Europeanisation and Hibernicisation: Ireland and Europe. (European Studies)

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EUROPEAN STUDIES An Interdisciplinary Series in European Culture, History and Politics

Executive Editor

Menno Spiering, University of Amsterdam [email protected] Series Editors Robert Harmsen, The Queen’s University of Belfast Joep Leerssen, University of Amsterdam Menno Spiering, University of Amsterdam Thomas M. Wilson, Binghamton University, State University of New York

EUROPEAN STUDIES An Interdisciplinary Series in European Culture, History and Politics 28

EUROPEANISATION AND HIBERNICISATION: IRELAND AND EUROPE

Edited by Cathal McCall and Thomas M. Wilson

Amsterdam - New York, NY 2010

NOTE FOR CONTRIBUTORS European Studies is published several times a year. Each issue is dedicated to a specific theme falling within the broad scope of European Studies. Contributors approach the theme from a wide range of disciplinary and, particularly, interdisciplinary perspectives. The Editorial board welcomes suggestions for other future projects to be produced by guest editors. In particular, European Studies may provide a vehicle for the publication of thematically focused conference and colloquium proceedings. Editorial enquiries may be directed to the series executive editor. Subscription details and a list of back issues are available from the publisher’s web site: www.rodopi.nl.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The editors would like to thank the organizers of the 2007 conference ‘Beyond the Nation?: Critical Reflections on Nations and Nationalism in Uncertain Times’ which provided us with a platform to engage with potential contributors to this volume through two panels: ‘Ireland and Europe (1) – Culture and Society’; and ‘Ireland and Europe (2) – Politics’. The conference was hosted by the School of Politics, International Studies & Philosophy, Queen’s University Belfast and sponsored by the British Academy and the Northern Ireland Community Relations Council. Special thanks to the conveners Dr Keith Breen and Professor Dr Robert Harmsen. We are grateful to colleagues who gave papers to our panels at the conference and we thank all contributors to the volume for making the editorial process a stimulating and enjoyable one. We extend special thanks to our editorial assistants on this book, Sarah Heyman and Teodora Hasegan of Binghamton University, whose dedication to the project was unwavering and essential.

CONTENTS Authors in this volume

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CATHAL MCCALL AND THOMAS M. WILSON Europeanisation and Hibernicisation: An Introduction

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RICHARD KEARNEY Renarrating Irish Politics in a European Context

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BRIAN GIRVIN Becoming European: National Identity, Sovereignty and Europeanisation in Irish Political Culture

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KATY HAYWARD ‘For Mutual Benefit’: Irish Official Discourse on Europeanisation and Hibernicisation

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MAURA ADSHEAD Assessing the Europeanisation Dimension of the National Anti-poverty Strategy in Ireland

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ETAIN TANNAM Northern Ireland and the EU: Europeanisation and Hibernisation? 149 MARY C. MURPHY The EU and ‘Normal Politics’ in Northern Ireland

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ANNE BARRINGTON AND JOHN GARRY Deliberative Fora and European Integration: What can Europe Learn from the Irish Experience?

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DAVID HASSAN Gaelic Games, Identity and the Irish Diaspora in Europe

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ROBBIE MCVEIGH United in Whiteness? Irishness, Europeanness and the Emergence of a ‘White Europe’ Policy

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GLENN PATTERSON Europe Between Political Folklore and National Populism: Poles Apart?

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AUTHORS IN THIS VOLUME MAURA ADSHEAD is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Limerick. She is author of Developing European Regions? (Ashgate, 2002), co-author (with Jonathon Tonge) of Government and Politics in Ireland (Palgrave, 2009), and co-editor (with Michelle Millar) of Public Administration and Public Policy in Ireland (Routledge 2003). ANNE BARRINGTON served as Director of the National Forum on Europe between 2005 and 2007. She has previously worked extensively on EU issues both in the Department of the Taoiseach in the lead up to and during the 2004 Presidency and in the Department of Foreign Affairs. She is currently serving as Ireland’s Ambassador in Tanzania. JOHN GARRY is Senior Lecturer in comparative political science in the School of Politics, International Studies and Philosophy, Queen’s University Belfast. His research interests include public opinion and political participation. BRIAN GIRVIN is Professor of Comparative Politics in the Department of Politics, University of Glasgow. His research interests include American politics, Irish politics, nationalism and West European comparative politics. He has written extensively on Irish politics, north and south. DAVID HASSAN is Senior Lecturer in Sport at the University of Ulster (Jordanstown). He is the Academic Editor of Sport in Society, and has published extensively in the field of sport and identity politics, focusing specifically on Ireland. In August 2008 Dr Hassan was appointed as an International Scholar with the International Football Institute. KATY HAYWARD is Lecturer in Sociology in the School of Sociology, Social Policy and Social Work, Queen’s University Belfast. She has published work on cross-border co-operation, conflict transformation, and political discourse. Her book Irish Nationalism and European Integration was published by Manchester University Press in 2009. RICHARD KEARNEY is Charles B. Seelig Chair of Philosophy at Boston College. He is the author of over 20 books on European philosophy and literature. In the 1980s and 1990s he was involved in drafting a number of proposals for a Northern Irish peace agreement. CATHAL MCCALL is Senior Lecturer in European Studies in the School of Politics, International Studies and Philosophy, Queen’s University

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Belfast. He has published widely on borders and European Union cross-border co-operation initiatives in the Irish border region, as well as on governance and cultural politics in Northern Ireland. ROBBIE MCVEIGH is a writer and researcher with a particular interest in racism and sectarianism. His publications include Racism and Anti-racism in Ireland (Beyond the Pale, 2002) and After Optimism? Ireland, Racism and Globalisation (MetroÉireann, 2005). He is currently working on a project on Roma EU citizens and Freedom of Movement for the European Roma Right Center in Budapest. MARY C. MURPHY is College Lecturer in the College of Business and Law, University College Cork. She has a special interest in EU-Ireland relations. Her book, Northern Ireland and the European Union: The Dynamics of a Changing Relationshi, will be published by Manchester University Press in 2010. GLENN PATTERSON is a novelist and Creative Writing Lecturer in the Seamus Heaney Center for Poetry, Queen’s University Belfast. His novels include Burning Your Own (1988), Fat Lad (1992), Black Night at Big Thunder Mountain (1995), The International (1999), Number 5 (2003), and That Which Was (2004). ETAIN TANNAM is Lecturer in International Peace Studies, School of Ecumenics, Trinity College Dublin. She has published widely on the topic of Northern Ireland, the EU and cross-border cooperation. THOMAS M. WILSON is Professor and Chair in the Department of Anthropology, Binghamton University, State University of New York. He is Co-editor of the Routledge Journal Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power and is currently President of the Society for the Anthropology of Europe. His most recent books are The Anthropology of Ireland (with Hastings Donnan, Berg, 2006), Drinking Cultures (editor, Berg, 2005), and Food, Drink and Identity in Europe (editor, Rodopi, 2006).

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EUROPEANISATION AND HIBERNICISATION: AN INTRODUCTION

Cathal McCall and Thomas M. Wilson James Joyce, the twentieth century Great of modern European literature, is often attributed with the claim that he wanted to ‘Europeanise Hibernia and Hibernicise Europe’. While his efforts at national and continental cultural change are beyond the scope of this volume, his claim highlights what we see as important and continuing themes in the evolution of contemporary societies and cultures in Europe, which here we phrase as questions. To what extent and in what ways do the processes of integration at macro-levels of society, politics, economics and culture in Europe affect European localities, regions and nations? Conversely, to what extent and in what ways do local, regional and national processes of social, political, economic and cultural integration and differentiation have an impact in the wider Europe? Our many years of working in various academic and non-academic roles in Europe and North America have led us to the simple conclusion that these are the major questions being asked at the heart of every aspect of European integration in Europe today, and the questions that motor public culture of all sorts from Iceland to the Caucuses and the Arctic to the Mediterranean, whether from a perspective of Euro-scepticism, Europhilia or Europhobia. At the very least, from our joint perspective, long moulded by our academic and scholarly endeavours in Ireland and in the United Kingdom (UK), these are the questions at the heart of the Irish love-hate relationship with Europe, which as we write are again being voiced across Ireland and beyond in regard to referenda and European treaties. This book sets out to investigate ways in which Ireland at the beginning of the twenty-first century has been Europeanised and Europe

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Hibernicised in the spheres of politics, culture and identity. As such it is also a book which seeks to query the nature and varieties of Europeanisation in Ireland, North and South, while exploring similar themes of how Irish politics, culture and identity are manifested, reproduced and received elsewhere in Europe. Europeanisation is now a heavily debated concept in academic literature with the number of definitions straying well into double figures and ranging across the disciplines of law, political science, international relations, economics, sociology and social anthropology. In sum, they amount to an attempt to encapsulate the impact of European integration – principally but not entirely conceived as European Union (EU) integration – on the national arena, be it in terms of statehood, regionalism, regionalization, borders, constitutional law, public administration, political process, political ideology, conflict transformation, migration, society, culture, identities and citizenship, and economic, public and social policy. For Knill (2001: 1), Europeanisation is essentially about ‘how European integration affects domestic administrative practices and structures’. Contributors to Featherstone and Radaelli’s 2003 edited collection The Politics of Europeanization were also concerned with the political aspects of Europeanisation, that is, the impact of European integration on national institutions, administrations and policies. Richardson (2006) specifically concentrated on the Europeanisation of public policy. Meanwhile, contributors to Snyder’s 2000 edited volume were concerned with analysing the effects of European integration on national law, be it, for example, in the area of labour law, private law or constitutional law (2000: 3). Others perceive the reach of Europeanisation extending beyond the legal and the political. Borneman and Fowler examined Europeanisation from the perspective of identities, seeing it as a term that refers to the reorganisation of territoriality and ‘peoplehood’ with consequences for group identification, principally nationhood (1997: 487). Spohn and Triandafyllidou (2003) were also concerned with the Europeanisation of collective identities though the focus was on the particular processes of EU enlargement and migration. For Dell’Olio (2005) Europeanisation encapsulates the tension between immigration and citizenship in light of a nascent European citizenship. This turn to citizenship highlights ways in which culture and identity figure into some considerations of the social dimensions of Europeanisation. Shore has used the term to draw attention to the ways in which

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EU policy makers have attempted to influence the ‘re-writing of history,’ under the banner of ‘cultural action,’ within the processes of EU politybuilding and European identity consolidation (2000: 56-62). Delanty and Rumford (2005) also addressed the thorny issues of nation and state as they relate to the reordering of European society and societies. In fact, in what may be the most ambitious effort at grasping the mercurial concept of Europeanisation, they have attempted to build a theory of Europeanisation in order to provide a framework for understanding society above and beyond that denoted by the nation-state. The difficulties in defining Europeanisation as an analytical category in social science was one of the reasons behind Harmsen and Wilson’s (2000) review of various ways in which Europeanisation figures in contemporary research and writing on European society, culture and politics. They provide a survey of the multiple usages of the term, from Europeanisation as ‘the reconstruction of identities’, to more narrow policy adaptations within member states, to those focused on the reconfiguration of EU governance (2000: 14-17). It will come as no surprise to learn that Hibernicisation has received no such treatment, despite the longstanding pride of Irish national culture and the generational waves of emigration from Ireland that have brought Irish people and customs to many shores. In fact, in some perspectives the force of Irish culture abroad must pale in comparison with other forms of cultural change at home. Yet, in a European context, Michael Malouf has argued, ‘it appears likely that the Europeanization (and Americanization) of Ireland may be more prevalent than the Hibernicization of Europe, which in itself may not amount to much more than Riverdance’ (1999, paragraph 20). While we concede that it would be eccentric in the extreme to suggest that Ireland and the Irish have had a major impact on European law and EU institutions, we believe that we are on firmer ground in exploring the influence of Irish culture on European culture and European identities. We also argue that Ireland’s geographical and sociocultural position between the USA and mainland Europe, the diplomatic efforts of Irish governments in the EU arena, Ireland’s experience of conflict and conflict transformation, and experiments in deliberative democracy, notably the Irish Forum on Europe, give substance to the term ‘Hibernicisation’ as a social and political process if not force in ‘Europe’, however defined. While this book does not represent an attempt to redress a perceived imbalance in the academic exploration of Europeanisation and Hiber-

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nicisation, it does seek to place the two processes side by side for comparison, and perhaps as an intellectual provocation to look at the cultural processes of integration between smaller nations and the wider Europe. Clearly, Europeanisation is a concept of serious breadth and depth that seeks to encapsulate the lived experience of Europeans in the twentyfirst century. In contrast, Hibernicisation is a blank page in the Academy1. This book addresses that blank page, admittedly with more questions than answers. What is Hibernicisation? If it represents an attempt to encapsulate the impact of Ireland and the Irish experience on the rest of Europe, its politics, its culture and its citizens, what has been the nature and strength of that impact? Does Hibernicisation inform a political, diplomatic or democratic impulse in the EU? Does it describe an experience of conflict transformation that can be brought to bear on other European conflicts? Is it representative of a cross-cultural phenomenon through language, the arts and European society? Or does it indeed amount to little more than Riverdance, its off-shoots like Lord of the Dance, Irish theme bars and St Patrick’s Day revelry? It is worth beginning with a consideration of European influence that preceded what has come to be known as ‘Europeanisation’. Europe has many shared influences and experiences – Christianity and the Reformation, the Enlightenment, a geographical environment and place consciousness, the Latin or Germanic roots of European languages, the industrial revolution, nationalism, ideology, revolution and false consciousness, European sports competition, European literature, and a European popular culture – most of which have extended their brief to Europe’s western peripheral island, some with particularly potent effect. The word Hibernia itself is the Latin word, derived from the Greek, for Ireland, a land visited by the Romans but not settled by them. The term does at the least show that the island was on the periphery of the first great European empire, and early Roman accounts of the island and archaeological remains across Europe demonstrate that while marginal in the affairs of Roman Britain, and in the greater empire, Rome was aware of the peoples and ways of Hibernia through trade and raiding. Considering that these peoples of Hibernia had in the main come from lands to the east of the island, and still had cultural roots if not direct ties to 1 A crude exercise in bibliometrics involving a keyword search in Google Scholar for the words ‘Hibernicisation’, ‘Hibernicization’ ‘Hibernicise’ and ‘Hibernicize’ produced no hits (conducted 30 October 2008).

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Germanic and Gaelic societies that were intimately involved with Rome, we posit that Europe and Hibernia have been in a long, almost continuous, and perhaps always subconscious cultural embrace. Ireland, at the western edge of Europe, has not been solely or perhaps even principally moulded by its continental geocultural positioning. There are a number of political and cultural relationships that at different times and in different ways have contributed to and at others have subverted the ties between Ireland and Europe. Among them are the longstanding links between Ireland and Britain and between Ireland and the United States of America. Until 1921, Ireland’s pre-eminent political and economic relationship was that with Britain. The establishment of the Irish Free State formally ended Britain’s political domination south of the new Irish border but it was not until the two states acceded to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973 that a transformation of the British-Irish relationship occurred. The Republic of Ireland’s EEC membership created the opportunity for the Irish economy to diversify and expand, thus transcending its reliance on British markets. EC membership also enabled the Irish state to achieve formal equality with the British state in the European political arena, a status and relationship that had been sought by the Irish since the 1920s. Consequently, the relationship between the two states shifted from one of dominance and dependence to one based on relative equality and interdependence. Contemporary Europeanisation has also had profound implications for the emergence of a new form of European governance in Ireland based on social partnership, consensus and a prominent role for the voluntary sector, rather than the adversarial Westminster-centred British style. Crucially, contemporary Europeanisation has challenged traditionalist assumptions of the Irish national political and economic cultures and identities by questioning the modern relationship between territory and national community as a strategy for national self-representation and empowerment. Consequently, Europeanisation has been fundamental to the Irish peace process and the reconfiguration of the partition of Ireland. What of the Hibernicisation of Europe? The Irish peace process itself, though temperamental and tortuous, has, nevertheless, been suggested as a template for the management and amelioration of ethnonational conflict in Cyprus, the Basque Country and elsewhere in Europe

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and beyond. Ireland has also been at the forefront of battles to secure optimum representation for the smaller member states. Furthermore, the success of Irish politicians and state officials in securing EU structural funding is something from which the most recent accession states may learn to their advantage. Many of the new members of the EU in the Baltic and Eastern Europe have sought to emulate the political and economic strategies of the Republic of Ireland within the EU, strategies that helped to underpin structurally the Celtic Tiger economic boom. And the stereotype of the Irish politician as ‘cajoler, cute hoor, sweet talker and deal-maker’ may have its negative connotations at home, but in the context of successive Irish presidencies of the EU it is a stereotype that has yielded positive results. As far as contemporary everyday life is concerned, Ireland’s nodes of external cultural reference include Rome and Brussels as much as they do London and New York. A common language, the arrival of transformative US transnational corporations in the 1990s, and familial connections with the Irish Diaspora in the US and Britain give special significance to these latter points of reference. Nevertheless, the significance of all of these relationships for Ireland, combined with the reputation of Irish politicians for ‘sweet talk’ and ‘deal-making’, gives Ireland the potential to carve out a special position for itself as a mediator in EU-US and EU-British relations in an enlarged EU of 27 member states. The arrival of prosperity and peace in Ireland during the 1990s, followed by EU enlargement eastwards in 2004, resulted in Ireland experiencing its first net in-migration in four hundred years. This phenomenon has potentially important implications for deepening the Europeanisation of Hibernia at the level of cultural integration, particularly in the areas of work, language, money, tourism, sport, food, drink and sex. Of course, the cultural experience of everyday life in Ireland already has a strong European flavour. Young mostly male motorists cruise around in BMWs, Mercedes, VWs, Fiats and Peugeots glaring at pedestrians and honking in derision. On Saturdays they shop in H&M and Zara2 in preparedness for a night of clubbing that may well reverberate to the sound The abundance of mainland European images, retailers, people and services operating in Ireland, North and South, renders absurd the claim by a respondent in a recent survey that ‘Northern Ireland is just different. Everything about it – the people, the infrastructure, even their clothes, their way of life, they are different people’ (in Through Irish Eyes: Irish Attitudes Towards the UK, a 2004 report commissioned by the British Council of Ireland and the British Embassy in Dublin). 2

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of a Serge Gainsbourg remix, and drown in a wash of Heineken and Budvar. In later life they graduate to assembly kits and Swedish meatballs from IKEA. Later still, they may join the promotions day scrum before opening time at Lidl, appetites whetted by the prospect of picking up a cheap chainsaw or crash helmet, never to be used. With the ebbs and flows of economic prosperity and migratory movements the Hibernicisation of Europeans, in Ireland and in the rest of Europe, may also become more prevalent, no more so than in the use of language, itself intrinsic to the idea of culture. Consider, for example, the case of the young Polish graduate Magda Jelonkiewicz who moved to Ireland for work in 2002. Ms. Jelonkiewicz explained that coming from Poland, where ‘you say what you think’, she found Irish conversation challenging because she encountered a barrier of ‘polite, yet distant friendliness’ that was almost impenetrable: it was difficult to ‘understand what was really said’3. Her solution to this challenge was to go to a public bar and wait for entry into ‘an inner circle of trust’. She delighted in the ‘Polonisation’ of Ireland after EU Enlargement in May 2004 and discovered emotional security and economic opportunity through belonging to a large minority ethnic group in Ireland. However, thoughts of ‘moving home’ with her friends now filled her with trepidation: ‘How will we be received? Will we fit in?” (Irish Times, 8 October 2008). In essence, “have we been Hibernicised?” The stereotype of Polish plumbers aside, the influx of Northern, Central and Eastern Europeans into Ireland over the last few decades has caused many peoples and institutions in Irish life to reconsider the roles of culture and identity, in their local, Irish, Northern Irish, Ulster, British and European variants, and how they can and even if they should mesh. Recently much was made of the Police Service of Northern Ireland’s (PSNI) reported bid to recruit officers from Poland. It was expected in some circles that these new constables would in the main be from a Roman Catholic background, and thus liable to right the balance in religious heritage that still plagues the largely Protestant police force of Northern Ireland, which since the Belfast Good Friday Agreement has 3 Evidently, Ms. Jelonkiewicz had not travelled north of the border to converse with ‘dour, honest and straight-talking Ulstermen’, a common stereotype accorded to Ulster Protestants in early twentieth century unionist histories (McIntosh 1999: 51-2). Though whether contemporary Poles working in Northern Ireland would agree that the stereotype conforms to their experiences is another matter.

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been committed to doing whatever it can to recruit numbers commensurate with the major religious and social groups in Northern Ireland. Despite a flood of Polish applications to join the PSNI none were successful4, raising many questions, among them whether language and other aspects of police and national cultures presented too large an obstacle to the recruitment of fellow Europeans to what might have been a newly transnationalized police force in a region seeking a new image on the world stage. These examples which we have reviewed of the intersections of Europe and Ireland, of Europeaness and Irishness, and of fellow and foreign Europeans and the Irish at home and abroad are but a sample of the peoples and issues that a consideration of the dialectics of local, national and global culture within a European context might entail. As such this volume as a whole seeks to contribute to wider and more inter- and multidisciplinary frames of reference in the social sciences of Ireland and Europe, but it also hopes to serve as a modest reminder to the scholars of other nations within the EU and elsewhere in Europe of how much we share in these heady days of global cultural change. To further these aims the volume cannot be more than provocative and suggestive; it does not seek to offer grand theories or to exhaust the range of case studies that demonstrate our interests and analyses. Thus, this introductory chapter explores the concepts of Europeanisation and Hibericisation mainly in terms of traditions, symbols and identities and through the consideration of borders and cross-border cooperation, political ideology, conflict transformation, migration and culture (themes we have pursued for many years in our research; see, for example, McCall 2001, 2003, 2007; Wilson 1993, 1996, 2000). Subsequent chapters will address themes of statehood, democracy, diplomacy, constitutional law, public administration, economic, public and social policy, political process, religion, racism and sport. Together, these chapters provide a portrait of the intertwined and transnational effects of Irish and (other) European cultural changes on the institutions, practices and values of politics, societies, and economics within one national frame, that of Ireland, that also extends beyond the borders of the two 4 In 2007, 968 Polish people applied to join the PSNI. The language barrier was cited as a significant stumbling block to recruitment. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ northern_ireland/6251117.stm and http://news.bbc.co. uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/ 6767227.stm (accessed 22 January 2009).

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nation-states that inhabit the island of Ireland to encompass Irishness as it has taken root across the European continent. European Traditions and Ireland Over two hundred years ago the Anglo-Irish philosopher Edmund Burke declared that ‘No European can be a complete exile in any part of Europe’ (cited in Davies 1996: 8). European cultural traditions form the bedrock for this attachment. When Martin Luther posted his Ninety-Five Theses on the door of the Castle Church in Wittenberg in 1517 as a protest against abuses of power in the Catholic Church, who could have predicted that the Reformation would meld with another European tradition, nationalism, to bring sustained havoc to Ireland many centuries later? Burke himself was a product of the Enlightenment with devotion not to religion, bigotry and superstition but to science and philosophy as the key to human salvation. Enlightenment thinkers valued critical reason, scepticism and doubt to the end of self-realisation in the world (Seidman 1983). Twentieth century Irish progeny, James Joyce and Samuel Beckett preeminent among them, had to flee Ireland to practice this revolutionary ideal: staying behind risked ruin. In the 1960s – a decade synonymous elsewhere in Western Europe with free-wheeling and free-thinking – the writer John McGahern was sacked from his job as a primary school teacher at St. John the Baptist Boys’ School in Clontarf after his second novel, The Dark, was banned in Ireland for obscenity. Peter Lennon’s now celebrated critical documentary Rocky Road to Dublin also received short shrift from the Irish Censorship Board at that time. Lennon returned to Paris with the renowned French cinematographer, Raoul Coutard, whom he had borrowed from Jean-Luc Godard, taking refuge in the Falstaff on rue Montparnasse with Beckett. Exile was the price of adhering to the core Enlightenment ideal of thinking outside the religious box and the upholding the right of criticism to a progressive end. Yet it was only a decade after the French Revolution that another European idea, nationalism, made an impact in Ireland. The revolt of the United Irishmen in 1798 was, however, an unmitigated disaster with French support failing to conquer Atlantic storms and informers acting on sectarian instincts bringing about the capture and execution of the ringleaders, among them Henry Joy McCracken who was found guilty of treason and hanged in Cornmarket, Belfast on 17 July 1798 (Elliott

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1982). In seeking to unite ‘Protestant, Catholic and Dissenter’ the ideology of the United Irishmen was also resonant with another European project closely associated with the French Revolution. Instead of appealing to a distinct ethnic group, civic nationalism espoused the investment of sovereignty in a nation made manifest in its own state and embracing all of its social groups including ethnicities. However, the reality was that the French Revolutionaries saw no place for the ancien regime and the prerevolution Establishment in the new French nation. Their nationalism favoured a distinct group within French society, namely, a rising class of republican politicians and social groups with a vested interest in political change. Perhaps something similar was feared in Ireland by those opposed to the United Irishmen’s revolt. A new Protestant organisation, the Orange Order, fomented sectarianism and ended hopes of realising a civic Irish nationalism. The empowered Irish nation that emerged in the twentieth century confirmed those fears. The interests served in the post-1916 conceptualisation of the Irish nation were quite clearly Catholic and Gaelic at the expense of Protestant, Dissenter, Anglo-Irish and Scots-Irish – many of whom considered themselves to have an Irish identity in some form even if they were alienated from the idea of a revolutionary Catholic Irish nation. According to Simon Prince (2007) French revolutionary influence was again felt in Ireland nearly two centuries later. He has argued that when revolution was in the air in Derry in October 1968, there was a small group of leftists involved who were influenced by, and attempting to emulate, their French comrades who took to the streets of Paris in May of that same year. They shared the same strategy of street protest, and even violence, in order to effect political change. Unlike Paris and France, however, what transpired in Derry and Northern Ireland was a 30 year civil war. Nationalism emerged as the most powerful ideology in twentieth century Europe and Ireland was no exception. Perhaps Ireland was particularly susceptible because of its prevailing un-Enlightened religiosity and the ability of Irish nationalism to co-opt religion’s spiritual and mystical elements. Add communal historical grievances inflicted on the dominant Irish Catholic ethnic group by the colonial British ‘Other’ down through the centuries and the cultural seam of Irish nationalism was a rich and enduring one. Nevertheless, the Irish Peace Process of the

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1990s and 2000s has been testimony to a qualitative shift in its expression. The potency of grievance and the emphasis on the territorial unification of the island in a single state, embodied in the politics of Sinn Féin and the violence of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), gave way to a discourse of peace, equality and cultural rights and, most significantly, an eventual standing down of the Provisional IRA itself. Though the EU was not a transnational diplomatic player in negotiations leading to this transition its presence was felt in a number of ways. Many key actors in the peace process, including those who negotiated the Belfast Good Friday Agreement, saw the agreement as one derived from many European sources, not least those of the guiding principles and treaties of the EU. Moreover, the EU, particularly through the European Commission, provided crucial and sophisticated support for the process at the local community level through its Peace programmes for Northern Ireland and the border counties of the Republic of Ireland running from 1995 to 2013. Combine this with a new confidence of the Irish in world affairs during the 1990s and early 2000s, which was in part due to their effective management of EU cohesion policies, and it is clear that the EU created a new symbolic terrain in Ireland which shaped many of the fundamental changes on the island over the last decades. Symbols Nationalism places great store in its symbolic representation. Symbols are often effective communicative instruments for connecting individuals to social groups, and indeed binding whole societies. Their genius is in their low production costs and their simplicity, the simpler the better since complexity creates opportunities for individuals to find offence. Simplicity also enhances repetition and relative invisibility, as people go through their quotidian lives without much thought to the banal nationalism that surrounds them (Billig 1995). However, mere simplicity may be unable to overcome serious divisions between social groups and ethnicities within society. Hence the effectiveness of symbols is often a doubleedged sword, they can communicate exclusion as well as inclusion (Smith 1991: 76-8). The symbolic inventory of nations includes flags, flowers, anthems, statues, caricatures and currency. The national flag is perhaps the most potent symbol. Taking inspiration from revolutionary France and the French Tricolore the Young Irelander John Francis Meagher first

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publically unveiled the Irish Tricolour in 1848. It was confirmed as the national flag of Ireland in the 1937 Bunreacht na hÉireann/Constitution of Ireland (Hayes-McCoy 1979). Although the Irish Tricolour was designed to symbolize the unity of Ireland’s two main ethnic groups – the ‘green’ Catholic Irish and the ‘orange’ Protestant Irish – it singularly failed to do so. In fact, many representations of the flag that were flown attempted to ignore the Protestant unionist dimension altogether by diluting the orange element of the flag to gold or yellow, a practice that would hardly go unnoticed by Protestant Orangemen. The failure of the Irish Tricolour as a symbol of the inclusivity for which it was intended followed in the path of similar failure in France. The French Tricolore was designed to include royalists (white) as well as republicans (red and blue) but became associated exclusively with the latter. The European Commission also recognised the importance of symbols for polity-building and thus, somewhat controversially, adopted nationalist tactics and procured a raft of its own symbols including the logo or flag (the circle of 12 gold stars on a blue background symbolizing perfection and unity), the anthem (‘Ode to Joy’, the prelude to the final movement of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony), the passport (symbolically identifying ‘Europeans’ at ports of entry), and a common currency (demarking yet another version of a Europe in interaction with Ireland, the ‘Euro-land’). Like nationalist symbols, these ‘inclusive’ European symbols also had the capacity to outrage and alienate, as when Queen’s University, Belfast first replaced the playing of God Save the Queen with Ode to Joy at the summer graduation ceremony in 1995. Unionists interpreted this development as exclusivist and yet another affront to their British identity and the Britishness of Northern Ireland. A protest demonstration was duly held (Irish Times, 4 July 1995). To the end of inculcating a sense of collective European consciousness and even identification perhaps the most effective symbol yet produced by the EU has been the aforementioned single currency embodied in the Euro. However, images of inanimate objects like the bridges, arches, windows and columns depicted on Euro notes do not have the emotive power of images of national heroes and notables. The aim may be to transcend such emotiveness of the heart and appeal to the rational

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head by suggesting the benefits of openness and interconnectivity in the globalised world5 (Kaelberer 2004). The potential inculcating power of a medium that could convey key chosen images on material in daily use was certainly not lost on nationbuilders. No less an important cultural figure than the poet William Butler Yeats was drafted in to chair the advisory committee on the design of the new Irish currency issued in 1928. The images produced of harps and symbolic animals of Ireland, notably the Irish Wolfhound, attempted to appeal to Irish tradition and the Gaelic Revival rather than to promote radical revolutionary change. However, the evangelical Catholic wing of Irish society was outraged because it understood the designs to be symbolic of Ireland’s pagan past (Ó Muimhneacháin 1975; Malouf 1999, paragraph 7). An image of Joyce himself appeared on a £10 Irish note in 1993, though whether this reflected the Europeanisation of Ireland or the commodification of all things Joycean for the purposes of tourism promotion and foreign direct investment is a moot point (Malouf 1999, paragraph 8). At least to some, in Ireland and elsewhere in Europe, Europeanisation and the commodification of culture are synonymous processes. It is no wonder that Europeanisation, when perceived as a threat to local, regional and national culture and identity, elicits various politics of resistance, subversion and opposition. Identity In 1996, Brigid Laffan argued that EU structural funding in Ireland had translated into an increased identification with the EU among the Irish public (1996: 87). However, Laffan recognized that appeals to the affective dimension of identity would have to be made in order to strengthen the ‘flickering gleam of a transnational political community’ (1996: 95). The suggested strategy for inculcating this affective dimension did not stray beyond appeals to tolerance and trust, hardly sufficient to tug the heart strings especially in hard times of economic recession, policy failure or political turmoil. Laffan and O’Mahony (2008: 255) cite Eurobarometer surveys to point out that a European layer to identity in Ireland is similar to the EU-wide average – 44 per cent opting for ‘Irish and European’ to 46 per cent for nationality and European generally. Surveys 5 Euro coins still contain national images of Euroland states. It is possible that this will have an educative effect on children interested in collecting coins from different Euroland states, raising a European consciousness in the process.

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are, of course, crude instruments of data collection. In this case, they tell us nothing about the relative weightings of national and supranational identification or the factors that influence identity change. Questions such as: ‘How Europeanised?’ and ‘Why Europeanised?’ remain unexplored. Crucially, does the European layer of identity in Ireland have a purely instrumental basis – economic prosperity and the economic rights associated with EU citizenship – that will come under pressure in the post-2008 period of recession, or is there a genuine affective dimension to a European layer of identity in Ireland? Perhaps these questions are unanswerable given the impact of rapid structural change on Irish identities themselves in the last two decades. The foremost newspaper commentator on Irish culture and identity matters, Fintan O’Toole, has argued that the processes of Europeanisation and globalisation which were intrinsic to the Celtic Tiger economy and the infrastructural change of the 1990s and early 2000s prompted fundamental questions regarding the nature of Irish identity, be it traditional or multidimensional and cosmopolitan (Irish Times, 29 November 1999; O’Toole 2003). He maintained that the connection to the land, that powerful divining force in the Irish communal imagination (Evans 1967: 7), had been severed by urban and suburban sprawl, multinational corporations, a cosmopolitan lifestyle, and immigration. O’Toole’s Ireland-specific thesis resonates with Stuart Hall’s argument that globalising forces have engendered a confusion of national identity because they have undermined the nation-state as a unit of political administration with negative consequences for national cultures. For Hall, nineteenth century capitalism created nationalism and nation-states to service its requirements, principally in smoothing the path to geographical and occupational mobility through the establishment of national cultures. Twentieth century capitalism, on the other hand, became wedded to globalisation with national cultures now surplus to requirement (Hall 1993, 1996). Ireland just took a little longer to catch up and when it did it bolted to the finish line. Irish Catholic grievances fired the engine of nineteenth century Irish nationalism. A history of religious oppression and discrimination, the Irish Famine and its social and cultural consequences, inequitable land ownership, and the execution and subsequent martyrdom of Irish revolutionaries provided ample material to keep the fires stoked at public rallies and through national newspapers. Some attempt was made to preserve

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the inclusive republican tradition invoked by Wolfe Tone and the United Irishmen: through its Nation newspaper the Young Ireland movement promoted an inclusive national culture in the nineteenth century; and the Irish cultural revival of the early twentieth century was lead by Irish Protestants W.B. Yeats, Æ 6, Standish James O’Grady and James Stephens. Politically, however, an ethnic course for Irish nationalism had already been charted. Daniel O’Connell’s early nineteenth century populist movement for full Catholic Emancipation captured Irish identity as an expression of modern Catholic Irish nationalism. The 1885 and 1886 General Elections established the ethnic Irish nationalist and Irish unionist political blocs in the home rule and conservative parties (Walker 2005). Gaining statehood in 1921 provided Irish nationalists with the necessary institutional support to cast Irish identity as Catholic and Gaelic, with British identity as the ‘Other’. After 1921, unionists in Northern Ireland gradually abandoned an Irish identity that could not be reconciled with their Ulster Protestant culture and British political identity (McIntosh 1999: 20). Europeanisation offered a key for unlocking this closed conceptualisation of an Irish identity as Catholic, Gaelic, rural and anti-British that dominated in the early years of the state. Taoiseach Sean Lemass is credited with beginning the process of ‘opening up’ in the 1960s in response to new globalising economic forces. Accession to the EEC in 1973 was a major step. At once new European markets were accessible and the shackles of economic dependency on the UK were loosened. Politically, the supranational space of the EEC/EC/EU enabled British and Irish ministers and their officials to communicate as equals in a hostile-free environment. Where economics and politics went culture was sure to follow. ‘Reimagining Irish identity’ became the cultural project of the 1990s with a ‘European’ aspect thrown into the mix. One serious stumbling block, however, was determining the cultural content of European identity. If students of European Studies at Irish universities struggle to identify agents of European consciousness or the cultural resources of a common European identity, what hope is there for the Irish population at large? And presuming that globalising forces have disconnected the people from the land, are indigenous Irish identities reducible to a cultural rump consisting of the Irish language, ‘Hiberno-English’ and the 6

Pseudonym for the mystic, poet and painter George Russell.

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Ulster-Scots dialect, the Gaelic Athletic Association, Irish traditional music, commemoration and Orange parades? It is, however, overstating the case to claim that the connection between the Irish nation and the land has been irretrievably ruptured. Land connected protests concerning the consequences of globalisation and the Celtic Tiger have been a feature of early twenty-first century Irish life. Two, in particular, serve to illustrate this point. The proposal to build the M3 motorway 2km from the site of the ancient Hill of Tara generated protests at the site and in the Irish press. Plans by the multinational company Shell to build a high pressure gas pipeline carrying gas from the Atlantic to a processing terminal nine kilometres inland near Rossport, County Mayo, also sparked a wave of protest and lead to the incarceration of the subsequently celebrated ‘Rossport 5' (Garavan 2006). In addition, health awareness means that an ever-increasing number of cyclists, bog walkers, and hill climbers are catered for by designated paths, trails and routes. Arguably, reconnection with the land is now made through environmental concerns and leisure pursuits rather than just with livelihood and/or ownership, but here too it is worth remembering the diminished but still forceful agricultural population of Ireland, as may be witnessed in the continuing prominence of the Irish Farmers Association in national and European agrarian politics. As for Irish nationalism, it is possible that it too is being reconfigured rather than dissolved. Indeed, Europeanisation may be viewed as a vehicle for this reconfiguration in the sense that it represents a fundamental reordering of the notions of territory and identity (Borneman and Fowler 1997). Lemass was careful to couch accession to the EEC in traditional nationalist terms (Laffan and O’Mahony 2008: 257). Accession empowered the state in the international arena and alliances were made with other small states for collective action in the EU (2008: 247-8). More important, the relationship with Britain was transformed. The significance of European integration in rendering state borders more permeable in some economic and political terms, not least the Irish border, has been appreciated and welcomed by the main political parties in the South and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) in the North. Critics counter-argue that Europeanisation also impinges upon Irish legal and political sovereignty, with serious consequences for Irish national culture and identity (O’Kelly 2004: 515-6). Even Sinn Féin, sympathetic in the main with this view, in the Irish Peace Process has

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demoted its emphasis on territorial sovereignty in favour of an emphasis on group rights in terms of equality, justice and culture. With anti-Britishness as a territorial reference point in abeyance, or at least sidelined, it would appear that Europeanisation makes some room for ‘rethinking’ Irish identity along civic lines. Thus, Irish identities – Irish Catholic, Ulster Protestant, Traveller and ‘New Irish’ become possible and deserving of ‘parity of esteem’. In their separate ways Yeats and Joyce recommended embracing difference and diversity to the ends of vibrancy, progressiveness and cultural fulfilment. In Northern Ireland, however, the cultural war continued and even intensified after the political agreement reached on Good Friday, 1998. The issues ranged from support for the Irish language, to the flying of flags, to the display of a vase of flowers in the foyer of Parliament Buildings, Stormont to mark the Easter Rising (McCall 2005). Cultural conflict does not advance the cause of a variegated Irish identity. Instead it compels combatants to button down the hatches and attempt to secure their respective mono-cultural positions, as evidenced by the aversion of the Ulster-Scots movement to any association with Irishness (McCall 2002). Europeanisation, in the shape of the EU Peace programmes (19952013), has had some effect in resisting this mono-cultural tide that emanates from the elite political level through support for local community projects engaged, among other things, in north-south cross-community dialogue with a view to inculcating communal self-reflection, promoting diversity, appreciating (small) cultural differences and searching for commonality. Cross Border Co-operation and Conflict Transformation In addition to economic development after World War II, Adenauer, Schuman and Monnet prioritised peace-building as a central goal of the new European project. While taking much of the credit for maintaining the peace between hitherto volatile European states, the EU, particularly the European Commission, has maintained a focus on the guiding peacebuilding principle of the founding fathers of the European integration project. However, actual and potential intra-state and border conflicts, rather that inter-state conflicts, are the contemporary cause for concern. Consequently, the EU has focused on the protection of minority rights within states and on how intra-state and border conflicts involving

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ethno-national groups may be pre-empted, managed and ameliorated (Diez, Stetter and Albert 2004). In its contemporary approach to conflict transformation and peacebuilding the EU has employed two strategies. One involved wielding ‘soft power’ during the Enlargement process through the establishment of terms and conditions for accession to the EU. In 1993, the Copenhagen European Council concerned itself, in particular, with the protection of minorities in candidate states. Consequently, pressure was brought to bear on Estonia to provide equal citizenship for its ethnic Russian-speaking minority (Kronenberger and Wouters 2004: xix). Another strategy has been to engage and support local actors in a peace-building endeavour – peace-building from below (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall 2005: 217-21). The EU Peace programmes for Ireland – Peace 1 (1995-1999), Peace II (2000-2006) and Peace III (2007-13) – represent a sophisticated and sustained example of this latter strategy. Europeanisation describes the tenor of the work undertaken in that the goals of promoting cross-cultural dialogue with a view to the acceptance of difference and the recognition of commonality are central. The importance of cross-border co-operation and the creation of a transnational border space for conflict transformation are also prioritised, and are a continuation of other European Commission intentions as enscribed in earlier development programmes, the most notable being INTERREG and LEADER (Wilson 2000). In principle, at least, cross-border co-operation is central to the process of Europeanisation. It encapsulates European integration ‘from below’ and holds out the promise of helping to redress the EU’s democratic legitimacy problem associated with its political elite level policymaking processes. It challenges modern state concepts of state sovereignty, territoriality and exclusivity and, as such, resonates and potentially contributes to the process of European integration. Perhaps most importantly cross-border co-operation is intrinsic to achieving the goal of peace-keeping in Europe because it offers an alternative to conflict and coercion in constituting and reconstituting state borders. Although the instrumental benefits to be gained from cross-border co-operation are often curtailed by limited EU funds, the communicative potential of cross-border co-operation cannot be underestimated, especially in a border region that has experienced violent conflict (O’Dowd 2002; Hayward 2007). Often, cross-border co-operation in these contexts takes the

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form of co-operation in and about culture, creating new conditions for the construction of cross-border culture itself (Anderson, O’Dowd and Wilson 2003). This communicative potential has been an important aspect of the cross-border, cross-community co-operation experience of local level projects funded under the EU Peace programmes in Ireland. Project leaders of Ulster Protestant groups that became involved in cross-border work under the programmes have spoken of their positive experiences, for example, through engaging in discussions on history, participating in storytelling, and in organising cross-cultural musical events or leisure pursuits for young people. Some claimed that it was an important stepping stone on the path to improved cross-community relations in Northern Ireland. For others, benefit was gained from the simple relief of escaping the cage of territorial conflict in Northern Ireland, however briefly, and glimpsing another way of life (McCall and O’Dowd 2008; O’Dowd and McCall 2008). A degree of estrangement rather than difference and otherness encapsulates the relationship between Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland and their co-nationals south of the border. Partition and separate state development, as well as prolonged violent conflict concentrated in Northern Ireland exacerbated this estrangement though, as a general rule, the closer the proximity to the border the weaker the degree of estrangement: Dundalk and Newry, for example, have long-held historic ties that survived the Troubles. Nevertheless, a general lack of communication across the border allowed prejudices to take hold. This was well illustrated when a group of nationalists from North and South were asked to air their prejudices in a cross-border meeting on prejudice reduction. The prejudices aired included: ‘Northerners leave dirty nappies on our beaches’; ‘Southerners are over here taking our jobs and working for buttons’; ‘Southern drivers are Padre Pio drivers, they close their eyes and trust to God’; ‘Derry women wear too much make-up’. The meeting was abandoned in some acrimony and, in the short-term, it appeared that cross-border communication had a negative impact (McCall and O’Dowd 2008: 45). However, in the longer term, such communication diffuses the territorial issue for nationalists, and can lead to strategic cross-border thinking, and ultimately reduce prejudices. Hibernicisation may also feature in the development of this ‘peacebuilding from below’ strategy in that the Peace programmes for Ireland

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were pioneer programmes of their kind in the EU, and the experience gained may inform the design of similar programmes addressing other European ethno-national border conflicts, notably Cyprus and the Basque Country. However, it is important to note that efforts by Basque PNV politicians to secure such funding after ETA’s 1998 declaration of cease-fire fell on deaf ears in the European Commission (Bourne 2004: 109-110). The model of governance most associated with Europeanisation in Ireland stresses transnational co-operation and a role for the third (voluntary and community) sector through social partnership. This resonates with an EU approach to the development of a conflict transformation strategy that mobilizes public, private and third sector organisations. The EU Peace programmes for Ireland engaged public, private and third sector organisations on both sides of the Irish border and many crossborder partnerships for conflict transformation became established, though the issue of their sustainability became omnipresent, particularly towards to end of one funding programme and the beginning of the next. Peace III marks the definitive end of this initiative in 2013, but perhaps not the sustainability of its Europeanisation effect. Some expectation has been expressed in Irish government circles that the British and Irish governments will need to intervene to support the infrastructure for conflict transformation that has been created7. However, in a time of economic recession the endurance of such expectation will be severely tested. The Europeanisation effect does not just apply to intra-state conflict in the Irish case. The EU (though in its earlier form of the EEC) also had a hand in the resolution of the wider British-Irish conflict manifested in a cold political war after partition of the island in 1921. With the simultaneous accession of both states in 1973, Europeanisation offered neutral political spaces in Brussels and Strasbourg where British and Irish government ministers, parliamentarians and officials could build a new relationship unsullied by economic dependence, political antagonism and mutual suspicion. The priority became one of dealing with the escalating intra-state conflict in Northern Ireland. Consequently the new

7 By Dermot Ahern, when Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the film documentary, The Border (Cathal McCall and Gavin Turnbull), broadcast on RTE 1, 4 September 2007.

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inter-state relationship became characterised by co-operation to that end (McCall 2001; Hayward 2005). The 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) was the product of that transformed governmental relationship and reflected the infrastructure of transnational European governance in that it gave the Irish government a role in Northern Ireland public affairs8. Thereafter, any fruitful negotiation on the future governance of Northern Ireland would require a transnational dimension leading to the establishment of transnational institutional structures. These structures were made manifest in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. The territorial Northern Ireland Executive, Assembly and Civic Forum (Strand 1) were matched by a transnational North/South Ministerial Council and its Implementation Bodies (Strand 2), as well as a transnational British-Irish Council and British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (Strand 3). The importance of the North/South arrangements was highlighted by the mandatory nature of the Implementation Bodies and by the clause, on paper at least, that linked the fate of the North/South Ministerial Council to that of the Northern Ireland Assembly. The Implementation Bodies concentrated on the specifics of cross-border co-operation in the areas of food safety, minority languages, trade and business development, aquaculture, waterways, and EU Programmes, with an all-island company established to communicate abroad Ireland’s tourism potential. The provision of the Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPB) was of particular significance, not least because this implementation body was given responsibility for managing EU programmes. Meanwhile, the North/South Ministerial Council met to discuss wide-ranging crossborder co-operation. The meetings involved ministers with sectoral responsibility for education, health, transport, agriculture, the environment and tourism. These institutions bear testimony to the effects of Europeanisation on the realisation of post-conflict, post-sovereign state institutional arrangements for the island of Ireland. Their genesis lies in the Europeanisation of John Hume (ex-SDLP Leader) on becoming an MEP, his aptitude for transnational thinking, and the political weight he brought to bear on negotiations as an ex-officio member of successive Irish governments in the 1980s and 1990s (Hayward 2007). However, post-conflict and post-state institutional Ireland is also a post-national 8

A British-Irish Inter-Parliamentary Body was also established in 1990.

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and post-modern Ireland, with its attendant lack of fixity in terms of people and places. Here too Europe looms large as a context for the increasing flows of culture in and out of Ireland. Migration, Racism and Sectarianism In the 1990s Ireland experienced a historic reversal of migration patterns – as net emigration was replaced by net immigration. The island as a whole has not experienced such substantial immigration since the seventeenth century. The impact of the ‘Celtic Tiger’ in the South, high levels of British public expenditure in the North and the effect of EU structural programmes in the border region reduced indigenous unemployment to historically low levels and created a demand for labour increasingly met by migrant workers. A debate ensued which considered the implications of in-migration for the (re)construction of Irish identities (Europeanisation). The impact of the indigenous communities in shaping the identities of migrants and transnational workers (Hibernicisation) is also deserving of attention. Identity politics stresses boundaries between ‘in-groups’ and ‘outgroups’ (Davis 2000). Processes of boundary construction and exclusion are embedded in particular sites of communication be they in the work place, school, training centre, the home, the immigration office, the social security office, the train station, or the public bar (Eder 2006). Much work needs to be done in Ireland, inside and outside the Academy, on the everyday experience of work, living conditions, and social interaction among migrants and between them, state and voluntary agencies and the indigenous population. The many barriers to social integration include language, local dialect, prejudice, and lack of social infrastructure. In the context of the Europeanisation and Hibernicisation of identity the research agenda includes a consideration of the possibilities that there are for cultural hybridisation between ‘migrant’ and indigenous groups in terms of religion, sport, food, or recreational activities. It requires a focus on how migratory movement has affected local expressions of ethnic/national identities (Europeanisation). It also needs to feature work on the effect of indigenous cultures on ‘New Irish’ identities (Hibernicisation). More research is urgently need on racism in Ireland and particularly on processes of racialisation and sectarianisation, rather than on racial or ethnic groups as basic analytical categories (Jenkins 1996; Brubaker

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2002). In Northern Ireland, racism is complicated by sectarianism. Important questions arise as a result of violent attacks on migrants, namely, do they represent a melding of racism and sectarianism – a double discrimination effect – emanating from an overlap between Ulster loyalist and British fascist/racist groups as identified by McVeigh (1992). Or, is it the manifestation of a more organic racism derived from Ireland’s endogenous racism directed against ‘Travellers’ (McVeigh 1996; Helleiner 2000)? Does racism in Northern Ireland tend to be ‘Protestant’ (McVeigh 1998: 25)? If so, following from Wimmer (1997), is it because migrant workers are seen as an additional threat to the unionist political position in Northern Ireland and to the rights and privileges associated with being ‘Ulster British’? Or, do downwardly mobile indigenous groups across Ireland share negative perceptions of migrants? The racist content of violent acts in inner-city Dublin has been considered by Declan Kiberd who contextualised such acts in terms of the everyday struggle for survival: It is sometimes hard to fathom whether the jibes and punches thrown at Nigerians in ... Parnell Street are manifestations of race hatred or of a beleaguered community seeking to defend itself as such. “We fought the Culchies when we had to” said one veteran of a night’s brawl, “and then we fought the cops. And now we have to fight the Darkies”. [It] suggests an advanced paranoia about outside groupings, but whether it is classical racism is a moot point (Longley and Kiberd 2001: 51).

This ‘advanced paranoia about outside groupings’ is recognisable in the ‘Village’, a traditionally Protestant loyalist working class area on the periphery of west Belfast. When the threat from the IRA dissipated in the 1990s a new perceived threat arrived in the form of Southern property speculators, Filipino nurses and Chinese students, caterers and shop keepers. Yet perceptions of threat to one’s way of life are longstanding and multisemic in an island with a long history of colonialism and imperialism, in terms of both being their victims and their perpetrators. The decline of the British Empire, for example, was one of the forces that led to generations of East and South Asian immigration to Ireland. These Asian migrants have encountered daily the difficulties of fitting in while attempting to hold on to aspects of their past lives and cultures (Wilson and Donnan 2006). Hibernicisation like Europeanisation is a process to be variously welcomed and variously resisted, depending on the people and the circumstances.

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One thing is clear in this complicated mix of overlapping peoples, cultures and identities: the forces of change are both liberating and threatening, and the leaders of Ireland and Europe must recognize these twin sides of the issue. Whether it is Belfast or Dublin, or towns like Dungannon or Gort that have witnessed rapid growth in their migrant/transnational worker populations, the challenge for policy-makers and community activists is essentially the same. They must deal with perceptions of threat, overcome prejudice and, as a first step, engender a spirit of tolerance. Yet, where is the successful model for such action? Should the Irish look to Europe for models of tolerance and peace-building, or should Europe look to Ireland? Obviously, the models to be used are the ones that work, that best attain the goals desired, and therefore Ireland and Europe are in an incessant feedback relationship. As to what works, the proof is in the pudding, and is in the balance struck in arriving at any solution to the problems of culture-building and culture-sharing. Conclusion In this chapter we have sought to identify and elucidate upon processes of Europeanisation and Hibernicisation occurring, or having the potential to occur, in the contexts of culture, identity, borders, political process, migration and conflict transformation. Our naturally sunny disposition translates into a broadly positive even celebratory reading of these processes. Other contributors to this volume adopt the more cautious and even circumspect positions that are synonymous with academic enquiry. Their inclusion gives substance and depth to the debate on the Europeanisation of Ireland and helps to kick-start one on the Hibernicisation of Europe. Richard Kearney applies the ideas of Paul Ricoeur and Jurgen Habermas on Europeanisation to the Irish-British context and also argues that Hibernicisation can be brought to bear on identity conflicts in Europe, notably in Pays Basque, Brittany, Catalonia, Cyprus, Serbia, Macedonia and Kosovo. In his detailed account the historian, Brian Girvin dissects the long and complex relationship between Ireland and Europe. Anne Barrington and John Garry give a thorough account of the working of the Irish Forum on Europe and ask whether it provides a suitable model that can be applied in other member states to help address the EU’s democratic deficit. Through an analysis of social policy

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Maura Adshead seeks to develop an understanding of Europeanisation effects on processes of governance in Ireland. Katy Hayward analyses Irish official discourse on the themes of Europeanisation and Hibernicisation. Etain Tannam examines the influence of Europeanisation on the Irish Peace Process and identities in Northern Ireland, as well as Hibericisation in the context of conflict transformation. Meanwhile, Mary Murphy looks at the role of the EU in the ‘post-conflict’ or ‘normal’ politics of Northern Ireland. David Hassan assesses the impact of the Gaelic Athletic Association on the Irish Diaspora and indigenous identities in mainland Europe. Robbie McVeigh provides a provocative essay on the relationship between ‘race’ and identity in Ireland and Europe. Finally, the novelist Glenn Patterson gives a lively account of recent in-migration experienced in Northern Ireland. Writing at a time when the beleaguered UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown has described economic recession following the global financial turmoil of 2008/9 as ‘the difficult birth pangs of a new global order,’9 this discussion on the themes of Europeanisation and Hibernicisation is particularly apposite. Economic globalisation may well be in retreat as a result of failing banks and the subsequent downturn in international trade. However, people will still move across Europe for work and leisure, communication networks will continue to develop, transnational political interaction, policy learning and institution-building, particularly under the auspices of the EU, will not decline, and any ‘new global order’ will still be informed by the transnational processes of Europeanisation and Hibernicisation with continuing consequences for Ireland and for Europe. At the heart of both Europeanisation and Hibernicisation will be the changing nature of being and belonging, the veritable stuff of identity production and reproduction. Europe and Ireland will continue to call to each other as we move further into the 21 st century, and the Irish and other Europeans will continue to move within each other’s circles, and perhaps increasingly so. But the processes of being Irish and European need not be about being more or less one or the other. They are at the end of the day processes of being at home, wherever. Perhaps the most European and Irish of icons of recent Irish culture are the two cinematic Dublin gangsters laying low in Belgium. As one of them, Ray, concludes 9

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7850647.stm (accessed 27 January 2009)

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after many discussions with his pal of the beauty of local Flemish art, architecture and culture, and after many considerations of the meaning of life and death, ‘Maybe that’s what hell is, the entire rest of eternity spent in fucking Bruges’ (IMDB 2009). Is Ray more or less Irish and European than Joyce? Must one be less at home in Ireland to be more at home in Europe? And what do we make of the Germans whom O’Carroll (2005) studied, patrons at an ‘authentic’ Irish pub in Berlin, who are Ireland fans, Ireland friends or Ireland freaks? Does their affiliation with things Irish, or their experience of Irishness, enhance or hinder their Germanness? Perhaps yes, perhaps no, but these Germans who seek to revitalize notions of home, elsewhere, while still at home, may be representative of many people across Europe who are Gaelophiles, just as there are many Europhiles in Ireland. We and the authors in this volume have approached the twin processes of Hibernicisation and Europeanisation as processes that alone and together have changed the dimensions of living, working and belonging in Ireland and Europe. Perhaps in the end Joyce was wrong: the Irish way and the European way are so interwoven that to try to make one into the other may unravel the whole thing. In this introductory essay and in the book as a whole we focus more on the impact of external European forces on the Irish in Ireland. This is to be expected given the contrast in dimensions between Ireland and the rest of its continent. But we have also proffered another thing also unsurprising: many Irish, including Joyce and Ray, suspect that Europe would be better off embracing its Irish self a wee bit more. References Anderson, James, Liam O’Dowd and Thomas M. Wilson, eds. 2003. Culture and Cooperation in Europe’s Borderlands. Amsterdam: Rodopi Publishers. Borneman, John and Nick Fowler 1997. Europeanization. Annual Review of Anthropology 26: 487-514. Bourne, Angela K. 2004. The EU and Territorial Politics Within Member States: Conflict Or Co-Operation? Leiden: Brill. Brubaker, Rogers 2002. Ethnicity Without Groups. Archives Européennes de Sociologie 43 (2): 163-189. Davies, Norman 1996. Europe: A History. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Billig, Michael 1995. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage.

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Delanty, Gerard and Chris Rumford 2005. Rethinking Europe: Social Theory and the Implications of Europeanization. London: Routledge. Dell’Olio, Fiorella 2005. The Europeanization of Citizenship: Between the Ideology of Nationality, Immigration, and European Identity. Aldershot: Ashgate. Diez, Thomas, Stephen Stetter and Matthias Albert 2004. The European Union and the Transformation of Border Conflicts. Working Papers in EU Border Conflicts Series, No. 1. at http://www.euborderconf.bham.ac.uk (accessed 2 June 2007). Eder, Klaus, 2006. ‘Europe’s Borders: The Narrative Construction of the Boundaries of Europe’ in the European Journal of Social Theory 9 (2): 255271. Elliott, Marianne 1982. Partners in Revolution: the United Irishmen and France. New Haven: Yale University Press. Evans, E. Estyn 1967. The Irishness of the Irish. Belfast: Irish Association for Cultural, Economic and Social Relations. Featherstone, Kevin and Claudio Maria Radaelli, eds. 2003. The Politics of Europeanization. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Garavan, Mark 2006. The Rossport 5: An Introduction at http://www.bluegreenearth.us/archive/article/2006/rossport5/rossport-12006.html (accessed 5 November 2008). Hall, Stuart 1993. Culture, Community, Nation. Cultural Studies 7 (3): 349-363. Hall, Stuart 1996. The Question of Cultural Identity. Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies. Stuart Hall, David Held, Don Hubert, Kenneth Thompson (contributors). London: Blackwell. Harmsen, Robert and Thomas M. Wilson 2000. Introduction: Approaches to Europeanization. Europeanization: Institutions, Identities and Citizenship. Robert Harmsen and Thomas M. Wilson, eds. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Hayes-McCoy, Gerard Anthony 1979. A History of Irish flags from Earliest Times. Dublin: Academy Press. Hayward, Katy 2005. Ireland/Northern Ireland: Final Report. EUBorderConf. Unpublished report. Hayward, Katy 2007. Mediating the European Ideal: Cross-border programmes and conflict resolution on the island of Ireland. Journal of Common Market Studies 45 (3): 675-93. Helleiner, Jane 2000. Irish Travellers: Racism and the Politics of Culture. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. IMDB: the Internet Movie Database. 2009. Accessed, 12 June 2009. http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0780536/quotes Jenkins, Richard 1996. Social Identity. London: Routledge. Kaelberer, Matthias 2004. The Euro and European identity: Symbols, Power and the Politics of European Monetary Union. Review of International Studies 30: 161-178. Knill, Christoph 2001. The Europeanisation of National Administrations: Patterns of Institutional Change and Persistence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Kronenberger, Vincent and Jan Wourters 2004. Introduction. The European Union and Conflict Prevention: Policy and Legal Aspects. Vincent Kronenberger and Jan Wourters, eds. The Hague: TMC. Laffan, Brigid 1996. The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe. Journal of Common Market Studies 34 (1): 81-102. Laffan, Brigid and Jane O’Mahony 2008. Ireland and the European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Longley, Edna and Declan Kiberd 2001. Multi-culturalism: The View from the Two Irelands. Cork: Cork University Press. Malouf, Michael 1999. Forging the Nation: James Joyce and the Celtic Tiger at http://social.chass.ncsu.edu/jouvert/v4i1/malouf.htm [accessed 28 October 2008]. McCall, Cathal 2001. The Production of Space and the Realignment of Identity in Northern Ireland. Regional and Federal Studies 11 (2): 1-24. McCall, Cathal 2002. Political Transformation and the Reinvention of the Ulster-Scots Identity and Culture. Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power 9 (2): 197-218. McCall, Cathal. 2003. ‘Shifting Thresholds, Contested Meanings: Governance, Cross-border Co-operation and the Ulster Unionist Identity’, European Studies: A Journal of European Culture, History and Politics 19: 81-103. McCall, Cathal 2005. From Long War to War of the Lilies: ‘Post-Conflict’ Territorial Compromise and the Return of Cultural Politics. A Farewell to Arms? From ‘Long War’ to Long Peace in Northern Ireland (Second Edition). Michael Cox, Adrian Guelke and Fiona Stephen, eds. Manchester: Manchester University Press. McCall, Cathal, 2007. ‘Creating Border Space in Ireland: an EU approach to Ethno-national Threat and Insecurity’, pp. 61-77 in Warwick Armstrong and James Anderson (eds.), Geopolitics of European Union Enlargement: The Fortress Empire. London: Routledge. McCall, Cathal and Liam O’Dowd 2008. Hanging Flower Baskets, Blowing in the Wind? Third Sector Groups, Cross-Border Partnerships and the EU Peace Programmes in Ireland. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 13, (4): 29-54. McIntosh, Gillian 1999. The Force of Culture: Unionist Identities in Contemporary Ireland. Cork: Cork University Press. McVeigh, Robbie 1992. The Specificity of Irish Racism. Race and Class 33 (4): 31-45. McVeigh, Robbie 1996. The Racialization of Irishness. Belfast: Centre for Research and Documentation. McVeigh, Robbie 1998. ‘There’s No Racism Because There’s No Black People Here’: Racism and Anti-Racism in Northern Ireland. Divided Societies: Ethnic Minorities and Racism in Northern Ireland. Paul Hainsworth, ed. London: Pluto. Ó Muimhneacháin, Maurice 1975. Currency and Central Banking in Ireland, 19221960. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan for the Central Bank of Ireland.

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O’Carroll, Cliona 2005. ‘Cold Beer, Warm Hearts’: Community, Belonging and Desire in Irish Pubs in Berlin. Drinking Cultures. Thomas M. Wilson, ed. Oxford: Berg. O’Dowd, Liam 2002. The Changing Significance of European Borders. Regional and Federal Studies 12 (4): 13-36. O’Dowd, Liam and Cathal McCall 2008. Escaping the Cage of Ethno-National Conflict in Northern Ireland? The Importance of Transnational Networks. Ethnopolitics 7 (1): 81-99. O’Kelly, Ciarán 2004. Being Irish. Government and Opposition 39 (3): 504–520. O’Toole, Fintan 2003. After the Ball. Dublin: Tasc at New Ireland. Prince, Simon 2007. Northern Ireland’s ‘68: Civil Rights, Global Revolt and the Origins of the Troubles. Dublin: Irish Academic Press. Ramsbotham, Oliver, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall 2005. Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts (2nd Edition). Oxford: Polity. Richardson, Jeremy John 2006. European Union: Power and Policy-making. London: Routledge. Seidman, Steven 1983. Liberalism and the Origins of European Social Theory. Berkeley: University of California Press. Shore, Cris 2000. Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration. London: Routledge. Smith, Anthony D. 1991. National Identity. London: Penguin. Snyder, Francis G. 2000. The Europeanisation of Law: The Legal Effects of European Integration. Oxford: Hart Publishing. Spohn, Willfried and Anna Triandafyllidou 2003. Europeanisation, National Identities, and Migration: Changes in Boundary Constructions between Western and Eastern Europe. London: Routledge. Walker, Brian Mercer 2005. The 1885 and 1886 General Elections in Ireland. History Ireland 13 (6): 36-4. Wilson, Thomas M. 1993. Frontiers Go but Boundaries Remain: The Irish Border as a Cultural Divide. Cultural Change and the New Europe: Perspectives on the European Community. Thomas M. Wilson and M. Estellie Smith, eds. Boulder: Westview Press. Wilson, Thomas M. 1996. Sovereignty, Identity and Borders: Political Anthropology and European Integration. Borders, Nations and States: Frontiers of Sovereignty in the New Europe. Liam O’Dowd and Thomas M. Wilson, eds. Aldershot: Avebury. Wilson, Thomas M. 2000. The Obstacles to European Union Regional Policy in the Northern Ireland Borderlands. Human Organization 59 (1): 1-10. Wilson, Thomas M. and Hastings Donnan 2006. The Anthropology of Ireland. Oxford: Berg Publishers. Wimmer, Andreas 1997. Explaining Xenophobia and Racism: A Critical Review of Current Research Approaches. Ethnic and Racial Studies 20 (1): 17-41.

EUROPEAN STUDIES 28 (2010): 41-57

RENARRATING IRISH POLITICS IN A EUROPEAN CONTEXT Richard Kearney Abstract In this chapter the models developed by Paul Ricoeur and Jurgen Habermas for appreciating the meaning and value of European integration are applied to the evolving British-Irish political constellation in the new European dispensation. The British-Irish political constellation in the new European dispensation fosters variable layers of compatible identification – regional, national and transnational – and provides the framework for the postnational hospitality envisaged by Habermas and Ricoeur. Introduction Ireland’s entry to the European Community (EEC) in 1973 signaled a new era in the country’s self-understanding and its understanding of its Siamese-twin, Great Britain. The Irish-British dialectic took a further turn in the signing of the Single European Act, when both nation-states agreed to a significant pooling of sovereignty with the other members of the community. These two moments of consent to the evolving process of European integration greatly helped to facilitate the ultimate reconciliation of Irish and British sovereignty claims in the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, a document approved by both National Parliaments allowing, for the first time in history, that citizens of Northern Ireland could be ‘British or Irish or both’. The same Agreement, significantly, also made provision for a British-Irish Council which looked forward to greater cooperation between the two divided communities in a transnational context. On that dramatic day when John Hume and David Trimble shook hands across historically entrenched barricades and borders, six hundred years of mutual hostilities came to an end. Since the

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notorious battles which pitched both island nations against each other were of European dimensions – Kinsale (Spanish), the Boyne (Dutch), the 1798 Uprising (French) – it was logical and fitting that the reconciliation of these ancient rivals should also be, ultimately, in a trans-national European context. I have written elsewhere of the details and implications of Irish-British rapprochement in a New Europe where the boundaries of nationstates are loosened and amplified to allow for greater regional (sub-national) and greater federal (supra-national) responsibility (1988, 1998, 2007). In this essay I would like to cite the ideas of two contemporary European philosophers, Paul Ricoeur (1996) and Jurgen Habermas (2001), who have, in my view, suggested inspiring models for appreciating the meaning and value of European integration. Though they do not mention Ireland as such I believe that their reflections have a significant bearing on the Irish-British constellation. And, I submit, that what pertains to the question of Northern Ireland also pertains to similar border disputes and identity conflicts in other communities of Europe – Basques, Bretons, Catalans, Cypriots, Serbs, Macedonians and Albanian Kosovars. Narrative hospitality and flexibility In an essay entitled ‘Reflections on a New Ethos for Europe’, Paul Ricoeur (1996) outlines a hermeneutic model of narrative hospitality. This involves, he says, ‘taking responsibility in imagination and in sympathy for the story of the other, through the life narratives which concern the other’ (1996: 7). In the context of a historically divided Europe, scarred by wars of religion, ethnicity and empire, this takes the form of an exchange between different people’s histoires (in the sense of both histories and stories). It calls for an art of transference and translation which allows us to welcome the story of the other, the stranger, the victim, the forgotten one. At the level of cultural and literary exchanges one might cite here (though Ricoeur does not) the way in which Irish writers of opposite sides used poetic imagination to empathize with the adversary – John Montague (Catholic nationalist) and John Hewitt (Protestant unionist) swapping stories of ‘Planter and Gael’, Frank McGuinness imagining the ‘sons of Ulster’ in the British-German battle of Verdun, or Brendan Kennelly getting into the mind of the national arch-enemy, Oliver Cromwell. At a political level, one thinks of how Irish Presidents, Mary Robin-

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son and Mary McAleese, participated in war memorials and inter-denominational religious ceremonies which con-celebrated communion with what was traditionally considered the ‘other community’. And these postnationalist gestures were reciprocated in kind from the British side. Ricoeur shows how acts of narrative hospitality call in turn for an ethic of narrative flexibility. Memorials face the challenge of resisting the reification of an historical event into a fixed dogma by showing how each event may be told in different ways by different generations and by different narrators. Not that everything becomes relative and arbitrary. On the contrary, acts of trauma and suffering call out for justice, and the best way of achieving this is often to invite empathy with strangers and adversaries by allowing for a plurality of narrative perspectives. The resulting overlap may thus lead to what Hans Georg Gadamer (1975) calls a ‘fusion of horizons’ where diverse horizons of consciousness may at last find some common ground; a reciprocal transfer between opposite minds. ‘The identity of a group, culture, people or nation, is not that of an immutable substance’, writes Ricoeur, ‘nor that of a fixed structure, but that, rather, of a recounted story’ (1996: 7). A hermeneutic exchange of stories effectively resists an arrogant or rigid conception of cultural identity which prevents us from perceiving the radical implications of the principle of narrativity – namely, ‘the possibilities of revising every story which has been handed down and of carving out a place for several stories directed towards the same past’ (1996: 7). The way in which numerous contentious events in Irish history – Battle of the Boyne, Battle of Wexford, Bloody Sunday, the Civil War – have been re-narrated by historians, writers, film makers and politicians to allow for a healthy rethinking of the origins and implications of these ‘foundational events’ is a case in point. Good examples of this are to be found in the New British History (and New Irish History) proposed by thinkers like Linda Colley, Benedict Anderson, Tom Nairn, IGA Poccok or Roy Foster, a more pluri-dimensional approach to historiography which widens the narrowly nationalist lens of British-Irish enmity to include regional and transnational horizons. This brings us to Ricoeur’s third suggestion for a new ‘ethos’ for Europe – that of narrative plurality. Pluralism here does not mean any lack of respect for the singularity of the event narrated through the various acts of remembering. It might even be said to increase our sense of awareness of the uniqueness of each event, especially if it is foreign to us

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in time, space or cultural provenance. ‘Recounting differently is not inimical to a certain historical reverence to the extent that the inexhaustible richness of the event is honored by the diversity of stories which are made of it, and by the competition to which that diversity gives rise’ (2006: 8). And Ricoeur adds this critical point: ‘The ability to recount the founding events of our national history in different ways is reinforced by the exchange of cultural memories. This ability to exchange has as a touchstone the will to share symbolically and respectfully in the commemoration of the founding events of other national cultures, as well as those of their ethnic minorities and their minority religious denominations’ (2006: 9). This point applies as much to events of pain and trauma (like those commemorated in Irish Famine or First World War memorials for example) as to events of triumph and glory. A fourth aspect of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic exchange of narratives is the transfiguring of the past. This involves a creative retrieval of the betrayed promises of the past, so that we may respond to our ‘debt to the dead’ and endeavor to give them a voice. The goal of historical narrativity is, therefore, to try to give a future to the past by remembering it in transformative ways, ethically and poetically. Ricoeur insists on this point: crucial to the act of reinterpreting transmitted traditions is the task of discerning past promises which have not been honored. For ‘the past is not only what is bygone – that which has taken place and can no longer be changed – it also lives in the memory thanks to arrows of futurity which have not been fired or whose trajectory has been interrupted’ (2006: 8). In other words, the unfulfilled future of the past – or what Habermas calls the ‘unfinished project’ of European history – may well signal the richest part of a tradition. Ricoeur claims that the emancipation of ‘this unfulfilled future of the past is the major benefit that we can expect from the crossing of memories and the exchange of narratives’ (2006: 8). It is especially the founding events of a national community – traumatic or dramatic – which require to be reread in this critical manner in order to unlock the potencies and expectancies which the subsequent unfolding of history may have forgotten or travestied. This is why any genuine memorial involves a certain return to some seminal moment of suffering or hope, to the original events and textual responses to those events, which are all too often occluded by Official History. ‘The past is a cemetery of promises which have not been kept’, notes Ricoeur. And

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generous rememorations can be ways of ‘bringing them back to life like the dry bones in the valley described in the prophecy of Ezekiel’ (2006: 9). A fifth and final moment in Ricoeur’s new ethos for Europe is pardon. If empathy and hospitality towards others and adversaries are crucial steps in the ethics of remembrance there is something more – something which entails moving beyond narrative imagination to forgiveness. In short, the exchange of stories of suffering demands more than sympathy and duty (though these are essential for any kind of justice). And this something ‘extra’ involves pardon in so far as pardon means ‘shattering the debt’. Here the order of justice and reciprocity can be supplemented, but not replaced, by that of ‘charity and gift’. Such forgiveness demands huge patience, an enduring practice of ‘working-through’, mourning and letting go. But it is not a forgetful forgiveness. Amnesty can never be based on amnesia. It remembers our debt to the dead while at the same time introducing something other, something difficult almost to the point of impossibility, but something all the more important for that reason. One thinks of Brandt kneeling at Warsaw, Havel’s apology to the Sudeten Germans, Hume’s and Trimble’s preparedness to speak with extreme Irish Republicans, Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, Hillesum’s refusal to hate her hateful persecutioners; all miraculous moments where an ethics of reciprocity is touched by a poetics of pardon. But I repeat: one does not replace the other – both justice and pardon are equally important in the act of remembering past trauma. ‘To the degree that charity exceeds justice we must guard against substituting it for justice. Charity remains a surplus; this surplus of compassion and tenderness is capable of giving the exchange of memories its profound motivation, its daring and its momentum’ (2006: 11). It is not difficult to see how Ricoeur’s European ethos of narrative exchange relates to the Irish-British context. What he is basically suggesting is that ‘if the end of art is peace’, as Seamus Heaney suggests, then politics will always need to be supplemented by culture. And culture here must be understood as both an ethics of historical judgment and a poetics of narrative fantasy. And the latter demands that we widen the frame of British-Irish hurt, inflamed by a long history of sovereignty neurosis, to include an exchange of narratives with the other communities of Europe to which we have always belonged and which we are now re-acknowledging as we move towards closer and deeper reintegration. For when we dare to visit the memorials dedicated to other peoples and

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communities (not our own), we are suddenly all famine sufferers, we are all holocaust victims, we are all casualties of the tragic wars of the European continent. Memory is not, alas, always on the side of the angels. Indeed sometimes we need to forget to remember or to remember to forget. In his book, Memory History and Forgetting, Ricoeur acknowledges the existence of several kinds of pathological memory – masked, blocked, fetishised, etc – and he sees it as a constant hermeneutic task to translate and transmute such disabling neuroses and traumas into more liberating forms of remembrance. If such emancipatory release sometimes comes in the guise of a gracious gift – as in Proust’s remembrance of times past – it frequently involves a laborious and painstaking ‘working through’ (Freud’s Durcharbeitung). Often memory enslaves and paralyses. Too much memory can indeed, as Brian Friel observed in his play of IrishBritish perceptions, Translations, become a form of ‘madness’ – a recipe for sterile repetition and revenge, unless we learn to ‘translate’ the past in a wise way. The task is to revisit the wounds of history so that, through acknowledgment of truth and possible forgiveness, we can begin to give a future to our past. Amnesty is not based on amnesia any more than it is based on repetition compulsion or the triumphalist propaganda of Official History. True pardon means we remember forward rather than backward. For only in that way, Ricoeur concludes, can history be retrieved as a laboratory of still unexplored possibilities rather than a mausoleum of dead facts. Any genealogy of Irish culture would do well to begin with the ancient Book of Invasions. For this earliest of Irish books serves as a reminder that the peoples of both Ireland and Britain are ‘mongrel islanders’ issuing from a countless series of Westward migrations from the continent of Europe. That is, after all, where the name Hibernia comes from: the most western point for immigrations and transplantions by numerous nations and tribes – fir bolg, tuatha de danann, milesians, Celts, Vikings, Danes, Normans, Anglo-Saxons. And this process of immigration and emigration between Ireland and the larger European community is still going on (the 2007 census of Polish and other Eastern Europeans living in Ireland speaks for itself). The dominant focus on the great 19th century Irish migrations in the direction of North America has often neglected the much older two-way migrations between Ireland and Europe. We remember, ritually, the celebrated Irish monks – Colum-

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banus, Gallus, Columba, Eriugena – heading off to re-evangelize Europe after the Dark Ages, or the Flight of the Earls after Kinsale, or Tone and the United Irishmen in Revolutionary France, or the exiled Catholic Colleges of Salamanca, Paris, Prague and Rome. But we forget much of the more constant and mundane exchanges between this western Isle and the great continent to our East over the centuries. Our membership in Europe invites us to re-narrate the question of national identity in a trans-national setting. By leaving home – literally or imaginatively – we can return home in a new way. The shortest route from self to self is through the other. And it is a two-way street. Identity and constitutional politics In The Postnational Constellation, Jurgen Habermas argues that in the third millennium postnationalism looks set to replace nationalism as a dominant political paradigm. The Twentieth century witnessed the break-up of the great national empires – British, French, Austro-Hungarian– as well as a number of devastating world wars resulting from the internecine rivalries between nation states. The terminal death-rattles of nationalist belligerence (on the European scene at any rate) sounded on the streets of Belfast where republicans and loyalists fought their last battles before finally reaching peace in 1998, and on the streets of Sarajevo and Kosovo where Balkan ethnicities clashed in genocidal hatred before an International accord was secured, at least for now. Widening the focus, the events of September 11, 2001, made it dramatically clear that wars of the 21st century cannot be confined to specific nation-states, or national empires, but traverse boundaries and borders with disturbing ease. Al Qaida is as post-nationalist as the ‘American Way of Life’ it targets. In several recent writings, the German philosopher, Jurgen Habermas, argues for what he calls a ‘postnational constellation’ as a response to the current political situation in Europe. Noting the erosion of the territorial sovereignty of nation-states, Habermas (2001) expresses the hope that this may open up a new space for 1) cultural hybridisation; 2) transnational mobility and emigration; 3) cosmopolitan solidarity, predicated on a neo-republican balance between private and civic liberties opposed to the neo-liberal disregard for social justice; and 4) constitutional patriotism (on a federal European scale inspired by principles of coordinated redistribution and egalitarian universalism).

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But Habermas is not naïve. He knows that such a postnational project faces many obstacles. One of the most challenging questions, he notes, is ‘whether the European Union can even begin to compensate for the lost competencies of the nation-state’ (2001: 90). And the related question of the EU’s ability to act effectively, motivating citizens towards social solidarity, will depend in turn, he argues, on ‘whether political communities form a collective identity beyond national borders, and thus whether they can meet the legitimate conditions for a postnational democracy’ (2001: 90). If these questions cannot be answered in the affirmative then no meaningful ‘Federal States of Europe’ is possible. Or in Habermas’ own words: ‘If Europe is to be able to act on the basis of an integrated, multilevel policy, then European citizens, who are initially characterized as such only by their common passports, will have to learn to mutually recognize one another as members of a common political existence beyond national borders’ (2001: 90).1 This calls for a radical rethinking of both 1) identity politics (the question of recognition and belonging); and 2) constitutional politics (the question of rights and justice). I fully agree with Habermas that the most promising context for such rethinking is that of a new postnational paradigm. Though I would insist that in the European context, at least, the idea of a postnational constellation is still very much a task, not a fait accompli. The European dispensation If most of our political conflicts and crises today are largely post-national in character so too, I submit, are the possible solutions. In pursuing my argument, let me return to the historic British-Irish Agreement of 1998, mentioned above, suggesting that it may serve as a litmus test for a new politics of peace at a pan-European level. What we are witnessing on the Irish-British archipelago today is little short of a revolution in our political understanding of the nation-state, marking the coming of age of two historically engaged peoples. With the ratification of the Good Friday Agreement in the spring of 1998, the sovereign governments of the UK and the Irish Republic signed away their exclusivist sovereignty claims over Northern Ireland. This signaled 1 See also Habermas’ development of this argument in ‘Why Europe Needs a Constitution’. Edgar Morin (2004) argues for a similarly postnational Europe, based on a federal/confederal model.

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the end of the constitutional territorial battle over the province of Ulster – that contentious piece of land conjoining and separating the islands of Britain and Ireland for centuries. The Siamese twins could now begin to live in a practicable peace, accepting that their adversarial offspring in Northern Ireland might at last be ‘British or Irish or both’ (The Belfast Agreement, 2). Unitary sovereignty could never be enjoyed by two separate nationstates over the same province at the same time. This is especially so if we were talking ‘absolutist’ sovereignty – and understood this to mean something like ‘one and indivisible’ (as defined by Hobbes, Bodin and Rousseau). The Agreement spelt the termination of the age-old conflict between a United Kingdom and a United Ireland: a conflict made inevitable by the fact that two into one won’t go. The British and Irish nation-states are now compelled to redefine themselves in the new European dispensation. The ‘hyphen’ has been reinserted into their relations, epitomised in the new British-Irish Council of Isles (BIC) which had its first meeting on 18 December 1999, and whose aim, as the Belfast Agreement tells us, is ‘to promote the harmonious and mutually beneficial development of the totality of relationships among the peoples of the British and Irish islands’. Membership of the Council is drawn from the British and Irish governments, the devolved assemblies of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the Isle of Man and the Channel. It acknowledges the fact that the citizens of both islands are inextricably intermingled thanks to centuries of internal migration, cultural borrowing and political exchange (positive and negative). And it purports to deal with a whole range of common interests running from trans-European policies of environment and transport to the knowledge economy (see, for example, the meeting held in Jersey on 15 June 2002). Speaking at the launch of the BIC in Lancaster House in 1999, then Prime Minister Tony Blair described its inaugural session as ‘an extraordinary and historical event that we have all the people of these islands finally coming together and saying we share certain things in common, that we can resolve our differences. The British and Irish people feel closer together now than at any time in their lifetime’.2 And the veteran Scottish political theorist, Tom Nairn, hailed it as ‘an imagined community disconcertingly different from anything in the political arsenal of the 2

Cited in Dworkin 2007.

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old British State’ (New Left Review, 2001).3 The fact that the BIC was able to secure the enthusiastic support of not only both sovereign governments but also of the two leaders of the traditionally opposed republican and unionist communities of Ulster – John Hume and David Trimble – was decisive. And it is significant that this sharing of sovereignty was actively and enthusiastically supported by the European community whose dual aspirations to great transnational and regional authority were being enacted in this historic gesture of cooperation. The sea-change signaled by the establishment of the BIC was reflected in a radical paradigm shift in the constitutional relations between the two islands. The Irish government endorsed the removal of articles 2 and 3 from the Constitution of the Republic (a move ratified by the vast majority of the electorate); while the British government redrafted the 1922 Government of Ireland Act and held referenda to establish regional assemblies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The zero-sum game of mutually exclusive ‘national identities’ was over. The utopian dream of a federal Europe of regions was taking a further step towards realization on its westernmost extremity. The emerging post-nationalist scenario permits, for the first time in history, that citizens of Northern Ireland profess differing degrees of allegiance to an expanding range of identifications: from regional townland, parish or province to national constitution (British or Irish or both) and, larger still, to the trans-national union of Europe. As John Hewitt presciently wrote to his fellow Ulster poet, John Montague: ‘I always maintained that our loyalties had an order: to Ulster, to Ireland, to the British archipelago, to Europe, and that anyone who skipped a step or missed a link falsified the total’4. This scenario of extending circles of identity corresponds felicitously, in my view, with the political paradigm of ‘subsidiarity’ which has become part of the new European thinking, particularly since the visionary Presidency of Jacques Delors in the 1980s and 1990s. The term ‘subsidiarity’ refers to the principle and practice of never taking a decision at a higher level that can be taken at a lower level. So the ever ascending and descending levels of political responsibility could be said to chime well with the cultural model of mobile, overlapping identities outlined by the Ulster poets, Hewitt and Heaney. Though originally 3 4

See also by Nairn: After Britain (2000) and The Break-Up of Britain (1977). http://library.ulster.ac.uk/craine/hewitt/work.htm (accessed 20/02/2010).

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deriving from Catholic social philosophy, the concept of subsidiarity has, of course, assumed its own special significance (beyond all denominational or confessional partisanship) in both the aspirational and actual exercise of power in the European parliament and by extension, in the increasing provisions for regional, subnational decision-making. There is little doubt that the future success of a post-national European project will depend greatly on the degree to which the model of subsidiarity is positively adopted, both politically and culturally, throughout the expanded community. For the larger the European Union becomes – as it moves eastwards and southwards – the more urgent the need to devolve and share sovereignty and power. Postnational sovereignty The British-Irish ‘Council of Isles’ is now a reality. This third spoke of the 1998 Agreement’s wheel – alongside the internal Northern Ireland Assembly and the North-South cross-border bodies – harbors enormous promise. What the trans-national model effectively recognizes is that citizens of Britain and Ireland are inextricably bound up with each other – mongrel islanders from East to West sharing an increasingly common civic and economic space in a European context. In addition to the obvious contemporary overlapping of our sports and popular cultures, we are becoming more mindful of how much of our respective histories are shared: from the old Celtic, Viking and Norman settlements to our contemporary belonging to the European community. For millennia the Irish Sea served as a waterway connecting our two islands, only rarely as a cordon sanitaire keeping us apart. And this is becoming true again in our own time with over 40,000 trips being made daily across the Irish Sea, in both directions. It is not entirely surprising then that over eight million citizens of the United Kingdom today claim Irish origin, with over four million of these having an Irish parent. Indeed a recent survey shows that only 6% of British people consider Irish people living in Britain to be foreigners. And we don’t need reminding that almost a quarter of the inhabitants of the island of Ireland claim to be at least part British. Finally, at a symbolic level, few can fail to have been moved by the recent unprecedented image of the President of the Irish Republic, Mary MacAleese, standing beside the Queen of England on the battlefield of Flanders commemorating their respective dead – Irish and British.

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In light of this reawakening to our common memories and experiences, it was not surprising to find Tony Blair receiving a standing ovation from both houses of the Parliament of the Irish Republic on 26 November 1998, in the wake of the Good Friday Agreement. Such a visitation had not occurred for over a century, and the ghost of Gladstone was not entirely absent from the proceedings. Blair acknowledged openly on this occasion that Britain was at last leaving its ‘post-colonial malaise’ behind it and promised that a newly confident Republic and a more decentralised UK would have more common tasks in the scenario of European convergence than any other two member states. East-West reciprocity was back on track for the first time since the divisive Statutes of Kilkenny. The Irish-British rapprochement may be seen as both a confirmation and prefiguration of postnational Europe. Though rarely acknowledged at the official or constitutional level, a practical form of joint-sovereignty has been endorsed by the Irish and British peoples. The pluralisation of national identity, epitomised by the provision of the BIC, entails a radical redefinition of the hallowed notion of sovereignty. In essence, it signals the deterritorialisation of national sovereignty – namely, the attribution of sovereignty to peoples rather than land. (A fact which finds symbolic correlation in the Agreement’s extension of national ‘belonging’ to embrace the Irish diaspora now numbering over 70 million world wide). Of course, this deterritorialising process is not confined to the British and Irish experience. It applies also to the significant diasporas of other European nations from their native lands to adopted countries abroad – one thinks of how the Italians and the Poles, for example, settled in North America while retaining substantial identity-links with their homeland. And in a curious, if somewhat different sense, it is timely to recall here how the attribution of sovereignty to peoples rather than land became a basic tenet of law under the Federal Republic of Germany after World War II, both as a way of taking account of the territorial division of Germany and the devolution of power to sub-national regions or Lander. Contrary to what many continue to believe, ‘land’ is chronologically and historically a much older criterion for sovereignty than ethnic or civic (that is, national or constitutional) identity. The deterritorializing and pooling of sovereignty in the new European project is therefore a wager which carries substantial stakes. If the wager fails, the consequences could be dramatic and, I would submit,

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dangerous. The fatal realignment of sovereignty with ethnic purity in the recent history of the Balkans surely serves as a powerful reminder. The term sovereignty (from the Latin superanus) referred, in its original European context, to the supreme power of a divine ruler, before being delegated to divinely elected ‘representatives’ in this world – kings, pontiffs, emperors, monarchs – and, finally, to the ‘people’ in most modern states. A problem arose, however, in that many modern European democracies recognize the existence of several different peoples within a single state. And many peoples mean many centers of sovereignty. Yet the traditional concept of sovereignty, as already noted, was always unitary, that is, ‘one and indivisible’ (Rousseau’s Social Contract). Whence the dilemma: how divide the indivisible? This is why, today, sovereignty has become one of the most controversial concepts in European political theory and international law, intimately related to issues of state government, national independence and minority rights. Inherited notions of absolutist sovereignty are being challenged from both within nation-states and by developments in international legislation. With the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, followed by the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Charter of the UN, significant restrictions on the actions of nation-states were laid down. A system of international checks and balances was introduced limiting the right of sovereign states to act as they pleased in all matters. Moreover, the increasing interdependence of European states – accompanied by a sharing of sovereignties in the interests of greater peace, social justice, economic exchange and information technology – qualified the very principle of absolute sovereignty. ‘The people of the world have recognized that there can be no peace without law, and that there can be no law without some limitations on sovereignty. They have started, therefore, to pool sovereignties to the extent needed to maintain peace; and sovereignty is being increasingly exercised on behalf of the peoples of the world not only by national governments but also by organisations of the world community’(‘Sovereignty’, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 11, 57). If this pertains to the ‘peoples of the world’ generally, how much more does it pertain to the peoples of the islands of Britain and Ireland? This is why I argued in Postnationalist Ireland (1997) for a surpassing of the existing nation-states in the direction of both an Irish-British Council and a federal Europe of regions. The nation-state has become too large and too small as a model of government; too large for the growing needs

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of regional participatory democracy; too small for the increasing drift towards transnational exchange and power-sharing. Hence my invocation of the Nordic Council as a model for resolving our sovereignty disputes – in particular the way in which these five nation-states and three autonomous regions succeeded in sorting out territorial conflicts, declaring the Aland and Spitsbergen islands as Europe’s two first demilitarized zones. Could we not do likewise under the aegis of a new trans-national BritishIrish Council, declaring Northern Ireland a third demilitarized zone?5 That the Blair government was prepared to grasp the sovereignty nettle and acknowledge the inevitable long-term dissemination of Britain, qua absolute centralized state, was to its credit. But it is not a decision taken in a vacuum. There were, of course, precedents for sovereigntysharing in Britain’s recent experience, including Westminster’s consent to a limitation and dilution of sovereign national power in its subscription to the European Convention on Human Rights, the Single European Act, the European Common Defence policy. If Britain had been able to pool sovereignty in these ways with the other nation-states of the EU, surely it was only logical to do so with its closest neighbor, the Irish Republic. Moreover, the EU principles of subsidiarity and local democPrior to the Belfast Agreement of 1998 such sovereignty sharing was mainly opposed by British nationalism which went by the name of Unionism. It was, ironically, the Irish republican tradition (comprising all democratic parties in the Irish Republic, as well as the SDLP and Sinn Féin in the North) which was usually labeled ‘nationalist’, even though the most uncompromising nationalists in the vexed history of Northern Ireland have been the Unionists. It was the latter, after all, who clung to an anachronistic notion of undiluted British sovereignty, refusing any compromise with their Irish neighbours; until Tony Blair blew the whistle and moderate unionism realized the tribal march was over. The final showdown probably came when the Unionists faced off against Her Majesty’s Army in Drumcree, prepared to do combat with the very Crown to which they swore unconditional loyality. At that fateful moment it must have dawned on even the most fervid loyalist that the United Kingdom was no longer united. By contrast, John Hume’s ‘new republicanism’ – a vision of shared sovereignty between the different peoples of this island – had little difficulty with the new ‘post-nationalist’ scenario. Indeed Hume had called himself a ‘post-nationalist’ for many years without many taking heed. And, curiously, one might even argue that Michael Collins was himself something of a post-nationalist when he wrote that as a ‘free and equal country’ Ireland would be willing to ‘cooperate in a free association on all matters which would be naturally the common concern of two nations, living so closely together’ as part of a ‘real league of nations of the World’ (Manchester Guardian, December 1921). A sentiment echoed by Linda Colley in her Downing Street address on the status of Britishness in the wake of the Belfast Agreement, where she concluded that ‘these islands may actually move closer together in the next century’ (‘Britishness in the 21st Century’, 10 Downing Street Magazine, London, 1999). 5

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racy, promoted in the European Charter of Self-Government, already signaled a real alternative to the clash of British-Irish nationalisms that had bedeviled Ulster for decades. The implications of the Good Friday Agreement are especially relevant here: the conflict of sovereignty claims exercised over the same territory by two independent governments – issuing in decades of violence – is now superseded by a postnational paradigm of intergovernmental power. The dual identities of British-Irish relations have long belied the feasibility of ‘unitary’ forms of government and shown the necessity of separating the notion of nation (identity) from that of state (sovereignty) and even, to some extent, from that of land (territory). Such a separation is, I submit, a precondition for allowing the co-existence of different communities in the same society; and, by extension, amplifying the models of identity to include more pluralist forms of association – namely, a British-Irish Council, a European network of Regions, and the Irish and British diasporas in global context. In sum, it is becoming abundantly clear that Bossuet’s famous seventeenth century definition of the nation as a perfect match of people and place – where citizens ‘lived and died in the land of their birth’ – is no longer tenable. Conclusion The fact is there are no pristine nations around which definitive state boundaries – demarcating exclusivist sovereignty status – can be fixed. (Germany’s attempts to do this from Bismark to Hitler led to successive and disastrous wars). The Belfast Agreement recognized the historic futility of both British and Irish constitutional claims on Northern Ireland as a natural and necessary part of their respective ‘national territories’. Instead, the Council of Isles (BIC) and the EU’s Regional Charter call for a network of interconnecting regional assemblies guaranteeing parity of esteem for cultural and political diversity and an effective comanagement of such practical common concerns as transport, environment, social equity and e-commerce. We are being challenged to abandon our mutually reinforcing myths of mastery (largely British) and martyrdom (largely Irish) and to face our more mundane post-imperial, postnationalist reality in a new European constellation. Might the BIC not, as Simon Partridge suggests, even serve as an inspiration to other parts of Europe, like the Balkans and Cyprus, still embroiled in the devastations of ethnic and religious nationalism?

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What the vision of a postnational Europe allows, in short, is that the irrepressible need for identity and allegiance be gradually channeled away from the fetish of the nation-state, where history has shown its tenure to be insecure and belligerent, to more appropriate levels of regional and federal expression. In the Irish-British context, this means that citizens of these islands may come to express their identity less in terms of rival sovereign nation-states and more in terms of: a) locally empowered provinces (Ulster, Scotland, Wales, North and South England, the Republic, etc); and b) larger trans-national associations (the BIC, EU, European Court etc). The new European dispensation, I repeat, fosters variable layers of compatible identification – regional, national and transnational – allowing anyone in Northern Ireland, to cite our chosen example, to declare allegiance to a) the Ulster region, b) the Irish and/or British nation, and c) European community. Citizens of these islands might, I suggest, do better to think of themselves as mobile mongrel citizens of Europe than as eternal dwellers of two pure, god-given nation-states. There is no such thing as primordial nationality. If the nation is indeed a hybrid construct, an ‘imagined community’, then it can be re-imagined again in alternative versions. The task is to embrace this process of hybridisation from which we derive and to which we are committed willy-nilly. In the face of nationalist resurgences in certain parts of Europe today, fired by rhetorics of purity and purification, we do well to remember that we are all interdependent, ethnically and culturally mixed up. If we can acknowledge this, the postnational hospitality envisaged by political philosophers like Jurgen Habermas and Paul Ricoeur need no longer be considered a utopian dream but a practical necessity.

References Dworkin, Dennis 2007. ‘Intellectual Adventures in the Isles: Kearney and the Ireland Peace Process’. Traversing the Imaginary: Richard Kearney and the Postmodern Challenge. John Manoussakis and Peter Gratton, eds. Chicago: Northwestern University Press. Gadamer, Hans-Georg 1975. Truth and Method. London: Sheed and Ward. Habermas, Jurgen 2001. The Postnational Constellation. Cambridge: Polity Press. Kearney, Richard 1988. Across the Frontiers: Ireland in the 1990s. Dublin: Wolfhound Press.

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Kearney, Richard 1998. Postnationalist Ireland. London and New York: Routledge. Kearney, Richard 2007. Navigations: Collected Irish Essays 1977-2007. Dublin: Lilliput Press. Morin, Edgar 1984. Penser L’Europe. Paris: Gallimard. Morin, Edgar 1994. La Complexité Humaine. Paris: Flammarion. Nairn, Tom 1977. The Break-Up of Britain. London: New Left Books. Nairn, Tom 2000. After Britain. London: Granta. Nairn, Tom 2001. Farewell Britannia: Break-up or New Union?. New Left Review 7: 55-74. Ricoeur, Paul 1996. Reflections on a New Ethos for Europe. Paul Ricoeur: The Hermeneutics of Action. Richard Kearney, ed. London: Sage.

EUROPEAN STUDIES 28 (2010): 59-93

BECOMING EUROPEAN: NATIONAL IDENTITY, SOVEREIGNTY AND EUROPEANISATION IN IRISH POLITICAL CULTURE1 Brian Girvin Abstract This chapter explores Ireland’s complex relationship with Europe since the end of the Second World War. For the most part Irish opinion was indifferent to Europe until the United Kingdom applied for membership of the EEC in 1961. In response to this, Irish attitudes to Europe changed and support for membership remained very high in comparative terms until very recently. The chapter examines Irish mass attitudes to Europe at a number of levels and suggests that there is little evidence for the emergence of a European identity among the Irish public. In so far as a European identity exists it is weak and secondary when compared to Irish identity. Identity remains located in the territorial concept of the nation-state and is not challenged by the evolution of the European Union. However, when developments in Europe are conceived as threats to Irish identity, as proved to be the case during the Nice and Lisbon referendums, Irish attitudes can become sceptical to European integration.

1 This paper was researched while I was a visiting scholar at the University of Aarhus, Denmark in 2006. This was facilitated by the generous award of a Research Fellowship by the Royal Society of Edinburgh.

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I ‘In the EEC we can, by becoming better Europeans,become better Irishmen’ (Jack Lynch, 20 December 1972)2. This claim by the Taoiseach immediately before Ireland joined the EEC in January 1973 represents one vision of Ireland and Europe. He suggests that by becoming part of Europe, Ireland would not lose its identity but indeed that its Irishness would be enhanced. This remains a firmly held view by those in Ireland who actively support European integration and has been expressed in public statements and documents for over thirty five years of membership of what is now the European Union.3 However, very little time has been spent in examining what this conceptualisation means or how being more European can be reconciled with being more Irish. While the term Irish is not without controversy, there are a limited number of versions available and widely used.4 This is not the case with the terms Europe and Europeanisation. There is widespread disagreement concerning the use of these concepts, their political content and indeed the territory to which they might apply. Does Europe as a geographical concept include all of continental Europe from the Urals to the Atlantic; indeed, does it include Britain and Ireland? Where do we locate Turkey or Israel in this meaning? Likewise, in political terms Europe has had many meanings and no one political sense, at least until very recently. If Europe is politically defined in terms of democratic governance where does that place contemporary Russia, never mind the former Soviet Union? A cultural definition can cause even greater confusion as this is a particularly complex area. We might talk about a European cultural tradition, but this is vague and generally unhelpful (See Rose 1996: 3-17; Smith 1991: 14377). Is Beethoven German, European or neither? While Europe has been a contested notion historically and in contemporary debate it is probably realistic to agree that the most widespread usage of the term in the twenty-first century refers to the EU and its member-states. This does not exhaust the term but it does give it a very 2 The statement was made during radio interview with the BBC; transcript can be found in National Archives of Ireland Department of the Taoiseach (NAIDT) S 18523T. 3 I will use the terms European Economic Community (EEC), European Communities (EC) and European Union (EU) where relevant as the usage has changed over the years. 4 Thus it might be asked if unionists/Protestants living in Northern Ireland are Irish or should they be described as British (Mac Gréil 1996: 232-53).

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real intuitional focus that has widespread appeal. The EU appears at times to be ubiquitous, especially in an Irish context. Yet the European project appears to challenge many of the ideological certainties that have been central to traditional European politics. At the heart of Europe the sovereign nation state has been the dominant political form for over 300 years and nationalism in the sense defined by Ernest Gellner (1983: 1) that the ‘people and the national unit should be congruent’ has been the foundation of political order.5 Is this about to change and if so how? One of the most controversial claims by some advocates of the European Union has been that the nation-state system will be replaced by a new supranational political form that will acquire the competences associated with the existing state system (a United States of Europe). This is often associated with the belief that a European identity will emerge with at least equal status to current national identities if not actually replace them (Sinnott 1995: 11-32; Duchesne and Frognier 1995: 193-266; Hutchinson 1994: 134-63). Much of this thinking is utopian in the sense that it presumes a better future and alternative to the existing reality – this possible future is to be preferred to the actually existing present. In a recent article, which summarises more detailed work, Ulrich Beck (2008) captures both the strength and fundamental utopianism of this project: The decline of the nation-state is really a decline of the specifically national content of the state and an opportunity to create a cosmopolitan state system that is better able to deal with the problems that all nations face in the world today. Economic globalisation, transnational terrorism, global warming: the litany is familiar and daunting. There are a host of problems that are clearly beyond the power of the old order of nation-states to cope with. The answer to global problems that are clearly gathering ominously all around and that refuse to yield to nation-state solutions is for politics to take a quantum leap from the nation-state system to the cosmopolitan state system. Politics needs to regain credibility in order to craft real solutions. More than anywhere else in the world, Europe shows that this step is possible. Europe teaches the modern world that the political evolution of states and state systems is by no means at an end. National realpolitik is becoming unreal, not only in Europe, but throughout the world. It is turning into a lose-lose game. Europeanisation means creating a new politics. It means entering as a player into the meta-power game, into the struggle to form the rules of a

5 This characterisation is not without ambiguity as most ‘nation-states’ are actually multi-national states, as is the case with the United Kingdom or Spain for example.

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This sense of urgency is not a new phenomenon in discussions of Europeanisation (see also Dunn 1994: 3-15). The hope of the early advocates of European integration was that the divisions and enmity associated with nationalism would be replaced by something more harmonious which would transcend the nation-state system. Altiero Spinelli (1972), later a European Commissioner and one of the architects of the European Communities (EC), pursues the utopian project in classical style. He seeks examples in the past that provide support for the view being developed and attempts to establish a historical lineage for the objective. The ghosts of Charlemagne and the Holy Roman Empire hang over much of this normative historiography. Then there is the catalyst; it is in this case the Second World War. According to Spinelli, the ‘idol of the national state’ now ‘aroused disgust and fell to pieces’. This led to the ‘downfall’ of the ‘sovereign national state’ and there emerged politicians who could give voice to this disgust by building on older non-nationalist and Catholic traditions (Kaiser 2007).6 This argument can be summarised in Spinelli’s (1972: 43-68) own words: If the respect of the public and of rulers for national sovereignty has fallen, this is also true for administrative, social and economic bodies. Such bodies, which are normally profoundly interested in the maintenance of sovereignty and to whom the system of national states usually gives a strong voice in the conduct of the political life of the state, found themselves in full decline at the end of the war.

Accordingly, this was not just a moment of uncertainty after a major crisis according to this view, but a new phase in the history of Europe analogous to Beck’s ‘quantum leap’. Yet even Spinelli acknowledged that this was not to be but he remains puzzled why the prescription was not more widely accepted. Like all utopians he blames others for the failure to realise the aims of the laudable objective; perfidious Albion, self serving governments and the failure of federalists to persuade the masses of their programme. Yet a simpler explanation might be available and that is that the diagnosis was inaccurate if not entirely wrongheaded. However, this was not readily admitted by observers. Ernst Haas for example could 6 Spinelli notes that it was no accident that the earliest advocates of integration were Catholic politicians such as Schuman, Adenauer and De Gasperi (see Kaiser 2007).

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claim that ‘the established nation-state is in full retreat in Europe’ and the European Commission could declare that the completion of the Customs Union on 1 July 1968 ‘will certainly go down as a milestone in the history of Europe’. This optimism was challenged by the intervention of de Gaulle’s nationalism within the EEC during the 1960s. By the time the European Commission issued its milestone declaration the objective of European Integration was in tatters. His ruthless pursuit of French national interest brought the institution to its knees and only major concessions to General de Gaulle maintained the structure intact (Vanke 2006: 141-65). The later decision to admit the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland changed the nature of the EC irrevocably. Stanley Hoffmann’s seminal article (Hoffman 1966: 862-915) posed the question in starker terms: was the European nation-state becoming obsolete or did it remain an obstinate institution? Unlike other writers, Hoffmann was more cautious in his analysis of the probability of the nation-state becoming obsolete while attempting to identify the circumstances in which this might occur. As a consequence he did not presume that the nation-state would fade away but recognised that this would require political action. Thus he suggests that support for political integration would have to be widespread, that issues of a transnational character would be salient to both the elites and the masses, that political parties and other political bodies would be engaged actively in the debate and supportive of it. At the heart of this argument rests the view that there must be mass popular support for integration as well as an active integrationist elite. The continuing existence of the nation-state would be maintained and supported if national consciousness remained strong and if the state remained the focus for loyalty and identification. This, more subtle, assessment was lost on Euro-enthusiasts who continued to juxtapose European integration and the nation-state as irreconcilables. Thirty years later Wallace (1994: 52-76) restated the conventional view that ‘the harrowing experience of a Second World War brought a wave of revulsion against the mutual identification of nation and state’. By the time he wrote Milward (1992) had challenged this claim in considerable detail and demonstrated clearly that European integration was an arrangement that expressed the national interest of the participants. Furthermore, he argued that rather than challenge the existence of the nation-state, European integration had rescued the nation-state. Wallace acknowledged the strength of Milward’s research but refused to accept

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the logic of it. He claimed that in the 1990s ‘the European nation state is in retreat’ and is unlikely to be again rescued.7 It is possible to recast Milward further and suggest that in fact the nation-state was already well established as the main institutional structure in 1945 and may not have needed to be rescued. Mann (1997) has suggested that the Second World War did not involve the defeat of the nation-state idea but the defeat of one version of it; Nazism and Fascism with their authoritarianism and racial extremism were replaced by a more moderate and ‘modest nationstate’. Not only did this version prove victorious but it provided the political and institutional model for post war world in Europe and elsewhere. Furthermore, Mann argues, persuasively in my view, that the dominance of this form is not seriously challenged by globalisation or other supposed threats in the contemporary world. If nothing else the relationship between the existing state system and its individual components parts, the nation-state, and Europe is to say the least problematic and complex. II Ireland provides an important case study of these relationships. Although not in the first wave of European integration, the state applied in 1961 and joined in 1973. Ireland’s engagement with Europe has been a long and complex one. The Europe that Ireland was most closely associated with was Catholic, represented by the Pope, Spain and until 1789, France. This relationship was conservative, anti-Protestant and restorationist. In the context of Ireland’s relation to England this Europe often appears as a saviour. There is however an important shift in Irish opinion in response to the French Revolution. The dominant Catholic view was anti-revolutionary; best expressed by Daniel O’Connell, the most successful Irish politician in the early nineteenth century. O’Connell was familiar with Europe and a child of the Enlightenment, but his rejection of the revolution drew him closer to England and to British liberal opinion rather than the European radical tradition. A closer identification with the United States also occurred after the Fam-

7 It should be noted that Milward does not deny that Europeanisation takes place but suggests that it is in the individual state’s interest to participate and that the process does not challenge the sovereignty of the state.

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ine, due to mass emigration there.8 This reorientation reflected the integration of Ireland into the British union in the nineteenth century, though in the case of Catholic Ireland this was achieved in a negative fashion when compared to Scotland. As a consequence Europe had a much narrower meaning for Irish opinion, largely focussed on the Pope and the Church rather than Catholic Europe per se. Nationalist public opinion overwhelmingly supported Pope Pius IX in his struggle with Garibaldi and the Risorgimento. An ‘Irish Brigade’ was formed to defend the Vatican states and support the secular power of the Pope in 1860 (O’Brien 2005: 289-305). This special relationship with Catholicism did not decline over the next 100 years. In 1948, Irish opinion was again mobilised in defence of the faith, when it was feared that the Italian Communist Party might win the general election. Pope Pius XII supported the Christian Democratic Party (DC) and a campaign of support for the party led to a major fund raising campaign in Ireland (Cooney 1999: 218-22). When the (informal) Committee on the Constitution (1967) reported, one of the most important influences on its deliberations was the Documents produced by the Second Vatican council. By 1967, however, Catholicism was not the only European influence present in Ireland. In 1961 the Irish government had taken the dramatic step to apply for membership of the EEC and in 1973 was admitted in the first expansion of that organisation. The EEC created challenges that were quite different from those of Catholicism. The Irish state and public opinion had to come to terms with the loss of sovereignty associated with the Treaty of Rome, as well as the prospect of further integration implicit in the concept of ‘ever closer union’. In 1961 the Irish government had little awareness of how radical the European challenge was; not only to sovereignty but also to national identity. Even when giving public expression to the political aspects of Europe, the official view continued to give priority to the economically positive aspects of the EEC and downgraded the political aspects of the institutions (Government of Ireland 1970). A review of Ireland’s relationship with European integration between 1945 and 1961 highlights some of the problems and dilemmas facing a 8 I am using Ireland as shorthand for nationalist Ireland or for independent Ireland after 1922. This does not imply that the term Ireland can be reduced to this and does not ignore the presence of British identity in Ireland, especially within Northern Ireland.

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small isolated and nationalist community on the periphery of Europe. One of the key dilemmas for all states is the extent to which they are prepared to give up existing advantages for future gains. This decision will depend on how averse to risk a state is and how influential certain interests are within the state. Various studies have demonstrated that many European states welcomed closer cooperation within the region after 1945, though only six of them took the radical step of signing the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The impact of the depression, National Socialism and World War II created opportunities and challenges for most if not all continental European states, while the Cold War and the threat from the Soviet Union provided a further incentive to cooperate. Yet not all states cooperated, nor did they do so in the same way. Most states were members of the Council of Europe and virtually all benefited from the Marshall Plan and became members of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). Fewer were members of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and fewer still the EEC. Thus while all states were influenced in their decision making by the experience of the period 1929 to 1945 and the division of Europe, the decision to join one or other European institutions rested on a balance of judgement between external pressure and opportunity, as well as an assessment of national interest. The Netherlands were enthusiastic Europeans, being a founder member of the EEC. Britain was an active member of NATO but a reluctant European. Finland did not join NATO and remained outside most of the cooperative initiatives due to its difficult relationship with the Soviet Union (Paavonen 200: 218-38).9 For Ireland the end of World War II and the period of post war recovery did not pose the same challenges as in continental Europe. There were certainly challenges, but paradoxically the lessons drawn for the period from 1932 to 1945 were positive rather than negative. Nationalism, military neutrality and a degree of aloofness if not isolation were positively affirmed by the government and general population. Ireland had not been seriously affected by the depression, while its neutrality had protected it from the worst of the wartime destruction (see Girvin 1989, 2006 for discussion). The European case is a complex one, but Ireland was not challenged in this way. Nationalism remained the key feature of the political culture, while economic nationalism was the favoured policy 9

Finland remained outside the OEEC but was a member of GATT.

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instrument for nearly two decades after 1945. Irish policy makers were broadly in agreement that little had to change at the end of the war. There was a consensus on Ireland’s future evolution and this included further industrial development (using tariff protection), the reunification of the island into a single state, and the revival of the Irish language. These policies emphasised continuity rather than change and they were to be the cornerstone of much of the public debate that took place subsequently. Ireland was thus largely unaffected by the reaction against nationalism or by the ‘failure’ of its state to protect and provide for its population. In Ireland neither intellectuals, the political elite or the mass of the population were disillusioned by nationalism and indeed continued to believe that Irish national interest was bound up with the pursuit of nationalist goals by the state (Girvin 2002). Ireland’s attitude to Europe after 1945 has been described as ‘nostalgic, warm and idealised’. Britain and the Soviet Union were not considered to be in Europe, if for different reasons, and knowledge of individual European states was sparse if not ill-informed. The Vatican loomed large for most Irish people due to the Papacy, and Catholic places of pilgrimage (such as Lourdes or Fatima) were the focus of much attention (Hederman 1983: 11-20). Larger European movements such as Christian Democracy were not important for the Irish post war understanding of Europe and political models were more likely to be adopted from Britain or the United States than from continental Europe. In welfare policy, for example, the influence of Britain was considerably stronger than that of Christian democracy or Catholic corporatism (Carey 2007). Although Ireland became a Republic in 1949 and left the British Commonwealth, one of the paradoxes of Irish post-war history is that the independent state became even more dependent on its relationship with Britain and more integrated into its economy. Irish diplomatic priority was bound up with its relationship with the UK; its relationship with the US was naïve and sentimental; while the Vatican was a source of spiritual identification that is difficult to quantify. Ireland was a relatively new state in 1945 and its response to the European crisis can in part be attributed to state building and constitution making between 1922 and 1945. However, it is strange that when circumstances changed radically after 1945 successive governments were either not willing or not able to adapt to these new circumstances. Ireland’s foreign policy was focussed on its relationship with Britain and

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largely ignored developments in Europe. The partition issue remained the primary concern of the political elite throughout the post war years. Economically the Irish economy was an extension of Britain for all practical purposes. While economic nationalism during the 1930s had damaged some of the close relations between the two states, many remained. There was a currency union between the two states, a common labour market and a common travel zone. Irish citizens had the right to vote in British elections and in each case individuals were not treated as foreign. British and American media were pervasive and there was a common intellectual climate between the two islands. Despite political independence, Irish citizens took what was in effect an informal union for granted and it continued after Ireland left the Commonwealth in 1949. Despite sharing this common economic and cultural space, Ireland was careful to maintain a political distance from its more powerful neighbour especially in respect of Northern Ireland and Europe.10 The political culture of post-war Ireland contributed to isolationism which was always implicit in its nationalism, but the changes in European politics reinforced these tendencies. There were few changes in either foreign or domestic policy making during the first two post-war decades. Other Western European states had to reconsider their domestic and foreign policy imperatives, most of which changed in the light of circumstances and a re-assessment of national interest. The Danes and Norwegians reluctantly joined NATO when a Nordic defence alliance would have been more politically acceptable to them.11 Some recent studies have questioned the extent to which Ireland was isolationist. Irish foreign policy, for example, has been characterised as ‘effectively Atlanticist’ and membership of the Council of Europe has been described as providing a forum for the Irish government to ‘become increasingly pro-European as the need to develop Ireland’s economy brought Ireland closer to Europe’ (Kennedy and O’Halpin 2000: 11, 17). The origins of ‘Ireland’s involvement in European integration’ have been located in the Marshall Plan and the OEEC (Geiger 2000: 222-46), while This is not the place to pursue this issue, but the Irish informal union with the UK is one that I am exploring in a project with colleagues at the University of Aarhus, Denmark: ‘Small States in Europe’. 11 I am grateful to Professor Thorsten B. Olesen at the University of Aarhus for sharing his work on post-war Denmark with me and alerting me to the Norwegian position. 10

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its impact on the Irish diplomatic service is interpreted in broadly positive terms. Another view is that Ireland used various institutions to interact positively with ‘the emerging challenge of multilateralism’ (Murphy 2004: 81-101). The Irish diplomatic service was certainly more active in post war Europe and especially after the Marshall Plan, but this activism should not be equated with policy change. As late as 1961 Ireland was institutionally one of the most isolated states in Western Europe. While it was a member of the Council of Europe and the OEEC, it eschewed membership of NATO, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the EEC and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Only Spain and Finland were more isolated, though Finland was a member of GATT and Spain developed a special military relationship with the United States. In policy terms, practically every decision taken between 1945 and 1961 reinforced Ireland’s isolation from contemporary European affairs. When Ireland left the Commonwealth this enhanced isolationism and was not seen as an opportunity to develop new obligations or relationships. The Council of Europe was used by politicians as a vehicle for promoting narrow nationalistic ends, much to the chagrin of other members who feared the revival of nationalism. Likewise Ireland favoured an inter-governmental structure for the Council and opposed integrationist proposals. Ireland was Atlanticist by default rather than by any conscious strategy on its part. Atlanticism implies (Griffiths and Pharo 1995), at the very least, good working relations with Britain and the United States, membership of a defence arrangement (NATO) and the privileging of institutions such as NATO and the OEEC over the Council of Europe and European integration. When Ireland is compared with other small European states, what is evident is its minimal engagement with the post-war world. Successive Irish governments were uncomfortable in this world and often misjudged the challenges and opportunities available to them. In particular, politicians frequently over-estimated Ireland’s importance for the United States or Britain. The most overt expression of this was made by Taoiseach John A. Costello in a speech in September 1948 when he claimed ‘we are sometimes accused of acting as if we were a big nation. In fact we are.’ This led him to assert that Ireland ‘wields an influence in the world far in excess of what its mere physical size and the smallness of its population might warrant’, a view shared by other leading Irish

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politicians (Cited in Keogh 1990: 214). The Irish government had an unrealistic view that Irish concerns were of significance to other states and that they would support Ireland’s promotion of them. This lack of realism is evident in the Irish approach to the Marshall Plan and to American engagement with the Soviet Union in Europe in 1948. The Taoiseach addressed the Dáil in July 1948 immediately after the beginning of the Soviet blockade of West Berlin and not long after the Communist coup in Prague. At a moment when relations between east and west were deteriorating, the Taoiseach chose to adapt a long standing Irish nationalist strategy for a new age. Whereas in the past nationalists had assumed that England’s difficulty was Ireland’s opportunity, Costello promoted the view that Europe’s difficulties was Ireland’s opportunity. In his estimation the European crisis could only be solved if partition was ended (Dáil Eireann Parliamentary Debates, volume 112, cc. 152021, 23 July 1948). Although the United States and Britain considered that Ireland might be a strategic partner in the war against Communism, it quickly became clear that the only terms that Ireland would accept for active cooperation was an end to partition. In this case as in the past Irish politicians and diplomats not only over-estimated their importance, but also failed to achieve any of their objectives.12 Throughout the post-war years the Irish seriously miscalculated virtually every foreign policy initiative. By the end of the war the United States was alienated and the British distant from Ireland. Neither the British nor the Americans were prepared to allow Ireland to participate in the peace conference. When Ireland applied to join the United Nations it may have been the Soviet Union that vetoed membership, but the United States and Britain were not prepared to squander any political capital to support the Irish application. More importantly, Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary (once an advocate of Irish unity), remained opposed to Irish membership on principle as did the Prime Minister Attlee (McMahon 2005: 5-24). Nor was the French government understanding when Ireland refused to replace an Irish diplomat who had served in Vichy. This led to frosty diplomatic relations until 1950 between the two states (Patterson 2000: 96-115). These misjudgements were reinforced by a failure to actively engage with the new world order 12 One of the surprising features of the post war historiography is the widespread failure on the part of historians to assess critically the effectiveness of Irish diplomacy and Ireland’s foreign policy objectives.

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that emerged after 1945. Every new initiative was perceived as a threat rather than an opportunity by Irish officials. Even the Marshall Plan was not originally welcomed by the Fianna Fáil government, though Lemass recognised that Ireland could not isolate itself from European developments. In contrast with other small states in Europe, Ireland did not gain much from the funding received under the ERP. This can be attributed to the weak institutional structure in the Irish civil service for handling the funds, a lack of planning and disengagement from the wider aims of the programme. But it was reinforced by the partition issue when Costello and his Minister for External Affairs Seán MacBride demanded that the United States amend its legislation to deny funding to Britain until it ended partition (Whelan 2005: 63-94). This seriously misread American priorities and continued to be the characteristic feature of Irish relations with the US into the 1950s. When, after the start of the Korean War the, US phased out the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) and introduced the Mutual Security Act (MSA), Ireland was the only European state to refuse to participate. Nor did Ireland play a positive role in the OEEC. Its membership was qualified and limited to protecting its bilateral relationship with Britain and its opposition to liberalisation. Throughout this period the main concern for successive Irish governments was to prevent liberalisation from affecting either Irish tariffs or its access to the British market for agricultural exports (Girvin 1997: 61-72). This was not a period when Ireland was developing a long term strategy for Europe, nor is it possible to locate the origin of its support for integration. To do so is to misread the politics of the period and to place too much emphasis on the reports of diplomats and not enough on the policy priorities developed by the government. The most significant foreign policy decisions taken by Irish governments between 1945 and 1961 were the Declaration of the Republic in 1949 and the Anglo Irish Trade Agreement in 1948. In both cases considerable ministerial resources were utilised to give effect to Irish policy, whereas these were not mobilised for integrationist or multilateral proposals. There is little difference between Irish and British Euroscepticism at this time. Ireland focussed on the defence of its sovereignty and its special relationship with Britain and paid little attention to European developments. At no time prior to the 1961 application to join the EEC can a pro-European sentiment be identified at the political level. It is true that there was a

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growing awareness of Europe and European developments within the Department of External Affairs, but this awareness had little impact on policy formulation. For Irish policy makers, Europe did not provide a solution to its problems during the 1950s and developments there went largely unnoticed. There was little interest in Ireland in these dramatic changes in European politics: de Valera had voiced his opposition to the Schuman Plan, the European Defence Force excited little interest, and the Green Pool Conference on Agriculture was strongly opposed by the government. Indeed, the supranational aspects of these proposals were explicitly considered inapplicable to Irish agriculture.13 There was little appreciation or discussion of the Treaty of Rome in Ireland or among officials or politicians later in the decade. Despite these momentous changes, Irish interest was focussed on its recession, while responding warily to British initiatives such as the EFTA. This is not to say that Europe was ignored. Irish opinion was mobilised in support of Catholics persecuted in Eastern Europe and there was widespread concern at the threat of communism. The Jesuit journal Studies published a series of articles on various aspects of post war European politics, including a number of articles on European integration and co-operation. Yet it is possible to exaggerate the significance of these contributions (Kennedy and O’Halpin 2002: 489, 71-3; Hederman 1983: 53-63; Girvin 1995: 239-60). In 1957, the proEuropean activist Garret FitzGerald noted ‘the interest, even excitement which this [EFTA] proposal has aroused throughout the country provides remarkable evidence of the existence of this new and receptive climate of opinion’ (cited in Murphy 2003: 157-8) but it is difficult to find support for FitzGerald’s views among the civil servants, politicians or the general public. The British Ambassador noted that de Valera was ‘obsessed by his economic worries’, but at the same time was reluctant to commit Ireland to the competitive environment that would exist in a Free Trade Area.14 In contrast to FitzGerald’s optimistic views on the matter, Irish officials were deeply uneasy about the proposals for the EFTA. Aiken and Lemass visited London to discuss the matter and told 13 NAIDT: S. 15011A, Department of Agriculture memorandum, 4 March 1953; Cabinet decision GC6/12, 13 March 1953. 14 National Archives London (NAL) DO 35/5210, Conversation between de Valera and Sir A. Clutterbuck 10 April 1957; note by Commonwealth Relations Office, 1 May 1957.

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their British counterparts that they did not welcome the proposals though they did recognise that if a Free Trade Area was established Ireland could not remain outside.15 The contrast between the Irish response to the Treaty of Rome and to EFTA is striking. The Treaty of Rome passed almost unnoticed whereas EFTA touched on vital national interests because if implemented it would affect the relationship between Britain and Ireland. Irish interest was not based on a reappraisal of its European policy but in response to unwelcome developments outside its control. The Irish government was also wrong footed by Harold Macmillan when he told them that the UK was about to apply for membership of the EEC. Ireland applied to join on the day that Macmillan announced his government’s decision in the House of Commons, pre-empting the British in this. However, Ireland’s dependency on Britain became plain when the EEC effectively ignored the Irish application for well over a year. The Irish application for membership between 1961 and 1972 depended entirely on the successful resolution of the UK’s difficulties with France. However, successive Irish governments between 1961 and 1973 recognised the positive benefits that Europe would bring. What perhaps is the most striking feature at the elite level within Ireland is the self-conscious and self-confident nature of the Irish membership of the EEC. Even when membership did not bring the cornucopia expected with it, the political elite insisted on working the system. The biggest test for Ireland immediately after joining in January 1973 was the decision taken by the new British government in 1974 to renegotiate its position within the EEC and hold a referendum to ratify its continued presence within it. The promise of a referendum had been a political sop to the left by Labour leader Harold Wilson; one that was regretted afterwards. If joining the EEC had seemed to be generally positive for Ireland, the British threat to withdraw posed a serious challenge to its new economic strategy. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Garret FitzGerald, had been an enthusiast for Europe since the 1950s, but his positive views of the EEC were now widely shared by his colleagues. If there had been some doubts concerning Europe among older nationalists (especially those of the 1916 Generation) these had been firmly allayed by the influence of Lemass in the 1960s and the change in political leadership across the 15 DO 35/8391, ‘ETFA and the Irish Republic’ report prepared by N. Aspin on visit by Aiken and Lemass to London, 13 December 1957.

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parties by the early 1970s. The Irish political elite were overwhelmingly in favour of membership by 1974. In a note to the Cabinet Sub committee on the EEC, which met to discuss the implications of a British withdrawal, FitzGerald highlighted the importance of continuing membership and noted the changes that had taken place in a relatively short period of time. He reminded his colleagues that prior to 1973 ‘Ireland was regarded as an appendage of the United Kingdom’, but that the state was now and was seen to be ‘an equal partner with eight other member states in a Community which is the most important trading entity in the world’. While FitzGerald’s emphasis on equality is somewhat exaggerated, his more general point is not. As a full member of the community, Ireland had gained considerable political advantages which paradoxically provided it with more autonomy in its international relations than had been the case previously.16 The most important reflection of this was Ireland’s accession as President of the Community during the first half of 1975 when it spoke for all nine member states. Accordingly, this ‘highly progressive position’ would be reversed if Ireland along with the UK withdrew from the EEC. Such a decision would ‘confirm and even deepen the view that Ireland should be regarded and even regard herself, as a United Kingdom appendage’. The implications of such a decision would be serious at a number of levels. The only association with Europe would be through the Council of Europe, while the state would be tied into a new bi-lateral trade dependency on the UK. A further consideration was that the state would lose any political influence it had gained within the EEC and decisions affecting Ireland’s trade and political position would be taken without an Irish input. FitzGerald also warned his colleagues that forging a renewed link with Britain would be economically disastrous, predicting that ‘the British economy would continue to decline at perhaps an accelerated rate’. More optimistically he predicted that if Ireland remained within the EEC, the economy would continue to improve. He speculated further that such economic success would provide a powerful pole of attraction for Northern Ireland and could create the basis for ‘a closer link with the Republic’. While FitzGerald was surely correct to note that the British government was unlikely to oppose such links, it is more questionable if 16 NAIDT: DFA, 2006/130/8, ‘Consequences of British Withdrawal from the Community’ 24 February 1975.

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a region of the UK under terrorist assault would be attracted to the Republic because of its prosperity. However, it does highlight two considerations for Irish policy makers in respect of Europe. The first presupposed that improved Irish economic performance would provide inducements for Northern Ireland to consider unity; the second that UK withdrawal from the EEC would have a negative impact on the prospect for Irish unity. If Britain did withdraw it was feared by FitzGerald that ‘the border would in the process be reinforced’. Likewise if the UK and Ireland took different positions on the EEC the likelihood was that the evolution of the EEC towards ever closer union would divide the island further. In realistic fashion, FitzGerald continued, ‘It is difficult to envisage how there could be an Irish dimension in such a situation’ though he rather blithely considered that ‘the uniqueness of the situation would no doubt make for willingness on the part of our Community partners to find appropriate solutions’.17 An Inter-Departmental Report on the consequences of withdrawal for Ireland was circulated to the sub-committee for consideration and concentrated on the economic benefits or losses for Ireland if Britain withdrew and Ireland remained in the Community, and if Ireland withdrew alongside the UK. While the report was careful to assess all the options, it emphasised the continuing benefits from remaining in the EEC and how best to manage the fall out from Britain withdrawing. In addition the Department of Finance concluded that while there would be a significant loss of employment in Ireland if the UK left the EEC, these losses would be appreciably heavier if the country withdrew with the UK. Ireland was already benefiting significantly from industrial investment, an increase in agricultural exports and payments from the CAP.18 The Irish government also calculated that the country could bear the cost of British re-negotiation, although they were concerned that national aids for agriculture might be reintroduced under pressure from the UK. FitzGerald wrote to the Taoiseach that he would maintain his ‘absolute opposition’ to any such change in policy within the EEC.19 There was also a 17 NAIDT: DFA, 2006/130/8, ‘Consequences of British Withdrawal from the Community’ memorandum , 24 February 1975. 18 NAIDT 2006/133/296, Note by Luke Leonard Department of Finance for Cabinet Committee on EEC. 19 NAIDT 2006/133/296, Note by Luke Leonard Department of Finance for Cabinet Committee on EEC. Note on British negotiations 24 February 1975; FitzGerald to Cosgrave 24 January 1975.

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degree of calculation in respect of state subsidies for industry. For over a decade Irish industrial expansion and exports had been driven by external investment and this was attributed to the generous levels of state aid received by transnational companies locating in Ireland. The government operated on the basis that no state in the EEC would be as generous, an accurate assumption as things turned out. The Export Tax Relief was considered to be ‘the most powerful of our incentives’ and it was a subsidy that could now be more effectively defended in the inner councils of the EEC by a highly mobilised Irish government. It should be emphasised that Irish policy was based on short term and long term considerations and these included support for an ever closer union. The government feared that a successful British re-negotiation in respect of agriculture and customs duties would weaken the integration process and in particular the further development of the CAP to its full potential. This is a process ‘to which we and most other member states are committed’.20 In political terms, despite some unease, the consensus within the government was that Ireland would remain in the EEC whatever the UK might do.21 The British Prime Minister Harold Wilson attended the Dublin EEC Summit in February 1975 and Taoiseach Liam Cosgrave pressed him on the impact of a British withdrawal on Ireland. Irish officials were operating in a wider arena and their choices now opened up. They were also now using the opportunity of membership to question some strongly held policy options for the state. They were concerned that British actions in respect of their domestic fiscal policy and uncertainty in respect of the EEC were having an adverse impact on Ireland’s financial reserves held in London (as had been the traditional policy since 1922). The value of these reserves had been eroded as a consequence of the financial markets’ negative response to Britain’s lukewarm attitude towards the EEC. Officials in Dublin now advised the Taoiseach that Irish reserves should be moved out of sterling, though warned that the issue ‘would need to be handled with great discretion’. The issue was an espe20 NAIDT 2006/133/296, Note by Luke Leonard Department of Finance for Cabinet Committee on EEC. DFA memorandum, 24 February 1975. 21 NAIDT 2006/133/296, Note by Luke Leonard Department of Finance for Cabinet Committee on EEC. DFA 2006/130/6 ‘Report on Inter-Departmental Group on Economic consequences for Ireland of Withdrawal of UK from the European Communities’ 23 January 1975; the group included representatives of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Agriculture and Fishing and Industry and Commerce.

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cially sensitive one, but it demonstrated that Ireland was no longer tied to Britain in terms of its fiscal policy or indeed in other areas. The thinking behind this decision was reinforced in later years when Ireland, unlike the UK, became a full member of the European Monetary System and the exchange rate mechanism in 1979. This can also be seen in the changing pattern of trade for Irish exports in particular. The destination of these was now more diverse and internally more differentiated, while the EEC became one of the major areas for trade. This in turn further demonstrated Ireland’s commitment to the underlying value of the EEC. Despite these considerations, Bri tain w as never f ar f rom the minds of Irish policy makers, especially in respect of Northern Ireland. When the UK electorate voted in favour of remaining in the EEC, Cosgrave welcomed t he v ote o n t he grounds that i t ‘p revented w hat i s cu rrently a difficult s ituation i n N orthern Irel and f rom b ecoming w orse. In t he longer term the moves towards integration in Europe can only be good in relation to the Northern Ireland situation.’22 Although Northern Ireland would always complicate relations with Britain, Ireland’s economic national interest at least became linked to the EEC ra ther than the UK after 1973. This is demonstrated by the wide-ranging support for EEC membership among the Irish electorate as shown in various referendums up to 2 001 and by the development of a powerful and influential elite culture supportive of the further evolution of the institutions of the EEC (Dooge and Barrington 1999). III When Irel and j oined the EEC i n 1973 it was t he most traditional and conservative of the member states. The European challenge in the 1970s and 1980s f or the country were overwhelmingly economic and institutional. There was no perceived threat to the dominant norms and values accepted by the majority. Indeed, considerable political energy was extended between 1973 an d 1991 t o reinforce some of the conservative aspects of Irish political culture. Successive Irish governments had maintained that Irish sovereignty would not be weakened by membership of the EEC/EC. Indeed, it was argued that membership would provide the means to break its dependence on Britain. Critics however focussed on 22 N AIDT: 2005/151/530, N ote p repared b y M. E . Murra y f or T aoiseach, 25 February 1 975; Murray t o T. P. Di gnan on be half of Taoi seach, not d ate bu t fr om internal evidence in the file probably later June or early July 1975.

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the threat to Irish economic independence, its culture, and its tradition of military neutrality as the main challenges to Irish sovereignty (Holmes 2005: 75-93). In a Dáil reply to Noel Browne in 1969, the Taoiseach Jack Lynch argued that ‘The Treaty of Rome in itself does not require members of the EEC or associates to join any military alliance. We recognise, however, that thos e w ho w ish to be come me mbers mu st a ccept the political implications of membership’. When pressed by Browne to reaffirm Irel and’s commitment to neutrality a nd w hether a ny f undamental change i n tha t pol icy w as l ikely, Ly nch re sponded i n s omewhat more ambiguous language: I do not thi nk that the w ord ‘neutrality’ i s relevant i n the c ontext of ou r membership of EEC. Neutrality would not be relevant in the context of our being a ttacked by anybody: w e w ould d efend o urselves. W e a pplied fo r membership of the communities because we believed in the aims and objects a nd be cause w e be lieve i t w ould be i n ou r be st interests to d o so. Being members of the community, we would naturally be interested in the defence of the territories embraced by the communities. There is no question of neutrality there (Dáil Eireann Parliamentary Debates, volume 112, cc. 1520-21, 23 July 1948).

For many of those involved in the debate on Ireland’s membership of the EEC in the late 1960s and early 1970s the issue of sovereignty was often reduced to whether Ireland w ould join a m ilitary alliance. However, t he q uestion o f s overeignty i s w ider t han t his a nd m embership challenged conventional models of it. The Treaty of Rome was primarily but not exclusively concerned with economic matters. This could not be said of the S ingle Eu ropean A ct, the Tre aty on Eu ropean U nion (Maastricht) or the Amsterdam or Nice Treaties. Critics had been correct in emphasising the potential threat from European integration, but their protests a ppeared u nconvincing a t t he t ime. Ho wever, t hose w ho defended me mbership w ere of ten ‘ economical w ith the truth’ w hen the y evaded the political implications of the integrationist process. In contrast to Denmark ( Branner an d K elstrup 2000) , t he d ebate in I reland was narrowly constructed and reinforced by an elite consensus that brooked no opposition. As t he p rocess o f i ntegration a ccelerated a nd i ts n ature b egan t o change, the Irish government published a White Paper on Foreign Policy in 1996 ( Department o f F oreign A ffairs 1996: 57- 120). T his r eflected both the over-arching consensus within the elite and the self-confidence

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that membership had brought. At the heart of this public statement was the view that: Irish people increasingly see the European Union not simply as an organisation to w hich Ireland belongs, but as an integral part of our future. We see ourselves, increasingly, as Europeans (Emphasis added).

It is not clear what this assertion implied, but the White Paper quickly qualified i t to take a ccount of pos sible obj ections a nd c oncerns a bout national identity: Europe is not a melting pot in which national identities are destined to be submerged or lost. On the contrary, it is intended to be a place where variety is a s trength r ather t han a n en cumbrance, w here d ifferences a re n ot denied but understood and accommodated.

The benefits of Europe as outlined in this document are largely utilitarian, especially given the size of the state. Small countries, it is recognised, can gain from membership of a larger grouping and exercise more influence t han i f t hey rem ain o utside s uch a n o rganisation. Mem bership should n ot a nd need not di lute t he s tate’s i ndependence. Th e W hite Paper ma kes tw o s ubstantive c laims i n re spect of E urope. The f irst i s that the EU has provided greater choice for Irish governments and enhanced the state’s independence. The second is that Irish identity has not been weakened b y m embership; o n t he co ntrary i t h as p ossibly b een strengthened. Are these claims borne out by the evidence of thirty-seven years of membership? If taken at one level it might mean that little or nothing has been changed by membership and that appearances to the contrary are exaggerated if not actually misplaced. Many critics of European integration at the time of the Nice referendums argued that the treaty subverted Irish sovereignty and endangered its identity. Support for this view comes from pro-European scholars such as Wallac e (1999: 503-21) who has c laimed tha t ‘ No g overnment i n Eu rope rema ins s overeign i n the sense understood by diplomats or constitutional lawyers of half a century ago’. In a c hallenging discussion on na tionalism i n E urope, Dog an (1994: 281- 305) h as forcibly ar gued t hat ‘ Nationalism is d eclining in Western Eu rope b ecause a s upranational co nsciousness is ri sing, b y a progressive interaction at several levels, economic, military, social, cultural and political’, a view that perhaps Wallace would share. Dogan has identified a number of factors that he suggests drives this change, includ-

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ing low le vels of pride in c ountry, an unwillingness t o f ight f or one’s country and a growing affinity with Europe as a transnational source of identity. There are various difficulties with both of these claims that will be treated below, but at the heart of Dogan’s claim in particular is that loyalty t o a nd i dentity w ith t he t raditional n ation s tate h as w eakened appreciably and that some of the conditions noted by Hoffman in 1966 have be en me t to the e xtent tha t i t c an be s aid tha t the na tion-state i s now obsolete. While Wallace might not go this far, the logic of his position is similar. If we apply this analysis to Ireland and then compare it with European opinion some of the evidence does appear compelling. It is widely agreed that when Ireland joined the EC in 1973 it was the most nationalistic of the member states not only in terms of attitudes but also because it was engaged with the United Kingdom in conflict over the status of Northern Ire land. Ye t, Iri sh a ttitudes to the EC/ EU g enerally a nd t o integration in particular have been among the most positive over three decades. Coakley (2005: 94-113) has shown that the Irish are the most positive Eu ropeans a cross a w ide ra nge of ca tegories. S upport for the Euro a nd en largement rem ained rem arkably h igh, t hough w eaker i n defence and security matters. However, in comparison with the UK or with other small member states such as Austria, Denmark and Finland, Ireland comes out as the most European of member states. Despite this positive re sponse, the Iri sh pu blic pa ys re latively l ittle a ttention to the EU or to Eu ropean ma tters. A Eu robarometer (EB) pol l (Eu ropean Commission 2003) reported in the spring of 2002 that just 13 per cent of Irish respondents pay a lot of attention to European matters, while nearly 80 per cent pay little or no attention. This poll was undertaken at a time when Europe was a source of considerable controversy in Ireland and between the first and second referendums on Nice. It might be suggested that if interest was this low on this occasion, when would it be high? In addition, Irish attitudes to Europe appear more instrumentalist than the European average and in some cases very close to those of the UK.

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Table 1: What Does the EU Mean to You Personally? Peace Economic Prosperity Social Problems Freedom of Movement Cultural Diversity Stronger Say Euro

Ireland 19 41 15 43 15 27 40

Denmark 44 30 22 51 25 35 30

UK 20 17 12 35 14 19 24

EU 15 32 24 14 50 26 29 49

Source: European Commission (2003)

Despite this instrumentalism, some fifty per cent of Irish respondents believe that using the Euro makes them feel more European, though 24 per cent disagreed with this and 18 per cent thought it had nothing to do with being European. The Euro is not only a currency; it is also a powerful symbol in everyday life of the relationship between a wider Europe and the individual, so this attitude is of some importance. Irish opinion also discriminates quite carefully when asked what the appropriate level for decision making is between the EU and the national governments. Th e EU w as co nsidered t o b e t he a ppropriate l evel f or decision ma king in respect of the E uro, f oreign pol icy, te rrorism a nd humanitarian aid by 70 per cent or more of those questioned. However, the National Government was considered appropriate in areas such as defence, h ealth a nd s ocial s ecurity, media, edu cation, cu ltural p olicy, immigration, p olicy, j ustice a nd ref ugees. Th ere w as a lso co nsiderable support for retaining a national veto within the EU. Most of the policy areas designated as national responsibilities can be considered traditional core competencies for independent sovereign states. What is surprising about these responses is that forty-eight per cent of respondents considered that agriculture an d f isheries s hould b e t he r esponsibility o f t he national government despite the very clear concentration of responsibility at supranational level since 1973 (and significant benefits to the farming c ommunity). Iri sh re spondents a re a lso reluctant to ta ke pe rsonal responsibility for European matters. One question asks if the individual would prefer to pay some tax directly to the EU instead of the government paying it. Fifty per cent of Irish respondents were unwilling to do so, in Denmark the figure was 76 percent (European Commission 2002). In 1992 respondents were asked if they ever think of themselves not only as Irish, but as European or as citizens of Europe as well. Sixty-four per

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cent never thought of themselves a s Eu ropean a nd s ixty-one per cent never thought of themselves as European citizens (European Commission 1992). When asked in 1992 how they saw their identity in the future, the Irish position and that of most Europeans is relatively unambiguous: Table 2: In the near future do you see yourself as: Irish (or nationality) Irish (or nationality) and European European and Irish (or nationality) European Only

Ireland 52 38 5 2

Denmark 40 46 4 1

UK 54 35 4 4

EU12 38 48 7 4

Source: European Commission (1992)

Nor did these dispositions change subsequently as the EU evolved in an ever complex fashion: Table 3: In the near future do you see yourself as: Irish 50 Irish and European European and Irish European Only

1997 42 3 2

2001 46 43 4 2

2002 47 43 4 3

Source: European Commission 1997, 2001, 2002

There is little evidence in these data for Dogan’s (1994) contention that a E uropean c onsciousness ha s e merged to re place ol der forms of na tional identity. The most that might be said is that a European sensibility has grown due to membership of the EU but that this is subordinate to the p rimary i dentity with Irel and. Th is i s rei nforced w hen p eople a re asked a bout pri de i n the na tion/country. The Iri sh re sponse i s ov erwhelmingly positive; indeed it is one of the strongest in the world. When those who responded that they are proud or very proud of their nation are combined the Irish figure is 97 percent, though the EU 15 was not far behind this at 85 percent. In the Irish and Danish cases there is a zero return when asked if not at all proud of the nation. Dogan (1994) only cites the very proud data and ignores the proud figure and this allows

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him to re ad the d ata a s a re jection of na tionalism. This w eakens hi s argument as do additional data on attachment to Europe. While there is evidence of attachment to Europe, this is considerably weaker than attachment t o individual c ountries. O nly 1 1 pe r c ent of the E U 1 5 s aid they are not attached to their country, a figure that drops to four per cent for Denmark and Ireland (European Commission 2001). However, 38 per cent of Europeans are not attached to Europe, which rises to 43 per cent for Ireland (32 per cent for Denmark). This is consistent with findings from earlier decades; in 1983, 70 per cent of Irish respondents were most likely never to see themselves as European, a figure that dropped a little to 64 per cent in 1992 (Davis 2003: 17-36). The European Values Studies (EVS) confirm the conclusion drawn so far and questions Dogan’s interpretation (Whelan 1994; Fahey, Hayes, and Sinnott 2005). Persistent high levels of pride in one ’s country are evident across the two surveys in 1981 and 1990, but it also reflected in the most recent surveys.23 Dogan (1994) places considerable emphasis on answers t o a q uestion a sking i ndividuals if they w ould f ight f or t heir country. In 1981 the overall figure was 43 p er cent which Dogan suggests marks a di sengagement from the nation-state and nationalism. In 1990 the overall figure was also 43 per cent, but there was considerable variance i n the responses. In five cases there is an increase in the percentage saying they would fight in the event of war. In France there is a 12 p oint in crease wh ile in t he N etherlands t he increase is 16 p oints. What then does this tell us? Have the Netherlands and France become more nationalistic and warlike over a nine year period and what would explain this? It may be that the question had little meaning in a political environment where war had been absent for forty years and the choice is not a real one between whether one goes to war or not. This is not to underestimate the rise of pacifistic sentiment in Europe, but nevertheless care needs to be taken in drawing large conclusions from such a question. It is just as likely that a serious military threat to any of the European s tates w ould q uickly and s ignificantly i ncrease t he p ercentages prepared to go to war.24 In 1980, 55.5 per cent of those interviewed said 23 T he da ta set s f or t he 1981 a nd 1990 su rveys for I reland w ere gen erously p rovided by Pr ofessor C hristopher T. W helan at t he E conomic and Social R esearch Institute Dublin who was the director of the Irish survey in 1990. 24 The widespread support for the British government in the Falklands War demonstrates in this case at least that specific circumstances have to be focussed on. This

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they were proud of the army, with 12 per cent saying they were not at all proud. Dogan utilises this finding to claim support for his hypothesis. Not onl y i s hi s i nterpretation ope n to q uestion, bu t d ata f rom the E B suggests that the armed forces are held in particularly high esteem across Europe. When asked which institutions they most trusted, the army and the police come out on top and well ahead of other bodies. In the Irish case, 8 0 per cent trust the a rmy a nd 7 1 per cent the police (European Commission 2002). The E VS a lso a sked tw o q uestions c oncerning the re lationship be tween the development of Europe and national identity. I will p resent the questions here as they are long and complex. The first asked: If the European states were truly to be united, this would mean the end of their na tional, historical a nd c ultural i dentity. T heir na tional e conomic interests would also be sacrificed.

The second question posed a similarly striking alternative: Only a tr uly u nited E urope can pr otect i ts sta tes’ na tional, hi storical a nd cultural identities and their national economic interests from the challenges of the superpowers.

Those who agreed with the first question believed that European unity would result in an ‘end of identity’ while those who agreed with the second question considered that identity would be protected, even if a united Irel and em erged. Th ere i s a lso a n i ntermediate ca tegory w here respondents are neutral on the options. Table 4: Would a united Europe end identity or protect identity? End of Identity Neither Protect Identity

Ireland 27.9 18.4 48.9

Britain 32.8 20.4 35.5

Northern Ireland 31.3 19.1 37.5

Netherlands 24.7 22.3 43.8

Source: European Values Survey (1990)

One way t o in terpret t his is t hat I rish respondents ar e more like ly t o adopt what might be described as the Milward thesis, that is, the EU is not considered a threat to national identity but provides the institutional can also be seen in the opposition to the invasion of Ir aq, in what were very different circumstances.

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means to protect it. This is not to say that there are not those in Ireland who consider the EU to be a threat to national identity, but to note that the largest support is given to its ability to protect. Drawing again on the EVS, a question was also asked about the territory that individuals identified most with. The table below calculates first and second choices and the combination of both. Table 5: What geographical group do you belong to? (first and second choice)

Locality or town where you live Region of Country Your country as a whole Europe The world as a whole

First Choice

Second Choice

First and Second Combined

43.9

21.0

64.9

13.6

30.6

44.2

37.3

35.4

72.7

2.5 2.6

7.2 4.8

9.7 7.4

Source: European Values Survey (1990)

What these data suggest is that European identity is fairly weak in most respects. Territorial identity has always been a strong aspect of nationalism and national identity and this suggests that the traditional identity with the existing territorial unity is the strongest. It is helpful to re member at this stage that the relationship between European integration, national identity, and the nation-state are not zerosum as both Dogan and traditional sovereignists imply. It is not the case of either the nation-state or European integration. There is, as Hutchinson (1994: 161-63) has pointed out, a creative interaction between them. Europeanisation is best considered in conditional terms and as a second order preference. Positive attitudes to Europe are a product of this conditionality, bu t thi s i n tu rn i s d ependent on E uropeanisation not c hallenging either national identity or those policy areas considered essential to na tional i nterest. Li kewise, d escriptions of the na tion-state have a ssumed in flexibility o n it s p art, ign oring its ability t o r emake i tself a t various times over the centuries. This flexibility allows it to evolve, often in quite innovative ways, and develop new responses to contemporary challenges. The absence of a strong European identity suggests that we need to look more carefully at how Europe is envisaged by the citizens

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of the nation-state and not assume that one is replacing the other. This reinforces the point made by Smith (1992: 55-76) that in terms of practical p olitics an d e motional consciousness t he m ost p otent sy mbols, myths, collective values and traditions remain national rather than European. Such a conclusion need not deny a multiplicity of identities in the contemporary world, but it would be mistaken to give them equal status or to fail to recognise the deep seated attractions of nationality in these circumstances. One of the key symbols of Irish sovereignty (and possibly identity) is neutrality. Although some politicians and commentators have argued that Ireland i s n ot et hically n eutral, there i s a n i nsistence t hat t he s tate i s militarily neutral (Salmon 1989).25 A poll in 1985 r eported that 64 p er cent of respondents thought Ireland should never join or consider joining a m ilitary allian ce. F ianna F áil s upporters we re t he m ost like ly t o hold this view, whereas Fine Gael supporters were slightly more positive to c onsidering jo ining an allian ce. Wh en as ked about wh at n eutrality meant to them, most responses emphasised avoiding war or membership of military alliances. In 1987, 40 per cent of those interviewed believed that ratifying t he Si ngle Eu ropean Act w ould b ring Irel and cl oser t o joining NATO. When asked in 1991 whether they would be in favour of dropping neutrality in order to participate in a European defence system, over two-thirds rejected this option. The persistent trend in all polls, no matter how the question is posed, is a commitment to ne utrality and a reluctance to trade it off against other objectives (Marsh 1992). In light of this, a poll in 1996 reported that 57 per cent of Irish respondents were prepared to support a proposal that all states within the EU should come to the aid of another state if attacked. This certainly runs counter to the general trend of non-participation, though in the same poll 69 per cent maintained their support for neutrality (King and Wilford 1997: 168-9). The referendum campaign on the Nice Treaty brought a number of issues i n res pect o f s overeignty i nto re lief. The N o ca mpaign, a s o n previous occasions, emphasised loss of sovereignty, the dangers of military alliances, and the extent to which the new treaty would change the security/defence environment for the member states. Supporters of the 25 Thus Brian Cowen stated in an address to the UN that ‘Ireland is not a member of a m ilitary a lliance, but Ireland is n ot n eutral in t he st ruggle a gainst in ternational terrorism’, which echoes statements by Seán Lemass who stated in respect of communism ‘we are on one side and not neutral’, cited in Rees (2005: 55-74).

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treaty em phasised, a s t hey h ad p reviously, t he eco nomic benefits f or Ireland an d t hat n o n ew o bligations we re e ntailed as a c onsequence. There was also considerable emphasis on the obligation to expand Europe to include prospective members from central and Eastern Europe. Although Article 17 of the Treaty appeared to support the view that no new military/security obligations were involved for Ireland, this was not enough to persuade former supporters of European integration to come out and vote. I t seems for the first time that the sovereignty argument touched a political cord. This unease was expressed by John Rodgers, the former Labour Attorney General who was widely reported when he said, ‘It is not my purpose to suggest that the consequences of the Nice Treaty are a pocalyptic. Bu t i t i s cl ear t hat the ca pacity o f a n Iri sh ci tizen t o influence decisions which will intimately affect his/her life will be significantly reduced by the impact of the Nice Treaty’, (O’Mahony 2001: 20114). There was al so residual resentment at the European Commission decision to c ensure Ireland’s economic policies in January 2001, a censure which was robustly rejected by the Irish Minister for Finance Charley McCreev y. McCree vy s ubsequently told his Eu ropean counterparts that their censure and pressure on Ire land contributed to the defeat of the referendum. There were also divisions within the government on the best strategy for the future of Europe. The Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, and the majority of the Cabinet continued to support an integrationist position, w hile Ma ry Ha rney a nd t he P rogressive D emocrats en dorsed a European policy that was broadly liberal and narrowly focussed on economic matters. More significantly perhaps was the emergence of a cultural d efence bl oc within F ianna F áil c entred o n S íle d e V alera an d Eamon O’Cu iv. Indeed, O’Cuiv a nnounced a fter the v ote that he had voted no in the referendum. The o pinion p olls p rovide an im portant in sight in to I rish p olitical culture at a time of crisis in its relationship with the EU. That those who voted (as distinct from those who abstained) made discrete decisions on polling day is clear. The referendums on abolishing the death penalty and joining t he I nternational C riminal C ourt we re r atified e asily, b ut jus t under 54 per cent voted against Nice. The votes on the death penalty and the ICC can be seen as liberal votes, so the vote against Europe on this occasion i s n ot s imply a co nservative v ote b ut i ndeed a v ote a gainst further integration. When asked explicitly in May 2001 whether Ireland ‘should do all it can to unite fully with the EU’ or ‘should do all it can to

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protect its independence from the EU’, support for the defence of independence increased when compared to previous polls. More telling is the change in Fianna Fáil attitudes. Between the two polls in May, Fianna Fáil identifiers shifted to the defensive position by 13 points. This suggests doubts on the issue rather than Euroscepticism, but was enough to justify abstention. A number of other polls in 2001, though taken after the referendum itself, demonstrated unease among voters in respect of changes within the EU to accommodate new members and the perceived decline in Irish influence as a consequence (Gilland and Kennedy 2003: 60-72). The government response to this setback was both prompt and innovative. It sought to reassert the elite consensus around Europe, which it successfully did, but it also convened a National Forum on Europe to provide the most inclusive debate that has taken place on Europe since joining in 1973. These two factors were important in increasing the turnout in the second referendum on Nice in October 2002, but the government also changed the wording of the constitutional amendment to take account of the widespread concerns over sovereignty and military commitments. Article 29 was amended to include the following: The State shall not adopt a decision taken by the European Council to establish a common defence pursuant to Article 1.2 of the Treaty referred to in subsection 7 of this section where that common defence would include the State.

The political reality of this amendment entails that Ireland will not play a role in the future of any European defence policy and its involvement in security matters may also be severely curtailed. When this is linked to Irish reservations on Justice and Security (especially Schengen) it also means that important areas of European policy are unlikely to be implemented in Ireland (Rees 2005). IV At a more general level the trend in opinion between those who support European unity and those who believe Ireland needs to be protected from unification remains stable, with approximately 40 per cent on either side (see European Commission 2008). The pattern since 2002, when the second Nice Treaty was ratified, has not changed appreciably. A poll held just after the Lisbon Treaty reported that very high support for continuing membership of the EU even among those who voted against

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the Treaty (European Commission 2008a). Despite this, the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty by the electorate in 2008 marks a new phase in the relationship between Ireland and Europe. Are we now seeing a form of Europe a-la-carte or indeed the strengthening of Euroscepticism where once support was taken for granted? It is probably a bit of both. Circumstances have changed and so has Irish opinion in respect of the further integration of Europe. The second Nice referendum was successful because of increased turnout and the ability of the pro-European elite to persuade doubters that key areas of Irish interest and concern could be effectively defended within Europe. The promotion of a European Constitution posed similar problems and challenges, but these were postponed by the referendums in France and the Netherlands. The warning contained in the Dutch and French rejection of the Constitution was ignored by the EU when the Lisbon Treaty was agreed. While all EU states sought to ratify the Treaty in Parliament, Ireland opted for a referendum as it has done on all occasions since 1972. In contrast to the Nice referendums, the turnout increased and the measure was decisively defeated. A survey carried out after the defeat (European Commission 2008a) reported that most respondents believed that the ‘No’ campaign had been more persuasive than those in favour of the Treaty. The poll also showed that among those who voted no, some 45 per cent cited reasons that can be considered nationalist (i.e. neutrality, identity or opposition to a united Europe).26 V At the heart of the European integration process there has always been a tension between the continuation of the 'nation-state' and the emergence of a European polity, even if this is not the same as a United States of Europe. There is a further tension between the sources of legitimacy linked to national identity and those that focus on notions of European loyalty (Smith 1991). Anthony Smith suggests that Europe has not even begun to move in the direction of replacing national sources of legitimacy and identity with a notion of loyalty that is more than superficial: There is no European analogue to Bastille or Armistice Day, no European ceremony for the fallen in battle, no European shrine of kings or saints. 26 Some 22 per cent said they voted no because they did not understand the Treaty and would not vote for something that they did not understand.

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Brian Girvin When it comes to the ritual and ceremony of collective identification, there is no European equivalent of national or religious community (Smith 1992: 73).

Smith is sceptical that a European identity can emerge out of the institution building associated with the European Union, though it might be premature to dismiss this out of hand. This chapter has suggested that Ireland’s relationship to Europe has been a long and complex one that has changed over time. Indeed, the closest political, cultural, and geographical relationship for Ireland has been with Britain and not with continental Europe for over two centuries. As a result of Europeanisation this relationship has changed somewhat but cultural, linguistic, and family links between Britain and Ireland are stronger than any similar type of identification with Europe generally or with any one country there. What has changed is the institutional relationship with Britain and Europe. Membership has provided Ireland with considerable choice in diplomatic terms and in respect of policy options. The impact of Europe on Ireland is significant but can be exaggerated. The research presented here suggests that most Irish citizens are indifferent to Europe and maintain traditional attitudes towards identity and nationality. This is not to claim that the attitude towards Europe is sceptical; it is in fact more complex than this. While interest in and knowledge of Europe is low at a mass level, it is high at an elite level and this is where Europe has had the most impact. However, this has not changed Irish political culture in any significant degree. To the extent that there have been changes, these have been generated by domestic political considerations rather than by European influences. Indeed it might be suggested that Ireland remains largely immune to Europeanisation and that Ireland along with most other EU member states views that institution in largely instrumental terms. If we go back to the statement by Jack Lynch in 1972, the evidence from thirty-seven years of membership of the EU suggests that European identity remains weak and that Irish identity and nationality take primacy over alternative attractions or identity. If there is no competition between the two there is likely to be no conflict, but that cannot be guaranteed. In contrast to those who suggest that the nation-state has outlived its usefulness and that other political forms will replace it, the Irish case suggests that this is unlikely to occur in the near future and that nationalism remains the binding force in public life as it has been for at least 200 years.

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References Beck, U. 2008. ‘Nation-state politics can only fail the problems of the modern world’. The Guardian 15 January 2008. Beck, U. 2005. Power in the Global Age. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Branner, H. and M. Kelstrup, eds. 2000. Denmark’s Policy Towards Europe after 1945: History Theory and Options. Odense, Denmark: Odense University Press. Coakley, J. 2005. Irish Public Opinion and the New Europe. In Ireland and the European Union: Nice, Enlargement and the Future of Europe. M. Holmes ed. 94113. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. Committee on the Constitution 1967. Report. Dublin: Stationary Office. Cooney, J. 1999 John Charles McQuaid. Dublin: O’Brien Press. Dáil Eireann Parliamentary Debates 1948. Volume 112, cc. 1520-21. 23 July. Dáil Eireann Parliamentary Debates 1969. Volume 241, c.1156-58. 23 July. Davis, T. C. 2003. The Irish and their Nation: A Survey of Recent Attitudes. The Global Review of Ethnopolitics 2(2): 17-36. Department of Foreign Affairs 1996. Challenges and Opportunities Abroad: White Paper on Foreign Policy. Dublin: Stationary Office. Dogan, M. 1994. The Decline of Nationalisms within Western Europe. Comparative Politics 26(3): 281-305. Dooge, J. and R. Barrington, eds. 1999. A Vital National Interest. Dublin: Institute of Public Administration. Duchesne, S. and A. Frognier 1995. Is There a European Identity? In Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance. O. Niedermayer R. and Sinnott, eds. 193-226. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dunn, J. 1994. Introduction: Crisis of the Nation State? Political Studies 42 (Special Issue): 3-15. European Commission 1992. Eurobarometer 37: Public Opinion in the European Union. Brussels: European Commission. European Commission 1997. Eurobarometer 47: Public Opinion in the European Union. Brussels: European Commission. European Commission 2001. Eurobarometer 54: Public Opinion in the European Union. Brussels: European Commission. European Commission 2002. Eurobarometer 57: Public Opinion in the European Union. Brussels: European Commission. European Commission 2003. Eurobarometer 59: Public Opinion in the European Union. Brussels: European Commission European Commission 2008. Eurobarometer 69.2: Public Opinion in the European Union: National Report – Ireland. Brussels: European Commission. European Commission 2008a. Post Referendum Survey in Ireland. Brussels: European Commission. Gellner, E. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Girvin, B. 1989. Between Two Worlds: Politics and Economy in Independent Ireland. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan.

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Girvin, B. 1995. Irish Agricultural Policy, Economic Nationalism and the Possibility of Market Integration in Europe. In The Green Pool and the Origins of the Common Agricultural Policy. R. T. Griffiths and B. Girvin, eds. 239-60. London: Lothian Press. Girvin, B. 1997. Ireland and the Marshall Plan: A Cargo Cult in the North Atlantic? In Explorations in OEEC History. R. T. Griffiths, ed. 61-72. Paris: OECD. Girvin, B. 2002. From Union to Union: Nationalism, Democracy and Religion in Ireland. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan. Girvin, B. 2006. The Emergency: Neutral Ireland 1939-45. London: Macmillan. Griffiths, R. T. and H. Ø Pharo 1995. Small States and European Integration. ARENA Working Paper No. 19, December, Oslo. Hederman, M. 1983. The Road to Europe: Irish Attitudes 1948-61. Dublin: Institute of Public Administration. Hoffman, S. 1966. Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation State and the Case of Western Europe. Daedalus 95: 862-915. Hutchinson, J. 1994. Modern Nationalism. London: Fontana Press. King, S and R. Wilford 1997. Irish Political Data, 1996. Irish Political Studies 12: 148-210. Gilland, K. and F. Kennedy, eds. 2002. Irish Political Studies: Data Yearbook 2002, A Supplement to Irish Political Studies, Volume 17. London: Frank Cass. Kaiser, W. 2007. Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Kennedy, M. and E. O’Halpin 2000. Ireland and the Council of Europe. Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe. Geiger, T. and M. Kennedy, eds. 2004. Ireland, Europe and the Marshall Plan. Dublin: Four Courts Press. Geiger, T. 2000. The Enthusiastic Response of a Reluctant Supporter: Ireland and the Committee for European Economic Cooperation in 1947. In Irish Foreign Policy, 1919-66. M. Kennedy and J. Morrison Skelly, eds. 222-46. Dublin: Four Courts Press. Government of Ireland 1970. White Paper: Membership of the European Communities: Implications for Ireland. Dublin: Stationery Office. Keogh, D. 1990. Ireland and Europe. Cork, Ireland: Hibernian University Press. MacGréil, M. 1996. Prejudice in Ireland Revisited. Maynooth, Ireland: Survey and Research Unit, St Patrick’s College. Mann, M. 1997. Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation State? Review of International Political Economy 4(3): 472-96. Marsh, M. 1992. Irish Public Opinion and European Union. Dublin: Institute of European Affairs. McMahon, D. 2005. ‘Our Mendicant Vigil is Over’ Ireland and the United Nations, 1946-55. In Obligations and Responsibilities: Ireland and the United Nations 1955-2005. Michael Kennedy and Deirdre McMahon, eds. 5-24. Dublin: Institute of Public Administration.

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Milward, A. S. 1992. The European Rescue of the Nation-State. London: Routledge. Murphy, G. 2003. Economic Realignment and the Politics of EEC Entry: Ireland 19481972. Bethesda, MD: Academica Press. Murphy, G. 2004. ‘An Exercise That Had to be Undertaken’ The Marshall Plan and the Genesis of Ireland’s Involvement in European integration. In Ireland, Europe and the Marshall Plan. T. Geiger and M. Kennedy, eds. 81-101. Dublin: Four Courts Press. O’Brien, J. 2005. Irish Public Opinion and the Risorgimento, 1859-60. Irish Historical Studies 24 (135): 289-305. O’Mahony, J. 2001. ‘Not so Nice’: the Treaty of Nice, the International Criminal Court, the Abolition of the Death Penalty – The 2001 Referendum Experience. Irish Political Studies 16(1): 201-14. Paavonen, T. 2000. Finland’s Relationship to West European Economic Integration 1947-1958. In Die Nuetralen und die Europäische Integration 1945-1995. M. Gehler and R. Steininger, eds. 218-38. Wien, Austria: Böhlau Verlag. Patterson, R. 2000. Ireland, Vichy and Post-Liberation France, 1938-50. In Irish Foreign Policy 1919-66: From Independence to Internationalism. M. Kennedy and J. M. Skelly, eds. 96-115. Dublin: Four Courts Press. Rees, N. 2005. Europe and Ireland’s Changing Security Policy. In Ireland and the European Union: Nice, Enlargement and the Future of Europe. M. Holmes, ed. 5574. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. Rose, R. 1996. What is Europe? New York: Harper Collins. Salmon, T. C. 1989. Unneutral Ireland: An Ambivalent and Unique Security Policy. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Sinnott R. 1995. Bringing Public Opinion Back In. In Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance. O. Niedermayer and R. Sinnott, eds. 11-32. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Smith, A. D. 1991. National Identity. London: Penguin. Smith, A. D. 1992. National Identity and the Idea of European Unity. International Affairs 68(1): 55-76. Spinelli, A. 1972 [1957]. The Growth of the European Movement since the Second World War. In European Integration. M. Hodges, ed. 43-68. London: Penguin. Vanke, J. 2006. Charles de Gaulle’s Uncertain Idea of Europe. In Origins and Evolution of the European Union. D. Dinan, ed. 141-65. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wallace W. 1994. Rescue or Retreat? The Nation State in Western Europe, 1945-93. Political Studies 42 (Special Issue): 52-76. Wallace, W. 1999. The Sharing of Sovereignty: The European Paradox. Political Studies 47:3 (Special Issue): 503-21. Whelan, B. 2005. Ireland, the Marshall Plan and United States Cold War Concerns. Journal of Cold War Studies 8(1): 63-94.

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‘FOR MUTUAL BENEFIT’: IRISH OFFICIAL DISCOURSE ON EUROPEANISATION AND HIBERNICISATION Katy Hayward Abstract The arguments for European integration put forward by successive Irish governments contain the conceit that Ireland’s EU membership has been of benefit not only to Ireland but also to ‘Europe’ (as both place and project). The political speeches analysed in this chapter demonstrate the complementary nature of the themes of ‘Europeanisation’ and ‘Hibernicisation’ in Irish official discourse. Although the meaning and interpretation of Europeanisation has changed over the course of Ireland’s European Union membership, it has remained vital to Irish political actors that this relationship is presented very much as a ‘two way’ one, with Ireland making an important practical and idealised contribution to the EU. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the viability of such discourses in the light of growing public wariness (and perhaps weariness) of them in a changing EUIrish context. We recognised that we had a part to play in securing a strong and prosperous Europe (…) We have seen unique institutions created (…) offering us all the chance to work together for mutual benefit (Ahern 2001a).

The case of Ireland has often been held, not least by Irish politicians, to exemplify the potential of the European Union to change and even redeem a nation-state. As many of the chapters in this volume demonstrate, the country’s recent experience of economic vitality, cross-border cooperation, constitutional change and relative cultural diversity may be linked (to a degree) to Europeanisation. This interpretation is advocated at the highest levels, with widespread and vocal consensus among the

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Irish political elite as to the advantages of European integration. Moreover, as the above quotation from a speech by former Taoiseach Bertie Ahern implies, ministerial observations on what Ireland has gained from membership are often accompanied by remarks on what it has given in return. Such official enthusiasm for European integration as a mutually beneficial venture has traditionally been crucial in maintaining public endorsement of EU membership. The first referendum on the Treaty of Nice (June 2001) could be said to be the exception that proves the rule, with the failure of this being largely put down to a lacklustre and inefficient ‘Yes’ campaign (see Hayward 2002). The rejection of the Treaty of Lisbon in June 2008 also reflected deficiencies in the organisation of the ‘Yes’ campaign; however, the relatively high turnout (53 per cent) indicates that factors persuading people to vote ‘No’ had a potency of their own. Given that public knowledge of the Lisbon Treaty (as with the selfprofessed knowledge of a few of the government members of the ‘Yes’ campaign) was relatively poor,1 public opinion appears to have veered from governmental discourse not in relation to the detail of the Treaty itself but rather in its perceived implications for the future direction of the EU and Ireland’s position within it. Nonetheless, the Eurobarometer survey conducted around the time of the Lisbon referendum shows the maintenance of a positive perception of EU membership among the Irish public, with 73 per cent declaring it to be a ‘good thing’ (European Commission 2008). This suggests that the disjuncture between public opinion and governmental discourses on EU membership does not generally occur on the matter of whether Ireland has benefited from membership or, indeed, whether it should remain an EU member. Whatever the precise reasons for the discrepancy between public opinion and political elite opinion on the future shape of the EU (which I consider in more detail elsewhere [Hayward 2009]), the result of the Lisbon Treaty referendum neither undermines nor eradicates the legacy of forty-plus years of Irish political discourse on the benefits of EU membership. Therefore it is worth examining in detail the way in which Ireland’s 1 According to research conducted on behalf of the Referendum Commission in Ireland immediately prior to the launch of the official referendum campaign, only one in 20 voters believed they understood the Treaty of Lisbon and two thirds said they did not understand it at all (‘Two-thirds do not understand treaty text’, Irish Times, 29 April 2008).

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governing elite has portrayed the country’s relationship with the EU since accession was first mooted in the early 1960s. In accordance with the unifying theme of this volume, there are two dimensions to this partnership. First, Europeanisation: how membership of the European Union has affected Ireland. Secondly, Hibernicisation: what Ireland has contributed to European integration. The official line on Ireland’s membership of the EU is that it constitutes a partnership of common interests and shared (albeit unequal) benefit. This chapter rests on the premise that official discourse has played a crucial role in the self-defined ‘success story’ of Irish membership of the EU.2 Specifically, it examines the ways in which the processes of what we refer to as ‘Europeanisation’ and ‘Hibernicisation’ are presented by the governmental elite to a public audience. The analysis of texts presented by/in the name of members of successive Irish governments is discussed here in relation to both principal ideals and linear change. Whilst the core themes articulated in relation to the EU’s impact on Ireland have remained relatively consistent since accession – sovereignty and prosperity, for example – discourse on what Ireland contributes to the EU has altered quite considerably. Indeed, official discourse on dynamics of Hibernicisation has become increasingly filled with references to the responsibilities and challenges of integration. Overall, the Irish government has tried to match economic growth and a rising international profile with a new presentation of Ireland’s position in the EU, i.e. as a role model rather than a recipient. This relates to the reflexive character of Irish official discourse on EU membership. The flexible concepts of a ‘Europeanised’ Ireland and a ‘Hibernicised’ EU have endured since Ireland’s first application for membership of the European Economic Community in 1961, fostered by a political elite determined that EEC/EU membership could benefit Ireland without putting it in a colonial-like position of dependence. The elements that they particularly cherished in and sought from Irish independence – sovereignty, prosperity, national identity, a role on the international stage – they therefore presented as being enhanced by participation in the EU.

2 For example, ‘The historic economic and political developments in Ireland during our membership of the EU represent a European success story as well as an obviously Irish one’ (Roche 2007).

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Studying the EU/nation-state relationship The scholarly literature of Europeanisation has become modified by awareness of the ‘two-way’ nature of the relationship between the European Union and its member-states. This has been illustrated in recent times with the concepts of ‘uploading’ and ‘downloading’ (Borzël 2002; Howell 2004). The figure (1) below provides a simplified model of the direction of processes in the member-state/EU relationship. For the purposes of clarity, I make a distinction here between the terms ‘Europeanisation’ and ‘European integration’. Europeanisation refers essentially to the top-down process in which EU membership impacts upon the domestic level. European integration, on the other hand, is a bottomup process by which member-states support the evolution of the European Union through institution-building and the acceptance of European norms, rules and practice.3 With regard to the particular theme of this chapter and volume, Hibernicisation may be seen as part of this ‘uploading’ process in that it relates to Ireland’s contribution to the evolution of the EU. Figure 1. Uploading and downloading in the EU/member-state relationship

3 It should be noted that these concepts of ‘bottom-up’/‘top-down’ and ‘uploading’/‘downloading’ are not always categorised as ‘European integration’ and ‘Europeanisation’ respectively. Borzël (2002:193), for example, sees these two-way processes as incorporated within Europeanisation.

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There are several ways to approach the question of how EU memberstates act as conduits of these two-way processes. Analysis may be conducted on the basis of institutions or administration, for example. One of the most comprehensive analyses at this level in the Irish case was conducted by Laffan and O’Mahony (2003). They discovered that Ireland’s traditional system of ‘flexible adaptation’ to EU-related business became more formalised after the first referendum on the Treaty of Nice (2001) in terms of clearer structures for domestic responses to Europeanisation. Other studies of Europeanisation consider the detail of policies, legislation and regulation emanating from the EU and their impact at the national level. Leading research in this field, such as that performed by Héritier, Knill and Mingers (1996) and Kohler-Koch and Eising (1999), has suggested that national adaptation to Europeanisation depends on the ‘goodness of fit’ between national administrative rules and policies and EU legislation. In the case of Ireland, there has been a significant degree of strategic adaptation in order to ‘fit’ the EU’s requirements, notably with regard to EU initiatives and policies that are of specific national interest (e.g. regional development, see Rees, Quinn and Connaughton [2004]). In relation to the particular focus of this chapter, some scholars have suggested that the nature of the domestic political culture may provide an insight into the response of member-states to Europeanisation and their approach to European integration. Carey (2002: 407), for example, contends that feelings of national identity are at least as important as utilitarian explanations for individuals’ evaluation of European integration. However, the case of Ireland (for which Eurobarometer surveys consistently give high readings for support for EU membership and strength of national identity) would appear to contradict Carey’s conclusion that stronger feelings of national identity lead to lower levels of support for the EU.4 It will be suggested herein that Irish exceptionality is in part to do with the lead given by the Irish political elite when it comes to showing a strong Irish national identity and pride to be compatible with a proEuropean stance. The thesis expounded here centres on the role of offiIn the Eurobarometer survey full report (2006) that included a question on national pride/identity, only two per cent of Irish respondents said they were not proud to be Irish (the lowest result in the EU). In the Eurobarometer survey of that year and the following year, Ireland had the highest positive response level (87 per cent in each) in the EU27 (the EU27 average being 54 and 58 per cent respectively) to the question of whether Ireland has benefitted from EU membership. 4

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cial discourse in the processes of Europeanisation and European integration, specifically its capacity to marry the two. Official discourse and EU membership The term ‘discourse’ can refer to various dimensions of the social world – i.e. language, interaction and context – and, most crucially, to the connections between them (Fairclough 2001: 21). In this chapter, however, I refer specifically to discourse as language/text whilst maintaining an awareness of its wider implications. The relationship between the changing political world and the language used to describe and appraise it, i.e. between conception and action, is close and crucial (Skinner 1989: 6). Because conceptual change attends any reconstitution of the political world, political change and conceptual change must be understood as one complex and interrelated process (Farr 1989: 30–2). Discourse is not only central to processes of change, it also serves to create the impression of stability throughout. Thus general perceptions of continuity and integrity in nation-statehood can be fostered despite the occurrence of substantial change (as has occurred in Irish membership of the EU). Discourse theory seeks to ‘chart and explain’ the role of discourse as a vehicle of both stability and change in relation to political practice (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 6). To study official discourse – i.e. the words spoken by members of the governmental elite in their official capacity and to a public audience – is to classify the speeches of those with political power as significant in the navigation/direction of major socio-political change. Yet, beyond power, positions of government bring credibility and accountability, both of which are essential for the acceptance and implementation of core political principles/ideals. If discursive practices are those through which actors seek to persuade others to see ‘reality’ in the same light as themselves (Billig 1987), official discourse can act – indeed, is intended to act – as a window on the national executive’s accommodation of elements competing for influence in the political realm. Thus, analysis of official discourse on the subject of EU membership can provide insights into the response of national leaders to multi-level pressures. Moreover, official discourse is generally the first medium through which developments in the uploading/downloading processes of EU membership are brought into the public arena. The discursive dynamics of Europeanisation and European integration in the realm of national politics can be, therefore,

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as essential as any institutional or instrumental device. According to Schmidt (2000, 2006) there are two types of discourse of the political elite involved in European policy making. First, the political elite use coordinative discourse in order to reach agreement on policy matters. Then communicative discourse is used to present the policy programme to the public. It is this type of discourse that I am particularly interested in here. With the notable exception of referendum campaigns on EU treaties (which have become increasingly arduous for ‘Yes’ campaigners), the Irish governmental elite have often revelled in their role as ‘mediators’ of the processes of Europeanisation to the domestic audience. In contrast to some of their European counterparts (the British being the most obvious example), Irish ministers have not generally perceived there to be impossible tensions between discourse on European and national issues; rather they have embraced the power they have over both in their use of official discourse. They are aware of the legitimising role of national discourse and use it to their political advantage. Moreover, they place themselves as the actors with active responsibility for addressing the ‘need to bring Europe closer to its citizens’ (Ahern 2004b). The following extract from a speech given by former Taoiseach Bertie Ahern (2004c) as President of the Council of the European Union to an audience of EU leaders in Prague, aptly summarises the implications of this approach: The Union can rarely expect to have the political immediacy of national and local issues. As a result, it can be presented as distant. This places a particular onus on politicians and leaders. We have got to work even harder to earn for the European Union the engagement which a living Union requires to remain successful (…) The dialogue in which we engage must remain respectful of the genuine differences that we will have from time to time.

National politicians, Ahern suggests, provide the channel for communication between the EU and its citizens. Their role in informing people about the EU and in ‘earning’ their engagement on its behalf brings with it ultimate responsibility for the ‘success’ of the EU as a whole. In return, national politicians need the freedom to speak frankly and to voice ‘genuine differences’ within the Union. This quotation, and the sentiments it reveals, provides a good starting point for the following analysis of Irish official discourse and its presentation of the processes of Europeanisation and Hibernicisation since Ireland’s accession to the Euro-

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pean Economic Community (EEC) in 1973.5 Discourse on Europeanisation, Realising Sovereignty Expectations about what membership of the European Economic Community would bring were closely aligned with the political and economic priorities of 1960s Ireland. The decision by Fianna Fáil to seek entry to the EEC was a logical step after the embracing of free trade and economic interdependence by the Lemass-led government (Murphy 2003). Ireland’s relationship with Britain was inseparable from such concerns. Keogh (1997: 13) describes Dublin as reacting with surprise to rumours that Britain planned to apply for EEC membership in early 1961; yet the move of its neighbour left Ireland little choice but to do likewise. Indeed, the Taoiseach’s statement to the Dáil in August 1961, in which he announced the decision to apply for membership of the Common Market, was greeted by the leader of the Fine Gael with the sardonic comment that, ‘The Fianna Fáil policy of economic self-sufficiency has now given way to the realisation of the essential value of the British market to the economy’ (Dillon 1961: 2247). Thus, the paradoxical situation in which what had made it necessary for Ireland to join was the same thing that Ireland hoped to escape from through EEC membership. This point was central to the ability of the Irish political elite to present EEC/EU membership as a step towards enhancing Irish national sovereignty. In a special issue of Community Report produced to mark fifteen years of Irish membership of the EEC, the overriding theme of the assessment of the political elite was that Irish sovereignty had become more of a reality through accession. A growing independence, in thought and practice, from Britain was seen as particularly important in this evaluation, as this extract from the piece by then-Tánaiste Brian Lenihan indicates: 5 The selection of sources quoted here is drawn from a wider study of Irish official discourse on EEC/EU membership (see Hayward 2009). This chapter deliberately includes a wide range of types of sources (e.g. press releases, newspaper articles, referendum material, speeches to Irish and European audiences, statements to the Oireachtas) and a range of actors (Taoisigh, party leaders, government ministers, ministers of state, European Commissioners, in and out of office – all from Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael as the two main parties of government). Given the constraints of space and the immense complexity of the topic, the choice of sources here is intended to be broadly indicative (particularly of trends in the lead-up to accession, after fifteen years and after thirty years of membership) rather than a comprehensive representation.

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Membership has boosted national morale. It has also helped to diminish the Anglo-centricity of Irish attitudes and given Ireland a role in Europe and the world which would otherwise have been beyond our reach. It has allowed us to have a real say in important decisions affecting our economic well being. This development reflects the wider development of the Community’s own self confidence and the fact that it is able to speak with one voice on so many major issues (Lenihan 1988: 3).

Commissioner Peter Sutherland (1988: 4) went even further in claiming that EEC membership, ‘was the ultimate expression of our hard-won independence’ because it demonstrated that Ireland, ‘could choose to participate in the new adventure of reshaping the old continent on an equal footing with our partner countries’. The notion that Ireland’s position in the world has been secured and strengthened by EEC membership has been central to official discourse on the subject. This has not only been in relation to abstract concepts of sovereignty and independence but also with regard to very real and urgent concerns about Irish economic welfare. Increased prosperity in Europe had been promised from the very beginnings of the Irish-EEC relationship. Prosperity as a promise The issue of economic development, against the backdrop of Anglo-Irish (economic) relations, continued to dominate official discourse through the process of Ireland’s three applications for EEC membership. Haughey’s (1962) speech as Minister for Justice following Ireland’s first application shows the intrinsic position of Britain in the economic case for joining the EEC: In purely economic terms our future prosperity as a nation depends on, firstly, increased industrialisation, and, secondly, a more profitable return from agriculture. For increased industrial production Britain alone will not be a sufficient market and it is to our nearest neighbours, the countries of Western Europe, that we naturally look for new customers. (…) If we join, new markets will be open to us, providing a new outlet for both industrial and agricultural goods.

Ireland’s application for EEC membership was indisputably a decision based on a zero-sum economic situation. This was also evident in official information pamphlets a decade later, prior to the referendum on accession: It is clear that there is no realistic alternative to membership which would provide the opportunities and economic environment which we need for

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the achievement of the national objectives of increasing employment and raising the standard of living (Department of Foreign Affairs 1972: 19).

Ever since the preliminary debates about applying to the EEC, the broad notion of the necessity of Ireland’s participation in European free trade has been translated for public consumption into the ideal of ‘prosperity’. As this extract from a pamphlet published for the referendum campaign demonstrates, the argument was that Europeanisation (as such) had brought prosperity to the original six members of the EEC and it would do so for Ireland: There has been a great increase in prosperity in each of the six member countries since the Community was set up. Indeed, the Community is one of the fastest growing economic areas in the world. This growth has been accompanied by high employment and considerable improvements in living standards. The member countries, large and small, recognise that they owe most of this exceptional prosperity to the existence of the Community (Department of Foreign Affairs 1972).

The inference was brought out even more strongly in a speech given by the Taoiseach in the lead-up to the referendum on EEC membership in May 1972: By voting ‘Yes’ on Wednesday the Irish people will ensure that we will have the powerful impetus which EEC membership can provide not only to accelerate the country’s economic and social advancement but to win for all our people a standard of living and a quality of life as good as that now enjoyed by the other peoples of Europe (Lynch 1972)6.

Prosperity as a goal If broad expectations of better living and working conditions were encouraged prior to membership, they were soon played down as progress in European integration was stymied during the 1970s. At the end of that decade, Ireland’s Commissioner to the EEC, Richard Burke (1979), blamed the lack of progress on widespread economic recession and, apparently without irony, ‘the acute strain created by the exercise of assimilating the three new member states which joined in 1973’. Disappointment at Ireland’s preliminary experience of membership meant that, 6 The correspondence between the message given in the Department of Foreign Affairs’ pamphlets and the speeches of government ministers around the time of the referendum on accession is unsurprising given that an interdepartmental committee of senior civil servants was formed to help conduct the referendum campaign, including the production of speaking notes for ministers (FitzGerald 2006: 34).

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by the time it came for the Irish government to ‘sell’ the Single European Act in the 1987 referendum, even broader brush strokes were used to paint an image of the Community. It was no longer claimed that prosperity was going to be definitively achieved by membership, but rather that the EEC provided Ireland with a better chance of increasing it. For instance, an official pamphlet (Government of Ireland 1987) for the 1987 referendum summarised the ‘meaning’ of the SEA thus: • More Irish exports • More progress in bringing our prosperity up to EEC levels • Better prospects for reducing unemployment levels • Better prospects for Ireland in tomorrow’s growth industries

The Irish governmental elite thus settled on the general tactic of portraying the effects of EEC/EU membership very much in terms of the shared ideals and ambitions of the Community. This meant that summaries of what Ireland has gained from membership, particularly following the slow years of the 1970s and 1980s, were as non-specific and idealised as predictions of what it would gain in the future. For instance, despite the affirmative title of his article – ‘First fifteen [years] has put Ireland ahead’ – the assessment of the Tánaiste Brian Lenihan (1988: 2) was relatively vague: Looking back on the last 15 years it is clear that the Irish economy has gained substantially from membership. Irish economic success is now inextricably linked with that of the Community as a whole. Nowhere are the inextricable ties between member-state and community more evident than in times of holding the Presidency of the Council of the European Union. The persistence of prosperity as central to Ireland’s relationship with the EU is exemplified in the stated aims of the Irish Presidency of the Council in 2004. Ireland’s goals for its presidential term were: to ‘make Europe the most competitive economy in the world by 2010’ (Ahern 2004b), ‘advance Ireland’s economic and commercial interests’ (Cowen 2003), and to meet the Ireland’s twin priorities from the Lisbon Agenda, i.e. sustainable growth and high quality employment (Ahern 2004b). European citizenship, national identity Occasions of Irish presidencies of the European Council and national referendums on European treaties have also been particular times at

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which EU priorities are matched with national principles. For example, from the mid-1990s, as the Treaty on European Union was drawn and ratified, official discourse on what EU membership brings Ireland included more emphasis upon European citizenship and the rights that this brings Irish people. The two quotations below from the Taoiseach in place during Ireland’s 1996 Council Presidency and prior to the 1998 referendum on the Treaty of Amsterdam demonstrate the use of the citizenship ideal in relation to the impact of Europeanisation: Both of these objectives [single market and tackling organised crime] of our presidency have one thing in common, and that is bringing the European project closer to citizens and showing that the European Union can address the problems that European citizens have (Bruton 1996). In the future the European Union will continue to impact on the lives of the Irish people in an even more positive way. The Treaty of Amsterdam (…) will ensure that Europe can address the real concerns of its citizens. It will allow Europe to address more effectively the most direct concerns of citizens in the areas of employment, crime and the environment, public health, consumer protection, social exclusion and non-discrimination (Ahern 1998a).

The concept of a ‘citizen’s Europe’ (Ahern 2000: 445) has developed into a core component of Irish official discourse on Europeanisation, not least because it contains within it the notion of a two-way relationship between member-state and EU. However, the notion of a European citizenship has, if anything, made the notion of a European identity even more remote in Irish official discourse. Lenihan’s (1988: 2) comment that Ireland’s motives for joining the EEC including seizing the ‘opportunity to participate in the movement towards a wider European identity’ is unusual for even mentioning the term ‘European identity’ let alone expressing such sentiments. Just as quickly as Eurosceptic opposition has conjured the spectre of a national identity trounced by Europeanisation, the Irish governmental elite have argued that ‘Ireland’s distinctive national identity has in fact been strengthened as a result of our EU membership’ (Ahern 2001a). The EU, the Irish public is constantly assured, is ‘a totally new form of political institution (…) based on the identification of common interests and the cherishing of cultural and national identities’ (Ahern 1998b). This is not to say that the door to a shared European identity has been bolted shut, but rather that there has been no political confidence in

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proffering such an ideal.7 This is despite the confidence that the Irish governmental elite has consistently expressed with regard to the ‘common cultural heritage’ between Ireland and Europe. Such a concept has always played a role in the construction of what Ireland can contribute to the EEC/EU, i.e. Hibernicisation. Discourse on Hibernicisation, Mutual Benefit In contrast to the clear and repeated predictions of what EEC membership would bring to Ireland, official discourse prior to accession made little reference to what Ireland might be able to contribute. This is unsurprising given Ireland’s relative inexperience of international cooperation and, in particular, its self-conscious position as a small and underdeveloped state. Nevertheless, the pro-European political elite were keen to counter the notion that EEC membership would be an entirely one-way process. As it meant a step up in Ireland’s international political and economic status, so it couldn’t imply a charitable gesture on behalf of the rest of the Community. The argument was that the conditions of accession negotiated for Ireland would allow it to play its part. The many concessions we have been granted, the protection offered us in areas of vital concern to us, are concrete evidence of the fact that there is a great deal of genuine goodwill for us amongst our partners-to-be and that we can look forward with confidence to working with them for our mutual benefit (Haughey 1972).

After over twenty-five years of EU membership, Bertie Ahern, as Haughey’s successor, gave a speech in which he indicated that such predictions regarding the potential of an Irish contribution to the European Union had been proven to be true. Such discourse – as the quotation below demonstrates – blends boasts of the Irish input to EU institutions with an implied comparison to Britain (whose approach to the evolution of the EU is not so ‘positive’ or in favour of ‘change’), with rhetoric that finds natural harmony between Irish and European interests:

7 ‘For the foreseeable future, I believe that most people’s primary loyalty will remain their own countries. There is as yet no predominant sense of a common European identity. But provided that what happens at the European level does not go beyond what the citizens of the Member States can identify with, I believe we can be flexible and innovative’ (Ahern 2001c).

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Ireland in turn has made a positive and constructive contribution to the European Union. Ireland has always adopted a positive approach in negotiations on the ongoing evolution of the Union’s policies and institutional architecture. It is generally agreed that the Irish Presidencies of the EU have been successful and helped to ensure the advancement of the Union’s agenda. We have not been afraid of change, but have always sought to participate actively in shaping change, in the best interests of Ireland and Europe (Ahern 1999).

Cultural heritage It is notable that, in accordance with what Ireland had most confidence in at the time, a fair amount of discourse on what Ireland might bring to EEC membership focused on the cultural, religious and mythical-historical dimensions of Europeanness. For example, in an article in the Irish Times on the Common Market written as an academic and journalist, Garret FitzGerald (5 January 1963) presented EEC membership as providing an opportunity to fulfil Ireland’s wider responsibility as a Catholic country: But we must not think only of ensuring the survival of our way of life – we should be thinking of contributing to the rest of the world, and this we can do too by joining Europe and bringing to it our sense of moral values.

The common Christianity of the EEC members was brought out for particular mention by Charles Haughey (1962: Doc.7), then Minister for Justice, in response to criticisms that the Common Market was ‘purely materialistic’:8 This union could never have come into existence if it had as its only binding force the pursuance of economic objects. On the contrary there is a distinctive European tradition founded on a long history of Christianity which is common to the Six. This we also share (…) we will be helping to build and strengthen a new Europe which will be a sanctuary for those spiritual values so highly regarded by us (…) a union founded on beliefs to which we enthusiastically subscribe.

In speaking about cultural heritage, the Irish political elite were on familiar ground. By framing discussion of EEC membership in such terms, they were able to draw upon established narratives of Irish nationhood. Taoiseach Jack Lynch’s (1967) statement to the Dáil following Ireland’s 8 In actual fact EEC membership was to bring with it some of the most potent challenges to the traditional moral ethos of Catholic Ireland in its legal and social implications, for example with respect to women’s rights (Dooley 1991: 18).

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second application for EEC membership contains an excellent example of the blending of national and European myths: Our friends in Europe are fully conscious of the part played by Irish scholars in the defence of those values at a dark moment in Europe's history, just as we cannot but be mindful of our debt to the European nations for the hospitality and encouragement found there by Irish exiles during our own long struggle for national identity. The facts of history and the links of a common civilisation join our small island to that great land-mass with whose destinies our own are bound up, and we cannot but welcome, support and contribute to any movement aimed at developing and strengthening that European way of life which is a part of our own Irish heritage.

The contention that in some ways Ireland’s EEC membership would mean a ‘return’ to its cultural roots has remained a feature of Irish official discourse, as in Ahern’s (2001c) assertion that, ‘The EU is not them: it is us’. It is interesting to note that, in these early stages of Irish movement towards EEC membership, the reliance in official discourse on ambiguous and generalised statements about expectations and conditions of membership was a source of frustration among opposition politicians. In response to Lynch’s statement referred to above, for instance, the Labour Party leader, Brendan Corish (1967: 783), bemoaned the fact that, ‘After a speech lasting an hour and a half, we still have got little information’. His party colleague, Michael O’Leary (1967: 989), went further in his particular criticism of the government’s reliance on idealised rhetoric: The only thing we continue to refer to are the endeavours of our missionaries in Europe 1,500 years ago. We have this kind of ridiculous posturing by the Government, as if it were any secret in the EEC countries that this was an underdeveloped economy, a ramshackle economy in every respect, in its social security and unable to fulfil any requirements of the modern State, but stating its willingness to undertake the implications of full membership. The people of Europe, unlike the Irish people, will not be codded by such nonsense.

Shaping the future Yet despite awareness of Ireland’s small size and capacity relative to other members of the EEC, a strong argument for accession was that Ireland would be able to have an effect upon the development of a major international body. See, for example, this extract from a booklet produced by the Department of Foreign Affairs prior to the referendum on Irish accession to the European Economic Community in 1972:

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Whether we join or stay outside, the Community will continue to develop. Inside, we can influence this development and have our interests taken fully into account. Outside, we can only watch while the Community take decisions which will inevitably affect our vital interests. The real choice is between having a hand in the shaping of our future or leaving it to others to shape it for us (Department of Foreign Affairs 1972: 13).

Implicit in this argument – and essential to its effect – was a contrast with the official narrative of Ireland’s experience of colonialism. This has continued in the government’s conscientious presentation of Ireland as a supportive and active member of the European community, rather than as a dependant on European benefaction. Hibernicisation, it may be said, has been as important a theme as Europeanisation in Irish official discourse on EEC/EU membership because it reflects well on Europe as well as on Ireland. For similar reasons, although the political dimensions of European integration had been played down prior to accession (‘ever-closer union’ being mentioned occasionally as a grand ideal rather than a strategic objective),9 it wasn’t long before the Irish governing elite saw an opportunity to raise its status within the EEC by being an advocate of political union. For a significant period of time, the most noteworthy gift Ireland could bring to European integration was its diligent enthusiasm. This has been presented in official discourse as bearing fruit in terms of Ireland gaining favour in the European community, as may be seen in the comments of Commissioner Sutherland (1988) after the ratification of the Single European Act: Much of our success in Europe has been due to the overwhelming endorsement of Europe by the Irish people which generated enormous goodwill towards Ireland. In the referendum on the Single European Act in 1987, Ireland renewed its commitment to Europe and its willingness to face the new challenges presented by further progress towards a united Europe.

Of course, the fact that this pro-integrationist stance contrasted defini‘The Treaties setting up the three Communities are concerned solely with economic, commercial and related social matters. They contain no specific political obligations. And yet it is clear that the founders of the Community had more in mind than cooperation in economic, commercial and social matters. They, in fact, saw themselves as laying the foundations of an ever-closer union among the European peoples and as helping to strengthen the safeguards of peace and liberty. However, progress in the field of political cooperation proper has not been significant’ (Department of Foreign Affairs 1972: 11). 9

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tively with its neighbouring member-state was no coincidence. Indeed, the tension arising from Ireland’s position of dependence on Britain in the EEC was now beginning to be expressed in terms of strong proEuropeanism. Commissioner Burke (1979) bemoaned the fact that ‘a number of member states have shown a renewed tendency to see things in national terms and to look for national solutions to problems, at the expense of the Community perspective.’ Pro-European Many of those who came to be leading decision-makers in Irish politics stated their support for European political union at an early stage. For example: We are fully aware that the Community as defined in the Treaty of Rome is intended to serve as a foundation for political unity (…) we support this objective and are anxious to play our part in making it a reality (Haughey 1967).

However, with virtually no exceptions, Irish official discourse on the subject of political union has been accompanied with some acknowledgement that progress towards this goal has been limited so far. As in the case of Haughey’s (1967) speech quoted from above: There is as yet no political union and any union that is to be created will be the creation of the peoples and governments that are members of the Community and the precise form it will take has yet to emerge.

This position echoed that of the Taoiseach’s at the time: Up to the present time, progress towards the ultimate goal of political union in Europe has been slow (…) Nevertheless, the quest for political unity has not been abandoned, and, so far as we in Ireland are concerned, we remain determined to play our full part in the new and greater Europe which we hope will, one day, emerge (Lynch 1967: 746).

In a neat twist on the notion that EEC/EU membership is necessary for the achievement of national sovereignty, the implicit argument here is that Ireland has to be an enthusiastic member of the EEC in order for the Community as a whole to fulfil its potential. Thus, retrospectively, the decision to join is described by a Commissioner as:

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a highly political decision motivated by our desire to be a part of the political process towards European union aimed at healing the wounds caused by national rivalry and also aimed at enabling Europe to play a role of real influence for peace and stability in the wider world (Sutherland 1988: 4).

The ability of the Irish governmental elite to present the interests of the EU and the nation-state as coterminous draws upon the oft-repeated notion that EEC/EU membership, ‘provided Ireland with both the means and the opportunity to exercise our identity as a distinctive and identifiable nation among nations – to influence the shape and direction of European politics’ (Alan Dukes, as leader of Fine Gael, 1988: 6). This is exemplified at times when Ireland is in the spotlight on the European stage. Ireland’s presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2004 showcased the notion that European and Irish interests went hand in hand. Thus, being ‘in the driving seat’ of the EU was not seen as an opportunity to realize national objectives but rather ‘to drive forward the agenda of the European Union’ (Ahern 2004b). The ‘motivating force’ of the Irish presidency was, therefore, ‘to build consensus’ and its ‘overriding aim’ was ‘to manage the business of the Union in an efficient, effective and even-handed manner’ (Ahern 2004a and b). Because of the Irish government’s confidence that strengthening the EU and strengthening its member-states goes hand in hand, Ireland is able to take on a role such as presidency of the Council of the EU with the confident assertion that a successful outcome for the EU as a whole would be the most successful outcome for Ireland. A model member-state A consistent theme in Ireland’s Presidency of the Council in 2004, and in its official response to enlargement of the EU, is that of Ireland as an exemplary member-state. This notion combines various concepts that Irish official discourse has relied upon in its presentation of Irish engagement with the EU, i.e. pro-integrationist, economic development, small size, revitalised sovereignty, etc. Such a concept serves to reassure the Irish public about the security of Ireland’s position in the EU and to dismiss concerns about such a major enlargement of the EU. Thus, it was used quite regularly in the Irish government’s campaigns for the referendums on the Treaty of Nice. For example, in an article subtitled ‘why we must all vote Yes to the Treaty’, Minister of State Tom Kitt (2001) wrote:

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when the applicant nations come to seek a model for their own development in Europe, it will be to Ireland that they will look. We should be proud of this and just as Europe did not turn its back on Ireland in 1973, we must not turn our back on them today.

The notion that the eyes of the prospective member-states were on Ireland was reiterated time and again, as in this statement to Seanad Éireann by the Taoiseach on the Nice Summit: I am well aware from my own visits to the applicant countries, most recently to Malta and Cyprus last month, that they have a particular interest in our experience within the Union. Ireland is seen as a small state, with an historical experience not totally different from their own, which, having started from a long way back, has made the best possible use of the support and opportunities given to it to catch up with the European mainstream. When, on my visits abroad, I am able to tell our story, to compare the statistics of today with those of thirty years ago, or even ten years ago, I always make clear just how much we owe to the Union, and just how unimaginable our current prosperity and self-confidence would be if we had not had the chance to grow within the EU framework (Ahern 2001b).

The truth of Ahern’s assertion that he spreads this positive message about EU membership is evident in speeches that he gives to EU applicant states. For example, in a speech to a Maltese audience the previous month, the Taoiseach had confidently put forward the concept of the Irish ‘model small state’: The demands of EU membership have been, in the experience of my small island, a prescription for a more prosperous and better future. Ireland may possibly be seen as a model by many of the applicant countries, especially the smaller ones. We went from relative poverty to shared affluence with our European partners within one generation. We have used the opportunities given us by EU membership well. I am happy and indeed privileged to acknowledge Ireland’s success here today (Ahern 2001a).

This discourse is not just for consumption around the time of referendums. A 2005 case study on the Department of Foreign Affairs in the Irish Times ‘Business 2000’ curriculum resource revealed that the idea of Ireland as a ‘model small state’ is intended to become embedded in the Irish national narrative on EU membership. Ireland is described in this text as ‘leading the way’ in EU enlargement, not least by ‘sharing its successful experience of EU membership with the new Member and acceding States’. The ‘model small state’ ideal exemplifies the way in which processes of Hibernicisation are inseparable from discourse on

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Ireland’s experience of and response to Europeanisation. Conclusion Successive Irish governments have responded to change in the paths and progress of the EU with broad-sweeping rhetoric lauding the unique Irish contribution to European integration. In this sense, what Ireland has gained from Europeanisation has, in idealised terms, fed directly into a fairly strong and confident assessment of what Hibernicisation might mean for an enlarged EU. Over time, Europeanisation has moved from being a straightforward necessity, through being beneficial, to being an essential part of Irish nation-statehood. Similarly has developed from a fairly idealistic sop to being an essential argument as to why Ireland should and could remain an active player in European integration. This harmony of interests and ideals did not come to a crashing end with the referendum on the Lisbon Treaty on 11 June 2008. Indeed, one interpretation of the referendum ‘No’ result might be that it reflects the internalisation of pro-European official discourses in Ireland. To apply a summary of the discursive themes covered in this chapter: votes were cast by citizens mindful of Ireland’s story as a ‘model member-state’, whose sovereignty was not compromised by integration, whose prosperity was achieved through membership, and which has helped shape the past and the future of Europe. On this occasion, for various reasons, the majority came to a different conclusion to the Irish and European political elite as to what the next chapter should be in this ‘European success story’. Unfortunately for Irish voters and European diplomats alike, the typescript is set (albeit one chapter, or treaty, at a time) and by the time it comes to the point of being ratified at the national level, the only type of submission for which there’s space is a stamp of approval. The overwhelmingly negative consequences of the ‘No’ result for Ireland’s relationship with the EU imply that the discourses of an active contribution to European integration have become little more than rhetorical devices. In seeking to redeem this situation, the Irish and European governmental elite might consider that what made Ireland a widely-credited ‘model member-state’ was its political elite’s recognition of Hibernicisation to be as important an ideal as Europeanisation. The case of Ireland – in its triumphs and crises in EU membership – proves that the principle of a twoway, mutually beneficial relationship must be manifestly upheld by the EU and each of its member-states if a cohesive union is to be achieved.

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References Ahern, B. 1998a. Statement by the Taoiseach on the 25th Anniversary of Ireland’s Accession to the EU, 1 January 1998. Electronic document, http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/index.asp?locID=375&docID=1265. Accessed January 2008. Ahern, B. 1998b. Address by the Taoiseach to the EU Heads of Mission, Dublin, 30 April 1998. Electronic document, http://www.bertieahern.eu /index.asp?locID=375&docID=998. Accessed January 2008. Ahern, B. 1999. Opening address by the Taoiseach at a European Movement National Conference on ‘Partnership for Peace’, Dublin, 29 March 1999. Electronic document, http://www.irlgov.ie/taoiseach/press/Archives/ 1998/29-03-99.htm. Accessed January 2001. Ahern, B. 2000. Statement by the Taoiseach to Dáil Éireann on the European Council in Nice on 7-11th December 2000, 13 December 2000. Dáil Debates 528: 444-52. Ahern, B. 2001a. Ireland’s Experience of EU Membership. Speech by the Taoiseach to the Malta Chamber of Commerce, Valletta, 8 January 2001. Electronic document, http://www.bertieahern.eu/index.asp?locID=369& docID=479. Accessed January 2008. Ahern, B. 2001b. Statement by the Taoiseach to Seanad Éireann on the Nice Summit of the European Council, 8 February 2001. Seanad Debates, 165 (160-166). Ahern, B. 2001c. Europe: The Irish Viewpoint. Keynote address by the Taoiseach to the ‘Wales, Europe and the World’ Forum, Newport, Wales, 1 March 2001. Electronic document, http://www.bertieahern.eu/index.asp? locID=369&docID=450. Accessed January 2008. Ahern, B. 2004a. Speech at the Flag Raising Ceremony to mark the commencement of Ireland’s Presidency of the European Union. Dublin Castle, 1 January 2004. Electronic document, http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/ index.asp?locID=399&docID=1711. Accessed December 2007. Ahern, B. 2004b. Statement on 2004 Ireland’s Sixth Presidency of the European Union. Dáil Éireann, 20 January 2004. Dáil Debates, 578 (1-8). Ahern, B. 2004c. The Enlarged European Union: Working Together for a Better Future. Waldstein Palace, Prague, 22 April 2004. Electronic document, www.ue2004.ie/templates/document_file.asp?id=13422. Accessed December 2007. Billig, M. 1987. Arguing and Thinking: A Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Borzël, T. A. 2002. Pace-Setting, Foot-Dragging, and Fence-Sitting: MemberState Responses to Europeanization. Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2): 193-214. Bruton, J. 1996. Interview with Taoiseach on Ireland’s Presidency of the EU. Europe (magazine of the European Commission delegation to the USA), 14 July 1996.

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Burke, R. 1979. Foreword. In The Race for Europe. John Cooney, ed. Dublin: Dublin University Press. Carey, S. 2002. Undivided Loyalities: Is National Identity an Obstacle to European Integration? European Union Politics 3(4): 387-413. Corish, B. 1967. European Economic Community. Response of Labour Party leader to Taoiseach’s statement, 25 July 1967. Dáil debates 230:782-794. Cowen, B. 2003. Opening statement by Minister for Foreign Affairs. Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, 10 June 2003. Electronic document, http://foreignaffairs.gov.ie/home/index.aspx?id=26035. Accessed December 2007. Department of Foreign Affairs 1972. ‘Into Europe’: Ireland and the EEC. Dublin: Stationery Office. Department of Foreign Affairs 2005. EU Enlargement: Ireland Leading the Way. Irish Times: Business 2000 (9). Dublin: Irish Times. Electronic document, http://www.business2000.ie/images/pdfs/pdf_9th/dept_of_fa _9th_ed.pdf. Accessed January 2008. Dooley, D. 1991. Medical Ethics in Ireland: A Decade of Change. The Hastings Center Report 21 (1): 18-21. Dillon, J. 1961. Common Market: Ireland’s Application for Membership. Dáil Debates, 1 August 1961, 191 (2246-52). Dukes, A. 1988. How Ireland has Coped with its New Role. Community Report, Special issue ‘Ireland in the EC, First 15 Years, 1973-88’, 8(3): 6, 11. Dublin: Irish Office of the Commission of the European Communities. European Commission 2006. Standard Eurobarometer Survey – Full Report, Autumn 2006, 66. Electronic document, http://ec.europa.eu/public_ opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_en.pdf. Accessed January 2007. European Commission 2007. Standard Eurobarometer Survey – First Report, Autumn 2007, 68. Electronic document, http://ec.europa.eu/public_ opinion/archives/eb/eb68/eb68_first_en.pdf. Accessed January 2007. European Commission 2008. Standard Eurobarometer Survey – First Results, June 2008, 69. Electronic document, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion /archives/eb/eb69/eb_69_first_en.pdf. Accessed July 2008. Fairclough, N. 2001 (1989). Language and Power. Harlow, UK: Pearson Education. Farr, J. 1989. Understanding Conceptual Change Politically. In Political Innovation and Conceptual Change. T. Ball, J. Farr and R. L. Hanson, eds. 24-49. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. FitzGerald, G. 1963. The Common Market. Irish Times, 5 January 1963. FitzGerald, M. 2006. Ireland Within the Realms of the EC’s First Wave of Enlargement. Paper presented at XIV International Economic History Congress, Helsinki, August 2006. Electronic document, http://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/dspace/handle/2134/2307. Accessed December 2007.

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Government of Ireland 1987. The SEA: Why Ireland’s Economy Depends on it. Dublin: Stationery Office. Haughey, C. 1962. The Common Market. Speech given by the Minister for Justice, University College Galway, 14 December 1962 (1986: Document 7). In The Spirit of the Nation. The Speeches and Statements of Charles J. Haughey (1957-1986). M. Mansergh, ed. Dublin: Mercier Press. Haughey, C. 1967. The Second Application for EEC Membership. 26 July 1967 (1986: Document 28). In The Spirit of the Nation. The Speeches and Statements of Charles J. Haughey (1957-1986). M. Mansergh, ed. Dublin: Mercier Press. Haughey, C. 1972. Ireland’s Place Among the Nations of Europe: an Historic Opportunity. Speech to election workers, Dublin North-East Constituency, Edenmore 7 May 1972 (1986: Document 52). In The Spirit of the Nation. The Speeches and Statements of Charles J. Haughey (1957-1986). M. Mansergh, ed. Dublin: Mercier Press. Hayward, K. 2002. Not a Nice Surprise: An Analysis of the Debate on the Nice Treaty in Ireland. Irish Studies in International Affairs 13: 167-86. Hayward, K. 2009. Irish Nationalism and European Integration: Identity, Borders, Governance. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. Héritier, A., C. Knill and S. Mingers 1996. Ringing the Changes in Europe: Regulatory Competition and the Redefinition of the State: Britain, France, Germany. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Howarth, D. and Y. Stavrakakis 2000. Discourse Theory and Political Analysis. In Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change. D. Howarth, A. Norval and Y. Stavrakakis, eds. 1-23. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. Howell, K. E. 2004. ‘Developing Conceptualisations of Europeanisation: A Study of Financial Services. Politics 24 (1): 20–25. Keogh, D. 1997. The Diplomacy of ‘Dignified Calm’: An Analysis of Ireland’s Application for Membership of the EEC, 1961-1963. Chronicon 1 (4): 1-68. Electronic document, http://www.ucc.ie/chronicon/keogh.htm. Accessed December 2007. Kitt, T. 2001. Ireland is a Model for Other Nations. Article by Minister of State with responsibility for Labour, Trade, and Consumer Affairs. The Irish Sun, 10 May 2001. Electronic document, http://foreignaffairs.gov.ie/home/ index.aspx?id=26462 Accessed January 2009. Kohler-Koch, B. and R. Eising 1999. The Transformation of Governance in the European Union. London: Routledge. Laffan, B. and J. O’Mahony 2003. Managing Europe from Home: The Europeanisation of the Irish Core Executive. Organising for European Enlargement Occasional Paper 1.1, Dublin: University College Dublin. Electronic document, http://www.oeue.net/papers/ireland-theeuropeanisationofth.pdf. Accessed December 2007. Lenihan, B. 1988. First Fifteen has put Ireland Ahead. Community Report, Special issue ‘Ireland in the EC, First 15 Years, 1973-88’ 8 (3): 2-3. Dublin: Irish Office

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of the Commission of the European Communities. Lynch, J. 1967. European Economic Community. Statement by the Taoiseach to Dáil Éireann on Ireland’s second application for EEC membership, 25 July 1967. Dáil Debates 230 (742-82). Lynch, J. 1972. Extract from speeches at meetings in Counties Kildare, Carlow, Kilkenny, and Waterford, 4 May 1972, National Archives, Department of the Taoiseach, S18523R. In Ireland Within the Realms of the EC’s First Wave of Enlargement. Paper presented at XIV International Economic History Congress, Helsinki, August 2006. Electronic document, http://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/dspace/handle/2134/2307. Accessed December 2007. Murphy, G. 2003. Economic Realignment and the Politics of EEC Entry: Ireland, 19481972. Bethesda, MD: Academica Press. O’Leary, M. 1967. European Economic Community. Resumed debate in Dáil Éireann, 26 July 1967. Dáil Debates 230: 987-1002. Rees, N., B. Quinn and B. Connaughton 2004. Ireland’s Pragmatic Adaptation to Regionalization: The Mid-west Region. Regional and Federal Studies 14 (3): 379-404. Roche, D. 2007. Minister of State with responsibility for European Affairs, Dick Roche, Addresses Seanad Éireann on eve of signing the Reform Treaty, 13 December 2007. Fianna Fáil press release. Electronic document, http://www.fiannafail.ie/article.phpx?id=8230&nav=Ogra. Accessed January 2008. Schmidt, V. A. 2000. Democracy and Discourse in an Integrating Europe and a Globalizing World. European Law Journal 6 (3): 277–300. Schmidt, V. A. 2006. Democracy in Europe: The EU and National Polities. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Skinner, Q. 1989. Language and Political Change. In Political Innovation and Conceptual Change. T. Ball, J. Farr and R. L. Hanson, eds. 6-23. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Sutherland, P. 1988. Why the Good News may only be Starting. Community Report, Special issue ‘Ireland in the EC, First 15 Years, 1973-88’ 8(3): 4-5. Dublin: Irish Office of the Commission of the European Communities.

EUROPEAN STUDIES 28 (2010): 119-148

ASSESSING THE EUROPEANISATION DIMENSION OF THE NATIONAL ANTI-POVERTY STRATEGY IN IRELAND

Maura Adshead Abstract Since the mid-1990s ‘Europeanisation research’ has increasingly acknowledged that the process is a two-way street: the impacts and effects of Europeanisation may comprise both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ dynamics, and may involve both vertical and horizontal dimensions of change in national governing styles. Nowhere is this interdependency more apparent than in the advent of the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) that emerged from the Lisbon European Council (23-24 March 2000). The method, which is not conceived as a means to achieve harmonisation, is designed to help member states to progressively develop their own policies whilst achieving greater convergence towards the main EU goals. This chapter presents a case study of the evolution of Social Inclusion policies in Ireland, embodied in the National Anti-Poverty Strategy (1997-2007) and National Action Plans for Social Inclusion that have been implemented to date. In order to develop a fuller understanding of the Europeanisation effects on processes of domestic governance in Ireland, this paper examines the dynamics of (social inclusion) policy learning at domestic and EU levels. It evaluates the extent to which the OMC provides an efficient platform for policy learning and looks at the outcomes in terms of actual results regarding poverty reduction and social protection in Ireland. Since the mid-1990s ‘Europeanisation research’ has increasingly acknowledged that the process is a two-way street: the impacts and ef-

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fects of Europeanisation may comprise both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ dynamics, and may involve both vertical and horizontal dimensions of change in national governing styles. Nowhere is this interdependency more apparent than in the advent of the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) that emerged from the Lisbon European Council (23-24 March 2000). The method, which is not conceived as a means to achieve harmonisation, is designed to help Member states to progressively develop their own policies whilst achieving greater convergence towards the main EU goals. In this respect, however, Radaelli (2003:39) notes that: ‘Good quality empirical analyses including an assessment of the impact on domestic beliefs, decisions, and policies are still scarce’. In order to contribute to this gap in knowledge, this chapter presents a case study of the evolution of Social Inclusion policies in Ireland, embodied in the National Anti-Poverty Strategy (NAPS), and subsequent National Action Plans for Social Inclusion (NAP s/inc) required by the EU, that have been implemented to date. In order to develop a fuller understanding of the Europeanisation effects on processes of domestic governance in Ireland, this chapter examines the dynamics of social inclusion policy learning at domestic and EU levels. It evaluates the extent to which the OMC provides an efficient platform for policy learning and looks at the outcomes in terms of actual results regarding poverty reduction and social protection in Ireland. ‘Lisbon Europe’ and social inclusion1 In 1997, Article 137 of the Amsterdam Treaty gave the first explicit reference to ‘Social Europe’ by requiring the EU to support the actions of member states to combat social exclusion and thus to ‘improve knowledge, develop exchanges of information and best practices, promote innovative approaches and evaluate experience’. It was not, however, until the Lisbon Summit in March 2000 that the EU began to specifically address social policy. The launching of the ‘Lisbon Strategy’, widely regarded as a watershed moment for the EU, signaled the EU’s most conspicuous move into the social policy arena. With the intention of making the EU ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustaining economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’; the Lisbon Summit agreed

1

The term ‘Lisbon Europe’ is taken from Brigid Laffan (2002).

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to ‘make a decisive impact on the eradication of poverty by 2010’ (Lisbon Conclusions 2000). Recognising the role played by quantitative indicators and targets in the implementation of monetary union, it was argued that there was a case for setting targets in terms of poverty and social exclusion similar to those that had been achieved earlier in the macroeconomic field as part of the Maastricht process (Atkinson 2002: 627). Broadly speaking, the Lisbon targets comprise: facilitating participation in employment and access to resources, rights, goods and services; preventing the risks of social exclusion; helping the most vulnerable; and mobilizing all relevant bodies towards the social inclusion agenda (see Atkinson, Marlier and Nolan 2004). In consequence, it was agreed that each member state should prepare a biennial National Action Plan on social inclusion (NAP s/inc) for consideration by the European Commission, in order to foster the exchange of best practice and peer review. A key element of this socalled ‘open method of co-ordination’ (OMC) is the preparation of a regular Joint Report by the Commission and Council, which ideally goes beyond simple description so as to provide critical analysis of action in member states with a view to improving overall performance in all member states. The Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) as policy instrument Although the Lisbon leaders coined the term ‘open method of co-ordination’ and described its features, the Lisbon Summit was not the first time that this kind of policy concertation had been attempted. It was, in many respects, modelled on the European Employment Strategy (Trubek and Mosher 2003) launched in 1997. The method also had prototypes in the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) and in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) (Tepsa 2002), as well as codes of conduct in business taxation (Radaelli 2002). Radaelli (2003: 17) suggests that the best way to understand this mix of new and old policy practices is to think of OMC as a ‘legitimising discourse’ within the circle of EU leaders, which is able to draw together and provide a common rationale for a variety of existing, yet scattered, policy practices. Notwithstanding, the Lisbon European Council (23-24 March 2000) is credited with establishing OMC as a policy mechanism in its own right, with its own distinctive features. As such, Radaelli (2003: 15) notes that OMC has the following properties and instruments:

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• ‘fixing guidelines for the Union combined with specific timetables for achieving goals in the short, medium and long terms; • establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks against the best in the world, tailored to the needs of the different member states and sectors as a means of comparing best practice; • translating these European guidelines into national and regional policies by setting specific targets; • periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organised as a mutual learning processes’ (Presidency Conclusions, point 37). The ‘method’ in its ‘most sophisticated form’ also comprises the use of: guidelines; bench-marking and sharing best practice; multi-lateral surveillance; indicators; iterative processes; and implementation through domestic policy and legislation without recourse to EU legislation (Radaelli 2003: 16). OMC as exemplar for Europeanisation By allowing some European influence to filter into domestic policy areas previously not covered by the EU, the ‘open method’ represents an EU ‘soft-policy’ – one which recognises that social policy remains the responsibility of member states. The EU Commission provides objectives, guidelines and indicators and monitors policy progress of implementation, but the responsibility for policy lies unambiguously with the member state. It is in this respect that OMC provides an interesting testing ground to assess the impact of Europeanisation on domestic policy processes and outputs. In assessing the impact of Europeanisation on Irish approaches to social inclusion under OMC, this paper uses Radaelli and Bulmer’s (2004: 4) definition of Europeanisation, where: Europeanisation consists of processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ , and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies.

It is this ‘new-institutionalist leaning’ definition of Europeanisation that distinguishes its analysis as ‘second generation’ (Goetz 2002). Commenting on the intellectual development of ‘Europeanisation research’, Goetz

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(2002:2-6) identifies ‘generational shift’ in the focus of EU related studies. First generation analyses of the EU, associated with the literature from the early 1970s and throughout the 1980s, were characterised by a number of assumptions related to the study of the EU on domestic political systems: the impact of European integration upon member states was usually approached from a top-down perspective, seeing the locus of change as a hierarchical relationship between the EU and the member states; most studies presupposed some form of mismatch between the European and domestic levels so that many studies tended to emphasise the reactive and often involuntary nature of adaptation; and, many studies were characterised by the expectation of an emerging crossnational convergence in the domestic arrangements of EU members over time. Second generation analyses of the EU, associated with the literature since the mid 1990s, on the other hand, tend to be far more agnostic about the impact of the EU on domestic politics. There is an acknowledgement that the impact of the EU upon domestic political systems may comprise both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom up’ dynamics, and may involve both vertical and horizontal dimensions to changes in governance. Moreover, there need not be any ‘mismatch’ in the institutional or policy design of domestic systems in order for change to take place. In place of a convergence assumption, there is a tendency to highlight the ‘differential impact’ of EU influence in alternative member states. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, increased EU involvement in domestic political systems is no longer associated with a substantively defined end-state to processes of change identified. Goetz (2002:6) notes that this shift in emphasis, from the so-called first generation analyses of EU involvement in domestic political systems to the second, is underpinned by a progressive move away from the study of macro-level system variables, to meso and micro level variables for analysis. In the following study, the degree of ‘mismatch’ in institutional and policy design between Irish/EU approaches to social inclusion stands out as a particularly important element in assessing the impact of Europeanisation on domestic policy. Briefly, it would appear that the literature offers two views of its significance: those who think that a degree of mismatch between EU and domestic policies is always a precondition for domestic adaptation (Borzel and Risse 2000; Risse, GreenCrowles and Caporaso 2001); and those who think that its significance

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varies depending on the policy (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004). Of the former, Borzel and Risse (2000) argue that some degree of misfit presents the state with adaptational pressures and that where there are some facilitating factors, such as actors or institutions, responding to these adaptational pressures, Europeanisation is likely to occur. Similarly, Risse, Green-Crowles and Caporaso (2001) suggest that in order to produce domestic effects, EU policy must be somewhat difficult to absorb at the domestic level. If the policy of the member states fits well with the EU policy, there will be little impact or change. Alternatively, if the member state has a policy which was wholly different from the EU policy, it may be almost impossible to adapt to it. In consequence, they argue that the effect of Europeanisation will be most marked in cases where the ‘goodness of fit’ is moderate. This ‘mismatch hypothesis’ is qualified by Bulmer and Radaelli’s (2004) suggestion that adaptational pressures only exist in certain policy cases and conditions. The importance of mismatch, they argue, is most significant where EU policy authority is dominant – in areas such as environmental policy, for example, where EU policy has imposed a model or a template of how a state should go about putting a policy into practice. In areas where states retain primary responsibility for policy, such as social policy, they argue that the pressures for change produced by mismatch are much weaker. By contrast, in areas where the EU acts only to ‘facilitate co-ordination’ of member state policies - where national governments are the key actors, decisions are subject to unanimity and the supranational institutions have very weak powers – if Europeanisation occurs, it is likely to be much more voluntary and nonhierarchical. In consequence, Radaelli and Bulmer (2004: 7) argue that the ‘mismatch hypothesis’ does not hold with patterns of governance such as ‘facilitated coordination’ and that in these cases, Europeanisation ‘hinges on horizontal mechanisms of governance rather than on the vertical imposition of models coming from Brussels’ (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004: 11). Together with de la Porte and Pochet (2002) and Trubek and Mosher (2003), they argue that the major impact of this mode of policy making is at the ideational level so that common benchmarks and common vocabulary materialise, and in ‘areas previously impenetrable to Europeanisation, “communities of discourse” with their own vocabulary, criteria and belief systems are emerging’ (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004: 11).

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The remainder of this paper presents a case study of Ireland’s National Anti-Poverty Strategy (NAPS) with a view to establishing the impact of Europeanisation evident in NAPS design and implementation. In doing so, two stories of Europeanisation emerge. The first, which focuses on NAPS policy outputs and the impact of the EU’s open method of co-ordination (OMC), confirms Bulmer and Radaelli’s (2004) propositions that in policy areas where the EU acts to ‘facilitate co-ordination’, its influence is limited and most apparent at the ideational level. The second, which focuses on the policy architecture and institutions of NAPS, provides more support for Borzel and Risse’s (2002) mismatch hypothesis. The lessons that both stories have for future policy learning in Irish anti-poverty initiatives are briefly outlined in the conclusion. NAPS – What it is and how it works The National Anti Poverty Strategy (NAPS) represented the first attempt by any state to adopt an explicit target against which progress in reducing poverty could be monitored. The NAPS overall objective of ‘considerably reducing the numbers of those who are “consistently poor” from 9% -15% to less than 5%- 10%’, as measured by the national Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) is often referred to as its ‘global target’. In this context, ‘consistent poverty’ is defined as being below 5060% of average household income and experience of basic deprivation as measured by at least one of eight indicators (Department of Social and Family Affairs 2001). In addition to this, NAPS identifies five priority areas for government action with associated targets in the areas of educational disadvantage; unemployment; income adequacy; disadvantaged urban areas; and rural poverty (see table 1). The first impulse towards the NAPS came at the Copenhagen UN World Summit on Social Development in 1995, when the then Minister for Social Welfare and leader of the Democratic Left in the so-called ‘Rainbow coalition’ (with Fine Gael and Labour), Pronsias de Rossa, announced the Irish government’s commitment to drawing up a National Anti-Poverty Strategy (NAPS). This ten-year strategy was subsequently launched in April 1997 as ‘a mechanism for changing the mindset of the decision-makers in our society, to factor in a consciousness of poverty into all public policy decisions’ (de Rossa 1997).

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Table 1: NAPS key areas and targets AREA

TARGET

Educational disadvantage

To eliminate early school-leaving before junior certificate; to have 90% completing the senior cycle by 2000 and 98% by 2007; to ensure there are no students with serious literacy and numeracy problems in early primary education within 5 years To reduce the rate of unemployment (as measured in the Labour Force Survey) from 11.9% in April 1996, to 6% by 2007; and reduce the rate of long-term unemployment from 7% to 3.5% with particular focus on the very long-term unemployed To contribute to reducing the percentage of the population whom the ESRI have identified as ‘consistently poor’ from 9-15% to less than 5-10% by 2007; all social welfare payments to reach the minimum of the lower range recommended by the Commission on Social Welfare

Unemployment

Income adequacy

Disadvantaged Urban Areas

Rural Poverty

To reduce the numbers suffering the greatest deprivation in disadvantaged urban areas by increasing their standard of living and providing opportunities for participation, thus reducing the measured indicators of disadvantage in the area, especially the rate of unemployment and particularly long-term unemployment by 2007 To ensure that strategies are developed with regard to the provision of services in rural areas, especially those concerned with educational disadvantage, unemployment and income adequacy, so that the overall targets of the NAPS are achieved in rural areas

Source: Government of Ireland (1997)

Following the launch of NAPS in April 1997, a Cabinet Committee on Social Inclusion was set up to meet on a monthly basis. Chaired by the Taoiseach, the committee includes all Ministers whose brief includes policy areas relevant to tackling poverty, including the Minister for Finance. By 1998, the work of the Cabinet Committee was being supported by a Senior Officials Group on Social Inclusion, comprising high level civil servants from relevant departments, whose function was to prepare the agenda and recommendations for review by the Cabinet Committee.

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In addition, the Inter-Departmental Policy Committee2 that originally developed the strategy remained in place to oversee its implementation and the Minister for Social Community and Family Affairs (SCFA) was given day to day responsibility for the roll-out of NAPS. At its first meeting after the launch of NAPS, the Inter-Departmental Policy Committee (IDPC) agreed that a system of policy proofing in relation to the impact of major policy measures on poverty should be established. Following an agreement with the Social Partners in July 1998, the government adopted a pilot poverty proofing system3 as part of official Cabinet procedures. As a result, memoranda for government and key policy initiatives which require significant policy decisions by cabinet must now indicate clearly the impact of the proposals on groups in poverty or at risk of falling into poverty (Goodbody Economic Consultants 2001: 13). The Department of Social, Community and Family Affairs was tasked with setting up a dedicated ‘NAPS Unit’, which, in addition to providing the secretariat to the IDPC, was given responsibility for co-ordinating and developing cross-departmental action in support of social inclusion initiatives and liaising between a variety of NAPS stakeholders (including government departments, other national and international agencies, the Social Partners and the EU). Originally, the Strategy envisaged that the NAPS Unit would be mirrored by a similar unit in the Department of the Taoiseach’s office which could provide political and administrative support for the Unit’s work. It was also intended that a Strategic Management Initiative (SMI) team comprising its own core staff, plus representatives from other relevant departments would also be located in DSCFA, complementing SMI support structure centrally in Taoiseach’s office and liaising with the Combat Poverty Agency where appropriate. This reflected the Rainbow government view that ‘a key element of the strategy is the extent to which it will be underpinned by the Strategic Management Initiative’ (Bruton 1997). Following the change of govern-

Comprising senior civil servants, plus representatives of FAS ( Foras Aiseanna Sáothair – the Training and Employment Authority), ADM (Area Development Management Ltd – an intermediary organization established by government to oversee the dispersal of EU Global Grant funds), and the Combat Poverty Agency (CPA – a statutory body responsible for providing policy advice and research on poverty and anti-poverty policies). 3 In January 2006 the concept of ‘poverty proofing’ was replaced by ‘poverty impact assessments’. 2

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ment in June 1997, however, these developments did not come to fruition. In order to promote the work of the NAPS Unit at departmental level, it was intended that the NAPS Unit would include permanent representatives from other relevant departments on a full or part-time basis, supported where necessary with external expertise. The corollary of this would be the appointment of NAPS Liaison Officers to all government departments, acting as the first point of contact in relation to NAPS issues within their departments. The appointment of permanent representatives from other departments and uptake of external expertise did not occur. Moreover, instead of appointing NAPS Liaison Officers to all departments, staff were placed only in those departments whose remit directly included anti-poverty work (CPA 2000: 39). This is important since the NAPS is intended as an overarching strategy statement and as such; ‘its focus is on co-ordinating and integrating policy responses. It remains the responsibility of individual Departments to implement their own programmes’ (Department of Social and Family Affairs 2001). In relation to monitoring and evaluation of NAPS, the National Economic and Social Forum (NESF), which already had responsibility for monitoring the social inclusion element of the national concordat (19972000), Partnership 2000, was asked to specifically report on the progress of NAPS implementation. The Combat Poverty Agency was charged with overseeing the evaluation of NAPS process, ‘which would include consideration of the views and experience of the community and voluntary sector’, and report back to the Inter-Departmental Policy Committee (CPA 2000: 36). The agency was also intended to provide information and education material, advice and support, to individual government departments and other appropriate local and regional government structures. NAPS and OMC This section considers the relationship between the NAPS and EU open method, through an examination of the Irish government’s National Action Plans on Social Inclusion (NAP s/inc) and the EU response to them in the European Council’s Joint Report on Social Inclusion. This is a process which, according to Radaelli and Bulmer (2004), may easily be classified as ‘facilitated co-ordination’ and, as our examination of the

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case demonstrates, EU influence is both limited and largely at the ‘ideational level’. Admittedly, the revision of the NAPS did take account of some of the EU criticisms, but it could easily be argued that the impetus for these reforms came as much from the national political arena - through a preexisting timetable for NAPS review and the integration of NAPS with pre-existing Social Partnership structures. More substantive issues highlighted by iterative Joint Reports (the need to develop relative poverty indicators, or to specifically address gender and ethnic minority based forms of exclusion, or to ring-fence resources to deliver on goals) remain largely ignored in Irish successive NAP s/inc. Relative income poverty (the proportion of the population falling below 60% of median income) increased from 15.6% in 1997 to 21.9% in 2004 (CSO 2005). By 2006 it was down to 18% of the population – a little over the EU average of 16% (CSO 2006, table 4.4). Whilst the experience of consistent poverty was much the same between the sexes at 16.6% for men and 17.4% for females (CSO 2006 table 4.5), still one in five of all ill or disabled people were experiencing consistent poverty (CSO 2006, table 4.7), with the government still reluctant to use relative poverty indicators as a baseline for policy. Nevertheless, there is an acknowledgement that over time, ‘a shared analysis of poverty [had] emerged’ (O’Donnell and Moss 2004: 6) and that, more generally, the discourse of Irish anti-poverty policy approaches is shifting. Policies that were once focussed on ‘poverty-reduction’ have over time switched their emphasis, first to ‘income adequacy’, then ‘combating social exclusion’, and most recently ‘fostering social inclusion’. At a glance then, it seems that Irish anti-poverty policies are reflecting EU anti-poverty discourses though - as the synopsis of Irish/EU relations regarding OMC below shows – there may be some delay before ‘talking the talk’ moves to ‘walking the walk’. NAP s/inc (2000-2002) It could be argued that the outcome of the European Council meeting in Lisbon, in March 2000, presented something of a ‘poisoned chalice’ for Ireland’s NAPS. For Ireland, the requirement to produce a national action plan on social inclusion, so soon after devising a National AntiPoverty Strategy, provided a perfect opportunity to demonstrate the government’s commitment to tackling social exclusion.

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Instead, the Irish government appears to have viewed the submission of the first National Action Plan on social inclusion (NAPs/inc) as a distinct and quite separate government activity (Atkinson 2002: 629). The Commission commented in its Joint Report that ‘neither the analysis which underpins the National Anti-Poverty Strategy nor any of the recent evaluations of this strategy are adequately reflected in the NAPs/inc’ (CEC 2001: 109). Suggesting that trend information on poverty was not adequately provided, rural deprivation was endemic, and there were no specific references to social rights within the plan; the Commission argued that the plan lacked an explicit analysis of the problems of social inclusion, including health, rural deprivation, housing and transport (CEC 2001). In sum, ‘it [the NAP s/inc] does not provide a quantitative or qualitative critique, nor any adequate evaluation evidence from the first four years of the Anti-Poverty Strategy’ (CEC 2001: 56). In response, the Director of the NAPS Unit suggested that both the timing (less than twelve months before the NAPS review) and the timeframe (six months) for completion of the NAP s/inc were inadequate, arguing that: The Commission are a little out of touch with national pressures, you couldn’t develop a NAP realistically in six months, policies have a long gestation period, you identify a problem, you have to come up with solutions to it, you have to convince the Department of Finance, and so many people. One policy is competing with another… and there’s no real easy solution (Freerick 2006: 24).

In terms of the institutional evolution of NAPS, this suggests three possible explanations: first, government mechanisms for monitoring the strategy were not yet operational; second, the monitoring mechanisms were in place, but the systems of feedback to government were not; or third, that monitoring and feedback mechanisms were in place but the drafters of the NAP s/inc report were unaware of them, or perhaps unwilling to share them with the European Commission. After first NAP s/inc, the Commission heavily criticised the Irish plan. In an original draft of the report, the member states were classified into four different groups. Ireland joined Belgium, Germany, Spain and Italy, which the Commission determined exhibited ‘elements of a national strategy that (was) being improved in order to reflect new realities or made more coherent’ but that did not set overall targets (Ferrera, Matsaganis and Sacchi 2002:12). This system of classification was subse-

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quently withdrawn and ‘rewritten to praise good practices rather than criticize bad ones’ (Zeitlin 2003: 26). In the final draft, Ireland was praised for its exponential economic growth, record decrease in both short and long-term unemployment, and fall in the national measure of poverty. Even so, the Commission still saw fit to criticize many elements of the plan. On a general note, the Commission expressed concerns over increasing income disparities and noted that Ireland had the lowest percentage spending of GDP on social protection in the EU: this stood at 16% in 2001; compared to an average of 27.5% across the EU (Healy and Reynolds 2003: 56). More specifically, the Commission noted that although the NAP s/inc plan contained a long list of pre-existing policies, it was very short on new initiatives and approaches. This less than positive view was shared by many in the community and voluntary sector, who pronounced the plan ‘extremely dissappointing’ (EAPN 2002: 69). Many complained that it was less participative than other strategic processes and that their contributions were ‘less valued’ (CEC 2001: 57). Originally it was intended that the community and voluntary sector would have a key role to play in the development and subsequent evolution of the NAPS. Following the first review of the NAPS, however, the Combat Poverty Agency noted that ‘the involvement of the community and voluntary sector in the implementation of the Strategy has been limited’ (Combat Poverty Agency 2000: 40). Community and voluntary sector representatives were involved in two NAPS led cross-departmental literacy initiatives, but these proved to be the exception rather than the rule and whilst national anti-poverty networks did have meetings with the NAPS Unit, for the most part these took ‘the form of information exchange, rather than consultation or joint initiatives’ (Combat Poverty Agency 2000:41). Moreover, whilst at the time of the first review there were seven National Anti-Poverty Networks4, there appeared to be no direct, formal or consistent mechanism for their involvement within the NAPS. A direct relationship to NAPS only existed insofar as the Combat Poverty Agency maintained an on-going relationship with each of these groups as part of its own organisational remit. Arguably, this left 4 The Irish National Organisation for the Unemployed (INOU); the Community Workers’ Cooperative (CWC); the Irish Rural Link (IRL); the European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN); the Forum of People with Disabilities (Forum); the Irish Travellers Movement (ITM); and the One Parent Exchange (OPEN).

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the CPA in an invidious position in relation to its responsibilities for evaluation of NAPS, since there was no mechanism available through which it could receive and channel representations from the anti-poverty networks to the government or OSI in relation to the roll-out of NAPS. Following the national review of NAPS provided for in the Programme for Prosperity and Fairness (2000-2002), mechanisms for the incorporation of civil society were amended. It was agreed that a White Paper on Relations between the community and voluntary sector and the state would be published in April 2000 (Government of Ireland 2000). Additionally, the NESF was charged with convening an annual NAPS Social Inclusion Forum, in order to facilitate the ‘government’s commitment to consult with all relevant stakeholders, including people experiencing poverty and the groups that represent them, in the fight against poverty and social exclusion’ (National Economic and Social Forum 2006: 5). Forum meetings were held in a single day: with the morning usually devoted to plenary sessions with presentations by guest speakers and discussion; and a series of parallel workshops in the afternoon. The Social Inclusion Report was sent to a variety of government actors5, though there was no formal provision fo any of these to report back to forum participants. Once more there was s sense that the feedback ‘loops. in the NAPS were not continuos. Other developments subsequent to the review included the creation of the Office for Social Inclusion (OSI) and the Social Inclusion Consultative Group (SICG). The OSI replaced the NAPS Unit, still located in the Department of Social and Family Affairs, but now with nine dedicated staff and a Director (who was previously director of the NAPS Unit). The SICG was primarily a re-gigging of the Inter-Departmental Policy Committee to include representatives of the ESRI, the social partners and the community and voluntary sector ‘to advise on issues related to the development, implementation and evaluation of Ireland’s National Action Plan’ (OSI 2006: 21). The terms of reference for this group did not state how often it should meet, but in 2005, the SICG met twice (OSI 2006: 21). The first meeting was to review poverty proofing 5 The Cabinet Committee on Social Inclusion and all government ministers; the Senior Officials Group; the Office for Social Inclusion, the Social Inclusion Units in government departments; local authorities and the Social Inclusion Consultation Group; as well as all NAPS related organisations and groups represented at the meeting.

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measures and OSI communications, the second was to prepare for the up-coming NAP s/inc 2006-08. A further result of the NAPS review was the establishment of a national consultation process prior to each NAP s/inc report. The OSI was charged with publicizing the process, inviting ‘written submissions from organizations and individuals on the broad objectives and policy measures to be reflected in the Plan’ (OSI 2006: 26). The written stage of the consultation process would be followed by a series of regional and national seminars organized by the OSI, ‘designed to facilitate the participation with the NAP/inclusion process of people with direct experience of poverty and social inclusion and those that work with them’ (Office for Social Inclusion 2006: 26). A report of both stages of the consultation process was included in the NESF Social Inclusion Forum and intended to inform Social Partnership talks. NAP s/inc (2003-2005) By the time that Ireland’s second NAP s/inc (2003-2005) was compiled, most of the commitments made under the first NAP s/inc had been fulfilled (O’Donnell 2004), and the revised NAPS had set new (36) targets and objectives in the area of social inclusion (Government of Ireland 2002). In consequence, the 2004 Joint Report was able to note the ‘substantial strategic progress made since the first plan’, especially in terms of the ‘ambitious new targets and institutional arrangements’ put forward in the NAPS review (CEC 2003: 177). In addition, the wider engagement of civil society through the social inclusion forum was noted and praised. Many other aspects of the plan were also welcomed in the report including the fact that commitments to increase social expenditure had for the most part been fulfilled, a large number of key targets had been introduced which were quantifiable and time focussed, and the plan was much more comprehensive than the previous NAP s/inc, covering a wider range of issues. Nevertheless, the Commission reiterated concerns expressed in the first Joint Report (over the continued income disparities which particularly affected the elderly, those with large families, and lone parents), as well as a few new ones. The persistent poverty stood at 13% - one of the highest rates among the EU countries – and the number of people falling into the ‘at risk of poverty’ category had risen from 19 to 21% between 1998 and 2001 (Commission 2003: 176). Additionally, health, rural dis-

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advantage, housing and homelessness were all singled out as being in need of further attention. The policy of ‘direct provision’ for refugees and asylum seekers was condemned as militating against social inclusion.6 The rights based approach included in the plan was insufficient, and the strengthening of the social inclusion coordinating mechanisms at local and regional levels was identified as being crucial to ‘ensure an integrated approach that will enable the successful delivery and implementation of the NAP objectives’ (Commission 2003: 179). Overall, the report identified the challenge of ensuring sufficient resources were available to underpin the commitments made as a major concern. Many of these concerns were amplified by the community and voluntary sector in Ireland. The European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN) voiced concerns relating to this NAP s/inc (EAPN 2003; Farrell 2003; Hanan 2004). Whilst acknowledging that the requirement to produce a NAP s/inc managed to keep the concern of addressing poverty on the European political agenda, there was nevertheless a feeling that whilst the second NAP s/inc contains strong statements about the importance of the Lisbon objectives, these were not well reflected in its policy content. Echoing criticisms of the first NAP s/inc, critics suggested that the second NAP s/inc read more like a report than a plan, with few proposals either for the period of the plan, or for the remainder of the NAPS (to 2010) as a whole (EAPN Ireland 2006; Adshead and McInerney 2008). Instead, the second NAP s/inc relied heavily on the existing revised NAPS and its contemporaneous social partnership agreement, Sustaining Progress. Those targets that were specified were a reiteration of those laid out in the revised NAPS, with little to indicate how they might be time-tabled, resourced or implemented. The absence of ethnic minority perspectives, gender-based or rights-based approaches to tackling poverty were singled out as particularly disappointing, more especially since these themes had featured strongly in the consultations prior to the compilation of the NAP s/inc. A statement produced in response to the plan by the Community Workers Cooperative (CWC 2003) suggested that it offered ‘little indication that the government is serious about tackling poverty and social exclusion’. Instead, they argued, the docu6 Following legislation in 2004, asylum seekers (those in the process of applying for refugee status or awaiting a decision on their application) are ‘boarded’ in groups (usually in hostels, or other more temporary pre-fab accommodation), supplied directly with all meals and given an allowance (for adults) of €19.10 per week.

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ment was primarily a recounting of existing government policies and commitments, ‘presented without any critique of how these policies are actually delivering change on the ground’ (CWC 2003). In short, the plan ‘restates the aspirations set in the NAPS review and in Sustaining Progress’, but ‘commits to no new resources or actions that might actually make a real impact on poverty or social exclusion’ (CWC 2003). NAP s/inc (2006-2008) In September 2006, the Government submitted its third National Action Plan (2006-2008) to the European Commission, with the proviso that it would be followed by a more comprehensive plan in November, covering all areas of the fight against poverty in Ireland and linked to the €200 billion National Development Plan for 2007-2013. This NAP s/inc was significant in that during its lifespan, the original National Anti-Poverty Strategy 1997-2007 was due to expire. It would be replaced henceforth by ‘integrated national reports on strategies for social inclusion, pensions, healthcare and long-term care’ in a further iteration of the Open Method of Coordination following the Lisbon strategy’s 2010 targets (see http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_inclu-sion/naps). The subsequent production of the Social Inclusion Report Ireland 2006-2007 (Government of Ireland 2007a) is notable in that it is now quite clear (from the details contained in chapter seven on ‘implementing and monitoring’) that the entire government approach to social inclusion has now been completely collapsed into the existing social partnership arrangements of the latest partnership agreement Towards 2016. The ‘Towards 2016 steering group’, which maintains overall responsibility for the implementation of the national agreement, has also been tasked with ‘an on-going oversight role in relation to the implementation of the lifecycle framework’ (Government of Ireland 2007b: 47-8). ‘The Department of the Taoiseach has held bilateral meetings with each of the social partners to discuss monitoring groups and mechanisms’ (Government of Ireland 2007: 48). The significant impact of collapsing NAPS into social partnership is discussed in detail in the next section. But what of the EU’s reaction to the new Irish NAP s/inc? Also noting that much of the NAPs/inc was ‘drawing to a considerable extent from Towards 2016’ (CEU 2007: 62), the Commission still pointed out ‘a notable weakness’ in ‘the absence of any explicit targets in relation to poverty reduction’ (CEU 2007: 62). Whilst the latest figures

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for the national ‘consistent poverty’ show positive results, down from 8.8% (2003) to 6.8% in 2004, the CEU still commented upon the high levels of people at risk of poverty and noted that notwithstanding the rapid economic growth and significant welfare investment, ‘the underlying high proportion at risk of poverty also reflects the structure of the Irish welfare system [-] and points to a continued level of inequality’, which the Commission argued ‘must be a matter for concern’ (CEU 2007: 62). The report further noted that public social expenditure remained considerably below the EU average (at 15.4% and 23.4% respectively), leaving families with children, older people and those with disabilities particularly vulnerable to poverty (CEU 2007: 63). More generally, however, the report suggested that the streamlining of NAP s/inc into the National Development Plan and national partnership agreements should lead to ‘more effective mainstreaming of poverty and social inclusion issues across all policy domains’ (CEU 2007: 62). Thus far, however, there is little evidence to show that national social partnership arrangements have been very effective at either instigating or implementing concrete anti-poverty initiatives (Connolly 2007). Why this might be is examined below. NAPS and social partnership Ireland’s shift to more deliberative forms of public policy making is welldocumented (OECD 1996). In this section the advent of Irish ‘Social Partnership’ is placed in the context of broader Irish shifts in governance that are widely associated with Ireland’s economic turnaround and EU membership. It is in this context that the advent of Social Partnership approaches has been considered as evidence of increasing Europeanisation (O’Donnell 2000; Adshead and Quinn 1998; Adshead 2005). Moreover, using the ‘mismatch hypothesis’ advocated by Borzel and Risse (2000) and Risse, Green-Crowles and Caporaso (2001), the development of Irish partnership approaches to policy may be seen as the state’s response to adaptational pressures caused by EU ‘hard’ policy (reflected, for example, in EU Structural and Cohesion Funding criteria, as well as conditions for joining with EMU). In the context of NAPS this is significant since, although initially access to NAPS was quite broadly envisaged, following the NAPS review community and voluntary sector participation seem to have been largely collapsed into the social partnership structure. The significance of partnership structures to the NAPS

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makes a mockery of suggestions that in NAPS there is little evidence of Europeanisation. The Irish system of ‘government by partnership’ is not a direct consequence of European integration, but was primarily nationally conceived and developed. Still, however, widespread references to Ireland’s ‘moving on’ from a UK model to a ‘European model’ for managing the economy point to the increasing salience of European attitudes and approaches (Adshead 2005: 171). It is argued that both the trade union movement and the business community greatly benefited from the stimulus provided by other European models of behaviour (Fitzgerald, J. 2000: 33) and that the successful growth of social partnership owes an intellectual debt to the experiences of countries such as the Netherlands and Germany, rather than to the more traditional channels of influence from the UK (Sexton and O’Connell 1996). Whilst European integration did not introduce partnership government, it did provide the back-drop and context within which Ireland was able to develop this form of economic management. After the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds and the Treaty on European Union in 1992, European Union membership provided Ireland with both a limited range of policy choices and a clear set of policy objectives (Fitzgerald, R. 2000). Thus together, ‘the crisis during the 1980s, the response of the elite to this and the role of the European Union as an agenda-setting agency combined to provide the basis for the political and social consensus that reinforced economic success during the 1990s’ (Fitzgerald and Girvin 2000:281). To date Ireland has experienced seven social pacts (see Table 2). Whilst a good deal of attention is paid towards the EU’s influence over policy processes through the application of new participative and consultative criteria embodied in the re-organisation and reform of EU Structural Funding (Adshead and Quinn 1998; Adshead 2002, 2005; O’Donnell 2000), the majority of attention is usually directed towards the development of associative and deliberative forms of policy making in the realm of economic management (O’Donnell and O’Reardon 1997, 2000; O’Donnell and Thomas 2002; O’Donnell, Adshead and Thomas 2007; O’Donnell 1999). This is important: first, because the assumption that ‘social partnership’ is a success and works well underscores the rationale for community and voluntary sector participation in NAPS; and second, because where gaps in NAPS are identified, it is assumed that Social Partnership agreements can fill them. The experience of the com-

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munity and voluntary sectors’ inclusion in the three social pacts since 1997, however, reveals a number of structural constraints to their effective participation in the Social Partnership process. Table 2: Social Pacts and Governments in Office 1987-2008 Programme Programme for National Recovery (1987-1990)

Government Fianna Fail minority government Fianna Fail/Progressive Democrat coalition (formed July 1989)

Programme for Economic and Social Progress (1991-1993)

Fianna Fail/Progressive Democrat coalition Fianna Fail/Labour coalition (formed Jan 1993)

Programme for Competitiveness and Work (1994-1996)

Fianna Fail/Labour coalition Fine Gael/Labour/Democratic Left coalition (formed Dec. 1994) Fine Gael/Labour/Democratic Left coalition Fianna Fail/Progressive Democrat coalition (formed June 1997) Fianna Fail/Progressive Democrat coalition (re-elected 2002) Fianna Fail/Progressive Democrat coalition Fianna Fail/Progressive Democrat coalition Fianna Fail/Progressive Democrat coalition/Green coalition (elected 2007)

Partnership 2000 (1997-2000)

Programme for Prosperity and Fairness (2000-2002) Programme for Sustaining Progress (2003-2005) Towards 2016. Ten year framework social partnership agreement 20062015

Reflecting on their engagement within the process, one representative acknowledged that: ‘within the community and voluntary sector, the lack of uniform ambition regarding its involvement in the process became quite problematic’ and ‘this situation was probably an important factor in determining the dynamics of participation’ (Interview, INOU, 30/11/2005). For some, achieving the principle of participation was the outcome, which led to the view that it was paramount to stay participating, even if there were no tangible benefits. For others, more concerned

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with achieving practical outcomes, there was a greater inclination to come and go from the process – depending on the degree to which they felt it was worthwhile participating. The community and voluntary sector’s inability to agree on the fundamental objectives of social partnership meant that they lacked a ‘sense of shared purpose’ with other social partners and were often unable to ‘acknowledge the necessity of compromise’ – both of which are regarded as key pre-conditions for successful partnership by the traditional social partners (Interview, IBEC, 8/2/06). Union representatives - who would politically have a degree of sympathy with many of the community and voluntary pillar ambitions - referred to their frustrations dealing with the pillar and particularly its inability to strategically prioritise its ambitions, or to acknowledge the realpolitik of negotiation. One union official explained: ‘they keep painting a bigger idealistic picture’ and ‘because of the huge range of interests that are in the picture they have to paint, the issues become enormous. We’ve arguments with them over which bits are for real and they find it very hard [to choose] because of their constituent group’ (Interview, ICTU, 30/1/06). Commenting on the same difficulties, one government official suggested that, ‘we found it hard to integrate [them] and to get a systemic bonus’ – ‘they haven’t connected if you like with the core business and partnership as well as they might have done’ (Interview, Department of Taoiseach, 8/2/06). From the government point of view, the effective participation of the community and voluntary pillar is ‘still a work in progress’ (Interview, Department of Taoiseach, 8/2/06). An additional problem for the community and voluntary pillar’s effective engagement is its inability to exercise the same degree of leadership that the other social partners take for granted. Superficially, the community and voluntary pillar looks much the same as the trade union pillar. It comprises a cluster of representative groups bound together by common interest in social inclusion in what appears to be much the same way that the trade union pillar comprises a cluster of representative groups bound together by a common interest in improved pay and conditions. However, the trade union (and agricultural) partners are organised in a classically hierarchical system, with a few powerful negotiators at the top (Interview, IFA, 16/2/06). Once these top officials have chosen to agree, their traditional organisational hierarchies assure that (with union ballots, etc.) they can deliver their membership. This is possible,

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not only because of the trade union pillar’s organisational capacity to achieve a mandate for action, but because ultimately the rewards of a successful agreement are worth negotiating. Trade union officials are able to convince their membership to support them because the agreement will deliver benefits on tax, pay and conditions. For the community and voluntary pillar, the opposite is the case (McCashin, O’Sullivan and Brennan 2002). Despite a variety of configurations, their organisational representation remains contested (CWC 2003) and their capacity to deliver support from their constituent groups is limited. This problem is further exacerbated by the absence of universally acknowledged rewards across the community and voluntary pillar when compared to the tangible benefit that trade unions can offer their members in the shape of pay and conditions. In the words of one community and voluntary sector negotiator, the pillar had ‘as a whole, failed to tactically coalesce together in a way that maximised their potential. I still think that. I think more could have been got’ (Interview, INOU, 30/11/05). Finally, there is a strong sense from many of the community and voluntary pillar members that they are competing unfairly with larger, better resourced interest groups who are better placed to bear the costs of engagement. For many, the time and resources that were invested in negotiations were effectively ‘being taken away from action on the ground’ (Interview, NWCI, 19/01/06). Membership activities, campaign strategies and political lobbying all had to take a back seat to partnership negotiations. ‘What was very difficult, and something that nobody expected, was the practical time it takes to negotiate those agreements. Whoever was mandated to be on those negotiating teams basically had to drop everything else for a few months’ (Interview, INOU, 30/11/05). Drafting reports, policy briefs and responses for the negotiations with minimum organisational support often became an all-consuming preoccupation for the pillar. For many members of community and voluntary groups on low pay or no pay, the burden of participation was substantial in personal terms as well. All in all, a failure to acknowledge these issues regarding community and voluntary sector participation in Social Partnership means that instead of being remedied by the NAPS, they have been copied into it (Meade 2005). Clearly, the NAPS process as it currently stands is designed to consult policy stakeholders, but not to engage with them on policy specifics. It seems then that the specific policy concerns of the commu-

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nity and voluntary sector, relating to the implementation issues concerning the roll-out of a national ten-year strategy, can be dealt with in a single day - whilst those of the ‘other’ social partners, relating to employment conditions and pay in the national social pacts, can take up to three or four months. This presents a dilemma for the community and voluntary sector participation. It seems that much of the ‘meat’ of NAPS discussion and engagement is to be found in Social Partnership structures that contain only very restricted opportunities for discussion of social inclusion and where anti-poverty strategies are not a primary concern. In 2003, the National Women’s Council and the Community Platform both publicly withdrew from negotiations for Sustaining Progress shortly before its conclusion, arguing that agreements made in the preceding programme remained to be implemented (Community Workers Co-operative 2003; National Women's Council of Ireland 2003). Commenting on their participation in the Programme for Prosperity and Fairness and Sustaining Progress, one representative from this section argued that: ‘there was no real negotiation with the community and voluntary pillar, there was no opportunity to discuss policy outcomes, to discuss things that could actually deliver for people, so it was a sham’ (Interview, NWCI, 19/01/06). Despite this, their return to the social partnership process as a part of a restructured community and voluntary pillar in the latter part of 2006 is noteworthy, demonstrating perhaps the continual tension and contradiction between community and voluntary sector desires to be represented in predominantly macro-economically oriented social partnership negotiations, whilst at the same time challenging their orientation and focus. Certainly, the negotiations for Sustaining Progress reflected a conspicuous ‘shift in gear’ when compared to previous partnership arrangements. The reasons for this were two-fold (O’Donnell 2003: 25). First, the government was reluctant to make any spending commitments not already included in the annual budget and the multi-annual National Development Plan. In part this was a response to the international economic slow-down, but also ‘an apparent wish to reassert government authority in the partnership context’ (O’Donnell 2003: 25). Second, it reflected a desire to draw back the reach and scope of partnership arrangements, which were becoming counter-productive ‘with the massive agenda and large number of working groups that characterized the previous partnership programme’ (O’Donnell 2003: 25). For the Community and Volun-

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tary sector, the paring back of partnership interests that lay outside the central pay bargain to ten ‘special initiatives’ was widely interpreted as a withdrawal of commitment to areas outside the central pay bargain. In a report prepared for the DG Employment, as a background to the second Irish NAP s/inc, Daly (2003: 10) suggested that (along with the second NAP s/inc) the potential of Sustaining Progress to advance commitments made in the revised NAPS was disappointing. Conclusion Formally launched after an extensive consultative process in 1997, the original concept of NAPS was three-fold: to achieve greater integration in policy initiatives by identifying cross cutting themes across government departments; to establish ‘poverty proofing’ of all government initiatives and key policy areas; and to develop the participation of people living in poverty whose lived experience might inform policy solutions and bring greater urgency to the debate about poverty. As such, NAPS was a potentially innovative cross-cutting institutional mechanism that widened the concept of governance by validating consultation with people experiencing poverty and affirming the role of NGOs in policy making. Although a change of government in 1997 diluted political support for the strategy, the incoming Fianna Fail/Progressive Democrat government allowed the institutional mechanisms to remain in place, which were subsequently maintained by individual civil servants determined to keep the concept alive. The impact of the NAPS on income maintenance policy is hard to determine. To some degree the content of the original NAPS in 1997 was reflected in the content of the social partnership agreement Partnership 2000 (1997-2000). The content of the revised NAPS (DSFA, 2002) and the income maintenance policy which set a target minimum weekly rate of €150 (in 2002 terms) to be achieved by 2007 was also reflected in the Programme for Prosperity and Fairness (2000-2002), then Sustaining Progress and again in Towards 2016.7 The NAPS highlighted consistent poverty allevi-

7 The income maintenance aspect of the second NAPS process was overshadowed by a social partnership Benchmarking and Indexation Working Group which had deliberated on the issues concerning the adequacy of social welfare and to some degree issues relating to relative income poverty. There was no income maintenance working group, only a short scoping paper on social security issues was prepared.

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ation8 and incentive preservation objectives. Income redistribution or income equality was explicitly rejected as a government policy objective during the process of negotiating the NAPS. Johnston (2002:3) refers to the fact that ‘one weakness in the revised NAPS is the absence of a relative income poverty target’9 - a feature critically reviewed by the European Commission who noted lack of attention to income equalities as a major weakness of Irish policy (Hanan 2002:5). So far there has been significant resistance to the operationalisation of all three themes and the civil service, as a whole, has been slow to develop inter-agency work, or to use the tools offered in poverty proofing or gender mainstreaming (NESC 2001; Hanan 2003; MacGuaran 2005). Moreover, the dilution of the mechanism to enable participation means that there is little direct participation of people living in poverty and this transformative potential is weakened. What this tells us about the alleged changing role of government visà-vis the EU in an open method of coordination context is worth considering. In terms of the multi-levelled governance dimensions to the NAPS, the influence of the EU is important, but only insofar as it has helped to shape contemporary Irish attitudes to social pacts and partnership. In terms of direct influence on the content of NAPS policies, the open method of coordination has proven to be significant only at the ideational level and not in terms of concrete policy advice. Overall then, evidence for the impact of the ‘Lisbon Agenda’ and OMC on Irish social policy is poor, still, it can convincingly be argued that the attention given to Irish NAPS and associated policies by the EU provides an additional potential impetus for policy reform that might not otherwise exist. Certainly, however, the responsibility for NAPS policy orientations and impetus lies at the domestic level.

8 Consistent Poverty has been defined as living below a specified income level (60 per cent of median disposable household income) and experiencing enforced deprivation of one of eight indicators of deprivation such as a warm overcoat or a second pair of shoes. 9 Relative Income Poverty refers to the proportion of the population falling below a certain income level; this population is considered to be at risk of poverty and experiencing income inequality.

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References Adshead, M. 2002. Developing European Regions? Comparative Governance, Policy Networks and European Integration. Harlow, UK: Ashgate. Adshead, M. and C. McInerny 2008. Ireland's National Anti Poverty Strategy as New Governance. In The Theory and Practice of Local Governance and Economic Development. M. Considine and S. Giguere, eds. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Adshead, M. and B. Quinn 1998. The Move from Government to Governance: Irish Development's Policy Paradigm Shift. Policy and Politics 26(2):209-225. Adshead, M. 2005. Europeanisation and Changing Patterns of Governance in Ireland. Public Administration 83:159-178. Atkinson, T. 2002. Social Inclusion and the European Union. Journal of Common Market Studies 40: 625-643. Atkinson, A., E. Marlier and B. Nolan 2004. Indicators and Targets for Social Inclusion in the European Union. Journal of Common Market Studies 42(1): 4775. Electronic document, http://eucenter.wisc.edu/OMC/Papers/Protection/atkinsonetal.pdf Borzel, T. and T. Risse 2000. When Europe Hits Home: Europeanisation and Domestic Change. European Integration online Papers 4(15). Electronic document, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-015a.htm Bruton, J. 1997. What the Politicians Say. Poverty Today Special Issue on NAPS. 36: 11-12. Bulmer, S.J. and C. Radaelli 2004. The Europeanisation of National Policy? Queen’s Papers on Europeanisation No.1/2004. Electronic document, www.qub.ac. uk/ies-old/onlinepapers/poe1-04.pdf Commission of the European Communities (CEC) 2001. Draft Joint Report on Social Inclusion. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Commission of the European Communities (CEC) 2003. Draft Joint Report on Social Inclusion, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities Council of the European Union (CEU) 2007. Joint Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion 2007. Brussels: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Combat Poverty Agency 2000. Planning for a More Inclusive Society: An Initial Assessment of the NAPS. Dublin: Combat Poverty Agency. Connolly, E. 2007. The Institutionalisation of Anti-Poverty and Social Exclusion Policy in Irish Social Partnership. Combat Poverty Agency Research Working Paper 07/01. Dublin: Combat Poverty Agency. Central Statistics Office (CSO) 2006. National Census. Dublin: CSO. Central Statistics Office (CSO) 2007. Measuring Ireland’s Progress. Dublin: CSO. Community Workers Cooperative (CWC) 2003. Sustaining Progress – also Sustains Poverty and Inequality. News and Views. Galway: Community Workers' Cooperative.

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O’Donnell, R. 1999. Ireland's Economic Transformation: Industrial Policy, European Integration and Social Partnership. Pittsburgh: Centre for West European Studies. O’Donnell, R. 2000. The New Ireland in the New Europe. In R. O’Donnell, ed. Europe – The Irish Experience. Dublin: Institute of European Affairs. O’Donnell, R. and B. Moss 2004. Ireland: The Very Idea of an Open Method of Coordination. Paper presented to the Conference of National Economic and Social Council, Dublin Presidency, 28 November 2003 (published proceedings 2004). O’Donnell, R., M. Adshead and D. Thomas 2007. The Emergence and Institutionalisation of Social Pacts: Ireland. Report written for ‘New modes of governance’, EU Framework 7 Integrated Project Priority 7 – Citizens and Governance in Knowledge-based society, Project No. CITI-CT-2004506392. O’Donnell, R. and C. O'Reardon 1997. Ireland's Experiment in Social Partnership 1987–1996. In Social Pacts in Europe – New Dynamics. G. Fajertag and P. Pochet, eds. Brussels: European Trade Union Institute. O’Donnell, R. and C. O'Reardon 2000. Social Partnership and Ireland's Economic Transformation. In Social Pacts in Europe – New Dynamics. G. Fajertag and P. Pochet, eds. Brussels: European Trade Union Institute. O’Donnell, R. and D. Thomas 2002. Ireland in the 1990s: Policy Concertation Triumphant. In Policy Concertation and Social Partnership in Western Europe. S. Bergher and H. Compston, eds. Oxford: Berghahn Books. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 1996. Ireland: Local Partnerships and Social Innovation. Paris: OECD. Office for Social Inclusion (OSI) 2006. Annual Report (Department of Social and Family Affairs). Dublin: Stationery Office. Radaelli, C.M. 2003. The Open Method of Coordination: A New Governance Architecture for the European Union? Sieps Report no. 1 (March), Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies. Electronic document, http://eucenter.wisc.edu/ OMC/Papers/radaelli.pdf Risse, T., M. Green-Crowles and J. Caporaso, eds. 2001. Transforming Europe: Europeanisation and Domestic Change. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Sexton, J.J. and P.J. O’Connell, eds. 1996. Labour Market Studies: Ireland. Luxembourg: European Commission. Scannel, Y. 1988. The Constitution and the Role of Women. In De Valera’s Constitution and Ours. 123-136. B. Farrell, ed. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan. Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA) 2002. The Broad Economic Policy Guidelines. Report prepared for DG Research of the European Commission, January. Trubek, D. and L. Mosher 2003. Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: The Role of the Open Method of Coordination. Governance Project Working Paper. Electronic document, http://eucenter.wisc.edu/OMC/ Papers/ EUC/trubekTrubek.pdf

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Zeitlin, J. 2003. The Open Method of Coordination and Social Protection: Constructing an EU Social Model? Course presented at the 14th session of the Academy of European Law, European University Institute, Florence, Italy. Text available electronically: A) http://eucenter.wisc.edu/OMC/Papers/ EUC/Academy1.pdf B) http://eucenter.wisc.edu/OMC/Papers/EUC/ Academy2.pdf

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NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE EU: EUROPEANISATION AND HIBERNICISATION? Etain Tannam Abstract This chapter examines the role of the EU in influencing Northern Ireland politics and the role of Northern Ireland in influencing EU approaches to ethnic conflict. The chapter is divided into three sections. In section one, an overview of EU policies is provided. In section two, the impact of the EU on political parties, business and public opinion in Northern Ireland is examined. In conclusion, the impact of Northern Ireland on the EU is examined. It is concluded that while the EU has played a role in Northern Ireland and in advancing cross-border cooperation, its role has been determined by British-Irish policy. Intergovernmentalism determines EU approaches. Northern Ireland is a model for the EU, but that model entails emphasis on state policies to resolve conflict – the EU responds to state demands in this realm, rather than playing an entrepreneurial role. The role of the European Union (EU) in Franco-German rapprochment after the Second World War is a model for Northern Ireland (NI). The EU has been credited with forging a stronger alliance between the UK and the Republic of Ireland since their membership in 1973 (Meehan 2000). The March 2007 agreement between all parties to share power in a Northern Ireland Assembly has highlighted Northern Ireland as a model for other areas of conflict in the EU and outside it. The aim of this chapter is to examine whether Northern Ireland has become ‘Europeanised’ by examining the impact of the EU on conflict resolution in Northern Ireland with emphasis on its role in advancing cross-border co-

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operation and to examine the approach of EU Commission officials to Northern Ireland. The secondary aim si to determine whether the example of Northern Ireland in the EU has influenced Commission approaches to other conflict cases – a Hibernicisation process in the wider EU, at least in EU policy and government circles. The paper is divided into three sections. In section one, an overview of EU policies is provided. In section two, the impact of the EU on political parties, business and public opinion in Northern Ireland is examined. In conclusion, the impact of Northern Ireland on the EU is examined. The EU role in Northern Ireland is two-fold: the EU has provided a model of transnational co-operation which the 1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA) signed by British and Irish governments emulated: thus the EU has influenced British-Irish policy to Northern Ireland (Coakley 2002). Secondly, the EU, by providing financial aid on condition that cross-border and inter-community co-operation occurs has influenced the cross-border and internal Northern Irish relationship (Tannam 1999). The EU and the GFA The Agreement Reached in Multi-Party Negotiations, or Good Friday/Belfast Agreement (GFA) signed in 1998, provided for a powersharing devolved Assembly in Northern Ireland and a cross-border ministerial council and secretariat-the NSMC and its secretariat. Strand Two of the GFA was of key relevance to cross-border co-operation. The North-South Ministerial Council (NSMC) was established to develop ‘consultation, co-operation and action within the island of Ireland, including thorough implementation on an all-island and cross-border basis – on matters of mutual interest within the competence of Administrations, North and South’ (Agreement Reached in Multi-Party Negotiations 1998). The NSMC resembles the EU style of policy-making in many respects. The plenary meetings of the NSMC comprise the Irish Prime Minister (Taoiseach), the Northern Irish First Minister and Deputy First Minister, and ministers from the Irish government and NI Executive. Like the EU, emphasis is on reaching decisions in designated areas by consensus (Coakley 2002: 8). Table 1 provides a list of the key areas of co-operation and implementation bodies established under the GFA.

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Table 1. Implementation Bodies and Areas of Co-operation, GFA Implementation Bodies, GFA, 1998 Inland waterways Special EU Programmes (SEUPB) Food safety Trade and Business Development Language Foyle, Carlingford and Irish Lights

Areas of Co-operation Agriculture Education Environment Health Tourism Transport

Source: Coakley 2002: 8

The designated areas of co-operation comprised areas where an economic need for cross-border co-operation was recognized, but where various objections existed to establishing implementation bodies. Under the GFA arrangements a new implementation body, the Special European Union Programmes Body (SEUPB), was responsible for administering EU cross-border programs (SEUPB 2003: 132) and for liaising with the monitoring committee and the European Commission on managing Peace II. Under Commission rules the implementation of each funding package must be checked by a monitoring committee with local, national and EU participation. The SEUPB chairs the monitoring committee, which comprises members of the Irish Department of Finance, the Northern Irish Department of Finance and Personnel, and business, voluntary sector, trade union and agricultural representatives (SEUPB 2003: 134). In addition the British-Irish Council (BIC) was established to provide for institutional co-operation on matters of common interest between representatives of British and Irish governments, devolved institutions in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales and representatives of the Isle of Man, Jersey and Guernsey (McCall 2007: 9). The cross-border institutions established by the GFA were highly significant, both in their own right, and also as an indication of change in the Northern Irish landscape. From the 1960s, cross-border co-operation had been the subject of deep division, undermining then prime minister of Northern Ireland, Terence O’Neill, and later leading to the collapse of the Sunningdale Agreement (1973). The GFA itself reflected many changes that had occurred in Northern Ireland, but also in the Republic of Ireland (ROI). In 1993, the Irish Government declared its support for a referendum to amend the Irish constitutional claim to Northern Ireland – an issue which had provoked widespread unionist opposition to cross-

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border co-operation with an Irish government. The Joint Framework Document (1995) provided for a joint body to administer co-operation in areas of common interest with emphasis on the need to develop a common approach to the EU in the face of its challenges and opportunities. The GFA was thus a culmination of British-Irish initiatives pursued since the 1970s. While attention paid to the EU in these initiatives was increasingly large, these intergovernmental agreements primarily reflected the strategies of British and Irish policy-makers as well as internal domestic change in the ROI and in Northern Ireland. However, EU practical support for Anglo-Irish initiatives and the peace process constitutes a more tangible influence of EU membership. EU Funding The EU’s regional policy packages and its Peace Package created incentives for increased cross-border co-operation between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland and cross-community co-operation in Northern Ireland. The establishment of the SEUPB itself reflected the key significance of EU membership and EU funding. From the 1990s, the EU increasingly attempted to use its financial and political weight to make funding conditional on cross-community and/or cross-border cooperation (Laffan and Payne 2001). Conditionality implied that money would be received only if proof of genuine co-operation existed. As the amount of funding at stake increased this influence grew potentially more significant. In July 1995, the European Commission approved the allocation of £351 million for expenditure on cross-community and cross-border cooperation in Northern Ireland and in the Irish border counties – Peace I. Cross-border development comprised nine per cent of the total Peace I package (SEUPB 2003: 103). Social inclusion measures to alleviate poverty among the poorest communities constituted the major share of the peace programme – 30 per cent (SEUPB 2003:103). The EU dimension was further strengthened financially when it was agreed that Peace I would be continued until 2004 (known as Peace II) and then extended to 2006, providing €500 million to the border regions (400 million to Northern Ireland and one million to the six Irish border counties (SEUPB 2003: 124). The main difference in the administration of Peace I and Peace II was that through the SEUPB, cross-border implications of Peace II, Interreg and Leader were all coordinated in a more pro-

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grammed approach. The emphasis of funding was on distinctiveness (European Commission, DGRegio, Interview, 6 July 2005), implying that expenditure would advance reconciliation and target areas most in need. The SEUPB established under the GFA harnessed these incentives and created an institutional overlap between the EU and the GFA. In addition, Interreg, Leader and other Community initiatives continued to provide funding to Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Northern Ireland was allocated €890 million under the above EU initiatives some of which were specifically for cross-border co-operation (SEUPB 2003: 125). In contrast to Peace I, under Peace II, cross-border development constituted 15.1 per cent of total funding (SEUPB 2003: 129). Peace III (for period 2007 to 2013) was agreed in 2004. Overall the total EU funding for 2007-2013 is half the value of the previous period of EU funding in real terms (DFA, Interview, 17 May 2007). However, while the EU contribution is smaller in size, partly because of the increased financial burden of EU enlargement, it is still perceived as a significant sum (DFA Interview, 17 May 2007). While, cross-border cooperation is a target of funding, there is also emphasis on developing ‘shared spaces’ for Catholics and Protestants and developing community centres and social networks is to be emphasized particularly for Protestant communities (European Commission, Interview, DGRegio, 11 May 2007). The initial establishment of and increase (until 2001) in EU funding, and the normative and institutional framework provided by the EU both to Northern Ireland and to AngloIrish policy-makers, constitute the key reasons why the EU may be argued to have ‘Europeanised’ key aspects of politics, government and administration in Northern Ireland and its relationship with the Republic of Ireland. In the next section the impact of the EU on Northern Ireland and on its relationship with the Republic of Ireland is assessed. The EU’s Impact: Political Parties Until the 1990s Northern Ireland political parties’ responses to the EU were determined by their policies to the constitutional issue of Irish partition. For Sinn Féin, the EU was opposed on the basis that it undermined national sovereignty. Similarly, cross-border co-operation was opposed on the basis that by definition it recognized the border (Tannam 1995: 810-813). For the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) the EU was

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an anathema, an embodiment of the influence of ‘Rome’ and Catholicism. The DUP once opposed the EU on the basis that it undermined national sovereignty. Cross-border co-operation was opposed because it was perceived to be one step on a road to Irish unification ‘through the back door’ (Tannam 1995: 810-813). Similarly, although more moderate, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) generally opposed cross-border co-operation and set out to protect British sovereignty within the EU (Tannam 1995: 810-813). UUP’s response was not as consistent as that of the DUP’s in the period 1973-1990. For example, the UUP supported cross-border drainage schemes in 1979 (Hainsworth 1979: 475). However until the 1990s both UUP and DUP responses to the EU were best characterized as lukewarm or hostile (Tannam 1995: 810-813). Both the DUP and the UUP vehemently opposed the European Parliament’s Haagerup Report recommending the establishment of joint British-Irish responsibilities in specific political, legal and other fields (Hayward 2004:7-11), cross-border co-operation, an EU integrated plan for Northern Ireland and the border regions, and eventually devolution (Haagerup 1988: 74). Of the four main parties, only the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) has been consistently positive in its approach to the EU, and has emphasised the EU’s roles as a reconciling force in the post-war world and financial aid in conflict resolution. Overall, until the 1990s, cross-border co-operation and the EU provoked responses from each of the main Northern Irish parties which were compatible with their nationalist or unionist ideologies (Hainsworth 1979: 470). Gradually these responses of the Eurosceptic parties mellowed. By 1992, there was evidence that both the UUP’s and DUP’s policy towards the EU had altered. In the aftermath of the Single European Act (1987), pragmatic emphasis on the EU’s benefits was highlighted by UUP MEP Jim Nicholson, who noted the positive sides of the EP: ‘It is possible to use the Parliament to benefit the people of Northern Ireland’ (Nicholson cited in Tannam 1995:812). Similarly, the DUP emphasized the need to secure a maximum amount of Structural Funds money from the EU. Nicholson and John Hume discussed the Northern Irish Structural Funds application informally at various times before the final application was made in summer 1993 (Tannam 1995). However, while the DUP supported the EU by trying to maximize its aid, its approach to

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EU-funded cross-border co-operation was still negative and its rhetorical response to the EU often hostile. By the new millennium this approach had also changed, partially bolstered by the apparent success of the ’Celtic Tiger’ economy in the Republic of Ireland (DFA, Interview, 17 May 2007). On broader ideological matters with respect to EU integration, unionist responses remained predictable. For example, both parties were opposed to a European Constitution (Hainsworth and McCann 2004:101). However as regards EU-funded cross-border co-operation and co-operation generally, the DUP was no longer opposed unless co-operation was linked to unification (Tannam 2006: 267). In its manifestos, it does criticize the NSMC and implementation bodies, but in a relatively measured manner. Thus, the DUP states that it ‘will oppose any attempts to integrate the Northern Ireland economy with that of the Irish Republic whilst encouraging companies to export goods and services south of the border’ (DUP 2001:15 cited in Tannam 2006:267). The 2004 EP election campaign provided a forum for the DUP to confront Sinn Féin, to undermine the UUP as ‘pushover unionism’ (Tannam 2006: 267) and also ‘to reassert the Eurosceptic position of the party’ (Hainsworth and McCann 2004: 99): ‘We reject further haemorrhaging of national power to the centre and the creation of structures for a European super-state’ (Allister, quoted in Hainsworth and McCann 2004: 99). However, emphasis on receiving EU aid continued. Following the 2007 agreement to restore the Northern Ireland Assembly, a DUP spokesman stressed that the DUP was keen to discuss matters of mutual concern with the Republic of Ireland and also to build up East-West institutions, encompassing the whole of the British Isles (Belfast Telegraph, 24 April 2007: 2). Similarly at Paisley’s meeting with then Irish Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, Paisley stated that ‘Some say that hedges make the best neighbours, but that is not the case. I don’t believe that we should plant a hedge between our two countries We discussed co-operation of an economic nature that will be to our mutual benefit’ (Ian Paisley quoted in Pollak 2007: 1). Moreover, the DUP asserted its aim of securing the Irish government’s help in accessing EU funds (Pollak 2007: 1). Overall, the UUP and the DUP, while ideologically opposed to a federal union and to an EU Constitution, perceive the EU as a useful and vital economic help (Belfast Telegraph, 24 April 2007). For the DUP

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the connection between EU–funded cross-border co-operation and Irish unification has weakened if not disappeared. EU funding and crossborder co-operation are welcomed and are separated out from attitudes to Irish unification. It is likely that increased East-West co-operation under an EU framework will also evolve. Similarly for Sinn Féin while ideologically it too is opposed to a federal EU and to an EU Constitution on the grounds that they would undermine national sovereignty, it also welcomes EU funding and it no longer explicitly emphasizes a linkage between Irish unification and cross-border co-operation – also separating out the two issues. Thus, in 1997, its section on cross-border development focuses on the economic merits of cross-border co-operation (Sinn Féin, 1997:5). In its 2001 manifesto, it stresses its status as an ‘all-Ireland party’ (Sinn Féin 2001:2), but again its emphasis on the NSMC is on its economic benefits and it refers frequently to the ‘island economy’ and the economic distortions of partition (Sinn Féin 2001, passim). Likewise, in its 2003 manifesto, it asserts the aim of developing ‘allIreland structures to foster an Ireland of equals’ (Sinn Féin, 2003:20). It seeks to use the NSMC ‘to effect co-ordination and integration of policymaking and programs of work across the border and throughout Ireland’ (Sinn Féin 2003:21). In discussing local cross-border co-operation, again, Sinn Féin continues to emphasise economic need for such co-operation. In its 2007 Northern Ireland Assembly election manifesto, it emphasizes creating an all-Ireland economic development plan in order to increase economic growth (Sinn Féin 2007: 7). While clearly, Irish unification is the aim of Sinn Féin, in recent manifestos it rarely explicitly links unification to the NSMC or to cross-border co-operation, but instead emphasizes the economic rationale for cooperation. However, while cross-border co-operation and the NSMC are core elements in these manifestos, there are not many explicit references to the EU. As in the cases of the DUP and the UUP the importance of securing EU funding and of cooperating with the Republic of Ireland to do so are emphasised, but otherwise the emphasis of Sinn Féin manifestos for EP and regional or national elections is on Northern Ireland constitutional and party political matters. Overall, the issue of cross-border co-operation has become less politicized for both the DUP and for Sinn Féin, a trend that emerged in the early 1990s. Co-operation within the EU’s funding framework is wel-

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comed, and EU funding is encouraged and provides a common interest with the Republic of Ireland. This rational cost-benefit approach taken toward the EU can also be observed at the local government level in Northern Ireland. Multi-level Governance? The EU and Local Actors The concept of multi-level governance and a ‘Europe of the Regions’ implied that the EU would have a significant impact on many regions within the EU, but specifically in the case of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The term is a little ambivalent in that the existence of a devolved administration in Northern Ireland – a region of the UK – is in itself an indication of regional empowerment. However, for federalists, the principle of subsidiarity implies that decisions should be made at the lowest competence level – at local council level for example. For many in the Irish/Northern Irish case multi-level governance was interpreted as implying that local actors (for example, councillors or farming and business communities) would have increased policy-making influence and would cooperate together to maximize that influence. In many ways, the EU’s initiatives have influenced the latter type of cross-border local co-operation, but as this section shows, the general emphasis is on the more centralized ‘North-South’ co-operation under the GFA1. Three cross-border networks were established before the GFA2 received impetus from the new administrative arrangements, increased funding, and the European Commission (Interview, 11 February 2004). These groups engaged in an extensive coordinated lobbying campaign to ensure a central role in Interreg III (Laffan and Payne 2001:103). At the start of the millennium, coinciding with increased EU funding, the Commission played a large role in influencing local actors. The Commission official who sat on the monitoring committee acted as a policy entrepreneur who strongly encouraged the networks to adopt a program approach and a border corridor strategy (Laffan and Payne 2001:98). The Commission rejected the first Interreg III submission partly on the basis This ambivalence is not specific to Northern Ireland, but indeed the difficulty in defining the meaning of a region may have undermined the usefulness of the concept of multi-level governance generally (Irish Regions office, Interview, 10 May 2007) 2 These networks are the North West Region Cross-Border Group (1975), the East-Border Region Committee (1976) and the Irish Central Border Area Network (1995) (Laffan and Payne 2001:96). 1

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that there was insufficient attention to providing indicators of the impact and concrete examples of cross-border co-operation (Laffan and Payne 2001: 116). Commission preferences and the demands of the networks would tend to push the implementation of Interreg towards a delegated and decentralized model rather than the civil service dominated model of the past (Laffan and Payne 2001: 101). In the submission of programs/projects to be funded and in the allocation of funding, NGOs, local authorities, and local businesses were all involved (Laffan and Payne 2001: 101). The Border Midland and Western regional assembly in the Republic of Ireland founded after the establishment of the Committee of the Regions also has implications for cross-border political co-operation. Although representing only Irish border counties, it comprises local councillors and is represented on the monitoring committees of Peace II and for Interreg IIIA, and hence provided another forum for local political co-operation. Similarly, for Peace I, a Joint Management Committee (JMC) was established to oversee the programme’s implementation. The JMC comprised five members from the border counties and five members from Northern Ireland as well as NGO representatives (SEUPB 2003: 119). In addition, seminars and conferences were held with broad participation marking ‘the development of strong working relationships with a wide variety of stakeholders’ (SEUPB 2003: 119). Local advisory committees were established to identify gaps in practical administration of crossborder programmes as well as ‘best practice’ in the area (SEUPB 2003:121). However, it is noteworthy that multi-level governance as a conceptual framework has ceased to be emphasized, and it appears that the predicted increase in local regional empowerment has not materialised in either the Republic of Ireland or in Northern Ireland. More generally, after the Maastricht Treaty (1993) the relevance of multi-level governance and the degree of confidence in the EU’s impact on regional power began to wane (Irish Regions Office, Interview, 11 May 2007). For states that were already highly regionalised the EU could play an active role, although it could also undermine regional authorities in certain areas. However, for Ireland and Northern Ireland the impact of regional policy on the allocation of decision-making power has been less marked. Many of the initiatives in local partnership schemes have been increasingly dominated by the provisions of the GFA, and the SEUPB has

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increasingly played a leadership role. Under Peace II, for example, the Commission no longer had a decision-making role on the monitoring committee, but was granted ‘observer status’ (Tannam 2006). Thus, their policy-making role was further diminished. In other words, of all the Peace programmes, Peace I was the most decentralised, and since the GFA each programme has become more centralised. The demands of both British-Irish and Northern Irish party preferences, rather than the European Commission, have determined levels of regional or local influence. When the Commission did appear to exert influence on the role of partnerships and local actors, it was because it was allowed to do so by British and Irish governments. After the GFA this situation altered with the establishment of the SEUPB. Key determinants of this more centralised outcome have been the preferences of both governments in their successful attempt to formulate agreement between the key Northern Irish political parties. DUP objections to cross-border co-operation under the GFA were often expressed as being their concern about accountability and transparency. Centralising control over schemes and ensuring that the restored Northern Ireland Assembly would ‘sign-off’ on any new initiatives were changes made at DUP behest in the St. Andrew’s Agreement (DFA, Interview, 17 May 2007), and were emphasized as ‘concessions’ won by the DUP which permitted them to share power with Sinn Féin in the new Assembly. In this way, any potential EU decentralising influence down to the cross-border regional level would not be allowed at the expense of achieving multi-party agreement in Northern Ireland. Practically, the decentralizing leverage enjoyed by the Commission depended on the amount of money it provided to Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Moreover, the combination of EU enlargement and of the Irish Celtic Tiger economy has led to a decline in overall EU funding for the period 2007 to 2013. Of particular significance is that no Irish region now qualifies for Objective One status (hence ROI will not receive a maximum share of funding) and of all Irish regions, the poorest is not the BMW region (Border Midlands West) encompassing the Irish border area, but the South East region in the ROI, encompassing the Waterford area (Irish Regions office, Interview, 11 May 2007; Irish Regions, 2007). Similarly, Peace III, as observed above, is smaller than its predecessors. In this way the much-emphasized multi-level governance model of the 1990s has not emerged in the case of the Irish/Northern

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Irish relationship, except to the extent that a devolved administration in Northern Ireland has policy-making influence. For the ROI decisions are centralized and for Northern Ireland there is only limited empowerment at the local level. While specific EU funding may not necessarily have the same impact on cross-border arrangements, joint lobbying with respect to the Common Agricultural Policy, inward investment and environmental policy issues for example, is expected to increase, along with levels of regional co-operation (DFA, Interview, 17 May 2007). The DUP has signalled its willingness to encourage this type of co-operation and Irish/Northern Irish teams already make joint bids for investment. Co-operation between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland in implementing EU law is thus also predicted to grow (DFA, Interview, 17 May 2007). Trade and tourism statistics have demonstrated a steady increase since 2003, albeit form a low base level (Birnie and Bradley 2001: 31-32), indicating the activity of businesses on both sides of the border and the impact of Intertrade Ireland. It is noteworthy too that there is no data on regional cross-border trade but there is anecdotal evidence that this type of trade, involving small businesses and farms, has been greatly stimulated by the end of the conflict in Northern Ireland. Similarly, although not specifically EU-influenced, the role of the British-Irish Council in facilitating co-operation between Northern Ireland, ROI, Scotland and Wales is set to increase and the relevance of the CAP and other EU policies will provide incentives for co-operation in this forum (Interview, DFA, 17 May 2007), these initiatives will not necessarily be regional. For example the British-Irish Council may increase centralised co-operation between the Republic of Ireland and its neighbours – the development of ports and ports access being a key example (Irish Regions Office, Interview, 11 May 2007). Yet, as the next section shows all the above changes and the Commission’s generally more pro-active role in Northern Ireland do not appear to have altered perceptions of identity. The EU, Citizenship and Identity in Northern Ireland: public opinion data3 Much has been written from a post-modernist or constructivist perspective about the impact of the EU on identity in territorial conflicts, where 3 I am grateful to John Coakley, Cathal McCall, Richard Sinnott and Jon Tonge for their advice about accessing data on this topic.

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the increased possibility of shared and multiple identities is highlighted (McCall 1999: 904). However, public opinion poll data does not indicate that this EU impact on identity has occurred yet. Most respondents define themselves as being Irish or British or both. Thus in 1999, regarding citizenship, Protestants in Northern Ireland tend to define themselves as British (86%) and Catholics tend to define themselves as British-Irish (50%) with only 29% of Catholics defining themselves as Irish citizens solely (Fahey, Hayes and Sinnott 2005 cited in Coakley 2007: 6). Only 8% of Catholics defined themselves in the ‘other’ category (not specified) and barely any Protestants defined themselves in this category (Coakley 2007: 6). A majority of Catholics define their identity as Irish, with a ‘significant proportion’ defining themselves as Northern Irish. A majority of Protestants define their identity as British and again a significant proportion define themselves as Northern Irish (Coakley 2007: 6). Indeed, the term ‘Northern Irish’ was only included from 1989 onwards, but an increasing number of Catholics and Protestants have opted for this description when surveyed, although again the changes in question-wording complicate findings (Fahy, Hayes, and Sinnot 2005: 64). However if away from Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, the proportion of Protestants who think of themselves as British declines and the proportion who think of themselves as Northern Irish increases – 35% would say they were Northern Irish if in England, as opposed to 17% if they were in Northern Ireland (Coakley 2007: 9). It is possible that the label ‘Northern Ireland’ may be used differently by Protestants and Catholics: Catholics may use it to assert a North-South axis and Protestants may use it assert an East-West axis (Tonge 2005:16). However, it is noteworthy that Ian Paisley has emphasized cooperating with the ROI to access EU funds and to influence, policy implying that a perception of Northern Ireland as an ‘independent’ region cooperating equally with other states or regions in the EU may dominate unionist elite behavior. Overall, none of these statisitics tap the level of regional cross-border identity or European identity felt in Northern Ireland. A striking finding reported by Coakley is that Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland are far more likely to identify primarily with their locality than with other 4 McCall does not claim that the EU has succeeded in cross-cutting nationalist and unionist identity, but that if violence ceased for a sustained period it may do so, in conjunction with the GFA arrangements (McCall 1999: 90).

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identities. However, regional identification is low implying that crossborder regional idenitifcation would also be low if examined specifically. Table 2. Geographical Identification by National Identity and Community, 1999.

Locality, town Region, county Country Europe World No. of cases

Protestant N. Irish British

All

Cath. Irish N. Irish All

Total

66

63

65

58

68

61

63

12

4

13

10

7

10

11

20 1 1 365

22 4 6 49

19 1 2 502

28 2 2 260

18 3 4 68

24 3 2 424

21 2 2 990

Figures in each column are per centages except bottom row. Source: Coakley (2007: 10), derived from European value survey 1999.

Similarly in 2004, when asked in a Eurobarometer poll to rate four levels of identity, 89% of Northern Ireland respondents were very or fairly attached to their town or village, 90% to their county, 67% to their country and 51% to the EU (Coakley 2007:10). Interestingly ‘the biggest difference between Northern Ireland and other societies lay in the relatively low level of attachment to the country’ (Coakley 2007:10). However, it is possible that respondents do not feel comfortable answering tihs question honestly-‘whatver you say, say nothing’. However, while there is a higher level of European identification among Catholics, European identity does not appear to have high levels of support, as Table 3 shows: Table 3. Levels of European Identity by Religion, Northern Ireland I always think of myself as European I sometimes think of myself as European I never think of myself as European Don’t know

% Cath. % Prot. % No religion % Total 7

6

15

8

27

19

29

23

64

73

54

67

2

3

3

2

Source: Northern Ireland LIFE and TIMES (NILT), 2002 www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/ 2002/Europe/THINKEUR.html

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Overall, from evidence provided by opinion poll data, ‘the limits of EU re-configuration are apparent in the sphere of identity’ (Tonge 2005: 16). Thus, public opinion data does not offer any evidence that the EU’s initiatives are causing the emergence of a cross-national territorial identity – either of a European or a cross-border regional kind. However the data does support political party and local actors’ findings that there is an appreciation of the EU as a provider of economic benefits that crosscuts political ideological divides. Also the increase in the numbers who describe themselves as ‘Northern Irish’ is noteworthy. If Northern Ireland is defined as one region within the UK (like Scotland and Wales) as opposed to identifying micro cross-border regions along the border, then the increase in support for the label ‘Northern Irish’ and the increase in support among unionists for cross-border co-operation does strengthen the concept of a ‘Europe of the Regions’, especially given the existence of the devolved Northern Ireland Assembly. However, as the next section shows it is not possible to determine that the EU has caused this development. Devolution in the UK itself and the success of BritishIrish policy in achieving power-sharing in Northern Ireland are key underlying factors. The EU and the Ireland/Northern Ireland Administrative Relationship There are two key aspects to evaluating the impact of the EU on the adminsitrative relationship: 1) Have contacts/co-operation between administrative systems increased? 2) Is public policy-making more integrated? (Magennnis 2007: 245). Both aspects are often at the heart of the Europeanisation literature examining how public policy institutions have adapted to the obligations of EU membership (Featherstone 2003: 7). While EU funding was conditional on meaningful co-operation at all levels until 1998, cross-border co-operation was often tokenistic. Relevant actors, including civil servants, met once or twice to fulfill the obligation to cooperate, but did not meet frequently. Co-operation between the Anglo-Irish Division in the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Northern Ireland Office was close, but not because of the EU – such cooperation was at the heart of Anglo-Irish policy since the 1980s and was a policy priority in response to IRA and unionist paramilitary violence. The implicit assumption particularly for the Irish govenrment and then later for the British government was that the key to resolving the conflict in Northern Ireland was Anglo-Irish co-operation. Apart from Foreign

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Affairs/NIO co-operation, administrative relations were not close. The border insulated both administrations from each other and civil service departments on both sides often perceived each other as rivals for scare resources – funding, inward investment, tourism – rather than perceiving the benefits of co-operation (Tannam 1999). The GFA in 1998 insitutionalised cross-border co-operation and as such has had a significant effect on administrative relations. The joint secretariat established by the GFA works closely on a cross-border basis to coordinate and implement policies. The SEUPB was created to administer EU regional funds and EU funds to underpin the peace process in Northern Ireland (SEUPB 2003: 132). It comprises members of the Department of Finance and Personnel and the Irish Department of Finance, but works with a wide variety of civil departments, for example, agriculture, trade and enterprise, and with local economic and political actors. Cross-border units exist in each Irish department to liaise with other departments on both sides of the border and to coordinate policy (Tannam 2006). These units represent clearing houses for cross-border issues (Tannam 2006). They are chaired by senior civil servants and meet once a month to discuss cross-cutting issues with their Northern Irish counterparts (Tannam 2006: 7). In addition, there is an overarching coordinating group, chaired by the Department of Foreign Affairs, in the Republic of Ireland (Tannam 2006). Thus, knowledge of cross-border schemes and initiatives is not confined to those directly involved, but is a broader part of departmental activity. This high-level intervention and management, as well as the establishment of the NSMC and secretariat, have all diminished problems of information gaps and poor coordination among civil servants. Crossborder co-operation is part of the broader remit of civil service departments in the Republic of Ireland. Moreover, if an Irish or Northern Irish civil servant has a matter to raise or needs advice on a certain issue, it has been observed that the NSMC secretariat is perceived as the relevant institution in many designated policy areas (Tannam 2006). The idea of functional co-operation administered jointly in a designated area that fuelled civil service change is very similar to the EU’s framework and as such it is intuitively plausible that the EU was influential in Anglo-Irish policy-making in a normative way. However the changes that occurred

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were politically driven by British and Irish governments and did not reflect directly an EU influence or a functional imperative. In addition, the EU’s impact on overall Irish/Northern Irish integrated policy-making has been argued to be less successful (Magennis 2007). Since 1994, a common chapter was included in Irish and Northern Irish development plans with the aim of achieving strategic co-operation and/or economic integration (Magennis 2007: 245). On the one hand, ‘there has been a consistent upward trend in expenditure on cooperation with an almost €100 million increase per year between 2002 and 2005’ (Centre for Cross-Border Studies 2007: 3). However, if only joint activity is accounted for, then annual totals fall from between €401 million-€44 million to €227 million-€237 million (Centre for Cross-Border Studies 2007: 3). Many projects were infrastructural – e.g, road building on one side of the border. However, in terms of administrative cooperation, most activity falls into the first type of co-operation – liaison between civil servants and information-sharing rather than integrated planning (Centre for Cross-Border Studies 2007: 5). In fact it is clear that official reporting overstates the extent of genuine cross-border co-operation – the phrases ‘actions in one jurisdiction with an impact on the other’, or ‘actions carried out on one side of the border but which benefit communities on the other side’ recur (Magennis 2007: 253). Specific programme evaluations provide a bleak picture of cross-border co-operation: the Border Midland Western region report provided little evidence of co-operation and Northern Ireland’s operational programme observed that the common chapter ‘had little additional impact on the delivery of structural funds North or South’ (cited in Magennis 2007: 255). However, Magennis’ study refers to the period of ‘care and maintenance’ whereby the suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly stalled dynamism in the cross-border relationship. In contrast, the visit of Commission President Barroso to meet with Ian Paisley and Martin McGuinness in March 2007 precipitated the announcement of a special Commission unit working on an all-Ireland basis to integrate all EU funding and manage it efficiently. Thus, the relatively recent settlement in Northern Ireland may improve the poor record in integrated public policy making. Be that as it may, there remain potentially significant barriers to such co-operation: for example, the structures of the two economies are very different with different economic problems in each

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(Bradley and Birnie 2001). Moreover, as both economies are small, greater benefits may be reaped by looking outwards to larger markets. To date, the EU’s impact on cross-border administrative co-operation has been at most indirect: the EU’s policy-making framework provided a useful example for British and Irish policy-makers and informed the SDLP approach to conflict resolution – particularly that of John Hume. Anglo-Irish policy initiatives have had the largest impact on administrative co-operation – in particular the GFA. As regards the Europeanisation of Northern Ireland, there is some evidence that the EU framework provided a neutral framework for political parties to cooperate and some EU-derived concepts and policies – for example multilevel governance and conditionality provided non-zero sum incentives for cooperation. In this way, formerly Eurosceptic parties appear to have become Europeanised. Similarly, local actors on EU matters and various crossborder local networks have received some impetus. However, as in the case of civil service co-operation, it is likely that ‘Europeanisation’ has roots in Anglo-Irish intergovernmental policy – the framework of opportunities was created by Anglo-Irish policy-makers curtailing and providing specific incentives through a policy of coercive consociationalism (O’Leary and McGarry 2004). A carrot and stick approach was adopted by British and Irish policy-makers whereby the EU became a useful carrot to encourage co-operation and conflict resolution. In other words Europeanisation has occurred, but its underlying cause is a mixture of European and national influences, the latter holding greatest weight. Indeed, this causal pathway is perceived by the EU to be the most appropriate method of dealing with other cases of conflict within and outside its borders. In the next section the impact of Northern Ireland on Commission approaches to conflict resolution is assessed. Northern Ireland’s Influence in EU Conflict Resolution Just as the Franco-German model of post war co-operation became a symbol of the EU’s success, Northern Ireland is now frequently cited as a model for other cases of ethno-national conflict in the EU. The question of whether the case of Northern Ireland provides policy lessons for the EU and influences its approaches to cases such as Cyprus, Kosovo and Palestine is of increasing relevance.

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For Commission officials, the Northern Ireland model is an intergovernmental one, whereby the conflict was perceived as an internal affair and the EU’s role was to offer financial and moral support to AngloIrish bilateral initiatives. Thus, the Commission’s approach became increasingly prominent as the peace process began to gather momentum, but prior to that, it was reluctant to intervene (Tannam 2007a: 345-347). Moreover, its preferences reflected those of British and Irish governments – it did not carve out its own policy. John Hume in particular emphasised the need to provide EU financial carrots to reward actors who cooperated in search of a solution to the conflict; the Hume approach influenced Irish and in turn British policy makers, particularly after the Thatcher years. The Commission followed suit. Thus, in 2001 there was evidence of strong Commission influence over the submission of the Peace II application. However for Peace III, the Commission had lost its participant status and was an observer on the monitoring committee. The GFA had centralised policy-making, bringing funding decisions under tighter executive control and the Commission’s role altered accordingly. In practical policy terms, the Northern Ireland model provides an intergovernmental prescription, whereby the EU is not irrelevant but plays a secondary role – it facilitates and supports bilateral policy by providing financial funding under rules of conditionality. It is this policy prescription which the Commission has adopted in its approach to other conflict cases. Commission desk officers with responsibility for peace are in relatively frequent contact with officials from the conflict prevention unit of the Enlargement Directorate (Tannam 2007b: 348). In particular their advice is sought about funding for Cyprus, Kosovo and Palestine. Similarly, delegations from Iraq and Kosovo have visited the SEUPB seeking advice (Tannam 2007b). Financial packages subject to conditionality rules have been provided for many conflict zones. In 2004, the Commission agreed a package of €35 million to support Greek-Turkish co-operation for 2004-2006, and the 2002 Civil Society Development Programme provided €8 million to promote Greek-Turkish dialogue to aid NGOs (Rumelli 2007: 121). The Commission also pledged €259 million to Northern Cyprus if a solution was reached, but when the referendum to establish a federal bi-communal Cyprus was rejected in 1994 by Greek-Cypriots, the money was made available anyway (Demetriou 2004b: 25). For the period 2007-2013,

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€492 million in Structural Funds were granted to Cyprus, €163 million from the agricultural fund and €119 million from the European Social Fund (ESF) (Commission of the European Communities, 25 October 2007). However, while Northern Ireland appears to be a model for Commission officials, it has been observed that ‘a failure to learn’ from Northern Ireland exists and formal mechanisms of learning and communication between the conflict prevention unit and the Northern Ireland unit are absent (Harvey 2003: 53), possibly leading to the conclusion that similarities between cases reflect an automatic knee-jerk reaction to conflict, rather than a deliberate strategy. The problem with using Northern Ireland as a model is that unlike the cases of Cyprus and of Kosovo, for example, Anglo-Irish policy makers gradually shared a consensus on policy towards Northern Ireland. In the case of Cyprus, while Greek-Turkish co-operation is developing, a convergence of preferences on the Cyprus issue is not apparent and Turkey is not yet a member of the EU. The Europeanisation argument would imply that once Turkey joins the EU, greater Greek-Turkish co-operation with respect to Cyprus will evolve. However, such predictions can only be speculative at this stage. In short, Northern Ireland has Hibernicised the EU, in that the Commission has adopted a similar approach to other cases of conflict. However, similarities between cases are superficial and it is doubtful that the EU and the Commission have adopted specific policies because of a systematic learning and analytical problem-solving process. Conclusion While the EU’s role in political change has been less than that of British and Irish governments, normatively the EU model has provided a consensual framework for Irish and British governments since 1973, and for political parties and other actors in Northern Ireland. While there is little hard evidence of this normative impact, it is clear that membership of the EU has had some effect on British and Irish ideas and policies regarding conflict resolution in Northern Ireland. Concepts such as joint authority and joint sovereignty discussed in many British-Irish negotiations have strong echoes of the EU; while federalism and confederalism are not the preserve of the EU, Irish and British proximity to the EU’s institutional system may have made these concepts more palpable, or less alien. However, there is no hard evidence of this effect. In this way,

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observing the long-term effect of membership on acceding states with ethnic conflict issues may be the best or indeed the only way of determining whether and to what extent the EU has a normative influence. Apart from any normative role, the EU’s main influence has been financial. This financial role has not had a causal effect on conflict resolution, but has underpinned Anglo-Irish efforts. While there is evidence of Europeanisation in political parties’ responses to the EU, in the weakening of partisan issue linkage and in local actors’ behaviour, most dynamism for cross-border co-operation has emanated from the GFA implying that the key influence on conflict resolution in Northern Ireland has been Anglo-Irish policy. Hibernicisation of the EU implies an intergovernmental model of conflict resolution with Commission and EU support, but relative detachment until a solution is reached. Indeed, Northern Ireland, as an example of Europeanisation and Hibernicisation, has become a very convenient case.

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Commission of the European Communities (2007), URL (June 2007) www/ec/europa.eu/commission_barroso/president/focus/norther_ ireland_en.htm Demetriou, O. (2004) ‘EU and Cyprus’, paper presented at ECPR? workshop, Uppsala, April. Department of Foreign Affairs, interview with author, 17 May 2007. Fahy, T., B. Hayes, and R. Sinnott (2005) Conflict and Consensus: A Study of Values in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Dublin: IPA. Farrell, M. (1979) Northern Ireland: The Orange State. London: Pluto. Featherstone, K. (2003) ‘Introduction: in the name of Europe’ in K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli, (eds) The Politics of Europeanization, 3-27. Oxford: OUP. Haagerup Report 1988, European Parliament, 12 March, 88.265/fin Hainsworth, P. (1979) ‘The European Election of 1979 in Northern Ireland: Linkage Politics’, Parliamentary Affairs 32(4): 470-81. Hainsworth, P. and G. McCann (2004) ‘Change at Last: the 2004 European Election in Northern Ireland’, Irish Political Studies 19(2): 96-111. Harvey B. (2003) Review of Peace II Programme. Belfast: Joseph Rowntree Trust. Hayward, K. (2004) ‘From Border Conflict to Identity Conflict: The EU’s Approach to Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland’, paper presented at ECPR Joint Sessions Workshops, Uppsala, April. Joint Framework Document (1995) URL foreignaffairs.gov.ie, accessed 15 October 2008 Keating, M. and B. Jones (1995) The European Union and the Regions. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Laffan, B. and D. Payne (2001) Creating Living Institutions. Armagh: Centre for Cross-Border Studies. Laffan, B., R. O’Donnell, and M. Smith (2000) Europe’s Experimental Union. London: Routledge. Meehan E. (2000) ‘Britain’s Irish Question: Britian’s European Question?’ British-Irish relations in the context of the European Union and the Belfast Agreement’, Review of International Studies 26: 1, 83-97. Magennis, E. (2007) ‘Public Policy Co-operation: The ‘Common Chapter’ – Shadow or Substance?’ in J. Coakley and L. O’Dowd (eds) Crossing the Border: New Relationships between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Dublin: Irish Academic Press. McCall, C. (1999) Identity in Northern Ireland: Communities, Politics and Change. Basingstoke: Macmillan McCall, C. (2007) ‘Hello Stranger: the Revival of the Relationship between Ireland, Northern Ireland and Scotland’, Journal of Cross-Border Studies 2(1): 722. Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey (NILT) (2002) URL (consulted May 2007): www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2002/Europe/THINKEUR.html

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McGarry, J. and B. O’Leary (2004) The Northern Ireland Conflict: Consociational Engagements. Oxford: OUP. Pollak, A. (2007) ‘Paisley the Champion of Co-operation’, Notes from the Neighbours, 9 May. Armagh: Centre for Cross-Border Studies. Rummelli, B. (2007) ‘Transforming Conflicts on EU Borders: the Case of Greek-Turkish Relations’, Journal of Common Market Studies 45(1):105-26. Sinn Féin (1997) 6 County Assembly Election Manifesto, Dublin, Sinn Féin Sinn Féin (2001) Westminster Election Manifesto, Dublin, Sinn Féin Sinn Féin (2003) Agenda for Government, Dublin, Sinn Féin Special European Union Programmes Body (2003) Building on Peace: Supporting Peace and Reconciliation After 2006, ADM/CPA, Monaghan Tannam, E. (1995) ‘The EU and Northern Irish Politics’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 18(4): 798-817. Tannam, E. (1999) Cross-Border Co-operation in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. London: Macmillan Tannam, E. (2006) ‘Cross-Border Co-operation Between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland: Neo-functionalism Revisited’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 8(1): 256-276. Tannam, E. (2007a) The European Commission’s Evolving Role in Conflict Resolution: the case of Northern Ireland 1989-2005, Co-operation and Conflict, 42: 3: 337-356. Tannam, E. (2007b) ‘Northern Ireland and the European Union’, paper presented at ‘Europe’s Divided Nations’, Kingston, Ontario, July 27-29. Tonge, J. (2005) ‘The EU and the Irish Border: Shaping Aid and Attitudes?’, CIBR Working Paper in Border Studies, CIBR/WP05-1, URL (consulted May 2007): www.qub.ac.uk/cibr

EUROPEAN STUDIES 28 (2010): 173-195

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ‘NORMAL’ POLITICS IN NORTHERN IRELAND Mary C. Murphy Abstract 2008 marked the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Belfast Agreement and followed a momentous year in the recent political history of Northern Ireland. Despite the passage of over a decade, the full operation of the new governance arrangements remains elusive. In 2008 however, it appeared that Northern Ireland had embraced ‘normal’ politics as local political representatives began to address the challenges of everyday political life. One such challenge is structuring and managing an engagement with the European Union (EU) which meets the interests of Northern Ireland. Over ten years after the decision to devolve power to Northern Ireland and despite the sporadic suspension of political institutions, the region has developed a functioning model of engagement with the EU. Using Wolff’s (2002) model of post-Agreement reconstruction, this chapter suggests that when compared with other domestic policy areas, the Europeanizing influence of the EU has produced important political developments in Northern Ireland. Agreed in 1998, the Belfast Agreement was followed one year later by the devolution of power to new Northern Ireland political institutions. A series of suspensions of power between 1999 and 2007 interrupted the operation of the new administration. The most prolonged suspension lasted almost five years from October 2002 until May 2007, when Sinn Féin and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) agreed to share power following decisive election results and prolonged negotiations.

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Despite the numerous interruptions in the exercise of devolved power in Northern Ireland, the new political institutions and those who work within them can point to some tangible achievements and outputs. Within the context of European Union (EU) politics, Northern Ireland has developed a model of engagement with the EU which is not dissimilar to that of other European regions. In terms of internal administrative mechanisms, regional representation in Brussels and the development of networks and relationships, the region has developed new ways of responding to the EU. It appears that Northern Ireland’s pursuit of an EU agenda stands as an early example of the ways in which different political interests can collectively achieve important political and economic developments. Perhaps more significant however is that of all the domestic policy areas where Northern Ireland has some responsibility, issues around the EU stand among the least divisive. Considering the very different EU outlooks of Northern Ireland political parties – in particular the four main parties who constitute the Northern Ireland Executive – this is a somewhat surprising observation. In contrast to issues around health, education and the Irish language, for example, matters which touch on the EU do not expose serious tensions among the political parties, or indeed between the two communities in Northern Ireland. This chapter begins by proposing that Northern Ireland is currently in a period of ‘post-Agreement reconstruction’ (see Wolff 2002). This constitutes a challenging backdrop for the establishment of political, economic and social change in Northern Ireland. In utilising Wolff’s classification of Northern Ireland, this chapter examines the evolution of EU politics and policy in Northern Ireland by focusing on three distinct processes: 1) building political institutions; 2) economic recovery and; 3) facilitating the emergence of a stable and functioning civil society. This chapter therefore seeks to determine the extent to which a process of Europeanisation has helped to bolster, even consolidate, the operation of devolved politics in Northern Ireland. Europeanisation has many, often contradictory meanings (see Harmsen and Wilson 2000; Olsen 2002), but it nevertheless provides a useful context within which to examine the evolution of EU-related domestic politics in Northern Ireland. For the purposes of this casestudy, the term ‘Europeanisation’ has a specifically European Union context and is used to refer broadly to the domestic response to the EU

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on the part of a sub-national unit. This interpretation of Europeanisation links with the work of Olsen who refers to Europeanisation as ‘change in core domestic institutions of governance and politics, understood as a consequence of the development of European-level institutions, identities and policies’ (2002: 932; see also Ladrech 1994 for a similar definition). In other words, the EU has a capacity to influence the shape and direction of domestic politics, institutions and policy processes. Some authors also claim that Europeanisation may impact on informal institutions such as norms and values (see Bache and Marshall 2004). Radaelli’s definition of Europeanisation however, is perhaps more applicable to a Northern Ireland case-study. He proposes that Europeanisation consists of processes of a) construction b) diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles and ‘ways of doing things’. It also consists of shared beliefs and norms that are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies (2006: 59).

This definition of Europeanisation is based on more than simply a topdown notion of ‘impact’ and as such acknowledges that processes of Europeanisation ‘provide considerable opportunities for creative usage of Europe’ (Radaelli 2006: 59). In this context, Europeanising influences are particularly interesting in Northern Ireland because they have facilitated a constructive approach to domestic politics within a unique and challenging post-conflict political environment. Having identified and considered the ways in which a closer engagement with the EU has allowed Northern Ireland to create and develop domestic institutions and processes, the chapter concludes by comparing the local management of EU policy in Northern Ireland with that of other domestic policy areas. This comparison demonstrates how the forces of Europeanisation have contributed to the emergence of a form of domestic politics which is consensus-driven and has produced a range of important EU-related political, economic and social developments. Context During the period of the ‘Troubles’, Northern Ireland was typically labelled a conflict society: Protracted ethno-national conflicts shape the societies in which they take place, in many different, yet almost always exclusively negative ways, result-

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ing in a lack of functioning or legitimate political institutions, weak economic performance, non-existing or polarized structures of civil society and antagonized elites (Wolff 2002: 88).

Since the calling of ceasefires by both republican and loyalist paramilitaries in 1994 and the signing of the Belfast Agreement in 1998, the region has moved into a new period in its evolution and development. It is still clearly a divided society, albeit one which appears to be in transition. The process of post-conflict transition or ‘normalisation’ is taking place against an unfavourable background, namely a history of violence, suspicion, mistrust, fear and limited exposure to ‘normal’ politics. In this context, building and operationalising legitimate political institutions, promoting economic recovery, and fostering new and constructive political and civil relationships is particularly challenging. Wolff suggests that Northern Ireland is currently in a period of postAgreement reconstruction. This essentially involves creating a set of ‘political, economic and social structures in accordance with an agreed conflict settlement that allow the conduct of a non-violent, just and democratic political process’ (Wolff 2002: 88). In this instance, post-Agreement reconstruction needs to address three different areas – ‘the building of (political) institutions, economic recovery and establishing conditions conducive for the development of civil society’ (Wolff, 2002: 89). The following sections will examine each of these areas as they pertain to the EU in Northern Ireland. The building of political institutions Wolff argues that ‘the analysis of post-Agreement reconstruction needs to include a thorough examination of the Good Friday Agreement and its suitability, or lack thereof, to serve as a framework for sustainable peace’ (2002: 89). In a post-conflict society, the creation of political institutions which are legitimate and acceptable to all is paramount. New political institutions must create structures and processes which respond appropriately to the conflict and simultaneously facilitate effective governance. For new political institutions to be deemed successful, they must create coherent and stable policy arenas, which also accommodate the needs and interests of both communities. In the case of EU policy issues, there is some evidence to suggest that the Belfast Agreement has produced political and administrative structures which minimise political conflict, enjoy legitimacy and have produced outputs of benefit to all.

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In addition to containing provisions on policing, prisoners, decommissioning and victims (amongst other themes), the 1998 Belfast Agreement outlines the basis for the exercise of devolved power in Northern Ireland by creating a set of inter-connected political institutions. The 108-member Northern Ireland Assembly has executive and legislative responsibility for a wide range of policy areas with distinctive voting mechanisms designed to produce cross-community consensus. Members of the Northern Ireland Executive are chosen from among the ranks of the Assembly on the basis of the D’Hondt formula which allocates Executive seats proportionally and thus produces a power-sharing arrangement. The key distinction between the two political blocs in Northern Ireland – unionist and nationalist – is in terms of political aspirations. Unionists seek to maintain the constitutional link with the United Kingdom (UK) while nationalists wish to achieve a united Ireland. The Belfast Agreement recognises and protects these positions. The nature of the Northern Ireland devolved administration is such that it provides an institutional framework within which these very different political aspirations are deemed protected. Against this backdrop, it also creates a political system, which allows the parties to co-operate with each other in jointly governing Northern Ireland. Political difference in relation to the constitutional issue is also manifest in relation to a number of policy issues in Northern Ireland. The challenge for the Northern Ireland administration is to develop ‘common, cross-community agendas on non-constitutional or conflict-related issues’ (Tonge and Evans 2002: 66). Under the terms of devolution in Northern Ireland, European policy is a reserved matter for the UK government. Nevertheless, such is the pervasive nature of the EU that many devolved policy areas, including for example agriculture and the environment, have a strong EU dimension. The devolved Northern Ireland administration is therefore compelled to engage with the EU in order to protect and further specific sub-national interests. The EU provides some evidence of co-operation and commonality between the Northern Ireland political parties in pursuing this agenda. New political and administrative arrangements have facilitated a more considered engagement with the EU. The Northern Ireland Assembly has debated EU issues. On practical policy-related matters, consensus is apparent. In 2002 the then Commit-

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tee of the Centre conducted an inquiry on the approach of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the devolved government to European Union issues (Committee of the Centre 2002). The document included a series of observations and recommendations which were broadly accepted and supported by all of the main political parties (see Murphy 2007: 307). This was a significant document which considered all aspects of Northern Ireland-EU relations. All Assembly Committees contributed as did a large number and variety of local interest groups. The document forms the basis for a broad EU strategy for Northern Ireland as a whole and includes consideration of all EU policy areas. The Northern Ireland Executive is an unusual institution in that it is in effect ‘a coalition government without a coalition agreement’ (O’Leary 1998: 5). By necessity, there is no adherence to the principle of collective responsibility and Ministers enjoy substantial individual powers in the discharge of their duties. On occasion, the degree of autonomy afforded individual Ministers has proved problematic. This is particularly so when their party preferences are at odds with those of other parties at the Executive tables. In contrast to other policy areas, policy issues concerning the EU have tended to produce consensus rather than conflict amongst the Executive partners. This is all the more interesting when one considers the very different party political positions on the EU at Executive level. The SDLP is alone in being a whole-hearted supporter of European integration. Despite opposing views however, the approach to a range of EU related policy issues (structural funds, agriculture, environment, etc) has been driven by practical considerations (see below). Northern Ireland’s day-to-day engagement with the EU was subject to change in the aftermath of the devolution of power. A new government department, the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM), was created and within it, the European Policy and Co-ordination Unit (EPCU). This unit ‘helps Northern Ireland to fulfil its EU responsibilities and develop a positive approach to participation in the European Union’ (see www.ofmdfmni. gov.uk/index/cooperation/about-the-european-policy-and-co-ordination-cooperation.htm). Symbolically at least, the EPCU places EU issues at the very heart of the Northern Ireland administration. The perceived significance of the EU to Northern Ireland was further underlined by the decision to open a regional representation in Brussels. The Office of the Northern Ireland Executive in Brussels (ONIEB) ‘represents an impor-

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tant strategic development’ (Murphy 2007: 305). Northern Ireland did enjoy a form of regional representation in Brussels prior to the creation of the ONIEB. The Northern Ireland Centre in Europe (NICE) brought together a range of Northern Ireland interests from the public, private and voluntary sectors and provided them with targeted support and advice in pursuing EU specific interests. Unlike the ONIEB however, the centre was not answerable to a locally elected assembly nor was it plugged into the machinery of UKREP. It was also less inclusive than the ONIEB. Its Board of Directors contained representation from all key Northern Ireland political parties bar Sinn Féin. Despite some initial DUP financial reservations about the creation of an official regional representation in Brussels, the facilities and resources of the ONIEB are now exploited by a wide range of actors. The North/South Ministerial Council (NSMC) is one of the innovative institutional features of the Belfast Agreement. The NSMC brings together ministers from the Northern Ireland Executive and the Irish government. The institution enjoys executive authority in defined areas and indeed many of the sectoral formats in which the NSMC meets have a significant EU dimension. Joint North-South actions have been achieved in the areas of agricultural policy and environmental policy and consensus has formed the basis for agreement within the institution (see Coakley 2005). The Special EU Programmes Body is directly accountable to the NSMC and has responsibility for administering EU funding programmes. Despite difficulties during its early operation, it is regarded as marking ‘a substantial movement towards greater institutionalised forms of cross-border activity within a specifically EU context’ (Murphy 2007: 304). In considering, deliberating and deciding on EU-related issues, the Northern Ireland administration has pursued matters primarily on the basis of pragmatism. The interests of Northern Ireland as a whole have formed the basis for agreement. Differing political perspectives on European integration have not proved to be divisive in the pursuit of EU policy positions. This has not compromised the positions of individual political parties. Instead the relative absence of conflict in relation to EU issues reflects the impact of an external Europeanising influence on the positions of political actors. The new devolved arrangements have occasioned a closer relationship with the EU. The combination of new devolved political structures and the ongoing experience of EU politics at

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the sub-national level has provided a context within which aspects of political activity in Northern Ireland have become somewhat less divisive. With respect to EU politics, the Belfast Agreement has produced a basis for the pursuit of policy which enjoys legitimacy and yet does not threaten either community. Economic recovery There are a number of ways in which the EU contributes to economic growth in Northern Ireland. The original motivation and rationale for UK (and Irish) membership of the EU in 1973 was to gain access to the Single European Market (SEM) and to reap the anticipated economic benefits. According to Gudgin, much of this impact occurred in the early years of UK membership when tariffs were initially reduced or removed and resulted, in part at least, in a significant increase in Northern Ireland exports (2000: 67-8) (Gudgin also suggests however, that such gains may have been achieved anyway in the context of GATT liberalisation). Nevertheless, Gudgin claims that ‘the liberalisation of trade with the EU has had a positive impact on levels of both output and exports in Northern Ireland’ (2000: 68). Further positive effects have been identified by Birnie and Hitchens who suggest that ‘at least some of the foreign direct investment in Northern Ireland has been attracted to the province by virtue of the UK’s membership of the EU and hence the single market’ (1999: 100). These positives, however, must be balanced by the recognition that EU membership also entails costs in the form of the financial impact of regulation. Birnie and Hitchens identify two forms of EU regulation which affect Northern Ireland – firstly, labour, health and safety issues and secondly, the environment (1999: 101). As part of the SEM programme, harmonisation of domestic policy has been pursued with the purpose of creating a level playing field for all member-states and regions. This has required the development of common EU-wide policies and approaches to social legislation and environmental regulation. Northern Ireland lies somewhere in the middle of the regulation spectrum with the evolution of harmonised and regulated EU policy sectors placing a financial burden on the region in its attempts to comply with EU legislative requirements. Nevertheless, ‘the impact of access to the Single European Market has the potential to effect the Northern Ireland economy in a more profound manner than the relatively small flow of

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financial transfers arising from Brussels’ (Birnie and Hitches 1999: 95). Paradoxically however, it is these latter funds which have traditionally provided the most visible manifestation of Northern Ireland’s engagement with the EU. Even before the extensive reform of the structural funds in 1988, Northern Ireland was treated as a priority region for EU structural fund assistance. The 1988 reforms led Northern Ireland to be classified as an ‘Objective 1’ region – a title it retained until 1999. Objective 1 status applies to EU regions whose GDP/capita is less than 75 per cent of the EU average. Although Northern Ireland’s GDP/capita was above this ceiling throughout the period, the region nevertheless secured priority status on the basis of the so-called ‘special circumstances’ pertaining to the region. This was a reference to the impact of the conflict on the socio-economic position of the region. After 1999, Northern Ireland lost its Objective 1 status but continued to receive high levels of EU funding until 2006 under the status of ‘transitional Objective 1’ (a new classification allowing former Objective 1 regions access to the structural funds but on a declining basis). Since 2007, the region receives the more limited financial support made available to an Objective 2 region. Structural funding has typically been committed to supporting actions related to economic growth and competitiveness (particularly the development of infrastructure); employment; urban and social revitalisation; agriculture and rural development; and the environment. Since 1995 the structural funds have been complemented by a series of PEACE programmes. These are distinct from other structural fund programmes in Northern Ireland in that they were created ‘to reinforce progress towards a peaceful and stable society and to promote reconciliation’ (see European Commission 1995). Ostensibly focused on supporting bottom-up, inclusive actions aimed at addressing specific problems, of an economic and social nature, which are linked to the legacy of the conflict, the PEACE programmes will have committed over €2 billion to Northern Ireland in the period 1995-2013. The extent to which the programmes have contributed to economic development in Northern Ireland is unclear. The real value of the PEACE programmes, however, has been the extent to which they have fostered reconciliation, promoted community development and empowerment, and thus contributed to the peace-building process. According to Byrne and Irvin:

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economic aid on its own is not a panacea to resolve ethnic conflict in Northern Ireland, but it can be part of an overall peace-building process that tackles structural inequalities that contribute to the protracted nature of ethnopolitical conflicts like Northern Ireland (2001: 425).

Although the contribution of the EU to economic development has been apparent, it is the social, political and cultural impact of structural fund contributions which have arguably been more significant. As one commentator has noted ‘the range of funding programmes and policy frameworks provided by the European Union has undoubtedly had a beneficial impact, however modest, on the quality of life in Northern Ireland’ (Oliver 1999: 126). The economic implications of the EU for Northern Ireland are multi-faceted and somewhat difficult to define conclusively. EU financial assistance, in all its forms, is estimated to account for approximately 5 per cent of regional GDP (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 8 April 2002). Although the size of EU contributions to Northern Ireland pales in comparison with the British Exchequer’s annual commitment to the region, the broad significance of EU funding has long been recognised and welcomed. Development of civil society Conflict societies tend to be either devoid of civil society or they possess a strongly polarised one. Northern Ireland provides an example of the latter. Little suggests that ‘divisions are just as evident in the spheres of civil society as in the formal political machinery’ (2004: 122). Nevertheless, the voluntary and community sector played an important role in Northern Ireland during the period of direct rule (from 1972-1999). According to McCall and Williamson, ‘the voluntary and community sector participated in the governance of the region to a degree that is unusual, if not unknown, elsewhere’ (2001: 364). Direct rule in Northern Ireland was characterised by a number of negative features. These included limited scrutiny of Northern Ireland legislation in Westminster, allegations of ‘helicopter rule’ whereby UK politicians headed up the local administration, and, in the absence of locally elected politicians, a heavy reliance on the civil service. Allowing the voluntary and community sector a role in local governance, therefore, was an attempt to alleviate the existence of these features of a democratic deficit (see Morison 2006). In post-Agreement Northern Ireland, Wolff argues that the divided nature of civil society must be eliminated and that the role of civil

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society generally must be restored to one which complements rather than replaces conventional political and governmental activities. To what extent does the EU facilitate the emergence of a new form of civil society in post-Agreement Northern Ireland? The Belfast Agreement is constructed around consociational principles. These features of the Agreement ‘aimed to manage, even nurture, difference in the hope that the Northern Ireland polity would be recognised as one in which the rights and aspirations of a national minority could be comfortably accommodated’ (Tonge 2005: 36). These aspects of the Belfast Agreement limit the extent to which the document supports engagement with civil society. It is within this context that Aughey makes reference to the creation of the Civic Forum: ‘Incorporated within the strong top-down consociationalism of the Agreement, then, was this concession to the bottom-up civil society approach’ (2005: 93). The 60 member consultative Forum was composed of representatives of business, trade unions, farmers and the voluntary sectors. Its creation was the subject of some dispute. The most vocal opposition to what was regarded as a ‘monster quango’ came from the DUP (see Bell 2004). However, even amongst those political parties which did support the creation of the Forum, their backing lacked intensity and conviction. As an institutional innovation, however, the Forum possessed the potential to foster a participatory aspect to the emerging Northern Ireland democracy which would see the development of more inclusive forms of civil society (see McCall and Williamson 2001). In reality, the Civic Forum never reached this potential. Guelke has referred to the ‘low profile’ of the institution (2003: 68) while Taylor claims it ‘lacked influence’ (2006: 222). The explanations for its poor performance lie in its composition being heavily influenced by the First Minister and Deputy First Minister and thus not controlled directly by the institution itself. It has also experienced difficulties in positioning itself between the Assembly and society in general. Additionally, politicians and civil servants have displayed animosity and hostility towards the institution further hampering its capacity to influence (see Taylor 2006). Currently under review, the future of the Civic Forum is unclear although it appears unlikely that it will be reconvened. The consociational nature of the Belfast Agreement has effectively limited any strong institutional engagement with civil society in that it affords a

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dominant role to political elites at the expense of civil society (Guelke 2003: 69). In contrast, the EU has helped to foster civil society in Northern Ireland, primarily via the PEACE programmes. According to Little, Northern Ireland has long been characterised by a ‘thriving civil society sector but one that is scarred by tensions and divisions along the traditional communal lines’ (2004: 116). Removing these divisions is the optimal basis for the long-term consolidation and stabilisation of Northern Ireland civil society in the post-Agreement reconstruction period. The EU, it can be argued, has made a contribution to this objective. Successive PEACE programmes have created new approaches to programme delivery which have directly impacted on civil society. According to Williamson et al., ‘[A]t an early stage in the negotiations about the shape of the Peace Programme, the Commission agreed to prioritise innovative means to deliver it’ (2000: 53). The result was the three-way division of implementation responsibility between central government, 26 District Partnerships and eight Intermediary Funding Bodies (IFBs) (see McCall and Williamson 2000). This was a marked break from traditional practice when government would have had sole responsibility for the delivery of funding. The creation of 26 District Partnerships to administer financial aid in their localities was a novel and innovative development. Corresponding geographically to then District Council areas, the District Partnerships were composed of members drawn equally from local government, the community and voluntary sector and other interests such as business, trade unions and local statutory agencies. Each Partnership was allocated a financial package which they distributed within their local areas. Funding was granted to projects on the basis that they fulfilled and furthered the aims and objectives of the PEACE programmes. The unique significance of the District Partnerships was the way in which they sought to foster and encourage cross-community co-operation. Members of Partnerships were drawn from all sectors of society and frequently contained individuals ‘whose political sympathies and affiliations are diametrically opposed, [and] who otherwise would never have considered working with each other’ (Williamson et al. 2000: 54). The eight IFBs which, like District Partnerships, had responsibility for disbursing funding, were drawn from the voluntary and community sector (and included a cross-border element). They encouraged a range

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of projects and programmes including business development, crossborder co-operation and social inclusion. According to McCall and Williamson, ‘it should be noted that the IFBs have been singularly successful in engaging grassroots voluntary and community organisations in the developmental process set in train by the peace and reconciliation initiative’ (2000: 403). Effectively, their proximity to the local level encouraged and facilitated active community engagement. Although the overall extent to which the PEACE programmes have assisted in the process of reconciliation; in empowering communities; and in overcoming community divisions remains unclear, there is substance to the view that they have promoted and encouraged the mobilisation of civil society. The process of stabilising and de-politicising civil society, however, remains incomplete. Comparatively fewer applications for EU funding emanate from Protestant community groups and it is also difficult to determine the extent to which the EU’s influence has meaningfully promoted the emergence of a less divided civil society. The Europeanisation of domestic politics in Northern Ireland The impact of a process of Europeanisation on institutions, policies, the economy and civil society has been most apparent in the period since 1999 when power was devolved to the new Northern Ireland administration (see Murphy 2007). The Belfast Agreement has produced an institutional framework which has been conducive to the pursuit of a consensual approach in relation to matters European. Furthermore, engagement by politicians with the EU has seen the creation of agreed domestic administrative structures and policy processes. In this way, the Europeanisation process, as experienced in Northern Ireland, has produced the type of consensual cross-community politics envisioned by the Belfast Agreement. In the context of EU politics, the community divide and sectarian politics have been somewhat neutralised. To return to Wolff’s analysis, the EU has succeeded in fostering the creation of a set of legitimate political, economic and social structures which broadly fit the requirements of a post-Agreement reconstruction period. Identifying the ways in which Northern Ireland’s engagement with the EU has developed provides a somewhat incomplete picture of postAgreement Northern Ireland, however. This chapter started from the premise that matters European have been less conflictual than other policy areas, and also that agreed cross-community and thus legitimate

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outputs have been achieved. Other domestic policy areas have not been subject to the forces of Europeanisation and have been less successful in creating political, economic and social structures capable of producing legitimate consensus-based outputs. Understanding that distinctions can be made between different types of policy allows conclusions to be reached as to the impact of Europeanisation on Northern Ireland. Undoubtedly, there have been glimpses of ‘normal’ politics in Northern Ireland since power was first devolved in 1999, and more especially since the resumption of devolution in May 2007. During the different periods of its operation, the new Northern Ireland political system has successfully passed a budget; agreed a Programme for Government; and debated a wide range of policy issues with direct relevance to the Northern Ireland electorate. It has also survived a property scandal involving Ian Paisley, Jr. which in February 2008 forced him to resign his post as a Junior Minister in the Northern Ireland Executive. Policy and political progress to date, however, must be balanced by a recognition that the wider operation of the political system across other policy areas has experienced problems and difficulties. Most controversy has centred around the two major policy areas of health and education, which both provide ample evidence of conflict between the main political parties and the two communities in Northern Ireland. In both of these instances, the approach to political difference has not been mediated or softened by an external dimension. Recourse to sectarian politics has been apparent, and displays a potential to undermine the legitimacy of the new political system. Education has arguably proved to be the most divisive policy issue tackled by the devolved administration and one which has resulted in ‘a worrying division of attitudes (...) along party political and sectarian lines’ (McKeown, Donnelly and Osborne 2006: 183). The Northern Ireland administration has considered a range of education related issues but the most controversial have been the Burns Review of Post-Primary Education and the Northern Ireland Student Finance Review. The Burns Report (2002) recommended the end of academic selection at the age of eleven years; the establishment of a new system of formative assessment; and the creation of a collaborative network of secondary schools. However, ‘[p]olitically, a clear division emerged between the main unionist and nationalist political parties, who oppose significant change or support it, respectively’ (Gallagher 2006: 144). The

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debate continues with clear political divisions apparent. The eventual outcome of deliberations and consultation may reveal serious challenges to the authority and legitimacy of the devolved system. Similar tensions emerged in the context of the Northern Ireland Student Finance Review. In 2000, the Committee on Further and Higher Education, Training and Employment within the Northern Ireland Assembly undertook an investigation into proposals to remove student fees. Here again, however, party political differences emerged: ‘... while most unionists agreed that there was a case for a contribution from students or graduates, most nationalists did not’ (McKeown and Osborne 2006: 129). Structured engagement with civic society on educational issues has also been poor: Although committee members had been anxious to encourage public participation in the policy process, and some had felt that developing a productive relationship with the Civic Forum would have facilitated this, political tensions around the legitimacy of the non-elected institution precluded any valuable communications (McKeown and Osborne 2006: 135).

Education policy is not alone in being affected by the failings of the Civic Forum. The impact of its possible abolition cuts across a range of other domestic policy areas also. The development of health services in Northern Ireland has similarly met with difficulties. The then Health Minister, Sinn Féin MLA Bairbre de Brún, ignored the majority view of the Assembly Health Committee on the location of maternity services in Belfast in 2000. The Committee had split – 7 in favour and 4 against on sectarian and/or constituency lines. A full meeting of the Assembly later rejected the Minister’s decision with members also largely voting along sectarian lines (see Wilford and Wilson 2001). Conflict has also been evident in relation to Irish language issues. The Culture, Arts and Leisure Ministerial portfolio is currently held by the DUP. Attempts to expand the use of the Irish language in Northern Ireland society have proved problematic. Unionist opposition to such moves tends to be grounded in ‘the belief that the Irish language is an integral part of the ideology of Irish Republicanism and Nationalist separatism’ (MacGiolla Chríost 2000: 46). During an Assembly debate in 2007, the Minister announced that he was ‘unpersuaded that there is a compelling case for introducing Irish language legislation at this time’ (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 16 October 2007). Differing atti-

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tudes towards the Irish language was one of the issues at the centre of the stand-off between Sinn Féin and the DUP which prevented Executive meetings for a period of five months in 2008. Environmental policy – a policy area with a strong EU focus – has experienced difficulties too. In contrast to the above examples, however, it is important to note that such difficulties are not rooted in disagreements about the substance of policy, rather they expose the weaknesses of the Belfast Agreement’s power-sharing basis for government. During early periods of devolved power, the Northern Ireland administration was focused on eliminating infraction proceedings against the region for noncompliance with EU environmental legislation. Under the terms of devolution, the region now assumed responsibility for transposing European legislation into domestic law. Failure to do so, within a set time-frame, exposed Northern Ireland to the possibility of heavy fines (this arrangement differed from direct rule practice whereby the UK central government was liable). Proposals by the then UUP Minister for the Environment to fast-track legislation through the Assembly (in an attempt to stave off the threat of financial penalties) was perceived as eroding the scrutiny function of the Assembly’s Environment Committee. This disagreement exposed tensions between the Minister, Committee and civil servants. In other words, the institutional structures and policy procedures contained within the Belfast Agreement were fuelling mistrust of civil servants (long-held by some politicians) and prompting concerns about the autonomy of the Executive level. Difficulties of this nature have since been addressed. Turner refers to the emergence of a more proactive and effective approach to environmental policy on the part of the Department of the Environment (NI) with support from local politicians. This modernisation exercise (as she labels it) ‘was largely focused by an external and negative pressure from the EU, in combination with the restoration of devolution’ (2006: 84). Agricultural policy (like environmental policy) in Northern Ireland is conducted in a Europeanised context (see Committee of the Centre, 2002). Differences between the political parties tend to be minimal with respect to the pursuit of Northern Ireland interests. Admittedly this reflects the cross-community reach of agricultural and rural issues and the potentially negative consequences of CAP reform for the future of agriculture in Northern Ireland. Regardless of this however, cross-party agreement in relation to defending Northern Ireland agricultural interests

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at both a national and EU level is evident. The first SDLP Northern Ireland Agricultural Minister enjoyed support (and sometimes praise) from the predominantly Protestant farmers’ organisation, the Ulster Farmers’ Union (UFU). Dispute and disagreement is part and parcel of ‘normal’ politics. In Northern Ireland’s case however, the pursuit of ‘normal’ politics is being conducted in the context of unconventional political arrangements. The key requirement in agreeing policy and proposals, under the terms of the Belfast Agreement, is that they must be supported by the widest possible degree of cross-community consensus. It is only in this context that decisions in this post-conflict society can be regarded as truly legitimate. In the case of the environmental and agricultural policy examples above, the demands of the EU have prompted an engagement with policy which is grounded in pragmatism and has reasonably successfully managed to neutralise political difference. In contrast, other policy areas including health, education and the Irish language, have revealed some serious tensions between politicians and communities. The differing views espoused by parties on these matters are not solely based on ideological policy difference. They also reflect the long-term constitutional division between nationalists and unionists. A number of these everyday policy areas have thus become the victims of constitutional politics, as given policy outcomes are assumed to favour one community over the other. In the absence of an external Europeanising influence, the pursuit of policy remains grounded in what are often old and narrow disagreements. There is no ‘neutral’ context within which to frame and agree new policy agendas and this has produced problems which have implications for the stability of the political system and the legitimacy of policy outputs. Admittedly the substance of educational reforms, health service decisions and support for the Irish language are more emotive in character than many of the issues covered by environmental policy and agricultural policy. This may well be true but it should not disguise the fact that the Northern Ireland political parties and the two communities in Northern Ireland have traditionally had very different views about the European Union. Writing in 1995, Smith and Corrigan noted that ‘attitudes to Europe in Northern Ireland strongly correlate to political identities which are defined partly around a contest about sovereignty’ (1995: 97).

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The intensity of these views has waned in recent years with McGowan and O’Connor more recently concluding that: Differences by political identification are evident particularly at the extreme end of the spectrum, that is ‘leave EU’ and ‘work for single EU government’ with those identifying as unionist being more likely to be negative but a strong majority of all political groupings are in favour of the status quo or increased powers for the EU (2004: 38).

Changing attitudes to the EU have arguably tempered party political rhetoric and allowed a more nuanced engagement with EU affairs. The result has been the emergence of an engagement with EU politics and policy in Northern Ireland which does not expose the type and intensity of difference associated with other domestic policy areas. This is despite the fact that the four parties to the Northern Ireland Executive maintain differing views on the European Union. Only one political party – the SDLP – is pro-European. The remaining three are, to differing degrees, anti-EU. This majority anti-EU position (which is not manifestly evident) appears to facilitate an engagement with the EU which is practical in nature. This overcomes the so-called political/constitutional divide between the parties and allows the local administration to engage with EU politics and policies in ways which benefit Northern Ireland as a whole. The treatment of EU policy in Northern Ireland since devolution has thus been pursued in the context of 1) the creation of functioning political and administrative institutions; 2) contributing to economic recovery; and 3) nurturing civil society (primarily via the Peace programme). Northern Ireland’s pursuit of an EU agenda therefore stands as an early example of the ‘normalisation’ of domestic politics in the post-conflict period, if we judge that against the aims of a post-Agreement reconstruction period i.e. the establishment of non-violent, just and democratic political, economic and social structures (Wolff 2002: 88). Conclusion It is estimated that approximately 60% of all Northern Ireland legislation emanates from the EU (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 8 April 2002). It is therefore instructive (and perhaps even reassuring) to note that in a range of EU-related policy areas, the Northern Ireland political parties are capable of consensus decision-making. The Belfast Agreement, being constructed along consociational principles, requires consensus for the effective operation of the political system as a whole. The

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ability of parties with differing ideological and constitutional outlooks to agree on EU-related policy issues is therefore significant. In contrast to other domestic policy areas such as health, education and the Irish language, the development of an engagement with the EU by Northern Ireland since 1999 demonstrates the important impact Europe has had on producing a stable example of regional governance. It is clear that a Europeanisation process has taken place in Northern Ireland. To return to Radaelli’s definition of Europeanisation: Northern Ireland has witnessed the construction, diffusion and institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles and ‘ways of doing things’ and has similarly developed shared beliefs and norms which have been incorporated into the logic of domestic discourse, political structures and public policies (see 2006: 59). The intensification of this process has coincided with the introduction of devolution. In other words, key features of the Belfast Agreement have facilitated an engagement with the EU which has produced tangible benefits. What is even more significant than the mere existence of this Europeanisation process is that it has had a positive impact on the evolving nature of governance in Northern Ireland. The introduction of devolution posed significant challenges for the fledgling Northern Ireland polity. In some policy areas, the process of governance since 1999 has proved difficult and fractious. In contrast, EU-related policy issues have been less divisive. New domestic administrative arrangements have been shaped, a regional representation in Brussels has been opened, agreed policy processes have been pursued, common links, particularly through the NSMC, have been identified, and the financial context to the EU has produced economic growth possibilities and an innovative engagement with civil society. In this way, the three key features of Wolff’s model of post-Agreement reconstruction have been at least partially met – functioning and consensus-driven political institutions and mechanisms have been created, economic recovery has been somewhat aided by EU financial assistance and the emergence of a stable and functioning civil society has been promoted by EU spending programmes. The process of Europeanisation in Northern Ireland has therefore assisted in producing conditions which contribute to sustainable long-term peace. Europe has provided an important context within which post-1999 Northern Ireland has had the capacity to engage creatively with the

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world beyond its borders. Most significant however has been the fact that in so doing, it has also produced consensus-driven governance at home. The forces of Europeanisation combined with the devolution of powers have thus produced twin outcomes. In the first instance, Northern Ireland’s renewed engagement with the EU since 1999 has been largely positive and secondly, this engagement has facilitated the emergence of a form of domestic politics built on consensus and pragmatism. Northern Ireland’s experience of the EU, however, is also important in a wider context because it confirms existing views on the impact of a Europeanisation process. Since the devolution of powers, Northern Ireland’s engagement with the EU has been pursued within the confines of new domestic institutional arrangements. These new structures and the continued status of the region as a component part of the UK have mediated the impact of the EU. Devolution has provided new and interesting possibilities for responding and adapting to the demands of the EU, but simultaneously has produced a unique region-specific model of engagement. The region’s form of regional representation is different from that of Scotland and Wales, while its links with the Republic of Ireland through the NSMC are particularly distinctive. In other words, the impact of Europeanisation in Northern Ireland has been mediated by the features of domestic politics. Northern Ireland is not entirely mirroring the experience of other devolved and Europeanised regions and as such, ‘the homogenisation or harmonisation of domestic practices across Europe is not a realistic expectation’ (Bache and Marshall 2004: 2). Although Europeanisation has provided opportunities for Northern Ireland to embrace conventional political practice, it has done so in ways which do not detract from the distinctiveness of the region. The forces of Europeanisation have had important implications for the devolved Northern Ireland unit. The fostering of conventional political activity in Northern Ireland, which is built around consensus and/or the formation of genuine political coalitions, has been nurtured by a close and pragmatic engagement with Europe. This not only potentially assists in overcoming historic tensions between communities but simultaneously includes the prospects of producing improved and legitimate policy outputs. The EU – long recognised as an example of conflict resolution – may be providing some context within which disparate parties in Northern Ireland can work together. Europeanisation, though subtle and discrete, may be nudging political actors along an important

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learning curve with potentially significant implications for Northern Ireland politics as a whole.

References Aughey, Arthur 2005. The Politics of Northern Ireland: Beyond the Belfast Agreement. London: Routledge. Bache, Ian and Adam Marshall 2004. ‘Europeanization and Domestic Change: A Governance Approach to Institutional Adaptation in Britain’. Queen’s Papers on Europeanization, 5/2004. Belfast: Queen’s University Belfast. Bell, Vikki 2004. ‘Spectres of peace: Civic Participation in Northern Ireland’. Social and Legal Studies 13(3): 403-28. Birnie, Esmond and David Hitchens 1999. Northern Ireland Economy: Performance, Prospects, Policy. Aldershot: Ashgate. Byrne, Sean and Cynthia Irvin 2001. ‘Economic Aid and Policy-Making: Building the Peace Dividend in Northern Ireland’. Policy and Politics 29 (4): 41329. Coakley, John 2005. The North-South Relationship: Implementing the Agreement. In John Coakley, Brigid Laffan and Jennifer Todd, eds Renovation or Revolution? New Territorial Politics in Ireland and the United Kingdom. Dublin: University College Dublin Press. Committee of the Centre, Northern Ireland Assembly 2002. Inquiry Into the Approach of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Devolved Government on European Union Issues, Report 02/01R. Belfast: The Stationery Office. European Commission 1995. Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of Ireland. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Union. Gallagher, Tony 2006. The Impact of Devolution on Education Policy: Two Case Studies. In Donnelly, Caitlin, McKeown, Penny and Bob Osborne, eds. Devolution and Pluralism in Education in Northern Ireland. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 139-48. Gudgin, Graham 2000. EU Membership and the Northern Ireland Economy. In Kennedy, Dennis, ed. Living with the European Union: The Northern Ireland Experience. London: Macmillan, 38-70. Guelke, Adrian 2003. Civil Society and the Northern Irish Peace Process. Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organisations 14(1): 61-78. Harmsen, Robert and Thomas M. Wilson 2000. Introduction: Approaches to Europeanization. In Harmsen, Robert and Thomas M. Wilson, eds. Europeanization: Institution, Identities and Citizenship. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 13-26. Ladrech, Robert 1994. Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France. Journal of Common Market Studies 32(1): 69-88.

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Little, Adrian 2004. Democracy and Northern Ireland: Beyond the Liberal Paradigm? Basingstoke: Palgrave. McCall, Cathal and Arthur Williamson 2000. Fledgling Social Partnership in the Irish Border Region: European Union ‘Community Initiatives’ and the Voluntary Sector. Policy & Politics 28(3): 397-410. McCall, Cathal and Arthur Williamson 2001. Governance and Democracy in Northern Ireland: The Role of the Voluntary and Community Sector After the Agreement. Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 14(3): 363-383. MacGiolla Chríost, Diarmait. 2000. The Irish Language and Current Policy in Northern Ireland. Irish Studies Review 8(1): 45-55. McGowan, Lee and Julia S. O’Connor 2004. Exploring Eurovisions: Awareness and Knowledge of the European Union in Northern Ireland. Irish Political Studies 19(2): 21-42. McKeown, Penny, and Bob Osborne 2006. Making Education Policy Under Devolution: The Role of Northern Ireland Assembly Committees. In Caitlin Donnelly, Penny McKeown, and Bob Osborne, eds. Devolution and Pluralism in Education in Northern Ireland. Manchester. Manchester University Press, 127-38. McKeown, Penny; Caitlin Donnelly and Bob Osborne 2006. Conclusions. In Caitlin Donnelly, Penny McKeown, and Bob Osborne, eds. Devolution and Pluralism in Education in Northern Ireland, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 183-7. Morison, John 2006. Constitutionalism, Civil Society and Democratic Renewal in Northern Ireland. In Michael Cox, Adrian Guelke and Fiona Stephen, eds. A Farewell to Arms? Beyond the Good Friday Agreement (2nd edition). Manchester: Manchester University Press, 238-252. Murphy, Mary C. 2007. Europeanization and the Sub-National Level: Changing Patterns of Governance in Northern Ireland. Regional and Federal Studies 17(3): 293-315. O’Leary, Brendan 1998. The Nature of the Agreement. The 9th John Whyte Memorial Lecture, 26 November, Queen’s University Belfast. Oliver, Quentin 1999. For Richer or Poorer: The Social Impact. In Living with the European Union: The Northern Ireland Experience. Kennedy, Dennis, ed. London: MacMillan, 115-27. Olsen, Johan P. 2002. The Many Faces of Europeanization. Journal of Common Market Studies 40(5): 921-952. Radaelli, Claudio M. 2006. Europeanization: Solution or Problem? In Cini, Michelle and Bourne, Angela, eds. Palgrave Advances in European Union Studies. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 56-76. Smith, Michael L. and James Corrigan 1995. Relations with Europe. In Richard Breen, Paula Devine, and Gillian Robinson, eds. Social Attitudes in Northern Ireland: The Fourth Report 1994-5. Belfast: Appletree Press, 84-105.

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Taylor, Rupert 2006. The Belfast Agreement and the Politics of Consociationalism: A critique. The Political Quarterly 77(2): 217-26. Tonge, Jonathan 2005.The new Northern Irish politics? Basingstoke: Palgrave. Tonge, Jonathan and Jocelyn Evans 2002. Party Members and the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland. Irish Political Studies 17(2): 59-73. Turner, Sharon 2006. Transforming Environmental Governance in Northern Ireland. Part One: The Process of Policy Renewal. Journal of Environmental Law 18(1): 55-87. Wilford, Rick and Robin Wilson 2001. A Democratic Design? The Political Style of the Northern Ireland Assembly. Democratic Dialogue Report, May (accessed at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/dd/papers/audit.htm, 12 January 2009). Williamson, Arthur, Duncan Scott, and Peter Halfpenny 2000. Rebuilding Civil society in Northern Ireland: The Community and Voluntary Sector’s Contribution to the European Union’s Peace and Reconciliation District Partnership Programme. Policy and Politics 28(1): 49-66. Wolff, Stefan 2002. The Peace Process in Northern Ireland: Success or Failure of Post-Agreement Reconstruction? Civil Wars 5(1): 87-116.

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DELIBERATIVE FORA AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: WHAT CAN EUROPE LEARN FROM THE IRISH EXPERIENCE? Anne Barrington and John Garry Abstract The ‘democratic deficit’ from which the EU is believed to suffer may be addressed via the reform of political institutions at national level – namely, the introduction of deliberative fora, made up of the political elite and representatives of civil society, whose remit is the considered discussion of issues relating to EU integration. Such a forum – the National Forum on Europe – was established in Ireland in the wake of the rejection of the Nice Treaty in 2001. This paper examines the extent to which the Forum engaged with ordinary citizens and was not merely ‘a talking shop’ for the political elite. Based on interviews with representatives of the participating civil society groups and examination of the print media coverage of the Forum we conclude that the Forum was moderately successful in engaging with the wider Irish population. Hence, the Forum may act as a model which Ireland’s European neighbours may wish to adopt or adapt in order to foster popular participation in deliberation on matters relating to the EU and the integration process. Many commentators and citizens believe that the European Union (EU) suffers from a ‘democratic deficit’. One possible way, we suggest, of reducing this deficit is to take action at the national (rather than European) level and augment existing national political institutions with a deliberative arena. Such an arena would be specifically devoted to raising interest in, and awareness and knowledge of, EU matters via reasoned and evidence-based debate on the process of European integration. If

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successful, this deliberative arena could result in a more informed citizenry who might be better placed to engage in high quality democratic debate on the issue of the EU and matters relating to the integration process. This may be particularly useful in states that rely on direct democracy for the approval of EU Treaties. If successful, a forum’s deliberations could render citizens more equipped to properly engage in discussion on the actual content of the Treaty rather than simply voting on ‘trivial’ non-European Union related matters or merely using the referendum as a mechanism for passing judgement on the performance of the incumbent government. The Irish government, in the wake of Irish citizens’ rejection of the Nice Treaty in 2001, established such a deliberative arena: the National Forum on Europe. This paper investigates the extent to which the Forum has been successful. There are many ways of evaluating the success or otherwise of a deliberative forum such as the Irish Forum on Europe but this paper focuses on what we believe to be the most important question: Was the Forum simply a ‘talking shop’ for the political elite or did its deliberations permeate society more generally? In other words, was the Forum just another institution for the political establishment or did the Forum genuinely connect with ordinary citizens? If the latter, then the Irish Forum on Europe may well be seen as a useful template to be adopted by other EU states who wish to reduce the democratic deficit by increasing popular deliberation on the EU integration process. In this sense, Ireland could act as a model that other EU states could choose to follow. The relationship between Ireland and Europe is typically seen as one in which the former is influenced by the latter (as suggested by several of the contributions to this volume). However, Ireland’s potential influence on the rest of Europe – the potential hibernicisation of Europe – has been much commented upon in recent years in so far as economic management and development is concerned. Since the mid 1990s the economic boom associated with the ‘Celtic Tiger’ has attracted admiring glances from many European quarters. The associated ‘social partnership’ style of decision making and low corporate taxation are seen by many as a ‘model’ of economic management to take seriously. The economic turbulence since late 2008, however, has led to the Irish economy suffering particularly badly and the idea of seeing the Irish case as a model of economic decision making has arguably been fatally under-

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mined. The possibility of Ireland having something to offer in terms of politics rather than economics remains alive however. The possible reform of national political institutions to enhance democratic engagement is something that many EU states are likely to seriously reflect upon over the coming years. The Irish Forum on Europe is a novel institutional device that may positively inform these reflections. We address our question – was the Forum more than just a ‘talking shop’? – in two ways. First, we draw on the results of an extensive series of interviews with leading members of the civil society groups that were an integral part of the Forum. We assess the extent to which these nonelite groups engaged with the Forum’s deliberations and the extent to which the leadership of these groups disseminated the Forum’s discussions to the wider group membership. Second, we draw on the results of an extensive analysis of the print media coverage of the Forum. Did the Forum’s deliberations actually get disseminated to the wider public via reportage in the mainstream press? We begin, however, in the first two sections of the paper by setting the political context of the establishment of the Forum (the Irish rejection of the Nice Treaty) and describing the institutional make-up of the Forum. Irish rejection of the Nice Treaty On 7 June 2001 the Irish electorate rejected the Treaty of Nice by a majority of 54 percent of eligible voters at a referendum marked by an exceptionally low turnout of only 35 per cent. This rejection was a blow to the entire Irish political establishment. The government, the vast majority of political representatives and virtually all the social partners had supported the Treaty and had advocated a ‘Yes’ vote. As well as dramatically affecting domestic Irish politics, the referendum result sent out shock waves in Europe and internationally. The result put in doubt the EU’s ability to enlarge from fifteen to twenty-five Member States on schedule on 1 May 2004 when Ireland, ironically, would be holding the Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the EU. Also, the result affected the strategic objective of the United States which was to embed the countries of the former Soviet Union in NATO and the EU ensuring ‘democracy, free markets, and common security’ (Bush 2001). Thwarting or delaying the strategic objective of the only global power was not where a small state wanted to be in the conduct of its foreign policy.

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Indeed, given the perceived negative implications of the Irish ‘No’ vote, the result raised questions as to whether the referendum was an appropriate democratic tool to determine public preferences (Fishkin et al. 2000: 657) in particular for decisions with profound external or foreign policy implications (Fitzgerald 2003: 53). Many in Europe found Ireland’s rejection of the Nice Treaty incomprehensible. How could a member state which claimed that ‘Irish people increasingly see the European Union not simply as an organization to which Ireland belongs, but as an integral part of our future’ (Department of Foreign Affairs 1996: 59) have rejected what was widely seen as a minor adjustment of the Treaties to provide for enlargement? How could the member state that had benefited most from EU membership in terms of financial transfers per head of population have jeopardized the hopes and aspirations of countries wishing to emulate Ireland’s success through membership (NFOE-CR1 2002: 10)? The rejection of the Nice Treaty cast doubts on Ireland’s commitment to what the Treaty of Rome in 1957 had termed the ‘ever closer union of the peoples of Europe’, put its standing and negotiating position in the EU at a very significant disadvantage and, according to then Commissioner Byrne, threatened inward investment (NFOE-RP18 2002: 28). The political establishment in Ireland was in a quandary. All political parties that had been in Government in the period from 1973, when Ireland joined the European Economic Community (EEC), supported the ratification of the Treaty of Nice and urged the electorate to vote Yes. Only the smaller parties in the Oireachtas (Parliament) – the Greens, Sinn Féin and the Socialist party – campaigned against ratification of the Nice Treaty (along with a number of very small parties not represented in the Oireachtas who ranged from extreme left to extreme right). The No side won in a campaign which was marked by a lacklustre effort and a significant lack of engagement by the Yes side (Gilland 2002; O’Mahoney 2001). The Government and the Yes side – a clear majority in the state up to then – seemed to have taken the electorate for granted. As a result, and as the then Taoiseach, Mr Bertie Ahern, later admitted: ‘confusion reigned and I think the responsibility for much of that lies with all of us charged with leadership, both politicians and social partners, who have a duty to make the issues as clear as possible so the people of Ireland can make the most informed choice’ (Ahern 2002).

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The electorate answered by turning out to vote in small numbers and, from the Government’s point of view, by giving the ‘wrong’ answer. The Treaty of Nice did not lend itself to a Danish-style solution. In 1992 when Denmark rejected the much more substantial Maastricht Treaty, or Treaty on European Union, by referendum, the Danish Government negotiated a number of opt-outs. The opt-outs covered distinct parts of the Treaty in the justice and home affairs area, monetary union and common foreign and security policy. Within the ‘pillar’ structure of the Maastricht Treaty these policy areas were stand-alone and discrete. The following year, the Danish electorate voted in favour of the Treaty. However, the Treaty of Nice was essentially a technical institutional adjustment to the Treaties to enable the EU to grow to twenty-five Member States. Opt-outs were not feasible. There was no obvious way forward which would address the issues raised during the referendum campaign and allow the Government with a significant degree of legitimacy to go back to the voters and ask them if, on reflection, they were sure they wanted to do what they had done. However, in little over a year a newly-elected Government, with the same Fianna Fáil/Progressive Democrat party make up, was, with very little opposition, in a position to call another referendum.1 By this time the Government had responded in a number of ways to the No to Nice vote. One response was to ‘neutralise’ the thorny issue of military neutrality by agreeing with Ireland’s European partners – at the Seville Summit in June 2002 – two Declarations on neutrality that were added to the Nice Treaty (see Garry et al. 2005 for details). Another response was to try to raise knowledge and awareness of EU matters via the establishment of the National Forum on Europe. The National Forum on Europe The National Forum on Europe was launched in October 2001 – four months after the No vote on the Nice Treaty – with a mandate to ‘facilitate a broad discussion of issues relevant to Ireland’s membership of the enlarging Union and to consider the range of topics arising in the context of the debate on the Future of Europe’ (NFOE-CR1 2002: 5). Two previous fora in Ireland (the New Ireland Forum and the Forum for 1 For a detailed description of the victory of the Yes side in the second referendum on the Nice Treaty see Garry et al (2005) and Hayward (2003).

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Peace and Reconciliation) informed the establishment of the Forum, its format and structures. The original idea for a Forum on Europe came from the Labour Party which floated the idea prior to the June referendum result (Brown 2004: 7). Membership The Forum was established with 33 political party/independent delegate members: ten for Fianna Fáil, five for Labour, three for the Progressive Democrats, two for the Green Party, one for Sinn Féin, one for the Socialists and four independent members of the Oireachtas. At the outset, the Fine Gael party did not take up the offer of membership due to its stated concern that the Forum would have a detrimental effect on democratic deliberation in the Oireachtas, where it felt the debates on EU issues should be held and because, in the words of the Foreign Affairs spokesperson, Jim O’Keeffe, it did not ‘agree that engaging in a non-binding open ended talking shop will achieve anything’ (O’Keeffe 2001). The party reviewed its policy following the June 2002 General Election and a change of leadership, and decided to enter the Forum that month and occupy the seven delegate seats reserved for it. From that point on, all political parties that were represented in the Oireachtas were also represented in the Forum. The strength of political party representation at Forum Plenary meetings was based on the outcome of the 1997 general election. This representation did not change following the General Election in June 2002 but was adjusted to take account of the outcome of the 2007 General Election. Representation was ‘digressively proportional’: the smaller the party the proportionally greater the number of seats it was allocated at the Forum. Thus, from 2001 to 2007 the Socialist Party with just one representative in the Oireachtas sent one representative to the Forum or had one hundred percent representation, while Fianna Fáil with 111 members in the Oireachtas had ten members in the Forum or less than ten percent of its parliamentary representation. As a result of the No vote in the Nice referendum the No side achieved a significantly greater voice in the Forum than their parliamentary representation would suggest. While full membership of the Forum has been made up mostly of either elected members of the Oireachtas (Parliament) or Local Authority Councillors, the political parties have also nominated alternates and substitutes who have participated in meetings, some of whom were

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people who worked on party policy on EU issues. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), including from Northern Ireland, have attendance and speaking rights at the Forum. However, the only Northern Ireland MEP to exercise these rights to date has been the Sinn Féin representative, Barbara de Brún. A significant feature of the Forum has been the practice by the political parties to nominate their party leader to head their Forum delegation. Thus, in the period 2001 to 2007 the Taoiseach Bertie Ahern, Enda Kenny, Pat Rabbitte, Michael McDowell, Trevor Sargent and Joe Higgins headed the Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, Labour, Progressive Democrat, Green and Socialist Party delegations respectively. On the other hand, Gerry Adams did not head the Sinn Féin delegation: that position has been held by a Dublin City Councillor, Daithí Doolan. The Taoiseach has addressed the Forum at least once a year and attended, but not spoken, when high profile speakers such as the United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan, and the President of the Commission, José Manuel Barroso, have addressed the Forum. In the second half of 2006 other party leaders were invited to address the Forum about their ‘vision for Europe’. By the end of May 2008, all party leaders had addressed the Forum on at least one occasion. The address given by the Fine Gael leader, Mr Enda Kenny, was followed by a question and answer session, including questions and comments by two Government Ministers, covering a two hour period – an unusual position for an opposition leader to find him or herself in whether in or outside a parliamentary setting. The Special Observer Pillar Perhaps the most innovative institutional response to the 2001 No vote was the creation of a Special Observer Pillar in the National Forum on Europe. Membership of the Pillar was confined to ‘organizations representative of civil society, including the Social Partners, groups (...) active in the Nice referendum campaign and/or European affairs in general, registered political parties not represented in the Oireachtas and parties from Northern Ireland’ (NFOE-CR1 2002: 5). There was provision for adding to the original thirty members and, by 2006, the Forum had increased its Special Observer Pillar membership from thirty to forty-two (see Table 1 for full list).

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Table 1. Special Observer Pillar Membership (March 2007) Agriculture and Fisheries Bodies Irish Co-operative Organisation Society Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Association Irish Farmers Association Irish Fish Producers Organisation Business Groups Chambers Ireland Construction Industry Federation Irish Business and Employers Confederation Campaigning Bodies European Movement - Ireland Ireland for Europe No to Nice Campaign Peace and Neutrality Alliance Churches and Religious Groups Catholic Bishops Conference Church of Ireland Conference of Religious in Ireland Islamic Cultural Centre of Ireland Jewish Representative Council Presbyterian Church Religious Society of Friends Community and Voluntary Sector Groups Community Workers Co-operative The Wheel Development Agencies AFRI-Action from Ireland Comhlámh Concern

European Research Bodies Institute of European Affairs The National Platform EU Research and Information Centre Political Parties Alliance Party of Northern Ireland Christian Democrats Communist Party of Ireland Sinn Fein Social Democratic and Labour Party (NI) The Worker’s Party of Ireland Regional /Local Bodies Association of Irish Regions Irish Delegation to the EU Committee of the Regions The Irish LEADER Network Social Inclusion Groups European Anti Poverty Network (Ireland) People with Disabilities in Ireland Trade Unions and Associations Association of Former Officials of the EU (Irish Section) Irish Congress of Trade Unions Women’s Groups Irish Countrywomen’s Association National Women's Council of Ireland Youth Groups Macra na Feirme National Youth Council of Ireland

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Only one organization has formally withdrawn from the Forum: the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition which dissolved in 2006. Many members of the Special Observer Pillar are active participants in all the meetings of the Forum. At the same time some members tend to be inactive in the periods when no referendum is expected. In terms of status, the Special Observer Pillar members were just as important as the more ‘political’ members and were seen as crucial to ensure that the Forum was made of actors representing a broad cross section of civil society (O’Brennan 2004: 180) The operation of this Special Pillar raised the potential that the deliberations of the Forum would permeate society and not merely remain the preserve of an elite political ‘talking shop’. The civil society groups making up this Pillar were encouraged to disseminate the work of the Forum to their wider membership base. The extent to which this occurred is elaborated later in this paper. Resources The National Forum on Europe was established as an independent agency fully funded by Government. The funding for the Forum is allocated in a vote line of the Department of the Taoiseach (Prime Minister). The budget of the Forum hit an all-time high in 2002 at €2 million reflecting a period of intense activity prior to the second referendum on the Treaty of Nice. Nonetheless, the €1.6 million allocated in the 2007 estimates – a nine percent increase on the 2006 allocation – suggests that the Forum was seen to have a continuing job of work to do. The Forum’s resources were designed to cover all expenses including salaries, publications, travel and meetings. Delegations have claimed a research/secretarial allowance (€19,000 is the maximum amount allowed to each party per annum). The offices of the Secretariat of the Forum have been located in Dublin Castle. (A brief move was required in 2004 to Merrion Row during Ireland’s Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the EU when Dublin Castle was required for other purposes.) These offices have been supplied without charge by the Government. The facilities of Dublin Castle have been available to the Forum for plenary and other meetings, also without charge. And when public space in Dublin Castle is not available on any given day for public meetings other state buildings such as the Royal Hospital in Kilmainham and Farmleigh have been made available.

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Management and staff A Steering Committee and a Secretariat were put in place to manage the work of the Forum. The Steering Committee consisted of the Chair and one representative each from the political parties represented in the Oireachtas as well as a number of independent Deputies and Senators. The Secretariat of the Forum was made up of officials seconded primarily from the Departments (Ministries) of the Taoiseach and Foreign Affairs. At one point in 2002 the Forum had a staff complement of over eleven people. By 2005 this number fell to seven and has remained relatively constant since then. The Steering Committee has acted largely by consensus, and has decided the outline programme of work of the Forum and reviewed applications for membership to the Observer Pillar. Meetings and their format From its establishment in October 2001 to the end of March 2007 the Forum held seventy-seven plenary meetings in Dublin and approximately sixty conferences and regional meetings mostly outside Dublin. A typical format for plenary meetings of the Forum consisted of introductory remarks by the Chairman, an invitation to the keynote speaker or speakers, often from outside Ireland, to address the Forum, and a series of statements, comments and/or questions from the members and observers following the keynote address. On 2 November 2006, for example, the then Turkish Chief Negotiator for Turkey’s accession to the EU and current Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Ali Babacan, addressed the Forum and prompted twenty-nine responses from across the political spectrum and from the Special Observer Pillar Members. This was a record number of comments and questions made at any plenary meeting to that date and was indicative of the interest that Turkey’s accession negotiations to the EU prompted. Keynote speakers have had the opportunity to respond to the issues raised by Forum members or observers at plenary meetings, and by members of the public at regional meetings, and the Chairman has then wrapped up. Since September 2006 plenary meetings of the Forum have been advertised in the national daily newspapers for two days generally on the Monday and Tuesday prior to each Thursday meeting. This was to ensure that the public were made aware that meetings were open to the public. Conferences and regional meetings have taken different formats. An example was the day-long conference for over one hundred women held

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in Athlone on 20 September 2006, which involved a mini-plenary session which was recorded verbatim. In contrast, a one and a half hour miniForum was held in Clonea, Co. Waterford on 18 October 2006 for fifty Church of Ireland clergy with a nominee from each of the main political parties which, because it was a meeting at the invitation of a partner organization, was not recorded. Regional meetings have tended to be more informal with members of the public participating. Generally advertisements have been taken out in the local radio and newspapers inviting the public to attend and to join a debate on a specific topic. When a group invites the Forum to attend its meeting, the Forum has not publicized the meeting and a verbatim record of what has been said has not been kept. Sessions of the Forum have lasted between one and a half and two and a half hours. Transcripts of each plenary meeting, or meeting with a plenary session, have been posted to the website (www.forumoneurope.ie) generally within one week of the meeting and, until March 2002, were published in bound volumes. Since 2005 summaries of plenary meetings have been issued in the form of press releases within hours of the meetings. The aim is for these user-friendly summaries of the arguments made in the debate to be carried by the national and local media and in newsletters or reports prepared by participants in the Forum for their members. In addition, since January 2007, podcasts of Plenary and other meetings have been available on the website within hours of the end of the meeting. This has enabled radio stations as well as members of the public access to the debates. From 2008 Forum sessions could be accessed on YouTube. Public submissions Once a year, members of the public have been invited to make submissions to the Forum on the current issues being debated at European and national level. Selected members of the public and organizations have been invited to defend their submissions before Forum members at a plenary meeting (NFOE-CR1 2002:18-19). For example, the focus for the Submissions Day in 2007 was the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Treaty of Rome. In October 2006 advertisements were taken out in the national and regional newspapers inviting members of the public to give their views on how the next fifty years of the EU should be shaped taking into account the past fifty years. Approximately forty responses from mem-

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bers of the public and individuals were received. A submissions day in the form of a mini-Forum session was held in Dublin Castle, with a selected number of individuals and groups invited to come and speak to their submissions and answer comments and questions from the Forum Members. Reports of the chairman A significant output of Forum activity has been the periodic report of the Chairman. Drafted by the Secretariat, these reports have been approved by the Chairman on his own initiative and responsibility. The members of the Steering Committee have been invited to make comments and suggestions on the drafts in a time-limited consultation. By June 2008, eight reports had been published. The reports have been presented to Government as the Forum’s collective contribution to the ongoing debate sent to all Members of the Forum, Members of the Dáil and Seanad, speakers at Forum Plenary and other meetings and participants at youth and women’s conferences as well as libraries, information centres and other possibly interested parties. The period of reflection and engagement? Following the No votes to the European Constitution in referenda in France and the Netherlands in May and June 2005, the Heads of State or Government meeting in Brussels called for a ‘period of reflection’. This period was then extended in June 2006 and was formally ended by the German Presidency of the Council at the European Council in March 2007. Thus, the referendum on the Constitutional Treaty, expected in October 2005, was postponed indefinitely. In the nearly four years of its operation, the Forum on Europe had acted within the framework of an impending referendum. The question arose as to whether the Forum could remain relevant and active outside the focus or the framework of an impending referendum? The Forum appeared to adjust to the circumstances. It changed its emphasis from dealing with the details of, and divergent views on, the Constitutional Treaty (Brown 2008: 83). It ‘decided to discuss issues of importance and concern as identified by individuals and groups themselves’. Taking a ‘bottom-up approach’ the Forum decided to partner with organizations, especially in the Special Observer Pillar, ‘with a view to debating issues of importance to specific audiences’ (NFOE-CR6

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2006: 3). In the title of its Sixth Report it mentioned ‘the period of reflection and engagement’ (authors’ italics). By the publication of its Sixth Report, in May 2006, the Forum claimed that it had partnerships with a range of organization including, for example, the National Youth Council of Ireland and the Irish Countrywomen’s Association (ICA) and the following year added institutions such as the Church of Ireland and the King Baudouin Foundation in Brussels. One measure of the success of this partnership approach may be the 2006-7 Schools’ competition which for the first time involved the Irish Members of the European Parliament directly. This partnership has increased participation in the Forum’s Transition Year Public Speaking Competition from under twenty schools in the past, when there was no partnership arrangement, to one hundred and twenty schools in 2006-7. Civil society bodies’ engagement with the Forum and media coverage of the Forum’s discussions may also be considered measures of success. What exactly is the Forum? The National Forum on Europe is a unique institutional construct by both national and international standards. Its credibility relies on the continuing involvement of the Yes and the No sides created in past referendum debates on the EU. It depends on the continuing engagement of the political parties, civil society organizations and the public. It relies on public meetings, and media coverage of those public meetings, to get the debates on EU issues out to a wider audience. Even though the Forum is fully funded by Government it remains independent, and Forum partnership bodies critical of Government policy can, and do, criticize the Government at every available opportunity. While the Forum is clearly something less than a government agency such as the Health Service Executive or the Industrial Development Authority it is something more than the ‘temporary committee’ which the Department of Arts Culture and the Gaeltacht has classified it: meaning that the provisions of the Language Status Act do not apply. Perhaps the Forum could be described as the foreign policy, or EU, equivalent of Ireland’s social partnership process, albeit with significant differences. The major difference from the social partnership process is that the meetings of the Forum are held in public and the proceedings of the meetings are made available. Another significant difference is that the Forum is not a decision-making body and does not allocate resources to

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specific policy objectives. What the Forum seems to be about is teasing out and making sense of complex European and global phenomena and domesticating them by putting them in an Irish context with local examples to enable people to engage in discussion on them. The National Forum on Europe is clearly an innovative, flexible and unique sort of institution. But is it a deliberative democratic body? As proposed by Habermas (1998: 305-6) a deliberative process has the following features: • deliberation is argumentative exchange of information and reasons among parties with proposals introduced and critically tested; • deliberations are inclusive and public with all those possibly affected having an equal chance to participate; • deliberations are free of any external coercion; • deliberations are free of any internal coercion that could detract from the equality of the participants with each having an equal opportunity to be heard; • deliberations aim at rationally motivated agreement; • political deliberations extend to any matter that can be regulated in the equal interests of all, and • political deliberations also include the interpretation of needs and wants and the change of ‘prepolitical’ attitudes and preferences. While all the meetings of the National Forum on Europe may not consistently reach these high standards, the Forum can clearly, on balance, be classified as a deliberative democratic body using Habermas’ criteria. However, as the National Forum on Europe does not make decisions, should it be regarded as a relatively weak and not very radical deliberative body? The literature gives no simple answer. Some commentators appear to place the emphasis on democracy as a decision-making process while others place the emphasis on deliberation and discussion. Bohman (1998: 401) does both. He defines deliberative democracy as ‘any one of a family of views according to which the public deliberation of free and equal citizens is the core of legitimate political decision-making and selfgovernance’ (italics added). Ultimately, of course, Irish citizens tend to have the opportunity to indicate their preference on the EU in successive referenda.

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The question then may be asked if the National Forum on Europe is a radical innovation. This may depend on your point of view. As Held (2006: 252) has commented: To the extent that deliberation is seen as a supplement to liberal institutions, theorists tend to recommend it as a way of improving the quality of existing political institutions. To the extent that deliberation is regarded as a transformative mode of reasoning which can be drawn upon in diverse settings, from micro-fora and neighbourhood associations to national parliaments and transnational settings, it tends to be interpreted as a new radical model of democracy.

Perhaps the Forum should be seen as an innovative but not particularly radical institutional change, given that it does not make binding decisions. Yet, with its emphasis on inclusion and reasoned, calm and evidence-based debate, it represents a potentially radical improvement on the often partisan and ill-informed ‘debate’ that is seen to typify political discussion of EU related matters. Obviously, the more that the Forum actually engaged with wider society, and did not just ‘indulge’ in arcane intellectual discussion among the Dublin-based political elite, the more confidence people can have that the Forum does, and potentially can, act as an inclusive deliberative arena. It is to this question of engagement with wider society that we now turn, focusing first on engagement with civil society groups and their members and, second, on the extent to which the Forum’s activities permeated wider society via dissemination by the media. Not just a ‘Talking Shop’? Engagement with civil society groups To get a sense of the extent of the Forum’s engagement with civil society groups and their members, interviews were conducted with 35 of the 42 groups.2 The issues discussed with the Forum members were based on the code of best practice elaborated with input from the Special Ob2 A number of organisations whose representatives declined to be interviewed (Ireland for Europe, the Christian Democrats and the No to Nice Campaign) indicated that they saw themselves as campaigning bodies in the context of a referendum and were not active outside that context – though a representative of one of those organisations did attend plenary meetings of the Forum occasionally. Four other organisations remained elusive in spite of repeated requests for appointments by a variety of means (telephone, post and/or email). Representatives of these four organisations had not attended plenary meetings of the Forum in the two year period up to the beginning of 2007.

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server Pillar of the Forum during the first half of 2006. This code outlined the manner in which civil society groups were expected to communicate to their members on Forum related activities (see Appendix A for the code and Appendix B for the list of questions asked in the interviews). The answers were reordered and grouped under three broad headings: information, communications and participation. These groupings were formulated with a view to categorising the activities of the Forum members. Information One indicator of the Forum’s reach was attendance at public meetings. In addition to notices to members and advertising in national media for plenary meetings and in local media for regional meetings, Special Observer Pillar members might have been expected to inform their membership of at least some meetings of particular relevance to them. Of interest was whether or not the civil society groups made efforts to publicise public meetings of the Forum to their membership and whether there was potential to do more in this area. It emerged from the interviews that half the members of the Special Observer Pillar had not been informing their own members of public plenary and regional meetings of the Forum and the others did so selectively when an issue was particularly salient to the membership by ‘newsflash’, in journals, by ‘elink’, email and fax. As a result of the question being raised, a number of members indicated that they would ‘inform their membership in the future’ through weekly or fortnightly newsletters, periodic bulletins or email notices. Others said they ‘would consider how’ to inform their membership on a more systematic basis and especially where the topic has a particular salience to the membership. The Forum has posted to its website the verbatim transcript of each plenary meeting approximately one week after the meeting was held. This was a resource for the media, members of the public and Forum members to access the debates and to keep abreast of current debates. Of interest was whether the members of the Special Observer Pillar saw any value in this service. More than half the members of the Special Observer Pillar indicated that they had used the verbatim transcripts of the Forum as a reference occasionally, or for research. Eleven members of the Pillar said that they had never had occasion to use the verbatim transcripts.

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The Forum has also posted on its website, and circulated to members and the media, a short summary of the debate held at plenary meetings within hours of the meeting. Again this was intended as a resource for the media, members of the Forum and the general public to get an overall flavour of the debate. In addition, the resource was made available so that the members could use the material as a base for reporting to their organisations orally, by email or newsletter or at annual or general meetings. Fifteen members of the Special Observer Pillar said that they had used the press releases of the Forum to inform members of the debate. This was qualified by some members by indicating that this practice was done occasionally, selectively or when the Forum member had made an intervention. Of the nineteen Members who indicated that they had not used the Forum’s press releases seven saw the possibility of using the press releases in the future in particular in their email communications with, or newsletters to, members. Twenty-two of the members said that they used the opportunities of annual reports, board meetings, or annual or general meetings and meetings at home and abroad to make known the work of the Forum. The Forum has produced a range of publications starting with the Chairman’s Reports which has synthesised the debates over a given period. During the survey the Chairman’s Seventh Report was published in March 2007. In addition the Forum had by this time produced a summary of the Constitutional Treaty, two publications explaining how the EU works and what it does and other general booklets and films for educational purposes. All this material was published on the authority of the Chairman with input from the Steering Committee. In other words, the material had cross-party support and represented essentially the consensus view on issues to do with the EU across the elected political spectrum. Of interest was whether or not the members of the Special Observer Pillar were using this material to inform their membership of the basic structure and operation of the EU and the issues which were debated in the Forum and with which the EU was concerned. Twenty-one members of the Special Observer Pillar said that they found the publications of the Forum to be useful and twelve members had circulated them widely in their organisations. Of the twenty-one members who said that they had not circulated Forum publications to

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their membership, eight indicated that that they would be willing to circulate the publications widely within their organisations. Communications According to the principles of best practice one of the practices Special Observer Pillar members could engage in was in writing briefs on upcoming topics which could be circulated to members. This was a heavy burden on any organization, especially those that had limited resources. Of interest was the extent to which this practice was prevalent among Special Observer Pillar members of the Forum and what the general practices were. Of the total number interviewed, five members of the Special Observer Pillar prepared briefs for members before plenary meetings either all the time (two) or occasionally (three). The other thirty did not. About a third of the organisations indicated that following a plenary meeting a report of what happened was prepared for the membership either on a regular or occasional basis using the Forum press releases as a basis. The National Forum on Europe has placed considerable emphasis on getting its website into a position where it became known as a useful source for finding out about the debates on EU issues. To do this it needed to not only get the content right, but also to improve its Google rating which impacted on where it was placed on the World Wide Web listings. One of the ways to improve its rating was for its member organisations to link their websites to that of the Forum as the number of external links an organisation had improved its ranking and its rating. Of interest was whether the member organisations had acted on the best practice principles in this area by linking their sites. Another indicator of an organisation’s involvement with European affairs was whether or not it had a web page dedicated to the future of Europe debate. In addition, of interest was whether or not the member organisations were aware that their members could get involved in the debate through the Forum’s interactive website. Only four organisations in the Special Observer Pillar indicated that they had a web page dedicated to the future of Europe debate. However, twenty organisations indicated that they had their web page linked to the website of the National Forum on Europe. The others said either that they did not know or that they would look into the issue. At the end of the interviewing process, however, a check of the websites of the Special

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Observer Pillar member organisations revealed that all but three of the organisations had made links to the Forum website. On awareness of the Forum’s interactive website most (twenty-seven) did not know that the Forum had this facility but all said that they would take steps to make sure their members became aware of it. Participation A significant indicator of engagement with the Forum has been attendance at Forum meetings. The Forum Secretariat has kept records of attendance and these were examined to assess the level of attendance as a measure of participation. Not surprisingly, participation by members of the Special Observer Pillar was highest when the Forum began its work in 2001 when an average of twenty member organisations attended plenary meetings and, in the context of an impending referendum in 2002, when an average of eighteen member organisations attended. Participation rates at Forum plenary meetings averaged at fifteen, eighteen, thirteen and sixteen for 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 respectively and fifteen for the first three months of 2007 (public meetings were suspended two months prior to the general election in June 2007). While it could be expected that attendance by the members of the Special Observer Pillar might trail off significantly when there was no referendum in sight – for example in the period following the No votes in France and the Netherlands in the second half of 2005 – this does not appear to have happened apart from a slight dip in 2005 which recovered in 2006. It can be argued, therefore, that the members of the Special Observer Pillar saw value outside a referendum context in attending plenary meetings of the Forum. Again using the records of the Forum, eight Special Observer Pillar members attended a meeting with the Chair of the Forum held in December 2005. All the members of the Special Observer Pillar were invited to attend so the attendance was disappointing from the Forum’s point of view. In addition, the meeting was held prior to a reception hosted by the Chairman of the Forum to encourage and maximise attendance. Points raised during this meeting included the partnership approach initiated by the Forum; the website of the Forum as a resource; the need for basic information on how the EU worked, and the format for including interventions from members of the Pillar.

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Four Special Observer pillar members indicated that they made interventions at plenary meetings only following consultation with members. The rest indicated that their interventions were made within the agreed policy framework of the organisation. Comments such as ‘the general approach may be discussed’ and ‘will only speak on issues where there is an organisational policy’ were prevalent. From the Forum’s point of view, and in terms of the quality of the debate, it is most likely better that Special Observer Pillar members for the most part come prepared to engage in debate in response to the arguments made rather than with a prepared script which may or may not bear a connection to what has been said in discussion. When asked about interventions made at plenary meetings one respondent said that he ‘would have made more if they had been allowed’. This referred to the time constraints at plenary meetings where both members of the Special Observer Pillar and political party members may offer to speak but have not been given the floor due to lack of time. As a way around this, and to ensure balance across the Special Observer Pillar members, the Secretariat initiated a system in 2007 whereby Members of the Special Observer Pillar were asked to indicate when they signed in whether they intended to make a contribution. This did not preclude them from indicating that they wanted to make a contribution during the meeting and in response to something said. However it did have the benefit of ensuring that those who may have been precluded from speaking at a previous session due to time constraints could be given preferential treatment at the next meeting if they wanted to speak. Another member of the Special Observer Pillar said that they had not made interventions at plenary meetings to date due to the fact that they found it ‘daunting’ especially ‘the posturing by politicians’. However, as this did not feature in any of the other interviews, it would appear to be a minority view and may be linked to the individual representative. It may be that the Forum should consider some encouragement or incentive for Special Observer Pillar members, especially newcomers, to overcome this. This is not an issue at the less formal regional meetings where all who agree to attend on the panel also agree to make verbal contributions. Fourteen members of the Special Observer pillar indicated that they had made suggestions for topics for Forum meetings in the past. In addition, seven members took the opportunity of the interview to make

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new suggestions. These suggestions for meetings included topics ranging from migration, subsidiarity, the Lisbon Agenda, rural development and the social debate to specific named persons to address a certain topic. There was, not surprisingly, a strong correlation between the organisation’s professional interest and the topic or person it suggested for debate at the Forum. Thus, the Irish Farmers Association suggested more debate about the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy and the Islamic Cultural Centre suggested the Islamic thinker Tariq Ramadan could be invited to speak. Eight of organisations in the Special Observer pillar made submissions to the Forum in the context of the Forum’s public submissions call in 2005-6 and eight again in 2006-7. Two organisations made submissions in response to each call. This is worth noting, in our view, because while the members in the Special Observer Pillar have many opportunities to participate in the debates of the Forum, a number of them see value in making a submission and are open to coming to the Forum and defending their point of view. Partnerships for specific events have been made with five members of the Special Observer Pillar of the Forum up to the time the interviews were conducted. The organisations themselves have indicated the significant value they place on this form of engagement. There is clearly considerable potential to continue these partnerships and forge new ones both within and outside the Special Observer Pillar membership. Overall assessment Overall, if the National Forum on Europe was relying on the activities of the members of the Special Observer Pillar as the only means to disseminate the debates it conducted then it was unlikely that this would be assessed to be highly effective. The implementation by members of the Special Observer Pillar of the best practice principles of the Forum was patchy. The information sent to members, the use of transcripts and press summaries, the reporting mechanisms and the use of publications were all less than optimum. Nonetheless, while briefing mechanisms were weak, web links were strong. In addition attendance remained relatively steady during the period, even without the prospect of an impending referendum. Interventions were both forthcoming and, for the most part, varied and engaged. Some organisations saw the value of

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making submissions and others engaged in partnership arrangements with the Forum. While the activity cannot be said to be at the highest level, many of the civil society organisations were to a greater or a lesser extent involved in disseminating the debates. And others indicated a willingness to build on existing practice with a view to using their networks to disseminate the debates – especially when there was a debate which was seen to be salient to a particular audience. It could be said that the Forum had in place a network of organisations which was disseminating the debates of the Forum to some extent and had the potential to do more. This in itself has set a base-line. A future follow-up questionnaire would be required to assess the extent to which members of the Special Observer Pillar had indeed taken on board best practice in this area and to establish if the principles discussed during the interview process had, in fact, been internalised by the organisations. One of the more interesting findings from this research is the average attendance rates at Forum plenary meetings. While it might have been expected that the civil society organisations would have significantly reduced their participation in Forum activities, such as plenary meetings, when there was no referendum in sight this did not happen to any significant extent. It can be argued therefore that the members of the Special Observer Pillar saw value outside a referendum context in attending plenary meetings of the Forum. This would support the Forum’s contention as stated in its Seventh Report that: ‘people will engage in discussion on EU issues if they are given the opportunity to do so and if the debate is geared to both inform them and to take their views into account’ (NFOE-CR7 2007: 5). It also suggests that the activities of the Forum in engaging civil society groups is perceived by those groups as going some way to address what they might call the information deficit if not the democratic deficit of the EU. In addition to dissemination via civil society groups a second main potential avenue for disseminating the activities of the Forum is the media, a matter to which we now turn our attention. Not just a ‘Talking Shop’? Dissemination by the media The Forum commissioned a commercial media tracker company to identify all the press coverage of the Forum’s activities. The results for the period June 2005 to June 2007 were that the Forum, its debates and

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activities, was covered in 221 articles in the national and regional newspapers in this two year period. In the first twelve months under review there were 88 articles and in the second year of consideration there were 133. This overall increase in press coverage in the second year occurred in both the regional and the national press. The fact that there was a fairly substantial increase from one year to the next is interesting as it allows us to speculate as to the possible cause of the increase. If the determinants of the increase could be identified then this would empower the Forum to further achieve its goal of disseminating its activities to the wider society via the press. On reflection we suggest that it was the increased activity of the Forum in the second as opposed to the first year under review that was responsible for increasing press coverage: these activities include number of meetings, development of the schools’ competition and the strengthening of the Forum’s website. Indeed the Forum was significantly more active in holding public meetings in the second year under review. From 17 June 2005 to 19 June 2006 the Forum held seventeen public meetings. For the same period the following year the Forum held twenty-five public meetings. The Forum held on average, therefore, 1.4 public meetings every month in the first year under review and an average of 2.0 public meetings per month during its second year. At the same time the activity of the Forum in the second year under consideration was for essentially ten and not twelve months. This was due to the general election held on 14 June 2007. It has been the Forum’s practice to quit the public stage up to two months before a general election to avoid the possibility that it will become used as a partisan platform. If the two months pre-election period of inactivity is factored in, the Forum held 2.5 public meetings on average per month, or a more than 50 percent increase in public meetings over the previous year. Related to the increase in the number of meetings was an increase in the number of press releases issued. In the first twelve month period 39 press releases were issued and in the second twelve month period 46 press releases were issued. Therefore 45 percent of the total number of press releases were issued in year one while 55 percent of the total number were issued in year two – a significant increase and one which was likely to have an impact on the increased level of press coverage. A significant amount of the coverage that the Forum got, in particular in the regional newspapers, was for its schools’ public speaking competition. This competition was targeted at Transition Year, or sixteen to

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seventeen-year-old students. The 2005-2006 competition covered fewer than twenty schools. For 2006-2007, in line with its developing partnership approach, the Forum joined with the thirteen MEPs representing all the main political parties and independents. With the local knowledge of facilitators appointed by the MEPs themselves the number of participating schools rose from under twenty in the period 2005-6 to one hundred and twenty in the year 2006-7. The competition used the euro-constituencies for its regional heats. The MEPs agreed to divide the schools up between themselves and local and regional heats were organised by the MEPs' representatives. The attendance of the MEPs at the regional and national finals of the competition attracted regional and ultimately national media attention in significantly greater quantity than in previous years. Website activity was significant. The Reports of the Forum outline this: ‘the number of website hits has increased from over 2,000 in October 2004 (the first data after upgrading) to over 30,000 in March 2006’ (NFOE-CR6 2006: 27-28). Then in the next report we find the following comment: ‘The number of people using the Forum website has increased significantly in recent months, breaking the 12,000 users (or visitors) per month barrier for the first time’ (NFOE-CR7 2007: 52). The change from ‘hits’ to ‘users’ makes comparisons difficult here. In addition, the Forum initiated broadcasts of its meetings via podcasts and opened an interactive discussion board which invited members of the public to have their say on a range of topical issues. Conclusion: Lisbon and beyond In the preceding two sections we have seen that the Forum has, on balance, been reasonably successful in engaging with the wider public and disseminating the deliberative debates via civil society groups and the media. On 12 June 2008, seven years and five days after the rejection of the Nice Treaty, the Irish electorate rejected the Lisbon Treaty by a 53 per cent No vote in a turnout which was also 53 per cent. This presented the Irish government ‘with the most serious crisis in external relations since the Second World War’ (O’Brennan 2008: 1). At the time of writing it looks likely that the government will hold another referendum on the Lisbon Treaty in autumn 2009. The government is currently attempting to clarify with its European partners the implications of the Treaty for

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issues of concern to Irish No voters (issues such as neutrality, abortion, taxation, workers rights as well as the right for all EU member states to nominate a European commissioner). The government plans to achieve, in concert with its EU partners, a series of declarations or protocols that would assuage the fears of No voters on the above mentioned issues. A re-run of the referendum in the autumn 2009 would then, from the government’s perspective, hopefully achieve a Yes majority and ratification of the Treaty in Ireland and, consequently, the EU as a whole. The Forum, we suggest, offers a calm arena for the discussion of the above mentioned controversial issues relating to the Lisbon Treaty (neutrality, abortion, taxation and so on). The Forum is well placed to play a constructive role in the inter-referendum period (as it did prior to Nice 2) in engaging in, and disseminating, deliberative discussions on the key concerns of actors on both sides of the debate. Our preceding discussion has demonstrated a desire for deliberation on EU matters outside of the confines of an actual referendum. The challenge of making sense of the integration process is an ongoing one regardless of whether there is an impending referendum. Other EU states, we suggest, may wish to adopt a version of the Irish National Forum on Europe. The creation of such fora in EU states should not be seen as an alternative to parliamentary consideration of EU issues. Rather a forum should be seen as a supplement to parliamentary scrutiny, oversight and debate which enables a broader spectrum of people to engage in the discourse on European issues. The establishment of such fora by European states would not amount to a radical upheaval of existing political institutions. Rather, it would be a relatively modest change that would complement rather than replace current practice. Hence, the Irish ‘model’ of a deliberative forum may be seen as a reasonably practical and implementable model. At the very least the Forum on Europe represents an example of a deliberative chamber which our EU neighbours may view as more or less useful. Hence, the Irish experience in this regard should contribute to the Europe-wide debate on democracy and engagement and in some states it may even influence institutional reform – a tangible contribution, then, to the ‘hibernicisation of Europe’. While this chapter has described how the success of the Irish Forum in engaging the wider public may well be qualified, the Irish Forum should probably be overall seen as at least moderately successful and has received commendations from academics, the media and the EU.

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O’Brennan, for example, states that the Forum ‘may in the future be seen as an important mechanism for democratizing political debate on European integration and engaging public opinion in a real and substantive way’ (O’Brennan 2005: 128-9). The Irish Times on 20 October 2006, marking the fifth anniversary of the founding of the National Forum on Europe, stated in an editorial that ‘the forum has (…) engaged the political class more effectively with the general public through its regional meetings, conferences, publications and media coverage. The intensity of this engagement ebbs and flows with the pace of events and the quality of political leadership; but it adds a new dimension to our democracy which should not be underestimated or taken for granted’. In October 2005, Margot Wallström, Vice-President of the European Commission and Commissioner in charge of Communications, speaking about the EU, made the following comment: ‘My thinking about how better public discourse can be organized has been inspired by the Irish National Forum on Europe which has done an excellent job and could serve as a model in other countries’ (Wallström 2005). The Forum has certainly broadened the scope of the EU debate in Ireland, bringing in the non-elite civil society group actors as well as the public. O’Brennan (2004: 171) states that ‘the Forum has engaged a wider and more inclusive group of societal actors in European debate. Thus, Irish EU debate is no longer concentrated among traditional elites – the political parties, trade unions, business groups and academics’ and O’Brennan concludes that ‘the Forum has contributed significantly to a reconfiguration of elite debate in Ireland on European issues’ (2004: 183). The Irish Forum may, overall, be seen as a relatively easily implemented institutional reform that established a deliberative arena which complements the array of pre-existing political institutions. It has certainly engaged the Irish political classes, has had moderate success in engaging civil society groups and the media, and is learning from experience about how to further engage these groups. Other EU states may be well served by adopting a variation of this Irish model.

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References Ahern, B. 2002. Speech to the Dáil on the Twenty-sixth Amendment to the Constitution Dáil: Dáil Reports (10 September) Bohman, J. 1998. The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy. Journal of Political Philosophy 6: 400-25. Brown, T. 2004. Ireland’s National Forum on Europe. London: The Federal Trust (Paper Number 33) Brown, T., ed. 2008. Lisbon: What the Reform Treaty Means. Dublin: Institute of International and European Affairs. Bush, G. W. 2001. Address at Warsaw University, June 15 www.lib.umich.edu/ govdocs/fedprs:html Department of Foreign Affairs 1996. Challenges and Opportunities Abroad: White Paper on Foreign Policy. Dublin: Stationery Office Fishkin, L., R. C. Luskin and R. Jowell 2000. Deliberative Polling and Public Consultation. Parliamentary Affairs 53: 657-666. Fitzgerald, G. 2003. Reflections on the Irish State. Dublin: Irish Academic Press. Gilland, K. 2002. Ireland’s (First) Referendum on the Treaty of Nice. Journal of Common Market Studies 40: 527-35. Garry, J., M. Marsh, and R. Sinnott 2005. Second–Order Versus Issue-Voting Effects in EU Referendums: Evidence from the Irish Nice Treaty Referendums. European Union Politics 6: 201-221. Habermas, J. 1998. Between Facts and Norms Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Hayward, K. 2003. If at First You Don’t Succeed…: The Second Referendum on the Treaty of Nice, 2002. Irish Political Studies 18: 120-32. Held, D. 2006. Models of Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press. National Forum on Europe 2001-2008 Chairman’s Reports (NFOE-CR 1 to 9), Reports of Proceedings (NFOE-RP 1-18) and Website www.forumoneurope.ie. O’Brennan, J. 2004. Ireland’s National Forum on Europe: Elite Deliberation Meets Popular Participation. European Integration 26: 171-89. O’Brennan, J. 2005. Ireland’s European discourse and the National Forum on Europe. In Ireland and the European Union: Nice, Enlargement and the Future of Europe. M. Holmes, ed. 114-32. Manchester: Manchester University Press. O’Brennan, J. 2008. Ireland and the Lisbon Treaty: Quo Vadis? Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) Policy Brief (available at: www.ceps.eu) O’Keeffe, J. 2001. Dáil: Dáil Reports (16 October). O’Mahoney, J. 2001. Not so Nice. Irish Political Studies 16: 201-15. The Irish Times 2006. Editorial (20 October). Wallstrom, M. 2005. The Irish Times (13 October).

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Appendix A. Principles of Best Practice for Special Observer Pillar Members The creation of the Special Observer Pillar of the National Forum On Europe is a relatively new development in democratic engagement. Each organisation in the Pillar is unique with its own separate organisation, membership and procedures. Nonetheless, since 2001, when the Forum was established, certain patterns and practices have emerged among Special Observer Pillar Members. It may be useful, therefore to set out the practices of some members of the Pillar to so that others can initiate the practices that best fit their organisations. Special Observer Pillar Members are involved in the following practices: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

circulating updated Forum Programmes to members and generally advertising the topics of forth-coming meetings; writing briefs on up coming topics which are circulated to members; drafting interventions and seeking approval for these interventions as appropriate; attending plenary meetings, regional and youth Forum sessions; attending meetings with the Chairman of the Forum; suggesting topics for debate in the Forum or ways that the Forum could maximise the contribution of the Special Observer Pillar; making interventions at plenary and other meetings of the Forum; preparing reports of plenary and other sessions for their organisations’ members (the Forum secretariat prepares a press release reporting on the discussion on the day of the plenary session which can be used, as appropriate); distributing reports of meetings to their membership by email or through newsletters; making submissions to the Forum involving consultation with members; partnering with the Forum for specific events; assisting with the youth programme and special events; organising introductory or ‘jargon-buster’ sessions for members before local public meetings; reprinting extracts from Forum transcripts in newsletters, especially where these relate to current campaigns by the organisation; creating special web-page(s) on the future of Europe, with links to the Forum and other websites. The Forum site is www.forumoneurope.ie; encouraging members to participate in the Forum’s online discussions on European issues; circulating Forum publications to members as appropriate (the Forum can meet postage costs); reporting on activities of the Forum, and the organisation’s role in it, in Annual Reports, at Board meetings and at AGMs; publicising the Forum’s work within Europe-wide and Irish networks, as appropriate.

Secretariat National Forum on Europe 2006.

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Appendix B. Questionnaire to Special Observer Pillar Members Information How are members informed of upcoming Forum meetings? Has your organisation used the verbatim transcripts of Forum meetings or the press releases issued after Forum plenary meetings in any way? Have the Forum's publications been used to inform your membership about the European Union? Has your organisation circulated National Forum On Europe publications to members? Has your organisation publicised the Forum's work within Europe-wide and/or Irish networks? Communication Are briefs circulated to members on upcoming topics? Are reports of meetings prepared for members by email or newsletter and, if so, is the press release prepared by the Forum used as a basis? Does your organisation have a web-page dedicated to the future of Europe debate and is your web-page linked to the National Forum On Europe? Has your organisation reported on the work of the National Forum On Europe in annual reports, Board Meetings or AGMs? Are you aware that the Forum has an interactive site and your members can participate in the debate? Participation Are interventions made at Forum meetings drafted in consultation with members? How many plenary or regional events has your organisation been represented at in the past year? Was your organisation represented at the last meeting held with the Chairman of the Forum? Has your organisation suggested topics for discussion at Forum meetings? Has your organisation made interventions at the Forum in the past year, and if so, how many? Did your organisation make a submission to the Forum in 2005? Is it proposed to do so in 2006? Have you partnered with the Forum on specific events? Are there possibilities to do so in the future? Has your organisation assisted on any of the Forum's special events?

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GAELIC GAMES, IDENTITY AND THE IRISH DIASPORA IN EUROPE David Hassan Abstract The study of sport amongst the Irish abroad is a relatively recent phenomenon. Its neglect to date is surprising given the central role sport plays in the lives of the Irish Diaspora and the broad agendas it serves. What little work has been undertaken has centred on Irish emigrants in North America, despite the fact that mainland Europe has proved to be the destination of choice for many Irish men and women in recent times. Aside from their qualifications and skills, some of these individuals have brought long standing cultural interests and pastimes with them on their travels. Foremost amongst these have been the indigenously Irish games organised and promoted by the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA). Despite the popularity of Gaelic sports in Europe, historically they have been organised on an informal basis. Indeed it was only recently that they came under the control of a formal governing body, Coiste Chonate na hEorpa (European County Board). The games attract a cross section of followers but the administration and management of GAA activities remains the preserve of young, well educated Irish professionals, the embodiment of the so-called ‘Ryanair generation’ of the late 1980s. The dominant ethos underpinning Gaelic games on mainland Europe is inclusiveness and is defined by a policy of equal opportunities for all. That said, one of the most noteworthy aspects of the GAA scene in Europe is the way its presence allows opportunities for indigenous sub-groups to further underline their separation from established states.

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In their recently published compendium, Darby and Hassan (2007) reflect on the considerable expansion in the study of the Irish overseas. They suggest that changing attitudes towards the Irish émigré have been influenced, in part, by an increased focus on their social and historical exploits. Irish emigrants are to be found in political, commercial, legal and civic life throughout the world, often exercising influence at the very highest levels. Yet to date ‘there has been little academic study of the significance and role of sport in the lives of the Irish migrant populations’ (Darby and Hassan 2007: 335). There are many reasons for this neglect, not all of them entirely convincing explanations as to why such an important aspect of the Irish emigrant’s cultural profile has been overlooked. Wilcox (1992) argues that this reflects nothing more than ‘elitist academic snobberies, harboured in the traditional halls of academe’. In reality it has more to do with the comparatively novel nature of the work under review. Indeed it is only recently that academics have turned their attention to the study of the Irish abroad in any concerted fashion. Ireland has a proud history of sport. This is particularly true when one considers its achievements in international competition, which are arguably disproportionate to its population size. Indeed, whilst Irish success on the sports fields and arenas throughout the world has brought attention to individual athletes, it has also created an interest in all things Irish. For some members of the Irish Diaspora, sport was the primary reason for their departure from Ireland and they have achieved considerable notoriety in their chosen fields. However for the great majority, sport was the source of much needed respite from the often harsh working conditions they experienced in their new locales (O’Day 1990; O’Sullivan 1992). They had left Ireland in search of a better life for themselves, economically and socially, and a mutual interest in sports teams or particular codes created a sense of community and interdependency amongst the Irish. As Darby and Hassan (2007: 336) confirm, ‘For some immigrants, sport eased their assimilation and facilitated a degree of acceptance in what could be hostile and unwelcoming environments. For others, proficiency and success in sports allowed for the promotion and preservation of a strong sense of ethnic pride and identity.’ The Irish were reluctant to completely discard their indigenous culture, tradition and identity. They sought to secure accommodation with their new neighbours, rather than complete assimilation or acculturation. Indeed

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this is typical of a great number of ethnic minorities who recognise the need to respect the established cultural practices of their new surroundings whilst at the same time wishing to preserve what makes them unique. It was this sense of pragmatism that offered opportunities for the Irish to secure employment, housing and generally settle into their new way of life. On the whole, what little work has been conducted on the sporting interests of the Irish abroad has, somewhat predictably, centred on their experiences in North America. Wilcox (1992), Reiss (1992), Bjarkman (1992) and McCaffrey (1997) have all made reference to the role of sport in the lives of the Irish Diaspora located, almost exclusively, along the Atlantic seaboard of the United States of America. Others have examined the specific importance attached to Gaelic games in this country, the seminal work of Darby (2003, 2005, 2006) being of particular significance in this area of study. Elsewhere, King’s (1998) work on the diffusion of hurling throughout various parts of the globe, McCarthy’s (2007) research on the place of Gaelic games in Western Australia, Bradley’s (1998, 2007) study of the GAA in Scotland and likewise Duignan’s (2004) work on the history of camogie in Britain are examples of the type of research that has been conducted in this field. Thus the main aim of this essay is to address a void in the literature examining the role sport plays in the lives of the Irish in Europe. That there has been a dearth of research in this area is understandable as the numbers emigrating to the near continent in the past were never sufficient to merit further investigation, beyond recording the origins and destinations of a small number of Irish men and women. However, as it became clear that Europe was enjoying increased popularity amongst the emigrating Irish, a closer look at their cultural preferences and how they negotiated their identity in a foreign land became important. Thus this essay begins by laying out the context of European immigration amongst the Irish. It suggests that the majority of those citizens are graduates of higher education institutions and represent a more youthful, confident, well-educated and mobile generation than many who have gone before them. It focuses almost exclusively on the specific role played by Gaelic games amongst the European Irish, although this should not imply that there is a lack of interest in other sports. The important role of major rugby tournaments, such as the annual International Rugby Board (IRB), Six Nations championships or the Heineken Cup, contested by the conti-

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nents leading rugby clubs, present obvious opportunities for temporary migration by the Irish as supporters move back and forth in support of various teams (Cronin 1999). Whilst it is beyond the scope of this essay to investigate whether this in turn contributes to some form of federal European identity, others have examined this issue in relation to the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) Champions League competition (Millward 2006). In relaying the important role the Irish Diaspora perform in administering, managing and representing GAA clubs situated throughout many parts of Europe, this essay also highlights the involvement in these activities of people indigenous to the areas in which the clubs have been established. Thus particular attention is paid in the latter part of the chapter to GAA activities in Brittany, France and amongst the Gaels of Catalonia. In some way therefore the establishment of GAA clubs and their active promotion by a range of peoples, some native to the areas in which these clubs operate, has informed a degree of hibernicisation in parts of Europe that may not have been overly acquiescent to the concept. Of course it is important not to overstate this influence as the numbers involved are comparatively small but alongside this there is certainly an awakening of a latent European identity amongst the migrating Irish and this is evident in discussions with members of this community, which are relayed throughout this chapter. The Irish Diaspora Insofar as work examining the sporting preferences of the Irish abroad has been orientated around North America, this has merely reflected a more focussed approach generally by those researching in the field upon this geographical setting (Almeida 1992). Hence, literature charting Irish migration to North America dominates much of what has been written about the experiences of the Irish overseas (Akenson 2000; Munslow 1992). This is appreciable given the historic movement of Irish people across the Atlantic, particularly during the 1880’s, 1950’s and late 1980’s when almost a quarter of a million people left Ireland in search of a new life (Akenson 1994; Courtney 2000; Swift 1992). In contrast, considerably less attention has been afforded Irish migration to mainland Europe (Coogan 2002). Indeed much of the recent scholarship concerning movement between the near continent and Ireland has been about the migration of large numbers of foreign nationals into the country (Clinch,

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Convery and Walsh 2002). Even this trend, partly the result of the continued enlargement of the European Union (EU), highlights several issues central to any study of migratory patterns within Europe. Firstly, it is an appreciation of the multi-disciplinary nature of migration, specifically the influences at work that persuade individuals of the need to move. Secondly, by way of building on this initial point, it is important to remain conscious of the economic, social and political imbalances that exist between certain post-Communist European countries and burgeoning, technologically advanced Western liberal democracies. Finally, when examining this issue there is a necessity to investigate the migrant experiences as phenomena in their own right and not merely in relation to their countries of origin or reception (Kearney 1992). Tracking Irish emigration to mainland Europe is problematic. There is a dearth of research in this field compared to studies into Irish migration to North America or Britain (Dickson 1988). The most reliable measures are intercensal estimates of net emigration which provide aggregate data for a five- or ten-year period (Delaney 2002). At several points over the last two decades, the numbers of Irish emigrants moving to mainland Europe have exceeded those settling in North America (Delaney 2002; Barrett 2005). An illustration of this is provided by the figures for Irish migration during the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1988 approximately 2,800 Irish people emigrated to mainland Europe, compared to 7,900 to North America. Four years later, in 1992, the numbers emigrating to Europe had trebled to 7,500 people whilst those moving to North America had more than halved to 3,500 individuals (Delaney 2002). It is not possible to state definitively that Irish people were opting to emigrate to Europe rather than North America but there was a clear transformation in migrant activity. Whereas the trend towards Irish emigration to Britain, the USA and the ‘Rest of the World’ has been in decline over the last 15 years, the numbers relocating to mainland Europe have remained consistent. These are now more than 30% higher than the figures for Irish emigration to North America, whilst over the same period there has been a remarkable decline in the numbers of Irish people moving to Britain, from a peak of 48,400 in 1989 to 6,300 in 2000 (Courtney 2000; Delaney 2002). This latter figure is only marginally higher than the numbers that emigrated to mainland Europe during the same year, which again has remained constant in the face of declining levels of emigration elsewhere.

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Thus one feature of the most recent ‘wave’ of Irish emigration in the mid-1980s was the greater variety of destinations (Shuttleworth 1993). Mainland Europe received significant numbers of young Irish people, although the ‘European’ nature of this ‘new wave’ emigration has been somewhat overplayed (Shuttleworth 1993). In reality only a small number of countries have received sizeable numbers of Irish men and women. These have primarily been those in the northern part of the continent. That said, in 1992 almost a quarter of the total annual outflow of Irish men and women made its way to mainland Europe (MacLaughlin 1997). This has oscillated somewhat in more recent times, confirming the less predictable aspect of Irish migration to the near continent. The peak of the early 1990s was predictable given the provisions for the free movement of labour within the various treaties of the EU, notably the Single European Act of 1987 (Clinch, Convery and Walsh 2002). Equally significant was the greater emphasis placed on European languages in Irish schools and universities from the mid-1980s onwards. A final contributing factor was the closer integration of the Irish and European labour markets, which meant that educational and other vocational qualifications were recognised, albeit not always fully rewarded in terms of remuneration (Hickman 2005). When focussing on Irish emigration to Europe two further issues are also worthy of brief comment. Most other European migrant flows have been dominated by single males, but the Irish situation has differed in this key respect (Ryan 1992; Shuttleworth 1993). Indeed Kennedy (1973) argues that in ‘normal’ circumstances, that is without a European war, a higher rate of female emigration from Ireland was the established pattern from the time of the first ‘wave’ of out migration in the mid-nineteenth century. Where there is inequality it is between the emigrant profiles based on age (Shuttleworth 1993). In this case an overriding characteristic of the persons who left twentieth century Ireland was their relative youth (Kirkham 1992). Between 1943 and 1951, when the first records became available, some 70% of female emigrants were under the age of 25, whilst two-thirds of males were 30 years of age or younger (Shuttleworth 1993). From the 1980s onwards, the high level of university graduate emigration to mainland Europe was attracting scholarly interest as well as public comment. According to Delaney (2002:16), ‘The graduate exodus also reflected the opportunities created by the demand for skilled work-

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ers, not just in Great Britain but also in mainland Europe…, which young middle class emigrants were well equipped to respond to.’ This point highlights a more general trend regarding the skills and educational background of Irish emigrant flows over the last century. In the 1930s the typical emigrant was from the ranks of the labouring or lower classes with few marketable skills to be transferred to the economy into which he/she was transposed. By the turn of the millennium emigrants were more likely to be from the ‘enlarged ranks of the middle class’ (Delaney 2002: 19). These were individuals with advanced levels of intelligence and in possession of attributes desired by major European corporations trading in the financial, IT and pharmaceutical industries. Thus some time after the resurgence of the Irish economy and the birth of the socalled ‘Celtic Tiger’, Ireland still led Europe in terms of net migration, some way ahead of Portugal in second place (Delaney 2002). This transformation has also affected the way in which Irish migrants have been viewed amongst wider society. According to MacLaughlin, ‘Despite the high volume of emigration in recent years, the tendency today is to treat emigrants as enterprising individuals, rather than seeing them as social class victims’ (1997: 143). The apparent gentrification of ‘new wave’ emigration in Irish political discourse is founded upon the view that there has been a haemorrhaging of graduates from Ireland, which has potential long term consequences for the economy (MacLaughlin 1997; Delaney 2002). The facts fail to substantiate this assertion as in the west of Ireland, for instance, secondary school students have historically accounted for three out of every four emigrants (MacLaughlin 1997; Delaney 2002). Nevertheless, when dealing with the country as a whole there are some interesting qualifications to bring to this discussion. Graduate emigration reached a peak in 1988 when 26% of those leaving university sought employment overseas (Shuttleworth 1993). Since then levels have remained moderate at between 15 and 20%. The reasons for this are many and varied. When surveyed, more than one in eight graduates cited a change in ‘lifestyle’ as a key reason for emigrating – the most commonly occurring response. ‘Clearly Irish graduates view emigration in much the same way as mobility within Ireland; that is to say, as a commonplace of career planning especially because of the integration of the Irish labour market with that of the United Kingdom and the European Union’ (Shuttleworth 1993: 319). Again, figures confirm

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that Irish graduates prefer to move to mainland Europe rather than the USA, albeit Britain remains the most popular destination. In fact according to a Labour Force Survey conducted by the Central Statistics Office, graduates are twice as likely to emigrate to mainland Europe when compared to the general population ( National Economic and Social Council 1993). In this respect Europe remains something of an exception or, in the cases of Britain, USA and the rest of the world, graduates constitute a minority of all emigrants seeking employment overseas. In real terms Europe attracts almost twice as many Irish graduates as non-graduates (Shuttleworth 1993). These are people who view the move as an opportunity to enhance not only their employment prospects but their general ‘lifestyle’. Moreover more graduates prefer to settle in mainland Europe than any other part of the world (excluding Britain) whilst significantly exceeding the numbers settling in the USA or Australia. Historically the latter are two destinations to which Irish emigrants have been attracted. Even today with the Irish economy growing at an exponential rate, with close to full employment in the Republic of Ireland and a degree of affluence never before experienced, people are continuing to leave, albeit not to the same extent as was evident during previous emigrant ‘waves’ (Kirby 2002). The birth of the so-called ‘Ryanair Generation’ has witnessed the continued exodus of young graduates to Europe. This is a section of Irish society that fully embraces the opportunities afforded Irish men and women by being part of the EU and whose emigration is strategic and opportunistic if comparatively brief in nature (MacÉinrí 1991; Delaney 2002; Barrett 2005). Ryanair is a so-called ‘low cost’ airline, established by Irish entrepreneur Michael O’Leary, which has revolutionised air travel in Europe. With its headquarters in Dublin but flying into and out off most European countries, the company has provided travellers with a cheap and convenient mode of transport throughout the continent. Its success has highlighted two main issues, both metaphorically and in reality. Firstly, it has facilitated the short term emigration of many Irish men and women throughout Europe by providing the option of returning to Ireland on a regular basis and in an economically viable way. Secondly, Ryanair’s rise to prominence has been interpreted as a metaphor for the Irish economy generally and exists as an example of what can be achieved given the proper support and financial acumen. In part this has spawned a more entrepreneurial and capitalist spirit amongst Ireland’s twenty-something

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generation and convinced them of the benefits of exploring the European marketplace as a potential source of economic gain rather than awaiting subsidies or what euphemistically have been termed ‘hand outs’ from the EU (Clinch, Convery and Walsh 2002). Thus the argument advanced here is not so much that emigration is an issue tied to economic conditions in Ireland per se (although this is undoubtedly an important factor) rather that the focus should be on the potential opportunities such a decision presents for the individual concerned. The Celtic Tiger was a catalyst for some of the most pronounced trends in the history of Irish immigration (Clinch, Convery and Walsh 2002). As a result not only have some previous migrants returned home they have been joined by other EU citizens as well as people from many different parts of the world. It is interesting to note, in light of the chequered history of the migrating Irish, that the attitude of a minority of the host nation to this development has been one of animosity, resentment and ethnic intolerance. Some elements living in Ireland have proved to be antagonistic towards foreign nationals settling in Ireland as they may perceive a dilution of local identity and hold a fear that their employment prospects may be adversely affected due to the influx of new labour. Nevertheless, in spite of Ireland’s healthy economic status, people are still keen to explore opportunities overseas. Again this is not necessarily because of the absence of available options in Ireland but merely because the possibilities presented elsewhere are relatively more enticing. According to the Central Statistics Office an average of 25,000 people each year left Ireland in the second half of the 1990s (Delaney 2002).Whereas the overall trend remains downwards, there are peaks and troughs. For example, in 1998 just over 4000 Irish people left the country to relocate to a destination other than the UK, USA or mainland Europe. Less than twelve months later this figure had more than doubled to almost 9000, whilst similar fluctuations exist within emigrant flows to the UK (Delaney 2002). This raises a final point, touched upon earlier, which is worth highlighting before moving on to provide a brief background to the Irish in Europe. The pattern of movement demonstrated by the ‘new’ Irish migrants to the near continent is typically short term, certainly when viewed in relation to their North American counterparts. On the whole they are not settling in Europe’s key destinations for long periods of time but for two to three years before moving on elsewhere or, as is commonly the

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case, back to Ireland. This temporary emigration is a key difference between the profiles of those Irish men and women choosing to pursue life abroad in the present era and those that went before them. The consequence is that comparisons of Irish migrant trends across generations need to be carefully handled, mindful of the considerable differences that exist between both sets of experiences. As MacLaughlin (1997: 5) confirms ‘“New wave” emigrants from Ireland today are portrayed as people set apart from their predecessors by the professional and other educational qualifications, and from their peers by their spirit of adventure and enterprising spirit.’ The Irish in Europe The Irish have been emigrating to mainland Europe from at least the 12th century AD but up until comparatively recently their presence there has been negligible (Coogan 2002). There was certainly never the critical mass required to constitute a Diaspora (Mac An Ghaill 2001). In fact it was the mid-1980s before any significant new migration trend to nonAnglophone countries began in Ireland (MacÉinrí 1991; Danaher 1992). During the early 1990s, some 10% of Irish emigrants decided upon a continental European destination, usually in Germany, the Benelux countries, or France, with the greatest numbers going to Germany (MacÉinrí 1991). These figures, alongside others, confirm the significance of continental Europe for modern-day Irish migrants in terms of numbers, mindful of the extra significance EU countries have for those holding third level qualifications. ‘The widespread media concentration on the situation of Irish “illegals” in the USA has tended to obscure this emerging trend, although it would be fair to say that the two regions of destination, the USA and the European mainland, are by and large chosen by persons of very different regional and social backgrounds’ (MacÉinrí 1991: 33). Again, what is also clear is that the spatial movements of Irish emigrants have undergone a major shift, and whilst Europe is still some way behind Britain as a preferred option, it is no longer what MacÉinrí (1991: 33) refers to as ‘aberrant’. Whilst historically something of an exception, Irish migration to mainland Europe is nonetheless typical of an identifiable sub-group which functions according to redefined motivations and criteria. For instance ‘the Paris Irish are an example of a new phenomenon, i.e. migration led by a sub-group (the urban,

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well-off, well-educated middle class) which was not historically significant as a leader in mass migration movements’ (MacÉinrí 1991: 33). One of the most enduring aspects of Irish emigration to Europe is the existence of a clear affinity with the French nation (O’Leary 1978; Walsh 1978). This is a recurring aspect of Coogan’s (2002) commentary on the experiences of the Irish in France. He suggests that this relationship is rooted not only in the tradition of Columbanus and Columcille but in the close bond that had been established between great Irish clans and the French. There is also a clear link between the national artistic and commercial interests of both countries as, particularly throughout the latter part of the 18th century, Irish men and women grew to positions of prominence in the social, military and ecclesiastical realms (Gilbin 1978). Close relationships in military circles were particularly commonplace, with the role adopted by the Irish Brigades in France (up to their formal suppression in 1791) a consistent theme of scholarship in this field (Coogan 2002). In fact, developments in France throughout the latter part of the eighteenth century were believed to be critical in motivating the actions of the Irish Presbyterian and Catholic communities in Ireland, who shortly afterwards founded the Society of the United Irishmen. It is of little surprise therefore that to this day the largest proportion of Irish migrants in Europe is to be found in Paris, where an estimated 15,000 Irish men and women reside (MacÉinrí 1991). Indeed, it is to France and Europe generally that Irish men and women moved during the three main waves of emigration from the midnineteenth century to the late twentieth century. Having said this, most only made the short journey to Britain, settling in major towns and cities, primarily London, Manchester, Liverpool and Birmingham (Walter 1997). Conscious that the experiences of the Irish in Britain were not always favourable, it is interesting to note that the treatment Irish migrants to mainland Europe encountered was considerably more sympathetic than their fellow migrants to Britain. A focus on this serves to highlight the different ways in which discourses surrounding racial discrimination, colonialism and mass immigration are unpacked within different national settings. The UK and Ireland both joined the European Economic Community (EEC – now the EU) in 1973. In the ensuing twenty-five years, Ireland’s rate of export to the UK increased nearly twenty fold whilst, over the same period, it exported forty times as much to the rest of the EU.

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All of which meant that in a short time Ireland had become a significant player within the rest of Europe (Fagan 2002, 2003; Kenny 1997). Indeed this growth continued at such a rate that when the USA magazine Foreign Policy issued a ‘Globalization Index’ in 2001 it ranked, to the surprise of many, the Republic of Ireland in the top spot. Drawing upon key indicators including IT, finance, trade etc., the assessment concluded that Ireland’s ‘pro-business’ policies had been decisive factors in its rise to international profile. Thus, today the Republic of Ireland is one of the top economic performers in the EU (Sweeney 1999). The once marginalised and underdeveloped Western fringe has given way to a thriving economy and a cultural revival that has seen ‘being Irish’ as a desirable trait in social as well as economic terms. So the Celtic Tiger (a phrase born in 1994 when the USA investment bank queried whether there was a new Celtic Tiger about to join the family of East Asian Tiger economies) took hold and spawned an entire generation of Irish people for whom emigration need not be the only available option (Fagan 2002, 2003; Kenny 1997). However, this should not mask the inherent inequalities typical of any emerging economy. The fact is that a small number of internationally owned IT and pharmaceutical firms hold the balance of power within the Irish economy and, mindful of the susceptibility of these sectors to volatile market forces, the long term sustainability of this upward trend remains a matter of some doubt (Fagan 2002, 2003; Kenny 1997). The GAA in Europe Alongside a still buoyant economy, the contemporary cultural scene in Ireland has itself undergone major changes. Indeed for some, including O’Hearn (1998), an explicit link can be drawn between Ireland’s economic revival throughout the Western world and its new vibrant culture, which in turn has captivated a whole new audience following the success of Riverdance, foremost amongst a host of similar artistic productions to engage worldwide interest. The Irish have successfully exported this cultural ‘product’ throughout the world and it has proven to be a successful marketing tool for the country. The phenomenal success of Riverdance, Irish musical artists and bands alongside certain sporting representatives has stood in stark contrast to the seemingly insular approach adopted by the country’s largest sporting body, the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA). This indigenous organisation, which has almost

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one million members, promotes and regulates the Irish sports of Gaelic football, hurling and camogie. It has a presence in every part of Ireland and its major games, culminating in the All Ireland Finals, attract many tens of thousands of spectators. Indeed its principal stadium, Croke Park in Dublin, is recognised as one of the leading sports grounds in the world and, with a capacity of 82,000, is the third largest such venue in Europe. And yet all of this cannot hide the fact that its games have never attracted any substantial interest outside of Ireland, save amongst the Irish in Britain, North America and Australia. Even then the long term sustainability of Gaelic games in these three locations is by no means assured, as clubs fold and numbers dwindle and many men and women return home to Ireland. In contrast, interest in the GAA and its games continues to grow in Europe, albeit from a much more modest starting point. The significant difference between the situation of the GAA in the aforementioned countries and in Europe is the degree of involvement of foreign nationals in Europe. Admittedly the work of McCarthy (2007) does reveal that the practice of involving non-Irish nationals has long been in place throughout Australia. Furthermore it would be wrong to assume that GAA enthusiasts on mainland Europe are involving non-Irish nationals out of necessity. Several clubs, notably the Zurich hurling club, exist simply because significant numbers of non-Irish nationals in that city wish to play the game. Moreover, they do so almost exclusively for their own benefit. The same, broadly speaking, could be said about the GAA activity in Brittany and their contemporaries based in the Catalan region of Spain embodied in the Barcelona Gaels team. Gaelic sports have a peculiar local and national ethnic dimension, rather than the fact that they are necessarily Irish, which is the critical point. The compelling work of Jarvie (1999) makes this point very clear in the context of apparent Celtic connections. Of course Irish nationals are key office holders in these clubs and they retain a watching brief over the activities of the clubs in question but mainly there is a genuine willingness to become involved on the part of non-Irish members (Interview with B. Killeen, 2 June 2006; interview with D. Reidy, 11 July 2006. Mr. Killeen and Mr. Reidy are central figures in the administration of Gaelic games on the European mainland). Notwithstanding this there are still a great many clubs that are dominated by Irish nationals or have first and second generation Irish holding

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positions of authority and who are participating on the field of play. Yet it is this relatively peculiar phenomenon of Gaelic games being played by teams of foreigners, allied to generous and forward thinking Irish immigrants dotted throughout Europe, which defines GAA activity on the continent. This is not to suggest that clubs based in other parts of the world, such as the USA or Australia, are less forward thinking or generous towards non-Irish nationals because they may not be as successful in attracting such people. It merely highlights that in the case of GAA activity in Europe, which is overwhelmingly dominated by young Irish professionals keen to enhance their life experiences and make links with their host nations, the GAA can act a facilitator for intercultural exchange. Whilst GAA activity in Ireland remains strong its impact in other parts of the globe is minimal. Where Irish people are to be found abroad then interest and involvement in Gaelic games is on show. Indeed the recently formed GAA Overseas Committee estimates that there are approximately 30,000 adults and 7000 juveniles playing hurling and Gaelic football outside of Ireland in 350 clubs. County boards and clubs are now affiliated in all five continents with active Gaelic Development Programmes in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, North America and New York (www.hoganstand.com/european/ArticleForm.aspx; website accessed 1 September 2006). The most noteworthy development in this regard has been the extensive promotion of Gaelic games in Singapore following the All Star tour of 2005. Elsewhere Gaelic sports are played in some of the most unlikely of locations, including South Africa, South America and Poland, and no longer exclusively by people of Irish descent. In fact, nowhere is this more clearly demonstrated than in the case of Europe where a new games development plan was launched in 2006. Here there are presently twenty-two clubs spread throughout Scandinavia, France, the Benelux countries, Germany, Switzerland and southern Europe. Membership is currently running in excess of 750 people but this does not account for the great many others who are not officially attached to clubs but who engage with the GAA throughout Europe at a number of different levels ( www.hoganstand.com/ european/Article Form.aspx; website accessed 1 September 2006). The games are developing all over Europe with youth programmes thriving in Rennes, Brussels and Barcelona. In 2005 a raft of new clubs were formed, most notably Maastricht, alongside the continued growth of clubs based in Budapest,

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Copenhagen and Vienna. Northern European cities with a strong commercial and economic base attract most Irish migrants who are seeking (or more commonly have secured) employment with major international corporations located in the central business district. Hence, when examining the Gaelic games scene in Europe two main themes emerge which aid our understanding of the place of GAA activity on mainland Europe. The first, to confirm a previous point, is the increasing numbers of young, well educated and confident Irish men and women to be found in major cities throughout northern and central Europe. Whilst some have lived in the region for many years the majority are temporary emigrants. Again most are well paid, mobile professionals working in the finance, banking, IT and recruitment sectors. This profile is in line with an Irish migrant typology established by MacÉinrí (1991) who, in recognising the more complex patterns of contemporary migration, nonetheless identifies a number of quite separate sub-groups. European migrants fall into the first ‘type’ of migrant, well-educated and from the middle classes, which has emerged over the last two decades. ‘Modern emigrants are likely to be comparatively well-educated and to include an important minority of highly qualified graduates….. The motivations of the middle-class emigrant are as likely to be non-economic as work driven’ (MacÉinrí 1991: 37). Their Irish identities are a more modern construct and are unburdened by the negative image of the Irish émigré, which existed as recently as the mid-1980’s. During the period Irishmen and women that had settled in various parts of the world had been subject to racial abuse by small numbers of natives who employed outdated stereotypes to marginalise and oppress the Irish immigrant community. These included portraying them as lazy, drunkards and untrustworthy and, in some cases, terrorists. Whilst some are very accomplished Gaelic games players most use the GAA scene as an opportunity to meet fellow Irishmen and women and to engage in mutually shared social, cultural and sporting interests (Interview with B. Killeen, 2 June 2006). However, it should be noted that migrants can and do arrive in mainland Europe for other reasons. Some are posted there by the Irish state for the purposes of international diplomacy or as members of the armed forces. Others have no recognised academic qualifications but pursue work in public houses, hotels and restaurants in the same way some foreign nationals do in Ireland. Finally, a significant number are current third level students who are either undertaking a

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‘gap’ year or are working on the European mainland during the summer months and whose residency therefore rarely extends beyond one calendar year. The other issue worth highlighting is the strong non-Irish presence amongst certain GAA clubs, examples include those based in Brittany and Barcelona (Interview with B. Killeen, 2 June 2006). This is essentially because people from the Breton and Catalan regions are able to relate to and appreciate the value of indigenous games for an ethnic group and chose to engage with Gaelic sports on this basis. In both cases the games are of such interest to those involved that they participate in Gaelic football and hurling ahead of other global pastimes. That they do so with minimal Irish involvement is all the more remarkable as they appear to exercise a degree of autonomy which belies the true origins of the games. The Brittany and Loire Atlantique regions of France are home to some 300,000 Breton speakers, a language descended from the Brythonic branch of Insular Celtic languages (MacÉinrí 1991). It is the only Celtic language in the world not officially recognised by its host state, a fact that has been the source of increasing frustration for those who regularly use it. To do so would require a change in article 2 of the national constitution, which explicitly states that the language of the Republic shall be French (MacÉinrí 1999). A result has been a resurgence of cultural identity and a concomitant interest in other Celtic ethnicities. Thus for the Breton speaking people of France, the ancient Irish sport of hurling is particularly popular with representative sides composed exclusively of those born in the region. In fact the Breton Gaels have even instigated their own federation to help promote and gain national recognition for Gaelic sports within France, the Federation Francaise de Football Gaelique. Coaching structures have been established and cooperation with some 20 schools in the Rennes district has led to a growth in Gaelic games activity in the region. The Championnat de Bretagne (Brittany Club Championships) is administered under the auspices of the Association Francaise des Sports Gaelique and features almost exclusively French-born players. The well established clubs in Brest and Rennes have been supplemented in recent years with sides in Merdrignac and Bains-sur-Oust. Such developments are reflective of the very strong efforts being made by the GAA and the Irish community in the region to promote Gaelic games. Alongside the appeal Gaelic games have for the Bretons, interest in creating a GAA

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team was also shown by a French army battalion based in the region as their commander believed Gaelic Football to be perfect in ensuring good physical fitness amongst his soldiers. This is in addition to recognition of Gaelic football as an official sport by officers of the French Foreign Legion, which means that recruits can participate in the game for the purposes of physical training and fitness in the same way they would for any other international sporting code (Interview with D. Reidy, 11 July 2006). In a fascinating account of Celtic Revivalism in Europe, Jarvie (1999) highlights the case of Breton ethnic identity. In doing so he also makes a broader point about submerged nationalisms. Referring to the specific role of sport in the celebration of the Celtic ‘nation’ he hails its contribution to ‘the conviviality and solidarity, resistance and struggle, and sheer accessibility within and between the configuration and development of Celtic cultures’ (1999: 6). He claims the survival and vibrancy of Celtic cultures is ‘a triumph of popular memory over the kind of forgetting that suits the powerful’ (1999: 6). This gives some contextual appreciation of the particular significance ethnic games have for fellow (oppressed) ethnic groups. Whilst the Breton’s interest in GAA may appear unique, in fact the same is broadly true of the Zurich hurling team in Switzerland. What is even more remarkable, in light of this, is that the latter is widely regarded as the leading hurling club on mainland Europe, despite the almost total absence of any Irish nationals on the team. Whilst this may indicate that the level of competition on show is not particularly high, the tournaments are in fact fiercely contested, albeit not to the same extent as in the North American championships. The difference is that in North America leading Irish players are recruited to play following attractive offers made to them by established clubs. This is certainly not the case in Europe. Here, there is simply not the comparable level of interest, or financial backing, in the games; individual clubs rely on word of mouth and personal contacts to attract players. Zurich therefore is a side with only nominal Irish involvement and is instead viewed as a Swiss club served by a mix of physical education teachers and active sportsmen possessing the necessary dexterity to play the game. The fact that it is hurling, not Gaelic football, which is adopted as the sport of choice is interesting on two levels. Firstly, for many, hurling is viewed as the quintessential Irish sport and secondly,

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compared to Gaelic football, the skills of hurling are difficult to master and have only limited transference from other codified sports. Of course, in recognising and accepting this it underlines the importance of distinguishing between the promotion of Gaelic games by members of the Irish Diaspora, on the one hand, and the establishment of clubs/playing of the games by non-Irish nationals on the other. However, these examples also confirm that across a number of levels a fair degree of cooperation exists between both parties. In dealing with the development of hurling throughout Europe, the growth of the sport in The Netherlands, specifically The Hague, owes much to the interest shown in it by a hockey club in Amsterdam called, appropriately enough, ‘Hurley Club’. The latter, as part of its centenary celebrations, approached the GAA to arrange two hurling teams to provide a demonstration of the game for its members. Consequently Clare and Wexford played an exhibition match, which was attended by the First Secretary at the Irish Embassy in The Hague at the time, Mr. Noel Kilkenny. It also served as a meeting point for several Irish exiles, whose conversations led to the formation of the first ever GAA team from The Hague to play Brussels and Luxembourg in a triangular tournament held in Cambrai, France. These developments constituted the formative years of what is now recognised as the Den Hagg Club, so called because it grew out of informal meetings between Irish exiles interested in Gaelic sports in Zulder Park, the home of the renowned soccer club FC Den Hagg. The growth of hurling in The Netherlands has been unprecedented in European GAA circles. During the summer of 2006, some 90 secondary school physical education teachers attended coaching sessions overseen by leading Irish hurling coaches. Since then another club, Amsterdam GAC, was formed which caters for Irish exiles in the city who share a mutual interest in GAA activities. The Irish Club Netherlands (De Jerse Vereniging Nederland) was founded in 1984 to provide a focal point for Irish people living in the Netherlands. However the playing of Gaelic games in Europe is not without its difficulties (Interview conducted with J. McCann, 8 June 2006). To begin with, the distance between clubs has had a profound impact upon the ability to hold regular matches, meaning that GAA tournaments rather than one off matches are the preferred option for most teams. Whilst there are strong clubs in Paris, Munich and Barcelona, travelling to Luxembourg or The Hague places a considerable strain upon the finances of

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the competing clubs not to mention the capacity of individual members to commit to what are, after all, amateur pastimes. Typically the numbers actively competing in the games are small so seven-a-side or eleven-aside matches are the norm, conveniently so as finding larger pitches to facilitate fifteen-a-side matches is problematic. Finally, playing Gaelic games in Europe is unlikely ever to be as attractive for young Irish men and women as doing so in North America. Thus the development and long term sustainability of the games on the continent appear to owe more to the people of the regions in which they are played than the Irish émigré itself. The migratory patterns of Irish people to Europe may indeed prove short term but it seems the people of the countries and cities in which they reside are more interested than most in sustaining and playing Gaelic games long after their visitors have moved on. Conclusion The cultural critic Terry Eagleton (1997:6) once wrote that while, on the one hand, Ireland signifies ‘roots, belonging, tradition’, it also spells at the same time ‘exile, diffusion, globality, Diaspora..’ This chapter has examined the latter through a focus on the place of Gaelic games activity in Europe. In part what it has demonstrated is that the ethos underpinning the GAA in Ireland, its ‘roots, belonging, tradition’, resonates with a great many people outside of Ireland too. Hence the apparent fascination the sports of Gaelic football (male and female forms) and hurling have on the near continent, particularly amongst those communities familiar with the need to preserve a particular ethnic identity. In this case it has also facilitated a particular form of hibernicisation, the quintessential Gaelic sports of Ireland, promoted ironically by a modern, cosmopolitan and upwardly mobile Irish generation, acting as a sporting introduction to unusual and foreign lands. Although Gaelic games have a relatively recent history on the European mainland, those with an interest in the GAA have lost little time advancing the profile of their sports through a policy of inclusion that has actively sought the participation of natives. Of course this should not cloud the fact that the Irish Diaspora in Europe is similar in many ways to their contemporaries elsewhere throughout the world. The Irish émigré remains a heterogeneous collective and whilst some actively seek assimilation, others draw upon and engage with those aspects of the host society that will allow them to get

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ahead whilst retaining some of their own practices and others continue to act in a broadly insular manner. This chapter suggests that, if those involved in the promotion of Gaelic games in Europe are anything to go by, the Irish Diaspora based on the continent is keen to promote its presence and engage with those who demonstrate interest in ‘their’ sports. They use Gaelic games as a point of entry into local schools and communities and actively seek the participation of teachers, civic leaders and local people to ensure their acceptance and sustainability. Of course this is not to understate the role GAA activities also perform for the ‘European’ Irish. They use GAA clubs, more than 20 at the last count, as a focal point to meet, discuss matters of mutual interest and engage in debate and discussion about Irish current affairs in exactly the same way Irish people do the world over. They are European ‘citizens’ in the full sense of the term and their capacity to retain and promote multiple identity forms, of which a European identity is one, provides a useful window into the lives of an Irish generation that recognises the value of its rich cultural tapestry and sees the benefit of promoting this throughout the continent. In fact many of those surveyed for this research had little or no involvement in the GAA when they lived in Ireland and have come to the scene for the first time in its European form. For them, as well as other Irish men and women, it fulfils an invaluable role in allowing the establishment of a mutually dependent network of émigré amid unfamiliar surroundings.

References Akenson, D. H. 1994. The Irish Diaspora: A Primer. Toronto, Canada: Meany. Akenson, D. H. 2000. Irish Migration to North America, 1800-1920. In The Irish Diaspora. A. Bielenberg, ed. 111- 138. London: Pearson. Almeida, L. 1992. ‘And They Still Haven’t Found What They’re Looking For’: A Survey of the New Irish in New York City. In Patterns of Migration (Vol. 1). P. O’Sullivan, ed. 196-197. Leicester, UK: Leicester University Press. Barrett, A. 2005. Irish Migration: Characteristics, Causes, and Consequences. In European Migration. K. Zimmermann, ed. Pp 44- 63. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bjarkman, P.C. 1992. Forgotten Americans and the National Pastime: Literature on Baseball’s Ethnic, Religious and Racial Diversity. Multi-Cultural Review 1:46-8.

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Bradley, J.M. 1998. Sport, Culture, Politics and Scottish Society: Irish Immigrants and the Gaelic Athletic Association. Edinburgh, Scotland: John Donald Publishers Ltd. Bradley, J.M. 2007. Gaelic Sport, Soccer and Irishness in Scotland. Sport and Society 10(3): 439 – 456. Clinch, P., F. Convery and B. Walsh. 2002. After the Celtic Tiger: Challenges Ahead. Dublin: O’Brien. Coogan, T.P. 2002. Wherever Green is Worn: The Story of the Irish Diaspora. London: Palgrave MacMillan. Courtney, D. 2000. A Quantification of Irish Migration with Particular Emphasis on the 1980s and 1990s. In The Irish Diaspora. A. Bielenberg, ed. 287-316. London: Pearson. Cronin, M. 1999. Sport and Nationalism in Ireland. Four Courts Press: Dublin. Danaher, N. 1992. Irish Studies: A Historical Survey Across the Irish Diaspora. In The Irish in the New Communities (Vol. 2). P. O’Sullivan, ed. 226-256. Leicester, UK: Leicester University Press. Darby, P. 2003. Gaelic Sport and the Irish Diaspora in Boston 1879 – 90. Irish Historical Studies 33(132): 387-403. Darby, P. 2005. Gaelic Games and the Irish Immigrant Experience in Boston. In Sport and the Irish: Historical, Political and Sociological Perspectives. A. Bairner, ed. 85-104. Dublin: UCD Press. Darby, P. 2006. Emigrants at Play: Gaelic Games and the Irish Diaspora in Chicago, 1884 – c.1990. Sport in History 26(1): 47-63. Darby, P. and D. Hassan 2007. Introduction: Locating Sport in the Study of the Irish Diaspora. Sport and Society 10(3): 333-346. Delaney, E. 2002. Irish Emigration Since 1921. Dublin: Dundalgan Press. Dickson, R. 1988. Ulster Emigration to Colonial America, 1718-1775. Belfast: Ulster Historical Foundation. Duignan, H. 2004. Keeping the Game Alive: One Hundred years of Camogie in Britain. London: Erin go Bragh GAA and Camogie Club. Eagleton, T. 1997. The ideology of Irish Studies. Bullan 1(1): 5-14. Fagan, G.H. 2002. Globalization and Culture: Placing Ireland. Annals, AAPSS 581: 133-143. Fagan, G.H. 2003. Globalised Ireland, or, Contemporary Transformations of National Identity? In The End of Irish History? Critical Reflections on the Celtic Tiger. C. Coulter, and S. Coleman, eds. Pp, 36-56. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. ‘GAA Development Continues Overseas’. Electronic document, www.hoganstand.com/european/ArticleForm.aspx. Accessed 1 September 2006. Gilbin, C. 1978. The Irish Colleges on the Continent. In The Irish-French Connection 1578/1978. L. Swords, ed. 36-49. Paris: The Irish College.

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Hickman, M. 2005. Migration and Diaspora. In Cambridge Companion to Modern Irish Culture. J. Cleary and C. Connolly, eds. 117-136. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jarvie, G. 1999. Sport in the Making of Celtic Cultures. In Sport in the Making of Celtic Cultures. G. Jarvie, ed. 1-11. Leicester, UK: Leicester University Press. Kearney, R. 1992. The Fifth Province: Between the Global and the Local. In Migrations: The Irish at Home and Abroad. R. Kearney, ed. 109-122. Dublin: Wolfhound Press. Kennedy, R. 1973. The Irish: Emigration, Marriage and Fertility. Berkeley: University of California Press. Kenny, M. 1997. Goodbye to Catholic Ireland: A Social, Personal and Cultural History From the Fall of Parnell to the Realm of Mary Robinson. London: SinclairStevenson. Killeen, B. 2006. Personal Interview, 2 June. King, S.J. 1998. The Clash of the Ash in Foreign Fields: Hurling Abroad. Cashel, Ireland: Tipperary. Kirby, P. 2002. The Celtic Tiger in Distress: Growth with Inequality in Ireland. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave. Kirkham, G. 1992. The Origins of Mass Emigration from Ireland. In Migrations: The Irish at Home and Abroad. R. Kearney, ed. 81-90. Dublin: Wolfhound Press. Millward, P. 2006. We’ve All Got the Bug for Euro-Aways. International Review for the Sociology of Sport 41(3-4): 375-393. Munslow, A. 1992. A ‘Bigger, Better and Busier Boston’ In Patterns of Migration (Vol. 1). R. Kearney, ed. 32-43. Leicester, UK: Leicester University Press. Mac An Ghaill, M. 2001. British Critical Theorists: The Production of the Conceptual Invisibility of the Irish Diaspora. Social Identities 7(2): 178-202. Mac Éinrí, P. 1991. The Irish in Paris: an Aberrant Community? In Geographical Society of Ireland Special Publications, No 6. R. King, ed. 32-41. Dublin: Geographical Society of Ireland. MacÉinrí, P. 2000 Introduction. In The Irish Diaspora. A. Bielenberg, ed. 1 - 16. London: Pearson. MacLaughlin, J. 1997. Ireland: The Immigrant Nursery and the World Economy. Cork, Ireland: Cork University Press. McCann, J. 2006. Personal Interview, 8 June. McCaffrey, L.J. 1997. The Irish Catholic Diaspora in America. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press. McCarthy, N. 2007. Enacting Irish Identity in Western Australia: Performances from the Dressing Room. Sport in Society 10(3): 368 – 384. National Economic and Social Council 1993. Dublin: The Government of Ireland. O’Day, A. 1990. A Survey of the Irish in England. London: Hambledon Press. O’Hearn, D. 1998. Inside the Celtic Tiger: The Irish Economy and the Asian Model. London: Pluto Press.

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O’Leary, J. 1978. The Irish and Janseniam in the Seventeenth Century. In The Irish-French Connection 1578/1978. L. Swords, ed. 56-73. Paris: The Irish College. O’Sullivan, P. 1992. Introduction: The Irish in the New Communities. In The Irish in the New Communities (Vol. 2). P. O’Sullivan, ed. 1-14. Leicester, UK: Leicester University Press. Reidy, D. 2006. Personal Interview, 11 July. Reiss, S.A. 1992. Sport, Race and Ethnicity in the American City, 1879 – 1950. In Immigration and Ethnicity: American Society – ‘Melting Pot’ or ‘Salad Bowl’? M. D’Innocenzo, and J.P. Sirefman, eds. Westport, CT and London: Greenwood. Ryan, L. 1992. Irish Emigration to Britain since World War II. In Migrations: The Irish at Home and Abroad. R. Kearney, ed. 46-63. Dublin: Wolfhound Press. Shuttleworth, I. 1993. Irish Graduate Emigration: The Mobility of Qualified Manpower in the Context of Peripherality. In Mass Migration in Europe. R. King, ed. 23-42. Chichester, UK: John Wiley and Sons. Sweeney, P. 1999. The Celtic Tiger: Ireland’s Continuing Economic Miracle. Dublin: Oak Tree. Swift, R. 1992. The Historiography of the Irish in Nineteenth-Century Britain. In The Irish in the New Communities (Vol. 2). P. O’Sullivan, ed. 52-81. Leicester, UK: Leicester University Press. Walsh, M. 1978. Irish Soldiers and the Irish College in Paris, 1706- 1971. In The Irish-French Connection 1578/1978. L. Swords, ed. 78- 93. Paris: The Irish College. Walter, B. 1997. Contemporary Irish Settlement in London: Women’s Worlds, Men’s World. In Location and Dislocation in Contemporary Irish Society. J. MacLaughlin, ed. P. 61-93. Cork, Ireland: Cork University Press. Wilcox, R.C. 1992. Sport and the Nineteenth Century Immigrant Experience. In Immigration and Ethnicity: American Society – ‘Melting Pot’ or ‘Salad Bowl’? M. D’Innocenzo and J.P. Sirefman, eds. 56-74. Westport, CT and London: Greenwood.

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UNITED IN WHITENESS? IRISHNESS, EUROPEANNNESS AND THE EMERGENCE OF A ‘WHITE EUROPE’ POLICY Robbie McVeigh Abstract This chapter asks what the specific experience of Irishness teaches us about the idea of ‘race’ and its relationship to ‘Europeaness’ and whiteness. It traces the process whereby Europe became ‘white’ and suggests that this is a core element of European identity. It also suggests that this legacy of whiteness is being profoundly reconfigured in the context of contemporary migration and the ongoing construction of the European Union. This project offers a intriguing perspective on the synergy between Hibernicisation and Europeanisation. This is illustrated by two Irish case studies. The first is an analysis of the way in which Irish migration policy has been shaped by the European Union, especially in regard to employment and migrant labour strategies. The second is an analysis of the Irish response to the ‘Chen case’ and resultant changes in Irish citizenship and nationality. This examination of the connection between Europeanness and Irishness raises uncomfortable questions about the contemporary European project and its outworking in terms of racism. The EU is currently uniting in whiteness. ‘Fortress Europe’ not ‘Sanctuary Europe’ remains the defining metaphor for the contemporary European project. This process is institutionally racist and profoundly anti-humanist - the very antithesis of becoming ‘united in diversity’. This chapter asks what the specific experience of Irishness teaches us about the idea of ‘race’ and its relationship to ‘Europeaness’ and the construction of the European Union. This obviously begs the question of what it is to be European. This chapter suggests that the answer lies

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increasingly in whiteness. It traces the process whereby Europe became ‘white’ and suggests that this is a core element of European identity. It also suggests that this legacy of whiteness is being profoundly reconfigured in the ongoing construction of the European Union, as the new Europe becomes ‘whitened’ again in the context of contemporary migration. This chapter offers a perspective on the synergy between Hibernicisation and Europeanisation. In some ways the very weakness of the contemporary Irish state makes it easier to trace the tension between the openness of the Irish state to Europeans and its closure to almost everyone else. This is illustrated by two Irish case studies. The first case study is the way in which Irish migration policy has been changed by its relationship with the European Union, especially in regard to its employment and migrant labour strategies. The second is the ‘Chen case’ and the profound changes this forced in terms of Irish citizenship and nationality. Not surprisingly we find different dynamics north and south of the Irish border. Nevertheless these work towards a broadly similar consequence in terms of the whitening of migration - new Eastern European migrant workers are presently replacing non-Europeans of colour both north and south of the border. This process is a direct consequence of European employment and migration policy. Thus the contemporary migration regimes in Ireland, north and south, combine as a classic example of Europeanisation. The character of migration is increasingly determined by the EU rather than British and Irish state policy. This has happened across the European Union but the forms it takes – and their consequences – are country-specific. For example, the British state (and therefore Northern Ireland) has severed its specific relationship with the citizens of former British colonies – the migrant workers that constituted the new Black British working class in the 1950s and 1960s. Likewise the Republic of Ireland has replaced the pluralism of its ‘Celtic Tiger’ inmigration with a specific recruitment from EEA (European Economic Area) countries and the exclusion of others.1 The case of Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v Secretary of State for the Home Department had EU-wide implications (European Court Reports 2004). The case became popularly identified as the ‘Chen case’ although this was misleading since it was primarily about the rights of 1 The contracting parties to the EEA Agreement are three of the four EFTA states - Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway – and the 27 EU Member States. Switzerland is linked to the European Union by bilateral agreements.

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Kunqian Catherine Zhu, a minor with Irish and EU citizenship. Irish nationality law conferred EU citizenship in cases like Kunqian Catherine Zhu’s through its application to the whole island of Ireland - thereby transcending the formal sovereignty of the two EU member states on the island (Republic of Ireland and UK). Irish reaction to the case led to fundamental changes in Irish citizenship and nationality - most obviously emblemized by the Citizenship referendum. The referendum - and consequent legislation and practice - was a direct consequence of European sensitivities over the openness of Irish citizenship law following the 1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA). The nuances and silences associated with this case – which profoundly changed the nature of Irishness and also undermined the GFA – provide a unique example of the raciallycoded European project in action. In combination, progressive EU-wide restrictions on asylum, migration, and citizenship impact disproportionately on non-European people of colour. New forms of white privilege are emerging, albeit drawing on centuries of imperialism and white supremacy. We find the European Union engaged in a form of racial osmosis – white people can access the EU with relative ease while people of colour cannot. The intentions of this approach are a moot point – European humanism remains outraged at the idea that this might involve exclusion on racial grounds – but its consequences are a white Europe policy. How Europe Became White Whiteness studies or ‘critical white studies’ is an area of theory and research focused on the deconstruction of the idea of race and an analysis of the social construction of whiteness as an ideology and practice (Delgado and Stefancic 1997). It also addresses the nature of white identity and white privilege (McIntosh 1990) and the ‘impact of racism on those who perpetuate it’ (Morrison 1992). Initially it centered specifically on the role of whiteness in the subordination of African Americans in the USA (Frankenberg 1993; Morrison 1992; Roediger 2007). A key part of this work focussed on ‘white ethnic’ migrants in the US (Jacobson 1999). Irishness – or more specifically Irishness in the USA – has been central to much of this analysis. Here Noel Ignatiev’s How the Irish Became White (1996) is definitive but the examination of the relationship between Irishness and whiteness is central to much of the other work (Roediger 2007; Jacobson 1999). Steve Garner (2006) has usefully characterized the applicability of this approach to a European context. His work too has

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specifically addressed whiteness and Irishness or the question of ‘How the Irish became white (again)’ (Garner 2007). Suzanna Chan (2005) has also illustrated how this focus on whiteness can be used in critically unpacking contemporary Irishness in Ireland. Irishness has thus already offered a particular prism through which to understand whiteness. Drawing on this work, we can begin to trace the evolution of whiteness in a European context. There is of course plenty of history to draw on. Despite the relative absence of critical work, whiteness is arguably more deeply embedded in Europe even than in the US. The Roman Empire was constructed against a ‘barbarian’ other. This influenced all subsequent European development – including the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire.2 The idea of Europe was subsequently constructed against a Saracen other – here we find the deep roots of contemporary European Islamophobia. Europeanness was consolidated against Jewish and Gypsy others - both of these groups arriving within Europe as migrants. Finally, Europeanness was constructed against a non-white other in its colonial and imperial projects from 1492 onwards. In other words, historical Europeanness is only understandable in relation to these series of racial and ethnic ‘encounters’ with people of colour. So the elective affinity between whiteness and the idea of Europe is hardly a new thing. However, historically this was determined by the character of the independent states of Europe. The whiteness of Britishness was determined by British imperial state policy, the whiteness of Frenchness by French policy and so on. Moreover, some European countries like Ireland did not exhibit the same elective affinity with whiteness. Having neither colonies nor significant migrant worker populations of colour, whiteness was a much less significant aspect of national identity in this other Europe. On the contrary, Irish people ‘became white’ on leaving Europe (Ignatiev 1996).3 This is of course as much a construct of post-facto rationalizing than any accurate reflection of phenotypical hierarchies within the Roman Empire. For example, the Italian Fascist racial laws of the 1930s identified an Aryan identity to Italian/Roman history under the influence of Nazism. This move carried a contemporary racial logic – since the alliance with Nazism was being built - but undermined the more accurate and more commonly accepted notion of Rome as a Latin or Mediterranean empire (Gillette 2003). 3 Although Chan questions this: ‘with a nod to Noel Ignatiev, we can ask did the Irish really have to wait until they got to America to ‘become white’ by differentiating themselves from ‘nonwhiteness’?’ (2005: 21). 2

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This has however changed gradually but profoundly with the construction of the EU project. These member states are now ‘united in diversity’ and their European whiteness has a concrete policy reality as well as a symbolic one. We might suggest that most of Europe has been white for centuries but that we are now seeing the EU becoming white. This is the most interesting and problematic dimension of the evolution of contemporary whiteness. Of course the idea of Europe and the idea of the European Union are not the same things.4 Increasingly, however, the European Union is becoming the defining context for Europeanness. Here we move from intangible identity questions to more tangible issues about evolving institutions and structures. As Etienne Balibar asked so provocatively: what are we doing in Europe? Building or destroying sovereignty? (Balibar 2004). Wherever this sovereignty lies on the continuum between the United States of Europe and a single European Union Superstate, what is the foundation myth? What makes this apparently arbitrary space become a polity? What allows and defines its imagined community? What is the essence of Europeanness that embeds the European project? At least part of the answer is found in the fact that Europe has been white for centuries. In this sense the idea of Europe is inherently racist – its legacy of racially-coded genocide, enslavement and colonisation is what defines it. Certainly, this history can be neither ignored nor erased by a couple of apologies and talk of celebrating diversity. This tradition of dead generations weighs heavily on the brains of the living ‘European’. For all the silences on the issue, whiteness matters to Europe and Europeans. It is the thesis of this chapter that it matters increasingly to the European Union. There is, however, also a sea-change here. The whiteness of imperial Europe was the whiteness of a dominant, expanding colonialism – it took its whiteness to other continents and visited it upon other peoples. The coming whiteness of the EU belongs to a different era – it is defensive, it is about keeping people out. It is a whiteness forged more out of a perception of siege than consciousness of the ‘white man’s burden’.

4 For example, the Council of Europe remains a larger and more inclusive European project boasting ‘800 million Europeans’ and 47 ‘member states’ (Council of Europe 2008).

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The European Union and the Development of a ‘White Europe’ Policy Race has never been absent from the discourse of European unity. For example, Churchill was very explicit about the racial credentials of the proposed new European project in his seminal ‘Let Europe Arise’ speech in 1946: Europe, this noble Continent, comprising on the whole the fairest and the most cultivated regions of the earth enjoying a temperate and equable climate, the home of all the great parent races of the western world, the foundation of Christian faith and Christian ethics. It is the origin of most of the culture, arts, philosophy, and science both of ancient and modern times (1946, emphasis added).

As the project unfolded, such explicit racial logic was dropped and replaced by the supposed inherent humanism of Europe. This was distilled in the Preamble of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in 2004: Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law (EUROPA 2004).

However, this ‘inheritance’ looks fairly dubious when it is held up to historical and contemporary actions. After the horrors of the slave trade and Nazi genocide, the notion of some easy European humanist inheritance seems hard to sustain. We might also observe that this has no basis in contemporary reality – it is difficult to defend in the aftermath of the post-facto legitimation of the invasion of sovereign countries. Thus both the causes and the consequences of European involvement in the invasion of Iraq appear to completely contradict the thesis – there is little evidence of any respect for human rights or freedom or democracy or equality or rule of law. Still the fiction is maintained. The quintessential expression of this notion of Europe came in the ‘united in diversity’ tagline of the failed European Union constitution.5 This – apparently anti-racist and multicultural self-definition – would be the very watchword of the new European state. Thus EUROPA tells us: “United in diversity” is the motto of the European Union. It first came into use around the year 2000 and was for the first time officially mentioned in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, which was signed in 5

See Article 1-8 ‘Symbols of the Union’ (Europa 2004).

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2004. Article I-8 lists which are the symbols of the EU. The motto means that, via the EU, Europeans are united in working together for peace and prosperity, and that the many different cultures, traditions and languages in Europe are a positive asset for the continent (2007a).

In the context of ‘Fortress Europe’, however, the idea of a celebration of diversity appears woefully hollow (BBC News 2005). For example, at least 11,400 people have died since 1988 along EU frontiers (Fortress Europe 2007). Migreurop identifies hundreds of ‘internment camps’ for non-EU citizens across the EU and beyond.6 The first EU agency to be situated in a new accession state is charged with ‘border security’.7 The myth of ‘unity in diversity’ does not hold up in the face of this ever expanding infrastructure of exclusion. The construction of legal and physical borders around the EU looks specifically designed to prevent any possibility of meaningful diversity. Thus the continuous references to diversity, democracy and freedom appear more like imperial psychosis than any reflection of European tradition. If this repudiation of the explicit narrative of European integration is correct, something else makes Europe ‘united’. What holds contemporary Europeanness together is something other than the lofty humanism and multiculturalism of the ‘united in diversity’ motto. Here we can offer a number of alternatives: geography, colonial legacy and Christianity. The oldest and most obvious argument can be made in terms of geographical proximity. The European Union might say ‘we are united simply because we are in juxtaposition’. This is a real dynamic but it is also fundamentally contradictory. For example, Turkey should get in on this basis along with all the states of the former Yugoslavia and everywhere else that connects to a geographical Europe. On this basis Morocco was rightly excluded from membership; but then Algeria was a member of the EEC 6 ‘Though internment camps have very diverse features … they also have common characteristics. The first one is their occupants: citizens of non-European countries who have committed no offence other than crossing or trying to cross a border without papers. A second characteristic is that "illegal migrants" are considered and managed as a group, instead of being treated as individuals with a personal history. Thirdly, it seems impossible to ensure the respect of fundamental rights in these places. There is no freedom of movement; basic rights to asylum, to family life and private life, as well as minors rights are not guaranteed, while inhumane and degrading treatments are often perpetrated’ (Migreurop 2005). 7 Frontex, ‘the EU agency based in Warsaw, was created as a specialised and independent body tasked to coordinate the operational cooperation between Member States in the field of border security’ (Frontex 2007).

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until it withdrew on independence.This reminds us that some parts of member countries are not part of the EU, although they are part of the European continent and linked to polities within the EU – like the Channel Islands and Faroe Islands.8 On the other hand, some overseas territories are formally part of the EU even though they are not geographically part of Europe, such as the Azores, the Canary Islands, French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Madeira, Martinique and Réunion. In 2008 the Caribbean islands of Bonaire, Saba and Saint Eustatius became part of the Netherlands as special municipalities thereby becoming part of the European Union. This was the first enlargement entirely outside geographical Europe. The geographical proximity thesis is therefore real but also profoundly contradictory. Ultimately, union on the basis of geographical proximity is a weak force. Alternatively, the EU might make its argument in terms of the notion of historical community of colonial nations. Here again there is a core element of truth – the history of European states is, mostly, a history of imperialist powers. It is also the case that the tagline ‘united in colonialism, slavery and genocide’ is less obviously appealing than ‘united in diversity’. Nevertheless, this imperial vision has been resurrected in terms of the future ambitions of the EU. In 2007, Manuel Barroso, as President of the European Commission, said: We are not the United States of Europe — we are unique in the history of mankind! Sometimes I like to compare the EU as a creation to the organisation of empires. We have the dimension of empire but there is a difference. Empires were made with force with a centre imposing diktat. Now what we have is the first non-imperial empire. We have 27 countries that fully decided to work together and to pool their sovereignty. I believe it is a great construction and we should be proud of it” (cited in Charter 2007).

There is clearly something in the legacy of imperialism and collusion with imperialism. Here nearly every European country qualifies, especially if collusion is read widely. For example, in terms of our own focus, the Irish were colonised Europeans but many Irish participated very actively in the military and religious colonisation of the world. While the legacy of colonialism is real, however, it is not definitive. On this crite8 In addition, several territories associated with EU member states that are outside geographic Europe are also not part of the EU (including Greenland, Aruba, the Netherlands Antilles and most of the non-European territories associated with the United Kingdom).

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rion, for example, Turkey would qualify much more straightforwardly than Ireland. Historically Turkey was recognised as the ‘sick man of Europe’ because of its imperial malaise. Ironically its Europeanness only became contested once it had lost its colonial empire. Christianity has also often offered an alternative foundation myth to European integration. This is being reinforced in the context of the ‘war on terror’ and European Islamophobia. It is however too inclusive. This Christian world would include Latin America and large parts of Africa. Many of the migrant workers that places like Ireland are now excluding are from intensely Christian countries like the Philippines. If Christianity is a characteristic, it is offered exclusively to white Christians. We can suggest therefore that the quality that increasingly defines Europeanness is simply being white. In recent years we have seen this emerging ideologically and practically. Perhaps the clearest example is the crisis around Turkish accession to the EU. Turkish accession is opposed by many different EU countries (Sarkozy 2007). For example, French President Nicholas Sarkozy (as presidential candidate) argued in January 2007: Enlarging Europe with no limit risks destroying European political union, and that I do not accept...I want to say that Europe must give itself borders, that not all countries have a vocation to become members of Europe, beginning with Turkey which has no place inside the European Union (Turkish Press 2007).

This resistance to Turkish membership has been accompanied by member states limiting numbers of Turkish migrant workers ( BBC News 2007a). Ignoring the fact that the German ‘economic miracle’ was built with the labour power of Turkish gastarbeiter, ever harsher restrictions are placed on Turkish migrants. Yet at the same time as the Merkel Government is limiting Turkish numbers, the EU is opened up to other white European migrants. The demand for labour in EU countries like Britain and Ireland has attracted thousands of Polish migrant workers, creating in turn a labour crisis in Poland. These are being replaced by other white, non-EU Europeans as ‘Poland acts to lure non-EU labour’ (BBC News 2007b). This non-EU labour is neither the Turkish gastarbeiter displaced by new German restrictions, or the ‘non-nationals’ who fuelled Irish economic development and who are now denied access to the Irish labour marker. It comprises white migrants from Eastern Europe. Here we begin to see the white Europe policy in action as a practice.

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This policy has been implemented in low-key Eurocratic, incremental style. The change is never couched in terms of keeping people of colour out and letting white people in. Nevertheless, the policy proceeds: [T]he Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 included a new chapter on employment which, while safeguarding the powers of the Member States in the field of employment policy, enshrines the Community approach in an overall manner for all Member States and focuses on a coordinated employment strategy. The promotion of a skilled labour force and a labour market which is more responsive to economic change becomes a ‘matter of common interest’ (EUROPA 2007b).

This development was then followed by the launching of the European Employment Strategy (EES): The Luxembourg Jobs Summit in November 1997 anticipated the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty by launching the EES. The aim of the EES is to reduce unemployment significantly within five years at European level. The EES establishes a multilateral surveillance framework to encourage Member States to put into place effective policies, notably a joint annual report on employment and employment guidelines. These are the basis for the National Action Plans (NAPs) prepared by the Member States, and recommendations of the Council of Ministers to the different Member States (EUROPA 2007b).

This new dispensation is explained in the 2006 ‘EU Year of Mobility’: [M]obility should be considered to be a natural way for workers to acquire new skills, adapt to an increasingly fluctuating labour market and obtain better living and working conditions. Mobility should also be one of the necessary vectors for establishing a genuine European labour market, by making it possible to attract workers to regions with specific needs while, at the same time, reducing the overload in regions with excess skills, and therefore high levels of unemployment, in a given economic sector (EUROPA 2006, emphasis in original).

This profound shift in the dynamics of migration towards an internal EU market is developed in bland and technical language. This is a classic example of ‘racism without racism’ (Lentin and McVeigh 2006). Neither EU politicians nor bureaucrats are routinely outspoken in demanding exclusion or repatriation of non-Europeans. In Ireland the process is rarely characterized by overt racism or calls to repatriate or keep black people out, only that ‘it is important that Ireland avoid the mistakes of other countries in operating policies to attract low-skilled workers on a (supposed) temporary basis’ (NESC 2006: 164). Nevertheless, the EU

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and its member states have progressively instituted policies and practices that make it increasingly difficult for people of colour to work in the EU, to reside in the EU, to seek asylum in the EU and to achieve citizenship in the EU.9 At the same time, they have made all of this easier for white people from both inside and outside the EU to do all of these things. This process has profound consequences for Irishness (as well as other European identities). Notions of Irishness are being reconstituted in the context of the EU – north and south of the Irish border. While the mechanisms are obviously different, given that the Republic of Ireland is a member state while the impact on NI is refracted through the British state, the effects are just as profound. Both parts of the island are now firmly integrated into the EU project. In its own small and subaltern way, Ireland is now part of a coming EU sovereignty. In a much more immediate way, Ireland is part of the process of making and keeping the EU white. Ireland is increasingly integrated into the racial osmosis that defines this EU sovereignty. Ireland and the Development of a ‘White Europe’ Policy Arguably the weakness of the contemporary Irish state – it has a doubly subaltern position vis-à-vis the European Union and the British State makes it easier to trace the tension between Irish state openness to Europeans and closure to (almost) everyone else. (For example, we would be surprised to find concern about the integrity of EU citizenship so openly touted as the reason for profound changes in domestic nationality and citizenship rights in similar debates in France or the UK.) Certainly the telescoping of changes in Irish citizenship, nationality, migration and refugee law over recent years provides a unique perspective. Changes that took fifty or sixty years in other European countries have happened in Ireland over the last decade. Ireland, north and south, was until recently a country of emigration. Neither asylum nor immigration nor nationality nor citizenship issues were particularly high on the political agenda. Immigration became live because of the pull factor of Ireland’s resurgent ‘Celtic Tiger’ economy:

9 Article 17 (1) of the Maastricht Treaty introduced the concept of citizenship of the European Union: ‘Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship’.

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[T]he number of work permits issued to non-EEA nationals rose dramatically from 5,750 in 1999 to 47,707 in 2003. Furthermore, it is known that approximately three out of every four permits issued in 2002 were for relatively low-skilled and/or low-wage occupations, especially in the service sector. There was also great diversity in the composition of the migrant workforce employed on work permits at that time; in 2000-2003, work permits were issued to nationals from more than 150 countries, with workers from the ten new EU member states accounting for about one-third of all permits issued during that period (International Organization for Migration [IOM] 2006: 30).

In consequence, for a brief moment Ireland became a country of high inmigration with migrants drawn from around the world. Ireland became conscious of its own whiteness, discovered ‘diversity’ and began to manage migration and integration over a short period of time. The dependency on migrant labour remains apparent but the source of migrant labour has changed remarkably over the last ten years. This key shift in the Republic of Ireland came with changes in migration policy in the context of the EES. In 2003, after ten years of unprecedented economic growth and a remarkable multiethnicizing of the Irish labour market and Irish society, the shutters came down on non-EEA nationals. The Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment made it clear that: Employers are obliged to have demonstrated that they have made every effort to employ an EEA national before a work permit will be issued (Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment 2003: 6-7). By 2004, the National Employment Action Plan had internalized this shift: It is expected that employers will be able to fill the majority of their labour needs from the extended EEA (European Economic Area) going forward. Consequently, work permits are now only being granted for non-EEA nationals in respect of highly skilled positions where no suitable personnel could be sourced within the enlarged EEA (Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment 2004: 39-40).

The low-skilled jobs which had generated the multi-ethnicizing of Ireland for the previous decade were now closed to non-EEA nationals. These priorities were made clear by the Lisbon Agenda Report: Economic migration policy is based on firstly, increasing participation and upskilling the resident population; secondly, maximising the potential of European Economic Area (EEA) nationals to fill skills deficits; and thirdly, using employment permits to meet skill needs which cannot otherwise be

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addressed. The Expert Group on Future Skills published a report in October 2005 examining the role of migration in meeting the skills needs of the economy. It identified sectors where the skills needs of the economy would not be entirely met from within Ireland or the EEA. These sectors are: ICT, healthcare, construction, financial services, engineering, pharmaceutical, and sales/marketing. These shortages are primarily the result of a tight labour market, against a backdrop of low unemployment and high levels of economic growth (Department of the Taoiseach 2006: 36-7).

This process was confirmed by the Labour Market Needs Test: A vacancy, in respect of which an application for a work permit is being made, must be advertised with the FÁS/EURES employment network and additionally in local and national newspapers, for three days, to ensure that, in the first instance a national of the EEA or Switzerland, or in the second instance a national of Bulgaria or Romania, cannot be found to fill the vacancy. Evidence that this has been done must be included with the application (Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment 2007: 2).

‘Legal’ employment routes to the Republic of Ireland for low-skilled workers from outside the EU were effectively ended by the introduction of a ‘green card’ system. The ‘Green Card System’ was introduced for highly skilled occupations identified by the Expert Group on Future Skills Needs (Department of the Taoiseach 2006: 37). As the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment (2007: 1) explains: The Employment Permits Acts 2003 and 2006 allow for the issuing of a Work Permit for those occupations with a the salary of €30,000 or more where Green Card Permits are not available and, in very limited circumstances, in the salary range below €30,000. So the hierarchy of migrant labour was very clearly established. The colour-coding of these changes is pretty stark. In 1996 migrants were overwhelming people of colour from outside the EU. By 2003 there were migrants from 150 counties with around one-third coming from the EU (IOM 2006: 30). By 2006, seven out of eight immigrants were from within the EU (Fahy 2007: 28). The IOM characterizes this transition: With regard to regulating the number and selection of migrant workers to be admitted, Ireland’s work permit policies evolved during the course of two distinct policy regimes. Until April 2003, Ireland's work permit policies were almost entirely “employer-led”. As long as they were prepared to go through the work permit system's administrative procedure, which included the mandatory labour market test … local employers were essentially in a position to legally recruit as many non-EEA workers as they wished, from whatever countries

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they wanted, and to employ them in any job, regardless of the skill level required…. The publication of the Employment Permits Act in April 2003, which facilitated the access for workers from the ten EU accession countries to the Irish labour markets immediately upon EU enlargement, marked the beginning of a more interventionist work permit system in Ireland. The government felt that its liberal policy toward workers from the EU accession countries required a more managed approach to regulate the number and selection of migrant workers to Ireland from outside the enlarged European Union. This was primarily based on the expectation that local employers would be able to fill most of their vacancies after 1 May 2004, from within the enlarged European Union (IOM 2006: 30, emphasis added).

The situation is now one in which all the non-EU nationals who had been meeting labour market needs of the Celtic Tiger are effectively excluded while EU member migrant workers are privileged. This is itself clearly racially coded. But it is even more problematic than this. There is privileged access to the Irish labour market not only for EU citizens but also for non-EU citizens who are members of the EEA and Switzerland. In the absence of any other logic, it seems that the most obvious ‘sufficient connection’ with Ireland in these cases is whiteness. Again, this logic is not spelled out - only the reference to the ‘mistakes’ of other countries hints at the real policy objective. Boucher (2007) characterizes this in his review of the NESC (2006) and IOM (2006) interventions on ‘managing migration’: [T]he policy recommendations in the NESC report ratify what the government had already done or planned to do: use EU nationals from the new member states for low-skilled work; severely reduce work permits for lowskilled work for non-EEA nationals; create high-skilled green cards for nonEEA nationals; and attempt ‘to avoid the mistakes of other countries in operating policies to attract low-skilled workers on a (supposed) temporary basis’ who could become the socially excluded, ethnic minorities of the future (Boucher 2007: 201).

Despite the different state context, the consequences of the developing ‘white Europe’ have been broadly similar north of the border (McVeigh 2006). Migrant workers in Northern Ireland are within the migration regime of the UK state. Citizens of EEA and EFTA (European Free Trade Area) countries are able to live and work in the UK without a visa or work permit. A8 nationals are able to live and work in the UK on the same basis as nationals of existing EU states, however they must register

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where and for whom they are working.10 Their right to work in the UK depends on their being issued with a registration certificate.11 Migrant workers from the most recent accession states Bulgaria and Romania find themselves with even more restricted residence and work rights. Citizens of non-EU countries that are not members of the EEA and EFTA must normally obtain a work visa or permit to work in the UK. These migrant workers find themselves within a new ‘points-based’ system. These new measures were accompanied by a repressive system designed to ‘ensure compliance’ and ‘respond flexibly to changes in the labour market’. Most importantly they aimed at ‘ending of employment routes to the UK for low-skilled workers from outside the EU except in cases of short-term shortages’ (Home Office 2006). As we have seen, the Irish Government has implemented a similar policy. As a direct consequence of this policy, the make-up of the migrant worker population in Northern Ireland has shifted significantly over recent years. Whatever the intention, this policy often has the consequence of replacing workers of colour from outside the EU with white workers from inside.12 Again, this policy has direct consequences in terms of where migrant workers come from in Northern Ireland. Migration from A8 countries - which had little historic connection to Northern Ireland – has already become more significant than migration from outside the EU (McVeigh 2006: 35-7). In consequence, the minority ethnic population of the north has been completely reconstituted. The pre-2000 minority ethnic migrant population of the north – sometimes self-defined as the ‘settled’ migrant population – was very clearly filtered through British post-colonialism. From 10 The ‘A8’ - Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia - acceded to the EU in 2004. Workers from these countries in both parts of Ireland are subject to a migrant workers registration scheme. Workers from Cyprus and Malta which acceded at the same time as the A8 are not subject to this scheme. 11 Ireland, Sweden and the UK were the only EU countries not to impose labour market restrictions on citizens of the A8. 12 It bears emphasis that this is a generalisation. Of course, not all EEA nationals are white and not all non-EEA nationals are people of colour. Concretely in the Irish case, some Zimbawean non-EEA nationals in Ireland are returned white settlers while sizeable numbers of Portuguese migrant workers are people of colour of Timorese origin. Nevertheless the broad tendency holds true. Over the past ten years, migration policy has replaced black migrant workers with white migrant workers. This policy was given definitive expression by the British Government in its commitment to the: ‘ending of employment routes to the UK for low-skilled workers from outside the EU’ (Home Office 2006).

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the 1960s to the 1990s this migrant population came from existing or former British colonies – primarily Hong Kong, secondarily South Asia. In the 2000s this has been very swiftly replaced by Eastern European migration. The Commonwealth associations of the first generation have been completely replaced by the EU context of the second. If anything, the racial meta-narrative is even clearer in the case of the UK than the Republic of Ireland. Since 1962 the UK has been gradually tightening its exclusion of people of colour from its former colonies and elsewhere. People who had a right of residence and a right to work have had those rights removed. Meanwhile it has opened its borders to white people from the EEA and Switzerland. People who previously had limited or no rights of residence or right to work have had those rights granted. Thus on both sides of the Irish border the EU has been part of a process both forcing and encouraging the Irish to become white. Through the particular Irish prism of that process, we also come to understand what is happening to Europeanness. The process is dialectical but it is also profoundly asymmetrical – Europeanness is determining Irishness to a much greater extent than Irishness is determining Europeanness. In labour market terms, Ireland is being Europeanized with a great deal more effect than Europe is being hibernicised. The ‘Chen Case’ and the Irish ‘Abuse of European Citizenship’ The facts of Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v Secretary of State for the Home Department are uncontested. Lavette Chen moved to Belfast specifically to enable the child she was expecting – Kunqian Catherine Zhu – to acquire the nationality of an EU member state. She was advised that giving birth in Britain would not give her new baby automatic residency rights because of the terms of the British Nationality Act but that choosing Northern Ireland guaranteed Irish nationality. This right granted to anyone born anywhere on the island of Ireland was underwritten by the Good Friday Agreement and enshrined in the Irish Constitution. Once the baby was born she would live in the UK under EU rules which allow nationals of one member state the right to settle in another. The Chen family already had a child and could not have another under China's ‘one-child’ rule. The case was referred to the Court of Justice by the British Immigration Appellate Authority after Chen appealed against the refusal of a residence permit in Britain (Statewatch 2004). In October

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2004, the Court ruled that it was irrelevant that Lavette Chen had travelled to Belfast specifically to enable the child she was expecting to acquire the nationality of an EU member state (Dyer 2004). The European Court allowed Lavette Chen as the mother of an Irish citizen the right to free movement within the European Union provided she had adequate health insurance and enough resources to prevent her becoming a burden on the State. Lavette Chen’s own position was fairly straightforward: I did not realise I would end up with such publicity; I feel we should be treated equally in Europe. I was advised to come to Belfast by the legal solicitor. I was pregnant with my second child and China has a one-child policy. I had breached that. I could not stay in China (BBC News 2003).

This course of action was eminently rational and was also deemed entirely legal by the European Court. The judgement made it clear that it was the British Home Office not the Chen family that had behaved unlawfully in the circumstances (BBC News 2004). Moreover, the case had no obvious implications for the exchequer of the Republic of Ireland. The EU decision was restrictive - allowing only the parents of Irish citizens with adequate resources to remain in the EU. As the Irish Supreme Court had already ruled that the parents of Irish-born children did not have an automatic right to residency, Lavette Chen did not necessarily acquire the right to live in Ireland. While the EU ruling applies in all member states, Irish citizenship law remains governed by the Irish Constitution and legislation. As The Guardian put it, the case ‘exposed a large gap in Britain's immigration laws’ but it exposed no similar gaps in the laws of the Republic of Ireland (Dyer 2004). Nevertheless, the Irish Government response to the ‘Chen case’ was couched in terms of ‘the abuse of European citizenship’. This intervention began long before the Court ruling on the ‘Chen case’. The government announced a referendum on citizenship on 10 March 2004 and the ‘Chen case’ became central to the government referendum campaign. Taoiseach Bertie Ahern set the tone: We also need to protect our laws from being used to abuse European citizenship. We know from the Chen case currently before the European Court of Justice that the acquisition of Irish citizenship by children of non-nationals — with no sufficient connection to Ireland — has implications for other member states (Dáil Éireann, Volume 583, 21 April 2004).

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Mary Coughlan as Minister for Social and Family Affairs developed this position in the Dáil with her notion that ‘abuse of our citizenship is an abuse of European citizenship’: This proposal will bring us into line with other European Union member states, in a Union where borders, like the unwanted differences between us, will become invisible. Perhaps we need to pause for a moment and consider what it means to be a citizen and what it means to hold citizenship. Citizenship is a highly valued commodity. It is the complex manifestation of rights and obligations shared by a people of a common nationality whose people value membership of that nation. Currently, it is possible for a person with no real connection with Ireland to arrange to give birth to a child in Ireland, North or South, and that child automatically acquires an entitlement to Irish citizenship and the benefits that attach to this citizenship…. Irish citizenship automatically confers citizenship and residency rights of the European Union. Abuse of our citizenship is an abuse of European Union citizenship. No other country in the world has a situation where citizenship can be acquired so easily (Dáil Éireann, Volume 584, 22 April 2004 Twenty-seventh Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2004: Second Stage).

She too began to develop this notion of ‘sufficient connection’: Critics of this proposal make two cases. They say that it represents an undermining or a reneging of the Good Friday Agreement and that it is a racist proposal. Both are wrong, spurious and, frankly, inflammatory. Let me deal with the Good Friday Agreement first, by stating clearly that the Agreement is not being altered. The Government was especially conscious that Article 2 of the Constitution had its origins in the British-Irish Agreement and we never had any intention of breaching this agreement. It is for this reason that we and the British Government issued the clear and unequivocal interpretative declaration which states that it was never the intention of either Government that persons born on the island of Ireland to parents who did not have, at the date of birth, a sufficient connection with the island of Ireland would be conferred with Irish citizenship (Dáil Éireann, Volume 584, 22 April 2004 Twenty-seventh Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2004: Second Stage).

This contorted logic led to some development of the notion of ‘connectedness’ to Ireland and Irishness – soon the equally ill-defined and non legal qualifications ‘active participation’ and ‘contribution’ would make an appearance. Witness Deputy Hanafin as Government Chief Whip: [C]itizenship brings with it a sense of responsibility, duties and all the obligations of being a member of society which do not come by virtue of the fact that one is handed an Irish passport…. I consider myself to be a citizen

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of Ireland as does everybody in the House, not just because I was born here. I am a citizen of Ireland because my parents and grandparents lived and worked here and contributed to society. I too continue to make a contribution to society. Citizenship does not imply any cultural or ethnic uniformity but it implies that contribution.… Given the importance of interculturalism and the changes in society which we welcome it is important that the opportunity is not undermined by the development of a suspicion about the motives of some people who seek Irish citizenship not as an expression of membership of the Irish community but as a passport to Europe (Dáil Éireann, Volume 584, 22 April 2004 Twenty-seventh Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2004: Second Stage).

Changing the Good Friday Agreement at all was a serious matter however. The precedent was now established that either British or Irish government could alter the Agreement without consultation with the other parties to the Agreement. More importantly it completely undermined the notion of an agreement underwritten by a referendum of the Irish people, north and south. Either government could define any issue as ‘intrinsically nothing to with the Agreement’ – despite the fact that it was unambiguously part of the Agreement – and rewrite it without appeal to other parties or the Irish people, north and south of the border.13 The notion that the Agreement was an act of self-determination was fundamentally undermined by the government actions to protect the integrity of EU citizenship law. This bears emphasis – the integrity of EU citizenship law now took precedence over the GFA which had copper-fasted the peace process ending one of the most prolonged and violent conflicts within and between EU states. The Irish government through Justice Minister Michael McDowell insisted that these changes were not made in the context of pressure from the EU: ‘No formal representations have been made to me by my EU ministerial counterparts concerning our citizenship laws’ (Volume 13 Thus Dr. Mansergh argued: ‘I would be opposed to any alteration to Article 2.…we would have to re-open the negotiation of the Good Friday Agreement for something that has intrinsically nothing to do with it. This matter is to do with people who have no connection with this country and who probably come here for the limited purpose of mainly acquiring EU citizenship rights rather than Irish citizenship rights. The annex to the Good Friday Agreement, inserted by the British Government, clearly defines the people of Northern Ireland. We must not get our wires crossed. We are trying to deal with this practical problem and matter in a self-contained way that precisely does not impinge on the Good Friday Agreement or upset it’ (Seanad Éireann, Volume 176, 5 May 2004. Twenty-seventh Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2004: Committee Stage, emphasis added).

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588, 8 July 2004. Written Answers. - Citizenship Laws). There was, however, constant reference to the EU context: ‘I warned that the Chen case…could seriously affect the standing of our citizenship law within the European Union if we did not take an early opportunity to amend our Constitution to prevent continuing abuse of the jus soli entitlement to citizenship for any person born in the island of Ireland (Dáil Éireann Volume 591 - 27 October, 2004. Irish Nationality and Citizenship Bill 2004: Second Stage). Frequent reference was made to the ‘Chen case’ throughout and after the citizenship referendum.14 The Minister of Justice Michael McDowell also made the astonishing claim that, ‘between 40% and 50% of non-EU nationals who give birth in Ireland do so to gain Irish citizenship for their children’(RTÉ 2004). On 11 June 2004 the referendum was held on the proposal to remove the constitutional entitlement to citizenship by birth. This change was supported by the two Irish government parties Fianna Fail and the Progressive Democrats as well as Fine Gael, the largest opposition party. It was opposed by the Irish Labour Party, Sinn Féin and the Green Party. Voters elected by four to one to change the jus soli basis of Irish citizenship. In other words, Irish citizenship law had become completely determined by the implications that it was deemed to have for EU citizenship. The case and its outcome was potentially a ‘problem’ for the UK and the EU but not for the Irish state. Yet changes driven through by the Irish government, and almost completely justified in terms of concerns about the ‘abuse’ of EU citizenship, had profound implications for both the Good Friday Agreement and Irish citizenship and nationality. The politics of ‘sufficient connection’ evolved in a more technical and legalistic way in the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 2004 which enshrined the referendum decision in law. Most bizarrely of all, some children of the Irish nation without ‘sufficient connection’ became ‘nonpeople’ – they were no longer ‘persons’ in the context of the Act: (6) In this section ‘person’ does not include a person born in the island of Ireland on or after the commencement of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship 14 Witness: Dáil Éireann, Volume 585, 19 May 2004. Written Answers. – ‘Citizenship Applications’; Dáil Éireann, Volume 586, 1 June 2004 Written Answers. – ‘Citizenship Rights’; Dáil Éireann, Volume 592, 9 November 2004. ‘Irish Nationality and Citizenship Bill 2004: Second Stage’; Seanad Éireann, Volume 178, 1 December 2004. ‘Irish Nationality and Citizenship Bill 2004: Second Stage’.

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Act 2004— ( a) neither of whose parents was at the time of the person’s birth— (i) an Irish citizen or entitled to be an Irish citizen, (ii) a British citizen, (iii) a person entitled to reside in the State without any restriction on his or her period of residence (including in accordance with a permission granted under section 4 of the Act of 2004), or (iv) a person entitled to reside in Northern Ireland without any restriction on his or her period of residence. 15

These Irish born ‘non-persons’ were still provided with Irish nationality by virtue of the GFA and Article 2, but Irish citizenship was denied them. Even more strangely, it was left to another state to decide whether someone might qualify for Irish citizenship. The question of whether someone is a ‘British’ citizen’ or ‘a person entitled to reside in Northern Ireland without any restriction on his or her period of residence’ are matters entirely beyond the control of the Irish state. A state which had been so concerned about the ‘abuse of European Citizenship’ offers a route to Irish citizenship (and therefore European citizenship) which is entirely out of its control. It denies citizenship to children with Irish nationality as a birthright yet offers it to any child born in Northern Ireland whose parents are entitled to be there by the British state. Arguably after 80 years of formal independence, the Irish government had handed the definitive element of its sovereignty back to the British state. This bizarre tension between nationality and citizenship continues to characterize Irish law. The Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service (INIS) was established in 2005 in order to provide a ‘one stop shop’ in relation to asylum, immigration, citizenship and visas. The INIS asks rhetorically, ‘Am I an Irish Citizen?’ and answers: Article 2 of the Irish Constitution says: "Every person born in the island of Ireland, its islands and its seas, has an entitlement and birthright to be part of the Irish nation". That entitlement and birthright translates, in terms of citizenship laws, into an entitlement to be an Irish citizen. Every person born in the island of Ireland is entitled to be an Irish citizen. If you were born anywhere in Ireland, it is open to you to choose to exercise that entitlement (INIS 2007).

But it then reminds us:

15 In contrast, the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956 read ‘Every person born in Ireland is an Irish citizen from birth’ and the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 2001 read ‘Every person born in the island of Ireland is entitled to be an Irish citizen’.

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Entitlement to Irish citizenship of person born to certain non-nationals: A person born in the island of Ireland since 1 January 2005, shall not be entitled to be an Irish citizen unless a parent of that person has, during the four years immediately preceding the person’s birth, been resident in the island of Ireland for a period of not less than three years or period the aggregate of which is not less than three years (INIS 2007).

Increasingly EU bureaucracy was defining Irish citizenship law. For example in the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2008: ‘foreign national’ means a person who is neither— (a) an Irish citizen, nor (b) a person who has established a right to enter and be present in the State under the European Communities (Free Movement of Persons) (No. 2) Regulations 2006 (S.I. No. 656 of 2006), the European Communities (Aliens) Regulations 1977 (S.I. No. 393 of 1977) or the European Communities (Right of Residence for Non-Economically Active Persons) Regulations 1997 (S.I. No. 57 of 1997).

Thus all those Irish children who acquire nationality as a birthright guaranteed by the Irish Constitution and the Good Friday Agreement but are denied citizenship on the basis of legislation which followed the ‘Chen case’ are now ‘foreign nationals’ since they fulfill neither criteria (a) nor (b) in the Immigration Bill. All of this might seem ‘firm but fair’ - or just embarrassingly inept– until it is put in context. Once we begin to unpack the implications, the colour coding again becomes clear. While the Irish government was agonizing over the abuse of citizenship around the ‘Chen case’, it was confirming precisely the same access to citizenship for millions of other people from non-EU countries like Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland – that happened to be overwhelmingly white. All of those persons that have ‘established a right to enter and be present in the state under the European Communities (Freedom of Movement of Persons) (No. 2) Regulations 2006 (S.I. 656 of 2006)’ can still make the same choice as the Chen family. Most of them have no more meaningful connection with Irishness than did the Chen family. Yet it seems they have ‘sufficient connection’ – the vast majority are white. At this point the policy is not just draconian or perverse, it is institutionally racist. For all the hand wringing about sufficient connection and active participation and contribution, there was no concern about the fact that through all of this, the same access to Irish citizenship was being provided for all EU citizens. The same access was also being provided to EEA citizens who were not EU citizens (Ingoldsby 2002). In addition,

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anyone from Switzerland could use the same route. Similar opportunities have also obtained in terms of the Common Travel Area – again predominantly white countries and again involved some – the Isle of Man, Jersey and Guernsey - that are not members of the EU (Ingoldsby 2002).16 Nobody in the government even mentions these ‘loopholes’ in the citizenship debate or referendum. In other words anyone from any of these countries could use the ‘Chen’ route to Irish and European Union citizenship - without any ‘connection’, ‘participation’ or ‘contribution’. By 2007, the Republic of Ireland had successfully closed the door to almost all ‘non-white’ migration from outside the EU. It had successfully closed the door to almost all ‘non-white’ residents acquiring citizenship. In the meantime it had opened its doors to unlimited migration from EU citizens – who are in the main white of course - without any apparent concern. In addition citizens of Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands could come without hindrance and without any apparent threat to Irish or European citizenship law. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the only difference is that these countries are overwhelmingly ‘white’. The key indication of ‘sufficient connection’ to Ireland was whiteness. After the brief flowering of multicultural Ireland in the late 1990s, the door had been closed to non-whites and an effective white Ireland policy introduced. This was all implemented in the context of Ireland’s defence of the integrity of European Union citizenship. It was ‘united in diversity’ in action - Ireland’s specific contribution to the construction of a ‘white Europe’. Conclusion When we work through the specifics of the developing ‘white Europe’ policy and the ‘Chen’ case, we discover a new dialectic between Hiber16 The United Kingdom, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and the Republic of Ireland collectively form a ‘Common Travel Area’. A person who has been examined for the purpose of immigration control at the point at which they entered the area does not normally require leave to enter any other part of it. The Channel Islands and the Isle of Man are crown dependencies – neither part of the UK nor the EU. Again no one seemed particularly exercised about the potential abuse of Irish Citizenship from this quarter. These – predominately white countries – continue to have an open door to Irish citizenship. The British and Irish governments recently reiterated their commitment to the CTA alongside announcements on increased cooperation on ‘border management’. The governments suggested that these measures were ‘aimed at foreign nationals (sic) rather than those living in the Common Travel Area’ (BBC News 2008).

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nicisation and Europeanisation. This suggests a broader synergy between national governments and the EU on the principle of racial osmosis. This is true in terms of both the principle of ‘ending of employment routes … from outside the EU’ and the centering of a notion of whiteness in the imagined community of Europe. As national governments construct ever more repressive and exclusive notions of citizenship and nationality alongside ever more draconian refugee and migrant worker regimes, this resonates with the European employment and migration policy and the internal labour market. This can be properly defined as a white Europe policy. Fortress Europe ensures that Europe is doing its best to both remain and become white. In Ireland, north and south, we saw an embryonic racial and ethnic pluralism brought swiftly to an end in 2003-4. The possibility of Irishness of colour became real for a brief period before it was closed by the Citizenship referendum and the EES.17 There is no suggestion in all of this that white Europeans do not experience racism in contemporary Ireland. They do, of course, north and south of the border. Moreover, there is no question that a ‘zero migration’ policy is the preferred option of both Irish and European racism. However the EU position, the institutionalized, capital logic position, is that white European migrants – whether from inside or outside the EU or EEA - are preferable to third country nationals or former colonials. This policy of ‘avoiding the mistakes of the past’ is explicitly racialized and explicitly racist. Whiteness trumps language and historical connectedness and even the legacy of imperialism. Despite all the window-dressing, this is a clear reversal of diversity policy. Current Irish and EU migration policy prevents diversity rather than encouraging it. Here the specific complexity of contemporary Irishness was crucial in the outworking of this citizenship struggle in the context of the EU. It only became an issue because of the post-GFA resolution to Irish nationality. In turn, it only became a solution because of the ability of the two governments to ignore the GFA. Thus the recent experience of Irish migration and migration policy provides a particular perspective on European citizenship and the largely hidden white Europe policy this 17 By 2005, asylum was effectively no longer a route to Irishness. Only 455 applicants were give refugee status, 4,787 were refused (ORAC 2006). And, of course, if any of them happened to have children in Ireland they would become part of the Irish nation as their birthright but they would also be denied Irish citizenship.

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embraces. This in turn repudiates and prevents other more inclusive notions of Irishness. (It also of course undermines pluralism in other state identities like Spanishness or Portugeseness or Britishness – where older colonial constructions of multi-ethnicity and multi-culturalism are renounced in favour of news forms of Europeanness.) Thus if Hibernicisaton means anything is this context, it is a bizarre hyper-Europeanism. The Irish state insisted that the ‘integrity of European citizenship’ would take precedence over the peace process and the ‘birthright’ of people born in Ireland. Undermining the Good Friday Agreement and stripping children with Irish nationality of their citizenship had become less problematic than ‘affecting the standing of our citizenship law within the European Union’.18 For all that the EU presents as ‘united in diversity’, it is defined by the commonality of whiteness and exclusion. If we begin by asking how Europe became white, we end raising profoundly uncomfortable questions about the contemporary European project and its outworking in terms of racism. European traditions are of course multifarious and complex. In terms of non-Europeans, these traditions include both repression and refuge. They have excluded some peoples while offering others access with varying degrees of generosity. However, ‘Fortress Europe’ not ‘Sanctuary Europe’ remains the correct metaphor for the contemporary European project. Rather than united in diversity, we see the EU uniting in whiteness. As this implies, European whiteness is not a state but a process – the EU is still becoming white. This process is both institutionally racist and profoundly anti-humanist. Moreover, it is also the very antithesis of becoming ‘united in diversity’.

References Balibar, Etienne 2004. ‘Etienne Balibar and Antonio Negri on the constitution of Europe Notes from a seminar in Rome, June 2004’. www.generationonline.org/p/fpbalibar3.htm BBC News 2003. ‘Mother in court battle’ 12 November, 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/3263859.stm 18 We might also suggest in passing from the perspective of Northern Ireland that the current British celebration of assimilation/integration and jettisoning of imperial multiculturalism is one key manifestations of this process. Paradoxically, therefore, the New Labour festishizing of the British flag and commitment to citizenship tests and oaths of allegiance is symptomatic of the British becoming ‘good Europeans’.

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BBC News 2004. Residency move ‘illegal’ 19 October, 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/3755580.stm BBC News 2005. ‘In Pictures: Fortress Europe’ 28 September 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_pictures/4287330.stm BBC News 2007a. ‘Berlin integration plan attacked’ 12 July 2007 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6294832.stm BBC News 2007b. ‘Poland acts to lure non-EU labour’ 20 July 2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6909562.stm BBC News 2008. ‘Britain-Ireland border check plan’ 24 July 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7523435.stm Boucher, Gerry. 2007. ‘International Organisation for Migration (2006) Managing Migration in Ireland: A Social and Economic Analysis/National Economic and Social Council (2006) Migration Policy’ Translocations Volume 2, Issue 1, Summer 2007. Chan, Suzanna. 2005. ‘Some notes on deconstructing Ireland’s Whiteness: Immigrants, emigrants and the perils of jazz’ Variant Volume 2, no 22 Spring 2005 20-21. Charter, David. 2007. ‘Call for vote on ‘Europe empire’‘ The Times 11 July 2007. www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article2056576.ece Churchill, Winston. 1946. ‘Let Europe Arise’ Speech, 19 September 1946 Zürich (Switzerland). www.coe.int/T/E/ Com/About_Coe/Discours Churchill.asp Council of Europe 2008. ‘Council of Europe’ http://www.coe.int Delgado, Richard and Jean Stefancic. 1997. Critical White Studies Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment 2003 Work Permits Information Leaflet Dublin: DETE. Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment 2004. National Employment Action Plan 2004 Ireland Dublin: DETE. Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment 2007. ‘Employment Permits Section: Employment Permits Arrangements: Guide To Work Permits: January 2007: Information Note on the Immigration Position Arising from the Accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU’. Department of the Taoiseach 2006. Lisbon Agenda Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs Ireland Implementation of National Reform Programme Progress Report October 2006 Dublin: Department of the Taoiseach. Dyer, Clare. 2004. ‘Ruling exposes immigration loophole’ The Guardian Wednesday 20 October, 2004. EUROPA 2004. ‘Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe’ Official Journal of the European Union Official Journal C 310 of 16 December 2004 http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/ 12004V /htm/C2004310EN.01000301.htm EUROPA 2006 ‘2006 – European Year of Workers’ Mobility, the importance of the mobility of workers to the implementation of the Lisbon strategy’

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Press Release http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference =MEMO/05/229&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en EUROPA 2007a. ‘The EU at a Glance: Symbols of the EU: United in Diversity’ http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/motto/index_en.htm EUROPA 2007b. ‘The birth of the European Employment Strategy: the Luxembourg process (November 1997)’ http://europa.eu/scadplus/ leg/en/cha/c11318.htm European Court Reports 2004. Case C-200/02 Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v Secretary of State for the Home Department. European Court Reports 2004 Page I-09925. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/ cgi/sga_doc? smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&numdoc =602J0200&lg=EN Fahy, Tony. 2007. ‘Population’ in Sara O’Sullivan (ed) Contemporary Ireland: A Sociological Map Dublin: UCD Press. Fortress Europe. 2007. ‘Immigrants dead at the frontiers of Europe’ http://fortresseurope.blogspot.com/2006/02/immigrants-dead-at-frontiersof-europe_16.html Frankenberg, Ruth. 1993. White Women, Race Matters: The Social Construction of Whiteness, London : Routledge. Frontex 2007. ‘What is Frontex?’ http://www.frontex.europa.eu Garner, Steve. 2006. ‘The Uses of Whiteness: What Sociologists Working on Europe Can Draw from US Research on Whiteness’ Sociology Vol. 40, No. 2, 257-275. Garner, Steve. 2007. Whiteness: An Introduction London: Routledge. Gillette, Aaron. 2003. Racial Theories in Fascist Italy London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Government of Ireland 2006. Statutory Instruments S.I. No. 656 of 2006 European Communities (Free Movement of Persons) (No. 2) Regulations 2006 Dublin: Stationery Office. Hanafin, Mary. 2004. ‘Speech in Dáil Éireann by Minister Mary Hanafin TD Minister of State at the Department of the Taoiseach’ 27th Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2004: Second Stage (Resumed) www.maryhanafin.ie/ constitutiona04.htm Home Office. 2006. ‘A Points-Based System: Making Migration Work for Britain’ 7 March 2006. http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/pressreleases/points-based-migration Ignatiev, Noel. 1996. How the Irish Became White New York: Routledge. Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2008. http://www.oireachtas.ie/ documents/bills28/bills/2008/0208/B0208D.pdf7 Ingoldsby, Brian. 2002. ‘Regular Migration to Ireland’ Paper delivered at the Incorporated Law Society Seminar: Rights to Reside in Ireland on 14 May 2002 at Blackhall Place, Dublin. //www.inis.gov.ie/en/INIS/regular migrationtoireland.pdf/Files/regularmigrationtoireland.pdf

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INIS. 2007. ‘Am I an Irish Citizen?’ www.inis.gov.ie/en/INIS/ Pages/WP07000040 International Organization for Migration [IOM]. 2006. Managing Migration in Ireland: A Social and Economic Analysis Dublin: NESC. Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 2004. www.oireachtas.ie/documents/ bills28/acts/2004/a3804.pdf Jacobson, Matthew Frye. 1999. Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lentin, Ronit and Robbie McVeigh. 2006. After Optimism? Racism and Globalisation in 21st Century Ireland Dublin: MetroEireann. McIntosh, Peggy. 1990. ‘White Privilege: Unpacking the invisible knapsack’ Independent School, Vol. 49 No 2. 31-6. McVeigh, Robbie. 2006. Migrant Workers and their Families in Northern Ireland: A Trade Union Response Belfast: ICTU. Migreurop. 2005. ‘Foreigners’ camps in Europe’ www.migreurop.org/IMG/ pdf/carte-en.pdf Moraes, Claude. 2003. ‘The Politics of European Union Migration Policy’ Political Quarterly 74 (1), 116–131. Morrison, Toni. 1992. Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination London: Picador. NESC (National Economic and Social Council). 2006. Migration Policy, Dublin: NESC Report No. 115, September 2006. ORAC 2006. ‘Details of Asylum Application Received and Cases Processed in 2005 (First Instance) By the ORAC’ Dublin: ORAC. Roediger, David R. 2007. The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class New York: Haymarket. RTÉ News. 2004. ‘40-50% non-EU births for citizenship: McDowell’22 April 2004 http://www.rte.ie/news/2004/0422/citizenship.html Sarkozy, Nicolas. 2007. ‘Speech at the opening of the Fifteenth Ambassadors Conference’ www.elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/anglais/speeches_and_ documents/2007/speech_at_the_opening_of_the_fifteenth_ambassadors _conference.79296.html Statewatch. 2004. ‘Opinion of the Advocate General in Case C-200/02 Press and Information Division’ Press Release Nº 39/04 18 May 2004 Man Lavette Chen and Kunqian Catherine Zhu v Secretary of State for the Home Department http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/may/chen.pdf Turkish Press. 2007. ‘News’ 15/01/2007. www.turkishpress.com/ news.asp?id=159133

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EUROPE BETWEEN POLITICAL FOLKLORE AND NATIONAL POPULISM: POLES APART?1 Glenn Patterson Abstract This chapter offers a wry look at the changing position of Northern Ireland in Europe. From the anomaly of ‘joining Europe’ as part of the UK in 1973 just as ‘The Troubles’ confirmed Northern Ireland as ‘a place apart’, to the twenty first century experience of peace process and the large scale influx of migrant workers from Poland and elsewhere. Queen Elizabeth I of England is reputed to have said that when she died the word Calais would be found written on her heart. All I can say is that when I die I wouldn’t be surprised if ‘Europe’ was found written on mine, followed in ever fainter script by the words that finished me off, ‘between political folklore and national populism’. There were days at a time when I feared I would get up here on my hind legs, as they say where I come from, and have not a single thought in my head. There were still other days when I argued back and forth with myself whether the problem was my imagination or someone else’s punctuation: ‘Europe between political folklore and national populism.’ I was muttering it at all hours of the day; I was starting to say it in my sleep. In the end I decided to sit very still (I’ve been writing for twenty years, so I have plenty of practice) and let my mind wander down whatever paths of association the title led it. True, I was as likely to come up smelling of shit, as I was smelling of roses, but at least it would be a

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definite smell; at least I wouldn’t be left standing in front of you with my mouth hanging open, speechless. I am not sure if you could call it ‘political folklore’ exactly, but the Irish novelist Colm Tóibín tells a very interesting story. (Sorry, the Irish novelist Colm Tóibín tells many very interesting stories. This one, however, to the best of my knowledge has not yet appeared in one of his very interesting books.) On Sunday the 30th January 1972 – Bloody Sunday as it came to be known – British soldiers shot and killed fourteen unarmed civilians at a Civil Rights march in Derry, Northern Ireland’s second city. Three days later a crowd of more than twenty thousand marched on the British Embassy in Dublin’s Merrion Square. Violence broke out; petrol bombs were thrown. An attempt was made to blow the embassy doors off their hinges. At the height of the protest Union Jacks were hung from the front of the building and set alight. The embassy was burnt to the ground. That night – that historical moment – says Colm Tóibín, who was there, was pivotal, not just for him as an individual, but for all of Southern Irish society. There were only two options: you either followed through on the logic of the flames – threw yourself heart and soul into the conflagration that was raging across the border – or you let the embassy fire be an end point. Like the vast majority, Colm chose the latter option. In the aftermath of the 2nd February 1972, the Republic of Ireland, ‘the South’ in every day speech, and in the title of Colm Tóibín’s own first novel (although it is partly set in Spain), the South turned its back on the North and in the same metaphoric motion turned its face towards Europe. ‘Joining Europe’ In January 1973 the Republic of Ireland joined the Common Market, as it was then. Northern Ireland, as an ‘administrative region of the United Kingdom’, to give it its correct title, joined at the same time. But while the South embraced Europe enthusiastically, the North continued to find less productive things to do with its arms. Northern Ireland, in fact, entered into a period of intense parochialism in which the sense of belonging was often to an area of a few square miles – sometimes considerably less. Belfast was so comprehensively divided that many people left ‘their area’ only to work, assuming, that is, they had work to leave for. The borders between these sectarian cantons were marked with flags and wall murals and, of course, with graffiti. One of the most common slo-

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gans in loyalist, or Protestant, working class parts of town was ‘No Pope Here’: a reminder that in the very distant past the conflict that was consuming so much of our energy and economy – so many of our citizens’ lives – had been part of a wider European religious war. When in October 1978 Cardinal Karol Jozef Wojtyla was named Pope John Paul the Second, the graffiti changed, in what passes with us for humour, to ‘No Pole Here’. It was less a threat than a statement of fact. Even given the conditions prevailing in their own country in 1978, few Poles in their right minds would surely have dreamt of relocating to Belfast. Looking back almost thirty years at film footage of that time the city does have the air of a police state, where ‘police’ could be extended to cover those paramilitary organisations who held sway in loyalist and republican districts and who had their own very crude way of silencing oppositional voices: tape across the mouth, a hood over the head and a bullet in the nape of the neck. Northern Ireland is famously a place where you cannot walk down a street without bumping into a poet, or at least cannot walk into a bar without bumping into one. Nothing any poet has written, however, comes as close to capturing the mood of those years for me as the words of a group of young men barely out of their teens: Belfast punk band Stiff Little Fingers, whose debut album, released four months after the ‘No Pole Here’ graffiti started to appear, contained a song called simply ‘Here We Are Nowhere’: ‘Here we are nowhere, nowhere left to go. Here we are nowhere, nowhere left to go.’ Or as a friend of mine at the time used to say, ‘Here we are floating in the Atlantic Ocean two-thirds of the way to the North Pole and we have the cheek to complain about the weather.’ Nowhere or near the North Pole, certainly we could not have felt further removed from the rest of Europe: we didn’t even seem to be made of the same stuff. What sticks in my memory most from my teenage years seeing news reports from Strasbourg and Brussels was the amount of glass in the buildings. In Belfast the window had given way to the security grille, the slit. Not only did we not feel part of Europe, we were in danger of losing sight of it entirely. In the opening pages of his magnificent history of Europe, the British historian Norman Davies has a neat interpretation of the myth of Europa. Europa, if you remember your Ovid, was the mother of Minos, who while paddling in the surf of her native Phoenicia, that is to say today’s southern Lebanon, encountered Zeus, in the guise of a snow-

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white bull. Europa allowed herself to be talked into clambering on to Zeus’s back, whereupon the god whisked her across the waves to Crete. ‘Zeus,’ Davies writes, ‘was surely transferring the fruits of the older Asian civilizations of the east to the new island colonies of the Aegean… At the dawn of European history, the known world lay to the east. The unknown waited in the west.’ This is a reversal of almost all of subsequent European history in which the ‘centre’ moved ever more steadily west (although sadly stopping well short of us in Belfast) and in which the east was increasingly characterised as a threat, wherever the east was deemed to begin at any given moment: the Bosporus Strait or the Brandenburg Gate. For the ultimate example of this westward drift I would suggest you look no further than Disneyland Paris. The Disney Corporation spent much time and money trying to locate the exact centre of Europe – deciding finally that it lay thirteen miles southeast of Paris – only to find that in the course of the park’s construction, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the break-up of Yugoslavia, history itself had shifted on its axis. And of course all the uncertainty and anxiety about the eastern boundary arises precisely because, as Norman Davies again points out, Europe is not strictly speaking a continent at all – is not, to use the cognate English term, ‘self-contained’ – but is merely a peninsula, an outcrop of the world’s greatest landmass. And I am reminded here of another mighty literary figure, Albert Camus, whose work was a godsend to many of us in our Northern Irish nowhere of the late 1970s. Writing during the closing months of the Second World War, which of course like most of the twentieth century’s biggest threats to Europe did not come from the east at all, Camus addresses the same question of definition. In the second of his Letters to a German Friend he talks about the ‘idea of Europe’ as opposed to the ‘coloured spot [the Nazis have] annexed on temporary maps.’ Europe’s real frontiers, he goes on with admirable imprecision, are ‘the genius of a few and the heart of all its inhabitants’. The Literature Express: From Belfast to Poland I first read Albert Camus at school. I first read Norman Davies in the late summer of 2000, on my return to Belfast from the Literature Express, a project originating in Berlin, which took one hundred and six writers on a seven-week ‘odyssey’ – an appropriate word in the circum-

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stances – from Lisbon to Berlin itself, via Spain, France, Belgium, northern Germany, the Baltic states, Russia, Belarus and Poland. And I had chosen Davies’s Europe out of the many hundreds of books on the subject in part because I knew he was an authority on Poland, the country which, after my month and a half on the Literature Express, I decided I most needed to find out about. Poland then was still in the middle of protracted negotiations over its application to join European Union: was still for the moment east. On one early detour into Malbork on our way to Kaliningrad from Hanover the Literature Express had had to sit for an hour on a bridge across the Oder while entry papers were checked. By some extraordinary coincidence a thunderstorm broke at almost the exact moment that the border guards gave us the signal to proceed: the resultant rain mistier than an iron curtain, but atmospherically every bit as effective. Two days later as we crawled into Kaliningrad after another border shakedown, a Croatian writer observed, ‘the time machine is working: we have gone from the Seventies to the Fifties.’ I laughed along with him, though in truth I already felt myself smitten by the country we were leaving behind. More than smitten: over the months that followed I became evangelical about Poland, talking about it with the zeal of the convert to whoever would listen. Without understanding Polish history there was no understanding European history and of course without understanding European history there was no breaking away finally from the politics of the past, no freedom, you might say, from folklore. I was so fond of Poland I kept pinned to the notice board above my desk the fine I had received in Warsaw for jaywalking in my distracted state. (The fine I had received and had left the country without paying: there is a limit even to my distraction.) Poles apart? A little under four years later, on the 1 st May 2004, Poland was finally admitted to the European Union and, the year after that, direct flights began between Belfast and Warsaw: direct and, more to the point, cheap. And, since I have, however glancingly, just invoked the first half of the title of this essay, let me in similar fashion now invoke the second: one of the greatest populist measures of recent decades has surely been the deregulation of the airline industry. Set aside for a moment the potentially disastrous environmental impact of all those short-haul flights;

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set aside for a moment, too, the cram-them-in approach to customer service; nothing has done more to encourage European integration than the budget airlines. Actually if they were to re-brand the European Union as the Easyjet Union and offer mini-weekend-break membership I am certain that Britain would be transformed overnight into a nation of EU enthusiasts. I am being facetious, of course, but there is a more serious underlying point. Europe was always seen as something we in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland could opt into. Add to this the fact that Northern Ireland, like the rest of the island, has always been a net exporter of people and you will appreciate something of the shock that was experienced when it became clear that the European traffic was two-way, that there were people – quite large numbers of people in fact – who were opting into living in our curious European outpost: Portuguese-speaking, Lithuanian, Latvian, and above all Poles. In less than three years the Polish population of Northern Ireland has gone from round about zero to more than thirty thousand, or to something close to two per cent of the population. More people now have Polish as a first language than have Irish, but then again more people have Cantonese than have Irish. Even before the recent immigration boom, Belfast was acquiring the unenviable reputation of being the racist capital of Europe. The Northern Irish peace process has brought a rapid increase in house prices – more rapid actually than the peace process itself. Rents too have been pushed up so that many of the new immigrants have been obliged to look for accommodation in ‘hard-to-let’ (and therefore cheap) parts of town. In the case of the Poles in particular this has sometimes had the effect of upsetting the religious or sectarian balance: Poland is a predominantly Catholic country; the hardest-to-let areas in Belfast tend to be working class Protestant areas. There have been innumerable incidents: windows broken, threats made, even houses set on fire. It makes not a blind bit of difference of course to the person on the receiving end of it, but it has not always been immediately clear whether a particular attack is an example of new-style xenophobia, or old-style religious bigotry. I recently witnessed something of this confusion myself. My wife is from Cork in the Republic of Ireland: the People’s Republic of Cork as some of its citizens like to refer to it. Earlier this year my wife’s family came to visit us in Belfast: parents, brother, sister, their spouses and

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children. Not so many years ago this might have been cause for concern: southern Irish cars have very distinctive number plates. People from Cork in particular have very distinctive accents. The part of Belfast we live in has a distinctively Ulster British hue: red, white and blue flags on the lampposts, red, white and blue paint on the walls. This being 2007, however, we all walked out to a neighbourhood restaurant on the Saturday evening and walked back, a little more unsteadily, a few hours later. My wife’s brother and her sister’s husband – the least unsteady of us all – had got quite far ahead of the rest of us when they suddenly found themselves confronted by a group of youths who had overheard them talking. ‘Fuck away off back where you came from, you Polish bastards,’ the youths said. My brothers-in-law were almost too astonished to be intimidated (the fear as always came much, much later). ‘Polish?’ they said when we had caught up with them and the youths had melted away. ‘They thought these were Polish accents?’ Well ‘thought’ is probably too reasoned a word, but there would appear to have been an automatic identification of something that sounded clearly ‘other’ with the new object of suspicion – recent EU immigrants – rather than with the old ‘folkloric’ enemy south of the Irish border. This incident occurred about fifty yards – sorry, metres – from the headquarters of the avowedly populist Democratic Unionist Party, founded and led by the Reverend Ian Paisley, who was once, infamously, ejected from the European Parliament for interrupting an address by Pope John Paul II with shouts of ‘antichrist’. (‘No Pole In Strasbourg’ either, obviously.) Ian Paisley was also the founder and long-time leader of the Free Presbyterian Church whose website carried the headline ‘Threat to Protestant Ulster’ above a story alleging that priests were helping immigrants get their names onto the Northern Ireland electoral register. Of course as citizens of the European Union the immigrants have every right to be on the register, but it is their Catholicism not, primarily, their nationality that the website is alarmed by. Whether explicitly or implicitly, however, the suggestion is made again that immigration could ‘tip the balance’ of local politics. Against this it is important to add that there have been attempts by Protestant community activists (often a euphemism for ‘former para-

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militaries’) to reduce racist attacks. In one instance, in the town of Lisburn, residents have been reminded that Polish pilots played a vital role during the Battle of Britain, though quite what the implications of this are for any Germans hoping to immigrate to Northern Ireland is anyone’s guess. In words not often associated with Northern Ireland in recent years, the scheme has been praised as a model of toleration and integration. And there have been other encouraging signs of late. The last decade in Northern Ireland has seen a transformation of the police, from the Royal Ulster Constabulary – ‘the RUC dog of repression’, in another famous song from that first Stiff Little Fingers album – to the Police Service of Northern Ireland. The PSNI has what is referred to as a 50-50 recruitment policy, that is equal numbers of Catholics and Protestants, to redress historic under-representation of the former. Figures released at the beginning of the year reveal that almost one thousand Poles currently living in Northern Ireland applied to join. There was even been a special recruitment drive in Poland itself, prompting some to joke that in time the name will officially change again to the Polish Service of Northern Ireland. (Stranger things have happened: look at the dominance of the Irish in the New York police of the last century.) However, in the event, none of the Polish applicants were successful. Conclusion Now I am conscious that in allowing my mind to wander down paths of its own choosing I have ended up sticking very close to home. Perhaps this is only to be expected. You know the old dictum: all politics is local politics. I hope, though, there is more to it than that. I have been trying to use the place that I know best to illustrate a general point, a point that Albert Camus makes much, much more eloquently (again, sadly, only to be expected) in that second wartime ‘Letter to a German Friend’ when he writes, ‘Europe will need to be re-established. It will always need to be reestablished.’ [My emphasis.] This is indubitably not, to Camus, a question of deciding where to draw the borderlines, between what is east, say, and what is west: what is ‘us’ and what is ‘other’. It is rather something more akin to an internal renewal, a perpetual revision or re-imagining, which, in a curious way brings me back again to where I began, speculating on failures of imagination or punctuation.

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Punctuation in English can also refer to one of the periods of rapid change that interrupt periods of stasis in the evolutionary theory of ‘punctuated equilibrium’. I think it is safe to say that Europe – the European Union in particular – has experienced just such a ‘punctuation’ in recent times. And there is more to come, with all the risks and all the opportunities that will bring. Norman Davies, in the final page of Europe written in 1992, says, echoing Camus, ‘the European Union in the West and the successor states in the East must redefine their identities, their bounds, and their allegiances. Somehow, at least for a time, a new equilibrium may be found… Europe is not going to be fully united in the near future, but it has a chance to be less divided than for generations past. If fortune smiles, the physical and psychological barriers will be less brutal than at any time in living memory.’ In 2007 elections were held in Northern Ireland. As expected the parties that emerged strongest were, in second place, Sinn Féin, led by Gerry Adams, and, in first place (despite the scaremongering of the Free Presbyterian website), the Reverend Ian Paisley’s Democratic Unionists. On the surface the election result indicated that the religious, some would say tribal, blocs in Northern Ireland were as far apart as ever, further apart perhaps than they had been when the whole sorry saga of what we call the ‘Troubles’ began. There were, however, some interesting pointers to a less divided future. The non-sectarian Alliance Party saw its vote rise for the first time in a decade. One of the party’s candidates, Anna Lo, became the first member of the country’s Chinese community to be elected to the Northern Ireland Assembly. Anna Lo herself believes that many in the Chinese community had never voted at all before. The weekend after the election Stiff Little Fingers played in the Ulster Hall in the centre of Belfast, a month short of thirty years after they first formed. They played their debut album in its entirety. I wasn’t there. But I’d like to think some of our new Polish neighbours were in amongst the ageing punks, singing along to ‘Here We Are Nowhere’. We’re still twothirds of the way to the North Pole, but thanks in no small measure to the people from other parts of Europe – other parts of the world – who have chosen to make their home here we’re somewhere a little bit different from where we used to be.