Ethics Part 4

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have certain feelings or opinions about it. They would admit that the feelings and opinions of men rnay, in various ways, have a bearing on the question; but the mere fact that a given man or set of men has a given feeling or opinion can, they would say, never be sufficient, by itself, to show that an action is.right or wrong. But the views, which have been considered in this chapter, imply the direct contrary of this: they imply that, when once we have discovered, what men's feelings or opinions actually are, the whole guestion is finally settled; that there is, in fact, no further question to .discuss. I have tried to show that these views are untenable, and I shall, in future, proceed upon the assumption that they are so; as also I shall proceed on the assumption that one and the same action cannot be both right and wrong. And the very fact that @e can proceed upon these assumptions is an indirect argument in favour of their correctness. For if, whenever we assert an action to be right or wrong, we were merely making an assertionabout some man's feelings or opinions, it would be incredible we should be so mistaken as to our own meaning, as to think that a question of right or wrong canrnt.be absolutely settled by showing what men feel and think, and to think that an action cannot be both right and wrong. It will be seenthat, on these assumptions,we can raise many questions about right and wrong, which seem obviously not to be absurd; and which yet would be quite absurd-would be questions about which we could not hesitate for a moment-if assertionsabout right and wrofig ?neremerely assertionsabout men's feelings and opinions, or if the same action could be . both right and wrong.

cl tn t" l ' 1,:l {tv

'fllll otuti(:'t'tvl't'Yotf MORAL J tJlX;liM l,:N'l'S (turlulrl) l ' t' w nr rl nl nrl ,nl l l re l rr,gi rrrri rrg of thc l nst chapt er , l l rl l l l rn nl l ri l nl l l rl oty rvc ut' rrcorr* i rl cri rrg* . t hc t h'eor y rl ntqrl ht l l ro l l l rl l rvo l l rupl erH rkrcsnot r naint ain ol ' vrtl rrrrl nry w hl t regnrrll o urryr' /rr,rr l cti ons,tlur t ,if an It' l l ott nl l l rn r' l neri rr rgrrurl i orr i n orrt' t:ri gl rt,a ny ot Her rt' l l utt.of tl rn l urrrar' l urnnrrrnlrrl w i rysl ro ri ght . And l l tl r h.trrte,l rr l l rr.rr.rrna i rr w l ri cl rl l rc nl :rtcnr cnt would, I l l rl trL, l ro nnl rrrnl l yrrrrrl ersl ootll.l rrt i t is now l l nl xrtl nrrll o nrrrpl ruxi zr l l rl t, i rr u r:t:rti ri nsc nsc,t he rlrlnrrlrrl lr rrrrlrrre.()ur llrt:ory docs lrsscrtthat, if etty vulrrrrlrt'ylt'tiorr in orrcc riglrt, then any other uly ut'liorrwlrit:lrrDlcrnblcclit in oneparticular vrrlrrrrf nlatptrl (irr rurlrr:r in u combination of two respects) nrrrrl nlwuyr rrlsobc riglrt; and since,if we take the 'wotrl r'lunsirr tlrc widest possiblesense,any set of nr'liorrnwlrich rcscmblc one another in any respect wlrulevrr nurylrc s:ridto form a class,it follows that, in llrtr witk' H(:nsr:, our thcory doeq maintain that there nrt, nurny r'l:rsst:s of action, such that, if an action lrllorrging to ollc bf thcm is once right, any action lx'hrrrpiirrg lo thc salneclasswould alwaysbe right. , l,)xlr'tlywlrat orrr the
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could have done instead. Let us suppose,then, that we have an action X, which is right, and whose total effects are A; and let us supposethat the total effects of all the possible alternative actions would have been respectively B, C, D and E. The precise principle with which we are now concernedrnay then be stated as follows. Our theory implies, namely, that any action Y which resembled X in both the two respects (r) that its total effectswere precisely similar to A and (z) that the total effectsof all the possible alternatives were precisely similar to B, C, D and E, would necessarily alsobe right, if X was right, and would necessarily also be wrong, if X was wrong. It is important to emphasize the point that this will only be true of actions which resemble X in both these two respects at once. We cannot say that any action Y, whose total effects are precisely similar to those of X, will also be right if X is right. It is absolutely essentialthat the other condition should also be satisfied; namely, that the total effects of all the possible alternatives should also be preciselysimilar in both the two cases. For if they were not-if in the caseof Y, some alternative was possible,which would have quite different effects, from any that would have been produced by any alternative that was possible in the case of X-then, according to our theory, it is possible that the total effects of this other alternative would be intrinsically betterthan those of Y, and in that caseY will be wrong, even though its total effects are precisely similar to those of X and X was dght. Both conditions must, therefore, be satisfied simultaneously. But our theory does imply that any action which does resemble another in both these two respects at once, must be right if the first be right, and wrong if the first be wrong. .

' t' rrrr ol rJrrc' rtvrTY oF MoR A r, JU D GTl MTt NTS 85 'l'lris is thc pt'ct:iscprirrcipk:with which we are lurw t'orrr:r;rrrcrl. It lnly pt:rlrirpsllc statedmore convrrrit:1111y in thc lirrrrr in which it was stated in the rer:orrrf clrrtptcr: trrttrrr:ly, tlrut if it ig cver riglrt to do ntr $ctiorrwlrortr totrrl cllccts rrc A in prcfcrenceto olrc wltrrrolrrtrrlclli'r'tr urc ll, it trrrrstalwaysbe right kr rkr rtny rtr'liotrwlrorc totrrl ellct:ts arc precisely rltrrilnr lo A irr lrt'clilcrrcct() onc wlrosctotal eflects y trri l nrto l l . l t i r ul no,I thi nk, what is rrn grrnr' i r,l ri rrrttuturttlytrrt'nrrtlry lryirrg, nirnlrly,tlrut thc cluestion wltellrorttr nrliott ir liglrt or wront{ llways depcnds ttpllt ltr lrlnl r,lln'll ot' ('onxc(lucltt:cs; but this will illtl(,rnclttof it, bcclusc,as we Itttl tlr [t nil n('r'urttlo rl tol l l oo, l l rrrnyl ro l rcl rl tl rut ri gl rt und w rong do, in n tatilrn,ulwnyr rlrlrctrrl rtl)on lrr tr:tion's total conrFrlut'rtr.trurrtl yct tlrrrtllris prinr:iplcis untrue. It is Ellr rorrrelinrnrcxprcsst:tlby sayingthat if an action ir otrcc riglrl, nny plcciscly similar action, done in t'ircrrtrrxlunct.n which arc also preciselysimilar in all lrrpr('tn, rnrret bc riglrt too. But this is both too nurr(,wnrrtl too widc. It is too narrow, becauseour plirrr:ipk:rlocs not confine itself to an assertionabout prrtivly sitnilar actions. Our principle assertsth4J g-ny nr'firrrr Y, wlrcse cffectsare preciselysimilar to,th.qse ll unotlrcr X, will be right, if X is right, provided the cllct:tnof all the alternativespossiblein the two cases nft' ulso prcciselysimilar, even though Y itself is zo-t sirnilar to X, but utterly different frorn.it" 1rt'r'r:ist:ly Arrtl it is too wide, becauseit doesnot follow from the l'nr't thut two actions are both precisely similar in llrcrrrsclvcsand also done in preciselysimilar circum;lrur('(:rr,that their effectsmust also be precisely similar. 'l'lris tltrcs,of course,follow, so longas the lawsof nature sttttttitrthe same.But if we supposethe laws of nature lo r:lrangeror if we conceive a Universe in which

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different laws of nature hold from those which hold in this one, then plainly a precisely similar action done in precisely similar circumstances might yet tr.ave different total effects. According to our principle, therefore, the statement that any two precisely sirnilar actions, done in precisely similar circumstances,rnust both be right, if one is right, though true as applied to this Uniyerse, provided (as is commonly supposed) the laws of nature cannot change,is not true absolutely unconditionally. But our principle asserts absolutely untonditionally that if it is once right to prefer a set of total effects A to another set B, it must always, in any conceivable Universe, be right to prefer a set precisely similar to A to a set precisely similar to B. r This, then, is a second very fundamental principle, which our theory asserts-a principle which is, in a sense,concernedwith classesof.actions, and not merely with particular actions. And in assertingthis principle also it seemsto me that our theory is right. But many different views have been held, which, while admitting that one and the same action cannot be both right and wrong, yet assert or imply that this second principle is untrue. And I propose in this chapter to deal with those among them which resemble the theories dealt with in the last chapter in one particular respectnamely, that they depend upon some view as to the rneaningof the word 'right' or as to the meaning of the word 'good'. i And, first of all, we may briefly mention a the6ry, which is very similar to some of those dealt with in the last chapter and which is, I think, often confused with them, but which yet differs from them in one very important respect. This is the theory that to say that an action is right or wrong is the same thing as to say that a majority of a// mankind have, more often

' rtrr( ouJtrc' [rvrTy oF MoR A L l uncrurN r s 87 llun not, someparticularfecling (or absenceof feeling) Iowirrtlsnctionsof thc classto which it bclongs. This tlrcorytlillcrnfrotn tlroseconsidcrcdin the lastchapter, Irt.t'nutrc it rl,rt:nlrot irrrplytlurt onc and thc sameaction cvcr nctrrnllyir lrotlr riglrt nrrd wronl{. lior, however ruut' l r l l ro l ecl i rrgaol ' rl i l l t' r' crrt rrtcu i rnd dif f er ent rocictier rrrnyrlill'rr nt rliH'crcnttitttcs,yt:t, if we take rl ri ctl y r rtrrri ,rl i tyol ' a// nrnnki ndfi . tl l ti n r espast , pl rrrnl nrtrl l rttrttc,ntry r' l nanol ' ncti on w hi ch is, f or Irrrllrrlo, gerrr.tnllyrtlrprrtvcrlby srtt:h irtt absolute tnrlot'lly of Ell rrrarrkirrrl, will rol ulnobc tlisrrpproved hy rrr Elrrnlrrlntnn.iorilyof a// nrnrrkirttl,although it ttuy lra rllrngrplrrvr.rl lry n nrnjorityof nny one society, rrr l ry r rrrn.l nri ol l y ' nl l l l rc nror l i vi ng ut any one per iod. 'l'lrlr ptrrp,rrul,llterclirrr, to nny that, whon we assert rtlr Ir'lton to lrc riglrt ()f wr(,n9, we are making an of rrn absolutemajority of enrtllorr ulrorrttlrc lt:<:lirrgs tkrcs rrot conflict with the principle that rll/ rrrnrrkirrrl otrc urrtl llre snrrrc:rction cannot be both right and wlung. lt llkrws us to say that any particular action elwnynin r:ithcr right or wrong, in spite of the fact that rlilli'rt'rrtnrcn and clifferentsocietiesmay feel differently lrrwnrtlsucti
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Now I do not know if this theory has ever been expressly held; but some philosophers have certainly argued as if,itwere true. Great pains have,for instance, been taken to show that mankind are, in gencral, pleased with actions which lead to a maximum of pleasure,and displeasedwith those which lead to less than a maximum; and the proof that this is so has been treated as if it were, at the sametime, a proof that it is always right to do fuhat leads to a maximum of pleasure, and wron$ to do what leads to less than a maximum. But obviously, unless to show that mankind are gencralljt pleased with a particular sort of action is the same thing as to show that that sort of action is alzlays right, some independent proof is needed to show that what mankind are generally pleasecl.with r'salways right. And some of those who have-lrsedthis argument do not seemto have seenthat any such proof is needed. So soon-as we recognize quite clearly that to say that an zaction is right is aol the same thing as to say that mankind are generally pleasedwith it, it becomes obvious that to show that mankind are generally pleasedwith a particular sort of action is aol sufficient to show that it is right. And hence it is, I think, fair to say that those who have argued as if it were sufficient, have argued as if to say that an action is right were the same thing as saying that mankind are generally pleased with it; although, perhaps,if this assumptionhad beenexpressly put before them, they would have rejected it. We may therefore say, I think, that the theory that to call an action right or wrong is the same thing as to say that an absolute majority of all mankind have some particular feeling (or absence of feeling) towards actions of that kind, has often been assumed, even if it has not been expressly held. And it is,

't'l tt{ oti Jl ("r'tvt'l 'Y

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llrelclirre,pcrlrrrlrn worth whilc to point out that it is erporcrl lo exnclly llrc sntttcolrjcctionas two of the tlu,oricrrlorll witlr irr tlre llrstchitptcr, 'I.he objection ilnrt tllttttcrof ftct, that a man ir tlrut it ir rlrriler'ct'tnirr, irrnylrnvcno rhrtrlrlilrrtl tttt rtctiortis right, cvcn where lv, ltpt rlrrrlrl wlrr'llrcr tttt ttlrsolrrtcmtjority of all l i ' t:l i ng (or absenceof rrrnrrhi rrrl l rnvr. n yrnt' l i t' ttl rtr l i ' r' l i rrg)l ow atrl Ei t, tto tttttl l trt'w l ri tt ftrcl i ngwe t ake. Arrrl whel llrir rltowr ir llrrrt,wltrttcvcrhc is thinking, whertltc thlrrhrllre nr'tiottlo lrc rigltt, hc is not merely l t:tvcany par t icular y ' trrrtrrki rrtl thl rrhl rgl l rel n rrrnj ori l ol feetlrrgtowurrlr ll. liverr,llrcrcfirrc,if it bc true that wlral lr npprrtvorlrrr !ikctl try rtrt ttbsoltttcmajority of tnnrrhftrrl ls, ot tt mttter ol .liu'l, rtlwnysriglrt (and this wF sre rrrrtrlirprrlittg),it in tlrtitc ccrttin that to say rrsto say that it is tlrqt if lr riglrt ir not llrc uunc thintr1 llrrrr ngrlrrovetl.Arrd with this wc corne to the end ol'a certuitr typc of thcoricswith regardto the meaning rrf llra words'riglrt'and'wrong'. We are now entitled kr tlrc cottclusionthat, whateverthe meaning of these wrrrrlarnay be, it is not identical with any assertion wlrutcvcrabout either the feelingsor the thoughts of zra= -neithcr those of any particular man, nor those ol' nny particular society, nor those of some man or ollrcr, nor those of mankind as a whole. To predicate ol' un action that it is right or wrong is to predicate of it somcthing quite different from the mere fact that uny man or set of men have any particular feeling towurds,or opinion about, it. llut there are some philosophers who, while feeling tlrc strongest objection to the view that one and the trlnrc action can ever be both rigllt and wrong, and ntso to any view which implies that the question whcther an action is right or wrong dependsin any way upon what men-€ven the majority of men-actually

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feel or think about it, yet seem to be so strongly convinced that to call an action right must be merely to make an assertion about the attitude of. somebeing towards it, that they have adopted the View that there is some being other than any man or set of men, whose attitude towards the same action or class of actions never changes, and that, when we assert actions to be right or wrong, what we are doing is merely to make an assertionabout the attitude of this non-human being. And theories of this type are the next which I wish to consider. / Those who have held some theory of this type haver' I think, generally held that what we mean by calling an action right or wrong is not that the non-human being in question has or has not somefeeling towards actions of the classto which it belongs, but that it has or has not towards them one of the mental attitudes which we call willing ot contmandingor fmbiddhg; a kind of mental attitude with which we are all familiar, and which is not generally classedunder phe head of feelings, but under a quite separate head. To forbid actions of a certain classis the same thing as to will or command that they should notbe dorre, And the view generally held is, I think, that to say that an action ought to be done, is the same thing as to say that it belongs to a class which the non-human being wilb or commands; to say thaf it is right, is to say that it belongs to a class which the non-human being does not forbid; and to say that it is wrong or ought not to be done is to say that it belongs to a class which the non-human being doesforbid. All assertionsabout right and wrong are, accordingly, by theories of this type, identifiqf with assertionsabout the will of some non-human being. And there are two obvious reasons why we should hold that, if judgements of right and

Ti l l r oIU IrcTrvITy ol r MoR A L JU D cE MENTS gr wrolrg itrc jutlgcnrclrtsabout any mcntal attitude at all, llrry rrrcjrrtlgt:rrrcnts rrllorrttlre nrcntalattitudewhich wr: t'rrll williu11,rutlrcr thln ab
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,some person or personshaving the necessaryauthority over that community, or can be deduced from something which has been so willed. It is, indeed, not at all an easything to define,what is meant by'hazting the necessalyauthority', or,'in other words, to say in what relation a person or set of persons must stand to a community, if it is to be true that nothing can be a law of that community except what theie persons have willed, or what can be deduced from something which they have willed. But still it may be true tha-t there always is some person or set of persons *hose will or consent is necessaryto;nake a law a law. And whether this is so or not, it does seem to be the case that every law, which is the law of any community, is, in a certain sense, dependentupon the human will. This is true in the sensethat, in the caseof every law whatever, there always are sornemen, who, by performing certain acts of will, could make it ceaseto be the law; and also that, in the case of anything whatever which is not the law, there always are somemen, who, by performing certain acts of will, could make it be the law: though, of course, any given set of men who could effect the changein the caseof some laws, could very often not efiect it in the case of others, but in their caseanother set of men would be required: and, of course, in some tases the number of men whose co-operation would be required would be very large. It does seem, therefore, as if laws, in the legal sense, were essentially dependent on the human will; and this fact naturally suggeststhat moral laws also are dependent on the will of some being. These are, I think, the two chief reasonswhich have led people to supposethat moral judgements arejudgements about the tdll, rather than about the feelings, of. some being or beings. And there are, of course, the

'l 'i l r

0 r r J I c T r v I 'r y o F M o R A L J U D C E M E N TS 9 3 ()l)j(:(:ti()nB hrufrc t() slll)lxrsing, in the case of moral l i r w r r ,l l r : r t t l r t : l r r : i r r go r l r c i r r g si n r l t r c s t i o nc a n be a n y r r i u r ( ) l 's c t o l 'r r u : r r , : r sl l r t : r c a r c t o t h c s u p p o s i t i on th a t jttrlgctttcrrtnnlrorrl riglrt lrrtl wrong cln be merely i r r r l g c t r r c r r l rn l r o r r t r r u : n 'r r l i : c l i n g s a r r d o P i n i o n s. In t l r i n w u y , l l r c t t 'l i r t r r ,t l r t : r e l u r s r r : r t r t n t l l yu r i s c n t h e vi e w w r n t ( ! t r o w t 'o r r n i t k 't 'i r r g- t l r r : v i c w t l u r t t o s a y o f a n i r 'l i o t r t l r u l i t o r r p l l r ll o l r t 't k r n c , o r i s r i g l r t , o r o u g h t r r r l l o l x 'r l , r r r t ', i n l l r c n i r r r r t :l l r i r r g u s t o s : r y th a t i t l r c l , , r g r l o l t c l n n n r r l ' r u 'l i o r r r w l r i t 'l r l r r r s l l c c n co m t t t r l i l r l r '{1o, t ' l r l r n r i l l c r l , o r l i r t l r i t h l t n b y s o r n c n o a huntttu lx'itrg,. llilli'rcrrl virwr lrlvt:, olt corrrsc, been Irthr,tn r s l r r t v l r o o r w l r u l l l r r r r o n - l r r r r r r i tlrlrc i r r g i s. On e o l 'l J r r , : i t r r | k . x l i n t l r r r t i t i a ( i o r l : t l r u t i s t o s a y, th a t, w l l r , n w r . r 'r r l l l r r r t r 'li o t r w t o t r l l , w ( : l n ( : i l l l t o s a y th a t ( i , r r l l r r t n l o t l r i r l t k 'r r i t . l l r r t o t l r t : r P l r i l o s o p h c rs h a ve r t t g r p o n l r l l l r u t i t i s r t l r r : i r r g w h i c h n r a y b c ca l l e d ' l {r 'u n o l r ',o r o r r c t 'r r l l c t l" l 'l r e P r a c t i c a l 'l {e a s o n ',o r o n e , n l l r . r l " l 'l r c l 'r r r c - Wi l l ', o r o n e c a l l e d 'T h e U n i ve r sa l Will ', r,r orrc t'irllcd "I'hc True Self '. In some cases, crrllcclby these names have been supposed llrr' lr.r'irr11s lo lrt: rrrr:rt:ly'ftrcultics' of the human mind, or some ollrt:l' crrtity, rcsidcnt in, or forming a part of, the rrrirrrlxol'irll rncn. And, where this is the case, it may n'r'ru rrrrlirir to call these supposed entities 'nonIrrrrrrirrr'.Ifut all that I mean by calling them this is to errrlrlursizc thc fuct that evdn if they are faculties of, rrr r:rrtitics rcsidcnt in, the human mind, they are, at It'rrut, rrot human beings-that is to say, they are not tru',t cithcr any one particular man or any set of rnen. l;or rx lrypothesi they are beings which can never will rvlrrrt is wrong, whereas it is admitted that alI men r';rrr,und sometimes do, will what is wrong. No doubt norrrt:tirnes,when philosophers speak as if they believed in thc existence ofbeings ofthis kind, they are speaking

ET H rc s 9+ metaphorically and do not really hold. any such belief. Thus a philosopher may often speakof an ethical truth as 'a dictate of Reason,,-without really meaning to imply that there is any faculty o, puri of our mind which invariably leaas us riglt ,r"rr", leads us ".,ithat such wrong. But I think there is no doubt language is not always metaphorical. The view is held th"at whenever l.judge truly or will rightly, there really is a something in me which does*these thines_the same something on every different occasion; uid th"t this-something,never jydges falsely or wills wrongly: so,that, when I judge falsely and will wrongly, itls a dffirent something in me which doesso. Now it may seem to many people that the most serious objection to views oi this Li.ra is that it is, , to say the least, extremely doubtful whether there is any being, such as they suppose to exist_any being, 'who never wills what is wrong but always o"ty wt ii is right; and I think myselflhat, in ail probability there is no.such being-neither a God, noiany bein! such as philosophers have called by the names I have mentioned. But adequately to discussthe reasonsfor and against supposing that there is one would take us far too long. And fortunately it is unnecessaryfor our presentpurpose; siqce the only questionwe need to.answer is whether, e/en supposingthere is such a being, who commands all thaf orrghito be done and only what ought to be done, and forbids all that is wrong and only what is wrong, what we mean by saying that an action ought or ought not to be done cai pog.illy be merely that this biing commands ir or forbids it.*And it seems to me thire is a conclusive argument against supposing that this can be all that we mean, even if there really is, in fact, such a being. The argument is simply that, whether there is suJh

'l 'r i l r o n r f i c 'r I v r T Y

o F M O R A L J U D G E M EN TS 9 5 ,r lrcing or lrot, tltt:rc ccrtainly are many people who rlo rrol lrclit:vc thrrt tltcrc is onc, and that such People' irr ngrile of trot lrclicving in its t:xistcncc, can neverllrclenn trrrrlirnre io lrclit:vc tlr:rt nctions are right and rvr'(lnl{. ltrtt tlrin worrltl lrc rptitt: itttpossiblc if the view wc nrc corrrirk'ritrg wrt't: lrttc. Accot'tlirtgto that view, lo lrrfirvc llrul ntt ur'liott in wrrltrtrlis lht sonrcthingasto l r r l i r v e t l r n t i t i r l i r r l r i r l r l e r rl r y o t t t : o f t l r c s c l t o n- h u m a n l r r i r r g r ; r r l l l r n l d t r y r , t l e w l t t t t t : v c r w l t r l c vcr d o e s lx'lirvn llrrrl rrrrnr'liort ir wlottg irr, ipsolarto, bclieving I t t l l r n n l l s l l t t r 'n t t f r t t t 'l t n l r c i r t g . l t l r t : r i t t t l i ns, th e r e l i r t e , l l r n l n v c ty l r , , , l y w l r o l r r l i t : v c u t l t l r t n c :ti o n s a r e r l g l r l r r r w l , r t t g r l , t , 's ,l l t t l t l t i t l l c r o f f i t t 't , b c l i c vc i n th e e r h l e r r r 'e r r l u r r r o l ' l l r c r a l r c i r r g r , A r r r l t l r i s c o n te n ti o n r r . p r r n l r r l r o p l r i r r l y ( \ r r l t 'r l t 'yl o l i t t : t . I t n r i g h t, i n d e e d , l r u u r g r . r ll l r l l w l r r r r w c n l y l l u : r t : a r c s b m c p e o p l e w h o r/l ltrrl lrr,licvc irr nrry of tlrt:sc bcings, all that is really lrrra ir f lrrtt llrctt ltt: nrnrtepcoplc who think they do not lrrlirvc irr llrcrr; wlrik:, in ftct, cverybody really does. Itrrt it irr rrrrcly irrrpossible seriously to maintain that, Irr nll orscs, tlrcy arc so mistaken as to the nature of tlrrir owrr lrt:licfs. Ilut if so, then it follows absolutely llrul cv<'n if wrong actions always are in fact forbidden Iry aorrrt: lron-human being, yet to say that they are wrrurg is lrot iclcntical with saying that they are so lorlrirlrk:tt. Arrrl it is important also, as an argument against vicws of tlris class, to insist upon the reason why they rorrtr;rrlict thc principle which we are considering in tlriH r'lr;rptcr. They contradict this principle, because tlrry irrrply that there is absolutely zo class of actions rrf rvlrir:lr wc can say that it always would, it any conr civ;rltl<:Universe, be right or wrong. They imply this I'r'r'ur*u:they imply that f the non-human being, whom tlrly urrppose to exist, did not exist, nothing would be

E T H rc s 96 right or wrong. Thus, for instance, if it is held that to call an action wrong is tlte samething as to say that it is forbidden by God, it will follow that, if God did not exist, nothing would be wrong; and hence that we cannot possibly hold that God forbids what is wrong, becauseit is wrong. We must hold, on the contrary, that the wrongnessof what is wrong consistssimply and solely in the fact that God does forbid it-a view to which many even of thoqe, who believe that what is wrong is in fact forbidden by God, will justly feel an objection. For these reasons, it seems to me, we may finally conclude that, when we assert any action to be right or wrong, we are not merely making an assertionabout " the attitude of mind towards it of any being or set of beings whatever-no matter what attitude of mind we take to be the one in question, whether one of feeling or thinking or willing, and no matter what being or beings we take, whether human or nonhuman: and that hence no proof to the effect that any particular being or set of beings has or has not a particular attitude of mind towards an action is sufficient to provf that the action really is right or wrong. But there are many philosophers who fully admit this-who admit that the predicateswhich we denote by the words 'right' and 'wrong' do not consist in the having of any relation whatever to any beingt feelings or thoughts or will; and who will even go further than this and admit that the question whether an action is right o_rwrong does depend, in a sense, solely'"upon its consequences,namely, in the sense, that no action ever can be right, if it was possible for the agent to do something else which would have had better total consequences; but who, while admitting

't 'i l x o r J D c T r v r T Y

oF MoRAL JUDGEMENTS 97 rull this, ncvcrthclcss maintain that to call one set of r'ons(:(lrrcnccsbcllcr th'tn anothcr is thc same thing as to rurytlrnt thc orrc st:t is rt:lirtctl to somc mind or minds i r r r r w : r y i r r w l r i c l r t l r c o t l r c r i s n o t r c l a t c d . T h a t i s to n n y , w l r i k : r r r l r r r i t t i r r gt l u r t t o c ; r l l a r r a c t i o n r i gh t o r wt,rrrg in lol rrrt:rcly t(, iut$clt tlurt sornc particular r r r c r r l u ln t t i l r r r l c i r t r r k e r rr r p t o w : r r t l s i t , t h c y h o ld th a t l o r 'n l l n l l r i r r g 'g o o t l 'o t ''l l r t l 'r . r n u r r c l y t o t r s s cr tth i s. A r r r l o l '( 'r r u t 'r ( ! ,r l i i l r r l r r r e t l l r t r r o l r t 't i o n c v c r ca n b e tlglrf ttllr.lr its lulrrl rlli't'lH rrlt: us 11txxlas possible, l l r e t r l l r i l v i c r v u n l o l l r e r r r c r r n i r r go l 't l r c w o r d s 'g o o d ' E t r r l 'I r n r l 'r v i l l l l r r l l n r l i c t t l r e l r l i r r t 'i P l cw e u r c c o nsi d cr l t r g l t r l l r h r l r r r p l l t 'l x c l l i 'r 't i v c l y r r si l 't l r c c o r r c s p o n d i n g v l e w l r e l u 'l r l l l r o r r l t l r c r r r c r r r r i r rogl ' t l r c w o r c l s 'r i g h t' s l r l 'w t , r r r g '. l , i r l i l ', i r r r i n y i r r gl l u r t o l r c s c t o f c f f ects A l : h p i l a t l l r r t t ru r r n l l r c r l l w c r r r c r c l y r r r c r r nt o s a y t h a t A lrng n tr.lrtliotr io sorrt: rrrirrtl or rninds which B has lytl p;i, tlr(.n il will lirllow tlurt a sct of effectsprecisely rirrrilrrr to A wilf wtl be bcttcr than a set precisely sirrilrrr to ll, il'llrt:y do not happen to have the required rrl,rlilrrH to :uty nrind. And hence it will follow that tvltr llrorrglr, orl onc occasion or in one Universe, it in liglrt to ;rrt:fcr A to B, yet, on another occasion or irr rrrrrrtlrcr l)nivcrsc, it may quite easily not be right. lo lrrr.li:r a sct of cfl'ects precisely similar to A to a set Itt".'i*t,ly sirnihr to B. l,irr this rcason, the view that the meaning of the m e r e l y t h a t s o m e b e i ng h a s w , t 'r l a 'g r x r d 'a n d 'b a d 'i s Er)tn(.rncntirl flttitude towards the thing so called, may r'r)nHtilutc r frrtal objection to the principle which we rrrr. r'orrsirlcring. It will, indeed, only do so, if we nrlrrrit tlurt it nrust always be right to do what has the /rr'r/ polsilrlc total cffects. But it may be held that this rg nr'll t:vitlcnt, and many persons, who hold this view rrrtlr r('gard to the meaningof 'good'and 'bad'would, ta

[T ]rrc s 98 I think, be inclined to admit that it is so. Hence it becomesimportant to consider this nerv objection to our principle. This viervthat by callinga thing 'good' or 'bad' we merely mean that some being or beings have a certain mental attitude torvards it, has been even more commonly held than the corresponding view with re g a r dt o' r ight ' and ' p ro n g ' ; a n d i t m a y b e h e l d i n as many different form3. Thus it may be held that to say that a thing is 'good' is the same thing as to say that somebodytlinks it is good-a view which may be refuted by the samegeneralargumentwhich was used in the caseof the correspondingview about 'right' and 'wrong'. Again it may be held that each man rvhen h e callsa t hing' goo d ' o r' b a d ' m e re l y me a n sth a t Ze himselfthinks it to be so or has some feeling towards it; a view from which it will follow, as in the caseof right and wrong, that no two mcn can ever differ in opinion as to whether a thing is good or bad. Again, also, in most of thc forms, in which it can be held, it will certainlyfollow that one and the samething can be botlt goorJand trad; sincc, whatcver pair of mental attitudes or single mental attitude we take, it seemsas certain hqre, as in the case of right and wrong, that different men will sometimes have different mental attitudes torvardsthe same thing. This has, however, been very often disputed in the caseof one particular mental attitude, which deserves to be specially mentioned. One of the chief differencesbetweenthe views rvhich have been held with regard to the meaning of 'good' and 'bad', and thoservhich havebeen held'lvith regard to th e m eaningof ' r i g h t' a n d ' w ro n g ' , i s th a t i n t he former case it has been very often held that what we mean by calling a thing 'good' is that it is dcsired,or

()i l Jt,io't'tvtl 'y oF MoItA L gg JU D GIi l \{IN TS .,i r ,l , ctl i rr sorrrt: p:rrl i t rrl l rr rvl ry ; untl thi s atti tude of ',l r'.i rr" i r; orrr'l l r;rl I rl i tl rrol rrrttrti otr i l r tl tc c as c of 'rrt,l ,l ' ;r1rl 'l t'torr1,' l i r r :nl ;(, :j o l .rr :rs I l i rrrl u', trobody 'f'i l ti

l r.r'i ('\'( t l r, l ,l l l r,rl 1,, r.rl l .rrr :r l ;r)r) 'ri ri l rt'i :; tl re s l tnte l l ri r,yi .r:' l o r,,ry l l r.rl l t r'r,l ,.i rr',1. l l rrt l l rt.tortrrttones t r'l .rl l r'i ,rr,, rrrl l r rr1i .rr,l 1,, l l rr.rtrcrrrri rrl l ol tlrc W Ofd '1',,,'rl ', i ,r l l r.rl l ,r r.rl l .r l l rr';1 1',',,r1 i :; to sl ry l h:rt i t tr rl r",i tl rl , r,r ,l ,ri urrl l rrt tl . r,\\n:i :rl .t'; :ur,l t.ttri ous l y ( rrr'i l t'l l l l rrrr tr tr l r.r,, l ,r i tr i l r,r.(l :t:; :trt :rtl l ul rrc trt i tt l .nl rrt r,l l l rr \ r t \' l l rr,r y r,l ,rl r,l trr our l i rl rl l u'o t' l r:i 1ttc rs , rrtr l l r l :r',l l rrl tl r.l l trr l r,ul r l , t rl ,.:,i t't':i(ol
r:/r'

IOO

'

ETHICS

One point should be carefully noticed to begin with; namely, that we have gro need to show that when we call a thing 'good' we neoermean simply that somebody has some mental attitude towards it. There are many reasonsfor thinking that the word 'good' is ambiguous-that we use it in different senses on different occasions;and, if so, it is quite possiblethat, in some of its uses, it should stand merely for the assertion that somebody has lsome feeling or some other mental attitude towards the thing called 'good', although, in other uses, it does not. We are not, therefore, concernedto show that it may not sometinzes merely stand for this; all that we need to show is that sometimesit does not. For what we have to do is merely to meet the argument that, if we assert, 'It would always be wrong to prefer a worseset of total consequences to a better',we nust, in this proposition, mean merely by 'worse' and 'better', consequences to which a certain mental attitude is taken up-a conclusion from which it would follow that, even though a set of consequencesA wzs oncebetter than a set B, a set precisely similar to A would not always necessarilybe better than a set precisely similar to B. And obviously all that we need to do, to show this, is to show that somesensecan be given to the words 'better' and 'worse', quite other than this; or, in other words, that to call a thing'good'does not ahtsays mean merely that some mental attitude is taken up towards it. It will be best, therefore, in order to make the problem definite, to concentrate attention upon one particular usageof the word, in which it seemsclearly not to mean this. And I will take as an example that usage in which we make judgements of what was called in Chapter II'intrinsb value'; that is to say,

'r r n i o U J D c T I v I T Y o F M O R A L J U D G E M D N T S r o r wlrcrc wc jrrrlgc, concerning a particular state of things tlrrrt it worrltl bc wortlr whilc*--woukl bc'a good thing' tlr:rt tlrrrt stltc ol'tlrirrgs slroultl cxist, even if nothing tlu' rurre lo tt;isl lttsilts, cithcr at thc snmc time or rulit'rwurrln. Wc rlr trot, of coursc, so const:urtly make j r r t l g c r r r c r r l no l ' l l r i n k i r r t l , u s w c t L r s o r u c o t h c r j u d g e r r r c r r l ru l r o u l l l u r g r x r r l r r c Honl ' t l r i r r g r . l l u t w c c e r ta i n l y r:llr lrurkc llrctrr, rrrrtlit rcr:rrurrltitt: t:lcar that we mean unurthiug lry llrctrr, We rot corrsitlcr with regard to r r r y p n t l i r 'r r l r r r r r l r l c o l ' t l r i r r g n w l r c t l r c r i t w o ul d b e wortlr wlrilc llrnt it rlurrrlrl cxirt, cvcn if thcre were n l r r o l r r l r . l y n r r l l r i t r g r l r <: i r r l l r c U n i v c r s e b esi d e s; w l u 'l l u , t , l i r t ' i r r r r l u r r l c i,l w r r r r l r ll u r v c b c c n w o r t h w h i l e l l r n l l l u . l l t r i v e t n r ', u n i t h l n c x i s l c t l u p t i l l n o w , s h o u l d I r n v l r , x i n t r r l ,r v l r r i l n l x r o l u t c l yn o t l r i n g w c r c t o f ol l o w , lrrrt ilr ctirlctrcc w('rc to bc cut short at the present rufrtfrrfrl I wr', (ttt, trrnsirlcr wlrcther the existence of rrrt'lr n lJtrivt't'scrvorrlrlhavc bcen better than nothing, or wlretlrt'r it would have been just as good that rurllritrgirt tll slmuld cver have existed. In the case of rrrclr jrrrlgclncnts as these it seems to me there are rlr'ong rcusons for holding that we are not merely lrrukitrg an asscrtion either about our own or about urrylrotly clsc's attitude of mind towards the state of lhirrgn in tlucstion. And if we can show this, in this (,n(: ('irsc,that is sufficient for our purpose. Wlutt, thcn, are the reasons for holding it? I tlrink wc should distinguish two different cases, , rrt't'rrr
IOz

ET HICS

the following argument seemsto me to be conclusi-ve all vieu'sof this type. Namely, a man certainly agair.rst can bclicve with regard to a given thing or state of things, that the idea of it doespleasesomebody, and rs desired, and even desired for its own sake, and yet not believethat it would be at all worth while that it should exist, if it existed quite alone. He may even believe that it would be a positively bad thing-zlorse than nothing-that it should exist quite alone, in spite of the fact that he knows that it is desired and strongly desired for its own sake, even by himself. That some men can and do make such judgements-that they can and do judge that things which they themselvesdesire or are pleasedwith, are neverthelessintrinsically bad (that is to say would be bad, quite apart from their consequences,and even if they existed quite alone) is, I think, undeniable; and no doubt men make this judgement even more frequently with regard to things which are desiredby others. And if this is so, then it shows conclusively that to judge that a thing is intrinsically good is not the same thing as to judge that someman is pleasedwith it or desiresit or desires it for its own sake. Of course, it may be held that anybodywho makessuch a judgement is wrong: that, as a matter of fact, anything whatever which is desired, alwaysis intrinsically good. But that is not the question. We are not disputing for the moment that this may be so as anxatter offact. All that we are trying to show is that, even if it is so, yet, to say that a thing is intrinsically good is not the samething as to say that it is desired: and this follows absolutely,if even in a single case,a man believesthat a thing rlsdesired and .yet does notbelieve that it is intrinsically good. But I am not sure that this argument will hold against all forms in which the view might be held,

T l t t ( ( ) | | J t i ( : 't 't v l 't 'Y o r r M o R A L J U D c E M E N T S r O3 nlllrorrgh it tltx:s lroltl agrrirrstthoso in which it is most t 'o r r r t r r r r t r l yl r t 'l r l . 'l 'l r t : r r : u r - c , I t l r i n k , f c c l i n gs w i th t 'c g n t 'rl o w l r i c l r i t i s r r r r r t 'l r r r o r r :p l i r r r s i b l ct o h o l d th a t k r l r e l i c v c t h u l l l r c y u r r : l i 'l t t o w ; r r t l sa g i v c n t h i n g i s th e ; u t r r r l l r i r r g n n t o l r r l i e 'v cl l r ; r t t l r c t l r i r r g i s i n t r i nsi ca l l y goorl, llrirrr it ir trr lrolrl tlris witlr rcglrrl to the mere l c r 'l i r r g o l '1 r l r '1 1 6 1 1o1t 'q 'r l',n r i r c , o r t l t r s i r co f a t l r i n g 'fo r i l r o w r r n t k r , ', l 'i r t ' i r r r l l r r r r ', i t l r r : r y ,s o l i r r : r s I c a n se e , I t o l r t t d t l r r t l l l r c r c r t 'u l l y i n H r ) l n ( v: ( : r y s p c c i u l f c c l i n g o f r t t r 'l t n t t r t l t t t r .t l r r t l u t r y r r r i r r rw l r o k r r o r v st h u t h c h i r n se l f o r a t t y l r o r l y r 'l n r t 'c r t l l y l c r 'l n i t t o w u r r l s a n y sta te o f l l t i t t g n c n t r t r r r rt l o t t l r t t l r l t t l r r : s t i t t c o l 't l r i n g s i n r ; u csti o n i n i l r t r i r r n i l r l l y g , , , x l . l l t l r i s l r t : s o , t h c n t h c l a st a r g u r r u 'r r tw i l l r r r l l r o l r l r r l l r i r r r rttl u : v i c w t l r u t w h c n w c ca l l a t l r i r r g i r r t r i r r n i t 'i r l l yg r r o t l w c r n i l y r n c a n r n c r c l y t l n t th i s rprritil .luling in fclt tow;rrtls it. Ancl against any such vicw, il' it wt:rc hclrl, thc only obvious argument I t'nn lirrrl is tlurt it is surcly plain that, even if the special fief irrg in tyrrcstionhad not been felt by any one towards f lrr: givcrr stltc of things, yet the state of thitgs would Iruvc bccn intrinsically good. , llrrt, in ordcr fully to make plain the force of this rurgurncnt, it is necessary to guard against one misrrrr