Existential Phenomenology (Duquesne Studies Philosophical Series 12)

DUQUESNE STUDIES Philosophical Series 12

EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY by WILLIAM A. LUIJPEN, O.S.A.,

PH.D.

Preface

by ALBERT DoNDEYNE,

PH.D.

SIXTH IMPRESSION

Pittsburgh, Editions E. Nauwelaerts, Louvain

DUQUESNE UNIVBllSITY PREss,

Pa.

"Philosophy demands: seek constant communication, risk it without reserve, renounce the defiant self-assertion which forces itself upon you in ever new disguises, live in the hope that in your very renunciation you will in some incalculable way be given back to yourself." Karl Jaspers, Ways to Wisdom, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1954, p. 124.

TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE PREFACE by Albert Dondeyne

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INTRODUCTION .........................................

1

CHAPTER ONE-MAN, THE METAPHYSICAL BEING 1. The Authenticity of Philosophy ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

2. To Be Man is to Exist. . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .

14

a. Existence as Being-in-the-World, p. 15; b. The Meaning of the World, p. 25 ; c. The Primitive Fact of Existential Phenomenology, p. 34; d. Existence as Being-Hat" -theWorld: Labor, p. 39.

3. Technocracy and Philosophy .........................

47

a. Technocracy, p. 47; h. The Metaphysical Question, p. 52. 4. Man, the Metaphysical Being ........................

65

CHAPTER TWO-PHENOMENOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 1. Explicitation

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2. Descartes

...................................... . . .

79

3. Empiricism and Idealism ............................

84

4. Critique of Phenomenology on the Traditional Prejudices Regarding the Nature of Man's Knowledge.............

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a. Intentionality, p. 92; b. Noesis and Noema, p. 95; c. Viewpoint, Profile, Unity, p. 97. 5. Sartre's Dualism and the True Immanence of Knowledge .. 103 a. "En-soi" and "Pour-soi," Being-in-Itself and Consciousness, p. 104; b. The Immanence of Knowledge, p. 112. 6. Sensitive and Spiritual Knowing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 117 Vll

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7. The Concept

120

a. The Concept is Abstract, p. 124; b. The Concept is Not a Schematic Image, p. 128; c. The Concept is Universal, p.137. 8. The Judgment ..................................... 138 9. Phenomenology of Truth ...................... " .... 142 a. Existence as "Logos," as "Natural Light," as Agent Intellect, p. 143; b. Objectivity and Objectivism, Subjectivity and Subjectivism, Relativity and Relativism, p. 146; c. Reason and Science, p. 149. 10. The Criterion of Truth ........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 158 11. Reasoning and Logic ................................ 169 CHAPTER THREE-PHENOMENOLOGY OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY 1. To Exist is to Co-Exist ............... . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 176 2. The Body as Intermediary ........................... 180 a. Reasoning by Analogy and ((Einjuhlung," p. 181; b. "My" Body is Not "a" Body, p. 186. 3. Phenomenology of Hatred ........................... 195 4. Phenomenology of Indifference ....................... 206 a. The "We" of Indifference, p. 207; b. The "He," p. 209; c. Encounter, p. 213. 5. Phenomenology of Love

214

a. Love as Active Leaning, p. 215; b. The Creativity of Love, p. 223. 6. Phenomenology of Law a. Unsatisfactory Theories, p. 234; b. The Source of Rights, p. 238; c. Laws and Legal Institutions, p. 246; d. Natural Right and History, p. 253.

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CHAPTER FOUR-PHENOMENOLOGY OF FREEDOM AND ITS DESTINY PAGE

1. The Sense of the Question Regarding the Meaning of Life .............................................. 261 2. Phenomenology of Freedom ......................... 265 a. To be SUbject is to be Free, p. 266; b. Freedom as "Distance," as "Having to be," and as "Project," p. 269; c. To be Free is to be Ethical, 281 ; d. Freedom as Transcendence, p. 294; e. Freedom as History, p. 305. 3. The Atheism of Jean-Paul Sartre ..................... 313 4. Heidegger's "Being-Toward-Death" ................... 330 5. Perspectives

350

INDEX OF NAMES

356

INDEX OF SUBJECT MATTER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • . • .•

358

PREFACE Phenomenology and existential philosophy have been the subjectmatter of numerous and well-informed studies written in the Dutch language. To this we may add that perhaps nowhere else than in the Netherlands has the phenomenological method been used so expertly and with such an ingenious originality for the renewal of psychology and psychiatry. Hitherto, however, we did not possess any general philosophical treatise which was conceived and formulated in the spirit of the new philosophy. The present book very suitably fills this gap. Although it does not befit the philosopher to indulge in prophecy, I do not hesitate to predict that Dr. Luijpen's new book will meet with great success. The openness of the Dutch-speaking intellectual world for contemporary philosophical thought, the name of the author, and the scope of his work warrant the accuracy of this prediction. In his Introduction the author clearly and unambiguously formulates the intention of his work. It is not an essay ({about existentialism or phenomenology" but "a relatively independent rethinking of the eternal problems which have always occupied the thinking man." This rethinking, however, takes place in the sphere of thought proper to existentialists and phenomenologists, because of the conviction that hitherto no other way of thinking has ever been proposed which manages to express the ultimate meaning of integral reality in a better way and more in accord with life. True, it is not very likely that integral reality will ever be expressed in an exhaustive way. With Shakespeare, we will always have to admit that "there are more things in heaven and on earth than are dreamt of in your philosophy." Nevertheless, even this saying of a man who did not at all want to be taken for a philosopher is a philosophical statement. It teaches us, better perhaps than all school definitions, what philosophy is or at least ought to be to do justice to its name. Philosophy is no high-flown speculation, no flight from reality, no conceptual structure estranged from the world. The lover of wisdom is one who loves the truth, one who is driven by a passion for truth and veracity, one who struggles with truth to arrive at wisdom, at the veracity which makes free. Truth and reality are nearly synonymous in the prephilosophical language of the people. Thus x

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being driven by a passion for truth means that reality itself speaks to man and, as it were, invites him to give expression to this reality, to show it to the world, to make it public, to free it for the liberation of mankind, for it is only truth that makes man free. For this reason man is Logos, i.e., the capacity to be spoken-to and to speak, to partake and to impart, to receive and to give. Philosophy is at the service of Logos. What philosophy wants is to reveal man to himself. Across and above all external appearance and modes of thinking, philosophy wants to let man see the true meaning of his tendencies and deeds, the true meaning of his subjectivity as being a living tension of situation and freedom, of care of the self and concern for others, of earthbound gravitation and openness for the celestial, for "not by bread alone does man live, but by every word that comes forth from the mouth of God." Above all, however, philosophy wants to sharpen our sense of responsibility for the authenticity of our human existence itself, for being-man is at the same time a givenness and a task or, in the words of the author, a "having-to-be-in-bonds-toobjectivity" and in faithfulness to the ethical movements of conscience. [Thus we may say that, in order to be valuable, philosophical thought must be true to life and in close touch with life. Philosophy is born from closeness to reality and must lead man to a more genuine and authentic closeness to reality. In his Letter Concerning Humanism Heidegger correctly remarks that under the influence of science and technology modern man often fosters the illusion that there are no longer any distances for him. His glance penetrates ever more profoundly into man's prehistoric past as well as into the farthest corners of the universe. Nevertheless, man has never felt so lonely and abandoned on earth as in our time, he has never been so remote and estranged from all his surroundings, he is without a fatherland. It is precisely the task of philosophical thought to give us a more authentic closeness to "integral reality." Whence we may conclude that a philosophy which is true to life an
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It is the fruit of seven years of assiduous· study and persevering firmness of proposal, for which we must be grateful to the author.

HIGHER INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF LouvAIN

ALBERT DONDEYNE

The English edition differs only in a few minor points from the original text. A number of examples have been modified somewhat for the convenience of the American reader. Introductory titles (in italics) permit quick orientation within the various sections of the different chapters. As a rule, the language of footnote quotations in French, German, and Latin has been retained, because many of these quotations are sufficiently paraphrased in the text, and others defy translation without a context for which there is no room in simple footnotes. Indexes of names and subject matter have been added to complete the work. We have abstained from appending the usual bibliography, because the copious footnotes adequately indicate which works should be consulted by anyone who wishes to pursue further studies in the subject. Our thanks are due to the Reverend Dr. John R. Kanda, C.S.Sp., who has read the text in typescript and suggested a few slight modifications to improve its readability. DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY, Pittsburgh, Pa. January 15, 1960

HENRY J. KOREN, C.S.SP.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The editor wishes to express his gratitude to the following publishers for permission to quote from the books listed below: Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, copyright M. Niemeyer Verlag, Tiibingen, 6th ed., 1949.

Einfiihrung in die M etaphysik, copyright M. Niemeyer Verlag, Tiibingen, 1953. Karl Jaspers, Einfiihrung in die Philosophie, copyright R. Piper & Co. Verlag, Miinchen, 1957. Gabriel Marcel, Journal metaphysique, copyright Librairie Gallimard, Paris, 11th ed., 1935.

Du refus d l'invocation, copyright Librairie Gallimard, Paris, 11th ed., 1940. Jean-Paul Sartre, L'etre et Ie neant, copyright Librairie GaIlimard, Paris, 29th ed., 1950.

Nausea, copyright New Directions, New York, 1949. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la perception, copyright Librairie Gallimard, Paris, 14th ed., 1953.

H umanisme et terreur, copyright Librairie Gallimard, Paris, 1947. Eloge de la philosophie, copyright Librairie Gallimard, Paris, 12th ed., 1953.

xiii

INTRODUCTION When a book title mentions the terms "phenomenology" or "existentialism," the reader may expect almost anything in its pages. Usually such books contain studies concerning phenomenology or concerning existentialism. They are fairly numerous. The works of James Collins, Kurt Reinhardt, Frederick Copleston, Emmanuel Mounier, and Jean Wahl, to name only a few, are excellent introductions to various aspects and systems of the philosophy known as existentialism and phenomenology. The careful reader, however, would not infrequently come to the conclusion that there seems to be no trace of unity and interconnection in the philosophical thought of existentialists and phenomenologists. Nevertheless, at present one can no longer make such an assertion without betraying a lack of understanding with respect to existentialism and phenomenology. True, from a certain viewpoint it may be claimed that Kierkegaard and Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre, Jaspers and Marcel, Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur, each have their own world of thought. But this claim does not do justice to the main element of their thinking. The principal point is that the difference between all these authors reveal themselves of little importance, as soon as one realizes that what nowadays is called "existential phenomenology" is primarily a "movement," a "climate" of thinking, whose proper character could not immediately be discovered and expressed. It was not without reason that the names of certain authors were at once connected with existentialism and phenomenology, while others were never mentioned at al1. It was not without reason that, contrary to others, a certain approach to problems pertaining to positive science was called "existential" or "phenomenologica1." AU this indicates a certain unity of "movement" or "climate," no matter how great the differences may be between the explicit theses of existentialists and phenomenologists. An historian of contemporary thought could render a very valuable service by writing a study about existentialism and phenomenology in which his principal aim would be to show that these philosophers have a common style of thinking, for hitherto far too little attention has been paid to this point. Such a study, however, would still be a book concerning existentialism and phenomenology. We must 1

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Existential Phenomenology

emphasize this to make certain that the reader understands the difference between such a work and the study presented to him in these pages. It is not our intention to write about existentialism or phenomenology. It is not possible to philosophize in an authentic way if our thinking does not consist in a relatively independent rethinking of the eternal problems which have always occupied the thinking man. Authentic philosophy is the aim of this book. The rethinking, however, presented in this work, takes places in the "climate" of thought proper to existentialists and phenomenologists, because we are convinced that rlOwadays existential phenomenology, enriched by the most profound insights attained by medieval philosophy, offers the most promising perspectives for any endeavor to express the ultimate meaning of integral reality. Of course, it is impossible to justify this conviction in an Introduction. On the other hand, however, the study itself presented to the reader in the subsequent pages is such a justification. The relative independence which is the duty of authentic thinking implies a certain reservation with respect to the systems and theses proposed by various existentialists and phenomenologists. We do not simply follow any existentialist or phenomenologist. Nevertheless, we have endeavored to situate our study in contemporary thought, in proof of which we have added the scientific apparatus of extensive footnotes. Is it necessary to point out that these quotations or references may never be understood as arguments? It would have been impossible for us to rethink existential phenomenology in a relatively independent way if we had been unable to profit from the fruits of the thinking offered by the School of Louvain, who~ main representatives are Albert Dondeyne, Alphons de Waehlens, and Herman Leo Van Breda. The attitude in which they met and assimilated contemporary thought was the immediate reason why present-day thinking did not lose its value and why its "climate" itself became the object of philosophical reflection. The "primitive fact" of existential phenomenology was brought to light, so that a relatively independent progress in thought became possible. We do not hesitate to acknowledge explicitly and gratefully that contact with the School of Louvain has been of decisive importance for our thought. Our gratitude goes out most of all to Professor Dondeyne. He would object if anyone were to call himself his disciple. However, if it is agreed that a master is called a master because the indisputable greatness of his thinking urges

3

Introduction

others on to relatively independent thinking, then it must be admitted that Professor Dondeyne has many disciples. For this reason we were very pleased to be honored by a Preface for this study from his hand. We wish to offer him here our sincere thanks. It is our heart-felt wish that this work may be fruitful for all who endeavor to think authentically. Their critique may help us to continue our own progress in genuine thought. WrLLIAM

A.

LUIJPEN,

O.S.A., PH.D.

CHAPTER ONE MAN, THE METAPHYSICAL BEING For twenty-five centuries men have busied themselves with philosophy, but there still is not even a modest number of theses about which philosophers have reached agreement.! Perhaps we may even say that there is not a single philosophical proposition which is not denied by one or the other thinker. While the men of positive science, marveling at the ever-increasing fertility of their chosen field of learning, mock or pity the poor philosopher, every century sees at least one genius propose a new philosophy. Apparently, man is unable to stop philosophizing. He simply cannot give up philosophy. If only the mockers could understand this, they would realize that to laugh at philosophy itself is a kind of philosophy, albeit a bad kind. Whenever a new philosophy makes its appearance, bad or unauthentic philosophers turn their eyes to the new system to see whether or not it presents at last the philosophy. Of course, their expectation meets with disappointment, i.e., they remain bad, unauthentic philosophers. The authentic philosopher knows better, for he realizes that there never was and never will be any such thing as the philosophy. He is keenly aware of the fact that, if the philosophy existed, there would no longer be any true philosopher. 1. THE AUTHENTICITY OF PHILOSOPHY

To Philosophize is Not to Learn a System of Theses. There exist fully-constituted philosophies. History knows a few gifted geniuses who have laid down their thoughts in grandiose masterpieces. 2 What, then, would be more obvious than to express these great systems in complexes of theses and simply learn them? Such an endeavor, however, could have success only with human beings who suffer from great narrowness of mind and fail to realize that the theses of great philosophers contradict one another. This point alone would suffice to reject the view that philosophy is "just lKari Jaspers, Ein/iihrung in die Philosophie, Miinchen, 1957, p. 9. 2"Aber die schaffende Urspriinglichkeit, der wir die grossen philosophischen Gedanken schulden liegt . . . bei Einzelnen, die in ihrer Unbefangenheit und Unabhangigkit als wenige grosse Geister in den Jahrtausenden aufgetreten sind." Jaspers, op. cit., p. 13.

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Man, the Metaphysical Being

5

another subject" to be learned. It would simply be impossible to know which philosophy would have to be "learned," for on what basis would one decide that one system is better than the other? This difficulty, however, is only a minor objection against the view that philosophy is a question of theses. Even if a system would not contain any error whatsoever, the authentic philosopher would have very little use for it. For the truth of these theses is not, or at least not yet, his truth and will never be able to become his truth if he limits himself to simply learning the theses in question, with or without the proofs. For authentic or genuine philosophizing is essentially original; it is a personal affair, a questioning and replying of man himself.3 It is life which raises the philosophical questions. 4 Man has to find a way to consent to his life, but there are so many situations in which he does not really manage to do so. My life is mine, however, and I cannot simply leave it aside as if it does not concern me. It is characteristic of man's being that he maintains a relationship to his own being. Man himself is what he is.5 Accordingly, it is not a mere coincidence that man is called to philosophize in an original and personal way. His whole life becomes authentically human only when he himself lives. Philosophy is authentic philosophy only when the individual man himself philosophizes, when he himself raises questions, when he himself attempts to reply, when he himself endeavors to clear away the obstacles to insight. The questions and answers of a system are impersonal, and the obstacles that have to be cleared away to make an integral formulation possible are irrelevant with respect to a system. If philosophy were merely a question of systems and theses, it would be a boresome thing whose knowledge would no more contribute to making a man more human than the enumeration of the industrial centers of the States or the mining regions of Canada. Nevertheless, it is rather frequent that philosophy is taught and studied in this way. Hence it should not surprise us that it leaves us dissatisfied. For if the questions of the systems are not my 3"Das philosophische Denken muss jederzeit urspriinglich sein. Jeder Mensch muss es seIber vollziehen." Jaspers, op. cit., p. 11. 4 Jaspers, op. cit., pp. 20-26. I)"Dasein ist Seiendes das sich in seinem Sein verstehend zu dies en Sein verhalt. Damit is der formale Begriff von Existenz angezeigt. Dasein existiert. Dasein ist ferncr Seiendes, das je ich selhst bin. Zum existierenden Dasein gehort die Jemeinigkeit als Bedingung der Moglichkeit von Eigentlichkeit und Uneigentlichkeit." Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Tiibingen, 6th impr., 1949, pp. 52-53.

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questions, then the answers are not mine either, so that I never become myself as a philosopher. The whole affair is reduced to what Heidegger calls ({Gerede," i.e., it is simply "talk."6 The philosopher talks as ({one" is accustomed to do in a certain tradition; the object ultimately is the talk itself, devoid of understanding of reality. Speech is no longer an original appropriation and a personal expression of reality, but merely a continued talking and repeating in accordance with what ({one" says in a certain tradition. The end result is a state in which the philosopher no longer knows whether he really understands something or is simply the victim of what has always been said. Heidegger expresses this situation by the term Zweideutigkeit, i.e., ambiguity.7 Philosophy as a Personal Affair. Systematized philosophy is what the French call parole parlee or solidified thought. This solidified thought, however, has its origin in the so-called parole parlante,8 the personal expression of reality. If philosophy is a personal affair, then as parole parlante it can find its starting point nowhere else but in the personal presence of the philosopher who I am to reality. This presence is generally called "experience." It is important, however, that this term be understood in the broadest possible sense. For, without raising here the question what the essence of experience is, it should be clear that there are many ways of experiencing which place us in a determined reality. There is a difference in the experience of a piece of rock, H 2 0, a rose, a mountain pass, a liar, a board of examiners, a police officer, a nice child, and being as being. For this reason we indicate every presence of a subject to reality in the broadest possible way as experience. True, we have not yet stated when an experience can be called philosophical but, nevertheless, it is certain that a philosophy which aspires to be of value must give expression to reality. It follows, therefore, that philosophy must start from a definite experience. If the philosopher were to start from theses, he will never know what he should admit as truth. He does not see reality, but without doubt is, at least at first, only what he sees. The same line of thought applies to philosophical formation. This formation cannot consist in this that the aspirant philosopher is drilled 6"Man versteht nicht mehr so sehr das beredete Seiende, sondern man hiirt schon nur auf das Geredete als so1ches." Heidegger, op. cit., p. 168. 7Sein und Zeit, pp. 173-175. 8Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la perception, Paris, 14th impr., 1953, p. 229.

Man, the Metaphysical Being

7

in certain theses, even if from other sources it would be certain that all these theses are true. There can be question of genuine philosophical training only insofar as the man in charge of the formation aids the aspirant to make him personally see reality. Of course, it may be true that for certain persons because of their future activities it is useful to be subjected to a simple drill in a number of theses, but such a procedure does not have any philosophical value. Even a real formation, i.e., one which does not amount to a kind of mental drill for practical purposes, runs the risk of falsifying the aspirant's philosophical activity, because the aid given to make him personally see reality consists and has to consist also in imparting knowledge of "previously philosophized" philosophy. How often does it not happen that the program does not go beyond this point? What university professors present as philosophy usually looks like philosophy, but far too often is not philosophy.9 An Objection and Clarification. The preceding idea requires to be completed and differentiated lest it give rise to misapprehension. Although the philosopher strives for personal thinking, it would be an illusion to imagine that this thinking can be accomplished independently of tradition. As a philosopher, I am a person, an I, and my philosophical thought is authentic only if it is my philosophical thought. Every person, however, is inserted in a history which is not personal, which he himself has not made. There is nothing we can do about this being-inserted and, therefore, I can never begin to think from zero, as it were, for others have thought before me and I am carried by their thought. I am in the stream of thought established by tradition, if only because I speak its language and thus am imbued with the thoughts embodied in this language. It is impossible to think without language and impossible, likewise, to think without tradition. Does it follow, therefore, that the philosopher has to abandon any claim to personal thought? The reply is definitely in the negative. Although the philosopher is carried by the history of thought, he is called to infuse new life into this history. He fulfils his task when he 9"Die Missdeutungen, von dencn die Philosophie standig umlagert bleibt, werden nun am meisten gefordert durch das, was unsereiner treibt, also durch die Philosophie-professoren. Deren gewohnliches, und auch berechtigtes und sogar niitzliches Geschaft ist es, einige gewisse bildungsmassige Kenntnis von der bisher aufgetretenen Philo sophie zu vermitteln. Das Sieht dann so aus als sei dies se1bst Philosophie, wahrend es hochstenfalls nur Philosophiewissenschaft ist." Heidegger, Einfuhrung in die Metaphysik, Tiibingen, 1953, p. 9.

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makes a profound study of the works of his predecessors. The philosophers of the past have important things to say. In their own way they have given expression to their experience of reality and laid it down in their works. By means of their works they speak to us and enter into contact with us. What is the purpose of this contact? Does it mean that we are invited to make ours their conceptual apparatus and to take over their system? Such an invitation would amount to a seduction to non-authenticity, to a philosophy that is not genuine. It would be a denial of our vocation as philosophers. The true purpose and value possessed by the works of the philosophers of the past are quite different. These works are the vehicle in which they have laid down their experience of reality in order to make us sensitive to the meaning of this reality and to give us access to the wealth of being which they have perceived. Philosophizing always means personal experience and expression of the wealth of being. It is because others preceded us that it is pos~iule for us personally to see something to which otherwise we would perhaps have been blind. If there had been no Plato, our conception of reality and its deepest meaning would have been much more trivial and material, or rather, in the totality of all that is we would perhaps not have experienced, seen and understood what we now understand when we think philosophically about reality. Without St. Augustine, we would perhaps not have been sensitive to the meaning of restlessness in our being-in-the-world. The philosophers of the past speak to us to make us capable of a personal experience of reality, to make us sensitive to the wealth contained in the totality of all that is.lo Once this view is accepted, there is no reason to be scandalized by the existence of many contradictory systemsY What matters is not the system but reality. And in every system some aspect of reality finds expression. Every truly great philosopher was struck by a certain aspect of reality. Perhaps a certain aspect of the wealth of being was unduly elevated by him to the rank of reality pure and simple; a certain experience may have been proclaimed as the only

lOAlbert Dondeyne, "L'historicite dans la philosophie contemporaine," Revue philosophique de Louvain, vol. 54. (1956), p. 6, Contemporary European Though, and Christian Faith, Pittsburgh, 1958, p. 41. llDondeyne, "Dieu et Ie materialisme contemporain, "Essai sur Dieu, l'homme et l'univers, edited by Jacques de Bivort de la Saudee, Paris, 1957, pp. 22-32.

Man, the Metaphysical Being

')

experience. Thus the resulting system is not good but, nevertheless, we cannot do without it. 12 Accordingly, the fact of being inserted in a history which is not of his own making does not render it impossible for the authentic philosopher to think in an autonomous, independent, and personal way. There is, however, a condition-namely, that he take up the past in a creative way, that he endow it with a new life. 13 Evidently, he himself has to do this. He does not contract with any school of thought and does not swear by any formula.14 He does not accumulate knowledge, but listens to reality, no matter from where its voice is heard. 15 When he studies the works of the past, he begins with an attitude of trust in and love of those who speak to him, because he realizes that they do not demand anything else of him than that he himself accept or reject their insights. For ultimately only that is recognized as true which can become a conviction in independent thought. 16 Philosophy as Truth-for-Me. Precisely because systematized philosophy can exist and continue to exist only in assertions and explicitly formulated judgments, there is an obvious temptation to stop and not to go beyond these judgments. However, just as ethics l2"Man sieht so eine grosse Reihe von Weltanschauungen, die man mit dem Namen Materialismus Calles ist Stoff und naturmechanisches Geschehen), Spiritualismus Calles ist Geist), Hylozoismus Cdas All ist eine seelisch lebendige Materie) und unter anderen Gesichtspunkten benannt hat. In allen Fallen wurde die Antwort auf die Frage, was eigentlich das Sein sei, gegeben durch Hinweis auf in der Welt vorkommendes Seiendes, das den besonderen Charakter haben sollte, aus ihm sei alles andere. Aber was ist denn richtig? Die begriindung im Kampfe der Schulen haben in J ahrtausenden nicht vermocht, einen dieser Standpunkte als den wahren zu erweisen. Fiir jeden zeight sich etwas Wahres, namlich eine Anschauung und eine Forschungsweise, die in der Welt etwas zu sehen lehrt. Aber j eder wird falsch, wenn er sich ~um einzigen macht und alles, was ist, durch seine Grundauffassung erklaren will." Jaspers, op. cit., p. 28-29. l3Heidegger, Sein und Zeit. p. 339. 14"The fact that a number of "definite truths" have been discovered previously, does not mean that we do not have a task of our own to fulfill. These truths still have to become ours, they remain to be discovered by us as truths, they remain to be seen in their evidence through our own eyes. Although philosophical activity is an intersubiective undertaking, it is also and especially an adventure each one has to undertake on his own-all philosophy has a moment of solipsism. Even those who adhere to a school will not a priori believe the truth of this or that thesis but at most suspect its truth. A tradition is not a creed, but each one for himself has to travel the road to insight, to the discovery or rediscovery of truth." G. Van Riet, "Geschiedenis van de wijsbegeerte en waarheid," Tijdschrift voor Philosophie, vol. 19 (1957), p. 177. l5Cf. Jaspers, op cit., p. 115. l6Cf. Jaspers, op. cit., pp. 143-145.

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does not consist in this that general laws are valid "somewhere," but in life itself as guided by personally experienced and accepted moral demands, so also philosophy does not consist in assertions and thes(:s, but in the personal expression of reality on the basis of a personal presence to reality.17 The same applies to the principles of philosophy. These principles are not the most general judgments but rather experience itself in its most fundamental and decisive dimension. In systematized philosophies also these fundamental experiences are laid down in explicit judgments. However, to be of real value, they have to be given life again by philosophy conceived as parole parlante, as a personal expression of reality. "Back to reality itself" was the watchword of Husserl, the founder of phenomenology. This principle is valid for all authentic philosophical thinking. While studying systematized philosophies, the philosopher must attempt to return to the reality intended by any statement whatsoever. Only in the presence to reality, in experience, is it possible to arrive at the incontrovertible and to accept it personally. Only in this way does truth become really my truth, and are "talk" and ambiguity overcome.

Truth-far-Me and Intersubjective Truth. The assertion that philosophical truth, to be authentically philosophical, has to be truthfor-me is sometimes misunderstood. Following Kierkegaard, some say that philosophical truth essentially is not truth-for-all, i.e., not generally valid and intersubjective. This view may be found, for instance, in Jaspers' work. In this way the de facto divergence of opinions is changed into an essential characteristic of philosophy.ls Where philosophers would reach agreement, philosophy would cease being philosophy.19 Intersubjectivity would be an exclusive characteristic of scientific truth. The philosopher would have to limit himself to a kind of monologue expressing his strictly personal truth. This view, which was defended by some philosophers of existence, is now antiquated and abandoned, because it implies a hidden con17Cf. J. Plat, "Geschiedenis van de filosofie en waarheid, "Handelingen van het XXIIe Vlaams Filologencongres, Louvain, 1957, pp. 68-74. 18"Das jede Gestalt der Philosophie, unterschieden von den Wissenschaften, der einmiitigen Anerkennung aller entbehrt, das muss in der Natur ihrer Sache liegen." Jaspers, op. cit., p. lO. 19"Was aus zwingenden Grunden von jedermann anerkannt wird, das ist damit eine wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis geworden, ist nicht mehr Philosophie." Jaspers, op. cit., p. 9.

Man, the Metaphysical Being

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tradiction. 20 For, how would anyone seriously endeavor to maintain such a philosophical conception of philosophical truth, unless he presuppose that this conception, as true, is in principle valid for all ?21 And without this presupposition it does not make sense to assert that no philosophical truth is valid for all. Thus the very denial of truthfor-all has to admit what it denies, and without this implicit affirmation the denial cannot have any conceivable meaning. In Jaspers the contradiction does not even remain hidden and merely implicit. For he first asserts that it pertains to the very nature of philosophy that philosophers do not agree and next he claims that the scope and culminating point of penetration into the history of philosophical thought lie in the "moments of communion in the source."22 Jaspers would be right, of course, if he merely wanted to say that philosophical truth differs from the truth revealed by the positive sciences. This difference, however, does not mean that, unlike the latter, the former is not intersubjective. It may be true that intersubjectively to undertake a work of research pertaining to the positive sciences and to verify its results are easier than the intersubjective examination of a philosophical question, so that de facto there exists more agreement in the realm of the positive sciences than in that of philosophy.23 However, in principle every truth is intersubjective because truth is truth. This point is strikingly illustrated by Sartre when he reflects on the origin of anxiety.24 I am anxious, Sartre says, because of the responsibility which I incur through my choice. For when I choose, I choose not only for myself but for all mankind. Suppose that as a laborer I decide to join a Christian organization and not a Communist union. I do this, then, with the conviction that man has to be resigned and should not attempt to establish the kingdom of man on earth, as the Communists want. I choose, therefore, because I am 20Cf. A. de Waehlens, La philosophie de Martin Heidegger, Louvain, 1948, pp. 295-302. 21"La volonte de parler est une meme chose avec la volonte d'etre compris." MerIeau-Ponty, Eloge de la philosophie, Paris, 12th impr., 1953, p. 74. 22"Aber Sinn und Gipfel historischen Eindringens sind die Augenblicke des Einverstandnisses im Ursprung." Jaspers, op. cit., p. 138. 23"Philosophy is not science. However, this does not mean that, contrary to science, philosophy does not possess any acquired truth, but only that its truths are not subject to verification as facts and to precise controls." G. Van Riet, "Geschiedenis van de wijsbegeerte en waarheid," Tijdschrijt voor philosoph ie, vol. 19 (1957), p. 177. 24L'existentialisme est un humanisme, Paris, 1954, pp. 25-30.

,

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convinced of a certain truth. This being-convinced means that I personally have come to the insight that it is true, but also that everyone must admit this truth because it is true. For this reason Sartre can say: when I decide, I decide for the whole of mankind. 25 Accordingly, in principle there is nothing arbitrary about truth, in principle there is no chaos in life.

De facto, however, truth is not recognized by all. This fact should not become an inducement to profess a relativistic pacifism, a "live and let live" which leaves each one his truth or error without attempting to arrive at a mutual agreement. A society which is truly worthy of man demands a common acceptance of the truth. The essential intersubjectivity of truth reveals itself as an impossibility to barter with truth. Although truth has to be unveiled by man, it transcends us human beings: we are subjected to truth. Truth as truth is disowned when tolerance is interpreted as relativism. In such a case it is impossible still to speak of truth. 26 The awareness which the true philosopher has of the absolute right to recognition that is implied by truth makes him to some extent intransigent. Truth is truth and, therefore, has to be recognized as such. Whoever for any reason whatsoever is interested in doing violence to the truth wilI find the philosophers against him. In a certain sense the philosophers speak as representatives of the human race and protect one of man's most precious abilities-namely, the one of becoming truly human. When a society bases itself on lies, the philosophers will either fall as martyrs 27 or function as puppets and thus cease to be philosophers. 28 Philosophy and Usefulness. For the positive scientist philosophy is a joke. 29 In self-defense the philosopher could be tempted perhaps to demonstrate the usefulness of philosophy. Such an effort, however, 25Ibid., p. 27. 26Cf. Albert Dondeyne, "L'idee de tolerance," Les etudes philosophiques, vol. XII (1957), Actes du IXe Congres des Societes de philosophie de langue francaise, pp. 398-399. 27Cf. G. Verbeke, "Apologia philosophiae," Tijdschrift voor Philosophie, vol. 19 (1957), pp. 580-583. 28Herman Leo Van Breda, "Les entretiens de Varsovie," Tijdschrift voor Philosophie, vol. XIX (1957), pp. 713-721. 29"On ne pourra jamais dire a que! degre l'image de l'atelier d'usine et celie du laboratoire auront obsede les philosophes. Et ici it y aurait a creuser profondement. Complexe d'inferiorite du philosophe en face du savant-mais du philosophe qui a trahi. Le philosophe, fidele, lui, ne cedera jamais." Marcel, Du retus d l'invocation, Paris, 11th impr., 1940, p. 86.

Man, the Metaphysical Being.

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would be in vain. so How would it be possible for those who do not see the value of philosophy to attribute any other meaning to the term "useful" than the usefulness which they experience in the pursuit of their own sciences. Nuclear physics, biology, economics, psychotechnique, etc., are useful-namely, for the world of labor in which they are integrated-but with respect to this world philosophy is wholly useless. Sl As Josef Pieper expressed it in a splendid address concerning philosophy and the world of labor: a first description of philosophy is "an act through which we pass beyond the world of labor."s2 The philosophical act leaves far behind itself "usefulness" as it is strived for in the world of labor. Philosophy is characterized by a "uselessness" which it cannot abandon under penalty of ceasing to be philosophy.sS Precisely, however, because our society tends more and more to become a technocratic organization of labor,34 philosophy is not only useful-albeit in a totally different sense from its technocratic meaning-but even necessary, at least for many. This assertion cannot be proved outside the pursuit of philosophical thinking. The understanding of the usefulness and the necessity of philosophy presupposes presence to the reality called philosophical thinking, to the experience of genuine philosophizing. Because this reality is absent in one who is wholly absorbed in a technocratic mentality, it must be admitted that whatever the philosopher states regarding the act of philosophizing can at most be accepted in good faith by the non-philosopher. Moreover, as was explained previously, there exists the difficulty that such an acceptance is nonphilosophical. As a rule, therefore, a plea for the usefulness of philosophy fails to convince the non-philosopher. Philosophers, on the other hand, do not need such a plea, because the value of philosophy clearly reveals itself in philosophical thinking itself.s5 SO"Die Philosophie 5011 sich also rechtfertigen. Das ist unmoglich. Sie kann sich nicht rechtfertigen aus einem anderen, fUr das sie infolge ihrer Brauchbarkeit Berechtigung habe. Sie kann sich nur wenden an die Krafte, die in jedem Menschen in der Tat zum Philosophieren drangen." K. Jaspers, op. cit., p. 16. slJosef Pieper, Was heisst Philosophieren?, Miinchen 1956, p. 23-34. 32"Philosophieren ist ein Akt, in welchem die Arbeitswelt iiberschritten wird." Pieper, op. cit., p. 12. 33Cf. Verbeke, art. quoted in footnote 27, p. 598. 34Cf. Remy C. Kwant, Het arbeidsbeslel, Utrecht, 1957, and Philosophy of Labor, Pittsburgh, 1960. 35"J ede Philo sophie definiert sich selbst durch ihre Verwirklichung. Was Philosophie sei, das muss man versuchen. Dann ist Philosophie in eins der Vollzug des lebendigen Gedankens und die Besinnung auf diesen Gedanken (die Reflexion) oder das Tun und das Dariiberreden. Aus dem eigenen Versuch

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In this chapter we intend to make the reader experience the value of philosophy by raising the philosophical question par excellence, the metaphysical question. By actuating philosophical thinking itself it is possible to make the reader experience "true to life" what philosophy is and how enormous the value is of the "useless" thinking of the philosopher. We are convinced that philosophy cannot be dispensed with in the development of our modern society. Modern man is more and more in danger of becoming the victim of a technocratic mentality. The more this process advances and extends itself, the more difficult it becomes for man to consent to his existence. The questions which arise in such a situation are always of a philosophical nature. Thus it is quite natural that we will begin by describing man as laborer to show how man in his labor has called technology to his aid. In itself this aid is a benefit to mankind. Man, however, has allowed himself to be dominated by his own creation. Technology has become a dictator, and society a technocracy However, since laboring is a mode of being human, and the modern laborer a type of man, it may be good first to point out some fundamental essential characteristics of being-human in general. In this way it will be easier to describe being a laborer, a technologist, and a technocrat. 2. To BE MAN IS TO EXIST

Whosoever endeavors to penetrate into the history of thought will be forced to admit that the effort to describe what man is amounts to the search for a difficult balance. Both the materialistic systems and the exaggerated spiritualistic systems clearly testify to the difficulties which thought encounters when it wants to express what man is. At the same time these systems are the result of a certain lack of equilibrium in thought. This does not mean that they are useless, for there is no philosophy which is simply not concerned with anything. Moments of equilibrium, however, are relatively rare in the history of philosophy. Such a moment of equilibrium is present in the contemporary philosophy known as existential phenomenology. This philosophy knows how to retain the values perceived by materialists and exaggerated spiritualists, without falling into the onesideness of either heraus erst kann man wahrnehmen, was in der Welt als Philosophie uns begegnet." Jaspers, op. cit., p. 14.

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system. 36 It 1S in the usage of the term "existence," which expresses one of the most fundamental essential characteristics of man, that this equilibrium of vision regarding man is, as it were, crystallized.3T This point will be made clear in this section.

a. Existence as Being-in-the Warld Materialistic Monism. All materialistic systems agree in this that they consider man as the result of processes and forces, just as things also are the result of processes and forces. A materialist, therefore, would say that the being of man is a being-in-the-world in the sense that, just like all things, man is a thing in the midst of other things of the world, a fragment of nature, a moment in the limitless evolution of the cosmos. 3S This idea is not so foolish that it can be dismissed as wholly impertinent. It expresses a valuable vision, it accounts for a reality which may never be lost sight of, it takes seriously the irrefutable fact that man is whatever he is only "on the basis of materiality."39 For there is no spiritual knowledge without sense perceptible objects, without brains, without physiological processes, without sense images, or without words. There is no spiritual love without sensitive love. There is no personal conscience without a biological substructure. There is no artistic act without expression in matter. Thus it is possible, for instance, to speak as a biologist about knowledge, love, or conscience, and the assertions of the biologist are concerned with reality. The example shows how it is possible that a certain way of thinking is materialistic, although the thinker in question does not at all explicitly state that man is a thing. Materialism is very often camouflaged. It reveals itself most of the time as scientism or physicalism, as an over-evaluation of the physical sciences, which are ex professo concerned with things and utilize categories and schemata 86This point may be found more extensively in almost every study of existential philosophy. For a very clear explanation of the critique which the philosophers of existence address to the materialists and the idealists, d. Dondeyne, "Beschouwingen by het atheistisch existentialisme," Tijdschrift voor Philosophie, vol. 13 (1951), pp. 1-41. s7Cf. Merleau-Ponty, Sens et non-sens, pp. 142-143. sSCf. Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 142. 89Cf. Dondeyne, art. quoted in footnote 11, p. 24.

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that are exclusively applicable to things. Esteem for science becomes scientism when one asserts that there are no other realities than those discovered by the physical sciences. Scientism is a materialistic theory for, apart from the material things with which the physical sciences busy themselves, nothing else is insofar as the adherent of scientism is concerned. With respect to man, materialism means, according to the expression of Ie Senne, a "detotalization of reality."40 Materialism attempts to explain man, i.e., to express what man is, to account for the totality of man, but fails because it indicates only one aspect of the totality, albeit an essential one. Materialism is a kind of monism in which there is in the totality of reality room only for one type of beingnamely, the being of a material thing. Therefore, man also is a thing, and human life is a concatenation of processes. If one were to claim merely that man is also in some way a thing and that his life has also process-like aspects, there would be nothing wrong with the assertion. Materialistic monism, however, means the "detotalization of the reality" which is man, the neglect of an essential aspect, because the assertion that man is a thing does not account for the undeniable fact that man exists-for-himself and that things existfor-man. The being of man has meaning for man himself and the being of things has meaning for man, while things have no meaning either for themselves or for one another. If there were nothing else but things, nothing would have any meaning. Materialism, then, neglects the fact that it is only with and through man that there can be question of things and processes. For this reason alone the being of man cannot be like the being of a thing. Accordingly, it is the subjectivity of man which is simply omitted by the materialist. 41 The being of man on the proper level of his beingman is a being-conscious and a being-free, by virtue of which man can name himself. Man is a self, an "I," a person. As long as the sciences speak of the physiological processes involved in knowing, they do not speak about knowledge itself; as long as they refer to the biological substructures of conscience, they do not speak of conscience itself. 4oQuoted by Dondeyne, ibid., pp. 24-25. 41"]e ne suis pas Ie resultat ou l'entrecroisement des multiples causalites qui determinent mon corps ou mon 'psychisme' j e ne puis pas me penser comme une partie du monde, comme Ie simple objet de la biologie, de la psychologie et de la sociologie, ni fermer sur moi l'univers de la science. Tout ce que ie sais du monde, meme par science, ie Ie sais a partir d'une vue mienne ou d'une experience du monde sans laquelle les symboles de la science ne voudraient rien dire." Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la perception, p. II.

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As soon as they claim that what they are saying refers to knowledge and conscience themselves, they go beyond their domain and become a philosophy-namely, that of materialism. Materialism actually lives by virtue of a hidden contradiction. 42 For it is entirely impossible for a materialist, as a materialistic philosopher, to account for his own being if he continues to hold fast to the conception that there is only one type of being-namely, the being of a thing. The contradiction consists in this that the materialist, on the one hand, admits that tables and chairs, geological layers, and rain showers are incapable of creating a philosophy while, on the other, as a materialistic philosopher, he wants to explain his own being by means of the same categories through which he expresses the being of tables and chairs, geological layers and rain showers. 43 In materialism we find not only the material world but also the materialistic philosopher, who is a human being. 44 Not everything is material, for man is spirit also.

Spiritualistic Monism. The fact that things and processes have a meaning for man as a conscious subject justifies us in attributing a certain priority to subjectivity with respect to things.45. Without man's subjectivity things and the world would have no meaning. \Vhen things are affirmed, they are affirmed in their being-for-man, and outside this affirmation there is no meaning. This point is exaggerated by spiritualistic monism, i.e., the relative priority of subjectivity with respect to material things is explicitated by it as an absolute priority. The absoluteness attributed to subjectivity amounts to this that the being of material things is reduced to that of subjectivity, 42"Les vues scientifiques se10n lesquelles je suis un moment du monde sont toujours naives et hypocrites, parce qu'elles sousentendent, sans la mentionner, cette autre vue, celie de la conscience, par laquelle d'abord un monde se dispose autour de moi et commence a exister pour moi." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. II. 43Cf. Merleau-Ponty, Sense et non-sens, p. 143. H"Materialism, which wants to reduce the totality of being to an interplay of moving particles of matter which can be explained only in a causal way, cannot be refuted throuirh a priori concepts. It does not contain a contradiction in terms but a practical contradiction, i.e., in materialism we find, in addition to the system of the material world with its causal laws, also the affirmation of this world and the conscious appeal to causal explanations. This appeal is an act of consciousness which, considered in its essential structure, transcends causal determinism." Albert Dondeyne, "Belang voor de metaphysica van een accurate bestaansbeschrijving van de mens als kennend wezen," Kenleer en Metaphysiek (Verslag van de 12de alg. verg. der Vereniging v. Thomistische Wijsb. en van de 3de studiedagen v.h. Wijsgerig Gezelschap te Leuven) , Nijmegen, 1947, p. 39. 45"Un au-deli de la pensee est impensable" (Ed. Le Roy).

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of the conscious self. Thus the direction in which the "detotalization of reality" is accomplished in spiritualistic monism is exactly opposite to that taken by materialism. While materialism simply neglects the meaning of subjectivity, spiritualistic monism lets the density of material things evaporate into the thin air of "contents of consciousness."46 In the next step the "other self" likewise is conceived as a content of consciousness. Finally, they would have us admit that everything which we call a reality is nothing else than a function in an all-embracing Self or absolute Spirit.47 Spiritualistic monism takes seriously the element neglected by materialism-namely, the originality (aus-sich-sein) of subjectivity. As a subject, man cannot be the result of material processes; hence the subject is original (aus-sich). However, if this originality is exaggerated, it easily leads to a view which makes this originality its own origin (aus-sich becomes duych-sich). Subjectivity becomes a kind of divine Ego before which the things of the world lose their consistency.48 Such a subjectivity, however, which is closed upon itself and fully self-sufficient, is not a human kind of subjectivity. Thus spiritualistic monism retains nothing of the fundamental and undeniable intuition of materialism that whatever man is he is only "on the basis of materiality."

Man's B eing-in-the-W orid. In the first section of this chapter we remarked that the authentic philosopher is not scandalized by the existence of contradictory systems. Philosophy is not concerned with the system as such but with seeing reality, and every system contains the expression of a certain vision of reality. There is no philosophy which is simply concerned with nothing. This thought will guide us when we attempt to express in our own way what it is to be man. We reject both materialistic and spiritualistic monism, but give full value to the reality which these systems have sighted. What, then, is man? To be man is fundamentally and essentially to exist. 49 This term may be understood quite literally as to "ex-sist." 46"L'idealisme transcendental lui aussi 'reduit' Ie monde, puisque, s'iI Ie rend certain, c'est a titre de pensee ou conscience du monde et comme Ie simple correlatif de notre connaissance de sorte qu'i! devient immanent a la conscience et que I'aseite des choses est par Ia supprimee." Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de fa perception, p. X. 47Cf. Dondeyne, essay quoted in footnote 11, pp. 26-27. 48Cf. Dondeyne, article quoted in footnote 36, pp. 24-25. 49Cf. Merleau-Ponty, Sens et non-sens, p. 143.

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Man is a subject, undoubtedly, but he is an existing subject, a subject which places itself outside itself, in the world. 50 As Heidegger expresses it, to be man is to-be-in-the-world 51 or, what amounts to the same, Dasein. 52 The German prefix Da indicates the eccentric character of man's subjectivity. The subject which is man simply does not occur without being involved in the world, it presents itself only in relation to the world. This assertion cannot be demonstrated in the strict sense of the term, i.e., it cannot be derived with certainty from another and more fundamental insight. The truth of the assertion can be indicated53 only by showing that no real mode of being man can be conceived which is not a mode of being-in-the-world. 54 There.is no mode of being-man which can be described without being obliged to name the world in the description. The emphasis which we put on the importance of the subject is demanded by the expression being-in-the-world, for with respect to the being of man this expression could be misunderstood. Materialistic monism could appropriate this expression and mean by it that man is in the world as a pen is in a drawer or a cigar in a box. 55 Such a view would be a failure to recognize man as a subject. Moreover, there can be question of a cigar in a box only when a subject surveys in a glance the distance of the cigar to the sides of the box, i.e., only when we admit an existing subject. Accordingly, that man exists means that the being of man is a being-conscious-in-the-world, a dwelling in the world, a being-at-home-in-the-world. 56

Consciousness. The same thought gradually arose also in the works ·of Husser!' While Heidegger speaks of man, Husserl prefers U 50 La premiere verite est bien 'Je pense,' mais i condition qu'on entende par Ii 'je suis i moi' en etant au monde." Merleau-Ponty, PhCnomenologie de fa perception, p. 466. 51Sein und Zeit, p. 43. 52Ibid., p. 41. 53"Le rapport au monde, tel qu'il se pro nonce infatigablement en nous, n'est rien qui puisse etre rendu plus clair par une analyse: la philo sophie ne peut que Ie replacer sous notre regard, l'offrir a notre constatation." Merleau-Ponty, PhCnomenologie de la perception, p. XIII. 54Cf. Sein und Zeit, pp. 56-57. 55Cf. ibid., p. 54. 56"Das In-Sein meint so wenig ein raumliehes 'Ineinander' Vorhandener als 'in' urspriinglieh gar nicht eine raumliche Beziehul).g der genannten Art bedeutet; 'in' stammt von innanwohen, habitare, ~ich aufh<:llten; 'an' bedeutet: ich bin g-ewoll11t, vertraut mit, ieh pflege etwas; es hat die Bedeutung von colo im Sinne von habito und diligo." Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 54.

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to speak of consciousness. The emphasis, therefore, is different. Heidegger's philosophy has a more anthropological orientation, while Husserl's thought is more directly an occasion for epistemological questions. 57 Consciousness, however, is always and of necessity consciousness of something-namely, of something which is not consciousness itself. Consciousness is essentially orientation to something or intentionality. If the "something" which is not consciousness itself is thought away, consciousness itself also is thought away. For otherwise consciousness would have to be thought of as consciousness of nothing, which is not consciousness. 58 The full emphasis has to fall upon "something which is not consciousness itself," for spiritualistic monism also makes use of the expression "consciousness is consciousness of something." Its "something," however, is nothing else than consciousness itself. Consciousness is conceived as closed and fully self-sufficient, and that of which it becomes conscious is conceived as a content of consciousness. Such a consciousness, however, does not occur, it is not a human consciousness, for human consciousness is always and of necessity involved in a world which is the world itself and not a content of a consciousness. 59 Consciousness is not locked up in itself but is intentional; it exists. 60 Can the same affirmation be made with .respect to consciousness insofar as it is self-consciousness? The reply has to be in the affirmative. I am conscious of myself as, say, a walter, a jailer, an engineer, a teacher, a New Yorker, as just, as a thief·, or whatever else it may be. But what else are these modes of being-man than modes of beingin-the-world? The same applies to the consciousness of the modes of being-man which are usually called "psychical activities." For instance, I am conscious that I hear, see, taste, feel, that I am sad, happy, or bored. But to see, hear, etc. cannot be conceived otherwise than as seeing-something, hearing-something, and sadness, happiness and boredom cannot be understood without a certain outlook presented to me by the world. We may not yet stop our explanation here, for one could ask whether the conscious self exists necessarily. By the self we mean 57This does not mean that the epistemological questions implied by beingin-the-world escape Heidegger. Cf. ibid., pp. 59-63. 58Cf. Marcel, Journal Metaphysique, p. 26. 50Cf. Merleau-Ponty, Sens et non-sens, p. 143. GOCf. Merleau-Ponty, Sens et non-sens, pp. 143-144.

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the subject-"I," the subject which is always identical with itself and which we express when we say: HI hear," "I see," HI am bored," the subject which is the source of actions on the basis of which I am ultimately called a jaiier, an engineer, just, or a thief. Concerning this self, we can only assert that it does not occur otherwise than as the source or origin of actions which are mediately or immediately directed to the world. We never meet an isolated self.6! As soon as man says "I," he expresses himself as a being-in-the-world. 62 It was our intention to stress this point when above we said that that the self posits itself only in relation. My Body. The idea of existence as expressing the essence of our being-man imposes itself also through the analysis of the meaning of the body. This is the approach preferred by Gabriel Marcel and Merleau-Ponty. Let us point out first of all, however, that it is necessary to conceive the body here really as the human body. My body is not just one of the many pertaining to the large family of bodies. 63 My body is mine because it is fused with the subject which I am. It pertains to the side of the subject. 64 My hands do not belong to the world that can be seized, my feet to the world that can be walked upon, my eyes to the visible world, my ears to the audible world, and my skin with its sensitivity does not pertain to the hard, soft, angular, sticky, warm, cold, tasty world. My body is not a thing among other things; it is mine, but in a very different sense from that in which my golf clubs or books are mine. My body, as mine, is interpenetrated by subjectivity, it is "subject-body" (Merleau-Ponty), it is not something which I "have" (Marcel). Thus we have to discard the view that my body means what is asserted of bodies in books about physiology.65 For in these books 61"Si Ie sujet est en situation . . . c'est qu'i1 ne realise son ipseite qu'en etant effectivement corps et en entrant par ce corps dans Ie monde." MerleauPonty, Phenomenologie de la perception, p. 467. 62"Im Ich-sagen spricht sich das Dasein als in-der-Welt-sein aus." Heidegger, Scin und Zeit, p. 321. 63Jean-Paul Sartre, L'etre et Ie neant, Paris, 29th impr., 1950, p. 278. 64"Le corps objectif n'est pas la verite du corps phenomenal, c'est-a-dire la verite du corps tel que nous Ie vivons, iI n'en est qu'une image appauvrie, et Ie probleme des relations de l'ime et du corps ne concerne pas Ie corps objectif qui n'a qu'une existence conceptuelle, mais Ie corps phenomenal." Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la perception, p. 493. 65"En ce qui concerne Ie corps d'autrui, iI nous faut apprendre a Ie distinguer du corps objectif tel que Ie decrivent les livres de psysiologie." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 403.

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there is no question of the self, while the body is human precisely because of subjectivity. Once this point is understood, it is easy to see also that my body is the transition from me to my world, that my body is the place where I appropriate my world,66 that it grafts me on the realm of things, and that it secures for me a solid or a labile standpoint in the world. It is also because I have hands with five fingers that can grasp the world in a certain way, different from the way in which I could seize it if 'r had only one finger on each hand; it is also because I have feet that the world can be walked upon in a certain way, different from the one I would use if I had wings or webfeet; it is also because I have ears that the world is for me a world of sound; it is also because I have eyes that the world is for me a field of vision; it is also from the standpoint which is my body that I call Mount McKinley high and the sidewalk low, that I say that Sirius is far away and my desk nearby,61 that fire is hot and that ice is cold. My body, therefore, is situated on the side of the subject which I am, but at the same time it involves me in the world of things. My body opens me for the world, or rather, opens me toward the world, and signifies my standpoint in this world. 6s My body keeps the visible scene constantly alive, animates and nourishes it.60 When my body disintegrates, my world likewise "goes to pieces,"1o and the complete dissolution of my body means a breach with the world and at the same time death-the end of my being as being-conscious-in-the-world, the end of my being-man.l1 Accordingly, my body must be conceived as intentionality, as existence; it is essentially the giving of meaning to the world. Although my body lies on the side of the subject, nevertheless it is involved in the world. Usually "my body knows more of the world than I myself."12 This point shows itself when one thinks of such 66Cf. Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 180. 67Cf. Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 502 6s u Mon corps est aussi ce qui m'ouvre au monde et m'y met en situation." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 192. 60u Le corps propre est dans Ie monde comme Ie coeur dans I'organisme: i1 maintient continuellement en vie Ie spectacle visible, i1 l'anime et Ie nourrit interieurement, i1 form avec lui un systeme." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 235. 10"Or, si Ie monde se pulverise, ou se disloque, c'est parce que Ie corps propre a cesse d'etre corps connaissant, d'envelopper tous les objects dans une prise unique." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 327. l1Cf. Merleau-Ponty, La structure du comportement, Paris, 3rd impr., 1953, p.226. 12Cf. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomen%gie de la perception, p. 276.

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acts as walking, swimming, skating, cycling, typing, doing the dishes, playing the piano, etc. When I am typing, my fingers, my "handsubject," knows more of the keys than the conscious subject which I am. 73 My eyes, my ears, and my feet know their way around in the world much better than I myself ;74 my sexual body knows more of the other sex than I; my lips know certain prayers much better than I myself.

Refiection on the Sciences. Finally, the idea of existence, as expression of man's essence, imposes itself inevitably through the reflection of the scientists on the nature of the objectivity which is revealed in their sciences. The exercise of this reflection evidently is not the pursuit itself of these sciences; for instance, to reflect on physical science and its objective value is not to study physical science. Such a reflection is a philosophical task, just as also the rejection of philosophy is a philosophy, albeit a bad one. The reflection in question has been performed by Heisenberg, von Weizsacker, Buytendijk, and others.75 It showed that the objectivity of the sciences may not be understood in an objectivistic sense,76 i.e., objectivity may not be conceived as the meaning which the world would possess in itself, independently of man-as-the-purpose-of-the-world. Epistemological considerations show that the objectivity of the sciences must be conceived as a well-determined realm of objectivity devised by man and coconstituted by the fundamental interest of the sciences in question. The objectivity of the sciences, the reality which they reveal, is not independent of man, but is only a true reply to a definite scientific question of the subject which man is, and has a function in relation to the fundamental interest which is specific for a given science. In other words, the objective world, better still, the objective worlds, of 73Cf. Remy C. Kwant, "De geslotenheid van Merleau-Ponty's wijsbegeerte," Tijdschrift v. Philosophie, vol. XIX (1957), pp. 223-224. 74"I1 Y a done un autre sujet au-dessous de moi, pour qui un monde existe avant que je sois Ja et qui y marquait rna place. Cet esprit captif ou naturel, c'est mon corps, non pas Ie corps momente qui est !'instrument de mes choix personnelles et se fixe sur tel ou tel monde, mais Ie systeme de 'fonctions' anonymes qui enveloppent toute fixation particuliere dans un projet generaL" Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la perception, p. 294. 75 Cf. F. J. J. Buytendijk, "Vernieuwing in de Wetenschap," Annalen van het T hijmgenootschap, vol. 42 (1954), pp. 230-249. 76"Physical science always presupposes man and, as Bohr expresses it, we have to become aware of it that we are not merely spectators but always players in the spectacle of life." Werner Heisenberg, "Das Weltbild der heutigen Physik," Die Kunste im technischen Zeitalter, Munchen, 1954, p. 52. Quoted by Buytendijk, op. cit., p. 240.

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the sCiences are inseparably attached to the questions raised by the subject. 77 Accordingly, the subject is fastened to many worlds, and it is this that is meant by the philosophers when they call man "existence."78 When the sciences observe that they are unable to make assertions about nature in itself in an objective way-they really mean in an objectivistic way-because man and his fundamental interests are always involved in it, they implicitly admit that man must be concei ved as existence, as being-conscious-in-the-world. 79

A Misunderstanding. All these preceding considerations should be kept in mind when the terms "existence" or "existential" are used. De facto, however, it is only rarely done with the result that a terminology as technical as that of phenomenology is sometimes used as a kind of jargon by which an attempt is made to give the greatest nonsense a chance of being admitted as truth. Many old problems are taken up again or rejected as pseudo-problems by the philosophy of existence, and this leads some to the conclusion that as an "existentialist" one can say anything as long as it is "personal." Many old terms receive a new meaning, which others fail to perceive and on the basis of this lack of perception they attribute to themselves the right to reject existential thinking. One of these misunderstandings we will discuss here briefly, because the reply to it fits in with the subject matter of our discussion. The accent placed on existence, so it is said, means neglect of the idea of essence, which is indispensable in genuine philosophy.80 The reply is extremely simple: the emphasis given to existence means precisely the stressing of the importance attached to the classical idea of essence for, when the philosopher of existence calls man existence, he wants to express the view that being-conscious-in-the-world constitutes the essence of man. 81 This being-conscious is that through which man is man and not a thing, a pure spirit, or a divine Being. 77C£. Buytendijk, op. cit., p. 240. 78"Ce concept (namely, the "concept-limite d'objectivite absolue") revenait

en somme a celui de 'monde desert' ou de 'monde sans les hommes', c'est-a-wre une contradiction, puisque c'est par la realite humaine qu'il y a un monde." Sartre, L' etre et Ie neant, p. 369. 79Cf. H. C. van de Hulst and C. A. van Peursen, Phaenomenologie en Natuurwetenschap, Utrecht, 1953. BOOne can appeal here to explicit texts of the philosophers of existence themselves. They constantly repeat that there is no such thing as human nature. However, in this expression "nature" must be understood as "part of nature," i.e., as a thing. 81"In-Sein dagegen meint eine Seinsverfassung des Daseins und ist ein Existenzial." Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 54.

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Accordingly, we must say that things, pure spirits, and God do not exist, i.e., they are essentially distinct from man. 82 Being-consciousin-the-world constitutes what man essentially is. Man does not enter into the world because there happens to be a world and it is up to him to enter it or not or to withdraw from it at his discretion. There is only one way possible for man to withdraw from the world-namely, by death. But through death he ceases to be man, for neither the immortal subjectivity nor the physico-chemical mass which after death is removed from the world of men is man. It is possible for man to withdraw from this or that world, but in doing so he inevitably enters into a new world. To withdraw definitely from the world can be accomplished only by giving up one's being-man. Accordingly, existence is not a property which man has or does not have or which he attributes or does not attribute to himself. Man is not first man and then enters or refuses to enter into a relation with the world. 83 To exist is a so-called existentiale, i.e., it is an essential characteristic of being man. 84 Man is embodied subjectivityin-the-world. 85 • At present philosophers in general acknowledge the truth of this assertion. The catastrophic historical events of the past decades have contributed very much to the fact that this aspect of being-man is no longer minimized. However, the principal consequence of the idea of existence is still far from being generally accepted. This consequence is concerned with the ontological status, the mode of being pertaining to things of the world and to the world itself.

h. The Meaning of tbe World If the idea of existence, as the expression of an essential aspect of man, is really taken seriously, there cannot be any misunderstanding about the mode of being of the world. If man is attached to the world, the world likewise is attached to man, in such a way that it is no longer possible to speak about a world-without-man. In other 82Cf. Dondeyne, "Beschouwingen bij het atheische existentialisme," Tijdschrift v. Philosophie, vol. XIII (1951), pp. 6-10. 83"Das In-Sein ist nach dem Gesagten keine 'Eigenschaft', die es zuweilen hat, zuweilen auch nicht, ohne die es sein kCinnte so gut wie mit ihr. Der Mensch "ist' nicht und hat uberdies noch ein Seinsverhaltnis zur 'Welt', die er sich gelegentlich zulegt. Dasein ist nie 'zunachst' ein gleichsam in-sein-freies-Seiendes, das zuweilen die Laune hat, eine 'Beziehung' zur Welt aufzunehmen." Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 57. 84Cf. Heidegger, ibid., pp. 42 and 54. 85"N ous ne sommes pas esprit et corps, conscience en face du monde, mais esprit incarne, etre-au-monde." Merleau-Ponty, Sens et non-sens, p. 148.

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words, the world is radically human. The thought of existence forces us not only constantly to say something of the object pole when we want to affirm something of the subject pole, but also reversely to name the subject pole when we want to speak of the object pole.

The Cultural World. At first sight, this assertion may sound strange. Let us try to make its depth and scope gradually more accessible. We may start with a few very simple examples. Entering the hall of a stately mansion, I see a toy gun, a cap, and a torn glove. They are part of a world, a child's world, of which I will not understand anything unless I include the child in my understanding. This part of the world betrays immediately the presence of man and without this little man it cannot be understood in its true sense. Likewise, a full ashtray, an untidy laboratory, a well-groomed garden, a bombedout city, etc. cannot be understood without the presence of man. Thus we should speak of a world for the farmer, a world ior the commercial traveller, a world for the journalist, for the politici:lll, the hermit, etc. The essential element of all these worlds is to-ue-worJdfor-man; without man, or rather, without a certain form of being man, nothing can be understood of all these worlds. What these worlds are cannot be expressed without naming man. Although these examples are easy to understand, they do not sufficiently illustrate the meaning of the humanity of the world. For one could make the remark that all these examples merely describe cultural worlds; obviously, such worlds cannot be understood without man's influence precisely because man's influence makes the world a cultural world. But what about the world of trees, animals, plants, seas, mountains, continents, and my fellow men? It is precisely here that there are difficulties, because we have become accustomed to consider man and the world separate from each other. Even those who accept the idea of existence as expressing the "ex-centric" character of subjectivity, often lose what they have gained on spiritualistic monism by conceiving the world as a world which even without man is what it is, as a N atur an sich, a monde-en-soi, a world in itseli, an agglomeration of brute realities. For, a world conceived as a reality isolated from man isolates man as subject again from his world. This means that the subject is once more locked up in itself. The result is that if one asserts that man knows things and the world, knO\dedge has to be conceived as a process which takes place "fr0111 within." Thus one is faced with the impossible task of explaining how it is possible for a subject that is locked up in itself to establish outside

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itself contact with a real world by means of a process ocurring "from within." The reality of an external world thus has to be proved from an internal world. This problem is traditionally called the problem of knowledge. 86

The Natural World. In this chapter we would like to avoid as much as possible all epistemological and gnoseological questions because they will be considered ex professo in the next chapter. However, it is not very well possible to avoid them entirely. We meet them here, for example, when we raise the question concerning the mode of being proper to the world. The problem is to show that the world in which man as a subject is involved is radically human, so that it is impossible to speak about a world-without-man. The point is evidently clear as far as cultural worlds are concerned. But what is the situation with respect to the natural world-let us simply say, the world which man merely perceives? Is this world not in itself, separate from man? &an's description as existence forces us to conceive the world in which man as a subject is involved as being a real world. This assertion may sound trivial. It would be trivial, indeed, if there was no spiritualistic monism which makes the reality of the world evaporate into the "thin air" of contents of consciousness. It is precisely this point which we want to deny because otherwise nothing would remain of the reality of the world. As subject, man is involved in things which are not contents of consciousness but the solid and immovable massiveness and density of reality.87 It is meaningless to object that such an assertion simply eliminates the whole problem of knowledge. 88 Obviously, there can be no question of proving a real external world from the consciousness of an internal world. However, such a proof 86"Je eindeutiger man nun festhalt, dass das Erkennen zunachst und eigentlich 'drinnen' ist, ... urn so voraussetzungsloser glaubt man in der Frage nach dem Wesen der Erkenntnis und der Aufklarung des Verhaltnisses zwischen Subjekt und Obj ekt vorzugehen. Denn nunmehr erst kann ein Problem entstehen, die Frage namlich: wie kommt dieses erkennende Subjekt aus seiner inneren 'Sphare' hinaus in eine-'andere und aussere', wie kann das Erkennen iiberhaupt einen Gegestand haben, wie muss der Gegenstand selbst gedacht werden, damit am Ende das Subj ekt ihn erkennt, ohne dass es den Sprung in eine andere Sphare zu wagen braucht?" Heidegger, S ein und Zeit, p. 60. 87"La verite n' 'habite' pas seulement l' 'home interieur', ou plutot il n'y a pas d'homme interieur, I'homme est au monde, c'est dans Ie monde qu'il se connait. Quand j e reviens a moi a partir due dogmatisme de sens commun ou du dogmatisme de la science, je retrouve non pas un foyer de verite intrinseque, mais un sujet voue au monde." Merleau-Ponty, Phenomen%gie de la perception, p. v. 88e£. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 61.

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becomes superfluous as soon as the subject is conceived as existing, as involved in the world. s9 It does not make sense to ask if there is a real world, for the world is precisely that without whose reality man is not existence and, consequently, not man. If there is a problem of knowledge, the terms in which this problem is expressed will have to be supplied by knowledge as it really occurs and not by a philosophical system of knowledge. 90 But knowledge as it occurs appears as a mode of existing pertaining to a subject, as a mode of being-in-thereal-world.91 4Ihe real world in which man exists as a subject is not a worldwithout-man, not a brute reality, a world in itself.92 The idea of existence, as expressing the essence of man, makes a contradiction of the thought construct "a world-without-man." As existence man is attached to the world, so that reversely also the world is attached to man. It is never possible for me to ask whether there is a worldwithout-man or what kind of a world it is, for a world-without-man presupposes that man withdraws from the world the questionaddressed-to-the-world which he himself is or that he could ask a question outside this question. A world-without-man simply cannot be thought, for it presupposes that it is possible to think a world without the thinking presence of an existing subject. A world without man would be a world of which man is not conscious, which he does not know, of which he has not heard and, consequently, a world which is not affirmed in any way. Such a world simply is nothing-for-man. A world which is not affirmed cannot be affirmed; man cannot be conscious of a world of which he is not conscious; one cannot speak of a world that is not spoken of. The thought construct "a world-without-man" is a contradiction. Any proclaimed speaking of such a world is nothing but the formation of meaningless combinations of words, just as when one alleges to speak of square circles or pentagon triangles. Evidently, in such cases there is no real speech, no expression of reality. SO"Je dirais pour mon compte que Heidegger a montre d'une fac;on probablement definitive qu'il est absurde d'isoler Ie sujet existant et de se demander a partir de lui si Ie monde existe ou non. Car en fait ce sujet existant n'est tel que dans sa relation au monde." G. Marcel, L'homme problematique, Paris, 1955, pp. 141-142. 90"Welche Instanz entscheidet denn dariiber, ob und in welch em Sinne ein Erkenntnisproblem bestehen soli, was anderes als das Phanomen des Erkennens selbst und die Seinsart des Erkennenden?" Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 61. 91"Erkennen ist eine Seinsart des In-der-Welt-seins." Heidegger, ibid. 92Cf. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la perception, p. 370.

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An Objection. One could raise perhaps the following objection: a world without man cannot be affirmed, as is shown by the preceding line of thought, but there is such a world without man. To understand the meaning of the term "existence" it is absolutely necessary to see that such a statement is meaningless. Of course, from a purely verbal viewpoint the statement can be formulated, but it has no meaning, it does not express any reality. When man uses the term "is," he affirms the being of whatever he wants to affirm. However, he does not make this affirmation outside his own presence as existing subject; in other words, man always affirms the beingfor-man and never anything else. Thus the term "to be" does not have any other meaning than to-be-for-man.93 Therefore, I must say that without man there is no world. 94 For "to be" cannot have any other meaning than to-be-for-man; therefore, what I am saying amounts to this: without man there is no world for man. How could I say anything else? As existing subjectivity, man is the affirmation of the real world. 95 The reality of the world, however, must be conceived neither subjectivistically nor objectivistically.96 Conceived subjectivistically, the world would be delivered to the arbitrariness of the subject and, consequently, cease to be objectively rea1. 97 If, on the other hand, the world is understood in the objectivistic sense, the subject would be annihilated as existing affirmation of the world and thus would cease to be a real subject. 9B A thing of the world is not a brute reality but self-revealing being, phenomenon,99 a meaning-for-the-subject. And 93Cf. Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. III. 94"Wenn kein Dasein existiert, ist auch keine Welt 'da'." Heidegger, Sri» und Zeit, p. 365. 95This affirmation, however, is not exclusively the task of the ego-body, as Merleau-Ponty thinks. Every affirmation of the ego-body, conditioned by space-time, contains an affirmation of the subj ect which transcends all spacetime. This affirmation is the classical intelligere, which Merleau-Ponty completely ignores-a neglect which leads him to re-introduce the 'in-itself' (en-soO in his explanations. Cf. below, p. 135 ff. 96"La plus importante acquisition de la phenomenologie est sans doute d'avior joint I'extreme subjectivisme et I'extreme objectivisme dans sa notion du monde ou de la rationalite." Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la perception, p. XV. 97"Die Bedeutsamkeitsbezuge, welche die Struktur der Welt bestimmen, sind daher kein Netzwerk von Formen, das von einem weltlosen Subjekt einem Material iibergestiilpt wird." Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 366. 98Cf. Marcel, L'Homme probIematiqlle, Paris, 1955, pp. 50-51. 90"Der griechische ausdruck phainomenon, auf den der Terminus 'Phanomen' zuruckgeht, leitet sich von dem Verbum phainesthai her, das bedeutet: sich zeigen; phainomenon besagt daher: das, was sich zeigt, das Sichzeigende, das Offenbare." Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 28.

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the world is a system of nearby and distant meanings. All being is essentially "sense" ;100 outside the "sense" no reality can be affirmed, and without affirmation of reality words have no meaning. As the scholastic philosophers used to say: being and truth are convertible. Against the assertion that there is no world without man the objection is often raised that the findings of the empirical sciences show the contrary. Geologists, geophysicists, and astrophysicists have established the fact that the world is much older than man and that the world was prior to man, i.e., without man. According to Father Laplace's theory, our earth resulted from a primitive nebula, and the physical conditions of this nebula were such that no life-a fortiori, no human life-was possible. The appearance of subjectivity in the infinite evolution of the cosmos is of a fairly recent date. What, then, is the sense of claiming that there is no world without man ?101 Of course, there is not a single phenomenologist who even thinks of throwing doubt on the results of the empirical sciences. All accept that the earth is much older than Adam, and none wants to make any difficulties against Laplace's primitive nebula. (Incidentally, contemporary empirical scientists now raise serious objections against it.) It must be admitted, of course, that certain empirical sciences speak about a world dating from before the first man. However, does this mean that, say, geologists speak of a world-without-geologists? This is the point at issue, and an affirmative reply to the question does not make any sense. What would be the meaning of Laplace's primitive nebula, of his formulas and calculations without the presence-inthe-world of the subjectivity of Laplace or of those who took over his viewpoint ?l02 The same conclusion imposes itself inevitably-the world is radically human, and the truth about this world likewise is radically human.103 Without man's subjectivity no affirmation of reality has lOO"Le monde phenomenologique, c'est, non pas de I'etre pur, mais Ie sens qui tranparait a I'intersection de mes experiences et a I'intersection de mes experiences et de celles d'autrui, par I'engrenage des unes sur les aut res, il est done inseparable de la subjectivite et de l'intersubjectivite qui font leur unite par la reprise de mes experiences passees dans mes experiences presentes, de I'experience d'autrui dans la mienne." Merleau-Ponty, Phenomblologie de la perception, p. XV. lOlef. Merleau-Ponty, ibid., pp. 494-495. l02"La nebuleuse de Laplace n'est pas derriere nous, a notre origine, elle est devant nous, dans Ie monde culture!''' Merleau-Ponty, ibid, p. 494. l03"Le monde phenomenologique n'est pas I'explicitation d'un etre prealable, mais la fondation de !'etre, la philosophie n'est pas Ie reflet d'une verite pn:alable, mais comme I'art la realisation d'une verite." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. XV.

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meaning, and without any affirmation of reality all words and formulas are empty shells, about as useful as square circles. The world is not the sum total of brute realities, which are what they are-without-man in an "absolutely objective" isolated manner of being. The most penetrating minds among the empirical scientists realize this truth when they say that there is no such thing as "absolute objectivity," i.e., objectivistically conceived reality. We realize that a very large number of epistemological questions are raised again by existential phenomenology. They cannot be treated here. However, once it is understood that the world and the truth about the world are radically human, there is a possibility to understand that there are very many human worlds and very many human truths about the world. Man is essentially intentionality, orientation to the world, but the meaning of the world is differentiated according to the standpoint or attitude (Husserl's Einstellung) taken by man in the world.

Human Standpoints and the World. We have to limit ourselves here to a few examples of human standpoints. A first example is provided by sensitivity. Subjectivity, as "meaning of the world," is embodied in definite senses. These senses mean a definite attitude of the subject which I am, and at the same time they, as it were, cut out a world-for-me. My field of vision is conceivable only in relation to my eyes, and a world of sound only in reference to my ears. There are no sounds in my field of vision nor is anything visible in my world of sound. As a second example we may name the standpoints to which the many cultural worlds are attached. The worlds of the farmer, the professor, the revolutionary, the travelling salesman, the hermit, the politician, the artist, etc. are fundamentally very different, because the modes in which these human beings stand in the world differ fundamentally from one another. Omitting provisionally the meaning of love and of history as standpoints,104 as well as the fundamentally diverse interests of the various sciences,105 we may offer a few very concrete examples. What is 104Cf. below, pp. 154 ff., 162. 105"Es gibt kein \;\feltbild, sondern nur eine Systematik der Wissenschaften. Weltbilder sind immer partikulare Erkenntniswelten, die falschlich zum Weltsein iiberhaupt absolutiert wurden. Aus verschiedenen grundsatzlichen Forschungsideen erwachsen je besondere Perspektiven. Jedes Weltbild ist ein Ausschnitt aus der \Velt; die \N elt werd nicht zum Bilde. Das 'wissenschaftliche Weitbiid' im Unterschiecl yom mythischen war seIber jeclerzeit ein neues mythisches WeitbiIcl mit wissenschaftlichen Mittein und cliirftigem, mythischen GehaIt." Jaspers, Ein!iihnmg in die Philosophic, p. 75.

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water for me? It is that which is regularly used for washing and for drinking. Let us suppose, however, that I love bathing. In this case water ""ould show itself quite different to me. I would refer to is as "the cooling waves." 1£ I were a fireman, water would again be something else-an extinguisher. I would never be able to affirm this meaning if I did not know what a fire is and what is meant by extinguishing a fire. For a fisherman water is neither a cooling wave nor an extinguisher, for a fisherman faces water with a quite different intention, so that it has an entirely different meaning to him. Anyone who in wintertime has the misfortune to break through the ice and is carried underneath the frozen surface sees the most fearsome aspect water can show. No one, however, ever froze to death in "the cooling waves." Finally, to terminate with another arbitrary example, there is a single standpoint from which water is H 2 0-namely, that of the chemist. One who asks water what it is by means of analytic techniques will receive the answer: H 2 0. Outside this standpoint of the chemist, water, of course, is not H 2 0-just as water is not "the cooling waves" for the non-bather or for one who refuses to place himself in the "world-meaning" which constitutes being a bather. Many Real Worlds. This example shows us 11wny worlds, worlds that are real, because we live in them, at least from a certain standpoint. There is not a single world in itself. A church tower is not a thing in itself. It has a certain meaning for the pastor or the minister, but this meaning differs from that of the architect. For the sacristan who goes to it every day to ring the bells the tower has another meaning than for the altarboys who secretly climb it to play. One who is obsessed by his sexual instincts does not see the meaning which the tower has for an artistically gifted soul, and the artist's meaning differs again from that which the tower has for the flyer who has to take care all the time to avoid hitting it. Such examples can be multiplied endlessly. Human nudity, to give a final example, does not merely have a sexually stimulating meaning. It constantly means something else according as the situation is dominated by a sexual, an artistic, a medical, an athletic, or an hygienic intention. From these examples it is easy to see how readily man can come to consider a certain particular world as the world. Such an attitude implies that a certain mode of being-in-the-world is interpreted as the only one, as being-in-the-world without any qualification. It estranges man from the wealth of possibilities contained in his own being and reduces his world to the narrow dimension of his field of interest.

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Is this View a Kind of Psychologism! When this objection is raised, attention has to be paid to what is understood by the term "psychologism." In general, it is used to indicate the tendency to reduce all philosophical problems, i.e., all problems of logic, ethics, esthetics, and metaphysics, to psychoiogical problems. lo6 When there is a psychological tendency in philosophical thought, the meaning of reality is reduced to, and explained by means of the psyche, the thinker's structure of consciousness, or the genesis of his thought. Those who accuse us of a kind of psychologism want to say that we project meanings which belong to consciousness outside consciousness toward things themselves and ascribe these meanings to them. The special meaning of water for the fisherman, the bather, or one who is thirsty, they claim, lies only in consciousness and may not be ascribed to water itself. The reply of this objection is very simple, for the difficulty presupposes two postulates that are not tenable. The first of these claims that the psyche or consciousness is an interiority closed in itself and that meanings dwell in it which we unjustifiably project outside on "things." The second assumes that the "things themselves" are brute realities of which, for instance, the chemist would be qualified to speak. However, there is no consciousness closed in itself with meanings pertaining to it. To be conscious is a mode of existence, of being-inthe world. Secondly, there is no such thing as brute reality. There are existing subjects and many human worlds. Finally, if "the cooling waves" have to be called a psychological meaning of water because it evidently cannot be defined independently of human existence, the same will have to be said with respect to H 2 0. The meaning "H 2 0" is attached to the "world meaning" which constitutes being a chemist and to the analytic techniques used by him. Without taking the special viewpoint of the chemist into account when speaking of water, nothing intelligible is implied or expressed by the formula H 2 0. The "unity of reciprocal implication of subject and the world"lo7 is the original dimension in which man stands, thinks, and speaks. Once he places himself outside this dimension, he does not stand anywhere and does not speak about anything. l06ef. Lalande, Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophic, Paris, 1947, pp. 836-838. l07Remy C. Kwant, "Mense1ijke existentie en geschiedenis vol gens het wijsgerig denken van Maurice Merleau-Ponty," Algemeen Ned. Tijdschri/t v. Wijsbegeerte en Psychologie, vol. 46 (1953-54), p. 234.

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c. The Primitive Fact of Existential Phenomenology Every Philosophy Has an Original Intuition. By speaking about the unity of reciprocal implication of subject and the world we indicated what nowadays in imitation of Dondeyne is fairly generally called "the primitive fact of existential phenomenology."lo8 The term is borrowed from Maine de Biran. Sometimes, however, the same reality is indicated by the expression "central reference point," used by Marce1. 109 What is meant by these terms? Dondeyne clarifies the matter by showing that in every great philosophy an original intuition, an all-illuminating light is at work, by virtue of which it is possible for the philosopher to bring clarity in the complexity of reality. This is true, for instance, for the philosophies of scholasticism, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Bergson, and others. There is no philosophy which stops at the complexity and plurality of what is immediately given and is satisfied with a disorderly enumeration. A philosophy is not a "tale told by an idiot." A philosopher endeavors to reduce the plurality to a kind of unity, he tries to discover structures, he wants to com-prehend (Brunschvicg). In attempting to do so, he does not know beforehand how the unity will be brought about or how the structures are to be discovered. The light by which he thinks is not first determined and then put into operation. It may perhaps be said that every new philosophy begins with the vague suspicion that a certain approach will be fruitful before the philosopher realizes exactly what he is doing, by what principle he is guided, by which light he is proceeding, or which fundamental intuition he is using. Usually the evident fruitlessness of a certain way of thinking employed in the past gives rise to and guides a new mode of thinking, but provisionally it is not clear at all in what this new mode consists. Thus, for instance, it may happen that a psychologist comes to the conclusion that a physiological explanation, e.g., of puberty, is insufficient and tries to proceed along new paths. What he is first of all interested in is the explanation of puberty and not the reflection on the light in which he considers puberty. Only much later this light becomes the theme of an investigation, and often this investigation is not performed by him who first made use of this light. Thus it could happen that the philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger were much better understood by others than by these two philosophers themselves. l08Dondeyne, Contemporary European Thought and Christian Faith, Pittsburgh, 1958, p. 25 fr. l09Du reius d l'invocation, p. 18.

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Evidently, a philosophy wiII be fruitful to the extent that its primitive fact is capable of making the multiplicity and complexity of reality transparent and of reducing it to unity. For instance, I can reach no results at all with the idea of a "big elephant," while the idea "matter" offers at least some explanation. llo

Existence as the Primitive Fact of Existential Phenomenology. After these explanations it is easily understood that at one time there were existentialists and phenomenologists, although there was practically no one capable of defining either existentialism or phenomenology. If one examines what was supposed to be existentialism or phenomenology, he gets the impression that these terms have as many meanings as there are thinkers who call themselves phenomenologists or existentialists. Considering, moreover, what specialists in such positive sciences as psychology, psychiatry, and sociology called or still call "phenomenological" or "existential,"lll this impression is still further strengthened. Finally, there is the difference between existentialism and phenomenolgy-Kierkegaard is the founder of existentialism and Husser! that of phenomenology, but one could hardly call Kierkegaard a phenomenologist or Husser! an existentialist. All this should be no reason for surprise. Man's whole life is something which runs its course in semi-darkness. Man, as conscious existence, knows what he does when he lives, but at the same time he also does not know it. He does not escape from himself but, on the other hand, he is not fully transparent to himself. Philosophizing itself is a mode of living and, consequently, likewise not fully transparent. A new mode of philosophizing is a new way of living and therefore of non-transparency. Moreover, thinking endeavors to express primarily reality and not the mode in which this reality is expressed. The way itself in which reality is expressed is last in receiving reflective attention. Thus one can understand that a philosophy first exists as a kind of movement and style of thinking and only later arrives at full consciousness itself.n 2 At first one finds everywhere only sympllO"Ainsi, si quelqu'un venait nous dire que Ie monde n'est finalement qu'un immense elephant, dont la multiplicite des existants qui composent Ie monde ne sont que des aspects ou des manifestations, nous Ie prendrions pour un insense et non sans raison." Dondeyne, "Dieu et Ie materialisme contemporain," Essai sur Dieu, l'homme et l'univers, ed. by Jacques de Rivort de la Saudee, p. 23, note 1. 11lS ee, e.g., H. C. Riinke, Psychiatrie, Amsterdam, 1954, vol. I, pp. 63-71. 112"La phenomenologie se laisse pratiquer et reconnaitre comme maniere ou comme style, eUe existe comme mouvement, avant d'etre parvenu a une entiere conscience philosophique." Merleau-Ponty, Phinomenologie de la perception, p. II.

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Existential Phenomenology

toms of the style, but the primitive fact itself through which this style is what it is cannot yet be clearly determined. At present these difficulties have been overcome. The primitive fact itself of the new movement, of the new style of thinking, was reflected upon and expressed after Kierkegaard's existentialism and Husserl's phenomenology had, as it were, fused together in the work of Heidegger. At present it is realized that the new style of thinking uses as its primitive fact, its fundamental intuition, its all-embracing moment of intelligibility, the idea of existence or, what may be considered synonymous with it,1l3 the idea of intentionality.l14 Let us emphasize it once more, this primitive fact was not chosen beforehand. It imposed itself in the very thinking about reality and could be accepted only in an act of loyalty to realityY5 It is for this reason that we began our study by developing the theme of existence and that of intentionality in a discussion with materialistic and spiritualistic monism, guided by the strong points of these systems and avoiding their weaknesses. Only after developing these themes, did we consider the question of the primitive fact proper to the new, style of thinking called existential phenomenology.

Expression of the Primitive Fact. A search has been made for terms which express as unequivocally as possible the fundamental moment of intelligibility proper to existential phenomenology. The main purpose of this search was to give expression to the fact that it is impossible to think subject and world as separate from each otherY6 Perhaps "encounter" is one of the most suitable terms for this purpose. For an encounter as encounter is wholly unthinkable unless both terms of the encounter are conceived in relation to each other. An encounter is not an encounter if the subject does not meet "something." For if he did not encounter anything, he would meet "nothing," so that there would be no 113"The term 'to exist' thus becomes synonymous with being-to-the-world, it is ultimately only another way of expressing what Husserl meant by the intentionality of consciousness." Dondeyne, Contemporary European Thought and Christian Faith, p. 29. 114"Existential phenomenology appears in the history of philosophy as a manner of philosophizing centered round the notion of existence." Dondeyne, ibid., p. 25. 115Cf. Dondeyne, work quoted in note 110, p. 23. 116"On sait qu'i1 n'y a point, d'une part, un pour-soi et, d'autre part, un monde, comme deux touts fermes dont it faudrait ensuite chercher comment its communiquent." Sartre, L'itre et Ie neallt, p. 368.

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encounter. Likewise, the "something" which is encountered would not be the term of an encounter without the subject which encounters. Both terms, therefore, imply each other. On the other hand, it must be admitted that the use of this term for the purpose of expressing the reciprocal implication of subject and world suffers from a serious handicap. This handicap lies in the fact that in ordinary speech the term is used only for the meeting of one subject with another subject.n 7 However, as a technical philosophical term it is not subject to misunderstanding. Moreover, it is already widely used in this technical sense. The term "dialogue" is suitable also. Existence is a dialogue in which both participants contribute their share. If either of them is thought away, the dialogue itself vanishes. The unity of subject and the world is a dialectical unity, the unity of a dialogue. This dialogue is the very source from which all statements of philosophy draw their origin. The dialogue which is existence cannot be dissolved in more simple elements without reducing the whole 1\:0 nothing. lIs Expressing this dialogue which is existence is called dialectics. lID Still other terms are used to give expression to the primitive fact of existential phenomenology. Gabriel Marcel prefers to use the term "participationJJ120 in the twofold sense of having part and taken part in the world. Merleau-Ponty speaks of "presence."121 This term also is very clear, for a presence is unthinkable without "something" to which a subject is present and, reversely, an area of presence is meaningless without a subject. An Exaggeration. One may ask whether or not these considerations sufficiently illuminate the primitive fact of existential phenomenology. We are convinced that the reply has to be in the negative. Of course, it is not subject to doubt that all philosophizing, no matter about what, is always and of necessity concerned with man as exist1I7Cf. Remy C. Kwant, "De harmonische uitgroei van een Wijsbegeerte," Studia Catholica. vol. 30 (1955), p. 207, note 9. lISC£. Merleau-Ponty, Phtinomenologie de la perception, pp. 467 and 491. 1I9Cf. Remy C. Kwant, ibid., pp. 216-219. 120"Mais alors cette participation qui est rna presence au monde, je ne puis I'affirmer, ou la retrouver, la restaurer, qu'en resistant a la tentation de la nier, c'est-a-dire de me poser comme entite separee." Marcel, Du refus d l'invocation, pp. 34-35. 121"[L'analyse du temps] eclaire les precMentes analyses parce qu'elle fait apparaitre Ie sujet et I'objet comme deux moments abstraits d'une structure unique qui est la presence." Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la perception, p.492.

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Existential Phenomenology

ence, as intentionality, understood as the unity of reciprocal implication of subjectivity and world. Even in love and in prayer man is embodied-subjectivity-in-the~world. If he is not such a subjectivity then he is not man, not even a loving or praying man. The being of man is a being-conscious-in-the-world. This consciousness belongs to his very essence. Hence man can never put it away or justifiably deny it as long as he is man. On the other hand, one would be going too far by saying that man's being, as being of necessity and essentially in the world, may be qualified as being exclusively in the world, i.e., that there is nothing else in man than the relation of subjectivity to the world and the modalities of this relation, and that whatever man is must be conceivable in terms of such a modality if it is to be called reality. To give an example, if this supposition were true, love and hatred could no longer be realities. Although it is quite true that the loving or hating man is related to the world, nevertheless love and hatred cannot be said to be notll1:ng else than modes according to which a subject is related to a worldly object. It would be incongruous if through a dogmatic a priori view the philosopher were to exclude himself from the possibility of recognizing as reality what everyone calls reality. Of course, he has the right to investigate critically what is objectively tenable and what needs to be rejected in whatever assertion or conviction presented to him. But he does not have the right to predecide the issue of his critique through a dogmatic a priori view. The primitive fact of a philosophy is only then not a form of dogmatism when it is accepted in an act of faithfulness to reality. There are forms of existential-phenomenological thought in which the primitive fact is existence or intentionality, conceived exclusively as the unity of reciprocal implication of subject and world. Such a form undoubtedly is the atheistic existentialism whose main representatives are Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. vVhen Merleau-Ponty says that man as subject is nothing else than the project of his world,122 nothing else than a possibility to become involved in worldly situations,123 he arbitrarily locks man up in a very limited and narrow dimension of existence and arbitrarily closes and limits the horizon 122"Le monde est inseparable du sujet, mais d'un sujet qui n'est rien que project du monde, et Ie sujet est inseparable du monde, mais d'un monde qu'i1 projette lui-meme." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 491. 123"Si Ie sujet est en situation, si meme il n'est rien d'autre qu'une possibilite de situations, c'est qu'i1 ne realise son ipseite qu'en etant effectivement corps en entrant par ce corps dans Ie monde." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 467.

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of existence to worldly things. Evidently, such an a priori view at once gives an atheistic character to a philosophy. For, what sense could it still make to say that man is orientation to God when one has first decreed that being-man is exhausted by being-in-the-world and that the horizon of existence is exclusively worldly? The affirmation of God could not be anything else than the affirmation of a deified, absolutized worldly form or of a "worldbound," degraded Transcendence. Such an affirmation of God can never be what it is supposed to be-namely, the affirmation of the Transcendent. It is intentionally that we express ourselves here with all due precaution. For in this question also it is true that the philosopher has the right and the duty to investigate critically what is tenable in no matter what conviction. He has the duty critically to see what has to be retained in such a generally admitted affirmation as that there is a God. He does not have the right, prior to all critique, to decide the issue of his investigation by means of a dogmatic a priori View. Summary. For us the primitive fact of existential phenomenology is existence or intentionality, conceived as openness of the subject to all that is not the subject itself. At least the material things, the world, belong to that which is not the subject itself. The unity of reciprocal implication of subject and world is an essential moment of existence. However, there is nothing which gives us the right to limit the openness of the subject to the world. Such terms as encounter, dialogue, participation, and presence may be retained, for they are adaptable enough to be used in a broadened sense if subsequent philosophical thinking should make it necessary. d. Existence as Be;ng-"at"-the-World,. Labor Meaning of "At." In giving expression to human existence we have emphasized being-in-the-world to such an extent that the impression may have been created that existence is wholly static an? devoid of any dynamism. It is time to correct this erroneous impressio']. To exist does not mean only to be in-the-world but also to be "at" -the-world. 124 The particle "at" is used here in an unusual way to express a kind of dynamism whose character, despite its unmistakeable presence, cannot be readily indicated. 125 The meaning of 124Cf. Merleau-Ponty, ibid., pp. 496-520. 125The proper nature of the dynamism pertaining to human existence will be considered in Chapter IV.

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this preposition approaches that of ordinary language in the expression "He is at it again."126 This sentence is used to convey the idea that the person in question is doing something. Accordingly, by saying that man's existence is being-"at" -the-world we want to indicate that he is not wholly immobilized in his world. Self-Project. When man reflects upon his existence, it is undoubtedly true that he finds himself "already" involved in a definite body and in a definite world. He is never sheer indetermination. He finds himself as an American, a Hebrew, as intelligent, a cripple, a laborer, rich, fat, etc. All this constitutes what he "already" is, or to say it differently, his past. Sometimes the term "determination" is used to describe this condition, for there is question here of that which is meant by all kinds of "determinations." The most current terms, however, are situation and facticity. I t should be clear that the facticity of existence means a kind of immobilization, as is clearly manifested by such determinatic(:) as cripple and fat. Facticity implies that certain potentialities are eliminated. For instance, a person with an LQ. of 80 cannot become Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. On the other hand, it is undeniable also that there is no facti city without potentialities. If one is a lawyer, stupid, or ill, and these determinations do not include any possibilities, then he is not really a lawyer, really stupid, really ill. One who is ill has always at least the possibility of accepting or cursing his illness, of taking it as a penance, or of tyrannizing his surroundings. Thus every determination that is "already" present in a human existence implies also something that is "not yet" there; every past implies a future. Existence is oppositional unity, unity in opposition of what de facto is and what can be. As such, man's existence is called project or plan. 127 I t is very important to realize that both facticity and possibility are related to the subject which man is. My facti city is min·e and my possibilities are mine. Man is not de facto fat in the same way as a dead elephant is fat. The potentialities of a fat man are not those of a dead elephant to which "something can happen."128 This idea may be expressed succinctly by saying that the project which man is is a self-project. 126Cf. Dondeyne, "Beschouwingen bij het atheistisch existentialisme," Tijdschrift voor Philosophie, vol. 13 (1951), p. 17, note 14. 127Cf. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 145. 128Heidegger, ibid., p. 143.

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Self-Realization. Man is also the execution of the self-project which he is. This execution is not something accidentaI,129 for every being "does" something. A thing that does not work and a man, on the proper level of his being-man, who does not "act" are not really a thing and a man. To be a being is to be active. As far as man is concerned, this being active means that the subject transcending his facticity, i.e., what his existence is "already," stretches out toward the fulfilment of one of the modes in which he can be, one of the modes pertaining to what he is "not yet," and himself brings this mode to realization. What exactly is meant here by himself is a question which will continue to occupy our attention for a long time. At present we limit ourselves to the observation that man himself acts because and insofar as his action is not the "effect" of a determining influence of his facticity. Man's action, in the fullest sense of the term, is the creation of a new meaning. It implies, moreover, that he knows what he is doing. The "light" which is his subjectivity is at the same time an original vision of his situation. For a man to act himself is to act rationally. The idea of responsibility is immediately connected with it. For man's action is not a process, but a "reply" to being addressed by his situation, and he has a "word" to fix the objective meaning of this situation. Things do not have "words," they do not give a "reply," and they are not "responsible" (Buytendijk). Care should be taken not to lose sight of the fact that at present we are exclusively concerned with man on the proper level of his being-man, with man as acting himself or personally. We do not wish to imply that man always or of necessity finds himself on this level. The contrary is true. Very often it is almost not man himself or man personally who acts. The subject of human actions is not always the self, the I in person, but rather the impersonal ((they."130 The I can let itself drift, it can think what "they" think and do what "they" do. The impersonal "they" can deprive man of beinghimself.l3l It hates originality and is addicted to "as everybody knows or does" and to "being one of the crowd."133 Such a man makes us think of an automaton. His potentialities are less and less his own, and their execution becomes more and more a process. The imper129"Das 'Wesen' des Daseins Iiegt in seiner Existenz." Heidegger, ibid., p.42. 130"Zunachst ist das Dasein Man und someist bleibt es so." Heidegger, ibid., p. 129.

131Cf. Heidegger, ibid., p. 126.

132/bid., 133/bid.,

p. 170. p. 127.

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sonal "they" can account for everything, for there really is not anyone who has to render an account. 134 We do not want to follow Heidegger in disparaging the positive value of the impersonal "they," of the almost impersonal, almost automatic, and almost process-like way of acting. It would be simply impossible for man to live if in a way he could not rely on this way of acting, if he had exclusively to exist personally in the almost overwrought sense which Heidegger seems to consider its only acceptable meaning. However, the impersonal "they" can mean the doom of the I with all its disastrous consequences. It is imperative that this distinction of "they" and HI" be clearly perceived, for in subsequent pages we will have to make use of it.

Labor as a Mode of Being-Uat" -the-vVorld. Man's action means his self-realization and the humanization of his world. These two go hand in hand, for man is essentially the unity of reciprocal implication of subject and world. Labor is a mode of being-Hat" -the world. Not Walking, courting, all actions are labor in the proper sense. 135 mountain climbing, holding a party, enjoying beauty, loving, praying, etc. are human actions but not labor. Moreover, we meaningfully distinguish between time of labor and free time. Free time is precisely the time in which we do not labor.136 What is labor? \Ve cannot be satisfied with the inadequate description stating that labor is the mode of being "at" the world in which man transforms nature as it is given in order to take from it what he needs to provide for his physical being. Man does not merely labor to live, to remain alive by eating and drinking. Strictly speaking, not even of eating and drinking may we say that we do these actions exclusively in order to live. What man wants is to live, and eating and drinking themselves are modes of living. 137 Man does not eat and drink in the same way as an engine is given a new 134"Es kann am leichtensten alles verantworten, wei! keiner ist, der fUr etwas einzustehen braucht." Heidegger, ibid., p. 127. 135Jean Lacroix does not admit this. "Le travail ... est liberte en action, c'est-it-dire effort pour actualiser des valeurs dans et par des mouvements, information nerveuse selon une norme, emission d' esprit, pour reprendre la belle figure de Proudhon, dans la nature et par la mediation de l'organisme." Personne et amour, Paris, 1955, p. 91. 136ef. F. Tellegen, Zelfwording en zel/verlies in de arbeid, Delft, 1958, p. 6. 137"Nous respirons pour respirer, mangeons et buvons pour manger et pour boire, nous nous abritons pour nous abriter, nous etudions pour satisfaire it notre curiosite, nous nous promenons pour nous promener. Tout cela n'est pas pour vivre. Tout cela est vivre." E. Levinas, De l'existence a l'existant Paris, n. d., p. 67. '

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supply of gasoline. There is a big difference between meals and taking pills. By identifying drinking and eating with filling the gas tank one disregards what is specifically human in these actions.13s Something similar applies to labor. Man wants to live and for this reason he also wants to labor. To work is for man a way of realizing himself, of becoming man. 139 We do not mean that man does not labor to provide for his physical needs, for evidentl man does work also for this purpose. Perhaps it is even for this reason that a certain mode of being "at" the world is called labor and not something else. l4O On the other hand, it is undeniable that the selfrealization, the becoming-man, which is attained in labor does not mean very much if man does not intend anything else than providing for his physical needs. In and through this work man realizes himself, but only as laborer, much in the same way as through eating and drinking he realizes himself but only as eater and drinker. True, his work always implies a certain liberation from the bond and physical pressure of nature. Nature loses something of its inhospitality and menace through labor. The almost instinctive character of the primitive search for food is somewhat interrupted by the rationality with which man turns to the earth in this labor. l41 However, with respect to what we would like to call "being integrally man," this mode of becoming man has very little meaning. Labor becomes human in the sense of becoming meaningful for being integrally human, only from the moment that man strives to wrest a surplus from nature. "Labor is essentially productive. The process of labor consumes the vital forces of one's own body to transform nature in order to restore these vital forces and to build up a system of forces available for higher purposes. The essential point is that man by virtue of his spirit wrests a surplus from nature."l42 In this way culture and civilization in the full sense become real human possibilities. It is undeniably true that the culture and civilization of the western world have been made possible by the fact that western man went to work. The demand, however, that work be really productive begins to be fulfiller!. to some extent, only when man begins to divide labor. Each assumes a special task in order to be capable of executing it more 13SC£. Levinas, ibid., p. 68. 139Cf. Tellcgen, ap. cit., p. 9.

14oCf. Tellegen, ap. cit., p. 3. 14IC£. Lacroix, ap. cit., p. 87. 142P. de Bruin, "De structuur van het economisch arbeidsbegrip," Tijd-

schrift vaar Philasaphie, vol. 4 (1942), p. 128.

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fruitfully. He fulfils this task for himself and for others; he lets others profit from his labor and, in his turn, profits from the work of the others. Thus labor assumes the character of a service. In the perspective of a national economy labor and services are spoken of as economic factors.143 Labor becomes more productive because there is a greater surplus; and precisely for this reason labor becomes more human, more meaningful for being integrally man, for culture and civilization. As soon as labor in the more restricted sense makes it possible to attain a more integral mode of being human through higher cultural activities, the meaning of the terms "labor" or "work" is extended and applied to these higher cultural activities themselves-namely, when they are performed in the service of others and compensated by goods or money in order to supply the laborer in question with the necessary means for his own physical needs and with a certain surplus for activities which lie outside the realm of his assigned labor. Thus, contrary to what used to be the case in former times, those who devote themselves to science and art may now be said to perform labor.144 Nevertheless, there remains a difference between work or labor and occupation. "Labor in the proper sense is only that occupation which produces goods or services and thus contributes to maintaining the life of society, while any action in which man puts his spiritual or bodily forces to work is an occupation. The labor of one may, of course, be directly or indirectly the occupation of the other. In this matter the boundaries are very uncertain, for there are many activities which are at the same time labor and occupation and, on the other hand, there are activities which have many characteristics of labor but few of occupation, and vice versa. Often an activity passes from one category to the other depending on who does it. The gardener who raises vegetables for the market certainly performs labor; the factory worker who farms his half-acre in his spare time works and plays at the same time, certainly nowadays when he does not strictly need his homegrown vegetables; the retired gentleman-farmer whose enthusiastic hobby is king-sized watermelons can hardly be said to labor."145 143Cf. de Bruin, ibid., pp. 130-131. 144Cf. Remy C. Kwant, Ret Arbeidsbestel, Utrecht, 1957, pp. 29-47; Philosophy of Labor, Pittsburgh, 1960, pp. 29-58. 140De Bruin, op. cit., p. 131.

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4S

As we have seen previously, one of the aspects of man's action, by virtue of which this action can be called human, consists in its rationality. It was Descartes whose vision foresaw what man would be capable of if he allowed his labor to be guided by the rationality which manifests itself in the physical sciences. Descartes foresaw that man could become master and possessor of nature if for the prescientific light of reason with which labor had hitherto been performed he would substitute the rationality of the sciences of nature. l46 His dream has become reality in modern technology-labor has become technical work.

Labor and Being-Integrally-Man. It is from the beginning of technocracy that dates the exaltation of labor as the mode of man's self-realization and humanization, as the condition for the rise of human relations and true peace. A labor civilization arosel4 7 as well as a philosophy whose primitive fact may be said to be labor. The French socialists Saint-Simon and Proudhon laid the foundation for the philosophy of labor of Marx.l4S To be genuinely human, man was supposed to be a laborer. This development should not cause any surprise. As we have seen, labor can be called human, in the sense of meaningful for beingintegrally-man, only from the moment when man through his work wrests a surplus from labor which makes cultural activities in the full sense possible. Evidently, it was only through the introduction of technology that this condition was fully satisfied. Moreover, through labor man enters not only into relation with nature but also with his fellow men. Wherever man really begins to labor he has constantly more and more to do with fellow human beings.149 It was the merit of Saint-Simon and Proudhon to have realized this meaning of labor when, despising politicians, lawyers, contemplatives, and philosophers, they described labor as formative of society. ISO Since the introduction of technology this character of labor has become visible to all. Labor means the humanization of man in the intersubjective sense. A philosophy does not fail because of what unfolds of reality, but because of what it eliminates from reality, because of its "detotali146C( Remy C. Kwant, "Arbeid en Leven," Arbeid, V crslag van de 22ste alg. verg. 'u. d. Ver. v. Thomistische Wijsbcgcerte, Utrecht, 1958, pp. 39-44. 147C£. Lacroix, op. cit., pp. 111-112. 148C£. Lacroix, op. cit., pp. 98-104. HO"Le travail n'est pas seulement rapport de I'homme a 1a nature, mais relation de I'homme a I'humanite . . . unc societe ne s'edifie qu'autour d'une oeuvre ree1le et a que1que degre commune." Lacroix, op. cit., p. 83. I50"La paix pour et par la production, c'est-a-dire pour et par Ie travail, telle est done l'idee centrale du saint-simonis me." Lacroix, op. cit., p. 105.

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zation of reality" (Le Senne). It is here also that we must seek the failure of Marxism which unqualifiedly defines man as a laborer. It is not the emphasis on the humanization of man .through labor nor the accent on the formative value of labor for society which constitute the mistake of Marxism, but the elimination of being-human from this "humanization" and from this form of society. Labor is human because of its value for being integrally man. If the integral man is defined as a laborer, how could labor still be called inhuman? The definition which Marxism gives of man eliminates precisely that which makes man's labor human. The thesis that labor means unqualifiedly becoming human is valid only in the supposition that to be man is identical with to be a laborer. This supposition, however, is false, for labor itself can be inhuman. Labor is inhuman when in humanizing nature man is reduced to mere nature. 151 This happens when labor has no longer any meaning for being-integrally-human. As soon, however, as it is realized that labor is human because of its meaning for beingintegrally-man, man can no longer be defined as laborer, and labor can no longer be proclaimed to be unqualifiedly the humanization of man. The same must be said with respect to the formative value of labor for society. Of course, it is true that labor brings very many human beings into contact with very many other human beings, that man becomes man in an intersubjective sense--but is such a network of relations necessarily human? Is its definition necessarily the definition of brotherhood and peace ?152 To be truly man certainly is to be a brother to fellow men, but since to be a laborer is not the same as to be truly man, the intersubjectivity of being a laborer may not be defined as brotherhood and peace. All this remains rather abstract. We have to look at society around us to see the concrete meaning of the dictatorship of technology, as it reigns in Marxism and Americanism. 153 The realization of its meaning drove Gabriel Marcel to pronounce a sharp condemnation of technocracy. 151"Le travail est bon en tant qu'il est une humanisation de la nature, mais il comporte aussi un risque perpetuel de naturalisation de l'homme." Lacroix, op. cit., p. 100. 152"Dans notre monde de plus en plus collectivise, Ie mot avec perd son sens et une communaute reelle apparait de moins en moins concevable." R. Troisfontaines, De l'existence Ii tetre, la philosophie' de Galn'iel Marcel, vol. I, Louvain-Paris 1953, p. 66. 153Cf. Marcel, Les hommes contre I'hu1I1uin, Paris, 1951, p. 198.

Man, the Metaphysical Being 3.

47

TECHNOCRACY AND PHILOSOPHY

No one can arraign technology without making himself ridiculous. It is more than evident that most monuments of genuine human greatness, no matter what their nature, are unthinkable without technology. It would be absurd to expeot any benefit from the closing of factories and 1aboratories. 154 Man did not acquire any real power over nature before he began to place his labor under the guidance of the physical sciences and used the means made possible by these sciences, i.e., he did not acquire any real power over nature before the use of techno10gy.155 To abolish technology would mean anarchy, barbarism, hunger, disease and death-briefly, the loss of whatever man has gained in human:ity through a ruthless struggle with nature. 156 The rationality which man uses in his technica11abor is a genuine human good, one of the most eloquent possibilities and expressions of human genius. The power which man acquired over the cosmos by means of his technology means a confirmation of his superiority over mere things. Technology is a good which can never be sufficiently appreciated. 157 a. Technocracy

Absolutism of Technology. Man has the duty to realize whither he goes when the spirit of technology begins to predominate to such an extent that technology is made the absolute. The fact that this spirit predominates so much should not cause surprise, for no form of rationality has shown itself so convincingly fruitful in its pursuit as the rationality which expresses itself in the physical sciences. This fruitfulness, moreover, finds its confirmation in the real power which man has gained over nature. What is more tempting for man than to surrender himself to a rationality supported by such promising perspectives and what is more natural than that he should overestimate the golden future to flow from this surrender? Is it not to be expected that the physical sciences will solve all questions and that technology will satisfy all needs? 154Cf. Marcel, ibid., pp. 63-64. 155"Enfin, et c'est peut-etre Ie point capital, nous nous rendons de mieux en mieux compte que to ute puissance au sens humain du terme implique la mise en oeuvre d'une technique." Marcel, Etre et avair, p. 272. 156Cf. Marcel, Les hammes contre l'humain, p. 50. 157Cf. Marcel, ap. cit., p. 64.

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Man has thought so, but he was mistaken. The physical sciences are good and technology is a benefit to mankind, but the absolutism of the spirit of technology gave rise to what nowadays is often called technocracy. As early as 1933 Marcel pronounced his terrible indictment of this technocracy. Practically all philosophers who still had any awareness of man's true destiny later signfied their adherence to Marcel's indictment. In a technocratic society the spirit of technology has become absolute. In what does this spirit consist and what is this absolutism?

Scientism. Insofar as the spirit of technology pertains to the order of knowledge, it is determined by the rationality of the sciences of nature. If this rationality is proposed as the absolute norm, it degenerates into scientism. 159 The physical sciences attained great fruitfulness as soon as man decided to question nature in a very definite way-namely, by means of mathematical categories, i.e., in terms of quantity. The manner in which the physical sciences question nature means a determined approach to the world; in reply to a question the world shows a definite objective aspect-namely, that of quantity. It reveals itself insofar as it is calculable, measurable. Previously it was pointed out that to every standpoint of intentional consciousness there corresponds a determined aspect of the world. The present case of the physical sciences shows very clearly the correctness of this assertion. It is easy to see to what the absolute conception of the standpoint of the physical sciences, which in its non-absolute form is wholly legitimate, must lead. The reality of anything in the world which cannot be calculated or measured, which cannot become a "problem" of the physical sciences,160 is simply denied. What cannot be measured or calculated is meaningless and simply is not so far as the physicist is concerned. To revert to the above-quoted example, for one who is imbued with the absolutistic view of scientism, water is exclusively H 2 0, and all other meanings of water are relegated to the domain of romanticism, mystification, and vain pretense. For the technocrat the world is energy (Heidegger). 158"Positions et approches concretes du mystere ontologique," Le monde casse, Paris, 1933, pp. 255-301. New edition with an excellent introduction by Marcel de Corte, Louvain-Paris, 1949. The original pagination has been in-

dicated in this edition. 159Cf. Marcel, Homo Viator, Paris, 1944, p. 195. 160Cf. Marcel, work quoted in footnote 158, pp. 258-272.

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Evidently in such a view the humanity of the world, its original and affective meaning is denied. But when I go for a walk and want to rest for a while in nature, the world is not available energy. \Vhen on a hot day I go bathing, I do not need to ask the chemist what the "cooling waves" are; he would not be able to tell me anyhow. Affective Cansequences. The spirit of technology, however, does not pertain only to the order of knowledge. It is also of an affective character, and is determined by the desire to dominate, to "have." Of course, once more, there should be no question of minimizing the positive value implied by the realization of this desire. However, what happens when this desire is made absolute? The progressive possibility of dominating the world strangles the power to wonder over the world. 161 According as technology progresses, man finds himself and his own creations more and more and forgets that the world was "already" there before he transformed it into energy. According as he "possesses" the world more and more through his technology, he becomes less and less capable of gratitude. Gratitude presupposes the reception of a gift,l62 but the world is no longer a gift, for man conquers it. In this way he is led to pride. The technologist deals not only with nature but also enters into relation with human beings. Insofar as he has surrendered to sci entism, men are not subjects for him. To be a subject is not reducible to a category of quantity. For the scientist human beings are bodies, or rather, bodily "forces," and "functions" in systems of tools and machines. 103 As such they are measurable and subject to calculations. The affective relationship of the technocrat to man is likewise destroyed. Technocracy does not know a "neighbor" ;164 the technocrat exploits man even if he pays a "just" wage. Let us repeat once more: we are not speaking here of technology but of the technocratic mentality. Until the present the reality of this mentality has nearly always been described from the viewpoint of the existence of the technocrat. We must therefore add a very ~1arcel, Homo Viator, p. lr.~"Renclre grace, ccla suppose

157. un don re<;u." (Troisfontaincs). 163''Lc monde du problematique est en meme temps celuj du desir et de la (rainte, qui ne se laissent point separer I'un de I'autre; c'eSt aussi sans doute Ie muncie fOIlCtionIlalise au fOllctionnalisable que j 'ai defini au debut de cette meditation, c'est enfin celui au regnent les techniques queUes qu'eUes soient." ~larcel, work quoted in footnote 158, p. 28. I G4"Mais comment ne pas voir que la technocratie consiste justement avant tout it iairc abstraction du prochain et, en fin de compte, a Ie nier?" Marcel, Lrs hOJlll/1es (Olltre /'I11mzain, p. 200. IGle£.

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brief description of this same reality from the standpoint of the existence of those who have become victims of technocracy.

The Victims of Technocracy. Let us start with the remark that most of the victims are not aware of their condition, at least not through an intellectual, reflective return to their own existence. Such a reflection would be impossible for them anyhow. Life in a technocratic society, like any way of life, is not transparent to itself but rather a semi-darkness. Man realizes what he is and does, but at the same time it is true that he does not realize it. Only the most penetrating minds are capable of describing their own time, provided that this time has already assumed very striking features. However, it is not only in an explicit intellectual reflection that the reality of life reveals itself. There is also the revealing value of what Heidegger calls Befindlichkeit, i.e., the "mood" of existence,165 although at present we must abstract from the exclusively negative interpretation which he has given to it. As we have seen previously, the beirig-in-the-world which defines man may not be conceived in the same fashion as a cigar is in a box. Such a conception would be a disavowal of the subjectivity of human existence. Man finds himself in the world. Being-man is beingconscious-in-the-world, it is "Welterfahrendes Leben" (Husserl), i.e., a certain affirmation, albeit not in a judgment, of the world. This finding of oneself, however, is not of a purely cognitive nature, but has also an affective meaning. The use of the term "affective" should not make us think here of the definition of affections according to the classical psychology of consciousness, in which the affections were conceived as a kind of commentary "inside" consciousness upon an event occurring "outside" consciousness. The affective meaning of the involvement of subjectivity in the world co-defines the being of man as being-conscious-in-the-world. We give expression to this meaning when we call the world our home, in which we long for a better fatherland. The way in which we have expressed ourselves here indicates that the "mood" of existence includes a positive and a negative moment. On the one hand, it is certainly an assent to the world-though not in the form of a value judgment-but this assent is not global and definitive; on the other hand, it is also a certain rejection of the world. Both moments define what man as existence essentially is. IG5Cf.

Heidegger. Sein und Zeit, pp. 139-140.

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Finding-oneself as affective tone of existing, as "mood" of existence,166 is equally immediately a finding oneself to be well and a finding oneself not to be well. It reveals what the world and beingin-the-world are worth and not worth. It is only on the level of the "mood" of existence that the victims of technocracy realize their condition. In our technocratic society finding oneself not to be well has fully overpowered finding oneself to be well. As Marcel expresses it, our society is characterized by a "choking sadness." Man does not feel at home in a technocratic society, because in it integrally being human, authentically being a person, is mutilated. The world raised by technology in which man has to live is wholly a world of mathematical calculation; it is empty and sounds hollow. 167 In the world of technology there is practically no longer any difference between day and night, nor are there any seasons left. The rhythm of life becomes more and more the rhythm of a machine. 16s Within it man is a "function," and his fellow-man is "another function"; being-together becomes a "coordinate function," calculated by the psycho-technician. Technocracy has deprived man of his selfhood. Nowhere so much as here is he reduced to anonymity. In practice, however, it is not possible for man to behave as an anonymity on one level of existence and as a person on a different level. The fact that the masses living in a technocratic society do not know what to do with their leisure shows this. These masses have lost their integral selfness to such an extent that they are willing slaves of any kind of propaganda or advertising. Goebbels, the Minister of Propaganda under the Hitler regime, saw this very clearly, and others realize it just as well as he did. 169 Insofar as man profits from technocracy, he has likewise lost his selfhood, for he has placed the focal point of his existence and the basis of his human balance in television sets and motorcars. 170 He loses himself in the products of his own technique. From the religious viewpoint the victims of technocracy belong to the category of those who "apostatize without noise." The los~ of personality is very widespread. "Choking sadness!" No wonder that many are tempted to despair as soon as their blindness disappears.171 They are faced with nihilism, 166Cf. 167Cf. 168Cf. 169Cf. 17oCf. 171Cf.

C. A. van Peursen, Rislwnte filosofie, Amsterdam, 1955, pp. 23-26. Marcel, work quoted in footnote 158, p. 49. Marcel, Homo viator, pp. 112-113. Marcel, work quoted in footnote 164, p. 43. Marcel, ibid., pp. 46-47. Marcel, ibid., p. 72.

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although it is not technology which is nihilistic but technocracy.172 Marcel's expression clearly paints the picture of the situation entangling modern man. Technocracy means the nihilation of the integral human personality. Characterizing the nihilism of our time in a dialogue with Ernst Junger, Heidegger calls it "forgetfulness of being" (Seinsvergessenheit) .173 Technology is a good, but man has not succeeded in mastering his own mastership of it.174 Clearly, to master this mastership is not a question of technology. It pertains, at least in part, to philosophy.175

h. The Metaphysical Question The Insufficiency of Technocracy. How is it possible that it belongs to philosophy to make man master his mastership if it is true that in a technocratic mentality there is no room for philosophical endeavors? Must not a technocratic society by virtue of its internal purpose tend to eliminate everything which does not want to serve its organization? Undoubtedly, this "everything" includes philosophy, for the philosopher does not contribute anything to the "usefulness" at which technology aims and which technocracy adores. 176 If the internal purpose of a technocratic mentality would be fully realized, philosophy would be doomed to death. However, as is shown by the above-mentioned "mood" of existence, it is a fact that our technology-struck society has become unbearable to itself. Although the protest against it is usually still merely of an affective nature, it is sufficient to prevent the system from becoming closed upon itself. The resulting breach in the system leaves enough room for an authentic philosophical question, and this question may be the beginning of genuine philosophical thought. Camus bears witness to this possibility in the following words: "It may happen that all of a sudden the whole scenery collapses. To get up, take the street car, work for four hours in the office or the 172"C'est un fait a la fois mysterieux et profondement significatif que, dans Ie monde qui est aujourd'hui Ie notre, Ie nihilisme tend a prendre un caractere technocratique et que la technocratie est inevitablement nihiliste." Marcel, ibid., p. 197. 173Heidegger, Zur Seinsfrage, Frankfurt a. M., 1956, p. 41. 174"Livre a la technique, ai-je dit: il faut entendre par Ia, de plus en plus incapable de la maitriser ou encore de maitriser sa propre maitrise." Marcel, work quoted in footnote 158, p. 282. 175Cf. Marcel, Les hommes contre l'humain, p. 99. 176Cf. G. Verbeke, "Apologia philosophiae," Tijdschrift voor Philosophie, vol. 19 (1957), p. 598.

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factory, eat, take the streetcar, work for four hours, eat, sleep, all the time in the same rhythm on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, and Saturday-usually man has no trouble in following this routine. But one day the question 'why' arises. Everything 'begins' in this boredom, once it is colored by wonder. We say 'begins,' for this word is important. Boredom lies at the end of the activities of a mechanized life, but at the same time it puts consciousness into motion. It arouses consciousness and incites it to continue. The result is either an unconscious return to the chain or being definitely awakened."177 A similar thought is expressed by Heidegger: "Always on the point of self-destruction, this Europe now lies between the giant pincers constituted, on one side, by Russia and, on the other, by America. From the metaphysical viewpoint Russia and America are both the same-the same disconsolate raging of unchained technology and of the endless organization of men, reduced to anonymity. When the most remote corner of the earth has been conquered and economically exploited, when any event whatsoever has become accessible wherever, whenever, and as quickly as desired, when you 'can be there' at the same time for a murder attempt on a king in France and a symphony concert in Tokio, when time is reduced to speed, immediateness, and simultaneity, when time as history has disappeared from the existence of all peoples, when a boxer has become the great hero of a people, when the millions turning up for monster-rallies are a triumph-even then the question 'whither? whereto? and what next?' looms as a specter over all these chimeras."178

The Mystery of Being. As long as man is still somewhat human, as long as he is capable of being bored, he will not be able to prevent this "why" from coming up. And when it arises, everything begins, everything begins to be, i.e., it ceases to be a matter of course and begins to be mysterious. To be, i.e., that something is, becomes a mystery. f,Vhy is there something and why is there not rather nothing! For, nothing is so much more simple (Leibniz). Within this questioning everything begins to be mysterious. As soon as man asks about the "why" of being, he ipso facto includes in his question all that is and was and will be. We do not mean that he, as it were, marches along the line of beings, for with respect to the 177 Le

p. 579.

my the de Sisyphe, Paris, 1942, p. 27. Quoted by Verbeke, op. cit.,

178Einfuhrung in die Metaphysik, pp. 28-29.

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question of being it does not matter what kind of being any being is. lTD A being is not a being because it is a tree, a cloud bank, a child, or a dog. If one were to assert that a being is a being because it is a tree, he could no longer affirm that a child is a being, because a child is not a tree. The question of being leaves the particular nature of all particular beings out of consideration and wants to ask only about their being beings. 18o This implies that the questioner himself and his question likewise are contained in the question, for the questioner is not nothing but being.l 81 Thus it is excluded that the questioning would be a "disinterested" questioning, for the reply is of "interest" to the questioner because it decides about the being which he is. Such a question is bound to escape the technocrat. In his world being never occurs as being. Being appears to him only as raw material, as energy, etc., and he himself appears to himself only as their calculator and master. This is what is of "interest" to him.182 But the question concerning being does not aim at a particular being as such.

Metaphysics. The preceding paragraphs indicate what is traditionally called "the metaphysical question." The science which undertakes such questioning critically and systematically is called "metaphysics"a name derived from the place assigned to it in the collection of Aristotle's works by Andronicus of Rhodes, who located it after the works about physics. We have already indicated how the metaphysical questions and metaphysics itself must be described. It may not be amiss, however, to return to this point more explicitly because, as far as the use of the term "metaphysics" is concerned, there is if not much misunderstanding at least much confusion of terminology. Sometimes "metaphysics" is used as synonymous with "philosophy."18s In this way

U9Cf. Heidegger, ibid., p. 2. 180"Bei der Frage halten wir uns jedes besondere und einzelne Seiende als gerade dieses und ienes vollig fern." Heidegger, ibid., p. 3.. 181"Indem [das Fragen] dem Seienden im Ganzen gegenubertritt, sich ihm aber doch nicht entwindet, schlagt das was in dieser Frage gefragt wird, auf das Fragen selbst zuruck." Heidegger, ibid., p. 4. 182Heidegger, ibid., p. 7. 18S"Le domaine de la metaphysique, si on Ie distingue de celui de la theodicee (qui, en fait, en constitute la partie principale) est done celui des absolus relatifs dont nous parlions plus haut et que nous avons pu, en discutant l'hypothese positiviste, ramener a trois; la pensee, l' etre et la valeur, qui font I'objet respectivement de trois traites, appeJes psychologie, ontologie et axiologie." R. Jolivet, L'homme metaphysiqlle, Paris 1958, p. 74.

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there is question of a metaphysics of society, values, poetry, knowledge, nature, man, etc. In general, the view amounts to this: alongside the knowledge given by the various positive sciences, there is room for the knowledge of more general structures, for philosophical knowledge. To give an example, the physicist questions nature from a determined viewpoint; he seeks laws of nature that are empirically verifiable. He presupposes, however, a certain knowledge of the things of nature as such, which he does not make the object of his inquiry. The thematization of this knowledge is the task of the philosophy of nature. But the philosophy of nature nowadays is also called metaphysics of nature. Thus we are faced with the curious situation that the scienc~ which in the orderly arrangement of Andronicus of Rhodes is called "physics" at present is known also as metaphysics (or special metaphysics) ,184 although metaphysics received its name precisely because of its location after philosophical physics. We do not wish to follow this strange terminology and reserve the term "metaphysics" for the science which considers being as being. The question of being as being began with Parmenides, was brought to a climax by Aristotle185 and Thomas Aquinas,186 and in our days was taken up again in its original sense by Heidegger. 187

Being as Being. The question about the meaning of being as being is concerned with being insofar as it agrees with any being whatsoever. Thus the metaphysical question is a query with a very special intention, a query in which the subject assumes a very definite standpoint. As a consequence, reality is structured in a very special way. When I consider a watch as a watch, my consideration extends to the watch not as made of gold or silver, as big or small, but as in agreement with any watch whatsoever. It does not matter whether the watch is made of gold or silver, big or small, for these determinations do not concern the watch as watch, i.e., as agreeing with any watch whatsoever. 184Cf. Louis de Raeymaeker, The Philosophy of Being, St. Louis, 1954, p. 4. 185"There is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature." Metaphysics bk. III, ch. 1. 186"Dicit aut em [Philosophus] 'secundum quod est ens', quia scientiae aliae, quae sunt de entibus particularibus, considerant quid em de ente, cum omnia subjecta scientiarum sint entia, non tamen considerant ens secundum quod ens, sed secundum quod est huj smodi ens, scilicet vel numerus, vel linea, vel ignis, vel aliquid hujusmodi." S. Thomas, In Metaph. IV, lect. 1 (Cathala, 530). 187"Durch dieses Fragen wird das Seiende im Ganzen allererst als ein solches und in der Richtung auf seinem moglichen Grund eroffnet und im Fragen offengehalten." Heidegger, op. cit., p. 3.

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In principle, therefore, every watch falls under my consideration. Or, as de facto amounting to the same, by means of the standpoint of the knowing and questioning subject which I am, an entire region of reality, a whole "landscape," is, as it were, drawn into the foreground of the general area in which my existence is present, and other meanings are relegated to the background. Within this selected region of reality the individual realities are in agreement. Asking about the meaning of a watch as a watch, I ask about the watch as pertaining to a certain "landscape," a determined region of reality. If, instead of asking about the watch as a watch, I ask about it as a cultural product, my field of presence undergoes a change of structure. There is no longer question of the watch as a watch, but about the watch as in agreement with no matter which. other cultural product.. The region of reality selected by the special viewpoint of my question contains also ash trays, bicycles, alarm clocks, wigs, etc. It is accidental to a cultural product to be a watch, for an ash tray is also a cultural product but is not a watch. The special determinations of the various .cultural produots withdraw into the background of my field of presence as soon as I ask a question about a cultural product as such. In ordinary life man does not explicitly pay attention to all this, but he presupposes it when he takes a streetcar, lights a cigar, buys a book, uses an ash tray, finds a watch, takes a bath, marries a wife, drinks a glass of water, etc. From this it is easy to understand the meaning of the question about being as being or the intention of the metaphysical question. Parmenides was the first who saw this question. He understood that from a certain standpoint all realities are radically in agreement. If every reality is considered as being, as not-nothing, all realities fundamentally agree with one another. Of every reality one can say at least that it "is," for otherwise it would be nothing. "Being is, and non-being is not," Parmenides constantly repeats, and "there is no escape from this thought." He even went so far as to claim that there can be no distinction at all between beirigs and that being cannot come to be. For if two beings are distinct, they are distinct either in and through being or through something else, i.e., in and through non-being or nothing. But in and through being it is precisely that beings agree, i.e., are not distinct; and if they differ in and through non-being or nothing, they are not distinct, for nothing does not give rise to any difference-what differs in nothing from

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something else does not differ at all. Likewise, Parmenides thinks, it cannot be admitted that beings come to be. For, if they came to be, they would have to come to be either from being or from nonbeing, from something or from nothing. But it is not possible that something comes to be from something, for it would already be something; on the other hand, something cannot come to be from nothing, for nothing contributes nothing to something. 188 One cannot escape from these difficulties by saying that a watch differs from an ash tray because a watch is a watch and an ash tray is an ash tray, and that chickens produce eggs while thunderstorms fill the air with ozone. Such "solutions" are not acceptable because they amount to abandoning the metaphysical viewpoint, which is not concerned with watches, ash trays, chickens, eggs, thunderstorms, or ozone. 189 Metaphysics is concerned with being as being, with difference as difference, with coming to be as coming to be. Two beings cannot differ insofar as one is an ash tray and the other a watch, for a bicycle and a wig differ also although they are not a watch and an ash tray. More than a century had to pass before Aristotle managed to give a satisfactory reply to Parmenides' difficulties. The importance of Parmenides in the history of thought lies in the fact that he discovered the possibility of the metaphysical viewpoint. Within this metaphysical intention the radical agreement of all beings has to be affirmed. In metaphysical questions one asks about the meaning of being as being, as agreeing with no matter what being, as opposed to nothing. It is not without significance that the question, "Why is there something?" is supplemented by "and why is there not nothing?" The Universality of the Metaphysical Question. As was pointed out previously, every viewpoint in raising questions places a definite "area of meaning," a definite "landscape" of reality in the foreground of my field of presence. We must see, therefore, what the dimensions and the boundaries are of my field of presence in asking questions with a metaphysical intention. 188ef. F. ]. Thonnard, A Short History of Philosophy, ~ew York, 1955, Nos. 14-15. 189"Im Sinne ihrer unbeschriinkten Reichweite gilt jedes Seiende gleich vie!. Irgend ein Elefant in irgend einem Urwald in Indien ist ebenso gut seiend \Vic irgend ein chemischer Verbrennungsvorgang auf dem Planeten Mars und he1iebig anderes." Heidegger, ibid.

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The reply is that the field of presence pertaining to the metaphysical question cannot be a definite "landscape."19o A definite "landscape" is "defined" because it is limited by other "landscapes." But with respect to questions which are asked with a metaphysical intention, a limiting landscape does not mean any real limitation. For of this landscape also one must affirm that it is either being or nonbeing. If it is being, it is not a limit of the landscape questioned by the metaphysical query, for it belongs to this landscape. If it is non-being, it likewise is not a limit, for nothing is not a real limit. The field of presence of the subject asking the metaphysical question is not limited and, therefore, is the universe. By this term "universe" we do not mean the sum total of earth, things, plants, animals, men, stars, planets, and suns, but the universality of all beings as beings. It belongs to beings as beings, and not as planets, men, or plants to pertain to this universe. If it were to belong to a being as a planet to pertain to this universe, then stars, men, animals, etc., would not pertain to this universe; they would not be beings, for they are not planets. Asking about being as being, man exists in this universe which, moreover, contains him. Every particular landscape which is cut out of reality through every particular intention prompting our questioning is· a kind of "boundary" ( U mgreifendes) of mutually agreeing particular realities (J aspers) .191 The universe is the all-embracing "boundary" of all beings as agreeing with any being whatsoever; it is limited only by nothing and, therefore, does not have a limit. 192 "Why is there something and why is there not rather nothing?" As for the poet, so also for the philosopher everything becomes mysterious in the light of this question, everything loses its obviousness. 193 In the everydayness of technocracy man loses himself in caring (Besorgen) for a small, particular world (Heidegger) .194 190"Wenn wir denkend ausblickend uns in die Richtung dieser Frage aufmachen, dann verzichten wir zunachst auf jeden Aufenthalt in irgendeinem der gelaufigen Gebiete des Seienden." Heidegger, op. cit., p. 10. 191 Jaspers, Einfiihrung in die Philosophie, p. 28-37. 192"Der Bereich dieser Frage hat seine Grenze nur am schlechthin nicht und nie Seienden, am Nichts. Alles was nicht Nichts ist, fallt in die Frage." Heidegger, op. cit., p. 2. 193"Im Dichten des Dichters und im Denken des Denkers wird immer soviel Weltraum ausgespart, dass darin ein jeglich Ding, ein Baum, ein Berg, ein Haus, ein Vogelruf die Gleichgiiltigkeit und Gewohnlichkeit ganz verliert." M. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 20. 1945 ein

und zeit, p. 189.

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He does not realize the metaphysical dimensions of his existence, but restricts the universe to the limits of his immediate surroundings (Umwelt) and despises the metaphysical question because he "cannot do anything with it." This, however, does not dispose of the matter. For if man "cannot do anything with metaphysics," metaphysics "does something with man."195 One who cannot do anything with metaphysics still has metaphysics, he still has a conception of being as being, of the universe. For the technocrat the universe is the system of what can be measured and calculated, and outside this system there is nothing. "Why is there something and why is there not rather nothing?" This is the most fundamental question which man can ask. But what exactly does man want to know when he raises this question? Does it make sense to ask this question? Is it not possible for man simply to stop at the beings which are and simply accept them as "beings that are there"? The reply is that such an attitude is impossible. Asking about being as being, about the "why" of being, man asks about the ground, the cause of being. 196 He must raise this question, for beings reveal themselves as beings although they do not have a ground in themselves.

Multiplicity and Being. The encounter with beings gives me the immediate certainty that there are many beings. A plant is not a stone, and a dog is not an ash tray. But a plant as well as a stone, a dog as well as an ash tray are beings. To be many, however, means to be different. If this plant does not differ from this stone, they could not be spoken about as two beings. If Tom, Dick, Mary, and Harry do not differ, they would not be a plurality. But the fact that two beings differ means that one being has something which the other does not have. That Tom differs from Mary, therefore, means that the being which Tom is includes also non-being, for Tom is not the being which Mary is. This thought constituted a great and unsurmountable difficulty for Parmenides, the first true metaphysician of ancient Greece. How 195Heidegger, op. cit., p. 9-10. 196"Zur FragestelIung gehort: 1. die bestimmte Angabe dessen. was in die Frage gestellt wird, befragt wird; 2. die Angabe des sen, woraufhin das Befragte befragte wird, wonach gefragt ist. Denn es wird in alIer Eindeutigkeit angegeben, was das Befragte ist, niimlich das Seiende. Wonach gefragt wird, das Gefragte, is das Warum, d.h. der Grund." Heidegger, op. cit., p. 17.

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is it possible that being-Tom includes not-being- Mary? Does it mean that being includes also non-being? No, for such an assertion revolts against reason. For Parmenides it is evident that being cannot be "thought" otherwise than as pure being. "Being is, nonbeing is not." It is impossible to "think" being as including non-being. Parmenides is so fascinated by this evidence of his "thinking" that he dares to draw conclusions from it which are contradicted by the encounter with beings. Existing in the universe, the subject asking metaphysical questions encounters many beings which come to be or change. It is of no use to deny this evidence. How, then, is it possible that Parmenides so obstinately denies what is evident? The reply is that he lets himself be guided by the evidence of his "thinking." His "thinking" does not permit any other conclusion. Thus the question arises how the evidence of Parmenides' "thinking" can be reconciled with the evidences contained in the encounter with beings? Socrates and Plato did not succeed in bringing about this reconciliation, and it took more than a century before Aristotle managed to show the light. We have to admire how Parmenides is and remains a metaphysician. He maintains the metaphysical viewpoint, despite the fact that his view drives him to accept impossible consequences. The requirements of "thinking" are inexorable. Parmenides is right: it is not possible for me to "think" being otherwise than as pure being, as the fullness of being. My "thinking" does not allow me to admit that being would somehow include non-being. Equally inexorable, however, is the evidence contained in the encounter with the beings of the universe: there are many beings, and they come to be or change. From this there follows for us a conclusion which Parmenides did not see. I cannot "think" being otherwise than as pure "to be," fulln~ss of "to be," one and immutable. Therefore, the beings of the universe are not "to be," for no being is the fullness of "to be," but all of them are mutable and different from one another. Now, however, the difficulties begin in earnest. Must we say, then, that the beings of the universe are not? Are trees, animals, !:looks, cigars, stars, the sun and the moon not real? Of course, such a supposition is nonsensical. These beings are; yet they are not "to be." What does this mean? That the beings are not "to be" means that they are not the fullness of "to be." What, then, does it mean that these beings are? Only one reply is possible: they partake of "to be," they have so much to do with it that they are not not-to-be.

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"To be," of which I can "think" only as the fullness of "to be," is realized only "partially" in the beings which I encounter in the universe. They participate in "to be," i.e., they have only something of what I must "think" as fullness. The use of the term "to participate" is very meaningful here: beings participate, take only a part, realize something of what can be "thought" only as fullness, so that every being is only "this" being and not "that" being. Thus these beings are reality, but not the fullness of reality. Thus certain beings may have something which others do not have and, therefore, differ from them, be many. Thus beings can come to be what they are not yet, for they realize only partially what can be "thought" only as fullness. Beings of the universe are, but only partially; they merely have "to be."

Why is There Not Nothing'! It is here that the metaphysical question "Why is there something and why is there not rather nothing?" assumes its full meaning. Nothing, indeed, is so much more simple than being. To see why, one should understand that being, as "having 'to be,''' is contingent. Whence does it have its "to be"? It did not give itself its "to be," for otherwise it would have preceded itself, it would have been prior to itself. On the other hand, only nothing precedes being, and nothing cannot contribute anything to the "to be" of a being. Moreover, the question, "Whence does being have its 'to be'?" cannot be rejected by asserting that it is through its own essence-in the same way as the question, "Why is it that the extended has parts outside parts?" is rejected by pointing out that having-partsoutside-parts is precisely the very essence of extension. Being is not through its own essence; its essence is not "to be," for otherwise it would be pure "to be" and, consequently, contrary to what we have seen, it would always be. Accordingly, being, as "having 'to be,' " is not ens a se, i.e., it does not have the ground of its "to be" in itself. We express this by saying that it is contingent. The wonder concerning being and the question how it is that there is something and not rather nothing are born from the vague realization that not a single being of the universe has within itself the ground of its being, that not a single being is self-explanatory as being. It is the metaphysician who explicitates the implications of this realization. The wonder concerning being becomes an occasion for radical questioning, so radical that every being loses its obviousness. 197 The 197"Mit unserer Frage stellen wir uns so in das Seiende, dass es seine als das Seiende einbiisst." Heidegger, 0/1. cit., p. 22.

Selbstverstiindlich~eit

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explicit realization of the contingency of beings and of the universe unsettles being as such. 19S Many special sciences have gained solid knowledge concerning particular "areas of meaning," particular regions of reality, sharply defined "landscapes"; the physical sciences and the technology which they have made possible have given man power over the world; nevertheless, everything shakes in its foundations as soon as man dares to ask why there is something and not rather nothing. The replies of the special sciences lose their meaning here, for they cannot even raise the question that has to be answered because they do not dwell in the universe. The power of the technologist suddenly becomes very doubtful here. Through the metaphysical question everything is suspended in mid-air I99-including the metaphysician who raises the question, for he also is a contingent being.20o

The Ground of Being. The participating being, which does not have the ground of its "to be" in itself and yet is, must find this ground in something other than itself, it must be-under-the-influenceof-something-else, it must be-caused. 201 The .contingent being is, but in such a way that it could also not-be. Being itself is open to question, so that it can never get rid of the question. The "to be" of the being is an also-being-able-not-to-be. This possibility is not something which man adds to it in his thinking, but being itself reveals itself as such to the metaphysician who questions it.202 Accordingly, being-caused likewise is not something which man adds in 19S"Das Seiende ist jetzt nicht mehr das nun einmal Vorhandene, es kommt ins Schwanken und dies ganz abgesehen davon, ob wir das Seiende in aller Gewissheit erkennen oder nicht, abgesehen davon, ob wir es im vollen Umkreis erfassen oder nicht. Fortan schwankt das Seiende als so1ches, sofern wir es in die Frage stellen." Heidegger, op. cit., p. 22. 199Heidegger, op. cit., p. 23. 2oo"Indem das Seiende innerhalb der weitensten und hartesten Ausschlagsmoglichkeit des 'Entweder Seiendes-oder Nichts' ins Schwanken gerat, verliert das Fragen selbst jeden festen Boden. Auch unser fragendes Dasein kommt in die Schwebe und wird gleichwohl in dies em Schweben von sich selbst gehalten." Heidegger op. cit., p. 22. 201"Omne enim quod alicui convenit non secundum quod ipsum est, per aliquam causam convenit ei ..." Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles I, c. 15. "Quia ex hoc quod aliquid per participationem est ens, sequitur quod sit causatum ab alio." Summa theol. p. I, q. 44, a. I, ad 1. 202"Dennoch vermag das Seiende nicht das Frag-wiirdige von sich abzuwalzen das als das was es ist und wie es ist, auch nicht sein konnte. Diese Moglichkeit erfahren 'wir keineswegs als etwas, was nur wir erst hinzudenken, sondern das Seiende selbst bekundet diese Moglichkeit, bekundet sich als das Seiende in ihr. Unser Fragen eroffnet nur den Bereich, damit das Seiende in so1cher Fragwiirdigkeit aufbrechen kann." Heidegger, op. cit., pp. 22-23.

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his thinking, but the "to be" of the being itself reveals itself as a to-becaused, as a to-be-under-the-influence-of-something-else. It is this "influence," i.e., the cause of being, which the metaphysician seeks when he tries to understand that something is not rather nothing. The search, however, for the ground or cause of being as being easily deviates from the right track. One could think that this search is similar to the questions, "Why are there plant-lice in the vineyard ?" or "Where does the mold on my books come from ?"203 Of course, when such questions are asked, one seeks for a cause. But the viewpoint of the question co-determines the kind of causal influence which is supposed to answer the question. The causal influence which is appealed to is an influence that is valid within a determined region of reality, within a determined "landscape," but not outside it. If I ask, "What makes celestial bodies move?" or "Why is it that someone deprived of all affection cannot indefinitely get on in life?", my questions delineate other regions of reality within which other types of causal influence are valid. The metaphysician, however, cannot appeal to any of these types of influences which apply only within a determined "landscape," because as a metaphysician he does not dwell in a determined "landscape" but in the universe itself. One who seeks the cause of being as being within a determined "area of meaning," within a determined "landscape," will never find anything which really explains being as being. He is entirely on the wrong track, because he does not even realize what exactly has to be explained. What is sought by the metaphysician is the cause which draws being from nothing and prevents it from falling back into nothing, for of itself being is nothing and, while being, it can also not-be. 204 The biologist may explain why there are plant-lice in the vineyard, but when he does so he merely explains the presence of lice as a victory over the poisonous substances with which the vineyard was sprayed and not as a victory over non-being. The cause of being as being has to explain the conquest of being as a victory over nonbeing.205 The physicist should not attempt to explain being as being 203Heidegger, op. cit., p. 21. 204"Das vVarum gewinnt ... eine ganz andere Macht und Eindringlichkeit des Fragens. Warum ist das Seiende der :.vfoglichkeit des Nichtseins entrissen? Warum {alit es nicht ohne wei teres und standig dahin zuruck?" Heidegger, ibid. 205"Ingleichen wandelt sich jetzt auch das Suchen nach dem Warum. Es zielt nicht einfach auf die Beistellung eines auch vorhandenen Erklarungsgrundes fiir das Vorhandene, sondern jetzt wird nach einem Grund gesucht, der die Herrschaft des Seienden als eine Ueberwindung des Nichts begrunden soll." Heidegger, op. cit., p. 22.

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for, as physicist, he does not even know what he is supposed to explain. When he rejects the explanation of the metaphysician, he necessarily denies something else than what is affirmed by the metaphysician. It should be clear now why above we could say that nothing is so much simpler than being. For what could be the cause of being as being? Certainly not a being of the universe. For whatever being one would want to indicate as the cause of being as being, it would always be a participating being, a contingent being and, therefore, a causedbeing. Being, however, is not the cause-of-being, for it is caused-being. Precisely under the aspects under which it would be indicated as the cause of being-namely, as being-it is not cause but caused, because it is participating and contingent-being. 206 Through the metaphysical questions everything is suspended in mid-air. Nothing appears much simpler as soon as it is understood that the universe, conceived as the universality of all beings, does not have the ground of its "to be" in itself. However, there is not nothing. There are beings, the universe is. Being is being-caused, being-under-the-influence-of-somethingelse; therefore, it is excluded that this "influencing reality" would not be, for otherwise nothing would be. But something is.

Transcendent "To Be." There is no escape: caused-being is; therefore, also its cause is. This cause does not lie in the universe; therefore, it is a reality which transcends this universe. This cause is not something which "has" its "to be," not a participating being; therefore, it is esse a se, Being through its own essence, pure "To Be." The cause of being is Transcendent "To Be." Do I still know what I am saying when I affirm Transcendent "To Be"? Perhaps I know better what I may not say of "To Be": it is not like a being of the universe. Nevertheless, "To Be" is, for there is not nothing, although nothing would be much more simple. It is certain that if the astrophysicist, geologist, biologist, or any other representative of specialized sciences reject Transcendent "To Be," they necessarily deny something else than what I affirm as a metaphysician; they cannot even realize what exactly I am looking for, because they do not dwell in the universe. 206"Diese Warum-frage sucht fur das Seiende nicht Ursachen, die von der gleichen Art und aus der gleichen Ebene sind wie es selbst. Diese Warumfrage bewegt sich nicht in irgendeiner Flache und Oberflache, sondern dringt in die 'zugrunde' liegenden Bereiche und zwar bis ins Letzte, an die Grenze; sie ist aller Oberflache und Seichtigkeit abgekehrt, der Tiefe zustrebend; als die weiteste ist sie zugleich unter den tiefen Fragen die tiefste." Heidegger, op. cit., pp. 2-3.

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The affirmation of Transcendent "To Be" immediately throws a new light on the beings of the universe. These beings revealed themselves as participating beings, as realizing only "partially" what can be thought only as the fullness of "to be." Now, however, it becomes clear that to participate means more than this, for the participating being partakes of the fullness of real "To Be" because it receives from this "To Be" what it is. Accordingly, "To Be" "imparts" to others their "to be," it makes them participate in "to be." With this insight metaphysical thinking enters into its second phase. In the first phase I question being as being, i.e., as agreeing with everything else. Through my metaphysical viewpoint I enter the universe, and the boundaries of my field of presence are, in principle, pushed back to infinity. But my thinking about the universality of being leads me beyond and above the universe to the affirmation of pure "To Be." I understand being as being only when I see it in its dependence on pure "To Be." In its second phase metaphysics is thinking about being in the light of the affirmation of Transcendent "To Be." Yet-do we not proceed too hastily? 4.

MAN, THE METAPHYSICAL BEING

Our uncertainty, arising from the question whether we did not proceed too hastily, is understandable when one takes into consideration that the proof of Transcendent "To Be" is the proof which the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition recognizes as a valid argument showing that there is a God. Everyone who uses the term "God" means by it an infinitely perfect Being, the first cause of all that is, and Itself uncaused. 207 Some, however, claim that there is no such Being, that it is merely the product of our thinking, a projection from an "unhappy conscience," a superfluous scientific hypothesis, etc. Nevertileless, they agree with those who affirm that there is a God concerning what has to be understood by the term "God," if there is a God. If God is, He must be an infinitely perfect Being, the first cause of all that is, and Himself uncaused. So far as the nominal definition is concerned, there is no difference of opinion.

The Validity of the Proof of God. In the preceding section we expressed the idea that what is expressed by this nominal definition is reality, that there is a God. What, then, is the meaning of the uncertainty expressed in the closing lines? 207Cf.

Thomas Aquinas, Summa theal., p. I, q. 2, a. 3.

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This uncertainty does not refer to the validity of the proof. Most objections against the train of thought followed in it arise from the inability to think in a truly metaphysical way. Objectors think of data and proofs as they are known in the empirical sciences and then consider God a superfluous scientific hypothesis or "unprovable." This term could mean here "unprovable in the way in which empirical sciences prove." Usually, however, the intention is to go further and to affirm that no other kinds of proof are possible.208 In other words, the assertion implicitly dictates a complete theory of knowledge and a corresponding view of reality. Such an assertion makes no impression at all on the metaphysician. He knows that no kind of empirical scientist can show that there is a God and that the so-called proofs proposed by physicists, biologists, etc. can only falsify the idea of God. 209 . He knows also that those who reject God with an appeal to the empirical sciences deny of necessity something else than what he affirms as a metaphysician. It is impossible to defend theism or to refute atheism by means of the empirical sciences. As physicist or as biologist, the physicist or the biologist does not even know what is under consideration when there is question of the experience of being as being or of the affirmation of Transcendent "To Be." We presuppose, therefore, that the train of thought is truly metaphysical. This train can be taken up by anyone who puts himself in the attitude that characterizes metaphysical experience and metaphysical thinking. Is it to be expected that God will be affirmed, that all those who make the attitude of metaphysical thinking their own will become convinced that there is a God? The reply is definitely in the negative. Not to admit this would be just as naive as accusing the opponent of bad faith or ill_will.210 The question is much more complex, and this is the reason why in the preceding section we asked ourselves whether we were not proceeding much too hastily. On the other hand, it would be likewise too hasty to 208"On voit done qu'il y a deux fa<;ons radicalement distinctes de denier l'existence aDieu . . . : l'une revenant a traiter Dieu comme un objet empirique et a dire: 'Cet objet ne se rencontre pas dans l'experience', l'autre se traduisant par l'affirmation que Dieu ne peut pas etre traite com me un objet empirique et que par consequent l'existence ne peut lui convenir." Marcel, Journal mCtaphysique, p. 33. 209Cf. R. Jolivet, Le Dieu des Philosophes et des savants, Paris, 1956, pp.

75-78. 210Cf. Marcel, Du refus Ii ['invocation, pp. 228-229.

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reject the proof as a valueless old stamp that has been withdrawn from circulation. True, in the history of thought new difficulties have constantly been raised against the proof, and these difficulties were not always refuted in the correct way-the struggle against Kant may serve as an illustration-because the refutations tried to prove too much. Nevertheless, there still are philosophers who consider the proof valid and they really are not always among the least intelligent. 211 However, among those who accept the proof there are many who are not really satisfied with it. They think that to be really satisfactory the proof would have to say much more than it does. For them, God is much more than Transcendent "To Be," identified as such by a metaphysical proof. Their God is "the Absolute Thou," (Marcel), and it is only in prayer that one realizes what this means. Perhaps an example which has some analogy with the difficulty under consideration may serve to clarify what they want to emphasize. Let us assume that I have to express the reality intended by the simple words "my mother" and that in doing this I would point only to a few physiological processes on which my conception is based. I would deserve being blamed for pointing out only what is least important and for not expressing the full reality which I myself have in mind when I speak of "my mother." About the same objection is made by some against the expression "Transcendent 'To Be.' " The proof concludes only to what Pascal called "the God of philosophers and scholars." The words "Transcendent 'To Be'" do not even approximately indicate the reality which God is for one who prays. Moreover, for a man who can really pray the whole proof of "Transcendent 'To Be' " would be superfluous. Thus we are faced with the paradoxical situation that those who need the proof appear unable to accept it and cannot be convinced by it, while others who accept it do not seem to need it because they affirm much more than the proof is capable of expressing. 212 The uncertainty mentioned in the concluding words of the preceding section, therefore, has a reverse: did we not say far too little? Marcel, op. cit., p. 229. 212"On aboutit done a ce paradoxe que la preuve n'est efficace d'une fac;on generale que Ia ou a la rigueur on pOllvait se passer d'elle; et au contraire, elle apparait presque certainement comme un jeu verbal ou une petition de principe a celui auque! e!le est precisement destinee et qu'il s'agit de convaincre." Marcel, op. cit., p. 231. 21ICf.

68 Nevertheless, first sight. I t is too little. It was too little for the

Existential Phenomenology this situation is not as paradoxical as it appears at true, indeed, that we have said both too much and much too much for the non-religious man, and much religious human being.

Orientation to God and the Proof of God. It would be a mistake to think that the force of the metaphysical proof of God lies in its rationally metaphysical and conceptual structure itself. Just the opposite is true. The rational construct which this proof is derives its meaning from the recognition of the deepest dimension proper to human existence-man's orientation to the Transcendent, the Infinite, the Absolute. 213 This orientation is called "religiousness."214 When we spoke of the primitive fact of existential phenomenology, we pointed out that the philosopher does not have the right through a dogmatic a priori view to make it impossible for himself to conceive no matter what reality as reality. More concretely expressed, he does not have the right to conceive existence exclusively as openness of subjectivity for-the-world-alone. The existence of intentionality means openness of the subject for whatever is not the subject. Whatever-is-not-the-subject certainly includes the world, but it is not excluded that this openness has to be conceived much more broadly, and that man, as intentional being, must be conceived also as destinedfor-the-other and as orientation-to-God. At present we go a step further and observe that it is impossible for man ever to recognize the validity of the proof of God, if he has not previously recognized his existence in its religious dimension. i.e., as directedness to God. Of this directedness the proof that there is a God is only the learned expression. The proof presupposes one's religiousness. It does not produce this disposition but, on the contrary, is produced by it. 211i 213Cf. Jolivet, op. cit., pp. 110-114. 214Cf. Marcel, J oltrnal metaphysique, p. 98. 215 L' erreur ici serait de penser que ce qui fait la valeur des preuves de Dieu, c'est leur appareil conceptuel et logique, alors que c'est plut6t l'exigence d'absolu et I'elan spirituel qui les soustient. . . En n!alite, la verite de Dieu est vecue avant d'etre eonnue: les preuves ne I'engendrent pas; c'est e1le qui engendre les preuves, qui ne sont pour elle que des moyens de s'exprimer et de sc jnstilier rdlexivement. lei, plus qu'ailleurs, la spontaneite rationnelle est Ie principe moteur de toute rdlexion. Comme en toute croyance, les preuves de Dieu redoublent I'aftirmation. Mais de Iii vient que, separees par abstraction de l' experience vecue qu' elles impliquent, e1les paraissent froides et ternes, inadequates infiniment iI I'ampleur de leur dcssein et qu'elles prennent facilement I'allure d'un jeu coneeptuel." R. Jolivet, op. cit., p. 111.

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In formulating the proof of God we presupposed something which does not find expression in rational formulas, but nevertheless is essentiaI216-namely, that man is already anchored in GOd. 217 The proof expresses on the metaphysical-rational level what religious man knows already in "blind intuition."218 An example which is somewhat analogous with this situation may help to clarify the point. Let us assume that I am challenged to prove that my mother loves me. At first I am inclined to doubt the possibility of such a proof. If they insist, I will begin to describe certain signs which for me are "proofs" of love. How can these signs be "proofs" for me? For an old-fashioned psychiatrist these same proofs would mean that my mother is a sadist and that I am the victim of an Oedipus complex which has not been timely removed! All I can do is to shrug my shoulders. What this old-fashioned psychiatrist says does not interest me, for I know that he is incapable of seeing what I see unless he loves my mother just as much as I do. To see something, man needs more than eyes: a suitable attitude and viewpoint are required. Not all realities are unqualifiedly accessible to all,219 not all realities can be identified by everyone, for this identification does not always resemble the way in which insects are labeled. As far as the proof of God is concerned, these considerations mean that the metaphysically rational affirmation of Transcendent "To Be" is preceded, firstly, by the experience of man's existence as directedness to the Transcendent, the Infinite, the Absolute, and secondly, by the acceptance of this orientation through a project or plan of life adapted to this experience. If in man's life there is no room for experiences which make him rise above worldly matters, if the project which he is does not go beyond the world and his own being as to be realized in this world, then there can be no question that he would ever be 216"N'y-a-t-il pas lieu de pn!sumer bien plutot qu'i1s mettaient dans leur argument quelque chose d'essentiel qui n'arrivait pas a passer comph~tement dans les formules et qu'il s'agirait pour nous d'expliciter?" Marcel, Du ,.efus d l'invocation, pp. 229-230. 217"],apercevais enfin la possibilite d'une reflexion sur i'idee meme de preuve de I'existence de Dieu, a propos des preuves thomistes. C'est un fait qu'elles ne sont pas universellement convaincantes. Comment expliquer cette inefficacite partielle? Elles supposent qu'on s'est preablement etabli ·en Dieu, et consistent au fond a ramener au niveau de la pensee discursive un acte tout different." Marcel, Etre et avoir, p. 141. 218Cf. Marcel, op. cit., pp. 175-176. 219Cf. Marcel, op. cit., pp. 307-308.

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capable of accepting the proof of God. 220 We may refer here to what has been said previously concerning the technocratic character of contemporary life. To the extent that man falls victim to the mentality in which a technocratic society lives he becomes more and more blind to God. 221 The affirmation of God presupposes what Marcel calls "recollection,"222 i.e., being sensitive to the deepest dimension of human existence and returning to this dimension. The more man is absorbed by "modern life," the more he becomes blind to God. 22 :l Summarizing we may say, therefore, metaphysics in its second phase, as the affirmation and consideration of Transcendent "To Be,"' presupposes the metaphysical in man, i.e., a truly metaphysical life. To live metaphysically, man does not need metaphysics,224 but without metaphysical life there can be no question of metaphysics. Here, however, it is necessary that the expression "the metaphysical in man" be understood in its full meaning. It is not enough that these words be taken to mean only, as is done by Merleau-Ponty,225 that man is more than physis, more than a particle of nature. That man is more than a little part of nature is required even for appreciating the most simple intellectual act of cognition at its true value. That man is metaphysical means that there is a dimension in man through which he transcends finite and relative being 226 and is directed to the Infinite, the Absolute, to Transcendent "To Be." It is from this orientation that metaphysics lives.

A Vicious Circle? The objection could be raised that this view contains a vicious circle, for the affirmation of Transcendent "To Be" presupposes the recognition of man as orientation to Transcendent "To Be." Moreover, one could say: By what right is it asserted that

220"Le 'probleme de l'etre' ne sera done qu'une traduction en un langage inadequat d'un mystere qui ne peut etre donne qu'a un etre capable de recueillement, a un etre dontla caracteristique centrale consiste peut-etre a ne pas coincider purement et simplement avec sa vie." Marcel, op. cit., p. 171. 221Cf. Marcel, Les hommes contre l'humain, pp. 126-138. 222Etre et avoir, p. 171. 223cf. Marcel, op. cit., p. 311. 224Cf. Jolivet, L'homme metaphysique, Paris, 1958, p. 16. 225Cf. Merleau-Ponty, Sens et non-sense, pp. 186-187. 226"Im Griechischen heisst 'iiber etwas weg,' 'hinuber': meta. Das philosophische Fragen nach dem Seienden als solchem ist meta ta physica; es fragt iiber das Seiende hinaus, ist Metaphysik." Heidegger, Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik, p. 13.

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the orientation to the Infinite and Absolute is the deepest dimension of human existence? Is this assertion an irrational choice, a decision which cannot be critically justified in reflection? As was previously pointed out, the philosopher does not have the right to make it impossible for himself through a dogmatic a priori view to recognize no matter what reality as reality. We added, however, that it is his duty critically to investigate what is tenable and what is not tenable in any assertion. The philosopher, therefore, has to investigate what is tenable in the assertion that the deepest essence of man lies in his orientation to the Infinite. Accordingly, there should be no question of appealing to an irrational decision, to a choice that cannot be justified. We may not dispense ourselves from the obligation to present a rational justification. This justification will consist in the reflection on the meaning of human freedom, conceived as project and as transcendence, and on the destination of freedom. It will be presented in the fourth chapter of this book. The expression "rational justification," however, is meaningless if it is not clearly indicated what is to be understood by .the term "rational." The second chapter will investigate the meaning of this term. Insight into the destiny of human freedom presupposes an insight into the meaning of intersubjectivity. This will be considered in Chapter Three. Thus we arrive at the conclusion that metaphysical thinking about "To Be" is related to thinking about man, that metaphysics presupposes an anthropology. This conclusion is true not only because even before the proof of the reality of Transcendent "To Be" difficulties arise against the acceptance of this reality. Equally important are the difficulties presenting themselves after the proof. Let us clarify this point.

God and Man's Freedom. If Transcendent "To Be" is the highest cause of all beings, what, then, is the nature of this Supreme Being? The first remark to be made is that Transcendent "To Be" must be such that .the beings which depend on it can at least be thought of as possibilities. Otherwise the whole of metaphysics collapses, for it is built on the reality of these beings. But we are faced with the fact that one of the beings of the universe is a free being-namely, man. How is this possible if man falls under the causal influence of Transcendent "To Be"? Is this influence contingent? No, for otherwise Transcendent "To Be" would not be the Supreme Cause

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of all beings. Is man not free? No, again, for otherwise he would no longer be man. This is only one example of the many difficulties arising after the proof of God. For not a few philosophers these difficulties became a reason to reject that there is Transcendent "To Be." If there is a God, man cannot be free and therefore cannot be man. This is the view, e.g., of Sartre227 and Merleau-Ponty.228 The difficulty is very grave. It shows clearly that the philosopher has not finished when he admits that God is the Supreme Cause of all beings. As soon as God's causal influence is conceived as the causality of one thing with respect to another thing, there is, indeed, no room for human freedom. The philosopher, consequently, will have to seek a category of causality in which causal influence can go together with freedom. This category certainly cannot be found in the order of things. It is only in the domain of intersubjectivity that he encounters it: love makes the other be free. 229 Thus even after the proof of God anthropology cannot be dispensed with. Once the relative value of the metaphysical proof of God is understood, there is no longer any reason to minimize or deny the value of this proof, as is done by MarceJ.230 The proof does not show that God is really a God..for-us, in the sense of an "absolute Thou," and that we are "of God" in :the full religious sense of the term. But does this mean that God is not the Transcendent "To Be," and that man's being-caused by God is not a mode of "being-of-God"? The opposite is true. On the basis of the proof, it is no longer possible to deny that God is the cause of man and that man is "0£ God." Thus man has to acknowledge his radical dependence. 281 227Cf. L'existmtialisme est un humanisme, passim. 228"Le P. de Lubac discute un atheisme qui entend supprimer, dit-il, 'jusqu'au probleme qui avait fait naitre Dieu dans la conscience'. Ce probIerne est si peu ignore du philosophe qu'au contraire il Ie met au-dessus des 'solutions' qui l'etouftent." Merleau-Ponty, Bloge de la philosophic, p. 62. 229Cf. below, pp. 223 ft. 230"11 se pourrait, dirai-je pour renouer Ie fil de mon argumentation, que Ie Dieu dont Nietzsche a annonce veridiquement la mort fut Ie dieu de la tradition aristotelico-thomiste, Ie dieu premier moteur." Marcel, L'homme probIematique, p. 63. 231"[La creature] ne se sent plus garantie par rien qui soit en elle-meme ou vienne d'elle-meme, ni par rien qui ait Ie caractere d'un object; toute garantie et toute justification se placent dans la liberte absolue de Dieu. Dans l'adoration, l'homme s'accepte quant a son existence injustifiable par elle-meme, ou par ce qu'il pourrait faire pour la justifier. II s'accepte tel qu'il est, creature." A. Brunner, La personne incarnee, Paris, 1947, p. 230.

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The fact that I am unable to e:xpress the reality which is "my mother" by pointing to the physiological processes on which my conception was based does not mean that these processes do not belong to the integral reality which is "my mother." It may even happen that only physiolQgy can determine who "my mother" really is. In a similar way it may happen also that only by means of metaphysics can man determine who "his God" really is and which gods are false godS. 2S2

232Cf. M. Sciacca, Le probleme de Dieu et de la Religion dans la philosophie contemporaine, Paris, 1950, pp. 203-204.

CHAPTER TWO PHENOMENOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE Without being explicitly conscious of it, we have made use in the preceding pages of an insight which has not yet been justified. There was question constantly of human knowledge as if we already knew what knowledge is. Such a procedure may seem to be unjustifiable for, if I ask myself what it is to know, I must admit that it is impossible for me readily to answer this question. Nevertheless, this not-knowing what knowledge really is did not cause me any special difficulties. Inevitably, we wonder why. The answer is not very far to seek. It is simply impossible to assume that I do not really know what it is to know. True, I cannot express this knowledge in words, but I do have it. I am capable, for instance of distinguishing between my knowledge of a person and my love of the same individual, between my seeing a piece of licorice and my aversion for it. I know, therefore, that knowledge is something else than love or aversion. In other words, I know what knowledge is, what love is, what aversion is, for otherwise I would not be able to distinguish them. However, as soon as I have to state this knowledge in words and express it, I begin to stammer and seem not to know it. As St. Augustine remarked, there appear to be two forms of knowing. In connection with his speculations about time he says that he knows what time is, but as soon as someone asks him to express this knowledge, it is as if he does not know it.l 1. EXPLIOTATION

Pre-Reflective Consciousness. What is it really to know what knowing is without being able to express this knowledge? This knowing is the being-present to the knowing human being which I am. I know trees, houses, men, but in this knowing it is as if I at first omit my own knowing. When a pyschologist tries to know a fellow human being who comes to him, this fellow man is the theme of his knowledge. He will say, for instance, that this man is an introvert, emotional, and intelligent. In this way he expresses the terminus encountered by his knowing. His own act of knowing, however, is omitted by him, it remains expressionless, and does not become the lConfessions, bk. 11, ch. 14.

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7S

theme of his knowledge. Nevertheless, he knows what it is to know, for he is present to the knower who is no other than he himself. The same can be said with respect to a limitless number .of .other situations. When I count the number of cigarettes in my pack, I express the terminus encountered by my cQunting by saying that there are twelve. My .own act .of counting, however, I .omit, I do nQt express it, it has not becQme the theme .of my occupatiQn. Nevertheless, I knQw what it is to count, for I am present to my .own act .of counting. If anyone asks me what I am dQing, I reply at .once that I am counting. 2 At this precise moment, then, the cigarettes are nQ longer the theme .of my act .of knowing. This theme is now my cQunting. I am present to my .own act .of counting, but as soon as someone asks me what I am doing, I place myself explicity in the presence .of this counting and give expressiQn tQ it. The difference between the two previQusly mentioned fQrms .of "knowing" reveals itself clearly here. There is an implicit, nQnthematic consciousness, which cQnsists in the simple presence to my existence. This consciQusness may be called "cQunt-cQnsciousness," "joy-consciousness," "IQve-cQnsciousness," etc., without being consciousness of counting, of enjoying, of loving, etc. Originally, therefore, cQnsciousness is nQt consciQusness of counting .or CQnsciousness of enjoyment, but cQunt-consciQusness .or joy-cQnsciousness. 3 Originally there is no cQnsciQusness of the self, but with the cQnsciousness-of-sQmething self-cQnsciousness is fused tQgether.4 Accordingly, there is question here of consciousness with respect to something withQut the explicitness indicated by the particle "Qf."5 This implicit, nQn-thematic consciQusness with respect to something, however, can be made thematic and explicit through my explicit return tQ this cQnsciousness. ThrQugh my cQnsciQusness I am originally present tQ myself, but through reflection I place myself in my presence, so that what I first omitted-my love, my enjoyment, my knowledge-becomes the theme .of my cQnsciousness. It is necessary to avoid a misconception here. Above we named several modes of existing, such as love, enjoyment, and knDwledge, with respect to which we are conscious. It would be a mistake to 2Cf. Sartre, L'etre et le neant, pp. 19-20. 3"Toute conscience positionnelle d'objet est en meme temps conscience nOll positionnelle d'elle-meme." Sartre, ibid., p. 19. 4"C'est la conscience non-thetique de compter qui est la condition meme de mon activite additive." Sartre, ibid., p. 20. II Sartre, ibid.

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think that these modes of existing stand alongside consciousness or that consciousness lies outside these modes of existing. The contrary is true. Loving, enjoying, perceiving, etc. are not what they are without the presence of consciousness. The perception of a table is just as immediately perception-consciousness. 6 The same applies to all modes of conscious existence. 7 Accordingly, implicit, non-thematic consciousness is not added as something new to existence but internally makes existence what it is. The two above-mentioned modes of being conscious occur in modern philosophical literature under the names "pre-reflective consciousness" and "reflective consciousness."8 Consciousness is called reflective when I pass from being-in-the-presence to placing-my selfin-the-presence. This transition means the thematization of what was non-thematic, the explicitation of what was implicit. Thus it appears that our procedure was not unjustifiable when we tacitly made use of a certain "knowledge of what knowing is." There is a pre-reflective knowledge-consciousness which, however, because it is pre-reflective, is not yet consciousness of knowledge. Thus we could not yet express what knowledge is, just as we could not express what love is, for such expressing presupposes that knowledge or love are themes, which they are not. Importance of Pre-Reflective Consciousness. The importance of pre-reflective consciousness can hardly be overestimated. It should be clear that philosophical thought begins with it and even at first is nothing else than expressing what we may now call in the most general way "life." Life, i.e., knowingly, actively, lovingly, emotionally, etc. being-in-the-world is a conscious-being-in-the-world. Because life is conscious, it does not escape me; nevertheless, I still have to "catch" it if I want to philosophize, for the consciousness of my being-in-the-world is still only a "lived experience," life is still the irreflechi (Merleau-Ponty), the unreflected dealing with things and men. However, reflective consciousness is constantly nourished by this irrejlechi, it is its thematization. Unless it is nourished by the irrejlechi, philosophical thinking is suspended in a vacuum.\I 6Cf. Sartre, ibid. 7"Toute existence consciente existe comme conscience d'exister." Sartre, ibid. 8Cf. Sartre, ibid., pp. 16-23. DCf. "La condition de toute reflexivite est un cogito prereflexif." Sartre, ibid., pp. 116-117.

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Thus philosophy may never go counter to the irrefUchi. Philosophizing is a grasping for life to give expression to it. But this grasping and expressing have value only if the philosopher expresses that to which he is present, only if his "lived experience" supports his reflective expression. 10 Knowledge as Explicitation. The question was raised as to what knowledge is. A reply to this question is possible because I am present to the knower who I myself am. There is in me a knowledgeconsciousness which is not consciousness of knowledge. The reply to the question will consist in explicitating this knowledge-consciousness into a consciousness of knowledge. Thus the reply can never be rationalized or demonstrated, in the strict sense of the term, in the same way as I, for instance, deduce, rationalize and demonstrate the properties of a circle or of a sphere from the essence of these figures.u In explicitation there is nothing to be demonstrated. All I can do is indicate. I can only try to "catch" that to which I am present and give expression to it. It may seem that the result of the method of explicitation is presupposed at the starting point. The process of thought gives the impression of being a circular procedure. 12 This impression is correct. However, the philosopher does not have to offer any excuses for it; he may not and cannot even try to avoid such a process of thought. The circle in his thinking is not a vicious circle, for the procedure of his thought is not that of a syllogism. 13 The so-called circular procedure of explicitation is the expression of what man himself is in his essential structure-namely, a being which in its being-in-the-world always aims at its "to be" itself,14 a being whose "to be" is consciousness of beingYi It is from this consciousness, which he himself is, that the philosopher has to start. There is no other starting point, for outside the consciousness of his existence there is nothing but concealedness with respect to both the subject pole and the object pole. 10Cf. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la perception, pp. II-V. llCf Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 315. 12Cf. Heidegger, ibid., p. 152. 13Cf. Heidegger, ibid., pp. 152 and 315. 14"Der 'Zirkel' im Verstehen gehort zur Struktur des Sinnes, welches Ph an omen in der existenzialen Verfassung des Daseins. im auslegenden Verstehen verwurzelt ist. Seiendes, dem es als In-der-Welt-sein urn sein Sein se1bst geht, hat eine ontologische Zirkelstruktur." Heidegger, ibid., p. 153. 11iCf. Heidegger, IDid., p. 14.

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The history of thought shows clearly how easily the philosopher in his explicitation neglects an essential moment of the irrefUchi. However, even this assertion can never be demonstrated. If I think that someone's explicitation omits an essential moment, I can at most attempt to indicate to him what he has omitted by means of very precise descriptions. Sometimes it may take a very long time before this method produces any result. It may happen that an entire generation of thinkers is completely blind to a certain phenomenon. Because of all kinds of conscious or subconscious prejudices, because their minds have become, as it were, fused with a certain system of view's, it may happen that they are not capable of seeing a certain phenomenon. I6 For these convictions and views mean a definite mentality which co-determines the meaning of their field of presence. Thus phenomena which presuppose a different mental attitude simply escape observation. In this way it could happen that a number of Christians who observed certain clearly formulated laws to the letter called themselves good Christians. As a result, they were not capable of seeing their duties in the realm of social justice and social love with respect to their fellow men, for until fairly recently no precise laws had been formulated in these matters. To become capable of seeing these duties, they had to be torn loose from their conviction of being good Christians, and their legalistic mentality had to be modified. If a discovery is ahead of its time because the general mental attitude of thinkers is not yet prepared to see a certain phenomenon, the lone genius has no alternative but to keep quiet about his discovery and to work first at reshaping the mentality of his contemporaries.u Accordingly, certain insights require a long time of preparation. They are born in history and it may happen that they disappear again in history. The historical growth of insight is very clearly illustrated by the history of the definition of knowledge. Before we begin the thematic consideration of knowledge, it will be necessary to trace this history, because the modern views of knowledge are not-and could not even be-unrelated to this history. Descartes' explicitations I6"Or, il se peut qu'une periode tout entiere soit par suite de certains partis pris inconscients, de certaines vues systematiques, impermeable a certains phenomenes. Ce sera plus tard seulement, quand la premiere attitude aura change pour faire place a une nouvelle, que ceux-ci po~rront s'imposer comme objectifs." A. Brunner, La personne incarnee, Paris, 1947, p. 184. I7Brunner, op. cit., pp. 180-184.

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of knowledge laid the foundations of both English empIrICISm and the rationalism of Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel. Existential phenomenology, which reacts against both of these trends, returns, therefore, to Descartes to correct his fundamental mistake. IS 2.

DESCARTES

His Starting Point. Descartes (1596-1650) lived at a time in which scholastic thought had fallen into a sad state of un authenticity. He was too much of a philosopher to accept this state of affairs passively.I9 For this reason he refused to commit his thought to a trend of thinking which could not offer him any certainty and made it his task to search for an indubitable starting point. Descartes' search of a starting point, however, showed immediately a very definite orientation. He had been struck not only by the chaos of philosophical thought but even more by the growing success of the physical sciences. Hitherto it had never been possible for man to seize nature and to dominate it. But according as the positive sciences managed to separate themselves from philosophy and to follow their own paths, their success grew steadily. Thus Descartes' search of a solid basis for philosophy amounted to this that in his critique of knowledge he presupposed the solidity of the knowledge gathered by the physical sciences. After illustrating the solid foundation of this conviction in his critique, he concluded that only that kind of knowledge can make a claim to objectivity which proceeds in the same way as the physical sciences. 2o The path followed by Descartes in his critique is that of methodically sustained doubt. Whatever can be doubted is provisionally "placed between brackets," i.e., no judgment is made concerning it. Thus, for instance, he doubts the reality of the world, for in his dream he sees worlds which later appear to be unreal and he does not have a criterion to establish with certainty that he is not dreaming now. Even the reality of his own body has to be doubted, Descartes thinks, for how often does he not dream of having another, more beautiful and stronger body. Therefore, he ISCf. E. Husser!, Cartesianische Meditafionen und Pariser Vortriige, herausgegeben und einge1eitet von Prof. Dr. S. Strasser, (Husser/iana, Band I), Den Haag, 1950. 19Rene Descartes, Discou.rse on Method, Part I (Dover ed. of Descartes' philosophical works, vol. I, pp. 83 ff.). 2oCf. A. de Waelhens, Moderne JVijsbegeerfe, Louvain, 1946, pp. 105-109.

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places the body "between brackets," for its reality is doubtful. For methodic reasons the existence of God likewise has to be doubted, for what is really evident regarding the existence of God? N evertheless, there remains some certainty for Descartes. It is impossible for him to doubt the reality of his own doubting, his own thinking. Even if the reality of all things in this world and even of my own body is doubtful, even then it is certain that I doubt and, consequently, that I am, for if I were not, I could not doubt.21 It is not subject to doubt that I, who think, am something. Why is this Cogito, ergo sum not doubtful? For no other reason than that I understand it clearly and distinctly.22 This principle became the supreme rule of Descartes' entire philosophy. He had sought for an insight which in its indubitableness would be able to be the starting point of philosophical thought. He found in it his Cogito, ergo sum. This insight is indubitable for Descartes, because he has a clear and distinct understanding of it. Every other truth, therefore, will have to be conceivable in equally clear and distinct ideas if it is not to be subjeCt to doubt. What cannot be understood clearly and distinctly simply is not true. 23 What is the realm par excellence of clear and distinct ideas? The reply to this question causes Descartes no difficulties. This realm coincides with that of mathematics. Consequently, all knowledge must take over the method of mathematics. His Explicitation of Knowledge. At present, it does not interest us at all whether or not Descartes discovered a solid basis for philosophical thought in his methodic doubt. Our interest is concentrated on the way in which he casually explicitates knowledge, for the internal demands of Descartes' very method profoundly affect this explicitation. To clarify this point, we will raise a few questions and endeavor to answer them in line with Descartes' thought. I am certain that I am because I think. Inevitably the question arises as to what I am. In Descartes' line of thinking I cannot reply: 21Discourse 011 Method, Part IV (pp. 101 f.) 22"And having remarked that there was nothing at all in the statement 'I think, therefore I am' which assures me of having thereby made a true assertion, excepting that I see clearly that to think it is necessary to be, I came to the conclusion that I might assume, as a general rule, that the things which we conceive very clearly and distinctly are all true-remembering, however, that there is some difficulty in ascertaining which are those that we distinctly conceive." Descartes, Discourse on Method, Part IV p. (102). 23In this way Descartes lays the foundation of modern rationalism, which accepts as real and true only what can be conceived in clear and distinct concepts. Nothing else is real for the rationalist.

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I am a bodily being, or I am a being-in-the-world, or I am an orientation-to-God, for body, world, and God have been placed "between brackets." Everything which is not thinking itself stands "between brackets"; hence the reply to be given to the question is that I am thinking. But what do I think? I have to think something, for otherwise I think nothing and thinking nothing means not thinking. Again, the reply cannot be: I think my body, my world, God, unless I mean by these words my thought-images, for whatever is not thinking itself is placed between brackets. Accordingly, I think my own thought, my own knowing, I am conscious of my own consciousness. Thus Descartes' method reveals itself heavy in consequences with respect to the explicitation of knowledge. Knowledge is a fully immanent process, a process which, to be what it is, does not need anything that is not knowledge. At once there arises the problem of the origin of knowledge. Let us limit ourselves to knowledge of the world. If knowledge is nothing else than knowledge of knowledge itself, i.e., not knowledge of the world but of thought-images, of idees tableaux, it will never be possible to say that knowledge derives its content from experience of the world, even if the existence of this world-which was placed between brackets-would be demonstrated. Consciousness cannot manifest any sensitivity to reality, for such a sensitivity would openly contradict the immanence of consciousness. The immanence of consciousness affirms its self-sufficiency: consciousness is closed and wrapped up in itself; it is what it is because of itself and therefore does not need anything else to be what it is. Consequently, there can be no passivity in consciousness as an essential aspect of it, for any kind of passivity would exclude the self-sufficiency of consciousness. Since ideas, then, cannot be born from the experience of the world, Descartes has only one possible solution-namely, that these ideas are innate. A bountiful Creator has endowed man with clear and distinct ideas at his very birth. Once this point is reached, there is no end to the difficulties and no possible solution. As soon as consciousness, knowing, thinking, is cut loose from the world and locked up in itself, as soon as knowledge is said to be nothing but knowledge of ideas, there is no longer any possibility of affirming reality, the real existence of the world, or to say it differently, to affirm that our knowledge of the world is

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objective. The two expressions mean the same, for, as should be clear, knowledge may be called objective if it gives expression to what really is. An affirmation of this reality is no longer possible in the Cartesian system, for every affirmation of no matter what remains locked up in itself, affirms only itself. Any attempt to show that a reality corresponds to certain concepts is doomed to failure, for the so-called proof is always at least a process of thought which presupposes the objectivity of thinking, the reality of what is thought. Nevertheless, Descartes thought that there was an escape from this difficulty, for he had found a criterion of truth and certainty in clear and distinct ideas. But with respect to the material world, there was one and only one clear and distinct idea for Descartes-that of the quantity or extension of material things. Therefore, regarding the material world he accepted only that which can be expressed in terms of quantity. This line of thought, however, does not remove the difficulty. Who will guarantee that in reality something corresponds to these concepts of quantity? Does something real correspond to every concept of quantity? Here Descartes appeals to the veracity of God. From his birth man has been endowed by the good Creator with clear and distinct ideas. These ideas are the criterion of truth. Man is convinced that his clear and distinct ideas express reality, objectivity, that which really is. If this conviction is wrong, God would deceive man, for God himself has given these ideas to man, so that man is forced to consider as objective whatever he conceives in clear and distinct concepts of quantity. God, however, cannot deceive man; therefore, the world is real insofar as man has clear and distinct quantitative concepts of it.24 All this is a clear-cut vicious circle. 25 First, everything that is even slightly doubtful, including that there is a God, is put "between brackets." Next, clear and distinct concepts are proclaimed the criterion of truth and certainty. Finally, the real value of these ideas

24"For to begin with, that which I have just taken as a rule, that is to say, that all the things that we very clearly and very distinctly conceive of as true, is certain only because God is or exists, and that He is a Perfect Being-, and that all that is in us issues from Him. From this it follows that our ideas or notions, which to the extent of their being clear or distinct are ideas of real things issuing from God, cannot but to that extent be true," Discourse on Method, Part IV (p. lOS). 25Cf. Frederick Copleston, A History of PhilosopllY, vol. IV, pp. lOS ff.

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is established by an appeal to God's veracity, although God has been placed "between brackets."26 Results of Descartes' Approach. What were the results attained by Descartes? First of all, knowledge, consciousness, was divorced from the world, for knowledge was explicitated as knowledge of knowledge itself. Next, Descartes in a very surreptious way reintroduced a kind of experience of the world, but only in an extremely limited sense. Experience of the world was reduced to the experience of the physical sciences, although man's ideas are not born from this experience, but merely arise on the occasion of it. As far as Descartes is concerned, only that experience of the world is reliable and genuine which results in the clear and distinct ideas of quantity. This experience is precisely the kind to which the viewpoint of the physical sciences limits itself. Descartes' real intention reveals itself here in an unmistakable way. His methodic doubt, which was supposed to result in a starting point of philosophical thought, is nothing else than a devious way to demonstrate the solidity of the physical sciences. It is not without great sacrifices that he arrives at his goal. Ordinary everyday experience of the world, everyday familiarity and contact with the world 27 has to be replaced by the scientific expression of experience, and this scientific knowledge is the only kind which may be called trustworthy. The fact that only the experience of the world proper to the physical sciences is called reliable and true knowledge of this world clearly betrays that Descartes had a definite, presupposed, but not explicitly stated view of what may be called trustworthy knowledge, for he says that the knowledge obtained through the physical sciences is such knowledge . .In what does the reliability, the truth of this knowledge consist? In the accurate mirrf'ring of a world that is by itself, i.e., loose from the subject. John Locke, who later explicitated Cartesian philosophy, very emphatically affirmed this point. Locke. According to Locke (1632-1704), only the primary qualities of things are objective. By primary qualities he meant those which the scholastics used to call "common sensibles," i.e., those which can be perceived by more than one sense, such as extension, form, and motion. They are to be distinguished from secondary qualities or "proper sensibles," which are the distinct object of a 26Descartes did not postulate that there '" a God or derive his certitude of God from faith. He attempted to formulate a proof, but in this attempt he had to appeal to the objectivity of the principle of causality which he made use of. The circle, therefore, remains. 27Cf. H. J. De Vleeschauwer, Rene Descartes, levensweg en wereldbschouwing, Antwerpen, 1937, pp. 153-162.

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particular sense, such as color of the eye or sound of the ear. According to Locke, the secondary qualities are not objective but merely subjective. They may be said to be objective only insofar as a real world emits stimuli which influence the senses. Accordingly, as for Descartes, so also for Locke, ordinary everyday experience in which man believes spontaneously loses its value. Objective is only the experience of extension, shape, motion, etc, i.e., the experience of the physical sciences. Contrary to Descartes, however, Locke did not want to have anything to do with innate ideas. For him, all knowledge arises from experience. What is the reason why Locke called knowledge of the primary qualities objective and that of the secondary qualities subjective? The answer is not far to seek. Locke had a presupposed view regarding the nature of knowledge, and this idea makes him despise the secondary qualities. These qualities are objective only insofar as an external stimulus makes them appear, but they must be called subjective because they do not accurately mirror reality. Locke, then, presupposes that knowledge is a mirroring of a reality outside man-just as Descartes, who assumed that knowledge is knowledge of idees tableaux. Only the knowledge obtained through the physical sciences is valuable, because only the experience of these sciences results in an accurate mirroring of the world. 3. EMPIRICISM AND IDEALISM

The influence of the Cartesian Cogito and its explicitations by Locke can be found in some form or other in practically all philosophical systems which arose after Descartes. After Descartes, every philosopher had to make the problem of knowledge the central theme of his thinking. The closedness of the Cogito, the pure immanence of consciousness was constantly accepted as an indisputable starting point. Knowledge was constantly viewed as knowledge of ideas. It was always assumed that true knowledge was the accurate, purely passive mirroring of an "outside" reality whose being did not depend in any way on the knower. Thus the epistemological problem, acute since Descartes, was concerned with the reality of that whose immanent cognitive images were in the knower. This common starting point left a possibility of different trends according as distinct aspects of Cartesianism were emphasized. Consciousness and the world were placed side by side as two separate

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realities, but according as post-Cartesian philosophers emphasized either one or the other, it is possible to distinguish idealistic and empiricist tendencies. Idealism. The idealistic trend emphasizes consciousness, its priority, spontaneity, and activity. For Descartes consciousness was still connected with the world-although the way in which he established this connection was not justifiable. Idealism considered it its task to overcome this connection and to eliminate the world entirely as a source of knowledge. It views the perception of the world by consciousness with its consequent obscurity and confusedness as an imperfect form of knowledge, which must be overcome and replaced by the clarity of the self-sufficient idea. In perception consciousness is in a state of estrangement from itself or, which amounts to the same, in the world of matter clear and distinct ideas are in a state of estrangement. Consciousness has as its task to return to itself, to conquer its estrangement from itself in matter. Once this return is made, consciousness is sufficient unto itself, pure for-itselfness, capable of perfect reflection (Hegel). Empiricism. While idealism isolated consciousness from the world and explicitated it as pure activity with respect to its cognitive content, empiricism did almost the exact opposite. Idealism was struck by a certain aspect of consciousness-namely, its spontaneity-and exaggerated this aspect. Empiricism likewise contains a fundamental intuition of philosophical thinking-namely, not the spontaneity but the "sensitivity," the passivity of consciousness. For it is indisputable that realities impose themselves on perceiving consciousness and that the perceiving consciousness finds reality. For this reason the empiricists never wanted to have anything to do with innate ideas, but maintained that all knowledge originates from the experience of reality. The reality of the world, however, as well as the experience of this reality, are explicitated in a very special way. For the empiricist, reality is a "world-in-itself," it is brute reality, an inhuman world, in the sense that man and his perceiving consciousness are left out of it. The empiricist totally disregards the spontaneity, the active presence of consciousness. He believes it possible to speak about a world without man. 28 Consciousness, therefore, has to be conceived as pure passivity, as tabula rasa, a sheet of paper on which nothing is written, 2SCf. pp. 34-39.

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a sensitive photographic plate, a mirror, on which a world that is fully in-itself imprints itself.29 Empiricism first affirms a world which is not the term of the encounter that knowledge is and next asserts that consciousness undergoes the influence of reality in a fully passive sense. The world is the totality of reality,30 purely a spectacle for consciousness, which in a "surveying glance" (Merleau-Ponty) watches this world without any standpoint, without being in a determined situation, without being itself involved in this world. Contrary to idealism, for which all reality dissolved more and more into thin air, empiricism emphasized the reality of the world. Nevertheless, it did not build a bridge between consciousness and world. As faithful followers of Descartes, the empiricists unanimously asserted that the proper and immediate object of perceiving consciousness is constituted by the impressions of perception themselves. It could hardly be otherwise. For in empiricism knowledge is separated and isolated from objectivity, yet at the same time it is called objective. Therefore, knowledge must be in harmony with the reality that is isolated from the knower. This harmony, however, demands that the knowing subject somehow possess reality. How is it possible to possess such a reality that is separated from the knower ?31 Surely, reality is not entitatively, according to its physical nature, in the knower. The reply is that in the knower there is a reflecting image,32 an impressed species, which the physical reality imprints on the knowing subject, and that this image, as the imitation or double of "reality-in-itself" constitutes the proper and immediate object of knowledge. 33 Accordingly, I never know a chair, a house, or a plant, but only a chair-impression, a house-impression a plant-impression. Empiricism accepts dogmatically, without any foundation, that there 29Phenomenologists usually call this empiricism realism. "Le realisme tente de rendre compte de la connaissance par une action du monde sur Ia substance pensante." Sartre, L'etre et Ie neant, p. 277. 30Cf. Merleau-Ponty, La structure du comportement, p. 218. 31"C'est d'abord Ie sensible, Ie per~u lui-meme, qu'on installe dans les fonctions de chose extra-mentale, et Ie probleme est donc de comprendre comment un double ou une imitation du reel est suscite dans Ie corps, puis dans la pensee." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 205. 32"Puisqu'un tableau nous fait penser a ce qu'il represente, on supposera, en se fondant sur Ie cas privilegie des appareils visuels, que les sens recoivent des choses reelles de 'petits tableaux' qui excitent I'ame ales percevoir. Les 'simulacres' epicuriens ou les 'especes intentionnelles', 'toutes ces petites images voltigeantes par I'air' qui apportent dans Ie corps I'aspect sensible des choses, ne font que transporter en termes d'explication causale et d'operations reelles la presence ideale de la chose au suj et percevant qui. nous I'avons vu, est une evidence pour la conscience naive." Merleau-Ponty, ibid. 33Cf. Merleau-Ponty, ibid., pp. 205-206.

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is, on the one hand, a world and, on the other, a Cartesian consciousness which is passive yet at the same time wrapped up in itself. Thus there is no bridge between consciousness and the world.

Empiricism and Experience. Meanwhile it is very problematic that there are any of these perceptive impressions. When Descartes asked himself to what extent his knowledge of the world could be called objective, he replied that there is only one clear and distinct idea of the material world-namely, extension. Extension was the realm of the physical sciences; hence Descartes' reply attributed a privileged position to the experience of the physical sciences. The same was done by Locke, for whom only the primary qualities of things were objective. To defend these proclaimed impressions of perception, empiricist psychologists let themselves be guided by their admiration for the results of the physical sciences to treat all contents of consciousness with the same method as the physicist uses for matter-namely, the analysis of matter into its ultimate elements. This is what the psychologist is supposed to do likewise with respect to the contents of consciousness. 34 Accordingly, a "house-impression," a "plant-impression," etc. have to be analyzed and resolved into their elements. 31i These elements are sought in elementary sensation, caused by physical stimuli with a measurable strength, which are supposed to exercise a unilateral and physically determinating causal influence on sensitivity.36 The summative interconnection of many elementary sensations, caused by physical stimuli, is thought to arise through the mechanism of association. In this way a "house-impression" or a (( plant-impression" is supposed to be constructed. 37 We make mention of this theory here because with the rise of phenomenology a radically new perspective is opened on the problem of physical stimuli as the cause of sensation and on the question of the value to be attributed to association as the principle of composition of elementary sensations. Let us examine next what is left of ordinary everyday experience by the empiricists. The reply allows no hesitation: empiricism not S4Cf. Merleau-Ponty, Phenombtologie de la perception, p. 72. 3liWe mention here only phenomena of knowledge, because other "contents of consciousness," e.g., appetitive phenomena, do not concern us here. 36The subjectivity or objectivity of these impressions does not enter into the psychological explanation of perception. s7Cf. J. van Dae1, Geschiedenis der empirische psycho logie, Zeist, 1929, pp.

12-20.

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only destroys ordinary everyday experience, which consists in being together with things, in communing with reality, hut also simply substitutes for it the experience of the physical sciences. Matters have gone so far in this respect that even the non-philosophizing public at large has slowly but surely become convinced that the world of the physicist and the chemist is properly the only real and objective world. Accordingly, the knowledge supplied by the physical sciences is true knowledge--the rest is poetry, romanticism or subjectivism. If this view is correct, then the question arises: About which world does the physicist speak? If this world is not the world that is familiar to us and in which we dwell, then physical science is a mere play of ideas. How could I ever discover what the physicist is speaking about if it be not the world of delicious grapes and breathtaking vistas? What is the meaning of speaking about the world if this world is not the world in which the girls are so sweet and the boys so manly and generous, if it is not the world in which there is a difference between a deceased and a murdered individual, in which there is a difference between the red of an apple, the red of lips, and that of blood? Such meanings do not occur in physical science, but together with the physicists we live in a world in which these meanings do occur and are taken into account, so that even the physicist can be a married man, having a good wife and handsome children, although he is unable to express these meanings in categories of quantity. This world is the real world in which man dwells. 38 That the knowledge presented by the physical sciences is not the only way of knowing is clear also from the fact that otherwise no one would be able to reflect upon the knowledge of the physical sciences. The physicist would not be able to do it, because for him there is only scientific experience, and the knowledge of the physical sciences itself does not fall under this experience; the non-physicist likewise could not do it, for he does not think in the way of the physical sciences. Nevertheless, no one doubts the possibility of such reflection, for de facto it is done. Accordingly, it is important to revise the concept of experience in a fundamental way. Experience has to be explicitated as it is integrally.39 It is a question of "restoring to experience its ontological weight."40 38Cf.

A. de Waelhens, "Signification de la phenomenologie," Diogene,

1954, no. 5, pp. 59-60. 39"[La phenomenologie] s'efforce de concevoir la philosophie comme l'explicitation de l'experience humaine integrale," A. de Waelhens, ibid., p. 60. 40Cf. Marcel, Etre et Avo;r, p. 149.

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4. CRITIQUE OF PHENOMENOLOGY ON THE TRADmONAL PREJUDICES REGARDING THE NATURE OF MAN'S KNOWLEDGE

Phenomenology Does Not Disparage Science. From the preceding reflections upon idealism and especially upon empiricism one could perhaps be inclined to conclude that the phenomenologist has no confidence in science and prefers a mysterious kind of irrationalism. More specifically, it is sometimes claimed that the phenomenologist considers positive sciences and especially the physical sciences valueless. Both views, however, are erroneous. As is generally known, like Descartes, Husserl, the father of phenomenology, was struck by the success of the sciences and dismayed by the chaos prevailing in the philosophical world. Husserl had great confidence in the sciences and wanted to raise philosophy to the level of a "rigorous science." His appeal "back to reality itself" certainly does not mean that in his view the sciences do not speak about reality. The appeal is directed to philosophy, which has turned away from reality.41 This assertion is true in the first place for the representatives of idealism and empiricism, but it applies also to those scientists who, perhaps unspokenly, think that no other mode of knowledge is possible than the one used in a certain science and that there is no other reality than the one discovered by the science in question. Such a view itself is a kind of philosophy, at least implicitly. It is called scientism. It is a view regarding reality and knowledge in general. It should be evident that a specialist in the positive sciences exceeds the realm of his science and his own qualifications when he begins to speak about knowledge in general. No chemist can speak about his own science without leaving the realm of chemistry, without ceasing to speak as a chemist. By reflecting on the knowledge presented by the physical sciences, the physicist becomes ipso facto a philosopher. This is what happened to Husserl also. In practice, when specialists in the physical sciences reflect upon their own physical knowledge they generally adhere to empiricism.42 They believe that there, before their eyes, the world of objects and facts lies displayed and that here registering consciousness stands as a mirror ready to receive these objects and facts as accurately as HCf. de Waelhens, "De la phenomenologie a l'existentialisme," Le choir, Ie monde, I'eristence. (Cahiers du College Philosophique), Grenoble-Paris, n. d., p. 42.

42Cf. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la perception, pp. 66-69.

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possible. They presuppose that there is a brute reality which through the unilateral and determining influence of its stimuli imposes itself upon a passive consciousness. They attempt to reconstruct by means of the special constructs of the physical sciences the sense of reality, which is immediately accessible to everyday experience, and think that the world, without qualification, is the world of the physicist, that truth unqualified is the truth of the physical sciences. Only in the way of the physical sciences they believe it possible to know the world pure and simple. Against such a view, which is usually only implicitly present, the phenomenologist rises in revolt. He does not distrust the sciences,· but he does distrust the philosophy which far too often is concealed behind them. This philosophy is purely empiricist. In this way the question which was formulated at the end of the preceding section arises again: How does the physicist know about which world he is speaking? If this world is not the world in which we live, the world of things with which we work and are familiar, physics is a play of words, for there is no other real world than the "world in which we live."44 This world, however, ryveals more meanings than those that occur in the physical sciences. \.Thus a the~ry of knowledge demands a return, a reflective return to know~edge las it de facto occurs, (a return to the knowing delightfully appetizing apples and breathtaking vistas, a return to the world in which we live and with which we are familiar. If the geographer does not speak about the landscapes in which we spend our holidays, if the chemist does not speak about the water which we drink when we are thirsty, then they do not speak about anything.45 For this is )the world in which we live, and there is no other world for man. 46/ The phenomenologist, therefore, does not distrust the sciences, but is c()uvinced that every scientific judgment about reality ultimately

bf

43"Nous I'avons vu: on ne peut pas reconstituer ainsi, en combinant des significations ideales (stimuli, recepteurs, circuits associatifs) la structure de l'experience perceptive." Merleau-Ponty, La structure du comportement, p. 235. 44"Revenir aux choses memes, c'est revenir a ce monde avant la connaissance dont la connaissance parle toujours, et a I'egard duquel toute determination scientifique est abstraite, signitive et dependante, comme la geographie a I'egard du paysage OU nous avons d'abord appris ce que c'est qu'un foret, une prairie ou une riviere." Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la perception, p. III. 45"La science c1assique est une perception qui oublie ses origines et se croit achevee." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 69. 46"Tout I'univers de la science est construit sur Ie monde vecu et si no us voulons penser la science elle-meme avec rigueur, en apprecier exactement Ie sens et la portee, .i1 nous faut reveiller d'abord cette experience du monde dont elle est I'expression seconde." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. III.

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goes back to a familiar, integral experience of reality and that otherwise such a judgment is simply suspended in mid-air. This familiar intercourse with the world has to be expressed if one wants to formulate a theory of knowledge, for this intercourse is knowledge as it de facto occurs. It should be clear now what, inter alia, the phenomenologist means when he says that phenomenology is a method for establishing a foundation or ground. As was indicated previously, no judgment regarding reality can be original, i.e., the very first. Prior to all is familiar intercourse, experience that is not reflected upon. This original experience has to be uncovered. Only when this is done, the judgment will have a ground and only then will it become clear what value any assertion hasY Phenomenology and the Nature of Knowledge. Knowledge is still the object of our inquiry. We want to discover its true nature. To attain this goal, it is necessary, however, to place "between brackets," i.e., to set aside, all kinds of theories about knowledge. Both idealistic and empiricist theories are provisionally set aside 48 as well as all the implicit assumptions regarding knowledge which are current among specialists in the positive sciences. 49 Let us suppose, for example, that we are dealing with knowledge of thi!. table. Anything that can be said regarding knowledge presupposes knowledge as it occurs, as, e.g., familiarity with this table. Insofar as this familiar intercourse is knowledge, it is called perception. Of course, there is more than just perception in this familiarity; there may be also activity with respect to it, an effective relationship, and a tendency to it. These, however, do not concern us now, for we are interested only in the nature of perception. How is it possible for me ever to discover what this nature is? Where do I stand when I attempt to describe perception? Do I have to leave perception behind, place myself, as it were, above it, to Hef. Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 69. 48"Theorien, das sagt hier theoretische Vormeinungen jeder Art, halten wir uns in diesen Untersuchungen streng yom Leibe." Edmund Husser!, Ideen zu einer reinen Phiinoml'n%gie und phiinomenoiogischen Philosophie, vol. I, Den Haag, 1950-hereafter quoted as Ideen, I-p. 62. 49"Aber ieh iibe eine im eigentliehen Sinn 'phanomenologisehe' Epoehe, das ist: die mir bestandig als seiend vorgegebene Welt nehme ieh nicht so hin, so wie ich es im gesamten natiirlieh-praktisehen Leben tue, direkter aber auch so wie ich es in den positiven Wissenschaften tue: als eine im voraus seiende Welt unci" in letzter Hinsicht nicht als einen universalen Seinsboden fur eine in Erfahrung und Denken fortschreitende Erkenntnis." Husserl, ibid., p. 67.

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judge it from without ?~O Or do I have to place myself precisely in perception and give expression to it, and if so, how can this be done? The reply is that I have to place myself in perception as it de facto occurs and give expression to it. This is possible because the perception-of-the-table is not concealed from me, for I am conscious of it. Perception, as it de facto occurs, is perceiving consciousness of the world, but at the same time equally immediately perception-consciousness. 31 The perception of a table belongs to what we have called previously the "irreftechi," of which I possess a "lived experience."52 Reflection on perception means that I place myself in the presence of the perception to which I am present, that I "catch" it, and give expression to it.

a. Intentionality The first point to be made is that perceIVIng consciousness is a being-together-with-the-reality of the table which is given to me, which I find as reality. The return to or reflection upon perception as it occurs shows immediately two things-namely, firstly, the beingoutside-itself-with-reality, the existence of perceiving consciousness and, secondly, the reality of the table to which consciousness is present. Consciousness is Never Wrapped up in Itself. Thus several assumptions of idealism and empiricism are simply denied. Perceiving consciousness is never closed, wrapped up in itself. On the contrary, it is openness, it is always a mode of existing, a mode of placing oneself outside oneself and with the reality which is not consciousness itself. In perception consciousness does not find itself in a state of alienation that has to be overcome. The sense uncovered by perceiving consciousness is not estranged from the clear and distinct idea to which consciousness is supposed to return. The sense which perceiving consciousness intends is an irreducible and invincible facti city which makes perfect reflection forever impossible. The perceiving consciousness, therefore, is never perfectly with itself, 50This would mean a regress to infinity for, in order to discover what the value is of this judgment-from-without, I would have to place myself again outside this judgment, and so on to infinity. fil"La n!flexion est possible parce que la conscicnce-tclle est sa natureest a la fois visee et conscience de la vi see. Ce n' est donc pas sortir de I'analyse intentionnelle . . . que de la considerer e1le-meme, et reflexivement, dans sa structure." de Waelhens, Phenomenologie et verite, Paris, 1953, pp. 30-31, note 2. 52Cf., pp. 25-33.

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wrapped up in itself. It is a directedness to what consciousness itself is not, i.e., it is intentional. This intentionality, however, can be misunderstood. Intentionality occurs also in the philosophy of Franz Brentano, from whom Husserl borrowed it, and in scholastic philosophy, which influenced Brentano. In both of them intentionality does not have the meaning intended by Husserl and, after him, by phenomenology. Contrary to Brentano's view, intentionality is not something pertaining to consciousness and distinct from it. For Brentano, consciousness is first consciousness and then only orientation-to. For scholasticism consciousness is first separated from reality and then enters into contact with it by means of an impressed species, a substitute form of brute reality. 53 Regarding the mode of being of such forms or species, scholasticism replies that they do not have an entitative being but only an intentional being, i.e., their whole being consists in referring-to-reality.54 HusserI, on the other hand, breaks with the idea of a closed consciousness and sees orientation-to, openness-for as that which is consciousness. 55 It is impcssible to demonstrate that his view is correct. Its truth can only be indicated. Perceiving consciousness is always a beingwith-reality which is not consciousness itself, a being-open-for and directed-to reality. The perfect being-with-itself of consciousness is an illusion. Consciousness is Intercourse with Reality. Secondly, it was said that consciousness is intercourse with reality. This assertion is implied by the first. If the pure immanence of consciousness is excluded by intentionality, if consciousness is said never to be consciousness of consciousness itself but always of that which is not consciousness itself, it is no longer possible to raise the question whether or not perceiving consciousness seizes reality, i.e., whether what I perceive really . 56

!S.

53Cf. John A. Peters, Metaphysics, nos. 123 ft. (to be published in this series) . 54J. H. E. Hoogveld-F. Sassen, Inleiding tot de Wijsbegeerte, vol. I, Utrecht, 1944, p. 22. 55"Wohl zu beachten ist dabei, dass hier nicht die Rede ist von einer Beziehung zwischen irgendeinem psychologischen Vorkommnis-genannt Erlehnis-und einem anderen realen Dasein-genannt Gegenstand--oder von einer psychophysischen und sonstwie realen Verkniipfung, die in objektiver Wirklichkeit zwischen dem einen und anderen statthiitte. Vielmehr ist hier und iiberall von rein phiinomenologischen Erlebnissen, bzw. von ihrem Wesen die Rede, und von dem, was in ihrem Wesen 'a priori', in unbedingter Notwendigkeit beschlossen ist." Husserl, Ideen, I, p. 80. 56"On voit ... comment Ie probleme de l'existence du monde exterieur ne presente a la rigueur aucun sens que1conque." Marcel, Journal metaphysique, p.26.

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This question is meaningful only if one asserts that only immanent cognitive images are perceived. Only in this case does the philosopher face the task of determining which images are objective. In other words, truth and objectivity have to be reached, as it were, in a devious way. The philosopher has to try to determine to what extent reality corresponds with his cognitive images, i.e., he has to prove that the perceived world of which the knower has only cognitive images is real. Such questions, however, cannot be solved in the situation faced by these philosophers. Some images will correspond with reality, others perhaps not, but this makes no difference insofar as the images are concerned. Thus in the images the knower can never "see" whether or not they are objective, express the objective world, and correspond with reality, for to determine this the knower has to be present already to objectivity. - Perceiving consciousness, however, itself is a being-with-reality, and without the reality of the table which I perceive my perception is not perception but dreaming or imagining. Of course, I can also dream or imagine things. I can ask myself whether or not I am dreaming while I think that I perceive the table. What does this possibility imply? The fact that I am capable of asking myself whether I am dreaming or imagining instead of perceiving means that I have already made a distinction between dreaming or imagining and perceiving. Thus I know that if I were dreaming, I would not perceive reality. Accordingly, I cannot ask myself whether what I am perceiving is perhaps not real, for without the reality of the perceived my perception is not perception. 57 In perception the real is "bodily" present. 58 Consequently, the "scandal of philosophy" does not consist in the fact that hitherto no one has managed to construct a valid proof for the reality of an "external world" (Kant), but rather in the fact that constantly new efforts are made to deliver such proof. 59 57"Car si je peux parler de 'reves' et de la 'realite,' m'interroger sur la distinction de l'imaginaire et du reel, mettre en doute Ie 'reel', c'est que cettc distinction est deja faite par moi avant I'analyse, c'est que j'ai une experience du reel comme de l'imaginaire, et Ie probleme est alors non pas rechercher comment la pensee critique peut se donner des equivalents secondaires de cette distinction, mais d'expliciter notre savoir primordial du 'reel', de deer ire la perception du monde comme ce que fonde pour toujours notre idee de verite'. I! ne faut done pas se demander si nous percevons vraiment un monde, il faut dire au contraire: Ie monde est eel a que nous percevons." Merleau-Ponty, PhinomenoLogie de La perception, p. XI. 58"Das Raumding, das \Vir sehen, ist bei all seiner Transzendenz Wahrgenommenes, in seiner Leibhaftigkeit bewusstseinsmassig Gegebenes. Es ist nicht statt seiner cin Bild oder ein Zeichen gegeben, Man unterschiebe nicht dem Wahrnehmen ein Zeichen oder Bildbewusstsein." Husserl, I dcen, I. pp. 98-99. 59Cf. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 205.

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In the intentionality of perceiving consciousness and the (( selfgiving" of the perceived the foundation of the objectivity and of the truth of a statement is indicated at the same time. 60 All evidence and all truth ultimately go always back to the giving itself, the showing itself of the perceived as it is. Of course, I can make a mistake, but the recognition of my mistake consists precisely in observing that my assertion does not correspond with reality. This recognition, however, presupposes that reality reveals itself as it is. The recognition of an error means the withdrawal of an assertion before the self-givenness of reality. If perceiving consciousness is intentionality, openness to reality, then the presence of the perceived decides the objectivity and truth of any statement regarding what is perceived.

h. Noesis and Noema

Consciousness is Not Pure Passivity. vVhat is real? Is it the brute, inhuman reality of empiricism? Does not the givenness of reality suggest the pure passivity of perceiving consciousness? Granted that perceiving consciousness is intentional, does this exclude that knowledge is a mirroring of reality, as empiricism thinks? The reply to these questions has been given previously in Chapter One when we spoke about the anthropological implications of phenomenology.61 The reality which I perceive is never en-soi, i.e., being-initself. The idea of intentionality implies this assertion very clearly. Husserl's statement that all consciousness is consciousness of something could not be called a "discovery" if it merely meant that knowledge has an object. Moreover, in this sense the statement would still be open to idealistic and empiricist interpretations. Husserl's conception, however, excludes idealism because the object of knowledge is always something which is not knowledge itself and can never be reduced to knowledge. The object is the invincible facticity of the bodily given, the density of being. Empiricism likewise is overcome by the idea of intentionality. When it is said that perceiving consciousness is involved in and clings to the immovable and invincible density of reality, this assertion implies also that reversely the real clings to perceiving consciousness. 62 vVithout perceiving consciousness things are nothing-for-man. 60Hu5serl, "Formaie und Transzendentaie Logik," lahrbuch fur Philosophie und phiinomenologische Forschung," vol. X (1929), pp. 142-144. 61 Cf., pp. 25-33. 62Cf. P. Thevenaz: "Qu'est-ce que ia phenomenoiogie," Revue de Theologie et de Philosophie (Lausanne), 1952, p. 26.

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Dialectic Unity of Noesis and N oema. Accordingly, percelvmg consciousness can never be pure passivity, for through perception I let things be-for-me. 63 Pure passivity belongs to the photographic plate and the mirror, in which there is no longer any question of knowledge. Perceiving consciousness is "sensitive" to reality: I find things; they are given to me, but only through and in my perceiving glance. Perceiving consciousness and perceived reality constitute a dialectic unity. The act of consciousness (noesis) which my perception is cannot be cut loose from the reality of the perceived (noema), and the noema cannot be cut loose from the noesis. Know ledge is, on the one hand, the wonderful mystery of man's openness to reality and, on the other, it is the mystery of rea1ity's-being-for-man.

By means of knowledge man overcomes the determinism of nature and of natural processes, for it is through man's consciousness that nature and its processes are-for-man. Nevertheless, nature, things of nature, and natural processes are reality,' they are the density, the invincible hardness, the unconquerable materiality of being. In his reflective return to knowledge the philosopher always strikes the density of things, and this density can never be removed or overcome because his knowing itself is a mode of being-in-the-world. 64 On the other hand, however, the reality about which the philosopher speaks in a meaningful way is not reality-without-man. Regarding rea1ity-without-man only silence befits man. 65 In a certain sense it may be said that through knowledge man and the world "become themselves." Man "becomes himself" because it is precisely through knowledge that he breaks through the determinism of nature. By virtue of this break-through, man is man and not a mere thing of nature. However, he cannot accomplish this without the aid of the things of nature, for to know is to exist, to be-with-things. But through this being-with-things in knowledge a

6SCf. Heidegger, Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, Frankfurt a.M., 3rd ed., 1954, pp. 14-17.

64"Mais puisque au contraire nous sommes au monde, puisque meme nos reflexions prennent place dans Ie flux tempore! qu'elles cherchent a capter ..., il n'y a pas de pensee qui embrasse toute notre pensee." Merleau-Ponty, Phtnomenologie de la perception, p. IX. 65"Cest par la connaissance . . . que l'etre brut accede au niveau de I'existence veritable, et notre conscience d'exister est presupposee dans celle de I'existence du monde," P. Foulquie, L'existentialisme, Paris, 1953, p. 38.

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world opens up, a world reveals itself, a world-for-man begins to be. Thus, in the words of Paul Claudel, connaitre, to know, is a kind of co-naitre, a being born together. 66

Phenomenology. The idea of intentionality, which at first sight seems so simple, because of its implications is a real discovery. It creates an entirely new climate of thought67 in which the classical antimony of idealism versus empiricism is overcome. 6S By virtue of the implications of the idea of intentionality, phenomenology is a philosophy of encounter. Quite frequently these implications have been overlooked, so that phenomenology was simply taken to mean a most accurate description. Thus it could happen that phenomenology was sometimes considered merely as a revival of realism. On the other hand, representatives of classical psychology of consciousness used the term for the introspective description of the various items contained in the "pigeonholes" of consciousness. 69 To exclude all kinds of derivative and watered-down meanings of the term "phenomenology," we intentionally speak all the time of existential phenomenology. c. Viewpoint, Profile, Unity The idea of intentionality, applied to percelvmg consciousness, includes more than the being-outside itself of the subject and the being-for-the-subject of reality. Let us return to the perception of the table to illustrate this point.

Viewpoint and Profile. It is striking that I am able to perceive the table only from a standpoint which is determined by the attitude of my body. Because I am now in this or that way in front of the table, I perceive the table in a determined profile. I perceive only one aspect of the table, and do not perceive its rear, one of its sides, the underside of the top, etc. Through perceiving consciousness I let the table be-for-me, reality is given to me, but reality gives itself only

66Cf. Paul Claudel, Art poetique. 67"La phenomenologie se laisse pratiquer et reconnaitre comme maniere, ou comme style." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. II. 6sCf. Merleau-Ponty, Sens et non-sens, Paris, 1948, pp. 171-172. 69See, for example, the well-known textbook Leerboek der Psychologie by L. Bigot, Ph. Kohnstamm and B. Palland (Groningen, 1950). It states literally: "Phenomenology is introspection" (p. 16).

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by means of profiles (Abschattungenpo which are correlated with a determined standpoint of the perceiving subject. A determined standpoint, however, refers intrinsically to other possible standpoints, and a determined profile contains an intrinsic reference to other possible profiles.u While I perceive the front of the table, I realize that I can perceive also the rear or the underside of the table if I change my standpoint. But if I do this, I no longer perceive the front or the top of the table. What has been said here regarding the perception of a table is true of any object of perception: perception takes place only through an endless series of profiles, corresponding to endless possibilities of standpoints and attitudes. 72 Nevertheless, all these profiles are profiles of the same table, the same apple, coin, etc. Peter's back which I perceive, after I looked in his face without seeing his back, is the back of the same Peter whom I looked in the face. I must say, therefore, that I perceive the unity and totality of the perceived object through an endless series of profiles, corresponding to endlessly many possible standpoints. 73 We must emphasize in this respect that the anticipation, the pregrasping of other possible profiles pertaining to the object of perception is an essential and constituent aspect of perception as perception occurs. Accordingly, perception simply is not perception if it does not contain these anticipations as possibilities. Likewise, and this amounts to the same, the object of perception simply is not a real object of perception if a determined profile does not refer to other possible profiles. If one profile of a man, say, his face, does not refer to another profile, such as his back, then this man is not a real man but a phantom. Anticipations, therefore, cannot be said to be merely incidental to perception. On the contrary, they are essential: an object is an object 70"1n Wesensnofwendigkeit gehort zu einem 'allseitigen', kontinuierlich einheitlich sich in sich selbst bestatigenden Erfahrungsbewusstsein yom selben Ding ein vieifaltiges System von kontinuierlichen Erscheinungs-und Abschattungsmannigfaltigkeiten, in denen, wenn sie aktuell gelten, alle in die vVahrnehmung mit dem Charakter der leibhaften Se1bstgegenheit fallenden gegenstandlichen Momente sich im Bewusstsein der 1dentitat in bestimmten Kontinuitaten darstellen bzw. abschatten." Husserl, Idem, I, p. 93. 71Husserl, E,ofahnmg ulld Urteil, Hamburg, 1948, pp. 26-27. 72Cf. Husserl, Ideen, I, pp. 100-101. 73"Gehen wir von einem Beispiel aus. 1mmerfort diesen Tisch sehend, dabei urn ihn herumgehend, meine Stellung in Raume wie immer verandernd, habe ich kontinuierlich das Bewusstsein vom leibhaftigen Dasein dieses einen und selben Tisches und zwar desselben, in sich durchaus unverandert bleibenden. Die Tischwah~nehmung ist aber eine sich bestandig verandernde, sie ist eine Kontinuitat wechselnder Wahrnehmungen." Husserl, I dee If, I, p. 92.

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of perception only because each profile refers to another profile. I am, moreover, aware of it that every profile is the profile of one and the same object of perception. 74 Unity and Horizon. Not everything, however, has been said if emphasis is laid on the unity and totality of the object of perception. It is not merely the totality of the object of perception that has to be stressed, but also the unity of this totality with the entire field of perception. Every object appears as a definite figure against a background; it appears against a horizon of meanings. The apple which through an endless series of profiles I perceive as a unity and totality appears first as a real apple against the horizon of the table, the fruitbowl, cupboard, or book on which it lies. An apple which does not lie on a table, in a fruitbowl, or in a dealer's crate, which does not hang on a branch or lie in a child's hand, an apple, briefly, which does not appear against any background simply is not a real apple. It is. nat the object of a real perception, but pure fancy, the product' of a dream or an hallucination. 75 The perception itself of an apple includes as an essential and constituen.t aspect the field of perception, the background, the horizon. Because I direct my attention to the apple and not to the hand of the child holding the apple, the apple appears as a salient figure, as a meaning which is, as it were, drawn forth and cut out from a background of meanings. The hand, the arm, the child's body, the floor on which the child stands, the room, the house, etc. are constituent elements with respect to the real apple. An apple which does not have any horizon cannot be perceived and is not real. Perception, therefore, is always perception of the whole thing, as integrated into a wider field which, in its turn, also is a part of a horizon of more remote meanings. It is the structure of these nearby and faraway horizons of perception which constitutes the "worldness" of the world. The Insufficiency of Empiricism with Respect to the Object. Once the original unity of the figure-horizon structure which is given in perception has been understood, it is not difficult to see that the 74(f. Merleau-Ponty, La structure du comportement, pp. 200-203. 75"Quand la Gestalt-theorie no us dit qu'une figure sur un fond est la donnee sensible la plus simple que nous puissions obtenir, ce n'est pas Ii un caractere contingent de la perception de fait, qui nous laisserait libres, dans une analyse ideale, d'introduire la notion d'impression. C'est la definition meme du phenomene percept if, ce sans quoi un phenomene ne peut etre dit perception." Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la perception, p. 10.

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psychological "explanation" of perception by the empiricists does not do justice to perception as it occurs in reality. The empiricists assume that perception is a structure composed of elementary, insular, and point-like awarenesses caused by physico-chemical stimuli. Since the philosophical implications of this theory have been pointed out previously, we will concentrate here on the psychological "explanation." Let us start by pointing out that the prospects of this explanation are very dim because de facto the elementary awarenesses in question have never been found. 76 Next, by pointing to a constellation of stimuli, one does not account for perception as it occurs in reality or express what is really given in perception. In perception a color is never only color but always the color of something,77 There is a huge difference between the wooly red of a rug, the slippery and sticky red of blood, and the refreshing and radiant red of a healthy youthful face. These differences are not accounted for by pointing to physico-chemical stimuli. 7s What is given in perception is the totality of the object, and in perception the object does not appear as an agglomeration of stimuli, but as a given meaning. An agglomeration of stimuli does not explain the fury or sorrow which I read on the face of my fellow man. Fury and sorrow are perceived by me as meanings of the perceived face. 79 Reducing the meaning to a certain constellation of stimuli means that I can never again perceive that a landscape or a face is happy, sad, lively, melancholic, monotonous, or dull. sO A happy and joyful face is not defined by the physicochemical properties of a constellation of stimuli. Nevertheless, I am aware of it that I have seen a happy and joyful face. The Empiricist Insufficiency with Respect to the Subject. From the viewpoint of the subject, likewise, there are innumerable difficulties 76Cf. Merleau-Ponty, ibid. 77"Une couleur n'est jamais simplement couleur, mais couleur d'un certain objet, et Ie bleu d'un tapis ne serait pas Ie meme bleu s'il n'etait un bleu laineux." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 361. 78The so-called "hypothesis of constancy," which states that stimuli of a determined strength always provoke a constant "reaction" is contrary to facts which psychologists thelill'e1ves recognize. Cf. Merleau-Ponty, PhCnomenologie de la perception, p. 14. 79"Definissant une fois de plus ce que nous percevons par les proprietes physiques et chimiques des stimuli qui peuvent agir sur nos appareils sensorie1s, l'empirisme exc1ut de la perception la colere ou la douleur que je lis pourtant sur un visage, la religion dont je lis pourtant l'essence dans une hesitation ou dans une reticence, la cite dont j e connais pourtant la structure dans une attitude de l'agent de ville ou dans Ie style d'un monument." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p.32. socr. Merleau-Ponty, ibid., pp. 31-32.

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against the psychological explanation of perception by the empiricists. The perceiving subject is reduced to an agglomeration of insular, point-like impressions. But the psychologists realized clearly that it is not feasible to assign a stimulus as its cause to each of these impressions. When, for instance, I read a book or engage in a conversation, I do not receive a special impression of every written or spoken letter. I see and hear only fragments, but nevertheless I read and hear sentences and words. My sensitive "receiving and registration apparatus" does not receive any "messages" of stimuli coming from the rear of the table and the underside of the tabletop, but nevertheless I am aware of perceiving a table. When I perceive my attic room, I receive stimuli only from the walls in front of me and alongside me but not from the wall behind me; nevertheless, I am aware of it that my room has four walls and is an attic room. These difficulties, however, did not induce the empiricists to abandon their theory of stimuli. They thought it possible to solve the difficulty by means of a new theory-namely, the hypothesis that through association or similar means the subject supplements what he does not receive from the stimuli. The recourse to this new hypothesis shows clearly what the empiricists do not want: perception may not be perception of the totality, but at all cost must be constructed and put together from psychical elements. In other words, the psychical subject has to be composed like a thing of nature, contents of consciousness have to be elements and have to be treated in the same way as the physical sciences are accustomed to treat their elements. For it is imperative that psychology proceed in this way if it is to be called "scientific." Meanwhile, as an "explanation" of the supplements demanded by the theory of stimulation, association presupposes what it wants to explain. According to the terminology of Claparecie,81 association must be conceived as a psychical "rope" by which the point-like impressions are connected. Because of the interconnection of the impressions, a fragmentary stimulation from without is sufficient to reproduce the whole, the totality of what has been perceived. In this way it is assumed that the primacy of isolated stimuli over the perception of the totality can be maintained. As we mentioned already, the theory presupposes what it wants to explain. Because the impressions are associated with other im81L'association des idees, Paris, 1913, p. 7.

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pressions in many directions,82 the reproduction of a whole world could take place in many ways. But what is the reason why precisely this whole is reproduced? Several totalities could be formed: hence how do the actual impressions "know" which other impressions have to be called forth to supplement the whole? If it is claimed that they call forth from memory these and not those supplementary impressions without "reason" or by chance, then perception is not explained, for an appeal to chance does not explain anything.s3 If, on the other hand, there is a reason to reproduce this and not that totality, then a certain "knowledge" of the totality is presupposed. But then the "explanation" by means of association becomes superfluous, because it presupposes the very knowledge of the totality which it has to explain. 84 Thus elemental psychology is forced to affirm the priority of the perceived object, for the association of elements presupposes this priority.85 If we hold fast to perception as it occurs in reality, the priority of the whole has to be affirmed explicitly; if one does not hold fast to it, then this priority is implicitly affirmed because it is presupposed.

Phenomenological Reduction. In this way we are back where we have started-viz., it is a contradiction to replace ordinary everyday experience by that of the physical sciences,86 it is a contradiction to replace the world of everyday experience by a system of meanings devised by a science. 87 Philosophical reflection demands a return to original experience and the original world, divested of the superstructure of theories added to it by the sciences. This return is called ((phenomenological reduction."88 82Classical psych910gy of consciousness has made many efforts to discover the laws governing the associations. They are of no importance to us here. See, e.g., J. Frobes, Lehrbuch der experimentellen Psychologie, vol. II, Freiburg, 1917, pp. SOl-60S. 83Cf. Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 22. 84"Au moment ou l'evocation des souvenirs est rend'ue possible, e1le devient superfiue, puisque Ie travail qu'on en attend est deja. fait." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 27.

85"Si nous nous en tenons aux phenomenes, l'unite de la chose dans la perception n'est pas construite par l'association, mais, condition de l'association, elle precede les recoupements qui la verifient et la determinent, elle se precede elle-meme." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 24. 86Cf. Merleau-Ponty, ibid., pp. II-V. 87Cf. Merleau-Ponty, La structure du comportement, pp. 235-236. S8We abstract here from the many modifications which the meaning of the term "reduction" has undergone in the history of phenomenology. The idea of reduction owes its origin to Husserl, but even in his own works the meaning of the term underwent as much evolution as his philosophy itself. Husserl's

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Through the reduction we meet again a really living human being instead of a subject thinking itself or a photographic plate. Through the reduction the world shows itself again with its human face, becomes again the world in which we live, think, love, labor, rejoice, suffer, and die. It becomes again our home-country, in which we dwell and long for a better fatherland. The world becomes again the real world. 5.

SARTRE'S DUALISM AND THE TRUE IMMANENCE OF KNOWLEDGE

Nmv that the fundamental principle of phenomenological thought has been described to some extent, it is possible to show the truth of the oft-repeated statement that Sartre, at least at certain and even crucial moments of his philosophical thinking, does not hold fast to existential phenomenology but defends a strange kind of dualism. Abstractions and Concreteness. To prevent misunderstandings, however, it will be useful first to emphasize a terminological question. Phenomenologists, for whom the unity of mutual implication of subject and object is the primitive fact of their philosophical thinking, indicate as "abstractions" all products of thought which do not respect this original unity. The use of this terminology is deceptive, because abstractioll has a different and very clearly defined meaning in traditional thought. Phenomenology speaks of abstraction with respect to knowledge which does not nourish itself on "lived experience," and therefore is not the expres.sion of the irrefiechi, of "life." Thus abstract knowledge is deformed knowledge, knowledge which is estranged from reality. For example, a "walled-in" and isolated consciousness is called an abstraction, because "lived experience" knows only intentional consciousness. Likewise, a world which is explicitated as brllte reality is an abstraction, for in the irrefiechi only a human world is given. The opposite of such abstraction is concrete thought. This term also is misleading. In phenomenology concreteness of thinking indicates respect for the irrejleclzi in explicitation. Thus I think concretely. progressive philosophical thought forced him constantly to modify the idea of reduction. We use the term in the meaning which it has in Husserl's later works and which was taken over by Heidegger and the French phenomenologists. Cf. de Waehlens, Vne philosophie de l'a111bigllite. I'Existentialisme de Maurice Mer!call-PolIty, Louvain. 1951. np. RQ-93

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about consciousness and the world when I conceive both as the unity of reciprocal implication. Only in this way I do no violence to "lived experience" in my explicitations and do not become entangled in abstractions. It is rather striking that Sartre, who is one of the most able phenomenologists of our times, all too frequently ends up with abstractions because he does not radically continue along the line of the previously accepted idea of intentionality. Whenever Sartre speaks of consciousness, he emphasizes its intentionality. Its noematic correlate, however, he calls "en-soi," "being-in-itself." When one reads how Sartre describes this being-in-itself, it becomes evident why he is accused of dualism. His inconsistency is so instructive, and the mistakes he makes in the explicitation of knowledge so eloquently illustrate the risks every phenomenologist runs, that we cannot omit them in silence. Moreover, the critique of Sartre's conception of knowledge will give us an opportunity to delve deeper into one of the aspects of knowledge which many contemporary phenomenologists deny, misunderstand, or neglect. We mean the aspect which the old philosophers called the immanence of knowledge.

a. "En-Soi" and "Pour-Soi," "Being-in-Itself" and Consciousness

"En-Soi." In Sartre two types of beings are radically opposednamely, en-soi, the "in-itself," and pour-soi, consciousness. "In-itself" is the material thing. The material is what is properly being, the only being which is justly called being. It is compact density, full of itself, complete positivity. It is what it is, fully identical with itself. It does not maintain any relationships with what it is not, it does not imply any negation, it never posits itself as other than something else, and when it disappears one can not even say that it is no longer. It cannot be deduced from the possible or reduced to the necessary. It is not created and does not have a ground of being; it merely is, it just happens to be, it is " 'in the way' forever."89 The meaning of these descriptions becomes somewhat clear if we consider that Sartre's "in itself" is not a conscious being. Relations, 89"En fait, l'etre est opaque a lui-meme precisement parce qu'il est rempli de lui-me me. C'est ce que nous exprimons mieux en disant que l'ctre est ce qu'il est . . . . II est pleine positivite. II ne connait donc pas l'alterite: il ne se pose jamais comme autre qu'un autre etre; il ne peut soutenir aucun rapport avec I'autre . . . . II est et quand il s'effondre on ne peut me me pas dire qu'il n'est plus . . . . Incree, sans raison d'ctre, sans rapport aucun avec autre ctre, l'etre-en-soi est de trop pour l'eternite," Sartre, L'etre et Ie neallt, pp. 33-34.

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otherness, ground of being, being no longer, being deduced or reduced, etc. presuppose consciousness. "In itself" does not have any consciousness; therefore, so Sartre thinks, it does not maintain any relations, it is not other than something else, has no ground of being, etc. Pour-S oi. While "being-in-itself" is always sufficient unto itself, simply is what it is, pO'ur-soi or consciousness always needs "beingin-itself" to be able to be consciousness. 9o All consciousness is always consciousness of something which is not consciousness itself, and without this something consciousness is not consciousness. Accordingly, for Sartre, consciousness is essentially relative to "being-in-itself," it is directedness to "being-in-itself," it is intentional. Consciousness as Nihilation. This intentionality, however, is not the main point so far as Sartre is concerned. For what exactly is meant by my consciousness of something? To clarify this, Sartre creates a new French word "neantiser/' which may be translated into English by "to nihilate)) or "to noughten.)) When I am conscious of something I nihilate this something. If, for instance I am conscious of this ashtray, I nihilate the tray, i.e., I am conscious that I am not identical with this ashtray. Thus consciousness is always consciousness of "being-in-itself" and as such pure nihilation. 91 The remark could be made that this description is valid only for the consciousness of a worldly object and that self-consciousness surely implies identity, so that it is not purely and simply nihilation. For do I not affirm myself when I am conscious of myself? However, Sartre insists: consciousness is purely nihilation, it expresses only non-identity, even when I am conscious of myself. For I am conscious of myself as a waiter, a just man, or the chairman of the local baseball club. What does this consciousness mean? Nothing else than that I am conscious of my non-identity with the just man, the waiter, or the chairman of the baseball club, for tomorrow I may give up being a waiter, tomorrow I may be unjust, or no longer chairman of the club. Hence when I am conscious of myself, I nihilate my own identity. Only "being-in-itself" is identical with itself, but not consciousness. 92 Consciousness always says distance, i.e., not-being that of which con90"Toute conscience, Husser! l'a montre, est conscience de quelque chose." Sartre, ibid., p. 17. 91"Le pour-soi est un chre pour qui son etre est en question dans son etre en tant que cet etre est essentiellement une certaine mainiere de ne pas etre un etre qu'il pose du meme coup comme autre que lui." Sartre, ibid., 92"I'Etre de la conscience ne coincide pas avec lui-meme dans une adequation pleniere." Sartre, ibid., p. 116.

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sciousness is consciousness. The compact density of "being-in-itself" is broken, therefore by consciousness. 93 In being-in-itself there is no room for negativity for, by virtue of its perfect identity with itself, it is fullness of being. 94 There can be question of negativity only when there is question of consciousness, and consciousness is nothing else than nihilation. It is rather striking that Sartre explicitates only the negative aspects of consciousness. Nothing, consequently, remains of the high place which tradition-unjustly, says Sartre-has always ascribed to consciousness. 95 The only being which has the right to be called being is being-in-itself. Pour-soi or consciousness is merely a "disease of being," and the being of consciousness is Nothingness. 96 The being through which negativity enters into the world has to be its own Nothingness. 97

Critique of Sartre's Nihilation. It would be interesting to investigate to what Sartre's explicitations of consciousness lead if they were pursued further along the same lines. According to Husserl, it is impossible to come to an agreement with one who cannot or does not want to see. What he means is that an explicitation cannot be a demonstration in the strict sense of the term. An explicitation does not demonstrate but merely indicates. Sometimes, however, it seems possible to demonstrate that a certain mode of explicitation does not make sense. This happens when different moments of an explicitation cannot be conceived in relation to one another without entering into contradiction. But according to Sartre, the being of consciousness is Nothingness. Nothingness, however, is not. Because Nothingness is not, it cannot do anything. Consequently, it would not be capable of nihilating itself. For this reason alone the identification of consciousness with Nothingness cannot be accepted. 9s 93"Tout se passe comme si pour Iiberer l'affirmation de soi du sein de 1'etre i1 fallait une decompression d' etre." Sartre, ibid., p. 32. 94"La coincidence de l'identique est la veritable plenitude d'etre, justement parce que dans cette coincidence il n'est laisse de place it aucune negativite." Sartre, ibid., p. 119. 95"Cette presence a soi, on l'a prise souvent pour une plenitude d'existence et un prej uge fort repandu parmi les philosophes fait attribuer it la conscience la plus haute dignite d'etre." Sartre, ibid. 96"l'Etre de la conscience, en tant que conscience, c'est d'exister a distance de soi comme presence a soi et cette distance nulle que l'etre porte dans son etre. c'est Ie Neant." Sartre, ibid., p. 120. 97"I'Etre par qui Ie Neant arrive dans Ie monde est un etre en qui, dans son Etre, il est question du Neant de son Etre; l'etre par qui Ie Neant vient au monde doit etre son propre Neant." Sartre, ibid., p. 59. 9sCf. B. Delfgaauw, "Heidegger en Sartre," Tijdschrift voor Philosophie, vol. X (1948), p. 298.

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Moreover, for the phenomenology of consciousness, Sartre's identification is singularly sterile. Of course, he is right when he asserts that all consciousness is consciousness of something. It is true also that in all consciousness of something there is a negative moment. When I am conscious of something, I am conscious, indeed, of a certain distance from this something, I am conscious of a certain non-identity with the something in question. I am not identical with this ashtray, that fountain pen, that wall; I am not identical with the just man, the waiter, or the chairman who I am. But-does this mean that consciousness is nothing else than nihilation? Such an assertion simply omits all positive aspects of consciousness. If consciousness is nothing else than nihilation, I cannot even assert that when I am conscious of something I affirm this something. Nevertheless, this affirmation is the first phenomenological evidence which presents itself: I affirm the ashtray, the fountain pen, the wall; I affirm the waiter, the just man, the chairman who I am. I affirm the being, the reality of all this. Do we have to do here with nihilation? Certainly not. On the other hand, it must be admitted that the affirmation includes a negative moment. I affirm the being of the ashtray, but this implies that I am conscious that this ashtray is not this pen and, likewise, that I am not this ashtray. But how would this negation be possible, how would I be able to say that I am not this ashtray, unless I affirm in a more primordial way my own being and, consequently, my beingconscious? Consciousness, therefore, is not merely nihilation, but both affirmation and negation of being. 99 Critique of Sartre's UBeing-in-Itself." These considerations offer us a starting-point for a critique of Sartre's conceptions of being-initself. This being is the material thing, the ashtray, the pen, the wall, etc. As was pointed out above, I am conscious that this ashtray is not this pen. An ashtray, therefore, is something else than a pen. This otherness, of course, can be stated only by means of consciousness, for without my consciousness the ashtray and the pen are nothing-for-me. Sartre, however, claims that being-in-itself is not something other than something else. For being-something-otherthan presupposes consciousness, and being-in-itself does not have any consciousness. Therefore, it is not something other than something else. 99Cf. de Wae1hens, "Zijn en Niet-Zijn," Tijdschrift voor Philosophic, vol. VII (1945), p. 113.

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Sartre forgets here that the being of which he speaks is always a phenomenon. Being-something-else presupposes consciousness, but this consciousness is there. My consciousness is there and cannot be thought away. A pen is something else than an ash tray for my consciousness. Although being-in-itself does not have any consciousness, I am not able to think of it without my consciousness. True, relations, being-something-else, ground of being, being-no-Ionger, being-deduced from or being-reduced-to presuppose consciousness. But when Sartre asserts that being-in-itself does not maintain any relations, cannot be other than something else, is without a ground etc., he presupposes that it is possible independently of consciousness to make a judgment regarding the terminus enc.ountered by consciousness. He presupposes that it is possible to describe a field of presence independently of the presence of consciousness. He assumes that it is possible for him to know something while removing the act of knowing itself. This explicitation .of knowledge does violence to the fundamental idea of phenomenology. C.onsci.ousness is intentional, Sartre says, but he mentions i.t .only when he speaks of the pour-soi, of consciousness. As soon as he speaks .of its noematic correlate, he withdraws the directedness or intentionality which consciousness is, but continues speaking. Speaking about what? Whatever Sartre thinks he can say .of the so-called en-soi, of being-in-itself, he says it is opposition to en-soi-pour-moi, being-initself-for-me. Sartre realizes that being as it appears includes negativity, maintains relations, is other than something else, comes to be and passes away, has a ground, and is created, etc. But then he artificially withdraws the intentional movement which is consciousness and thinks that he has no longer to do with en-soi-pour-lui, with being-in-itself-for-him, but with unqualified en-soi, unqualified beingin-itself. And he goes on to describe it in opposition to being-initself-for-him as not including any negativity, not maintaining any relations, not being other than something else, not having a gr.ound, not created, etc. A reproach that is sometimes addressed to the phenomenologists is that their works constantly reveal themselves as influenced by idealism. Their phenomenology frequently deviates from the original sense which they themselves have discovered in their thinking, so that they fall into a kind of idealism of meaning mixed with a clear

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realism of brute reality.loo This reproach is certainly justified in the case of Sartre. He endeavors to speak about an en-soi, being-initself, and therefore is a realist. On .the other hand, he sees clearly that it is only through the intentionality of consciousness that the world-for-man comes to be and has meaning. 10l But what is the value of these meanings? In his principal novel, Nausea, which antedates Being and Nothingness, Sartre had already given a provisional reply to this question. The meanings of the world are illusory, as long as being-in-itself is not laid bare. l02 Soothing colors, delicious odors, beautiful weather, the green sea, all are meanings which poets and superficial human beings have cast on brute reality.l03 The in-itself of everything is nauseating. "The word 'absurdity' is born here under my pen."104 Beingin-itself is absurd. This is Sartre's last word. But it is here that Sartre the phenomenologist ceases to be a phenomenologist. Being-initself is not absurd, but it is absurd to want to speak of being-initself.105 Sartre's Fundamental Mistake. Sartre's description of being-initself amounts to the abandonment of the most fundamental idea of phenomenology. The result of this description must be called, therefore, an abstraction in the sense explained above-namely, a product of thought which has been torn loose from "lived experience." At the same time we are offered an opportunity to consider more closely Sartre's description of pour-soi, consciousness, or the noetic aspect of knowledge. How is it possible that the explicitation of the subject results in the affirmation of Nothingness? How is it possible that all positive aspects of consciousness are simply omitted? To understand this, it is necessary to see the Introduction to Being and Nothingness in connection with the atmosphere emanating from 100Cf. A. de Waelhens, "De la phenomenologie a l'existentialisme," Le Choix, Ie monde, I'existence (Cahiers du College Philosophique) , GrenobleParis, n.d., p. 62. De Waelhens uses these expressions 'to characterize the

philosophy of Heidegger. We abstract from the question whether the characterization of Heidegger is correct. 101"La mondanite, la spatialite la quantite, l'ustensilite, la temporalite ne viennent a l'etre que parce que je suis negation de l'hre." S;trtre, ibid., p. 269. 102Cf. H. Pais sac, Le Dieu de Sartre, Arthaud, 1950, pp. 46-52. 103J. P. Sartre, La nausee, Gallimard, 1938, pp. 175-176, 188. 104Ibid., p. 182.

105"La chose ne peut jamais etre separee de quelqu'un qui la pen;oive, elle ne peut jamais etre effectivement en soi parce que ses articulations sont celles memes de notre existence et qu'elle se pose au bout d'un regard ou au terme d'une exploration sensorielle qui l'investit d'humanite." Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la perception, p. 370.

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Nausea. The whole Introduction to Being and Nothingness drives the reader to a first climax reached in the last two pages of the Introduction, where Sartre summarizes his vision on being-in-itself. Precisely these two pages provoke the same feeling of disgust as Sartre's principal novel Nausea. It is no accident that in Being and Nothingness there is a recurrence of certain expressions which are the warp and woof of Nausea. When Antoine Roquentin, the chief personality of the novel, in the city park of Bouville comes to realize the meaning of uncamouflaged being, he describes his experience as follows: If anyone had asked me what existence was, I would have answered in good faith that it was nothing, simply an empty form which was' added to things from without but did not change anything in their nature. And then suddenly, there it was, clear as day: existence had suddenly unveiled itself. It had lost its harmless look of an abstract category: it was the very paste of things, this root was kneaded into existence. Or rather the root, the park gates, the bench, the sparse grass, all that had vanished: the diversity of things, their individuality, were only an appearance, a veneer. This veneer had melted, leaving soft, monstrous masses, all in disorder-naked, in a frightful, obscene nakedness . . . . All things, gently, tenderly, were letting themselves drift into existence like those relaxed women who burst out laughing and say: "It is good to laugh," in a wet voice; they were parading, one in front of the other, exchanging abject secrets about their existence. I realized that there was no half-way house between non-existence and this flaunting abundance. If you existed, you had to exist all the way, as far as mouldiness, bloatedness, obscenity were concerned.... We were a heap of living creatures, irritated, embarrassed at ourselves, we hadn't the slightest reason to be there, none of us, each one confused, vaguely alarmed, felt ill the way in relation to the others. In the way: it was the only relationship I could establish between these trees, these gates, these stones . . . . In the way, the chestnut tree there, opposite me, a little to the left. In the way, the Velleda. . . . And I-soft, weak, obscene, digesting, juggling, with dismal thoughts-I, too, was In the way. Fortunately, I didn't feel it, although I realized it, but I was uncomfortable because I was afraid of feeling it (even now I am afraid-afraid that it might catch me behind my head and lift me up like a wave). I dreamed vaguely of killing myself to wipe out at least one of these superfluous lives. But even my death would have been In the way. In the way, my corpse, my blood on these stones, between these plants, at the back of this smiling garden. And the decomposed

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flesh would have been In the way in the earth which would receive my bones, at last, cleaned, stripped, peeled, proper and clean as teeth, it would have been In the way: I was In the way for eternity.106 And a little later he continues: I hated this ignoble mess. Mounting up, mounting up as high as the sky, spilling over, filling everything with its gelatinous slither . . . . I was not surprised, I knew that it was the World, the naked World suddenly revealing itself, and I choked with rage at this gross, absurd being. . . . That was what worried me: of course there was no reason for this flowing larva to exist. But it was impossible for it not to exist . . . . I shouted "filth! what rotten filth!" and shook myself to get rid of this sticky filth, but it held fast and there was so much, tons and tons of existence, endless; I stifled at the depth of this immense weariness. 107 In the light of Nausea it is evident that the description of the so-called en-soi, of being-in-itself, in Being and Nothingness could not have been different-"in the way forever!" At the same time, however, it is abundantly clear that the meaning of the subject, as source of sense-in Sarte's case as source of nonsense-, cannot be expIicitated otherwise than as Nothingness. In Nausea Sartre describes the subject as pure disgust with beings. This disgust or nausea-over-beings is a mode of nihilation, a rejection and a refusal of beings on the level of affectivity. Through this rejection and refusal the whole attitude of Sartre with respect to being is determined. Hence it is not surprising that on the level of scientific reflection and explicitation he merely pays attention to the negative aspects of the subject pole of human existence. lOS Above we spoke of abstractions in the contemporary sense of the term. It indicates explicitations which have lost touch with the irrejlechi and are no longer nourished by "lived experience." In this sense Sartre's en-soi and pour-soi, being-in-itself and consciousness, both are abstractions. Being-in-itself is isolated from consciousness, and the negative and positive aspects of human existence are cut loose from one another. Moreover, being-in-itself is described as absolute positivity and consciousness as absolute negativity. Against such explicitations "lived experience" rises in protest. But, to quote Husserl 106Sarte, Nausea, New York, 1949, pp. 171-173. 107 Ibid., pp. 180-181. 10SR. Verneaux, Le,ons

sur l'existentialisme, Paris, n.d., p. 118.

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again, "it is impossible to come to an agreement with one who neither wants nor is able to see." h. The Immanence of Knowledge Self-Consciousness and the W orld-for-Man. As was pointed out previously, by means of his consciousness man breaks through the determinism of nature; hence he himself is not reducible to a thing of nature or his life to a causalistic process. For it is only through man's consciousness that there are things and processes of nature for man. 109 By virtue of the existential movement of the conscious subject which man is, there is a world-for-man. It was pointed out also that being-in-the-world orginates at the same time as man's being-himself, for man is himself by being in the world. Man's self-consciousness is never pure interiority but essentially refers to that which consciousness itself is not. The self-consciousness, the being-with-himself, the self-possession which characterizes man and causes him to be called a person is correlative with the coming to be of the world-for-man. The coming to be of the world-for-man under all its aspects, is constantly emphasized in existential phenomenology. However, one gets the impression that the same amount of attention is lacking when there is question of the noetic aspect of this coming to be. As long as there is question of creative cultural activity in the strict sense, the remark is usually added that this activity is "profitable" not only for the world but also for the subject-in-the-world. Man realizes himself, achieves his being-a-person, answers his vocation, advances toward his destiny, when through his creative cultural activity he makes the world a dwelling place for man. However, as soon as there is question of creative cultural activity in the broader sense only, i.e., of the act of knowing, they are inclined to pass over in silence the fact that the subject "profits" from this activity. There is certainly no tendency at all to recognize that it is primarily the subject which gains in perfection through knowledge. It should be clear that knowledge may be called creative of culture, for through it there arises a world-for-man a world having a possibility of affective value and meaning for man. But it is also unmistakably true that it is in the first place the subject which becomes more perfect through this knowledge, enriches itself through it, experiences joy from it, etc. l09Cf. Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. III.

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The old philosophers were not blind to this aspect of knowledge. They called knowledge an immanent act, by which they meant that knowledge, arising from the subject, primarily perfects the subject itselfllO-in opposition to creative cultural activity in the strict sense, which is also called transient activity,ul The immanence of knowledge in the sense of the ancient philosophers is not easily understood by the phenomenologists. They think immediately of a closed consciousness and pure interiority. In this sense one may say that there is no "interior man."1l2 The conscious subject may even be called Nothingness-namely, the Nothingness of pure interiority.113 On the other hand, however, it remains true that the genuine immanence of knowledge and the selfhood of the knowing subject cannot be expressed in concepts such as nihilation and Nothingness,114 Attention is paid only to the coming to be of the world-for-man, so that one gets the impression that the knowing subject is wholly without any consistency and is fully resolved in .the affirmation of the world. The subject is reduced to a reference point without value. As a result, it is no longer possible to assert that the knowing subject gains in value through knowledge, for the acceptance of this assertion makes it necessary to recognize the proper value and meaning of the knowing subject. It is this value and meaning which we must now endeavor to understand. The Subject of Knowledge. Who exactly is the subject of my knowledge? The only reply that makes sense here is I. The subject of knowledge is not a supra-individual Ego which manifests or particularizes itself in me, as some have thought. This conception, however, is not as strange as may appear at first sight. Those who defended it were struck by the fact that in principle truth-for-me is llOC£. L. de Raeymaeker, The Philosophy of Being, St. Louis, 1954, pp. 209211.

111 "Respondeo dicendum, quod duplex est actio. Una quae procedit ex agente in rem exteriorem, quam transmutat . . . . Alia vero actio est, quae non procedit in rem exteriorem, sed stat in ipso agente ut perfectio ipsus." Thomas Aquinas, de Veritate, 8, a. 6. 112"II n'y a pas d'homme interieur, l'homme est au monde, c'est dans Ie monde qu'il se connait." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. V. 113In this way Foulquie interprets Sartre's concept of Nothingness. Cf. P. Foulquie and G. Deledalle, La psychologie contemporaine, Paris, 1951, p. 383. 114"Et je suis, au contraire, Ie neant ... Le connaissant n'est pas, i1 n'est pas saisissable. II n'est rien d'autre que ce qui fait qu'il y a un etre-I<\ du connu, une presence." Sartre, L'etre et Ie tleant, p. 225.

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also truth-for-the-other. To explain this fact, they assumed that I and You coincide in a supra-individual subject or that such a subject operates in us. Nevertheless, this conception loses sight of one of the most primary evidences of knowledge-namely, that it is I who knows, while I am not the other.l1 5 On the other hand, the fact that I am not the other does not mean that the other has nothing whatsoever to do with me when I know. The other can be found in everyone of my cognitive acts-if only as the one from whom I have received the language in which I embody my knowledge and without which I am unable to know. However, no matter what importance this other has, ultimately it is I who knows, and no one else can take this task over from me. 'What is this subject-I? To clarify this point somewhat, we will make use of the method proposed by Stephan Strasser-namely, the analysis of the retroverting act. 116 A retroverting act is an act of which I am, at least to some extent, both the origin and the terminus. 117 There are many such acts. vVhen I wash myself, correct myself, hate myself, think of myself, etc., I am at least to some extent both the origin and the terminus of these acts. If I pay attention to myself as the origin, I have to admit that it is always the same identical I from which these actions spring.l1 s This I, this subject-I, is also that in which activities that are immediately directed to the world find their origin: it is this I which sometimes does carpentry, goes for a walk, knows the world and fellowmen, loves and hates.l1 9 If, on the other hand, I pay attention to myself as the terminus of the retroverting act, I have to admit a plurality of termini. True, I constantly use the term "myself" to indicate this terminus, but its meaning changes according as I wash myself, correct myself, hate myself or think of myself. In washing, myself refers, e.g., to my head or my hands; in correcting, it refers to a mistake; in hating, it means a misdeed; in thinking, it indicates my capacities. My head, my hands, 115The subjective universality of knowledge induced the Arabian philosophers Aviccnna and Averroes to accept a single agent intellect voor all human beings. llr,Cf. Stephan Strasser, The Soul in Metaphysical and Empirical Psvchology, Pittsburgh, 1957, pp. 79 ff. . 117It is intentionally that Strasser says that I am at least to a certain extent the origin and terminus of retroverting acts for it is not at all certain that I am t}~eir sole source and their sole terminus. Cf. ibid., p. 81. llBCL ibid., p. 83. 119 Cf. ibid., p. 83.

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my mistake, my misdeed, and my capacities are all called "myself;' but de facto are distinct realities, i.e., a plurality.120 On the other hand, they are not purely a plurality, for head, hands, mistake, misdeed, capacities, etc. are mine, i.e., they constitute a "multi-unity" by referring to the subject-ego,121 or to say the same in a different way, they receive from the subject-ego a certain formnamely, the form called "mine" or "of me."122 In this way the retroverting act reveals a composition of the subject which I am. In the subject we must distinguish the subject-ego, which is always identical with itself, and the "multi-unity" of mutually distinct object poles, which we have previously indicated by the term facticity and which Dr. Strasser calls the quasi-objective ego. 123 This quasi-objective ego is called quasi-objective because the object poles do not show the same distantness from the subject as is shown by the objects of my world. They are almost-object, as it were object, because they are not identical with the subject-ego, without, however, being object. 124 When we say, as we have to do, that the subject-I is a conscious self, there is danger of construing this as an inhuman consciousness, characterized by pure interiority.125 This danger is overcome if we explicitly take into account that it is only by virtue of the fusion of self-affirmation with the affirmation of the non-ego that there can be question of an ego-consciousness, a self-consciousness. 126 In one and the same act I affirm both the other and myself.127 In this act 120Cf. 121Cf.

ibid., pp. 83 f. ibid., pp. 85 f.

122If we may identify the subject-ego with what scholastic philosophy calls the "soul," and the multi-unity of object poles with the "body," the thesis that the soul is the form of the body obtains a meaning which is subject to phenomenological verification. 123Ibid., pp. 95 ff. 124 French writers usually express the distinction in question in the terms "je-sujct" and "moi-objet" or simply "je" and "moi." Cf. J olivet, Traite de Philosophie; vol. 2, Psychologic, Lyon-Paris, 1945, pp. 584 f. J. Vialatoux in his work L'intention philosophique, Paris, 1954, p. 33, speaks of "je-trallscendental" and "moi-phhlOmenal." 125We strongly suspect that Strasser himself ultimately arrives at such a consciousness. Cf. M. de Petter, "De ziei en het psychische," Tijdschrift v. Philosophie, vol. XIII (1951), pp. 714-723. 126This is a classical view, formulated by St. Thomas Aquinas when, speaking of the soul he says "Quod percipiendo actum suum seipsam intelligit quandocumque ali quid intel1,igit." Summa theol., p. I, q. 93, a. 7, ad 4. 127"Im Ich-sagen spricht sich das Dasein als In-der-\Velt-sein aus." Heidegger, Seia und Zeit, p. 321.

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there can be no question of a priority or posteriority of either affirmation, for if I attempt to think one without the other, nothing remains. 128 Accordingly, the subject-I is not Nothingness. Likewise, it is not sufficient to say with Merleau-Ponty that the subject-I is "nothing else than a possibility of situations."129 It is a positive reality,130 from which facticity and history derive their unity and are my body, my world, and my history. The knowing subject does not reduce itself to the affirmation of the object. Otherwise I would have said everything that can be said about the subject as soon as I explicitate it as the affirmation of the object. Evidently, this is not the case, for in one and the same act I affirm both the object-which-I-am-not and the subject-which-I-am. Once the proper and positive meaning of the subject-I is understood, the possibility is given that it is primarily the subject which gains in perfection through the act of knowing. Sartre cannot accept this possibility, because for him the subject has lost all consistency: "The knower is not."131 The opposite, however, is true. Through the life of knowledge I make reality my personal' possession. 132 In every cognitive act I affirm myself as a person, every act of knowing means a phase in the growth of my personal being. Through these acts reality does not gain in perfection, but it is primarily I who benefits. As a knowing subject I acknowledge that reality has its own mode of being, and this recognition means primarily an enrichment of the subject which I amP3 I am an openness for the entire order of being and, in making this order progressively my own,134 I achieve my being-a-person. In this sense, therefore, knowing may be called 128"Si Ie sujet est en situation ... c'est qu'il ne realise son ipseite qu'en etant effectivement corps et en entrant par ce corps dans Ie monde." MerleauPonty, PhCnomcnologie de la perception, p. 467. 129/bid., pp. 466-467. 130It is beyond the scope of the present question to describe more accurately the very special mode of being proper to the subject-ego. But it should be clear that it may not be described as a quasi-object and that it can never be objectivized, i.e., placed as an object before a subject. The subject-ego will always escape objectivizing thought. For this reason it is sometimes spoken of as the "elusive" ego. Cf. C. A. van Peursen, Lichaam, Ziel, Geest, Utrecht, 1956, pp. 128-141. For a summary of the various theories of man as a person, see Jolivet, op. cit., pp. 594-602. l3lCf. Sartre, L'etre et Ie neant, p. 225. l32"Cognitio fit secundum assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam." Thomas Aquinas, Summa theol., p. I, q. 86, a. 2, ad 4. 133Cf. Dondeyne, Contemporary European Thought and Christian Faith, p. 118.

l34"Anima est quodammodo omnia." Thomas Aquinas, Summa theol., p. I,

q. 14, a. 1.

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an immanent act, for it is an act which originates from the subject which I am and remains in me as my perfection. 6.

SENSITIVE AND SPIRITUAL KNOWING

Sensitive and Spiritual Knowing are Inseparable. Many may have been struck by the fact that hitherto there has been no reason to make a distinction regularly used in treatises of knowledgenamely, the distinction between sensitive and spiritual knowing. We do not want to insinuate that there are no reasons for making such a distinction, but 'tan not omit mentioning that the way in which the distinction is proposed is very often incorrect. Too often the distinction is simply posited at the beginning of the treatise as the distinction between, on the one hand, sensitive seeing, hearing, smelling, etc. and, on the other, spiritual consciousness or understanding, after which the treatise goes on to a consideration of sensitive knowing, divorced from spiritual consciousness. Thus the impression is created that the distinct modes of knowing are not only distinct but also separable, so that it would be possible to speak about, say, "seeing" without "understanding."135 "Seeing" would be found also in animals, but not "understanding," which distinguishes man from animals. This way of presenting matters is wrong because it contradicts the most immediate phenomenological evidences. It is perfectly impossible to isolate certain facets of knowing from one another and, therefore, it is not permissible to present them as separable. ls6 Man does not have any purely sensitive seeing which is not impregnated with spiritual consciousness or understanding. If, then, by "seeing" is meant a purely sensitive activity of knowing, man does not have any such power and, consequently, he does not have it "in common" with animals. On the other hand, it has to be admitted that among animals there occurs something which more or less resembles what is called "seeing" in man. Without a certain "shadow of knowledge" the 135This impression is created, e.g., by Charles Boyer in his Cursus philosophiae, vol. 2, Paris, n. d. 136Therefore, we may not say "Manifestum est enim intellectum incipere ubi sensus desinit." De principio individuationis (Mandonnet ed. of St. Thomas's Opuscula, Paris 1927, vol. V, p. 194). The authenticity of this little work is rejected by Mandonnet. However, it is rather striking that Johannes Capreolus, the Princeps Thomistarum, quotes precisely this text to express the view of his Master. Cf. Defensiones theologiae in IV Sen tent., dist. 10, q. 4, ad 6 (PabanPegues ed., Turin, 1906, p. 212).

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behavior of an animal cannot be understood. 1ST But if this seeing is a purely sensitive form of knowing, what exactly it is escapes man because he does not have any experience of it. lsS If the above-mentioned distinction is not simply posited a priori, it is difficult to find it in experience. Hence it is not surprising that many philosophers do not want to accept it. They fall into the opposite extreme, which likewise cannot be justified phenomenologically. For it cannot escape my attention that my act of knowing a worldly object reveals distinct facets which cannot be reduced to one another.

Sensitive and Spiritual Knowing are Not Reducible to Each Other. Let us return to the perception of this table. I see only a determined profile of this table, because I occupy a definite standpoint with respect to it. I am capable also of perceiving another profile, but then I would have to change my standpoint in space. There is a corre1ativeness between the profile that actually appears and my spatial standpoint, so that my perception of this table here is determined by spatial conditions. These spatial conditions are at the same time temporal conditions. Now I perceive this profile of the table, but my perception of this profile appearing now refers intrinsically to past perceptions of other profiles and future perceptions of again other profiles. Perceiving consciousness is the synthesis of the present, past, and future, i.e., of temporality.189 Perceiving consciousness, therefore, is determined by spatio-temporal conditions, i.e., I see here and now something else than what I will see soon there or saw a moment ago elsewhere. If the spatio-temporal conditions of perception are changed, the perception itself also changes. However, this is not all that can be said of perceiving consciousness. For, while I perceive now from this standpoint in space a determined profile of the table, I understand at the same time what a table is and I experience that this understanding does not change when the conditions of space and time are modified. With respect to lSTCf. F. J. J. Buytendijk, "De schaduwen van het kennen," Tijdschri/t v. Philosophie, vol. 1 (1939), pp. 5-28. lasIt is rather striking that writers who divorce sense knowledge from spiritual knowledge and attribute sense knowledge primarily to animals prove several theses referring to animal knowledge "from the testimony of consciousness." On the one hand, they feel the impossibility of placing themselves inside animal cognition but, on the other, they forget that the "testimony of consciousness" does no refer to animal cognition. See, e.g., Paul Siwek, Psychologia metaphysica, Rome, 1948, pp. 89-214. lS9Cf. below, pp. 294 ff.

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this understanding the phases of temporality and the standpoints in space of the perceiving subject appear to be accidental. Through every appearing profile, from every standpoint in space, and in every phase of temporality I unchangeably understand what a table is. Similar remarks can be made with respect to perception itself. Independently of the spatio-temporal conditions of perception, I understand what perception is. The understanding of what perception is does not change when the spatio-temporal conditions of perception are modified.l 40 It is only because I possess an unchangeable concept of perception that a phenomenology of perception is possible. Because I understand what a table is, I can speak of a certain profile of the table. Accordingly, knowing contains at least two facets of unequal value. On the one hand, my consciousness depends upon conditions of space and time but, on the other hand, it does not depend upon them. These facets, then, cannot possibly be identical or coincide perfectly, for otherwise one would have to admit that one and the same reality would be characterized at the same time and in the same respect by opposite characteristics. Thus the changeable character of the perception of this table here contains a cognitive aspect that may be called absolute. We mean: understanding transcends the relativity which affects perception. What I see, the "face" of the terminus encountered in perception, what appears to my perceiving glance, has a spatio-temporal relation to me as the perceiving subject. The noema also of my understanding is related to my understanding glance, but it is not affected by the relation to spatio-temporal standpoints. In this sense understanding escapes relativity and is absolute. The distinction, then, of sensitive and spiritual knowing cannot possibly be discounted, but at the same time it is extremely difficult to understand the distinction correctly. On the one hand, my consciousness is consciousness of something which is, of that through which something is what it is, of the essence, nature, or quiddity of something. HI On the other hand, however, my consciousness is con140This point is disregarded by J. H. van den Berg, when he blames the old psychologies for "flattering themselves with the belief that they are developing a lasting and 'objective' knowledge of man." See his Verantwoording or Introduction to Person en Wereld, Utrecht, 1953, p. 9. I41"Objectum intellectus nostri, secundum praesentem vitae statum, est quidditas rei materialis quem a phantasmatibus abstrahit." Thomas Aquinas, Summa theol., p. I, q. 85, a. 8.

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sciousness of the thisness, the here and now of something. 142 The fact that these distinct aspects have different names could easily lead to isolating them from each other. Being conscious of what something is, is called understanding143 or also spiritual consciousness, while with respect to the experience of "this, here and now" we speak of seeing, feeling, hearing, etc. Thus the two facets of consciousness are frequently placed "alongside" each other or one "after" the other as spiritual and sensitive knowing. In this way the impression is created that the spirit is not present to "this, here and now," because it grasps "only" the essence of something, and it is accidental to this essence to be "this, here and now"; on the other hand, sensitive knowing is presented as limited to the concrete and changing forms of the essence. De facto, however, man's knowing is undivided: my seeing, hearing, feeling, etc. are always permeated by spiritual consciousness or understanding. If, then, an animal is not a being having a spiritual life, I may not ascribe to it human hearing, seeing, etc. Likewise, my spiritual understanding is never disconnected from sensitive knowing.144 7.

THE CONCEPT

The distinction of the spiritual and sensitive facets of knowing manifests itself even more clearly when attention is paid to the termini of both. Through my act of knowing, a definite worldly object is raised above being nothing-for-me. Through understanding, the thing is constituted a certain quiddity-for-me, it has received a certain intelligible meaning for me. But there is more. The "whatness" or essence of an object imposes itself upon me: I am unable to give an arbitrary meaning to the world. A chair represents another intelligible meaning than a cigar or a plant. Thus my understanding is a dialogue between me and the thing which I understand. This dialogue comes to a provisional stop or terminus in the expression which I give to what I have understood. What is under142"Sensus est singularium, intellectus autem universalium." Thomas Aquinas, Summa theal., p. I, q. 85, a. 3. 143"Nomen intellectus quamdam intimam cognitionem importat: dicitur enim intelligere, quasi intus legere. Et hoc manifeste patet considerantibus differentiam intellectus et sensus: nam cognitio sensitiva occupatur circa qualitates sensibiles exteriores; cognitio autem intellectiva penetrat usque ad essentiam rei. Objectum enim intellectus est quod quid est." St. Thomas, Summa theol. II-II, q. 8, a. l. 144Cf. St. Thomas, op. cit., p. I, q. 84, a. 7.

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stood imposes itself upon me, in and through my understanding it is interiorized, assimilated, and fixed in an expression. This expression -scholastic philosophy uses here the term "verbum" or "word"resulting from my being-understandingly-in-the-world is called "concept" or "idea."145 The result of understanding this tree, this chair, or this cigar is the concept "tree," "cigar," or "chair,"146 in which the intelligibility which imposes itself on me lies expressed. By means of my understanding I dwell in my world as in a system of intelligible meanings, but insofar as I express this intelligibility in concepts and embody it in words, I dwell in a "world of ideas."

Immutable Concepts. This point brings us very close to Plato's view. There certainly is a world of ideas. Plato was quite right in his idea that cognitive man is not limited to the reception of changeable impressions of mutable things, that he is not receptive only to the variable and movable forms of things. He realized that man possesses immutable ideas. But it was an enigma to him how such ideas could be acquired because, under the influence of Heraclitus' philosophy, Plato thought that in the world there was nothing but changeability. Thus from the encounter with this world immutable ideas could not possibly arise. For this reason he posited a subsistent world of ideas, contemplated by the soul in a mysterious previous state. By accepting this contemplation of subsistent ideas-before the soul was chained to a body-Plato could conceive at least the possibility that the soul would actually possess immutable ideas. H7 It should be clear, however, that such a mythical explanation is superfluous. There is a world of ideas, but this world is not subsistent. The world of ideas is produced by me and my world. I myself give expression to the world in which I dwell, to the worldly objects which I encounter. I seize what they are and fix this in my concepts. Accordingly, immutable concepts are the expression of the essence of reality. This expression transcends the changeable character 145Sometimes a distinction is made between concept and idea-namely, when the term idea is reserved for concepts which guide man's agere and facere. For instance, an artist works out an "idea." For us here the two terms are used synonymously. Regarding other terms to indicate concepts, see Jacques Maritain, Formal Logic, New York, 1937, p. 17, note 3. H6"Quicumque autem intelligit, ex hoc ipso quod intelligit, procedit, aliquid intra ipsum, quod est conceptio rei intellectae, ex ejus notitia procedens. Quam quidem conceptionem vox significat, et dicitur verbum cordis significatum verbo vocis." St. Thomas, ibid., p. I, q. 27, a. 1. 147Cf. F. J. Thonnard, A Short History of Philosophy, New York, 1955, Nos. 41-43.

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of the concrete and is the basis which makes it possible to speak of absolute truth. If no value is attached to the idea of essence, difficulties are bound to arise with respect to the absoluteness of truth.

Phenomenology and Essences. As a matter of fact, several representatives of existential phenomenology, such as Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, run into such difficulties. They are so fascinated by the historicity of existence, which drags the world along in its historicity, that they no longer notice the trans-historical aspects of existence or at least do not sufficiently stress them in their explicitations.148 As far as concerns the representatives of existentialism before it was fertilized by Husserl's phenomenology, such as Jaspers and Marcel, man is generally unique in a radical way, an "exception" in every respect (Kierkegaard). Thus they leave no room for an immutable essence common to many and, consequently, neither for an absolute truth.149 Contemporary phenomenology has not yet managed to overcome these difficulties. As is well-known, when Sartre and others following the same line of thought occasionally make truth the explicit theme of their consideration, they reject the possibility of an absolute truth. 150 The eidetic reduction, i.e., the reduction of the phenomenal to its eidos or essence, which Husserl had originally emphasized most strongly, has been all too quickly pushed into the background of philosophyYH This reduction results in what Husserl calls "Wesenschau/' i.e., seeing the essence or essential vision. His original intention proposed phenomenology as a method to arrive at determining what is aimed-at, intended, in any affirmation whatsoever (de Waehlens). What exactly do I "intend" when I speak of extension, color, memory, etc? What is their essence 115 :2 By using imaginary variations Husserl thought it possible to understand at last the essence of the "intended."

148Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, Sens et Non-sens, Paris, 1948, pp. 190-191. 149Fr. Gregoire, "Foi chretienne et pensee contemporaine," Revue philosophique de Louvain, vol. 49 (1952), p. 311. This is a review of Professor Dondeyne's book of the same title. 150Cf. R. C. Kwant, "De geslotenheid van MerIeau-Ponty's Wijsbegeerte," Tijdschri/t v. Philosophie, vol. 19 (1957), pp. 250-254. 151Cf. P. Ricoeur, "Methode et taches d'une phenomenologie de la volante," Problemes actuels de la phenomhtologie, Bruges, 1951, pp. 115-116. 152It is exclusively in this sense that we ourselves conceived phenomenology in our book De psychologie van de verve ling, Amsterdam, n.d., pp. 51-83.

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HusserI's first followers did not go beyond the eidetic reduction and its consequent essential vision. This explains why even nowadays it is quite frequently thought that phenomenology is really nothing else than a revival of realism or even of Platonism (Edith Stein). As far as contemporary existential phenomenologists are concerned, the essential vision is done so little justice that some of them seem to be blind to understanding the essence of reality. Thus they do not succeed, at least not explicitly, in overcoming a new type of positivism. Unfortunately, this is all some opponents of existential phenomenology know about it.153 They disregard that Sartre and MerleauPonty presuppose classical "understanding" and that Sartre speaks even explicitly about the essence of man,154 although elsewhere he denies that there is any human nature. 155 What to think of this paradoxical situation? The conclusion appears warranted that phenomenology does not yet sufficiently realize its own nature, has not yet arrived at explicit awareness of what it is doing. Phenomenologists know the idea of essence and classical intelligere or understanding, but they have not yet taken them into account. They still lack a doctrine about concepts and conceptual knowledge. 156 MerIeau-Ponty is right when he says that perception "forever grounds our idea of truth,"151 but he would have to indicate more aspects of perception than he de facto does. His phenomenology of perception presupposes more than he himself thinks is contained in it. A phenomenology of perception, of emotional life, of imagination, of volitional life, etc., presupposes, at least implicitly, an immutable idea regarding these modes of existing. 158

153Dondeyne, "Beschouwingen bij het atheistisch existentialisme," Tijdschrift Vaal' Philosophie, vol. XIII (1951), pp. 3-10. 154"Nous sommes donc dans la situation inverse de celie des psychologues puisque nous partons de cette totalite synthetique qu'est l'homme et que nous (·tablissons I'essence d'homme avant de debuter en psychologie." Sartre, Esquisse d'une fheorie des emotions, Paris 1948. p. 9. 1fi5"Ainsi, il n'y a pas de nature humaine, puisqu'iJ n'y a pas de Dieu pour la concevoir." Sartre, L'existentialisme est un kurnanis11le, p. 22. lfi6Cf. Dondeyne, Contemporary European Thought and Christian Faith, pp. 102-107. lfi7Cf. Merleau-Ponty, Phenoml:nologie de la perception, p. XI. 158Cf. Sartre, op. cit., p. 7.

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a. The Concept ;s Abstract Abstraction. Further reflection on the relation between my world of ideas and the world as the terminus of encounter or the field of presence of my existence shows that these two worlds do not wholly agree. I cannot fail to notice that my concepts are abstract, mysteriously stripped of the aspect "this, here and now," pertaining to the individual terminus encountered by my knowledge. My concept "figure" says nothing about "this" or "that" figure, my idea "man" says nothing of John or Peter. My concept is abstract, and my understanding therefore is abstractive. 159 A similar situation was met when we spoke of the figure-horizon structure of perception. When I look for the biggest apple on a fruit tray, apples leap forward as salient figures in a field of presence of nearby and faraway meanings composed of plums, bananas, etc., while one of the apples, as it were, detaches itself and makes itself present as the biggest against an horizon of other smaller apples. Thus the figure-horizon structure has already differentiated itself on several levels. The same has to be said also with respect to the biggest apple which I take. Because I look for the biggest apple, meanings such as color, juiciness, flavor, etc., which are qualities of the same apple, slide into the background of my field of perception, and size alone occurs in it as a figure. It would be possible to speak here already of abstraction, for I have abstracted a certain meaning from the network of nearby and faraway meanings which is my field of perception. 160 Strictly speaking, however, the term "abstractive" is used as a qualifier of the act of understanding. When I understand something, my act of understanding abstracts the essence from "this, here and now," from the individual. 161 The essence is placed in the foreground as a salient figure, while the individual marks of this figure are pushed toward the horizon of my field of presence. Thus the terminus of under159Cf. Dondeyne, "L'abstraction," Revue neoscolastique de Philosophic, 1938, pp. 5-20, 339-373; L. B. Geiger, "Abstraction et separation d'apres S. Thomas," Revue des Sciences philosophiques et theologiques," vol. 31 (1947), pp. 3-40; G. Van Riet, "La theorie thomiste de l'abstraction," Revue philosophique de Louvain, 1952, pp. 353-393. 160"Et hoc possumus videre per simile in sensu. Visus enim videt colorem pomi sine ejus odore. Si ergo quaeratur ubi sit color, qui videtur sine odore, manifestum est quod color, qui videtur, non est nisi in porno. Sed quod sit sine odore perceptus, hoc accidit ei ex parte visus, in quantum in visu est similitudo coloris, et non odoris." St. Thomas, Summa theol., p. I, q. 85, a. 2, ad 2. 161Cf. St. Thomas, ibid., p. I, q. 85, a. 1.

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standing, the concept, does not express the individual features of what I have encountered. The concept is abstract. It retains only an implicit reference to the individual, insofar as it connotes that its content is of necessity realized in the individual and only in the individual. The abstract concept is an "open" concept. 162 Accordingly, when in my understanding I express the quiddity of the terminus of my encounter, the object pole of my understanding, I am forced to leave behind the aspect "this, here and now" of the terminus encountered. In my world of ideas there is only one concept, one idea "horse," "man," "figure," etc., although in the world in which I live I have encountered perhaps thousands of horses, men, figures, etc. The fact that my concepts are always abstract does not at all mean that I do not know the individual. It would not even be possible for me to deny such knowledge without contradicting myself. For I notice that my understanding leaves the aspect "this, here and now" out of consideration and I would not be able to notice this if I were not conscious of the individual, if I did not know it. Whenever I know something, it is always primarily an individual something which is for me, to which I am present. At the same time I must admit that I have primarily interiorized and assimilated "this, here and now," the individual. However, the cognitive content "this, here and now" is nothing else than a reference to the terminus encountered by my act of knowing. It means consciousness of "this being," "this something," consciousness of a certain "something-for-me."163 But I do not rest in this first, vague act of knowing. I seek a more accurate determination, an expression of what this something is. The expression of what a thing is, is the concept which, however, is stripped of the individuality contained in the terminus of the encounter.

Abstraction Divides. Conceptual expression, therefore, means of necessity a kind of dismemberment, which progressively becomes even more pronounced according as I attempt to penetrate more profoundly into the quiddity. I may have "conceived" Peter as a man, but this does not mean that I explicitly see what exactly is meant by being a man. My understanding is at first only very elementary. Although grasping the essence of something is called seizing the absolute, it does not mean that all relativity is excluded by it. Grasping the essence of something, understanding, is a relative grasp, because it 162G. Van Riet, art. quoted in footnote 159, p. 360. 16Sef. Van Steenberghen, Epistemology. New York, 1949, p. 129.

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never gives perfect expression to the terminus of the encounter by a single stroke. It grasps the essence but does not comprehend it; it draws its content from the terminus encountered, but does not exhaust this terminus. Only after a prolonged and diligent search do I understand that Peter's being-a-man implies existence, "havingto-be" (zu sein), transcendence, having a conscience, etc. Thus my deeper penetration produces a greater dismemberment, and every partial expression itself is always abstract. I observe the same situation when I attempt to express the individual more accurately. Although both John and Peter are "man," John is not Peter for, unlike Peter, John is healthy, a New Yorker, young, intelligent, a lawyer, upright, a stamp collector, etc. Therefore, the determination and expression of the individuality of the terminus encountered is likewise conceptual and abstract. 164

Abstraction Unifies. Nevertheless, the abstract conceptual expression of the terminus encountered by my act of knowing does not consist solely in a dismemberment of the original organic unity proper to the act of knowing. By means of abstractive understanding the field of cognitive presence is also unified in a certain sense. If I were to stand in reality "without any concepts," reality would be for me a chaotic mass of concrete and individual uniquenesses. If I do not know what a mammal is, then every mammal is an enigma for me in this respect; I am not able to see, as it were, through a certain "region" of objects; I am not capable of com-prehending, i.e., of summarizing many objects in their essential resemblance. 16 1> If I were unable to grasp the essence of an emotion, my emotional life would be chaotic for me. 166 Precisely because understanding is abstractive, it brings unity into the plurality of individual objects.167 These objects no longer appear 164A. Marc, Psychologie reflexive, vol. I, Paris, 1949, pp. 166-273. 165"Etymologically, to 'comprehend' as Brunschvicg pointed out, means 'to take simultaneously,' to establish relationships, to bring back the diversity of data to the unity of an idea or a system of ideas." Dondeyne, Contemporary European Thought and Christian Faith, p. 152. 166Cf. Sartre, Esquisse d'une theorie des emotions, Paris, 1948, p. 7. 167"Im Vorstellen, z.B. einer Linde, Buche, Tanne als Baum, wird das je einzelne Angeschaute als das und das bestimmt, aus dem Hinblick auf solches, was 'fUr viele gilt'. Diese Vielgiiltigkeit kennzeichnet zwar eine Vorstellung als Begriff, trifft jedoch noch nicht dessen urspriingliches Wesen. Denn diese Vielgiiltigkeit griindet ihrerseits als abgeleiteter Charakter darin, dass im Begriff je das Eine vorgestellt ist, in dem mehrere Gegenstande iibereinkommen. BegrifHiches Vorstellen ist Ubereinkommenlassen von Mehreren in diesem Einen. Die Einheit dieses Einen muss daher im begrifHichen Vorstellen

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to me as unique. Because I leave behind the individual, I draw the essence found in many into the foreground of my field of perception, so that this field becomes organized and delineates itself as a certain region against an horizon of distinct meanings. To make reality intelligible means to take away its chaotic character, to unify it and thus to make it transparent. Every science performs this task, each in its own way. Undoubtedly it is not difficult to see now that the term "abstract" does not have here the pejorative sense which many phenomenologists attach to it. The abstract character of understanding does not mean a corruption of knowledge. The abstract concept is not cut loose from experience in the broadest sense. The abstractive character of understanding pertains to our human condition (Maritain).

A Misrepresentation. To prevent much useless discussion, it may be useful to point out how traditional presentations of the concept often give rise to misunderstanding because of their defective explanations. It is often said that man "has" abstract concepts. This expression can be understood correctly, but also incorrectly. I do not "have" abstract concepts in the same way as I "have" marbles or dollars. Abstract concepts are not "things."168 My "having" a concept means nothing else than that I am understanding, that I understand. Therefore, I can never "have" a concept without understanding. My concepts, which are the results or terms of my understanding, are not stored and kept in my consciousness as in a locker for use on later occasions. This way of presenting the affair draws its origin from the psychology of consciousness, which conceived consciousness as a kind of container and the phenomena of consciousness as little "things" stored in this container (Herbart). If this description of consciousness and its facts were correct, it would be possible for me to "have" a concept and yet not to understand. vorgreifend herausgesehen und allen bestimmenden Aussagen iiber das Mehrere vorgehalten werden. Das vorgangige Heraussehen des Einen, darin Mehreres soli iibereinkommen kiinnen, ist der Grundakt der Begriffsbildung." Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, Bonn, 1929, p. 47. i68The objection could be raised that concepts, as they are treated in logic, strongly resemble things. The concept is considered there as a "thing of thought" and is viewed precisely as divorced from understanding. It is what St. Thomas calls the "building" studied in separation from "the act of building" (Summa theol., p. I-II, q. 90, a. 1, ad 2). Of course, we do not want to deny that this is what happens in logic. Nevertheless, we want to emphasize that the logical study of concepts does not favor the phenomenology of understanding.

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But the abstract concept is nothing without understanding, and understanding is nothing without the intelligible meaning of the noema, expressed in the concept and embodied in the word. Understanding, however, is not always actual in the highest degree. It is always more or less actual and, therefore, the concept also will be more or less actual. When my understanding has become fully nonactual, I no longer "have" a concept. When for any reason whatsoever my understanding becomes actual again, I again give expression to a certain aspect of my field of presence, I again "have" a concept, I again understand. It is because this understanding is accompanied by the consciousness of having understood before, that we speak here of memory.169 h. The Concept is Not a Schematic Image

Have we not emphasized too much what above was called "spiritual consciousness"? Surely, spiritual consciousness or understanding is not to be divorced from sensitive consciousness? Does the final term of understanding not retain anything of sensitive consciousness? I see, I feel, I hear "this, here and now," and in my seeing, feeling, hearing, etc., I grasp the quiddity, the essence of something, expressed in a concept, which is abstract because it leaves the individual behind. But what is left in this way of the assertion that sensitive and spiritual consciousness are inseparable aspects of a single undivided cognitive attitude? Let us repeat emphatically that sensitive and spiritual consciousness can merely be distinguished but not separated. Hence the expression of what I have made mine in the encounter with things contains so much sensitive consciousness that many philosophers have not even succeeded in distinguishing the two aspects of the expression in question. 170 When I perceive a match-box on my desk and then close my eyes, I am able to imagine this box in its individuality. This image is a mode of expression, but an individual one, for it is the image of this box lying here and now on my desk. This image certainly is not the concept "match-box," because it is not the abstract expression of the quiddity, the essence of a matchbox. In the sight of the individual box and in the individual represcn169The questions regarding memory are much more complex than is suggested in these lines. However, we are not concerned with the psychology of memory. What we are interested in here is the insight that concepts are not "things" and, consequently, that they are not kept as "things" and d? not come "to the surface" of my consciousness whenever I remember somethmg. 170Cf. A. Marc. Psych%gie reflexive, vol. I, Paris, 1949, p .167.

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tation in the imagination the abstractive understanding of what a box is, is realized. I express the essence in my concept, but the abstract expression cannot be divorced or isolated from the individual image,171 although the two are not identical.

The Abstract Concept According to the Empiricists. Some empiricists, e.g., Hume, think that there is, strictly speaking, no distinction between concept and image. As all empiricists, they posit, on the one hand, a world as being-in-itself and, on the other, a consciousness without a world. This consciousness is sensitive to stimuli coming from the world and receives them in a wholly passive way. Each impression from without, however, is fully individual as, say, the impression of this box or the impression of that box. Nevertheless I use a single term for all these impressions-namely, the general term "match box." What justifies me in doing this? We reply that in the experience of this or that box we acquire the abstract concept "match-box" and in our understanding we leave behind the aspect of this or that. 172 The empiricists in question do not agree to this reply. According to their view, what we have called an abstract concept is nothing else than an impoverished and weakened image of individual things. In this image all the striking features of individuality are supposed to have simply faded away. There are several ways in which this fading away is explained. Some, such as Galton, appeal to a kind of fusing together of superimposed individual impressions. Through the overlapping of the individual impressions their overall result becomes confused and resembles a scheme, i.e., a schematic image of numberless individual realities. What we have called abstract concepts and have distinguished from images are, according to these empiricists, only vague schematized images. 173 This view is another instance of insufficient explicitation of the irreflechi. It is the phenomenologist's duty to give expression to knowledge as it is. Undoubtedly, it is true that in knowledge there is something that may be called a schematizing image. 174 In very many cases man does not even manage to go beyond a kind of 171Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theol., p. I, q. 84, a. 7. 172"Der Gegenstand einer Anschauung, der je ein Einzelnes ist, bestimmt sich jedoch als "das und das" in einer 'allgemeinen Vorstellung', d.h. im Begriff." Heidegger, op. cit., p. 47. 173Cf. Jolivet, Traite de Philosophie, vol. 2, Psycho logie, Lyon-Paris, 1945, pp. 435-437.

174Cf Thomas Aquinas, Summa theol., p. II-II, q. 173, a. 2. 17~Cf. A. D. Sertillanges, Saint Thomas d'Aquin, vol. II, Paris, 1925, p. 141.

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schematizing. However, is this schematic representation the abstract expression of an essence? Certainly not.175 Whenever man's knowledge does not go beyond a schematic image we have clearly to do with a case of non-understanding rather than understanding. An anthropology, for example, which would be limited to arranging in orderly fashion the schematic images of individual human beings would not be able to go beyond trivialities. Moreover, a theory regarding the schematizing phase of human knowledge is not possible without a concept of schematizing. 176 We are speaking here of concept and schema, but the distinction between these two can be seen only by those who are able to distinguish understanding and schematizing. The act of knowing a worldly object reveals different aspects which show themselves irreducible. The irreducibility of understanding to any form whatsoever of sensitive consciousness imposes itself also when consideration is given to the termini of understanding and of sensitive consciousness. The schematization of the individual results in an individual representation, no matter how much this representation is schematized, but not in the abstract conceptual expression of what something is.177 The various aspects of the one and undivided cognitive attitude are distinct and not identical, and the same is true of their respective termini. The abstract concept occurs in an insoluble unity with the vague schematic image. Perhaps one may even say that a kind of schematization prepares for understanding. 17 8 Nevertheless, they are distinct. The attempt of certain empiricists to minimize this distinction at the expense of the abstract concept is phenomenologically not justi176The distinction between abstract concept and representation was established by empirical psychology and emphasized especially by the School of Wurzburg when Kiilpe and his followers Biihler, Messer, and Marbe through the method of experimental introspection were forced to distinguish between imaginative and non-imaginative consciousness. For a survey of the experiments, see F. Roels, Handboek der Psychologie, Utrecht, 1934, pp. 73-93. I77To clarify the distinction between concept and schematic representation, an appeal is sometimes made to the fact that man .can perfectly understand a figure having seventy-five angles without being capable of representing this figure schematically in his imagination. Hence, so they conclude, concept and schematic representation are not identical. We do not make use of this argument because we do not think that it is valid. When we speak of the concept, we mean the abstract expression of the essence proper to a discovered reality. In this sense the "concept" of a figure having seventy-five angles is not a concept. Nor is that of a simple triangle. The content of such a "concept" is not the expression of the essence proper to a discovered reality, but is, on the basis of perception, simply posited in an unequivocal and indisputable fashion. I78Cf. Marc, op. cit., p. 253.

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frable. They explicitate only one aspect of consciousness-namely, the one which we have called sensitive consciousness. For this reason their empiricism is called sensualistic empiricism. H umean Phenomenalism. Descartes' method to arrive at a criterion for truth and certainty led logically to the isolated, walled-in and closed, purely active consciousness and to a neglect of the importance the worldly object has with respect to the act of knowing. Empiricism recognizes the influence of the object which imposes itself upon consciousness, but in its explicitation of this influence it lays emphasis only on the sensitive aspects. For most empiricists there is no other consciousness than sense consciousness. Nevertheless, the influence of Descartes' method is clearly discernible in many representatives of empiricism and especially in Hume. David Hume admits the influence of the worldly thing on the knowing subject. But, if the question is asked what do I know directly when I know a thing, Hume replies that I know directly my subjective impressions. Thus, according to Hume, I am dealing only with sensitive facts of consciousness. He could not have replied differently without doing violence to the Cartesian inspiration of his philosophy. If consciousness and world are first separated, one simply has to appeal to representative cognitive images, impressions, to save the value of the world. The impressions presuppose an external stimulus, but directly I know only the "phenomena" of things, i.e., the subjective impressions and representations which I receive from things.170 For this reason Hume's theory is called phenomenalism. As soon as this point in Hume's thinking is reached, there is no longer any possibility of avoiding scepticism. If I know only subjective impressions, what lies behind these impressions? What is the reality itself of which empiricism asserts that it is in-itself? Hume does not reply to this question, but remains satisfied with scientifically demolishing everything which hitherto had been held for certain. Only one thing is certain-namely, that we know only phenomena of consciousness, impressions, and images; hence it is about these and nothing else that the sciences should speak. Thus the empiricist postCartesian trend of thought ends with the same conclusions as its opponent-idealism. ISO 170 Accordingly, the "phenomenon" of the empiricists differs radical\y from what is indicated by the same term in phenomenology. For the phenomenologist the phenomenon is the real being which is reality-for-man and not a subjective impression of a world-in-itself. 180Cf. Thonnard. A Short History of Philosophy, Nos. 384bis-385.

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Kant. When this stage was reached, Kant began his critique of knowledge and his speculations regarding the possibility of science. At first, he was profoundly influenced by the rationalism of Wolff, but soon contact with Hume's philosophy caused a crisis in his thought. With Hume, Kant is of the opinion that man knows directly the subjective impressions of things and not the things themselves. But it did not escape him that this empiricist principle was bound to lead to radical scepticism. If the subjective impressions of things are the object of knowledge, will it ever be possible for man to know things themselves? Moreover, are the subjective impressions of things not variable and individual? How would it be possible that these impressions would generate the necessary and universal insights of the sciences? Nevertheless, the sciences are a fact-one cannot deny the success of mathematics, the results of physics and of Newton's astronomy. Therefore, man's knowledge must contain the condition which renders science possible; knowledge has to be explicitated in such a way that it accounts for the fact of science, for if de facto there are sciences, it would be meaningless to describe knowledge in such a way that according to the description there cannot be any sciences. Meanwhile it is certain that Hume's description of knowledge leaves no room for the fact that there are sciences. Kant's proposed solution of these difficulties amounts to an emphasis on the separation between what we have called sensitive and spiritual consciousness. We say emphasis, for from the very start Kant assumed this separation by virtue of the presuppositions which lie took over from empiricism. Man never knows the thing-in-itself, the noumenon, the objective essence of things. Only the phenomenon, the subjective impression which things cause in man's sensitivity, is directly known. Accordingly, I am not able to assert that the thing-initself is a substance, a cause, or caused. Nevertheless, these concepts are predicated of the object known. Where, then, lies their source? The subjective impressions are variable and individual and, therefore, cannot explain the necessary and universal character of the concept. Thus there remains no other possibility than that they arise from the knowing subject itself, independently of the experience of the objects (a priori). In other words, the concepts are thought forms of pure reason. They are not the result of understanding the essence of things, but the subject is necessitated to think the things according to these a priori forms. The

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forms arise from the very structure of consciousness itself. In this way scientific knowledge is possible. Kant himself called this solution his "Copernican Revolution." Before Copernicus, it was thought that the sun revolved around the earth, but Copernicus reversed the proposition. Before Kant, it was thought that things imposed themselves upon consciousness, but Kant reversed the proposition and claimed that consciousness imposes its a priori forms on things. Kant, then, acknowledged abstract concepts, but fully isolated them from sensitive consciousness. 181 The reason put forward by Kant was taken over from Hume: man's contact with things is nothing but a contact of sensitive consciousness. 182 Such a contact can result only in a changeable and individual image. N evertheless, there are necessary and abstract concepts. These concepts, therefore, have to come from the conscious subject itself. Because of this thesis, there is no room for abstractive understanding of reality in Kant's explicitation of knowledge and there is a radical divorce of sensitive and spiritual consciousness. The Kantian antinomy between phenomenon and noumenon, betw~en the subjective impression and the unknowable thing-in-itself hidden behind it, could be radically overcome by phenomenology. For the phenomenologist, it is certaip. that assertions can be made only regarding the phenomenon, but the phenomenon in question is not a subjective impression, but being itself making its appearance. When I perceive an ash tray or a table, I perceive the tray or the table themselves. The tray and the table are phenomena, appearing beings, but really tray and really table. The unity, however, of reciprocal implication of noesis and noema shows distinct aspects. From the noetic viewpoint there is, on the one hand, the changeable and individual expression of the terminus encountered by the act of knowing, an ~pression which is determined by spatio-temporal conditions, and on the other, there is the abstract expression which transcends space-time. From the noematic viewpoint the distinction between the essence and the form of the terminus encountered imposes itself. 181"Quod autem intellectualia stricte talia attinet, in quibus usus intellectus est realis, conceptus tales tam objectorum quam respectuum dantur per ipsam naturam intellect us, neque ab ullo sensuum usu sunt abstracti, nec formam ullam continent cognitionis sensitivae, qua talis." "De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma atque principiis," Immanuel Kanis W,,.k, herausgegeben von Ernst Cassirer, Berlin, 1912, vol. 2, p. 410. 182Kant did not realize that this "thesis" was precisely the very issue at stake.

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Antinomy of Sartre and M erleau-Ponty. In their description of perception some phenomenologists, such as Sartre and MerleauPonty, call forth a new antinomy, which again amounts to an exclusive emphasis upon the sensitive aspect of consciousness to the detriment of its spiritual aspect. They clearly realize that every profile of perception is the profile of a table, a chair, an apple, etc. This situation was the reason why we spoke about the abstractive understanding of what a table, a chair, etc. are, and why we consider this abstractive understanding as the ground on which it is intelligible that the many spatio-temporally determined profiles appear as profiles of one and the same table, chair, etc. If, however, with Sartre one indicates nothing else in perception than the letting appear of profiles, difficulties arise when one has to account for the fact that these profiles appear as profiles of one and the same table. 183 For Sartre this difficulty becomes the occasion for speaking of the transphenomenal being of that which stands before consciousness. This transphenomenal being is being-in-itself. 184 However, one may ask how such an affirmation can be made. Although Merleau-Ponty is more consistent than Sartre in his use of the idea of intentionality, he too lets himself be seduced by the perspectivistic character of perception to make the strangest assertions. For Merleau-Ponty it is certain that the only possible sense which the terms being and reality can assume has to be explicitated as being-for-me. 185 Any assertion concerning reality presupposes the presence of the knowing subject, and outside this presence nothing can be said, Perception, however, shows itself to be perspectivistic, and the perceived reveals itself in an endless series of profiles. The perceived thing itself, the table or the stone itself is never reached. 186 Moreover, Merleau-Ponty thinks, it would be in principle impossible ever to reach the thing itself, for I would have to be capable of putting together all perspectives, of synthesizing present, past, and future, of being "always" and "everywhere." But the idea of such a synthesis of historically conditioned perspectives denies every real 183Sartre, L'etre et Ie Ilea lit, pp. 11-16. 184"L'etre trans phenomenal de ce qui est pour la conscience est lui-meme en soi." Sartre, ibid., p. 29. 185Phellomell%gie de la perception, p. III. 186"L'ioseite n'est, bien entendu, jamais atteillte: chaque aspect de la chose qui tombe- sous notre perception n'est encore qu'une invitation it percevoir au· del a et qu'unarret momentane dans Ie processus percept if. Si la chose meme etait atteinte, elle serait desormais etalee devant nous et sans mystere. Elle cesserait d'exister comme chose au moment meme ou no us croirions la posseder." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., pp. 269-270.

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perspective and, therefore, the real involvement of the subject in the world or the being-for-me of worldly things. 1ST The same has to be said, according to Merleau-Ponty, about "the" world. In perception I draw a certain figure into the foreground, so that it appears against a background of more or less remote meanings. Of course, I am capable of making a more remote meaning itself a figure, but in that case other meanings will slide into the background. More remote meanings in the background of my field of perception in their turn have a certain background. The background, however, of all backgrounds, the horizon of all horizons, i.e., the world itself, is never reached in perception. The thing and the world are only insofar as they are "lived" by me or by other subjects like me, for they are the concatenation of our perspectives. However, they transcend all perspectives because the concatenation is temporal and incomplete. ISS The question can be raised as to what this transcendent being is. Merleau-Ponty replies that when I say that things are transcendent, this means that I do not possess them, I cannot fathom them; they are transcendent to the extent that I do not know what they are and blindly affirm their naked being.ls9 The transcendent is reality and it is real to the extent that it is beyond our grasp.190 The world of nature presents itself as being-in-itself beyond its being-for-me. 191 We are here in the midst of contradictions. On the one hand, it is said that reality is always reality-for-me. On the other hand, the term "reality" is used for that which escapes being-for-me, that of which I do not know what it is, that whose being I affirm blindly, 1S7"Si la synthese pouvait etre effective, si mon experience £ormait un systeme clos, si la chose et Ie monde pouvaient etre definis une lois pour toutes, si les horizons spatio-temporels pouvaient, meme idealement etre explicites et Ie monde pense sans point de vue, c'est alors que rien n'existerait, je survolerais Ie monde, et loin que tous les lieux et tous les temps devinssent a la lois reels, ils cesseraient tous de I'etre parce que je n'en habiterais aucun et ne serais engage nulle part. Si je suis toujours et partout, je ne suis jamais et nulle part." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., pp. 382-383. 18S"La chose et Ie monde n'existent que vecus par moi ou par des sujets tels que moi, puisqu'i1s sont l'enchainement de nos perspectives, mais ils transcendent toutes les perspectives parce que cet enchainement est temporel et inacheve." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., pp. 384-395. 189"Quand je dis que les choses sont transcendantes, cela signifie que je ne les possede pas, que j e n'en £ais pas Ie tour, elles sont transcendantes dans la mesure ou j'ignore ce qu'elles sont et au fen affirme aveugh!ment l'existence nue." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 423. 190"Ce aui fait la 'realite' de la chose est donc justement ce qui la de robe a notre possession." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 270. 191"En effet, Ie monde naturel se donne comme existant en soi au dela de son existence pour moL" Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 180.

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that which beyond its being-for-me is in-itself. It is evident where this contradiction finds its source. As long as there is question of the profiles of things and of the world, as long as there is question of the noematic correlate of sensitive consciousness, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty emphasize the being-for-me of reality. But the thing and the world themselves are not reached, for otherwise sensitive consciousness would have to be able to do something that is possible only for spiritual consciousness or understanding. Nevertheless, the noematic correlate of understanding forces itself upon the perceiving subject. This fact should have induced Sartre and Merleau-Ponty to attribute a meaning of its own to understanding as distinct from sensitive consciousness. But they fail to do this. Instead, the primitive fact of phenomenology is adultera:ted, and phenomenology is reduced to an idealism of meaning. 192 Conelusion. This much is certain for us-we possess a concept of the thing itself in every perspectivistic grasping of the thing. To have such a concept, it is not necessary to be capable of synthetizing all standpoints and all profiles and to be present "everywhere and always." To understand what something is is not the same as to let forms appear which are determined through spatio-temporality. Likewise, we have a concept of the world itself in every concrete situation. To have this concept, it is not necessary to abandon or deny our spatio-temporal situation, for in and through every concrete situation I understand what it is to-he-situated and what the world is in which I am situated. To understand what the world is is not the same as surveying its nearby and more remote meanings. Above we observed that Hume's identification of the schematic image with the abstract concept means disregarding spiritual consciousness. For this reason Hume is said to be a sensualist. Insofar as he explicitates knowledge as a mirroring of a reality that is in-itself, he must be called an empiricist or a realist. Sartre and MerleauPonty, of course, unlike Hume, are not empiricists or realists, but the way in which they speak about being-in-itself makes it impossible to absolve them from every form of realistic thinking. The important point, however, is to see that both are undoubtedly sensualists. For fear of the false intellectualism of the idealists they disregard every real intellectuality in the knowing subject and eliminate from their explicitation of knowledge everything which recalls its spiritual 192Dondeyne, Contemporary European Thought and Christian Faith, pp.

111-112.

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aspect. After all, it does not make too much difference whether one explicitates understanding as the schematizing of changeable and individual impressions or as the temporal and incomplete concatenation of our perspectives.

c. The Concept is Universal The abstractness of the concept leads immediately to a second property-namely, universality. The concept is universal, i.e., it is applicable to many, predicable of many subjects. l9S In forming a concept, I bring unity into the chaotic multiplicity of unique beings, I seize upon that in which many agree, I leave out of consideration that which makes each terminus of encounter unique and thus, as it were, separate a certain region of realities. In the concept, then, the fact of pertaining to a certain region is expressed, so that the concept can be predicated of every object which belongs to this region, John, Peter, and Mary, for example, pertain to a determined region of realities because they are human beings and, therefore, the concept "man" can be predicated of them. l \}4 Thus the concept shows very peculiar characteristics-namely, abstractness and universality-which I do not encounter in the real world. They are exclusively proper to my world of ideas, which I gradually build up in my encounter with reality. These characteristics are a result of my human condition, of the fact that my understanding is abstractive. It is not possible for me to give expression to the essence of the terminus encountered by my act of knowing without leaving behind the individual, variable, and accidental form of this terminus. The concept, the expression of the essence of something, therefore, will of necessity possess certain qualities which are exclusively qualities of the expression itself. They do not belong to the content of the concept, they do not say what the terminus encountered by my understanding is and, consequently, I am unable to express the essence of this terminus in such a way that the result of the expression is not abstract and universal. If, then, I ask what kind of being these qualities possess, I can give no other reply than that they are "modes" in which reality is understood by me. Nevertheless, I understand also these "modes" themselves. I know what being-abstract is and what being-universal is. I have, there£or~, a concept "abstract" and a concept "universal," which are 193By 194Cf.

"subject" here is meant the subject of the judgment. Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, p. 47.

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predicated of the concept. The concepts "abstract" and "universal" are very appropriately called "second concepts" (secundae intentiones in scholastic philosophy), because they are concepts of our concepts. In understanding I grasp reality and express it in a concept and, reflecting on the concept, I give expression to the qualities of the concept in my "second concepts."195 A concept may be more or less universal, i.e., predicable of a greater or smaller number of subjects. The concept "figure" is predicable of more subjects than the concept "triangle," for "figure" can be predicated of all triangles and, in addition, of all figures which are not triangles. The greater or smaller universality of the concept is called its extension. It is determined by the number of subjects of which the concept can be predicated. In opposition to the extension we speak of the content of the concept or its comprehension. The comprehension is determined by the sum total of characteristics constituting the essence expressed by the concept. According as the comprehension of a concept is richer and wider, the extension of this concept will be smaller. Thus, for instance, the concept "triangle" expresses more than the concept "figure," so that "triangle" is predicable of a smaller number of subjects. 196 8.

THE JUDGMENT

What am I doing when I attempt to explicitate the first, vague, content of knowledge which my encounter with things produces? I face, for instance, an object and say "this is heavy" or I meet a man and say "he is intelligent." Through the encounter a thing or a man becomes reality for me, but at the same time there results from this encounter a certain, provisionally very vague content of knowledge, which I indicate by the pronouns "this" or "he."197 In order to overcome this vagueness in my knowing, I begin to explicitate and say, for instance, "he is intelligent." However, I realize that others may think differently. In such a case I observe that someone else "judges" differently. I, too, therefore, pronounced a judgment. I gave expres195Cf. Charles Boyer, Cursus philosophiae, vol. I, pp. 65·66. 196Cf. Jacques Maritain, Formal Logic, pp. 36-45. 197We analyze knowledge which man has, without being able to indicate exactly how this knowledge arose. When in the above-mentioned example it is said that "he is intelligent," the concept "intelligent" is presupposed. How did it arise? Perhaps I will never be able to trace its origin. Genetic psychology would have to investigate the empirical laws governing the origin of ideas but, as the work of the Swiss psychologist Piaget shows, this is very difficult. Nevertheless, I cannot deny that I have concepts.

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sion to the terminus encountered by my act of knowing and this expression is called to judge. 19s In the judgment a concept, e.g., "intelligent" is united with a certain content of knowledge, e.g., "he."199 This union is permissible because, in the attempt to overcome the vagueness with which the terminus of encounter is given to me, I see that this vague content of knowledge implies what is expressed by the concept "intelligent." Accordingly, I see that the comprehension of a concept which in the judgment I predicate of the subject belongs to the comprehension of the subject. For this reason the two may be united, and this union is effected in the judgment. If, on the other hand, I would notice that what the concept "intelligent" says is not contained in the comprehension of the subject, I would not unite the two contents of knowledge and pronounce a negative judgment: "he is not intelligent." The concept, then, which in the judgment is said of a certain content of knowledge is a further determination or, which amounts to the same, the explicitating expression of the terminus encountered by the act of knowing. 20o In traditional terminology such a concept is called a "predicate," and the content of knowledge with which the predicate is united as its further determination is called a ''subject.''201 Since to judge is known also as to predicate, it is clear why modem thought is quite correct in using the qualifier "pre-predicative" for the encounter with, the being present to the object of knowledge. Prepredicative knowing, therefore, is a knowing which has not yet entered the stadium in which the encounter which knowing is, is expressed in judgments. The vagueness with which the terminus of encounter is originally given has not yet been explicitated. This explicitation demands explicit consideration, a placing-oneself-in-the19S"Chaque concept se presente comme une affirmation en germe, une possibilite de jugement et tout jugement est un mode de concevoir Ie reel, une maniere humaine de se dire a soi commes les choses sont." Dondeyne, "L'abstraction . . ." Revue neoscolastique de philosophie, 1938, p. 340. 199This is the classical definition. "Alia operatio intellectus est secundum quam componit et dividit, affirmando et negando." Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 14, a. I. 200"Concept et jugement sont comme I'explicitation d'une saisie intuitive qui leur sert de point d'appui, mais qui, a son tour, se maintient et s'acheve, a l'interieur de I'epanouissement conceptuel." Dondeyne, ibid., pp. 340-341. 2010riginally every concept is a predicate. Of course, a universal concept may function as the subject of a judgment, but precisely because it is universal, it was originally predicated of an individual subject, of which it was the expression.

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presence-of, a returning-to, reflection. For this reason prepredicative knowing may be called also prereflective knowing. 202 Above we explained that the extension and comprehension of the concept are distinct. The judgment was seen to be the affirmation or negation that the comprehension of the predicate pertains to the comprehension of the subject. The judgment, however, may be considered also from the viewpoint of the predicate's extension. Let us take the judgment: "John is virtuous." The extension of the concept "virtuous" is determined by the number of subjects of which the concept can be predicated. When in a judgment "virtuous" is predicated of John, this means that John belongs to the whole of subjects which determines the extension of the predicate. Thus the judgment is also the expression of the fact that the subject belongs to the extension of the predicate. In the case of a negative judgment the subject is said to be outside the extension of the predicate. The Necessity of Many Judgments. The judgment does not merely express the comprehension of the subject by means of a predicate or merely that the subject pertains to the extension of the predicate. Further reflection reveals more. When I make the judgments, "Peter is mortal," "Peter is intelligent," "Peter is tall," etc., I show that I need many judgments to express the encounter which is my act of knowing. It is not possible for me to seize the terminus encountered by my act of knowing all at once and in its totality and to express it in a single grasp. It is necessary for me to express and determine it progressively, for the encounter with the individual at first does not offer me more cognitive content than a reference to the terminus of the encounter: "this, here and now" or "Peter," etc. But what is "this" or "that"? I endeavor to clarify the vagueness of the encounter to explicitate, express, and determine it. This means, however, that many judgments are needed to overcome the vagueness of my encounter, and the encounter itself degenerates into a dismemberment of expression. One could think perhaps that the terminus encountered by my act of knowing is expressed in its totality when I say, e.g., "Peter is Peter." De facto, however, I do not express anything in this way, I do not give any further determination, but remain in the initial vagueness of the encounter. In such a statement I affirm the same of the same, so that there is a so-called "tautology." 2n~"La condition de toute reflexivite est un cogito prereflexif." Sartre, L'etre et Ie neallt, pp. 116-117.

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The Verbal Copula "Is." The judgment is not only a dismemberment of the encounter which is knowledge. Through the judgment I also reduce what I understand of the object pole of my act of knowing to the identity of the terminus of the encounter. This point should be evident when I reflect on the meaning of the verbal copula "is." Let us say that my judgment is: "this 'is' heavy," "this 'is' shaped," "this 'is' red," "this 'is' fragile," etc. At first my encounter with the object of my knowledge did not contain more than the "being-ofsomething-for-me." Through my knowing "something is for me." I can express this in a judgment by saying: "this is be-ing" or "this is something." However, the predicates "be-ing" and "something," which in the judgment are affirmed of the subject, of the cognitive content of "this," in the terminus encountered by my knowing are fully identical with the terminus itself of the encounter. The same applies also to the further determinations of being, of the "something" which "this" is. "This" is "being-heavy," "being-shaped," etc. The "beingheavy" or "being-shaped" in question is fully identical with "this." This identity is expressed by the verbal copula "is." Likewise, when I judge: "John is a man, a lawyer, stubborn, a stamp-collector," etc., I express what John "is." John is not distinct from the man, the lawyer, the stamp-collector, etc. which he is. The verbal copula, then, which I use in the jUdgment expresses that what my judgments predicate of the terminus of the encounter in an endless dismemberment, is present in this term. The judgment, therefore, not only expresses the subject's comprehension in a concept, but also places the subject under the predicate's extension and, in addition, declares that the subject and the predicate are identical in the terminus of the encounter.

Accordingly, the verbal copula "is" which is used in every judgment, never indicates the quantitative equality which mathematics expresses by the sign =. This assertion does not mean that the mathematical statement, line A = line B, is not a judgment. Mathematical statements, too, are judgments, but their mode of formulation is misleading. The statement, line A = line B, is not intended to mean that line A is identical with line B, for there is question of two lines. Every judgment, however, states an identity. For this reason a kind of "translation" is necessary to reveal the declaration of identity contained in mathematical statements. One would have to say that line A "is" just as long as line B. In this way it becomes clear that the "line-just-as-Iong-as-line-B" is identical with line A.

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PHENOMENOLOGY OF TRUTH

Introduction. In the preceding pages the term "truth" was used occasionally, but it is perhaps .only now that we have sufficient data to attempt a more systematic consideration of truth. A judgment is said to be true or false. By this is meant that it agrees or does not agree with reality.203 The judgment "Peter is stubborn" is true if Peter really is stubborn, and false if he is not really stubborn. The question, however, is: what is meant by agreeing with reality? FoQr the reader who has followed us thus far it should be superfluous to point out that "reality" does not have the objectivistic meaning which empiricism wants to assign to this term. The reality about which I speak is not "brute reality," not the thing-in-itself, without me. Therefore, there can be no question of making truth the agreement of the judgment with brute reality. Such a truth can never be affirmed. It would mean the affirmation of the agreement of the thing-as-known~to-me (judgment) with the thing-as-notknown-to-me (brute reality). To affirm such an agreement is impossible, for it presupposes a comparison which cannot be made. 204 This situation should not give rise to any concern. It means merely that the world about which I make judgments is a human world and that the truth which I state is a human truth. 205 The truth regarding things results from the encounter with the things, and it is impossible for me to speak of things while at the same time I place myself outside the encounter with these things or think this encounter away. Brute reality cannot be affirmed by me, for the affirmation itself signifies the very relation which I would have to negate to be able to speak of brute reality. Thus, even when there is question of defining truth, it is imperative that tile idea of intentionality be followed through. The classical definition of truth as the conformity of the judgment with the thing could be misunderstood if the "thing" were conceived as the thing-in-itself. The truth of the judgment is called "predicative truth." This truth is the agreement of a predicate with the terminus encountered by knowledge. It ex:presses the truth of things in predicates. Full emphasis must be placed here on the term "expresses." The question which arises immediately is: What is the foundation of this ex203S cholastic philosophy defines truth as the conformity of the intellect with reality. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, De anima, a. 3, ad 1. 204Cf. Reidegger, Sein unci Zeit, pp. 214-219. 205Cf. A. de Waelhens, Phenomenologie et Verite, Paris, 1953, pp. 165-166.

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pressing? The reply to this question is contained in our preceding considerations. If the truth of the judgment is the truth of expression, then the foundation of this truth is, noetically considered, the unveiling of the meaning of things and, noematically considered, is the unconcealedness of the unveiled things themselves. 206

a. Existence as "Logos," as "Natural Light," as "Agent Intellect" Existence and Truth. Phenomenology does not deny the classical definition of truth. However, it puts full emphasis on a more fundamental sense of truth. The "place" of truth is not primarily in the judgment, the statement (Aussage),207 the sentence (Satz),208 but in man's existence, insofar as being-man is to exist consciously.209 The agreement of the judgment with reality presupposes that reality has already been taken out of concealedness. This requires a certain "light," the light of conscious existence. On the proper level of his being-human man is a light for himself and at the same time immediately a light on the other-than-himself.210 This light is a lumen naturale,211 a. "natural light," a light which constitutes the very nature of man on the proper level of his being-man. 212 The being of man is a "being-unveiled" and a "being-unveiling," because the being of man is a being-conscious. To indicate the light which man is for himself and for the other-than-himself, the old Greek philosophers used the term logoS.213 The logos takes being out of concealedness. 214 To understand the classical definition and to avoid falling into an objectivistic, empiricist realism, it is, therefore, necessary to see 206Cf. Dondeyne, Contemporary European Thought and Christian Faith, pp. 49 if. 207Cl Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 214. 208Cf. Heidegger, Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, Frankfurt, 1954, pp. 6-9. 209"Sofern das Dassein seine Erschlossenheit ist, als erschlossenes erschliesst und entdeckt, ist es wesenhaft 'wahr'." Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 221. 210"Erschlossenheit . . . betriift gleichurspriinglich die Welt, das In-Sein und das Selbst." Heidegger, ibid., p. 220. 211Cf. Heidegger, ibid., p. 133. 212"Das Dasein ist seine Erschlossenheit." Heidegger, ibid., p. 133. 213"Das Wahrsein des logos als apophansis ist das aletheuein in der Weise des apophainesthai: Seiendes-aus der Verborgenheit herausnemend-in seiner Unverborgenheit (Entdecktheit) sehen lassen. Die aletheia, die von Aristote1es nach den oben angefiihrten Stellen mit pragma, phainomena gleichgesetzt wird, bedeutet die 'Sachen selbst', das was sich zeigt, das Seiende im Wie seiner Entdecktheit." Heidegger, ibid., p. 219. 214"Also Gehiirt zum logos die Unverborgenheit, a-letheia." Heidegger, ibid., p. 219.

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that the truth of the judgment presupposes both truth as the unconcealedness of things and the truth of human existence as the unveiling of things.215 The truth of the judgment presupposes the being-intruth of man. 21G With the appropriate modification, the same applies to the untruth or falsity of a judgment. The untruth of the judgment presupposes that existence has been uprooted. 217 By this expression we mean that man is no longer rooted in truth as unconcealedness but in mere appearance. Reality is not wholly concealed; it is to some extent unveiled, but at the same time it is deformed. 218 The untrue judgment is the explicitation of being-in-mere-appearance. Agent Intellect. Scholastic philosophy was not wholly ignorant of the importance of the subject as logos, as natural light, with respect to the constitution of reality, in the only sense in which this term can be used. It is shown by the emphasis which was given to the poieticos nous, the agent intellect, in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. How Aristotle conceived the agent intellect is not likely to be exactly determined by anyone. 219 However, the texts of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas are sufficiently clear to allow us definitely to exclude the view that knowledge would be a purely passive mirroring of brute reality. According to Thomas Aquinas, the intellect is in potency with respect to things to be understood. The intellect is receptivity with respect to reality. It lets itself be governed by reality and to this extent is passive. Thus from the things to be understood a certain movement, a certain influence, has to issue to bring the intellect to actual understanding. However, what is not cannot move, cannot influence. But of the intelligible as intelligible it cannot be said that it is if attention is paid only to the intellect insofar as this intellect is in potency and therefore passive. The intelligible is not something that is in nature; it does not lie in brute reality as an intelligible in readiness for mirroring; things

215"Primar 'wahr', d.h. entdeckend ist das Dasein. Wahrheit im zweiten Sinne besagt nicht entdeckendsein (Entdeckung), sondern endecktsein (Entdecktheit)." Heidegger, ibid., p. 220. 216"Dasein ist 'in der Wahrheit'." Heidegger, ibid., p. 221. 217"Das Sein zum Seienden ist nicht ausgeliischt, aber entwurzelt." Heidegger, ibid., p. 222. 218"Das Seiende ist nicht viillig verborgen, sondern gerade entdeckt, aber zugleich verstellt; es zeigt sich-aber im Modus des Scheins." Heidegger, ibid., p. 222.

219Cf. J. J. M. v. d. Berg, Aristoteles' verhandeling over de Ziel, UtrechtNijmegen, 1953, pp. 173-178.

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are not intelligible-in-act. 22o If the intelligible is to be able to move, to influence, it has to be as intelligible. It has to be constituted in its intelligibility. But it cannot be constituted as such by the intellect insofar as the intellect is passive. Therefore, the intellect cannot be merely a potential intellect, but has to be also an agent intellect, an intellect which acts or works, and whose "work" consists in this that it constitutes the intelligible in its intelligibility by means of the light which it itself is. 221 A phenomenologist would say: outside the active presence of consciousness things are nothing-for-man. Through consciousness things have to be raised from their concealedness, from their being-nothingfor-man. This raising is not done by consciousness insofar as it is passive. Consciousness, however, is also active, for it constitutes being as being-for-man, it makes being be for man what it is. 222 It is only as unconcealedness that reality can be the norm of knowledge. 223

Historicity of Truth. A final remark imposes itself in connection with the present matter. Once it is seen that the truth of the judgment presupposes the unconcealedness of reality, it is immediately evident that the birth of truth is an historical event, i.e., that the unveiling of reality is an event which takes place in a determined 220Thomas Aquinas, Summa theol., p. 1, q. 79, a. 3. 221"Respondeo dicendum, quod necesse est ponere intellectum agentem. Ad cujus evidentiam considerandum est, quod cum intellectus possibilis sit in potentia ad intelligibilia, necesse est quod intelligibilia moveant intellectum possibilem. Quod autem non est, non potest aliquid movere. Intelligibile autem per intellectum possibilem non est aliquid in rerum natura existens, in quantum intelligibile est; intelligit enim intellectus possibilis noster aliquid quasi unum in multis et de multis. Tale autem non invenitur in rerum natura subsistens, ut Aristoteles probat in VII Metaphys. Oportet igitur, si intellectus possibilis debet moveri ab intelligibili, quod hujusmodi intelligibile per intellectum fiat. Et cum non possit esse id quod est, in potentia ad aliquid factum ips ius, oportet ponere praeter intellectum possibilem agentem, qui faciat inte1ligibilia in actu, quae moveant intellectum possibilem." Thomas Aquinas, D~ anima, a. 4. 222D. M. De Petter, "De oorsprong van de zijnskennis volgens de H. Thomas van Aquino," Tijdschri/t voor Philosophie, vol. XVII (1955), pp. 199-254. 223We do not claim that the scholastic theory of the agent intellect fully agrees with the constitution theory of phenomenology. N eo-scholasticism has reduced the role of the spontaneity of consciousness to being an abstractive power. The intellect is supposed to be active only insofar as through its illumination it strips the phantasm, which results from sense knowledge, of individual sensible matter. The above-mentioned text of Thomas Aquinas readily leads to such an interpretation. Cf. G. Van Riet, "La theorie thomiste de I'abstraction," Revue philosophique de Louvain, 1952, pp. 363-366.

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phase of history. The history of truth began with the appearance of man. 224 For man knows only human truth and, therefore, there was no truth before man was 225 for, before man was, nothing was unconcealed for man. The objection could be raised that before man made his appearance, there was truth-for-God. But what does this mean? Certainly not that the unconcealedness of reality-for-God coincides with the unconcealedness of reality-for-man. And even if it be admitted that man could to some extent enter into the reality-for-God, it would not be possible for him to do so before the appearance of man for whom God and the reality-for-God would be unconcealed. 226 A clear understanding of this point is necessary in order not to misunderstand the historicity of truth.

b. Obiectivity and Objectivism, Subjectivity and Subiectivism, Relativity and Relativism Objectivity and Objectivism. Truth as unconcealedness is called also objectivity. This statement is objected to only by the defenders of objectivistic theories of knowledge. For an objectivist the objectivity of phenomenology is not sufficiently "objective."227 He would 224"Das Dasein ist als konstituiert durch Erschlossenheit wesenhaft in der Wahrheit. Die Erschlossenheit ist eine wesenhafte Seinsart des Daseins. Wahrheit 'gibt es' nur, sofem und solange Dasein ist. Seiendes ist nur dann entdeckt und nur solange erschlossen, als iiberhaupt Dasein ist." Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 226. 225Cf. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, pp. 226-227. 2.26"Nous dirons qu'il est absolument certain qu'il ne faut pas chercher une autre sorte d'etre que l'etre-pour-moi, par Ie fait meme qu'il ne peut y en avoir d'autre: un etre ou une sorte d'etre qui ne serait pas pour-moi, serait, par definition, radicalement exterieur et etranger a toute apprehension et a toute connaissance. De ce point de vue, Dieu, s'il est, est necessairement pourmoi: il entre de quelque fa.;on dans Ie champ de mon experience et, a ce titre, il en prend necessaitement la forme." R. Jolivet, "Le probleme de l'absolu dans la philosophie de M. Merleau-Ponty," Tijdschrift voor Philosophie, vol. XIX (1957), p. 59. . 227Nevertheless, there is "more" objectivity for the phenomenologist than for the objectivist. The phenomenologist calls also the delicious taste of an apple and the green of grass aspects of objectivity. Grass is objectively green, and the apple is objectively delicious. This view removes the very basis of the controversy between perceptionists and interpretationists. The controversy in question is concerned with the objectivity, the reality of qualities of things which are known through \he senses. How is it possible, it was said, that qualities, such as green, red, delicious, etc., are objective when it is certain that they are caused by stimuli to which the senses react "subj ectively"? These stimuli were supposed to have a "constant value," but the "reactions" to them appeared not to be constant but "subjective." For this reason the question was asked whether or not what we call "red," "green", "delicious," etc., as such, is present in things and outside sensation. It is not surprising that this question received so many diverse answers. But this diversity becomes appar-

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allow us to speak of objectivity only if the subject is eliminated from the encounter which is knowledge. However, this elimination would destroy the encounter and, consequently, also knowledge itself. When the phenomenologist calls the unconcealedness of realitv objectivity, he refers to the things themselves. As subjectivity-in-theworld, man unveils reality, he lets things be for himself. But he lets them be what they themselves are. 228 In perception things give themselves, so that it is meaningless to ask whether that which I perceive is objective or not. Of course, it is possible that I dwell in mere appearance, I can dream, imagine, or hallucinate all kinds of meanings; driven by fear, anxiety, desires, and wishes, I can deform reality. However, what does this mean? The fact that I am aware of this possibility, shows that even now I know that in such a situation I do not dwell in objectivity. I have already distinguished perception from dreaming, imagining, hallucinating, fearing, or desiring; I have already distinguished objectivity from mere appearance. For this reason I cannot ask whether or not what I perceive is objective. Objective is that which I see. 229 Evidently, the terms "objective" and "see" should be understood here in a very broad sense. By "seeing" we mean all possible modes ent when one realizes that the question itself is meaningless. It is not possible to ask whether something which in sensation has a certain meaning possesses this same meaning also outside sensation. For the phenomenologist these meanings are real and objective. They are real replies of the object to the subject whose sensitivity means a determined question addressed to the object. Through sensitivity subject and object enter into a dialogue, and in this dialogue objective meanings reveal themselves. Those who hold that "through the senses the qualities of bodies are perceived which exist in themselves and outside sensation" (Boyer, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 21) like to call themselves defenders of realism. It should be evident, however, that such a "realism" cannot be taken seriously. Cf. Remy C. Kwant, "Transcendeert Merleau-Ponty het realisme?" Tijdschrift v. Philosophie, vol. XVI (1954) pp. 236-264. 228"Das Aussagen ist ein Sein zum seienden Ding selbst. Und was wird durch die Wahrnehmung ausgewiesen? Nichts anderes als dass es das Seiende se\bst ist, das in der Aussage gemeint war .... Das gemeinte Seiende selbst zeigt sich so, wie es an ihm selbst ist, d.h. dass es in Selbigkeit so ist, als wie seiend es in der Aussage aufgezeigt, entdeckt wi rd." Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 218. 229"I1 ne faut donc pas se demander si nous percevons vraiment un monde, it faut dire au contraire: Ie monde est cela que nous percevons. Plus generalement, it ne faut pas se demander si nos evidences sont bien des verites, ou si, par un vice de notre esprit, ce qui est evident pour nous ne sera it pas iIIusoire a I'egard de quelque verite en soi: car si nous parlons d'illusion, c'est que nous avons reconnu des illusions, et nous n'avons pu Ie faire qu'au nom de quelque perception qui, dans Ie meme moment, s'attestat :omme vraie, de sorte que Ie doute, ou la crainte de se tromper affirme en neme temps notre pouvoir de devoiler I'erreur et ne saurait donc nous ieraciner de la verite. Nous sommes dans la verite et I'evidence est 'experience de la verite." Merleau-Ponty, Phenomen%gie de la perception, I.

XI.

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of placing anything whatsoever directly in one's presence. "Objective" is the noematic correlate of this seeing. Man sees green grass, a delicious apple, H 2 0, the "you-for-whom-I-care," the necessity of love, etc. For this reason all these things are objective. All this was already implied in our critique of empiricist and idealistic views about human knowledge and was thus spoken about to some extent. What has to be added here is mainly a reply against objections that are sometimes addressed to phenomenology. This reply can be very brief. Subjectivism and Relativism of Phenomenology. The reproach addressed to the phenomenologist is that in his explicitation of man's knowledge all truth becomes subjective and relative. The phenomenologist would be willing to admit that all truth is, indeed, relative and subjective if his opponents did not tacitly mean that phenomenology adheres to a subjectivistic and relativistic view of truth. It is against this unspoken accusation that he protests. He does not admit that in his explicitation of knowledge truth is surrendered to the arbitrary decision of the subject. For the subject, as the natural light, unveils the object, lets the object be what the object itself is, and is bound by the object. Thus all subjectivism, relativism, and arbitrariness is excluded. 230 Under this proviso it has to be admitted, indeed, that all truth is subjective. For truth is unconcealedness or objectivity for a subject. This objectivity is the only one about which man can speak in a meaningful way, the only one of which it can be asserted in the full sense of the term that it is. This objectivity is "more" objective than the so-called object spoken of by empiricist realism. 231 The same has to be said about the relativity of truth. All truth is relative, i.e., in being related to a subject it is absolute. 2s2 These assertions are simple consequences of the idea of intentionality. The objections we have considered above arise from the denial 230"Alle Wahrheit ist gemass deren wesenhafter daseinsmassiger Seinsart relativ auf das Sein des Daseins. Bedeutet diese Relativitat soviel wie: aile Wahrheit ist 'subjectiv'? Wenn man 'subjectiv' interpretiert als 'in das Belieben des Subje"kts gestellt', dann gewiss nicht. Denn das E;ntdecken entzieht seinem eigensten Sinne nach das Aussagen dem 'subjectiven' Belieben nnd bringt das entdeckende Dasein vor das Seiende selbst." Heidegger, ibid., p. 227. 231"Wenn das'Subjekt' ontologisch als existierendes Dasein begriffen wird, dessen Sein in der Zeitlichkeit griindet, dann muss gesagt werden: Welt ist 'subjektiv'. Diese 'subjektive' Welt aber ist dann als zeitlich-transzendente 'objektiver' als jedes miigliche 'Objekt'." Heidegger, ibid., p. 366. 232Cf. Heidegger, Sein und zeit, pp. 226-227.

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of this idea, a denial which Husserl called the "natural viewpoint" (naturliche Einstellung).233 This viewpoint separates the subject and object of knowledge and wraps the subject up in itself. The subject is supposed to be in possession of cognitive images, i.e., to know primarily and directly its own states of consciousness. It is, then, left to the critique of knowledge to determine which images are objective, i.e., accurately mirror objectivistic reality--objectivistic, because it is in principle separate from the subject. 234 As we have noted previously, this conception disregards the true nature of the act of knowing and its noematic correlate. 235 c. Reason and Science

Speaking about existence as natural light, we explicitated what everyone means in calling man a rational being. The insight that man is a light unto himself and unto the other-than-himself was expressed by the old philosophers in the classical definition of man as a rational animal. It certainly is not saying too much when one maintains that it is difficult to defend this definition in an existential phenomenology. Is existentialism not characterized precisely by its struggle against reason? What other meaning can be given to the struggle for man's essence, as it can be relived in the works of the precursors of existential phenomenology, such as Pascal, Kierkegaard, Newman, Scheler, Blondel, than that it is a giant effort to escape from the clutches of rational, scientific, and objective knowledge of man in the hope of thus arriving at an "existential" experience of "concrete" reality? Irrationalism. The phrases are well-known. They are used at every opportunity, generally without too much competence. As a result, slowly the view gained ground that the philosophers of existence favored a mysterious kind of irrationalism, against which serious philosophers, for whom philosophy is the "science of the sciences" were bound to arise in protest. N ow that the smoke of the first battles has cleared, and the light itself in which existential phenomenology thinks has been reflected 233 I deen, I, p. 63. 234E. Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vortrage, (Husserliana, I), pp. 115-116. 235"Si je disais avec Ie sensualisme qu'i1 n'y a Ia que des 'etats de conscience' et si je cherchais it distinguer mes perceptions de mes reves par des 'criteres', je manquerais Ie phenomene du monde." Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la perception, p. XI.

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upon and explicitated, it is perhaps possible to arrive at a clearer view of the situation. Existential phenomenology now appears to have no objections against reason, but only against certain conceptions of reason which in its view overestimated or underestimated reason's real capacities. It is not our intention to dwell extensively on the various ways in which this overestimation or underestimation took place in history.236 \\'e want to investigate only to what extent existential phenomenological thinking can accept the qualification "irrational" and more especially we wiII endeavor to understand what is meant by so-calIed "broadened reason." Existential phenomenology would have to accept the qualifier "'irrational" for its mode of thinking if this term did not have any other meaning than the one attached to it since the time of Descartes. \Ve wiII abstract provisionalIy from the idealistic interpretation of reason after Descartes, to concentrate on the scientism whose foundations were laid by Descartes. His methodic doubt was a sly manoeuver calculated to reserve exclusive rights to the qualifications rational, ob jective, and scientific for the positive sciences of nature, as soon as the reality of the world would be re-established by Cartesian thought. Only the clear and distinct ideas of quantity are objective, says Descartes, and therefore the reason, the light which shows objectivity unqualified has to be described as mathematical and physical reason. 237 Of course, when this view gained currency, it was inevitable that the term "irrationalism" would be used as soon as it was realized that other modes of knowing also were possible. Such modes have to be calIed irrational, because rational is exclusively reserved for mathematical and physical thinking. Thus one can understand why Pascal claimed that in the realm of metaphysics and morality reason can only lead into error. 238 This assertion does not mean that, for Pascal, man is not capable of saying anything about God and about human actions in accordance with God's laws. Certainly, Pascal admits, man is capable of it, hut he does not do it by means of his reason but by means of his heart. The heart has reasons which "reason" does not know. 239 2:j,;0.

IJunrleync, CUlltcmporar}' European Thought alld Christian Faith,

pp. 07-107. Dondeyne, ibid., p. 68. ]. Laporte, Le coeur ct la raison selon Pascal, Paris, 1950. 23!J"Le coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connait point." Pascal, Pensees, cd. Brunschwicg, Paris, 1942, no. 277. 237Cf.

2:l~Cf.

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If the attention paid to the so-called irrational aspects of knowledge implied already a certain broadening of epistemological views, it did not take away from the fact that so-called irrational knowing was considered less "objective" and especially less "scientific." In this way again a concession was made to the Cartesian a priori principle that reason should, be taken to mean only mathematical and physical reason. Objectivity is the correlate of reason, and this objectivity was guaranteed by science, by the critical structure of reason's achievements. Accordingly, less objective and less scientific meant less reason.

Narrowed and Broadened Reason. The phenomenologist cannot accept this view. Reason is the place where objective sense appears and the power to let it appear; objective is what I see, in the broadest sense of this term; objective reason is human existence as constituting things-for-man in any field of presence, even if this field cannot be expressed in terms of categories. Reason has to be understood existentially, i.e., it has to be seen as the light of existence itself, and this light unveils much more objectivity than scientism would have us believe. Scientism adheres to a narrowed view of reason, and it is against this narrowness that existential philosophers join battle. They realize that reason sees far more than scientism considers visible, they consider "concrete" reality much richer than scientism would have us believe. This wealth is no less objective than the objectivity revealed by mathematical reason. It is without justification that the knowledge of reason in the existential sense-so-called irrational knowledge-is judged to be less "objective" and, therefore, it is better not to speak of irrational knowledge but of the rational knowledge of reason in a broadened sense. 240 Why is reason, as conceived by Descartes and scientism, a narrowed reason? As was already suggested, the answer is: because it considers a single determined viewpoint of the knowing subject-the mathematico-physical viewpoint-as the only possible viewpoint. Repeatedly we have emphasized that the attitude or standpoint of the subject in reality co-determines which face reality will reveal. The knowing subject is a determined question addressed to reality, and the reply is a determined objective aspect of reality. Man's existence contains innumerable standpoints as possible modes of 240"Hegel inaugure la tentative pour explorer l'irrationnel et l'integrer une raison elargie." Merleau-Ponty, Se1IS et non-sens, p. 125.

a

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"aiming" at reality. These standpoints mean as many possible questions of the subject and as many possible replies of reality. Man, as natural light, is the awareness of the meaning of reality and the asker of questions about it, but on different levels of intentionality. It is absolutely necessary, however, to realize that a determined objective meaning of reality is perceptible only from a determined standpoint and not outside it. It may be useful to illustrate the matter by means of a few more or less arbitrarily chosen examples. Let us begin with the example of Chapter One and repeat the various meanings which water may have. For me water is what I drink from time to time and use for washing, for the fireman it is an extinguisher, for the bather a cooling wave, for the chemist H 2 0; for the fisherman it has another meaning than for the unfortunate skater who in the winter falls through the ice and slides underneath its surface. Likewise, human nakedness has various meanings according as a subject finds himself in a medical, an artistic, an athletic, or a sexual situation. The meaning a brush has for the artist cannot be found in the world of the druggist. The meaning God has for a Christian must not be sought among the meanings revealed by empirical scientists, nor should the meaning of sound be sought among colors. One with strongly artistic talents sees the big city slums full of picturesque corners and views. But a heart filled with social feelings is needed to appreciate in an objective way the true nature of the sufferings endured by the slum-dwellers. One who is bereft of any feeling of beauty sees Michelangelo's Pietil merely as an expensive piece of marble. Those who do not like apples never perceive a deliciously tasting apple, and one who limits his viewpoint to that of the biologist never discovers what a lovely child is. In this brief enumeration it is easy to recognize the result of the phenomenological reduction-namely, the existing subject and the corresponding world in which this subject lives. 241 The subject stands in reality in numberless, more or less actual modes, which in everyday life remain unspoken. This world is not one so-called objective world-we should really say objectivistic-but an enormously complex network of nearby and remote meanings. Every standpoint of the subject as natural light means the determination of a restricted landscape and an invitation to penetrate more profoundly into this landscape by means of a scientific, critical reflection. 241Cf.

above, pp. 90 and 102.

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S cientism. In the realm of the sciences this insight into the meaning of the attitude of the subject has extraordinarily important consequences. In principle, there are as many sciences as there are attitudes, standpoints, or specific questions of the subject. This truth was not noted as once at the beginning of man's quest of knowledge. For Aristotle, philosophy meant an encyclopedia of all sciences containing both philosophical and non-philosophical questions. Although with the rise of modern empirical sciences philosophy was left to its sad fate, the ideal of the new sciences did not differ much from that of Aristotle. For a long time hope persisted that ultimately it would be possible to "mirror" the whole of reality in a single giant system constitute by the combined sdences.242 Each science was supposed to contribute its building block. With incredible optimism it was assumed that all these blocks would fit neatly together and thus constitute a consistent whole, a perfect mosaic. 243 It was, moreover, deemed proper to demand that all sciences adopt the methods of the physical sciences. Needless to say, this is pure scientism. It is the dictatorship of the physical sciences, the absolutizing of one determined standpoint, one determined question. Thus it is understandable that modern thinkers rose in protest against "scientific" knowledge and that they attacked so-called "reason" and "objectivity." There is not just one reason, one objectivity, one science. 244 Insofar as scientism contains implicity bad philosophy, it has been destmyed by phenomenology. Phenomenology realized that every science means the critically reflective investigation of a determined question raised by subjectivity as natural light. 245 The sciences themselves likewise arrived at the same conclusion. 248 When a new science is born, a determined question is explidty asked of reality, and this asking is possible because this question is previously present in an implicit way. As an original interest, a mode of being, of man it is contained in his existence as natural light. Through this mode 242F. J. J. Buytendijk, "Vernieuwing in de wetenschap," Annalen van het Thijmgenootschap, vol. 42 (1954), pp. 230-247. 248R. C. Kwant and J. H. G. van den Berk, "Het gesprek van de physicus met de wereld," Annalen van het Thijmgenootschap, vol. 43 (1955), pp. 1-4.

244"The ... deliverance we have attained from seventeenth century thinking, which had been reduced to a dogmatically accepted schema, means that for modern consciousness there is not just one absolutely real knowable world, but many worlds which are no less-and no more-real than the world created by the physicist." Buytendijk, op. cit., p. 236. 245"Wissenschaften sind Seinsweisen des Daseins." Heidegger, op. cit., p. 13. 248Buytendijk, op. cit., pp. 237-247.

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of being a certain landscape of reality is already somewhat de1ineated. 247 However, this delineation is not immediately so sharp that the landscape in question stands out clearly against its surroundings: the explicitation of a determined question, a determined mode of human existence as natural light, at first is not such that the question clearly distinguishes itself from other questions to which other sciences reply.24s As long, for instance, as one thinks that the earth is the center of the universe because Christ became man on earth, one confuses the attitude or intention of the astronomer with that of the theologian. As long as one tries to explain puberty through the maturation of the sex glands, one confuses the intention of psychology with that of physiology. The fact that distinct landscapes interlock and constitute a Gestalt makes it understandable that a confusedly formulated question may still receive some kind of answer. \Vhen a psychologist thinks that he has to adopt the ideal and methods of the physical sciences in psychology, he is still able to say something about, say, a smile. He will describe it as a "kind of contraction of the nostrils and corners of the mouth, accompanied by eye twinklings."249 No doubt, this description says something, but what it says is not what makes the psychologists interested in the smile. It expresses more what a smile is for a physicist, but a psychologist would be expected to speak differently about it. 250 No science, therefore, manages to find its own true character without seeing its fundamental principles undergoing one or more crises. 251 The resulting revision of these principles means a more precise explicitation of the original interest, the original attitude in asking questions, the standpoint of the science in question. At the same time a determined region of reality, a determined area of being, is more accurately defined. It is in "lived experience" by means of the "understanding of being" (S einsverstiilldniss) which man himself is that man vaguely realizes what "really" interests him when 247"Die Ausarbeitung des Gebietes in seinen Grundstrukturen ist in gewisser Weise schon geleistet durch die vorwissenschaftliche Erfahrung und Auslegung des Seinsbezirkes, in dem das Sachgebiet selbst begrenzt wi rd." Heidegger, op. cit., p. 9.

24s"Wissenschaftliche Forschung vollzieht die Hebung und erste Fixierung der Sachgebiete naiv und roh." Heidegger, op. cit., p. 9. . 249Cf. L. Bigot, Ph. Kohnstamm, B. Palland, Leerboek der Psychologle, Groningen, 1950, p. 394. 25GB. Kouwer and ]. Linschoten, l1Iieidillg tot de Ps}'choiagic, Assen, 1956, pp. 13-20.

,"

.

.

251"Die eigentliche 'Bewegung der Wlssenschaften spleit slCh ab 111 der mehr oder minder radikalen und ihr selbst durchsichtigen Revision der Grundbegriffe." Heidegger, ap. cit., p. 9.

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he raises, e.g., physical or psychological questions. As long as he does not let this fundamental interest fully dominate the corresponding science, he will be dissatisfied with his own science, because it does not let him advance and is not fruitful. Love as "Standpoint" of the Knowing Subject. The idea that thought must be fruitful to guarantee its truth could lead our considerations immediately to the question of the criterion of truth. However, before we take up this problem, we must first make a few additional remarks in connection with the theory that the attitude of the knowing subject is very important. These remarks concern love, viewed as the "standpoint" of the knowing subject. Love, as a standpoint of the knowing subject, is not so much of importance when there is question of knowing things· as when man tries to understand his fellow-man. True, even with respect to things, the terms "to love" and "to like" are often used and, when the terms apply in this context, an unmistakably selective influence must be attributed to "love" as a standpoint. Nevertheless, it should be evident that there is question here only of love in a less strict sense. Used in its proper sense, the term always refers to intersubjectivity and indicates a specific attitude of a subject toward a sUbject. 252 The understanding of man, of what goes on in him, of the meaning of his behavior in various situations, has always been the fundamental aim of anyone who in any situation wanted to proceed "psychologically." The different schools of scientific psychology may, and even should, be viewed as attempts to pursue ordinary "lived" psychology in a more rigorous fashion. 253 This purpose justifies whatever is undertaken in psychology provided that the undertaking is viewed as a participation in, and a contribution to a task whose accomplishment can never be fully satisfactory. However, more is involved than this impossibility of ever being fully satisfied with the attainments of scientific psychology. As was pointed out by Buytendijk, even under the most favorable conditions, scientific psychology will not be able to proceed beyond understanding the facti city of the man whom it attempts to know. 254 252Cf. pp. 214 fl. 21i3The above-mentioned book of Kouwer and Lindschoten has done good work in determining the value of the various schools or psychology. 21i4Buytendijk, "De waarde van de roman voor de psychologische kennis en de psychologische vorming," Tijdschrift voor Philosophie vol. XI (1949), pp. 351-360.

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As soon as there is question of a human being in distress, of the aid one would like to give him or of the advice one would like to offer, scientific psychology falls short of what is needed. 255 Or, to express it more accurately, in such conditions the psychologist "feels" his insufficiency, because the strictly personal in his fellow man-which is what is at issue here--never does find expression in scientific psychology . Perhaps one would be inclined to conclude immediately that. consequently, it will be meaningless even to attempt to obtain such knowledge. Such a conclusion, however, would be premature, for de facto man cannot dispense with this knowledge, or rather, he will always act as if he did possess knowledge of what is strictly personal. Love and Knowledge of the Strictly Personal. Buytendijk thinks that this kind of knowledge is really attainable. "This knowledge of man," he says, "can never be acquired unless it be of someone for whom we care. This definition of the correct attitude and relationship to the person whom we want to know is considered correct and wholly uncontested outside the realm of science. It is Binswanger who has convincingly shown that even in psychology knowledge of a human being is possible only by means of what he calls the objectivity of love-which is nothing else than what in daily life is called 'heart-toheart' knowledge."256 It is striking that Buytendijk uses here the term "attitude." If we may understand this term as expressing Husserl's Einstellung,256a. we find ourselves immediately in wellknown territory. At the same time it should be apparent why scientific psychology has to fall short. By means of certain psycho-diagnostic models, of typological and characteriological schemata, the scientific psychologist asks the man whom he wants to know a definite question, to which only a definite reply can be expected. His concepts and schemata indicate a certain attitude, to which corresponds a certain profile of the person who the other human being is. Although this profile is a real profile, it is only one aspect of him. Moreover, psychological "determinations" such as introvert, extrovert, frustrated, neurotic, sentimental, etc., always express only the "determination" of a person, i.e., his facticity. What this facticity means for this person the psychologist will understand only if he has at least some insight into the person himself as the 255Cf. Buytendijk, op. cit., p. 353. 256Buytendijk, op. cit., p. 355. 256aWe have consistently rendered this term by "attitude." Tr.

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source of meaning, into his subjectivity and freedom. This knowledge is possible only as a knowing from "heart-to-heart." Such a knowledge "means that we not only know a man's qualities, his character, and his ethical structure, but have also met him in the freedom of his decisions."257 To understand a human being is more than to express his facticity. For man is the unity-in-opposition of subjectivity and facticity.258 Although scientific psychology may go very far in its determination of this facticity, an insight into the subjectivity of a human being presupposes love. As was mentioned above, the insufficiency of scientific psychology is "felt" especially when there is question of a human being in distress, of the aid one would like to give him, or of the advice one would like to offer. 259 The reason is that effective aid or sound advice to a person presupposes not only an understanding of his facticity but also an insight into, and an appeal to his potentialities as his potentialities. The scientifically trained psychologist also knows that facticity is never purely facti city, i.e., that the unity-in-opposition of sUbjectivity and facticity leaves the subject a certain latitude-namely, the latitude of what he is capable of becoming (Seinkiinnen). For man is essentially a project. 260 However, to be able to help and offer advice, it is not sufficient that one knows "in general" about this latitude. It is not even enough to know that this facticity "in general" permits the development of this or that possibility. The crucial point is to establish whether or not this possibility really is the possibility of this human being. This means that I have to know the individual through whom a general possibility is a real possibility-namely, as his possibility. But "to know the essence and orientation of a concrete human being is possible only by participating in the self-project of his being."261 Such a participation is called love. It goes without saying that we must call this knowledge rational and the reality which it discloses objective. Knowledge in "the objectivity of love"262 does not imply a special and mysterious cognitive power alongside mathematical and physical reason, but it is reason 257Buytendijk, op. cit., p. 356. 25SFor a more extensive treatment, see pp. 15 if., 113 f. 259D. J. van Lennep, Gewogen-bekeken-ontmoet in het psychologisch onderzoek, 's-Gravenhage, 1949. 260Cf. pp. 275 ff. 261Buytendijk, op. cit., p. 356. 262Cf. L. Binswanger, Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins,

Zurich, 1953.

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itself in its native capacity which is able to have this knowledge. This reason, however, has to be conceived more broadly than it was understood by Descartes and scientism. 10.

THE CRITERION OF TRUTH

Previously we have defined the truth of the judgment as the agreement of the judgment with the objective meaning of the terminus encountered in the act of knowing. This definition expresses formal truth, truth in facto esse, i.e., conformity with the terminus of encounter which is explicit, expressed as such, and laid down in predicates. But the foundation of this formal truth is the unveiling of the truth of things, the revelation of objective meaning, or truth in fieri. This revelation takes place in the dialogue of the subject with the object, in the history of existence. The emphasis has to fall upon the objectivity of things, upon their real meaning, i.e., a meaning which is not imagined, dreamed, or hallucinated, but seen-the term seen being understood here in the broadest sense as any mode whatsoever of the subject's presence to anything. This emphasis gives rise to the question of what exactly is the criterion by means of which I can distinguish truth from untruth. Can I not be mistaken? Is it not possible for me to imagine things? Am I not subject to prejudices? Daily experience shows me that I contradict others and that others contradict what I say. Where, then, can we find a criterion to distinguish between the illusion of one and the blindness of the other ?263 When can I be certain that a given meaning is objective?

Scepticism. The sceptics have a ready reply-never. Sometimes it becomes very difficult for the philosopher to resist this seductive answer. Evidently, giving in to this temptation would mean the immediate end of all philosophy. Its demise would not be deplorable if philosophy is meaningless, for what is without meaning has no reason not to disappear from the scene. More important, however, is that scepticism which makes philosophical thought impossible is itself a philosophy, albeit a bad one. If the sceptic is taken seriously, we must assume that he is convinced that his statement: "I am never certain whether or not a statement is objective" explicitates an objective meaning of his existence. But it is precisely the possibility of such an explicitation which the sceptic wants to deny. Accordingly, while he makes philosophy impossible, he is a philosopher and he pre263A. Brunner, La Persolllzc illcarnee, Paris, 1947,

p. 181.

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supposes a theory regarding knowledge and objectivity. On the other hand, he wants to deny objectivity and the possibility to disclose objectivity. Thus his very denial is surreptitiously based upon the affirmation of what he wanted to deny, and it is precisely through this implicit affirmation that his denial is possible. In other words, scepticism is an internal contradiction.264 The possibility of objective knowledge, therefore, is a primordial evidence which, as soon as it is denied, is affirmed again in the negation itself. A genuine sceptic, in virtue of his own principles, "may" not think, speak, or act. In other words, there are no true sceptics. 265 Within the general fundamental outlook of scepticism there is room for many forms of this doubting theory. All kinds of conditions may give rise to the appearance of this fundamental attitude in this or that particular form. There are intelligent and unintelligent forms of scepticism. However it would be beyond the scope of this work to survey these forms. The important point is to see how scepticism, despite its internal contradiction, can be intelligent. Although it may sound strange, Hume's radical scepticism, which led him to wreck scientifically everything which before him was considered certain, is an intelligent kind of scepticism.

~ ~

Hume. David Hume inherited one of the most important properties of the Cartesian legacy-namely, the divorce of consciousness from reality. This divorce meant that consciousness was locked up in itself and that reality was posited as being in-itself. Hume rejected innate ideas; instead, he claimed that ideas are impressed by reality upon man's consciousness and that they constitute the direct object of knowledge. This situation should immediately have led to the most radical type of scepticism. However, prior to Hume such a radical conclusion was not reached, because it was thought possihle to safeguard reality by means of the principle of causality. There must be reality in264"Aller echte Skeptizismus, welcher Art und Richtung er auch ist, zeigt sich durch den prinzipiellen Widersinn an, dass er in seinen Argumentationen implizite, als Bedingungen der Miiglichkeit ihrer Geltung, eben das voraussetzt, was er in seinen Thesen leugnet. . . . Wer auch nur sagt: Ich bezweifle die Erkenntnisbedeutung der Reflexion, behauptet einen Wiedersinn. Denn iiber sein Zweifeln aussagend, reflektiert er, und diese Aussage als giiltig hinstellen setzt voraus, dass die Reflexion den bezweifelten Erkenntniswert wirklich und zweifellos (sc. fiir die vorliegenden Faile) habe, dass sie die gegenstandliche Beziehung nicht andere, dass das unflektierte Erlebnis im Ubergang in die Reflexiol1 sein Wesen nicht einbusse." Husserl, Ideen, I, pp. 189-190. 265Cf. J. Peters, Metaphysics, no. 13.

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dependently of consciousness, for reality causes man's subjective cognitive images. Hume was clever enough to see through this fallacy. If man knows nothing else than subjective images, then the principle of causality itself is nothing but a subjective content of cognition without any real value. About reality man knows nothing;~ therefore, the philosopher is bound to be a sceptic. / What, however, is the reality whose knowledge the philosopher, according to Hume, has to forswear? It is brute reality, the world-initself, das Ding an sich. We have to admit, of course, that such a world is unknowable. In this respect, therefore, Hume's scepticism is an intelligent scepticism. Usually, the consciousness of the sceptic is a conscience malheureuse, i.e., an unhappy consciousness. It is "with sorrow" that the sceptic sees himself forced to being a sceptic. But what is implied by this "sorrow"? It indicates that the sceptic still holds fast to the ideal of objective truth. The phenomenologist rejects both scepticism and the "sorrow" of the sceptic, because the sceptic's ideal of truth is a contradiction. On the other hand, it is a matter of fact that some phenomenologists are not without reason accused of relativism and, consequently, ultimately also of scepticism. Sartre and his followers reject the possibility of definite, perfect, absolute truth. This rejection cannot be interpreted otherwise than as an adherence to relativism, even though this relativism reveals itself as being of a very special type. One could point out at once that the three terms "definite," "perfect," and "absolute," which they apply in one breath to truth, should call for some distinctions if they are to be at least somewhat intelligible.266 But these distinctions are conspicuously absent in Sartre and not sufficiently stated by Merleau-Ponty.267 Without going into questions of exegesis, we will attempt to consider here thematically the main point of this question of absolute truth.

Historicity of Truth. The reason why absolute truth is rejected is found in the historicity of existence. The existing subject which man is, is history and in this history the world is carried along, because the world is fastened to man's subjectivity. Heidegger has 266Cf. Dondeyne, Contemporary European Thought and Christian Faith, pp. 54-66. 267Many years ago Merleau-Ponty promised a book about the origin of truth, but it has never been published. Cf. Sens et non-sens, p. 188, note.

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made this thought the center of existential-phenomenological thinking.26S Man is history on innumerable levels of intentionality, and not the least of these is the level of knowledge, conceived as the unveiling of reality. If, then, one admits that truth can be definite, perfect, and absolute, this admission implies that the history which is knowledge is brought to its completion. But such a completion would mean the denial of man's being. Truth, "therefore," is radically historicalbecause of the historicity of knowledge, it can always be denied. 269 Certain distinctions impose themselves here, for the foregoing unqualified formulation blocks any escape from relativism. Moreover, the unqualified statement that no truth is definite, perfect, and absolute is a contradiction, for this statement itself has no meaning unless the speaker presupposes that his statement contains definite, perfect and absolute truth. 270 As was mentioned, all truth is historical in the sense that truth as unveiledness presupposes the historical event of its unveiling. When a new subject appears in the world, a new history of truth begins, for the history which every subject is, is at the same time the history of his discovery of reality. No truth, therefore, is definite, perfect, and absolute, but we must admit that every definite, perfect, absolute truth intrinsically makes the further unveiling of reality possible, provokes it and demands it. No truth is so definite, perfect, absolute that it 26S"Die These von der Geschichlichkeit des Daseins sagt nicht, das weltlose Subjekt sei geschichtlich, sondern das Seiende, das als In-der-We1t-seins existiert. Geschehen der Geschichte ist Geschehen des In-der-Welt-seins. Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins ist wesenhaft Geschichtlichkeit von Welt, die auf dem Grunde der ekstatisch-horizontalen Zeitlichkeit zu deren Zeitigung gehort. Sofern Dasein faktisch existiert, begegnet auch schon innerwe1tliches Entdecktes. Mit der Existenz des geschichtlichen In-der-Welt-seins ist Zuhandenes und Vorhandenes je schon in die Geschichte der Welt einbezogen." Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p.388. 269"Tout arret dans Ie mouvement de la conscience, toute fixation de I'objet, toute apparition d'un 'que1que chose' ou d'une idee suppose un sujet qui cesse de s'interroger au moins sous ce rapport-Ia. Voila pourquoi, comme Descartes Ie dlsait, it est a la fois vrai que certaines idees se presentent a moi avec une evidence irresistible en fait, et que se fait ne vaut jamais comme droit, ne supprime pas la possibilite de douter des que nous ne sommes plus en presence de I'idee. Ce n'est pas un hasard si I'evidence meme peut etre revoquee en d'oute, c'est que la certitude est doute, etant la reprise d'une tradition de pensee qui ne peut se condenser en 'verite' evidente sans que je renonce a I'expliciter." MerleauPonty, Phenomenologie de la perception, p. 45. 27o"Mais, a ce niveau et sous une forme aussi generale, qui ne voit que deja cette argumentation depossede ce1ui qui I'avance? Car cette constatation de I'absolu de la pensee et de la valeur devient elle-meme, dans Ie propre contexte de M. Merleau-Ponty, une 'verite' definitive et indispensable, bloquant sans recours tout progres de la pensee. N ous sommes devant un autre absolu." Jolivet, "Le probleme de I'absolu dans la philosophie de M. Merleau-Ponty," Tijdschrift voor Philosophie, vol. XIX (1957), p. 62.

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makes all further questions impossible, makes the subject possess the object in perfectly transparent clarity, and drives away all obscurity, so that there remains nothing else to be unveiled. There is no truth which has no longer any future,271 for every truth opens up new gaps.272 There is no truth which may be defined as a situationless self-penetration of thought,273 for such a definition would mean the denial of the intentionality and of the historicity of man as a knowing being. 274 One has only to look at the empirical sciences to become convinced that there is no definite, perfect, absolute truth in the abovedescribed sense of the term. The sciences derive their impetus precisely from the realization that every scientific truth reveals new gaps. Science would be finished as soon as the man of science were to think that his truth has reached its completion. 271i

Historicity of Truth in a Different Sense. The example of the sciences may be useful to show that another sense has to be attached to the historicity of truth. Truth is historical, firstly, as an event; secondly, as a never completed event; and thirdly, insofar as the event which is the unveiling of truth is possible only in a certain phase of the personal history of the knowing subject and in a certain phase of the collective history of mankind-in-search-of-truth, in which every personal history is contained. A certain phase of the personal and collective history of knowledge has the value of a definite standpoint in asking questions-and from this standpoint it is possible to see, while outside it this seeing is impossible. For instance, one who has only recently.started to think in a personal way does not see the proper nature of society, authority, love, right, marriage, family, etc. One who has barely assimilated the first principles of physics does not

:l7lCf. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la perception, pp. 452-453. 1272"11 sait seulement qu'il n'y a pas de savoir absolu et que c'est par cette lacune que nous s~mmes ouverts a la verite." Merleau-Ponty, Eloge de la Philosophie, Paris, 1953, p. 55. 273"La possession effective de l'idee vraie ne nous donne donc aucun droit d'affirmer un lien intelligible de pensee adequate et de productivite absolue, elle fonde seulement une 'teleologie' de la conscience qui, avec ce premier instrument, en forgera de plus parfaits, avec ceux-ci de plus parfaits, et ainsi sans fin." Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la perception, p. 453. 274C£. Merleau-Ponty, ibid., pp. VIII-IX. 271i"La conscience metaphysique et morale meurt au contact de l'absolu." Merleau-Ponty, Sens et N on-sens, p. 191.

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yet possess the intellectual attitude which is required even for raising meaningful questions about nuclear physics. These examples are drawn from the personal history· of the knowing subject, but the same applies to the collective history of knowing mankind in general or of a particular human society. Absolute Truth. For the above-mentioned three aspects under which truth is historical there is simply no room within intellectualistic idealism. This point should be kept in mind when one tries to account for the fact that some phenomenologists reject absolute truth. What they have uppermost in their minds is the "absolute knowledge" of idealism. :rhe true Cogito is not, as Merleau-Ponty expresses it, "thought communing with the thought of thought."276 However, does this mean that every form of absoluteness must be denied to truth? Can every truth be rejected with an appeal to the history which knowledge is as the unveiling of reality? An affirmative reply would mean that today's truth would be tomorrow's untruth-the most vulgar form of relativism. Such a relativism would be self-destructive, for even of this relativism it would have to be affirmed that it would be tomorrow's untruth. 277 Although there are phenomenologists who insinuate this type of relativism, it does not prevent them from rejecting certain views of their opponents in a definite and absolute fashion. Undoubtedly, this phenomenon is a genuine tour de force. For only on the basis of a definite possession of truth is it possible to reject an error definitely and absolutely.27s There are also definite, perfect, and absolute truths, and we may even say that every truth, no matter how insignificant it appears, is definite, perfect, and absolute in the sense that no subject can ever deny it in any phase of my history and in any phase of the collective history of mankind. 279 If it is true that today I suffer from a toothache, then this truth has reached its completion, i.e., it definitely and

276Cf. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la perception, p. 344. 277Certain expressions of Merleau-Ponty cannot be interpreted in any other way than that of vulgar relativism. 27S"Nous ne savons qu'i1 y a erreur que parce que nous avons des verites, au nom desquelles nous corrigeons les erreurs et les connaissons comme erreurs." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 341. 279Cf. Dondeyne, Foi chretienne et pensee contemporaine, p. 36.

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absolutely cannot be rejected because this truth is true. 280 A denial of this assertion would imply the tacit assumption of what is denied. In this context, then, "absolute" means transhistorical and, in principle, intersubjective. The transhistoricity of truth used to be expressed by scholastic philosophers as cognitio sub specie eternitatis, knowledge under the aspect of eternity. Truth is eternal. However, this expression should not be understood as if it meant that truth, once it is disclosed, is in-itself. For a meaning is objective only by being objective for a subject. Likewise, the acceptance of eternal truths does not mean that there will be eternally subjects, human beings, for whom objective meanings will be objective. According to Heidegger, it is fantastic to claim that there are eternal truths, as long as it is not proven that there will eternally be human beings. 281 This view misunderstands the intention of those who admit eternal truths. The statement that truth is eternal means this: whoever in any phase whatsoever of history wants to make an assertion regarding a certain truth will have to recognize this truth as truth. A denial of this statement would imply the tacit assumption of what is denied. Intersubjectivity of Truth. The absolute character of truth as transhistoricity immediately calls for its intersubjectivity. This intersubjectivity, however, would be misunderstood if with Merleau-Ponty one were to conceive it as the actWll agreement of knowing subjects. 282 In principle, intersubjective truth means that, if something is true, it is in principle true for every subject. I cannot be convinced of a truth and at the same time admit that someone else is ~ight if he denies my truth. In principle, objectivity cannot be rejected by any subject who makes a statement regarding this objectivity. Accordingly, the inter-subjectivity of truth is not merely the experience of certain 280The fact that a text of Merleau-Ponty can' be quoted in favor of this view shows how little consistency there is in the truth theory of this author: "Je pense, et telle ou telle pensee m'apparait vraie; ie sais bien qu'elle n'est pas vrais sans condition et que I'explicitation totale serait une tache infinie; mais cela n'empeche pas qu'au moment ou ie pense, ie pense quelque chose, et que toute autre verite, au nom de laquelle ie voudrais devaluer celle-ci, si elle peut pour moi s'appeler verite, doit s'accorder avec la pensee 'vraie' dont j'ai I'experience." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., pp. 455-456. 281"Dass es 'ewige Wahrheiten' gibt, wird erst dann zureichend bewiesen sein, wenn der Nachweis gelungen ist, dass in aile Ewigkeit Dasein war und sein wi rd. Solange dieser Beweis aussteht, bleibt der Satz eine phantastische Behauptung, die dadurch nicht an Rechtmiissigkeit gewinnt, dass sie von den Philosophen gemeinhin 'geglaubt' wird." Scin und Zeit, p. 227. 282Cf. Sens et non-sens, pp. 189-191.

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actual agreements. 283 The absoluteness of truth, conceived as its inter-subjectivity, is not merely the actual result of our verifications. 284 Nevertheless, Merleau-Ponty maintains that truth is only the result of our verifications and attempts to fortify his view by pointing out that, even if there were an absolute truth, it would be wholly useless. Even if there were such a truth, all I have are my thoughts and all you have are your thoughts. 285 What else, then, can be the meaning of intersubjective truth than that we fortunately are in actual agreement?286 Once more the same reply imposes itself: the negation of the absolute implies its affirmation. "All I have are my thoughts," says Merleau-Ponty. Of course, we agree, but the fact that MerleauPonty holds this statement to be true makes it impossible for him to accept that others would be right if they deny this, his truth. Therefore, Merleau-Ponty must imply that his truth is our truth-in other words, that truth, in principle, is intersubjective-and if he does not imply this, then his statement is meaningless. Evidence as Criterion of Truth. De facto, however, truth is not intersubjective, for "ordinary" people as well as philosophers contradict one another. We may name here "ordinary" people and philosophers in one breath, for what else do philosophers do than explicitate and express in concepts what "ordinary" people practice? Philosophers give expression to life. People practice charity and justice or do not practice them, they perform their task in the world or do not perform it, they raise a family or do not raise one, they love and adore God or do not love and adore Him. In all this they are guided by a kind of "thinking" about what reality is and ought to be, but they contradict one another. Their "thinking" is taken up by the philosophers, who pursue it ex professo, and they too 283"L'accord avec moi-meme et avec autrui reste aussi difficile a obtenir, et j'ai beau croire qu'en droit il est toujours realisable, je n'ai d'autres raisons d'affirmer ce principe que l'experience de certaines concordances, si bien qu'enfin rna croyance a l'absolu, dans ce qu'elle a de solide, n'est rien que mon experience d'un accord avec moi-meme et avec autrui." Merleau-Ponty, Sens et non-sens, p. 19. 284Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 191.

285"Qu'il y ait ou non une pensee absolue, et dans chaque probleme pratique, une evaluation absolue, je ne dispose pour juger que d'opinions miennes, qui restent capables d'erreur, si severement que je les discute." Merleau-Poney, ibid., p. 189. 286The desire of a "new classicism," a "verite par deld les prises de position divergentes," manifested by Merleau-Ponty (p. 126 of Sens et nonsens) must be understood likewise as a desire of a de facto agreement (ibid., p. 190).

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contradict one another. However, both "ordinary" people and philosophers know that there should not be any contradiction, that truth should be recognized universally, and that error should be rejected universally. The fact that there is no such universal agreement is experienced as a defect of our being-human. Truth is one for all of us. Nevertheless, we contradict one another. We cannot accept that we both speak the truth when we contradict each other, for otherwise thinking would be entirely meaningless. There is no escape, therefore, from raising the question about a criterion of truth, or rather from raising this question again. For previously287 we have already indicated that if perceiving consciousness is intentionality, openness for reality, then the presence of the perceived decides about the objectivity and truth of every statement regarding the perceived. Of course, it is possible for me to dream, imagine, hallucinate, fear, or desire all kinds of meanings, and in such cases I err. But the recognition of my error implies that a statement is withdrawn because of the self-givenness, the bodily presence of what I see. This idea is traditionally expressed by saying that the criterion of truth is evidence. Evidence is nothing else than the experience of truth,288 as original "givenness" ;289 it is the seeing, in the broadest sense of the term, of what is given itself,290 and with this seeing certitude is fused. 291 Nevertheless, because I can think that I see, although I am actually dreaming, imagining, or hallucinating, the question about a criterion of truth has to be pursued further. How can one distinguish between the illusion of one and the blindness of another?

Fruitfulness as Evidence. Let us start with a simple example. We have here a certain instrument-a pen--of which John affirms that it is a screwdriver, while Peter thinks that it is a pen. John says that Peter is merely dreaming or imagining things, while Peter claims that John must be blind. What criterion can be used to determine who is right? In daily life one would say: let John try 287Cf. above, pp. 146 ff. 288"Evidenz ist . . . nicht anderes a!s das 'Er!ebnis' der Wahrheit." Husser!, Logische Untersuchungen", I, Prolegomena Bur reinen Logik, Halle a. d. 5 .• 1928, p. 190. 289"Das evidente Urteil aber ist ein Bewusstsein originarer Gegebenheit." Husser!, ibid. 290"Man nennt die Evidenz ein Sehen, Einsehen, Erfassen des se!bst gegebenen ('wahren') Sachverhalts." Husserl, ibid. 291Cf. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 256.

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to fasten the screws of his garden gate with the instrument in question, and he will see that it is not what he claims it to be. The philosopher expresses the same thought when he says that the criterion of truth is the fruitfulness of the dialogue with reality which existence is. To exist is a dialogue of subjectivity with what is not subjectivity. In this dialogue the reality of things reveals itself-if only insofar as at a certain moment the dialogue becomes utterly impossible because reality is overloaded with meanings which are merely imagined or fancied. A consequence of this overloading is that reality no longer gives any reply, offers resistance, or is destroyed, for the dialogue which is human existence continues as if these imagined or fancied meanings are reality-witness the wrecked pen which was supposed to be a screwdriver. If I use the pen as a pen, the result of my action will be what I write: the continuation of my dialogue is fruitful, which is not the case if I attempt to write with a screwdriver. Scientific Use of this Criterion. The sciences make use of the same criterion. The physicist will question reality with a certain a priori idea, an hypothesis. He "thinks" that reality will be this or that, but he does not accept it as true and certain before reality itself reveals itself as this or that. The physicist provokes replies from reality, and before reality itself answers his question, he does not speak of scientific truth. If, however, his hypothesis is wrong, his dialogue with reality will come to a stop,292 reality gives no reply, offers resistance, or is destroyed. The physicist sees that he was imagining things and that his dialogue with reality was unfruitful. The same criterion applies to the cultural sciences with this difference, however, that in them the questioning of reality is much more difficult than in the physical sciences because very often no recourse is possible to experiments. It is only with the greatest difficulty that truth can be discovered in the cultural sciences. Often entire generations of thinkers have to pass before it becomes clear that a certain view is valueless. It is then said to be no longer "tenable," which means that it "contradicts" the object. In other words, the dialogue with the object has come to a stop, and new views are required to re-open it. As an example we may refer to orthodox Freudianism. Psychoanalysis has shown that there are other

292R. C. Kwant and J. H. G. van den Berk, "Het gesprek van de physicus met de wereld, " Annalen van hel Thijmgenootschap, vol. 53 (1955), pp. 13-15.

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dimensions to man than those of sex. Frequently when the psychiatrist held fast to the narrow conceptual framework of Freud, it became apparent that a fruitful dialogue between the psychiatrist and the patient was impossible. 293

Science and Daily Life. It may not be amiss to return from the realm of the sciences to that of daily life. For what the cultural sciences endeavor to express, the ordinary man is supposed to know and possess as truth in his daily life. The cultural sciences attenmpt, as it \vere, to catch and lay down in general principles man's dealings with himself, with his fellow men, with society, and with God. These dealings take place in daily life and presuppose objective insights. The more complicated the situation is, the more difficult it will be to disclose the objective meaning of reality. It is inevitable for man to make mistakes and to err in religious, social, and political life, in gubernatorial functions, in education, teaching, verdicts of law, the care of souls, etc. Frequently the dialogue with reality has to go very far before man realizes his error and comes to the conclusion that he lives in a world of make-believe. Often he does not even see that long ago he reached an impasse. Sometimes an entire life or education, an entire culture has to be a failure before man will recognize the truth about himself, about his fellow men, and about God. How often does it not happen that a man realizes only at the end of his life that his wife is really his wife--I mean, realizes what it really means that his wife is his wife. Although man is convinced that he often errs, he has to act. Consequently, he will always be "making a mess of it," and he will experience that others do the same. He is not even capable of not taking any action and not having any opinion, for having no opinion itself is having an opinion about reality, and not taking any action itself is a kind of taking action. To express it metaphorically, man's hands are always stained. There is in everyone's personal history and in the collective history of mankind a kind of material sinfulness of which superficial minds have no inkling. But this sinfulness inspires the philosopher to the greatest prudence and restraint in his action, and teaches him to be modest and unassuming in forming his VJews. The fruitfulness of his dialogue with reality imposes upon him the condition that he be ready to self-sacrifice. As Gabriel Marcel ~93J. :t\uttin, Psychoanalyse Utrecht, 1952, pp. 90-138.

ell

spiritualistische opvatting van de mens,

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puts it: "I believe that there lies an inexhaustible concreteness in the center of reality or of man's destiny and that progress in the knowledge of this concreteness is not made by stages and by passing knowledge on to one another as is done in any of the specialized sciences. This inexhaustible concreteness can be penetrated by anyone of us only through what is most untouched and most virginal in his being. The difficulties are, indeed, enormous. For, as experience shows, the virginal forces, which alone are capable of attaining to being, become at once contaminated and covered with dirt, and it is only by means of a long and difficult cleansing process, or rather, through a purification, a painful asceticism, that we manage to restore these forces to their purity."294 The most important point in this matter, however, was made by Thomas Aquinas. He was so much impressed by the obscurity of human reason that he considered divine revelation necessary with respect to man's search of truth about God. For if man in this search had to rely on natural reason, the truth would be discovered only by a few, and this only after a long time and mixed with many errors. 295 So far as life is concerned, there is no one who takes his guidance only from the cultural sciences or from philosophy. 11. REASONING AND LOGIC

Man's thinking moves naturally from prepredicative to predicative knowledge. This natural movement, however, does not stop with the judgment or predication. For I am able to combine two judgments in such a way that the combination gives rise to an insight which neither of the two, taken separately, expresses or contains. To give an example, to the judgment, "material objects are subject to wear," I can add the second judgment, "an animal organism is material." In that case there occurs in my thinking a natural movement leading to the expression of a third judgment: "Therefore, an animal organism is subject to wear." There is a definite connection between the first two judgments, as well as between their subjects and predicates, so that I am able in a perfectly natural way to join the subject of the second judgment with the predicate of the first. The technical term for performing this operation is "to conclude." 294Du refus Ii l'invocation, pp. 91-92. 295"Ad ea etiam quae de Deo ratione humana investigari possunt, necessarium fuit hominem instrui reve1atione divina; quia veritas de Deo per rationem investigata, a paucis, et per longum tempus, et cum admixtione multorum errorum homini proveniret." Summa theol., p. I, q. 1, a. 1. Cf. Summa contra Gentiles, lib. I, c. 4.

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In the case of other judgments a similar connection appears to be lacking, so that the natural movement to a conclusion is not actualized. The combination of "John is intelligent" with "man is mortal" does not offer any possibility to draw a conclusion. One who would conclude from it that John is mortal proceeds in a way which everyone calls "illogical," even though it would be readily admitted that the "conclusion" is true. Apparently there are laws which a reasoning process must obey. These laws are formulated by traditional logic. Logic was fathered by Aristotle,296 and has reached us practically without modifications through Boethius and the scholastic tradition. Classical logic may be defined as the theory of reasoning~ provided this expression be not misunderstood. Logic does not speak about the way man actually reasons. How man actually reasons is considered by psychology, but logic merely determines how reasoning ought to be performed if the purpose of reasoning is to be attained. 297 For this reason it is better to define logic as the theory of correct reasoning.2 9 8

Natural and Scientific Logic, Formal and Material Logic. As we pointed out, man possesses a spontaneous and natural type of logic. He realizes intuitively that his thinking is subject to laws if it is to lead him to any results. As the above-mentioned example shows, even if the conclusion itself is true, the way in which it was reached may be wrong. In that case the conclusion is not true by virtue of the reasoning process but in spite of it. It does not follow from the premises and, therefore, is not really a conclusion. Classical scientific logic has "caught" man's spontaneous or natural logic; it has formulated in clear and precise laws what is required for the correctness 296This traditional view is no longer as certain as has always been supposed. The doubt applies especially to the so-called "categories," which probably are of neo-Platonic origin. 297This is also the reason why so-called "affective logic" does not pertain to logic. The proponents of affective logic, among whom we may count Goblot and Ribot, point out that man reasons according to his preferences, aversions, sympathy, antipathy, etc.-in brief, according to his affectivity. For this reason, they claim, an affective logic has to be added to the rational system of classical logic. Of course, we do not want to deny that de facto reasoning is usually performed according to affectivity. However, as long as logic is concerned with the "correct" form of reasoning, the study of man's de facto reasoning according to his affectivity belongs to psychology. Logic is a normative science: it does not say how something de facto is but how it should be. Cf. R. Jolivet, Tt'aite de philosophie, vol. I, pp. 40-43. 298"Ars directiva ipsius actus rationis, per quam scilicet homo in ipso actu ration is ordinate et faciliter et sine errore procedat." Thomas Aquinas, Comment in Aristotelis libros Posteriorum Analyticorum, lib. I, lect. 1.

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of a reasoning process and it has justified these laws scientifically. This logic is called "formal logic," because it imposes a certain "form" upon the materials (concept, judgments) used in reasoning which guarantees the correctness of the process. Insofar as logic is concerned with the value of the materials to be arranged in orderly fashion, i.e., with the truth and certainty of the judgments and with connected issues, such as that of scepticism, it is spoken of as "material logic."299 The history of logic, however, does not always show this distinction, for often questions of formal logic and of material logic are treated indiscriminately according to the order in which they occurred in Aristotle's logical works, as edited by Andronicus of Rhodes. He called these works organon, instrument, because they constitute a tool no science can dispense with. The division into formal and material logic roughly coincides. with that into minor and major logic. Minor logic used to consider the subject matter of formal logic in a simple way, while special questions received a more extensive treatment in major logic. Especially under the influence of Kant, however, major logic gradually limited itself to the validity of man's knowledge, and the other questions were assigned a place in minor 10gic.300 Nowadays many authors proceed rather arbitrarily in assigning the various topics to either material (major) or formal (minor) logic. 301 All this, however, IS of small importance.

Deduction. At first, the reasoning process of which logic speaks was practically identified with deduction. In deductive reasoning one proceeds from a more general assertion to a less general or particular assertion contained in the more general one. I can say, for instance: the spiritual is immortal; man's soul therefore, man's soul is immortal;

IS

spiritual;

In doing this, I deduce a less general assertion from the more general statement that the spiritual is immortal. In daily life we make a constant use of deduction. Every time we use the terms 299Aristotle's Analytica Priora may be called "formal logic," for this work deals with the principles of correct reasoning. In his Analytica Posteriora he deals especially with what falls under material logic. 300Cf. I. J. M. van den Berg, Logica, vol. I, Nijmegen, 1946. pp. 38-45. 301Jacques Maritain makes an effort to keep the various questions clearly distinct. Cf. his Formal Logic, pp. 8-11.

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"because" or "for," we deduce a less general truth from a more general one. When a boy calls a girl "silly," because she is afraid of mice, he implicitly makes a deduction from the more general proposition: "Whoever is afraid of mice is silly."

Induction. In daily life we make use also of another form of reasoning. The certainty that an object will fall unless it is supported, that a match will burn when it strikes a phosphoreted surface, that potatoes will not grow on wooden floors, etc. is not derived from a more general proposition. This certitude is not acquired deductively but inductively. In inductive reasoning one proceeds from individual cases to a general law. When a physicist observes that copper samples A, B, C, D, E, ... conduct electricity, he finally concludes that "copper" conducts electricity. The importance of this new type of reasoning was emphasized especially by Francis Bacon in his Novum Organon. John Stuart Mill later formulated the special rules governing it. "Lived" Logic . . Classical logic never knew exactly what to do with induction. It could not be fitted anywhere within its frame-work without being out of place. This fact was a first indication that "the logical element" in man's existence had been conceived too narrowly. Scientific logic has as its function to "catch," as it were, "the logical element" in human existence, i.e., "lived" logic, and to explicitate it in scientific reflection. The fact that no suitable place could be assigned to induction revealed that "the logical element" had been wrongly identified with the inner coherence of deductive thought, for the irreflechi of inductive thinking also has its inner coherence. In the course of the last few decades it has become apparent that "lived logic" must be conceived even more broadly. A reflection upon the use of the terms "logical" and "illogical" makes this clear. If these terms are reserved for deductive and inductive thinking, then they may not be applied to, e.g., a phenomenological description. However, if a phenomenologist claims to place himself on the standpoint of intentionality, he thinks illogically when he lapses into the "natural viewpoint."302 Nevertheless, he cannot be accused of having sinned against any of the laws of induction or deduction. On the other hand, his thinking is "illogical." Moreover, a phenomenological description must have an inner coherence, and this coherence 302Cf. Chapter Two, p. 149.

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can perhaps be expressed in laws, although these laws would be wholly different from those of deduction. De facto every good phenomenologist follows certain laws. Even though he may not be explicitly aware of these laws, he gropes for the correct form, the required interconnection, the "logical" structure of his description. More or less the same may be said about a work of art. A novel can be composed in a "logical" or "illogical" fashion. Likewise, a painting or a musical composition. Perhaps man will never succeed in explicitating the laws of this "lived" logic, but there are such laws, hidden in the irrefUchi. Even the ways in which a humorist tells hi!> joke, a prosecuting attorney weaves his web around the accused, and a teacher catches a lying schoolboy are "logical" or "illogica1." Likewise, there is an inner coherence in a political system, in love, justice, and Christianity, in an economic order, and even in the psychical abnormalities by which, e.g., schizophrenic behavior is distinguished from other pathological behaviors. Logic and Philosophy. The use of the term, therefore, indicates that "the logical element" in human existence has a much wider extension than the inner coherence which classical logic explicitates in its formulation and justification of the deductive laws. Classical scientific logic managed to "catch" only one aspect of "lived logic." But many other aspects are contained in "lived experience." Undoubtedly, it is not very likely that anyone will ever attempt to formulate the laws governing the telling of jokes, and we do not see any reason for bewailing this lacuna. But the lack of explicit knowledge regarding the logical laws of phenomenological description makes itself painfully felt. Nothing can be expected of classical logic in this matter, for it is concerned only with "correct" deduction. One may even raise the question whether classical logic is of any use for the present-day currents of philosophical thought. Phenomenologists are not interested in it-they do not need classical logic, because they do not proceed "deductively." They would need another type of logic. For beginners in philosophy classical logic is not as indispensable as has often been thought. 303 Philosophy is born of wonder about reality, and this wonderment contains the invitation to seize reality and make it one's own. In the first stage of this appropriation of reality there can be no question of reasoning in the sense of deduction. Consequently, I do not need to know how deductions should be made. 303ef.

Van den Berg, In het voorportaal der wetmschappen, 1952, p. 4.

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It is not even impossible that a prolonged study of logic at the beginning of philosophical thinking could render authentic philosophizing extremely difficult. To make its subject matter somewhat intelligible, classical logic has recourse to a multitude of examples. These examples, however, are borrowed from philosophy. But, as philosophical insights, they are not yet "mine" when I begin to philosophize. I have not yet appropriated these insights and made them my personal views; there has not yet been any question of a personal grasp of reality. In this situation the use of such examples favors unauthentic philosophy and even pure verbalism. Philosophy becomes a playing with words, which is not even interesting. Let us clarify the matter by means of an example. How often does not classical logic say that man is a rational animal? This statement is presented, e.g., as an example of a perfect definition. But-what do I know about man? Max Scheler struggled his entire life in an attempt to understand at least something of man. Thus such an "example" from logic cannot be more for me than mere words which I learn by rote. But these words can cause me trouble for a long time to come. When I reach philosophical anthropology, it becomes almost impossible for me to convince myself that I do not really know what man is, for I have become thoroughly accustomed to manipulating man's perfect definition. Traditional logic strongly favors unauthentic philosophy and thus makes it almost impossible to arrive at personal thought. Personal thinking knows the temptation to despair and not only the obstacle course of "logical disputes." For certain readers these reflections may be a cause of annoyance, especially if from the very beginning of their philosophical training they were introduced to a system. For others, however, these thoughts may mean a deliverance and an exhortation to say farewell to "learning" philosophy and to proceed to authentic thinking.

CHAPTER THREE PHENOMENOLOGY OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY Introduction. Is the man who I am unique? Am I an isolated being? Am I "first" man and do I "subsequently" concern or not concern myself with others? These and other similar questions have not yet been raised, although on several occasions our investigations could have been led in this direction. The man who I am disclosed himself as a conscious-being-in-the-world, as a being which cannot be isolated or divorced from the world without losing his human identity. But in the world in which I dwell I encounter human beings; wherever I go, I come across them; they look at me, gesture to me, and address me. Their looks, words, and gestures make me stop. I am the project of my world, and through my projects I make the world a cultural world. As soon, however, as I encounter the ether in my world, I realize that this other may not be sacrificed to my project, that he is not a worldly thing which receives its meaning. from my history as the creator of culture. What is my relationship to the others? I t was for the sake of not interrupting the systematic plan of our investigations that we did not yet make use of the occasions which arose for speaking about the relationship of my existence to other existences. In the description of authentic philosophical thinking it became apparent that this thinking implies a personal question and a personal answer. The question which I as a philosopher raise must be my question, and the reply to it has to be given by me and for me. If philosophy is not to degenerate into mere "talk"-Gerede (Heidegger), parole parlCe (Merleau-Ponty)-truth will have to be truth-for-me. However, what is truth-for-me is at the same time of necessity also truth for all, I because truth is truth. If it is true that General Patton found the bridge over the Rhine near Remagen undamaged, then this truth is not only truth for me who affirm it, but also for all actual and possible subjects who make or will make a statement regarding this event. It is impossible for me at the same time to admit that someone who denies my truth is right and to be lef. Sartre, L'existentialisme est un humanismc, pp. 26-27.

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convinced that I speak the truth. Anyone who does not admit this no longer accepts any truth. Whoever speaks of truth means truth for all. The denial of this primordial evidence implies the denial of truth itself and, in addition, makes chaos the principle of man's action. 2 Thus it is not truth that should be blamed for the chaos in human activies, but untruth. We abstract here from ill-will and bad faith, but even without them chaos in human society becomes a fact when truth is no longer recognized universally true. In principle, truth is truth for all, but de facto it is not truth for all. Authentic philosophical thinking, therefore, seems to imply a vocation and to impose upon the philosopher a task which contains more than the duty of philosophical thought. The philosopher, as such, will endeavor to explicitate and express the truth about human life but, because he knows that his truth about life is truth for all, he feels himself called to make his fellow man personally see the truth. But the task and vocation of the philosopher will not be understood if the philosopher views himself as an isolated individual. 3 What sense would it make for truth to be truth for all if the philosopher locks himself up in an ivory tower? What would be the sense of saying that in principle truth is destined for all if the philosopher does not destine himself for all?4 However, we must ask, on what ground can he destine himself for the others? What does man have to do with his fellow man? 1. To EXIST IS TO CO-EXIST

The concrete thinking of existential phenomenology deserves our gratitude for having restored man to his place in the world and having described this world as a human world. Man and the world are not isolated in exis·tential phenomenology but constitute a unity of reciprocal implication. This view cannot be "demonstrated" in 2Cf. Dondeyne, "L'abstraction," Revue N eoscolastique de Philosophie, 1938, pp. 345-346. 3"Wir sind dessen auch schon dem allgemeinsten nach inne geworden, dass menschliches Philosophieren und seine Ergebnisse im gesamtmenschlichen Dasein nichts weniger als die blosse Bedeutung privater oder sonstwie beschrankter Kulturzwecke hat. Wir sind also-wie kiinnten wir davon absehen-in unserem Philosophieren Funktonare der Menschheit." Husserl, Die Krisis der Europaischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phiinomenologie (Husserlinana, vol. VI,) Haag, 1954. 4"Si la verite peut se definir comme Ie bien de l'intelligence, c'est un devoi. strict pour celui qui la possede de la communiquer. Aussi est-ce la charite qui exige imperieusement la transmission du vrai." Jean Lacroix, Personne et amour, p. 130.

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the strict sense of the term. It is a fundamental insight and therefore, can only be "pointed out" by the phenomenologist. Moreover, he can make it dear that his conception offers a solution for the impasse to which philosophy has been led by all kinds of subjectivism and objectivism. His thought reveals itself fruitful and, as we have seen, this is a criterion of truth. vVith respect to the meaning of fellow human beings, proofs and demonstrations are likewise impossible. Thus it should not be a cause of surprise to see that different phenomenologists offer such a variety of descriptions of interhuman relationships. What one "sees," the other qualifies as pure fancy or illusion. One stops where the other thinks that nothing. of importance has yet been stated. For instance, "to love each other is to hate the same enemy" according to Sartre. 5 But Marcel thinks that this hatred has nothing to do with love, that love is something entirely different, something which Sartre does not see. Must we say that Sartre is blind or that Marcel is deluded? The particular complexity of the system of meanings which is the world serves as a warning not to over-simplify matters in our attempt to describe interhuman relations. It is quite possible that these relationships of man to his fellow man will show many different dimensions.

My World as Our World. Does man have anything to do with those living beings which he calls men? The reply cannot be given at once, but gradually develops when I attempt to think the man I am without the others. I am a being-in-the-world, but the wordly meanings of my world constantly refer to other human beings. 6 The letter which I write refers to its addressee; the pen I use refers to the supplier who has to make his living from his sales. A boat at anchor refers to travellers; the mountains and forests which I admire refer to the architect for whom they mean stone and wood, i.e., construction materials. The system of close and distant meanings which owes its origin in part also to my existence is permeated, therefore, with actual and possible meanings of which I am not the origin. My world refers to origins of meanings which are not my existence. Nevertheless, these meanings are not "nothing-for-me." They are 5Cf. Le diable et Ie bon Dieu.

6"Die untersuchung nimmt die Orientierung am In-der-Welt-sein, durch weJche Grundverfassung des Daseins jeder Modus seines Seins mitbestimmt wird." Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 117.

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meanings also for me, albeit in another senSe than for other existences. My world, therefore, apparently is not exclusively my world, and your world is not only yours, but the world of existence is our world (die Welt des Daseins ist Mitwelt 7 ). Man and world, however, constitute a unity of reciprocal implication. Therefore, that the world-for-other-existences has meaning also for me means that my existence is a co-existence with other existences. My presence in the world is a co-presence; my encounter with the world is our encounter; my world is our world.

A priori speaking, it is not certain that this co-presence indicates an essential structural aspect of being-man. Man is essentially in-theworld; his being-in-the-world is an existentiale, an essential structural aspect of being-man. It is impossible, therefore, to conceive man without the world. When the bond between man and world is broken, man is no longer. This break is inevitable--death-and after it at any rate it is no longer possible to speak of being-man. Whatever I may be after death, I will not be a man. Accordingly, I am not first a man and then enter or do not enter into the world. Being-inthe-world is not added to my being-man because there just happens to be a world. My being-man is a being-in-the-world. 8 To think away the world means to think away man. Is Co-Existence an Essential Aspect of Being-Man? Obviously, in this phase of our investigation it is not permissible to appeal to arguments which are without any immediate relationship to the reason why above existence was described as co-existence. Existence, we said, is co-existence because my world reveals itself as our world (M itwelt). But could this not simply be the consequence of the fact that there happen to be other men? If the answer would be in the affirmative, the affirmation of existence as co-existence would not imply much more than establishing a fact-much as one establishes that a man has two arms and two ears. Man cannot be thought as man without the world, but he can be conceived without two ears. Would perhaps the same have to be said about man's coexistence? Heidegger neglects to investigate this possibility thoroughly and considers co-existence as an existentiale, as an essential structural aspect of existence. 9 Sartre attacks Heidegger on this point 7Heidegger, op. cit., p. 118. 8Heidegger, op. cit., p. 54.

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and refuses to agree with him. He reproaches him for simply passing from an empirical observation to the affirmation of an essential structural aspect. lO Binswanger leaves Heidegger's description for what it iSll and remarks that one cannot find in Heidegger what is most proper to being-human-namely, "the loving togetherness of Me and YoU."12

Of course, it would be possible to point with Binswanger to situations showing that man has more dealings with his fellow man than were indicated above. Later we shall analyze these situations. At present, however, we are concerned with the question whether or not the fact that my world must be called our world is more than a fact, whether or not this co-existence is an essential structural aspect of human existence. When Heidegger replies in the affirmative to this question, he surreptitiously appeals to arguments which presuppose a co-existence in a much more profound sense. He puts forward reasons which are not derived from the fact that my world is our world, although it is precisely on this ground that existence is called co-existence. Heidegger points out that precisely the deficient modes of co-existence reveal existence as co-existence. For instance, he says, the experience of being-alone is possible only on the ground of a more original being-together. I can "miss" another only if my being is a being-together. 13 The possibility of being-alone, the fact that I can "miss" another, reveal a more original togetherness. Of course, the point is hardly debatable. However, the togetherness whi~h I "miss" when I feel "alone" contains more than the co9" 'Mit' und 'Auch' sind existenzial und nicht kategorial zu verstehen" (ap. cit., p. 118). "Das Mitsein ist ein existenziales Konstituens des In-derW.elt-seins. Das Mitdasein erweisst sich als eigene Seinsart von innerwelt1ich begegnendem Seinenden. Sofern das Dasein uberhaupt ist, hat es die Seinsart des Miteinanderseins. Dieses kann nicht als summatives Resultat des vorkommens mehrerer "Subjekte" begriffen werden." ap. cit., p. 125. lO"Pourquoi devient-elle Ie fondement unique de notre etre, pourquoi est-elle Ie type fondamental de notre rapport avec les autres, pourquoi Heidegger s'estil cru autorise a passer de cette constatation empirique et ontique de I'etre-avec a la position de la coexistence comme structure ontologique de non etre-dans-Ie monde?" Sartre, L' etre et Ie ncant, p. 304. llL. Binswanger, Grundfarmen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins, Zurich, 1953, p. 267. 12"Das W ersein des Daseins im Sinne des 'Ich und Du' oder der dualen Wirheit linden wir jedoch nirgends." Heidegger, ap. cit., p. 65. 13"Auch das Alleinsein des Daseins ist Mitsein in der Welt. Fehlen kann der Andere nur in einem und fUr einen Mitsein. Das Alleinsein ist ein delizienter Modus des Mitseins, seine Moglichkeit ist der Beweis fur dieses." Heidegger, op. cit., p. 120.

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existence to which Heidegger concludes on the ground of the fact that my world is our world. Even when I am alone and miss the other, the ship refers to the traveller, and the book to the supplier. My existence, then, is still co-existence, yet I feel "alone." Being-alone, therefore, is not a deficient mode of this co-existence. When I am alone and miss the other, there reveals itself the possibility and the necessity of a mode of co-existing which has a richer content than the being-together in the world spoken of above. Accordingly, the deficient modes of this more profound mode of co-existing do not "prove" that being-together in the world is an essential structural aspect of human existence. But they show that several dimensions must be distinguished in co-existence. 2.

THE BODY AS INTERMEDIARY

The Other's Accessibility to Me. Whether or not our beingtogether in the world has to be called an existentiale, it certainly is evident that the meaning of the world for the other is accessible to me. This implies that the other himself is accessible to me. The letter which I write may be for me a material question of pen, paper, and communication, but for the other it may be the biggest fear and nightmare of his life. His fear and nightmare, however, are meanings also for me, they are accessible to me. Perhaps I have already taken these meanings into account when I wrote the letter. This would mean that I take the other into account and, therefore, that he is not concealed from me but accessible to me. In daily life this situation is accepted as quite normal. Everyone admits that the patient is accessible to the doctor, the customer to the salesman, the student to the teacher. The thief is not concealed from the policeman who surprises him in the act, and a naughty boy is not concealed from his mother when she catches him. The philosopher has to respect this unconcealedness and accessibility. He does not have the right to explicitate co-existence in such a way that it is reduced to nothing or that its reality can no longer be conceived as reality. His function merely is to express this coexistence. He has to proceed in the same way in this explicitation as he does in explicitating the perception of a worldly thing, where his function is to describe this perception. Let us say that I perceive a "deliciously fragrant" apple. When it becomes apparent that the idea of the physical causality exercised by means of stimuli does not

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give us an insight into this perception,14 i.e., that this idea does not allow us to conceive the possibility of perceiving a "deliciously fragrant" apple, then the philosopher will have to drop the idea of physical causality as the "explanation" of perception as it occurs and will have to retain his perception. 15 In daily life this procedure is considered quite normal. There was a time, however, when scientific circles judged it very abnormal to assume that I really smell delicious apples and really see green grass. They preferred to start from physico-chemical stimuli or from physiologically described organs and thus no longer attained to perception. 16 Existential phenomenology, however, is sensitive for what in daily life is accepted as quite normal. It officially forces doors open, or rather, it points to open doors and invites man to enter through them. l7 '

a. Reasoning by Analogy and "Einfiihlung" The Cartesian Heritage. The unconcealedness and accessibility of my fellow man are such an "open door." Philosophers, however, have had great trouble re-discovering this door from the time when Descartes had told them that this door was closed. True, Descartes did not say so explicitly in so many words. Nevertheless, led by his own method, he proceeded to think about man in such a way that one could no longer see any possibility of a real relationship between subject and subject. Descartes' method locked consciousness up in itself: consciousness, for him, was consciousness of consciousness. Consciousness was isolated, walled-in, and existed without the body.ls On the other hand, however, man is also corporeal. For Descartes "body" simply means "extension." The body, therefore, is fully subjected to the laws of extension, functions as a machine, and is l4"La theorie de la sensation, qui compose tout savoir de qualites determinees, no us construit des objets nettoyes de to ute equivoque, purs, absolus, qui sont plutot riMal de la connaissance que ses themes effectifs, eIle ne s'adapte qu'iJ. la superstructure tardive de la conscience." Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la perception, pp. 18-19. 15J. H. V. d. Berg and J. Linschoten, Persoon en wereld, Utrecht, 1953, pp. 251-253. 16A. de WaeIhens, "La phenomenologie du corps," Revue philosophique de Louvain, 1950, pp. 374-382. 17e£. H. C. Riimke, Psychiatrie, vol. I, Amsterdam, 1954, p. 148. 18"Et quamvis fortasse . . . habeam corpus, quod mihi valde arcte conjunctum est, sum tantum res cogitans, non extensa, et ex alia parte distinctam ideam corporis, quatenus cst tantum res extensa, non cogitans, certum est me a corpore meo revera esse distinctum, et absque iIIo posse exi~tere." Medita1iones de Prima Philosophia (Bibliothi?que des Tcxtes Philosophzques), Paris, 1946, p. 76.

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studied in mechanics. On the other hand, it did not escape Descartes that there are relations between consciousness and the body. Although they are two isolated substances, consciousness is not related to the body merely as the helmsman is to a ship.19 Consciousness somehow is unified and even merged with the body. These assertions, however, came too l~t'e to solve the problems created by the Cartesian divorce of body and soul or consciousness. Descartes thought that he could solve them by locating consciousness (the soul) in the pineal gland and asserting that from this gland the body is "guided" and that in it consciousness is "sensitive" to the influence of the body. But the artificiality of this hypothesis ultimately did not even satisfy Descartes himself and he had to admit that he could not solve the problem. If one keeps in mind that Descartes first isolated consciousness and the body from each other and placed them alongside each other as complete substances, the confession of his inability to conceive consciousness and body as a unit should not come as a surprise. Attempts to Overcome the Cartesian Divorce of Consciousness and Body. Descartes' explicitations of the relationship between consciousness and body became the reason why subsequent philosophers were unable to see any longer the possibility of direct contact of the conscious self with another conscious being. For consciousness was conceived as fully closed upon itself, locked up and concealed in the body-machine. The other's consciousness, likewise, was supposed to be so locked up and concealed in his body. In that case, of course, a direct .contact of my consciousness with the consciousness of the other would not be conceivable. 20 My consciousness would be isolated from my body, my body would be isolated from that of the other, and finally his consciousness would be isolated from his body. Consequently, I would not be able to see that someone else is sad or joyful, I would not be able to hear that he is furious or frightened to death, etc.

19"Docet autem natura, per istos sensus doloris, famis, sitis, etc. me non tantum adesse mea corpori ut nauta est navigio, sed iIIi arctissime esse conjunctum et quasi permixtum, adeo ut unum quid cum iIIo componam." Meditationes, pp. 78-79. 2o"Si les ames sont separt!es par leurs corps, e1les sont distinctes comme cet encrier est distinct de ce livre, c'est-a-dire qu'on ne peut concevoir aucune presence immediate de I'une a l'autre." Sartre L'etre et Ie neant, p. 277. 21"L'ame d'autrui est donc separee de la mienne par toute la distance qui separe tout d'abord mon arne de mon corps, puis mon corps du corps d'autrui, cnfin Ie corps d'autrui de son arne." Sartre, ibid.

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However, there is no one who accepts that he really cannot do such things. Anyone can do it. Of course, the philosophers were not unaware of this and, therefore, they tried to re-create this possibility, despite Descartes' explicitations. The Argument from Analogy. The usual ~rgument ran as follows. Despite the fact that my consciousness is pure interiority, this interiority reveals itself externally by expressing itself through the body. Fury and joy are internal states of consciousness to which mimicry and pantomimic movements give expression. These coarse movements of expression, however, are not the only ones, for more refined expressive symptoms also reveal something of the interiority of consciousness. Inspired as they were by physics, psychologists soon felt themselves on familiar ground here, for blood pressure, frequency of heart-beat, depth and frequency of breathing, glandular secretions, electric conductivity, etc. appeared subject to exact measurementsP By means of appropriate instruments the psychologists hoped to equal the exactness proper to the measurements of physics. 23 They were convinced that by means of the other's bodily movements of expression it would be possible to penetrate into the interiority of his consciousness. An essential condition for this was that the bodily movements of expression be interpreted in the light of introspection. This interpretation was supposed to include the following argument from analogy: just as in anger or in joy I give a bodily expression in a definite way to the interiority of my conscious:1ess, and the way in which I do this differs according to the presence of different contents of consciousness, so also will the other give expression to the presence of certain contents of consciousness by means of lIlimicry and pantomimic motions and through more refined symptoms. Thus perception, they thought, would tell me, first, that the other is a subject as I am a subject, and second, that the same takes place in his subjectivity as in mine when I observe in him also the same motions and symptoms by which I express my interiority.24 After being accepted for many years, it has now become evident that such an argument does not explain my contact with, and the presence of the other as the other. The actual occurrence of contact with the other is not conceived as a possibility in such an argument 22Cf. F. Roels, Handboek der psychologie, vol. I, Utrecht-Nijmegen, 1934, pp. 66-67.

23Cf. G. Dumas. La vie affective, Paris, 1948. 24Cf. Sartre, op. cit., p. 278.

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if one first asserts that consciousness is locked up in itself and hidden away in a body or, which amounts to the same, if the body is first described as a part of nature, as a thing among other things. We abstract here from the fact that no such argument from analogy occurs de facto in our experience. \Vhen I hear someone screaming with pain, he is directly and in person present to me, without there being the slightest trace of an argument from analogy. Thus it seems rather optimistic to think that one can base certainty of the other's presence as the other on such an argument. The biggest difficulty, however, lies in the fact that the abovedescribed argument from analogy presupposes the presence of the other in person, the direct contact of my consciousness with that of the other. Why do I not admit that the other's body is a machine, but consider it the expression of the other's subjectivity? Why do I not accept that the smile on the other's countenance is solely and purely a complex of muscular contractions, the effect of a nervous reaction which is mechanically determined by a physical stimulus (Watson)? I reject this possibility, because I assume that the other is a subject and not a machine. Only in this supposition can I call certain bodily movements and symptoms expressive movements. Without such a supposition they are, in the Cartesian way of thinking, purely mechanical motions. The purpose of the argument, however, was to justify the statement that the other is a subject. For this purpose an appeal was made to his expressive movements, but his motions may be called an expression only when one has recognized the other's subjectivity. All these remarks aim at the first part of the argument from analogy-namely, the certainty about the presence of the other as the other, as a subject. Reasoning from analogy explains nothing in this matter. Thus the second part of the argument is likewise condemned-namely, the conclusion that the same internal experiences are present in the other as in me. This conclusion is based on the fact that I perceive certain determined phenomena of expression in him which are the same as those through which I give expression to determined experiences. Such a "conclusion," however, is not acceptable. Though it may be true that I give expression to a determined interiority of consciousness in a determined fashion, nevertheless, if I cannot directly see the subjectivity of the other, then the beings which I see walking and laughing in the streets may still be

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understood as machines. At most one could say that probably they are not machines. 25 The Einfiihlung Theory. Accordingly, the psychologists' argument from analogy presupposes the presence of the other as the other precisely when this presupposition has to be justified. Nevertheless, I am certain that the other in person is present to me. Hence it is not surprising that other theories have been put forward to justify this certainty. We may name the Einfiihlung or empathy theories of Dilthey, Simmel and Scheler. However, they also presuppose what they have to justify-namely, the unconcealedness of the other as the other. Although they offer a possibility to describe more perfectly the means which we possess of placing ourselves in the presence of the other, they do not offer any explanation of the fact that the other appears to us as the other. 26 The unconcealedness of the other is constantly presupposed. 27 Encounter with the Other as the Other. The unconcealedness of the other as the other is an "open door" through which finally the phenomenologist enters. It is not all necessary to appeal to reasoning from analogy or to theories of Einfiihlung in order to explain the presence of the other as the other, for the encounter with the other directly and immediately distinguishes itself from the encounter with a mere thing. In this encounter the other reveals himself directly as the other, as not-a-thing, as a conscious-being-in-the-world.28 It is the other in person whom I see shaking with fear or whom I hear sighing under the burden of his cares. I feel his cordiality in his handshake, in his soft-spoken voice, in the benevolence of his looks. Those too who hate me or are indifferent toward me, who find my company boring, who fear, despise, or mistrust me, those who want to console, tempt, blame, persuade, or amuse me are in person present to me. The look of such a one, his gesture, his words, his attitude, etc. are always his look, gesture, words, or attitude. He is in person directly and immediately present to me. The presence of a thing, on the other hand, manifests itself quite differently. The way in which a rolling rock approaches me differs 25"On reconnaitra volontiers que ces procedes peuvent seulement nous donner d'autrui une connaissance probable: il reste toujours possible qu'autrui ne soit qu'un corps. Si les animaux sont des machines, pourquoi l'homme que je vois passer dans la rue n'en serait-il pas une?" Sartre, op. cit., p. 278. 26Cf. Sartre, op. cit., p. 279. 27Cf. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, pp. 124-125. 28Cf. Merleau-Ponty, Sens et non-sens, p. 187.

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from that of an angry policeman. My desk does not groan under my elbows, my pen does not give me a hurt look when I use it wrongly, I do not blame an apple for falling on my head, and I do not expect to be congratulated on my birthday by my dog. Accordingly, I have to accept the unconcealedness, the direct presence of the other as the other, as an original fact. Any "proof" is wholly superfluous, because this presence is immediately evident, and any attempt to make this presence-acceptable appears to presuppose that the other is present to me. h. "My" Body ;s Not "a" Body

The preceding considerations, however, do not remove all difficulties. The other may be present to me through his look, his gesture, his attitude, his speech, etc., but his look, gesture, attitude, etc. are bodily realities. Is it not true, then, that it is only the body of the other which is present to me and comes into contact with me? Again Cartesian Dualism. When the question is raised in this way, all the consequences of Cartesian dualism threaten to return. "Only the body" and not the conscious other, says the question. This presupposes that it is possible to speak about "the body alone." Such a presupposition appears to be of a Cartesian origin. Descartes had divorced consciousness and body from each other and described the body as a machine. Only from this Cartesian viewpoint is it possible to speak of "the body alone." Such a view, however, is an explicitation that does not take into consideration the mode in which my body is given to me-namely, as "mine." The consequences of such a faulty standpoint are funest for, if I no longer think of my body as "mine," I no longer conceive my "self" as being corporeally-in-the-world. In his explicitation of the meaning of the human body Descartes omits precisely the most important aspect-namely, that the body is a human body. The body is properly human only in the indivisible unity which man is, just as an organ is an organ only in the totality of the organism.29 The body is my body only in its participation in the conscious self. According to Descartes' description the body is always only "a" body, i.e., a body pertaining to the immense group of bodies.so My body, however, is mine through its mysterious refer29Cf. Sartre,

op. cit.,

30Cf. Sartre, ibid.

p. 278.

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ence to me, to the conscious self with which it has fused. My body has even grown so much into one with me that in some cases I do not hesitate to speak of "me" when I mean my body. I say, for instance, that I wash myself, move myself, watch myself. This "myself" means my body. Physiology and My Body. My body, therefore, is not the body described by physiology or drawn by anatomy.3l The body which occurs in anatomy, biology, and physiology is merely "a" body. These sciences describe the body as a thing in the world. Their descriptions are based upon the observations of men of science, but they do not explicitate my perception of my body as mine. 32 My hand reveals itself as mine when I try to grasp an object; my feet manifest themselves as mine when I carefully place them on the steps of a steep staircase; my eyes disclose themselves as mine when I let my gaze travel over the world. My hands with which I grasp do not belong to the system of seizable things, such as my pen, my shoes, and my pack of cigarettes. My feet do not belong to the world that can be walked upon, and my eyes do not pertain to the visible world. They reveal themselves as meanings which lie on the side of the subject which I am. These meanings cannot be found in a text book of anatomy or physiology, because "I" do not occur in such books. 33 My Body is Not a Mere InstrwmeJlt. For the same reason my body is not an instrument, as a hammer and a microscope are instruments. Instruments are extensions of my body but, if I consider my body as an instrument, of which body is my body an extension? My body cannot be an instrument, for it is my body, for it is fused with the conscious self which I am. 3• 3l"En ce qui concerne Ie corps, et meme Ie corps d'autrui, il nous {aut apprendre a Ie distinguer du corps objectif tel que Ie decrivent les livres de physiologie." Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la perception, p. 403. 32"Mon corps tel qu'i1 est pour moi, ne m'apparait pas au milieu du monde." Sartre, op. cit., p. 365. 33"Nous avons reappris sentir notre·corps, no us avons retrouve sous Ie savoir objectif et distant du corps cet autre savoir que nous en avons parce qu'i1 est toujours avec nous et que nous sommes corps." Merleau-Ponty, op. cit., p. 239. 34"Si je pense mon corps common instrument, j'attribue par la, disons a I'ame dont iI serait I'outil, les virtualites meme dont iI assurerait I'actualisation; cette arne, je la convertis en corps, et par consequent Ie probli~me se pense nouveau pour elle." Marcel, Du refus [,invocation, p. 29.

a

a

a

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My Body is Not the Object of "Having." It is not possible to apply to my body what, according to Marcel, can be said of the object of "having." I "have" a car, a pen, a book. In this "having" the object of the "having" reveals itself as an exteriority. There is a distance between me and what I "have." What I "have" is to a certain extent independent of me.3~ I can dispose of it or give it away without ceasing to be what I am-a man. 36 The same cannot be asserted of my body, at least not without so many restrictions that "having" is deprived of its strict sense. My body is not so far removed from my conscious self as is the ashtray on my desk. Likewise, my body is not something external to me like my car. I cannot dispose of my body or give it away as I dispose of money or give away my golf clubs. All this stems from the fact that my body is not "a" body but my body, not in the same way as my golf clubs are mine, but in such a way that my body embodies me. My Body is Not Isolated from Me. Accordingly, there can never be question of the body "alone" if this term is supposed to indicate an isolated body, a body which would stand apart from the conscious self but nevertheless be my body. The conscious self "informs" the body, i.e., it permeates the body with the forma} the form-giving actuality of the self,37 through which the body is "mine." Reversely, I have to admit that my body is the embodiment of the conscious self, and that this self is an embodied self.3s It is true, of course, that the glance, the gesture, the attitude, speech, etc. of the other are bodily realities. However, the other's body is "his" body and, therefore, the glance, gesture, attitude, and speech are also "his" glance, gesture, attitude, and speech. The contact, then, with "his" body is not a contact with "only a body," with "a" body, for "a" body is not "his" body.s9 Accordingly, I encounter the other as the other, as a subject, when he looks at me with love, 35This independence does not mean that in "having" there is question of a thing-in-itself. For there is always question of my "having" and its object, which reveals itself to me as independent of me to a certain extent. 36Cf. Marcel, Journal metaphysique, p. 30l. 37Not all members of my body and their functions participate equally in the formative actuality of the self. There are different levels of this "information," but they do not concern us here. Cf. Stephen Strasser, The Soul in Metaphysical and Empirical Psychology, Pittsburgh, 1957, pp. 123-126. 38We mention the embodiment of the self here only insofar as it is required to understand the meaning of immediate presence to the other as the other. s9Cf. Marcel, Journal metaphysique, pp. 325-329.

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hatred, or indifference, when he throws me a gesture, when he assumes a threatening attitude, when he addresses me in speech, for his body is the embodiment of his subjectivity.

The Oth'er's Body as Intermediary in His Encounter. We have previously pointed out that the meaning of the world-for-the-other is accessible to me-the world is our world. This world's accessibility implies the accessibility and unconcealedness of the other for me. I experience the fact of this unconcealedness in the encounter with the other. I myself am in the world, and in my world I encounter the other. In this encounter the other reveals himself directly as the other, I distinguish him immediately from worldly things,40 I discern in him a source of sense and meaning, another existence, because his body is the embodiment of his subjectivity. In a certain sense, therefore, I may say that the other's body functions as an intermediary in my encounter with the other. For it is through his body that the other occurs in my world and, because I am in the world, the other must occur in my world if I am to meet him. There is still another sense in which the other's body acts as intermediary in the encounter with my fellow man. His body not only makes direct contact possible, but also makes me participate in his world and makes it possible for me to enter into his world. Marcel's explicitations of "having" excellently serve to clarify this statement. I do not "have" my body in the same way as I have a car. Nevertheless, in a certain sense we may say that I do "have" my bodynamely, insofar as the subject which I am "is" not my body. Although the conscious self and my body imply each other, although the conscious self has insolubly fused with my body, nevertheless I "am" not my hands, my face, my seeing, my hearing. There is a certain non-identity, a certain distance, between me and my body. In a sense, I can dispose of my body and give it away. In the supposition that I "am" my body, I am a thing and wholly immersed in a world of mere things. But then the conscious self is reduced to nothing and, consequently, also my body as "mine," as well as the world as 40Heidegger uses different terms to indicate the distinction of man's relationships to the wordly thing and to the other. To the wordly thing I am related in an attitude of Besorgen. My relation to the other is called Fiirsorge. "Das Seiende zu dem sich das Dasein als Mitsein verhalt, hat aber nicht die Seinsart des zuhand'enen Zeugs, es ist selbst Dasein. Dieser Seiende wird nicht besorgt, sondern steht in der Fiirsorge." Sein und Zeit, p. 121.

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"mine."41 Accordingly, I neither "am" my body nor "have" it. 42 My body is precisely mid-way between these two extremes. It constitutes the transition from the conscious self to the worldly object. It is the mysterious reality which grafts me on things, secures my being-in-the-world, involves me in the world, and gives me a standpoint in the world.

Entering the Other's World Through His Body. The direct contact with the other involves me also in his world through his body. When I am seated alongside the driver in a car, I enter through his body and its extension-the car-into the meanings which for him are possessed by the road, the countryside, the hills, narrow passes, bridges, etc. If I become nervous because of the great speed, the driver enters into the meaning which the narrow bridge we are crossing has for me. When I watch a carpenter at work, I am through his bodily being involved in his world, and the meanings which saw, hammer, and nails have for him reveal themselves to me. I place myself in the meaning which my garden and trees have for the urchins whom I see crawling in through the hedge. The words my friend uses in describing distant countries which I have never visited transfer me into his world. Through his words I enter into his world, and his world becomes meaningful to me-his world becomes my world, our world. The Body as Intermediary of the Other's Concealedness. Although the body is intermediary between me and the other, between the other and me, between his world and me, and between my world and him, not everything is said when this mediacy has been expressed. The other as the other is unconcealed from me, but nevertheless he is not totally transparent to me. The other never appears to me in perfectly lucid clarity. This should not be surprising, for not even I 41"Cette identite supposee est un non-sens; elle ne peut etre affirme qu'a la faveur d'un acte implicite d'annulation du je et se change alors en une affirmation materialiste: mon corps, c'est moi, mon corps existe seu!. Mais cette affirmation est absurde; Ie propre de mon corps ~st de ne pas exister seul, de ne pouvoir exister seu!. Nous re£ugerions-nous alors dans l'idee d'un monde des corps? Mais qu'est-ce qui lui confere l'unite? qu'est-ce qui Ie pense comme monde? et d'autre part, que devient dans ce monde purement obj ectif Ie principe d'intimite (man corps) autour duquel se constituait l'orbite existentielle?" Marcel, Du refus Ii l'invocation, p. 30. 42"Etre incarne, c'est s'apparaitre comme corps, comme ce corps-ci, sans pouvoir s'identifier a lui, sans pouvoir non plus s'en distinguer-identification et distinction etant des operations correlatives l'une de l'autre, mais qui ne peuvent s'exercer que dans la sphere des objets." Marcel, op. cit., p. 31.

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myself am transparent to myself. This "not even" indicates a kind of disappointment, a disappointment with the reality which I myself am. This disappointment befalls the phenomenologist when he experiences that Descartes' clear and distinct ideas are artificial constructs which do not occur but are mere abstractions. Who am I and what am I? I am present to myself, unooncealed from myself, I do not escape from myself. But I am also absent, concealed, and escaping from myself. The other also is concealed from me. Who are you and what are you? The body not only is an intermediary in the encounter with the other, but at the same time also means a possibility for the other to hide from me, to withdraw from me. I too am able to conceal myself. Man is capable of simulation with respect to his fellow man, he can feign, dissemble, and lie. The body again is the intermediary. Nevertheless, it is precisely in this mode of self-concealment that man's unconcealedness before man is affirmed. Self-concealment is possible only on the basis of unconcealedness.

We Exist Together. Descartes' Cogito, then, means the negation of a phenomenological evidence which imposes itself irresistibly.u I am not consciousness of my consciousness, locked up in myself, isolated from my body, from the world, and from the other. Through my body I am in the world, which appears to be our world and, therefore, my existing is an existing-to-gether, a co-existence. The philosophy.of "I think" has to be replaced by that of "we exist." It goes without saying that this "we" shows many forms and contains a multitude of possibilities which still have to be investigated. Nevertheless one point should be clear: the encounter with the other reveals the other to me as "not a thing," but as existence, as a source of sense and meaning. Because the other is not a thing, he is my companion 44 and, therefore, I can speak of "we." A thing does not accompany me. It is important to emphasize this point, because we could easily become victims of our own terminology. To indicate the reciprocal implication of man and the world, we have made use of the terms "encounter" and "presence." When there is question of the other as the other, these same terms are used again. However, they have 'SCf. E. Mounier, Introduction aux existentialismes, Paris, 1947, p. 100. 44"Dieses Seiende ist weder vorhanden noch zuhanden, sondern ist so, wie aas freigebende Dasein selbst-es ist auch und mit da." Heidegger op. cit., p.118.

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Existential Phenomenology

now a wholly different meaning, for the other reveals himself precisely as a meaning that differs from the thing. It is to stress this difference of meaning that we use the terms companion and to accompany. The encounter with the other, his presence, reveals the other to me as "like-me-in-the-world"-a meaning which I never perceive in the encounter with things. Because the other is "like-mein-the-world," he is my "companion-in-the-world."45 The same remarks apply to the term "dialogue." I am a dialogue with the world, because what I am is unthinkable without the world, and because my world is not without me. A dialogue cannot be conceived without both participants. However, the way in which the other takes part in the dialogue when I encounter him differs radically from that in which a worldly thing replies to my questions. The other answers me as another self; he replies to me as I myself reply to his questioning, which is something no thing can do. Finally, we must draw attention to a certain one-sidedness of our explicitation and compensate for it. Too much emphasis has been given to "I," to "like-me," to "my" companion. Vlhy is the other "my" companion? Am I not "his" companion? Who are the others? Are they perhaps the rest of mankind, from which I set myself apart? By what right would I "first" affirm myself and "next" the others as the mass above which I raise myself? Evidently, the others are precisely those from whom I do not set myself apart, but among whom I "also" am.46 We exist together. The Manifold Forms of "We." Probably many years will have to pass before positive sociology and social psychology will manage to indicate in a fairly satisfactory way the many forms which this "we" can assume. This should not surprise us if we keep in mind that man can act toward his fellow man in numerous different ways. "We" means a relationship of the "I" to another "I," a "You," and it should be evident that this relationship differs constantly, for instance, when there is question of working together, taking a drink together, travel45According as we penetrate more profoundly into the possibilities of interhuman relationships, the term "companion' will show a shift of meaning, as is also the case with the terms "encounter" and presence." For the way in which the other accompanies me can be very diverse. For instance, the other with whom I go through life may love, neglect, or hate me. He is my companion, but this term can have many meanings. 46"Die Anderen besagt nicht soviel wie der ganze Rest der "Obrigen ausser mir aus dem sich das ach heraushebt, die Anderen sind vielmehr die, von den en man selbst sich zumeist nicht unterscheidet, unter denen man auch ist." Heidegger, ibid.

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ling together, having an accident together, etc. The "we" experienced in a trade-union differs from that in a military barrack or in a monastery; the "we" of a hospital ward is not the same as that of a boys' camp, a hockey club, a lecture hall audience, or a movie theatre. Examples can be multiplied almost endlessly, so that it will really be very difficult to bring some order in this diversity of forms.47 The same situation occurs here with respect to this "we" as we previously met regarding the meanings of my world. My world is an extraordinarily complex system of nearby and remote meanings which are correlated with my more actual or less actual standpoints. Every effort to absQlutize a certain standpoint, tQ consider it as the .only or even the only possible standpoint, makes a real concept .of my wQrld impossible. Yet the tendency to absolutize a certain viewpoint and a certain meaning, f.or instance, that .of physics and chemistry, is difficult to contrQl. This tendency is an impoverishment .of man's being and a constant threat of total blindness for everything which cannot be classified under certain categories, such as those of the physical sciences. Different Levels of Co-Existence. The realization that absolutizing leads to impQverishment and blindness exhQrts us to be very prudent when there is questiQn of recQgnizing the multifQrmity .of co-existence. It is necessary to see that this multifQrmity can occur .on different levels. Thus, for instance, .one may speak .of human relati.ons in the family, the sch.o.ol, the fact.ory, the .office, in YQuth organizations, in the armed forces, in medical services, in pastoral care. These relati.ons could be described, and one could try to discover the rules governing the fundamental forms .of human interrelati.onships, as is d.one, for example, by J.osef Pieper. 49 That is the task .of the sociologist. It is P.ossible als.o, .on the other hand, t.o .observe, as is d.one by Rutten, that in the many changes which have occurred in human relationships we "have suffered a loss in true humanity,"50 that ,ve have been deprived of "intimate values which make man rich in a definitely human sense."S1 In that case .one is no longer concerned with the actual s.ociological forms .of c.o-existence, but with the conditions on which human relatiQnships deserve to be 47Cf., e.g., M. Nedoncelle, Vers une philosophie de ['amotlr, Paris, 1946, pp. 125-138. 48Cf. F. J. Th. Rutten, },lenselijke verhoudingen, Bussum, 1955. 49Cf. Josef Pieper, Grundformen socialer Spielregeln, Frankfurt a. M., n. d. sOCf. Rutten, op. cit., p. 11. 5ICf. Rutten, op. cit., p. 46.

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called human in the full sense of the term. For these relationships can also be inhuman. Thus it appears that the multiformity of co-existence lies on different levels. We are aware of it that, regardless of the sociological form of co-existence, 52 we always' come closer to or retreat from an ideal of co-existence which at the same time is an ideal of authentically being human. If in a labor organization, in a factory, all employees are perfectly attuned to one another, so that the purpose of their organization-the product-is perfectly realized, one could perhaps speak of a perfect form of co-existence from the sociological point of view. Nevertheless, it remains possible and even is very probable that these sociologically perfect human relationships are inhuman. 53

Sociological and Anthropological forms of Co-Existence. Thus there is good reason for making a distinction between sociological forms of co-existence and those forms which from now on we shall call anthropological. In any sociological form it is possible for man to be authentically man, less man, or inhuman. This thought supposes, of course, that man is not as an ash tray or a cabbage is, but that man's being is a "having-to-be" (zu sein, Heidegger; avoi,. d etre, Sartre) .54 ] ust as sociologists search for the basic forms of co-existence from a definite standpoint, so also anthropologists, although their aim is different. In the present chapter we will limit ourselves to these fundamental anthropological forms. We will name them here without making an attempt to justify the classification. They are hatred, indifference, love, and justice. It is not possible to speak in a true-to-life way about love or justice in general unless one realizes that, to use ethical terminology, they are not concerned with commandments, at least not if "commandments" are understood as laws without a foundation in man but imposed upon him from without. Once they are understood in this way, it is no longer possible to make it clear that man ought to love and to be just, 52\Ve do not want to argue here whether or not the term "sociological" is correct. Our intention should be sufficiently clear. 53\Ve abstract here from the fact that, where the relationships are inhuman, it is usually impossible to speak of a perfect labor organization and a perfect realization of its purpose. This is the reason why even people who want merely to safeguard economic interests are concerned with the human character of their labor organization. 54\Ve cannot discuss this point here. It will be considered in the last chapter.

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in the sense in which people always desire to understand this "ought" -namely, as a demand of our being, as something required by beingman, as an internal "ought" in opposition to an extrinsically imposed command. Love and justice are modes of being-man, insofar as being-man is characterized by zu sein, by avoir a etre, by "having-tobe." Hatred and indifference likewise are modes of being-man, but in the sense that they are modes in which man ought not to realize himself. This classification is not a division into four disparate modes. Hatred, indifference, love, and justice do not lie outside one another like marbles, wigs, courts of law, and cloud banks. Here also one should keep in mind that they are modes of being-man, or rather, modes in which one and the same concrete man can and does realize himself. It could even be said that all four are always real in this concrete man, but that the emphasis falls on one of them.

3.

PHENOMENOLOGY OF HATRED

For the phenomenology of hatred we base ourselves fully on Sartre's explicitations of the "stare." At first, this procedure may seem to be unjustifiable, for a stare is not per se a hateful stare. However, although it is true that the qualifier "hateful" does not per se belong to "stare," de facto Sartre's description does not apply to stare in general but only to the hateful stare. The following pages will make this point clear.

The Other is One who Stares at Me. Like every phenomenologist, Sartre considers it wholly superfluous to prove that the other as the other is, because this is immediately evident and every proof would presuppose what it wants to establish. 55 This general thesis, however, gets a wholly unexpected result when Sartre investigates in which situation the other as the other, as other than myself, as subjectivity, becomes accessible to me. The other is revealed to me in his stare. 56 The subject which the other is always reveals himself as "he who stares at me,"1i7 and never in any other way. This expression, of course, could still have all kinds of meanings but, as was pointed out, de facto Sartre describes the stare in a very special way. 55Cf. Sartre, L'etre et U 56 Et dans l'epreuve

Ie neant, pp. 278-279. du regard, en m'eprouvant comme objectivite non reveiee, j'eprouve directement et avec mon etre l'insaississabie subjectivite d'autrui." Sartre, op. cit., p. 329. 117Cf. Sartre, op. cit., p. 315.

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The stare which reveals to me the other's subjectivity is always his hateful stare and never anything else. The other does not occur in Sartre except as the one who stares hatefully at me. Let us investigate this point somewhat more closely. Catching the other's stare does not consist in percelvmg one quality among many pertaining to his eye .or to an object which functions as an eye. It is intentionally that Sartre speaks of an object which "functions" as an eye, because a stare reveals itself not only in the convergence of two pupils on me, but also in the snapping of twigs-e.g., during an assault at night-, in the sound of steps foll.owed by silence, in the half-opened shutter, or in the slight movement of a curtain. 58 All these objects "function" as eyes. But catching the stare of someone who looks at me is not the perception of his eye or .of certain qualities of his eye. Of course, the eyes are there, but I cease to perceive them thematically; they are neutralized, they do not count, and remain unexpressed. Eyes which stare at me do not impress me explicitly as beautiful or ugly. The other's stare masks his eye and seems to precede his eyes. Accordingly, it is not possible for me to pay attention to someone's stare without having the perception of his eyes fall into the background. 59 To catch someone's stare, then, is not to perceive an object-in-theworld, but rather to become aware of being stared-at. The other's stare which is watching me proceeds from his eyes and throws me back upon myself. 60 When I am assaulted and suddenly hear the breaking of twigs behind me, I am thrown back upon myself, upon my vulnerability, and I understand immediately that I have been seen, that I am being stared-at. 6l The Meaning of Being Stared-at. Sartre's example clearly illustrates the exclusive meaning t~e stare has for him, a meaning to 58Cf. Sartre, ibid. 59Accordingly, I am able to perceive and express thematically the qualities of the other's eye, but this is possible only insofar as the experience of his stare withdraws into the background. In other words, insofar as I perceive that someone's eyes are beautiful or blue, I am not influenced by his stare. Presently we will see that this means: I do not experience my own "beinglooked-at." "J e dirais volontiers ici: nous ne pouvons percevoir Ie monde et saisir en meme temps un regard fixe sur nous; i1 faut que ce soit l'un ou l'autre." Sartre, op. cit., p. 316. 6o"Saisir un regard n'est pas apprehender un objet-regard dans Ie monde (a moins que ce regard ne soit pas dirige sur nous), c' est prendre conscien~e d'etre regarde. Le regard que manifestent les yeux, de quelque nature qu'!ls soient, est pur renvoi a moi-meme." Sartre, ibid. 6lCf. Sartre, op. cit., pp. 315-316.

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which he clings tenaciously. Let us suppose, says Sartre, that driven by jealousy I press my ear against the door of someone's room or peep through the key-hole to catch him in a compromising, situation. In doing this, I am fully present to the "object" to which I listen or at which I am looking and to the door or the key-hole, which have the meaning of being an instrument for, or obstacle to my deeds. My own existence, the acts through which I am with the objects, escape me. 62 Suddenly I hear footsteps in the corridorsomeone is looking at me. At the same moment I realize that I am being looked-at, i.e., I experience my being-an-object-for-the-other. The subjectivity of the other reveals itself in this being-looked-at, but to the detriment of my own subjectivity. For when I am stared at by the other, I am ashamed. But shame is always shame of myself. I am ashamed of my freedom, insofar as my freedom escapes me to become an object given to the eyes of the other. Shame is the realization that I am the object which the other looks at and judges. 63 Under the other's stare I am what I am-an object, a thing, an en-soi. As subjectivity, I am always what I am not, and I am not what I am; as subjectivity, I am in the mode of avoir a etre, or more simply expressed, I am a self-realizing freedom and the free project of my world. 64 Under the other's stare, however, my subjectivity is lost; my freedom goes numb and freezes under his glance; I no longer transcend my facticity. Shame reveals to me my being-forthe-other, and I am being-for-the-other. The other has only to stare at me and I am at once what I am. 61i When the other sees me sitting, I am seated for him, just as this inkwell stands on the table; for the other I am bent over the key-hole 62"Je suis pure conscience des choses et les choses ... m'offrent leur potentialite comme replique de rna conscience non-thetique (de) mes possibilites propres." Sartre, ofr. cit., p. 317. More simply expressed, there is a thematic consciousness of the objects, which fuses with the non-thematic consciousness of my own acts ("conscience de quelque chose" and "conscience (de) soi"; ibid., pp. 19-20). My own acts, therefore, are irre/lechi. Cf. above, pp. 30-31. "l1s sont nullement connus, mais je les suis." The assertion that these acts are not "known" becomes somewhat intelligible if one takes Sartre's view of knowledge into consideration. For Sartre, "to know" always means the thematic affirmation of an object. "Connaitre, c'est-a-dire poser comme objet." Qp. cit., p. 329. 6S"Or, la honte est honte de soi, elle est reconnaissance de ce que je suis bien cet objet qu'autrui regarde et juge". Sartre, ofr. cit., p. 319. 64Sartre uses all these expressions to indicate that I am not a "thing," an "object." A thing is what it is. 65"11 suffit qu'autrui me regarde pour que je sois ce que je suis." Qp. cit., p.32.

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just as this tree is bent by the wind; for the other I am indiscrete just as a table is round or a cabbage is rotten. My being-for-the-other is always a being-robbed of my subjectivity as transcendence. 66 In a single sentence Sartre fully generalizes this thought. If there is even a single other man, no matter who or where, no matter what relations he has to me, the mere fact that his subjectivity arises before me makes me have an external side, a "nature,"67 makes me be an object 68 _"my original fall is the existence of the other."69 The preceding paragraphs merely express the broad outline of Sartre's vision of the stare: the other's stare annihilates me as a subject to make me an object. This idea has to be explored somewhat more in detail. The Other's Stare Makes Me Lose My Selfness. As subject, I am the source of the system of meanings which the world is for me. When unsuspectingly I peep through the keyhole, the walls, the door, the keyhole, the semi-darkness of the corridor derive their meaning as obstacles or instruments from my subjectivity. In a certain sense they are organized by me and stand as functions of my project. But as soon as the other's subjectivity arises before me, the whole situation changes. My subjectivity is lost, i.e., I am no longer the source of the meaning of my world. My world become organized in a wholly different way, and shows me a different face, one that is outside my grasp and correlated with the other's subjectivity.70 Under the other's stare I am robbed of my selfness and, therefore, also of the world which I organize..71 For his subjectivity I am a thing-in-the-midst-of-things. 72 His glance strikes me, so that for him I am what I am; at the same time he seizes also my world, just as he seizes me, so that I am "bent 88"Aussi ai-je crepouille, pour l'autre, rna transcendance." Op. cit., p. 32l. 67Sartre always identifies, but incorrectly, "nature" with "thing" and "being." Cf. L'existentialisme est un humanisme, pp. 17-23. 6s"S'il y a un Autre, quel qu'il soit, ou qu'il soit, quels que soient ses rapports avec moi, sans meme qu'il agisse autrement sur moi que par Ie pur surgissement de son etre, j'ai un dehors, j'ai une nature." L'etre et Ie neant, p. 321. 69Cf. ibid. 7o"Mais avec Ie regard d'autrui, une organisation neuve des complexes vient se surimprimer sur la premiere." Ibid. 7l"Mais, du coup, l'alienation de moi qu'est l'etre-regarde implique l'alienation du monde que j'organise." Op. cit., pp. 321-322. 72"Car Ie regard d'autrui embrasse mon etre et correlativement les murs, la porte, la serrure; toutes ces choses ustensiles, au milieu desquelles je suis, tournent vers l'autre une face qui m'echappe par principe." Op. cit., p. 319.

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over the keyhole."73 What I am under the other's stare, I am in-themidst-of-the-world. 74 As a subject, I am characterized by my potentialities as mine. A thing does not have any potentialities which it could call its own. But under the other's glance my potentialities are annihilated as mine.

The Other's Stare Kills My Potentialities. The other's glance means the death of my subjectivity with respect to what I can be. I could perhaps hide from his stare in a dark corner of the corridor. But the other transcends, dominates, and prevents this possibility by his own capacity to dissipate the darkness with his flashlight. I am present to my own capabilities, I seize them, but as absent ;75 I seize them in my fear insofar as the other keeps his eye on me, has foreseen them, and already eliminated them. 76 Under the other's stare I seize my own potentialities as absent: my possibility to hide becomes his possibility to detect and identify me. Every action which I take against the other can become, under his stare, an instrument of which he makes use against me. All my potentialities lie petrified under his stare as objects in his world. 77 Under his look I "no longer dominate the situation." As an instrument of possibilities which are not my potentialities and deny my transcendence, I am "in danger."78 As we have previously pointed out, Sartre generalizes very easily. First, if there is anyone, no matter who or where, then the very fact that his subjectivity arises before me makes me an object. Now he adds that I am in danger and that this danger is not an incidental and unfortunate circumstance but the permanent structure of my beingfor-the-other.79 As appearing before the glance of the other, I have to consider myself a slave. I am a slave insofar as I am dependent upon a freedom which is not mine. 80 And at the same time I am delivered up to 73"Si je suis vu comme assis, je dois etre vu comme 'assis-sur-une-chaise', si je suis saisi comme courbe, c'est comme 'courbe-sur-Ie-trou-de-Ia-serrure', etc." ap. cit., p. 321. . 74"Et ce que je suis . . . je Ie suis au milieu du monde." ap. cit., p. 322. 75"Elle est la, cette possibilite, je la saisis, mais comme absente." Ibid. 76"Cette tendance a m'enfuir, qui me domine et m'entraine et que je suis, je la lis dans ce regard guetteur et dans cet autre regard: I'arme braquee sur moi. L'autre me I'apprend, en tant qu'il I'a Prl!VU et qu'i1 y a deja pare." Ibid. 77 Cf. op. cit., pp. 321-323. 78Cf. op. cit., p. 326. 79"Je suis en danger. Et ce danger n'est pas un accident, mais la structure permanente de mon etre-pour-autrui." Ibid. 8oCf. ibid.

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the other's evaluation without being able to exercise any influence upon it. Under the other's stare I am what I am. Accordingly, under the other's glance my being-for-the-other is revealed to me in sentiments of shame (the feeling that I am what I am), of fear (the feeling of danger in reference to the other's freedom), and of slavery (the feeling of estrangement from all my potentialities).81 The other's stare is the death of my subjectivity.

Sartre's Stare is Only a Hateful Stare. From the foregoing considerations we may conclude that the glance spoken of by Sartre is a very special one, whose meaning Sartre does not hesitate to generalize and abolutize without any sign of restraint or reserve. Sartre's glance is the hatelul stare, the stare which does not accept me as a subject, which does not allow that I as subjectivity project my own world, but throws me away as a thing among the things of the world by murdering my potentialities. We do not mean to say that Sartre's explicitations do not express reality. Undoubtedly, they express somethingnamely, the hateful stare, and this stare is reality. It would be far from us to deny this reality or to disclaim the ingeniousness of Sartre's description. At the same time, however, we have not the slightest intention of admitting that Sartre's explicitations describe the glance in general, i.e., that man can look at his fellow man only in a hateful way.82 The example chosen by Sartre as his starting point forces him to follow his chosen way to the bitter end, especially because he does not add any other examples which would somewhat enlarge the field of his investigation. Sartre, then, does not speak of the glance in general, but of a very special way in which man can look at his fellow man. But, apart from this glance, there is also a benevolent, gracious, merciful, and forgiving glance, an understanding, exhorting, encouraging, in brief, a loving glance. 83 Sartre leads us astray not by what he says, but by what he does not say and by surreptitiously suggesting that there is nothing else than what he expresses for US. 84 81Cf. ibid. 82Cf. E. Mounier, Introduction aux existentialismes, p. 99. 83Cf. A. J. Arntz, "Het aanvaarden der lichamelijkheid," Lichamelijkheid, Utrecht-Brussel, 1951, p. 146. 84Later Sartre will state explicitly what he merely insinuates in his phenomenology of the stare--namely, that love is impossible: "i! est, par essence, une duperie." Op. cit., p. 445.

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The Meaning of Being Stared-at According to Sartre. However, we have not yet reached the end of our trouble. On the occasion of a self-made objection Sartre attempts to penetrate even more into the meaning of the glance. What is the value of the certainty that I am being stared-at? I experience this certainty on the occasion of the appearance of certain objects in the world-the other's eyes, the snapping of twigs, etc. But I can be mistaken. In an assault at night the snapping of twigs may be caused by the wind. What, then, does my certainty of being stared-at mean in such a case, for there is no one who looks at me? My shame, my experience of being-anobject-for-the-other, would be false shame, for it would be shame for no one. 85

This difficulty became for Sartre the occasion to emphasize once more the purely incidental relationship between the eye and the stare. Being-stared-at does not depend upon the object which manifests the stare. The experience of being looked-at is not at all identical with the perception of an object. On the contrary, the perception of an object makes it impossible to experience at the same time the stare, i.e., to experience being looked-at. I experience the other's glance only when his eyes no longer playa role but are "destroyed."86 Thus to-be-stared-at by the other is not necessarily conditioned by his body;87 it is only on the occasion of certain objects that I experience being-stared-at. That I am being looked-at is certain; that the other's glance is conditioned by this or that object is always merely probable and at any rate not more than an occasional bond. 88 Example. Sartre's original example again serves to illustrate this view. When I stand bent over the keyhole, I may be mistaken in thinking that I hear steps. But I do not err in my certainty of being-stared-at. The other's glance is so real that I abandon my plan or, if I hold on to it, I can hear my heart beat in my throat and sharpen my ears for the slightest sound, the faintest creaking of the stairs. I am not mistaken in the experience of the other's stare. The

85Cf. op. cit.,

p. 335. 80 U Le regard, nous l'avons montre, apparait sur fond de destruction de I'objet qui Ie manifeste." Ibid. 87"Si done I'etre-regarde, degage dans toute sa purete, n'est pas lie au corps d'autrui plus que rna conscience d'etre conscience, dans la pure realisation du cogito, n'est liee a mon propre corps." Op. cit., p. 336. This is a very d'ebatable thesis. It amounts to positing the Cartesian C ogito, the isolation of the pour-soi. 88Cf. op. cit., p. 336.

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other is everywhere, below me, above me, in the neighboring rooms, in a dark corner of the corridor. It is only the other's facticity, his being-there, the concrete and historical event which we express by saying "someone is in the room," that is doubtful, but not his presence. 89 Moreover, well-understood, someone's absence reveals precisely his more original presence. For instance, I approach Peter's room and notice that he is absent. I would not even think of saying that the Sultan of Morocco is absent. Accordingly, Peter's absence does not mean that there are no determined relationships of Peter to a determined place, as is the case with the Sultan of Morocco. On the contrary, it is precisely about Peter in relation to a determined place that I speak when I mention that he is absent. This place, however, is determined not by Peter's location or by his relationships to a determined space, but by the presence of other human beings. For instance, I can say that Peter is absent from the picnic, but he is absent for his girl-friend Theresa; his absence is a concrete mode of being with respect to Theresa; to be absent is a certain mode of being present. 90 The distance separating Peter and Theresa has nothing to do with it. In London, India, America, on a lonely island, everywhere, Peter is present to Theresa who remained in Paris, for the situation of a man is not determined by a place, his latitude, or his longitude. However, not only are Peter, Rene, and Lucas present or absent to me, but I am also situated as a European with respect to Asiatics and Negroes, as an old man with respect to youth, as a judge with respect to delinquents, as a bourgeois with respect to laborers, etc. 91 Man, therefore, is present or absent for all,92 on the basis of an original and fundamental presence. 93

My Certainty of the Other's Presence. In this way it becomes clear that I am justified in my certainty about the other's presence. 89Cf. op. cit., pp. 336-337. 90"~tre absent, pour Pierre

par rapport a Therese, c'est une fa,.on particuliere de lui etre present." Op. cit., p. 338. 91All examples added by Sartre to his starting point merely serve to illustrate this starting point, viz., the being looked-at of one who peeps through the keyhole. Even the picnic adds no new dimension to presence. "Et cette presence originelle ne peut avoir de sens que comme etre-regarde ou comme etre-regard'ant, c'est-a-dire selon que autrui est pour moi objet ou moi-meme objet-pour-autrui." Op. cit., p. 339. 92Cf. op. cit., pp. 338-340. 93"Ainsi les concepts empiriques d'absence et de presence sont-ils deux specifications d'une presence fondamentale." Op. cit., p. 338.

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I may be mistaken with respect to the object which reveals to me the other's stare, my being-looked-at, but not with respect to the presence of this stare. The arrival of certain objects in my world is merely the occasion on which I experience myself cast down into the arena, under the stare of the other.94 It would be incorrect to speak here of stares in the plural, for the plural pertains only to the objects, which presuppose my world-projecting stare. It is, likewise, not correct to synthetize human presence and to conceive it as the presence of a single infinite subject, an omnipresent God. 95 I experience only the pre-numerical presence of the other. When I lecture in the classroom or deliver an address in an auditorium under the stare of the audience, the presence of the other remains undifferentiated. I never experience a single synthetized stare and, consequently, likewise never a single synthetized, infinite stare of God,96 but likewise never many, distinct stares. But as soon as I want to check whether my audience has understood me, I look at them and suddenly see "heads" and "eyes" appear. The pre-numerical presence of the other is dissolved and reduced to a plurality of objects. At the same time, however, the other's stare, the experience of being looked-at, has disappeared. D7

How to Regain My Subjectivity. From these descriptions it is apparent that there is only one way for me to regain my subjectivity which has to become frozen under the other's stare. I am an object for the subject which the other is, but never an object for an object. Therefore, to deliver myself of my being-an-object, I will rise and attempt to reduce the other to an object through my stare.98 For as soon as the other appears to me as an object, his SUbjectivity degenerates into a "property" of the object whose appearance was the occasion on which I became his victim. His subjectivity becomes U"L'epreuve de rna condition d'homme, objet pour tous tes aut res hommes vivants, jete dans l'arene sous des millions de regards et m'echappant a moimeme des millions de fois, je la realise concretement l'occasion du surgissement d'un objet dans mon univers." Op. cit., p. 340. 95Cf. Op. cit., p. 341. 96What Sartre wants to pass off here as the concept of God evidently has nothing to do with the true concept of God. It reminds us of the "evil eye," so common in myths and folk tales, rather than of the God of Revelation. The effort made by Sartre to show that the concept does not express reality impresses the reader as a humiliating reflection on his intel\igence. But the true concept of God is not affected by his remarks. 97Cf. Op. cit., pp. 340-342. 9S"L'objectivation d'autrui . . . est une defense de mon etre qui me libere precisement de mon etre pour autrui, en conferant a autrui un etre pour moi." Op. cit., p. 327.

a

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a property of, e.g., his eyes, just as being blue or ugly are properties of those eyes. The other now "has" his subjectivity just as a box "has" an inside. "And in this way I recover myself.99 jVo I ntersubjectivity. In this way all concrete human relationships are in principle determined. Either the other rejects me and reduces me to a thing-in-his-world or I control his subjectivity by making it an object-for-me. There are no other possibilities. Therefore, intersubjectivity is meaningless if this term is intended to express a relation of a subj ect to a subj ect. Nevertheless, man will never cease to tend to intersubjectivity. Love, masochism, desire, hatred, and sadism are all attempts to attain to the intersubjectivity of which man dreams. loo But all these attempts are in vain. IOl Human relationships are fully exhausted by the twofold possibility of either transcending the other or letting myself be transcended by him. The essence of human interrelationships is not beingtogether (M itsein, Heidegger), but conflict.lo2 The greater complexity of relationships among men does not change anything in this fundamental situation. Thus the "us"experience also stands as a function of being-looked-at, but the one who looks at "us" now is a third person. Let us say that I am fighting with the other. A third looks at us. I experience that for him I am an object, that I occur as a thing in a world which is not mine. I discover also that the other with whom I am fighting undergoes the same estrangement from his subjectivity. The other also is an object in the world of the third. However, his beingobject does not simply run parallel with mine; I experience that we occur as equivalent and solidary meanings in the world of the third; a third holds "us" in his power. loa In the absence of a third, I fight the other, but under the stare of a third we are fighting. We are ashamed, because a third stares at "us." Certain situations reveal the "us" -obj ect very clearly. For instance, the class-consciousness and the solidarity of the laborers against their oppressors is nothing else than the experience of being stared-at by a third-viz., the ruling class. Likewise, the solidarity 99Cf. Op. cit., p. 349. looCL Op. cit., pp. 428-503. lOl"Vainement souhaiterait-on un nous humain dans lequel la totalite intersubjective prendrait conscience d'elle-meme comme subjectivite unifiee." Op. cit., p. 501. 1I)2"L'essence des rapports entre consciences n'est pas Ie Mitsein, c'est Ie conflit." Op. cit., p. 502. l03Cf. Op. cit., p. 490.

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of the Jews under the pressure of anti-semitism, and that of citizens under the stare of the occupying forces. lo4 If the term "love" has any meaning at all, it could be used for this mode of being solidary. To love one another means to hate the same enemy.105 The "us" -experience, then, does not imply more than has been explained above and is only a more complex modality of beingstared-at. Accordingly, there is only one possibility of liberationthe oppressed class will rise and through its stare reduce the oppressing class to "them"-objects. lo6

Death. As Malraux has said previously, "every consciousness is the death of the other." Sartre takes these words seriously in a very lugubrious way when he investigates the meaning of death. As seen from the pour-soi, from my transcendence, my self-realizing subjectivity, death is absurd. For death brutally cuts short my transcendence; we die "into the bargain. lo7 My potentiality freezes to the compact density of the "in-itself." Death cannot give any meaning to life but, on the contrary, deprives life of all meaning. lOS From the viewpoint of being-for-itself no sense can be found in death, but it is meaningful from the stand-point of my being-for-theother. The experience of my-being-for-the-other reveals to me myself as stared-at, as an object, a thing-in-his-world. Through his stare my transcendence is transcended. His stare means the death of my potentiality. Thus my death is the definite triumph of the other over me. 109 As long as I live, I am capable of transcending his transcendence through my stare. But this possibility of self-defense is taken away from me through death. In death I am definitely a prey of the other's stare. I am what I am-a thing, just as the other has always judged me. \Vhoever wants to understand the meaning of his future 104Cf. op. cit., pp. 491-494. l05Cf. Le diable et Ie bon Dielt. 1061t does not escape Sartre that there is also a we-subject. The goals and instruments common to us reveal this we-subject to us. "We" make use of the highways and the gas pump; "we" oppress the laborers; "we" annihilate our oppressors. There is question here of a certain solidarity of subj ects. However, for Sartre this "we" does not have any ontological meaning. It is a purely psychological, purely subjective experience of a singular consciousness. It does not include a similar experience of the other. In other words, it is the fleeting symbol of an absolute solidarity between subjects which cannot be realized, because "les subj ectivites demeurent hors d'atteinte et radicalement sepan'!es." L'etre et Ie neant, p. 498. 107"N ous mourons toujours par-dessus Ie marche." Op. cit., p. 633. 108"Ainsi la mort n'est jamais ce qui donne son sens a la vie: c'est au contraire ce qui Dte par principe toute signification." Op. cit., p. 624. 109Cf. op. cit., pp. 624-625, 629.

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death will have to see himself as the future prey of the other.110 As long as I live, the other will try to murder my subjectivity; only when I have died does he definitely triumph over me.

Critique. When the reader of Being and Nothingness finally manages to raise himself and to escape from the lure of Sartre's genius, he will have only a single verdict: a splendid analysis of a degenerate society. But he will refuse to accept that even in the degeneration of the twentieth century there is nothing else than hatred which cannot bear the other's subjectivity, his simple self-realization-in-the-world, and which cannot find rest before it has reduced the other definitely to the compact density of the "in-itself." As we mentioned before, the forms of "we" are innumerable. In Sartre all anthropological forms of co-existence are reduced to a single fundamental pattern: the conflict between the hateful stare and the hated being-stared-at. For a genuine co-existence, for intersubjectivity in the sense of beingsubjects-together, there is no room in Sartre. We have only one reply: "There are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in your philosophy." 4.

PHENOMENOLOGY OF INDIFFERENCE

Introduction. When it is said that in the hateful stare I "see" nothing else in the other than a thing, an object, this expression should not be misunderstood. I do "see" the "other," I am aware of his subjectivity, I encounter the other "in person." Sartre is one of the first philosophers to affirm this point against a Cartesian tradition that has not yet been fully overcome. Nevertheless, very little of this awareness seems to remain when Sartre finishes his analysis of the stare. What Sartre says about the stare, however, is merely the explicitation of man's reply to the other's subjectivity. Being-stared-at has to be understood as a way of being-treated by the other. By means of my stare I reduce the other to an object, and through his stare the other murders my subjectivity .. Accordingly, what Sartre says about the stare does not really apply to my consciollsness of the other's subjectivity or to the other's consciollsness of my subjectivity, but only to my or his reply to this consciousness. For Sartre, this reply cannot be anything else than hatred. To hate means not to accept the subjectivity of my fellow man, 110t to be able to bear that the other realizes himself in a personal llO"Etre mort, c'cst etre en proie aux vivants. Ce1a signifie done que celui qui tente de saisir Ie sens de sa mort future doit se decouvrir comme proie future des <.lutres." Op. cit., p. 628.

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way and makes his personal history. To hate means to refuse to dwell "together" in "our" world and "together" to make "our" history. It is an attempt to make the other's subjectivity dissolve in my project of the world and to integrate it in the system of meanings planned by me for myself. But this is slavery and murder. Whoever hates his brother is a murderer, for he destroys the subjectivity which makes the other a human being. On several occasions we have pointed out that relationships among men show more differentiation than is insinuated by Sartre. Apart from hatred, there is also love, which is the exact opposite of hatred. Of course, it is possible that a phenomenologist-or any philosopher -simply does not see the reality of love. The cause of this lies usually in considerations of an epistemological nature. In an emempiristic or. scientistic conception of knowledge, as is, e.g., assumed by rigid behaviorism, there simply is no room for love because the reality of love cannot be conceived and expressed in terms of quantity. Of course, we may not address to Sartre the reproach that he adheres to such an epistemological prejudice. Nevertheless, he does not see any other possibility in human relationships than that of the hateful stare. Sartre is simply blind to the reality of love. Before presenting the phenomenological description of love, it will be useful to realize that the schema love-hatred is too narrow to do justice to the complexity of human relations. Love is exactly the opposite of what Sartre says about the hateful stare. But between these two there is a mode of being-related to fellow men which occurs perhaps most frequently in human society. It is called "indifference." We will consider it in the following pages. a. The "We" of Indifference

I am indifferent with respect to most people. I encounter them in my world and recognize their subjectivity at once. I address them as "you" because I realize that I am dealing with another self, a being who is "like-me" in the world, who "accompanies" me in the world, and with whom I am "together" in the world. "We" exist. The terms "to encounter," "to accompany," "you," "together," and "we" may have all kinds of meanings. I11 In general they imply l11"Il est clair au surplus qu'il existe dans Ie domains de la rencontre toute une gamme qui va de I'insignifiant au plus hautement significatif; plus je m'approche de la limite inferieure, c'est-a-dire d'une insignificance radicale, plus la rencontre peut etre traitee comme entrecroisement objectif; humainement parlant elle n'est d'ailleurs qu'un coudoiement." Marcel, Le mysfere de l'etre, vol. I, p. 153.

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the recognition that the man whom I find in my world is distinct from the thing in my world.112 For instance, I never turn to a thing "in the second person," I never call a thing "you." I am aware of it that I will never be able to obtain a personal reply from a thing and, therefore, I do not address a thing as I address a person, a "yoU."Il3 Likewise, it is meaningless to say that things "accompany" me or that I am "together" with things. As used for interhuman relationships, these terms can pass through a long series of meanings according as the relationships of man to man acquire more content, become more profound, and assume a more genuinely human character.u4 As we pointed out above, the "we" which the phenomenologist encounters most often is the "we" of indifference, the empty, unfeeling, dull "we" of a society which constantly loses more of its human character. Let us give an example. What is the meaning of the man behind the ticket window of a railroad station for most travellers? One becomes aware of it in watching how most passengers indicate what they want. They snap: "New York, one way" and put a few dollars on the revolving disk. A few seconds later, the same disk shows a ticket and some change. What meaning has the man behind the window? He means the function which he performs, and all human beings whom he encounters in this function are identified by him with the qualifier "traveller." How many "human beings" did the man at the ticket window "encounter" before he finished his eight-hour day? One could say: ''756,'' but also: "just two"-the two who addressed him deliberately with: "May I have a ticket to New York, one way?" For the term "encounter" can have a variety of meanings. The first reply illustrates the "we" of indifference. There is a "we" -consciousness contained in it, which is not the case if I take my ticket from an automatic dispenser. However, what is the meaning of the "you" that is contained in this "we"? It expresses no more than a certain quality-that of 112The term "encounter" is an exception, because it is used also for the unity of mutual implication of man and the world. For a good understanding of the correctness of this use, see Buytendijk, Phenomenoiogie de fa rencontre, Paris, 1952, pp. 16-22. What applies to the term "encounter" is valid also for "presence," which we have used as equivalent with "existence." However, the term "presence" is often reserved for "personal presence." 113"Je ne m'adresse a la deuxieme personne qu'a ce qui est regarde par mo; comme susceptible de me repondre, de quelque fa!;on que ce soit-meme si cette reponse est un "silence intelligent." Marcel, J ournai metaphysique, p. 138. 114Cf. Marcel, op. cit., p. 169.

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ticket clerk-while I am nothing else than a "traveller" for the man behind the window. In such a "we" the "encounter" means purely and simply the confrontation of a certain quality or function of the "I" with a quality or function of the "you." It is the functions which bring us into contact, and the contact is limited to the meeting of the functions. In such circumstances the other does not concern me, and it is of no interest to tne who is at the window. Whoever is there simply is a ticket clerk, and as far as I am concerned he is identified with this quality. It would leave me cold if someone else were put behind the window, just as the identity of the traveller saying: "New York, one way" does not interest the man behind the window. The "we" of this contact is the "we" of indifference.

h. The "He" The Indifferent ((You" is ((He." It makes sense to reserve the term "he" for this "yoU."11G For explicitating the experience of the "he" discloses exactly the same content as the analysis of the indifferent "you." The experience of the "he there in the class room," "he there on the operating table," "he there behind his desk," etc. can be adequately expressed in a series of predicates, expressing the sum total of qualities which an objective judgment attributes to "him." For "he" is sick, "he" is a bookkeeper, "he" is sensuous, authoritarian, learned, a publisher, smart-looking, prudent, a spendthrift, a Jew, a Jesuit, etc. The experience of the "he" is as the experience of a completely filled-out form,116 a source of information,117 a file card which is its own archivistPS If, however, I investigate how I experience myself when I see nothing else in the other than a series of qualities, a sum total of predicates, I discover that for myself I am likewise such a series of predicates. For he is a "teacher," and I am a "student"; he is a "physician," and I am "sick" ; he is a "spendthrift," and I am a "poor devil" ; he is "authoritarian," and I am his "victim" ; he is a "farmer," ~nd I am a "technician" ; he is a "Jesuit," and I am an "Augustinian." In other words, "he" is a file card, and "I" also am a file card. We are filled-out forms. llGCf. Marcel, op. cit., p. 171. 116Marcel, Du re/us d l'invocation, p. 49. 117 Marce1, Journal metaphysique, p. 174. l1sMarcel, Du re/us d l'invocation, p. 71.

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When we become clearly aware of this situation, a spontaneous protest arises in us: are "we" not much more than these qualities and predicates? But what, then, are "we," what can "we" be, what should "we" be? It is not difficult to recognize in the preceding description the "we" of bureaucracy, of administration, of the technocratic world. It is the "we" of indifference, in which nobody is somebody because nobody is anybody's concern. Nevertheless, to "see" nothing else in the other than a "he" means a way in which I treat the other, a mode in which I encounter him. This way of treating the other is a reality, just as 'Sartre's hateful stare is a reality. But, we must ask, is it the only possible reality? Evidently, not.

"He" as "Absent" from Me. This is perhaps the right place to one of Heidegger's arguments for being-together,119 Heidegger points out that the experience of "being-alone" indicates a more original togetherness, so that being-alone is a deficient mode of beingtogether. 120 While this is true, we may add that the same is experienced very clearly in the "we" of indifference, at least when one does not systematically close oneself to this experience. In the "he" I experience the other as "absent," as "far" from me. This is not a question of mathematical distance, for it could very well happen that the other is mathematically speaking, close to me, while he is "far" from me,121 What is at stake here is a certain fullness of beingman, and it is with respect to this fullness that I experience the other as "far" from me and myself as "alone." It may happen that I walk with the other, speak with him, and even work with him day after day,122 yet he remains "far" from me. 123 Corresponding to this situation is the experience of my "being-alone." It is as if I am identified with the qualities which I have in the eyes of the other. The thesis of Christian ethics, "Judge not lest thou be judged," apparently is capable of being philsophically interpreted. 124 As soon as I judge the other, i.e., reduce him to qualities which I express in objective predicates, as soon as I classify him as pertaining to this or that category, I myself also am judged. I do not have to wait till the above, p. 179. und Zeit, p. 120. 121Cf. Marcel, Le mystere de /'etre, Vol. I, p. 221. 122It is this "we" which Sartre describes as a purely subjective experience of a singular consciousness. Cf. L'etre et Ie neant, pp. 495-504. 123Cf. Marcel, Du refus a I'invocation, p. 48. 124Cf. Marcel, Journal metaphysique, p. 65. 119See

120Sein

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end of time, for this judgment is executed immediately: I experience myself as identified with my qualities, as bearer of predicates, as classified and filed under a category. I experience myself as "alone." And in this way I am also "condemned."

An Objection. The objection could be raised that It IS preposterous to call simply functional encounters, such as that between the ticket clerk and the traveler, indifference. Obviously, the term "indifference" has a pejorative sense and refers to a human relationship which ought to be different. But who would seriously claim that the encounter between, say, the ticket clerk and the traveller, ought to be more than the confrontation of qualities? To express it more directly, should affectivity have any role in such an encounter? Josef Pieper speaks of this difficulty when he pleads for the recognition of the proper meaning pertaining to society and to social relationships in opposition to community and community bonds. 1211 He calls the social element a speciaf category, having its own characteristics and "rules of play" based upon the man's individuality, through which man is "sharply defined and separated from every other individual,"126 through which he is an "I," finds the purpose of his activities in himself, works for his own sake, and seeks his own advanrage. 127 Like a community, society would be a model form an an ideal of social bonds. 128 Those who do not see this could at most reproach society for not being a community.129 But even this reproach would be unjustified, thinks Pieper. The area covered by Pieper's views is broader than that touched by the objection that it is perhaps preposterous to call simple functional relationships "indifference." We shall, therefore, restrict ourselves to the objection in question, especially because a general evaluation of Pieper's views is not possible without anticipating questions which have to be considered extensively-namely, love and its relation to justice. We will subsequently describe justice as willingness to execute the minimum demands of love while, according 125Cf. Pieper, Grundformen sozialer Spieiregein, Frankfurt a. M., n. d., pp. 39-65. 126]. Pieper, op. cit., p. 44. 127]. Pieper, op. cit., pp. 44-45. 128J. Pieper, op. cit., pp. 57-58 and 64-65. 129]. Pieper, op. cit., p. 52.

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to Pieper, justice is the foundation of social life, in which everyone ought to take care of his own interest, albeit with due respect for the equal rights of the other to do the same. 130 Thus it should be evident that, unlike Pieper, we cannot see society as a model and ideal of social relations for what he calls the "community" in which love is the fundamental law governing the interrelations. Social relations, in Pieper's sense, may be called an ideal only if they are compared to barbarism ruled by the law of the strongest. 13l They are not an ideal alongside, and on an equal basis with community relations. 132 What Pieper calls an ideal is for others, e.g., Couwenberg, merely a de facto situation which constitutes the social problem par excellence of our time. lS3 We think that Couwenberg is right. Reply to the Objection. Our reply to the objection may be brief. We do not call functional relations "indifference," because they are functional,. but because and to the extent that they are purely functional. In purely functional relations there is no affectivity at all. Accordingly, we do not claim that every functional encounter ought to be permeated with the highest degree of love,134 but we do maintain that every functional encounter ought to participate in a general affection for man by virtue of which the encounter ceases at once to be purely functional. The point is not that there should be an explicit act of love, but a loving disposition. This disposition is practically undefinable, but in the relationship of man to man it is either experienced as beneficial or felt as a painful lack. If it is lacking, the encounter is correctly termed indifference. Something is missing in it that ought to be present. Man experiences himself as "alone" and the other as "far-away." l30J. Pieper, op. cit., p. 52. l3lIt is rather surprising that Pieper himself accepts this. "Such a struggle of interests before the court of law perhaps may not present a lofty spectacle to the proponent of society-but nevertheless even the proponent will not be able to deny the large and encouraging difference between a civil lawsuit and the law of the strongest." Gp. cit., p. 52. l32"Par I'amour seul nous instituons des rapports veritablement humains, nous nous unissons en nous rendant trans parents les uns pour les autres. L'amour est l'unique societe humaine parce qu'il est communion." Jean Lacroix, Pusonnc et amour, Paris, 1955, p. 14. 133Cf. S. \V. Couwenberg, De vereenzaming van de lIIoderne mens, 's-Gravenhage, n.d. pp. 11-34. 1

HThe reason for this lies in the fact that love is "situated."

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Am I not more than the sum total of my qualities ?135 Am I not more than the object of an "objective" judgment ?136 \Vhat is the meaning of my "loneliness" when the other is "far-away"? The fact that I "miss" the other, that I am capable of "missing" him, indicates a more original vocation in me, a vocation to community. c. Encounter If nothing else was possible than the "we" of indifference, the term "encounter" could not have the genuinely human meaning that is attributed to it. 137 In the genuinely human sense "encounter" is filled with an affection of which there is no trace in the "we" of indifference. Used in this genuinely human sense, the term indicates a kind of participation in the personal existence of the other for whom I care. This is precisely what is missing in the "we" of indifference. If there were only the "we" of indifference, the encounter with human beings would not have much more meaning than the meeting of certain qualities. But there are cases in which it is apparent that more than such a meeting is experienced. Let us assume that I travel by Metro, the subway of Paris. The car is full to overflowing and with every sudden shift of motion I "bump" into my fellow travellers. Noone takes any offence-we are for one another "travellers in a full Metro." In Saint-Michel the train stops. Since another train has just left this station, only one man is waiting. He opens the door and "bumps" into me who am standing close to the entrance. Does he "bump" into me? Perhaps, yes, but it is also possible that something entirely different happens between the two of US. 13S It may happen that a "feeling" grows between us, if only because I make an effort somehow to make room for him, or 130"Je suis toujours a tout moment plus que l'ensemble de predicats que serait susceptible de mettre en lumiere une enquete faite par moi-memeou par tout autre-sur moi-meme." Marcel, Journal metaphysique, p. 196. lS6"Certes je puis me decrire-mais outre qu'it n'est point aise de comprendre comment cette description est metaphysiquement possible, ne faut-it pas dire que rna realite la plus profonde deborde infiniment cette description?" Marcel, op. cit., p. 215. lS7"Rencontrer quelqu'un, ce n'est pas seulement Ie croiser, c'est etre au moins un instant aupres de lui, avec lui; c'est dirai-je d'un mot dont je devrai user plus d'une fois, une co-presence." Marcel, Du refus d l'invocation, p.20. lss"Mais iI suffit parfois d'une rencontre de regards, ou d'une parole, ou d'un service echange, pour que deux etres sachent immediatement qu'it y a entre eux une sorte de communaute metaphysique et qu'a travers la mediation des qualites its decouvrent deja une solidarite de leurs essences personnelles. M. Nedoncelle, La reciproc.iti des consciences, Paris, 1942, p. 17.

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because of the friendly smile on his face, or because of the tone in which he says: "I am sorry," when he gingerly steps on my toes. What is it that there is between this man and me, this reality between us, which we both feel when we leave the train together and go our own ways? "Nothing at all," would be the reply of the materialist. But this answer is not right. True, it is "almost nothing," but during the short trip it exercised a kind of surreptitious reciprocal causality so effectively that, if I should happen to meet the same man the next day in the Louvre, I would feel inclined to address him: "Hey! Are you here too ?"139 What took place between this man and me? Did I "bump" into him just as I would bump into the doors of the subway car when they suddenly close? In an affirmative reply my encounter with the man becomes wholly unintelligible. I want to use again the term "encounter," but now this word indicates a reality, a "we" which has a much more profound meaning, a meaning that is full of genuine humanity and affection. It is not the "we" of indifference which became real, for this man concerned me, I did not want him to let this train pass without finding a place in it in spite of all difficulties. I too concerned him, as appeared from the tone of his apology when he could not avoid stepping on my toes. The most remarkable point of our situation, however, was that the objective qualities which could be predicated of both of us remained fully in the background of our encounter. Only now I become aware of it that this man was rather fat and that there was something wrong with his left eye. But I did not reduce him to the predicates "fat" and "cross-eyed." If I had done that, what now has become a reality between us would not have taken place. And I would certainly not have addressed him the next day when we met in the Louvre, but would simply have made the mental remark to myself: "There is that cross-eyed fatso again." 5.

PHENOMENOLOGY OF LOVE

The example which was analyzed above could serve as the starting point for the formation of a correct concept of the true character of love. Spontaneously we are convinced that in the suggested situation a first beginning of what may be called "true love" is reality. Of course, there are other situations which could qualify just as well 139These thoughts paraphrase an idea of Marcel in Le myslere de ['eire, vol. T, p. 153.

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as "loving encounters." We may speak of such an encounter when a boy leads a blind man across the road, when a total stranger goes out of his way to show me the road, when a soldier deprives himself of something to give comfort to the prisoner whom he leads away. Loving also in the encounter-let us suppose so at least--of the young man who realizes that he is called to go through life together with "this" gir1. But, we must ask, what is the proper character of the loving encounter and what are the conditions in which it develops into love?

a. Love as Active Leaning The loving encounter always presupposes the appeal of the other to my subjectivity. A call goes out from him, embodied in a word, a gesture, a glance, a request. His word, gesture, glance, or request mean an invitation to me whose true meaning is difficult to express in words. No matter, however, in what form the appeal of the other is embodied, it always implies an invitation to transcend myself, to break away from my preoccupation with myself and my fascinated interest in myself. Self-Centeredness. The compulsive way in which I am centered upon myself and mine makes it clear why I have such difficulty in understanding the true appeal of the other to me. For, to see a certain reality, I need more than eyes. To understand the meaning of the other's appeal to me I need a certain attitude, and this attitude implies that I have broken away to some extent from my pre-occupation with myself. Ho One who is full of pride or cupidity sees nothing. For the appeal of the other has nothing violent about it, it is not brutal, not bent on conquest, it does not jolt me, and deliberately leaves open the possibility or" refusal. It does not present itself as a demand, for it is too humble to demand anything. For this reason it is possible that I will not understand this appeal. If I am fully occupied with myself, if I am absorbed in my occupations, obsessed by my thoughts and desires. I will not understand the other's appeal. If I am fully absorbed in myself, I know a priori that I am excused, no matter what the request may be, even though I may not explicitly realize that I have this conviction. HI Excused from everything, I am insensible to every appeal. HOCf. Marcel, Etre et avoir, pp. 152-153. HICf. Marcel, op. cit., pp. 101-lO2; 105-106.

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In daily life I am accustomed to playing a role. I am a physician, a middle class citizen, a teacher, a priest, an intellectual, or a laborer. As a judge I face the delinquent, as a teacher the student, as a physician the sick, as a priest the sinner. But who are they-those delinquents, students, sick, and sinners? They are those who address an appeal to me. Yet I will not understand their appeal if I identify myself with the role I have to play. Such an identification would mean a pre-occupation with myself which closes me to any appeal of the other to me. What the Other's Appeal is Not. Is it possible to make the appeal in question more clearly explicit? Perhaps it will be easier to begin by indicating how the appeal should not be understood. It may not be conceived as the other's attractiveness because of any of his corporeal or spiritual qualities. Such attractive qualities could perhaps invite me and draw me to a "being-with-the-other"-but can we speak of love here? Would love be impossible if the other's qualities are not attractive? Would love have to cease when the other's qualities cease to be attractive? At most, qualities may give rise to a kind of enamoredness, in which the desire to be "with" the other is inherent-but is love not rather the firm will to be "for" the other? As long as only the other's qualities speak either positively or negatively to me, my reply will only be a reply to a "he" or a "she". If, however, one really loves, he is aware of it that the qualities or merits of the other are of little importance; they fall into the background to make roOl;l1 for what the other is over and above a certain facticity, over and above an inventory file card. 142 . Likewise, the other's appeal to me may not be understood as being identical with any explicit request. A request could be explicitated as the expression and presentation of a de facto situation for which provisions have to be made. But this is not the other's appeal, as may be evident from the fact that, even when I satisfy the other's request materially, he may still go away "dissatisfied." He departs "dissatisfied," because he realizes that my heart was not in it when I did or gave what he wanted, that I spoke to him or received him only in a casual way, that he disturbed me, that "he was too much bother for me," that I was absent-minded and distracted. 143 I satisfied his re142"C'est en vain que l'amant denombre les caracteres, les merites de l'etre aime; il est certain a priori que cet inventaire ne lui rendra pas son amour transparent pour lui-meme." Marcel, Journal mlitaphysique, p. 226.

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quest and, nevertheless, he is "dissatisfied." Why? Because his appeal to me is more than his explicitly formulated request. The other does not merely make a request, he "is" also an appeal. "Be With Me." Accordingly, understanding the other's appeal to me ties in not with his facticity but rather with what the other is over and above his facticity-namely, a subjectivity. His subjectivity itself is the appeal that is addressed to me. It is a plea that I participate in his subjectivity. Marcel endeavors to express this plea in words: "Be with me."144 It is the call of the other to go out beyond the confines of myself, to support, strengthen and, as it were, increase his subjectivity by participating in it. Break with Self-Centeredness. If the other's call, "Be with me," is to be understood by me, it is necessary that I shall have already somewhat broken away from and conquered my fascination with myself. On the other hand, however, it is precisely the appeal of the other which makes it possible for me to liberate myself from myself. The other's appeal reveals to me an entirely new, perhaps wholly unsuspected dimension of my existence. Who am I? Am I not more than the sum total of my objective qualities ?1411 Am I not more than a file card full of predicates? Am I not more than the role I play? Certainly, my being-human is richer. I am not identical with my facticity, I am a subjectivity, called to give again and again meaning to my facticity in free self-realization. I am not a thing-in-the-world, but I am. a project-in-the-world, called to realize myself in the world and to make the world a human world. The awareness of this calling, however, is merely a provisional insight. For the encounter with the other, his appeal to me, reveals an entirely new dimension of my subjectivity. I am called to realize myself in the world, but for you. The encounter with you reveals to me my destiny as destiny-for-you. Through you I understand the meaninglessness of my egoism and self-centeredness, which would H3G. Marcel, "Positions et approches concretes du mystere ontologique," Le monde casse, Paris, 1933, p.293. 144"Pour que cette unite soit, it faut d'abord, semble-t-il, qu'iJ y ait appel, invocation, un "sois avec moi" plus ou moins c1airement enonce. II faut que cet appel soit entendu, sans necessairement que Ie sujet sache qu'it l'entend, et c'est sur la base de ce co-esse mysterieux que la vision pourra s'edifier." Marcel, 1 ournal metaphysique, p. 169. 14 II ef. Marcel, op. cit., pp. 215-216.

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fatally tempt me to lock myself up in myself and in my world. Yielding to this temptation would mean that I would miss my destiny. Affection as Reply to the Other's Appeal. The other's appeal and my awareness of my destiny require that I reply. I realize, however, that the reply must be adapted to the call, "Be with me." A piece of information, a crust of bread, or a bit of money are not the answer that is requested of me. On the contrary, I am aware that they may be means to buy off the proper answer which lowe the other. "Be with me" is his request. It is a call upon my being, an appeal to be together. "Be satisfied if I give you what I have," I could reply. ·But such a reply would be the meaning possessed by tending the other a crust of bread or a coin. It would mean that I lock myself up again in myself, in my world, and hope that the other will never again disturb me. I remain alone, and the other stays "far away." When the other's appeal does not originate from his facticity, the proper answer to his appeal is not primarily connected with any determined facticity. It is for this reason that the true meaning of my being-destined-for-the-other is so difficulty to define. The appeal is not an explicit request, and the reply is not the material satisfaction of a desire. Sometimes even the refusal to satisfy a certain request may be the only way of really loving the other. The reply to the other's appeal is a reply to his subjectivity. As an embodied subject, the other is a source of meaning and of new meaning, and he gives unceasingly in his freedom meaning and new meaning to his facticity. As a subject, as another I, as a "selfhood," he freely goes through the world, he makes his history, he goes to meet his destiny. His appeal to me means an invitation to will his subjectivity, to offer him the possibility to exist, to consent to his freedom, to accept, support and share in it. My affirmative reply to his appeal is known as "affection."146 Implications of My Reply to His Appeal. As it is used in the preceding context, there is little danger that the term "affection" will be misunderstood. In the ordinary usage of language, however, from which it has been borrowed, there is a certain ambiguity. It very often means a kind of sentimental indulgence which has nothing HaUL'amour est une volonte de promotion. Le moi qui aime veut avant tout I'existence du toi; il veut en outre Ie developpement autonome de ce toi." M. NedoncelIe, Vers une Philosophie de l'amour, Paris, 1946, p. 11.

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to do with love. The truth of this assertion should be immediately evident from the preceding considerations and from the nature of indulgence. Indulgence means a kind of openness to and compliance with the arbitrariness that can be implied in the other's explicit or implicit desires. But it is not at all certain that my openness to this arbitrariness really means an active participation in the other's subjectivity. Love wants the other's subjectivity, his free self-realization, but this implies that love refuse, precisely because it is love, whatever could impede or destroy the other's possibility of self-realization. This thought has still another implication. The loving leaning to the other does not only refuse to show itself open to the other's arbitrariness, but also contains always, in the background, at least an implicit awareness of the destiny proper to the other's subjectivity. As a source of meaning and direction, the other's subjectivity means a searching for, and partial finding of his way in the world, and to the extent that he finds his way, he realizes himself, i.e., goes forward toward his destiny. The other's subjectivity is not an isolated Cogito, separated from his body and from his world. The other exists; he is bodily in the world; as an embodie~_I-in-the­ world he accomplishes his being-human. I am called to love him as such and not as anything else. This call implies that I will his bodily being and that I will his world for him. Otherwise my love would be an illusion. The man who loves his fellow man cares for his body, is concerned with what he needs for his material life, builds hospitals, constructs roads, harnesses rivers and seas, establishes traffic rules, builds schools and prisons-all to make it possible for the other to attain to self-realization in the world. Bodily being and the world are the £acticity which for the other constitutes the starting point from which he sets forth to freely realize his possibilities and those of his world. It is in the world that he gives meaning and direction to his existence, that he goes forward to his destiny. But what is this destiny? It is not possible that I have no opinion about it. Even the conviction that the other has no destiny is a mode of thinking about his destiny. Love and Happiness. This destiny may be called in a most general way "happiness." We abstract here from what exactly happiness is and from that in which it consists. Perhaps it is absolute freedom, perhaps material possessions, perhaps knowledge, virtue, or the possession of God. Whatever opinion I hold regarding happiness, it should be evident that my idea of it will exercise influence

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on, and give an orientation to my affection for the other. Through my affection I will his subjectivity, but this subjectivity is a searching for his way in the world onward to his destiny. My affection, therefore, will open certain worldly roads to him, but also close others-namely, those which would not bring him closer to his destiny.lu There are, for instance, subjects who long for the day when they will be able to make the entire world one huge concentration camp. Others would like to poison youth or kill off the incurably sick and the insane. Effective love of our fellow man owes it to itself to oppose such desires wherever it is possible. This duty incombent on love is the reason why true love, i.e., love which is effective and takes action and which is not conceived as a sentimental feeling, is so often misunderstood. Conceived as a sentimental feeling, as being fascinated by the other's qualities, love will show itself as an illusion, as being nothing of true love. But if love is effectively ready to open certain worldly roads to happiness and to close others, it is often interpreted as an attempt to dominate the other, as a means to overcome him and hold him in subjection. H8 Of course, it cannot be denied that sometimes a man will tend to control his fellow man in this fashion. I can try to control the other completely, but it would mean that I reduce him to a thing and destroy his subjectivity, the project of the world which he is. In such a case there can be no question of love.149 The effectiveness of love, however, has nothing to do with domineering or tyrannizing the other.150 In this connection it may be pointed out that love is modest and reserved, i.e., has an immense respect for the other's subjectivity. This respect is so essential that its absence would destroy 10ve.151 147This is expressed in the classical definition of love as "to will good for someone else." 14SC£. G. Madinier. Conscience et amour, Paris, 1947, p.24. 1491t happens sometimes that parents attempt to control their children completely to make them play the "role" which they themselves have chosen for them. For instance, quite a few boys and girls have to remember all the time that they are the "parson's son," the "bank-director '5 daughter," or "better-class children." 150"Aimer, c'est s'interesser a ce que I'autre est a la premiere personne et dans son pour-soi, c'est s'efforcer de Ie constituer dans son intimite, c'est Ie vouloir comme liberte et principe d'initiative. C'est pourquoi l'objection d'intolerance et de tyrannie, si frequemment faite a la charite, ne peut s'adresser qu'a une charite mal entendue et mal pratiquee. Qui aime vraiment veut l'autre en tant que sujet et s'efforce de Ie constituer comme tel." Madinier, op. cit., p. 127. 151 Heidegger also speaks about respect for the other's subj ectivity and freedom. Being authentically human, as conceived by Heidegger, lets the other be what he is. However, it does not include participation in the other's subjectivity, but rather the abstention from this participation because the other is destined for death anyhow. Cf. Seil~ und Zeit, p. 264.

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Disinterestedness of Love. Is love, then, concerned only with the other? It would be going too far to reply in the affirmative, for in love I am concerned also with myself. However, this could easily be misunderstood. \Ve are still speaking here of love as an active leaning to the other, and not about the legitimate desire to be loved by the other. Insofar as my own subjectivity is an appeal to the other's being, a call to participate in my subjectivity, love is concerned with myself. This, however, is not the point. What is to be considered here is that even in love as the active leaning to the other I am to a certain extent concerned with myself. But, the point is, in what sense? Since love wants the other's freedom,. it is in a way defenseless. It places a limitless trust in the other and thus delivers itself to him. This trust implies an appeal 'Of the lover to the beloved. The trust which love shows, the defenselessness which it displays, themselves are a call upon the love of the beloved: Love is not wholly concerned only with the other. Once more, it is easier to state what this appeal of love to the beloved is not than to explicitate its meaning immediately in a positive way. The appeal of love to the beloved is not the will to draw in some way advantage from the affection for the other. It is impossible for the lover to aim at his own promotion or career and at the same time to keep his love pure. A sick person who would discover that the nurse caring for him in such a "loving" way does so exclusively in order to become head-nurse as soon as possible or to receive an eternal reward in heaven does not think that he is really loved. Likewise, the appeal of love to the beloved does not mean that the lover wants to compel, dominate, or possess the other. Love wants the other's freedom. It does not suffice for love that the other de facto takes a certain way through the world, not even if this way is a good and safe way from the viewpoint of the destiny of human freedom. What love wants is that the other himself chose this safe way and avoid that dangerous path.152 Self-Realization and Love. Sincerely being at the other's disposal, therefore, implies that I renounce the temptation to promote myself in loving the other and the possibility of dominating the other. However, love contains still another aspect of self-denial, which is more difficult to seize. In love I destine myself for the other, but I vaguely realize that I also go forward to my own destiny. Even if I have never heard 152"Aimer, c'est vouloir I'autre comme sujet." Madinier, op. cit., p. 95.

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of any doctrine regarding man's destiny, I experience that in love I am on the road to the achievement of my manhood. Man's being is paradoxical in more than one way. As we pointed out previously, man is a subject, a being who exists for himself, a presence to himself, a self-controlling being. Man is an I, a selfhood. But he is a selfhood only in being fused with the non-I. Man is the paradox of immanence and transcendence (Dondeyne). This paradoxical aspect of man is put even in sharper relief by love. Love is the ready availability of my subjectivity, its belonging to the subject which the other is. But in giving and surrendering myself, it is revealed to me what my selfhood really is. )'Iy real self is the available self. Is, then, the appeal of love to the other perhaps the request to offer me the possibility of achieving my own manhood? \Ve are touching here the eternal question whether or not a fully disinterested love is possible. Is it possible for man to will something without willing it for his own sake? This question is especially important with respect to love, because at the least love wants the other's benefit. Weare of the opinion that it is impossible for man to love his fellow man in such a way that his love will not de facto be for the benefit of the lover himself. It is not possible for man to forego the fact that love, as active leaning to the other, is equally immediately the achievement of his own being, conceived as zu sein. This, however, does not mean that the achievement of one's own manhood is what love aims at, that this achievement is the motive why man loves. The opposite is true. In love man goes forward to his destiny, he finds the fulfilment of his manhood, on condition that this fulfilment be not the motive of his love. If the other were to thank me for my affection, and I would wave these thanks aside by saying that what I was interested in was the achievement of my own manhood, the other would immediately conclude that he was not really loved. For, ultimately, I would have been aiming at my own "career."

Love as the Appeal to the Other's Freedom. The appeal of love to the beloved can be correctly understood only when one sees that willing the subjectivity, the freedom, of the other cannot be fruitful unless the other ratifies this will through his consent. Love does not want to compel; it cannot even compel without ceasing to be love. For this reason love is in a sense helplessly surrendered to the other. Love wants the other's freedom and, therefore, becomes fruitful only

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through the free consent of the other. But the lover cannot will that his love be not understood, not accepted, and without fruit. Hence it appeals to the beloved, and this appeal we may explicitate as the request: "Accept that I be at your disposal." Even when love is obliged to close certain roads through the world for the beloved, it cannot want otherwise than that the beloved himself avoid these roads. It is not sufficient for love to make it materially impossible for the other to enter certain roads. This insufficiency is contained in its refusal to compel the beloved. The appeal of love to the beloved, then, means the request that the beloved himself see that this road and not that one will lead his subjectivity to its destiny. The request, "Accept that I be at your disposal," means, "See for yourself and realize your own happiness in freedom." The only fruit which love may hope for is that the other exist. 153

b. The Creativity of Love The "You." All the lines which gradually become visible in the explicitation of love converge on one point-the "you." It is always the "you" which is at stake in love and, when the "you" is not the point at issue, love loses its authenticity or is even fully destroyed. Thus love becomes possible only when I am sensitive to the other's subjectivity and no longer consider the other as the sum total of qualities, not even of very noble and perfect qualities. Thus what love wants is the other's subjectivity, and not my own promotion, career, or perfection, and still less my domination of the other. All this may be pithily expressed by saying that the motive of my love is "you." I love you, because you are you, because you are who you are. I love you, because you are lovable, but you are lovable because you are you. The Meaning of You in Love. This "you" does not have the neutral meaning of "another self," of a "subjectivity like my subjec1530ne may ask whether love implies Pet· se reciprocity. Insofar as my love is fruitful only through the other's "yes," the question has to be answered in the affirmative. If I love the other, I cannot will that he does not accept my ready availability. In this sense, then, it is true that in love "not everything turns around the other." "Liebe, in der sich 'alles nur um Dich dreht', is ebensowenig sich-selbst mehrend und zehrt sich ebenso an ihrem eigenen Feuer auf, wie Lieben in der sich 'alles um Mich dreht'." L. Binswanger, Grundformen 14nd Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins, Zurich, 1953, p. 121. That "not everything turns around the other," however, really means for Binswanger that love is not love unless I am loved with the same intense love with which I myself love. It seems to us that this thesis, which Binswanger presupposes from the very first page of his book, is very debatable.

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tivity," which is disclosed to me in each and every encounter with a human being. A fortiori it is not the hateful subjectivity of the other who, as Sartre thinks, wants to murder me. Finally, it is not the "you" of indifference, for which above we have reserved the term "he." The "you" of which there is question here is a "you-for-whom-Icare." This expression, however, says almost nothing unless the reality it represents is vividly in my mind. 11i4 The meaning of this "you" is given to me in experience, taken in the broad sense, it is accessible to me as presence on condition that I love the other. HIi Accordingly, there is no possibility at all that this "you" would ever be discovered by experience, in the sense of the physical sciences, just as it is likewise impossible that one would be able to account by means of scientific experience for the difference between a dead man and a murdered man. As far as· the experience of the physical sciences is concerned, only that is real which can be expressed in terms of quantity. With respect to the "you," nothing can be understood in terms of quantity-just as in the case of a murdered man as murdered. To express it in phenomenological language, the viewpoint of the subject co-constitutes the objective meaning which reveals itself present in experience. Knowledge is the encounter of a subject with an object, a dialogue in which both take part and in which the questioned reality is oriented in its replies by the questions of the questioning subject. . The experience of the physical sciences, because of its own particular attitude, reveals to me nothing of the "you-for-whom-Icare."156 Likewise, the reality of this you is not disclosed by an objectivistic psychology which holds fast to the enumeration of psychical qualities or the description of the other's character, temperament, aptitude, inclinations, deviations, etc. An objectivistic psychology discovers the other's subjectivity as "a filled-out questionaire," as a "he."151 Of course, we do not want to claim that love is capable 154"Diese Wahrheit kann nicht in Satzen von objektiver Giiltigkeit ausgesprochen, ausgesagt, mitgeteilt und 'gezeigf, sondern nur 'gelebt' werden." Binswanger op. cit., p. 11. H5Cf. Marcel, Le mystere de l'etre, pp. 11-13. 156"Das aber heisst, dass das Seinkiinnen in der Wahrheit rein gegenstandlicher Erkenntnis und das Seinkiinnen in der Wahrheit der Liebe, mit andern Worten dass theoretisch-wissenschaftliche Wahrheit und \Vahrheit des Herzens rein als solche 'inkommensurabel' sind." Binswanger, op. cit., p. 110. 151"Le jugement porte essentiellement sur un 'lui', sur quelque chose qui est cense etre 'categorisable' en dehors de toute reponse". Marcel, Journal metaphysique, p. 162.

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only of a subjectivistic judgment of the other and, therefore, unable to observe that the other is stupid, rude, and immature. The very opposite is true. Love, however, refuses to reduce the other to a series of predicates, and it is precisely love which makes the lover clear-sighted for what the other is over and above his qualities. lIls The statement that the "you" of love is a "you-for-whom-I-care" merely establishes a fact. However, after all the preceding considerations it may be possible to realize to a certain extent the implications of this fact and at the same time perhaps to find a way to penetrate more profoundly into the true nature of love, considered as the active leaning to the other. 159 Most of the emphasis will have to fall upon the "active" character of the leaning. We would like to conceive this "active" character as creativity.

Making the Other Be. As was pointed out previously, the truth of every judgment is founded on a more prof.ound truth-namely, the aletheia, the unconcealedness of reality for the knowing subject. 16o This unconcealedness, however, presupposes the unveiling activity of the subject, by virtue of which reality is reality in the full sense of the term, viz., appearing reality. Knowledge, therefore, always is an encounter in which the subject "lets" reality be, respects and accepts its character as reality. This "letting-be" of reality by knowledge is not purely active but also passive, for it implies respect for, and acceptance of what reality is. Only when reality is respected and accepted, will knowledge be objective. Objective knowledge lets reality be-for-man, makes reality itself appear. The spontaneity or activity of the knowing subject, accordingly, is very limited precisely because of the sensitivi,ty or passivity implied by knowing. Knowledge of reality cannot be called creativity. The active aspect, implied by the existing subject which is not purely knowing but acting, distinguishes itself clearly from the active aspect found in knowledge. To do carpentry work is more than being sensitive and open to reality. The same applies to artistic labor. It is meaningful to call such activity of the subject "creative," I58"L'amour porte sur ce qui est au del a de I'essence, j'ai dit deja que I'amour est I'acte par lequel une pensee se fait libre en pensant une liberte. L'amour en ce sens va au dela de tout jugement possible, car Ie jugement ne peut porter que sur I'essence." Marcel, ibid., p. 64. I59The reader may have noticed that, to prevent misunderstanding, we have intentionally and systematically excluded the phenomenological data of reciprocal love from our analysis. I60Cf. above, pp. 143 f.

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although this term is used here in a less strict sense. In carpentry work and in artistic labor I do not merely "let" reality be, but I also "make" it be. I create a new meaning. By way of analogy with this "making-be" we would like to call the loving encounter, as active leaning to the other, "creative," although the creativity of love differs from that of the above-described actions. In and through love I "make" the other be.

Encounter and Making the Other Be. If one realizes that not only the loving encounter, but any encounter with the other "makes" the other be, a first step will have been made toward the understanding of the preceding view of love. The loving encounter is only a special way of "making" the other be. Every encounter does the same, but in a way which is determined by the nature of the encounter in question. Examples should make this evident. They show that I "make" the other be and that he "makes" me be. This reciprocity offers no difficulty, because every encounter is reciprocal. Let us take as a first example an encounter between two schoolboys which ends in a fight. At first, John and Pete are quite friendly. They romp a bit and try to surpass each other in little tricks. John's every little trick calls for a counter-trick from Pete, which John in his turn tries to parry. At a given moment one of John's blows is unexpectedly hard. Pete thinks that it was intentional and protests. John vigorously defends himself against this accusation, but Pete feels insulted by his tone and assumes a threatening pose. John thinks that he is already under attack. The first brutal blow falls and, before either of them realizes what the situation is, the friendly encounter has degenerated into a fight. On several occasions we have called the encounter a dialogue, in the broadest sense of the term. Two partners participate in a dialogue, two conscious beings contribute their part. But at the end of the dialogue it is no longer possible to determine what came from one and what from the other.161 John and Peter are first "rompers," then "quarrelers," and finally "fighters." But they are these things "through" each other. They "make" each other be, as romping, as quarreling, and as fighting. I am Not "Alone" in My Mode of Being. As the preceding example suggests, man rarely if ever realizes that he makes the other be 161Cf. Kwant, "Het begrip 'ontmoeting' in de phaenomenologische Wiisbegeerte," Gawein, vol. IV (1955), pp. 9-20.

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and that the other makes him be. Nevertheless, it is simply impossible to think of a mode of being or of behavior in which I am fully "alone," in which the other and the encounter with the other do not count. If I want to think of myself as a reality, I will have to include the other, for he has contributed and still contributes to the reality which I am. I have to think of my own reality as come forth from the other, as nourished and educated by the other, as speaking the language of the other. And if I do not do this, I think of myself as a phantom, a demi-god, or the hero of a fanciful tale, but not as reality. I am a New Yorker through New Yorkers, an American through Americans, a philosopher through philosophers, a Christian through Christians, a smoker through smokers, etc. A mother is really a mother through her child, a sick person is genuinely sick only when he has visitors/ 62 a German is a real German only when he is with other Germans, an outcast is a real outcast only when the others hate him. An asocial family is completely asocial only when society abandons or excludes it, a cute little button-nose is a cute little buttonnose only when others notice it/63 a baldhead is a real baldhead only when he is called so by others, a Jew is really a Jew only when there are anti-Semites, and a youth is a real youth only through a girP64 An Objection. We realize that these examples should be formulated with considerably more differentiation, for otherwise they are open to all kinds of objections. However, to avoid making this section too long, we have to risk this simplification. On the other hand, objections to the examples could easily show that they are misunderstood. It could easily happen that they miss the point. For instance, one could say that a Jew is a Jew even when there are no anti-Semites, that a sick man is sick even when he is not visited, and that a baldhead is a baldhead even if he is not called by that name. The objector, however, would be mistaken. He presupposes that being a Jew is purely a biological matter, that a sick man is sick just as a cabbage is spoiled, and that a baldhead is bald just as a billiard ball is smooth. This assumption does not take into consideration the human aspect of being a Jew, being ill, or being bald. A baldhead is not bald just as a billiard ball is smooth, because a baldI62Cf.

J. H. van den Berg,

Psychologie van het ziekbed, Nijkerk, 1954,

p. 14.

I6SCf. F. J. J. Buytendijk, Ontmoeting de,. sex-en, Utrecht-Antwerpen, 1952, p. 7. IG4Cf. E. de Greeff, Notre Dcstinee et nos Instincts, Paris, 1945. pp. 157-158.

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head as a subject is related to his bald pate, has awareness of it, takes a standpoint with respect to it, and can make use of it. The being of man is a human being, because of his relatedness to being,165 which is an understanding of being. 166 Man is the being who in his being is concerned with this being itself.167 Applied to the example, this means that the reality of a bald head is distinct from the smoothness of a billiard ball because the baldhead is a subjectivity who gives meaning to the facticity in question. But the sense he gives to it depends to a large extent upon the way the others treat him. A baldhead is really a baldhead only when the others call him so. When we disregard the inaccuracies in the formulation of the examples, the essential elements will reveal themselves at once. In the encounter I am the bearer of a being-for-the-other, which is at the same time a being-through-the-other. Once again, Sartre's analysis of the hateful stare could serve as a splendid illustration, because it shows how the violence of hatred can be wholly destructive of the other's subjectivity. However, our present aim is to penetrate more profoundly into the creative force of love, to discover the specific nature of love's power to make-the-other-be. Accordingly, we ascribe a kind of "influence" to love. Let us point out at once that we are not thinking here of influence in a causalistic sense. There can be no question of reducing the active reality of love to the efficacy of a unilateral, determining "cause" in the scientific sense of the term. The reason is that such a set of concepts would not make it possible for us to realize what love is in its genuine form. Such concepts do not express the reality of love as it is accessible in "lived experience" to reflecting consciousness. There is more in love than the concepts of physical causality are capable of expressing. This should be evident at once if the essential aspects of love are called to mind. Appeal, destiny, being-at-the-other's disposal, self-denial, and acceptance indicate a reality which includes consciousness, reciprocity, and freedom. They are precisely the denial of a unilateral, determining, causalistic influence and therefore cannot be "explained" by it. 165Cf. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 12. 166Cf. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 14. 167"Das Dasein ist ein Seiendes, das nicht nur unter anderern Seienden vorkornrnt. Es ist vielrnehr dadurch ontisch ausgezeichnet, dasz es dies em Seienden in seinern Sein urn dieses Sein selbst geht. Zu dieser Seinsverfassung des Daseins gehiirt aber dann, dasz es in seinern Sein zu diesern Sein ein Seinsverhiiltnis hat." Heidegger, op. cit., p. 12.

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Analysis of Being-Loved. Perhaps there is no better way to arrive at some understanding of love's creativity than the phenomenological analysis of being-loved. What is the meaning of love, understood as the active leaning of the other toward me? What does the other "make" me be when he loves me? As was pointed out, every encounter with the other "makes" me be. Love, however, "makes" me be in a way which no other encounter realizes. Through the encounter with New Yorkers I am a New Yorker, through the encounter with smokers I am a smoker, through that with philosophers I am a philosopher, etc. These modes of encounter result in a certain facti city or determination, which in the course of the encounter, as it were, adheres to me and makes me "determinable." A kind of sedimentation takes place through which ultimately all kinds of predicates expressing my factual being can be predicated of me. Social psychology investigates this matter. However, I am not identical with my facti city ; I am a subjectivity, and for this subjectivity my factual being is the starting point for the realization of possibilities which are contained in my facticity. I am freedom. Now it is the loving encounter, love as the other's active leaning which makes me free, "makes" my subjectivity be/ 68 and enables me to realize myself. Of course, we do not mean that without the other's love I would not be a subjectivity. But being a subjectivity can have all kinds of meanings. It may point to the fact that I am not a thing, even when my freedom is strangled or crushed by any force whatsoever. It may indicate also a lived fullness of manhood, by which every obstacle is changed into a value, and man affirms himself as the king of creation. The term "subjectivity" can cover an entire gamut of meanings, and this should be kept in mind if we are to understand the creativity of love. The other's loving leaning toward me "makes" my subjectivity be, insofar as the other by means of his affection participates mysteriously in my subjectivity, aids and favors it, so that I no longer plan my manhood and go forward to my destiny "alone" but "together" with the other. The other's love gives me to myself if this being-myself is understood as a kind of fullness of being. 169 The reality of this

a

168"Est-ce dire que la volonte de promotion soit une volonte de creation? Peut-etre. En principe, l'amant aspire a engendrer integralement l'etre de l'aime." N edoncelle op. cit., p. 15. 169"Vvho cannot say to his friend or beloved: 'You have given yourself to me, I have received my soul from your hands.''' Gustave Thibon.

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creativity is uncontrovertably experienced by anyone who receives genuine love. But it reveals itself most strikingly in the pedagogical situation if this situation is as it ought to be. 170 By means of the educator's love the educated child or adult is, as it were, raised above himself; through the "power" of the educator's love obstacles lose their invincibility and the educated child or adult becomes "master of the situation," capable of self-realization on a level which he would never have reached if he had been left "alone."I71 Creativity of Love. The awareness of no longer being "alone" is perhaps the most eloquent witness of love's creativity. Love creates a "we," a "together" which is experienced as wholly different from the "we" of any other encounter whatsoever. The "we" of love can be expressed only-if it can be expressed at all-in terms of "fullness," "fulfillment," and "happiness." The other's love "makes" me be authentically human, "makes" me be happy. My world, likewise, is "re-created" by the other's love,172 for this world is a correlate of my self-realizing subjectivity. Through his love the other participates in my subjectivity and, therefore, also in my' world. By means of his affection he wants me to have my world, so that the world shows itself to me in its mildest way and becomes accessible to me without offering resistance.l1 3 Through the other's love my world becomes my H eim.at, my country; through it I feel at home in my world, and love it.l74 Children whose parents are unfeeling psychopaths are destined to come in touch only with the harshest meanings of the world. For them the world is pure resistance, and from their earliest youth inspires them to protest and hostility.175 Without love the world is hell for man. 176 At the same time it becomes crystal clear that the creative influence of love may not be conceived in a causalistic way. For the creative affection of the lover remains without results until the beI70"Le 'nous' devient fecond et createur; de nouveaux 'toi' sont suscites, et l'enfantement se prolonge dans l'education qui est par excellence oeuvre d'amour, puisqu'elle consiste non pas a far;onner une nature, comme en un dressage, mais a susciter un sujet existant par soi, sentant et pensant a la premiere personne". Madinier, op. cit., p. 133. I71This idea is the starting point of Carl Rogers' "client centered therapy." Cf. J. Nuttin, Psychoanalyse en spiritualistische opvatting van de mens, UtrechtAntwerpen, 1952, pp. 111-127. 172Max Picard, Die unerschutferliche Ehe, Erlenbach-Ziirich, 1942, pp. 13-25.

I73"Nil homini amicum sine homine amico." St. Augustine. 174"Seit ich in Deiner Liebe ein Ruhen und Bleiben habe, ist mir die Welt so klar und so lieb." Goethe. I75S ee Bunuel's film "Los 0Ividados." 176"Pas besoin de gril, l'enfer c'est les Autres." Sartre.

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loved accepts this affection. The "yes" of the beloved ratifies the affection and makes it fruitful. Whoever loves the other, wants his subjectivity, his freedom, his transcendence. Therefore, he cannot will but that the other freely consent to the love offered to him, for this love is precisely the willing of the beloved's freedom. Once again, the pedagogical situation is particularly illustrative of this point. The educator is fully aware of the fact that his love is not understood if the one who is being educated simply does what he tells him because the educator is in a controlling position. His love is fruitful only when the other "chooses" in favor of his education. Accordingly, the "influence" of love is not "causal," but it is a mysterious exchange from subject to subject. There is only one word to express what love is-grace. l71 I can only say "yes" to it. Or, is perhaps even something of this "yes" also given to me? Love's Clear-Sightedness. In concluding this section, let us return briefly to its starting point-namely, the clear-sightedness of love. The "you-for-whom-I-care," as present to me, is accessible to me, on condition that I love the other. Neither the physical sciences nor positivistic psychology or sociology are capable of "observing" this "you." Only love "sees," and what I see is no longer disputable. The indisputably real character of this "you" is at least to some extent intelligible now that we have become aware of love's creativity. For through love I "create" that which I see. I "make" the other "be" what I see. Therefore, there is no possibility that one who does not love will see what I see. At the same time I remain indifferent to his denial of what I see, for I know that he is denying something else than what I see. Hence I will not even try to prove that I am not mistaken, for, as Husserl says, "it is impossible to come to an understanding with one who does not want or is unable to see."

6.

PHENOMENOLOGY OF LAw177a

Introduction: Rights and Law. A consideration of love calls almost of necessity for its confrontation with rights and law.l7 8 The 177"J e demeure convaincu que c'est seulement par rapport a la grace que la liberte humaine peut etre de£inie en profondeur." Marcel, L'homme problCmatique, Paris, 1955, p. 71. 177aln this section the one Dutch term "recht" has been translated by "justice," "right," "law," or combinations of these words according as required by the context. Tr. 178Cf., e.g., the controversy between Renouvier en Secretan. Madinier, op. cit., pp. 25-51.

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fact that such a confrontation often is to the advantage of love may appear unbearable to those who are justifiably proud of the results attained by man's efforts to formulate a tightly closed system of rights and duties. They see in law the means par excellence to make the world a human world and to secure the life of the individual. Nevertheless, the philosophy of law does not receive any light from such an admiration for the system of rules of law formulated by man in the course of his history. Only in the supposition that right and law are identical, would there be any ground for complacency. This supposition was generally accepted by jurists in the nineteenth century and continues to make its consequences felt even in our time, especially in practice. 179 It manifests itself also in the customary designation of the subject-matter treated here as "philosophy of law." There would be no room for a philosophy of law if right and law were identical. Whatever a philosophy of law is meant to do, at least it wants to gather knowledge about what is just and unjust. If, however, just and unjust are identical with what the laws prescribe or forbid, it would be impossible to see how a philosophy of law could add anything to what has already been established by the particular sciences of law. 180 In reality, however, the above-mentioned presupposition is false, for right is not identical with law. 181 The laws of the past, present, and future are the work of human beings who untiringly endeavor to express and formulate what has to be done or not done in concrete situations in order that there be justice. These men, then, have at least implicitly a certain awareness of what justice is and what is according to justice and, therefore, right. Laws are made; they are not discovered just as a mountain is discovered somewhere. But, as everyone knows who is acquainted with legal systems, there is always injustice in laws. We mean not that among the rules of law there are some which go against other rules, but that there are rules which 179Cf. R. Kranenburg, Podtiet recht en rechtsbewustzijn, Groningen 1938, p.2. 180Cf. Kranenburg, op. cit., p. 1-2. 181It seems difficult to understand this. W. Ondin writes in his Inleiding to Carlos Gits, Recht, Persoon en Gemeenschap, Louvain, 1949, "Justice, i.e., objective rights, are undoubtedly a whole of norms which are positively imposed for the purpose of attaining a social goal-the common good-in order to organize the collaboration of individuals in a necessary social organization. Practically all treatises of the philosophy of law agree on this definitio_n." Ondin, however, is very much mistaken. For the jurist, justice may be a "whole of norms." The philosopher of law, however, is aware of it that this whole of norms may be in agreement or disagreement with justice. Therefore, the philosopher cannot agree to this definition.

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are unjust because they go against justice. It is necessary constantly to revise the laws to make them correspond more and more with rights and justice. 182 Finally, it may and does happen that a man misuses the system of laws to commit the greatest injustice in the most efficient way without punishment. Therefore, it is entirely out of the question that the system of laws would be identical with justice. Philosophy oj Law and Sciences of Law. Thus it should be apparent that even for one who has mastered the various sciences of law there still remain all kinds of questions which will never receive an answer from these sciences. There is, first of all, the question as to what exactly "right" is. If laws merely indicate, formulate, and define certain definite concrete rights, the question as to what "right" is imposes itself immediately. A second, related question inquires into the value of the normative character proper to justice. Every jurist is convinced that laws ought to be observed. But why? Because there is a law which prescribes it? Such an answer would merely postpone the question, for why must this law be observed? Justice itself is normative, but this point is not considered by the particular sciences of law. Finally, the work of revising the system of laws which goes on constantly to bring the system more and more into harmony with justice requires knowledge which none of the special sciences of law supplies. 183 The lawmaker will have to keep justice in mind if he wants to make just laws. These and other similar questions are raised and answered, as far as possible, by the philosophy of law. In considering them, it may be useful to refer once more to the source of philosophical knowledge. This source is the being of man, characterized by understanding of being. The philosopher conceptualizes the juridical aspect of man's being, just as he conceptualizes its aspects of knowledge, love, etc. Everyone really knows what justice is,184 as should be clear from the fact that in many cases men know unmistakably that this or that is an injustice. For instance, I am convinced that a master does an injustice to his servant if he withholds his wages. Everyone knows that it is unjust if a particular social class is excluded from the 182Cf. Madinier, op. cit., pp. 54-55. 183Cf. Kranenburg, op. cit., p. 3. 184"An attempt to determine exactly what the essence of 'right' is, presupposes a gen~ral idea of 'right' as a phenomenon occurring in human society and not in the stratosphere or in certain geological strata." R. F. Beeriing, Kratos. Studies over Macht, Antwerpen-Amsterdam, 1956, p.170.

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possibility of self-realization. No matter what the laws say, such a thing is unjust. IS5 In other words, my experience of my being as a self-together-with-other-selves-in-the-world contains a requirement of justice; co-existence includes consciousness of justice. Here also it is the task of phenomenology to conceptualize "lived experience."186 The important point is to remain faithful to experience, to eXlJress experience accurately, for otherwise I will fall into "abstractions" which would make the character proper to the juridical aspect of coexistence unrecognizable and elicit a protest irom "lived experience."187 a. Unsatisfactory Theories

There are innumerable theories about the origin of rights. However, if less radical differences are left aside, most theories can be reduced to two main trends-namely, the objectivistic, empiricist, or positivistic trend and the subjectivistic, aprioristic, and intellectualistic trend. We have met these trends before. They agree insofar as they divorce the subject which man is from the world and the world from man. Objectivism places most stress on the world; for it, "reality" as a domain that is independent of man is the place \vhere meaning is found. Subjectivism, on the other hand, emphasizes the spontaneity of the subject; for it, the place where meaning is lies in an isolated and locked-up-in-itself consciousness. Let us examine the bearing of these views on the philosophy of law. Obj,ectivistic Theorv. The objectivistic, positivistic, or empmClst trend s~~ks the origin ~f rights in the de facto relationships occurring in the world. Laws are supposed to be an explicit mirroring of these relations. The right resides in a world-in-itself, and the consciousness facing this world, even the consciousness of right, is fully passive. 190 ConsCiOl1S;leSS mirrors what happens regularly, and this I85Cf. Henri Bergson, Lcs deux SOIl1'ces de la Morale et de la Religiun, Paris, 1942, p. 76. IS6C£. Kwant, "De bestaanswijze van het recht," Alge1lleen N ederlallds Tijdschrift voor wijsbegeerte en Psychologie, vol. 48 (1956), p. 130. 187Thus it could conceivably happen that the philosopher will summarize his reflections in the definition "right is might." The only possible reply is that this is not true. "Lived experience" knows better. IssCf. G. E. Langemeyer, Inleiding tot de studie von de Wijsbegeerte des Rechts, Zwolle, 1956. 189Cf. H. G. Rambonnet, "Opvattingen van Nederlandse juristen over Recht en Rechtswetenschap," Tijdschrift voor Philosophie vol. IX (1947), pp. 327-351. 190The views also of the so-called "Historical School," chiefly represented by Puchta and von Savigny, must be considered to be objectivistic and empiri-

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regularity indicates also what ought to be done in justice. 191 Our conviction that injustice ought to be punished is simply "explained" by the fact that we are accustomed to perceive the de facto punishment of deviations from the above-mentioned regularity. The views which are defended by the objectivistic trend of the philosophy of law make one essential element of "right" very clearnamely, "right," or rather the juridical aspect of existence, whose concrete demands are formulated by laws, implies an involvement of subjectivity in the facticity of relationships.192 There can be no question of making an isolated consciousness self-sufficient as consciousness of "right." The consciousness of "right" needs involvement in actual situations to be what it is. However, objectivism exaggerates this aspect of !'right." For the objectivist, consciousness of "right" is a consciousness which has been filled with impressions regarding the actual relationships between human beings. Thus working at the establishment of laws means to codify the mirroring of actual relationships in consciousness. Rather frequently this is the viewpoint taken by those who actually hold power in a human society. The thesis that might is right implies an objectivistic theory of right. 193 The principal difficulty against objectivism consists in its inability to explain the normative character of "right."194 I "ought" to behave according to justice, but whence comes this obligation? I do cistic. This school pays attention only to the origin of rights and justice among primitive groups. Such groups are constituted by a kind of biological-affective fusion of their members, driven by quasi-instinctive, almost unconscious, almost animal forces and impulses of a gregarious character. A kind of order and equilibrium "grows almost spontaneously" from these forces and impulses, and the members of the group hold fast to this order because it is a vital necessity. Thus right and justice are, as it were, the sediment of forces resulting from tribal spirit (Volksgeist). However, we should not speak of rights and justice here, for such primitive groups are not societies of persons in the full sense of the term. These groups and people still live on an almost-animal level. Cf. Gits,. op. cit., pp. 355-375. 191"A regulari!y establishes itself in man's behavior toward his fellow men, i.e., society assumes a certain form, a fixed order. Here lies the origin of the matter from which the legal order is built, for man becomes aware of this regularity. From the particular actions which he perceives man forms the rule which is immanent in them. The consciousness of this rule is called 'ethical conviction.' Thus justice is born." H. J. Hamaker, "Dogmatische en empirische rechtsbeschouwing," V erspreide Geschriften, collected by Molengraaff and Star Busmann, vol. 7 (Algemene Rechtsgeleerdheid), Haarlem, 1913, pp. 15-16. See also "Het recht en de maatschappij," ibid., pp. 19-133. 192Cf. C. Gits, Recht, Persoon en Gemeenschap, Louvain, 1948, pp. 267-274. 198"This is the standpoint to which those are inclined who more or less favor the factual character of justice and right rather than its normative character." Beeriing, op. cit., pp. 173-174. 194Cf. Gits, op. cit., pp. 274-275.

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not account for it by pointing to a mental mirroring of actual relationships. What is de facto is not per se what ought to be. Under the influence of all kinds of factors actual relationships are not rarely unjust-what ought not to be. Juridical existence contains more than can be explained by the objectivist. De facto relationships in a socalled "world-in-itself" lie, if we may express ourselves in this way, on the side of reality where "I" am not to be found. How, then, could such relationships explain that "I" ought to be just? Does not this "ought" refer rather to "me" as to the source whence right springs? Is there not in man something like a "sense of justice," an "idea of justice"? Subjectivistic Theory. The concluding sentence of the preceding paragraph points to the fundamental inspiration of the subjectivistic, aprioristic, and intellectualistic trend in the philosophy of law. 190 This trend thinks that justice or "right" draws its origin from an idea, instinct, or feeling, dwelling in the interiority of an isolated consciousness that is closed upon itself. This idea or feeling prescribes what is just for man, and through it man knows that he is ··bound." Accordingly, to justify its views, the philosophy of law refers to psychology,196 defined as the theory of contents of consciousness considered in themselves. It is not difficult for the subjectivistic trend to justify the normative character of "right". Some of the "contents" with which our consciousness is filled simply possess in an unmistakable way the normative character by which we know that we are obliged to act in this or that way.l97 On the other hand, however, we never know whether and to what extent normative ideas or feelings grasp the reality which justice endeavors to transform into a legal order. How could there ever be question of creating such an order if the normative consciousness of justice were insensible to the de facto relationships given in experience? For instance, how could consciousness 195Cf. J. H. E. J. Hoogveld, Hoofdlijnen z'an de AIgcmene Rechtsfilosofie naar Peripateties-Thomistiese beginselen, Nijmegen-Utrecht, 1934, pp. 4-5. 196C£. H. Krabbe, Het Rechtsge:::ag, 's-Gravenhage, 1917, p. 28. l!l7"My starting-point, on the other hand, ... is that of the affections which fill our consciousness. Some of them have a normative character, i.e., they manifest themselves to us as an obligatory duty to judge, think, and act in accord with the orientation expres,cd in such an awareness. The consciousness of justice and right, therefore, is a psychological fact,-albeit of a special character-as are esthetic feeling, moral consciousness, truth consciousness and religious feeling." Krabbe, op. cit., p. 21.

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express the right to emigration if the experience of Western Europe's overpopulation had not preceded? Philosophy of Law and Anthropology. Thus we see that neither objectivism nor subjectivism are capable of explaining the origin of justice and rights. Both objectivism and subjectivism, however, are transcended and harmonized by phenomenology, which at the same time retains whatever true insights either of them contains. 198 As soon as it is recognized that the questions raised by the philosophy of law are of an entirely different nature than those of the sciences of law, i.e., that the question what justice or "right" is cannot be answered by a system of laws, it becomes evident that the reply has to be sought where man himself is, for it is man who has rights and duties. As a matter of fact, the objectivistic and subjectivistic philosophies of law themselves tried to find justice and "right" where they thought that man could be found. The failure of these philosophies must be blamed mainly on the insufficiency of the anthropologies which constituted their foundation. Objectivism considers man as a fragment of nature in the midst of other things of nature. 199 If, then, justice or "right" has anything to do with man, it will have to be found in a world-in-itself. For subjectivism, on the other hand, man is one or other form of pure interiority; therefore, "right" also, as a state of this interiority, will have to be found in this interiority. Noone who is aware of the general orientation of this book will be surprised to see that we do not spend much time in refuting objectivism or subjectivism in the philosophy of law. Once the fundamental insights of phenomenology are accepted, one seeks the source of right no longer in an objectivistic world or in a pure interiority of consciousness, but in existence. 2oo The place where the source of "right" must be sought is man, but man conceived as 198Cf. Remy C. Kwant, op. cit., pp. 132-134. 199"It is evident that in this view the very exceptional position which, according to the opposite opinion, belongs to man in nature is abolished . . . . Man is a part of matter which, although it has its own peculiar structure and is endowed with powerful action, is not distinct from any other matter with respect to the character of its action .... In its eternal motion matter has assumed also the form of human beings." Hamaker, op. cit., p. 121. ~ooFor this reason we may be much briefer here than C. Bronkhorst ill his article "Recht en Wereld," Tijdschrijt voor Philosophie, vol. XVII (1955), pp. 591-622. Bronkhorst pleads for an existential view of law. Unfortunately, he makes no effort to explicitate what is meant by "always being-concretely-inthe-world as being-in-the-order-of-justice" (p. 611).

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existing, or better still, as co-existing, as an embodied subjectivity together with other embodied subjectivities in a common world.

b. The Source of Rights Let us begin by pointing out that the term "right" can have several meanings, so that we have to determine more accurately in what sense it is used here. I may say, "John has a right to this loaf of bread" or "John has the right to study law." The term "right" indicates here that he is entitled to possess something or to do something. In this case we speak of subjective right. This subjective right, however, calls for another meaning of the same term which is directly related to subjective right-namely, objective right. I may say, for instance, that I deprive John of his "right" if I take away his loaf of bread or make it impossible for him to study law. The bread and the study themselves are called "rights" insofar as they are objects to which John's right refers. Hence they are called '·objective rights."201 That to which John is entitled is called "John's rights" or "his."

Intersubjectivity and Right. With respect to John, there can be question of "his" only insofar as the object in question is not "mine." That John can call something "his" means the exclusion of the other, the limitation of the other's power. If there were only a single human being in the whole world, he would not have any right. With respect to nature man has no rights; for instance, no one will speak of injustice if John's bread is spoiled by a humid climate. Likewise, so far as animals are concerned, we do not speak of justice and injustice; when, e.g., an animal devours a man, the animal cannot be said to go beyond its rights. Right, then, implies a relationship of a subject to a subject, intersubjectivity, one or other form of "we." But "we" are in-the-world and, therefore, the place where right is, is co-existence, the being of man as a self together with other selves in the world. Justice. When I give or leave to John what is "his," I am called "just."202 Justice is the willingness to accept my exclusion from what John is entitled to and from everything to which his title refers, regardless of the form which my acceptance may take. Justice is not 201Cf. W. J. A. J. Duynstee Over recht eK rechtvaardigheid, 's-Hertogenbosch 1956, p. 1. 202Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theol., p. II-III, q. 57, a.l.

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some kind of feeling or idea in the interiority of my consciousness, but it is a mode of co-existence, a mode of accompanying the other in the world, in such a way that I respect the rights of the other.203 It should be evident that justice does not merely indicate a de facto form of co-existence. For the other can demand that I respect his rights. He can claim his rights. With his right to make this demand is connected that I "ought" to be just, i.e., that I have the "duty" to respect the other's rights. This "ought" and "duty," then, are situated on an ethical level: I am considered to be "good" when I am just, and "bad" when I am unjust. For this reason justice is a virtue, and injustice a vice. Moreover, when what is just has been laid down in a law, right can be enforced. In a society which rises at least somewhat above barbarism man's right are secured to a certain extent through the penalties which uphold the laws. \Ve are now in possession of the reasons why many have '1 high esteem for rights and justice. They may be annoyed to see that in contemporary thought a much greater value is quite often attributed to love. Usually, however, this annoyance results from a misunderstanding of love. They call love a sentimental feeling which is powerless to create a human world. 204 This "love" they oppose to right and justice which have recreated the world and made it a place where man can live. Unfortunately for them, however, their view of love is incorrect. Moreover, they probably have never even asked themselves whence right and justice originate. The static aspect of justice has made them lose sight of its historical source. 205 Justice Does Not Create an Ideal Human Situation. It IS not difficult to see that justice does not create relationships which may be called "ideally human." This assertion flows from our explicitations of love, as seen in reference to what can be achieved by justice. Justice is concerned with my being as a self together with other selves in the world. The world is "our" world. Evidently, however, it is not possible for each and everyone of us to possess the things of our world fully at the same time. A field cannot be both fully mine and

203',] ustitia, perpetua et constans voluntas est, ius ,ummum unicuique tribucns." Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., p. II-II, q. 58, a. I. 2fJ4Cf. Madinier, op. cit., pp. 24-25. 2fJ5"Trop sou vent, I'aspect statique de la justice a fait oublier son origine et sa nature; dans Ie present du constat, on croit decouvrir les lineaments d'un fCmtenu eternel, comme si toutes les determinati()!1s de la nature humaine etaicnt deja pleinement revelees." Nedoncelle, op. cit., p. 87.

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fully of someone else. Of course, we can agree to work it together, but in that case the field is neither fully mine nor fully the other's. In such an arrangement there is a great danger of disagreement. We, therefore, decide to divide the field in a just way, taking each exactly one half of the land, just as we were each supposed to get one half of the harvest when we were working together. What have we achieved through our justice? We have managed to prevent disharmony. But we have remained strangers for each other, we go parallel ways through life,206 we are and remain for each other "he's" and "owners." Justice, then, excludes brute barbarism, war, and altercations. It is a first step on the road to the humanization of our relationships. But if we take into consideration that man is called to destine himself for the other, to be readily available for the other, to belong to the other, then it becomes evident that justice does not and cannot realize the ideal of manhood. 207 Moreover, our rights may have been laid down in a law. But it may happen that for some reason the other needs more than one half of the harvest to lead a fully human life. If I were to demand that we adhere to the law, it could mean that my insistence on my right would destroy the other's subjectivity. There are people who are exclusively "law-abiding" in the sense suggested abo'Ve. If society consisted only of such people, it would be an inhuman hell. 208 Perhaps we are now in possession of sufficient data to indicate co-existence as the source of right and justice. In doing so, it is important to justify the "ought" by which I am bound, and to investigate what it means that the other can call a certain object or a certain power his "right." It will not be necessary to distinguish subjective and objective rights, for both meanings are correlated; they constitute a dialectic unity and evoke each other, so that one is not what it is without the other.

Man's Fundamental "Ought." As we have pointed out before, right is not to be identified with law or the regulation of rights. For laws may be "not right" or unjust. Justice, therefore, determines 206"La justice en elIet n'est pas l'ideal moral; eIle implique un effort d'union et d'ordre, mais ene consacre !'alterite des individus au lieu de les unir." J, Lacroix, Personne et amour. Paris, 1955, p. 28. 207"La force nous oppose et Ie droit nous laisse encore exterieur et comme etrangers les uns aux aut res ; par I'amour seul nous instituons des rapports veritablement humains, nous nous unissons en nous rendant transparents les uns pour les autres. L'amour est l'unique societe humaine parce qu'il est communion." Lacroix, op. cit., p. 14. 208Cf. J. Delesalle, Liberti et Valeur, Louvain, pp. 177-182.

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what is right. Moreover, I "ought" to be just. It may be possible, then, to discover the origin of "right" and of the "duty" corresponding to "right" by means of an understanding of justice. The "ought" of justice is implied in a much more general "ought." It is merely an aspect of the "ought" which characterizes my entire existence. For man's being must be described as a zu sein,209 an avoir a etre. 210 This idea has been expressed several times already without becoming the theme of our investigation. Because it will be treated ex professo in the last chapter, we will limit ourselves here again to what is needed immediately-namely, what is required for an understanding of the "ought" of justice. Man, as we have seen, is not just as a thing is. A child is not small just as a daisy is small; a teenager is not confused just as there is confusion in the box containing his erector-set; a girl is not hunchbacked just as a willow-tree is gnarled; a man is not chaste just as a lily is white, and he is not sick just as a cabbage is spoiled. What distinguishes man from a thing is that man as a subject is always related to what he is. Man's being is a relationship to being (Seinsverhiiltnis),211 i.e., he is concerned with his being. A thing simply is what it is without being concerned with its being, without any relatitionship to its facticity. Consequently, a thing "cannot do anything with its facticity." The opposite, however, is true of man. Man as existence is an embodied-subjectivity-in-the-world, but the subject which man is, is not fixed in the facticity of his body and of his world. Every de facto mode of existing includes elbow-room for a capacity of being. Man is not merely de facto small, confused, hunchbacked, chaste, sick, etc. On the proper level of his manhood his facticity always leaves some possibilities open. We may even say that his facticity is no real facticity unless there is "elbow-room" for potential being. 212 As the unity of facticity and potentiality, man is called a "project."213 209Cf. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 12. 210Cf. Sartre, L' etre et Ie neant, p. 33. 211'"Das Dasein ist ein Seiendes, das nicht nur unter anderem Seienden vorkommt. Es ist vielmehr dadurch ontisch ausgezeichnet, dasz es diesem Seienden in seinem Sein urn dieses Sein se1bst geht. Zu dieser Seinsverfassung des Daseins gehiirt aber dann, dasz es in seinem Sein zu diesem Sein ein Seinsverhiiltnis hat." Heidegger, ap. cit., p. 12. 212"Das Seiende, dem es in seinem Sein urn dieses selbst geht, verhiilt sich zu seinem Sein als seiner eigensten Miiglichkeit. Dasein ist je seine Miiglichkeit und es 'hat' sie nicht nur noch eigenschaftlich als ein vorhandenes." Heidegger, op. cif .. p. 42. 213"Der Entwurfcharakter des Verstehens konstituiert das In-der-Weltsein hinsichtlich der Erschlossenheit seines Da als Da eines Seinkiinnens.

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The term "project" evokes the idea of incompleteness. This incompleteness, however, which is attributed to man does not yet express what we mean when we call man's being a zu-sein. The term zusein indicates a certain aspect of the relationship between man's subjectivity and facticity. Although this relationship is very complex,214 it contains at least a kind of affective distance, a kind of saying "No" to any kind of facticity. It is not possible for man to give his complete consent to any facticity whatsoever. 215 Man's consent to the facticity of his existence is never given without a certain reserve. For this reason any plenitude of manhood is experienced at the same time as permeated with emptiness, any fulness and satisfaction as stained with hollowness and dissatisfaction. As a project, man is the unity-in-opposition of facticity and potentiality; consequently, he is unfinished. Insofar as no de facto situation is capable of satisfying him, his existence is characterized by a fundamental restlessness, he is, as it were, driven constantly to extend himself beyond his facticity toward the fulfilment of this or that mode of potential being. This restlessness means that man's being is a having-to-be, that it is characterized by a fundamental and general "ought."

The "Ought" of Justice. This fundamental "ought," however, is not yet the "ought" which is proper to justice. Of justice it is true that it is what it "ought" to be, contrary to injustice which is what it "ought not" to be. I ought to be just, but I am capable of being unjust. I do not per se do what I ought to do in justice, but I do per Sf what belongs to the fundamental and general "ought" constituting my manhood as zu sein. I cannot withdraw fr0111 my Zit seil1 as I can withdraw from the obligations of justice. I am a project. but I am also and just as primordially the executioll of this project. All this may sounds perhaps a little strange. I\" evertheless. it ht'comes transparently clear \vhen I attempt to think of the man I a111 as a refusal to execute the project which I am. Let us assume that I refuse to execute the project-of-myself-and-of-my-world which I am. refuse to realize myseJi and to create my world. My attitude no\\" is one \rhich \\"C may style that of the "quietist, the "do-nothing." Der Entwurf ist die existenziale Scinsverfassung des Spie1raums des fakti-c1wll Seinkonnens. Und als gc\Yorfcnes ist das Dasein in die Seinsart des Ellewerfens geworfen." Heideggcr, op. cit., p. 145. 214See below, pp. 269 ff. 215"I1 manque a son assentiment qtlelCltle chose de massif et de charnel." Merleau-Ponty, E10ge de la philosophic, Paris, 1953, p. 81.

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However, even the "quietist" realizes himself and creates a world. Despite the fact that he wants to withdraw from the world, or rather, precisely because he withdraws from it, he constructs a world, but a very special kind of world. Whoever allegedly withdraws from the world builds a world in which his fellow men are illiterate, in which most children die before the age of one, in which floods make regularly hundreds of thousands of victims, in which contagious diseases and famine make the land inhabitable, etc. I can "refuse" to realize myself, but this refusal means that I realize myself as an ignoramus, a lazybones, an egoist. The "quietist," then, necessarily realizes himself and necessarily creates a world. Of necessity man realizes his "havingto-be," the fundamental and general "ought" of his existence, but it may happen that he does it in a way it "ought not" to be done. Why is the "quietist's" way of self-realization not what it "ought" to be in the pregnant sense of the term? The meaning of his world shows the reason in the simplest way. This world "ought" not to be, because it is inhuman, i.e., not worthy of man. In this world no man can continue to live, all subjectivity is choked to death, no freedom can blossom. The "quietist" builds a world, but he does not take the subjectivity of his fellow men into account. The "ought-not" character of his world points to a special mode of "ought" pertaining to his existence. That his world is not what it "ought" to be means that he has not fulfilled the most fundamental requirement, the most basic "ought" of his self-realizing essence-namely, the requirement to will, support, and promote the subjectivity of his fellow man.

Justice and Love. We have met this requirement before. It is the demand to love. In the encounter with the other as subjectivity I experience this subjectivity as an appeal to my being. This appeal reveals to me my own being as destination for the other. I am authentically human only by means of my ready availability for the other. This availability, as my reply to the other's appeal, is not a subjective feeling, but the firm will to support his subjectivity and to open his world to his freedom, so that it will be possible for him to be at home in his world and freely to go forward to his destiny. My "havingto-be," therefore, contains a very special kind of "ought"-I have to be for the other. If I refuse to do so, I build a world which "ought-not" to be, and am what everyone calls a "bad man." These considerations bring us close to the concept of justice and the origin of rights. To realize how close, we have only to see that

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no one would think of claiming rights with respect to me if I were perfectly at his disposal. \Vhen love is perfect, there can be no thought of rights, for whoever loves perfectly is willing to sacrifice his life for his beloved. One whose love is perfect is always a step ahead of all rights. It will never be possible to demand something of one who is willing to offer his life for his fellow man, for he has already given or done what is contained in the demand, he has already given or done more than could be demanded of him. In a community of perfect love there could be no rights and no justice. Justice as the 1lJinitllltin Demand of Love. Man, however, knows that there are no such communities. No matter how perfect a community may be, there is always something in it that pertains to the aspect of manhood by which "man is a wolf for his fellow man."216 It is not necessary to describe this aspect of manhood in detail, for we experience and practice it every day.217 ?-dan is not only "ready availability" (Marcel) but also "stare" (Sartre). Our experience of co-existence contains, on the one hand, the awareness that man is destined for his fellow man, called to will his subjectivity, and on the other, the knowledge that man is a wolf for his fellow man, inclined to destroy his subjectivity. It is to control this situation that man has "invented" rights. Because a community of perfect love is Utopian, the society which manhood calls for and demands must be a society of justice, precisely because of the imperfection of its love. Experiencing himself as destined for the other and realizing that it is a loveless act to destroy the other's subjectivity, man sees himself obliged at least to respect the other's subjectivity. Experiencing himself as destined-for-the-other as well as a wolf-for-the-other, man sees that the minimum demanded by love consists in not allowing the wolf in him to devour the other. What love prescribes as the minimum "ought" is formulated as the other's most fundamental right, so that in fulfilling this minimum I am just. 218 We have now formulated the most fundamental right of my fellow man-his right to 216"Homo homini lupus" (Hobbes). 217Madinier uses here the term "biological opposition," which is perhaps less fortunate, for one can hardly consider as biological the opposition between human beings because of cupidity, envy, distrust, or hatred. \\That Madinier means is "the exclusive character of individuals." Cf. op. cif., p. 123. 218"Justice . . . has as its object the minimum of objective elements and relations which are needed to make love possible and to safeguard it." L. Janssens, "Naastenliefde en rechtvaardigheid," Kit/filar/even, vol. XIX (1952), p.

12.

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life. This right is the most fundamental right of my fellow man, because my destination-for-the-other demands at least that I do not murder him. The Minimum Demand of Love is Constantly Modified. Numerous examples could be adduced to show that the minimum demanded by love changes all the time. To understand such examples, it is necessary to be deeply convinced that truth, conceived as the unveiling of reality, is an historical event. This necessity applies even to understanding the meaning of the other's subjectivity as appeal and of my own subjectivity as destiny. Becoming aware of this meaning is an event in the history of my knowledge, an actual event which, however, has a future. Any actual acts of seeing opens the road to future acts. Once I understand that love demands of me at least not to murder the other, my understanding opens to me the possibility of seeing that the other has a right also to a piece of our world, to livelihood, to work, to facilities for self-development, etc. For love wills the other's subjectivity and selfhood, and this subjectivity is not what it is without the body and without the world in which it is involved. No one, therefore, can really want the other's subjectivity without wanting for him his body and his world. But one who does not even see how uncharitable it is to bar the other from institutions for medical care will certainly not see that the other has a right to an intellectual development proportioned to his capacities and to old age security. Love becomes constantly better able to see and, therefore, the minimum demanded by love is constantly modified. 219 Confirmation. It may not be amiss to emphasize that we are not speaking here of right and justice in the full sense of the term. Jurists especially will be distinctly aware of this. All we have spoken about is the origin of right and justice. Right finds its source in the 219"One has only to survey our modern constitutional rights: the right of man to his life, to the integrity of his body, to his honor and reputation: the various public freedoms: freedom of movement, freedom of thought and of religion, freedom of education, freedom of union and meeting, freedom of the press and of correspondence; the rights of possession: the acquisition of property by occupation or work; contracts: the obligations arising from freely entered contracts, the possibility of disposing of one's property in life and death; the rights of labor: the right to work, the right to a living wage; political rights: the equality of all citizens before the law, the right to a legally conducted trial or process of recovery, the abolition of privileges, the right of everyone to participate in government and to hold public office." Gits, op. cit., pp. 367-368.

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minimum performances demanded by love. Before we will endeavor to explicitate the full meaning of right and justice, we would like to indicate a few confirmations of our theory as delineated above. A first confirmation may be found in the history of rights. What, for instance, today is affirmed as a right of the laborer was formerly only given to them through the love of the best of men. What formerly was considered an act of charity is viewed today as a duty of justice. 220 A second confirmation may be seen in the fact that it is impossible to make love juridically obligatory. This impossibility is obvious, because an obligation of justice cannot prescribe as a minimum duty a mode of "having to be" which in its very essence transcends every minimum. Finally, traditional moral philosophy confirms our view when it judges the obligations of justice greater than those of charity or love. The greater obligation of justice is immediately evident when one realizes that justice prescribes only minimum performances. To the minimum man is most stringently obliged. 221 c. Laws and Legal Imtitutions

A Juristic Objection Against Justice as the Minimum of Love. Jurists especially will object to the theory which considers rights and justice as the minimum of love. They have the impression that the philosopher is not concerned with what they call rights and justice, and think that he does not view justice as a special category, a proper realm, a specific reality which constitutes their field of labor. They are convinced that the philosopher cannot even see this special category, because he is a philosopher and not a jurist. Especially this conviction of the jurists is meaningful. It lies on the same level as the objections of, e.g., chemists against the yiews of the philosophers of nature. What these philosophers say about matter as matter is frequently indigestible as far as the chemist is concerned. He has the impression that the philosophers of nature are not interested in the stuff the chemists are working with, that 220Cf. Janssens, 'op. cit .. p. 15. 221"At once it is evident that the duties of justice are most urgent and have to be fulfilled first. This does not mean that justice excels love or can be separated from it, but that justice is concerned with the strictly necessary minimum of the duties of love." Janssens, /lp. cit., p. 12.

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they do not even see the reality of this stuff, and are incapable of seeing it, because they are not chemists. The difficulties of both the jurists and the chemists against the philosopher are based on a misunderstanding, which the philosopher has to remove. His reply is a retort. He claims that the chemist is not entitled to stating what matter is and that the jurist has no right to say what right is because, as specialists in particular sciences, they do not know the answer. The questions raised by the philosopher and the noemata or objects corresponding to these questions are distinct from the questions and objects aimed at by the specialists in particular sciences. For all questioning takes place with a determined intention, from a determined viewpoint, in such a way that the aspect of reality which is in question is co-dependent on the intention of the question, on the standpoint of the questioner. For instance, the chemist asks for empirically verifiable laws governing material reactions, and about these laws the philosopher says nothing. The philosopher of nature asks about the essence of the material thing insofar as this thing agrees with every other material thing. This essence is something about which the chemist, as chemist, can say nothing. He presupposes and has, albeit only implicitly, some knowledge of the philosophy of nature, and in virtue of this knowledge he can work as a chemist without confusing his job with that of, e.g., the psychologist. However, as a chemist, he does not explicitate this philosophical knowledge of nature. If he attempts to do it anyhow, he goes beyond the framework of his own questions and becomes a philosopher. What he produces as such is not infrequently bad philosophy. An analogous answer has to be given to jurists when they reproach the philosopher of law for not speaking about that which they ,tudy and work with. This is true, of course, but it is exactly as it should be. Jurists speak about particular laws and institutions of law, which for them seem to live a kind of separate and isolated life, and with which they work as if these laws and institutions were kinds of substances. They presuppose and possess, albeit only implicitly, some knowledge of the philosophy of law, just as the chemist presupposes and possesses some knowledge of the philosophy of nature. However, they do not explicitate this knowledge and, if they try to do it anyhow, they abandon the proper framework of their questions and become philosophers. A jurist deals with rules of right and legal institutions. He is not concerned with man's existence as creative of

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rights, at least not when he limits himself to questions which are proper to a jurist. Nevertheless, it will be possible to grant the jurist something more then we have done till the present. We do not mean that the philosopher will give in and begin to speak about right and justice as about rules of right and legal institutions. All we intend to do is to show the jurist that justice as the minimum of love calls of necessity for rules of rights or laws and legal institutions if it is to be justice in the strict sense, i.e., enforceable right.

Justice Requires Authority. It is not sufficient that the minimum of love be simply stated and formulated. This minimum means a first step in the humanization of society, the first success in the taming of the wolf, the first victory over barbarism, on condition that man take measures to consolidate this first victory. There can be no question of real progress in humanization unless men place an authority at the head of their society and provide this authority with the necessary power to give concrete shape to the ever-changing minimum demands of humanity in a system of laws and legal institutions and, if necessary, to impose this system by force. The reason is that the envisioned ideal of humanity cannot be realized without running into a multitude of obstacles,222 which we have indicated in general by the term "the wolf in man." There can be no justice, in the full sense of the term, no enforceable right, unless there be an authority. As soon as in a society certain minimum demands of humanity make their appearance, the society will indicate some persons from among its members whose task it will be to see to it that these demands be realized and that what has been realized be safeguarded. These persons derive their power from the Zft sein which characterizes man as co-existence. As bearers of authority they represe~t this Zft sein and only insofar as they represent it are they bearers of authority.223 Authority Demands Power. The realization of this zu sein demands that the authority can dispose of power. 224 No legal order is possible without authority, but this authority is not real unless it 222Cf. Gits, op. cit., pp. 337-338. 223Cf. Gits, op. cit., p. 332. 2.24"It is very difficult to explicitate the meaning of power, especially in its relatioltship to rights and justice." Cf., e.g., Beerling op. cit., pp. 167-250.

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has power. 225 The time in which we live makes us painfully aware of this truth. There is no jus gentium, because there is no supranational authority and no supra-national power. Here also lies the mistake of radical pacifists and anti-militarists.!!26 They want a just peace, but without armies, they want right without might. Such an idea is Utopian and anthropologically a mistake. At present, the situation is even such that these anti-militarists are able to defend their error only because others fulfill their military duty. Right without power is not possible. However, it would be an exaggeration to identify the two. Nevertheless, such an identification does not always arise from contempt for true humanity and it does not necessarily mean that true rights are cynically trampled upon. "Ideologies of power often go hand in hand with pessimistic anthropologies. This pessimism may be a matter of principle, but it may also be the result of certain political experiences. In this case it must be considered the expression of a disappointed and disenchanted idealism. It praises power not for power's sake, but as the only and the last means against chaos (MacchiaveIli, Hobbes) ."227 Laws as Embodiment of the Minimum of Love. Rules governing rights, i.e., laws, belong to the embodiment of the minimum demands of love in a legal order.228 These laws are proclaimed by the authority. They derive their normative character from the zu sein vvhich characterizes existence as co-existence. 229 Justice cannot do without these laws. 23o Without laws there would be no orientation in the 2~5"Tout droit exprime un certain rapport de forces. Un droit que ne soutient aucune force peut faire illusion un moment: il ne tarde pas a s'ecrouler et la rc!alite remplace bientot l'apparence. Aussi ne suffit-il pas de dire que Ie droit sans la force est inefficace: i1 faut affirmer qu'iJ n'existe pas." Lacroix, op. cit., p. 15. 226Cf. Lacroix, op. cif., p. 14. ~27Beerling, op. cit., p. 177. 228"Mais la justice est issue de la charite, et si elle constitue un ensemble de regles, ce sont des regles que la charite a, pour ainsi dire, deposees." Madinier, op. cit., p. 128. 229Regarding the obligatory character of the norms there exists rather strange views, which usually flow from the idea that norms are rules-whichare-there. For instance, Duynstee writes: "The action of the norm, then, is necessarily addressed to reason, and to reason alone. Its proper effect is to illuminate reason, to make it recognize a determined action as good. It is essentially an ordering of reason. Through this i111umination, in which a certain action is made known to man as a necessary good, the obligation arises for him to act in accord with it." Op. cit., p .5. Thus the "effect" produced by the "action" of the norm is the obligation. This is an upsidedown view of the whole matter. ~soCf. Gits, op. cit., pp. 337-344.

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innumerably many actions which take place within a society. If the orientation in which the actions ought to be performed is not to be against the minimum of humanization reached in a given society, the direction to be taken must be indicated by directives, i.e., laws. For man is also a wolf for his fellow man and, therefore, many actions are done which go against this orientation. For this reason laws are often negative: they simply prohibit many actions. 231 Laws with their sanctions guarantee a certain stability to the level of humanization which has been reached in a certain society. From the legal system of a society one can deduce how far the society in question has advanced on the road to humanization. The existing laws fix, as it were, a certain level of humanization. The stability of the laws is the expression of the firm will the society in question has not to fall below a definite leve1. 232 The laws are a barrier which deprives the wolf in man of his chances.233 The fact that strictly speaking there is no j~s gentium, no international law, is very significant. It indicates that the nations have not yet arrived at that minimum of love in virtue of which one nation wills-and still less favors-the collective subjectivity, the selfhood of the other. On the international level the relations of nations are still fully inhuman.

The Legal Order as a Special Category. Above we have described justice as the willingness to give the minimum of love. This minimum is called "right," understood as the moral power of a subject to realize his own selfhood and his own world. As soon as one understands that justice and right need a legal order to be effective in a society, it will be easy to see why right is frequently, although unju.stIy, identified with the legal system, and why justice is explicitated as the willingne.ss to adopt oneself to this system. 234 Jurists especially succumb to this temptation, because they are ex professo occupied with the legal order. As jurists, they busy themselves with the legal system, as it is embodied and anchored in 231C£. Gits, op. cit., p. 340. 232"Le moraliste . . . peut la detinir comme une volonte de ne pas retrograder dans Ie chemin parcouru par I'oeuvre ancestrale de I'amour." Nedoncelle, op. cit., p. 87. 233"La justice est l'ensemble des regles que la charite a inventees pour s'assurer et s'etablir parmi les hommes d'une fa~on durable. Ces regles sont un cran d'arret et un parapet; e1les representent un certain etat d'unite et d'harmonie audessous duquel une societe n'accepte pas de descendre." Madinier, op. cit., p. 128. 234C£. Gits, op. cit., p. 339.

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the facticity of society. They see to it that "justice takes its course," and that the legal system "functions." For the jurist or lawyer the legal order functions as a kind of "process" which in a sense, like every process, works "blindly." Justice, therefore, is represented as blindfolded. Those who live in a given society "undergo," as it were, the facti city of the legal order. They try as much as possible to prevent any deviation from this order, because they know that otherwise they will almost "automatically" set the order against themselves. The legal order "reacts" immediately. Once a legal system has been set up, it begins somehow to lead a life of its own. We say "of its own," because it can be considered apart from its origin as a facticity, and this facticity exercises a certain pressure on the members of the society, so that it has a normative "action." It is of the greatest importance that the members of a society undergo this "action," this "pressure." To undergo the facticity of the legal order means to participate in the results which the struggle with the inhumanity of the wolf in man has produced. These results are laid down and rendered secure in a "functioning" legal order. Because of the "pressure" exercised by this order, it "produces" humanization in an almost "process-like" way, even if some or many members of the society do not personally apply themselves to becoming humanized. This consequence is important, for it means a first victory over barbarism. On the other hand, it is true that the "we" produced by the legal order is not the "we" of love. For within the legal oNSer appeal becomes a demand, ready availability a duty, reciprocity of love the equality of rights, and creative spontaneity a '·process." Jurists, therefore, are right when they state that justice is a special category and that right is not the same as love. But what they mean by justice and right is the legal order together with the intersubjectivity "produced" by this order.

The Legal Order Can Become a Danger to Authentic Human Life. The philosopher will immediately admit that this justice and right are not love. But he denies that this justice is justice unqualified. He denies also that it will be possible to find out what justice is by looking only at what is handled by jurists and lawyers-namely, the legal order. And finally, he points out that the legal order would be a danger for society if it were to be exclusively in the hands of jurists who are nothing but jurists. We have indicated above how it is possible that a jurist be nothing but a jurist. He manipulates the legal order, which can be considered

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as the facticity of society, and this society can be considered separately from its origin as well as separately from its destiny. The legal order, however, should not be considered exclusively as separated from its origin and destiny.235 If the origin and destiny of the legal order are no longer seen at all, if man stares himself blind looking at its facticity and its quasi-processlike functioning, petrifaction and formalism will enter the order.236 Stability, which hitherto was the strength of the system, now becomes its weakness, because the order lacks the spontaneity and creativity of authentic subjectivity, of authentically human life. Insofar as the system is stable, it stagnates in a certain minimum whose embodiment it is. Authentically human life, however, which is the life of love, cannot be satisfied with any minimum. Precisely because of its stability, the legal order can impede the progress of social life. 237 If jurists are nothing but jurists and, therefore, do not see the origin and destiny of the legal system, they may still be able "to settle a number of old debts,"238 but they cannot contribute to the ever-i1lcreasing humanization of man's relationships. Jurists who are nothing but jurists are just as dangerous for man as are biologists who are only biologists but nevertheless endeavor to speak about man on the proper level of his manhood. As viewed from the ideal of humanity, a petrified and formalistic legal system is only a waste product of love. :!39 Justice and rights have to be seen not only juridically but 2:J5"Trop souvent, l'aspect statique de la justice a fait oublier son originc et sa nature." N edoncelle, op. cit., p. 87. 236Les concepts juridiques sont des constructions humaines, toujours pcr~ fectibles, pour no us approcher toujours davantage de l'idee eternelle de charit~." Lacroix, cit., p. 29. 237Madinier calls the "we" of justice "social room." (p. 112). On the other hand, he affirms that "true social life" is constituted by love (p. 68). One may ask whether it docs not pertain primarily to love to constitute "social room." Madinier will not be able to reply in the affirmative because he defines "social room" as "the organization of the exteriority of human persons" (p. 122). Th~ mutual exteriority of persons, their otherness, distance, independence, which together are "social room" (p. 36), are constituted by justice (p. 63). "Just," then, would be "socia1." It does not seem possible to reconcile with this asser~ tion the thesis that love constitutes "true social life." This thesis would require that "charitable" and "social" be identified. Cf. ;. van Boxte!, Ii crstcl del" lipide il~ de sociale wijsbcgecrtc, Nijmegen-Utrecht, 1953. :\Iadinier's vic'\ has consequences in his conception of the relationship between love and j u;tice. Love would need justice. because it pertains to justice "to constitute the other as the other. (p. 122). Whoever is not "himself," distinct from the other, cannot give "himself" (p. 129). Although this thought is undoubtedly true, olle does not need Madinier's difficult and debatable train of thought to arrive at this insight. 238"La justice est une charite aux yeux bandes, une memoire opinatrement active qui ne cree rien mais regIe de vicux comptes avec une precision sLverc. ~edoncelle, op. cit., p. 87. 239"When justiCE and rights are described from the viewpoint of the moral ideal, they necessarily amount to a rather poor sediment of a much broader

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also anthropologically. The legal order should not be controlled entirely by people who are merely jurists, but has to be entrusted to those who are authentically human among both jurists and nonjurists. The authentic human being will not simply repeat the facticity of the legal order but, starting from this facticity, he will act to project it toward a future of greater humanization. 240 d. Natural Right and History The Meaning of Natural Right. In speaking about justice and right, we do not mean the legal order or, even more restrictedly, the system of laws which man's efforts have produced in the history of justice. We are referring to the right which is traditionally called "natural right." This right should be understood as the moral powers (subjective right), together with everything to which these powers refer (objective right), as they are given together with the unconcealedness of the essence of co-existence, conceived as zu sein. It is intentionally that we speak here of the essence of co-existence rather than of its nature, because nature is often misunderstood. On hearing "nature," many think, albeit incorrectly, of a "thing-like" kind of being, which, moreover, they conceive as a being-in-itself, a beingapart-from-man. According to this line of thinking, natural right and the corresponding duties would have to be conceived after the fashion of mountains and valleys in a hitherto undiscovered land. Since, however, it is evident that man is not a thing of nature, and since the affirmation of being-in-itself does not contain anything intelligible, some people think that natural rights have to be rejected entirely. This rejection contains more than one misunderstanding of what must be understood by natural right.241. "Natural" should not be understood as referring to "nature" in the sense of "thing." "Nature" here simply means "essence," i.e., that through which something is what it is.242 vVith respect to man, then, "nature" means that through and richer moral life. If, however, they are viewed from the bottom layer of common life, they appear to us as a first manifestation of a new life which makes its appearance in the group." Gits, op. cit., p. 357. 240"11 n'y a pas une dignite humaine objectivement concevable. Le progres de la justice consiste precisement a inventer une dignite humaine toujours plus haute et plus riche. Le progres ne consiste pas a s'approcher de plus en plus pres d'un ideal de dignite humaine con(;u avant que ce progres ait eu lieu. II y a de I'invention en morale." Madinier, op. cit., pp. 57-58. 241Cf. Kwant, op. cit., pp. 136-137. 242Thus Heidegger can say that the being of man is not Vorhandensein (being like a thing of nature) but Dasein, because "the essence of Dasein lies in its Existence." Sein lind Zeit, p. 42.

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which man is man and not, e.g., a paper-knife. 243 Man is not a paper-knife because of his human nature. The natural right, therefore, is the right which is given together with the unconcealedness of the essence of my being as a se1f-together-with-other-se1ves-in-theworld, the right which is given together with the essence of co-existence.

The "Givenness" of Natural Law. The term "given" demands a further explicitation. It would be contradictory to conceive this "givenness" as the reflex mirroring of being-in-itself in my consciousness. Sometimes defenders of natural right play straight into the hands of their opponents, because, to say the least, their formulations of natural right are inept. Defending the objectivity of natural right, they often lapse into an objectivism which makes them an easy prey for their subjectivistic opponents. It is meaningless to claim that natural right "exists, independently of man, and independently also of knowledge of man."244 If this assertion were true, natural right would be a being-in-itse1f, which is not intelligible. As we pointed out before, natural rights and natural duties do not lie in co-existence like mountains and valleys in a hitherto undiscovered land. All "givenness" presupposes the unconcealedness of the given and, therefore, the presence of unveiling consciousness. Thus natural right presupposes the unconcealedness of what co-existence is. Natural right presupposes that the essence of the 1-You-relationship is not concealed from man, that man sees what the "I" and the "You" essentially are. Man has to "see" that the "You" is an appeal and that the "I" is destination-for-theother. This is the objective nature, the real essence of the I-Yourelationship. Moreover, the reality of natural right demands that man sees certain deeds as being against the essence of the 1-Yourelationship, for right is the minimum of love. Objective natural right, then, is "given" as objective for a conscious subject. Without a conscious subject for whom the right is objectively given, it is impossible to affirm or deny anything regarding natural right. Strictly speaking, one may even say that without man there is no 243For Sartre it is certain that the being of man is reduced to that of a paper-knife if one speaks of a human Iwture. Cf. L'existentialisme est un humanisme, pp. 17-24. This, however, does not prevent him from speaking of the '.'na.ture" of the "!or-itself".: "Le pour-soi, par nature, est l'etre qui ne peut cOlnclder avec son etre en-sOl." L' etre et Ie nfoant, p. 502. 244Cf. Duynstee, Over recht en rechtvaardigheid, p. 32.

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natural right, for the only meaning which the term "to be" can have is to-be-for-man. Accordingly, to say that there is no natural right means to say that without man there is no natural right for manan assertion which is self-evident.

The Subject of Objective Natural Law. This thought leads spontaneously to the question of who the subject is for whom natural right is an objective reality. The fact that what is nowadays affirmed to be a right, e.g., of laborers, was formerly given to them through the charity of the best makes it possible to reply to this question. "The" subject for whom natural right is an objective reality is at first the best among the members of a society and, next, all those who are capable of seeing what the best see.245 This assertion follows from the insight that knowledge is not mirroring brute reality, but knowingly establishing reality-for-man. If knowledge is conceived as nothing else than the passively being-acted-upon of the cognitive power, it will never be possible to explain how some persons endowed with an excellent intellect simply do not see certain realities. To "see" I need more than "eyes." This applies also to the establishment of natural right. Only .the best see it, because they are capable of taking the standpoint needed for this vision. A minimum demand of love is not visible without love. One who is fully immured in hatred, avarice, or pride does not see the most elementary demands of love. 246 So far as such a one is concerned, life in a legal order, or more broadly, the whole moral life is not much more than being under the pressure of a certain facticity of society. Such a life moves as yet only barely, or almost no longer, on the level of what is proper to humanity. On the other hand, there are human beings who, so to speak, personally represent the very best of mankind. They are the geniuses, the heroes, and the saints. Mankind cannot do without them, because through their virtue and their clearsightedness it becomes possible for the others to see. 247 For this reason we said that natural right is objective for the best of society and for those who, in imitation of the best, are capable of seeing what they see. Since the best are convinced that what they see is objective, is true, i.e., that they see the real essence of co-existence, understood as 2411Cf. Bergson, Les deux sources de la Morale et de la Religion, Paris, 1942, pp. 29-30. 246Dietrich von Hildebrand, Sittliche Grundhaltutlgen, Mainz, 1933, pp. 7-20. 247H. Bergson, op. cit., pp. 85-86.

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zu ::ein, they are convinced also that what they see is in principle valid for all. Truth is per se truth for all: every subject who expresses a truth includes in the subject which he is all actual and possible subjects and affirms the truth in their name-truth is in principle intersubjective and transhistorica1. 248 The best of society, however, see also that the objectivity of natural right is not de facto recognized by all. They experience that their fellow men do not even realize what is at stake when they express what they see as objective demands of humanity. Nevertheless, as "functionaries of mankind" (H usserl), they do not acquiesce in this situation. Their task is primarily educational. 249 All those who love without self-interest are aware of the minimum demanded by love, i.e., of what is just. This awareness, however, is not enough to effectively humanize society.25o Right has to become law to be fully right, and this requires a struggle against opposing views. Justice, therefore, is not simply a matter of applying an immutable code, but demands that the legal order be constantly under revisioll. There are two reasons why work on the legal order can never cease. Historical Evolution Modifies the Legal Order. First of all, the relative equilibrium attained by a society at a given moment of its history can never last very long. As soon as rights and duties have been weighed and formulated in laws, something new occurs which necessitates new measures to prevent society from losing the relative humanization of interrelationships. For instance, it may happen that after much trouble and labor a code has been set up to safeguard the workers in a certain industry. The code presupposes, e.g., that electricity is used as the source of energy. But when a satisfactory code has finally been introduced, it may happen that these industries discard the use of electricity and switch to atomic energy. At once at least part of the accepted code is antiquated and needs to be replaced by new rules. 251 Every historical situation differs from all others and, therefore, demands its own regulations. The right of man to safety 24SSee above, pp. 160 ff. 249"Aussi compte-t-il seulement sur un long effort de l'humanite et sur une lente education pour former les hommes et les rendre toujours plus raisonnables. En attendant il importe de se premunir contre les retours offensifs de I'egoisme vital." Lacroix, op. cit., p. 13 . 230"The question which arises at once is, how will the community react to their message? This reaction is just as important as the intuition of the few. The reaction plays a role in the experience of justice as the opposite pole of the initiative of the few." Gits, op. cit., pp. 335-336. 251C. Gits, op. cit., pp. 326-327.

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requires different measures according as society's means of transportation consist of donkeys, bicycles, motorcars, or jetplanes. The new regulations cannot be deductively derived from the concept of love. 252 They presuppose, on the one hand, inspiration from love of mankind and, on the other, a very realistic insight into the real character of the new situations. Both of these are necessary. Without awareness of the zu sein which characterizes co-existence, no steps will be taken to prevent the destruction of the subjectivity of fellow men. But this awareness alone is not sufficient. What is needed also is the ability to determine whether or not this or that concrete situation means the destruction of the other's subjectivity. For this determination a realistic insight into the true nature of the situation cannot be dispensed with. Whether or not, for instance, a certain method of psychological examination disregards the other's subjectivity can be determined primarily not by a reflection on co-existence as zu sein, but by investigating what exactly takes place in such a psychological examination. Whether or not there is a natural right to emigration is not determined by reasoning about the essence of love, but by investigating what it really means for subjectivity to dwell in an over-populated country. Such investigations must always take their inspiration from love, but it is not sufficient that love be the first rule within a society. Even if a society is ruled by love, it may happen that the situations are inhuman, because of the fact that perhaps the objective meaning of the actual reality is not sufficiently taken into account.253 In the encounter of love's ideal with the facticity of society love assumes a body and is incarnated inter alia in the body of a legal order. By means of this body love is truly real and not an illusion. 254 But the body changes and even has to change. Nevertheless, there is a viewpoint from which natural right is immutable-namely, the immutability which natural right derives 252"Aussi, les valeurs morales particulieres ne peuvent etre deduites d'une fin qui serait la moralite parfaite. Le systeme de droits et de devoirs, qu'elles forment, refiete plut6t l'eIaboration que la reconnaissance de la dignite humaine a rer;u a un monent determine de l'histoire." A. Wylleman, "L'elaboration des valeurs morales," Revue philosophique de Louvain, vol. 48 (1950), p. 245. 253"La justice ainsi n'est ni un ideal purement spirituel ni un strict fait sociologique, mais la morale en tant que s'appliquant a la realite sociale et preparant l'avenement de I'amour." Lacroix, op. cit., p. 29. 254"Le grand danger de I'heure, surtout pour les chretiens, est celui d'une sorte de surnaturalisme dlfsincarne qui est pret a sacrifier la force, qui meconnait Ie role du droit et s'imagine resoudre tous les problemes par des temoignages d'amour." Lacroix, op. cit., pp. 29-30.

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from the invariability proper to the primordial demand of justice. 2GG If man has a natural right to recognition of his subjectivity, this right necessarily implies that his subjectivity may never and nowhere be destroyed whether by a violent attack on his life, a process of industrial production, a psychological examination, a political system,· an economic order, or schoollaws. 256 However, this immutability does not exclude a change of the legal order. On the contrary, the immutable primordial demand of justice is effective only if the legal order adapts itself to the historical situation. An unyielding legal order could mean a violation of man's subjectivity.

Love's Dynamism Modifies the Legal Order. The second reason why the legal order has to be constantly revised lies in the fact that love knows no limits. Even if we suppose that the relative equilibrium is not disturbed by radically new conditions, e.g., new methods of production, the legal order will not lose its mobility.2G7 For the best elements of a society are always dissatisfied with what has been achieved and look forward to the possibility of more satisfactory, more human regulations. 2G8 This mutability of the legal order, then, finds its source in the inventiveness, the dynamism of love possessed by the best. 2GB Precisely because love knows no limits, it is obvious that the legal order will never be "finished." Every phase in the history of justice sounds the arrival of a new phase; every new perfection, given to society by the development of the legal order, enables the best elements of a society and, after them, the society itself to see a new demand of love as objective. 260 Once more, then, it is apparent that justice does not humanize the relationships among men by the application of an immutable code. What man's destiny for the other contains becomes accessible and manifest only in the history of man's real love of man. 261 If, for 255"La seule reponse a cette question est de montrer que ce contenu est fidele it l'exigence morale initiale, qu'il realise dans Ie present et pour l'avenir une reconnaissance de la dignite de l'homme." A. Wylleman, op. cit., p. 245. 256Cf. Janssens, "Moderne situatie-ethiek in het licht van de klassieke leer over het geweten," Persoonlijke verantwoordelijkheid en geweten (verslagboek van de lSe R. K. Paedagogische Week), Tilburg, 1955, p. IS. 257Cf. Gits, op. cit., p. 327-328. 258"11 ne s'agit pas ici d'une production empirique de la justice par la charite; on pourrait sans doute montrer, du double point d'e vue historique et psychologique, que la justice do it son progn!s aux intuitions de certaines consciences insatisfaites qui, sous l'inspiration d'un amour inventif, ont su anticiper des formes d'existence et d'organisation sociales nouvelles." Madinier, op. cit., pp. 117-118. 259"n y a de l'invention en morale." Mad'inier, op. cit., p. 58. 260Cf. Janssens, op. cit .. pp. 18-20. 281Cf. Wylleman, op. cit., p. 243-246.

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instance, man is not inclined to see to it that human conditions of labor prevail and to recognize them collectively as the right of the laborer, it will be impossible for him to affirm and express in a law certain provisions for old-age security as a right of the laborer. Accordingly, the perfection attained by the legal order of a society is an unequivocal indication of the level reached by love in a society.262 The objection could be raised that this level of love would be merely the level of one or of a few individuals, because the others would simply be forced by law to do what they would not do of their own accord. However, this objection is without force. For experience makes it clear that, if the legal order is to remain effective, there must be a rather general love of our fellow men. Moreover, experience has made it also abundantly clear to us that, where love is totally absent, rights are utterly meaningless.

262"Et la justice represente alors dans la civilisation Ie niveau present de l'oeuvre accomplie par la charite." Nedoncelle, ap. cit., p. 86.

CHAPTER FOUR PHENOMENOLOGY OF FREEDOM AND ITS DESTINY Introduction: the Meaning of Life. It is the task of the philosopher to express life. Starting from the experience of co-existence, i.e., of his being as a self-together-with-other-selves-in-the-world, he attempts to conceptualize this experience. As soon, however, as the philosopher sees that the being of man must be explicitated as zu sein, as avoir a etre, as a task, his question regarding man's essence assumes a dramatic importance. He realizes that his question coincides with the most profound concern of every human being who does not want to go through life as an impersonal entity (das Man) ; he sees that with his question he touches the heart of life; he is aware of it that the explicitation of man's life as "having-to-be" forces him to search for a reply to the question which every authentically human being asks himself: "What do I have to be?" His question assumes an ethical meaning. At the same time, however, it takes a dramatic turn, for the question: "What do I have to be?" makes it impossible for the philosopher to consider. his speculations any longer as a kind of luxury. He is no longer capable of being a "disinterested spectator," for he realizes that his manhood itself is at stake. If the being of man must be called a "having to be," then man's life can be a failure, for it could be what it ought not to be. This, however, is not the only reason to speak of drama in philosophical thinking. Evidently, the philosopher can consent to life only if life is what it ought to be. But-is he ever capable of saying that his life "is"? The impossibility of an affirmative reply is apparent as soon as he earnestly admits that the being of man is a having-to-be. Man's being is unrest. l Is it, then, at all possible to consent to life? This is the question which every authentic man asks himself when he inquires about the meaning of life. With this question the philosopher finds himself again in the middle of a drama, for how could life be livable if it were absurd? Is it surprising, then, that there are philosl"Et inquietum est cor nostrum." (St. Augustine).

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ophers who think that there is only one really important philosophical question-the question about the meaning of life. 2 They do not mean that the philosopher is not a philosopher before he has answered this most important of all questions. When this question arises, a large amount of authentic philosophical work has already been done. N everthe1ess, it should be evident that the results of this work will obtain their most profound meaning in the light of the reply to the most serious question which the philosopher can raise-namely, is life meaningful or not? Let us first endeavor to state exactly what this question means. 1. THE SENSE OF THE QUESTION REGARDING THE MEANING OF LIFE

The Term "Meaning." Is life meaningful or not? The term "meaning" assumes here a very special sense. In the preceding chapters we have become very familiar with this term. Hence it is necessary to emphasize here that asking about the meaning of life gives to the term "meaning" a dimension which has not yet been thematically explicitated. "Meaning" has been constantly used in the sense of "appearing reality" or "phenomenon." "Meaning" is correlative with the intentional movement which is consciousness.3 There is "meaning," therefore, as soon as there is a human being to whom reality appears as reality. If "meaning" is taken in this sense, life obviously has a "meaning."4 Man's existence, in the sense of being-conscious-in-the-world, is precisely the discovery of meaning, and man's existence, in the sense of being-"at" -the-world, is the giving of meaning. The question, however, regarding the meaning of life aims at a much more profound issue. Its orientation is toward the question which contemporary philosophers generally refer to as the question of 2"n n'y a qu'un probleme philosophique vraiment serieux: c'est Ie suicide. Juger que la vie vaut ou ne vaut pas la peine d'etre vecue, c'est repondre a la question fondamentale de la philosophie. Le reste, si Ie monde a trois dimensions, si l'esprit a neuf ou douze categories, vient ensuite. Ce sont des jeux: i1 faut d'abord repondre." Camus, Le My the de Sisyphe, Paris, 1942, p. 15. 3"Wenn innerweltliches Seiendes mit dem Sein des Daseins entdeckt, d.h. zu Verstandnis gekommen ist, sagen wir, es hat Sinn.... Was im verstehenden Entschliessen artikulierbar ist, nennen wir Sinn." Heidegger, Sein una Zeit, p. 151. 4"Nur Dasein kann daher sinnvoll oder sinnlos sein. Das besagt: sein eigenes Sein und das mit diesem erschlossene Seiende kann im Verstandnis zugeeignet sein oder dem Unverstandnis versagt bleiben." Heidegger, op. cit., p. 151-152.

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"value." Among ancient philosophers the term "good" was used for what we call "value." By this term they meant that which perfects, i.e., that which means a fulfilment of human tendency and desire. 1i

Meaning and Value. There would be no objection against maintaining these terms if there were no danger that tendencies or desires would be conceived as "contents of consciousness." Classical psychology of consciousness conceived tendencies and desires as "things" in the "locker of consciousness" in a similar way as perceptions and memories were supposed to be "things" stored away in consciousness. De facto, however, tending is a mode of being-human, a mode of existing-namely, the mode through which man affectively "nihilates" his facti city and anticipates what he sees as a possibility to be realized. This affective "nihilation" is essential to any tendency. It means that one is not at peace with the facticitous, not satisfied with it, and in a sense says "no" to facticity. Affective "nihilation," then, is distinct from cognitive nihilation, which consists in the awareness that the subject is not identical with his facticity.6 While all affective nihilation implies cognitive nihilation, cognitive nihilation says nothing about dissatisfaction, emptiness, or insufficiency. Insofar as man nihilates his facticity both cognitively and affective1y and is "ahead" of himself, he is a being which is characterized by its openness to possibilities to be realized. The same cannot be asserted of a rock or a paper knife. These things are facticities. Man, on the other hand, is facticity and potentiality7-he is essentially unfinished. In this sense, therefore, man cannot be said to "be," just as a paper knife or a rock "is," for man "has to be." Accordingly, instead of speaking of tendencies "in" man, we should speak of man as zu sein, 8 as "having to be," as task. Human existence, as task, contains the experience of value, i.e., the awareness of what is objectively valuable for man as zu sein, as "having to be," as task. An example may perhaps serve to render this assertion more easily intelligible and to lead to its further explicitation. Man experiences himself as a being in quest of truth. To search for 5Cf. Louis de Raeymaeker, The Philosophy of Being, pp. 212-235; John A. Peters, Metaphysics, no. 43 and no. 75. 6Cf. above, pp. 104 ff.; pp. 269 ff. 7Cf. the well-known expression of Merleau-Ponty, calling man "ouverture toujours recreee dans la plenitude de l'etre." Phenomenologie de la perception, p.229. 8"Und weil die Wesensbestimmung dieses Seienden nicht durch Angabe eines sachhaltigen Was vollzogen werden kann, sein Wesen vielmehr darin Iiegt, dasz es je sein Sein als seiniges zu sein hat." Heidegger, op. cit., p. 12.

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the truth of things is a task of man, one of the many forms which his zu sein may assume. If he succeeds in discovering truth, he experiences his discovery as a fulfilment of his zu sein, as a perfection of his "unfinished" being, as valuable. 9 Thus what we have hitherto called "meaning" is known as "value," insofar as the meaning implies an enrichment of man's "having to be." Man is not a task merely as a seeker of truth. His biological nature also prescribes certain modes of his "having to be." Man, for instance, becomes hungry, thirsty, or sleepy from time to time. With respect to these deficiencies and defectivenesses, or rather, with respect to the modes of zu sein which are called to be hungry, thirsty, and sleepy, food, drink, and ~est mean the desired fulfilments, i.e., values. These two examples show that the zu sein which characterizes man assumes many forms. There is a hierarchical order of intentionality levels. On none of these levels man "is" just as a rock or a paper knife "is." On the contrary, on each of them man "has to be." Accordingly, there is also a hierarchy of value levels, a hierarchy of meanings which imply a relative fulfilment of man's zu sein in its diverse forms.

Objective Values. These values are called "objective." It should no longer be necessary to emphasize that the objectivity of the values may not be understood in an objectivistic sense. The values cannot be affirmed in-themselves. They do not lie as rocks in a desert which has not yet been discovered. Values are values only within the unity of reciprocal implication of subjectivity-as-zu-sein and facticity. Values may be called values only in the full sense when they are appreciated, i.e., adhered to as fulfilments of man's zu sein.l0 Food, fresh air, sun light, truth, humor, beauty, justice, love, etc. are objective values, because I do not merely dream, hallucinate, imagine, or wish that they fulfil manhood as zu sein, but because I see that they 9"Un bien ne vaut que si nous trouvons a travers lui une suffisance et une plenitude nouvelles; Ie plaisir, ['emotion estethique, I'evidence intellectuelle, la communion amoureuse ne sont que des modes de conscience ou se rend presente a elle-meme notre propre perfection d'etre." A. Wylleman, "L'elaboration des valeurs morales," Revue Philosophique de Louvain vol. 48. (1950), p.239. lO"L'experience de valeur ne nous enleve pas du monde. Sans Ie contenu qui lui vient de ['ensemble des choses et des autres, elle sera it vide. Pourtant, si elle indique a la fois une possession de soi qui est autonome et absolue, et une presence au monde qui est relative et dependante, it reste que Ie fondement des valeurs est l'existence meme qui les eprouve." Wylleman, ibid., p. 239

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do this. It goes without saying that the term "to see" should be understood again in a very broad sense. It indicates any form of recognizing what is present. Obviously, the presence of food as value differs from the presence of truth or love.

"Meaningful.}} The term "meaningful" is used with respect to zu sein itself. A meaning is called a "value" because it really perfects man's being as zu sein. For this reason the term "meaningful" is used also with respect to zu sein itself. The zu sein is perfected or "filled" by means of certain activities regarding determined values. These activities themselves are called "meaningful," insofar as they put man in possession of values corresponding with his zu sein. Eating and drinking are meaningful activities, for they satisfy hunger and thirst, they mean a filling of certain modes of zu sein. Insofar as the various modes of zu sein can be filled by corresponding activities, these modes of zu sein also are called "meaningful.' , Relative and Absolute Consent to zu Sein. Is life meaningful, is it worth living, or is it idle and absurd? In the light of the preceding remarks the meaning of this question is perhaps clear to some extent. The question is concerned with the meaning of life. Man busies himself in many realms: economy, politics, medicine, pedagogy, arts, and sciences. In each of these realms his being is a zu sein, which is meaningful to the extent that his activities in these realms imply a certain fulfilment of his respective modes of zu sein. The zu sein of man as an economic being is meaningful, insofar as his economic activity gives him a real fulfilment with respect to a definite mode of existing. This meaningfulness makes it possible for man to consent to a certain extent to himself as an economic being, and not to despair of himself as having-to-be in a determined realm of existence. This assent would be impossible if Zft sein would not be able to find its fulfilment. In that case zu sein would be meaningless, absurd, and idle, not worth undertaking or promoting. This consent to himself, however, is merely relative. Even if man consents to himself as an economic being or as a political being, etc., this consent does not mean that it is possible for him to consent to himself as man. Being man says more than being economic or political; more even, we may say, than all possible modes of existing taken together. For this reason man has always the possibility of asking

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about his "being-there" (Da-S ein) as such, about his zu sein as suchY Although he may consent to his zu sein. as an economic being, this consent does not imply that his life is .filled, that he can definitively consent to himself as man. The question regarding the meaning of life is the question regarding the possibility of consenting ultimately and definitively to being-man as to "being-there" and zu-sein unqualifiedly. The full meaning, of course, of this question is realized only when it is raised in life itself. There is even a very real danger that the philosopher will speak very unauthentically about this questionnamely, when he himself has never really experienced it as a question. It may happen that because of "knowledge obtained from other sources" he knew beforehand how to answer the question. Of course, he may be able to take the question over from others, but is such a question still authentic? Perhaps the answer may be in the affirmative, but certainly only on condition· that he be filled with love for his questioning fellow man. For a human being for whom this question is a real question, it is at the same time a struggle against despair. By speaking unauthentically about it or without love, a philosopher would make himself despicable. 2.

PHENOMENOLOGY OF FREEDOM

It is not possible to speak of the meaning of life unless being-man is understood as being-free. If man were a thing and if his life were a thing-like process, the term "meaning" would not make sense. Only on the supposition that being-man is being-free is "meaning" more than an empty sound. By means of an analysis of freedom we will attempt to justify this supposition. We may expect that this analysis will lead us back to the question of the meaning of life. In the works of contemporary phenomenologists the term "freedom" is used in significations which seem to be widely different. Closer inspection, however, will show that an inner dialectics can be discerned in these different significations, that they evoke and comll"Above all particular goals, such as science, art, economics, and politics, which give meaning and value to man's being as being-in-the-world, there arises in man by virtue of a natural necessity the question regarding the meaning alld value of his being as a whole, i.e., the question, What am I? whence do I come? what is the ultimate destiny of my life?" Dondeyne, "Belang voor de metaphysica van een accurate bestaansbeschrijving van de mens als kennend wezen," Kenleer en Metaphysiek (Verslag v. d. XlIe alg. verg. der ver. v. Thomistische Wijsb. en v. d. 3de studiedagen v. h. Wijsgerig Gezelschap te Leuven) , Nijmegen, 1947, p. 37.

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plement one another, and are internally coherent. We will endeavor to let these meanings present themselves in their inner coherence, starting from the "lived" experience of the freedom which is our own. 12 a. To be Sub;ect is to be Free Whoever gives a real meaning to the term "freedom" uses it to express negatively a certain absence of necessity and positively a certain autonomy.13 This use of the term points immediately to man as distinct from a mere thing.

The Being of a Thing. What a thing is finds its full explanation in its antecedents. A thing is nothing else than the result of processes and forces; the being of a thing is to be a result. Once the processes and forces which causally influence a thing are fully known, the thing itself is wholly known. A thing is only a pause in the endless evolution of the cosmos. It is not something new with respect to the forces and processes causing it.14 A thing, then, is essentially relative, merely a part of the material cosmos, and not itself something transcending its antecedents. 15 The being of a thing is nothing else than its pertaining to the material cosmos. The statement that the being of a thing is nothing else than being-a-result means the same as the assertion that the being of a thing is a being-necessitated, because the world of things is ruled by determinism. Cosmic forces act of necessity and give to processes the constancy which the physical sciences express in their laws. If in individual cases the physicists notice that their laws do not apply, then they know that other forces must be at work which likewise act of necessity. The necessary forces of the cosmos are "blind" forces. This term expresses that these forces do not know themselves as forces and their results as results. The world of things is struck with "blindness." Things are utterly "prostrated," they are not for themselves and are not for other things. 12':Like every human concept, our concept of freedom is drawn from experIence and must remain in contact with that experience' otherwise it wiII end up by standing for an abstract and empty freedom which no longer has anything to do with true human freedom." Dondeyne, "Truth and Freedom" Tmth and Freedom, Pittsburgh, 1954 p. 30. ' 13Cf. Dondeyne, ibid. l4C£. A. de \Vaelhens, "Lineaments d'une interpretation phenomenologique de la liberte," Liberti? (Actes du IVe Congres des SocWes de Philosophie de langue fran,aise.) Neuchatel, 1949, p. 82. 15Cf. D. M. de Petter, "Personne et Personnalisation," Divus Thomas (Piac,), 1949, p. 164,

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The question could be asked how such a statement can be made. The assertions that things are not for themselves and are not for other things, that things have no meaning for themselves and no meaning for other things can be made only if the totality of reality is not identical with the totality of things. If there were nothing else than things, processes, and forces, there would be no meaning, nothing would make sense. But there is meaning. To express it paradoxically, if there were nothing else than things, processes, and forces, nothing would be in the only meaning which the term "to be" can assume-namely, to-be-for-man. But there is something. There are things, processes, and forces.

Man is Not a Mere Thing. Once these ideas have been thoroughly understood, it will be impossible to call the totality of manhood, i.e., all that man is, the result of processes and forces. If man were such a result, he would be a thing and, therefore, to express it again in terms of the above-mentioned paradox, nothing would be in the strict sense of the term. But something is-thanks to the fact that man reveals reality. The being of man, therefore, cannot be called in its totality "being a result." Likewise, it cannot be called in its entirety a mere part of the material cosmos. Although man is also a result, although he is also necessitated, also a part of the cosmos, he cannot be wholly result, entirely necessitated, merely a part, for otherwise nothing would be. In the world of things there is absolute darkness. A thing is. not a light for itself or a light for something else in such a way that something would be for a thing. The being of a thing is blindness. With the appearance of subjectivity in the endless evolution of the cosmos, the darkness is pierced. Man as subject is a "natural light," the light through which something is in the only possible sense of this term.16 Accordingly, it is through the being of man as subject that are transcended the being-a-result, being-merely-apart, being-necessitated, which have to be predicated also of man.

Being Man is Being Free. Whoever attaches a real meaning to the term "freedom" negatively expresses a certain absence of necessity. It is evident, therefore, that being subject must be called being free, for it is through his freedom that man transcends necessity. No 16C£. Heidegger, Von WeSffl der Wahrheit, pp. 14-17.

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matter how many aspects there are in man under which he must be considered the necessary result of processes and forces, they cannot be the totality of man's being, for it is only through man's subjectivity that there are necessity, results, processes and forces.17 The being of man as subject is being free as the "letting be" (Seinlassen) of the cosmos. IS It should be evident that there is no question here of freedom as the property of an action or of a power. Freedom here is concerned with the being of man on the proper level of his manhood. The being of man as subject is being free. It is only in the light of this fundamental freedom that the freedom of human action can be understood and that the many meanings which the term "freedom" has in the philosophical literature of our time become transparent. 19 Before considering these meanings, we must endeavor to express the positive content of being-free in the above-mentioned sense. The freedom of man as subject implies a certain autonomy.20 Not everything which man is results from processes and forces, but the being of man as subject is a self-being. Man cannot be fully explained by his antecedents, but the being of man as subject is a being-of-himself (aus-sich-sein). Man's being is not merely being a part of the cosmos, it is not solely a pertaining to the cosmos, but as subject, man is subsistent and belongs to himsel£.21 As subject, man is an "I," a "selfhood," a person. 22 The freedom of man as subject, 17"En effet, si la condition de l'homme est de decouvrir et d'etablir des significations, !'idee que Ie determinisme pourrait s'appliquer a l'homme devient simplement absurde." de Waelhens, op. cit., p. 83. IS "Die Freiheit zum Offenbaren eines Offenen lasst das jeweilige Seiende das Seiende sein, das es ist. Freiheit enthiillt sich jetzt als das Seinlassen von Seiendem." Heidegger, op. cit., p. 15. I9"Affirmer qu'ontologiquement l'homme est libre par definition et, encore, que la liberte est pour lui la condition de la verite puisqu'un etre non-libre ne pourrait dire ce que les choses sont, n'equivaut naturellement pas a resoudre tous les problemes que l'existence de la liberte peut poser, ni meme a nier que la liberte, relativement a l'homme, peut s'entendre en bien des manieres. On pense pourtant que cette affirmation de principe permet seule de comprendre la portee exacte de ces difficultes ulterieures et Ie sens que l'idee de liberte devra revetir lorsqu'on l'envisage dans les divers domaines de la philosophie et notamment, sur Ie plan psychologique, moral, social, religieux." de Waelhens, op. cit., p. 83. 20In general philosophers approach the autonomy of being proper to man as subject from the autonomy of human activity. By virtue of the prin· ciple "action follows being" they conclude from man's self-acting to his self-being. Cf. De Petter, op. cit., p. 170. 2ICf. H. D. Robert, "Phenorr.enologie existentielle et Morale thomiste," Morale Chretienne et Requetes contemporaines, Tournai-Paris, 1954, pp. 208209. :nCf. de Petter, op. cit., pp. 170-171.

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therefore, should be understood positively as a certain autonomy of being, a certain independence of being, a belonging-to-oneself on the ground of a "to be" which is his own and thus also non-generated. 23 Scholastic philosophy uses the term "subsistence" for the ontological autonomy of man as subject.24 As subject, as person, man "subsists."25 Man's ontological superiority constitutes at the same time his rationality. Boethius' famous definition of person as "an individual substance of a rational nature"26 clearly emphasizes this. The being of man as I means his ontological superiority over the things of the cosmos. But this I, as ontological superiority, is the "natural light" through which man is a rational being. If it were not for man's subjectivity, there would be nothing but darkness. Man's ontological superiority as subject is the light through which there is meaning To be subject, as being free, means to be rational. 27

h. Freedom as "Distance," as "Having to Be," and as "ProJect" No Absolute Freedom. If being subject means to be free, then the way of conceiving this subject is decisive for the content of the freedom attributed to man. If the subject which man is is described as an isolated subjectivity, his freedom must evidently be called absolute. As a matter of fact, there are a few contemporary phenomenologists who do this.28 Their views, however, mean that they have given up the phenomenological way of thinking on this particular point. There is no absolute freedom in human beings, because the subject which man is, is not an isolated subjectivity.29 The self occurs only as involved in the density of reality, in the facticity of body and world, with which it is not identical. The self posits itself only in 23Cf. de Petter, op. cit., p. 171. 24Cf. de Raeymaeker, The Philosophy of Being, p. 241 25Cf. de Petter, "Het Persoon-zijn onder thomistisch-metaphysische belichting," De Persoon (Verslag v. d. XlIIe alg. verg. der ver. v. Thomistischr Wijsb. en van de 4de studiedagen v. h. Wijsgerig Gezelschap te Leuven),

Nijmegen, 1948, pp. 45-46.

26De duabus naturis, c. III.

271t is important to draw explicitly attention to the fact that in the case of a person, the concept "rational nature" is not related to "subsistence" or "supposit" as an extrinsic difference but expresses that rationality means a higher perfection of subsistence itself. Moreover, it is only in the case of a rational nature that there can be question of subsistence in the strict and proper sense. Cf. de Petter, ofr. cit., pp. 45-46. 28Cf. Robert, op. cit., p. 202-204. 29"1m Ich-sagen spricht sich das Dasein als In-der-Welt-sein aus." Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 321.

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relativity, it exists, it is intentional, and situated. 30 The ontological autonomy, therefore, which man is, is very relative, for it is not what it is without the body and the world. The freedom which is proper to man because of his being-subject is at the same time immediately a bond, and this bond must be conceived as a kind of "powerlessness." Freedom is not an "acosmic liberty," not the perfectly autonomous source of reality's meaning, for without this reality subjectivity is not what it is. On the other hand, man is not merely a phase of the material cosmos, for without man there would not even be a cosmos. The Self as Non-Distant from Reality. If attention is paid to the meaning of manhood, understood as "engaged" subjectivity, as situated freedom, one sees that the envolvement of the subject in reality implies a "distance which is at the same time zero and infinite."31 Reality is conceived here as the facticity of the world and of being corporeal in the broad sense, i.e., the facticity of what with Strasser we have called the "quasi-objective ego."32 That there is a "zero distance" between the self and reality means that the self as conscious "I," as self-affirmation, simply does not occur except in fusion with consciousness of reality, in fusion with the affirmation of bodily being and the world. Accordingly, the "zero distance" is nothing else than what we have previously called "intentionality." The self-affirmation of the I, however, lies on a two-fold level, just as the affirmation of the reality in which the self is involved by virtue of its intentionality. It lies, first of all, on the cognitive level, the level on which the self is recognized as self and reality as reality.33 The ontological superiority of the self, as "natural light," i.e., the rationality of subjectivity, constitutes at the same time the rationality of reality by "letting it be."34 Secondly, the self-affirmation of the I and the affirmation of reality which is fused with this self-affirmation by virtue of intentionality lie on the affective level. The subject is not only a Cogito, but also a Vola (I will). The affective aspect of subjectivity is distinct from the cognitive level. The self-affirmation of 30"Si Ie sujet est en situation . . . c'est qu'il ne realise son ipseite qu'en etant efiectivement corps et en entrant par ce corps dans Ie monde." MerleauPonty, Phenomenologie de la perception, p. 467. 31Cf. de Waelhens, op. cit., p. 8l. 32Cf. above, pp. 114 f. S3"C'est en communiquant avec Ie monde que nous communiquons 10dubitablement avec nous-memes." Merleau-Ponty, op. cit., p. 485. 34"On ne peut dire ni que I'homme libre veut Ia Iiberte pour devoiler I'etre ni Ie devoilement de I'etre pour la liberte; ce sont hi. deux aspects d'une seule realite." S. de Beauvoir, Pour une morale de l'ambiguite, Paris, 1947, p. 99.

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the I contains not only a recognition of the self as self and of reality as reality, but also a consent of the self to the self and, fused into one with it, a consent to reality. The taste of the first cigarette after breakfast, the relish of a glass of wine, the joy over a lovely baby, the rapture of the bride over the groom, the happiness over the finding of a long-sought truth, the burst of laughter over an hilarious stroke of wit, the emotion over the sight of the ocean or of mountain scenery-all are examples of being affectively involved in, and of affirming reality. Fused with this consent of the self to reality is the consent of the self to itself. The self-affirmation of the I on the affective level means a certain plenitude of being, a certain fulfilment and satisfaction, a kind of rest and peace, which may be called "happiness." The Self as Infinitely Distant from Reality. The involvement of the self in reality, however, may not simply be called "zero distance," for it is just as immediately "infinitely distance," on the cognitive as well as the affective level. What is meant by this infinite distance? It implies that the positivity of the self-affirmation which the I is, is not simply what it is without negativity, without self-negation. At the same time negativity affects the affirmation of reality which is fused into one with self-affirmation by virtue of intentionality. As self-affirmation, the I is positivity of being. On the cognitive level, however, the recognition of the self as self implies a negationnamely, the denial that the self is identical with any reality whatsoever, conceived as the facticity of my bodily being and my world. The ontological positivity of the I, therefore, as cognitive self-affirmation, is not what it is without ontological negativity: the self is not the All, but a finite positivity of being. Likewise, the cognitive affirmation of reality which is fused with the self-affirmation of the I by virtue of intentionality implies a negation-namely, the negation that the reality of bodily being and world are identical with the self, and the negation that any reality is identical with any other reality whatsoever. No single reality is the All, but every reality is a finite positivity of being. The Positivity of Being-for-Itself. The well-informed reader will recognize a Sartrian thought in the foregoing remarks, although there is a difference insofar as we conceive the self and intentionality primarily as positivities. Sartre's "for-itself" is pure nihilation. This is not correct. While the "for-itself" is also nihilation, it is not noth-

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ing but nihilation. The subject-I, therefore, is not pure nothingness, but a positivity of being which is affected by negativity and consequently finite. Sartre considers the negativity of intentionality in Being and Nothingness especially from the cognitive level. In his literary works, mainly in Nausea, he is primarily concerned with the affective level. On this level he likewise absolutizes negativity: for Sartre, the affective involvement of the subject in reality is pure nausea. This, too, is not correct. Nevertheless, in the affective self-affirmation of the subject and in the affirmation of reality which is fused into one with this selfaffirmation by virtue of intentionality there is an aspect of negativity, an affective "no." The consent to reality is never a consent without reservation. The subject which man is, is never capable of a perfect "yes" to r~ality.35 Money, sex, bodily health, power, revolutionnothing fully satisfies man. 36 The subject's affective "yes" to reality includes an affective "no." The same applies to the affective selfaffirmation, the consent of the subject to itself. All fullness of being is at the same time emptiness, all fulfilment and satisfaction is affected by unfulfilment and dissatisfaction, all rest, peace, and happiness are permeated with unrest, lack of peace, and unhappiness.

((Man is a Being which in its Being is Concerned with its Being." It is not at all a purely imaginary danger that the details which had to be mentioned in considering the subject's involvement in reality may have obscured somewhat the view of man's being in its totality. Nevertheless, these details were necessary to prevent certain aspects from being emphasized at the expense of others, as is done in Sartre's works. To counteract the danger, let us endeavor to see man again in his totality. We will do so by means of an expression used by Heidegger. When the German philosopher wants to explain that man is not a thing among things, that he is a subject, a person, he calls man a "being which in its being is concerned with its being."37 A thing "is not concerned with what it is," for it lies "prostrated in what it 35"11 manque a son assentiment que!que chose de massif et de charnel." Merleau-Ponty, Eloge de la philosophie, p. 81. 36S. de Beauvoir, op. cit., pp. 65-75. 37"Das Dasein ist ein Seiendes, das nicht nur unter anderem Seienden vorkommt. Es ist vielmehr dadurch ontisch ausgezeichnet, dasz es diesem Seiendem in seinem Sein urn dieses Sein selbst geht. Zu dieser Seinsverfassung des Daseins gehort aber dann, dasz es in seinem Sein zu diesem Sein ein Seinsverhiiltnis hat." Heidegger, op. cit., p. 12.

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is."B8 A man is not bald in the same way as a billiard ball is smooth, he is not sick in the same way as a cabbage is spoiled, he is not hunchbacked as a willow tree is gnarled, for "man is concerned with" his bald pate, with the disintegration of his organism, with his deformity. He has a relationship to what he is-bald, sick, hunchbacked, etc.namely, as a subject. Heidegger expresses this idea by saying that man's being, Dasein, possesses a relationship to being (S einsverhiiltnis) which is an understanding of being (Seinsverstiindnis).39 This .understanding relationship is what distinguishes the being of man from the being of a thing. For this reason Heidegger says that man "in his being" is concerned with what he is, thus excluding that there would be question only of something accidental to man's being. 40 In the relationship of man as subject to what he is lie the positive and negative aspects on both the cognitive and the affective levels which were spoken of above. All this is lacking in a thing. A thing is not related to its own being, but is compact density, it is "prostrated in what it is," so that there is no possibility that it will raise questions, be astonished, bored, glad, sad, anxious, hopeful, or desperate.

"Situated" Freedom and Distance. As was stated above, beingsubject is being-free, and this freedom manifests itself as a superiority of being with respect to the being of things. The subject, however, is not a human subject without being involved in reality. Freedom is not acosmic freedom but a situated freedom. When one considers this freedom, it is seen to include a "distance which is at the same time zero and infinite." Such an assertion can be made only on the basis of being-subject. A thing is not a subject and, therefore, is not at a distance from what it is; a thing is not concerned with what it is, for it is compact density and lies "prostrated in what it is."41 Because being-subject is being-free, it is readily understood why several phenomenologists use the term "freedom" for the distance itself which characterizes man on the ground of his being-subject as situated sub38Heidegger's idea is taken over by Sartre when he says: "L'etre de Ja conscience est un etre, pour Jequel iI est dans son etre question de son etre." L' etre et Ie neant, p. 116. sSCf. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, pp. 12-15. 40The old philosophers expressed this in the definition: man is a rational animal. 41"Mais si nous supposons une affirmation dans laquelle I'affirme vient remplir I'affirmant et se confond avec lui, cette affirmation ne peut s'affirmer par trop de plenitude. . . . Tout se passe comme si pour Iiberer I'affirmation de soi du sein de I'etre iI fallait une decompression d'etre." Sartre, op. cit., p. 32.

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jectivity. They use this term in this sense even without first drawing attention to the ontological superiority, the subsistence, of the subjed. 42 That there is justification for the use of the term "freedom" for the distance which, as pointed out, is implied in the subject's involvement in reality can, of course, be seen fully only when being-subject is conceived as being-free. About the same has to be said regarding a third meaning of the term "freedom"-namely, zu sein, avoir a etre, or "having to be." These meanings likewise are intelligible only through a more profound penetration of freedom as distance.

Man as a "Natural Desire." The effective distance of the subject from reality, as an infinite distance, is invincible. Although there is an unmistakable consent of the subject to reality, the reservation, the negativity, which affects this consent cannot be eliminated. No valueexperience is such that man's "yes" is definitive and not permeated with "no." This applies to every level of intentionality, to man's existence in the technical, economic, political, social, medical, pedagogical, artistic, and intellectual realms. Insofar as an economic, social, or political order has a certain value, man is capable of consenting to it and to himself as an economist, a sociologist, or a politician. The same applies to the arts, sciences, education, etc. However, there is never a consent that is not affected by negativity. For this reason man cannot stand still, but has to go forward. He is never "finished," whether as economist, artist, philosopher, physician, or anything else. The same applies to his world. Because man "is bored by what is established,"43 because his "yes" can never be definitive, he is constantly urged on. Man as subject is not only a "natural light," but also a "natural desire." To understand this characteristic of man, it is necessary that in considering freedom as infinite distance emphasis be placed on affective "nihilation." It is in this sense that certain expressions of Sartre must be taken to be fully understood. Thus, for instance, one may say that "nothingness haunts being,"44 for all affirmation is 42"La liberte est echappement a un engagement dans l'etre, elle est neantisation d'un etre qu'elle est. . . . Simplement Ie surgissement de la liberte se fait par Ia double neantisation de i'etre qu'elle est et de l'etre au milieu duquel elle est." Sartre, op. cit., p. 566. See also de Waehlens, op. cit., p. 81. 43Cf. Merleau-Ponty, Eloge de la philosophie, p. 79. H"La condition necessaire pour qu'il soh possible de dire non, c'est que Ie non-etre so it une presence perpetuelle, en nous et en dehors de nous, c'est que Ie neant hante l'etre." Sartre, op. cit., p. 47

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affected by an invincible "nihilation." Or "nothingness lies in the very heart of being as a worm,"45 which expresses that the affective "yes" is never "massive" and definitive. Affective nihilation always means a certain distance of subjectivity from reality, a not-beingattached-to-it, a certain reservation and affective non-immersion in facticity which are never overcome. Terms such as "nihilating rupture,"46 "nothingness of being,"47 "hole of being"48 "decompression of being,"49 are synonyms which may be used to express that the affective involvement of subjectivity III reality can never mean a definitive consent.

Man as a Task-in-the-W orld. What we have ::tctually explicitated here is what phenomenology means when it calls man's being a zu sein, avoir d etre, or "having to be." Man is a task, a task-in-theworld. As long as man is man, his being is a task, and essentially a task. Man is never "finished." A task which is "finished" is no longer a task. A human being which is "finished" is no longer a human being. Man, of course, may fail to see the task-lik~ character of his being in the world, but then he fails to see himself as he is, as man .. In doing so, he gives himself the mode of being of a thing, for a thing "is not concerned with what it is." For a thing being is not a task, because a thing is not a subject, not free. "Having to Be" and "Being Able to Be." It would be meaningless to say that the being of man is a "having to be" unless this "having to be"-if we may use the expression-be "preceded" by a "being able to be." The being of man cannot be a task if it does not imply any potentiality. Being-man, however, manifestly is a being-able. This means that manhood may not be described as a purely facticitous-being-in-theworld. Let us illustrate the point and assume that I have earned the Bachelor's degree. This degree is a certain facticity, a certain mode of being-de-facto-in-the-world. However, this facticity does not express everything, for the facticitous situation implies precisely all kinds of possibilities. When I am in possession of the degree, I have 45"Le neant ne peut se neantiser que sur Ie iond d'etre; si du m!ant pcut etre donne, ce n'est ni avant ni apres l'etre, ni d'une maniere generale, en dehors de l'etre, mais c'est au sein meme de l'etre, en son coeur, comme un ver." Sartre, op. cit., p. 57. 46S artre, L' etre et Ie neant, p. 514. 47 Ibid., p. 516. 48Ibid., p. 121. 49Ibid., p. 116.

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the possibility of becoming a lawyer, a journalist, an officer, or enter in many other professions. The man who I am facticitously is always also a "being able to be." One must even say that facticity is not a real facticity without capacity-of-being. I am not a really educated man if my actual education does not imply all kinds of possibilities. A facticity without possibilities is not a real facticity.50 This assertion applies to any facticity. I am never merely facticitously ill. Even actually being ill implies possibilities. I can take the illness as a means to extol myself over those who were never ill; I can seize the illness as an opportunity to revolt against God; I can accept it to expiate my sins. An illness which does not include any possibility is not a real illness. 51

"Being-Able" is an Essential Characteristic of Man. It is important to keep in mind here that the ability-to-be of which we are speaking here is not suspended in a vacuum. It should not be identified with a purely logical possibility and, therefore, is not merely the absence of contradiction between two terms. Likewise, being-ableto-be is not similar to the possibility or contingency of things to which something may "happen."52 Finally, it should not be conceived as a kind of plan which later can be readily abandoned. 53 The ability to be of which we are speaking is an existentiale, an essential characteristic of man. This idea is implicit in the thought that man's facti city is no real facticity without this being-able-to-be. The question to be answered here, however, is, how are we to conceive this ability as an existentiale l' Above, we have described the ontological superiority of the subject as a "light" for both the subject itself and the other than the subject. Insofar as the subject is a light for reality we ascribed to it the "letting be" (S einlassen) of reality. This "letting be" is not a , creative "letting be" of reality, but only the unveiling, the freeing of a reality which reveals itself as already present. To be subject is to-stand-consciously-in-reality-as-facticity. The "letting be" of subjectivity, however, is also and just as immediately Verstehen. 54 By 5IJThis idea has been very neatly explained in B. Delfgaauw's sympathetic little book, Wat is existentialism?, Amsterdam, 1952, pp. 111-113. 51Cf. Sartre, ibid., p. 393. fi2"Das Miiglichsein, das je das Dasein existenzial ist, unterscheidet sich ebensoseher von der leeren, logischen Miiglichkeit, wie von der Kontingenz eines Vorhandenen, sofern mit diesem das und jenes 'passieren' kann." Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 143. 53Cf. Heidegger, ibid., p. 145. 5iHeidegger, ibid., pp. 143-146.

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this term Heidegger means that subjectivity is not only the "freeing of the 'already,' H i.e., of reality's facticity, but also and just as immediately the "freeing of the 'not yet,' H i.e., of the possibilities of reality. Verstehen is the "letting be" itself insofar as "letting be" is the consciousness not only of a facticitous-being but also of a beingable-to-be. 55 It should be evident that the potential being which is contained in the facticity of subject and object is not something accidental but essential for each mode of existing. An ash tray is not a real ash tray, and perception is not real perception unless a determined appearing profile refers to the possible appearance of other profiles, and unless the actual perception refers to the possibility of future perceptions. If one adds to this that existence is facticity and ability-to-be not only as perceiving existence but as any mode of existence, we may say that man is the oppositional unity of facticity and capacity of being. Man as Project. To indicate this unity-in-opposition which man is, the term "project" (Entwurf) is used. 56 Man is a project. He does not lie "prostrated" in his facti city, but Verstehen leaves him a certain "margin," space for his being-able-to-be. 57 Man's being, however, is a being-in-the-world. Consequently, man's ability to be is a being-able-to-be-in-the-world. 58 To every possible mode of existing there corresponds a possible meaning of the world. The project which man is, is at the same time at once the project of his world. 59 On the basis of the capacity of being which is contained in every facticitous meaning it becomes possible now to attribute to the term "meaning" a more profound sense than that of "appearing reality." Meaning reveals itself as "direction." The clearest example is provided perhaps by the perception of an ash tray. The appearing profile is the meaning which adheres to the perception from a certain stand55"Dasein versteht sich immer schon und immer noch, solange es ist, aus M6glichkeiten," Heidegger, ibid., p. 145. 56"Warum dringt das Verstehen nach allen wesenhaften Dimensionen des in ihm Erschlieszbaren immer in die M6glichkeiten? Weil das Verstehen an ihm selbst die existenziale Struktur hat, die wir den Entwurf nennen." Heidegger, ibid. 57"Der Entwurf ist die existenziale Seinsverfassung des Spielraums des faktischen Seink6nnens." Heidegger, ibid. 58"Als Seink6nnen ist das In-sein je Sein-k6nnen-in-der-Welt." Heidegger, ibid., p. 144. 59The French philosophers of existence also describe man as a "worldproject."

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point. But the profile of the ash tray which de facto appears indicates also the "direction" which my gaze must follow if it wants to let appear what is not yet de facto appearing. The subject, as "letting be," is the source of meaning but, as Verstehen, it is the origin of "direction." This assertion applies to every level of existing. The facticitous meaning of the world, for instance, for a college graduate is full of references to possible modes of existing and these references are, as it were, sketches of the "direction" which his existence can take in the world. The facticitous value of the legal order indicates to the juridical existence the "direction" in which this existence can realize itself fuhher. The statement also that "man in his being is concerned with his being" receives a new and more profound meaning when one considers that subjectivity, as "letting be" of facticity, is at the same time Verstehen of possibilities. 60 That man is concerned with his being now means that man is concerned with his possibilities and the possibilities of his world. 61 Man is always "ahead" of himself and of his world,62 because his facti city is not what it is without the "room for expansion" of his ability to be. This room, however, of his existence means the "direction" in which his existence can gO.63 Such a room can be found in any mode of existing. Asking about the meaning of a mode of existing, e.g., as an economic being or as a political being, puts not only facticitous values in question but also the values which are not facticitous. It is at the same time a matter regarding the direction which the mode of existing in question can take. From this angle the sense of the question about the meaning of life makes itself urgent again. The question is not concerned with some particular mode of existing. It puts into question the facticity of "being-there" (Dasein) without any restrictions but at the same time 60"Das Seiende, dem es in seinem Sein urn dieses selbst geht, verhalt sich zu seinem Sein als seiner eigensten Moglichkeit. Dasein ist je seine Moglichkeit und es 'hat' sie nicht nur noch eigenschaftlich als ein Vorhandenes." Heidegger, op. cit., p. 42. 61"Das Dasein ist Seiendes, dem es in seinem Sein urn dieses selbst geht. Das 'es geht urn .. .' hat sich verdeutlicht in der Seinsverfassung des Verstehens als des sichentwerfenden Seins." Heidegger, op. cit., p. 191. 62"Dasein ist immer schon 'i.iber sich hinaus', nicht als Verhalten zu anderem Seienden, das es nicht ist, sondern aI,s Sein zum Sei~konn~, d.as es selbst. ist. Diese Seinsstruktur des wesenhaften es geht urn . . . fassen wlr als das Slchvorweg-sein des Daseins." Heidegger, op. cit., p. 192. 63 ["Le temps] est a la lettre Ie sens de notre vie." Merleau-Ponty, PhL:lIomen%gie de la perception, p. 492.

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it is aware of the many "directions" which a subject-in-the-world can take. 64 Man as Self-Project. As was pointed out above, it would be meaningless to say that man's being is a having-to-be unless this having-to-be is "preceded" by a being-able-to-be. Man's being cannot be a "commission" or task if man lies "prostrated" in his facticity, i.e., if his facticity does not leave the "elbowroom" of potential being. It should be clear now that the term "preceded" is not correct. Man's being is not "first" a being-able and "next" a having-to-be, but is both in an equally immediate way. Having-to-be, however, expresses something more than being-able-to-be. Having-to-be reveals itself only when one sees that the affective involvement in facticity does not imply a definitive consent but is affected by and permeated with nihilation. For this reason man always wants to go forward and reach beyond any facticitous situation. It is his being-able-to-be that offers him the necessary room for expansion. What we are considering here are still the various aspects of man's being on the properly human level-in other words, man as "engaged," as involved in the world. As we have seen, man's being as subject reveals itself as being-free. Secondly, the subject's involvement in reality implies a distance. This distance itself is called "freedom" also. Further reflection showed us man as having-to-be and as project. Now we have to point out that in phenomenological literature the term "freedom" is used for having-to-be and beingable-to-be. 65 . In this usage man's freedom as subject is not always explicitly mentioned. It is, however, implicitly presupposed, for the ability-to-be attributed to man reveals itself as different from the potential being of things precisely because of man's characteristic being-subject. Man's being-able-to-be, the potentialities of human existence, are potentialities of a subject. Man's possibilities are his own. To a thing something may "happen,"66 but the various possible happenings cannot be said to be possibilities of the thing itself because 640nce being-subject has been explicitated as being-ethical, the question regarding the meaning of life becomes more specific in this sense that man realizes not only that many "directions" are open to him but also that he has the obligation to choose a certain "direction." But at the present we cannot yet speak about this sense. 65"Dire que Ie pour-soi a it etre ce qu'il est, dire qu'il est ce qu'il n'est pas en n'etant pas ce qu'il est, dire qu'en lui l'existence precede et conditionne I'essence ou inversement, selon la formule de Hegel, que pour lui "Wesen ist was gewesen ist," c'est dire une seule et meme chose, it savoir que l'homme est libre." Sartre, L'etre et Ie neant, p. 515. 66Cf. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 143.

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the thing is not a selfhood. Man, on the proper level of his manhood, is "master of the situation" and holds his possibilities "in his own hands." The p,roject which man is, is a self-project. This does not mean that nothing can "happen" to man, for obviously the opposite is true insofar as there is an aspect in man under which he is as a thing. However, the thing-like level in question is not the proper level of manhood. Just as having-to-be is not something accidental to man's being but constitutes what man is essentially as a situated subjectivity, so also his being-a-project is 'not a "little plan"67 which man can readily abandon if he wishes but an essential characteristic. 68 In his own way Sartre expresses the same thought very appropriately. He says that man "is not what he is, and is what he is not."69 Man is not what he is, i.e., he is not mere facticity, for his facticity leaves him the "room for expansion" of his capacity of being. He is at the same time what he is not, i.e., man is a being-able-to-be, but this ability to be he is not facticitously. However, his ability to be is not something accidental and, therefore, we must say that man is what he (facticitously) is not. Necessity and Relativity of Freedom as Project. If man as project is called "freedom," there is no decisive objection against Sartre's statement that man "is condemned to freedom."70 The expression is meant to indicate that the being of man is a project and that this is an essential characteristic of man, which he cannot set aside. By the "essence" of a reality is meant that by which this reality is what it is. Essence always implies a hypothetical necessity. If, then, a certain reality must be called a "human reality," this reality must of necessity be freedom, because man's essence is freedom. Just as man's freedom as subject includes a limiting bond insofar as the subject which man is does not occur without the facticity of bodily being and the world, so also freedom as project must be said to be relative. Man's ability-to-be is a being-able-to-be from a given situation. A given factictous situation implies certain possibilities and excludes others.71 I am free to realize myself as a classicist, but 67Cf. Heidegger, ibid., p. 145. 68"Das Verstehen ist, als Entwerfen, die Seinsart des Daseins, in der es seine Moglichkeiten als Moglichkeiten ist." Heidegger, ibid. 69"Pourtant, Ie pour-soi est. II est, dira-t-on, fut-ce a. titre d'etre qui n'est pas ce qu'i! est, et qui est ce qu'il n'est pas." Sartre, L' etre et Ie neant, p. 121. 7oIbid. See also "Etre libre c'est etre condamne a. etre libre." Ibid., p. 174. 71"Und als geworfenes ist das Dasein in die Seinsart des Entwerfens geworfen." Heidegger, op. cit., p. 145.

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this mode of potential being is contained only in the facticity of an education in a college of arts and sciences and not in the one resulting from training in home economics. I am free to realize myself as a mountain-climber, but not if my facticity is that of a cripple. My situation, therefore, binds and limits me in many respects. I am free only within the limits resulting from being bound to my situation. To use a Heideggerian term, the project which I am is a "thrown" project, one that is not entirely of my own making. My facticity is no real facticity without the "room for expansion" of potential being. On the other hand, my potential being is a real possibility only insofar as it is contained in my facticity. c. To be Free is to be Ethical

The Opposition of Freedom and Ethical Bonds. Not infrequently an opposition is seen between being-free and being-ethical. This view is based on the idea that freedom is the absence of bonds, and that being-ethical is being bound by law. Evidently, if this idea is true, the opposition of the two is inevitable. Nevertheless, the view that freedom is opposed to being ethical is rather primitive, because the presupposition that freedom is the absence of bonds cannot be justified and, on the other hand, the view does not clarify the origin of the moral law. Or rather, it is simply assumed that this law "is there" and is imposed on man's freedom from without. Even if freedom is not conceived as the absence of bonds but as "se1fhood," there remains a certain opposition between being-free and being-ethical as long as law is viewed as a norm which "is there" and has been imposed from without upon freedom. It is the opposition between a personalistic conception of man and a legalistic conception of being ethical. This opposition becomes even stronger when the irreducible and original aspect of the person is placed in contrast with the natural law as valid for all, everywhere and at all times. Legalism and .Morality. Legalism, or the view that morality is nothing else than willingness to obey a law imposed from without, was highly favored by Kant's ideas. 72 This legalism led to aridity and even to hypocrisy with respect to the moral ideal. 73 If the good 72"Au fond la valeur chez Kant n'est pas du cote de la personne mais du cote de la loi, ou plutot la personne ne vaut qu'autant qu'elle se met au servi~e de la loi: elle n'a pas de valeur propre. Ce qu'il y a de personnaliste chez Kant est detriut par ce qu'il y a de legaliste." J. Lacroix, Personne et amOllr, Paris, 1955, pp. 40-41. 73Cf. Lacroix, ibid., pp. 36-41.

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or evil character of a human action depends solely upon its agreement or disagreement with the law, then the disposition of the acting subject is irrelevant, so that a purely external agreement with the law suffices to speak of a good deed. Self-satisfaction and pride are thus promoted: one does not have any self-reproach to make and is "in accord" with one's conscience. 74 Moreover, one has a criterion to judge the others-namely, the agreement or disagreement of their deeds with the law. If one sees that their deeds deviate from what is prescribed, one has every reason to "wash one's hands in innocence" and to thank God that one is not like them. This is pharisaism. In a legalistic view of moral life moral education cannot appeal to anything else than fear of the consequences following from the non-observance of the law. There can be no question of a moral ideal which could give the strength to overcome obstacles. For law is conceived as imposed from without and, therefore, itself has to supply the motive leading to its observance. This motive is found in the threat of sanctions, the fear of which is supposed to move the subject to keep the law. Educational value is attached to the law itself and even to "regulations."75 Legalism is not only a predominant mentality in a particular historical phase of morality but is above all a permanent temptation, against which a man who lives an authentically ethical life will always have to struggle. As we will see later, this struggle and resistance imply the refusal to be satisfied with the minimum. It is the refusal simply to substitute a process-like acting according to the law for the creative aspect of moral life, the refusal to sacrifice the progressive character of moral life to the "settlement of old debts."76

Atheistic Existentialism and Legalism. Accounts with the legalism of the preceding century were settled especially by the representatives of atheistic existentialism. Their procedure consisted simply in denying that there are general laws. This denial is based upon various grounds. Sartre, for instance, rejects universally valid norms or 74"D'une part vis-a.-vis de soi-meme on sera porte a. une sorte de satisfaction interne, de contentement interieur d'autant plus grand qu'on se soumettra davantage jusque dans Ie detail aux plus petites prescriptions-et, comme disait saint Augustin, il y a quelque chose de pire que Ie vice, a. savoir l'orgueil de la vertu." Lacroix, op. cit., pp. 37-38. 75Cf. N. Perquin, J. "Het 'welopgevoede' Kind," Dux, Vol. XIII (1951). pp. 432-434. 76Cf. Lacroix, op. cit., pp. 41-45.

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values because, in his view, there is no God who can hold values before us or impose norms upon us. n For Merleau-Ponty general norms or values are impossible, because there is no meaning which transcends the historical situation in which it reveals itself. MerleauPonty admits meaning, but this meaning is never valid for all, everywhere and always. It applies only within a given historical situation to those who live in this situation.78 Outside this situation values are mere words. 79 As we noted previously, from the viewpoint of Merleau-Ponty a general idea of, e.g., "table" or "perception" is impossible, because knowledge contains nothing else than the selfrevelation of reality through profiles which correspond with a definite historical standpoint and therefore pass away with this phase of history. so In a similar way the values which appear apply only to a phase of history and pass away with it, i.e., lose their value. On the basis of historicity every value can be denied. Thus MerleauPonty's ethics is a radical situational ethics. Deficiency of Atheistic Existentialism. It goes without saying that within this existentialistic perspective legalism is impossible. However, the way in which it is rejected is full of difficulties. No general norms or values at all are recognized. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to conclude that these phenomenologists have abolished all ethics. Sartre rejects God as law-giver, although he finds it a "great nuisance" to do so, because thus values "are no longer written in heaven."sl But he then proceeds to elevate freedom to the rank of norm of good and evil: an action is morally good if it is done freely. 82 What can be the meaning of this? General 77Cf. Sartre, L'existentialisme est un humanisme, p. 37. 7s"Dans une periode donnee de l'histoire et de la politique du parti, les valeurs sont determinees et I'adhesion est sans reserves, puisqu'elle est motivee par la logique de I'histoire. C'est cet absolu dans Ie relatif qui fait la difference entre la dialectique marxiste et Ie relativisme vulgaire." Merleau-Ponty, Humanisme et terreur, Paris, 1947, p. 129. 79"La decision . . . n'est pas affaire privee, elle n'est pas l'affirmation immediate des valeurs que nous pre£erons, elle consiste pour nous a faire Ie point de notre situation dans Ie monde, a nous replacer dans Ie cours des choses, a bien comprendre et a bien exprimer Ie mouvement de l'histoire lors duquel les valeurs restent verbales et par lequel seulement elles ont chance de se realiser." Merleau-Ponty, op. cit., p. 23. soC£. Merleau-Ponty, PhenomhlOlogie de la perception, pp. 382-383, 454. SIC£. Sartre, L'existentialisme est un humanisme, pp. 35-36. 82"On peut tout choisir si c'est sur Ie plan de l'engagement libre." Sartre, ibid., pp. 88-89.

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norms are rejected and then freedom is made a general norm. Sartre could perhaps defend himself by saying that his norm is not "written in heaven," but anchored in human existence. But, we may ask, what exactly was the objection to the ethical norm? Its universality or the fact that it is supposed to be "written in heaven"? Moreover, who claims that the norm is "written in heaven"? The only reply can be: legalism. But if the rejection of legalism still implies the affirmation of a general norm, then it will perhaps be possible to find in existence a real ethical norm without having to re-introduce legalism. A similar difficulty may be raised against the view of MerleauPonty. It is useless to reject a general norm and then to introduce one. 8S Merleau-Ponty does not want to have anything to do with freedom in Sartre's sense but posits in its stead humanity, the human dignity of sOCiety, as the norm of good and evil. 84 This norm, however, is wholly meaningless in the perspective of MerleauPonty's general line of thought.. For, according to him, all truths and values are fully determined by history, they are never more than provisional and can always be rejected on the ground that the various phases of history slide away. If this assertion is true for all values and all truths, then it applies also to the "human dignity of society." Man, therefore, would never be able to determine whether a particular situation is in agreement or in disagreement with human dignity. He would need a norm to determine this, but a "sliding" norm is not a norm.85

Man's Being is a "Having to Be" Which is Bound by Objectivity. Does being-ethical mean to be "bound by law"? May it be said that the ethical is law which "simply is there"? Is there opposition 83Cf. Kwant, "Rencontre et Verite," Rencontre-Encounter-Begegnung, Utrecht-Antwerp en, 1957, pp. 236-242. 84"Le marxisme avait vu qu'inevitablement notre connaissance de I'histoire est partiale, chaque conscience etant elle-meme historiquement situee mais au lieu d'en conclure que nous sommes enfermes dans la subjectivite et voue~ a la magie des que nous voulons agir au dehors, iI trouvait, par deJa la connaissance scientifique et son n!ve de verite impersonnelle, un nouveau fondement pour la verite historique dans la logique spontanee de notre existence, dans la reconnaissance du proletaire par Ie proletaire, et dans la croissance affective de la revolution." Merleau-Ponty, op. cit. pp. 19-20. 85Cf. Kwant "Menselijke existentie en geschiedenis volgens het wijsgerig denken van Maurice Merleau-Ponty," Algemeen N ederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte en Psychologic, vol. 46 (1953-1954), pp. 246-247.

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between freedom as "selfhood" and law? Are there laws which are valid for all, everywhere and always? Let us see to what extent it will be possible to reply to these questions by making use of the insights into freedom which we have acquired and by continuing to penetrate more profoundly into the essence of freedom. Being subject should be conceived as an ontological superiority over the being of things. The being of things is a being-necessitated, while being-subject is being-free. As subject, man is a "natural light," a light for himself and for reality which is not the subject itself. Insofar as the subject is a light for the other-than-the-subject, it is the "letting be" of reality. This light, however, is an objective light, it lets reality be what reality is,86 is bound by objectivity.87 Being subject is to be bound by objectivity, to stand in truth as in the unconcealment of reality. The freedom, therefore, which characterizes man on the proper level of his manhood reveals itself at the same time and just as immediately as a being-bound-namely, by objectivity as unconcealment. On the other hand, man's being must be called a zu sein, a "having to be," because the subject which man is cannot definitively consent to any reality. Thus being-subject is the basis of both being-bound by objectivity and having-to-be. Man, then, is a having-to-be-which-isbound-by-objectivity,

Man's Fundamental "Ought" and Morality. When we spoke about the "ought" of justice, we inserted it into a more general "ought"-the "ought." namely, which characterizes man's existence and is called zu sein or "having to be." It was pointed out that man executes this "ought" per se, even if he pretends to abstain from doing so. When a man alleges that he abstains from realizing himself and his world, he still realizes himself, but as a blockhead and as an egoist, and he still constructs a world, but a world that is full of illiterates and contagious diseases, a world in which babies can survive only a few months, and in which floods regularly make thousands of victims. Man executes per se the zu sein which characterizes him,

S6C£. Heidegger, Sein Il1Id Zeit, p. 218. 87"Das Sicheinlassen auf die Entborgenheit des Seiendem verliert sich nicht in dieser, sondern entfaltet sich zu einem Zuriicktreten vor dem Seienden, damit dieses in dem, was es ist und wie es ist, sich offenbare und die vorstellende Angleichung aus ihm das Richtmass nehme." Heidegger, Vom der Wahrheit, p. 15.

rresell

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but this execution can be done in an unfitting way-namely, when it destroys the other's subjectivity. What is unfitting in this last-named sense is called by everyone "immoral." Immorality consists in this that man fails to admit the being-bound by objectivity which characterizes his having-to-be. The objective meaning of man's fellow man is being-subject. This meaning binds man. He has to respect and favor it. Perhaps it is not as it should be that we endeavor to explicate the ethical man by means of immorality. However, this approach may have an advantage-namely, that in this way it is more quickly realized that we are speaking of reality than if we were directly to describe being-ethical as an ideal. Nevertheless, this direct description has to be made also, for the ethical laws, which usually are formulated in a negative way, explicitate only the minimum demanded by the moral ideal. To use again the same example, the ethical norm "man may not destroy the subjectivity of his fellow man" finds its source in a positive ethical demand-namely, the demand to love our fellow ma'll. Man's being is a having-to-be-for-the-other, a beingdestined-for-the-other. Its minimum demand implies that man organizes his life and his world in such a way that the other's subjectivity does not have to perish in this world. Other examples could be given to illustrate the point. For instance, that marriage is monogamous and indissoluble is merely a minimum insight into the objective meaning of intersubjectivity as sexually differentiated.

The Norm of Man's Action. Perhaps it has become clear now that being-ethical may not be conceived as being "bound by a law" which "simply is there." For having-to-be-which-is-bound-by-objectivity is what constitutes what man essentially is as distinct from a thing, as subject, as free. The law gives expression to this being, laws and norms explicitate and conceptualize it. The law is not imposed from without, but expresses man's bound status reflexively and predicatively, and this bound condition is the being of man himself as subjectivity, as freedom. The expression of man's bond on a reflexive and predicative level is possible because man's being is a beingconscious. As characterized by "understanding of being" (S einsverstandnis), man knows implicitly of his being as zu sein, his "having to be." His consciousness, therefore, is moral consciousness or conscience, and this conscience constitutes what man essentially is as characterized by "understanding of being." Existence, as unconcealedness, then, is the norm of human actions. Existence is unconcealed

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because it is characterized Ly "understanding of being." This understanding, as the unveiling of existence-as-norm, is called "conscience." It constitutes what man essentially is as distinct from a thing. As distinct from the Leing of a thing, man's l)eing is not a beingnecessitated, Lut a being-free, i.e., a being-obliged. 88 As Renouvier expressed it, "Man is an animal with precepts."

Conscience and its Substructures. As is evident, we are speaking here only of the adult conscience of the person, the personal conscience which pertains to man on the proper level of his manhood. This conscience, however, has substructures of a biological, instinctive, and social nature whose reality has been brought to light through the work of psychologists and sociologists, especially in the past few decades. 89 Their studies have shown that aLsence of conscience is frequently the result of serious defects on the infrahuman level, e.g., the absence of sufficient affection during infancy. The integrity of an adult conscience presupposes a favorable development of these suLstructures. This dependence of conscience upon its substructures is really quite normal, for subjectivity is not an isolated subjectivity but a subjectivity-embodied-in-a-world. On the other hand, however, it would be going too far to follow Freud and sociologism in their identification of rudimentary and primitive forms of conscience with the adult conscience of a person. 90 It is intentionally that we speak here of an "adult conscience" and not of the "conscience of the adult," for there are many so-called adults whose development has stopped with ~lJe or the other rudimentary and primitive form of conscience. The adult conscience may not Le identified with its biological, instinctive, and social substructures. The reason is that the "knowledge" which lies contained in these substructures is not the personal, objective knowledge pertaining to the subject as "natural light" and, 8BThe phenomenology of conscience is a very suitable example if one tries to understand the thought "movement" of the phenomenologist. His thinking is a so-called "spiral thought." It penetrates in a spiral fashion into the depth of reality, making each acquired insight the standpoint leading to an ever more profound understanding. His thinking about man as a conscientious-being illustrates this spiral process. What phenomenology says about cunscience can and has to be taken up again when man's being-asubject has been understood as being-the-result-of-divine-Love and when having-to-be has been understood as the task to come closer to this divine origin through life in the world. Only then can the bond of subjectivity to unconcealedness be understood as a bond to God's will. This identity, however, cannot he immediately pronounced by the phenomologist. 89Cf. H. H. M. Fortmann, "Het goede, het geweten en de moraal, Een paedagogische studie over de crisis in de opvattingen over moraal en geweten." Dux vol. XX (1953), pp. 436-442. 90Cf. G. Madinier, De Mens en zijn Geweten, Utrrecht, 1957, pp. 19-24,

107-116.

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secondly, the zu sein and restlessness contained in the substructures cannot be understood, respectively, as the tending to objective values and as ethical idealism. Personal conscience emerges from its substructures and from its rudimentary and primitive forms. It continues to presuppose them, but is not identical with them, as may appear also from the fact that the person is aware of the substructures' influence. As soon, however, as he becomes aware of them, he will be faced with the necessity of making a personal judgment. He will ask himself whether he will approve these influences or had better take a different road. This question means that he places himself on the proper level of his manhood, the level of the personal conscience. 91

Personal Conscience and General Norms. A personal conscience is not contradicted by general norms which are valid for all, always and everywhere. Likewise, the acceptance of such norms does not mean a return to legalism. Of course, one may want to follow Sartre and Merleau-Ponty who see in knowledge nothing else than the unveiling of reality through profiles and thus fail to recognize in man's characteristic "understanding of being" the reality of the intellectual act by which he grasps the essence of the rea1. 92 In that case, of course, there can be no question of an abstract norm which is objectively general, i.e., valid in every situation, not even of the general norms which these phenomenologists quietly introduce. Their sensualistic positivism excludes utterly any possibility of general norms. However, such a position is not tenable. In" accepting general norms, we do not mean norms which "are written tor us in heaven." General norms are the reflexive expression of man's essence, understood as "having to be" or zu sein. To use again the above-mentioned example, man's essence as co-existence is his being-destined-for-the-other. This is what man essentially is, no matter what his historical situation may be. If this idea is expressed negatively and in relation to the minimum demand of love, one must say that man may never and nowhere destroy the subjectivity of his fellow man. 93 This general law is not "written in heaven," but "in 91"Let us say, if need be, that conscience is produced by the various forms of social pressure, but not that it is solely the product of social pressure. The influence of social pressure has to be integrated and developed rather than rejected. Only the idea that this influence alone produces conscience is wrong." Madinier, op. cit., p. 23. 92Cf. above, pp. 128 ff. 93Cf. L. Janssens, "Moderne situatie-ethiek in het licht van de klassieke leer over het geweten," Persoonlijke vcrantwoordelijkheid en geweten, (Verslagboek van de lSe R. K. Paedagogische Week), Tilburg, 1955, p. 18.

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the hearts of men." This law in unconcealed for man who is characterized by "understanding of being." In the .general law man gives expression to his implicit awareness of his own essence as zu sein. For this reason this law is called the "natural law" and has a transhistorical validity.94

Sartre's Objection Against General Norms. Sartre claims that, even if there were a God and even if general norms were "written in heaven," they would not be of much use to man. 95 For even in that case man would not be dispensed from the duty to decipher these heavenly signs and to give them a meaning. 96 He clarifies his view by means of an example. During the war one of his students came to visit him and ask for his advice. He did not know what to do: go to England and enlist in the French forces there or stay at home with his mother to support her.97 Sartre ends the example by triumphantly observing that there is no system of general moral norms which can reply to this question. Therefore, even if there were general norms, they would be wholly useless. This train of thought is very primitive. First of all, even if there is a God, the general norms are not written "in heaven" but in man's essence. Man knows this because he is characterized by "understanding of being." Secondly, Sartre makes use of a general norm by the very fact that he does not even consider a third possibility-namely, that his student could have become a collaborator and a traitor. This possibility is simply discarded by Sartre, because it was already excluded by the general law that one may not destroy the subjectivity of one's countrymen. 98 The general law, therefore, is not wholly useless. Finally, it is a mistake to think that a system of general laws has to be capable of indicating what should be done in concrete situations and that such a system becomes valueless because it cannot do so. The realization of what has to be done in concrete situations arises from 94"Il Y a au sein et a la racine du choix moral une visee de yaleur constante et immuable que nous n'avons pas a inventer, ni a creer de toute piece, mais a accepter et a faire notre; a savoir la reconnaissance de l'eminente dignite de la per sonne humaine et des valeurs constitutives de la personnalite." Dondeyne, "Les problemes souleves par l'atheisme existentialiste," Sapientia Aquinatis (Communicationes IV CongresSlts Thomistici Internationalis) , Rome

1955, p. 468. 95L'existcntialisme est un humanisme,

p.

95.

96"L'existentialiste ne pensera pas non plus que l'homme peut trouver un secours dans un signe donne, sur terre, qui l'orientera; car il pense que l'homme dechiffre lui-meme Ie signe comme il lui plait." Sartre, op. cit., p. 38. 970p. cit., pp. 4O-4l. 98Cf. Dondeyne, Contemporary European Thought and Christian Faith, p.

197.

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the encounter of the ethical ideal which man essentially is with the concrete situation. To know what he has to do here and now, it is not sufficient for man to be convinced of his destiny for the other.99 He will have to investigate whether this particular deed is such that it will foster the other's subjectivity or destroy it. This investigation cannot be conducted by looking at general norms, but only by studying the deed itself and the situation in which it is to be done. What has to be done here and now cannot be deduced from general norms, because these norms say nothing about the character of this particular deed and this particular situation. Whether or not a Rorschach test is a violation of on~'s subjectivity cannot be deduced from the general law which prescribes respect for the other, but becomes clear only by investigating what exactly is done in a Rorschach test. Claiming that this question can be solved by a reply deduced from the general law is tantamount to saying that an artist can deduce from general esthetics what he has to paint on this particular wall and how he has to do it.loO Evidently, no such reply is possible. The same applies to the moral order. The acceptance of general norms in itself does not justify any moral choice in particular. It is excluded that man would necessarily do good deeds because general norms would dictate a certain moral choice to him.lol

Insufficiency of General Laws. While general laws are not useless, they are not sufficient for an authentic moral life. Some reasons for their usefulness as well as their insufficiency have been mentioned above, but others could be added. General laws are insufficient especially because they do not explicitate moral life as an ideal of manhood. This is certainly true of general laws which express moral 99"S'il est vrai que la foi chn!tienne developpe Ie sens de la personne humaine et nous oblige a promouvoir la justice et la paix dans Ie monde, par l'instauration d'un ordre temporel plus digne de l'homme, elle ne nons donne pas pour autant une image concrete de cet ordre." Dondeyne, art. quoted in footnote 94, p. 467.

lOO"On ne deduit pas plus la morale de la loi qu'on ne deduit la science des axiomes de la raison ou l'art des principes de l'estetique." Lacroix, op. cit. p. 44. lOl"La foi ne justifie aucun des choix qu'on peut etre amene a faire dans une situation donnee; i1 faut se risquer, s'aventurer, et l'on ignore touiours se qui en result era et l'on ne doit pas pour autant cesser de s'en preoccuper, d'y veiller, de s'efforcer au besoin d'y porter remede. Peut-etre a-t-on 'tort', peut-etre va-t-on . . . declencher des catastrophes; du moins doit-on savoir qu'elles risquent de se produire et ne pas se rassurer par avance en se disant: ce que je fais est necessairement bon, puisque c'est la foi qui me Ie dicte." Fr. J eanson, "Les caracteres existentialistes de la conduite humaine selon Jean-Paul Sartre," Morale chrhienne et requites contemporaines, TournaiParis, 1954, p. 181.

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demands in a negative and minimal way. An authentic moral life implies that the subject constantly continues to give himself to a task which is never finished. Man's being is always a zu sein or "having to be" and, therefore, never finished. One can never say of a man that he is virtuous, without misunderstanding the proper character of virtue. As a mode of being-man, being-virtuous is a mode of havingto-be. An authentic moral life always progresses. This progress does not consist in an increasingly more accurate observance of an increasingly more sharply formulated law, but in an ever-greater clear sightedness of conscience and an ever-more faithful realization of an ideal which is never reached. Moral life too knows geniuses and inventors (Madinier). They no longer need the general laws,102 because in their personal endeavor to realize the moral ideal they always do more than is prescribed by general laws. loa We may even say that laws which are "in force" endanger authentic moral life. Every moral life begins with an almost process-like observance of the laws which in a sense "rule" a society. Every violation of these laws is met or punished by the moral facticity of the society in a similar almost process-like fashion. Thus there is a danger that moral life will never advance beyond a kind of automatic functioning under the law. This is legalism of the worst kind, fixism,lO' which leads to the disparagement of any authentic moral life.

The Value of Moral Facticity. On the other hand, it would be wrong to deny, on the basis of this danger, the value of these general laws, understood as a kind of moral facticity of a society. Yet moral idealism often leads to such a denial. It begins by placing itself above the law in the conviction that the moral ideal can be attained without "passing through the law."1011 This attitude may be compared with a similar mistake committed by those who one day experience the attraction of authentic philosophical thinking, unite into a "circle," place themselves above all so-called "ready-made truth" or all "dogmas," and earnestly expect that now they are capable of serious philosophical achievement. This expectation is illusory. What happens all the time is that such people remain below the level of "ready-made truth." The same applies to those who appeal to the personal charac102Cf. Lacroix, op. cit., pp. 45-46. 103"Plus un hom me progresse en moralite et devient une personne, moins la loi a pour lui d'importance; plus la charite regne dans une arne ... moins ses devoirs apparaissent comme des obligations." Lacroix, op. cit., p. 52. 104Cf. Dondevne. art. quoted in footnote 94, p. 467. lOIlCf. Lacroix, op. cit., p. 48.

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ter of the moral ideal to place themselves above the law: what they attain is less than the law, less than the minimum. lo6 Man needs the law, at least to prevent him through a minimum achievement from falling in times of aridity, discouragement, and weakness. 107 The failure to admit the necessity of a law which is valid in a society as a moral facti city is an anthropological error. No subject is without a body and, likewise, no moral subject is without a "moral body." This is a truth which the pedagogists of freedom should not lose sight of. Sin. A final thought comes to our mind here. It is concerned with sin. Whatever moral principles a person or a society may follow, ultimately moral life is not concerned with principles but with life itself. What counts is not the inscriptions on monuments, the slogans of commemorative addresses, the principles of national constitutions. Even the most noble moral principles will not absolve a person or a society if they are not embodied in the world. lOS Yet all too frequently this embodiment is lacking. The wicked do not merely make martyrs, but also liquidate hypocrites professing pious principles. Because of his personal lack of fidelity to the moral ideal, the person living an authentic moral life is always inclined to apologize for the sublimity of his principles, especially when he defends these principles against others. His principles are pure, but his hands are not. Nevertheless, he has to defend his principles. For truth, even moral truth, is intersut5jective. Unfortunately, this intersubjectivity is one of principle but not ;:tlways de facto present. Since a society of persons can live only on the basis of truth, life becomes increasingly difficult according as moral demands are more frequenti)Ldenied in practice, albeit not in theory, by those who see and accept the objectivity of these demands. For, if those who see negate in practice what they see, how will those who do not see be able to obtain sight? There is No Isolated Conscience. However, it is not only personal sins that have to be considered here. Even one who tries to realize the l06"De meme que . . . celui qui s'eleve au-des sus de l'intelligence sans passer par elle risque de tomber au-dessous, ainsi celui qui veut s'elever au-dessus de la loi sans passer par elle risque de tomber au-dessous." Lacroix

ibid ..

l07Cf. Lacroix, op. cit., p. 53. lOS"Quelle que soit la philosophie qu'on professe, et me me theologique, une societe n'est pas Ie temple des valeurs-idoles qui figurent au front on de ses monuments ou dans ses textes constitutionnels, elle vaut ce que valent en e1les les relationS de l'homme avec I'homme. . . . La purete de ses principes ne I'absout pas, elle Ie condamne. s'il apparait qu'elle ne passe pas dans la pratique." Merleau-Ponty, Humanisme et terreur, Paris, 1947, p. X.

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moral ideal as faithfully as possible is unable to do the "absolutely" good. 109 If man were an isolated subjectivity, fully locked up in himself and separated from the world, from mankind, and from history, a stainless conscience would be possible in the midst of a morally rotten world. But such a subjectivity does not occur. Man lives in the world, in history, among his fellow men. As a "natural light," man has a certain objective awareness of his own reality and of the reality of the other men and things. When he acts, he knows what he is doing. But the light which man himself is, is at the same time and just as immediately darkness-man does not possess reality in a "clear and distinct idea." He knows what he is doing, but at the same time he also does not know it. Oedipus did not want to kill his father and wed his mother, but he did do itYo Responsible parents do not want to make life impossible for their children by excessive indulgence or excessive discipline, but many do it anyhow.

"Man's Hands are Always Dirty." Because man gropes in darkness, his hands are always dirty. He is not fully master of his deeds, because he also does not-know what he is doing. Man, moreover, is not master of his deeds, because his deeds may also resound in reality in a way which he rejects or disapproves of, but which principles are utterly unable to modify. The holiest wedded love cannot prevent that children are born whose life is only a long chain of misery and wretchedness. The most unselfish and dedicated educator cannot prevent himself from occasionaly making a mess of his task. The noblest intentions of a statesman cannot guarantee that he will not cause a series of disastersYl A philosopher who speaks the language of phenomenology cannot prevent that others with the best intentions will seize his words to spread errors. The same would happen if he used instead the language of scholastic philosophy. While man's deeds resound in the world and in history, man has lost his control over them. They may receive also a meaning which he detests.1l2 Principles alone cannot change this situation. If only it were possible for man to withdraw his hands completely! But it cannot be done. Precisely because man is essentially in the I"~Cf. Jeanson, op. cit., pp. 182-189. 110M. Merleau-Ponty, op. cit., p. XXV. I l l " ~ ous ignorons pour une tres large part

1es consequences de nos actes. Nous posons des actes et nous ne savons pas au juste que1s en seront 1es retentissements, proches ou lointains. Tout ce que nous faisons est de£orme, et nf)S intentions les plus genereuses subissent, en se propageant dans Ie monrle. tine sorte de refraction sou vent imprevisible." J eanson, op. cit., p. 186. 1I2Cf. Jeanson, op. cit., p. 187

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world it is impossible for him, despite the fact that he lives for love, not also somehow to destroy the other's subjectivity. For in the world in which he lives murder and manslaughter are a kind of facti city that has been institutionalized in tyrannical colonial systems, dictatorial economic orders, the intolerant fanaticism of ill-conceived religion, and other similar ways. By withdrawing his hands, man becomes automatically an accomplice, for he commits the sin of omission. 113 The sinfulness with which we are concerned here, the sins which man commits in spite of his principles, is not a personal sinfulness. It is a kind of facticity in which man participates and of which he partakes by the simple fact that through his birth he belongs to mankindin-the-world and is inserted it.to history. Man's hands are always dirty. He cannot lock himself up in the interior of his conscience to live on his principles,u4 His interior life is not an alibi for the disasters of history-there is no pure conscience in a rotten world. Moral man is a task-in-the-world, a task-in-history, and this task always is also a failure. Nevertheless, contrary to what MerleauPonty thinks,l11S man does not have the right to liquidate his fellow man because of this failure. In this sense Merleau-Ponty is right when he says that no revolution can rely on the full support of a Catholic. 118

d. Freedom as Transcendence Human Action is Not a Process. When psychologists, pedagogists, and moralists speak of freedom, they usually mean the freedom of human action. The more fundamental meanings of the term, which we have explicitated above, are not denied by them, but they do not fall within the sphere of the interest, the intentions, of their respective sciences. After our preceding considerations, the characteristics which mark the freedom of human action reveal themselves readily. When man's action is said to be free, the meaning is that 113"Du seul fait que je continue d'exister dans ce monde, je me retire Ie droit de prt!tendre refuser Ie meurtre absoillment: car Ie meurtre est dej a la, car je vis de ce meurtre indefiniment perpetre-sur d'autres hommespar une organisation solidaire. Je n'ai me me pas besoin de lever Ie petit doigt pour etre complice, il me suffit de m'abstenir." Jeanson, ap. cit., p. 182. lU"Dans la mesure meme ou un homme est moins sur de soi, ou i1 manque de gravite et, qu'on nous passe Ie mot, de moralite vraie, i1 reserve au fond de lui-meme un sanctuaire de principes qui lui donnent, pour reprendre Ie mot de Marx, un 'point d'honneur spiritualiste,' une 'raison generale de consolidation et de justification'," Merleau-Ponty, op. cit., p. XL. 115Merleau-Ponty, op. cit., pp. 26-75. 116Sens et non-sens, p. 352.

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his action is not a deterministic process, not a discharge of forces, not a reaction. Man's action, on the proper level of human being, is the execution of the self-project which man is. Man's action is not a process. While the being of a thing must be called the being-the-result of processes and forces, man's existence contains an aspect through which man transcends such a mode of being. As subject, man is a self and this self itself possesses a certain autonomy of being with respect to the processes and forces acting upon man. This ontological autonomy reveals itself most strikingly in human actions for, insofar as an action is human, man himself is its source. The self from which the action springs means a breach in the chain of deterministic processes; the result of the action is a meaning which is "new" with respect to the forces acting upon man. The locomotion of billiard ball B is nothing new with respect to the force with which ball A hits ball B. If, however, John bumps into Peter and knocks him down, the meaning of Peter's fall cannot be revealed by mechanics, calculating the force with which John ran into Peter. Peter's spatial position is "new" with respect to the force because of the attitude which Peter himself takes toward this position. Because man himself acts, his acting is not a process and, insofar as man's activity is not a process, it is free. Facticity and Human Action. Perhaps it is better once more to emphasize a point which has drawn our attention repeatedly in the preceding pages. What we want to stress is that man's action always originates also from man himself. Otherwise there is danger that the I, the selfhood of man will again be conceived in isolation, divorced from the facticity of its situation. Subjectivity is not what it is, is not human subjectivity, without being involved in facticity.n 7 If, therefore, I say that I myself perform a certain action, I exclude that the action would be solely the result of a determining influence of facticity but, on the other hand, I include that without facticity this action would not be what it is. 118 The consequences of this insight are far-reaching. There is no personal philosophy without sedimented philosophies, there is no personal religiousness without institutions, no personal love without sensuality,119 no personal morality without biological and sociological 117Merleau-Ponty, Phblomenologie de la perception, p. 467. 11S"I\ n'y a done jamais determinisme et jamais choix absolu, jamais je ne suis chose et jamais conscience nue." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 517. 119Cf. Humanus, "Zinnelijkheid en Hefde," J( ultuurleven, vol. XXIV (1957), pp. 485-497.

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conscience, etc. The meaning of asceticism in human life can never consist in "killing" man's facticity, for without this facticity the person is not capable of anything. The subject's facticitous situation makes an appeal to him in a certain way, but this facticity does not mean that a causalistic influence is exercised, the reaction to which would consist in man's action. 120 On the proper level of manhood there is not a single situation which determines human action. A very harsh economic situation does not determine me to revolutionary activity.121 There is question only of an appeal made to me by a certain facticity, so that a certain decision is rather obvious. 122 The way in which facticity makes its appeal co-motivates my decision. The motive, however, has no meaning in itself but derives its meaning also from my subjectivity as a certain project. The motive is taken as a motive. My poverty does not drive me into a revolutionary party in the same way as a storm pushes a ship ashore. But my poverty makes an appeal to me in a certain fashion, so that the decision to join a revolutionary party is rather obvious. The motive, however, is taken by me as a motive and stands in relation to a certain project-namely, to be well off. In relation to another project, e.g., resignation, the situation has a different meaning. Accordingly, there can be no question of facticity having a unilateral, deterministic influence, for subjectivity also is a co-source of new meaning.

"Existence Precedes Essence." Sartre expresses this idea by means of his notorius characterization of existentialism: "Existence precedes essence."123 We call this characterization "notorious," because in Sartre's view this assertion is connected with atheism. From the fact that man is not a paperknife, i.e., that his being is not as the being of a thing, and, "therefore," not conceived and created by a "superior craftsman,"124 Sartre concludes that man is what he makes of himself.121i Of course, Sartre is rather hasty in asserting that God 120"Le choix semble etre entre une conception scientiste de la causalite incompatible avec la conscience que nous avons de nous-memes, et l'affirmation d'une liberte absolue sans exterieur." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., pp. 498-499. 121Cf. Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 505. 122"Notre liberte ne detruit pas notre situation, mais s'engrene sur elle: notre situation, tant que nous vivons, est ouverte, ce qui implique a la fois qu'elle appeUe des modes de resolution privilegies et qu'elle est par elle-meme impuissante a en procurer aucun." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 505. 123L'existentialisme est un humanisme, p. 17.

124Ibid., p. 19. 1211/bid., p. 20.

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can conceive and create only things. However, if abstraction is made of Sartre's atheism, his statement that existence precedes essence may be very useful, for his main intention is to indicate that a certain priority of subjectivity has to be admitted. 126 This priority holds even insofar as man's actions are concerned, i.e., action is not the result of a causalistic influence exercised by facticity in the same way as a process takes place under the influence of a unilateral, deterministic causePT In this way Sartre's assertion simply means that man is not a thing like a paperknife, a stone, a table, a kind of moss or a cabbage, and his life is not just a rotting-away.128 Another reservation, however, must be made with respect to Sartre's statement. We said that a "certain priority" of subjectivity has to be admitted. For Sartre, as could be expected, this priority is absolute. Although Sartre--correctIy-
et Ie neant, pp. 60-62. l27"On voit ainsi dans quel sens et dans queUe mesure il nous est possible d'accueillir la these fondamentale de I'existentialisme, qui dans I'homme veut accorder a l'existence, c'est-a-dire a I'exercice de son activite autonome, une priorite sur I'essence; qui caracterise I'homme comme I'etre qui doit par son existence, c'est-a-dire par la mise en ceuvre de sa liberte, se donner sa propre determination." De Petter "Personne et personnalisation," Divus Thomas (Piac.), 1949, p. 174. l28Cf. Sarte L'existentialisme est un humanisme, pp. 22-23. 129L'etre et Ie neant, p. 17. 130 Ibid., pp. 33-34. l3lCf. Remy Kwant, "Menselijke existentie en geschiedenis volgens het wijsgerig denken van M. Merleau-Ponty," Algemeen N ederlands fijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte en Psychologie, Vol. 46 (1953-1954), pp. 231-233. l32"La liberte est origineUement rapport au donne." Sartre, op. cit., p. 567. 183 L'cristentialisme est un humanisme, pp. 35 -50.

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becomes in him a being-from-himself (durch-sich-sein), an absolute autonomy.IU Such a mode of autonomy, however, is not human. Absolute, non-situated freedom does not occur.181i At the most crucial moments of his philosophy Sartre falls with a resounding crash from the phenomenological standpoint which he professes to occupy.

((Man Knows What he is Doing." Because man subsists, is a selfhood, it is possible to say that man himself acts. To be a subject, however, means at the same time immediately to be a light. In connection with the proper character of man's action on the proper level of his manhood, it is important to indicate explicitly the meaning of man as a light. Because man as subject is a "natural light," the action emanating from the subject is not a blind action. Processes operate blindly, without knowing about their actions and effects. Man's action, however, as subject is not a process, because man performs his actions knowing what he is doing. As subject, as a "natural light," man exists in truth, lives in objectivity. The subject as light frees the objective meaning of facticity and the objective meaning of the possibilities that are grounded in this facticity. "Man knows what he is doing." Man's activity which is creative of culture in the strict sense of the term testifies in an unmistakable way to this characteristic of human action. 136 Animals have no culture, because they do not live in objectivity. For an animal reality has meaning-this term cannot even be properly used her~nly as an imperative call upon its biological nature. Because an animal does not live in objectivity, it does not develop techniques and arts, it does not form a language, organize a social, political, and economic order, cultivate the mind, and undertake education. 137 134Cf. A. Dondeyne, "Beschouwingen bij het atheistisch existentialisme," Tijdschrift voor Philosophie, Vol. XIII (1951), p. 24.

185"Au nom de la Iiberte, on refuse I'idee d'un acquis, mais c'est alors la Iiberte qui devient un acquis primordial et comme notre etat de nature. Puisque nous n'avons pas a la faire, elle est Ie don qui nous a ete fait de n'avoir aucun don, cette nature de la conscience qui consiste a n'avoir pas de nature, en aucun cas e1le peut s'exprimer au dehors ni figurer dans notre vie." Merleau-Ponty, PMnomenologie de la perception, p. 499. 136Cf. de Petter op. cit., pp. 166-170. 137"Que I'on songe, pour preciser quelque peu les idees, par ex. aux productions de la technique et de l'art, a la formation du language, a I'organisation sociale, politique et economique, a la culture de I'esprit et a l'education." de Petter, op. cit., p. 166.

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Facticityand Choice. Finally, the freedom of man's action implies that a decision precedes his action, that the subject chooses among the possibilities allowed by his facticity. Every facticity allows the subject a certain "room for expansion" of his potential being, for man is a project. These possibilities are possibilities of the subject, for man is a self-project. When man acts, he decides to realize this or that possibility and not another. With respect to man's action on the proper level of his manhood, this decision or choice is free. For the possibilities which every facticity leaves open to the subject are the subject's own possibilities, and it is the subject himself which decides to realize this possibility and not that one. This choice, however, is not absolute. It does not start from zero. It is a decision regarding possibilities, but possibilities are real possibilities only within a certain facticity. The project which man is, is a "thrown project" (Heidegger). Every choice is a decision about possibilities within a given situation. The facticity of human existence will at most indicate an obvious way of deciding, but does not causally produce a decision. ISS Strictly speaking, man is always faced with several possibilities, even in those cases where it is said that there is only one possibility. For on the proper level of his manhood man can always choose either for or against this possibility. This choice for or against is even essential to the freedom of choice, for it is utterly meaningless to say that man can choose between various possibilities if he is not able either to accept or reject them one by one. U9 In choosing for or against a given possibility, man explicitly takes up an aspect of the fundamental structure of his being as "engaged" subjectivity. For the subject's "engagement" or involvement in his situation implies both a positive and a negative moment on the cognitive as well as the affective level.140 What interests us here is the affective level. Its involvement in its situation means for the subject an affirmation as well as a nihilation of this involvement, an affective consent and at the same time just as immediately an affective dissent. There is no reality to which man can not to a certain extent give his consent and, likewise, there is none to which he can give this consent fully and definitively. No reality is the All for man as zu sein, as having to be. Affirmation and nihilation are essential aspects of manhood as existing subjectivity. lssef. Merleau-Ponty, op. cit., p. 505. 13gef. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theol., p. I-II, q. 10, a. 2. Boef. above, pp. 270 If.

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In his choice for or against a certain possibility man explicitly takes up the positive or negative aspect of his "engagement" in reality. His subjectivity, as Verstehen, means to anticipate, to run ahead of the objective sense proper to the new meaning which his action will establish. Man anticipates also the affective affirmation and nihilation of the new meaning. Even before the action is done, the subject's intentionality includes a positive and a negative aspect. When man chooses for or against a certain possibility, he allows the positive or the negative aspect of his existence to prevail. The freedom of choice consists in explicitly taking up what man as "engaged" subjectivity essentially is. An explicit choice for or against a certain, not yet actual, meaning is possible, because the subjectivity's relation to this meaning essentially includes an affirmative and a negative aspect. 141

Situated Freedom and Responsibility. When the subject which man is establishes a new meaning through his action, this meaning remains in the subject as facticity of his existence. This newly established facticitous meaning opens new possibilities for the subject, for man is a project. Because man is essentially a project, a constantly re-created openness,142 this assertion is valid for any human action. Man through his action constantly calls forth new voids; hence one can never say that man is "finished." For this reason Merleau-Ponty calls man a "movement of transcendence,"143 a self-transcending movement. Sartre simply speaks of "transcendence,"144 and Heidegger of "existence." 145 The insight into the situated character of freedom applies most especially to the question regarding the relationship between freedom 141 "Unde, si proponatur aliquod obiectum voluntati quod sit universaliter bonum, et secundum omnem considerationem, ex necessitate voluntas in illud tendit, si aliquid velit: non enim poterit velie oppositum. Si autem proponatur ei aliquod obiectum quod non secundum quamlibet considerationem sit bonum, non ex necessitate voluntas fertur in illud. Et quia defectus cujuscumque boni habet rationem non boni, ideo illud solum bonum quod est perfectum, et cui nihil deficit, est tale bonum quod voluntas non potest non velie, quod est beatitudo. Alia autem quaelibet particularia bona, in quantum deficiunt ab aliquo bono, possunt accipi ut non bona; et secundum hanc considerationem possunt repudiari vel approbari a voluntate, quae potest in irem ferri secundum diversas considerationes." St. Thomas, Summa theol. p. I-II, q. 10, a. 2. 142"Cette ouverture touiours recreee dans la plenitude de l'etre . . ." Merleau-Ponty, op. cit., p. 229. 1430p. cit., p. 492.

144"Mais, precisement, par la transcendance, j'echappe L'etre et Ie neawt, p. 96.

a tout ce que ie suis."

141i"Das 'Wesen' des Daseins liegt in seiner Existenz." Sein

lind

Zeit, p. 42.

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of action and being-driven by passions or emotions. Psychologists and moralists are mainly interested in freedom from this viewpoint because of its connection with the subject's accountability and responsibility. us Above we indicated that facticity makes a certain appeal to the subject by virtue of which this or that decision presents itself as obvious without, however, being ever causally produced by a facticitous situation. Psychologists could object to the last part of this assertion on the basis of established facts. To what extent can one say that man himself is the co-source of his actions without unduly minimizing the influence of passions and emotions? Freud. In this question Freud and Sartre are perhaps the most authoritative representatives of radically opposed views. For Freud it is certain that man's actions, even the higher psychical activities which reveal themselves in science and art and in living a life of faith, are determined in their rise from the depth of an unconscious libido. At first Freud considered his view applicable only to pathological behavior. But when his analysis of dreams showed that the same normal behavior, because dreams are entirely normal. For Freud, mechanisms worked in dreams as in pathological behavior, he expanded the area of applicability and declared his view valid also for there is no freedom in cases of pathological behavior; dreams reveal the working of the same mechanisms as those which determine pathological behavior; therefore, he concluded, normal behavior, of which dreams are merely a form, must also be considered to be determined by an unconscious libido. 147 In other words, the freedom of normal behavior is merely an illusion. The logical consequence is that there can no longer be question of accountability and responsibility. Sartre. Sartre, however, denies this and takes a position which is radically opposed to Freud's standpoint. So far as Sartre is concerned, there can be no question of diminished or merely partial responsibility,148 for man is entirely free. He possesses absolute autonomy, even with respect to his passions. 149 Of course, one could ask whether there is no difference between an act of will and an act de Waelhens, op, cit., p. 84. 147Cf. ]. Nuttin, Psychoanalyse en spiritualistische opvatting van de mens, Utrecht, 1952, pp. 138-145. 148Cf. L'existelltialisme est un humallisme, pp. 37-38. 149"Et si la neantisation est precisement l'etre de la liberte, comment refuser l'autonomie aux passions pour l'accorder a la volonte?" L' etre et le neant, p. 159. 146A.

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of passion. llio Sartre does not deny that there is a difference, but considers it unimportant, because in a certain sense freedom lies ahead of the act of will and of passion. Freedom lies in existence as a project. A threat against my life, for instance, is a threat only in relation to the project of saving my life. I can execute this project either through a passion-inspired flight or through rational resistance. I myself make a choice between these two possibilities. Iii 1 I choose either the act of will or the passion-whether the world will be a rational world (the object of the act of will) or a magical world (the object of passion) depends entirely on my choice. lli2 It goes without saying that motives in themselves have no meaning. They appear as motives only in relation to a project. But Sartre should have added at least that freedom as project is situated, i.e., that all projects are possible only within definite limits, e.g., within the limits imposed upon freedom by passions or emotions. With this restriction Sartre's question may be repeated: Is it unthinkable that passions or emotions may be so strong that at a given moment there can no longer be question of projects in the authentically human sense of the term? As far as Sartre is concerned, this possibility is excluded. Fear of a threat can never determine me, for something or someone appears to me as a threat to my life only in relation to my project of saving my life. For Sartre, this means that the threat derives its meaning exclusively from my subjectivity.lli3 Thus subjectivity is fully isolated from the facticitous situation and absolutized as a project. For freedom of action it makes no difference whether the subject replies with an impassioned action or with a free action: the impassioned action also is free, for a threat, for instance, becomes a motive of fear only through a fully autonomous project of subjectivity. This fully autonomous project is executed either through passion or through an act of will. l54 Reply of Phenomenology. The phenomenologist has only one answer to the views of both Freud and Sartre: "lived" experience 150 0.

ibid. 151"Serai-je volontaire ou passionm:? Qui peut Ie decider sinon moi?" Ibid., p. 520. 152Cf. Ibid., p. 521. 153"En fait, motifs et mobiles n'ont que Ie poids que mon project, c'est-adire la libre production de la fin et de I'acte connu a realiser, leur confere." Ibid., p. 527. 154Cf. Ibid., pp. 523-528.

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knows better. "Lived" experience knows that freedom as project and as the execution of the project, i.e., as action, is not an isolated but a situated freedom. In his actions man is appealed to by motives that are anchored in his facticity, or rather, motives which are his facticity. Motives have no meaning in themselves but, on the other hand, they do not derive their meaning exclusively from subjectivity. They "themselves" also have a certain weight, albeit only in the unity of reciprocal implication of project and meaning. The properly human element of the action consists in this that the action is always to a certain extent performed by man himself, by the subject which man is. If I want to express the meaning of a given action, I have to indicate more than the influence of facticity. For in addition to facticity, there is also the subject's spontaneity, by virtue of which a meaning is always in a certain sense a new meaning, even if only because the subject either ratifies or does not ratify the facticity. The action, therefore, is always also the action of the subject itself. We may say even more. The fact that the action always cooriginates from the subject means also that the subject, as standing in objectivity, places himself in a sense at a distance from his facticity, from the motives which make an appeal to him, in order to grasp their objective meaning. This implies that man investigates whether or not a certain meaning will give a real fulfilment to his being as having-to-be. More simply expressed, man knows what he is doing. lIill

Human and Animal Action. The action of man, therefore, is different from that of an animal. Psychologists have established that an animal in its behavior simply follows the impulse of the strongest need. IllS A given impulse within certain conditions will per se lead to a certain behavior. In this way the animal's behavior is determined, as is also the development of this behavior. This development is fixed and can be expressed in laws that are valid for a given biological species. Thus the animal is and remains an element of material nature, and its behavior is a phase in the evolution of this nature. An animal is a "stagnant being."157 With man the situation is different. Man's action is, within the limits of facticity, always an activity of man himself with the objective I55"Everyone agrees that to act freely is to act with knowledge of what one is doing and why one is doing it." Dondeyne, "Truth and Freedom," Truth and Freedom, Pittsburgh, 1954, p. 3l. 11l6Cf. J. Nuttin, Psychoanalyse en spiritualistische opvatting van de mens, Utrecht, 1952, pp. 202-205. 1 II 7 Nuttin, op. cit., p. 203.

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consciousness of what his facticity is and what the action will be. This objective consciousness also makes it possible for man to improve a certain way of acting, as is shown by his cultural activity. Hence the "evolution" of human existence cannot be laid down in laws, while the evolution of an animal's behavior can be codified as typical of its species. los If we apply this idea to the relationship between free action and passion, it means that subjectivity places itself at a distance from every instinctive impulse and breaks through its necessitating and determining force. The action of man, as human action, is not a being completely fascinated and captivated in the same way as an animal is fascinated by its prey.l09 On the contrary, it is a modifying intervention in facticity, in which the subject places himself at. a distance and judges objectivity from a standpoint which transcends the appeal that is made to him here and now. 160 However, it is necessary to keep in mind that we are speaking here all the time of human action as human. We do not say that all actions which in some way or other can be attributed to man are per se authentically human actions. 16l We do not deny, therefore, that passions can ever determine man. Likewise, it is not asserted that an action can never be considered as a kind of "discharge," elicited by an instinctive impulse. Whether or not, however, such an "instinctive" action ever occurs is something which can be determined only on the basis of experiential data. To solve the question, one would have to determine to what extent an action was concretely preceded by the objective evaluation of the motives or whether for some reason or other the subject was not capable of such an evaluation. 162 If the subject was not capable of it, then the action cannot be considered as human action and, consequently, not as free. In Hegel's words, as man, man is a sick animal. l5S"En efIet, si la condition de I'homme est de decouvrir et d'etablir des significations, I'idee que Ie determinisme pourrait s'appliquer a I'homme devient simplement absurde." De Waelhens, op. cit., p. 83. l59"Que je puisse dire Ie sens des choses, suppose que je ne sois pas emporte ou ravi par elles comme l'animal par la proie qu'il poursuit, que je puisse toujours les considerer en me pla~ant en retrait par rapport a elles: c'est qu'on exprime en disant que je saisis l'etant comme tel ou que je suis capable de laisser cet etant etre ce qu'il est." de Waelhens, op. cit., p. 81.

l60ef. Nuttin, op. cit., pp. 152-155, 166-168. l6lWe are referring here to the classical distinction between "act of man" and "human act." Our considerations refer to the human act. l62Nuttin, op. cit., p. 153.

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Freedom as a Task. The data of experience make it clear that every concrete action is guided by a very complex whole of motives. The involvement of subjectivity in facticity is so complex that it is certainly wrong to claim that a concrete action is either free or determined. According to Nuttin, there are only a few manners of behaving which "do not contain at least a certain influence or after-effect of insights and considerations that transcend matter, if only because of the specifically human braking or hesitation with which an irresistible impulse is accepted or through which the instinct is followed less vigorously."163 From this viewpoint, therefore, it is meaningless ,to say that man "is condemned to freedom." On the contrary, we should say that it is the task of man to be man and, therefore, to act humanly. In this way the freedom of action appears to us at the same time as a task, and in this sense one may say that freedom has to be gained by conquest. l64 e. Freedom as History The term "history" is used to indicate the proper character of the dynamism of human existence. The use of this term is justified by the implications contained in the insight that on the proper level of his manhood man is the execution of the project which he is, that man is transcendence, a transcendent movement. To arrive at this insight it is necessary and sufficient to understand, first, that man's dynamism on the proper level of his manhood is wholly different from the dynamism found in things. 161i Terms, therefore, such as process, evolution, becoming, and movement are no longer appropriate. 166 Secondly, it must be understood that man as transcending movement is the synthesis of the three states of time, present, past, and future. Because we have sufficiently spoken about l63Cf. ]. Nuttin, op. cit., p. 167. l64"Mais du fait de son incarnation, ce sujet est toujours menace de se laisser submerger par Ie vital, de ne vivre que pour celui-ci. II eprouvera done Ie besoin de se defendre contre cet engluement dans la matiere pour sauvegarder sa Iiberte et pour conserver intacte la faculte meme de jouir des objets, faculte qui serait compromise par un affaiblissement de la subjectivite personnelle. Une lutte incessante s'impose ainsi a I'homme, ranc;on de la liberte dans une personne incarnee." A. Brunner, La personne incarnee, pp. 191-192. l65"On n'explique rien par I'homme, puisqu'i! n'est pas une force, mais une faiblesse au coeur de I'etre; (iJ n'est pas) un facteur cosmologique, mais Ie lieu ou tous les facteurs cosmoiogiques, par une mutation qui n'est jamais finie, chan gent de sens et deviennent histoire." Merleau-Ponty, Eloge de la philosophic. p. 61. l6GCf. Dondeyne, Contemporary European Thought and Christian Faith, pp. 41-43.

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the proper character of the dynamism of human existence in the preceding pages, we will concentrate here especially on showing that existence as transcendence is temporality.

Human and Infrahuman Temporality. In describing man as existence, we indicated that to exist is to-be-conscious-in-the-world. 167 We saw that a twofold level has to be distinguished in existence: the level of the infrahuman, of the I-body, and the level of subjectivity, of personal consciousness and personal freedom. It should be obvious, therefore, that in the description of existence as temporality this temporality also must be seen on several levels, and that we must distinguish at least an infrahuman and a human temporality.16s The temporality of the infrahuman, which is also called "cyclic time"169 or "prehistory,"170 leaves room for "processes." As soon, however, as we find ourselves on the level of the properly human, on the level of consciousness and freedom, terms such as becoming, movement, process, and evolution lose their meaning. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to separate human temporality from the infrahuman. l71 Such a separation would mean the divorce of facticity and freedom. Freedom would no longer be situated, it would no longer be human freedom but an abstraction. Human action, however, as conscious and free, is set in a prehistory. Conscious and free existence "uses the results" of prehistory, it is the "resumption of a prepersonal tradition."172 Man as Human Temporality. The human temporality of which we will speak now is man himself, insofar as in his culturally creative 167See above pp. 15 ft. 16SCf. Remy Kwant, "De historie en het Absolute." Tijdschrift voor Philosophie, Vol. XVII (1955), pp. 264-273. 169"Ce temps est celui de nos fonctions corporelles, qui sont cycliques comme lui, c'est aussi ce1ui de la nature avec laquelle nous existons." Merleau-Ponty, Phbwmenologie de la perception, p. 517. 17oCf. Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 277.

171"I1 faut ... que mon histoire soit la suite d'une pn!histoire dont elle utilise les resultats acquis, mon existence personnelle la reprise d'une tradition prepersonnelle. II y a done un autre sujet au-dessous de moi pour qui un monde existe avant que je sois Iii et qui y rnarquait rna place." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., pp. 293-294.

172What exactly is this prehistory? What is the precise relationship between history and prehistory? We do not know and, therefore, can speak about it only in a superficial way. This superficiality shows itself, e.g., in the fact that with respect to the temporality of facticity no explicit distinction is made between facticity as a "natural whole" and as a "cultural whole," i.e., as the "sediment of spontaneous actions." Cf. Merleau-Ponty, La structure du comportement, p. 227, note 1.

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activity he gives life to any facticity whatsoever, i.e., insofar as placing himself at a distance, he grasps the objective meaning of this facticity and realizes the possibilities contained in it. An example may clarify the point. Let us take one from economic life. To provide for the needs of his physical being man has created a very complex system of institutions. This system did not suddenly arise from nowhere, but was laboriously constructed by man. In the past the system has undergone many changes, and in the future the same will happen. Therefore, we may say that there is "movement" in economic life. What is meant by movement here? The movement in question is not like the movement of the earth's crust in vulcanic regions; it is not like the growth of a plant; it is not like the evolution of giant reptiles in the Cretaceous and Jurassic periods. The reason for the dissimilarity is that in the movement of economic life human subjectivity plays a role. It is man who is aware of the facticity of an economic order and who, starting from this facticity, plans a more satisfactory system to be realized by man himself. The matter with which the economist works is a "human matter," and the changes in an economic order are not made by the weight of an economic facticity in itself but always also through the intervention of human subjectivity.11 3 The same could be said of language, arts, social and religious life, sciences and philosophy.IH Philosophy does not "evolve," and philosophical views do not "arise" in the same way as things are thrown into being by other things. On the contrary, authentic philosophical thinking is the taking up again of eternal problems, the reconsideration of previously given replies. In this thinking a previously given reply will be ratified, rejected, or more profoundly analyzed. 175 Without the subjectivity of human existence nothing can be understood of the "changes" in the cultural world, and by virtue of this subjectivity these "changes" are not processes. 176 Time Refers Essentnlly to a Subject. For the superficial thinking of "general opinion" history is the succession of events "in" time. Time is thus considered as a kind of stream, and events in time as the successive passage of bits of flotsam in the stream.IT7 Different 173Cf. Merleau-Ponty, Eloge de la philosophie, p. 73.

174Cf. in connection with this how Heidegger develops the notion of Wiederholung in Sein und Zeit, pp. 384-386. 175Cf. Dondeyne, op. cit., pp. 46-47. 176Cf. Marcel, L'homme problematique, p. 45. 17TCf. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la perception, p. 470.

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moments would have to be conceived as points of "now," as elements or atoms of time, and time itself as a succession of such points.178 Without further discussion, it should be clear that "general opinion" speaks of time as an objectivistic process, as a stream without witness, as a fluid substance, a process that is in itself (Heraclitus). The illustration itself, however, indicates that there can be no question of time without reference to a subject.17o For what does it mean that one piece of flotsam in the stream passes after the other? There can be no question of an "after" unless the passing of the pieces is conceived to occur in the presence of a perceiving subject, a subject which in perceiving the second piece is capable, so to speak, of holding on to the first perception. This holding-on-to is essential. We may not say that the past perception no longer is at all) for otherwise we cannot say that the second perception occurs after the first, that the second piece of flotsam passes after the first. As soon as we can no longer speak of "after," time no longer has a past. But without a past, time is not time. Unless the subject somehow holds on to the past, any "succession" is meaningless. Likewise, it is evident that "events" cannot be thought to occur in time if every subjectivity is thought away. Strictly speaking, the term "event" loses all meaning if an event is not thought of as an event-for-someone, for a subject. 180 Objectivism cannot form an idea of time. 18l It is essential to time, therefore, that one holds on to the past and anticipates the future. As we pointed out, only a subject can do this. Nevertheless, we should not attempt to "locate" present, past, and future in the subject, i.e., consider them as states of an isolated consciousness, so that time would again be represented as the succession of "nows," this time not in an objectivistic world, but in an isolated 178"Und so zeigt sich denn fur das vulgare Zeitverstandnis die Zeit als eine Folge von standig 'vorhandenen', zugleich vergehenden und ankommenden Jetzt. Die Zeit wird als ein Nacheinander verstanden, als 'Flusx' der Jetzt, als 'Lauf der Zeit'." Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 422. 179"Le temps suppose une vue sur Ie temps." Merleau-Ponty, ibid. 180"11 n'y a pas d'evenements sans quelqu'un a qui ils adviennent et dont la perspective finie fonde leur individualite," Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 470. 181Some expressions of Merleau-Ponty are rather unfortunate. When he says: "Le moude objectif est trop plein pour qu'il y ait du temps" (Phenomenologie de fa perception, p. 471), his way of speaking reminds us of Sartre's ideas regarding the in-itself. According to Sartre, the in-itself is the fullness of being, because the in-itself-for-me evidently implies negativity. But it is meaningless to turn a qualification of the in-itself-for-itself simply around and then to think that we may say that the in-itself is the fullness of being. Nothing whatsoever can be said of the in-itself-not even that it is "too full to be temporaL"

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consciousness. 182 For otherwise another consciousness would be needed as consciousness of the successive "nows"-as-states-of-consciousness. And the question that would arise immediately would be how the temporality of this consciousness would have to be explained without forcing us to continue forever to place one consciousness after another .183

Existence as Temporality. For those who understand the way of thinking proper to existential phenomenology the preceding considerations of time are somewhat superfluous. Considerations of time may be used to find this way of thinking, but once it has been found, one no longer seeks time either in an objectivistically conceived world or in an isolated consciousness. 184 The "place" of time is existence, presence, the unity of reciprocal implication of subject and object. We may ask the question as to what existence is as temporal. Man is essentially existence, presence-to-something, but his beingpresent is at the same time and just as immediately presence in the temporal sense. I am "now" in this or that way directed-to-something. This something is something which I myself am not, but without which I am not what I am. My presence is at the same time my temporal present, my "now." My presence, however, is not closed. Neither am I nor is what is present "finished." In every presence there lies a now-present retention of a former presence and a now-present "protention" (Husserl) or anticipation of a future presence. 185 In perceiving my ash tray I see now a certain profile. But in the present profile which I now perceive there lies a pre-reference to other possible profiles which will be present when I change my standpoint or move my ash tray. The presence of the terminus encountered in a perception, therefore, is never a closed presence, for the actually appearing profile always refers to the presence of another profile, and without this reference an object of perception is not reality. This reference implies that no "now" is a real "now," no present IS a real present without a future. The presence of the terminus 182Cf. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de fa perception, p. 472. 183"Si la conscience du temps etait faite d'etats de conscience qui se succedent, iI faudrait une nouvelle conscience pour avoir conscience de cette succession et ainsi de suite." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 483. 184"Mais I'analyse du temps . . . ec1aire les precedentes analyses parce qu'elle fait apparaitre Ie sujet et I'objet comme deux moments abstraits d'une structure unique qui est la presence." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 492. 185"Husserl appelle protensions et retentions les intentionnalites qui m'ancrent dans un entourage." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 476.

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encountered in perception is never a closed presence. The same IS true of being-present-as-temporality. Something similar has to be asserted regarding the relationship present-past. My perception at this moment is not a real perception without reference to a future perception and likewise not without a retention of the past perception. I could not even say that a perception is past if it had been totally cut off, i.e., if it had disappeared into nothingness. The past as well as the future are always present in a certain sense. Present, past, and future cannot be understood without one another, they imply one another, they are not what they are without one another.186 Past, Future, and Present. Nevertheless, it may seem that we are now in a predicament. We said that in every presence there is a now-present retention of a former presence and a now-present "protention" of a future presence. To prevent the present from being cut off from the past and the future, it is necessary to place emphasis on the presence of retention and "protention," for an isolated "now" is not a real "now." But, we must ask, if past and future are conceived as presences, does it not follow that the synthesis of present, past and future is represented as the sum-total of points of "now," albeit that these points are "now" -points of existence? For above it was stated that my presence constitutes my present-as-temporal. Do these retentions and "protentions" mean the addition of past and future to the present? Such a view is contradicted by experience. There is no present without intrinsic reference to past and future. The past and the future, therefore, are present in the present. Nevertheless, temporality is not a sum-total of "nows," because present, past, and future are not in the same sense. 187 Temporality is the never-completed unfolding of my subjectivity-in-the-world, the flow of my present. There is not a plurality of interconnected phenomena, but the one phenomenon of flOW. 18S In this flow my actual presence can be seen as the present, and my past and future as absent presences. Temporality, therefore, is not unqualified having-passed-away and unqualified not-yet-being, but the flowing-by, the coming within my reach and slipping from my grasp of the close and the distant.

186ef. Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 479. 187"11 ne peut y avoir de temps que s'il n'est pas completement deploye, si passe, present et avenir ne sont pas dens Ie meme sens." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., y~ 474. 18SCf. Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 479.

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An Example. It may be good to illustrate the matter by means of an example. I am at present writing a philosophical book. I write: "There is no present without intrinsic reference to past and future." When I write "without" my presence constitutes my presentas-temporality. In writing this word, I retain my grasp on the words which I have already written, i.e., my present holds on to my past. At the same time, however, I anticipate the words which I am still going to write, for without this anticipation the term "without" is wholly meaningless. Past and future, therefore, are present in the present, but as absent presences, for they are past and future presences. This description may be rendered even more detailed. When I am writing the letter i of "without," I hold the w still in my grasp. The w is still present under a certain profile (A), and the letter t is already present under a certain profile. The same applies to the other letters. When next I write t, I again hold on to the preceding letterthe i under profile B, but I hold on to the w under a different profile (Al) than when I was writing the i. In reaching the h, there occurs another modification in the presence of the past. I hold fast to the w under profile A2, to i under profile B1, to t under profile C. The same could be said with respect to the anticipations. 1811 Existence is the "Place" of Time. Concluding, we must say that time is not found in an objectivistically conceived world or in an isolated subject. The "place" of time is existence, or rather, the subject-in-the-world is temporality.190 Time is not composed of "now"-points synthetized from without, but time itself is the synthesis of present, past, and future, which excludes any type of juxtaposition of data. 191 Temporality is an essential characteristic of an "engaged," situated subject; better still, temporality is this subject itself. As Husserl expresses it, temporality is "the living flow of presence." Temporality and History. Subjectivity-in-the-world means breaking through the determinism of the cosmos. It means freedom. The subject, however, is not only in-the-world, but also "at" -the-world: it is the execution of the project which he himself is-transcendence. 189Cf. Merleau-Ponty, ibid., pp. 477-481. 190"11 faut comprendre Ie temps comme sujet et Ie 5ujet comme temps." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 483. 191"Chaque present, par son essence meme de present, exclut la juxtaposition avec les autres presents." Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p. 483.

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Even as transcendence the subject is freedom and breaks through the determinism of the cosmos insofar as no facti city at all determines the subject's action as human action. Freedom as transcendence, however, is the synthesis of present, past, and future; consequently, freedom is temporality. The temporality of the subject-in-the-world is called history when there is question of man's cultural activity in the stricter sense of the term. Although perception itself is a humanization of the world, a cultural activity, the term applies with far greater justification to all activities in political, social, economic, artistic, scientific, and religious life. There is more reason to speak of the history of art than of the history of a perception or of writing the term "without." Moreover, the customary usage of the term "history" suggests the intersubjectivity of human action. We do not want to assert that all intersubjectivity must be denied to perception but, nevertheless, its intersubjectivity is certainly not as emphatic as that of cultural activity in the more restricted sense. The history of man as a cultural being is always a collective history and, according as the world becomes more and more unified, history will more and more become the history of mankind as a whole. In his cultural activity man is rooted in the past. This past was created by human beings who preceded him. Our ancestors, especially those among them who were really eminent, have endeavored to humanize the world. All our cultural activity is the taking-up again of their intentions. In his cultural activity man places himself at a distance from what is already constituted, from facticity, and tries to grasp its real meaning in order to ratify, reject, or modify it. 192 Thus he constantly enters into dialogue with his fellow men, and thus also the past continues to live in the present and is projected toward a future. Man is never "finished" and his world, likewise, is never "finished." History, therefore, is not something like a film watched by a "non-involved" subject, for a film is already "finished" and a non-involved, non-situated subject is not a human subject.

History and Having-to-Be. As long as man is, he is history. Involved as it is in reality, subjectivity is always the affective nihilation of every facticity. For this reason man's being is a "having to be": man is essentially a "natural desire." As history, man is the execution of his "having to be," but there remains the affective distance 192Cf. Dondeyne, Contemporary European Thought and Christian Faith, pp. 46-47.

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between the subject and the meaning established by history. "Having to be" is the motive of the transcending movement, the history which man is.19S Man is essentially a "having to be," for the subject's involvement in reality is essentially negativity. History, therefore, as the execution of this "having to be," is also the non-execution vf this "having to be." We may ask: what does man want? Or rather, what is the deepest meaning of the "natural desire" which man essentially is? Full emphasis must be placed here on essentially, for the "natural desire" is not a desire in the psychological sense, a desire which man could abandon because it is not fulfilled. Man himself is this desire which is not satisfied and cannot be satisfied in history. "Our heart is restless until . . ." (St. Augustine). The reality of this fundamental desire has not escaped phenomenology. A survey, however, of the efforts to interpret this desire would strike the weakest spots of existential phenomenology-namely, the question regarding the meaning of life and whether there is a God. In subsequent pages we must try to understand the principal replies given to these questions. At the same time it will become clear that certain "philosophies of openness" close themselves in a very remarkable way at the most decisive moment of their thinking. 3.

THE ATHEISM OF JEAN-PAUL SARTRE

God and the Meaning of Life in Medieval and Contemporary Philosophy. All truly great philosophies speak of God. A philosopher who does not a priori posit a certain way of thinking, e.g., that of the physical sciences, as the only one having validity, a philosopher who does not begin by elevating one particular face of reality to reality tout court, briefly, a philosopher who is sufficiently open to let every reality be reality, cannot pass over in silence the phenomenon of religiousness and the question whether there is a God. It was an incomparable mark of distinction of medieval philosophy that it showed itself open in this way. As a result, God stood perfectly in the center of the life and thought of medieval man. It is rather striking that in the Middle Ages the question about God and the thinking about the life of man interlocked. God's central position in the life and thought of medieval man meant de facto

193ef. Kwant, "De historie en het Absolute," Tijdschrift voor Philosophie. Vol. XVII (1955). pp. 291-292.

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that God was considered as the source of all reality and as the final destiny of history. Medieval man affirmed the meaningfulness, the definitive value of life, provided the pursuit of this life meant the recognition of God and drawing nearer to Him. In any other sense man's being was characterized as purposeless, meaningless, and absurd. Man's eternal rejection was seen as the being doomed to experience oneself eternally as identified with the meaninglessness of one·s being. A similar relationship between the question whether there is a God and the meaning of life is found also in the philosophies of our time. It is striking that only those philosophers who admit a God are capable of giving expression to the meaning of life. This does not always imply that the others no longer consider themselves capable of distinguishing meaningfulness and meaninglessness, but it does imply that they present the distinction in a way against which "lived experience" has to protest, because "it knows better."

"Left Wing" and "Right Wing" Existentialism. It is sufficiently well known that there is some justification for speaking about a left wing and a right wing in existential philosophy. The justification lies in the fact that there are atheistic and theistic forms of existentialism. Since, however, Sartre thought that he could identify existentialism with atheism, or rather, since he thought that existentialism had to be defined as atheism,194 some authors began to indicate the right wing of existentialism as the "philosophy of existence."195 Marcel also rejected the term "existentialism" as a characterization of his philosophy, because its acceptance would have put his philosophy under a common denominator with that of Sartre. 196 Marcel prefers to refer to his philosophy as a kind of neo-Socratism. 197 In recent years, however, it has become evident that the distinction between atheistic and theistic forms of existentialism, between existentialism and the philosophy of existence, is not very important. The reason is that in the exercise of existential thinking the fundamental intuition of existential phenomenology has gradually come I94Although Sartre himself distinguishes two schools of existentialism, (d. L'existentialisme est un humanisme, pp. 16-17), in practice the distinction remains unimportant. De facto his existentialism and atheism are identical. I95Cf. R. Verneaux, Let;OI1,S sur l'existmtialisme et ses formes principalcs. Paris, n.d., pp. 19-20. 1965 ee the epilogue in Delfgaauw's unsurpassed little wo,k, Wat is existentialisme?, Amsterdam, 1952, pp. 107-118. 197G. Marcel, L'homme problematique, Paris, 1955, p. 72.

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into focus. At first, this intuition-we have spoken above of a "primitive fact" -was not itself reflected upon, although it was not fully hidden. The fundamental intuition was practiced without being explicitly thought about, it was implicitly present in philosophical thought itself. This is the reason why all philosophies indicated by the term "existentialism," despite their fundamental differences, betray the same style, the same sphere, the same climate, and move in the same dimension. But this dimension itself was not previously explicitated and could not yet be expressed, because existential thinking was still too "young" to understand itself.198

The Decisive Issue. At present, however, it appears possible to explicitate also the primitive fact of existentialism. It is now understood that the fundamental intuition, the most basic idea, which guides existentialism is not a primitive atheism but the intentionality of existence, conceived as man's essential openness, as the encounter of subjectivity with given realities which are not this sUbjectivity. The decisive issue of an existential philosophy is the reply to the question regarding the real meaning of intentionality. To what extent is man essentially open? Does his openness merely mean the presence to and in the world or does it obtain a more profound meaning as encounter with the other and with God? Different replies are given by various philosophers, and these replies mark the distinction between atheistic and theistic systems. It is, however, striking that those who limit man's openness to an opennessfor-the-world either are no longer able to express the meaning of life (Sartre) or cannot distinguish meaningfulness and meaninglessness without introducing internal contradictions into their work (Merleau-Ponty) .199 Sartre's Rejection of God. Undoubtedly, Sartre is the most ardent representative of atheism among the adherents of existential phenomenology.20o In the following pages we will endeavor to trace the reasons for his position, after which we will investig:.tte the consequences of his view with respect to the meaning of life. 198"La phenomenologie se laisse pratiquer et reconnaitre comme maniere ou comme style, e1le existe comme mouvement, avant d'etre parvenue a une entiere conscience philosophique." Merleau-Ponty, op. cit., p. II. 199Concerning this question see the conclusion of Remy Kwant's article "Men~elijke existentie en geschiedenis volgens het wijsgerig d'enken van MaUrice Merleau-Ponty," Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte en Psychologic, Vol. 46 (1953-1954), pp. 245-247. 2ooCf. Sarte, Situations, Vol. I, Paris, 1947, p. 153.

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Strictly speaking, Sartre has only one argument to reject God -namely, man's freedom. This argument, however, is presented in three different ways. It should be noted that we merely say: Sartre rejects that there is a God. God is not absent from Sartre's works. On the contrary, He is mentioned all the time, but only to be constantly rejected. 201 Sartre's categorical refusal to accept that there is a God, despite the fact that it is impossible for him simply to pass God over in silence, gives reason to suspect that we are dealing here with an effort to do away with a certain form of intentionality and to close a certain form of openness-to.

Sartre's Argument from the Autonomy of Freedom. Human freedom, as it is conceived by Sartre, simply cannot tolerate the idea that there is a God. As we have noted previously, on derisive issues of his philosophy Sartre drops the phenomenological dimension of thinking by isolating being-for-itself from facticity. The consequence is that freedom as transcendence is inflated to absolute autonomy. If occasionally Sartre describes the situated character of freedom, the value of the description is undermined by his conviction that the meaning of the situation is determined by subjectivity in a wholly autonomous way.202 There is no reason for Sartre not to inflate the autonomy in question even more. His next step is the denial of any dependence of man upon God. God is not the King of mankind, for man is free. If God had wanted to rule man, He should not have created him as a free being. At the very moment when God created man as a free being, this freedom turned against God, insofar as man as freedom no longer belongs to God. Thus there is no one to give orders to man. Man has only one law-his own. Freedom, therefore, consists for Sartre in perfect autonomy and independence. 203 The idea is clear: there is no God, for man is free. A real God would press man as freedom to death. But man is free and, therefore, there cannot be any God. 204 Why must a real God destroy human freedom? To justify this idea, Sartre relies on classical thinking about God as Creator. God creates in accord with a certain idea of the reality to be created, just as a craftsman who makes a paper-knife first has an idea of that paper201Cf. 202Cf. 203Cf. 204Cf.

H. Pais sac, Le Dieu de Sartre, Arthaud, 1950 pp. 9-11. Sartre, L'etre et Ie neant, pp. 638-642. ' Sartre, Les Mouches, pp. 133-135. Pais sac, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

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knife. 205 God, then, is a "superior craftsman," and the result of His act of creation is pre-fixed in God's idea. What is the meaning of this being-fixed with respect to man? According to Sartre, it means that man as freedom is destroyed. For man is reduced to something like a paper-knife, to a being that is what it is, to pure facticity, to a thing. Man, however, is not in this way, for man is not what he is, and is what he is not; he is project and, as transcendence, he is the execution of this project. It is the subject itself which controls this execution. 206 Man is not, but makes himself.207 To admit a real God, Sartre thinks, amounts to conceiving man as a thing, as a being which "lies prostrated" upon itself. It is the denial of man as project, as transcendence, as freedom. Sartre's Argument from Intersubjectivity. Sartre uses a second opportunity to deny a real God in his study of intersubjectivity. What is God if there is a God? He is the other par excellence. But what does the experience of the other's sUbjectivity mean for me? As we have explained above,208 to experience the other's subjectivity means to experience his stare, i.e., to experience my being-looked-at. This stare implies the death of my subjectivity as project, as transcendence, as freedom. Under the other's stare I appear as a thing-in-the-world, I am what I am. 209 My being-for-the-other means that I am robbed of my transcendence. 21o If I want to save my manhood, I have to raise myself, reject through my stare the other's subjectivity, and reduce him to a thing-in-the-world. 211 In these conditions there cannot be any question of acknowledging God if man does not want to give up his subjectivity.212 God is the Other par excellence, which means: He is the one who stares at all subjects, before whom all experience themselves as objects, one whose presence is unbearable for any subject. God is the being who stares at all, but Himself cannot be stared at by any.213 To accept God, therefore, would mean to accept being a mere thing. Acknowledging Him would mean to exist as estranged, to be alienated from my man205Cf. Sartre, L'existentialisme est un humanisme, pp. 17-19. 206Cf. Sartre, ibid., pp. 22-24. 207"L'homme n'est rien d'autre que ce qu'i1 se fait." Sartre, ibid., p. 22. 208See above, pp. 195 II. 209Cf. Sartre, L' etre et Ie neant, p. 320. 210Cf. Sartre, ibid., p. 321. 211"Et par la, je me recupere." Sartre, ibid., p. 349. 212"Dieu n'est ici que Ie concept d'autrui pousse 11 la limite." Sartre,

ilXd., p. 324.

213Sartre, ibid., p. 495.

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hood, understood as freedom.214 But is it true that I have to admit God and that freedom is an illusion? Definitely not, for man is free and, consequently, there is no God.

Critique of these Arguments. It is not primarily Sartre's rejection of God which induces us to reproach him for unduly narrowing intentionality, for arbitrarily closing the openness-to which characterizes man. The reproach is inspired by the arguments which Sartre permits himself to manipulate. Why can there be no question of man's dependence upon God? Because, Sartre supposes, God's causality can be only of such a nature that its effect is a thing, and there can be no question of causality with respect to man as freedom. This supposition is false, but no one will be able to explain this to Sartre so long as he conceives causality univocally, so long as he does not see the special meaning of the causality of love. Love "acts," it has its own "effect," it is creative, it makes the other be. But what does love make the other be? Not some kind of facticity which would make man similar to a thing. Love, understood as the active leaning to the other makes the other be a subject, i.e., project, transcendence, freedom. 215 Sartre, however, does not speak of the openness-for or intentionality of love and does not know the "causality" that is proper to it. As a result, he does not have any terms to conceive the creativity through which God makes man be freedom. Likewise, there is no reason to reject God as if the acknowledgment of His being would deprive man-under-God's-regard of his freedom. Of course, from Sartre's viewpoint there is no other choice, because for him the other's regard can only be a hateful stare. 216 Hatred murders the other's subjectivity, so that man has to reject God if he wants to save his freedom. Love is unknown to Sartre; consequently, he is unable to see that God can also look at me lovingly and thus give me my freedom. From all this it should be clear that Sartre cannot conceive a real God because he does not recognize a certain form of intentionalitynamely, man's openness for the other as the other, man's destiny for the other, the creativity of love. If the other can only want to murder 214"La position de Dieu s'accompagne d'un chosisme de mon objectivite; mieux, je pose mon-etre-objet-pour-Dieu comme plus reel que mon Pour-soi; j'existe aliene et je me fais apprendre par mon dehors ce que je dois etre. C'est l'origine de la crainte devant Dieu." Sartre, ib1d., p. 350. 211iCf. above, pp. 223 if. 216Cf. above, p. 200.

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me how could the Other par excellence want precisely the opposite and give me my manhood? The consequences flowing from Sartre's conception of God, insofar as this conception has been explained here, are mainly of a moral nature. His thinking of God results in a vision of man's being as having-to-be: man has to develop and defend his freedom and, in doing so, he has to recognize only one law-the law of his freedom.217

S artre' s Argument of God's Internal Contradiction and the M eaning of Life. The question regarding the meaning of life remains. Is it possible to consent to life? Sartre's reply, which is really the pivotal point of his whole philosophy, is prepared by his thinking about God, as is also his concept of morality. Life is absurd, for man is an attempted self-deification, and God is a contradiction. Let us explain the point somewhat more in detail. By means of his fundamental concepts of in-itself and for-itself Sartre endeavors to make some remarks about the Being which the various religions call "God." What he· means by in-itself has been explained previously.218 Hence it will be superfluous to repeat its description here fully, especially because not all the qualifications of the in-itself play a role in the use which Sartre makes of it in his conception of God. The in-itself, unlike consciousness, is not a being which refers to itself, it is not a being which "is concerned with its being." In Heideggerian terms, it is not characterized by Seinsverhaltnis and Seinsverstandnis. It lies "prostrated" upon itself, i.e., it does not show the nihilating distance· which characterizes consciousness and, consequently, includes no negativity, but is full positivity.219 It is in the full sense of the term. 220 It is the fullness of being and does not need anything else to be what it is. 221 These remarks st~ffice, Sartre thinks, to see that the God of whom religion speaks must be an in-itself. For God is conceived as a Being which has the fullness of being, a Being which is perfectly self-sufficient and does not need anything else to be what it is. 222 At the same 217Cf. Sartre, ibid., pp. 720-722. 218Cf. above, p. 104. 210Sartre, ibid., p. 119. 220This assertion justifies Troisfontaines' characterization of Sartre's system as an "materialisme a epiphenomcne". The "epiphenomenon" is consciousness, for in Sartre consciousness is merely "nothingness." Troisfontaines, Le choix de 1. P. Sartre, Paris, 1945, p. 18. 221 Sartre, ibid., pp. 33-34. 222"Et Dieu n'est-il pas . . . un etre qui est ce qu'il est, en tant qu'il est tout positivite et Ie fondement du monde?" Sartre, ibid., p. 119.

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time, however, God is conceived as a for-itself, as consciousness. 22s But, according to Sartre's general characterization of the for-itself, the for-itself is diametrically opposed to the in-itself: it is nothing but negativity and, by definition, it needs the in-itself to be capable of being for-itself. Consequently, the for-itself is never self-sufficient. 224 The contradiction is evident. God would have to be the identity of in-itself and for-itself, of pure positivity and pure negativity, of self-sufficiency and self-insufficiency. Accordingly, God is an internal contradiction. 225

Critique. This so-called contradiction does not make the slightest impression on true phenomenologists, for it results from an evident betrayal of the fundamental principle of phenomenological thinkingnamely, the unity of reciprocal implication of subject and object. In his phenomenological descriptions Sartre admits this principle, but nothing remains of it in his ontology. What is the meaning of the "fullness of being," ascribed to the in-itself if one accepts that we can meaningfully speak only about the in-itself-for-me? The in-itself-forme certainly does not appear as fullness of being. Is it justifiable then to withdraw the intentional movement of consciousness and claim that the in-itself is nevertheless the fullness of being? It is true that religion calls God the Highest Being, the Fullness of Being, but the identification of this Fullness with the in-itself-as fullness opens an unbridgeable abyss between Sartre and religion. Sartre thinks that the definition of God is a contradiction but, as a matter of fact, his own attempt to speak of the in-itself implies a contradiction. Similar remarks could be made regarding the for-itself. The various religions affirm that God is the Highest Being and that, therefore, His being must lie on the level of consciousness. But when Sartre deprives consciousness of all positive value, denies it the rank of the highest mode of being,226 and conceives it as pure nihilation, his assertion that God is conceived by religion as an in-itself opens another abyss. When the various religions call the Being of God consciousness and fullness of being, what they are saying has nothing whatsoever to do with Sartre's in-itself and for-itself. Consequently, what Sartre denies is something else than what the religious man affirms. 223Sartre, ibid., p. 133. 224See above, pp. 104 if. 225Cf. Sartre, ibid., pp. 133, 707-708. 226"Cette presence it soi, on I'a prise souvent pour une plenitude d'existence et un prejuge fort repandu parmi les philosophes fait attribuer it la conscience la plus haute dignite d'etre." Sartre, ibid., p. 119.

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Consequences of Sartre's Vie1-u-Man's Fundamental Project is to Be God. The way in which Sartre makes the idea of God a contradiction is heavy with consequences for his view of man. That there is an in-itself-for-itself is a contradiction, but it cannot be denied that in-itself and for-itself meet each other in man. For man is the oppositional unity of subjectivity and facticity or, in Sartre's terminology, of for-itself and in-itself. The in-itself is wholly contingent: it "just is there," without necessity, without ground or reason. For "ground" and "reason" refer to the for-itself, to consciousness, and in-itself does not have any consciousness. Man, therefore, must be conceived as the emergence of consciousness in the compact density of a contingent, groundless, in-itself. It is as if the in-itself, which is without ground in itself, "decompresses itself,"227 breaks through its compactness, produces a certain distance with respect to itself, i.e., gives itself the modification of the for-itself, to find a ground for its groundlessness. 228 This bold undertaking is called "man." Man, therefore, is a project of self-grounding. Sartre conceives this project as an attempt of consciousness to eliminate the distance separating it from the in-itself. Consciousness wants to be what it is. As not being what it is and as being what it is not, consciousness would like to be what it is. 229 Consciousness would want to give itself the fullness, the massivity, the density of the in-itself and nevertheless preserve its consciousness. If man were to succeed in identifying in himself for-itself and in-itself and making them coincide, the contingency of being-man would have been overcome, i.e., man would have grounded himself by elevating himself to the dignity of the Ens causa sui, he would have become his own cause. 230 But "Being which is the cause of itself," the identity of in-itself and foritself, is nothing else than the definition of God. Consequently, the self-grounding project which man is is the desire to be God. 231 227"L'ontologie no us fournit deux renseignements . . .: c'est d'abord, que tout processus de fondement de soi est rupture de I'etre-identique de I'en-soi, recul de I'etre par rapport a lui-meme et apparition d'e la presence a soi ou conscience." Sartre, ibId., p. 714. 228"L'ontologie se bornera d'one a dcc:ctrer que tout se passe eomme si I'en-soi, dans un projet pour se fonder lui-mcme, se donnait la modification du pour-soi." Sartre, ibid., p. 715. 229Sartre, ibid., p. 653. 230Sartre, ibid., p. 708. 231"Ainsi peut-on dire que ee qui rend Ie mieux concevable Ie project fondamental de la realite humaine, c'est que I'homme est I'etre qui projette d'etre Dieu." Sartre, ibid., p. 653.

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This Project is Doomed to Failure. In his transcendence man endeavors to execute this project. As not being what he is and being what he is not, as the oppositional unity of facticity and potentiality, man in his activity tries to bring about the fulfilment of the possibilities which are anchored in his facticity. Once a meaning has been realized, it remains as an in-itself which, however, is again nihilated by the for-itself. Thus new possibilities reval themselves, each of which in its turn is realized, remains as an in-itself, and is nihilated by the for-itself. The for-itself, which is a nothingness, always "follows hard on the heels of the in-itself"232 which of itself is the fullness of being, but never succeeds in identifying itself with the in-itself. Man is essentially a hole, a tear, a breach in being, and his transcendence cannot eliminate this breach. Man is essentially a "disease of being." What else could be implied in all this than that the execution of the self-grounding proj ect which man is, is doomed to failure? The for-itself is an invincible nihilation of the in-self, so that there always is and remains an infinite distance between the in-itself and the foritself.233 By means of his transcendence man wants precisely to overcome this distance in order to ground his being. His effort is bound to fail. "Human reality," as a self-grounding project, is an absurdity. What else could it be, for it is a project to become a God, and God is a contradiction. 23 • If man were to reach his ideal, he would lose himself. For there would no longer be any distance between for-itself and in-itself, and what else could this mean than that man would no longer be man ?235 Human consciousness, therefore, is a conscience malheureuse, an ill-starred consciousness, and there is no remedy for its misfortune. Man never succeeds in being more than a "failure as God."236 Man's suffering, then, is the opposite of Christ's Passion, for man would want to lose himself as man and be reborn a God. But the whole idea of God is a contradiction, and we lose ourselves in vain. Man is a useless suffering. 237 232S ar tre, ibid., p. 47. 233Sartre, ibid., p. 714. 234"Sans doute cet ens causa sui est impossible et son concept, nous l'avons vu, enveloppe une contradiction." Sartre, ibid., p. 717. 235Sartre, ibid., p. 134. 236"Tout se passe comme si Ie monde, l'homme et l'homme-dans-Ie-monde n'arrivaient a realiser qu'un Dieu manque." Sartre, ibid., p. 717. 237Sartre, ibid., p. 708.

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Critique. In the Middle Ages the thinking about the meaning of life was intermingled with the thinking about God. The same is true of Sartre with this difference, however, that his philosophy is wholly negative. In medieval thought God's reality occurred as the final goal of human transcendence. Thus it was possible for medieval man to consent to his being. What we find in Sartre is more or less the exact reverse of this idea: there is no God, and life is meaningless. It is difficult to say what has to be admired most: Sartre's virtuosity in using dialectics to arrive where he "officially" wants to be or his insight into the life of man, which brings him "surreptitiously" where he does not want to be. To understand Sartre's impasse, it is necessary first to realize, as we have already explained, that his idea of God is an aprioristic concept, a rationalistic construct. In addition, Sartre's negation has a positive importance because of the consequences flowing from it for the understanding of man. If God is not the identity of in-itself and for-itself, then man as the oppositional unity of facticity and SUbjectivity is not an attempt to deify himself. The self-grounding project which man is should, therefore, not be conceived as the desire to elevate himself to being his own cause. 238 Nevertheless, man is a search for self-ground. This is what Sartre has clearly seen and what brings him where he does not want to go. The question now is to discover what this search really means if it is not the desire for self-deification. Sartre's Existential Psychoanalysis. For Sartre, man's desire for self-deification is identified as the meaning of life because of what he calls an "existential psychoanalysis."239 Such an analysis does not consist in making lists of human behavior patterns, inclinations and tendencies, but in an attempt to decipher these psychological data. 24o On the basis of a pre-ontological grasp of what man is as man,241 on 238The expression "ens causa sui," a "being which is its own cause," may not be used to characterize the divine Being. God may not be said to be His own cause, for a cause is naturally prior to its effect. How could God as cause be prior to himself as ~ffect? God is a "Being-from-Himself," an Ens a se. 239"La psychoanalyse existentielle va lui decouvrir Ie but reel de sa recherche qui est I'etre comme fusion synthetique de l'en-soi avec Ie pour-soi." Sartre, ibid., p. 721. 240Sartre, ibid.} p. 656. 241As has been pointed out, Sartre does not want to speak of a human "nature" or "essence," because these expressions supposedly imply what he calls "chosisme," i.e., making man a thing. Of course, no such implication is necessary. De facto Sartre himself speaks of man's essence when he refers to "human reality," "the human person," or "man."

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the basis of the unreflective presence of man to his own essence, it i~ possible to decipher the individual behaviors and tendencies as manifestations of what man is in his most intimate essence. 242 The result reached by Sartre's investigation is that "man is a useless suffering." Man is an attempt to identify in-itself and for-itself, an impossible effort, for the for-itself is nothing else than nihilation, than the creation of distance between in-itself and for-itself. One who rejects the result of Sartre's existential psychoanalys:s and his way of deciphering man's behavior could attempt to express again the meaning of human behavior, inclinations, and tendencies as manifestations of man's most intimate essence. He would not have to doubt the real value of Sartre's phenomenological descriptions d man as transcendence. But it would be necessary to see through Sartre's words, to read between the lines, in order to express what Sartre really did see when he described man as searching for selfground. However, there is also another possibility, which perhaps will be more fruitful with respect to what man is in his most intimate being-namely, to investigate what exactly Sartre rejects when he thinks that he rejects God. Moreover, this method will enable us to enlarge the area of our investigation considerably, for it is on the question of the denial o'f God that Sartre's disciples, such as Jeanson, de Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty, agree most heartily with their master.243

The "Grave" Man's Bad Faith. This agreement extends not only to the reasons for their denial but also to their way of thinking about the man who does believe in God. In a unanimous but cynical way they speak about him as "the grave man." To understand, therefore, how Sartre and his school conceive the acceptance of God, one has to understand what this "grave man" looks like. Subsequently, after realizing the reasons why Sartre rejects the "grave man," it will be possible to understand what Sartre really rejects when he feels obliged to deny God. And finally, we may be in a position to show what Sartre did see when he described man as searching for a ground. The grave man is a coward, because he conceals his absolute freedom from himself.244 He interprets his own being as the being of a thing-among-things, he resigns his manhood in favor of the world. 245 242Sartre, ibid., p. 656. 243Concerning Merleau-Ponty see Remy Kwant, op. cit. (in footnote 193). 244Sartre, L'existentialisme est un humallisme, p. 84. 245Sartre, L'etre et Ie neant, p. 669.

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He ascribes to himself the mode of being proper to a rock, the consistency, inertia and opaqueness of a thing-in-the-world. 246 Karl Marx is typically such a grave man, for he affirms the priority of the object over the subject, and man is "grave" when he considers himself as an object. 247 Since the grave man buries the consciousness of his freedom, he is "in bad faith."2;l8 Sartre's analysis of bad faith brings us a step closer to our goal. It may sound strange but according to him everyone who strives to be sincere is in bad faith. For what else is this striving but an attempt to be for oneself what one is ?249 And is not this precisely the definition of the in-itself, the thing ?250 This effort, therefore, is always and of necessity hypocritical, for man is a being which in its being is concerned with its being and this means that man nihilates what he is. 251 Man, then, of necessity escapes from what he is, and the ideal of sincerity is a task that cannot possibly be done because it contradicts the nihilating structure of consciousness. 252 The attempt to be sincere is the attempt to be like a thing. 25B The grave man, therefore, is in bad faith, because he ascribes to himself the mode of being proper to a thing. The same, say Sartre and his school, applies to the man who believes in God. Let us see what he means by this. When man gives himself the mode of being proper to a thing, he disparages his freedom as distance. It is precisely for this reason that he is in bad faith. As has been pointed out, the distance inherent in the involvement of subjectivity in facticity has to be conceived in two ways. It refers to nihilation on both the cognitive and the affective levels. The affective distance of subjectivity from facticity is essential to being-man. It is impossible for man to consent fully and unreservedly to any worldly facticity and, consequently, all full246"I1 s'est donne a lui-rnerne Ie type d'existence du rocher, la consistance, I'inertie, l'opacite de l'etre-au-rnilier-du-monde." Sartre, ibid., p. 669. 247Sartre, ibid., p. 669. 248"I1 va de soi que l'homme serieux enfouit au fond de lui-meme la conscience de sa tiberte, il est de rnauvaise foi." Sartre, ibid., p. 669. 249"Or quel est !'ideal a atteindre en ce cas? II faut que l'homme ne soit pour lui-rnerne que ce qu'iI est, en un mot qu'il soit pleinernent et uniquement ce qu'iI est." Sartre, ibid., p. 98. 250Sartre, ibid., p. 98. 251Sartre, ibid., p. 83. 252"Que signifie, dans ces conditions, I'ideal de sincerite sinon une tache impossible a rernplir et dont Ie sens meme est en contradiction avec la structure de rna conscience? Etre sincere disions-nous, c'est etre ce qu'on est. Sartre, ibid., p. 102. 253Sartre, ibid., p. 103.

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ness of being is permeated with emptiness, all fulfilment and satisfaction are undermined by unfulfilment and dissatisfaction, all rest, peace, and happiness are mixed with restlessness, lack of peace, and unhappiness. The disparagement of his non-being means that man disparages his manhood. It is bad faith. Sartre and his school reject this kind of man, and correctly so. Man cannot be satisfied with any form of his being-in-the-world, he cannot give his complete and definite consent to any worldly reality. But this is precisely what the grave man does. 254 Thus the affective distance of subjectivity from facticity is buried, and man gives himself the mode of being of a thing, for a thing is compact density and lies "prostrated" upon itself. For this reason Sartre says that the grave man resigns his manhood in favor of the world and that he "belongs to the world."255 Simone de Beauvoir, who follows Sartre most slavishly, calls the grave man eloquently, with an allusion to Nietsche's superman, a "subman." The "subman" loses himself in the object,256 he holds fast to his facticity and thus impedes the expansion of the kingdom of man, the development of freedom. 257 But the "subman" is bored and experiences the world as a desert. 2G8 He is in bad faith.259

The God Denied by Sartre. It is sufficiently clear now, we think, what Sartre and his followers really reject when they feel obliged to deny God. The man who admits God is "grave," but this grave man renounces his manhood in favor of the world. God, therefore, is conceived as a worldly reality, to which man nevertheless consents unreservedly. Such a "god," of course, must certainly be rejected, for he is not God. Simone de Beauvoir gives us a series of unambiguous examples of the "gravity" she despises so much, i.e., of the acceptance of God. The military for whom the army is Everything, the colonial administrator who sacrifices the lives of the natives for the construction of a Road, the revolutionary who lives only for Revolution, all of 254"L'homme serieux, s'i! existe, est l'homme d'une seule chose a laquelle il dit oui." Merleau-Ponty, Bloge de la philosophie, p. 79. 255"L'homme serieux est 'du monde' et n'a plus aucun recours en soi." Sartre, ibid., p. 669. 256"L'attitude de sous-homme passe logiquement d'ans celle de l'homme serieux: i! s'efforce d'engloutir sa liberte dans Ie contenu que celui-ci accepte de sa societe, i! se perd dans l'objet afin d'aneantir sa subjectivite." Simone de Beauvoir, Pour une morale de l'ambiguite, Paris, 1947, pp. 65-66. 257Simone de Beauvoir, ibid., p. 64. 258Simone de Beauvoir, ibid., p. 65. 259"La mauvaise foi de l'homme serieux provient de ce qu'il est oblige de sans cesse renouveler Ie reniement de cette liberte." de Beauvoir, ibid., p. 68.

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these are "grave men," because they are servants of divinities. 260 But what are these divinities really? They are only worldly realities to which a transcendent value is attributed. A man who unreservedly· consents to them disparages the negativity which affects his existence, he crushes his freedom. Life will necessarily be a disappointment for him, because his "gravity" is the impossible attempt to realize the self-contradictory synthesis of in-itself and for-itself.261 Simone de Beauvoir returns to this Sartrian definition of God immediately after her examples of "gravity." Evidently, then, God is conceived as a reality within the world, and the man who consents to God appears to us as someone who absolutizes a relative being and his own relativity. On the basis of these premises it has to be admitted that man's properly human being dies through contact with this absolute. 262

Sartre's Psychoanalysis and the Essence of the Absolute. It should not be necessary to state explicitly that all this has nothing whatsoever to do with the true God and the authentic belief in God. On the contrary. The Christian religion speaks about sin where Sartre and his followers speak about belief in God. Sin, in the strict sense of the term, is precisely the absolutizing of a worldly phenomenon, the affirmation of a "God" by the "grave" man. Man's struggle against evil is precisely a struggle against such affirmations, to which the world invites him. The way, however, in which Sartre rejects the massive affirmation of the world, of man's "belonging to the world," is of such a penetrating nature that his insight may be called a permanent acquisition of philosophy. The most profound ground of "having to be" has perhaps never been so clearly revealed as in Sartre's philosophy. This ground is the negativity belonging to the essence of manhood. No one perhaps has shown more clearly than Sartre that "having to be" is the most intimate essence of man. This insight is the result of what Sartre calls an "existential psychoanalysis," i.e., an analysis which starts from a pre-ontological and fundamental awareness and understanding of the essence of the human personality in order to conceptualize this essence and express it in clear terms. 263 The result 260de Beauvoir, ibid., pp. 70-73. 261"Le serieux est une des manieres de chercher a realiser l'impossible synthese de l'en-soi et du pour-soi." de Beauvoir, ibid., p. 74. 262"La conscience metaphysique et morale meurt au contact de l'absolu." Merleau-Ponty, Sens et non-sens, p. 191. 263Sartre, L'etl'e et Ie neant, p. 656.

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of his analysis is, as we have said, that man is the desire to be God.26~ This statement, however, can be made only under the aegis of an erroneous idea of God. If we reject Sartre's interpretation of man's most intimate essence, our rejection must not be taken to mean that we cannot accept the ontological value of the description he gives of man's most intimate essence. His description is, indeed, very penetrating. Man as a "natural desire" is essentially such that no worldly reality can fill him. As long as man lives locked-up in the world, it is impossible for him definitively to consent to his subjectivity as "having to be," for all consent to himself is given in function of the fulfilment which subjectivity finds as "having to be." Searching for the ground of his being, man seeks a possibility to consent definitively to his subjectivity as "having to be."

The Reality of the Transcendent. Such a consent is not possible within the confines of the world. The "grave" man, the sub-man, is an eloquent witness of this impossibility. He is in bad faith. He is bored in a world which is for him like a desert. This boredom has metaphysical dimensions. It reveals the innermost essence of man as "having to be," it shows the true character of subjectivity-in-theworld, understood as a "natural desire," it discloses that the "desire" which subjectivity-in-the-world is must be understood as "desiring more than worldly beings," as "desiring really something entirely other" than the world. This "Other" we have called the Transcendent, but the only thing we are provisionally able to say about it is that the Transcendent is real but not like worldly beings. The Transcendent is real. If the natural desire which man is would be conceived as a desire in the psychological sense, as a tendency which man could also disregard if he wants, it would be impossible to show the reality of the Transcendent. If the natural desire is conceived in this way, and man comes to the conclusion that it is impossible for him to give his definitive consent to any worldly reality whatsoever, he could tell himself that he wants "crazy things," that he should not foster any impossible desires, just as a man with an I.Q. of 70 should not want to become Secretary of Education. 264"La valeur fondamentale, qui preside a ce projet est justement I'en-soipour-soi, c'est-a-dire I'ideal d'une conscience qui serait fondement de son propre etre-en-soi par la pure conscience qu'elle prendrait d'elle-meme. C'est cet ideal qu'on peut nommer Dieu. Ainsi peut-on dire que ce qui rend Ie mieux concevable Ie projet fondamental de la realite humaine, c'est que I'homme est I'etre qui projette d'etre Dieu." Sartre, ibid., p. 653.

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Such a man should definitely set aside his desire. But the same cannot be asserted of the natural desire as it is described by Sartre, for this desire constitutes what man is. If man sets it aside, he disparages his own essence. Thus he can no longer ask whether the Transcendent is real, for without the reality of the Transcendent man would not be what he unmistakably is: a natural desire, in the full sense of the term. It is impossible to ask whether the world is real, for without the reality of the world man would not be what he unmistakably isnamely, a being-in-the-world. In the same way, it is not possible to ask whether the Transcendent is real, for without the reality of the Transcendent man would not be the intentional directedness which he is. On the other hand, the Transcendent is not real in the same way as a worldly being is real. For this reason it can never be affirmed in the same way as worldly being is affirmed. Every attempt to affirm it as one affirms a worldly being degrades the Transcendent and disparages man's proper dimension as a natural desire. Nevertheless, the Transcendent has to be affirmed, because without this affirmation man cannot recognize the integral reality of his essence.

Man is Authentically Directed to the Transcendent. Man is a being which in its being is concerned with its being. Asking about the meaning of his being, man asks about the "direction" of his being. Existential psychoanalysis reveals man to himself as intentional directedness to the Transcendent. In searching for the meaning of his being, man seeks a possibility in which he can definitively consent to his being as a natural desire. As long, however, as man understands himself exclusively as directedness to the world, such a consent is impossible. Nevertheless, the world invites man to this consent. Acceptance of the invitation is called "sin." Sartre and his followers join issue against this invitation, because they realize that its acceptance is the death of manhood, because they realize that the suffering of the sinner is a useless suffering. 265 His existence as a self-grounding project cannot find its ground in the world. Merely as being-in-the-world man cannot be definitively happy. 26~" L' etre et Ie neant est tout entier consacre a la description de cette attitude d'echec, qui est une attitude de mauvaise foi. Loin de representer ma morale de Sartre, L' eire et Ie neant devoile au contraire, dans ce souci d'etre, l'attitude spontanee que la morale aura a convertir pour engager Ie mouvement d'authentification." Fr. Jeanson, "La conduite humaine selon J.-P. Sartre," Morale chretiCllne et requetes contemporaines. Tournai-Paris, 1954, p. 176.

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\Ve may ask, however, whether it is perhaps possible for man definitively to consent to his existence as a natural desire on the basis of his consent to the Transcendent. In the perspective of Sartre's thought this question can be raised only if one understands the implications of his thought better than Sartre himself. According to his explicit theories, the question is meaningless, for Sartre does not explicitly recognize the Transcendent and, consequently, a definitive affirmation of anything at all can have no other meaning than an estrangement of being-man. On the other hand, one may distinguish the Transcendent radically from the world, for otherwise man would degrade the Transcendent and disparage his own being. If this distinction is admitted, it cannot be said that a definitive consent to the Transcendent implies "gravity," for the "grave" man massively affirms a wordly reality. This affirmation, however, does not give any definitive meaning to life. Once man is convinced of this, his question regarding the meaning of life is placed in its proper perspective, provided that the explicit recognition of the Transcendent precedes the question. As conceived in this way, the question remains unanswered by Sartre. But it is not impossible that later Sartre's philosophy may have to be interpreted as a theology without God. 266 We must see now whether the same has to be said of Heidegger's philosophy. 4.

THE "BEING-TOWARD-DEATH" IN HEIDEGGER

In his book Sein und Zeit (Being and Time) Heidegger intends to open again the road to a correct understanding of being.267 This re-opening is necessary because, according to Heidegger, in the course of history the thinking of the philosophers themselves has closed this road. 268 In order to be able to understand being-ingeneral, Heidegger first asks about man's being, because man is the being which asks the question about being. 269 Asking what man is must be the correct approach to the idea of being-in-general, because man is the being which in its being is concerned with its 266Egon Vietta, "Theologie ohne Gott," Versuch iiber die menschliche Existenz in der modernen /ranzosischen Philosophie, Zi.irich, 1946. 267Sein und Zeit, pp. 2-15. 268Ibid., pp. 2-3. 269"f!:insehen auf, Verstehen und' Begreifen von, wahlen, Zugang zu sind konstltutlve Verhaltungen des Fragens und so selbst Seinsmodi eines bestimmten Seienden, des Seienden, das wir, die Fragenden, je selbst sind." Heidegger, ibid., p. 7.

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being,270 man is a being which is capable of reflecting upon its own being, and the question regarding being-in-general is a mode of man's own being. 271 Man's "Falling-Away." Reflection on man's being will open the road to understanding being-in-general only if this reflection supplies a view of man in his totality. This view is given to man in the experience of dread. 272 Dread, however, is a rare phenomenon,273 for everyday man is constantly fleeing trom himself, i.e., from the proper meaning of his being-himself, from his dread. 274 Heidegger calls this flight from oneself "falling-away" (Verfallen) .275 He first speaks about this mode of being-man when he asks himself who really is the subject of man's everyday mode of being.276 This subject is the anonymous everybody (das Man), not the I, the I 'lnyself.277 The others have robbed the self of its being. "They" are not even determinate "others," for each "other" can replace and represent any "other." The others exercise an unobtrusive control and dictatorship, although no one can be pointed to as the dictator. 278 In using the means of transportation, in reading the newspaper, everyday man behaves just like every other man. We enjoy things and rejoice just as "everybody" (das Man) enjoys and rejoices; we read, see, and judge as "everybody" reads, sees, and judges; we find shocking what "everybody" finds shocking.279 The "everybody," the anonymous nobody, allows no exceptions, has no secrets. Its possibilities have been channelled and limited to well-determined tracks. The anonymous nobody and everybody can explain everything, for no one in particular is responsible for anything. 280 270Heidegger, ibid., p. 12. 271"Wenn die Interpretation des Sinnes von Sein Aufgabe wird ist das Dasein nicht nur das primiir zu befragende Seiende, es ist iiberdies das'Seiende, das sich je schon in seinem Sein zu dem verhiilt, wonach in dieser Frage gefragt wird. Die Seinsfrage ist dann aber nichts anderes als die Radikalisierung einer zum Dasein selbst gehorigen wesenhaften Seinstendenz, des vorontologischen Seinsverstiindnisses." Heidegger, ibid., p. 15. 272Heidegger, ibid., p. 182. 273Heidegger, ibid., p. 190. 274Heidegger, ibid., p. 184. 275Heiciegger, ibid., pp. 166-180. 276"Wer ist es denn, der das Sein als alltiigliches Miteinandersein iibernommen hat?" Heidegger, ibid., p. 125. 277"Das 'Wer' ist das Neutrum, das Man." Heidegger, ibid., p. 126. 278Heidegger, ibid., p. 126. 279Heidegger, ibid .. pp. 126-127. 280Heidegger, ibid., p. 127.

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What remains in this state of the 1's selfhood? The selfhood of the everyday mode of being-man is the selfhood of the anonymous everybody (das Man), but this selfhood constitutes the unauthentic, non-genuine man. 281 The unauthentic man is absorbed by the things in which everybody is absorbed and ends up by being no longer capable of interpreting himself in any other way than as a thing among other things. 282 To clarify the unauthenticity of being-man, Heidegger undertakes a very detailed analysis of "talk" (Gerede), "curiosity" (N eugier), and "ambiguity" (Zweideutigkeit), in which everyday man is absorbed. This analysis shows that everydayness is a positive mode of being-in-the-world,283 but in this mode the I is no longer itself,2u and its possibilities are no longer its own. 285 For this reason this mode of being-man must be called a "falling-away."286

Dread. Because man in his everydayness has fallen victim to the dictatorship of the anonymous everybody and nobody, he experiences himself only rarely in his authenticity. Thus one can understand that dread is a rare occurrence, for it is dread which constitutes the proper, genuine, and authentic meaning of the self. If then, one wants to acquire a vision of man as a totality, and the road to this vision lies in understanding man as dread, there seems to be no possibility of ever acquiring such a view, because everyday man in his "fallingaway" always has avoided dread. The difficulty, however, is merely apparent. For "falling-away" is evidently man's flight from being authentically man, from being authentically himself, from dread. 287 But this flight betrays the unconcealedness of that from which man flees. 288 Man's flight from 281"Das Selbst des alltaglichen Daseins ist das Man-selbst, das wir von dem eigentlichen, d.h. eigens ergriffenen Selbst unterscheiden." Heidegger, ibid., p. 129.

282Heidegger, ibid., p. 130. 283Heidegger, ibid., pp. 175-176. 284"Von ihm selbst als faktischem In-der-Welt-sein ist das Dasein als verfallendes schon abgefallen." Heidegger, ibid., p. 176. 285Heidegger, ibid., p. 178. 286Heidegger, ibid., p. 175. 287"Das Aufgehen im Man und bei d'er besorgten 'Welt' offenbart so etwas wie eine Flucht des Daseins vor ihm selbst als eigentlichem Selbst-seinkonnen." Heidegger, ibid., p. 184. 288"Nur sofern Dasein ontologisch wesenhaft durch die ihm zugehorende Erschlossenheit iiberhaupt vor es selbst gebracht ist, kann es vor ihm fliehen." Heidegger, ibid., pp. 184-185.

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the genuine meaning of himself is possible only insofar as man as dread is unconcealed for himself.289 The flight of unauthentic man must not at all be conceived as the shrinking-from and drawing-back of fear. Fear is entirely different from dread. 290 What is feared is always a definite thing or a definite person. 291 A definite being approaches me in a threatening but not fatal way. The threat can be diverted. 292 What approaches me threateningly as something definite from a determined region of my world makes me fear for myself. Only a being which in its being is concerned with its being can fear. 29B What is feared and that for the sake of which I fear, therefore, are correlated: a certain worldly being threatens my being-in-the-world.294 In fearing a determined worldly being, I am concerned with my own being-in-the-world as threatened. In his unauthenticity man does not flee from fear but from dread. 295 Unlike the object of fear, that of dread is wholly indeterminate. 296 It is never a well-defined object of my world which makes me dread. What makes me dread is even wholly undeterminable, it cannot be pointed out. What threatens me does not approach me here or there: the dreadful is not really anywhere, but nevertheless it is so close that it takes my breath away.297 In dread the world in which I am involved collapses. In dread the world as a totality reveals itself as unimportant, insignificant, null. What I dread is not a determined worldly being but the world as such. In dread the world as world inexorably appears to me in all its nothingness. 298 In dread the world reveals itself as nothingness. 299 Unauthenticity and Dread. This, however, is not the most important point. With respect to fear, I am afraid of a certain object 289Heidegger, ibid., p. 185. 290Heidegger, ibid., p. 185. 291"Das Wovor der Furcht, das 'Furchtbare', ist jeweils ein innerwe1tlich Begegnendes von der Seinsart der Zuhandenen, des Vorhandenen oder des Mitseins." Heidegger, ibid., p. 140. 292Heidegger, ibid., pp. 140-141. 293"Das Worurn die Furcht fiirchtet ist das sich fiirchtende Seiende selbst, das Dasein. Nur Seiendes, dern es in seinern Sein urn dieses selbst geht, kann sich fiirchten." Heidegger, ibid., p. 141. 294"Das Fiirchten urn als Sichfiirchten vor erschlieszt irnrner .... gleichurspriinglich das innerwe1tliche Seiende in seiner Bedrohlichkeit undo das In-sein hinsichtlich seiner Bedrohlichkeit." Heidegger, ibid., p. 141. 295Heidegger, ibid., p. 186. 296"Das Wovor der Angst ist vi:illig unbestirnrnt." Heidegger, ibid., p. 187. 297Heidegger, ibid., p. 186. 298Heidegger, ibid., pp. 186-187. 299Heidegger, ibid., p. 187.

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but for or on behalf of myself. Regarding dread, we must likewise say that I am in dread of my world as such but for myself, for my being-in-the-world as such. 300 For the world is a system of meanings correlated to my facticitous and possible modes of being-man as being-in-the-world. The world belongs essentially to being-man as existence. 30l If, then, the world as such reveals itself as unimportant, insignificant, null, the implication is that being-in-the-world as such is experienced as a nullity. For this reason man does not feel "at home" in the world. 302 In dread man stands face to face with the hard, inexorable, invincible fact that he "is thrown into a state of notbeing-at-home" (U nheimlichkeit) .303 Unauthentic man tries to escape from this hard fact. He takes refuge in being one-like-many (das Man), in the peaceful and trusted world of the impersonal and anonymous. His flight is an escape from the not-being-at-home implied by his "thrownness" into the world. 304 In his falling-away man closes himself to the unconcealment of the world as such and to his being-in-the-world as such to lose himself in the care of a particular well-defined world, a world in which he is at home-be it at the expense of the meaning that is proper to his selfhood. His peace, however, is fragile, for in the most unexpected situations dread may suddenly appear. If this happens, the impersonal man has only one escape-fear. By interpreting dread as fear, the terror of unconcealing dread can be kept concealed. 30s Dread and Being-Toward-Death. What is the reason that in dread the world as world is experienced as unimportant, insignificant, null, and that being-in-the-world as such reveals itself as beingnot-at-home? This experience is the effect, if we may use this term, of the fact that in dread man faces the mysterious presence of the utmost possibility contained in his being as project.306 As project, man is the oppositional unity of facticity and possibility, of determination and 300"Worurn sich die Angst angstet, ist das In-der-Welt-sein selbst." Heidegger, ibid., p. 187. 301"Diese (die Welt) jedoch gehort ontologisch wesenhaft zurn Sein des Daseins als in-der-Welt-sein." Heidegger, ibid., p. 187. 302"Das In-sein kornrnt in den existentialen 'Modus' des Un-zuhause. Nichts anderes rneint die Rede von der Unheirnlichkeit." Heidegger, ibid., p. 189. 303"Die Angst angstet sich urn das nackte Dasein als in die Unheirnlichkeit geworfenes. Sie bringt zuriick auf das pure Dass der eigensten, vereinzelten Geworfenheit." Heidegger, ibid., p. 343. 304Heidegger, ibid., p. 189. 305"Furcht ist an die 'Welt' verfallene, uneigentliche und ihr selbst als solche verborgene angst." Heidegger, ibid., p. 189. 306Heidegger, ibid., pp. 265-266.

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potentiality.307 Dread discloses the utmost possibility of man as project, and this possibility is death. All dread, therefore, is dread of death. sos For the acquisition of a vision of the whole man an adequate concept of death is indispensable. For how could anyone claim to have acquired such a vision if man as project always contains an aspect of potentiality and therefore, is never really "finished" ?309 This difficulty can be overcome only by the explicitation of man's being as being-toward-death. slo For as long as man is man, one or the other form of potential being is always open to him. Among these forms of man's possible being is also the end of his being-in-the-world, and this end is death. The end of man as potential being limits and determines the possible totality of man's being. 1Il1

An Objection. Is not all this, one may ask, merely the postponement of a fundamental difficulty? The aim is a total vision of man,312 but as long as man is man, i.e., until his end, man has possibilities, his being includes a being-able-to-be, is unfinished and, therefore, cannot be grasped as a totality.3ls On the other hand, as soon as beingman no longer includes any possibilities, as soon as it is finished, man has become a "no-longer-there," he is no longer concerned with his being, he can no longer experience himself.s14 This line of thought reveals a wholly mistaken view of man as capable-of-being.s15 As potential being, being-man is not the being of a thing "to which something can happen."S16 Man's being-unfinished is not like the not-yet-being-full of the moon or the not-yetS07Heidegger, ibid., p. 145. S08"Das Sein zum Tode ist wesenhaft Angst." Heidegger, ibid., p. 266. 309"Und wenn die Existenz das Sein des Daseins bestimmt, und ihr Wesen mitkonstituiert wird durch das Seink6nnen, dann musz das Dasein, solange es existiert, seink6nnend ie etwas noch nicht sein. Seiendes dessen Essenz die Existenz ausmacht, widersetzt sich wesenhaft der m6glichen Erfassung seiner als ganzes Seiendes." Heidegger, ibid., p. 233. 3l0Heidegger, ibid., p. 234. 311 "Dieses Ende, zum Seink6nnen, d.h. zur Existenz geh6rig, begrenzt und bestimmt die ie m6gliche Ganzheit des Daseins." Heidegger, ibid., p. 234. 3l2Heidegger, ibid., p. 236. 3lS" 'Solange es (das Dasein) ist' bis zu seinem Ende verhiilt es sich zu seinem Seink6nnen." Heidegger, ibid., p. 236. 314"Sobald iedoch das Dasein so 'existiert', das an ihm schlechthin nichts mehr aussteht, dann ist es auch schon in eins damit zum Nicht-mehr-da-sein geworden. . . . Ais Seiend'es wird es dann nie mehr erfahrbar." Heidegger, ibid., p. 336. 3l5Heidegger, ibid., p. 237. 3l6Heidegger, ibid., p. 143.

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being-ripe of a fruit.s17 In a similar way man's end or death is not like the end of a shower or the end of a road. Sl8 Such a way of thinking about man does not conceive death as the death of man. Death is conceived as the death of man only when man's being is understood as being-toward-death. 319

Death and Man's Fundamental Structure. Accordingly, when death is said to be the end of life, this expression means that life is a being-toward-the-end. It is not a being-at-the-end, but a beingtoward-the end. 320 Life is consecrated to death: as soon as man comes to life, he is old enough to die. Death is not an external fact which happens to man,321 but is intrinsic to life. Hence man's being must be called a being-toward-death. Just as the facticity of human existence is not what it is without man's potential being, so also human life is not what it is without death. Because death is inherent to life, death has to be understood from the fundamental structure of man's being.322 This fundamental structure Heidegger characterizes as "care,"323 as the organic unity of existence (the "not yet"), facticity (the "already"), and "falling-away."824 If death belongs to the being of man, it should be possible to determine death from man's fundamental structure. 321i As a matter of fact, this determination can be made. 326 First of all, death is the mode of potential being which is most proper to man, the mode in which he, alone, is confronted with the possibility that 317Heidegger, ibid., pp. 243-244. 318Heidegger, ibid., p .. 244. 319"Daseinsmassig aber ist der Tod nur in einem existenziellen Sein zum Tode." Heid'egger, ibid., p. 234. 320S0 wie das Dasein vielmehr standig, solange es ist, schon sein Nochnicht ist, so ist es auch schon immer sein Ende. Das mit dem Tod gemeinte Enden bedeutet kein Zu-Enge-sein des Daseins, sondern ein Sein zum Ende dieses Seienden. Der Tod ist eine Weise zu sein, die das Dasein iibernimmt, 50bald es ist. Sobald ein Mensch zum Leben kommt, sogleich ist er alt genug zu sterben." Heidegger, ibid., p. 245. 32lHeidegger, ibid., p. 254. 322Heidegger, ibid., p. 249. 323Heidegger, ibid., pp. 191-196. 324"Als Grundverfassung des Daseins wurde die Sorge sichtbar gemacht. Die ontologische Bedeutung dieses Ausdrucks driickte sich in d'er 'Definition' aus: Sich-vorweg-schon-sein-in (der Welt) als Sein-bei (innerweltlich) begegnendem Seienden. Damit sind die fundamental en Charaktere des Seins des Daseins ausgedriickt: im Sich-vorweg die Existenz, im Schon-sein-in ... die Faktizitat, im Sein-bei ... das Verfallen." Heidegger, ibid, pp. 249-250. 325Heidegger, ibid., p. 250. 326Heidegger, ibid., p. 252.

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is most proper to him, the invincible possibility of his impossibility.327 Man's "being-ahead-of-himself" becomes concrete in the most original way in his being-toward-death. 328 Death is the extreme "not yet" of man's being as potential. This possibility, however, is not incidentally acquired by man in the course of his life. The extreme possibility of his existence, as a possibility, is also "already" present,329 for as soon as man begins to live, he is old enough to die. Finally, death reveals also the third characteristic of man's being as care-namely, "falling-away."330 Unauthentic Man and Death. In his everydayness man is absorbed by the anonymity of being "one like many" and by its anonymous world, he flees from the most proper possibility of his existence, from dread and not-being-at-home. This flight from dread is an escape from the dread of death. 331 The anonymous "one like many" is not ignorant of death. His knowledge, however, consists in a very definite way of explicitating being-toward-death. The anonymous man knows death as an item in the column of death-notices. 332 For everyday man death is a trivial event which befalls man from without: one dies, of course, but right now the "one like many" himself is spared. 333 "One dies" means: not I die, but everybody (das Man), i.e., nobody, dies. Thus dying is explicitated as an event, while death itself does not belong to any person. Everydayness is the covering-up of death as the possibility which is mine par excellence. 334 Even the way in which the dying are consoled reveals the same unauthenticity: the "one like many" tries to make him believe that he will not die, that he will return to trusted old everydayness, i.e., he tries to conceal from the dying man his most proper possibility.331i The "one like many" simply does not 327"In dieser Moglichkeit geht as dem Dasein urn sein In-der-Welt-sein schlechthin. Sein Tod ist die Moglichkeit des Nicht-mehr-dasein-konnens ... Der Tod ist die Moglichkeit der schlechthinnigen Daseinsunmoglichkeit." Heidegger, ibid., p., 250. 328Heidegger, ibid., p. 251. 329"Sondern, wenn Dasein existiert, ist es auch schon in diese Moglichkeit ~eworfen." Heidegger, ibid., p. 251. 330"Das Dasein stirbt faktisch, solange es existiert, aber zunachst und zumeist in der Weise des Verfallens." Heidegger, ibid., p. 252. 331 Heidegger, ibid., p. 252. 332"Die ~ffentlichkeit des alltaglichen Miteinander 'kennt' den Tod als standig vorkommendes Begegnis, als 'Todesfall'." Heidegger, ibid., p. 252. 333Heidegger, ibid., p. 253. H34"Das Man gibt Recht und steigert die Versuchung, das eigenste Sein zum Tode sich zu verdecken." Heidegger, ibid., p. 253. 335Heidegger, ibid., p. 253.

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allow the courage for dreading death to arise,s36 but only knows fear of death-as-an-event, a fear to which self-confident man may not give in.337 Evidently, then, the being of the one-like-many is an estranged being. He is estranged from himself and from his most proper possibility. Death is conceived as an event which occurs to the anonymous one-like-many. Thus the proper meaning of death, its beingalready-present-as-a-possibility, its being a possibility as a possibility of me, of me alone, is not recognized and is concealed. The impersonal one-like-many is interested only in the certainty that it iself is still alive. 338 It does not want to accept that the being itself of man is a being-toward-death, that life itself is affected by death as an ever-present possibility. In spite of this unwillingness, the being of the one-like-many is still a being-to ward-death. We may even say that in his everydayness man is concerned with his most pr9per and inescapable possibility, albeit only by nurturing an undisturbed indifference toward his possible impossibility.339 The impersonal one-like-many is also quite certain of death. Although this certainty does not seem to be more than a kind of empirical certainty, derived from the occurrence of death as an item in the column of death notices, i.e., as an event,340 the one-like-many really knows better.341 Insofar as he tries to hide, conceal, and banish the proper meaning of death, insofar as he flees from death, the impersonal one-like-many really derives his certainty about death from an awareness that being-man is being-toward-

336"Das Man laszt den Mut zur Angst vor dem Tode nicht aufkommen." Heidegger, ibid., p. 254. 337Heidegger, ibid., p. 254. 338"Dass das je eigene Dasein faktisch immer schon stirbt, d.h. in einem Sein zu seinem Ende ist, dieses Faktum verbirgt es sich dadurch, dasz es den Tod zum alltaglich vorkommenden Todesfall bei Anderen umpragt, der allefalls uns noch deutlicher versichert, dasz 'man selbst' ja noch 'lebt'." Heidegger. ibid., p. 254. 339Heidegger, ibid., p. 255. MOHeidegger, ibid., p. 257. 341"Wenngleich das Dasein in der iiffentlichkeit des Man scheinbar nur von dieser 'empirischen' Gewissheit des Todes 'redet', 50 halt es sich im Grunde doch nicht aU5schlieszlich und primar an die vorkommenden Todesfalle. Seinem Tode ausweichend ist auch das alltagliche Sein zum Ende des Todes doch anders gewisz, als es selbst in rein theorethischer Besinnung wahrhaben miichte." Heidegger, ibid., pp. 257-258.

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death. 342 Death is certain, for it is present in the being of man as being-toward-his-end. 343

Authentic Being-Toward-Death. We are now perhaps in a position to determine the correct attitude of man toward death. This determination must be possible on the basis of the fact that the true meaning of death has been unveiled and the improper, unauthentic being-toward-death exposed. 8u The true reply to man's awareness of his being as being-towarddeath consists at least in this that he does not try to escape from his most proper possibility, that he does not conceal it, and give it a false meaning. a41i The reply does not mean that man must put himself to death. Man's being is a having-to-be, but in obedience to the unconcealedness of his essence. The essence of man lies in his existence ;848 consequently, the reply to his awareness of his being-toward-death may not destroy his whole potential being, But by suicide man would demolish all his potentialities. 347 In man's being-toward-death the possibility of death must be apprehended as a possibility without being minimized, it has to be cultivated as a possibility, it must be "endured" as a possibility.a48 The authentic answer to the awareness of being-toward-death is "expectation" (Erwarten) , not in the same way as one expects a shower, but by "running forward in thought" on its possible impossibility, in the realization that in the light of this extreme, yet present, potentiality it is futile to busy oneself with things and with the company of fellowmen. 349 Nevertheless, this realization must not induce man to abandon his occupation with things and the company of fellow-men in a kind of apathetic surrender. For busying himself with things and being-together with other men pertain to the essential structure of man's being. He must accept all this, but in the light of his most proper pos342"Das verdeckende Ausweichen vor dem Tode vermag seinem Sinne nach des Todes nicht eigentlich 'gewisz' zu sein und ist es doch." Heidegger, ibid., J>. 256.

343"Der Tode ist als Ende des Daseins im Sein dieses Seienden zu seinem Ende." Heidegger, ibid., p. 259. 344Heidegger, ibid., p. 260. 345Heidegger, ibid., p. 260. 346Heidegger, ibid., p. 42. 347"Damit entzoge sich aber das Dasein gerade den Boden fUr ein existierendes Sein zum Tode." Heidegger, ibid., p. 261. 348Heidegger, ibid., p. 261. 349Heidegger, ibid., pp. 262-263.

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sible impossibility.350 Man's proper being is an ahead-of-himself liberation for the extreme possibility of his self-realizing essence, a liberation from losing himself in the particular possibilities which happen to present themselves, an understanding and choosing of these possibilities in the light of the extreme possibility, the impossibility of being "benumbed" by what has already been attained. 3sI Thus it does not matter that the "when" of death, which itself is certain, is not determined. 352 The constant "threat" of death does not arise from death as an event which happens at a certain moment. The threat springs from the unconcealedness of man to himself as "running ahead of himself." Man is certain of his being-in-the-world and, consequently, of his extreme, "already" present possibility.35s All this is revealed in dread. For all understanding is at the same time a being-affected (befindliches) .354 The fundamental affectivity or mood of being-man, through which man constantly and unqualifiedly IS faced with the threat arising from his innermost and isolated being, is nothing else than dread. 355 In dread man stands face to face with the nothingness of the possible impossibility of his existence as selfrealizing being; in dread he stands face to face with death, for dread is dread of death. 356 The freedom to be authentically himself which reveals itself in dread appears to be freedom-toward-death.

Conscience. Finally, Heidegger seeks a confirmation of his theory about man's proper being in the testimony of conscience.35T As de Waehlens points out, looking for such a confirmation cannot mean more than making an effort to approach the same question again from a different viewpoint-namely, the question regarding the meaning of man's proper being.3ss Ultimately, therefore, if we abstract from Heidegger's theory about the character of moral consciouness, the analysis of the testimony of conscience does not offer any important new 350"Das Dasein ist eigentliches selbst nur, sofern es sich als besorgendes Sein bei . . . und fiirsorgendes Sein mit . . . primar auf sein eigenstes Seinkonnen, nicht aber auf die Moglichkeit des Man-selbst entwirft." Heidegger, ibid., pp. 263-264. 351Heidegger, ibid., p. 264. 352Heidegger, ibid., p. 265. 353"Im Vorlaufen zum unbestimmt gewissen Tod'e offnet sich das Dasein fur eine aus seinem Da selbst entspringende standige Bedrohung." Heidegger, ibid., p, 265. 354"Alles Verstehen ist befindliches." Heidegger, ibid., p. 256. 355Heidegger, ibid., pp. 265-266. 356Heidegger, ibid., p. 266. 357Heidegger, ibid., I!P. 267-301. 35SCf. A. de Waelhens, La philosophie de Martin Heidegger, Louvain, 1948, pp. 150-151.

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ideas. Although man has fallen victim to losing himself in the anonymity of the impersonal one-like-many, he has sometimes privileged moments in which he is addressed by the voice of his conscience. 3Ci9 The one thus addressed is man insofar as he has become lost in the one-like-many. But this being-addressed is a call upon man, a call to his most proper potential-being-himself. 360 How does this "voice" have to be understood? Who is it that calls? Undoubtedly, it is man himself who calls,361 but not man insofar as he has become lost in the one-like-many. The voice of conscience is man in his not-being-at-home, in his original "thrownness"in-the-world, in his "nullity."362 Man calls himself from his unauthenticity to his most proper potential being.

Conscience and Guilt. The origin of the call, however, is not the main point. Before one can say that he really understands the call of conscience, it will be necessary to clarify the relationship which evidently exists between conscience and guilt. 363 Here also the anonymous one-like-many has done its nefarious work: it has coupled the guilty conscience to certain evil deeds. 364 This is wrong, for guilt is not the result of evil deeds, but evil deeds are possible only on the basis of an original being-guilty.86Ci What, we must ask, is this original guilt? This original guilt is constituted by "thrownness" (Geworfenheit). Man's being as care (sorge) is always also a being-already-throwninto-the~world. Man is a having-to-be, but as already-embarked; he has to undertake his being, but without having chosen it himself, without having asked for it; man belongs to himseii, but without being his own gift to himself; man is the ground of his potential being, of his possibilities, but he himself has not established this ground. 366 Man, for whom being-himself is a task, can never be himself to such an 359Heidegger, ibid., pp. 270-27l. 360"Der Ruf stellt, seiner Ruftendenz entsprechend, das angerufene Selbst nicht zu einer 'Verhandlung,' sondern als Aufruf z.um eigensten Selbstseinkonnen ist er ein Vor-(nach 'vorne'-) Rufen des Daseins in seine eigensten Moglichkeiten." Heidegger, ibid., p. 273. 361"Das Dasein ruft im Gewissen sich selbst.... Der Ruf kommt aus mir und doch iiber. 1l!ich." Heidegger, ibid., p. 275. 862Heidegger, ibid., pp. 276-277. 863Heidegger, ibid., pp. 280-281. 864Heidegger, ibid., pp. 281-282. 36Ci"Das Schuldigsein resultiert nicht erst aus einer Verschuldung, sondern umgekehrt: diese wird erst moglich 'auf Grund' eines urspriinglichen Schuldigseins." Heidegger, ibid., p. 284. 366Heidegger, ibid., pp. 284-285.

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extent that he overcomes his "already."367 Man undertakes his own being, he realizes himself, without ever acquiring perfect power over himself. He is a "thrown" project and, therefore, null, and this radical and invincible nullity constitutes his guilt.36s The call of conscience is an invitation to man to recognize himself as being-guilty,369 but at the same time an invitation to take his guilt, his nullity, upon himself, i.e., as null, to run forward (in thought) to his most proper potentiality, his end, his death. 370 Man is the nulllike ground of his nullity, the thrown project of his death, and it is as such that he "has to be."371 The authentic reply to the call of conscience is the resolve (Entschlossenheit )372 with which man as an I myself takes the nullity of his being-thrown-into-the-world upon himself and in anguished silence projects himself forward to the nothingness of his death. The Meaning of Life: Contradiction or Despair'! It is time to survey the road we have thus far travelled. Asking about the meaning of his being, man seeks a value which is a perfect and definitive fulfilment of his being-man, understood in the sense of having-to-be. The philosophers of the Middle Ages replied to his question by describing man as a seeker of God. Man's being is a being-toward-God; his having-to-be ultimately means to be destined for the Transcendent. Man, however, may fail to recognize his own being, he can refuse to acknowledge God and to adhere to Him. By doing so, he condemns himself, his being is rendered absurd, good for nothing, "in the way forever." To be doomed means to experience himself as identified with this "in the way," to experience the meaninglessness of his being as eternally unfulfilled having-to-be. Sartre rejects the affirmation of God for reasons which have been explained above. In the works of his followers this rejection is presented in greater relief and reveals itself as the refusal definitively to consent to any worldly being whatsoever. This consent is erroneously conceived as the affirmation of God. Such a misconception, however, 367"Das Selbst, das als solches den Grund seiner selbst zu legen hat, kann des sen nie miichtig werden und hat doch existierend das Grundsein zu iibernehmen." Heidegger. ibid., p. 284. 36SHeidegger, ibid., p. 285. 369Heidegger, ibid., p. 287. 370"Die Entschlossenheit wird eigentlich das, was sie sein kann, als verstehendes Sein zum Ende, d.h. als Vorlaufen in den Tode." Heidegger, ibid., p. 305. 371Heidegger, ibid., pp. 305-306. 372"--das verschwiegene, angstbereite Sichentwerfen auf das eigenste Schuldigscin-." Heidegger, ibid., p. 'l!:)7.

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is inevitable as soon as man's being is explicitated as fully identical with being-in-the-world. 373 If man is nothing else than openness for the world, the openness for God can be understood only as referring to an incorrectly absolutized worldly reality. It becomes something similar to the being-fascinated by the world which we observe in children.874 Many adults have been benumbed by the same attitude. But such an attitude is slavery and ignorance. 375 The authentic man is free. He "makes himself" and follows only one law: his own. He does not labor under any illusions, for he knows that his affirmations can never be definitive. He wills himself as a "defect of being" and does not fall into despair or nihilism. For the nihilist is "grave," because he attributes an absolute weight to his "non-being" thereby making it an immobile "being" instead of realizing his negativity as living movement, as freedom.376 Likewise, the man who despairs is "grave," for in his despair he really continues to live in accordance with the contradictory ideal of making the in-itself and for-itself identical in himself.877 Man's authentic life, however, begins only beyond despair. For Heidegger, on the other hand, genuine, authentic beinghuman is precisely despair. Does this view make Heidegger "grave"? Does he live according to a contradictory ideal? Is it impossible for him to accept that the consent to a worldly being can never be definitive? Or is there something more in Heidegger's philosophy than relatedness-to-the-world when there is question of man? Is man in Heidegger's thought related to the Transcendent ?378 873"Mais si nous retrouvons Ie temps sous Ie sujet et si nous rattachons au paradoxe du temps ceux du corps, du monde, de la chose et d'autrui, nous comprendrons qu'il n'y a rien a comprendre au-dela." Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la perception, p. 149. 874Simone de Beauvoir, Pour une morale de I'ambiguite, pp. 51-54. 375de Beauvoir, ibid., pp. 54-61. 876"Le nihiliste est proche de l'esprit de serieux, car au lieu de realiser sa negativite comme mouvement vivant, il con<;oit son aneantissement d'une maniere substantielle; il veut n'etre den et ce neant qu'il reve est encore une sorte d'etre, exactement l'antithese hegelienne de l'etre, un donne immobile." de Beauvoir, ibid., p. 75. 377"Mais dans la mesure ou cette tentative participe encore de l'espdt de sedeux et ou ils peuvent croire encore que leur mission de faire exister l'en-soipour-soi est ecrite dans les choses, ils sont condamnes au desespoir, car ils decouvrent en meme temps que toutes les activites humaines sont equivalentescar elles tendent toutes a sacrifier l'homme pour faire surgir la cause de soiet que toutes sont vouees par principe a l'echec." Sartre, L'etre et Ie neant, p. 72l.

.

878There are authors who see an indication of God in Heidegger's notion of being. Cf. e.g., F. de Graaff, Het schuldprobleem in de existentie-philosophie'Van Martin Heidegger, 'sGravenhage, n.d. pp. 49-53.

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According to Sartre and his followers, despair betrays that man secretly continues to dream of the Absolute within the realm of worldly being. We must point out, however, that when this dream comes to an end, a new dream begins. What we mean is that when the Absolute is denied for the sake of freedom as a transcendent movement, freedom itself emerges as the Absolute. Man is freedom, because no reality is worth his definitive consent: any definitive consent is the death of man's being. But in Sartre and his followers it is freedom itself which has to be definitively and unreservedly affirmed. Freedom itself appears as the Absolute. Thus we meet here with a contradiction.

Heidegger's Philosophy is Not Nihilistic. Is, then, our only choice one between contradiction and despair? Certainly not. In Heidegger also the dread which motivates despair is not the last word. Just as it is unjustifiable to say that Descartes' philosophy is a philosophy of doubt, so also there is no justification for saying that Heidegger's philosophy is a philosophy of dread. It may be difficult to see this for one who limits his reading to S ein und Zeit. But even if one puts full emphasis on "resolve" as the explicitation of the most proper and most authentic mode of beingman, understood as being-in-the-world, one may not present Heidegger's philosophy as nihilism. The reason is that there is no justification for claiming that in Heidegger being-man and being-inthe-world are synonymous. Only insofar as being-man is beingin-the-world, being-man, according to Heidegger, is null because it is toward-death. The reader of Sein und Zeit must keep in mind that at the beginning of his work Heidegger does not describe man as openness to the world but as openness to being. Man is the being which in its being is concerned with its being, and the question about being-in-general is a mode of being-man. Everything depends, therefore, on the question whether this being-in-general, which is what all the questions aim at, for which man is openness, and to which he is related, is identical with the world in Heidegger's thought. We are not able and do not intend to tackle his question exegetically.379 Perhaps it cannot even be solved so long as 379Cf. J. Moller, Existenzialphilosophif und katholische Theologie, BadenBaden, 1952, pp. 112-144.

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Heidegger himself does not make clear what he means by being.380 But it is certain that he has not yet expressed himself clearly enough to allow anyone to identify being and the world. Noone, therefore, has the right to consider the terms being-man and being-in-theworld synonymous in Heidegger's philosophy. Otherwise there would be no room for an affirmation of God. But Heidegger himself has declared that the explicitation of being-man as being-in-the-world decides neither positively nor negatively about a being-toward-God.381 Moreover, it should be kept in mind that whatever Heidegger says about dread and the nothingness revealing itself in dread is related to the question regarding the meaning of being. Heidegger's thinking speaks only about man as a road to being. What he says really becomes a road to the concept of being only when a total view of man is given. Dread, the revelation of nothingness, is Heidegger's approach to this total view. True, in Sein und Zeit he does not make the passage from dread and nothingness to being, but in later works it becomes clear that dread and nothingness are not Heidegger's last words on this question. 382 While the thought of Sartre and his followers has reached its term and is contradictory, Heidegger's philosophy is not yet completed and leaves open the road to the affirmation of the Absolute. 383

Is All Non-Dread Being Unauthentic? With respect to Heidegger's "road" to being, a final question must be raised. Is dread really the gate to a total vision of manhood as being-in-theworld? Are there no other experiences, distinct from dread, which open up a view of the world-as-world and of being-in-the-world as such? Heidegger's own reply would be in the negative. No 880Cf. W. Biemel, Le concept de Monde chez Heidegger, Louvain-Paris, 1950, pp. 172-178. 381"Durch die ontologische Interpretation des Daseins als In-der-We1t-sein ist weder positiv noch negativ iiber ein miigliches Sein zu Gott entschieden. Wohl aber wird durch die Erhellung der Transzendenz allereerst ein zureichender Begriff des Daseins gewonnen, mit Riicksicht auf welches Seiende nunmehr gefragt werden kann, wie es mit dem Gottesverhiiltnis des Daseins ontologisch bestellt ist." Heidegger, Vom Wesen des Grundes, p. 36, note 56. 382"Die rechte Stellungnahme zu diesen Siitzen [ie., the objections which opponents have raised against Was ist Metaphysikf] entspringt aus einen erneuten Durchdenken der Vorlesung. Es mag priifen, ob das Nichts, das die Angst in ihr Wesen stimmt, sich bei einer leeren Verneinung alles Seienden erschiipft, oder ob, was nie und nirgends ein Seiends ist, sich entschleiert als das von allem Seienden Sichunterscheidende, das wir dil.s Sein nennen." Heidegger, Was ist M etaphysik f Nachwort, L>, 45. 383For a simple explanation of this point see Delfgaauw, What is existentialismef, Amsterdam, 1952, pp. 74-81.

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other answer could be expected from him, because his own view of dread forces him to relegate whatever is not dread to the domain of "falling-away," of unauthentically being-man. The fact that dread is such a rare phenomenon does not trouble him in his efforts to build a metaphysics of man. On the contrary, it strengthens him in his views, because the rarity of dread demonstrates how man has always been submerged in what Pascal calls "diversion," and in this submergence the recognition of man's authentic being as dread is supposed to be implied. If, then, anyone would remark that he is not at all aware of dread in the Heideggerian sense, the German philosopher would reply: "That only proves that you have never yet been man."384 A very simple answer, of course, but it presupposes precisely what has to be proved-namely, that whatever is not dread pertains to "falling away." Is, then, the resolve to which Heidegger "concludes," if we may use this term, not really a prejudice which he wants to "prove" at any price? Is not his thinking merely a circular form of reasoning in which a certain type of authenticity is first presupposed and next "concluded" to? Heidegger himself has raised these questions 385 and replied to them without hesitation. 386 It is readily to be admitted that a certain form of authenticity is presupposed and it is quite obvious that the process of thought has a circular form. One must even say that everything is presupposed which a philosopher conceptualizes and expresses about man's being. The philosopher, however, does not have to apologize for it, he does not have to avoid it, as a logician would be obliged to do when he uses a syllogism. s87 Man is the being which in its being is concerned with its being, man's being is an understanding of being (Seinsverstiindnis) , and for this reason man is always to a certain extent "already" unconcealed for himself ;388 hence every explicit question regarding man's being is "already" prepared by man's mode of being

384Cf. R. Verneaux, "L'experience humaine et Ie Tout Ie monde," Actes du XIeme Congres International de Philosophie, Amsterdam-Louvain, 1953, vol. II, p. 173.

385"Aber liegt der durchgefiihrten ontologischen Interpretation der Existenz des Daseins nicht eine bestimmte ontische Auffassung von eigentlicher Existenz, ein faktisches Ideal des Daseins zugrunde?" Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 310. 386Heidegger, ibid., pp. 310-316. . 387Heidegger, ibid., p. 315. 388"Die forma Ie Anzeige der Existenzidee war geleitet von dem im Dasein selbst liegenden Seinsverstandnis." Heidegger, ibid., p. 132.

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itself, and the reply also is always to a certain extent "already" given. s89 But in his "understanding" (V erstehen) man is unconcealed for himself as potential being i.e., ultimately, as being-toward-death. What higher possibility could there be in man's potentiality than that of death ?S90 The so-called presuppositions in the philosophy of man are nothing else than man himself as understanding of being, and the so-called circular form of reasoning is nothing else than man himself again insofar as in his "understanding" he is unconcealed for himself with respect to his most proper potential being, i.e., his being-towarddeath. Anyone who tries to avoid this "circular form of reasoning" really attempts to set aside the fundamental structure of man as "care." But such an attempt cannot succeed. Accordingly, if from a pre-ontological awareness of the most proper mode of potential being one "concludes" that "resolve" is man's authentic being, he does not make himself guilty of a circular argument, in the sense in which such an argument must be rejected by the logician, but he simply gives expression to what man is and has to be. sn Dread is Not the Approach par Excellence to the Total Vision of Man. It is on the basis of this pre-ontological awareness, mentioned by Heidegger, which man has of himself that we refuse to see in dread the gate par excellence to an integral vision of man. Heidegger's view is very one-sided, because in his philosophy there is no room for something which lies unconcealed in man's pre-ontological self-awareness-namely, that existence always implies a kind of qualified consent. If Heidegger were fully right, man's being would have to be explicitated as a curse and there would be no r:oom for the experience of the same being of man as a grace, as a gift.892 This experience cannot be disposed of and disregarded. The "resolve," however, in which Heidegger sees the authenticity of man's being does not offer any possibility of a qualified consent-to-the-world. Moreover, an effort to make this consent fall under "falling-away" is doomed to failure, because in Heidegger "falling-away" occurs as a being-absorbed in the world. Heidegger is right when he rejects man's unauthenticity, as are Sartre and those of a kindred spirit when 389"Jede ontologisch ausdriickliche Frage nach d'em Sein des Daseins ist durch die Seinsart des Daseins schon vorbereitet." Heidegger, ibid., p. 132, s90"Hat das in-der-W elt-sein eine hahere Instanz seines Seinkannens als seinen Tod?" Heidegger, ibid., p. 313. 391Heidegger, ibid., pp. 314-316. S92Marcel, L'homme problematique, Paris, 1955, pp. 9-47.

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they speak of the "grave" man and the sub-man. Such a man misjudges his manhood, because he destroys the affective distance which bores into his affirmation of any worldly being whatsoever, and this destruction is the end of freedom as transcendent movement. It is, however, intentionally that we speak of a qualified consent and not of wonder (Cmerveillement), as is done by Vemeaux. 393 For we are aware of it that no worldly reality is worth a definitive consent and that no worldly value can be the definitive fulfilment of manhood as having to be. On the other hand, we may not deny all fulfilment and every consent. Heidegger and Sartre with his followers constantly point out that unauthenticity cannot be "lived," because it constantly denies itself in life,894 while authenticity keeps imposing itself as a demand. The same, however, has to be asserted with respect to Heidegger's "resolve." The resolve cannot be "lived," not even by Heidegger himself, because life itself constantly denies the resolve. And what else has a philosopher to do than to give expression to life? But life implies a qualified consent to the world. The things of the world are worth such a consent, because they offer man a real, albeit not definitive, fulfilment of his being as having to be. But, Heidegger asks, "is there in man's potential being any higher possibility than his death ?"895 The reply is in the negative. Does this mean that the world-as-world and being-in-the-world-as-such are radically null? Let us point out that the matter can be turned around. Man's being as being-in-the-world includes essentially an aspect of affirmation. Could death really be the highest possibility of his potential being, in view of the fact that in this supposition it is impossible to maintain the affirmation in question despite all its evidence? New perspectives suddenly arise here, which Heidegger failed to consider. Thus we are forced to conclude that Heidegger's description of man cannot be considered as the explicitation of man in an unqualified sense. 396 We do not mean that there are no human beings whom Heidegger's description fits. But it is certain that they misjudge the true character of their own manhood, because they have no eye for the affirmative aspect of their existence. With respect to them 393R. Verneaux, op. cit., p. 173. 394Cf., e.g., de Beauvoir, op. cit. (footnote 374) pp. 72-94. 395Heidegger, ibid., p. 313. 396Cf. A. de Waelhens, La philosophie de Ma,.tin Heidegge,., Louvain, 1948, pp. 179-180. -

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one can ask at most what the cause or the occasion was which made them be or become as they are. If, however, such a question is asked, we are no longer in the realm of philosophy and have to leave the reply to psychologists, characterologists, or psychiatrists. 397 One could also point to the spirit of the time and, as far as Heidegger is concerned, to the fact that during World War I he experienced the horrors of life in the trenches. 398 This experience was for him a very special revelation of man's being.

A Psychological Factor. If a psychological explanation is sought for the fact that in some human beings the affirmative aspect of their existence has been pushed completely into the background, a certain statement of St. Augustine may bring some light. In his letter to Proba, he writes: UNit homini amicum sine homine amico," nothing is lovable for a human being without a loving human being, which we may perhaps paraphrase more clearly in this way: without the love of his fellow-man, man is not capable of affectively affirming the real world. This truth has been definitely established by empirical psychology. One who is unloved always sees the harshest face of the world: the world appears to him always as resistance, as an obstacle for his having-to-be. The more a man stands alone, i.e., unloved, in the world, the more difficult it is for him to realize himself in the world and to-consent to his own being.a99 Is it a mere coincidence that love finds no place in Heidegger's works? In dread man's most proper possibility reveals itself, for in dread man stands alone, isolated, before the extreme possibility of his potential being, in dread man is eminently an "I."400 This revelation calls upon man to make the only proper reply-namely, "resolve," a radical "no" to the world. But we know that there is more in man than this dread. His authentic being-himself is not the lonely, isolated, doomed-to-death being-in-the-world, but being-together with his fellow-men in love. In love the world shows man a face that is entirely different from the one described by Heidegger, What Heidegger says may be true of the unloved, "barracks-type of man" (Marcel), but one who loves cannot speak in his way. Man cannot 897Cf. R. Le Senne, Trait; de Caracterologie, Paris, 1949, pp. 258, 288. 398Cf. R. Troisfontaines, Existentialisme et pensee chretienne, Louvain-Paris, 1948, pp. 14-16. 8D9Cf. John Bowlby, Child Care and the Growth of lAue, London, 1953. 400"So sich bevorstehend sind in ihm aile Beziige zu anderem Dasein geliist. ... So enthiillt sich der Tod als die eigenste, unbeziigliche, uniiberholbare Miiglichkeit." Heid'egger, ibid., p. 250.

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live without being loved but, on the other hand, neither can he die without love. Whoever faces death alone, isolated, will curse the world-as-world and being-in-the-world-as-such. But such a man is a mutilated human being. 5.

PERSPECTIVES

Transcendent Cause. "Why is there something and why is there not rather nothing?" Following an age-old tradition, we have raised this question in our first chapter. It is the philosophical question par excellence, the metaphysical question. We conceived this question as the search for the ground, the cause, of being as being, and found as our first reply that the being of beings is the being-result of the causality of the Transcendent Being, of God. No being escapes from God's causality, not even the conscious and free being which is man. 401 Undoubtedly, man is a co-source of the world's meaning, but as such he is the "second source": through his actions man co-originates new meanings, but his initiative is a "produced initiative." With man the world begins to be in the real sense of the term, but the beginning-of-the-world which man is, is a "begun beginning."402 God is the Lord of beings in their universality. Cause and Freedom. The first chapter formulated the difficulties which arise from this thought. How can the being of man be caused by God if his being is a being-free and if God's causal influence cannot be contingent? God's causal influence may not be explicitated ill such a way that the free-being which man is can no longer be conceived as a possibility. Metaphysics must be based on the reality of beings. But the being of man cannot possibly be conceived as beingfree if God's causal influence is conceived analogously to the causality prevailing in the realm of things. A causal influence that is conceived in a thing-like or process-like way would crush man as freedom. Instead of borrowing the categories of our thinking about God from the realm of things, we must derive them from the order of intersub401"Sind wir unserer Freiheit gewiss, so wird alsbald ein zweiter Schritt zu unserer Selbsterfassung getan: der Menschist das gottbezogene Wesen. Was heisst das? Wir haben uns nicht se1bst geschaffen. Jeder kann von sich denken es sei !lloglich gewesen, dass er nicht sei. ... Wenn wir frei entscheiden und erfiillt vom Sinn unser Leben ergreifen, so sind wir uns bewusst, uns nicht uns se1bst zu verdanken. Auf der Hohe der Freiheit ... sind wir in unserer Freiheit als uns von der Transcendenz gegeben bewusst. Je mehr der Mensch eigentlich frei ist, desto gewisser ist ihm Gott." Karl Jaspers, Einfuhrung in die Philosophie, Miinchen, 1957, p. 63. . 402Brunner, La personne incarnee, p. 230.

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jectivity. In this order we know a single case in which true "causal influence" has as "effect" subjectivity, freedom. It is the case of the creative "influence" of love. Man does not conceive himself as reality unless he conceives himself as the result of divine Love. Contrary to Sartre's claim, man's freedom does not mean that man does not belong to God. For Sartre God is not the King of Mankind because man is free. As far as things are concerned, God could perhaps exercise his dominium, but if He had wanted to do the same over man, He should not have created him free. The very moment when God created man as a free being, this freedom turned against Him. As freedom, man does not belong to God, so that there is no one to give any orders to man. This Sartrian thought is very primitive. Evidently, God's kingship over man must be totally different from God's power over things. But does this difference mean that God is not the King of man? It is evident also that things "belong" to and "receive orders" from God-if these terms may still be used-in a way which is entirely different from that .of man. But must we admit, therefore, that man does not belong t.o God and d.oes not receive any orders from Him? Sartre is not capable .of conceiving the relationship of God t.o man in any .other way than the relati.on to a thing. But he is mistaken: man belongs to God in the way a subject belongs toO God.

Man's Self-Consent. Everything is put into question when we ask about the cause of being as being.403 This applies in a very special way to man. Because man is a being which in its being is concerned with its being, man asks questions not only about the "whence" of his being but also about its "whither." Man is concerned with the "direction" of his existence. The "room for expansion" of the potentiality which is inherent in any facticitous way of existing indicates the "direction" which the subject can go. Man seeks the roads through the world which will make it possible for him to consent to himself as subjectivity-in-the-world. This consent stands in relation to the fulfilment found by his subjectivity, conceived as "natural desire." As being-conscious-in-the-world, man enters into the realms of technology, economics, art, and science, to name only a few. He experiences his entrance into these realms as meaningful to the extent that his activities in them imply a certain fulfilment with respect to his various modes of having-to-be. Thus he can consent to himself as a technologist, an economist, etc. 403Cf. Heidegger, Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik, p. 22.

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Nevertheless, the being which man is remains in a state of suspense. With Sartre and his school we stated that man's consent to himself as well as to his world cannot be definitive. This consent is affected by negativity in an invincible way. To deny this point is to misjudge the essence of man's being. Anyone who continues to foster illusions will find his last prop removed by Heidegger's philosophy of being-toward-death. For being-man, as being-in-theworld, death is the supreme and most decisive court of appeal. If man's being is nothing else than being-in-the-world, it is impossible to see how anyone could consent to himself unless he minimizes the meaning of death. One who sees nothing else in man than the beingin-the-world which he also is may at most say that man's greatness consists in this that he is aware of the meaninglessness of his being, for this is something which cannot be asserted of an animal. Man's being is put into a state of suspense in the most horrible way through its explicitation as being-toward-death. Seeking the ground of his being, man seeks not only his origin but also his purpose. There are many human goals, corresponding to the many possible modes of having-to-be-in-the-world. But not a single one of all these goals constitutes the proper purpose of man as "natural desire." The self-grounding project which man is and which is executed in his transcendence fails radically if it is conceived exclusively as a project-in-the-world. The "natural desire" which man is, however, must be understood as man's orientation to Transcendent Being, an orientation which is essential in man. Man does not have the desire to be God but to see God.

The Affirmation of God. For the man who understands this point the self-grounding project which he is appears in an entirely new light. Is it possible for man to consent to his existence on the basis of his affirmation of Transcendent Being? But, we must ask, what is this affirmation? Is it the one that is effected in the proof of God? At the end of the first chapter we pointed out that man does not exactly know what he affirms when he affirms Transcendent Beirig. Nevertheless, this Being must be affirmed, for otherwise no affirmation of anything is possible. Without the Transcendent Being nothing is. But there is something, there are beings, the universe is. Not everyone can be convinced that there is a Transcendent Being. The affirmation of God, prepared and made on the purely cognitive level in the proof of God, remains an idle playing with words for the

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non-religious man. The entirely new light in which the question about the possibility of consenting to life is placed by the recognition of the Transcendent Being is not the light of the affirmation of God in and through the proof of God. The affirmation of God, prepared and made on the purely cognitive level in the proof of God, itself presupposes a preparation and practice on the affective level. The purely rational proof presupposes a disposition of an affective nature, through which man detaches himself from the world and does not belong to it in a "carnal" way. The decision to become detached in this way is not an irrational decision but rather based on the rational recognition of man's most intimate essence: man is not destined-only-for-the-world. Only if this recognition is made, will there be a possibility that the Transcendent Being will really become a light. If in the proof of God man's thinking endeavors to transcend beings to attain to Being, the success of this endeavor presupposes a way of life in which this transcendence of beings is affectively executed. If life itself is not a preparation for, and the execution of the affirmation of God, then there is no possibility whatsoever that God will be affirmed in a way which has real meaning for man's life.

Transcendent Being and the World. It is undeniably true that "modern" man becomes increasingly absorbed in hedonism and utilitarianism. 404 To the extent that he falls victim to these trends, he is a mutilated human being. The world is like opium for the recognition of his most intimate essence. Nevertheless, to some extent the tide is on the turn, as appears from the fact that man no longer tries to camouflage his "sadness," even though he may not yet have found the courage to give up the attitude of life which has caused this "sadness." The philosophers, however, are far ahead of their fellow men, for they have long since given up faith in reality that is solely of this world. Accordingly, Transcendent Being can become reality for man only when the things of the world begin to mean less in his life. The man of real wisdom is aware of this. He manages to maintain himself when the world fails him.405 Heroes and saints revealed their true 404Cf. M. Sciacca, Le probteme de Dieu et de la religion dans la philosophie contemporaine, Paris, 1950. p. 261.

405"ln der Hingabe an Realitat in der Welt-das unerlassliche medium der Hingabe an Gott-wachst das Selbstsein, das sich zugleich in dem behauptet, an das es sich hingibt. Wenn aber alles Dasein eingeschmolzen wurde in die Realitat, in Familie, Volk, Beruf, Statt, in die Welt. und wenn dann die Realitat dieser Welt versagt, dann wird die Verzweiflung des Nichts nur dadurch besiegt, d"ass auch gegen alles bestimmte Weltsein die entscheidende Selbst-

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greatness in such conditions. They renounced their worldly future and their possessions and did not allow the most horrible possibilities to defeat them. They died in peace. 406 The fascination of the world has to be broken. Detaching himself from this world may be experienced by man as entering into a dark night, but it is only by entering the nothing-of-the-world that it is possible for man to enter into the "light of Being." A metaphysics which is true to life demands a metaphysical life. Only then will we have to do with a real question when it is asked whether it is possible to consent to life on the basis of the affirmation of Transcendent Being.

H ope or Despair'! This question allows also a different formulation: Is there any hope for man? So long as being-man is understood as absorption in being-in-the-world, so long as his destiny is sought solely in the possession of the world, there is no hope for man. Hope finds its source not in being-in-the-world but in the beingin-the-world-but-transcending-it (in-der-W elt-uber-die-Welt-hinaussein .. Binswanger) which is real in love. When we spoke about the possibility of an unselfish love, we pointed out the paradoxical character of human subjectivity. Love is the availability of my subjectivity for the other, the belonging to the other. But in the surrender of myself my own selfhood is revealed to me. In love I have the vague awareness that by destining myself for the other I authentically become myself, I go forward to meet my own destiny. My having-to-be as a task in the world finds a certain fulfilment in the world. But there can be no question of a definitive fulfilment of my having-to-be, and in the light of death it is even questionable whether the term "fulfilment" is still meaningful. As soon, however, as I see that my having-to-be must be understood as a having-to-be-for-the-other and I effectively undertake the execution of this task, everything becomes different. Even if I have never heard about a doctrine regarding man's destiny, I experience in love that I am on the road to the fulfilment of my manhood as having-to-be. I can say "yes" to it. We say "I am on the road ..." I cannot say "yes" definitively. True, there lies something of eternity in love, but only as a promise. Moreover, who will guarantee love to me? Do I not daily experience behaugtung vollzogen wurde, die allein vor Gott steht und aus Gott ist. Erst in der Hingabe an Gatt, nicht an die Welt, wird dieses Selbstein seiber hingegeben und als Freiheit empfangen, es in der Welt zu behaupten." Jaspers, op. cit., pp. 81-82. 4oaCf. Jaspers, op. cit., p. 63.

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that I betray the other and that the other is unfaithful to me? Is, then, the last word that I can say as a philosopher still "despair"? How could I consent to my existence if this existence is a task which I would not be able to accomplish anyhow? Nevertheless, despair is not the last word. First of all, the realization that in love I am meaningfully man cannot be simply pushed aside, and love also is a reality in my life. Secondly, love gives rise in me to a kind of awareness of orientation, a consciousness of the "direction" which I myself am in my most intimate essence and which I must follow if I want to expect to be capable of consenting definitively to my existence. If I could believe in an Absolute Thou (Mareel), a Being in whom unfaithfulness and betrayal are impossible, if I could believe in this Being's Love for me and if I would be permitted to love this Being, then I would be able definitively to consent to myself. This awareness of orientation IS called "hope": it is the belief in Love. The man who I am is directedness to Transcendent Being, the hope in God. I may say also with Marcel that I am "invocation": my whole being is a calling-for-God. God has heard this "call" which man is and has entered history. He has made His Word speak toman. He has spoken about Himself and about man. If this is true,. then all that we have said here will be unimportant. Man's thinking has to begin all over again.

INDEX OF NAMES AndronicuB of Rhodes, 54 f., 171. Aristotle, 54 f., 57, 65, 170 f. Arntz, A., 200. Augustine, St., 74, 230, 260, 313, 349. Averroes, 114. Avicenna, 114. Bacon, Francis, 172. Beerling, R, 233, 235, 248 f. Bergson, Henri, 34, 234, 255. Biemel, W., 345. Bigot, L., 97, 154. Binswanger, L., 156 f., 179, 223 f. Blondel, Maurice, 149. Boethius, 170, 269. Bohr, Niels, 23. Bowlby, John, 349. Boyer, Charles, 117, 138, 147. Brentano, Franz, 93. Bronkhorst, c., 237. Brunner, A., 72, 78, 158, 305, 350. Brunschvicq, 34, 126, 150. Buehler, 130. Busmann, Star, 235. Buytendijk, F., 23, 41. 118, 153, 155 ff., 208, 227. Camus, 52, 261. Capreolus, Johannes. 117. Cassirer, Ernst, 133. C1aparede, 101. Claudel, Paul, 97. Collins, James, 1. Copernicus, 133. Copleston, Frederick, I, 82. Couwenberg, S., 212. De Beauvoir, Simone, 270, 272, 324, 326 f., 343, 348. De Bruin, P., 43 f. De Bivort, de la Saudee Jacques, 8, 35. De Graaff, F., 343. De Greeff, E., 227. Deledalle, G., 113. Delesalle, J., 240. Delfgaauw, B., 106, 276, 314, 345. De Lubac, 72. De Petter, D. M., 115, 145,266,268 f., 297 f.

De Raeymaeker, Louis, 55, 113, 262, 269. Descartes, Rene, 34, 45, 78, 79 ff., 85 f., 89, 131 f., 151, 161, 181 ff., 186, 191, 201. De Waehlens, Alphons, passim. Dilthey, W., 185. Dondeyne, Albert, passim. Dumas, G., 183. Duynstee, W., 238, 249, 254. Fortmann, H., 287. Foulquie, P., 96, 113. Freud, Sigmund, 167 f., 301 f. Froebes, J., 102. Galton, 129. Geiger, L. B., 124. Gits, Carlos, 232, 235 ff., 245, 248 ff., 256. Gregoire, Fr., 122. Hamaker, H., 235, 237. Hegel, Georg, 34, 85, 151, 279, 304. Heidegger, Martin, passim. Heisenberg, Werner, 23. Herbart, 127. Hobbes, 244. Hoogveld, J., 93, 236. Humanus, 295. Hume, David, 131 ff., 136. Husserl, Edmund, passim. Janssens, L., 244, 246, 258, 288. J aspers, Karl, passim. J eanson, Fr., 290, 293 f., 324, 329. Jolivet, R, 54, 66, 68, 70, 115, 129, 146, 161, 170. J iinger, Ernst, 52. Kant, Immanuel, 67, 94, 132 f., 171, 281. Kierkegaard, Soren, 1, 35, 36, 122, 149. Kohnstamm, Ph., 97, 154. Kouwer, B., 154, 155. Krabbe, H., 236. Kranenburg, R, 232 ff. Kiilpe, 130. Kwant, Remy c.. 13, 23, 33, 37, 44, 45, 122, 147, 153, 167, 226, 234, 237, 253, 284, 297, 306, 313, 315, 324.

356

Index of Names Lacroix, Jean, 42 f., 45 f., 176, 240, 249, 252, 256 f., 281 f., 291 f. Lalande, 33. Langemeyer, G., 234. Laplace, Abbe, 30. Laporte, J., 150. Leibniz, G., 53. Le Roy, Ed., 17. Le Senne, 16, 349. Levinas, E., 42 f. Linschoten, J., 154, ISS, 181. Locke, John, 83 f., 87. Madinier, G., 220 f., 230 f., 233, 239, 244, 249 f., 252 f., 287. Maine de Biran, 34. Mandonnet, 117. Marbe, 130. Marc, Andre, 126, 128, 130. Marcel, Gabriel, passim. Maritain, Jacques, 121, 127, 138. Marx, Karl, 45, 325. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, passim. Messer, 130. Molengraaf, 235. Moller, J., 344. Mounier, Emmanuel, 1, 191, 200. Nedoncelle, M., 193, 213, 218, 229, 239, 250, 252, 259. Newman, Card., 149. Nietzsche, Friedrich, 72, 326. Nuttin, J., 168, 230, 301, 303 ff. Onclin, W., 232. Paissac, H., 109, 316. Palland, B., 97, 154. Parmenides, 55 ff., 59 f. Pascal, Blaise, 67, 149 f. Perquin, N., 282. Peters, John, 159, 262. Piaget, 138. Picard, Max, 230. Pieper, Josef, 13, 193, 211 f. Plat, J., 10. Plato, 60, 121. Proudhon, 42, 45. Puchta, 234. Ramltonnet, H., 234. Reinhardt, Kurt, 1.

357

Renouvier, 231. Ricoeur, Paul, I, 122. Robert, H., 268. Roels, F., 130, 183. Rogers, Carl, 230. Riimke, H., 35, 181. Rutten, F., 193. Saint-Simon, 45. Sartre, Jean-Paul, passim. Sassen, F., 93. Scheler, Max, 149, 185. Sciacca, M., 73, 353. Secretan, 231. Sertillanges, A. D., 129. Simmel, 185. Siwek, Paul, 118. Socrates, 60. Stein, Edith, 123. Strasser, Stefan, 79, 114 ff., 188. Stuart Mill, John, 172. Tellegen, F., 42 f. Thevenaz, P., 95. Thibon, G., 229. Thomas Aquinas, 55, 62, 65, 113, 115 f., 119 ff., 124, 127, 129, 139, 142, 145, 169 f., 238 f., 299, 300 Thonnard, F., 57, 121, 131. Troisfontaines, R., 49, 319, 349. Van Boxtel, J.. 252. Van Breda, Herman Leo, 2, 12. Van Dael, J., 87. Van de Hulst, H., 24. Van den Berg, T.. 119, 144, 171, 173, 181, 227. Van den Berk, J.. 153, 167. Van Lennep, D. J., 157. Van Peursen, c., 24, 51, 116. Van Riet, G., 9. 11, 124 f., 145. Van Steenberghen, Fernand, 125. Verbeke, G., 12, 13, 52 f. Verneaux, R., 314, 346, 348. Vietta, Egon, 330. Von Hildebrand, Dietrich, 255. Von Savigny, 234. Von Weissa.cker, 23. Wahl, Jean, 1. Watson, J., 184. Wylleman, A., 257 f., 263.

INDEX OF SUBJECT MATTER Absence, as presence, 201 f.; from the other, 218 f. Absolute, truth, 163 f.; the essence of the, 327 £I. Abstraction, concreteness and, 103 f.; divides, 125 f.; unifies, 126 f. Abstractness of concepts, 124 £I. Act, retroverting, 114 £I. Action, norm of human, 286 f.; human, is not a process, 294 f.; facticity and human, 295 f.; animal and human, 302 £I. Active leaning, love as, 215 £I. Affection, encounter and, 211 £I.; as reply to appeal, 218 f. See also Love. Alone, I am not, 226 £I., see also CoExistence; dread and being, 349 f. Ambiguity, 6, 332. Analogy, reasoning by, 181 £I. Anonymous everybody, 331 £I. Anthropology, philosophy of law and, 237 f. Antonomies of knowledge, 129 £I. Appeal, the other's, 215 £I. Atheism, Sartre's, 313 £I. Attitude, 156; world and man's, 31 £I. Authenticity, of philosophy, 4 £I., 24 f.; of human life and legal order, 252 £I.; of being toward death, 339 £I.; dread and, 345 £I. See also Man. Authority, required by justice, 248; demands power, 248 f. Autonomy, freedom and, 268 f., 297 f.; of freedom and God, 316 £I. To Be, Transcendent, 64 £I., 353 £I.; making the other, 225 f. Being, in the world, 15 £I., 344 £I.; "at" the world, 39 £I.; mystery of, 53 f., 58; as being, 55 £I.; multiplicity and, 59 £I.; ground of, 62 £I.; "in itself" and "for itself," 104 £I., 297 f., 319 f.; consciousness and, 115 £I. ; beingfor-me, 134 £I.; of a thing, 266 f.; man's concern with his, 272 f.; Transcendent, 328 £I.; toward death, 330 £I. ; the world and Transcendent, 353 f.; man's, as bound by objectivity, 284 f. See also MUll.

Body, my, 21 £I.; as intermediary, 180 £I.; my body is not a, 186 £I.; physiology and my, 187; is not a mere instrument, 187 f.; I do not have my, 188 i is not isolated from me, 188 f.; the other's, 225 f.; as intermediary in encounter, 189 £I.; or of concealedness, 190 f. Cause, being and, 62 £I.; love and, 228 f.; transcendent, 350; freedom and 350 f. ' Choice, facticity and, 299 f. Co-Existence, 175 £I., 191 f.; levels of, 193 £I. Concept, 120 £I.; immutable, 121 f.; abstract, 124 £I.; not schematic image, 128 £I.; empiricists and abstract, 129 £I.; universal, 137 £I. Concreteness, abstractions and, 103 £I. Conscience,287 £I.; no isolated, 292 f.; being toward death and, 340 f.; guilt and, 341 f. Consciousness, 19 f.; closed, 33, 92, 103; man's being and, 38; in the world, 50; prereflective and reflective, 74 £I.; idealism, empiricism and, 84 £I.; reality and, 93 f.; not purely passive, 95 f.; as "for itself," 104 £I. ; as nihilation, 105 £I.; nothingness and, 106 f.; spatial and temporal conditions of, 118 f. See also Sel/Consciousness, Intentionality, PourSoi, Reality, World. Consent, to zu sein, 264 f.; to self, 270 f.

Copula, verbal, "is," 141 f. Creativity of love, 223 £I., 230 f. Criterion of truth, 82 £I., 158 £I. Dasein, 19, 278 f. See also, Being, in the world, Existence, Man. Death, 205 f.; being toward, 330 £I.; man's fundamental structure and, 336 £I.; authentic being toward, 339 f.

DedllCtion, 171 f. Descartes, on knowledge, 79 £I., 151; heritage of, 181 £I. Desire, man as natural, 274 f. Despair, hope or, 354 f.

358

Index of Subject Matter Destiny, phenomenology of freedom as, 260 if. Dialogue, 37, 168, 192. Disinterestedness of love, 221. Distance, consciousness and, 105 f.; freedom as, 269 if.; situated freedom and, 273 f. Doubt, Cartesian, 79 if. Dread, 332 if.; being toward death and, 334 if.; authentic being and, 345 if. Dualism, Sartre's, 103 if.; Descartes', 79 if., 181 if., 186 f. Einfiihlung, 181, 185. Empiricism, 84 if.; experience and, 87 if.; object and, 99 f.; subject and, 100 f.; and abstract concepts, 129 if. Encounter, 36 f., 97, 191 f., 207 f.; with other, 185 f., 207 if., 213 f.; and making the other be, 226 f. En-Soi, 104 if. Essence, existence and, 24 f.; phenomenology and, 122 f.; existence precedes, 296 if.; of absolute, 227 if. Ethical, freedom and being, 281 if.; bonds and freedom, 281 f., 284 f. Evidence, as criterion of truth, 165 if.; fruitfulness as, 166 if. To Exist, is to be man, 14 if.; is existentiale, 25; is to co-exist, 176 if. See also Existence, Man, Being, To Be. Existence, as being-in-the-world, 15 if.; science and, 23 f.; essence and, 24 f.; world and, 25 if.; as primitive fact of existential phenomenology, 35 f.; as being "at" the world, 39 if.; as logos, natural light, and agent intellect, 143 if.; as truth, 143 f.; precedes essence, 296 if.; as temporality, 309 f.; as place of time, 311. See also To Exist, Man, Being, To Be, World. Existentialism, phenomenology and, 1; essence and, 24 f.; legalism and atheistic, 282 f.; its deficiency, 283 f.; atheistic, 313 if.; two wings of, 314 f.; primitive fact of, 314. Existential phenomenology, 1 if.; primitive fact of, 34 if. See also Existentialism, Phenomenology. Experience, philosophy and, 6 f.; empiricism and, 87 if. Facticity, 40 if., 116; potentiality and, 157 f., 241 if., 275 f.; value of moral,

359

291 f.; and human action, 295 f.; choice and, 299 f. Faith, the bad faith of the "grave" man, 324 if. Falling away, 331 if. Fear, dread and, 333 if. Freedom, God and man's, 71 if., 316 if.; stare and, 198 f.; love as appeal to the other's, 222 f.; love and, 230 f.; phenomenology of, 260 if., 265 if.; subject and, 266 if.; as distance, having to be, and project, 269 if.; no absolute, 269 f.; situated, 273 f., 300 f.; as proj ect, 277 if.; as being ethical, 281 if.; as transcendence, 294 if.; as task, 305; as history, 305 if.; cause and, 350 if. Freudianism, 167 f., 301 if. Fr14itfulness as criterion of truth, 166 if. Future, 310 f. Geworfenheit, 314 if. Give1lness of natural law, 254 f. God, existentialism and, 38 f.; transcendent "to be," 64 f.; proof of, 65 if.; man's freedom and, 71 if.; Descartes and, 82 f.; meaning of life and, 313 if.; denied by Sartre, 326 if.; affirmation of, 352 f. See also Transcendent. Happiness, love and, 219 f. Hatred, phenomenology of, 195 if. Having to Be, freedom as, 269 if.; and being able to be, 275 f.; and history, 312 f.; meaning of, 327 if. See also Zu Sein. He, meaning of, 209 if.; as absent from me, 210 if. H eidegger, critique of, 330 if., 344 if. Historicity, of truth, 145 f., 160 if. See also History. History, facticity and, 116; natural right and. 253 if.; and legal order, 256 if.; freedom as, 305 if.; temporality and, 311 f.; and having to be, 312 f. Horizon, 99 f. Hume, critique of, 131 if., 159 f. Ideal, law and the, of the human situation, 239 f. Idealism, 84 if., 131. Ideas, Descartes on, 80 if. See also Concept.

360

Index of Subject Matter

Immanence of knowledge, 103 ff., 112 ff. Impersonal "They," 41 f., 51 f. Induction, 172. Intellect, existence as agent, 143 ff. See also Consciousness, Concept, Judgment, Reasoning. Intentionality, 22, 92 ff. See also Consciousness. Intersubjectivity, phenomenology of, 175 ff.; Sartre on, 204 f.; of rights, 238; and God, 162, 317 ff.; of consciousness, 92 ff.; of truth, 10 f., 164 f. Irrationalism, 149 f. I"ejlechi, the, 76 ff., 92, 103 f., 111, 129. Judgment, 138 ff., why many, 140 f. Justice, law, right and, 231 ff., 238 f.; love and, 243 ff.; requires authority, 248. Kant, critique of, 132 f. Knowledge, phenomenology of, 74 ff., as explicitation, 77 ff.; critique on prejudices about, 89 ff.; immanence of, 103 ff., 112 ff.; subject of, 113 ff.; sensitive and spiritual, 117 ff. Labor, 39 ff.; being man and, 45 ff. Law, phenomenology of, 231 ff.; philosophy and sciences of, 233 ff.; origin of rights, 234 ff.; and legal institutions, 246 ff.; ethics and, 284 f.; insufficiency of general, 290 ff. Legal institutions, 246 ff. Legalism, morality and, 281 f.; atheistic existentialism and, 282 f. Legal order, 250 ff.; life and, 251 ff.; and histol"'y, 255 ff. Life, and legal order, 251 ff.; meaning of, 260 ff., 278 f.; God and meaning of, 313 ff., 319 ff., 342 ff. Light, existence as natural, 143 ff. Locke, critique of, 83 f. Logic, reasoning and, 169 ff., "lived," 172 f.; philosophy and, 173 f. Logos, XI, existence as, 143 ff. Love, as standpoint of subject, 155 f.; and knowledge of the personal, 156 ff.; phenomenology of, 214 ff.; happiness and, 219 f.; disinterestedness of, 221; self-realization and, 225 f.; as appeal to the other's freedom, 222 f.; creativity of, 223 ff.;

analysis of being loved, 229 f.; and justice, 243 ff.; minimum of, 244 f., 249 f.; modifies legal order, 258 f. Man, metaphysical being, 1 ff., 65 ff.; to exist is to be for, 14 ff.; being in the world, 15 ff., 344 ff.; being "at" the world, 39 ff.; self-realization of, 41 ff.; labor and being, 45 f.; co-existence as essential aspect of, 178 ff.; as project, 40 f., 241 f.; life of, 60 ff.; is not a thing, 267; is free, 267 ff.; concern with being, 272 f.; as natural desire, 274 f.; being-able characterizes, 276 f.; as project, 277 ff.; as self-project, 279 f.; as temporality, 306 f.; wants to be God, 321 ff.; the grave, 324 ff.; directed to transcendent, 329 f.; death and fundamental structure of, 336 f.; death and unauthentic, 337 f., 346 ff.; and the transcendent, 343 ff.; dread and the being of, 345 ff.; self-consent of, 351 f. See also Existence, Having to Be, Task, Destiny, Freedom, Consciousness. Materialism, 16 f. Meaning, of meaning, 261 f.; value and, 262 f.; of life, see Life. Merleau-Ponty, on perception, 134 f. Metaphysical question, 52 ff.; its universality, 57 ff. Metaphysics, 54 f.; God and, 65 ff. Monism, 16 ff. Mood, 50 ff. Morality, legalism and, 281 f.; fundamental ought and, 285 f. Multiplicity, being and, 59 ff. Mystery of being, 53 ff., 58. Nausea, critique of, 110 ff. Necessity of freedom as project, 280 f. Nihilatio1;J, consciousness as, 105 ff. Noema,95 ff. Noesis, 95 ff. Norm, of human action, 286 f.; personal conscience and general, 288 f. Nothing, 53 ff., 58, 61 ff. Nothingness, 106 f., the I is not, 115 f.; dread and, 345. Object, empiricism and, 99 f.; subject reduced to, 196 ff. Objectivism, objectivity and, 23, 146 ff.; of law, 234 ff. Objectivity, objectivism and, 23, 146 ff.; man's having to be is bound by, 284 f.

Index of Subject Matter Orientation, proof of God and, to God, 68 fI. Other, accessibility of the, 180 ff.; encounter with the, 185 f., 206 ff.; the body as intermediary in the encounter with the, 189 f.; entering the world of the, 190; I and the stare of the, 195 ff.; presence of the, 202 ff.; appeal to me of the, 216 ff.; love as appeal to the freedom of the, 222 f.; making the other be, 225 f. Ought, fundamental, 240 ff.; of justice, 242 f.; morality and the fundamental, 285 f.

361

Profile, viewpoint and, 97 ff. Project, man as, 40 f., 277 ff., 321 ff.; freedom as, 265 ff. See also SelfProject, Freedom, Task, Destiny. Psychoanalysis, Sartre's, 323 ff. Question, the metaphysical, 52 ff.; its universality, 57 ff.

Reality, philosophy and, x f.; detotalization of, 16 ff.; human character of, 27; scientism and, 48 f.; knowledge and, 74 ff.; consciousness and, 93 ff.; self as non-distant from, 270 f.; and as infinitely distant from, 271; letting be of, 276 f.; of the Participation, 37. Transcendent, 328 ff. Past, the, 310 f. See also Time, TemReason, science and, 149 ff. porality. Perception, 91 ff., 118 ff.; viewpoint, Reasoning, logic and, 169 ff.; by analogy, 181 ff. profile, unity, 97 ff.; views on, 131 Reduction, phenomenological, 102 f. ff. Personal, knowledge of the strictly, Relativism, 146 ff., 160 ff. 156 ff. Relativity, relativism and, 146 ff.; of freedom as project, 280 f. Phenomenalism, 131 ff. Phenomenology, existentialism and, 1 Responsibility, situated freedom and, ff.; truth and, 24 f.; of knowledge, 301 f. 74 ff.; its critique on prejudices about Rights, law and, 231 ff., 250 ff.; oriknowledge, 89 ff.; of intentionality, gin of, 234 ff.; history and natural, 92 ff.; essence and, 122 ff.; of truth, 253 ff. 142 ff.; objectivity and, 146 ff.; Sartre, critique of, 106 ff., 134 f., 195 subjectivism and relativism of, 148 f., 289 ff., 301 ff., 313 ff. f.; irrationalism of, 150; of intersubjectivity, 175 ff.; of hatred, 195 Scepticism, 158. ff.; of indifference, 206 ff.; of love, Science, intersubjectivity and, 10 f.; 214 ff.; of law, 231 ff.; of freedom existence and, 23 f.; world without and its destiny, 260 ff., 265 ff.; man and, 30 f.; Descartes and, 80 primitive fact of, 34 ff., 314 ff. See ff.; world and, 88 f.; phenomenoloalso Philosophy, Existentialism. gy and, 89 f.; reason and, 149 ff.; Philosophy, reality and, x f.; authendaily life and, 168 f. ticity of, 4 ff., 24 f.; systems and, 4 Scientism, 15 f., 48 f., 89 f., 150 f., 153 ff.; tradition and, 7 f.; truth and, 9 ff. ff.; usefulness and, 12 ff.; psycholo- Self, as non-distant from reality, 270 gism and, 33 f.; technocracy and, 47 f.; as infinitely distant from reality, ff.; metaphysics and, 54 f.; logic and, 271 f.; -affirmation, 270 ff.; -cen173 f.; God and, 312 ff., 343 ff. teredness, 215 ff.; -consent, 351 f.; Physiology, my body and, 187. -consciousness, 20, 105 f., 114 ff.; Potentiality, the other's stare aria my, world for man and -consciousness, 199 f.; having to be and, 275 f.; es112 ff.; stare and my -ness, 198 f.; sential characteristic of man, 276 f. -project, man as, 40 f., 279 f.; -realization of man, 41 f.; love and man's Pour-Soi, 104 ff. See also Conscious-realization, 221 f. ness. Sin, 292 ff. Prepredicative knowledge, 139 f. Situation, see Facticity. Presence, the other's, 202 f. Present, the, 310 f. See also, Time, Society, labor and, 45 ff. Stare, analysis of the, 195 ff. Temporality. Primitive fact, of existential phenome- Stimulation theory of perception, 100 ff. nology, 34 ff., 314 ff.

362

Index of Subject Matter

Subject, world and, 25 H.; openness of, 39; facticity of, 40 H., 276 f.; empiricism and, 100 f.; of knowledge, 113 f.; truth and, 148 f.; love as standpoint 'of, 155 f.; of natural law, 255 f.; and freedom, 266 f.; time and, 307 H.; reduced to object, 196 H. See also Subjectivity. Subjectivism, 146 H.; of right, 236 f.; subjectivity and, 146 H. Subjectivity, 18, body and, 21 f., 25; subjectivism and, 146 H.; facticity and, 157, 277 f.; stare and, 197 f.; how to regain my, 203 f.; and love, 229 f. Substructures of conscience, 287 f. Task, man as task-in-the-world, 275; freedom as, 305. See also Man, Freedom. Technology, absolutism of, 47 H. Temporality, 306 H.; history and, 311 f. Thing, 104 H., 241 f., 266 f. Thrownness, 341 H. Time, subject and, 307 H. See also Temporality. Tradition, philosophy and, 7 f. Transcendence, freedom as, 294 ff. Transcendent, reality of the, 328 f.; man as directed to, 329 f.; man and the, 343 ff.; cause, 350. See also God. Truth, philosophy and, 9 f.; intersubjective, 10 f., 164 f., 175 f.; Descartes on, 81 ff.; phenomenology of, 142 ff.; existence as, 143 f.; historicity of, 145 ff., 160 ff.; objec-

tivity and subjectivity of, 146 ff.; criterion of, 82 ff., 158 ff.; absolute, 163 f.; evidence as criterion of, 165 ff. Unauthenticity, dread and, 333 f. See also Existence, Man. Understanding, 117 ff. Unity, 97 ff.; horizon and, 99. Universality, of metaphysical question, 57 ff.; of concept, 137 ff. Usefulness, philosophy and, 12 ff. Value, meaning and. 261 ff.; objective, 263 f. Ver/allen, 331 H. Verstehen, 276 f. Viewpoint, profile and, 97 ff.; love as the subject's, 155 f. We, forms of, 192 f.; of indifference, 207 ff. World, existence as being in the, 15 ff., 327 ff.; meaning of, 25 ff.; cultural, 26 f.; material, 27 f.; reality of the, 29 ff.; man's attitude and, 31 ff.; existence as being "at" the, 39 ff.; inhuman, 85; consciousness and, 84 ff.; science and, 88; selfconsciousness and world for man, 112 ff.; perception and, 135 ff.; my, as our, 177 ff.; love and my, 230 f.; man as task in the, 275; Transcendent Being and, 353 f. You, meaning of, 207 f.; he and, 209 ff.; meaning of, in love, 223 f. Zu Sein, 262 ff., 275 ff.; consent to, 264 f. See also Having to Be, Ought.