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EUROPE FOR THE EUROPEANS

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Europe for the Europeans The Foreign and Security Policy of the Populist Radical Right

Edited by CHRISTINA SCHORI LIANG Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland

© Christina Schori Liang 2007 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Christina Schori Liang has asserted her moral right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identiﬁed as the editor of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Gower House Croft Road Aldershot Hampshire GU11 3HR England

Ashgate Publishing Company Suite 420 101 Cherry Street Burlington, VT 05401-4405 USA

Ashgate website: http://www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Europe for the Europeans: the foreign and security policy of neo-populist parties 1. Populism – Europe – Congresses 2. Political parties – Europe – Platforms – Congresses 3. National security – Europe – Congresses 4. Europe – Foreign relations – Congresses I. Liang, Christina Schori 324.2'403 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Europe for the Europeans: the foreign and security policy of the populist radical right / [edited] by Christina Schori Liang/ p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7546-4851-2 1. Conservatism--Europe. 2. Radicalism--Europe. 3. Europe--Politics and goernment--1989– I. Liang, Christina Schori. JC573.2.E85E87 2007 327.4--dc22 2007013163 ISBN 978 0 7546 4851 2

Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Cornwall.

Contents List of Tables Notes on Contributors Foreword – François Heisbourg Acknowledgements

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Europe for the Europeans: the Foreign and Security Policy of the Populist Radical Right Christina Schori Liang

vii ix xiii xv

1

Against the ‘Green Totalitarianism’: Anti-Islamic Nativism in Contemporary Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe Hans-Georg Betz

33

The Aims and Objections of the Austrian Far Right in the Fields of Foreign and Military Politics Fabian Virchow

55

Our Own People First in a Europe of Peoples: The International Policy of the Vlaams Blok Marc Swyngedouw, Koen Abts and Maarten Van Craen

81

Nationalism. New Right, and New Cleavages in Danish Politics: Foreign and Security Policy of the Danish People’s Party Jørgen Goul Andersen

103

‘La politique du dehors avec les raisons du dedans’: Foreign and Defence Policy of the French Front National Jocelyn A.J. Evans

125

‘Nationalism Ensures Peace’: the Foreign and Security Policy of the German Populist Radical Right After (Re)uniﬁcation Christina Schori Liang

139

The Communist Legacy? – Populist but Not Popular – The Foreign Policies of the Hungarian Radical Right

177

Europe for the Europeans

vi

Eric Beckett Weaver 9

Recalcitrant Allies: The Conﬂicting Foreign Policy Agenda of the Alleanza Nazionale and the Lega Nord Marco Tarchi

187

10

A Fortuynist Foreign Policy Cas Mudde

11

The Swiss People’s Party and the Foreign and Security Policy since the 1990s Oscar Mazzoleni

223

Non Angeli, sed Angli: The Neo-populist Foreign Policy of the ‘New’ BNP Roger Grifﬁn

239

Between Tradition and Transition: The Central European Radical Right and the New European Order Michael Minkenberg

261

A Speciﬁc Variant of Neo-Populism: Foreign and Security Policies of Extreme Right Parties in the European Parliament Elections in 2004 Volker Ahlemeyer

283

12

13

14

Appendix A: Populist Radical Right Parties Index

209

295 299

List of Tables 4.1

5.1 5.2 5.3

The number of seats of radical right parties in the European Parliament.

96

Perceived effects of globalization, 2005, by party choice. Strive to reduce the role of the nation-state, 2005, by party choice. Attitudes towards participation in international conﬂicts, 2001 and 2005, by party choice. Attitudes towards sending Danish soldiers to war, 2005, by party choice. Attitudes towards Danish participation in the war against Iraq, 2005, by party choice. Attitudes towards the United States as a peacekeeper, 2005, by party choice. Attitudes towards defence expenditures, 2001 and 2005, by party choice. Percentages voting yes in Danish referenda, 1972–2000, by party choice. Muslim countries a threat to Denmark, 1998–2005, by party choice. International solidarity, 2005, by party choice. Correlation between perception of Muslim/Arab countries as a threat to Danish security and perception of immigration as a threat to ‘our national identity’, 1990–2005. Gamma coefﬁcients.

121

7.1 7.2

Development of the German Radical Right from 2000 to 2005. The Internet Network of the European National Front.

144 170

13.1 13.2

Dominant actors in the Central European right-wing family: Poland. Electoral performance of the Central European Radical Right: Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary. The radical right-wing mobilization potential in East and West, 1991 (nos. 1 – 6) and 2000 (nos. 7 and 8). Dissatisfaction with the democratic system in four Central European countries (in per cent). Analytic framework for right-wing radical mobilization potential in post-socialist Europe. Opportunity structures and right-wing radical electoral potential in post-socialist Europe.

265

5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10 5.11

13.3 13.4 13.5 13.6

113 114 115 116 116 117 117 118 119 120

269 272 273 275 277

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Notes on Contributors Abts, Dr. Koen. Sociologist and researcher at the Institute of Social and Political Opinion Research (ISPO), Belgium. Pursuing PhD regarding progression of right extremism in Antwerp, Belgium. Key research topics also include populism, political trust and modernity. Andersen, Dr. Jørgen Goul. Professor of Political Sociology, director of the Danish Election Studies and the Centre for Comparative Welfare Studies at Aalborg University, Denmark. Main research ﬁelds include the welfare state, parties and political behaviour, and political participation. Publications include Voting and Political Attitudes (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1997). Betz, Dr. Hans-Georg. Professor of Political Science in the United States and Canada. Main research includes religion, culture and political polarization in the United States, including a text to be published in 2008 in Paris. Publications include Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994); La droite populiste en Europe (Paris: CEVIPOF/Autrement, 2005). Evans, Dr. Jocelyn. Senior Lecturer in politics at the University of Salford, England. Authored articles on French Euroscepticism, the extreme right, and party system theory. Main research includes Northern Ireland party memberships, and the European extreme right; also co-founding the Extreme Right Electorates and Party Success (EREPS) in the European research network. Publications include: Voters and Voting: An Introduction (London: Sage, 2004); editor of The French Party System (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2003). Grifﬁn, Dr. Roger. Professor of Modern History at Oxford Brookes University, England. Main research includes the primary or secondary sources relating to fascism and their relationship to established religion, modernity, and aspiration to bring about a secular cultural and temporal revolution. Publications include: The Nature of Fascism (London, New York, 1991); Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). Liang, Dr. Christina Schori. PhD from the Graduate Institute for International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. Research Ofﬁcer at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. Lecturer for the Diplomatic Studies Programme at the Graduate Institute for International Studies (HEID), Switzerland. Member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and Advisory board member of Columbia International Affairs Online.

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Mazzoleni, Dr. Oscar. Director of the Observatory for Political Research in the canton of Ticino, Switzerland, and lecturer at the University of Applied Sciences of Southern Switzerland (SUPSI). Fellow researcher at the University of Turin, Italy and the University of Lausanne, Switzerland. Main research ﬁelds are citizens’ behaviour, party politics, and electoral behaviour in Switzerland. Publications include: Nationalisme et Populisme en Suisse: La Radicalisation de la ‘Nouvelle’ UDC (Lausanne: Presses Polytechniques et Universitaires Romandes, 2003). Minkenberg, Dr. Michael. PhD from the University of Heidelberg, Germany. Professor of Political Science at Europa-Universität Viadrina, Frankfurt/Oder, Germany. Main research includes comparative politics, the radical right, religion, and politics. Publications include: Die neue radikale Rechte im Vergleich USA, Frankreich, Deutschland (Opladen and Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag 1998); co-editor of Politik und Religion, with U. Willems (PVS Special Issue 33/2002). Mudde, Dr. Cas. PhD from Leiden University, The Netherlands. Currently a Senior Lecturer and former Chair of the Department of Political Science of the University of Antwerp, Belgium. Main research includes political extremism, civil society, parties and party families, and democratization. Publications include: Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Antwerp: Cambridge University Press, 2007); editor, the Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe (London, New York: Routledge, 2005). Swyngedouw, Dr. Marc. Professor and PhD in social sciences from K.U. Leuven, Belgium. Director of the Institute of Social and Political Opinion Research (ISPO), Belgium. Formed the foundation for national elections studies in Belgium conducted by ISPO. Founder of analytical exit polls organised by public broadcaster BRTN/VRT for federal and local elections in Flanders. Guest professor at several universities and research centres worldwide. Research includes political sociology, electoral research, extreme right voting behaviour, comparative research, value orientations and ethnic minorities. Tarchi, Dr. Marco. PhD and Professor of Political Science, Political Theory and Political Communication at the University of Florence, Italy. Main research includes comparative politics, concentrating on populism, political parties, fascism, and the radical right. Publications include: Dal Msi ad An (Bologna : Il Mulino, 1997) ; Fascismo. Teorie, interpretazioni e modelli (Bari: Laterza, 2003) ; L’Italia populista (Bologna : Il Mulino, 2003). Van Craen, Dr. Maarten. Political scientist, researcher at the Institute of Social and Political Opinion Research (ISPO) at K.U. Leuven, Belgium. Works as a researcher at the University of Limburg (LUC), Belgium. Member of the research group ‘Government and Society’. Main research includes extreme right-wing parties, social and political opinion research, and voting rights for immigrants.

Notes on Contributors

xi

Virchow, Dr. Fabian. PhD in Political Science and Professor at the Centre for Conﬂict Studies at Philipps University of Marburg, Germany. Main research includes social/political movements, militarism, political communication and political culture research. Publications include: Gegen den Zivilismus: Internationale Beziehungen und Militär in den politischen Konzeptionen der extremen Rechten (Berlin: VS Verlag Für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006); co-editor of Banal Militarism (Berlin: VS Verlag, 2005). Weaver, Dr. Eric Beckett. Junior member of St Antony’s College and a DPhil candidate in history at the University of Oxford, England. Serves on the board or managing committee of a number of academic societies focusing on central or southeastern Europe. Curator of two highly-acclaimed exhibitions, PhD Nationalism (Belgrade, 1998), and Kosovo/a: The Media War (Budapest, 2000). Co-editor of the book Challenges to New Democracies in the Balkans (London: The South Slav Research and Study Centre, 2004).

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Foreword François Heisbourg

The editor and the authors of Europe for the Europeans have produced a timely and important book. By providing a broad-spectrum analysis of right-wing populist external policies in Europe, it not only ﬁlls a signiﬁcant gap in the academic literature; it also does so at a critical juncture of the European project: after a full half-century of deepening and broadening, the European Union ﬁnds itself, after the rejection in 2005 of the constitutional treaty by two of the six founding countries, in a deep institutional crisis, which is itself a reﬂection of an existential crise de conﬁance. Radical right-wing populism is in part both a product and a cause of this situation. The pan-European picture painted by the contributors of this book must be set in its longer-term historical context. The radical forces that occupy the European scene today greatly resemble the earlier episode of the emergence of right-wing populism on a European level; that of the closing decades of the nineteenth century that marked, indeed, the invention of the world ‘populism’ itself, drawn from the Russian narodniki movement. Then, as now, the driving forces of populism were the wrenching changes brought about by what was then called internationalization, and what we now know as globalization. Karl Marx, in the opening pages of his ‘Manifesto of the Communist Party’ gives a description of internationalization, which bears a close resemblance to current characterizations of globalization: ‘In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufﬁciency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations, become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature to cite just one example among others.’1 While this ‘development of productive forces’ (to use another Marxian formula) was welcomed by Marxists and anti-Marxists alike as a necessary stage of humanity’s historical progress, because of its cosmopolitan nature, collides with more recent and increasingly powerful narratives of national identity. Then as now, the trauma resulting from internationalization was born of success, not of failure. The unprecedented growth typical of the Industrial Revolution in Europe, like today’s equally unprecedented growth at the global level, put into jeopardy established economic and social patterns. The greater the success, the 1 Marx, K. and Engels F. (1969), Manifesto of the Communist Party, (Moscow: Progress Publishers).

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worse the disruption for those who were thus challenged. The sharp cyclical crises of the 19th and early 20th-century economic growth – such as the German ﬁnancial crash of 1873 subsequent to the overheating produced by the inﬂux of French payments after the Franco-Prussian war of 1870–71 – were crises of adaptation, which disproportionately hit the working poor, thus providing ready fuel for those in search of scapegoats. Then as now, attacks against ‘rootless plutocracy’ or ‘locustlike investment funds’ found ready-made audiences in Europe, as they did in the United States : William Jennings Bryan’s ‘Cross of Gold’ speech at the Democratic National Convention in 1896 bears witness of the appeal of populism beyond Europe’s shores.2 Then as now and somewhat more surprisingly, right-wing populism also found roots in popular perceptions of Europe’s decline. After all, Europe reached its apex of global power during the second half of the 19th century. With a majority share of both the world’s domestic product as well as of the territory, European powers with their colonial possessions were in a position of unprecedented strength. Yet, it was also during the 1870s that the United States overtook the British Isles as the number one economic power, and the 1890s also witnessed the birth of the ‘Yellow peril’, a slogan coined by Wilhelm II to marshal the Europeans against the Asiatic hordes. Although Oswald Spengler had not yet conceived his ‘Untergang des Abendlandes’,3 there was a Spenglerian feel to late 19th-century European attitudes. The fear of decay added fuel to populism. The differences are of course as notable as the similarities. Today, globalization is not simply a copy of 19th-century internationalization. Most of Europe has become a post-Kantian paradise (to use Robert Kagan’s expression4 instead of a collection of warring imperial rivals ; and the misery index of the losers of globalization in Europe today mercifully bears little resemblance to the proletariat and the Lumpenproletariat of Marx’s day. Yet the parallels between yesterday’s populism and today’s are compelling. They should at least force one to reﬂect on the future consequences of today’s right-wing populism, in comparison to the late 19th century precedent. In the 19th century, the forces of radical right-wing populism did not take power in any of the European states. But nearly everywhere, they strongly inﬂuenced the terms of the political debate and the shape of the new consensus. In particular, they gave a valid character and a broad political base to the forces of nationalism, which were to make the ‘wars of peoples’ so much bloodier than the ‘wars of kings’, to use the prescient words of Winston Churchill during the Boer

2 Bryan, W. J. (1896), The Cross of Gold: Speech Delivered before the National Democratic Convention at Chicago, July 9, 1896 (Chicago: University of Nebraska Press). 3 Spengler, O. (1977), Der Untergang des Abendlandes, (Germany: DTV Deutscher Taschenbuch). 4 Kagan, R. (2003), Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order, (New York: Random House).

Foreword

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5

War. The white-hot nationalistic atmosphere of the initial stages of World War I was heavily inﬂuenced by the populist climate of the previous decades. The anti-semitism of pre-1914 right-wing populism – with Edouard Dumont in France, Karl Lüger in Austria and the anti-Semitic league in Wilhelminian Germany – along with the xenophobic denunciation of ‘la haute ﬁnance apatride’ – were to be the ideological spawn from which emerged the forces of Nazism and fascism in post-World War I Europe. Obviously, the historical background of the times, characterized by the breakdown of pre-1914 internationalization and its post-war replacement by the quest for economic autarchy, bears no resemblance to today’s era of triumphant globalization. However, systemic crises can, and do, occur in history and should make us cautious vis-à-vis forecasts of the linear pursuit of existing global economic trends. Furthermore, the speciﬁc characteristics of new radical right-wing populism in post Soviet, central and eastern Europe create the condition whereby rabid anti-Semitism and open racism can move from the discredited outer fringes of the new-fascist twilight zone towards the realm of widely accepted discourse of European-wide radical right-wing populism. In the communist states of the USSR’s empire, the absence of any serious coming to terms with the history of the years of persecution and killing of the Jews helps explain the lack of inhibition in the expression of such views today. There was no Vergangenheitsbewältigung – nor was there a Historikerstreit – in the German Democratic Republic or in any of the other ‘People’s Democracies’. The existence today in these countries of a powerful, and justiﬁed, narrative of rejection of oppression imposed by the Soviet Union and its communist allies in the ‘People’s Democracies’ has also been a major factor behind the difﬁculty of fostering a mainstream European narrative that is built on the need to deal with the legacy of World War II, seen ﬁrst and foremost as the crucible of the Holocaust. The ‘victims of Yalta’ have a view of post-1945 history that is obviously deeply different from that of those states – including the western portion of Germany – for whom the fall of Nazism was an unadulterated liberation from the worst catastrophe of European history. That difference of historical experience provides a foundation for a rightwing populism more openly and avowedly radical than most of its West European counterparts. It also gives greater respectability to the unacceptable and by osmosis, makes similar discourses acceptable in Europe as a whole. All of this is serious and potentially even dangerous. The potential danger ﬂows from the consequences of an as-yet non-existent systemic crisis, which would derail global economic progress, under circumstances similar to the crash of 1929. In this crisis, noisy populism could readily morph into militant fascism. The current seriousness of the situation is the consequence of populism regarding the European Union’s ability to be a winner rather than a relative loser of globalization. For example, the successful reforms of economically and politically liberal post5 Churchill, W. (1901). The wars of peoples will be more terrible than those of kings. Retrieved October 10, 2007, from the Churchill Centre website: http://www.winstonchurchill. org.

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dictatorship Spain, undertaken over a period of more than 25 years show what can be achieved positively, notwithstanding severe challenges including terrorism and separatism. Conversely, the recent populist and revanchiste lurch of Poland – a country of roughly the same size and population as Spain – demonstrates what can go wrong. An EU in which right-wing radicalism would set the terms of the debate in a signiﬁcant number of member states would increase the risk of entering into a selffulﬁlling prophecy of decline, while making it more difﬁcult to cope with eventual economic shocks. Dr Christina Schori Liang and an impressive cast of authors have thus rendered us a great service in providing this European-wide overview of one of the most troubling political developments of the post-Cold War era.

Acknowledgements This publication arose out of a workshop on the foreign policy of European rightwing populists which was initiated under the auspices of the Graduate Institute for International Studies in Geneva in July 2004. The workshop was hosted by Philippe Burrin, the current director of the Graduate Institute for International Studies and Development and the editor of this volume. Philippe Burrin generously supported this conference with funds from his 1997 Max-Planck Forschungspreis for his monumental work in German historical scholarship. I am deeply indebted to Philippe Burrin, my former thesis advisor and mentor, for inspiring me to continue my work in this ﬁeld. I would also like to express my gratitude towards André Liebich and Jussi Hanhimäki, who did a wonderful job in chairing the workshop. As well as Melanie Sully and Piero Ignazi for their contributions to the workshop. Numerous colleagues and friends at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy were generous in their time and support for this project. I would especially like to thank Pál Dunay, Graeme Herd, and Fred Tanner who took the time to read individual chapters. Special thanks are also due to Sigrid Chatton, Shahram Chubin, François Heisbourg and Karl-Heinz Rambke. I would like to extend my warmest appreciation to: Kai Michael Kenkel, Sebastian Keil, Genevie Gold, Pablo Padrutt, Jason Powers, Rebeca Puentes, Julie Schindall, and Wolf Schweitzer for their very valuable work. As well as Nikki Dines at Ashgate Publishing for her support and keen guidance in bringing the book to its completion. This book would not have been possible without the support and encouragement of Hans-Georg Betz who offered his extremely valuable expertise throughout this project. I would also like to thank the many other chapter contributors to this volume for their collegiality and their exciting scholarship in this ﬁeld which is increasingly relevant in Europe today. Finally, I am indebted to my parents for their kind support and most especially, my husband Oliver, for his thoughtful encouragement and patience throughout. Christina Schori Liang Geneva, November 2007

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Chapter 1

Europe for the Europeans: The Foreign and Security Policy of the Populist Radical Right Christina Schori Liang

Introduction There is a new populist moment in Europe. Populist politicians are enjoying unprecedented success at the polls and throughout Europe there is a crisis of conﬁdence in how contemporary politics are being shaped. As Krastev has noted, ‘[t]he result is a new type of politics where the main structural conﬂict is not between the Left and the Right or between reformers and conservatives. The real clash is between elites that are becoming more suspicious of democracy and the angry publics that are becoming more hostile to liberalism.’1 Added to this political dilemma are rising fears of insecurity which have shifted from classical fears of Soviet state aggression to less tangible threats from non-state actors, such as terrorism, organized crime, and uncontrolled immigration, as well as economic fears about the costs of globalization and European integration. Europeans have become increasingly worried. In a recent survey of 51 countries, western Europeans were the most pessimistic, with 64 per cent being negative about the future. Most of them feel ‘unsafe, powerless, and gloomy’.2 Europeans fear radical Islamists or ending up as demographic losers in a new ‘Eurabia’, and are anxious about being left behind in the globalization process or, even worse, being governed by an outside power such as the United States or the ‘elite driven’ and ‘undemocratic’ European Commission.3 Seventy-ﬁve per cent of West Europeans believe there will be further deterioration in global security in the future.4 According to another recent survey, Central European citizens are the most sceptical about the merits of democracy of all the regions of the world.5 According to a recent Gallup International Poll, 79 1 Krastev, I. (2007), ‘The populist moment’, Eurozine.com, http://www.eurozine. com/articles/2007-09-18-krastev-en.html>. 2 Gallup Poll (2007), ‘Future Threats’ prepared for the 2007 World Economic Forum Conference, Davos, Switzerland. 3 Moїsi, D. (2007), ‘The Clash of Emotions: Fear, Humiliation, Hope and the New World Order’, Foreign Affairs 86:1, 1. 4 Gallup International Association (2006), ‘Voice of the People 2006: What the World Thinks on Today’s Global Issues’, Gallup International Association. 5 Krastev, I. (2007), ‘Is East-Central Europe Backsliding? The Strange Death of the Liberal Consensus’, Journal of Democracy 18; 4, 57.

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percent of the world believes that democracy is the best form of government available but only one third agrees that the voice of the people is heard by the governments of their countries.6 In view of these fears, it is not surprising that after decades at the margins of political life, European populist radical right parties are making a political comeback across the continent. As many books on the topic have already argued, one of the most signiﬁcant developments of the past two decades has been the transformation of these parties from the margins to the mainstream’.7 In western Europe, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland have strong right-wing populist parties that have inﬂuenced their national governments and are shaping their countries’ foreign and security policies. In eastern Europe, populist and nationalist parties have developed in Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. Even though the new European order has brought many positive changes, reform fatigue is causing proEurope and pro-market parties to lose ground to nationalist and populists groups.8 This book argues that the populist radical right’s foreign political platforms play an important role in their growing appeal in Europe. Until now, the vast majority of research on these parties has focused on their historical origins, political platforms, voter patterns and domestic politics. Only limited attention has been given to their international agenda. This is especially surprising since several of these parties were founded to speciﬁcally deal with foreign political issues. The meteoric rise of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) can be attributed to putting foreign policy issues at the centre of its agenda, namely preventing Switzerland from ‘unnecessarily’ getting involved in international affairs, and by mobilizing public opinion against Swiss membership in the European Economic Area and the United Nations, furthering ties with the European Union (EU), and defending Switzerland’s role in the Second World War.9 The German Republikaner also gained political notoriety when they argued for a new direction in German foreign policy based not on American political interests but rather focusing on its own national interests, namely German reuniﬁcation. As the subsequent chapters in this book show, the foreign–political platforms of numerous populist right-wing parties have allowed them to formulate coherent messages that have met with success at the polls. Although other works have covered some speciﬁc aspects of foreign policy issues10, this is the ﬁrst book which attempts to describe the European populist radical right’s 6 Krastev, I. (2007), ‘The populist moment’, Eurozine, . 7 Hainsworth, P. (2000), The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream (London: Pinter). 8 Larrabee, S.F. (2006), ‘Danger and Opportunity in Eastern Europe’, Foreign Affairs 85:6, 1. 9 Betz, H.-G. (2004), La droite populiste en Europe : Extrême et démocarate? (Paris: Autrement), p. 96. See also chapter 11 by Mazzoleni. 10 Mudde, C. (2007), Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), discusses globalization and International Organizations. Greven, T. and Grumke T. (eds.) Globalisierter Rechts-extremismus? Die extremistische Recht in der Ära der Globalisierung, (Wiesbaden : VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften), discusses globalization issues. Betz, H.-G. (2004), La droite populiste en Europe : Extrême et démocarate? (Paris: Autrement), discusses Islamophobia and migration.

Europe for the Europeans

3

foreign and security policy objectives. It is a result of a workshop that was organized by Professor Philippe Burrin11 and the editor of this volume at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva in July 2004, which brought together experts in the ﬁeld of right-wing populism to examine the right-wing foreign policy agenda, the importance of these views in attracting voters, as well as their ability to cooperate at the international level. The expanded contributions to this study seek to examine the wider foreign-policy platform of Europe’s populist radical right parties, to highlight the particular issues that exist at the national level, and to raise further questions for future scholarship. Deﬁning the Populist Radical Right Before addressing the foreign policy landscape of the populist radical right it is important to formulate a common deﬁnition of the parties explored in the book. It is extremely difﬁcult to ﬁnd a common deﬁnition in the plethora of terms that exist: ‘fascist’, ‘neoNazi’, ‘extreme right’, ‘radical right’, ‘far right’, ‘old right’ and ‘new right’ are but some of the most common concepts used in the past. According to Mudde, there are no less than 26 deﬁnitions of extreme right used in the literature and they list no less than 58 different features.12 Added to this complexity is the fact that some deﬁnitions carry historical signiﬁcance no longer relevant to the new generation of right-wing populists that emerged after the Cold War.13 Eastern European parties, which emerged from the double historical legacy of fascism and communism, are a particular challenge. Added to this dilemma is the ongoing political reform process of opportunistic parties constantly reinventing themselves. The book covers parties14 representing the Old Right (Front national, Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja, Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands) and regional separatists (Vlaams Blok, Lega Nord) as well as right populist parties (Schweizer Volkspartei, Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs/Bündnis Zukunft Österreich, Dansk Folkeparti), and ultra-catholic party (Liga Polskich Rodzin), and post-fascist turned conservative (Alleanza Nazionale) or post-modern (Lijst Pim Fortuyn). A common term to describe this wide range of parties is difﬁcult to ﬁnd. Mudde, in his most recent book,Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, develops the term ‘populist radical right’ which simpliﬁes these complexities into a simple and usable, minimum and maximum deﬁnition, in which elements of the ‘maximum’ are also contained in the ‘minimum’ group. 15 According to this deﬁnition, all parties which ﬁt into this category espouse, at a minimum, a speciﬁc form of nationalism. He has argued effectively that nationalism is one core concept of these parties. Outliving many of the other -isms in our century, nationalism espoused by these political parties 11 Professor Philippe Burrin is currently the Director of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID) in Geneva, Switzerland. 12 Mudde, C. (1996), ‘The War of Words Deﬁning the Extreme Right Party Family’, West Europe Politics, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 225–48. 13 Grifﬁn, R. (2000), ‘Interregnum or Endgame? The Radical Right in the ‘Post-fascist’ Era’, Journal of Political Ideologies 5:2, 163–78. 14 The myriad of party names – often long and mutable – necessitates the use of many acronyms. A list of abbreviations can be found at the end of the chapter. 15 Mudde, C. (2007), Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 15.

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declares the maintenance and strengthening of one’s own nation to be the highest principle of human thought and action, and denigrates other nations.16 Nationalism alone, however, cannot describe the parties in this book, since the minimum deﬁnition ‘nationalist’ here does not make a distinction between ‘moderate’ nationalists – so-called ‘liberal’ nationalists – and radical nationalists. Thus the term nativist helps further reﬁne this distinction. The term nativism is deﬁned by Mudde ‘as an ideology which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the nation’) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state.’17 Mudde maintains that nativism can also accommodate the xenophobic and nationalist reactions to (socalled) indigenous minorities within the country (for example, Russians in the Baltic States, Roma and Sinti groups in Central and Eastern Europe).18 Nativism thus can encompass groups that are speciﬁcally racist or simply protectionist in relation to their own culture. In addition to nationalism and nativism, the parties examined in this volume support authoritarianism. Stöss deﬁnes authoritarianism as the willingness to voluntarily submit oneself to those who are stronger, or rather to a power that has not been legitimated, as well as the tendency to dominate those who are weaker. 19 Drawing on Theodor Adorno’s The Authoritarian Personality, Robert Altemeyer further deﬁnes three facets of this authoritarian personality: conventionalism, authoritarian aggression and authoritarian submission. In order to measure this cluster of beliefs, Altemeyer developed the Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale, asking subjects to rate their agreement (or disagreement) with statements such as ‘Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers/Do what the authorities tell us to do/Get rid of the “rotten apples” who are ruining everything.’ This example contains all three facets of RWA scale: ‘honor the ways of our forefathers’ – conventional/traditional values; ‘do what the authorities tell us to do’ – authoritarian submission; ‘get rid of the “rotten apples” who are ruining everything – authoritarian aggression.20 All the parties described in this book share these traits, which seem to feed off a growing taste for authoritarianism in Europe. In a recent study by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, for example, 9 per cent of Germans polled believed that under some circumstances a dictatorship could be a better system to run a state than a democracy. 21 An iron-ﬁsted leader who would ‘govern Germany for the beneﬁt of all’ would be supported by 15 16 Ibid., p. 16-17. See also Prizell, I. (1998), National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine (Cambridge Russian, Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 13. 17 Mudde (2007), op. cit. p. 19. Hans-Georg Betz further elaborates the term in the subsequent chapter. See also Betz (2002), ‘Conditions Favouring the Success and Failure of radical Rightwing Populist Parties in Contemporary Democracies’, in Mény, Y. and Surel, Y. (eds.), Democracies and the Populist Challenge (Basingstoke: Palgrave); Friedman, N. (1967), ‘Nativism’, Phylon 28:4, 408–15. 18 Mudde (2007), op. cit., p. 19. 19 Liang, Christina (2002), German Far Right Ideology in the Decade of German Uniﬁcation, thèse no. 641, IUHEI, Geneva, p. 10. 20 Altemeyer, R. (1981), Right-Wing Authoritarianism (Manitoba: University of Manitoba Press). 21 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 9 December 2006.

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per cent of the respondents. One in four – 26 per cent – said they favoured a single party in Germany ‘that would embody the national community as a whole …’.22 It is the authoritarian element of the nativism espoused by these parties that places them into the spectrum of radical parties, which, by democratic means, seek to change the conception of democratic values at the same time. The term radical in this sense does not necessarily mean marginal or extremist (although it can). Populist radical right parties can range from the Swiss SVP, which has a radical wing in what is otherwise a mainstream populist right party, to the French Front national, which is an ethnocentric party attempting to achieve a more mainstream populist image, to parties like the German National Democratic Party (NPD) and the British National Party (BNP), which are direct heirs of European Nazism and fascism. Finally, Mudde also suggests that the element of populism delineates speciﬁc parties from each other. Populism can be considered to be an ideology that separates society into two homogenous and antagonistic groups – ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’ – and that holds that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people. For Krastev populists maintain that politics is the expression of the general will of the people and social change will only be possible with radical change of the elite.23 According to populist notions of democracy, nothing is more important than the general will of the people, not even human rights or constitutional guarantees. Following Napoleon Bonaparte’s dictum that ‘the politics of the future will be the art of stirring the masses’, populist radical right parties seek to foster populist leaders ‘who think with the head of the citizens.’24 They encourage ‘plain speaking’ and they believe they represent the common man from the street whom the traditional leadership elite has forsaken. Their task, according to the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs’ (FPÖ) Jörg Haider, is to protect ‘the citizens against a political and intellectual dispossession and incapacitation.’25 Neo-populist parties are able to address common feelings shared by large numbers of people that are largely ignored by politicians. Kriesi has suggested that the emergence of populist movements is intricately linked to major experiences of social and cultural turmoil and dislocation.26 Taggart also supports this argument by stating that populism is not the politics of the stable, ordered polity, but instead comes along due to change, crisis and challenge.27 Linked to the notion of populism is the characteristic of resentment politics. For Krastev, populism indicates that liberal solutions in the ﬁelds of politics, economics and culture are no longer considered attractive to voters who are drawn instead to politics of exclusion.28 Many of the parties examined pose themselves as political outsiders who dare to break political taboos and thus express the resentment felt by the populace against the political elite. For example, many of the parties in question express racist viewpoints, all the while abiding by democratic rules and staying within the legal 22 Ibid. 23 Krastev, I. (2007), Eurozine, p. 2–3. 24 Crick, B. (2005), ‘Populism, Politics and Democracy’, Democratization 12:5, 627. Betz (2004), op. cit., p. 45. 25 Ibid. 26 Kriesi in Betz (2004), op. cit., p. 52. 27 Taggart, P. (2004), ‘Populism and Representative Politics in Contemporary Europe’, Journal of Political Ideologies 9:3, 275. 28 Krastev, op. cit., p. 1–6.

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parameters of racism laws. As Betz has argued, this strategy of breaking political taboos allows the radical right to present itself as a fresh political force outside the established parties and not corrupted by power. If punished for breaching racism laws, this tactic allows the radical right to present itself as a victim of the established parties and to advance a range of extreme demands without having to assume responsibility for the consequences.29 Resentment politics have received a further boost through changes in the democratic political process brought about by information technology. In the past, people traditionally identiﬁed with a particular party that espoused the same political traditions of the voter, based usually on political and religious traditions. Voters are now choosing their candidates based on real-time information in a rapidly expanding media world. The Internet has allowed the populist radical right an equal speaking platform with established mainstream parties. In almost all Western European countries there are declining levels of trust in political leaders. Legitimizing democratic governance has become a leading challenge in European democracies, especially in Eastern Europe, where 40 years of communist control have undermined the legitimacy of party-related activities and were the political class is viewed as corrupt. In Eastern Europe, the populists’ obsession with corruption has become more important than the actual policy options. Voters are mostly interested in revenging themselves against the politicians who are viewed as corrupted elites. Clearly this is not helped by the fact that politicians such as the current Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Gyuresàny admitted to lying “in the morning, in the evening, and at night.” According to the Eurobarometer surveys, parliaments, governments and parties are facing increasing scepticism in almost all European democracies.30 In 2005, 32 per cent of all EU citizens trusted their parliament, 28 per cent trusted their government, and just 14 per cent trusted their political parties.31 The populist radical right has helped foster this political disenchantment, arguing that mainstream political parties no longer meet the demands of their citizens. A further populist strategy employed by a number of parties is what Swyngedouw describes as the “jumping of scales technique” whereby global complexity is rescaled to local simplicity.32 Using this technique, radical right-wing parties describe global issues such as the processes of European integration, economic globalization as local, comprehensible matters which are a direct threat to established prosperity, rights and power.33 International migration, organized crime and international terrorism that are global issues can be redeﬁned as national or local problems. Jean-Marie Le Pen has used this simple formula when describing immigration, which, according to him, if prevented, would resolve all of France’s domestic problems. The SVP, DPP, and LPF have also used this formula. The Vlaams Blok (VB) suggests that criminality, domestic security and family politics can all be prevented by ending the preferential treatment of foreigners.34 29 Betz (2004), pp. 49–50. 30 European Commision (2006), ‘Attitudes towards European Union Enlargement’, European Commission: Special Eurobarometer, . 31 Ibid. 32 Swyngedouw (1997), Urry (2003) as described in chapter 4 by Swyngedouw et al. 33 See chapter 4 for an explanation of this formulas as it pertains to the Vlaams Blok. 34 Scharenberg (2006), op. cit., p. 97.

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Ethno-pluralism A ﬁnal concept linked to much of the populist radical right is ethno-pluralism. In the past these parties focused largely on anti-party rhetoric and issues such as immigration, asylum and refugees and, according to Betz, made little effort to develop a coherent ideology as a basis of legitimization for their demands.35 However, as Betz, Grifﬁn and others have pointed out, after the Cold War these parties developed a core doctrine based on ethno-cultural pluralism whose main characteristic is a highly restrictive notion of society, citizenship and democracy, all which are seen as intricately tied to a culturally and ethnically homogenous community.36 In some cases, ethno-cultural pluralism is also an attempt to preserve the idea of race and ethnicity in political discourse without evoking Nazi ideas of racial exclusion and persecution. Ethno-pluralism uses their own notion of ‘difference’ and ‘multiculturalism’ – mirroring anti-racist terms used in left-wing discourse – so as to seemingly reject all notions of biological racism and racial superiority and to promote the coexistence of races. Nonetheless, the concept of ethno-pluralism denounces the mixing of the races either through marriage or through immigration.37 Ethno-pluralist thinkers argue that multiculturalism will lead to ‘ethno-suicide’ due to the fact that lifestyle and traditions of the different peoples are inherently not compatible. Ethno-pluralists further maintain that if each ethnic identity were to develop its own separate political space, cooperation and harmony among different ethnicities would be assured. They want to ensure that ethnic-pluralism is ﬁrst and foremost to be preserved at home and in Europe. As one German Republikaner afﬁrmed: We are Europeans and would like to remain Germans within this Europe. We want a Europe that lives on cultural diversity, does not look down upon traditions, and in which diligence and civic-mindedness, order and security for everyone, the love of one’s own people and respect of others are not discounted as relics of a bygone era.38

The parties examined in this book thus comprise what can be called populist radical right parties. They have at a minimum a speciﬁc form of nationalism and a core identity of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. These characteristics separate these parties from the mainstream Right, and from the radical and populist Left. Finally, as will be shown, they are all gravitating towards an ethno-pluralist foreign political outlook, which is the closest the groups have yet come to deﬁning a common platform in Europe. Towards a European Populist Radical Right Foreign Policy The post-Cold War development of the populist radical right’s foreign policy was marked by three events: the perception of the economic and social effects of globalization 35 See chapter 6 by Evans. 36 Betz (2004), op. cit., p. 145. 37 Minkenberg, M. (1997), ‘The New Right in France and Germany: Nouvelle Droite, Neue Rechte, and the New Right Radical Parties’, in Merkl, P. (ed.), The Revival of RightWing Extremism in the Nineties, p. 72. 38 ‘Warum nicht Volkswahl?’, Der Republikaner 5, 1989, p. 1.

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in the mid-1990s; the increased rate of European integration in the late 1990s; and, the launch of the US-led ‘war on terror’ after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. Each of these themes merits closer examination. Globalization The fear of the globalized economy runs as a sub-current through many of the positions of the populist radical right parties, who see globalization as a threat to be countered with strong national preference, welfare systems that favour indigenous populations, strong immigration laws and strong criminal legislation. Globalization is largely seen as being driven by the United States – economically from Wall Street, politically from Washington, and culturally from Hollywood. Indeed, the populist radical right have mapped out much of their foreign political programme on the feared impact of globalization on the economy, political sovereignty and national culture. The economic threat of globalization has been one of the most important catalysts of bringing the populist radical right to power in Europe. Due to the globalization of production, capital, labour and information, the world economy is perceived by the populist radical right to have become ‘a contest of regions’. Millions of cheap labourers are prepared to produce highly valued products for low wages. The German Republikaner consequently fear that [t]he world is at the brink of a world economic revolution, which will make the Europeans the biggest losers. In the end it will lead to a complete dispersal of political and economic power from western Europe to Asia, which might lead to a destabilization of social cultural structures and result in a recrudescence of ‘Marxist values’.39

The Republikaner further maintain that globalization undermines the welfare state and emasculates democracy. Economic globalization has also raised fears in Europe of the death of social welfare – a shock to deeply embedded mentalities for those who are accustomed to a ‘cradle to grave’ welfare state. Competition puts pressures on governments not only to deregulate and liberalize goods and labour markets, but also to substantially alter the welfare state. These changes especially affect small pensioners and the elderly. To respond to this fear, the populist radical right promote a welfare chauvinism to protect the nation state for their ‘own people’.40 An example of this is an initiative promoted by Le Pen, who enjoys particular support among the French elderly, which called for a ‘national preference’ welfare system favouring indigenous French over immigrants.41 In Poland, the Kaczynski brothers have used extreme social conservatism to attract voters. Both the capitalists (liberals) and the neo-communists were blamed for the plummeting standards of living in the East, mostly due to the fact that during the transition period there was a certain continuity between the ruling “communists” and the parties’ pro-market reformist wing. Currently both are out of favour and are being replaced with populist leaders who argue that the social welfare 39 Ritter, M. (1996), ‘Droht eine Weltwirtschafts-Revolution?’, Der Republikaner 11, p. 7. 40 Mudde (2007), op. cit., p. 186-87. 41 Poggioli, S. (2006), ‘Europe’s Right Turn Anti-Immigrant Policy Boosts France’s Le Pen Again’, radio broadcast, National Public Radio, 12 January .

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institutions are the backbone of identity and the only remaining principle of cohesion in traditionless capitalist society. This new revolt is based not only on fears of losing the nation but more importantly fears of becoming déclassé in a new materialistic society. According to the populist radical right, the biggest winner of economic globalization is the United States, which through its powerful business giants and its control of international economic institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO), has managed to dominate the global economy. One of the only exceptions to this is the Swiss SVP, which has maintained a more positive attitude towards the global economy and international ﬁnancial institutions, partially due to its close ties with the business community through party chief Christoph Blocher, himself a leading industrialist.42 Another exception are the Kaczynski brothers in Poland who have managed to combine anti-Russian and anti-German sentiment with pro-Bush military zeal. The populist right’s depiction of economic globalization draws on well-documented anxieties among European workers in the face of foreign competition. Indeed, studies have pointed to a systematic link between the decline in manufacturing employment and support for the populist radical right parties, even in the context of a developed welfare state.43 The impact of globalization on European economies and rising unemployment are producing a growing sense of insecurity that is provoking a populist backlash. This backlash is not only due to economic concerns. For the populist radical right, the United States is not only the economic power in the world, it is also the omnipotent driver of world politics – a hyperpuissance.44 Anti-Americanism has become one of the dominant foreign policy themes of the populist radical right since the end of the Cold War, and the United States is widely perceived as the main state adversary of Europe. Moreover, the populist radical right believes that globalization has led to a devolvement of traditional economic and political powers of states to international institutions, international companies, and other non-state actors. The United States is viewed by many populist radical right parties (notably by the Front national, the DVU, and the NPD) as having hegemony over international institutions, in particular the United Nations (UN), the WTO and international business. The United States is also represented as a warmonger, forcing countries to join in unwanted conﬂicts and instigating and forcing political, economic, and cultural integration. The Front national, FPÖ, the DVU and the NPD, among others, portray the United States as the biggest threat to world peace. They maintain that while the United States attempts to cloak itself in a mantel of good ofﬁces and propaganda, bestowing upon itself the role of the world’s policeman and protecting countries from foreign aggressors, it is in fact using any means necessary to further its imperialist ambitions—sometimes even by breaking international law – in order to control the globe for its enormous economic needs. In Eastern Europe, there is the popular perception that the ultimate winners of the painful convergence process for European integration were not Eastern Europeans

42 See chapter 11 by Mazzoleni. 43 Betz (2004), op. cit., p. 160. 44 A political concept ﬁrst described in 1999 by then French Minister of Foreign Affairs Hubert Védrine to describe the United States at the end of the 20th century.

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but mainly, multinational corporations, the American-led military alliance and the EU bureaucracy.45 While political and economic globalization has led to important foreign policy positions – notably a shift towards anti-Americanism and the rejection of global institutions – the cultural aspects of globalization have brought the populist radical right together in a perceived common clash of cultures, giving new impetus for populist parties to pose as guarantors of the authentic national culture. Numerous antiforeign culture slogans abound, including ‘Britain for the British’ (National Front), ‘Bulgaria for the Bulgarians’ (Ataka), ‘Denmark for the Danes’ (Danish People’s Party) and ‘Deutschland den Deutschen, Ausländer raus!’ (Germany for the Germans, foreigners out!) by the Republikaner. They also stress the predominance of their own nationals – Les français d’abord’ (‘the French ﬁrst’ by the FN); Eigen volk eerst! (‘own people ﬁrst’ by the Flemish VB). These notions are not only anti-immigration, but reﬂect a cultural anxiety about the dilution of national cultures. Consequently, the current populist radical right rejects multiculturalism, with its ideas of a melting pot and cultural plurality. The DVU, for example, presents the United States as a cultural enemy. ‘The United States knows no national boundaries and embodies the concept of immigration, the entire humankind being on its territory. As a result, internationalism becomes national identity, based on the fundamental concept of the melting pot of races and peoples.’ 46 The United States is also represented as engaged in ‘cultural suicide’, which has led to high criminality, drugs and HIV/AIDS. This representation serves the dual purpose of holding the United States as an example of the failures of multicultural society and at the same time depicting the United States as an enemy composed of cultural degenerates. The DVU maintains ‘that it is impossible to counter the basic instincts of peoples to identify themselves with their ethnic group and their region and the strong desire not to become part of the amorphous mash of peoples that the European population is threatening to become.’47 By externalizing multi-culturalism as the ideology of the enemy, much like the creation of a Jewish conspiracy hosted abroad, the populist radical right justify the destruction of foreigners at home, or as Herf has pointed out, ‘that the destruction of foreigners in Europe would eliminate the spirit of multiculturalism from Europe.’48 European Expansion and Integration A speciﬁc issue for the populist radical right in its fear of a global culture clash is European expansion. The recent ‘big bang’ enlargement added eight Eastern European states, and in 2006, Bulgaria and Romania also joined, making a grand total of 27 EU countries. So far the purpose of enlargement has been to consolidate EU power and 45 Tamás, G.M., ‘Counter-revolution against a counter-revolution, Eastern Europe Today,’ Eurozine.com . 46 Rassen, S. der and Völker (1990)‚ ‘Die USA als Richter der Welt? Serie zur Geschichte und Gegenwart des US-Imperialismus, 2 Teil’, DNZ, 21 September, p. 4. 47 ‘Die Stunde des Nationalismus Europagedanke zum Scheitern verurteilt,’ DNZ, 24 January 1992, p. 6. 48 Herf, J. (1984), Reactionary Modernism. Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), p. 231.

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to enhance political and economic reform in Eastern Europe. The EU is also meant to act as a political and economic counterweight to the United States. Most populist radical right parties have supported the integration of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states but have opposed the ‘big bang’ of EU membership. These sentiments were shared with 42 per cent of the EU population who opposed enlargement. Some voters were especially unfavourable to greater enlargement, such as the Germans (66 per cent), the French (62 per cent), the Austrians (61 per cent) and the Finnish (60 per cent).49 The rhetoric of the populist radical right has found resonance precisely because support for the EU has declined sharply in the last decade – from 72 per cent in 1990 to 54 per cent in 2005.50 The failure of the European Constitutional Treaty to win popular approval in the Dutch and French referenda in 2005 was a symbolic reminder of declining support for the EU, especially since it was rejected by two of its original founding countries. For most populist radical right parties, the EU represents a political problem. Since 1996, the populist radical right has formed the largest group of so-called ‘Eurosceptics’ in the EU.51 One of the key grievances is that the EU lacks democratic accountability. Pointing out that the EU’s power rests within the unelected Council of Ministers rather than with the elected European Parliament, the populist radical right claims that the EU is undemocratic. It also does not support the idea of a European ‘superstate’ and it does not want to relinquish political power to Brussels. Brussels is represented as corrupt and being run by a political and technocratic elite. Already in 1997, Pim Fortuyn in his book ‘Soulless Europe’ described Europe as a heartless, distant, bureaucratic monster.52 For the populist radical right, the creation of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 represented a step too far in the direction of supra-national control and signiﬁed an unacceptable loss of national sovereignty, and an egregious violation of constitutional principles such as the principle of democracy and the separation of powers. They proclaimed that the treaty was a coup d’état from above.53 The often-invoked principle of subsidiarity did not redress the fact that the European Union would not be able to solve the conﬂict between centralization and decentralization nor alleviate the democratic deﬁcit of the European institutions.54 Others attacked the Maastricht Treaty even more sharply. The DVU maintained that ‘[a]pparently one wants to quietly withdraw our Bundeswehr from German sovereignty and internationalize it under the sign of the Maastricht über-Versailles [treaty].’55 In a somewhat unusual deployment of their symbolic heritage, they compared the establishment of the EU with the Nazi takeover of Germany in 1933: ‘[w]ith the intended Machtergreifung of the Brussels bureaucracy and the renunciation of our

49 European Commission (2006), op. cit., p. 255. 50 Clark D. et al. (2005), A New Deal for Social Europe (London: Foreign Policy Centre), p. 2. 51 Taggart, P. (1998), ‘A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroskeptism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems’, European Journal of Political Research 33:3. 52 See chapter 10 by Mudde. 53 See chapter three of the 1987 Republikaner Party Platform. 54 Ibid. 55 ‘Das Verbrechen an Somalia. Bonn als Mittäter,’ DNZ, 13 August 1993, p. 1.

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national identity, German history would have come to its end.’56 Le Pen compared Maastricht to the ‘infamous Treaty of Troy’.57 Conspiracy theories abound within the populist radical right as regards to who is really in charge of the EU – the Americans, the Germans, the French. The German Republikaner believe that the EU is a strategy of the United States to keep Germany controlled in Europe. In Central and Eastern European countries, the populist radical right argues that the EU is but an extension of the old Soviet Union or its economic organization (COMECON).58 Weaver points out that the Hungarian Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja (MÍE ́ P) calls the European Constitution a ‘new Soviet system of centralization that was prepared in the West.’59 Similarly, the Lega Nord (LN) refers to the ‘Soviet Union of Europe as a nest of freemasons and Communist bankers.’60 Some Eastern Europeans such as the Czech National Party (NS) and Association for the Republic–Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR-RSČ) maintain that joining the EU would make the country fully dependent on Germany, which will end up dominating it.61 The Polish radical right harbours similar views.62 According to most populist radical right groups, the creation of the European Union was a ‘no’ to Maastricht and a ‘yes’ to the idea of a ‘Europe of Nation States’, or a Europe of peoples based on ethnicity. Drawing on their ethno-pluralist values, the populist radical right promotes the idea of a ‘Europe of the Europeans’, based on the core values of a ‘European civilization’ – a Europe whose sovereignty does not lie with Europe or with the existing states but with their cultural communities.63 This concept of Europe is best expressed in the words of Pim Fortuyn: ‘I love Europe, I love its multitude of peoples, cultures, landscapes, weather conditions, language and human beings. I sometimes hate the Euro-elite in its arrogant negligence. In short, I want a Europe of the people, of the human scale, a Europe of you and me.’64 After German uniﬁcation, the Republikaner called for the reafﬁrmation of lost European strength, and thus an integrated Europe detached from the West. They were interested in a model of a ‘Europe of the Fatherlands’ as envisioned by Charles de Gaulle. In their view, the ‘nations that are joining together here are not losing their proper personalities. And the path they are going down will be the organized co-operation of states, until one day they might form a powerful confederation of states’.65 For many the idea of a Europe of the Fatherlands reconciles both national and European interests. A majority of the populist radical right parties strongly oppose the idea of a federal ‘United States

56 Deutsche National-Zeitung 11, 1992, p. 4, as quoted in the Bundesministerium des Innern (1993), Verfassungsschutzbericht 1992 ( Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern), p. 112. 57 Mudde (2007), op. cit., p. 160. 58 Mudde (2007), op. cit., p. 161. Chapter 8 by Weaver. 59 See chapter 8 by Weaver. 60 Mudde (2007), op. cit., p. 161. 61 Mudde (2007), op. cit., p. 163. 62 Ibid. 63 See chapter 4 by Swyngedouw et al. 64 See chapter 10 by Mudde. 65 Der Republikaner, No.6, 1989.

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of Europe’, believing it will erode national identity and will eventually lead to a multicultural Europe that will be ‘open to antidemocratic and violent’ movements.66 This does not mean that the populist radical right is entirely against the European project. Most populist radical right parties presented in this book believe in the basic tenets of European integration but are sceptical about the direction the EU has taken. These groups can be identiﬁed as Eurosceptics, among which Mudde includes the FN, LN, and Republikaner.67 He has argued that most populist radical right parties in the accession countries also fall into this category, since they are inconsistent about their membership.68 So-called ‘Eurorejects,’ on the other hand, are more nativist and believe that the EU represents a threat to national independence with a serious ‘democratic deﬁcit’. Among the Eurorejects are the BNP, Democracia Nacional, Democratic Unionist Party, Veritas, and the SVP.69 Larrabee has shown that parties in Poland, especially the Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) and the Catholic League of Polish Families, have also been critical of Poland’s membership in the EU.70 While the above categories are useful typologies, the parties examined in this book appear difﬁcult to classify as Euroenthusiasts, Eurosceptics and Eurorejects since they are constantly reinventing themselves. Good examples of this are the Repulikaner, the FN and the LN who started out as Euroenthusiats but have become Eurosceptics. The Republikaner, FN and the LN, have vacillated between supporting and rejecting the EU. As populists, the parties opportunistically use their animosity against the European Union as a political tool, depending on what best suits their political needs. In this regard some parties supported the European Union when a large enough majority of the country was in agreement, but then dropped political support when it became a political liability. The Populist Radical Right and the European Union In 2005, greater international cooperation was set in motion by the Austrian think tank, Freiheitliche Akademie, which organized an international meeting of high level populist radical right party members from seven countries including the FPÖ, Vlaams Belang, Ataka, FN, Italian Azione Sociale and Movimento Sociale-Fiamma Tricolore (MS-FT), as well as the Romanian PRM and the Spanish Alternativa Española.71 The parties agreed to conduct annual meetings and to create a “Contact Forum for European Patriotic and National Parties and Movements with a permanent ofﬁce in Vienna.”72 At the meeting they adopted the Vienna Declaration of Patriotic and National Movements and Parties in Europe, whose main points clearly articulate a new globalized nationalist agenda:

66 Liang. 67 68 69 70 71 meeting. 72

BZÖ is one of the exceptions. See chapter 5 by Anderson and chapter 7 by Schori Mudde (2007), op. cit., p. 164. Mudde (2007), op. cit. p. 164. Mudde (2007), op. cit., p. 163. Larrabee, S.F. (2006), ‘Danger and Opportunity in Eastern Europe’, Foreign Affairs 85:6. The DFP, Lega Nord, the Polish PiS sent ofﬁcial greetings but did not attend the Ibid.

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1. The establishment of a Europe of free and independent nationals within the framework of a confederation of sovereign nation states; 2. The renunciation of all attempts to create a constitution for a centralist European super-state; 3. The clear rejection of a boundless enlargement of European integration to geographical, cultural, religious and ethnic non-European areas of Asia and Africa such as Turkey; 4. The effective protection of Europe against dangers of terrorism, aggressive Islamism, superpower imperialism, and economic aggression by low-wage countries; 5. An immediate immigration stop in all states of the European Union, also in the area of so-called family reunion; 6. A pro-natalist family policy, which aims at the promotion of large numbers of children of the European ethnic communities (Völker) within the traditional family; 7. The solidarist struggle of European ethnic communities against the social and economic effects of globalization; 8. The restoration of the social systems of the member state of the European Union and social justice for the European ethnic communities.73 The recent accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU provided another opportunity for the populist radical right and its more extremist fringes to build common consensus and to further their political agendas at a transnational level. Ironically, while many of these groups were opposed to further enlargement, two of the new EU members, Bulgaria and Romania, helped the ‘Identity, Tradition, and Sovereignty Group (ITS)’ to achieve its critical mass to form a party within the European Parliament.74 Along with greater funding75 they will have the ability to chair debates and help set the agenda for plenary sessions, allowing for more time to outline their policies. Many of the 23 ITS members reiterated some of the points they had already outlined in 2005 Vienna declaration. These included: • • • • • •

Recognition of national interests, sovereignties, identities and differences. Commitment to Christian values, heritage, culture and the traditions of European civilization. Commitment to the traditional family as the natural unity within society. Commitment to the freedoms and rights inherited by all. Commitment to the rule of law. Opposition to a unitary, bureaucratic, European superstate

73 “Wiener Erklärung der europäischen patriotischen und nationalen Parteien und Bewegungen”, November 2005, available at the FPÖ website (http://www.ots.at/ presseaussendung.php?schluessel=OTS_20051114_OTS0051&ch=politik). 74 EU rules require groups to raise 20 members from seven different EU states in order to form a party. 75 ITS party is entitled to approximately one million Euros for staff and administrative costs.

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•

15

Commitment to direct accountability of governments to the people and the transparent management of public funds.76

The group itself is made up of a mixed bag of Holocaust deniers, ultra-nationalists, neoFascists and anti-Islamists making it difﬁcult for them to reach common consensus on some of the more speciﬁc issues. Bruno Gollnisch of the FN is currently leading the group. He was convicted in January, 2007 by a French court for Holocaust denial. Other members include FN leader Jean Marie Le Pen and his daughter, Marine, as well as, Alessandra Mussolini, granddaughter of Benito Mussolini, who was voted into the Italian Parliament on the motto “better Fascist than gay”, and Dmitar Stoyanov of the Bulgarian Ataka party who during the ITS’s foundation launched an attack on the “powerful Jews, with a lot of money who are paying the media to form the social awareness of people.” He has also accused Roma parents of selling their young daughters.77 Other members include, Philip Claeys of Vlaams Belang, who is a well known supporter of the late Léon Degrelle, a notorious Beligian Nazi, who later became a prominent Holocaust denier. Corneliu Vadim Tudor of the Greater Romania Party, a former propagandist of Nicolae Ceauşescu78 and anti-Semite, and who regularly attacks the Roma and Hungarian minorities living in Romania. While in the past, populist radical right groups mainly focused on purely national policies and showed little interest in cooperation, they have found common ground on issues such as immigration, the treatment of minorities, and keeping Turkey out of the European Union. The Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN)79 is another national conservative group within the European Parliament. They include the Danish People’s Party, the Northern League and the League of Polish Families among others. It is a generally Euroskeptic party which does not necessarily want to leave the European Union. Both the ITS and the UEN include many members from states within East and Central Europe, whose historical experience as Communist satellite states largely dictated by the Soviet Union make them largely unwilling to concede to a new supra national structure such as the Brussels bureaucracy. The voting power of the ITS will be mostly negligible since they are opposed by virtually all of the other political groups. Nonetheless, their notoriety at the European level attracts media attention and the fact that ITS organized a faction might provide them a certain amount of legitimacy internationally, which could translate into more popularity at home if the mainstream parties are not able to articulate their ideas into concrete and effective new policies within the European Union. 76 http:www.its-pe.eu/pages/page.php?LANG=EN&TYPE=2, download 12 October 2007. 77 In response to a Roma MEP receiving parliamentarian of the year. Stoyanov wrote to the organizers: “Well, Gentlemen, I must disagree with you. In my country there are tens of thousands of gypsy girls way more beautiful than this honourable one. In fact if you’re in the right place at the right time you even can buy one (around 12–14 years old) to be your loving wife. The best of them are very expensive – up to 5,000 euros a piece, wow!” as quoted in Kroeger, Alix, ‘EU’s surprise far right coalition,’ BBC News, Brussels. 78 The Former Communist President of Romania who was in ofﬁce from 1965–1989. 79 Members include, Danish People’s Party, Irish Fianna Fáil, Italian - National Alliance, Northern League, Sicilian Alliance,Latvian For Fatherland and Freedom, Lithuanian – Peasant Popular Union and Order and Justice; Polish – Law and Justice, League of Polish Families, Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland and Polish Peasant Party.

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The new group of Parliamentarians which have strong representation within the Eurosceptic parties could also play a role in the future policies of the European Union. While joining the European Union has brought with it many positive changes, building democratic institutions and producing economic growth, their have been heavy social costs, including social alienation, high unemployment and growing income discrepancies. The fact that the transition led to rapid social stratiﬁcation that hurt many and only privileged a few caused a lot of antagonism towards those in power. Especially since the politics of transition included cooperation between the communist elite (old nomenklatura) and the anticommunist counter-elite, allowing current populists to vilify not only the old communists but the new liberal elite.80 The paradox of this situation lies in the fact that it was not the failures but the successes of postcommunist liberalism which has given rise to the nationalist and populist groups.81 In an effort to bring economic prosperity (EU) and security and democracy (NATO), policies were presented not as “good” but as “necessary.” Liberal elites did not give their constituents the ability to protest or express dissatisfaction, opening the door for the populists. Krastev argues that in Central Europe there is a new political polarization, a rejection of consensual politics and the rise of populism.82 Parties that espouse strong nationalist language in Central and Eastern Europe such as in Romania and Slovakia and the anti-Communist parties in Poland and Hungary are enjoying electoral success in the face of economic insecurity. Rupnik argues that these populist movements’ could lead to further apprehension towards European integration and could make current EU member states even more resistant to further enlargement and could erode the political bonds within the EU.83 European Security and NATO In their position regarding Europe, populist radical right parties have also developed speciﬁc ideas about European defence policy. During the Cold War, the populist radical right greatly supported the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in the absence of a European defence force that could realistically counterbalance the Soviet threat. After the Cold War, some parties broke with NATO, which was at that point seen as an instrument of US imperialism. The most extreme populist radical right parties such as the FN, LN and FPÖ believe NATO to be redundant and call for the creation of a European defence force.84 The FPÖ’s Haider heaped scorn on the Maastricht Treaty as it ‘only contains a small segment on Common Foreign and Security Policy which makes it impossible to function’.85 However, some groups still uphold a more realist foreign policy view of NATO as an interim insurance to protect them while they establish their own European security and defence policy. Other groups, inﬂuenced by Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations theory – which argued that post-Cold War conﬂict 80 Krastev, p. 60. 81 Krastev, op. cit., p. 58. 82 Krastev, op. cit., p. 57. 83 Rupnik, J. (2007), Anatomy of a crisis : The referendum and the dilemmas of the enlarged EU, Eurozine, < http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-09-10-rupnik-en.html>. 84 See chapter 6 by Evans. 85 See chapter 3 by Virchow.

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would occur most frequently and violently along cultural instead of ideological lines, as under the Cold War – look upon the United States as the only true protector against the ongoing war on terror and ‘Islamiﬁcation’ of Europe (Danish People’s Party, Alleanza Nazionale, the VB, Lijst Pim Fortuyn). Interestingly, as the contributions to this volume indicate, many populist radical right parties view future aggressions coming from their proximate neighbours: Central and Eastern Europeans view Russia and Germany as potential adversaries; the Italians fear their Balkan, African and Asian neighbours; the Austrians fear their Balkan neighbours and look upon Germany as a protector. Hungary and Poland still fear Russian and German aggression.86 Populists generally call for a well-deﬁned European security policy and believe that European integration will make them less reliant on the United States for security. Haider, for example, believes the EU can act as a counterweight to the United States, allowing Europe to delimit itself ‘from Slavic orthodoxy on the one hand and the Anglo-American sphere on the other.’87 Europe can only protect itself from further aggression with a strong European military force. Both the populist radical right in Germany and Austria speak of Berlin and Vienna being back in the centre of the new Europe whose frontiers will be reminiscent of the Holy Roman Empire.88 For the Italian Alleanza Nazionale (AN), Italy will play an important role in the formation of European interests because of its proximity to the Mediterranean, which they believe has become the gravitational centre of world geo-politics. The Austrian FPÖ hopes to enlarge its inﬂuence to encompass both Eastern and South Eastern Europe.89 Security concerns weigh heavily in the populist radical right’s discussion of further European enlargement. Almost all parties agree that the European border should be drawn at the Urals and that the EU should eventually include all the Christian or occidental nations of Eastern Europe. They maintain that the EU represents a civilization based on Greek, Roman and Christian civilizations. Mudde argues that most parties would probably agree with the Republikaner’s statement that ‘[g]eographically Europe ends at the Mediterranean, at the Bosporus, and at the Urals’.90 The VB dreams of a united Indo-European Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals, united in a loose Confederation of Peoples.91 Most populist radical right parties adamantly reject Turkish membership in the European Union, claiming it would lead to a clash of civilizations.92 In this position the populist radical right have captured a common sentiment shared by a number of European governments, even though Turkey’s eligibility as a European country to join has already been unanimously approved by the European Council on several occasions. According to the 2005 EU barometer, across the EU 25, 41 per cent of the respondents agreed with the statement that ‘Turkey’s accession to the EU would favour the mutual comprehension of European and Muslim values’. However, 54 per cent of the respondents agreed with the statement that ‘the cultural differences between Turkey and the EU Member States are too signiﬁcant to allow for this accession’. 86 87 88 89 90 91 92

See chapters on Central and Eastern Europe, Italy, Austria and Hungary. See chapter on Austria. See chapter 7 by Liang and chapter 3 by Virchow. See chapter 3 by Virchow. Republikaner Platform 2003. Mudde (2007), op. cit., p. 171. See chapter 4 by Swyngedouw et al. See chapter 3 by Virchow.

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European hesitations and populist radical right rhetoric is supported by the politicians of the big three of Europe – France, Germany and the United Kingdom – all of whom have expressed reservations on a number of occasions about Turkey joining the European Union.93 Immigration Already before the fall of the Berlin Wall, populist radical right parties harboured ethno-pluralist fears about immigration. Yet they hoped that the eventual fall of the Soviet Union would lead to the creation of independent, neutral states with robust foreign policies, precluding the need for immigration and multiculturalism. This utopian vision did not materialize after the collapse of the Soviet Union; instead, the wave of migration from Eastern Europe and the conﬂict zones in the former Yugoslavia accelerated the capacity for the populist radical right parties to gain support based on anti-immigrant positions.94 Immigration and related fears of cultural conﬂict ﬁgure heavily in the populist radical right agenda. One of the major political problems within the EU is that it opened its borders with the Schengen agreement while at the same time extending its borders with big bang enlargement without creating a common immigration policy beforehand. For the populist radical right, the effects of international migration have not only meant a loss of traditional group ties, traditional values and culture, but are increasingly being perceived as a security threat. The Vlaams Blok revealed these kinds of fears when it argued there is no reason whatsoever, religious, political, historic, economic or cultural to accept Turkey as a member of the EU. … The person who opens the door to Turkey, moves Europe’s borders to Egypt, Syria, Iraq and the Caucasus, and ﬂings open the gates to a new and massive tidal wave of immigration.95

The populist radical right’s reaction to the immigration issue plays on the increasingly negative perception of immigration in Europe. Media reports ﬁlled with accounts of illegal migration and human trafﬁcking especially have caused public distrust and lack of conﬁdence in politicians being able to address the problems effectively, despite the fact that European states are increasingly limiting immigration and some countries are attempting to block immigration all together. In a European Social Survey study 93 Dominique de Villepin argued that Turkey must recognize the present Republic of Cyprus before membership talks can resume. Jacques Chirac, during the campaign for the French referendum on the EU Constitutional treaty in 2005, backed calls for France to hold a referendum on whether Turkey should enter the European Union. Angela Merkel pledged to oppose Turkey’s membership of the EU, and Austria’s Finance Minister Karl-Heinz Grasser stated that he will strive to ensure that membership is not a realistic option for Turkey. Austin, G. and Parker, K. (2005) ‘The Mono-Cultural Delusion: Turkey and Migration Politics’, in Austin, G. et al. (2005), Turks in Europe: Why Are We Afraid? (London: Foreign Policy Centre), pp. 19–21. 94 Although some parties rise to power were due to country speciﬁc issues: taxes in Denmark; uniﬁcation and the ‘criminalization of history’ in Germany. See Betz (2004), op. cit. 95 See chapter 4 by Swyngedouw et al.

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96

in 2003, half of the respondents expressed a resistance to immigrants belonging to a different race or ethnic group rather than the majority population. These feelings are shared by a large majority of Europeans who believe that their country has reached the limits of cultural ethnic diversity. In 2003, in the EU 15, 60 per cent of people surveyed believed that ‘there is a limit to how many people of other races, religions or cultures a society can accept’ and ‘if there were to be more people belonging to these minority groups, we would have problems’.97 According to the European Monitor Centre report98 on European public attitudes towards migrants and minorities, 58 per cent of people surveyed held the dominant perception of minorities in Western and Eastern Europe as ‘a collective ethnic threat’.99 In a recent Eurobarometer survey, respondents from across the EU ranked the importance of immigration higher than terrorism, pensions, taxation, education, housing, the environment, public transport, defence and foreign affairs.100 In Britain, a public survey found that immigration was considered a more important problem than the economy, education, drugs or Europe.101 Luedtke argues that EU citizens have been resistant to the idea of Brussels’ control over immigration not because of instrumental calculations regarding perceived strategic gains or losses from immigration cooperation and not because of their opinions of immigrants themselves, but because the proposed supranationalism of immigration control clashes with historically rooted national identities.102

Precisely because of the cultural issues at heart of the immigration debates, several researchers have argued that populist radical right parties have achieved their greatest success with this issue, forcing moderate parties to adopt the positions of the right.103 Over the years, the populist radical right claimed that all social problems of the state, be they job loss or insecurity, increased competition or criminal activity, are directly linked to immigration. Their argument that immigration is a direct threat to welfare and increased criminal activity has particularly managed to mobilize public opinion enough to force governments to change their immigration laws. Schain suggests that in France, fear of Le Pen managed to persuade the Rally for the Republic (RPR) and the Union for French Democracy (UDF) to adopt populist anti-immigrant rhetoric as 96 European Social Survey 2003, round I. 97 Chebel-d’Appolonia, A. (2006), ‘How Wonderful It Is to “Hate”: The Use of Anti-Migrant Sentiments by ERPs’, paper presented at the CEVIPOF Conference on ‘The Radical Right and its Impact on Migration Politics and Policies’, Paris, France, the New York University in Paris, Center for Political Research at Sciences Po, 17–18 November. 98 European Monitor Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. 99 Canoy, M. et al. (2006), ‘Migration and Public Perception’, Bureau of European Policy Advisors, European Commission, . 100 Eurobarometer 60, 2004 101 British Business Survey 2001. 102 Luedtke, A. (2005), ‘European Integration, Public Opinion and Immigration Policy Testing the Impact of National Identity’, European Union Politics 6:1, 83–112. 103 Norris, P. (2005), Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); Scharenberg (2006), op. cit.; Schain, M. (2002), Shadows Over Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).

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early as 1986 in an attempt to prevent further support for the FN. Pettigrew has argued that Austria also followed suit with more restrictive immigration policies when the FPÖ entered the coalition government with the Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP).104 Scharenberg has shown that the Dansk Folkeparti (DF) managed to tighten Danish immigration laws after its success in 2001.105 The Dutch government also copied this trend when it acted to remove tens of thousands of failed asylum seekers, a move heavily inﬂuenced by Lijst Pim Fortuyn’s success at the polls. The Swiss SVP also managed to have strong immigration and asylum legislation passed in 2006 through a national referendum after many years of propaganda that criminalized immigrants and asylum seekers. The author of the SVP initiative, a member of the Swiss Federal Council, and current Swiss Justice Minister, Christoph Blocher, has in the meantime become a role model on this issue for the populist radical right across Europe. The United Kingdom also promulgated new regulations to limit low-skilled workers from Bulgaria and Romania ever since they joined the EU in 2006, marking a departure from the open-door policy adopted after eight other former Eastern European communist states joined the EU in May 2004. Islam The greatest single group of ‘foreigners’ singled out by populist radical right groups are Muslims. Before and immediately after the Cold War, immigration anxieties focused on migrants from the developing world who were perceived to exploit Europe’s welfare systems. This changed dramatically after the launch of the US-led war on terror in 2001, following the September terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. Subsequent events, including the 2004 murder of the Dutch ﬁlmmaker Theo Van Gogh by a Dutch-born Moroccan, the Madrid train and London bus bombings of 2005, the 2005 cartoon controversy in Denmark, which sparked rioting in Muslim countries, and the attempted bombings of British Airway ﬂights as well as the weeks of unrest in France which following the death of two Muslim boys in 2006 all nurtured the idea of a growing culture clash between Islam and Europe.106 Drawing on these events, the populist radical right portrays Islam as one of the greatest threats to Europe in the twenty-ﬁrst century, replacing the old spectre of communism across Europe.107 Bossi, the leader of the Italian LN, used the wars in the Balkans to attack the United States and Muslims by maintaining that the ‘Christian Serbs’ were attacked by NATO because they represented the ‘ultimate obstacle to advance the global American and Muslim Empires’.108 According to the Danish People’s Party (DPP), Islam is anti-modern, anti-democratic, patriarchal, violent dogmatic religion belonging to a lower level of civilization.109 Islam is a political religion that is contemptuous of human beings and anti-democratic, the Republikaner 104 Norris (2005), op. cit., p. 366. 105 Scharenberg (2006), op. cit., p. 94. 106 Savage, T. (2004), ‘Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing’, The Washington Quarterly, 27:3, 25–50. 107 Savage (2004), op. cit., p. 46. 108 Betz (2003), p. 84–9; Mudde (2007), op. cit., p.85. 109 See chapter 5 by Goul Andersen.

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contend, and whoever admits it into classrooms favours the establishment of a parallel Islamic society, the ultimate aim of which is to set up an Islamic theocracy.110 Pim Fortuyn argued that Islam is a backwards culture that was diametrically opposed to all the norms and values of Dutch identity. He maintained that democracy, the separation of church and state, equality of the sexes, freedom of thought, and religious freedoms were not compatible with Islam.111 The LPF called for a stop to all Muslim immigration, pushed for stronger assimilation of immigrants and wanted to stop the Geneva Refugee Convention and prevent all economic migrants from entering the country.112 The VB favours the introduction of an immigration and asylum policy that would make use of a list of ‘unsafe countries’ and believes the EU should take steps to amend the Geneva Conventions to include a territoriality principle which would allow only Europeans refugee status.113 The fear of Europe losing its religious identity has led to a remarkable reafﬁrmation of Europe’s Christian identity. The AN argues that there should be an acknowledgement of Christian roots inserted into the European Constitution.114 The VB and the LN as well as the Polish Radio Marya stress the incompatibility of Islam with their Christian beliefs. The Bulgarian Ataka, the Party of Great Romania (PRM) and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) all view their nation as essentially Orthodox Christian.115 Indeed, for the populist radical right, Islam will not only change the European way of life but will pose political, cultural, economic and security threats to the point where the Europeans can lose the right to their own home.116 A Republikaner article entitled ‘Mohammed ad [sic] portas’, claims that the conﬂict in France over the wearing of the hijab portends a potential Kulturkampf in Europe, which could have the same dimensions as the conﬂict between the government and religious forces in Algeria, a conﬂict that threatens to engulf all of Mediterranean Europe.117 This suggests that although the ‘Muslim question’ is intimately tied to the larger question of immigration, it transcends the latter. To be sure, immigration control and the ﬁght against insecurity are still at the centre of the populist radical right election campaigns. However, these issues no longer deﬁne the populist radical right. With the cultural turn of the 1990s, the populist radical right deﬁnes itself primarily as an identitarian movement, which derives its identity and political legitimacy from a new politics based on claims of recognition.118 In the process, the populist radical right has opened up a new line of conﬂict that no longer ﬁts into the traditional left–right schema. As a Lega Nord politician put it during the LN’s campaign to have cruciﬁxes displayed in all public ofﬁces, this new line of conﬂict runs between those who ‘are in favor of a battle in defense of the traditions and cultures of the peoples’ and those

110 Der neue Republikaner 9, 1999, p. 3; Verfassungsschutzbericht 1999, p. 41. 111 Scharenberg (2006), op. cit., p. 95. 112 Ibid. 113 See chapter 4 by Swyngedouw et al. 114 See chapter 9 by Tarchi. 115 Mudde (2007), op. cit., p. 85–6. 116 Verfassungschutzbericht 1994, p. 56. 117 ‘Mohammed ad portas. Fundamentalisten auf dem Vormarsch: Fällt Frankreich?’, Der Republikaner, September 1990, p. 6. 118 Betz (2004), op. cit., p. 134–5.

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who, ‘on the contrary, are opposed to it, promoting instead the building of a globalized society, in which all identitarian symbols are banished’.119 These views tap into a wider European anxiety about their Muslim citizens and residents. The Belgian politician Willy Claes, during his tenure as NATO SecretaryGeneral, already in the mid-1990s claimed that the new threat to the alliance was Islam.120 Besides the perception of a security threat, Europeans also regard Muslims as a direct challenge to the collective identity, traditional values and public politics of their societies, as has been demonstrated by heated controversies over the hijab as well as outrage on both sides regarding the Danish cartoons scandal.121 Demographic dynamics in Europe have also raised fears. The US National Council projects that with continued immigration and high Muslim fertility rates, Europe’s Muslim population will double by 2025.122 Other estimates predict that today’s Muslim population, which amounts to ﬁve per cent of the Europe’s population, could rise to 20 per cent by 2050.123 Muslim populations more than doubled in the last three decades. Moreover, Europeans have not been successful in integrating their Muslim communities. Experts have argued that even second and third generation Muslims growing up in Europe feel disenfranchised in a society that does not accept them. These Muslims are politically marginalized – they do not ﬁt national deﬁnitions of minorities, which are based primarily on ethnic and racial criteria – as well as economically marginalized due to unemployment rates for foreign-born nationals, that are twice as high as for native born citizens.124 This anger spilled over into the streets of Paris and nationwide in France during the riots in September 2005, which was widely perceived as a culture clash between nativists and their Muslim communities. This threat is considered the greatest in countries that have large Islamic communities such as France, the Netherlands, and Germany. Fear of a new domestic security threat has been exacerbated by instability in the Middle East, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq, which have contributed to the radicalization of Muslim youths, many of whom view the ‘war on terror’ as a ‘war on Islam’ and claim common cause with Muslims in the Israeli-occupied territories, Iraq, Chechnya, and elsewhere.125 Savage argues that, as it has done historically, ‘the world of Islam may do more to deﬁne and shape Europe in the twenty-ﬁrst century than the United States, Russia, or even the European Union’. He regards the challenge as twofold: Europe must ﬁnd a way to integrate its ghettoized and rapidly growing Muslim minority and externally must devise a viable approach to the primarily Muslim-populated volatile states, stretching from Casablanca to the Caucasus. The problem so far is that Europeans are

119 See chapter 2 by Betz and chapter 9 by Tarchi. 120 Betz (2004), op. cit., p. 150. 121 Savage (2004), op. cit., p. 43. 122 Gallis, P. et al. (2005), ‘Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries’, Congressional Service Reports on Foreign Policy and Regional Affairs, , p. 3. 123 Savage (2004), op. cit., pp. 25–50. 124 According to the International Migration Report released by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in 2004 as cited in International Institute for Strategic Studies 2005. 125 Gallis (2005), op. cit., p. 4.

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pursuing a status quo approach at home and abroad, and are unwilling to adapt and engage and redeﬁne relationship in the way that the new situation requires.126 The spectre of a growing Muslim threat in Europe has given new life to populist radical right parties in Europe. Several countries (Austria, Denmark, Italy, Norway and Switzerland) must rely on the support of parties with anti-Muslim views within their coalitions to remain in European government.127 As with the immigration issue, the populist radical right appear to have had an impact on wider European attitudes towards its Muslim citizens. The inﬂuence of the rhetoric of the populist radical right on more moderate mainstream parties is evident in new legislation to restrict immigration.128 For some European countries the words ‘Muslim’ and ‘immigrant’ are virtually synonymous. Not only have their been tougher immigration laws but there is also now increased emphasis on national interests in EU policy debates.129 The impact of Islamophobia is also visible in new religious practices. Thirteen of the 37 countries in Europe do not recognize Islam as a religion, even though it is at least the second-largest religion in 16 European countries.130 In Denmark, a recent book entitled ‘Islamists and the Naïve’ has become a bestseller.131 The book compares Islam to Nazism and communism with the argument that they all represent a totalitarian ideology, and argues that those who underestimate the threat Islamists pose to Danish values are naïve since they underestimate the radicals’ zeal in achieving the ‘Islamization’ of Europe.132 The authors of the book are former social democrats; one of them, Karen Jespersen, was the former Danish Interior Minister in charge of immigration issues. In Denmark, the DPP has been successful because a growing number of Danes are against immigration from countries that do not have the same European culture and way of life.133 Another example of populist radical right inﬂuence is so-called ‘Muslim tests’ which are designed to discourage Islamic immigrants from applying for citizenship. Since May 2006 would-be immigrants who want to settle in the Netherlands must take a language exam and watch a video that shows, among other images, two gay men kissing and a topless woman emerging from the sea. The message of this civic integration exam is obvious: those who cannot support the Dutch liberal lifestyle need not apply. Anti-Semitism No other issue recalls the populist radical right’s historical pedigree more than the continued importance it places on anti-Semitic rhetoric. Contemporary European populist radical right anti-Semitism is composed of four main themes: outright 126 Savage (2004), op. cit. See also Ash, T.G. (2002), ‘The Price of Parsley’, The Guardian, July 25, pp. 7–16; Davies, N. (1996), Europe: A History (Oxford University Press), pp. 251–8. 127 Savage (2004), op. cit. 128 Ibid, p. 41. 129 Ibid. 130 Ibid. 131 Islamists and the Naïve (2006) by Karen Jespersen and Ralf Pittlekow. 132 Bilefsky, D. (2006) ‘Danish Wake-up Call on Islam’, International Herald Tribune, . 133 See chapter 5 by Goul Anderson.

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Holocaust denial, attacks on the taboo of anti-Semitism (such as anti-racism laws), conspiracy theories that portray Jews as in charge of government, business and media, and ﬁnally sentiments that cross the line between objective criticism of Israeli policies and anti-Semitism. After 1945, as a result of the Second World War and the Holocaust, domestic manifestations of anti-Semitism were less prevalent and were largely not considered salonfähig in most Western European states. As a result, some populist radical right parties have remained wary of embracing anti-Semitism too openly. In Central and Eastern Europe, the presence of anti-Semitism varies: in some countries, such as the Czech Republic and Slovenia, it barely exists, while in others, such as Hungary, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Poland and Russia, anti-Semitism has become widespread. Mudde has noted that in Hungary and Lithuania, almost a quarter of the population can be classiﬁed as anti-Semitic, and in Poland almost half the population has negative views towards Jews and Israelis.134 In Hungary and Russia, nationalism is also strongly xenophobic, based on strong anti-Semitic sentiments. Holocaust denial has become one of the most common modern forms of antiSemitism, despite the fact that it is punishable by law – in ten European states, denial of the Holocaust can lead to ﬁnes or prison time.135 During its EU presidency in 2007, Germany has sought the adoption of a European law on racism and xenophobia, including Holocaust denial. However, the laws have not forced Holocaust denial to disappear; instead, and perhaps as a result of these laws, Holocaust denial has gained in currency as a primary manifestation of anti-Semitism and as a means of demonstrating a willingness to break taboos. This was most recently revealed in a recent 2007 Holocaust denial conference in Tehran hosted by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, which was attended by 67 delegates from 30 countries.136 Many attendees attempted to argue that mass murder was simply a myth.137 Holocaust denial in this case is linked with the Israeli–Palestinian crisis: by denying the Holocaust as a myth, conferees attempted to discredit Jews in general and Israel in particular.138 Among the populist radical right, there are a number of Holocaust sceptics and reductionists, including the DVU’s Gerhard Frey, the NPD’s Horst Mahler, the FN’s Jean-Marie Le Pen and Bruno Gollnisch, and the LDPR’s Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Linked to Holocaust denial is so-called ‘secondary anti-Semitism’, broadly deﬁned as any form of attack on the taboo of expressing anti-Semitism. Broder described this type of anti-Semitism as embodying the sentiment that ‘Germans will never forgive 134 Mudde (2007), op. cit., p. 81. 135 Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Lithuania, Poland, Poland, Slovakia, Switzerland. 136 Conference participants included American David Duke, a former KKK leader and white supremacist, Australian Fredrick Toeben, jailed in Germany for incitement and insulting the memory of the dead, Frenchman Robert Faurisson, convicted in France under Holocaust denial laws, and Frenchman Georges Thiel, convicted in France under Holocaust denial laws. 137 Schorr, D. (2006), ‘Iran’s Holocaust-denial Conference: a Community of Hate’, The Christian Science Monitor, . 138 For Muslim extremists, Holocaust denial is also an attempt to force the West acknowledge the need to limit free speech, which they feel should apply to ‘blasphemous’ comments regarding Islam.

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the Jews the existence of Auschwitz’. Secondary anti-Semitism is a mechanism to cope with Holocaust guilt. The FPÖ, Republikaner, the DVU, and the NPD use this strategy to turn the tables of German war guilt by maintaining that there is a Jewish conspiracy that attempts to weaken Germany by keeping Germans shackled to their past and in a permanent state of apology. The populist radical right interpretation of German history rests on relativizing German responsibility and actions during the Second World War and blaming other nations for provoking the war and committing atrocities. In their quest for a useable past, they cast Germans as victims of both the Nazis and Allied power designs, and blame the Jews for starting, supporting and being victimized by the war.139 Vladimir Zhironovsky, who is currently senior parliamentary ofﬁcial and leader of the ultranationalist LDPR, also blames the Jews for starting the Second World War, provoking the Holocaust, sparking the 1917 Bolshevik revolution in Russia – and destroying the country ever since. He has maintained that ‘[y]ou will always ﬁnd Jews where war is raging because they realize that money ﬂows where blood is spilled.’140 Finally, he blames Jews for the rise of Nazism in Germany on the eve of the Second World War because ‘there were too many Jews’.141 The populist radical right also peddles more traditional anti-Semitic canards. One is the claim that Jews control government, business and media, which they are using for their own designs, and that they are therefore responsible for society’s woes.142 In some countries, especially in Eastern and Central Europe, the populist radical right laments that Jews have too much inﬂuence over the government. However, in a newer, more globalized context, Jews are now mostly viliﬁed abroad, where they are represented as agents of foreign interests and powers.143 Most anti-Semitic rhetoric is directed against the Jews who reside in the United States and Israel. One of the most common conspiracy theories perpetuated by the populist radical right is the belief that Jews have control over US government policy, and, by extension, global politics. Finally, the Israeli–Palestinian conﬂict has also become an important issue around which anti-Semitic ideas have developed. Ever since the Jews formed their own state, they have been considered even more powerful by the populist radical right. Goldhagen argues that the image of the sly, stealthy and corrupting Jew – Shylock – has been largely replaced by the image of the ‘Rambo’ Jew, who through military and political power has become a subjugating, brutalizing killer. He either does the work himself, as in Israel, or employs others to do it for him, including the White House or the American ‘East Coast’ establishment.144 The notion of militarized Jews controlling world institutions has led the populist radical right to maintain that the second Iraq 139 Liang, Christina (2002), German Far Right Ideology in the Decade of German Uniﬁcation, thèse no. 641, IUHEI, Geneva. 140 Krichevsky, L. (1998), ‘Russian Right-winger Gives Long Anti-Semitic Tirade’, Jewish News Weekly, . 141 Ibid. 142 Department of State to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on International Relations (2004), Report on Global Anti-Semitism, US Department of State, . 143 Scharenberg (2006), op. cit., p. 101. 144 Goldhagen, D. (2004), ‘The Globalization of Anti-Semitism’, Christian Action for Israel, .

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war was orchestrated by Jews in a plot to take control over global ﬁnance, supported by the media under the inﬂuence of Jewish plutocrats.145 For example, German radical populists maintain that ‘there is no war of the US against terrorism. We are witnesses of a global reign of terror which comes from the US under Jewish inﬂuence.’146 István Czurka, leader of the MÍEP, suggests that there is a global conspiracy driven by American and Jewish capital that oppresses global interests via the IMF and the World Bank.147 Czurka even celebrates the perpetrators of the 11 September 2001 attacks as ‘those who represent the oppressed people who have brought down the bastion of globalization to soot and ashes’.148 Another example is Horst Mahler, the infamous left-wing militant of the BaaderMeinhof gang and who is now a celebrated member of the German NPD. Mahler is an aggressive anti-Semite and has openly declared that one of his main political and ideological goals is to destroy Judaism. For him the symbolic meaning of 11 September 2001 was that it represents a ‘war of extermination of the globalists by those who are attempting to protect the cultures of the peoples … and which produced for the ﬁrst time a military defeat on the American soil’. He also maintains that 11 September 2001 marks the beginning of a long Islamic war against the West to unseat the Jews from power.149 This rhetoric no longer has anything to do with criticisms of Israeli foreign policy: as in the past, the Jews serve as a useful scapegoat upon whom to blame conﬂict in the Middle East, US imperialism, and the economic woes of globalization.150 It should be noted that anti-Semitism is not a universal manifestation among all the populist radical right. Some parties have realized that this issue is toxic and could alienate them from less extremist voters. Others have reconsidered their perception of the militarized Jew as a potential ally in their ﬁght against Islam in Europe. As Betz points out in a following chapter, Vlaams Belang’s DeWinter has become a staunch philo-Semite. A clash between Arabs and residents in the Jewish quarter of Antwerp on 3 April 2002 led DeWinter to take on the role as the protector of the Jewish community by insisting that there be more police protection in the area.151 DeWinter’s anti-Islamic remarks and support for Israeli foreign policy sit well with part of his new electorate, a large community of Hassidic Jews who have been supporting his candidacy in the latest elections. DeWinter’s apparent philo-Semitism of course is rooted in an ethno-pluralist worldview. Israeli defence policy is lauded as a resolute defence against Islamic extremism, not because of respect for Jewish life and culture. Similarly, while 145 ‘What we have commonly accepted as democracy is Jewish authority, arranged through the authority to dispose over the global ﬁnancial- and currency system and through the media power of the Jewish plutocrats.’ Ibid., p. 101. 146 Weitzman, M. (2006), ‘Antisemitismus und Holocaust-Leugnung: Permanente Elemente des globalen Rechtsextremismus’, in Greven, T. and Grumke T. (eds.) (2006) Globalisierter Rechts-extremismus? Die extremistische Recht in der Ära der Globalisierung, (Wiesbaden : VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften), op. cit., p. 60. 147 Scharenberg (2006), op. cit., p. 101–2. 148 Ibid., p. 102. 149 Ibid., p. 59. 150 Department of State to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on International Relations (2004), op. cit. 151 Scharenberg (2006), op. cit., footnote 17, p. 97.

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Muslims are mostly perceived as a threat to the European way of life at home, they are praised for their ethnic struggle against Americans and Jews abroad. The Islamic fundamentalists’ code of exclusion and conservatism sits well with many aspects of the populist radical right’s vision of the world. Some populist radical right parties, while condemning the killing of civilians, embraced the 11 September 2001 attacks as a brave action against the ideology of America and the West and as a sign that US globalization and ideological hegemony will come to an end.152 Le Pen, who has made numerous anti-Semitic statements, recently shifted to become more philo-Islamic in order to gain votes from the disgruntled inhabitants of the French banlieue, which the FN believes might be a source of protest votes against the French political system.153 Conclusion: Towards a Common Foreign Policy of Globalized Nationalism Will the many strands of populist radical right foreign policy – anti-immigration, nativism, anti-globalism, anti-Americanism, anti-Zionism, anti-Semitism, and antiIslamism – lead to a common foreign political outlook? Will their inherent nationalistic interests allow for transnational cooperation? Nationalism and internationalism are not mutually exclusive categories for today’s populist radical right, as Grumke has rightly pointed out.154 As was indicated earlier, they can be deﬁned as globalization’s greatest critics. However, in their struggle against globalization, they have managed to ﬁnd universal themes that bind them with other radical right groups in Europe and across the globe. Grumke argues that they have created a transnational network which is supported by a collective identity and international compatible ideologies. Their collective identity is perpetuated by a racial and a cultural community based on Greek, Roman and Christian civilizations. Their compatible ideologies include pan-Arian racism and anti-Semitism.155 They also share a core doctrine based on ethno-cultural pluralism whose main characteristic is a highly restrictive notion of nation, society, citizenship and democracy, which are seen as intricately tied to a culturally and ethnically homogenous community. Moreover, the enemies of the nation, once seen as primarily internal, are now increasingly seen as part of global networks themselves, be it radical Islamic terrorist groups, US-Israeli conspiracies, or elitist Eurocrats. This ethnopluralist thinking has united the populist radical right and inspired global cooperation and in the setting of increased economic, political and cultural globalization, has led to a common foreign policy outlook which can be described as globalized nationalism.156 152 ‘Republikaner bekunden Mitgefühl mit den Opfern.’ December 2001@ www. republikaner.de. 153 Gurﬁnkiel, M. (2006), ‘Le Pen France‘s Le Pen To Strike a Deal With Muslims’, New York Sun, . 154 Greven,T. and Grumke,T. “Enleitung: Die globalisierteAnti-Globalisierungsbewegung der extremistischen Rechten?“ chapter in Greven, T. and Grumke T. (eds.) Globalisierter Rechts-extremismus? Die extremistische Recht in der Ära der Globalisierung, (Wiesbaden : VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften), op. cit. p. 9. 155 Grumke, Thomas. ‘Die transnationale Infrastruktur der extremistischen Rechten’, in Greven, T. and Grumke T. (eds.) (2006), op. cit., p. 130. 156 Greven, T. (2006), ‘Rechtsextreme Globalisierungskritik: Anti-globaler Gegenentwurf zu Neoliberalismus und Global Governance’, in Greven and Grumke (eds.)

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After the Second World War, the Nazis and other European fascists already cooperated in helping war criminals escape to Latin America and the Middle East – they even held small international gatherings. Oswald Mosley, the veteran British fascist leader, unsuccessfully attempted to organize a Europe-wide fascist party. Many more attempts at creating international far-right organizations ensued with little or no success.157 Today, globalized nationalism has gained momentum in the instantaneous media world of the Internet and television, which can transmit far-right populist ideology via satellite across the globe. Some of the stories that originate in Europe are sent to the Middle East where they are further embellished and are sent back to Europe, the Americas, Asia and Africa. The populist radical right have been inﬂuenced by Antonio Gramsci’s theory that the Left could only achieve its political aims by creating a ‘cultural hegemony’ of political and social discourse in order to shape a particular social and political reality. The nouvelle droite of the 1960s seized this idea and developed the strategy of ‘metapolitics’, which sought to inﬂuence people by spreading right-wing ideology through mass media; today, the populist radical right has successfully implemented this idea via the Internet, including through websites, music downloads as well as 24-hour blogging. As a result, globalization’s greatest critics have become globalization’s biggest political beneﬁciaries. Leaders of populist radical right groups meet together to discuss international cooperation, and organize international marches, rallies, Volksfests, rock concerts and conferences. As previously mentioned, the European Parliament’s Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty Party has managed to launch itself on the European stage. The populist radical right is increasingly taking advantage of the interdependent world in which global issues have an ever-stronger domestic dimension and domestic politics have an ever-stronger global dimension. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, other extremist groups, including the neo-Nazi NPD, have come together to create a European National Front, which promotes networking and mutual support among far right groups in almost all European countries. This shared vision of a struggle between globalized nationalism versus internationalist multiculturalism point to the fault lines in the larger ideological battle looming in the globlalized economy. In his celebrated article ‘End of History,’ Francis Fukuyama argued that society had reached its endpoint in its ideological evolution with the end of communism and the emergence of Western liberal democracy as the ﬁnal form of human government. Several years later, in his equally celebrated article on the ‘Clash of Civilizations,’ Samuel Huntington criticized Fukuyama’s vision and argued that the fundamental source of conﬂict in the twenty-ﬁrst century would not be ideological or economic but in fact cultural. Joseph Nye has pointed out that both scholars oversimpliﬁed their positions, arguing that ethnic and cultural conﬂict tends to rise when national identities are under threat. Nye argues that we are actually marking a ‘return to history’, as the end of the Cold War replaced communism with ethnic, religious and national communalism as the chief ideological rivals to liberal capitalism.158 As Filip DeWinter of (2006), op. cit., p. 16. 157 For a good historical overview see chapter 14 by Ahlemeyer. 158 Nye, J.S. (2000), Understanding International Conﬂicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, 3rd edition. (New York: Longman Publishing Group) p. 266. See also Smith, A.D. (1995), Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity); Kaldor, M. (2004), ‘Nationalism and Globalisation’, Nations and Nationalism 10:1–2, 166–77; (1999),

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the Vlaams Belang has argued, the exhaustion of the left–right conﬂict between Marxism and Liberalism that dominated the post-war period has lead to a new cleavage between ‘identity versus multiculturalism’.159 As in the past, this identity is strongly expressed in the populist radical rights’ foreign-political conceptualizations of their nation, Europe, and Europe’s place in the world – a vision that conceives a confederation of European peoples battling both the developed superpowers and much of the developing world in a bid to retain nativist notions of cultural identity and the welfare state. It has also become a defensive reaction to neoconservative or neoliberal globalization and neo-imperialism. There are also growing fears of new security threats, including the threats posed by Islamic migrants, fears of homegrown terrorists, organized crime and future global insecurities brought on by the on-going wars in the Middle East. As subsequent chapters will explore, the formulation of this foreign political vision varies greatly at the local level and in response to national political developments. Nonetheless, at the collective level, globalized nationalism has allowed these parties to cooperate at the international level. The populist radical right in Europe have developed for the ﬁrst time a coherent foreign-political message – ‘Europe for the Europeans’ – and it remains to be seen how the European electorate will react. Acronyms AN AE AS AS BNP DF DPP DVU COMECON EU FF FN FPÖ IMF ITS LDPR LN LPF LPR MÍE ́ P MS-FT NATO

Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance) Alternativa Ẽspagnola (Spanish Alternative) Azione Sociale (Social Action) Alternativa Sociale (Social Alternative) British National Party Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People’s Party) Danish People’s Party Deutsche Volksunion (German People’s Union) Council for Mutual Economic Assistance European Union Fianna Fáil (Soldiers of Destiny) Front national (French National Front) Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Austrian Freedom Party) International Monetary Fund Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty Group Liberal Democratic Party of Russia Lega Nord (Northern League) Lijst Pim Fortuyn (Pim Fortuyn List) Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families) Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja (Hungarian Justice and Life Party) Movimento Sociale-Fiamma Tricolore (Social Movement-Tricolor Flame) North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

‘The Nation: Real or Imagined’, Mortimer, E. and Fine, R. (eds.), The Meaning of Ethnicity and Nationalism (London: I.B. Tauris & Co.), pp. 41–2. 159 Betz (2004), op. cit., chp. 2.

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NPD NS ÖVP PiS PRM REP RPR RWA SPR-RSČ SVP UDF UEN UN VB VB WTO

Europe for the Europeans

Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Democratic Party of Germany) National Party (Czech Republic) Österreichische Volkspartei (Austrian Peoples’ Party) Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice) Partidul România Mare (Party of Great Romania) Republikaner (The Republicans) Rassemblement pour la République (Rally for the Republic) Right Wing Authoritarianism Sdruženi pro republiku-Republikánská strana Československa (Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia) Schweizer Volkspartei (Swiss People’s Party) Union for French Democracy Union for Europe of the Nations United Nations Vlaams Blok (Flemish Block) Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest) World Trade Organization

References Altemeyer, R. (1981), Right-Wing Authoritarianism (Manitoba: University of Manitoba Press). Ash, T.G. (2002), ‘The Price of Parsley’, The Guardian, July 25, pp. 7–16. Austin, G. et al. (2005), Turks in Europe: Why Are We Afraid? (London: Foreign Policy Centre). Austin, G. and Parker, K. (2005) ‘The Mono-Cultural Delusion: Turkey and Migration Politics’, in Austin, et al. Betz, H.-G. (2004), La droite populiste en Europe : Extrême et démocarate? (Paris: Autrement). — (2002), ‘Conditions Favouring the Success and Failure of Radical Right-wing Populist Parties in Contemporary Democracies’, in Mény and Surel (eds.). Bilefsky, D. (2006), ‘Danish Wake-up Call on Islam’, International Herald Tribune, . Bundesministerium des Innern (eds.) (1993), Verfassungsschutzbericht 1992 (Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern). Canoy, M. et al. (2006), ‘Migration and Public Perception’, Bureau of European Policy Advisors, European Commission, . Chebel-d’Appolonia, A. (2006), ‘How Wonderful It Is to “Hate”: The Use of AntiMigrant Sentiments by ERPs’, paper presented at the CEVIPOF Conference on ‘The Radical Right and its Impact on Migration Politics and Policies’, Paris, France, the New York University in Paris, Center for Political Research at Sciences Po, 17–18 November. Clark D. et al. (2005), A New Deal for Social Europe (London: Foreign Policy Centre). Crick, B. (2005), ‘Populism, Politics and Democracy’, Democratization 12:5, 625–32. Department of State to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on

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International Relations (2004), ‘Report on Global Anti-Semitism’, US Department of State, . Davies, N. (1996), Europe: A History (Oxford University Press). European Commission (2006), ‘Attitudes towards European Union Enlargement’, European Commission: Special Eurobarometer, . Friedman, N. (1967), ‘Nativism’, Phylon 28:4, 408–15. Gallis, P. et al. (2005), ‘Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries’, Congressional Service Reports on Foreign Policy and Regional Affairs, . Gallup International Association, (2006), Voice of the People 2006: What the World Thinks on Today’s Global Issues, (Gallup International Association). Goldhagen, D. (2004), ‘The Globalization of Anti-Semitism’, Christian Action for Israel, . Greven, T. (2006), ‘Rechtsextreme Globalisierungskritik:Anti-globaler Gegenentwurf zu Neoliberalismus und Global Governance’, in Greven and Grumke (eds.). Greven, T. and Grumke, T. (eds.) (2006), Globalisierter Rechtsextremismus? Die extremistische Rechte in der Ära der Globalisierung (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften). Grumke, T. (2002), ‘Freiheitsrechte der Völker zurückfordern’, Deutsche Stimme 3. — (2006), ’Die transnationale Infrastruktur der extremistischen Rechten’, in Greven and Grumke (eds.). Gurﬁnkiel, M. (2006), ‘Le Pen France’s Le Pen To Strike a Deal With Muslims’, New York Sun, . Grifﬁn, R. (2000), ‘Interregnum or Endgame? The Radical Right in the ‘Post-facist’ Era’, Journal of Political Ideologies 5:2, 163–78. Hainsworth, P. (2000), The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream (London: Pinter). Herf, J. (1984), Reactionary Modernism. Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press). International Institute for Strategic Studies (2005), ‘Muslims in Europe: The Challenge of Integration’, Strategic Comments 12:2. Kaldor, M. (2004), ‘Nationalism and Globalisation’, Nations and Nationalism 10:1–2, 161–77. Kiss, Y. (2007), ‘Xenophones, not Workers are Uniting Across Europe’, The Guardian, 29 January. Krastev, I. (2007), ‘The populist moment’, Eurozine.com, . Krastev, I. (2007), ‘Is East-Central Europe Backsliding? The Strange Death of the Liberal Consensus’, Journal of Democracy,18; 4, 57. Krichevsky, L. (1998), ‘Russian Right-winger Gives Long Anti-Semitic Tirade’, Jewish News Weekly, . Larrabee, S.F. (2006), ‘Danger and Opportunity in Eastern Europe’, Foreign Affairs 85:6. Liang, Christina (2002), German Far Right Ideology in the Decade of German Uniﬁcation, thèse no. 641, IUHEI, Geneva. Luedtke, A. (2005), ‘European Integration, Public Opinion and Immigration Policy Testing the Impact of National Identity’, European Union Politics 6:1, 83–112.

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Mény, Y. and Surel, Y. (eds.) (2002), Democracies and the Populist Challenge (Basingstoke: Palgave). Merkl, P. (ed.) (1997), The Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the Nineties. Minkenberg, M. (1997), ‘The New Right in France and Germany: Nouvelle Droite, Neue Rechte, and the New Right Radical Parties’, in Merkl (ed.). Moїsi, D. (2007), ‘The Clash of Emotions: Fear, Humiliation, Hope and the New World Order’, Foreign Affairs 86:1. Mortimer, E. and Fine, R. (eds.) (1999), The Meaning of Ethnicity and Nationalism (London: I.B. Tauris & Co.). Mudde, C. (2007), Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Norris, P. (2005), Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Nye, Jr., J., (2000) Understanding International Conﬂicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, 3rd edition. (New York: Longman Publishing Group). Poggioli, S. (2006), ‘Europe’s Right Turn Anti-Immigrant Policy Boosts France’s Le Pen Again’, radio broadcast, National Public Radio, 12 January. Prizell, I. (1998), National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine (Cambridge Russian, Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Rassen, S. der and Völker (1990)‚ ‘Die USA als Richter der Welt? Serie zur Geschichte und Gegenwart des US-Imperialismus, 2 Teil’, DNZ, 21 September. Republikaner bekunden Mitgefühl mit den Opfern (2001) Der Republikaner . Ritter, M. (1996), ‘Droht eine Weltwirtschafts-Revolution?’, Der Republikaner 11. Savage, T. (2004), ‘Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing’, The Washington Quarterly, 27:3, 25–50. Schain, M. (2002), Shadows Over Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan). Scharenberg, A. (2006), ‘Brücke zum Mainstream – Mainstream als Brücke: Europäische Rechtsparteien und ihre Politik gegen Einwanderung’, in Greven and Grumke (eds.). Schorr, D. (2006), ‘Iran’s Holocaust-denial Conference: a Community of Hate’, The Christian Science Monitor, . Smith, A.D. (1995), Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity). — (1999), ‘The Nation: Real or Imagined’, in Mortimer and Fine (eds.). Taggart, P. (2004), ‘Populism and Representative Politics in Contemporary Europe’, Journal of Political Ideologies 9:3, 269–88. — (1998), ‘A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroskeptism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems’, European Journal of Political Research 33:3, 363–88. Tamás, G.M., ‘Counter-revolution against a counter-revolution, Eastern Europe Today,’ Eurozine.com, < http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-09-18-tamas-en.html>. Weitzman, M. (2006), ‘Antisemitismus und Holocaust-Leugnung: Permanente Elemente des globalen Rechtsextremismus’, in Greven and Grumke (eds.).

Chapter 2

Against the ‘Green Totalitarianism’: Anti-Islamic Nativism in Contemporary Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe Hans-Georg Betz

Introduction A few days before the Belgian parliamentary election in 2003, a relatively unknown candidate for the Senate, Marc Joris, started a letter campaign among Antwerp’s Jewish community soliciting their support for the upcoming election. The incident would probably have gone unnoticed, had Marc Joris not come from the ranks of the then Vlaams Blok (today Vlaams Belang), at the time one of Western Europe’s most extremist right-wing populist parties, which in the past had been associated with both anti-Semitism and Holocaust negationism. The letter was part of a larger campaign by the party designed to modify its image. The most remarkable example was an interview with Filip Dewinter, the party’s most prominent politician, with the orthodox Jewish newspaper Hamishpacha a few months before the election.1 In this interview, Dewinter not only made explicit reference to the suffering the Jews had experienced throughout history, including the Holocaust, but also presented himself as an admirer of Jewish culture and traditions, which had marked ‘our identity’ and therefore was ‘a part of European culture’. In short, Dewinter implied, the Vlaams Blok had no problems with the Jewish community in Belgium. The problem was with the Muslim community. As Dewinter put it, ‘Our culture cannot adapt itself to the Muslim way of life. We will never be able to live in harmony with each other. The way we think is completely different.’ Therefore, the Jewish community should look at the Vlaams Blok as allies, particularly with respect to the State of Israel, which Dewinter characterized as ‘a piece of Europe in the Middle East, the only democracy in the Middle East.’ Israel and the Vlaams Blok had the same enemy: Israel’s war against Palestinian terrorism was the same battle as that which the Vlaams Blok and other right-wing populist parties were ﬁghting ‘against Islam in Europe.’ Dewinter’s intervention was clearly designed to gain political respectability for the Vlaams Blok and thus undermine the strategy of marginalization (referred to as cordon sanitaire), which the major political parties had pursued with respect to 1

‘Antwerpse Joden achter Vlaams Blok’, Hamishpacha, (12 March 2003).

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Belgium’s radical populist right since its rise to prominence in the early 1990s. At the same time, it was an attempt to capitalize on growing public concern about Muslim fundamentalism (which Dewinter at one point assailed as ‘Green totalitarianism’) in the wake of 11 September 2001 in order to justify the party’s positions on immigration. As the party put it in one of its pamphlets, its programme had nothing to do with racism or ‘hatred toward others’ but was merely an expression of the desire to assert and defend ‘the distinctiveness [eigenheid] of our culture’ and way of life.2 For Filip Dewinter, his party’s main political priority was to safeguard the ‘right to identity’ and assure that Flemings would remain ‘boss in [their] own country.’3 This required above all a radical reversal of the prevailing immigration policies, which had allowed foreigners to enter the country, whose culture and values were fundamentally alien, if not hostile, to those of the West. The only way for Flanders (and, by extension, Europe) to preserve its identity and prevent cultural suicide was to introduce and observe a politics of selective exclusion, particularly with respect to migrants from Muslim countries. The Vlaams Blok has hardly been the ﬁrst and only party on the radical populist right to adopt identitarian themes in support of a politics of selective exclusion. In fact, the appeal to questions of culture and identity represents a central ideological instrument of radical right-wing populist strategy, which has allowed the radical populist right to promote itself not only as a staunch defender of cultural distinctiveness but also as a champion of western values and liberal democratic principles.4 The radical populist right’s justiﬁcation for its politics of selective exclusion derives its logic from arguments about the right to difference and recognition, designed to counter charges of xenophobia and racism. Ideologically, the focus is no longer on questions of inequality but, as Pierre-André Taguieff put it some time ago, on ‘the inability to communicate, of being incommensurable or incompatible’. As a result, ‘exclusion is given a place of honor in the general demand of the right to difference’.5 The emergence of exclusionary populist ideology in recent years is not, as is sometimes maintained, a revival of fascism or neo-fascism in postmodern guise; rather, it is a revival of an older strand of virulent nationalism – nativism. Historically, nativism has been associated primarily with settler societies, such as Australia, Canada and the US, where nativist movements played a major role in shaping political culture, particularly in the early years of the republic.6 For this reason, there might be hesitation to adopt this concept to analyse the development of contemporary radical right-wing populism in Western Europe. However, as I will try to show in what follows, there are striking parallels between American nineteenthcentury nativism and contemporary radical right-wing populist ideology in Western

2 Vlaams Blok (2003), Aanpassen of terugkeren (Brussels: Vlaams Blok), p. 8. 3 Dewinter, F. (2000), Baas in Eigen Land (Brussels: Uitgeverij Egmont), p. 11. 4 See Betz and H.-G. (2004), La droite populiste en Europe: extreme et démocrate? (Paris: Autrement). 5 Taguieff and P.-A. (1994), ‘From Race to Culture: The New Right’s View of European Identity’, Telos 98–99, pp. 122, 124. 6 On Canadian Nativism see See, S. (2000), ‘“An Unprecedented Inﬂux”: Nativism and Irish Famine Immigration to Canada’, American Review of Canadian Studies 30(4), pp. 429–53.

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Europe, which suggest that there is considerable heuristic value in using this concept to further our understanding of important developments on the contemporary radical populist right. Nativism Nativism emerged in the early nineteenth century in the US, at a time when the new country was faced with a ﬁrst mass wave of immigrants from Europe, many of them Roman Catholic peasants from Ireland and Germany.7 It was a defensive response on the part of the original settler community to newcomers, who were seen as threatening the culture, basic values and institutions of that community.8 The white, native-born Protestants responded to the immigrants with resentment and open hostility, reﬂecting wide-spread fears that mass immigration was part of ‘a Papal plot to subvert American liberty and seize control of the United States politically through the use of slavish Catholic immigrant minions’. At the height of the anti-immigrant backlash in the 1840s and 1850s, nativist groups formed the Know Nothing party (also known as the American Party), a political association designed to ﬁght the ‘despotic faith’ (Catholicism) that in their view was seeking to ‘uproot the tree of Liberty’.9 The party attracted: working class and middle class voters angered by the job competition from immigrants, the increase in crime, public drunkenness, and pauperism that accompanied immigration, the supposed pollution of the body politic by ignorant immigrant voters, and an assertiveness by Catholic clergymen that supposedly threatened the nation’s Protestant values and institutions.

Among other things, the party demanded that the residence requirement for new immigrants be extended from ﬁve to 21 years, that immigrants be disenfranchised until they had met the new residence requirement, and, generally, that ‘native-born’ Americans receive preferential treatment.10 Although the political movement proved rather short-lived – with nativism soon losing out to the question of slavery as the dominant issue of the day – it left a signiﬁcant imprint on American life. For one, the movement’s strident antiimmigrant campaign, which occasionally led to violence, was instrumental in putting an end to the mass migration of the mid-century.11 More importantly, its nativist ideas continued to play a signiﬁcant role for the rest of the century and

7 Billington, R. (1964), The Protestant Crusade 1800–1860 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books). 8 On the distinction between settlers and immigrants see Huntington, S. (2000), ‘Reconsidering Immigration: Is Mexico a Special Case?’ (Washington: Center for Immigration Studies.) 9 McPherson, J. (1992), ‘Patterns of Prejudice’, The New Republic, 19 October, p. 45. 10 Holt, M., ‘Nativism’. . 11 Cohn, R. (2000), ‘Nativism and the End of the Mass Migration of the 1840s and 1850s’, Journal of Economic History, 60(2), pp. 361–383.

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well into the twentieth century, spawning new arguments for exclusion.12 Thus, at the end of the century, at a time of increased immigration from Central and Eastern Europe, various authors advanced the notion that American institutions were derived from the ‘Teutonic’ parts of Europe and might therefore ‘be compatible only with immigrants of Teutonic (Anglo-Saxon or German) immigrants’.13 Finally, in the late twentieth century, when the country was faced with a growing inﬂux of immigrants from developing countries, the focus increasingly shifted to the allegedly ‘huge burden’ the new arrivals imposed on the American taxpayer. Nativists argued that because new immigrants generally had lower skill levels, they were more dependent on public services than earlier immigrant groups.14 American nativism was originally the expression of an ethnocultural upsurge, fed by deep-seated fears of the effects of mass immigration on American society and the polity. These fears were fed by suspicions that newly arriving immigrants held values that were fundamentally incompatible with American democratic traditions and institutions. Thus, Catholic traditions were seen as ‘dangerously un-American because they did not harmonize easily with the concept of individual freedom embedded in the national culture’.15 These fears and suspicions turned American nativism increasingly into a profoundly political movement seeking to preserve the ‘ethno-national dominance’ of the Protestant majority either through exclusion or by forcing newcomers to assimilate to the dominant – that is, Anglo-Saxon Protestant – value system.16 In the nativists’ eyes, immigration represented a Trojan horse designed by the European monarchies – and later by European anarchists, communists and other radical movements – to subvert American liberty and democracy. Typical examples of this view were the titles of two inﬂuential books by Samuel Morse, the inventor of the telegraph and one of the founding fathers of American nativism. The ﬁrst, published in 1834, bore the title The Foreign Conspiracy Against the Liberties of the United States; the second, published one year later, was published under the title, The Imminent Dangers to the Free Institutions of the United States through Immigration. Morse’s writings were highly inﬂuential in perpetuating the notion that the Catholic Church was ‘an anti-democratic, dangerous, and even evil institution’ and immigration the instrument ‘of the Catholic Church’s supposed quest for world domination’.17 As late as 1960, when John F. Kennedy ran for president, evangelical 12 Higham, J. (2002), Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925, rev. edn (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press); Crawford, J. (2001), Cycles of Nativism in U.S. History (Washington: The National Immigration Forum). 13 Vedder, R., Gallaway, L. and Moore, S. (2000), ‘The Immigration Problem Then and Now’, The Independent Review, 4(3), p. 350. 14 Ibid., p. 354. 15 Higham, J. (1972), Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism 1860–1925 (New York: Atheneum Press), p. 6; cited in Berlet, C (2001), ‘Nativism’, The Public Eye 15(3), p. 10. 16 Vedder, R., Gallaway, L. and Moore, S. (2000), ‘The Immigration Problem Then and Now’, The Independent Review, 4(3), pp. 418, 420. 17 Gall, R. (2003), ‘The Past Should not Shackle the Present: The Revival of a Legacy of Religious Bigotry by Opponents of School Choice’, New York University Annual Survey of American Law, 59, pp. 415–416.

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Protestant leaders raised their voice warning that electing Kennedy ‘would be like handing the Oval Ofﬁce to the Antichrist’. And the Reverend Billy Graham, one of the most prominent leaders of America’s Protestant Fundamentalist movement, wrote at the time that the Vatican ‘does all in its power to control the governments of nations’.18 Chip Berlet, one of the leading experts on American right-wing extremism, has deﬁned nativism as a defensive form of nationalism that ‘doubts the suitability for citizenship (or even residency) of those suspected of being unable or unwilling to function as loyal and patriotic citizens’.19 However, nativism should not be confounded with opposition to immigration per se nor is it necessarily the same as xenophobia and racism. As Carol M. Swain and Russ Nieli have noted, the focus of American nativists has generally been to ‘stress the central importance of AngloSaxon ethnic and cultural hegemony as factors contributing to the success of the United States as a stable and progressive society’.20 Samuel P. Huntington, in a recent article warning of the threat to American identity posed by mass immigration from Mexico and other Latin American countries, has reiterated this point. Huntington argues that contemporary American identity is largely deﬁned ‘in terms of culture and creed’, which: was the product of the distinct Anglo-Protestant culture of the founding settlers. Key elements of that culture include the English language; Christianity; religious commitment; English concepts of the rule of law, including the responsibility of rulers and the rights of individuals; and dissenting Protestant values of individualism, the work ethic, and the belief that humans have the ability and the duty to try to create a heaven on earth, a ‘city on a hill’.

In Huntington’s view, mass immigration from Mexico and other Latin American countries poses a fundamental challenge to the foundations of American identity, both in terms of the survival of English as ‘a single national culture’ and the survival of its ‘core Anglo-Protestant culture’.21 It would be unfair to characterize the author of The Clash of Civilizations as a right-wing extremist or to put him in the same league as Jean-Marie Le Pen, Filip Dewinter or even the standard bearer of contemporary American populist nativism cum protectionism, Patrick Buchanan.22 However, as I will show in what follows, the arguments he advances are virtually identical with those advanced by the contemporary Western European populist right to bolster their campaign against migrants, particularly those from Muslim countries. No wonder the European radical 18 Goodstein, L. (2004), ‘How the Evangelicals and Catholics Joined Forces’, The New York Times, 30 May. 19 Berlet (2001), op. cit., p. 9. 20 Swain, C. and Nieli, R. (2003), Contemporary Voices of White Nationalism in America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 17. 21 Huntington, S. (2004), ‘The Hispanic Challenge’, Foreign Policy, April. 22 For a critical approach to Huntington’s recent writings see Golway, T (2004), ‘The Return of the Know-Nothings’, America, 29 March, p. 6. As the title indicates, Golway sees Huntington in the tradition of American nativism.

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populist right has enthusiastically adopted Huntington’s central argument – namely that ‘the most pervasive, important, and dangerous conﬂicts will not be between social classes, rich and poor, or other economically deﬁned groups, but between peoples belonging to different cultural entities’ – to lend intellectual legitimacy to their campaign against immigration and multiculturalism.23 In the process, the arguments advanced by nineteenth-century American nativists have made a reappearance to bolster the populist right’s rhetorical assault on Muslim migrants and fan the ﬂames of Islamophobia, largely replacing the virulent antiSemitism characteristic of the traditional extreme right. Its ideological justiﬁcation is found in the appeal to the ‘right to difference’ based on the notion that all cultures are equal, but largely incompatible, which makes the idea of cultural merging and mutual enrichment advanced by the advocates of multiculturalism not only a foolish, but also a highly dangerous proposition. The nativist challenge posed by the radical populist right reﬂects the growing importance of sociocultural conﬂicts at the expense of traditional conﬂicts over material distribution. Or, as Filip Dewinter has put it, in the twenty-ﬁrst century the main political cleavage will be between identity and multiculturalism.24 Nativism, Islamophobia and the Radical Populist Right Radical right-wing populist parties have generally been characterized primarily as anti-immigrant parties. This is not wrong, but rather too simplistic. It ignores important developments in the evolution of these parties’ ideology, which has led to signiﬁcant differentiations and modiﬁcations with respect to their position on immigration and questions of citizenship. Particularly after Western European governments progressively tightened immigration rules during the past decade in order to stave off the electoral gains of the radical right, radical right-wing populist parties started to shift their focus to questions of integration and particularly multiculturalism. No longer was the main emphasis of the parties’ political mobilization on preventing immigrants from entering Western Europe, but on how to deal with the existent resident alien population. While a number of parties increasingly recognized and acknowledged that the vast majority of aliens had come to stay, they strongly objected to liberal trends that accepted ethnic and cultural diversity as legitimate and integral to full and equal participation in society. At the same time, the radical populist right vehemently opposed any attempt to help migrants reclaim, preserve, and foster their identity as well as any policies designed to promote cultural awareness and understanding. The new emphasis was on ‘integration before immigration’, bolstered by the argument that further immigration ‘impedes integration’. According to this argument, new immigrant groups were even less prepared than ‘ﬁrst generation migrants’ to integrate themselves into their host society since they could always rely for support on the already existing immigrant communities, which ‘often constitute their own 23 Huntington, S. (1996), The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster), p. 21. 24 Dewinter (2000), op. cit., p. 14.

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25

separate worlds’. To counter these developments, the radical populist right called for an end to the failed ‘multicultural experiment’, which was to be replaced by policies that give foreign residents a clear choice – either to integrate themselves or to go home. As the Vlaams Blok put it in its party program, peaceful coexistence between migrants and Flemings presupposes that migrants ‘unequivocally choose assimilation. They must become Flemings among the Flemings. Those who don’t want to or who can’t do it have to return to their country of origin.’26 This line of reasoning substantially changes the nature of the radical populist right’s discourse on immigration and integration. No longer is the focus on the desirability of integration per se, but on the conditions that make integration possible and likely and those that do not. As the passage from the Vlaams Blok programme cited earlier makes clear, for the radical populist right, successful integration depends both on the willingness and the ability of foreigners to adopt their host country’s culture, values, and way of life. Willingness and ability, in turn, crucially depend on the commensurability and compatibility of the cultural disposition of each individual immigration group. For those who share the prevailing values, integration poses no problem at all; for those whose cultural disposition is incompatible with the prevailing values, integration is impossible. They should be returned to their country of origin. Jean-Yves Le Gallou and Philippe Olivier, two prominent former members of the Front National, were among the ﬁrst on the radical populist right to promote this argument and spell out the consequences. In a Front National pamphlet on immigration written in the early 1990s, the two authors advanced the following thesis: The experience of the nineteenth and early twentieth century shows that France has had no problem receiving and assimilating foreigners of European origin and generally Catholic (Italians, Poles, Belgians, then Portuguese and Spanish). By contrast, the experience of the past twenty years shows that the same has not been true with immigrants from the Maghreb, Turkey, India and Pakistan or Black Africa. The establishment of ethnic quarters and ghettoes, the crisis of the suburbs (banlieues) show that with the population from the Third World, integration does not work… The history of Europe and of the world shows that there has never been an example of an enduring, peaceful coexistence between peoples of different ethnic and religious origin sharing the same territory… An additional matter of concern is the growing role of Islam within the foreign communities. More than two-thirds of all immigrants currently entering France come from Muslim countries [ … ], and that at a time when Islam is in full expansion… Yet throughout history there has never been enduring peaceful coexistence between the Europeans and Christians on the one hand and the Orientals and Muslims on the other.

From this the authors concluded that continued immigration from developing countries represented a fundamental threat to France’s national identity, its European

25 De Smedt, D. (2003), ‘Volgmigratie – Blijvende instroom’ Vlaams Blok Magazine, 5 May, . 26 Vlaams Blok (2002), Een toekomst voor Vlaanderen: Programma en standpunten van het Vlaams Blok (Brussels: Vlaams Blok), p. 19.

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and Christian heritage, and its national sovereignty.27 Under the circumstances, France was faced with a choice: either to continue to subject itself to the unimpeded inﬂow of Developing World immigrants; or to reverse the inﬂux and effect the ‘progressive departure’ of those immigrants who turn out to be ‘inassimilable’.28 The Front National and the Vlaams Blok were the ﬁrst radical right-wing populist parties to propose concrete measures to confront the growth of Islam in France. In its 50-point anti-immigration programme, ‘Immigration – 50 mesures concrètes’ from 1991, the Front National called for, among other things, a stop to the construction of mosques in France and for strict regulations concerning the opening of Koranic schools and Islamic centers in the country. Following the Front National’s lead, the Vlaams Blok, in the party’s ‘70-point programme for solving the immigration problem,’ put together by Filip Dewinter in 1992, went even further stating that Islam was an ‘anti-Western and intolerant religion’. In Dewinter’s view, it had become increasingly obvious during the past several years that there was a ‘fundamental and irreconcilable antagonism between Islam and Western values’. Therefore, it was of paramount importance to do everything possible to stop and reverse the expansion of Islam in Belgium, particularly by drastically reducing the number of mosques in the country. Given the fact that mosques served not only as houses of worship but also as community centres, they contributed to the formation of separate ethnic and cultural communities and thus to the ‘Maghrebinization’ (magrebijnisering) of whole districts in Belgian cities. Putting a stop to the construction of new mosques, to be followed by a ‘drastic reduction’ in the number of already existing mosques, was therefore the best way to respond effectively to the formation of ghettoes in the country’s cities.29 At the same time, Dewinter warned of the growing danger stemming from Islamic fundamentalism. As early as 1993, the party maintained that fundamentalism was intrinsic to Islam, for a doctrine that ‘preaches holy war, assassination, forced conversions, oppression of women, slavery and extermination of “inﬁdels”, will automatically lead to what we now call fundamentalism.’30 In response, the radical populist right increasingly stressed the notion of identity as the most important weapon in the struggle against Islam. The point was most famously made by Pim Fortuyn in The Netherlands, who in 1997 published a polemic against multiculturalism and the Dutch policy of integration entitled, Against the Islamization of Our Culture – Dutch Identity as a Foundation. The book’s core argument was that Islamic culture, values and norms were diametrically opposed to those predominant in modern Western societies: the separation of church and state, democracy, and gender equality, religious tolerance and freedom of opinion, individual responsibility and respect for minorities.

27 Le Gallou, J.-Y. and Olivier, P (1992), Immigration: Le Front national fait le point (Paris: Éditions Nationales.), pp. 19–23. 28 Ibid., p. 35. 29 Dewinter, F. (1992), ‘Immigratie: De oplossingen. 70 voorstellen ter oplossing van het vreemdlingenprobleem’. . 30 Vlaams Blok (1993), no. 6, cited in Mudde, C. (2000), The Ideology of the Extreme Right (Manchester/New York: Manchester University Press), p. 103.

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Unlike other right-wing populist leaders, Fortuyn could claim to have personal experience with Islamic intolerance. As has been pointed out, the key to Fortuyn’s political views was his open homosexuality. Fortuyn’s diatribes against multiculturalism were a direct consequence of his aversion to, and loathing for, Islam, a religion, which in his view was deeply offensive toward women and members of minorities such as himself – as reﬂected in an infamous statement by a fundamentalist Moroccan imam who had found refuge in The Netherlands and who on Dutch television characterized homosexuality as a disease and in his sermons charged that Europeans were lower than pigs because they tolerated homosexuals in their midst.31 As René Cuperus has pointed out, Fortuyn’s invectives against Islam were meant ‘to sound the alarm’ while at the same time lent legitimacy to what he considered to be his personal mission as a writer and politician, namely ‘to defend hard fought-for Western liberal and democratic freedoms’ against a deeply suspect religion, which in his view was the expression of a fundamentally ‘backward culture’.32 Unlike modern societies, which place central importance to individual responsibility, Fortuyn noted that Islam accorded prime importance to collective responsibility, subject to religious law, and the family, while at the same time considering women inferior to men. From this it followed that Muslim immigrants could only be integrated into Dutch society if they abandoned their traditional worldview and adopted Western values and ‘secular, democratic procedures for resolving disputes’.33 Fortuyn’s arguments and propositions were similar to those advanced by established radical right-wing populist parties elsewhere in Western Europe. A prominent example is the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti), which after splitting off the Danish Progress Party (Fremskridtspartiet) in the 1990s became a major factor in Danish politics. One reason for the party’s success has been its uncompromising position on Islam. Mogens Camre, the party’s representative in the European parliament, set the tone when he charged as early as 2000 that Islam was ‘not only a religion but a fascist political ideology mixed with a religious fanaticism of the Middle Ages, an insult to human rights’. While noting that there was nothing one could do to prevent Muslims from ruining their own societies, ‘we ought to protect our own society. People who seek to wage a holy war should not be in Denmark.’34 A year later, the party made Islamophobia central to its campaign for the parliamentary election of that year. A few months before the election the party issued a book-length pamphlet entitled, Danmarks fremdtid: dit land – dit valg… (Denmark’s Future: this country, this election…). The cover of the pamphlet already provided a glimpse of its content: It displayed two young Muslim militants, one 31 Neurink, J. (2001), ‘Double Dutch’ in Al-Ahram Weekly, 5–11 July, . 32 Cuperus, R. (2005), ‘Roots of European Populism: The Case of Pim Fortuyn’s Populist Revolt in The Netherlands’ in Political Survival on the Extreme Right, Casals (ed.), (Barcelona: ICPS). 33 Hooper, J. (2002), ‘The Twisty Politics of a Far Right Politician’, The Guardian, 7 May. 34 Camre, M. (2000), ‘Islam kan ikke integreres’, .

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brandishing a pistol, the other what appears to be the Palestinian ﬂag, surrounded by a large group of young Muslim demonstrators. The picture was taken years earlier at an anti-Israel demonstration in Copenhagen. The intent of the pamphlet was to warn Danish voters of the attempts of militant Muslims to subvert Danish society and turn it into a country dominated by foreigners. (In order to drive home the point, the pamphlet featured a lengthy discussion – complete with a wealth of photographs, many of them depicting Muslim women wearing a head-scarf or even a chador – of life in Kreuzberg, a district in Berlin with a large Turkish population.) Like Fortuyn, the authors of the pamphlet charged, among other things, that Islam was a ‘political programme’ that promoted ‘medieval practices’ and that therefore was incompatible with democracy (as the party put it: ‘Islam and democracy – the impossible combination’). At the same time, it made a second point, which was to become increasingly important in radical right-wing populist campaigns against Islam, namely that Islam was not only fundamentally incompatible with democracy, but was also incompatible with Christianity.35 In the wake of 11 September 2001, virtually all parties and formations on the radical right made the confrontation with Islam a central political issue. Characterizing Islam as a fundamental threat to the West and its way of life allowed even extremist parties such as the Vlaams Blok to launch a frontal attack on both Islam and Western Europe’s rapidly growing Muslim immigrant population without automatically being charged with propagating racism. On the contrary, by adopting Fortuyn’s line of argumentation, the radical populist right managed to promote themselves as genuine defenders of secularism, democracy, and Western values in general. Among the ﬁrst to lay out the new strategy was, once again, Jean-Yves Le Gallou (this time, however, as a leading representative of Bruno Mégret’s renegade Mouvement National Républicain). In a speech delivered some three months after 11 September, Le Gallou argued that the attack against the US marked the end of the illusion that with the collapse of the Soviet Union history had come to an end.36 Instead, it heralded the beginning of a new global conﬂict – a clash of civilizations, as analysed by Huntington, which was likely to dominate most of the ﬁrst half of the twenty-ﬁrst century. This clash of civilizations had two primary causes. On the one hand, what Le Gallou called ‘the return of archaisms’; on the other hand, ‘the expansion of Islam’ as a ‘war religion’ (religion guerrière). The two processes were interrelated: in the Arab and Muslim world, the return to archaisms meant a return to Islam; in the West, the expansion of Islam as a war religion meant nothing less than the beginning of a ‘reverse colonization.’ As Le Gallou put it, when ‘they try to impose the chador on our streets and schools, mosques in our neighborhoods, the Ramadan in our cities and hallal meat in our canteens, it’s a culture war, a religious war which they wage on us. It’s a total war!’ Under these circumstances, the ﬁrst step toward confronting the threat was to deﬁne the main enemy – what Le Gallou called l’Islam conquérant. Islam threatened France both from the outside and the inside. Against the outside enemy, Le Gallou argued, France would only prevail if 35 Dansk Folkeparti (2001), Danmarks fremdit – dit land, dit valg… (Copenhagen: Dansk Folkeparti). 36 Le Gallou and J.-Y. (2001), ‘Le retour de l’Histoire’, Paris, 8 December.

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it opted for a politics of political and military strength. Against the threat from the inside, what France needed was a moral revival, which would lay the foundation for what Le Gallou called a patriotisme de civilization. For, as he put it, what ‘we have to defend today is more than France, it’s our civilization, meaning European civilization in its French expression.’ In the years since 11 September 2001, the claims and charges advanced by Fortuyn, Le Gallou, Camre and other leading advocates of a hardline position on Islam have come to dominate and deﬁne the radical populist right’s nativist discourse on immigration. At the same time, both established radical right-wing populist parties as well as relative newcomers have increasingly appealed to anti-Islamic sentiments to garner support for their cause. The Dutch politician, Geert Wilders, for instance, who gained notoriety abroad as The Netherlands’ most vocal opponent to the European Union Constitution, owes his political prominence to a large extent to his vocal campaign against radical Islam. Wilders, who many consider the heir to Pim Fortuyn, has maintained that Islam and democracy are incompatible because Islam preaches a ‘fascist body of thought, which threatens to destroy our democracy’. Muslims, if they seek to live in The Netherlands on a permanent basis, must therefore put the Dutch constitution above the Koran.37 Similar statements have been made by Robert Spieler, a former Front national deputy and founder of Alsace d’Abord, a regionalist radical right-wing populist party, which in the regional elections in 2004 received almost 10 per cent of the vote in Alsace. Like other parties on the radical right, Alsace d’Abord promotes itself as a staunch defender of cultural identity particularly against the Islamic threat. In fact, Spieler has maintained that Islam represents a ‘totalitarian religion’ that will never be a ‘European religion’. At the same time, he has warned that those who believe in the existence of a ‘moderate Islam’ not only delude themselves with regard to Islam’s true nature, but do not understand the real threat of Islam’s eventual ‘reconquest of Europe’ (reconquête de l’Europe par l’islam).38 The point was most forcefully made by Filip Dewinter in a programmatic speech delivered in late 2002 in his stronghold, Antwerp, and entitled, Het groene totalitarisme: De kolonisatie van Europa! (The green totalitarianism: the colonization of Europe.)39 Dewinter started his speech with a quote from a radical Islamist reported in the Italian daily La Republica predicting that it was only a matter of time until the ‘Green banner of Islam would wave over Rome, then Italy, and ﬁnally Europe.’ Citing other Islamists who had made similar claims with respect to France and Belgium, Dewinter came right to the central point of his discourse: Islam 37 See ‘Islam verderfelijk gedachtegoed’, De Volkskrant, 31 October (2004); Wilders, G. (2005), ‘Onafhangkelijkheidsverklaring’. , p. 12; Schreiber, M (2005), ‘Terror’s Unforeseen Consequences,’ PBS, 25 January, ; Gartner, T. (2004), ‘Tolerance Tested in Holland’, The Washington Times, 20 December. 38 Spieler, R (2004), ‘De l’islam en Alsace, de l’immigration’, 12 October, . 39 Dewinter, F. (2002), ‘Het groene totalitarisme: De kolonisatie van Europa!’, speech given at the Colloquium ‘Karel Martelstichting’, Antwerp, 20 November.

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was a ‘religion of conquest’ (Veroveringsgodsdienst), which disdained and rejected Western values and the Western way of life. In fact, European culture was nothing less than the ‘archenemy’ of the ‘Green totalitarianism – Islamism’. The attacks against the US represented the beginning of a new campaign of ‘blind terror’ whose ﬁnal end was the ‘complete Islamization of humanity’. If Europe so far had failed to recognize the threat stemming from ‘Europe’s colonization by Islam’ by means of a ‘cultural jihad’, it was largely due to naïvité and misplaced tolerance, fostered by ‘subsidized anti-racism’ and political correctness. Therefore, only if Europe started to assert its cultural identity, values and norms, proud and without shame, would it be able ‘to drive Islam back to where it belongs – the other side of the Mediterranean Sea’.40 Driving Islam back across the Mediterranean Sea also seems to have been the objective of a mass organized by the Liga Veneta in October 2002, commemorating the 431st anniversary of the ‘Christian victory’ against the Turks at Lepanto (7 October 1571), which saved Europe from ‘the horrors of a Muslim invasion’.41 The mass was celebrated by Don Gianni Baget Bozzo, a priest who a few months earlier had exhorted Umberto Bossi to make the defence of ‘our identity against the Islamic invasion’ a central issue in the Lega Nord’s political struggle.42 Baget Bozzo was not disappointed. During the past several years, the Lega Nord increasingly adopted a militant anti-Islam position, while at the same time promoting itself as a staunch defender of traditional ‘Christian values’. Thus, in September 2002, the Lega Nord came out strongly in favour of a law which would have made it obligatory to display a cruciﬁx in all public ofﬁces, including schools and universities. Given the symbolic character of the cruciﬁx as a symbol of Western civilization and Christian values, the law was designed not only to strengthen Italian cultural identity but also to counter the ‘arrogance and intolerance’ of Muslim organizations in Italy, which had attacked and denigrated the cruciﬁx.43 In the years that followed, the Lega’s tone with regard to Islam became even more strident. For instance, in 2004 on Holy Thursday, the Lega Nord held a public reading of Oriana Fallaci’s book La forza della ragione in front of the cathedral in Milan (where at the same time, Milan’s cardinal was performing the traditional foot-washing ritual on, among other people, a number of immigrants). The reading took place in order to remind the people of Milan of ‘the danger confronting the city and society’ stemming from ‘the violent and arrogant part of the Muslim world’.44 A year later, Roberto Calderoli, one of the Lega Nord’s leading politicians and minister for reforms, characterized the relationship between Islam and the West as a conﬂict between ‘a civilization and a non-civilization’. Calderoli was also quoted as saying that if Muslims ‘thought theirs was a great

40 See also Walt, V. (2005), ‘Life on the Front Lines,’ Time (Europe), 28 February. 41 ‘Messa Latina antica per il 431° della victoria di Lepanto,’ Una Voce Venetia, . 42 See Savoini, G. (2002), ‘Lega baluardo contro l’invasione islamica’, La Padania, 26 June. 43 See ‘Crociﬁssi contro l’Islam: la Lega li vuole dovunque’, La Repubblica, 18 September 2002; ‘Il Crociﬁsso torni nelle aule e negli ufﬁci’, Qui Lega (20 September 2002), p. 2. 44 ‘Lega Nord: Lettura Publica in Piazza Duomo Libro Fallaci’ ANSA (8 April 2004).

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civilization, let them show it. Otherwise, the door is always open. Let them return to the desert and talk with the camels, or to the jungle and talk with the apes.’45 The Lega’s pronounced and strident Islamophobia was an almost logical result of the party’s self-understanding as a primarily identitarian movement, which sought recognition of cultural diversity, identity, and difference, as Umberto Bossi afﬁrmed in his speech at the Lega Nord’s annual meeting in Pontida in June 2000.46 Confronted with what the party considered an increasingly militant and aggressive Islamic movement, the Lega Nord maintained that only by returning to the Christian roots of its civilization would Europe be able to hold its own. For, as the secretary of the renegade Lega Padana Lombardia-Lombardia Nazione and regional councillor, Roberto Bernardelli, put it, Christianity and Christian values are not only the foundations of European culture, but also the ‘fundamental bulwark against expanding Islamism, which is trying to invade our society, with the complicity and support of the centre-left.’47 Similar charges have also been advanced by the populist radical right in Switzerland, which in recent years has become a major political force in the country. This is largely due to the electoral gains of the Schweizer Volkspartei, which within a decade has managed to more than double its support at the polls. Against that, the traditional radical right – the Schweizer Demokraten – and the populist right in the canton Ticino – the Lega dei ticinesi – has experienced a considerable decline in popular support. Like its counterparts in other Western European countries, the Swiss populist radical right promotes itself as defender of national and cultural identity, particularly against the country’s growing Muslim immigrant population. The Schweizer Demokraten adopted as early as 2000 the notion, advanced by the French nouvelle droite writer Guillaume Faye, that Europe was severely threatened of being colonized by Islam, a conquering religion, which had embarked on a deliberate campaign of massive settlement designed to subjugate Europe.48 As a letter to the party’s ofﬁcial monthly paper put it with great pathos: ‘One day, our bells won’t come back from their Easter voyage, and the muezzin will replace the calls to prayer with a shrill cry from the bell towers and minarets, ﬁve times a day, with bows toward Mecca.’49 If the party could claim, in the wake of 11 September 2001, to have been justiﬁed in warning of the grave dangers posed by Islam, it was unable to exploit Islamophobia politically, particularly with regard to the Schweizer Volkspartei.50 45 Fontana, E. (2005), ‘In Arabia paragonano I leghisti ai terroristi’, Il Giornale, 22 September. 46 ‘Intervento del segretario federale, OnUmberto Bossi’, Pontida, (4 June 2000), . 47 Bernardelli, R. (2004), ‘Lombardia nazione difende I valori cristiani!’, Lega Padana Lombardia-Lombardia Nazione, 3 March, . 48 See de Seinmers, M. (2000), ‘La Colonisation de l’Europe’, Schweizer Demokrat, March–April, p. 13. 49 Ibid. 50 See Schmidhauser, W. (2004), ‘Gefahr durch den Islam’, Schweizer Demokrat, January, pp. 1–2.

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The Schweizer Volkspartei has shown itself particularly unscrupulous in constructing the image of an Islamic threat in order to attain concrete political goals. A case in point was the party’s campaign in 2004 against a proposed law put before the Swiss electorate in a referendum, which would have made it easier for long-term foreign residents to become Swiss citizens. The campaign was led by Ulrich Schlüer, a national councillor situated on the far right of the Zürich wing of the Schweizer Volkspartei, who organized a ‘Nonpartisan Committee against Mass Naturalization’ to defeat the proposal in the referendum. The committee managed to place several ads in a number of major daily papers, which strongly suggested that the adoption of the law would invariably lead to the ‘Muslimization’ of the country.51 One of the committee’s ads suggested that if the number of Muslims in the country continued to grow at the same rate as it did between 1990 and 2000 (going from 150,000 to more than 310,0000), Muslims would represent, by 2040, 72 per cent of the resident population in Switzerland. As a result, Christians would soon be a minority in the country, while Muslims would shape political issues, such as the rights of women. Given the fact that Muslims put religion over secular laws, this would create major problems.52 The party’s anti-Muslim campaign proved highly successful: in the referendum in November 2004, a majority of those participating in the vote rejected the initiative. For the party’s leadership, the outcome of the referendum was a conﬁrmation that a majority of the Swiss population shared their concern about the threat posed by Islam to democracy and liberalism. As Christoph Mörgeli, a national councillor and one of the party’s main ideologues, put it (quoting the German specialist on Islam, Hans-Peter Raddatz), a ‘religious Muslim is always also a political Muslim. This means that those who follow the religious laws must invariably come into conﬂict with the democratic legal system’, because those who base their claim to power on religious foundations cannot ‘accept the Western rule of law, which places itself above the commandments of the Koran’.53 This could mean only one thing: the silent ‘Muslimization’ of the country caused by the failed immigration policy of the past posed a deadly threat to the very foundations of the Swiss political system and Switzerland’s national identity. Islamophobia and the Quest for Political Recognition In his classic study of the nativist movement in the US, the American historian John Higham characterizes nativism as ‘an intense opposition to an internal minority on the ground of its foreign (i.e., “un-American”) connections’. Nativists believed 51 Schlüer, U. (2004), ‘Die Konsequenzen von Masseneinbürgerungen: Muslimisierung’, Schweizerzeit, 3 September; See also Impuls, no. 4, (2004), the ofﬁcial publication of the Schweizer Volkspartei St. Gallen, which features, among other things, a cartoon with the title ‘Federal Council 2044’ (the Federal Council is the country’s government, composed of 7 members elected from the four major political parties). The cartoon suggests that by 2044 all of the national councillors will be from the Balkans and the Middle East. 52 See Schär, M. (2004), ‘Das Kreuz mit dem Islam’, Die Weltwoche, 38. 53 Mörgeli, C. (2004), ‘Auswüchse einer fälschen Einbürgerungspolitik’, SVPja 12, p. 7.

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that ‘some inﬂuence originating abroad threatened the very life of the nation from within… Seeing or suspecting a failure of assimilation,’ nativists charged the newcomers with disloyalty to the country. In response, they embarked on a campaign intent on destroying ‘the enemies of a distinctly American way of life’.54 If in the US nineteenth-century nativists agitated predominantly against the burgeoning Catholic community, it was because they regarded Catholicism fundamentally different from other denominations and a lethal threat to the norms and values of American AngloProtestant culture. Nobody expressed this more poignantly than Samuel Morse when he exhorted his fellow American Protestants to see ‘the truth that Popery is a political as well as a religious system; that in this respect it differs totally from all other sects, from all other forms of religion in the country.’55 For the nativists, the practical political consequences that followed from this evaluation were obvious. As the Know-Nothing Party put it in 1855: ‘The politico-religious foe is fully discovered – he must be squarely met, and put down. We want in this free land none of his political dictation.’56 Some might argue that nativism is a distinctively American phenomenon, which has to be seen in the context of its history as a settler nation. The evidence presented above, however, suggests that the term can be usefully employed to further our understanding of the nature of contemporary radical right-wing populism in Western Europe. Like the nineteenth-century nativists did with respect to Catholicism, contemporary radical right wing populist parties and movements ground their campaign against Islam on at least two, mutually reinforcing arguments: Islam is an alien religion, fundamentally incompatible with Western Europe’s secular values and way of life; and, given its ‘totalitarian’ claims and aspirations, it represents a fundamental threat to individual freedom and liberal democracy. Underlying these claims are two mutually reinforcing notions: on the one hand that ‘civilizations are made up of one type of people who are inherently different to the members of another civilization’ and on the other, that there is something ‘within Islam and in the nature of Muslim people’ that makes them inherently more prone to pursue their objectives with violent means.57 As the analysis provided above clearly demonstrates, after 11 September 2001 virtually all radical right-wing populist parties and movements have made Islam a central target of their political mobilization. There are a number of good reasons from this development. For one, with regard to the question of Islam, the radical populist right has a large percentage of public opinion on its side. For example, a 2003 French survey on immigration found that more than 60 per cent of the French population agreed with the statement that Islamic values were incompatible with

54 Higham (2002), op. cit., p. 4. 55 Cited in Golway (2004), op. cit. 56 Cited in Sinopoli, R. and Gabrielson, T (1999), ‘Mirroring Modernity: America’s Conﬂicting Identities’, Polity, 32. 57 See Lentin, A. (2005), ‘‘Racism Ten Years On’, speech delivered at the Tenth Anniversary of the Council of Europe ‘All Different – All Equal’ Campaign against Racism, Strasbourg, 26 October, .

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the values of the French Republic.58 One year later in Germany, some 70 per cent of the population agreed with the statement that Islam was incompatible with the ‘Western world’. When asked what they associated with the word ‘Islam’, over 80 per cent said ‘fanatical’ and ‘radical’ and two-thirds, ‘backward’. Only 6 per cent associated Islam with openness and tolerance. At the same time, more than 60 per cent of the respondents agreed with the suggestion that what was happening was a ‘clash of cultures’ between Islam and the Christian world. And almost the same number said they could not imagine living in a neighbourhood where there were many Muslims.59 In addition to unfavourable public opinion, there are also a growing number of public ﬁgures who have made negative and even derogatory remarks about Islam. A case in point is Oriana Fallaci, whose book La rabbia e l’orgoglio became a bestseller in a number of Western European countries (in Italy it sold one million copies within seven months), not least because of its provocative, uncompromising indictment of Islam and its ‘silent invasion’ of Italy and the rest of Western Europe. One might also mention Michel Houellebecq, one of France’s leading – and most widely translated – writers, who in 2001, after calling Islam ‘la religion la plus con’ caused a storm of indignation among the country’s Muslim community. Houellebecq went even further in his book Plateforme, in which an émigré Egyptian biochemical engineer lament the precipitous decline of his country of origin and its total intellectual void, which he attributes to the fact that Egypt adopted Islam, a religion brought to Egypt by what he calls [l]es minables du Sahara.60 Although Houellebecq was charged with inciting racial hatred for his remarks, he was acquitted and never suffered any of the sanctions usually imposed on those who transgress Western Europe’s norms on hate speech. On the contrary, in 2005 Michel Houellebecq received the Prix Interallié for his most recent book, La possibilité d’une île.61 Given the extent of anti-Islamic sentiments prevalent in Western Europe, the adoption of Islamophobia by the radical populist right might be interpreted as an attempt to gain political legitimacy and acceptance beyond the relatively circumscribed circle of sympathizers without having to abandon the identitarian and exclusionary positions at the core of their ideology. Filip Dewinter is perhaps the most prominent and emblematic case in point. In the introduction to this chapter, I already mentioned the Vlaams Blok’s attempts to ﬁnd favour with Antwerp’s Jewish community in 2003. After Belgium’s highest court in late 2004 charged the Vlaams Blok with racism, Dewinter responded quickly. He not only refounded the 58 ‘Sondage Ipsos-LCI-Le Point: Islam l’inquiétude des FrançAis’, Le Point (16 May 2003), p. 39. 59 Heitmeyer, W. (2004), ‘Die gespaltene Gesellschaft’, Die Zeit, 2 December; Noelle, E. (2004), ‘Der Kampf der Kulturen’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 September. 60 Houellebecq, M. (2001), Plateforme (Paris: Flammarion), p. 261. 61 Another famous example is the French ﬁlm legend and ardent admirer of Jean-Marie Le Pen, Brigitte Bardot, whose denunciation of ‘the Islamization of France’ and its inﬁltration by Islamism in her most recent book, Un cri dans le silence, which appeared in 2003, provoked outrage among anti-racist organizations. See Schoﬁeld, H. (2003), ‘Brigitte Bardot s’attaque aux musulmans et à la France moderne’, Agence France Press, 12 May.

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party, changing its name to Vlaams Belang, he also intensiﬁed his efforts to gain respectability, particularly in view of the upcoming municipal election in 2006, in which Dewinter hoped to be elected mayor. As part of this strategy, Dewinter once again made great efforts to appeal to Antwerp’s Jewish community. Thus, in October 2004, Dewinter granted an interview to the American paper, Jewish Weekly, which he made available on his personal website. In the interview, Dewinter readily acknowledged, among other things, that Vlaams Belang was an Islamophobic party: ‘Yes, we’re afraid of Islam. The Islamization of Europe is a frightening thing. Even distinguished Jewish scholars, such as Bat Ye’or and Bernard Lewis warned for this. If this historical process continues, the Jews will be the ﬁrst victims. Europe will become as dangerous for them as Egypt or Algeria.’ Under the circumstances, Belgium’s Jews had but only one choice: if they were intent on defending Western democracy and Western civilization, ‘with its Judeo-Christian roots’, they should ‘vote for a party that wants to stop the spread of Islam in Europe’.62 It would be easy to dismiss Dewinter as a political opportunist with limited impact beyond Antwerp’s municipal boundaries. However, an editorial which appeared in the Jewish liberal paper Forward in May 2002 suggests otherwise. The author deals explicitly with the challenges that the Western European radical rights’ anti-Islamic positions posed to the Jewish community. While reafﬁrming the notion that fascism ‘remains profoundly wrong’, the editorialist put particular emphasis on the fact that ‘the main target of the far-right’s animus, Europe’s restless Muslim immigrant population, happens to be pretty high up on the list of Jewish worries as well’. The author continues that the Jewish community appreciated ‘help and support wherever we ﬁnd it, including the new right’, particularly from those like ‘Filip Dewinter’s Flemish Bloc’, which appeared to have made ‘genuine efforts at bridge-building’ and who had ‘taken a lead role in defending Israel and opposing anti-Jewish violence’.63 Under these circumstances, Dewinter’s public profession of Islamophobia – which led two anti-racist organizations to lodge a formal complaint with the Antwerp public prosecutor requesting that Dewinter be charged with inciting radical hatred – represents a perfectly rational political calculation. The radical populist right’s appeal to Islamophobia can also count on the benevolent support from a second, important sector of American opinion – conservatives and the Christian Right, who more often than not share a common view of Islam with the West European radical populist right. Take, for example, Don Feder, a columnist for a number of right-wing and Christian Right publications, who has characterized Islam ‘an atavistic cult (more ideology than religion) whose tenets glorify holy war, teach contempt for other peoples, foster toxic resentment and inspire megalomania among its followers’.64 There is also the prominent television evangelist and head of a multi-million Christian broadcasting empire Pat Robertson, who in a speech 62 ‘Interview with Filip Dewinter’, Jewish Weekly, 28 October 2005, ; See also Schwartz, A. (2005), ‘Between Haider and a Hard Place’, Haaretz, 29 August. 63 ‘Fire on the Right’, Forward, (3 May 2002). 64 Feder, D. (2005), ‘Condi Ups Ante on Crescent-Kissing – Says Islam’s a Religion of Peace,’ GrasstopsUSA.com, 31 October,

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delivered in 2003 in Jerusalem referred to Islam as ‘a fanatical religion intent on returning to the feudalism of eight-century Arabia’ and to the Middle East conﬂict as a historical struggle over the question of whether Hubal, the Moon God of Mecca, known as Allah, is supreme, or whether the Judeo-Christian Jehovah, God of the Bible, is supreme.65 Given these views, the results of a 2002 poll of American fundamentalist and evangelical Protestant religious leaders are hardly surprising. It found that 77 per cent had an unfavourable view of Islam, 72 per cent believed that Islam was opposed to religious pluralism and to democracy, and 70 per cent held that Islam was a religion of violence.66 Add to this the widespread concern expressed by a number of right-wing American columnists and pundits that Western Europe is slowly committing ‘cultural suicide’ only to be overtaken by militant Islam and turning into ‘Eurabia’, and it is hardly surprising that radical right-wing populist Islamophobia has received relatively few negative reviews in the American conservative press.67 Undoubtedly, radical right-wing populist parties and movements have derived signiﬁcant political beneﬁts from promoting themselves as defenders of democracy and Western values against allegedly intolerant Islam. Not least, by couching xenophobia in predominantly cultural terms, the radical populist right has to a large extent succeeded in taking the wind out of their detractors’ sails. It is hardly an easy feat – particularly given 11 September 2001 and the events that followed – to persuade a court to charge a party with inciting racial hatred for purportedly standing up for the rights of women or defending Israel’s right to survival as a state. Strategic considerations, however, only partly explain why virtually every radical right-wing populist party has adopted Islamophobia to some degree as a core programmatic issue. The main reason for this development is that Islamophobia ﬁts perfectly into the larger identitarian political agenda, which these parties pursue. As I have argued elsewhere before, one of the radical populist right’s main political objectives is to put an end to ‘multicultural experiments’ as a ﬁrst step toward the restoration of ethno-national dominance.68 Ethno-national dominance means, among other things, that integration, if it is envisioned at all, is strictly determined and controlled by the majority culture. Minority cultures are denied recognition; instead, they are expected to absorb the majority norms and values, as a non-negotiable 65 Robertson, P, 2003, ‘Why Evangelical Christians Support Israel’, address to the Herzliya Conference, Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy, Jerusalem, 17 December, . 66 The poll data are from a 2002 survey of fundamentalist and evangelical Protestant leaders commissioned by The Ethics and Public Policy Center and Beliefnet and reported in ‘American Public Opinion about the Religion of ISLAM’, Religious Tolerance.org, . 67 See Germano, M. (2003), ‘Islamic Europe?, The Rise of Eurabia’, Biblical Archeology Perspectives, July–September, ; Caldwell, C. (2004), ‘Islamic Europe?’, The Weekly Standard, 4 October; Weigel, G. (2004), ‘Is Europe Dying?’, European Outlook, American Enterprise Institute, 17 March. 68 Betz, H.-G. and Johnson, C (2004), ‘Against the Current – Stemming the Tide: The Nostalgic Ideology of the Contemporary Radical Populist Right’, Journal of Political Ideologies 9(3), pp. 320–23.

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precondition for inclusion and participation. As Geert Wilders put it in early 2004 in respect to Muslim immigrants in The Netherlands, ‘Why aren’t we allowed to say that Muslims should conform to us given the fact that our norms and values are on a higher, better, and more humane level. No integration. Assimilation!’69 The radical right’s insistence on assimilation, however, is hardly something new. According to Eric Kaufmann, the determination to preserve ethno-national dominance was also one of the main motivating factors fuelling the American nativists’ anti-Catholic mobilization in the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century.70 In fact, similar attitudes can still be found today in the US. In a recent article, a leading right-wing commentator warns of the dangers resulting from the views of ‘certain elites’ that ‘there is something better about other countries. In this view, immigrants should keep their allegiance and cultural heritage and not assimilate.’ This view, in the author’s opinion, ‘is a strategy for the death of any culture. While a nation cannot exist “half slave and half free”, in President Lincoln’s words, neither can it exist in a state that is culturally subdivided.’71 Given the real and imagined challenges posed by Western Europe’s growing Muslim population, the fervour and determination displayed by radical right-wing populist parties to constantly reassert Western Europe’s dominant secular culture is hardly surprising. It is likely to prevail as long as the established political parties fail to advance a convincing alternative model. In the meantime, the radical populist right is likely to continue to exert a considerable inﬂuence on the public debate about the role of Islam in Western Europe. Given the profound lack of understanding of and wide-spread lack of interest in, Islam among the Western European public – in a survey conducted in late 2004, more than 80 per cent of the Dutch and 85 per cent of the Italians admitted knowing very little or nothing at all about Islam – this is hardly reassuring.72 References ––– (2002), ‘Crociﬁssi contro l’Islam: la Lega li vuole dovunque’, La Repubblica, 18 September. ––– Impuls, 4, 2004. ––– (2004), ‘Islam verderfelijk gedachtegoed’, De Volkskrant, 31 October. ––– (June 2000), ‘Intervento del segretario federale, On. Umberto Bossi’, Pontida, 4. .

69 Wilders, cited in ‘VVD'er Wilders haalt uit naar collega-Kamerleden’, De Telegraaf, 4 February 2004. 70 Kaufmann, E. ‘American Exceptionalism Reconsidered: Anglo-Saxon Ethnogenesis in the “Universal” Nation, 1776–1850’ . 71 Thomas, C. (2005), ‘Cockeyed Immigration Proposals’, Sacramento Bee, 1 December. 72 Allam, M. (2004), ‘I musulmani?, Amici solo per uno su dieci’, Corriere Della Sera, 24 January.

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––– (March 2003), ‘Antwerpse joden achter Vlaams Blok’, Hamishpacha, p. 12. ––– (May 2002), ‘Fire on the Right’, Forward, p. 3. ––– (May 2003), ‘Sondage Ipsos-LCI-Le Point: Islam l’inquiétude des FrançAis’, Le Point, p. 16. ––– (28 October 2005), ‘Interview with Filip Dewinter’, Jewish Weekly. . ––– (September 2002), ‘Il Crociﬁsso torni nelle aule e negli ufﬁci’, Qui Lega, p. 20. ––– ‘’VVDer Wilders haalt uit naar collega-Kamerleden’, De Telegraaf’ (04 February 2004). ––– ‘American Public Opinion about the Religion of ISLAM,’ religious. Tolerance. org; . http://www.religioustolerance.org/reac_ter18a.htm. ––– ‘Lega Nord: Lettura publica in Piazza Duomo libro Fallaci’, ‘Ansa’ (08 April 2004). ––– ‘Messa latina antica per il 431° della victoria di Lepanto,’ Una Voce Venetia . Allam, M. (2004), ‘I musulmani? Amici solo per uno su dieci’, Corriere Della Sera, 24 January. Berlet, C. (2001), ‘Nativism’, Public Eye, 15, p. 3. Bernardelli, R. (2004), ‘Lombardia nazione difende I valori cristiani!’, Lega Padana Lombardia-Lombardia Nazione, 3 March . Betz, H.-G. (2004), La droite populiste en Europe: Extreme et démocrate? (Paris: Autrement). Betz, H.-G. and Johnson, C. (2004), ‘Against the Current – Stemming the Tide: The Nostalgic Ideology of the Contemporary Radical Populist Right’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 9, p. 3. [DOI: 10.1080/1356931042000263546] Billington, R. (1964), The Protestant Crusade 1800–1860 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books). ––– (2003), Aanpassen of terugkeren (Brussels: Vlaams Blok). Caldwell, C. (2004), ‘Islamic Europe?’, Weekly Standard, 4 October. Camre, M. (2000), ‘Islam kan ikke integreres’ . Casals, X. (ed.) (2005), Political Survival on the Extreme Right (Barcelona: ICPS). Cohn, R. (2000), ‘Nativism and the End of the Mass Migration of the 1840s and 1850s’, Journal of Economic History, 60(2), pp. 361–383. Crawford, J. (2001), ‘Cycles of Nativism in U.S. History’ (Washington: The National Immigration Forum). Cuperus, R. (2005), ‘Roots of European Populism: The Case of Pim Fortuyn’s Populist Revolt in The Netherlands’ in Casals (eds.). Dansk Folkeparti (2001), Danmarks fremdit – dit land, dit valg… (Copenhague: Dansk Folkeparti). de Seinmers, M. (2000), ‘La Colonisation de l’Europe’, Schweizer Demokrat, March–April. de Smedt, D. (2003), ‘Volgmigratie – Blijvende instroom’ Vlaams Blok Magazine, 5 May .

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Dewinter, F. (1992), ‘Immigratie: De oplossingen. 70 voorstellen ter oplossing van het vreemdlingenprobleem . ––– (2000), Baas in Eigen Land (Brussels: Uitgeverij Egmont). ––– (2002), ‘Het groene totalitarisme: De kolonisatie van Europa!’, speech given at the Colloquium ‘Karel Martelstichting’, Antwerp, 20 November. Feder, D. (2005), ‘Condi Ups Ante on Crescent-Kissing – Says Islam’s a Religion of Peace’. GrasstopsUSA.com; 31 October . Gall, R. (2003), ‘The Past Should Not Shackle the Present: The Revival of a Legacy of Religious Bigotry by Opponents of School Choice’, New York University Annual Survey of American Law, 59, pp. 415–416. Gartner, T. (2004), ‘Tolerance Tested in Holland’, Washington Times, 20 December. Germano, M. (2003), ‘Islamic Europe?, The Rise of Eurabia’, Biblical Archeology Perspectives, July–September . Golway, T. (2004), ‘The Return of the Know-Nothings’, America, 29 March. Goodstein, L. (2004), ‘How the Evangelicals and Catholics Joined Forces’, The New York Times, 30 May. [PubMed: 15616553,15459382,15372022,15257355,15057 824,15164834] Heitmeyer, W. (2004), ‘Die gespaltene Gesellschaft’, Die Zeit, 2 December. [PubMed: 15325638,15261284,15139749] Higham, J. (2002), Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860– 1925, rev. edn (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press). Holt, M., ‘Nativism’ . Hooper, J. (2002), ‘The Twisty Politics of a Far Right Politician’, The Guardian, 7 May. Houellebecq, M. (2001), Plateforme (Paris: Flammarion). Huntington, S. (1996), The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster). ––– (2000), Reconsidering Immigration: Is Mexico a Special Case? (Washington: Center for Immigration Studies). ––– (2004), ‘The Hispanic Challenge’, Foreign Policy, March/April. Kaufmann, E., ‘American Exceptionalism Reconsidered: Anglo-Saxon Ethnogenesis in the “Universal” Nation, 1776–1850’ . Le Gallou, J.-Y. (2001) ‘Le retour de l’Histoire’, Paris, 8 December. [PubMed: 115 52810,11505222,11450395,11429857] Le Gallou, J.-Y. and Olivier, P. (1992), Immigration: Le Front national fait le point (Paris: Éditions Nationales). Lentin, A. (2005), ‘Racism Ten Years On’, Speech Delivered at the Tenth Anniversary of the Council of Europe ‘All Different – All Equal’ Campaign against Racism, Strasbourg, 26 October . McPherson, J. (1992), ‘Patterns of Prejudice’, The New Republic, 19 October. Mörgeli, C. (2004), ‘Auswüchse einer fälschen Einbürgerungspolitik’, SVPja 12. Mudde, C. (2000), The Ideology of the Extreme Right (Manchester/New York: Manchester University Press).

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Neurink, J. (2001), ‘Double Dutch’ Al-Ahram Weekly, 5–11 July . Noelle, E. (2004), ‘Der Kampf der Kulturen’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 September. [PubMed: 15618467,15355128,15007094,14707116,15032580] Robertson, P. (2003), ‘Why Evangelical Christians Support Israel’, address to the Herzliya Conference, Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy, Jerusalem, 17 December . Savoini, G. (2002), ‘Lega baluardo contro l’invasione islamica’, La Padania, 26 June. Schär, M. (2004), ‘Das Kreuz mit dem Islam’, Die Weltwoche 38. Schlüer, U. (2004), ‘Die Konsequenzen von Masseneinbürgerungen: Muslimisierung’, Schweizerzeit, 3 September. [PubMed: 12915945] Schmidhauser, W. (2004), ‘Gefahr durch den Islam’, Schweizer Demokrat, January. Schoﬁeld, H. (2003), ‘Brigitte Bardot s’attaque aux musulmans et à la France moderne’, Agence France Press, 12 May. Schreiber, M. (2005), ‘Terror’s Unforeseen Consequences’ PBS, 25 January . Schwartz, A. (2005), ‘Between Haider and a Hard Place’, Haaretz, 29 August. See, S. (2000), ‘“An Unprecedented Inﬂux”: Nativism and Irish Famine Immigration to Canada’, American Review of Canadian Studies, 30(4), pp. 429–453. Sinopoli, R. and Gabrielson, T. (1999), ‘Mirroring Modernity: America’s Conﬂicting Identities’, Polity, 32. [DOI: 10.2307/3235334] Spieler, R. (2004), ‘De l’islam en Alsace, de l’immigration’, 12 October . Swain, C. and Nieli, R. (2003), Contemporary Voices of White Nationalism in America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Taguieff, P.-A. (1994), ‘From Race to Culture: The New Right’s View of European Identity’, Telos, 98–99. Thomas, C. (2005), ‘Cockeyed Immigration Proposals’, Sacramento Bee, 1 December. Vedder, R., Gallaway, L. and Moore, S. (2000), ‘The Immigration Problem Then and Now’, The Independent Review, 4(3). Vlaams Blok (2002), Een toekomst voor Vlaanderen: Programma en standpunten van het Vlaams Blok (Brussels: Vlaams Blok). Walt, V. (2005), ‘Life on the Front Lines’, Time (Europe), 28 February. [PubMed: 15766049] Weigel, G. (2004), ‘Is Europe Dying?’, European Outlook (American Enterprise Institute), 17 March. Wilders, G. (2005), ‘Onafhangkelijkheidsverklaring’ .

Chapter 3

The Aims and Objections of the Austrian Far Right in Foreign and Military Policies Fabian Virchow

Introduction In 2005 Austria celebrated the 50th anniversary of the signing of the State Treaty (Staatsvertrag) which had been negotiated by the occupying powers of the United States of America, the Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain, as well as the government of Austria. At the core of the agreement, which came into force on 27 July 1955, had been the restoration of a sovereign and democratic state called the Federal Republic of Austria. Besides this general recognition of the Austrian state, the main points of the covenant dealt with minority rights for Croats and Slovenes (article 7), with the Austrian obligation not to enter into any kind of political or economic uniﬁcation with Germany (article 4), and with the dissolution of Nazi organisations and protections against any attempt to revive them (article 9). In addition, the signing of the State Treaty would be followed by the declaration, of Austria’s own volition, of an eternal neutrality. Occupying powers left Austrian territory by 25 October 1955, and the next day was marked as a national holiday.1 Today, the neutral status of Austria remains highly valued among the Austrian population2 and is a crucial part of the way the ‘Austrian nation’ sees itself. Nevertheless, there has always been discussion about the meaning and the consequences of neutrality, regarding, for example, membership of Austria in supranational organisations such as the United Nations (UN) or the amount of ﬁnancial resources to be allocated for military purposes. This article aims to outline the politics that the Austrian far right has supported in regard to foreign affairs and military issues.

1 See Rotter, M. (1984), Bewaffnete Neutralität. Das Beispiel Österreich (Frankfurt/ Main: Haag + Herchen); Gehler, M. (2005), ‘From Non-Alignment to Neutrality. Austria’s Transformation during the First East-West Détente, 1953–1958’, Journal of Cold War Studies 7:4, 104–36. 2 See IMAS International (2004), Die österreichischen Denkmuster (Sonderbericht Mai 2004) (Linz), p. 4; IMAS International (2005), Die Signale des öffentlichen Bewusstseins (IMAS-Report 14/2005) (Linz).

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Considering the diverse and varied spectrum of the Austrian far right,3 this chapter does not claim to give a complete overview, but focuses instead on some of the movement’s most relevant actors. Looking at the past 20 years, it is important to take into account the political party the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ),4 the weekly publication the Neue Zeit, and the monthly magazine Aula5. It is important to note that several high-ranking ofﬁcers of the Austrian Armed Forces have contributed articles to these publications. In this analysis, the term far right is solely used in an academic sense corresponding to the deﬁnition of Holzer.6 As far as organisations and publications are concerned, the term ‘far right’ refers to the political proﬁle that is discernible from public statements or programmatic material; however, this does not mean that every member of an organisation or every author featured in a publication under investigation here should be labelled as far right. To a certain extent, even, conservative authors who appear in these publications actually contradict the far right on some occasions.7 There is also a further peculiarity regarding the over-proportional number of authors from Germany (as compared to other non-Austrian countries) in these papers, which can be explained by the proximity of language as well as by the idea of being part of the ‘German nation,’ an idea that is fairly widespread among followers of the Austrian far right. However, the analysis here focuses on Austrian actors. This article starts with a look at the question of neutrality and membership in international organisations such as the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), as these has been and remain a main issue of political controversy in Austria. It then widens the analytical horizon by looking at visions and ideas that actors from the far right have put forward in relation to the future Austrian role in international politics. The article further investigates standpoints on issues such as Turkish membership in the EU and the Israeli–Palestinian conﬂict. Finally, the situation and perspective of the Austrian Armed Forces (Bundesheer) as it is portrayed by authors in the far right media are looked at; this includes ﬁnancial matters as well as armament issues, the deployment of Austrian soldiers abroad, and the decision about having a conscripted or professional army – a topic that is widely debated. Following the methodological approach of Franz L. Neumann which mandates that the study of National Socialist ideology should be based on the review of its

3 See DÖW – Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes (ed.) (1993), Handbuch des österreichischen Rechtsextremismus (Wien: Deuticke). 4 See Bailer, B. and Neugebauer, W. (1993), ‘Die FPÖ: Vom Liberalismus zum Rechtsextremismus’, in DÖW, pp. 327–428; Morrow, D. (2000), ‘Jörg Haider and the new FPÖ: beyond the democratic pale?’, in Hainsworth, pp. 33–63; Scharsach, H.-H. (2002), Rückwärts nach rechts: Europas Populisten (Wien: Ueberreuter), pp. 9-39, 188-208; Luther, K.R. (2003), ‘The FPÖ: From Populist Protest to Incumbency’, in Merkl and Weinberg, pp. 191–219. 5 See Gärtner, R. (1993), ‘Die Aula’, in DÖW, pp. 253–70; Gärtner, R. (1996), Die ordentlichen Rechten. Die Aula, die Freiheitlichen und der Rechtsextremismus (Wien: Picus). 6 Holzer, W.I. (1993), ‘Rechtsextremismus. Konturen, Deﬁnitionsmerkmale und Erklärungsansätze’, in DÖW, pp. 11–96. 7 See for example Merkel, H. (1994), ‘Westbindung statt Einkreisung’, Aula, 7–8/1994, p. 13.

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follower’s own statements in order to understand their goals , the exposition of this chapter rests on a critical analysis of the ideology of publications of the Austrian far right. The data and sources used for the analysis have mainly been written material published over the past 15 years. Due to the limited amount of space, the focus of this chapter is on the critical reconstruction of political concepts of the far right in Austria. Redeﬁning or Abolishing Neutrality? The issue of neutrality is an important subject in publications of the far right, although no uniform position exists. At ﬁrst glance there seems to be support for neutrality, for example in the political platforms of the FPÖ9 or in statements by FPÖ Member of European Parliament (MEP) Andreas Mölzer, who has spoken out in favour of neutrality.10 But a more detailed look gives a much more complex and confusing picture. One can ﬁnd a dominant perspective and valuation as far as the emergence and character of neutrality until the late 1980s, but the period thereafter has seen a very varied range of standpoints on this question. According to many authors in far right papers, neutrality has not been the result of a truly voluntary decision, but rather was imposed on Austrian decisionmakers in exchange for the withdrawal of the Red Army in 1955.11 Otto Scrinzi, one of the éminences grises of the Austrian far right, has reminded readers of Aula magazine that the predecessor of the FPÖ, the Verband der Unabhängigen (VdU), had supported the State Treaty on the basis that it reestablished at least the status of, in Scrinzi’s view, partial sovereignty.12 Scrinzi argues that denying the necessary ﬁnancial and military means to this sovereignty in subsequent years comes close to treason.13 In sum, he suggested that one should speak of a neutralised, instead of a neutral, country.14 Erich Reiter, who labels himself a liberal15 but has stayed with the FPÖ despite its strong turn to the right, is of the opinion that the end of the period of occupation was, in fact, weighted with the ‘burden of neutrality’.16 A general and often repeated complaint of the far right is that the central status of neutrality in the political culture of the country has led to a severe neglect of what they call serious security politics: 8 See Neumann, F.L. (1942/1977), Behemoth. Struktur und Funktion des Nationalsozialismus 1933–1944 (Köln and Frankfurt), pp. 65–7. 9 Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (1985), Parteiprogramm (Wien), p. 42; Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (2005), Parteiprogramm (Salzburg), p. 10. 10 Mölzer, A. (2004a), ‘Wer reitet den Stier?’, Zur Zeit, 15–16/2004, p. 16. 11 Mölzer, A. and Hatzenbichler, J. (1997), ‘Die Neutralität – früher nutzlos, heute nur mehr Nonsens’, Zur Zeit, 1/1997, p. 6; Scrinzi, O. (2005), ‘Die Lebenslüge von der Freiwilligkeit’, Zur Zeit, 21/2005, p. 4. 12 Ibid. 13 Scrinzi, O. (1991a), ‘Von den kurzen Beinen der drei Neutralitätslügen’, Aula, 5/1991, p. 7. 14 Ibid. 15 Reiter, E. (1998), ‘Der aufrechte Gang fehlt noch’, Zur Zeit, 51–52/1998; Hatzenbichler 1992 16 Reiter, E. (1997), ‘Von der Neutralität zur Realpolitik’, Zur Zeit, 1/1997, p. 7.

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Europe for the Europeans While the political class of Austria started to internalize neutrality, thereby contributing to the ﬁction that this is an integral part of the national identity of the Austrians in general, from a perspective of political realism the country was not in a position to build up a credible military component of neutrality, as in the case of Switzerland.17

Erich Reiter, who had been an active representative of the FPÖ for a long time and who is a well respected expert in the international security community, laments a ‘peculiar philosophy to oust security politics’.18 Arguing that Austrian defence policy has not been developed on the basis of an analysis of real and potential threats but rather vice versa, assuming a low level of threat by nature of low military resources, Reiter aligns himself with two well-known far rightists, Mölzer and Hatzenbichler, who state that from the military and security point of view the ever-lasting neutrality of the country has been nothing but a ‘façade’.19 Reiter himself has argued that neutrality served Soviet interests20 and that Austria’s only voluntary act in relation to neutrality had been to make a myth out of it.21 Given the portrayal of neutrality as a policy that had importance in history but is not relevant today, one must ask what consequences will result from this portrayal. This has led to a situation in which far right actors criticize politicians of other Austrian parties for misusing the idea and the concept of neutrality to avoid necessary changes in foreign and military affairs, while also themselves speaking up for neutrality at one turn and at the next proclaiming that neutrality has lost its relevance for political reasons and must be replaced. Therefore, if neutrality is no longer the appropriate approach, what alternative(s) do actors of the far right propose? Some recommend NATO, few prefer joining the EU, and others speak out for a European confederation22 with a kind of federated armed forces. Jörg Haider, who has dominated and shaped the development of the FPÖ for two decades23 and founded the Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (BZÖ) as a splinter group from the FPÖ in 2005, opted for the integration of Austria into NATO quite early on.24 He argued that the Cold War had created a situation in which Austria had been under the ‘sword of Damocles of a nuclear Holocaust’;25 an that now, with a new political map after the breakdown of the Soviet Union, with many former Soviet bloc countries looking toward the West,26 Austria should become a bridge to the West for these 17 Ibid. 18 Reiter (1997), op. cit., p. 7. 19 Mölzer and Hatzenbichler (1997), op. cit., p. 6. 20 Reiter, E. (1992), ‘Neutralität als Mythos’, Jahrbuch für politische Erneuerung des Freiheitlichen Bildungswerkes (Wien), pp. 357–8. 21 Ibid., p. 353. 22 Dillersberger, S. (1994), ‘FPÖ und Europa’, in Freiheitliches Bildungswerk, pp. 469– 475; Mölzer, A. (2005c), ‘EU muß völlig neuen Weg beschreiten’, Aula, 7–8/2005, pp. 30–31. 23 See Bailer-Galanda, B. (1997), Haider und die Freiheitlichen in Österreich (Berlin: ElefantenPress); Ottomeyer, K. (2000), Die Haider-Show: Zur Psychopolitik der FPÖ (Klagenfurt: Drava). 24 Haider, J. (1996), Friede durch Sicherheit. Eine österreichische Philosophie für Europa (Wien: FBW), p. 7. 25 Ibid., p. 9. 26 Ibid., p. 19.

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countries and could do so best by becoming a member of NATO. In addition, keeping Austria neutral would even be ‘a hindrance for the further stabilization of our east and middle European sphere. Whomever wants to live securely cannot assign himself the role of a marginal position at the eastern border of a European Security System’.28 Erich Reiter is also a staunch supporter of Austria joining NATO.29 He points to the importance of NATO for preventing struggles for hegemony among European countries30 and emphasises the relevance of the location of Austria, with its borders with Hungary and Slovenia, for the integration of these countries into Europe and also for military operations.31 In the case Ukraine allied itself with Russia, Austria becoming a NATO member ‘would change the status of Austria from a NATOinﬂuenced area to a fully integrated member with its own sphere of inﬂuence’.32 When the Austrian Ofﬁcers’ Association published a statement in favour of Austrian membership in NATO in 1998, far rightist Juergen Hatzebichler criticized the statement, pointing out that some erroneous had been put forward (for example, that only becoming a NATO member would secure access to sophisticated technology). Notably, however, he nonetheless stated that recent developments had proven the suitability of the Austrian Bundesheer for NATO.33 Indeed, since entering the Partnership for Peace programme initiated by NATO in the early 1990s,34 Austria has increased its military cooperation with NATO forces signiﬁcantly. Again, this development is put forward as proof by voices of the far right that Austrian neutrality is already historically out-dated. Others argue that Austria may become a NATO member, but only on certain conditions.35 Some actors in the Austrian far right emphasise that already the decision to become a member of the UN (in 1955) had brought the neutral status of Austria, in a formal sense, to an end.36 While the participation of Austrian soldiers in UN military operations is valued highly by several contributors to Aula and Zur Zeit, especially those who are themselves ofﬁcers in the Bundesheer, others have slandered the UN as a ‘red world parliament’ with an ‘anti-democratic Security Council’37, a view held commonly by far rightists in Germany.38 27 Ibid., p. 130. 28 Ibid., p. 155. 29 Reiter, E. (1994), ‘Österreich als NATO-Staat?’, in Mock, Pirzio-Biroli and Kießling, pp. 38–43; Reiter, E. (1999), ‘Parteipolitik statt Sicherheitspolitik’, Zur Zeit, 33/1999, pp. 6–7. 30 Reiter, E. (1995), Nato-Beitritt Österreichs? (Wien: Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie), p. 77. 31 Ibid., p. 93. 32 Ibid., p. 95. 33 Hatzenbichler, J. (1998b), ‘NATO neu – die Sehnsucht nach dem Osten’, Zur Zeit, 11/1998, pp. 6–7. 34 See . 35 Walter, E. (1998a), ‘Österreich und die NATO: Fragen und Konsequenzen’, Aula, 2/1998, p. 26; Gudenus, J. (1999), ‘NATO mit wenn und aber’, Zur Zeit, 16/1999, p. 2. 36 Romig, F. (1992), ‘Warum “Nein” zu EWR, EG und EU’, Aula, 11/1992, p. 25. 37 Scrinzi (1991a), op. cit., p. 8. 38 Virchow, F. (2006), Gegen den Zivilismus. Internationale Beziehungen und Militär in den politischen Konzeptionen der extremen Rechten (Wiesbaden: VS), pp. 142–8.

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Whereas NATO gets a fairly positive judgement from a pragmatic perspective by several actors,39 others see no need to join the alliance,40 and even expect trouble in doing so41, and stress that being a non-member gives Austria more ﬂexibility regarding decisions in military and foreign affairs.42 The Austrian far right’s position towards the EU is much more critical than views towards the UN. While Colonel Helge Endres advocates participating in the integration process of the EU,43 Mölzer once argued that a strict interpretation of the status of neutrality would isolate Austria in relation to its European neighbours,44 and later referred negatively to the bureaucratic and ‘materialistic orientation’ of the EU45 and, together with Hatzenbichler, stated that EU membership would have a destructive impact on the ethnic and cultural homogeneity of Austria.46 Haider has said that he regrets that the Maastricht Treaty, which contains only a small segment on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and, in addition, includes a very cumbersome ﬁxed modus of agreement.47 This, he concludes, leads to a situation in which a true CFSP is ‘practically impossible’.48 Nevertheless, Haider did approve of Austrian membership in the Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU), as ‘Atlantic and European interests may, in the long run, drift apart’.49 Relating NATO and the EU, Haider argues that European integration should not start with a common currency, but with the CFSP50 – with ‘NATO enlargement before EU enlargement’.51 Contrary to Haider, Friedrich Romig opposes in principle any formal afﬁliation with the European Economic Area or the EU and claims that the WEU does not operate properly.52 Gudenus as well as Hofer have had doubts that membership in the EU is compatible with Austria’s neutrality law53, and Mölzer is against a ﬁnal

39 Niemann, N. (1998), ‘Weiterwursteln muß ein Ende haben’, Zur Zeit, 11/1998, p. 6; Romig (1992), op. cit., p. 25; Haider (1996), op. cit., p. 30; Mölzer, A. (1998b), ‘Solidarität mit der NATO’, Zur Zeit, 43–44/1998, p. 6; Spath, G. (2000), ‘Zum Begriff “Sicherheit” in Österreich’, Aula, 5/2000, pp. 21–4. 40 Jung, W. (2002a), ‘Die neue Sicherheitsdoktrin’, Aula, 1/2002, p. 7. 41 Jung, W. (2003), ‘Neutral, in die NATO oder europäisches Bündnis?’, Aula, 3/2003, pp. 21. 42 Gudenus, J. (2005a), ‘Die Neutralität liegt am Seziertisch’, National-Zeitung, 46/2005, p. 4. 43 Endres, H.W. (1995), ‘Neue sicherheitspolitische Perspektiven für Österreich’, Aula, 7–8/1995, p. 15. 44 Mölzer, A. (1989c), ‘Neutralität oder Isolation’, Aula, 9/1989, p. 15. 45 Mölzer, A. (1998a), ‘In der Tradition des alten Reiches’, Zur Zeit, 27/1998, p. 7. 46 Mölzer, A. (1997a), ‘Das Abendland – sonst nichts’, Zur Zeit, 9–10/1997, p. 7. 47 Haider (1996), op. cit., pp. 81–2. 48 Ibid., p. 94. 49 Ibid., p. 175. 50 Ibid., p. 153. 51 Ibid., p. 154. 52 Romig (1992), op. cit., pp. 23–5. 53 Gudenus (2005a), op. cit., p. 4; Hofer, W. (2002), ‘Hochwasser, Abfangjäger…’, Zur Zeit, 36/2002, p. 5.

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rejection of neutrality as long as Europe has no security system of its own. Walter argues that joining the EU does not make sense regarding aspects of security or economy, but has advantages in view of Austria’s national interests, especially efforts to counter ‘Italian inﬂuence in southern Tyrol’.55 The Austrian right has long seen itself as a supporter of Tyrolean autonomy.56 Contrary to the basic idea of the EU as viewed by Mölzer, as simplifying complex processes of interaction and as being controlled by ‘some lobbies, secret societies, and wire-pullers’57 to create a supranational body that takes charge of decisions hitherto made by national governments, the Austrian far right favours a European confederation of sovereign nation-states. This would exclude a European Minister of Defence,58 keep the command of the Bundesheer in Austria and, according to Bundesheer ofﬁcer Wolfgang Jung, ‘[guarantee] that our soldiers will not be sent into action by an overzealous commissioner in Brussels’.59 However, criticism towards the EU should not be confused with a principled rejection of the option of a ‘uniﬁed Europe’. Instead, this latter vision is very much supported by a large majority of the far right. This leads to attempts to deﬁne what ‘Europe’ is. Looking at the post-Second World War landscape, Haider mourns that the division of Europe was accompanied by the vanishing of Europe as a historical actor.60 Its recreation as a political factor reaching ‘from the Atlantic to the Urals would be desirable but is not possible at the moment’.61 Mölzer points to the necessity to deﬁne ‘how far Europe stretches from a geopolitical and a cultural perspective, and which states and peoples belong to it, in order to make this Europe complete’.62 Ignoring the Holocaust as an important, if not the most important, historical occurrence of not only German, but of European history, Mölzer speaks of the values and strengths of a Western humanism and a European individualism that make it easy to ﬁnd separation from the Islamic world, black Africa and Asian Confucianism. Much more difﬁcult, in his view, is it to delimit ‘Europe’ from the Slavic orthodoxy on the one hand and the Anglo-American sphere on the other. While he does not answer this question directly, Mölzer nevertheless gives an idea about the shape and positioning of the ‘Europe’ he advocates. According to his vision, the Old World is still the hub of the universe and the philosophy of history of the translatio imperii suggests that ‘this worlds needs states (Staatlichkeit) that 54 Tomaschitz, B. (2005a), ‘Mölzer für Beibehaltung der Neutralität’, Zur Zeit, 10/2005. 55 Walter, E. (1994), ‘Realisierung Mitteleuropas durch den EU-Beitritt’, Aula, 6/1994, p. 9. 56 See Grund, J. (1996), ‘Mit der Dornenkrone nach Brüssel’, Aula, 6/1996, pp. 22–5; Scrinzi, O. (2002), ‘Südtirol – 10 Jahre Streitbelegung, 50 Jahre Tolomei-Schwindel’, Aula, 7–8/2002, pp. 8–9; Zacharasiewicz, A. (2002), ‘Kooperation – trotz allem!’, Zur Zeit, 46/2002, p. 16. 57 Mölzer (2004a), op. cit., p. 16. 58 Scrinzi (2005), op. cit., p. 5. 59 Jung (2002a), op. cit., p. 8. 60 Haider (1996), op. cit., p. 10 61 Ibid., p. 151. 62 Mölzer (1998a), op. cit., p. 7.

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have a sacred legitimation – which is the Reich’.63 The history, idea and future of a renewed Reich have played a very important role in recent debates of the German far right,64 not least inﬂuenced by the Austrian doyen of geopolitical thought, Heinrich Jordis von Lohausen.65 While Mölzer blames the National Socialist Empire of having been a ‘hypertrophic imperialist nation-state of violence’66 he suggests that a future ‘Europe’ expand geopolitically and cultural–spiritually out to where the spiritual and, with it, the political frontiers of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation had once existed. In accordance with this view, he values eastward enlargement positively, to include the Baltic states, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Slovenia, plus, in the long run, Croatia. From Mölzer’s point of view, eastward enlargement is not about ﬁnancial advantages, but rather is relevant by ‘the simple fact that Silesia and Transylvania are indisputable parts of European history and European territory’.67 Apart from the territorial expanse, Spath demands a ‘European idea for the world of tomorrow’ that should include surmounting Europe’s homage to ‘paciﬁst de-bellicism’68 as the wished-for ideal that ‘cannot be protected by abstract twaddle about peace’ but by a strong European military force only.69 Mölzer also demonstrates a clear expectation that the relationship between ‘Europe’ and the Anglo-American sphere, with its ‘extreme materialism and its hypocritical and irrational puritanism’,70 has tended to become (and in a certain sense must become) more competitive and even hostile. While Jung declares that there is no opposition in relation to the United States, he advocates that, ‘Europe has to recognize its autonomy more than previously and it has to detach itself from American coat-tails’71, given that the two spheres’ interests may become contrary in the future. Haider underlines that he regards the uniﬁcation of Europe as a necessary means of self-assertion: ‘Opposite to the American and the Asian bloc, our continent will only withstand politically and economically and will be able to secure its interests if it is united and acts unitedly in foreign policy’.72 Spath argues that the ‘American plutocracy is about the subjugation to global ﬁnancial and economic interests and the control of limited natural resources’.73 To counter the ‘US claim to world domination and the “One World” concept to be behind it’74 and to end a situation in which the West is busy ‘collecting crumbs and adopting every lack

63 Ibid. 64 Virchow (2006), op. cit., pp. 115–27. 65 Lohausen, H.J. von (1994), ‘Das Reich – eine Raum- und Erlebnisgemeinschaft’, Aula, 1/1994, pp. 18–24. 66 Mölzer (1998a), op. cit., p. 8. 67 Ibid., p. 8. 68 Mölzer, A. (2003a), ‘36 wären besser’, Zur Zeit, 21/2003, p. 14. 69 Ibid., p. 15. 70 Mölzer (1998a), op. cit., p. 7. 71 Jung (2002a), op. cit., p. 7. 72 Haider (1996), op. cit., p. 29. 73 Spath, G. (2003a), ‘Weltmacht USA – und wo bleibt Europa?’, Aula, 5/2003, p. 13. 74 Ibid.

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of culture from the other side of the Atlantic’ , Spath strongly demands a military arming of Europe. Otherwise, he declares, European states will be ‘vassals of the US’,76 a country that has become the ‘biggest threat to survival on Earth’.77 For Mölzer, the failure of the referenda on the EU constitution in France and The Netherlands in 2005 offered a chance to redirect the EU in a way that competes with and confronts the United States: Support of non-European interests, for example those of the USA, by members of the EU has to be unthinkable in the future and has to be ostracized by all means. The British, for example, who support US wars and mock European interests, have to make a decision from now on. Do they want to be European and take part in the future Europe or not?78

Mixed with anti-Semitic phrasings is Romig’s (rhetorical) question of who ‘really’ governs us; little surprise that he has detected ‘the Jews’ dominating US affairs79, as this is a wide-spread theory of conspiracy long-held by far right thinkers.80 To understand the role that Austria should strive for in the scenario of a revived ‘Europe’, according to the right-wingers, one should refer to military expert and historian Magenheimer, who has positioned himself with rightist revisionist approaches, German nationalism and anti-Semitic arguing, according to researchers from the Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes (DÖW).81 He argues that security policy is also a policy of ordering.82 In this sense, leaving behind the Austrian government’s role as a ‘servile executing body of US politics’83 would allow a return of the country to its historical position as a dominant power (Ordnungsmacht). Integrating eastern and southeastern European countries into ‘Europe’ would bring ‘Berlin and Vienna back into the centre of the new Europe’ as Mölzer argues84, thereby reclaiming their traditional role as a hegemonic power in this sphere. With this issue, the question of the German–Austrian relationship is also addressed. While a uniﬁed Germany may provoke fears of German domination and a ‘German Europe’, there is, from the far right’s viewpoint at least, no reason for Austria to share in worries as ‘it is part of it’.85 Even if long-term FPÖ leader Jörg 75 Ibid., p. 16. 76 Spath (2003a), op. cit., p. 14. 77 Ibid., p. 16. 78 Mölzer (2005c), op. cit., pp. 30–31. 79 Romig, F. (2002), ‘Wer regiert uns wirklich?’, Aula, 4/2002, pp. 7–9. 80 See Pfahl-Traughber, A. (1993), Der antisemitisch-antifreimaurerische Verschwörungsmythos in der Weimarer Republik und im NS-Staat (Wien: Braumüller); Meyer zu Uptrup, W. (2003), Kampf gegen die ‚jüdische Weltverschwörung’: Propaganda und Antisemitismus der Nationalsozialisten 1919–1945 (Berlin: Metropol). 81 See Bailer, B. et al. (1996), ‘Revisionistische’ Tendenzen im österreichischen Bundesheer? Stellungnahme zu Aussagen von Dr. Heinz Magenheimer (Wien: DÖW). 82 Magenheimer, H. (2003), Sicherheitspolitik in Theorie und Praxis (Wien: Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie), p. 3. 83 Romig (2002), op. cit., p. 9. 84 Mölzer (1998a), op. cit., p. 8 85 Hatzenbichler, J. (1994), ‘Rückkehr zur Geopolitik’, Aula, 10/1994, p. 8.

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Haider has been oscillating between declarations of ‘Austrian patriotism’ on the one hand (in 1995) and a devaluation of the ‘Austrian nation as a failure’ on the other (in 1988),86 there is a strong commitment to ‘Germanness’ inside the FPÖ and the far right.87 Mölzer has even spoken of the ‘sham existence of an ethnic and culturally independent “Austrian nation”’88 and could hardly hide his enthusiasm about the emotional participation of many Austrians in the German uniﬁcation.89 These perspectives derive from an understanding of national belonging not in a republican sense, but instead by merging republican ideals with a völkisch approach that deﬁnes a nation as a ‘natural community of common destiny united by origin, language, common territory, culture, religion, and history’.90 Beloning to a people is therefore ‘something given, natural, and, if one likes, something fateful and therefore something that is hardly of one’s choice’.91 In linking Austrian and German affairs so fundamentally, it comes as no surprise that rightist statements have emphasized the ‘common interests’ of the two countries. When Germany gained full sovereignty through signiﬁcant changes that have occurred after the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, codiﬁed in the four-plus-two treaty, Haider remarked that ‘Austria can exercise its sovereignty fully for the ﬁrst time since the Second World War and therefore can shape its security policy according to its own needs’.92 Hoping for a situation in which Austria can exert inﬂuence on countries in central Europe, actors in the far right regularly declare that the dissolution of Soviet states created a setting in which Austria has far more small state neighbours than before: ‘Since 1993 Austria has more neighbouring countries with low population ﬁgures than with high ones,’ Haider said.93 Additionally, it is noted that the military abilities of these countries have shrunk as well. In sum, it is expected that Austria should play the role of what is euphemistically called the ‘protector’, not only of Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia,94 but also of the South Tyroleans.95 Adolph-Auffenberg has even declared that southeastern Europe had its best time when under the pinion of the imperial and royal monarchy.96

86 See Obszerninks, B. (1999), ‘Nachbarn am rechten Rand. Republikaner und Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs im Vergleich (Münster: Agenda), pp. 127–9. 87 Hatzenbichler, J. (1992), ‘Der “Umvolker” und das Parteiprogramm’, Aula, 6/1992, p. 14; Jenewein, H.J. (2002), ‘Wie deutsch ist Österreich’, Aula, 6/2002, pp. 28–30. 88 Mölzer, A. (1990a), ‘Neutralitäts-Heucheleien’, Aula, 10/1990, p. 7. 89 Mölzer, A. (1990b), ‘Österreich – im Windschatten der deutschen Einigung’, Aula, 4/1990, pp. 7–9. 90 Schiszler, S. (2002), ‘Vom Unsinn der österreichischen Nation’, Aula, 6/2002, p. 31. 91 Ibid. 92 Haider (1996), op. cit., p. 173. 93 Haider (1996), op. cit., p. 124. 94 Haider (1996), op. cit., p. 172. 95 Nachtmann, H. (2002), ‘Das Ende freiheitlicher Südtirolpolitik?’, Aula, 9/2002, p. 11. 96 Adolph-Auffenberg, H. (1994), ‘Südosteuropa und das alte Vaterland’, Aula, 7–8/1994, p. 21.

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Shaping Foreign Affairs In terms of foreign affairs, the far right addresses several questions. Among the most prominent are the issue of Turkish accession to the EU, the situation in the Balkans, and conﬂicts in the Middle East. Concerning further enlargement of the EU as promised to Turkey for decades, there is broad concurrence against it, especially after Jörg Haiders’ about-turn on the issue. He had previously argued in favour of Turkish EU membership due to security reasons,97 but recently changed his mind. His BZÖ party fellow Hubert Gorbach is also against Turkish membership.98 Many well-known FPÖ-members – Daniela Raschhofer (MEP), Johann Gudenus, Herbert Fritz and Heinz-Christian Strache99 – spoke out against Turkish membership in the EU, arguing that there would be a huge ﬁnancial drain for Europe and that a great number of Turkish people would migrate to Europe. This position is turned into negative stereotyping by Melisch, who asserts that a large portion of the Turkish population wants to take advantage of social security systems of middle European countries.100 Also, there is the demagogic picture of millions of Turks invading Europe and living in ghettoes – as if the behaviour of migrants and their readiness to become a lively part of society is not also dependent on how the society welcomes its new members. But for far rightists, Turkey as an EU member state would ‘directly lead to the decline of the EU’.101 Mölzer agrees with Samuel Huntington’s idea of the ‘clash of civilisations,102 as the theory ﬁts with the völkisch thought of peoples living in distinct territories each with a certain language and a set of cultural forms. Huntington’s book received a good response from far right actors, despite receiving harsh criticisms from other groups.103 Turkey, Mölzer argues, does not ‘belong to Europe by its religious, cultural and the whole of its social structure’.104 From his point of view, there is a line deﬁning ‘Europe’ that should not be crossed: Historically and culturally there is a pretty clear boundary in the East and in the Southeast, where in its widest sense the cultural and political inﬂuences of the old Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation have ended. All those areas that had been, sometime during the Middle Ages, exposed to the political control of the Roman-German emperor.105

97 Golowitsch, H. (2004), ‘Europa oder Eurasien?’, Aula, 1/2004, p. 32. 98 Tomaschitz (2005b), op. cit. 99 See Aula 4/2004, pp. 9–10. 100 Melisch, R. (2004a), ‘Der Nahostkonﬂikt und die EU-Osterweiterung’, Aula, 1/2004, p. 27. 101 Grund, J.C. (2005), ‘Türkei – Tanzbär der EU’, Zur Zeit, 1/2005, p. 9 102 Huntington, S.P. (1997), The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster). 103 See Menzel, U. (1998), The West against the Rest. Samuel Huntingtons Rekonstruktion des Westens (Braunschweig: IfS); Müller, Ha. (1998), Das Zusammenleben der Kulturen – ein Gegenentwurf zu Huntington (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer). 104 Mölzer (1997a), op. cit. 105 Ibid.

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In a paranoid view, Müller believes that Turkey entering the EU is mainly of interest for Israel,106 and another writer near to the German NPD offers the idea that Israel was a major actor behind the kidnapping of Abdullah Öcalan.107 Instead of paying too much attention to Turkey, Mölzer argues that the Balkans are a special interest area for Austria.108 The conﬂict in the former Yugoslavia that led to the disintegration of the federation is seen as proof that multi-ethnic societies cannot exist. Following the paradigm of völkisch purity, Kerschhofer argues apartheidstyle: ‘A solution can only consist of the breaking up of the quarrelling peoples and in border changes’.109 Mölzer sees the Austrian soldiers deployed as peacekeepers to Kosovo as successors of the German Wehrmacht who tried to ‘prevent killing between the Balkan peoples’.110 To portray occupying Nazi forces in this way denies the massacres and cruelties that German and Austrian soldiers perpetrated in the ﬁrst half of the 1940s, in a morally shameful way. In a changing international environment, Austria’s far right hopes that Austria will be able to enlarge its inﬂuence in eastern and southeastern Europe. Mölzer has more than once demanded that Austria should become the ‘advocate of the small East and Southeast European nations’.111 As the far right wants to make nationalist ideas and the völkisch principle universal paradigms, it is no wonder that the Austrian far right is especially interested in the political welfare of like-minded residents of these neighbouring countries. Therefore, political parties like the anti-Semitic Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP) led by István Csurka,112 the Bulgarian ATAKA,113 and the Greater Romania Party114 are featured in Austrian far right agendas.115 As one of the most tragic and continuous conﬂicts of the last decades, the Israeli– Palestinian conﬂict has drawn special attention from the far right. The dominant perspective that rightist media takes is a one-sided position against Israel. In Aula magazine, Johann F. Balvany has been a frequent reporter on the Israeli–Palestinian conﬂict. He speaks up for consensual conﬂict resolution116, but his statements are regularly biased when it comes to the question of who is the main obstacle for achieving peace and who has been prolonging the conﬂict. While he ﬁlls page after page accusing Israel and its politicians of exercising a ‘reign of terror’,117 of running

106 Müller, H. (2004), ‘Im Hintergrund Israel’, Zur Zeit, 40/2004, p. 3. 107 Schwab, J. (1999), ‘Wer steckt hinter der Entführung Öcalans?’, Aula, 3/1999, p. 20. 108 Mölzer, A. (2004c), ‘Pulverfaß Balkan’, Zur Zeit, 47/2004, p. 10. 109 Kerschhofer, R.G. (1998), ‘Der nächste Domino-Stein?’, Zur Zeit, 33/1998. 110 Mölzer, A. (2004d), ‘Streitschlichter am Balkan’, Zur Zeit, 14/2004, p. 12. 111 Mölzer (1997a), op. cit., p. 1. 112 See Aula 12/2001, p. 19; Aula 1/2006, p. 18 113 See Aula 1/2005, p. 19. 114 See Aula 1/2006, pp. 20–21. 115 See Mudde, C. (ed.) (2005), Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe (London and New York: Routledge). 116 Balvany, J.F. (2002b), ‘Israel taumelt in eine Katastrophe’, Aula, 3/2002, pp. 22–3; Balvany, J.F. (2003a), ‘US-Irrwege im Nahen und Mittleren Osten’, Aula, 12/2003, pp. 14–15. 117 Balvany, J.F. (2002c), ‘Der Palästina-Teufelskreis’, Aula, 9/2002, p. 26.

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‘concentration camps’, of acting like Nazis, of having a growing number of ‘settler-warriors with a particular brutality’120, and of being responsible even for the intensifying warfare in Iraq,121 there are few comparable attributes given to the second conﬂict party, the Palestinians. Instead, Balvany regularly mentions his good contacts with ‘high-ranking Arabic interlocutors’122, although not giving any details as to who they may be. While it cannot be ignored that ofﬁcial Israeli politics include ignoring UN resolutions and violating human rights, the statements of the far right are so biased that one has to speak of severe anti-Semitism. There is some phrasing about ‘Islamist terror’123 in these articles, but in the sum of all the articles there is much more coverage of Israeli brutality and injustice124, and hardly anything about the terrorist character of suicide attacks in Israeli cities, which cause deaths and injuries to the population and cause wide-spread fear and anger. Regular articles in rightist media contain statements that US politics are under the control of Israel/the Jews125 and that these two countries are the ‘real rogue states’.126 The results of European opinion polls in which nearly 60 per cent of people agreed to the statement that Israel is endangering world peace are not seen as the result of uneven perceptions or of anti-Semitic attitudes, but rather as the result of violations of human rights by Israel against Palestinians127. This view by the far right of polling numbers thereby gives credit to their biased interpretation of the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict. On some occasions, the US and Israeli are made responsible even for the terrorist threats they now face. In regard to the nuclear arms race, author Sitte ﬁnds the ultimate responsibility with the Jews: ‘Mankind knows without doubt that these atomic bombs invented by the highly intelligent Jewish scientists Oppenheimer & Co should never have been there’.128 He not only reenforces the stereotype of the ‘intelligent Jews’129, but also overlooks the many non-Jewish scientists who contributed to the development of atomic bombs. A similar one-sidedness can be found in another article from Sitte in which he points to early Jewish terrorist groups like Haganah or Irgun but ignores relations between the National Socialists and some

118 alvany, J.F. (1998), ‘Alptraum Nahost’, Zur Zeit, 14/1998. 119 Balvany, J.F. (2002e), ‘Wie lange noch Scharon?’, Aula, 4/2002, p. 25. 120 Bavany, J.F. (2002d), ‘Nahost erlebt den fünften Krieg’, Aula, 6/2002, p. 22. 121 Balvany, J.F. (2004b), ‘Der asymmetrische Krieg’, Aula, 4/2004, p. 20. 122 Balvany (2002b), op. cit., p. 23. 123 Balvany, J.F. (2002a), ‘Palästina 2002’, Aula, 1/2002, p. 20. 124 Balvany (2002b), op. cit., p. 22. 125 For example, Romig, F. (2004), ‘Der Krieg gegen den Terror und Israel’, Zur Zeit, 44– 45/2004, p. 9; Balvany, J.F. (2004a), ‘Der Bruch: Europa – USA’, Aula, 1/2004, p. 23; Romig, F. (2005), ‘Ein Schlag ins Gesicht’, Zur Zeit, 15/2005, p. 10; Balvany, J.F. (2005), ‘Amerika und die Israel-Lobby’, Aula, 9/2005, p. 24. 126 Prantner, R. (2004), ‘Israel ein Schurkenstaat?’, Zur Zeit, 38–39/2004, p. 16. 127 Balvany (2004a), op. cit., p. 23. 128 Sitte, F. (2004a), ‘Die Schurken und ihre A-Bomben’, Zur Zeit, 41–42/2004, p. 26. 129 Gilman, S. (1996), Smart Jews. The Construction of the Image of Jewish Superior Intelligence (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press).

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Arab leaders. While he stated in 2003 that anti-Semitism is inexplicable for him and a ‘bad thing’,131 he openly confessed to being ‘anti-Semitic’ two years later.132 On several occasions the weekly Zur Zeit reported on the activities of Moishe Ayre Friedman and his orthodox Jewish community in Vienna, which of course included rightist demands to get rid of the present state of Israel133 and placing blame on Zionism, at least partly, for the occurrence of the Holocaust.134 While it is true that US foreign policy supported Islamist forces in Afghanistan to ﬁght the Soviet occupation, it is a dramatic simpliﬁcation to explain the terrorist and anti-democratic activities of the Al Qaeda network as the result of the one-sided policy of the US in the Middle East, as Sitte does.135 As in the case of the Israeli– Palestinian conﬂict, the dominant interpretation of the armed conﬂict between the regime of Saddam Hussein and the US is one that portrays the Arab side simply as the victim.136 When FPÖ leader Jörg Haider visited Iraq and Saddam Hussein in 2002, one author admitted in his report that Saddam is a dictator, but the author was ultimately more interested in the performance of Haider.137 His visits to Iraq and the commentary in the media of the far right are more or less typical of the view the majority of the far right holds in regards to the situation in Iraq. Presented by Haider as a contribution to peace138 the long-time FPÖ leader’s book on the meeting with then head of state Saddam Hussein only rarely mentions crimes committed by the Baath regime. What the book offers instead is a kind of fascination Haider seems to have for powerful men, even when they are unscrupulous and dedicated to an anti-Semitic worldview. Solely blaming UN sanctions for the miserable situation of Iraqi children and horrible conditions in Iraqi hospitals, but not mentioning the large share of ﬁnancial assets spent by the Baath regime for military purposes, Haider deﬁnitely creates an erroneous picture of the causes of the situation in Iraq. While Haider argues that the engagement of the United States in the Middle East is mainly dictated by strategic and economic interests, he himself proudly speaks of the advantages Austrian enterprises (may) have due to his visits to Iraq and his good relations with the Arab world. Mölzer backs him up, arguing that Haider’s visit continues a tradition of taboo breaking by Austrian politicians, including Austrian Chancellor Kreisky’s meetings with Yasser Arafat and Muammar Gaddaﬁ at a time when both were widely seen as terrorists.139

130 Sitte, F. (2003a), ‘Gordischer Knoten: Der Nahe Osten’, Zur Zeit, 28/2003, p. 13. 131 Ibid., p. 14. 132 Sitte, F. (2005b), ‘Sie machten mich zum Anti’, Zur Zeit, 7/2005, p. 15. 133 See Zur Zeit 11/2004, p. 13. 134 See Zur Zeit 48/2003, pp. 22–3. 135 Sitte, F. (2005a), ‘Die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika auf allen Kontinenten’, Zur Zeit, 24/2005, p. 12. 136 For example Melisch, R. (1998), ‘Irak, der Störenfried’, Aula, 1/1998, pp. 18–19; Prantner, R. (2003), ‘Größenwahn und Wirklichkeit’, Zur Zeit, 49/2003, p. 11. 137 Domberg, G. (2003), ‘Zu Gast bei Saddam’, Zur Zeit, 13/03, p. 15. 138 Haider, J. (2003b), ‘Aus den US-Giftküchen’, Zur Zeit, 7–8/2003, p. 12. 139 Mölzer, A. (2002a), ‘Schurken unter sich?’, Zur Zeit, 8/2002, p. 6.

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Arming the Armed Forces With the remarkable exception of Franz Kernic’s study140, up until today there has been very little research done on the military politics of the far right in Austria. The Austrian far right portrays itself as the champion of the Bundesheer. Rightist media presents Austrian armed forces as not receiving the necessary appreciation from mainstream political parties, the political and military leadership of the armed forces,141 and from a relevant part of the population.142 Rightists say that the troops are running out of money, are paid poorly,143 are trained insufﬁciently,144 and that their weaponry is outdated.145 Following these statements, the far right’s demands seem logical: a stronger military is necessary to meet the security demands of today and tomorrow, as well having military standards maintained at such a level so as to enable them to face the United States at ‘eye level’.146 Like several other national armed forces, the Austrian Bundesheer is undergoing a process of restructuring accelerated by the fundamental change in world politics after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. While prominent members of the FPÖ, like Brigadier Wolfgang Jung, declare that previous approaches to adapt the Bundesheer to the new security environment have been worthless, he claims that the FPÖ has been successful at pushing through a new security agenda when it was part of the national governing coalition from 2000 to 2002. According to Jung, the FPÖ’s agenda seeks to integrate aspects of foreign and domestic policy into military restructuring.147 Indeed, the far right is fully supportive of the so-called Austrian assistance operations (Assistenzeinsätze) that became signiﬁcant in the early 1990s. Bundesheer Colonel Helge Endres, who in 2002 supported a militia in Graz closely connected to the local FPÖ and who once joined the Kameradschaft IV, an association of former members of the Wehrmacht and the Waffen-SS, praised the effectiveness of soldiers in preventing refugees from passing through the Austrian border and entering Austrian territory.148 Vinzenz Eschlauer (alias Andreas Mölzer) also argued in favour of a militarization of asylum politics when he wrote, ‘who else but the Bundesheer had been competent to bring the stream of refugees under control and to channel it?’149 If Austrian forces do not control the border, Mölzer claims, painting a catastrophic 140 Kernic, F. (1988), Zwischen Worten und Taten: Die Wehrpolitik der Freiheitlichen 1949–1986 (Wien: Österreichischer Bundesverlag). 141 Kamehl, G. (1998), ‘Bundesheer – in der Krise?’, Zur Zeit, 48/1998, pp. 4–5. 142 Endres, H.W. (1990), ‘Umstritten – das Bundesheer’, Aula, 7–8/1990, p. 9. 143 Pfeiffer, M. (2003), ‘Bundesrat Gudenus für Heeresreform ohne Tabus!’, Zur Zeit, 39/2003. 144 Groß, W. (2005), ‘Die Drachensaat’, Aula, 1/2005, p. 9; Kamehl, G. (2005), ‘Eine Armee von Folterknechten?’, Zur Zeit, 2/2005, p. 6; Moser, R. (2005a), ‘Vom Großen zum Kleinen’, Zur Zeit, 35–36/2005, p. 18. 145 Howanietz, M. (2005), ‘Abrüsten ohne Zukunft’, Zur Zeit, 41/2005, p. 18, calling the Bundesheer ‘mere administrative machinery’. 146 Bachmann, G. (2004), ‘Papiertiger Europa?’, Zur Zeit, 22/2004, p. 16. 147 Jung (2002a), op. cit., p. 7. 148 Endres, H.W. (1991), ‘Landesverteidigung – Assistenzeinsatz’, Aula, 2/1991, p. 9. 149 Eschlauer, V. (1991a), ‘Nötiger denn je!’, Aula, 3/1991, p. 9.

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picture, that there will be a growth of Slovenians settling in Carinthia and they will fulﬁll ‘the daring dreams of chauvinist Slovenian nationalists’.150 Another author in the weekly Zur Zeit made the suggestion to equip Austrian armed forces with pilotless remote-controlled helicopters of the type that are already in use on the US– Mexico border.151 Bundesheer Lieutenant Colonel Reinhard Bösch, who was one of the FPÖ spokespersons in military affairs until April 2006, demanded an extensive use of the assistance operations in order to confront ‘international terrorism and illegal immigration’.152 Given that the FPÖ speaks up for the idea of a people as an organic and homogeneous entity, the use of military forces is part of its policy to keep the number of immigrants in Austria as low as possible. Another change in Austrian security structures the FPÖ ascribes to its successes in the national government is the creation of a National Security Council, which has replaced several administrative bodies and has become the central counsel committee of the government in foreign, security and defence affairs.153 Referring to the advantages of this permanent committee, FPÖ politician Jung argued that it will produce common ground between all parties in terms of security policy and that it will allow ‘real progress among government and opposition groups as far as the fostering of conﬁdence is concerned’.154 Nevertheless, the far right’s expectation that security and military affairs would be exclusively dealt with by parliamentarians and high-ranking military personnel did not materialise. In 2004, militia ofﬁcer Günter Kamehl complained that 10 per cent of the members of the then commission working on reform of the Bundesheer were clueless in military issues, while military experts had been allowed observer status only.155 FPÖ activist Howanietz called the commission a ‘Bundesheer smashing committee’.156 One controversial topic debated within the FPÖ and on the pages of Zur Zeit and Aula is the question of whether the Bundesheer should be transformed from an army of conscription to an army of professional soldiers. Some rightists have praised the performance of Austrian soldiers on UN missions157, or have argued that present purposes could not be managed sufﬁciently by a professional army due to a shortage of ﬁnancial and personnel resources.158 Also, there is the complaint that turning to a professional army would support a trend ‘to enlarge the rights of the individuals but 150 Eschlauer, V. (1991b), ‘Bürgerkrieg vor der Tür’, Aula, 6/1991, p. 13. 151 Pfeiffer, M. (2002a), ‘Grenzüberwachung der nächsten Generation’, Zur Zeit, 6/2002, p. 13. 152 Bösch, R. (2004a), ‘Heimatschutz’, Zur Zeit, 6–7/2004, p. 6; Bösch, R. (2004b), ‘Für ein starkes Heer’, Zur Zeit, 27/2004, p. 3. 153 See Bundesgesetz über die Errichtung eines Nationalen Sicherheitsrates, Bundesgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich vom 16.11.2001, Teil I. 154 Jung, W. (2001a), ‘Sicherheitspolitik nicht militärisch ﬁxiert’, Zur Zeit, 42/2001, p. 3. 155 Kamehl, G. (2004), ‘Schon wieder Bundesheerreform!’, Aula, 3/2004, pp. 20–21. 156 Howanietz (2005), op. cit. 157 Endres, H.W. (1989), ‘Die beste Investition – Frieden’, Aula, 3/1989, p. 14; Endres, H.W. (1994), ‘Bundesheer – international’, Aula, 7–8/1994, p. 12. 158 Jung (2002a), op. cit., p. 8; Spath, G. (2004), ‘Bundesheer 2010 – klein, aber fein oder…?’, Aula, 3/2004, pp. 17–19; Kamehl (2004), op. cit.

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159

to reduce his/her duties concerning the community’. Others speak up for a periodic review of the proposal for a professional army,160 or suggest for the continuation of the conscription system to be accompanied by general compulsory service for young adults.161 Author Endres once made the suggestion to have a system in which compulsory military service is suspended rather than abolished.162 Finally, a minority represented by Gudenus favours an army made up of professional soldiers.163 No matter the internal debate, there is general unhappiness in the far right with the present state of the Bundesheer, which is portrayed as too civilian,164 too small in number165, and hostile towards right-wing political positions.166 Reducing the period of military service from eight months to six months by January 2006 met opposition from the FPÖ.167 Admiration of elite soldiers like the French Foreign Legion168 and the German Commando Special Forces169 is found side by side with praise for the ‘bravery’ and ‘fulﬁlment of duty’ of Wehrmacht soldiers170 – as if they had not been part of a criminal war of aggression and as if the Wehrmacht had not been involved in war crimes. There is also constant complaining about allegedly lacking ﬁnancial resources. Reiter, as one of the most prominent security experts of the FPÖ, has demanded several times for the doubling of the military budget.171 Lieutenant Colonel Kamehl once stated that Austrian soldiers are ‘despised as “fare dodgers” in security politics’, followed by a dramatic appeal to the Austrian chancellor: ‘We cannot allow ourselves to be smiled at and not taken seriously any longer. Mister Chancellor: Lead Austria back to the way of honour and dignity!’172 When former FPÖ spokesperson for military affairs Herbert Scheibner became Minister of Defence in the conservative– far right coalition, he actually lamented that he had taken over a ‘pile of smashed crockery with decades of investment deﬁcit’.173 Yet, contrary to demands from fellow party members, he did not carry through with an increase in military expenditure during his period of ofﬁce. 159 Kamehl, G. (1999), ‘Soll unser Bundesheer einem Berufsheer weichen?’, Zur Zeit, 28–29/1999, p. 7. 160 Bösch (2004b), op. cit. 161 Magenheimer, H. (1999), Zur Frage der Allgemeinen Wehrpﬂicht. Standortbestimmung – Alternativen – Konsequenzen (Wien: Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie. Institut für strategische Forschung). 162 Endres, H.W. (1999), ‘Ohne Geld keine Militärmusik’, Aula, 12/1999, p. 10. 163 Gudenus, J. (2002a), ‘Streit um Abfangjäger’, Aula, 4/2002, p. 11. 164 Wiesinger, K. (1998), ‘Die eingesparte Sicherheit’, Zur Zeit, 26/1998. 165 Gudenus (2005a), op. cit. 166 Niemann, N. (1997), ‘Das kann bei uns nicht passieren’, Zur Zeit, 9–10/1997. 167 Mölzer, A. (2003c), ‘Widersprüche um das Heer’, Zur Zeit, 11/2003, p. 5; Bösch (2004a), op. cit. 168 Müller, H. (2001), ‘Fremdenlegionäre voran’, Zur Zeit, 42/2001, p. 7. 169 Pfeiffer, M. (2001), ‘Schnelle Eingreifstruppe’, Zur Zeit, 42/2001, p. 6. 170 Jung, W. (2002b), ‘Rede zum 8. Mai’, Aula, 6/2002, pp. 9–10. 171 Spitzauer, F. (1989), ‘De-facto Aufgabe der Neutralität’, Aula, 3/1989, p. 15. 172 Kamehl, G. (2001b), ‘Einseitige Loyalitäten’, Zur Zeit, 31/2001, p. 7. 173 Kamehl, G. (2001a), ‘Oben ohne, Frau Vizekanzler?’, Zur Zeit, 26/001, p. 5.

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The question of what kind and what amount of weaponry and armament the Austrian armed forces should have is a regular subject in the media of the far right. Authors tend to discuss armament issues in terms of a wide range of pieces of equipment, from boots and trucks to nuclear weapons. However, attention has longer been focused on the issue of getting new interceptor ﬁghters for the Austrian Air Force. For two decades, Swedish Draken ﬁghter planes were the backbone of the Austrian Air Force. In response to the announcement by the planes’ manufacturer that it would not continue maintenance of the jets, the far right came out with several different positions. While Kamehl complained that the decision to buy the successor of the Draken had taken too long,174 and former Bundesheer Colonel John Gudenus, who had been convicted in 2006 for violating the law banning attempts of National Socialist revival, favoured a temporary solution to be put in place quickly.175 FPÖ Member of European Parliament Andreas Mölzer made critical remarks about the hurry in which the acquisition of the interceptor ﬁghters had ﬁnally been carried out, and he said that he suspected dishonest motives in the process of decisionmaking.176 Bachmann, however, supported the decision to buy the Euroﬁghter as a ‘decision for Europe’ by which dependence on the United States in the armament sector would be reduced.177 Mölzer was disappointed by FPÖ parliamentarians who had previously voiced opposition but then voted in favour of the Euroﬁghter.178 This case exempliﬁes important differences inside the FPÖ on the issue of obtaining military resources179 leading some observers to suspect improper decisionmaking processes.180 The issue of the interceptor ﬁghters is connected to the question of whether or not a small country like Austria is capable of running an air force can independently carry out a full spectrum of missions. With the majority of the far right favouring the integration of Austria into either a transnational European security structure or NATO, the argument goes that strategic air defence will be covered by forces of these military coalitions. Given this supposition, Pfeiffer points out that money allocated for the aircraft might be spent more usefully elsewhere.181 Gudenus, too, argued that the interceptor ﬁghters should not be seen as the most important and necessary innovation of military technology and equipment for the Austrian armed forces. For the purpose of an air police, technically sophisticated machines would not be necessary,182 especially as there is a future with UCAVs (Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles).183 Also, Brigadier Wolfgang Jung, one of the representatives of the FPÖ in the national parliament (Nationalrat) and a regular author in publications like Aula

174 Ibid. 175 Gudenus, J. (2003b), ‘Wer trägt die Verantwortung?’, Aula, 10/2003, pp. 7–8. 176 Mölzer (2003a), op. cit., p. 6. 177 Bachmann, G. (2002), ‘Zwiespältige Sicherheitspolitik’, Zur Zeit, 40/2002, p. 6. 178 Mölzer, A. (2003b), ‘Ein Sturzkampfbomber?’, Zur Zeit, 20/2003. 179 Mölzer, A. (2002b), ‘Wer den Schaden hat...’, Zur Zeit, 32–33/2002, p. 5; Ebenberger Stix, C. (2002), ‘Nur ﬂiegen ist schöner…’, Zur Zeit, 26–27/2002, p. 5. 180 Golowitsch, H. (2003), ‘Drittes Lager, wohin?’, Aula, 6/2003, pp. 25–31. 181 Pfeiffer, M. (2002b), ‘Bundesheer bald NATO-kompatibel?’, Zur Zeit, 7/2002, p. 7. 182 Gudenus, J. (2003a), ‘Teuerste Kampfmaschine für Luftpolizei’, Aula, 5/2003, p. 5. 183 Ibid., p. 6.

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and Zur Zeit, has pointed out that modern equipment had been bought for the armed forces, but that buying new military trucks has been deferred several times.184 In June 2006, Reiter provoked a scandal when he demanded that the EU should become a global power with access to nuclear weapons.185 This issue had already been raised by Brigadier Gunther Spath three years before. Writing as the then Chief of Staff of the Military Commando in the Austrian state of Carinthia, Reiter stated that, in order to compete with the United States, Europe needs a strong nuclear component: It is obvious that the French and the British will not Europeanize their national nuclear forces in the short term. Europe has to make a decision: do we want to be involved, or do we want to be a vassal and an appendage? Equality with the US in power politics is a sheer illusion without having strategic capacities at one’s disposal.186

Summary The political strategies of the Austrian far right regarding foreign and military affairs rest on a nationalist and völkisch understanding of the idea of peoples that is then integrated into a wider European perspective. Organic understandings of state and nation187 and a connection between ethnic purity and cultural development188 are relevant pillars of this far right world view. Austria’s future role is seen as being part of a European confederation that gets migrants off Austria’s back, keeps Turkey out, aggressively ﬁghts moral degeneration as part of the ‘clash of civilizations’189, and rises to become a ‘strong and independent factor in world politics’190, rivalling the United States. As far as the military factor is concerned, according to authors in far right media, better ﬁnanced, better equipped and better trained Austrian armed forces are needed. As part of a European military alliance that should have nuclear bombs at its disposal, Austrian soldiers are expected to remain under national command. The question of changing to an army of professional soldiers is not answered as uniformly as is the issue of neutrality. The idea and the concept of neutrality, while occasionally referred to positively, is not an indispensable pillar in political concepts of the Austrian far right, as the many proponents of the EU, NATO or a European confederation demonstrate. Concerning the Austrian relationship with Germany, there is a deep feeling of belonging to the same nation and some expectation that, speaking geopolitically, Germany’s move to the centre of Europe will also strengthen the position of Austria, which will then become a dominating power over several smaller countries in eastern 184 Wiesinger (1998), op. cit. 185 Reiter, E. (2006), ‘Will die EU eine globale Macht werden?’, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 17/18 June 2006, p. 6. 186 Spath (2003a), op. cit., pp. 15–16. 187 Scrinzi, O. (1991b), ‘Nation Europa – ohne Nationen?’, Aula, 7–8/1991, pp. 30–31. 188 Mölzer (2004a), op. cit., p. 16. 189 Romig, F. (2001), ‘Krieg gegen den Gottesstaat’, Zur Zeit, 51–52/2001, p. 12. 190 Mölzer (2004a), op. cit., p. 16.

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and southeastern Europe. The latest FPÖ programme even opts for the entry of South Tyrol into Austria.191 As Stirnemann already noted several years ago, the Austrian Rights’ hopes for Europe may mirror a changed perspective regarding the Austria’s relationship with Germany: ‘What has been the idea of the Anschluss in these circles during the monarchy and the First Republic seems now to have become the idea of Europe with its possibility to merge with at least a part of the sphere where German is the language.’192 Some may even dream of a revival of the imperial and royal Habsburg Empire. Acronyms BZÖ CFSP DÖW EU FPÖ MEP MIÉP NATO UN VdU

Bündnis Zukunft Österreich Common Foreign and Security Policy Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes European Union Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs Member of European Parliament Hungarian Justice and Life Party North Atlantic Treaty Organisation United Nations Verband der Unabhängigen

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— (1995), Nato-Beitritt Österreichs? (Wien: Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie). — (1997), ‘Von der Neutralität zur Realpolitik’, Zur Zeit, 1/1997. — (1998), ‘Der aufrechte Gang fehlt noch’, Zur Zeit, 51–52/1998. — (1999), ‘Parteipolitik statt Sicherheitspolitik’, Zur Zeit, 33/1999. — (2006), ‘Will die EU eine globale Macht werden?’, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 17/18 June 2006. Romig, F. (1992), ‘Warum “Nein” zu EWR, EG und EU’, Aula, 11/1992. — (2001), ‘Krieg gegen den Gottesstaat’, Zur Zeit, 51–52/2001. — (2002), ‘Wer regiert uns wirklich?’, Aula, 4/2002. — (2003), ‘Israelischer Bush-Krieg’, Zur Zeit, 12/2003. — (2004), ‘Der Krieg gegen den Terror und Israel’, Zur Zeit, 44–45/2004. — (2005), ‘Ein Schlag ins Gesicht’, Zur Zeit, 15/2005. Rotter, M. (1984), Bewaffnete Neutralität. Das Beispiel Österreich (Frankfurt/Main: Haag + Herchen). Scharsach, H.-H. (ed.) (2002), Haider: Österreich und die rechte Versuchung (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt). — (2002), Rückwärts nach rechts: Europas Populisten (Wien: Ueberreuter). Schiszler, S. (2002), ‘Vom Unsinn der österreichischen Nation’, Aula, 6/2002. Schönhuber, F. (2004), ‘Die Gründe des Wahlsieges der Serbischen Radikalen’, Aula, 2/2004. Schöfbänker, G. (1997), Neutralität – Quo Vadis? Struktur eines außenpolitischen Prioritätskonﬂikts (Stadtschlaining: ÖSFK). Schwab, J. (1999), ‘Wer steckt hinter der Entführung Öcalans?’, Aula, 3/1999. Scrinzi, O. (1991a), ‘Von den kurzen Beinen der drei Neutralitätslügen’, Aula, 5/1991. — (1991b), ‘Nation Europa – ohne Nationen?’, Aula, 7–8/1991. — (2002), ‘Südtirol – 10 Jahre Streitbelegung, 50 Jahre Tolomei-Schwindel’, Aula, 7–8/2002. — (2005), ‘Die Lebenslüge von der Freiwilligkeit’, Zur Zeit, 21/2005. Schönfeld-Pfennigbauer, B. (2005), ‘Frieden für Palästina?’, Zur Zeit, 03/2005. Sichelschmidt, G. (1998), ‘Was die Welt Amerika verdankt?’, Aula, 10/1998. Sitte, F. (2003a), ‘Gordischer Knoten: Der Nahe Osten’, Zur Zeit, 28/2003. — (2004a), ‘Die Schurken und ihre A-Bomben’, Zur Zeit, 41–42/2004. — (2004b), ‘Doppelbödige Moral’, Zur Zeit, 30–31/2004. — (2005a), ‘Die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika auf allen Kontinenten’, Zur Zeit, 24/2005. — (2005b), ‘Sie machten mich zum Anti’, Zur Zeit, 7/2005. Spath, G. (2000), ‘Zum Begriff “Sicherheit” in Österreich’, Aula, 5/2000. — (2003a), ‘Weltmacht USA – und wo bleibt Europa?’, Aula, 5/2003. — (2004), ‘Bundesheer 2010 – klein, aber fein oder…?’, Aula, 3/2004. Spitzauer, F. (1989), ‘De-facto Aufgabe der Neutralität’, Aula, 3/1989. Steindl, A. (2005), ‘Wegtreten’, Zur Zeit, 7/2005. Stirnemann, A. (1986), ‘Das neue Parteiprogramm der FPÖ – eine kritische Analyse’, in Khol, Ofner and Stirnemann (eds.). Tomaschitz, B. (2005a), ‘Mölzer für Beibehaltung der Neutralität’, Zur Zeit, 10/2005.

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— (2005b), ‘Kehrtwende in EU-Politik’, Zur Zeit, 31/2005. Verband Österreichischer Gewerkschaftlicher Bildung and Österreichisches Studienzentrum für Frieden und Konﬂiktlösung (eds.) (2001), Von der sozialen zur militärischen Sicherheit? Die Rolle der Neutralität im 21. Jahrhundert (Wien: Verlag des ÖGB). Vetter, M. (2005), ‘Sieht Europa bald ganz anders aus?. in: Aula, 11/2005. Virchow, F. (2006), Gegen den Zivilismus. Internationale Beziehungen und Militär in den politischen Konzeptionen der extremen Rechten (Wiesbaden: VS). Waldner, C. (1993), ‘Europäische Region Tirol’, in Bossi, Pučnik, and Haider (eds.). — (1994), ‘Südtirol zwischen Autonomie und Selbstbestimmung’, Freiheit und Verantwortung 1994. — (1995), ‘Berlusconis Triumph. Südtirol und das italienische Rechtsbündnis’, Freiheit und Verantwortung 1995. Walter, E. (1994), ‘Realisierung Mitteleuropas durch den EU-Beitritt’, Aula, 6/1994. — (1998a), ‘Österreich und die NATO: Fragen und Konsequenzen’, Aula, 2/1998. — (1998b), ‘Die überforderte Weltmacht Amerika’, Aula, 10/1998. Werz, N. (ed.) (2003), Populismus. Populisten in Übersee und Europa (Opladen: Leske+Budrich). Wiesinger, K. (1998), ‘Die eingesparte Sicherheit’, Zur Zeit, 26/1998. Zacharasiewicz, A. (2002), ‘Kooperation – trotz allem!’, Zur Zeit, 46/2002.

Chapter 4

Our Own People First in a Europe of Peoples: The International Policy of the Vlaams Blok Marc Swyngedouw, Koen Abts and Maarten Van Craen

Introduction Over the past 25 years, the Vlaams Blok (Flemish Block) has progressively established a prominent position in the party system of Flanders. If initially there was some doubt about the viability of an extreme-right party, the Vlaams Blok now has a greater impact on Flemish politics than ever before. With more than 24 per cent of the votes, in 2004 the anti-system party became the largest political party in the Flemish parliament. Its electoral success has been largely due to its anti-foreigner position, its anti-political arguments and its continual harping on criminality.1 In the 1990s the anti-immigrant party had succeeded in combining its radical agenda of exclusion with a populist ideology, mobilization strategy and style.2 Depending on the research tradition to which they belong, political scientists call this interweaving of populism and cultural (and ethnic) exclusion, ‘national populism’,3 ‘right-wing populism’,4 ‘exclusionary populism’5 or ‘xenophobic populism’.6 On the one hand, the Vlaams Blok can be 1 Swyngedouw, M. and Beerten, R. (1996), ‘Cognitieve en affectieve motieven van partijkeuze, De nationale verkiezingen van 21 Mei 1995’, Res Publica, 38(3–4), pp. 555–574; Swyngedouw, M. (2001), ‘The Subjective Cognitive and Affective Map of Extreme Right Voters: Using Open-End Questions in Exit-Polls’, Electoral Studies, 20(1), pp. 217–241; Van Craen, M. and Swyngedouw, M. (2002), Het Vlaams Blok doorgelicht: 25 jaar extreem-rechts in Vlaanderen (Leuven: ISPO-Bulletin). 2 Swyngedouw, M. and Ivaldi, G. (2001), ‘The Extreme Right Utopia in Belgium and France, The Ideology of the Flemish Vlaams Blok and the French Front National’, Western European Politics, 24(3), pp. 1–22. 3 Taguieff and P.-A. (1995), ‘Political science confronts populism’, Telos 103(1), pp. 9–43. 4 Betz, H.-G. and Immerfall, S. (eds.) (1998), The New Politics of the Right (New York: Macmillan Press); Betz, H.-G. (2002a), ‘Conditions Favoring the Success and Failure of Radical Right-wing Populist Parties in Contemporary Democracies’, in Mény, Y. and Surel, Y. (eds.), Democracies and the Populist Challenge (New York: Palgrave). 5 Betz, H.-G., 2002b, Exclusionary Populism in Austria, Italy and Switzerland, paper presented at Renner Institut. 6 DeAngelis, R. (2003), ‘A Rising Tide for Jean-Marie, Jörg, and Pauline? Xenophobic Populism in Comparative Perspective’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 49(1), pp. 75–92.

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deﬁned as a ‘populist’ party that rejects the established powers and that claims to derive its legitimacy from a direct and privileged link with the people. The Vlaams Blok presents itself as the only true defender of the indivisible Flemish community and of real democracy.7 On the other hand, Vlaams Blok supports a particular type of populism, namely an ‘ethno-nationalistic’ populism, since the party is convinced that the Flemish national identity should be pursued and that the ethnic identity should actively be defended against internal enemies of the Flemish community and against external inﬂuences. ‘Ethnic populism’ limits citizenship explicitly to the ethnic community: the community is deﬁned on an ethnic basis. The community, for the Vlaams Blok, is ethnos, not demos, since the party is convinced that the cultural community should precede the political community. However, because the party preaches at the same time that the boundaries of the state should coincide with those of the nation, its ideology can also be deﬁned as ‘nationalistic populism’. From the beginning, the ideal pursued has been an independent Flanders. Several studies have already dealt with the exclusionary politics of ethnic populism.8 Strikingly, however, research has focused only on the domestic programme of neo-populist parties and movements. That only limited attention is paid to the international agenda of modern populist movements is remarkable, since their rise is often linked to the consequences of political, cultural and economic internationalization and globalization.9 Although international questions have hardly any impact on the public discourse and electoral success of the Vlaams Blok, the party has still developed its own view on international matters. Ethno-nationalistic populism, as described above, also ﬁnds expression in the international programme of the Vlaams Blok. As scientiﬁc and popular analysis has paid scarcely any attention to either the international and European programme of the Vlaams Blok, or the position of the party in the European political system, this article aims to go some way to ﬁlling this gap. 7 Canovan, M. (1999), ‘Trust the People!, Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy’, Political Studies, 47(1), pp. 2–16; Taggart, P. (2000), Populism (Buckingham: Open University Press); Mény, Y. and Surel, Y. (eds.) (2002), Democracies and the Populist Challenge (New York: Palgrave); Abts, K. (2004), ‘Het populistisch appel: voorbij de populaire communicatiestijl en ordinaire democratiekritiek’, Tijdschrift voor Sociologie, 25(4), pp. 451–476. 8 Merkl, P. and Weinberg, L. (eds.) (1997), ‘The Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the Nineties’ (London: Frank Cass); Betz and Immerfall, op. cit.; Hainsworth, P. (ed.) (2000), The Politics of the Extreme Right. From the Margins to the Mainstream (London: Pinter); Mudde C. (2000), The Ideology of Extreme Right (Manchester: Manchester University Press); Swyngedouw and Ivaldi (2001), op. cit. 9 Kitschelt, H. (1995), The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press); Immerfall, S. (1998), ‘The Neo-Populist Agenda’ in Betz and Immerfall; Kriesi, H. (1999), ‘Movements of the Left, Movements of the Right: Putting the Mobilization of Two New Types of Social Movements into Political Context’ in Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism, Kitschelt, H., Lange, P., Marks, G. and Stephens, J. (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); Betz (2002a), op. cit.; Swank, D. and Betz, H.-G. (2003), ‘Globalization, the Welfare State, and Right Wing Populism in Western Europe’, Socio-economic Review 1, pp. 215–45.

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The Indirect Importance of International Politics International and European policy questions can hardly be described as central to the political campaign of the Vlaams Blok. Originally, the party preferred to completely ignore Europe. Only in 1989, more than 10 years after the party had gained its ﬁrst representative in Belgium’s parliament, did the Vlaams Blok win a seat in the European Parliament. In the very early period – in 1979 – other priorities and ﬁnancial difﬁculties discouraged the Vlaams Blok from taking part in that year’s European elections. Five years later the Vlaams Blok did in fact take part, but its ﬁrst European campaign, with the slogans ‘We say what you think’ and ‘Sooner a rocket in the garden, than a Russian in the kitchen’, attracted only a few votes. This was the ﬁrst and last time that the party would take part in an election, yet fail to win any seats at all. The 1989 campaign on the other hand was a success. Its ‘Europe for Europeans’ campaign enabled it to send its ﬁrst Member of the European Parliament (MEP) to the European parliament, namely the party’s founder and then chairman Karel Dillen. The anti-politics ‘Spring Clean’ slogan of the 1994 campaign, which played on the need to rid Belgium and Europe of foreigners, political banditry and fraud, helped the Vlaams Blok do even better and allowed the current party chairman, Frank Vanhecke, to join Karel Dillen in the European parliament. In 1999, both MEPs were re-elected with ease, but relinquished their seats in favour of others in June 2003. Karel Dillen, then 77, retired from politics and was succeeded by his son Koen Dillen. Frank Vanhecke, on the other hand, won a seat in the Belgian Senate (upper house) and was succeeded in the European Parliament by Philip Claeys, a former employee of the parliamentary party in the Flemish parliament. The change was accompanied by a marked rise in the parliamentary activities of Vlaams Blok in the European parliament. Finally, in 2004 the party gained its electoral triumph. In the European elections, the Vlaams Blok’s share of the vote increased considerably from 15.1 per cent in 1999 to 23.2 per cent in 2004. As a result, three former MEPs were elected: Frank Vanhecke, Philip Claeys and Koen Dillen. Although interest in foreign policy and Europe has signiﬁcantly increased over time, international questions are still given only low priority in the public discourse of the Vlaams Blok and in its electoral appeals. The party has relatively little interest in Europe, and the average Vlaams Blok voter is unlikely to lose much sleep over international political issues.10 Nonetheless, the party succeeds all too well in exploiting for its own ends a range of local consequences of the complex social changes of late modernity, namely internationalization, globalization, and individualization. Always coated with outspoken populist and anti-establishment rhetoric in relation to the European Union (EU), all kinds of local/national problems associated with ﬂoods of immigrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees are linked back to the erosion of national borders. All this is presented as part of a discourse of Flemish national particularism. Here we see how the Vlaams Blok cleverly applies the ‘jumping of 10 Ackaert, J., de Winter, L. and Swyngedouw, M. (1996), ‘Belgium: an Electorate on the Eve of Disintegration’ in Choosing Europe: the European Electorate and the National Parties in the Face of the Union, van der Eijk, C. and Franklin, M. (eds.) (Ann Arbor: University Press); Van Craen and Swyngedouw, op. cit.

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scales’ technique, whereby global complexity is rescaled to local simplicity.11 Social and political problems that are manifested globally, such as international migration, organized crime and international terrorism, are redeﬁned as national or local problems. Global complexity, which refers to the processes of cultural and economic globalization as well as the enlargement of the EU, is translated into comprehensible and tangible issues, whereby such changes are condensed and expressed as a direct and immediate threat to established prosperity, rights and power. In this way, the complexity of international issues can be simpliﬁed to the all-embracing populist opposition between insiders and outsiders. Crucial to this translation process are the instrumental ﬁgures of the political establishment and the immigrants, who threaten the unity of the Flemish people from inside or outside.12 Thus, the international problems are chieﬂy linked back to and expressed in terms of the national core issues of the Vlaams Blok, namely immigration, crime, and the theme of anti-politics. Indirectly, the Vlaams Blok makes a connection, whenever possible, with European policies, and the party exploits the growing resentment of current asylum policies and European enlargement. For example, 49 per cent of Belgians reject the most recent enlargement of the EU by the addition of ten new member states, whereas barely 38 per cent of Belgians favour the accession of these states.13 Furthermore, the Vlaams Blok successfully exploits the widespread distrust of asylum-seekers. Roughly 55 per cent of Flemings think that Flanders has too many asylum-seekers relative to its number of inhabitants, while 46 per cent want the borders shut to new asylum-seekers. Moreover, two in three Flemings think that too many asylum-seekers come to Flanders to proﬁt from the social security system.14 In sum, the data show an enormous reservoir of resentment. To capitalize on these forms of resentment, the Vlaams Blok succeeds in redeﬁning the foreigner or asylum-seeker as a threatening public enemy in the shape of a competitor for social and economic beneﬁts in the labour market, the grave-digger of the welfare state, and the beneﬁciary of communal provision. It portrays the foreigner as disturbing everyday life and as a criminal immigrant and cultural intruder who threatens and contaminates the Flemish heartland.15 Although freedom of religion is not a point of conﬂict in Belgian politics, the Vlaams Blok constructs the image of the threatening immigrant by invoking the alleged threat of Islam. One of the arguments in its 2004 campaign literature against Turkish membership of the EU was that Islamic Turkey is not part of European civilization.16 11 See Swyngedouw, E. (1997), ‘Homing in and Spacing Out: Re-Conﬁguring Scale’, School of Geography, University of Oxford, WPG97-10; Urry, J. (2003), Global Complexity (Cambridge: Polity Press). 12 Swyngedouw and Ivaldi, op. cit.; Cuperus, R (2003), ‘The Populist Deﬁciency of European Social Democracy’, Internationale Politiek und Gesellschaft, 3, 83–109; Abts, op. cit. 13 European Commission (2004), Eurobarometer 61 (Brussel: EC). 14 Billiet, J. and Meireman, K. (2004), ‘Immigratie en Asiel: de opvattingen en houdingen van Belgen in het Europees Sociaal Survey’, Leuven: Onderzoeksverslag DA/2004-36. 15 Swyngedouw, M. (1995), ‘The “Threatening Immigrant” in Flanders 1930–1980, Redrawing the Social Space’, New Community (Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies), 21(3), pp. 325–40. 16 Vlaams Blok (2004b), Vlaamse Staat, Europese Natie. Europees verkiezingsprogramma 2004 (Brussel: Vlaams Blok).

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The Ambiguity of the International Discourse In general, the ofﬁcial approach to international politics is characterized by internal contradictions and the adoption of vague positions. Central to this is a somewhat contradictory argument for a strong Europe of European peoples. On the one hand, the Vlaams Blok wants a strong and powerful Europe to act on the international stage, capable of speaking and acting as one. Characteristic of this thinking is the call for a fully developed European defence system, as well as uniform and stringent policies towards immigration and asylum-seekers. On the other hand, however, the party loudly objects to the asphyxiating centralism of Europe, where the European structure is viewed as a breach of the inalienable right of a people to determine their own fate. As a result, the attitude towards the European Union is in general highly ambivalent: greater integration of the free market economy, foreign policy, defence, immigration, crime ﬁghting, and environmental policies, combined with a powerful plea for less or even no intervention in national matters such as the arts, education, law and order and social security. Similarly, there is no clearly articulated attitude towards the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) or the US, although, in general, the party’s positions on transatlantic policy, the hegemony of the US and international bodies such as NATO and the United Nations (UN) are largely negative. As the core ideas of the far-right party regarding international policy are most clearly expressed through its positions on European integration, we look ﬁrst at the attitude of the Vlaams Blok to the process of European integration. In Grondbeginselen [Basic Principles], the electoral programme Baas in eigen land [Boss in our own country], the congress texts Staatsgedachte [Idea of State] and Europa [Europe], the study document Europa: vloek of zegen [Europe: Curse or Blessing?] and, above all, the programme for the European elections Vlaamse staat, Europese natie [Flemish State, European Nation], the Vlaams Blok appears to position itself as constructive but critical with respect to the European Union. In reality, however, its attitude towards Europe is ambiguous due to intrinsic tensions between the party’s national and international objectives, wherein the development of a Flemish national community should be linked to the objectives of the project of European integration. A Confederal Europe of Peoples The Vlaams Blok is against the political uniﬁcation of Europe. However, as a matter of principle the party is in favour of and a defender of cooperation among the peoples of Europe. The core of this ‘Europe of peoples’ idea is that sovereignty does not lie with Europe or with the existing states, but with the various cultural communities.17 An essential aspect of the extreme-right view is the right of self-determination of a people. As a result, it is not the existing states that are the building blocks of a future Europe. Rather, future European integration can only be built on the basis

17 See Verreyken, W. (1994), Europa barst! (Antwerp: Tyr).

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of cooperation among such peoples.18 On the one hand, therefore, the party argues for a confederal Europe or a ‘confederation of peoples’ that allows for the selfdetermination of all European peoples, as deﬁned in cultural terms. Thus, it totally rejects the concept of a federal Europe as characterized by a European constitution and European citizenship. On the other hand, the plea for a Europe of peoples allows the Vlaams Blok to link its struggle for a separate Flemish state to a European agenda. As a result, the Vlaams Blok demands a rightful place in the European Union for the future state of Flanders. The concept of a ‘Europe of the fatherlands’ reconciles the national and European interest. The current process of political uniﬁcation in the direction of a federation of states, similar to the United States of America, is thus regarded by the Vlaams Blok as unnecessary, and is moreover both dangerous and harmful. In this view, Europe is a serious threat to the sovereignty of the member states, and in the longer term would be a danger to the cultural diversity of the European peoples. Additionally, the European superstate is likely to become a bureaucracy. The Vlaams Blok decries the notion of European tutelage and expressly opts for the restoration of the primacy of the nation state. First of all, in the eyes of the extreme right, the EU cannot lay claim to any constitutional authority: ‘the EU is not a state and for us it can never be that. Constitutions can only be drafted by and for states.’19 Furthermore, the party argues for a consistent and radical application of the principle of subsidiarity in the European Union. Some inalienable policy areas continue to be a proper part of the national decision making process. In part, the Vlaams Blok argues that powers and decisions of relevance to the peoples of Europe, such as culture, education, law and order, social policy, and social security, must remain ﬁrmly in the hands of the national states and can be better exercised at state level, which is closer to the people.20 For the Block, such matters are inherently associated with the national identity of every language and cultural community. The ﬁrst and main argument against the transfer of these inalienable powers to the European level is the conviction that there never can and never will be a ‘European demos’ or ‘European people’. For the Vlaams Blok, Europe is a patchwork of peoples, each with its own cultural identity and interests. Because a minimal consensus on fundamental principles is missing in so many respects, the party thinks there is absolutely no point in working towards a European federal superstate.21 Using similar arguments, the Vlaams Blok continues to reject on principle the concept of European citizenship, according to which any person – wherever he or she may live – who has the nationality of one of the European member states is allowed to vote in European and local elections. To bring about the suppression of local voting rights for EU citizens, the party demands a fundamental review and curtailing of 18 Dillen, K. (1990), Manifest van het rechtse Vlaams-nationalisme. Grondbeginselen (Brussel: Vlaams Blok); Vlaams Blok (2004b), op. cit. 19 Vlaams Blok (2004a), Dossier ‘Europa: vloek of zegen?’ (Brussel: Vlaams Blok); Vlaams Blok (2004b), op. cit. 20 Vlaams Blok (2001b), Congrestekst Europa. (Brussel: Vlaams Blok); Vlaams Blok (2004b), op. cit. 21 Vlaams Blok (2001b), op. cit.

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the Maastricht Treaty. After all, according to the Vlaams Blok, political rights must continue to be directly linked to citizenship or nationality. ‘Everybody has the right to assert more political rights on their “own ground” than what guests can lay claim to.’22 Although the Vlaams Blok’s actions are primarily aimed at electoral rights for non-European foreigners introduced in 2004, the party continues, by reason of its strict linkage of voting rights and nationality, to aim at EU citizens. The second argument by the Vlaams Blok against a far-reaching transfer of powers is based not so much on the denial of national interest, but rather on the enormous democratic deﬁcit that the party thinks would accompany a federal Europe. European institutions lack democratic legitimacy. Here the Vlaams Blok has taken advantage of the numerous anti-establishment sentiments associated with the democratic paradox inherent in every representative liberal democracy.23 First, the constitutional democracy and the European system of checks and balances is contested.24 The institutions lack transparency and are too complex, while the European bureaucracy is characterized by interference and a mania for organization. Second, the party capitalizes on the discrepancy between the ideal of good governance and the practice of European politics.25 ‘Mismanagement is the rule rather than the exception.’26 Europe’s institutions are wasteful, badly run, beneﬁt only the few, and are corrupt and nepotistic. According to the Vlaams Blok, the solution lies in a drastic tightening of anti-corruption measures, but above all in a far-reaching reform of the EU’s political institutions and a signiﬁcant reduction in the number of civil servants employed by the EU. Third, the Vlaams Blok takes advantage of the unbridgeable gap between citizens and political system.27 Time and again, important decisions are made without public debate. The Vlaams Blok therefore argues in favour of a plebiscitary democracy and the introduction of binding referenda as a direct expression of the popular will. Nonetheless, the Vlaams Blok is not simply an anti-European party. Contrary to some other West European populist movements, the attitude of anti-Europeanism in itself forms no part of the populist appeal of the Vlaams Blok.28 Its populist critique 22 Vlaams Blok (2004b), op. cit. 23 Oakeshott, M. (1996), The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism (New Haven: Yale University Press); Canovan (1999), op. cit.; Mouffe, C. (2000), The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso); Papadopoulos, Y. (2002), ‘Populism, the Democratic Question, and Contemporary Governance’, in Mény and Surel (eds.), op. cit.; Taggart, P. (2002), ‘Populism and the Pathology of Representative Politics’, in Mény and Surel (eds.), op. cit.; Abts, op. cit.; Abts, K. and Rummens, S. (2007). Populism versus Democracy, Political Studies (forthcoming). 24 Leca, J. (1996), ‘La démocratie à l’épreuve des pluralismes’, Revue françaize de Science Politique, 46(2), pp. 225–279; Mair, P. (2002), ‘Populist Democracy versus Party Democracy’ in Mény and Surel (eds.). 25 Bobbio, N. (1987), The Future of Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press). 26 Vlaams Blok (2004b), op. cit., p. 24. 27 Canovan, M, 2002, ‘Taking Politics to the People: Populism as the Ideology of Democracy’, in Mény and Surel (eds.), op. cit.; Papadopoulos, op. cit. 28 Taggart, P. (1995), ‘New Populist Parties in Western Europe’, Western European Politics, 18(1), pp. 34–51; Taggart (2000), op. cit.

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is principally directed at the European establishment in general. Although in the Vlaams Blok’s view, Europe can never be a political unit or federal superstate, it does subscribe to the idea of a confederal Europe with an extensive and strengthened common policy with respect to certain areas where Europe can offer beneﬁts. In the party’s view an institutionally united Europe is only an ‘intergovernmental cooperative association’ with respect to a number of clearly deﬁned matters, all of which are associated with transnational problems. First of all, these are matters such as the internal market, environment, transport infrastructure, and consumer protection. For the Vlaams Blok, efﬁcient economic, environmental and infrastructure policies can only succeed in the European context. The approval of the procedures for such policies requires, in the Vlaams Blok’s view, a qualiﬁed European majority. Apart from this, the party is also forcefully in favour of common European foreign affairs, defence, and immigration and asylum policies. In view of their enormous impact on national interests, decisions made at the European level on such matters must in the party’s view be adopted unanimously.29 Foreign Policy, Defence Policy, Immigration and Asylum Policy The Vlaams Blok regards the best response to the geopolitical challenges of the twenty-ﬁrst century as comprising a common foreign policy, an effective European defence force and a strict common immigration and asylum policy, with these policies serving as the main concerns of the European Union. With respect to foreign policy, the party notes that ‘Europe must speak with a single voice.’30 At present, EU foreign policy offers insufﬁcient counterbalance to the global hegemony of the US and suffers excessively from internal division, as well as a lack of credibility and effectiveness, as demonstrated most strikingly by the war in Iraq. Nonetheless, the Vlaams Blok fails to formulate any forceful and relevant, let alone clear, positions with regard to European diplomacy. When asked for an opinion about the second Gulf War, the Vlaams Blok replies, with a mixture of sarcasm and nonchalance, that it is not ‘our war’. In general, the attitude towards transatlantic politics is marked by internal division. On the one hand the Vlaams Blok points to the danger of blindly following the US, and questions the de facto position of the US as world leader. After all, the Vlaams Blok ideal is of the organic community and a European Community of peoples that rejects both American individualism and socialist collectivism.31 On the other hand, the party nonetheless views the US as a natural ally in this era of clashing civilizations. The ambivalent attitude of the party towards the US is clearly visible in the party’s view of the NATO alliance. Although the party is well aware that the US offered protection from the Soviet threat during the Cold War, the Vlaams Blok considers that Europe should take initiatives as quickly as possible to protect itself. In the 1980s this was formulated as follows:

29 Vlaams Blok (2001b), op. cit. 30 Vlaams Blok (2004b), op. cit. 31 Dillen (1990), op. cit.

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The Vlaams Blok takes the view that future European policy should aim to achieve and maintain the independence of Europe… By way of transition, and as long as Europe is not a single entity and does not itself have the power to pursue its own policies, it is perfectly clear that the lesser evil is the inevitable continuation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The Vlaams Blok therefore takes the position that a uniﬁed Europe must also be a strong, armed and effective Europe capable of protecting its freedom and itself.32

During the Cold War the ofﬁcial line was unanimous – as long as there was no European defence force, Europe had to remain in NATO. However, after the fall of the Berlin Wall there has been a clear call to withdraw from NATO. In 1993, Karim Van Overmeire, currently a Vlaams Blok member in Belgium’s lower house, put it as follows: Nowadays no more excuses can be invented for following the United States or even recognizing US leadership in the world. There is no longer any such thing as the West. Although North America and Europe may often have similar interests, which they should jointly pursue, they have just as often conﬂicting interests.33

The party’s programme for the European elections34 reafﬁrms its plea for the development of an independent European defence force separate from NATO and the US. The underlying idea is that in the absence of any such political and military union, the US will continue to set the international agenda not only in Europe, but elsewhere in the world as well. More speciﬁcally, the party proposes a European defence community based on an intergovernmental treaty that provides that EU member states must harmonize their defence initiatives and render one another assistance, should a member state be attacked. To this end the Vlaams Blok would certainly be prepared to double the defence budget to the same relative level as the US, namely to 3.2 per cent of GDP instead of the current 1.5 per cent. After all, says the Vlaams Blok, ‘the world is not a peaceful village. It is a jungle where only the right of might counts. Without properly motivated and equipped armed forces no country in the world can retain its freedom, its prosperity or its independence.’35 Despite its plea for an independent European defence force, the Vlaams Blok is apparently not unambiguously anti-American. The EU and the US have, according to the party, similar interests in the ﬁght against terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism and the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapon technologies. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the common threat of communism has been steadily replaced by Islam, especially after 11 September 2001.36 For this reason, the Vlaams Blok, in this arena at least, is in favour of far-reaching cooperation between the EU and the US as equal partners in a treaty of association. In short, the US is viewed

32 Dillen, K. (1980), Vlaams Blok Grondbeginselen (Deurne: Vlaams Blok). 33 See Spruyt, M. (1995), Grove borstels. Stel dat het Vlaams Blok Morgen zijn Programma realizeert, Hoe Zou Vlaanderen er dan uitzien? (Leuven: Van Halewyck). 34 Vlaams Blok (2004b), op. cit. 35 Vlaams Blok (2004a), op. cit. 36 Vlaams Blok (2004a), op. cit.; Vlaams Blok (2004b), op. cit.

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as a natural ally, while the supremacy of this great power and the subordination of Europe in NATO are decried. The Vlaams Blok also favours the abolition of the United Nations, although it uses rather different arguments. First of all, the party does not recognize the legitimacy and authority of the UN. ‘The illogical composition of the Security Council. The unwieldy bureaucracy. The democratic deﬁcit. All those factors make the UN an unproductive, unreliable and incredible organization.’37 However, the criticism is more fundamental. In the party’s eyes the entire logic behind the UN is bad. The Vlaams Blok attaches no faith at all in the existence of a world community or an international legal system, let alone the possibility of enforcing any such legal system. In any case, there is no international consensus about fundamental concepts like democracy, justice, freedom or human rights. Consequently, the party argues that the UN is totally unsuitable for such a task, as the majority of the organization’s members are non-Western and undemocratic countries. ‘The UN is weighed down with an accumulation of insoluble contradictions… If the West is to survive in a hostile and barbaric world, it will have to rely on its own strength. We must not subordinate our right to self-defence to the decisions of the UN.’38 The Vlaams Blok is therefore in favour of an international police force controlled solely by Western countries to secure the continued existence of Europe. On the other hand, the Vlaams Blok adopts a far less European, and even less international, approach to the ﬁght against international terrorism. Although the party supports the European arrest warrant, it is ﬁrmly opposed to the way the draft European Constitution promotes mutual cooperation among Europe’s police forces and courts. According to the party there is no longer any mention of intergovernmental cooperation, but simply a threatened equivalence of police forces and the administration of justice throughout Europe, as a result of which the operation of the police could escape the sovereignty of national states. The Vlaams Blok is therefore in favour of less Europe with respect to law and order and justice. Despite the complexities of ﬁghting international terrorism, the party sticks to the view that law and order and the administration of justice belong among the inalienable responsibilities of the national authority.39 Nevertheless Europe may not evolve into ‘an open-door zone for the third world’.40 Accordingly, the Vlaams Blok favours the introduction of a strict European immigration and asylum policy that makes use of a list of ‘unsafe countries’. The party wants new member states to provide greater guarantees that they will make sufﬁcient effort to protect their external borders against the entry of illegal immigrants and criminals from non-member states in Eastern Europe. With respect to asylum policy, the Vlaams Blok believes that member states must also take steps to amend the Geneva Conventions so as to include the territoriality principle. Once this is done, refugee status could only be granted to European citizens. In the meantime, a list of ‘politically unsafe countries’ must be drawn up. Applications for political 37 38 39 40

Vlaams Blok (May 1994), Magazine, p. 7. Vlaams Blok (May 1994), Magazine, p. 7. Vlaams Blok (2004b), op. cit. Vlaams Blok (June 1994), Magazine, p. 8.

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asylum from these countries would be automatically disqualiﬁed from consideration. As for economic refugees, the Vlaams Blok favours fast and ﬁrm repatriation, while prospective refugees are best held in their countries of origin. Finally, such a strict immigration and asylum policy must be underpinned by a common European foreign policy, where development and aid initiatives would be linked to the repatriation of illegal immigrants.41 Here it also appears that the Vlaams Blok views development aid mainly in terms of its immigrant policy, and speciﬁcally in terms of the prevention of international migration and a proactive return policy. For example, the party would like to invest virtually the entire development aid budget in the countries of origin of those non-European foreigners in Belgium, such as Morocco, Turkey and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Such a radical reorientation of policy would lead to the suspension of all government support to the projects of non-governmental aid organizations.42 European Enlargement The party’s attitude towards the expansion of the European Union is likewise highly ambiguous. Here the Vlaams Blok ﬁnds itself squeezed between ideology and practice. The party still dreams, for example, of a united Indo-European Europe, stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals. The fact that the EU has opened its arms to Eastern Europe is a good thing in abstract terms, particularly as this reduces the danger of these countries falling back into the clutches of the Russian sphere of inﬂuence. Yet, although the Vlaams Blok is not opposed to this enlargement as such, it seriously objects to the practical feasibility and the conditions of accession for the ten new member states. The Vlaams Blok thinks that the EU enlargement has taken place too fast and that too many new members have been accepted at once. The rush has meant that that the EU has tried to accept too many countries at once, even though most countries were not ready and are still faced with all kinds of unresolved problems. The Vlaams Blok fears that this will lead to a new and massive wave of immigrants, a rise in crime, brutal economic competition, a steep rise in the democratic deﬁcit and a permanent breakdown of national communities. The Vlaams Blok sees a new wave of immigration and crime as the most catastrophic consequence of the new round of European enlargement. According to the party, numerous East European gangs and terrorist networks have been given free rein now that these criminals live within EU territory. For this reason, the Vlaams Blok opposes the free movement of persons within the EU and favours strict border controls at the internal borders of the EU, particularly along the borders with the new member states. This measure would serve to restrict the free movement of people for a speciﬁc period of time; namely, for as long as the standards of the economies of the new states do not approach those of the existing states. This restriction on the free movement of persons would, according to the Vlaams Blok, also prevent existing member states from being ﬂooded by a new wave of guest workers. Nonetheless, 41 Vlaams Blok (2004b), op. cit. 42 Dewinter, F. (2000), ‘Baas in Eigen Land’, Over identiteit, culturele eigenheid En nationaliteit (Brussel: Egmont).

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the party fears that there will be an immense rise in unemployment, a distortion in industrial relations, and catastrophic consequences for the social welfare system as a result of internal competition within Europe, ‘The Flemings will probably have to pay the bill for the unbridled accession policy adopted by the European Commission; not just once but twice. First as net contributors to the EU budget and second as victims of an enormous increase in competition.’43 The Vlaams Blok also opposes any fast expansion on democratic grounds; on one hand because the EU threatens to become a bureaucratic government incapable of adopting decisions that are good for all member states, and on the other hand because the democratic process does not work as it should in the new member states and many of their political systems are riddled with corruption. Finally, the sharp differences in prosperity and social and cultural distinctions will, in the party’s view, probably result in even greater conﬂicts and contradictions within the EU, while at the same time natural ethnic communities will be disrupted. However, the party fails to make itself at all clear about what might be a desirable size for the European Union, particularly as there are apparently divergent opinions on this within the leadership. What does emerge though is that Vlaams Blok clearly and openly opposes any further unlimited and rapid expansion. Moreover, the party is ﬁrmly convinced that any expansion of the EU should be limited to those peoples who belong to the European cultural community. This is because the Vlaams Blok sees Europe primarily as a community of civilizations: ‘To achieve meaningful cooperation, all partners must share a number of fundamental values.’44 Thus, for the Vlaams Blok the acceptance of Turkey as a prospective member of the EU is totally unacceptable. Apart from the fact that Turkey is not a democracy, and is economically irreconcilable with the EU, which would result in a massive drain on ﬁnancial resources, the main objection is that Islamic Turkey could never be part of the European cultural community. ‘There is no reason whatsoever, religious, political, historic, economic or cultural to accept Turkey as a member state of the EU… The person who opens the door to Turkey, moves Europe’s borders to Egypt, Syria, Iraq and the Caucasus, and ﬂings open the gates to a new and massive tidal wave of immigration.’45 This doomsday scenario is the reason why the Vlaams Blok is so radically opposed to any Turkish accession: it is not just undesirable, it would also be a dangerous precedent. ‘In the blink of an eye, both Tunisia and Morocco will be knocking on Europe’s door, application forms in hand.’46 The Vlaams Blok therefore demands that the entire Turkish question should be settled by a binding referendum in each of the member states, whereby Europeans would cast their votes not only on the admission of Turkey, but also on the European Constitution and further enlargement of the EU. This move allows the Vlaams Blok to make a populist appeal to anti-establishment as well as anti-Islamic feelings while openly lamenting the disinclination of the political class to give expression to the people’s will on the integration of Europe. Although anti-Islamism is an important 43 44 45 46

Vlaams Blok (2004b), op. cit. Vlaams Blok (2001a), op. cit. Vlaams Blok (2004b), op. cit. Vlaams Blok (2004b), op. cit.

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plank of the Vlaams Blok’s international vision, the rejection of Turkey as an EU member does not mean that the party thinks that far-reaching cooperation and good neighbourliness with Turkey is impossible, that is if Turkey respects human rights and makes every effort to deal fairly and strictly with Islamic fundamentalism.47 Once again this is indicative of the ethnopluralism of the Vlaams Blok. Such essentialist distinctiveness is the point of departure of the party’s model of cultural segregation. In its view every cultural community must be allowed to be itself and has a right to its own room for living. Between the People’s Community, the Indo-European Cultural Community, the Dream of a Great European Empire and a Western Alliance From the above it will be clear that the position of the Vlaams Blok on international questions is far from unambiguous. To put it brieﬂy, the party ﬂoats between the idea of a Flemish people’s community, a Europe of peoples, a strong Europe, and a Western alliance. The call for a strong Europe alternates with complaints about too much Europe, whereas a powerful anti-American note in some areas seems to be interchangeable with calls for more transatlantic unity. The ambivalence of the international face of the Vlaams Blok is, however, most clearly expressed in the party’s attitude to the process of European integration and enlargement. In general, the extreme-right vision of Europe attempts to link the Flemish community to the European cultural community, in which ‘our own people ﬁrst’ is combined with ‘Europe for Europeans’. Consequently, the party sees the European uniﬁcation project both as a threat to the Flemish identity and an opportunity to realize the dream of a true Europe that would be the rightful successor to the Indo-European heritage. To counter the far-reaching inclusiveness of the European project, the Vlaams Blok invokes le droit à la difference,48 or the right of the Flemish people to their own cultural identity, whereby a people’s nationalism forms the ideological framework for demanding a separate and independent place as of a right in Europe. A striking aspect of this nationalist party, which above all wants to bring about an independent Flanders, is that it does not reject the European project as such. This can be easily understood by looking at the link between the nouvelle droite trend in the Flemish extreme right and the Indo-European heritage.49 Apart from undermining the speciﬁc nature of the Flemish people, European uniﬁcation offers, in the Vlaams Blok’s view, a way of reviving European culture, in particular the original and essential Indo-European or Indo-Germanic cultural community. This overarching culture or mentality would, according to the party, stress the common origins of the European peoples and should therefore be actively defended. The meaning of the

47 Ibid. 48 De Benoist, A. (1978), Vu de droite: anthologie critique des idées contemporaines (Paris: Copernic). 49 Taguieff and P.-A. (1994), Sur la nouvelle droite: jalons d’une analyse critique (Paris: Descartes); Delporte, S. (2002), Nieuw Rechts in Vlaanderen (Universiteit Gent: Licentiate dissertation).

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‘European heartland’ is illustrated by following quote: ‘In our view Europe would be better constructed from the glory of the past, free of all guilt complexes, and the consciousness of the common culture and heritage [ … ] We don’t want to lose the European grandeur of the past at this juncture when joint action at the world level is vitally important.’51 So, the party’s attitude towards Europeanism is based on two references. On the one hand there is an ideological foundation, notably the common European civilization and core values. On the other hand, a united Europe is simply realpolitik to keep external threats at bay. Nonetheless, the attitude towards the European project is extremely ambivalent. Each radical-nationalist party is faced with the difﬁculty of connecting the national community to Europe. At the same time the Vlaams Blok supports two types of heartland: the community of the Flemish people and the Indo-European cultural community. However, the Vlaams Blok is perfectly clear about the relationship between the Flemish community and the European one, namely that the interests of the Flemish community must always take precedence over those of the IndoEuropean people. This is why the Vlaams Blok argues in favour of ‘including the sovereign principle of “one’s own people ﬁrst” in all European conventions, followed in importance by the “European preference”, which means that Europeans should be given political preference over residents who are not citizens of an EU member state’.52 The cultural singularity of the different European peoples is thus inviolable. As a consequence, not only the idea of a federal Europe, but also the theoretical construct of a shared Indo-Europe itself is undermined. In spite of this, European identity remains crucial to the international policy of the Vlaams Blok. The signiﬁcance of the European heritage is especially apparent from the party’s attitude towards the enlargement of the EU. Although the party is critical of the implementation of the recent enlargement, it seems that the Vlaams Blok has nothing against the idea of enlargement as such. After all, the new member states share the same European culture. ‘Of course Poles and Greeks are culturally different from Flemings or Italians, but these cultures are related to one another. They rest on shared foundations: a mixture of elements of pre-Christian, Germanic, Christian, classic Graeco-Roman and humanist civilization.’53 The celebration and importance of the Indo-European identity in the party’s approach to Europe is mainly identiﬁable from the rejection of any possible consideration of Turkey’s membership. According to the Vlaams Blok, Islamic culture is simply irreconcilable with, and a direct threat to, the Indo-European heritage. In other words, apart from advocating the Flemish identity, the Vlaams Blok makes it clear that it is also an uncompromising defender of an essential and original European identity. The opposition to a united or federal Europe demonstrates, however, the limits of the Vlaams Blok’s Europeanism. Even in Europe, ‘our own people ﬁrst’ seems to be the political creed. Defence is an exception to the rule. With respect to defence and 50 Taggart (2000), op. cit. 51 Vlaams Blok (June 1989), Magazine, p. 5. 52 Vlaams Blok (2004b), op. cit. 53 Vlaams Blok (1999), Baas in eigen land. Verkiezingsprogramma van het Vlaams Blok. (Brussel: Vlaams Blok).

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foreign policy, the Vlaams Blok mainly laments the weakness and powerlessness of Europe compared with the US and Russia. The solution is a ‘block-free’ Europe with a powerful defence. This call for a powerful European defence force refers to the ‘Great European Empire’ ideal and the dream of a large and powerful Europe, independent of the US and Russia. The core of this dream is a uniﬁed central Europe, which would, once again, occupy a powerful position in world politics and whose territory would stretch from the Atlantic shore to the Urals. Finally, despite the anti-American discourse, the Vlaams Blok continues to see the US as Europe’s natural ally in the struggle against the menace of Islam and communism. In the shared struggle of the West against the rest, the party argues in turn for more transatlantic unity, and the development of a powerful and effective Western global police force. In short, the Vlaams Blok hovers between the Flemish people, a Europe of peoples, Indo-Europe, a strong European Empire and a Western alliance as the elements of its international policies. The International Extreme Right: A Party Family? From early in the 1980s, the Vlaams Blok was interested in the political developments of extreme-right movements in other countries. Whenever a radical-right party met with success anywhere in Europe, the Vlaams Blok was prepared to seal an alliance. In this respect the close relationship with the French Front National (FN) is particularly striking.54 The Vlaams Blok maintains close contacts with the FN and leaders from both parties regularly attend each other’s activities. The FN is sometimes described as the model and big brother of the Vlaams Blok. Indeed, ever since 1984 the Vlaams Blok has kept a close eye on the electoral strategy and political line of the FN and has successfully applied the French party’s strategy in Flanders. Furthermore, the Flemish party regards the administrative mandates that the FN has won in Marignane, Orange, Toulon and Vitrolles as interesting test cases, and as a source of priceless information for the development of its own political strategy, particularly in Antwerp. Apart from the French connection, other contacts are heavily biased towards Eastern Europe. Over the years the Vlaams Blok has had contacts with all kinds of nationalist movements and parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. These contacts form part of a deliberate strategy aimed at preventing the political vacuum in Eastern Europe from being ﬁlled by the traditional parties by default.55 The contacts and exchanges with Austria’s Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) and Italy’s Lega Nord (LN) are more recent. Despite numerous attempts by the Vlaams Blok to establish links with Jörg Haider’s party, the FPÖ leadership for a long time shied away from any approach by the Vlaams Blok. As for the Lega Nord, it was the Vlaams Blok itself that distrusted the Italian party. But the three parties made overtures to each 54 Gijsels, H. and Vander Velpen, J. (1989), Het Vlaams Blok 1938–1988: Het verdriet van Vlaanderen (Berchem: EPO/Halt). 55 Spruyt, M. (2000), Wat het Vlaams Blok verzwijgt (Leuven: Van Halewyck).

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other in the summer of 2002, after which the Vlaams Blok has maintained contact with both the FPÖ and the Lega Nord. At a meeting in Austria these parties even proposed that talks be started with the Danish People’s Party to establish cooperation around a number of speciﬁc themes. It was also hoped that the four could form a parliamentary party in the European Parliament following the 2004 elections.56 But previous experiences show that formal cooperation in the European Parliament is not realized in an instant.

Table 4.1

The number of seats of radical right parties in the European Parliament

Vlaams Blok (Belgium) Front National (France) Die Republikaner (Germany) MSI - Alleanza Nazionale (Italy) Lega Nord (Italy) Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Austria) Dansk Folkeparti (Denmark) Ethniki Politiki Enosis (Greece)

1979

1984

1989

1994

1999

2004

– – – 4 – – – –

0 10 – 5 – – – 1

1 10 6 12 4 – – –

2 11 0 11 6 – – –

2 5 – 9 4 5 1 –

3 7 – 9 4 1 1 –

After the 1984 elections, MEPs from FN, the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), the Ethniki Politiki Enosis (EPEN) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) formed the Group of the European Right. Five years later the 10 FN MEPs, the six MEPs from Die Republikaner and the one Vlaams Blok MEP established the EuroRight parliamentary party – known ofﬁcially as the Technical Group of the European Right. However, the formation of this group was not done without difﬁculty. The case of South Tyrol made it impossible for the Republikaner to conclude an alliance with the MSI. Secondly, the ideological differences between the FN and the Vlaams Blok meant that the agreement resulted in only a technical alliance, not a deal to present a common party line. In spite of repeated discord within the parliamentary group, the Vlaams Blok wanted to form a strengthened European parliamentary party after the elections of 1994. But the voters decided otherwise. Only the Vlaams Blok and the FN were reelected to the European Parliament, which made it impossible to carry out the plan. To be recognized as an ofﬁcial parliamentary party, a group must consist of at least 16 MEPs from at least three different countries. As a result, Vlaams Blok MEPs sat with the unregistered delegates. However, together with the MEPs of the FN they established an alliance called The Coordination of the European Right.57 Neither did the dream of a strong European party come true in 1999 and 2004. Bad election results and differences of opinion hampered ﬁrm cooperation. 56 Vlaams Blok (2002), Magazine, September. 57 Spruyt (1995), op. cit.; Spruyt (2000), op. cit.

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As far as European unity is concerned, there is a big gap between the dreams of some radical politicians and their concrete realizations. The so-called party family of the extreme right has so far succeeded only twice in forming a European parliamentary party. Since 1994 the radical parties are divided among themselves. ‘The problems of establishing the parliamentary group were an early indicator of the limits to cross-national co-operation between parties whose assertive nationalism was to the fore in their ideological platforms. Historical enmities were clearly a major hurdle to any shared patriotism towards Europe.’58 So, one can wonder what is meant by ‘party family’. Scientiﬁc discussions focus primarily on the question of whether there is a group of radical-right parties that have a common ideological basis.59 Less attention is paid to the formal and informal cooperation among these parties in Europe. In any case, the inability to cooperate is a characteristic of this so-called party family. As a result of fundamental ideological disagreements, the parties failed to form a European parliamentary party. Thus, we doubt there exists a radical-right party family. Conclusion The international programme of the Vlaams Blok deals only brieﬂy with many foreign policy aspects. Often the programme is also ambiguous or vague. There are two reasons for this. First, foreign policy is not the core business of the party. International politics only matters for the Vlaams Blok if it can be linked to national and local politics. The Treaty of Maastricht is reduced to voting rights for EU citizens, 11 September 2001 to the threat of Islam, and the EU membership of Turkey to the downfall of the centuries-old European heritage. Second, there is a lack of agreement on some aspects. But the fact that there are internal disagreements concerning international topics is not a problem for the party. The Vlaams Blok allows the subject of the EU and the relations with the US to be debated openly in its magazine, because these are purely internal discussions and as such have virtually no impact on electoral appeal. Although some party members have a clear view on some issues, the world-view of the party is described in a rather utopian and nonsystematic way. The internal relations between the Flemish community, a Europe of peoples, Indo-Europe, the great European empire and the Western alliance are not always clear and sometimes even conﬂicting. This does not mean, however, that there is no logic to the Vlaams Blok’s international ideology. On the contrary, its view on international topics is built on the ethno-nationalistic populism that the party defends in national politics. Its ‘own 58 Fieschi, C., Shields, J. and Woods, R. (1996), ‘Extreme Right-wing Parties and the European Union: France, Germany and Italy’ in Political Parties and the European Union, Gaffney, J. (ed.) (London: Routledge), p. 236. 59 Ignazi, P. (1992), ‘The Silent Counter-Revolution, Hypotheses on the Emergence of Extreme Right-wing Parties in Europe’, European Journal of Political Research, 1–2(22), pp. 3–34.; Betz, H.-G. (1994), Radical Right-wing Populism in Western Europe (New York: St. Martin’s Press); Kitschelt, op. cit.; Mair, P. and Mudde, C. (1998), ‘The Party Family and its Study’, Annual Review of Political Science, 1, pp. 211–29; Mudde, op. cit.

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community’ also has priority in the international policy agenda of the party. National and international matters are included in an ethno-pluralistic worldview. Therefore, the slogan ‘our own people ﬁrst, always and everywhere’, should be interpreted very literally. This thesis is also the basis of the party’s international agenda, as evidenced by the conceptualization of the ‘European confederation of peoples’. So, the relation to the ‘outside’ is a speciﬁcation of the ethno-pluralistic attitude towards the cultural or ethnic ‘other’. The Vlaams Blok takes the view that people are inextricably bound up with a speciﬁc ethnic community, that people and ethnic communities are not identical but equivalent, and that every community has a right to its own place to live. For the Vlaams Blok, rights to cultural identity imply that every community has a right to its own territory. How the international party line will evolve in the future is unclear. In November 2004 the party transformed itself into Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest), because Belgium’s Supreme Court (Court of Cassation) upheld the conviction by the Court of Appeal of racism and discrimination. The party’s audacious pronouncements directed primarily at non-European foreigners can in the view of the Court not be tolerated. This judgement strikes at the heart of the Vlaams Blok, for it is precisely its antiforeigner position that has yielded electoral gain. So far the anti-foreigner position has been the be-all and end-all of the Vlaams Blok’s ‘our own people ﬁrst’ ideology. To safeguard its political heavyweights against prosecution and to guarantee future revenue, in November 2004 the party changed its Basic Principles and Regulations. Although several extremist clauses have been deleted, the transformation of the Vlaams Blok into Vlaams Belang seems to have no other goal than to polish its façade. At the ﬁrst congress of the ‘new’ party, President Frank Vanhecke underlined that the content of the party line will hardly change: ‘We change our name, but not our tricks. We change our name, but not our programme… We stay the party that never said “only our own people”, but that always, even if we may not say it any more, will keep thinking “our own people ﬁrst”.’ At this point it is simply too early to assess the consequences of this transformation, but time will tell whether the Vlaams Belang wants or needs to develop a new ideological basis and new public frames.

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Acronyms EU FN FPÖ LN MEP MSI NATO UN

European Union Front National Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs Lega Nord Member of the European Parliament Movimento Sociale Italiano North Atlantic Treaty Organisation United Nations

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Dewinter, F. (2000), Baas in eigen land. Over identiteit, culturele eigenheid en nationaliteit (Brussels: Egmont). Dillen, K. (1980), Vlaams Blok Grondbeginselen (Deurne: Vlaams Blok). ––– (1990), Manifest van het rechtse Vlaams-nationalisme. Grondbeginselen (Brussels: Vlaams Blok). European Commission (2004), Eurobarometer 61 (Brussels: EC). Fieschi, C., Shields, J. and Woods, R. (1996), ‘Extreme Right-wing Parties and the European Union: France, Germany and Italy’ in Gaffney, J. (ed.). Gaffney, J. (ed.), Political Parties and the European Union (London: Routledge). Gijsels, H. and Vander Velpen, J. (1989), Het Vlaams Blok 1938-1988: Het verdriet van Vlaanderen (Berchem: EPO/Halt). Hainsworth, P. (ed.) (2000), The Politics of the Extreme Right. From the Margins to the Mainstream (London: Pinter). Ignazi, P. (1992), ‘The Silent Counter-Revolution, Hypotheses on the Emergence of Extreme Right-wing Parties in Europe’, European Journal of Political Research, 1–2(22). Immerfall, S. (1998), ‘The Neo-Populist Agenda’ in Betz, H.-G. and Immerfall, S. (eds.). Kitschelt, H. (1995), The Radical Right in Western Europe: a Comparative Analysis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press). Kitschelt, H., Lange, P., Marks, G. and Stephens, J. (eds.) (1999), Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Kriesi, H. (1999), ‘Movements of the Left, Movements of the Right: Putting the Mobilization of Two New Types of Social Movements into Political Context’ in Kitschelt, H., Lange, P., Marks, G. and Stephens, J. (eds.). Leca, J. (1996), ‘La démocratie à l’épreuve des pluralismes’, Revue françaize de Science Politique, 46(2). Mair, P. (2002), ‘Populist Democracy Versus Party Democracy’ in Mény, Y. and Surel, Y. (eds.). Mair, P. and Mudde, C. (1998), ‘The Party Family and its Study’, Annual Review of Political Science, 1. [DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.211] Mény, Y. and Surel, Y. (eds.) (2002), Democracies and the Populist Challenge (New York: Palgrave). Merkl, P. and Weinberg, L. (eds.) (1997), The Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the Nineties (London: Frank Cass Publishers). Mouffe, C. (2000), The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso). Mudde, C. (2000), The Ideology of Extreme Right (Manchester: Manchester University Press). Oakeshott, M. (1996), The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism (New Haven: Yale University Press). Papadopoulos, Y. (2002), ‘Populism, the Democratic Question, and Contemporary Governance’ in Mény, Y. and Surel, Y. (eds.). Spruyt, M. (1995), Grove borstels. Stel dat het Vlaams Blok morgen zijn programma realizeert, hoe zou Vlaanderen er dan uitzien? (Leuven: Van Halewyck). ––– (2000), Wat het Vlaams Blok verzwijgt (Leuven: Van Halewyck). Swank, D. and Betz, H.-G. (2003), ‘Globalization, the Welfare State, and Right Wing Populism in Western Europe’, Socio-Economic Review, 1. [DOI: 10.1093/ soceco%2F1.2.215]

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Swyngedouw, E. (1997), ‘Homing in and Spacing Out: Re-Conﬁguring Scale’, School of Geography, University of Oxford, WPG97-10. ––– (1995), ‘The “Threatening Immigrant” in Flanders 1930–1980, Redrawing the Social Space’, New Community (Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies) 21(3). ––– (2001), ‘The Subjective Cognitive and Affective Map of Extreme Right Voters: Using Open-End Questions in Exit-Polls’, Electoral Studies, 20(1) [DOI: 10.1016/ S0261-3794%2800%2900010-X] Swyngedouw, M. and Beerten, R. (1996), ‘Cognitieve en affectieve motieven van partijkeuze. De nationale verkiezingen van 21 mei 1995’, Res Publica, 38(3–4). Swyngedouw, M. and Ivaldi, G. (2001), ‘The Extreme Right Utopia in Belgium and France. The Ideology of the Flemish Vlaams Blok and the French Front National’, Western European Politics, 24(3). Taggart, P. (1995), ‘New Populist Parties in Western Europe’, Western European Politics, 18(1). Taguieff, P.-A. (1994), Sur la nouvelle droite: jalons d’une analyse critique (Paris: Descartes). ––– (1995), ‘Political Science Confronts Populism’, Telos, 103(1). ––– (2000), Populism (Buckingham: Open University Press). ––– (2002), ‘Populism and the Pathology of Representative Politics’ in Mény, Y. and Surel, Y. (eds.). Urry, J. (2003), Global Complexity (Cambridge: Polity Press). Van Craen, M. and Swyngedouw, M. (2002), Het Vlaams Blok doorgelicht: 25 jaar extreem-rechts in Vlaanderen (Leuven: ISPO-Bulletin). Van der Eijk, C. and Franklin, M. (eds.) (1996), Choosing Europe: the European Electorate and the National Parties in the Face of the Union (Ann Arbor: University Press). Van Dijck, W. (2001), ‘Vlaanderen in Europa’, Vlaams Blok-Magazine, 25(7–8). Van Overmeire, K. (2000), ‘Uitbreiding Europese Unie is moeilijke oefening’, Vlaams Blok-Magazine, 24(2). Verreyken, W. (1994), Europa barst! (Antwerp: Tyr). Vlaams Blok (1999), Baas in Eigen Land. Verkiezingsprogramma van het Vlaams Blok (Brussels: Vlaams Blok). ––– (2001a), Congrestekst staatsgedachte (Brussels: Vlaams Blok). ––– (2001b), Congrestekst Europa (Brussels: Vlaams Blok). ––– (2004a), Dossier ‘Europa: vloek of zegen?’ (Brussels: Vlaams Blok). ––– (2004b), Vlaamse Staat, Europese Natie. Europees verkiezingsprogramma 2004 (Brussels: Vlaams Blok).

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Chapter 5

Nationalism, New Right, and New Cleavages in Danish Politics: Foreign and Security Policy of the Danish People’s Party Jørgen Goul Andersen

Introduction Foreign policy is not a priority area of the Danish People’s Party, which since 2001 has been the only ‘new right’ party of any signiﬁcance in Denmark. Rather, the party’s foreign policy positions are mainly a consequence of its ardent resistance against immigration and multiculturalism. This issue has triggered a basic change in the Danish political cleavage structure and has become equally as important for party choice as the traditional class-based left–right conﬂict. As the resistance against multiculturalism has it appeals mainly to the less-educated segments of the population, the Danish People’s Party has adjusted its position leftwards on the traditional left–right scale, on distributional and welfare issues, in order to consolidate its support. This chapter presents the policy positions of the party and the attitudes of its voters within a framework that emphasizes changes in political cleavages1 and relatively ‘rational’ political behaviour more than the party’s populist platform and voters’ panic reactions to globalization and related fears of marginalization of which we ﬁnd few signs in the Danish case. As a result of the changing cleavages, the relative strength of the political parties and the majority combinations in Parliament have changed quite profoundly. When the Danish People’s Party (DF) gained 12 per cent of the votes in the Danish 2001 election, it was lifted from the margins to the mainstream of Danish politics. For the ﬁrst time since the 1920s, parties to the right were able to form a majority in Parliament without the support of centre parties. Since then, the party has functioned as a stable, loyal and inﬂuential coalition partner for the liberal-conservative government led by the liberal Prime Minister Anders Fogh 1 Lipset, S. and Rokkan, S. (1967), Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York: Free Press), pp. 1–64; Andersen, J.G. and Bjørklund, T. (1990), ‘Structural Changes and New Cleavages: The Progress Parties in Denmark and Norway’, Acta Sociologica 33, 195–217; Kitschelt, H. (1995), The Radical Right in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press).

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Rasmussen. This cooperation has included, inter alia, annual budget negotiations, a big reform package in 2002 that lead to an unprecedented tightening of the conditions for immigration (and of social rights of new immigrants), support for Danish participation in the war against Iraq in 2003, and a major reform of the municipal and regional structure and division of labour between administrative levels in 2004, all of which were decided by the narrow minority of the three parties. Further, the Danish People’s Party has participated in nearly all broader compromises over labour market reforms, welfare reforms, and so on. The only major exception is European politics where the Danish People’s Party has consistently resisted any move towards further integration. This position as a ‘respectable’ coalition partner represents a fulﬁlment of the party’s dreams, especially of the undisputed party leader, Pia Kjærsgaard. Because of the ‘mainstreaming’ of the party (some might prefer to speak of the ‘populism’ of other parties), and because of the ambiguity of the term, we have abstained from using the word ‘populism’ in the headline, in favour of the term ‘new right’. Unlike what has often happened to ‘new right’ parties, political responsibility has not been detrimental to the electoral support of the party. On the contrary, the party obtained 13.3 per cent in the 2005 election, and throughout the period 2001–2006, support for the party in opinion polls has stabilized around 12–15 per cent, in spite of the declining saliency of the issue of immigration, and in spite of widespread satisfaction in the population with the new, tighter rules on immigration. On the other hand, and unlike what was previously the case, dramatic media events that trigger negative feelings towards immigrants have only caused moderate increases in support for the party. Even after the 11 September 2001 attacks, or during the Mohammed cartoon crisis in 2006, support for the DF only went up by some 2–3 per cent. One more peculiarity should be mentioned: although the Danish 2001 election was a landslide election, it was by no means a ‘protest election’. With the exception of the issue of immigration, voters had rather positive evaluations of the former Social Democratic coalition government, and the level of political trust in parliament, politicians, parties, government, and so on was not only among the very highest in Europe, but also the highest that had been recorded in Danish elections since 1971.2 In this respect, the 2001 election was diametrically opposite to the 1973 election, which witnessed the birth of the Danish Progress Party. The situation around the 2005 election was roughly the same as in 2001. Furthermore, the increasing support for the Danish People’s Party and the importance of immigration in Danish politics has come in a situation where there is nearly full employment (after 20 years of mass unemployment from 1975–1995), and where even the most cautious economists ﬁnd it difﬁcult to point at anything to be pessimistic about. This is similar to Norway where the DF’s sister party the Progress Party obtained 22 per cent in the 2005 election, but different from the experience in many other regions of Europe. Finally, the 2001 election did not unambiguously represent a resurgence of nationalism. On the contrary, even though the Danish population had largely maintained its scepticism against sacriﬁcing national sovereignty in favour of the 2

Andersen, J.G. (2004), Et ganske levende demokrati (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press).

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European Union (EU), the feeling of a European identity had been increasing. In 1990, only 17 per cent of the population felt ‘as much European as I feel Danish’; in 2001, the ﬁgure was 32 per cent. By 2003, even a small majority felt as much European, perhaps reﬂecting the successful extension of the EU to 25 members under Danish chairmanship of the EU3; in 2005, the ﬁgure was back to 32 per cent. However, at the time of the election in February 2005, 50 per cent declared themselves inclined to vote in favour of the new EU constitution (with only 30 per cent against it). This is about the highest proportion of favourable vote intentions recorded since the ﬁrst Danish referendum on EU membership in 1972. This paper focuses on the party’s foreign policy positions in the broad sense, including nationalism, attitudes to security policy, Europeanization and globalization. Further, it brieﬂy relates the party’s positions to voters’ attitudes and to the new cleavages in Danish politics which can be discerned even in the ﬁeld of foreign policy. The initial section elucidates the foreign policy positions of the Danish People’s Party and its actual behaviour in Parliament on foreign policy issues, including its position during the conﬂict with Muslim countries over the cartoons of Mohammed that had been printed in a Danish newspaper. Then, the article will analyse foreign policy opinions of Danish new right voters and discuss to what extent there is congruence between the party and its supporters on foreign policy issues, and to what extent new divisions are crystallizing among voters over foreign policy issues. Nationalism and Foreign Policy Positions of the Danish People’s Party The Danish People’s Party is the successor of the Progress Party, which was launched as an anarcho-liberal, populist tax protest party in 1973. From the beginning, the party was almost anti-nationalist. For instance, its founder Mogens Glistrup proposed to abolish the Danish defence in favour of an automatic telephone replier answering in Russian ‘we surrender!’, and to sell off Greenland and the Faroe Islands to the highest bidder. However, the party soon adopted a conventional bourgeois foreign policy with support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the EU. In 1984, Mogens Glistrup was imprisoned for tax fraud and replaced by Pia Kjærsgaard, who soon managed to grasp control of the party. From the mid-1980s, immigration became the core issue of the party while the issue of tax protest gradually disappeared except in the party programme. Since then, the cleavage structure of Danish politics has changed profoundly. It has increasingly been structured along two different dimensions: the traditional (distributional) left–right dimension, and a new liberal-authoritarian value dimension triggered by the issue of immigration, which is the core of this dimension alongside issues like law and order and aid to developing countries.4

3 Andersen, J.G. (2003a), ’EU og modstanden i Danmark’, in Danmark 30 år i EU. Et festskrift (København: Gyldendal), pp. 82−104. 4 Borre (1995), ‘Old and New Politics in Denmark’, Scandinavian Political Studies 18(3), pp. 187–205; Andersen, J.G. (2006), ‘The Parliamentary Election in Denmark, February 2005’, Electoral Studies 25(3), pp. 393–98.

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After a rebellion in the parliamentary group against Pia Kjærsgaard’s ‘dictatorial’ leadership, she broke out in 1995 and launched a new party, The Danish People’s Party. At the same time, most of the neoliberal heritage was thrown overboard, and as the party increasingly attracted workers – since 1994, the Progress Party/Danish People’s Party has recruited a larger proportion of its voters among workers than any other party – it further adjusted its welfare policies to consolidate its working class support. Increasingly, it has presented itself as a Social Democratic party as far as welfare is concerned, and in 2006, it even stated that it would by no means support any tax relief before the next election. As workers are leftist on distributional issues but rightist on liberal-authoritarian issues (determined by education), the centrist or even centre-left position of the Danish People’s Party on distributional issues has brought it closer to the political preferences of many workers. Instead of tax protest and critique of the welfare state, nationalism has been the core point and organizing principle of the party’s ideology. Nationalism and threats to the nation The nationalism of the Danish People’s Party is eclectic and by no means an intellectual doctrine. It is a small-state, ethnic nationalism, stressing the national cultural community, and the need to protect it against perceived threats. There are no attempts to deﬁne positively what constitutes ‘Danishness’ or its historical origins, and the programmes do not draw any distinctions between Danish and other Western cultures. But there is strong emphasis on the superiority of modern, secular, democratic Western culture, as compared with non-Western cultures. In her introduction to the extremely short party programme (Programme of Principles, of October 2002) which contains only 983 words, Pia Kjærsgaard states that ‘the essence of the party programme is a warm and strong love of our country’. Whereas there may be similarities with other Danish parties in concrete policy proposals, even on a few issues concerning immigration, the emphasis on the nation and the national Gemeinschaft is certainly a distinguishing feature of the party. Culture is loosely deﬁned as ‘the sum of the Danish people’s history, experience, beliefs, language and customs’.5 The party wants to ‘protect and develop’ this culture – and to support Danish minorities abroad. The party’s working programme says in a section about citizenship: Belonging to a nation presumes that you are a part of the community that binds the nation’s citizens together: Common language, a common set of values, common basic views, customs developed through history, and a behaviour the nation’s citizens feel conﬁdent about. People who do not share the common values – or actively oppose them – cannot be admitted to the community.6

According to the party programme, the task is to: 5 Translation by the author; actually, in 2004 the party programme was for a while available at the party’s home page in ten languages, including Turkish, Arabic and Hebrew! 6 It should be added, though, that the operational criteria of citizenship are about knowledge of language, society and democracy.

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• ‘strengthen the country’s internal and external security’; • ‘support those Danes who are in need’; • ‘oppose any attempt to curtail democracy and citizens’ rights of freedom’. The ﬁrst headline refers to law and order and defence and security policy, the second headline to welfare policy. The threats against democracy and freedom are spelled out in the party’s working programme which is undated, but was written around 2000. The decisive threats are immigration and loss of national sovereignty, but actually, the programme also includes a few other issues as threats, in particular a populist one and a neoliberal one: •

•

• •

•

•

‘Increasing distance between political decision makers and the people.’ Decisions are criticized for being made behind closed doors, and more referenda are demanded. This anti-establishment stance is strongly weakened in public statements since 2001, however, except in relation to the EU. ‘The tremendous growth of the public sector’ which creates disincentives to work and an ‘institutionalized dependency culture’. Since 2001, however, criticism of taxes and welfare has disappeared from the rhetoric of the party, and when the party’s Member of the European Parliament (MEP) (Camre) and a Member of Parliament (Messerschmidt) sought to revive it in 2005, they were immediately silenced by the party leader.7 ‘Normlessness and lack of respect’, due to ‘inefﬁcient and ideologically biased methods of socialization and teaching’ in schools. ‘Immigration from countries that are far away from Danish and European culture and way of life’ – groups that are ‘impossible to integrate in Danish society’. Due to high birth rates, marriages and family reunions, this ‘can transform Danes into a minority in Denmark within the 21st century’. Ghettoization, crime, illiteracy and suppression of women among nonWestern immigrants whose ‘religions and customs… have made their own countries poor, unfree and unbearable’. The working programme underlines the inferiority of non-Western cultures without explicitly mentioning Islam. The reference to Islam is highly explicit in other writings, however (see below). European Unionization as it will suppress national self-determination. To erode national identity will lead to a multicultural Europe which is ‘open to antidemocratic and violent movements’.

Against multiculturalism The nationalism of the party is related to – and originates from – the party’s ﬁerce opposition to immigration and multiculturalism. In a headline in the programme of principles, it is stated that ‘Denmark is not a country of immigration’ and that the party ‘will not accept a transformation to a multi-ethnic society’. In the working 7

Politiken, 12 July 2005.

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programme it is more explicitly stated that the party ‘will resist any attempt to build a multi-cultural or multi-ethnic society in Denmark, that is, a society where substantial groups of the population adhere to a different culture than ours. Making Denmark multiethnic implies that reactionary cultures hostile to development will erode our hitherto stable, homogeneous society’ Foreigners should be ‘admitted’ (the party’s own English translation uses the expression ‘it ought to be possible to absorb foreigners’) but ‘only provided that this does not put security and democratic government at risk’. Still, ‘to a limited extent… foreign nationals should be able to obtain Danish citizenship’. Islamophobia As mentioned, Islam is not explicitly referred to in the party programme or the working programme. But the documents are ﬁlled with allusions, and other writings are more explicit. The picture of Islam as a dogmatic, anti-modern, antidemocratic, patriarchal, violent religion has become the core of the party’s criticism of multiculturalism. Although the party leader Pia Kjaersgaard does sometimes distinguish between Islam and Islamists (see below), it is doubtful whether her audience grasps that – or whether they are intended to. When leaders from the Islamic religious community in Denmark travelled to the Middle East in January 2006 to mobilize protest against 12 cartoons of Mohammed that had been printed in a Danish newspaper, the Islamic religious community was described by Pia Kjaersgaard as a ‘ﬁfth column’. She added that ‘imams who injure Denmark’s interests should be thrown out of the country’ and that: The Islamic religious community in Denmark is populated by miserable, mendacious men with a troubling inﬂamed view on democracy and women. These are the enemy from within. The Trojan horse in Denmark. A kind of Islamic Maﬁa giving us an offer we can’t refuse: Apologize, or ...

She went on stating that: The Islamic religious community thinks that Denmark and the Danes should follow the instructions from the Koran. Our children are not allowed to eat pork, but only halalmeat in kindergartens, and [the newspaper] Jyllands-Posten is not allowed to draw their hypocritical [sic] Prophet, if these people were to decide.8

This is about as far as the rhetoric goes. The party leadership has been keen to ensure that it should not go too much further. Members have been excluded, MPs have been corrected, and homepages have been erased if they appeared more racist or hateful. Signiﬁcantly, on 29 January 2006, amid the growing cartoon crisis, MPs were instructed by mail that ‘Critique of Islam as such and Muslims in general is

8 Actually, the headline of the article is the title of a well-known song from the resistance against the Nazi occupation (‘weed seeds’). Pia Kjærsgaards weekly, 6 February 2006, .

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9

not the political mission of the Danish People’s Party’. The instruction was hardly written in order to avoid an escalation of conﬂict, but rather to maximize the gains in voter support by appearing sufﬁciently moderate. On the other hand, however, Pia Kjaersgaard has not hesitated to describe ‘tens and tens of thousands’ of immigrants as belonging to a ‘lower level of civilization’.10 Finally, as a curious side effect, the identiﬁcation of Muslims with the Middle Ages has reinforced the party’s insistence on secular modernity and tolerance on a number of issues not usually associated with right-wing extremism. This includes not only gender equality, but also the rights of homosexuals, for instance when a Gay Pride Parade was attacked by young Muslims (in fact, one of the party’s wellknown MPs takes pride in presenting herself as lesbian). In a contradictory way, one might say that such ‘progressive’ or ‘liberal’ values are among the few elements encountered in the party discourse that contribute to a positive deﬁnition of what Danish culture is at all about.11 Globalization The basic tenets above serve as the foundation for the Danish People’s Party’s foreign and security policies. In terms of globalization, the party has not developed any comprehensive notion of globalization, but in the working programme, it has borrowed from various sources to portray globalization as a threat. Characteristically, the introduction to the working programme states that ‘The solidarity and the community in Denmark and other small countries are currently threatened in several respects: from within by closed and intolerant minorities, and from outside by globalization and the power of international capital’. The latter is the only trace of anti-capitalism that is found in the party programme. Although the working programme recognizes that countries have become increasingly interdependent, the authors of the programme warn against seeing globalization as a natural law or as an inevitable process. It depends on political

9 Politiken, 29 January 2006. 10 The statement is worth quoting at full length: ‘[nobody had imagined] that large parts of Copenhagen and other big cities in 2005 would be populated by people on a lower level of civilization, carrying with them primitive and cruel habits like killings of honour, forced marriages, halal slaughtering − and blood feuds. This is precisely what has happened. That tens and tens of thousands of people who, culturally, mentally and in terms of civilization seem to live in 1005 rather than 2005, have come to a country that departed from the medieval age centuries ago’ (Pia Kjaersgaard’s Weekly, 13 June 2005). Addressed to immigrants, Pia Kjaersgaard writes elsewhere: ‘If you want that your life – and the lives of your fellow citizens – should be dictated by Islamic dogmatism, then go to those places in the world where these dogma are prevailing − rather than trying to inﬂict these religious rules upon us’ (Pia Kjaersgaard’s Weekly, 17 October 2005). 11 In June 2006, however, the party collectively voted against a law that placed lesbian couples on an equal footing with heterosexual couples as regards right to insemination in public hospitals. The law was carried through by united opposition and some defectors from the governing Liberal party.

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decisions. The working programme calls for national and international cooperation to avoid the evils of globalization: Speculative capital movements, wage competition and job losses, increasing international inequality, and exploitation of people and natural resources in poor countries. The most heavy criticism, however, is launched against those discourses that see globalization as a force that will inevitably lead to happy amalgamation of all societies and cultures.

The quotes above are quite remarkable as some of the statements resemble criticism from the left. But this is united with the party’s emphasis on national sovereignty and fear of immigration. Certainly, these latter parts are by far the most important concern, but the party’s critical stance as far as the economic aspects are concerned is nevertheless remarkable. In day-to-day statements of the party, however, there are few references to this issue, or to ‘globalization’ altogether, probably on the grounds that it has been less and less discussed as a threat in Danish politics, as the Danish economy rather seems to prosper from globalization. Foreign and defence policy As for foreign policy, the party expresses support for international cooperation but the key value is to maintain national sovereignty. Therefore, the party is against the European Union (in particular development towards a federation) but is in favour of the NATO alliance and a strong national defence as well as the maintenance of compulsory conscription and even of the Danish Home Guard. The party also supports (in principle, at least) the United Nations, especially for providing humanitarian aid and for its contribution to peaceful coexistence among member countries. The party has also supported Danish participation in the war against Iraq, which was decided by the narrowest possible vote by the government and the Danish People’s Party against the vote of all other parties. The party has also supported Danish participation in military operations in Afghanistan. However, in 1999, the Danish People’s Party had joined the Socialist left in its opposition against NATO’s war against Serbia. Commenting on the bombings, Pia Kjaersgaard stated that ‘It is terrible and unreal. A tragedy. We shouldn’t have done it. It is to turn things upside down when a defence alliance like NATO now attacks.’12 However, the party kept a low proﬁle on the issue, especially as it turned out that a large majority of the population supported not only the bombings but even an intervention by troops on the ground13, persuaded by a long series of media reports about what was described almost as genocide against the Albanian people in Kosovo. Aid to developing countries In accordance with their perception of a ranking of cultures, the Danish People’s Party sees culture as a major determinant of poverty:

12 Politiken, 26 March 1999. 13 Sonar and Jyllands-Posten, 26 March 1999.

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Poverty must to a large extent be seen as a culturally determined problem, because the development of society basically is determined by the consciousness of the people… . It is because of cultural differences that some countries with infertile soil and lack of resources have developed order and wealth whereas some very fertile countries that are endowed with large natural resources are characterized by over-population, poverty, and dictatorship.

However, it is necessary to change this under-development in order to avoid ‘that poverty and over-population leads to hostile clashes between the different cultures’. In particular, the task is to prevent mass immigration. Aid to developing countries should be lowered to the same level as in most other countries – and be directed to peaceful nations and to social, institutional and democratic reforms, the working programme states. Thus, the party position on this issue is strictly determined by the goal of protecting the Danish society against immigration and multi-culturalization. Against European integration If the Danish People’s Party has become much more in favour of a strong defence and military intervention than its predecessor the Progress Party ever was, it has at the same time become much more anti-European, a process which started already when Pia Kjaersgaard was the leader of the Progress Party. Characteristically, the Norwegian Progress Party, which has not experienced a similar break with the past, has maintained a somewhat more sympathetic attitude towards the EU.14 However, the negative attitude of the Danish party is quite logical as the European Union is a crystallization point for almost everything the party is against, as spelled out in the working programme: • • •

threats against national sovereignty and national identity ‘growing distance between politicians and the people’: Centralization and the political culture of EU dangers of bureaucratization, or in the party’s words: ‘irresponsible administration’, ‘corruption’ and ‘nepotism’

To this comes: • • • •

free movement of workers and dangers of immigration ‘the wrong perception’ that immigration is the solution to Europe’s lack of labour power in the future the initiatives of the EU against racism, notably the actions against Austria when Jörg Haider’s party entered the government the intention to enlarge the EU to include Muslim countries like Turkey

Rather than intensiﬁed European integration, the party demands a preservation of the ‘veto right’, a strengthening of the European Council vis-à-vis the European Commission, and Danish withdrawal from the Schengen Agreement. 14 Bjørklund, T. and Andersen, J.G. (2006), ‘The Far Right Parties in Scandinavia’, manuscript.

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Foreign and defence policy, the cartoons of Mohammed, and political cooperation The foreign and defence policy positions of the Danish People’s Party, including the issues on which the party deviates from other bourgeois parties, are ﬁrst and foremost a reﬂection of the party’s opposition to immigration and multiculturalism. One could imagine that this would complicate cooperation with the bourgeois government. Indeed, the opposition against the European Union is a potential barrier for cooperation and certainly one of the reasons why the party is unlikely ever to be offered a government position. But in practice, the obstacles have been few as the differences in policy positions are not that big. The bourgeois government has tightened the rules on immigration more than the Danish People’s Party could have dreamed of in the mid-1990s. The parties have roughly coincidental views on defence and security policy, and like the Danish People’s Party, the liberal Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen chose a close alliance with the United States rather than with the majority of Western European countries in the Iraq conﬂict. The government has also made large cutbacks on aid to developing countries, partly in accordance with the preferences of the Danish People’s Party.15 And in 2006, the vice-chairman of the Liberal Party declared that his party and the Danish People’s Party to a large extent had shared values: ‘We are all concerned about the cohesion of Danish society. We are concerned about being Danish and to look at core values as freedom of speech and democracy… in that way we share a wide array of values.’16 Perhaps the most signiﬁcant instance of the cooperation between the government and the Danish People’s Party was during the crisis launched by the cartoons of Mohammed that were published in a Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten in the autumn of 2005. The Prime Minister took what might be described as a rather ‘fundamentalist’ stance in his defence for freedom of speech which made him reject the complaints and the request for a meeting from a number of Muslim ambassadors, and which made it extremely difﬁcult for him to come up with something that could look like an excuse. This was in accordance with the position of the Danish People’s Party, and throughout the crisis, from its very beginning, the party backed the prime minister and abstained from criticism, even before the most intensive stages of the conﬂict when Danish embassies and ﬂags were burned. Only in one instance, when the prime minister appeared on Arab television channels and said something that could be interpreted as a regret more than an excuse, was he criticized by the DF for being a bit too vague. But the party abstained from further criticism, and shortly thereafter, all parties agreed that this was not the time to criticize the government too much in public – a decision which was followed loyally by the Danish People’s Party. But to what extent is the Danish People’s Party followed by its voters? And is it at all about representation of policy views, or should the support for the party rather be seen as an effect of fear of marginalization in relation to globalization? 15 This explains the apparent change in spending attitudes towards foreign aid from 2001 to 2005 in Table 5.2. 16 Politiken, 23 September 2006.

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Foreign Policy Attitudes of Danish People’s Party Voters Fear of globalization It is relatively common to see support for the new right as an effect of marginalization related to the transition to post-industrialism and globalization.17 However, in the case of the supporters of the Danish People’s Party, there is nothing about their social characteristics that can justify a description of these voters as marginalized or as threatened by marginalization.18 But what about their political views? Even though they are not personally threatened, people may nevertheless feel worried about the general impact of globalization on society. As mentioned, the Danish public is generally optimistic about globalization. But as revealed by Table 5.1, this optimism is less apparent among those who vote for the Danish People’s Party. Even though only 27 per cent expect that globalization will have a negative impact, this ﬁgure is substantially higher than among adherents of other parties – and much more than can be explained by educational and age composition which is almost similar to the Social Democrats except for a somewhat lower proportion of highly educated people.

Table 5.1

Perceived effects of globalization, 2005, by party choice. Percentages and PDI (Percentage Difference Index): Positive minus negative.

Left Wing Social Democrats Centre Parties Liberals and Conservatives Danish People’s Party Population Average

Positive

Neutral/ don’t know

Negative

PDI

39% 41% 48% 56% 26% 44%

46% 46% 43% 38% 47% 44%

15% 13% 9% 6% 27% 12%

+24 +28 +39 +50 -1 +32

Wording: It is often discussed whether so-called ‘globalization’ will have an overwhelmingly positive impact on Denmark or an overwhelmingly negative impact. On this scale from 1 to 5 where 1 means very positive and 5 means very negative, which impact do you think globalization will have? Source: Election survey 2005.

17 Betz, H.-G. (1994), Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe (New York: St. Martin’s Press). 18 Bjørklund, T. and Andersen, J.G. (2002), ‘Anti-Immigration Parties in Denmark and Norway: The Progress Parties and the Danish People’s Party’, in Schain, M, Zolberg, A. and Hossay, P. (eds.), Shadows over Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 107–36.

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Apart from mainly economic fears, there could also be fears of terrorism and the like. As this does not occupy very much space in the public debate, it was not included in the 2005 election survey, but the 2001 survey, conducted shortly after 11 September 2001, contained two questions on the issue. However, the deviation was very small indeed. When asked whether they felt that the world was under more threat, 69 per cent of Danish People’s Party voters answered afﬁrmatively, as compared with a population average of 64 per cent. And when asked if they feared a terrorist attack, 22 per cent of the party’s voters conﬁrmed this, compared to a population average of 15 per cent. On both issues, Social Democrats came very close to the supporters of the Danish People’s Party.19 On the other hand, those who vote for the Danish People’s Party are fully in line with the party’s emphasis on maintaining the sovereignty of the nation-state. Whereas a majority of the population in the 2005 election survey agreed that ‘we should strive for a society with more international orientations and less weight on borders between countries and their populations’, only 27 per cent of Danish People’s Party voters agreed (Table 5.2). This is in very sharp contrast with adherents of other parties, including the Social Democrats.

Table 5.2

Strive to reduce the role of the nation-state, 2005, by party choice.

We should strive for a society with more international orientations and less weight on borders between countries and their populations Left Wing Social Democrats Centre Parties Liberals and Conservatives Danish People’s Party Population Average

Agree

Neutral/ don’t know

Disagree

PDI

59% 53% 69% 57% 27% 54%

23% 30% 22% 29% 28% 28%

18% 16% 9% 14% 45% 18%

+41 +37 +60 +43 -18 +36

To summarize, there is little to indicate that supporters of the new right in Denmark are personally worried about globalization, but they clearly distinguish the issue in their political opinions. Not so much in terms of fear of terrorism and so forth, but ﬁrst and foremost in purely political terms – they are more isolationist and more keen to protect the sovereignty of the nation-state. This could perhaps be viewed as nostalgia for the past, but it seems more fair simply to describe it as a ‘political preference’ (which may or may not be realistic, but in the ﬁnal analysis, that holds for all sorts of political preferences).

19 Andersen, J.G. (2004), ‘The Danish People’s Party and New Cleavages in Danish Politics’, working paper. Also as ‘Fremskridtspartiet och Dansk Folkeparti’, in Rydgren, J. and Widfeldt, A. (eds.), Från Le Pen till Pim Fortuyn – populism och parlamentarisk högerextremism i dagens Europa (Stockholm: Liber), pp. 147–70.

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Defence and security policy With these isolationist attitudes, one could expect the supporters of the Danish People’s Party to be somewhat at odds with their party when it comes to military intervention in other countries. And this actually seems to be the case. As seen in Table 5.3, supporters of the Danish People’s Party are considerably less inclined to intervene in international conﬂict in order to protect human rights – a difference that has been consistent since 1990.

Table 5.3

Attitudes towards participation in international conﬂicts, 2001 and 2005, by party choice. 2005

Left Wing Social Democrats Centre Parties Liberals + Cons. Danish People’s Party Population average

Stay out of conﬂict

Don’t know

Intervene

PDI 1990

PDI 2001

PDI 2005

15% 27% 12% 15% 32% 20%

6% 4% 5% 5% 7% 6%

79% 69% 83% 80% 61% 74%

+66 +37 +52 +42 +29 +41

+76 +64 +77 +65 +24 +58

+64 +41 +71 +65 +29 +54

Source: Election surveys 1990, 2001 and 2005.

This also holds true when it comes to the issue of sending Danish soldiers to war. Here, the Danish People’s Party is much more in line with Social Democrats and left wing voters (Table 5.4). Unlike during the Cold War, when the Danes stuck very much to the ideology of non-interference, military intervention in international conﬂicts in order to protect human rights gained legitimacy in Denmark in the late 1980s and the 1990s, even to the point of sending Danish troops into conﬂict. Among Danish People’s Party voters, there was a balance between adherents and opponents of sending troops, but in the other parties, in particular among centre and right parties, ‘interventionists’ constituted a majority in 2005. It might be said that the items above concerns situations where human rights are threatened and that human rights may not be the most important concern to the supporters of the Danish People’s Party. However, the difference between the supporters of the Danish People’s Party and other bourgeois parties is also evident when it comes to the issue of Danish participation in the war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq (Table 5.5). Among Danish People’s Party voters in 2005, more than 40 per cent considered it as mistake to participate in the war in Iraq – fewer than among the supporters of the opposition parties, but substantially higher than among liberal and conservative voters.20 20 Admittedly, the relatively high support originally enjoyed by the intervention probably derived from the fact that the intervention was legitimized to the population by the cruelty of Saddam Hussein, more than by perceived threats of chemical weapons, let alone suspicion of

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Table 5.4

Attitudes towards sending Danish soldiers to war, 2005, by party choice.

We should be willing to send Danish soldiers to war, if it is necessary to protect human rights in other countries. Left Wing Social Democrats Centre Parties Liberals and Conservatives Danish People’s Party Population Average

Agree

Neutral/ don’t know

Disagree

PDI

44% 42% 59% 63% 40% 51%

20% 20% 20% 19% 20% 10%

36% 38% 21% 18% 40% 29%

+8 +4 +38 +45 0 +32

Source: Election survey 2005.

Table 5.5

Attitudes towards Danish participation in the war against Iraq, 2005, by party choice.

It was a mistake for Denmark to join the war against Iraq Left Wing Social Democrats Centre Parties Liberals and Conservatives Danish People’s Party Population Average

Agree

Neutral/ don’t know

Disagree

PDI

79% 66% 58% 23% 42% 47%

9% 13% 15% 18% 14% 17%

12% 20% 27% 59% 43% 36%

+65 +46 +31 -36 -1 +11

Source: Election survey 2005.

When it comes to attitudes towards the ‘Atlantic alliance’ with the United States, on the other hand, Progress Party voters are in line with the supporters of the two big bourgeois parties. However, it should be added that even among the supporters of the bourgeois parties, there is a very sceptical attitude towards the peace-keeping role of the United States. There is almost as large a proportion disagreeing as agreeing on the item ‘The United States does a very positive effort for peace in the world’ (Table 5.6), even among the adherents of the governing parties which have so strongly allied themselves with George Bush.

cooperation with al-Qaeda. What has de-legitimized Danish participation is presumably not the disproof of the latter accusations, but more the failure of the operation in achieving its democratic goals.

Nationalism, New Right, and New Cleavages in Danish Politics

Table 5.6

117

Attitudes towards the United States as a peacekeeper, 2005, by party choice.

The United States does a very positive effort for peace in the world Left Wing Social Democrats Centre Parties Liberals and Conservatives Danish People’s Party Population Average

Agree

Neutral/ don’t know

Disagree

PDI

4% 16% 10% 38% 36% 25%

9% 22% 17% 32% 28% 24%

87% 62% 73% 30% 36% 51%

-83 -46 -63 +8 0 -26

Source: Election survey 2005.

As far as defence expenditures are concerned, the voters of the Danish People’s Party are also somewhat at odds with the party line. Even though the proportion of Danes favouring cuts in defence budgets has, surprisingly, declined since the end of the Cold War, there is somewhat less support for defence expenditures among Danish People’s Party voters than among liberal and conservative voters (Table 5.7).

Table 5.7

Attitudes towards defence expenditures, 2001 and 2005, by party choice. The public spends [in 2005]:

Left Wing Social Democrats Centre Parties Liberals and Conservatives Danish People’s Party Population Average

Too much money

Appropriate

Too little money

55% 39% 37% 20% 34% 33%

41% 55% 60% 73% 55% 60%

4% 6% 3% 7% 11% 7%

PDI 2001

PDI 2005

-54 -26 -22 -7 -13 -19

-51 -33 -34 -13 -23 -26

Source: Andersen, J.G. (2003), ‘EU og modstanden i Danmark’, in Danmark 30 år i EU. Et festskrift (København: Gyldendal), pp. 82–104; Election surveys 2001 and 2005.

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European Attitudes When it comes to European Unionization, Danish parties have generally found it difﬁcult to control the votes of their supporters. But supporters of the Danish People’s Party are an exception. At least the supporters of the Progress Party were positive or mixed until the party split in 1995, but supporters of the Danish People’s Party have since 1998 been the most negative group of voters, next to the supporters of the left wing Unity List party (which got its breakthrough in the 1994 election mainly based on its criticism of the Socialist People’s Party’s acceptance of the Maastricht Treaty with the so-called Edinburgh reservations in 1993). This is also the case with the aborted referendum in 2005 which actually pointed towards a signiﬁcant ‘yes’ in Denmark at the time of interviewing. Apart from the Unity List (not shown in the table), the Danish People’s Party voters were the only ones with a majority for a ‘no’ (Table 5.8).

Table 5.8

Percentages voting yes in Danish referenda, 1972–2000, by party choice. 1972 1986 1992 1993 1998 2000

Election result (per cent of valid votes) Socialist People’s Party Social Democrats Radical Liberals Conservatives Liberals Progress Party Danish People’s Party Non-socialist parties, total

Change Voting 1972–2000 intention for 2005

63% 56% 49% 57% 55% 47%

-16

62%

17% 59% 73% 89% 97% – – 87%

+8 -17 -10 -16 -34 – – -29

57% 57% 79% 83% 79% – 29% 70%

15% 24% 75% 95% 99% (63) – 91%

11% 33% 64% 79% 89% 33% – 73%

16% 49% 58% 85% 88% 45% – 77%

22% 52% 70% 78% 79% 27% 20% 66%

25% 42% 63% 73% 63% – 16% 58%

Source: Andersen, J.G. (2003), ‘EU og modstanden i Danmark’, in Danmark 30 år i EU. Et festskrift (København: Gyldendal), pp. 82–104; and Election survey 2005 (voting intentions 2005).

It would be tempting to see hostility against foreigners and negative attitudes to the EU as constituting one single dimension. However, in Danish politics, this is not the case. In the 1990s a weak association seemed to be emerging,21 but by 2005, the association between general attitude towards the EU and the main indicator of attitudes towards immigration (‘immigration constitutes a serious threat to our national identity’) was as low as r = −0.05. This partly reﬂects the fact that opposition against the EU has two main roots: in the anti-capitalist left and in the xenophobic

21 Andersen, J.G. (2003a), op. cit.

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22

right, to put it bluntly. On the right there is a moderate association, and one could imagine that with a waning of resistance against the Union on the left, there would in the long run emerge such a dimensionality. But this is speculation. So far, there has been little or no movement in this direction, and in the 2000 referendum on the Euro, resistance was actually strengthened, absolutely and relatively, among the anti-capitalist left, probably because the referendum came to be framed in terms of the welfare state versus market. New Dividing Line in International Conﬂicts There is much debate about a clash between civilizations. Such a conﬂict is wanted among Islamists whereas moderate Muslims and the West seek to deny and avoid it. The strong support of Danish People’s Party – and to quite some extent the attitudes of Danes in general – can perhaps be seen as an indication that the Islamists may get what they want. At any rate, there is a surprisingly widespread perception among Danish voters in general that ‘Muslim countries constitute a serious threat to Danish security’, (Table 5.9) as 44 per cent agree and only 37 per cent disagree. It could be argued that the 2005 ﬁgures reﬂect the war in Iraq, and that the 2001 ﬁgures reﬂect the 11 September events of the same year. But even in 1998, there was a relative majority who agreed that Muslim countries constitute a threat in the long run. By 2005, 79 per cent of the Danish People’s Party’s voters agreed whereas only 6 per cent disagreed.

Table 5.9

Muslim countries a threat to Denmark, 1998–2005, by party choice. 2005

In the long run, Muslim countries constitute a serious Agree threat to Danish security Left Wing Social Democrats Centre Parties Liberals and Conservatives Danish People’s Party Population at large

18% 41% 19% 50% 79% 44%

Neutral/ don’t know 16% 17% 20% 22% 15% 19%

Disagree

PDI 1998

PDI 2001

PDI 2005

66% 42% 61% 28% 6% 37%

-50 +1 -33 +14 +59 +2

-70 -7 -50 +14 +60 +8

-48 -1 -42 +22 +73 +7

Source: Election surveys.

22 Andersen, J.G. (2003b), Over-Danmark og under-Danmark? (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press); Andersen, J.G. (2003a), op. cit.

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Table 5.10

International solidarity, 2005, by party choice.

Denmark should work for a better distribution of the world’s resources, even if it means that we should lower living standards in countries like Denmark Left Wing Social Democrats Centre Parties Liberals and Conservatives Danish People’s Party Population at large

Agree

Neutral/ don’t know

Disagree

PDI

72% 48% 59% 36% 34% 46%

17% 31% 24% 35% 30% 30%

11% 21% 17% 29% 36% 24%

+61 +27 +42 +7 -2 +22

Source: Election survey 2005.

As far as international solidarity is concerned, it comes as no surprise that Danish People’s Party voters are by no means cosmopolitan in their outlook. Nevertheless, as can be seen from Table 5.10, quite a few support a fairer distribution of the world’s resources, in principle at least, and their numbers are not much fewer than among liberals and conservatives, but much fewer than among adherents of the opposition parties. Analyses over time indicate that there has been a restructuring of foreign policy attitudes in Denmark where the traditional dividing line was ‘West versus East’, that is, the line in the Cold War. For instance, the issue of NATO membership correlated strongly with other indexes of economic left–right position and used to form part of a left–right index in Danish election studies. By 2005, the main structuring factor in foreign policy attitudes rather is North versus South, that is, modern Western countries versus the developing world and in particular Muslim countries. This dividing line is not related to the traditional economic left–right dimension, but to the ‘value politics’ dimension. Table 5.11 reveals the development of the association between the perception of Muslim countries as a threat to Danish security and the perception of immigration as a threat to Danish identity. Of course, the wording could play a role (the keyword ‘threat’), but it is nevertheless surprising that the correlations have become that strong: gamma = 0.73 in 1998 and 2005, 0.76 in 2001. A similar question referring to the ‘Arab countries’ in 1990 and 1994 produced much lower correlations. This could be explained by the replacement of ‘Arab countries’ by ‘Muslim countries’, but it is noteworthy that the increase from 1990 to 1994 and from 1994 to 1998 form a linear pattern which speaks more in favour of the structural explanation.

Nationalism, New Right, and New Cleavages in Danish Politics

Table 5.11

121

Correlation between perception of Muslim/Arab countries as a threat to Danish security and perception of immigration as a threat to ‘our national identity’, 1990–2005. Gamma coefﬁcients. Gamma

1990 (‘Arab countries’) 1994 (‘Arab countries’) 1998 (‘Muslim countries’) 2001 (‘Muslim countries’) 2005 (‘Muslim countries’)

.30 .50 .73 .76 .73

Source: Election surveys.

Conclusion In Denmark, conﬂict over immigration has become a political dividing line equal in importance to the traditional economic left-right conﬂict in domestic politics. In foreign policy, alongside divisions over the EU which live their own life, so to speak, the main division has changed. Previously, it was the West versus East conﬂict (capitalism versus socialism) which formed part of the economic left–right dimension. Since the end of the Cold War, the most important dividing line in foreign policy attitudes has become the North versus South conﬂict, in particular the perceived conﬂict between Western and Islamic countries. The latter conﬂict forms part of the new value cleavage that has become so important in Danish politics. This development is quite troubling, as it conforms much too well to the notion of a ‘clash between civilizations’. This also conforms with the ideology of the Danish People’s Party. The party had is origin in the Progress Party which was gradually transformed from a tax protest party to an anti-immigration party in the 1980s, happening at the same time as a dramatic increase in the number of asylum seekers. The split of the Progress Party gave the surviving Danish People’s Party the opportunity to reformulate its political position in nationalistic terms, and the party has tried to make this nationalism the nodal point of its ideology. This involves protection of Danish culture and Danish democracy against perceived threats from inside and outside. Whatever constitutes ‘Danish culture’ is by no means clear, but ﬁrst and foremost it is deﬁned negatively in relation to immigrants’ cultures which are portrayed as traditionalist, religiously fundamentalist, undemocratic and patriarchal. This is ‘the threat from inside’, in the Danish People’s Party’s view of the world. Foreign and defence policy is certainly not a major concern of the party. But the Danish nation is threatened from the outside by threats of immigration, by Islamic fundamentalism, by the European Union, and by globalization. The inequalities of the world are portrayed primarily as a problem of cultures where Islamic and other cultures of the developing world are explicitly portrayed as inferior levels of civilization. In accordance with its emphasis on protection of the nation, the party strongly supports Danish defence, and in accordance with resistance against the EU, it supports the security policy of NATO as an alternative. Since 2001, it has

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strongly supported the government’s foreign policies except when it comes to the enlargement of the EU. Voter support for the party’s foreign and defence policy positions is a bit ambiguous, as the party’s voters are more isolationist and appear relatively critical of Danish military participation in Iraq and of defence expenditures. But what is perhaps more remarkable is that the party’s view of the most important conﬂict lines in domestic and foreign policy to coincide to a large extent with the views of Danish voters at large. This is also one of the reasons why the label ‘populist’ is perhaps not very informative in the Danish case and, at worst, misleading. Even though the party’s rhetoric is unusual, and even though the party’s supporters are mainly to be found among the less-educated segments of the population, the party represents and mobilizes deep-rooted cleavages which are also shaping mainstream politics. Acronyms DF EU MEP NATO

Danish People’s Party European Union Member of the European Parliament North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

References Andersen, J. and Borre, O. (2003), ‘Personfaktorer’ in Andersen and Borre, pp. 363–72. Andersen, J.G. (2002), ‘Denmark: From the Edge of the Abyss to a Sustainable Welfare State’ in Andersen, Clasen, Van Oorschot and Halvorsen, pp. 143–62. ––– (2003a), Over-Danmark og Under-Danmark? (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press). ––– (2003b), ‘EU og modstanden i Danmark’ in Danmark 30 år i EU. Et festskrift (Copenhagen: Gyldendal), pp. 82–104. ––– (2004a), Et Ganske levende demokrati (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press). ––– (2004b), ‘The Danish People’s Party and New Cleavages in Danish Politics’, Working Paper. Also as ‘Fremskridtspartiet och Dansk Folkeparti’, in Rydgren and Widfeldt, pp. 147–70. ––– (2006), ‘The Parliamentary Election in Denmark, February 2005’, Electoral Studies, 25(3), pp. 393–398. [DOI: 10.1016/j.electstud.2005.10.004] Andersen, J.G. and Bjørklund, T. (1990), ‘Structural Changes and New Cleavages: The Progress Parties in Denmark and Norway’, Acta Sociologica, 33, pp. 195– 217. [DOI: 10.1177/000169939003300303] ––– (2000), Radical Right-Wing Populism in Scandinavia: From Tax Revolt to NeoLiberalism and Xenophobia’, In Hainsworth, pp. 193–223. Andersen, J.G. and Borre, O. (eds.) (2003), Politisk Forandring. Værdipolitik Og nye Skillelinjer Ved Folketingsvalget 2001 (Aarhus: Systime). Andersen, J.G., Clasen, J., Van Oorschot, W. and Halvorsen, K. (2002), Europe’s New State of Welfare. Unemployment, Employment Policies and Citizenship (Bristol: Policy Press).

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Betz, H.-G. (1994), Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe (New York: St. Martin’s Press Books). Bjørklund, T. and Andersen, J.G. (2002), ‘Anti-Immigration Parties in Denmark and Norway: The Progress Parties and the Danish People’s Party’ in Schain, Zolberg and Hossay, pp. 107–36. ––– (2006), ‘The Far Right Parties in Scandinavia’, manuscript. Borre, O. (1995), ‘Old and New Politics in Denmark’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 18(3), pp. 187–205. ––– (2003), ‘To konﬁktdimensioner’, in Andersen and Borre. Elklit, J. and Tonsgaard, O., (eds.) (1984), Valg og vælgeradfærd. Studier i dansk politik (Aarhus: Forlaget Politica). Glans, I. (1975), En Liberal reaktion. Fremskridtspartiet och dess väljargrundlag (Aarhus: Aarhus University, Department of Political Science). ––– (1984), ‘Fremskridtspartiet – småborgerlig Revolt, högerreaktion eller generell Protest?’ in Elklit and Tonsgaard, pp. 195–228. Hainsworth, P. (ed.) (2000), The Politics of the Extreme Right. From the Margins to the Mainstream (London: Pinter Publishers). Kitschelt, H. (1995), The Radical Right in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press). Lipset, S. (1960), Political Man (London: Heinemann). Lipset, S. and Rokkan, S. (1967), Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York: Free Press). Rydgren, J. and Widfeldt, A. (eds.) (2004), Från Le Pen till Pim Fortuyn – populism och parlamentarisk högerextremism i dagens Europa (Stockholm: Liber). Schain, M., Zolberg, A. and Hossay, P. (eds.) (2002), Shadows over Europe: the Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Books).

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Chapter 6

‘La politique du dehors avec les raisons du dedans’: Foreign and Defence Policy of the French Front National Jocelyn A.J. Evans

Introduction As the fourth largest economy in the world, one of the two major military powers in continental Europe and certainly the principal focus of the European Union (EU) military union, and a former imperial power with over half-a-million square kilometres of overseas dependent territories, policy positions on both foreign and defence policy among France’s political parties would be expected to be of high priority, particularly among non-governing parties. Indeed, the spéciﬁcité française of France’s international role both militarily and diplomatically, established during the Cold War period and now striven for in the post-communist period, further underlines the fundamental nature of the promotion of France’s economic and strategic interests and of the protection of its territorial sovereignty. However, when considering the foreign and defence policies of a relatively small, non-governing party in France such as the Front National (FN), one must remember that its programme and policy stance are likely to remain theoretical and hence of value to the researcher only in terms of symbolic and ideological analysis – one will look largely in vain for evidence of such actors having palpable inﬂuence on outcomes in these policy areas. As for all democracies, the realms of foreign policy, defence and the military are ones which remain ﬁrmly in the executive domain. While opposition parties, pressure groups and public opinion may increasingly inﬂuence governmental agendas on domestic policies, foreign and defence policy still remain technical areas in which executive decisions remain largely beyond the reach of non-governmental actors. Consequently, key exceptions to this rule, such as the May 2005 referendum rejection of the European Constitution, achieve increased importance in their symbolic rejection of the executive’s stance. Even in cases where public opinion is strongly against the elite’s decisions, for instance the deployment of troops to Iraq by the UK and Spain, recourse against these decisions is notable principally because of its absence. In the French case, however, the inﬂuence that governmental actors, let alone non-governmental actors, can exert is further limited by the presidential domain over defence, foreign policy and European policy. There may be nominal ministers for all three policy realms in the government, and the prime minister may have inﬂuence inasmuch as domestic

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policy – the prime ministerial domain – is inﬂuenced by these policy spheres. Nevertheless, it is still the president who is dominant in these domains. Consequently, this paper will use the French context as the basis for its study of FN foreign and defence policy. It will consider ﬁrst the post-war historical context in which the FN operates, looking speciﬁcally at the inﬂuence of the Gaullist troisième voie and the presidential domain established during de Gaulle’s incumbency. It will then consider how the historical roots of the party itself may give us an entrée to the FN’s programmatic stance on policy. Finally, it will consider the developments in the party’s programme since its electoral breakthrough in the 1980s, to ascertain the extent to which its programme has shifted in line with the international context and perceptions of public opinion. Foreign and Defence Policy in France: Institutional and Historical Context Since the beginning of the Fifth Republic, the fundamental tenet of foreign and defence policy has been a unilateralism which has oscillated between defending French interests within international and supranational organizations, and blatant isolationism removing French interests from the international domain.1 The reasons for this are clear: the Gaullist assertion of la troisième voie during the Cold War period, playing off US and Soviet interests in the pursuit of French Republican inﬂuence, asserted the continued post-war role of France as a second-rank power, and in many ways blinded the French population and policy-makers alike to the decline in real inﬂuence in the way that Britain’s assertion of the ‘special relationship’ with America had exaggerated the former’s role, at least in its own eyes. This of course has not always been the French foreign and defence policy mentality. Under the Fourth Republic, the ultra-Europeanists of Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman and Guy Mollet were committed to the primacy of international and supranational arenas in an attempt to prevent a return to the aggressive billiardball model of international relations which lasted until the end of the Second World War.2 That this strategy failed, for instance in the case of the European Defence Community (EDC), is illustrative ﬁrst in the paramount role of the elite in determining their country’s orientation to the outside world – that the EDC reached the stage of rejected ratiﬁcation by the National Assembly is testament to its having been strongly propelled forward by the government – but secondly, of course, that de Gaulle found an under-current of support among deputies, public opinion and, of greater importance in the demise of the Fourth Republic, the military, which saw the sacriﬁce of French military independence as a negative step, even in guarding against the former enemy, Germany. The after-effects of this Gaullist promotion of foreign and defence policy have been to force French parties and politicians to constantly address the role of France in the world. Unlike European countries with less independent foreign and defence 1 Knapp, A. and Wright, V. (2001), The Government and Politics of France (London: Routledge). 2 Williams, P. (1964), Crisis and Compromise. Politics in the Fourth Republic (London: Longman).

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policies, these are two domains that every party must explicitly address, particularly those parties of the Right who claim to represent the Gaullist inheritance. Left-wing parties and Greens may have more room for manoeuvre in rejecting French speciﬁcity and interests as the core to foreign policy, given their policies of internationalism and universalism, but parties of the Right have ideological baggage which their traditional electorates expect them to promote. Ironically, perhaps, the importance of these policy areas in party programmes and the simultaneous weakness they enjoy in precisely this area means that French parties are more likely to make grandiose claims and to ‘outbid’ each other in these areas.3 Opposition always allows parties the luxury of policy idealism, and where likely inﬂuence is so minimal, self-constraint is likely to be non-existent. Evidently, in the case of the FN, its classic use of outbidding in all areas of policy in its attempt to capitalize on its pouvoir de nuisance4 means that one should expect particularly marked examples of this in the foreign and defence policy areas. Not that this is restricted to small and opposition parties – for instance, in an attempt to mark out a return to explicitly Gaullist practice after the reign of François Mitterrand, the president who most successfully managed to combine a Europeanism reminiscent of the Fourth Republic with a strident defence of France’s interests, Jacques Chirac had no compunction in restarting nuclear testing in Moruroa, against all international opinion, upon his election in 1995. The constitutionally determined presidential nature of these domains also forces presidential candidates to assume the role of proto-statespeople in a demonstration of their credibility and suitability for the job. Failure to live up to expectations in these domains can have deleterious consequences – witness Lionel Jospin’s trouncing by the eminently more internationally experienced Jacques Chirac in the pre-secondround presidential debates in 1995, undoubtedly a key reason for the former’s loss. Opportunities for international experience are clearly more limited for presidential hopefuls outside the executive sphere, but where they exist politicians are more assiduous than other European leaders in publicizing their knowledge. The petulance of cohabiting prime ministers – namely, Jacques Chirac and Lionel Jospin – in asserting their right to accompany presidents on European summits are obviously the highest proﬁle cases. Take for example Robert Hue’s whistle-stop tour of Europe prior to the 1999 European elections (redundant as it was); the negotiations for the formation of the European Left party prior to the 2004 European election; Daniel Cohn-Bendit’s European commuting as part of the Greens; and Jean-Marie Le Pen’s long-standing bilateral negotiations with other European extreme Right party leaders, such as Franz Schönhuber of the German Republikaner and Nick Grifﬁn of the British National Party, all point to French politicians’ need to assert themselves where possible on the foreign stage – and to be seen to do so.

3 Sartori, G. (1976), Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 4 Perrineau, P. (2003), Le Vote de tous les refus (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po).

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Roots of Front National Foreign and Defence Policy It is commonplace in the extreme Right literature to ﬁnd that comparative deﬁnitions of these parties pose a particularly thorny problem not least because of the divergent historical contexts from which they have emerged.5 The FN has an equally diverse and often apparently contradictory set of ideological inﬂuences which, as with its more commonly studied domestic policy platform, provide an array of perspectives on foreign and defence policy. At its root, the frontiste element of the party combined elements from French ultraroyalism, Catholic fundamentalism, wartime fascism and view of the post-Algerian Organisation de l’Armée Secrète (OAS) and pied noir dissidence.6 For the ultraroyalists and the Catholic fundamentalists in particular, the Republic is a minor and somewhat aberrant part of French history – what matters is the nation. Of course, the inﬂuence of these two divisions in the FN is now minimal, although their presence is still strongly felt at May Day parades and the Fête Jeanne d’Arc. However, for the party as a whole, while not regarding the Revolution as a negative element, it is still only seen as part of the heritage of the French nation, rather than a watershed, and as part and parcel of that the key element to France’s strength which is French identity. Thus, in looking at FN foreign policy, economic and strategic concerns will, of course, be important, but underlying these is the primacy of identity. From a defence perspective, the legacy from the 1950s and French Algeria has been important in two respects. Firstly, from an electoral standpoint, the bastions of the FN vote in the Midi have been based upon displaced pieds noirs voters and their families, and upon conscripts from the Algerian War (although these will evidently not be limited to the south of the country). A party with such a power-base will consequently be forced to keep the ﬂame of French Algeria and the army’s betrayal by the civilian Republic burning, if not as an important policy point, then certainly in related policies such as defence spending and in foreign policy, and relations with overseas territories and former colonies. Secondly, the FN elite have strong links to France’s last major war. Most famously, Jean-Marie Le Pen volunteered for the parachute regiment and was implicated in allegations of torture of Algerian nationalists. However, in the south old French Algerian supporters such as Pascal Arrighi were the charismatic personalities who helped the FN establish a local support-base in the 1980s.7 Links with wartime fascists in the shape of the militia, the Parti Populaire Français of Jacques Doriot and Marcel Bucard’s Francistes are less pronounced both due to the historical distance of these groups and their members in the party, such as Henri Charbonneau and Guy Jeantet, and the conscious attempts by the FN’s 5 Von Beyme, K. (1988), Right-Wing Extremism in Post-War Europe (Basingstoke: Frank Cass); Mudde, C. (1996), ‘The War of Words: Deﬁning the Extreme Right Party Family’, West European Politics, 19(2), pp. 225–48; and Evans, J. (2005), ‘The Dynamics of Social Change in Radical Right-wing Populist Party Support’, Comparative European Politics 3(1), pp. 76–101. 6 Mayer, N. and Perrineau, P. (1996), Le Front national à découvert (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po). 7 Raffy, S. (1988), ‘La Vendetta Arrighi’, Le Nouvel Observateur, 9 July, p. 26.

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precursor, Ordre Nouveau, to hide such beginnings behind its moderate, ‘acceptable’ frontiste face, led by Le Pen. However, to the extent that echoes of these inﬂuences still reverberate, it is clear that they will largely coincide with the ideology of the hard Right, which views foreign and defence policies as means to promoting the individual strengthening of France as a nation, promoting its interests in zero-sum games of economic and strategic gain, and ascribing to these elements a spiritual role in the sustenance it provides to French identity. What, then, would one regard as the likely key elements to the FN’s foreign and defence policy? Five principles can be identiﬁed against which one can match the FN’s current policy programme, and additionally ascertain the extent to which the party’s programme has changed, or indeed never conformed to expectations. Policy proselytism In Le Pen’s tract ‘Les français d’abord’, he wrote: ‘We believe in the superiority of Western civilization, in the necessity of its authority in the world, tempered with Christian charity and European humanism.’8 Given the primacy of France in the development of Western civilization, Le Pen views France’s role as to disseminate national ‘good practice’ to less developed corners of the world. In a period when the democratic, liberalizing Left increasingly reject the notion of aggressive external intervention even for the purposes of democratization, and the democratic Right is generally the supporter of such actions, the FN’s stance on spreading the civilized Christian word corresponds to a hard right philosophy. Much – perhaps too much – has been made of the French extreme Right’s rejection of Judaeo-Christian values, with groups such as the think-tank GRECE (Groupement de Recherche et d’Etudes pour la Civilisation Européenne) calling for a revaluing of millennia-old pagan values. More a product of French intellectual ﬂamboyance than a true ideological corpus, the FN’s solid rooting in Christian doctrine, in its eyes at least, manifests itself as a missionary zeal to promote France’s interests as the interests of the world more generally. The existence of la francophonie contextualizes such an approach in a country where outside economic, social and cultural inﬂuence is seen as something to be proactively pursued, particularly against pervasive Anglo-Saxon dominance. Policy protectionism Precisely as a result of its conviction in the superiority of European – that is French – culture, the party precisely wishes to protect all aspects of this from internal and external threat. Internally, Left and moderate Right governments are seen to have contributed almost proactively to the decline of French inﬂuence and interests. Equally, France’s long-standing maghrébin community is portrayed by the FN as a dead-weight, at best, and at worst an actively invasive and aggressive element committed to the destruction of French society, and whose participation in such 8 Le Pen, J.-M. (1984), Les Français d’abord (Paris: Carrère/Lafon), p. 73. The quote is the author’s translation.

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disruptions as the car-burning riots in late 2005 is interpreted as evidence of pervasive criminality. Externally, the dominance of the United States, the parasitic encroachment of the European Union, excessive and underhanded demands and actions by other allies, particularly in the Middle and Far East, and unreasonable economic competition and wage-dumping from developing world nations have all contributed to France’s fall from the top rank of world powers. Consequently, ‘foreign policy’ is an end in itself, rather just a means to an end. Outcomes in this case are only as important as the aims themselves, because the aims conﬁrm the existence of a strong volonté française. Policy isolationism In common with all extreme-right parties (ERPs), the FN shares a perception that, in almost all aspects of the modern world, something has gone fundamentally wrong. Whether it concerns globalization, creeping cosmopolitanism, the burden of excessive state apparatus, the decline of national identity or the decline of the spiritual nation in favour of its socio-economic shadow, the status quo is unacceptable, and in the majority of cases should be replaced by the status quo ante. In the case of foreign policy, this ostensibly means adopting positions which place France at odds with the ‘New World Order’. Post-colonial trends in Europe have pushed France and others into closer relations with the United States, to the detriment of relations with former allies, and despite this constituting the geopolitical norm, it needs to be altered, even if this means removing France from the mainstream. Again, however, as emphasized in the previous section, this may be seen as a good in itself: if it allows French identity to remain unsullied by internationalist tendencies, then geopolitical autarky is preferable even if it means sub-optimal economic performance, for example. In defence policy, this would equally imply a self-sufﬁciency for the French armed forces – increased budget, autonomy from supranational control and organization, defence procurement from the French arms industry, and so on. As with proselytism, France’s strong militarist tradition – witness 14 July parades along the Champs-Élysées, the paramilitary element to Polytechnique, and so on – provides a supportive context for such notions. Post-colonial imperialism Given the proselytic quality to the FN’s conviction of French/Western superiority, the historical roots of colonial support within the party, and the desire to explore alternative avenues of geopolitical inﬂuence, one would expect to see evidence of strategies for at least symbiotic but in all likelihood exploitative relationships with foreign nations which, while not involving the active occupation and ruling of the country, would imply economic and strategic advantages for France not necessarily offset by concomitant gains in the opposite direction (the ‘good’ coming from the exchange and contact itself with the ‘superior’ Western civilization). To the extent that the FN wishes France to challenge the hegemony of the United States, for example, the use of overseas territories for military bases and centres of local inﬂuence, as well as treaties and cooperation with foreign states, would imply a

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vassal-like quality to such arrangements. An implicit advantage would be the ability to control inﬂuxes of immigrants from these countries more effectively, tying in with New Racism ideology advocating indigenous populations remaining in their own territory. Given the geopolitical order, this is not to suggest that military force would be on the FN agenda to enforce such arrangements. However, where French interests and security are at stake, one would certainly expect the FN to countenance use of military force more readily than, say, a party of the Left. Policy pragmatism As a party whose raison d’être is almost to oppose the stances of the mainstream political parties, as a reﬂection of France opposing the geopolitical norm, the FN must above all ensure a ﬂexibility to its policy, from a domestic perspective at least, in order to be able to maintain its anti-system status on the right ﬂank of the French political spectrum. Contrariness per se cannot ensure the party’s success, particularly if this is too explicitly pragmatic, but an ERP whose policy positions match its competitors’ too closely risks losing its distinctiveness. Evidently, this is more clear at the domestic level, and given the particular distance of non-executive leaders and parties from the presidential foreign and defence policy domain, these aspects are less likely to be fundamental to party and presidential strategy. However, in commentaries on French actions in Europe, military involvement overseas, and other high-proﬁle areas, one would expect the FN to manifest shifts in policy direction not necessarily linked to ideological concerns. In empirical terms, one should look for inconsistencies in foreign and defence policy stances which do not correspond to any great change in context. Developments in Front National Foreign and Defence Policy Since the 1980s In the sections which follow, the FN’s current programme9 on foreign policy, defence and security policy, Europe, identity and domestic and overseas sovereignty will be analysed to consider the extent to which the above elements are indeed to be found in these areas of FN policy, and to highlight where this illustrates an evolution in the party’s position, and the extent to which this corresponds to the notion of policy pragmatism highlighted above. Geopolitical concerns As noted above, the FN’s view is that governments of both the Left and moderate Right (which it does not regard as truly ‘right’) have contributed to the weakening of France. The Cold War context in particular obliged it to accept falling in line with US positions (a view somewhat at odds with the reality of France’s troisième voie and, as will be seen, is contradictory with many of the party’s other stances) and

9 Front National, ‘Programme du Front National’, .

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a reintegration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The FN now perceives the post-Cold War world as placing nations once more at the forefront of international relations. Yet its perception of the world since 1990 is still heavily inﬂuenced by the vestiges of the communist threat. Firstly, the FN sees the end of the Cold War as constituting a threat to France’s very existence.10 As a nation taking the line of the Third Way and independence (despite the view of US hegemony presented above), France is seen as being deﬁned by the US–communist opposition, a deﬁnition which no longer exists. Secondly, the role of France has been and, on the Left, still is to sustain communism, both historically in the close relations between Mitterrand and Gorbachev (but against Yeltsin), in the support of Milošević (a product of communism, and in no way deﬁned by nationalism) by Jacques Chirac, in the support of Edvard Shevardnadze against the anti-communist Zviad Gamsakhourdia in Georgia, and so on.11 Thirdly, since the end of communism, France has made no effort to help former satellite nations or Russia itself, beyond offering the former membership in NATO and the EU, and it has no policy whatsoever towards Russia.12 In tandem with the bemoaning of loss of inﬂuence in the Middle East has come a volte-face concerning Israel. In the 1980s, Le Pen’s stance in particular was often avowedly pro-Israel. This particularly derived from his view of Israel as an oppressed nation ﬁghting for its identity – and its life – against the Arab nations, and it was also a by-product of the FN’s defence of the Lebanese Christian communities,13 and their opposition to Palestine and Syria. However, in the contemporary arena, Israel is now seen as an oppressor, a satellite of the United States and as deliberately undermining peace accords such as Oslo.14 Opposition to the ﬁrst war against Iraq was based not only on the view that there was no self-interest for France to get involved so far from home (somewhat at odds with the party’s own proclamation of wishing to extend its sphere of inﬂuence) but also because Israel would be the only nation to beneﬁt from intervention. Indeed, support for Israel would sit very oddly with Le Pen’s support for Saddam Hussein, seen by the party as another leader ﬁghting a threat to his country’s national sovereignty. Some commentators have seen Le Pen’s initial stance as naively unaware of anti-Semitic feeling within the party and its electorate. However, it seems likely that this stance is more due to a desire to distance themselves from pro-Israel support in France and the United States, which is linked to the stance on the Iraq War. Not only is France without geopolitical deﬁnition in the post-Cold War period, it is also apparently entirely ignorant of the explosive demographic threat of Islamic expansionism to the south – the southern threat – according to the FN. In abdicating responsibility in the Middle East in former colonies such as Syria and Lebanon, particularly in its failure to protect the Christian population in the latter against Muslim attack, and its devil’s alternative between Algerian nationalists and 10 11 12 13 14

Ibid., p. 54. Ibid., pp. 54ff. Ibid., p. 55. Ibid., pp. 59, 61. Ibid., p. 56.

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Muslim fundamentalists, France has lost its direction in developing alliances with potentially inﬂuential nations. However, the Algerian case is instructive. While the Islamic fundamentalists in 2004 were seen as a grave threat, Le Pen saw Algerian fundamentalism as a way of stemming North African immigration into France.15 Overall, the FN sees France’s current orientation – towards NATO, towards Europe – as almost entirely erroneous. The FN’s foreign and defence policy suggestions are thus designed to address these perceived problems. Its ﬁrst step would be to ensure France’s independence through a neo-Gaullist (that is, unilateral) approach to actions within international organizations. The United Nations and the World Trade Organization would be the focus of its refusenik stance, preventing the United States from attaining hegemony in either, and using the latter to enjoy discretion in its economic alliances, rather than falling into line within the EU customs union.16 Similarly, US relations would be rebalanced by rejecting agricultural tariff barriers, for instance, and refusing support for any US action as ‘global policeman’.17 Of the greatest importance, perhaps, is the view on Europe. The FN is clear on its view of Europe as a convoluted bureaucracy beyond redemption – ‘a Europe of Brussels can no longer be reformed… the Gordian knot needs to be cut forever!’ 18 Of course, to the extent that Marine Le Pen has stated repeatedly that, were she in charge of the party, she would shift its policy in a pro-European direction is currently irrelevant: the views of her father are rejectionist of any Brussels-orientated, federal, or even inter-governmental, Europe.19 Instead, Europe should be a structure wherein nation-states cooperate – no institutions necessary, whether civil or military, and no ‘sovereign’ elements such as the Euro,20 freedom of work for other European nationals, vote for these same individuals, border controls, and so forth. Compared with other political parties, then, the FN’s programme on Europe is remarkably short and clear, in its theory if not in its practice. As might be expected, the FN’s line on the May 2005 referendum was unequivocal: ‘no’ to the perceived loss of French sovereignty and independence, and an equal ‘no’ to the (fallacious) equation of ‘European Constitution = accession of Turkey’. The FN’s campaign on the referendum was never in doubt, not just on account of its ideological opposition, but because of pragmatic opposition to the ruling centre’s line. To this extent, the crucial role of the centre Left’s progressive ‘no’, based upon a lack of social content in the Constitution, made them strange bed-fellows with the FN in the anti-Constitution camp.

15 Marcus, J. (1995), The National Front and French Politics. The Resistible Rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen (Basingstoke: Macmillan), p. 121. 16 Front National, op. cit., p. 59. 17 Ibid., p. 60. 18 Ibid., p. 69. 19 In the lead-up to the 2007 Presidential campaign, Marine Le Pen has emphasized that her father’s stance will be softened from the ‘immediate withdrawal’ position of 2002 (Les Echos, 19 June 2006). 20 Interestingly, the FN is not against a European currency, but not one where individual nations lose their sovereignty over this currency; Front National, op. cit., 70. Quite how such a multi-laterally deﬁned monetary policy would work is not explained.

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Strategic concerns If France has apparently lost its direction in global relations, then its military defence situation is in an equally bad state, according to the FN. Again, the post1990 situation has changed the FN’s view of the world order to the extent that it has changed its position signiﬁcantly. Prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, Le Pen and the FN perceived France’s armed forces as old-fashioned and impotent. This manifested itself in three key ways. Firstly, the nuclear deterrent was seen as essentially redundant.21 The missiles based upon the Albion Plateau were of the strategic kind, following the US and Soviet model, and useless in terms of unilateral defence and discretionary deployment. Instead, the FN promoted the development of smaller tactical nuclear weapons for use on the battleﬁeld, and pointed as much to the south as to the east. Secondly, the stance of the party was strongly pro-American in terms of military alliances, given its position in the Cold War. NATO was seen as a key element in the ﬁght against communism, providing a far more convincing nuclear shield than France could unilaterally, and allowing France to exercise inﬂuence over military options in the Western sphere.22 Thus, France’s absence from NATO was seen as a key weakness in its defence policy. Thirdly, the need to modernize the armed forces was focused in particular upon the need to abandon conscription, and rather to develop a well-trained, professional army, relying more on technology than on numbers.23 In the post-Cold War period, this stance has changed almost entirely. Firstly, France’s nuclear weapons are suddenly important in defending against the southern threat.24 Tactical weapons are still promoted as a necessity, but no longer at the expense of strategic weapons. Secondly, NATO is seen as an entirely redundant force from which France must withdraw immediately.25 Moreover, the reliance upon neighbouring allies has also been removed – France should play no part in the European Union. Thirdly, although the return to conscription is not asked for (although major civil defence and ‘Republican guard’ measures in some measure replace this, with 50 demi-brigades of volunteers26), the date of the abandonment of conscription (February 1996) is explicitly cited as the moment that sounded ‘the death-knell of French defence policy’.27 In addition to this, a vast number of ideas for the expansion of the armed forces are presented, in complete opposition to the trend toward demilitarization among European nations. Highlighting France’s drop of over 35 per cent in defence procurement, the FN’s main aim would be to spend 4 per cent of GDP on defence spending on two new carrier groups, a rapid response force able to intervene at up to

21 Marcus (1995), p. 121. 22 Taguieff, P.-A. (1996), ‘Un programme révolutionnaire?’, in Mayer and Perrineau, op. cit., p. 218. 23 Le Pen (1984), p. 148. 24 Front National, op. cit., p. 108. 25 Ibid., p. 60. 26 Ibid., p. 106. 27 Ibid., p. 99.

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5,000 km distance within 24 hours, defence satellite deployment, and an augmented and modernized air force.28 This increase in military capacity is not seen in terms simply of strategic practicalities, but as a way of revivifying national identity via French military strength, as well as stimulating French industry by using national procurement. This is particularly important in the south and west of France where the main shipyards and naval bases, particularly Toulon, are located – and it is no accident that FN politicians have come out in support of striking workers in areas where Jacques Chirac’s budget cuts have caused lay-offs. In its summary of potential military threats, a number of unlikely contenders appear. Firstly, the United States is seen explicitly as a potential threat, despite being an ‘ally’.29 Its spying on its allies, the divergence in economic interests, and a nuclear shield that could potentially be used against France are seen as reasons for keeping the nation’s guard up against this threat. Secondly, Eastern Europe is seen as a menace. Not only does the presence of organized crime groups in these countries threaten France’s internal security (see below), the remnants of the Soviet military infrastructure, and in particular insecure nuclear arsenals, are a potentially major military and terrorist threat.30 Lastly, Muslim fundamentalist in North Africa and the Middle East is seen as a new strategic threat – missile launchers along the southern Mediterranean coast could reach France, and proto-nuclear power Iran and illegal arms trading from the ex-Soviet Republics could supply weaponry to these countries.31 Internal security concerns While the FN concentrates on internal threats from immigrants, non-military threats are also given primacy in the programme. The growth of transnational criminal groups is seen as a question that now needs to be dealt with as much under the ‘defence’ heading as under the traditional domestic ‘law and order’ remit.32 Groups in Central and Eastern Europe, the Far East and South America are seen as targeting France, together with other European countries, in the sale of contraband such as drugs, radioactive materials, prostitutes and illegal arms. Moreover, dirty money from laundering is seen as a threat to France’s economy. Even Internet fraud, despite its complete irrelevance to national borders, is seen as an international menace, rather than something that requires localized policing. Equally, Islamic fundamentalist groups in France are identiﬁed as beneﬁting from the social dislocation and self-sufﬁciency derived from welfare beneﬁts that immigrant groups ‘enjoy’, in that they can socialize immigrants where the French state is failing to do so. The urban riots of 2005 are seen as evidence that committed

28 29 30 31 32

Ibid., pp. 107–8. Ibid., pp. 101–2. Ibid., p. 102. Ibid., p. 103. Ibid., p. 105.

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Islamic groups such as les Frères Musulmans or the Tablighi may recruit support among young people from Muslim backgrounds.33 Linked to these elements are also illegal immigration and clandestine workers. One of the reasons for France’s need to reach beyond its own borders is to ensure that in areas of weaker security, France can contribute to policing. For instance, even in territories formally belonging to France, such as Guiana and some Caribbean islands, drug trafﬁcking is proﬁting from the unclear status of such territories to export produce to France. Money laundering is particularly rife in the St. Martin and St. Barthelemy islands, and is again linked to drug running.34 Most notoriously for the FN, the new autonomous status of New Caledonia gives ‘unbalanced’ rights to New Caledonians respective to metropolitan French. Although not linked to illegal activity, this epitomizes for the FN a bias against France that disempowers it upon the world stage. As a result, France needs to defend its border far more effectively, particularly along its maritime borders, with the creation of a powerful coast guard, as well as port authorities. Moreover, the French navy should be given greater freedom to detain suspicious-looking vessels, and to engage ships suspected of pirate activity, particularly in the Atlantic and on the African coast.35 Conclusion It is clear that the elements identiﬁed in the opening sections are evident in the party programme. France is still seen as having an exceptional role, and indeed the nature of exceptionalism seems to deﬁne the programme itself, reacting almost unthinkingly against the current geopolitical context. Rather than identifying key areas for continuity in foreign policy, the programme mentions only perceived negative elements and how these might be addressed by a return to past practice, as in the case of the revival of military strength or the importance of nation-states in a Europe des patries. Undoubtedly the global context has changed since the fall of the Berlin Wall and 11 September 2001. However, while such events require consideration of possible continuities inﬂuenced by gradual change, the FN’s approach urges wholesale change by appealing to a status quo ante that probably never existed in the ﬁrst place. These elements in particular emphasize the FN’s view that France should have neo-colonial role in protecting itself from negative effects emanating from such areas, and contributing to France’s own material and strategic well-being by encouraging ‘development’. The FN programme is explicit in referring to the ‘cultural and economic expansion of Europe in the world’, citing the fact that Guiana is French in explaining why the European Space Agency’s Ariane rocket launches have been so successful.36 Consequently, rather than the criminal havens that such areas are 33 For a full description of FN’s explanation of the riots, and the groups identiﬁed as potential recruiters, see . 34 Front National, op. cit., p. 83. 35 Ibid., p. 87. 36 Ibid., p. 82.

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portrayed as, they could be turned into rich locations for exploitation in the French interest. These elements allow the FN to act as the prophet of France’s true foreign and strategic policy needs, by promoting a complete change in focus of the nation’s geopolitical view. Of course, by never having the chance to implement any of these proposals, they may precisely remain idealistic and impracticable – the luxury of opposition. But for those voters who choose to read and consider the FN and Jean-Marie Le Pen’s programme for France – and believe it – the policies press all the right buttons: the superiority of French identity; the inferiority of criminal and economically backward territories; the ‘beneﬁts’ of French exploitation for such areas; the proactively insidious plot by other nations, organizations and leaders to drag France down and emasculate its foreign policy power. By way of epilogue, it would be wrong to leave the impression that the issues mentioned above are exclusive to the FN. The preoccupation with France’s role on the world stage is one which is common to all French parties, whatever their proposed solution. Perceptions of Anglo-Saxon dominance and threat are also not the preserve of the nationalist Right by any means, and indeed have come almost to caricature the French state’s approach to foreign and defence policy.37 Equally, apparent reversals in these policy domains are also hardly the exclusive preserve of the extreme Right, although the practical application of many policy areas does fall short of mainstream parties whose programmes are more likely to undergo the acid test of executive power. However, in true populist fashion, the FN programme does root its policy positions in these domains ﬁrmly in the concerns of the French populace, or a signiﬁcant proportion thereof. In many ways, the threats to France that are portrayed symbolize on a macro scale the threats that individuals who support the FN perceive in everyday life – the aggressive and criminal foreigner, the common man being kept down by malevolent oppressors, the search for an identity and community, and so on. France’s ﬁght against the world is le petit blanc’s ﬁght against the world. For the presidential domain of statesmanship, diplomacy and negotiation, this perspective suggests that the deference paid to leaders, such as Mitterrand who could play the international game in a way beyond the ‘average’ French person, may be less important now. For those requiring simple solutions to complex problems, then, the foreign and defence policy domains are perhaps no different from their domestic counterparts.

37 Keiger, J. (2005), ‘Foreign and Defence Policy. Constraints and Continuity’, in Cole, A., Le Galès, P. and Levy, J. (eds.), Developments in French Politics 3 (Basingstoke: Palgrave), p. 153.

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Acronyms EDC ERPs EU FN NATO OAS

European Defence Community Extreme-Right parties European Union Front National North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Organisation de l’Armée Secrète

References Cole, A., Le Galès, P. and Levy, J., (eds.) (2005), Developments in French Politics 3 (Basingstoke: Palgrave). Evans, J. (2005), ‘The Dynamics of Social Change in Radical Right-wing Populist Party Support’, Comparative European Politics, 3(1). Front National, ‘Programme du Front National’, . Keiger, J. (2005), ‘Foreign and Defence Policy, Constraints and Continuity’ in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds.). Knapp, A. and Wright, V. (2001), The Government and Politics of France (London: Routledge). Le Pen, J.-M. (1984), Les Français d’abord (Paris: Carrère/Lafon). Marcus, J. (1995), The National Front and French Politics. The Resistible Rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen (Basingstoke: Macmillan Publishing). Mayer, N. and Perrineau, P. (1996), Le Front national à découvert (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po Books). Mudde, C. (1996), ‘The War of Words: Deﬁning the Extreme Right Party Family’, Western European Politics, 19(2). Perrineau, P. (2003), Le Vote de tous les refus (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po Books). Raffy, S. (1988), ‘La Vendetta Arrighi’, Le Nouvel Observateur, 9 July, p. 26. Sartori, G. (1976), Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Taguieff, P.-A. (1996), ‘Un programme révolutionnaire?’ in Mayer and Perrineau. von Beyme, K. (1988), Right-Wing Extremism in Post-War Europe (Basingstoke: Frank Cass). Williams, P. (1964), Crisis and Compromise. Politics in the Fourth Republic (London: Longman Books).

Chapter 7

‘Nationalism Ensures Peace’: the Foreign and Security Policy of the German Populist Radical Right after (Re)uniﬁcation Christina Schori Liang

Introduction Over the past decade the populist radical right in Germany has developed a coherent foreign political vision in which Germany will lead in a Europe of nations, free from the domination of the United States, from the economic vicissitudes of globalization, and resolute in the face of danger from Muslim extremists and asylum seekers. One would expect such a message to have an impact on an electorate that is undergoing signiﬁcant economic readjustment due to reuniﬁcation in 1990 and economic globalization, and which resisted participating in the US-led 2003 Gulf War amid a growing atmosphere of anti-Americanism. However, not many Germans have signed on. Of all the major populist radical right parties in Europe, the German populist radical right appears to be the most insigniﬁcant. Despite success in several regional elections, they have not yet been strong enough to make it into the Bundestag.1 Indeed, if one were to judge the populist radical right solely on their ability to gain political power, they would appear to be an extremely marginal force. Nonetheless, what the German populist radical right lack in political power they have consolidated on the street in the form of subcultural milieus which are gaining ground, especially in the east. Particularly the ultranationalist Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (German National Democratic Party – NPD) has found fertile ground in the new German states, where they have gained a political foothold in two of eastern Germany’s ﬁve state parliaments. The double historical legacy of fascism and communism, a lack of a critical relationship with their past, deep-rooted xenophobia, and social and economic hardship have encouraged the spread of rightwing extremism in eastern Germany, where the respective parties have been able to garner protest votes, especially for young voters with dim employment prospects

1 In 2005 the NPD and DVU formed an electoral alliance and won only 1.6 per cent of the total votes in the federal elections.

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and other ‘losers’ in the globalization process.2 Recently, many people have ﬂocked to these parties due to Germany’s economic stagnation in which unemployment levels have been languishing around 10 per cent in western Germany and have reached 20 per cent in some depressed areas in eastern Germany. Anger against the Hartz IV economic reform, which reduced beneﬁts for the unemployed and cut back the welfare state, led to demonstrations nationwide. Many east Germans feel like second-class citizens in their own country and are disappointed with uniﬁcation and their new political system with which they have no sense of strong political afﬁliation. Resentment has also led to increased attacks on foreigners. Although the population in the new German states represents only 17 per cent of Germany’s total population, 50 per cent of the violent acts motivated by extremism are committed there. Right-wing attacks are on the rise: nationwide right-wing motivated attacks have increased by 14 per cent from 2005 to 2006.3 This chapter argues that while the electoral presence of the German populist radical right remains marginal, its increasing policy coherence, including a willingness to cooperate internationally, might allow the parties to gain ground in the future. This development might be accelerated as populist radical right parties become more legitimate in Europe and German voters shed their historical inhibitions towards nationalist parties. There are three populist radical right parties of signiﬁcance in Germany: the NPD, the Deutsche Volksunion (DVU) and the Republikaner (REP). As developed in the introduction to this volume, their core ideologies include nationalism, nativism, populism, authoritarianism and ethno-pluralism. They have vacillated in terms of political importance over the last two decades. The oldest of the populist radical right parties, the NPD, was founded in 1964 as a successor of the Deutsche Reichs Partei (DRP). It has been described as the ‘hardcore of the German right’ and is regarded as a neo-Nazi Party.4 The party’s current chairman, Udo Voigt, a former Bundeswehr ofﬁcer, believes that he must save the destruction-bound German people through a national socialist government which would subordinate the rights of the individual in favour of the public interest. Although Voigt has rejected accusations that his party is neo-Nazi, he argues that ‘nationalism and social issues cannot be separated.’5 Voigt has also referred to Hitler as a ‘great statesman’ and the current German government as an ‘illegal system’ requiring ‘revolutionary change.’ The NPD targets neoNazis and youths from the skinhead milieu and grooms them for leadership roles. It maintains a training centre in Berlin to ‘professionalize’ its cadre. Although the NPD has only approximately 6,000 members, it has great organizational potential and political consistency and is considered the most threatening in the radical right

2 NPD has made itself indispensable for the poor in the new German states where it has established neighbourhood help groups, cultural clubs, youth centres, and information centres which it uses to distribute its extremist messages. 3 2007 Report on Racism and Xenophobia in the Member States, published by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA). 4 Staud, T. (2006), Moderne Nazis: Die neuen Rechten und der Aufstieg der NPD (Köln: Verlag Kiepenheuer & Witsch). 5 DDP News Agency, Berlin, 13 February 2005.

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6

camp. The NPD’s best voting results include the 2004 state elections in Saxony, with 9.2 per cent of the vote, and the 2006 state election in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, with 7.3 per cent of the vote. The NPD currently has representatives in two of the ﬁve Länder parliaments in the new eastern states, Sachsen and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. While it is not really considered to be a populist radical right party due to its strong neoNazi characteristics and extremist views, it has been included in this chapter because of its inﬂuence on the DVU and its growing popularity and therefore signiﬁcance in the right-wing scene in Germany. The DVU was established in 1987 in Munich by Gerhard Frey, who was elected party chief. It is referred to as the ‘phantom party’ due to the fact that it is steered centrally by Frey, who maintains full control both politically and ﬁnancially.7 The DVU promotes a platform of anti-immigration and German autonomy. The DVU also maintains a special niche in relativizing and rehabilitating Germany’s National Socialist past, in particular through Frey’s publishing house, which has made a fortune selling literature reestablishing a ‘useable’ German past. Although Frey’s publications make statements that ﬂaunt German laws on racial antagonism and Holocaust denial, his formidable resources and legal council have protected him from over 150 law suits. The DVU’s most recent electoral successes included 6.1 per cent of votes in the state elections in Brandenburg, and 12.9 per cent in the 1998 state elections in Saxony-Anhalt. The third populist radical right party is the Republikaner, who initially were to be a splinter-group of the Christian Socialist Union. Founded in 1985 by Franz Schönhuber,8 Franz Handlos and Ekkehard Voigt, the party found it difﬁcult not to be stigmatized as a Nazi party because of Schönhuber’s past, portrayed in detail in his 1982 memoir Ich war dabei (I was there), in which he vindicated and relativized the actions of the German Waffen-SS. After Schönhuber was voted in as the party chairman in June 1985, he aimed at making the party a ‘national-social cadre party’9 with politics ‘right of center.’10 However, its rhetoric places it in the middle of the family of the populist radical right. In 1989 the Republikaner ﬁnished with a 7.1 per cent result in European elections, making Schönhuber a delegate in the European Parliament.11 This success made the Republikaner the ﬁrst populist radical right party to jump the ﬁve per cent hurdle and spawned a worldwide debate on whether Germany was becoming more conservative 6 Bundesministerium des Innern (ed.) (2006), Verfassungsschutzbericht 2005 (Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern), p. 72. 7 Hoffmann, L. (1998), ‘Die DVU in den Landesparlamenten: inkompetent, zerstritten, politikunfähig’, in Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (ed.), Bilanz rechtsextremer Politik nach zehn Jahren. Interne Studie 163 (St. Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung), p. 7; Virchow, F. (1999), ‘Struktur und Funktion der Frey-Presse’ in Mecklenburg (ed.), Braune Gefahr: DVU, NPD, REP Geschichte und Zukunft (Berlin: Elefanten Press), p. 35. 8 Schönhuber died in December 2005 at the age of 82. 9 Kahlund, M. (1999), ’DVU und Republikaner − zwei rechtsextreme Parteien im deutschen Parteiensystem’, , p. 45. 10 Lepszy, N. (1994), ‘Die Republikaner im Abwind’, Aktuelle Fragen der Politik 17 (St. Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung), p. 7. 11 Assheuer, T. and Sarkowicz, H. (1994), Rechtsradikale in Deutschland. Die alte und die neue Rechte (Müchen: C.H. Beck Verlag), pp. 41–54.

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and xenophobic. In communal elections in Munich and Frankfurt of 1990 and 1993 respectively, the Republikaner were able to beat out the established liberal Federal Democratic Party (FDP).12 They partially succeeded in representing a ‘mainstream’ political image, moving the Republikaner into the realm of the populist radical right. After the success of German uniﬁcation, the Republikaner lost momentum and direction, and they continued to lose popularity in 1994, after the asylum seeker issue that had galvanized support for the party was deﬂated due to a change in asylum laws in 1993.13 The year after the asylum laws changed, the party was only able to gain 1.9 per cent of the vote in the German Bundestag elections. When Rolf Schlierer took over the chairmanship of the party in 1994, the Republikaner attempted to distance themselves from the more militant DVU and NPD. As a result the Republikaner failed to gain protest votes in the new German states,14 which went largely to the DVU, the NPD and the left-wing Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), now the Left Party. Both the NPD and DVU have had similar political agendas, both having historical ties to the Nazi party (NSDAP). In 1987 the NPD and DVU-Liste D decided to agree on an immediate ‘stop to the immigration of foreigners, the “protection of the honour” of Germany’s fallen soldiers, the speedy realization of the uniﬁcation of Germany, the protection of life through a massive battle against the “misuse of abortion”, an end to Vergangenheitsbewältigung (struggle to come to terms with the past) and a general amnesty for National Socialists and war criminals.’ Although their collaboration succeeded in winning them a seat in the European Union (EU) elections of 1989, the relationship ended in 1991 when Günter Deckert,15 at that time head of the NPD, decided to break off relations. Since 1996, under the new leadership of Udo Voigt, the NPD has managed to become ‘the dominating force’ in radical right politics in northern and Eastern Germany by promoting itself as an uncompromising defender of German interests. It has moved from being an anti-communist party to an anti-capitalist party, and 12 Munich communal election 18 March 1990: Republikaner 7.3 per cent: FDP 5.3 per cent. Frankfurt communal election 7 March 1993: Republikaner 9.3 per cent: FDP 4.4 per cent. Der Spiegel (1994), Spezial Wahljahr 1994, no. 1, p. 64. 13 Before 1993, asylum seekers could ﬁnd refuge under Article 16 of the Basic Law which stated that ‘every politically persecuted individual had the right to asylum’. After lengthy debates in 1992 and 1993 a new law was added, Article 16a, which placed limits on asylum seekers. This new law stipulated that asylum seekers who had already passed through a ‘safe’ third state such as Denmark, France, or Poland would be returned to their country without consideration of his or her case. ‘(1) Those who are politically persecuted enjoy the right of asylum. (2) Whoever enters from a member state of the European Union or from another state that guarantees the application of the agreement on the legal position of refugees and of the convention of human rights and basic freedoms cannot invoke paragraph one. Those states outside of the European Union to which the prerequisites of the ﬁrst sentence apply are determined through a law which needs to be approved by the Bundesrat…’ Article 16a, Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. 14 It was banned from the ﬁrst democratic elections in new states in March 1990, the Volkskammer elections. 15 From 1995 to 2000 Günter Deckert went to jail on criminal charges for racist crimes.

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from conforming with the system to becoming an anti-system revolutionary party with the motto ‘against system and capital, our ﬁght is national.’16 The NPD has also opened its ranks to include neo-Nazi parties, which ﬂocked to it after many of their groups were outlawed in the 1990s. The current NPD, unlike the REP and DVU, is overtly anti-democratic. In 1997, Udo Voigt outlined a three-pillar approach to gain inﬂuence, urging NPD members to ‘ﬁght for the streets, ﬁght for the minds and ﬁght for the parliaments’.17 Voigt further stated: ‘We want absolute power in Germany, in order for our politics to achieve the wellbeing of the German people and in order to replace the liberal capitalist system with our national, united, Volksgemeinschaft. This and nothing else is the German revolution!’18 The NPD has created ‘nationally liberated zones’, in which a street force of 10 to 12 militants are meant to control both the political and ethnic factors in the area. These ‘liberated zones’ give right-wing extremists a place where they can practice cultural and political dominance by keeping foreigners away and create a kind of apartheid culture within small, mostly east German towns and villages. They are also able to dominate and drive out their rivals with the use of violence. During the 2006 World Cup held in Germany, a German politician ignited controversy when he warned non-whites to avoid such areas since ‘they would possibly not leave these areas alive.’ In 2004 Udo Voigt added a ﬁnal pillar to his campaign – Kampf um den organisierten Willen (ﬁght for the organized will) – which called for all populist radical right parties to join a political alliance in a new Volksfront19 in order to gain more parliamentary representation in 2006.20 This strategy has led to cooperation between the NPD and the DVU and leading Free Nationalists from Germany’s neoNazi scene. The Republikaner have refused to join the coalition and have attempted to disassociate themselves from the NPD and DVU by assuming a ‘respectable’ image. In view of the low votes the Republikaner received in the election, the DVU declared that their refusal to join their Volksfront was ‘party suicide’. Nevertheless, recent developments between the parties has resulted in an agreement between the NPD, the DVU, and the Republikaner, who on 25 September 2007 decided to cooperate in an attempt to make it past the ﬁve per cent hurdle to gain representation in the European Parliament. The Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty joint European party of rightist groups in Europe was invited to attend the German meeting, in preparation for the 2009 European elections. 16 (Gegen System und Kapital, unser Kampf ist national) in Borgwardt and Molthagen (2006), ‘Geben Rechtsextremismus in Original soundtrack und West’ (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung), p. 11. 17 Jaschke et al. (2001), Nach Hitler. Radikale Rechte rüsten auf (Munich: Bertelsmann), p. 172; Federal Ministry of the Interior (2001), ‘The Federal Government has ﬁled a petition at the Federal Constitutional Court to ban the “Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands” (NPD) (National Democratic Party of Germany)’, . 18 Jaschke et al. (2001), op. cit., pp. 172–3. 19 Right-wing popular front. 20 ‘German extreme-right leader calls for three-party alliance’, AFP, 30 October 2004.

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Table 7.1

Development of the German Radical Right from 2000 to 2005* (Numbers represent membership)

Violent Rightwing extremists, Skinheads†

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2 groups 9,700

1 group 10,400

1 group 10,700

2 groups 10,000

2 groups 10,000

2 groups 10,400

65 groups 2,800 3 parties 33,000 15,000 6,500 11,500 72 groups 4,300 141 groups and parties 50,500

72 groups 2,600 3 parties 28,100 13,000 6,100 9,000 70 groups 4,400 146 groups and parties 45,800

95 groups 3,000 3 parties 24,500 11,500 5,000 8,000 69 groups 4,600 169 groups and parties 42,100

87 groups 3,800 3 parties 23,800 11,000 5,300 7,500 76 groups 4,300 168 groups and parties 41,900

105 groups 4,100 3 parties 21,500 9,000 6,000 6,500 73 groups 4,000 183 groups and parties 40,000

49,700

45,000

41,500

40,700

39,000

60 groups 2,200 3 parties Political Parties 36,500 DVU 17,000 NPD 6,500 REP** 13,000 78 groups Others 4,200 143 groups and parties Sum 52,600 Sum total (minus multiple 50,900 memberships) Neo-Nazis§

* Most of the ﬁgures are rounded and some are estimated. † Most of the subcultural violent right-wing extremist groups (mainly Skinheads) are not organized in groups. The ﬁgures do not solely include criminals and alleged criminals, but also those right-wing extremists that only show indications for a propensity to violence. § After subtraction of multiple memberships. Only Neo-Nazi groups and “comeradeships” with a certain degree of organization are taken into account. ** One cannot assume that all members of the Republikaner party support or pursue rightwing extremist aims. Source: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000–2005, http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/ publikationen/verfassungsschutzbericht/

The German Constitutional Protection Service (Verfassungsschutz), charged with combating extremist movements in Germany, has kept a careful tally of development of the German radical right over the years. Table 7.1 illustrates that while the DVU and Repulikaner parties are on the decline, violent right-wing parties are on the rise, and the NPD, however small, is gaining ground and has evolved from being a protest party to a legitimate political party, especially in eastern Germany. German populist radical right parties exist in a particular political context. Because of the history of political extremism in the Weimar Republic, the German Basic Law of 1949 deﬁnes Germany as a ‘militant democracy’21 and provides for a mechanism 21 Article 1 of the Basic Law ensures that Germany is committed to the protection of human dignity and human rights, and that Germany shall be a democratic and social federal state, in which all public authority emanates from the people. Article 21(2) of the Basic Law

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to defend against anti-democratic political parties. In November 2000, the German federal government invoked Article 21(2) and passed a resolution calling on the Constitutional Court to ban the NPD, stating that the party ‘pursues xenophobic goals’ and ‘promotes an atmosphere that encourages right-wing extremists to commit acts of violence’.22 In 2001 the Bundesrat and Bundestag issued a Verbotsantrag (legislation to outlaw) against the NPD. However, after two years, the Constitutional Court was forced to suspend the proceedings after it emerged that the government’s case included testimony and speeches from paid government informants. According to the NPD, the informants had been instructed by the government to incite racial hatred and recruit violent neo-Nazis to strengthen its case.23 The attempted ban gave the NPD martyr status and allowed it to portray the mainstream parties as corrupt.24 In a 2005 survey by pollster Infratest Dimap, only about 35 per cent of Germans believed banning the NPD would be effective. The Foreign Policy of the German Radical Populist Right Foreign policy questions have always played an important role for the populist radical right, sometimes even taking a leading role in their platforms. Before 1990, the DVU and the Republikaner gained political notoriety as the self-styled defenders of Germany’s interests, when they argued for a new direction in German foreign policy based not on American political interests but focusing instead on national interests, speciﬁcally German reuniﬁcation. Since German reuniﬁcation, the populist radical right has argued that as a legal sovereign state, Germany should no longer be subjected to any international limitations. Accordingly, German foreign policy should now be solely based on German interests, with the primary goal of creating a strong independent Germany in the heart of Europe that will act as a counterweight to the United States. In order to achieve this goal, the populist radical right maintains that globalization must be halted and European security must be insured through a new security pact among like-minded European nations. Finally, their foreign policy is also based on a sense of perceived injustices of being under Western domination, a situation they are determined to change. In order for Germany to regain its international standing, it must offset this subjugation and rehabilitate its past.

empowers the Constitutional Court to ban parties. Militant democracy rests on the assumption that a democratic state that places self-determination at the highest level is a relatively weak form of the state, making it easy for anti-democratic forces to organize and ﬁght against it. See Backes, U. (1996), Politischer Extremismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung), p. 464. 22 Rippert, U. (2000), ‘German Government Moves to Ban Neo-Nazi Party. What are the Consequences of Banning the NPD?’, World Socialist Website, 11 November, . 23 Reuters (2003), ‘Bid to Ban German Far Right Fails’, CNN . 24 Horst Mahler was part of the legal counsel representing the NPD.

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Ethno-pluralism As in many of the populist radical right parties in Europe, the international politics of German extremists are based on a ethno-pluralist view of peoples, nations and cultures. The DVU argues that Germany’s interests stem from the interests of the ‘German Volk’ and the ‘German nation’ and not from universal rights of the individual. The NPD25 and the Republikaner26 deploy the same rhetoric, maintaining ‘that the sovereign people ﬁnd their political will in the nation, which freely gives itself internal and external form in the shape of the state.’ The notion of ‘self-determination’ of people (Volk) is cleverly couched in liberal human rights terms, but is linked to more populist notions of the ‘will of the nation’, which will determine the form of the state. As Lepszy points out, this kind of rhetoric imposes ‘the precedence of the collective, that is of the people and the nation, over the human individual, whose rights and areas of freedom are rather seen as a potential threat to the community, the people or the nation’.27 Already in the 1980s, the German populist radical right promulgated neo-völkish ideas in order to foster cultural apartheid against foreigners living in Germany. In order to disassociate itself from Nazi ideas, it reformulated concepts of nationhood in terms of ‘ethno-pluralism’, which was used to conceptualize a nation that is at once conservative, Völkisch and nationalistic while at the same time preserving the appearance of conforming to democratic ideals.28 As described in the introduction to this volume, ethno-pluralism denounces the mixing of the races either through marriage or through immigration.29 Ethno-pluralist thinkers argue that multiculturalism will lead to ‘ethno-suicide’ due to the fact that lifestyle and the traditions of the different Volks are not compatible. Foreigners are considered a biological, social, and cultural threat to the German state, ‘since multicultural and multiethnic societies and states contain the seeds of (military) conﬂict within themselves, leading to inter-ethnic conﬂict.’30 The relations of Germans with asylum seekers and immigrants are often described in bio-humanistic terms, suggesting that a full integration of foreigners into German society is biologically impossible.31 The German populist radical right call for ethnic apartheid in Germany plays well with established popular perceptions that foreigners are an economic threat, depleting the social welfare system and exploiting the German taxpayer. In a 2006 FES study, 25 Europa Programm der NPD , p. 25. 26 The Republikaner (1993), Party Programme. 27 Ibid., p. 20. 28 Weber, I. (1997), Nation, Staat und Elite: die Ideologie der Neuen Rechten (Köln: PapyRossa Verlags GmbH), p. 42. Langanke, H. (2002), Die extreme Rechte in der Bundesrepublik. Ideen, Ideologien, Interpretationen (Hamburg: Argument-Verlag GmbH), p. 52. 29 Minkenberg, M. (1997), ‘The New Right in France and Germany: Nouvelle Droite, Neue Rechte, and the New Right Radical Parties’ in Merkl, P. (ed.), The Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the Nineties (London, Frank Cass & Co.), p. 72. 30 Virchow, F. (2004), ‘Racial Nationalism as a Paradigm in International Relations: the Kosovo Conﬂict as Seen by the Far Right in Germany’, Peace & Change 29(1), p. 34. 31 Linke, A., (1994), Der Multimillionär Frey und die DVU: Daten, Fakten, Hintergründe (Essen, Klartext), p. 172.

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36.9 per cent of the respondents agreed with the statement ‘foreigners only come here to exploit our welfare state.’32 Foreigners are also presented as a security threat, displacing Germans from their homes, attacking their property and their women, and terrorizing society through organized crime cartels. In many ways, the foreigner has become for the Republikaner, the DVU, and the NPD a pivotal enemy in their Weltanschauung. All three populist radical right parties support an immigration stop, and the NPD has called for the repatriation of all foreigners. Foreigners are portrayed as an internal enemy as well as an external enemy. Already historically, foreigners were identiﬁed with Allied powers that not only occupied Germany, but also sought to change its ethnic composition, culture and political system. The whole notion of liberalism, democracy, multiculturalism and pan-Europeanism can therefore be attributed to foreign propaganda designed to weaken the German state.33 The populist radical right likes to hold up the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as a ‘purer’ nation that did not allow multiculturalism, and thus enjoyed a lower crime rate and threats to its culture. The GDR’s policy of restricted fraternization and naturalization of foreigners is a model for united Germany to follow. The populist radical right’s vision of nation, therefore, belies their claim to be just like other populist parties. A biopolitical vision of democracy in a globalized world necessarily excludes a signiﬁcant portion of the body politic, undermining any claims to democracy. Recourse to Schmittian language on a state of emergency and the need for an authoritarian state to truly reﬂect the people’s will, as opposed to corrupt liberal parties, reveals the fundamentally anti-democratic nature of the DVU and Republikaner as well. Finally, as if any doubt were left, the tacit approval of the GDR’s authoritarian and nationalist system shed light on the populist radical right’s true vision of German utopia. Nation According to the populist radical right, since the ratiﬁcation of the ‘two plus four’ treaties in 1990, Germany became a legal sovereign state and thus should no longer be subjected to any international limitations. Accordingly, German foreign policy should now be solely based on German interests. Germany can only be secured by the separation of ‘races’ or ‘people’ into ethnically homogenous countries. Maintaining that one of the greatest threats to Germany would be the encirclement by ethnic groups that could destroy the nation, ethnicity is revived as a cornerstone for politics and national identity. If each ethnic identity were to develop its own separate political space, cooperation and harmony between different ethnicities would be assured. In order to protect Germans from this threat, the populist radical right developed the notion of creating a German living space in a greater Germany, 32 Decker, O. and Brähler E. (2006), Vom Rand zur Mitte: Rechtsextreme Einstellungen und Ihre Einﬂussfaktoren in Deutschland (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung). 33 Neaman (1997), ‘A New Conservative Revolution?: Neo-Nationalism, Collective Memory, and the New Right in Germany since Uniﬁcation’ in Bergmann et al. (eds.) (1997), Antisemitism and Xenophobia in Germany after Uniﬁcation (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 191.

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more ‘Lebensraum for the German people.’ As a result, the foreigner issue – while ostensibly a domestic issue – is linked to a broader world political perspective. Foreigners represent a new invasion threat, coming not in the form of the Red Army but through illegal ‘inﬁltration’. Secondly, in order to stem this ﬂow, Germans should secure an environmentally secure, and possibly enlarged ‘living space’. A ﬁnal aspect of the vision of the German nation that makes it unique among West European populist radical right parties is connected with the reacquisition of the so-called ‘lost territories’. The DVU, the Republikaner and the NPD seek to restore western Poland, the former Sudetenland in the Czech Republic, and the former East Prussia in the former Soviet Union. As laid out in the Republikaner party platform, ‘German uniﬁcation is not yet complete until Germany has successfully uniﬁed within the borders of 1937.’ They maintain that ‘eastern Germany’ has been excluded from this ‘partial uniﬁcation’. A ‘durable paciﬁc order’ in Central and Eastern Europe could only be achieved with ‘a peaceful and harmonious establishment of contractual relations with our East European neighbour states, with the goal of peacefully consummating the unity of Germany, including the Eastern territories’.34 The 2002 Republikaner platform maintains that the Benes and Bierut Decrees must be lifted and that Germans should have the freedom to settle in those lands that still rightfully belong to Germany. Lost property should be regained and Germans living outside of Germany should not be discriminated against and should have both cultural and lingual autonomy. They maintain that the countries that do not uphold these caveats should not be allowed membership within the EU or NATO.35 The DVU party platform maintains that the separation of German territories east of the Oder and Neisse Rivers because of the war was in contravention of international law; however, they argue that ‘only peaceful agreement between peoples can and may bring about the alleviation or even the correction of this situation.’36 Anti-Americanism The German populist radical right’s foreign policy is best deﬁned against an enemy. During the Cold War this role was played by the Soviet Union; today it is the United States that is seen as Germany’s greatest state enemy. Anti-Americanism is also linked to the populist radical right’s preoccupation with globalization. The United States is represented as the main driver of globalization, which they interpret as another form of Americanization; in fact, the NPD maintain that globalization is the continuation of a war against the German Empire that began in 1914.37 The populist radical right maintain that the United States espouses a ‘one-world’ cultural idea, the aim of which is to mix all the nations into a one world civilization that would

34 The Eastern territories refer to the areas in the current Czech Republic, Poland, Russia and Ukraine that were part of the German empire in 1937. 35 Parteiprogramm (2002), Der Republikaner, p. 12. 36 Parteiprogramm (2004), available online http://www.npd.de. 37 ‘Den Völkern die Freiheit – Den Globalisten ihr globales Vietnam!’, Deutsche Stimme 10 October 2001, p.10.

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38

be under US control. The NPD argues that since the Cold War the United States has attempted to get a foothold in all regions of the world in which it is exercising political unilateralism in order to maintain its economic interests.39 For the populist radical right, globalization is another form of American imperialism that manifests itself both militarily, economically, culturally, and politically. US Militarism As a military power, the United States is portrayed by the populist radical right as a dangerous nation willing to risk war to protect its national interests. The Gulf War of 1991 provided the post-uniﬁcation populist radical right the greatest opportunity to attack the ‘New World Order’ and American hegemony. At this time, the NPD repeated the well-known canard that the United States signalled weakness in the face of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in order to create a pretext to attack Iraq and establish a permanent foothold in the Middle East. When war broke out, in concurrence with popular opinion in Germany, the populist radical right labelled the war against Iraq as an imperialist US move to secure oil reserves and to make a proﬁt. The NPD also claimed that the United States needed to create new enemies after the demise of the Soviet Union in order to justify its huge military expenditures. American imperialism is compared graphically to Iraqi expansionism, indicating that while the United States conquered a continent through murder, Iraq had only conquered Kuwait, which was ‘in truth is but the uniﬁcation of two Arab areas which belong together’.40 Echoing Saddam Hussein, the populist radical right claimed that the United States was continuing to exercise the Monroe Doctrine, extending the control of Latin America to the rest of the world.41 A number of new themes emerged during the Gulf War that marked new directions in populist radical right thinking about the United States. The populist radical right ascribe US policy towards Iraq to the inﬂuence of American Jews. Gerhard Frey suggested that the United States was openly waging an exterminationist campaign against the Arabs, thus aligning himself very closely to extremist Arab rhetoric about the true nature of Zionism.42 In starkly religious terms, the populist radical right claimed that President Bush was prepared to use nuclear weapons against what had been the site of the Garden of Eden to bring about an apocalyptic ‘inferno’.43

38 ‘Die USA als Richter der Welt?Serie zur Geschichte und Gegenwart des USImperialismus, 2 Teil’, Deutsche National-Zeitung (21 September 1990), p. 4. 39 Aktionsprogramm für ein besseres Deutschland (2006), NPD Parteivorstand, Berlin, 49. 40 Ibid. 41 Frey, G. (7 February 1992), ‘Die wahren Schuldigen am Kuwait-Konﬂikt, Was verheimlicht wird’, Deutsche National-Zeitung, pp. 1−2. 42 Frey, G. (18 January 1991), ‘Die Blutschuld der USA and USSR, Verbrechen am Golf und in Litauen’, Deutsche National-Zeitung, pp. 3, 7. 43 Ibid.; see also Eggers, S. ‘USA: Kriegstreiber Nr. 1. Wie uns Amerika täuscht’, Deutsche National-Zeitung, 7 September 1990, p. 7.

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Furthermore, the populist radical right drew a number of historical analogies to the current situation of Germany with that of Iraq. The annexation by Iraq of Kuwait, they claimed, was no worse than what was done to Germany after the Second World War, especially with the annexation by Poland of Eastern Prussia. The DVU argued that the annexation of tiny Kuwait with its 1.8 million Arabs was no dangerous event for the world; if it were, then surely the world should have reacted with the same vigour during the loss of German territory after the Second World War which caused the forced emigration of 15 million Germans, of which 3 million were murdered.44 They added that ﬁnancial motives were naturally also at play: the United States stood to make millions in proﬁt from protecting its oil supply in the Middle East. The ever naïve German political elite was being duped into paying millions for the US war chest,45 since oil had to be secured for the United States’ enormous energy consumption, at the cost of numerous lives, if necessary.46 The NPD maintained that the war was programmed by the United States in order to build military and economic contacts in a region that used to be in the sphere of Soviet interests. American businesses made gigantic proﬁts in rebuilding Kuwait and selling it US arms, which Helmut Kohl paid for. The war itself brought the deaths of thousands of civilians, including many children.47 The populist radical right’s greatest fear during the Gulf War was that if the Germans helped, they would ultimately be blamed for any military excesses that were perpetrated against Iraq, since Germans had already been conveniently labelled as war criminals. It might be in the US’s interest to place the moral blame of the Gulf War on Germany, thus fulﬁlling its dual agenda of using German resources for the war while prolonging Germany’s diminished role in world affairs.48 The populist radical right argue that the US ploy of burdening Germany with war guilt is an attempt to keep Germany economically weak. A DVU article entitled ‘The United States Economic War Against Germany: Washington’s Fight for Power and Proﬁt’ argues that while bombs were falling on innocent women and children in Iraq, an anti-German campaign was being conducted in the United States that blamed the Germans for arming the Iraqis, including claims that German engineers were helping the renegade nation to build atomic weapons. This defamation, the populist radical right argue, was a deliberate campaign by the United States to keep Germans economically weak and their trade relations hampered.49

44 Frey, G. (7 February 1992), ‘Die wahren Schuldigen am Kuwait-Konﬂikt, Was verheimlicht wird’, Deutsche National-Zeitung, pp. 1−2. 45 ‘Kriegsverbrechen und kein EndeBilanz des Golfkrieges’, Deutsche Nation, 11, 1993, p. 1. 46 Frey, G. (24 August 1990), ‘Amerikas Kreuzzug in der Wüste, Die Hintergründe: Öl, Macht und Israels Sicherheit’, Deutsche National-Zeitung, p3; Eggers (1990), op. cit., p. 7. 47 Aktionsprogramm für ein besseres Deutschland (2007), NPD Parteivorstand, Berlin, p. 49. 48 Ibid. 49 ‘US-Wirschaftskrieg gegen DeutschlandWashingtons Kampf um Macht und Proﬁt’, Deutsche National-Zeitung (3 May 1991), p. 2.

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Themes on US aggression were further developed during the Balkan wars. The United States was blamed for starting the war with the aim of weakening Europeans’ ability to work together in a joint political, economic and military unit, which preserved the need for US military might.50 When the West, through NATO, intervened and attacked Yugoslavia, the populist radical right joined in the leftist opposition to the war, maintaining that it was an example of American aggression and showed complete disregard for international law. Rightists pointed out that nothing appeared to have been accomplished by the war, and that NATO had destroyed the international legal framework governing international conﬂicts. In this way, the populist radical right critique of Western intervention resembled the European Left’s view of the war. Yet the German populist radical right also put forth its own speciﬁc concerns. It maintained that the United States was attempting to undercut German foreign policy and was in fact using Germany as a pawn for it own imperialist ambitions. The West had demonstrated its military superiority over the world, causing developing nations to bind together in nuclear military alliances, including India, China and Russia. The German proﬁle had been damaged by German participation in NATO attacks, and Germans were consequently reviled by Serbs, Russians and the Chinese. The United States used Germany and the German Bundeswehr to pursue its imperialist goals, all the while continuing to burden German national identity with guilt from its Nazi past. Millions of marks were heading toward the Balkan crisis instead of being used to assist the German unemployed.51 The Balkans and surrounding areas had been destabilized, unleashing a stream of refugees who would seek to enter Germany and could threaten Germany’s internal security and provoke trouble. Finally, the dreaded Western solution for the Balkan dilemma was to enforce multi-ethnicity and coexistence among the different ethnic groups. As an alternative, the German populist radical right suggested a fulﬁlment of ethnic separation and the creation of three ethnically ‘pure’ entities made up of Croats, Serbs and Bosnians.52 The populist radical right stressed that ‘the national sovereignty of Serbia/Yugoslavia has to be defended’ and that the NATOled attack against Yugoslavia could be interpreted as an aggression against states that actively stood up for their national interests: ‘the real reason behind the massive NATOaggression against Yugoslavia was to cure the Serbs of their nationalism and to break their national pride.’ The populist radical right also feared that the war would help to further spread Islam and would lead to an enlarged Turkish sphere of inﬂuence.53 The populist radical right claimed that nations have the ‘right for ethnic selfassertion’ by attempting to destroy existing nations either through occupation (Kuwait) or secession (Yugoslavia), with the goal to ultimately reinstate a seemingly original historical or natural state of affairs. Consequently, military interventions to stop such attempts to reinstate ethnic nationals are imagined to be governed by American- and Israeli/Jewish-dominated interests. The populist radical right views

50 Virchow (2004), op. cit., p. 32. 51 ‘Leser fragen – unsere Redaktion antwortet’, Deutsche National-Zeitung (4 June 1999), p. 3. 52 ‘Ist der Islam unser Feind?’ (1993), Deutsche National-Zeitung, 17 September 1993, p. 3. 53 Virchow (2004), op. cit., p.34.

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these types of interventions as a further step to expand ‘Usraeli’ interests.54 Rightists’ heroes of ethnic nationalism include such leaders as Milosovich and Saddam Hussein, who are lionized due to their strong nationalism and aggressive militarism. The German populist radical right unanimously opposed the US-led military action to bring down Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003. Conspiracy theories circulated that Israel and a ‘cabal’ of neo-conservatives (East Coast advisers – mainly ‘Jewish neocons’), propelled Bush to start an imperialist war in order to seize Iraqi oil resources.55 Even German politicians repeated these kinds of conspiracy theories, including Rudolf Scharping, former Defence Minister in the Schröder cabinet, who maintained that Bush was pushed to war by an ‘overly powerful Jewish lobby’.56 These types of conspiracy theories were easy to believe in a wider anti-American climate in Germany. A 2003 Forsa Institute poll showed that 57 per cent of Germans thought that the United States was a nation of warmongers, and only six per cent thought they were interested in peace. The NPD party argues that the US war in Iraq was not meant to stem Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programme, nor to bring democracy and human rights to the region. It argues that the US was interested in maintaining its big business industries and in gaining imperial power by creating a new world order enforced with military might, in order to secure oil, natural gas, water and to strengthen its arms industry. The NPD also maintains that the US wanted control of the near and Middle East and access to central Asia. These are the real reasons, the NPD argues, that people are being sacriﬁced in the Middle East. The German populist radical right organized several public protests throughout Germany against the war.57 The German populist radical right does not support using the German Bundeswehr for any engagement that does not directly affect Germany. Such actions, it argues, would risk the lives of German soldiers for American neo-colonial ambitions.58 The spirit and the sense of the German soldiers’ oath to defend his country has thus been entirely turned on its head.59 All parties criticized German involvement in the ﬁrst Gulf War, claiming Germany was acting as a vassal to the US-dominated United Nations (UN). They have also argued against German involvement in ex-Yugoslavia and Somalia, claiming German lives were too precious to be wasted in intractable conﬂicts. The populist radical right also argues that German troop involvement raises the stakes of German guilt for potential war crimes. Based on these arguments, the populist radical right have rejected the proposed amendments to the Basic Law (Article 87a) and the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of 12 July 1994 54 See conclusions in Virchow, F. (2006), Gegen den Zivilismus. Zur Militarisierung der Internationalen Beziehungen und von Militär und Gesellschaft in den außen − und militärpolitischen Konzeptionen der extremen Rechten’ Thesis, Free University Berlin. 55 Wistrich, R. (2004), ‘The Politics of Resentment: Israel, Jews and the German Media’, Analysis of Current Trends in Antisemitism 23 (Jerusalem: SICSA), p. 3. 56 Ibid. 57 In the Hessian town of Hanau, 300 protesters assembled under the aegis of the NPD to support the slogan ‘No blood for oil! Those who oppose war have to rise against it!’ Virchow (2006), op. cit., p. 1. 58 ‘Das Verbrechen an SomaliaBonn als Mittäter’, Deutsche National-Zeitung (13 August 1993), p. 1. 59 Ibid.

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which found that Germany’s armed forces may be deployed for purposes other than the defence of the federal territory. In this respect, the populist radical right shared many of the anti-American views espoused by the mainstream and the extreme Left. The populist radical right twist to this discourse consisted of maintaining that US goals thwarted Germany’s due role in world affairs. The United States used Germany and the German Bundeswehr to pursue its imperialist goals, all the while continuing to burden German national identity with guilt from its Nazi past. US Economic Domination One popular NPD chant is ‘jobs for millions, instead of proﬁts for millionaires, stop globalization’. The United States is portrayed as a supercapitalistic driver of globalization, whose economic interests threaten wages and welfare systems. The NPD maintains that once the United States has achieved military hegemony, economic hegemony will follow. For the NPD, ‘the essential core feature of globalization is the destruction of national and social control mechanisms. Thus globalization destroys the capabilities of the state.’60 For others in the populist radical right camp, Jews are synonymous with economic globalization. Some maintain that globalization is an American conspiratorial project with the ﬁnancial capital of Jews, and that Americans and Jews use human rights and the ideology of multi-culturalism to weaken the resolve of nations.61 For example, the NPD maintains that US aid after the 2004 tsunami disaster was only a ploy to gain a foothold in Asian markets.62 The NPD’s Mahler even speaks of a ‘Jewish plutocracy’ as deﬁned by the National Socialists when he maintains ‘…the dollar empire’s center of power – some years ago euphemistically being termed “globalism” – is the United States “banking system controlled by Jews”.’63 To break resistance to exploitation, every form of cultural corruption is used, from radio, music, ﬁlm and television.64 The populist radical right posit themselves as the true protectors of German economic interests, including fair wages, employment and the continuation of the welfare state. Gerhard Schröder echoed some of the sentiments of the populist radical right during the German election campaign of 2002 when he maintained that ‘the days are truly over when America and others were to serve as an example for us.’65 At the same time, he further declared that ‘the plundering of little people in the US, who must now worry about their old-age pensions while executives carry home millions and billions after a company bankruptcy, this is not the German way we want for ourselves.’66 60 Mudde, C. (forthcoming), Populist Radical Rights Parties in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 250. 61 Bundesministerium des Innern (ed.) (2002), The Signiﬁcance of anti-Semitism in current German right-wing extremism, (Bonn: Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz), p. 1. 62 Aktionsprogramm für ein besseres Deutschland (2007), NPD Parteivorstand, Berlin, p. 51. 63 Bundesministerium des Innern (ed.) (2002), The Signiﬁcance of anti-Semitism in current German right-wing extremism, (Bonn: Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz), p. 12. 64 Aktionsprogramm für ein besseres Deutschland (2007), NPD Parteivorstand, Berlin, p. 51. 65 Cohen, R. (2006), ‘The America Complex, Germany’s Quest for a Postwar Identity’, Berlin Journal, 13(fall), p. 4. 66 Ibid, p. 4.

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American Cultural Domination Finally, US-led globalization presents a challenge to German culture since rightists believe that globalization will eventual lead to the homogenization of culture(s) around the world.67 Cultural globalization is mostly blamed on America, which is largely held responsible for the ‘Cocacolonization’ or ‘McDonaldization’ of global culture. The populist radical right fears that the harmonization of a global cultural will lead to the loss of individual states’ uniqueness. The Jungen Nationaldemokraten (JN), the junior organization of the NPD, claims that the nation and national identity are in direct opposition to a universalist world culture, and it presents itself as the defender of the nation, culture and the Volk.68 The JN created an action committee, ‘Nationals against Globalization’, arguing that globalization is a modern form of internationalization, which will lead to a world of global citizens without an identity or soul.69 Anti-Semitism Anti-Semitism has become the ‘twin brother of European nationalism’ and symbiotic with anti-Americanism.70 The American government is portrayed as corrupt and controlled by Jews, raising the spectre of a Jewish world conspiracy with a superpower to back it. The United States is viewed as one of the most powerful tools of the Jewish lobby, and it is accused of propagating US/Jewish interests, undermining all social values, and advancing the reeducation of Germans by the extreme left. The DVU claim that US television networks such as ABC, CBS, and NBC, as well as all leading newspapers, are controlled by Jews.71 The NPD supported Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2006 when he questioned the Holocaust and said Israel should be wiped off the map. The NPD’s Horst Mahler has stated that Jews are part of an ‘Americanized world which at the same time is a Judaised world’.72 Mahler, once a left-wing militant of the Baader-Meinhof gang, is now a celebrated member of the NPD, and maintains that ‘overcoming Yahweh, the Jews’ God’ is a ‘vocation of the Germans in terms of the history of human thought’.73 Jews are portrayed as synonymous with the dissolution of ethnic purity and the loss of national identity because, according to Udo Voigt, they have no roots themselves and they rose above their shortcomings by ridiculing other peoples’ origins.74 The populist radical right maintains that a modern version of 67 Mudde (forthcoming), op. cit., p. 256. 68 Ibid, p. 9. 69 Greven T. and Grumke T. (eds.) (2006), Globalisierter Rechtsextremismus: Die extremistische Rechte in der Ära der Globalisierung (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften), p. 15. 70 Clausen (1998), Nach Auschwitz Ein Essay über die Aktualität Adornos, in Diner, D., Zivilisationsbruch. Denken nach Auschwitz (Frankfurt-on-Main), p. 60. 71 ‘Unsere Gefallen Leben ewig’, Deutsche National-Zeitung (10 May 1985), p. 1. 72 Bundesministerium des Innern (ed.) (2002), The Signiﬁcance of anti-Semitism in current German right-wing extremism (Bonn: Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz), p. 1. 73 Ibid, p. 3. 74 Bundesministerium des Innern (ed.) (2002), The Signiﬁcance of anti-Semitism in current German right-wing extremism, (Bonn: Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz), p. 9. Udo

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Hans Morgenthau’s plan for the destruction of the German nation through agrarization is being carried out through the liquidation of the German nation by means of mass inﬁltration of foreigners.75 The fear of ethnic mixing is also evident in the populist radical right agitation against the admission of Jews from Eastern Europe, who are portrayed as ‘lazy’, ‘work-shy’, and ‘unproductive’. The NPD talks of ‘millions of Russian Jews’ allowed to immigrate in unlimited numbers.76 Jews are accused of directing US foreign policy even against the will of the majority within the nation.77 During the ﬁrst Gulf War the populist radical right maintained that the American Jewish lobby is controlled from Israel, which pushed for a war in order to secure the destruction of Iraq’s arms arsenal in order to weaken Arab military power. In the pursuit of this goal, Israel intentionally obstructed negotiations that could have averted the war.78 When Tel Aviv and Baghdad were bombed during the Gulf War, both were referred to in the populist radical right press in comparison with the 1945 bombing of Dresden. These claims served a dual purpose. By claiming it was the Jewish lobby that wanted war, the DVU was resurrecting old Nazi notions about the Jewish lobby moving Roosevelt to war.79 Secondly, by comparing Baghdad and Tel Aviv with Dresden, the suffering of the Second World War is relativized. As Frank Stern points out, ‘this wilful rearrangement of historical facts relativizes everything, so that Germans and Jews become similarly victimized.’80 Another type of anti-Semitism that is a central part of the German far right ideology is so-called secondary anti-Semitism, which is an attack on the taboo of expressing anti-Semitism. This type of anti-Semitism is especially prevalent in the populist radical right in Germany, where laws and taboos on anti-Semitism are a convenient opportunity to ﬁght against the mainstream political ‘muzzle’. Secondary anti-Semitism is primarily a mechanism to cope with the history of the Holocaust. All three main populist radical right parties in Germany claim that German war guilt is the result of a Jewish conspiracy to keep Germans shackled to their past. In their quest for a useable past, they cast Germans as victims of both the Nazis and Allied power designs, and blame the Jews for starting, supporting and being victimized by the war.81 In terms of foreign policy, however, it is the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict which has become the most important issue around which the populist radical right develops Voigt has also said that Berlin’s memorial of cement blocks to commemorate the Holocaust victims would make a good foundation for the future Chancellery of the new German Reich (Der Spiegel online, 31 January 2005). 75 Ibid, p. 9. 76 Bundesministerium des Innern (ed.) (2002), The Signiﬁcance of anti-Semitism in current German right-wing extremism, (Bonn: Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz), p. 10. 77 ‘God Bless America’, Deutsche Rundschau, 3 March 1993. 78 Frey (1991a), op. cit., pp. 3, 7. 79 ‘God Bless America’, Deutsche Rundschau (3 March 1993). The article further laments that the United States ‘largest minority’ – descendants of Germans – are underrepresented in the Clinton cabinet. 80 Stern (1992), Jews in the Minds of Germans in the Postwar Period (Bloomington, in Robert and Sandra S. Borns Jewish Studies Program), p. 16. 81 Liang, C. (2002), ‘German Far Right Ideology in the Decade of German Uniﬁcation’, thèse no. 641, IUHEI, Geneva.

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its anti-Semitism. With the creation of the State of Israel, Jews have been considered even more powerful. The populist radical right has cynically juxtaposed the ‘real’ Holocaust inﬂicted on the Palestinians by Israel with the purely ‘ﬁctive’ Holocaust inﬂicted by the Germans against the Jews. According to Wetzel, ‘criticism of the Jewish state provides an acceptable opportunity for disseminating anti-Semitic prejudice largely unhindered and overtly ... This is why the constantly invoked parallel between the genocide of the Jews and the Palestinian’s fate has become a basic part of the right-wing extremists’ strategy of comparison and belittlement.’82 The populist radical right parties mostly describe the war as the ‘extermination of the Palestinians’ or ‘the genocide of Palestinians’ or ‘Israel’s annihilation war’. One NPD article draws a parallel between the Germans and the Palestinians as such: We Germans share a similar fate with the Palestinian people… the Palestinians were deprived of their territory and became strangers in their own country… this brave small people deserves our recognition and respect. Therefore we sympathise with victims and declare our solidarity with the ﬁghting people of Palestine, Syria and Lebanon!83

Israeli territorial expansion is dubbed as imperialistic, and Israeli foreign policy is compared with the aims of East European nations after the war, which sought to expel German minorities from their territories. Israeli foreign policy is reduced to seeking allies among the superpowers and, under their aegis, expulsing and stripping the rights of the ‘native’ Palestinian people.84 Furthermore, the populist radical right argue that Israel has brought the Middle East to the brink of a nuclear war, as, for example, during the Yom Kippur war in 1973, in which nuclear weapons stood on standby for deployment against Arab states.85 The German populist radical right appears to have some support on these issues. Anti-Semitic feelings are shared by approximately 15–20 per cent of the German population, according to a 2002 report of the German Verfassungsschutz, and have been on the rise since the 11 September 2001 attacks, which were seen by some as a result of ‘Usraeli’ politics in the Middle East. In a 2006 Friedrich Ebert Foundation survey, 21.8 per cent of 5,000 people surveyed in Germany agreed with the statement that ‘The Jews are more prone than other people to use nasty tricks to get what they want.’86

82 Wetzel, J. Antisemitismus als Element rechtsextremer Ideologie und Propaganda in Benz, W (1995), Antisemitismus in Deutschland zur Actualität eines vorteil (Munich: Deutschen Taschenbuch Verlag), p. 104. 83 Bundesministerium des Innern (ed.) (2002), The Signiﬁcance of anti-Semitism in current German right-wing extremism, (Bonn: Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz), p. 19. 84 ‘Wie mächtig ist Israel wirklich? Die geheimen Verbindungen des Judenstaates’, Deutsche National-Zeitung (27 May 1988), p. 5. 85 ‘Die Vanunu-AffäreIsraels geheimes Atompotential’, Deutsche National-Zeitung (12 July 1996), p. 2. 86 ‘Sieg Heil! On Anniversary of Pogrom against Jews’, Spiegel Online, (10 November 2006).

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Islamophobia Muslims have become a third group targeted by the populist radical right, especially after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. One DVU article claimed that 80 per cent of Muslims are fundamentalists who are willing to start a holy war in order to wipe out Christians. Germany has become the centre for the ‘Islamiﬁcation of Europe’ and therefore Muslims have become a threat to the domestic security of the country. They also argue that Muslims are inherently criminal and are using their houses of worship to conduct criminal acts. Muslims are described as a growing invasion stemming from the Maghreb countries, and claims have been made that Muslims have successfully inﬁltrated the German government. The Republikaner also frequently attacks Islam, not only fundamentalists but also any government measures that may have been designed to integrate ordinary Muslims into German society. One Republikaner article claimed that Islam is a political religion that is contemptuous of human beings and anti-democratic.87 By describing Islam as an anti-democratic religion bent on taking over and essentially converting Germany, the populist radical right sets itself up as the defender of Christianity, evoking the notion of Habsburg efforts to halt the Muslim invaders. The populist radical right incessantly underlines the fact that the Muslim population in Germany has been growing, indicating, for example, that in 1970 there were only three mosques in Germany, whereas in the 1990s there were over 1,500. While this growth represents not only a threat to Christianity and the ethnic integrity of the German people, the populist radical right also raises more immediate political threats, claiming that German Muslims are seeking to create an Islamic party that will run in elections for the Bundestag. According to the author of one DVU article, these developments are a direct affront to Christian culture of tolerance and humanity, and the Christian religion must again reassert itself as a national religion in order to triumph over Islam. The article concludes in a call to all Christian conservative powers in the country to build a movement over their theological and party-political boundaries in order to reintegrate Christian heritage into every day life.88 Already before 11 September 2001, the Republikaner argued that Muslims were undemocratic, militant and ultimately murderous against non-Islamic believers. One Republikaner article cites a Turkish member of the Fundamentalist Union of Islamic Associations and Parishes in Cologne who allegedly stated that many of his religious friends believed that ‘[d]emocracy is not planned, therefore it must be the ideology of the Satan. Therefore the Koran demands a jihad, a holy war against non-Muslims.’ In this regard, Muslims are working towards the goal of violently establishing an Islamic society in Germany and making it the material and spiritual middle point of European Islam. Mosques, according to the populist right, serve as headquarters for criminal activity, including terrorism and drug dealing. The populist radical right represent the rising Muslim population in Germany as a direct menace against the German people. Furthermore, there appear to be no solutions to this threat other 87 p. 41. 88

Der neue Republikaner (1999), no. 9, p. 3, cited in Verfassungsschutzbericht (1999), Von Seht, D. (1996), ‘Eine Religion greift zur Macht’, Der Republikaner, 10, p. 8.

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than direct interdiction of further Muslim immigration into Germany, since they estimate that over 80 per cent of Muslims are fundamentalists who believe in the violent destruction of all non-Muslims. Finally, France is described as an example of what can happen to a nation which does not ‘protect itself’ against the tide of Islamic fundamentalism. The Kulturkampf unfolding in France could end up having the same dimensions as the conﬂict between government and religious forces in Algeria, a conﬂict that threatens to engulf all of Mediterranean Europe.89 According to a BBC World Service poll, 39 per cent of Germans think that violent conﬂict is inevitable between Muslim and Western cultures, the highest percentage among the European countries polled.90 Philo-Islamism Yet while Muslims are perceived as a traditional threat to the European way of life at home, they are praised for their struggle against Americans and Jews abroad. The fundamentalists’ own code of exclusion and conservatism sits well with many aspects of the populist radical right’s world view, since they both live in a hermetic fundamentalist world were both America and Zionism are viliﬁed. This has led the radical right to have alliances with Islamic organizations worldwide. It contends that like the Arabs, the Germans are victims of imperialist powers. The misery of the Arab nations is due to the fact that 300 million people are divided up into 20 different states, a problem faced by the German people.91 The NPD maintains ties with Ahmed Huber, a Swiss who converted to Islam. He became a ‘fervent anti-Semite’ and has since the 1980s attempted to built global ties between neo-Nazis and Muslims against Israel and the Jews. Through his ties with the Muslim Brotherhood he became Director of the Lugano-based Al Taqwa-Bank, whose assets were frozen immediately following 11 September 2001 because it was accused by the American government of funding al-Qaeda.92 Huber has taken part in NPD and neo-Nazi conferences in Germany and has global ties with fundamentalists in Egypt and Iran.93 In response to the terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001, the populist radical right condemned the killing of civilians, but embraced many of the positions of Islamic terrorist organizations, arguing that the attack was against the ideology of America and the West and a sure sign that American hegemony 89 ‘Mohammed ad portasFundamentalisten auf dem Vormarsch: Fällt Frankreich?’, Der Republikaner (September 1990), p. 6. 90 BBC World Service and Poll, Backgrounder, . 91 Frey, G. (7 February 1992), ‘Die wahren Schuldigen am Kuwait-Konﬂikt, Was verheimlicht wird’, Deutsche National-Zeitung, pp. 1−2. 92 Whine, M. (2006), ‘Eine unheilige Allianz: Inernationale Verbindungen zwischen Rechtsextremismus und Islamismus’ in Greven, T. and Grumke, T. (eds.) Globaliserter Rechtsextremism: Die extremistische Rechte in der Ära der Globalisierung (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften), p. 181. 93 Ibid: p. 181.

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94

would end. For the NPD’s Horst Mahler, the symbolic meaning of September 11 was that it represented a ‘war of extermination of the globalists by those who are attempting to protect the cultures of the peoples… and which produced for the ﬁrst time a military defeat on the American soil’. He also maintained that the attacks marked the beginning of a long Islamic war against the West to unseat the Jews from power.95 The populist radical right also argues that 11 September 2001 gave the United States new impetus to start wars to protect its economic interests. The NPD maintain that the attacks gave the United States the propaganda tool to justify starting a war in Afghanistan, where a new strategic pipeline was to be built, and that since the War on Terror, 15 states had been classiﬁed by the United States as ‘evil states’ only because they did not want to succumb to a new US global order. These states are now subject to attack by all military means available, including atomic weapons.96 The NPD considers that US imperialist policies began with the genocide of the American Indians and will continue with the bombardment of Afghanistan and Iraq, and its next targets will be North Korea, Iran, Libya, Sudan and Syria.97 REP founder Schönhuber believed in 2002 that ‘[I]n the war against US-Jewish world hegemony we shouldn’t shy away from collaborating with Islamists who want to ﬁght the US with terrorist actions.’98 This idea of ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ fuelled an interest in radical Muslim groups in the German neo-Nazi and skinhead scene. Wistrich has noted that ‘Aryan Action’ called on the Internet to its supporters: ‘Either you ﬁght with the Jews against Al Qaeda or with us and Al Qaeda against the Jews.’ Horst Mahler and Udo Voigt took part in an Islamic symposium organized by Hizb ut-Tahrir, an Islamic fundamentalist organization, at the Technical University in Berlin. A representative of the group gave an interview in the NPD’s newspaper, in which he discussed combined anti-Zionism strategies.99 Until it was outlawed in 2000, the homepage ‘White Youth’ of the German skinhead group ‘Blood and Honour’ made links to Hamas and Hezbollah Internet sites. Others in the populist radical right scene, including neo-Nazi groups, and the NPD welcomed the terrorist attacks as an ‘act of liberation’.

94 ‘Republikaner bekunden Mitgefühl mit den Opfern’, Der Republikaner, December (2001). 95 Ibid., p. 59. 96 Aktionsprogramm für ein besseres Deutschland (2007), NPD Parteivorstand, Berlin, p. 51. 97 Ibid. 98 Schönhuber, F. (2002), ‘Deutscher Selbstmord?’, Nation and Europa, 52, p. 55; Jesse, E. (2003), ‘Funktionen und Strukturen von Feindbildern im politischen Extremismus’ in politischen Extremismus. Ein Symposium des Bundesamtes für Verfassungsschutz, 1 October. Im, F. (ed.), , pp. 3–18. 99 Puschnerat (2003), ‘Antizionismus im Islamismus und Rechtsextremismus’, Feindbilder im politischen Extremismus. Ein Symposium des Bundesamtes für Verfassungsschutz, 1 October, , p. 59.

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Military The populist radical right’s willingness to converse with Muslim extremism signals a new combativeness in confronting Germany’s perceived enemies. The DVU, REP and NPD stress that Germany should steer an independent course of security policy, based on German military self-reliance and battle-readiness. For them, the Bundeswehr represents an important tool for German foreign policy. Indeed, Virchow has argued that for the populist radical right, battle-readiness and war are believed to be anthropological constants.100 The notion of aggression, war, and violence were all but expunged from the German political vocabulary after 1945. No credible political party could talk about the role of war in statecraft until very recently. The presumption behind this thinking was that people are essentially paciﬁst, and that war was brought about in Germany by a ruling class bent on exploitation and economic beneﬁt. Not so, argued the far-right psychologist Prof. Hans-Jürgen Eysenck,101 who drew on works by Konrad Lorenz and Sigmund Freud to demonstrate that people are inherently aggressive, especially when it comes to defending their own kind. He defends a biological reductionist notion that claims that it is not the arms industry, capitalism or class conﬂict that cause war, but rather instinctive primitive aggression. War is even more likely today, Eysenck argues, because the remoteness of combat makes soldiers and leaders less sensitive to the pain and suffering caused by conﬂict.102 In the populist radical right worldview, war is a necessary part of national identity. Echoing Weimar Republic discourse, which saw war as the best condition to build up a Volksgemeinschaft, some populist radical right publicists see war as a natural development that uplifts certain ethnic groups and develops national character.103 In this regard the populist radical right have taken inspiration from the Austrian psychologist Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, who has argued that war is ‘cultural separation through pointing out contrasts with others. It has brought much suffering to the world, but has led to cultural and racial diversity! Man must be prepared to ﬁght. The essential characteristic in the coming struggle will be toughness against oneself and one’s surroundings.’104 In accordance with this type of thinking, all three parties have called for the maintenance of conscription for all Germans. They have also called for the improvement of training and reserve deployment so as to win over larger sectors of society. They add that the attractiveness of voluntary engagement as a reserve ofﬁcer and petty ofﬁcer must be increased; and that the process of structuring the armed forces must avoid the creation of a two-class army. The Republikaner has 100 See introduction Virchow (2006). 101 Hans-Jürgen Eysenck (1916–1997) left Germany in 1934 and in 1955 became professor at the Institute for Psychology at the University of London. Eysenck published a number of books regarding the links between race, biology, and intelligence, and he was a regular contributor to the Deutsche National-Zeitung. Mecklenburg (2002), op. cit, pp. 456–7. 102 Eysenck, H.-J. (1985), ‘Krieg in der Natur des Menschen?’, Deutsche NationalZeitung, 4 October, p. 4 as cited in chapter 5, Virchow (2006). 103 Schwagerl, H.J. (1995), Rechtsextremes Denken: Merkmale und Methoden (Frankfurt/M: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag), p. 119. 104 Ibid., pp. 119–20, see footnote 84.

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also argued that the human being should be at the centre of the armed forces, be it as an active soldier, a reservist or a civilian collaborator. Proclaiming that soldiers and employees of the federal armed forces deserve trust and protection, they have called for the rehabilitation of German veterans who were sentenced at ‘mock’ trials by the Allies after the war. For the DVU, militaristic men such as Chancellor Bismarck, General Field Marshal von Roon and Supreme Commander Hans von Seeckt are represented as heroes, whose sacriﬁcial courage (Opfermut) and heroism in tragedy make them ideal models for citizens and politicians. Soldiers willing to die for their country are the ultimate symbol of sacriﬁce for one’s country and are thus symbolic of the type of nationalist fervour that the populist radical right expects of every citizen in Germany. But sacriﬁcial courage is not enough to defend Germany: the populist radical right also links military power with ethnicity and underlines the notion of the biologically powerful (if not superior) German male. The populist radical right often invokes Kraft des Blutes105 or Liebe zur eigenen Art und Rasse.106 If anything, it appears that the DVU is concerned with a loss of a disciplined society, a society homogenous in nature and able and willing to follow a strong leader. For this reason, the populist radical right supports a conscripted army arguing that with a purely professional army there lies the danger that there will be a spiritual uncoupling of the German community, which could then dynamically develop into a state within a state. Both education (willingness to ﬁght) and training (ability to ﬁght) are necessary to protect Germany against an outside threat, and only a conscripted army could represent an ‘Army of the people’.107 The DVU has demanded foreign troops should no longer be stationed on German territory, and that Germany have the right to protect itself and to have appropriate military strength.108 Finally, the populist radical right parties support a strict renunciation by Germany of involvement in any international conﬂict, particularly in the case of civil wars and other intra-state conﬂicts. They argue that German foreign policy should be guided by the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of other states.109 The populist radical right maintains that German foreign policy should be based ﬁrst and foremost on the interests of Germany.110 Germans should not take part in NATO-led operations anywhere in the world. All three maintain that not a single German life should be risked at the expense to further US global hegemony. Taking Switzerland as a role model, the NPD, DVU and REP hope to convert Germany to the principle of armed neutrality.111

105 Strength of blood. Schwagerl (1995), op. cit., p. 110. 106 Love of one’s kind and race. Ibid. 107 Schwagerl (1995), op. cit., p. 110. 108 ‘Neutralität oder NATO – Wo liegt Deutschlands Zukunft?’, Deutsche NationalZeitung (30 March 1990), p. 1. 109 2002 Republikaner Party Platform, Chapter two on Intra-German, Foreign and Security Policy. 110 Ibid. 111 Wetzel, B. (31 May 2002), ‘Wohin treibt die neue NATO?’, Deutsche NationalZeitung, 23, p. 5.

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Decoupling German interests from US interests also means denouncing NATO. Before German uniﬁcation, populists called for stepping out of NATO because it would prevent Germany from reuniﬁcation. Post-1990, the populist radical right maintains that the real purpose of NATO was revealed by the former British NATO Secretary-General, Lord Ismay, who stated that the purpose of NATO was ‘to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down’.112 With Russia ‘out’, rightists feared that the Allies would concentrate on the remaining two goals. The Bundeswehr would still be under US command, even though the principal enemy of the Cold War had disappeared.113 According to the DVU, this structure was maintained to keep the German army in check.114 The populist radical right also opposed NATO enlargement, since it would mean that Germany might in the future have to protect Polish interests, which rightists described as a Vertreiber state, a state known for driving people of particular religions or ethnicities away. The NPD, DVU and REP called for the dissociation of Germany from NATO, which they saw as servitude to ‘other states’ or ‘Western’ interests. For the DVU, NATO has changed from a defensive organization to protect against Soviet imperialism to an aggressive pact used to promote US imperialism.115 The DVU argues that the 310 US military bases in Germany are all potential sites for a terrorist attack.116 In the place of NATO, all three parties support the idea that German security should only be based on an effective European defence force anchored in a European defence pact (Europäisches Sicherheitspakt) comprised of ‘like minded states’. Germany would take a lead role in such a grouping due to its centrality and due to the fact that it will be able to guide with its self-assured defence policies.117 In the past, the populist radical right, especially the NPD, has targeted the military in order to promote its causes. Throughout the history of the Bundeswehr there were incidents of conscientious objection to army service based on ‘nationalistic arguments.’ During the 1999 war against Yugoslavia, calls for insubordination were launched by various organizations in the populist radical right camp. In one brochure entitled Initiative zur Deutsche Nationalbewegung Aufbruch 99, the NPD called on German soldiers and administration ofﬁcials not to follow orders pertaining to any military action related to the war against Yugoslavia, due to the fact that they characterized the war as an infringement of public international law. They called on

112 ‘Das Verbrechen an SomaliaBonn als Mittäter’, Deutsche National-Zeitung (13 August 1993), p. 1. 113 ‘Die Auﬂösung der Bundeswehr’, Deutsche National-Zeitung (03 September 1993), p. 2. 114 ‘Das Verbrechen an SomaliaBonn als Mittäter’, Deutsche National-Zeitung (13 August 1993), p. 1. 115 Frey, G. (22 May 2006), ‘Sind die Moslems unsere Feinde?, Wer wirklich den Weltfrieden bedroht’, Deutsche National-Zeitung, p. 2. 116 ‘Sind wir eine Kolonie der USA?310 amerikanische Stützpunkte in Deutschland’, Deutsche National-Zeitung, 23 (December 2005) (available online) . 117 Europa Programm der NPD, op. cit., p. 20. .

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soldiers to object to a war that served only a ‘criminal cause’ and maintained that they had the right to do so according to Article 20 of the German Constitution.118 European Integration With a shared view of German political, economic and military hegemony, it is no surprise that the German populist radical right is against the European Union. The three main parties maintain that they support the idea of Europe but not the current form of the European Union. The EU represents too great a loss of national power, and will eventually lead to a multicultural Europe that will be ‘open to antidemocratic and violent’ movements. For the NPD, the idea of creating an EU superstate with a common political programme and a common foreign policy is a utopist dream that is inconceivable since it would be against the sovereignty of the people and their nation. The DVU compare the Maastricht Treaty to the Versailles Treaty and to the Nazi takeover of Germany in 1933.119 The NPD, probably not wishing to share this metaphor, compare European institutions to communism. The Republikaner maintains that the EU is a strategy of the US to keep Germany controlled in Europe. They maintain that since the destruction of the German Reich in 1945, the ideas of nationstates as envisioned by G.W.F. Hegel and Jean-Jacques Rousseau have been replaced by the oligarchic interest of US government ﬁnancial capitalism.120 Instead of being controlled by the economic interests of outside powers, the NPD supports eliminating the system of liberal economics with its Hobbesian social state principles. Instead of creating a ‘United States of Europe’, the populist radical right promote the idea of creating a ‘Europe of Nation States’. The NPD argues that there should be a European Union based on the idea of a ‘Europe of the Europeans’ with common European values and based on the core values of a ‘European civilization’ in which national governments will cooperate in the area of immigration, culture, economics, internal security, environmental protection and technological advances.121 Besides its basic disagreement with European principles, the German populist radical right is speciﬁcally concerned with the progression of European enlargement. All three parties opposed the ‘big bang’ enlargement and later accession by Romania and Bulgaria. Each new membership threatens the German welfare system, threatens German jobs and opens the door to ‘criminal immigrants’. Rightists lament the fact that German politicians are ﬁnancially supporting new members and are carrying most of the ﬁnancial burden, arguing that Germany has become the ‘cash cow for Europe’. Bulgarian and Romanian membership also represented a cultural and security threat, since membership will open the door to the ‘millions’ of Roma and Sinti living in Romania and Bulgaria.122 118 See Chapter 5, Virchow (2006). 119 ‘Das Verbrechen an SomaliaBonn als Mittäter’, Deutsche National-Zeitung (13 August 1993), p. 1. 120 Europa Programm der NPD, op. cit., p. 7. 121 Werkstatt Europa, NPD Pressestalle, Berlin (3 January 2007). 122 Wetzel, B. (January 2007), ‘Wie die EU Deutschland ruiniert, Rumänien und Bulgarien geben uns den Rest’, Deutsche National-Zeitung, 25.

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For the populist radical right, Europe represents an exclusive ethnic and cultural makeup. For the NPD, the European population is ethnically white and stems from Greek, Roman, Germanic, Celtic and Slavic origins.123 In regards to further enlargement, the NPD and the DVU agree with the REP’s statement that ‘(g)eographically Europe ends at the Mediterranean, at the Bosporus, and at the Urals’.124 All three oppose Turkish membership since ‘Europe is not an oriental bazaar’. The populist radical right laments the fact that the EU opened its borders with the Schengen Agreement while at the same time extending its borders with ‘big bang’ enlargement, all without creating a common immigration policy beforehand. It also views Europe as an exclusive zone meant only for Europeans; according to the NPD’s Programme for Europe, the European zone should be off limits to the United States, Israel and Turkey.125 The NPD argues that today America poses the greatest threat to Europe since it represents the antithesis of the nation and is enforcing its multiculturalism on Europe, and is attempting to bring Turkey into the EU to weaken Europe. Therefore, Germans should address their ﬁrst enmity against America since anti-Americanization of Europe is the ﬁrst step to the Anti-Islamiﬁcation of Europe.126 European Hegemony über Alles Within the European sphere, the German populist radical right seeks to carve out a place for German hegemony, and, at the international level, European hegemony under strong German leadership. In order to secure German hegemony in Europe, the German populist radical right has since uniﬁcation renounced all participation of Germany in any binding international political bodies that could limit its sovereignty. Instead, it supports the self-determination of German ethnic groups in Eastern Europe, revitalizing the geopolitical concept of a strong middle Europe under German hegemony against the Maastricht concept of a European Union. Germans believe a common European Security Pact will give them greater freedom and will make them less reliant on the United States for security. The NPD and the DVU also argue that Germany should be able to have the right to have nuclear weapons, claiming that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is no longer relevant since a growing number of countries have acquired nuclear arms. This insecurity is compounded by the fact that not only nation-states but non-state actors could threaten Germany, making it paramount for the country to be able to protect itself, especially since allying itself with the United States poses a greater security threat than a beneﬁt. Both the populist radical right in Germany and Austria speak of Berlin and Vienna as the centre of the new Europe, held together by the four former German Imperial Cities – Aachen, Prague, Vienna, and Berlin.127 123 Europa Programm der NPD, op. cit., p. 5. 124 Republikaner Platform. 125 Europa Programm der NPD, op. cit., p. 9. 126 Gansel, Jürgen W., ‘Der Nationalismus im “Kampf der Kulturen” Eine Positionsbestimmung zwischen Islamismus und Amerikanismus’. . 127 Liang (2002), op. cit. p. 207. See chapter 3 by Virchow. See also Hillek, W. (1995), ‘EU, was nun? Gedanken zum Europa der Zukunft’, Deutsche National-Zeitung, 26 May

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Indeed, dreams of a new Holy Roman Empire have led the German populist radical right to see European integration as the vehicle for German dominance in Europe, especially in the face of the hegemonic United States. The populist radical right argued recently that only through adhesion to Europe can Germany deal with the effects of globalization. Germans should pursue common policies with France and other European countries ‘to combat the dictatorship of the Anglo-American bank and big business world empire’.128 According to the NPD’s Jürgen Schwab, the only answer to ‘encirclement of Germany is though a collective effort of likeminded nationalist governments in a new axis of Paris, Berlin, Moscow, whose strategic aim would be of throwing the Americans back into the Atlantic’.129 In the populist radical right view, East and South Eastern European nations will orientate themselves toward Germany and create extensive trade and commerce networks. Germany should act as the natural leader for a uniﬁed Europe of western, Central and Eastern European regions, since it represents the cultural middle between East and West and is therefore in a position to protect the regions’ cultural identities. International Cooperation The German radical Right platform as described above reconﬁgures much of its ethno-pluralist thought into a post-globalization, post-11 September 2001 world. The United States and Muslims have taken over from the Soviet Union and economic immigrants as the main enemies. What has also changed, however, is the populist radical right’s attitude towards globalization and internationalism as a means of achieving its ethno-pluralistic goals. Nationalism and internationalism are not mutually exclusive categories for today’s populist radical right, as Grumke has rightly pointed out.130 As was indicated earlier, the populist radical right in Europe can be deﬁned as globalization’s greatest critic. However, in their struggle against globalization, these parties have managed to ﬁnd universal themes that bind them with other radical right groups in Europe and across the globe. In defence ‘of the destruction of culture, tradition and values’ they have formed a collective identity as a racial (Aryan) and a cultural community based on Greek, Roman and Christian civilizations. Their compatible ideologies include pan-Arian racism and anti-Semitism.131 They also share a core doctrine based on ethno-cultural pluralism (München: DSZ-Verlag), p. 4. 128 DVU Manifesto, see homepage of the Berlin Ofﬁce at . 129 Schwab, J. (1999), Deutsche Bausteine. Grundlagen Nationaler Politik (Stuttgart: DS-Verlag), p. 10, quoted in Virchow (2004), op. cit., p.35. 130 Greven, T. and Grumke, T. ‘Enleitung: Die globalisierteAnti-Globalisierungsbewegung der extremistischen Rechten?’ in Greven T. and Grumke T. (eds.) (2006), Globalisierter Rechtsextremismus? Die extremistische Rechte in der Ära der Globalisierung (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften),p. 9. 131 Grumke, T. (2006), ‘Die transnationale Infrastruktur der extremistischen Rechten’ in Greven T. and Grumke T. (eds.) Globalisierter Rechtsextremismus? Die extremistische Rechte in der Ära der Globalisierung (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.), p. 130.

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whose main characteristic is a highly restrictive notion of nation, society, citizenship and democracy, which are seen as intricately tied to a culturally and ethnically homogenous community.132 This perceived common identity with other European populist radical right parties has led German far right groups to invest considerable energy into creating a pan-European network, resulting in what is referred to in the opening chapter of this volume as globalized nationalism. The populist radical right has taken part in demonstrations and meetings in no less than eight European countries in 2005.133 Globalized nationalism has also gained momentum in today’s instantaneous world of the Internet134 and television and music downloads. Drawing on Gramsci’s notion of ‘cultural hegemony’, the radical Right has tried to create a cultural matrix of Internet websites, music downloads as well as 24-hour blogging to widen its appeal. Hate songs are now being sung in English in order to broaden the audience. Globalized nationalism is also part of the greater globalization trend, where events in the Developing World and global issues such as migration and environmental protection have direct local impacts, and where an anti-globalization movement is active in almost all developed countries. Greven argues that the populist radical right vision of Völkish renationalization as a fundamental alternative to the dominant neoliberal globalization as well as for the social ecological version of ‘global governance’ should be taken seriously.135 Globalized nationalism has also led to greater international cooperation between the German populist radical right and other European parties. Leaders of populist radical right groups meet together to discuss international cooperation and organize international marches,136 rallies, Volks fests, rock concerts and conferences. There is international cooperation among parties within existing institutions such as the European Parliament’s ‘Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty Party’. Finally they form international organizations, plan international conferences and invite party leaders to mutual think tanks in order to highlight their common objectives in formal political platforms. For German radicals, one of the godfathers of international cooperation was the US extremist William Pierce (1933–2002), author of The Turner Diaries, a graphically violent depiction of a future race war in the United States that gained notoriety when Timothy McVeigh maintained that the book had led him to conduct the Oklahoma City bombings. Pierce is also the founder of the white separatist National Alliance party, the largest neo-Nazi organization in the US. During his lifetime, Pierce cooperated very closely with the NPD, arguing that ‘if we are to gain real strength anywhere – ultimately, if we are to survive anywhere – we must overcome the international Jew, and we can only do that through collaboration across national

132 Greven, T. (2006), ‘Rechtsextreme Globalisierungskritik: Anti-globaler Gegenentwurf zu Neoliberalismus und Global Governance’, in Greven and Grumke (eds.), op. cit., p. 16. 133 Verfassungsschutzbericht (2005), p. 121. 134 The Verfassungsschutzbericht reports that there are over 1,000 German language right-wing sites on the internet. 135 Greven and Grumke (2006), op. cit., p. 11. 136 On 13 February 2005 the NPD marked the bombing of Dresden with a march of 6,000 neo-Nazis through Dresden.

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137

borders.’ He believed that the only solution for the future of nationalist organizations was cooperation with other European organizations in Europe and America.138 He was one of the ﬁrst right-wing extremists to take on the role as ‘bad will ambassador’ by globalizing his ideology of hate. Frey of the DVU has also collaborated internationally with other populist radical right ﬁgures including Vladimir Zhirinovsky, whom he visited in Moscow. In 1998, Frey met with Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of the French Front National. While Le Pen had supported the Republikaner for years, he changed course in the middle of the 1990s to support the DVU, prompting Frey to describe the Front National as a model for the German populist radical right.139 In 2004 Voigt was invited to the European Parliament by parliamentarian Alessandra Mussolini,140 which led to further discussions with Jean-Marie Le Pen and the party chiefs of Forza Nuova and the Lega Nord in which the parties found common interests which included collaborating against ‘foreignization’, globalization, curtailing American economic imperialism, and preventing Turkey from joining the European Union.141 The NPD appears to have become a leader within the European National Front (ENF), a decentralized and pan-European organization made of independent ultranationalist organizations and political parties working in the same direction.142 The group’s main agenda is ‘to reconstruct sovereign states based on strong family and national property’. It opposes all institutions that destroy states and nations, either on the local (‘United States of Europe’) or global (‘United States of the World’) level; in a concession to French and Spanish interests, however, it also ﬁghts against quasinational separatism (such as Basque or Corsican movements), supposedly supported by globalists, which it argues breaks up the integrity of states. The ENF also supports an active policy of resistance against the United States, and it seeks to protect Europe against a ﬂood of non-European immigration.143 ENF members include the Romanian Noua Dreapta (The New Right), the Spanish La Phalange, the Italian Forza Nuova, the Greek Patriotic Alliance, and a number of associate members. The ENF’s charter calls for a Europe of Nations; defence of culture, traditions and Christian identity against cultural globalization, uncontrolled immigration; and the agitation against the entrance of Turkey and Israel into the EU. It also seeks to achieve an economic system based on social justice against capitalist globalization and Marxism, and a new world order against ‘Yankee imperialism’. Finally, it supports defence of life and traditional family against the ‘crime’ of abortion, gay marriage and adoption by homosexual couples. Udo Voigt has described the role of the NPD within this organization as a ‘historical role model’, arguing ‘all nationalists will lean on the “Berlin, Madrid axis” so that in the future a European Right Party can develop’.144 The ENF also cites as potential members groups in Romania, Spain, Germany, 137 Grumke (2006), in Greven and Grumke (eds.), op. cit., p. 134. 138 Ibid, p. 135. 139 Liang (2002), op. cit., pp. 14–15. 140 Granddaughter of Benito Mussolini. 141 Grumke (2006), in Greven and Grumke (eds.), op. cit., p. 137. 142 http://www.europeannationalfront.com. 143 European National Front Declaration of Foundation, europeannationalfront.com>. 144 Grumke (2006), in Greven and Grumke (eds.), op. cit., p. 136.

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France, Italy and The Netherlands. Internationally, the NPD has cooperated with other nationalists to ﬁnd common ground, on such issues as Turkey’s accession to the EU, European enlargement, prevention of globalization and reducing the role of ‘American-Israeli global governance’. So far, none of the core members have become members within the European Parliament. Table 7.2 illustrates the Internet links of the European National Front and shows how the NPD is linked with numerous other populist radical right parties across the globe. Table 7.2

The Internet Network of the European National Front

Source: Grumke, T. p. 156

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Books and music are also used to spread the NPD’s message internationally. One of the most successful NPD initiatives is its Operation Schoolyard, which, in cooperation with Panzerfaust records, spreads neo-Nazi (NS) rock and ‘white power’ music worldwide through over 500 CDs and more than 300 bands. By working in collaboration with other countries, German populist radical right groups can skirt Germany’s strong racist laws. The NPD has bragged that with Operation Schoolyard ‘we don’t just entertain racist kids, we create them!’145 Conclusion The above analysis of the German populist radical right foreign policy position shows that the parties concerned have developed a coherent foreign policy outlook over the past decade. While their ethno-pluralist stance has long existed, globalization and the War on Terror have shifted their positions towards new enemies. The populist radical right portrays immigrants not only as economic threats, but as important security threats, especially in the form of Muslim extremists. Once beholden to the United States in the Cold War, the populist radical right now openly advocates its anti-US sentiments, and some groups even suggest allying with Muslim extremists abroad to bring down the US–Israeli alliance. Rightists once again dream of German sovereignty in Europe, although Europe should be maintained as an institution to thwart multiculturalism and American economic and cultural domination. For the populist radical right, Germany must reastablish military prowess in order to exercise its national interests. In order to protect itself and its interests in Europe, Germany must get out of NATO and form a security defence pact of likeminded nationalist nations. The German Bundeswehr should no longer act as the servile accomplice of US global interests. The idea of a future non-American Europe is connected with the idea that the future of Europe will be steered centrally by a new German hegemon, in close cooperation with its nationalist neighbours who hold the same interests of maintaining their own national and cultural spheres free from ‘Usraeli’ interests. Although populist radical right parties claim to be paciﬁst by opposing German deployment of troops aboard, their recognition of the importance of jihad and their worldview based on biohumanism have led them once again to advocate an Alleingang in foreign policy, which will help them reassert what should be rightfully theirs: European hegemony as it was during the Wilhelmine Empire. In this quest for European dominance, the German populist radical right has taken the lead in creating cross-border radical right cooperation. While these ideas are extreme in German political discourse, they have had an inﬂuence on mainstream political thinking over the last 10 years. Regarding Germany’s relationship with it past, it has become apparent that as the Third Reich generation dies out, Germany has more actively sought to seek closure on the Holocaust and to feel again like a ‘normal’ nation. With this new ‘normality’ has come new reﬂections on ﬁrst admitting to German pain, suffering and loss in the Second World War, with a push to build a memorial for ethnic Germans who were 145 Ibid, p. 145.

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forced out (Vertrieben) from their ancestral homes in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and discussions about the bombing of Dresden as well as the reconstruction of the city’s Frauenkirche, which had for many years had not been repaired as a solemn reminder to Germans about the destructive forces of war. Another big change is that Germany no longer feels beholden to the US as its economic and military guarantor, despite the US’s vital support during the Cold War and German uniﬁcation. This newfound liberty was evident when Germany decided not to support the US-led war in Iraq in 2003. The move towards a unipolar world in which the US is seen to write its own rules in the Middle East has had a deeply unsettling affect on Germans, who no longer feel they want to be tethered to this imperial giant. All of this represents a new psychological liberation for Germans. Also, while in eastern Germany there are segments of society that see Americans as liberators from communism, there are a signiﬁcant number of those raised as anticapitalists who look at the US as synonymous with the evils of globalization that might threaten their welfare state. All these factors have helped bring some of the issues articulated 20 years ago by the populist radical right into current mainstream public discussions. Indeed, anti-Americanism appears to be at a high point in Germany after the launch of the 2003 Gulf War, which many Germans saw as illegal. Gerhard Schröder’s anti-American campaign during the 2002 German elections was well received. He referred to Germany as a Friedensmacht (peace state), arguing that ‘we are not available for adventures’ and dismissing the attack on Iraq as ‘terrible for the common ﬁght against terrorism.’146 The fact that some of the issues that the populist radical right feels so strongly about are being discussed more openly in Germany might quell some of the populist radical right’s power. However, the current global insecurities could help build even stronger anti-American perceptions, fed by growing anti-Semitic sentiments across Europe which see the wars in the Middle East as being driven by US-Israeli interests, leading to a strengthened populist radical right appeal. Twenty per cent of Germans under 35 believe it is possible that the CIA or the Israeli Mossad steered the planes into the World Trade Center on September 11th 2001.147 Thus, the importance of the populist radical right worldview cannot be limited to the numbers of people actually within the parties. While the actual number of members in populist radical right parties and associated subcultural milieus are low, there are, according to Stöss, six million Germans over the age of 16 who have a closed right-wing view of the world.148 Indeed, the German weekly Der Spiegel labelled the populist radical right as a ‘thorn in the side of Germany’, pointing out that it might undermine Germany’s campaign for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. The current leader of Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel, has argued that she will not tolerate 146 Cohen (2006), op. cit., p. 5. 147 Schneider, P. (2006), ‘Responds to Cohen’, Roger ‘The America Complex. Germany’s Quest for a Postwar identity,’ The Berlin Journal, 13(fall), p. 12. 148 ‘Geschlossenes rechtsextremes weltbild’. Borgwardt, A. and Molthagen D., (2006), Gegen Rechtsextremismus in Ost und West (Berlin, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung), p. 35.

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extremism in any form. In order to ﬁght extremism, the German government has stepped up its ﬁght against political extremism in 2007 with a new €19 million programme called ‘Youth for Diversity, Tolerance, Democracy – Against Right-Wing Extremism, Racism and Anti-Semitism’. She has also called for not only German cooperation to ﬁght extremism but is also, as current leader of the EU, working on European legislation to introduce minimum sentences for stirring up racial hatred and incitement to violence, as well as for denial of acts of genocide, such as the Holocaust, and the use of the Nazi swastika. This strong political conviction in preventing radical right populism and the signiﬁcant ﬁnancial investment in quelling its growth should have an impact on the populist radical right’s chances for electoral gains. While many political changes in Germany will help address the foreign and security issues articulated by the populist radical right, it remains to be seen if the German populist radical right remains an electoral nuisance or if it becomes a greater problem. This will be determined by whether the German government will be able to respond to some of the issues that are most pressing for the populist radical right’s electorate. Acronyms DVU ENF EU FES FDP GDR JN NATO NPD NSDAP PDS REP UN

Deutsche Volksunion European National Front European Union Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Federal Democratic Party German Democratic Republic Jungen Nationaldemokraten North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands Nazi party Party of Democratic Socialism Republikaner United Nations

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Borgwardt, A. and Molthagen, D. (2006), Geben Rechtsextremismus in Ost und West (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung). Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (1999), Entwicklungen im Rechtsextremismus in den neuen Ländern (Köln: Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Presse- und Öffentlichkeitsarbeit). Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (2005), Argumentationsmuster Im Rechtsextremistischen Antisemitismus: Aktuelle Entwicklungen (Köln: Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Presse- und Öffentlichkeitsarbeit). Bundesamt fürVerfassungsschutz (2006), Verfassungsschutz gegen Rechtsextremismus (Köln: Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Presse- und Öffentlichkeitsarbeit). Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (2006), Verfassungsschutz gegen Rechtsextremismus (Köln: Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Presse- und Öffentlichkeitsarbeit). Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (2006), Verfassungsschutzbericht 2005 (Köln: Druckhaus Locher). (Available online) . Bundesministerium des Innern, (ed.) (2001), Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000 (Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern). ––– (ed.) (2002), The Signiﬁcance of Anti-Semitism in Current German Right-Wing Extremism (Bonn: Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz). ––– (ed.) (2002), Verfassungsschutzbericht 2001 (Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern). ––– (ed.) (2003), Verfassungsschutzbericht 2002 (Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern). ––– (ed.) (2004), Verfassungsschutzbericht 2003 (Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern). ––– (ed.) (2005), Verfassungsschutzbericht 2004 (Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern). Clausen, D. (1998), Nach Auschwitz ein Essay über die Aktualität Adornos, in Diner. Cohen, R. (2006), ‘The America Complex: Germany’s Quest for a Postwar Identity’, Berlin Journal, 13(fall), p. 4. Decker, O. and Brähler, E. (2006), ‘Vom Rand zur Mitte: Rechtsextreme Einstellungen und ihre Einﬂussfaktoren in Deutschland’, (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung), Der Spiegel (1994), Spezial Wahljahr 1994, no.1. Deutsche Volksunion, Partei-Programm. (Available online) . Die Republikaner (2002), Erste Festschreibung des Parteiprogramm 2002 der Republikaner (Berlin). (Available online) . Die Republikaner (2006), Resolution. Unseren Staat und die freiheitlich-demokratische Grundordnung verteidigen – Keine Absprachen oder Zusammenarbeit mit linken, recht oder liberalen Extremisten, 10 Dec. (Höchstadt). (Available online) . Diner, D. (1988), Zivilisationsbruch Denken nach Auschwitz (Frankfurt-on-Main).

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European Commission (2006), Eurobarometer 66: Public Opinion in the European Union, (Available online) . Eysenck, H.-J. ‘Krieg in der Natur des Menschen?’, Deutsche National-Zeitung, 4 October 1985. Federal Ministry of the Interior (2001), ‘The Federal Government has ﬁled a petition at the Federal Constitutional Court to ban the “Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands“ (NPD) (National Democratic Party of Germany)’, . Frey, G. (1993), ‘Ist der Islam unser Feind?’, Deutsche National-Zeitung, 17 September 1993. Frey, G. ‘Amerikas Kreuzzug in der Wüste. Die Hintergründe: Öl, Macht und Israels Sicherheit’, Deutsche National-Zeitung, 24 August 1990. Frey, G. ‘Die wahren Schuldigen am Kuwait-Konﬂikt. Was verheimlicht wird’, Deutsche National-Zeitung, 7 February 1991. Frey, G. ‘Die Blutschuld der USA and USSR. Verbrechen am Golf und in Litauen’, Deutsche National-Zeitung, 18 January 1991. Frey, G. ‘Sind die Moslems unsere Feinde? Wer wirklich den Weltfrieden bedroht’, Deutsche National-Zeitung, 22 May 2006. (Available online) . Frey, G. ‘Machen wir’s wie die Schweiz: Raus aus allen Kriegen’, National-Zeitung, 19 January 2007. (Available online) . Greven, T. (2006), ‘Rechtsextreme Globalisierungskritik:Anti-globaler Gegenentwurf zu Neoliberalismus und Global Governance’ in Greven and Grumke (eds.). Greven, T. and Grumke, T. (eds.) (2006), Globaliserter Rechtsextremism: Die extremistische Rechte in der Ära der Globalisierung (Wiesbaden: V S Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften). Hillek, W. (1995), ‘EU, Was Nun?, Gedanken zum Europa der Zukunft’, Deutsche National-Zeitung, 26 May 1995. Hoffmann, L. (1998), ‘Die DVU in den Landesparlamenten: inkompetent, zerstritten, politikunfähig’, in Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (ed.). Jaschke, H.G. et al. (2001), Nach Hitler. Radikale Rechte rüsten auf (München: Bertelsmann). Jesse, E. (2003), ‘Funktionen und Strukturen von Feindbildern im politischen Extremismus’ in Feindbilder im politischen Extremismus. Ein Symposium des Bundesamtes für Verfassungsschutz, 1 October, . Kahlund, M. (1999), ‘DVU und Republikaner − zwei rechtsextreme Parteien im deutschen Parteiensystem’, . Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (ed.) (1998), Bilanz rechtsextremer Politik nach zehn Jahren. Interne Studie 163 (St. Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung). Langanke, H. (2002), Die extreme Rechte in der Bundesrepublik. Ideen, Ideologien, Interpretationen (Hamburg: Argument-Verlag GmbH).

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Lepszy, N. (1994), ‘Die Republikaner im Abwind’, Aktuelle Fragen der Politik 17 (St. Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung). Liang, C. (2002), ‘German Far Right Ideology in the Decade of German Uniﬁcation’, thèse no. 641 (Geneva: IUHEI). Linke, A. (1994), Der Multimillionär Frey und die DVU: Daten, Fakten, Hintergründe (Essen: Klartext). Loebuch, M. ‘Schweizer Dogma: Neutralität und bewaffnete Verteidigungsbereitschaft’, National-Zeitung, 5 January 2007 (Available online) . Mecklenburg (ed.) (1999), Braune Gefahr: DVU, NPD, REP Geschichte und Zukunft (Berlin: Elefanten Press). Merkl, P. (ed.) (1997), The Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the Nineties (London: Frank Cass Publishers & Co.). Minkenberg, M. (1997), ‘The New Right in France and Germany: Nouvelle Droite, Neue Rechte, and the New Right Radical Parties’ in Merkl (ed.). —— (2005), ‘From Party to Movement?, The German Radical Right in Transition’ in Political Survival on the Extreme Right. European Movements between the Inherited past and the Need to Adapt to the Future. Casals, X. (ed.) (Barcelona: ICPS), pp. 51−70. —— (2006), ‘Der europäische Rechtsradikalismus heute – Proﬁle in West und Ost und der Vergleich des Unvergleichbaren’ in Radikale Rechte und Fremdenfeindlichkeit in Deutschland und Polen: Nationale und europäische Perspektive. Minkenberg. M. et al. (eds.) (Bonn: Social Science Information Centre). Mudde, C. (forthcoming), Populist Radical Rights Parties in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Neaman, E. (1997), ‘A New Conservative Revolution?: Neo-Nationalism, Collective Memory, and the New Right in Germany since Uniﬁcation’ in Bergmann et al. (eds.). NPD ‘Europa Programm der NPD, (Available online) . Peukert, D.J.K. (1987), Inside Nazi Germany. Conformity, Opposition, and Racism in Everyday Life (New Haven: Yale University Press Books). Pfahl-Traughber, A. (2002), ‘Droht die Herausbildung einer Antiglobalisierungsbewegung von rechtsextremistischer Seite? Globalisierung als Agitationsthema des organisierten Rechtsextremismus’, Politischer Extremismus in der Ära der Globalisierung, Köln, pp 36-66. —— (2003), ‘“Antiamerikanismus”, “Antiwestlertum” und “Antizionismus” − Deﬁnition und Konturen dreier Feindbilder im politischen Extremismus’, Feindbilder im politischen Extremismus: Gengensätze, Gemeinsamkeiten und ihre Auswirkungen auf die Innere Sicherheit (Köln: Bundesamtes für Verfassungsschutz), pp. 19−34. Puschnerat, T. (2003), ‘Antizionismus im Islamismus und Rechtsextremismus’ in Feindbilder im politischen Extremismus. Ein Symposium des Bundesamtes für Verfassungsschutz, 1 October, (Available online) .

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Rippert, U. (2000), ‘German Government Moves to Ban Neo-Nazi Party. What are the Consequences of Banning the NPD?’, World Socialist Website, 11 November. . Schneider, P. (2006), ‘Dissents’ in Cohen, R. (2006) ‘The America Complex. Germany’s Quest for a Postwar identity,’ The Berlin Journal, 13(fall), p. 12. Schönhuber, F. (2002), ‘Deutscher Selbstmord?’, Nation and Europa, 52. Schwagerl, H.J. (1995), Rechtsextremes Denken: Merkmale und Methoden (Frankfurt/M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag). Staud, T. (2006), Moderne Nazis: Die neuen Rechten und der Aufstieg der NPD (Köln: Verlag Kiepenheuer and Witsch). Stern, F. (1992), Jews in the Minds of Germans in the Postwar Period (Bloomington, in Robert and Sandra S. Borns Jewish Studies Program). Stöss, R. (2002), ‘Globalisierung und rechtsextreme Einstellungen’, Politischer Extremismus in der Ära der Globalisierung (Köln: Bundesamtes für Verfassungsschutz), pp. 21−35. Veen, H.J. et al. (1993), The Republikaner Party in Germany: Right-Wing Menace or Protest Catchall? (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishing), p. 18. Virchow, F. (1999), ‘Struktur und Funktion der Frey-Presse’ in Mecklenburg (ed.). —— (2004) ‘Racial Nationalism as a Paradigm in International Relations: the Kosovo Conﬂict as Seen by the Far Right in Germany’, Peace and Change, 29(1) 34. —— (2006) ‘Gegen den Zivilismus, Zur Militarisierung der Internationalen Beziehungen und von Militär und Gesellschaft in den außen − und militärpolitischen Konzeptionen der extremen Rechten’. thesis, Free University Berlin. Von Seht, D. (1996) ‘Eine Religion greift zur Macht’, Der Republikaner, 10. Weber, I. (1997), Nation, Staat und Elite: die Ideologie der Neuen Rechten (Köln: PapyRossa Verlags GmbH). Wetzel, B. ‘Wie die EU Deutschland ruiniert, Rumänien und Bulgarien geben uns den Rest’, Deutsche National-Zeitung, 25 January 2007. —— ‘Vor deutsch-französichem Krieg? Warum US-Truppen in Deutschland bleiben sollen’, Deutsche National-Zeitung, 1 November 1991. —— ‘Braucht Deutschland Atomwaffen? Warum wir erpressbar sind’, NationalZeitung. (Available online) . 3 February 2006. —— ‘Wohin treibt die neue NATO?’, National-Zeitung 23, 31 May 2002. —— (1995) ‘Antisemitismus als Element rechtsextremer Ideologie und Propaganda’ in Benz, W. Antisemitismus in Deutschland zur Actualität eines vorteil (Munich: Deutschen Taschenbuch Verlag). Whine, M. (2006) ‘Eine unheilige Allianz: Inernationale Verbindungen zwischen Rechtsextremismus, Islamismus’ Greven and Grumke (eds.), Globaliserter Rechtsextremism: Die extremistische Rechte in der Ara der Globalisierung (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften). Wistrich, R. (2004), ‘The Politics of Resentment: Israel, Jews and the German Media’, Analysis of Current Trends in Antisemitism, 23 (Jerusalem: SICSA).

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Chapter 8

The Communist Legacy? Populist but not Popular – The Foreign Policies of the Hungarian Radical Right Eric Beckett Weaver

Many have attempted to describe the legacy communism has left to the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe.1 As time passes, the countries in the region, which had their own unique political cultures even under monolithic communism, tend to become even more unique, as the legacy that remains of communism differs from culture to culture. In Hungary, one of the remaining legacies of communism may ﬁnd expression in the elites’ style of political communication, or rather their lack of communication of policy content, perhaps reﬂecting their feelings for the electorate, or rather their understanding of populism and democracy. The elites’ style of political communication, generally low on real content, but high on emotional appeals and populist promises, is particularly empty with regards to foreign policy. The radical right in Hungary, offensively honest in its communication to the electorate, provides a sort of negative reﬂection of the political elite as a whole, for instead of offering concrete foreign policy ideas, it relies on a populist meta-narrative of the nature of the world from which a potential foreign policy can only be derived through guesswork. If we take the Oxford English Dictionary’s deﬁnition of a populist as being ‘one who seeks to represent the views of the mass of ordinary people’, then most democratic political parties today are populist, and can hardly object to being called so. In this sense, as the dictionary records, one could write of populists ‘who love the people’. In this sense there was a warm description in the Times Literary Supplement on 16 April 1976 of ‘a man with his own blend of simple, populistic dignity and even honesty’. The most successful parties in Hungary today, on the right and left alike, are populist. Yet the term offends them. Populism suggests base motives, and attempts to appeal to the worst instincts of the mob. Mistrust of the masses is certainly evident 1 Such as Curry, J.L. (1995), ‘The Sociological Legacies of Communism’, in Bárány, Z. and Volgyes, I. (eds.), The Legacies of Communism in Eastern Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press), pp. 55–83; Shaﬁr, M. (2002), Between Denial and ‘Comparative Trivialization’: Holocaust Negationism in Post-Communist East Central Europe (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University); and Rév, I. (2005), Retroactive Justice: Prehistory of Postcommunism (Stanford: Stanford University Press).

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in the common use of the term in Hungary. The Hungarian Academy’s dictionary deﬁnes populism (populizmus) as ‘a political movement often characterized by demagoguery that stands as a representative of the true or supposed interest and will of the people at times of social change or crisis’.2 When Václav Havel used the word populist to describe (among others) Viktor Orbán, the former Hungarian prime minister (1998–2002) and leader of the centre-right political party Fidesz, the Hungarian press – and Orbán himself – understood it to be an insult.3 This view of populism – that appealing to the masses is negative – reveals an inherently undemocratic mistrust of the abilities of common people to make sound political decisions. Judging by the intellectual level of the electoral promises and rallies of 2006, Hungary’s political elites regard the mass of the electorate as extraordinarily unintelligent people driven by greed and primitive collective emotions. The term populist, in the negative sense, became a commonplace in Hungary to describe politicians of all stripes in the electoral campaign of 2006. The low intellectual level of the campaign and the umbrage taken by politicians if they are called populist reveals a schizophrenic dissonance in their understanding of democracy, and their feelings about the electorate. Although they must appeal to the masses to achieve power, the vanguards of democracy are offended to be called populist. This is not because they are ashamed of, or coy about, their attempts to appeal to the rabble. In the elections of 2006 the major Hungarian parties served the electorate a series of unfulﬁllable promises to increase social handouts, strengthen the state, cut taxes, and unify all Hungarians in a life of communal happiness. Like voters elsewhere, judging from public reactions in televised interviews, very few Hungarian voters believed the promises. In the sense of appealing to the voter’s worst instincts, however, some parties on the right are more populist than others. They believe what they say, and the voters apparently believe them too. They are also some of the least successful political parties in Hungary today. Only one of them has been in parliament since the ﬁrst elections in 1990. The Hungarian Truth and Life Party4, MIÉP, has been in parliament twice, but only once, in 1998, was it able to garner enough votes to (just) pass the 5 per cent threshold needed to enter parliament. In the elections of 2002, when some erstwhile MIÉP supporters backed Fidesz, MIÉP received 4.37 per cent of the vote and the party fell out of parliament. MIÉP ﬁrst joined parliament without being formally elected, for it was formed in 1993 as a break-away group of members of parliament after MIÉP’s leader, István Csurka, was expelled from the then governing Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF). From the outset MIÉP has been distinguished by its combative stance which, in the party’s own terminology, is radical right-wing. Recently, to try to insure that it will 2 Juhász, J. et al. (2003), Magyar Értelmező Kéziszótár, 2nd rev’d. ed (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado Books). 3 Havel made his comments in an interview published in Slovakia in SME, 3 November 2005. They were repeated in Hungarian in Népszabadság, 4 November 2005. 4 The party’s name is often translated as The Hungarian Justice and Life Party. But since the party has wittily been called The Hungarian Lies and Death Party, I prefer truth over justice.

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pass the 5 per cent threshold in the 2006 elections, MIÉP formed a coalition called The Third Way with two other far-right parties. The ﬁrst, Jobbik (The Movement for a Better Hungary), has yet to show what it can do in an election. Jobbik’s slogans, its emphasis on the needs of Hungarians beyond Hungary’s borders, and its liberal use of the map of pre-First World War Greater Hungary in its campaign materials, make it clear that if it were ever to come to power relations with most of Hungary’s neighbours whose states include territories of old Greater Hungary with signiﬁcant numbers of Hungarian minorities (Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine) would rapidly deteriorate. The third partner in The Third Way, the latest incarnation of the old Smallholders’ Party, joined the coalition too late, has an unusually vague party platform (vague even by the standards of the radical right) and is too weak and disorganized to be much of a factor in the coalition as yet.5 In the end, even this combination was not enough to convince the electorate of the need for a truly populist party, for together MIÉP and Jobbik received just 2.2 per cent of the votes in the ﬁrst round of the elections of 2006, ending in ﬁfth place in party ranking. That was enough to insure that the parties in the MIÉP coalition would receive state funding, but far from the threshold required to enter parliament. Of the three of these somewhat irrelevant parties, MIÉP’s views toward foreign policy are the most clear. This is not to say that MIÉP has a foreign policy more clearly articulated than that of any other extra-governmental party in Hungary. Given the nature of Hungarian politics, it is impossible to know what any party’s foreign policy is before it enters government and is confronted with the realities of international politics. It is not even easy to discern what the country’s foreign policy is even after governments have been formed.6 Indeed, one analyst recently claimed that ‘Hungary simply has no foreign policy.’7 But by reviewing MIÉP’s, or rather Csurka’s, vision of the world and Hungary’s place in it, one might theoretically imagine what MIÉP’s foreign policies would be if the party were ever to enter government. Now, as the surprising riots on the streets of Budapest at the end of September 2006 show, one should be very careful about making any political predictions in Hungary. Nonetheless it should be stressed that unless something drastic changes in Hungary over the four year cycle of government (2006–2010), it seems somewhat unlikely that MIÉP will be invited to enter any possible government even after the next elections in 2010. Indeed, many may wonder how much longer MIÉP will remain on the scene, and if (or rather, when) it will be eclipsed by some other radical Hungarian party that will attempt to appeal to MIÉP’s constituency. Csurka, a veteran of the uprising in 1956 and a skilled playwright, was born in 1934, and it is difﬁcult to say how much longer

5 Jobbik can be translated as Better, or More Right. As to the Smallholders’ Party, while there is some overlap in membership with the former and once quite successful Smallholders’ Party led by József Torgyán, it is not entirely clear what the new Smallholders’ represent other than a willingness to run common candidates with MIÉP and Jobbik in some districts in 2006. 6 Balázs, P. (2006), ‘Új külpolitikai stratégiát’, Népszabadság, 14 June. 7 Gyarmati, I. (2006), ‘A méltó hely Európában – Kül − és biztonságpolitikai stratégia kellene’, Népszabadság, 27 May.

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he will be active. As yet, nobody of his stature has appeared from his party’s ranks (or in any other radical conﬁguration, for that matter) to replace him. Csurka, a great supporter of order, is proud to point out that not a single crime has been committed by his followers at his party rallies, where he presents a dark vision of the state of the world and Hungary. According to Csurka and MIÉP, the world is dominated by an international Jewish conspiracy. America, the most powerful state in the world, is under the control of Jews and Israel. In a recent interview with a Canadian journalist, Csurka put it very succinctly: ‘White Anglo-Saxon Protestants have lost America.’8 In Csurka’s reading, the Jewish conspiracy also controls Hungary through local Jewish elites, who are snapping up Hungarian housing and buying up Hungarian land to prepare the country to become a Jewish settlement. In a platform statement prior to the elections of 2006 Csurka explains: ‘The squeezing out of MIÉP was a World Bank-New York-Tel Aviv demand in [the elections of] 2002. It was a Jewish demand, to eliminate Hungarians in the way of those [Jews] who would settle [in Hungary].’9 The radical Right at times compares the eventual fate of Hungarians in Hungary to that of Palestinians in Israel. Csurka claims that false Hungarians embedded in the liberal-socialist coalition who governed Hungary from 2002 to 2006 had been, along with the banking elite, preparing the ground for the Jews who would settle in the country. Csurka sees a broad variety of events as pointing to the corrosive Jewish inﬂuence in the media and public life in Hungary. In December 2004 a referendum asked whether Hungarian citizenship should be given to ethnic Hungarians living outside Hungary’s borders on the territories of old Greater Hungary. The referendum failed. A MIÉP party statement prior to the referendum explained that it had to fail ‘so that there will be room for Jews who will arrive from Russia, Ukraine and the Near East. Anything to prevent a Hungarian from getting a run-down farmhouse’.10 Oddly, Csurka objects strenuously to being called anti-Semitic,11 leaving one to wonder what, in his view, anti-Semitism is. The old Hungarian bon mot that ‘the Anti-Semite is a man who detests Jews more than is reasonable’ may be applicable here.12 We can deﬁnitely reject the claim recently made by a right-wing Hungarian politician that MIÉP is not anti-Semitic or neo-fascist because it is a legal party. Hungarian analysts have not hesitated to call MIÉP neo-fascist.13 Certainly, the party qualiﬁes for the classiﬁcation based on the typology of neo-fascism developed by Umberto Eco. 8 Petrou, M. (2006), ‘Neo-neo-nazis’, Maclean’s, 27 February–6 March. 9 Csurka, I., (2006), ‘Megmaradni’, MIÉP homepage (published online 5 April 2006), . 10 MIÉP (2004), ’A Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja állásfoglalása’, Magyar Fórum, 2 November, cited in Weaver, E.B. (2006), National Narcissism: The Intersection of the Nationalist Cult and Gender in Hungary (Oxford: Peter Lang), p. 101. 11 Csurka, I., (2001), quoted in RFE/RL Newsline, 6 December. 12 Poliakov, L. (2003), From Voltaire to Wagner, trans. Miriam Kochan, vol. III. of The History of Anti-Semitism (4 vols.) (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press), p. 40. 13 Hajdú, A. F. (2001), ’MIÉP: Egy nemzeti szocialista párt’, Mozgó Világ, no. 3, pp. 17–29; and Fehér, F. and Heller, Á (1998), ‘Magyar-Szomália felé?’ in Feitl, I. (ed.) (1998), Jobboldali radikalizmusok tegnap és ma (Budapest: Napvilág), pp. 221–26.

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Given Csurka’s views of Jewish designs on Hungarian soil, and his belief that a Jewish plot lies behind the new (for Hungary) liberal economic order, it becomes clear why he dislikes bankers (a codeword for Jews), the World Bank, and the international liberal economic order that enables people to freely move capital and purchase property abroad. In MIÉP’s vocabulary globalization is globalism, just the latest form of the international Jewish conspiracy to control the world, a brutal force to be resisted and to outlive, like the other great -ism, communism, was in its day. Another code word, Christian, simply means not Jewish in the vocabulary of the extreme Right in Hungary, and has very little to do with Christian beliefs. MIÉP’s anti-Americanism14 also can only be understood through the party’s anti-Semitic vision, the lens through which it represents all politics. Csurka and his followers are anti-American in the sense that ultra-patriotic American neo-Nazis are also; he despises what he sees as Jewish control of America through which Jews force neo-liberalism and a new world order upon the planet. Thus, after 11 September 2001, Csurka crowed that ‘the castle of globalism lies in ruins.’ He explained that the attack by al-Qaeda had taken place because ‘The oppressed peoples of the world could not bear the humiliation and exploitation forced upon them by globalism and the planned genocide occurring in Palestine.’15 Not surprisingly, given American dominance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), MIÉP campaigned against NATO membership in the referendum on joining the organization, and would have Hungary withdraw from the pact as soon as possible. Csurka’s views of the European Union (EU), while more circumspect and nuanced than those towards the United States, are also negative. Csurka called the failed European Constitution ‘a new Soviet system of centralisation that was prepared in the West’.16 Most recently the liberal EU has also ﬁt within Csurka’s view of Jewish domination of the world. Thus, when explaining how and why Fidesz, the largest Hungarian centre-right party, had been able to seduce MIÉP’s voters, and all but establish a two-party system in Hungary,17 Csurka wrote: ‘The Israeli, American and European factors directing the two-party system are asking Fidesz for assurances that MIÉP will not get in [to parliament].’ And reacting to the fact that Fidesz leader Viktor Orbán has called an Israeli party, Likud, Fidesz’s partner, Csurka said: ‘That ﬁts the fancy of the prime directors of the [European] Union. Israel in any case has had ﬁnancing from Union funds […] for more than a decade.’ In Csurka’s view immediately prior to the 2006 elections, if Orbán had just realized that he can only achieve the two-thirds majority he needs in parliament to modify the constitution and certain basic laws by allowing MIÉP to enter parliament, that is by not seducing MIÉP’s voters, quite a lot could be achieved. ‘The media law could be rewritten; 14 Borbála, K. (2004), ‘Anti-Americanism and Right-wing Populism in Eastern Europe: The Case of Hungary’, paper presented to the Socrates Kokkalis 6th Annual Graduate Student Workshop at Harvard. 15 Csurka, I. (2001), ‘Ég a Pentagon, romokban a globalizmus fellegvára: Amerika reszket’, Magyar Fórum, 13 September, cited in Weaver, E.B. (2006), National Narcissism: The Intersection of the Nationalist Cult and Gender in Hungary (Oxford: Peter Lang), p. 106. 16 Csurka, I. (2004), ’A Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja állásfoglalása’, Magyar Fórum, 12 October. 17 In fact four parties entered parliament as a result of the elections of 2006.

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the settling of non-Hungarians in Hungary could be stopped; we might renegotiate [EU] membership; or we could force concessions that would allow us to avoid the dangerous withering away of the nation, the selling out of Hungarian agriculture.’18 As to Hungary’s immediate neighbourhood, MIÉP has featured images and maps of old Greater Hungary in its party events, much like its partner Jobbik does. And in the past Csurka has openly expressed interest in attempting to regain Hungarian lands lost at the end of the First World War – lands now incorporated in the states bordering Hungary. Csurka once even suggested that, if Hungary had the necessary military power, she might pursue her territorial claims.19 More recently, however, Csurka has been more cautious, declaring that while Greater Hungary is a historical heritage that nobody can take away from the Hungarians, the task now is to survive the storm of liberalism and globalism that is destroying the nation in what is left of little Hungary. Thinking of boundary revisions now, when the radical Right (and thus the nation) is struggling for its very survival, would be unrealistic. As to his ideological inspiration, Csurka himself claims that the font of his and the MIÉP’s views are the Hungarian populist writers of the 1920s and 1930s, many of whom were the domestic, autonomous Hungarian variety of nationalist socialists. Given the populist writers’ ideologies, formulated in the decades when Hungarian irredentism was at its peak, one can only imagine that expanding Hungary’s borders will become an issue again if MIÉP were ever to form a government capable of formulating foreign policy. Based on MIÉP’s and Csurka’s vision of the world, and Hungary’s place in it, we might imagine his foreign and related domestic policies to take the following form: the United States, and the world’s economic order, is to be resisted and subverted by all possible means. Hungary should withdraw from NATO. Israel should be seen and treated as Christian Hungary’s prime enemy, and the enemy of all humanity. Laws should be passed to prevent treason of the sort that some citizens of Hungary have engaged in – that is, people who act or speak in ‘anti-Hungarian’ ways should be punished. The press should be made national, that is it should support the values and interests of true, ethnic Hungarians. Foreigners should not be allowed to settle in Hungary unless they are Christian, and unless they can prove that they can conform to, and be fully integrated into Hungarian life. Ethnic Hungarians from beyond Hungary’s borders should be granted Hungarian citizenship in the short-term. In the long-term, there should be no doubt that the issue of Hungary’s borders will be raised with neighbouring states, who will be pressured to return territory with ethnic-Hungarian majorities. Hungary should become economically self-sufﬁcient, and should limit the movement of foreign capital into and out of the country. The European Union will have to accept these new regulations, or Hungary will be compelled to leave the Union. If international partners are found, if (for example) someone like Jean-Marie Le Pen were to come to power in a state rather distant from

18 Csurka (2006), op. cit. 19 Csurka, I., (1993), quoted in ‘Ha katonai erőnk lenne…’, Magyar Hírlap, 27 February; and Schöpﬂin, G. (2000), Nations, Identity, Power: The New Politics of Europe (London: Hurst), p. 388.

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Hungary, then Hungary will have an ally within the EU. If not, then Hungary will, and can, go it alone. In a scenario with MIÉP in government, the potential for serious conﬂict between Hungary and some neighbouring state cannot be disregarded. As the recent political changes in Slovakia demonstrate, where an extreme right-wing party has been included in the government coalition, there should be little doubt that if an extreme right-winger were also to come to power in a country neighbouring Hungary tensions would quickly rise between that country and Hungary, for anti-Hungarian sentiments are a feature of extremism in the countries with a signiﬁcant Hungarian minority. It seems clear that if any country in Europe were led by a government that pursued the policies outlined above, that country would fairly quickly ﬁnd itself alone, and in conﬂict with its immediate neighbours. Even if the possibility of withdrawal from the European Union were not amongst such a government’s policies, a member state that pursued just a few of them would quickly ﬁnd itself isolated from the EU, for they violate many of the union’s most basic ideals and laws. The country would ﬁnd itself aligned with other pariah states, and might potentially ﬁnd itself in an odd (odd for a so-called ‘Christian’ government) coalition of interests with radical Islamists, or semi-authoritarian regimes such as those in Russia and China.20 In many ways these policies are a strange and twisted mirror image of the policies of hard-core communist states. The outlines of many of MIÉP’s potential policies were pursued by communists at one stage or another, such as: economic self-sufﬁciency; trade and intercourse only with those of like mind; limiting the movement of people and capital; controlling the press on ideological grounds; opposition to the United States; and alliance with some Muslim states or organizations based on a common opposition to Israel. In contrast to the ideology of communism, however, the people, for Csurka, are not some vague proletariat – they are the ethnic-Hungarian Christian majority, whose vanguard and protector would be a nationally-minded Hungarian government. Those who believe in human rationality and that, should MIÉP ever come to power, the realities of the international and European stage would force a MIÉP government to change its tune, are both too optimistic, and too cynical. They are cynical because Csurka and his fellows have not taken this position out of any desire to win votes. If they were populist in that sense, they would have modiﬁed their position long ago. Instead, they have maintained their position in the face of electoral failure, and in some ways become more radical despite never coming near to gaining much more than 5 per cent in any election. Unlike the public policies of many political parties in Hungary, these policies, or policies very like them, come not from a tactical desire to win elections or to gain the most beneﬁt from power. Csurka and MIÉP’s supporters truly believe what they say. They speak about the international Jewish conspiracy because they are convinced that it exists, and that it is their duty to inform people about it, not because they might gain votes by talking about it. And they actually think that separation from the international liberal system would be a good thing for Hungary. This may seem absurd, and politically untenable, 20 Such links, though rarely discussed, have already been made. One radical right-winger in Hungary received funding from Saddam Hussein’s regime before its overthrow.

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but one need only recall Milošević’s Serbia to see that it is still all too possible for the government of a small country to pursue policies that leave it totally isolated, and even in a state of war with much of the world. MIÉP may well exhibit a communist heritage in its dark view of the ideal nationally narcissistic state (a sort of Hungarian sacro egoismo). MIÉP is also somewhat like the Communist Party in its halcyon days in expounding upon ideas not because they are popular, but because MIÉP believes that they are good for the nation whether the nation wants them or not. For their part, Hungary’s other populists may well be exhibiting a communist heritage in another way, in the dumbing down of their campaigns in 2006, and in their unwillingness to expound fully on their ideas (if they actually have any new ones), and to expose their policies to critical debate. Thus, Hungary’s other, less radical populists reveal a deep mistrust of the electorate, and a reluctance to engage the voters with their ideas. In a way this unwillingness to discuss policy with the voters (especially evident in the paucity of public information on foreign policy) reveals the elites’ feeling that they are the only thinkers capable of taking the country forward; that the electorate cannot and should not think for itself in the period between elections, but is to be courted once every four years with unreasonable promises that nobody really intends to fulﬁl; that only the elites’ ideas matter; that people are to be led by government and not to be enabled to express themselves by it; and that only the elites, the new nomenklatura, have the right to lead the nation. Given the nature of MIÉP’s honesty, it is not surprising that in the elections of 2002 the suggestion (never proven) that Fidesz might form a government with MIÉP if MIÉP were to enter parliament drew a signiﬁcant number of voters away from the Fidesz government, helping to bring the opposition liberalsocialist coalition to power. Indeed, given the nature of MIÉP’s honest vision, the vast majority of the Hungarian electorate would never consider voting for the party. Instead, much like voters in older democracies, the majority of Hungarians vote for populists who at least will not tell them horror stories about international conspiracies while driving them into the cold wilderness, but may actually tell them what they want to hear and show them a sunny vista or two from time to time, even if they know they are being lied to, and that stormy weather may yet come. Acronyms EU MIÉP NATO

European Union Hungarian Truth and Life Party North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

References Balázs, P. (2006), ‘Új külpolitikai stratégiát’, Népszabadság, 14 June. Bárány, Z. and Volgyes, I., (eds.) (1995), The Legacies of Communism in Eastern Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press).

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Borbála, K. (2004), ‘Anti-Americanism and Right-Wing Populism in Eastern Europe: The Case of Hungary’, Paper presented to the Socrates Kokkalis 6th Annual Graduate Student Workshop at Harvard. Csurka, I. (1993), quoted in ‘Ha katonai erőnk lenne …’, Magyar Hírlap, 27 February. ––– (2001a), ‘Ég a Pentagon, romokban a globalizmus fellegvára: Amerika reszket’, Magyar Fórum, 13 September. ––– (2001b), quoted in RFE/Newsline, 6 December. ––– (2004), ‘A Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja állásfoglalása’, Magyar Fórum, 12 October. ––– (2006), ‘Megmaradni’, MIÉP Homepage (published online 5 April 2006), . Curry, J.L. (1995), ‘The Sociological Legacies of Communism’ in Bárány and Volgyes (eds.). Fehér, F. and Heller, Á. (1998), ‘Magyar-Szomália felé?’ in Feitl (ed.). Feitl, I., (ed.) (1998), Jobboldali radikalizmusok tegnap és ma (Budapest: Napvilág). Gyarmati, I. (2006), ‘A méltó hely Európában – Kül − és biztonságpolitikai stratégia kellene’, Népszabadság, 27 May. Hajdú, A.F. (2001), ‘MIÉP: Egy nemzeti szocialista párt’, Mozgó Világ, 3. Juhász, J. et al. (2003), Magyar Értelmező Kéziszótár. 2nd revd. ed (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó). MIÉP (2004), ‘A Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja állásfoglalása’, Magyar Fórum, 2 November. Petrou, M. (2006), ‘Neo-neo-Nazis’, Maclean’s, 27 February – 6 March. Poliakov, L. (2003), From Voltaire to Wagner, trans. Miriam Kochan, vol. III. of The History of Anti-Semitism (4 vols.) (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press). Rév, I. (2005), Retroactive Justice: Prehistory of Post-Communism (Stanford: Stanford University Press Books). Schöpﬂin, G. (2000), Nations, Identity, Power: the New Politics of Europe (London: Hurst). Shaﬁr, M. (2002), Between Denial and ‘Comparative Trivialization’: Holocaust Negationism in Post-Communist East Central Europe (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University). Weaver, E.B. (2006), National Narcissism: the Intersection of the Nationalist Cult and Gender in Hungary (Oxford: Peter Lang Publishing).

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Chapter 9

Recalcitrant Allies: The Conﬂicting Foreign Policy Agenda of the Alleanza Nazionale and the Lega Nord Marco Tarchi

The concept of ‘right-wing populist party’ is not easily applicable to the study of the Italian political system where both populism and the Right are widely present but do not always overlap. When this is the case, it is due more to a particular personality rather than to a party. In fact, Silvio Berlusconi can been considered, in matter of style and mindset, a ‘right-wing populist’ (although, he loves to think of himself as a ‘man of the centre position’ which is much more fruitful in terms of electoral consensus); but his party Forza Italia is more similar, both in its programmes and political action, to a conservative political force and it is not by accident that now it is part of the European Popular Party. Nevertheless, the sociological and political literature which has been looking at the growth of ‘radical-right’ neo-populism in Western Europe in the last two decades frequently includes in this area two Italian political actors: the Lega Nord and the Alleanza Nazionale. As for the Lega Nord (Northern League), one can agree with this inclusion for, in the ﬁrst instance, the party led by Umberto Bossi shows all the characteristics of a populist party1 and from 2001 to April 2006, it was part of the ‘centre-right’ coalition that assured the parliamentary majority to the second Berlusconi cabinet, in which it has assumed extreme positions on many controversial issues.2 On the other hand, the inclusion of the Lega in the list of ‘radical right’ or ‘extreme right-wing’ parties3 does not suit this party and has frequently aroused misunderstandings among the scholars about its nature. 1 Betz, H.-G. (1994), Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe (Houndmills: Macmillan); Biorcio, R. (1997), La Padania promessa (Milano: Il Saggiatore); and Tarchi, M. (2003), l’Italia Populista (Bologna: Il Mulino). 2 Albertazzi, D. and McDonnell, D. (2005), ‘The Lega Nord in the Second Berlusconi Government: In a League of its Own’, Western European Politics, 28, pp. 952–972. 3 Zaslove, A. (2004), ‘The Dark Side of European Politics: Unmasking the Radical Right’, Journal of European Integration, 26, pp. 61–81; Norris, P. (2005), Radical Right: Parties and Electoral Competition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); and Rydgren, J. (2005), ‘Is Extreme Right-Wing Populism Contagious?, Explaining the Emergence of a New Party Family’, European Journal of Political Research, 44, pp. 413–437.

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Indeed, one should not forget that the Lega has in the past continually swung between right-wing and centre and left-wing alliances, emphasizing its ambiguous ideological bases.4 It is instead a mistake to classify Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance, AN) under the label of ‘populism’ since the party has made an effort in changing from the neo-fascist ideological roots of the Movimento Sociale Italiano, of which the AN is a revised and updated version, to a national-conservative party of the Right, carefully avoiding the use, as political tools, of all the main themes of populist ideology, which could have compromised its new image as a democratic party capable of fulﬁlling the governing responsibilities that the participation in the two Berlusconi’s cabinets (1994 and 2001–2006) required. This clariﬁcation is necessary in order to understand in more general terms both the potentialities and the limitations of the penetration of populist ideas into the Italian political agenda. However, a comparison between the positions adopted by the Lega Nord and the Alleanza Nazionale, whose importance for the Italian political dynamics is testiﬁed to both by the electoral results of the European elections on 13 June 2004 – 3,759,575 votes (11.5 per cent) for the AN and 1,615,814 (5 per cent) for the Lega – and by the presence of both parties in the government, is quite useful to assess in a more speciﬁc and empirical way the inﬂuence of populist views in attracting voters, as well as the impact on the established political parties in Italy. Here we will refer to the different positions of the Lega Nord and the Alleanza Nazionale on foreign and military issues. Our aim will be to understand how far these positions can contribute toward a synergy of action of these two parties in the parliamentary arena, within the government and in their activities on the ground, and as well how far these positions are fated to be an obstacle for cooperation and, consequently, to be an element of disturbance for the center-right coalition Casa delle Libertà led by Berlusconi. The Foreign Policy Agenda of the Lega Nord Since its origins – its creation dates back to 1989 as result of a fusion of several regionalist movements active mainly in the northern regions of the country5 − the Lega Nord has put European integration at the centre of its political agenda, which has often been used as political tool in terms of domestic affairs and in sending signals to its potential electorate. The analysis of its press production, of its ofﬁcial political documents such as Congress motions and electoral programmes, and of the declarations of its leaders at different levels, from Bossi to the party Members of Parliament (MPs), shows that the party, until the end of the 1990s, has devoted much less attention to other foreign policy issues that fuelled the national debate in such matters. In particular, issues concerning national security have been systematically neglected: the Lega, considering itself as having nothing to do with the Italian state and concentrating its efforts on the mission of building 4 Tarchi, M. (1998), ‘The Lega Nord’ in Regionalist Parties in Western Europe, de Winter, L. and Türsan, H. (eds.) (London: Routledge), pp. 143–57. 5 Diamanti, I. (1995), La Lega: geograﬁa, storia e sociologia di un soggetto politico (Roma: Donzelli); and Tarchi (1998); op. cit.

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up a ‘Northern Republic’, or a secessionist ‘independent Padania’, has not paid attention to the public debate on border controversies and military alliances. Things changed only in 1999 with the outburst of the Serbia–Kosovo conﬂict in the former Yugoslavia, since for the ﬁrst time a Muslim population was involved in a war fought on European soil. The Lega Nord has always manifested an open hostility toward any form of immigration which it considers a threat to the identity and cultural integrity of the populations of the north of Italy, of which the party has proclaimed itself the champion, and this position has always pushed it to adopt an extremely suspicious attitude toward all issues related to the presence of immigrants. Its propaganda has always depicted the Islamic countries from where the majority of developing world immigrants come, as enemies of Europe and of Christianity (even if towards the latter the Lega has often held ambiguous positions, emphasizing sometimes the presumed Celtic roots of the ‘Padanian people’ and criticizing the Vatican for its preaching of solidarity and for its welcoming of foreigners). The events of 11 September 2001 have added new arguments to this controversy and have increased the interest of the Lega in the relationship with the US, causing a shift in its attitude towards Western civilization, which had been previously accused of feeding multiculturalism and ‘mondialismo’ (a word that in the Lega political language recalls the cosmopolitan cultural substratum of globalization). The position of the Lega Nord in matters of foreign policy can be divided into phases in order to better understand its development. The ﬁrst phase goes from the formation of the party until 1997. For almost a decade, the Lega Nord deﬁned and followed a line that was strategically coherent, although expressed with varying intensity and tone according to the different circumstances in which the party found itself: from radical opposition in the early 1990s, to political partnership of conservative-moderate parties in the ﬁrst Berlusconi government in 1994, and to the opposition again in 1995 but in an opposite position in respect to right and left, resulting from secessionist aspirations. During this period, pro-European feelings were emphasized, although the recognition of the importance of European integration alternated with calls for the building of the European Union (EU) on different ground than that of the nation-state. The Lega Nord was above all a ﬁerce adversary of those ‘integrationist’ tendencies which risked leading to the emergence of a ‘superstate’ in the hands of technocrats and bureaucrats in Brussels; this feeling induced its leadership to campaign for a negative vote in the 1989 consultative referendum on the power of enforcement of the EU institutions and to propose, as an alternative, a confederation of self-governing European populations: a ‘Europe of peoples, nations and regions’. Nevertheless, four years afterwards, the Lega expressed a positive opinion regarding the founding of the European Economic Community (EEC) in the 1950s, considered the EEC a winning idea against ‘the paranoid egocentrism of the national states’, and supported the political and monetary union in which it saw the ‘foundation of the United States of Europe’.6 In the meantime, 6

Lega Nord (1993), Un’Italia federale per l’Europa del 2000 (Editoriale Lombarda), p. 4.

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the Lega agreed with the ‘Eurosceptics’ when they reported on unclear procedures on the part of the EU bureaucracy, and on the scarce power of the parliament in making important decisions. Despite these doubts, the party maintained that the integration of Europe must not be stopped. On the contrary, ‘it is necessary that the CEE commission is the sole builder of the EU.’7 The party itself showed a clear pro-EU attitude: ‘The Lega Nord is undoubtedly the most pro-Europe party of all the political movements in Italy.’8 Moreover, the reference to European identity was one of the main arguments used to criticize the overly centralized Italian state: ‘farther from Rome, closer to Europe’.9 As a matter of fact, the interest of the Lega Nord in developments concerning European integration was focused mainly on the economic aspects of such a process: Northern Italy looked to Europe (while, as Bossi says, southern Europe looked to Africa) because it hoped that integration would be favourable to the modernization of the country and the improvement of small- and medium-size industry, the socioeconomic milieu where the Lega found most of its electoral support. The European Union was acceptable only if the states which were part of it were willing to embrace the federalist cause. The Maastricht Treaty was welcomed but with reservations: it could be approved on the condition that it would not be used to build up a new, enlarged form of centralism. Europe had to keep its internal borders; moreover, it had to strengthen them by guaranteeing the self-development of the European regions, seen as the most efﬁcient intermediaries between the EU and people. The Council of the Regions had to become a full-status European institution as a Regional Chamber of the European Parliament with accordingly legislative competence and the building of big transnational Euroregions must be encouraged. In a sense, the EU, in order to avoid the danger of becoming a superstate, needed to be conceived of as a super-region, mainly based on a network of economic relationships, and provided with speciﬁc competence only in matters of foreign policy.10 This imaginary Europe was useful to the Lega above all in order to redirect Italian foreign policy, considered too much in favour of Mediterranean cooperation, and in order to redeﬁne the centre-periphery relationship within the Italian peninsula. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid., pp. 4–12. Umberto Bossi enforced this position on the eve of the 1994 European Elections when the Lega Nord was still in power, saying that Europe must ‘have new international responsibilities’ and thus, must complete its political uniﬁcation in order to ‘offer to Russia and to the former Soviet Republics a concrete aid to facilitate the transition for a free market and therefore, to save democracy’. The Maastricht Treaty leads the way toward a possible European Federalism: ‘United Europe is not an utopia but a historical necessity!’ And even if the European Parliament has not chosen a federalist Constitution, as the Lega hoped, the password is ‘no Euro pessimism!’; Bossi, U. and Vimercati, D. (1993), La Rivoluzione. La Lega: storia e idee (Milano: Sperling & Kupfer), 9 Confalonieri, M.A. (2005), ‘La Lega Nord e l’Unione Europea: un’ analisi del discorso Politico,’’, in Fedel, G. (ed.), Studi in onore di Mario Stoppino (1935–2001) (Milano: Giuffrè), p. 353. 10 Gohr, A. (2001), Die Lega Nord – Eine Herausforderung für Italien (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang).

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Bossi bet on the incapability of the ‘Roman’ governments to allow Italy to enter the European monetary system with the Euro and tried to obtain popular support for northern secession on the basis of the promise to bring the Padania, with its strong economic assets, alone into the new Europe that was forming. Bossi’s slogan was: ‘more Europe, less Rome’.11 Already in this phase, while Europe provided the positive image of the target to reach, the developing world constituted on the other hand the negative model to avoid and the source of most perceived dangers. On January 1992, the ofﬁcial party publication Lombardia Autonomista (Autonomist Lombardy) wrote that ‘Islam presents itself as an element of conﬂict: in all the countries where it operates, it is the source of severe tensions, bloody deconstructions and violations of the most elementary human rights.’12 The responsibility of mass migrations from the poorest countries of the world is attributed to the explicit will of the capital, the Church and the established parties (‘partitocrazia’). Bossi also clearly indicated the alternatives: ‘the civilization on one side and the barbarians on the other. The civilized West and Islam’. And in order to ‘cool down’ the breeding-grounds of the crisis which were destabilizing the international order in the Middle East, in some regions of Eastern Europe and elsewhere, ‘even the use of force is justiﬁed’.13 It must be added though, that in order to face the conﬂict between the ‘North’ and ‘South’ of the planet, that after the breakdown of the communist regimes had become the major danger to a peaceful coexistence, a ‘well-deﬁned’ cooperation between developed and poor countries, aimed to sustain the autonomous development of the latter, was envisaged.14 The rare observations on the general dynamics of international relationships were mainly left to Bossi and showed scarce trust of the US’ potential hegemonic role, together with a declared preference for multi-polarism. ‘The end of the world division between two blocks marks a turning point’; ‘the borders ﬁxed and defended for almost half a century by opposite imperialisms both American and Soviet’ no longer existed. The US aim to act as the world policeman ‘cannot ﬁnd agreement among the federalists’, for in order to build an ‘immense empire’ the US would require an unacceptable concentration of bureaucratic-military force. Washington is the new Rome and its tendency to centralize powers ‘can represent a sign of decadence and senility’. ‘The era of the American tutoring, which was of great value in order to guard against the Soviet giant, is over’ and Europe had to recognize this fact and create its own army for defence purposes ‘from possible aggressions from Africa and Asia, which have became dangerous after the proliferation of nuclear weapons’.15 When the centre-left government led by Romano Prodi succeeded in having Italy accepted within the Euro monetary system, the Lega Nord’s foreign political 11 Aguilera de Prat, C. (1999), El Cambio Político En Italia y la Liga Norte (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas-Siglo XXI). 12 Ibid., p. 172. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Bossi and Vimercati (1993), op. cit., pp. 128, 140 and 212.

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agenda changed suddenly and entered into a second phase. European integration was no longer considered as the ‘historical opportunity’ that the former minister Maroni had stressed in his speech at the 1997 Lega congress, sketching the possible future scenario of a ‘federal executive presided by a premier directly elected by European citizens for a maximum of four years, depending on the conﬁdence of the European Parliament and responsible for monetary policy, strategic foreign policy and defence policy’. Nor was the desired confederation characterized by a bicameral parliament and by ‘a sort of network of capitals including the seats of all European institutions’.16 It was now a ‘Euromenace’, ‘a giant already aged that has as its sole scope to keep in life the “usual” parties’ against which a strong opposition had to be organized. The adoption of the new common currency, the Euro, which had represented some of the hopes of the Lega because of its welcomed strength on the ﬁnancial market, was now seen as the ﬁrst stage of a process that would lead to the emergence of a centralized and illiberal state dominated by a ‘new Jacobinism’. In other words, the Lega feared that the EU would develop into a pachydermal structure, dominated by the German-French axis and regulated by ‘parasite bureaucrats’, which would hinder European production and employment. Euroscepticism17 was reevaluated and, although it had been until then defended from those ‘parties that descend from chauvinist or collectivistic ideologies’ like the Front National, the Parti Communiste Français, the Vlaams Blok or the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (even if the latter had sent its own delegates to the 1997 and 1998 Lega congresses), it became the favourite political campaign theme of the hypothetical ‘autonomist liberal forces’ cartel that the Lega would like to organize, after having tried to be both part of the Arc-en-ciel and of the European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party European Parliamentary groups, and after being expelled from the latter for sitting in a government where ministers of the ‘post-fascist’ Alleanza Nazionale are included.18 The perception of transatlantic relationships changed as well. According to the Lega Nord, in order to overcome the unsatisfactory Treaty of Amsterdam, the European Union should intensify its cooperation efforts aimed at the development of the Balkan and Mediterranean countries. A new document, issued by the 1998 Federal Congress of the Lega Nord, with contents very different from that of the one issued the previous year, reported the risk of ‘a monopoly linked to the presence of the only superpower that inﬂuences the way of life and the information at a planetary level’ and leads the party, on the wave of the refusal of ‘world McDonaldization’, to refuse not only what is perceived as excessive US power, but also the apology of the cultural roots of Western civilization. As well, the acceptance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was no longer a given fact and the International Monetary Found was accused of suffocating the

16 Maroni, R. (1997), ‘A Free Padania in a Free Europe’, speech to the 1997 Federal Congress of the Lega Nord, p. 4. 17 Taggart, P. (1998), ‘A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western Europe’, European Journal of Political Research, 33, pp. 363–388. 18 Bonometti, G. (1998), ‘Eurominaccia’, Il Sole delle Alpi 2(16), pp. 15–19.

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freedom of the diverse peoples whose right to the self-determination is contrary to the idea of world government.19 The deepening of the crisis in the Balkan region offered further motivations to this change of perspective. The struggle for the liberation of Kosovo, ‘stronghold of the Islamic invasion to the detriment of the Christian Europe’, was condemned and attributed to the ‘American puppet master’ who wanted this ‘only and exclusively for economical reasons’.20 In contradiction to the traditional solidarity with peoples who claimed autonomy from ethnically mixed states, the Lega asserted the pre-eminence of a geopolitical imperative: the enforcement of Eastern European borders against Islamic penetration. Support to Serbia, the ‘the last European shelter’, was demonstrated at the beginning of the war by the decision to send to Belgrade an ofﬁcial deputation including some party MPs, who expressed their support to the population. In the Chamber of Deputies, Bossi condemned the decision of ‘using the NATO as an aggression tool’ and stated the necessity to reexamine the presence of NATO military bases in Italy.21 In the party press, the appeals for cooperation between Europe and Russia multiplied: Bossi came into contact with the Russian nationalist political leader Vladimir Zhirinovskij and came as a guest to the congress of Russia’s ‘liberal-democrat’ party. Moreover, the attacks against a so-called shadow government of the ‘twenty bankers’ who would dominate the world (an old stereotype of the extreme right milieux) and against an ‘obsolete and ageing’ NATO multiplied, as well as criticism of the ‘illicit’ war against the Yugoslavian federation and of the delegitimization of the United Nations that the war implied.22 In addition, in order to oppose the US policy, perceived as opposed to European interests, the strengthening the EU Commission was welcomed by the party.23 Even the Pope’s appeals against the war were interpreted as an opposition to ‘mondialismo’, the ideology that, according to the Lega, inspires both globalization and US hegemonic plans.24 The Lega daily newspaper La Padania continuously ran articles and interviews that reported the dark side of the ‘masonic’ war launched to ‘destroy Europe’.25 Despite its intensity, the period of anti-US propaganda by the Lega was short. The end of that period was due to the clear dissent of voters, whose support fell 19 Lega Nord (1998), Per una Padania Libera e Antagonista All’omologazione, Tesi Congressuale elaborata dal Dipartimento Affari Esteri della Lega Nord per il Congresso Federale del 1998, pp. 3, 7–9. 20 Ferrari, M. (1999a), ‘La Crociata verso il Kosovo’, Il Sole delle Alpi, 3(5), pp. 16–19; and Ferrari, M. (1999b), ‘Un conﬂitto per distruggere l’Europa’’, Il Sole delle Alpi, 3(14), p. 1. 21 Garibaldi, I. (1999a), ‘Diciamo no alla guerra’, Il Sole delle Alpi, 3(13), pp. 4–5. 22 Cornali, A. (1999), ‘Compleanno di fuoco’, Il Sole delle Alpi, 3(15), pp. 4–5; Ferrari, M. (1999c), ‘I perché del mundialismo’, Il Sole delle Alpi, 3(15), pp. 6–11; and Gnocchi, M. (1999), ‘C’era una volta l’Onu…’, Il Sole delle Alpi, 3(16), pp. 10–13. 23 Garibaldi, I. (1999b), ‘La forza dell’Unione’, Il Sole delle Alpi, 3(21), pp. 22–24. 24 Leoni, G. (1999), ‘Papa Woytila e Bossi contro il mundialismo’, Il Sole delle Alpi, 3(6), p. 1. 25 Marchi, G. (1999), ‘No alla guerra dei massoni’, interview with Umberto Bossi, in La Padania, 24 March.

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from 10.1 per cent in the general elections in 1996 to 4.5 per cent in the European elections in 1999. The defeat obliged the party leadership to abandon voluntary isolation and to accept the role of alliances. This was one of the prices to pay in order to weave a new alliance with the centre-right parties: a more pro-Western, moderate position on the main foreign policy issues. This third phase was initially uncertain and contradictory, as the Lega Nord, in order to have its hard-core supporters accept the alliance with partners whose faults it had been harshly denouncing for years, nevertheless could not renounce the more characteristic aspects of its ideological identity. This explains the recurrent criticism to development projects involving the EU; the opposition to the accession of Turkey – which would mark once for all ‘the total selling out of the Christian Europe and its civilization’;26 the opposition to the accession of East European countries which still had immature democratic institutions, weak markets and economies, poorly developed technology and scarce natural resources;27 and the satisfaction with the humble results obtained by the EU at the Nice conference in December 2000. On the other side, the criticism against the US persisted, nurtured by strong attacks of the Northern League press against the so-called ‘Atlantic warriors’, whose secret plotting aimed to weaken Russia, which the Europeans should look upon as a powerful and potential ally ‘without the deforming lens of the old anti-Soviet propaganda’ in view of a continental defence ‘independent from Washington and separated from the NATO infrastructures’.28 Moreover, the Albanian guerrillas in Macedonia, together with the deepening of the crisis in Chechnya, provided the opportunity for once more accusing the US of fuelling anti-Russian activities, even if this meant giving Islamic fundamentalism the chance to expand its inﬂuence area.29 On the other hand, the election of G.W. Bush was perceived as the success of ‘the other America’, more conservative and less open to multiculturalism, and therefore attracting the sympathy of the Lega.30 The attacks of 11 September 2001 hastened the conversion of the Lega Nord to a pro-American policy. The identiﬁcation of Islamism with terrorism made it possible to view any illegal (and sometimes also regular) immigrant of Arab (or more generally Muslim) origin as potential follower of al-Qaeda. In the aftermath, the ‘clash of civilizations’ has become the theme of Lega arguments. The voices of those members and leaders that, like Senator Provera, maintained that in order to defeat terrorism it was necessary to seek ‘above all a political intervention which aims to solve certain unsustainable situations of misery and deprivation’,31 so reducing the potential of discontent among the Muslim populations, remained isolated. Many more supported 26 Ferrari, M. (1999d), ‘Europa, arrivano i Turchi’, Il Sole delle Alpi, 3(42), pp. 30–31. 27 Gnocchi, M. (2000), ‘L’Unione che non ci piace’, Il Sole delle Alpi, 4(48/49), pp. 4–7. 28 Migliorini, P. (2001a), ‘Grandi manovre sulla scacchiera eurasiatica’, Il Sole delle Alpi, 5(10), pp. 22–25. 29 Migliorini, P. (2001b), ‘Primavera di sangue in Europa’, Il Sole delle Alpi, 5(13), pp. 10– 13. 30 Di Ferdinando, F. (2001), ‘Un team a tempo ‘i record’, Il Sole delle Alpi, 5(2),20–26. 31 Bassi, P. (2001), ‘«Siamo pronti insieme all’Alleanza». Intervista a Fiorello Provera’, La Padania, 14 September.

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the War on Terror, including the party-press daily La Padania, and the weekly Il Sole delle Alpi. The ‘legitimate’ rights of the Palestinians were recognized, but in the meantime, the attitude of international Left parties and movements which used their defence as a ‘cover’ for a destabilizing offensive against Israel, the US and the West, was denounced.32 The West ‘must be defended at all costs’ for it represented ‘a civilization which with all its limitations and faults it is also the civilization where our roots lay’.33 The Lega Nord welcomed Oriana Fallaci’s extremist ideas on the conﬂict of civilizations, and sent its own supporters to the so-called ‘USA Day’, a demonstration organized by the right-wing daily Il Foglio to express solidarity with the policies adopted in foreign and military matters by the US administration after the attacks of 11 September 2001. Furthermore, the party abandoned the usual neutral position on matters concerning the Middle East and became a supporter of Israel, ‘that cliff of western civilization which is surrounded by a hostile sea’34 and stated that ‘the enemy is not only in Afghanistan but in every mosque’35 while evoking the battles of Lepanto and Poitiers, and approving without reservation the Italian military participation to the international intervention in Afghanistan. The equation of terrorism, Islamism and immigration became one of the main themes of the party’s public discourse which, having put aside the horror of the suicide bombings on the World Trade Center, returned to focus its foreign political agenda on Europe. The EU had already been criticized for its interferences in the Padan economic problems (for example the issue of the so-called ‘Milk fees’, which had allowed the Lega to become the sponsor of a revolt of northern dairy farmers against both the Italian government and the Brussels commission) and again the EU was the object of criticism even after the Lega had returned to power, obtaining three ministries in the second Berlusconi cabinet: Reforms with Bossi, Welfare with Maroni, and Justice with Castelli. The Lega opposed the European warrant of arrest and expressed strong doubts about the introduction of the Euro, fearing the common currency could be used as a Trojan horse to create a European superstate. As Minister of Reforms, Bossi stated that he was seeking a ‘confederal Europe where the democratic axis people/national parliament is guarded’36 and refuses the ‘diktat’ of the European Union in economic matters, insisting that the EU should have only well-deﬁned, limited power to modify the national policies in this ﬁeld. The party MPs presented a proposal for a bill that would allow a referendum in the case that the Italian state ever found itself in the position to lose its own national sovereignty. Nevertheless, being in the government and criticizing the government’s choices was not an easy task, and the party, while fuelling the polemics in the press through the rhetoric of its leaders, adopted moderate behaviour at the institutional level.

32 Lega, A. (2001), ‘Terrore sul nuovo millennio’, La Padania, 12 September. 33 Baiocchi, G. (2001a), ‘Sﬁda di popolo nei venti di guerra’, La Padania, 16–17 September. 34 Baiocchi, G. (2001b), ‘Gli ebrei morti, gli ebrei vivi’, La Padania, 6 November. 35 Ricci, M. (2001), ‘Una nuova guerra, quella globalizzata’, La Padania, 16–17 September. 36 Malaguti, C. (2002), ‘Ruggiero, ministro o provocatore? Intervista a Umberto Bossi’, La Padania, 4 January.

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In fact, the Lega Nord criticized the Nice Convention and restated its opposition to the EU enlargement in favour of Eastern European countries, ‘an experiment of social engineering that will take millions of immigrants to our land’,37 but quite surprisingly in March 2002, the party voted in favour of the ratiﬁcation of the Nice Treaty. As the Lega spokesman for the Chamber of Deputies, Alessandro Cè, explained, it did so just for reasons of realpolitik. In the meantime, the Lega former minister Speroni called the EU Constitution ‘a centralist monster’38 and the party formally protested because in the Constitution there is no mention of the Christian roots of Europe, while at the same time Bossi himself called the Constitution a satisfying basis for discussion. Changes in judgement and behaviour occurred also in regard to transatlantic relationships: on one side, the Lega Nord could not withdraw its support to its other political allies when crucial issues were at stake (like the sending of Italian troops to the already occupied Iraq, strongly wanted by both Forza Italia and Alleanza Nazionale); on the other side, the party was seeking to differentiate itself from its allies and mingled with the extreme pro-US image that Berlusconi and Fini had carefully cultivated. According to this perspective, the party showed a sort of schizophrenia: on one side, its press criticized the selﬁshness of the US, which was accused of looking only after its economic and geopolitical affairs, and asked for an intervention from the United Nations to solve the Iraqi crisis;39 on the other side, some of its most inﬂuential representatives, like Cè, chairman of the parliamentary group of the Chamber of Deputies, denounced as a political mistake the anti-US attitudes shared by France and Germany during that crisis and went as far as to give support to the hypothesis of cooperation between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda.40 This contradiction showed the existence of different views on topics like transatlantic relations, defence and international alliances within the party, and contributed to giving the foreign policy agenda of the Lega an even more heterogeneous character. One year after the beginning of the Iraq war, for instance, the Lega daily newspaper criticized the conﬂict, judging it a violation of international law that would bring dire consequences. Yet at the same time, the war was justiﬁed in the name of the struggle against terrorism, the ultimate enemy of the West, and those who opposed the war, like the French President Jacques Chirac, were accused of selﬁsh blindness.41 In the long run, the anti-Islamic stance and the sharing of governmental responsibilities with its more pro-US coalition partners weakened the party’s criticism of US policy, but some disagreements with Berlusconi’s enthusiastic approval of G.W. Bush’s foreign and military policies arose at regular intervals when some of the Lega leaders (among them Roberto Calderoli, who became Minister for Institutional Reforms when Umberto Bossi, suffering from 37 This statement can be found in an unsigned short article published on the front page of La Padania, 10 October 2002. 38 Bassi, P. (2003), ‘Così la Ue uccide Regioni e Stati, Intervista a Enrico Speroni’, La Padania, 13 February. 39 Vanzo, A. (2003), ‘La guerra è una batosta per tutti’, La Padania, 6 February. 40 See this statements in La Padania, 7 February 2003. 41 See respectively La Padania, 23–24 March 2004 and 27 March 2004.

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a serious heart disease, resigned) called for the withdrawal of Italian troops from Iraq. Moreover, since 2004 two other issues have come to the fore in the Lega Nord foreign policy agenda and have fuelled some of its main propaganda campaigns: the unconditional opposition to the beginning of talks regarding the accession of Turkey to the European Union, and the demand for heavy import duties on all products coming from China. On the basis of this double platform, the Lega not only tried to widen its constituency by appealing to those fringes of the rightist electorate which had been disappointed by the ‘integrationist’ choices of the Berlusconi cabinet, but also aimed at coordinating its action on the international level, particularly in the European Parliament, with Eurosceptic parties that had won a signiﬁcant amount of votes in several countries in the 2004 European elections. In spite of divergences on some issues, this coordination led to the creation of a unitary Eurosceptic parliamentary group and to the organization of joint press conferences and meetings, and above all offered to the Lega the opportunity to take advantage of additional administrative resources. The repeated infringements of institutional rules by the Lega leaders, always prone to adopt extremist behaviours, wreaking their resentment upon their scapegoats – immigrants, political class, Muslims, ‘eurobureauocrats’, and so on – outside any agreement with their European partners made, however, the collaboration of these parties highly unstable.42 On the other hand, the persistent opposition to Turkey’s entry into the EU had led the Lega ministers to dissociate from decisions of the Berlusconi Government on this issue, thereby deepening the isolation of their party within the Italian political system. The Foreign Policy Agenda of the Alleanza Nazionale If for the Lega Nord the positions held in matter of international affairs had been conceived in order to emphasize its differences of views in comparison with the parties of the Italian political establishment and to make clear that Bossi’s party (which prefers to deﬁne itself as a movement, according to the anti-political style of neo-populist parties) is quite alien to the logic of compromise and hypocrisy imputed by the League to its competitors, the situation is completely different for the Alleanza Nazionale. The heir of the neo-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) had been seeking since its birth a legitimate political position both abroad and on the national political stage, in order to demonstrate full acceptance of democratic rules and a complete abandonment of the most controversial ideological features of the MSI, and had carefully avoided, when forming its foreign policy agenda, adopting attitudes that could attract charges of extremism. Consequently, if the Lega Nord did not hesitate to assume strong oppositional positions that located it far from the Italian political mainstream, as in the case of the disagreement with the ‘humanitarian war’ in Kosovo and with the opening of the EU to Eastern European countries and markets, the AN has often done exactly the contrary by being careful 42 After Calderoli’s involvement into the Jyllands Post anti-Muslim cartoons affair, the Eurosceptic parties have expelled the Lega Nord from their Europarliamentary group, but this decision was cancelled some weeks later.

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not to compromise the guidelines of the conservative coalition to which it belongs and which has allowed the party to come in from the political fringe, promoting its leader to Deputy Prime Minister and later to Minister for Foreign Affairs. The reasons for such a choice become evident if we consider that the distance between Alleanza Nazionale and its past has usually been measured according to its position on four major issues: fascism, of course, but also civil rights, the economy, and foreign policy. In relation to the latter, reference is often made by critics to the ‘neither right nor left’ aspects of MSI ideology, to its difﬁdence towards NATO, and to the anti-American feelings widely spread among the party’s grass roots. In reality, reservations of this type were only cultivated during the early years of MSI’s existence, more to conﬁrm a nationalist attitude than anything else. The choice to side with the West has nevertheless always been afﬁrmed by ofﬁcial MSI documents since the middle of the 1950s.43 Residual hostility to the bi-polar hegemony of the US and the Soviet Union was maintained only by the most radical elements of the party, and with notable oscillations according to the period by its youth organizations. On the other hand, the MSI was never opposed to European integration, seeing it as a shield against the Soviet menace, and indeed it often referred to the continent as a potential nation, insisting only on a marked degree of autonomy for Italy. Nevertheless, each of the development stages of the integration process has attracted criticism from the neo-fascist party, particularly in relation to the dangers of the establishment of a new powerful supranational technocracy and the potential suffocation of state sovereignty. In its early stages, the Alleanza Nazionale did not diverge from the line established by its predecessor, and the more uni-polar post-1989 world presented few reasons to make major changes. The party reafﬁrmed its faith in Western alliances, recognized the role of the US for its ‘contribution to liberty’ through its military and economic presence, and also recognized the need to reinforce NATO’s European pillar. In fact, Europe is the theme most exhaustively treated by the document issued from the AN’s ﬁrst National Congress in January 1995, and it is approached from two points of view: the external projection of Europe over the globe; and internal relations within the European Union. The Europeanism professed in 1995 by the party in its ofﬁcial statements is strong and enthusiastic. Much is made of the idea of a ‘Grand Europe’ stretching from the Atlantic coast to the Urals, united by common foreign policies and shared defences, both objectives facilitated by the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. The obverse of this optimistic vision is, of course, the idea of limiting the integration process and creating a confederation of states, in line with the ‘Europe of fatherlands’ envisaged by Charles de Gaulle and foreseen by the Pan-European projects in the 1920s. This ‘historical unity of the national states’ opposes the idea of a ‘federalist,

43 Finotti, S. (1988), ‘Difesa occidentale e Patto Atlantico. La scelta internazionale del MSI (1948–1952)’, Storia delle relazioni internazionali 4(1), pp. 85–124; and Chiarini, R. (1990), ‘«Sacro egoismo» e «missione civilizzatrice». La politica estera del MSI dalla fondazione alla metà degli anni cinquanta’, Storia contemporanea 21(3), pp. 541–60.

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44

centralizing super-state’ which does not respect national interests – interests that the AN proposes should be defended ‘strenuously’ in Slovenia and Croatia, and suggests an active projection in the Middle East, in the Mediterranean and in Africa (in order to promote local development, a proposal which, as we have seen, is closely linked to the idea of a solution to the problem of growing immigration). In the ﬁnal document adopted by the ﬁrst National Congress of the party, extraEuropean questions are hardly mentioned. An exception is provided unsurprisingly for the Middle East, which offers the opportunity to express open support to Israel, ‘the only democracy in the region’, which should be fostered by the EU.45 There is also a warning against Islamic fundamentalism, the principal enemy of stability in the area and a blame of the ‘aggressiveness of Iraq’.46 Beyond this, there is a suggestion that Taiwan should be supported, so that, along with the other anticommunist countries of South-east Asia, it can counterbalance the growing power of China. The debate on such questions at the congress itself resulted in both greater precision and depth in relation to these issues, and the emended version of the congressional record gives twice as much space to the section entitled The Role of Italy in Europe and in the World, where the nationalist tendencies of the MSI reemerge more clearly. The assembly called for the revision of the Maastricht Treaty and for a European Union that would be ‘respectful of the cultural identities and peculiarities of the member states, [not one that is] founded on bureaucratic dirigisme and oligarchic technocracy’.47 There was also a call for a Union less eastward leaning – as the Germans would have it – and more politically active in the Mediterranean basin. The document expresses some hope for the cultural promotion of European citizenship, but the essence of the emendations approved by the congress delegates concerns the interests of Italy, which should, according to the Alleanza Nazionale, take on the role of a medium power in the Mediterranean region. In line with this, the document also tones down the earlier pro-Israeli stance, aiming to take a leading role in a multilateral dialogue between Italy, Islamic countries and Israel, and to focus economic cooperation on the State of Palestine48 and on Northern Africa. However, the inclination to mediate disappears when the problem of the dissolution of Yugoslavia arises. The demand to promote an Adriatic policy that afﬁrms ‘the Italianism of Istria and Dalmatia’,49 making restitution of the property expropriated to the exiles as a condition for the EU membership for Croatia and Slovenia, and to create an autonomous region for the Italian-speaking peoples still resident in the two countries, demonstrates that in this area MSI roots are still very solid. 44 Alleanza Nazionale (1995a), Pensiamo l’Italia, il domani c’è già, theses of the AN First National Congress, p. 32. 45 Ibid., p. 33. 46 Ibid., p. 35. 47 Alleanza Nazionale (1995b), Pensiamo l’Italia, il domani c’è già, the emended theses of the AN First National Congress, approved at the Fiuggi Congress, p. 35. 48 Deﬁned literally ‘Palestinian State’, shunning the ofﬁcial denomination that recognizes a straightforward ‘national authority’. 49 Ibid., p. 36.

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Once the Alleanza Nazionale had returned to opposition, its interest in international relations diminished. Space dedicated to such questions in programmatic documents falls from 8 per cent in 1995 to 1 per cent in 1998, to rise again slightly, to 3 per cent, in 2001.50 In the document prepared for the Verona programmatic conference in 1998, even the few references to the consequences of the application of the Maastricht Treaty focused on monetary questions. The only argument of any signiﬁcance was an admonition that the birth of the European Union would not reduce competition among member states, and in fact, would probably intensify it. The Charter of Values, presented by AN President Gianfranco Fini to the press in 2000 as a milestone in the party’s life, devoting one section to the ‘European fatherland’, might give the impression that previous doubts were about to be left behind. However within the text itself difﬁdence prevails over optimism, and if the party commits itself to ensuring that the EU is not reduced to ‘an architecture of ﬁnancial or economic interests’, moving to a phase of creating integrated political institutions, it does so while making it very clear that the internal structure of the Union must contain ‘the cultures and interests of the constituent nations’.51 This background makes it easier to see that the dominant aims behind the government program elaborated by the party in 2001 are the following: to arrange Italy’s foreign policy around its own national economic interests; to defend these interests against the European Commission, which has often made decisions that violate them; to exert pressure so that the centre of gravity of the European Union policies shifts towards the Mediterranean, favouring in particular Italy’s southern areas. The reemergence of the national factor is also visible in a renewed criticism of the ‘new world order’ which, under the delusions of an ‘irenic dream’, has in fact created the ‘nightmarish clash of civilizations’,52 using the excuse of human rights to quash the concept of state sovereignty. The harshness of this judgement, surprising for a party that approved all the ‘international police operations’ ofﬁcially motivated by ‘humanitarian’ intentions, is only mitigated in part by an expressed commitment not to oppose globalization and not to close itself off from ‘the adventure of civilization’.53 After seven years of routine, the proceedings of the second national congress (Bologna, April 2002) reveal a relative discontinuity in the party’s approach to foreign policy, with the foreign policy agenda taking on a greater importance after the crisis provoked by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. If we look at the title Vince la Patria, Nasce l’Europa, we can see that the primacy of national interests characterizing previous documents does not disappear, but is balanced

50 See Pedani, V., La cultura politica di Alleanza Nazionale. Un’analisi dei documenti programmatici (1995–2001), tesi di laurea Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Florence, 2002, p. 42. 51 Alleanza Nazionale (2000), Carta dei valori, presented to the Press by AN President Gianfranco Fini, p. 3. 52 Alleanza Nazionale (2001), Libero Forte Giusto. Il Governo che vogliamo, ‘pat to di programma’ Discussed at the AN Second Programmatic Conference, p. 5. 53 Ibid.

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by a growing psychological participation and interest in the opportunities offered by the creation of a European political unit. The realistic tone of the analysis, explicitly opposed to ‘do-good neo-enlightenment’,54 does not stand in the way of making Europe into a sort of political myth in tones that recall, yet again, the political culture of the MSI. With Euroscepticism banished, the Alleanza Nazionale regards continental integration as indispensable to ‘healing the wounds, military and political, of the “European Civil War”’.55 But the Europe of the future cannot be conceived as a union of banks or a technocracy unable to inﬂuence global wellbeing – it must become an important political player in international relations. This will involve an emphasis on the diversity of Europe’s constituent parts on one hand, and on the other, a redeﬁnition of its relationship with the US. In order to avoid Europe becoming a ‘directory of the few’, the Alleanza Nazionale proposes that the future enlarged European Union will be based on the reactivation of the vitality of its member states, on a harmonious sum of identities and on ‘concentric’ sovereignties that will produce ‘unity and diversity’.56 The cultural foundations for the idea of the profound unity of Europe are the ‘fruit of the history and speciﬁcities of its peoples’ and the ‘nineteenth century of fatherlands’,57 thus comprising common features and distinctive elements. Therefore, the ‘patriotism of culture’ deriving from this history needs to be defended from homogenizing inﬂuences. The goal is a confederation of states, which only through the action of national governments can acquire political reality. The inﬂuence of a nationalist culture that accompanied the passage from the MSI to the AN is not yet extinct, and ﬁnds its expression in the belief that Italy can and must assume a leading role in the formation of European interests, particularly because the EuroMediterranean macro-region has become, at the beginning of the new millennium, ‘the gravitational centre of world geopolitics’.58 Still more important is the novelty that emerges from the document as it expresses the belief that Europe’s destiny is intimately linked to its integration. For the ﬁrst time, an alliance which for decades the MSI, and later the AN itself, considered to have been imposed by circumstances, is presented as the logical consequence of a basic afﬁnity: Europe is the West, which ‘has transferred part of itself over the Ocean’, and consequently, ‘an awareness of Westernism and in particular, the link with America’ are ‘a great truth that must be whatever Italy does’.59 Thus, the West is a transatlantic Magna Europa, so much so that the cry ‘we are all Americans’ uttered after 11 September 2000 could also be correctly translated as ‘we are all Europeans’ without a change in meaning. To defend Western traditions and cultures – in other words, civilization – is thus a duty for the drafters of the Theses and for those who approve them at the congress. Nevertheless, Europe does have 54 Alleanza Nazionale (2002), Vince la Patria, Nasce l’Europa, ‘Piattaforma politicoprogrammatica’ proposed to and approved by the Second AN National Congress, p. 7. 55 Ibid., p. 8. 56 Ibid., pp. 17–18. 57 Ibid., p. 20. 58 Ibid., p. 8. 59 Ibid., p. 20.

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its own interests to consider, and for this reason, must maintain a certain autonomy from the US. This goal is not so much to be achieved by speeding up the expansion of the Union (a delicate process that must be undertaken step-by-step, especially concerning economic matters) but rather through bringing European citizens closer to the Union institutions with greater transparency in decision making and a broader popular involvement in the choice of the Commission president. As in the case of the Lega Nord, the Alleanza Nazionale statements in principle must coexist with the compromises required in practice. The AN’s participation to the centre-right government in a responsibility role – the party is in fact, the second biggest party of the coalition and holds by itself more parliamentary seats than the UCD and the Lega all together. This forces the AN to take into account only partly its congress resolutions and the positions expressed in the party daily newspaper Secolo d’Italia. Thus, Fini’s appointment as ofﬁcial Italian representative in the convention created to write a European Constitution soothed the criticism by the AN of the elitist character of the EU integration process. Although the party is willing to attract the votes of the most traditional Catholics and therefore insists on the acknowledgement of Christian roots to be inserted into the European Constitution, its leader never assumed during the working process of the convention rigid positions on the matter, trying on the contrary to act as a mediator among the diverse parties involved. In the same way, the party press once very critical towards the ‘bureaucratic and technocratic’ institutional trend of the EU, is in line with the new party tendency, namely, supporting the AN’s efforts for integration with the European mechanisms to which its MPs’ activity in the European Parliament testiﬁes. The AN European deputies join the parliamentary group of the UEN (Union européenne des nations), where Eurosceptic feelings are not absent, but at the same time, they make every possible effort to keep good relations with the European Popular Party, which they usually support in the European Parliament, especially when it opposes the European Socialist Party on some important issues. The other two big themes toward which the Alleanza Nazionale has orientated its foreign and military policy – the latter always receiving the party’s particular attention, since patriotism is always prompted along with special emphasis on the defence of the state authority and of national sovereignty – are Western solidarity and support for Israel in the conﬂict with the Palestinian National Authority. In both cases, the AN has directed its choices according to its resolution to ﬁght terrorism. In fact, without linking radical Islamism to the whole Muslim community (although, an internal faction linked to the radical confessional organization Alleanza Cattolica does not hesitate to identify in Islam a political, cultural and religious threat against the West60), the party has always warmly supported a military solution to the threat to the security of Western countries, and has made Atlantic solidarity one of the central points of its strategy,61 especially focusing 60 To this faction belongs, among the others, the Under Secretary to the Interior of the Berlusconi cabinet, Alfredo Mantovano, a former magistrate to whom the delegation of powers to deal with the immigration problem has been given. 61 It is odd to notice how far this rhetoric has been accepted, however with some distinctions, by the internal faction Destra Sociale, led by Gianni Alemanno, Minister for

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on this issue after 11 September 2001. The Alleanza Nazionale, with its proposal of sending Italian troops to Afghanistan and Iraq for ‘peace enforcing’ operations after the military occupation of both countries, has always stressed its support to the White House even when military resolutions had not been ratiﬁed by the United Nations (even though the AN has always stressed the need of reestablishing as soon as possible the respect of the rules of the international law). Moreover, the Alleanza Nazionale has always opposed the paciﬁst movement, accusing it of betraying the interests of the West, of neglecting the violations of human rights in countries still ruled by communist regimes (Cuba, China, North Korea, Vietnam) and of being an obstacle to the exportation of democracy. However, the party’s major effort in seeking international legitimacy has been in the direction of Israel. In fact, fearing the sharing of the moral responsibility for the racial laws issued by Mussolini’s regime in 1938 and for its neo-fascist past (political and moral charges which had isolated AN ministers of the ﬁrst Berlusconi government at international level), the party has always openly supported the Jewish state and has condemned the second intifada. Especially after Sharon’s election as Prime Minister, Fini intensiﬁed his public declarations in favour of Israeli government policies, and has tried to obtain an ofﬁcial invitation to Jerusalem in order to give evidence of his credibility as an ally, succeeding in his efforts in October 2003. In this respect, the AN has welcomed the proposal of the future entry of Israel into the European Community, as Berlusconi and the Radical Party have proposed, and it expressed its moderate disapproval when the EU manifested outrage against the policy of ‘targeted killing’ practiced by Israel against its Palestinian enemies and against the construction of the ‘defensive wall’ separating Israel from some of the Palestinian territories. After his appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs, the AN leader conﬁrmed and strengthened all the positions assumed in the recent past, showing himself as a champion of Europeanism who welcomes the entry of Turkey into the EU and who blames the failure of the European Constitution on the French and Dutch electorates, as a loyal and enthusiastic supporter of the transatlantic alliance, and a moderate statesman who appreciates and practices the art of compromise without openly subscribing to the doctrine of the clash of civilizations. Conclusions: Divergent Positions and Unstable Alliances The foreign policy agendas of the two Italian parties usually included in the category of ‘right-wing populism’, as the present overview shows, are clearly divergent and contribute to putting into doubt the soundness of such a classiﬁcation. The Lega Nord and the Alleanza Nazionale, because of tactical and strategic reasons also linked to their different ideologies, have had opposite positions on several policy issues in the last 12 years. In matters of European integration, in spite of repeated statements of a strong Europeanism in principle, motivated above all by Agricultural Policy from 2001 to 2006, who in 1989 was severely beaten and jailed by the Italian police because, as leader of the MSI youth section, during the visit to Italy of American President G.H.W. Bush, he organised a sit-in against American support to Israel, that was violating, in his opinion, Palestinian people’s rights.

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the desire to distinguish the north from the south of Italy, especially concerning EU economic standards, the Lega Nord has never concealed its suspicions regarding the constitution of a techno-bureaucratic superstate and has shown a clear preference for a limitation of the integration processes to the ﬁeld of economic relations. When the Lega has turned away from this line, accepting the idea of a common European foreign and military policy and a common European army, it has done so only to oppose an even bigger superstate, the US. The Alleanza Nazionale, despite the initial hesitations concerning the Maastricht Treaty, has instead supported the strengthening of European institutions and, though sometimes expressing concern with the increasing power of the Brussels Commission, has done so in the name of national sovereignty in which, contrary to the Lega Nord, it still believes. The perspective of a ‘Europe of peoples and nations’, dear to the Lega, has never met with the AN’s favour. Even in matters of enlargement to Eastern Europe, the two parties have held different positions: the opposition of the Lega Nord has been open and repeated; the Alleanza Nazionale has expressed only timid concerns, ultimately approving the EU decision. In matters of international alliances, the Lega’s positions do not coincide with the AN’s. Bossi and his party think of the West in exclusively cultural terms as in opposition to the East – especially the Islamic East – and envision a wider clash of civilizations, and consider transatlantic relations only in terms of a defence against fundamentalist terrorism (and indirectly, against immigration from Muslim countries). Even so, this has not prevented the Lega Nord from expressing its own reservations against the imperialistic role of the US and criticizing the ‘multicultural’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ (mondialista) mind-set that inspires US politics. This distrust increased to the point of open opposition during the NATO military intervention in Yugoslavia and provoked harsh judgements against the Atlantic Alliance. On the contrary, the Alleanza Nazionale has always emphasized the political value of Western solidarity, supported NATO enlargement to the east, and welcomed it as a tool for the handling of international crisis situations. Especially when G.W. Bush succeeded Clinton, the AN has approved US military actions when they have been presented as actions of ‘international policing’ and ‘humanitarian involvement’ aimed at ‘ﬁghting terrorism’ and ‘exporting democracy’. At the same time, the Alleanza Nazionale has not associated military action against terrorism with a presumed clash of civilizations or with a struggle against immigration, themes to which the party has dedicated its energy only on the internal front by favouring repressive measures against illegal immigrants and by implementing, when in power in the second Berlusconi cabinet, a more restrictive immigration policy. The Lega’s indifference towards any claim to the common political interests of the West has also been demonstrated in its scarce interest to the Middle East conﬂict. The AN, however, has taken a clear position favouring the Israeli side in the Israel-Palestine conﬂict. Both parties have handled the problem concerning the relations between the North and the South of the world with an approach of being more attentive and fostering selective cooperation for development, without committing themselves to any particular campaign. Finally, both the Lega Nord and the Alleanza Nazionale have taken these steps from very different angles in terms of coordinated political action at the

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international and European level. The Lega ﬁrst tried to cooperate with other autonomist movements within the European parliamentary group Arc-en-ciel, and after the end of that experience, it tried without any luck to be accepted as a partner by liberal parties. Since 1995, the Lega has kept some contact with other neo-populist parties, including the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, the Vlaams Blok, and the Russian liberal-democrats, without making any stable alliances. Only after the 2004 European elections, thanks to simultaneous opposition to the entry of Turkey into the European Union as well as to the enlargement of the EU to former communist countries, has the Lega Nord been able to lay the foundations for synergy with other parties represented in the European Parliament, including those of the Eurosceptical family, which are in some ways less stigmatized and marginalized than the national-populist ones and therefore offer better opportunities for fruitful cooperation. The Alleanza Nazionale has instead pursued its search for legitimacy, linking itself to moderately Eurosceptic right-wing parties within the UEN Europarliamentary group, and trying in the meantime to retain good relations with the European People’s Party thanks to the mediation of its government allies Forza Italia and the Unione dei Democratici Cristiani. In spite of several deep differences, the Lega Nord and the Alleanza Nazionale have been part of the same government for ﬁve years, in which they have both contributed to, with more or less conviction according to circumstances, choices in matters of foreign policy. This cooperation has been due to the particular situation of the Italian political system after the fall of the ‘First Republic’ and the fragmentation of its political class, a large part of whom had been prosecuted by judiciary inquiries because of their propensity for bribery. From that period onwards, the adoption of a mixed electoral system (for 75 per cent of the seats plurality, and 25 per cent proportional representation) has imposed on parties with governance ambitions the need to enter into heterogeneous coalitions whose coherence in matters of programmes is still unstable. Until this situation changes, it will difﬁcult for Italian politics to come out from this phase of transition, and the recent adoption of a new electoral law, based on a proportional representation system but conditioned by the introduction of a majority prize given to the party coalition obtaining a plurality, has not changed the situation. Until then, recalcitrant and often conﬂicting allies like the Lega Nord and the Alleanza Nazionale – or their counterparts on the Left – will be forced into a difﬁcult coexistence. Acronyms AN EEC EU MP MSI NATO UEN

Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance) European Economic Community European Union Member of Parliament Movimento Sociale Italiano North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Union européenne des nations

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References Aguilera de Prat, C. (1999), El cambio político en Italia y la Liga Norte (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas-Siglo XXI). Albertazzi, D. and McDonnell, D. (2005), ‘The Lega Nord in the Second Berlusconi Government: In a League of its Own’, Western European Politics, 28. Alleanza Nazionale (1995a), ‘Pensiamo l’Italia, il domani c’è già’, theses of the AN First National Congress. Alleanza Nazionale (1995b), ‘Pensiamo l’Italia, il domani c’è già’, the emended theses of the AN First National Congress, approved at the Fiuggi Congress. ––– (2000), ‘Carta dei Valori’, presented to the press by AN President Gianfranco Fini. ––– (2001), Libero Forte Giusto. Il Governo che vogliamo, ‘pat to di programma’ Discussed at the AN Second Programmatic Conference, p. 5. ––– (2002), Vince la Patria. Nasce l’Europa, ‘Piattaforma politico-programmatica’ proposed to and approved by the Second AN National Congress. Baiocchi, G. (2001a), ‘Sﬁda di popolo nei venti di guerra’, La Padania, 16–17 September. ––– (2001b), ‘Gli ebrei morti, gli ebrei vivi’, La Padania, 6 November. Bassi, P. (2001), ‘«Siamo pronti insieme all’Alleanza». Intervista a Fiorello Provera’, La Padania, 14 September. ––– (2003), ‘Così la Ue uccide Regioni e Stati. Intervista a Enrico Speroni’, La Padania, 13 February. Betz, H.-G. (1994), Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe (Basingstoke: Macmillan). Biorcio, R. (1997), La Padania promessa (Milano: Il Saggiatore). Bonometti, G. (1998), ‘Eurominaccia’, Il Sole delle Alpi, 2(16). Bossi, U. and Vimercati, D. (1993), La Rivoluzione. La Lega: storia e idee (Milano: Sperling & Kupfer). Chiarini, R. (1990), ‘«Sacro egoismo» e «missione civilizzatrice». La politica estera del MSI dalla fondazione alla metà degli anni cinquanta’, Storia contemporanea 21(3). Confalonieri, M.A. (2005), ‘La Lega Nord e l’Unione Europea: un’analisi del discorso politico’, in Fedel, G. (ed.). Cornali, A. (1999), ‘Compleanno di fuoco’, Il Sole delle Alpi, 3(15). de Winter, L. and Türsan, H., (eds.), Regionalist Parties in Western Europe (London: Routledge). Di Ferdinando, F. (2001), ‘Un team a tempo ‘i record’, Il Sole delle Alpi, 5(2). Diamanti, I. (1995), La Lega: geograﬁa, storia e sociologia di un soggetto politico (Roma: Donzelli). Fedel, G. (ed.) (2005), Studi in onore di Mario Stoppino, 1935–2001 (Milano: Giuffrè). Ferrari, M. (1999a), ‘La Crociata verso il Kosovo’, Il Sole delle Alpi, 3(5) ––– (1999b), ‘Un conﬂitto per distruggere l’Europa’, Il Sole delle Alpi, 3(14) 1. ––– (1999c), ‘I perché del mundialismo’, Il Sole delle Alpi, 3(15). ––– (1999d), ‘Europa, arrivano i Turchi’, Il Sole delle Alpi, 3(42).

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Finotti, S. (1988), ‘Difesa occidentale e Patto Atlantico. La scelta internazionale del MSI (1948–1952)’, Storia delle relazioni internazionali, 4(1). Garibaldi, I. (1999a), ‘Diciamo no alla guerra’, Il Sole delle Alpi, 3(13). ––– (1999b), ‘La forza dell’Unione’, Il Sole delle Alpi, 3(21), pp. 22–24. Gnocchi, M. (1999), ‘C’era una volta l’Onu’, Il Sole delle Alpi, 3(16) 10–13. ––– (2000), ‘L’Unione che non ci piace’, Il Sole delle Alpi, 4(48/49). Gohr, A. (2001), Die Lega Nord – Eine Herausforderung für Italien (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang). Lega, A. (2001), ‘Terrore sul nuovo millennio’, La Padania, 12 September. Leoni, G. (1999), ‘Papa Woytila e Bossi contro il mundialismo’, Il Sole delle Alpi, 3(6). Malaguti, C. (2002), ‘Ruggiero, ministro o provocatore? Intervista a Umberto Bossi’, La Padania, 4 January. Marchi, G. (1999), ‘No alla guerra dei massoni’, interview with Umberto Bossi, in La Padania, 24 March. Maroni, R. (1997), ‘A Free Padania in a Free Europe’, speech to the 1997 Federal Congress of the Lega Nord. Migliorini, P. (2001a), ‘Grandi manovre sulla scacchiera eurasiatica’, Il Sole delle Alpi, 5(10). ––– (2001b), ‘Primavera di sangue in Europa’, Il Sole delle Alpi, 5(13). Lega Nord (1993), ‘Un’’Italia federale per l’Europa del 2000 (Editoriale Lombarda). ––– (1998), Per una Padania libera e antagonista all’omologazione, Tesi Congressuale elaborata dal Dipartimento Affari Esteri della Lega Nord per il Congresso Federale del 1998. Norris, P. (2005), Radical Right: Parties and Electoral Competition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Ricci, M. (2001), ‘Una nuova guerra, quella globalizzata’, La Padania, 16–17 September. Rydgren, J. (2005), ‘Is Extreme Right-Wing Populism Contagious?, Explaining the Emergence of a New Party Family’, European Journal of Political Research, 44. [DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2005.00233.x] Taggart, P. (1998), ‘A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western Europe’, European Journal of Political Research, 33. [DOI: 10.1111/1475-6765.00387] Tarchi, M. (1998), ‘The Lega Nord’ in de Winter and Türsan (eds.). ––– (2003), l’Italia Populista (Bologna: Il Mulino). Vanzo, A. (2003), ‘La guerra è una batosta per tutti’, La Padania, 6 February. Zaslove, A. (2004), ‘The Dark Side of European Politics: Unmasking the Radical Right’, Journal of European Integration, 26. [DOI: 10.1080/07036330420001 97799]

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Chapter 10

A Fortuynist Foreign Policy Cas Mudde

Dutchman, European, and world citizen, and in that order! Pim Fortuyn1 Introduction During the time that Western Europe was still supposed to be ﬂooded by the third wave of right-wing extremism, rather than right-wing or national populism, The Netherlands was one of the few countries in the region that seemed safe. Compared with the electoral successes of political parties like the Vlaams Blok in Belgium, the Front National in France, or the Lega Nord in Italy, the roughly 1 per cent of the vote generated by the various parties of the extreme right Centrumstroming (centre stream) was far from threatening.2 Moreover, while other European parties had skillful and charismatic leaders like Jean-Marie Le Pen and Filip Dewinter, the Dutch extreme Right was lead by Hans Janmaat, the personiﬁcation of the disgruntled petit bourgeoisie. With the entrance on the Dutch political scene of the ﬂamboyant Pim Fortuyn in 2001, all seemed to change. Inside, but increasingly only outside The Netherlands, academics and journalists considered the former safe haven of liberalism as the next country to fall prey to right-wing extremism and intolerance. The Lijst Pim Fortuyn (List Pim Fortuyn, LPF) became a common name in the list of successful extreme right parties in Europe, although some authors would at times question its extremity, mainly on the basis of Fortuyn’s open homosexuality. In the following text, I will present short histories of, ﬁrst, Pim Fortuyn himself, and, second, his party the LPF. Next, I discuss the phenomenon of Fortuynism, arguing that it has both a stylistic and an ideological element. I will then present the foreign policy agenda of the party (and its founder and namesake). In the conclusion, I’ll provide a short assessment of the importance of foreign policy to the LPF and of the place of the LPF in regards to Dutch foreign policy.

1 Fortuyn, W.S.P. (2002), De puinhopen van acht jaar paars (Uithoorn: Karakter/ Rotterdam: Speakers Academy), p. 181. 2 See van Holsteyn, J. and Mudde, C. (eds.) (1998), Extreem-rechts in Nederland (Den Haag: SDU).

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Pim Fortuyn: the Pink Populist3 The LPF was founded on 11 February 2002 by Wilhelmus Simon Petrus Fortuyn. Though Fortuyn’s career as a high-proﬁle politician lasted less than a year, his legacy on Dutch politics will long outlive him. In fact, many a commentator has claimed that ‘the person Fortuyn marks a watershed in Dutch politics’.4 Moreover, while the party only made it into parliament (and government) after the death of its founder and leader, the LPF is still ﬁrst and foremost the party of Pim Fortuyn. Pim Fortuyn was born into a conservative Catholic family in Velsen on 19 February 1948.5 After studying sociology at the Free University of Amsterdam, he wrote a dissertation on ‘The Socio-economic Policy in The Netherlands, 1945–1949’ at the University of Groningen. He then became a lecturer in the Department of Sociology there, which at that time was well-known for its left-wing politics. Fortuyn himself was known as a Marxist, even though he joined the social democratic Partij van de Arbeid (Labour Party, PvdA), and not the then locally quite popular Communistische Partij Nederland (Communist Party of The Netherlands, CPN). Although he remained a senior lecturer at the University of Groningen until 1989, from the 1970s onwards he became involved in functions within the university administration and increasingly outside of the university altogether. Particularly in the late 1980s, Fortuyn held various advisory positions in public and semi-public organizations. From 1990 to 1996 he was a ‘special professor’ in government at the University of Rotterdam; hence he became known as ‘Professor Pim’.6 In the 1990s, Fortuyn became a well-known publicist and political commentator. From 1992 to 2000 he was a columnist for the conservative weekly Elsevier, and his provocative columns led several times to public discussions. The same is true for his many books – in the period 1994–2001 Fortuyn published no less than 10 books, most of which present revisionist views on sensitive topics, such as the European Union (EU) and Islam.7 More and more Fortuyn became the voice of a right-wing opposition, which was no longer mobilized within the mainstream conservative Liberal Party Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy, VVD). In August 2001, Fortuyn received attention in the national media by announcing his interest in the leadership of Leefbaar Nederland (Liveable Netherlands, LN), a

3 See also, Mudde, C. (2002), ‘The Pink Populist: Pim Fortuyn for Beginners’, e-Extreme 3(2), . 4 Bennis, M. and Renout, F. (2002), ‘6 mei 2002. De Nederlandse geschiedenis maakt een sprongetje’, in Fortuyn: de opkomst, de moord, de naslaap (Rotterdam: Het Spectrum), p. 7. 5 The information on Pim Fortuyn has been taken from two biographies on different websites: , and . 6 Even after 1996, Fortuyn had continued to use his professor title, despite the fact that he no longer had a right to do so. 7 Including books with titles like ‘Against the Islamicization of Our Culture’ (1997), ‘The Orphaned Society’ (1995) and ‘Business Cabinet Fortuyn’ (1994).

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new national political party based on the success of various local Leefbaar parties.8 The LN was the product of local politicians who generally used to be active or close to the social-democratic PvdA, but the party itself had an amorphous ideological proﬁle. Its most distinct feature was its populism, combining strong anti-politicalelite rhetoric with various policy proposals for the introduction of more instruments of direct democracy. On 25 November 2001, Fortuyn was indeed elected party leader, despite some questions about his alleged xenophobic ideas. Almost immediately, the LN jumped in the opinion polls, from a mere 2 per cent without Fortuyn as leader, to some 17 per cent with him. However, there were problems with some of his statements on immigration, and on 9 February 2002 he was ousted as leader, after he called Islam ‘a backward religion’ in an interview with the Dutch daily de Volkskrant (9 February 2002). Two days after his ouster, Fortuyn founded a new party, the LPF, and became its political leader. While most local branches of the LN remained loyal to The National Party, most supporters followed Fortuyn. In no time the LN was back to a mere 2 per cent in the polls, while the LPF soars to some 17 per cent. In the local elections of 6 March 2002, Leefbaar Rotterdam (LR), one of the few local Leefbaar parties that stayed loyal to Fortuyn, had great success. With Pim Fortuyn at the head of the list, the newly found LR gained no less than 34.7 per cent of the votes in The Netherlands’ biggest city. As a direct consequence, the stigma of ‘extreme right’ around Fortuyn was broken for good. In a television debate on the night of the elections, a raving Fortuyn was ignored by the national leaders of the ‘purple parties’ (these being the ‘blue’ VVD and the ‘red’ PvdA), offering a perfect visualization of the clash between the energetic new politics and the stagnant old politics. After a relatively quick round of negotiations, the LR formed a coalition with the Christen-Democratisch Appèl (Christian Democratic Appeal, CDA) and the VVD in the local government of Rotterdam, thereby for the ﬁrst time since the end of the Second World War ousting from power Fortuyn’s arch enemy, the PvdA. While staying outside of the local government himself, Pim Fortuyn did represent the LN in the negotiations and was the faction leader in the local council. On 6 May 2002, nine days before the parliamentary elections, Fortuyn was shot dead by environmental activist Volkert van der Graaf. His funeral, four days later, is broadcast live on Dutch television and leads to scenes of mass hysteria not seen since the Dutch national football team won the European Championship in 1988. The List Pim Fortuyn: An Ill-Behaved Orphan Founded on 11 February 2002, the List Pim Fortuyn was led by its founder and namesake for less than three months. This notwithstanding, on 15 May 2002, nine days after the murder of its leader, the LPF gained 17 per cent of the votes and 26

8 See, for example, van Praag, P. (2003), ‘The Winners and Losers in a Turbulent Political Year’, Acta Politica, 38(1), pp. 5–22.

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(out of a total of 150) seats in the Lower Chamber of the Dutch Parliament.9 This was the biggest electoral success ever of a new political party in The Netherlands. Pim Fortuyn, though deceased, headed the party list and received a staggering 1,358,942 preferential votes. Though orphaned by the killing of its leader, the LPF sought and found a role in the government. Inspired by the cooperation in Rotterdam, the CDA, the LPF and a reluctant VVD formed the most right-wing government of post-war Netherlands.10 Prime Minister of the coalition was Jan-Peter Balkenende, the relatively new leader of the CDA, while the LPF provided four of the 14 ministers: Eduard Bomhoff (Healthcare, Welfare and Sports, as well as vice-premier), Roelf de Boer (Trafﬁc and Water Management), Herman Heinsbroek (Economic Affairs), and Hilbrand Nawijn (Foreigner Issues and Integration).11 The LPF’s junior status within the new government becomes painfully clear when ones looks at the ‘light’ ministries it received; in comparison, the VVD, which had two seats less in parliament, also had four ministers, but these included the ‘heavy’ ministries of Internal Affairs, Finance, and Defence. The ﬁrst Balkenende Government was the shortest and most chaotic in Dutch post-war history. It fell after 87 days, largely because of the anarchic situation within the LPF. From the beginning there had been serious tensions between the ‘party on the ground’ and the ‘party in parliament’, between the ‘party in parliamentary’ and the ‘party in ofﬁce’, and as well within all these different branches.12 The parliamentary party went through various leadership challenges and changes, and experienced some expulsions and splits. The main functional problem was the behaviour of two ministers, Bomhoff and Heinsbroek, who both strived for political leadership within the LPF and despised each other personally. Their conﬂict increasingly stiﬂed not just the LPF, but the whole government, which in the end led to its fall. The 2003 parliamentary elections were clearly fought over the drifting ‘Fortuynvoters’. Polls had indicated that the LPF had lost most of its support, but that the sentiments that Fortuyn had championed had lost little of their strength. Virtually all political parties – left, right, and centre – tried to assure the voters that they 9 In contrast, the LN gained a mere 1.6 per cent and two seats. Percentages are taken from van der Brug, W. and Pellikaan, H. (2003), ‘Preface’, Acta Politica 38(1), pp. 1–4. 10 The inspiration of the Rotterdam model was also duly noted by Prime Minister Balkenende, who stated that the motto of his new government was ‘no words, but deeds’ (geen woorden, maar daden), which is also the ofﬁcial motto of Feyenoord, the biggest football club in Rotterdam. 11 The most comprehensive and detailed account of the turbulent developments within Dutch politics in general, and the LPF in particular, in 2002, is Hippe, Lucardie and Voerman (2002), ‘Kroniek (2002). Overzicht van de partijpolitieke gebeurtenissen van het jaar 2002’, in DNNP, Jaarboek (2002) (Groningen: DNPP), pp. 18–180. For an English language overview of the unprecedented self-destruction of the LPF, see Ghillebaert (2004), ‘Miscasting Politicians in The Netherlands. What Remains of the Fellowship of Pim Fortuyn After a Brief Ruling Time?’, paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Uppsala, 13–18 April. 12 For the different ‘faces’ of a political party, see Katz, R. and Mair, P. (1993), ‘The Evolution of Party Organizations in Europe: The Three Faces of Party Organization’, American Review of Politics 14, pp. 593–617.

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had ‘understood the message’ and claimed to be the true political representative of Fortuyn’s legacy. Concretely, this meant a realignment at the right end of the political spectrum.13 This time, the voters did not prefer the original over the copy, and the LPF received just 5.7 per cent of the votes and eight seats. Additionally, it was exchanged for the social liberal Democraten 66 (Democrats 66, D66) in the coalition. In opposition, the LPF found it hard to stabilize its remaining support. Most of its parliamentarians were not very visible (or competent), with the notable exception of Joost Eerdman, while then parliamentary party leader Mat Herben had his hands full keeping the party from further internal inﬁghting. Also, the party was in great ﬁnancial straights, and was regularly blackmailed by its creditors (mostly real estate agents with a political agenda). Moreover, the new coalition chose to largely continue the policies of the earlier government, which meant the LPF had to oppose its own policies. That the end is not yet in sight was made clear in the European elections of 10 June 2004. After a non-campaign by all parties, in which the LPF was seriously hampered by ﬁnancial problems, the party was able to enlist the support of just 2.6 per cent of the voters. This was not even enough for one seat in the European Parliament. It seemed that another outsider had stolen Fortuyn’s thunder – Paul van Buitenen, the Eurocrat whose inside information about corruption was responsible for the fall of the European Commission in 1999, and his new Transparant Europa (Transparent Europe) party gained a surprising 7.3 per cent of the votes and 2 (of 27) Dutch seats in the European Parliament. Since then the LPF has almost ceased to exist. In opinion polls the party hovers between 1 per cent and 0 per cent, particularly now that its remaining supporters have moved to the new Lijst Geert Wilders.14 The parliamentary party, though numbering only eight, has continued its chaotic inﬁghting to the level that one can hardly speak of an LPF parliamentary party by the end of 2004. The party itself, ﬁnally, has lost not just most of its members, but also its parliamentary faction (which declared itself independent from the party). Still troubled by chaos and inﬁghting, the current low point in the short yet turbulent history of the party was the arrest of chairman Sergej Moleveld, who had sent threatening letters to both the LPF and himself. Fortuynism: Style or Ideology? Various commentators have argued that Fortuyn’s many writing have little ideological consistency. While he wrote about virtually all major (contentious) issues in Dutch politics, including multicultural society and European integration, his views were 13 See, for example, Pennings and Keman (2003), ‘The Dutch Parliamentary Elections in 2002 and 2003: The Rise and Decline of the Fortuyn Movement’, Acta Politica 38(1), pp. 51–68; van Praag (2003), op. cit. 14 Minister of the European Parliament Geert Wilders left the VVD parliamentary party after a conﬂict over the EU membership of Turkey, of which he is a staunch opponent. His Islamophobic and law-and-order positions are close to those of the LPF, which explains his attraction to former LPF voters.

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at times contradictory and his solutions often vague and incoherent. In the words of two commentators, Fortuyn was ‘sometimes left, sometimes right. But always very outspokenly left or right’.15 There are roughly two ‘schools’ on the content of Fortuynism, which here will be called the emotional and the ideological. The emotional school holds that Fortuynism was ﬁrst and foremost a political style of protest, directed at the alleged elitism and bureaucratic style of the purple governments. In contrast, the ideological school argues that Fortuynism was in essence a distinct ideology, a vision of society that provided an alternative to the dominant views held by the established parties. The emotional school does not so much reject the view that Fortuynism included ideological elements. Rather, it argues that the ideology of Fortuyn was secondary to his political style. What exactly this style was, however, is debated. Some argue that ‘Fortuynism is… a political style of openness, directness, and clearness.’16 Others are far less positive, and see Fortuyn’s political style mainly as populist or even demagogic. Some, ﬁnally, have argued that the whole Fortuyn phenomenon should be seen, ﬁrst and foremost, through the lens of charismatic leadership.17 While the ideological school does not reject the importance of style in the Fortuyn phenomenon, it sees Fortuynism ﬁrst and foremost as a distinct ideology, an alternative to the world views of the other main parties in The Netherlands.18 In one of the few serious analyses of Fortuyn’s ideology, Paul Lucardie and Gerrit Voerman argue that Fortuyn had not just one ideology, but several: liberalism, populism, and nationalism.19 I agree largely with their analysis, though would prefer the term ‘national preference’ over nationalism, as his ideology lacked the coherence and collectivism of nationalism. Most of Fortuyn’s writing was part of a comprehensive and coherent neo-liberal attack on Dutch society and economy. He despised the Dutch ‘polder model’, the pride of the purple governments of Wim Kok, which he criticized for their bureaucratic, uninspired and static character. Fortuyn saw The Netherlands as an overregulated country in which the market was stiﬂed by both bureaucratic and moral limitations. The solution to most problems was, in his opinion, more market and less state. If citizens and entrepreneurs were no longer held back by bureaucratic overregulation and state manipulations, including ‘enslaving’ social beneﬁts, the logic of the market would prevail in most sectors of life, and both the economy and society would function far better. 15 Bennis and Renout (2002), op. cit., p. 9. 16 Ibid., p. 9. 17 See Ellemers, J.E. (2002), ‘Het fenomeen Fortuyn. De revolte verklaard’, in DNNP, Jaarboek DNPP 2002 (Groningen: DNPP), pp. 252–66; and Ellemers, J.E. (2002), ‘Pim Fortuyn: een zuiver geval van charismatisch gezag’, Facta 10(7), pp. 2–5. 18 According to Paul Cliteur, a law professor and well-known Dutch conservative intellectual, Fortuyn was (together with former VVD leader Frits Bolkestein) one of the few Dutch politicians with an ideology. See his ‘Bolkestein, Fortuyn en Renan over de islam’, lezing bij de opening van het Wetenschappelijk Bureau Lijst Pim Fortuyn, The Hague, 21 February 2004. 19 Lucardie, P. and Voerman, G. (2002), ‘Het gedachtegoed van Fortuyn. Liberaal patriot of nationaal populist?’, Samenleving en Politiek 9(6), pp. 53–62.

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But Fortuyn was not just a (neo-)liberal in economic terms, he also generally expressed very liberal views on cultural issues. He held the right of self-determination in both an immaterial and a material sense as one of the most important fruits of the Enlightenment, was a staunch defender of the separation of church and state, and preferred the individual over the collective. As he was openly homosexual, he was a ﬁerce defender of the rights of gays, and detested the conservative and repressive ‘culture of sprouts’ of the 1950s. And despite making many sexist remarks in his publications and interviews, he also defended the equality of men and women. Most of these liberal values Fortuyn believed to be under growing threat from the Muslim immigrants and their alleged left-wing defenders in politics. A second key feature of Fortuyn’s ideology is populism, the view that society is a struggle between ‘the pure people’ against ‘the corrupt elite’ and politics should be an expression of ‘common sense’.20 Interestingly, his view of the people was probably closer to that of the left-wing populists of the 1970s and 1980s than to that of the national and right-wing populists of the 1990s and later: free, emancipated, reasoning citizens.21 The key target of Fortuyn’s anti-establishment critique was the PvdA, the party that he had left in 1989 after 15 years of membership. Fortuyn saw the PvdA as the leaders of what he referred to as ‘the left Church’, the politically correct establishment that allegedly ruled The Netherlands. It was the PvdA with its ‘perverted Mandarin culture’ that exempliﬁed for Fortuyn the Dutch culture of elitism, to which he referred to as the rule by ‘Our Kind of People’ (Ons Soort Mensen, OSM), non-political politics, and the stiﬂing of open debate (by accusations of ‘racism’ or ‘populism’).22 In conclusion, situating Pim Fortuyn and the LPF in a national and international comparative context might make this phenomenon a bit better understandable. In a Dutch comparative context, Pim Fortuyn was more like a Bolkestein-plus than a Janmaat-light. Similarly, the LPF is rather a radical and populist version of the conservative liberal VVD than a moderate version of the national populist Centrumdemocraten (Centre Democrats, CD). In a European comparative context, Pim Fortuyn was more like the Italian entrepreneur-politician Silvio Berlusconi than the French ﬁghter-politician Jean-Marie Le Pen, and the LPF is more like the rightwing populist Forza Italia than the national populist Front National.23

20 See Mudde, C. (2004), ‘The Populist Zeitgeist’, Government & Opposition 39:3, 541–63. 21 Lucardie and Voerman (2002), op. cit., pp. 54–55. 22 Among his many attacks on the PvdA, see Fortuyn (1991), ‘Geperverteerde manderijnencultuur doet PvdA de das Om,’ de Volkskrant, 9 March. On his use of the term OSM, see, for example, Fortuyn, W.S.P. (1992), Aan het Volk van Nederland (Amsterdam: Contact). 23 Fortuyn himself always rejected (angrily) the accusations that he was similar to Janmaat, Haider pr Le Pen, ehile admitting that he felt ‘related’ to Berlusconi. See, for example, the double interview with Pim Fortuyn and former PvdA leader Ad Melkert in the Dutch newspaper Algemeen Dagblad: Dohmen, J. and de Zwart, M. (2002), ‘Therapie of nachtmerrie?’, in Fortuyn: de opkomst, de moord, de nasleep (Rotterdam: Het Spectrum), pp. 30–35.

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A Fortuynist Foreign Policy As a post-11 September 2001 party, it is not surprising that the LPF believes that ‘the international safety situation [sic] is unstable.’24 Moreover, Pim Fortuyn’s worldview was, already before 11 September 2001, dominated by the thesis of the ‘clash of civilizations’,25 most notably ‘the conﬂict between Western society and Islamic culture’ or the clash between ‘the two dominant cultures [in the world]: modernity and Islam.’26 At the same time, for the LPF domestic concerns were by far the most important. If one reads the three election programmes of the party, the bulk addresses domestic issues, most notably education, ﬁnance, health care, public order and safety. The most elaborate election programme so far, Politiek is Passie (Politics is Passion) of 2003, only one section out of 15 deals exclusively with foreign policy.27 The section title included the three subﬁelds that the party found most important: defence, Europe, and development cooperation. Defence policy Not withstanding its gloomy worldview, the LPF takes a fairly mainstream position with regard to defence policy. The party supports North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) membership, but wants to slightly decrease Dutch participation.28 It supports the budget cuts proposed by the Dutch government, but criticizes the lack of vision underlying the plans, and states that further cuts are not possible if The Netherlands wants to remain a full and reliable defence partner in international organizations. In line with its neo-liberalism, the party wants the military, and most notably the Ministry of Defence, to work more efﬁciently, which means less bureaucracy and more cooperation between the various branches of the defence forces. In his 2002 book, Fortuyn even argued for the abolition of both the Army and the Air Force as separate units, and to bring all defence forces under the Navy.29 One of the few ﬁelds in which the LPF wanted to increase the role of the defence forces, most notably the Military Police (Marechaussee), was in the ﬁght against terrorism. European policy Pim Fortuyn was one of the ﬁrst open Eurosceptics in The Netherlands. Already in 1997 he wrote the book Zielloos Europe (Soulless Europe), in which he painted the 24 See LPF (2002), Businesslike but with a Heart, election programme for the Dutch Parliamentary Elections, , accessed 29 April 2002. 25 Huntington, S. (1993), ‘The Clash of Civilizations’, Foreign Affairs 72(3), pp. 22– 50. 26 See LPF (2003), Politiek is Passie, election programme for the Dutch Parliamentary Elections. 27 If not explicitly indicated differently, all citations and references are to LPF (2003), op. cit. 28 See LPF (2002), op. cit. 29 Fortuyn (2002), op. cit., pp. 174–6.

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European Union as a heartless, distant, bureaucratic monster that had grown too big and too powerful.30 Similarly, the LPF states in the introduction of its ﬁrst election programme: ‘Europe is a bureaucracy which barely interests its citizens, let alone inspires them.’31 The LPF is Eurosceptic rather than Euroreject, as it supports the underlying values of European integration.32 Fortuyn summarized his European vision clearly and simply: ‘I am a loyal supporter of the EU, but while retaining [the Dutch] identity and where possible while retaining sovereignty.’33 The party’s basic pro-European standpoint is amply demonstrated in its programmes. For example, it describes the European Union as a ‘phenomenal experiment, which has contributed a great deal to peace in our part of the world’.34 The party also believes that the EU ‘has contributed a great deal to the prosperity of its member states’.35 So, rather than wanting to dismantle the EU, the LPF suggests different ways in which the organization can be made more efﬁcient, more democratic, and less threatening to national (that is, Dutch) sovereignty. The ideological bases of the reform of the EU are in line with the party’s general ideology: liberalism, national preference, and populism. First and foremost, the Eurocracy should be reduced and the EU should provide less subsidies. Seeing the EU largely as an inefﬁcient and corrupt bureaucratic machine, the LPF demands the ‘forceful combating of bureaucracy, fraud and favouritism’.36 The party also wants the incremental abolition of food subsidies and structural funds. Second, national identity and sovereignty should be guaranteed through the principle of subsidiarity as well as through the introduction of ‘a senate composed of delegates from the national parliaments’.37 Moreover, the democratic deﬁcit should be solved at the national level, not at the European level. Consequently, ‘[t]he List Pim Fortuyn believes that only an expansion of the inﬂuence of the national parliaments on European policy making can be truly effective.’38 Third, the LPF wants the introduction of a consultative (national) referendum for all major decisions of the EU. According to then party leader Mat Herben, the

30 Fortuyn, W.S.P. (1997), Zielloos Europa (Uithoorn: Karakter). 31 See LPF (2002), op. cit. 32 With the term Eurosceptic, I refer to views that support the underlying ideas of European integration, that is, a European market and pooled sovereignty, but that believe the current EU is developing in the wrong direction. It does not mean a complete rejection of the whole idea of European integration. See Kopecky, P. and Mudde, C. (2002), ‘The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe’, European Union Politics 3(3), pp. 297–326. 33 Fortuyn (2002), op. cit., p. 181. 34 See LPF (2002), op. cit. 35 Ibid. 36 LPF (2004), Is U iets gevraagd?, election programme for the European Parliamentary Elections, , accessed 27 May 2004. 37 See LPF (2002), op. cit. 38 LPF (2004), op. cit.

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EU is ruled by a ‘Euro-elite.’39 Even worse, the LPF accuses Dutch politicians of squandering Dutch interests because they wanted to be ‘the best pupil in the class’.40 Only a referendum can break the power of the Euro-elite, and their Dutch vassals, and give power back to the Dutch people. Consequently, with regard to the expansion of the European Union, the party states: New member states will only be permitted to join after the Dutch people have been given their say in a politically binding referendum in the matter. This will ensure that politicians are forced to examine carefully the beneﬁts and disadvantages of expansion of the EU.41

With regard to expansion, it is very clear where the LPF draws the line: ‘The European Union shouldn’t cross the Bosporus and the Ural. Turkey, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia should not be allowed to become members of the EU.’42 Moreover, after the 2004 expansion, the party wants a 10-year halt to further expansion, to ensure that the effects of this accession can be dealt with. In the European elections of 2004 the LPF campaigned under the slogan ‘Accession of Turkey? Have you been asked anything?’ This combined several popular themes of the party: Islamophobia, national preference, and populism. Oddly enough, the election programme for the 2004 European elections devoted little attention to the possible EU accession of Turkey. It does state as one of its 10 summary points the party’s opposition to that other contentious issue of European integration: the European Constitution. The programme ﬁnishes with a citation from Fortuyn’s book Soulless Europe: I love Europe, I love its multitude of peoples, cultures, landscapes, weather conditions, languages and human beings. I sometimes hate the euro-elite [sic] in its arrogant negligence. In short, I want a Europe of the people, of the human scale. A Europe of you and me!43

Development cooperation Not surprisingly, the sub-section on development cooperation is fully inspired by the neo-liberal ideology of the party. The solution to underdevelopment is more market and less aid. The LPF wants the Dutch government to ﬁght harder for open markets and against barriers to the European market. Concretely, they want to abolish agricultural subsidies, which the party believes will structurally strengthen the ability of 39 Herben, M. (2004), ‘Stemmen voor Europa,’ speech at Het Plein, The Hague, 25 May. 40 LPF (2004), op. cit. 41 See LPF (2002), op. cit. 42 LPF (2004), op. cit. 43 ‘Ik houd van Europa, ik houd van zijn veelheid aan volkeren, culturen, landschappen, weersomstandigheden, talen en mensen. Ik haat soms de euro-elite in zijn verwaten achteloosheid. Kortom, ik wile en Europa van de mensen, van de menselijke maat. Een Europa van u en mij!’ LPF (2004), op. cit.

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developing countries to cope independently. They also want the Dutch private sector to play a more important role in development cooperation, while at the same time taking a more critical attitude towards NGOs. The LPF wants to bring the Dutch contribution to development cooperation back to 0.7 per cent of the GDP, which is the international norm (currently The Netherlands spends 0.8 per cent). At the same time, it wants The Netherlands to pressure other EU countries to keep their promises and also spend 0.7 per cent. In line with their national preference, the LPF wants Dutch national interests to be safeguarded in development cooperation. They also see a link with immigration policy, a central concern of the party. Through development aid to countries from which many immigrants in The Netherlands come, they hope to also address the ‘immigration problem’. For example, they want to promote the return of asylum seekers to reconstruct their own country. Finally, they want ‘generous support’ for the reception of asylum seekers in the broader region by extra support for the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. Conclusion: the LPF and Dutch Foreign Policy As is the case with most if not all populist parties – left, right or centre – foreign policy is at best a secondary issue for the LPF. Consequently, the party has a limited programme on the issue, which is fully consistent with the general basic features of the party ideology: (neo-)liberalism, national preference, and populism. Additionally, foreign policy is of little consequence to the voters of the LPF.44 Both in government and in opposition the LPF has focused little on foreign policy issues. The sole exception is the issue of EU membership for Turkey, which the party staunchly opposes. More generally, one could argue that the LPF has had some effect on the discussion in The Netherlands regarding European integration. For example, the national referendum on the European Constitution was fully in line with LPF policies, even though it was decided by the second Balkenende government, and the party itself played little role in the campaign. But rather than the initiator of new foreign policy positions, the LPF has functioned as a catalyst of Euroscepticism within The Netherlands. It has enabled other political actors in the mainstream, most notably Geert Wilders, to challenge widely held ‘truths’ and depoliticized issues regarding European integration at the elite level. Whether this will lead to any signiﬁcant future changes in Dutch foreign policy remains to be seen. Acronyms CD CDA

Centrumdemocraten (Centre Democrats) Christen-Democratisch Appèl (Christian Democratic Appeal)

44 The relation between the (skeptical) position on European integration and LPF voting, for example, turned out to be non-signiﬁcant for the 2002 parliamentary election. See van Holsteyn, J. and Irwin, G. (2003), ‘Never a Dull Moment: Pim Fortuyn and the Dutch Election of 2002’, West European Politics 26(2), pp. 41–66.

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CPN D66 EU LN LPF LR NATO PvdA VVD

Communistische Partij Nederland (Communist Party of the Netherlands) Democraten 66 (Democrats 66) European Union Leefbaar Nederland (Liveable Netherlands) Lijst Pim Fortuyn (List Pim Fortuyn) Leefbaar Rotterdam North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Partij van de Arbeid (Labour Party) Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy)

References Bennis, M. and Renout, F. (2002), ‘6 mei 2002. De Nederlandse geschiedenis maakt een sprongetje’ in Fortuyn: de opkomst, de moord, de naslaap (Rotterdam: Het Spectrum). Cliteur, P. (2004), Bolkestein, Fortuyn en Renan over de islam, lezing bij de Opening van het (The Hague: Wetenschappelijk Bureau Lijst Pim Fortuyn), 21 February. Dohmen, J. and de Zwart, M. (2002), ‘Therapie of nachtmerrie?’, in Fortuyn: de opkomst, de moord, de nasleep (Rotterdam: Het Spectrum). Ellemers, J.E. (2002), ‘Het fenomeen Fortuyn, De revolte verklaard’ in DNNP, Jaarboek DNPP 2002 (Groningen: DNPP). ––– (2002), ‘Pim Fortuyn: een zuiver geval van charismatisch gezag’, Facta, 10(7). Fortuyn, W.S.P. (1991), ‘Geperverteerde manderijnencultuur doet PvdA de das Om,’ de Volkskrant, 9 March. ––– (1992), Aan het Volk van Nederland (Amsterdam: Contact). ––– (1997), Zielloos Europa (Uithoorn: Karakter). –––(2002), De puinhopen van acht jaar paars (Uithoorn: Karakter/Rotterdam: Speakers Academy, 2002). Ghillebaert, C.-P. (2004), ‘Miscasting Politicians in The Netherlands. What Remains of the Fellowship of Pim Fortuyn After a Brief Ruling Time?’, Paper Presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Uppsala, 13–18 April. Herben, M. (2004), ‘Stemmen voor Europa,’ Speech at Het Plein, The Hague, 25 May. Hippe, J., Lucardie, P. and Voerman, G. (2002), ‘Kroniek 2002. Overzicht van de partijpolitieke gebeurtenissen van het jaar 2002’ in DNNP, Jaarboek DNNP 2002 (Groningen: DNPP). Huntington, S. (1993), ‘The Clash of Civilizations’, Foreign Affairs, 72(3). Katz, R. and Mair, P. (1993), ‘The Evolution of Party Organizations in Europe: The Three Faces of Party Organization’, American Review of Politics, 14. Kopecky, P. and Mudde, C. (2002), ‘The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe’, European Union Politics, 3(3). [DOI: 10.1177/1465116502003003002]

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Lucardie, P. and Voerman, G. (2002), ‘Het gedachtegoed van Fortuyn. Liberaal patriot of nationaal populist?’, Samenleving en Politiek, 9(6). Mudde, C. (2002), ‘The Pink Populist: Pim Fortuyn for Beginners’, e-Extreme 3(2), . ––– (2004), ‘The Populist Zeitgeist’, Government and Opposition, 39(3). [DOI: 10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x] Pennings, P. and Keman, H. (2003), ‘The Dutch Parliamentary Elections in 2002 and 2003: The Rise and Decline of the Fortuyn Movement’, Acta Politica, 38(1). [DOI: 10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500001] Pim Fortuyn, L. (2002), Businesslike but with a Heart, Election Programme for the Dutch Parliamentary Elections, , accessed on 29 April 2002. ––– (2003), Politiek is Passie, Election Programme for the Dutch Parliamentary Elections. ––– (2004), Is U iets gevraagd?, Election Programme for the European Parliamentary Elections, , accessed on 27 May 2004. van der Brug, W. and Pellikaan, H. (2003), ‘Preface’, Acta Politica, 38(1). [DOI: 10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500000] van Holsteyn, J. and Irwin, G. (2003), ‘Never a Dull Moment: Pim Fortuyn and the Dutch Election of 2002’, Western European Politics, 26(2). van Holsteyn, J. and Mudde, C., (eds.) (1998), Extreem-rechts in Nederland (Den Haag: SDU). van Praag, P. (2003), ‘The Winners and Losers in a Turbulent Political Year’, Acta Politica, 38(1). [DOI: 10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500003]

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Chapter 11

The Swiss People’s Party and the Foreign and Security Policy Since the 1990s1 Oscar Mazzoleni

The Swiss political system has traditionally been seen under the light of its high stability. The 1990s introduced a discontinuous trend; shifting international dynamics following the end of the Cold War had a signiﬁcant impact on this small country with a long tradition of neutrality and independence, and the consequences of the international challenges on the Confederation’s foreign and security policies and on domestic politics have been quite deep. In particular, these challenges indirectly contribute to changes in the balance of power between the principal Swiss parties. The leading player in these domestic changes has been the former Agrarian Party, the Swiss People’s Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei, SVP), which in recent years has developed a ‘radical right-wing’ and ‘national-populist’ ideology2 and put foreign policy issues at the centre of its agenda. Until the 1990s, the SVP was the smallest Swiss governmental party, but during the 1990s its vote share increased from 11.9 per cent in the national elections of 1991 to 26.6 per cent in the last national election of 2003. The SVP has become the principal Swiss national party at the national level, and on December 2003, its charismatic leader, Christoph Blocher, was elected counsellor (‘minister’) to the federal government by the parliament. Despite the importance of foreign and security issues to the agenda of the SVP, scholars have rarely examined this topic in depth. This paper will ﬁrst set out to show the place of the SVP’s strategy and success in the context of changing Swiss foreign and security policies. It will then examine the arguments used by the SVP to oppose the new ofﬁcial direction taken in Swiss foreign policy and security by providing a number of examples.

1 An earlier version of this paper has been presented in the Workshop on ‘The European Right-wing Populist Parties and Their Foreign Policy Agenda’, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, 1–2 July 2004. The author is indebted to Maurizio Masulin, Pascal Sciarini and Carlo Malaguerra for comments on a previous draft. 2 Betz, H.-G. (2004), La droite populiste en Europe. Extrême et démocrate? (Paris: Autrement); Decker, F. (2004), Der neue Rechtspopulismus (Opladen: Leske + Budrich); and Skenderovic, D. (2006), The Radical Right in Switzerland: Continuity and Change, 1945– 2000 (New York/Oxford: Berghahn).

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Resources and Political Opportunities Many aspects are to be found at the basis of the rising electoral success of the SVP in recent years. Certainly, economic and political crises have played an important role,3 as well as a number of institutional elements, particularly direct democracy. Switzerland is one of the countries where direct democracy institutions are the most developed4 and it is indeed by regular use of referendums and initiatives that the radical right-wing and national-populist parties have exploited and sharpened a set of central issues on the Swiss policy agenda, such as European integration, United Nations (UN) membership and others. While Swiss right-wing parties are the principal opponents to new foreign and security policies adopted by the Swiss government, only the SVP has been able to capitalize on its opposition to these policies through a systematic use of the referendum, and thereby turn its opposition into a notable electoral success. Of right-wing parties, only the SVP appears to have the necessary resources and the ability to use them in the political ﬁeld. Furthermore, in addition to its capability to use ideological and material resources, many gleaned from connections with powerful lobbies, the SVP is the only right-wing party that can avail itself of having a truly charismatic leader at the national level. This success could hardly be explained without considering the changing position of Switzerland in international affairs, and the ‘political opportunities’5 arising from strong tensions existing between the Swiss legacy and the economic and political pressures exerted in the new international context of the 1990s. From the end of the Second World War and until the 1980s, foreign policy had never been an issue in Swiss politics. All governmental parties, from centre-right to the left,6 albeit with diverse nuances, shared the policy of neutrality and independence. It was only from the 1980s and onwards that the foreign policy agenda has made an increasing impact on domestic politics. Although the acceleration of economic globalization and European integration has had a strong inﬂuence on every European country, pressure has been stronger in Switzerland, because of its speciﬁc foreign and security policy history.7 3 Poglia, M.F., Tondolo, R. and Schulteis, F. (2000), Socio-economic Change and RightWing Extremism in Switzlerland (Neuchâtel: Université de Neuchâtel – SIREN). 4 Butler, D. and Ranney, A. (eds.) (1994), Referendums Around the World: The Growing Use of Direct Democracy (Hampshire: Macmillan). 5 Tarrow, S. (1998), Power in Movement. Social Movements and Contentious Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 6 Between 1959 and 2003 the Swiss Federal Council was composed by a coalition of four parties: two members were liberals (Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei, FDP), two were Christian democratic (Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei, CVP), two were socialists (Sozialdemokratische Partei, SP) and one was a member of the SVP. This situation changed in 2003, as a second SVP ‘minister’ entered the Federal Council, to the detriment of the CVP. 7 See Kreis, G. (1995), Der Lange Weg des Staatsvertragsreferendums. Schweizerische Aussenpolitik zwischen indirekten und direkten Demokratie (Basel: Europa Institut, University of Basel); and Haltiner, K.W. (2002a), ‘Tradition as a Political Value. The Public Image of Security, Defence and the Military in Switzerland’, paper presented at the 5th International Security Forum (ISF), 14–16 October, Zurich.

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From the Second World War to the 1980s, Swiss foreign policy conﬁrmed and in certain respects reinforced what is known as the ‘Swiss Sonderfall’, the ‘special case’ status of this country on the international scene, a legacy begun even before the founding of the Swiss federal state in 1848.8 During the Cold War, Swiss foreign policy was based on the principle of neutrality, in accordance with a tradition dating back to the seventeenth century, although the signiﬁcance and the relevance of that neutrality has changed over time.9 In order to survive in a polarized world and defend national interests, neutrality has been considered by the Swiss government as the most appropriate means of safeguarding its interests in the world. In terms of foreign policy, until the 1990s the principle of neutrality implied ﬁrst, the practicing and ‘offering’ of ‘good ofﬁces’ and mediation in conﬂicts around the world; and second, independence from international organizations, above all the UN. It should be pointed out that this did not entail complete isolation on the diplomatic front and in terms of international relations. For example, in the 1960s, Switzerland joined the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which later became the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and Switzerland participated in various governmental and non-governmental organizations. However, up to the 1980s these commitments were of a circumscribed, technical and relatively non-politicized nature.10 With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the acceleration of the European integration process in the 1990s, Switzerland’s special case status within the realm of international relations had to be revised.11 Rather than safeguarding the independence and sovereignty of Switzerland as its foremost aim, the new policy that the Swiss government elaborated in the early 1990s was designed to ensure ‘security and welfare’ through international cooperation. With this new outlook, the weight of neutrality was considerably reduced.12 On an operational level, the consequences were to be highly signiﬁcant: over the last 10 years Switzerland has established multiple alliances with supranational organizations (joining the UN in 2002) and developed more intensive forms of collaboration with the European Union (EU), albeit with no intention of joining (see Bilateral Agreements I, approved in 2000, Bilateral Agreements II, adopted in 2005). Moreover, during the 1990s, Switzerland 8 Kreis, G. (1992), ‘Von der Gründung des Bundesstates bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg (1848– 1914)’, in Riklin, A., Haug, H. and Probst, R. (eds.), Neues Handbuch der Schweizerischen Aussenpolitik (Bern/Stuttgart/Wien: Haupt), pp. 27–40; Altermatt, U. (1992), ‘Vom Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges bis zum Gegenwart (1945–1991)’, in Riklin, A., Haug, H. and Probst, R. (eds.), op. cit., pp. 61–78. 9 Riklin, A. (1992), ‘Die Neutralität der Schweiz’, in Riklin, A., Haug, H. and Probst, R. (eds.), op. cit., pp. 191–210. 10 Schnarenberger, M. (1999), Vom Sonderall zum Normalfall. Ein Einführung in die Aussenpolitik der Schweiz (Zurich: Pro Helvetia). 11 Goetschel, L., Bernath, M. and Schwarz, D. (2002), Schweizerische Aussenpolitik (Zürich: NZZ Verlag). 12 Conseil Fédéral (1993), Rapport sur la politique extérieure de la Suisse dans les années 1990 (Bern); Gabriel, J.M. (2001), ‘Neutralität für den Notfall: Der Bericht des Bundesrats zur Aussenpolitik der Schweiz in den 90er Jahren’, Swiss Political Science Review 2–3, pp. 161–90.

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adhered to new international security initiatives such as the Partnership for Peace promoted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and it acquired the position of observer in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, again within NATO. These different treaties of cooperation allowed Switzerland to remain inside the limits of a neutral country. The organization and the objectives of the Swiss military also changed, as they have shifted from duties exclusively related to the defence of national territory to embrace a greater bilateral and multilateral international cooperation within Europe. One important change in the military regards the diminished signiﬁcance of obligatory conscription, which is in accordance with the systems adopted by other European countries. The uncertainties of ofﬁcial foreign policy in deﬁning national identity in the post-Cold War world,13 in addition to difﬁculties at socioeconomic and political levels, have aided in the growth of anti-establishment political parties supporting a conservative point of view. For the Swiss government and the principal government parties (between left-wing and centre-right), it was not easy to develop a consensual foreign and security policy, in contrast to the tradition of compromise that typically dictates Swiss decision making. The main difﬁculty for the ofﬁcial foreign policy in post-Cold War Europe has been the setting of a new coherent frame deﬁning Switzerland’s ‘place in the world’. Neutrality and independent policies had for a long time contributed to national cohesion in a country characterized by strong cultural and linguistic differences. Alongside with direct democracy and federalism, neutrality had become a fundamental element in the making of national identity, not only as a long-term factor, dating back to the foundation of the federal state, but also because of the Second World War experience. Switzerland was the sole neutral European continental country to be spared from the conﬂict. In contrast to what happened in Austria, Belgium and The Netherlands, Swiss neutrality was conﬁrmed as a pillar of the continuance of independence and national sovereignty.14 In the post-war period, memories of the wartime experience and the assimilation of Soviet communism to the main external threat, contributed to affording neutrality a main role in fostering national unity. The ‘National Versus International’ Political Cleavage Especially from the second half of the 1980s and onwards, the defence of independence, support for the solitary path followed by Switzerland, and the importance of maintaining a strong neutrality deﬁned the principal themes taken up by number of political forces that one may deﬁne, with a certain degree of simpliﬁcation, as ‘rightwing radical-populists’. Until the mid-1990s these opposition forces were highly fragmented, being composed of small parties (Freedom Party, Swiss Democrats, Ticino’s League), but in the second half of the decade this opposition politically 13 Aggestam, L. (1999), Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy, ARENA Working Papers no. 8 (Oslo: Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo). 14 Sciarini, P., Hug, S. and Dupont, C. (2000), ‘Example, Exception or Both?, Swiss National Identity in Perspective’ in Constructing Europe’s Identity: the External Dimension. Cederman, L.E. (ed.) (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers), pp. 57–88.

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consolidated around the ‘new’ SVP. With increased membership, the SVP has been capable of presenting a clear-cut position in numerous referendums regarding foreign policy and policy towards foreigners, and this capacity has proved invaluable to the SVP in electoral terms. Never has a Swiss governmental party grown so much and so rapidly as the SVP between 1990 and 2003. This progress has had three main consequences: ﬁrst, it put the other principal parties on the defensive, especially those of the centre-right; second, it has contributed to the polarization of the party system, reinforcing the left-wing parties (socialists and Greens); and third, it has contributed to putting and maintaining in the centre of the political agenda certain issues in security policy and especially foreign policy, like European integration. Indeed, the repositioning of the principal parties regarding foreign policy was accompanied by the deepening of a political cleavage between an orientation concerned with the safeguarding of national traditions and a position advocating greater international openness. In fact, the main result of the SVP’s success is an increasing salience of a national versus international cleavage (or ‘insularity’ versus ‘openness’, ‘tradition’ versus ‘change’) in Swiss partisan and electoral ﬁelds. Historically, the Swiss party system has been characterized by a broad range of cleavages, in particular those regarding religion, language and class, and those between urban and rural, Left and Right.15 The polarization of citizens’ opinions around these differing positions is not new in Switzerland. In the 1970s, in fact, this was expressed above all in relation to migratory policy, which while submitted for a number of federal referendums, nevertheless had no consistent impact on the party system.16 The party-based structure of the ‘national versus international’ cleavage only strengthened in the 1980s and especially in the 1990s, articulating migratory themes, foreign policy and national security issues.17

15 Kerr, H. (1987), ‘The Swiss Party System: Steadfast and Changing’, in Daalder, H. (ed.), Party Systems in Denmark, Austria, Switzerland, The Netherlands and Belgium (London: Frances Pinter), pp. 107–92; Trechsel, A.H. (1995), Clivages en Suisse. Analyse des impacts relatifs des clivages sur l’électorat suisse lors des élections fédérales (Genève: Département de science politique, Université de Genève); Hug, S. (1994), ‘Les coalitions référendaires’, in Papadopoulos, Y. (ed.), Elites politiques et peuple en Suisse. Analyse des votations fédérales. 1970–1987 (Lausanne: Réalités sociales), pp. 57–83; Papadopoulos, Y. (1997), Les processus de décision fédéraux en Suisse (Paris: L’Harmattan), pp. 163–4. 16 Sidjanski, D. et al. (1975), Les Suisses et la politique. Enquête sur les attitudes d’électeurs Suisses (1972) (Berne/Francfort: Lang), pp. 114ff. 17 Sciarini, P. and Marquis, L. (2000), ‘Opinion publique et politique extérieure. Le cas de la Suisse’, International Political Science Review 2(21), pp. 149–71; Kobi, S. (2000), Des citoyens Suisses contre l’élite politique: le cas des votations fédérales. 1979–1995 (Paris/Montréal: L’Harmattan Books), chap. 5; Kriesi, H. (2003), ‘The Transformation of the National Political Space in a Globalizing World’, in Ibarra, P. (ed.), Social Movements and Democracy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 195–210; Brunner, E. and Sciarini, P. (2002), ‘L’opposition ouverture-traditions’, in Hug, S. And Sciarini, P. (eds.), Changement de valeurs et nouveaux clivages politique en Suisse (Paris: L’Harmattan Books), pp. 29–94.

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The Foreign and Security Agenda In the case of the SVP, this cleavage has been consolidated, at a rhetorical level, in different ways. Since the 1990s, the aim of the foreign and security agenda focused on four groups of issues: the relationship with the European Union, membership in the United Nations, the role of the Swiss Army, and the international role of Switzerland in the Second World War. The principal contention: the EU issue Foreign affairs issues regarding relationships with Europe have certainly been among the most important on the SVP’s political agenda, from the early 1990s to the present day. The ‘new’ SVP that developed around the charismatic ﬁgure of Christoph Blocher was born of referendum campaigns and the success achieved in the popular vote on 6 December 1992 regarding the European Economic Area (EEA). The referendum on Switzerland’s adherence to the EEA, rejected by a narrow majority of voters, was a decisive moment for the SVP’s dissenting political strategy, a strategy established by Blocher, who was then merely the leader of the cantonal party section of the canton of Zürich. The campaign had for the EEA vote been very heated and turnout was the highest registered for a Swiss referendum or initiative since the Second World War.18 The radical-populist SVP’s success was based on the deployment of considerable material and ideological resources, including the AUNS (the Campaign for an Independent and Neutral Switzerland), a powerful pressure group born in the wake of the referendum against Switzerland joining the UN. Blocher was president of the AUNS from 1986 to May 2004.19 The SVP rejects any form of integration with the EU on the basis of three strictly combined arguments. First, the SVP equates the integration of Switzerland with the EU with the risk of seeing an increase in unemployment (sharply rising in Switzerland in the early 1990s and again in 2000), a threat to the strength of the Swiss ﬁnancial market and the danger of paying an exorbitant price for EU development, like in the case of its opposition to the ﬁnancial support for the enlargement of the EU from 15 to 25 members decided by the Federal Council in May 2004. Second, the SVP’s opposition to the EU is motivated by the fear of an inﬂux of immigrants from other countries that could negatively impact the Swiss labour market. Third, the party considers that the EU threatens the fundamental institutions of Swiss identity and sovereignty, namely direct democracy, neutrality and federalism. These are the main themes on which the SVP develops its anti-establishment rhetoric, accusing Brussels’ political and technocratic elite of corruption and centralism, and the Swiss government of incompetence and inconsistency. Since 1992, the SVP’s arguments against the EU have remained essentially unchanged. Although the party is not ofﬁcially against all agreements with the EU, arguments against integration remain at the core of the party’s agendas since 1992. 18 For this vote on historical perspective, see Du Bois, P. (1992), La Suisse et l’espace économique européen (Lausanne: L’Âge d’homme). 19 Sciarini and Marquis, op. cit.

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Following the popular rejection of the EEA – condemned by Blocher in January 2004 as a ‘colonial agreement’ – the Swiss executive decided to adopt a new approach strategy towards the EU, based on the negotiation of speciﬁc bilateral agreements, instead of an immediate membership application. The key points of the ﬁrst seven bilateral agreements negotiated with the EU between 1994 and 1999 were supported by 67 per cent of voters in the referendum of 2000, based on issues concerning the free circulation of people, the recognition of academic qualiﬁcations, agriculture and scientiﬁc research. While all other governmental parties ofﬁcially supported these agreements, the SVP displayed a degree of ambivalence. While the national SVP ofﬁcially supported the agreements, the other 17 cantonal sections of the party, that is to say a broad majority, expressed contrary opinions regarding bilateral agreements prior to the vote. This ambivalence revealed both the party’s scepticism with regards to the bilateral agreements, and the awareness of the beneﬁts the Swiss ﬁnancial market and economy (all the Swiss business associations supported ofﬁcially the ﬁrst agreements) could draw from them. Blocher’s position with regards to the ﬁrst bilateral agreements conﬁrmed, to a certain extent, this attitude. Blocher’s position stated that agreements with the EU should ‘solely’ be a means of defending Swiss interests, but such agreements would lose any sense of this if Switzerland did not withdraw its application to join the EU. Ultimately, the application was ‘frozen’, but retained so-called ‘strategic objectives’ (as a long-term goal) by the government, despite Swiss public opinion remaining sceptical about EU membership. With regards to the second set of bilateral agreements with the EU, initiated in 2002 and concluded in May 2004, the SVP instead displayed a far more clear-cut opposition, in part due to the less exclusively economic nature of the new agreements. The main reason for rejection principally concerned the acceptance of the Schengen Agreement (which abolishes border controls between EU member states) and the Dublin Treaty (a control system regulating access to political asylum), both considered a serious attack on Swiss ‘security, freedom and tradition’.20 Finally, the SVP also opposes the extension of the free circulation of people from new EU member states countries of Eastern Europe due to the risk of an excessive inﬂux of immigrants. However, because of the new position of Christoph Blocher as the head of the Federal Department of Justice and Police, and the fact that he has the governmental responsibility for this dossier, the referendum on the Schengen Agreement was not an easy campaign for the SVP. Indeed, the Schengen and Dublin treaties were supported in referendums by a majority of Swiss citizens in June 2005. The United Nations Alongside the European question, the UN is the second most important international political issue over which the SVP is at odds with the government and other principal centre-right and left-wing parties. The defence of national integrity is by no means a new theme for the SVP; it is instead an integral element of its history, at least 20 Schweizerische Volkspartei (2003a), Für eine eigenständige Aussenpolitik. Positionpapier der SVP Schweiz.

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from the foundation of the party through to the early 1970s. Around the mid-1980s, against all other parties, the SVP argued for the defence of Swiss neutrality and fought against the joining of the UN; those arguments allowed the party to defeat, in the following 1986 referendum, the position taken by the Federal Council. However, opposition to international and supranational political integration assumed a new, more central meaning in the 1990s. Even before the end of the Cold War, the Swiss government had put forward plans for strengthening its ties with the UN, in which Switzerland occupied an observer position since 1948. Switzerland was also already a member of all the UN’s specialist organizations (the United Nations Children’s Fund; the United Nations Educational, Scientiﬁc and Cultural Organisation; the Food and Agriculture Organization and others) and numerous funds, programmes and institutes. As we have seen, the 1986 referendum on joining the UN resulted in a defeat for the government and the majority of Swiss parties, and the SVP, which for the ﬁrst time took an opposing line to the ofﬁcial foreign policy, came out victorious. The SVP did not reject joining a host of organizations associated with the UN, but viewed joining the organization itself as a loss of the recognition of Switzerland’s neutrality and independence. On this occasion Christoph Blocher was already in the opposition front line. In 2002, there was yet another vote regarding Switzerland joining the UN, but this time the international climate was quite different. The new vote was not a governmental promotion, but the result of an initiative launched in 1998 by a number of ﬁgures from various parties and this time 54.5 per cent of the voters accepted Swiss membership of the UN. Once again, however, the SVP was the sole governmental party to oppose joining it and ran a very polarized campaign with the AUNS. The arguments were familiar: joining a supranational political organization implies the surrendering of a part of national sovereignty to a higher body and contradicts the Swiss policy of neutrality. The Swiss army and missions abroad During the 1990s and the ﬁrst years of the new millennium, the SVP again distinguished itself from the governmental majority, and in particular the centre and centre-right parties, the Christian-Democratic Party (Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei, CVP) and the Liberal Democratic Party (Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei, FDP), regarding questions of national security. One important issue focused on the new ofﬁcial government policy allowing the intervention of Swiss military forces abroad, a clear break from the army’s traditional domestic-only role. Shifting to a more active security policy in terms of international collaboration, in the early 1990s the Swiss government was already proposing to form a contingent of Blue Helmets for the UN and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In 1994, in the context of the referendums launched by committees from both the left and right, the SVP took the leading role in the opposition to the government. This vote was to have the same importance to Swiss foreign policy as the referendum on the EEA in 1992. The new vote was an important test of the strength of the political opposition to the Federal Council’s new policy of openness and collaboration. Once again, the SVP’s argument, organized around Blocher, was that the deployment of troops abroad was contrary to the principle of neutrality,

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and that the creation of a contingent of Blue Helmets conﬂicted with the popular rejection of the government’s proposal to join the UN in 1986. In the face of the evolving international situation, the Federal Council and the majority of the parties proposed a modiﬁcation to federal legislation concerning the army in order to allow its participation in international peacekeeping missions. The legislation would allow for the possibility of arming Swiss troops serving abroad and permitting the conclusion of international conventions for cooperation with regards to military training. A referendum was to be called against this proposed legislation, with its principal promoters being of course the SVP and the AUNS as well as some parts of left-wing parties and organizations, which considered the referendum to be antithetical to the safeguarding of the neutrality and independence of Switzerland and an indirect way of bringing Switzerland closer to NATO, with the risk that Swiss citizens would be sacriﬁced in the defence of foreign interests. In contrast to the 1994 ‘no’ vote on the Blue Helmets, in 2001 this reform of federal legislation concerning the army narrowly passed, with 51 per cent of voters in favour. At the same time, with regards to the army’s internal structure, the SVP assumes an ambivalent attitude towards the new government policy. Until the 1980s, the Swiss militia army had constituted a real nation-at-arms in terms of the number of men involved (650,000 – around 10 per cent of the population). The Swiss army had been considered as the bastion of armed and permanent neutrality, performing a training role for every Swiss citizen called up for service between 20 and 40 years of age.21 The majority of the centre-right parties had also always stood together in parliament to vote in favour of support for the army. In the 1990s and 2000s, as in other Western countries, Switzerland has been confronted by the declining legitimization of the mass conscription.22 In this case, the SVP’s rhetoric reﬂects the difﬁculty of managing economic liberalism (especially the need to reduce public sector expenditure) and national integrity arguments. This party tries to avoid any systematic opposition to internal reforms of the Swiss army when the principle of the militia army (obligatory conscription) is formally safeguarded. The federal government’s new policy was not rejected outright by the SVP. For example, the SVP did not oppose the reform voted in 2003 (‘Army XXI’), that signiﬁcantly reduced the resources and forces assigned to the army. In both the parliamentary and referendum phases, the SVP took care to emphasize that the reform should not concern the militia army and that the reform itself should not become a pretext for joining NATO. In contrast to marginal oppositions to the reform, coming above all from the ranks of the army itself, the SVP also accepted a signiﬁcant numerical reduction of military personnel in the army, citing ﬁrst and foremost ﬁnancial concerns. In the reforms of the army, called ‘1995’ and ‘XXI’, the SVP formed in the parliament an alliance with the centre-right, in order to counter the 21 Frevert, U. (ed.) (1997), Militär und Gesellschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta). 22 Haltiner, K.W. and Kühner, A. (eds.) (1999), Wehrpﬂicht und Miliz. Ende einer Epoche? (Baden-Baden: Nomos.); Haltiner, K.W. (2002b), ‘The Decline of the European Mass Armies’, in Caforio, G. (ed.), Handbook of the Sociology of the Military (New York: Kluver Academic/Plenum Publishers), pp. 351–74.

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positions of the left, which was calling for a more drastic reduction in the resources allocated to the army. Nevertheless, as soon as reforms seem to reduce the national and ‘spiritual’ role of the Swiss army, the SVP goes back to its traditional oppositional point of view. In fact, more recently the SVP revised its position on the ‘XXI’ army reform. In contrast to its previous support, the party, in particular the party delegates, decided in October 2004 to oppose the Federal Defence Department, under the direction of Samuel Schmid, the second SVP member of the Swiss government. The principal arguments of the party are that the development of this reform implies in reality the abandonment of the compulsory conscription as a key element of Swiss identity.23 Swiss pride and the Second World War With regard to the defence of national integrity, it is important to consider the political use of the Swiss history. The SVP has strongly exploited in many ways the symbolic power of neutrality, as a reference to a fatherland that is proud of itself and its past, both in economic and political terms. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that actions taken against the weakening of Switzerland’s international credibility and the role it assumed during the Second World War has become part of the political agenda of the ‘new’ SVP. From 1945 to the end of the Cold War, the dominant historical image of Switzerland during the Second World War was that of a country that succeeded in defending its own frontiers thanks to the abstention of its armed forces and its recognized neutrality. Furthermore, in accordance with a long tradition, Switzerland did its utmost to welcome exiles ﬂeeing from Nazi and Fascist repression. However, this image of the role played by Switzerland has been severely tested during the 1990s. In 1995, the report by the American Secretary of State, Stuart Eizenstat, and then the report by Swiss historians, coordinated by Jean-François Bergier and commissioned by the Swiss government, underlined how Swiss banks had appropriated assets deposited by Jews subsequently deported to concentration camps, and that the Swiss government itself took part in discrimination against the Jews in accordance with the Nazi authorities, expelling exiles in search of refuge. The resulting international controversy, led by the government of the United States and the Jewish community, has also divided Swiss public opinion. The SVP has been the party that has done the most to put itself forward as the defender of the traditional positive image of Switzerland, drawing on injured national pride.24 The SVP has accused the Swiss government of excessive weakness (in 1995 the President of the Confederation apologized to the international community), but at the same time, it has also played on a certain level of anti-Americanism, 23 Schweizerische Volkspartei (2004), Pour une armée adaptée à la ménace. Document de fond sur l’armée. 24 Kriesi, H. (2002), ‘Politische Folgen nationaler Identität. Das Beispiel der Eidgenössischen Wahlen von 1999’, in Bosshart-Pﬂuger, C., Jung, J. and Metzger, F. (eds.), Nation und Nationalismus in Europa. Kulturelle Konstruktion von Identitäten. Festschrift für Altermatt (Frauenfeld: Huber & Co.), pp. 565–87.

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which derives from the superpower’s policy of domination with regards to smaller countries, and which is very openly displayed by many of the leading ﬁgures within the SVP. In 2002, in fact, on the initiative of the SVP, a vote was held with the objective to impede efforts to partially transfer gold proﬁt held by the Swiss National Bank that would be partially devoted to the Swiss Solidarity Foundation (designed to ﬁght poverty in accordance with the Swiss humanitarian tradition). This proposal was originally crafted by the Federal Council in response to criticism from abroad. The SVP’s initiative was rejected (albeit with only 52 per cent of the votes being against it), but not even the counter-proposal of the Federal Council (a referendum in response to the initiative) was accepted. In effect, the SVP succeeded in preventing funding for the Swiss Solidarity Foundation, and it conﬁrmed the existence of deep wounds that still divide Swiss public opinion over the country’s role during the Second World War. Between Nationalism, Neo-Liberalism and the Pragmatic Way The direction taken by the SVP, particularly beginning in the second half of the 1990s, did not go systematically head-to-head against the proposals of the Federal Council regarding foreign policy issues (for example, adhesion to the UN convention on racism). On the one hand, SVP opposition focused on every piece of legislation or project that implied any form of Swiss integration with a supranational political organization and the weakening of traditional neutrality and independence of the country. On the other hand, the SVP has demonstrated ostensibly pragmatic behaviour, which could be perhaps explained by its traditional role in the Swiss coalition government as the holder of the ambivalent position (between opposition and responsibility), and the heterogeneous interests of its supporters. The SVP must manage the interests of the old agrarian electorate, as well as the concerns of the increasing urban working-class vote.25 Furthermore, the SVP aims to become the representative party of the sizeable Swiss business class and try to respond to their interests as well. In order to understand the SVP’s positions concerning foreign and security issues, it is also important to place its arguments in the context of the SVP’s ideology, which not only includes a nationalist ideology and an anti-establishment critique, but also a neo-liberal claim. The neo-liberalist dimension is characterized by a blend of free trade and protectionism that focuses on the cost of supranational political integration from the point of view of Swiss economic interests. If this neo-liberalism is an expression of this ideological radicalization of this party in the 1990s, this point of view does not break deeply with Swiss legacy in economic policy. Actually, in contrast to its generally insular foreign policy, Switzerland has demonstrated an extremely high degree of international openness with regards to economic relations, having one of the world’s most open and dynamic ﬁnancial and banking markets and an ofﬁcial government policy based on free trade and the development of a global export

25 Mazzoleni, O. (2003), Nationalisme et populisme en Suisse. La radicalisation de la ‘nouvelle’ UDC (Lausanne: Presses polytechniques et universitaires romandes), pp. 97ff.

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economy, beginning as early as the start of the twentieth century.26 For the SVP, this ﬁnancial and economic openness is the truest source of material well-being after the 1950s. In this sense, right-wing radicalization at an economic level within the SVP is a reevaluation of the Swiss Sonderfall, which concerns not only the exceptionality of its founding principles (neutrality, federalism and direct democracy), but also the singularity of its economical success. Above all, the SVP exploits the fact that national neutrality and independence have since the Second World War been associated with a period of economic security – Switzerland became one of the world’s richest countries during this period. However, in the 1990s, the ofﬁcial change in foreign policy and the decline in neutrality that followed were paralleled by the deepest economic crisis to strike Switzerland since the 1930s. It is no coincidence that the working class and people with lower levels of education are over-represented in the SVP electorate in comparison with the main Swiss parties.27 Today, the new agenda of the SVP tries to respond to the demands of the new (middle- and especially working-class) and the old electorate (farmers). The priority of the 2003–2007 electoral programme of the SVP is the ‘defence of the interests of Switzerland and its economy within world trade’.28 Contrary to other European radical right-wing parties, such as the French Front National, the SVP does not criticize the globalization of the economy and its international institutions. On the contrary, the SVP was in favour of Switzerland joining the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO), even though it criticized potential negative effects on Swiss agricultural policy. The SVP believes that a Swiss foreign policy based on political independence is the best way of defending the economic interests of the country in multilateral negotiations and supranational economic cooperation ventures, while at the same time remaining faithful to the tradition of Swiss economic openness. Conclusions In this essay we have attempted to illustrate the role of the foreign and security issues in the rising success of the Swiss People’s Party. Various reasons helped the SVP become the major Swiss political party between the 1990s and 2000s. In this article we emphasize the SVP’s capacity to capitalize on widespread difﬁdence existing among Swiss citizens with regards to any form of international or supranational integration. The SVP did not only exploit the opportunities offered by the institutions of direct democracy, but also the Swiss people’s traditional attachment to neutrality 26 Bairoch, P. (1990), ‘La Suisse dans le contexte international aux XIXe et XXe siècles’, in Bairoch, P. and Körner, M. (eds.), La Suisse dans l’économie mondiale (Genève: Droz), pp. 103–40. 27 Selb, P. and Lachat, R. (2004), Wahlen 2003 (Zürich: Institut für Politikwissenschaft); Mazzoleni, O., Masulin, M. and Péchu C. (2005), ‘Dimensions socio-professionnelles et explication du vote en faveur de l’union démocratique du centre en Suisse’, Revue Française de science politique, 55(5), pp. 663–89. 28 ‘Schweizerische Volkspartei (2003b), Wahlplattform’ (2003) Bis., 2007, p. 43.

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and political independence – two elements that profoundly inﬂuence Swiss national identity. Almost all important changes introduced in Swiss foreign and national security policy after the fall of the Berlin Wall have, in fact, been subjected to popular referendums. The SVP was unable to block the new policy of international cooperation promoted by the government and the principal Swiss parties, but it did manage to put a brake on the stipulation of various agreements, in particular with the UN and the EU regarding cooperation of military and security ventures, as in the case of the Swiss Solidarity Foundation. At the same time, this consensus in direct democracy has been strongly decisive for the SVP’s electoral success, which permitted the SVP to inﬂuence Swiss foreign and security policies in a direct way. Since the early 1990s, the ‘new’ SVP’s political agenda is focused on the defence of the Swiss Sonderfall; that is to say, Switzerland’s ‘special case’ status with regards to foreign policy based on political independence. At the same time, the SVP strives to conﬁrm the traditional role assumed by Switzerland in the realm of international diplomatic dialogue, offering its services to countries in conﬂict and being open towards the rest of the world in commercial and ﬁnancial terms. The SVP advocates for a return to the ‘integral neutrality’ of Switzerland, attributing to the concept of neutrality a signiﬁcant role in the constitution of the national identity, rejecting any form of integration within a supranational or international political organization such as the EU or the UN. The SVP’s defence of the Sonderfall is also associated with the economic success achieved by Switzerland after the Second World War. In fact, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the acceleration of European integration coincided with a deep socioeconomic crisis in Switzerland (increasing unemployment, and so on). Nevertheless, in some issues, especially security and economic topics, neo-liberal perspectives and pragmatic ways seem to prevail. Although the army also plays a symbolic role in representing Swiss independence, the SVP is not categorically opposed to the reform of the Swiss army, even as it entails a reduction in resources for the military and a limited reduction of the universal conscription. Above all, the SVP isn’t an ‘anti-globalization’ party. Actually, it doesn’t reject the international treaties of economic and commercial nature, so long as they do not compromise Swiss political sovereignty (as in the case of the ﬁrst bilateral agreements with the EU or adhesion to the WTO). Despite the greater governmental co-responsibility it has taken on since 2003, the SVP hasn’t abandoned the use of direct democracy as a weapon of opposition. Since its national leader Christoph Blocher has been elected as a member of the national government, the anti-establishment role played by the party has become more difﬁcult, even though its ability to delay Switzerland’s policy of European integration, and to use it for its electoral advance, does not appear to have been weakened.

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Acronyms AUNS CSCE EEA EU NATO ECD OEEC SVP UN WTO

Campaign for an Independent and Neutral Switzerland Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe European Economic Area European Union North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Organisation for European Economic Co-operation Schweizerische Volkspartei (Swiss People’s Party) United Nations World Trade Organization

References ––– (2003b), ‘Wahlplattform’ 2003 Bis., 2007. ––– (2004), ‘Pour une armée adaptée à la ménace’. Document de fond sur l’armée. Aggestam, L. (1999), ‘Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy’, Arena Working Papers no. 8 (Oslo: Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo). Altermatt, U. (1992), ‘Vom Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges bis zum Gegenwart (1945–1991)’ in Riklin, Haug and Probst (eds.). Bairoch, P. (1990), ‘La Suisse dans le contexte international aux XIXe et XXe siècles’ in Bairoch and Körner (eds.). Bairoch, P. and Körner, M., (eds.) (1990), La Suisse dans l’économie mondiale (Genève: Droz). Betz, H.-G. (2004), La droite populiste en Europe. Extrême et démocrate? (Paris: Autrement Books). Blocher, C. (2000), Die Seiben Geheimnisse der SVP. 12. Albisgüetli-Tagung der Schweizerischen Volkspartei des Kantons Zürich. ––– (2003), Dialog mit Abwesenden Eine Rede in Zitaten: An ihren Worten sollt ihr ihre Taten messen, 15. Albisgüetli-Tagung der Schweizerischen Volkspartei des Kantons Zürich. ––– (2004), Die bürgerliche Wende vollziehen, 16. Albisgüetli-Tagung der Schweizerischen Volkspartei des Kantons Zürich. Bosshart-Pﬂuger, C., Jung, J. and Metzger, F., (eds.) (2002), Nation und Nationalismus in Europa. Kulturelle Konstruktion von Identitäten Festschrift für Altermatt (Frauenfeld: Huber & Co.). Brunner, E. and Sciarini, P. (2002), ‘L’opposition ouverture-traditions’ in Hug and Sciarini (eds.). Butler, D. and Ranney, A., (eds.) (1994), Referendums around the World: the Growing Use of Direct Democracy (Basingstoke: Macmillan Publishing). Caforio, G., (ed.) (2002), Handbook of the Sociology of the Military (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers).

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Cederman, L.E., (ed.) (2000), Constructing Europe’s Identity: the External Dimension (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers). Conseil Fédéral (1993), Rapport sur la Politique extérieure de la Suisse dans les années 1990 (Bern). Daalder, H., (ed.) (1987), Party Systems in Denmark, Austria, Switzerland, The Netherlands and Belgium (London: Frances Pinter). Decker, F. (2004), Der neue Rechtspopulismus (Opladen: Leske + Budrich Books). Du Bois, P. (1992), La Suisse et l’espace économique européen (Lausanne: L’Âge d’Homme). Frevert, U., (ed.) (1997), Militär und Gesellschaft Im 19. Und 20. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta). Gabriel, J.M. (2001), ‘Neutralität für den Notfall: Der Bericht des Bundesrats zur Aussenpolitik der Schweiz in den 90er Jahren’, Swiss Political Science Review, 2–3, pp. 161–190. Goetschel, L., Bernath, M. and Schwarz, D. (2002), Schweizerische Aussenpolitik (Zürich: NZZ Verlag). Haltiner, K.W. (2002a), ‘Tradition as a Political Value, The Public Image of Security, Defence and the Military in Switzerland’, Paper presented at the 5th International Security Forum (ISF), 14–16 October, Zurich. ––– (2002b), ‘The Decline of the European Mass Armies’ in Caforio (ed.). Haltiner, K.W. and Kühner, A., (eds.) (1999), Wehrpﬂicht und Miliz. Ende einer Epoche? (Baden-Baden: Nomos). Hug, S. (1994), ‘Les coalitions référendaires’ in Elites Politiques et peuple en Suisse. Analyse des votations fédérales, 1970–1987. Papadopoulos, Y. (ed.) (Lausanne: Réalités sociales), pp. 57–83. Hug, S. and Sciarini, P., (eds.) (2002), Changement de valeurs et nouveaux clivages politique en Suisse (Paris: L’Harmattan Books). Ibarra, P., (ed.) (2003), Social Movements and Democracy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Books). Kerr, H. (1987), ‘The Swiss Party System: Steadfast and Changing’ in Daalder (ed.), pp. 107–92. Kobi, S. (2000), Des citoyens Suisses contre l’élite politique: le cas des votations fédérales, 1979–1995 (Paris/Montréal: L’Harmattan Books). Kreis, G. (1992), ‘Von der Gründung des Bundesstates bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg (1848–1914)’ in Riklin, Haug and Probst (eds.). ––– (1995), Der Lange Weg des Staatsvertragsreferendums. Schweizerische Aussenpolitik zwischen indirekten und direkten Demokratie (Basel: Europa Publications Institut, University of Basel). Kriesi, H. (2002), ‘Politische Folgen nationaler Identität. Das Beispiel der Eidgenössischen Wahlen von 1999’ in Bosshart-Pﬂuger, Jung and Metzger (eds.). ––– (2003), ‘The Transformation of the National Political Space in a Globalizing World’ in Ibarra (ed.), pp. 195–210. Mazzoleni, O. (2003), Nationalisme et populisme en Suisse La Radicalisation de la ‘nouvelle’ UDC (Lausanne: Presses polytechniques et universitaires romandes).

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Mazzoleni, O., Masulin, M. and Péchu, C. (2005), ‘Dimensions Socio-professionnelles et explication du vote en faveur de l’union démocratique du centre en Suisse’, Revue Française de Science Politique, 55(5), pp. 663–689. Papadopoulos, Y. (1997), Les processus de décision fédéraux en Suisse (Paris: L’Harmattan). ––– (ed.) (1994), Elites Politiques et peuple en Suisse Analyse des votations fédérales. 1970–1987 (Lausanne: Réalités sociales). Poglia, M.F., Tondolo, R. and Schulteis, F. (2000), Socio-economic Change and Right-Wing Extremism in Switzerland (Neuchâtel: Université de NeuchâtelSIREN). Riklin, A. (1992), ‘Die Neutralität der Schweiz’ in Riklin, Haug and Probst (eds.). Riklin, A., Haug, H. and Probst, R., (eds.) (1992), Neues Handbuch der Schweizerischen Aussenpolitik (Bern/Stuttgart/Wien: Haupt). Schnarenberger, M. (1999), Vom Sonderall zum Normalfall. Ein Einführung in die Aussenpolitik der Schweiz (Zürich: Pro Helvetia). Schweizerische Volkspartei (2003a), Für eine eigenständige Aussenpolitik. Positionpapier der SVP Schweiz. Sciarini, P. and Marquis, L. (2000), ‘Opinion publique et politique extérieure, Le cas de la Suisse’, International Political Science Review, 2(21), pp. 149–171. [DOI: 10.1177/0192512100212003] Sciarini, P., Hug, S. and Dupont, C. (2000), ‘Example, Exception or Both?, Swiss National Identity in Perspective’, pp. 57–88 in Cederman (ed.). Selb, P. and Lachat, R. (2004), Wahlen 2003 (Zürich: Institut für Politikwissenschaft). Sidjanski, D. et al. (1975), Les Suisses et la politique Enquête sur les attitudes d’électeurs Suisses (1972) (Berne/Francfort: Lang). Skenderovic, D. (2006), ‘The Radical Right in Switzerland’, Continuity and Change, 1945–2000 (New York/Oxford: Berghahn). Tarrow, S. (1998), Power in Movement. Social Movements and Contentious Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Trechsel, A.H. (1995), Clivages en Suisse Analyse des impacts relatifs des clivages sur l’électorat suisse lors des élections fédérales (Genève: Département de Science politique, Université de Genève).

Chapter 12

Non Angeli, sed Angli:1 The Neo-Populist Foreign Policy of the ‘New’ BNP Roger Grifﬁn

Some Anomalies of ‘British Neo-Populism’ There is no British equivalent of France’s Front National, Austria’s Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ), Denmark’s Dansk Folkeparti or Belgium’s Vlaams Blok. Britain has a relatively new anti-immigration party on the scene, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), an anti-European Union (EU) movement with a very narrow political platform and so far no conspicuous aspirations to represent the forces of British neo-populism.2 And of course there is always the British National Party (BNP). But despite its concerted bid since Nick Grifﬁn took over as leader in 1 A pun on the famous phrase by Pope Gregory who, in the sixth century, ﬁrst witnessed blonde-haired, blue-eyed boys awaiting sale in a Roman slave market. The Romans enslaved thousands of white inhabitants of Great Britain, who were also known as Angles. Pope Gregory was very interested in the looks of these boys therefore asking their origin. He was told they were Angles from Briton. Gregory stated, ‘Non Angli, sed Angeli’ (not Angles, but Angels). Anglo-Saxon Heathen Heritage (extreme right-wing website), , accessed 29 June 2004. 2 I should explain that, consistent with the way it is being used in this volume of essays, ‘neo-populism’ (also known as ‘radical right-wing populism’, ‘national populism’, or ‘the new populism’) is to be understood here as referring to the complex of political attitudes which ﬁnds electoral expression in such parties as Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Front National and Jörg Haider’s Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, and which has been the subject of extensive comparative research by such scholars as Hans-Georg Betz, Herbert Kitschelt, Paul Taggart and Cas Mudde as a contemporary manifestation of right-wing extremism. Neo-populist parties do not have the monopoly of ethnocentrism, ethno-regionalism, or xenophobia, however, for it is also a deﬁning feature of fascist and neo-fascist parties, and can be hosted by conservative, liberal and socialist parties operating well within the spectrum of parliamentary politics. I have thus coined ‘civic neo-populism’ to denote a radical, and hence, in terms of ethos, illiberal rejection of multiculturalism which paradoxically combines a fear of mass immigration with a reluctance to vote for overtly extreme (for example, Nazi) forms of white supremacy. Its natural or logical outlet would be votes for a fascist or populist party, but in Britain it tends instead to be currently expressed in xenophobic, ‘white chauvinist’ responses to issues of race, identity, and immigration externalized within the mainstream news media and catered to a varying degree by traditional centrist parties.

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1999 to emulate the relatively high public proﬁle and populist acceptability of Le Pen’s movement in France, the BNP remains at heart a highly marginalized factor in British politics with a persistent neo-Nazi legacy,3 and thus does not really belong in this volume. Nevertheless, in the same way as much can be gleaned about the nature and image of inter-war fascism by examining how reactionary authoritarian regimes such as Franco’s Spain set about appearing fascist, so it can hopefully contribute to the synoptic picture of neo-populist foreign policy to consider the policies adopted by the ‘new’ BNP now that it is attempting with some marginal success to sell itself to the electorate as a ‘modern’ neo-populist party. Before we do this, several anomalies in the political culture in which BNP is projecting its new identity need clariﬁcation. These are the ambiguity of the term ‘British’ in the context of identity politics in the United Kingdom; the British phenomenon of ‘civic neo-populism’; the ambiguous relationship of the UKIP to the extreme right; and the drive to reposition the BNP in relation to Nazism and neo-populism that has characterized the leadership of Nick Grifﬁn. The ﬁrst point relates to the fact that, despite a subliminal tendency for the English (perhaps as a legacy of their colonial past) to identify ‘Britain’ with ‘England’, the ‘United Kingdom’ hosts four quite distinct historically forged nationalities identities, each containing numerous identities shaped by diverse historical, religious, social, and ethnic factors. In the context of the contemporary far right this is important because, though Oswald Mosley’s movement called itself the British Union of Fascists, it gained minimal support outside England and approached politics from a resolutely Anglocentric perspective, a tradition perpetuated by today’s British National Party, despite its use of the Union Jack rather than the ﬂag of St. George and its efforts to establish itself in Wales and Scotland. It would thus be more appropriate to refer to English rather than British fascism. If anything this is even more the case today than in the inter-war period. Since the war Northern Ireland has continued to host powerful forms of identity politics based on sectarian religious divisions and conﬂicting perceptions of the histories of Ireland and Britain, while Welsh and Scottish nationalisms and regionalisms have found expression in parties dedicated to defend their interests against English hegemony, both of which have small extremist fringes demanding something more radical than devolution in the form of national assemblies or parliaments can offer. Moreover, Catholic, Scottish, and Welsh ethnocentrism is directed as much against the English as against foreigners from outside Britain, and both Welsh and Scottish nationalisms contain strong proEU factions who look to Brussels and Strasbourg for protection of the interests of smaller nations against the hegemony of bigger ones, a stance that precludes the emergence there of neo-populism in its continental permutations. Outside England the political space for extremist forms of identity politics based on the defence of Britishness as such is therefore minimal. It is revealing that Nigel Copsey’s excellent study of extreme right-wing politics, Contemporary British 3 The Nazi credentials of the ‘old’ BNP are clear from its previous leader’s book – Tyndall, J. (1988), The Eleventh Hour: A Call for British Rebirth (Welling: Albion Press) – which fully bore out Nigel Copsey’s 1994 analysis of its world-view in his article ‘Fascism: the Ideology of the British National Party’, Politics 14(3), pp. 101–8.

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4

Fascism, contains no reference to ultra-nationalist politics beyond England: its real subject is the evolution of the BNP, a variant of fascism upholding an essentially Anglocentric vision of a powerful Britain. It should thus be made clear that this article sets out to clarify the state of English, and not British, neo-populism. Those interested in what is going on in the rest of the British Isles should consult specialist works dealing with racism, separatism, and identity politics in the other three constituent parts of the United Kingdom. ‘Civic neo-populism’ Even when the focus is limited to English neo-populism, the task of investigating its policies is far less straightforward than it would be to study them in many other European countries. Though Britain has no major neo-populist party, it hosts signiﬁcant neo-populist forces in the form of widely held ethnocentric and xenophobic attitudes5 to what one expert considers the constitutive issues of contemporary extreme right-wing politics in Europe, namely ‘immigration, nation, security, unemployment, culture, anti-communism, globalization, Europe, corruption, moral questions, and identity’.6 However, rather than manifesting themselves through formal organizations in political space, such attitudes are generally expressed in the social or civic space, namely on the pages of some mass circulation newspapers, through institutional racism in labour market and state institutions, and, perhaps most importantly of all, through the racial stereotyping and prejudice expressed in people’s everyday behaviour. Once this aspect of society is taken into account, there is little scientiﬁc evidence to suggest that Britain’s ‘civic neo-populism’, namely the culture of ethnocentrism and xenophobia within civic society that underpins organized political racism and extremism, is any weaker in England than it is in France, Austria, Denmark, or Belgium, despite the absence of Le Pen-style political neo-populism in Britain and the persistent self-image of Britain as a multicultural society committed to moderation and tolerance. In fact, the widely-held assumption of British exceptionalism within a Europe rife with currents of extreme Right and neo-populist xenophobia does not bear close scrutiny,7 a point highlighted by The Report of the Commission on the

4 Copsey, N. (2004), Contemporary British Fascism (London: Palgrave). I would like to thank Nigel Copsey for his helpful comments on the ﬁrst draft of this chapter. 5 Grifﬁn, R. (2001), ‘“No Racism, Thanks, we’re British”. How “Right-wing Populism” Manifests Itself in Contemporary Britain’, in Eisman, W. (ed.), Rechtspopulismus in Europa. Analysen und Handlungsperspektiven (Graz: Czernin-Verlages), pp. 90–111. This chapter was based on a paper presented at an international conference on neo-populism held in Graz in March 2001 in the wake of the international outrage unleashed after the successes of Haider’s party in Austria’s general election enabled the FPÖ to form part of the coalition government (the English draft of this chapter is available on request to rdgrifﬁ[email protected]). 6 Hainsworth, P. (2000), editorial introduction to The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream (London: Pinter), p. 14. 7 See Favell, A. (2000), ‘Multi-ethnic Britain: An Exception in Europe?’, Patterns of Prejudice 35(1) (special issue on multiculturalism and citizenship).

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Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain,8 as well as by the Steven Lawrence Inquiry and the subsequent reports on the implementation of the action plan that resulted from it.9 One manifestation of this peculiarly English form of ‘apolitical’ racism is offered by the displays of public outrage regularly triggered by proposals to site reception centres for asylum seekers near residential areas. One example is the successful campaign organized by the small south coast town, Lee-on-the-Solent, in 2003 to prevent the opening of such a reception centre, the subject of a documentary shown on the Channel 4 television network in 2004.10 The fear, hatred, and prejudice displayed by the protesters were at one point intercut with an interview in which one of the asylum seekers at the centre of the furore recounted the heart-rending personal tragedies that had driven him into exile. The programme’s effect was to graphically evoke the existence of a ‘silent majority’ of normal, law-abiding British citizens who would never consciously associate themselves with racism, let alone vote for the BNP, yet who feel their whole way of life and identity under threat at the prospect of having a few hundred asylum seekers temporarily housed in their midst. The documentary showed that once a sense of communal threat or ‘siege mentality’ develops in such a situation, the famed liberalism and tolerance of ‘Middle England’ can be weakened even in the absence of an established neo-Nazi or neo-populist subculture and of the socioeconomic deprivations and ethnic tensions that are widely assumed to be its preconditions. Further manifestations of this apolitical neo-populism ﬁll Britain’s so-called ‘tabloid press’. One chance for The Sun to broadcast its xenophobia was unwittingly provided by Tony Blair in March 2001 when, at the height of the Foot and Mouth epidemic that was threatening to devastate the tourist industry, he hastened to reassure the world that Britain was still ‘open’. The columnist Richard Littlejohn seized this opportunity to run an article with the title ‘Visiting this country? How you can help yourself?’ It parodied the Prime Minister’s speech as an attempt to reassure potential asylum seekers abroad that the ‘lucrative bogus asylum industry’ in which ‘the Government invests billions of pounds a year’ was still open for business as usual.11 More recently the front-page headline of The Sun read ‘Swan Bake’, followed by 8 The Report was published by the Runnymede Trust in July 2000, the result of two years of research and deliberation by 23 experts. It subsequently appeared in book form as The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain. The Parekh Report (London: Proﬁle Books, 2001). For further information see the Trust’s website at <www.runnymedetrust.org/projects/meb/report.html>, accessed 29 June 2004. 9 A vast amount of literature on British racism generated by the Steven Lawrence Inquiry, a major investigation into the British police’s mishandling of a racially motivated murder due partly to institutional racism, is available on the web. See, for example, , accessed 9 November 2004, or , accessed 9 September 2004. 10 The programme Keep Them Out was shown on 6 May 2004 in Channel 4 Dispatches series. See , accessed 29 June 2004. 11 Littlejohn, R. (2001), ‘Visiting this country? How you can help yourself?’, The Sun, 30 March, p. 11.

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an article claiming that a police raid on a group of East Europeans had revealed that ‘Callous asylum seekers are barbecuing the Queen’s swans’.12 There had been no such raid and the story was fabricated. Both articles would not be out of place in the newspaper of a neo-populist party, but instead they appeared as a manifestation of urban myth originating in a realm of national consciousness separate from partypolitics. Another important factor that allows civic neo-populism to thrive in Britain without being articulated and mobilized by a major neo-populist party is the effectiveness with which xenophobic and racist anxieties concerning mass migration and national identity have been extensively catered to politically by mainstream parties that claim the political middle ground. Both the Conservative and Labour parties boast a long tradition of appealing to the patriotic reﬂexes and insular instincts of the British, and the core membership of both contain strong anti-EU factions that are predisposed to be belligerently opposed to mass immigration, whether legal or illegal. Moreover, since the 1980s both parties have in practice, whatever their rhetoric, gone to great lengths to reduce the inﬂux of citizens from non-European countries to a minimum, to curb the ﬂow of asylum seekers, and to be perceived as ‘ﬁrm’ on immigration issues.13 The suspicion that strong currents of civic neo-populism course through the veins of English national life was conﬁrmed by an opinion poll by the Daily Express in August 1995 which suggested 9 per cent of the populace would vote for a Le Pen-type party and another 17 per cent would consider doing so.14 These are ﬁgures which, if turned into electoral results in a voting system based on proportional representation, would place England alongside France, Belgium, Austria, and Denmark in terms of neo-populism. Clearly such polls are difﬁcult to interpret, but it is signiﬁcant that Roger Eatwell, a leading psephologist and expert on the contemporary far Right in Britain, ended his 2000 article ‘The Extreme Right and British Exceptionalism’ with the observation that ‘the potential for a British Le Pen-type party has never been greater’. However, the anomalous nature of Britain’s relationship to both extremism and neo-populism was underlined when he added, ‘especially if it emerges from the Conservatives rather than the ranks of British fascism’.15

12 The Sun, 4 July 2003. For comment on this and other examples of ‘civic’ xenophobia in the British press that year see the anti-racist website ‘Tabloids and Asylum Seekers (2003)’, . 13 Considerable empirical evidence for this assertion is provided in Spencer, I.R.G. (1997), British Immigration Policy since 1939 (London: Routledge), on the basis of which he argues, according to the publicity blurb for the book, that ‘Britain became a multi-racial society despite, rather than because of the policies of both Labour and Conservative governments’ (publisher’s summary). 14 See Eatwell, R., ‘The Extreme Right and British Exceptionalism’ in Hainsworth (2000), op. cit., p. 186. 15 Ibid., p. 190.

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UKIP and Neo-Populism Roger Eatwell’s article makes only a ﬂeeting reference to UKIP, which in the European parliamentary elections of 1999, the ﬁrst in Britain to be based on proportional representation, had obtained a mere 7 per cent (still seven times the vote for the BNP). Nevertheless, its rise to prominence since seems to bear out his prediction. UKIP was founded in 1993, not by ‘moderate’ fascists, but by members of the hard-line anti-EU faction within the Conservatives who saw their party adopting an increasingly conciliatory attitude toward Brussels after the political demise of Margaret Thatcher. By the early 2000s it was starting to lose its single-issue party status and began to pose a serious challenge to an ailing Conservative Party in some constituencies, despite Britain’s ‘ﬁrst-past-the post’ system that is traditionally assumed to act as a barrier to the rise of extremist and single-issue parties. Then, in the European elections of June 2004, UKIP came in third in the national poll, scoring 16.1 per cent of the vote, which ironically placed this anti-EU party in the position to send 12 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to Brussels. By contrast, the BNP, which had ﬁelded 22 candidates and looked forward to the elections as their chance for a major breakthrough, failed to gain a single seat.16 UKIP’s spectacular performance was described by The Telegraph as potentially Britain’s ‘Pim Fortuyn moment’ − a reference to the neo-populist anti-immigrant party Lijst Pim Fortuyn in The Netherlands which, following the assassination of its leader, took second place in the country’s general election of 2002. Certainly, the BNP sees UKIP as a direct rival for at least part of its natural constituency capable of luring away potential BNP voters with its uncompromising anti-EU and anti-immigration policies. That an element of elective (or electoral) afﬁnity between the two parties does indeed exist is suggested by the fact that some UKIP members have backgrounds in the extreme right. For example, Aidan Rankin, UKIP electoral candidate and co-author of the party’s manifesto, was once a member of Third Way, a ‘moderate’ breakaway from the National Front (though he has since repudiated such views), and another candidate, Andrew Moffat, was once a National Front (NF) supporter with links to revisionist historian David Irving.17 In 16 The modern marginalization of the electoral extreme right in Britain is the perpetuation of a pattern already established in 1920s: Mosley’s British Union of Fascists (BUF) peaked at 45,000 members and, despite chasing the mirage of the imminent breakthrough to which so many minority movements fall prey, never won a single parliamentary seat. The BNP obtained 808,000 votes in recent Euro-elections (5 per cent), but won no seats and actually lost ground in some wards. Even if the UKIP undermined the BNP’s potential performance to some extent in these elections, its weakness as a political party is not conditioned solely by contingent factors, such as personalities, current affairs, rivals, and personalities. Rather it is structural, reﬂecting the perennial history of extremism in Britain since at least the Glorious Revolution of 1688 when liberalism and pluralism became an integral part of the British political culture, national sense of identity and collective ‘psyche’. 17 Not surprisingly, UKIP’s ﬁrm anti-Europe stance has attracted the attention of other members of the far right whose concept of putting ‘Britain First’ has more to do with the policies of Mosley’s BUF than concerns with British sovereignty. A fringe meeting held by UKIP at the Conservative Party Conference in Brighton in 2004 was attended by an associate

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addition, Alistair McConnachie, UKIP candidate and National Executive member, was exposed as a former Holocaust denier (although he was expelled from UKIP when this was discovered),18 and in 2004 another prominent UKIP member, John Brayshaw, turned out to have been working for the BNP. The most notorious case of two-timing, however, was that of Mark Deavin, a UKIP National Executive committee member who had completed his PhD at the London School of Economics where his supervisor had been Dr Alan Sked, leader of UKIP at the time. It also turned out Deavin was working in his spare time as a covert member of the BNP, and at one point exerted considerable inﬂuence on forward planning within the Grifﬁn camp as one of the party’s only intellectuals apart from Nick Grifﬁn himself. Deavin’s career as a BNP mole within UKIP was abruptly terminated in 1977 when Sked was played recordings of Deavin talking about UKIP to another ‘undercover agent,’ this time an investigative journalist sent by the BBC with a hidden camera to expose the BNP’s strategy to pose as a neo-populist party. At one point in the proceedings Deavin described the changed landscape in the wake of the imminent Labour victory in the general election in these terms: After the election, if Blair becomes the Prime Minister, the BNP will be the ofﬁcial opposition in the inner cities, in working class areas. The UKIP will be in opposition in the shires, the country areas, the middle class opposition. That party is serious opposition to us in Middle England, but, if we had the resources, we could tear it to pieces.19

The grounds for treating UKIP in a pan-European context as a genuine rival of the BNP20 and as a British variant of far-right neo-populism becomes stronger when it is realized just how much of its manifesto is concerned not with taking Britain out of the EU, but with wider issues of immigration. Its October 2004 manifesto calls on the British to defend three fundamental freedoms, one of which is ‘Freedom from Overcrowding’. In the elaboration of this policy we are told: With the fourth largest economy in world, the UK is a very attractive destination for people seeking a better life. The trouble is the UK is already full up. The average population density of England is twice that of Germany, four times that of the France, and twelve times that of the United States… In 2002 the government allowed another two hundred of David Irving, Lady Michelle Renouf, whose question to the speakers (who had just made hardline anti-immigration statements) included the assertion that multi-culturalism brought with it the risk that ‘we are at risk of becoming psychologically Judaic, like the US.’ Taylor (2004), ‘Migrating into UKIP’s territory’, Searchlight, no. 353, November, p. 16. 18 See , accessed on 29 June 2004. 19 ‘Nick Grifﬁn … The Sting. How Searchlight and the Cook Report ruined the Nazi backroom boys’ plans to dominate the British far right’, Searchlight, (June 1997). Also at , accessed 29 June 2004.. 20 Taylor (2004), op. cit., p. 15. Kate Taylor’s article argues that in the course of 2004 a symbiosis has occurred whereby the BNP hoped ‘to reinvent itself as “the only true and credible anti-EU political party”’, while ‘UKIP has had to address the issue of immigration more clearly’, leading it to make ‘a barrage of pronouncements in the past few months concerning the number of immigrants in the country’.

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Europe for the Europeans thousand people into the country, plus several thousand asylum seekers, many of whom are simply economic migrants living in our country illegally. This adds considerably to our problems, increasing social tensions and depriving poor third world countries of their brightest and best. We cannot sustain this increase which compares with a city the size of Cambridge coming into Britain every six months, or two million people over the next ten years.21

This is followed by the pledge that, once out of the EU, Britain will ‘regain control of our own borders’, which will involve applying a far more strict regime to limit economic immigration and asylum seeking. Moreover, in his brief spell as UKIP MEP Robert Kilroy-Silk promised the party would set a quota of 100,000 immigrants a year to Britain and withdraw from the Geneva Convention on refugees if it ever came to power.22 Such sentiments would not be out of place in the manifesto of a continental neopopulist party, and have a profound resonance with BNP articles on immigration, such as one which opened the ﬁrst issue of Freedom in January 2001 under the banner headline ‘How many more can we take?’23 Nevertheless, surveys of xenophobic party-politics in Europe such as The European Race Bulletin24 and Piero Ignazi’s Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe25 are surely right to omit UKIP from their stock-taking exercises. UKIP remains primarily a single-issue party driven by hostility to Britain’s membership of the EU and the loss of sovereignty that implies. It was frustration at its reluctance to become a full-ﬂedged ‘real’ party that caused its most high-proﬁle MEP, Robert Kilroy-Silk, to leave the UKIP group of MEPs in October 2004. Consistent with its origins in an anti-EU and anti-immigration faction of the Conservatives, UKIP’s ofﬁcial policy statements and the major speeches of its leaders lack the overt xenophobia and claims of being the guardians of a national identity against the effects of mass immigration that typify ‘genuine’ neo-populist parties abroad. This article can thus afford to leave UKIP to one side, though with one caveat. There is a clear link, even if it is one that has not yet been fully articulated in UKIP’s policy statements, between its concerns about the loss of British sovereignty due to EU membership and wider anxieties about the erosion of a mythic historical and allegedly homogeneous national identity. To that extent, the party has been campaigning with growing success in a political space that, if not coterminous with, certainly overlaps with the one in which neo-populist parties operate elsewhere in 21 See , accessed on 27 October 2004. 22 Taylor (2004), op. cit., p. 15. 23 Its ﬁrst paragraph read ‘Illegal immigration into European Union countries is soaring, and the new arrivals favour Britain as the softest touch of all. Illegal immigration into the EU has gone up more than ten times since 1993 and the ﬂood is getting stronger all the time’. The same page reproduces a cutting from an article published on 8 December 2000 in the Mirror (a mass-circulation tabloid) warning that ‘Britain is heading towards a majority black and ethnic population’. 24 See , accessed on 29 June 2004. 25 Ignazi, P. (2003), Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

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Europe, and in this sense the BNP are justiﬁed in seeing them as direct political rivals. In the unlikely case that UKIP can make the transition from a dual-issue pressure group to a full-ﬂedged multi-issue party, the underlying issue of defending Britain’s mythic national identity, and the concomitant need to preserve Britain’s historical legacy, cultural homogeneity, and national mission against the allegedly corrosive forces of multiculturalism and globalization, may well move to the forefront of its rhetoric and policies. By this point it would have developed genuine rather than feigned afﬁnities with a ‘Le Pen-type’ party in the way Eatwell suggests, which in turn would mean formulating a foreign policy that elaborates the implications of taking Britain out of the EU for the global spheres of trade, national security, and ecology. Such a development would not enable UKIP to mount a credible challenge for government, but might help pull both Conservative and Labour parties further to the right on issues of immigration and national sovereignty, one of the classic effects that the presence of neo-populists exert on mainstream politics. As an article on UKIP in Searchlight argues, ‘the Tory Party has made it clear that it will deal with the hardline approaches offered by the BNP and UKIP on Europe not by discrediting their stance but by echoing it.’26 The ‘Modernizing’ Ambitions of Nick Grifﬁn The ﬁnal piece of background needed to provide a context for the current BNP’s neo-populist foreign policy concerns the radical changes in its policies, discourse, and style brought about by Nick Grifﬁn, once a hard-line fascist,27 since taking over the party’s leadership in 1999. Under its founder, John Tyndall, the BNP had upheld an overtly neo-Nazi and resolutely Anglocentric vision of Britain’s future in the world which embodied the ‘little England’ mentality that had once led Ferenc Szálasi, leader of the Arrow Cross Party and eventually Head of the Hungarian puppet state under the Third Reich, to omit England from his ‘Hungarist’ vision of the new Europe since it was for him ‘a historical fact’ that England had never been part of Europe.28 What drives the recent transformation of its foreign policy is Grifﬁn’s deliberate bid to transform the party’s image from one widely (and correctly) identiﬁed with a neo-Nazi worldview to a neo-populist one based on what 26 Taylor (2004), op. cit., p. 15. 27 Nick Grifﬁn, Cambridge Law Graduate, joined of the National Front in the late 1970s, and eventually became its chairman, but after it had collapsed into warring factions after the election of Margaret Thatcher signalled its imminent demise, he also co-founded the anticapitalist International Third Position with Derek Holland. Later he was also responsible for an overtly racist article which led to a trial in the course of which he publicly denied the Holocaust as a historical fact. For a fascinating insider view of the diverse trajectories followed by the most ideologically committed National Front ideologues, see Southgate, T. (2002), ‘Transcending the beyond: From third position to national-anarchism’, Pravda (web newspaper), , also at , accessed 29 June 2004. 28 Szöllösi-Janze, M. (1989), Die Pfeilkreuzlerbewegung in Ungarn, (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag), p. 245.

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he called a ‘new, modernist [sic] nationalism’29 and an enthusiastically pro-European (but resolutely anti-EU) perspective on world events. It is a process comparable in some respects to the metamorphosis of the intransigently neo-Fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano into the Alleanza Nazionale (AN) in 1994–1995 under Gianfranco Fini,30 another young leader who cut his teeth in a radically fascist milieu31 before becoming a modernizing moderate. This renunciation of its Fascist past was a vital step towards enabling the AN to join Silvio Berlusconi’s coalition governments, and towards making it possible for Fini, one of Italy’s most articulate politicians, to be appointed Italy’s Deputy Prime Minister. What makes the attempt by the ‘new’ BNP to associate itself with neo-populists in Europe such a dramatic about face is the fact that Tyndall espoused a particularly narrow version of ethnocentrism that turned its back on Europe altogether. In doing so he was rejecting an important component of the post-war variant of English fascism pioneered by Oswald Mosley, at the heart of whose Union Movement lay the vision of ‘Europe a Nation’. Already in an essay entitled ‘The World Alternative’, published in 1936 in Britain (and in 1937 in the Nazi periodical Geopolitik), Mosley had promoted a new peace settlement for Europe that guaranteed each major power its own sphere of autonomy and hence, as he claimed in a subsequent essay, offered the prospect of a ‘united Europe’ that would have avoided war.32 Certainly, once the war was over, Mosley devoted enormous energy to promoting his vision for the creation of a Fortress Europe as a counterweight to the European Common Market in numerous speeches and publications, notably his newspaper The European (1953– 1959).33 Mosley also became a founder member of the European Social Movement ,formed at a meeting held in Malmö in May 1951. This pivotal event in the evolution of European fascism brought together prominent fascists from every West European country, including such prominent fascist internationalists as the French ideologues René Binet, Maurice Bardèche and the Swede Per Engdahl.

29 Grifﬁn, N. (2000), editorial in the ﬁrst issue of the BNP’s new newspaper, Identity, no. 1, January/February, p. 1. ‘Modernist’ is clearly a misnomer for ‘modern’, but eloquently signals the shift from neo-Nazi to neo-populist. 30 Grifﬁn, R. (1996), ‘The Post-fascism of the Alleanza Nazionale: A Case-study in Ideological Morphology’, Journal of Political Ideologies 1(2), pp. 123–46. 31 In the 1980s Fini was the leader of MSI’s hard-line Fronte della Gioventù or Youth Front. 32 Mosley, O. (1956), ‘European Socialism’, Nation Europa, May: ‘It is suggested that the leaders of Fascism and National Socialism, so late as the 1940’s had contemplated some form of European movement which would transcend nationalism. I will go further and recall from my own experience the very favourable reception they gave to my own advocacy of a united Europe in an article entitled in English ‘The World Alternative’, which was published in Germany by Geopolitik in 1937; so from my own experience I can conﬁrm and pre-date this event. Yet the sad fact remains, whatever the merits of the dispute or the justice of the cause, Europe was divided and temporarily destroyed shortly afterwards in a fratricidal war which had the narrowest of national origins!’ 33 Contemporary opponents of EU federalism are still prepared to invoke Mosley’s position: see .

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By contrast, John Tyndall’s variant of neo-Nazism deliberately rejected Mosley’s stance on Europe. We learn from his manifesto The Eleventh Hour: A Call for British Rebirth that after the Second World War he had been drawn to Mosley’s newly formed Union Movement. However, he confesses: On hearing of this “Europe a Nation” concept I was immediately put off. I had certainly come to believe that the policies of the pre-war gang of British leaders leading to the division of Europe and then to war had been disastrously wrong… and that a more enlightened foreign policy would have been directed towards achieving a state of European harmony which would have spared us the 1939–45 conﬂict at least in the West. Harmony among the nations of Europe remained, and still remains, a good thing. [ … ] But a single European Nation was, and is, out of the question, being wholly undesirable and not remotely possible.34

Tyndall’s subsequent path took him to the League of Empire Loyalists, and then to various milieux dominated by British variants of ‘Universal Nazism’,35 his own version of which he went to great lengths to inject into British fascist politics as editor of the racist magazine Spearhead and as party chairman of the NF and then the BNP. By the time Nick Grifﬁn had become Tyndall’s main contender to take over the BNP in the late 1990s, he had reached the conclusion that there was only one way to transform it into the major force in British politics it had failed to be ever since Tyndall helped form it in 1982. This was to give it a new identity as a neo-populist party. His plans to forge direct links with (and secure generous funding from) Le Pen’s Front National while retaining a hardcore neo-Nazi racist ideology under its new guise were revealed in an operation carried out in 1997 by the BBC’s investigative journalism programme The Cook Report,36 the same one that had revealed Mark Deavin. The BNP’s leader-in-waiting was thus subjected to the humiliating public exposure on prime-time national television of his scheme to turn the BNP into Britain’s Front National while secretly remaining true to the British brand of white supremacism. However, Nick Grifﬁn was not to be put out of his stride. On his election to the BNP leadership in September 1999, with 62 per cent of the vote in a head-to-head struggle with Tyndall, he immediately set about implementing his plan. Despite subsequent exposures of the inveterate neo-Nazism of the BNP’s hardcore membership (and partly because of the publicity this brought), including several of its ofﬁcers, Grifﬁn has managed to change the public perception of the BNP sufﬁciently to give it a more moderate public image, raise its media proﬁle, and make localized gains in the 2003 local elections. In June 2004 it increased its total number of councillors from 17 to 21, and could boast six seats in the Midlands, four in Bradford, and three in Epping Forest.37 However, it lost councillors in Blackburn, 34 Tyndall (1988), op. cit., pp. 48–9. 35 See Grifﬁn, R. (1995), Fascism (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 325–8. 36 Details of the undercover operation were also given in Searchlight June and July 1997, and on their website at . 37 It retained existing ones in Broxbourne, Burnley (where it has six seats), Kirklees, Calderdale, and Stoke-on-Trent.

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Thurrock, Dudley and Sandwell and failed to gain any seats in the Greater London Assembly, polling only 90,365 votes (4.7 per cent). Its much-hoped-for breakthrough in the European elections the same month came to naught. Subsequent results have shown that the BNP is still ﬁrmly conﬁned to the periphery of British politics, its results providing no grounds for the sort of media hysteria and moral panic unleashed by the rise of the National Front in the 1970s, when there was much talk of it becoming Britain’s ‘third party’. The cornerstone of the BNP’s new image is its explicit renunciation of the white supremacist discourse of xenophobia and its adoption of a new dialect of racism which purports to be xenophile, and is technically known as ‘differentialism’. It was ﬁrst pioneered in France by the New Right as part of a deliberate tactic in the 1960s to replace the biological racism of hard-core French fascism by an exclusively culturalist discourse,38 and its subsequent adoption by Le Pen’s Front National has been one of the major factors behind its ability to establish itself as an integral and durable component of French party-politics.39 Thus, we read in (The Voice of) Freedom, one of the two new newspapers that Grifﬁn launched as part of the BNP’s make over (the other is Identity), that: The BNP is not a “race supremacist” party. The BNP does not claim that any one race is superior to any other, simply that they are different. The party merely wishes to preserve those differences which make up the rich tapestry of human kind… To protect and preserve the racial and cultural integrity of the British people – and of others to – the party believes in separation… To sum up, the BNP is ﬁghting for the very right to exist of not just the British, but of all peoples.40

Without this change of tack it would have been unthinkable that Jean-Marie Le Pen would have accepted Grifﬁn’s invitation to join him on the campaign trail for the European elections in the spring of 2004 and appear with him at rallies in Birmingham and Manchester to produce just the sort of media image he longs to achieve: that of a modern statesman, European without being pro-EU, nationalist without being fascist, educated, respectable, electable. So conﬁdent was Grifﬁn of his prospects before the European elections that on 21 April 2004 he told the BBC Today programme that he intended the clutch of BNP MEPs that would be sent to Strasbourg to form part of a nationalist bloc within the EU parliament, stating cryptically that ‘When the liberal-left politicians all over Europe ﬁnd they really 38 Grifﬁn, R. (2000), ‘Plus ça change!: The Fascist Pedigree of the Nouvelle Droite’, in Arnold, E. (ed.), The Development of the Radical Right in France 1890–1995 (London: Routledge), pp. 217–52. 39 For more on the fascist origins and afﬁliations of the NF’s differentialist cultural policies see the articles Flood, C. (2000), ‘The Cultural Struggle of the Extreme Right and the Case of Terre et Peuple’, Contemporary French Civilisation, 24(2), pp. 241–66; and Bastow, S. (2002), ‘A Neo-fascist Third Way: The Discourse of Ethno-differentialist Revolutionary Nationalism’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 7(3), pp. 351–68. Both are reproduced in Grifﬁn, R. with Feldman, M. (eds.) (2003), Fascism: Critical Concepts in Political Science (London: Routledge). 40 ‘The BNP and Race’, (The Voice of) Freedom [whose banner reads ‘For British tradition, identity and democracy’], January 2001, p. 4.

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have now got a nationalist alternative there at the heart of Europe then I think we will see the same thing that has happened in Holland in the past two years.’ Foreign Policy of the New BNP The BNP thus represents a very ‘British’ compromise between extremism and moderation. It should therefore be no surprise to ﬁnd that the ideological material and pronouncements available on the BNP’s website that could be construed as constituting the party’s foreign policy41 are, to be magnanimous, an attempted synthesis between conﬂicting attitudes to nationalism and race, and, to be less charitable, a mix of traditional and moderate racism. The two central planks of its pronouncements about Britain’s relationship with the wider world are: ﬁrst ending multiculturalism, and so reversing a process that allegedly means that ‘on current demographic trends, we, the native British people, will be an ethnic minority within 60 years’,42 and second ‘putting Britain’s interests ﬁrst’, and hence achieving independence from the United States, the ‘international community’, the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and any other international organization in deciding what is best for Britain.43 To achieve its ﬁrst objective the BNP has no qualms in calling ‘for an immediate halt to all further immigration, the immediate deportation of criminal and illegal immigrants, and the introduction of a system of voluntary resettlement’, as well as a clamp-down on all asylum seekers ‘all of whom are either bogus or can ﬁnd refuge much nearer their home countries’.44 The declared rationale given for such policies, however, is, in contrast to Nazism, not imperialism, white supremacism, or fantasies of a fascist state rising phoenix-like from the ashes of a liberal state in 41 The following is based on material available on the BNP’s website (http://www.bnp. org.uk) in June 2004 when the presentation on which this chapter is based was being prepared for the symposium in July that gave rise to the present book. 42 A slightly more nuanced, less monolithic position on the complex issue of British identity emerges from a recent article by Nick Grifﬁn published in Identity (May 2004, pp. 4–5) under the title ‘Nationalist groups of the British Isles must stand together’. It accepts that ‘only an unrealistic “Anglo-fundamentalist” would deny the very close cultural, ethnic and historical links which exist between the indigenous peoples on the British Isles. English, Scots, Welsh, Irish, and the local identities in Ulster, Cornwall and the Isle of Man, whatever our past problems, the simple fact is that, in geo-political terms, and in the crisis of Western civilization which is now upon us, we must stand together or we will hang separately’. He goes on to argue that certain issues, such as ‘maintaining effective defence forces’ and ‘foreign policy decisions’ are ‘best decided at a pan-British level, ideally including Eire’, but other things ‘such as resisting the socially atomising, culture distorting inﬂuence of American CocaCola cultural imperialism’ are ‘better done at the level of our older and more organic national identities’. In this respect he warns that ‘England is by far the weakest present’, and, while we may be able to learn from institutions such as the Welsh Eisteddfod, ‘in the end the English must rediscover their own roots by themselves’. 43 See , p. 3, accessed 29 June 2004. 44 Home Page, What We Stand For, p. 1, , accessed 29 June 2004.

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ruins based on a single-party state. The argument against immigration is couched not in terms of racial superiority, but of the ‘differentialist’ rationale, which underlines the importance ‘that the British people retain their homeland and identity’,45 and uphold the ‘freedom to keep our traditions’. This means putting a stop to forces such as globalization, EU membership and subservience to US foreign policy that ‘undermine our cultural identity and the very notion of what it is to be British’.46 This cultural discourse is sometimes supplemented by a socioeconomic one, as when an article highlights the alleged increase in poverty, social delinquency, and crime in London due to mass immigration from the developing world (which we are assured will have turned Caucasians into an ethnic minority in London by 2010).47 We are also told of the devastating effects of the ‘brain drain’ caused by mass emigration from developing world societies and economies,48 a piece that would never appear in an overtly Nazi propaganda tract. What also stems from the BNP’s two core principles of foreign policy are attacks on a number of other forces that are allegedly weakening English identity: globalization,49 radical Islam and its mission to attack the West50 in the ‘clash of civilizations’,51 and the imperialism of the US superpower.52 Its anti-Americanism combined with wider concerns over British independence as a sovereign power has led the BNP to be a severe critic of the Second Gulf War.53 Yet, despite Grifﬁn’s efforts to reposition his party, residues of the pre-Grifﬁn era are all too easy to ﬁnd in its literature. Grifﬁn abandons the creed of ‘cultural difference’ for bio-politics when he declares it to be an ‘ineradicable fact’ that ‘Mankind is divided into races, and those races, while sharing many common features of humanity, are innately different in many ways beyond mere colour.’54 Also, he indicts multiculturalism and liberalism for undermining the genius of the British people in an article with the stirring title ‘Awake! Arise! Britannia – or Be

45 See , accessed on 29 June 2004. 46 See , accessed on 29 June 2004. 47 See , accessed on 29 June 2004. 48 See , accessed on 29 June 2004. 49 For example, Grifﬁn, N., ‘Cults, jets and greed – the frantic rush to One World’, at , accessed 29 June 2004. 50 ‘Islam is the menace’, , accessed 29 June 2004; see the headline ‘Anti-UK Muslims supporting Islam in the war with Christianity’, Freedom, November 2001, p. 1; followed on p. 2 by ‘Whose side are UK Muslims on?’, and the article announcing a ‘surprising’ alliance with the UK Sikh leader ‘Rajinder Singh, long opponent of Islamic fundamentalism’, Identity, February 2002, p. 10. 51 There is an article on Huntington’s thesis in Identity, January 2002, p. 4. 52 ‘Why the U.S. is Now the Greatest Threat to World Peace’, Identity (February 2002), pp. 1–3. 53 For example, ‘The Halabja Gassing and other lies about Iraq: Arthur Kemp reveals the lies behind Bush’s war in Iraq’, , accessed 29 June 2004; ‘Daddy, why did we have to attack Iraq?’, , accessed 29 June 2004. 54 Grifﬁn, N., ‘The BNP: Anti-asylum protest, racist sect or power-winning movement?’, , accessed 29 June 2004.

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55

Forever Fallen’. Furthermore, Grifﬁn displays a deeply anti-Semitic mindset in his article ‘Cults, jets and greed – the frantic rush to One World’. It purports to be discussing one the new bugbears of the post-war extreme Right, and opens in neopopulist mode by explicitly renouncing crude theories that attribute globalization to ‘some enormous, monolithic “conspiracy”, or allege that it is the work of a secret council of the Learned Elders of Zion, the Vatican, Satan or the British monarchy’. Instead Grifﬁn traces its origins to three interlinked ideological strands, ‘the Zionist movement’, ‘Marxism’, and ‘liberalism’. Grifﬁn proceeds to claim that: An important motivating force behind globalisation is not logic but messianic hysteria. This is at its most obviously insane among the Zionist zealots who are the main movers behind the strongly anti-white bias of the whole project. These people really do believe that their Messiah will arrive shortly; they really are planning to rebuild the Temple in Jerusalem; they really have made the sacred knives and blood-bowls needed to kill the red heifer whose ashes are required to sanctify the new building; they really have had a special research centre in Israel dedicated to breeding a perfectly red-coated calf for the holy sacriﬁce!

Grifﬁn then alleges that, while in the White House, Hillary and Bill Clinton fell under the Rasputin-like inﬂuence of Michael Learner, leader of an esoteric cult ‘that mixes the Old Testament with a dash of medieval kabbala mysticism and a good deal of 1960s campus Marxism’.56 Stripped of its hysterical anti-Semitism and paranoia, this attack on the ‘new world order’ would chime in perfectly with the repeated critiques of mondialisation both in Front National literature and in the writings of the new right on which it has drawn so heavily for its ideology. At the same time it is important to stress that the French New Right itself is an outstandingly successful example of the translation of hard-core fascist bio-politics into a cultural discourse that took place three decades ago.57 It is also a particular expression of the general obsession with the decadence of the present age and the need to enter a new historical era that is a hallmark of the fascist mindset, and whose importance to the evolution of the twentieth-century extreme Right can be seen from a study of such ﬁgures as Oswald Spengler and Julius Evola.58 The theme of the ‘decline of the West’ emerges explicitly in Grifﬁn’s

55 See , accessed on 29 June 2004. 56 See , accessed on 29 June 2004. 57 See Grifﬁn, R. (2000), pp. 217–252. 58 Both Oswald Mosley and some currents of Nazism were profoundly inﬂuenced by Spengler’s Decline of the West. Spengler went on to create his own fascist solution to the problem of reversing the decay of civilization, thereby breaking with the determinism and pessimism with which he is widely identiﬁed. On Evola’s importance in this context see Grifﬁn, R. (2000), ‘Between Metapolitics and Apoliteía: the New Right’s Strategy for Conserving the Fascist Vision in the “Interregnum”, Modern and Contemporary France 8(2), pp. 35–53; Grifﬁn, R., ‘“I am no longer human. I am a Titan. A god!” The fascist quest to regenerate time’, Electronic Seminars in History, History of Political Thought, at , ﬁrst published May 1998.

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article ‘Time is running out for Western civilization’.59 It is a theme that can assume profoundly mythic connotations, as when BNP members are encouraged to see the The Lord of the Rings trilogy at the cinema as an allegory of how Western civilization and the identities of European nations are being overwhelmed by evil hordes and can only be saved by an epic act of courage.60 Here again the BNP shows that it is more related to the extreme right than to any form of ‘modern’ or ‘modernist’ neopopulism. However, as the history of the Third Reich illustrates so graphically, the most metapolitical of cosmologies have radical consequences for human reality once translated into political ideology. In concrete terms, the foreign policy, in the case that it would ever come to power, that could be inferred from the BNP’s diffuse ideological pronouncements, could take the following stances: • • •

• • • • •

•

•

Take Britain out of the EU.61 Take Britain out of NATO (while retaining the nuclear deterrent). Stop undertaking military interventions in critical situations abroad (for example, Kosovo, Iraq), while increasing defence spending to make Britain more secure against foreign threats. Abandon the ‘special relationship’ with the United States. Establish closer ties with the Commonwealth. End support for Israel while also condemning Islamic militancy. Impose strict anti-immigration and anti-asylum legislation and promote voluntary repatriation. Curb ﬁnancial and humanitarian assistance to countries in the developing world, linking foreign aid available to any country to its readiness to accept repatriated emigrants from Britain under the BNP’s ‘voluntary resettlement policy’.62 Oppose any peace process in Northern Ireland that would make excessive concessions to the Irish Republican Army, while at the same time adopting an overtly pro-Loyalist stance.63 Introduce economic protectionism by introducing high import tariffs and various measures to revitalize the capacity of British industry to cope with domestic demand, thereby applying ‘nationalist principles to all areas of our economy’, so as to exert ‘some kind of control over globalism’.64

59 See , accessed on 29 June 2004. 60 See , accessed on 29 June 2004. 61 One of the most prominent BNP campaigns with which it seeks to extend its success as a neo-populist party to ‘keep the pound’. See , p. 1, accessed 29 June 2004. 62 This would mean giving cash to those nations ‘taking signiﬁcant numbers of people back to the homelands’ to ‘help those returning’. The BNP pledges to spend the money thus saved ‘our own people’. See , p. 2, accessed 29 June 2004. 63 See Freedom (November 2001), p. 3. 64 Identity, February 2002, pp. 14–15.

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In short, the BNP would attempt to extricate the country from the dense web of agreements and relationships that bind it with Europe and the international community politically, economically, militarily, ideologically, culturally, and ethnically, while maintaining contacts with movements in continental Europe that are engaged in a parallel struggle to preserve national identity. Grifﬁn’s ultimate goal seems to be to exploit the potential electoral appeal of neo-populism to create a ‘sovereign’ Britain (or England), all of whose inhabitants of white Anglo-Saxon stock would be free to enjoy their ‘own’ culture in a state of cultural and economic autarky. Some Final Observations on the BNP in the Context of Neo-Populist Foreign Policy This chapter has hopefully made a convincing case for including the ‘new’ BNP in any comparative study of contemporary neo-populist politics, even if it is only to illustrate the type of discourse that is adopted by parties who want to position themselves for tactical purposes as neo-populist radicals rather than as fascist extremists. At the same time, it should now be clear just how superﬁcial the BNP’s makeover has been. Ultimately, the BNP’s foreign policy would be a partial (and often stilted) translation into neo-populist terms of the neo-Nazi principles that informed the party’s policies under Tyndall until 1999. The undertones of racial hatred, white supremacy, and revolutionary nationalism inspired by the Third Reich have been airbrushed away, but underneath the attacks on multiculturalism and globalization there linger hints of pan-Aryanism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, isolationism, and nostalgia for national greatness that are instantly intelligible to any unreconstructed fascist. The barely hidden agenda is still the creation of an allegedly British, but essentially English, ‘national community’ bound together by a common (homogeneous) culture and a sense of identity based on a generational rootedness in English history. Citizenship laws based on this concept would automatically exclude millions of contemporary British individuals who have a ‘hyphenated’ ethnic identity for whom the United Kingdom is not only the basis of their national citizenship, but provides their authentic home and ‘roots’, and whose removal in practice could only be carried out by a form of cultural, or even ethnic cleansing, something still unthinkable in Britain. Even the feigned entente cordiale Grifﬁn established with Le Pen in 2004 cannot disguise the fact that the new BNP lacks any convincing right-wing vision of a new Europe, and that its espousal of differentialism is a cosmetic exercise rather than a genuine change of ideology and policy. In this respect Fini’s creation of the Alleanza Nazionale represents a far more radical metamorphosis from fascist to neopopulist party, even in its foreign policy.65 Another point worth commenting on is that in renouncing the overt neo-Nazism that was the hallmark of BNP politics under Tyndall, the BNP illustrates some of the anomalies that have arisen since 1945 in the relationship of right-wing nationalism to radical left-wing ideologies. Thus, when BNP propaganda argues that, rather than be lured into working for the British National Health system, developing world doctors 65 See Grifﬁn, R. (1998), ‘Ce n’est pas Le Pen: The MSI/AN’s Estrangement from the Front National’s Immigration Policy’, in Westin, C. (ed.), Racism, Ideology and Political Organisation (Stockholm: CEIFO), pp. 197–216.

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should stay at home, not because their presence contaminates British ethnic purity, but so that they are available to contribute to the development of their own societies, a differentialist logic that makes the article read more like something from the pages of The New Internationalist or an Oxfam pamphlet than from a far-right website.66 Similarly, its radical anti-globalization and anti-Americanism brings the BNP into the orbit of left wing critiques of the neo-liberal New World Order, of US economic, military and cultural imperialism, and of the ‘McDonaldization’ of the world. This anomaly is shared by New Right publications such as Alain De Benoist’s Krisis and Marco Tarchi’s Trasgressioni, both of which have been known to publish Marxist attacks on the current system when it suits their purposes. In particular, the BNP’s opposition to British involvement in the Second Gulf War put it in good Marxist company. In both these points it is implicit that the importance of the BNP lies neither in the sophistication of ideology under Grifﬁn, which soon reveals itself as a curious mix of old and new positions, nor in the size of its support, which remains minimal, and which poses far less of a threat to British liberalism than the culture of ‘civic neo-populism’ that it has hosted for so long. Instead, it lies in what the BNP’s bid to impersonate the Front National reveals about the difference between the inter-war and post-war eras with respect to the way radical nationalism and ethnocentrism manifest themselves. The objective and subjective crisis of liberalism in the interwar period provided an ideal incubator for many variants of revolutionary and pseudo-revolutionary extremism of the Left and Right, and even leaders with the instincts of reactionary conservatives (for example, General Franco, Marshal Pétain) scrupulously fascistized their regimes. By contrast, the subjective stability of the West’s liberal capitalist system since 1945 has reduced the natural constituency for revolutionary nationalism and internationalism to a pathetically small percentage of extremists temperamentally at odds with the status quo, but incapable of mobilizing any sort of mass following because the objective material and corresponding psychodynamic conditions for this are simply lacking. As a result, sentiments within the ‘masses’ that would have in inter-war Europe been available to be channelled into fascism now ﬁnd expression in what I have termed ‘ethnocratic liberalism’, a xenophobic perversion of liberalism that wants to exclude foreigners from the right to gain access to the material prosperity and the basic civic rights that are enjoyed by the ‘indigenous’ population (whose deﬁnition applies essentially mythic historic and cultural criteria).67 Whereas the British Union of Fascists wanted to put ‘Britain First’ by establishing a totalitarian state (outlined in Mosley’s manifesto The Greater Britain), the BNP has no other option but to imply that the existing British state will serve as its vehicle for ‘putting the British ﬁrst’. 66 ‘British immigration is killing the Third World’, <www.bnp.org.uk/articles/foreign_ nurses.htm>, accessed 29 June 2004. 67 For an elaboration of this argument see Grifﬁn, R. (1999), ‘Last Rights?’, afterword to Ramet, S. (ed.), The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press), pp. 297–32; Grifﬁn, R. (2001), ‘Interregnum or Endgame? Radical Right Thought in the “Post-fascist” Era’, in Freeden, M. (ed.), Reassessing Political Ideologies (London: Routledge), pp. 116–31.

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There are thus good grounds for treating the BNP as an ‘honorary’ neo-populist party in comparative studies of the European extreme Right. However, what the British/English case also suggests is that researchers should be far less ﬁxated on exclusively political parties and political space and far more concerned with civil society and civic space. Britain presents an outstanding example of a country with a vigorous neo-populism hosted within mainstream civic society even though it traditionally lacks a major neo-populist party. This gap has only been partially ﬁlled in the early 2000s by two parties, UKIP and the BNP, neither of whom pass muster as ‘genuine’ neo-populist movements, and both of which are destined to remain peripheral and largely irrelevant, at least as far as effective parliamentary power in their home country is concerned. For the time being, the extraordinary inﬂux of migrant workers from Eastern Europe into the UK as citizens of the enlarged EU has taken place without strengthening the popularity of either party – in fact, UKIP has gone into sharp decline just as legal and illegal immigration has soared and the BNP is as far from a parliamentary ‘breakthrough’ as ever. Britain looks set, at least for the time being, to remain a ‘sceptered isle’, a ‘demi-paradise’, another ‘Eden’, appreciated as such by an increasing number of people from ‘less happier lands’ with only a marginalized minority seeing it as a ‘fortress built by Nature for herself/ Against infection and the hand of war’.68 Acronyms AN BNP BUF EU FPÖ MEP NF UKIP

Alleanza Nazionale British National Party British Union of Fascists European Union Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs Member of the European Parliament National Front United Kingdom Independence Party

68 John O’Gaunt’s eulogy of England in William Shakespeare’s Richard II contains these famous lines (Act II, scene i, lines 42–54): This royal throne of kings, this scepter’d isle, This earth of majesty, this seat of Mars, This other Eden, demi-paradise, This fortress built by Nature for herself Against infection and the hand of war, This happy breed of men, this little world, This precious stone set in the silver sea, Which serves it in the ofﬁce of a wall, Or as a moat defensive to a house, Against the envy of less happier lands, This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England, This nurse, this teeming womb of royal kings, Fear’d by their breed and famous by their birth.

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References ––– (1997), ‘Nick Grifﬁn … The Sting. How Searchlight and the Cook Report ruined the Nazi backroom boys’ plans to dominate the British far right’, Searchlight, June. ––– (2001), ‘The BNP and Race’, The Voice of Freedom, January, p. 4. ––– (2002), ‘Why the U.S. is Now the Greatest Threat to World Peace’, Identity, February, pp. 1–3. [DOI: 10.1207/S1532706XID0201_01] ––– (2002), The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain. The Parekh Report (London: Proﬁle Books Books). ––– (2003), ‘Callous Asylum Seekers Are Barbecuing the Queen’s Swans’, The Sun, 4 July. Arnold, E., (ed.) (2000), The Development of the Radical Right in France 1890– 1995 (London: Routledge Books). Bastow, S. (2002), ‘A Neo-Fascist Third Way: The Discourse of Ethno-differentialist Revolutionary Nationalism’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 7(3), pp. 351–368. [DOI: 10.1080/1356931022000010610] Copsey, N. (1994), ‘Fascism: the Ideology of the British National Party’, Politics, 14(3), pp.101–108. ––– (2004), Contemporary British Fascism (London: Palgrave). Eatwell, R. (2000), ‘The Extreme Right and British Exceptionalism’ in Hainsworth, p. 186. Eisman, W., (ed.) (2001), Rechtspopulismus in Europa Analysen und Handlungsperspektiven (Graz: Czernin-Verlages). Favell, A. (2000), ‘Multi-ethnic Britain: An Exception in Europe?’, Patterns of Prejudice, 35(1). Flood, C. (2000), ‘The Cultural Struggle of the Extreme Right and the Case of Terre et Peuple’, Contemporary French Civilisation, 24(2), pp. 241–266. Freeden, M., (ed.) (2001), Reassessing Political Ideologies (London: Routledge Books). Grifﬁn, N. (2000), ‘Editorial,’, Identity, January/February, p. 1. ––– (2004), ‘Nationalist Groups of the British Isles Must Stand Together’, Identity, May, pp. 4–5. ––– ‘Cults, jets and greed – the frantic rush to “One World”’, , accessed on 29 June 2004. ––– (1995), Fascism (Oxford: Oxford University Press). ––– (1996), ‘The Post-fascism of the Alleanza Nazionale: A Case-Study in Ideological Morphology’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 1(2), pp. 123–146. ––– (1998), ‘“I am no longer human. I am a Titan. A god!” The fascist quest to regenerate time’, Electronic Seminars in History, History of Political Thought. . ––– (1998), ‘Ce n’est pas Le Pen: The MSI/AN’s Estrangement from the Front National’s Immigration Policy’ in Westin (ed.), pp. 197–216.

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––– (1999), ‘Last Rights?’ in Ramet (ed.), pp. 297–232. ––– (2000), ‘Between Metapolitics and Apoliteía: the New Right’s Strategy for Conserving the Fascist Vision in the “Interregnum”’, Modern and Contemporary France, 8(2), pp. 35–53. ––– (2000), ‘Plus ça change!: The Fascist Pedigree of the Nouvelle Droite’ in Arnold (ed.), pp. 217–252. ––– (2001), ‘“No Racism, Thanks, We’re British”. How ‘Right-wing Populism’ Manifests itself in Contemporary Britain’ in Eisman (ed.), pp. 90–111. ––– (2001), ‘Interregnum or Endgame?, Radical Right Thought in the ‘Post-fascist’ Era,’, pp. 116–131 in Freeden (ed.). Grifﬁn, R. and Feldman, M., (eds.) (2003), Fascism: Critical Concepts in Political Science (London: Routledge). Hainsworth, P. (2000), The Politics of the Extreme Right: from the Margins to the Mainstream (London: Pinter Publishers). Ignazi, P. (2003), Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Littlejohn, R. (2001), ‘Visiting this Country? How you Can Help Yourself?’, The Sun, 30 March, p. 11. Mosley, O. (1956), ‘European Socialism’, Nation Europa, May. Ramet, S., (ed.) (1999), The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe Since 1989 (University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press). Southgate, T. (2002), ‘Transcending the Beyond: From third Position to NationalAnarchism’, Pravda, . Spencer, I.R.G. (1997), British Immigration Policy Since 1939 (London: Routledge). Szöllösi-Janze, M. (1989), Die Pfeilkreuzlerbewegung in Ungarn (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag). Taylor, K. (2004), ‘Migrating into UKIP’s Territory’, Searchlight, November. Tyndall, J. (1988), The Eleventh Hour: A Call for British Rebirth (Welling: Albion Press). Westin, C., (ed.) (1998), Racism, Ideology and Political Organisation (Stockholm: CEIFO).

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Chapter 13

Between Tradition and Transition: the Central European Radical Right and the New European Order Michael Minkenberg

Introduction In the recent European elections of June 2004, right-wing radical and populist parties in the new Central European member states of the European Union (EU) did not even remotely fare as well as expected. Neither the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP) nor the Czech ‘Republicans’ gained more than a few percentage points, and no seats at all in the enlarged European parliament. In the Baltic states, ultranationalist parties did not even run in these elections. The big exception, however, was Poland, where two surprises were seen. First, among the top four parties yielding more than 10 per cent of the vote, three were right-wing radical or populist parties. They took places two to four behind the winner Platforma Obywatelska (Polish, Citizens Platform), a conservative party. Second, the ﬁercely anti-EU and populist Andrzej Lepper’s Samoobrona (Self-Defence), which was second in the opinion polls preceding the elections, received only 10.8 per cent and took fourth place. This was even more remarkable in the face of the rather low turn out of 20.9 per cent. It was equally remarkable that self-defence was surpassed by the more extreme and ideological Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR, League of Polish Families), also strongly anti-EU but at the same time ethnocentric and Catholic orthodox, which took second place after the PO. The third right-wing party was the Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc (PiS, Law and Justice), a nationalist law and order party, and more EU-sceptic rather than outright anti-EU. All together, these three parties received 38.7 per cent of the vote, an impressive result for these types of parties. It seems, then, that the radical right in Poland ﬂourishes, despite the high volatility in the Polish party system since the end of state socialism. Therefore, this paper takes a closer look at the Central European situation, with a particular focus on Poland. It attempts to outline the ideological and organizational contours of the Central European radical right, their bases of support, and the role of the geopolitical order in which these new democracies ﬁnd themselves, on the way from state socialism in the Warsaw Pact to market capitalism and the EU. The major argument is that the new European order provides new issues and opportunities for the Central European radical right, but that the speciﬁc role of the EU (as scapegoat for all kinds of unwelcome changes in domestic politics and economics

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in the course of the post-1989 regime change) is embedded into a larger agenda of ultra-nationalism. This paper also aims to demonstrate that the Polish case deviates from other Central European cases both in terms of levels of support for the radical right and the nature of the phenomenon itself – it lies between cases of consolidated democracies and fellow EU acceding states like Hungary and the Czech Republic and non-consolidated regimes and extra-EU countries like Romania and Russia. Comparing the Radical Right: Conceptualizing Ideological and Organizational Variants For a workable deﬁnition of right-wing radicalism foe a comparative perspective, it is preferable to avoid the ‘shopping list’ quality of most deﬁnitions and instead tie it to theoretical concepts of social change which underlie most analyses of the radical right.1 Most ‘classical’, but also modern, approaches (that is, the works by W. Kornhauser, S.M. Lipset, Lipset/Raab, Scheuch/Klingemann, up until the 1960s; H.G. Betz, P. Ignazi, H. Kitschelt and others from the 1990s on) include, implicitly or explicitly, arguments derived from modernization theory, and they persuasively indicate conditions for a successful mobilization of right-wing radicalism. It seems useful to build on modernization theory not just in terms of the societal context for mobilization, but also in order to identify the core ideology of the phenomenon, not in the least because these theories might provide some conceptually grounded criteria for such analyses which would help to overcome the shopping list problem.2 Generally, modernization can be understood as a growing autonomy of the individual (status mobility and role ﬂexibility) and an ongoing functional differentiation of the society (segmentation and growing autonomy of societal subsystems).3 In this light, right-wing radicalism can be deﬁned as the radical effort to counter such social change. The counter-concept to social differentiation is the nation as community, and the counter-concept to individualization is the return to traditional roles and status of the individual in such a community. It is this overemphasis on, or radicalization of, images of social homogeneity which characterizes radical right-wing thinking. Hence, right-wing radicalism will be deﬁned primarily by the ideological criteria of populist and romantic ultra-nationalism, a myth of a homogenous nation that puts 1 See discussion in Mudde (2000), The Ideology of the Extreme Right (Manchester: Manchester University Press); for the following see also Minkenberg, M. (2003), ‘The West European Radical Right as a Collective Actor: Modeling the Impact of Cultural and Structural Variables on Party Formation and Movement Mobilization’, Comparative European Politics 1, pp. 149–70; and Minkenberg (1998), Die neue radikale Rechte im Vergleich. USA, Frankreich, Deutschland (Opladen/Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag Books). 2 I am following here the seminal essay by Scheuch and Klingemann (1967), ‘Theorie des Rechtsradikalismus in westlichen Industriegesellschaften’, Hamburger Jahrbuch für Wirtschafts − und Gesellschaftspolitik 12, pp. 11–29. See also Chapter 1 in Minkenberg (1998), op. cit. 3 Rucht, D. (1994), Modernisierung und neue soziale Bewegungen (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag).

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the nation before the individual and his civil rights, and which therefore is directed against liberal and pluralist democracy (though not necessarily in favour of a fascist state), its underlying values of freedom and equality, and the related categories of individualism and universalism. This deﬁnition focuses explicitly on the idea of the nation as the ultimate focal point, situated somewhere between the poles of demos and ethnos. The nationalistic myth is characterized by the effort to construct an idea of nation and national belonging by radicalizing ethnic, religious, lingual, and other cultural and political criteria of exclusion in order to bring about a congruence between the state and the nation, and to condense the idea of nation into an image of extreme collective homogeneity. Some authors insist on including anti-system attitudes or opposition to democracy as essential deﬁnitional criteria.4 According to the deﬁnition used here, right-wing radicalism is not the antithesis to democracy per se. Instead, by focusing on ultranationalism instead of anti-democratic attitudes, the question of right-wing radicals’ relationship to democracy remains open for empirical veriﬁcation or falsiﬁcation. To put it differently, right-wing radicals are not necessarily in defence of doing away with democracy, but they want government by the people in terms of ethnocracy (per Grifﬁn). Moreover, the focus on ultra-nationalism instead of fascism or racism allows one to account for a wider range of, and distinctions between, varieties of right-wing radicalism according to the way ethnic, religious, cultural and other criteria of exclusion are used. It is therefore suggested here to distinguish at least three ideological types that are derived from the respective concept of nation and the exclusionary criteria: autocratic-fascist (in which violence often plays an important role), ethnocentric, and authoritarian-populist.5 Special cases are speciﬁcally racist or religious fundamentalist versions.6 All versions have in common a strong, anti-pluralistic quest for internal homogeneity of the nation and a populist, antiestablishment political style. Next to ideological variations, organizational distinctions of the radical right need to be taken into account. In comparative analyses, the emphasis is usually on right-wing radical parties. The differences in party strength are then measured in 4 See Backes, U. and Jesse, E. (1989), Politischer Extremismus in Deutschland (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung); Ignazi, P. (2003), Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 5 The category of populism is hard to deﬁne and rather controversial since many experts see it as matter of style rather than substance, embodying a protest rather than programmatic quality. Here, it will be used for those parties of the radical right which exhibit internal authoritarian structures built around some charismatic leader and which beyond their populist rhetoric are hard to pin down programmatically, except for some vision of exclusionary politics. See, for example, Hans-Georg Betz, who recently has reconceptualizied his previous catch-all category of radical right-wing populism into ‘radical right’ with two variants: exclusionary populism, and fascism, see his ‘The Growing Threat of the Radical Right’, in: Merkl, P. and Weinberg, L. (eds.) (2003), Right-wing Extremism in the 21st Century (London: Frank Cass), pp. 74–93; for authoritarian populism, see also Kopecky, P. and Mudde, C. (2002), ‘Two Sides of Euro-Scepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East-Central Europe’, European Union Politics, 3(3), pp. 297–325. 6 For this category, see Minkenberg (1998), op. cit.

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terms of membership and electoral support, and they are explained in the party and electoral research literature by pointing both to ideological variations and the degree of fragmentation of the right-wing radical party sector and the political and electoral system, on the one hand, and other parties’ strategies, that is, the ‘political space’ for the radical right, on the other (for example, in Betz or Kitschelt). Already in 1988, Klaus von Beyme argued that ‘future studies of right-wing extremism will have to pay more attention to the whole political context of this political movement instead of being preoccupied with traditional party and electoral studies.’7 Following this, the organizational variants of the radical right will be distinguished by their approach to institutional political power and public resonance. The most obvious are parties and electoral campaign organizations that participate in elections and try to win public ofﬁce. Next to these are social movement organizations that try to mobilize public support as well, but do not run for ofﬁce; rather they identify with a larger social movement (a network of networks with a distinct collective identity) and offer interpretative frames for particular problems.8 Finally, smaller groups and sociocultural milieus operate relatively independently from both parties and larger social movements and do not exhibit formal organizational structures, but can also be characterized as networks with links to other organizations and a collective identity which tends to be more extreme than that of the parties or movement organizations (including exhibiting higher levels of violence). They represent a ‘micro-mobilization potential’ for the Radical Right.9 The Radical Right in Central Europe: a Topographical Overview With a few modiﬁcations, this concept of the radical right can be applied to the post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well. These modiﬁcations include the role of legacies of the state socialist past, the role of nation-building ,and the particular opportunity and cleavage structures (see below).10 The topography of the central European radical right, as exempliﬁed with the Polish case, is summarized in Table 13.1. 7 Von Beyme (1988), ‘Right-wing Extremism in Post-war Europe’, West European Politics, 11(2), p. 16. 8 See Tarrow (1994), Power in Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 9 Bergmann (1994), ‘Ein Versuch, die extreme Rechte als soziale Bewegung zu beschreiben’, in Bergmann, W. and Erb, R. (eds.), Neonazis und rechte Subkultur (Berlin: Metropol Verlag), pp. 183–207; for an elaboration of the different types, see Minkenberg (1998), Chapter 1. 10 See Minkenberg (2002), ‘The Radical Right in Post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe: Comparative Observations and Interpretations’, East European Politics and Society, 16(2), pp. 335–62; Beichelt, T. and Minkenberg, M. (2002), ‘Rechtsradikalismus in Transformationsgesellschaften. Entstehungsbedingungen und Erklärungsmodell’, Osteuropa, 2(3), pp. 247–63; and the ensuing debate in Osteuropa, 52(5, 7 and 8) (May, July and August 2002) with contributions by Cas Mudde, Dieter Segert, Andreas Umland, and Volker Weichsel; and Minkenberg, M. and Beichelt, T. (eds.) (2003), Cultural Legacies in PostSocialist Europe: The Role of the Various Pasts in the Current Transformation Process. FITWorking Papers (Frankfurt/Oder: Frankfurt Institute for Transformation Studies.

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Table 13.1

265

Dominant actors in the Central European right-wing family: Poland Party/Campaign Organization

Social Movement Organization

Subcultural Milieu

Fascist/Autocratic Right

–

NOP Niklot

Neo-Nazis Black metal skinheads

Racist/Ethnocentrist Right Authoritarianpopulist Right Religiousfundamentalist Right

KPN LPR Samoobrona PiS ZChN LPR

PWN-PSN Radio Maryja

Neo-Nazis skinheads

Samoobrona

–

Radio Maryja

–

Abbreviations/translations used in Table 13.1: KPN – Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej (Confederation for an independent Poland) LPR – Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families) NOP – Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski (Polish National Rebirth) PiS – Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc (Law and Justice) PWN-PSN – Polska Wspólnota Narodowa: Polskie Stronnictwo Narodowe (Polish Nationalist Union) ZChN – Zjednoczenie Chrzescijansko-Narodowe (Christian National Union)

As a glance at Table 13.1 already suggests, the Polish situation is characterized by a high degree of fragmentation and variation, which often leads to a restructuring of the party system and a reorganization and renaming of individual parties. To some extent, this can be attributed to a lively right-wing radical movement sector which feeds into party formation and reformation and which, so far, is largely understudied. Hence, there is only fragmented evidence for various groups and activities. One of the larger groups was the neo-fascist movement the Polish Nationalist Union, led by Boreslav Tejkovski. In the early 1990s, it numbered about 4,000 members and became known internationally for its attacks on Jewish property and the Catholic Church in 1991 and 1992.11 Another right-wing movement organization is the Party of Polish National Rebirth (NOP), which can be characterized as the major fascist organization in Poland and, under the leadership of Adam Gmurczyk, set up local branches in many cities, including Lodz, Krakov and Warsaw.12 ‘Niklot’ (the name denotes a Slavic prince of the ninth century) is an organization founded 1998 by Tomaz Szczepanski, a former member of the NOP. The group advocates pre-war fascist ideas and the superiority of Slavs (in fact, it propagates a Slavic übermensch). 11 Prazmowska (1995), ‘The New Right in Poland: Nationalism, Anti-Semitism and Parliamentarianism’, in Luciano Cheles et al. (eds.), The Far Right in Western and Eastern Europe (London: Longman), pp. 208ff. 12 Ost (1999), ‘The Radical Right of Poland: Rationality of the Irrational’, in Ramet (ed.), The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press), p. 96.

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The group ﬁghts for the preservation of Polish ethnic homogeneity and in the local elections of 2002 entered alliances with Samoobrona in Western Pomerania.13 Finally, since the mid-1990s, the ultra-Catholic radio station Radio Maryja has attracted millions of listeners, mainly poor retired workers, the unemployed and all kinds of ‘transformation losers’, with its mix of religious, anti-modernist, nationalist, xenophobic, and at times anti-Semitic messages. Although far from being a political party, Radio Maryja nonetheless had signiﬁcant political success in the late 1990s by ﬁnding parliamentary allies with several representatives of the Solidarnosc group AWS in the Polish Sejm14 and entertaining close ties with the new party the League of Polish Families. Beyond these organizations, there is a growing right-wing extremist scene of violent groups and Nazi skinheads. In many Polish towns, meetings of several hundred militants are rather frequent events, as are anti-Semitic or fascist grafﬁti on buildings.15 In the party sector, there were six radical right-wing parties in Poland in the early 1990s, but none of them entered parliament in the ﬁrst elections.16 The most important ones were the Stronnictwo Narodowe ‘Ojczyzna’ (SN, National Front Party of the Fatherland), which advocated an explicit anti-Semitic and anti-German platform and is orientated towards the nationalist ideas of Roman Dmowski of the inter-war period;17 the Ruch Odbudowy Polski (ROP, Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland), which joined the alliance with AWS in 1997 but broke apart before the 2001 elections; and the Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej (KPN, Confederation for an Independent Poland), which is ideologically modelled after the ideas of Pilsudski.18 Finally, as a Polish peculiarity, there is a clerical-nationalist party, the Zjednoczenie Chrzescijansko-Narodowe (ZChN, Christian National Union), which advocates that Catholic dogma should be the basis of Polish politics and which claims to embrace the interest of ethnic Poles in all of eastern Europe.19 Until the late-1990s, the Polish

13 Strzykala (2004), Rechsradikalismus in Polen nach 1989, unpublished Masters Thesis (Frankfurt/Oder: Europa-Univeristät Viadrina), p. 75; and Kornak, M. (2003), ‘Cien’, Nigdy Wiecej, 13, 9–10. 14 Letter to the author from Dr Karol Kostrzebski, Institute of Political Science, Warsaw University, 12 June 2000. 15 Die Tageszeitung (13 November 1998), p. 13. 16 For a detailed but very descriptive overview of all post-1989 national, nationalist and right-wing radical parties, see Kalina, T. (2000), Polskie Partie Narodowe, unpublished Master’s Thesis (Warsaw: Institute of Political Science, Warsaw University); see also Grott, B. (1994), ‘Ruch narodowy w Polsce postkommunistyczenj’, Arka 53/54, 13–34; Prazmowska, op. cit., pp. 198–214; and Strzykala, op. cit. 17 See Walicki (2000), ‘The Troubling Legacy of Roman Dmowski’, East European Politics and Society, 14(1), pp. 12–46. 18 For the role of Pilsudski and his opponent Roman Dmowski as a focus of orientation in the contemporary Polish right, see Stankiewicz (2000), ‘Die “neuen Dmowskis” – eine alte Ideologie in neuem Gewand?’, Osteuropa 52(3), pp. 263–79. 19 See Kalina (op. cit., 78–82, 114–118), See Also Szayna, T; (1997)‘The Extreme Right Political Movements in Post-Communist Central Europe’ in Merkl, P. and Weinberg, L. (eds.), The Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the Nineties (London: Frank Cass Publishers), p. 116; and Ost (op. cit., 98ff).

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radical right parties had a rather limited following, which was attributed to the fact that they lacked ‘a persuasive target against which to mobilize constituents’.20 However, with the growing importance of EU accession, the Polish radical right seems to have found such a persuasive target. This was suggested by the results of the most recent parliamentary election in September 2001, which combined the elements of ﬂuidity in the party system on the one hand, and of stability and even some growth in support for the far right on the other. While older right-wing parties such as the Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej and Ruch Odbudowy Polski virtually disappeared, three new parties on the far right appeared. First, the right-wing populist Samoobrona of Andzrej Lepper gained 10.2 per cent. Second, the fundamentalist LPR, which is allied to Radio Maryja, and orientated at the ideas of Roman Dmowski, scored 7.9 per cent of the vote. And third, the nationalist, Catholic-orientated and law-andorder party PiS received 9.5 per cent. All three mobilized their electorate around the issue of opposition to Poland’s accession to the EU but in the case of PiS, criticism of the EU and Polish accession was rather soft, compared with the other two. Samoobrona is a rather special case in this picture. Founded and led by Andrzej Lepper, in 1992, it consists of two organizations, a political party and a farmers’ lobby group. It led an obscure life until its breakthrough in the 2001 parliamentary elections. It continues to evade easy programmatic classiﬁcation, advocating a ‘third way’, which combines appeals to Polish nationalism, cultural traditionalism and economic protectionism. The two organizations are truly only one, held together by Lepper’s charisma and skilful leadership.21 Its ﬁerce anti-EU rhetoric has been more of a tactical tool than an ideological cornerstone: both Lepper’s public statements on the eve of the referendum in June 2003 on Poland’s EU accession, and interviews with Samoobrona cadres, show that the party does not oppose Polish membership in the EU but rather criticizes the mode of accession. In the campaign that led to the referendum, Samoobrona decided not to persuade its followers to vote against EU accession, but rather steered a neutral course.22 Certainly, Lepper’s previous criticism of EU accession did not pay off at all in the European elections in 2004. This rather pragmatic attitude is also found in the other two Polish parties considered here. While LPR represented EU-phobic and EU-rejectionist opinions, this image changed dramatically after the 2003 referendum. Before, the EU was seen by LPR leaders and followers in classical right-wing radical ways as an effort to subordinate Poland to Western, in particular German, interests (the slogan was Akcesja, Aneksna, Anschluss23); as being run by freemasons and by the United States; and as being too secular to accommodate Polish religious traditions and interests. Even the Pope’s support of Polish accession to the EU was criticized in 20 Ost, op. cit., p. 88. 21 See Grün, M. (2004), Phänomen Samoobrona. Vom Bauernbund zur etablierten Partei?, unpublished Masters Thesis (Frankfurt/Oder: Europa-Universität Viadrina). 22 See Klemenska, K. (2003), The Polish Political Parties Opposing EU-Accession, unpublished Masters Thesis (Frankfurt/Oder: Europa-Universität Viadrina), pp. 65–72; see also Kopecky and Mudde, op. cit. 23 ‘Accession, Annexation, Anschluss’, a word play with Austria’s ‘Anschluss’ to Nazi Germany in 1938; as provided by LPR representative Andrzej Chrzanowski in the journal Nasz Dziennik, 5 June 2003.

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the ranks of LPR as a mistake because he allegedly did not understand the EU. However, only ﬁve days after the referendum, LPR leader Roman Giertych argued in favour of transforming LPR’s anti-EU proﬁle into a nationalist and EU-compatible proﬁle (with slogans such as ‘LPR for Poland within the EU’, emphasis added).24 This pragmatism is even more pronounced with PiS, which also advocated rejection of Polish integration into the EU before the referendum, but interpreted the result of the referendum and EU membership as a ‘destiny’ for Poland, to be accepted once it had happened.25 Overall, it seems that despite a deep-seated distrust of the EU (with even some racist undertones) among the three Polish parties discussed here, opposition to Polish EU-membership is not a central programmatic feature or deﬁning element of these parties. Rather, these parties, especially Samoobrona and the LPR, used the campaign for the referendum and its outcome in order to position themselves favourably in the electoral arena and to attract new supporters, which seemed to have paid off in the European elections of 2004, although it worked better for the PiS and the LPR than for Samoobrona. In contrast with the complex situation in Poland, the party sector of the radical right in other Central European accession countries looks rather simple – and shrinking. Table 13.2 provides an overview of the electoral fate of these parties or their candidates, and reveals signs of waning electoral strength in Hungary and the Czech Republic, but a stable potential in the unstable party system in Poland. In the Czech Republic, the most important party on the radical right is the ‘Republicans’ (Sdruzení pro republiku − Republikánská strana Ceskoslovenska, SPR-RNC), founded in 1989 and led by Miroslav Sladek. This party, modelled after the Russian Liberal Democratic Party and the German Republikaner, is openly xenophobic and the only Czech party that does not accept the secession of Slovakia. Its dreams of an ‘ethnically pure’ greater Czechoslovakia (comprising only Slavic people) are combined with visions of a paternalistic and corporatist (authoritarian) state.26 In 1994, the party had about 25,000 members, thus making it the third largest party in the Czech Republic and, compared with the German Republikaner or DVU, an unusually strong radical right-wing party.27 Nonetheless, in the 1998 parliamentary elections, the SPR-RNC lost all their seats.

24 In an interview with Gazeta Wyborcza, 13 June 2003; see Klemenska, op. cit., pp. 57f. 25 Ibid., pp. 83–90. 26 See Szayna (op. cit., p. 125). 27 Brendgens (1998), Demokratische Konsolidierung in der Tschechischen Republik, unpublished Master’s Thesis (Heidelberg: University of Heidelberg), p. 60.

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Table 13.2

269

Electoral performance of the Central European Radical Right: Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary

Country and Date

Election Type

Candidate/Party

Poland 1990

presidential**

1991

parliamentary†

1993

parliamentary

1997

parliamentary

Leszek Moczulski(KPN) KPN ZChN and allies KPN ZChN and allies [AWS§]

2001

parliamentary

LPR Samoobrona

Votes (in per cent; bold if seats)* 2.6 7.4 8.7 5.8 6.3 [33.8] 7.9 10.2 9.5

PiS CzechRepublic 1990± 1992± 1992 1996 1998 2002 Hungary 1990 1994 1998 2002

parliamentary parliamentary parliamentary parliamentary parliamentary parliamentary

– SPR-RSC SPR-RSC SPR-RSC SPR-RSC SPR-RSC

7.5 6.0 8.0 3.9 1.0

parliamentary parliamentary parliamentary parliamentary

MIÉP MIÉP MIÉP MIÉP

– 1.6 5.5 4.4

*Most East European electoral systems are based on the principle of proportional representation with a threshold of 4 or 5 per cent (in Poland, electoral alliances such as AWS needed at least 8 per cent to enter parliament). **Presidential election, ﬁrst round only. †Parliamentary elections, ﬁrst chamber only. §An alliance of the moderate Right (Solidarnosc) and radical Right (ROP, ZChN, Radio Maryja). ±Czech part of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic’s national assembly

The Hungarian radical right is dominated by Istvan Czurka’s Hungarian Justice and Life Party (Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja, MIÉP) which split off in 1993 from the conservative Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokráta Fórum, MDF), one of the major players in the 1989–90 ‘Velvet Revolution’. The MIÉP espouses antiSemitic and biological-nativist views and advocates a recovery of the old Hungarian territory which now belongs to Romania, Ukraine, and Slovakia. It thus refuses to accept the Treaty of Trianon of 1919 which settled the current borders between

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Hungary and its neighbouring states. Precisely for this reason, MIÉP is much less Eurosceptic than its Polish counterparts. Because of the national ‘status law’ that grants special relationships between the Hungarian state and Hungarians living in neighbouring countries (such as Romania), and because a large group of Hungarians living in Slovakia joined the EU as well, MIÉP has softened its criticism of the EU to the point where on the eve of Hungary’s accession to the EU, it issued an ofﬁcial statement endorsing EU accession.28 Although Czurka claims not to be anti-Semitic, he shares with openly anti-Jewish neo-Nazis the goal to expose what he sees as a world-wide Judeo-liberal-cosmopolitan conspiracy, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and George Soros.29 But like its Czech counterpart, the MIÉP dropped out of parliament in the last general elections in 2002 when it reached only 4.4 per cent, thus narrowly missing the ﬁve-per cent threshold. Right-Wing Mobilization Potential in Central Europe In general, the mobilization potential for the radical right in central (and eastern) Europe seems rather large, but not signiﬁcantly larger than in Western democracies.30 Survey data reveals sizeable currents of nationalism, anti-Semitism and right-wing self-identiﬁcation among the populations of various countries in the region (see Table 13.3). In the early 1990s, patriotic or nationalist attitudes were only slightly higher in the East than in the West. Anti-Semitism was relatively strong in Poland, as were irredentist feelings regarding ‘lost territories’.31 This is supported by more recent data. In a Polish survey in 2000, 55 per cent reported that they have heard statements like ‘Jews are governing Poland’ in their immediate surroundings, almost 49 per cent heard ‘Jews are running the world’, and 17 per cent reported Holocaust denial.32 Among Hungarians, 25 per cent of respondents in a 1998 survey were classiﬁed as

28 Bock (2004), Rechtsradikale Mobilisierung im postsozialistischen Ungarn – Ideologische Altlast oder transformationsbedingter Protest?, unpublished Master’s Thesis (Frankfurt/Oder: Europa-Universität Viadrina), p. 65; see also Bock, A. (2002), ‘Ungarn: Die‚Wahrheits − und Lebenspartei’ zwischen Ethnozentrismus und Rassismus’, Osteuropa 52(3), pp. 280–92. 29 See Karsai (1999), ‘The Radical Right in Hungary’, in Ramet (ed.), p. 143. 30 For the concept and measuring of the radical right-wing mobilization potential which includes components of right-wing self-identiﬁcation, nationalism, anti-system orientations, anti-Semitism and racism, authoritarianism and religious fundamentalism, see Minkenberg (1998), op. cit., Chapters 5 and 6. For the problem of nationalism in Eastern Europe, see Brubaker (1996), Nationalism Reframed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 31 An international comparison of Anti-Semitic attitudes in Poland, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic revealed that Poland ranked consistently higher than the other two countries across various measures. Communication from Werner Bergmann, Technische Universität Berlin, Zentrum für Antisemitismusforschung, February 1999. See also Oschlies, W. (1995), ‘Antisemitismus im postkommunistischen Osteuropa (I),’ Berichte des BIOst 21/1995. 32 Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej (2000), ‘Poles – Jews’, Survey 112.

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33

anti-Semitic. On the other hand, anti-migration feelings seem rather low compared with western countries, a result of the general direction of migration in Europe from east to west while there is widespread resentment against the largest regional minority, the Roma, which, except for in Poland, ranges between 5 per cent (Hungary) and 9 per cent (Romania) of the population in central and southeast Europe.34 In Poland, antipathy against Germans, which was rather high in the early 1990s (53 per cent expressing dislike of Germans in 1993), declined over the 1990s and ranges around 35 per cent in the new century. Nationalities which consistently rank high on the antipathy scale of Poles after 2000 include Roma (around 60 per cent), Arabs (around 60 per cent), Romanians (around 56 per cent), Ukrainians (around 50 per cent), Jews (around 47 per cent), and Russians (around 47 per cent). Interestingly, other East European groups such as the Baltic neighbours are seen in a neutral light or even favourably.35 These trends take place in the context of a declining trust in democracy and low levels of conﬁdence in parliament and political parties, on the one hand, and a sizable authoritarianism on the other. Table 13.4 summarizes the trend of dissatisfaction with the working of democracy in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Hungary during the 1990s. It shows that sizable portions of the public in these countries which are sceptical about the functioning of democracy, especially in Hungary. In Poland, the decline of dissatisfaction which set in after 1993 reversed after 1998; between 1998 and 2003, the proportion of those dissatisﬁed with the working of democracy in Poland rose from 47 per cent to over 70 per cent.36 At the same time, support for civil liberties seems rather fragile. In a survey of the mid-1990s, only 27 per cent of Polish respondents agree that police force against protests is ‘never justiﬁed’ (Hungary: 49 per cent, Czech Republic: 44 per cent), 60 per cent of Poles think it is ‘never justiﬁed’ that the government uses force against strikes (Hungary: 74 per cent, Czech Republic: 75 per cent), and only 48 per cent of the Poles agree it is ‘never justiﬁed’ that political parties that disturb the work of the government should be banned (Hungary: 58 per cent, Czech Republic: 77 per cent).37

33 Kovács (1999), ‘Antisemitismus im heutigen Ungarn. Ein Forschungsbericht’, Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung 8, 201. 34 See Barany, Z. (1998), ‘Ethnic mobilization and the state: the Roma in Eastern Europe’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 21(2), pp. 308–27. 35 Data from Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, cited in Strzykala, op. cit., p. 46. 36 Centrum, B. and Społecznej, O. (2003), ‘The Poles about Democracy’, Survey 141. 37 Weiss, H. and Reinprecht, C. (1998), Demokratischer Patriotismus oder ethnischer Nationalismus in Ost − und Mitteleuropa? (Wien), p. 102.

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Table 13.3

USA UK F D-W D-E CS H PL BG R

The radical right-wing mobilization potential in East and West, 1991 (nos. 1 – 6) and 2000 (nos. 7 and 8)

L-R (1)

Patriot. (2)

– – – – – 31 13 20 23 9

88 72 64 74 69 70 70 75 75 60

Right or Irredent. Control AntiAntiWrong (4) (5) semit. (6) parl. (7) (3) 55 56 37 31 16 28 30 47 53 42

– 20 12 43 25 39 68 60 52 22

– 79 86 70 70 65 68 58 38 45

6 14 – 26 – 14/33* 11 34 9 22

– – – – – 12** 20 29 44 54

Strong Leader (8) – – – – – 13** 9 24 35 43

Questions: (1) Right-wing self placement in 1992–1993 (in per cent, EU average 20 per cent). (2) ‘I am very patriotic’ (per cent agree). (3) ‘We should ﬁght for our country, right or wrong’ (per cent agree). (4) ‘There are parts in neighbouring countries which belong to us’ (per cent agree). (5) ‘We should increase the control of access to our country’ (per cent agree). (6) (Inquiring about negative opinions about Jews). (7) ‘It is best to get rid of parliament and have a strong leader who can make fast decisions’ (per cent agree). (8) ‘There are circumstances when a dictatorship is the best form of government’ (per cent agree). Countries: USA: United States of America, UK: United Kingdom, F: France, D-W: Germany, Western part, D-E: Germany, Eastern part, CS: Czechoslovakia (*Czech Republic/Slovakia, **Czech Republic only), H: Hungary, PL: Poland, BG: Bulgaria, R: Russia. Source: Minkenberg, M. (2002), ‘Die radikale Rechte in Mittel- und Osteuropa nach 1989’, in Grumke, T. and Wagner, B. (eds.), Handbuch Rechtsradikalismus (Opladen: Leske + Budrich), pp. 61–74, table 1.

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Table 13.4

273

Dissatisfaction with the democratic system in four central European countries (in per cent)

Poland Czech Republic Slovenia Hungary

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

7.6 14.0

20.7 16.0

32.9

23.1

20.3 11.1 6.5 29.5

20.6 13.8 16.1 25.9

11.0 11.5 13.8 31.8

0.6 13.3 13.5 32.0

5.8 16.6 12.4 20.3

12.8 13.9 10.3 35.4

Source: Jacobs, J. et al. (2003), ‘Persistence of the Democracies in Central and Eastern Europe,’ in Pollack, D. et al. (eds.), Political Culture in post-Communist Europe: Attitudes in New Democracies (Aldershot: Ashgate), p. 97.

In geopolitical terms, there is a higher concern among East Europeans for territorial issues, especially in Hungary, Poland, and Romania, where sizable ethnic minorities live in neighbouring countries or large parts of the former territory was lost after the Second World War. Table 13.3 illustrates a rather high proportion of Poles who in the early 1990s cared for their ‘lost territories’. However, this issue never entered the platform of larger right-wing parties as a campaign tool (unlike the German radical right). The reason why Polish ‘irredentism’ never turned into a hallmark of the radical right can be seen in the complexity of this issue because there are fears that raising the issue of territorial reordering might lead to a similar issue regarding the western Polish (former East Germany) territories.38 The situation is quite different in Hungary, where 17.8 per cent of Hungarians agreed in 1994 that Hungary should try everything to regain the territories lost in the Treaty of Trianon, a proportion that went up to 52.3 per cent agreeing that Hungary should change the border rulings of the 1919 treaty (a somewhat ‘softer’ wording of the previous question).39 In sum, one might conclude that the attitudinal proﬁle of central European mobilization potential for the radical right is shaped in rather classic terms by high levels of nationalism mixed with anti-Semitism and territorial concerns, and is fed by sizable anti-system sentiments. Moreover, the comparison of survey data and electoral results for the radical right in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary points to some congruence between attitudes and voting behaviour, with Poland reaching higher levels in both accounts. The Radical Right in Central Europe: Towards an Analytical Model After having outlined the ideological and organizational shape of the radical right in central Europe and the role of geopolitical issues (EU membership, territorial and minority issues), this article will review the identiﬁcation of crucial variables in the 38 There are no studies known to the author that look into this ‘lacking debate’. However, the explanation of fears of German revisionism was offered to the author by numerous Polish colleagues and students. 39 See Bock (2004), p. 28.

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region’s ‘opportunity structures’ for radical right-wing mobilization.40 This will be done for the region beyond central Europe to better contextualize and compare the central European, and especially Polish, radical right. The variables are derived from the general concept of right-wing radicalism, as outlined earlier, and the particular nature of regime transformation in central and eastern Europe. It lies in the very nature of systems undergoing transformation that regime structures and systems of interest mediation are still being negotiated. Thus, the following factors are identiﬁed as the most crucial components of the radical right’s opportunity structures in central and eastern Europe: nation-building and nationalism (ethnic, cultural and political types of national identity, the role of minorities and ‘homelands’); regime change and political cultures (settled or not, traditions of ‘national communism’); and socioeconomic and cultural conﬂicts and cleavages (‘transformation costs’ and multiple modernization including economic restructuring and secularization).41 These variables are summarized for a number of countries and shown in Table 13.5. The following highlights some characteristics of the cases in Table 13.5. As suggested by this model, the countries under consideration present different opportunity structures for the emergence of right-wing radicalism. The minority issue in some countries (Moldova, Romania and Slovakia) tends to be included in the regime conﬂict, with post-socialist forces instrumentalizing ethnic interests in the battle against handing over power to ‘democrats’, in other words taking stances against minority rights and against full-ﬂedged Western capitalism. In contrast with Poland, Romania should be seen as an ethnic nation, in particular because of the cultivation of Romanian ethnicity under fascist-autocratic Antonescu and communistnationalist Ceausescu at the expense of the Hungarian minority in western Romania – a conﬂict that still carries on today. The Slovak and Czech Republics seem to be similar cases as a result of their common history until the 1992 partition. However, the two countries’ conditions are quite different. The revival of Czech culture and ethnic nationalism in the nineteenth century referred to Bohemia mainly. Tomas Masaryk’s – himself a Slovak – argument of Czechs and Slovaks constituting a joint nation was politically motivated and ﬁrst aimed at constituting an autonomous province within the Hapsburg empire. The only period of reference for an independent Slovakia is the clerical-fascist regime of Jozef Tito from 1939 to 1945. The Velvet Divorce of 1992, then, changed a lot more for the Slovaks than for the Czechs. The Slovaks, whose majority opposed the Divorce,42 had to reorientate themselves both politically and culturally. Moreover, they were faced with a problem the Czechs do not have anymore: the Hungarian minority. All this helps explain why the Czechs were able to overcome regime conﬂict very quickly, whereas Vladimir Meciar’s party, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia 40 For the following see, Minkenberg and Beichelt (2001), ‘Explaining the Radical Right in Transition: Theories of Right-wing Radicalism and Opportunity Structures in Post-socialist Europe’, paper for the APSA 97th Annual Meeting, San Francisco, 29 August–2 September. 41 The full model is elaborated in Minkenberg and Beichelt (2001), op. cit.; and Beichelt and Minkenberg (2002), op. cit., pp. 305–23. 42 Vodicka, K. (1994), ‘Wie der Koalitionsbeschluß zur Auﬂösung der CSFR zustande kam’, Osteuropa, 44, pp. 175–86.

Between Tradition and Transition

Table 13.5

275

Analytic framework for right-wing radical mobilization potential in post-socialist Europe Relevant cleavage variables

Nation type (main mode of reference)

Existence of external national homelands

existence of a national minority (a)

regime contested by major political forces

socioeconomic transformation costs (b)

degree of socio-cultural transformation (c)

Overall degree of modernization (transformation)

Historical and cultural conditions

Czech Republic

high

ethnic

no

no

no

high

very high

Estonia

high

ethnic

no

yes

no

Hungary

high

ethnic

yes

yes

no

high

high

Poland

high

culture

no

no

no

high

high

Romania

high

ethnic

yes

yes

yes

high

high

Slovakia

high

in-ﬂux

no

yes

yes

high

high

Russia

high

culture

yes

yes

yes

very high very high

very high very high

(a) A minimum of 3 per cent of the population. (b) An index based on inequality 93/95 (GINI index), change of inequality (between 87/88 and 93/95) and change of real GDP (between 1989 and 2000). (c) A measure derived from churchgoing statistics and value orientations. Source: Minkenberg and Beichelt (2001), op. cit.

(HZDS), had to rely to a much greater extent on the old elites of the Czechoslovak Republic, especially at the subnational level. The remaining countries are all characterized by the fact that regime conﬂict has been largely resolved: all relevant political forces clearly prefer the democratic regime to the former socialist one. Estonia gained independence in the early 1990s, but had already experienced a period of statehood between the wars. Rule by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, and the deliberate migration of Russians to Estonia during the entire Soviet period, left deep traces and fostered a clearly ethnic sense

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of nationhood in Estonia. Its whole political sphere is marked by the elite’s will to escape Russian power as much and as soon as possible; there is no regime conﬂict but an unusual elite consensus concerning political and economic questions. In Hungary, a cultural sense of nationhood developed under the auspices of the dual monarchy. Then, however, due to the Treaty of Trianon, the country lost two-thirds of its former territory, with several millions of Hungarians suddenly living outside their native state. The question of external homelands heavily burdened the inter-war regime and eventually led to an authoritarian regime with fascist traits. Therefore, deﬁning oneself as Hungarian today has a strong ethnic ring.43 The Polish nation is marked by a strong sense of cultural nationhood. The main contributing factors include the long history of partition and foreign rule, the role of the Catholic church in providing a focus of national identity, and the results of the Second World War, in particular the territorial and population shift to the west and the disappearance of ethnic minorities.44 In Poland, the character of the inter-war regime seems to be more heavily debated than in some other central European states where authoritarian rulers took over the weak democracies during the inter-war period. The antagonism between pro-Russian Roman Dmowski and anti-Russian Jozef Pilsudski experienced a revival after 1989 (see above). The ﬁnal portion of this paper provides an empirical overview with regard to the key factors of the model presented (see Table 13.6). The selection of variables for the opportunity structures is directly related to the analytic framework outlined earlier. Those which have been identiﬁed as facilitating the emergence of the radical right are shaded. Because of the near empirical overlap with levels of socioeconomic and sociocultural transformation costs, these dimensions have been merged. The overall empirical ﬁndings reveal some interesting patterns. In cases with more than two facilitating variables, the radical right can count on higher levels of electoral support. This is true for the Czech Republic and Hungary where rightwing radical parties only play a minor role, and for Romania and Russia, where strong right-wing radical groups coexist with communist nationalist parties. This leads to a second important ﬁnding. Countries with a strong pre-1989 communistnationalist tradition seem to produce the fascist-autocratic variant of right-wing radicalism as the major party type. Here, the radical Right does has a problematic effect on the development of democracy. Due to the interplay of the radical Right and the post-communist left ( a ‘Weimarization’), a growth in the party system of the political extremes happen at the expense of the (democratic) centre and causes an obstruction of the normal policy process. Thirdly, racist or ethnocentrist types of right-wing radical parties dominate the scene in cases where democracy has taken root. This raises the question of whether these parties are merely ‘catching up’ with western European cases. But as shown above, these parties’ leaders and 43 Fischer, H. (1999), Eine kleine Geschichte Ungarns (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp), pp. 138–46; see also Bock (2004), op. cit. 44 Davies, N. (2000), Im Herzen Europas. Geschichte Polens (München: Beck), pp. 292–5; Porter, B. (2000), When Nationalism Began to Hate. Imagining Modern Politics in Nineteenth Century Poland (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 20.

Between Tradition and Transition

Table 13.6

Opportunity structures and right-wing radical electoral potential in post-socialist Europe Opportunity structures

no

yes

no

very high

0

0

E

yes

yes

no

high

0

5.0

5.0 Ethnocentrist

E

no

no

no

(very) high

0

2.5

2.5 Ethnocentrist

In ﬂux

no

yes

yes

high

0

7.2

7.2 Ethnocentrist

C

no

no

no

high

0

C

yes

yes

yes

very high

23.3

E

yes

yes

yes

high

29.1 14.4 43.5 Fascist-autocratic

Sum

Dominant party type (e)

Transformation costs

E

Nationalist parties (a) (c)

Regime conﬂict: regime contested by major political forces

Non reformed postcommunist parties with ‘communist-nationalist’ predecessors (pre-1989) (a) (b)

Existence of a strong national minority

Russia (1993–2000) Romania (1990–2000)

Existence of external homelands

Poland (1991–2001)

Electoral potential

Nation type (E = ethnic, C = culture) Estonia (1992–2000) Hungary (1990–2002) Czech Republic (1992–2002) Slovakia (1992–2000)

277

0

Ethnocentrist, (d) 19.8 populist, 19.8 fundamentalist 8.6 31.9 Fascist-autocratic

(a) Average result of the last two elections until end of time frame indicated in national parliamentary elections. (b) Parties included: Romania: PDSR, Russia: KPRF. (c) Parties included: Czech Republic: SPR-RSC, Hungary: MIÉP; Poland: KPN, ZChN, LPR, PiS, Samoobrona; Slovakia: SNS, Romania: PUNR, PRM, Russia: LDPR. (d) For Poland, this ﬁgure is the average of the 1993 and 2001 election results for the parties discussed above (see Table 13.2) because of the difﬁculty in determining the rightwing radical vote in 1997 when some of these parties ran on the AWS ticket. (e) For classiﬁcation see Table 13.1 and text above.

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platforms advocate more backwards-looking ideologies, notably with regard to ‘lost territories’, open anti-Semitism and anti-democratic sentiments. The European elections results of 2004 conﬁrm these trends. Conclusion Since the end of the 1990s, and especially at the time of accession to the EU, there are some diverging trends among the radical right in central Europe. In Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the radical right played a minor role in the 2004 European elections; in Poland it was the clear winner, next to the conservative bloc. Clearly the new European order can help to address this divergence by opening up new opportunities and bringing back old issues of neighbourly relations. But the EU as an issue does not contribute much by itself. Rather, larger issues of national identity, the strength of nationalist traditions, and country-speciﬁc features may supersede narrow foreign policy concerns. In the Polish case, for example, these cannot be understood without reference to the inter-war conﬂict between a ‘western’ (Pilsudski) and an ‘eastern’ orientation (Dmowski) and the role of Catholicism in shaping national identity and discourses. Today, Polish Catholicism is suffering a split replicating the old East-West divide, and this seems a particularly important factor for the contemporary radical right and its outlook. Acronyms EU LPR MIÉP NOP PiS PO SPR-RNC

European Union Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families) Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja (Hungarian Justice and Life Party) Party of Polish National Rebirth Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc (Law and Justice) Platforma Obywatelska (Citizens Platform) Sdruzení pro republiku – Republikánská strana Ceskoslovenska

References Backes, U. and Jesse, E. (1989), Politischer Extremismus in Deutschland (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung). Bárány, Z. (1998), ‘Ethnic Mobilization and the State: the Roma in Eastern Europe’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 21(2). Beichelt, T. and Minkenberg, M. (2002), ‘Rechtsradikalismus in Transformationsgesellschaften, Entstehungsbedingungen und Erklärungsmodell’, Osteuropa, 2(3). Bergmann, W. (1994), ‘Ein Versuch, die extreme Rechte als soziale Bewegung zu beschreiben’ in Neonazis und rechte Subkultur. Bergmann, W. and Erb, R. (eds.) (Berlin: Metropol Verlag).

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Bergmann, W. and Erb, R., (eds.) (1994), Neonazis und rechte Subkultur (Berlin: Metropol Verlag). Betz, H.-G. (2003), ‘The Growing Threat of the Radical Right’ in Right-wing Extremism in the 21st Century. Merkl, P. and Weinberg, L. (eds.) (London: Frank Cass Publishers). Bock, A. (2002), ‘Ungarn: Die “Wahrheits − und Lebenspartei” zwischen Ethnozentrismus und Rassismus’, Osteuropa, 52(3). ––– (2004), ‘Rechtsradikale Mobilisierung im postsozialistischen Ungarn – Ideologische Altlast oder transformationsbedingter Protest?’ Master’s thesis (Frankfurt/Oder: Europa-Universität Viadrina). Brendgens, G. (1998), ‘Demokratische Konsolidierung in der Tschechischen Republik’, unpublished Master’s Thesis (Heidelberg: University of Heidelberg). Brubaker, R. (1996), Nationalism Reframed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Centrum, B. and Społecznej, O. (2000), ‘Poles – Jews’, Survey 112. ––– (2003), ‘The Poles about Democracy’, Survey 141. Cheles, L. et al., (eds.) (1995), The Far Right in Western and Eastern Europe (London: Longman). Davies, N. (2000), Im Herzen Europas. Geschichte Polens (Munich: Beck). Fischer, H. (1999), Eine kleine Geschichte Ungarns (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp). Grott, B. (1994), ‘Ruch narodowy w Polsce postkommunistyczenj’, Arka, 53/54. Grumke, T. and Wagner, B., (eds.) (2002), Handbuch Rechtsradikalismus (Opladen: Leske + Budrich). Grün, M. (2004), ‘Phänomen Samoobrona’ in Zur etablierten Parte i?. Vom, B. (ed.), unpublished Masters Thesis (Frankfurt/Oder: Europa-Universität Viadrina). Ignazi, P. (2003), Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Jacobs, J. et al. (2003), ‘Persistence of the Democracies in Central and Eastern Europe’ in Pollack et al. (eds.). Kalina, T. (2000), ‘Polskie Partie Narodowe’. unpublished Master’s Thesis (Warsaw: Institute of Political Science, Warsaw University). Karsai, L. (1999), ‘The Radical Right in Hungary’ in Ramet (ed.). Klemenska, K. (2003), ‘The Polish Political Parties Opposing EU-Accession’. unpublished Masters Thesis (Frankfurt/Oder: Europa-Universität Viadrina). Kopecky, P. and Mudde, C. (2002), ‘Two Sides of Euro-Scepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East-Central Europe’, European Union Politics, 3(3). [DOI: 10.1177/1465116502003003002] Kornak, M. (2003), ‘Cien’, Nigdy Wiecej, 13. Kovács, A. (1999), ‘Antisemitismus im heutigen Ungarn, Ein Forschungsbericht’, Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung, 8. Luciano Cheles et al., (eds.) (1995), The Far Right in Western and Eastern Europe (London: Longman ). Merkl, P. and Weinberg, L., (eds.) (1997), The Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the Nineties (London: Frank Cass Publishers). ––– (eds.) (2003), Right-wing Extremism in the 21st Century (London: Frank Cass Publishers).

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Minkenberg, M. (1998), Die neue radikale Rechte im Vergleich. USA, Frankreich, Deutschland (Opladen/Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag). ––– (2002), ‘Die radikale Rechte in Mittel − und Osteuropa nach 1989’ in Handbuch Rechtsradikalismus. Grumke, T. and Wagner, B. (eds.) (Opladen: Leske + Budrich). ––– (2002), ‘The Radical Right in Post-Socialist Central and Eastern Europe: Comparative Observations and Interpretations’, East European Politics and Society, 16(2). ––– (2003), ‘The West European Radical Right as a Collective Actor: Modeling the Impact of Cultural and Structural Variables on Party Formation and Movement Mobilization’, Comparative European Politics, 1. [DOI: 10.1057/palgrave. cep.6110017] Minkenberg, M. and Beichelt, T. (2001), ‘Explaining the Radical Right in Transition: Theories of Right-Wing Radicalism and Opportunity Structures in Post-Socialist Europe’, Paper for the APSA 97th Annual Meeting, San Francisco, 29 August–2 September. ––– (eds.) (2003), Cultural Legacies in Post-Socialist Europe: the Role of the Various Pasts in the Current Transformation Process FIT-Working Papers (Frankfurt/ Oder: Frankfurt Institute for Transformation Studies). Mudde, C. (2000), The Ideology of the Extreme Right (Manchester: Manchester University Press Books). Oschlies, W. (1995), ‘Antisemitismus im postkommunistischen Osteuropa (I)’, Berichte des BIOst, 21, 1995. Ost, D. (1999), ‘The Radical Right of Poland: Rationality of the Irrational’ in Ramet (ed.). Pollack, D. et al., (eds.) (2003), Political Culture in Post-Communist Europe: Attitudes in New Democracies (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing). Porter, B. (2000), When Nationalism Began to Hate. Imagining Modern Politics in Nineteenth Century Poland (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Prazmowska, A. (1995), ‘The New Right in Poland: Nationalism, Anti-Semitism and Parliamentarianism’ in Cheles et al. (eds.). Ramet, S., (ed.) (1999), The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe Since 1989 (University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press). Rucht, D. (1994), Modernisierung und neue soziale Bewegungen (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag). Scheuch, E. and Klingemann, H.-D. (1967), ‘Theorie des Rechtsradikalismus in westlichen Industriegesellschaften’, Hamburger Jahrbuch für Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftspolitik, 12. Stankiewicz, K. (2000), ‘Die “neuen Dmowskis” – eine alte Ideologie in neuem Gewand?’, Osteuropa, 52(3). Strzykala, A. (2004), ‘Rechsradikalismus in Polen nach 1989’. unpublished Masters Thesis (Frankfurt/Oder: Europa-Univeristät Viadrina). Szayna, T. (1997), ‘The Extreme Right Political Movements in Post-Communist Central Europe’ in Merkl and Weinberg (eds.). Tarrow, S. (1994), Power in Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

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Vodicka, K. (1994), ‘Wie der Koalitionsbeschluß zur Auﬂösung der CSFR zustande kam’, Osteuropa, 44. von Beyme, K. (1988), ‘Right-wing Extremism in Post-War Europe’, Western European Politics, 11(2). Walicki, A. (2000), ‘The Troubling Legacy of Roman Dmowski’, East European Politics and Society, 14(1). Weiss, H. and Reinprecht, C. (1998), Demokratischer Patriotismus oder ethnischer Nationalismus in Ost- und Mitteleuropa? (Wien).

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Chapter 14

A Speciﬁc Variant of Neo-Populism: Foreign and Security Policies of Extreme Right Parties in the European Parliament Elections in 2004 Volker Ahlemeyer

Introduction The last several decades have seen a tremendous increase in the amount of attention paid by academics to neo-populism, which is most frequently associated with rightwing populism. Most scholarly work takes what could be termed an anatomical approach and seeks to establish a set of criteria to explain what parties representing such policies look like and where they come from. This has proven to be very fertile ground for study, with debates ranging from the relationship of such parties to interwar fascist movements to assessments of the parties’ organizational features. A pitched battle has also emerged on the question of what accounts for the rise of these actors – is their emergence the result of new political cleavages or the politicization of particular policy issues? While this literature has contributed to a better understanding of the appearance and growth of the phenomenon, it does not offer much help in explaining the behaviour of the party political actors involved. Scant attention has been focused so far on the particular policies pursued by these parties and how they seek to achieve their political goals once they have become established political actors. The tendency to conﬂate the right wing or neo-populism with a small subset of political priorities – resistance to immigration being chief among them – has meant that hardly any effort has been made to analyse certain speciﬁc policy areas. The aim of this paper is to provide a ﬁrst step towards ﬁlling this gap by analysing the foreign and security agenda of a speciﬁc subset of political parties who advocate neo-populist policies – a subset that has remained highly controversial over the course of the last two decades, namely extreme-right parties (ERPs). More speciﬁcally, the analysis focuses on these parties’ strategies and policies in the European Parliament with the ultimate aim of assessing their ability to build cross-party coalitions within the extreme right. With the increased success of the group of ‘Eurosceptic’ parties in the European Parliament elections in 2004, it seems necessary to start with a discussion of which parties will be the focus of this chapter and why they are labelled as ERPs rather than as something else. The second section serves to put cooperation between these parties

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into a broader context by analysing their behaviour in the European Parliament from the mid-1980s onwards. As we will see, while attempts have been made to overcome their differences, divisions have been more common than cooperation for most of this time. The last two parts of the analysis will focus on the current behaviour of the parties in terms of foreign and security policies and the implication this might have on the level of success in European elections. Here, the focus is on the parties’ stances toward the Iraq war – likely the most salient issue in this area over the last two years. The aim is to ﬁnd an answer to the following question: Are there elements of a common neo-populist or extreme-right position in foreign and security policies at the European level? If so, this would make one expect enhanced cooperation between the parties in this category in the upcoming legislative period. If not, it would be interesting to analyse the variables that determine the stance of the different parties. Does their role as governmental partners or opposition forces in national parliaments have an impact on their stance? Is it the different ideologies that they adhere to that can account for differences? Or do they try to highlight different issues in the general political debate by supporting or opposing the war in Iraq? Extreme-Right Parties: A Speciﬁc ‘Face’ of Neo-Populism A few words should be said on this study’s use of certain expressions, such as ‘neopopulism’ or ‘ERP’, and what it assumes as common points, overlaps and potential divergences. The ﬁeld of research is especially particular about its terminology and the academic literature is ﬁlled with a wide variety of scholarly terms used to describe these parties: ‘the New Radical Right’,1 ‘radical right-wing populist parties’,2 ‘neopopulist parties’,3 ‘anti-immigrant parties’4 and ‘anti-political-establishment parties’5 are only a few examples. Cas Mudde describes this situation as a ‘War of Words’6 and justiﬁably so. Each label carries with it a speciﬁc understanding of this family of 1 Kitschelt, H. (1995), The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press). 2 Betz, H.-G. (1993), ‘The New Politics of Resentment: Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe’, Comparative Politics 25(4), pp. 413–28; Betz, H.-G. (1994), Radical-Right Wing Populism in Western Europe (London: Macmillan Press). 3 Immerfall, S. (1996), ‘Party Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and the Future of the West European Party System’, West European Politics 19(2), pp. 410−15. 4 van der Brug, W., Fennema, M. and Tillie, J. (2000), ‘Anti-immigrant Parties in Europe: Ideological or Protest Vote’, European Journal of Political Research 37(1), pp. 77– 102. 5 Schedler, A. (1996), ‘Anti-Political-Establishment Parties’, Party Politics 2(3), pp. 291–312; Abedi, A. (2002), ‘Challenges to Established Parties: The Effects of Party System Features on the Electoral Fortunes of Anti-Political-Establishment Parties’, European Journal of Political Research 41(4), pp. 551–83; Fennema, M. (1997), ‘Some Conceptual Issues and Problems in the Comparison of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe’, Party Politics 5(3), pp. 473–92. 6 Mudde, C. (1996), ‘The War of Words: Deﬁning the Extreme Right Party Family’, West European Politics 19(2), pp. 225–48.

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political parties as well as a particular set of assumptions regarding their origins and their electoral success. However, the full breadth of this debate is beyond the scope of this work. Therefore, the upcoming paragraphs merely serve to explain brieﬂy why the term ‘extreme right’ is used and what it encompasses in this particular analysis. The reasons for choosing this term are as follows. Besides ‘extreme right’, the concept most commonly employed in the literature remains that of ‘populism’.7 Taggart talks about new populism which he distinguishes from neo-fascism insofar as it combines nationalism with neo-liberal economic policies. He prefers the term populism because it invokes the notion of a people who is characterized, in his opinion, more by whom they exclude (for example immigrants) than by whom they include.8 Hans-Georg Betz talks about ‘radical right-wing populist parties’ in a somewhat similar way. For him, these parties are: [R]adical in their rejection of the established sociocultural and sociopolitical system and their advocacy of individual achievement, a free marketplace, and a drastic reduction of the role of the state. They are right-wing in their rejection of individual and social equality, in their opposition to the social integration of marginalized groups, and in their appeal to xenophobia, if not overt racism. They are populist in their instrumentalization of sentiments of anxiety and disenchantment and their appeal to the common man and his allegedly superior sense.9

However, others argue that the distinction between the right and the extreme right is not clear enough in the term populism. Additionally, populism does not describe a political current, but merely deﬁnes a speciﬁc form of political relations between the politicians, parties and the people.10 What is most important for our analysis is the following point: the term populism does indeed describe a major feature of the group of parties under discussion. However, it does not distinguish parties, such as the French Front National (FN), the Lega Nord (LN) and others clearly enough from other, ‘more moderate’ ones. Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, Jacques Chirac’s Union pour un mouvement populaire might well be included. It also remains unclear how to treat Eurosceptic groups, such as the UK Independence Party, Charles Pasqua’s list or even the newly emerged Liste Martin in this regard. It seems as if they appeal to popular resentments against Brussels (and the loss of national sovereignty) and could therefore also be included. This study focuses on a representative sample of parties selected because they share enough common characteristics to enable them to be compared over time.

7 Betz (1994), op. cit.; Betz (1998), op. cit.; Immerfall, S. (1998), ‘Conclusion: The Neo-Populist Agenda’, in Betz, H.-G. and Immerfall, S. (eds.), The New Politics of the Right; Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies (London: Macmillan); Taggart, P. (1995), ‘New Populist Parties in Western Europe’, West European Politics 18(1), pp. 34–51; Immerfall (1996), op. cit. 8 Taggart (1995), op. cit. 9 Betz (1993), op. cit., p. 413. 10 Kowalsky, W. and Schröder, W. (eds.) (1994), Rechtsextremismus – Einführung und Forschungsbilanz (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag), pp. 7–22; Mudde (1996), op. cit., p. 231.

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Bearing such factors in mind, the FN, the LN, the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ), Vlaams Blok (VB) and the Dansk Folkeparti (DF) have become the focal point of this analysis. These parties are referred to here using the term ‘extremeright party’, which follows the analysis and choice of other authors in the ﬁeld, such as Cas Mudde and Piero Ignazi.11 These parties are generally considered to be on the extreme right of the left–right political spectrum by both academics and the general public – a scale that is widely accepted for its validity and believed to be most suitable scale on which to examine parties.12 Under no circumstances does this mean that other features often used in a synonymous sense or to describe a broader group, such as neo-populism or right-wing populism, would not ﬁt these parties. They clearly do. However, for the purpose of this study, the term ERP remains the most suitable. The History of Extreme-Right Cooperation in the European Parliament While it is often mentioned how ERPs inspired themselves in their political and electoral projects,13 cooperation between these parties at the European level has only received scant attention in the academic literature. One obvious reason for this lack of attention might be the inability of the different actors to build alliances in the European Parliament. As Pascal Perrineau mentions in his introduction to Hans-Georg Betz’s new book: Up to this point, the radical populist right has not managed to substantially destabilise the European scene and for the last two sessions, there has no longer been an autonomous extreme right grouping in the European Parliament.14

Whereas the general assessment of this claim is correct, several clariﬁcations for the latter period are needed in the following historical overview of ERP cooperation. These parties actually have a common, albeit difﬁcult history of cooperation in the European Parliament. This started soon after the more widespread success of ERPs in the early 1980s. More speciﬁcally, the French Front National, the Italian Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) and the Greek National Political Union (EPEN) were able to form an interparliamentary group later their successes in European elections in 1984. However, increased success became as much a dividing as a uniting factor and divisions emerged ﬁve years after when more groups wanted to 11 Ignazi, P. (2003), Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Mudde (1996), op. cit. 12 Sani, G. and Sartori, G. (1983), ‘Polarization, Fragmentation and Competition in Western Democracies’, in Daalder, H. and Mair, P. (eds.), Western European Party Systems; Continuity and Change, pp. 307–40; Mair, P. (1997), Party System Change – Approaches and Interpretations (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 26–7. 13 See for example Bell, D. (2000), Parties and Democracy in France: Parties under Presidentialism (Aldershot: Ashgate), p. 128. 14 Perrineau, P. (2004), ‘Introduction’, in Betz, H.-G., La droite populiste en Europe: extrême et démocrate (Paris: Autrement/Cevipof), p. 11.

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join. While the Greek Member of the European Parliament (MEP) was not re-elected, the German Republikaner, the Lega Lombarda and the Vlaams Blok were able to win representation in the European Parliament for the ﬁrst time. However, nationalist tensions emerged between the Republikaner and the MSI over the disputed AustroItalian border province of South Tyrol. The Republikaner was unwilling to work with the MSI, which led the latter to leave the group. The other ERPs were unable to establish a common group until about 1994; despite being part of a common group, cooperation came with great difﬁculty, if at all. This period was marked by a high degree of tension between the different parties, often culminating in exchanging accusations of being fascists or Nazis.15 Unwilling to endure such strife for another parliamentary session, the MEPs chose to have non-attached status in the subsequent legislative period from 1994 to 1999. From 1999 onwards, however, a new situation emerged: the FN, the VB, Lega Nord and the FPÖ remained non-attached whereas the DF, the Alleanza Nazionale (AN) and the Gaullist splinter group around Charles Pasqua became part of the Europe of Nations group. However, differences quickly surfaced within and among non-attached parties and Europe of Nations group. Divisions emerged especially between the AN and FPÖ on the one hand, which sought to gain respectability, and the more pronounced anti-system stance of the FN and the VB on the other. While the former two parties did not manage to establish a closer link (mostly due to the resistance of the AN), the latter two parties cooperated on a daily basis.16 Attempts at alliance building continue to more recent elections. Just before the European elections in June 2004, FPÖ documents showed that the party tried to establish closer links to the VB. The magazine of the FPÖ’s youth organization published a special article on the history and aims of the VB in an edition preceding the elections. Additionally, the FPÖ’s chief ideologist Andreas Mölzer speciﬁcally mentions the party with regard to future alliances. However, with view to other partners, only the name of the LN is mentioned.17 This seems to be another indication of how difﬁcult it is for these parties to cooperate on a wider scale. The evidence clearly indicates that ERPs do not consider themselves to be a monolithic group within the European Parliament. Several attempts have been made to establish a common caucus in the Parliament, but have met with little success. Other attempts at cooperation have been almost exclusively between two ERPs without any effort to forge a broader coalition. Such ﬁndings give a picture of a very heterogeneous group of parties that nevertheless share the label ‘extreme-right party’. This is in line with several studies that have tried to classify these parties into

15 Fieschi, C. (2000), ‘European Institutions: The Far-Right and Illiberal Politics in a Liberal Context’, Parliamentary Affairs 53(3), pp. 517–31. 16 Fieschi (2000), op. cit., pp. 524−25. 17 Ring Freiheitlicher Jugend (2004), Tangente, vol. 2.

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different sub-groups either according to the phase in which they emerged18, or to different features and policies on which they focus.19 The Extreme Right Agenda on Foreign and Security Issues in the Run-up to European Elections in 2004 Current research on extreme-right parties often focuses on the parties’ ideology and on their stance on different issues, mainly immigration. However, no comprehensive comparative study has analysed their foreign policy agenda so far. While the parties’ position towards European integration is widely known, their foreign policy priorities remain less explored: what is their position concerning the Rapid Reaction Force? What do they propose in regards to the Israel-Palestine conﬂict? What was their stance towards the South African apartheid regime? All of these questions would give important insight into the parties’ positions on national self-determination, their stance towards authoritarian regimes, the propensity to prefer military solutions, or the preference for anti-Arab, anti-Semitic or anti-American sentiments. Unfortunately, the upcoming analysis cannot address all these questions. However, by choosing the Iraq war as a case study, many of these questions can be addressed. As this was the main issue in the ﬁeld of foreign and security policies in the period before the 2004 European elections, the analysis cannot only serve to examine the different party’s preferences, but also to examine the parties’ interaction at the European level. Observation # 1: no common ERP position The ﬁrst observation one can draw from the experience with the Iraq war is that there were conﬂicting views among the ERPs on how to deal with the situation. The only common point in the positions of the different parties is their ‘extremeness’, either in favour or against. The group of opponents most importantly included the FN and the FPÖ, whereas the LN and the DF supported action. Only the Alleanza Nazionale seemed to have adopted a somewhat more moderate approach, which was nonetheless consistently in favour of intervention. This behaviour seems to be in line with its general policy since 1995, in which the party tried to gain respectability by attempting a strategic move towards less extreme, more centrist policies in preparation for the post-Berlusconi era. Observation # 2: ERPs supported their coalition partners A second observation is that the three actors that are part of a national government coalition – the FPÖ in Austria and the AN and LN in Italy – all backed the actions of their senior government partners. This position was born neither from loyalty to 18 See for example Ignazi, P. (1992), ‘The Silent Counter-Revolution. Hypotheses on the Emergence of Extreme Right Wing Parties in Europe’, European Journal of Political Research 22(3), pp. 3–34. 19 See for example Kitschelt (1995), op. cit.

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their coalition nor from political opportunism; rather, the reasons for their stance ﬁt well with their traditional strategies and political behaviour. For the FPÖ, the issue seemed to be of vital importance at the European, as well as at the national, level. Hans Kronberger was one of the few MEPs to give a statement at each of the two European parliamentary sessions on the situation in Iraq preceding the war as well as on the occasion of a special session after the start of the war. In his opinion it was a ‘preventive war of aggression’ and Europe had a moral obligation to prevent the conﬂict.20 The FPÖ constructed its campaign for the European elections in 2004 around this issue. Kronberger tried to start a signature campaign for a petition against the war at the European level, and Jörg Haider demanded that Austria stop payments to the EU as long as European soldiers were stationed in Iraq.21 These actions seem in line with earlier policies of the party and especially of its former chairman Jörg Haider. His visit to Baghdad in February 2002, at a time when the Iraqi government was being increasingly ostracized, was a number one issue in the Austrian media. It gained even more importance as it coincided with the visit of Vice-Chancellor Simone Riess-Passer to the United States. The objective of Haider’s visit seems somehow unclear. Melanie Sully seems to suggest that it was a political manoeuvre by Haider to demonstrate power. Furthermore, she suspects Haider to have had further political goals, notably at the European level, surpassing his governorship in Carinthia.22 While Haider stayed in Klagenfurt at the time, the party had indeed already used different levels of governance, most importantly the local and the state level, for its own purposes before: the state elections in Carinthia and Vorarlberg in 1999, in which the party built a coalition with the Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP), seems to have led to a ‘spill-up’ effect and national cooperation in the next legislative elections. The Lega Nord had its own reasons, that were based on its traditional policy programme, for supporting the intervention in Iraq. The party’s MEP Mario Borghezio linked the intervention to a rise of Islamic fundamentalism, not only in Arab countries, but also among Arab immigrants in European cities.23 Thus, in the European Parliament’s debates on Iraq he stressed the need to ﬁght terrorist Islamic groups that found shelter within the European Union.24 The strong link drawn by the LN between the war and immigration was emblematic of the party’s increasing stress on immigration policy since the mid-1990s. This became even clearer after the murder of an Italian hostage Fabrizio Quattrocchi in June 2004, which led the party to demand massive deportations of Muslim immigrants from European countries.25

20 European Parliament, sittings of 29 January 2003 and 12 February 2003. 21 Der Standard (24 May 2004). 22 Sully, M. (2002), ‘Austria: Jörg Haider Uses his Powerbase in Carinthia as a Springboard for Broader Ambitions’, Federations 2(3), pp. 3–4. 23 European Parliament, extraordinary sitting of 20 March 2003. 24 European Parliament, extraordinary sitting of 20 March 2003, and sitting of 14 May 2003. 25 See for example Hamburger Abendblatt, 25 June 2004.

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As indicated above, Berlusconi’s second governmental partner, the Alleanza Nazionale, kept a rather low proﬁle on the Iraq issue. In Italy, the AN highlighted legal justiﬁcations for the war and Italy’s commitment to stabilize Iraq; at the European level, the AN stressed the need for a common European front during the crisis.26 Party leader Gianfranco Fini linked the anti-war movement to anti-American sentiments, which while popular, ‘will certainly not persuade Saddam Hussein to disarm’.27 Contrasting with the stance of the Italian ERPs, Jean-Marie Le Pen and his FN were probably the most ardent opponents of the war. His speeches were mainly marked by vigorous anti-American appeals. Not only did he link the war in Iraq to a US plan to reshape the Middle East, but he was also afraid that the United States would not stop in Iraq but continue to make war on other countries.28 He also tried to appeal to anti-Americanism by stating, ‘It is not the dictator Saddam Hussein who is the warmonger. The warmonger is Bush, the democrat.’29 Although Le Pen also ferociously attacked Jacques Chirac for having delivered weapons to Iraq, his position was more or less in line with that adopted by the French government. Observation # 3: ERPs generally followed their governments’ position This leads us to a third observation: on the issue of the Iraq war, ERPs generally seemed to support the line of action of their respective governments regardless of the existence of an ofﬁcial coalition. The case of the Dansk Folkeparti supports this argument, as both the party and the Danish government favoured an interventionist policy. Nevertheless, the language the DF used to support its position was extreme. Mogens Camre, MEP, compared the stance of governments opposing the war to Chamberlain’s appeasement policy. Hence, he saw the war as one of liberation and as a ‘question of democratising the Arab countries’.30 Support for governmental policies is a point that seems very unusual for ERPs, which are traditionally identiﬁed by their anti-system features. ERPs normally try to emphasize their differences from other parties and especially their government. However, as one could have expected, the pattern of government support is not an entirely coherent one. Of the big ERPs in western Europe, the VB is the exception. It opposed its government’s anti-war stance and linked the issue to Islamic fundamentalism. In an interview in the British Telegraph, Filip Dewinter states, ‘The chief threat to the world now is radical Islam. They were taught a lesson by the Iraq

26 Domenico Nania, speech at the Senate, 17 June 2004, available ; European Parliament, sitting of 29 January 2003, speech of Cristiana Muscardini. 27 Corriere della Sera, 16 February 2003. 28 European Parliament, sitting of 12 March 2003. 29 European Parliament, sitting of 29 January 2003. 30 European Parliament, sitting of 12 March 2003.

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war that they must take the West seriously. They thought we were very soft and tolerant but they now see we can hit back when necessary.’31 That this is a very similar stance to the other big ‘ethno-regionalist’ ERP, the LN, is not a coincidence. Showing a nationalist or strong-state position is less important for both actors than highlighting the importance of the immigration issue and appealing to anti-Arab sentiments, which could be better integrated into a pro-interventionist stance. On the other hand, the position of a strong state could be shown in both ways: through a pro-interventionist (military might, legacy of colonialism) as well as through an anti-interventionist position (anti-Americanism / ‘la Grande Nation’, national self-determination). This brief comparison of the positions taken by the various ERPs during the run up to the Iraq war in 2002 and 2003 is revealing. Rather than establishing a united front, the ERPs kept strongly divergent opinions. The ERPs tended to support the position taken by their government and ﬁtted those decisions within the framework of their traditional political programme. While they engaged in often extreme rhetoric, the actual policy positions taken by the ERPs were relatively tame, as they made little effort to distinguish themselves from traditional parties or to establish ownership over the issue. The Search for an Issue – the Failure of ERPs in the 2004 European Elections The diversity of opinions in the ERP on issues such as the Iraq war not only shows the problems that the parties face to cooperate with each other. The failure to take advantage of this particularly salient issue also explains the somewhat limited success of these parties in the European elections in June 2004. The different ERPs did not manage to distinguish themselves in their stance from the mainstream actors on a vital issue. The only party that succeeded in this point and was able to integrate this position into its broader agenda, the VB, was the only actor to gain a signiﬁcant share, with 14.3 per cent of the national vote. This seems to be evidence for the view that the success of ERPs should be linked to the salience of different issues and their capacity to win issue ownership. Many authors have linked the rise of ERPs to the salience of the immigration and/or the security/crime issue. As it can be conveniently linked to other issues (crime, urban decay, unemployment, and so on), immigration might indeed be the ERPs’ favourite issue. However, it is not the increased existence of immigration or crime in itself that makes these parties rise. It is the interaction between the established centre-right and centre-left parties that will inﬂuence issue salience and determine whether ERPs will be able to attract voters. ERPs will only succeed when they have a political opening to exploit; immigration has traditionally served as this point of entry into the political system. However, the immigration issue worked not because of any intrinsic magic, but because it was a wedge that the ERPs used to split centrist parties. The failure of ERPs to ﬁnd such a wedge issue during the 2004 European elections may explain their failure at the polls. 31 The Telegraph, 23 May 2003.

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Conversely, a key lesson from the 2004 European election is that a confrontational stance can help ERPs gain credibility and win issue ownership.32 As the analysis demonstrated, the established ERPs could not take advantage of such a pattern of interaction that would have allowed them to distinguish themselves from other actors on vital issues, such as the Iraq war. Although some authors have warned us that national election results ‘should give us a note of caution’,33 most ERPs did not celebrate major successes this time. Which parties, then, were able to establish issue ownership in 2004? Those were the Eurosceptic parties. Their success was the surprise of the European elections in 2004. These parties seemed to have been far more successful in winning issue ownership through their critique of how the EU works, for example Liste Martin, or of the EU system in itself, for example the UK Independence Party. In comparison, ERPs who offered candidates for the European elections were unable to capitalize on this anti-European sentiment, nor were they able to offer a compelling alternative to traditional political parties. As a result, the story of the 2004 European elections was the rise of a new single-issue bloc, the Eurosceptics. Conclusion This article has tried to move beyond the traditional boundaries of scholarship on extreme-right parties. Discussions of ERPs usually focus on the reasons for their emergence and their electoral success. Therefore, most work dwells on the traditions of fascism in certain political systems as well as on the constellation of exogenous factors that may have opened the door for politically opportunistic ERPs. However, given that ERPs have now been coalition partners in two long-lived European governments in the last ﬁve years, it is worth moving beyond the origins of ERPs and rather focusing the discussion on the realm of governance behaviour. The Iraq war provides an ideal springboard for taking such an approach. Analysing ERP positions on foreign and security policy provides an opportunity to assess the parties’ positions on a wide variety of issues, including national self-determination, relations to authoritarian regimes, a preference for military solutions, and the resonance of anti-Arab, anti-Semitic or anti-American rhetoric. The ﬁndings of this study have been somewhat surprising. Rather than falling into the worst stereotypes of extreme-right politics, European ERPs tended to marry the Iraq crisis into their traditional policy programme; as a result, they did not attempt to capitalize on the issue and tended to support the position taken by their national governments. By failing to take ownership of this issue, the ERPs deprived themselves of a weapon they had used to good effect before: a wedge issue to exploit during an election. Consequently, ERPs fared poorly at the polls during the 2004 European elections. It was instead the major Eurosceptic parties who could offer a compelling alternative vision to European voters, who rewarded them with a substantial increase in seats and prestige. 32 Meguid (2001), ‘Competing with the Neophyte: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Rising Party Success’. 33 Perrineau (2004), op. cit., p. 11.

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Acronyms AN DF EPEN ERP FN FPÖ MEP MSI ÖVP VB

Alleanza Nazionale Dansk Folkeparti Greek National Political Union Extreme-Right party Front National Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs Member of the European Parliament Movimento Sociale Italiano Österreichische Volkspartei Vlaams Blok

References Abedi, A. (2002), ‘Challenges to Established Parties: The Effects of Party System Features on the Electoral Fortunes of Anti-Political-Establishment Parties’, European Journal of Political Research, 41(4), pp. 551–583. [DOI: 10.1111/14756765.t01-1-00022] Bell, D. (2000), Parties and Democracy in France: Parties under Presidentialism (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing). Betz, H.-G. (1993), ‘The New Politics of Resentment: Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe’, Comparative Politics, 25(4), pp. 413–428. [DOI: 10.2307/422034] ––– (1994), Radical-right Wing Populism in Western Europe (London: Macmillan Publishing). ––– (2004), La droite populiste en Europe: extrême et démocrate (Paris: Autrement Books/Cevipof). Betz, H.-G. and Immerfall, S., (eds.) (1998), The New Politics of the Right; NeoPopulist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies (London: Macmillan Publishing). Daalder, H. and Mair, P., (eds.) (1983), Western European Party Systems; Continuity and Change. Fennema, M. (1997), ‘Some Conceptual Issues and Problems in the Comparison of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe’, Party Politics, 5(3), pp. 473–492. [DOI: 10.1177/1354068897003004002] Fieschi, C. (2000), ‘European Institutions: The Far-Right and Illiberal Politics in a Liberal Context’, Parliamentary Affairs, 53(3), pp. 517–531. [DOI: 10.1093/ pa%2F53.3.517] Freiheitlicher Jugend, R. (2004), Tangente, 2. Ignazi, P. (1992), ‘The Silent Counter-Revolution, Hypotheses on the Emergence of Extreme Right Wing Parties in Europe’, European Journal of Political Research, 22(3), pp. 3–34. [DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.1992.tb00303.x] ––– (2003), Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

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Immerfall, S. (1996), ‘Party Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and the Future of the West European Party System’, Western European Politics, 19(2), pp. 410–415. — (1998), ‘Conclusion: The Neo-Populist Agenda’ in Betz and Immerfall (eds.). Kitschelt, H. (1995), The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press). Kowalsky, W. and Schröder, W., (eds.) (1994), Rechtsextremismus – Einführung und Forschungsbilanz (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag Books), pp. 7–22. Mair, P. (1997), Party System Change – Approaches and Interpretations (Oxford: Clarendon Press Books). Meguid, B. (2001), ‘Competing with the Neophyte: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Rising Party Success’. Mudde, C. (1996), ‘The War of Words: Deﬁning the Extreme Right Party Family’, Western European Politics, 19(2), pp. 225–248. Perrineau, P. (2004), ‘Introduction’ in Betz (ed.) (2004). Sani, G. and Sartori, G. (1983), ‘Polarization, Fragmentation and Competition in Western Democracies’ in Daalder and Mair (eds.). Schedler, A. (1996), ‘Anti-Political-Establishment Parties’, Party Politics, 2(3), pp. 291–312. [DOI: 10.1177/1354068896002003001] Sully, M. (2002), ‘Austria: Jörg Haider Uses his Powerbase in Carinthia as a Springboard for Broader Ambitions’, Federations, 2(3), p. 3–4. Taggart, P. (1995), ‘New Populist Parties in Western Europe’, Western European Politics, 18(1), pp. 34–51. Van der Brug, W., Fennema, M. and Tillie, J. (2000), ‘Anti-immigrant Parties in Europe: Ideological or Protest Vote’, European Journal of Political Research, 37(1), pp. 77–102. [DOI: 10.1023/A%3A1007013503658]

Appendix A

Populist Radical Right Parties Table A.1

Populist radical right parties in contemporary Europe (1980–2005)

Country

Populist Radical Right Parties

Period

Albania

Balli Kombëtar (BK) Partia Demokratike e Djahte (PDD) Partia e Unitetit Kombëtar (PUK)

Since 1991 Since 1994 Since 1991

Austria

Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (BZÖ) Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ)

Since 2005 Since 1986

Belarus

Belarusskaya partiya svobody (BPS) Liberalno-demokraticheskaya partiya Belarusa (LDPB)

Belgium

Agir Front National (Belge) (FNb) Front Nouveau de Beligique (FNB) Vlaams Blok (VB) Vlaams Belang (VB)

1989-1994 Since 1985 Since 1995 1979-2004 Since 2004

Bosnia & Hrvatska demokratska zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine Herzegovina (HDZBiH) Srpska demokratska stranka (SDS) Srpska radikalna stranka Republike Srpske (SRS RS) Stranka demokratska akcije (SDA)

Since 1990

Bulgaria

Bălgarska Christijandemokratičeska partija (Centăr) (BChP) Bălgarska nacionalna radikalna partija (BNRP) Nacionalen sayuz Ataka (NSA) Partiya Ataka (Ataka) Vătrešna makedonska revoljucionna organizacija-Săjuz na makedonskite družestva (VMRO-SMD)

Since 1990

Hrvatski blok (HB) Hrvatska demokratska zajednica (HDZ) Hrvatski istinski preporod (HIP)

Since 2000 1989-2000 Since 2001

Croatia

1990-1998 Since 1991 1990-?

Since 1989 Since 2005 Since 2005 Since 1990

296

Country

Europe for the Europeans

Populist Radical Right Parties

Period

Croatia cont. Hrvatsks stranka prava (HSP) Hrvatska stranka prava-1861 (HSP 1861)

Since 1990 Since 1995

Cyprus

Yeni Doğuş Partisi (YDP)

Since 1984

Czech Republic

Národní strana (NS) Republikáni Miroslava Sládka (RMS) Sdruženi pro republiku-Republikánská strana Československa (SPR-RSČ)

Since 1998 Since 2001 1989-2001

Denmark

Dansk Folkeparti (DFP)

Since 1995

Estonia

Eesti Iseseisvuspartei (EIP) Eesti Kodanik (EK) Eesti Rahvuslik Eduerakond (ERE) Eesti Rahvusliku Sõltumatuse Partei (ERSP) Eesti Rahvuslaste Keskliit (ERKL) Parem Eesti (PE)

Since 1999 1992-1995 1993-? 1988-1995 1994-1996 1994-1995

Finland

Isänmaallinen kansanliike-Liitto (IKL)

Since 1993

France

Alsace d’abord Front national (FN) Mouvement Corse pour l’Autodétermination (MCA) Mouvement national républicaine (MNR)

Since 1989 Since 1972 1984- ? Since 1999

Germany

Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD) Deutsche Liga für Volk und Heimat (DLVH) Deutsche Volksunion (DVU) Republikaner (REP)

Since 1964 Since 1991 Since 1987 Since 1983

Greece

Eoniko Komma (EK) Front Line (FL) Elliniko Metopo (EM) ΚΟΜΜΑ ΕΛΛΗΝΙ∑ΜΟΥ (KE) Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos (LAOS)

Since 1989 Since 1999 Since 1994 Since 1996 Since 2000

Hungary

Magyar Igazság és Elet Partja (MIÉP)

Since 1993

Ireland

Immigration Control Platform (ICP)

Since 1997

Italy

Die Freiheitlichen (F)

Since 1998

Iceland

Appendix: Populist Radical Right Parties

297

Country

Populist Radical Right Parties

Period

Italy cont.

Lega Lombarda (LL) Lega Nord (LN) Lega Veneto (LV) Movimento Sociale-Fiamma Tricolore (MS-FT)

1984-1991 Since 1991 1982-1991 Since 1994

Latvia

Tēvzeme un Brīvībai (TB)

1993-1995

Lithuania Luxembourg Aktiounskomitee ﬁr Demokratie a Rentegerechtegkeet Lёtzebuerger Partei Nationalbewegong (NB)

Since? 1989-? 1987-1995

Macedonia

Dviženja za Semakedonska Akcija (MAAK) Partia Demokratika Shqiptare Vnatreška Makedonska Revolucionerna OrganizacijaDemokratska Partija (VMRO-DP) Vnatreška Makedonska Revolucionerna OrganizacijaDemokratska Partija za Makedonsko Nacionalno Edinstvo (VMRO-DPMNE) Vnatreška Makedonska Revolucionerna OrganizacijaMakedonska (VMRO- Makedonska)

Since 1990 Since 1997 Since 1991

Centrumpartij (CP) Centrumdemocraten (CD) Centrumpartij ‘86/Nationale Volkspartij (CP’86) Nederlandse Volksunie (NVU) Nieuw Rechts

1980-1986 1984-2002 1986-1998 1971-1996 Since 2003

Poland

Alternatywa Partia Pracy (APP) Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej-Ojczyzna (KPN-O) Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR) Party X Ruch Odbudowy Polski (ROP) Ruch Spoleczny Alternatywa (RSA) Stronnictwo Narodowe (SR)

Since 2001 Since 1999 Since 2001 1990-1991 Since 1995 1998-2001 Since 1989

Portugal

Alliança Nacional Partido Renovador Nacional (PRN)

Romania

Partidul (Popular) România Mare (PRM) Partidul Unităţii Naţionale a Românilor (PUNR)

Netherlands

1990-1998

Norway

Since 1991 Since 1990

298

Europe for the Europeans

Country

Populist Radical Right Parties

Period

Russia

Liberal’no-demokraticheskoi partii Rossii (LDPR)

Since 1989

Serbia & Montenegro

Lëvizja Kombëtare për Çlirimin e Kosovës (LKÇK) Srpski pokret obnove (SPO) Srpska radikalna stranka (SRS) Stranka srpskog jedinstva (SSJ)

Since 1993 1990-1996 Since 1991 Since 1990

Slovakia

Prava Slovenská národná strana (PSNS) Slovenská národná strana (SNS)

2001-2003 Since 1993

Slovenia

Republikanci Slovenije (RS) Slovenska nacionalna desnica (SND) Slovenska nacionalna stranka (SNS) Stranka slovenskega naroda (SSN)

Since 1992 1993-1996 1990-2000 Since 1996

Spain

Alternativa Española Democracia nacional (DN) España 2000 Frente Nacional

Since 2005 Since 1994 Since 2002 Since 1986

Sweden

Nationaldemokraterna (ND) Skånes Väl (SV) Sverigedemokraterna (SD)

Since 2001 Since 1997 Since 1988

Switzerland

Freiheits-Partei der Schweiz (FPS) Nationale Aktion für Volk und Heimat (NA) Schweizer Demokraten/Démocrates suisses (SD) Schweizer Republikaner Bewegung/Mouvement républicaine Suisse (SRB) Vigilance

Since 1994 1961-1990 Since 1990 1971-1989

Ukraine

All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” Kongres Ukraiins’kikh Natsionalistiv (KUN)

Since 2004 Since 1992

UK

British National Party (BNP) Freedom Party National Front (NF) Veritas

Since 1980 Since 2004 Since 1967 Since 2005

1964-1993

Note: Whenever doubt exists about the populist radical right status of the party in question, of the period, or of the date of foundation, the information is in italics. Source: Mudde, C. (2007) Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 305–308, with permission.

Index

Aachen 164 abortion 142, 167 academics 209, 257, 283, 286 see also research actors 9, 56, 58, 59, 60, 64, 65, 125, 187, 283, 286, 291 Adolph-Auffenberg, H. 65, 74 Adorno , Theodor 4 Afghanistan 20, 68, 110, 159, 195, 203 Africa 14, 26, 39, 61, 135, 136, 190, 191, 199 aggression 160 agriculture 133, 182, 195, 218, 229, 234, 267 Ahmadinejad, President Mahmoud 22, 154 airforces 72, 135 Algeria 132, 133, 158 see also French Algeria aliens 38; see also foreigners Alleanza Nazionale (AN) 3, 14, 96, 187, 248, 255 caution of 197, 200 and EU 198, 199, 200 and European integration 203-4 foreign policy 198-203, 288 and Iraq war 288, 290 and Israel 202, 203 military policy 203 and NATO 198 origins 188, 197-8 populism 188 right-wing cooperation 204-5, 287 and US 198, 201, 204, 290 Al-Qaeda 68, 158, 159, 194, 196 Alsace 43 Al-Taqwa-Bank 158 Altemeyer, Robert 4 American Jews 23, 67, 149, 152, 153, 154, 155, 158, 232 Amsterdam Treaty 192 analytical model 274-8 anatomical approach 283 Anglo-American sphere 62, 165 Anglo-Saxons 36, 37, 129, 137

anti-Americanism 7, 9, 95, 148-9ff., 158, 159, 162, 165, 167, 169, 170, 181, 232-3, 252, 256, 290, 291 anti-capitalist parties 143 anti-democratic views 263, 271, 276, 278 anti-establishment ideologies 92, 107, 215, 226, 228, 233, 235, 263 anti-immigration laws 17, 20 anti-interventionist position 291 anti-politics 81, 83, 84, 215 anti-Semitism 21-5, 38, 132, 166, 180, 253, 273, 278 attacks on taboo of 21, 22-3 Austria 63, 66-8 Germany 153, 154-6, 158, 159, 170, 171 Hungary, 180-81, 183, 270-71 Poland 266, 270 secondary 22, 155 anti-system attitudes 263 Antonescu 274 Antwerp 24, 33, 43, 48-9, 95 anxiety 9, 19, 285 apartheid 143, 146 Arabs 50, 67, 68, 69, 120, 121, 132, 149, 271, 289, 291 Arc-en-ciel 205 armed forces Austrian 55, 56, 58, 60, 61, 66, 69-74 French 128, 130, 131, 134, 135, 136 German 160-63, 169 Netherlands 216 Switzerland 226, 230-31, 235 arms trade, illegal 135 arrest warrant, European 195 Arrighi, Pascal 128 Aryans 165 Asia 14, 135, 153, 191, 199 Assembly of the European Union (WEU) 60 assimilation 39, 47, 51 asylum seekers 17, 18, 70, 83, 84, 90, 121, 142, 146, 219, 229, 242, 243, 246, 251

300

Europe for Europeans

Ataka 9, 13, 18, 66 Aula 70, 73 AUNS 228, 231 Austria 17, 20, 23-4, 55-74, 111, 226, 288, 289 air force 72 anti-Semitism 63, 66-8 armed forces 56, 58, 69, 70, 72-74 and EU 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 65, 66, 73, 74 Far Right publications 56, 57, 70, 73 foreign policy 62, 68 and Germany 55, 56, 60, 64, 74 military budget 71 minority rights 55 and NATO 56, 58, 59, 60 74 neutrality 55, 56-61, 74 security 57-61, 63-5, 69 State Treaty 55, 57 and UN 55, 59, 60, 67-8, 71 and uniﬁed Europe 61 and US 63, 67, 68, 70, 73 Austrian Ofﬁcers’ Association 59 Austrians 11, 17 authoritarianism 4, 7, 140, 147, 263, 268, 271, 276 autonomy 61, 62, 130, 141, 148, 193, 198, 201, 248, 262 Bachmann, G. 72 Balkan wars 18, 65, 66, 151, 193 Balkenende, Jan-Peter 212, 219 Baltic states 10, 14, 62, 261, 271 Balvany 67 bankers/banks 12, 153, 165, 181, 232 BBC 158, 245, 249, 250 Belarus 218 Belgians 84 Belgium 2, 24, 43, 44, 83, 98, 226 Jewish community 33, 48-9 Muslim community 33-4, 40, 48-9 refugees 91 see also Flanders; Vlaams Blok (VB) Benes Decree 148, 164 Benoist, Alain de 256 Berlet, Chip 37 Berlin wall, fall of 18, 89, 134, 136, 225, 235 Berlusconi, Silvio 187, 188, 189, 195, 196, 197, 203, 215, 248 Bernardelli, Roberto 45 Betz, H.-G. 5, 6, 24, 262, 264, 285, 286

Beyme, Klaus von 264 Bierut Decree 148 bilateral agreements 127, 225, 226, 229, 235 biology 7, 146, 147, 160, 161, 169, 250, 252, 253, 269 Blocher, Christoph 9, 20, 223, 228, 229, 230, 235 ‘Blood and Honour’ 159 Blue Helmets 230-31 Bohemia 274 Bolkestein, Frits 215 Bologna 200 Bomhoff, Eduard 212 books 169, 210 borders 18, 91, 133, 135, 136, 164, 182, 190, 229, 246, 269, 273 Borghezio, Mario 289 Bösch, Colonel Reinhard 70 Bosnia 95, 151 Bossi, Umberto 18, 45, 188, 190, 191, 193, 195, 196, 197, 204 Bourgeois government 112 Brandenburg 141 Brayshaw, John 245 Britain 9, 240, 241, 257 and radical nationalism 257 see also England; United Kingdom British National Party (BNP) 5, 13, 29, 127 anti-Semitism 253 electoral results 244, 249-50 and Europe 244, 248, 251, 254, 255 foreign policy 247, 251-7 and globalization 252, 253 ideology 254 and immigration 246, 251-2 impact of Nick Griﬁn 247-51 marginalism of 240, 257 and Marxism 253, 256 nationalism 255 and NATO 251, 254 neo-Nazi elements 240, 249, 255 neo-populism of 240, 247-8, 249, 255, 256, 257 and race 252 and UKIP 244, 245, 247 and US 251, 252, 254, 256 and Western civilization 253-4 British Union of Fascists 240, 256 Broder 24 Bucard, Marcel 128 Buchanan, Patrick 37

Index Budapest 179 Buitenen, Paul van 213 Bulgaria 2, 10, 14, 20, 24, 95, 163-4 Bundesheer 59, 60, 69-72 Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (BZÖ) 59 bureaucracy 10-11, 15, 87, 92, 111, 133, 192, 214, 216 Burrin, Professor Philippe 3 Bush, President George W. 149, 152, 194, 196, 204 business community 233 Calderoli, Roberto 44, 196 Camre, Mogens 41, 43, 107, 290 capitalism 109, 153, 163, 167, 256, 261, 274 Caribbean 136 Carinthia 70, 73, 289 Casa delle Libertà 188 Catholic parties 3, 13, 128, 261, 266, 267 Catholic Church 35, 36, 37, 47, 276, 278 Cé, Alessandro 196 Ceausescu 274 Central Europe 1, 15-16, 25, 31, 135, 165, 177 analytical model 274-8 anti-democratic views 271, 273, 276, 278 anti-migrant views 271 anti-Semitism 24, 266, 270-71, 278 civil liberties 271 cleavage structures 264 electoral support for Right 276, 277 mobilization potential 270-78 nation-building 264 Radical Right parties 261-2, 269 regime conﬂicts 274, 275-6 territorial issues 273, 275, 278 uniﬁed 95 centralization 12, 111, 190, 214, 228 Centre Democrats (CD) 215 centre-left parties 45, 106, 191, 291 centre-right parties 178, 181, 187, 194, 202, 224, 226, 227, 229ff., 291 chador 42 change 5, 19, 21, 227, 262, 274ff. charismatic leadership 214, 224 Chechnya 20, 194 chemical weapons 89, 115 children 169 China 183, 197, 203 Chirac, Jacques 127, 132, 135, 196, 285, 290

301

Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) 211, 212 Christian- Democratic Party (CVP) 230 Christian National Union (ZChN) 265, 266 Christian Right 49 Christian Socialist Union 141 Christianity 14, 17, 21, 25, 27, 37, 40, 44, 45, 49, 94, 129, 132, 157, 165, 167, 181, 189, 194, 196, 202 Christians 20, 46, 48 church-state separation 21, 40, 215 citizens 1, 5, 6, 19, 22, 23, 37, 215, 257 citizenship 7, 23, 27, 38, 82, 87, 106, 108, 166, 182 European 86 ‘civic neo-populism’ 240, 241-3, 257 civic space 241, 257 civil defence 134 civil liberties 271 civil society 257 civilization 12, 14, 17, 20, 43, 44, 47, 49, 92, 94, 129, 130, 163, 164, 165, 191, 194, 195, 200, 253-4 see also ‘clash of civilizations’ Claes, Willy 19 Claeys, Philip 83 ‘clash of civilizations’ 16-17, 28, 37, 42, 44, 65, 73, 119, 194, 195, 200, 203, 204, 216, 252 cleavages 264, 274, 275, 283 Clinton, Bill 204, 253 coalition governments 3, 7, 9, 16-17, 20, 28, 103-4, 112, 179, 202, 205, 212, 213, 288-90 Cold War 13, 89, 115, 120, 125, 126, 131, 134, 225 collectivism 88, 214 Cologne 157 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 230 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 60, 61 communism 3, 20, 23, 28, 95, 132, 139, 163, 177, 183, 184, 203, 210, 274, 276 community 98, 137, 161 cultural 85, 86, 92, 93 Flemish 82, 85, 86 homogenous 4, 5, 7, 27, 166 and nation 262 competition, economic 8, 9, 19, 91, 130 complexity 3, 6, 84, 273

302

Europe for Europeans

Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN) 265, 266 conferences 166 conscription 71, 110, 134, 160, 161, 226, 231 Conservative Party, British 243, 244, 247 conservatives 49, 50, 56, 72, 127, 188, 226 conspiracy theories 12, 24-5, 63, 152, 154, 155, 180, 183, 184, 253, 270 constitutions 86 consumer protection 88 cooperation 7, 13, 15-16, 19, 27-8, 95-7, 143, 165-9, 188, 204-5 difﬁculties of 286, 287, 291 in European Parliament 286-8ff. foreign policy 288-92 Coordination of the European Right, The 96 Copsey, Nigel 240-41 corruption 83, 87, 92, 111, 213, 215, 228, 241 cosmopolitanism 120, 130, 189 Council of the Regions 190 courage 161, 254 credibility 88, 127, 203, 232, 292 crime 1, 6, 29, 81, 84, 91, 107, 130, 135, 136, 137, 140, 147, 157, 163, 251, 252, 291 Croatia 62, 95, 199 Croats 55, 151 cultural conﬂict 9, 10, 14, 15, 18, 19, 27, 28, 38, 42, 48, 92, 146, 158, 207 analytical model 274, 275 see also ‘clash of civilizations’ cultural diversity 7, 38, 45, 86, 160 ‘cultural hegemony’ 28, 166 cultural identity 29, 45, 93, 98 cultural liberalism 215 cultural segregation 93 ‘cultural suicide’ 10, 34 see also ‘ethno-suicide’ culture 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 14, 18, 20-3, 26, 33, 34, 37, 50, 85, 86, 106, 121, 165, 207, 263 and poverty 110-111 US domination of 153-4 Cuperus, René 41 Czech New Party (NS) 12 Czech Republic 24, 62, 95, 268, 269, 271, 273, 278 opportunity structures 276, 277 regime conﬂicts 274, 275 Czech ‘Republicans’ (SPR-RNC) 261, 269 Czechoslovakia 170, 268, 274, 275

Czechs 274 Czurka, Istvan 26, 178, 179-80ff., 269, 270 Daily Express 243 Dalmatia 199 Danes 107, 113ff. Danish People’s Party (DF or DPP) 3, 10, 14, 15, 17, 286 and Danish culture 9, 106 and EU 110, 111, 112, 118-19, 121, 122 and European integration 111 foreign policy 103, 105, 109-13, 120 and globalization 109-10 and humanitarian aid 110-11, 112 and immigration 10, 103, 105, 106, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 118, 121 and Iraq War 288, 290 and Islam 20, 41-2, 108-9, 112, 119 and local problems 6 loyalty to government 290 and multiculturalism 103, 107-8, 112 nationalism 106-7, 121 and NATO 105, 110, 121 origins of 105, 121 parliamentary strength 103-4 party programme 106-7, 110 populism 122 right-wing alliances 96, 287 and security 107, 111-13, 115 and tax protest 105, 106 and UN 110 voters and 113-22 Deavin, Mark 245, 249 decadence 191, 253 Deckert, G. 142 defence 85, 89, 94, 107, 122, 134-5, 192, 216 air 72-3 expenditure 117 see also security Democracia Nacional 13 democracy 1, 2, 7, 8, 11, 16, 18, 21, 27-8, 36, 40, 87, 112, 147, 166, 178, 203, 276 Islam and 42, 43, 47, 157 lack of trust in 1, 6 opposition to 263, 271, 273, 276, 278 see also democratic deﬁcit; direct democracy democratic deﬁcit 1, 11, 13, 87, 91, 92, 217

Index Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 12, 13, 96 Denmark 2, 10, 20, 21, 41-2, 290 asylum seekers 121 cartoon controversy 18, 104, 108, 112 cleavage politics 103, 105, 122 culture 106, 121 defence expenditure 117, 122 election (2001) 103, 104 and Europe 105, 118-19, 121 foreign policy 120, 121 and globalization 113 immigration 105, 118, 121 and Islam 20, 23, 108-9 and NATO 120, 121 parliamentary coalition 103-4, 112 public opinion 23, 113-22 reforms 104 taxation 105, 106 and US 112 deportation 251, 289 Der Spiegel 170 Deutsche reichs Partei (DRP) 140 Deutsche Volksunion (DVU) 9, 10, 11, 25, 140, 141, 143, 144 anti-Semitism 22, 154 cooperation with European Right 167 ethno-pluralism 146 and foreigners 147 and EU 11, 163, 164 foreign policy 145 Islamophobia 157 and lost territories 148 military policy 160, 161, 162, 164 and NATO 162 Nazi ideology 142 and US 9, 150 developing countries 111, 112, 120, 130, 166, 189, 191, 219, 252, 254, 255 development aid 91, 110-11, 112, 218-19, 254 DeWinter, F. 26, 28, 38, 290-01 and Muslim immigrants 34, 40, 43-4, 48 pro-Jewish views 28, 33 dictatorship 4, 111, 165, 272 difference 7, 34, 38, 45 ‘differentialism’ 250, 252, 255 Dillen, Karel 83 Dillen, Koen 83 Dimap, I. 145 direct democracy 224, 226, 228, 234, 235 discipline 161

303

discrimination 98 dislocation 5, 135 Dmowski, Roman 266, 267, 276, 278 domestic policy 82, 125, 126, 131, 188, 216, 224 Doriot, Jacques 128 Draken ﬁghter planes 72 Dresden, bombing of 155, 170 drugs 10, 19, 135, 136, 157 Dublin Treaty 229 Eastern Germany 139-40, 142, 144, 147, 148, 170, 273 Eastern Europe 2, 3, 4-6, 10, 11, 15, 16-19, 62, 66, 135, 148, 165, 218, 229, 257, 264 analytical model 274ff. anti-Semitism 24 borders 17 communist legacy 177 and EU 10, 12, 91, 278 Germans in 164, 169-70 Muslims in 193, 194 right-wing cooperation 95 territorial issues 273 Eastern Prussia 148, 150 Eatwell, Roger 243, 247 Eco, Umberto 180 economic change 11 economic hardship 139-40 economic liberalism 214, 231, 233 economic reform 140, 190, 274 education 19, 86, 107, 161 Eerdman, Joost 213 Egypt 92, 158 Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I. 160 elderly people 8 elections 26, 43, 83, 85, 95, 96, 103, 104, 127, 139, 141, 178, 184, 188, 193, 209, 224, 227, 235, 244, 249, 276, 277, 278, 291, 292 see also European Parliament electoral campaigns 264 elites 1, 6, 16, 51, 84, 125, 126, 177, 178, 184, 215, 218, 219, 275, 276 11 September 2001 attacks 8, 20, 26-7, 34, 119, 158-9, 170, 181, 194, 195 Elsevier 210 empirical research 131, 188, 263, 276 employment 9, 104, 139, 153 Endres, Colonel H. 60

304

Europe for Europeans

enemies 10, 27, 43, 147, 160, 165 England 257 asylum seekers 242, 243 fascist parties 247, 248 neo-populism 240, 241 racism 241, 242 Enlightenment 215 environment 19, 88 equality 263 Eschlauer, Vinzenz 69 see also Mölzer, Andreas Estonia 95, 275, 276, 277 ethnic cleansing 255 ethnic community 82, 92, 106, 166 ethnic conﬂict 274-5 see also cultural conﬂict ethnic identity 7, 10, 28, 82 ethnic minorities 4, 16, 20, 40, 50, 109, 164, 179, 242, 271, 273 analytical model 274, 275 ethnicity 6, 82, 147, 161, 164 Ethniki Politiki Enosis 96 ethnocentrism 240, 241, 246, 257, 263, 276, 277 ethnocracy 263 ethno-cultural pluralism 165-6 ethno-national dominance 50, 51 ethno-nationalistic populism 82, 97 ethno-pluralism 7, 12, 15, 24, 25, 98, 140, 146-7, 165 ‘ethno-suicide’ 7, 146 see also ‘cultural suicide’ Euro currency 133, 191, 192, 195 Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 226 Eurobarometer surveys 6, 19 Euroﬁghter 72 Europe borders 14, 15, 17, 91, 133 and British fascism 248-9 confederation of 12, 14,17, 29, 61, 73, 74, 86, 98, 189, 192, 198, 201, 232 cultural expansion 136 defence policy 16, 89 of ‘fatherlands’ 198, 200, 201 federal 86, 94 foreign policy 60-61 and globalization 8 identity 94 Muslims in 19-20, 22-3, 26, 39-46 uniﬁed 61, 64, 74, 85ff., 93-4 and US 35, 36

see also European Union ‘Europe of Nation States’ 12, 163, 167, 198 ‘Europe of Peoples’ 12, 85-6, 93-4, 95, 97, 163, 189, 204 Europe of the Nations group 287 European Commission 1, 111, 190, 193, 200, 213 European Constitution 12, 21, 63, 90, 125, 133, 196, 202, 218, 219 European Council 111 European Defence Community (EDC) 126 European defence force 16, 88, 89, 95 European Economic Area (EEA) 2, 60, 228, 229 European Economic Community (EEC) 189, 248 European ethnic communities 14 European Extreme Right party 127 European integration 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 1617, 85, 111, 163-4, 165, 188, 189-90, 192, 198, 201, 202, 203-4, 217, 219, 224, 228 European Left party 127 European Liberal Democrat group 192 European Monitor Centre 19 European National Front (ENF) 28, 167-8 European Parliament 11, 14-15, 83, 96, 97, 141, 192, 197, 202 elections (1989) 141 elections (1999) 194, 244 elections (2004) 83, 188, 205, 213, 244, 250, 261, 268, 278, 283-92 foreign policy coordination 288-92 right-wing failures 291-2 Iraq debates 289 powers of 190 right-wing cooperation in 95-7, 204-5, 286-8ff. European Popular Party 187, 202 European Race Bulletin, The 246 European Social Movement 248 European Social Survey 18 European Socialist Party 202 European Space Agency 136 European Union (EU) 2, 12-16, 22, 56, 60, 73-4, 86, 91-3, 94, 95, 97, 105, 107, 110ff., 121, 122, 142, 163-4, 181, 182, 183, 189-90, 192ff., 198, 199, 200, 201-2, 203, 204, 205, 216-18, 228-9, 240, 246, 248, 257, 278, 292 ambivalence to 85, 94

Index bureaucracy 87, 92, 133, 190, 192, 202, 217 customs union 132 Danes and 118-19 democratic deﬁcit 11, 87, 91, 92, 217 enlargement 10-11, 14, 15, 16-18, 62, 65, 84, 91-3, 94, 196, 203-4, 218, 228 foreign policy 62, 68, 88, 91 and Hungary 271, 278 member states 218 open borders 15 and Poland 261, 267-8, 269 security 16-17 structural funds 217 subsidies 217 super-state 26 and Turkey 15, 17-18, 26, 65-6, 73 see also European Commission; European Constitution; European integration; European Parliament Europeans 1, 7, 8, 12, 18, 19, 41, 164 and EU enlargement 10 fear of migrants 19, 21 insecurities of 1, 8, 9, 16, 19 lack of trust 6 and Muslims 19-23, 29, 47-8, 51 ‘Eurorejects’ 13, 190 EuroRight 96 Euroscepticism 11, 192, 197, 205, 216, 217, 219, 244, 246, 261, 283, 285, 292 Evola, Julius 253 exclusion 34, 36, 81, 82, 158, 257, 263, 285 executive 125 extremism 37, 127, 128, 140, 143, 144, 17071, 183, 197, 209, 240, 243, 251, 254, 256 theories of 264, 276, 283, 284 see also extreme-right parties (ERPs) extreme-right parties (ERPs) 283 cooperation in European Parliament 2868ff. deﬁnition of 284, 286, 287 electoral failures 291, 292 foreign policies 288ff., 292 and immigration 289, 291 and Iraq War 288-91, 292 issue ownership 291-2 and neo-populism 284-6 support for governments 288-90 Eysenck, Hans 160

305

Fallaci, Oriana 44, 48, 195 family policy 27, 167 Far Right 3, 28, 46, 67-74, 127, 254 deﬁnition of 56, 128 publications 56, 57, 70 see also extreme-right parties (ERPs); populist radical right; right-wing radicalism farmers 195, 234, 267 fascism 35, 49, 128, 139, 198, 203, 240, 247, 248, 249, 253, 256, 263, 265-6, 276, 283, 292 fascist-autocratic parties 276, 277 Faye, Guillaume 45 Feder, Don 49 federalism 86, 94, 226, 228 Fidesz 178, 181, 184 Fini, Gianfranco 196, 200, 203, 248, 255, 290 Flanders 34 asylum policies 84, 90-91 defence 89, 94-5 and EU 86, 94 foreign policy 88-91, 94-5 national particularism 83 people’s community 93, 98 see also Vlaams Blok (VB) Flemings 34, 49, 93, 97 food subsidies 217, 218 foreign policy 3, 7, 9, 10, 16, 26-7, 88-91, 109-13, 128-31, 147-53, 161, 169, 179, 183, 188-203, 216-19, 247, 251-7 European cooperation 288-92 and local issues 84 political elites and 177 see also security foreign troops 161 foreigners 9, 10, 83, 84, 98, 108, 137, 140, 146-7, 155, 182, 189, 227, 257 preferential treatment of 6 see also xenophobia Forsa Institute 152 Fortuyn, Pim and armed forces 216 books 11, 210, 214, 216-17, 218 career 210-11 death of 211, 212 and Europe 11, 12, 216-18 and gay rights 215 ideology 214-15 and Islam 21, 40-41, 43, 211, 215, 216

306

Europe for Europeans

political style 214 populism 214, 215, 217, 218, 219 see also Lijst Pim Fortuyn Forward 49 Forza Italia 187, 196, 205, 215, 285 Forza Nuova 167 fragmentation 264, 265 France 1, 2, 10, 15, 17, 18, 19, 95, 167, 192, 196, 250 Algerian war 128 army 126, 128, 130, 131, 134 and EU 125, 126, 127 exceptionalism 136 fascist heritage 128-9 foreign policy context 126-7, 137 Muslims in 20-22, 39-40, 42-3, 47-8, 133, 136 and NATO 134 nuclear weapons 127, 134, 135 Presidency 125, 126, 127 Prime Minister 126, 127 Republic 128 riots in 20, 22, 130, 135 security threats 135, 136, 137 see also Front National (FN) Francistes 128 Franco, General 240, 256 fraud 83, 105, 135, 217 free movement of people 91, 229 free trade 233 freedom 21, 40, 41, 47, 215, 263 Freedom 246, 250 freedom of speech 112 Freedom Party 226 Freiheitliche Akademie 13 Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs (FPÖ) 3, 5, 56-58, 64-5, 68-74 65, 111, 192, 286 anti-Semitism 22 armed forces 56, 58-74 in European Parliament 96 and Germanness 64 and Iraq War 288, 289 loyalty to government 288, 289 and NATO 13 neutrality 56-61, 74 right-wing cooperation 205, 287 and US 9 and Vlaams Blok 95 French Algeria 128 Freud, Sigmund 160 Frey, Gerhard 24, 141, 149, 167

Friedman, Moishe Ayre 68 Friedrich Ebert Foundation 4, 156 Fritz, Herbert 65 Front National (FN) 3, 5, 167, 192, 249, 250, 253, 256, 285, 286 and armed forces 130, 134-5, 136 Christian motivations 129, 132 defence policy 134-5 and EU 12, 130, 133 in European Parliament 96, 286 and foreign policy 128-31, 134 and globalization 130 and immigrants 39-40, 42-3, 135 imperialism of 13-31, 136 inﬂuence on mainstream 17, 125-6 and internal security 135-6 and Iraq War 288, 290 isolationism 130 and Israel 132 and Muslims 19135-6 and NATO 13, 132, 133, 134 as opposition party 127, 131 origins 128-9 party programme 136 policy pragmatism 131 post-1980s policies 131-6 protectionism 129-30 right-wing cooperation 95, 167, 168, 286, 287, 288ff. and UN 133 and US 130, 131, 132, 133, 135 and Vlaams Blok 95, 96 Fukuyama, Francis 28 functional differentiation 262 fundamentalism, Islamic 34, 40, 89, 93, 133, 157, 158, 194, 199, 263, 289, 290; see also Islamists Gallou, J.-Y. Le 39, 42-3 Gamakhourdia, Z. 132 de Gaulle, Charles 126, 198 gay marriage 167 gay rights 109, 215 Geneva Refugee Convention 18, 90, 246 genocide 159 geopolitics 17, 61, 62, 74, 88, 130, 131, 136, 137, 164, 193, 196, 201, 261, 273 Georgia 132 German Basic Law 144-5, 152 German Constitutional Protection Service 144

Index German Democratic Republic (GDR) 147 see also Eastern Germany German National Democratic Party (NPD) 5, 9, 25-6, 28, 139 anti-Americanism 148-9, 159 anti-democratic nature 143 anti-Semitism 26, 154, 155, 166 cooperation with European Right 166, 167-8 election results 141 ethno-pluralism 146, 147 and European integration 163, 164 and foreigners 147 and globalization 148, 153 growth of 144 and Islam 158 and Israel 156 and lost territories 148 military policy 160, 162, 164 Nazi ideology 142 origins 140 proposed ban on 145 and US 9, 149, 150 Germanic culture 93, 94, 164, 165 Germans 4, 7, 11-12, 36, 48, 148, 152, 156, 158, 164, 169-70, 271 Germany 11, 14, 15, 55, 56, 60, 64, 74, 192, 267 anti-Semitism in 25, 153, 154-6, 158, 159, 165, 170, 171 armed forces 160-62, 169, 152 asylum seekers 142, 146 Constitutional Court 145, 152 economic stagnation 139-40 elections 141 ethno-pluralism 146-7, 165 and EU 142, 163-4 foreign policy 145ff., 160, 162, 169 foreigners 140, 143, 146-7, 148, 155 and globalization 139, 140, 145, 148, 153, 154, 165, 166, 167 growth of Radical Right 144 hegemony of 164-5, 169 Holocaust denial in 22, 141, 154, 156, 171 immigration 142, 146, 147, 163 Islamophobia 157-9 lost territories 148 Muslims in 159-60 nationalism 147-8, 155 and NATO 151, 161, 162, 169

307

Nazi past 141, 142, 151, 152, 155, 169 philo-Islamism 158-9 prospects of Radical Right 140, 171 reuniﬁcation 55, 62, 64, 139, 145, 162 right-wing cooperation 143, 166-8 right-wing extremism 170-71 right-wing sub-cultures 139, 140, 159, 166, 169 security 160-63, 164-5, 169 and UN 170 and US 139, 145, 148-9ff., 159, 162, 165, 170 war guilt 25, 150, 152, 155 see also Deutsche Volksunion (DVU); Eastern Germany; German National Democratic Party (NPD); Republikaner (REP) Giertych, Roman 268 Glistrup, Mogens 105 global problems 84 globalization 1, 6, 7-10, 14, 26-7, 29, 82, 83, 109-10, 148, 153, 154, 165, 166, 167, 181, 224, 247, 252, 253 fear of 8, 9, 113, 130 right-wing uses of 26, 27, 139-40 globalized nationalism 27-9, 166 Gmurczyk, Adam 265 Gogh, Theo van 20 Goldhagen, Daniel 25 Gollnisch, Bruno 15, 24 Gorbach, Hubert 65 Gorbachev, M. 132 Graham, Reverend Billy 37 Gramsci, Antonio 28, 166 Great European Empire 93, 95, 97 Greater Hungary 179, 182 Greater Romania Party 66 GRECE 129 Greek civilization 17, 94, 164, 165 Greek National Political Union 286 Greek Patriotic Alliance 167 Green parties 127m 227 Greven, T. 166 Grifﬁn, Nick 127, 239, 240, 245, 247, 24951, 263 anti-Semitism 253 see also British National Party (BNP) Grifﬁn, R. 7 Group of the European Right 96 Grumke, T. 27 Gudenus, J. 61, 65, 71-3

308

Europe for Europeans

Guiana 136 Gulf War (1991) 132, 149, 150, 155 see also Iraq War (2003) Haider, Jörg 5, 58, 64, 65, 68 and EU 16, 60 and European foreign policy 17, 60-62, 63, 64 and Iraq 68, 69, 289 and NATO 59 Hamas 159 Handlos, Franz 141 Hatzenbichler, J. 58, 60 Havel, Václav 178 Hegel, G.W.F. 163 Heinsbroek, Herman 212 Herben, Mat 213, 217 Herf, Jeffrey 10 Hezbollah 159 Higham, John 46 hijab 21, 22 Hisb ut-Tahrir 159 historical legacy 3 history 12, 25, 42, 58, 61-2, 64, 106, 150, 232, 254 Hitler, Adolf 140 HIV/AIDS 10 Hofer 61 Holocaust denial 15, 24, 141, 154, 156, 171, 245, 270 Holy Roman Empire 17, 62, 66, 165 Holzer, W.I. 56 ‘homelands’ 274, 275, 276, 277 homogeneity 262, 263 homosexuality 41, 109, 167, 209, 215 Houellebec, Michel 48 Huber, Ahmed 158 Hue, Robert 127 human rights 5, 37, 41, 67, 90, 93, 115, 191, 203 human trafﬁcking 18 humanism 62, 94, 129 humanitarian aid see development aid Hungarian Academy 178 Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) 178, 269 Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP) 12, 26, 66, 269-70 anti-Semitism 180-81, 183 electoral results 178-9, 181, 261 and EU 11, 181, 182, 183

foreign policy 179-83 and globalization 181 name 178 and NATO 181, 182 populism 183-4 territorial aims 182, 269 and US 180, 181, 182 Hungarians 179, 182, 269-70, 274 Hungary 1, 2, 14, 16-17, 24, 59, 62, 64, 247 anti-democratic views 271 anti-migrant views 271 anti-Semitism 24, 180, 181, 270- 71 communist legacy 177, 183, 184 elections 178, 184 and EU 271, 278 foreign policy 177, 179, 183 political elites 177, 178, 184 populism 177-8, 182, 184 regime conﬂicts 275, 276 right-wing mobilization potential 275, 276, 277 Smallholders’ Party 179 territorial issues 179, 182, 183, 269, 273 Huntington, Samuel 28, 37, 38, 42, 65 Hussein, Saddam 68, 132, 149, 152, 196, 290 identity 7, 9, 13, 21, 29, 34, 38, 40, 45, 82, 93, 217 collective 25, 165, 264 European 94, 190 French 128, 129, 130, 137 religious 21 see also cultural identity; national identity ‘Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty Party’ 14, 28 ideology 25, 38, 91, 93, 94, 121, 125, 128, 140, 214, 223, 224, 233, 254 disagreements 97 theory of 262, 263 Ignazi, Piero 246, 262, 286 Il Foglio 195 immigrants 8, 19-21, 23, 35-5, 83, 84, 104, 105, 130, 146, 289 choice facing 39 illegal 91, 251 integration of 38-40, 50, 51 threat from 18-20, 109, 163, 215 immigration 1, 6-8, 10, 14-15, 18-20, 26, 37, 90, 147, 228, 239, 289, 291 Britain 243, 245-6, 251, 252 Denmark 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 118

Index illegal 136 and Islam 20-23, 27, 34 Italy 189, 191, 195, 196 and local problems 6 Netherlands 21, 40-41, 215, 219 imperialism 14, 16, 26, 29, 130-31, 149 import duties 197, 254 independence 223, 224, 225, 226, 234, 235 individualism 37, 41, 61, 83, 215, 263 individualization 262 Indo-European heritage 93-4 insiders 84 institutions 224, 264 interest mediation 274 intergovernmental cooperation 88, 89, 90 international companies 9, 154 international conﬂicts 115 international cooperation 225-6, 234, 235 international law 162, 203 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 9, 26, 192-3, 234, 270 international organizations 9, 133, 166, 225, 226, 234 international policies 82, 83, 85, 126, 130 international relations 126, 191, 207, 225 international solidarity 120 internationalism 10, 27, 82, 83, 120, 126, 127, 165, 166, 256 Internet 6, 28, 135, 159, 166, 168, 251 Iran 135, 158 Iraq 18, 20, 22, 25, 67-8, 92, 150, 159, 196, 197, 199, 203, 254 see also Gulf War (1991); Iraq War (2003) Iraq War (2003) 23, 88, 104, 110, 115, 116, 119, 125, 139, 152, 170, 252, 288-91 see also Gulf War (1990) Irving, David 244 Islam 20-23, 26, 17-21, 24, 39-51, 84, 89, 95, 107, 108-9, 112, 119, 132-3, 136, 151, 191, 193, 194, 195, 199, 204, 252, 254, 289, 290 and democracy 21, 42, 43, 47, 157 Germans and 157-60, 169 and homosexuality 41 in Netherlands 211, 215, 216 political nature of 46 positive attitudes to 158-9 as ‘war religion’ 42, 44 and women 40, 41

309

see also fundamentalism, Islamic; Islamophobia Islamists 1, 23, 40, 45, 119, 135-6, 183, 194, 195, 202 see also fundamentalism, Islamic Islamophobia 1, 20-23, 38, 41-2ff., 48-51, 92, 108-9, 157-8, 218 Ismay, Lord 162 isolationism 126, 130, 184, 227 Israel 24-5, 33, 66, 132, 152, 154, 155, 156, 164, 180, 181, 182, 199, 202, 203, 254 and Palestinians 24, 66-7, 204 see also American Jews; Jewish conspiracy issue ownership 291, 292 Istria 199 Italy 2, 17, 23, 167, 248 centre-right coalition 187, 188, 194, 195, 202, 205, 288ff. economic development 190 electoral system 205 immigration 189 and Iraq 196, 197 and Islam 43, 44, 48, 191, 193, 195 populist parties 187-8, 204-5 south of 200, 204 see also Alleanza Nazionale (AN); Lega Nord (LN); Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI); North Italy Janmaat, Hans 209, 215 Jespersen, Karen 23 Jewish conspiracy 10, 25-6, 63, 152, 153, 154, 155, 180, 181, 183, 270 see also American Jews; Israel Jews 15, 24-7, 63, 67-8, 149, 153, 180, 181, 232, 271 Belgian 33, 48-9 jihad 157, 169 Jobbik (The Movement for a Better Hungary) 179, 182 Joris, Marc 33 Jospin, Lionel 127 jumping of scales technique 83-4 Jung, Wolfgang 61, 62, 69, 70, 73 Jungen Nationaldemokraten (JN) 154 justice 90 Kamehl, G. 70, 71, 72 Kaufmann, Eric 51

310

Europe for Europeans

Kennedy, John F. 36-7 Kernic, F. 69 Kilroy-Silk, Robert 246 Kitschelt, H. 262, 264 Kjærsgaard, Pia 104, 105, 106, 109, 110, 111 Klingemann see Scheuch and Klingemann Kohl, Helmut 150 Kok, Wim 214 Koran 40, 43, 46, 108, 157 Kornhauser, W. 262 Kosovo 66, 110, 189, 193, 197, 254 Kriesi 5 Kronberger, Hans 289 Kuwait, 149, 150, 151 La Padania 193, 195 La Repubblica 43 labour 8 Labour Party, British 243, 247 language 86, 106 Larrabee, S.F. 13 Latin America 37, 135, 149 law and order 86, 90, 105, 107, 180, 261 Learner, Michael 253 Lebanon 132 Le Pen, Jean-Marie 12, 15, 17, 19, 24, 27, 127, 129, 167, 182, 247, 255 and Algerian war 128 and BNP 250 and Iraq War 290 and Islam 132-3, 136 anti-Semitism 24, 27, 132 and EU 11 see also Front National (FN) Le Pen, Marine 15, 133 League of Empire Loyalists 249 League of Polish Families (LPR) 13, 15, 261, 265, 266, 267-8, 269 Lebensraum 147-8 Leefbaar Nederland 210-11 Leefbaar Rotterdam (LR) 211 Lee-on-the-Solent 242 Left 1, 7, 21, 26, 28, 110, 114ff., 118, 119, 127, 131, 132, 142, 151, 154, 188, 189, 195, 215, 227, 255-6, 276 left-right scale 29, 103, 105, 120, 121, 276, 286 Lega Lombarda 287 Lega Nord (LN) 1, 3, 21, 28, 44-5, 167, 285, 286 ambivalence of 196

and Christianity 18, 19, 44 electoral setbacks 193-4 and EU 12, 13, 189-90, 192ff., 204, 205, 287 and European integration 203-4 in European Parliament 96 foreign policy 188-97 and immigration 189, 191, 195, 196 and Iraq War 288, 289, 291 and Islam 191, 193, 195 loyalty to government 288, 290 and NATO 16, 192, 193 oppositional stance 197 origins 188, 189 populism 187-8 right-wing cooperation 204-5, 287ff. and Turkey 197 and US 189, 191, 192 and Vlaams Blok 95-6 Lepper, Andrzej 261, 267 Lepszy 146 Lewis, Bernard 49 Liang, Christina Schori 3 liberal-authoritarian values 105, 106 Liberal Democratic Party (FDP) 230 Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) 21, 25, 268, 295 liberalism 1, 16, 29, 34, 41, 105, 106, 108, 147, 192, 214-15, 242, 252, 253, 256 Liga Veneta 44 Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) 6, 21, 209, 244 in coalition government 212 defence policy 216 and development cooperation 218-19 electoral success 211-12 and EU 216-18, 219 foreign policy 216-19 founding 210, 211 and Islam 21, 211, 215, 216 and local problems 6 and NATO 216 splits 212, 213 Lijst Geert Wilders 213 Lipset, S.M. 262 Liste Martin 285, 292 Lithuania 2, 24 Littlejohn, Richard 242 local government 211 local issues 6, 83, 84 Lohausen, H. J. von 62 Lombardia Autonomista 191

Index Lorenz, Konrad 160 ‘lost territories’ see territorial issues Lucardie, P. and Voerman, G. 214 Luedtke, A. 16-17 Maastricht Treaty 12, 16, 87, 97, 118, 163, 164, 190, 199, 200 McConnachie, Alistair 244-5 Macedonia 194 Magenheimer, H. 63 Mahhreb, immigrants from 39, 40, 157 Mahler, Horst 22, 24, 153, 154, 159 mainstream 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 15, 23, 104, 122, 137, 142, 169, 219, 243, 247, 291 majority culture 50 marginalization 113 market economy 214, 261 Maroni, R. 192, 195 Masaryk, Tomas 274 masons 193 Marxism 27, 167, 210, 253, 256 masses 5, 178, 256 Meciar, Vladimir 275 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 141 media 6, 14-15, 18, 24-6, 56, 66-9, 72, 74, 166, 168, 169, 182, 183, 210, 241, 242 Mediterranean 14, 44, 135, 158, 190, 199, 200, 201 Mégret, Bruno 42 Melisch, R. 65 MEPs 83, 96, 107, 250, 286, 287, 289 see also European Parliament Merkel, Angela 170 methodology 57 Mexico 37, 70 Middle East 22, 26, 28-9, 33, 65, 68, 132, 135, 149-50, 156, 191, 195, 199, 204, 290 migration 21-3, 27, 91, 191, 257, 271 Milan 44 military expenditure 72, 89, 117, 122 military intervention 115ff., 151-2, 230, 254, 288ff. Milošević, Slobodan 132, 152, 184 minority rights 274 Mitterand, François 127, 132, 137 mobilization 38, 262, 264, 270-78 moderation 241, 251, 285, 288, 291 modernity 216 modernization 247-51, 262, 274, 275

311

Moffat, Andrew 244 Moldova 274 Moleveld, Sergej 213 Mollet, Guy 126 Mölzer, Andreas 57, 70, 72, 287 monarchy 65, 74 money laundering 135, 136 Monnet, Jean 126 moral revival 43 Mörgeli, Christoph 46 Morgenthau, Hans 155 Morocco 91, 92 Morse, Samuel 36, 47 Mosley, Oswald 28, 240, 248, 249, 256 mosques 40, 42, 157 Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) 275 Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland (ROP) 266 Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) 96, 188, 197, 198, 199, 201, 248, 286, 287 Mudde, Cas 3-5, 13, 17, 24, 284, 286 Müller, H. 66 multiculturalism 7, 10, 18, 28-9, 38, 39-40, 103, 07-8, 112, 146, 147, 189, 247, 251 and ethnic difference 7 failures of 10 multi-polarism 191 music 28, 166, 169 Muslim countries 119, 120-21, 132-3, 135, 183 Muslims 20-22, 27, 119, 159-60, 193, 194, 202, 289 ambivalent attitudes to 24 in Antwerp 33, 48-9 exclusion of 22 fear of 19, 20-22, 24, 27, 109, 136, 157-8 integration of 22, 38, 39-40, 50 in Kosovo 189 in Netherlands 215 see also Islam Mussolini, Alessandra 15, 167 mysticism 253 myth 24, 58, 201, 243, 254, 262, 263 nation 62, 64, 74, 82, 130, 146, 147, 151 as community 262 and individual 262, 263 opportunity structures 274ff. threats to 106-7, 154, 155, 166

312

Europe for Europeans

nation-building 274 nation state 3, 4, 8, 12, 14, 27, 86, 114, 136, 163 National Alliance party (U.S.) 166 national character 160 national community 5, 106 national culture 8, 10, 64 National Front (NF) 9, 244, 249, 250 National Front Party of the Fatherland (SN) 266 national identity 10, 12-13, 45, 82, 111, 129, 147, 154, 217, 226, 232, 240, 246, 247, 255 analytical model 274, 276 national minorities 274, 275 national particularism 83 national populism 81, 82, 205, 223, 224 national preference 8, 214, 217, 218, 219 National Socialism 56, 57, 62, 68, 72, 140, 182, 249 see also Nazis nationalism 3, 4, 7, 22, 24, 27-8, 63, 93, 104, 106-7, 121, 214, 240, 255, 273 ambivalence 94 German 140, 147-8 globalized 27-8, 166 and nativism 37 opportunity structures 274ff. and populism 285 revolutionary 256 theory of 262-3 nationalists 4, 15, 94, 167 nativism 4, 5, 7, 12, 27, 34-5, 140, 269 and Muslims 38-46ff. in US 35-8, 46-7, 51 navies 134, 136, 216 Nazis 5, 6, 7, 11, 15, 23, 25, 28, 55, 66-7, 141, 142, 151, 152, 153, 155, 169, 171, 248 see also National Socialism neo-fascism 180, 188, 203, 248, 285 neo-liberalism 214, 215, 216, 218, 219, 233, 235, 285 neo-Nazis 3, 28, 140, 143, 144, 145, 158, 159, 169, 181, 240, 247, 249, 255, 265, 266, 270 neo-populism 5, 240ff., 246, 247, 257 civic 241-3, 256 deﬁnitions 284, 285, 286 and extreme right 283, 284-6 and right-wing parties 283

Netherlands 2, 22, 23, 43, 167, 226 armed forces 216 asylum seekers 17 bureaucracy of 214 extremism in 209 immigration 27, 40-41, 215, 219 Leefbaar parties 211 populism 211 right-wing coalition 212 see also Fortuyn, Pim; Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) networks 27, 264 Neue Zeit 56 Neumann, Franz L. 57 neutrality 57-61, 74, 161, 223, 224, 225, 226, 228, 230, 232, 233, 234, 235 New Caledonia 136 ‘New European Order’ 2, 261 ‘New Populism ‘ 285 ‘New Racism’ 131 ‘new right’ 3, 49, 103, 104, 113, 114, 167, 250, 253, 256 ‘New World Order’ 130, 149, 200, 253, 256 newspapers, mass circulation 241, 242-3 Nice Treaty 194, 196 Nieli, R. see Swain, C. and Nieli, R. Niklot 265-6 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 210, 225 Non-Proliferation Treaty 164 non-state actors 9, 125 North Africa 129, 135 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 22, 56, 58-9, 60, 61, 72, 74, 85, 88-90, 110, 120, 121, 132, 133, 134, 151, 161, 162, 169, 181, 182, 192, 193, 198, 216, 226, 231, 251, 254 North Italy 189, 190, 191, 204 milk fees 195 see also Padania Northern Ireland 240, 254 North-South conﬂict 120, 121, 191 Norway 23, 104 nuclear weapons 72, 73, 89, 127, 134, 135, 149, 156, 164 Nye, Joseph 28 OAS 128 oil 150 Oklahoma City bombings 166

Index ‘old right’ 3 Olivier, Philippe 39 ‘one-world’ idea 148, 154 Operation Schoolyard 169 opinion polls 67, 104, 211, 213, 243, 261 opposition parties 125, 127, 131 opportunity structures 274-7 Orbán, Viktor 178, 181 Ordre Nouveau 129 organization 263-4, 283 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 225 Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) 225 Oslo peace accords 132 Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) 20, 289 outsiders 84 Overmeire, Karim Van 89 paciﬁsm 62, 160, 169, 203 Padania 189, 195 Palestinians 24-5, 67-8, 132, 155, 156, 180, 195, 199, 202, 203 Parti Populaire Français 128 Partnership for Peace 59, 226 Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) 142 Party of Great Romania (PRM) 13, 15, 1819, 21 Party of Polish National Rebirth (NOP) 265 Pasqua, Charles 285, 287 patriotism 37, 43, 64, 97, 201, 202 people/peoples 5, 15, 19, 21, 26, 28, 29, 61, 64-7, 70, 73, 146, 147, 177, 178, 215, 285 confederation of 86, 98 European 85, 86 People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) 210 Perrineau, P. 286 Pettigrew 20 Pfeiffer, M. 72 Phalange 167, 168 philo-Semitism 24, 33 pied noir 128 Pierce, William 166 Pilsudski, J. 266, 276, 278 PiS (Law and Justice) 13, 261, 265, 267, 268 plebiscites 87 Poland, Citizen’s Platform 261 Poland 1, 2, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16-7, 24, 62, 148, 150, 162, 170

313

anti-democratic views 271, 273, 278 and EU 261, 267-8, 269, 278 fascist groups 265-6 anti-Semitism 24, 266, 270 and immigrants 271 lost territories 273 mobilization potential 275, 277 parties 261, 265, 266-7, 269 regime conﬂict 275, 276, 278 Right-Wing successes 261 Poles 271 police forces 90, 216, 271 policy, research on 283 Polish National Union 265 political behaviour 103, 105, 196, 233, 283, 284, 288, 290, 292 political communication 177, 184 political cultures 274 political establishment 84 political goals 283 political leaders 6, 84, 137, 177, 178, 215 political parties 3, 6, 113ff., 243, 257, 261-2, 269, 271, 277, 283, 284-5 issue ownership 291, 292 organization 263-4 political rights 87 political space 7, 147, 240, 241, 246, 257, 264 political style 214, 263 politicians 285 politics 9, 16-7, 21-2, 25, 28, 47, 55-8, 63, 67, 69, 70-1, 73, 82, 201, 215, 224 identity 240 populism 3-5, 7, 16, 81-2, 84, 87, 92, 97-8, 104, 122, 140, 146, 223 categories of 81, 82 deﬁnitions of 177, 178, 284, 285 in Hungary 177-8, 182, 183-4 in Italy 187-8, 204-5 Netherlands 211, 214, 215, 217, 218, 219 see also neo-populism; populist radical right 2, 3, 5 populist radical right anti-Muslim policies 33-4 concept of Europe 12 cooperation 13, 25, 26-7, 95-7, 143, 1659, 188, 204-5, 286-8ff. deﬁnitions of 3-7, 128, 262-3 distinctions between 285 electoral success 2, 16, 276, 277 identitarian ideology 19, 34, 45, 50

314

Europe for Europeans

ideological evolution 38 inﬂuence on mainstream 2, 17, 20, 23, 169, 243, 247 and Islamophobia 48-51 and multiculturalism 39-40 and nativism 5, 7, 27, 34-5, 38-46ff. parties 3, 13 comeback 1-2 foreign policy agenda 2, 7-29 research on 2 see also extreme-right parties (ERPs); right-wing radicalism post-Cold War era 3, 7, 14, 16, 20, 27, 28-9, 121, 132-3ff., 226 post-colonialism 130 poverty 110-111, 252 power 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 16, 25-6, 46, 55, 66, 68, 74, 84, 64, 139, 143, 155, 161, 264, 289 pragmatism 91, 131, 202, 226, 233, 267, 268 Prague 164 press, control of 182, 183 pressure groups 125 Prodi, Romano 191 professional army 56, 71, 74 Progress Party, Norwegian 104, 105, 111, 118, 121 prostitution 135 protectionism 37, 129-30, 233, 254, 267 Protestants 35, 36, 37, 47, 50 Provera, Senator 194 psychology 160, 200 public opinion 1, 2, 16, 18-19, 47, 51, 84, 125 British 243 Central Europe 270-73 Danish 113-22 German 152, 156, 158, 170 Swiss 229 public resonance 264 PvdA 211, 215 qualiﬁed majority vote 88 Quattrocchi, Fabrizio 289 race 146, 147, 165, 166, 250, 252 racial stereotyping 241 racism 5, 6, 7, 24, 25, 27, 37, 42, 48, 98, 108, 111, 131, 165, 169, 171, 241, 242, 243, 251, 276 modernization of 250, 251 Raddatz, H.-P. 46

radical Left 26, 255-6 radical parties 5 Radical Party 203 Radical Right deﬁnitions of 284-6 theories of 262-4 see also extreme-right parties (ERPs); Far Right; populist radical right; right-wing radicalism Radio Maryja 21, 265, 266 radioactive materials 135 Rankin, Aidan 244 rapid response force 134 Raschhofer, Daniela 65 Rasmussen, Anders Fogh 104, 112 rational political behaviour 49, 103 realpolitik 94, 196 recognition claims 14, 21, 34 referenda 11, 20, 46, 87, 92, 107, 118, 125, 133, 189, 217, 218, 224, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 235 Reform Party European Parliamentary Group 192 refugees 70, 83, 91; see also asylum seekers regime change 262, 274, 275-6, 277 Reiter, Erich 57, 58, 59 relativization 155 religion 19, 20, 23, 40, 42, 44, 47, 263, 266 religious identity 21 repatriation 91, 147, 254 Report of the Commission on the Future of Mult-Ethnic Britain 241-2 Republikaner (REP) 2, 7, 8, 10, 12, 127, 140, 144, 167, 268 anti-Semitism 25 election results 142, 143 ethno-pluralism 146 and EU 12, 13, 17, 164, 287 in European Parliament 96, 141-2 foreign policy 145 and Islam 20-21, 157 and lost territories 148 military policy 160, 161 origins 141 right-wing cooperation 167, 168, 287 research 19, 63, 69, 81, 82, 125, 187, 257, 262-4, 283, 284, 288 resentment politics 5, 6 revisionist approaches 63 revolutionary ideologies 8, 143, 256

Index Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale 4 right-wing nationalism, and Extreme Left ideologies 255-6 right-wing parties 127, 131, 188, 189, 212, 224, 261-2, 277, 283 right-wing populist parties 2, 3, 81, 226, 283 see also populist radical right right-wing radicalism analytical model 274-8 see also extreme-right parties (ERPs) Robertson, Pat 49-50 rock music 166, 169 Roma 4, 13, 15, 164, 271 Romania 2, 10, 13, 14, 15-16, 17, 20, 62, 66, 163-4, 167, 179, 269, 270, 273 ethnic conﬂicts 274 mobilization potential 275 opportunity structures 277 Romanians 271 Romans 94, 164, 165 Romig, Friedrich 60, 61, 63 Rotterdam 211 Rousseau, J.-J. 163 royalism 128 Russia 14, 17, 21, 22, 24-5, 59, 91, 95, 132, 162, 180, 183, 193, 194, 218, 275, 276, 277 Russians 4, 271 sacriﬁce 161 St Barthelemy 136 St Martin 136 Samoobrona 261, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 277 satellite defence 135 Savage 22 Saxony 141 scapegoats 26, 197, 261 Schain, M. 19 Scharenberg 20 Scharping, Rudolf 152 Scheibner, Herbert 72 Schengen Agreement 18, 111, 164, 229 Scheuch and Klingemann 262 Schlierer, Rolf 142 Schlüer, Ulrich 46 Schmid, Samuel 232 scholarship 187, 283, 284, 292 Schönhuber, Franz 127, 141, 159 Schröder, Gerhard 153, 170 Schuman, Robert 126

315

Schwab, Jürgen 165 Schweizer Demokraten 45 scientiﬁc research 229 Scotland 240 Secolo d’Italia 202 Second World War 2, 24, 25, 28, 150, 155, 169, 226, 232-3, 276 secularization 41, 46, 47, 51, 106, 109, 267, 274 security 1, 2, 3, 7, 29, 61, 63-5, 69-72, 74, 107, 111-13, 115, 135-6, 160-63ff., 230-32 European 16-18, 191 and immigrants 18-19 and Islam 19, 20, 21, 22 see also defence; foreign policy segmentation 262 self-determination 85, 86, 164, 215, 291 separatist parties 3, 167 separation 250 Serbia 151, 179, 184, 189, 193 Serbs 20, 110, 151 sexual equality 21, 40, 109, 215 Shevardnadze, Edvard 132 simplicity 6, 84 Sinti 164 Sked, Dr Alan 245 skinheads 140, 144, 159, 265, 266 Sladek, M. 268 Slavs 62, 265, 268 slogans 10 Slovakia 62, 64, 95, 179, 183, 268, 269, 270, 278 ethnic conﬂicts 274 mobilization potential 275 opportunity structures 277 Slovaks 274 Slovenia 24, 59, 62, 64, 70, 95, 199, 271, 273 Slovenians 70 small parties 127, 264 small states 64, 106, 109, 240 social change 5, 262 Social Democratic parties 106, 113, 114, 115ff., 213 social homogeneity 262 social justice 167 social movement organizations 264 social policy 86 social security 85, 86 see also welfare state social space see civic space

316

Europe for Europeans

society 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, 19, 20, 22, 25, 27, 28, 41, 65, 73, 108, 111, 114, 160, 161, 214, 241 functional differentiation 262 sociocultural milieus 264 socio-economic discourse 252 soldiers 66, 56, 59, 61, 70, 71, 74, 115, 116, 142, 152, 160, 161, 231 Somalia 152 Soros, George 270 Soulless Europe (Fortuyn) 11, 216-17, 218 South-East Asia 199 South Eastern Europe 17, 63, 65, 66, 74, 271 South Tyrol 74, 96, 287 sovereignty 11, 40, 57, 64, 85, 86, 90, 104, 107, 110, 111, 200, 204, 217, 226, 230, 246 Soviet Union 12, 15, 18, 55, 58, 64, 69, 126, 135, 148, 198, 226, 276 Spain 125, 167, 240 Spath, G. 62, 63, 73 Spengler, Oswald 253 Spieler, Robert 43 spirituality 62, 129, 130, 232 SPR-RSC 12 state/states 85, 86, 146, 153, 167, 214, 263, 291 Stern, Frank 155 Steven Lawrence Inquiry 242 Stirnemann, A. 74 Stöss 4, 170 Stoyanov, Dimitar 13 Strache, H.-C. 65 subsidiarity principle 11, 86, 217 Sudetenland 148 Sully, Melanie 289 Sun, The 242-3 supranational organizations 55, 61, 126, 225, 233 surveys 1, 6, 16, 18, 19, 156 Swain, C. and Nieli, R. 37 swastika 171 Swiss Democrats 226 Swiss National Bank 233 Swiss People’s Party (SVP) 5 ambivalence of 233 economic policies 9, 234 electoral success 224, 227, 235 and EU 2, 13, 228-9 foreign policy 2, 227, 228, 235 and globalization 8, 234

growth of 227 ideology 223, 233 and immigration 13, 20, 227, 228 and international organizations 234 and Islam 45-6 and local problems 6 and NATO 231 and Swiss army 230-32, 235 and Swiss traditions 234-5 and UN 2, 228, 229-30 Swiss Solidarity Foundation 233, 235 Switzerland 1, 20, 45-6, 58, 161 anti-Islamic views 46 armed forces 226, 230-31, 235 cleavages 228, 229 economy 233-4 and EU 225 foreign policy 223, 224-6, 227, 233 and globalization 224 international cooperation 225-6, 234 migration policy 227, 228 national identity 226, 232 and NATO 226, 231 neutrality 223, 225, 226, 228, 230, 232, 233, 234, 235 political changes 223, 224, 226-7 and Second World War 226, 232-3 security 230-32 as ‘special case’ 225, 234, 235 and UN 224, 225, 228, 229-30 see also Swiss People’s Party (SVP) Swyngedouw 6 symbols 22, 125, 171, 235 Syria 92, 132 Szálasi, Frenc 247 Szczepanski, T. 265 Tablighi, the 136 taboos 6, 24 Taggart, P. 5, 285 Taguieff, P.-A. 34 Taiwan 199 Tarchi, Marco 256 taxation 19, 105, 106 Technical Group of the European Right 96 Tejkovski, B. 265 terminology 3-5, 7, 104, 240, 284-6 territorial issues 148, 156, 179, 180, 182, 183, 270, 273, 275, 276, 278

Index

317

terrorism 1, 6, 14, 16, 18, 19, 23, 26, 70, 84, 89, 90, 91, 157, 158-9, 194, 195, 202, 204, 216 voter fears of 114 see also 11 September 2001 attacks test cases 95 Teutons 36 theory 262 think-tanks 166 Third Reich 254, 255 ‘third way’ 126, 131, 132, 179 Third Way party 244 Ticino’s League 226 Times Literary Supplement 177 tolerance 109, 242 totalitarianism 23, 34, 43, 44, 47 Toulon 135 tradition 227, 292 traditional roles 262 traditional values 4, 18, 22 transformation costs 274, 275, 276, 277 transnational problems 88 Transparant Europa 213 transport 88 Treaty of Trianon (1919) 269, 273, 276 trust 6, 18 tsunami disaster (2004) 153 Turkey 14, 65-6, 73, 84, 91, 151 accession to EU 15, 17, 18, 26, 65-6, 92, 93, 94, 111, 133, 164, 167, 168, 194, 197, 203, 205, 218, 219 Tyndall, John 247, 248, 249

United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) 239, 244-7, 257, 285, 292 and BNP 244, 245, 247 and immigration 245-6 United Nations (UN) 2, 9, 55, 59, 60, 74, 85, 90, 110, 133, 170, 193, 224, 225, 228, 229-30 military missions 71 United Nations Commission on Human Rights 219 United States 1, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 17, 18, 20, 22, 23, 25, 55, 62-3, 68-9, 72-4, 73, 88, 89, 95, 97, 112, 180, 181, 182, 232-3, 252, 254, 256 Christian conservatives 49-50 cultural domination 153-6 economic domination 8-9, 153 France and 130, 131, 132, 133, 135 Germany and 145, 148-9ff., 162, 165, 170 and globalization 7, 8, 9, 148, 149, 153, 154 imperialism 149, 151, 152, 159, 162 and Iraq 290 Italy and 189, 191ff., 198, 201, 204 nativism 34, 35-7, 46-7, 51 race 166 see also anti-Americanism ‘United States of Europe’ 12, 13, 163 Unity List party 118 universalism 127, 263, 154, 263 University of Groningen 210

Ukraine 59, 95, 179, 180, 218, 269 Ukrainians 271 ultra-nationalism 262, 263 unemployment 9, 16, 22, 92, 104, 140, 228, 291 Union pour un Mouvement populaire 285 Unione 188, 205 United Kingdom 18, 20 Euroscepticism in 244, 246 fascism in 240, 248, 249, 256 immigration 243, 245-6, 251-2 nationalism 240 national identity 240, 246, 247, 255 neo-populism 240ff., 247, 249, 255, 256, 257 see also British National Party (BNP); England; United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)

values 105, 106, 108, 120, 163 Vanhecke, Frank 83, 98 variables 274, 275, 276, 284 Vatican 37, 189, 193, 253 VdU 57 Veritas 13 Verona 200 victims 6, 25 Vienna 13, 14, 17, 63, 68, 164 Vienna Declaration of Patriotic and National Movements and Parties in Europe 13, 14 violence 47, 49, 50, 140, 143, 144, 145, 160, 171, 266 Virchow 160 Vlaams Belang 24, 49, 98 see also Vlaams Blok (VB) Vlaams Blok (VB) 3, 6, 18, 33, 192, 286

318

Europe for Europeans

ambivalence of 85, 93, 94, 95, 97 anti-foreigner policies 81, 84, 98 anti-politics of 81, 83, 84 change of name 49, 98 defence policy 89, 94-5 and Europe 17, 83-8, 89, 90, 91-3, 94, 95, 97 in European Parliament 96, 287, 291 foreign policy 88-91, 93-4, 97 ideology 93, 94 and immigration 18, 21, 34, 39, 40, 81, 90-91 international policy 83-5, 97 and Islam 17, 21, 40, 48-9, 92-3, 94 and local problems 6, 84 and NATO 85, 88-90 populism of 81-2, 84, 87, 92, 97-8 right-wing cooperation 95-7, 205, 287 and UN 85, 90 and US 85, 88, 89, 95, 97 Voerman, G. see Lucardie, P. and Voerman, G. Voigt, Ekkehard 141 Voigt, Udo 140, 142, 143, 154, 159, 167 völkisch approach 64, 146, 154, 166 Volksfront 143 voluntary resettlement 251, 254 Vorarlberg 289 voters 3, 5, 6, 8, 11, 26, 104, 113ff., 140, 178, 181, 184, 193, 273 VVD 211, 212, 215

welfare state 8, 9, 29, 66, 84, 106, 146, 153, 163 cuts to 140 beneﬁts 135 reforms 104 West 27, 42, 44, 59-61, 63, 95, 120, 129, 151, 189, 191, 195, 201, 202, 204 decline of 253-4 see also civilization; Western Europe; Western values West European Union 134 Western alliance 93, 97, 198, 202 Western Europe 42, 134 fascism in 248 mobilization 270, 272 public opinion 2, 19, 47-8 Western values 34, 41, 44, 49 Wetzel, J. 156 white people 164, 169, 255 white supremacism 249, 250, 255 Wilders, Geert 43, 213, 219 will of the people 5, 87, 92, 146 women 40, 41, 42, 107 working-class 106, 135, 234 World Bank 9, 26, 181, 234, 270 world government 193 World Trade Organization (WTO) 9, 133, 234

Waffen-SS 69, 141 Wales 240 war 160 war crimes 71, 150, 152 ‘war on terror’ 7, 14, 18, 159, 195 Weaver 12 Wehrmacht 69, 71 Weimar Republic 160

Yom Kippur war (1973) 156 young voters 139, 140 Yugoslavia 18, 66, 151, 152, 162, 189, 193, 198, 199

xenophobia 24, 37, 50, 139, 211, 241, 242, 243, 246, 250, 255, 256, 266, 268 and populism 81

Zhirinovsky, Vladimir 24, 167, 193 Zionism 68, 149, 158, 159, 253 Zur Zeit 59, 68, 70, 73