European Integration and the Cold War
Post-war Europe was deeply affected by both the Cold War and European integratio...
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European Integration and the Cold War
Post-war Europe was deeply affected by both the Cold War and European integration. All too often the two processes have been studied entirely separately, however. This edited volume therefore brings together contributions from prominent historians in both of these fields. What emerges is the way in which the East–West conflict and the emergence of organised cooperation in Europe did become entangled with one another, despite the attempts of some governments deliberately to avoid any interplay between the two. The period covered is one of major change in Western Europe involving both de Gaulle’s rebellion against the structures of Atlantic and European cooperation and Brandt’s radical new Ostpolitik. It was also a time when the British debate about how to define their world role involved calculations about both their approach to NATO and the EEC. From 1969 onward these changes had also to be carried out against the backdrop of the American foreign policy of Nixon and Kissinger. This book will appeal to students of Cold War history, European politics and history, and International Relations in general. N. Piers Ludlow is a senior lecturer in the Department of International History at the LSE. He is author of Dealing With Britain: the Six and the First UK Application to the EEC (1997) and The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s (2006).
Cold War history series Series editors: Odd Arne Westad and Michael Cox ISSN: 1471-3829
In the new history of the Cold War that has been forming since 1989, many of the established truths about the international conflict that shaped the latter half of the twentieth century have come up for revision. The present series is an attempt to make available interpretations and materials that will help further the development of this new history, and it will concentrate in particular on publishing expositions of key historical issues and critical surveys of newly available sources. 1 Reviewing the Cold War Approaches, interpretations, and theory Edited by Odd Arne Westad 2 Rethinking Theory and History in the Cold War Richard Saull 3 British and American Anticommunism before the Cold War Marrku Ruotsila 4 Europe, Cold War and Co-existence, 1953–1965 Edited by Wilfred Loth 5 The Last Decade of the Cold War From conflict escalation to conflict transformation Edited by Olav Njølstad 6 Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War Issues, interpretations, periodizations Edited by Silvio Pons and Federico Romero 7 Across the Blocs Cold War cultural and social history Edited by Rana Mitter and Patrick Major
8 US Paramilitary Assistance to South Vietnam Insurgency, subversion and public order William Rosenau 9 The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s Negotiating the Gaullist challenge N. Piers Ludlow 10 Soviet–Vietnam Relations and the Role of China 1949–64 Changing alliances Mari Olsen 11 The Third Indochina War Conflict between China, Vietnam and Cambodia, 1972–79 Edited by Odd Arne Westad and Sophie Quinn-Judge 12 Greece and the Cold War Frontline state, 1952–1967 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou 13 Economic Statecraft during the Cold War European responses to the US trade embargo Frank Cain 14 Macmillan, Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis, 1958–1960 Kitty Newman 15 The Emergence of Détente in Europe Brandt, Kennedy and the formation of Ostpolitik Arne Hofmann 16 European Integration and the Cold War Ostpolitik–Westpolitik, 1965–1973 Edited by N. Piers Ludlow
European Integration and the Cold War Ostpolitik–Westpolitik, 1965–1973
Edited by N. Piers Ludlow
First published 2007 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” © 2007 N. Piers Ludlow for selection and editorial matter; individual chapters, the contributors All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data European integration and the Cold War : Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, 1965–1973/edited by N. Piers Ludlow. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. 1. Europe–Military policy. 2. European cooperation–History–20th century. 3. European federation–History–20th century. 4. Detente. 5. Cold War. I. Ludlow, N. Piers, 1968– UA646.E92349 2007 327.4009'046–dc22 2006035816 ISBN 0-203-08897-2 Master e-book ISBN ISBN10: 0-415-42109-8 (hbk) ISBN10: 0-203-08897-2 (ebk) ISBN13: 978-0-415-42109-6 (hbk) ISBN13: 978-0-203-08897-5 (ebk)
Contents
Notes on contributors Acknowledgements List of abbreviations
ix x xi
Introduction
1
PIERS LUDLOW
1
The linkage between European integration and détente: the contrasting approaches of de Gaulle and Pompidou, 1965 to 1974
11
GEORGES-HENRI SOUTOU
2
‘Grandeur et dépendances’: the dilemmas of Gaullist foreign policy, September 1967 to April 1968
36
GARRET MARTIN
3
Détente and European integration in the policies of Willy Brandt and Georges Pompidou
53
WILFRIED LOTH
4
New Ostpolitik and European integration: concepts and policies in the Brandt era
67
ANDREAS WILKENS
5
Anglo-French relations, détente and Britain’s second application for membership of the EEC, 1964 to 1967
81
HELEN PARR
6
Stabilising the West and looking to the East: Anglo-American relations, Europe and détente, 1965 to 1967 JAMES ELLISON
105
viii 7
Contents The Netherlands, the Gaullist challenge and the evolving Cold War, 1966 to 1973
128
JAN VAN DER HARST
8
An insulated Community? The Community institutions and the Cold War, 1965 to 1970
137
PIERS LUDLOW
9
Searching for a balance: the American perspective
152
JUSSI M. HANHIMÄKI
Conclusions
174
PIERS LUDLOW
Bibliography Index
180 190
Contributors
James Ellison is a senior lecturer at Queen Mary, University of London. His expertise centres on British foreign policy since 1945 and especially on Britain’s relations with both the United States and Western Europe. Jussi M. Hanhimäki is Professor of International History and Politics at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva. He has written widely about Cold War history, including a major new biography of Henry Kissinger. Jan van de Harst holds the Jean Monnet Chair in the History and Theory of European Integration at the University of Groningen. He is a member of the European Union Liaison Committee of Historians and has published widely on Dutch foreign policy, European integration history and the Cold War. Wilfried Loth is Professor of Modern and Contemporary History at the University of Duisberg-Essen. He is the Chair of the European Union Liaison Committee of Historians and has written extensively about the origins and development of European integration and about the Cold War. Piers Ludlow is a senior lecturer in the Department of International History at the London School of Economics. He is an expert on European integration history and on Western Europe during the Cold War. Garret Martin completed his Ph.D. on de Gaulle and the Cold War at the LSE in 2006. He is currently teaching in the Department of History at the University of Warwick. Helen Parr is a lecturer at the University of Keele. She has published a book and several articles on the question of Britain’s membership of the EEC. Georges-Henri Soutou is Professor of Contemporary History at the University of Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV) and a specialist in the international history of the twentieth century. He has published widely on the First World War, the Cold War, Franco-German relations and French foreign policy. Andreas Wilkens teaches at the University of Metz. He is a specialist on postwar German foreign policy. Franco-German relations and the history of European integration.
Acknowledgements
This volume is the outcome of a conference held at Pembroke College, Oxford in September 2004. This event was generously funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council as part of a larger grant awarded to the Department of International History at the LSE for the study of Cold War history. I would therefore like to thank the AHRC for its funding, my fellow award-holders in the Department for their encouragement and practical assistance, Pembroke College for the excellence of its hospitality, and each of the paper-givers for their efforts both during the conference itself and since. I am also grateful to those who participated in the conference without presenting a paper: Odd Arne Westad, Nigel Ashton, Steve Casey, Svetozar Rajak, Takeshi Yamamoto and Holger Nehring all added significantly to the event. I should also like to thank Andrew Humphrys at Routledge for his help in the preparation of the volume. And finally, I have as always received much encouragement, support and proofreading from Morwenna my wife. NPL Oxford, August 2006
Abbreviations
AAPD AdsD AN ANF AOT CAB CAP CDU CIA COREPER CSCE DDF DEA DGI EC ECHA ECSC EDC EEC EFTA ENF EPC EU FCO FDI FO FRG FRUS GATT GDR IMF KVP
Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bonn Archives Nationales, Paris Atlantic Nuclear Force Associated Overseas Territory Cabinet Files Common Agricultural Policy Christlich Demokratische Union Central Intelligence Agency Committee of Permanent Representatives Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Documents Diplomatiques Français Department of Economic Affairs Directorate General I European Community European Commission Historical Archives European Coal and Steel Community European Defence Community European Economic Community European Free Trade Association European nuclear force European political cooperation European Union Foreign and Commonwealth Office Foreign direct investment Foreign Office Federal Republic of Germany Foreign Relations of the United States General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade German Democratic Republic International Monetary Fund Katholieke Volkspartij
xii
Abbreviations
LBJL MAE MBFR MLF NA NAC NARA NATO NIE NPG NPMP NPT NSAM NSC NSF OEEC PNW PRC PREM SALT SDRs SF SPD TNA UN US USSR WEU
Lyndon Baines Johnson Library Ministère des Affaires etrangères, Paris Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Multilateral Force National Archive, The Hague North Atlantic Council National Archives and Record Administration, Maryland North Atlantic Treaty Organisation National Intelligence Estimate Nuclear Planning Group Nixon Presidential Materials Project Non-proliferation Treaty National Security Action Memorandum National Security Council National Security Files Organisation for European Economic Cooperation Prevention of Nuclear War agreement People’s Republic of China Prime Minister’s Files Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Special Drawing Rights Subject File Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands National Archives, London (formerly the PRO) United Nations United States of America Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Western European Union
Introduction Piers Ludlow
European integration and the Cold War have both played a significant role in shaping the evolution of Europe since the Second World War. Each, in their own different ways, did much to divide Europe and to unify it. The integration process has from the outset drawn a sharp dividing line between those countries which chose to participate in the ‘building of Europe’ and those which did not. It also created strong bonds, economic, political and institutional, between the six, then nine, ten, 12, 15 and now 27 countries which have been involved. Likewise the Cold War underlined not merely the sharp distinction between Eastern and Western Europe, between the communist and free worlds, but also a less clearcut but still important fracture between those European countries which belonged to one bloc or the other and those neutrals which remained detached from the East–West conflict. The Cold War too had a strong unifying effect, establishing lasting ties between the countries of each Cold War alliance and making much more solid and enduring the interconnections between Western Europe and the undisputed leader of the Western world, the United States. Both processes, moreover, were born, or at least institutionalised, in the same crucial five years immediately following the end of the Second World War. In addition, both were profoundly marked by many of the political heavyweights of the postwar period. Ernest Bevin, Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Charles de Gaulle, Paul-Henri Spaak, Dwight Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles or John F. Kennedy feature prominently in most accounts of both the integration of Europe and the development of Western Europe during the Cold War. Surprisingly, however, the history of each has tended to be studied and told with next to no reference to the other. Much has thus been written about Western Europe and the early Cold War,1 and an almost equal amount of ink has been spilled in attempts to analyse the origins and early development of the European integration process.2 But these two historiographies have tended to develop in parallel with few obvious points of intersection. Cold War historians have thus focused their attention on a narrative which stretches from the establishment of the blocs in the 1940s, through the high tension and confrontation of the 1950s and early 1960s, the détente of the later 1960s and 1970s, the ‘second Cold War’ of the early 1980s and the final collapse of the Cold War system and of the Soviet bloc in 1989 to 1990. Historians of European integration
2
P. Ludlow
meanwhile have refined a story in which the frustrated hopes of those aspiring to European unity in the 1940s were partially realised in the early 1950s, hard hit by the collapse of the putative European Defence Community (EDC) in 1954, dramatically revived in 1955 with the Messina Conference and the start of the negotiations which were to lead to the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC), consolidated by the Community’s early success, depressed by the stagnation of the process during the 1970s and early 1980s, and revived once more by the renewed surge forward of the integration process in the midto late 1980s. These twin tales, moreover, have been expounded, debated and critiqued in different journals and at different conferences.3 And they have been introduced to students in simplified form in separate textbooks designed for separate university courses.4 There are admittedly some partial exceptions to this rule. The most obvious, perhaps, is constituted by some of the writing on the late 1940s and early 1950s. Analysts of the Marshall Plan, for instance, have been able to point out that the European Recovery Programme was not simply a Cold War milestone and a crucial step towards the formation of a solidly Western US-led bloc, but also a policy initiative intended by its creators to foster European unity and to encourage the economic integration of Western Europe.5 Likewise, studies of the EDC have seldom been able to ignore its Cold War origins – it was born in response to the outbreak of the Korean War and the increased urgency which this gave to the issue of whether or not West Germany should be allowed to rearm – or to overlook the enormous energy with which the United States championed the project as both a crucial step towards strengthening Western Europe’s defences against the Soviet threat and as major advance in the direction of that European unity for which the US had called since 1947.6 Revealingly, however, both of these examples of Cold War and integration cross-over are normally regarded as failures. Thus most European historians, at least, would view the Marshall Plan as a major economic success and as vital in establishing the Western bloc, but as something of a flop as far as European unity is concerned. US attempts to force the recipients of Marshall Aid to submit a single pan-European wish-list rather than multiple national requests or to accept the appointment of a heavyweight secretary general of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), able to bang heads together and oblige the different countries to cooperate, were systematically thwarted by European resistance.7 Over time the Marshall Plan thus did more to cement bilateral links between Washington and each of the major European capitals than it did to nurture multilateral European cooperation. And the institutions that were born out of the Marshall Plan – notably the OEEC – came to be regarded by many of those responsible for establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) or the EEC as examples of how not to integrate and as the archetype of ineffective intergovernmental structures doomed to paralysis.8 Similarly, the EDC became European integration’s most celebrated failure – the project that momentarily threatened to bury the whole endeavour.9 Here too, therefore, enthusiastic American backing seemed to have been in vain and possibly even counter-productive. Dulles’ celebrated
Introduction
3
threat that the rejection of the EDC might trigger ‘an agonising reappraisal’ of the US commitment to Europe proved totally futile, with French parliamentarians choosing to call his bluff and vote down the ambitious treaty in August 1954. Overall, therefore, even the two main exceptions to the normally separate narratives of integration and the Cold War in Europe seem only to justify the normal detachment between the two fields. For on the rare occasions where the two did interconnect, Cold War-inspired US pressure led the integration process astray and failed to have a lasting impact. European integration, the implication seems to be, has worked only when it has been carried out by Europeans for European reasons rather than when it has been foisted upon Western Europe by a well-meaning but over-enthusiastic superpower. The gulf between the two fields has only been increased by recent trends in the historiography of both European integration history and Cold War history. The former, for instance, has been deeply marked by the emphasis placed by Alan Milward and his followers on the economic causes of the integration process. The notion that ECSC was the product of a particular crisis in the French steel industry, or that the EEC constituted a Dutch-inspired attempt to rescue the European nation state by consolidating and making irreversible the intra-European trade boom of the 1950s, left little space for Cold War considerations.10 The ‘Cold War’ indeed does not register in the index of either of Milward’s influential two volumes on the origins of European integration.11 Likewise, the proliferation of detailed, archivally based studies of each individual country’s path to the EEC has also tended to lessen the emphasis on the Cold War as a motivation. For the central figures of many of these new studies have been national civil servants, often based in either economic ministries or those portions of the foreign ministry most concerned with commercial affairs, who were much less involved professionally with the parallel evolution of the Cold War than were the statesmen and parliamentarians who populated earlier, less detailed accounts of integration’s origins.12 Cold War historians, meanwhile, have responded in kind. Over the past two decades there has been a fairly systematic attempt to demonstrate that the Western European powers did matter in a Cold War context and that events were not entirely determined by the superpowers.13 But much of this emphasis on the power or even tyranny of the weak has concentrated on the way individual European states were able to manipulate and use Washington to their own ends.14 The emphasis has thus been bilateral and transatlantic rather than multilateral and pan-European. With a few honourable exceptions, neither ‘new Cold War history’ nor the most recent writings of integration experts have broken the pattern described above; many of its products have if anything made the separation more acute.15 This volume and the conference at Pembroke College, Oxford out of which it emerged were designed to examine these parallel histories and to begin to assess whether or not their lack of interconnection was justified. Those invited to participate were historians who had shown interest in either Cold War history or European integration history or occasionally both. Indeed, several of those who attended belonged to that comparatively rare breed of scholar who had published
4
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about both fields, although revealingly even they had most often done so in different volumes and in different articles rather than in single works.16 The players on which they concentrated – France, West Germany, Britain, the Netherlands, the United States and the Community institutions – were those deemed most likely to have played significant roles in both the Cold War and the European integration process. And the period upon which they were invited to focus – the second half of the 1960s and the early 1970s – was one of some importance to both the development of European integration and the Cold War, but equally one where the interconnections between the two fields had not previously been explored. It therefore constitutes a good testing ground for the hypothesis that the separation between Cold War and European integration history described above was artificial and too extreme. The 1960s were an important period in the development of Western Europe. Economically, the period was one during which the Continent’s remarkable post-war rise seemed to continue.17 There were a few minor interruptions, and the relatively sluggish British economy went on defying the wider trend. Overall, however, the period was one of high growth rates, booming exports, minimal unemployment and controllable inflation – a performance that did much to cement in the minds of Western European policy-makers and citizens an equation between European integration and economic success that would be largely absent from those countries such as Britain that were only to join the EEC in 1973, the very year when the economic bubble burst. Politically, meanwhile, the gradual rise of the political left after the dominance across Western Europe of the centre-right during the 1950s seemed to be occurring in a controlled and unthreatening manner – until 1968 at least. And in international terms, the rapid liquidation in the early 1960s of Western Europe’s remaining colonial empires meant that Britain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands no longer found themselves besieged by world opinion and liable to criticism even from their superpower ally about their imperial policies in the way that had been the case throughout the latter half of the 1950s. The speed and dignity with which each power left its former Asian, African and Caribbean holdings varied significantly – but in all of the European colonial powers the sense of relief at the end of empire seemed to outweigh any regret for diminished international influence. Indeed, Gaullist France was probably not unique in believing that it could operate more effectively on the world stage after it had lost its empire than it had been able to when it still ruled directly over significant portions of Africa and South-East Asia.18 Western Europe’s renewed self-confidence – fuelled by its economic success and facilitated by colonial disengagement – did not however correspond to increased centrality to global affairs. From a Cold War history perspective the 1960s are the decade when the centre of gravity of Cold War confrontation shifted most decisively away from Europe and towards the Third World. This reflected the fact that, while the European status quo was comparatively stable – Trachtenberg talks of a European settlement having been reached by 196319 – the battle over the international alignment of the newly independent states of
Introduction
5
Asia and Africa had only just been joined.20 The way in which headlines and news reports about the situation in Vietnam or the state of Sino-Soviet relations had all but replaced bulletins from Berlin or anxious speculation about the fate of Trieste as the main daily reminders of the ongoing Cold War accurately symbolised the change. Likewise, the manner in which the one clear Cold War crisis which did occur in Europe in the latter half of the 1960s – the crushing of the Prague Spring in August 1968 – was not allowed by either East or West to interrupt more than momentarily the slow progress of détente, demonstrates the extent to which each bloc had accepted, de facto if not de jure, the presence and the geographical limits of the other.21 To a large extent this stabilisation of the European Cold War front was good news for Western Europe. The fading fear of Soviet invasion or subversion certainly contributed to that sense of growing confidence and well-being noted above. But it also significantly reduced the pressure on each European country to march in tight formation behind the United States as far as their international policy was concerned. By the mid-1960s not only had the countries of Western Europe long since rid themselves of that financial dependence on the US which had characterised the early Cold War but they were also self-confident enough to feel that they could each devise their own distinctive approach to East–West relations.22 This allowed the diversity of national approaches which will be analysed in the chapters that follow. And it also carried with it the potential that disagreements over Cold War policy could spill over and interconnect with that other key area of intercourse between European countries, namely the development of the EEC. Dissension in NATO might, in other words, contaminate the successful process of European integration, thereby endangering Western cooperation over much more than just military or security matters. The opening two chapters of the volume focus on France – the first Western country to break ranks significantly in its approach to the Cold War. GeorgesHenri Soutou thus sets out to contrast the European and Cold War policies of the two French Presidents to occupy the Elysée during the 1965 to 1973 period, namely Charles de Gaulle and Georges Pompidou. Both Presidents were supposedly Gaullist. Pompidou indeed won the 1969 elections partly by presenting himself as the candidate of continuity after de Gaulle’s surprise resignation earlier that year.23 But as Soutou demonstrates, each had very different approaches to the Cold War, to European integration and to the interconnections between the two. Thus while de Gaulle’s whole strategy centred upon a belief that the Cold War division of Europe could be overcome and that the Soviet Union (or Russia as he preferred to call it) could be reintegrated into a pan-European system, Pompidou’s vision was much more cautious as far as East–West relations were concerned. This underlying strategic gulf meant that each then turned towards greater Western European cooperation (although neither liked integration as such) in radically different circumstances. For de Gaulle it was a fall-back option to be explored most energetically when the prospects for détente were least encouraging – as they were in the early 1960s. For Pompidou, by contrast, Western European cooperation became most attractive in the latter
6 P. Ludlow half of his presidency when détente appeared to be in danger of advancing too far too fast. Closer European cooperation might give France some degree of control over Germany’s Eastern policies and somewhat lessen the danger of a superpower condominium over Europe. Garret Martin’s chapter, by contrast, adopts a rather different approach. For instead of looking at how French policy developed over the whole of the period, he focuses in some detail on one crucial eight-month period, from September 1967 to April 1968. This allows him to prove how tightly entwined were the different strands of French foreign policy. Thus the mounting frustrations of French Eastern policy – which were ever more apparent during these months despite the seeming success of de Gaulle’s state visit to Poland – were closely connected to France’s growing isolation vis-à-vis its Western partners. And this last was in turn accentuated by the way in which the French struggled to rally Germany and the other EEC member states to its side in the ongoing debate about how global monetary cooperation should be organised, while at the very same time seeking to defy those same Community partners by blocking the widely supported British bid for EEC membership. While Soutou explores the linkages between the Cold War and European integration at the level of overall French strategy, Martin thus reveals the ways in which the two fields could become entangled at a tactical level. In Chapters 3 and 4 the focus shifts to West Germany. The Federal Republic had, for understandable reasons, been the most orthodox and reliable ally throughout most of the early Cold War years. Both its approach to East–West relations and its engagement with European integration had been everything that the United States could have wished for during all but the last few months of the lengthy period when Konrad Adenuaer remained Chancellor. Indeed, if misunderstandings or mistrust did arise between Washington and Bonn in this era, it was normally because Adenuaer’s government proved itself plus royaliste que le roi in its steadfastness towards the East and its enthusiasm for cooperation with the West!24 And even Adenuaer’s brief final flirtation with de Gaulle, which did ring alarm bells in Washington and cast momentary doubt over West Germany’s reliability, seemed to have been decisively ended by Adenauer’s successor, the ultra-loyal Atlanticist Ludwig Erhard.25 Much was to change, however, with the rise of Willy Brandt, initially as Foreign Minister of the Grand Coalition government which ruled the FRG from 1966 to 1969 and then, from September 1969, as Chancellor of a centre-left government. Both chapters on Germany thus centre their attention on the Brandt years. The chapter by Wilfried Loth focuses on the crucial relationship between the new German Chancellor and his French opposite number. Theirs was not a particularly easy relationship: the Brandt-Pompidou pairing has not been treated with the same sort of retrospective reverence in the burgeoning literature on le couple franco-allemand as de Gaulle and Adenauer, Helmut Schmidt and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing or François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl.26 As Loth shows, however, they did make an effort to find areas where the two countries could cooperate closely and were not totally without their successes. Importantly for
Introduction
7
this volume their dialogue encompassed both the evolving pattern of East–West relations and the question of how the early successes of the EEC could be built upon. Much of their attention was therefore directed towards the possibility of building a more political Europe, one able to assert itself more clearly from the United States over foreign policy matters in general and the direction of détente in particular. Ironically, though, these discussions emphasised the extent to which Germany and France had swapped positions by the late 1960s and early 1970s. In the Brandt era it was thus Germany that put forward the radical ideas as much about transatlantic relations as about the approach to Eastern Europe, while it was France that played the role of conservative brake on a partner prone to over-ambition. Germany’s radicalism is explored still further in Andreas Wilkens’ chapter. This traces the development of Ostpolitik back to Brandt’s formative years as mayor of Berlin during the 1950s and early 1960s, before explaining how the new approach to Eastern Europe and to the German Democratic Republic was implemented when the Social Democrats became the dominant party of government in Germany in 1969. It also explores the extent to which Brandt’s new Eastern policy was rooted in the earlier success of the Federal Republic’s Westpolitik. On this Wilkens suggests some interesting divergences between the ideas of the Chancellor and those of his closest aide and collaborator, Egon Bahr. Chapters 5 and 6 on Britain both concentrate on the years when the United Kingdom found itself outside of the European Community but deeply preoccupied with the question of how to get in. Helen Parr confronts the vexed question of Community enlargement head-on in her chapter, identifying the reasons behind Harold Wilson’s belated conversion to the idea of European integration and elucidating how the Labour government hoped to avoid its bid to enter the EEC being thwarted by de Gaulle in much the same manner as Harold Macmillan’s 1961 membership application had been. Ultimately, of course, the French President did bar Britain’s path once more. However, as Parr explains, the General’s second veto turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory – a short-term success that actually revealed more about de Gaulle’s weakness than it did about his strength. En passant, Parr’s chapter also demonstrates that the question of EEC membership was one of the aspects of early European integration where the interconnections with the overarching Cold War were strongest and most clear. James Ellison’s chapter is somewhat more Cold War-centred in its focus, but again brings out the existence of links between the Cold War and the EEC. A study in Anglo-American relations, the piece investigates the way in which London and Washington coordinated their response to de Gaulle’s March 1966 decision to withdraw France from NATO’s integrated military command. Central to British and American strategies was their shared belief that Britain’s capacity to establish itself as a rival pole of attraction to France and thereby prevent the General’s actions from having the detrimental effects on Western unity which both London and Washington feared was tightly wrapped up with the UK’s attitude towards the EEC. The Wilson government’s realisation that it needed to revive the issue of British EEC membership and move the country
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closer to, and if possible into, the European Community was thus in part a response to the crisis in NATO and to the wider challenge posed by de Gaulle. Other aspects of the same basic strategy involved the resolution of the longstanding question of how to give Germany some in uence over Western nuclear strategy without allowing the Federal Republic to acquire nuclear weapons of its own, the settling of the acrimonious wrangle between the United States, Britain and Germany over the costs of allied troops stationed in Germany, and the public demonstration of NATO s commitment to the pursuit of d tente. The chapter hence underlines both the scale of the challenge which Gaullist France was deemed to pose to the West and the multifaceted nature of the AngloAmerican response. Jan van der Harst s contribution on Dutch foreign policy (Chapter 7) acts as a salutary reminder that in neither NATO nor the EEC did the larger countries have it entirely their own way. The Netherlands in particular emerged as a doughty adversary of General de Gaulle and a determined defender of Atlanticist orthodoxy. This re ected its profound belief that while European integration was economically vital to a small trading nation, Dutch security interests were much better looked after in a wider grouping including the United States and Britain than they would be in any rival European entity. The Hague government was thus strongly opposed to the premature development of a coordinated European foreign policy — in 1962 it had played a central role in blocking the socalled Fouchet Plan, de Gaulle s most systematic attempt to create such foreign policy coordination27 — and deeply suspicious of anything that might lessen the ties between Europe and the US. In an interesting illustration, however, of the potential in uence of public opinion and domestic political change over foreign policy, van der Harst explains how several of the certainties of 1960s Dutch foreign policy were overturned when the veteran foreign minister Joseph Luns was replaced in 1971 by Norbert Schmelzer. The Netherlands moderated, for instance, their hard-line stance towards d tente and became more supportive of the idea that the soon-to-be-enlarged European Community could acquire some involvement in the eld of foreign policy coordination. The presence of the British, after all, was believed likely to minimise the chances of any dangerous drift away from Atlantic alignment. As Piers Ludlow explains in Chapter 8, the Community institutions themselves remained somewhat detached from the Cold War and the question of East—West relations throughout the 1960s. Contacts were thus minimal between the European Commission and a Soviet bloc which still regarded the integration process as a vehicle for German revanchisme; the agenda of ministerial discussions in the EEC Council of Ministers involved little which directly impinged upon East—West relations; and there were both bureaucratic and tactical reasons militating against any real linkage between the EEC s development and the wider Cold War. Despite this, however, Ludlow maintains that there were a number of more indirect connections between the integration process and the East—West struggle. In particular, he argues that the whole environment within which the early Community was able to ourish was profoundly shaped by the
Introduction
9
Cold War alliance between Europe and the United States. As a result it is impossible fully to understand what went on in the Brussels institutions without being aware of parallel developments in the Cold War. Chapter 9 by Jussi Hanhimäki turns its attention to the United States. America’s importance in the calculations of all of the European players examined in the book is obvious, but as Hanhimäki reminds us, Washington was less centrally concerned with European affairs in the late 1960s and early 1970s than it had been a decade or so before. The salience of Western European affairs in American foreign policy had steadily diminished in a period where the key issues preoccupying US policy-makers were the protracted war in Vietnam, crises in the Middle East, and the exciting prospects of superpower détente and triangular diplomacy. By the end of the period reviewed, the Watergate scandal and the domestic failings of the Nixon administration constituted an additional distraction. The US did, however, remain involved in Western Europe – its largest trading partner as well as its main Cold War ally – and was therefore in a position to react to de Gaulle, to co-opt Brandt’s opening to the East into its own policy of détente, to support the enlargement of the EEC, and to engage, albeit belatedly, with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Despite a number of transatlantic contretemps, notably Henry Kissinger’s illfated attempt to designate 1973 as the Year of Europe, the United States continued to be a key actor in Western Europe, exercising a vital influence over both the course of East–West relations and the development of the EEC. This alone added a further layer of interconnection between the Cold War and European integration. The final chapter will then bring together a number of preliminary conclusions before briefly suggesting some of the issues upon which future research might focus. Much more remains to be studied in this field. Serious international history-writing about the late 1960s and early 1970s remains very much in its infancy, and the long-standing divide between Cold War history and the history of European integration is too well established and too profound to be entirely bridged by just one edited volume. Overall, however, there is enough in the chapters of this book to suggest that there were multiple points where the Cold War and integration narratives did intersect and that when they did not their separation was often an act of deliberate policy which deserves to be studied and explained rather than taken for granted. Even in an era of détente largely free from the Cold War crises which had punctuated earlier decades, European countries worked and interacted on an international stage which they were obliged to share with both of the superpowers and which had been deeply shaped by the East–West struggle. Ignoring this fact is a step that no one writing a detailed history of post-war Europe’s efforts to unite can afford to take.
Notes 1 See e.g. Graml (1985), Young (1991), Reynolds (1994), Trachtenberg (1999). 2 See e.g. Milward (1984), Poidevin (1986), Schwabe (1988), Deighton (1995).
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3 Among the specialist journals in each field are Journal of Cold War Studies and Cold War History and Journal of European Integration History and Journal of Common Market Studies. The most complete series of conferences on European integration history are those organised by the European Community Liaison Committee of Historians. These have led, among others, to Poidevin (1986), Schwabe (1988), Serra (1989), Deighton and Milward (1999), and Loth (2001). 4 On European integration history see e.g. Urwin (1995) and Stirk (2001); on the Cold War, Crockatt (1994), Reynolds (2000), Soutou (2001). 5 See e.g. Hogan (1987). 6 On the EDC see Dumoulin (2000); on US policy towards German rearmament see Large (1996). 7 See Milward (1984) and Esposito (1994). 8 See Snoy’s comments cited in Jaumin-Ponsar (1970, pp. 99–100). 9 See Quaroni’s assessment cited in Serra, E. ‘L’Italia e la conferenza di Messina’ in Serra (1989, pp. 93–4). 10 Milward (1984), esp. pp. 362–420 for the former; Milward (1992) for the latter. 11 Ibid. 12 Bossuat (1996), Lynch (1997), Rhenisch (1999), Mahant (2004). 13 Reynolds (1994) is a good example of the genre. 14 See e.g. Esposito (1994). 15 Probably the clearest exceptions to the rule are Schwabe (2001) and Giauque (2002). While both are useful, however, they do not go nearly far enough to undermine the basic contention of this section. 16 Georges-Henri Soutou, Wilfried Loth and Jan van der Harst have all written about both Cold War history and European integration history, albeit normally on separate occasions. 17 Boltho (1982). 18 The sense of liberation felt by Gaullist France following the end of the Algerian imbroglio comes across very clearly in Vaïsse (1998). 19 Trachtenberg (1999, pp. 352–402). 20 In general see Westad (2005). 21 See e.g. Hughes (2004). 22 The altered financial balance between Western Europe and the United States is a central theme of both Zimmermann (2001) and Gavin (2004). 23 Roussel (1994, p. 282). 24 Adenauer’s nostalgia for the Cold War certainties of Dulles and mistrust of Kennedy’s greater flexibility is a central theme of Schwarz (1991). 25 See Bange (1999), and Oppell (2002) and Granieri (2003). 26 See e.g. Bitsch (2001). 27 See Vanke (2001).
1
The linkage between European integration and détente The contrasting approaches of de Gaulle and Pompidou, 1965 to 1974 Georges-Henri Soutou
As usual, the French are a special case: both de Gaulle and Pompidou were against European integration, and neither of them believed in détente in the same sense as American or British leaders. They both feared that the kind of détente sought by Kennedy, Johnson or Nixon would lead either to excessive concessions to the USSR or to an American–Soviet condominium over Europe. As for Europe, they drew an important distinction between Western Europe, which was a reality that had emerged with the Cold War, and Europe as a whole, including, at least potentially, Russia, which remained an historical and cultural heritage they cared for and kept in mind, probably more than other Western leaders at the time. For both of them West European integration was inseparable from Atlantic integration under American leadership – so-called ‘Europeans’ were in their view actually Atlanticists – and as such would antagonize Moscow and prevent any meaningful détente and any eventual overcoming of the Cold War division of Europe. The theme of this book was still meaningful for Paris, but it needs to be investigated in the light of overall French views. Both de Gaulle and Pompidou wanted an ‘organized Europe’ (a favourite Gaullist expression, by which was meant Western Europe) but a ‘Europe of States’, relying upon intergovernmental cooperation, not supranational integration. Both wished to overcome the Cold War, but not in the same way: for de Gaulle the solution would be a new panEuropean security system reminiscent of the Concert of Europe; for Pompidou, who was much less sanguine about the possibility of realizing such a vision, it could only happen through a prudent evolution, relying in the distant future upon a convergence of the USSR and the industrial West. Given the general framework of French foreign policy in those complex years between 1965 and 1974, there was some sort of link between the Cold War theme and the European one. But the link was different and even opposite for the two presidents. Broadly speaking, when the Soviet threat was seen as growing, so did the West European component of de Gaulle’s foreign policy. When the Soviet threat receded, so too did his West European engagement, or at least it became secondary to the Franco-Soviet relationship. Pompidou’s
12
G.-H. Soutou
European engagement, by contrast, grew when he feared that excessive détente between Moscow and Washington and between Moscow and Bonn might lead eventually to a superpower condominium over Europe. For de Gaulle, détente could be a way to reshape Europe in line with his views. For Pompidou, too rash a détente could be destabilizing and detrimental to French interests. Of course both presidents had to take into account the complex evolution of both détente and European integration, and of the relationship between the two. Both had to pass through different tactical stages, and could not always appear consistent. And both had a clear vision, a preferred concept to which they returned wherever possible. But these visions and concepts differed significantly. For de Gaulle, the preferred concept could be subsumed under his motto ‘détente, entente and cooperation’. This meant that the evolution of the USSR would make it possible to establish a new European security system not unlike a modernized Concert of Europe. Such a pan-European system would include the USSR, but exclude the US; it would rely on privileged Franco-Soviet cooperation, in particular to contain Germany. France would be able to balance the Soviet Union, and thus play a leading role in the system, through her leadership of a Western Europe, organized through interstate cooperation. In such a concept there was clearly a strong link between de Gaulle’s kind of détente and de Gaulle’s kind of Europe. But such a Europe was clearly subordinated to the overall concept, which was meant to achieve the greatest possible freedom of action for France and to maximize her world role. Pompidou’s concept of choice was different. He harboured no great panEuropean scheme ‘from the Atlantic to the Urals’. His vision was that of a collaborative Western world, from which he certainly did not want to exclude America, where France would be in a unique position to mediate between Western Europe and the US, thanks to French leadership over a pragmatically developing Western Europe. As for the Soviet Union, he believed in continued containment and in incremental détente provided it was not detrimental to French interests (he was probably among the first to realize that the Cold War, dividing Germany and engaging the US in the security of Europe, was in the best interest of France!). Slow convergence would ultimately bring Russia back into the fold; by that time the development of Western Europe would prevent the two dangers he most feared: an American–Soviet condominium over Europe, or a German–Soviet one. Détente was less to the fore in Pompidou’s thinking than in de Gaulle’s, and the kind of link de Gaulle established, in his own way, between détente and Europe was far less in evidence with Pompidou. Both presidents had one thing in common, however: they reverted more forcefully to an ‘organized’ European Community (the nearest they could come to integration) when they felt that their preferred concept was endangered or unachievable for the time being. To that extent there was a factual link between Europe and détente, even for Pompidou, because one important factor (if certainly not the only one) which compromised the success of their respective concepts was that both Moscow and Washington, and ultimately Bonn, refused to
The linkage between integration and détente
13
play along. As for London, which could have easily shared at least parts of Pompidou’s and maybe even at times de Gaulle’s concept, Paris had no wish to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for the British and thereby endanger their first priority: France’s leading role.
A caveat The link between détente and European integration was a matter of high policy, discussed at the level of the head of state and of the minister for foreign affairs. It did not appear frequently in the day-to-day working of the diplomatic machinery, which tended, in part due to the habit of working along existing organizational lines and also through the necessity to avoid turf battles, to stick either with one or the other. Thinking about Soviet reactions to the EC, for instance, was a rare commodity: in May 1966, in preparation for de Gaulle’s visit to Moscow, the Direction des Affaires politiques issued a note about ‘The USSR and European construction’, which concluded that, despite being less vocal in its opposition to the EC since 1963, Moscow was still opposed, out of the fear of having to deal with a vast and cohesive group which might counteract its influence and attract Eastern Europe.1 But such a document remains an exception. The norm was rather the clear separation between the two topics. For instance, at the regular meetings between the political directors of the French and German Foreign Offices instituted by the Elysée Treaty of 1963, the different topics, including the relations between Moscow and Europe, were clearly separated in the discussion with no cross-fertilization allowed.2 This seemed even to apply at ministerial level: when Maurice Couve de Murville, the French foreign minister, met his German counterpart Willy Brandt on 20 October 1967 (and Brandt would have been an ideal partner with whom to explore the links between détente and the development of the EC), the British candidacy to the Community and the Harmel report were kept firmly apart.3 On occasions, however, the two themes did coincide. For instance, in October 1964 Rolf Lahr, the state secretary at the Auswärtiges Amt, told Oliver Wormser, head of the Economic Department of the Quai d’Orsay, that by deciding to extend long-term loans to the USSR, Paris had broken the necessary unity of the Six towards Moscow.4 But this may have been more an expression of displeasure grounded in German national interest than a sign of a true European preoccupation. The same thing occurred at their next meeting on 27 November, Lahr calling for the formulation of a common economic policy towards the East among the Six. Significantly, Wormser countered that ‘trade policy touches questions of foreign policy and one cannot go very far in that direction without more progress towards a political union’ – a reminder to Lahr of the consequences of the failure of the Fouchet Plan in 1962!5 But the issue was probably less a matter of real substance than part of the running tit-for-tat that characterized Franco-German relations in the mid-1960s. De Gaulle also told Erhard ‘that [a joint approach to East–West trade] would look quite different, if the concept of a common Franco-German policy had acquired real substance’, a
14
G.-H. Soutou
clear allusion to Bonn’s failure to follow up on the Elysée Treaty of January 1963.6 In normal circumstances, however, it was left to de Gaulle or to Pompidou themselves to raise a linkage which stood far above the normal work of the Foreign Office. De Gaulle, for instance, did it in both private conversations and in public pronouncements, as we shall see. On occasions he could also stress the linkage talking with the Soviets, as he did with Gromyko on 27 April 1965: ‘France stands for balance. That is why it feels that Western Europe must get organized in order to establish a normal cooperation with Eastern Europe and first of all with the Soviet Union.’7 This was a statement which went to the heart of his approach. Pompidou may have gone even further in exploring intellectually the relationship between détente and the development of the EC from the French point of view.
De Gaulle’s initial and favoured concept: a new Concert of European Nation-states When de Gaulle came back to power in 1958 he had already formulated a longterm blueprint for France’s relations with the USSR and for European security: even if in the short term and especially during the Berlin crisis of 1958 to 1962 he realized that Soviet policy was very aggressive and dangerous, in the long term he was convinced that Russia would ultimately discard communism and return to traditional great power diplomacy. France would seek a profound revision of the Atlantic Alliance, ending NATO integration. NATO reform and greater European independence from the Americans would enable France to launch a new détente policy towards Moscow; at the same time the reduction of tension would diminish the dependence of Eastern Europe on the USSR. Germany (through tacit Franco-Soviet cooperation) would be forced to accept its Potsdam boundaries and to give security guarantees to its neighbours, especially renouncing atomic weapons; thus reinsured and able to dispense with the need for Soviet protection against Germany, the countries of Eastern Europe would overcome the artificial ideology of communism and revert to their traditional national interests. The Soviet Union meanwhile, no longer confronted with the danger of an integrated Western Alliance and especially with a strong German–American alliance, but having to address the Chinese menace, would also revert to its long-term national interests. Thus it would be possible to rebuild a European security order freed from ideological tensions, resting on a tacit Franco-Soviet understanding to control Germany. The United States would revert to their former role of outside guarantor of the new European order, as a reinsurance. This would be a return to the Concert of Europe as had existed before 1914, but suitably modernized to take into account the political, strategic and democratic necessities of the twentieth century.8 A new European balance would thus evolve, between a de-ideologized Russia on one hand and a Western Europe led by Paris on the other. Within this new Concert of Europe Germany might ultimately be reunited, if only in some
The linkage between integration and détente
15
sort of confederation (but once again within the borders decided at Potsdam and with security guarantees for its neighbours such as denuclearization). The necessary counterweight to Soviet power would be provided by the United States (but from afar) and first of all by the grouping of Western Europe, including Germany, around France. In this complex of interlocking balances, France would balance Germany with the help of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union with the help of Germany, thereby staying at the apex of the European system, multiplying its actual power, and remaining able to go on playing a world role. Such a blueprint was largely set out by de Gaulle himself to Soviet diplomats in Paris in 1958 to 1959, just before and just after his return to power.9 He actually published its main lines in the third volume of his Mémoires de guerre, which came out in 1959 and were as much a programme for future action as an account of the past.10 He explained quite clearly for instance to the Italian President, Giovanni Gronchi, as early as 24 June 1959, that the Soviet system was mellowing and that cooperation between Western Europe and Russia might become possible.11 He also explained his views to Alain Peyrefitte, the official spokesman of his government for four years and one of the Elysée’s main links with the media.12 And he told Khrushchev in March 1960 that only a European détente from the Atlantic to the Urals would solve the German problem by ‘controlling the German body in a Europe of peace and progress’.13 De Gaulle’s basic views about France’s relationship with the USSR and his own brand of détente derived from three major considerations. First, the historical necessity for France to control Germany and the German problem; apart from the Franco-German rapprochement initiated by de Gaulle in 1958 which very clearly was devised to draw the FRG away from the US and closer to Paris, the only method which would help France control the German problem was cooperation with the USSR.14 Second, his very strongly held views about the permanence of nation-states, despite internationalist ideologies, as the building blocks of the international system and, beyond that, as repositories of history, civilization, democracy and progress.15 And third, his will to restore the unity of Europe. Europe would overcome the division induced by the Cold War, would include Russia and would rest on a system of cooperation between sovereign states.16 As for Western Europe, de Gaulle had been since the beginning of the 1950s adamantly opposed to the concept of European (or Atlantic) integration. As early as 1951 he publicly explained his scheme for a European system of interstate cooperation, as an alternative to the European Defence Community plan, which in his view would have destroyed French national sovereignty. One of his closest advisers, Michel Debré, provided much intellectual input to organize those ideas, beginning with his 1948 book Projet d’union des Etats européens, and defended them at the Council of the Republic in 1952 and followed them up as Prime Minister between 1958 and 1962. In other words, de Gaulle wanted to achieve his kind of détente for his kind of Europe.
16
G.-H. Soutou
The organization of Western Europe as a second choice Until 1964, however, Franco-Soviet relations were poor and there was no scope for détente along Gaullist lines. In addition to the Berlin crisis and the failure of the Paris summit in May 1960, there were three sources of discord between France and the USSR: first, the war in Algeria and Moscow’s support of the rebels, culminating with the recognition of the FLN government 24 hours after the signature of the Evian agreements in March 1962 but months before actual Algerian independance.17 Second, Soviet opposition to Franco-German rapprochement – a belief that led the Soviets to accuse Paris of promoting an antiSoviet and revanchist military bloc.18 And third, de Gaulle was furious with the signature of the Moscow Treaty of July 1963 banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, which for him epitomized American–Soviet hegemonic collusion.19 The priority for Paris during these years was the organization of Europe of the Six under French leadership. The great question at the time of de Gaulle’s return to power was whether he would actually implement the Rome Treaties despite his earlier opposition. He decided to do so, but at the same time he sought to launch a system of political cooperation among the Six European States which much better met his views and was meant to keep the integrative, supranational momentum of the EEC within strict technical limits, to rein in integration and to place the European authorities under the control of the Six governments. As early as 11 August 1958, de Gaulle had stated his views: Europe should become a political, economic and cultural reality, but through cooperation among the governments of the Six; the existing treaties of the European Communities would be fulfilled, but the integrative supranational process should stop there.20 Significantly, given the theme of this volume, de Gaulle relaunched and accelerated his European plans against the backdrop of the worsening East–West situation after the failure of the Paris summit in May 1960. In his TV address of 31 May 1960, he promised to promote interstate cooperation extending to defence matters, so as to build up a European political and economic grouping, possibly developing into a Confederation.21 On 30 July 1960, de Gaulle convinced Adenauer to go along with him in the same direction.22 And de Gaulle’s tactics were clearly expressed in a letter to Debré on 30 September 1960: for the time being Paris would not confront integration head-on. Anyway, the emergence of a system of interstate political cooperation would automatically reduce the scope of the integrated institutions. It was only if the political project failed that Paris would seek the reduction of their powers and a revision of the European treaties.23 The Fouchet Plan for a political union in 1961 to 1962 was the product of this strategy. It failed because at the last minute de Gaulle departed from the prudent tactics of 1960 and introduced provisions reducing the scope of the integrated institutions and of NATO. But the Fouchet Plan was taken up again on a bilateral basis by France and Germany with the Elysée Treaty of January 1963, which, in de Gaulle’s view, was a stepping stone for a comparable agreement
The linkage between integration and détente
17
among the Six leading to ‘a European Europe’. It should be noted here that the Elysée Treaty had a most important strategic and military component and that a major argument to convince Adenauer to break ranks with NATO was that the US military guarantee to Europe was insufficient in the face of the growing Soviet threat.24
Complex overlapping tactical moves De Gaulle being a complex personality, his policies have to be followed at several levels. Thus at one level and at first sight it would appear that he felt initially that there was no immediate possibility of negotiating with Moscow under the pressure of Khrushchev’s Berlin ultimatum.25 As a result, between 1960 and 1964 he tried to establish a privileged political and strategic relationship with Germany so as both to foster his European plans and to form a counterweight to the Soviet threat. Then in 1964 to 1965, as the international environment changed with the beginning of détente, he decided to approach Moscow directly and to return to his initial concept, which now appeared to have a good chance of success.26 The historical reality, however, is more complex than this apparently logical succession of events. His basic blueprint of interlocking balances remained the same all along and these different steps did not supersede each other, but overlapped in a complex and subtle way. Thus, even as he was taking a firm stand on the Berlin crisis, de Gaulle did not hesitate, in March 1959, to recognize the Oder–Neisse line – a clear signal to the Soviets which was supported by subtle feelers in the background.27 As early as 1959 de Gaulle also spoke publicly of a ‘Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals’ and did not hesitate to state to French diplomats and to Adenauer that Soviet communism was mellowing, to mention an inevitable Sino-Soviet rift, and to evoke a new European security order including Russia.28 In May 1962 he stressed publicly that the establishment of close Franco-German cooperation would make possible the establishment of a new European balance between East and West, and thus of a European cooperative system from the Atlantic to the Urals.29 This one sentence revealingly linked steps two and three of his programme. At the same time de Gaulle’s positions were not to be taken always at face value but could be instrumentalized to further his aims. For instance, as soon as the Berlin Wall was erected in 1961 he was aware of the vulnerability of West Berlin; his uncompromising stance (refusing to associate himself with Anglo-American offers of negotiation with Moscow) was probably not so much directed against Moscow as devised to draw an isolated FRG towards Paris and thus to ‘create Europe’.30 Even as he appeared to follow the logic of more European cooperation against a growing Soviet threat, he did not in fact renounce his preferred vision. Nor did he make any effort to hide that basic concept from his Western partners, presenting it as a permanent blueprint independent from the ebb and flow of East–West relations long before he began actually to implement it. On 25 May 1963, Couve de Murville told Kennedy rather clearly how Paris saw the
18
G.-H. Soutou
link between its kind of détente and its kind of Europe: the pre-condition of East–West balance and of a settlement of the Cold War in Europe would be the emergence of a political and military European entity since American forces would not remain always in Western Europe.31
The years 1964 to 1965: the time appears ripe for de Gaulle’s concept Between 1964 and 1966 all the major problems of French foreign policy (the relations with Washington, Bonn and Moscow and the EEC) came to a head together and were deeply linked: now was the time to try to implement the Gaullist blueprint. With Washington the relations had gone from bad to worse since 1963 and in October 1964 France launched a massive attack against the Multilateral Force (MLF) project, which was now seen as the major tool of American policy to thwart the French concept of a ‘European Europe’. In December the MLF was effectively killed by de Gaulle.32 On 23 December 1964, the Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin lost no time in telling the French ambassador Philippe Baudet that France and the Soviet Union agreed about the necessity of promoting ‘security in Europe’ in order to forestall the dangers of German ambitions and of privileged American–German cooperation. This was an evident offer of cooperation, in the wake of the MLF failure, tailored to French fears about an eventual Bonn–Washington axis.33 Immediately Paris decided to take up the offer. Both states now agreed that the main problem, the division of Germany, was a ‘specifically European’ problem that could only be solved in the framework of a European détente, in which the European countries should play the leading role, marginalizing the US.34 De Gaulle himself told the Soviet ambassador in Paris, Vinogradov, as much on 25 January 1965: France would not recognize the GDR or allow itself to be drafted into an anti-American coalition, but Paris was ready to discuss with Moscow a European solution to the German problem.35 During his press conference of 4 February de Gaulle explained very clearly his whole concept: the USSR and Eastern Europe freed from communist totalitarianism; the German problem solved in the framework of a European security agreement; European cooperation from the Atlantic to the Urals; a Western European grouping to balance the continent; and cooperation between this new European system and America, ‘Europe’s daughter’.36 (But let us note here that one month earlier, on 2 January de Gaulle had told the French ambassador to Washington, Hervé Alphand, that he contemplated a European security system from the Atlantic to the Urals, in which the US would not participate).37 During the next weeks careful soundings between Paris and Moscow took place, until it was announced on 2 March that Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko would visit Paris in April, and Couve de Murville would fly to Moscow before the end of the year.38 On 23 March, Gaulle toasted the outgoing ambassador Vinogradov by evoking ‘the centuries old sympathy and natural affinity’ between the two countries.39 This was widely noted and it became evident that something was afoot. In his talk with Gromyko on 27 April
The linkage between integration and détente
19
de Gaulle was very outspoken. He believed that the partition of Germany was ‘abnormal’ and would not last for ever, but he was ‘in no hurry’ to overcome it, and for the time being partition was ‘an accomplished fact’. Gromyko and de Gaulle agreed on the idea of a European security framework established among Europeans (that is, without the US). The ground was now laid for de Gaulle’s visit to Moscow in June 1966. Meanwhile relations with Washington grew steadily worse, with de Gaulle’s opposition to the Vietnam War being followed by the French departure from the integrated command structure of NATO in March 1966. As for Germany, relations were less easy after Adenauer left the government in October 1963: de Gaulle felt his successor Ludwig Erhard was much too close to the US. As early as the beginning of 1965 de Gaulle was again alluding, publicly and privately, to Germany as the perennial European problem, which could be solved only in the framework of a new European security system and with the help of the USSR. He also foresaw special limitations on Germany, particularly the final recognition of the borders drawn up at Potsdam and the permanent denuclearization of the country.40 At the same time de Gaulle still believed that political and strategic cooperation with Germany was necessary to achieve the security of Western Europe and the overall balance of power in the new Europe which he hoped to construct.41 Parenthetically, it is interesting to note here that the Quai d’Orsay was convinced that ‘the strengthening of Western Europe through the implementation of the Common Market’ encouraged the Eastern European countries to seek more freedom from Moscow and that ‘the corollary was the retreat of Soviet domination’.42 But the order of priority between the organization of Western Europe and the emergence of a new pan-European system now changed: the new European system would not rest primarily on the Franco-German relationship in the framework of a developing Western Europe, but on the Franco-Russian relationship in a pan-European security context. The whole point was now to build through a basic agreement with Moscow a new European order, in which Germany could eventually be reunified (although as we shall see this was a possibility not a necessity) but would anyway be kept under control by a European security system led by Paris and Moscow. De Gaulle explained most clearly in his Press conference on 28 October 1966 that Bonn’s reluctance to follow him combined with the new developments in the East changed the whole situation.43 Détente now took precedence over the West European confederative scheme, although the latter was by no means forgotten.
The year 1966: towards a new European security order? De Gaulle’s trips to Moscow and Warsaw in June 1966 and June 1967 De Gaulle probably never explained his whole concept more vividly than to the American Senator Frank Church on 4 May 1966. The USSR had to come to terms with the West, he asserted, since it was afraid of China and threatened by
20
G.-H. Soutou
the erosion of ideologies. The German problem could be solved only after the establishment of an overall détente in Europe, which would appease Eastern Europe’s fears about Germany provided she foreswore her ambitions and accepted her borders and denuclearization. But, as we shall see, de Gaulle was perhaps less than candid with his American host (who asked a pointed question to that effect) when he stressed the necessity of the continuing presence of US troops in Europe in order to balance the USSR and stated that the US should fully participate in the negotiations leading to the new system.44 De Gaulle’s trip to the Soviet Union in June 1966 was a very amicable affair. Atmospherics aside, the most important part was the talk between Brezhnev and de Gaulle on 21 June.45 The Soviet leader began with his usual tirade about the German menace. De Gaulle agreed that Germany should not possess any nuclear weapons and should finally recognize her 1945 borders. At the same time he stressed the necessary balance between the US and the USSR: without this balance, France would fall victim to the hegemony of either one or the other power. ‘We are therefore quite happy with your might, and also with that of America.’ None of this was new. More important was the repeated statement that the French were ‘neither very sanguine, nor in great hurry’ to see Germany reunified. Reunification should be a ‘hope’, a ‘perspective’, to prevent dangerous developments in Germany. Reunification was no longer a firm (if hypocritical) element of French foreign policy aims, as had been officially the case since the Paris Agreements of October 1954. And anyway the German problem should be discussed among Europeans, so as to take it out of the Soviet–American rivalry which Germany, de Gaulle implied, was using in a dangerous way for her own purposes. At this point Brezhnev suggested a European security conference without the US. De Gaulle then equivocated: it was too soon for such a conference, but ‘one should go in that direction’: the conference would be the result of détente. As for the Americans, they certainly had rights resulting from the war regarding Germany, but there were grounds to believe that the US might accept a settlement arrived at among Europeans and allowing America to disengage itself from Europe. At another point, de Gaulle agreed explicitly with Brezhnev’s statement that the Europeans should collaborate among themselves without the US. Those two questions (German reunification and American participation in a European security conference) were the most important issues discussed. De Gaulle’s position, as stated rather ambiguously to the Soviets, now went far beyond the previous official French stance. It was one thing to envisage European détente including the mellowing of Soviet communism in Eastern Europe, the reunification of Germany and a continuing American military presence in Europe – the scenario outlined to Senator Church. It was quite another to speak of a European security system without an American presence and with a severely controlled Germany with only a distant prospect of reunification in its midst. The two pillars of such a system would have to be the USSR and France. France with its nuclear weapons and its leadership of Western Europe would counterbalance Russia, which would be contained on one side by China and on the other by the peripheral power of the US.46
The linkage between integration and détente
21
When de Gaulle went to Poland in 1967, he tried to convince the Poles to overcome the ideological barrier in Europe, to affirm their own interests and to help France achieve a new ‘European order’. In his well-known speech to the Polish Diet on 11 September, he exhorted the Poles to affirm their independent role.47 But Gomulka answered that ‘the alliance with the USSR and the treaties concluded with the socialist states of Eastern Europe, including the GDR, were the lynchpin of Poland’s foreign policy’. De Gaulle’s world view was hence unrealistic.48
Reining in integration: the Empty Chair crisis of 1965 Still convinced that the time had now come for his pan-European concept, de Gaulle decided quite logically to rein in EEC integration, which he had tolerated for tactical reasons since 1958. The linkage between his concept of détente and his view of Western Europe is quite evident here: France’s freedom of action, essential for Paris to control the interplay between interlocking balances he wanted to establish, implied the end of integration. In June 1965 Paris launched the Empty Chair crisis, and for six months France boycotted Brussels until the ‘Luxembourg compromise’ of January 1966. De Gaulle had three objectives: first, to block the decisive switch to majority voting which was due to take place in January 1966 (that objective was achieved, at least in practical terms, with the Luxemburg compromise). The second, long-term objective was to thwart the federalist tendency of the Brussels institutions. But the third aim was to force France’s European partners both to move away from integration, whether European or Atlantic, in favour of a ‘Europe of States’ dealing with both superpowers under French leadership, and to adopt his views about a reconstruction of the whole continent through ‘détente, entente and cooperation’ with the USSR.49 As Raymond Aron sensed at the time, there was a close interconnection in de Gaulle’s mind between the mantra of French national independence, the concept of a ‘Europe of the States’ and the blueprint for a new Concert of Europe including Russia.50
The failure of the new ‘Concert of Europe’. A final return to Western Europe? De Gaulle’s basic concept did not succeed, however: no progress was made towards a European confederation of states. NATO overcame the crisis caused by the French withdrawal thanks to the creation on the Nuclear Planning Group in December 1966 and also thanks to the Harmel Report of 1967. As for the policy of ‘détente, entente and cooperation’ with Moscow, the Prague Spring of 1968 made its limits clear. If Brezhnev was quite happy to capitalize on French foreign policy because it led to a loosening of NATO, he was not willing to talk seriously about the future of Europe with France: his real partners were the US, and, quite soon, the FRG.51 Did de Gaulle though retain after 1966 his basic concept of a renewed Concert of Europe, especially after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August
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1968? The evidence is mixed: the ‘Soames affair’ in February 1969 would seem to indicate that in a climate of renewed East–West tension de Gaulle wished to reactivate the Western European component of his policy.52 It has also been frequently said that relations with Washington evolved for the better when Nixon became president. Actually Nixon’s visit to Paris at the end of February 1969 went quite well. But de Gaulle did not change at all his overall views during that visit: the change was in the atmosphere, not the substance.53 It would seem that de Gaulle remained true to his basic concept to the end. There are good reasons to believe that de Gaulle judged the Czech events to be but an episode, which did not alter the general trend towards détente and hence did not call into question his concept.54 One tended in Paris to ascribe a great deal of the responsibility for the failure of the Prague Spring to Bonn’s policy towards Prague, which was perceived as reckless. The conclusion was that it was now more important than ever for Paris and Moscow to discuss together the future of European security.55
Georges Pompidou’s basic conception and policy until 1972 Georges Pompidou, President of the French Republic from 1969 until his death in 1974, was fully aware of the revolution in international affairs which took place during those years: the ‘Nixon shocks’, détente and Ostpolitik. He basically favoured détente because it could enhance stability in Europe. He believed it represented the best framework in which to try to settle the German problem, which preoccupied him greatly because he feared the basic instability of Germany and the constant temptation of a deal with Moscow which arose from the partition of the country.56 For him détente, provided it was prudently managed without provoking the USSR, was the only possible way to give more leeway to Eastern Europe in its relations with Moscow. It was also the best framework to help the forces to slowly transform the USSR into a modern industrialized society less hostile to the West. As far as the link between détente and integration was concerned, Pompidou (like de Gaulle) believed that détente and integration, whether European or Western, were mutually exclusive. He felt, exactly as de Gaulle had done, that EEC integration was seen by France’s European partners as an indirect means to bring France back into NATO integration. Brandt in particular was suspected of pushing in this direction so as to get France’s nuclear policy under Alliance control.57 Were this to happen, it would endanger détente and destroy the vision shared by both de Gaulle and Pompidou of an independent France acting as the fulcrum of an East–West balance. As Pompidou told Brezhnev on 7 October 1970: ‘whatever the development of the EEC, we shall never return to NATO.’58 He also alluded to the fact that too much European integration could lead to a West European military bloc including Germany and equipped with nuclear weapons, which would of course mean the end of détente. France, he promised, would prevent such a development at all costs.59 Like de Gaulle, Pompidou envisaged a system of intergovernmental
The linkage between integration and détente
23
European cooperation, not integration. Such a system would be compatible with détente. However, as we shall see, Pompidou did not view the relationship between the two processes in exactly the same terms as did de Gaulle. Georges Pompidou’s views were undoubtedly Gaullist: he was insistent on French independence, he was against European and NATO integration as a matter of principle, he was very much on guard against any sign of the US using NATO to control Europe, he was very ambivalent towards Germany feeling that it should be closely controlled in a French-led Europe, and he was in favour of détente with the Soviet Union and of a special French role in Moscow to enhance France’s influence in the world.60 At the same time he was quite ready to have better relations with Washington, feeling that the military and economic coherence of the West was an absolute necessity.61 As for Russia, he distrusted Soviet geopolitical aims towards Europe and the Middle East and deeply feared the totalitarian expansive force of communist ideology, but at the same time he believed that Marxism was ultimately doomed, if only because of the failure of Soviet economy;62 he did not share de Gaulle’s vision of a ‘Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals’ and believed rather that through economic, social and political evolution the USSR would ultimately become part of the Western, industrialized world. Conversely, he feared from the beginning a possible Soviet–American condominium over Europe.63 About the US, Georges Pompidou had quite different views from de Gaulle, even if, once again, he was no Atlanticist and was absolutely determined to uphold French independence. He certainly did not wish America to retreat from Europe. For him Western solidarity in the face of the still present Soviet menace was very important, the United States should remain fully committed in Europe, and for the time being the best solution for Germany was partition. The present balance between East and West was preferable to dangerous innovations along the lines of a grand pan-European security concept, which could only lead either to an American–Soviet or a German–Soviet condominium detrimental to French interests. Détente was useful because it prevented war, brought stability and could in the long run help Eastern Europe get more freedom from Moscow. But it could not be used as a short-cut to further French ambitions in Europe. France’s role in the world would rely on her leadership of Western Europe and on a central role between the two sides of the Atlantic as the first European partner of the US, not on a tacit cooperation with the USSR. Georges Pompidou understood quite well that there was a fine line between détente as a useful way to increase stability between East and West and détente as a series of unilateral Western concessions to the Soviet Union.64 He particularly feared the tendency towards disengagement which was evident in American public opinion and in Congress (Senator Mansfield’s campaign for a reduction of US troops in Europe, for instance) and which he suspected was present even inside the Nixon Administration. That was why for him détente had to be indivisible and to concern not only Europe but also the rest of the world, especially the Middle East and Asia. He feared that if détente was limited to Europe it might lead to a form of superpower condominium over the continent.65
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He was particularly anxious that Moscow and Washington might strike an implicit deal at the expense of the Europeans in order to concentrate their energy on their converging feud with China. Towards the European security conference, which the Soviets had been advocating for years and about which de Gaulle had kept an open mind, Pompidou’s views were complex. On the one hand he favoured it, despite the initial opposition of the Quai d’Orsay which correctly realized that the Soviet’s aims were to achieve recognition of the 1945 settlement and to divide Western Europe from America. For Pompidou it was a way to escape from the ‘two blocs’, a very Gaullist concern which he constantly supported. Anyway, he felt sure that other Western countries would end up embracing the Soviet proposal since the urge for détente was simply too powerful: he therefore believed that France should derive the advantages from being the first Western country to embrace the idea. This was also the only concession he could bring to Moscow for his first visit, scheduled for October 1970. But at the same time he saw in the European conference a way to achieve a modicum of freedom from Moscow for the Eastern Europeans, particularly for countries such as Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia, and to alleviate the consequences of the ‘Brezhnev doctrine’.66 He told Willy Brandt that the security conference could ‘shake up the Eastern bloc as a bloc’; he added that, provided the Western world remained together (which was meant as an indirect warning to Brandt), ‘we could dissolve the blocs, including the Soviet one, a little bit . . . and bring together all nations East and West, including the two German states’.67 And, in a major difference with de Gaulle, he felt that the United States should ‘naturally’ participate in such a conference and he did not hesitate to state explicitly that they were not ‘foreign to European problems’.68 In addition to the European conference, two main topics were discussed during Pompidou’s visit to Moscow in October 1970. First, the participants talked about the United States. Referring evidently to de Gaulle’s 1966 visit, Brezhnev asked if Pompidou agreed with his predecessor that ‘American influence in Europe should be progressively eliminated’. The French President stressed that he remained true to the basic principles of Gaullism, but, in a significant intellectual twist, he went on to explain that if the United States were influential in Europe it was largely because they were militarily supporting European countries against ‘the immense weight’ of the Soviet Union. He was all in favour of an evolution allowing ‘Europe to be fully Europe’, but there could be no question of exchanging ‘what you fear to be American tutelage’ by Soviet tutelage: ‘we want to be friends, but we intend to be free.’69 In similar fashion he announced on the first day of his visit that ‘France was a western country and fully intended to remain such’. The second topic to be discussed at length was Germany. Pompidou repeatedly assured his interlocutors that France would never tolerate German access to nuclear weapons and expressed his satisfaction with the Soviet–German treaty signed in August, because it helped détente and confirmed the existing borders and the partition of Germany. But he asked searching questions about the future
The linkage between integration and détente
25
of the German problem. He enquired, for instance, about where the Soviets stood regarding reunification, stressing that Germany was always an uncertain factor that had repeatedly become dangerous. Noting that both Germanies were now free to ‘get more acquainted’, he also asked how far Moscow would allow this process to go. It is interesting to note that in response Brezhnev escaped into platitudes about the need for the FRG to respect the independence of the GDR without committing himself to oppose reunification, as Pompidou would have wished.70 In these talks Pompidou was evidently promoting his own agenda. He was both following in de Gaulle’s footsteps when he reaffirmed French independence, and following a very different line when he stressed the need for an American military presence in Europe and made no mention at all of his predecessor’s grand security concept for Europe based on a Franco-Soviet entente. Compared to de Gaulle, he was much more prudent towards Moscow. Pompidou’s first contacts with the Americans were largely positive. He did not hesitate, for instance, to state that Europe and France needed the Atlantic alliance.71 Naturally there were differences between Paris and Washington, for instance, over the international monetary system, but also and particularly over the military aspects of détente. Paris feared that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) which started in earnest in 1969 might reduce the American nuclear guarantee to Europe and encourage Washington and Moscow to regard smaller nuclear powers as destabilizing factors that needed to be controlled in times of crisis. Paris was also against the proposal made in late 1969 by the Atlantic alliance, with strong American support, for a conference about mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe (MBFR). Apart from the wellestablished French opposition to any negotiation ‘between the blocs’, Pompidou feared that such negotiations could further worsen the existing imbalance in conventional forces and lead to a kind of neutralization of Central Europe. By contrast Paris supported the European security conference, which Washington still opposed. But the French were quite willing to have serious exchanges with Washington about all of these questions; in fact there was to be a non-stop Franco-American dialogue on all questions pertaining to détente, which amounted to a renewed intimacy after the frosty years since 1963.72 Despite the well-known incidents with Jewish groups, Pompidou’s visit to the United States in February 1970 was a success. The French President’s talks with Nixon on 24 and 26 February showed that there was a broad area of agreement about the evolution of the international system towards multipolarity (United States, USSR, Western Europe, China, Japan), about the need for a prudent attitude towards the USSR, about the importance of not isolating China, and about the need to ask the Germans to keep their western partners accurately informed about the development of the Ostpolitik.73 Nixon accepted French foreign and military policy independence and did not try to bring France back into NATO. Both presidents also decided to restart Franco-American strategic talks and military cooperation which had basically stopped since 1962. This led to very important developments under Pompidou and his successor Valéry Giscard
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d’Estaing.74 The Franco-American rift of the mid-1960s was about to be bridged. And of particular importance was the agreement to follow quite closely Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik. Neither power feared any direct threat from Germany, seeing such anxieties as outdated, but rather the risk of excessive German concessions to the Soviets.75 At the Azores summit of December 1971 Pompidou was to stress that France belonged to the West and remained true to the Atlantic alliance. His aim was to be recognized by Nixon as the spokesman of the European Community and to put France in a privileged strategic position of intermediary between America and Europe. This idea was at the heart of his foreign policy. As for the EEC, Pompidou decided that it was no longer in France’s interest to oppose British entry: London was actually successfully playing the Five against Paris and blocking the evolution of the EEC in matters important for French practical interests. But Pompidou had no intention of relaunching integration: the EEC would be kept as it was, with a measure of progress in technical matters useful for France. At the time (it was to change somewhat after 1973) Pompidou’s concept for Europe was more along the lines of a useful framework to foster a series of pragmatic bilateral relations in economic or technical matters. He did not believe in supranationality, and was convinced that the protestations of federalist faith by France’s partners were hypocritical and selfserving.76 The clearest negative link in Pompidou’s eyes between détente and European integration, which he refused, as opposed to European cooperation, which he supported, appears in the case of Germany. Thus in January 1969 (prior to becoming President) he explained to Brandt that a Western Europe united along prudent intergovernmental lines could manage a meaningful détente with the East and eventually encourage a liberalization of even the USSR.77 But excessive European integration would be different. In particular, he believed Ostpolitik and closer European integration to be mutually exclusive. He told Barzel, the CDU leader, and Brandt himself as much, in quite clear terms.78 He told Helmut Kohl, the new CDU leader, on 15 October 1973, that it was senseless to try to achieve a close-knit, very deeply integrated Europe, because Germany would not hesitate to escape from it if it were necessary to do so in order to solve her national problem.79 Pompidou did not believe German proclamations of European faith. He noted on 24 February 1972, that the official stand in favour of ever deeper European integration and supranationality in Bonn was contradicted by the affirmation of a permanent German nation, which stood at the core of the Ostpolitik.80 Generally speaking, Pompidou was convinced that Brandt’s first foreign policy objective was reunification and that this influenced the rest of Bonn’s policies. In particular, Pompidou was certain that Bonn no longer wished the construction of a strong Western Europe which could hamper its search for a broad settlement with Moscow, and that there was a risk of a divided Western Europe negotiating piecemeal with Moscow.81 At the same time, a prudent détente needed a strong Western Europe, even if it was a Europe built upon effective intergovernmental
The linkage between integration and détente
27
cooperation and not on integration. He told Brandt on 3 December 1971 that ‘the policy of getting closer to Eastern Europe implied a strong Western Europe. If Western Europe divides itself, that policy will soon become dangerous.’82 The overall concept that thus emerges involved a prudent and incremental détente and a prudently developing EEC, strong enough to resist the blandishments of Moscow, admitting Great Britain to overcome the negative effects of London’s opposition to France’s European policy, able to collaborate with the United States on equal footing, but no longer bound to integrate in a manner which could reduce Paris’ freedom of action. In such a context, with good relations with all major capitals, in a state of approximate international balance, and on the verge of a major period of economic progress, France could play an important role and defend her interests, particularly as a an intermediary between the US and a French-led EEC. The linkage between a prudent détente not endangering Western solidarity and a EEC developing in practical terms but not along integrative lines seems clear.
The years 1972 to 1973: Pompidou’s concept in jeopardy From 1972 onward however, Pompidou began to feel that détente was evolving in anything other than a prudent fashion. Franco-American relations soured between 1972 and 1973, largely due to growing differences over détente and particularly over the military negotiations with Moscow (SALT and MBFR). As early as 1971, Paris realized that a Soviet–American SALT agreement was now to be expected and might have negative consequences for France, reducing the political and military value of its own deterrent.83 As for the MBFR, the French rejected this outright. They feared that it could lead to a withdrawal of American troops from Europe and to a neutralization of Central Europe, allowing Moscow to exert constant and considerable pressure on Europe.84 The growing difference over the strategy of détente thus led to a realignment of Pompidou’s policy towards the United States after 1972: his aim was henceforth less to be the privileged intermediary between Europe and the United States and much more to gather the Europeans together to balance American influence – in a way a return to Gaullism. The American embassy in Paris sensed this change as early as September 1972.85 Paris was concerned by the SALT agreements of May 1972 and their possible implications for France. On the strategic side the agreements reduced the value of the American military guarantee to Europe.86 On the political side the French President wondered aloud when talking to Gromyko on 13 June if these agreements ‘did not amount more or less to a sort of will to establish a condominium over the rest of the world’. This theme would recur frequently.87 And the differences between Paris and Washington about the strategy of détente grew rapidly from the summer of 1973 onward. The turning point was the ‘agreement to prevent a nuclear war’ signed by Brezhnev in California on 22 June. For Paris, the most disquieting feature of this agreement was the clause concerning mutual consultation in case of a conflict between two other powers. Pompidou sensed
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the danger ‘of a kind of tutelage over Europe’, as he wrote to Nixon on 13 July.88 The suspicions about a Soviet–American condominium were growing fast, the more so because Paris believed that there was a convergence between the 22 June agreement, SALT and MBFR.89 Matters were made still worse by the ‘Year of Europe’ announced by Henry Kissinger on 23 April 1973, which was supposed to see the transatlantic relationship defined anew in an ‘Atlantic Charter’. Pompidou and Michel Jobert, his new foreign minister, looked upon these developments with anxiety: were not the Americans going to strike a deal with the USSR at the expense of Europe? Kissinger in his ‘Year of Europe’ speech had referred to Europe as a regional gathering with limited interests. Did Washington envisage itself as the leader of a vast transatlantic grouping?90 Paris and Washington thus appeared ever more divided about the very strategy of détente. Largely as a result, the very important military and nuclear talks which had began between the two countries in 1970 were halted at the end of 1973 (they were to resume only under Pompidou’s successor, Giscard d’Estaing). Paris was under the impression that Washington was now more reticent to share information with the French and give them technical advice because it did not want to compromise SALT. Pompidou thus brought exchanges to a halt and issued instead in February 1974 a new defence directive for the Armed Forces which was characterized by a renewed insistence on the independence of the French nuclear deterrent; it was again a return to Gaullist orthodoxy, albeit of a rationalized kind.91 The growing differences about détente had led Pompidou to revert to a more independent stance vis-à-vis Washington. As far as Ostpolitik was concerned, Pompidou had very mixed feelings. He was not opposed to its first period, namely that leading to the treaties between Germany and the East in 1970 to 1972. After all it had been French policy since de Gaulle’s press conference of 5 February 1964 that the German problem could be solved only after the reconciliation of Eastern and Western Europe, and that Bonn should renounce the territories beyond the Oder-Neisse line. Furthermore, alongside Pompidou’s general wish for détente in Europe, there was a very specific reason for his support of the Ostpolitik’s treaties: they consolidated the partition of Germany. French internal documents from Pompidou’s Cabinet Office allude indirectly to that consideration. The President was unequivocal when he visited Brezhnev in October 1970: he told him that France looked favourably towards the international recognition of the GDR, and that it ‘believed that one should not deprive Germany of the hope of reunification, but that [Paris] was in no hurry’.92 But from the beginning Pompidou suspected both Brandt and Moscow of having ulterior motives. Hence he was much less enthusiastic about any further evolution of Bonn’s policy towards the East beyond the early treaties and anxious about the way that any such German overture might be used by Moscow. Pompidou and his advisers were convinced, as early as December 1969, that Bonn wished through Ostpolitik ultimately to weaken the East German regime and to absorb East Germany. But this policy could misfire: the growing contacts between both Germanies could well play into the hands of the Soviets and lead, not to a ‘destabilization of the East’, but instead to a destabi-
The linkage between integration and détente
29
lization of the West and to increased Soviet influence, a process which Pompidou often described as ‘Finlandization’.93 Pompidou was also afraid that Ostpolitik could lead, given Moscow’s leverage over Bonn, to a vast Soviet–German agreement and to a kind of Soviet–German condominium over Europe, under the paramount influence of Moscow. And it should be noted here that some proponents of the Ostpolitik, certainly Egon Bahr and probably Brandt himself, were actually contemplating the formation of a European security system based upon a broad Soviet–German agreement as a means to solve the German problem, even if they were not sure about the possible timetable for such an evolution.94 In private conversations with French journalists, Pompidou stated as early as September 1970 that he feared both the new German assertiveness towards the Western Allies and the fact that the Soviet Union now had strong leverage over Bonn. He was also concerned about an eventual withdrawal of American troops in Europe (a constant obsession) which might lead to a Soviet–German agreement. Germany might then become reunified, neutralized, and armed with nuclear weapons: three nightmares for the French! The only defence was to anchor Germany to a strong Western Europe in such a way that it could no longer detach itself.95 Nothing better epitomizes Pompidou’s prudence about détente than his attitude towards the negotiations over Berlin. As is well known, the French played an important part in the negotiation of the quadripartite agreement on Berlin from September 1971. But it was the French Foreign Office which supported the negotiation: the President was from the beginning very sceptical and urged the utmost caution. He refused to make an agreement on Berlin the condition of a broad East–West détente; he would have preferred to limit the negotiation to practical matters concerning the life of West Berliners. As he had stated in October 1969: ‘one must not alter the status of Berlin.’ Of course France could not remain isolated and had to go along with the negotiation. But it would seem from the record that Pompidou played an important role in fighting to preserve quadripartite control of the city and in blocking any role for the GDR. Why was the defence of this strictly quadripartite status so important for Pompidou? The answer would appear to be that he was convinced that Berlin was the fulcrum of the East–West balance. In a long handwritten note dated 26 March 1970, the President noted ‘that quadripartism was capital because it implicated the USSR’. Any other solution would enable the East to blackmail the FRG through Berlin – a city that as he told both Brandt and Barzel was ‘the crucial and determining factor of the balance between Eastern and Western Europe’. For him the whole East–West balance and the evolution of the German question hinged on Berlin: if the status of Berlin was altered, Moscow could put pressure on the FRG and France would lose their best instrument to control the evolution of the German problem: their rights in Berlin. This clearly relates to Pompidou’s fears of early German reunification and of a large-scale deal between the Germans and Soviets.96 In 1973 Ostpolitik seemed to the French to be evolving ever more in the
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direction of those ulterior motives which Paris had always feared. On 23 November 1973, Jean-Bernard Raimond, diplomatic adviser at the Elysée, warned the President that Bonn wanted to promote the MBFR as a mean to achieve a European security system ‘relying on the withdrawal of foreign troops [hence the departure of American troops from Europe] and the guarantee of the superpowers’; that is, along the lines which the Soviets had been suggesting for 20 years.97 Pompidou’s unease was increased by what Brandt had told him on 21 June 1973. The Chancellor alluded to the possibility of a European defence organization, ‘duplicating or replacing NATO’, expressing the view that the Franco-German strategic dialogue, which had never ceased since de Gaulle and Adenauer, should become now ‘more practical’, and that in such an organization Germany could not content itself with a second-rate role, even if it was not currently seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. Without fully closing the door to a European defence arrangement, Pompidou remained very non-committal. On 9 November, the German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel brought up the subject once again with Jobert: he was more precise than Brandt, explaining that the European Community would have eventually to ‘free itself from its dependence’ on NATO, and to acquire a nuclear defence capability. Coming from the Foreign Minister of a country purporting to be the staunchest supporter of NATO on the European continent, this was a rather startling statement. What Jobert answered on 9 November is not known, but his reaction can be inferred from his speech to the Western European Union (WEU) Assembly on 21 November and from an article in Le Monde on 27 November, which was visibly inspired by him.98 On those two occasions Jobert stressed the necessity of the Atlantic Alliance, of the permanence of American troops in Europe, and of the American nuclear guarantee. To the Europeans he suggested only ‘an effort of dialogue and reflection’ in the framework of the WEU; a European defence capability ‘was a long-term affair, about which one could only say that it was not for tomorrow’. This was a very low-key answer to Scheel’s suggestions. Evidently Paris reacted quite negatively to the German overture. Quite clearly, and this goes to the heart of our theme, Pompidou’s opposition to a militarily stronger and more independent Europe was not only shaped by his preference for national independence rather than European integration, but also by the fear that such a Europe might stray from a balanced transatlantic relationship and thus steer détente into very dangerous waters as far as French interests were concerned.
Pompidou’s reaction Confronted with what was in his view the derailment of détente, Pompidou reacted in three ways. The first was by reasserting French independence in military and strategic matters: Paris’ attitude towards NATO remained uncompromising and the new presidential directive on defence of 1 February 1974, although not a full return to the ‘tous azimuts’ approach of de Gaulle, stressed French nuclear and military independence most forcefully.99 Gaullist political
The linkage between integration and détente
31
and media circles in Paris, and particularly Jobert, were meanwhile pressing for a full return to Gaullism and for an uncompromising stance towards Washington. The President however preferred to heed the more moderate counsels of the Elysée staff. He tried to reaffirm his concept of European and Western solidarity and his views about détente. An occasion to do so was provided by the difficult negotiations about an Atlantic Declaration in which Kissinger wanted to reaffirm transatlantic links and which the French feared would be an instrument to control the development of the EEC. On 3 October 1973, Jobert drew up a French draft for the Declaration, under instructions from Pompidou.100 This text brought to the fore all the French worries about détente: it reaffirmed the necessity for transatlantic solidarity and for the continuing presence of American forces in Europe; but it stressed also the need for nuclear deterrence reflecting the suspicion that the Americans were drifting towards a non-nuclear stance and fear of the possible negative consequences of SALT. The French wording stressed that the United States would not allow Europe to be put under any ‘external pressure, political or military, which might affect its freedom’ – a statement designed to block the possible consequences of the 22 June Soviet–American agreement. The text also underscored the ‘specificity’ of Europe’s defence and the contribution made to the Atlantic alliance by both European conventional forces and the nuclear deterrents of Great Britain and France. This was a way to persuade the Alliance to recognize the usefulness of the French Force de Frappe and also to open up the possibility of a future European defence identity – albeit one approached with the caution outlined by Jobert’s WEU speech. The French draft was to be a major success, much of its wording finding its way into the Ottawa Declaration adopted by the Atlantic Council on 19 June 1974 following Pompidou’s death. The French had thus managed to bring the Alliance to endorse some of their more important views about nuclear deterrence, about détente, and against ‘condominium’. At the same time they had reaffirmed Atlantic solidarity at a time when the Germans (Brandt and Scheel at least) were exploring the possibility of a new European security system and of a European defence arrangement outside of NATO in order to help German reunification. Their stance thus epitomized the rationalized Gaullism of Georges Pompidou: steadfast defence of French independence but basic solidarity with the United States in the face of the Soviet threat and the risk of Germany drifting towards neutralism. Pompidou’s third reaction was meant for the long term. He certainly believed that a deepening of European intergovernmental solidarity, possibly extending to foreign policy and defence, was the only way to steer détente into safe waters, to contain the Soviets, to keep Germany firmly in the West and to force Washington to take more into account European interests.101 In his press conference of 27 September 1973, he suggested that the European heads of state and government meet regularly to discuss political cooperation. This was to lead to the Summit of the Nine in Copenhagen in December 1973 and, ultimately, to the present
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European Council, which, it should be noted, is an organ of intergovernmental cooperation not of integration. But in his view Europe would have to develop pragmatically due to the Cold War, the German problem and the ambiguities of détente; to try to go too far too fast could be very dangerous and eventually counter-productive. As he explained to Kohl on 15 October 1973: in the case of a major East–West crisis Germany (and maybe others) would certainly not hesitate to discard European integration if it could help them safeguard their vital interests. Hence the development of Europe had to rely on practical progress, on the progressive formation of common links, interests and habits. Such links would be more difficult to discard at a time of crisis than a series of European treaties would be; it was useless for Europeans ‘to build up a wall of paper which would not survive a crisis’.102 As he wrote to Brandt on 17 October 1973, it was more important to develop Europe in practical terms than to engage in theoretical words or arguments for or against integration which would just hide the heart of the matter and prevent true progress.103 Pompidou’s world view thus remained basically Gaullist, probably even more so after détente began to take what he regarded as a dangerous direction after 1972. He told Brandt on 22 January 1973, that to become a reality Europe would have to distinguish itself from both the USSR and the US. It would be even more difficult with America, because Washington wanted to take part in the Community decision-making process and to appear as its mentor.104 He also told the Soviet ambassador in Paris on 6 November 1973 that his recent suggestions for closer cooperation among the Nine were in no way meant to regroup the member states against Moscow.105 The Elysée was quite aware of the fact that the Soviets were suspicious about the discussions of a European defence system, which went on in Western Europe in a particularly lively way in 1973.106 Furthermore, Pompidou was careful to dispel such fears when he met Gromyko on 15 February 1974: discussions about cooperation in conventional armaments were of an economic nature, not a political or military one.107 He said much the same to Brezhnev at Pitsounda on 13 March.108 Once again, it was felt that imprudent progress on some aspects of the European agenda could endanger détente and the delicate Franco-Soviet balance. At the same time, it would seem that if the linkage between détente and European integration had a special meaning for the French, it did exist and was not without long-term effects on policy. Both Pompidou and de Gaulle were convinced that European integration in the full supranational meaning of the word and détente were mutually exclusive. The relationship was more complex and less negative between détente and the Gaullist kind of cooperative Europe. But that link was reversed for de Gaulle and Pompidou: de Gaulle laid more stress on Europe when the Soviets appeared more menacing and détente was in jeopardy, while Pompidou insisted more on Europe (albeit a cooperative not an integrated one) when détente threatened to grow by itself beyond the scope of French interests.
The linkage between integration and détente
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Notes 1 Ministère des Affaires étrangères (MAE), Europe 1966–1970, URSS, Box 2672, 25.5.1966. 2 See, for instance MAE, Europe 1961–1965, URSS, vol. 1932, meeting 17.5.1965. 3 MAE, Service des pactes, vol. 322. 4 MAE, Papiers Wormser, vol. 3, Conversation 6.10.1964. 5 MAE, Papiers Wormser, vol. 3, Wormser note, 27.11.1964. 6 Letter to Erhard, 29 July 1964 cited in de Gaulle (1987, p. 82). 7 MAE, Europe 1961–1965, URSS, vol. 1932. 8 Soutou (1990), (1996, ch. VIII); Maillard (1990, pp. 247–52). 9 See the fascinating account by a Soviet diplomat based in Paris at the time: Erofeev (1988, pp. 143–53, 152–60). 10 See de Gaulle (1959, p. 62). 11 Archives Nationales (AN), Michel Debré Papers, 2 DE 62. 12 See esp. Peyrefitte (2000, pp. 195–207). 13 de Gaulle (1970a, pp. 239–42). For his 1944 to 1945 ideas see Soutou (1994). 14 Soutou, ‘Frankreich und die Deutschlandfrage 1943 bis 1945’ in Volkmann (1996); Soutou (1996). 15 Fondation Charles de Gaulle (2000). 16 Fondation Charles de Gaulle (1999). 17 See e.g. the very cool talks between de Gaulle and Vinogradov on 23 November 1960 (MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, entretiens), on 23 February 1961 (MAE, Europe 1961–1965, URSS, vol. 1930) and ‘note pour le secrétaire général a.s. Relations franco-soviétiques’, same volume, 29.3.1962. 18 MAE, Europe 1961–1965, URSS, vol. 1930, note, 21.9.1962; telegrams from Moscow, 5 and 6.2.1963; circular telegram, 8.2.1963; note, 14.2.1963. 19 Vaïsse (1993, pp. 41–53). 20 de Gaulle (1985, p. 73). 21 de Gaulle (1970b, p. 220). 22 de Gaulle (1985, pp. 382–3). 23 de Gaulle (1985, pp. 398–9). 24 Soutou (1996). 25 Froment-Meurice (1998, pp. 202–3). 26 See Soutou (1996). 27 Wolton (1997, pp. 272ff). 28 Froment-Meurice (1998, p. 213). 29 de Gaulle (1970b, p. 411). 30 Froment-Meurice (1998, pp. 228, 234–5, 237–8). 31 MAE, Série des Pactes, vol. 409. 32 Soutou (1996, pp. 277–80). 33 MAE, Europe 1960–1965, URSS, vol. 1931, note, 5.1.1965. 34 Ibid., Paris to Moscow telegram, 8.1.1965. 35 Ibid., note, 25.1.1965. 36 de Gaulle (1970c, pp. 338–42). 37 Alphand (1977, p. 445). 38 MAE, Europe 1960–1965, URSS, vol. 1931, multiple notes. 39 de Gaulle (1970c, pp. 348–9). 40 Soutou (1996, pp. 287ff). 41 De Gaulle explained his views to a Cabinet committee on 4 February 1966. See de Gaulle (1987, pp. 246ff). 42 MAE, Europe 1961–1965, URSS, vol. 1932, note by the Sous-direction d’Europe oriental, 20.4.1965. 43 de Gaulle (1970d, pp. 101–2).
34 44 45 46 47 48
49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82
G.-H. Soutou de Gaulle (1987, pp. 295–6). MAE, Europe 1966–1970, URSS, box 2672. Maillard (1990, p. 241). For de Gaulle’s views in 1944 to 1945 see Soutou (1994). de Gaulle (1970d, pp. 212–13). Renaud (1999). See also Soutou, ‘De Gaulle’s France and the Soviet Union from conflict to Détente’ in Eastern Europe and Western Europe in the Cold War (1965–1975), proceedings of the Conference in Muenster, 21–23 October 2004 (forthcoming). Newhouse (1967); Peyrefitte (1997, pp. 284. 295–6). ‘Perspectives européennes’, 27.12.1965; ‘Quel est le grand dessein?’, 4 and 5–6.2.1966 (reprinted in Aron (1997)). Weit (1971, p. 188). Françoise de La Serre, ‘De Gaulle et la candidature britannique aux Communautés européennes’ in Institut Charles de Gaulle (1992). Kissinger (1979, pp. 106–11). See de Gaulle (1970d, pp. 332–5); see also Wormser (1978, pp. 590–605, 31–45). Debré (1993, pp. 260–1). He expressed these fears frequently, for instance, to Heath on 21 May 1973. Cited by Roussel (1994, p. 653). Georges-Henri Soutou, ‘L’attitude de Georges Pompidou face à l’Allemagne’, in Association Georges Pompidou (1995). AN, 5AG2 1018. AN, 5AG2 1018, meeting with Brezhnev 13.10.1970. For Pompidou’s views before 1969 see Sulzberger (1973) and Peyrefitte (1994). Sulzberger (1973, pp. 216–17). Pompidou (1974). See Peyrefitte (1997, p. 25) and Sulzberger (1973, pp. 4, 406). AN, 5AG2 1017, Pompidou’s annotation on Moscow telegram, 2.1.1971. He said as much to Brezhnev on 29 October 1971, AN, 5AG2 1018. AN, 5AG2 1041, esp. Raimond note, 7.8.1969 and Pompidou conversation with Jean de Lipkowski, 6.1.1970. See also AN, 5AG2 1018, Pompidou underlinings on Quai note, 2.10.1970. AN, 5AG2 1011, Pompidou–Brandt meetings, 4.12.1971, 10.2.1972. AN, 5AG2 1022, Pompidou–Rogers meeting, 8.12.1969; National Archives, RG59/67–69/Box 2103; AN, 5AG2 1041, Raimond to Pompidou, 18.11.1969, 21.1.1970; AN, 5AG2 1021, Pompidou to Nixon, 1.7.1972. AN, 5AG2 1018, Brezhnev–Pompidou meeting, 13.10.1970. AN, 5AG2 1018, Pompidou meeting with the Soviet leadership, 7.10.1970. AN, 5AG2 1022, Pompidou–Shriver meeting, 23.7.1969. AN, 5AG2 1022, Pompidou–Rogers meeting, 8.12.1969; National Archives, RG59/67–69/Box 2103; AN 5AG2 1041, Raimond to Pompidou, 18.11.1969, 21.1.1970. In his private conversations after the meeting Nixon declared himself quite satisfied; see Sulzberger (1973, pp. 614–15). Soutou (2000). As Kissinger told Lucet on 13 April 1970; AN, 5AG2 1021, Lucet to Schumann, 14.4.1970. Association Georges Pompidou (1995). AN, 5AG2 1010. AN, 5AG2 1010, Pompidou to Barzel, 5.3.1970; Pompidou to Brandt, 25.1.1971. AN, 5AG2 1012. AN, 5AG2 1009. AN, 5AG2 1010, meeting with Brandt, 25.1.1971. AN, 5AG2 1011.
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83 AN, 5AG2/1041, Pompidou marginal notation on a document from the Quai d’Orsay, 13.5.1971. 84 AN, 5AG2/1018, Raimond to Pompidou, 8.10.1971. 85 National Archives, RG 59/Nos 70–3/Box 2278, Paris telegram, 20.9.1972. 86 AN, 5AG2 1018, Raimond to Pompidou, 12.6.1972. 87 AN, 5AG2 1018. 88 AN, 5AG2 1021. 89 AN, 5AG2 1019, Quai note, 20.6.1973. 90 AN, 5AG2 1021, Raimond to Pompidou, 3.5.1973. 91 Soutou (2004). 92 Roussel (1994, pp. 395ff). 93 This was Raimond’s point of view. See AN, 5AG2 1010, notes 6.11, 8.12.1969. 94 See W. Link ‘Außen- und Deutschlandpolitik in der Ära Brandt 1969–1974’ in Bracher et al. (1986, pp. 169ff). 95 Roussel (1994, pp. 393–4). 96 For a more detailed account see Soutou (2004b). 97 For the Cabinet splits this caused, see Link, ‘Außen- und Deutschlandpolitik’ in Bracher et al. (1986, p. 231). 98 See Le Monde, 23.11.1973. 99 Soutou (2000). 100 AN, 5AG2 1021. 101 Soutou, ‘L’attitude de Georges Pompidou face à l’Allemagne’, in Association Georges Pompidou (1995). 102 AN, 5AG2 1012. 103 AN, 5AG2 1009. 104 AN, 5AG2 1012. 105 AN, 5AG2 1019. 106 AN, 5AG2 1019, Robin to Pompidou, 13.2.1974. 107 AN, 5AG2 1019. 108 AN, 5AG2 1019.
2
‘Grandeur et dépendances’ The dilemmas of Gaullist foreign policy, September 1967 to April 1968 Garret Martin
During de Gaulle’s tenure as French President, France famously twice vetoed British applications to join the European Economic Community (EEC). The first veto, made during de Gaulle’s press conference of 14 January 1963 is certainly the more famous and spectacular of the two. De Gaulle, in his characteristically grandiloquent style, not only vetoed the British application but also rejected the American offer to set up a Multilateral Force (MLF), and by doing so effectively kick-started a more ambitious and independent foreign policy for France. The second veto of December 1967, while seemingly less spectacular and more cautious, was nonetheless also a very categorical no to the British.1 Not surprisingly, the literature on de Gaulle has tended to focus far more on the first rejection of the British candidacy than the second. This is unfortunate since the second rejection proved an equally important event. As had been the case in January 1963, the need to decide on the British candidacy in December 1967 took place at a time when the future of the Western world seemed at a crossroads, with important ongoing negotiations on the international monetary system and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) approaching their conclusion. Yet, unlike 1963, the second British question also reached its climax during an important period for East–West relations in Europe. Thus, while the first veto by France announced a new ambitious foreign policy in the aftermath of the Algerian War, the second veto and other intertwined events dramatically underlined the limits and shortcomings of Gaullist foreign policy. The prestige of Gaullist France relied greatly on its strong commitment to key principles, such as national independence, détente in Europe, or the value of gold in a new international monetary system. However, in the period September 1967 to April 1968, France faced an underlying dilemma: was it preferable to be in the right and true to one’s principles, but alone; or compromise, at the risk of being in contradiction with one’s principles, so as to avoid international isolation?
Immobilism in the East . . . De Gaulle undoubtedly attached great importance to his trip to Poland in September 1967. De Gaulle had gone to Moscow in June 1966 with the idea of convincing the Soviet leaders to accept détente in Europe and to show more
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flexibility on the German question. The trip to Poland, by contrast, was, according to French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville, part of the plan ‘to disengage Europe from the bloc system and to accentuate the opening of Eastern Europe, while still recognising the postwar borders’.2 France could not hope immediately to detach the satellite states from the Eastern Bloc, but to overcome the Cold War in Europe it had to encourage them to become more active in European affairs and show more independence from Moscow. Finally, the trip would hopefully promote French prestige, strengthen Franco-Polish relations, and prove an important stage in the blossoming rapprochement between Western and Eastern Europe. Such a rapprochement depended ultimately on West Germany improving its relations with the states of the Eastern Bloc. The Grand Coalition, in power in West Germany since December 1966, had made a new Ostpolitik one of its major policy aims, and relations with France had consequently improved as Bonn had enlisted the support of its neighbour. Bonn’s appreciation of help from Paris had only grown once its policy towards Eastern Europe started to face increasing resistance from the satellite states. In the weeks preceding de Gaulle’s trip to Poland, West German officials repeatedly lobbied the French government. The West German ambassador in Paris met de Gaulle a few days before his departure to find out more details about the trip. The chargé d’affaires of the West German Embassy in Paris, Limburg, in a meeting with Jacques de Beaumarchais, the Directeur Politique of the Quai d’Orsay, expressed the hope that de Gaulle would treat the question of post-war borders with maximum discretion. He further indicated that Bonn would appreciate it if France could not only support its Ostpolitik in front of the Poles, but also point out that West Germany sincerely wanted to improve relations with Poland.3 Bonn’s plea for help proved a mixed blessing for France, however. On the one hand, it gave the French government a trump card in its relations with Bonn, allowing it to demand cooperation in other political fields. For example, after de Gaulle’s visit to West Germany in July 1967, Couve had made it ‘brutally clear’ that West Germany had now to choose between either forceful support for the British application for admission to the EEC or alignment with de Gaulle on the policy of détente. On the other hand, de Gaulle faced a difficult juggling act with his trip to Poland. He needed to plead the West German cause while giving the Poles satisfaction on the issue of post-war borders. He also needed to encourage Poland to show more independence while not angering Moscow. Despite the warm reception which the French President received, the inflexibility of the Polish leaders, and especially Gomulka, meant that de Gaulle’s trip to Poland was at best a half-success. To de Gaulle’s claims, in a speech to the Polish Diet, that security in Europe could only exist through détente and entente between the states rather than through the futile opposition of two blocs, Gomulka firmly replied by describing the alliance with the Soviet Union as the ‘cornerstone of Polish foreign policy’.4 During private talks, Gomulka proved equally inflexible on the issue of West Germany. He pointed out to de Gaulle that Polish policy on the German problem (i.e. rejecting German reunification in
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favour of the recognition of the two Germanies) was even more dogmatic than Soviet policy and the only good policy, and that France could not expect concessions from Poland on the subject.5 Privately, de Gaulle clearly felt frustrated with the limited results of his trip. During a meeting of the French cabinet, de Gaulle poured scorn on a Polish government which ‘barely remembers that Poland is in Europe’.6 Yet, whether they described the trip as a half-success or a half-failure, de Gaulle and his aides considered the trip to be a true breakthrough. Looking at it on a long-term basis, they surely believed that the trip would provide momentum to the struggle of the peoples of Eastern Europe for the liberalisation of their regimes and greater independence towards Moscow.7 Thus, despite the negative experience in Poland, de Gaulle refused to give up on a policy for Europe to which he was greatly attached.8 For de Gaulle, a temporary setback could not stop the inexorable march towards East–West détente in Europe. Not all observers, however, shared de Gaulle’s optimism. While Le Monde acknowledged that the trip had produced some interesting results, especially for Franco-Polish relations, it also pointed out that the visit to Poland highlighted the limits of Gaullist policy. The states of Eastern Europe applauded French policy when it weakened Western solidarity, but their leaders quickly ran away when asked to follow in France’s footsteps.9 Such an assessment proved all too accurate, and many authors later singled out the trip to Poland as an important turning point in explaining the shortcomings of de Gaulle’s attempts to foster East–West détente in Europe. Thus, Jean Lacouture concluded that the trip to Poland showed de Gaulle that the ‘the Kremlin would control any possible contacts between East and West’, while Catherine Durandin observed that Gomulka’s speech to the Diet ‘clearly marked the limits of French ambitions’.10 There is certainly no clear consensus, however, when it comes to assessing whether de Gaulle’s own performance in Poland played a part in provoking the backlash against French policy. On the one hand, Maurice Vaïsse points out that while de Gaulle’s speech to the Polish Diet was less blatant in style than the famous speeches in Quebec or Phnom Penh, it was equally clear in content as he called on Poland to follow France’s independent model and distance itself from Moscow; and for Rey, this call for ‘revolt’ undoubtedly worried the Soviet leaders.11 On the other hand, Thierry Wolton talked of the trip to Poland as an embarrassment for de Gaulle and his supporters. After the speeches of Phnom Penh and the Quebec scandal, ‘it was hard to find equivalents in the speeches in Poland that would credit the idea that de Gaulle maintained a good equilibrium between East and West’; Charles Roussel agreed, pointing out that de Gaulle showed a very moderate attitude towards the socialist bloc and lacked conviction when criticising the policy of blocs in the Polish Diet.12 Yet, while both views are to a certain extent correct, they tend to ignore the central point. Of course, de Gaulle’s calls for greater Polish independence from Moscow tended to be lacklustre and cryptic. On one occasion, for example, he invited Poland to ‘look a bit further, a bit bigger’ and pointed out that: ‘Obstacles that seem insurmountable today, you [Poland] will overcome without
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doubt. You know what I am referring to.’13 But he could neither afford nor did he want to cause the same degree of shock as with the speeches in Phnom Penh and Quebec. As mentioned before, de Gaulle went to Poland with the idea of increasing the momentum of East–West détente in Europe. In order to do so, he needed to keep Poland, West Germany and the Soviet Union happy and on board, a feat that was only possible through nuanced and carefully balanced rhetoric. France, however, faced a dilemma in the sense that while it possessed a clear strategy, it lacked a vast array of tactics. During his visit, de Gaulle gave the Poles satisfaction on the question of post-war borders and shied away from major criticism of the Soviet Union, but in exchange he met with serious Polish inflexibility on the German question and little to show for Bonn. Aside from promoting the policy of détente, what else could France do to influence other countries, to keep the momentum of détente going if a country or group of countries showed greater rigidity? In the months following de Gaulle’s trip to Poland, France’s policy of East–West détente in Europe faced ever growing obstacles. This is not to say that the policy lost its momentum altogether. Indeed, the process of consultation and mutual visits with the countries of the Eastern Bloc continued unabated. The Czech President Josef Lenart visited Paris in October 1967, while his Hungarian counterpart Jeno Fock followed in March 1968; the French General Ailleret visited Moscow in October 1967, and the French Minister for Armies Pierre Messmer met his Soviet counterpart in April 1968. These regular contacts, nevertheless, could not hide the fact that the French efforts towards détente clearly appeared to be stuttering in this period. Both Moscow’s growing rigidity and the Soviet attempts to restore discipline within the Eastern Bloc – suggested by Gomulka’s speech to de Gaulle and confirmed in the following period – played a central role in frustrating France’s policy. In addition, as some of the satellite states showed less flexibility; the tone they adopted towards France became far less lenient. For example, Prace, the organ of the Czech trade unions, welcomed de Gaulle’s visit to Poland, but it also sent an explicit warning to the French President: The noble words of De Gaulle did not fool the sharp observer when it came to the little diplomatic subtleties by which he tried to tell his interlocutors about the need for stronger national feelings. De Gaulle would obviously welcome what in the West they describe – in the relations between socialist states – as the ‘policy of independence’ towards the Soviet Union. It is also why there are some divergences in views between France and Poland on the German problem.14 Like Gomulka, the journal wanted to reaffirm the solidarity between the socialist states and the Soviet Union, and warn de Gaulle that French policy would go nowhere if it tried to threaten that link. Not surprisingly, France’s attempts to foster East–West détente further faltered because Franco-Soviet relations suffered from Moscow’s hardening stance
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in European affairs. As pointed out by Jacques Andréani, deputy director of the Quai d’Orsay in charge of Soviet and Eastern European affairs, ‘for some time now Russia and we have been playing hide and seek with each other’. He added that the Soviets kept suggesting taking a new step forward, but then remained very vague about what that step should be.15 The Soviet Union remained very wary, especially of West Germany, and far more interested in the status quo.16 During talks with their French counterparts, Soviet officials wanted primarily to discuss the question of a European security conference and a possible FrancoSoviet pact. Any such conference would undoubtedly confirm the status quo in Europe, and in bonus the Soviets could exploit the theme of the conference in order to jeopardise Western solidarity. For example, Valerian Zorine, the Soviet ambassador to Paris, suggested to de Gaulle that a time close to April 1969, or the date of the revision of the North Atlantic Treaty, constituted a favourable period to consider the question of European security in a different manner than through military blocs.17 Similarly, the insistence with which Zorine pushed for a FrancoSoviet pact led Hervé Alphand, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to believe that Moscow was seeking nothing else apart from further detaching France from the Western world.18 On the other hand, the Soviets remained deaf to any French calls for help on the issue of East–West détente in Europe. In particular, de Gaulle insisted to Zorine in two meetings that any improvement in Moscow’s relations with Bonn could have a vital impact on the cause of détente.19 If anything though, the Soviet attitude towards Bonn hardened in the period between late 1967 and early 1968. Moscow added more and more pre-conditions to any signing of a declaration with Bonn banning the use of force, and stepped up its propaganda campaign against the Federal Republic. In December 1967, for instance, Moscow denounced the rise of neo-Nazism in West Germany, and in January 1968 a further note condemned Bonn’s policies towards West Berlin. France obviously appeared powerless when it came to convincing the Soviets to show more leniency towards West Germany, and, to make matters worse, external problems made Moscow even less amenable to East–West détente. This became very apparent following the nomination of Alexandr Dubcek as the new General Secretary of the Czech Communist Party in January 1968 and the start of his attempt to liberalise the country’s regime. For, if de Gaulle welcomed the arrival of Dubcek as a victory for the supporters of liberalisation, he also undoubtedly feared the chain impact of this nomination in Eastern Europe.20 As Messmer was to find when he visited Moscow during the spring of 1968 there was a high risk that the Soviets might intervene to restore discipline in Czechoslovakia. Marshal Gretchko, the Soviet Minister for Defence, for instance, commented of the Prague Spring: ‘We won’t tolerate for long this Czech policy supported by the German revanchards. We will soon take the right dispositions to end this.’21 As with the Soviet’s relations with West Germany, France again appeared powerless and incapable of influencing the events in Czechoslovakia. The fate of Eastern Europe and East–West détente was not in France’s hands; all it could do was wait, hope the events would develop in its favour, and certainly not interfere or try to worsen the dissensions within the Eastern Bloc.22
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The French government certainly seemed very aware of the difficulties encountered by its policy of détente towards the end of 1967. Couve, for example, complained to Willy Brandt, the West German Foreign Minister, about the rigidity of Soviet policy, and the general immobilism in East–West affairs and within NATO. However, he also added that immobilism was an easier position to adopt, at least in the short term.23 Once again, a categorical belief in the success of the French ideas of détente in the long term led many within the French government to underestimate the difficulties faced by their policies. Asked in an interview to give his impressions about the general immobilism in East–West affairs, Couve first pointed out that the idea of détente was now accepted by nearly all the states of Europe. He then explained that the relative stalling of détente was down to an unfavourable international context – with the continuing Vietnam War – and the ongoing German problem that would take a long time to solve.24 Convinced of the validity of its ideas, France resigned itself to a passive attitude, waiting for the international context to become more favourable. However, time was evidently not on France’s side. In the East, the growing rigidity risked worsening as the Soviets debated about how to deal with the Czech efforts to liberalise their regime. Moreover, developments in the West threatened to offer a more credible alternative to the French model of East–West détente. On 16 December 1966, during a NATO Ministerial Meeting, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), on the initiative of Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel, decided to ‘undertake a large analysis of the international changes that have occurred since 1949, in view of determining their influence on the Atlantic Alliance and to define the tasks that it should accomplish so as to reinforce the Atlantic Alliance as an element of lasting peace’.25 The NAC expected the representatives of the member states to complete their analysis by the NATO ministerial meeting of December 1967. The Harmel report, as it came to be called, sought mainly to prepare the Atlantic Alliance for the date of April 1969, and to give it a new political raison d’être after the shock of the French withdrawal from NATO’s military integrated structure. The problems over the sections of the Harmel report dealing with East–West détente in Europe only really began to surface for France as the drafting of the report reached its critical phase in the autumn of 1967. According to Bozo, France faced a clear dilemma. It realised that the Harmel report offered an opportunity for the US to reunite the Atlantic Alliance and to lead the process of détente, thereby undermining the French impact in the East–West dimension. Yet, as the Harmel report took on board many of de Gaulle’s ideas on détente, France could find itself in clear contradiction with its own policies if it distanced itself too far from the report’s conclusions.26 Unquestionably, the US hoped to give NATO a larger role in the conduct of East–West affairs. The American Permanent Representative to NATO, Harlan Cleveland, pointed out in an interview that the Atlantic Alliance offered ‘an appropriate frame to organise the policy of détente’ and that the West faced ‘more and more a problem of political and diplomatic coordination’.27 Such an approach, of course, was not compatible with a French policy that
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refused the ‘institution, even in appearance, of a policy of blocs which, while claiming to reinforce and harmonise the initiatives of allies, would only perpetuate a situation of Cold War’.28 Yet the relative unity and determination of the 14 other members of NATO to proceed with the Harmel report offered little room for a totally negative French position. The best Roger Seydoux, the French Permanent Representative in NATO, could do was to focus on the drafting of the report, and to remove the formulas that referred to the ‘organisation’ or ‘harmonisation’ of détente within the Atlantic Alliance, or that sounded like a refutation of Gaullist foreign policy.29 In conclusion, as argued especially by Vaïsse and Bozo, the adoption of the Harmel report in December 1967, with its twin emphases on defence and détente, represented a great victory for the US and its conception of détente. By ‘Atlanticising’ détente, NATO said yes to détente and no to the dissolution of blocs, which was one of the central aims of de Gaulle’s policy of détente.30 The Harmel report effectively gave NATO a new impetus to take a more active role in East–West détente. In the spring of 1968, in order to give the Harmel report a concrete content, General Secretary of NATO Manlio Brosio came up with a list of proposals focusing on arms control, disarmament the promotion of East–West détente, and the German question.31 The setbacks of France’s policy of East–West détente in both the Eastern and Western world naturally affected the confidence of some French officials. Alphand, for example, complained that: Everything is in a dead end: West Germany is not accepting either the postwar borders or the existence of East Germany, the Soviets prefer the status quo, and Brandt still persists with the search for détente with Eastern Europe.32 A similar gloom also applied to some of the West German officials. After some minor successes during the summer of 1967, with the trade agreement with Czechoslovakia and Brandt’s visit to Romania, Bonn’s Ostpolitik seemed once again to be stalling in the face of the rigidity and inflexibility of some of the states of the Eastern Bloc. During the meeting of the West German representatives in Eastern Europe in Bonn on 4–5 December 1967, the mood was decidedly pessimistic. They agreed that in 1968, with the exception of Yugoslavia, West German diplomacy could expect no key development with Eastern Europe.33 Such dejection was not without consequence for Franco-German relations. De Gaulle’s declarations in Poland on the irreversible nature of the postwar borders created controversy in the West German press. The discussions then spread to the whole of West Germany’s Ostpolitik. With the latter’s lack of success, some implicitly questioned the usefulness of the Paris–Bonn link, considering that France’s aid had not enabled the German government to achieve its aims.34 With the stalling process of East–West détente, France was in serious risk of losing its trump card over Bonn and endangering the latter’s cooperation in other political domains, especially for Western affairs. To sum up, de Gaulle’s policy of détente faced serious problems well before
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the Soviet coup in Prague in August 1968, even if the coup effectively sounded its death-knell.35 Due to both the growing rigidity within the Eastern Bloc and the competition within the Western Bloc, French ambitions were quickly losing steam in late 1967 and early 1968. Moreover, this faltering in East–West affairs undoubtedly weakened France in other political domains. Concretely, the stalling affecting East–West affairs undermined the Paris–Bonn link, and symbolically, France appeared more vulnerable at an important period for the future of the Western world.
Defeat in the West Events during the summer of 1967 led some members of the international press to speak of a certain ‘thaw’ in France’s relations with the Western world, and especially with the US. Problems still existed, of course, between the two countries, but the Ailleret-Lemnitzer agreement of August on the cooperation between French troops and NATO troops in West Germany, the London agreement of 26 August on the reform of the international monetary system, and the French decision to return to an annual authorisation for US overflights of French territory suggested at least a certain respite in the ongoing FrancoAmerican conflict.36 Yet, rather than a thaw, this proved to be the calm before the storm. Many elements of this thaw were in fact highly misleading. In early September 1967, a compromise on the reform of the international monetary system appeared possible. A system where the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) progressively replaced the dollar, subordinated to the same discipline as other currencies, and that gave the Six greater influence, was compatible, in key issues, with the ideas on the international monetary system of de Gaulle’s press conference of February 1965. But this compromise was fragile and unlikely to last.37 Moreover, on the issue of the annual authorisations for US overflights, it actually turned out that the decision had been taken without de Gaulle’s clearance.38 Finally, the discussions around the Harmel report and the British application to join the EEC had not yet reached their critical phase. Between late 1967 and early 1968 however, the storm effectively erupted because several questions central to the future of the Western world approached their conclusion, including the Harmel report, the reform of the international monetary system and the British application to join the European Economic Community. The challenge for France was how to deal with these intertwined but largely independent questions, brought closer to one another by the coincidence of timing. De Gaulle faced as complicated a juggling act with his Westpolitik as he did in his relations with the Eastern Bloc. An inherent tension existed between the various aims pursued by France and it needed to find a way to reconcile them. Indeed, there is a grain of truth in Kuisel’s assertion that France’s campaign against the dollar, and the quest for monetary reform, resulted from a will to elevate Europe and France over the Anglo-Saxons in the running of the international monetary system, and to end the Anglo-Saxon dominance of the
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International Monetary Fund (IMF).39 This really meant that, without the support of the other members of the EEC, the French government would find it near impossible to achieve the desired reform of the international monetary system and the IMF. For example, French Minister of Finance Michel Debré primarily accepted the London agreement as a way of highlighting the cohesion of the six members of the EEC, and because it ensured the EEC a veto in the IMF voting procedure on the SDRs.40 On the other hand, France also wanted to veto the second British application to join the EEC and limit the impact of the Harmel report, which stood in stark contrast with the other members’ support for both the British candidacy and the efforts to strengthen NATO. Thus, the test for France was how to keep the other members of the EEC on board in the monetary sphere while achieving its aims towards the Harmel report and the British candidacy. As the problems of interdependence became more acute for France from September 1967 onward, the need to elaborate a successful strategy grew accordingly. In the monetary field, France put a primacy on maintaining cohesion between the Six. This desire only increased as the fragile London accord started to erode. In a letter to the American Secretary of the Treasury Henry Fowler, Debré expressed his concerns about some of Fowler’s declarations that appeared to contravene the decisions of the London agreement. Debré pointed out that the SDRs could not be considered reserve instruments of the same quality as gold or dollar and sterling, and he reaffirmed his desire for both a reform of the IMF and a resolution of the US’ balance of payments problems.41 Clearly, Debré felt that the Anglo-Saxon powers were stepping up their attacks in the monetary field, especially the US. In his view, the Americans followed the age-old tactic of ‘divide and rule’, putting under constant pressure and trying to win over to their policies some of the states of the EEC, with a view to both preventing a unanimous opposition of the Six to the implementation of the SDR mechanism, and to limit any reform of the IMF.42 In these circumstances, France could feasibly maintain the cohesion of the Six only if it dealt with the questions of the Harmel report and the British application with great tact. Fundamentally, France’s opposition to the British candidacy was well known. It distrusted Britain and its intentions towards Europe, and these misgivings were only increased by the sudden nature of the Labour government of Harold Wilson’s conversion to the merits of EEC membership.43 However, despite this opposition, France still needed to determine the best strategy to go about rejecting the British bid. A fascinating document from the Archives Nationales – basically a memorandum of an Inner Cabinet meeting involving de Gaulle, Prime Minister Georges Pompidou, Couve, Debré and French permanent representative to the EEC Jean-Marc Boegner – offers a rare insight into the French top-level decision-making and choice of strategy. All the participants agreed to reject Britain’s entry to the EEC, but expressed differing opinions on how best to proceed. While de Gaulle emphasised mostly the need for France to be firm in its position, the other participants attached more importance to presentation and tactics. A consensus, though, seemed to emerge on two
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distinct tactics: first, pushing forward a discussion about whether or not Britain was ready to join the EEC, with the clear implication that it was not ready, especially due to its monetary problems; second, playing the card of cohesion by suggesting that a Community of ten members might not be viable, and could disintegrate because of the increased number of obstacles it would face.44 These tactics, in the French view, possessed distinct advantages. According to Couve, they were likely to confuse the other EEC member states, as they amounted not to a straight yes or no, but to a debate about the state of Britain. In addition, they placed the onus on Britain to demonstrate its suitability for EEC membership rather than obliging France to make a strong case against.45 France wanted the discussions between the Six to centre mostly on Britain’s state, and had early on adopted the issue of the UK’s monetary problems as a possible way of rejecting the British application.46 Yet, as the pressures on the pound sterling to devalue grew inexorably in October to November 1967, France attempted to kill two birds with one stone. In effect, France indirectly tied its opposition to the British application with its opposition to the current international monetary system. In his public speeches during this period, Couve did his best to give the impression that France did not reject the British candidacy a priori, but he pointed out that an enlarged Community might not survive. He then added, for Britain only, that it was hard to imagine the latter joining as long as the pound sterling remained an international reserve currency, and thus remained at odds with the national currencies of the Six.47 When Britain finally devalued the pound sterling on 18 November, France used the opportunity to step up its attacks. During his press conference of 27 November, de Gaulle used the devaluation of the pound to both launch another scathing attack on the dollar and to advocate a new international monetary system centred on gold, and to veto the British application to join the EEC.48 French problems with the Harmel report began to loom ever larger from September 1967 onwards. As Bozo notes, France’s dissatisfaction during this period threatened to turn into all-out opposition.49 The member states of NATO had agreed to create four subgroups for the report, each of which was to complete draft conclusions by the end of September: the first group, headed by Watson and Schuetz, focused on East–West relations; the second, headed by Paul-Henri Spaak, on inter-allied relations; the third, headed by Foy Kohler, dealt with defence policy; the fourth, headed by Professor Patijn, examined NATO’s relations with the outside world. If France tolerated the ideas of the first group and was indifferent to the conclusions of the third, it considered the views of the second and fourth group to be barely hidden attacks on French policy.50 Yet, France avoided an all-out confrontation on the Harmel report in September to October, mainly in order to maintain cohesion with its allies in the EEC. Rather, it adopted the tried-and-tested method of the carrot and the stick with the intention of limiting the impact of the Harmel report. For the stick, de Gaulle relied on the threat of withdrawing from the Atlantic Alliance altogether. During a meeting with Manlio Brosio, the NATO Secretary-General, de Gaulle sent a clear warning to his Allies. While reaffirming France’s loyalty to the Atlantic
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Alliance and its likely adherence to the Treaty after 1969, he stated that any attempts by the Allies to ‘transform the Atlantic Alliance’ or to turn the Atlantic Alliance into a political alliance designed ‘to control and direct East–West relations’ – an oblique reference to the Harmel report – might force France to act otherwise.51 At the same time, France tried to coordinate policy with West Germany and convince Bonn that the Harmel report should not be too ambitious. Couve insisted to Brandt that he perceived the Harmel report to be a purely academic report, which should not attempt to define a common foreign policy of the 15 member states of NATO.52 Yet, for all its efforts, France could not altogether avoid the dilemmas and the tensions inherent in a strategy – maintaining the cohesion of the Six in the monetary field while acting cautiously in NATO and over the British application – that required France to play its limited cards extremely well at all times. In essence, the difficult juggling act within its Westpolitik drove France towards imperfect solutions. Starting with the monetary question, France could not escape the fact that ‘the five partners of the Common Market, under strong Anglo-Saxon pressure, were slowly accepting the idea that the SDRs might not be a form of credit, but rather the outline of a real international currency detached from gold’.53 Such a development, of course, was anathema to de Gaulle as it involved both the Five accepting the Anglo-Saxon monetary theses and a rejection of gold, which for de Gaulle was to play a central role in a new international monetary system. Moreover, and perhaps even more problematic, to what extent was the financial context favourable for a reform of the international monetary system? After Britain devalued the pound sterling, France seemingly fanned the speculative flames by leaking unsettling financial news to the press – for example, by informing Le Monde of its secret withdrawal from the gold pool in June 1967 – and by encouraging other countries, especially China, Algeria and the communist states, to convert their dollars into gold. However, by mid-December, France had become more concerned with the deepening financial crisis and afterwards generally refrained from unsettling actions.54 Paradoxically, the deepening crisis within the international monetary system made matters more difficult for France and its quest for reform. A complete breakdown of the current system was hardly in the interest of France, due to the unforeseeable consequences for its economy. Equally, France faced increasing dilemmas as the Harmel report reached its critical phase between late October and mid-December 1967. France felt trapped, clearly finding many of the Harmel report conclusions unacceptable, but hesitating to break completely with the 14, especially West Germany. In addition, the fear of isolation was even more acute at a time when the possibility of France vetoing the British application caused problems with its EEC partners.55 To make matters worse, the US and Belgium were extremely aware of the need to find a good balance between firmness and openness when dealing with French obstruction.56 They both pressured France and avoided actions that would push it to the sidelines, while they discreetly informed the other states of
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their determination to go through with the Harmel report and to give it a meaningful content. The result was that as the Harmel report approached its conclusion, France increasingly faced a hardened and regrouped opposition from the 14, which significantly reduced its margin of action.57 In the end, as Cleveland put it, France ‘preferred the embarrassment of compromises to the risk of rejection’.58 It accepted the Harmel report, which undoubtedly was a great victory for the US. France compromised on the Harmel report in part because it did not want to further anger its partners within the EEC in view of their imminent veto of the British candidacy. In the end, France realised it could not gain satisfaction on both fronts and had to choose. However, the decision did not prove as beneficial as expected. As mentioned previously, Couve and others felt confident that the French tactic towards Britain – placing the onus on Britain – would be successful in preventing a full-blown crisis within the EEC of the sort which had occurred in 1963. Others, though, felt differently. Alphand believed that the great forthcoming crisis would occur once the partners of the EEC realised that France viewed the opening of any negotiations with Britain as pointless;59 and his judgement proved all too accurate. France, as pointed out in the early part of this chapter, expected Bonn to cooperate in Western matters in return for its support for Ostpolitik. In particular, while France realised that West Germany was favourable to Britain joining the EEC, it did not expect Bonn to start a confrontation on the matter. Indeed, Kiesinger in his speeches opposed the idea of forcing France on the issue of Britain, because he viewed relations with France as essential and because he felt that ‘if you want to bring a girl to the altar, you must first persuade her’.60 Nevertheless, pressure was mounting on the German government in the latter months of 1967 to support Britain more vocally. The relative loss of popularity of de Gaulle in West Germany, added to the frustration with the slow progress of Ostpolitik, pushed many Germans to insist that Britain join the EEC, despite the problems it would cause.61 For example, in early December the Commission for Foreign Affairs of the Bundestag asked the German government to be firm and not let Paris ‘create a breach between Bonn and its four partners’.62 In the end, France gained satisfaction. The EEC Council of Ministers could only note the disagreement at the meeting on 19 December and decide to postpone sine diem the negotiations with Britain. Couve, a day later, expressed his relief as the meeting ended in disagreement, but not with the crisis desired by Britain.63 However, while the French veto did not cause a crisis as in 1963, it was still to have some important consequences, noticeably in the important negotiations over the international monetary system in early 1968. Indeed, the IMF countries had agreed at the end of the Rio meeting, on 29 September 1967, that they would study by 31 March 1968 at the latest a report concerning the implementation of the SDRs and the reform of the IMF. The prospects for France, though, seemed quite gloomy in early 1968, especially following the difficult compromise over the Harmel report and the pyrrhic victory on the British question. True, the French veto did not cause a crisis as
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spectacular as the one in 1963, and the other members reacted with a mix of anger and resignation. But the British application remained on the EEC’s agenda, and as such was likely to continue to undermine the cohesion between the Six. This could only have important consequences, considering that the discussions around the international monetary system were approaching a critical phase. The Five were already on their way towards accepting the Anglo-Saxon theses and France, as Debré confided to Alexei Kosygin, already felt very isolated. Debré realised that France could only be successful if it swayed its European partners back towards its ideas.64 By Europeans, of course, he essentially meant West Germany. In view of the weaknesses of the international monetary system, de Gaulle emphasised the need to consult and maintain Franco-German solidarity in these circumstances.65 However, the worsening Franco-German relations in the early months of 1968 prevented any kind of purposeful cooperation. For a start, if the French veto of the Britain candidacy did not cause any open wounds between Paris and Bonn, it was not without consequences. In early 1968, West Germany harassed France on the possibility of a transitional arrangement for Britain with the EEC so as to keep the question of Britain on the agenda.66 On top of this, the so-called ‘Brandt affair’ erupted soon after. On 4 February, according to a German press agency, Brandt had publicly claimed that the Franco-German friendship was strong enough, especially among the youth, to overcome the rigid and anti-European conceptions of a head of state ‘thirsty for power’.67 Despite the many complaints and denials, this incident left its mark. De Gaulle certainly gave the impression that he would not forget this incident easily.68 Alphand even went so far as to claim that this episode marked the end of the ‘honeymoon’ with the Kiesinger government.69 The FrancoGerman summit that took place a few days later in Paris produced little and was held in a difficult atmosphere. Apart from the agreement between both countries to envisage a form of association between Britain and the EEC, little was done. This was very problematic for France at a time when more than ever it needed Bonn’s cooperation in the negotiations over the international monetary system.70 In the end, and again paradoxically, another crisis in the international monetary system provided the setting for France’s undoing. The brief respite of early 1968 that followed the run on gold and the devaluation of the pound in November 1967 did not last. A significant new run on gold occurred in March 1968, forcing the Bank of England to close for one day. Yet this crisis actually offered a great opportunity for the US to move away from the tyranny of the gold–dollar link and to start forging new and more flexible arrangements for the development of the international monetary system.71 On 16 March, the governors of the Central Banks of the member states of the gold pool met in Washington to discuss how to solve this gold crisis. The US, for its part, wanted to end this run on gold and give a boost to the SDRs – whose negotiations were approaching their climax – as being fully equivalent to gold. As its trump card, the US could rely on the threat of suspending the convertibility of dollars into gold. The aims of the European states were less clear, but ultimately they wanted to put an end to the crisis atmosphere, and so accepted the US proposals.72
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On the eve of the crucial meeting in Stockholm of 29 March 1968 to discuss the SDRs and the IMF, the French government – not privy to the Washington meeting of the gold pool – debated its tactics during a Council of Ministers. If not all the participants agreed when it came to assessing the negotiations – de Gaulle seeming more confident and Debré very pessimistic, complaining of France’s isolation – all agreed that it was crucial to find a common position among the Six.73 But this was not to be the case. As Prate explains in great detail, France faced a tough choice before the Stockholm meeting. If it refused to accept the new monetary system, it would keep its freedom of action, but could not oppose the creation of a ‘dollar zone’ spreading to large parts of the Western world. Alternatively, should France prioritise European cohesion, accept a solution that could only cause deterioration in the international monetary system and world inflation, and give up on the Munich compromise? De Gaulle’s conclusion was not to accept the failure of talks, but to ‘push negotiations to their limits’. He added that ‘if precise promises are obtained from US that they will redress their balance of payments, if the majority rules give the Six a right of veto, France would give its assent’. Yet France only gained satisfaction on the question of majority rule, and so refused to support the decisions of the Stockholm meeting.74 This proved to be a particularly painful blow. Debré complained that ‘I was abandoned by our European partners’ and that ‘the subordination to the US was total and humiliating’.75 As the British were to observe, France’s isolation during the Stockholm meeting was of ‘considerable political significance’; the meeting proved to be the ‘last fling of the French attempt to destroy the confidence in the dollar’.76
Conclusion: France caught in a political no-man’s land? In the end, when it came down to it, France made the choice of grandeur, of independence, of loyalty to its principles, rather than the choice of compromise and dépendance. Between influence and status, France preferred the latter. Such a dilemma plagued France during the period examined in this chapter, but was also a choice which France was obliged to make on a longterm basis and which goes a long way towards explaining the limits and shortcomings of the Gaullist project. The Gaullist model of foreign policy, with its repeated emphasis on the value of national independence, proved a very valuable tool for France when it came to making a claim for Great Power status. While still within NATO and within the EEC, France could rely on the power of obstruction to make its voice heard, and to give credence to its desire to be treated as a Great Power. Once France stepped up and seized the mantle of Great Power, the dynamics of its policies fundamentally changed. What France gained in status, it also lost in influence. As Bozo points out, the conclusion of the Harmel report underlined the limits of the French margin of manoeuvre once it withdrew from the military integrated structure of NATO.77 Equally, once France withdrew from the gold pool in June 1967, it lost part of its capacity to influence the outcome of the
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negotiations over the international monetary system, especially during the troubled period of March 1968. Fundamentally, France found itself trapped, or lost in a kind of political no-man’s land between the Eastern and Western worlds. During the high point of its policy of détente in 1966, the Eastern Bloc welcomed France with open arms, especially because of its value as a troublemaker within the Western world. Once the tide of détente started to turn, however, France was powerless to stop the efforts within both the Western and Eastern blocs towards greater stability and discipline.
Notes 1 Viansson-Ponté (1970, p. 324). 2 Peyrefitte (2000, p. 293). 3 Ministère des Affaires etrangeres (MAE): Europe 1966–1970, Pologne, vol. 2500: Note de De Beaumarchais, 18.8.1967. 4 Documentation Française (DF): La Politique Etrangère de la France (PEF), Textes et Documents 1966–1967: de Gaulle and Gomulka’s speeches to the Polish Diet, 11. 9.1967. 5 MAE: Cabinet du Ministre (CM), Couve de Murville (CD), vol. 388: de Gaulle–Gomulka meeting, 11.9.1967. 6 Peyrefitte (2000, p. 298). 7 L. Salgo, in Institut Charles de Gaulle (1992, p. 478). 8 Rey (1991, p. 61). 9 MAE: Europe 1966–1970, Pologne, vol. 2500: Le Monde, 13.9.1967. 10 Lacouture (1986, p. 541); Durandin (1994, p. 101). 11 Vaïsse (1998, p. 439); Rey (1991, p. 61). 12 Wolton (1997, p. 439); Roussel (2002, pp. 843–4). 13 MAE: Europe 1966–1970, Pologne, vol. 2500: de Gaulle speech in Gdynia, 10.9.1967. 14 MAE: Europe 1966–1970, Pologne, vol. 2500: Note of Sous Direction Europe Orientale, 18.10.1967. 15 National Archives Record Administration (NARA): Record Group (RG) 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CF), 1967–1969, Box 2104: Wallner to State, Airgram no. 1751, 22.3.1968. 16 Couve de Murville (1971, p. 281). 17 MAE: Secrétariat Général (SG), Entretiens et Messages (EM), vol. 32: Zorine–de Gaulle meeting, 4.10.1967. 18 MAE: Europe 1966–1970, URSS, vol. 2666: Alphand–Zorine meeting, 20.9.1967. 19 See MAE: SG, EM, vol. 32: de Gaulle–Zorine meeting, 4.10.1967; MAE: CM, CD, vol. 391: de Gaulle–Zorine meeting, 20.2.1968. 20 Lefort (1999, p. 231). 21 Messmer (1992, p. 299). 22 MAE: SG, EM, vol. 33: Couve–Stewart meeting, 26.4.1968. 23 MAE: CM, CD, vol. 389: Couve–Brandt meeting, 17.10.1967. 24 DF: PEF, 1966–1967: Couve interview with French Television, 14.12.1967. 25 MAE: Service des Pactes (Pactes), 1961–1970: Note no. 348 of the French delegation to the NAC, 20.7.1967. 26 Bozo (1996, p. 174). 27 MAE: Pactes, 1961–1970, vol. 277: Roger Seydoux to Couve, 30.11.1967. 28 Bozo (1996, p. 175). 29 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS): 1964–1968, vol. XIII: Document 277. 30 Bozo (1996, pp. 176–7); Vaïsse (1998, p. 395).
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31 MAE: Pactes, 1961–1970, vol. 277: Roger Seydoux to Couve, Telegram no. 382–287, 15.3.1968. 32 Alphand (1977, p. 494). 33 MAE: Europe 1961–1970, Allemagne, vol. 1545: François Seydoux to Couve, Telegram no. 6543–6547, 9.12.1967. 34 MAE: Europe 1961–1970, Allemagne, vol. 1608: Note of Sous-Direction Europe Centrale, 22.11.1967. 35 A fact acknowledged by Vaïsse (1998, p. 395). 36 NARA: RG 59, CF, 1967–1969, Box 2102: Lucet–Eugene Rostow meeting, 18.9.1967. 37 Prate (1978, p. 225). 38 de Gaulle (1987b, p. 134). 39 Kuisel (1993, pp. 174–5). 40 Archives Nationales (AN): 5ème République Archives de la Présidence De Gaulle (5AG1), Carton 29 Affaires Economiques, Conseils Restreints: Note of the Secrétariat Général de la Présidence, 23.8.1967. 41 LBJL: Private Papers of Francis Bator, SF, Box 10: Debré to Fowler, 7.9.1967. 42 AN: 5AG1, Carton 29 Affaires Économiques, Conseils Restreints: Debré note, 14.9.1967. 43 Couve de Murville (1971, p. 418). 44 AN: 5AG1, Carton 29 Affaires Économiques, Conseils Restreints: Conseil sur les Affaires Économiques et Financières, 16.10.1967. 45 Peyrefitte (2000, p. 273). 46 See e.g. AN: 5AG1, Carton 29 Affaires Économiques, Conseils Restreints: Debré note, 14.9.1967; AN: 5AG1, Carton 29 Affaires Économiques, Conseils Restreints: Conseil sur les Affaires Économiques et Financières, 16.10.1967. 47 See e.g. Fondation Nationale de Sciences Politiques (FNSP): Couve de Murville 2 (CM2) Speech to the European Communities, 23.10.1967; FNSP: CM2: Speech to l’Assemblée Nationale, 7.11.1967. 48 de Gaulle (1970d, pp. 231–45). 49 Bozo (1996, p. 352). 50 MAE: Pactes, 1961–1970, vol. 276: Note of Service des Pactes, 4.10.1967. 51 LBJL: PP, NSF, Agency File, Box 36: Cleveland to Rusk, Telegram no. 5, 15.10.1967. 52 MAE: CM, CD, vol. 389: Couve–Brandt meeting, 17.10.1967. 53 Prate (1978, p. 225). 54 LBJL: PP, NSF, Country File, Box 174: CIA Intelligence Memorandum, 20.3.1968. 55 Bozo (1996, pp. 354–5). 56 FRUS: 1964–1968, vol. XIII: Document 267. 57 MAE: Pactes 1961–1970, vol. 277: Roger Seydoux to Couve, Telegram no. 673–675, 24.11.1967. 58 FRUS: 1964–1968, vol. XIII: Document 277. 59 Alphand (1977, p. 494). 60 FRUS: 1964–1968, vol. XIII: Document 272. 61 Seydoux (1977, p. 101). 62 MAE: Pactes 1961–1970, vol. 277: François Seydoux to Couve, Telegram no. 6393–6400, 2.12.1967. 63 Peyrefitte (2000, p. 274). 64 AN: 5AG1, Carton 188, URSS: Debré–Kosygin meeting, 11.1.1968. 65 Peyrefitte (2000, p. 284). 66 See e.g. MAE: SG, EM, vol. 33: Brunet–Lahr meeting, 16.1.1968. 67 Seydoux (1977, p. 105). 68 MAE: SG, EM, vol. 33: de Gaulle–Luebke meeting, 5.2.1968. 69 Alphand (1977, p. 500).
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70 For French efforts to enlist Bonn’s cooperation, see AN: 5AG1, Carton 164, Allemagne RFA: Debré–Schiller meeting, 15.2.1968. 71 Schwartz (2003, p. 200). 72 Solomon (1977, p. 120). 73 Peyrefitte (2000, pp. 285–7). 74 Prate (1978, p. 226). 75 Peyrefitte (2000, p. 287). 76 Schwartz (2003, p. 204). 77 Bozo (1996, p. 356).
3
Détente and European integration in the policies of Willy Brandt and Georges Pompidou Wilfried Loth
As closely related as the chancellorship of Willy Brandt and the presidency of Georges Pompidou in France were in time, the differences between the two leaders outweigh the points of agreement. Contemporaries remember the irritations that the Eastern initiatives of the Brandt/Scheel government caused in France, close observers emphasize the differences in disposition and political styles, and analysts point out the incompatibility of conceptions and strategic interests. Alongside such conceptual differences, however, there was also enough common ground to allow shared policies and shared successes. This applies in particular to the process of détente – something which for both leaders needed to be much more than a simple re-evaluation of national positions.1
Complementary concepts In essence, Willy Brandt’s Eastern policies were pan-European policies. Ever since the mid-1960s, Brandt, like General de Gaulle, was convinced that Germany would only grow back together as part of the process of overcoming the East–West conflict in Europe. As he explained in an interview in the summer of 1967 during his term as Foreign Minister of the Grand Coalition, ‘We need an orientation that puts the German Question within the European context, and for this purpose we need a concept that contains the basic traits of a peace order.’2 And he confirmed this basic belief to Georges Pompidou in January 1971: ‘We have become convinced that our national problem will not be resolved in isolated fashion, but that it will be if there is a modification which affects both halves of Europe.’3 ‘Modification’ for Brandt meant the renunciation of aggression guaranteed by treaty, balanced troop and arms reduction, confidence-building measures, the ‘levelling off of borders’ and ‘new forms of cooperation’ between the East and the West. Freedom of information and movement were to be realized and in the longer term all human rights would be guaranteed, including the right to ethnicity and self-determination of each people. Within the framework of such a ‘European peace order’ the Germans were to regain their unity as well.4 It remained unclear, however, what the security architecture of this new Europe would look like. In the planning phase of the ‘new Eastern policies’,
54 W. Loth Egon Bahr contemplated a security system of equal European states that was to replace the existing pacts. As he outlined in a planning study of the Foreign Ministry in June 1968, the new arrangement would be guaranteed by the two superpowers, but they would not be members themselves. This study was based on a draft by the Centre d’Études de Politique Etrangère in Paris which had foreseen the possibility of a Central European zone free of foreign troops and nuclear weapons, composed of the two German states, the Benelux countries, Poland and Czechoslovakia.5 Such an arrangement, however, was neither in the interest of the United States nor in that of the Soviet Union. For both superpowers it meant – as the French draft had already concluded – the loss of influence in Europe; for the Soviet Union it also implied the breaking up of the communist regimes in Europe. By the same token, Bahr’s vision threatened the previously special roles of both Great Britain and France, and was incompatible with the common notions of the political unification of Western Europe. As a result, Bahr acknowledged that the plan would be impossible to carry out in the foreseeable future: ‘An agreement on a new security system that replaces the previous military alliances cannot be anticipated,’ he wrote on the 21 September 1969 in a memorandum entitled ‘Thoughts on the foreign policies of a future federal government’.6 The result was that Brandt opted to use that which already existed in his search for a European peace order, in other words not to break up the existing alliances but to reorganize their relationship to each other. In an interview with Der Spiegel he argued that it was necessary ‘to re-organize the existing relationship [between the two blocs] and then to see how the process can be taken further, that is to further develop existing structures and to renew them’.7 He demonstrated this conviction by avoiding a premature reaction to the Warsaw Pact’s 17 March 1969 Budapest Appeal for a ‘European Security Conference’ and instead insisting that the West should not respond unless and until the Alliance had agreed on a united position.8 Likewise, when he was elected Chancellor he sent Carlo Schmid, his special assistant for Franco-German affairs, to Paris to reassure Pompidou that France had nothing to fear from the initiatives of the new federal government: ‘Franco-German cooperation will become the fulcrum of our policy.’9 This also meant that Bahr’s notions of a gradual transition to a collective security system were illusory. Despite being aware of the opposition that his ideas would encounter, Bahr did ‘not want to exclude’ agreements ‘that allow for the continuation of the existing system on a lower level, while at the same time serving as the preliminary stage of a new order’.10 But for Brandt steps towards a new order could only go as far as the Federal Republic’s allies were willing to countenance. It was thus impossible to anticipate how far and where this approach would lead. The Chancellor’s notorious vagueness in describing the European peace order – a European security system that ‘will bring the present alliances . . . to form a certain relationship to each other’11 – was hence not the product of indecisiveness or conceptual vagueness. Rather, it was the necessary result of a political approach that simultaneously aimed at balancing
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out common interests and changing the perception of each power’s selfinterests.12 Pompidou shared Brandt’s understanding of détente in Europe at least in principle. He too understood the loosening up of the communist bloc to be ‘in the general interest of Europe and of peace’; he too thought that it was necessary ‘to communicate’; and he too recognized that following the suppression of the Prague Spring, communication primarily had to involve Moscow.13 ‘We do not intend to obstruct a policy of détente towards the East, however limited this may be’, he told Schmid at their meeting on 7 November 1969.14 And as he told Brandt in early 1971, he was convinced that cooperation would one day be rewarded with the liberalization of the system: A moment will come when it will be necessary to liberalise. At that point many questions will be resolved. This will not happen at once, but we must not enclose ourselves in a system which, vis-à-vis the East is a type of closed bloc and which would deprive them of all hope of cooperation.15 Yet Pompidou feared Soviet military power and its potential psychological effects on Western Europeans more than the Chancellor did. In particular he feared the possibility of the Federal Republic’s breaking out of the Western alliance. In December 1971, he told Brandt frankly that he considered this to be in the natural interest of Soviet policies;16 and despite Brandt’s claims to the contrary he could not help but worry that the Germans might accept such an offer for the sake of reunification. Thus in February 1972 he warned: We feel very strongly that the Soviet Union, in appealing to Germany’s fundamental national aspiration for reunification, may well feel that at some point in time a form of neutralisation of Germany could be the means to bring reunification about.17 In Pompidou’s view, a united and strong Western Europe was thus a prerequisite for the success of détente. As he concluded in a conversation with Brandt in December 1971: ‘For me, a policy of rapprochement with Eastern Europe – yours as much as ours – presupposes a strong Western Europe. If Western Europe is divided, such a policy would quickly become dangerous.’ Two months later he argued more precisely: I feel that if we are all united, we could dissolve the blocs to some extent, including the Soviet bloc. The rapprochement of all the peoples of East and West, and also of the two German states, will become possible to carry out in an atmosphere of political cooperation and detente rather than that of the neutralisation of central Europe and therefore of Germany.18 Pompidou thus linked his warnings about German solo efforts with an offer to cooperate and the prediction that such cooperation would bear fruit.
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At about the same time he explained his vision of a united and strong Europe to US President Richard Nixon: I then believe that it is necessary to give Western Europe the greatest possible unity in the economic field, then in the political one, and probably, if all goes well, in that of defence. After all, it is the only possible counterweight to the Soviet Union, and this is all the more true given, I am sure, that the United States will gradually want to relinquish the burden of defending Europe. As I have already told you, I do not want your presence to diminish rapidly, but it will inevitably decline and it will therefore be necessary for Europe to be united so as to be solid in the face of the East.19 The unity of Western Europe was all the more important since the reduction of the American presence in Europe was inevitable. As a result, Europe in the medium term would need a unified approach to defence matters also. ‘If we manage to build Europe not only on the economic level, but also on that of foreign policy, we will have to accept that there cannot be either a single policy nor a single economy without some sort of common defence policy’, he acknowledged to Edward Heath in March 1972.20 This approach meshed well with Brandt’s plans, since the Chancellor wanted to pursue the path towards a European peace order alongside his Western allies and did not merely see European unification as a means to an end. Ideas of European unity thus represented a potential foundation for shared Franco-German efforts at détente. However, the two countries differed both in their perception of the Soviet threat and in the degree to which their foreign policy was dependent on the progress of détente. As a result this foundation was not effectively built upon. Instead, Franco-German relations oscillated between joint action and underlying mistrust of German motives on the part of the French.
Troop reductions and a security conference The difficulties in French–German relations became especially obvious in the two countries’ respective approaches to arms reduction in Europe. Both Brandt and Bahr saw arms control as a decisive step towards a European peace order alongside agreements on the renunciation of aggression and the start of greater cooperation with the Eastern Bloc countries. German politicians, moreover, knew that multilateral arms control was all the more important due to the risk that the American military presence could be reduced independently. There was also the danger of an agreement between the superpowers on arms reduction in Europe being carried out behind the back of the Europeans.21 Brandt told Pompidou in January 1971 that this was the reason why he wanted to include negotiations on balanced troop reductions in Europe as a central item on the agenda of the Conference on Security in Europe.22 In Pompidou’s view, by contrast, immediate negotiations on troop reductions posed the danger of weakening the West unilaterally. Should the Russians leave
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Poland, he answered Brandt, it would not be long before the Americans left Germany.23 A militarily thinned out zone in Central Europe only favoured the Soviet Union, further damaged the credibility of the American deterrence guarantee, prevented the building up of a militarily strong Western Europe, and opened the doors to the neutralization of Europe under German leadership. In the light of all these risks, he did not support American disengagement plans. As he explained to Nixon in December 1971: It is true that Brandt is hostile to the idea of neutralisation, of Finlandisation, but once there are no longer American forces in Germany, or Canadian, British or French troops for that matter, Germany will not be far from neutralisation.24 At first, Pompidou sought to impress Brandt with the argument that negotiations on troop reductions would only hasten an American withdrawal.25 When the two leaders met in Bonn on 6 July 1971, for instance, Pompidou warned: ‘The French government, if only for intuitive reasons, foresees that the West will inevitably be the loser in this affair.’ There would either be an ‘an exclusive deal between the United States and the USSR’ or the ‘neutralisation of Central Europe, a sort of resurrection of the Rapacki Plan, which France at least does not wish to see’. Brandt, however, appeared unmoved by these arguments. So the French President tried again once the foreign and defence ministers had rejoined the gathering: ‘M. Pompidou wishes to be heard and to note on the record of the meeting his words of warning: “Achtung, Achtung!” ’26 Later in the same meeting, the German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel insisted on the importance of French participation in the disarmament negotiations. Even if the French government had reservations about the ‘bloc character’ of negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, it should at least participate ‘as an associated member or observer’ in the Western alliance’s preparations for the conferences. In talking to his French counterpart Michel Debré, Helmut Schmidt, the Minister of Defence, emphasized the US interest in disarmament: basically, it was all about either unilateral or balanced troop reductions. If the Western Europeans did not participate in the negotiations, American–Soviet rapprochement and a drastic reduction of the American military presence might result. And in his reply to Pompidou, Brandt again argued that the French participation in the preliminary talks of the alliance ‘would be an extremely appreciated assistance to the Federal Republic’.27 None of these efforts to recruit and to convince the French helped, however: all that the participants in the Bonn summit of 1971 managed finally to agree was that there would be further consultations. Nor did it help matters when in September, Brandt travelled to Oreanda in Crimea and succeeded in convincing Brezhnev and the Soviet leadership of the need to take up negotiations on balanced troop reductions.28 Pompidou again categorically ruled out negotiations at the present time. As he told Brezhnev on the occasion of the Soviet Secretarygeneral’s visit to Paris at the end of October: ‘We believe that the reduction of
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forces, which will surely come about one day, should be made subordinate to the moral and political effort to obtain greater security.’29 France did not participate in NATO’s preliminary talks and sought to postpone negotiations on troop reductions as long as possible by making them conditional upon a satisfactory agreement over Berlin. Pompidou was almost certainly aware that such negotiations could not be delayed indefinitely. It was just, he insisted to Brezhnev, that they had to take second place following the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE): The conference on security must have priority. On the basis of the success of this conference, which might well create a deep détente between the two parts of Europe and contacts amongst all the States, it is possible to imagine and wish that this will have a knock-on effect at the level of armaments. As a result, in one form or other, whether in a special committee born out of the conference or in some other forum, it will become possible to discuss such questions; but amongst all, and not between two blocs, represented, let me be blunt, by the Soviet Union and the United States. Sooner or later negotiations on troop reductions would become inevitable, he added: We believe it essential to give priority, in timing and not only in spirit, to the security conference. Once this has met and can begin the examination of all that you have mentioned about détente and the rapprochement between peoples, I think like you that we will inescapably be drawn into a discussion about the reduction of forces and of the tension created by the presence of armed forces, whether they be national or foreign.30 At the NATO Council meeting in early December 1972 Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann hinted that the French government might modify its position on troop reductions in Europe: consultations on the foreign military presence, and on the American and Soviet troops in particular, were a prerequisite however.31 And when, in their meeting in Zaslavl near Minsk at the beginning of January 1972, Brezhnev again urged the French President to participate in the disarmament negotiations, Pompidou even showed some flexibility in public: There was no question, of course, of us modifying our position overnight. But I took note with interest of the detailed discussion we had with the Soviet Union about the conference, about its procedures and about its objectives . . . and we have agreed to discuss it further.32 Yet, for the time being, this concession did not amount to more than a further argument in favour of the Conference for Security and Cooperation. Pompidou welcomed the CSCE in principle, provided that all European states
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participated on an equal level and were free to communicate as they pleased. In this way it would be possible to embed Germany’s Ostpolitik in a multilateral framework. Furthermore, Pompidou also saw a real chance to unsettle the Eastern Bloc and to multiply contacts between East and West. France, therefore, was the first Western power to take up the Budapest appeal. Schuman concluded his 1969 visit to Moscow with a communiqué announcing that efforts would be made to convene an all-European Conference: The two ministers believe that, effectively prepared, a European conference could be a means to develop cooperation amongst all European states through their common efforts, to bring to an end the division of Europe into blocs, and to thereby reinforce security and peace.33 When Brandt and Pompidou first talked about the security conference project, they found some common ground. It included the German demand that the Soviet leadership satisfactorily settle the Berlin Question before any such conference opened. Pompidou adopted this demand in talking to his Soviet interlocutors.34 By the same token both sides agreed that the conference agenda should include not only questions concerning the renunciation of aggression and economic cooperation, but also cultural exchange, free passage of people and ideas as well as human rights. After the breakthrough in the negotiations on the Berlin Question in the summer of 1971, Pompidou argued in favour of the speedy convention of the CSCE. In his view, this was the only way to prevent the linking of the security conference to the negotiations on troop reductions, to which the other NATO members meanwhile gave priority. Furthermore, with the Soviet leadership showing reservations about the NATO approach to balanced troop reductions, a greater French commitment to the CSCE project might allow France to regain some of its once privileged role in Western dialogue with the Soviet Union. When Brezhnev visited Paris at the end of October 1971, Pompidou was thus able to present himself as the Soviet Union’s partner in urging for the opening of the CSCE.35 Brandt was quite uncomfortable with this, because he preferred to conclude the negotiations on the basic treaty with the GDR prior to the opening of the CSCE.36 But he was obliged to accept the NATO Council’s May 1972 decision in favour of separate negotiations on troop reductions, as well as Henry Kissinger’s agreement in Moscow in the second week of September that preliminary talks should begin on 22 November. Brandt and Pompidou were by contrast in agreement on the agenda of the planned conference. When preparing for the Franco-German summit of early July 1972, Jean-Bernard Raimond noted that: ‘German views on the security conference, other than on the question of force reductions, are fairly close to our own.’ And at the summit meeting Brandt suggested that the two countries ‘encourage’ the foreign ministers of the EC ‘to continue with political cooperation’, and especially with ‘preparations for the CSCE’.37
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Pompidou also argued in favour of making the CSCE a permanent body. This, he explained to Brandt in December 1971, would only increase the effectiveness of the conference: ‘The Eastern Bloc would be loosened as a bloc.’ In January 1973 he added that such a body might make more difficult potential Soviet aggressions within its sphere of influence. He did not mention, however, that it might also serve to negotiate troop reductions, as Raimond noted in June 1972.38 Brandt had some reservations, presumably because a permanent body in which the GDR participated could be understood as the acceptance of the status quo on the German question. In November 1972 the foreign ministers of the EC agreed to reject the Soviet proposal to establish a permanent political body. However, the federal government then showed some support for the Czech proposal to establish a permanent consultative body of the CSCE members. In November 1973 Bahr suggested that this body be seated in Berlin.39 European defence integration? Brandt tried to assuage French fears of a German drift towards neutralization by speeding up moves for a Western European defence identity. In December 1971, for instance, he moved quickly to remove any anxieties that might have been created by his meeting with Brezhnev in Oreanda. Neutralization he insisted was not his aim. Furthermore, he too wanted to slow down the American retreat from Europe and simultaneously to get the Europeans to cooperate more closely in defence questions. It was necessary for NATO to remain, but also ‘that its European part be differently organised’. By the same token this was necessary for the further development of the European Community as well: How will it be possible, for that matter, to develop Europe beyond the realm of economics in the years ahead, if we do not also have a common representation on defence matters. I believe that this will first emerge in the political domain and then gradually move into defence matters.40 Pompidou did not react right away. When on 5 April 1973 the new French Foreign Minister, Michel Jobert, used a speech in the National Assembly to call upon the West Europeans to think about European defence with an ‘independent character’, the German Chancellor therefore made yet another effort.41 At the summit of 21–22 June 1973 he assured his interlocutor that he did not want unilateral disarmament even if the German public opinion favoured it, and then argued for concrete decisions in the question of European defence: ‘The time will come when we must become more concrete in our discussions and go beyond theoretical studies.’ He also explained that a common defence organization required movement in the French nuclear doctrine: I do not want there to be any misunderstanding. I am not seeking and have never sought to obtain nuclear weapons for Germany. But if Germany is to
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be in a common defence organisation complementing or replacing NATO, it will not be possible for it merely to play the role of infantry.42 Indirectly, this also showed that Brandt found a united European defence project suitable to solve those problems which the French decision for a national nuclear strategy had posed for the Germans. He used the intolerability of the present situation, in which the Federal Republic would not be consulted on the use of French nuclear weapons on its territory, as an additional lever to convince the French partners to realize the European solutions which both sides called for: I need your response to a number of questions. . . . How should we understand the French intervention plan, which are the towns targeted by French nuclear weapons, in which part of Germany are these towns? Are they even in the part of Germany which is so closely linked to France? I am not talking about the French army in Germany and its special position there, but the Ailleret/Lemnitzer agreement of 1967 which sketched out this situation no longer corresponds to the position of our two countries.43 Pompidou had to agree that the French strategy had not been sufficiently thought through: ‘We are somewhat in a state of flux.’ Regarding the present situation he assured Brandt: ‘We have no targets on the territory of the FRG – keep that to yourself but I give you my word of honour.’44 He then pleaded once more for cooperation in armament production and the enrichment of uranium. On Brandt’s demands for movement towards European defence he only commented that it was ‘obvious that on a strategic level we could not content ourselves with a European defence strategy that was based only on conventional weapons’. Brandt answered Pompidou’s hesitations by applying more pressure. At the end of September he let the French President know that he wanted ‘a detailed and confidential exchange of views’ between the two foreign ministers ‘on the future development of European security’.45 On 9 November, Scheel met with Jobert and reported in detail on the views of the federal government: it was necessary for the Europeans to develop a common defence strategy that would enable Europe ‘to secure its defence with its own means’. He believed ‘that the day will come when Europe must, come what may, liberate itself from this “indissoluble” dependence [on the US]’. Scheel further emphasized ‘that a European Community with a central political will and wishing also to defend itself would necessarily have to have a nuclear defence policy’. This solution did not pose any problems for the non-proliferation treaty for nuclear weapons, because the Community would inherit the corresponding rights of France and Great Britain.46 Pompidou, however, could not summon up the courage to respond to Brandt’s movement away from the traditional Atlantic orientation of West German security policy. Jobert confined himself to an ‘effort of dialogue and reflection’ on the problems of defence within the framework of the Western European Union (WEU) which he presented to the parliamentary assembly of
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the WEU on 23 November.47 Four days later he also had a journalist write in Le Monde: ‘As for a specifically European defence policy, it is a long term endeavour about which it can only be said that it is not a question for tomorrow.’48 And when Brandt hinted at the summit of 26–27 November that the federal government was prepared to speak about European defence, Pompidou reacted evasively.49 All he noted in the margin of a telegram from his ambassador in Bonn reporting that the Germans wanted to discuss the ‘definition of security policies within the framework of the Nine’ in the Franco-German study group for strategic questions was: ‘Prudence!’50 In his last meeting with Brezhnev on 13 March 1974 he emphasized that the political unification of Europe would not go beyond mere cooperation: It must not impinge upon the independence of states, and of our own in particular. There can be no question of defence. We are simply seeking, with only mediocre success, to establish whether it is possible to reach agreement in arms production. Matters must not go any further and should in no case impinge upon the essential, namely the nuclear domain.51 One can only speculate about the reasons for Pompidou’s reservations. Part of the problem, it would appear, was that he lacked the power to realize a vision – which he previously had only formulated in vague terms anyway – when confronted with the orthodoxies of France’s military and diplomatic establishment. But he also lacked that degree of trust in Brandt and the continuity of his policies that would have been necessary for the further development of the French security system. Constantly worried about the possibility of a German drift to the East, he concentrated on that which in his eyes was the best antidote: securing the American presence in the Federal Republic. Pompidou’s mistrust was further strengthened by the publication of Bahr’s planning paper of 1968 which a Bonn diplomat associated with the opposition leaked to the magazine Quick at the very moment when Brandt was intensifying his offensive about European cooperation.52 That which Bahr had sketched out as the optimal albeit unrealistic constellation for reunification now appeared to be the real objective if not of Brandt himself then at least of strong forces within the Bonn coalition. Raimond, who as early as June 1972 had suspected ‘old tendencies within the social democratic party in favour of disengagement plans for Central Europe’ behind Bonn’s urging for troop reductions, now wrote in a preparatory statement for the Franco-German summit of 26–27 November 1973 that the Bahr paper of 1968 ‘explains to a large extent the sometimes strange positions adopted by the FRG on the question of force reduction’.53 Bahr’s conception ‘gave to MBFR the character of a gradual progression towards a European security system close to that which the Soviets have been proposing for twenty years’. The publication of the old planning staff paper thus thwarted Brandt’s attempt to overcome French distrust of negotiations on security issues by playing upon French notions of an independent Europe. French diplomats (and
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presumably Pompidou as well) used the supposed contradictions in Bonn’s policies as a pretext not to discuss the demand for Europeanization of the French nuclear weapons included in Brandt’s security political offensive. France did not participate in the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) which began on 30 October 1973 in Vienna; and in the light of the French reservations, the federal government confined itself to proposals for minor reductions of foreign troops in a first phase of the process. Confronted with all this opposition, Brandt played for time: the MBFR negotiations were to last for a long time, he had explained to Pompidou in June 1973.54 As far as the CSCE was concerned, the growing French concerns about possible ‘German drift’ away from NATO and towards a new European security arrangement led to a reversal of the French and German approaches to the negotiations: now it was France that warned against too rigid a structure of any follow-up body, and Paris also opposed the Soviet suggestion of a spectacular summit of the heads of state and government in the third phase of the conference.55 In the opening session of the CSCE in Helsinki on 4 July 1973, Jobert warned of the dangers of the project: The public has to know that a conference, as prestigious and as long expected as it may be and despite its intentions, can mislead opinions by wrong assurances. . . . Security needs to be earned, it cannot be won in a tombola.56
Common successes In the meantime, the range of common positions, which the EC foreign ministers had worked out in their preparations for the CSCE, was sufficient to allow the Western Europeans to appear united when the negotiations began in Geneva in September 1973. On the invulnerability of the borders, for instance, the German interest in keeping the German Question open dovetailed well with French efforts to loosen Soviet control over the Eastern European satellites. Thus on 19 October 1973, the French delegation acting in the name of the nine EC governments presented a text on the unanimous change of borders that was based on an earlier German draft. Both sides also aimed at the highest level of ‘exchange of people, information and opinions’ (such was the wording in the so-called ‘Basket 3’ of the negotiations) without being set on drafts that were absolutely intolerable for the Soviet Union, and thus likely to lead to no more than sterile polemics.57 Thanks to the mutual support that the French and Germans gave one another, the final conference documents contained more emphasis on change than acceptance of the status quo.58 Willy Brandt had thus been unable to realize his intentions of persuading the French to accompany him all the way along the path towards a European peace order. Accordingly, détente in the 1970s remained far short of what had once seemed possible. On the other hand, the France of Georges Pompidou did not apply the brakes as continuously as some observers have suggested. Especially
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regarding the opening of the borders, the two leaders achieved much more together than they would have been able to obtain had they acted on their own. At the same time the realization of their notions about contacts across the borders gave some substance to European political cooperation. The European Community became an independent actor in détente. Brandt and Pompidou did not only confront one another; they also shared common successes.
Notes 1 This chapter is based on the published German foreign policy documents, the Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland [AAPD], as well as on the archives of Georges Pompidou’s presidency: Archives Nationales [AN], 5 AG 2: Archives de la Présidence de la République, 1969–1974. I would like to thank my assistant Dr Claudia Hiepel for finding the sources in the Archives of the Presidency. 2 Interview with Deutschlandfunk, 2 July 1967 cited in W. Link, ‘Außen- und Deutschlandpolitik in der Ära Brandt 1969–1974’ in Bracher et al. (1986, p. 169). 3 AN, 5 AG 2, 105, Pompidou–Brandt meeting, 25.1.1971; see also the German version in AAPD (1971, pp. 115–23, citation p. 122). 4 On the revisionist aspects of Brandt’s Eastern politics see Niedhart (2002, pp. 233–66). 5 AAPD (1968, pp. 796–814). The French study in its German translation in EuropaArchiv (1968, pp. 51–64). See also Link, ‘Außen- und Deutschlandpolitik’ in Bracher et al. (1986, p. 171f.); Garton Ash (1995, p. 121f). 6 AAPD (1969, pp. 1047–57, citation p. 1052). 7 Der Spiegel, 27.9.1971. 8 See the dossier worked out by Pompidou’s diplomatic advisor Jean-Bernard Raimond in preparation for the Franco-German summit of 3/4 July 1969: AN, 5 AG 2, 1010, Note pour GP, 3.7.1969. 9 AN, 5 AG 2, 104, Pompidou–Schmid meeting, 7.11.1969. 10 AAPD 1969, p. 1052; see also n. 6. 11 Interview of 2.7.1967; see n. 2. 12 Compare this with the preparation for The Hague Summit Conference 1969; see Hiepel (2003, pp. 63–81). 13 AN, 5 AG 2, 104, Pompidou–Brandt meeting, 30.1.1970. 14 AN, 5 AG 2, 104, Pompidou–Schmid meeting, 7.11.1969. 15 AN, 5 AG 2, 105, Pompidou–Brandt meeting, 25.1.1971; see also AAPD (1971, pp. 115–23, here p. 122). 16 AN 5 AG 2, 1011, Pompidou–Brandt meeting, 4.12.1971; see also AAPD (1971, pp. 112–27, here p. 118). 17 AN 5 AG 2, 1011, Pompidou–Brandt meeting, 10.2.1972; see also AAPD (1972, pp. 112–27, here p. 118). 18 Ibid. 19 AN, 5 AG 2, 1002, Pompidou–Nixon meeting, 13.12.1971; cited in M.-P. Rey, ‘Georges Pompidou, l’Union soviétique et l’Europe’ in Association Georges Pompidou (1995, p. 146). 20 AN, 5 AG 2, 1015, Pompidou–Heath meeting, 19.3.1972. 21 See Link, ‘Außen- und Deutschlandpolitik’ in Bracher et al. (1986, pp. 176f). 22 AN, 5 AG 2, 105, Pompidou–Brandt meeting, 26.1.1971. 23 AN, 5 AG 2, 105, Pompidou–Brandt meeting, 25.1.1971; see also AAPD (1971, pp. 149–62, here p. 159). 24 AN, 5 AG 2, 1022, Pompidou–Nixon meeting, 13.12.1971. 25 He first used this argument in the conversation of 3 July 1970: see AN, 5 AG 2, 1010;
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26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34
35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46
47 48 49 50
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AAPD (1970, pp. 1069—80, here p. 1077); and again in their meeting of 25/26 January 1971: see AN, 5 AG 2, 105, Pompidou—Brandt meeting, 25.1.1971. AN, 5 AG 2, 105, Pompidou—Brandt meeting, 6.7.1971; see also AAPD (1971, pp. 1076—85, here p. 1080). AN, 5 AG 2, 105, Pompidou—Brandt meeting, 6.7.1971. AAPD (1971, pp. 1385—99 and 1408—19) on MBFR ibid., pp. 1392ff. and 1411ff.; see also Brandt s identical reports to Pompidou, Heath and Nixon of 19 September 1971, cited in Vogtmeier (1996, p. 175). AN, 5 AG 2, 1018, Pompidou—Brezhnev meeting, 29.10.1971, cited in Roussel (1994, pp. 455—60). Ibid. Le Monde, 9.12.1972. Press conference after the meeting of 11/12 January 1973, quoted in Le Monde, 14/15.1.1973. Communiqu of 13 October 1969, quoted in Rey, Pompidou in Association Georges Pompidou (1995), p. 152; cf. ibid., pp. 152—5. AN, 5 AG 2, 105, Pompidou—Brandt communication, 25—6.1.1971; see also AAPD (1971, pp. 149—62, here p. 155). On the junktim with the Berlin Question see also Meimeth (1990, pp. 159—61), as well as J.-B. Raimond, Georges Pompidou et l Union sovi tique in Association Georges Pompidou (1995, pp. 171—83); for details on the role of the French ambassador Jean Sauvagnargues in the negotiations on the Berlin Agreement see Wilkens (1990, pp. 123—76). Cf. Rey, Pompidou in Association Georges Pompidou (1995, p. 158) and Meimeth (1990, p. 162). AN, 5 AG 2, 1011, Raimond s analyses of 18.6.1971 and 23.6.1971. AN, 5 AG 2, 106, Raimond, Note pour GP, 23.6.1972 and ibid., Pompidou—Brandt meeting, 4.7.1972; see also AAPD (972, pp. 1893—911, here p. 1896). AN, 5 AG 2, 105, Pompidou—Brandt meeting, 4.12.1971 and AN, 5 AG 2, 106, Pompidou—Brandt meeting, 22.1.1973; Note Raimond 23 June 1972, ibid. 1011. AN, 5 AG 2, 1012, Note de synth se du Quai d Orsay, 22.11.1973. AN, 5 AG, 105, Pompidou—Brandt meeting, 4.12.1971; see also AAPD (1971, pp. 1893—911, here p. 1903). Jobert (1974, p. 267). AN, 5 AG, 106, Pompidou—Brandt meeting, 21.6.1973; partially cited in Soutou, G.-H., L attitude de Georges Pompidou face l Allemagne in Association Georges Pompidou (1995, pp. 267—313, here p. 300). Ibid. The French had had air-based tactical nuclear weapons since 1972. The stationing of plutonium carrier missiles that had a range of 130 km was planned for 1974. See Soutou (1996, pp. 330—3). This passage is only contained in the original minutes of AN, 5 AG 2, 1012; the particular page is in a folder with the heading: Page contenant un paragraphe ne pas communiquer . AN, 5 AG 2, 1009, Brandt—Pompidou meeting, 29.9.1973. AN, 5 AG 2, 1012, Scheel—Jobert meeting, 9.11.1973; quoted in Soutou, L attitude in Association Georges Pompidou (1995, p. 302). Contrary to Soutou (p. 304), the German proposals were neither fort ambigues nor were they likely to lead to the creation of a neutralistic security system based upon an accord germano-sovi tique . They simply explained that which Germany deemed necessary in order to realize the independent defence of Europe which France had demanded. Text in Le Monde, 23.11.1973: see also Soutou, L attitude in Association Georges Pompidou (1995, p. 302f). Jean Schwˇbel writing in Le Monde, 27.11.1973. AN, 5 AG 2, 106, Pompidou—Brandt meeting, 26.11.1973. AN, 5 AG 2, 1009, Bonn telegram, 3.12.1973.
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51 AN, 5 AG 2, 1019, Pompidou–Brezhnev, 13.3.1974. 52 ‘Wie Egon Bahr Deutschland neutralisieren will’, Quick, 27.9.1973. Only a little later the American political scientist Walter F. Hahn reported a conversation of January 1969 in which Bahr had outlined the planning staff study to him: Hahn (1973, pp. 859–80). 53 AN, 5 AG 2, 1012, Note, 23.11.1973. For Raimond’s earlier suspicions, see AN, 5 AG 2, 1011, Note 23.6.1972. 54 AN, 5 AG 2, 106, Pompidou–Brandt meeting, 21.6.1973; see also his assurance ‘that our approach remains very careful and will not be in opposition to your notions’ in the conversation of 22 January 1973, ibid. 55 AN, 5 AG 2, 1012, Note de synthèse, 22.11.1973. 56 Jobert (1974, p. 245f). 57 See the remarks on the reports of the French conference delegation: AN, 5 AG 2, 1012, Note, 23 November 1973; also Meimeth (1990, pp. 169–73). 58 See the short analyses of the course of the conference in Loth (2002, pp. 2–4, 118, 130–2); on the Geneva negotiations in detail Ferraris (1979, pp. 99–398).
4
New Ostpolitik and European integration Concept and policies in the Brandt era Andreas Wilkens
The ‘new Ostpolitik’ of Brandt’s government is something of a historical curiosity. Deeply controversial in the early 1970s, it had become the object of widespread consensus only 12 years later. Blamed by many of its domestic critics for perpetuating indefinitely the division of Germany, it alarmed some, outside of Germany, for diametrically opposite reasons: beyond the opening of a dialogue with the other German state and its publicly proclaimed objective of tempering the effects of division, was it not a policy designed to pave the way towards actual reunification? It is also misleadingly named. For while it did involve, in one way or another, all the states of Eastern Europe, the ‘German Question’ lay at its heart and was the issue it was intended primarily to resolve. As a result, it was natural that German Ostpolitik had implications and ramifications which stretched far beyond the Eastern policies of any other Western European state. Despite the interest Ostpolitik has always provoked, its historical analysis is still in its infancy. Researchers do now enjoy access to a rich array of documents, however, which should in time allow a better understanding to emerge of the origins, development and effects of a policy which will be linked forever to the names of Willy Brandt and his closest adviser and collaborator Egon Bahr. It must also be said that German reunification in 1989 to 1990, by dramatically altering all perspectives, has not really facilitated a balanced assessment of the policies conducted 20 to 30 years earlier.
The genesis and articulation of new Ostpolitik The building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 has often been seen as the starting point for the formulation of a new approach to the German Question. It is true that the brutal cordoning off of East Berlin and the German Democratic Republic did have so profound effect as to make many contemporary observers feel that 1961 constituted a new ‘zero hour’ in Germany, a break in developments after which nothing would ever be as it was before. And both Brandt and Bahr in their retrospective writings have seemingly endorsed the idea that the strategies which underlay their new approach were devised in the aftermath of and in reaction to the building of the wall.1 Nevertheless, in the volume of memoirs which he published in 1989, Brandt did somewhat qualify this view,
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referring back to some of his appeals for closer links between the two halves of Germany from 1956 onwards.2 Recent research suggests that the roots of Brandt’s and Bahr’s ideas may be traced back to the second half of the 1950s.3 A detailed analysis of Brandt’s declarations during those years shows a gradual evolution in the direction of what would later be seen as the strategy which underpinned Ostpolitik. Thus as early as 1955 certain elements were already in place: the conviction that the solution of the German Question would take time and could only be the culmination of a process which involved all the affected countries; the readiness to negotiate with the East Berlin authorities so as to facilitate contacts across the city divide while remaining careful to avoid a recognition of the East German state; and finally, an appeal to the West German government to take the initiative and to act rather than to limit themselves to declamatory rhetoric in place of policy. In an address at Chatham House on 13 March 1958, the then mayor made the point that ‘the West has been far too much on the defensive in its dealings with the peoples of Eastern Europe’, thus implicitly criticising Adenauer’s approach.4 He also called for the development of what he called an ‘open door policy’ designed to lead to a certain ‘degree of normalisation’ in Berlin and possibly between the two Germanies, a speedy solution of the German problem being ‘unlikely’. There was thus a dialectic between the recognition of realities and their dynamic evolution. In his 25 November 1960 speech to the SPD party conference in Hannover, Brandt referred explicitly to the need to fix the status quo so as to ‘acquire the freedom of manoeuvre indispensable for any political move beyond the status quo’.5 In the same speech Brandt portrayed the communist system as already lacking dynamism and having an ideology which had lost any power of attraction. He therefore appealed to the West to respond to Khrushchev’s challenge, certain that it would be Western democracies which would triumph in any form of ‘peaceful co-existence’. Brandt ended with this remarkable affirmation: ‘We have all the means to carry out a self-confident Ostpolitik.’6 Even before the culmination of the Berlin crisis, Brandt had thus begun to develop the ideas which would underpin his thinking throughout the 1960s. The day-to-day reality of life in the 1950s in the divided and isolated former German capital doubtless played a part in encouraging Brandt to develop an approach that reached beyond the normal pieties about the division of Germany. As Mayor of Berlin, he could have few illusions about the aims of the Soviet and East German leaders, and was hence driven to acknowledge the situation as it was and to begin a process able to transform a seeming impasse. The building of the wall in August 1961 materially completed the division of Germany. It also undermined the dominant approaches to the German Question, including those of the SPD mainstream who had shown their enduring belief in a purely national solution to division with the presentation of their 1959 ‘Plan for Germany’.7 For it was clear to Brandt and his advisers that it was necessary both to think in terms of a much longer time scale and to realise that there could not be any solution to Germany’s division unconnected with the wider evolution of East–West relations.
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Once the immediate crisis over Berlin was over, Brandt and Bahr sought to devise an overall approach which was based on the ideas they had developed long before 1961 but which also took account of the new situation. This last included not merely the ‘stabilisation’ of the GDR brought about by the erection of the wall, but also the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the clear desire on the part of the Kennedy Administration to begin a dialogue with Moscow, notably over arms control. It was in a speech at Harvard in October 1962 that Brandt first presented in a systematic fashion his ideas on the new international context and its implications for the German Question.8 A year later Egon Bahr attracted much more attention and controversy by trying to apply these new ideas to the relationship between the two Germanies, using on this occasion the celebrated and highly effective, if still ambiguous, formula ‘Wandel durch Annäherung’ – change through rapprochement.9 Bahr, unlike Brandt, was ready to talk very openly and to challenge directly the taboos of Deutschlandpolitik. He believed that it was pointless to hope to detach the GDR from the Soviet empire or to await its imminent collapse. The only strategy which could deliver results, according to Bahr, was one based upon improving the living conditions of the East German population – and doing so in ‘homeopathic dosages’ so as not to transform the situation too rapidly thereby provoking a violent reaction. Creating structures so as to permit trade, meetings or communication was already an end in itself. And in the long term, the multiplication of these small openings would contribute to the transformation of the Eastern European regimes. It was true of course that Bahr spoke of the progressive transformation of the GDR as leading eventually to reunification, but this was not primarily a plan designed to bring about an end to the division of Germany; it was instead designed to ease tensions and to favour solutions to some of the humanitarian problems caused by the country’s partition. A unification of the two states was not seen as something within the range of practical politics. Instead, it was viewed as a historical eventuality which would only arrive at the end of a process which could last indefinitely. As a result, Brandt and Bahr preferred to talk less of reunification and more of the ‘right to self-determination’ of which the German people should not be deprived. By so doing the problem was transferred to the level of human rights rather than being based upon historical, legal or national demands. The formula also suggested that any eventual changes to the European status quo need not concern the OderNeisse line (i.e. the border between East Germany and Poland), but would be limited to a transformation of the relationship between the two German entities. The relationship between a new Ostpolitik and European integration was not mentioned in either of the programmatic speeches of 1962 and 1963, implying that the two issues were seen as lying in entirely different spheres, with little possibility of interlinkage. It was only at a more general level that Brandt took every opportunity to insist that the solid anchorage of West Germany within the European and Atlantic structures was a pre-condition for any Eastern policy.
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Brandt’s thoughts moreover were turning ever more often during the latter half of the 1960s away from the specific German case and towards the forms and conditions of a rapprochement between Eastern and Western Europe – an indispensable accompaniment to any normalisation of relations between the two Germanies. The term which Brandt used to describe this medium-term objective was a ‘European peace-order’ (europäische Friedensordnung).10 Any long-term agreements on European cooperation would only be possible however once something had been settled about inter-German relations. This meant that Brandt found himself edging towards a two-stage plan in which the establishment of a bilateral modus vivendi with East Germany and the other countries of Eastern Europe would be followed by a multilateral round of negotiations at European level, designed to reinforce cooperation, devise confidence-building measures and negotiate disarmament. One of the key challenges which Brandt faced during the second half of the 1960s was integrating his new policies towards Eastern Germany within a wider European approach.11
The mixed fortunes of Ostpolitik during the 1960s International developments during the 1960s both encouraged Brandt and Bahr to push on with their new ideas and threw up unexpected difficulties. One source of encouragement was the growing climate of East–West détente and the seeming willingness of other Western governments, especially the US and France, to explore the possibilities of dialogue and negotiation with the Eastern Bloc. Brandt’s ideas were certainly not caused by the new thinking in Washington or Paris, but it was nevertheless vital to his ambitions that the West developed a coordinated and if possible harmonised approach. This was not just a matter of prudence; it also reflected his whole political strategy. For the medium-term objective to which he aspired, namely the transformation of East–West relations, could only be attained if all the main actors involved were ready to throw their weight behind the cause and push Europe into a new era of negotiations. Very revealing in this respect is the memorandum of 26 August 1964 that Brandt, then still Mayor of West Berlin, sent to the American Secretary of State Dean Rusk.12 This made clear the importance which Brandt attached to what he believed to be the first stirrings of foreign policy independence within the Eastern Bloc. The cases of Yugoslavia and Romania, then Poland and a little later of Czechoslovakia, and finally – at a different level – that of the Italian Communist Party had all caught his attention. It was true of course that the GDR was a special case given that the East Berlin government could not turn to its national past in order to justify a greater distance between itself and Moscow. But the overall trend was something which Brandt hoped to encourage across Eastern Europe, by multiplying contacts, trade and cooperation at all levels. Other states and organisations should also play an active role in this policy of openness towards the East, especially the United States and the EEC, but also GATT and the various United Nations bodies. This clearly demonstrates the
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extent to which Brandt had rejected the notion that the German Question could be settled in isolation. Only a much wider process could, in due course, bring about the changes in Europe which would then allow the relationship between the two parts of Germany to be improved. It went without saying for Brandt that the existing organisations of Western cooperation such as NATO or the EEC were in no way dispensable, even in the long term. It was up to them, however, to adapt and to make their contribution to the ‘restoration of Europe’ as a whole.13 The emphasis on the multilateral approach was indeed one of the most distinctive features of Brandt’s policies once he became Foreign Minister in December 1966. The recommendations of the Harmel report agreed in December 1967 stipulating that the Atlantic Alliance should henceforth have the double objective of security and détente was thus fully in line with Brandt’s thinking.14 Likewise the ‘Reykjavik signal’ of June 1968 by which NATO declared itself willing to engage in negotiations about the balanced reduction of arms in Europe owed much to the direct involvement of the German minister.15 As was noted in the SPD prise de position pushed through by Brandt in March 1968, NATO reform ‘should not weaken the Atlantic Alliance but instead contribute to the reduction of East–West tension.’16 A further encouraging factor was the evolution of German public opinion. Initially reticent and wedded to the patterns of the Cold War and confrontation, the German public became progressively more conscious of the need to address the realities of the situation directly and to find a modus vivendi with all of Germany’s Eastern neighbours. It was time to come to terms with the past and to recognise fully the consequences of the Second World War. This debate was pushed forward by intellectuals, some newspapers of the centre-left such as Die Zeit, Süddeutsche Zeitung and Der Spiegel, and also, from 1965 onwards, by both the Protestant and Catholic churches.17 Opinions which were still isolated and very much in the minority during the first half of the 1960s had begun to attract a much wider degree of acceptance by the end of the decade. Thus, if opinion polls are to be believed, the percentage of West Germans who favoured the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as Germany’s Eastern border rose markedly during this period: in February 1966 it was 27 per cent whereas by November 1967 it had become 47 per cent.18 However, while taking note of this evolution, which he himself had encouraged, Brandt was careful not to rush matters. His rhetoric thus developed slowly partly on the basis of how far public opinion could go in recognising realities, and partly in reaction to international events. In reality, the prospects for an agreement between the two Germanies on Bonn’s terms grew ever less good. By the autumn of 1966 this was not just the view of Brandt and Bahr, but also that of the influential State Secretary at the Auswärtiges Amt, Karl Carstens.19 The Hallstein doctrine was becoming more and more difficult and costly to apply, especially in the Third World.20 As Carstens noted somewhat bitterly, even Germany’s Western allies were less and less inclined to defend Bonn’s traditional insistence that it represented all of Germany, the so-called Alleinvertretungsanspruch.
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As West Germany showed greater flexibility in its approach to the German Question, so the position of the GDR tended to harden. Thus from 1967 onward, East Germany began to insist upon full recognition as a sovereign state as a precondition for any negotiation with Bonn. Likewise, the East Germans took steps to prevent the establishment of diplomatic relations between Romania and the FRG in January 1967 from setting a precedent which might allow Bonn to marginalise East Berlin, appealing to their socialist brothers to refrain from forming closer links with West Germany. This hardening was in line with Moscow’s own priority which was to end the trend towards greater autonomy within the socialist bloc. According to Brandt, the Soviet Union was also tempted during this period by a strategy of selective détente which would single out West Germany so as to be better able to impose conditions. This gave Brandt an additional reason to emphasise the integration of West Germany’s new policies into a wider and coordinated Western approach. In all respects, West–West consultation and coordination was thus an indispensable pre-condition for any satisfactory East–West negotiation.21 In this context, the question of timing became of fundamental importance to the West Germans. If East Germany succeeded on its own in securing an ever greater degree of international recognition, Bonn would have lost what it viewed as one of its few assets – its ability to lift its veto on the generalised acceptance of the GDR as a second German state. Brandt and Bahr were therefore convinced that it was necessary to begin negotiations while the East in general and Moscow in particular could still see the advantage of paying a price for West Germany’s recognition of the status quo. Initiatives like the proposed conference on European security launched by the USSR in July 1966 were clearly intended to consolidate the position of the GDR. As soon as the Grand Coalition between the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats was formed in December 1966, Brandt began to push for a process of dialogue and negotiation with all the countries of Eastern Europe, including the GDR. This last would not be fully recognised as a state, but Brandt and the majority of the SPD favoured its de facto acceptance since this alone would clear the way towards negotiated agreements. Such an objective, however, collided head-on with the maximalist positions adopted by Moscow and East Berlin; it also inflamed some of the divisions which already existed within the ruling coalition in Bonn.22 Laborious internal bargaining was thus necessary before the government could agree on the conditions of a dialogue with Moscow or East Berlin and no decision at all could be reached on the question of whether or not to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The Soviet intervention to crush the Prague Spring had comparatively little impact upon Brandt’s ideas. No Western government wanted to allow the repression in Czechoslovakia to interrupt the general improvement of East–West relations in Europe.23 Bahr, who had visited Prague repeatedly during the period of liberalisation, did not see the Prague coup coming. Underestimating the imminence of danger, he was still advising Brandt as late as 19 August 1968 to go to Prague himself in order to meet Alexander Dubèek.24 It is true that it was
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tempting to see the Prague Spring as a sign of the way in which the blocs were being overcome and of the possibility of the East European regimes acquiring a human face. It was also true, however, that the changes carried out in Czechoslovakia far exceeded the ‘homeopathic dosages’ which Bahr himself had regarded as necessary were a violent reaction to be avoided.25 What Brandt termed Moscow’s ‘imperialist action’ forced the German Foreign Minister back to a more realistic position and acted as a reminder of how far the continent still was from anything approaching a ‘European peace order’ based on the selfdetermination of all peoples. This long-term objective remained valid, Brandt insisted, ‘even if others sought to exempt themselves from its implications’.26 At another level, the Soviet invasion also reinforced the conviction in West Germany that the country’s Atlantic and European links were more necessary than ever to the maintenance of stability and security. At a more operational level, Bahr drew the conclusion from the events of 1968 that it was now even more important to ‘prioritise the Soviet Union’.27 In a memo which he wrote on ‘Ostpolitik after the occupation of Czechoslovakia’, he foresaw a German initiative after the ‘consolidation’ of the situation in Czechoslovakia – an initiative which would be all the more propitious given that it contained ‘the recognition of some elements of the status quo’. One aspect of Bahr’s analysis thus remained very much based on an acceptance and recognition of existing power relations in Europe. At the same time, Bahr still declared himself convinced of ‘the erosion of the Soviet sphere of interest’, thereby implying that his objective continued to be that of going beyond the existing status quo. Brandt, by contrast, was both more careful and more sceptical. In his handwritten corrections to Bahr’s note, he replaced the phrase ‘going beyond the status quo’ with the more cautious ‘modify’ the status quo.28 This is one of the few instances where it becomes possible to identify a clear difference of opinion between Brandt and his close collaborator. The documents which have become available over the past few years provide a fairly precise indication of the way in which Brandt’s entourage viewed the state of East–West relations at the moment when Brandt became Chancellor in October 1969. Bahr’s reflections in a note on ‘the foreign policy of a future federal government’, dated 18 September 1969, demonstrate that what was expected was not a rapid transformation of the situation but instead a difficult process of negotiation, full of potential pitfalls.29 The document did predict that the Soviet Union would face growing difficulties – at an economic and technological level, but also in terms of the cohesion of the communist world – but it did not feel that these would call the regime itself into question. Nor was there any question of ‘expecting progress towards reunification as traditionally envisaged by the West’. Equally improbable was any agreement on the replacement of the military pacts (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) by a European security system. The scenarios about this last which Bahr had had drawn up in June 1968 and which would subsequently cause much controversy when they were leaked and published in 1972 to 1973 were thus theoretical simulations rather than concrete plans for the short or medium term.30
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By contrast the central question for the years ahead was that of how to lure the GDR into signing a framework agreement which would certainly give it a degree of recognition as a separate state, but which would also contain a number of elements underlining the persistence of a German nation. Given that the GDR had potentially the most to lose from a process of détente and cooperation, Bahr had to rely on the self-interest of Moscow and the pressure which it would be able to bring to bear on East Berlin in order to obtain the necessary concessions from the GDR leadership. These tactics appeared all the more appropriate, since Moscow had since the spring of 1969 shown itself to be less systematically hostile towards Bonn and more interested in the start of discussions.
European policy and the anchoring of the FRG By the end of the 1960s, Willy Brandt could justifiably argue that he had been in favour of an organised Western Europe for fully 20 years. It is known that he belonged, from the late 1940s onwards, to that minority of social democrats who were convinced that it was in the interests of West Germany to participate in the first steps towards European integration even if doing so involved a number of concessions on the part of Bonn. Participation would underline the return of Germany to the democratic fold; and it would also bolster the country in the face of the threat from the East. In these circumstances, Brandt had never perceived any incompatibility between the integration of the Federal Republic into the structures of Western economic, political and military cooperation, and the long-term objective of overcoming the division of Germany. Rather the reverse: from the 1950s onwards, Brandt argued that the FRG’s secure membership of the West was a vital foundation for any active policy towards the East. Some of his speeches in the early 1950s thus contain the same range of rhetorical formulas about Western alignment which he would use again two decades later. Thus Brandt never stopped underlining the importance of Germany’s ‘anchorage in the West’, repeatedly rejected any ‘balancing act’ between East and West, and wove constant variations on the theme that Germany could not ‘meander between two worlds’.31 The fundamental continuity of Brandt’s basic position on this issue cannot therefore be doubted. Brandt’s vision of European integration was not however exactly the same as that of Bahr. 32 For the former, a German commitment to the organisation of Europe was both an end in itself and also a pre-condition for any dialogue with the East. The latter, by contrast, was by no means convinced that the end of the era of nation-states was approaching and thus favoured a Europe based on cooperation rather than tight integration. In a book written towards the end of 1965 and early 1966, Bahr drew a clear distinction between economic cooperation within the EEC, which he supported, and the various plans for European political unity which could – he feared – have negative effects on the chances of reunification.33 It was for this reason that Bahr was openly supportive of de Gaulle’s emphasis on the persistence of national interest and the French President’s attempts to put the brakes on the process of integration.
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It was hence without regret that Bahr noted in January 1968 that European political integration, in the manner in which it had been conceived of in the 1950s, was no longer a realistic proposition and that, as a result, the European Community did not represent a real obstacle to any plans of rapprochement between East and West and especially between the two Germanies.34 Both European integration and the surpassing of blocs in the East, indeed, were slow processes which were unlikely to become too seriously entangled. It should also be pointed out that Bahr’s activity was very much concentrated on Bonn’s Eastern diplomacy; he had no influence over the development or implementation of the Federal Republic’s Westpolitik. A new start in policy towards the European Community was one of the priorities of Brandt when he arrived at the Chancellery in October 1969. Of particular importance was advance in those fields where practical progress seemed urgent and realisable: enlargement and monetary cooperation. Also of significance were two areas where it was necessary to overcome French reticence: political cooperation and the consolidation of the Community institutions. As with his Eastern policy, Brandt thus intended to base his European policy on the realities of the situation when he came to power and those forward steps which seemed feasible. The longer term direction did matter, however. From the Hague Conference in December 1969 onward, the Chancellor insisted upon the long-term political goal of European unity as the only means of giving direction to the integration process.35 Brandt was conscious that his main counterparts, Georges Pompidou and Edward Heath, were much more reserved about this.36 Bonn’s approach was therefore to seek to advance in a pragmatic manner but without losing sight of the longer term objectives – hence, for instance, its initiatives in the fields of social policy or defence. Important external factors, such as the international monetary turmoil of the early 1970s, or later, the effects of the first oil shock would subsequently mean that several of the projects formulated in this period were only partially realised. In some fields, notably the vital one of monetary cooperation, it would become clear that a much more gradual and less ambitious timetable was necessary. And yet despite these failures and slowdowns, the EEC of the early 1970s did enter a new era, overcoming the blockages of the 1960s, successfully completing its first enlargement and underlining its status as the central framework for European cooperation. Brandt’s own contribution to this notable and quite rapid advance was very significant. A close analysis of German decision-making does suggest, however, that Bonn’s policy would have been exactly the same, down to the last comma, had there not been a process of Ostpolitik underway in parallel. The speed with which a bilateral Ostpolitik was launched, leading to the treaties in Moscow in August 1970 and Warsaw four months later, appears surprising at first sight. Ostpolitik, however, had been in gestation for many years, allowing Brandt and his collaborators to arrive at a clear definition of what was acceptable and necessary and what was not. The unifying feature of the bilateral treaties was that they involved the renunciation of force, a principle which was applied quite explicitly to both the frontier between the two
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Germanies and the Oder–Neisse line. This degree of recognition of the status quo was to be the basis indefinitely for the cohabitation of the Federal Republic with its Eastern neighbours. There were however a number of indications that the idea of one day achieving unity between all Germans had not been entirely abandoned. This was already apparent in Brandt’s policy statement of 28 October 1969 – the speech which for the first time referred to the GDR as a ‘state’: ‘Even if there exist in Germany two states, they are not foreign to one another; their relations cannot but have a special character.’37 Brandt had thus played the card of GDR state recognition at the very outset, while at the same time making clear the limits of his flexibility. In their bilateral relations, the two states could henceforth be seen as equals – thereby opening the way to political contacts and, as far as was possible, to the ‘normalisation’ of their relations. Equally, however, the two states would remain within a single German nation, thus respecting both the legacy of history and the sense of responsibility which the Federal Republic felt for the East German population. When assessing this approach retrospectively, it is important to avoid the error of anachronism. The core of Ostpolitik in the early 1970s was the desire to be realistic and truthful about the situation in which Germany found itself. The German population needed to be rid of the delusions it had long harboured about the prospects of reunification or the return of the Eastern territories. The signature of the treaties was thus, as was noted by the contemporary but still highly relevant analysis of the political scientist Richard Löwenthal, nothing less than the end of the provisional state and a sort of self-recognition by West German society.38 This did not mean however closing the door entirely to long-term evolution or dropping the FRG’s insistence on the inalienable right of self-determination of the German people. The architects of Ostpolitik were certainly aware that, in all likelihood, history had not had its last words about the ‘German Question’. ‘There is no day which does not see the creation of new realities’ as Brandt put it, expressing a solid belief that the international constellation was not fixed and immutable.39 The long-term aspiration to a European peace order remained, moreover, conjuring up a vision of a Europe in which the divide between the two blocs and the two Germanies would have been replaced by peaceful and organised links. This was already an ambitious target to aim for, given the depth of Cold War hostility which had existed. An early return to a single German state, in whatever form, looked out of reach in the 1970s including to those who devised Ostpolitik and the German approach to détente. The support of Germany’s Western allies was also of fundamental importance to Brandt. This reflected a number of realities. First, by its very nature, bilateral German Ostpolitik could only clear the way for the European and multilateral level of negotiation which would be necessary for any lasting transformation. An isolated Ostpolitik in other words would not be able to attain its objectives. Second, it was only with the solid backing of the other Western powers that the West Germans could hope to pressurise the Soviet Union into
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making certain compromises. Central to this solid backing was the non-recognition of East Germany unless and until the two German states had agreed upon their future relations. It is also true, of course, that early recognition would have contradicted the notion of quadripartite rights and responsibilities – something which none of the four major powers were intending to relinquish. Third, in the specific case of negotiations over Berlin (which were to lead to the Quadripartite agreement of 3 September 1971), the three Western powers had a direct say over a vital part of the Ostpolitik agenda. The Americans in particular had a real ability to accelerate or slow the rate of negotiations – an option that Henry Kissinger was to use on several occasions.40 Bonn in turn tried to place pressure on the Soviet Union and its three Western allies by means of the link – or junktim – which it had established between a ‘satisfactory’ solution to the question of Berlin and the ratification by the German Parliament of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties. Finally, the prises de position of Bonn’s partners were of some significance in the German domestic debate about Ostpolitik, with statements of allied support being seized upon by Brandt and his allies, and signs of dissent within the Western Bloc emphasised by the Christian Democrat opposition Party. The attitude of the Western allies did thus have an influence over the fate of Ostpolitik. It was for this reason that Bonn sought to conduct its negotiations with the Soviet Union, Poland or East Germany in as transparent a fashion as possible. In addition, there were intensive consultations between Germany and its partners, whether at senior political level or among civil servants, notably the Bonn Group. No detail of the negotiation therefore escaped the carefully watching eyes of Washington, London or Paris.41 However, if Brandt’s government had every reason to seek the agreement and support of its main partners, it was also determined to press ahead so as to implement a policy which it believed to be in line with the well-understood interests of Germany. The allies’ desire to be kept informed was thus totally legitimate, but there could be no question of giving ground or delaying the process simply out of fear of discomfort in other West European or American government circles. This explains the celebrated exchange between Bahr and Kissinger in October 1969 in the course of which the former warned the latter that the new German government would be ‘less comfortable’ to deal with than its predecessors, especially as Brandt and Heinemann would ‘not be the representatives of the defeated Germans but of the liberated Germans’.42 Kissinger on the same occasion noted that the Brandt government ‘was asking not for our advice but for our cooperation’.43 Indeed, one of the characteristics of the new German government was its desire to establish a certain autonomy of action, larger than that of its predecessors. Brandt had been quite explicit about this at the very start of his mandate, claiming that the Federal Republic was in the process of ‘returning to a basis of equality’ with other countries and noting that it would defend its legitimate interests even against its Western allies.44 Looking beyond the necessary degree of entente with its Western partners over Germany’s new policy towards the East, it is possible to ask whether there
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was any interference between the Ostpolitik and the integration policy conducted in parallel by the Brandt government. It would be legitimate to claim that the German government sought tangible progress in its European policy, in part to prove the continuity of its overall foreign policy to its own public as much as to its neighbours. Nevertheless, this calculation never seems to have been decisive in German decision-making. It is thus impossible to link this or that compromise made by Bonn at a European level to the desire to obtain the ‘goodwill’ of its Western partners for its Eastern policies. The evidence indeed seems to indicate rather that the two policy areas were kept as separate from one another as was possible: thus Brandt was ready to place ever greater pressure on Georges Pompidou over the British membership negotiations in the EEC despite his ongoing need for the French President’s support over Ostpolitik. Likewise, the delicate final stages of the Berlin negotiations in the spring and summer of 1971 did not seem to prevent multiple confrontations between Bonn and Paris over monetary issues. It would therefore seem that Germany’s European policies and its Eastern policies evolved according to their own criteria and did not really intersect – at least as far as it is possible to tell on the basis of the archival records. Overall, Bonn therefore widened its margin for manoeuvre at an international level by solving indefinitely its own ‘private battle’ with the Eastern Bloc. Brandt, however, was well aware of the limits that still applied to West German foreign policy, not least due to its exposed position and its security dependency. He was also highly conscious – how could it have been otherwise? – of the responsibilities that Germany bore for the catastrophes of the twentieth century. But at the same time he believed that, a quarter of century after the end of the war and after the consolidation of its own democracy, it was in everybody’s interest that Germany became seen as, and saw itself as, a fully fledged participant in international diplomacy. The country had become ‘adult’, to use Brandt’s expression, and was hence in a position to contribute fully both to the building of Europe in the West and to the normalisation of its relations with the East.
Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Brandt (1976, pp. 9–41); Bahr (1996, p. 125ff). Brandt (1989, p. 64). Schmidt (2001, 2003, pp. 521–63); see also Speicher (2000). Speech on 13 March 1958, entitled ‘The East–West Problem as seen from Berlin’, in International Affairs 34 (1958) 3, pp. 297–304 (p. 301). Speech of 25 November 1960. Published in Krause and Gröf (1984, pp. 23–40 (p. 31)). Krause and Gröf (1984, p. 32) (‘Wir können uns eine selbstbewußte Ostpolitik leiste’). H. Soell ‘Die deutschlandpolitischen Konzeptionen der SPD-Opposition 1949–1961’, in Kosthorst et al. (1976, pp. 41–61); Klotzbach (1996, pp. 482–94). Published in Brandt (1963). Text in Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, IV. Reihe 9 (1963), pp. 572–5; cf. Bahr (1996, pp. 152–61); see also the dossier ‘Wandel durch Annäherung’ in Egon Bahr’s
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11 12 13 14
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
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papers, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bonn, vol. 123/2 (hereafter: AdsD); on the term itself see also Bender (2000, pp. 971–8). Willy Brandt, ‘Grundvorstellungen einer europäischen Friedensordnung’, interview with Deutschlandfunk, 2.7.1967, in Bulletin der Bundesregierung, 4.7.1967, no. 70, pp. 604–7; Willy Brandt, ‘Our objective: a European peace order’. Speech to the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Düsseldorf, 30.11.1967, in Brandt (1971a, pp. 57–72). For overviews see Bender (1995) and Potthoff (1999). Text in Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, IV. Reihe 10 (1964), pp. 877–83. Reprinted in Brandt (1971b, pp. 115–24). The phrase was used by Brandt. Memo to Rusk (n. 12), p. 883. See his plaidoyer in favour of the Alliance assuming ‘new tasks’ and against ‘the excess of bilateralism in East–West relations’ in Brandt (1967, pp. 449–54); Dujardin (2004, pp. 637–57); H. Haftendorn, ‘The Adaptation of the NATO Alliance to a Period of Détente: The 1967 Harmel Report’, in Loth (2001, pp. 285–322). See Brandt’s speech to NATO foreign ministers, 24.6.1968, cited in Brandt (1971b, pp. 199–205); also Brandt (1976, pp. 189–91). SPD motion adopted at the Nuremberg conference, March 1968. Cited in Schönhoven (2004, p. 424). For an overview see Baring (1982, pp. 197ff). Polling by the Allensbach Institute, cited by Schönhoven (2004, p. 394). Carstens note, 19.10.1966, ‘Die Problematik unserer Deutschland-Politik’, in Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1966 (hereafter: AAPD), Munich, Oldenbourg, 1997, doc. no. 333. For a critical analysis of the Hallstein doctrine, see Kilian (2001). See Brandt’s comments to the SPD Fraktion in the Bundestag, 11.4.1967, cited in Brandt (2005, pp. 126–9). This is very clear from Schönhoven (2004, pp. 380–408); see also W. Link, ‘Die Deutschlandpolitik der Bundesregierungen Erhard und der Großen Koalition (sowie die dazu geführte Diskussion in Parlament und Öffentlichkeit)’, in Enquête-Kommission Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland (1995, pp. 1676–743). Schwarz (1999, pp. 159–86). Bahr to Brandt, 19.8.1968, Egon Bahr’s papers, AdsD, vol. 399/1. Tutzing speech – see n. 9. See Brandt’s comments on events in Czechoslovakia in Brandt (2005, pp. 160–5); also his interview with Der Spiegel, 9.9.1968, in Brandt (2005, pp. 178–87); Brandt (1969, pp. 20–6). Bahr note, ‘Ostpolitik nach der Besetzung der CSSR’, 1.10.1968, AAPD 1968, doc. no. 324. Draft of the above note, 19.9.1968, Egon Bahr’s papers, AdsD, vol. 399/3. Brandt had replaced the term ‘Überwindung’ with ‘Abwandlung’ and the verb ‘verändern’ with ‘abwandeln’. See also Niedhart (2002). Note, ‘Überlegungen zur Außenpolitik einer künftigen Bundesregierung’, 18.9.1969, AAPD 1969, doc. no. 296. The elections which brought Brandt to the Chancellory took place on 28 September, 1969. Memo ‘Betr.: Europäische Sicherheit’, 7.6.1968, Egon Bahr’s papers, vol. 396; reprinted in AAPD 1968, doc. no. 297; Hahn (1972, pp. 859–80); cf. Bahr (1996, pp. 226–9). Speech in Hamburg, 3.9.1970: in Bulletin der Bundesregierung, no. 118, 5.9.1970, pp. 1225–8. Bahr himself felt that the development of the EEC was the only question of importance on which he and Brandt differed. Bahr (1996, p. 176). This manuscript, entitled ‘Was nun?’ (What now?), in which Bahr tried to develop a multi-stage plan leading to the unification of the two German states was never published because of Brandt’s objections. On this see Vogtmeier (1996, pp. 80–95).
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34 See the meeting between Bahr and Carl-Friedrich von Weizsäcker, 18.1.1968, note for Brandt, 23.1.1968, Egon Bahr’s papers, AdsD, vol. 399. 35 Wilkens (1999, pp. 73–102); Wilkens, ‘Relance et réalités. Willy Brandt, la politique européenne et les institutions communautaires’, in Bitsch (2001, pp. 377–418). 36 See e.g. the tone of Pompidou and Heath’s discussions on 20.5.1971: Archives nationales (Paris), 5 AG 2, vol. 108. The British record is in the same file. 37 Speech to the Bundestag, 28.9.1969, in Deutscher Bundestag, Stenographische Berichte, 6e législature, pp. 20–34 (p. 21). 38 R. Löwenthal, ‘Vom Kalten Krieg zur Ostpolitik’, in Löwenthal and Schwarz (1974, pp. 604–99) (p. 691). Having emigrated to Britain during the Second World War, Löwenthal was close to Brandt in Berlin during the 1950s and 1960s. 39 From his speech ‘Deutsche Außenpolitik nach zwei Weltkriegen’, Berlin, 6.10.1967, in Bulletin der Bundesregierung, 10.10.1967, no. 109, pp. 933–7. 40 D.C. Geyer, ‘The Missing Link. Henry Kissinger and the Back-channel Negotiations on Berlin’, in Geyer and Schaefer (2004, pp. 80–97); Hanhimäki (2004, pp. 85–91). 41 For the reactions of other governments see: R. Morgan, ‘Willy Brandt’s ‘Neue Ostpolitik’: British Perceptions and Positions, 1969–1975’, in Birke et al. (2000, pp. 179–200); G. ‘Niedhart, The Federal Republic’s Ostpolitik and the United States: Initiatives and Constraints’, in Burk and Stokes (1999, pp. 289–311); A. Wilkens, ‘Accords et désaccords. La France, l’Ostpolitik et la question allemande 1969–1974’, in Pfeil (2000, pp. 357–78). 42 Bahr note, ‘Betrifft: Gespräch mit Henry Kissinger am 13.10.1969’, 14.10.1969, Egon Bahr’s papers, AdsD, vol. 439/2. See also Bahr (1996, pp. 270–3). 43 Kissinger (1979, p. 411). 44 Brandt speech, ‘Für den Frieden kämpfen. Ein Jahr der Initiativen in Europa’, in Bulletin der Bundesregierung, 13.11.1970, no. 157, pp. 1653–4.
5
Anglo-French relations, détente and Britain’s second application for membership of the EEC, 1964 to 1967 Helen Parr
Britain’s second application for membership of the EEC in 1967 has been widely regarded as a failure: ‘another Wilsonian initiative had bitten the dust.’1 In 1961, when Harold Macmillan applied to join the European Community, the Foreign Office, press and public opinion had contemplated the possibility that the French President General de Gaulle would prevent British entry, but did not consider his veto to be inevitable. Britain’s membership application was launched ‘amid considerable (and fully justifiable) optimism’.2 The fact that it had taken de Gaulle eighteen months to deliver his negative verdict, and that negotiations between Britain and the Six had made considerable headway, gave succour to this judgement. Indeed, Edward Heath insisted, despite evidence to the contrary, that de Gaulle vetoed in part because the negotiations were on the verge of success.3 Harold Wilson’s 1967 application, by contrast, was viewed at the time and since as certain to meet rejection at the hands of the irascible de Gaulle. As Richard Crossman reportedly remarked having agreed to Britain’s application: ‘the General will save us from our folly.’4 That it took de Gaulle only eight months to make apparent his opposition, and that official negotiations did not even begin, has supported the sense that Wilson’s application was ill-conceived and fated for rejection. Commentators taking a different line have not challenged the sense of unavoidable defeat, but have argued instead that Wilson’s decision was a triumph in terms of domestic public opinion.5 It was essential to make the initiative regardless of its short-term fate. That Wilson did so, and that he agreed to ‘leave the application on the table’ put pressure on the French to lift their veto to enlargement and consequently expedited British accession in the early 1970s.6 Thus, with the exception of very recent work, there has been little attempt to consider the diplomatic foundations of Wilson’s initiative, and still less effort to connect this policy with Britain’s broader foreign policy objectives.7 The aim of this chapter is to assess the diplomatic rationale underlying Wilson’s bid for membership, and to explore the connections between British policy towards the EEC and Britain’s response to the foreign policy challenge delivered by de Gaulle’s approach to NATO. Documentary evidence shows that in formulating their diplomacy for the second initiative, the British had learnt
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from the shortcomings of the first. Foreign Office officials concentrated on making Britain attractive to the Community as a whole, undermining the pretexts under which de Gaulle could justifiably exclude Britain from the EEC. Contrary to the impression of Britain as a reluctant European player, and of Harold Wilson as an ambivalent and directionless Prime Minister, the second bid also had a political content. Wilson delivered a convincing vision of Britain’s future role in Europe, a vision that could appeal to de Gaulle, but was also designed to pose an alternative view of Europe to that espoused by the General. Whereas de Gaulle preferred a ‘cosy nest’ of Europe of the Six, the British supported an enlarged and strengthened Europe, one that would play its part between the superpowers, but would act in fellowship with the Atlantic world. Wilson thus tried to use British entry into the EEC to promote the idea of European integration within an Atlantic shell. In this way, Britain’s approach to the EEC played a role in an AngloAmerican response to the French challenge to NATO.8 The idea of détente – in this case of Europe’s position in the ultimate reconciliation between the two Germanies and between Eastern and Western Europe – was an essential element of the competing French and British visions for the Community’s future. However, the primary aim of Wilson’s application was to secure British membership of the EEC: the application was not a diplomatic weapon to fulfil other foreign policy objectives.9 Rather, the gradual shift of British policy towards Europe represented a genuine reorientation of Britain’s foreign outlook and acceptance of Britain’s diminishing influence in the world. Wilson failed in his primary objective to secure British entry into the EEC. Nevertheless, in addition to the benefits in terms of a domestic reconciliation to the EEC, the failed application did have a certain degree of diplomatic success in drawing attention to the limits of de Gaulle’s foreign policy goals.
Britain, the empty chair crisis and NATO, 1965 to 1966 The empty chair crisis in the latter half of 1965 and the French withdrawal from NATO in 1966 led to a shift in Harold Wilson’s position towards the European Community. Up until this point, Wilson did not consider policy towards the EEC to be a priority. Wilson hoped to encourage ‘functional collaboration’ in technological projects with the French. The ‘bridge-building’ initiative in May 1965 sought to create links between the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the European Community, primarily in order to ensure continued economic dynamism in the EFTA countries. Although Wilson was aware of the political arguments in favour of entry, and did not oppose the idea of ultimately joining a European Community of ‘the right sort’, he was not prepared to accept the economic sacrifices which membership of the existing Community would involve.10 Evidence suggests that Wilson first began to revise his stance in January 1966. Although the process of Wilson’s move towards accepting membership of the Community was complex, and primarily connected to shifts in Britain’s international power position, the timing in relation to the empty chair crisis is
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compelling.11 In dealing with the empty chair and NATO crises, Wilson took heed of Foreign Office warnings that the French stance was a threat to Britain’s interests in Europe and globally. British policy reflected four consistent concerns. First, that Britain’s own influence in Europe would weaken if French dominance remained unchecked. Second, that the Atlantic Alliance and the idea of European integration within the Atlantic framework was in jeopardy. Third, that the Soviet Union could extend its influence over a weakened Europe, and finally that France’s actions could encourage nationalism in Germany. Although France posed an immediate danger, the more threatening prospect was the reemergence of German power in ways that could undermine the ever-fragile European peace. When the empty chair crisis began in July 1965, Britain’s initial reaction was one of ‘sympathetic inactivity’. The Foreign Office was concerned that Britain should not appear to be gloating over the Community’s difficulties, and did not want to be seen to capitalise on the crisis.12 As the Six failed to resolve their difficulties, the reasons to respond increased. This was primarily because, from the Foreign Office’s point of view, the longer the crisis endured, the more likely were the Five to acquiesce to France’s demands in order to bring France back into the European roost. The crisis concerned the issue of supranationality, as France attempted to stall the introduction of qualified majority voting and to curb the influence of the European Parliament and the European Commission. It was also a dispute about agricultural financing, as the French wished to prolong and to consolidate the existing system whereby member states’ contributions to the agricultural fund were calculated based on the quantity of agricultural imports from third countries.13 Furthermore, de Gaulle’s diplomacy ensured that the crisis was also about politics and defence. As the Five resisted the French in September and October, de Gaulle suggested that France would withdraw from NATO. The Foreign Office worried that in order to forestall this greater danger the Five could sacrifice their position in the European Community.14 The connection between the empty chair crisis and the perpetuity of Western European integration tied to the Atlantic world led the Foreign Office to demand an urgent British reaction. Stewart wrote to Wilson on 10 December to recommend that Britain should make a declaration of intent to accept the Treaty of Rome in order to ‘stiffen’ the Five against acquiescence to French terms.15 The British administration was divided as to which side to take in the Six’s dispute. George Brown, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, felt that the destruction of supranationality would prove an advantage for Britain. His department, the Department of Economic Affairs, wrote to the Foreign Office to counsel that a French victory would remove one of the primary obstacles to British accession and would facilitate Britain’s advance towards Europe.16 Harold Wilson was minded to agree. In response to Stewart’s minute on 10 December, Wilson wrote: Why should we find the acceptance of French conditions dangerous since they reject supranationality, play down the Commission and oppose
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H. Parr majority voting. These ought to help us and also minimise the dangers of an exclusively European foreign policy and an ultimately European deterrent. On agriculture and the Commonwealth there seems to be no analysis of the cost to our balance of payments. All the figures I have seen would seem to be ruinous to our already vulnerable balance of payments. It is still a recipe for high prices therefore high wages and high industrial costs. On planning I am sure that had we been in the EEC last year we would have had to accept full deflation – as Italy was forced by the EEC to do.17
Wilson’s response indicated that he had not thought much about Community membership. The Prime Minister was still concerned about the economic impact of going into the EEC, particularly because the Labour government had not convincingly resolved Britain’s persistent balance of payments crises. Like Brown, Wilson felt that the removal of supranationality would benefit Britain, but unlike Brown, he regarded acceptance of supranationality as an affront to Britain’s national sovereignty. His stance reflected a crude view that entry into a Europe with political content would force Britain away f