The European Union and East Asia
The world economy continues to be dominated by the ‘Triad’ regions—Europe, North Amer...
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The European Union and East Asia
The world economy continues to be dominated by the ‘Triad’ regions—Europe, North America and East Asia. This text analyses the economic relationship that has evolved between two Triadic powers—the European Union (EU) and East Asia—and its future prospects, especially in the wake of the recent financial crises that have shaken the East Asian region. The author examines the development of economic diplomacy and exchange between the EU and its East Asian trading partners—Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) —in both bilateral and multilateral contexts. The inter-regional dimension provided by the Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM) is also considered, as are theoretical perspectives from the field of international political economy on these different relationships. Furthermore, the economic development and future challenges facing the East Asian states are studied with special reference to the region’s recent financial crises. This text argues that the EU must afford greater priority in the promotion of its economic relationship with East Asia. If it continues to remain the weakest Triadic link, the EU risks future geoeconomic marginalisation as the transpacific axis strengthens into the twenty-first century. It is also proposed that the EU and major East Asian powers must assume greater responsibilities in managing the international economic order. Undergraduate and postgraduate economists and students of European, International Relations and Asian Studies will find in this book possible answers to the challenges facing Europe and East Asia in the next century. Christopher M.Dent is Senior Lecturer in Economics and European Studies at the University of Lincolnshire and Humberside and is the author of The European Economy: The Global Context (1997).
The European Union and East Asia An economic relationship
Christopher M.Dent
London and New York
First published 1999 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2002. © 1999 Christopher M.Dent The right of Christopher Dent to be identified as the Author of this Work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval systm, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Dent, Christopher M., 1965– The European Union and East Asia: an economic relationship/ Christopher Dent. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. European Union countries—Foreign economic relations—East Asia. 2. East Asia—Foreign economic relations—European Union countries. I. Title. HF1531.Z4E184 1999 98–55762 337.405–dc21 CIP ISBN 0-415-17199-7 (hbk) ISBN 0-415-17200-4 (pbk) ISBN 0-203-02368-4 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 0-203-17215-9 (Glassbook Format)
To Ruth, Thomas and Koshka… amor fidelis pertinax est
Contents
List of figures List of tables Preface Acknowledgements List of abbreviations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
viii x xiii xiv xv
The international political economy of EU-East Asia relations: theoretical perspectives EU-East Asia economic relations: an overview of recent developments The EU and ASEAN The EU and Japan The EU and China The EU, Taiwan and Hong Kong The EU and Korea Regionalism and inter-regional co-operation Future prospects for the EU-East Asia economic relationship
250
Appendix Notes References Index
259 267 287 309
1 16 36 76 118 152 187 219
Figures
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4
World Bank model of East Asian growth East Asian group shares of EU trade with the region (1980, 1997) EU-East Asia trade (1975–97) EU trade with East Asia by member state (1987, 1997) ASEAN’s exports to the EU by sector (1980, 1987, 1997) EU-ASEAN merchandise trade (1975–97) ASEAN member state shares of EU-ASEAN trade (1987, 1997) EU member state shares of EU-ASEAN trade (1987, 1997) Inward FDI stocks in ASEAN by geographic origin (1996) EU financial assistance to the ASEAN 10 group (1976–98) Stock of outward FDI from Japan by geographic destination (1981, 1996) EU-Japan merchandise trade (1975–97) Japanese FDI flows to Europe and USA (1981–96) Sectoral structure of EU-Japan trade (1980, 1997) EU trade with Japan by member state (1987, 1997) Stock of Japanese FDI in Europe by host country destination (1996) Inward FDI stocks in Japan by geographic origin (1989, 1996) EU direct investment in Japan: net stock invested by member state (1996) China’s import and export trade (1979–97) Inward FDI flows in China, 1979–97 (actual realised) Inward FDI stock in China by geographic origin (1987, 1995) China’s exports to the EU by sector (1980, 1987, 1997) EU-China merchandise trade (1975–97) EU trade with China by member state (1987, 1997) EU-Taiwan merchandise trade (1975–97) EU member state trade with Taiwan (1987, 1997) Taiwan’s exports to the EU by sector (1980, 1987, 1997) Inward FDI stocks in Taiwan by geographic origin (1987, 1996)
19 23 24 25 52 53 67 68 68 69 84 93 102 104 109 111 112 113 120 120 124 133 134 138 168 169 170 171
Figures
6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.9 8.1 8.2
ix
Stock of outward FDI from Taiwan by geographic destination (1996) 172 EU-Hong Kong merchandise trade (1975–97) 179 EU member state trade with Hong Kong (1987, 1997) 180 Hong Kong’s exports to the EU by sector (1980, 1987, 1997) 181 Inward FDI stocks in Hong Kong by geographic origin (1987, 1996) 182 EU-Korea merchandise trade (1976–97) 198 EU member state trade with Korea (1987, 1997) 202 Korea’s exports to the EU by sector (1980, 1987, 1997) 203 Inward FDI stocks in Korea by geographic origin (1989, 1996) 204 Stock of outward FDI from Korea by geographic destination (1987, 1996) 205 International lending to Korea (by end of June 1997) 210 Stock of Korean FDI in Europe by host country destination (1996) 211 Cumulative stocks of Korean outward FDI (1980–96) 212 EU direct investment in Korea: net stock invested by member state (1996) 215 Subregional economic zones in East Asia 224 Europe’s major growth axis 237
Tables
2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4
3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 4.1 4.2 4.3 5.1 5.2 6.1 6.2 6.3
Triad trade flows: percentage shares of world total (1960, 1980, 1996) The Triadic distribution of East Asian trade (percentage of total) Geographic breakdown of ASEAN’s international trade (percentage per trade partner, 1960–97) EU-ASEAN relations: the institutional framework EU-ASEAN economic relations: main co-operative activities Average utilisation rates of quotas by East Asian countries in EC imports of textiles and clothing under the MFA, 1979–82 (%) EC non-tariff barriers against imports from selected East Asian countries, 1974 ($m affected) Applications approved under Article 115 against imports from selected East Asian countries, 1981–5 EU financial assistance to ASEAN by category and time period (Ecu million) EU anti-dumping duties on ASEAN products (at November 1998) Geographic breakdown of Japan’s international trade (percentage per trade partner, 1960–97) EU-Japan consultation frameworks EU anti-dumping duties on Japanese imports (at November 1998) Geographic breakdown of China’s international trade (percentage per trade partner, 1960–97) EU anti-dumping duties on Chinese imports (at November 1998) Geographic breakdown of Taiwan’s international trade (percentage per trade partner, 1960–97) Geographic breakdown of Hong Kong’s international trade (percentage per trade partner, 1960–97) EU anti-dumping duties on imports from Hong Kong and Taiwan (at November 1998)
17 20 39 47 50
55 56 56 58 63 89 99 101 130 141 156 160 173
Tables xi
7.1 7.2 7.3
Geographic breakdown of Korea’s international trade (percentage per trade partner, 1960–97) Major Korean manufacturing FDI projects in Europe EU anti-dumping duties on Korean imports (at November 1998)
8.1 The ASEM: main elements A.1 East Asian countries: comparative economic profile A.2 Economic growth in East Asia during the 1960s to 1990s (real GDP growth %, average annual for each decade) A.3 Geographic breakdown of the EU15’s external trade, 1960–97 (percentage per trade partner) A.4 EU-East Asian trade: sectoral analysis in 1997 (Ecu million) A.5 EU industrial trade with East Asian countries: top ten positions of East Asian trade partners in selected extra-EU export markets and import sources (1997) A.6 Cumulative stocks of foreign direct investment in developing East Asia by Triadic source (1980, 1985, 1993, 1996) A.7 Extra-EU trade and the East Asian financial crisis (1997– June 1998) A.8 EU anti-dumping investigations initiated against trading partners A.9 Patterns in international trade (percentage shares of total by trading partner, 1960–97)
195 197 206 243 259 259 260 261
262 263 264 265 266
Preface
The economic relationship between the European Union (EU) and East Asia remains a much under-researched field, and yet it has become one of the most important structural features of the world economy. This text offers a systematic and thorough analysis on various aspects of this relationship. It not only considers the present state of EU-East Asia economic relations but also their historical development, primarily in a post-war context. Furthermore, the bilateral, interregional and multilateral dimensions of EU-East Asia economic diplomacy are examined with frequent reference to the wider ‘Triadic’ framework of relations (i.e. Europe, East Asia and North America). How developments at the sub-state, state and regional level have influenced the direction of the EU and East Asia’s economic relationship are also studied by this text. In the concluding sections to most chapters, different theoretical perspectives from the field of international political economy (IPE) are applied to enhance the reader’s understanding of the substantive issues covered. The text’s opening chapter provides its initial theoretical framework and introduces some of the running themes found in subsequent chapters. In Chapter 2 an overview of recent developments in EU-East Asia economic relations is offered that further introduces the reader to recurrent themes. Chapters 3 to 7 then respectively examine the EU’s economic relationship with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Japan, China, Taiwan and Hong Kong (jointly), and South Korea. Regionalism in both East Asia and Europe together with inter-regional co-operation are the focus of Chapter 8. Finally, Chapter 9 considers the future prospects of the EU-East Asia economic relationship. On a technical matter, while the term EU is often used to refer to its precursial guises (i.e. the EEC and EC) before 1993, the date when the Treaty on European Union was fully ratified, there are other times when the terms EEC and EC are used in their historical context. Furthermore, as no EU-based data beyond 1998 has been introduced into the text, ECUs (European Currency Units) instead of euros are accordingly used as reference terms.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank a number of people who have made this book possible. From my university, I owe a great deal to Leigh Davison who has both encouraged my efforts and helped facilitate research time and resources. The guidance and support I have received from Debra Johnson should also be acknowledged, as should the administrative efficiencies of Pat Phillips. A long overdue acknowledgement of thanks is also deserved by Clive Piggott, Jan James, Joan Lawrence, Malcom Bee and Lee Miles for inspiration. There are a number of people at other organisations to whom I am also very grateful. At the European Commission, Jonathan Hatwell, Lenette Kgeldsen, Jonathan Claridge, Peter Guildford, Alastair McDonald, Noreen Doyle, Jean-Pierre de Laet, Willem Noe, Maryvonne Coursin, Carl Asenius, Jean-Christian Remond, Laurence Argimon-Pistre and Philip van Amersfoort proved particularly helpful in supplying both valuable insight and information. At the various East Asian missions to the EU located in Brussels, I am extremely grateful to Pyung-oh Kwon (Korea), Young Song (Korea), Xian-kun Lu (China), Pang Eng Fong (Singapore), Mohamed Zain (Malaysia), Toshikazu Inui ( Japan) and Songsak Saicheua (Thailand). Masataka Fujita and Lizanne Martinez from UNCTAD provided a wide range of foreign direct investment data crucial to this text. I owe similar thanks to Hayley Crumpler at JETRO, Caroline Millerick (Bank of Korea), Simon Chan (Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office), Pam Lucas (Majestic Trade Centre), Melanie Grainte (Taiwan Trade Centre), Chong-wha Lee (Korea Institute for International Economic Policy), Michael Porteous (Invest in Britain Bureau), Pierre-Yves Leborgn (RJR International) and also Serge Perrin who proffered information on recent Korean investment projects in Europe. I would also like to extend my gratitude to the Routledge team— Andreja Zivkovic, Alison Kirk and Craig Fowlie—for humouring me through the ordeal that is book writing. I would finally like to thank my family who have had to suffer an ordeal of their own as a consequence of this project. In this respect, my wife deserves especial mention, as does our son Thomas, to whom I have given the onerous responsibility of writing this very last word. Cottingham, England
Abbreviations
ACP ADD AFTA AMF ANZCERTA APEC ASEAN ASEM CAP CCP CEC CEE CET CFSP CIS DG EAEC EAEG EC ECIP ECSC ECU EDF EEC EFTA EMU EOI EPZ ETDZ EU FDI FTA
Africa Caribbean Pacific anti-dumping duty ASEAN Free Trade Area Asian Monetary Fund Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Agreement Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum Association of Southeast Asian Nations Asia-Europe Meetings Common Agricultural Policy Common Commercial Policy Commission of the European Communities (European Commission) Central and East Europe Common external tariff Common Foreign and Security Policy Commonwealth of Independent States Directorate General (of the CEC) East Asian Economic Caucus East Asian Economic Grouping European Community European Community Investment Partners European Coal and Steel Community European Currency Unit European Development Fund European Economic Community European Free Trade Area economic and monetary union export-oriented industrialisation export processing zone Economic and Technical Development Zone European Union foreign direct investment free trade area
xvi Abbreviations FTAA GATS GATT GDP GNP GPA GSP IBRD ILO IMF IPE IPR ISI ITA ITTO JERC KMT LDC LLDC MFA MFN MITI MNE MOF MOSS MPD NAFTA NAS NGO NIC NIDL NIDZNAT NME NTA NTB ODA OECD OPEC PAFTA QMV QR R&D RIA
Free Trade Area of the Americas General Agreement on Trade in Services General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade gross domestic product gross national product Government Procurement Agreement Generalised System of Preferences International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) International Labour Organisation International Monetary Fund international political economy intellectual property rights import substitution industrialisation Information Technology Agreement International Tropical Timber Organisation Japan Economic Research Centre Kuomintang (Taiwan’s Nationalist Party) less developed country least developed country Multi-Fibre Agreement most favoured nation Ministry of Industry and International Trade (of Japan) multinational enterprise Ministry of Finance (of Japan) ‘market-oriented, sector-specific’ Modulated Preferential Duty North American Free Trade Agreement New Asia Strategy non-governmental organisation newly industrialising country new international division of labour National Industrial Development Zone for New and Advanced Technology non-market economy New Transatlantic Agenda non-tariff barrier official development assistance Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries Pacific Free Trade Area qualified majority voting quantitative restriction research and development Regional Integration Arrangement
Abbreviations
SEA SEM SEZ SII SPARTECA SREZ SRTA TAFTA TRIMs TRIPs TVE UN UNCTAD VER WTO
Single European Act Single European Market Special Economic Zone Structural Impediments Initiative South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement sub-regional economic zone sub-regional trading arrangement Transatlantic Free Trade Area Trade-related investment measures Trade-related intellectual property rights township and village enterprise United Nations United Nations Conference on Trade and Development voluntary export restraint World Trade Organisation
xvii
1
The international political economy of EU-East Asia relations Theoretical perspectives
Introduction This text is a work of international political economy (IPE). The main aim of this chapter is to introduce the theoretical perspectives from the IPE field that can be applied to the European Union (EU)-East Asia economic relationship. Such an exercise serves two main purposes. First, it provides an analytical framework in which events and developments covered in subsequent chapters can be better understood. Second, it presents an additional introductory overview of the relationship to that offered by Chapter 2. International political economy can be defined as ‘the interplay of economics and politics in the world arena’, where ‘the economy can be defined as the system of producing, distributing, and using wealth’, and ‘politics is the set of institutions and rules by which social and economic interactions are governed’ (Frieden and Lake 1995:1). It emerged (some would say re-emerged) as a subset discipline of the international relations (IR) field in the early 1970s after the global shocks of the period, most notably the collapse of the Bretton Woods exchange rate system in 1971, the 1973–4 oil crisis and the ensuing stagflation experienced by the world economy. These raised new questions of economics and politics to which many politics-oriented IR specialists could not provide comprehensive and convincing answers. 1 Other developments in the international arena during the 1970s gave further impetus to IPE studies, for instance Japan’s ascendancy as the world’s next economic superpower and the growing global impact of the European Community (EC), both of which posed a challenge to the post-war American hegemony. More recently, the identification of new linkages forged between states and societies by the various processes of globalisation has supplied more work for IPE academics. The end of the Cold War and the associated shift from ideological competition to economic competition (and from geopolitics to geoeconomics) have had a similar effect. According to Milner (1998), IPE scholars are principally involved in the study of foreign economic policy (FEP) choices (e.g. protectionism, exchange rates), issues of comparative economic development and the impact of international economics on domestic politics. Moreover, they have generally
2 International political economy of EU-East Asia relations
sought answers to the above through the investigation of four categories of explanatory factors: • distribution of world power, with particular reference to the hegemonic state; • structure, function and consequences of international institutions; • impact of ideas, beliefs and values; • effect of domestic politics. These are recurrent themes and focal points in the chapters that follow. However, the specific organising principle of this text is the study of how the economic relations between the EU and East Asia have evolved to their present state, how these relations are likely to develop in the future and what conclusions can be drawn from the observations made by each chapter. This entails a multilevel analysis in which the process of economic diplomacy, the development of economic exchange, the impact made by systemic factors and different theoretical interpretations on the above are examined. Theoretical Perspectives of IPE In this section, we introduce IPE’s three main theoretical traditions, namely neo-realism, neo-liberalism and Marxism, concentrating on the key assumptions of each theoretical perspective as well as their associated theoretical concepts. Neo-realism From realism to neo-realism As its name suggests, neo-realism is a revision of realist theory, which itself is the most established school of thought in the IR field whose roots can be traced to the writings of Thucydides and Machiavelli. According to realism, the nationstate is the only significant actor in international affairs and all other actors are essentially subordinate to it. Moreover, states are assumed to be power maximisers and behave in a rational manner in seeking this objective. Thus, states are involved in a competitive struggle to advance their position and status within the international community. As no global governing authority exists to cajole states into acting in a certain manner, anarchy prevails in the realm of international relations. Although coalitions between states may arise where they assist each state to attain self-serving goals, these arrangements are loose and inherently unstable. States are more interested in achieving relative gains over other states than receiving higher absolute gains bestowed to individual states that participate in co-operative acts. In addition, the internal characteristics of nation-states (e.g. democracies, dictatorships) are irrelevant. All share the same goal of national advancement and hence function within the international system in a similar manner. Neo-realism is founded on these basic assumptions. However, whereas
International political economy of EU-East Asia relations
3
realism stresses hierarchy between states settled by equilibrium balances of power, neo-realism is more concerned with polarity and how centres of power within the international economic system affect state behaviour. Furthermore, neo-realism posits that the balance of power between states can change quite rapidly with the frequent shift in interstate alliances. Realist assumptions about the absolute primacy of politico-military objectives in the state’s agenda are also questioned by neo-realists, but only insofar as economic objectives can attain tantamount importance where their realisation advances the nation’s international status. Another departure from realist thinking lies in the neorealist view that the interstate struggle for power is the result of the anarchic structure of the international system as a whole. Consequently, state behaviour is conditioned, but not determined, by the structure of the international economic system. Hence, neo-realism is essentially concerned with both states and systemic structure (Waltz 1979; Gilpin 1984). Hegemonic stability An important aspect of neo-realist theory is the issue of hegemonic stability (Kindleberger 1973; Krasner 1976; Lake 1991). This centres on the role of the world’s hegemonic state to maintain stability in the international system amid the anarchic conditions of interstate relations. It is thus inclined because of the awards conferred with this responsibility. By supporting an open and free trading system, the hegemon is able to exploit its industrial superiority through exporting to accessible overseas markets. The hegemon also has the capability to persuade or force other states to comply with international trade rules, which it itself has principally fashioned. This constitutes an exercise in both relational and structural power. The former relates to the leverage that an international actor can directly exert on the behaviour of or decisions made by another. On the other hand, structural power refers to the ability of certain international actors to shape and determine the systemic structures within which other actors must also operate (Strange 1994). This pertains not just to an actor’s ability to influence the rules, procedures and scope of international institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), but also the regulatory environment in which transnational economic activity takes place.2 Hegemonic stability theory contends that friction in international economic relations will rise as hegemonic power declines. Neo-realists point to the demise of Britain’s hegemonic position after World War I and the trade conflicts of the 1930s as evidence of this. Even though the USA was in a position to assume the hegemonic mantle from Britain during the inter-war period, it was reluctant to do so, preferring instead a policy of isolation and passivity while simultaneously being engaged in a zero-sum game protectionism along with its industrial rivals.3 Post-war policymakers in the USA were, however, determined to avoid any conditions that would lead to another Great Depression. Consequently, the USA adopted a proactive hegemonic position as manifested by both its pivotal role in creating new international organisations—most notably the General
4 International political economy of EU-East Asia relations
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the United Nations, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank—and as architects of the Marshall Plan. Further historical evidence for hegemonic stability was provided by the golden period of Pax Americana that followed (late 1940s to 1960s). Moreover, the decline in American hegemony that was evident by the 1970s4 and the contemporaneous increase in trade friction during the decade were seen as further vindication of neo-realist theory. To a significant extent this originated from US recourse to unilateralism and a more defensive trade policy stance.5 However, the validity of hegemonic stability theory is contested by neoliberalism for reasons we shall discuss later. There is also a strong case that claims regarding the death of the US hegemonic position have been much exaggerated (Strange 1987, 1994). During the 1990s, the US economy has performed better than its two potential hegemonic contenders, the EU and Japan, and has maintained a technological lead across a broad range of strategic industries. Moreover, even if the EU is predicted to be the hegemonic successor to the USA (Thurow 1992; Hughes 1996), history shows that prolonged structural adjustments are required before such a transition is effected. For example, the US economy was around three times larger than Britain’s by 1914 and sterling persisted as the global standard currency up until the outbreak of World War II (Kennedy 1988). Acquiring hegemonic status is thus not automatically conferred upon attaining the world’s highest gross national product (GNP) but rather through a combination of factors. The collective economic weight of the EU may be greater than that of the USA (see Table A.1), yet it lacks the same politico-military weight carried by the USA in the international arena. This is a recurrent theme in subsequent chapters as most East Asian countries still look to the USA for leadership in many aspects of international economic affairs. The resurgent economy of the 1990s, as well as the US’s involvement in the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum, have reinforced this position. Neo-mercantilism Neo-mercantilism is not so much part of the neo-realist theory but rather an expression of it. Mercantilism was the conventional wisdom on trading practices during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and much of the eighteenth century, thus pre-dating liberal notions of free trade based on comparative advantage. It stressed the role played by economic activity in ensuring the security of the state and promoting national advancement. This was primarily achieved by accumulating wealth through commercial endeavour and regulation, with the ultimate aim of realising higher political objectives. Traditionally, this inferred strengthening the state’s military capabilities in order to extend its sphere of influence within the international community. In modern times, enhancing the nation-state’s industrial capabilities with the additional objective of improving the material well-being of its people has become increasingly relevant. While the principles of free trade and comparative advantage have more or less dominated the intellectual high ground from the late eighteenth century
International political economy of EU-East Asia relations
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onwards, many states have pursued neo-mercantilist trade policies during the post-war period. Among neo-mercantilism’s most ardent protagonists have been various East Asian countries, most notably Japan, Korea and Taiwan. Some EU member states, but particularly France, have also shown strong neo-mercantilist impulses, although national-level protectionism is circumscribed by the framework of the EU’s Common Commercial Policy (CCP). Neo-mercantilism is essentially a state-centric philosophy, hence its association with the neo-realist worldview. Its most ostensible practices are concerned with the protection and promotion of strategic industries, these being essential to maintaining the long-run political and economic security of the state. Examples include essential material-based sectors (e.g. steel), large globalised sectors (e.g. automobiles and electronics) and high-tech sectors with considerable future growth potential (e.g. information technologies and aerospace industries). The emergence of strategic trade theory during the 1980s lent some intellectual support to neo-mercantilism (Krugman 1980, 1986; Brander and Spencer 1985; Krugman and Smith 1993). Adopting an industrial organisation approach, the premise of strategic trade theory was based on the view that imperfect competition prevailed in most of the world’s industries and not perfect competition, a central assumption of the neo-classical theory of comparative advantage. Hence, by assisting its indigenous oligopolistic firms or ‘national champions’ in exploiting attainable economies of scale and scope, greater economic rents and other positive externalities could be generated to the benefit of the whole economy. Such state intervention could involve the granting of export subsidies or orchestrating inter-firm collaborations, hence the promotive aspects of neo-mercantilism. Despite its obvious appeal to policymakers, neo-mercantilism has become an increasingly untenable policy option for two main reasons. First, it is an antagonist commercial policy that is likely to have repercussions, for example, from retaliatory actions undertaken by other states. Furthermore, neo-mercantilist policies have become increasingly dissonant in the current era of freer markets presided over by the new multilateral order. Second, because globalisation has blurred the boundaries of ‘national’ economic activity, state sponsorship of indigenous firms and industries has become less effectual. The expanding web of cross-border linkages woven by multinational business activity has weakened the internationalised firm’s allegiance to its country of origin. This has narrowed the scope of the state’s ‘national’ industrial policies. Neo-realism in context At first glance, it may appear that an application of neo-realist analysis to EUEast Asia economic relations poses some important methodological difficulties. This is not least because the main actor most frequently considered throughout this text, i.e. the EU, is not actually a nation-state but rather a complex ‘system of governance’ operating between a regional group of nation-states (Chapter 8 provides a fuller discussion on this issue). Nevertheless, the general framework of this text is based on the use of territorial reference points—the economic
6 International political economy of EU-East Asia relations
relationship between two regions, or regional groups of states. Like a state, the EU can be defined by its territorial boundaries and employs diplomatic agents to represent its interests in international affairs. With respect to trade, this is principally conducted at the supranational level by the European Commission under the auspices of the CCP. In subsequent chapters we analyse the development of the EU’s economic relationship with other territorial-based units, whether they are nation-states ( Japan, China, Korea), another regional group of states (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN) or territories possessing economic sovereignty but where political sovereignty has either been withdrawn (Hong Kong) or remains contested (Taiwan). This gives scope to apply the basic tenets of neo-realist analysis to the text’s themes. For instance, a central preoccupation of the EU has been to improve its competitive position against East Asian producers and in the region’s expanding markets. Neo-realism’s anarchic struggle for advancement is even more applicable to the East Asian states. The rapid economic development that most have experienced during the post-war period has been achieved because, invariably, both the state and society have been willing to subordinate all other goals to ‘catching up’ with the developed countries. For Japan this specifically related to restoring its position as a major industrial power. Korea’s industrial endeavours were initially galvanised by the state’s objective to achieve ‘nation-building through exports’. A similar strategy was pursued by Taiwan in attempts to establish itself as a de facto nation-state and thus augment its political legitimacy. For most ASEAN states, the goal of rapid industrialisation has been part of a post-colonial, confidence-building exercise in nation-statehood. The significant economic achievements made by China in recent years have also demonstrated the willingness of state to make ideological compromises in order to secure national advancement. Furthermore, neo-realists would argue that the EU’s international agenda is only a reflection of inter-state bargaining within the group with more powerful member states able to shape this agenda quite considerably. Throughout this text we will note how EU commercial policy is often influenced by specific national interests, such as France with respect to agricultural trade. However, most neorealists did not expect the EU’s long-standing coalition of member states to endure because of the negation of political sovereignty that is required to make the coalition work. In the context of the international economic system, EU member states have accepted to varying degrees that they must co-operate in order to compete with their common industrial rivals, especially the USA and Japan. Neo-realism’s focus on systemic factors is shared to some extent by this text. In recent times, these factors have become more important with the strengthening of both the multilateral trade order under the aegis of the WTO and other regimes6 in which the EU and East Asian states participate. However, the role played by fortified international institutions and new regimes that helps govern the global economic system is stressed more by neo-liberals than neo-realists. The hegemonic stability issue is also highly relevant given the longer-term relative decline in US hegemony over the post-war period, the
International political economy of EU-East Asia relations
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new multi-polar balance of power between the Triad regions (Europe, North America, East Asia) and recent developments in alliance formation between them (see Chapter 2). Frequent reference will be made to how the USA is still able to use hegemonic power to broker deals or forge alliances with East Asian states that have been to the actual or potential detriment of EU commercial interests. Finally, we have already noted that some East Asian and EU states have displayed a predilection for neo-mercantilist policies. As a whole, the EU has also been accused of neo-mercantilism, whether in regard to sponsoring major European industrial collaborations such as Airbus in civil aerospace or ESPRIT in information technology, or concerning its ‘managed’ trade policies (Winters 1994). In more recent times, these accusations have subsided as the EU has embraced a more neo-liberal economic agenda. Neo-liberalism From liberalism to neo-liberalism Like neo-realism, neo-liberalism is also a revision of an earlier theoretical tradition. The assumptions and emphasis of neo-liberal theory, though, are considerably different to neo-realism, being founded on ‘classic’ liberal notions of individual self-determination and utility-maximising rationality. The laissezfaire principles of free trade and comparative advantage are essentially expressions of the above, that is uninhibited individual endeavour in its quest to pursue laudable economic objectives. Moreover, the private organisations (i.e. firms) trade with each other, not states as such, and hence liberals emphasise the individual as the most significant actor in the international economic system. From this leads a preoccupation with competition between firms, rather than interstate competition, and the primacy of markets over states. Neo-liberalism builds on these assumptions but has also expanded its theoretical foundations. The view that non-state actors play a key role in international economic affairs is extended to include transnational and transgovernmental factors. Transnational actors can take many guises, for example, as representatives from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as industry associations, officials from supranational or international agencies, or business executives employed by multinational enterprises (MNEs).7 Transnational relations can either work separately or in tandem with interstate relations. Even where statecentric negotiations determine actual outcomes, transgovernmental coalitions may evolve between like-minded state officials whose own self-serving interests may not necessarily be aligned to the state they are supposed to represent. The growth in both the number and scope of international organisations, together with the new interlinkages forged by globalisation, have broadened the nature of transnational relations and introduced greater complexity to the governance of international economic relations (Risse-Kappen 1995). This trend has, of course, affected those between the EU and East Asia where transnational actors have become increasingly participative.
8 International political economy of EU-East Asia relations
According to neo-liberals, this proliferation of transnationalised linkages presents an a priori case for interstate co-operation. As interdependence prevails, and with it convergence of different state’s interests, governments are forced to work together to find resolutions to common problems and challenges. This can also manifest itself in state-firm co-operation and diplomacy (Stopford et al. 1991), where ‘to regain some influence over events, governments and firms have to collaborate with one another; they have to sacrifice their unilateral freedom of action for some degree of mastery over transnational flows of goods, capital, technology, ideas and people’ (Keohane 1993:48). While there exists a strong neo-liberal consensus against state intervention, it is also accepted that states need to co-operate both to redress market failure at the international level and jointly to provide the public goods required for the international economic system to function in a non-anarchical fashion. Examples of the former include collaborative efforts to regulate global monopoly power (e.g. the Microsoft case involving EU and US competition policy authorities) or international accords on pollution control (e.g. the Montreal Protocol on ozonedepleting substances). Examples of the latter include international organisations such as the WTO and IMF that are able to ‘facilitate co-operation by reducing transaction costs, improving transparency and elaborating rules and norms that serve to regulate relations among states’ (McGuire 1997:21). Moreover, neo-liberalism maintains that while international organisations may owe their origins to hegemonic power, they are not subsequently dependent upon it once established. This is partly due to the creation of conditions in the international economic system that help to legitimise their own independent raison d’être. The WTO is a case in point, although it is questionable whether it could function effectively without US membership. Some neo-liberals, however, play down the importance of institutionalised co-operation by arguing that ‘international organisations are not the causes of co-operation but mechanisms through which co-operation occurs’ (Haggard and Moravcsik 1993:285). Thus, the institutionalist wing of neo-liberal theory has often been treated as a separate theory. For the purposes of this text, though, the existence of a liberal-institutionalist synthesis is acknowledged. Complex interdependence Originally conceived by Keohane and Nye (1977), the notion of ‘complex interdependence’ is a critique of the neo-realist worldview that states are able to behave in a largely autonomous manner, proposing instead that independent state strategies are often not viable. This derives largely from the neo-liberal observation that multiple transnational channels connect societies, or sections of societies, across different nation-states. These may include workers employed by MNEs, members of international pressure groups (e.g. Greenpeace) and transgovernmental policy networks. The interaction of state and non-state actors through these channels produces a complex interdependence of relationships, while also challenging the neo-realist assumption that states act as coherent units
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with unambiguous national interests. Furthermore, non-state actors can develop their own agendas independent of nation-states. This process may be mutually reinforcing. For example, international organisations provide an important forum in which transgovernmental alliances are forged, that in turn help support or legitimise the distinct agenda of the international organisation. Complex interdependence is also applicable to the foreign policy agenda, whereby issues of concern have become increasingly more eclectic and interconnected with no clear hierarchy established among them. Issues of politico-military security thus compete with the new issues of economic security (e.g. the environment, drug trafficking). The greater interaction now witnessed between all issues can be largely attributed to the effects and processes of globalisation. Keohane and Nye also suggest that, in the daily minutiae of state affairs, governments are usually engaged more in maintaining or promoting co-operative economic interactions than distracted by traditional security matters. Moreover, the distinction between domestic and international issues has become increasingly blurred as a growing interdependence between them has emerged. This is explored by Putnam’s (1988, 1993) two-level games model, whereby the Janus-faced state must simultaneously reconcile both the demands of the international economic system and those of its own domestic stakeholding constituencies. Resolving conflicts of interest that lie therein may be achieved through striking bargains with other states, which must be simultaneously ratified at the domestic level. The relationship between the state and different stakeholding constituencies in the FEP-making process can also be analysed within Rogowski’s (1989) ‘commerce and coalitions’ model. The premise of this model is that economic cleavages between domestic stakeholding constituencies are caused by their exposure to trade, which is assumed to have either beneficial or adverse effects upon them. The distribution of effects in turn determines the configuration of alliances made between these constituencies that seek to influence the direction of the nation’s foreign economic policy. Surplus capacity The notion of surplus capacity is not so much part of neo-liberal theory, but rather an alternative explanation of trade friction to hegemonic stability that has been proposed from a neo-liberal institutional viewpoint (Strange 1979; Strange and Tooze 1980; Tsoukalis and Ferreira 1980; Cowley and Long 1983). Surplus capacity exists when, for a sustained period and for a large percentage of producers, demand is insufficient to absorb production at prices that can maintain a substantial level of employment and adequate returns on investment. This has been caused by major shifts in the world economy. First, the amount of capital investment per unit of output has risen sharply in many sectors, thus making idle capacity more costly. Second, newly industrialising countries (NICs) that have emerged in recent post-war decades have expanded their world market shares of manufactured products at the expense of established Western
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producers. Third, post-oil crisis structural changes have been responsible for greater unpredictability in patterns of demand for and prices of manufactures. Moreover, cyclical downturns exacerbate surplus capacity predicaments. Where surplus capacities exist in industry sectors, we can anticipate a rise in trade friction as less competitive producer countries, or those with a pronounced over-capacity problem, erect protectionist barriers against more competitive producer countries. Such sectors have tended to be those in structural decline in the West and where NIC producers have developed a significant comparative advantage. Surplus capacity’s main connection to neo-liberal theory lies in the international agreements that frequently arise between governments, as well as non-state actors, in which an understanding to limit competition is established. These restrict conflict among countries ‘by softening the costs of cutting capacity for weaker competitors and preserving some of the foreign markets for stronger ones’ (Cowley and Long 1983:162). However, while a capacity-cutting regime created by relatively uncompetitive producer countries but imposed upon competitive producer countries restricts conflict between the former group, it naturally antagonises the latter group. The Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) is an example of the above, where Western producer countries agreed to contain NIC competition in the textiles and clothing sectors. As we discuss below, surplus capacity situations have been an important theme in the EU-East Asia economic relationship. Neo-liberalism in context While the EU and East Asia are not engaged in a comprehensive security relationship, Chapter 2 shows in some detail how economic interdependence between the two regions has grown substantially in recent years. East Asia became the EU’s most important regional trading partner by the mid-1990s, while East Asian firms have been lured by the commercial opportunities presented by the Single European Market. The increase in mutual flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) and other interconnections generated by financial globalisation have expanded and deepened the economic linkages between the EU and East Asian economy. Managing the more complex interdependence in EU-East Asia economic relations has increasingly required the participation of various non-state actors, made more imperative by the general shift from states to markets. Representatives from business have become important constituents in the conduct and process of EU-East Asia economic diplomacy as globalisation has necessitated their deeper involvement in international public policy cooperation and co-ordination. For example, the relatively high exposure of European banks in the East Asian financial crisis gave them a considerable stake in helping find effective policy solutions. The growing engagement of business representatives is generally apparent in new initiatives taken within EU-East Asia bilateral accords and the new Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM) framework.8 State-firm diplomacy has itself become increasingly relevant, for
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instance, where an East Asian MNE directly investing in the EU seeks the best incentive package from potential host governments. To some degree, the corporate governance practices of European and East Asian companies also bring influence to bear on economic relations. This becomes more relevant where strategic alliances between them have been formed or where industrial co-operation between companies from the two regions has been promoted within EU-East Asia bilateral or inter-regional framework accords. Globalisation can also make the allegiances or negotiating positions of some European or East Asian MNEs difficult to predict. For example, a European multinational that has established operations in an East Asian country may request the host government to impose an anti-dumping duty (ADD) against a rival European firm, or even lobby the European Commission to remove its own ADD against its locally produced exports which are destined for the EU market. While business representatives have thus become key constituents in EUEast Asia economic relations, their actual influence over the direction and governance of these relations is still limited. Within the existing framework of EU-East Asia economic diplomacy, the private sector’s function remains primarily consultative. However, if business is to make an effective contribution to promoting greater economic exchange between the EU and East Asia, its representatives will be required to play a more proactive rather than passive role in the future. This is more likely to be achieved through collective action, for instance, through initiatives undertaken at the industry association level or through certain consortium arrangements. Interdependence is also manifest in the broader range of issues now apparent on the EU-East Asia economic diplomacy agenda. This is revealed at the ASEM level and the various bilateral contact groups that have evolved to manage these issues. The latter is especially applicable to the EU’s economic relations with Japan and ASEAN, its two longest-standing partners in East Asia. Such regime building has forged a greater number of transgovernmental alliances and policy networks between EU and East Asian policymakers. It could be argued that these developments helped progress EU-East Asia economic diplomacy beyond the more conflictual relations of the 1980s towards the more co-operative trend that was evident by the 1990s. Transgovernmental linkages have also contributed to a mutual support of multilateral regimes, although Chapter 2 discusses how some East Asian states have remained wary of the emerging new trade agenda. However, the EU, Japan and the more advanced East Asian NIC s have all been signatories to new WTO plurilateral agreements. Their support of the WTO is especially important given the relative decline in American hegemony and the US penchant for occasional unilateralism in its trade affairs. Despite the co-operative trend in EU-East Asia economic diplomacy, the surplus capacity problem remains an important source of conflict. Many European firms have faced a significant competitive threat from their East Asian counterparts which has accelerated the process of industrial contraction in various sectors. In response, European industry lobby groups have urged
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EU national governments and the European Commission to defend their interests. Although EU protectionism aimed at counteracting this threat subsided during the 1990s, some measures have been retained. As we note in Chapter 2, the EU’s anti-dumping policy has been particularly singled out for criticism by East Asian states. Their graduation from the EU’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) scheme, in which trade concessions have been removed where beneficiaries have become too competitive, can also be linked to the surplus capacity issue. The current dismantling of the MFA regime is, however, an example where the EU and other Western powers have taken greater responsibility for tackling their own surplus capacity problems. Most recently, though, East Asia has experienced surplus capacity problems of its own as a result of the region’s 1997–8 financial crisis. Chapter 2 discusses the general implications of this for the EU. Marxism The Marxist worldview Marxism’s intellectual origins are the most modern of the three main IPE theoretical approaches, stemming from the writings of nineteenth-century political economist Karl Marx. According to Marxist theory, classes are the dominant actors in the international political economy, although it also acknowledges that states, societies and various non-state actors operate as part of the world capitalist system. Like neo-realism, Marxism contends that international economic relations are essentially conflictual. This is attributed to the inherent inter-class frictions that arise between capital and labour, and particularly from the capitalist exploitation of workers and the suppression of their interests. Thus, the prevailing hierarchy in the international economic system is determined not by politicomilitary power, as neo-realists suggest, but rather by the patterns of production and exchange established by MNEs. Moreover, globalisation has enhanced the power of capital which has strengthened firms’ influence over state economic policy. Marxists therefore emphasise the primacy of economic objectives in the foreign policy agenda of states. Furthermore, international economic relations must be understood from a historical perspective on the development of world capital (Wallerstein 1979). Marx’s own writings highlighted the relationship between the expansion of internationalised capital interests and imperialism. Imperialism arose from the exploitation of labour-intensive countries by their capital-intensive counterparts. This involved state governments from the latter organising or sanctioning the colonisation of other countries and regions to safeguard the commercial interests of their indigenous firms. Interstate competition between capitalist countries for control of these territories was another important feature of the international political economy. In the post-colonial era, the Marxist interpretation of transnational class conflict has moved on to place greater emphasis on MNE competition for global market shares, thus branding them as the new imperialists.
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The FDI of multinationals, in which firms extend their control over factors of production in other countries, is seen by Marxists as a continuation of imperialist practices. Marxist theory also stresses how MNEs use their oligopolistic market power to play off workforces against each other within international production networks in their endeavours to drive down labour costs and maximise economic rents (Frobel et al. 1980). The so-called new international division of labour (NIDL) has been facilitated by two main developments: first, advances in transport and communication technologies that have helped create these international production networks which link together different workforces within actual or potential transnationalised divisions of labour; second, new process technologies have fragmented and standardised specific tasks that can be more easily contracted out to developing countries with low labour costs. The wider diffusion of more mature production technologies in a number of sectors (e.g. textiles, steel) has also contributed to this development. Consequently, greater scope has emerged for competition between workforces from developed and developing country locations which MNEs exploit to their advantage. In analysing the structure of the international economic system, modern Marxist thinking focuses on dependency theory to explain the persisting gap between developed and most developing countries. According to this theory, the core-periphery divide between industrialised regions and under-developed regions is sustained by a subservient economic relationship in which the latter remain dependent upon the former for capital, technology, finance and trade. Marxists propose that this relationship has endured because it has been in the interests of dominant capitalist forces (e.g. state policymakers from developed countries, MNE executives and capital-orientated international organisations such as the IMF and World Bank) to maintain the status quo. It could be argued that many East Asian states have managed to cross the core-periphery divide, while the region as a whole has become a new pole of economic wealth in the world economy. However, Marxists would point to the pivotal role played by Japan—the region’s long-established core capitalist power—with respect to both these achievements and in determining the current regional division of labour, production and economic exchange. Radicalism, reformism and idealism Marxism is placed by some IPE scholars within a broader theoretical and ideological tradition that embraces the notions of radicalism, reformism and idealism. This is mainly due to its prescription of radical alternatives to marketoriented pluralist democracy, the current leading credible model of economic development. Moreover, the fundamental transformation of the international economic system Marxism advocates, based on the greater empowerment of labour in both its domestic and transnational contexts, is anathema to most of today’s policy-makers. The ideals to which Marxism aspires have also been interpreted by many as utopian. In addition, mainstream thinkers dismiss
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Marx’s prediction of the demise of international capitalism due to its inherent contradictions, even more so since the retreat of Communism from the late 1980s onwards. Radical alternatives to the current structure, conduct and process of international economic relations have been offered by other ‘reformist’ movements. Examples include environmentalism, pacificism and feminism, with most tending to emphasise transnational solutions to international economic problems. Links here can be made with the neo-liberal view that states alone are not able to resolve these and require the participation of non-state actors. Reformism argues this point further, contending that the pursuance of national sovereignty is ultimately damaging because of the nature of the economic problems faced by the whole international community. Again, another link can be made with neo-liberalism, on this occasion regarding the prominence of new economic security issues, e.g. ecological crises, drug trafficking, the persistent divide between rich and poor countries, economic migration and Third World debt. Reformists highlight the interconnections between these issues and therefore propose a holistic approach towards managing them. International organisations are seen as playing an important role here, although this is contingent upon them serving higher moral or ethical interests rather than simply the representations of powerful national interests. Marxism in context Marxist analysis on capital and imperialism has historic relevance to certain EU member states’ earliest involvement in parts of East Asia, and particularly Southeast Asia. The development of the EU’s economic relations with ASEAN has thus evolved within a post-colonial context. Moreover, many of the EU firms that were responsible for establishing an imperial division of labour in the region have not left. Some ASEAN states, such as Malaysia and Singapore, remain highly dependent upon inward FDI from European sources and EU governments are still concerned about safeguarding the foreign investment interests of their indigenous MNEs in the region. Furthermore, the long-running dispute between Portugal and Indonesia over East Timor (see Chapters 2 and 3) demonstrates how current economic relations can be impeded by postcolonial friction. Notwithstanding these points, the basis of the EU-East Asia economic relationship has generally moved away from dependency to interdependency as noted earlier under neo-liberalism. Most analysts would accept that East Asia has become a new ‘core’ region within the world economy, although the region’s lesser developed states arguably lie on the wrong side of the coreperiphery divide. However, the recognition of East Asia’s new commercial power and potential has been the principal motivation behind EU efforts to promote the economic relationship between the two regions. Marxists would interpret such endeavours as maintaining or extending the international capitalist alliance.
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Marxists would further argue that the NIDL concept is highly applicable to the EU-East Asia economic relationship. Competition between both regions’ workforces has intensified with economic interdependence as EU and East Asian MNEs have greater opportunities to play off domestic and foreign labour against the other. The emerging parity of unit labour costs between cost-inflated East Asian countries (e.g. Korea) and certain EU member states has broadened the scope of this competition, with companies from the former looking to expand their investments to Europe owing partly to this development. While there may be some truth in this Marxist analysis, other factors that explain the growth in FDI flows between the two regions are examined by this text. A final note should be reserved concerning the retreat of Marxism in East Asia. This can be most clearly observed in the capitalist experiments recently undertaken by the Communist states of China and Vietnam. Many other East Asian states that have practised variations of state economic planning have also embarked on a new policy direction. To some extent, this has eased the tensions in the EU’s economic diplomacy with the East Asian states owing to a firmer market-oriented, neo-liberal consensus which has grown as a consequence of these changes. However, both sides have been increasingly affected by the reformist agenda of new economic security issues, as witnessed by environmental clauses introduced to the EU’s GSP scheme in 1998, joint efforts to combat drug trafficking and various other initiatives. Concluding note Each of the different IPE theories that we have analysed offer their own perspectives on the EU-East Asia economic relationship. It is not the intention of this author to adopt a dogmatic theoretical position, but rather use these theoretical perspectives to enhance the reader’s understanding of the themes and arguments covered in the text, demonstrating their salience where appropriate. This primarily take places in each chapter’s conclusion where a specific theoretical evaluation on the preceding analysis will be made.
2
EU-East Asia economic relations An overview of recent developments
Introduction Over recent decades the tripolarisation of the world economy has become increasingly evident. By the mid-1990s, the Triad regions1 —the EU, North America and East Asia—accounted for around 80 per cent of international trade (Table 2.1) and investment. In acknowledging that its relationship with East Asia remains the weak link in the Triad, the EU has more actively promoted its economic relations with the region in recent times. This has been crucial given the global production centre and new pole of prosperity that East Asia has become. Progress made by the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum in augmenting a stronger transpacific alliance has added greater imperative to the EU’s cause. However, now running parallel to the EU’s established ties with East Asian countries is the recently created Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM) framework that provides an inter-regional basis for dialogue between the EU and East Asia. Together with the 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA), APEC and the ASEM represent the completed triangle of inter-regional Triadic links. The EU’s economic relations with East Asia must also be understood in their multilateral context. From one perspective, the scale of the inter-regional Triadic links noted above pose a challenge to the multilateral order, presided over by the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Another challenge facing the WTO lies in extending its legitimacy to deal with the so-called ‘new’ trade issues. These have arisen largely because both the gradual post-war reduction in tariff barriers and the exposing effects of globalisation have raised a variety of non-tariff trade barriers to prominence. If the WTO succeeds, this would have significant ramifications for how international economic relations are conducted and governed in the future. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the above themes, thus introducing the recent developments in EU-East Asia economic relations. We shall first examine the reasons why the EU has afforded increasing priority to developing its economic relations with East Asia. This includes a brief study of East Asia’s economic dynamic and recent financial crisis, and what impact these have had upon patterns of the EU’s economic exchange with region. We shall then consider the new developments in the EU-East Asia economic diplomacy,
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Table 2.1 Triad trade flows: percentage shares of world total (1960, 1980, 1996)
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, various editions. Notes: 1 US, Canada and Mexico 2 Japan, China, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and ASEAN10.
which involves an examination of the nature and practice of EU economic diplomacy, the EU’s bilateral economic relations with East Asian states, the new ASEM framework and diplomatic interactions at the multilateral level. East Asia in the balance: economic dynamism and financial crisis In the chapters that follow, we make separate studies of the dynamic economic development of each East Asian country, or group of countries in the case of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).2 It is useful at this point, though, briefly to examine the wider regional dynamic of East Asia’s economic development and make reference to the debate over whether the ‘Pacific Century’ is inevitable. This relates to the notion that an emergent East Asia that is closely aligned to its North American economic partners constitutes a transpacific axis which could potentially marginalise the EU in forthcoming decades. However, the 1997–8 East Asian financial crisis changed assumptions regarding the region’s future growth and prosperity, with many analysts believing that the economic miracle was either a myth or had come to an end.
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Hence, each subsequent chapter will also examine how the crisis has affected the East Asian trading power in question and what impression this has made on its economic relationship with the EU. The East Asian economic miracle The economic performance of East Asian countries in recent decades has been stunning. Over a sustained period they have achieved the fastest economic growth rates yet recorded, both on an individual country and regional group basis (see Table A.2). In the wake of Japan’s post-war reindustrialisation came the advance of the ‘first generation’ newly industrialising countries (NICs) of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong from the 1950s onwards. These were joined later by the ‘second generation’ NICs of Southeast Asia with Malaysia and Thailand in particular achieving the highest growth rates amongst this subgroup. As Table A.1 indicates, many East Asian states now enjoy income per capita levels that have overtaken or are approaching those for the EU. There have been numerous studies which have sought to explain the determinants of East Asia’s rapid industrialisation and growth.3 Although the highly diverse political, economic, demographic and socio-cultural complexion of East Asia has made it difficult to formulate a unified explanatory model, certain commonalties can be established between at least particular sub-groups of states and their paths to development. A World Bank (1993) study perhaps offers the most comprehensive attempt at providing such a model in which various multi-linked relationships between different developmental functions were considered (Figure 2.1). However, the study’s ‘market fundamentalism’ and strong emphasis on ‘macroeconomic basics’ as opposed to ‘microinstitutions that exhibit pervasive state intervention’ were criticised by Amsden (1994:627) and others,4 many of whom prescribe to the ‘developmental state’ model of East Asian development which emphasises the centrality of the state’s role. Additional determining factors could arguably have been given more prominence by the World Bank model, for example: the facilitating role played by Japan in the industrialisation of the region through foreign direct investment (FDI) and accompanying capital, technology and management practice transfers;5 benefits conferred by US financial aid, other capital investments, domestic institutional support and the provision of markets;6 socio-cultural factors (e.g. Confucianism) and the positive influence of ‘collectivist’ norms on human capital practices, industrial and societal relations.7 What has become clear is that East Asia’s developing economies are moving beyond a dependency on the USA and Japan, thus helping create a more independent momentum for the region as reflected in the growth of its intraregional trade and investment flows8 (Table 2.2). East Asia’s enhanced regional integration is extensively analysed in Chapter 8, but suffice to comment here that the future of a more defined and coalescent East Asian economy and the potential that lies therein have become the subject of much debate. On the one hand, there are those early optimists who believed that the region is destined to
Source: World Bank (1993)
Figure 2.1 World Bank model of East Asian growth
20 EU-East Asia economic relations Table 2.2 The Triadic distribution of East Asian trade (percentage of total)
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, various editions. Notes: 1 US and Canada. 2 Includes intra-ASEAN trade for ASEAN.
become the world’s most prosperous economic region by the early twenty-first century.9 On the other, there are more sceptical analysts who remain unconvinced of East Asia’s assured bright future.10 The 1997–8 East Asian financial crisis certainly lent increasing credence to the latter view, although its longer-term effects on the region’s economic growth trajectory cannot easily be discerned. The 1997–8 East Asian financial crisis There is a multitude of views on the actual causes of the 1997–8 East Asian financial crisis.11 However, the region’s high debt-driven economic development and misconceived international finance policies are generally accepted as the main sources of instability from which the crisis evolved (Goldstein 1998; Henderson 1998; Wade 1998; Wade and Veneroso 1998). Bridges (1998) blames the immediate cause of the crisis on foreign over-borrowing by the region’s banks, companies and individuals on a short-term basis and the mountain of non-performing loans that this created. At a deeper level, the structural defects of many East Asian economies were exposed by the crisis but also served to exacerbate it, not least by undermining
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wider systemic confidence. Examples of such ‘defects’ included the use of political as opposed to commercial criteria in loan allocations (particularly in Indonesia and Thailand), surplus manufacturing capacity (Korea), over-ambitious megaprojects (Malaysia and Indonesia), macroeconomic weakness caused by sustained current account deficits and inadequate prudential controls in national financial systems (most affected countries).12 The one specific event commonly cited as having precipated the crisis was the Thai government’s decision to float the baht on 2 July 1997, the day after Hong Kong’s return to mainland Chinese sovereignty. The baht’s subsequent freefall on the foreign exchange markets created a general crisis of confidence in other Southeast Asian currencies,13 which was later to spread to the region’s stock markets. By November 1997, Thailand, Indonesia and Korea had accepted significant International Monetary Fund (IMF) rescue packages at $17.2bn, $37.0bn and $57.0bn, respectively. The two other countries most affected by the crisis, Malaysia and the Philippines, avoided direct appeal to the IMF but nevertheless were compelled to introduce a range of austerity measures aimed at maintaining economic stability.14 From July 1997 to January 1998, the currencies from all five countries had depreciated by between 40 and 60 per cent against the US dollar. Furthermore, in the latter half of 1997 their stock market indices had fallen by around 50 per cent. Japan’s ability to offer assistance to the wider region was constrained by both its own financial difficulties and prolonged recession. Moreover, its August 1997 proposal for establishing an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), backed by secured pledges from China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore,15 lacked essential support from the USA which was reluctant to back any initiative that undermined IMF multilateral competence in such situations (see Chapters 4 and 8). Low or negative growth was anticipated in 1998 for the five most affected economies with significant spillover and transmission effects for the wider region. However, at time of writing, most estimates predicted a mild recovery towards 1999 or 2000 and beyond. Yet the longer-term impact of the crisis on the region and its ‘developmental state’ model of economic development remains difficult to determine at this point (Burkett and Landsberg 1998; Johnson 1998), but we shall nevertheless return to this issue in subsequent chapters. The European response It was not until Korea’s financial difficulties became fully apparent in November 1997 that the EU’s political reaction to the wider East Asian crisis became significantly audible. Even then, the EU’s response was somewhat dismissive. In January 1998, European Commission President, Jacques Santer, stated that the EU economy would be only slightly affected by the crisis.16 A similar evaluation was given by Yves-Thibault de Silguy, EU Monetary Affairs Commissioner at the time, who argued that the crisis would have ‘only a marginal impact on growth in Europe’.17 However, by the time of the Second ASEM Summit held at London in April 1998, a more foreboding view was taken by EU leaders.
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Notwithstanding the setbacks, pressures and dour predictions generated by the crisis, this text will argue that the EU’s efforts at fortifying its economic links with East Asia must remain a priority. The region has recently offered some of the most significant commercial opportunities for European companies, as the following analysis on EU-East Asia economic exchange testifies. East Asia’s improving competitiveness in an ever wider range of industries also poses a serious threat to EU producers. Both trends should be anticipated to continue at least over the medium term and hence provide a case for the EU to develop more harmonious and collaborative economic relations with East Asian states. However, it becomes evident in subsequent chapters that the USA generally enjoys a more developed and encompassing economic relationship with East Asia, which itself is underpinned to varying degrees by US close security ties with many of its allies in the region. Progress made by APEC over the 1990s has further cemented the transpacific alliance,18 thus making the EU’s task of achieving proximate influence over East Asia’s economic affairs even more arduous.19 The new ASEM framework has, however, managed to redress this somewhat. Moreover, as Chapters 8 and 9 discuss, the financial crisis had generated considerable tensions in transpacific relations by the end of 1998. In order to obtain a clearer perspective on the above matters, let us now examine a broad overview of recent trends in economic exchange between the EU and East Asia. Economic exchange between the EU and East Asia Trade For the last decade or so, East Asian countries have been the most dynamic trading partners of the EU. In 1980, East Asia’s share of extra-EU imports was 11.7 per cent and its share of extra-EU exports 8.4 per cent. By 1997 these had increased to 26.9 per cent and 20.2 per cent, respectively (see Table A.3). Five years earlier trade flows between the EU and East Asia had overhauled the vol ume of transatlantic trade,20 thus making East Asia the most important regional trading partner of Europe from this time onwards.21 Among the East Asian group, China has been the EU’s fastest growing import source while Korea and Taiwan have been its fastest expanding export markets in the region (Figure 2.2). In comparison, the EU’s shares of East Asian trade have remained relatively static with a few exceptions (see Table 2.2). For example, the EU improved its shares of Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese import trade over the 1975–97 period although these are still well below those for North America and other East Asian countries. Meanwhile, the EU’s share of Chinese import trade fell sharply in the 1980s, while its share of Hong Kong’s exports almost halved during the period. Like the EU, North America’s shares of East Asian trade have also remained reasonably stable, but it should be remembered that it began the period with generally much higher shares than the EU. The rise of intra-regional trade in East Asia has, though, posed a challenge to both Western regions. The general regional balance of trade between the EU and East Asia lies
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23
Figure 2.2 East Asian group shares of EU trade with the region (1980, 1997) Source: Eurostat.
squarely in the latter’s favour, with the EU’s trade deficit standing at Ecu33.8bn in 1997 (Figure 2.3). The deficit’s peak of Ecu51.5bn reached in 1991 more or less coincided with Japan’s 1992 peak surplus against the EU recorded at Ecu34.1bn. China’s own growing surplus with the EU threatens to reach the same scale as Japan’s, having risen from Ecu5.3bn in 1990 to Ecu20.9bn by 1997.22 Both ASEAN and Taiwan also achieve trade surpluses with the EU on a regular basis, although Hong Kong has seen its trade balance with Europe fall further into the red over the 1990s.23 The EU has also recently moved into a trade surplus position against Korea. An examination of EU member state trade with East Asia reveals that Germany and the UK are the EU’s most prominent traders with the region, with France, Italy and the Netherlands also being key trade partners (Figure 2.4). A closer examination of sectoral trade flows presents a more revealing picture. In general, the EU’s chemical industries have retained their competitive advantage over their East Asian counterparts (see Table A.4). However, the technological balance is shifting more in East Asia’s favour in manufactures trade. The EU
24 EU-East Asia economic relations
Figure 2.3 EU-East Asia trade (1975–97) Source: Eurostat. Note: 1975 figures do not include Korea.
continues to import higher tech goods from Japan in return for relatively lower tech exports. While China’s low-tech exports to Europe are still growing rapidly (e.g. clothing, footwear and toys), it has also begun to dispatch higher value-added products to EU markets (e.g. electrical machinery, telecoms and audio-visual goods). As with East Asia’s NICs, though, China has increased its demand for EU capital goods to assist the industrialisation process. Yet the EU’s dependence on the NIC group’s technology-intensive consumer products is now quite pronounced. For example, in the office machines and computers sector the EU’s import:export ratio with the group is 1:9. Moreover, in both this and the telecoms and audio-visual sector, East Asian countries represented eight of the EU’s top ten import sources for these products (see Table A.5). Notable sectoral imbalances also persist in other sectors at country level, such as Korea’s exports of automobiles to the EU which outnumber imports by over 100 to 1. Foreign direct investment Greater economic interdependence between the EU and East Asia has also been nurtured through FDI links (CEC 1996a). East Asia has attracted huge inflows of investment since the 1980s and much of this has come from European companies (see Table A.6). The EU’s share of FDI in developing East Asia has nevertheless fallen marginally since the mid-1980s, although those for both Japan and the USA have declined more sharply. However, over the mid-1990s the EU’s share of cumulative inward FDI in developing East Asia increased from 8.7 per cent up to 1993 to 12.3 per cent by 1996, which contrasted with
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Figure 2.4 EU trade with East Asia by member state (1987, 1997) Source: Eurostat.
Japan and USA’s falling shares. This was primarily due to the surge of European investment in Southeast Asia and China over the period. Triad investments in the region have fallen in proportionate terms, mainly due to the expansion of inter-NIC outward investments.24 Meanwhile, Europe has been increasingly targeted by East Asian multinationals for FDI projects, particularly those from Japan and Korea.25 The escalation of Japanese investment in Europe, especially during the late 1980s, helped to increase the region’s cumulative share from 11.6 per cent by 1981 to 19.2 per cent by 1996. Largescale investments made by Korea’s senior chaebol companies in Europe during the mid-1990s have attracted more recent attention (Dent and Randerson 1996), not least because LG and Hyundai still intend to make the two largest inward investments into the EU from a third country source.26 Europe has subsequently increased its share of Korean outward FDI from 6.4 per cent at the beginning of the 1990s to 15.3 per cent by 1996. European investments made by companies from Singapore,27 Taiwan and Hong Kong are also on the
26 EU-East Asia economic relations
rise as, like many of their East Asian counterparts, they seek to establish a stronger global positioning (UNCTAD 1997). The general impact of the East Asian financial crisis Finally, there has been much conjecture about the impact of the East Asian financial crisis upon EU business. There are a number of negative and positive outcomes that could apply, although it is too early to evaluate the long-term balance of effects (CEC 1998a). On the negative side, the depreciation of East Asian currencies has caused the EU an immediate price competitive loss, although over the longer run this effect will be mitigated by depreciation-induced inflation in East Asian countries. European firms will face additional competitive pressure as their East Asian counterparts and others seek to re-route exports away from contracting East Asian markets. The general economic slowdown in the region will reduce the demand for EU exports, particularly for luxury or non-essential items, as already revealed by some 1997 and early 1998 trade figures. These figures also suggested that East Asian firms had begun to export more aggressively to EU markets (see Table A.8). One estimate suggested that the crisis could reduce West Europe’s net exports by $55bn a year.28 Furthermore, Europe has already witnessed a decline in inward FDI from East Asian sources as a result of the crisis. On the positive side, the EU can expect to pay lower prices for East Asian imports. Intensified price competition will also force European firms to look for efficiency gains where scope exists. Moreover, the crisis-induced restructuring of East Asian economies will generate market-opening opportunities for foreign firms. This has been perhaps most clearly demonstrated in Korea under the conditions of the IMF ‘bailout’ programme. In addition, East Asia’s asset deflation presents new acquisitional FDI opportunities for EU investors, although these may not be exploited until the path of the crisis has become more determinate. With regards to finance, European banks were even more exposed to the crisis than their US or Japanese counterparts.29 The subsequent loan defaulting to which they have been subject in the most affected East Asian countries has placed severe pressure upon them. Many have had to work closely with East Asian governments and firms to establish private-sector rescue packages to resolve short-term debt repayment problems (Bridges 1998). The adverse effect on the European financial community’s earning and profit levels has been considerable,30 although it is unlikely that any European bank will become bankrupt as a result. While some European banks are obviously more circumspect in their dealings within the region, others have looked to the new commercial opportunities that crisis-related events have spawned. For example, in Korea, where IMF loan conditionality includes liberalising the country’s financial sector, some EU banks are looking to set up subsidiary operations or buy into indigenous operations. In the chapters that follow, the more specific impacts of the crisis on EU-East Asia economic exchange will be considered.
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27
New developments in the EU’s economic diplomacy with East Asia The nature and practice of EU economic diplomacy Economic diplomacy can be defined as the means and parameters within which trade, investment and any other international economic relations are conducted between representative agents, the process of which may or may not take place within an institutionalised framework. An important aspect of economic diplomacy concerns the protagonist’s use of defensive and promotive policy measures. Defensive measures are derived from the application of commercial policy instruments, whereas promotive measures stem from trade and economic cooperation accords but also commercial policy concessions. Other key aspects of economic diplomacy centre on negotiatory engagements at the bilateral, plurilateral or multilateral level where conflict resolution may be the prime issue. As a supranational actor, the EU is a relatively young proponent of economic diplomacy with both its Common Commercial Policy (CCP) and European Political Cooperation (EPC) framework31 beginning to operate effectively from the early 1970s onwards. Since then, the European Commission has acted as the EU’s interlocutor in international trade negotiations, although FDI policy remains at the member state level. Thus, in terms of governance the management of the CCP is both a demonstration of the EU’s model of common policymaking and its collective exercise of power against third country partners.32 Its member states accept that it is generally in their own interests to grant the European Commission exclusive competence of the CCP for the strategic advantages this confers upon them in the international economic system. The Commission, though, requires a mandate from the Council of Ministers on CCP decisions,33 and hence the levers of direct governance and control over EU trade policy lie somewhere between the two institutions. Moreover, the Commission can be viewed as either an initiator or facilitator of EU trade policy, depending on the degree of politicisation surrounding the trade issue at hand. While it is more or less left alone to the technical management of the CCP, it is susceptible to the influence of member state coalitions who desire a certain outcome from international trade negotiations. This is most likely to occur on sensitive issues such as agriculture, France’s interventions in the Uruguay Round being a case in point. More recently, the future direction of the EU’s anti-dumping regime is being contested by the European Commission, protectionist-minded EU member states (e.g. France, Italy, Portugal) and liberal-minded EU member states (e.g. Germany, UK, Netherlands).34 The expansion of EU-East Asian economic exchange and the accompanying competitive threats to European industry which lie therein have meant that the European Commission and CCP have become increasingly familiar to the East Asian countries. In the European Commission, Directorate General (DG)1 is responsible for conducting the EU’s external economic affairs. More specifically, DG1A deals with Northeast Asian states ( Japan, China, Korea, Taiwan and Hong
28 EU-East Asia economic relations
Kong) while DG1B manages relations with Southeast Asian states (i.e. ASEAN) and other South Asian countries (i.e. the Indian subcontinent). This division is significant in that DG1A adopts a more hard-nosed approach towards its group of generally more advanced industrial states, which is in contrast to DG1B’s approach that has traditionally been based on the donor-recipient relationship that one expects between developed and developing country powers.35 However, as we shall later discuss, attempts at restructuring the basis of EU-ASEAN economic relations has been attempted in recent years to reflect new realities. Each East Asian trade partner also has a designated status within the CCP’s hierarchy of preferences. The EU’s trade relations with Japan function on a ‘most favoured nation’ (MFN) basis. Most developing East Asian countries are beneficiaries of the EU’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) which grants them tariff concessions in both industrial and agricultural products. The advanced industrial development of Hong Kong, Singapore and Korea led to their ‘graduation’ from the EU’s GSP in May 1998,36 while their East Asian counterparts that remain in the scheme have experienced a partial graduation in those sectors in which they enjoy a growing competitive advantage. However, of greater impact to East Asian producers has been the EU’s use of anti-dumping duties (ADDs). Since the mid-1980s they have been targeted more than any other group by the EU, attracting 46.8 per cent of all anti-dumping investigations over the 1985–97 period37 (see Table A.8). These have coincided in industries where East Asian exporters have attained high levels of import penetration in EU markets and hence have been interpreted by the offenders as overtly defensive countermeasures.38 Although East Asian fears of a ‘Fortress Europe’ have subsided,39 the consolidation of the Single European Market (SEM) heralded important changes to the CCP which have affected the conduct of EU-East Asia economic diplomacy. For instance, the SEM necessitated that the European Commission’s competence in EU commercial policy matters be fortified in order to avoid internal market distortions that would arise from national level measures. The extension of the Commission’s governance in this area was perhaps most clearly shown by the EU-level voluntary export restraint negotiated with Japan on its automobile exports to Europe. This replaced five national-level equivalents that had been previously operated by France, UK, Italy, Spain and Portugal. Other similar bilateral arrangements have either been transposed to the EU level or eradicated altogether, which particularly affected the numerous quantitative restrictions that individual EU member states had previously placed on East Asian imports. More promotive aspects of the EU’s economic diplomacy with East Asia have come through new accords being signed with the region’s countries, or established ones being upgraded. This approach has been underpinned by the EU’s ‘New Asia Strategy’ which it launched in 1994 (CEC 1994a) to provide a more coherent basis for developing its relations with East Asia. The EU’s economic diplomacy with each East Asian partner has nevertheless evolved in its own distinct manner, as Chapters 3 to 7 show. The section that follows offers a summary analysis.
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Bilateral developments The conduct and management of the EU’s economic diplomacy with Japan have proved the most challenging, largely due to its ascendant economic superpower status and the substantial competitive threats it has posed to a broad range of European industries. Japan’s adeptness of playing off one EU country against another in pre-CCP trade negotiations was actually a significant catalyst in the development of the CCP itself (Rothacher 1983).40 Moreover, EU-Japan economic diplomacy can only be fully understood within the context of trilateral relations, i.e. including the USA. Concepts of trilateral co-operation date back to the work of Brzezinski (1973) and others,41 although this primarily centred on issues of high politics. Until quite recently, the EU pursued a largely reactive policy towards Japan by following in the slipstream of US policy initiatives. This particularly related to bilateral market access deals brokered by the USA (e.g. on semiconductors) normally under threat of ‘301’ actions.42 Some years later, Japan usually conceded to granting the same or similar access to EU producers.43 Furthermore, two of the Triad powers have often formed an alliance against the other so as to extract concessions from it. Transatlantic alliances of this kind have been the most prevalent, invariably at the USA’s behest, although a transpacific alliance was deployed to effect at the Uruguay Round from which the EU agreed partially to liberalise its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).44 Notwithstanding the enlivened debate on Triadic competition (Hart 1992; Thurow 1992; Tyson 1992; Albert 1993), there has been a gathering momentum behind trilateral economic co-operation. The Plaza Accord of 1985 and subsequent G7 meetings on co-ordinating macroeconomic policy were important first steps forward.45 By the early 1990s, all three powers had signed bilateral ‘declarations’ with each other46 inspired by possibilities that the new post-Cold War era could herald. While the 1991 EC-Japan Declaration enabled the EC somewhat to redress the trilateral imbalance of relations, its influence with Japan remains a considerable distance behind that enjoyed by the USA. However, the EU and USA have actively encouraged Japan’s deregulation programme47 with equal verve and both have witnessed an improvement in their trade position with the country. In contrast to the underlying geoeconomic basis of EU-Japan economic diplomacy, that between the EU and China was initially determined by geopolitical factors. Before the normalisation of Sino-American relations, Western Europe was a major trade partner and crucial source of advanced capital and technology for China during much of the Cold War period. Nevertheless, full diplomatic relations were only established with the receding of Maoism and the first EC-China trade agreement was not signed until 1978. We have already noted how China has subsequently become a key trading partner for the EU, yet due to a combination of China’s state-trading policies and cost-competitive export production, the EU has deployed various defensive measures against its imports, particularly ADDs.48 China’s relatively high tariff levels, regular breaches of intellectual property rights (IPR) and other numerous trade-related problems, together with its growing trade status, have made the EU keen advocates of the country’s accession into the WTO
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(CEC 1995a, 1998b). If this is achieved it will make a significant impact on how EU-China economic relations are governed, not least because it will provide the EU with another legitimate channel through which to pursue its trade disputes with Beijing. The path taken by EU-ASEAN economic diplomacy has evolved from postcolonial links and an initial ‘donor-recipient’ basis. What also makes this relationship different is its inter-regional nature. Furthermore, the 1980 ASEAN-EC Cooperation Agreement has helped create a wide range of joint policy initiatives and business contact groups making the EU’s economic diplomacy with the ASEAN states arguably the most interactive of all with its East Asian partners. Nevertheless, attempts to update the 1980 Agreement on a ‘partnership of equals’ basis (CEC 1996b) has been beset by political obstacles at the national level.49 Parallels here can be drawn with the economic relations between the EU and Hong Kong, which are also now post-colonial and moreover largely hinge on the pivotal role played by one member state, i.e. the UK. How the new Special Administrative Region of China conducts its economic diplomacy with the EU and other international economic partners raises interesting questions of governance.50 These will undoubtedly be considered very carefully by Taiwan, whose own sovereignty disputes with Beijing have kept the island state’s economic diplomacy with most third countries at an informal level. As Taiwan is no longer a member of any major international forum after China’s normalisation of relations with the West, its economic diplomacy with the EU has remained the most under-developed of the East Asian group.51 Yet Taiwan’s current position as the EU’s tenth largest trading partner, higher even than either Canada or Australia, necessitates that a strong informal economic diplomacy be maintained. The EU’s economic diplomacy with Korea was only advanced and formalised after the onset of democratic reform in the country from the early 1990s onwards (CEC 1996c). We mentioned earlier that EU-Korea trade and investment flows have expanded considerably during this decade. Yet Korea’s aggressive export practices in key sectors have also generated problems for the EU which has responded by applying a comparatively high number of ADDs on Korean imports.52 Despite ongoing trade frictions in EU-Korea economic relations, Korea’s growing stature within East Asia as its third largest economy holds yet unexplored strategic value for the EU if it can persuade the Koreans to become its advocate in Asia-Pacific affairs (Dent 1998a). This has to some extent been proven by Korea’s past support of the EU when it sought ‘dialogue partner’ status to APEC, although this bid was not actually successful. Korea’s admission to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1996 also improved the scope for co-operation with Europe in economic affairs. ASEM: the new inter-regional framework The most important recent development in EU-East Asia economic diplomacy has been the creation of the ASEM dialogue framework. This essentially emerged out of the EU’s existing inter-regional arrangement with ASEAN to incorporate
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Japan, China and Korea in new summit-driven negotiations (CEC 1996d). Inaugurated at Bangkok in March 1996, the ASEM’s value at present remains largely symbolic, although it has made better than anticipated progress on trade facilitation and investment promotion initiatives. For the EU, it could provide a strategic counter-balance to APEC by reminding East Asia that Europe also has a stake in its future. For its East Asian participants, the ASEM constitutes a riskaverse strategy by diversifying their economic relations beyond the Asia-Pacific region. To many, the EU’s potential as a trade and investment partner is only just being explored. There are a number of observations that should be made regarding how the ASEM functions and its potential impact upon how EU-East Asia economic relations could be governed in the future. Unlike APEC, the ASEM does not aim mutually to align the regulatory environments of its participants but instead to establish both congruency in selected administrative procedures (e.g. customs, standards and certification) and to enhance familiarity among companies of the policy regimes they confront in their opposite region (Dent 1998b). Engendering a broader and deeper understanding between the EU and East Asia on economic issues on this basis is also hoped to close the psychic and cultural distances that had previously kept them apart. Like APEC, though, the ASEM framework could act as a catalyst for WTO liberalisation by helping to filter negotiating issues in preparation for WTO ministerial meetings.53 However, both interregional arrangements carry the latent threat of producing considerable diversionary effects upon trade and investment flows. In other words, the ‘open regionalism’ principle to which both ASEM and APEC subscribe is yet to be thoroughly tested. In addition, important questions exist surrounding how the ASEM’s interregional framework of relations is supposed to interface at the bilateral level (e.g. EU-China). Although the European Commission believes that the two are intended to have mutually reinforcing effects upon the other, this has not been exactly clarified. Furthermore, there exists the potential for confusion over where the actual demarcation of responsibility lies between different Directorate General (DG)1 authorities.54 Ironically, this will especially arise if the EU wishes to develop a more coherent approach towards East Asia. For example, where the Commission wishes to adopt a joint position towards both China and Japan on a common issue, should this be driven at the bilateral or ASEM level? There is, though, no reason why both approaches cannot be co-ordinated. Moreover, the ASEM must be allowed to develop in order to judge if it provides a more suitable approach than bilateral channels in dealing with certain issues. These issues are discussed in greater depth by Chapter 8. The 2nd ASEM summit in London provided an important opportunity for high-level discussions on the East Asian financial crisis. However, EU leaders were not willing to offer any real ‘crisis management’ solution beyond their rhetoric extolling the greater market and policy reform needed in East Asia. The only initiative of substance to emerge was the creation of the Asia-Europe Trust Fund, whereby Ecu30.9m would help resource the provision of technical assistance for those East Asian financial sectors in most difficulty. No new significant policy
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framework was established to deal with potential crisis-induced problems that may affect EU-East Asia economic relations. Where commercial tensions arose, for instance from those negative outcomes highlighted in the previous section, these would be managed through the usual bilateral and multilateral channels. In the financial realm, policymakers and banking representatives from the EU and East Asia have worked in a largely ad hoc manner with the IMF to help resolve the crisis. While this constitutes a new governance structure of sorts, it is a relatively loose arrangement that may have an ephemeral existence depending on the future proportions of the crisis. Developments at the multilateral level The conduct of EU-East Asian economic diplomacy at the multilateral level has also become increasingly important. This is primarily due to the more active participation of both sides in multilateral economic regimes and the broadening of the new trade agenda. Most East Asian states have become WTO members and those that have not enjoy observer status.55 Neo-liberal institutionalists would argue that the responsibility now conferred upon the WTO and other international organisations (e.g. the OECD) to handle the new trade issues makes them part of the governance equation in their own right, although as neo-realists contend, this ultimately depends on just how much responsibility participating members are willing to part with (Qureshi 1996; Jackson 1998). More generally, the growing relevance and impact of ‘new’ trade issues have both broadened the scope of EU-East Asia economic relations and furthermore have encompassed more constituents with a stake in how they are governed.56 This relates to discussions concerning the interaction between the domestic and international economic agendas covered in Chapter 1. In summary, the new trade issues refer to: • The interface between competition policy and trade. As an OECD (1994a:2) report argues, ‘trade liberalisation and globalisation change the basic features of competition in ways that increase the potential benefits to be derived from greater competition policy convergence and greater international cooperation’. The OECD’s own Committee on Competition Law and Policy already provides a forum for discussions between enforcement agencies from developed countries. • Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs). The relationship between trade and investment has become increasingly entwined and hence there is a need for FDI codes or rules on matters such as local content regulations and government incentives to attract FDI that are consistent with existing trade rules. • Trade-Related Intellectual Property rights (TRIPs). Breaches of IPR have become an important concern for both the EU and USA in their economic relations with East Asia. • Environmental clauses and social clauses (e.g. labour standards, human rights) in trade relations. Again, these have been pushed by both the EU and USA, although different approaches have been adopted.57
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• The stricter and wider application of the ‘national treatment’ principle, especially con cerning domestic tax policies and public procurement contracting.58 • Securing wider market access in specific sectors, particularly where government restrictions are designed to limit foreign company access. The Information Technology Agreement (ITA) negotiated at the WTO’s inaugural Singapore Ministerial Meeting held in December 1996 to which twenty-eight countries became signatories59 was an important example of this. • The increase in services trade. The Uruguay Round’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) was a key breakthrough in establishing the norms for service trade rules. Since then, WTO negotiations have led to specific agreements on liberalising basic telecoms trade, financial services, electronic commerce and other service sectors. • Harmonising the results of different regional integration arrangements (RIAs). Although the proliferation of RIAs during the early 1990s was not regarded as a threat to multilateralism by the WTO (1995), this is yet to be proven.60 The prospect of WTO negotiations being managed more on an inter-regional basis also carries some interesting questions relating to the governance of the new multilateral order. Most of these issues acquired their prominence during the Uruguay Round or in subsequent WTO deliberations, although a few have come through bilateral negotiations or OECD attempts to establish plurilateral codes of practice.61 The more technocratically difficult to manage tend to be discussed through the latter channels. However, the OECD’s persistent failure to conclude the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) may soon lead the WTO to become the new forum in which any common FDI rules are established, thus further extending its competence into trade-related matters.62 The process of multilateralising a wider range of trade-related matters that have traditionally been the realm of domestic policy, or indeed work conducted by other international organisations,63 has already led to numerous disputes over institutional governance and ownership. Moreover, such developments have been viewed with more concern by the East Asian states than by the EU.64 In general terms, this stems from both the EU and USA’s comparatively stronger structural power over the WTO and how this can be used to shape its agenda. Taken to the extreme, this may be interpreted as a new means to legitimise developed country interference in the internal affairs of developing countries.65 As I have argued elsewhere (Dent 1997b), the EU has been mainly preoccupied with tackling ‘internal’ barriers to international trade in East Asian markets (i.e. non-official trade barriers such as discriminatory domestic tax structures, complex administrative procedures and biased public procurement contracting) rather than the more conventional ‘external’ barriers (e.g. tariffs, duties and quotas). However, both the EU and USA’s respective structural power over influencing WTO outcomes is circumscribed by the organisation’s own independent procedural and enforcement capabilities (e.g. its trade policy reviews and disputes mechanism)66 which have been enhanced in comparison to the preceding GATT
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framework. In addition, both Japan and China have the potential to exert their own significant structural power within the WTO, although China must of course first become a member. Japan is also helping developing Asian countries to learn how to manipulate WTO processes to their own advantage.67 A more fortified WTO regime would itself constitute a shift towards a more rule-based rather than a power-based system of international trade relations. As Woolcock (1993) has argued, the EU is more likely to concur to this change than the USA because European integration has made EU member states more accepting of rule-based or adjudicative methods of resolving disputes. Nevertheless, the EU’s faith in the WTO’s rule-based procedures may only run as deep as the degree to which it can fashion the rules themselves. In a 1997 article interview, Leon Brittan, the EU Commissioner responsible for external economic affairs, stated that: The EU has increasingly used the WTO…to negotiate open markets worldwide in high technology sectors where European industry has a competitive edge. The unity of purpose required to achieve this—and to shape WTO policy in the way Europe—will collapse if Europe ever takes a pick-and-choose approach to individual disputes.68 Thus far, the EU has made considerably more use of the WTO disputes mechanism than the East Asian group, both in its general dealings with third countries and with those complaints brought specifically against its East Asian trade partners.69 Furthermore, the WTO has assisted the EU’s cause by pressuring Korea into ending its ‘frugality campaign’ after it was deemed to have protectionist objectives.70 With the EU’s advanced technocratic capabilities comes the expectation that it will also more easily subsume the new trade issues into its commercial policy framework than most of its trading partners.71 This in itself could strengthen the EU’s bargaining position in multilateral trade negotiations. However, as we discussed earlier, the institutional management of the CCP is a relatively complex process. Higher degrees of complexity can be anticipated given the encroachment of the new trade issues into areas of EU domestic policy. This will arise from a more politicised CCP as certain member states oppose any challenge to national sovereignty that such an encroachment poses, or those decisions perceived as having detrimental effect upon their own internal affairs. Yet the parameters of the CCP have never been clearly defined which gives it an inherent malleability to adapt to a changing trade agenda. Certainly DG1’s high profile ‘market access’ strategy (CEC 1996e) alluded to such a broadening of the CCP to encompass the new issues. This process has entailed the introduction of new constituents with a direct interest or involvement in how the CCP is governed. For example, DG1 authorities now have to work more closely with fellow DGs with responsibility in other policy areas (e.g. social, environmental, competition, marine transport, energy) and also a wider band of transnational actors with trade-related concerns. The impact of these changes upon EU-East Asia economic relations will be most
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widely felt where these new constituents wish to use any influential leverage they have either to seek the restriction or tighter regulation of certain East Asian imports (e.g. for environmental reasons) or where they want particular ‘internal’ trade barriers to East Asian markets to be removed. Conclusion While Chapter 1 provided an introductory overview of theoretical perspectives on EU-East Asia economic relations, the purpose of this chapter has been to introduce the main substantive issues that are examined in greater detail in following chapters. In addition, a number of important observations have been made here regarding how new developments have affected the governance of these relations. Although the new ASEM framework has provided an important new basis for enhancing EU-East Asia economic relations, questions still persist over its compatible management alongside existing bilateral links and the new multilateral order presided over by the WTO. The impact of the WTO depends on the extent to which the EU can and will exert structural power over the organisation, how willing both the EU and East Asian countries are to resolve their trade disputes through its channels, as well as how far the WTO’s own scope and capabilities are allowed to develop. The new trade issues are not only relevant here but also regarding how they are shaping bilateral governance structures and processes in the EU’s economic relations with East Asia. Furthermore, it has been suggested that while the East Asian financial crisis has changed the immediate context of EU-East Asian economic relations, there has been no substantial change to the structure of how they are governed. We have also shown how the CCP is having to adapt to the encroachment of the new trade issues into the traditional realm of domestic policy, in addition to the institutional pressures and complexities this has introduced to its own governance. At the same time it was noted how there is greater resistance among East Asian countries to accommodate the expansion of the new trade agenda, not least because of the legitimacy it confers upon the EU and USA to meddle in their internal economic affairs. Yet calls to remove ‘internal’ barriers to international trade are generally being echoed by both EU and East Asian business, which have much to gain from new economic interdependencies being created between the two regions and whose representatives have also become increasingly active in the economic diplomacy process. Thus, the new developments in multilateralism and the globalisation of economic activity that have been highlighted here will bring increasing influence to bear on how EU-East Asia economic relations are governed at every level.
3
The EU and ASEAN
Introduction The EU’s economic relationship with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is unique among those studied over the next five chapters in that it represents an inter-regional relationship. Although ASEAN has not developed to the same level of integration as the EU, it has been arguably the most successful and enduring regional integration arrangement (RIA) that has emerged from the developing world. This group-to-group relationship is one of the EU’s most established in East Asia. It is made further distinct by the ex-colonial ties between European and Southeast Asian countries. Thus, the development of their more recent economic relations can to some extent be viewed in a post-colonial context. We shall also show how during the 1990s the EU-ASEAN economic relationship made further significant shifts from dependence to interdependence, based on Southeast Asia’s continued dynamic economic development. Nevertheless, both the region’s financial crisis of 1997–8 and EU disputes with ASEAN members over certain human rights issues have hindered attempts to recast the institutional framework of this relationship. As well as discussing these and other issues in depth, this chapter also sets a pattern for Chapters 4 to 7, whereby an initial analysis of the EU’s East Asian economic partner in question is made to provide an important background context to the chapter’s main study, namely the development of this partner’s economic relations with the EU. This is followed by an evaluative conclusion which pays more specific reference to international political economy (IPE) theoretical perspectives on the relationship. Southeast Asia: economic dynamism and change Southeast Asia has become one of the most dynamic regions in the world economy. In this section, we shall consider those factors that have contributed towards the region’s ascendancy. The economic development and internationalisation of the ASEAN states are analysed first, followed by a study of the origins and evolution of the ASEAN organisation itself. We shall then examine in closer detail its ambitions to create a free trade area, AFTA, by
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37
2003 and its compatibility with ASEAN’s commitments to the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum. Finally, the most important economic challenges facing ASEAN in the future are considered. The ASEAN states: economic development and internationalisation Southeast Asia has a long history of international trade. For centuries its peninsula and archipelago territories have been a major thoroughfare for traders passing between China and the Indian subcontinent. This not only explains why the Southeast Asian states have traditionally been more outward looking than the once ‘hermetical’ economies of Northeast Asia (Lim 1995), but also the former’s relative ethnic diversity as traders migrated and settled across the region. The advent of colonial rule in Southeast Asia continued the legacy of internationalisation by linking conquered lands into an imperial division of labour. Most Southeast Asian countries succumbed to the Western colonialists: Myanmar, Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei to Britain; Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia to France; Indonesia to the Netherlands; the Philippines to Spain and then the USA.1 Independence came to some by the late 1940s (Indonesia, the Philippines, Myanmar) and to most others by the 1950s (Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore), with Brunei finally becoming independent in 1984. During the early post-colonial years, much tension surrounded the nationbuilding process in Southeast Asia. Communism’s advance in Indochina (i.e. Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam) posed an ideological threat to the US-backed, market-conforming model prescribed to by their neighbours. There was also concern that the costly civil wars in the former (as well as in Myanmar) would have adverse spillover effects into the latter. Elsewhere, additional friction was generated by territorial disputes between Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia in the early 1960s, and Singapore’s separation from the Malaysian Federation in August 1965. The formation of ASEAN in 1967 was thus taken as an antagonistic gesture by the region’s Communist states by marking a clearer ideological divide in Southeast Asia. However, for the ASEAN states themselves it provided an important framework for conflict resolution. The ASEAN group remains a diverse collection of nation-states, yet there are also notable similarities within subsets of members. Singapore and Brunei are both rich ‘microstates’ with the former having developed arguably the most sophisticated techno-industrial base of any East Asian newly industrialised country (NIC). Moreover, Singapore is the main regional hub for financial and business services and has thus facilitated the development of other ASEAN states. Most members are resource-rich with many being oil and gas producers since the late 1970s (Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand). Malaysia in particular has managed to shift its dependency from primary to secondary exports,2 a strategy that has helped to make it the second most advanced in the group and one that was later emulated by other resource-rich members. The Philippines, which has undergone least structural change, has made only limited progress and consequently remains the least dynamic core ASEAN member3 (see Tables A.1, A.2).
38 The EU and ASEAN
The relatively poor performance of the economy of the Philippines can also be attributed to a series of domestic political problems. This contrasts with the political stability and continuity experienced in many other ASEAN countries, notably in Malaysia, Singapore and until quite recently in Indonesia,4 which created a generally more conducive environment for enterprise to flourish, allegations of ‘crony capitalism’ notwithstanding. Although most Southeast Asian countries have pursued market-conforming economic policies, these have invariably been structured within a broad state-planning framework.5 However, ASEAN’s developmental state agencies do not exercise the same degree of bureaucratic guidance over the economy as their northerly counterparts (see Chapters 4 to 7). In recent years, many ASEAN states have also witnessed the emergence of more assertive and influential business associations that have sought alliances with reformist technocrats in economic ministries, referred to by Doner (1991) as a process of ‘inclusionary institutionalism’. Such a decentralisation of the developmental state has been accompanied by deregulatory policies in the 1990s across Southeast Asia, yet the state remains active in orchestrating endeavours to accelerate domestic techno-industrial development. Like their East Asian NIC counterparts, the dynamic economic development of the ASEAN states has been principally export led. Singapore’s early switch to export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) in the mid-1960s had positive demonstration effects for the others. Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines initiated their EOI strategies to varying degrees of conviction and effectiveness in the late 1960s, while Indonesia did not follow until the early 1980s (Ariff and Hill 1985). Table 3.1 shows that the USA has been a prime export market for the ASEAN states while Japan has served as an essential source of imports. As a group, ASEAN’s share of world trade has risen consistently in recent decades, with 4.6 per cent of world imports and 4.1 per cent of world exports in 1997 (see Table A.9). Many Southeast Asian economies have also developed a notable capital dependence on inward FDI flows.6 Singapore actively courted investment from US electronics manufacturers from the late 1960s onwards. Malaysia’s foreign to domestic investment ratio was as high as 60:40 in 1993, although this subsequently moved towards parity during the latter 1990s. Thailand and Vietnam have increasingly played host to investments from Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan as guanxi business links continue to extend across the Chinese diaspora.7 The region in general experienced a substantial wave of inward investment as a consequence of the 1985 Plaza Accord’s currency realignments that entailed a significant appreciation in the yen and subsequent appreciations in the currencies of East Asia’s first generation NICs. The USA’s withdrawal of its Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) status from the latter in 1989 provided additional incentive for East Asia-based companies to relocate further south. The varying stages of development between ASEAN economies have led to a vertical integration of transborder production systems, with Singapore, Malaysia and increasingly Thailand responsible for most high value-added activities while the remainder play host to lower-end production. Horizontal linkages have also been facilitated by guanxi networks that connect Chinese business
Notes: 1 Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan. 2 Excludes Taiwan for this year. 3 Includes the Caribbean states.
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, various editions.
Table 3.1 Geographic breakdown of ASEAN’s international trade (percentage per trade partner, 1960–97)
40 The EU and ASEAN
communities across Southeast Asia. The region’s export processing zones (EPZs) still play an important role in attracting inward investment8 and have become building blocks for the sub-regional economic zones (SREZs), or ‘growth triangles’, that have emerged more recently (see Chapter 8). In brief, these comprise the Southern Growth Triangle or SIJORI (Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia), the Eastern Growth Triangle (Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines), the Northern Growth Triangle (Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia) and the Mekong River SREZ (Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, China—Yunan and Guangxi provinces), each involving contiguous states in joint transborder development projects that are frequently geared to promote or extend international subcontracting networks (Thambipillai 1998). However, the momentum behind Southeast Asia’s economic development was significantly abrupted by the 1997–8 East Asian financial crisis. Among those ASEAN states that experienced severe financial difficulties were Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia. These were triggered by speculative attacks upon newly floated currencies, beginning with the Thai baht in July 1997, which later exposed and exacerbated economy-wide liquidity problems. Indonesia and Thailand both received assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the form of respective $37.0bn and $17.2bn rescue packages, but these failed to prevent a currency collapse and a widespread loss of confidence in Southeast Asia’s financial systems. Japan and Korea’s financial difficulties at the time compounded the region’s own. Consequently, short to medium-term economic growth estimates for most ASEAN states were downgraded, while far-reaching structural reforms were prescribed as a solution to Southeast Asia’s ailments. The origins and evolution of ASEAN The Bangkok Declaration, ASEAN’s founding document, was signed on 8 August 1967 by its five original members—Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand (the newly independent Brunei joined in 1984). The initiative was conspicuously promoted by the USA which was seeking to coalesce a group of ideologically compatible regimes in Southeast Asia to act as a bulwark against further communist advance in the region. Thus, Sum (1996) concludes that ASEAN’s inception was ‘threat-driven’, yet it was also an attempt by its members to put their own past conflicts aside and forge an inter-state alliance. Despite such overt political motivations behind forming ASEAN, the organisation’s main stated objectives were to facilitate co-operation in economic, social and cultural matters. Yahuda (1996a:72) argues that this was to ‘minimise communist and non-aligned possible suspicions about its orientation.’ With the exception of the proposal to create a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971, which envisaged the creation of a neutralised security zone in Southeast Asia, ASEAN lay more or less dormant up to 1975. However, after the communist victory in the Vietnam War that year, ASEAN was prompted into organising its first summit which was held at Bali in February
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41
1976. Members agreed that their economic ministers should meet regularly to develop and implement economic co-operation proposals. The most important of these were the Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTA) which commenced operation in early 1977, entailing a reduction of tariff levels on intra-ASEAN trade. Yet widespread exclusions meant that by the mid-1980s the PTA only affected at most 5 per cent of this trade. Moreover, the ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIPs) and ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture schemes, both initiated around the same time, proved just as disappointing. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation was also introduced at Bali in which ASEAN states reaffirmed their political loyalties to each other. A second summit soon followed in August 1977 at Kuala Lumpur that saw the start of ASEAN’s ‘dialogue partner’ framework. This brought together foreign ministers from ASEAN, the EC, USA, Japan, New Zealand, Australia and South Korea in a forum to discuss Southeast Asian security matters. Regional security continued to dominate ASEAN’s agenda throughout the 1980s, with particular focus on Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia that lasted from 1979 to 1989. The USA maintained its considerable financial and political support for ASEAN during this period. At ASEAN’s third summit at Manila in 1987, its members also considered the growing economic influence of Japan in Southeast Asia and a five-year plan to extend PTA coverage to 90 per cent of intraASEAN trade, although this never materialised. Such matters were, however, precursors of substantial change to come. Up until the 1990s, ASEAN’s raison d’être had been primarily political, but the end of the Cold War together with the growing trend towards globalisation and regionalism presented new challenges. Central to establishing a clearer economic rationale was a proposal tabled at the group’s fourth summit held at Singapore in January 1992 to create an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) within fifteen years. This was an ambitious plan given ASEAN’s previous record on economic co-operation. Moreover, the AFTA project has only partially eclipsed ASEAN’s security concerns. Although US military presence in Southeast Asia has been substantially downscaled, security threats persist, especially concerning multiple territorial claims in the South China Sea, e.g. over the Spratly Islands. In 1994 the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established as an enhanced ‘dialogue partner’ framework with new partners (Russia, China, Vietnam and Laos) added to the original list (the EU, USA, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand) with India joining later in December 1995 (Simon 1998). Vietnam actually acceded to ASEAN membership in July of the same year year, while Myanmar and Laos joined in July 1997 and Cambodia is due to join shortly.9 Given ASEAN’s underachievements, especially on matters of economic cooperation, it had done well to survive into the 1990s. As Redmond (1992) notes, ASEAN’s success as an organisation, when compared to its counterparts in other developing regions, owes much to the dynamic economic development of its members and not the dynamic of the organisation itself. Nevertheless, ASEAN’s future success is likely to be judged on its implementation of AFTA, not just between long incumbent members but also new, relatively less developed members.
42 The EU and ASEAN
The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) While the AFTA proposal constituted the basis for ASEAN’s new economic rationale in the post-Cold War era, it can also be understood as a response to external pressures. Both prolonged delays in the GATT’s Uruguay Round and intensified regionalist activity in both the developed and developing world during the early 1990s presented a future possible scenario of entrenched protectionism and trade bloc proliferation. Furthermore, many of ASEAN’s economic rivals could anticipate preferential access to important regional markets: Mexico to NAFTA and the Central and East European (CEE) economies to the Single European Market (SEM). AFTA therefore constituted a risk-averse strategy in the face of such challenges that confronted ASEAN members. Internal pressure has also come from Southeast Asia’s business sector that has long been a significant promotive force in calling for further regional integration and of AFTA itself (Lim 1996), seeking to exploit the opportunities that an integrated market of around 470 million people would offer. The centrepiece of AFTA is the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme which originally aimed to reduce intra-ASEAN tariffs on manufactures and processed agricultural products10 to between 0–5 per cent by 2008. At the ASEAN Economic Ministers meeting of 1994, it was agreed to bring this date forward to 2003 and also to expand the coverage of the CEPT by phasing in the original ‘temporarily excluded’ products into the scheme’s Inclusion List by the year 2000.11 This means that by this time around 98 per cent of intra-ASEAN trade will be subjected to no more than 5 per cent import tariffs, and by 2003 about 79 per cent of intra-ASEAN trade will be completely tariff free.12 Vietnam does not have to comply to CEPT targets until 2006, while ASEAN’s newest members—Laos and Myanmar— were initially to remain outside the scheme. Of paramount importance to creating a free trade zone within ASEAN has been AFTA’s objective to promote the region’s efficiency as an export production location in order to attract further inward investment from third countries. Thus, the recently introduced ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) concept, which runs parallel to AFTA, can be seen as part of the same process. Tariff rates vary greatly across ASEAN, being comparatively high in Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia but notably low in Brunei and virtually non-existent in Singapore.13 There has, therefore, been much debate about the relative distribution of AFTA’s benefits within the group. Singapore stands to gain not just because of its comparatively liberal tariff regime but also owing to its highly internationalised production interests in Southeast Asia. Moreover, Singapore’s facilitative role played in the region’s commercial transactions means it benefits further from any increased intraregional trade AFTA induces. Yet Singapore’s small size implies that it will not receive the largest absolute portion of benefits. Other countries, which like Singapore have relatively high ASEAN-based trade ratios, will also gain proportionately more from AFTA’s trade liberalisation. However, intra-
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43
ASEAN trade remains around only 20 per cent of total ASEAN trade, a relatively low figure for a prospective trade bloc14 and a common predicament for regional groupings of developing countries whose main export markets and import sources lie in advanced industrial economies. Furthermore, views differ over the impact AFTA will make. For instance, Imada (1993) concluded that the CEPT scheme would lead to a significant increase in intra-ASEAN trade, while both Kumar (1992) and Santos (1993) contend that non-tariff barriers (NTBs) may prove to be more significant barriers to intra-regional trade than ASEAN’s current tariff regimes. Creating a free trade area within ASEAN has been seen by some as serving another end, this being to promote the region’s efficiency as an export production location so as to attract further inward investment from third countries. Bowles and MacLean (1996) have argued that AFTA is aimed more at outward-looking investment creation than inward-looking trade creation. Thus, AFTA may be perceived as a collective EOI strategy, or simply a method for enhancing other more informal but perhaps more significant forms of regional economic integration taking place in Southeast Asia. Tariff liberalisation will work to reduce the transaction costs of the region’s SREZs and other forms of transborder networked trade. Future challenges Notwithstanding the considerable problems presented by Southeast Asia’s recent financial crisis noted earlier, ASEAN faces a series of important challenges elsewhere (Dosch and Mols 1998). The ASEAN group should still be considered as a collection of nation-states whose economic integration owes far more to corporate and sub-regional driven initiatives than institutional design. This is likely to remain the case for some time. Even if AFTA has profound effects on ASEAN’s institutional framework and political economy (Pelkmans 1992), its participating states are expected to resist moves to extend ASEAN’s organisational structure beyond the permanent Jakarta-based secretariat level towards any EU-modelled supranational agencies, for this is not the ‘Asian way’ (see Chapter 8). However, it remains to be seen if AFTA can function effectively under ASEAN’s current governance structure. As we noted earlier, ASEAN’s future success as an organisation will be judged largely on its ability to realise AFTA’s objectives. In addition to the important political and security-related challenges facing the ASEAN states, they must also come to terms with other emerging economic challenges. The CEE economies continue to rival the Southeast Asian NICs in both international markets and attracting inward investment. Moreover, the accession of some to EU membership will confer further ‘Single Market’ advantages. We have also noted Mexico’s relative access advantages to the US market over the ASEAN states. This will be broadened to other Latin American NICs under the forthcoming Free Trade Area of the Americas agreement, albeit on comparatively less preferential terms to NAFTA. Closer to home, the
44 The EU and ASEAN
ASEAN economies must also consider how to respond to the potential trade and investment diversionary effects of a booming China, as well as the new source of commercial opportunities it presents (Chia and Bifan 1992; Zhang and Hock 1996). Returning to the issue of AFTA, there has been much debate concerning its place within the broader APEC regional initiative to create a free trade and investment zone across the Asia-Pacific by phased-in 2010 and 2020 deadlines (Crone 1992; Soesastro 1995; Parrenas 1998). The decision taken by the ASEAN states to bring forward AFTA’s intended completion by five years to 2003 was interpreted by many as motivated by fears that the APEC process would overtake or subsume ASEAN’s own regionalist endeavours. Yet the ASEAN states must achieve a balancing act between creating AFTA while prescribing to APEC’s ‘open regionalism’ principle, whereby trade liberalisation is conducted on a MFN-consistent and therefore non-exclusory basis. This would naturally undermine the purpose of maintaining AFTA if it were to become essentially ‘permeable’. However, it is still debatable whether the APEC zone will ever materialise and the ASEAN states are committed to the 2020 deadline, a full seventeen years after AFTA’s own. As also noted in Chapter 8, the APEC process could assist the AFTA project by helping ASEAN to reach common positions on future tariff liberalisation. Finally, the ASEAN state’s interest in realising AFTA is also founded on enhancing their collective bargaining leverage in international affairs. Attempts at converting AFTA into political capital can therefore be anticipated in the future. It may also provide a firmer basis to extend ASEAN’s inter-regional affairs, which began with its Co-operation Agreement with the EC in 1980. However, for these objectives to be realised ASEAN must come to terms with two main structural problems (Buszynski 1998). The first relates to its Indochina enlargement which could potentially dilute cohesion within the group. This would generally stem from a more diversified membership which raises the proclivity for sub-group coalitions to form within ASEAN. The international dispute over the legitimacy of Myanmar’s military regime could provide a catalyst for such cabalistic behaviour, exposing the historic division between mainland and maritime Southeast Asia. The second problem is partly related to the first and concerns the future of economic co-operation within ASEAN. We previously noted how the Indochina members’ lower level of economic development has forestalled the full extension of AFTA across ASEAN territory. Moreover, the organisational structure of ASEAN is principally geared to manage political issues. The elevation of economic issues during the 1990s has often revealed the inadequacies of ASEAN current inter-governmental mechanisms. An example of this was the problem of co-ordination that arose between ASEAN foreign and economic ministers at the ASEAN-EU meeting at Karlsruhe in 1994 where, because of their relative lack of influence within the ASEAN framework, the latter were ill-informed regarding matters of economic co-operation being discussed. It is now to ASEAN’s economic relations with the EU that we shall turn.
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EU-ASEAN economic relations The first direct commercial linkages between Europe and Southeast Asia were forged from the fifteenth century onwards by the eastward excursions of the European maritime powers. From these developed the series of colonial relationships noted earlier that persisted into the post-war era. Over this period, European firms dominated many aspects of Southeast Asia’s economy. In more recent times, ASEAN has become one of the EU’s most dynamic trade and investment partners and the cornerstone of its New Asia Strategy. Despite the new impetus to EU-ASEAN economic exchange that was apparent from the early 1990s, economic diplomacy between the two regional groups has been soured by recent political disputes over East Timor and Myanmar. However, the new Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) framework has provided some distraction to these disputes and enhanced the existing framework in which EU-ASEAN relations are promoted. The following sections analyse the development of EU-ASEAN economic relations. We shall first examine the initial diplomatic contacts made between both sides, as well as the exploration of mutual interests that followed. The shift from dependence to greater interdependence is then examined. Finally, attempts made in the 1990s to recast the institutional basis of the EU-ASEAN economic relationship are considered with extensive reference to parallel developments during the decade. First contacts and exploring mutual interests The centrepiece in the framework of ASEAN-EU relations remains their 1980 Co-operation Agreement. At the time, it constituted a significant event for both parties. The Agreement represented the first inter-regional pact that each had made with another distinct regional bloc of countries.15 For the EC member states, the Agreement also provided an opportunity to recast their framework of relations with ex-colonial countries and promote European interests in the world’s most dynamic developing region. The ASEAN states hoped the Agreement would help diversify their external relations beyond the confines of the Asia-Pacific region and bolster links with an emergent economic superpower. Let us first plot the events and developments that led to the signing of the 1980 Agreement. While ASEAN’s initial interests concerned the dual process of nation building and reaching mutual reconciliation within the group, a key objective of the Bangkok Declaration of 1967 stated that ASEAN members would strive to ‘maintain close and beneficial co-operation with existing international and regional organisations with similar aims and purposes’. The first indication of ASEAN’s interest in establishing close links with the EC came at the group’s fourth Foreign Ministers Meeting in March 1971. This principally derived from Malaysia and Singapore’s concerns of the potential adverse effects the UK’s then impending accession to the EC would have upon its producers: Britain’s entry
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into the Community would lead to an effective dismantling of its Commonwealth trade preferences system and an adoption of the EC’s Common Commercial Policy (CCP).16 Furthermore, as no ASEAN country appeared eligible for inclusion into the Community’s existing Lomé Convention arrangement,17 securing improved access to the wider EC market was also a general ASEAN objective.18 In June 1972, ASEAN set up the Special Coordinating Committee of ASEAN Nations (SCCAN) which consisted of ASEAN trade ministers whose collective task was to improve the group’s standing in the EC’s hierarchy of preferential trade partners. Also in the same month the ASEAN Brussels Committee (ABC), comprising ambassadors from diplomatic missions to the EC posted at the Belgian capital, was created to assist SCCAN’s work and met regularly with European Commission officials to discuss key issues (Table 3.2). Similar committees were subsequently established in London, Paris and Bonn, which also currently assist in conducting and maintaining EU-ASEAN dialogue. The EC’s response to these initiatives was generally positive. Britain’s accession to the EC had prompted a re-evaluation of the Community’s links with Southeast Asia as part of a broader re-assessment of its relations with developing countries in general. In July 1971, the EC had become the first commercial power to adopt a Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) scheme19 and as a consequence offer more favourable trade concessions to poorer trading nations which were not eligible for Lomé Convention membership.20 Furthermore, the EC’s apparatus for conducting economic and political relations with third countries was beginning to take shape through the recently inaugurated European Political Cooperation (EPC) framework and the embryonic CCP (see Chapter 2). The EC was therefore looking to develop its role as an actor in international affairs at this time. Nurturing ties with ASEAN provided a useful opportunity for the EC to help achieve this. Southeast Asia represented the most stable developing country region with promising economic growth potential and was also key mediators in the NorthSouth dialogue. Both the economic and political gains of partnership, albeit an imbalanced one, thus seemed attractive. However, relations with Asia, along with Latin America, were a relatively low priority in the EC’s foreign policy objectives during the 1970s and, moreover, were perceived to be more in the US sphere of influence than Western Europe’s (Regelsberger 1989). Hence, when the EC offered ASEAN a mutual commercial agreement in 1974, the former was reluctant to include a political dimension requested by the latter. The proposal was duly rejected by ASEAN,21 whose search for new assurances from its allies intensified in the mid-1970s as its international relations entered a precarious phase. The collapse of the Bretton Woods exchange rate system in 1971, the subsequent US dollar devaluation and 1973–4 oil crisis all combined to raise ASEAN’s fears of increased Western protectionism that would follow as a consequence of these ‘shocks’ to the international economic system. The US withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975 caused ASEAN more seriously to consider diversifying its external relations with the Western global powers so as to broaden its anti-Communist alliance. This became the central issue of discussion at ASEAN’s Bali Summit of 1976.
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Table 3.2 EU-ASEAN relations: the institutional framework
Source: European Commission.
The EC was an obvious target for alliance building given its growing economic and political significance and an unexplored potential for partnership (Mols 1990). West European states could also empathise with ASEAN in facing a proximate communist threat. Although Japan was an important economic partner for the ASEAN states (see Table 3.1), political relations were hampered by the former’s constitutional restraints on conducting a proactive foreign security policy and memories of its war-time involvement in the region.22 The Australasian countries were too weak and ASEAN was aware of developing too skewed a dependence on the USA. Hence, promoting closer relations with
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the EC would serve as a valuable counter-weight to the assertive interests of both capitalist and communist powers alike. After the failure of the EC’s 1974 commercial agreement initiative, ASEANEC relations moved forward again with the creation of a Joint Study Group in July 1975 which prepared the path for future agreements between ASEAN and the EC. This marked the first step towards formalising EC-ASEAN relations. Additional momentum came from a new dialogue framework established between the ABC and the COREPER23 in 1977. This became a precursor to the first ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting (AEMM) convened at Brussels in November 1978 in which a structured political dialogue was established. In the following year, economic dialogue was initiated and both channels were institutionalised by the 1980 EC-ASEAN Co-operation Agreement signed in March at the Second AEMM in Kuala Lumpur. In EC jargon, the 1980 Agreement was classified as a ‘second generation’, in contrast with the wider ranging ‘third generation’ agreements made later with some Central and East European and Latin American countries. This included provisions on trade and development co-operation, promoting investments, joint ventures and other miscellaneous economic issues such as technological transfers. Although it is a co-operation rather than a trade agreement, the EC extended most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment to the ASEAN countries. This was intended to complement the GSP concessions which they already enjoyed, with the EC extending its eligible product list as part of the 1980 Agreement so that tobacco and a number of processed agricultural products were now included. The original framework and provisions of the Agreement were intended to run for five years with subsequent biannual reviews to be conducted thereafter. Its general objectives comprised: • strengthening regional organisations committed to economic growth, social progress and cultural development; • developing EC-ASEAN trade and economic relations on the basis of comparative advantage and mutual benefit; • contributing to the expansion of international trade; • facilitating the development of both parties’ human and material resources. Despite references to promoting closer inter-regional economic ties, the main substance of EC-ASEAN relations leading up to, and soon after the signing of the 1980 Agreement was predominantly political (Indorf 1983; Luhulima 1984). Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978 and the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were the core issues of discussion at the first two AEMMs. Enhancing political co-operation continued to dictate the agenda of other AEMMs held during the early 1980s.24 Early criticism of the 1980 Agreement focused on its lack of effective provisions to resolve the outstanding trade disputes between the EC and ASEAN (Redmond 1992). More generally, there was frustration over the Agreement’s failure to create a new framework for EC-ASEAN economic relations, even
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though it carried provisions on technical assistance, economic and commercial co-operation. In an early evaluative analysis, Reyes (1982:2) commented that ‘ASEAN-EC economic relations may be regarded as an aspect of the ongoing, albeit periodically stalemated North-South dialogue’. As we note later, this was despite the gradual increase in both trade and FDI flows between the two groups. A more positive approach emerged in 1985 when the first ASEANEC Economic Ministers Meeting was convened in 1985 at Bangkok (Table 3.3).25 However, while this yielded some practical outcomes, such as an initiative to make a detailed examination of investment conditions in the two regions, these too were received with limited enthusiasm. Moreover, in Schiavone’s (1989) view, the European Commission had failed sufficiently to engage the European business community in an interchange of views with its ASEAN counterpart across a range of related issues covered at the Meeting. He further argued that these issues lacked both breadth and significance. There was also subsequent disappointment over the ad hoc and infrequent basis on which these meetings were convened: the second Economic Ministers Meeting was not held until 1991 after the ninth AEMM at Luxembourg while the third and most recent was convened at Bangkok in 1995. From dependence to interdependence In its formative years, the basis of the EU-ASEAN economic relationship was essentially one of respective donor and recipient. Thus, there was an initial focus on developmental issues and attempts by ASEAN to improve its position within the CCP hierarchy of trade relations. The ASEAN states received a considerable degree of financial aid from EU member states which was often in excess of inward FDI flows from European firms. Given the relative economic weights of each regional group, ASEAN’s dependence on the EU was further apparent in respective trade partner shares. In 1980, the EU 15 represented ASEAN’s third most important external trade partner with 14.1 per cent of its total export and import trade (see Table 3.1), whereas ASEAN was responsible for only 3.0 per cent of extra-EU15 exports and 2.7 per cent of extra-EU15 imports (see Table A.3). Furthermore, EC-ASEAN trade flows had traditionally conformed to the typical North-South pattern of comparative advantage with ASEAN exporting labour-intensive products and receiving the EC’s capital-intensive products, thus reflecting Southeast Asia’s technological dependency on European companies. However, by the advent of the 1980s a more intra-industry pattern was emerging.26 In 1973, ASEAN manufacture exports to the EC as a share of its total EC exports was 25.5 per cent, but this had risen to 54.4 per cent by 1980 (Figure 3.1). This, of course, reflected the rapid industrialisation achieved by the ASEAN states, which to some extent relied on imported technology and capital goods supplied by European companies. While the ASEAN states had originally looked to the EC as a model for regional co-operation, the onset of ‘Eurosclerosis’ in the 1970s switched their
50 The EU and ASEAN Table 3.3 EU-ASEAN economic relations: main co-operative activities
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51
Source: CEC, DG1B.
attention to its deficiencies (Rajendran 1985; Rieger 1991). In subsequent years, a considerable body of literature has amassed that contrasts the emergent Asian-style regionalism with European-style regional integration. This issue is explored in greater detail in Chapter 8. However, it is useful to make a brief analysis here, including its bearing on the evolution of EU-ASEAN economic relations. First, the EU’s approach has been essentially contract or treaty based and managed with the assistance of supranational institutions, whereas ASEAN is founded on a consensus-building, inter-governmental model of regionalisation. Such dissimilarity is primarily due to politico-cultural differences and their manifestation in institutional structures, processes and interactions within each region, as well as the approach to external relations pursued by each group (Palmer 1991; Langhammer 1997; Palmujoki 1997). We shall note later how ‘value-system friction’ has significantly hampered the progress of EU-ASEAN economic diplomacy in recent years. In addition, the relatively heterogeneous composition of ASEAN membership has not been conducive to the group aspiring to or realising deeper integrative links between themselves. Such factors have also made it difficult for the EU and ASEAN to forge closer economic relations at a politico-institutional level. The very fact that both the EU and ASEAN are regional blocs has, nevertheless, worked to bring them closer on certain co-operative issues. In 1975, the EC applied cumulative rules of origin provisions to imports from ASEAN and other developing country RIAs.27 This has promoted transnational export-oriented production within these regions and hence de facto regional integration itself, particularly at a corporate and subregional level (i.e. Southeast Asia’s SREZs) but not at the institutional level per se.28 More recently, the success of the SEM programme revitalised ASEAN’s interest in European integration and had some part in inspiring the AFTA project. In the years that followed the 1980 Agreement, the EC and ASEAN witnessed a gradual rise in their mutual trade flows. Over the 1980–85 period, EC exports to ASEAN increased by 84.4 per cent from Ecu5.32bn to Ecu9.81bn, while ASEAN exports to the EC increased by 44.7 per cent from Ecu6.89bn to Ecu9.97bn (Figure 3.2). During this time, their investment relationship was also expanding with the cumulative stock of FDI from EC firms rising by 83.5 percent from $4,183m to $7,675m (see Table A.6). This represented an increase in the EC’s share of total inward FDI in ASEAN from 18.7 per cent to 21.7 per cent, second only to Japan whose own share rose by a smaller degree from 25.3 per cent to 26.0 per cent, while the third-
52 The EU and ASEAN
Figure 3.1 ASEAN’s exports to the EU by sector (1980, 1987, 1997)
placed US share rose fastest of all from 12.7 per cent to 17.5 per cent. Accompanying the expansion of EU-ASEAN economic exchange were various persisting trade disputes which particularly arose from the range of EU protectionist regimes that faced ASEAN exports:
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Figure 3.2 EU-ASEAN merchandise trade (1975–97) Source: Eurostat.
• • • • •
the treatment of ASEAN exports within the GSP scheme; the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA); the EC’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP); various EC-level NTBs; EC member state protectionist measures that were permissible under Article 115 of the Treaty of Rome and thus outside the CCP.
Under the EC’s original GSP scheme, selected exports from beneficiary countries could enter Community markets tariff free, but subject to quantitative restrictions (QRs). These became more stringent in accordance with the degree of ‘sensitivity’ of the products concerned. Special arrangements for textiles were made in co-ordination with the MFA. The ASEAN countries have been significant beneficiaries of the EC’s GSP owing to its encompassing a broad range of sectors in which the Southeast Asian countries have a comparative advantage29 and also because it conferred greater advantages to the more competitive developing country producers.30 One would therefore expect that the GSP scheme helped to facilitate the significant import penetrations made by ASEAN producers in the EC’s ‘sensitive’ and ‘semi-sensitive’ product markets. However, research conducted by Langhammer (1982a) revealed that ASEAN export performance appeared to be better in the USA, where no GSP privileges were forthcoming until 1976, than in the EC during the initial years of the EC’s own scheme.31 Although Langhammer conceded that a range of other determining factors might explain this, it nevertheless cast doubt on the effectiveness of the EC’s GSP to promote ASEAN exports. Corbet (1982) and Ariff (1989) also criticised the EU’s GSP scheme for its
54 The EU and ASEAN
restrictive rules of origin, low quota provisions and high administrative costs incurred upon beneficiaries. Such factors explained why the utilisation of GSP quotas were under-optimised by the ASEAN states and most other qualifying countries.32 While ASEAN members were constantly seeking better access for particular product lines within the scheme (e.g. tapioca, palm oil and plywood), their paramount concern was to approximate the trade concessions bestowed upon rival ACP exporters under the Lomé regime. However, changes to the GSP scheme introduced in the late 1980s were to narrow further the scope of benefits enjoyed by ASEAN, especially the ‘accentuated differentiation’ provisions that limited GSP concessions to non-sensitive sectors. Consequently, ASEAN exports to the EU enjoying GSP status fell from 70 per cent in 1989 to around a third by 1994. The EC’s MFA regime had also been a point of significant contention for ASEAN. Under the MFA, which has been operative since 1974,33 developing country textile and clothing producers agree to restrain export production so as to enable their developed country counterparts to make structural adjustments within the industry in response to more intensified competition. The basic rules of the MFA were negotiated at a multilateral level, although developed country powers could determine how these rules were implemented. The MFA1 (1974–7) was most the liberal regime with 6 per cent growth allocated for export quotas and a significant degree of flexibility built into the quota provisions themselves.34 However, a new MFA regime was renegotiated in 1977 amid the global recession of the mid-1970s. Under MFA2 (1978–81), a global quota was introduced that effectively limited the growth of imports from all sources.35 Indonesia and the Philippines became subject to restrictions for the first time.36 Table 3.4 also shows a declining trend in the utilisation of MFA quotas by East Asian producers over 1979–82 period. To Langhammer (1986), this was indicative of the increasing informational costs and uncertainties borne from the administrative complexities of the regime. The MFA3 (1982–6) saw a continuation of new restrictions, such as the ‘anti-surge’ clause which aimed to counter sharp increases of imports from previously unused quotas. In addition, ‘reasonable departures’ provisions were introduced in the EC’s protocol arrangements that meant it could reduce the quota levels of a number of exporters, with East Asian producers being particularly targeted for this treatment. While the EC’s MFA regime offered more opportunities to developing country exporters in comparison with the US regime, from 1981 to 1987 only Indonesia and Thailand gained in their shares of EC textile and clothing imports, while Malaysia and the Philippines experienced no change and Singapore’s share declined. Under MFA4 (1987–91), the EC claimed to have liberalised its regime since it had made a 25 per cent reduction in the number of categories subject to quotas and removed the ‘anti-surge’ clause. However, as Pangestu and Hasni (1991) note, quotas were removed on under-utilised categories and the aforesaid clause had been inoperable. In a broader criticism of the EC’s regime, Langhammer (1986) argued that short-term discretionary
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Table 3.4 Average utilisation rates of quotas by East Asian countries in EC imports of textiles and clothing under the MFA, 1979–82 (%)
Source: GATT (1984).
changes in MFA market access conditions had discouraged investment in developing Asia’s textile and clothing sectors. Moreover, newcomer exporters were discriminated against in favour of established producers, thus impeding sectoral relocation and restructuring across East Asia. Like other developing countries, the ASEAN group has been highly critical of the EC’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This not only relates to its inherent protectionism of the CAP (e.g. variable levies, QRs) but also the dumping of surplus EC agricultural stocks that result in unstable and depressed price levels in world markets. The more resource-intensive ASEAN economies have naturally been greatly affected by the CAP’s excesses. The Philippines particularly took issue with the EC over subsidies granted to European sugar producers which have had injurious effects upon its own industry. Both Indonesia and Thailand suffered significantly after QRs were placed on cassava in the early 1980s. As a consequence, the volume of Thailand’s cassava exports to the EC fell by 40 per cent after 1982, entailing a loss of $329m or 11 per cent of Thailand’s total earnings from exports to the EC. ASEAN’s agricultural producers were additionally disadvantaged by the discriminatory regime maintained by the EC in tropical products, such as cocoa, palm oil, tobacco, fruits and coffee, which granted the ACP group preferential access.37 During the 1980s, similar trade complaints from ASEAN arose concerning other industries where the EC has experienced deep structural decline. This not only applied to EC-level restrictions but also at a national level, where EC member states could invoke the Treaty of Rome’s Article 115 ‘escape clause’ and impose their own protectionist measures if the imports in question were having an injurious effect upon domestic producers. Table 3.5 shows how ASEAN and other East Asian producers (i.e. Hong Kong and Korea) were affected by various EC-level NTBs in the mid-1970s. Singapore was particularly targeted by export restraints, licensing obligations and quotas, the Philippines by health and safety regulations and Thailand by variable levies. However, it is also apparent that ASEAN exporters were not subject to the same degree of protectionism as their East Asian NIC counterparts, largely due to the less significant competitive threat posed by the former to EC industry. A similar
56 The EU and ASEAN Table 3.5 EC non-tariff barriers against imports from selected East Asian countries, 1974 ($m affected)
Source: UNCTAD (1979)
situation also applied to the EC national-level import restrictions placed on East Asian countries. As Table 3.6 illustrates, the total number of such restrictions on the ASEAN5 group during the 1981–5 period was exceeded by every East Asian counterpart listed. After the installation of the SEM in 1993, these were either removed or harmonised at the EU level to uphold the integrity of the enhanced CCP. Over the 1970s and 1980s, the EC’s trade disputes with the ASEAN states mainly concerned high tariff rates and the expanding range of ‘internal’ barriers to international trade affecting European exports in Southeast Asian markets.38 However, these did not constitute a significant source of anxiety within the EC for various reasons. We have seen how the EC was able effectively to mitigate the competitive threat posed by Southeast Asian exporters through Table 3.6 Applications approved under Article 115 against imports from selected East Asian countries, 1981–5
Source: Official Journal of the European Communities, Series C, Information and Notices, various issues.
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the trade policy regimes analysed above. The ASEAN states also lacked both the individual and collective geopolitical power to challenge EC protectionism in either bilateral or multilateral channels. Furthermore, by the early 1980s the EC-ASEAN trade balance was moving towards the EC’s favour (see Figure 3.2) which generally abated the pressure upon EC trade negotiators to secure market access gains. Moreover, their attentions towards East Asia were attracted elsewhere by Japan’s burgeoning trade surplus against the EC which become a major politicised issue at this time.39 However, the European perception of ASEAN as a minor economic partner was to change over the course of the 1980s. Southeast Asia’s dynamic industrial development during the decade had made the EC increasingly aware of the growing interdependent economic relationship that was evolving between itself and ASEAN. In this context, a number of trends are worth noting. By 1990, ASEAN’s share of extra-EU15 exports had risen to 4.8 per cent, thus becoming a larger export market than the whole of Latin America, while its share of extraEU imports had increased to 4.0 per cent, making it a more important source of imports than Canada and Australasia combined (see Table A.3). As Figure 3.2 indicates, the acceleration of EC-ASEAN trade flows was especially apparent from the late 1980s onwards: EU imports from ASEAN increased by 66.8 per cent over 1987–90, rising from Ecu10.0bn to Ecu16.8bn by the end of the period. Meanwhile, EU exports to ASEAN had increased even faster at 80.5 per cent, rising from Ecu8.9bn to Ecu16.1bn. Furthermore, Table 3.1 shows that the EU 15’s position as an ASEAN trade partner had improved slightly, with its share of total ASEAN imports and exports standing at 15.5 per cent and 15.9 per cent respectively by 1990. A growing interdependence was also manifest in sectoral trade trends with ASEAN manufacture exports to the EC as a share of the group’s total EC exports increasing from 54.4 per cent in 1980 to 58.4 per cent by 1987 (Figure 3.1). Among the group, the highest individual rates were attained by Singapore (86.4 per cent), Malaysia (83.7 per cent) and the Philippines (83.0 per cent). In addition, Southeast Asia had become a new strategic location for outward EU direct investment by the end of the 1980s, with a growing number of EC companies relocating their labour intensive sub-assembly and full assembly manufacturing activities to the region. Over the 1985–9 period, the stock of FDI from EC firms in the ASEAN5 group increased by 57.2 per cent from $7.7bn to $12.1bn, thus maintaining the EC’s position as the second largest inward investor in Southeast Asia after Japan. Moreover, in the structure of EU financial assistance to ASEAN there was a notable switch of emphasis towards economic co-operation and away from development co-operation and humanitarian assistance over the 1980s (Table 3.7), a further reflection of ASEAN being perceived by the EC as a more capable economic partner. Thus by the end of the 1980s, there were calls for a more equal partnership to be established within the institutionalised framework of EC-ASEAN economic relations (Wannamethee 1989). This was to set the tone for a new phase of EU-ASEAN economic relations in the 1990s.
58 The EU and ASEAN Table 3.7 EU financial assistance to ASEAN by category and time period (Ecu million)
Source: European Commission. Note: 1 Up to 04.1998 and includes ASEAN10.
Recasting the partnership Moves towards establishing a ‘partnership of equals’ in EU-ASEAN economic relations during the early 1990s were occurring within a broader context of change. At the multilateral and global level, the completion of the Uruguay Round, a growing consciousness regarding globalisation and the post-Cold War détente had produced both a general shift from geopolitics to geoeconomics. A greater emphasis on economic affairs in EU-ASEAN relations was to emerge as a result of these and other factors. At the regional level, ASEAN had to consider how the EU’s post-SEM trade policy would evolve, as well as the external impact of a future European economic and monetary union (EMU). Central and Eastern Europe’s market reformation also posed a new challenge to ASEAN by the region’s potential to distract EU trade and investment interest away from Southeast Asia. Similarly, the trade diversionary effects of the forthcoming AFTA and ASEAN’s participation in APEC were potential causes of concern for the EU. Furthermore, preparations for ASEAN’s Indochina enlargement were resonant of the EU’s own plans eventually to expand eastwards. In the face of deepening transpacific integration, the EU had to re-evaluate its strategic position vis-à-vis the wider
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East Asia region, and hence the role that its established ASEAN links would play. As Chapter 8 discusses in more detail, the new ASEM framework essentially grew out of the EU-ASEAN inter-regional link but which also encompassed Japan, Korea and China. At the industrial level, we have already commented on how Southeast Asia’s continued rapid industrialisation had brought about significant structural changes to EU-ASEAN economic exchange by the end of the 1980s. These trends showed no signs of abating into the early 1990s, with manufactured goods as a share of ASEAN’s exports to the EU rising from 58.4 per cent in 1987 to 78.6 per cent by 1993.40 The intra-industry trade ratios of ASEAN country trade with the EU had all risen over the 1989–94 period: Indonesia from 11.7 per cent to 26.3 per cent; Malaysia from 42.2 per cent to 46.2 per cent; the Philippines from 28.9 per cent to 44.7 per cent; Singapore from 45.3 per cent to 47.1 per cent; Thailand from 32.1 per cent to 34.1 per cent. While this offered broader scope for EU-ASEAN industrial co-operation, the EU was simultaneously under pressure to maintain or even extend its protectionist regimes against Southeast Asian producers. Economic diplomacy The above issues thus provided the initial background to EU-ASEAN economic relations in the 1990s and the objective of recasting the economic partnership. This was first attempted via institutionalised channels at the ninth AEMM in 1991, but negotiations became deadlocked owing to the persisting conflict between Portugal and Indonesia over East Timor. Indonesia had annexed this former Portuguese colony in 1975 and had been subsequently accused of human rights violations in the territory. Portugal was therefore unwilling to ratify any new agreement with ASEAN that might confer advantages upon the Suharto regime. However, at the following two AEMMs some progress was achieved in adapting the economic provisions of the 1980 Agreement to new realities.41 This was most notably achieved at the eleventh AEMM held at Karlsruhe, Germany in September 1994 which produced a number of significant outcomes: • the consensus that EU-ASEAN economic relations should be founded on the principle of greater equality and partnership; • the creation of an ASEAN-EU Eminent Persons Group (EPG), partly modelled on APEC’s equivalent42 (see Table 3.3); • a mutual commitment to implement the provisions of the Uruguay Round of GATT; • with respect to development co-operation, the need to prioritise human resource development, environmental issues and better targeting of poverty alleviation. In addition, Karlsruhe provided the momentum for the first ASEAN-EU Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) held at Singapore in 1995, the twelfth ASEAN-
60 The EU and ASEAN
EU JCC (see Table 3.2) in Brussels in October 1995 and the second SOM Meeting convened at Dublin in 1996 where more frank and open discussions on a wide range of issues took place, including those of a sensitive nature such as human rights. The ‘Karlsruhe drive’, as it subsequently became known, also coincided with the 1994 launch of the EU’s New Asia Strategy and helped pave the way for the first ASEM summit of 1996. However, it was the newly established EPG which was specifically charged with generating ideas on how a ‘partnership of equals’ in EU-ASEAN economic relations could be advanced. With this in mind, the main recommendations proposed in their first report published in 199643 were: • more regular convening of ASEAN-EU Economic Ministers Meetings; • EU and ASEAN governments to adopt more positive measures to assist trade facilitation and investment promotion between the two regions; • to establish a stronger and more effective ASEAN-Europe Business Council to promote corporate links between EU and Southeast Asian firms. In July of the same year, the European Commission published its own policy document entitled, Creating a New Dynamic in EU-ASEAN Relations (CEC 1996b) which echoed many the ideas presented in the above report. Within the document, the Commission considered two future directions that EU-ASEAN relations could take. The first was a protocol to the 1980 Agreement with an emphasis on inter-regional level objectives and mechanisms. The second was the signing of a New Joint Declaration, entitled ‘An Active Partnership’, which would entail a redefinition of general aims, an action plan to ensure the dynamic implementation of the original Agreement and the development of new actions within domains other than those identified in the Agreement. This approach stressed the need for closer private sector involvement within the current framework of institutionalised relations. Moreover, the Commission emphasised its relative flexibility as greater latitude was available here for inter-regional mechanisms and bilateral dialogues to coexist. Both approaches, though, aimed to broaden the scope of these relations into specific sectors of economic activity (e.g. transport, telecoms) as well as horizontal matters (e.g. IPR, industrial standards). However, neither option would place the ASEAN states on the same level of co-operative engagement with the EU as enjoyed by other Asian and Latin American countries which were signatories to ‘third’ generation agreements. As previously mentioned, the 1980 Agreement was a ‘second’ generation arrangement, but its upgrading could not be achieved while the ASEAN states maintained resistance to the incorporation of a human rights clause into a revised agreement. In the event, the European Commission stated its preference for the second option and after a somewhat difficult ratification at the Council of Ministers it tabled the proposal at the twelfth AEMM held in February 1997 at Singapore where it was duly accepted. Other outcomes from the meeting included an agreement to initiate co-operation on customs matters, the launch of ISQAP’s
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second phase and support for the ASEAN-EU Partnenariat scheme that promoted strategic alliance formation between EU and ASEAN small firms. Despite these positive developments, EU-ASEAN economic diplomacy fell victim to the ‘value-system friction’ identified earlier. The long-standing dispute over East Timor has already been noted, but this was joined in the mid-1990s by the Myanmar débâcle. For some time, the EU had imposed economic sanctions upon the country because of its human rights abuses. When Myanmar— a new ASEAN member since January 1997—sought official observer status with ASEAN backing at the then forthcoming November 1997 EU-ASEAN Joint Cooperation Committee meeting, the EU refused to concur.44 The ASEAN states made clear their view that European hypersensitivity over such issues was hindering the progress of their relationship. After the EU’s compromise of permitting an ‘informal and passive presence’ for Myanmar representatives was rejected by ASEAN, it was decided to postpone the November JCC where the adoption of a work programme designed to implement the ‘New Dynamic’ initiative was to have taken place. The persistence of this dispute led to a curtailment of EU-ASEAN diplomatic contact thereafter. However, interactions continued at the more informal level through various EU-ASEAN working groups and co-operative projects, the network having expanded during the 1990s (see Table 3.3). It was here that most progress in building a more equal partnership had been made. The different objectives apparent within the ASEAN group regarding their economic relations with the EU are also worth noting. Singapore’s position as a small, but highly developed and internationalised economy meant that it was concerned more with broader geoeconomic issues. Thus, the EU’s longer-term position in East Asia as a strategic counter-balance to other major powers (i.e. USA, Japan and China) was of greater importance to Singapore as an issue than the sectoral trade disputes that preoccupied ASEAN’s less advanced states. Singapore has also expressed greater interest in the EU’s regional integration agenda (i.e. the SEM, EMU and the anticipated eastern enlargement) than most of its Southeast Asian neighbours. To some extent Malaysia has also adopted a broader geo-economic perspective to its economic relations with the EU. Its desire to promote closer bilateral ties with Europe is strongly associated with Prime Minister Mahathir’s aspiration to establish Malaysia as a significant player in the international community. Furthermore, Malaysia’s relatively strong advocacy of the ASEM framework has been interpreted as further scepticism towards APEC, with Mahathir believing it to be essentially a US-driven process. The prime concerns of other ASEAN countries relate to EU sectoral protectionism which is perceived as a significant hindrance to their economic development. Trade relations The difficulties experienced in the institutional dimension of EU-ASEAN economic relations during the 1990s were compounded by both ongoing and new trade disputes. Although the Uruguay Round had helped temper the
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protectionist excesses of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, ASEAN’s criticism of the regime hardly diminished. Heavily subsidised sectors such as oilseeds were especially targeted by Southeast Asian trade negotiators (Lim 1997). The reclassification of oleochemicals (e.g. palm oil) and dry fruit products within the EU’s customs framework, which led to higher tariffs being placed on these goods, was a further cause of ASEAN concern. In October 1995, Thailand also requested WTO consultations with the EU over its import duties on rice. In textiles and clothing, the ASEAN states still faced considerable protectionism from the EU under its MFA quota arrangements, although under the terms of another Uruguay Round accord all MFA regimes were to be gradually phased out by 1 January 2005. While the EU was thus obliged to raise its quota limits by increasing increments leading up to this date, the sectors to which they applied were not reduced. Moreover, two extra product lines were added to the EU’s quota arrangements with Indonesia from 1995 onwards. A new significant problem for Southeast Asian producers arose during the 1990s concerning the EU’s anti-dumping regime. Dumping is said to occur if an export’s price is lower than the normal value of the product, whereby its normal value may be based on the domestic price in the country of origin or export, on the supplier’s export price to a third country, or on the cost of production in the country of origin. While dumping is seen to be an aggressive commercial practice, the European Commission only undertakes an antidumping investigation where it is causing or threatening to cause material injury to an EU industry and that the imposition of an anti-dumping duty (ADD) complies with EU interests. Such injury—which must at least afflict a major part of an industry—is judged according to various criteria, including the loss of EU market shares to the imports in question, unemployment, depressed EU market prices, loss of profits and low capacity utilisation.45 Two kinds of ADD exist, these being provisional and definitive. Provisional duties are applied for a limited period which allows the European Commission to consider its proposal to the Council of Ministers as to whether a definitive duty should be imposed.46 Alternatively, the culpable exporter may be offered the ‘undertakings’ option whereby the company promises to increase its prices to a level that eliminates either the dumping margin or, if less, the injurious effects of dumping.47 Between 1985 and 1990, the ASEAN5 were subject to only eleven antidumping investigations from the European Commission, representing 5.3 per cent of all EU investigations. However, in the following 1991–7 period, this had risen to forty-seven investigations and 20.9 per cent of the total (see Table A.8). Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia had been particularly singled out for attention with sixteen, thirteen and eleven investigations undertaken against them respectively over this period. While these are high figures for any EU trading partner, relatively few investigations led to the actual imposition of ADDs. Table 3.8 shows that by November 1998 Thailand was subject to ten definitive ADDs, Malaysia eight, Indonesia five, Singapore three, the Philippines one and Vietnam one; Thailand was also subject to one
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Table 3.8 EU anti-dumping duties on ASEAN products (at November 1998)
Source: DG1C, European Commission. Note: A definitive countervailing duty (CVD) had also been in force on ball-bearing imports from Thailand since 06.07.93 up to this period.
provisional ADD.48 These were well below China’s own figures (thirty-two definitive) but comparable on average to those for Korea (nine), Taiwan (seven and one provisional) and Japan (seven). However, the ASEAN states have criticised the EU’s anti-dumping regime for being generally unpredictable and too susceptible to lobbying pressure from European industry representatives. In the EU’s defence, the European Commission maintains that its ADD procedures are WTO consistent and thus comply to a judicial process. Changes made by the EU to its GSP scheme during the mid-1990s were another cause of concern for the ASEAN beneficiaries.49 The group still enjoyed considerable advantages from participating in the scheme, receiving around 30 per cent of its total concessions in value terms in 1993.50 However, in 1995 the system of fixed and flexible QRs on industrial products was replaced by preferential CET duty concessions granted according to ‘sensitivity’ classification. Unlimited market access was also offered to GSP imports, although safeguard measures were still applicable under certain circumstances. These revisions meant that GSP imports were no longer eligible for automatic zeroCET rates, but attracted a Modulated Preferential Duty (MPD) commensurate with the degree of sectoral sensitivity associated with the products in question. Four types of classification exist:
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• Very sensitive: a MPD equivalent to 85 per cent of the CET. Examples mainly include textiles and ferro-alloys. • Sensitive: a 70 per cent MPD rate. A wide range of products are covered, including chemicals, consumer electronics, cars and footwear. • Semi-sensitive: a 35 per cent MPD rate. A similarly diverse range of products in less sensitive sectors than the above, e.g. jewellery, calculators, watches. • Non-sensitive: a zero MPD rate applied to products deemed to not to possess any degree of sectoral sensitivity. Furthermore, the new scheme incorporated a ‘graduation’ mechanism which allowed the EU gradually to phase out GSP benefits for certain products from the more advanced countries. This is determined by criteria indices representing both the level of development and product specialisation found in a beneficiary country.51 For industrial products, specified benefits were phased out over 1995– 8, while those for agricultural products occurred over July 1996 to June 1999.52 Within the ASEAN group the following withdrawn benefits consisted of: • Thailand: plastics and rubber; leather and furskins; clothing; footwear; jewellery and precious metals; miscellaneous products (chapters 94–96); seafoods; vegetables, fruits, nuts and horticultural products; miscellaneous prepared foods. • Malaysia: plastics and rubber; wood; clothing; consumer electronics; cereals; oils, fats and waxes. • Indonesia: wood; footwear; oils, fats and waxes. • Singapore: electro-mechanical equipment. • Brunei: jewellery and precious metals • Philippines: oils, fats and waxes. • Vietnam: unaffected However, the withdrawal of ASEAN’s sectoral benefits was not as drastic as that experienced by China, Korea and Hong Kong. Moreover, Korea and Hong Kong were completely to graduate from the EU’s scheme in May 1998, admittedly along with Singapore—by far ASEAN’s most advanced economy.53 Nevertheless, these changes did have some significant impact on Southeast Asia’s less advanced economies whose dependence upon the EU’s GSP concessions was naturally more pronounced. The ASEAN states were also sceptical of the new social and environmental clauses that had been incorporated into the scheme which were to take effect in 1998.54 Under the respective terms of the clauses, beneficiary countries, in complying either to certain International Labour Organisation conventions or International Tropical Timber Organisation standards for sustainable forest management, would be eligible for lower MPDs. While this represented an award-based approach, the ASEAN states and other developing countries were cautious of any attempt by Western powers to embrace such issues within the framework of trade relations. As Palmujoki (1997) observed, the basis of ASEAN’s concerns had already been
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established with the publication of two European Parliament reports—one by the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection (CEPHCP) and other by the Committee on Development and Co-operation (CDC) —both of which argued for the introduction of punitive social clauses in any forthcoming new EU trade agreement with ASEAN. Moreover, the CEPHCP proposed that a similar environmental clause be incorporated while the CDC defended the principle of conditionalising development and cooperation agreements in accordance with human rights and democracy records. Although such views were not adopted as part of EU policy towards ASEAN, the potential for ‘value-system friction’ was nevertheless relevant by once again demonstrating how EU-ASEAN economic relations were highly susceptible to such politico-cultural discordance. This is also applicable at the multilateral level where developed and developing countries are contesting the form and direction of the emerging WTO agenda. As discussed in Chapter 2, the EU and other developed powers have advocated the expansion of this agenda to include various new traderelated issues that, by their nature, encroach on traditional domain of domestic policy. The less advanced ASEAN states have been critical of this approach which in their view has helped consign the liberalisation of agriculture, textiles, clothing and other labour-intensive sectors to a slow track by comparison. As in the 1980s, EU disputes over ASEAN trade policies and practices in the 1990s have hardly registered. As ASEAN does not conduct a common external trade policy, disputes that have arisen continue to be managed between the European Commission and each separate ASEAN state. Because no one state has become a significant international power during the decade, these disputes have not been politicised as those with larger EU trading partners (i.e. Japan, China and Korea). Nevertheless, various commonalities exist regarding EU trade disputes with the ASEAN group. For example, the European Commission has expressed concern over the high tariff rates that persist in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand on both industrial and agricultural goods. It has been more concerned, though, over the prevalence of certain non-tariff barriers in most ASEAN states, most importantly: import licensing, public procurement practices, IPR and TRIMs violations, customs procedures and miscellaneous import prohibitions. A singular dispute of significance did arise over Indonesia’s car policy in which the EU, joined by the USA and Japan, complained that it breached the Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) Agreement and various WTO rules. This specifically related to Indonesia’s alleged discriminatory trade practices that permitted those companies investing locally to import their products under preferential conditions. The EU and Japan requested WTO disputes panel negotiations with Indonesia in June 1997, with the USA demanding the same two months later. This matter lay unresolved for over a year. Meanwhile, EU-ASEAN economic exchange continued to expand rapidly in the 1990s. The EU’s imports from ASEAN rose from Ecu16.8bn in 1990 to Ecu45.7bn by 1997, and its exports from Ecu16.1bn to Ecu45.5bn. Figure 3.2
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indicates how the relative balance in EU-ASEAN trade continued with ASEAN maintaining a minor surplus against the EU in most years. The ASEAN states’ share of EU imports and exports had also risen to 6.9 per cent and 6.3 per cent respectively by 1997 (see Table A.3), although the EU’s share of ASEAN imports and exports dropped to 14.7 per cent and 14.5 per cent in the same year (see Table 3.1). However, the East Asian financial crisis had a dramatic effect upon EU-ASEAN trade over the 1997 to early 1998 period, with Table A.7 showing a sharp decrease in EU exports to ASEAN (-Ecu7.6 bn) and a significant increase in EU imports from ASEAN (+Ecu3.6 bn). Regarding the distribution of ASEAN member state trade with the EU, Malaysia overtook Thailand to become the second most important trader among the group during the 1987–97 period, with Singapore remaining the most important (Figure 3.3). Figure 3.4 shows that Germany and the UK remained ASEAN’s most prominent EU trade partners over the same period. France and the Netherlands also have close trade ties with ASEAN. Trends in sectoral trade patterns showed a continued shift towards intra-industry exchange with the share of ASEAN manufactures as a percentage of total ASEAN exports to the EU rising from 78.6 per cent in 1993 to 84.6 per cent by 1997 (see Figure 3.1). A significant shift to more technology-intensive ASEAN exports was also apparent. In 1997, ASEAN exports of office machinery and computers to the EU accounted for 25.1 per cent of the total, electrical machinery 14.6 per cent, and telecoms and audio-visual products 7.8 per cent. During the 1990s, European FDI flows into Southeast Asia also accelerated. This particularly occurred over the mid-1990s where the stock of EU direct investment in the ASEAN5 group increased sharply from $23.3bn in 1993 to $66.2bn by 1996 (see Table A.6). Consequently, the EU’s share of the total FDI stock in the group rose from 16.7 per cent to 25.3 per cent over the period, thus making it the largest extra-regional investor in the region (Figure 3.5). By the mid-1990s, Singapore had also become a major European investor from the East Asian NIC group with an accumulated $3.057m worth of investment in 1995. Much of this investment was acquisitional, concentrated in the financial sector and located in the UK. Moreover, the general smallscale nature of Singaporean FDI projects in Europe explains why they have received less media attention than the multi-billion dollar manufacturing projects initiated by Korean firms in Europe during the mid-1990s55 (see Chapter 7). In the structure of EU financial assistance granted to the ASEAN group there was a continued shift of emphasis away from development co-operation to economic co-operation projects during the 1990s (see Table 3.7). Figure 3.6 shows that over the total period of EU assistance, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam have been the main beneficiaries. Since the mid1990s, the EU extended its European Industrial Bank (EIB) loan facilities to Asia and Latin America. As a result, the EIB were able to finance natural gas transport projects in Indonesia and Thailand and the extension of Davao Airport in the Philippines.
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Figure 3.3 ASEAN member state shares of EU-ASEAN trade (1987, 1997)
The impact of intensified regionalism Given the ambitious regional agendas of both the EU and ASEAN during the 1990s, each side expressed a clear interest in how the other’s agenda would be realised. According to Sengupta (1992), the initial concerns of the ASEAN states over the SEM programme could be summarised as: • the enhanced efficiency, and hence competitiveness of rival European producers; • the introduction of stricter product standards and the associated costs of compliance; • the removal of bilateral concessions given to ex-colonial ASEAN countries by EU member states; • increased levels of EU-wide protectionism (‘Fortress Europe’) and more stringent local content rules to help internalise the benefits yielded by the Single Market; • the diversion of potential FDI to the EU or CEE countries that may have been destined for Southeast Asia.
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Figure 3.4 EU member state shares of EU-ASEAN trade (1987, 1997) Source: Eurostat.
Figure 3.5 Inward FDI stocks in ASEAN by geographic origin (1996) Source: UNCTAD database.
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Figure 3.6 EU financial assistance to the ASEAN 10 group (1976–9 Source: European Commission. Note: Up to April 1998.
However, as Wagner (1991) observed, ASEAN would also benefit from the growth-induced demand for ASEAN imports and the simpler uniform standards now operating in the EU as a consequence of the SEM programme. However, the overall balance of the SEM’s effects upon ASEAN are difficult to quantify. The superior Single Market access enjoyed by Southeast Asia’s close industrial rivals in Central and Eastern Europe nevertheless remains a primary concern. This is currently embodied in the CEE countries’ ‘Europe Agreements’ with the EU and plans for an eastern enlargement in the early twenty-first century that will eventually confer their full access to the SEM. In the meantime, the CEE countries still have to contend with a level of EU protectionism similar to that faced by ASEAN states in certain areas, such as anti-dumping duties. The East Asian financial crisis has raised ASEAN’s interest in EMU and its potential to restructure aspects of the international financial system. The ASEAN states must also consider whether the euro is a viable reserve currency alternative to the dollar and yen. While EMU will further enhance ASEAN perceptions of the EU as an important global power, there are concerns that it could make the EU even more introspective than before. In comparison to its other trading partners, the EU had done little to promote the euro to the ASEAN group or explain to Southeast Asian companies how they would be affected by EMU in general. The EU has, though, taken an interest in how European companies will be affected by AFTA. In its initial 1996 report on EU-ASEAN relations, the EPG stated that countries which establish bilateral or regional free trade arrangements with potential diversionary effects should reduce tariffs for non-member countries concomitant to reducing those between participating countries. It went on to suggest that ‘alternatively and preferably, countries which wish to form free trade areas should also simultaneously undertake unilateral
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liberalisation on an MFN basis’ (CEC 1996b:5), a reference to the notion of ‘open regionalism’ which is explored in some detail by Chapter 8. As I have argued elsewhere, AFTA’s potential impact upon EU industry could take many forms (Dent 1998c). Regional integration arrangements such as AFTA are generally treated with some degree of caution by third country trading partners owing to the potential for new RIAs to have trade diversionary effects. Trade diversion arises when third country producers which offer a more competitive product than producers within the RIA are subsequently disadvantaged by relative tariff changes incurred by the RIAs internal liberalisation that is not matched by similar external liberalisation. For example, we have noted how AFTA aims to create a zero or minimal tariff zone within ASEAN. As with all free trade area agreements, each participating country retains the ability to determine its own external tariffs (i.e. on third country imports). Hence, some ASEAN members may decide to maintain relatively high tariffs on competitive EU imports if this enables their own comparatively uncompetitive producers to exploit the advantageous tariff position they now enjoy in other ASEAN markets. The ensuing increase in market shares achieved by these ASEAN producers at the expense of their competitive EU rivals will result in a negative welfare outcome. This is because ASEAN’s tariff regimes help support inefficient production as well as deny consumers the same tarifffree access to more competitive product alternatives. Conversely, economic theory suggests that the negative welfare effects of trade diversion are offset by the positive welfare effects generated by trade creation. This arises when the same internal tariff liberalisation allows more competitive RIA-based producers to expand their own share of the RIAs markets once held by their less competitive neighbouring rivals. While it is not the aim here to present an ex ante quantitative analysis of what AFTA’s tariff liberalisation would imply for EU business, we can make a number of important qualitative assertions. First, AFTA is supposed to comply with the principle of ‘open regionalism’, and hence ASEAN is committed simultaneously to liberalise its internal and external tariff regimes. This is reinforced by APEC’s even stronger advocacy of open regionalism which its Southeast Asian members are also obliged to support. Depending on how closely this is adhered to, the trade diversion effects of AFTA on the EU and ASEAN’s other trading partners should be thus minimised. It should also be noted that current tariff levels vary greatly across ASEAN, being comparatively high in Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia but low in Singapore and Brunei, so most anticipated trade diversion effects will be attributed to the former subgroup. Second, trade diversion will affect those European operations located outside AFTA. European firms that have acquired ‘insider’ status through foreign investments should therefore enjoy the same benefits as their indigenous ASEAN counterparts. Most Southeast Asian economies have a notable capital dependence on inward FDI flows which implies that many foreign multinationals are positioned to take advantage of the CEPT scheme. As previously noted, the stock of EU direct investment in ASEAN is relatively
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high (see Figure 3.5; Table A.6). Thus, ASEAN-based EU multinationals stand to benefit or lose from the AFTA’s trade creation and any longer-term dynamic effects that tariff liberalisation will bestow upon ‘insider’ firms.56 Third, we acknowledged earlier in the chapter the mutually reinforcing relationship between the AIA and AFTA and how ASEAN is using AFTA to attract further foreign investment into the region. The emphasis on promoting FDI will particularly appeal to multinationals whose Southeast Asian operations are configured and co-ordinated across more than one country, and hence benefit the most from CEPT liberalisation. However, as previously discussed, there exists much debate over the degree to which AFTA will stimulate intraASEAN trade. Fourth, assuming that AFTA enhances ASEAN’s economic growth potential, its trade partners can anticipate an increase in the demand for their imports. This demand could arise through efficiency gains that consequently improve production factor incomes (e.g. wages, profits), which in turn lead to higher import expenditures, or through the need for ASEAN firms to acquire foreign capital goods in order to expand into a more unified regional market. The EU is a major provider of capital-intensive and technologyintensive products for Southeast Asian countries, as well as many of the luxury ‘boutique’ goods that their emerging middle-class consumers aspire to possess. ASEM: an extension of inter-regionalism Another important development in EU-ASEAN economic relations has been the ASEM dialogue framework which was created in March 1996. As Chapter 8 discusses at some length, ASEAN’s position within ASEM has been critical. Its original conception can be attributed to a 1994 Singaporean initiative to create a new inter-regional framework between the EU and East Asia that encompassed not just the ASEAN group but also Japan, China and Korea. The EU-ASEAN link provided some form of model on which ASEM was based, whereby a wider inter-regional exchange would be promoted in economic, political and cultural fields. The inclusion of the latter two dimensions ran the risk of aggravating ‘value-system friction’, and some ASEAN observers were indeed puzzled over why the EU was so keen to develop a political dialogue in particular when the associated issues were so contentious.57 Given that the new framework offered an alternative regime for conducting inter-regional relations, there was also the issue whether ASEM would dilute or strengthen the EU-ASEAN bond. In considering this, Pelkmans (1997) argued that the latter case was more likely owing to a number of factors. First, ASEM provides a new summit-level dialogue between the ASEAN and EU member states which has consequently raised the level of political contact between both regional groups. Second, the ASEM process is managed more in accordance with Asian-style principles of consensus and informality that are in some contrast to the more contract-based features of 1980 ASEAN-EC Agreement. Third, ASEM offers a broader framework in which wider regional issues can be addressed, an illustrative example being the first ASEM Economic
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Ministers Meeting held at Tokyo in September 1997 where finding possible solutions to the East Asian financial crisis was at the top of the agenda. Conclusion The major themes running through this chapter have included whether the post-colonial legacy of dependence has persisted in the EU-ASEAN economic relationship, how the EU has managed the Southeast Asian competitive threat, ‘value-system friction’ and difficulties experienced at the politico-institutional level of economic relations, the role of state and non-state actors, and the impact of each group’s respective regional agendas. These are analysed from different IPE theoretical perspectives in the analysis that follows. Neo-realists would stress the primacy of the nation-state in the structure and process of EU-ASEAN economic relations, despite their inter-regional dimension. The diversity of foreign policy interests of EU member states in Southeast Asia, to a large part determined by post-colonial links, has led in the past to coalition building within the EU on some issues (Regelsberger 1989). For example, Spain has given strong support to Portugal’s stance against Indonesia over the East Timor issue. Contrasting national interests among the ASEAN states have also been identified in this chapter, such as Singapore’s broader geoeconomic perspective on the EU-ASEAN relationship, Malaysia’s wish to develop more distinct bilateral ties with Europe and the less advanced state’s preoccupation with EU protectionist regimes. The variance of national interests within ASEAN explains why consensus on matters relating to the EU has often been elusive. At an organisational level, ASEAN’s relatively loose inter-governmental framework does not compromise national sovereignty in the same way as the EU’s supranationalism, thus allowing greater scope for nation-state objectives to be pursued. Neo-realists admit that this may prove counter-productive, especially where the achievement of relative gains within the ASEAN group based on an independent state strategy takes precedence over attaining higher absolute gains borne from a common group strategy. This helps explain why lowest common denominator objectives have prevailed both in ASEAN’s internal affairs and its external economic relations with the EU and others. Moreover, we can attribute ASEAN’s frequent failure to apply greater collective pressure upon the EU (e.g. in making favourable adaptations to its trade policy) to this predicament. In addition, Indorf (1983:105) made the observation in the early 1980s that EC-ASEAN relations in general were hindered by ‘the complexity of their organisations, the lack of procedural mobility and the stagnating effects of diverse national standpoints’. Neo-realists would argue that little has changed since then. They further point out that where the ASEAN states have collaborated closely, this is because structural changes to the international economic system have conditioned such behaviour, the AFTA project being a prime example. Maintaining close links with ASEAN has been important for the EU because
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of the continuity they represent with an important East Asian economic partner. The relatively harmonious nature of the EU’s longer-term economic relations with ASEAN in comparison to other East Asian partners has made this more so. Yet, neo-realists would argue how the EU has been willing to jeopardise this objective for the sake of upholding higher political principles. By adopting a tough stance on the human rights issues pertaining to East Timor and Myanmar, the EU places the development of its economic relations at the politico-institutional level at some risk. Furthermore, ‘value-system friction’ is simply a manifestation of interstate conflict according to neo-realism, whereby opposing socio-cultural values have helped influence the state’s foreign policy objectives. The neo-realist concept of hegemonic stability has also been applicable to EU-ASEAN relations. We noted earlier in the chapter that the EC was initially reluctant to develop ties with ASEAN owing to the perception that Southeast Asia lay more in the US sphere of ‘hegemonic’ influence. Despite Europe’s extensive post-colonial links with the region, the neo-realist argument follows that the EC did not want to compete with US interests over ASEAN and thus risk disturbing American hegemonic stability, which by the mid-1970s was already looking vulnerable. This situation persisted to some degree up until the 1980s when security matters continued to dominate the ASEAN agenda. However, the 1990s have seen a relative shift from politics to economics. As ASEAN’s largest extra-regional source of inward FDI and major trading partner, the EU’s potential to exploit this agenda shift is considerable. However, while the EU is an ARF dialogue partner, it nevertheless lacks the comprehensive security relationship with ASEAN that neo-realists emphasise underpins US economic relations with the group. Neo-liberals acknowledge the shift to a more pluralist agenda in EU-ASEAN relations but also stress the importance of other developments. For example, the role of non-state actors has become pivotal in the economic relationship, especially given the débâcles over East Timor and Myanmar at the politicoinstitutional level. Failures in the diplomatic realm contrasted with the rapid expansion of EU-ASEAN economic exchange witnessed in the 1990s. More extensive commercial linkages have been forged between European and Southeast Asian firms as a consequence of these trends and also from the numerous business-related contact groups and collaborative activities promoted by the lower politics of EU-ASEAN co-operation (see Table 3.3). Thus, business representatives and other transnational non-state actors have taken greater responsibility for maintaining the momentum of EU-ASEAN economic relations at a time of a diplomatic impasse. At the outset of formalised attempts to promote the EU and ASEAN’s economic relationship, we noted how both sides were criticised for failing effectively to engage a wider range of non-state actors, and particularly business representatives, in this process. A visible complex interdependence applies not only to the mix of state and non-state actors in the management of a more transnationalised EU-ASEAN economic relationship, but also to the wider range of interconnected issues that define it. According to neo-liberals, this is evinced by the broadening of the
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EU-ASEAN economic agenda to include technology, the environment, human resource development, labour standards and other issues in addition to trade, investment and financial assistance. Moreover, the expansion of this agenda demonstrates an impulse from both sides to create a co-operative framework of economic relations rather than accept conflict as an inevitable outcome. However, we have seen how conflict has invariably become a feature of EU-ASEAN relations. Most ASEAN states have been suspicious of the EU’s policy to include environmental and social clauses within its GSP scheme, as well as its role in shaping the WTO’s new trade agenda. Consequently, ‘valuesystem friction’ has applied not just to human rights but also to the multilateralisation of domestic economic policy which many ASEAN states have resisted (see Chapter 2). More traditional instances of trade conflict have also been evident where EU surplus capacity problems have arisen, and hence where ardent protectionist regimes still face ASEAN producers, e.g. in agriculture, textiles and other labour-intensive manufacturing sectors. Both the EU and ASEAN, though, have embraced the neo-liberal notion of ‘open regionalism’ whereby external and internal free trade are simultaneously promoted by the regional group. Notwithstanding the surplus capacity problems noted above, Southeast Asian fears of a ‘Fortress Europe’ have subsided as more general access to the SEM has improved (Hanson 1998). Conversely, progress towards installing AFTA entails a retreat of neo-mercantilist trade policies still conducted by many ASEAN states. This chapter has considered the balance of AFTA’s effects on EU firms. A Marxist perspective would emphasise how EU firms continue to govern a post-colonial division of labour in Southeast Asia. As the largest extra-regional investors in the region, European multinationals play an important determining role in the ASEAN economy. Thus, according to Marxists, the link of dependency and subservience between the EU and ASEAN member states remains essentially intact. Southeast Asia still depends on European firms as crucial sources of imports, investment, finance, technology and capital. However, we have shown that a clear shift towards interdependence in the EU-ASEAN economic relationship was apparent from the 1980s onwards. Intra-industry trade between the two regions has grown as Southeast Asia industry has become more capital intensive. Moreover, the AFTA project demonstrates how ASEAN is confident in promoting a greater regional selfsufficiency. It has also turned more to other East Asian NICs as partners in the group’s future economic development. We have noted how these developments pose certain challenges for the EU Marxist explanations of ‘value-system friction’ arising from tensions between capital and labour interests are somewhat limited. Although it may be interpreted as an attempt by European firms to raise the level playing field of competition to suit their interests, the reformist emphasis on socio-cultural determinants is perhaps more appropriate. A Marxist critique of changes made by the EU to its GSP scheme would similarly question the motives behind its new environmental and social clauses and the graduation mechanism. From the East Asian group,
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less developed ASEAN and China will experience most difficulty in complying with these changes. To Marxists, the developed countries’ pushing of new trade issues onto the WTO agenda ultimately serves to reinforce their dominant position against developing countries, as compliance erodes the competitive advantage of many ASEAN and other developing country producers. Moreover, we have noted concerns within ASEAN over the evolving WTO agenda and its preoccupation with capital-intensive sector liberalisation at the expense of promoting freer trade in labour-intensive sectors, e.g. agriculture and textiles. Consequently, developments at the multilateral level have been to the EU’s advantage. At the inter-regional level, Marxists perceive arrangements like the ASEM as part of consolidating the international capital alliance by helping align the interests of European and Southeast Asian capital. Further transnationalised links between EU and ASEAN private and public sector representatives have certainly been forged by the ASEM dialogue framework. The growing momentum behind ASEM may prove vital to EU-ASEAN economic relations as it provides a parallel conduit through which high level politico-institutional contacts can be maintained.
4
The EU and Japan
Introduction Japan remains the EU’s most important economic partner in East Asia, but also that with which its most problematic economic relations have been maintained. The country’s ascendancy to economic superpower status has been at the relative expense of European industrial power. During the postwar period, the EU has had to come to terms with the Japanese competitive threat on various fronts. Consequently, the EU-Japan economic relationship has been mostly characterised by persistent trade conflicts. Japan’s rise has also altered the global balance of power and thus the nature of the international economic system in which the EU operates. The emergence of a tripolar structure of economic power, or Triad (i.e. the USA, Japan and the EU) became evident by the late 1980s with the demise of the Soviet Union and longer-term decline in American hegemony. We shall discuss later how Triadic relations provided the essentially context for EU-Japan economic relations during the 1990s. It will also be shown how the recent escalation of Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Europe has significantly transformed the complexion of these relations. Before analysing these issues in some depth, we shall examine the nature of the Japanese economy. Japan: East Asia’s hegemon This section considers four broad themes. We shall first examine the emergence of Japan as a new economic superpower, analysing the development of the Japanese economy both from a historical and structural perspective. A study of Japan’s role in East Asia will follow that acknowledges its part in generating greater economic interdependence in the region. Our third theme focuses on Japanese outward FDI, highlighting both its general determinants and the growing internationalisation of the Japanese firms. Finally, a consideration of the main future challenges facing the Japanese economy are made, with particular reference to Japan’s recent recessional and financial problems.
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The emergence of a new economic superpower Japan was the first Asian country to embrace modern capitalism. The origins of this process can be traced to the so-called ‘Meiji Restoration’ of 1868 which broke two centuries of isolationism under the preceding Tokugawa regime. Renewed contacts with the West revealed Japan’s comparative industrial and military weakness and subsequently galvanised the nation into pursuing a catchup strategy under the Meiji slogan of ‘rich country, strong army’. Wide-ranging economic and social reforms followed and Western industrial practices were emulated. By the 1930s, Japan had developed a broad and powerful industrial base with its large, family-based zaibatsu conglomerates playing a crucial part in realising the country’s expanding international trade and investment interests. Japan’s pre-war colonisation of East Asian countries, euphemistically phrased the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, was partly driven by the need to satisfy the burgeoning resource demands of its rapidly growing industries. After defeat in World War II, Japan began the reconstruction of its shattered economy under the stewardship of the US caretaker administration (1945–53), benefiting from the considerable resources and assistance it conferred. US capital was particularly directed towards enhancing Japan’s export-oriented industrialisation. Although Japanese exports were initially synonymous in the West with poor quality, such perceptions began to change as innovative production and management techniques (e.g. ‘just-in-time’ delivery, lean production and total quality management) pioneered by Japanese companies gradually provided their products with a competitive advantage over foreign rivals. The implementation and adaptation of new industrial systems were largely made possible by Japan’s highly skilled and disciplined workforce. There has also been a commitment in Japan to what Thurow (1992) terms ‘producer economics’, whereby manufacturing activities and the development of process technologies enjoy pre-eminence over rent-seeking, service activities. As a consequence, Japan’s best graduates have entered careers in industry as opposed to accountancy, finance or law—the favoured path of many of their Western counterparts. Japan’s industrial prowess has been very clearly manifested in its share of world export trade, which rose from 3.2 per cent in 1960 to 8.4 per cent by 1990, although this share fell to 7.7 per cent in 1997 (see Table A.9). Consistent and sizeable trade surpluses through most of the post-war period have generated huge foreign exchange reserves for the country. By the 1970s, the Japanese economy had overhauled every Western industrial rival with the exception of the USA. In 1965, Japan’s nominal GDP was 10 per cent of the USA but by 1996 this had risen to 70 per cent and currently stands as the world’s second largest national economy (see Table A.1). A definitive feature of the Japanese economy’s post-war success has been its underpinning structural relationships, the most important being the keiretsu industrial groups, the special collaborative relationship between government and business, employment relations and Japan’s distribution systems. The keiretsu1 evolved out of the handful of zaibatsu company groups that dominated the economy in the pre-war years.2
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These were usually vertically organised with a holding company at the centre that controlled a number of core operating companies and their subsidiaries. The zaibatsu were formally dissolved by the US caretaker administration but the keiretsu emerged in the 1950s in the shape of former zaibatsu-affiliated companies with most closely associated with a major bank. For the six major keiretsu these were the Fuji, Dai-ichi Kangyo, Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sanwa and Sumitomo banks. These six keiretsu groups have together accounted for around a quarter of Japan’s post-war GDP. Keiretsu can be distinguished either by their vertical integration, such as the major automobile assemblers, or by their inter-market, horizontal integration.3 Each keiretsu group has a general trading company (sogo shosha) which in addition to providing commercial services to associated companies also developed the group’s extensive intelligence networks: these sought to identify potential export markets and cheap import sources. Although the links between keiretsu members were looser than their zaibatsu predecessors, they were connected by both interlocking share ownership and company directorships. This gave each stakeholder a part to play in meeting the group’s ‘shared destiny’ (unmekyodatai) corporate objectives. The specific role of the group banks was to provide financial capital for the group on favourable terms. As an outcome, Japan’s capital markets have developed in a contrasting manner to the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model, aligning more closely the interests of finance and industry while also producing a relative absence of takeovers, particularly of the hostile kind. The above arrangements have encouraged longer-term planning, technological transfer, elaborate subcontracting relationships and general synergetic linkages across the group. Not all of Japan’s large firms grew in such a way (e.g. Sony and Honda) while the vast majority of Japan’s businesses consist of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that are mostly independent of keiretsu links. While a high level of competitive rivalry exists between Japanese firms in both domestic and international markets, the keiretsu have been accused of cartelisation and other forms of restrictive practices. Such criticism has especially come from the USA and EU which have expressed concern over Japan’s ‘structural impediments’ to foreign competition. These have been defined by the European Commission as ‘the protracted and unpredictable technical certification and registration procedures and above all the habits and attitudes bred of Japan’s vertically and horizontally integrated industrial, commercial and financial groups’ (CEC 1985a). Thus, the perceived discriminatory contracting between keiretsu members to the frequent exclusion of foreign counterparts has been an often cited example of the above. The formation of the keiretsu helped to co-ordinate the policy of partnership that post-war Japanese governments wished to engender with big business and their representative associations—collectively referred to as zaikai (business world). This formed an essential part of Japan’s ‘developmental state’ whose origins date back to the Meiji period, where an initially underdeveloped private sector led to the government orchestrating Japan’s catch-up with the Western powers. Strategic investment programmes were managed by the government in close collaboration
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with the emerging zaibatsu groups, whose scale advantages were promoted and exploited by the state. The legacy has continued through the bonds nurtured between the state bureaucracy, zaikai and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which itself had consistently held power from 1955 to 1993 and remains Japan’s most singularly powerful political party. According to Johnson (1982, 1987), Japan’s post-war developmental state entailed the formation of developmentoriented political elites, which were essentially responsible for devising development strategies, and whose actions tended to be market conforming rather than market displacing. The most powerful of these elites have been ensconced within Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and Ministry of Finance (MOF). Komine (1993) contends that both MITI and the MOF have worked to three basic objectives in compliance with their developmental state partners: • to forecast the way that the economy ought to and can develop; • to indicate the fundamental direction that government medium-term and long-term economic policy should take, as well as identify their priority objectives and methods; • to provide ‘administrative guidance’ for both corporate and household decisions. The state bureaucracy, in addition to its direct links with the keiretsu, also meets with zaikai through several industry associations, most notably the Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organisations), the Nikkeiren (Federation of Employer’s Associations) and the Keizai-Doyukai (Committee for Economic Development). These have been joined by a number of deliberative councils (e.g. the Industrial Rationalisation Council and Industrial Structure Advisory Council) that also play a role in forging Japan’s industrial and commercial policy. The developmental state partnership is further reinforced by various informal ties such as amakudari, whereby some retiring government officials take up high-level executive positions in business or an industry association. Over time, MITI has adjusted its policy approach to suit the contemporary needs of the Japanese economy. During the 1950s and 1960s, when the economy was more fragile, it used extensive protectionist measures to insulate key infant industries from foreign competition as well as strict controls over foreign exchange and the licensing of imported technology. As the economy transformed, the focus of policy soon began to shift away from low-tech, labour-intensive industries and their markets to more high-tech, capital-intensive activities. From 1974 onwards, MITI began to collaborate with industry in fabricating the consensual ‘long-term visions’ to which the economy could commit itself. In more recent times, the internationalisation of the Japanese economy has become an important preoccupation. However, this very process, together with the reining back of the developmental state approach during the 1990s, has diminished the power of MITI’s ‘administrative guidance’ over the private sector. Another key structural relationship of the Japanese economy has been its
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framework of employment relations. Whitehill (1991) summarises the main defining characteristics of these relations as being: • • • •
lifetime employment agreements, especially in large companies; consensus decision-making; seniority wage and promotion; ‘enterprise unionism’ —single company-based unions that adopt a less adversarial stance towards management.
In return for worker devotion to the company, Japanese employers have offered their employees a reward package designed both to provide security and inspire further self-sacrifice. Large firms will more than likely agree to a lifetime contract of employment for certain new recruits. Even in times of recession, Japanese firms are reluctant to dispose of excess personnel, believing that releasing in particular a young employee is a lost investment for the future. Within a keiretsu group, personnel in overmanned sections in one company member are simply redeployed to companies elsewhere within the group that can more easily absorb extra employment. This may involve a temporary move (shukko) or a permanent one (tenseki). Our final structural relationship studied, Japan’s distribution systems, is characterised by interlocking wholesaler-retailer networks that are often difficult for outsiders to penetrate. Furthermore, government restrictions on sales space and business hours have hindered the progress of Western ‘scale’ retailers (e.g. superstores) in Japan. While both domestic and foreign latecomers are disadvantaged, the latter, lacking familiarity with Japan’s cultural and social environment, are naturally more so. In addition to distribution factors, foreign firms have attributed the comparative impenetrability of Japanese domestic markets to a relatively low consumption propensity (and hence a low import propensity in general) and the overtly chauvinistic tendencies of Japanese consumers. However, two points should be noted in response to these criticisms. On the first matter, Japan’s economic success owes much to the high saving rates of its people which have been essential in facilitating the country’s rapid investment-driven industrial growth. Second, the Japanese are among the world’s most discerning consumers, demanding high standards on product quality, choice and service which only Japanese-made products are perceived to deliver. We should conclude by noting that since the early 1990s’ recession of the Japanese economy, there has been mounting pressure upon these underpinning structural relationships to adapt to new realities. For example, many Japanese companies have retracted offers of lifetime employment contracts for new recruits while also cutting back on their intake of graduates. Another legacy of the recession has been the weakening of the keiretsu enterprise networks as members have sought to improve corporate flexibility by linking up with more competitive outsiders. This has sometimes manifested itself in the form of international strategic alliances that have been established with Triad counterparts. As we shall discuss later in this chapter, there has also been increasing foreign pressure (gaiatsu) on Japan to make adaptations to its domestic distribution systems and markets in
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order to raise its import propensities. Furthermore, in attempts to eradicate market-distorting state practices, the relationship between government and business has been somewhat emasculated. Japan’s role in East Asia Japan’s position in the East Asian economy has been the subject of much analysis (Korhonen 1994; Funabashi 1995; Mendl 1995). There are several reasons for this. As the region’s economic hegemon, other East Asian countries have looked to Japan for leadership and hence championing their region’s cause against competing regional powers. Attempts by Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir to persuade Japan to lead his East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) initiative, a rival to the US-involved Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum is a case in point (see Chapter 8). Japan has also been a developmental role model for other East Asian newly industrialising countries (NICs), with the Japanese state providing an exemplar that many developing country bureaucracies have tried to imitate (Francks 1992). Furthermore, the Japanese economy’s rapid industrial growth and development have had positive multiplier effects on the regional economy. Japanese companies have stimulated the export growth of the East Asian NICs, provided them with capital and technological resources, demonstrated their innovative ergonomic techniques in transplanted production and service facilities, participated in East Asia’s many sub-regional economic development projects4 and promoted the development of East Asian companies through strategic alliance agreements. These processes are analysed within the ‘flying geese’ model of regional development, whereby the leader alleviates the resistance to economic progress made by those that follow in its slipstream (Akamatsu 1962; Blomqvist 1996). Japan has also become the major donor of overseas development assistance for many of its region’s less developed countries (Feldsieper 1997). However, the economic relationship is reciprocal. East Asian NICs have provided Japan with material and component supplies, new market opportunities and location-specific FDI advantages, enabling the Japanese economy to make important structural changes over time (Kojima 1995). For example, the offshore relocation of Japan’s more labour-intensive industrial activities to host East Asian countries has helped maintain the cost competitiveness of Japanese firms. In addition, Simon and Jun (1995:221) state that ‘Japanese firms in aggregate have begun to create regional sources of national competitive strength and capability through their expanding access to and ability to harness the technological assets of Asian economies.’ The extensive transborder systems of production and distribution developed by Japanese multinational enterprises (MNEs) across East Asia have also been instrumental in creating a de facto economic integration in the region. This, in turn, has enhanced the yen’s position as a regional reserve currency, though the predominance of the dollar in East Asia’s trade and capital transactions is likely to persist for some time (Frankel 1993; Ito 1993; Kwan 1994).
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Notwithstanding the advantages that regional economic interdependence has conferred, Japan has been cautious in promoting certain of its aspects. Japanese firms are understandably averse to imparting too much technology transfer for fear of undermining their own competitive position (Dobson 1993). Recipient East Asian countries are also circumspect, not wishing to become too technology dependent on Japan. Moreover, despite the leading intellectual role played by Japanese academics in formulating the ideas that have shaped East Asia’s, and the Asia-Pacific’s regional economic identity, Japan has been somewhat reluctant in assuming the mantle of political leadership in East Asia (see Chapter 8). This can be accredited to various factors. Funabashi (1995) notes that for historical and cultural reasons Japan has traditionally seen itself as part of yet separate from Asia: a parallel that can arguably be drawn with Britain and Europe—a shared ‘island resistance’ to continental forces. Much of this stems from the legacy of the Tokugawa period’s self-imposed isolationism. Japan has also avoided the possible invoking of memories associated with the infamous Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere and the imperial division of labour that it imposed on weaker neighbours (Shibusawa et al. 1992). As Chapter 8 reveals, Japan’s scope for assuming leadership in East Asia has also been overshadowed by the straddling presence of the USA across the wider AsiaPacific region (Rix 1993). The failure of Japan’s proposal to establish an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) to help resolve the region’s wider financial problems is a recent case in point. Many blame this failure on American resistance to the AMF initiative because of its potential challenge to the multilateral competence of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), an organisation over which the USA exerts significant structural power. Moreover, Japan’s political upheavals of the early 1990s compromised its ability to adopt a coherent position on APEC when a more ambitious agenda was emerging within the forum. Given that APEC’s liberalisation plans imply that Japan, as a key member, will come under a wider gaiatsu to remove trade and investment barriers on a supposed MFN-driven, open regionalist basis, it must look to shape APEC’s future agenda with greater interest. Japanese outward FDI In the early post-war decades, Japan maintained a highly controlled FDI regime. The US caretaker administration did not permit Japanese firms to conduct overseas investments until 1951, which thereafter were tightly regulated via the Foreign Exchange and Trade Control Act of 1949 for the next twenty years. There were two main reasons for this. First, Japan’s experienced persistent trade deficits until the late 1960s and thus its foreign exchange reserves needed to be carefully husbanded. Second, rapid industrial growth during this period diverted investment towards domestic needs, resulting in a lower priority being afforded to FDI, which averaged at a mere $180m per annum over 1951–70. However, changing economic conditions led the Japanese government to undertake a five-stage liberalisation programme of outward FDI over 1969–78. Substantial increases in
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Japan’s domestic labour costs and a significant appreciation of the yen provided a rationale for relocating parts of Japanese industry overseas. Japan’s growing trade surpluses at this time improved the viability of progressive liberalisation during the 1970s. According to Redies (1990), the expansion of Japanese FDI that followed can be understood as an exercise in financial power, with overseas investments being used to re-cycle Japan’s fast-accumulating foreign exchange reserves. The rapid growth of Japanese exports over the decade is also highly relevant, with trade-supporting investments being prominent in both the EC and USA. As a consequence of the above factors, Japanese outward FDI on a cumulative basis rose from $3.6bn in 1970 to $36.5bn by 1980. There are important sectoral and structural factors which also explain the escalation of Japanese foreign investment. According to Ozawa (1991), this must be understood within the context of domestic industrial restructuring in Japan, which could be categorised into four distinct but overlapping phases of structural change: • Phase 1: expansion of labour-intensive manufacturing (1950s to mid-1960s). • Phase 2: scale-based modernisation of heavy and chemical industries (late 1950s to early 1970s). • Phase 3: assembly-based, subcontracting dependent, mass production of consumer durable products (late 1960s to present day). • Phase 4: flexible manufacturing of highly differentiated goods utilising microchip technologies (early 1980s to present day). Between each phase lay three stages of overseas investments. The ‘elementary’ stage of Japanese FDI evolved from the locational advantages of basing labourintensive production offshore in neighbouring East Asian countries. In the second FDI phase, Ozawa (1991) observed that the Japanese economy fell into a ‘RicardoHicksian trap’, whereby its shift to heavy industry production induced an unsustainable resource-dependent position. At the centre of the predicament lay the country’s own lack of natural resource endowments. The trap essentially originated from constraints born from an ‘irremovable scarcity’ of resources upon the economy’s ability to generate substantial levels of reinvestable profits. Foreign investment provided an escape from this trap by securing stable supplies of industrial raw materials, the transfer of some resource-intensive industrial activity overseas and policy-guided moves to restructure domestic industry towards less resource-consuming and more knowledge-intensive industries. Ozawa’s third ‘export-substituting-cum-surplus-recyling’ stage provided the key impetus behind the surge of FDI into North America and Europe during the 1980s. As we shall later discuss, the structural change embodied in Phase 4 enabled the keiretsus’ overseas subsidiaries to compete with effect in Triadic markets. Trends in the geographic distribution of Japanese outward FDI shown by Figure 4.1 are indicative of both continuity and change in the global strategies of Japanese firms. Asia’s high 30.0 per cent share of Japanese cumulative net investment by 1981 partially revealed the hollowing out of labour-intensive
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Figure 4.1 Stock of outward FDI from Japan by geographic destination (1981, 1996) Source: JETRO.
production in Japan, as well as the relative strategic importance of mining and other primary sector offshore investments. The almost halving of this share, together with the USA and Europe overtaking Asia as principal host regions by 1996, inferred that fundamental changes to the structure of Japanese outward FDI had occurred. From the mid-1980s onwards, it was apparent that Japanese multinationals were engaged in more proactive and globally integrative foreign investments in adapting to the new realities of global competition. This is confirmed by Mason (1992) in his deep historical analysis of Japanese FDI in Europe, who contends that there was a marked turn from basically trade-supporting FDI to a more proactive approach around this time. Meanwhile, Japanese outward FDI continued to escalate globally, rising to a cumulative $590.1bn by 1996. We shall analyse in depth the EU-Japan FDI relationship later in the chapter. Future challenges Despite the substantial achievements of Japan’s post-war economic miracle, the country faces a broad range of challenges in the twenty-first century. Although Japan enjoys productive and technological strength in key sectors, such as automotive, electrical/electronic and certain high-tech industries (e.g. biotechnology), it lags behind its Triad rivals in others (e.g. aerospace, pharmaceuticals and chemicals). In many important service sector industries (e.g. retailing), Japanese firms remain at a competitive disadvantage. The improving techno-industrial capabilities of East Asia’s more advanced NICs have also intensified competitive pressure in important Japanese industries such as semiconductors and consumer electronics. Japan’s heavy reliance on imported raw materials, especially oil and other mineral resources, constitutes another strategic industrial concern. While the country’s education system continues to produce highly numerate and technically skilled individuals, there has been increasing criticism of the
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system’s ethos and structure in light of Japan’s future industrial challenges. Intuitive and independent thought has not traditionally been encouraged in its schools and universities. Given that the new knowledge-intensive growth industries depend more upon the input of creative-minded individuals, Japan may be presented with an additional ‘scarce resource’ predicament unless alternative pedagogical methods are pursued. The country’s rapidly ageing population further compounds this problem.5 Many other future challenges stem from the lessons and legacy of the early 1990s’ recession. The speculative excesses of the 1980s, on which Japan’s socalled ‘bubble economy’ rested, were brought to an end after a tightening of monetary policy during 1990 and 1991. Japan’s worst post-war recession ensued, as did a pattern of low economic growth for most of the decade (see Table A.1). Government endeavours to stimulate economic activity failed largely because of the huge overhang of non-performing debt and deficient incentives to invest. Serious asset price deflation (the Nikkei index fell by around a half) led to a loss of confidence that pervaded the whole economy. The financial sector was particularly affected with bad debt problems currently expected to persist for some time, owing to the fact that real estate and shares have been key assets in Japanese bank portfolios.6 The recession had exposed the rigidities inherent in the underpinning structural relationships of the Japanese economy which we have analysed. In 1995 the government launched a deregulation programme that it hoped would inject sufficient flexibility into the economy. However, as we discuss later, both the EU and USA criticised the programme over its lack of ambition. Meanwhile, Japan’s financial problems were mounting with the emergence of the East Asian financial crisis in 1997. Japan had significantly contributed to the origins of the crisis and its own financial predicament was subsequently compounded by it (Dore 1998; Yamazawa 1998). After a series of financial sector bankruptcies, including a number of small banks and securities firms, the government announced plans for a far-reaching liberalisation of the financial sector over the 1998–2001 period. As part of the ongoing deregulation programme, MITI, MOF and other ministries with a role in economic policymaking have been directed to pursue a less interventionist approach. The above thus represents an attempt by Japan to find a new development model for the twenty-first century (Bevacqua 1998). The emphasis on deregulation and liberalisation is commensurate with the general shift towards the neo-liberal paradigm that was previously manifest in Europe and North America. While this has provided new market opening opportunities in Japan for foreign firms, many aspects of the country’s unique capitalist culture will also remain essentially unchanged (e.g. keiretsu dynamics). Finally, now that Japan has become a mature industrial power of some considerable stature many expectations surround its ability to convert its economic power into commensurate political power. However, we have already commented on Japan’s hesitancy to assume a regional leadership role and this may extend to the wider international community.7 It must also be noted that it usually takes
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time for ascendant nations to acquire relational and structural power in international relations, just as it takes time for declining nations to relinquish it (see Chapter 1). Furthermore, while Japan’s significant trade surplus position makes it an important global creditor, it also continues to be an obstacle to establishing cordial economic relations with its main international partners. This has been a recurrent theme in Japan’s economic relations with the EU. EU-Japan economic relations The analysis that follows examines both the sequential and thematic development of the EU-Japan economic relationship. We shall begin by exploring the pre-war origins of this relationship and how Japan posed its first competitive threat to the European industrial powers. Early post-war developments reveal the continuation of trade conflict as the underlying theme of Euro-Japanese economic relations which persisted until the 1980s. However, by the 1990s a more co-operative framework of relations had been established, brought on partly by the growth of Japanese FDI in Europe. Moreover, the Triadic context of the EU-Japan economic relationship had become increasingly relevant during the decade. This is also studied in some detail. Japan and Europe: the pre-war years Economic ties between Japan and Europe date back to the sixteenth century. Not long after the Jesuit order had established a base on Japanese soil in 1542, a growing number of Portuguese, Spanish and Dutch traders came to explore the commercial opportunities which Japan had to offer. However, by 1641 the new and isolationist Tokugawa regime had expelled virtually every European from its shores. Some 200 years later, Japan came under pressure from both the USA and a number of European countries to open up its markets for international trade. The Tokugawa regime was thus forced to sign new commercial treaties in 1858 and 1866 that obliged Japan to make substantial tariff concessions, consequently leading to a flood of Western imports entering the country. The inauguration of Meiji rule in 1868 produced a modernising and more outward-looking Japanese state whose expansionist aspirations would inevitably bring it into eventual conflict with Europe’s colonial powers in Asia. Along the way, though, Japan was to make alliances with certain European powers, most notably with Britain, that lasted from 1902 to 1923. Japan’s government and its companies were also eager to learn from Europe’s industrial and technological successes. It is with some irony, then, that Wilkinson observed: In the nineteenth century, Europeans regarded Japan as an exotic playground, the ultimate in sophisticated tourism, while the Japanese regarded Europe as a disciplined, group-oriented society possessing the secrets of industrial production. Today, it is the Japanese who flock to
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Europe for exotic tourism and it is the Europeans who increasingly regard Japan as a disciplined society with amazingly efficient industries. (Wilkinson 1983:154) By the 1930s, relations between Japan and Europe had somewhat soured. Japan’s colonial interests were increasingly perceived to challenge Europe’s own in Asia. Meanwhile, European countries continued to complain about Japan’s aggressive trade practices, such as the dumping of textile products in European markets, regular breaches of intellectual property rights and the maintenance of a highly protected domestic market. Yet by now Japan was a modern industrial state, confident of challenging the Western powers on their own terms. However, its attempt to realise this militarily was to end in an humiliating defeat by the Allies in World War II. Coming to terms (1945–68) In the early post-war years, European nations were wary of re-establishing trade links with Japan, not only on account of it being a former Axis power but also because of its pre-war neo-mercantilist policies. For its part, the US caretaker administration sought Japan’s re-assimilation into the international community as part of its reconstruction strategy for the country. Thus, the USA rigorously supported Japan’s 1952 application to GATT membership which it secured in 1955, although not without encountering some resistance. A British White Paper published earlier that year argued that Japan’s accession to the GATT would result in a bilateral trade war. Furthermore, fourteen incumbent GATT members, including the UK, Netherlands, France, and Belgium, refused Japan MFN status on its entry by invoking Article 35, allowing them to erect trade barriers against Japanese imports without compensation on the grounds of ‘injurious’ competition. There was indeed little doubt that Japan’s post-war ‘developmental state’ was adopting neo-mercantilist policies. Although Japan began to liberalise its tariff regime on GATT entry, it simultaneously enacted compensatory measures such as weakening its anti-trust laws and readjusting its import licensing scheme. At around the same time, Japan’s long-serving Prime Minister Ikeda (1960–69) initiated a foreign economic policy founded on promoting trilateralist cooperation between Japan, the USA and EEC.8 This policy was hampered by both European antagonism towards Japanese trading practices and, to a lesser degree, the debate among Japan’s ministries over what approach to economic diplomacy with West European countries would prove the most effective.9 Those agencies responsible for formulating and conducting Japan’s foreign economic policy eventually agreed that the country’s interests would be best served by exploiting European disunity and challenging the rationale of Europe’s discriminatory trade policies. Without a functional Common Commercial Policy (CCP), the EEC were vulnerable to Japan’s attempts to play off one member state against another. The trade negotiation ‘offensive’ of autumn 1962, whereby Japan sent high-level representatives from its ministries and other agencies
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(e.g. the Keidanren) on visits to major West European countries, was a key stage in this process. Rothacher (1983:132) comments that the initiative ‘was conceptually simple: to flood Europe with successive waves of polite, modest and well-briefed top politicians and business leaders’. The varied nature of EEC member state attitudes to trade policy (e.g. Germany and the Netherlands as free traders, France and Italy as protectionist) was also exploited to effect by Japanese ministerial officials.10 By 1964, Japan had succeeded in persuading all West European countries to grant it MFN status in return for what transpired as essentially symbolic safeguard clause agreements that had more political than economic significance.11 The manifest desire of the EEC member states to secure relative gains at ultimately the other’s expense and not the higher absolute gains potentially yielded from co-ordinated action towards Japan was to the continued frustration of the European Commission. Such action would have entailed a loss of sovereignty over national trade policy well before the EEC’s customs union arrangement came into operation. Most member states, especially traditional protectionists, were not yet willing to make this sacrifice. Thus, the Commission’s endeavours during 1963–4 to orchestrate a common trade policy,12 and hence a united front against Japan, ended in failure. In the meantime, on an individual and collective basis, European countries had to come to terms with Japan’s growing international stature both economically and through its integration into global power structures. Japan’s attaining of OECD membership in July 1963 and its ascendance as a major contracting party within the Dillon and Kennedy Rounds of GATT were clear demonstrations of this. By the mid-1960s, Japan also began to view the EEC as less formidable than initially perceived as a result of its revealed lack of unity. France’s withdrawal from Community proceedings over 1965–6 and the UK’s failure to accede in both 1961 and 1967 only served to reinforce this belief. During the early post-war period, the EEC continued to represent a minor trade partner for Japan, accounting for only 3.2 per cent of its total trade in 1956 and 2.0 per cent in 1964, although this rose to 5.9 per cent in 1968 (Table 4.1).13 The UK was Japan’s most important trade partner in Europe up until the late 1960s, then overtaken by Germany which was the only EEC country not to sustain trade deficits with Japan by this time. The Community as a whole has run continuous trade deficits with Japan since 196814 and these began to expand rapidly, rising from $78m in the aforementioned year to $309m in 1970, $1,344m in 1972 and to $3,615m by 1976. It is worth noting that the EEC’s trade balance with the rest of the world was in surplus during most of these years. The EEC’s worsening trade position with Japan constituted, both in industrial and diplomatic terms, a belated recognition by the major European powers of Japan’s economic significance and the challenges that lay therein. It also led to the reluctant and haphazard development of a common EEC policy towards Japan up to this point, although the Community’s incomplete customs union arrangement naturally impeded this development. Moreover, Nester (1993) argued that Japan’s threat to West Europe over the period was perceived more as geopolitical than geoeconomic. Significant concern existed regarding Japan’s
Notes: 1 Comprises ASEAN10 and Taiwan. 2 Central and Eastern Europe, excludes former Yugoslavia. 3 Includes the Caribbean states.
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, various editions
Table 4.1 Geographic breakdown of Japan’s international trade (percentage per trade partner, 1960–97)
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neutrality and its possible future alignment with China, and the effect this would have on the Cold War balance of power. Japan and ‘One Europe’ (1969–90)? The completion of the EEC (hereafter referred to as EC) customs union arrangement in July 1968 formally established a CCP between member states, requiring them to adopt the EC’s common external tariff on third country imports.15 In theory, the CCP strengthened the Commission’s executive powers over managing EC external trade policy. This was soon tested at the first official EC-Japan level trade negotiations which began in 1970. In the talks, the Commission resisted Japanese pressure to resolve the growing number of trade disputes that had arisen between them through GATT’s mechanisms and procedures. Instead, the Commission pressed for assurances from Japan that certain administrative and other non-tariff barriers (NTBs) be removed. These demands were similarly resisted by Japan which furthermore had no incentive to comply to EC-wide agreements given the proven success of its ‘divide and conquer’ strategy. It therefore proceeded to confound the Commission’s endeavours by still consorting with a multiplicity of European agencies, such as industry groups, member state governments and national antitrust groups in addition to EC external trade representatives. Indeed, during the first EC-Japan trade negotiations, the Commission’s stance was undermined by the insistence of France and the Benelux countries on maintaining their own bilateral safeguard clauses against Japanese imports. From the early 1970s onwards, EC-Japan economic diplomacy also began to be conducted more at a corporate level. Europe’s industry groups were by this time aware of the concentrated market penetrations that Japanese producers were making in certain industrial sectors, such as consumer electronics, cars, motorcycles, ships and steel (Shepherd 1982; Ishikawa 1990). In October 1971, Keidanren representatives met with European business leaders to discuss the application of voluntary export restraints (VERs) on those Japanese imports deemed to have the most injurious effects on European industry. These measures were favoured by Japanese business as these conferred some voice and representation on European protectionist decisions and actions taken. Moreover, by shortening their supply to European markets, it also enabled them to exact higher economic rents from European consumers due to the relatively low price elasticity of demand enjoyed by many Japanese imports. A year later, the first VER on Japanese consumer electronics imports was negotiated between some European countries and Japan. Others were to follow on various products, the most profiled of which was on automobiles. In the context of Japan’s growing trade surplus with Europe and the stagflatory conditions caused by the 1973–4 oil crisis, EC member states began to exert their demands in unison. On his visit to Europe in October 1976, Toshio Doko, President of the Keidanren, met with consistent and similar calls for Japan to open its markets to foreign competition.16 Encouraged by this development, the Commission sought to take bolder initiatives. At the Tokyo Round negotiations
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of GATT, it took a much tougher stance against Japan on a range of issues (Kudo 1994). In February 1977, and without prior consultation with the Japanese government, the first EC anti-dumping duty (ADD) was applied on a Japanese import (ball bearings). A number of others followed: acrylic fibres, saccharin and stereo cassette heads in 1979; automobiles, numerically controlled machine tools and colour televisions in 1981; cathode ray tubes, light commercial vehicles, quartz watches; hi-fi equipment, fork lift trucks and video cassette recorders over 1982–3; electronic typewriters in 1985.17 Over 1983 to 1989, the EC investigated a total of twenty-two anti-dumping cases against Japanese imports with seventeen leading to the application of ADDs, the highest number for any EC trading partner over the period. During the late 1970s, the Japanese government became increasingly weary of the EC’s defensive, protectionist stance. In his visit to Brussels in October 1978, Prime Minister Fukuda expressed his regret over the poor state of ECJapan relations. This did nothing to induce a more conciliatory approach from the Community. In March 1979, the EC’s Commissioner for external relations, Wilhelm Haferkamp, stated that ‘Japan has a special responsibility towards her trading partners to eliminate or lower existent restrictions. And we do not like the idea of negotiating every year with the same list of specific complaints.’ Such blunt language was just the harbinger of worse to come. In an addendum to the original text of a Commission working paper it was commented: Japan’s trade expansion was due to hard work, discipline, corporate loyalties, and management skills of a crowded, highly competitive island people only recently emerged from a feudal past, a country of workaholics who live in what Westerners regard as little more than rabbit hutches…There is as much propensity to import as there would be carnival spirit on a rainy Sunday morning in Glasgow…Japanese exporters operate like soldiers venturing out from a fortress, and create havoc in concentrated areas of industry in the Community with major regional unemployment problems. (CEC 1979) This marked the nadir of EU-Japan economic diplomacy. The Commission formally apologised over this statement,18 although the document’s main text was a critique of Japan’s neo-mercantilist policies and called for the EC to adopt a tough stance in future trade negotiations. The uproar caused in Japan only served to unite the nation to reciprocate in kind. In January 1980, MITI announced that Japan’s automobile producers were to increase production by 10 per cent with similar targets set for consumer electronics and the subsequent offensives on European markets. Once more in its endeavour to pre-empt separate policies being conducted by individual EC member states, the Commission constructed a four-point common policy, subsequently approved by the Council of Ministers in November 1980, which proposed that: VERs should be uniform as possible throughout the Community; a stronger yen was required to reflect more accurately Japan’s
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economic strength; various NTBs protecting Japanese markets should be removed; and the EC’s right to similar treatment afforded by Japan to the USA should be upheld. However, EC member states continued to insist upon bilateral trade policy actions against Japanese imports, the most famous example being the French government’s decision in 1983 to route all imported video cassette recorders through a small customs office at Poitiers, staffed by only eight people.19 The Commission’s 1980 policy plan nevertheless enabled it to stake further ground in conducting the EC’s trade relations with Japan. In February 1983, a Commission delegation visited Tokyo to commence negotiations that were to lead to the first EC-level VERs being applied on Japanese imports later that year.20 At the politico-institutional level, the EC’s troika foreign ministerial meetings with the Japanese also began, albeit in an ad hoc manner, in March 1983, although these were actually suspended over 1986–90 owing to Japan’s internal political problems. The increasingly higher profile of the Commission in EU-Japan economic diplomacy coincided with a more cordial environment of relations evolving between the two powers as the 1980s progressed.21 Various bilateral and global factors could be attributed to this, including the end of the early 1980s’ world recession which helped ease international relations between the developed nations in general, while a further framework for dialogue and policy co-ordination was established within the Plaza Accord agreement signed at the historic G7 meeting in 1985. At the meeting, Japan agreed to revalue the yen in an attempt to depress its substantial trade surpluses22 held against both Triad partners. Although Japan’s tariff regime was notably liberal,23 it also resolved to make more convincing and proactive efforts to open up its own markets to imports,24 largely at the behest of the US ‘market-oriented, sector-specific’ (MOSS) negotiations of the mid-1980s and the economy-wide ‘Structural Impediments Initiative’ (SII) of 1989–90 (Tyson 1995). The EC also adopted a more concessionary approach with the number of nationally imposed quantitative restrictions (QRs) on Japanese imports falling from 466 in 1962 to 113 by 1989.25 Another 42 restrictions were removed by March that year in negotiations orchestrated by the Commission as a response to engender a more open trade environment between them.26 EC-Japan relations were further enhanced by the initially favourable view that Japan took towards the EC’s Single European Act (SEA) of 1986 and its blueprint for creating the Single European Market (SEM). Envisaging the potential opportunities which the SEM presented for ‘insider’ firms, the SEA precipitated a huge surge of Japanese direct investment into Europe during the latter 1980s. However, there was simultaneous concern about the SEM’s potential to induce autarkic behaviour from the Community that led to mounting fears of a ‘Fortress Europe’ emerging as the Single Market coalesced. Furthermore, Japan acknowledged that the SEM would inevitably commit EC member states to conduct a more integral CCP, and hence increase the Community’s weight within the international economic system. As we discuss later, deepening European integration and the influx of Japanese firms into the EC were significantly to recast the bargaining structure of EC-Japan economic diplomacy.
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Around this time, the Community’s trade deficit with Japan began to stabilise, with EC exports to Japan actually increasing almost 50 per cent faster than Japanese exports to Community markets in 1988 (Figure 4.2). In preparations made for the SEM programme, the Commission announced its intentions to substitute national level QRs with Community-based measures but that ‘these measures would not result in a higher level of protection than exists at present’ (CEC 1988). A similar arrangement was made for VERs on Japanese automobile imports whereby bilateral measures that had been separately applied by France, Spain, Italy, Portugal and the UK were replaced with an EC-level equivalent.27 Slower Japanese export growth to the Community could at this point be partly ascribed to the trade-displacing effects of rapid Japanese FDI growth in Europe. However, the arrival of increasing numbers of Japanese multinationals within the Community gave rise to other concerns. Some saw the strategy as a means to circumvent protectionist measures imposed upon them by installing low value-added ‘screwdriver’ assembly plants within the European market. The first so-called ‘screwdriver’ regulations were introduced by the Commission in 1987, which enabled ADDs to be deployed on foreign imports now produced in the Community that once previously attracted ADDs. Related and associated products could also be targeted for similar treatment in accordance with stated criteria, while local content rules applied the same measures against lower valueadded foreign assembly plants. Under the general rules of this regulation, foreign assembly plants were obliged to acquire at least 40 per cent of their materials and components from domestic EC sources. Earlier investigations had revealed that the effective local content found in some Japanese assembly plants varied from 4 per cent to 25 per cent, and in one case the only local materials used was the
Figure 4.2 EU-Japan merchandise trade (1975–97) Source: Eurostat.
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packaging for electronic typewriters. The regulations were first invoked in July 1987 against Japanese ball-bearing producers. When a string of other cases followed,28 Japan made a formal complaint to GATT on account that they contravened the ‘national treatment’ principle of Article 3, while also negating the Anti-Dumping Code procedures of Article 6.29 In March 1990, a GATT panel upheld Japan’s complaint and the Commission had to adjust its policies accordingly. Further consternation for the Japanese was caused by the EC’s new emphasis on ‘reciprocity’, which became a guiding principle of the CCP during the latter 1980s. At the start of the GATT’s Uruguay Round talks, the European Commission President Willy de Clerq stated: The Community feels that many of the present tensions affecting world trade find their origin in the fact that concessions negotiated between the various contracting parties have in reality not resulted in effective reciprocity. It is therefore essential that the Ministerial Declaration should establish the objective of achieving a genuine balance in the benefits accruing to contracting parties from the GATT. (CEC 1986:15) At the European Council meeting at Rhodes in 1988 the reciprocity principle was more euphemistically defined as one being founded on a ‘balance of mutual advantages’ (CEC 1988). Put alternatively, guarantees of similar or at least nondiscriminatory opportunities for EC firms in foreign markets would be sought that approximated those benefits which foreign firms enjoyed in EC markets. This had particular reference to the anticipated gains that a harmonised European marketplace would not only bestow upon EC companies but also their non-EC rivals, especially those foreign multinationals operating as ‘insiders’. Thus, the SEM programme’s associated ‘reciprocity’ directives in banking,30 capital movements and public procurement caused particular concern to Japanese companies and their US counterparts. In an evaluative analysis of EU-Japan economic diplomacy over this period, a number of points should be made. For Hosoya (1979), the trials and tribulations experienced during the 1970s were indicative of a ‘perception gap’: the EC saw its trade deficit with Japan as a political problem, whereas Japan viewed the situation in economic terms. The EC’s position was essentially defensive in that it attempted to repress the impact of Japan’s expanding competitive advantages rather than finding positive solutions to enhance Europe’s own. However, European frustrations could also be attributed to Japanese passivity, especially regarding the slowness with which Japan implemented the provisions of commercial agreements signed with the EC. This apparent bureaucratic prevarication has been excused on the grounds of the Japanese consensual approach to decision-making. Hanabusa (1979) also notes how this explains Japan’s passivity with regard to taking the initiative in international economic affairs. For Yamane (1990), it was the perception of Japan’s ‘insular expansion’
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which was at the root of European hostility at this time. In analysing the 1980s, Woolcock and Yamane (1993) contended that discord in EU-Japan economic relations mainly originated from different perceptions over the fundamental ‘rules of the game’. They argued that EU’s position continued to be based on equivalent competitive opportunities for both European and Japanese firms whereby bilateral protectionist measures are applied in those sectors possessing an imbalance against them, e.g. machinery, electrical products, automobiles. For the Japanese, the apparent demise of Europe’s industrial prowess during the 1970s was symptomatic of eikokubyo: the economics of decline and Great Power decadence that derives from labour troubles, productivity lags and cumulative economic rigidities. In a comparative historical analysis, Masaru (1986) drew similarities between EC-Japan commercial disputes and the AngloGerman trade conflicts of the early twentieth century, where Britain’s relative economic decline was blamed on German industrial practices. Masaru argued that, like Britain, Europe as a whole faced its own ‘crisis of capitalism’ and was looking to attribute culpability to the commercial practices of an ascendant Japan. Although the USA was also suffering a chronic trade deficit with Japan, it was nevertheless seen as a more proximate industrial competitor owing to US perceived technological and entrepreneurial superiority over Europe. Given the proven success of its ‘divide and conquer’ economic diplomacy with the Community, Japan continued its efforts to polarise EC trade politics and was reluctant to negotiate at an EC level. This approach became increasingly untenable, especially after the signing of the SEA. The gradual implementation of the SEM programme from the late 1980s onwards not only necessitated third countries and their companies to think more in terms of ‘one Europe’, but also improved the relational and structural power of the EC in international economic affairs. The enhanced competence granted to the Commission by member states in the realm of EC external trade policy was an important part of the latter process. Although never utilised to effect, the ‘reciprocity’ principle was a demonstration of how the EC at least considered converting the SEM into political capital. According to Nuttall (1996:109), this was a significant missed opportunity at leveraging influence over Japanese trade negotiators, stating that ‘the Japanese would not have abandoned a strong position so easily, and took some convincing that the Europeans had’. As it transpired, the EC probably gained more from the externality effects of the MOSS and SII negotiations in terms of making Japan more generally compliant to eradicating its NTBs, although the bilateral market sharing deals which the negotiations yielded (e.g. semiconductors in 1986) would compromise EC manufacturers. EC-Japan economic diplomacy also benefited from the moderate shift from ‘low’ politics (bureaucratic-driven) to the ‘high’ politics (elected leader-driven) of G7 summits which, especially in the more favourable world economic conditions of the late 1980s, helped promote more amicable relations between the EC and Japan. Moreover, according to Bourke (1996) the bargaining structure of EC-Japan economic diplomacy was significantly recast by the escalation of Japanese FDI
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into Europe in the latter 1980s. This particularly related to how globalisation was creating new patterns of loyalty across national boundaries. Bourke contended that the growing number of Japanese firms ensconced within the EC led to a ‘commercial symbiosis’ between themselves and sub-state or nonstate actors in Europe. These included regional authorities which had attracted Japanese investment and subcontracted firms that had been incorporated into the European-based production networks of ‘insider’ Japanese firms. This development gave both a more direct stake in the economic diplomacy process and furthermore made them a potential ally of Japan in commercial negotiations with the European Commission, giving rise to what Bourke refers to as ‘internalised co-operative tension’.31 Gradually, EC member states began to acknowledge the net advantages of hosting Japanese FDI, in terms of improved domestic competitiveness (e.g. from infused Japanese production and management techniques, technology transfers, etc.), employment creation and new capital formation. Perhaps not surprisingly, the UK led the way since it attracted around 40 per cent of inward Japanese FDI into the EC. These new Anglo-Japanese commercial links were to make the UK a valuable advocate of Japan within Europe.32 As Nuttall (1996) observed, this was to have a significant effect on Community opinion during the late 1980s, with especially more liberal-minded member state governments such as Germany and the Netherlands adopting a more positive and less confrontational attitude towards Japan. Although divisions between member states persisted over what approach EC economic diplomacy with Japan should take, there was now a clearer consensus for more co-operative relations to be nurtured with the Japanese. Towards trilateralism (1991 to present) At the beginning of the 1990s, the international community stood at an important geopolitical and geoeconomic crossroads. The Cold War was thawing, Europe was on the verge of creating its single market and Japan had become the world’s most important creditor nation. While the USA was seen to have won the ideological contest with communism, it simultaneously faced a more direct challenge to its economic hegemony from its Triadic counterparts. Furthermore, globalisation was blurring the demarcations of territorial-based loyalties across the Triad powers and requiring closer trilateral co-operation on a wider range of issues. This sets the general context of EUJapan economic relations during the 1990s. In theory, the greater geoeconomic weight now afforded to the EU and Japan and associated structural changes to the international economic system had created new opportunities for these relations to develop beyond an agenda dominated by commercial conflicts.33 As we shall later discuss, while closer dialogue and co-operation were consequently to emerge between the two powers, the USA continues to play the pivotal role in Triadic relations. Moreover, the persistent problem of advancing the EU-Japan relationship beyond the unidimensional realm of
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commercial issues34 has somewhat impeded the development of economic relations themselves for reasons we shall analysis below. A closer economic partnership? We should begin, though, by considering the important steps forward which have been made during the 1990s in developing closer EU-Japan dialogue and co-operation. In July 1991, both powers signed the landmark EC-Japan Declaration which was partly modelled on the previous year’s EC-US transatlantic equivalent.35 Notwithstanding new ideas on how to enhance ECJapan relations, for example, on conferring a higher priority to political dialogue and promoting both industrial co-operation and cultural exchange, commercial issues dominated both the content of the agreement and subsequent outcomes. The European Commission was keen to emphasise the ‘equitable access’ aspect of the Declaration with its objective of seeking to eradicate any structural impediments to trade, thus echoing old demands. Those impediments especially highlighted were: • the keiretsu business groups whose interlocking corporate relationships reduce the scope for foreign competition; • an ineffective competition policy that overlooks the potential and