two Separate Memorial Services Social movement groups and students had their first April memorial service in 1989 and made it a yearly event to commemorate the 4.3 events and cherish the victims. The association for the victims, which started as the Anticommunist Association for the Civilian Victims' Family Members of the Jeju 4.3 Events, started to have their own memorial service in a different location on the same day since 1991. However, a separate memorial service of the victims association was not welcomed at all by groups who had been involved in the 4.3 movement. It was partly because the association was created and led by people whose family members had been killed by leftist guerrillas. The leaders of the association were usually former police and military who firmly believed that the 4.3 events are a communist rebellion. One interesting aspect of the association is that it was led by those who had contributed in creating a new derivative of anticommunist narrative of the 4.3 events as a communist rebellion plus massacres and abuses (which, they believed, were mainly committed by leftist guerrillas). Park Seo Dong, a chief editor of a magazine which propagated this perspective by exclusively reporting massacres by the guerrillas, was a secretary general ofthe association. Park, whose mother was brutally killed by the leftist guerrillas, was not hesitant at all in divulging his deep aversion to those students and social movement groups "who did not experience and do not know anything about the 4.3 events." The leaders of the association had the same antagonistic feeling toward

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"outsiders" of the 4.3 events and thought that the leftist organizations were manipulating the 4.3 events and their pain to "use it for their political purposes.,,185 Thus, these groups did not want the 4.3 events and the death of their parents and siblings to be remembered and commemorated by students and activists. Moreover, it was "absolutely intolerable" for them to watch their family members commemorated with those armed guerrillas who murdered their family members. 186 In a sense, their opinion was a partial truth since about 12 percent - 1,500 if we estimate the number of victims at 15,000 - of the total victims were killed by armed guerrillas and it is not a small number. For example, the Chilean truth commission was established in 1990 and reported 3,428 victims who had been killed and disappeared. However, it was not the view of majority of the 4.3 victims whose family members had been killed by official agents of the state. Thus, it was not a voice of majority of the victims but that of the minority who were empowered and privileged by the consecutive anticommunist regimes. However, these empowered minorities were extremely powerful among victims who were already intimidated by the past and present state violence. Victims had a vivid memory ofthe past state violence and also have been suffering by the guilt-byassociation system. The majority of victims were hesitant to speak up and make an objection to those empowered few in the leadership. In addition, there was also a deep chasm within the association between who were murdered by armed guerrillas and those by the police and military. One victim whose father was murdered by the police mentioned that people were exchanging whispers when he made an explicit objection to 185 Anonymous.

2006. Interyiew by author, April 2, Jeju. Interview note Kim Sung Soo, a founding member of the Anticommunist Association for the Civilian Victims' Family Members of the Jeju 4.3 Events and a victim of the violence committed by leftist armed guerrillas. 2006. Interview by author, Jeju. Interview note 186

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the leadership and oftentimes a word "the red" was heard. 187 The association dropped "anticommunist" from the title and changed it name into the Association for the Civilian Victims' Family Members of the J eju 4.3 Events in June 1990, but still maintained its previous constitution. The constitution itself reveals the exclusiveness and thoroughness of those who designed the association. One of the core articles was that the constitution should not be amended and, if amended, the association should be disbanded. It was only after the 4.3 Committee was established in 2000 when the majority of victims created a new association, the Association for the Victims of the Disappeared, and later "actually merged" the existing associations. 188 This anticommunist victims association started to have its own memorial service at the Sinsan Park since 1991 arguing that they only have a privilege of commemorating the dead since they are direct family members. One researcher saw two separate memorial services as a manifest sign of an ideological confrontation between two understandings of the 4.3 events - one as a communist rebellion and the other as a resistance movement (Ko 2005: 33). One reporter who closely followed the process of separate memorial services viewed that these two groups were "incompatible with each other like oil and water" in their view on the 4.3 events and possible solutions. Social movement groups proposed seeking the truth while the anticommunist victims association sought for "healing."I89 Oftentimes, "healing (chiyoo)" was a term used by those groups such as anticommunist victims, rightwing scholars, and media, who did not want to address civilian massacres. It is interesting because their notion of healing does

Anonymous. 2006. Interview by author, March 24, Jeju. Interview note Anonymous. 2006. Interview by author, March 24, Jeju. Interview note 189 Kim, Kyung Hoon. 1993. "Why did the United Memorial Service Fail?" Monthly Jeju. 187 188

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not necessarily include investigating and remembering the past atrocities. Healing, for them, is equivalent to blindly forgetting the past and moving forward. Due to fundamental differences, each was hostile to one another. The social movement groups viewed the victims association as a government-patronized organization and victims' association thought of activists as communists. The fault line between two groups was a debate around whom to commemorate, how to commemorate, and the purpose of commemoration, which was represented in different titles of memorial services. Activists and students had named their memorial service as "cherishment (choomoje)" meaning cherishing the memory ofthe deceased while victims association used "appeasement (yuiryungje)" meaning appeasing the souls of the deceased. This difference in name represents three profound differences. First, for the victims association, the act of commemoration was only for the dead but, for activists, it was for the dead, the living, and those who will be born. Second, the act of commemoration focused only on the past for the victims association but it was for both the past and the future for activists. Third, the victims association wanted only to appease the souls of the innocent victims, however understood, while activists wanted to appease and remember not only victims but also those who had to lift arms against the oppressive rule ofthe U.S. military government and the Korean government. With the establishment of the Provincial 4.3 Committee in 1993, the victims association and activists started to discuss the possibility of having a united memorial service from a personal level between Park Seo Dong (a secretary general of the victims association) and Kim Dong Man (a secretary general of the Research Institute). 190

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Kim, Dong Man. 2006, Interview by author, Apri112, Jeju. Tape recording

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However, discussion was up in the air for a month sine the first meeting due to the ambivalent attitude of victims. Although Park and Kim had a verbal agreement, the victims association refused to publicly announce the agreement arguing that the proposal was Park's personal idea and they had declined a united memorial service. Activists proposed the mediation of the Provincial 4.3 Committee and a meeting was held on March 25, 1993 but failed to achieve an agreement. However, Kim Young Hoon, a chair ofthe provincial committee, positively commented, that "a mere fact that the meeting between two ideologically confronting groups took place was very meaningful progress."

It demonstrates a deep chasm between two ideologically opposite groups. It actually was a meaningful event to bring the leaders of two camps in the same room and it was only possible because of the neutral and official position of the Provincial 4.3 Committee. A reporter who followed the mediation process pointed out five reasons for the failure; 191 First, an initial discussion started in late February which allowed only a month to discuss and coordinate different positions. Second, the provincial committee was created in late March and was not ready to mediate for the two groups. Third, there were enormous differences in the viewpoints of the groups. Fourth, the unbalanced support of the provincial government and governor was a major impediment to the negotiation. During the course of mediation, the governor promised to give 30,000,000 won ($ 38,000) to the victims association to support their memorial service. A reporter found this impartiality by the government officials to be an important obstruction when he wrote, "The governor and the mayors participated in the memorial service of the victims association but did not even send a flower to the activist's memorial service."

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Kim, Kyung Hoon. 1993. "Why did the United Memorial Service Fail?" Monthly Jeju.

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Finally, the media did not advertise the possibility of a united memorial service and failed in creating public opinion.

7.3.2. United Memorial Service Next year, three among five obstacles - a lack of time, expertise of the provincial committee, and media coverage - were effectively eliminated. The negotiation process .had already begun a year ago; the provincial committee was in full session and moved towar.d starting an official investigation; and the mass media actively published stories of the negotiation around a united memorial service. Two larger obstacles still remained - a deep chasm between two parties and the partial support of the governor and local administration. However, the two groups had already reached a verbal agreement in the previous year regarding two core principles: first, both parties agreed that victims are ideologically neither left nor right, and second, both parties agreed to avoid using extreme labels of the 4.3 events such as resistance uprising or communist rebellion. The last impediment was the partial support of the victims association by the governor and this was overcome by a strategic move of the provincial council. The governor tenaciously tried to provide the same amount of money only to the victims association but this attempt was blocked by a strategic threat from the provincial committee members saying that the provincial council would not approve the budget if the governor kept insisting on supporting one group. In Thus, all five factors that a reporter had pointed out as obstacles had been removed in 1994. Under this situation, the first united memorial service was held by the agreement of the leadership between social

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Kim Young Hoon. 2006. Interview by author, April 7, Jeju. Tape recording

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movement groups and victims association by the mediation of the Provincial 4.3 Committee. The two camps reached an agreement and announced their items of understanding. First, the name of the memorial service is the Memorial Service for the Appeasement of the Jeju 4.3 Victims, which shows that it was activists who made concession to the victim association. Activists not only gave up their understanding of the 4.3 events as being a popular uprising but also gave up their argument that armed protestors in addition to the victims should be remembered and appeased. In addition, with recommendation of the provincial committee, the 4.3 events were left undefined as

"4.3." Second, both parties decide to create a joint temporal committee to administer the memorial service and this committee was under the leadership of an executive committee of six members, which consists of three from each group. However, the united memorial service was not a smooth process from its beginning to aftermath. Fist, during of the negotiation process, disputes and dissensions existed within each camp, and eventually, members with extreme viewpoints in each group were dropped out of the movement. On the one hand, victims association became more inclusive as core anticommunist members left the association. Immediately after the first united memorial service, core anticommunist members created their own association because they believed that the existing association "fell under the subversive conspiracy ofthe reds,,193 On the other hand, the most radical members of the social movement group - students - withdrew from the alliance because they believed that the leaders of social movement groups made a compromise and denied the 4.3 events being a

193

Anonymous. 2006. Interview by author, Jeju, March 12. Interview Notes

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democratic and resistance uprisitig.

194

Since then, student activism was separated from

the mainstream and led an independent transitional justice movement. Second, immediately after the first united memorial service, the victims association complained that social movement groups violated agreements by including the mortuary tablet of one of the leaders of armed guerrillas. The victims were enraged arguing that the souls of their family members were not appeased at all by the memorial service because their souls were commemorated with those who murdered them. The president of the victims association resigned bearing the responsibility. The leaders of social activist organizations investigated their group members but could not find any evidence that the tablet was made and displayed by activists. On the contrary, activists addressed possible conspiracy by the dissenting members of victims association since the tablet was written using Chinese characters and activists' tablets were all made with Korean characters. It still is an unresolved issue and clearly reveals the deep chasm between the two groups and possible dissenters within each camp. 195 Thus, efforts to have a united memorial service made both ideologically polarized groups more moderate. By making leading groups more moderate, the whole process helped in creating a pool of moderates who later actively led the petition and enactment movement. Ko, who led the united memorial service movement as a director of the Research Institute, argued that it was a watershed event since it for the first time created "one voice" on the 4.3 events. 196 This one voice provided a strong "justification"

194 Kang, Ho Jin, a former president of the Jeju National University Student Association in 1996.2006. Interview by author, Jeju. March 22. Tape recording. 195 Ko Chang Hoon, who was a director of the 4.3 Research Institute, later argued that the Korean Central Intelligence Agency was involved in the process to obstruct the efforts to have a united memorial service. 196 Ko, Chang Hoon. 2006. Interview by author, March 24, Jeju. Transcript

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for seeking the truth of the 4.3 events and restoring justice for the victims. In addition, students, who could not agree on strategically abandoning the resistance movement lexicon, actively pursued their own activism by aligning with the national student association. This step of Jeju university students helped the nationalization of the 4.3 events among university student groups, which later empowered the enactment movement. Some even think that by separating themselves from social movement groups, students could be left as a "pure" groups and reservoir of the narrative of the 4.3 democratic uprising (Ko 2005). For example, an independent organization was created under the Jeju National University Student Association to investigate the 4.3 events. 197 This institution took full responsibilities ofthe 4.3 movement by making reports and archives, publicizing the event, and organizing a lecture series. Next year, student activism took a more concrete form when they sent out their reports and a documentary videotape, The Unquenchable Shout, the Jeju 4.3 Uprising (1996), to all universities nationwide. Students additionally sent special envoys to the national student conference to publicize the 4.3 events and civilian massacres. 198 In addition to a direct impact on actors, the united memorial service had an important impact on the advocacy by enhancing public support by showing that the 4.3 movement is neither an ideologically inclined activity nor an ideologically polarized one. Now, the advocacy for the truth and justice virtually became the foremost issue of the whole province. It was made possible, first, by the excavation of Darangshi cave and the establishment of the Provincial 4.3 Committee in 1993, and second, by the united memorial service in 1994. It certainly enhanced public support which already had been 197 198

Kim, Nam Roon. 2006. Interview by author, Jeju. March 23. Tape recording Kang, Ro Jin. 2006. Interview by author, Jeju. March 22. Tape recording

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in a high level after the excavation of the Darangshi cave. This public support for the movement was a key in the enactment of the Special Act in 1999. In addition, the first united memorial service also empowered the Provincial 4.3 Committee. Ever since its creation in 1993, the committee had not achieved any visible outcome until February 1994 when it instituted the Office of 4.3 Victims Registration. Thus, for a year, the committee had not functioned effectively and dissatisfaction grew not only among activists and media but also among the general public. However, with its successful mediation, the status of the Provincial Committee grew and public awareness increased. This increased popularity and trust helped its official investigation and the petition movement, which later continued to the enactment movement.

7.4. The Petition Movemen.t

Starting in the mid-1990s, activists, students, and victims used a petition movement (chungwon) to bring the issue of transitional justice for the 4.3 events into national politics. Two different actors - the Provincial 4.3 Committee and the Jeju Student Association - carried out the petition movement. This movement, which started as early as July 1993, took the form of submitting a signed petition of the victims and general public to the National Assembly entreating them to create a special investigatory committee on the 4.3 events. The right to petition is one of the citizen's rights proclaimed in the Constitution and many victims and activists in other massacre cases have resorted to petitions to encourage the members of the National Assembly to investigate the matter, draft and propose a bill, and finally enact a law. Students first took the initiative and succeeded in submitting a petition on

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October 28, 1993 with 17,925 signatures. 199 Students gathered the signatures from students, victims,and citizens by weekly street campaigns. It was the first effort made to bring the 4.3 events into national politics and it marked another pioneering attempt made by students. Students who were at the very front of activism after democratization were also the first ones to move to national politics?OO This, in part, was a result of the efforts made as early as 1991 to make the 4.3 events a national issue among students. In 1991, the National Association ofthe Representatives of the University Students accepted the suggestion of the Jeju Student Association and had its first nationwide student demonstration on the 4.3 events. Since then, the 4.3 events had been widely studied and educated among national students. A few days later, members of the provincial committee also submitted another petition in November 1993. Kim Young Hoon remembered that they already started preparing a petition even before the student's initiative. 201 The committee members learned the importance of a petition from the transitional justice experience of a Taiwanese massacre - the 2.28 events - after their official visit to Taiwan in August 1993. 202 It is important to understand the role of the transitional justice experience in Taiwan in the course of the Jeju transitional justice advocacy, which is a good illustration of how diffusion occurs. The Taiwanese experience and their special law were even referred to in the petition submitted to the National Assembly. The Taiwanese experience 199 Oh Young Hoon, a chairperson of the Jeju Student Association in 1993 remembered that the first effort was made at the first conference of the representatives from universities in Jeju in 1993. The initial goal was to get 50,000 signatures from Jeju residents and create the special committee under the National Assembly. Oh Young Hoon. 2006. Interview by author, April 11, Jeju. Tape recording 200 Kim, Nam Hoon. 2006. Interview by author, Jeju. March 23. Tape recording 201 However, official minutes of the Provincia14.3 Committee show that the first decision on a petition was made on October 28,1993. A draft petition was passed unanimously in a plenary session. OSJPC. 1993. A Minute of the 88 th Plenary Session (No.1) 202 Kim Young Hoon. 2006. Interview by author, April 7, Jeju. Tape recording

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had first been brought up by a reporter of the Jemin Ilbo, Kim Jong Min who saw an extreme similarity between the Taiwanese 2.28 events and the Jeju 4.3 events in terms of the characteristic of the events, time and location, perpetrators, the number of victims, and the aftermath of the massacre. 203 The 2.28 events occurred in Taiwan under the Chiang Kai-Shek's Kuomintang regime in mainland China. Taiwan was then a peripheral island in the southern part of China and was inhabited by the aboriginal people of Taiwan. A crisis started when a few policemen and government agents confiscated all cigarettes and money from an old lady in a street kiosk on the charge of illegal importation. When she and her young sons resisted, the police and agents had beaten her to death. The Taiwanese were outraged and vehemently protested against the Chiang Kai-Shek regime. However, the government brutally suppressed public protest arguing that the armed protest was instigated, planned and supported by the communists in the mainland. However, in the course of an official investigation, scholars could not find any evidence that it was ordered or instigated by the Chinese Communist Party and it was merely a protest against unfair treatment to Taiwanese, not a communist rebellion. Similar to the 4.3 events, counterinsurgency was extremely brutal murdering approximately 18,000 to 20,000 civilians within a short period of time. However, the Chiang Kai-Shek government who later found asylum in Taiwan declared a martial law and suppressed the truth for forty years during the consecutive anticommunist governments. With democratic transition in 1987, victims and activists demanded to find the truth ofthe massacres and pay reparation for the victims. In 1995, the government

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Kim, Jong Min. 2005. Interview by author. November 24, Seoul. Tape recording.

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enacted a law to investigate the massacres and make reparations. The government, after one year of investigation, announced that 18,000 to 20,000 victims were murdered and, more than anything else, announced that Chiang Kai-Shek himself was responsible in ordering the massacres. In addition, the government declared February 28th a national memorial day to commemorate the victims. The Provincial 4.3 Committee and Congressman Byun Jung 11 had a visit to Taiwan and had a meeting with activists, politicians, and victims to seek advice for the 4.3 events. Why did the committee seek advice from Taiwan since, by 1993, Korea also had an experience of addressing the 1980 Kwangju massacre in the form of the Congressional public hearings? There are two reasons for this. First, the Congressional public hearing on the Kwangju massacre was believed to be a failure since it did not lead to further action by the national government. In addition, two major figures of the massacre - Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo - were still powerful and did not pay any price for their past atrocities. Second, activists and politicians who first encountered the 2.28 events found a stark similarity between Taiwan and Jeju experience. Both events occurred in late 1940s immediately after World War II; systemic and province-wide massacres were committed by the anticommunist government under the name of counterinsurgency strategy; both events were characterized as a communist rebellion instigated by the Communist Party, which was a major enemy of the state by that time; the truth had been suppressed under the consecutive anticommunist regimes; and the number of victims who were murdered was more than 15,000. Among many similarities, I would like to explore one particular aspect that drew the attention of activists and politicians in Jeju. Most of all, both cases occurred in an 228

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island, which is located in the periphery and state violence targeted islanders who traditionally suffered unfair treatment by the central government. It is worth examining because many activists and victims believed that the fact that Jeju being an island is a major variable in explaining both the 4.3 events and a successful transitional justice advocacy. Many believed that the 4.3 events and its transitional justice advocacy are different from state violence and civilian massacres occurred in the mainland?04 Unlike massacres in Kwangju or Geochang which affected only a small portion - a couple of cities or counties - of the province, the 4.3 events was a massacre that affected the whole island and whole province. They also believed that the transitional justice advocacy was successful because unlike victims in the mainland who usually fled to other provinces after the massacres, most of victims in Jeju stayed in the island. Thus, the stark similarities of the massacre in Taiwan initially appealed to activists, media, and politicians. It can also be examined in the remark made by the Speaker of the J eju Provincial Council, J ang Jung Un: "I hope that the transitional justice process of the Taiwanese 2.28 events can help transform the perspectives of national politicians and lawmakers.,,205 In addition, the Taiwanese experience was addressed in the plenary meeting of the provincial committee. 206 Many whom I interviewed - not only activists but also victims - referred to the Taiwanese massacres and the transitional justice processes. However, despite the similarity, victims in Jeju and Taiwan were in a completely different situation in 1993 since Taiwan has already enacted a law to address the 2.28 events and had received a presidential apology. Thus, the provincial committee It was confirmed by my interview with Oh Seung Kook, Park Kyung Hoon, Yang Dong Yoon, Ko Chang Hoon, Kim Young Hoon, and Kim Chnag Hoo. 205 Jemin Ilbo, April 24, 1993 rd 206 OSJPS. April 28, 1993. A Minute of the 83 Plenary Session (No.1)

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had an official visit and was reminded of the importance of the petition again. Based on these two petitions in 1993, Congressman Byun Jeong II moved a resolution proposing a special investigatory committee with 74 signatures from congresspersons in February 1994. However, all these efforts were not successful since the

14th National

Assembly decided not to discuss the petitions and resolution and

tentatively passed the 4.3 issue to the 15 th parliamentary period. Thus, after two years of procrastination, petitions and a resolution were simply dismissed with an excuse oflack of time and the issue was again transferred to next Congress. It was not the first time when transitional justice attempts were frustrated and dismissed with a reason of a lack of enough time and resources. In the 4th Congress, the activities of the Congressional Special Committee were terminated without any effective results with the dissolution of the 4th National Assembly. Based on these two results, we could learn that the timing is crucial in transitional justice activism. In specific, tactics to get over these lame excuses are critical in activism. Both initial attempts to bring the 4.3 events into national politics failed with an ostensible reason of a lack of time left in a period of Congress. However, these early attempts are still important because these were the first efforts to bring the 4.3 events into national politics. Moreover, local newspapers and broadcasts closely followed the review process of the petitions and a resolution. For example, the Jemin IIbo carried news reports on the review process almost every week between 1993 and 1996 and the MBC also broadcasted related news. It was an unintended consequence of a failed attempt and helped the transitional justice movement in three respects. First, frequent and continued news coverage helped draw local attention to the 4.3 events and transitional justice. This frequent coverage generated an 230

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atmosphere that the finding truth and restoring justice was "the single most important issue in Jeju.,,207 For example, during the congressional campaign in 1996, most candidates declared that the investigation and reparation is a primary concern for Jeju (Kim 1999). Moreover, changes in local public attitudes affected public officials in the provincial government. In March 1996, Governor Shin Koo Bum pledged support for a prompt and appropriate transitional justice measure to investigate the truth and to restore the dignity of civilian victims. This promise later took the form of concrete action of sending an open statement to prime minister and an official request was made to the Office of Prime Minister asking for the policy measures. In sum, the 4.3 events now officially became "the issue of J eju as a whole." It was an unexpected consequence of the petition movement which the pending and unsuccessful petition caused. Second, in the course of petition movement, an important document was discovered through the efforts of the provincial committee and Congressman Hyun Kyung Dae. Prior to the petition movement, the members of the Provincial 4.3 Committee visited the National Assembly to request a release of the report, minutes, and victims applications of the Congressional Special Committee in 1960. These documents were opened to the general public for the first time since 1960s by an official request from a congressman and the members of the provincial council. Although the existence of the Congressional Committee was a known historical fact, it was first time that the details of their activities and the information of victims were released. For a month, local newspapers including both conservative and progressive covered the special reportage on the released documents. It also brought public attention to the 4.3 events and transitional

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justice movement. Third, activists and victims now realized how difficult it is to bring the 4.3 events into national politics. Three years of pending, silence, and final dismissal helped victims and activists realized the barriers that exist in the political center. This barrier is composed of two elements. First, there was simple ignorance and indifference to the events that occurred 50 years ago in a remote and peripheral island. For instance, one Congressman was skeptical when the provincial committee brought the petition and said, "Why are you even sweating and bothering the National Assembly for events in which less than one hundred people were dead?,,208 The second barrier was that the still strong anticommunist belief that the 4.3 events were a communist rebellion and that people who were killed were armed guerrillas. Throughout the petition movement, activists and victims again realized how tall the national barrier is. Activists realized the nature of barriers and were able to plan a strategy to overcome the obstacles in the later advocacy. In November 1996, the provincial committee submitted another petition to the newly formed 15th National Assembly. This time, activists and politicians moved quickly to avoid a lame justification of a lack of time. A month later, three congresspersons from Jeju moved another resolution with the consent of 154 congresspersons urging the institution of a special investigatory committee. The sheer number constituted a majority since the total enrollment in the 15th National Assembly was 299 representatives. The number of supporting congresspersons alone evoked optimism and all major local newspapers and media made it their headlines. Many newspapers cautiously predicted that the special committee at a national level would be possible in the following year in

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Kang Duk Hwan. 2006. Interview by author, March 21, Jeju. Tape recording

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1997. However, the process was much more tedious than most people had expected. Few expected that the resolution would be pending for another three years, which again proved the resilient nature of the barrier.

7.S. Yet another Suppression The barriers also existed outside the National Assembly. Under the Kim Young Sam administration, three significant events took place which illustrates that the path toward transitional justice was still thorny. The first event occurred in March 1994 when the committee responsible for revising history textbooks for middle and high school students hosted a conference and released its initial draft. Under the previous military regimes, textbooks defined the 4.3 events as the 4.3 communist rebellion and described it as a communist rebellion under the control of the North Korean communists. After democratization, a more neutral term - Jeju 4.3 events - was used but still stated that it was caused by local communists instigated by the communists in North. After the inauguration of Kim Young Sam, the sixth revision of the textbook took place and Suh Joong Suk, a history professor at the Sungkyunkwan University, cautiously suggested rewriting the 4.3 events as the "4.3 uprising.,,209 It was the second time when the 4.3 events became a focus of national newspapers following the excavation of the Darangshi cave in 1992. Immediately after the new report, most politicians, media, and rightists vehemently protested against the suggestion. Professor Suh, known for his revisionist and progressive perspective on modem Korean history, was soon to be a target of rightwing media and activists. Even Kim Jong Pil, a prominent politician and leader

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of the ruling party criticized a draft arguing that there should not be a "distortion in history textbook.',,21o The Ministry of Education, having been realized of the graveness of the situation, quickly retreated and announced that it is a personal view of professor Suh and the ministry would not allow the changes and will stick to the "orthodox perspective which most scholars agree upon." This official position was adhered to throughout the revision process and finally no change was made. In this revision, the fact that innocent victims and civilians were murdered was included for the first time. Nevertheless, it still had the limitation of not mentioning who perpetrators were. In sum, this textbook process and vehement social objection it provoked revealed how strong the social barrier is to the transitional justice advocacy. The second event was a manifest suppression of the 4.3 advocacy by arresting documentary filmmakers and the publishers under the National Security Act in 1997. As the general strike of workers and street demonstrations of students increased and became violent, police and secret agencies began investigating books and documentary films that were circulating in labor unions and university campuses. Ironically, books and films published under the Roh Tae Woo administration now became ideologically dangerous and rebellious materials. Two documentary films on the 4.3 events were targeted; the police announced that two films - The Unquenchable Shout (1996) and The Red Hunt (1997) - "benefited the enemy" and they arrested and indicted two activists (Kim 1997).2 11

Halla Ilbo, March 22, 1994 Kim, Dong Man, a film maker and distributor of the Unquenchable Shout, the Jeju 4.3 Uprising (1996) and the Sad Song of the Darangshi Cave (1993), 2006, Interview by author, April 12, Jeju. Tape recording. 210

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Finally, on April 1, 1997,4.3 Reporting Team had exclusive news on the 4.3 events arguing that the declaration of a martial law during the 4.3 events by President Rhee Seung Man was illegal. Many including victims and scholars believed Jeju was under the martial law during the counterinsurgency campaign. The report was possible because the 4.3 reporting team found an official document announcing the martial law where the date of signature was problematic. This document was one that had been signed by President Rhee and his cabinet members on November 17, 1948. However, the date of signing is problematic because the Martial Law Act had not been enacted until November 24, 1949. Thus, many legal scholars argued that the martial law in 1948 Jeju was illegal because there was no enacted law on the martial law to be based upon (Kim 1999). This was exclusive news not only for people in Jeju but also for national audience. Therefore, not only the Jemin Ilbo but also the Hankyorye, a national newspaper with a progressive p,erspective, published a report. Social movement organizations and victims associations made an announcement that the government should investigate the issue and Congressman Chun Jung Bae, who later became the Minister of Justice also pressed the government. The Office of Legislation quickly made an objection to the report by providing an opposite interpretation of the law. Rhee In Soo, an adopted son ofRhee Syng Man, filed a civil lawsuit against the Jemin Ilbo and Hankyorye on the charge of libel of the deceased and the plaintiff asked for 300,000,000 won ($ 380,000) for indemnity. The lawsuit went all the way from district court to high court, and finally to the Supreme Court. At the district court, a judge made a decision favorable to the plaintiff and asked the J emin Ilbo and Hankyorye to publish a correction. However, in January 2000, the high court made decision that the

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plaintiff does not have a reason for a lawsuit and finally, in April 2001, the Supreme Court dismissed the final· appeal of the plaintiff. Although the lawsuit ended favorable for the newspapers and reporting team, a civil lawsuit was so costly that it was a great burden for the board of directors ofthe Jemin Ilbo.

7.6. Conclusion These three events show that the barrier was still high even under the first civilian regime after democratic transition. Nevertheless, activists, victims, and local politicians made great progress under the Kim Young Sam administration. Although many attempts could not be transferred to national politics, many saw the potential of the movement which had been accumulated through the efforts of activists, media, researchers, victims, politicians, writers and artists. People in Jeju made a great effort in making the transitional justice movement an issue of the whole Jeju province. The role of the Provincial 4.3 Committee was a crucial in the transitional justice advocacy by leading the movement as an official and representative body ofthe Jeju people. Their role was important in the first investigation of the massacres, mediating the united memorial service between social movement groups and victim groups, and finally leading the petition movement.

It is important that the central point ofthe movement - Provincial 4.3 Special Committee - was created and empowered during this period. This provincial committee tried to maintain a neutral position between the left and right and also had a public confidence of being an official and representative body of the government. The creation of the committee was possible because of the qecentralization of political power which

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transferred the state's administrative and legislative power to those local governments and councils. In other words, it was possible as democratic consolidation proceeded in Korean politics. With the advancement of the 4.3 advocacy in Jeju, activists and victims also found the possibility that the 4.3 events could be addressed by the central government. Activists also saw the obstacles and barriers that existed in the center and started to overcome the barriers of ignorance and anticommunism. In addition, activists and victims started to have hopes through several events that occurred under the Kim Young Sam regime. First, two special acts were legislated to address the past abuses committed by the state in Korea. A Special Act on the May 18th Kwangju Democratic Movement and Others (5.18 Special Act) and a Special Act on the Recovering of the Honor of Persons Concerned to the Geochang Event and Others (Geochang Special Act) were respectively enacted in December 1995 and January 1996. Second, Kim Dae Jung who declared a retirement immediately after his defeat in 1992 presidential election, decided to return to politics in 1995 by creating his party, the National Congress for New Politics. A new hope grew among victims and activists with the prospect of Kim Dae Jung, who had consistently pledged to restore of the honor of victims, being the next president. Third, activists envisioned mobilizing the accumulated power and resource of the 4.3 advocacy in the year 1998, which is a symbolic year of a "half century" since the outbreak of the events and the creation of the Republic of Korea.

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8. The Establishment of the 4.3 Committee

8.1. Seeing Hope In 1998, President Kim Dae Jung, whose political constituency was based in Cholla and Jeju province and who had pledged several times to enact a special act, was inaugurated. Kim Dae Jung made a first public statement regarding transitional justice of the 4.3 events in November 1987 when he visited Jeju for his presidential campaign immediately after democratization: "People in Jeju have suffered a tragedy ofthe 4.3. I will be with you in your regrets, pain, and hope. The military and authoritarian governments also falsely accused me of being a communist and I myself am a victim. If I am in power, I will investigate the truth of the events where people have been falsely accused of being a communist and will restore the honor of the victims (Kim 1999: 343)."

He further pledged to enact a special act for the investigation and restoration of the honor of victims during his presidential campaign in 1992. One newspaper reporter who closely traced public commitments of Kim stated that he made a public pledge twelve times within II-year-Iong period after democratization (Kim 1999:

343~345).

Professor Ko Chang Hoon argued that he was one who drafted Kim's Jeju address in 1987 and decided to include the 4.3 issue into the statement. 212 Accorqing to Ko, his advisor Lee Moon Young, a professor at the Korea University called him a few days before Kim Dae Jung's visit to ask him to write a draft of his campaign address. In a sense, the first presidential pledge was also a result of previous activism and research of a few scholars and activists. Although, it was Kim Dae Jung himself who decided to promise truth and reparation for the 4.3 victims, the previous accumulation of interests 212

Ko, Chang Hoon. 2006. Interview by author, March 24, Jeju. Transcript

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and studies by the locals was an indispensable precondition. Even the presidential pledge is not made out of vacuum but closely related to the previous transitional justice efforts. Kim Dae Jung's inauguration was dramatic since he declared a retirement from politics after his defeat in 1992 presidential election to his old friend and foe Kim Young Sam. Since Kim Dae Jung was the only major political figure who had been consistently promising truth, justice, and reparation, his decision to retire from politics was a huge disappointment for victims. However, a new hope grew as he returned to politics by creating his own party in 1998. Although Kim was criticized of eating his previous word of retirement, proponents of transitional justice in Jeju welcomed his return and truly believed that a settlement of any sort could come into being only during his tenure. Moreover, victims and activists became more optimistic because of the Geochang Special Act was enacted in January 1996 under the Kim Young Sam administration?13 Kim Young Sam had his constituency in the Kyongsang province and promised to investigate, restore the honor, and make reparation to Geochang victims. Victims of the massacre in Geochang made use of his tenure as an opportunity to enact a special law and they succeeded. This act was designed not only to address the Geochang massacre but also similar massacres by including the words "and others" in the law. However, an interesting point is that the Kim Young Sam administration investigated and made reparation to victims based on this law only in Kyongsang province but not in ChollaJJ eju province, which represents the severe regional politics in Korea. Victims and In addition, a Special Act on the May 18 th Kwangju Democratic Movement and Others (5.18 Special Act) was also enacted in December 1995. Previous efforts to bring Chun and Roh to a court failed when the Prosecutor's Office decided not to prose~mte the case on July 18,1995 by arguing that the acts regarding the coup and bloody suppression of the demonstration is not an object of the legal jurisdiction after an investigation of one year and two months. Scholars, lawyers, and activists vehemently protested against the decision and urged the enactment of a special act and this law was passed in December and provided a legal ground to prosecute former presidents. 239

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activists in Jeju now expected that Kim Dae Jung would enact a special law for the 4.3 events as Kim Young Sam did for Geochang under his presidency.214 In addition, most activists wanted to make the best use of the symbolic "50th anniversary of the 4.3 events" by using the notion of Jubilee, human rights, and peace.

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In Korean, 50 anniversary is usually referred to as "half a century (bansegi)" which oftentimes is associated with word "division of the Korean peninsula (boondan)." When these two terms are used together "half a century after the division of the Korean peninsular," this has a connotation that something has to be done in order to solve the grave problem. By using the concept "half a century" in the transitional justice advocacy, activists tried to evoke public awareness that something substantial has to be done on the 4.3 events also. 216 In addition, 1998 was also a half a century since the establishment of th

the Republic of Korea in 1948. By commemorating the 50 anniversary of the 4.3 events, activists also showed an ugly and gruesome side of state-building which had been hidden under the glorious and exuberant side (Pan National Committee 2000). In order to maximize the movement, the Pan National Committee for the 50th Anniversary of the Jeju 4.3 Events (Pan National Committee) was created in April 1997 in Seoul. This was an effort made by prominent scholars, activists, journalists, and writers in Seoul originally from Jeju. In the same month, local activists, artists, and In retrospect, it was much better for the 4.3 events not to be included in the consideration of the Geochang Special Act. Although the law had been enacted in 1996 and an official investigation had started as early as 1997, it was an investigation at a county level and was fundamentally different from the national level investigation proclaimed in the 4.3 Special Act. 215 Among three concepts, the notion of Jubilee was foreign to most activists and victims in the first place. Yang Dong Yoon, the former chairperson of Provincial Solidarity, told me that this concept were first brought up by a Catholic priest Lim Moon Chul who was actively working on transitional justice movement and later became a committee member. Yang understood the Jubilee as "a year of forgiveness," which I believe he extended from Biblical concept of setting slaves free, restoring the property, and remitting debt. Yang, Dong Yoon. 2005. Interview by Author. October 1, Jeju. Transcript 216 Oh, Young Hoon, a former chairperson of the Jeju Student Association and executive director of Provincial Solidarity. 2006. Interview by author, April 11, Jeju. Tape recording 214

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th

researchers also decided to create an organization to commemorate the 50 anniversary of the 4.3 events through art, cultural projects, and academic conferences. This was another collective effort made by the local political, social, and cultural organizations that had been working for transitional justice for a decade since democratization. The 50th Anniversary Commemoration Committee for the Jeju 4.3 Events through the Cultural and Academic Projects (Commemoration Committee) was created in February 1998. This organization was a forerunner of Provincial Solidarity for the Investigation of the Truth and Restoration of the Honor of the Jeju 4.3 (Provincial Solidarity)?l? The enactment movement proceeded based on these two centers in both Seoul (Pan National Committee) and Jeju (Commemoration Committee, and later by Provincial Solidarity) since most activists, victims, and organizations who worked for the transitional justice advocacy actively participated in these two associations. These two asso<;iations were at the very center of the commemoration projects and the enactment movement in 1998 and 1999. Although activists and victims have been pursuing the enactment movement both in 1998 and 1999, the commemoration projects were the main activism of the year 1998 and the full scale enactment movement started in 1999.

8.2. The Enactment Movement 8.2.1. Commemoration Projects in 1998 From the onset, the situation under President Kim Dae Jung looked highly There existed one more association commemorating the 50th anniversary of the 4.3 events. The Pan Provincial Committee for Appeasing the Souls of Victims of the Jeju 4.3 Events was also created in September 1997. However, the creation and activities of this organization was limited because it was an effort made by the provincial government mainly to administer the 50th anniversary united memorial service. Many social movement organizations and victims withdrew from the organization after the governor appointed a chair Cho Seung Ok who were neither activists nor victims but a public official of the local government (Kim 1999). 217

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promising. First, a special committee on the 4.3 events chaired by Congressman Kim Jin Bae was set up within the ruling party, which clearly demonstrated the political will of President Kim to address the issue. Two public hearings were held both in Jeju (May 7, 1998) and Seoul (September 28, 1998) hosted by the ruling party. In addition, a policy conference took place between four major political party officials hosted by the ruling party to address the 4.3 events and civilian massacres. Second, the prominent political . figures with no personal root in Jeju - a representative from the Office of Prime Minister and two congresspersons - participated in the united memorial service for the first time. Starting with these public hearings and a policy conference, national newspapers started to cover the 4.3 events as a current political issue. It differed from the previous coverage where newspapers covered the 4.3 events only around April as merely a historic and controversial issue or as personal stories. Kim Jong Min, a former reporter ofthe Jemin Ilbo, remembered that, every April, reporters from national newspapers and broadcasting agencies either called or had a casual visit in search of news items and this was "the only way" that the 4.3 events could be published by any national news media. 218 It was also different from sporadic coverage of sensational news items such as the

Darangshi cave, controversies around textbook revision, and illegality of the martial law. These nontrivial changes indicated that the local transitional justice process was now moving toward national debate and contestation as a current political issue. However, the progress in 1998 was limited to the advancement within the ruling party and no measures were taken beyond the confines of the ruling party. It fell short of the expectations of activists and victims, but it was still a significant year. First, all

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Kim Jong Min. 2006. Interview by author, March 25, Seoul. Transcript

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previous actors and organizations decided to work together under two united associations in Seoul and Jeju which provided a center of the advocacy. Since its creation, the Pan National Committee in Seoul and the Commemoration Committee in Jeju worked closely and started to divide activism between them. The former worked with prominent political figures such as congresspersons and staffs in the Office of the President in Seoul and the latter focused on publicity and mobilization ofthe general public in Jeju. The interaction of these two associations became more effective and powerful in the following year when the special act was finally enacted. Secondly, 1998 was also the year when activists realized that a resolute political will of Kim Dae Jung alone cannot lead to a success in transitional justice. Many victims and activists naively believed that the special act would be legislated immediately after President Kim's inauguration. Two public hearings by the ruling party also raised the expectation. Nevertheless, by the end of 1998, activists and victims learned·a lesson that "although politicians could be persuaded by a few, it is always the power of many that could make politicians act."Z19 Thus, year 1998 was mainly a year of commemoration of the 50th anniversary which drew public awareness and participation through many cultural and academic projects. Three cultural and academic projects were especially important. First, a traditional ritual of exorcism (gut), which traditionally was a shamanistic way to cure illness by exorcising evil spirits, played a crucial role. This exorcism was also used to appease spirits by calling them, communicating with them, and guiding them to heaven. Cultural activists, especially those who were specialized in this exorcism, thought that it

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Yang, Dong Yoon. 2006. Interview by Author. March 22, Jeju. Tape recording

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would be a good idea to have a province-wide exorcism in order to appease the souls of the dead and also communicate the dead with the living (Commemoration Committee 1998: 39). Despite the bad weather, the event was crowded with 1,200 participants including approximately 700 victims and their family members. The exorcism lasted for 11 hours but victims and their family members would not leave but kept crying. Many who participated in the event stated that fifty years of distress and rancor seemed to have gone away and activists also evaluated a traditional ritual of exorcism was a crucial element oftheir project. 220 Second, a symbolic event was planned by the committee to build a tower that is traditionally believed to ward off evil spirits and misfortune. In Jeju, it was a tradition to build a tower in fishing villages since people's life at sea was unpredictable and fragile. The tower was built to achieve the investigation of the truth and restoration of the honor of the victims and also for the unity of the province (Commemoration Committee 1998: 40-41). The tower was built with one stone laid down by one victim and their family members and an official report ofthe Provincial 4.3 Committee was also kept under the tower. Activists and victims believed that it was a significant project because there was no symbol of the 4.3 events until then. It was the first efforts to build a symbol for the 4.3 events and the celebration of the enactment of the special act was held at the tower. Third, in 1998, several conferences were held by the Pan National Committee (April 28, 1998), the Commemoration Committee (April 9, 1998), and the Research Institute (August 21-25, 1998). Of all three conferences, the one hosted by the 4.3 Research Institute - the 2nd International Conference on Peace and Human Rights in the

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Park, Kyung Hoon. 2006. April 5, Jeju. Interview by author. Tape recording

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21 st Century East Asia - was by far the largest and most influential one. The first international conference was started in 1997 at Taiwan to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the 2.28 events. Scholars and activists decided to have next meeting in Jeju to commemorate the 50th anniversary ofthe 4.3 events. It was a conference of 500 activists and scholars from Taiwan, Japan, and Korea and Jose Ramos Horta, a 1996 Nobel piece prize laureate, participated; Many who worked for the conference admitted that it was "beyond the ability" of the Research Institute to host such an international conference. 221 However, it was an important conference and activists used this conference by drawing not only local attention but also national and international attention to the issue of transitional justice. It was also an opportunity for the discourse of human rights violations used to describe the 4.3 events and civilian massacres. This change was timely and important because the human rights discourse started to be widely used and adopted in Korean society with an inauguration of Kim Dae Jung, who was know for his life-long fight for liberal democracy and human rights. Thus, the 4.3 events, which had been defined as either communist rebellion or popular uprising, were reframed as human rights violations. All three cultural and academic commemoration projects enhanced public awareness of the 4.3 events and also increased the participation of the victims and their family members. Again, it was mainly the cultural movement and research activists who led the project. There were two reasons for this. First, many agreed that the cultural and research realm in the 4.3 movement was the most advanced area and had enough

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Park, Chan Sik. 2006. Interview by author. April 6, Jeju. Tape recording

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potential and resources to lead the project. 222 Second, it was possible because arts, song, poems, literature, plays, and traditional exorcism were all easily accessible to the victims and general public. With this momentum, activists started to pursue a concrete political project and the most vivid precursor of this move is a creation of Provincial Solidarity. Provincial Solidarity is a permanent association of various groups and organizations which aimed at achieving the enactment of the special law. It was created because the Commemoration Committee was a temporary organization for the commemoration projects. Provincial Solidarity was created with five presidents representing various groups who were actively participated in the 4.3 movement. The main goal of Provincial Solidarity was "the enactment of the special act" and the slogan of the activists and victims were, "The events in 20th century must be redressed before the tum of 21 st century (4.3 Committee 2003).,,223

8.2.2. Developments in 1999 In 1999, the focus of activism was no longer on making a plea for the establishment of a special committee with in the National Assembly but for enacting a binding special law that guarantees the institutionalization of a national investigatory committee and possible reparations. The Jeju Provincial Council and the Provincial 4.3 Committee again played a key role in leading the enactment movement. The provincial committee was already heavily involved in the petition movement since 1993 but their

Park, Kyung Hoon. 2006. April 5, Jeju. Interview by author. Tape recording By October 28, 1999, the Solidarity Association for the Achievement of the 4.3 Special Act was formed encompassing 24 local organizations. This was an important organization including most activists and social movement organization both in Seoul and Jeju. Provincial Solidarity also was a part of the Solidarity Association and played a lead role. 222 223

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activism reached its climax in 1999. As provincial council members themselves, they realized the fragility of a resolution or a temporal committee without any binding force. In order to overcome the barrier of ignorance, the provincial council members carried out a national public awareness campaign and made several visits to the National Assembly and the offices of political parties urging for the enactment of a special law. This national campaign was led by the elected provincial council members and approximately 90 representatives from various organizations such as human rights NGOs and associations of victims' families that were heavily involved with the movement. Upon their visit to the National Assembly, floor leaders of both the ruling and opposition party promised to establish a special committee and enact a special law by the end of the year. In each visit, provincial council members and activists stressed that the investigation.and restoration of the honor of victims were a pledge that President Kim Dae Jung has made over ten times. In addition, they reminded politicians that there was no visible policy or action so far since his inauguration other than establishing a small committee within his ruling party. The word, "president's pledge", "promise", or "will of the President" had been frequently used in 1999 to push party members and congresspersons. Many activists recalled that strategy was the most effective one, which is an illustration of the accountability politics. 224 The other lesson learned from the national campaign was the ignorance of the general public. 225 This led to a weekly rally for the enactment of a special law organized in Seoul by the Pan National Committee and in Jeju by Provincial Solidarity, which Yang, Dong Yoon. 2006. Interview by Author. March 22, Jeju. Tape recording; Yang, Jo Hoon. 2006. Interview by author. March 15, Seoul. Tape recording; Kim Young Hoon. 2006. Interview by author, April 7, Jeju. Tape recording 225 Kim Young Hoon. 2006. Interview by author, April 7, Jeju. Tape recording

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proved to be highly effective tool to "push politicians forw.ard, especially whenever there is a deadlock.,,226 Thus, activism existed at two levels: one, lobbying elites and congresspersons and, on the other, publicizing the 4.3 events and civilian massacres. These different levels of activisms closely interacted with and strengthened each other. For example, there were several occasions when activists encountered a deadlock in their activism at the elite level. Yang, a president of the Provincial Solidarity, testified that he was often contacted by the activists in Seoul to organize a political rally or a visit to Seoul to press the movement on?27 Although both floor leaders of the ruling and the opposition party promised to establish a special committee and a special law, it was never a natural process. Despite the promises, there was no visible advancement, and leaders were oftentimes hesitant to move forward, claiming that more prudence is need in addressing an ideologically controversial issue such as the 4.3 events. This shows that the grassroots demands and activism is more important the role of committed elites in transitional justice activism. One congresswoman in the ruling party - Choo Mi Ae - played a significant role in bringing the 4.3 events into national politics and urging the ruling party to fulfill its commitment. Choo Mi Ae was not from Jeju but encountered the 4.3 events when serving as a vice chair of the ruling party's special committee and participating in the memorial service in 1998. She became the center of attention after she successfully chaired the first public hearing organized by the ruling party. People in Jeju were impressed by her ability to lead a discussion on a highly controversial issue at a very By this time, the Pan National Committee for the 50th Anniversary of the Jeju 4.3 Events changed its name to the Pan National Committee for the Investigation of the Truth and Restoration of the Honor of Victims of the Jeju 4.3 Events. 227 Yang, Dong Yoon. 2006. Interview by Author. March 22, Jeju. Tape recording 226

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difficult debate including loud voices and

~howers

of abuse (Kim 1999).

In 1999, amidst the debate around the enactment of a special act, Choo released an official document containing a 200-page list of 1650 persons who were courtmartialed between December 1948 and July 1949 on the charge of involvement in the 4.3 "communist rebellion." According to Park Chan Sik, a senior researcher at the 4.3 Research Institute, it was the Research Institute that first found out that the list was in the National Archives. But, they strategically gave the list to Choo because they believed that it would be more dramatic and effective for her to announce the list. It contained detailed personal information including name, age, address, occupation, sentence, and a location of the prison along with 5~20 page description of military trials (Park 2001). It also reveals that the local efforts are the igniter for the action of political elites. Previously, evidence ofthe 4.3 events entirely relied upon newspapers, interviews, and the U.S. military documentation, and this was the first time any official document of the Korean government was released to the general public. Although the report of the Congressional Special Committee in 1960 was released in the middle of petition movement, it was first time any document from an administrative body, which was partly responsible for the massacre, was released. All major national newspapers, including the one highly critical of the transitional justice movement, carried the news report and all local papers in Jeju made it their headlines?28 Most activists and victims had ceaselessly asked for the release of the document for over a decade, but the National Archives was hesitant to release it until a congresswoman officially asked for the release. A few days later, Choo released another document created by a J eju police officer, which The Chosun Ilbo known as the rightwing and conservative national newspaper published the news in their second page. It was the first time that the news on the 4.3 events made this close to headline. 249

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she personally acquired from an anonymous former police officer. This document also contained a detailed list of 52 persons in Do-Soon village who were shot to death, and the names of the police officers who documented it. The release of these two documents was important in three ways. First, it provided undeniable evidence of the execution of a large number of people in a short period of time without due process, which indicated the possible abuse of state power. The documents provided evidence that most people were executed within a month after initial trials and showed that, at some point, 132 prisoners were executed in one day. Since these documents were made by government officials, this provided indisputable evidence of mass killing under the name of the law. Second, the list was highly meaningful to the families of victims who wanted to know whether their family members were killed or disappeared. Most people in the list were those whose family members did not know their whereabouts during the conflict and were regarded as the disappeared. The documents provided personal information and the place where they were executed, which is important information for family members. One activist told me that "related families now finally could have a memorial service because they now knew for sure that their husbands and fathers are dead.,,229 People in Jeju were highly respectful to the ancestors and they often kept the tombs in the middle of the field where they worked everyday. Family members of the disappeared now could either build an empty tomb and have memorial service or visit the prison where execution was carried out and have annual memorial service. Third, the timing of the release was crucial in the enactment of a special act since

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Yang, Dong Yoon. 2006. Interview by Author. March 22, Jeju. Tape recording

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many rightwing and conservative congresspersons objected to the enactment based on insufficient evidence. In previous regimes before Kim Dae Jung, the rightwing and conservative congresspersons objected to any legal action for transitional justice of the 4.3 events because it was clear that the event was a "communist rebellion." It was simply enough to argue that it was a communist rebellion against the free, legitimate, and democratic government. However, since President Kim's inauguration, not many rightwing congresspersons relied on this logic any more. In discussions of the 4.3 events, words representing this viewpoint - red, communist, or rebellion - were now seldom used. The basis of objection now veered toward "insufficient evidence" and "a historic event that cannot be tailored with the current political perspective." Nevertheless, after the release of the documents, the only reason for the objection to the enactment was that "it is a crime against history that we arbitrarily redefine the 4.3 events.,,230

8.3. Legislation of the 4.3 Special Act Since the release of official documents, activism both in Seoul and Jeju noticeably accelerated. In addition, the last regular session of the 15 th National Assembly was approaching and activists and victims knew that there was no guarantee that the same efforts and promises would be made by congresspersons in the 16th National Assembly. No one could expect either that the composition ofthe next National Assembly would be similar to the current one or that the ruling party would have a majority of seats. The first move ironically came from members of the opposition party - Grand National Party. Three congressmen in the opposition party who had their constituency in Jeju - Byun Congressman Kim Yong Kap, a renowned conservative politician, made this remark at the regular session of 15 th National Assembly against the enactment of the 4.3 Special Act on December 15, 1999.

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Jeong 11, Yang Jung Kyoo, Hyun Jung Dae - announced they were drafting a bill in October 1999. The limitation, however, was that it was the action not of the opposition party but of three individual congresspersons. Many activists and victims including the Pan National Committee and Provincial Solidarity showed concern for the bill since it lacked any party platform or concrete action plan. Provincial Solidarity even suggested that the bill was merely a "calculated political gesture aimed at the upcoming election in May 2000." It was not the fist time that a bill or resolution was proposed by congresspersons close to the next election. Congressman Byun at the very end of the 14th National Assembly hurriedly proposed an unsuccessful resolution and many activists and victims criticized it as a "mere political tool for next election." Nevertheless, despite the concern and criticism, the bill was meaningful because it was the first detai1~d bill ever drafted to address the 4.3 events by proposing the establishment of a special investigatory committee. Moreover, it later became the bill of the opposition party with only a minor change. One striking difference of this bill from two prior resolutions in 1994 and 1996 is that the bill went beyond proposing the creation of a special committee under congress and proposed the establishment of an independent investigatory committee under the Office ofthe Prime Minister (Article 3). It was the first time when the 4.3 events were redefined in political realm as an event other than the "Jeju 4.3 communist rebellion." In Article 1 of the draft, the 4.3 events were defined using a cautiously chosen neutral term as "a disturbance occurred from April 3, 1948 in Jeju Island and following process of governmental suppression." By using a word "disturbance (soya)," authors ofthe bill wanted to avoid pointing out or even mentioning responsible parties of the atrocity. The political definition ofthe 4.3 events, which had

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been heavily relied on actors -local communists instigated by the communists in North, now started to adjust its focus on the broader conditions of the armed uprising. Although authors of the bill proclaimed that their definition was a neutral perspective without any ideological inclination, it was at the center of debate throughout the legislative process. In sum, the basic skeleton of a special act started from this bill, including the structure of an investigatory committee, publication of an official report, institution of the local executive committee, building a memorial site, and providing financial and medical support for the victims. This bill provided a basic frame of reference since all later bills originated from this bill, and arguments were made for and against this bill. Thus, despite the criticism, it was a timely and important bill in the trajectory ofthe enactment of the 4.3 Special Act. It is important to provide the first actions in the movement since it provides a frame of reference against which later actions can be evaluated. It was rather surprising because many expected the ruling party or Congresswoman Choo would propose a bill first. Nevertheless, it was individual congresspersons from Jeju who first laid down the cornerstone of a special act, and this again shows that the local efforts are more important than the committed elites in the center. Within a month, the Pan National Committee announced its version of the bill after holding public hearings and a critical examination of the bill of the opposition party. This bill, drafted by activists, later laid down the foundation for the bill of the ruling party. The most important difference from the bill of the opposition party was its definition of the 4.3 events. It was defined more specifically as "events which occurred in Jeju Island from March 1, 1947 to July 27, 1953 when civilians were abused without a good cause during the armed conflict and governmental suppression by the American Military

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· Government police and military, Korean military and police, and other paramilitary organizations (Article 2)." This definition, first of all, redefined the 4.3 events as acts of massive human rights violations by the state - both the U.S. and Korean - power. The proponents of transitional justice wanted to go beyond the simple and neutral definition of a "disturbance" and reframe the events as human right violations, which was the framework and concepts imported and developed by social activists, cultural movement th

activists, and scholars during the 50 anniversary commemoration events. The bill proposed by the opposition party and that of victims and activists differed in their understandings of the essential characteristics of the events. The former wanted to define it as armed resistance and suppression and the latter wanted to go beyond and place the focus on human rights violations and state violence. In redefining the events, the periodization played a critical role. The date April 3, 1948 is the day when the armed conflict first broke out by armed members of the local communist party. The opposition party - rightwing and conservative one - adhered to this date since their focus was more on the disturbance caused by leftist armed guerrillas. However, activists advocated a different periodization which included the possible causes of the armed uprising. Thus, the date March 1, 1948 when the police under American Military Government open fired to protesters and resulted in 12 deaths and injuries became more significant. It was the 4.3 Research Institute and the 4.3 Reporting Team in the Jemin Ilbo who first rediscovered the 3.1 incidents and had been persistently arguing for its significance. The activist groups wanted to achieve an apology oy the Korean government and possibly the U.S. government, restoration of the honor of the victims and 254

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families, and reparations. The second key difference was regarding the scope and subject of monetary support including financial and medical assistance to the victims. An article on a financial and medical subsidy for those lost their livelihood due to the 4.3 events was included in the bill of the opposition party (Article 10). Nevertheless, the word "reparation (baesang)" did not appear and the term "subsidy (bojo)" was used instead. The most far reaching concept close to reparation in the bill of the opposition party was "a restoration of the honor of victims and families." On the other hand, the bill drafted by activists clearly defined the responsible actor as the state and articulated that the state should make reparations to victims and families (Article 6). In addition to these major differences, the bill by activists proposed an independent commission under the president not the prime minister, which was intended to give more power and resources to the commIssIOn. In response to the bill drafted by the Pan National Committee, the opposition party revised its previous bill to appeal to the need of the victims. The most advanced change made was the inclusion of the possibility of accepting retrial petitions (Article

14).231 In addition, the revised bill adopted the part of the periodization used in the bill of the Pan National Committee. Although the revised bill still maintained the starting date of the events as April 3, 1948 but it extended the end of the events to September 22, 1954. However, since the beginning date of the events was the core of the debate, it really was not a meaningful change. In addition, no changes were made regarding the Article lOon governmental subsidy and they refrained from using the word, reparation. 231 However, this progressive article on the possibility of retrial was dropped in the course of negotiation between the opposition party and the ruling party.

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Why did the members of the opposition party strictly refrain from using the word reparation? One answer could be found in the remark made by one of three congresspersons, Byun Jeong II, when he visited the victims in order to explain his bill. He said, "It is too costly for the government to make reparations for so many victims. Therefore, in order to enact the law, you must consider political reality.,,232 His argument here is that reparations are costly and congresspersons would not agree to enact the bill if it is too costly. However, it is only an ostensible reason for not using reparations but the fundamental reason was that the use of the word, reparation was equivalent to admitting state responsibility for the massacres. The opposition party which was in part composed of the descendents of the political and military elites during the 4.3 events and in part of the political and military elites during the consecutive military regimes would not admit their wrongdoings. It is also supported by their tenacity not to accept the March 1, 1947 as a starting date. On November 16, 1999, partly in reaction to the initiative taken by the opposition party and partly pressed by the demand of activists and victims, the Jeju local branch of the ruling party drafted a bill and proposed it to the ruling party in Seoul. It was mostly based on the bill drafted by the Pan National Committee, and more than anything else, it adopted exactly the same definition ofthe events. Nonetheless, the party members in Seoul still insisted on creating a special committee within the National Assembly first. Despite the proposal from the local branch, the ruling party submitted a resolution with 101 signatures of the congresspersons on the very next day. Although the party members in J eju already knew that a bill for the special law was more important for

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Jemin Ilbo, November 3, 1999

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the people than a resolution without teeth, more time and efforts were needed to make the members in the center realize this fact. Thus, by November 18, 1999, two moves have been officially taken in the 15

th

National Assembly by the ruling and the opposition party. The ruling party moved a resolution to institute a special investigatory committee under the Congress and the opposition party submitted the revised bill to enact a special law. Even for activists and victims who had been working more than a decade to see these moves take place in the National Assembly, it was an undesirable situation. One activist described the situation as an "emergency since people in Jeju may face the worst situation if, once again (considering the failed resolutions in mid 1990s), a bill and a resolution from both parties were moved but did not succeed. Because it would give both parties an excuse and justification not to pursue further policies on the 4.3 events since they can say that they have done their best but did not succeed. ,,233 The Pan National Committee and related organizations immediately announced their objection to the proposal of a resolution by the ruling party. The dilemma here was that activists and victims were tom between two party's political moves. On the one hand, they welcomed the opposition party's pursuit of a special law but most deeply disagreed with its contents and understanding ofthe 4.3 events. It was most likely that their decade long activism would be obstructed by the bill proposed by the opposition party since it did not view the 4.3 events as human rights violations and state violence. A word disturbance could not capture the state violence and human rights violations the locals had to experience. On the other hand, while sympathizing with the ruling party's will to 233 Oh, Young Hoon, an executive director of Provincial Solidarity. 2006. Interview by author, April 11, Jeju. Tape recording

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settle the issue, people were exhausted with a series of unsuccessful resolutions without teeth over the last six years in the National Assembly. A period between November 17, 1999 when the ruling party initially proposed a resolution and December 2, 1999 when the ruling party finally decided to propose a bill to enact a special law was the most strained time in the transitional justice advocacy. Upon realizing the graveness of the situation, 34 representatives of various social organizations in J eju created a special task force and visited several offices in Seoul including the offices of political party and the National Assembly. The first product of the visit was a verbal agreement to propose a bill from the leader of policy planning committee within the ruling party Congressman Lim Chae Jung. Nevertheless, the situation became urgent as the congressional steering committee decided to establish a special committee with 11 congresspersons on the very same day when local representatives heard a verbal commitment. The worst scenario seemed near since a bill of the opposition party was scheduled to be reviewed and the process of instituting a special committee proposed by the ruling party was on the way. On the one hand, there was a high chance that the bill of the opposition party was not going to pass various committees where the ruling party held a majority since the ruling party did not support the bill. On the other hand, a special committee proposed by the ruling party, if established, would obviously be ineffective because it would only have a three to four months term before the dissolution of the 15th National Assembly. In addition, since it was a special committee, not a permanent committee, there was no guarantee that the 16th National Assembly would reinstitute the committee. However, a dramatic change in policy of the ruling party was made and it 258

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announced its decision to propose a bill on December 2, 1999. The role of two people close to President Kim Dae Jung was critical to swerve the official policy of the ruling party from establishing a special committee to proposing a bill- Congressman Lim Chae Jung and senior secretary to the president Kim Sung Jae. Congressman Lim was a leader of the policy planning committee in the ruling party, which is an executive position determining the priority of party's policies and coordinating policy concerns between the ruling party and the President's office. Secretary Kim was a senior secretary to the President for civil affairs and had a meeting with the representatives of the Pan National Committee and Provincial Solidarity. According to activists, Secretary Kim was sympathetic to the victims, understood the concern of activists, and thus channeled those concerns to President Kim Dae Jung?34 Yang Jo Hoon and Yang Dong Yoon who chaired Provincial Solidarity and participated in the visits stated, "These two people worked as a bridge between the activists and Kim Dae Jung." One person whose role was also crucial in the enactment movement at this critical period is Kang Sung Koo. According to Kim Jong Min, Kang Sung Koo was actively involved in the democratization movement during the Park's and Chun's military regime and had worked closely with Kim Dae Jung and his followers at that time. With these personal connections, Kang played a critical role in bridging President Kim Dae Jung and activist groupS?35 On December 6, 1999, the first move was taken in the National Assembly to review both bills proposed by the ruling and the opposition party. The bills first had to go through small screening committee in the Administration and Self-governing Committee. 234 235

Yang, Jo Hoon. 2006. Interview by author. March 15, Seoul. Tape recording Kim Jong Min. 2006. March 30. Email correspondence.

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The coordination within the committee was successful and a bipartisan bill was created on the very next day. The bipartisan bill passed a plenary session of the Administration and Self-governing Committee and a plenary session of the Legislation and Judiciary Committee only with minor and technical adjustment. Two different bills from the ruling and opposition party had to go through the negotiation process. Two points were at the center of debate - first, the definition of the events, and second, reparations. For the ruling party and activists, the definition of the events was the single most important aspect which could never be compromised. It was achieved through fifty long years of research, activism, and investigation. Activists and victims have fought to clear themselves from being characterized as the "reds" since all those killed or imprisoned were treated as communist rebels. Most activists and victims were also the victims of the guilt-by-association system which effectively existed until recently. People in Jeju felt under a grave social disadvantage by simply being a direct family member or sometimes a distant relative of the victims. The only way to redress the issue was to redefine the 4.3 events as, at least, state violence and human rights violations and, at most, democratic and popular uprising. On the other hand, the opposition party, as mentioned, refused any transitional justice measures going beyond the investigation of the events and constantly avoided any possibility of reparations. In a sense, a simple investigation of the events was not a threat to the opposition party but codifying reparations in an act was a different matter. Therefore, activists and victims held fast to definitions and the opposition party held fast to the principle of no reparations and this provided a window of opportunity for the negotiation. For victims and activists, reparations were a secondary matter compared to 260

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the investigation of the events and redefining the events so that the honor of the dead and disappeared could be restored by clearing them from being "reds." In addition, activists believed that it was possible to achieve reparations later through activism after the official investigation was completed. Based on their experience with the investigation of the Provincial 4.3 Committee, they believed that the truth of state violence will be revealed by the investigation, which will provide a ground to push for governmental reparation. Hence, it was something that could be deferred and may - and must - be achieved by future activism. For activists and victims, the compromise was "a strategic and provisional concession in order to enact a special law. ,,236 A bipartisan bill was a compromise between the ruling and the opposition party. First, the definition of the 4.3 events was exactly the same as the one proposed by activists and the ruling party. The periodization (March 1, 1947 ~ September 21, 1954) and the characteristic of the events - gross human rights violations by state violence were adopted without any modification. Nevertheless, the words, "reparations" or "compensation" were not included in the bill. Only an article on a financial and medical subsidy for the victims who were still under medical treatment due to the 4.3 events was included (Article 9). The only transitional justice measures that were further guaranteed by the law beyond the establishment of a truth commission were commemoration projects including building a memorial cemetery, monument, museum, and memorial park (Article 8). Although victims and activists retreated on the reparation issues, the most important ground - the redefinition ofthe Jeju 4.3 events - was successfully laid down.

Ko Hee Bum, one of the leaders of the Pan National Committee, mentioned "strategic concession (choice)" during a conference held by the Research Institute in 2006. It was also confirmed by many leaders including Yang Dong Yoon, Oh Young Hoon, Yang Jo Hoon, and Kim Young Hoon.

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In addition, the purpose of the committee was also stated as to investigate the truth and restore the honor of the victims. As expected, the definition of the 4.3 events in the Special Act played a critical role in the subsequent battle against the opponents. Yang Jo Hoon testified, "The proponents of transitional justice held fast to the definition in the 4.3 Special Act whenever there were objections and attempts to frustrate the efforts of a commission by spoilers.,,237 On December 15, 1999, the bipartisan bill first appeared at the regular session with the explanation of the bill by Congresswoman Choo. She explained the purpose of the bill as "to investigate the truth ofthe Jeju 4.3 events and restore the honor of related victims and families, and thereby promote human rights, democracy, and unity of the nation" as stated in Article 1?38 The bill encountered objections on the next day when Congressman Kim Yong Kap, renowned conservative politician, made an objection speech and left the session expressing his objection. However, most congresspersons agreed to the enactment and the bill even passed without a vote by virtue of the chairman's authority. On December 16, 1999, at the regular session of the 15th National rd

Assembly, the Special Act for Investigation of the JejuApril3 Events and Recovering the Honor of Victims was finally passed. The 4.3 Special Act established three central institutions - the 4.3 Committee (Article 3), 4.3 Working Committee (Article 4), and Task Force for the Report (Article 6 and 7). First, the 4.3 Committee is the highest deliberative organization and was designed to "(1) investigate and reveal the truth of the 4.3 events, (2) screen and decide victims and surviving family members, and (3) deliberate and make a decision matters 237 238

Yang, Jo Hoon. 2006. Interview by author. March 15, Seoul. Tape recording The Office of the Secretariat of the 15 th National Assembly (208-22)

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related to restoration of the honor ofthe victims." The Prime Minister was the commissioner and the members of the committee included the governor of Jeju provincial government, related ministers, representatives of victim's family members, and others with a recommendation of the president. Second, the 4.3 Working Committee was instituted under the Governor of the J eju provincial government and designed to carry out practical businesses entrusted to it by the 4.3 Committee, such as (1) accepting applications from victims and family members, (2) conducting an initial screening process of victims, (3) administering a financial and medical subsidy to victims. Third, the Task Force for the Report was in charge of collecting and analyzing domestic and foreign evidence to investigate the 4.3 events within two years since the date ofthe official launch of the 4.3 Committee (Article 6) and prepare and publish an official report within six month from the end date of investigation (Article 7). Nevertheless, it took another six months to legislate the enforcement ordinance of the 4.3 Special Act, which was the next step for an act to be practically effective. In addition, it took nine months to launch the 4.3 Committee and 13 months to constitute and start the Task Force for the Report. These delays indicate that the establishment of the 4.3 Committee, 4.3 Working Committee, and Task Force in specific and transitional justice process for the 4.3 events in general were neither smooth nor without obstacles after the enactment of the special law. Although activists and victims were triumphant in celebrating a long-waited victory on the next day of the enactment around the symbolic tower made during the 50th anniversary commemoration, opponents were already ready to open fire on the newly-enacted special act and transitional justice advocacy.

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8.4. Legislation of the 4.3 Ordinance and the 4.3 Provincial Ordinance For any law legislated in the congress to be effective, it has to go through a consideration of the Cabinet Council and the final approval of the president. Then, the law is promulgated and made effective in three months since the promulgation. Eight people including six activists and two representatives of victims' family members were invited to the Blue House, the presidential residence, to join the first open ceremony of signing the act. This was the first open and public signing of any bill passed under Kim Dae Jung because president wanted to appreciate the efforts of activists by inviting them to the Blue House. With the president's signature, the 4.3 Special Act was promulgated on January 13,2000 and came into effect on and after April 14, 2000. Nevertheless, Monthly Chosun - a rightwing and conservative monthly magazine - published two articles opposing the enactment. The first article was written by Lee Jin Woo, a former congressman and lawyer, titled "The National Assembly betrayed the Korean Army" where he argued that the 15th National Assembly made a fatal mistake because the congresspersons forgot the nature of the events - communist rebellion - and tainted military and police as grave human rights perpetrators. Lee Jin Woo was already involved with the 4.3 events when he took it upon himself to defend Rhee In Soo, an adopted son ofRhee Seung Man who filed a civil lawsuit against the Jemin Ilbo. In addition, Lee Jin Woo played a central role in filing an official petition to the Constitutional Court arguing that the 4.3 Special Act is unconstitutional. Another article was written by a professor studying the modem Korean history with a conservative perspective. Professor Lee Hyun Hee at Sungsim Women's University argued that the 4.3 events were a communist rebellion abetted by the Soviet Union. Both articles

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focused on the fact that the 4.3 events were a communist rebellion against the free and democratic Korea. Although the lexicon disappeared in the National Assembly, it was still the most powerful and prevalent argument of the opponents. These two articles marked the beginning of opposition against the transitional justice advocacy. Although activists and victims had gone through a long and thorny way to the enactment, the struggle was not ended with the enactment. This struggle began with the legislation ofthe enforcement ordinance on the 4.3 Special Act (4.3 Ordinance). Two core aspects of the 4.3 Special Act, including (1) the organization and operation of the 4.3 Committee, 4.3 Working Committee, and Task Force for the Report and (2) the administration of a financial and medical subsidy, were left to at the ordinance level. The Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs announced its first draft of the 4.3 Ordinance on May 3,2000 and it was a moment when victims and activists were alerted that the struggle is not over at all. Three central disagreements existed between the administration's draft and the opinion of the victims and activists. First, the administration's draft proposed that the 4.3 Committee and Task Force for the Report should be composed mainly of public officials. The 4.3 Committee, by law, was composed of 20 committee members and eight positions were for the prime minister and cabinet members. Thus, a third of the committee members were already decided by the administration and the decision was relatively unchanging throughout the negotiation process. 239 For the rest of the 13 committee meII:lbers, the administration

239 A draft of the 4.3 Ordinance proposed that the Prime Minister, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of National Defense, the Minister of Government Administration and Home Affairs, the Minister of Health and Welfare, the Minister of Planning and Budget, the Minister of Government Legislation, the Minister of

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wanted to include "the representatives from victim's family members, military specialists, and others oflearning and experience (Article 3)." The situation was much worse for the Task Force for the Report. The administration suggested a task force be composed of 14 members where 7 of them were director-level public officials and it wanted to include "the representatives from victim's family members, military specialists, and others of learning and experience." For activists and victims, the proposed draft suggested that two core institutions would consist of a third to a half of members who were ignorant of the 4.3 events. In addition, since the 4.3 Provincial Ordinance, which had an authority to constitute the 4.3 Working Committee, was a subordinate law of the 4.3 Ordinance, there was a high probability that all three core institutions might be designed in the same manner. In general, there was a slim possibility that high-level public officials were sympathetic to the 4.3 events and the victims since most of them were educated and succeeded under the consecutive military regimes where the 4.3 events were believed to be a communist rebellion. In addition, the inclusion of military specialists in those institutions was quite troubling since it was obvious that the administration wanted to include people from the military who mostly saw the 4.3 events as a communist rebellion. Activists argued that since the major perpetrators were military and police, it is "absurd for the persons from the military to be involved in the truth-seeking process of human rights violations by themselves. " Second, there was a disagreement on the specific composition of the Task Force

the Office of Government Policy Coordination and the Governor of J eju Provincial Government should be included in the 4.3 Committee. This draft passed only with a minor change of dropping the Minister of the Office of Government Policy Coordination from the list.

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for the Report. The administration proposed 15 members in the Task Force with two nonpermanent expert advisors assisting members. However, a half of the members of the Task Force proposed were neither from Jeju nor experts of the subject. There was not much likelihood that the 50 year old truth could be thoroughly investigated with only two "nonpermanent" expert advisors. Through an official investigation of the Provincial 4.3 Committee, activists and victims already knew how much time, efforts, and resources were needed for the thorough investigation of the 4.3 events. Even for the provincial investigation, 17 investigators were appointed. Activists had a realistic estimate of time and resources needed for the investigation through the provincial investigation. Third, the draft allowed 120 days after the proclamation of the Ordinance for family members of victims to apply for a victim status. Also, the scope of family members was limited to direct family members and there existed a requirement that the victims must have had an official family registration record in hand. The proposal encountered three objections. First, activists and victims argued that at least a year should be given to families in order to have thorough list of victims for the events spanned 7 years based on the experience of the provincial investigation. People remembered that the initial report of the Provincial 4.3 Committee had to go through a constant revision and addition for about six more years. In addition, activists objected to the direct-family-report rule and family-registration-record requirement on the ground that these strict regulations might reduce the number of victims reported. Activists had seen many cases, in which whole family was murdered simultaneously and no one survived to apply for the victim status. In addition, it was a nationwide norm to record a new born child into a family registry after a year or two because of high mortality rate.

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Thus, there was a possibility that those victims under one- or two-year-old could not be recorded if the family-registration-record requirement pursued. Activists and victims were once again on the street protesting against the draft of the 4.3 Ordinance proposed by the administration. The purpose of the political rally was twofold. First, activists and victims wanted to demonstrate the organized power of the Jeju people behind the special law. Second, protests were also against the rightwing and conservative groups - the so-called "spoilers" - who did not want transitional justice and tried to obstruct the transitional justice process. The opponents already started to act against the 4.3 Special Act and, by April, their action became more concrete to the level of submitting the first official petition to the Constitutional Court arguing that the 4.3 Special Act is unconstitutional. It was the first petition submitted to the Constitutional Court and similar petitions were serially submitted afterwards against the official report of the committee and against the presidential apology. This first petition against the special law was important because it was the first official move taken by the opponents. Not only retired military generals but also former prime minister, minister of national defense, and congresspersons were among 14 applicants of the petition. This first petition was soon followed by a similar petition signed by 322 retired generals on May 10, 2000. Through consecutive petitions, the composition of the opponents to transitional justice was revealed. The records showed that it was mostly retired military generals who by themselves were in a commanding position during the 4.3 events. However, other rightist and anticommunist organizations and activists - the Korean War Veterans, the Association of the Former Marine Corps, the Association of the Former Police, and the Democratic Association for Protection of Freedom - were also active.

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Activists and victims organized a protest and issued an official statement threatening that activists and victims would not participate in any governmental committee if the current draft of the ordinance were to be passed without revision. In addition, activists asked politicians and congresspersons who played a major role in the enactment process to protect the genuine purpose of the 4.3 Special Act. For example, Congresswoman Choo visited the Minister of Administration, Choi In Kee and a Chief Secretary of President Kim Dae Jung, Han Kwang Ok and advocated the position of activists and victims. Choo urged that the article on the inclusion of military specialists must be revised as to "related experts who have been studied the 4.3 events." She also argued that the current composition of the Task Force with only two nonpermanent expert advisors who were not even guaranteed with sufficient salary should also be changed. Reflecting the will of people in Jeju and sympathetic congresspersons, the 4.3 Ordinance was passed in the Cabinet Council on May 2, 2000 with a few revisions made favorable to the claims of activists and victims. First, the number of public officials in each committee was reduced and the chance for civilian experts' inclusion in the Committees and the Task Force increased. The number of public officials was dropped from 8 to 7 in the 4.3 Committee and from 8 to 5 in the Task Force for the Report. However, a compromise was made r~garding the participation of the military specialists. Instead of totally accepting the demand of activists and victims - "related experts who have been studied the Jeju 4.3 events," the ordinance vaguely stated that "related experts" are included, leaving a room for military experts. The Task Force was composed of more expert advisors whose status and salary were guaranteed by a contract. Thus, the Truth Investigation Team composed of 20

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experts headed by Yang Jo Hoon, a fonner editor and the head of the 4.3 Reporting Team of the Jemin Ilbo and also a co-chair of Provincial Solidarity, was able to be instituted under the Task Force. In addition, the Ordinance allowed 180 days to report for victims to be reviewed by the 4.3 Working Committee, allowing 90 more days more than the original draft. The 4.3 Ordinance was promulgated on May 10, 2000 as Presidential Decree No.16803. However, it was yet another beginning of the battle of who should be included in the national and provincial committees and Task Force. As soon as the 4.3 Ordinance was announced, the Jeju provincial government began to draft a provincial ordinance, a subordinate law regulating the affairs of the provincial government. The two most important aspects were, first, the institution of the 4.3 Working Committee and second, the regulations regarding application for victims for the initial screening. The composition of the 4.3 Working Committee was very similar to the 4.3 Committee only with the provincial government level officials included. However, the regulations on the application process for victims were problematic. As mentioned, the 4.3 Ordinance was very strict in tenns of defining who the direct family members of victims were and how long application process will last. The duration was negotiated and decided as six months achieving a compromise between the 3 months proposal by the administration and the one year demand from victims and activists. Nevertheless, two other issues - the direct-family-report rule and the familyregistration-record requirement - were still up in the air and included in the draft of the provincial ordinance. The provincial government proposed that applicants must submit a family registration record and official evidence of death or injury. First of all, this evidence of death or injury was vague and most family members of victim did not have 270

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evidence and did not know what constitutes such evidence. Thus, the organizations which had been involved in transitional justice movement instituted various centers and clinics to help family members to find evidence and file an application. If evidence was unavailable, applicants must submit an application with three sureties who were currently over 65-years-old and lived or still living in the same village with the applicant. But for family members of victims, it was not always easy to find three people who were still alive and are able and willing to testify for her. In addition, most infants who were under 2-years-old by the time of the 4.3 events were mostly not listed in the official family registry since it was a norm to put their names after one or two years of birth due to high infant mortality rates. Due to all these situations, there was a high risk that that family members of victims could or would not apply, and eventually, the number of victims would be reduced. Nevertheless, the 4.3 Provincial Ordinance was passed by the provincial council with not many changes made. Although activists were not satisfied with the provincial ordinance, they accepted it since the governor and provincial administration agreed to revise the provincial ordinance if any problems would occur. Activists trusted the provincial government since it actually was relatively easy to revise the provincial ordinance compared to that ofthe central administration. As many activists and organizations stated, it was not a struggle against another rightwing or conservative political but it was simply a struggle against red tape.

8.5~

Establishment of the 4.3 Committee By June 2000, three basic legal structures - 4.3 Special Act, 4.3 Ordinance, and

4.3 Provincial Ordinance - and a few related regulations were designed. In addition, two 271

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administrative organizations both in Seoul and Jeju were already functioning since March 2000 to support the work of various committees and task forces. Based on these legal structures, the highest deliberative organization - 4.3 Committee was finally formed on August 11, 2001. The committee was composed of 20 members where 8 members were the related ministers ofthe offices in the administration and 12 were selected and appointed by the prime minister based on recommendations from activists, victims, scholars, and lawyers. Among twelve appointed, two were retired military generals but the overall composition was considered fair and impartial since many politically progressive figures were also included. Activists were generally satisfied with the balanced composition of the committee, which was designed to avoid a possible bias in the committee's work. They generally believed that a balance in the composition of the committee members would also empower'the investigation and the final report of the committee. In August 2000, the 4.3 Committee was officially launched after appointing 12 civilian committee members and having the first plenary session. Following the composition of the 4.3 Committee, the Jeju provincial government also announced the members of the 4.3 Working Committee. The working committee followed the design of the 4.3 Committee by including opponents of transitional justice for achieving a balance. The working committee was launched in September 2000 and had first plenary session chaired by the Governor of J eju Provincial Government Woo Keun Min. The Task Force for the Report was composed of 15 members with 5 public officials. Under the task force, an expert advisory group, the Truth Investigation Team with around 20 staff members was instituted. The process of appointing the team members was relatively smooth because many agreed that the 4.3 Reporting Team and

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4.3 Research Institute had the most expertise on the 4.3 events. Thus, it was headed by the head of the reporting team Yang Jo Hoon and people from both groups. However, the appointment of members for the Task Force for the Report was delayed due to the objections by activists and victims when the head of the Task Force was decided as Lee Sang Keun, a former director of the Department of the Modem and Contemporary History at the National Institute of Korean History. Activists and victims did not want a public official to be the head since the status as being a public official may taint the results of an official report. The administration and activist reached a compromise when Judge Park Won Soon, a renowned human rights lawyer who also led the prosecution against former military leaders Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo, was appointed as the head of the Task Force. Eventually, the Task Force for the Report was established in January 2001 with 15 members and 20 expert investigators. According to the 4.3 Special Act, the task force must finish its investigation in two years after the launch and prepare an official report within six months after the end date of the investigation.

8.6. Conclusion Therefore, by January 2001, all three major bodies of the 4.3 Special Act were launched. The Task Force fot the Report was responsible for investigating evidence, collecting statements from victims and witnesses, and preparing an official report and filing the details of human rights violations; the 4.3 Working Committee processed and decided individual applications and administered a financial and medical subsidy given to victims and family members; and the 4.3 Committee as a highest deliberative institution had a final decision-making power regarding the business of its subordinate organizations.

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The committee eventually approved and published an official report and released the first list of victims on October 15,2003. With the publication of an official report, President Rho Moo Hyun announced an official government apology on October 31, 2003 and participated in a memorial service on April 3, 2006. The commemoration projects in 1998 and enactment movement in 1999 was the crux of the transitional justice advocacy. It was possible because of accumulated power and expertise of activism and support of the general public. All social, cultural, and political forces were concentrated around the commemoration projects and enactment movement. Of course, an indispensable condition was the inauguration of President Kim Dae Jung and the activities and support of the ruling party. However, constant activism was a more important factor than the commitment of Kim Dae Jung or a few political elites. The working of advocacy networks and, more specifically, an effective division of power between people in Seoul and Jeju were crucial. The role of culture and research was reconfirmed in this period by successfully leading the 50th anniversary commemoration projects, which was a stepping stone for the enactment movement in 1999. In addition, the process of enactment proved that release of evidence in a timely manner was a key in transitional justice advocacy in Korea. If it were not for the release of the list of court~martialed victims by Congresswoman Choo, the enactment of the Special Act would not have been possible in the 15th National Assembly. It was the power of consecutive evidence of the civilian massacres - the Darangshi cave in 1992, release of the congressional report, minutes, and victims applications of 1960 in 1996, and finally, the release of the list of court~martialed victims in 1999 - that facilitated the

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enactment of the special act. However, the transitional justice process, even after the enactment, was and still is a never-ending struggle. The enactment of the 4.3 Ordinance and creating various committees and institutions were another struggle to achieve transitional justice and the eight years of the committee work until now had been also "an everlasting struggle.,,24o The most important achievement of the advocacy was the new definition of the

4.3 events. An important redefining and reframing process occurred in the course of the commemoration project and the enactment movement. The human rights framework, which became popular with an inauguration of Kim Dae Jung, was applied to the 4.3 events to understand the state violence and atrocities. This reframing process intensified and sharpened in the course of the commemoration project by the international conference held by the 4.3 Research Institute. The human rights framework was fully developed in the course of debate and negotiation during the enactment process against political opponents. The codification of the 4.3 events as human rights violations by the state was the most important achievement of the transitional justice advocacy.

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Yang, Jo Hoon. 2006. Interview by author. March 15, Seoul. Tape recording

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9. Conclusion

9.1. Introduction By 2004, twenty-eight truth commissions had been used in one hundred counties. In my dissertation, I analyzed the variation in truth commission establishment by asking, "Why and when do countries establish a truth commission after transition?" A multimethods approach was used because, first, there were not many established theories and, second, more persuasive conclusion could be reached. In my global analysis, I examined 100 transitional countries over 30 year period between 1974 and 2004 to understand an overall trend. It was the first empirical test on various assumptions, assertions, and well founded conjectures. In the case study, I studied the unexplored transitional justice process of Korea focusing on the 4.3 Committee. In this chapter, I first summarize overall findings from both my global analysis and case study. I bridge my findings from different parts of dissertation, based on the fact that Korea, from my global analysis, is an outlier. On the one hand, I explore how the findings from my deviant case study confirm the findings and a general trend found from my cross-national analysis. On the other hand, I examine the findings of my Korean case study that are unique and differ from the findings from the global trend. I first suggest how these unique elements in my deviant case study contribute to a future theory building and, second, point out lessons learned from the Korean case. Finally, a part of my concluding chapter is devoted to explaining my post-dissertation research directions, especially on the impact of transitional justice measures.

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9.2. Findings from Global Analysis In Chapter 2 and 3, I answered my research question using cross-national analyses. Both the establishment of a truth commission and the use of human rights trials were studied because both fell under a broader category of transitional justice measures. I tested nine key hypotheses to explain the variation in a state's use of transitional justice measures and its timing of use: diffusion, democracy and consolidation, respect for human rights, domestic advocacy groups,~ international actors, legal tradition, types of transition, alternative transitional justice measures, and domestic economy. Among nine explanations, five were proven to be significant: diffusion, democracy and consolidation, domestic advocacy groups, international actors, and legal tradition. On the other hand, previous arguments made based on state's respect for human rights, types of transition, alternative transitional justice measure, and domestic economy were not supported. Hence, my global analysis provided an initial ground to evaluate previous arguments and explanations made from the studies of a single or a few country cases. Although these explanations were pertinent to one or a couple of cases, they lacked external validity when examined in a cross-national study. When controlled for all other relevant factors, five elements were proven to be valid.

Diffusion I found strong evidence for the diffusion effect of neighbors' transitional justice experience. States are more likely to use transitional justice measures if such measures have already been used by their neighbors. However, there was a difference between the diffusion of trials and that of truth commissions. While trials diffused among culturally

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similar neighbors, simple geographic proximity determined the diffusion process of truth commissions. Moreover, contrary to the fact that the impact of neighbors' trials was rather constant over time, the impact of neighbor's truth commissions was most effective in the year of transition and decreased over time. It partly reflected that a truth commission was a temporary body with limited period of influence but also suggested that diffusion was motivated by a country which seeks for transitional justice since the impact of neighbor's experience was at its peak in the year of transition. It further suggested that other internal factors such as domestic advocacy groups and democracy and consolidation were more important in delayed establishment of a truth commission since the effect of neighbor's experience was not significant after 14 years of transition.

Democracy and Consolidation Transitional justice measures were more likely in democratic countries after transition and the chance of using such measures increased with democratic consolidation. The level of democracy was an important determinant of trial initiation and such human rights trials would also be more frequently and persistently used if democratic consolidation continued. Thus, my finding provided a basis for explaining delayed transitional justice measures in a few countries. One possible reason for having delayed measures could be accounted for the fact that the country had not yet achieved a certain level of democracy and consolidation after transition. My study showed that, empirically, transitional justice measures can be, and are more likely to be, adopted after a country becomes a more consolidated democracy. I am not arguing that the delayed transitional justice measures are more effective or desirable since I did not study the effectiveness of

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the measures in my dissertation. All I am arguing based on my global analysis is that it is more probable to have delayed measures as democratic consolidation continued.

Domestic Advocacy Groups and International Actors The existence of active and strong domestic advocacy groups was a significant determinant affecting a state's decision to adopt and persistently use transitional justice measures. The role of advocacy groups such as domestic human rights NGOs was critical in both human rights trials and truth commissions. My finding was important because previous arguments on the role of domestic advocacy groups and civil society in case studies were now additionally validated through my cross-national study. It also confirmed that my theoretical framework combining social movement theory and a transnational advocacy network approach was relevant. In addition, my study proved that international actors, either intergovernmental organizations such as the U.N. or nongovernmental organizations as Amnesty International or the leT] could contribute to the transitional justice process.

9.3. Findings from Case Study, Part 1: Commonality My Korean case situated itself in a broader global analysis in several ways. First, my study provided an analysis of an interesting yet less studied Asian experience and helped correct for disproportionate attention given to Latin American and African cases. Second, my case was a good example of belated transitional justice since it took 52 years after the atrocity and 13 years after transition to establish a truth commission. It provided various lessons of belated transitional justice since many different attempts and efforts 279

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were made in the course of 50 years of activism. Finally, Korea was an outlier that deviated from the prediction of my global models in Chapter 3. It was troubling because, among three outliers, the Korean case was the only success case. In revisiting my findings from the case study, I considered the context of the Korean case as a deviant case that had not been studied. I first examined my findings in Korea that were congruent to my findings in the global analysis and the previous studies of Latin America and Africa. The same conclusion drawn from both studies confirmed the significance and validity of my conclusion. Second, I explored factors and findings in my Korean case which had not been focused on or examined in the previous studies and global analysis. These factors were unique findings from the Korean experience for three possible reasons: (1) Because the Korean case was a less studied case; (2) it was a belated transitional justice process; or (3) it was an outlier.

9.3.1. Activism Strong and persistent activism was the most important basis of transitional justice. The role of advocacy groups was a crucial and indispensable element and it was a motor of the transitional justice process. Contrary to the prediction of scholars, the demands for truth and justice did not diminish over time after transition. Various actors played a significant role in different phases of activism but local social movement and human rights activists, students and scholars, and the mass media were three key actors who were constantly important in all phases. These three actors were the pillars of the 4.3 advocacy networks and other actors such as victims, local provincial councils, and politicians were important in particular phases. As expected by the advocacy networks 280

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approach, actors were mostly motivated by the sense of justice, pursuit of the truth, compassion and empathy, historical consciousness, or conscience and firmly believed that they were doing the right thing despite manifest and severe suppression and surveillance by the government. Among these three key actors, students made the first move or innovation in advocacy and thus inspired other actors. Students first published an announcement in a local newspaper and started to investigate in 1960, during a short period of democracy. After the 1987 democratization and even before, students first openly advocated transitional justice and had open and public street demonstrations. Moreover, students first initiated the petition movement, which marked the entrance of the 4.3 issue into national politics. Students, after separating themselves from the mainstream 4.3 movement groups in 1994, were also the first group to seek national solidarity with university students nationwide for the 4.3 issue. For all these initial and important moves, student activism was in the forefront. Students were the ones who inspired the mass media to investigate the massacre in 1960 and made the Provincial 4.3 Committee lead the petition movement in 1996. In addition, student activism was and still is an important place where the discourse of a popular resistance uprising was maintained and preserved. Student activism was also a place where key local social movement and human rights activists were born and raised. One interesting and significant aspect was that, in Korea, victims were not the most active actors in the transitional justice process. Although there were a few sporadic courageous actions taken by individual victims under the anticommunist regimes, collective action of victims was rare. It was not until the 4.3 events had come to the 281

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surface around the first united memorial service and the establishment of the Provincial 4.3 Committee when victims started to actively engage in the transitional justice process. It was rather others who were more active and tried hard to open the tightly sealed

mouths of victims and induce their participation. Thus, after the initial transitional attempts in 1960, victims became targets rather than instigators of transitional justice activism. Some even argued that it was not until the enactment of the special act in 1999 that a genuine participation of majority victims, not the minority of anticommunist victims, began. In part, it has to do with the fact that victims had been closely associated with a very strong taboo - communism - under the consecutive military and authoritarian regimes. Victims not only experienced explicit suppression by the government but also had to experience implicit social discrimination because of the death of their family members. The family members also suffered from a guilt-by-association system which left victims in constant fear of the government. The role of activists was extremely important because victims were more intimidated by the government than the general public. Victims were active in the early phase of the advocacy in 1960 but the military coup in 1961 and the brutal suppression made them more reluctant to support transitional justice than the general public. Interestingly, a group of people who consistently argued that the 4.3 issue has to be led by victims themselves were mostly anticommunist victims who did not want the participation of activists, students, and journalists. This group of victims created the first victims association, had a separate memorial service, and openly expressed their anticommunist perspective. Ironically, this group of victims was an impediment to the transitional justice process since they expressed their objection to the activity of students 282

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and activists, journalists, and even to the provincial committee. This group was created in part because about 12 percent of victims were murdered by guerrillas but also because some victims successfully survived and succeeded under the consecutive anticommunist governments. One interesting aspect is that these groups proposed "reconciliation" as opposed to truth and justice proposed by activists and student. Their understanding of reconciliation was similar to blindly accepting the current situation and forgiving all who were involved in the atrocities.

9.3.2. Democracy The development in democracy and its consolidation was an important precondition for the 4.3 movement. This development allowed the most open domestic political opportunity structures for transitional justice advocacy. It was more important because a truth commission was established thirteen years after democratization. As an official report stated, "The transitional justice movement for the 4.3 events had been advanced in conjunction with the development of democracy in Korea (4.3 Committee 2003: 15)." The first evidence is that the initial attempts were made immediately after the democratic transition from the Rhee Syng Man dictatorship in 1960 and were totally destroyed with the military coup and dictatorship of Park Chung Bee. In 1960, the fall of Rhee Syng Man's dictatorship allowed victims nationwide to organize and actively pursue their demands and it also stimulated the initial activism for the 4.3 events as seen in the cases of Lee Moon Kyo and Shin Doo Bang and many others. The transitional justice process after 1987 provided additional examples of how the movement is closely related to the development of democracy and its consolidation.

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The 4.3 movement incrementally achieved the purported goal as Korean democracy developed in the Chun Doo Hwan, Roh Tae Woo, Kim Young Sam, and Kim Dae Jung administrations. In addition, overt suppression by the government also decreased as the administrations changed from Chun Doo Hwan to Kim Dae Jung. It is not a coincidence that the special act was enacted under Kim Dae Jung and not under Roh Tae Woo, a successor of the former authoritarian Chun Doo Hwan regime or under Kim Young Sam, who took the power after a grand merger of his party with Roh Tae Woo's ruling party. The special act was enacted under Kim Dae Jung whose party platform did not have any explicit connection with any of previous military or authoritarian regimes. An important breakthrough occurred in 1993 when the regional self-governing

system, which marked the decentralization of state power, effectively started. The role of the Provincial 4.3 Committee was indispensable in the transitional justice movement. The efforts of the provincial committee was a stepping stone for the national movement and it had a symbolic meaning since it was the first time that the 4.3 events and the massacres were openly addressed by a government agency. My case provided one possible mechanism of how democratization and the consolidation of democracy could facilitate tran~itional justice processes. It was the decentralization and localization of state power that significantly opened the domestic opportunity structure for the movement. A lesson could be learned that, if atrocities occurred in a certain local province, it is' a good strategy to use the local government to strategically introduce interim measures. The local government tends to be more attentive to the demands of local activists and victims and it is much easier to move local leaders than national leaders. In addition, there are many advantages of this interim measure. Findings can be

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further used as additional evidence and the local process provides realistic estimates of -the national process. However, the interim measures should not substitute for the measures of the national government since it is not a local government but a national government that is responsible for the atrocities?41 It simply is a good way to mobilize th~ general public and to push the central government to take an action. It should not substitute for national measures. In Korea, there were two cases where the efforts stopped at a local level - the Kwangju case and Geochang case, which were believed to be success cases of transitional justice until the Jeju case was addressed by 'the national government.

9.3.3. Diffusion Evidence of diffusion - or, the positive impact of neighbor's experience - existed in the Korean case. The Taiwanese 2.28 events and its transitional justice experience played a significant role throughout the transitional justice process and were especially critical in suggesting that the Provincial 4.3 Committee use a petition to push the 4.3 events into national politics. In addition, local media closely followed and introduced any further developments in the Taiwanese case, and this inspired not only people who were deeply involved but also the general public. One interesting aspect is that two notable experiences in Argentina and South African were also known to activists and the general public but it was not these globally well-known cases but the Taiwanese case, which was and still is not known internationally, that had a significant and recurring It is possible that a local government could be responsible for atrocities, but in most cases, it is the military or police forces of the central government who is responsible. If the local government is responsible, it is likely that the local government may resist more and the central government may be more open to consider the adoption of transitional justice measures. 285 241

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impact on the Jeju case. Although other cases were introduced by scholars or researchers during the conferences and seminars, they did not have a repeated and lasting impact on the local activists, politicians, and media as the Taiwanese case did. The Korean case in part explained why diffusion occurred among geographically proximate countries. It was a stark similarity of the characteristics of the events that led activists to believe that there is much to be learned from Taiwanese experience. The similarities between the events mostly were already determined by the similarity in the geopolitical context of Korea and Taiwan after the end of World War II. Moreover, a stark difference in the level of transitional justice process between two countries also made activists and victims in Jeju closely examine Taiwan. Although the events themselves and democratic transitions took place concurrently, advances in the governmental responses in 1996 were totally different. Besides, the impact was greater because the_Provincial 4.3 Committee and the 4.3 Reporting Team decided to have an official visit to Taiwan to study the case and seek advice. The neighbor's experience had an impact on the Jeju case because the locals actively sought out the influence. In addition, frequent visits to Taiwan were possible because it is closely located and readily accessible because many travel agencies had reasonably priced travel packages. Thus, my case provided two possible mechanisms for how geographic proximity contributed to diffusion processes. First, it is probable that the geographic proximity already shaped two countries with similar culture, histories, political situations, or international contexts. Thus, for Korea and Taiwan, not only the similarity in the events and massacre itself but also the similarity in timing of the democratic transition made activists focus on the Taiwanese case. Second, it is probable that the geographic

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closeness reduces the cost related to visits including flight fares, time, and amount of efforts related to planning the visit. However, the second point is certainly a subordinate factor facilitating the exchange rather than a deterministic element. It is also important to examine the timing of the impact of neighbor's experience

in my case study. The introduction of the Taiwanese case into Korea was not triggered and had nothing to do with any events in Taiwan - neither the onset of the committee nor the presidential apology. It was introduced, closely studied, and publicized by the concerned journalists and activists who had been engaged in the movement and eager to find a breakthrough in the movement. The Taiwanese cases was not at all sensational in other national newspapers but one journalist Kim Jong Min read an international news article and saw the potential of the Taiwanese case to inspire and guide the 4.3 movement. A single international news report could have been disregarded as other thousands of news reports published in a day. The Korean case provides a good example of information politics of advocacy networks. It was possible because of Kim's keen eyes which had been sharply focused on the 4.3 events through collecting data and witnesses and writing weekly special reports on the 4.3 events. More than anything else, Kim made a significant move to ask scholars who majored in the contemporary Chinese history to analyze the events, and then also published a series commentary comparing Taiwan to Jeju. The information ofneighbor's experience was not a significant factor by itself, but it became useful only after it had been studied, understood, and reinterpreted by activists. I found that diffusion occurred within this thick context of previous activism.

9.3.4. Evidence

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It was a victory of the indisputable evidence of the 4.3 events and civilian

massacres that tipped the scale in favor of activists and victims whenever there was a deadlock or confrontation. When the events are over 50 years old and the previous regimes had been destroying evidence and intimidating victims and witnesses to shut their mouths, it is extremely difficult to find evidence. Under these conditions, even the testimonies of victims and witnesses were ineffective since the general public had been constantly educated to accept the government's perspective and not to be deceived by the "communist agitation." In other words, the society itself had been built on that ground of forced oblivion and distorted understanding of the 4.3 events for 50 years. In this situation, evidence is rare and only the voices of the empowered few are loudly heard as in case of the anticommunist victims association. Thus, the role of evidence which is beyond dispute and confrontation was an indispensable element to advance the movement. Concrete and indisputable evidence is the most effective way to defeat the endless objections and threats to the movement. Three pieces of evidence were especially important in the 4.3 movement - the Darangshi cave and 11 skeletal remains, Congressional documentation of the 1960 investigation, and the list of 1,650 persons who had been court-martialed released by Congresswoman Choo. Although there were important discoveries of other documents a copy of J eju Shinbo in 1940s by the Research Institute or Colonel Kim Ik Ryul's memoir on the 4.3 events by the Jemin Ilbo, these three especially played a significant role in different phases and made important breakthroughs. First, the Darangshi cave played a critical role in creating the Provincial 4.3 Committee, which symbolized the transfer of accumulated societal activism into a public sector. The cave and the skeletal

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remains publicized and thereby made the general public "see and believe" previous arguments and testimonies. It for the first time created a symbol of the 4.3 events and the massacre. Second, Congressional investigation documents including the stenographic records, victim applications, and minutes were the first governmental documents that revealed the existence ofthe massacres. It enhanced public awareness of the 4.3 events in 1996 when the petition movement was under way and made the issue oftransitional justice the foremost issue of Jeju. Finally, the list of court-martialed persons was a crucial motivator of the enactment process and effectively silenced objections. The timing of the release was extremely important in this case because the list made politicians act on the 4.3 issue in the National Assembly. The list was also crucial in organizing victims who were mostly underrepresented in the previous anticommunist victims association. The victims of the disappeared created their own association and helped change the anticommunist leadership of the previous association. This newly transformed victims association was highly active not only in the enactment process but also in further activism in creating committees and fighting against opponents. The last example also shows that three elements are important: the content of the evidence, timing of the release, and the nature ofthe actor. The release ofthe list was effective because it was Choo who announced the list in a press conference and constantly asked for the political action by the Congress and administration. The strategic calculation of the members of the Research Institute to give the document to Choo was appropriate. One aspect worth studying is how evidence is found. One thing for certain is that evidence never reveals itself to activists and researchers. In the Korean case, it was discovered by people who were actively pursuing the evidence. The Darangshi cave was

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discovered by researchers who were on a research trip to find witnesses and evidence. The Congressional records were released by the local council members who constantly visited the National Assembly urging for transitional justice. The list of court-martialed persons was discovered by a member of the Research Institute. Moreover, various types of evidence and documents were discovered by the 4.3 Reporting Team. Although discovery of this evidence seems to be coincidental, a close examination of it showed that it never was found by coincidence or luck.

9.3.5. Leaders The role of significant political leaders and their commitment to truth and justice was an important factor in Korea. Not only the regime characteristics such as democracy but also leader characteristics were a key in determining the domestic opportunity structure. It was Kim Dae Jung who had first publicly promised the enactment of the special law and consistently repeated his pledges. The inauguration of Kim Dae Jung was a necessary condition for the enactment of the 4.3 Special Act. Nevertheless, constant activism and persistent demands were more important factors than Kim's will and pledge alone because leaders intentionally or unintentionally forget and do not carry out what they have promised. In addition, it is possible that the measures adopted to address the past violations could be far behind the expectations of victims and activists. For example, Kim Dae Jung was caught up with more urgent issues such as getting out of the Asian financial crisis and the measures he introduced - instituting a special committee within the ruling party - was far from what people had expected. In addition, for a year, there had not been any advances beyond two public hearings hosted by this special 290

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committee. It certainly was a disappointment to victims and activists. The 4.3 Special Act was possible because of strong and persistent activism. It would not have been achieved if victims and activists passively waited for Kim Dae Jung to take proper steps. The process of transitional justice was not smooth at all even with the Kim Dae Jung's ruling party. Despite a persistent and constant demand for the special act, the ruling party pursued the establishment only of a special congressional committee and even submitted a resolution to that effect. The ruling party in the center was even deaf to the demand of the local branch who consistently demanded the policy change. Only through activism and lobbying, activists and victims could divert the main policy of the ruling party and even break the impasse. At every point, activists strategically held fast to and used Kim Dae Jung's public promise in order to make passive and uninterested politicians move forward and take an action, which is a good illustration of accountability politics of advocacy networks.

9.3.6. Renaming, Redefining, and Reframing At some point of time in the process, it was necessary to rename, redefine, and reframe the 4.3 events and civilian massacres in order to move forward and achieve the desired goals. These three moves - renaming, redefining, and reframing - were separate but highly interconnected activities of framing process ih the movement. First, various labels of the 4.3 events were created, used, revived, or discarded throughout the transitional justice process. Immediately after the events, it was called the 4.3 communist rebellion without any hesitation. Even after the initial democratization in 1960, the label, a communist rebellion, did not change. A few students started to use "4.3" without any

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label for the first time in 1960 to get away from the lexicon of communist rebellion. Nevertheless, two concepts - the 4.3 communist rebellion, on the one hand, and mass murders of innocent civilians, on the other - were understood separately during the early transitional justice advocacy. However, the notion of mass murders of innocent civilians was again suppressed and only a single adamant concept of the 4.3 communist rebellion revived with the military coup of 1961. It took eighteen long years for a courageous writer to revive the notion of mass murder. Furthermore, it took another twelve years for a few intellectuals and activists cautiously to use an alternative name - i.e. a resistance uprising. In the course of events, a practice of describing the events with only two numbers - 4.3 revived among institutions proclaiming neutrality such as the mass media and provincial council. Thus, after democratization, four labels - "4.3 events", "4.3 communist rebellion", "4.3 resistance uprising," and "4.3" - were in use,z42 Discourses of rebellion and uprising had been struggling for seven years until both activists and anticommunist victims agreed to use the 4.3 events in the course of negotiation process for the united memorial service. Since then, the name, "4.3 events" has been predominantly used and even adopted in the 4.3 Special Act and the 4.3 Committee. Once the label had been agreed upon, contestations were centered on the content. The 4.3 events had traditionally been defined by three elements: actors, motives, and period: traditionally, it was an armed uprising of the communists in Jeju started on April 3, 1948 that was instigated by the North to obstruct the state building efforts in the South. The initial objection was raised against the starting date ofthe events by the 4.3 Ko Chang Hoon who closely followed the lexicon of the 4.3 events even argued that there are at least thirteen different names of the events. 292

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Reporting Team who closely studied political and socioeconomic situation of Jeju since 1945. The Reporting Team, by analyzing old newspapers discovered by the Research Institute, concluded that the incident on March 1, 1947 was a watershed event. It was congruent with previous research which concluded that the U.S. and Korea's misgovernment actually triggered the armed uprising. On the other hand, activists and researchers argued that the events lasted until 1954 insinuating that, although guerrilla activities were mostly quelled by the end of 1949, human rights abuses lasted unti11954 by the state under the name of counterinsurgency strategy. Second, activists and researchers objected to the traditional understanding of actors and the motives, which persistently were presented as a direct order from the North Korean Communist Party. Again, the 4.3 Reporting Team and the 4.3 Research Institute found out that there was no ground to believe that the events were ordered or instigated by the North. By thorough interviews, the team found evidence that previous testimonies supporting these arguments were mostly fabricated under anticommunist regimes by the intelligence agency. In sum, the official narrative on the 4.3 events based on actor, motive, and period were all challenged throughout 50 years of activism and research and was finally changed by the efforts of activists, intellectuals, and journalists in the course of the enactment process. Finally, the 4.3 events had to be reframed under the rubric of a human rights violation in order to persuade political leaders and win the support of the general public. In early movements, civilian deaths were understood as killings of the innocent civilians, not as a human rights violation. In Korean, the two concepts differ because the former was mostly used in history textbooks in describing the past history and old events. On

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the contrary, a human rights violation was a newly introduced concept in Korea and used to describe the abuses under the consecutive military regimes or mass killings of the Kwangju. It was actually Kim Dae Jung who was known for his lifelong pro-democracy movement and human rights advocacy that revived a theme of human rights in Korean politics and society. Thus, by using the concept of human rights violations, activists and scholars conferred the civilian massacres under the 4.3 events a present or recent connotation. It was the efforts of a few scholars and activists who saw the possibilities in

which atrocities could be framed under more general and contemporary notion of a human rights violation in order to appeal to the general audiences. A term human rights violations started to be used more frequently since the international conference hosted by the 4.3 Research Institute in 1998. It appealed to the national public who were not familiar with the 4.3 events and civilian massacres. In a sense, it was a strategic move to reframe the 4.3 events as a human rights violation. Furthermore, there was one unintended consequence of using human rights violations. By focusing on human rights violations, activists were temporarily set free from the ideologically controversial issues of the characteristic of the events themselves. When activists used a concept of "mass murder of innocent civilians," a question of whether the dead were really innocent always followed and further led to the debate around the characteristics of the events. The debates are usually swamped by the inconclusive division between civilians and combatants or between active participants and reluctant ones. When a concept "human rights violations" were used, more focus was given to the violators of human rights - the state - and less on the characteristic of the events. Although human rights abuses of the

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leftist guerrillas were also brought up, the focus was more on state violence, which constituted 80 percent of violations.

9.4. Findings from Case Study, Part 2: Uniqueness 9.4.1. Culture The role of culture was extremely important in bringing the hidden and suppressed issue of the 4.3 events, leading the 4.3 movement, and finally establishing a truth commission. Three different roles for culture could be found. First, culture brought the forgotten discourses and lost memories back. The transitional justice movement was extremely difficult since the initial attempts in 1960s were totally destroyed and brutally suppressed under Park Chung Hee. It was a courageous attempt of one writer who first publicly mentioned the 4.3 events and massacres that first reopened the floodgate of transitional justice advocacy. Only after reading Aunt Sooni, concerned individuals started to gather together and act together. New generations started to learn the 4.3 events and decided to devote themselves to finding the truth and restore justice. Although Hyun Ki Young did not intend or even know ofthis enormous impact, his novel had a huge impact and finally healed the depressed and shattered hearts of 30,000 victims and their family members. It was the relative distance of the cultural sector from governmental suppression and surveillance which provided a condition to make such a breakthrough possible. Second, cultural activists and their arts and products deeply touched victims in the first place. For events that had been suppressed more than 40 years, the most difficult task was to open the tightly sealed mouths of victims and their family members. It was 295

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more difficult because family members themselves were also victims of the current guiltby-association system. Family members were targets of government violence when the military regimes suppressed the initial transitional justice movement in 1960. Thus, direct family members and the relatives not only have heard or seen state violence but also have actually experienced it themselves. Thus, victims were more terrified because of the cumulative state violence at different levels. It was cultural activists who knew that arts and culture could effectively help victims and the general public to remind them of the 4.3 events and even let out their agony, rancor, and distress. Literature such as novel and poems, fine arts, dances, plays, and traditional exorcism made people sympathize, recollect, and communicate their painful experiences. By starting to share and tell their stories, victims were already acting together. In a sense, cultural activists bridged victims with other later forms of social movement by first awakening them from deep silence. Third, cultural activism drew attention of the general public and earned their supports and hearts. After 50 long years, the demography of Jeju had been dramatically changed by a generation shift and by an inflow of people from the mainland. According to the official reports, 4.3 victims and family members accounted for about 27 percent of

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total residents in 2004. It was not a small portion but it still was not a large portion to make the 4.3 events an issue ofthe Jeju province as a whole. It was activists and their constant movements that made this possible. Many worked hard, and cultural activists were extremely important in creating readily accessible artistic and cultural symbols drawings, photographs, sculptures, and so on. It was at its peak in 1998 when the accumulated power of the cultural and research sector led to the 50th anniversary

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commemoration projects, where the traditional exorcism performance and the symbolic tower was its climax. Many argue that the enactment movement in 1999 was a mere political manifestation ofthe commemoration projects in 1998. 243

9.4.2. Endogenous Efforts There was no evidence of the direct impact of any international governmental or nongovernmental organizations, and this was the only finding from the global analysis that was not supported in my case study. Other findings from my global analysis diffusion, democracy and consolidation, and domestic advocacy groups - were strengthened by my cast study. But, I could not find single evidence of the direct involvement of the U.N. or other international NGOs. One reason could be found from an answer of Juan E. Mendez, a president of the International Center for Transitional Justice, to my question why the ICTJ did not work in Korea,z44 He remembered that the ICTJ usually starts work when there is a "request" from the government or local NGOs and apparently there were no such request from Korea. His answer also provided one possible mechanism how international actors influence the truth commission establishment. Although international actors are important, it may be initial requests made by domestic actors themselves that are more important in bringing international actor's expertise and know-how. It is consistent with my finding of the effect ofa neighbor's experience where it was mostly effective when domestic actors actively sought for their influence. Thus, two outside factors - diffusion and international Park, Kyung Roon. 2006. April 5, Jeju. Interview by author. Tape recording Juan E Mendez was invited to the University of Minnesota and had informal discussion with faculty members and students at the Dean's Conference Room, University of Minnesota Law School, April 24, 2007. 243

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involvement - are also mainly driven by endogenous demand and efforts. For the Jeju case, it was mostly endogenous efforts that led the transitional justice process for fifty long years. International factors appeared in three settings but it is difficult to argue that they had a decisive impact. First, as mentioned in previous section, the Taiwanese experience was introduced by a local journalist and played an important role. However, it was the local media and Provincial 4.3 Committee which made the Taiwanese experience more meaningful. It was local activists who made the Taiwanese experience have an influence on the transitional justice process. Second, Korean Japanese who were originally from Jeju had a significant role throughout the process. This group made three contributions. First, Japan - or, Korean communities in Japan - provided a refuge and served as a reservoir of written records, memories, and alternative narrative of the 4.3 events as seen in the case of Kim Bong Hyun and Kim Min Joo's work. This role was more important because the Korean government systematically destroyed and suppressed any discourse ofthe 4.3 events under the Park Chung Hee dictatorship and Japan was relatively balanced in its policy on both ideological fronts. Thus, these records, memories, and narratives created and maintained in Japan were important in leading the transitional justice advocacy immediately after democratic transition since there were not many records and writings in Korea except Hyun Ki Young's novel. Thus, ~ost studies published immediately after transition used the materials from Japan (Arari Research Institute 1988; Roh 1988). Second, Korean Japanese communities were also a place where people were able to secretly commemorate the 4.3 events and have a smallbut open and public gathering. It affected a few of activists and scholars who were studying in Japan and helped them lead

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in the advocacy later as seen in the cases of Kang Chang II and Kim Myung Sik. Third, Korean Japanese were actively engaged in the enactment movement in 1999 and empowered local ~ctivism from outside. Some of them participated in the Pan National Committee and represented victims in Japan. It provided a symbolic meaning that the 4.3 events and victims were not only a matter at the local and national level but also at the international level. However, the role of Korean Japanese cannot be understood as a purely international effect but an internationalized local influence. Third, individuals from foreign countries especially those from the countries with human rights violations or transitional justice experience helped to take a lesson from their efforts and expertise and to draw national and international attention to the 4.3 events. The international conference organized by the 4.3 Research Institute in 1998 was an exemplar of hosting internationally renowned persons. For example, Jose Horta from East Timor and Fazel Randera, a commissioner of the South African TRC were important in drawing the attention of the national media and the general public. In addition, a former Japanese senator Den Hideo who led a supporting campaign to rescue Kim Dae Jung when he fell under the assassination operation of Park Chung Hee was also invited. Although Kim Dae Jung did not appear at the conference as many activists had intended and expected, Senator Hideo had a private meeting with Kim Dae Jung upon his visit and it also helped to publicize the 4.3 events. Thus, transitional justice efforts were largely motivated and carried out by domestic actors. It was not even an effort of the Korean society as a whole but that of the Jeju provincial society. It first started as an initial action taken by a few local activists, scholars, and journalists and later became the movement of the local society as a whole 299

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including victims, elites in Seoul, local politicians, and the general public. Not only close relationships, cooperation, and solidarity but also coordinated division of labor among diverse actors was important. Many testified that the shared sentiment of being an islander facilitated the solidarity and close alliance. Many, when asked what is unique about the 4.3 movement, were not hesitant at all and said, "The transitional justice movement succeeded because it was Jeju."

9.4.3. Ghosts A unique feature of the Korean transitional justice process was the role of the dead. The victims who had already been dead and their ghosts played a significant role in transitional justice process. My interviews revealed that some activists and victims believed that the ghost were helping them and thought that the role of the dead in the process was indispensable. They described five ways the dead were important. First, ghost helped activists to find the decisive and important evidence and an explicit example is the Darangshi cave. Even the witness who had lived in the cave and visited it several times could not find the entrance of the cave but it was discovered by a member of the 4.3 Research Institute. If it were discovered by the witness and words had been spread out in town, it may not have been achieved the same dramatic impact on the 4.3 movement. In addition, the 4.3 Reporting Team also admitted that they had felt the guidance and help from the dead in the course of their special reports. Both Yang Jo Hoon and Kim Jong Min admitted that their reports would not have been fruitful and complete if the dead did not help them find the late Colonel Kim Ik Ryul's memoir and

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many other witnesses. 245 Second, ghosts made people act in the first place, sometimes forcibly. Yang Jo Hoon was and still is a key member of the transitional justice movement. He was an editor of the Jemin Ilbo and led the 4.3 Reporting Team and found numerous significant facts. He also was at the center of the enactment movement by effectively leading Provincial Solidarity. Most of all, he was in charge of the writing an official report under the Task Force for the Report. It is impossible to discuss the process without mentioning his name. This important figure said he started to act when he was forcibly pushed by ghosts while he was still hesitant. A ghost haunted him every night and made him take charge of the reporting team and consistently helped him in his activism. Third, many victims who started to act even under severe repression of the military regimes were all inspired by their perceived duty as sons and siblings of the dead. In a sense, it was the dead that made them move forward despite repression. Sometimes, it was the last word of the dead that constantly made people act even under difficulties. In Korea, people who were killed innocently are believed to have a rancor and cannot enter the other world unless their distress is removed. For descendents and survivors, it was a responsibility and duty to take care of their ancestor's innocent deaths. Thus, appeasing the souls and restoring their honor were two essential elements. The duty, many times, extended to those who were not related to the victims in blood. Sometimes, a village or a larger community felt a sense of obligation to the dead. Here, we can find the shadow of the dead in the movement. Fourth, ghosts appeared in the dream of activists and their family members to 245 Kim Jong Min. 2006. Interview by author, March 25, Seoul. Transcript; Yang, Jo Hoon. 2006. Interview by author. March 15, Seoul. Tape recording

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alert them of an upcoming danger or suppression. It was a case for Ko Chang Hoon when his mother had a mysterious dream and let him know of the upcoming danger for him after the excavation of the Darangshi cave. Similar mysterious cases were also examined in other cases where the dead appear in the dream of the living guiding, communicating, and sometimes correcting the directions. Many testified about this during the first transitional justice attempt when bodies and mass murder sites were discovered. The dead appeared in the dream of the bereft members of the family and told them exactly where they were buried (Kim 2002). Finally, it was a memorial service which first provided a ground for ideologically diverse groups even to consider having a conversation. It was the very act of commemorating and cherishing the souls of the dead that provided a ground of reconciliation of the living. Both ideologically diverse camps agreed that the dead were ideologically neither left nor right and this agreement provided a ground of cooperation in later actions. Another example is a traditional ritual of exorcism, where the dead and the living communicated and opened the mouths of victims. In sum, it is no exaggeration to argue that (people's beliefs about) the ghosts of the dead drove the transitional justice movement.

9.4.4. Timing A lesson could be learned from the Koran case about the timing of truth commission establishment. In the transitional justice literature, debates go on for and against the prompt establishment of a truth commission. On the one hand, arguments are made for the early use of the mechanism on the basis that perpetrators are alive, evidence 302

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is relatively abundant, and many victims and eyewitnesses are still alive. The Korean case, in a way, supports this position because it was extremely difficult to find evidence since the events were 50-years-old and the governments intentionally destroyed the evidence. It certainly was a challenge to find credible and indisputable evidence in the course of the movement. If transitional justice measures were used immediately it would have been less problematic. In addition, many opposed establishing a truth commission or pursuing justice on the basis that most victims and perpetrators were dead by 1999 and it was difficult to do justice toward the dead. In a sense, belated transitional justice may not be the best option for transitional societies. On the contrary, the Korean case demonstrated the failures of premature transitional justice attempts and measures. After the initial democratization in 1960, people and the National Assembly took action to find the truth and restore the honor of the victims. But as explained in Chapter 5, the overall composition of the National Assembly and the administration was not amenable at all to transitional justice. Many in important positions were either perpetrators themselves or deeply related to perpetrators. Moreover, the initial efforts met serious backlash when Park Chung Hee took power and the counterattack of military was so strong that victims became more intimidated. The memory of a failed transitional justice experience and subsequent brutal suppression by the military government in earlier period was a serious impediment in the later transitional justice process. Victims and family members were more reluctant to open their mouths and act together in the second phase of the movement. An immediate achievement of transitional justice could easily backfire when the SOciety and government are not ready and sincerely committed. The two-week-Iong 303

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Congressional Committee headed by former police chief in 1960s clearly reveals this. Certainly, for victims, there is no such thing as "immature" condition of transitional justice or any measures that are "too soon" since it is always too late for victims. However, there are immature conditions and a measure that is too soon for the government and society. My case study showed that there are certain stages in the movement when the transitional justice measures should preferably have been postponed. Hence, activists must be more careful in examining unexpected scenarios and factors such as possibility of military coups. In addition, there is always a danger that previous insufficient and unfruitful measures could block more full-scale and effective measures in the future. In case of Jeju, it was one day on-the-spot investigation of the Congressional Special Committee in 1960 which obstructed the later investigations and development. Activists should examine the sincerity, committee composition, and remained terms of the investigatory body. A premature and not genuine measure cart obstruct more genuine efforts in the future by allowing indulgence to perpetrators and providing a false impression to the public that the investigation had been done and there actually was not much to be revealed.

9.4.5. Truth vs. Justice? Why was a particular form of a truth commission adopted and not others? This specific question had been studied in previous literatures focusing on the truth vs. justice framework where a truth commission lies at the opposite side of criminal prosecution. In the Korean case, justice discourse was used in the earlier movement in 1960s. Students demanded for the punishment for perpetrators after a through investigation of the 304

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massacre. In addition, complaints were filed to the local prosecutor's office. However, interestingly, justice was not a main discourse used in the later activism after democratic transition in 1987. Major concepts that appeared in the course of 50 years of the movement were truth, restoration of the honor of victims, apology, and reparation. The punishment of perpetrators of any sorts was rarely mentioned except in a few extreme cases of student movement. It does not mean that no perpetrators remained to be punished since many of them were still alive. Many of them were in their sixties, seventies, and eighties, but perpetrators were healthy and alive. In many cases, they were still living in the same village with victims and people knew he was the one who murdered. The names of perpetrators and the commander of military units appeared in an official report. Nevertheless, victims and activists did not pursue criminal prosecution. Rather, it was truth vs. reparation that was at the center of the debate in the course of the enactment movement. It appeared at the center of debate when the special act was drafted, debated, and negotiated. Before that, it was only the truth that victims wanted. The truth had two elements in it. Activists, scholars, and journalists demanded the truth for the 4.3 events themselves. They wanted to know why people in Jeju had to lift arms against the government and also wanted to know what really had happened. They also wanted to know the scope and magnitude of the massacre and the composition of perpetrators. For victims, on the other hand, they wanted to know the truth that their family members who were murdered during the events were not communists. Finding out that single evidence which showed that their parents, brothers and sisters were not involved with communists was enough. This aspect of the truth is closely related to the restoration ofthe honor of victims by clearing the false accusation of being a communist. 305

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Family members believed that only when these false accusations are cleared can the dead peacefully enter the other world without any rancor or distress. Activists wanted to pursue reparation - either individually or collectivelybecause it was the most visible way that the state officially admits its past wrongdoings. Thus, for activists, it was a choice between doing nothing and achieving reparation. A truth commission was the third and middle way between the two. At first, activists wanted to push the government for reparation and came across objections from the opposition party and rightwing groups. Many activists and politicians also knew that a consistent demand for reparation may jeopardize the whole transitional justice process. Thus, a truth commission was a "strategic choice" between doing nothing and achieving reparation. It does not mean that a demand for reparation had been ultimately abandoned. On the contrary, activists foresaw the process as an incremental one. Once the truth is revealed thoroughly by the government, apology and reparation are the next steps to be followed.

9.5. Further Research Projects First of all, I will examine the actual truth seeking process of the 4.3 Committee after its establishment. It will cover the period between 2000 and 2008 when the committee was in session. 'Throughout my dissertation, what I have analyzed was the process leading to the establishment of the committee. Two justifications can be provided. First, unlike other cases where truth commissions were established within two or three years since the transition, it took fifty long years for Korea, and I had to examine this expansive period oftime. Second, the committee is still in tenure and effectively 306

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working at the time the dissertation was complete. This had been the longest operation of a truth commission in Korea since other commissions which were instituted even later had already finished their work. Although the 4.3 Committee published its report in 2004, it is still effectively working in deciding additional victims, revising registered victims, and making decisions on the memorial projects. Documents are still undisclosed and people in the committee were reluctant to comment on the ongoing committee works and told me that they would be more comfortable once the process was over. Thus, for a more thorough investigation, I have to wait until the term of the committee ends. The other aspect to research in the future is the impact of transitional justice measures. Here, I also plan to answer the question by examining both the global sample of 100 transitional countries and the Korean case. There have been divided arguments on the impact of trials and truth commissions on the future condition of human rights, peace, and democracy (Mendeloff 2004). Since mid-1990s, many scholars believe that transitional justice measures are both legally and ethically desirable and practically useful in deterring future human rights violations (Orentlicher 1995; Mendez 1997; Minow 1998; Hayner 2002; Kritz 1995). Important contributions were made from diverse disciplines including law, political science, sociology, history, psychology, and philosophy. Nevertheless, international relations and security studies scholars recently argued that prosecutions based on universal jurisdiction may cause more harm and human rights trials after conflict resolution are detrimental to nascent peace (Goldsmith and Krasner 2003; Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003). In my previous work, I found empirical evidence that trials and truth commissions actually lead to improvements in human rights protections (Kim and 307

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Sikkink 2007). Moreover, I found that trials and truth commissions in neighbors have a possible deterrence impact beyond the confines of the single country. Thus, I reached a conclusion that investigation of the past history of state violence and human rights abuses do make a difference in a country's human rights practices. Nevertheless, the crossnational analysis has many limitations and I want to carry out the case study on the impact of the 4.3 Committee. This topic has not yet been fully addressed in scholarship for two reasons. First, as mentioned, the 4.3 Committee itself has not yet been the center of academic focus. Second, scholars were hesitant to evaluate the impact of relatively recent and still ongoing 4.3 Committee, with only a few exceptions. However, during my field research, I realized that people had already started to discuss the changes that the 4.3 Committee brought about. The impact of the committee's work is clearly shown in a President's apology in 2003 and his participation in a memorial service in 2006. An official understanding of the 4.3 events has also changed and the committee's reinterpretation of the events has been reflected in history textbooks and official government documents. In addition, the 4.3 Committee provided guidance to a newly established Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2005). Therefore, it is not too early to discuss the impact of the 4.3 Committee as seen in a few examples. My field research already provides enough data to analyze the impact of the 4.3 Committee at a societal level. In addition, I learned about a highly significant project of the 4.3 Research Institute and the J eju provincial government during my fieldwork. In 2004, the One Thousand Testimonies on the Jeju 4.3 Events Project was launched where people who

308

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have experienced the 4.3 events were interviewed. 246 A senior researcher in charge of the project told me that they started a project in urgency because many witnesses had already died and those who were living were in their seventies and eighties. I was told that not . only the 4.3 events itself but also the 4.3 Committee and its activities were discussed during the interviews. The interviews, which were not available in 2006, will soon be available to· researchers. 247 I believe these interview transcripts are the best resource to study and evaluate the impact of the 4.3 Committee at an individual level including victims, family members, and even perpetrators. In some sense, these will be the only publicly available sources since the 4.3 Committee decided not to release their 502 interviews which were conducted to write a report. Although there have been studies on the impact of a truth commission at an individual level, most previous studies depended upon survey methods or interviews with a handful of persons (Longman, Pham, and Weinstein 2005; Gibson and Gouws 2003). As far as I know, no studies have done based on one thousand in-depth interviews with individuals involved.

2460h, Seung Kook, a director of the 4.3 Research Institute. 2006. Interview by author, April 7, Jeju. Tape recording 247 Kim Eun Hee, a senior researcher of the 4.3 Research Institute. 2006. Interview by Author. May 21, Jeju. Tape recording

309

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