Ethics, Human Rights and Culture Beyond Relativism and Universalism
Xiaorong Li
Ethics, Human Rights and Culture
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Ethics, Human Rights and Culture Beyond Relativism and Universalism
Xiaorong Li
Ethics, Human Rights and Culture
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Ethics, Human Rights and Culture Beyond Relativism and Universalism
Xiaorong Li
© Xiaorong Li 2006 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted her right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published in 2006 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–1–4039–8548–4 hardback ISBN-10: 1–4039–8548–0 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Li, Xiaorong, 1958– Ethics, human rights, and culture : beyond relativism and universalism / Xiaorong Li. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–8548–0 (cloth) 1. Human rights. 2. Social ethics. 3. Pluralism (Social sciences). I. Title. JC571.L52828 2005 323—dc22 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 06 Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne
2005049198
In the memory of my mother, Wang Jianrong, and my father, Li Shen
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Contents List of Figures
ix
Acknowledgements
x
Introduction
Part I
xiii
Living with Cultural Paradoxes
1
1 Paradoxes of Culture Why ‘culture?’ A consensus view Three paradoxes Cultural ‘community’ and ‘tradition’
3 3 9 14 19
2 The Ethical Significance of Culture Qualifying ethical significance The ethical significance of tradition Of character traits Of cultivated sentiments Of community
25 25 29 33 38 47
3 A Cultural Critique of Cultural Relativism Case closed? Discontents with philosophers’ critiques The cultural critique Case against irrational cultural relativism
54 54 57 64 69
Part II Transcending Dichotomies
73
4 Destructive of Cultural Community? The collapse of ‘individual vs. collective’ Human rights to culture: an oxymoron? Prerequisites for viable communities
75 76 85 92
5 Intolerant of Cultural Pluralism? Pluralism with moral purpose The intolerance of toleration
vii
102 104 111
viii Contents
Part III
Validating Rights: The View from Anywhere
119
6 Cross-Cultural Via the Inter-Subjective The return to the ordinary Between objectivity and subjectivity Identifying effective equivalents Uncovering core functions Ruling out corrupt judgments
121 121 127 131 135 140
7 From Human Values to Inherent Rights Ask us why we all agree The leap of conscience Constructing rights
143 143 155 159
8 From Practical Reasons to Extrinsic Rights Rights as instruments Integrity and trade-off Contingent universality
166 166 172 182
9 An Unfair Utopia? ‘Unrealistic,’ ‘Unfair,’ and other criticisms ‘Centrifugal circles’ of duties Fairness, impartiality, and institutions
185 185 190 199
Postscript
211
Notes
218
Bibliography
252
Index
264
List of Figures 2.1 A breakdown of culture’s ethical significance 8.1 The structure of rights 8.2 Example of a micro-structure of rights 9.1 Centrifugal circles of duties toward the standard rights-bearer 9.2 Centrifugal circles of duties of the standard duties-bearer’s
ix
27 177 178 197 197
Acknowledgements
For publicly expressing some of the beliefs I try to validate in this book, I am banished by Chinese authorities from returning to China. I was unable to visit my ailing parents and subsequently to attend their funerals. I hope to honor their memory by articulating the reasons for the convictions that are feared by such a government. There are many other motives for this venture, of course. My years of involvement in NGOs monitoring rights, particularly my experiences shared with many, Chinese and non-Chinese of creating and nurturing the group Human Rights in China, taught me the complexity of the human rights struggle. My primary inspiration continues to be the many courageous and thoughtful individuals in China or in exile who denounce abuses and defend democratic and human rights values at the risk of imprisonment or banishment from their homeland. Colleagues at the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, University of Maryland, made this book possible in every way imaginable. Judith Lichtenberg and David Wasserman read various chapters and suggested significant revisions. Arthur Evenchick and Verna Gehring, former and current editors of Philosophy & Public Policy Quarterly (formerly Report from the Institute for Philosophy & Public Policy) meticulously edited large chunks of the book. Arthur also extensively commented on Chapter 2. Director Bill Galston provided constant encouragement and advice. Mark Sagoff, David Crocker, Robert Wachbroit, Peter Levine, Jerome Segal, David Luban, and Bob Fullinwider commented on various papers that evolved into this book. Mark gave valuable advice at the final stage. Carroll Linkins’ unflappable wit was just as helpful as her assistance in producing the manuscript. I also profited from my teaching at the university, perhaps more than the students, particularly of the Proseminars in Philosophy, Politics and Public Policy (with Judith Lichtenberg, Mark Graber, Christopher Morris, and Karol Soltan). My interest in the subject matter emanated from writing my dissertation on John Rawls’ theory of justice, in the Philosophy Department at Stanford University. My advisors, Debra Satz and the late Susan M. Okin,
x
Acknowledgements xi
and Martha Nussbaum who served as the outside reader, challenged me to explore alternative approaches to international justice. Their own critical work in related areas of philosophy has helped shaping my views. The year I spent at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Princeton, New Jersey, provided the oasis I needed to conceptualize the main arguments in the book. I must thank IAS faculty, particularly Michael Walzer and Joan Scott, for making this possible. My fellow members from the same class, Anat Biletzki, Thomas Pogge, Danilyn Rutherford, Eve Troutt-Powell, Claire Jean Kim, Mary Lou Roberts, Ruth Abbey, Joan Fujimura, Liang Zhiping, Moshe Shokeid, Alastair Davidson and others all provided helpful insights and criticism. Thomas Pogge, David Little, and Perry Link kindly read different parts of earlier drafts, and helped me to shape the current arguments and structure of the book. My husband Eric Goldstein was by default the first to be subjected to these ideas in their hazardous raw forms. As someone who makes a living by visiting prisons, reporting on torture, and listening to victims criticizing their abusers in mostly Muslim countries, he served as my sounding board and reality check without destroying harmony on the home front. His no-nonsense editing has spared readers not a few clichés, pedantic passages, and philosophic nitpickings. My in-laws, Inge and Martin Goldstein and Aviva Goldstein, edited parts of the manuscript in a valiant effort to defend the English language from butchery on the keyboard by this non-native speaker. A scientist by training, Martin also brought needed rigor to my handling of ‘culture’ in Chapter 1. Much gratitude also goes to Nancy Farley, of the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, who edited an earlier version of the manuscript in its entirety. A grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities in the mid-1990s, in which my colleague David Crocker was the principal investigator, allowed me to undertake some of the initial research. This unexpectedly protracted pursuit was then sustained with the help of grants from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the US Institute of Peace, and the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton. Throughout, the University of Maryland, my employer, provided a rich and supportive environment in which I could bring this work to fruition. Finally, for the past year, thanks to Marie Holzman, JeanPhilippe Béja, and the Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Internationales for hosting me in Paris while I finalized the text.
xii Acknowledgements
It has been a pleasure and an education to work with Daniel Bunyard and Ann Marangos, my editors at Palgrave MacMillan. I must also thank the anonymous readers whose comments helped improve the final version. It took many villages, ‘East’ and ‘West,’ to make this little book. No doubt, the views will find support and objection in each of them. X. R. Li Paris, 23 April 2005
Introduction In everyday moral decision-making, particularly in grappling with ethical dilemmas, we routinely encounter seemingly incongruent perspectives and competing values. These may or may not have much to do with cultural differences. The challenges of such diversities, to the soundness, objectivity, fairness or implementation of our judgments, however, have become increasingly more acute and complex as globalization rapidly redefines our lives. For instance, should we take seriously any suggestion that the culture in the Arab world or the Muslim religion have something to do with the latest spate of terrorist attacks? Should we buy cheap textile products made in sweatshops where the locals seem eager to get work? Should we grant asylum to young women seeking shelter from female circumcision practiced as part of the way of life in their own societies? Should we stop certain religiously sanctioned or customary legal punishments such as amputating thieves or stoning adulteresses to death since we see these as cruel, inhumane and degrading? In this book, I join many others in the effort to address these types of questions. I approach them by scrutinizing many of our taken-for-granted presumptions and experimenting with some alternatives. We have learnt our lesson that it will not do to deny the culture factor of human life, which remains omnipresent, irrepressible, and assertive in our moral discourse and policy debates. Thus when a government bans the teaching of a language, such a ban may infringe upon the cultural rights of the relevant linguistic community. In promulgating legal restrictions, whether a ban on stem-cell research or on Internet posting of opinions critical of government policies, authorities often defend them by citing cultural traditions or religious faiths. Women’s rights advocates have urged outlawing customary practices such as honor killing or widow burning because of the arbitrary taking of lives, but also the cultural symbolism with respect to women’s subjugation or discrimination. Their critics, of course, have appealed for cultural sensitivity and tolerance of cultural differences. Members of ethnic, religious, or indigenous groups have demanded cultural privileges and exceptions to legal or political norms in liberal states. Prominent intellectual and religious leaders comfortably lend their prestige or blessings to policies and social norms by speaking eloquently on behalf of cultures. xiii
xiv Introduction
To take the culture factor seriously, however, we may not have particularly good reason to perpetuate an under-appreciation and a chronic overlook of convergence and mutual influence among people with heterogeneous backgrounds. After all, people in many societies, from diverse social, political, economic, and cultural contexts, seem quite forthright and certainly capable of expressing revulsion and outrage at acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing, slavery or torture. Those who see cultural differences as the proof that there is no such thing as universal ethical standards cannot appear credible if they fail to provide an account of convergence and commonality. There may not be particularly strong reason either for discounting internal differences in moral views within a given community. When we urge sensitivity to differences between whole cultures, we owe others and ourselves an account of differences inside such a culture, which is likely to be hybrid or creolized. What sense shall we make of the fact that, for instance, the traditional custom of female circumcision has run into resistance and opposition from young girls, women’s organizations, and religious scholars in the very communities where it is practiced?1 Indeed, many of our mental habits and our received presuppositions about these matters are questionable or have become increasingly so given the rapidly changing circumstances of human life and the latest inventive understandings of cultures. For instance, how influential or determinant is the culture factor in shaping moral judgments, given the impact of other factors in life, for example, political pressures, perceived necessity of survival, or class domination? Thus, for instance, as the Chinese government eases its enforcement of the family planning policies adopted in the late 1970s, as more couples now are able to pay stiff fines for breaching the policies, and as rural women become salary-earners in the manufacturing industry, the abandonment of female infants – a presumably ‘cultural’ practice prevalent in rural China in the past two decades – seems to have subsided. Is it possible, however, to isolate the culture factor from other factors in order to assess its influence on such changes in moral practice? What shall we make of controversial anthropological findings of internal heterogeneity, overlapping similarity, and changes in the cultural practices of various communities? What implications do these findings have for our increasingly ossified habits of assuming cultures as homogeneous, incommensurable, and static, and of designating national, geopolitical, ethnic, or socioeconomic entities as whole ‘cultural’ communities?
Introduction xv
How plausible are the habitual references to the culture factor as either the explanation or the justification for moral judgments and practices? Moreover, we have often conflated the two functions, explaining and validating, when we attribute them to cultures. When Herodotus questioned whether there was any right ritual for disposing the bodies of deceased fathers, since the Callatians approved of eating their flesh but were appalled by the burial ritual the Greeks practiced, he was puzzling over a fact of life of his time. (Herodotus, 1999, Book 3, Chapter 38) He was not necessarily prescribing or validating cultural relativism as an ethical norm. Also, when Michel de Montaigne observed that what his compatriots considered the most horrible of things, death, was for others the only haven from the torments of this life and the common and prompt remedy for all evils,2 he was likewise describing a phenomenon, not granting cultural relativism a normative status. Of course, since Montaigne, the drastic increase in person-to-person encounters across entrenched borders and the growing needs for collaboration in the human community have done little to dissipate moral disagreements. The recognition that confluence and tensions of competing faiths and loyalties contributed to deadly conflicts of past centuries and of our own time, however, has roused a great deal of curiosity about the role of cultures in judgment making and evaluation of policies, and about the baffling relationships between claims to universal standards and cultural diversity. In this book, I begin addressing some of these issues and trying to take the ongoing discussions further by scrutinizing commonly used concepts and presuppositions. These issues, however, deserve much more focused and sustained attention than they have received in ethics and will receive in this book. Perhaps, they deserve to be studied as a special subject of ethics, under a sub-discipline of their own: ethics of culture. There, among other things, we could systematically scrutinize presumptions about culture, explore how cultural differences and similarities bear upon moral decision-making, tease out the implications of the conceptual scrutiny and empirical studies of culture for evaluating competing moral views, and so on. In particular, as I try to do in this book, by engaging in these exercises, we inform our responses to cultural challenges to human rights, the proposed (and internationally implemented) ethical principles for governing human behaviors everywhere: our treatment of fellow human beings and our actions or choices with perhaps unintended consequences on their lives.3 While any further discussion of these topics must move beyond the talk of ‘Asian values’ that dominated nearly all debates about human
xvi Introduction
rights and culture during the 1980s and 1990s,4 I shall note certain limitations and gains as results of those debates. The ‘Asian values’ melodrama was played in the backdrop of rapid economic development, accompanied by growing demands for social justice and political participation in Southeast Asia, and of the efforts in the international community to hold some governments in the region accountable for human rights abuses. Adversaries in philosophy and political theory argued whether the Confucian cultural heritage was an asset or a liability for protecting human rights and developing democratic governance. Proponents of Asian’s unique and exclusive values claimed that local practices could not be measured against any internationally adopted universalist standards. They warned that the cultural values of the West and the East might be incommensurable, or the East might have better answers to moral problems of our time. (Pye, 1992, and Rosemont, 1991) Some went so far as diagnosing a culturally destined Asian chronicle in failed or ill-practiced democracies. (Huntington, 1996) Critics of ‘Asian values,’ meanwhile, focused on demonstrating such claims’ fraudulence and incoherence. They drew attention to the internal heterogeneity of East Asian cultures and their inter-penetration with other cultures.5 They cited evidence that people in the region were capable of successful democratic transformation. Some have thus proposed to banish ‘culture talks’ altogether from the human rights debate,6 or at least to ‘take culture less seriously.’ (Bell, 2000, ‘Introduction.’) Some of these critics, however, implicitly share their opponents’ presuppositions about ‘culture,’ ‘tradition,’ or ‘community’ – that these are monolithic and static entities. They differ from their opponents in their assessment of whether certain cultural characteristics are present or absent in Asia or whether they are compatible to ideas of human rights and democracy.7 Having cast sufficient doubt as to the authenticity of the ‘Asian culture vs. universal human rights’ confrontation, hence shed some light on how cultures and universal value claims might relate to each other, however, the ‘Asian values’ debate did not go far enough due to some of its underlying presuppositions. Further inquiries must engage in conceptual scrutiny of ‘culture,’ ‘tradition,’ or ‘community,’ just as what such inquiries have with regard to such notions as ‘humanity,’ ‘personhood,’ and ‘right.’ While interest in the ‘Asian values’ debate recedes, inquiries of the broader issues can no longer proceed with implicit and often question-begging presumptions about ‘culture’ or ‘cultural’ values.8 A critical analysis of ‘culture’ is a necessary conceptual exercise for the more specific purposes in Part I, ‘Living with Cultural Paradoxes,’ of clarifying culture’s significance to ethics, of assessing culture’s role in
Introduction xvii
explaining and validating moral judgments, and of examining the proclaimed relativity of morality to culture. This conceptual exercise also paves the way for addressing, in the rest of the book, questions such as, whether and how persons’ intricate connections in cultural tradition or community may bear upon matters of personal autonomy in moral decision-making; how to make sense of ‘the right to culture’; how tolerance of cultural pluralism is ethically plausible; and how the idea of universal, trans-cultural, basic human rights can be justified with a sensitivity to culture. I respond to several ‘cultural’ criticisms of human rights in Part II, ‘Transcending Dichotomies.’ I question some of the often implicitly accepted assumptions about the opposition of cultural differences to universal human rights. I also question its supporting dichotomies of ‘collective’ cultural communities vs. ‘individual’ rights, tolerance of cultural diversity vs. intolerant human rights standards, and cultural pluralism vs. universal human rights monism. I intend to demonstrate the plausibility of transcending these dichotomies, which grossly simplify the complexity of the problems and confine our quests for solutions. Taking stock of these clarifications and responses to criticisms, I then outline an account of the possibility to validate universal human rights and the duties they demand in Part III, ‘Validating Rights: The View from Anywhere.’ Thus, in the brief yet critical review, in Chapter 1, of the contentious evolution of the notion of ‘culture’ in empirical studies, readers will quickly find that the anthropologists and sociologists are just as divided about what ‘culture’ is and what functions it has as philosophers are about what ‘human nature’ is and what ‘rights’ or ‘duties’ human beings have. I will identify what I see as a plausible, or the least controversial and reasonably coherent, understanding of ‘culture.’ This understanding will define a working concept of culture for this inquiry. One of its main appeals is that it informs us with inventive, fresh thinking from culture studies. It highlights the paradoxical features of the social phenomenon that ‘culture’ is meant to characterize. Three such ‘paradoxes’ or tensions are of particular importance: tensions between a culture’s uniqueness and similarity, uniformity and internal heterogeneity, and continuity and transformation. It is because of these paradoxical features from cultures is inevitably conflicted, fragmented within, as well as ‘creolized’ and culture are interpenetrable, giving rise to ‘overlapping consensus’ in values and judgments. Accelerating globalization today has only accentuated the paradoxical tendencies of cultures by highlighting their discordance but also facilitating convergence.
xviii Introduction
Consequently, it is plausible that standards of moral rightness or wrongness found in any given culture are likely to be locally contested while attracting cross-cultural allegiance. In Chapter 2, I attend to questions concerning whether and how seriously we should take cultures into consideration in ethics. If someone claims that the urge to ban female circumcision was an imposition of Western cultural values, such a person is taking the culture factor seriously in evaluating policies. If someone rebuts such a claim, citing the revulsion expressed by non-Westerners, particularly those in societies where this custom is practiced, and their support for a ban, this person, too, tacitly acknowledges the normative significance of the culture factor for policy debate. One way to tackle this question is to examine the assumption that culture has normative ethical significance because of its capacity to explain or justify the views and behaviors of moral agents. I pay special attention to what is known as the ‘irrational cultural relativist’ claim that moral sentiments, presumably products of cultural upbringing, defy and end any rational ethical evaluation. I also scrutinize the communitarian claim that persons are ‘embedded’ in cultural community in such a manner that their capability for autonomous and innovative judgment-making is in jeopardy. These inquiries, at this stage, require us to revisit cultural relativism, though one purpose of this book is to broaden the ethical interest in culture by thinking outside the box of ‘cultural relativism vs. universal human rights.’ Readers may have reasons to find cultural relativism a tiresome topic. For many philosophers and political theorists, the verdict on relativism is sealed. Bernard Williams once called cultural relativism ‘the anthropologists heresy, possibly the most absurd view to have been advanced even in moral philosophy.’ (B. Williams, 1972, p. 20) Advocates of relativism drawing upon empirical studies of culture, however, rarely have been bothered to rebut philosophical arguments against cultural relativism.9 They find philosophers ignorant about culture. For them, ‘culture’ is by nature relativistic, no matter what the philosophical arguments against cultural relativism. This may be why relativism has found a cozy refuge in cultural studies. To dislodge relativism from this shelter, however, philosophers and political theorists must scrutinize their own and their opponents’ presumptions about ‘culture,’ which is crucial for weakening, as I do in Chapter 3, the case for morality’s relativity to culture. I confine the discussion about cultural relativism to its normative variety because it is this variety of relativism that upholds culture’s ethical significance in validating moral judgments. Once we have
Introduction xix
established culture’s paradoxical nature, I argue, we have decidedly undermined normative cultural relativism. I refer to this line of argument as the cultural critique of cultural relativism. This critique is meant to supplement the philosophical arguments refuting relativism, which will also be examined in a new light. The thrust is this: if culture is a social phenomenon with paradoxical features, the rightness of moral judgments, such as those about honor killings or amputating arms of accused thieves, cannot plausibly have any relativity to cultures. Next, in Part II, I undermine the ‘culture vs. human rights’ dichotomy by responding to several ‘cultural’ objections to human rights. To some extent, these objections rely on several dichotomies – ‘collective vs. individual rights,’ ‘intolerant rights standards vs. cultural tolerance,’ and ‘monolithic universal rights vs. cultural pluralism.’ These objections include (1) the ‘communitarian’ objection that human rights are inherently insensitive to and destructive of diverse traditional cultural communities, which are governed by special relationships, loyalties, and personal commitments, not by impartial individualistic rights, and (2) the ‘cultural–pluralist’ objection that human rights are monist and inherently intolerant of pluralist cultural values and ways of life. I respond by further explicating the implications of the arguments developed in Part I concerning the paradoxical nature and attributes of culture. My response to the communitarian objection, in Chapter 4, is based on undercutting the ‘collective vs. individual rights’ dichotomy. This dichotomy rests on the claim that human rights are individualistic, while claims to communal or cultural rights are collectivist. I examine several possible uses of ‘collective rights’ and argue that most of them could not sufficiently differentiate civil – political rights, as ‘individualistic,’ from social, economic, and cultural rights, as ‘collectivist.’ I then argue for ‘the right to culture’ as a human right, but a ‘collective’ one – in the sense of being attached to ‘special membership.’ Granting privileges and immunities to members in order to strengthen their cultural communities, I contend, can be defended by the rationale of ensuring protection of members’ basic human rights. Meanwhile, from the perspective of members of cultural communities, it is reasonable to see certain rights as necessary and instrumental for safeguarding them from insecurity and deprivation, as well as for the survival and flourishing of their communities. In developing the case against the ‘cultural pluralist objection’ in Chapter 5, I challenge its presuppositions about the status of tolerance and pluralism as two stringent ethical norms. These include the presuppositions that pluralism is generously permissive of moral diversity and
xx Introduction
that tolerance requires indiscriminate acceptance of moral practices. I argue that the monist moral vision of human rights and a regime of human rights’ intolerance of violations of its principles do not necessarily breach the principles of tolerance and pluralism. The fact that a human rights regime is intolerant of, say, slavery, genocide, or torture, is not necessarily a negation of its commitment to pluralism and tolerance. I begin Part III by responding, in Chapter 6, to moral skeptics who doubt any possibility of knowing and validating any ethical standards for assessing substantive moral claims cross-culturally. According to such skeptics, any claims to common standards are inevitably biased or influenced by interventions of cultures. I try to respond to such cultural subjectivism, so to speak, without embracing metaphysical realism. Instead, I argue with ‘internal skeptics’ or ‘internal realists’ to identify methods for verifying the inter-subjective, hence cross-cultural, validity of value claims. This exercise is not intended to provide moral certainty. Rather it is to demonstrate that an uncertainty about any mindindependent objectivity of value claims does not entail that any such claims are nothing but the subjective, arbitrary, or irrational preferences or tastes cultivated in various cultures. I illustrate how certain simple tests can be performed in a preliminary inter-subjective evaluation of moral judgments or value claims, which are presumably subjective or culturally biased and cannot be subjected to cross-cultural evaluation. These include ‘identifying effective equivalent,’ ‘establishing core function,’ and ‘ruling out corrupt judgment.’ In Chapter 7, I demonstrate how these methods can be applied to verifying the underlying value claims of human rights. I follow the suit of a constructivist approach to validating several fundamental human rights on the basis of such value claims. I refer to the small set of human rights thus grounded as inherent rights. This approach aims to demonstrate the possibility of human rights’ justifiability to people from diverse cultural traditions. Once the suppositions that cultures are highly uniformed and morality is relative to cultures are shaken, as I demonstrate in the first part of the book, it follows that certain proposed ethical norms, like human rights, can no longer be plausibly seen as valid in one culture, uniquely and exclusively, but not another. Indeed, the moral skeptics can no longer maintain that, due to cultural differences in moral visions, it is impossible for human rights to become a valid framework of global ethical governance. I proceed in Chapter 8 to validate a host of additional rights – extrinsic rights – on the ground of their instrumentality to safeguarding inherent
Introduction xxi
rights.10 These include such rights as, so I argue, the rights to basic civil and political liberties and to equal social and economic access to resources and opportunities. The necessity to defend extrinsic rights as universal stems from the rapid homogenization of basic human conditions in the contemporary world. Human beings everywhere today are implicated and at least potentially vulnerable to the standard modern threats to basic human security and subsistence, or, to basic freedom from fear and want. We become increasingly interdependent and interconnected, voluntarily or involuntarily, in our daily struggles against such threats. Others bear the harmful and sometimes devastating consequences, directly or indirectly, of our actions and our choices. To safeguard the inherent rights of everyone, everywhere, to make the safeguards sustainable, we must implement extrinsic rights universally. Critics are bound to point out that human rights thus justified envision an unrealistic and unfair Utopia: human rights are unable to motivate compliance to the duties and obligations they demand. To respond to this challenge is perhaps especially important for implementing human rights in a culturally complex world, where such notions as ‘duty’ and ‘obligation’ may have different understandings or have obtained different status as moral norms. Specifically, I address three anticipated critiques in Chapter 9: ‘the impartiality critique,’ ‘the “onerousness” critique,’ and ‘the “statist” critique.’ These critiques raise some legitimate concerns such as, whose duty it is to guarantee that children in Africa are protected from enslavement or military conscription, from malnourishment or death from preventable diseases, what duties should be imposed in order to protect vulnerable populations from genocide or ethnic cleansing, or, who has the duties to secure the American ‘homeland’ and whether such duties should override other human rights duties such as the duty not to torture (particularly if those tortured may not pose any direct threat to the homeland). A person may claim many rights but will enjoy none if no specific duties are assigned to and performed by others. A duty can only be broadly motivating and realistically implementable, however, if it appeals to persons, whatever their cultural or other backgrounds, as being fair and feasible. For stimulating further discussions, I outline in this final chapter how a culturally sensitive account of the duties to safeguard human rights would handle some anticipated critiques. This sketch also gives rise to general proposals for institutional reforms. Specifically, I demonstrate how the demands for duties to safeguard human rights can be justifiably met, in a fair and realistic manner, through a division of moral labor. I illustrate how duties to safeguard human rights form ‘centrifugal
xxii Introduction
circles,’ circles of membership duties in communities and collaborative social organizations of various degrees of intimacy. In this manner, it is conceivable that the great many duties and obligations demanded by basic human rights can be realistically fulfilled without doing injustice to duties-bearers. These ideas demand being given more thought than I am able to manage fruitfully at this point – as this book goes to print.
Part I Living with Cultural Paradoxes
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1 Paradoxes of Culture
Culture is ‘historically produced, globally interconnected, internally contested, and marked with ambiguous boundaries of identity and practice.’ Sally E. Merry1
Why ‘culture?’ The troubled and puzzling relationships between culture(s) and universalist ethical principles have always challenged efforts to defend and implement such principles. We may note complaints about religious intolerance and anti-multiculturalism when France adopted legislations to curb religious fundamentalism and ban displaying ostentatious religious symbols at public schools. The latest sensational incarnations of these challenges involve, for example, criticisms of a backlash against Muslims in the anti-terrorism campaign after the terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001. In some ways, the rhetoric used by some opponents to the ‘anti-terror’ wars that ‘one person’s freedom fighter is another’s terrorist’ mirrors the unease relationships. Some in the Arab world saw the smoke of cultural–psychological warfare after the exposé of US soldiers’ use of torture and mistreatment of Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib prison. Meanwhile, patterns of abuses and deprivation of legal rights of terrorist suspects in prisons outside US territories outraged many people both inside and outside ‘the Western civilization.’ Such reactions, partly politics for sure, are bound to burden those who dismiss the international ban on torture and ‘cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment’ as a ‘Western’ cultural obsession.2 The culture factor in the everyday moral discourse and policy-making is undeniable and perhaps no longer avoidable. In ethics and political 3
4
Living with Cultural Paradoxes
philosophy, ‘culture’ has always been a versatile tool. When defending their competing moral positions or proposals for political reform, for instance, theorists cite characteristics or values of culture as the source of legitimacy. They demand privileges and exceptions to established norms for certain groups or persons because of their culture. Alternatively, they try to explain or even justify (or discredit) moral views or the ethical standards on the ground of moral agents’ cultures. For some, the rightness of moral judgments and the validity of ethical standards are relative to moral agents’ cultures, for others, this must have nothing to do with culture. A critical analysis of ‘culture’ may thus have to be integral to the critical assessment of substantive ethical (and political or legislative), proposals. Such an analysis helps determine whether or to what extent culture is relevant or significant to ethics. Specifically, it helps determine whether culture can explain or validate moral judgments and ethical standards, and whether such judgments and standards are or ought to be relative to culture. A critical analysis of ‘culture’ must scrutinize the attributes and nature of culture. It must not ignore the empirical question of what culture is. Only after one has a grasp of the controversial findings about culture in the empirical fields, one can begin to appreciate the delicacy of addressing this host of questions concerning the versatile roles of ‘culture.’ In this chapter, I will consult the latest, inventive, findings in cultural anthropology and sociology, seeking to identify a plausible understanding of the nature and attributes of culture. I then explicate the implications of this understanding for clarifying the ethical significance of culture in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, I spell out what this inventive understanding of culture entails for assessing the claim that the rightness of moral judgments and standards is and should be relative to culture. These conceptual analyses and clarifications, I hope, pave the way for the second part of the book, where I respond to several so-called ‘cultural’ objections to human rights, and for the third part, where I develop an account of the possibility to validate human rights cross-culturally. In political theory and philosophy, ‘culture’ is generally spared the typically relentless scrutiny such concepts as ‘personhood,’ ‘justice,’ ‘human’ or ‘right’ are routinely subjected to. Inquiries about the validity of universal (trans-cultural) moral claims, or cultural relativism, or cultural exceptionalism, often seem to proceed with the implicit presumption that ‘culture’ is self-evident or at least commonly understood by those disputing these positions. Often, such inquiries rely on ambiguously defined concepts of ‘culture,’ ‘cultural tradition,’ and ‘cultural
Paradoxes of Culture 5
community.’ These are often too ambiguously defined to benefit useful analysis. However, how a political theorist or moral philosopher understands ‘culture’ – what she means by ‘culture’ or assumed about culture, perhaps only implicitly – has implications for the substantive views she puts forth. The understanding of, or assumptions about, ‘culture’ influence one’s substantive ethical position or policy proposal. Let me illustrate with some examples. The political philosopher John Rawls, takes the Overlapping Consensus approach to constructing principles of justice in order for such principles to generate broad public support in a liberal pluralist society. He is concerned that grounding principles of justice in any particular belief systems (religion or philosophy) would undermine these principles’ appeal. However, in constructing the law of peoples,3 Rawls’ equivalent of principles of international justice, he rests such law on a consensus between two types of people in the world, distinct in the style of government, under which they are ruled: people in liberal and ‘decent hierarchical’ states. (Rawls, 1999, p. 16) For Rawls, only a consensus between these two types of peoples is realistically possible. This is because ‘decent hierarchical’ peoples are granted some political consultation status; they are non-aggressive; and their rulers honor and protect the urgent human rights of their citizens.4 Rawls suggests that, these two types of peoples do not form any consensus with the rest of the world composed of ‘disordered peoples’ in ‘outlaw states,’ states ‘burdened by unfavorable conditions,’ or states ruled by benevolent dictators who deny public political participation. But he argues that liberal and ‘decent hierarchical’ peoples have ‘extremely good reasons’ for condemning or intervening against the violation of urgent human rights in these other types of states.5 Clearly, what Rawls refers to is a political consensus among sovereign states. Yet, he seems to draw hardly any distinction between sovereign population and people with shared religious faith or philosophical traditions. By inference, for him, geo-political borders that divide states also seem to divide these kinds of communities. From the reality of a lack of political consensus among sovereign states in the contemporary world, Rawls seems to infer that people ruled under these states must lack consensus in their religion, philosophy, or culture. This implicit assumption fails to recognize possible internal religious, philosophical, or cultural differences within a sovereign state, and it fails to acknowledge possible transnational similarities in faith, moral vision, or cultivated habits. Countries with distinct styles of government, e.g. liberal or non-liberal,
6
Living with Cultural Paradoxes
may have populations that overlap in religion (e.g. Islam as the faith of population groups in Turkey, India, Pakistan, and France) or tradition of moral thought (e.g. Confucianism in Japan, Taiwan, S. Korea, and China). More importantly, the particular style of government (liberal, hierarchical, or totalitarian) may not be representative or reflective of the dominant religious or philosophical traditions of the population ruled by it. Other theorists have employed Rawls’ Overlapping Consensus to elaborate a strategy to justify human rights as crossculturally valid. For instance, Lindholm argues that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) represents such an ‘overlapping consensus’ since the UDHR is ‘a sketch … toward a fully elaborated theory,’ where different cultural traditions could fill in their own substantive justifications for human rights, and such a sketch allows a ‘pluralist, and overlapping, global consensus on universal human rights.’ (Lindholm, 1992, p. 399) Charles Taylor also argues in favor of the plausibility of ‘an unforced consensus on human rights’ among diverse spiritual/cultural traditions such as Christianity and Buddhism.6 Taylor uses Rawls’ Overlapping Consensus to explain why there has actually existed an inter-cultural acceptance of the general idea of human rights in spite of cultural variations in how it is justified. These authors must take note of the statist or political nature of Rawls’ partially international consensus. If they have managed to bridge the difference between political and cultural consensuses, they owe us an explanation as to how a political consensus among sovereign states functions similarly to a cultural consensus. Presumably, there has existed, for more than half a century now, a political consensus among most sovereign states over international human rights. This political consensus, I suppose, does not entail a global cultural consensus. Conversely, if a cultural consensus over human rights is conceptually plausible and perhaps historically realistic, this consensus does not entail a political consensus. For another example, consider critics who challenge Rawls’ metaphysically ‘freestanding’ approach, particularly those from the communitarian (Sandel, 1982) and moral particularist perspectives. Walzer, for instance, questions the realistic possibility of constructing any substantive principles of justice on non-metaphysical grounds. (Walzer, 1994) In fact, Walzer seems to believe that any shared sense of international justice or human rights is inevitably ‘thin’ – abstract or meager in any particular local knowledge. Though Walzer seems to believe that certain rights of individual human beings are important (such that they override rights of political communities and justify
Paradoxes of Culture 7
humanitarian intervention in crisis situations), such rights must be understood as general, minimalist, and abstract norms such that their meanings and demands can vary in local contexts. (Walzer, 1985) Walzer grounds ‘minimal rights’ such as the rights to freedom from repression and freedom to protest against injustice in a ‘thin’ universal conception of justice. (Walzer, 1994, pp. 1–6 and 58–61) As soon as we set out to specify ‘minimal rights’ and ‘thin’ justice for any specific political community, we must immediately consider the thickets of local conditions – history, tradition, and culture, in which local people conceive rights and justice. Walzer illustrates this with the following example. Americans felt a sense of solidarity when the Czech citizens or Chinese students demonstrated against tyranny. These foreigners’ rejection of tyranny and oppression is immediately recognizable to democrats in the US even if these Americans are ignorant of the different ‘thick’ traditions in these countries. This ‘thin’ notion of justice, however, is part and parcel of, not ‘freestanding’ from, the Czech, the Chinese, or the American cultural traditions. (Walzer, 1994, pp. 5–6) Americans can only truly understand the ‘thin’ expressions of democratic demands by the Czechs and the Chinese when they understand the local ‘thick’ belief systems. The ‘thin’ values, in Walzer’s view, though ‘universally accessible,’ are not substantive enough to support any programs of action and reform in any countries. (Walzer, 1994, p. 3) An account of what it means for the Czech or the Chinese to have justice or democracy, all the particular factors considered, is likely to differ from the American ideal of justice or democracy. Walzer concludes that, ‘democracy in China will have to be Chinese’ and ‘Chinese democracy’ should ‘be defined by the Chinese themselves in terms of their own history and culture’; (Walzer, 1994, p. 60) and that a ‘Chinese democracy’ is ‘reiteratively particularistic and locally significant, intimately bound up with the maximal moralities created here and here and here, in specific times and places.’ (Walzer, 1994, p. 7) In order for this to be the case, Walzer seems to assume that the Chinese have their own exclusive culture, within which there are shared ideas about, e.g. democracy. Though I sympathize with Walzer’s concerns about the importance for understanding international justice of particularistic factors in local contexts, I find it extreme to particularize or relativize the normative idea of democracy or the right to equal political participation. Having the right to equal liberty of political representation must not mean whatever people in a society agree what it means, if any such internal agreement can be managed – particularly in a society of pluralist and
8
Living with Cultural Paradoxes
changing cultural traditions, seems to rule out the scenario of internal diversity. For him, it seems, the geo-political or societal boundaries of the People’s Republic of China also draw the boundaries of a unified cultural tradition with its uniformed view on such matters as democracy and human rights. In order for us to recognize democracy in any country, what we are looking at must meet certain requirements. Democracy cannot be defined in so far-fetched a way as to mean dictatorship or one-party rule, nor can it mean meritocracy (such as installing a ruling intelligentsia presiding over a popularly elected legislature – granting more rights and power to the educated elite7), even if the locals may understand democracy in these terms. There is certainly a need for special efforts and innovative methods, due to varying historical or circumstantial conditions in various societies, to achieve self-governance and equal protection of political liberty. The pace of democratic development and democratic procedures (voting rules, e.g.) vary from the US to the UK, from South Korea to India. One can understand the critical importance at this level of particularity. However, we recognize democracy in these countries as a more substantive normative framework than a faint, abstract, general sense of indignation against oppression and tyranny. For instance, we recognize in them constitutions that enshrine equal basic liberties and a rule of law to guarantee equal political liberty and a system of peaceful transition of power through open competition. Walzer seems to believe that local actors, immersed in the local tradition and culture, are more likely to be realistic or well informed about particularistic factors relevant to justice in the local context. However, this is not always the case. Competing local traditions tend to fight over precisely the issue of which of them is realistic or better informed about local conditions. Some of them are likely to be more reasonable or realistic than others. Some contemporary Chinese may consider Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, or a more recent import, communism, unrealistic or insensitive to their aspirations and local conditions in today’s China. Indeed, Walzer himself has observed that local cultural traditions reflect moral criticisms by men and women in such traditions, who are themselves each and everyone a socially and historically produced, yet internally divided, critical self. (Walzer, 1994, pp. 85–104) Through critical reflection, very likely, Americans will disagree about what or which of competing historical cultural traditions is authentically American. This makes it very difficult for them to agree on one ‘thick’ notion of justice ‘in terms of their own history and culture.’ Of course, upon critical reflection by men and women in Czechoslovakia or China, the same may be true about the Czechs or the Chinese.
Paradoxes of Culture 9
In these examples, implicit assumptions about ‘culture,’ ‘tradition,’ or ‘community’ contribute to political philosophers’ substantive views on justice. Rawls’ presupposition of peoples as largely geo-politically selfenclosed and internally homogenous in their comprehensive system of religious, moral, or cultural convictions is key to his assessment of the prospect for a partial consensus over the ‘law of peoples.’ Walzer’s assumption of political states as largely self-contained monoliths in culture and tradition is key to his conclusion that democracy is relative to local cultural tradition. (Philosophers are no exception in thinking inconsistently. At the end of this chapter, we will see how the pessimistic moral prospect that Alasdair MacIntyre once mapped out for the contemporary Western world does not exactly follow from his own fascinating reflection on cultural tradition and practice.) An evaluative inquiry of ethical and political proposals for justice – democracy and human rights, e.g. – must not leave any stone (including their assumptions about ‘culture’) unturned.
A consensus view What is culture? This is an empirical question, as much as an analytic question requiring conceptual clarification. Any answer to such a question must be verifiable by referring to anthropological at sociological findings. Consequently, then, we can turn to empirical and historical studies, where data is collected and, generalizations, about culture tested for accuracy, for rudimentary understandings. We must then analyze and clarify competing, often confusing, conceptions. Specifically, in this chapter, I begin with a relatively less controversial textbook definition generally accepted in today’s cultural anthropology and sociology. I first trace how it has emerged from debates among competing schools. I then analyze and elaborate the paradoxical features of culture understood as such. In the last section, I explicate the related, often interchangeably used concepts: cultural ‘tradition’ and ‘community.’ Let me first lay out what I identify as the less controversial textbook definition. A culture is an inherited body of informal knowledge embodied in traditions, transmitted through social learning in a community, and incorporated in practices.8 Accordingly, a moral culture is such a body of morally relevant knowledge. To know a culture is to know the informal codes of conduct. To be its member is to belong to those who know the codes and to be known as somebody who knows the codes. While this concept reflects a broad consensus among contemporary schools of cultural thought, it has evolved from bitter disputes among
10 Living with Cultural Paradoxes
cultural theorists, including cultural anthropologists and sociologists, in the past half century. I elaborate this concept below by way of a brief review of the main contentious points. For the sake of clarity, I will divide these schools roughly into two camps, the classic and contemporary schools. The classic school visions culture as a bounded entity; it is largely homogeneous, holistic, systematically structured, and time-insensitive; and it determines the destiny of the population and the ways in which they think, feel, judge and behave. The contemporary school visions culture as open and influenced from outside; if it has any borders at all, these are porous and fluid; it changes over time, often drastically; it is internally heterogeneous and dynamic; and it is its people, not culture itself, who are the agents capable of action and innovation. The classic school of cultural thought, characteristic of the generation of post-colonial anthropologists like Franz Boas and his students, Ruth Benedict, Melville Herskovits, and Margaret Mead,9 was inspired by the eighteenth-century German intellectual Johann von Herder, who, according to Sahlins, believed that, Each people knows their own kind of happiness: the culture that is the legacy of their ancestral tradition, transmitted in the distinctive concepts of their language, and adapted to their specific life conditions. It is by means of this tradition, endowed also with the morality of the community and the emotions of the family, that experience is organized, since people do not simply discover the world, they are taught it. They come to it not simply as cognitions but as values. (Sahlins, 1995, p. 12) This school views cultures as entities with impermeable borders, as internally cohesive and static. It considers persons in different cultures as incapable of communicating with each other and comparing their views.10 Consequently, as the anthropologist Clifford Geertz put it, the Boasian views lead to the belief that: … The world does not divide into the pious and the superstitious; that there are sculptures in jungles and paintings in deserts; that political order is possible without centralized power and principled justice without codified rules; that the norms of reason were not
Paradoxes of Culture 11
fixed in Greece, the evolution of morality not consummated in England. (Geertz, 1984, p. 275) After the two World Wars, more cultural anthropologists and sociologists began to find that any knowledge they might gain from studying isolated ways of life, in which a diminishing number of people now lived, shed little light on contemporary social life in the rest of the world. In this world, rapid development and globalization have since picked up speed. Some of them began studying dynamic social changes and emerging global and hybrid forms of life in the increasingly complex world.11 Some find that the Boasian demand that ‘culture’ have an intrinsic right to be respected impossible to fulfill since ‘the kind of bounded culture implied in such a formulation simply does not exist.’ (Cowan et al., 2001, p. 27) They cite recent ethnographic work to show that it is misleading to conceive of ‘culture’ as applying to integrated, harmonious, consensual, and bounded ethnic–national groups or territorialized communities – such as the ‘Arab people’ or the indigenous tribes in the Amazon. They challenge the use of ‘culture’ to refer to all human activities, spiritual, economic, social, or political, in a society or country (China) or a region (East Asia). This discrepancy between a ‘culture’ and a population group or society further challenges the view that ‘culture’ determines a population’s destiny, which reifies ‘culture’ as if it were an autonomous agent capable of choosing and dictating courses of social/political actions. According to the contemporary school, ‘culture’ is neither an island nor even an ‘archipelago,’ images depicting ‘a more or less chimerical premodern tribal world.’ Rather, ‘culture’ is ‘historically produced, globally interconnected, internally contested, and marked with ambiguous boundaries of identity and practice’; a ‘culture’ is often a hybrid, a product of ‘creolization’ of views and practices.12 People create and use ‘culture’ when they try to adapt to changing social conditions. (Jackson, 1995, p. 19) Culture is the tool for communication and validation of actions.13 Culture may consist of ancient, local, as well as new and globally portable norms, ideals, perspectives, and views. Culture need not be associated with ‘roots,’ with the past.14 In this view, culture is the product of hybrid, ‘creolization’ of diverse views and practices. ‘Creolization’ is not merely a modern invention. Ancient cities, trade routes, and empires were the oldest social contexts, where traditions and customs mixed, and where people exchanged and
12 Living with Cultural Paradoxes
transmitted goods and ideas. Globalization had started since Alexander the Great, since Damascus when it was a metropolitan trading post, since the Inquisition or the Ottoman Empire, and certainly since the Opium Wars and colonialism. Brutal, greedy, and arrogant as some of the conquerors, adventurers, or missionaries were, the flow of persons, goods, technologies, projects and institutions facilitated the flow of ideas, knowledge, perspectives, sentiments, or ‘values.’ (Appadurai, 1996) Since the mid-nineteenth century, the interpenetration and creolization of cultures picked up speed, particularly in the past few decades, as technology, tourism, trade and capitalism, the formation of de-territorialized communities, and exchange programs and migration have penetrated geopolitical and ethnic borders and redefined boundaries of religion, ideology, and tradition. What is new today is the deepening and expansion of ‘creolization’ worldwide. The ideas we have, the dreams we dream, the languages we speak, the music and art we consume, the way we relate to others, the products we crave, the persons we socialize with, or the customs we learn, have more or less acquired this creolized, hybrid quality. ‘Hybrid’ is now the norm than exception in cultural life. It no longer amazes us to find American folk tunes or Italian opera sung to Chinese words, Taiwanese born American raised in Mexico and schooled at Cambridge, Yiddish Spanish music, Cuban Chinese food, neo-Confucian liberalism, or Tibetan Buddhist advocacy for human rights. According to the contemporary school, culture has the dynamics within itself for such an expansion and transformation. The sociologist Raymond Williams, a founder of cultural studies, developed the ‘ordinary’ conception of culture to account for such dynamics. Williams wrote in 1958 that A culture has two aspects: the known meanings and directions, which its members are trained to; the new observations and meanings, which are offered and tested by individuals, by their irreducibly diversified and concrete experiences.15 Dominant forces in a society or a group always seek to establish and perpetuate certain sets of values, meanings, and standards (such as the Christian or Confucian values promoted through social and political systems). ‘Every human society has its own shape, its own purposes, [and] its own meanings. Every human society expresses these, in institutions, and in arts and learning. The making of a society is the finding of common meanings and directions …’. (R. Williams, 1958, p. 6) This aspect is the work of collective forces in society in a process of
Paradoxes of Culture 13
integration and enforcement. Yet, individual members always seek to apply norms innovatively and modify them while they pursue their own interests, intimately informed by their acculturation and education, but more importantly by their unique experiences. The individualized understandings, interpretations, contestation and innovations grow out of members’ and sub-groups’ diverse experiences. In Williams’ words, ‘The making of a mind is, first, the slow learning of shapes, purposes, and meanings, so that work, observation and communication are possible. Then, second, but equal in importance, is the testing of these in experience, the making of new observations, comparisons, and meanings.’ (R. Williams, ibid.) This aspect of the cultural process inevitably makes the meanings, directives, and norms taught and reinforced by social forces diversify and transform. The contemporary school views the development of culture as the process of ‘an active debate and amendment under the pressures of experience, contact, and discovery …’ ‘The growing society is there, yet it is also made and remade in every individual mind.’ (R. Williams, ibid.) Culture is the debate itself and its product. The hearts and minds of members variously reflect the social meanings and directives. For Williams, there is thus little myth about ‘culture,’ which is simply made and re-made in the daily-renewed ‘ordinary processes of human societies and human minds’ – where these encounter each other and where they discover, learn about, negotiate with, contest, and reshape each other. One observes in these processes the various peculiar reflections of the ‘nature of culture’: ‘always both traditional and creative,’ both constant and changing; and ‘both the most ordinary common meanings and the finest individual meanings,’ both cohesive and diversified. ‘Culture’ is both ‘ordinary’ and extraordinary, and unique but ‘in every society and in every mind.’ Williams’ ‘ordinary’ concept stresses ‘the significance of their conjunction.’ (R. Williams, ibid.) Increasingly, the view of culture’s internal dynamics has gained sympathy among anthropologists in the last few decades. Theodore Schwartz, for instance, views culture as the product of both the social and individual experiences.16 Jack Goody corroborates that the interactive dynamics of social and individual contributions to culture exists not only in complex societies, but also in ‘simpler’ ones.17 Anthropologists have also observed how, when locals claim to have possession of a harmonious and bounded culture, those who make such a claim may be using it as a strategic tool for their negotiation with the outside world, with parties they interact with, which is itself an indication of porous boundaries.18
14 Living with Cultural Paradoxes
The consensus view of culture is able to accommodate some of the seemingly incongruent insights of the classic and contemporary schools. First, it gives ‘culture’ a more definitive and concrete form – a body of informal knowledge, socially transmitted and learned ideas, wisdoms, or experiences – than the contemporary school seems to be willing. It does not consider visions privately intuited, ideas solitarily contemplated, and attitudes not publicly expressed as being ‘cultural,’ as the classic school seems to imply. Second, it further specifies culture as a body of knowledge that is historically inherited over generations, rather than any newly minted ideas, not yet tested across generations, which the contemporary view may admit into ‘culture’ while it stresses fluidity and change. This specification fits better with our intuitions about culture. Thirdly, it further narrows culture to a body of knowledge that is incorporated in practices – embodied in customs, expressed in symbols, implemented by institutions, or codified in rules – and turned into lived experiences. This body of knowledge is not limited to knowledge transmitted and circulated through books or classrooms. Indeed, fourth, people interconnected in a collaborative entity– community – are identified as actors who conduct the learning and creatively develop the knowledge, whereas authorities and elites are not the exclusive interpreters of culture. In this regard, one can differentiate culture from certain hierarchical religions that forbid worshipers to communicate directly with God or have their own interpretations of God’s will.19 This initial concept is thus more balanced. It transcends some of the long disputes among cultural theorists. For instance, it conceives cultures not as merely observable or external social entities or physical objects,20 nor as merely internal, interpretive mental states of affairs.21 One example of identifying culture with interpretive states of affairs is Richard Rorty’s reference to ‘culture’ as acquired tastes or ‘sentimentality,’ (Rorty, 1993) which I discuss in some length in Chapter 2. This concept has another attractive feature. It can accommodate paradoxical attributes of the social phenomena that ‘culture’ is to characterize, as I argue below.
Three paradoxes The contemporary school’s vision is thus too close to dissolving culture altogether for comfort. A body of knowledge that is borderless, changing, and internally contested, would be too undefined to be a ‘body’ at
Paradoxes of Culture 15
all. Those who view culture from the contemporary school’s perspective seem to resist the idea of giving culture any specific dimensions. Seen from such a perspective, it is not a surprise when some anthropologists call for abandoning ‘culture’ altogether and, instead, directly invoking local meanings and concrete practices.22 This hesitation, as one can see, to say whether culture is a thing, a set of mental states or behavioral dispositions, a structure of meanings, a set of relations, or a form of life betrays a fear that, as soon as culture is given a more substantive shape by identifying it with one of these entities, the problems with the classic vision would return to haunt, blinding one to culture’s openness, transformation, and discordance. However, this fear may be unwarranted. One can describe human beings as growing, changing (in physical shape and cognitive capacity), and internally conflicted (in feelings, ideas, or desires), without having to refrain from also identifying human beings as a particular kind of animal – demarcating them from other kinds of animals or lifeless things. A conception of ‘society’ as a specific entity – as having certain dimensions, boundaries, or structure – does not preclude the characterization that it is changing, internally diversified, with historically drawn and redrawn boundaries, such that its members can communicate with those in societies other than their own. Some elements of the classic vision are, after all, worth retaining in a more balanced vision. Such a vision would stress that one must further understand culture, a body of historically inherited, traditionally embodied, incorporated, and socially transmitted knowledge in a community, as a contradictory social phenomenon. For lack of a better phrase, I use ‘paradoxes of culture’ to characterize the contradictions (though what I refer to are not paradoxes in the strictly logical sense of the term as ‘dilemmas,’ ‘contradictions,’ or ‘predicaments’). Three such ‘paradoxes’ are particularly worthy of our attention for the purpose of the ensuing discussions. First, the ‘paradox’ of a culture’s uniqueness and discreteness on the one hand, and its similarity and compatibility with others; Second, the ‘paradox’ of uniformity, unity, and common heritage on the one hand, and internal heterogeneity, diversification, and individualization on the other; Third, the ‘paradox’ of roots, destiny, continuity, and conservation on one hand, and on the other, choice, self-critique, transformation, perhaps a measure of unpredictability, and formation of hybrids. Those who singularly stress preserving historical cultural identities and respecting other people’s cultural identities, in effect, if not in intention, are insisting treating these people the same old way as in their past.23
16 Living with Cultural Paradoxes
These paradoxes have important implications for our thinking about matters that concern ethics of culture. Let me briefly illustrate. Consider the first paradox. It is common to cite uniqueness of culture as an obstacle to conceptualizing and validating cross-cultural moral principles. Denial of or over-emphasis on cultural uniqueness sometimes demarcates human rights universalists from cultural relativists.24 Relativists emphasize uniqueness in order to uphold their assertion about the moral incommensurability between cultures. Their belief seems to be that one cannot judge a culture with unique moral views and standards according to any other culture’s standards; any so-called cross-cultural (objective) standards are fictions, since all standards are inevitably one or another culture’s unique standards. Critics of relativists, while insisting that certain standards are cross-culturally commensurable, are uneasy in accepting uniqueness as if accepting it would undermine the universality of certain moral norms. (Nathan, 1997, pp. 136–51) What does it mean to say uniqueness entails incommensurability? A body of knowledge can be unique if it has no exact copy elsewhere. Nevertheless, overlapping bodies of knowledge are also unique – they may have unique formations of mosaic or unique eclectic patterns. Two overlapping eclectic patterns can be commensurable in spite of their uniqueness. In our world of cultural ‘creolization,’ we do not simply have discrete and parallel cultures as bounded entities, where by ‘looking across boundaries between distinct cultures’ ‘people gain ideas from alternative ways of living.’ (Wright, 1998, p. 13) Rather, our own ways of living are hybrids of interactioning cultures. The relativists’ tenacious hold on uniqueness thus does not help strengthen their incommensurability thesis. Their critics’ hesitation to recognize uniqueness may not strengthen their case against incommensurability. Consider the second paradox. Uniformity in social learning is rarely a reality in any territorially finite community. Yet the sense of unity can surprisingly rise to the occasion, e.g. when members resort to a common cultural heritage for solidarity, when they perceive outside discrimination against them as a group. Any attempt at understanding the role that a religion, ideology, or the myth of shared destiny play in social and political processes must take this external pressure for cultural unity into consideration. One must balance this attentiveness to unity with awareness of the historical fluidity of cultural identity and intra-cultural diversity.25 Fluidity and diversity are constant and ubiquitous while rise of cultural solidarity is occasional and contingent.26 The problem, as the anthropologist Jack Goody observes, is that the politically active tend to over-emphasize unity over internal fissures,
Paradoxes of Culture 17
Actors generally define their culture in terms of the dominant political, linguistic, or religious units to which they owe affiliation, … presuming a bounded unity which is often problematic … . In this sense, the concept of ‘a culture’ tends to have a highly nationalistic flavor about it, certainly highly political. Culture may be visualized as homogeneous, as a way of covering up the cracks in the fabric of society.27 Some anthropologists do not find that intracultural diversity and cultural unity are not mutually exclusive even in a society dominated by one religious or spiritual tradition.28 Alternative interpretations of the dominant tradition compete for influence and authority. Intracultural heterogeneity is often manifest in members’ individualized interest and experiences tied to positions in the social and political hierarchy. It is fallacious to infer that there exists a cultural unity from a lack of visible behaviors in opposition to dominant norms. Consider the routine use of violence in raids to obtain food, land, and women among the Yanomami, known among anthropologists for their fierceness and brutality. One study found a widely expressed preference among the people for, and glorification of, violence. The problem is that one cannot infer from these findings about behaviors and expressions the conclusion that all Yanomami share a common view about how and why to use violence. Even if there was a lack of behavioral or vocal dissent, it may still be the case that, some may not be eager to fight and die a violent death. They may fight out of social pressure to conform. As one anthropologist observed, the women did not want to become victims of abduction, rape, or beating in violent raids. They feared being shot by arrows. They dread forced marriage to members of enemy tribes, which would mean they lose the only protection they had from their brothers. The men did show fear during warfare (and they slept in certain ways to avoid attacks while sleeping).29 They may conceivably have the gut feeling, ‘This is no way to live, it is foolish, but I have to do it!’ Intracultural diversity despite unity opens the possibility for intercultural communication and overlap.30 The constant contestation of the boundaries of culture, from within and outside, also makes any such boundaries porous. Cultural identity has always been historically fluid. As Seyla Benhabib maintains, cultures are themselves torn by disputes over where and how to draw their own boundaries.31 Two minority interpretations in two separate cultures may find more in common between them than with members of their own cultures. They may have
18 Living with Cultural Paradoxes
similar experiences (knowledge) from living as dominated and repressed minorities. Now consider the third paradox. To recognize this paradox is to recognize profound changes in culture and new formation of culture and sub-cultures, local or hybrid (‘creole’), as well as historical continuity. Friedrich Nietzsche, who once said that nothing that had a history could be defined, might seem to declare the project of defining culture, giving its historical dimension, hopeless. Nietzsche may have unintentionally warned against exaggerating fluidity and variation to the extent of denying stability and constancy. Cultural changes are evidential everywhere (such that it is misleading to conceive the West as an icon of rapid development and transformation and the East of stagnation, tradition, or backwardness (Huntington, 1991, pp. 36–40)).32 Yet changes have not made culture only a fleeing moment of illusion, having no durable reality. Changes promise not only diversification, but also openness, mutual penetration, and overlapping similarities. Taking paradoxes of culture seriously has practical implications. For instance, as part of its ‘war on terrorism,’ the Bush Administration launched a cultural offensive to improve America’s image, particularly in Muslim countries. The US State Department’s Office of Public Diplomacy defines its mission as ‘engaging, informing, and influencing key international audiences.’ Its outreach programs are intended to ‘advance U.S. interests and security and to provide the moral basis for U.S. leadership in the world.’33 Such programs have little chance of success, however, if their purpose is merely to facilitate one-way communication. Even if such programs were effective in making American culture and values better understood, there would still be a need to improve Americans’ own understanding of the cultures of people around the globe. The idea of a cultural offensive merits caution for another reason as well. Its effectiveness will be diminished if it assumes that its audiences, be they citizens of a nation-state or the members of a religious or ethnic group, share a single static cultural perspective. We must amend our initial consensus concept of ‘culture’ now with an important clause. A culture is a body of informal knowledge that is historically inherited and transformed, embodied and contested in traditions, incorporated and innovated in practices, and transmitted and altered through social learning in a community of evolving and porous boundaries. In the rest of the book, I will refer to and use this amended concept as the working concept. A moral culture, if we ever need to invoke such a notion for purpose of moral discussion, is accordingly such a body of informal moral knowledge.
Paradoxes of Culture 19
‘Moral knowledge’ refers here to knowledge about how to relate to others and how to live, including the knowledge that human actions have beneficial or harmful consequences on others, and that under certain conditions such actions are or are not permissible. Many have considered informal moral knowledge developed in particular communities of specific historical circumstances, i.e. moral cultural considerations, relevant to explaining and justifying actions and views. Ethics of culture involve efforts to scrutinize such assumptions about cultural explanation and cultural justification, as I attempt to do in Chapters 2 and 3.
Cultural ‘community’ and ‘tradition’ We tend to use ‘culture’ and ‘tradition’ or ‘community’ interchangeably. For the sake of clarity, I want to spell out some of the implications of the working concept of ‘culture’ on these two related concepts. Community as paradoxical social context The working concept of culture, identified in the previous two sections, entails a specific conception of cultural community. A ‘cultural community’ is a paradoxical social context – a socially organized population group, a group of shared identity, or a society, within which a body of inform knowledge is socially transmitted and contested. Being ‘paradoxical,’ this social context has identifiable yet contested and porous boundaries. It is unique yet commensurable with other social contexts. Its members have mixed feelings about their inherited practices and ideas. They relate to their heritage differently. Their heritage means different things, invokes different feelings, in them. We can now differentiate a cultural community from any collection of persons on the one hand, and on the other, from an idealized, bounded, internally harmonious, and timeless group or society. Political theorists sometimes conceive ‘culture’ and ‘cultural community’ in the latter fashion. Walzer, for instance, refers to the Indian caste system as a paradigm of the Indian ‘cultural community,’ as if all Indians had practiced, identified with, or could nonetheless be represented by such a practice. (Walzer, 1983, p. 313) Those who see the Chinese society as once upon a golden time a Confucian cultural community, presenting a better alternative to presumably imported liberal democratic society, also seem to take this approach. (Bell, 2000) Charles Taylor, e. g. has used ‘culture’ to refer to a distinct geo-political entity, which is ‘commingled in each individual society.’ (Taylor, 1992, p. 72)
20 Living with Cultural Paradoxes
Will Kymlicka, one of few political philosophers who have paid more attention to cultural community, conceive ‘culture’ as ‘the existence of a viable community of individuals with a shared heritage, language, history, etc.’ (Kymlicka, 1989, p. 168) Culture may not be possible without community. Yet, to identify ‘culture’ with a community that has not only its own language and history, but also homeland and complete institutions leads to equating ‘culture’ with a ‘nation,’ a ‘people,’ or a ‘society.’ (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 18) Kymlicka thus is able to use ‘culture’ to characterize aboriginal, first-nation, peoples in liberal states, which he defends as worthy of the liberal state’s protection because of their intrinsically valuable cultures. However, such a definition is limited in its application. Kymlicka’s ‘cultural’ community excludes too much. It excludes such communities as immigrant groups as Chinese Americans or Arab Canadians, who share among themselves language, ancestry, or history, but not ‘homeland’ or socio-political ‘institutions.’ Their own members often contest the communities identities. This makes using community identity as the indicator of culture problematic.34 (Kymlicka’s ‘culture’ may be able to accommodate internal diversity in opinions and change over time, according to the adjustment that Kymlicka has made in response to critics.) Meanwhile, such a definition of ‘culture’ as a special type of community may also include more than what Kymlicka may have intended, hence may defeat his purpose. For example, the French society must be considered a cultural community (while its Muslim minority must not); also gated communities of affluent, ethnically or religiously less heterogeneous Americans, or Jewish settlers on the West Bank also fall under this description of ‘culture’ or cultural community. Tradition as reflective discourse The working concept suggests that culture manifests itself in the form of tradition and that tradition gives a shape to culture. The working concept entails that ‘cultural tradition’ is the embodiment of the historically inherited and transformed, socially transmitted, practically incorporated, and contested informal knowledge. The substance of a tradition consists in rules or principles, customs, symbols (language), rituals, habits, and practices. This notion of ‘tradition’ emphasizes that members revise and recreate the embodiment of informal knowledge, though they inherite it with some continuity from the past, as they acquire new experiences under changing conditions of life. Tradition thus contains clashing views and diverse perspectives. General principles may be incompatible with specific rules (for example, consider ‘All are God’s children and
Paradoxes of Culture 21
loved by him’ and ‘Young girls must be subjected to genital cutting – in spite of the pain and health consequences’). Rules of different times may also clash. In addition, interpretations of principles or rules may clash. Members of the same tradition, who are taught the same principles and rules, who lived under similar circumstances, through roughly the same historical events (war, revolution, recession, or prosperity), however, do not always agree about the validity or applicability of these principles and rules. Their judgments are likely to differ about what one ought to do in a given situation. (For example, consider the disputes among Catholics in the US about abortion.) Consequently, it is insufficient to invoke cultural tradition (or identity with such a tradition) to justify enforcing any practice, as in the claim, ‘It is our tradition!’35 Philosophers generally employ two notions of ‘tradition’: one narrow, the other broad. The working concept of ‘culture’ favors the latter, which I will further discuss. The narrow view recognizes only intellectual or spiritual discourses, in which the learnt elite deliberates and disputes norms, rules, or standards. The broad view sees tradition as reflected knowledge that is continuously reinterpreted, recreated, and enacted. In this view, tradition is not merely an intellectual discourse or its products. It is also practice and practiced rules or lived ideas. The narrow view, focusing on religious texts or philosophical theories as the substance of a tradition, is inadequate to capture what has actually become embodied – accepted and motivating – in the form of custom, practice, or convention. A person taught in the Kantian or utilitarian theoretical traditions, or well-versed in Confucian or Christian texts, may not have internalized the ideas and may not be motivated to act accordingly. Conversely, those who have the appropriate beliefs and practice the customs may be unaware of these theories or texts.36 This discrepancy leads us to the broad view of tradition, which recognizes that cultural traditions have something to do with dispositions cultivated through social learning and experiences, and with lived ideas. Social learning, through which informal knowledge is transmitted and contested, thus involves more than understanding and reflection. It involves practicing acquired knowledge and internalizing the teaching through experiences into habits, dispositions, and skills. Virtue ethicists refer to this process applied to social learning of morality as moral cultivation. According to the virtue ethicist, when moral ideas are cultivated into moral habits or virtuous character traits, good judgments and right actions flow from such dispositions. It is thus not surprising that Alasdair MacIntyre has put in serious efforts at conceptualizing the broad view of tradition while he elaborates
22 Living with Cultural Paradoxes
his virtue ethic vision. A brief discussion of MacIntyre’s view, interesting in its own right, helps strengthen the broad view, which I see as the more plausible of the two views from the perspective of our working concept of ‘culture.’ I hope to do this without, as I demonstrate, accepting MacIntyre’s rejection of the idea of liberal rights. MacIntyre laments the decline of the Greek–Aristotelian tradition in Western societies and has a ‘very gloomy estimate of the prospects of a secular culture,’37 i.e. the Enlightenment movement. He wants to counter the Existentialist view that the human life is composed of discrete actions which lead nowhere, which have no order. For this purpose, MacIntyre invokes ‘tradition’ to help understand and assess ‘what someone else is doing’ by placing the action within the traditional practices in a community. In other words, MacIntyre tries to establish a connection between one’s tradition and one’s views and actions. For him, one can only comprehend the latter in the context of the former. For MacIntyre, one can understand others’ actions better by placing them ‘in the context of a set of narrative histories, histories both of the individuals concerned and of the settings in which they act and suffer.’ (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 211) He calls the narrative histories ‘tradition.’ Members of such a ‘tradition’ co-author the master ‘narrative,’ which is thus an open-ended, and continuously reworked manuscript, simultaneously accessible to all members. Central authority or elites, it seems, have no privilege in overriding the co-authors and dominating the editing, rewriting, or interpretations. Members edit (delete, add, or rewrite) their parts as they reenact them in practices in pursuits of the good. (MacIntyre, 1981, pp. 212, 213–16, 222) Tradition, in this broad conception by MacIntyre, involves reflective practices (as opposed to mere contemplation). A tradition is reflective and has room for self-critique for it is ‘sustained and advanced by its own internal arguments and conflicts.’ (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 260) The ‘narratives’ of different traditions might be context-specific, yet not in principle mutually incomprehensible or incomparable. If an actor participates in multiple traditions, one can make his action ‘intelligible,’ it seems, by referring to or placing it within a number of different narrative histories. (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 214) These traditions can thus become commensurable. Tradition does not determine actions. Actors actively participate in creating and redefining tradition. Such participation allows an innovative role for individuals and leaves room for individual autonomy. These views are essentially compatible with the account of culture as paradoxical social phenomenon.
Paradoxes of Culture 23
Despite his account of tradition as reflective practices and reinterpretations, MacIntyre seems to fear that changes taking place within a tradition is threatening the survival of the very tradition. He comes to view the rise of the Enlightenment liberal tradition in historically Christian societies as the end to an entire way of life that once was the foundation of Western civilization. He sees in this change the onset of ‘the coming ages of barbarism and darkness.’ The only hope he can find for preserving morality and civility is to retreat to bunkers – into smaller and insulated ‘local forms of community,’ free of the unlike-minded others, ‘barbarians,’ who have moved from ‘beyond the frontiers.’ Only in the enclaves of like-minded virtuous men and women, ‘civility and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained through the new dark ages.’ (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 263) MacIntyre’s account of tradition, at least as I read it, however, need not take him to such panic reactions to what he perceives as ‘barbarians’ – un-reflective persons of certain cultural or religious background, presumably non-Christian or non-Western. If this account is meant to be a description of the Christian tradition, then, there is no reasons to believe that other traditions are ‘barbarian’ or un-reflective. Traditionembedded persons everywhere engage in social learning from inherited knowledge and from experiences as well. This enables them to question and reinterpret their heritage. There is no reason to believe that any people, of any particular historical traditions, have the privilege to be capable of realizing the ideally reflective interaction with their tradition, MacIntyre urges one to strive for such reflective interaction. Moreover, to realize such an ideal, which seems to be MacIntyre’s prescription for averting ‘the new dark age,’ certain preconditions must be realized in order to achieve the sort of ‘civility and the intellectual and moral life’ that gives substance to this ideal. To engage in the kind of critical reflection and innovative re-writing of one’s own role in such an ideal ‘tradition,’ it is a prerequisite that the reflective person be safeguarded from typical threats (tyranny of power, e.g.) to his liberties of conscience, thought, and expression. To follow through this reading of MacIntyre, one may not find oneself where he has intended for one to end up – an opposition to the cosmopolitan liberal outlook.38 * * * For purpose of assessing proposals for ethical governance in our culturally complex world later in the book, I have engaged in critical analyses of
24 Living with Cultural Paradoxes
‘culture’ and its related concepts, ‘tradition’ and ‘community,’ in this chapter. I have focused on scrutinizing the nature and attributes of culture. Specifically, by engaging competing and contested findings in the empirical fields, I identify a plausibly workable concept of culture, i.e. one that takes seriously the paradoxes of culture. From there, I veer into a brief discussion of moral philosophers and political theorists’ uses or misuses of ‘culture’ or cultural ‘community’ and ‘tradition.’ I hope that these exercises help elucidate whether, or to what extent, culture is relevant or significant to ethics (Chapter 2), and help bring some clarity to common presumptions about the relativity to culture of the rightness of moral judgments and standards (Chapter 3).
2 The Ethical Significance of Culture
The capacity for culture is tantamount to the capacity for humanity. Culture is the precondition for the realization of this capacity by individuals, and in turn depends on the cooperative efforts of individuals for its creation and reproduction. American Anthropological Association1
Qualifying ethical significance Having identified an inventive and reasonably plausible understanding of ‘culture,’ i.e. the working concept, I proceed now to consider a host of questions concerning the ethical significance of culture or its lack thereof. These include: Whether and how culture can provide the explanation and justification of moral actions and judgments, and whether an ‘embeddedness’ of persons in cultural tradition or community entails the impossibility of personal autonomy in moral decision-making. This investigation is important, as we will see, for further inquiries in the rest of the book about such questions as, e.g. whether morality must be relative to culture; how to make sense of ‘the right to culture’; to what extent tolerance of cultural pluralism is plausible; and how the idea of universal, trans-cultural, human rights can be reconciled with a genuine sensitivity to culture. If reports of American soldiers torturing Iraqi prisoners had outraged only those in Western nations, if no genuine indignation beyond political posturing had fueled the condemnations from elsewhere, one might have been able to claim new evidence that the ban on torture was a culturally idiosyncratic obsession of the West. Clearly, though, no such claim was even conceivable, given the universal expression of outrage at the abuses. In other cases, the relevance of the ‘culture factor’ I have 25
26 Living with Cultural Paradoxes
spoken about seems more visibly divisive among those involved in political, legal and ethical debates about practices such as female genital cutting, the abandonment of female infants, and the lapidation of accused adulteresses. In yet other cases involving practices with lessthan-obvious harms to those subjected to them (as in the case of enforcing the custom that females must cover themselves head to toe), their legal and ethical defense invoking cultural traditions raises more delicate questions concerning the moral relevance of culture. One underlying question is whether and how an understanding of different cultural perspectives serves any normative function in justifying or explaining acts deemed right or wrong from such perspectives. How plausible is it to cite the claim ‘In contrast to Western liberal traditions, Chinese culture puts the interest of the community ahead of that of the individual,’ assuming its cultural authenticity for the moment, to defend the Chinese government’s curtailment of individual rights presumably for the sake of social stability and public order? In policy debates, when parties demand exceptions for their practices to the law or policy, saying, for instance, ‘Wearing the headscarf is the heritage of Muslims and hence deserves tolerance by the state,’ they give normative weight to the ‘culture factor.’ Alternatively, when critics accuse efforts to abolish practices such as honor killing as insensitive to cultural differences, they also give weight to the ‘culture factor,’ granting it a decisive role in moral/policy decision. Many of us invoke culture, as in these cases, in part because we assume that culture can explain or justify moral judgments or actions. It is due to this assumption that we consider culture relevant to, or significant for, morality or ethics. In an attempt to re-examine this entrenched notion of culture’s ethical significance, I take a close look at the assumption that a culture has the capacity to explain or justify the moral views and behaviors of those embedded in the culture. There are contentious views about what constitutes an explanation. For the sake of argument, I consider two such views differing in their assumptions about the function of explanation: (i) explanation as identifying a causal relationship between what explains and what is being explained, and (ii) explanation as illuminating, or conferring intelligibility and coherence on, what is yet to be understood. I will refer to (i) as a strong explanation and (ii) as a weak one. If culture is able to perform function (i), I refer to it as having a strong heuristic significance for ethics, and if it is able to perform (ii), it has a weak heuristic significance. Meanwhile, I refer to the presumed role of culture in justifying actions or judgments as morally right or just as granting culture a normative ethical
The Ethical Significance of Culture 27
significance. I will offer a preliminary assessment of culture’s presumed normative significance below, but a substantive discussion will unfold in Chapter 3. In this chapter, I focus on questioning culture’s strong heuristic significance, i.e. its role in providing causal explanations while, however, confirming culture’s weak heuristic significance, i.e. its role in illuminating moral agents’ views or actions. This confirmation accords with the intuition that, to the extent that culture provides a source of informal moral knowledge, it shapes the judgment of moral agents, motivates them to act, and is therefore able to play a weak heuristic role in making sense of their actions or judgments – of how agents find their actions or judgments sensible and how they came to adopt them. Let me illustrate, graphically, these alleged types or gradations of culture’s ethical significance I have tried to differentiate and will, in the remaining pages of this chapter (see Figure 2.1). The working concept of ‘culture’ developed in Chapter 1 already entails some preliminary assessment of culture’s ethical significance. The working concept, to recall, views culture as a body of informal knowledge with paradoxical features. This concept suggests a two-fold assessment of culture’s presumed normative (justifying) and heuristic (explanatory) significance: First, a paradoxical body of informal knowledge can potentially justify different positions concerning a moral problem. This is because this body of knowledge is itself internally conflicted and changes over time. If both x and anti-x can be justified by referring to the same culture, such justifications are uninteresting and hardly worthy of consultation by ethicists. This preliminary assessment means that culture understood as paradoxical informal knowledge has little normative ethical significance. Ethical significance of culture
Normative significance (If culture justifies)
Heuristic significance (If culture explains)
Strong (Causal explanation)
Figure 2.1 A breakdown of culture’s ethical significance
Weak (Illumination)
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Secondly, a paradoxical body of informal knowledge cannot provide a strong or causal explanation of moral decisions by those raised in or identified with the relevant cultural community. This is because a member’s moral outlook tends to have developed from, or associate with, one of several contested moral visions (including those that gained orthodoxy or authoritative status) in the culture or shared with those in other cultures. A Confucian faithful may identify with classical Confucianism, neo-Confucianism, or new-Confucianism, competing visions based on interpretations of classical Confucian texts. A member’s specific relationship with one of the competing moral visions tends to be influenced by her personal experiences (e.g. as the daughter of a privileged family or of poor illiterate peasants). Other situational factors such as those created by circumstance (e.g. an incidental relationship with a custom or school of thought) or basic structural institutions (e.g. a systematic ban on women’s attending school or holding public office) also influence such a relationship. A reference to a person’s culture alone thus is at best only of limited usefulness for determining the cause of her action or judgment in a concrete moral situation. There exists no causal chain whereby one can trace her decisions to her culture or vice versa. In this sense, culture hardly has a strong heuristic significance for ethics. However, this is not to say that an investigation of persons’ cultural upbringing cannot illuminate why and how they made certain moral decisions. Such an investigation can yield some useful background information making a person’s decisions more intelligible. In this sense, culture can provide a weak explanation of actions or judgments, and hence it has a weak heuristic significance. Due to this recognition, a ‘cultural defense,’ as the political scientist Alison Dundes Renteln argues, is admissible in an US court for explaining a Chinese immigrant selling live chickens, hence possibly mitigating any punitive verdict, but not justifying the action as legal (given the law) or ethical.2 (Renteln, 2004) The foregoing provides an analytic assessment of the ethical significance of culture. I infer and make explicit the implications of the working concept of culture on culture’s ethical significance. Next, I continue this analytic approach by disaggregating culture into some of its key components or into some entities, with which ‘culture’ has been used interchangeably. I further explicate the implications of the working concept on any ethical significance of these components or entities. Specifically, I will examine tradition, cultivated character traits and skills, sentiments, and community. This exercise allows greater accuracy in identifying where and how, and which parts or resemblances of culture, might be ethically
The Ethical Significance of Culture 29
relevant in a specific way. In particular, I challenge the irrational cultural relativist claim that cultivated sentiments end any rational evaluation of ethical responses. I also examine the communitarian claim about persons’ ‘embeddedness’ in cultural community and the difficulties this claim faces in making sense of moral agents’ autonomy in decisionmaking.
The ethical significance of tradition If two persons hold different judgments about what is the right action to take in a specific situation (for example, whether to use torture or abandon one’s own baby girl), to what extent can we say with plausibility that their judgments can be explained by their different cultural traditions? To seek a strong explanation, as noted above, one would seek to identify a cultural tradition as the cause of the moral agents’ judgments. In contrast, to seek a weak explanation, one would invoke the moral agents’ upbringings in the respective traditions to provide narratives, historical information, to help make sense of their judgments, thereby eliciting a certain coherence and intelligibility. Does cultural tradition have a strong or merely weak heuristic significance to ethics? Our working concept of culture understands cultural tradition broadly as the embodiment of informal knowledge that is the subject of reflection, reinterpretation, renovation, and contests in a historical discourse. (See ‘Tradition as reflective discourse’, p. 20) Tradition thus understood serves the function of illuminating, or conferring coherence on, what one invokes tradition in order to explain: the views or actions of moral agents affiliated with the tradition. However, it does not competently serve the function of providing the cause of these views or actions. Individual members of the same tradition may have very different experiences, which lead them to different interpretations of classic texts or different degrees of motivation to act in accordance with or in opposition to the interpretation ascended to orthodox or held by authority. As a result, they may disagree in their moral judgments or actions. For example, a contemporary person raised in the Eskimo tradition may disagree with some fellow members about the prevailing belief that it is necessary for collective survival under conditions of severe scarcity to leave the elderly, too frail or sick to work, to die in the wilderness. He may reinterpret this rationale, based on his own experiences, in the following way: Living conditions have changed or can conceivably change
30 Living with Cultural Paradoxes
if certain actions are taken or social arrangements made; and it has become feasible to take such actions or make such arrangements. Thus, he may argue, it is no longer a necessity, if it ever was, for collective survival to send the elderly out to die in the wilderness. In fact, he may contend, there can be enough resources to care for them in the community.3 In this case, referring to the Eskimo tradition (or, more precisely, to one of its customs, which, according to one possible interpretation, is seen as acceptable) alone does not help one determine the cause of this person’s moral judgment about this particular practice. (Likewise, an uncaring or greedy son’s action of sending his old father out to die in the wilderness also cannot be traced to his belief in the necessity for collective survival – though he acts seemingly in compliance with such a belief.) To some readers, this may seem like an easy call. Obviously, since the contemporary Eskimo disagrees with the custom, we will not refer to the tradition alone to explain his views. What about those who continue to adhere to it? On the one hand, the unconventional person may be persuasive and change some people’s perspective. Together, they may gradually gain enough support to abandoning the custom. In the case that an adherent to the custom cites it as the cause of his judgment and action, it is reasonable to ask whether such a custom is still in accordance with the rationale of caring for the survival of the community, which supported the custom in the first place. One might reasonably further question whether other motives or rationales (than the traditional rationale) played a role in a person’s decision to adhere to such a custom. For instance, a person may not want to take the responsibility to care for his sick parents. In any case, an awareness of intra-tradition diversity helps engineer this kind of critical reflection, uncovering more accurate, concrete, causes of specific agents’ actions and judgments. On the other hand, the fact that we must explain actions and judgments of moral agents growing up in a tradition on case-by-case basis says that it is problematic to invoke their tradition automatically and wholesale as the uniform cause of their (different) actions and judgments. In this sense, tradition loses its luster as a reliable cause, on which one can rely in providing a causal explanation of actions and judgments of anyone growing up in a tradition. Consider those Chinese who judge it acceptable or do not question selling live chickens and other live birds in the markets of southern China. For the sake of argument, let us assume that such a practice is a custom. How reliably can one refer to ‘Chinese cultural tradition’ as the cause of such a practice, providing its causal explanation? An awareness of certain internal fracture and changing perspectives erodes any
The Ethical Significance of Culture 31
reliability or causal inevitability that a strong explanation is intended to establish. If we consider the historical China as the definition of the parameters of a ‘traditional Chinese culture,’ we may then note that, e.g. historically, Chinese Buddhism believes in the unity of diverse forms of life and the possibility of this (human) life incarnating in a different form (of another kind of animal). Those who accept this competing belief in the Chinese historical discourse oppose killing or hurting any form of life. This awareness advises us not to invoke ‘Chinese tradition’ as a whole to dispense the cause for the action of selling and killing live chickens and other birds. (The traditional Buddhist belief may gain a measure of popular acceptance, changing the perspectives of many, after the recent scare of deadly viruses transmitted in southern China’s live animal stock markets. Practical considerations of public health would motivate such a possible change.) A practice like selling live animals is not sanctioned by all members in a tradition. Those who choose to stick to it may not have done so because of some shared traditional cultural conviction about its validity. For instance, they may believe that live chickens sell better and are more profitable. They may find following new regulations governing sanitary processing of livestock too expensive and so on. The real motives or causes of their action challenge those who try to explain the action. One thing is sure: they cannot rely on the cultural tradition as the cause of the action. If nothing else, taking this short cut is intellectual laziness at the expense of accuracy. Understanding a tradition, including its internal diversities and clashing views in its historical course and contemporary debates, as among the situational factors in the relevant context, however, does shed some light on why and how variously situated members of a tradition have acted or made judgments in specific fashions. Such an understanding does not adequately answer the question of why some Eskimos find a particular custom acceptable and others do not, or why some Chinese venders resist changing the practice of selling birds killed on the spot, others find it easy to change, and yet others have long opposed it. In the US court case cited in Renteln’s study, such an understanding allows the judge to see why the Chinese immigrant cited for selling live chickens may have done it, and also to see the options even from the perspectives of her cultural tradition. (It does not follow that, however, the judge illuminated by understanding the tradition would necessarily, find the practice justifiable.) Arguing in this fashion, I treat internal diversity in a tradition as the norm rather than exception. There are often very specific codes of
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conduct that have been adopted and enforced by authorities or customary law in a traditional community. However, if we inspect the community and its tradition(s) in question, we can be almost sure to find competing and challenging views from within about these codes. The competitors and challengers may have fallen out of favor with powerful authorities or have had no chance for education and failed to persuade members in the community. The reasonable thing to do, for the outsiders, is to engage these internal debates rather than stopping at whatever codes or customs that have politically prevailed or have been adopted without the benefit of fair open debates with their competitors and challengers. The connections between political interest and cultural/religious/ideological expressions are well-known, but still too important for our understanding of cultural perspectives and traditional practices to be brushed aside. We must not romanticize what we see – what people express and practice – as what these people would, under ideal conditions of empowerment, information, critical reflection, and opportunities for choice, openly endorse and adopt. I will return to this point as I discuss the possibility for community-embedded members to achieve autonomy. One common scenario is that challengers and dissenters to the prevailed codes or customs adhere to fundamental beliefs, which provide rationale to these codes. Yet, those beliefs are now violated or ignored by the practices developed to implement the specific codes, or these codes or customs have become outdated vehicles for actualizing those beliefs due to changing situational factors. For instance, theft is severely punished in some societies (such as Taliban’s Afghan) by cutting off the accused thief’s arms. A fundamental rationale provided in the historical discourse for this punishment may be that social justice must be done – those who took things from others must be punished so that they would not be able to do it again and others would be properly warned. Those who reject this practice can go back to this rationale and point out that justice can be served without cutting off the arms of ‘offenders’ under changed circumstances. Thus, the act of an exploited poor person taking things from an exploitative landlord is arguably doing justice and one should exempt the ‘offender’ from the punishment.4 Similarly, an adulterous woman can be spared stoning to death (a punishment prescribed by the penal codes in the Muslim tradition upheld in parts of the Sudan), as opponents within the tradition have argued, since more general principles upheld in the same tradition (such as God’s equal concern for all of His children, women or men) should also be brought to bear. Such opponents can argue with the judges that if adulterous men are tolerated by the penal code and thus by God, God would also
The Ethical Significance of Culture 33
tolerate the women. Sparing the women thus does not violate God’s mandate. On the other hand, if the women must be punished in some fashion, the men involved must also be punished in a similar fashion. The man who saves a drowning child may be motivated by various beliefs about the purposes and consequences of his action. Citing his cultural tradition as the only or deciding cause is misleading for those who assess the action or make rules or propose institutional reforms, in order to shape (encouraging or discouraging) similar actions. The ‘liberation of women’ under Mao’s communist regime, for example, may have been motivated by ideological conviction about equal respect for women or by a pragmatic policy to boost higher productivity. Those who marched in the streets of Beijing to denounce the US bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade may have been motivated by the belief that the US deliberately targeted the embassy, or by the belief that American hegemonic power was a general security threat to China, or simply by the sensation of freedom that came to them during a rare moment of government tolerance for public protest and rowdy behaviors in the streets. One problem with linking an agent’s tradition to her action is thus that an action may have multiple causes or sources of impetus – including reasons or motives that do not spring directly or solely from that tradition. Even in the event that a group of people share a practice (say, abandoning their elderly), these people may still engage in this common action for multiple, sometimes incongruent, motives and reasons.
Of character traits I now proceed to consider the ethical significance of such components of culture as character trait, products of social learning and social transmission of informal knowledge. For the sake of clarity, I should note that, as components of culture, character traits (and moral sentiments, to be examined later in this chapter) are not on a par with ‘tradition’ and ‘community.’ They are developed within a tradition or community. There cannot be a culture without tradition and community, but there can be a culture without cultivated character traits or sentiments (also, there cannot be cultivated virtues and moral sentiments without tradition and community.) Thus a body of informal knowledge may be historically inherited, embodied in traditional customs, incorporated in practices, and socially transmitted in community, yet it has not been internalized by persons of the current generations into character traits or sentiments. In this case, we speak of a failing or ineffective culture.
34 Living with Cultural Paradoxes
I have an argumentational motive to consider ‘cultivated characters’ here. Some virtue ethicists argue for the primacy of shaping character, rather than building just institutions. This position has played a role in the debate on culture and human rights. In virtue ethics, a rival of deontological and consequentialist approaches in moral philosophy, it seems generally accepted that a benevolent person – someone who has cultivated the virtuous character trait of benevolence in a moral/cultural tradition – would seem more likely to act benevolently than those who have not cultivated this trait. This view suggests that cultivated dispositions, products of social learning in a cultural tradition, are ethically significant in that they provide a causal explanation for the acts or judgments of the cultivated persons. In endorsing this view, one accepts that there exists a causal relationship between a person’s cultivated dispositions and her actions or judgments. The latter, it is assumed, flows directly from the cultivated character traits. This assumption may be implicit, yet apparently vital, in virtue ethics, especially in the idea that cultivating character traits is of fundamental importance for ensuring that persons act righteously and make good moral judgments.5 Such an assumption about the causal relationship between virtues and moral judgments or actions, hence about a strong heuristic ethical significance of cultivated character traits, must answer some challenging questions. One set of such questions comes from moral psychologists. Gilbert Harman and John Doris, for instance, have seriously doubted such a connection. They reject the claim that virtuous character traits, once cultivated, generally direct persons to act virtuously. (Harman, 1998–99, 1999–2000; Doris, 2002) They cite well-known psychological experiments conducted in the US in the 1970s to show that there is rather a disconnection between cultivated character traits and moral behaviors. The Milgram Experiment – perhaps the most famous of their examples – reportedly showed that most subjects, regardless of moral character or convictions, were willing to inflict pain on others by administering electric shocks when told by the authority in charge of the experiment that such shocks would test the effect of penalties on learning. (Milgram, 1974) In another example, the Stanford Prison Experiment, university students were asked to play the roles of prison guards and prisoners. After only six days, the students came to identify closely with their assigned roles: the ‘guards’ behaved sadistically and the ‘prisoners’ pathologically. The experiment had to be terminated ahead of schedule, out of concern that serious harms would be inflicted. (Haneyet et al., 1973)
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Harmon and Doris also cite the Helping Behavior Experiment, conducted in various countries, in which a person pretended to have collapsed in a hallway where religious seminary students were to go by. The experimenters wanted to identify the factors that would influence students’ decisions to act when they encountered a person apparently in need of assistance. The experimenters reported that the most important variable was time. Those who were hurrying to their next scheduled appointments tended to rush by, without offering help or even stopping to find out whether help was needed. Those who stopped to offer help gave as a main reason the fact that they were not in a rash. The students’ religious commitments or the nature of their next appointment (such as preparing for a sermon on the Good Samaritan) made little difference. (Darley and Batson, 1973) These experiments suggest that situational factors (i.e. the presence of authority figures, the assignment of roles, time pressures, and so on) are the primary determinants of subjects’ willingness to do harm to others or to ignore others’ need for help. Such situational factors seem to exert greater influence on behaviors and decisions to act in specific moral situations than cultivated virtues or faith and commitments do. A virtue ethicist, however, may respond to such challenges by noting the distance between ideally cultivated virtuous character traits and what ordinary people could be realistically expected to achieve through social learning. They may acknowledge the difficulty to shorten this distance. Subjects in these experiments may have not perfected the desired virtues. They may have not succeeded in moral cultivation. Thus, they lacked the necessary resolve, the character strength, the motivation for doing the right thing in the relevant moral situations. Such insufficiently cultivated persons, even if they are inclined to not harm others and to assist those in need, may be unable to judge when and how to assist, or may not be courageous enough to disobey orders or resist peer pressure. The results of these experiments, they may conclude, hence do not disprove the power of cultivated virtues to dictate right action; rather, they only demonstrate the difficulties in achieving the cultivation of virtues. This acknowledgment of the demanding nature of cultivation, however, undermines the prospects for virtue ethics to offer a plausible account of the moral life as it is lived by ordinary people, who count for the vast majority of humankind. The difficulties for most people in perfecting virtues suggest that a causal link between cultivated virtues and right actions is anything but useful in explaining everyday moral actions. In other words, virtuous character traits, as a product of social learning in traditions, can only provide a strong explanation of the few rarely
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cultivated persons’ actions or judgments. As far as it concerns the actions and judgments of ordinary people, cultivated virtuous character traits are largely irrelevant or insignificant. For explaining ordinary people’s moral actions or judgments in a cause–effect fashion, as we have seen, one must take into account situational factors (basic institutions, power structures, and authority and so on), which provide reasons and shape motives for agents to take certain actions or make certain judgments. Some knowledge of agents’ exposure to moral learning or character cultivation in particular traditions, whether with any success or sheer failure, however, does provide background information, illuminating those who try to understand where the agents come from and why they acted or judged the way they did. This means such knowledge does have a weak heuristic significance for ethical inquiry. A related product of social learning – skill, a form of inherited and embodied knowledge – can also be analyzed for ethical significance. The process of learning a skill, and then practicing it, is a form of cultivation. Could skills alone provide a strong heuristic explanation for the skilled agent’s judgments or actions? To address this question, imagine a certain skill involved in administering torture. Let us assume that this skill has been practiced in a society for generations. Now, imagine two persons, x and y, where x is a member of this society and y is not. Now, x and y disagree about the rightness of torture: x, who has learned the particular skill very well, judges that torture is right or permissible, and y judges that it is wrong. The skill of torture, however, seems only incidentally relevant to the formation of their judgments. It is not the skill, directly and alone, that upholds x’s judgment or motivates him to torture; and y’s judgment would likely not be reversed if she were to undergo training and acquiring the skill of torture. In the event that y had changed her judgment about torture, an explanation of the cause(s) of this change would require more than the information that she had now learned the skill. It is plausible that one who chooses to learn the skill of torture is also learning to emulate its practitioners and to identify with an institution (or a society) where torture is accepted. Such a person may also become indifferent to the cruelty of torture, or come to approve of the infliction of pain on those who are judged to deserve it. (Consider the indifference of butchers toward animals. They may have gone into the business for purpose of emulating generations of practitioners in their families or immediate community. They developed the indifference because they have identified with the practice – practitioners’ social status and the economic
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benefits.) Moreover, once a person acquires a skill, he has an investment in its continuing practice: to renounce the practice may be to disavow a significant part of her and her group’s history, social identify, and a practical means of economy.6 However, as soon as we provide this richer narrative about how and why a person now judges torture acceptable, we offer a broader ranger of interconnected motives and rationales, among which, the skill is neither the only, nor the most influential one. A host of heterogeneous social, economic, historical considerations comes into play in motivating her judgment about the practice. Consequently, we are able to conclude that skill alone does not identify the cause of an agent’s action or judgment about the action, in carrying out which the agent applies the skill. Those who are still unconvinced may point to the skill to make sound judgments. Admittedly, such a skill is relevant to, and indeed required for, making good moral judgments. However, if we must call it a ‘skill,’ it is of a substantially different kind from the skill of a butcher or that of a pianist. Strictly speaking, the ‘skill’ to make good moral judgments requires not only training, like the skill to play the piano. It involves, for the most part, a certain instinct and a great deal of moral knowledge. Presumably, one does not gain instincts and moral knowledge simply by undergoing training. One must live through real-life events. (Not all of us are so lucky to live through certain lifetime experiences!) The ‘skill’ to make sound judgment is required, for instance, for arriving at the correct moral decision about whether to lie about a friend’s hiding place when the Nazi soldiers come to look for her. However, the ‘skill’ to make the judgment about the appropriateness of lying in the given situation requires the ability to draw upon many resources – friendship, courage, knowledge of the evil nature of Nazism, and a sense of justice. From the judgment (that it is morally permissible to lie in this situation), one cannot infer that certain trained ‘skill,’ as butcher or playing the piano, has the exclusive authorship – or that it alone caused the agent to make the judgment. This examination of cultivated character traits (and skills) indicates that these things may have a weak heuristic significance for understanding moral decisions and behaviors. They can be invoked to provide some coherence – giving background information and making the moral agents’ decisions intelligible. In the next section, I examine whether and how one specific product of social learning in cultural community – moral sentiments – might have a certain kind of ethical significance. The argumentational consideration behind my decision to proceed in this direction is that sometimes ‘sentiment’ is identified with culture and such a ‘culture’ is granted an ethical significance. Such an equation
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plays no small a role, as we will see, in Rorty’s attempt to defend the ‘culture of human rights’ on the ground of irrationalist cultural relativism.
Of cultivated sentiments In attempting to explain or justify our judgment that torture or genocide is wrong, can anything more be said after we refer to what propel us – our strong sentiments of outrage, indignation, empathy, or shame stirred up by such hideous acts? When persons from another society hold the opposing moral judgment about these acts, what explains or provides the cause of our difference? Is it nothing but differences in certain cultivated sentiments, i.e. or their presence or absence? Socially cultivated sentiments7 no doubt have a role in shaping moral judgments and motivating actions. One’s outrage at torture and empathy with victims often contribute to one’s judgment of torture as a moral wrong and motivate one to take action to stop torture or assist victims. The question is whether and how moral agents’ sentiments cause or have a cause–effect chain connection to their judgments or actions. Richard Rorty, in rejecting rationalist theories ‘in favor of the existence of a universal human nature,’ argues that moral differences are, and can only be, explained (and justified) by cultivated sentiments or tastes through upbringing or education in different cultures, and that such sentiments defy rational analysis. (Rorty, 1993, p. 116) Rorty attributes the Serb soldiers’ acts of torturing and humiliating Muslim prisoners to their lack of fellow feeling with their victims – a lack that the soldiers confessed to.8 Rorty contends that it is our outrage and indignation at atrocities, not a Kantian or other rationalist transcendental moral truth, that motivate us to ban atrocities and to support human rights. He traces the cause of our judgment about the wrongness of torture to ‘our sentiments’ – disgust and revulsion at what the Serb soldiers or the Nazis did, and sympathy for the tortured and sadness about their pain and suffering. Such humane sentiments are culturally shaped: We obtain them as we are told the sad stories about victims.9 The differences between those who have and those who have not acquired these sentiments, Rorty suggests, are indeed differences in culture. ‘Our’ humane sentiments, shared among citizens in liberal democracies, constitute ‘our’ ‘human rights culture.’ (Rorty, 1993, p. 115) This ‘culture’ is no more and no less than our cultivated ‘sentimentality.’ ‘Our’ ‘human rights culture’ is therefore explained and justified by ‘our’ ‘superior’ sentiments: ‘We like what we have and we will do what we can
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to change the sentiments that divide us from others.’ Rorty wants us to be content with our ‘human rights culture’ instead of digging ‘beneath or behind’ for universal rational moral ‘truth’ about human nature and transcendental duties. For Rorty, our having such sentiments is ‘a historically contingent fact,’ a ‘cultural fact,’ about ‘us’ in the West. Human rights appeal to ‘our culturally influenced intuitions about the right thing to do.’ There is nothing more profound than such intuitions, which can be shaped through manipulation of the sentiments through moral education. (Rorty, 1993, pp. 115–17)10 The moral philosopher can only go as far as to ‘summarize’ our sentimentality. One operating assumption here seems to be that there exists a causal relationship between acculturated sentiments and moral judgments/ actions. Rorty is not alone in making this assumption. Others have granted sentiments similar significance, though perhaps not to the exclusion of other (possibly rationalist) causes. Michael Ignatieff, for example, seems to share this assumption when he notes that sentimental reactions to human atrocities, images of which now beam into living rooms around the world, have fuelled efforts to push for international human rights and humanitarian interventions. (Ignatieff, 1998) Such sentimentality, others contend, is present in the ‘shock’ to ‘the moral conscience of mankind,’ (Walzer, 1977, p. 107) the ‘shame’ at heinous and barbaric acts being perpetrated upon innocent victims, the feelings of obligation to act, (Luban, 2002, pp. 79–115) or emotions roused by situations that are ‘beyond the pale.’ (Teson, 2003, p. 98) It is plausible that, at least in unambiguous cases involving serious harm and human suffering, there is some connection between strong sentiments and moral judgments/actions. People who react to torture or genocide with strong sentiments often cannot imagine they could judge or act otherwise – turn a blind eye or remain inactive. The connection between sentiments and moral judgments/actions, however, is not robust enough to establish a causal link between them. Nor are sentiments alone sufficient to justify moral judgments and actions. Without assuming strong causal link, Rorty would not be able to postulate that the only effective way to alter inhumane practices is not to supply rational explanations or normative justifications for human rights but to supply humane sentiments. For Rorty, the problem can be addressed by educating (supplying sentiments to) those outside ‘our’ ‘culture of human rights,’ those who ‘were not so lucky in the circumstances of their upbringings as we were’ and who were sentimentally ‘deprived.’ (Rorty, 1993, p. 128) Education intended to provide humane sentiments ‘sufficiently acquaints people of different kinds with one
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another so that they are less tempted to think of those different from themselves as only quasi-human.’ Moral education consists in ‘manipulation’ of sentiment and aims to expanding the reference of the terms ‘our kind of people’ and ‘people like us’ by telling ‘sad stories’ about strangers. (Rorty, 1993, pp. 122–3, 133. Italics are mine) Telling sad stories may have the desired impact when the listeners are oriented, sometimes with assistance from rational reasoning, to be moved by such stories. ‘Sad stories’ of African slaves did not seem to move white slaveholders who were intimately familiar with the suffering and misery of slaves. The slaughters in the Balkans and in Rwanda took place in most cases among neighbors and fellow villagers. It was certainly not because the slaveholders, murderers, and torturers were unaware that such brutal acts would humiliate their victims, making them suffer and their relatives grieve. Indeed, inflicting emotional pain by way of torturing or threatening loved ones seems a common strategy of campaigners of terror – the Nazis, Stalinists and Maoists, and violent religious fanatics. Perhaps, though, Rorty would reply that, in these cases, the torturers and genocide executioners’ recognition of victims’ suffering was not ‘manipulated’ in such a way so as to foster shame or outrage, or to elicit awareness of common humanity; instead, it was exploited to confirm the subhuman or ‘demonic’ quality of victims. However, the very acknowledgment that the right kind of sentiments (shame or outrage) must be ‘manipulated’ for the sake of eliciting recognition of common humanity betrays an exaggeration in Rorty’s claim that nothing but sentiment motivates and legitimizes human rights and humanitarian actions. What determines which sentiments are the right (or wrong) kind? The choosing and decision-making about ‘the right kind’ of sentiments involves, it seems, more than sentiments. Still, I am willing to assume with Rorty that persons with similar moral sentiments are likely to concur in their judgments about particular moral situations and to act similarly in response. By comparison, common heritage in a tradition or membership in the same traditional community may seem to leave larger margins for individual differences in moral judgments and actions. Sentiments compel us to make certain judgments and motivate us to act in a more powerful and direct fashion. In this sense, I am willing to say that sentimentality may contribute more than tradition to causing (motivating) action, though sentimentality is hardly the only or the ultimate cause. Meanwhile, sentimentality has a weak heuristic significance for moral understanding. It provides some intelligibility and confers certain coherence as we try to explain why people judge or act the way they do.
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However, Rorty wants to go further. He grants a strong heuristic and sometimes a normative ethical significance to sentimentality – even though ‘normative significance’ is incongruent with some of his basic claims. He treats sentimentality as if it were the only cause of our judging torture wrong and our acting to forbid torture. He also sees it the sole legitimating factor of such judgments and actions. He wants us to stop searching for anything ‘beneath or beyond’ sentimentality for rational explanation or justification for these judgments and actions. When we come to sentimentality, he insists, we have come to an end to critical analysis and rational assessment. Trying to reason with torturers – to persuade them of the wrongness of their acts – is gratuitous and pointless; we must be content with the fact that they lack humane sentiments toward their victims. For him, each side in such a moral disagreement has recourse only to their sentiments: ‘It’s something I feel strongly about!’ or ‘It’s a matter of cultivated taste!’. By granting a normative significance to ‘our’ ‘culture of human rights,’ Rorty joins a circle of relativists in asserting, with William Graham Summer, that when we come to culture, or the folkways, ‘we are at the end of our analysis.’ However, Rorty’s recognition of moral sentiments’ key role in moral decision-making need not to have taken him to irrational cultural relativism.11 Berlin, for instance, acknowledged that cultural differences might be differences in ‘tastes.’ Nonetheless, he denounced cultural relativism for erroneously assuming that each culture is ‘enclosed in its own impenetrable bubble’; and, instead, he contended that, ‘[m]embers of one culture can, by the force of imaginative insight, understand … the values, the ideals, the forms of life of another culture or society. Even those remote in time or space.’ (Berlin, 1992, pp. 10–11) Rorty may not think of cultures as ‘enclosed and impenetrable’ for otherwise he would not be able to recognize that our ‘manipulated sentiments’ enables us to recognize the humaneness of members in another culture and that it is possible to supply them with humane sentiments through moral education. Yet his view of moral education as consisting in ‘manipulation of sentiment’ of those in other cultures discloses residues of a belief about cultural incommensurability. The irrational relativist would agree that, while one may switch from one cultural perspective to another (which Rorty believes can be done through manipulation of sentiments), one cannot compare and assess the perspectives. We like ours, they like theirs; but we will do what we can to convert them to ours. In an attempt to undermine irrational cultural relativism without denying differences in cultivated sentimentality, I now draw attention
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to the curious map suggested, if not intended, by Rorty of moral ‘cultures’ in the world and then examine his irrational relativist claim. On this map, we find a binary division between ‘our’ ‘culture of human rights’ and ‘others’ culture of no human rights. Such a map does not have to correspond to the geopolitical map of nations, or to a map of the world’s communities characterized by ethnicity or philosophical and religious traditions. Indeed, many people in societies (or traditional communities) other than ‘ours’ are perfectly capable of feeling outraged at human atrocities and compassion for victims. But some people in our own society are perfectly capable of being indifferent toward human suffering (perhaps because their humane sentiments have been overtaken by bigotry, resentment, and fear). Such a map of (moral) cultures is compatible with the view that cultures are interpenetrating, creolized, and unbounded by geo-political, societal, or philosophical and ideological borders. It transcends the notoriously simplistic political, philosophical, and religious dichotomies between East and West despite Rorty’s claim to the contrary. Its divides cut across geopolitical, religious, racial, and social-economic divisions, recognizing that humane sentiments are not the exclusive possession of any nation, country, or region. Thus interpreted, Rorty’s ‘culture of human rights’ would be a ‘creolized’ patchwork – a description well articulated in contemporary cultural studies. (See ‘A consensus view’, p. 9). Still, Rorty’s view that such a ‘culture’ of human rights consists of mere sentiments – not ideas, and certainly not rationalist arguments – remains problematic. I now proceed to examine his irrational relativist claims. It is conceivable that, contrary to the irrational cultural relativist claim, sentimentality does not end all rational analysis in ethical inquiry. As we have seen, Rorty rejects what he calls the ‘rationalist’ view that the ultimate ‘truth’ about human nature lies ‘beneath and beyond’ the sentiments. In Chapter 6, I will take up the issue of whether abandoning metaphysical realism about objective moral truth must inevitably leave us with moral relativism. For the time being, however, I want to consider Rorty’s claim that nothing ‘beneath and beyond’ the sentiments can be found to illuminate or validate moral judgments or actions. Note how, in staking out this position, Rorty sides with classical moral empiricists such as Hume.12 The empiricists believed that human sentimentality was malleable and could be supplied and shaped by education. (Freud may have vindicated this belief.13) Such an education supplies motives and nurtures the desire to do what is right, making use of rewards and punishments for this purpose. (If undesirable sentiments are acquired
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in early life, moral education must attempt to undo them.) For this school of thought, it is not crucial to establish whether human beings have any original or innate moral instincts or potentials for humane sentimentality. The important thing is that sentimental education can supply such sentiments if human beings are devoid of the potentials. In contrast, the rationalists Rorty argues against belong to the philosophical tradition associated with Rousseau,14 Kant,15 and J. S. Mill.16 A more recent addition might be John Rawls, though Rorty commends Rawls as one of his own brand of irrationalist pragmatists. These philosophers believe that human beings are endowed with certain ‘innate intellectual and emotional capacities,’ which can be cultivated through their ‘free development’ ‘according to their natural bent.’ (Rawls, 1971, pp. 459–62) (The psychological theory of Piaget is credited for vindicating this tradition of thought.17) The rationalists believe that human beings have a natural sympathy with fellow human beings and an innate susceptibility to the pleasures of fellow feeling. These capacities form what Rawls calls ‘the affective basis for moral sentiments,’ which can be developed into a robust sense of justice through education under appropriate social institutions. One cannot create moral sentiments out of nothing or supply sentiments from entirely outside the human being. Rather, moral sentiments are a natural outgrowth of our common humanity – the human potential for realizing our social nature. Based on this common humanity, different sentiments that ground judgments and motivate actions can be understood, compared, and assessed – for example, by considering the possibility or the extent of their divergence from what they could have been if the potentials had been fully developed.18 The dispute between these two traditions will have to be settled with assistance from findings in moral psychology, which may bring us beyond the disagreements between the Freudian and the Piagetian schools. Nonetheless, even if we set aside the question of whether human beings are endowed with certain innate intellectual and emotional potentialities, the irrationalists face a number of hurdles. Sentiments are not the only sort of things we draw upon as our ultimate source of justification as we reflect on our judgments or actions. Prudence tells us that strong passions and sentiments do not always provide the best guidance or justification for action. Meanwhile, we must factors other than sentiments, e.g. information about the situation at hand, in order to make sound judgments and take the right course of action. Our sentiments might be in excess or deficit. They might be so powerful that they overwhelm our judgment, or so listlessly weak that
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they give us unclear direction for judgment and insufficient motivation to act. Perhaps, though, sentimental education takes care of this problem by supplying human beings with the right amount or intensity of emotions. However, the decision about the ‘right intensity’ in order to produce desirable judgments and actions must involve something other than sentiments. We must have already known what sort of judgments and actions are desirable and calculated what level of intensity is just right for producing them. On the other hand, we are rather capable of being motivated by persuasive ideas or rational arguments even when we do not have sufficient sentiments. Sentiments are not the last word on the subject of understanding or validating a moral judgment. It is thus understandable why many, not just a few rationalist philosophers, might find it unsatisfying for moral inquiry to end at a catalogue of sentiments. Rorty insists that we have no choice but to end there because he thinks that we cannot understand or evaluate irrational sentiments. Do we really have no other options? Trying to reconstruct the logical structure of our queasiness at human atrocities, or trying to reason with perpetrators, might be futile. Attempting to uncover and prove to them transcendental moral ‘truth’ might likewise be pointless. Short of these objectives, however, we can subject the judgment, say, of the torturers or of their apologists to evaluative inquiries in order to determine whether it is flawed or corrupt. If it is, it is not worth taking seriously in ethical reflection. Let me explore this option below, while acknowledging that there may be other options as well. The likely factors that corrupt judgment include, as Judith Lichtenberg suggests, cognitive or epistemic errors, vested interests, defective ability to judge, and deficient sentiments.19 Deficient sentiments satisfy one sufficient condition for corruption, but adequate sentiments are insufficient for uncorruption. A judgment uncorrupted by deficient sentiments may still be corrupted by other factors. An evaluative inquiry to rule out the possibility that the judgment in question is corrupt by any of these factors is necessary. It helps us reach a preliminary assessment determining whether, e.g. the torturer’s judgment is indeed a bona fide judgment worthy of being taken seriously – whether it is worth the trouble to subject it to further evaluation. Lichtenberg proposes that we consider uncorrupted judgments as reflective of basic convictions, ‘unshakable, bedrock beliefs,’ (Lichtenberg, 1994, p. 187) which we do not normally question or
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abandon when challenged by opponents. When, for example, we are confronted by persons who disagree with our judgment disapproving torture, we do not immediately question or abandon our conviction, e.g. that ‘Human beings have certain inherent worth and dignity.’ We may wish to assure ourselves that our judgment truly reflects this conviction – that we have not, for example, condemned the practice of torture by an enemy regime mainly for political reasons. However, once we have ruled out, as much as we can, the possibility that our judgment about torture may be corrupt, we still need to subject it to further validation. We go on to reflect any hidden assumptions we may have made or check any inconsistence among our basic beliefs and so on. Beyond ascertaining that our judgment is uncorrupt by deficient sentiments, many tests for validity remain to be conducted. In challenging our opponents’ judgment approving torture, meanwhile, we also want to examine whether this judgment has been corrupted by one or more factors. Even if it passes the test for adequate sentiments, such preliminary evaluation does not end. It is subjected to tests for corruption by other factors. A corrupt judgment, however, is bad enough that we need not proceed further in attempting to validate or refute it. (Imagine, in this context, that someone judged it right to shoot what appeared to be an approaching predatory animal, only to discover that it was actually a person. In this case, we would not regard the judgment as reflective of the person’s moral conviction about not harming a fellow human being. Nor should the person, upon recognizing his error, continue to hold on to the judgment or try to defend it.)20 Thus, when we evaluate the torturers’ judgment, their inventory of sentiments (or ours) is neither the only nor the ultimate place we end our evaluation. We inspect any deficiency or absence of humane sentiments, but also the cognitive soundness of the judgment, the torturer’s capability to make judgments, and any self-serving interest involved. Even if the judgment approving torture is carefully evaluated and shown to be uncorrupted in these respects, we will still proceed to subject it to further assessment for validity. When we discover deficient sentiments in the course of this analysis, we cast aside the judgment as corrupt. We conclude that it is not a serious competitor (with the opposing judgment disapproving torture) for ethical validity. This is perhaps what Rorty meant by saying our rational inquiry came to an end. However, having ruled out that a judgment is not corrupt by deficient sentiments, we do not sufficiently establish it as uncorrupt or justified. The sentiment factor is thus not always the end to ethical inquiry.
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If the judgment approving torture is found corrupt (by any of the corrupting factors), however, we are not in a position to conclude that the difference between this and our judgment reflects opposing fundamental convictions. It is conceivable that those making this judgment may have deep (general, abstract, perhaps unarticulated) convictions that are not reflected in their corrupt judgment and, instead, are distorted by it and violated by the act of torture. Perhaps they lacked the necessary information or were deprived of the conditions under which they could have developed the capacities required for making sound judgments or for acting in accordance with their deep convictions. Consider the torture of Iraqi prisoners by US soldiers at Abu Ghraib prison outside Baghdad. If the judgment made by these soldiers (that it is permissible to torture) is found corrupt, it does not necessarily indicate any deeply held convictions by them opposing human dignity or approving human atrocity. Even if we assume that they could not imagine the humanity – the pain and humiliation – of the Iraqi prisoners (though this is unlikely for they must be able to imagine these effects all too well such that they might be convinced of the instrumentality of torture for extracting valuable military intelligence or deterring insurgents), we may still find it conceivable that, given their education in our schools and their upbringing in our liberal democratic society, where the values affirmed in our constitution are generally taught, they do not completely lack in humanist convictions. Based on their judgments and actions alone, however, we simply cannot draw any conclusion about their convictions. We need to find out more about, for instance, their personal experiences, the instructions or pressures their superiors gave, and other situational factors. Rorty is unconcerned about the possibility that a judgment corrupted by deficient sentiments does not necessarily indicate a total absence of moral conviction shared by those who make the opposing judgment. Upon discovering the difference (between presence and absence, between sufficiency and deficiency) in sentiments, ethical evaluation can still proceed. This further evaluation will not clear those who made corrupt judgments due to deficient sentiments. It helps, however, demonstrate to them and to us why their wrong is not merely a matter of ‘taste.’ They may have distorted or violated their own deep convictions. It is thus not quite the case that, if we identify absent or deficient humane sentiments as the culprit for judging torture acceptable or carrying it out, we can proceed no further in ethical reflection other than declaring our preference and taste. One thing we can proceed to inquire
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and evaluate is whether those who make such a judgment or take such actions may still agree with us about some general moral claim, of which their corrupt judgment is a breach. Perhaps they do not. It is worth finding out. Ethical analysis and evaluation thus goes on. The void of common convictions (values) among persons of different sentiments (cultures) remains unestablished. This inquiry suggests that cultivated sentiments do not have a strong heuristic or a normative ethical significance. Sentiments alone are insufficient for making – and hence do not guarantee that the moral agent will make – the right judgment, even though deficient or absent sentiments alone can result in corrupt judgments. Moreover, sentiments alone do not provide the ultimate source of justification for moral judgments.
Of community I now turn to examine the ethical significance of cultural community. In ‘cultural “community” and “tradition,” ’ (p. 19). I have derived a concept of ‘cultural community’ from the working concept of culture. A cultural community is a social context with paradoxical features, where a body of informal knowledge is transmitted and incorporated into practice. The boundaries of such a community, however, are porous; its members share a certain identity, but they are not monolithic in their moral views or motives. Furthermore, although such a community maintains some historical continuity, it also changes over time. (My discussion here focuses on cultural communities as such, though concerns about community in ethics and political thinking often extend to other types of communities.) This understanding of cultural community has important implications for assessing certain communitarian contentions. Particularly, I have in mind the claims that communally ‘embedded’ persons (a) always act out of, and (b) must act in accordance with the goals and commitments traditionally accepted and practiced in their communities.21 Some communitarians fault liberalism on the ground that its conception of the ‘self’ as autonomously choosing individual portrays a ‘disembodied’ ghost of the real-world person, thus contradicting (a), and liberalism is wrong, because of (b), to promote institutions or policies that shape such individuals. (Sandel, 1982, pp. 15–23) Communitarians accept one or both of these claims. According to those who subscribe to (a), a causal claim, persons’ judgments or actions can always be traced to their community-defined duties, loyalties, and purposes. This implies that their judgments or actions can be explained with a cause-effect certainty: knowing the
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norms accepted in a community, one identifies the cause or impetus of a member’s acts and judgments. Meanwhile, according to those who subscribe to (b), a normative claim, these acts and judgments must be evaluated against such norms. Let us first consider (a). The concept of ‘cultural community’ developed in Chapter 1 entails that the moral judgments and actions of communally ‘embodied’ persons, though influenced by their communitytransmitted norms, cannot always be exclusively traced to any shared norms in their community. In such a community, there are likely to be diverse, conflicting, critically contested, and changing norms. Members’ reflection and debates about competing norms are often influenced by ideas originated in other communities. The communitarian notion of the ‘self’ as acting out of norms accepted in a community, in which they are ‘embedded,’ is thus insensitive to the reality of diversity, the prominence of critical reflection and autonomous choice, and the interpenetration of ideas across community boundaries. If this assessment of (a) is fair, then, we can say the following about (b). Members’ judgments or actions cannot be meaningfully validated by norms found in their own community: they are likely to be considered right against some norms, but wrong against others. Because of interpenetration among communities and diversity within a community, the insistence that members’ moral decisions must be traced to and validated norms accepted or available within the community becomes trivial. Guided by such a prescription, we will not have any direction as to which of the competing and changing norms we must refer to in assessing members’ judgments and actions. These preliminary observations leave us doubtful about the kind of strong heuristic and normative ethical significance that some communitarians attribute to cultural community. Let me illustrate these observations with an imagined scenario. Consider one contemporary society, where female infant abandonment (FIA) is rather common. The communitarian who adheres to (a) and (b) would invoke the cultural community – the commitments and duties it defines – to identify the cause of and to assess the judgments involved. In so doing, he assumes (perhaps implicitly) that there exists a strong connection between what the members of a community do (FIA) and the social context in which they are acculturated – a connection sufficiently strong to provide a causal explanation of why members practice FIA. He also assumes a sort of evenness or parity among individual members of a community – evenness in the depth and durability of their ‘embeddedness’ in community-defined duties, commitments, and purposes, and,
The Ethical Significance of Culture 49
therefore, evenness in the strength of the causal connection between community norms and each instance of FIA. Any variations among individual members, in their connections to these norms, are for the communitarian unimportant or negligible. Undermining this last assumption about members’ even ‘embeddedness’ in community, I contend, is crucial for undermining the thesis about strong heuristic or normative ethical significance of cultural community. Let’s continue with our imagined scenario. If members of the cultural community had an even or invariable ‘embeddedness’ in their community-defined norms, we would then have trouble explaining why (assuming that FIA is dictated by such norms) presumably not all members of the community, other things being equal, have practiced FIA. To establish such an even ‘embeddedness,’ one must establish that the tradition in favor of FIA, transmitted in the relevant community, is overwhelmingly influential on the social learning of all members, such that they have developed the same moral outlook, hold the same conviction, are similarly motivated, and so on. One must further establish that the community remains highly effective in transmitting the tradition and sustaining the traditional way of life. One must also establish that personal experiences relevant to the making of judgments about FIA, and motives to act accordingly, vary slightly or not at all among members. In addition, one must establish that overarching political or legal institutions play little role in enabling or constricting members’ capacities to reflect upon, adhere to or reject a tradition.22 Consider a parent in our hypothetical society. Let us assume that the family leads a life under economical deprivation and political oppression. Let us also assume that this person is illiterate (though illiteracy does not prevent one from acquiring informal knowledge, which can be transmitted through oral tradition and practice). She and her spouse are heavily burdened with daily struggles for the family’s basic subsistence. They rarely go to the temple to worship, yet they have acquired certain spiritual beliefs from folk tales. The government has, let us suppose, banned any spiritual groups and, indeed, any officially unrecognized ideology or moral tradition of thought. It has recently put into effect a regulation strictly limiting the number of births for each couple to one.23 The couple in our hypothetical case had hoped to have a boy, after having had a girl. Their experiences tell them that the family farm benefits more from male than from female children. (It is the local custom that, for example, when a girl gets married, she moves in to live with her husband’s family.) Instead, the wife gives birth to another girl. The couple faces sanctions (stiff fines and trouble with authorities) for violating the policy. These and other practical
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considerations eventually weigh more heavily on our hypothetical couple than any considerations they might have the opposing FIA. In much sorrow and shame, they leave their newborn baby girl out in the street, in the dark of night, hoping someone will find her and save her life. Like this couple, persons making moral decisions generally balance competing considerations: conflicting goals, commitments to others with legitimate claims to one’s devotion, obligations attached to relationships one has with fellow community members. It is thus conceivable that in the same hypothetic community, some parents may never find compelling considerations favoring FIA, while others may have found weighty considerations supporting a clear judgment of its wrongness. Among those who found the factors favoring FIA weightier, some may be more torn and feel guiltier than others did. Such disparate judgments, decisions, and emotions can hardly be attributed to the fact that they are all affiliated with the same community. In order to explain adequately why some took the action, others did not, and yet others condemned it, one must take into account many factors other than their ties to the community. For the sake of argument, let us suppose, finally, that the state in our hypothetical example now decides to relax enforcement of its birth control policy, reform its economic system (so that hard-working, honest farmers can support their families), and allow rural migrants to work in cities (so that rural women begin earning wages in factories). Such changes in government policies, and subsequently in the social status of women, lead to changing situational factors – and these, in turn, ease the burdens upon poor parents as they attempt to resolve conflicting moral obligations and demands. If the couple in our imagined scenario no longer face the prospect of stiff fines for having more children than officially permitted; if they can afford to raise those children; and if their economic survival no longer depends on having a son, then the conditions that had made FIA seem necessary now undergo changes. A person’s status in society, in the family, in the church, and in the state – her rights and responsibilities, her treatment as an equal or inferior member – have significant impact on the way in which she processes traditional teachings, identifies with authorities and fellow community members, makes choices, or reflects on inherited customs. Such experiences as personal suffering or the victimization of friends and family members are directly relevant to how intense her compassion may be toward certain practices. Personal experiences enable and force persons to learn and think differently. The informal knowledge transmitted in her community also contains clashing, contested, and changing views. For example, the community
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may teach God’s love for all of His children, while allowing the interpretation that women are undeserving and untrustworthy and must therefore be subjected to control. (In some places, this has meant that young girls must undergo genital cutting, despite the excruciating pain and adverse health effects associated with the procedure.) Alternatively, a community may teach appreciation of women, but also decree that by nature they embody the force of Ying – always in the lower position, passive and weak, though perhaps persevering, as contrasted to the force of Yang that men embody – always in higher position, aggressive and strong. In addition, members of a community may aspire to equal freedom and rights for all human beings, but allow such rights being withheld from women or persons of color. Now, these views and practices have always faced challenges from within such communities. The very communities in these examples contain spiritual and moral resources (God’s universal love, appreciation of women, and equal rights) that opponents to these views and practices draw upon to support their alternatives. These scenarios make it difficult to designate the traditional community or membership affiliation as the cause of, or the ultimate moral justification for, members’ judgments approving certain actions. This brief explication of ideas from earlier discussions gives credentials to what seems plain. Even if persons grow up and lead their lives in the same cultural communities, they are able to form judgments with some autonomy – ideas from though they may be forced by life’s necessities and authorities to act against their judgments (and their judgments may distort their deep convictions). Their judgments are not exclusively nor predominantly determined by their ‘embeddedness’ in their communities; they always weigh circumstantial or situational factors as among the competing reasons for action, which may have been created by complex forces, including government policies, basic institutions, and power relationships, as well as by their affiliations in various communities. Membership in a cultural community does not guarantee that all members achieve the same proficiency in social learning and thus acquire the same degree of informal moral knowledge transmitted in the community. Nor does it guarantee the same depth in their acquired convictions or the same intensity in their motives to act accordingly. (There always are, in any given cultural community, the devoted, the half-hearted, the cynic, and the dissident!) Though perhaps no one is ‘disembodied’ or un-embedded in any cultural community (as communitarians have emphasized), no two persons are ‘embedded’ in exactly the same fashion. We may say that
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they achieve higher or lower dosage of acculturation. They relate to, or identify with, the same cultural community differently. Their relationships with fellow members and authoritative agencies in their community differ in strength and durability. These relationships are individualized and individualizable; there is always room for variation. Consequently, a person’s moral judgments and decisions to act are incompletely defined and underdetermined by her membership in traditional cultural community. To invoke a cultural community sensibly in explaining members’ moral judgments or actions, one must recognize and assess the nature of varying relationships members have developed with that community. This account of ‘embeddedness’ in community corroborates the view that moral decisions are shaped in an important way by situational factors created by basic political structures and government policies. It is therefore essential to design and reform institutions to ensure that they contribute to shaping desirable moral judgments and behaviors. In A Theory of Justice, particularly in Part III, Rawls argues that institutions – family, social organizations and the state – if just, shape the sense of justice of individuals who grow up and live in these institutions. It is in the context of this discussion Rawls made the claim found objectionable by communitarians: It is not our aims that primarily reveal our nature but rather the principles that we would acknowledge to govern the background conditions under which these aims are to be formed and the manner in which they are to be pursued. For the self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by it; even a dominant end must be chosen from among numerous possibilities. (Rawls, 1971, p. 560) Sandel made Rawls’ claim to the ‘self’s priority’ the main target of his scathing critique of the liberal conception of the person. Sandel finds the implied concept of the ‘self’ unrealistic, for it conceives of the self as ‘disembodied’ from the aims and goals it is given by tradition and community. (Sandel, 1982, pp. 19–23) Sandel’s ‘embedded’ account of persons, however, fails to take into account persons’ relative autonomy from their traditions and communities. This is because it fails to acknowledge the strong influence of basic institutions on situational factors that contribute to the formation and development of aims and goals.
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I have tried to assess various claims (indirectly inferred in some cases) about the ethical significance of culture. I begin with an analysis of the implications of the working concept of ‘culture’ for grasping the ethical significance of culture. I disaggregate culture into its various components or its various manifestations in order to explore, more specifically, any ethical significance of tradition, character traits, cultivated sentiments, and community in explaining and justifying moral judgments and actions. I conclude that while culture may have a weak heuristic significance in illuminating the formation of moral views or motivation of action, it does not have a strong heuristic significance in furnishing the causal explanation of such views and actions. In the next chapter, I examine culture’s normative ethical significance, i.e. its presumed capacity in providing normative justification for moral judgments or actions, as I revisit cultural relativism.
3 A Cultural Critique of Cultural Relativism
The fact of moral diversity no more compels our approval of other ways of life than the existence of cancer compels us to value ill-health. Elvin Hatch (1983, p. 68)
Case closed? Armed with the working concept of culture, identified in Chapter 1, and having tried to reach a qualified, hence more precise understanding of culture’s ethical significance in Chapter 2, I now turn to the problem concerning the normative ethical significance of culture. To recall, I have postulated that a culture has ‘normative ethical significance’ if it can provide justification for the moral judgments or actions of members in the culture. This leads me to revisit normative cultural relativism for this position assumes that culture has normative ethical significance in providing justification in the above-defined fashion. Without this assumption, the relativist would not be able to claim that the rightness of moral views and actions must be relative to (i.e. determined by) the moral agents’ own culture; and that culture must be the exclusive source, the provider of standards, of the rightness of its members’ moral views and practices. I will draw upon the critical analysis of the nature and attributes of culture in previous chapters and spell out its implications for assessing normative cultural relativism. I refer to this exercise as a ‘cultural critique’ of cultural relativism (though such a label may mislead readers to think that I try to critique relativism from the perspective of a particular culture). If the ‘Asian Values’ debate managed to shift the critiques of cultural relativism to a scrutiny of the presumptions cultural relativists make 54
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about ‘culture,’ this scrutiny remains to be carried out and its critical implications elaborated. Pursuing this sifted focus, I develop the ‘cultural critique’ of cultural relativism, as a comparison and supplement to the philosophical critiques (also to be re-examined below). For many philosophers, the verdict on relativism is sealed. Bernard Williams calls cultural relativism ‘the anthropologists’ heresy, possibly the most absurd view to have been advanced even in moral philosophy.’ (B. Williams, 1972, p. 20) Though philosophical arguments against cultural relativism have rarely been rebutted in a serious fashion by those in culture studies, they are largely dismissed because of what these scholars see as philosophers’ ignorance and neglect of culture.1 For more than a few cultural scholars, culture is by its very nature relativistic, no matter what philosophical arguments refuting cultural relativism are out there.2 Cultural relativism has thus found a rather cozy shelter in cultural studies. To drive relativism out of this shelter, philosophers must scrutinize cultural studies and their own presumptions about, and the empirical claims to, ‘culture’ and morality’s relativity to culture. Before I elaborate the ‘cultural critique’ of normative cultural relativism (NCR), let me differentiate NCR from another position, with which NCR may be confused. There are at least two types of ethical relativism: descriptive and normative.3 There are accordingly two types of cultural ethical relativism: Descriptive cultural relativism (DCR) describes morality’s relativity to the moral agents’ culture. It says that different cultures hold different moral views and ethical standards. It supports this description by citing observations that for instance, some Pakistanis hold the view that it is morally permissible to kill a woman who dishonors her family,4 but many Americans hold the view that it is morally wrong to kill anyone for such a cause and that they apply different standards to validate these different judgments. Normative cultural relativism (NCR) requires that moral judgments and standards must be considered valid or invalid only relative to the moral agent’s own culture: his or her moral views or actions ought to be considered right if they are judged right according to the standards in his or her own culture.5 The distinction between DCR and NCR is not always drawn or drawn properly in debates about cultural relativism. Thus when Herodotus heard that the Callatians ate their deceased fathers’ flesh, he marveled how their morals actually differed from those of the Greeks but he did not prescribe that such actions must only be judged according to standards found in each tribe. (Herodotus, The Histories, 1999, Book 3,
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Chapter 38) Nor did Montaigne’s comment constitute a normative prescription when he noted that we considered death the most horrible of horrible things, while others called death the only haven from the torments of this life, the sole support of our freedom, and a prompt remedy for all evils.6 Montaigne described how people actually judged death. He did not prescribe how people ought to judge or what standards they must invoke. The focus of my discussion is NCR. I will, however, briefly state what a ‘cultural critique’ of DCR would look like. A cultural critique of DCR consists in ascertaining whether it is indeed empirically accurate that members of one culture have a different judgment about, for instance, honor killing, and hold a different set of moral standards, from those in another culture; and whether these different judgments and standards are in fact mutually incomparable. For theorists concerned about the normative validity of such judgments about honor killing and the standards used in validating such judgments, DCR is of very limited interest. Simply describing that slavery is considered wrong in one culture, right in another, does not constitute an argument for or against slavery. However, one must not, as the human rights theorist Jack Donnelly has warned us, dismiss DCR too quickly, though many do, especially in political theory and philosophy. DCR, according to Donnelly, is a rather healthy outlook and deserves more attention than it has got from defenders of universal human rights.7 DCR alerts one to problems concerning the feasibility and effectiveness in implementing ethical principles. DCR challenges one to consider the question: Given cultural differences in the world, how will it be feasible and effective to motivate compliance and implement a normative ethical principle such as human rights? (In comparison, NCR poses a different type of question: Since a judgment of right or wrong can only be valid or invalid according to standards in the cultures in which they are found, should one assess such a judgment only according to the local standards?) If DCR were merely a description of cultural difference in morality, we would then not want to dismiss it. But DCR is often a description of morality’s relativity to culture. Cultural relativity is not entailed by cultural difference. If people of various cultural backgrounds differ in moral judgments, this does not mean that such judgments are only right or wrong relative to their own culture(s). What Donnelly and others human rights theorists want us to take seriously are in effect cultural differences, not relativity as they state.8 Both of these theses (about difference and relativity) can be empirically contested. For example, one
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can survey moral views and cultures and find out whether a moral view (say, moral judgment about honor killing) does indeed vary from culture to culture, and whether indeed the rightness of honor killing is relative to culture. Cultural anthropologists are yet to conduct any survey of all cultures in the world to warrant the claims that morality differs from culture to culture and that morality is relative to culture. (MoodyAdams, 1997) Moreover, the differences of moral opinions or practices from culture to culture, so commonly presumed, but not established by empirical studies, may not indicate differences in basic moral values. In order to ‘establish the claim about the radical differences in values among the world’s populations,’ as Hatch points out, cultural anthropologists would have to ‘eliminate these differences in factual belief and compare pure moral values uncontaminated by existential ideas’; yet ‘not only has this never been done, it would be most difficult, perhaps impossible’ to do. (Hatch, 1983, p. 67)
Discontents with philosophers’ critiques Before I turn to the cultural critique of normative cultural relativism (NCR), I must answer the question why I am not content with philosophical critiques of normative (moral) relativism (NR) in general. Not all the analytic arguments philosophers have offered, I contend, effectively refute NCR, at least not as effectively as they are supposed to. To make these arguments more effective, one needs to challenge NCR’s presumptions about ‘culture.’ When philosophers argue against NCR, a special type of NR, some of them fall back on the understanding of ‘culture’ once championed by the classical school of cultural thought. Bernard Williams, for instance, who is a contemporary architect of some of the most important arguments against NCR, uses ‘culture’ to refer to comprehensive ‘forms of life.’ He contends that any two cultures are ‘incommensurable’ in that they have different concepts, references, and notions of what counts as evidence, and that one could not ‘combine accepting’ both or ‘work within both of them.’ He goes on to say that the incommensurability of cultures, however, should not leave room for cultural relativism. This is because when two incommensurable cultures exclude each other, those in one culture can still ‘reject’ ideas in the other. Williams contends that, when one culture conceptualizes ritual killing as deliberate killing of innocents and the other as human sacrifice, a person in the first could still ‘reject’ the practice. He concludes that cross-cultural moral judgment and criticism are possible despite cultural incommensurability.
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For Williams, cultural incommensurability understood as mutual exclusion thus does not entail an impossibility of mutual rejection or approval. (B. Williams, 1985, pp. 157–8) This rebuttal does not seem to address NCR’s concern that, though we can criticize a practice in another culture, as we do all the time, we are likely to misunderstand the practice we criticize because the meaning of this practice to persons in another culture may have completely escaped us. Nevertheless, more relevantly for my purpose here, the implicit classic vision of cultures as ‘incommensurable,’ or systematically different and mutually exclusive, is now discredited in anthropology as a poor reconstruction of what cultures are in the real world. In spite of their distinctiveness and uniqueness, cultures are not self-enclosed, bounded, and internally homogeneous enough to be ‘incommensurable.’ This is not a trivial revelation. It means that the ‘culture’ that Williams’ rejection of cultural relativism concerns may not really exist. What Williams is rejecting – the relativity of morality to such ‘cultures’ – is something with a hypothetical existence. If one raises sufficient doubt about the claim that cultures are incommensurable, one also raises doubts that there is a problem of cultural relativity or cross-cultural evaluation in the first place. Most philosophers have focused on refuting NR, rather then NCR.9 The rationale for this focus seems to be that, if one successfully refutes the general form, then, one also refutes its specific varieties. I highlight three influential arguments refuting the general thesis of NR: the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ argument, the inconsistency argument, and the ‘generality requirement’ argument. My purpose is to show that they may not be as effective in rejecting NR, particularly NCR, as they are believed to be – that is, without also critiquing NCR’s presumptions about ‘culture.’ The ‘naturalistic fallacy’ argument This is the argument that NR involves the error that David Hume named the naturalistic fallacy, i.e. the fallacy of arguing from ‘is’ to ‘ought,’ or from observed or observable states of affairs to normative principles or general laws. This fallacy occurs when the relativists infer from observations about the ‘relativity’ of moral beliefs to society, social groups, or historical context, to the normative propositions of NR: One should judge moral beliefs using the moral agent’s own standards – found in her own society, culture, or group; and it is wrong to use an outsider’s own standards. It is fallacious, according to this argument, if one cites observed different practices, say, arranged marriage in one society and free marriage in another, to support the norm that one should not judge
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marriage practices in other societies by standards in one’s own society about what is the right way to form a union. It is also fallacious, if, from the observation that, in different societies, people make moral judgments according to local standards, one concludes with the meta-ethical proposition that this ought to be how people make ethical judgments – according to their own standards only. This is because the existence of diversity in moral views and practices does not say whether diversity must be good and ought to be preserved; similarly, the existence of diverse moral standards in different contexts does not say that one ought to use diverse local standards only. As one critic points out, ‘[t]he fact of moral diversity no more compels our approval of other ways of life than the existence of cancer compels us to value ill-health.’ (Hatch, 1983, p. 68) The ‘naturalist fallacy’ argument seems unpersuasive when applied to evaluating everyday life moral reasoning. It is easier to understand that, in the sciences, it is a problem if the law of gravity were solely based on observations that each time one throws an apple, the apple falls down. No one would trust such a law and rely on it to build a spacecraft! In everyday life, however, we are more trusting of our observations of repeated patterns. When the streets are wet in the morning, we usually assume it rained overnight, despite the possibility of bursting water pipes. Those who arrive at normative prescriptions from observations may have relied on such a commonsensical trust. They may rationalize that, if it is observed repeatedly that, when an ‘outsider’ tells locals what they should do (according to the outsider’s standards), things have not turned out well, then, one should adopt a rule of thumb to guide behaviors to the effect that one should in general refrain from judging others according to one’s own standard of rightness. This appeal of the inferences used in the ordinary discourse of everyday morality, which strictly speaking involves the naturalistic fallacy, makes ‘naturalistic fallacy’ objection to NR unpersuasive. The ‘naturalist fallacy’ argument, when applied to rejecting NCR, may seem even less persuasive. In a moral culture – a body of informal moral knowledge inherited in history, embodied in tradition, integrated in customs and practices, and transmitted in communities – moral rules and principles are learnt from lived social experiences. Moral learning and ethical reflection in a culture are to this extent historically contingent on persons’ experiences and conditions in the particular communities. We also learn about how to judge moral views and behaviors in different cultures from our experiences in making such judgments. We may judge wearing the headscarf in another culture ‘degrading’ to women, but then
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learning is that some locals find our judgment offensive, and that undergoing breast implant in our own culture may seem to them ‘degrading’. Such experiences tell us to take caution in judging different practices before we understand the circumstances and symbolism enough to make sensitive and precise judgments. We learn that what degrades women may not be what they do – wearing headscarf, undergoing breast implant, etc. – but what limits their choices and forces them to do things harmful to their health or safety. We may learn that, at this deeper level, our own culture may have not progressed as far as we thought or much father than other cultures in the treatment of women. To the extent this process of moral learning through observations and experiences is the case, the argument that the inference underlying NCR involves the naturalistic fallacy seems less effective in refuting NCR than generally believed. If we are to specify any ethical rules governing judgment-making about moral decisions by persons in other cultures, we may only have our experiences as the relatively more reliable sources of guidance. It is from these experiences that we generalize and revise rules. Abandoning this approach, for fear of the naturalist fallacy (and other cognitive errors) it may involve, we deprive ourselves one useful method of learning about how to judge views and practices in other cultures. (Leaning or identifying moral norms seems to proceed from generalizing in ways that involve this fallacy. Consider the simple reasoning a child may make: If each time I hit a playmate, I hurt her (or him), then, I must stop hitting any playmate.) Stopping making inferences involving such a fallacy would leave us impoverished in our tools for moral learning and ethical norm-setting. This line of thinking, which does not deny the charge of naturalist fallacy, rather, demonstrates that its rejection of NCR is not as effective as it is believed to be. To enhance effectiveness, one must question the empirical claim that moral views and standards are ‘relative’ to culture – that they vary from culture to culture and are applicable only to the culture of their origin. The crucial premise of the inference from observations of cultural ‘relativity’ to NCR will be seriously undermined if it is shown that such observations are inaccurate or mistaken – that such observations are contradicted by observations that similar moral judgments are found in different cultures or that the same culture contains conflicting moral judgments. This approach is suggested by what I refer to as ‘the cultural critique’ of NCR. The self-inconsistency argument Philosophers have also found fault with an inconsistency involved in making NR a general rule or demanding general adhering to NR. NR prescribes (1) ‘Never judge someone else’s views according to standards
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of one’s own’ and (2) ‘Judge others’ views according to their own standards only.’ (1) and (2) state the relativist’s own standards. By stating (1) and (2) as general rules and demanding everybody to act according to (1) and (2), the relativist applies standards of her own to judging ‘others.’ This contradicts (1) and (2).10 This inconsistence can be illustrated with the examples of beating a child in order to teach him a lesson about never beating others as a way to settle disputes; or of government censoring expressions of a group for its censorship on its own members’ expressions. NR as a meta-ethical standard is prescribed for everyone who might or is able to judge others, whether or not she belongs to a group that has adopted such a standard. This meta-ethical standard itself does not respect any boundaries between ‘us’ (the relativists) and ‘others’ (non-relativists). When the relativist applies this standard to judging non-relativists, she is making a judgment about ‘others’ according to her own standard. She is also making an exception to the standard that she has accepted as her own. Consider an American postmodern relativist who has accepted, or belongs to a group that has accepted NR. Now, our postmodernist judges according to NR that it is wrong for the liberal cosmopolitans, in fact for any Americans, to judge, according to their own standards, that honor killing in Pakistan or Palestine is wrong. According to this analytic critique of NR, this American postmodernist contradicts herself. Now, suppose the relativist responds by revising her proposition (1) to the effect of (1⬘): ‘Never judge others according to one’s own standards, except when one’s own standard is the one laid out here, in this prescription.’ Accordingly, one revises (2) to (2⬘): ‘Judge others’ views according to their own standards, except in judging the behavior of judging others, where the standard laid out here applies.’ This may help get rid of an apparent self-contradiction. However, as critics point out (Teson, 1985), the relativist needs to give a substantive argument for the provision of exceptions included in (1⬘) and (2⬘) in order to avoid arbitrariness. The relativist may reply to this demand by pointing out that it is not unheard of that general standards include exceptions. Consider, ‘Never restrict freedom of the press except under conditions of war and national security.’ However, the specific exceptions laid out in such a principle are presumably accounted for and given reasons independently of the principle itself – e.g. national security is a good for all citizens, or winning a particular war is important for securing freedom of the press and other freedoms in the long run, or restricting the press can save lives during war and so on. There is yet to be an account, independent of (1⬘) and (2⬘), to defend the exceptions specified by them.
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One way to avoid arbitrary exception is to further restrict (1⬘) to (1⬘⬘): Those in my own group (in which NR is accepted) should never judge morality in other groups (including non-relativists) according to our own standards as laid out here. Now, (1⬘⬘) does not involve the troubling self-inconsistency and it does not make any arbitrary exception to itself. The relativist who judges it wrong for members of her own group to judge non-members according (1⬘⬘) is not contradicting (1⬘⬘). One price she pays, however, is a significant restriction on (1⬘⬘)’s scope of applicability. (1⬘⬘) does not apply to anyone outside the group consisted of relativists. It does not govern anyone else’s judgment making about others (including the relativists). For an effective rejection of (1) and (2) and (1⬘) as well as (1⬘⬘), one must challenge their presumptions about the ‘other,’ particularly the ‘cultural other’. These positions prescribe that those in our own culture (in which certain moral standards are accepted) should never judge morality in other cultures according to our own standards. This statement can be effectively rejected by challenging its presumptions about the solid divides between ‘our’ and ‘others’ ‘cultures,’ and about cultures’ fixed and air-tight boundaries. Such challenges should raise sufficient doubt as to whether these positions have any application in the real world. By requiring members of our own cultural community not to judge outsiders according to our own cultural standards, we must be able to tell apart our members from ‘outsiders.’ We must assume that there are clear borders between our own culture and others’ cultures. We must also assume that a certain standard is uniquely that of one’s own culture, not shared with any other cultures, and that all members in one’s own culture share this standard. These are, as it is obvious to us now, implausible assumptions. The generality requirement argument This argument faults relativists for mistaking ethical propositions for non-ethical propositions – propositions that do not involve judging what is the right thing to do or how one ought to live. Critics point out that ethical propositions are by nature general or universalistic. As Bernard Williams puts it, The fact that people can and must react when they are confronted with another culture, and do so by applying their existing notions – also by reflecting on them – seems to show that the ethical thought of a given culture can always stretch beyond its boundaries. … Each
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outlook may still be making claims it intends to apply to the whole world, not just to that part of it which is its ‘own’ world. (B. Williams, 1985, p. 159) This remark confirms that anyone who makes moral judgments is also always making general (normative) claims intended to apply universally. A claim about what is right is a claim about what is right for anyone, anywhere, in similar moral situations. For instance, the proposition that it is permissible to lie to a killer looking for one’s friend applies to anyone in similar situations that may be found in any societies or cultures. When one makes a moral claim, one is making it universally binding not only on others but also on oneself, not only in one’s own culture or society, but also beyond. (Teson, 1985, pp. 137–8) Consider propositions such as ‘It is not wrong for me to steal from my neighbors but it is wrong for them to steal from me,’ ‘Telling lies is bad except when I do it.’ Such propositions are ruled out as proper moral propositions because they cannot be generalized. They have a private dimension. Their being known publicly by others would make them unrealizable (in the case of stealing) or self-defeating (telling lies). Also consider: ‘I want everybody to act always according to my desires,’ ‘I should have possession of Mr. Gates’ wealth,’ or ‘All persons with green eyes are allowed to walk only on the left side of Manhattan streets.’ These are not moral propositions either. They express personal (partial) preferences, which the persons who make them have no particular reason to expect everybody to accept. Thus, ‘the generalization principle is involved in or presupposed by every genuine moral judgment, for it is an essential part of … [any] distinctively moral terms.’ (M. G. Singer, 1961, p. 34)11 This characterization of moral propositions seems plausible. The Confucian moral teaching that one has a duty to be benevolent is universalistic in that it is about the desirability that everyone love and have compassion for people ‘within the four seas’ – not just one’s own kin or fellow subjects in the kingdom. The Confucian virtue of benevolence (ren, which also means love and care between any two persons) thus has a global outlook. Sometimes a moral claim may specify that it only governs particular persons of certain identity or capacity. For example, the Confucian moral rules tend to state that it is good or right for all who have certain social identities (women or men, laborers and scholars, or kings and subjects) or capacities (teaching, advising the king, or raising children) to behave in such and such ways. But even such claims have a general and universalizable outlook. They apply to those with such identities or capacities in any societies or cultures. When the
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Taliban proclaimed that it was immoral to fly a kite in Afghanistan, they did not mean that it was morally permissible to fly a kite elsewhere: They disapproved of flying kites in neighboring Pakistan or in Mary Popping’s England. They would like to ban it in these places if only their power could reach. Those Muslims who believe it is decadent for women to wear miniskirts believe it is decadent for women everywhere to do so – though they may only have power to enforce a ban on miniskirts in places where they are in control. This criticism is essentially that the relativist is mistaken about the nature of moral judgment when she demands that one should never make universalistic judgment across societal or cultural or historical contexts. James Rachels points out that, due to this mistake, relativists are unable to make moral criticisms of past wrong (slavery in American South) and wrongs in other places (Nazi Germany). (Rachels, 1999) This point may have force in exposing the relativist’s insincerity or hypocrisy – if she had claimed to be able to criticize such wrongs. For Rachels and other critics of relativism, it is important to be able to criticize moral wrongs in other places and at other times. But this importance is not necessarily recognized by relativists. They are likely to reply to this rejection by clarifying that their point is precisely that no one is able to make such criticisms due to incommensurability of moral standards. They may be proud of themselves for following the logic of this impossibility and accepting its bitter consequences – our inability to judge moral wrongs in other places and at other times, or in other cultures. To point out these consequences thus does not seem to effectively reject normative relativism. To enhance this argument’s effectiveness in refuting NCR, one must challenge NCR’s presumptions about, ‘other cultures’, as impenetrable and incommensurable, such that it is impossible to apply any general standards to judging moral behaviors across their boundaries. One must undermine NCR’s insistence on the impossibility to comprehend and evaluate moral views, to formulate general moral propositions, crosscultural boundaries. This is to challenge NCR not on the ground that it does not allow criticisms of past wrongs or wrongs elsewhere, but on the ground that it is mistaken about the nature and attributes of cultural boundaries when it laments the impossibility of making such criticisms.
The cultural critique I now sum up the cultural critique of NCR. (In the section that follows this one I will attend to the cultural critique of a special type of
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NCR – irrationalist NCR.) The cultural critiques state that, according to the working concept of ‘culture’ as a body of informal knowledge with what I refer to as the ‘paradoxical’ features (in Chapter 1), one cannot insist that the rightness of moral judgments (such as those approving of, for example, honor killing or punishing women deemed adulterous by stoning to death), is relative to the local culture. The cultural standards of moral rightness are likely to be locally contested and changing over time. In addition, one cannot plausibly prescribe that the rightness of moral judgments should be decided by standard found in the local culture only. If there cannot be any agreed upon local standard in a culture and a local standard may also be non-local, such a prescription would demand that, it seems, we should do what cannot be done – to employ local standards only. Let me elaborate. First, let me state NCR more precisely. NCR is the prescriptive (normative) proposition that it is wrong to judge moral beliefs and practices in other cultures according to one’s own standards, or on the flip side, one should only use standards from the moral agent’s culture, if possible, to judge his or her moral beliefs and practices. This proposition is sometimes supported by following inference: ‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ (if one prescribes that one ought to do X, one must assume that one can do X; however, if one cannot possibly do X, then, it is fallacious to prescribe that one ought to do X); if there cannot be any trans-cultural standards and nothing can possibly be trans-culturally right or wrong, then one should not use (or search for) such standards; and since there are only local cultural standards, then one ought to judge moral agents’ views or actions only by their local cultural standards only. Laying out this inference allows us to challenge its premises, e.g. its assumptions about the impossibility of trans-cultural standards and the incommensurability of standards found in cultures. If these assumptions are invalid, that is, if there can be trans-cultural moral standards, then the argument for NCR (on the bases of these assumptions) is undercut. (However, the validity of NCR does not depend on the (empirical) validity of DCR. Rather, even if DCR is un-confirmed on empirical grounds, NCR can still be plausible. If Gold Mountains have not been confirmed to exist, one can still make normative propositions prescribing what one ought to do or not do with regard to Gold Mountains. If internally homogenous, unchanging, and self-enclosed, hence incommensurable cultures are not found to exist, one can still prescribe what one ought to do or not to do with regard to such cultures. But such a prescription would apply to an empty set of behaviors unless one can prove that Gold Mountains or cultures as such do exist. Similarly, if no one would
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ever be a complete ‘outsider’ to any given culture, due to the fluidity of cultural boundaries, and if one’s standards or judgments are likely to be shared by some members in another culture, then the rules governing ‘outsiders’ would have no applicable scenario. (Crocker, 1991) Consider the disputes over honor killing in the local cultural community in Pakistan among perpetrators and victims (with supporters on each side). Here, each group is in solidarity with ‘outsiders’ (victims with women’s advocacy groups in Karachi or abroad and the Pakistani government law enforcement, international rights agencies, while perpetrators with sympathizers of honor killing in other places). Each group would not hesitate to use standards to support their positions even if such standards are also found elsewhere. To insist that one should apply only local cultural standards to judge honor killing, as NCR does, is in effect to insist that one either takes sides with one of the opposing local camps – with their judgments and standards, or simultaneously judges honor killing both right and wrong by accepting all local, conflicting, standards. In the event that some of the competing local standards (for example, a standard implicit in the view that women’s lives are less important than family honor) are also found in a non-local ‘outsider’s’ own culture, if one follows what NCR prescribes, the outsider faces a dilemma: If she applies such standards to judging honor killing, she applies her own culture’s standards; if she refrains from applying them, she is selectively not applying certain local standards, but not others. NCR assumes that a culture’s boundaries can always be clearly drawn such that there should not be any ambiguity as to the cultural identity of the moral agent or of the standard used to judge the agent’s position. This assumption is challenged by the working concept of culture, which contends that there are possibly competing or conflicting standards in a culture and a culture is likely interconnected to other cultures. Some members of a culture may have multiple memberships in other cultures. And certain standards may have been developed and socially transmitted in more than one culture. The ambiguity of the cultural identities of moral agents and moral standards makes it difficult to apply NCR to judging the ways in which persons make moral judgments about each other. First, it may be difficult to identify the cultural standard since one may be presented with a host of competing standards in a culture. For example, there are conflicting standards for judging abortion in what one may refer to as American culture. Second, one may not be able to identify one particular culture as a moral agent’s own. A moral agent is likely to have been acculturated in
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or become affiliated with multiple cultures. Consider, in the case of judging abortion, for example, the multiple cultural affiliations of a liberal feminist Catholic doctor. Consequently, an ‘outsider’ may not be able to apply only those standards that are exclusively of the moral agent’s own, since any standards the ‘outsider’ identifies are likely to be found in other cultures as well. Consider, for instance, the standards judging honor killing in the Pakistani villages, where such a custom was recently found to be practiced. Such standards are local, yet ‘foreign,’ since they are also found, for instance, in the West Bank and many other countries.12 When a moral position, X, is judged both right and wrong according to conflicting ‘local’ standards in a culture, the rightness or wrongness of X then is not particularly relative to that culture. To establish that moral judgments and standards are relative to culture, one must establish that whenever moral judgments and standards vary, it must be that the cultures in which they are found have varied; and whenever moral judgments and standards remain the same, it must be that they exist in the same culture. Let’s call this the thesis of cultural relativity. It essentially contends that the variations in judgments and standards correspond to variation in culture. Given that a culture may contain conflicting judgments or standards, their variations do not correspond to any variation in culture. Also, given that two cultures may contain the same standards, and that their members may make similar judgments, the variation in culture in such a case does not correspond to variations in standards and judgments. These cases seriously undermine the thesis of cultural relativity. Such critiques of ‘culture’ as it is presumed in normative cultural relativism effectively dissolve the so-called problems of moral relativity to culture. In other words, at least in the scenarios we have considered, there is no genuine problem of cultural relativity, though there are problems with cultural misunderstanding and insensitivity toward differences between cultures but also within a culture. Now, suppose the normative cultural relativist responds by making certain concession but still trying to hold on to the thesis of relativity. He may, for instance, admit intra-cultural diversity and inter-cultural connectedness and then adjust NCR to the effect of NCR-1: It is wrong to judge moral views or practices in a culture according to any outsider’s standards, and one should only apply standards in the moral agent’s own culture, even if these are internally disputed or externally shared with other cultures.
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NCR-1 departs from NCR by abandoning the position that the only acceptable standard is exclusively found and uniformly shared in the moral agent’s own culture. According to NCR-1, it is permissible to use standards that are disputed in the local culture or shared by some people in other cultures. However, we may respond to NCR-1 by pointing out that the admission of culture’s internal heterogeneity and inter-culture commensurability practically means abandoning morality’s relativity to culture altogether. NCR-1 is no longer a thesis about moral relativity to culture since it no longer insists on a correspondence between a variation in morality and one in culture. Rather, NCR-1 is about local particularity. It prescribes that the particular local standards must be used even though these are shared elsewhere and disputed locally. Alternatively, the relativist may respond to these cultural critiques by insisting that the relativity thesis can still apply to any culture that is bounded and homogenous, no matter how small such a culture may be. Thus, one can conceive those who agree about the rightness of honor killing as members of a bounded and homogenous culture, although the local tribe, village, or the Pakistan society or a region may not have a unified culture due to their internal disagreements about this practice. According to this view, those who do not approve of this practice, whatever their social, religious, or national identities are, simply do not belong to the same ‘culture’ as those who approve of it. She may then contend that morality’s relativity to culture is salvaged since, wherever moral disagreement occurs, different ‘cultures’ or sub-cultures would form. Those in each of the disagreeing camps would become members of separate cultures or sub-cultures. This response grants exit, a kind of cultural secession, to those who do not accept a moral position (approval of honor killing, e.g.) of fellow members of their group. The boundaries around the new group are supposedly unambiguous and the make-up of the group, as far as its position on the particular moral issue (concerning honor killing in this case) is homogenous. This response allows the possibility that a ‘culture’ consists in a very small group of like-minded individuals or even simply one solitary individual, who agrees about a single moral issue. And it allows dividing up any group into ‘cultures’ along the lines of their disagreements over various moral issues. Thus, for example, those who agree in their judgment about honor killing but disagree in their judgment about widow burning would have to be seen as divided, again, into different ‘cultures.’ This response may save these of culture’s internal monolith and differences in morality from culture to culture, hence
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the thesis of morality’s relativity to culture. However, culture is in this way understood as a morally like-minded group or an individual, whose cultural affiliation would re-shift each time they disagree with each other. This is a bizarre way of picturing cultures in the world. Cultural relativism, moreover, seems to collapse into its extreme form – individual relativism or solipsism: Each according to her standards. Still, one may find that this line of cultural critiques does not constitute a rejection of the normative propositions of NCR. Rather, it merely demonstrates NCR’s unrealistic or faulty presumptions about culture – especially its classic vision of culture as an internally homogeneous, self-enclosed, and static entity. One can, of course, go on to prescribe behavioral rules governing how we ought to assess moral views found in such ‘cultures’ even though ‘cultures’ as such may not exist. NCR as a prescriptive norm may indeed survive this critique. However, it may have little application in the real world – just as prescriptive norms governing how we ought to treat ‘gold mountains’ (preserving or depleting them, e.g.) would have little application in a world where gold mountains do not exist. In our world of ‘creolized,’ hybrid, evolving and clashing cultures, it remains the case that it is hardly possible to identify which culture(s) exactly the rightness or wrongness of a moral agent’s judgment is relative to.
Case against irrational cultural relativism As discussed in some length in Chapter 2, ‘irrational’ cultural relativism, as it is advocated by Rorty,13 is the position that what divides human rights believers from non-believers is not their rational ideas, but their ‘cultures,’ which Rorty refers to as sets of incommensurbale sentiments defying rational analysis. Ethical evaluation of moral views or actions comes to the end, Rorty says, when its digging hits the impasse formed by sentiments. Rorty contends that one cannot and should not dig any further for rationalist justifications beneath or below sentiments. This position is one special instance of NCR – the irrationalist version. Rorty’s brand of the irrationalist version, distinctive in its view of ‘culture’ as cultivated sentiments, can be formulated as follows: Moral agents’ views and standards must be considered valid only relative to their culturally inculcated sentimentality. They should be considered right if they correspond to what these agents’ sentiments demand or motivate. It is thus wrong to judge others’ moral beliefs and practices according to one’s sentimentally grounded moral standards, or, on the flip side, one should only use
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others’ own sentimentally grounded standards to judge their moral beliefs and practices. Does the cultural critique work effectively in undermining this irrationalist version of NCR? Such a cultural critique would scrutinize its presumptions about ‘culture.’ Let me then lay bare some of these presumptions. Rorty contends that a culture is reducible to cultivated sentimentality and the ‘human rights culture’ is reducible to historically contingently cultivated humane sentimentality. Such sentimentality refers to sentiments such as revulsion and indignation against human atrocities, compassion for victims, etc. Such sentiments motivate people to adopt human rights and they provide the final justification for human rights. Those who oppose human rights lack such humane sentimentality. The justification for ‘our’ beliefs in human rights, in the final analysis, can only be our strong feelings – not any rationalist recognition of human nature or transcendental law of nature. These assumptions about ‘culture’ or ‘culture of human rights’ in particular can be assessed by examining, first, whether the support that human rights draw from culture(s) is reducible to sentiments, and second, whether culturally developed sentimentality alone suffices in motivating human rights actions and generating support for the belief in human rights. The first question can be reformulated as the follows: Can the motives that people have acquired to act on the idea of human rights and the support that has been generated for this idea be reduced to sentiments? It is very difficult to reduce motives to act in accordance with moral principles to the narrow and indeed single source – sentiments. This is because religious convictions or ideological beliefs, once adopted, can also shape moral motives and generate support for relevant moral principles.14 It is conceivable, that certain humane sentiments may not be necessary for the moral agents to act in accordance with requirements of a moral vision, such as that of human rights. Rorty’s view of moral agents’ sentiments – their adequacy or inadequacy, presence or absence – as the only measure of their culture’s compatibleness with or capacity to support human rights, offers a poor account of these resources that human rights can draw upon and of the complex ways in which moral motives can be shaped. Meanwhile, in what Rorty might refer to as ‘a culture of anti-human rights’ or ‘a culture of absent human rights’ found in places where human atrocities, inhumane, cruel, and degrading treatments of fellow human beings take place, it is conceivable that these conditions are not
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necessarily due to the absence or insufficiency of humane sentiments among the people, or due to the local culture’s inability to cultivate such sentiments. Some of these people may be just as sickened by the atrocities, or just as compassionate for the victims, as those in the ‘culture of human rights.’ But they may have to suppress such sentiments. Some may rationalize, quite against their sentiments, that such atrocities are unavoidable tragic sacrifices for achieving some greater good. As one observer of the Rwanda genocide in 1994, which claimed 800,000 lives, comments, people in Rwanda ‘don’t do these things just because they can’t control their primordial instincts’ – ‘because [the Rwanda genocide] didn’t happen with weapons of mass destruction but with machetes, doesn’t mean it happened without a policy’ or rationale.15 Somehow, an absence of humane sentiments or abundance of inhumane (beastly ‘primordial’) feelings just do not do the job in explaining what happened. The second thing one can do to contest irrational NCR’s assumptions about ‘culture’ is to scrutinize whether culturally developed sentimentality alone suffices in motivating human rights actions and generating support for human rights. Imagine two groups characterized by distinctive sentiments – one with shared revulsion and outrage against human atrocities and compassion for victims, the other with indifference at others’ suffering and a lack of compassion for victims. In the arm-chair fashion of philosophical speculation (in the absence of interviews or surveys or historical research), one can speculate, guided by commonsense, that not all members in the first group would support human rights, nor would everyone in the second oppose it. In the first group, members are likely to have competing ideas about what social–political reforms and institutional arrangements are optimal for eradicating what outrages them or protecting those for whose sufferings they feel compassion. And their options for action are limited by their circumstances, including existing social-political institutions and historical experiences. Those who are outraged by brutal rulers, violence, massacres, and deprivation may find violent rebellion or bloody revenge the justified or more realistic options than the legalist institutional approach of human rights. This is because human rights are one particular kind of reaction to and a calculated approach to ending human atrocities. As a moral regime, it requires highly disciplined, coordinated, and deliberative responses through generally non-violent processes, for example, procedural justice for suspects of perpetrators, to end the cycle of violence and atrocity. This may be why human rights only become a growing social conscience and moral ideal for social reform in the last
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couple of centuries though there had been a long history of human atrocities and passionate social reform to eradicate human sufferings. The differences in sentiments between these two imagined and groups may not always be cultural or socially acquired, historically inherited, and traditionally embodied. Such differences may occur between members of the same culture, who have inherited the same spiritual or intellectual traditions, who even go to the same churches, who are raised in the same process of social learning, and who have suffered from the same economic hardships or injustices. The point is that opposite sentimentalities may characterize two distinctive cultural groups, but they may also characterize intra-cultural sub-groups. Thus, even if it were the case that members of one group had supported human rights, and those of the other had not, this would not entail that sentiments (their presence in one and absence in the other) alone had made the difference. These rather sketchy critiques of the ‘culture’ presumed by irrationalist NCR, its sentimentalist variety particularly, may not amount to a refutation of its normative theses. However, they demonstrate that morality (moral support for human rights in particular) does not vary relative to sentimentality – the adequacy or inadequacy, presence or absence of humane sentiments in particular. These critiques, in need of development and elaboration which I am unable to pursue here, should undermine the conceivability and plausibility of moral relativity to cultivated sentimentality. They should suffice to dissolve the so-called problem of morality’s relativity to sentimentality. In this chapter, to summarize, I have tried to explicate some of the implications of the working concept of culture for evaluating the normative position of ethical cultural relativism. I contend that there is hardly a genuine problem of morality’s relativity to culture. Cultures have porous and shifting boundaries and they are interpenetrable, internally heterogeneous, and changing over time. I explain how this understanding of culture decisively undermines the case for normative cultural relativism.
Part II Transcending Dichotomies
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4 Destructive of Cultural Community?
People and groups have a generic right to realize their capacity for culture … American Anthropological Association1 For a Muslim country, as for all complex state societies, the most pressing human rights issue is not local cultural preferences or religious-cultural authenticity; it is the protection of individuals from a state that violates human rights, regardless of its cultural-ideological façade. Reza Afshari (1994, p. 249) The debate on the universality of human rights – how and why it is plausible in a world immersed in diverse cultures – has joined the ethical concerns (1) about the role and significance of culture in moral judgment making and norm-setting (as addressed in Part I) and (2) about the possibility of validating the universal value claims inherent in human rights (to be addressed in Part III). In this part of the book, I begin explicating the implications of the analyses and clarifications in Part I for this debate. Particularly, I spell out what they entail about the received ‘culture vs. human rights’ dichotomy, which has framed the debate for the most part. I argue that such a frame seriously distorted the complex relationships between diverse cultures and the universalist vision of human rights. I also undercut two of its supporting dichotomies, the ‘individualistic (civil–political) rights vs. collective (cultural–social– economic) rights’ dichotomy (in Chapter 4) and the ‘monist/intolerant human rights vs. tolerant cultural pluralism’ dichotomy (in Chapter 5). In challenging the notion that civil–political rights are individualistic while the other rights are collectivist in this chapter, I underpin an 75
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argument against the communitarian objections that human rights are destructive of cultural communities. I will thus makes the first case demonstrating that ‘culture vs. human rights’ is a false dichotomy. In the first section of this chapter, I examine five conceptions of ‘collective rights’: ‘socially collaborated rights,’ ‘non-excludable rights,’ ‘communally constituted rights,’ ‘associational prerequisite rights,’ and ‘special membership rights.’ I argue that none of these, except the last one, can define ‘collective rights’ as sufficiently distinct from classic civil–political liberty rights. ‘Cultural rights’ understood as ‘collective rights,’ i.e. ‘special membership rights,’ I argue, are compatible with and integral to human rights. Certain exclusive membership privileges may be crucial to the survival and flourishing of communities in which certain mechanisms of safeguards for life and basic human securities are developed and sustained. However, every human being can claim such privileges universally. Moreover, certain civil-political liberty rights are indispensable for the survival and flourishing of cultural communities.
The collapse of ‘individual vs. collective’ In December 1996, after tense negotiations, government and insurgent forces in Guatemala approved a UN-brokered peace agreement ending a thirty-year armed conflict.2 This is an example of rebels fighting in the name of, or with the genuine conviction of defending, the interests of marginalized indigenous population could be persuaded to resort to legalistic strategies seeking political representation and socio-economic participation.3 Women in rural Turkey and in Zinacantan, Mexico, used the legal norms and language of international women’s rights to contest local discrimination.4 The global network of practitioners and supporters of the persecuted Buddhist sect Falun Gong have used US and European courts to seek accountability and punish Chinese officials for the ongoing crackdown and the torture of many followers of the sect.5 The rights of indigenous, ethnic, minority or cultural groups have gained prominent attention since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948. In spite of its initially exclusive drafting process, its international human rights framework has seemed of particular appeal to these groups. (Kothari and Sethi, 1989; Muzaffar, 1993, 2002) They have utilized human rights to voice concerns for marginalization, demand justice, and empower themselves. They have taken to employ the emerging international legalistic instruments and sought participation in the norm-setting and implementation
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process. They have formed ‘curious grapevines,’6 networks of local nongovernmental forces that have generated grassroots support for human rights, pushed for effective enforcement, including international legal institution-building, to hold powerful state and multinational parties accountable for abuses. The language and institutions of human rights have made all this possible. Yet these too have evolved since, toward embracing the rights to culture and the rights of indigenous peoples.7 Nevertheless human rights have been denigrated as individualistic. Critics claim that as they ignore the cultural ‘embeddedness’ of persons in traditional communities and undermine indigenous ways of life. This critique has merited differentiated responses. First, if human rights were essentially individualistic, they would have had little appeal to cultural or indigenous groups. Traditional communities would not have appealed to classic civil–political rights for they would find these rights undermining locally crafted safeguards or their legalism is so alien and objectionable from their perspectives. Secondly, if rights to culture and indigenous way of life, granted to groups and communities under the international human rights regime, are an integral part of such a regime, one needs to give an account of these rights as human rights (i.e. rights of human beings).8 To verify these responses, one must re-examine the claim that human rights are individualistic. International recognition of collective human rights, hailed as an important and necessary addition to classic human rights (hence ‘third,’ generation of human rights following classic liberal and then, cultural, social and economic rights9), sharpened the debate over the relation between individual versus collective human rights. If individual rights are rights of human beings taken one by one and collective rights are rights of human beings en masse, there needs to be a coherent account of the identity of the human agency, particularly of how individual and collective agencies relate to each other and how to resolve potential conflicts between them or between the two kinds of human rights. (Wallerstein, 1995) The expansion of human rights to include rights to culture and rights of indigenous peoples, some argue, undermines the principle of protecting the life and dignity of human beings, particularly those whose rights and interests may be overridden by their communities’ exercises of collective rights. In international conventions, most of the so-called ‘third generation rights’ are granted both to each and every human being and sometimes
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to whole peoples.10 This ambiguity hinders efforts clarifying who exactly bear these rights – members of the relevant groups taken one by one, or the groups as whole collectivities – and, if the latter, who can properly represent any such collectivity. It is unclear whether the international framework recognizes individual rights as more important than collective rights where these two sets conflict. Nor has the framework explained how a collective right by membership only, which excludes non-members, can be coherently understood as a universal equal right. Let us scrutinize the dichotomy between individual and collective rights. To clarify ‘individual’ and ‘collective’ rights, we can begin by exclusion. We can first exclude the use of ‘collective right’ to mean state sovereign right. A violation of a sovereign right does not necessarily entail the violation of the rights of its citizens. A state’s sovereign right can be exercised at the expense of its individual citizens’ rights particularly in the case of non-democratic states. For comparison, the violation of other group rights, such as women’s rights, is a violation, at least potentially, of the rights of each woman. It is also difficult to consider state sovereign rights as human rights since they are not possessed or exercised by any human agency, but rather by the state as a territorially bound administrative and political machine, although persons may have the authority to exercise sovereign rights (kings, emperors, or leaders of a state). If ‘collective’ or ‘group’ rights are understood as sovereign rights, then, in the case of non-representative sovereign states, such rights are inherently incompatible with human rights as rights of human agencies. This explains why I proceed without considering sovereign rights ‘collective’ human rights. However, there are at least five common uses of ‘collective rights,’ including ‘socially collaborated rights,’ ‘nonexcludable rights,’ ‘communally constituted rights,’ ‘associational prerequisite rights,’ and ‘special membership rights.’ The purpose of examining these is to ascertain if and how they might give plausible meaning to ‘collective rights’ as human rights, while reasonably differentiating such rights from ‘individual’ human rights. ‘Collective rights’ as ‘socially collaborated rights’ ‘Collective rights’ is often used to refer to rights that can be implemented only through social cooperation and coordinated efforts. I refer to these rights as socially collaborated rights. However, in this conception, not only the third generation rights, but also many of the first and second generations of rights are collective. They all demand social cooperation and coordinated efforts in the relevant society and communities in
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order to achieve their effective protection. If socially uncooperative individuals pursuing their own interest are said to undermine any prospects for peace, a clean and sustainable environment, development, or viable and flourishing cultural or indigenous communities, the same can be said about the prospect of achieving the classic liberal rights: the lack of social cooperation undermines any prospect for protecting, e.g. the rights to conscience or expression or political participation. The political right to self-government and equal participation can only be guaranteed and meaningfully exercised if social and economic arrangements can be supported by citizens as just through their social cooperation, and if civic virtues can be fostered and sustained in social institutions – family, voluntary associations, schools, and churches. The development and consolidation of liberal democratic governance require, in the most part, positive, proactive, and collaborated actions. Un-coordinated individual pursuits of their separate interest can lead to all sorts of collective action problems and undermine a functional democracy.11 That the costly procedural safeguards of individuals from being arbitrarily detained or wrongfully jailed or sentenced to death in the US, for example, demonstrate their demand for social cooperation and public support. More generally, as Jeremy Waldron put it, The right to vote, to hold public officials accountable, to participate in the execution of the public power, even arguably the rights of freedom of speech and association, … are rights which bring people together to act collectively and in concert, rather than rights which drive them back into the narrow preoccupations of their privacy. … In their form, at least, democratic rights, the rights of the citizen, express a vision of political community, not a nightmare of privatized individualism. (Waldron, 1993, pp. 342–3) Extensive social and communal efforts have to be made so that the substance of these classic liberal rights can be actually enjoyed and individuals can be held responsible for exercising these rights and respecting the equal rights of fellow human beings. These rights do not differ from the ‘third generation rights’ in that they simply demand non-action or hands-off on the part of governments and fellow human beings.12 This notion of ‘collective’ rights thus does not support the dichotomy between ‘positive’ (action-demanding, or third and second generations of) and ‘negative’ (hands-off, or first generation of) rights.13 The collapse of the ‘positive’ vs. ‘negative’ rights means that a classic liberal right
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cannot be adequately differentiated from other rights, as ‘individualistic,’ since such a right is also positive and demands social collaboration for its enjoyment. The demand for social cooperation alone does not disqualify the first generation rights from being considered ‘collective’ rights. ‘Collective rights’ as ‘non-excludable rights’ ‘Collective rights’ is also used to refer to rights that are granted to all members of a group, or rights that, when exercised, produces goods enjoyed with all other members in the group. These have been referred to as non-excludable rights, rights that, according to Waldron, if they are ‘to be supplied to any member of the group, [they] cannot be denied to any other member of the group …’ (Waldron, 1993, p. 348) It has been argued that due to the nonexclusive nature of goods such as peace and a clean environment, their importance cannot be expressed in the language of human rights due to that language’s individualistic nature. (MacCormick, 1982, p. 143; Raz, 1986, p. 198; Waldron, 1993, pp. 346–51) If one insists on doing so, i.e. claiming ‘the human right to peace,’ then, it is said, one must be referring to an entirely new category of rights, different in nature from classical (individualistic) rights. Two qualifications are in order. First, it is not accurate to call clean air and peace non-excludable. We know perfectly well that many residents of urban centers and industrial sites do not necessarily though enjoy clean air. Others in their national community do and they can exercise the right to such goods. Peace, once secured for human beings living in one regions of the world, can be denied to other members of the human community. Meanwhile, the rights to clean air or peace, when effectively protected, do not necessarily mean that its goods are equally enjoyed by all in the relevant community. It is likely that those with lung disease or neurotic conditions may be unable to benefit as much from clean air or peace as their fellow members. Secondly, to make sense of this understanding of collectivity of rights, one can limit the scope of the relevant communities. Thus, one can qualify that once clean air is supplied to some residents in the Los Angels area, it cannot be denied to any other local residents though these residents may not be the intended beneficiaries or may not benefit equally. One can also state that once peace is secured in a country, say, Sri Lanka, it cannot be denied of any residents in the country. Given these qualifications, some third generation rights could be considered ‘collective’ in the sense of non-excludable and most of the first generation rights are not. The right to freedom of equal political
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participation, once protected for some members of a political community (male, ruling class, elite, e.g.), other members do not automatically enjoy the goods coming out of those members’ exercising such a right. Waldron seems to argue that some of these rights are non-excludable. He gives as an example that when the European Court of Human Rights addresses a case about the right not to be tortured, it considers it a test case for the similar right of countless individuals who stand to be affected in the same way in the European community. When the Court passes judgment on an individual plaintiff, the judgment is guidance concerning the treatment of anyone involved in similar situations. How about the other civil–political rights? (Waldron, 1993, pp. 351–2). However, this example does not show that the right not to be tortured is non-excludable. All Europeans had already been granted the equal right not to be tortured when the Court addresses the torture case. However, such a right can in theory be granted only to some citizens (whites, or ethnic majorities e.g.) in a country. Others do not automatically stand to benefit as they would in the case of clean air. However, some third generation rights such as the right to culture also cannot be said to be non-excludable. Thus when authorities or a special class of members are granted the right to interpret the tradition or enforce certain customs, others (women, e.g. in the case of the Taliban’s ban on their schooling) do not automatically benefit. Such a right cannot be ‘collective’ in the sense of being non-exclusionary. From these considerations, one can conclude that, as far as a right is considered ‘collective’ because of its ‘non-excludability,’ this criterion does not help distinguish first generation rights from third generation rights. I suspect that it does not help distinguish first from second generation (socio-economic) rights either. When the right to subsistence is secured for the well-to-do, for example, the poor do not automatically benefit. ‘Collective rights’ as ‘communally constituted rights’ In this usage, ‘collective rights’ refers to those rights whose goods or benefits are available only in viable communities. For such a right to be possible, a certain community must exist and flourish. Such a community in this sense is required for excising such a right. It constitutes such a right. The right to culture, i.e. the right to pursue and benefit from cultural activities, such as using a language or practicing certain customs, can be understood as ‘collective’ in this sense. The goods that are made available through exercising this right (such as effective expression or
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communication through using local languages) can exist only if the relevant cultural or linguistic communities exist and function. Cultural communities are constituent of the cultural goods in that such communities are necessary preconditions for them. However, cultural communities are themselves products of the goods insofar as those goods help nourish and sustain the community. Yet, third generation rights are not unique in being communally constituted. Political participatory right, for example, is also communally constituted since the goods, the benefits, of exercising this right – public deliberation, equal participation in decision-making, representation of the governed, legitimacy and trust built into the process, and so on – require the existence and thriving of a cohesive, well-ordered, and cooperative political community. The right to free speech and expression, to be meaningful and effective, also requires a viable community where the freely expressed ideas can be comprehended and contested by members. ‘Collective rights’ as ‘associational prerequisite rights’ A fourth usage of ‘collective’ rights refers to rights that are germane to the development of non-governmental associations, groups, and communities. This understanding is perhaps the most subversive to the differentiation of types of human rights, such as ‘individual vs. collective’ and ‘classical vs. new generational,’ rights. Such classical liberal rights as the rights to free association, expression, assembly, thought and conscience, and the right to form independent workers’ unions, are all vital to protecting associations, groups, and communities against coercive state or societal forces. These rights are ‘collective’ rights in the sense that they enable persons to form and protect their groups and communities, and to pursue their collective interests. I discuss this point further later in this chapter. ‘Collective rights’ as ‘special membership rights’ In this usage, ‘collective rights’ refers to special protections, immunities, or privileges granted to specific people because of their membership in specific groups or communities. Special membership rights are granted to members only or come with membership in groups of various distinctions. Unless it concerns the community (or group) of humanity as a whole, membership in any other smaller groups define rights that are unequally and nonuniversally granted to all human beings, hence are special – partial or exclusive. Such rights can only be claimed by members in groups that
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are smaller than the human community. Cultural and indigenous rights can be understood as ‘collective’ in this sense. How can cultural and indigenous rights as special membership rights then be coherently understood as human rights? The only way is to view such rights as potentially granted to human beings, who have the capacity to claim. They are all human rights in this preliminary sense. They can be potentially granted to, exercised in a cultural community, and enjoyed by human beings. For example, one can coherently say, ‘Fatima has a cultural right to wear a headscarf’ (but not ‘Iran has a cultural right to enforce the headscarf’) or ‘The Tibetan people have a cultural right to speak the Tibetan language.’ It is Fatima or Sungchi and every person with special membership in a cultural community who have the rights to press for certain exemptions or privileges against the state and the larger society in which their communities exist. When the preservation of traditional practices requires state assistance, when the benefits of such practices are not available to non-members, they become exclusive privileges). Moreover, according to this view, Fatima has an equal set of membership rights as any other members in her community. Fatima has an equal say as any other members as to which membership rights, to what extent, in what manner, can be curtailed in the community. (Because of the human agency of cultural rights, some theorists are reluctant to consider it a collective right. (Donnelly, 2003, pp. 204–24)) However, understood in this way, special membership rights remain unequally and non-universally granted to all human beings. Special membership rights have a characteristic that equally granted human rights do not seem to share. Deprivation of a specific special membership right affects all members of the group. If Muslim schoolgirls are prohibited to wear headscarves in public schools in France, they are likely to be singled out for discrimination because of the negative portrayal of their practice – whether or not they personally endorse this custom.14 If taking time off for prayers during a workday is granted, all members of the Muslim religious community and they alone enjoy this particular privilege, though everyone has allowance to worship at other times or on other occasions – Jews, Christians, etc. (In comparison, in the US, ‘personal days’ are nondenominational and non-exclusive.) Yet, apparently, when free expression is prohibited, say, in a country by its government, then, all citizens and even non-citizens are affected, at least potentially (i.e. anyone traveling to that country would be subjected to the prohibition). Such a ban clearly disrespects humanity – in effect, if not intended, no special group of human beings are singled out for discrimination.
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One argument for special membership rights’ compatibility to equal and impartial human rights, I argue, is that unequal and partial rights (privileges and exemptions) for disadvantageously situated, unequally treated, persons can level the playing field so they could equally exercise impartial and universally granted human rights. To promote such an unequal treatment is, seemingly paradoxically, intended and seen as necessary for promoting and ensuring equal exercise of these other human rights by giving a head-start to those who are or can be unequally treated in society due to their cultural or indigenous group affiliations.15 Granting unequal treatment can thus be seen as a means to the end of equal exercise of other human rights. In comparison, women’s rights, which grant special privileges or immunities to women only, are similarly understood as compatible or integral to human rights. The reason that human rights must support such unequally granted, exclusive, rights is historical and specific. Precisely because women have been unequally treated and socially discriminated, they can be empowered and lifted to an equal footing as men in exercising their other human rights.16 In this aspect, cultural membership rights are similar to social group rights such as women’s rights, rights for gays and lesbians, and rights for indigenous peoples. They are claims made by or on behalf of individuals with membership in groups; a denial of such claims disadvantage members, or perpetrate historical mistreatment, such that they are unable to exercise their equal human rights. However, cultural membership rights also differ from these other social group rights. Cultural membership rights include claims to special protections, immunities, or privileges to members, e.g. claims to assistance in preserving certain language or traditional ways of life (though cultural rights also include claims to nondiscrimination and equal freedom, e.g. to display traditional symbols or worship one’s own gods). Women’s rights and gay rights are mainly about nondiscrimination and having equal opportunities, e.g. for work, education, health benefits, or marriage. Cultural membership rights differ from these social group membership rights in another significant aspect. While sex, sexual preferences, ethnicity, or skin color, may not be something that one could choose or alter, culture is (or should be) based on self-identification and voluntary affiliation. However, there are important exceptions: First, one cannot choose the heritage and traditions into which one is born.17 Second, members do not often have the freedom to choose to affiliate with cultures into which they were not born.
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However, one difference between the argument for certain social group rights as human rights and the argument for cultural rights as human rights is that, while some social group rights are granted on grounds of undoing past wrongs, one needs not assume past mistreatment or historical injustice against members of all cultural groups. One need only recognize that discrimination on the grounds of cultural membership undermines people’s ability to exercise their human rights on basis of equality. Not all special membership rights are automatically justified, in this argument, as compatible with or integral to human rights. There need to be specific historical arguments for a demand for special membership rights to be considered compatible or integral to human rights. The key to defending exclusive cultural membership rights as human rights lies in demonstrating that, without granting such rights, persons as members of cultural groups would be disadvantaged in exercising their equal human rights. I will elaborate this defense in the next section. ‘Special membership rights’ stand out, among the five conceptions of ‘collective’ rights described above, in drawing a meaningful and sufficient distinction between first and second/third generations rights. Thus such rights as children’s rights, women’s rights, cultural rights, and rights of indigenous peoples, can be understood in this view as ‘collective’. Equal and impartial rights for all human beings, regardless of their membership in any social and cultural or religious groups, are not ‘collective’ in this sense. Cultural rights can also be seen as ‘collective’ according to some of the other operating usages examined above. Protection of cultural rights requires social collaboration and positive actions; a cultural right, if granted in a society, is non-excludable to members of all cultural groups in the society. Cultural rights are communally constituted in that, without a viable or thriving cultural community, they cannot be meaningfully exercised; and the right to culture is essential or germane to the flourishing of cultural communities. However, these other usages would not sufficiently demarcate cultural rights from other human rights – which, according to these usages, are also ‘collective.’
Human rights to culture: an oxymoron? Sometimes, the reservation about the international recognition of ‘rights to culture’ as human rights stems from a fear. This is the fear that collective interest in cultural communities, once protected, will trump
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members’ civil–political liberty (individual) rights. This fear underpins the commonly held dichotomy of ‘collective (social–economic–cultural) vs. individual (civil–political) rights’. The Chinese government plays up this fear by claiming that securing ‘individual’ liberty rights would bring disorder and instability undermining efforts to secure ‘collective’ interest rights. It also asserts a ‘cultural right’ to maintain its own interpretation of human rights, i.e. human rights with ‘Chinese (Confucian cultural) characteristics,’ featuring emphases on the interest of family, society, or collectivity over that of the individual. This is of course a rather selective representation of the Confucian culture, denying its changes over time and heterogeneity within, where such emphases have undergone transformation and have been disputed by influential Confucian disciples and scholars. It is also rather odd since the communist state itself has claimed to protect dozens of ethnic minorities residing on its territory and has allowed Buddhists, Taoists, Muslims, and Christians to worship within official limits. In the broader debate about whether human rights apply to a culturally unique country like China, those arguing against universal human rights tend to refer to a Confucianized ‘Chinese culture’ as they claim that the Chinese should maintain their own cultural interpretation of or alternative to human rights. The millions who now practice Buddhism, Muslim, or Christianity in China today apparently defy such efforts to ‘Confucianize’ the population. Meanwhile, some Chinese liberal intellectuals and reformers blame the long Confucian dominance for the country’s lack of democratization and freedom. Not surprisingly, as this case demonstrates, parties with vested-interest tend to construct their own and others’ ‘cultural identities’ – the Chinese state is not alone. However, while Chinese liberal intellectuals and reformers find evoking cultural traditions suffocating, while Chinese Christians may find homegrown spirituality less appealing, they are only expressing their own beliefs and aspirations, identifying hence with one or another secular or religious tradition in the mosaic of Chinese culture. They exemplify the diversity and change in ideas and beliefs on the Chinese (political, moral) cultural landscape. To attend to intra-cultural diversity and change, and acknowledge inter-cultural convergence in this case is to take necessary caution to avoid selective, biased, or selfserving representation and manipulation of cultural identity. Relevant here are important ethical questions concerning culture, i.e. whether a government should determine what groups have ‘cultural rights’ or, in the Chinese case, what count as ‘the Chinese culture’ – and
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what are ‘Western pollutants’ or ‘evil cults’ or ‘separatists.’ Using its exclusive control of the power to impose its will on these matter, the Chinese government has jailed Tibetan Buddhists who recognize their own spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, driven unofficial Christian churches underground, and persecuted practitioners of Falun Gong (a Buddhist sect) when it threatens to surpass the communist party’s popularity. The recent exponential rise of spiritual, artistic, and intellectual groups and activities, which may fill the void left by obsolete and sterile Chinese Communism, has met with heavy policing in religious gatherings, in cyber cafes, as well as crackdowns on the press and tight regulations on non-government organizations. In the broad understanding of culture I pursued in this book, these constricted areas of pursuits of the development and dissemination of informal knowledge also count as ‘cultural.’ According to this understanding, I also consider what historians have documented as the development of ideas (and efforts to incorporate then into practices), such as ‘people’s rights,’ ‘rulers’ responsibilities,’ and ‘personal freedom,’ as cultural developments even though a ‘liberal rights’ tradition may have never become mainstream or dominant. (de Bary (1983, 1998); Angel, 2002; Svensson, 2002) Such ideas and the practices motivated by them have become part of the informal knowledge inherited, embodied, and transmitted in the Chinese society.) However, to be aware of the often politically motivated construction of ‘cultural identity’ is not to deny the existence of cultural communities, no matter how they interpenetrate, change, and are internally heterogeneous. As pointed out in earlier discussions about cultural community a social group such as the Mayans in Guatemala or women in rural Turkey does not necessarily have one distinctive and all-encompassing culture; each may be a social context where hybrid, interpenetrating, competing bodies of moral, ethical, political ‘informal knowledge’ are inherited, embodied in customs, and socially transmitted and contested. It is thus, strictly speaking, problematic to refer to any social group or community, or a country or a historical society (China, e.g.), as a ‘culture.’18 A cultural community must be seen as an association of people, whose views, values, or sentiments are geo-politically or socially unbounded, contested, fluid, and possibly shared by persons from more than one ethnic group, religion, society, or region.19 This conception cautions us that, given our commonly used notions of ‘cultural community’ as a nation, an ethnic group, a religion, or a society, we must be aware that members do not necessarily share homogeneous beliefs (about, e.g. whether women are inferior or girls must not be schooled, disagreement of which normally exist inside cultures even though
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sexism may dominate). We must keep in mind that such beliefs change over time (some members may no longer believe in women’s inferiority and the reasons others gave in its defense may change). We must also allow that similar beliefs and ideas are found in other communities. In short, adopting the working concept of culture does not entail a denial of the existence of distinctive cultures and cultural communities. This recognition leaves open the question concerning cultural rights and their relationship with other (human) rights. International conventions now recognize cultural rights as human rights.20 The rights to culture, according to the international conventions,21 are rights to pursue and develop the culture(s) of a person by birth or by identity and to benefit from the fruits of and the communities associated with such pursuits and development. As we have seen, cultural rights understood as such are ‘collective’ in that they demand ‘social collaboration’ for their enjoyment. They are also ‘collective’ in that they are ‘non-excludable’ from being claimed and enjoyed by all human beings (given that all are somehow raised in, capable of participating in or identifying with, cultural communities). Moreover, they are ‘collective’ in that they are ‘communally constituted.’ However, being ‘collective’ in these manners does not sufficiently distinguish cultural rights from other human rights, particularly classic liberty rights. These other human rights are collective in some of these ways as well. In these cases, cultural rights, while being collective, do not raise any particular challenge to the compatibility and integrity of various human rights. To a refutation of liberty rights on the basis that they create instability and disorder and are thus detrimental to achieving ‘collective’ (cultural, social and economic) rights, such as the one given as the Chinese official line, one can then reply that liberty rights are just as ‘collective’ as these other rights. Violation of liberty rights also undermines social collaboration necessary for safeguarding members’ basic securities since liberty rights are also ‘non-excludable’ and ‘communally constituted.’ Additionally, liberty rights are ‘collective’ in ‘associational prerequisites’ for communities to pursue their conceptions of the good. However, cultural rights are sufficiently distinct from other (particularly civil–political liberty) human rights in that they are exclusively granted membership privileges. This may seem to challenge their compatibility with liberty rights and their integrity. Note briefly again that granting certain exclusive membership privileges may be justified by the reason that they are required for transmitting and practicing bodies of informal knowledge, including ‘know-how’ about safeguarding lives and basic
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securities, and for preserving and developing the community in which the transmission and practices are carried out and sustained, as I argue. Such privileges may include, e.g. taking time off from work to pray, speaking a local language, ways of educating the young or caring for the old, or practicing certain mind-body exercises in open space. I have suggested that we can meet the challenge posed by cultural rights (granted as exclusive membership privileges) to their compatibility with liberty rights in at least two ways. First, we can point out that cultural rights are granted to all human beings, though not everyone chooses to exercise them, given that all human beings often are or at least can be members of (diverse) cultures. They are likely to be raised in some culture, to be members of some cultural communities, and are capable of participating in and identifying with such communities. Cultural rights are thus universal or non-exclusive, even though they are claims to exclusive privileges and to protections of diverse beliefs and practices. Cultural rights allow a Tibetan to have the ‘privilege’ to access resources enabling her to practice Tibetan Buddhism or learn to speak the Tibetan language, but cultural rights allow every human being accesses to resources enabling them to practice their faiths and learn to speak their mother tongues. The contents of the privileges may be different and exclusive, but that all human beings must be granted such privileges is a non-exclusive claim. Secondly, certain classic liberty rights, i.e. rights to freedom to associate, assemble, expression, conscience and religion, are prerequisites, necessary if not sufficient conditions, to effective exercise of the right to culture. Without these liberty rights, one is vulnerable to violation of one’s right to have ‘exclusive’ privileges. Such privileges may be necessary for one to participate in the creativity and development of, and to benefit from, one’s culture. This is the consequentialist argument for the integrity of cultural rights with liberty rights. Thus perhaps learning such a rationale from their experiences, the persecuted Tibetan Buddhists, underground Christian churchgoers, and members of the banned Falun Gong in China have demanded from the Chinese state protection of their civil-political liberties. The government’s persecution and suppression have turned many of them into sympathizers and supporters of the Chinese human rights and pro-democracy movement. Members of the Falun Gong have organized the most effective and sustained campaigns against torture and arbitrary detention seen in PRC history. Pro-democracy activists and liberal intellectuals are among the most outspoken in the majority Han Chinese society to condemn discrimination, repression, and cultural destruction in these regions.
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Let me say something more about why cultural rights should be granted as exclusive membership rights. Certain safeguards from life’s standard threats – to basic human securities or freedom from physical assault and deprivation, for example – are developed and perceived as particularly suited under given conditions. They may have similar effects as what some human rights aim to achieve. Such communitydeveloped, particularly suited safeguards are desirable from the perspective of protecting human rights to life and basic securities.22 They may be more effective than unfamiliar or untested ones under particular conditions. Although certain communities may not have a concept of human rights as safeguards for human life and basic human securities, they may have developed other mechanisms to protect members against life’s typical perils. Where there are some functional mechanisms of safeguards, introducing new mechanisms may indeed be disruptive or redundant. This recognition is not, however, a rejection of the idea of human rights; rather, it is an acknowledgment that, under specific situations, alternative (traditional or community-developed), particularly suited safeguards might be more effective in achieving similar goals as those aimed by human rights. One example is practicing deep-breathing and stretching exercises taught in Falun Gong, the banned quasi-Buddhist sect in China. Some practitioners see the exercise regime as a way to help them strengthen their health and avoid having to pay skyrocketing medical bills. Under the specific circumstances (such as government cut of socialist healthcare, raising medical care costs, and dysfunctional public health system and so on), some practitioners may find no other viable options. Granting members of the Falun Gong ‘privileges’ to practice their exercises in open air in a public space, if such exercises seem beneficial or at least non-harmful, is compatible with the goal of health rights. Non-members may find such exercises to have no benefits, or on the contrary, have harmful effect on health. If cultural rights were protected, non-practitioners would be allowed to persuade the practitioners to change their beliefs, but not to use force to stop them or discriminate against them. The state would not be allowed to use the law (and law enforcement machines) to ban them and penalize them. If denying members certain privileges to pursue their practices, their community will be unable to survive; certain effective or particularly suited safeguards for life and basic securities, then, will not be developed or maintained and members will not be able to benefit from them. In such cases, granting members these ‘privileges’ is compatible with the objectives of protecting basic human rights.23
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In other cases, certain practices, though they may not directly produce safeguards for life and basic securities, are nonetheless instrumental to developing or sustaining such safeguards, or are simply un-harmful or somehow useful in improving the quality of life. Learning the local language (so that members can effectively communicate and participate in community collaborations necessary for safeguarding them from life’s typical threats) might be an example of the former, while wearing the Islamic headscarf (as a faith-based choice, not imposed by force or authority) is one of the latter. This argument for granting cultural rights as membership privileges does not assume that all cultural communities were or still are capable of developing or maintaining particularly suited safeguards. It need not deny that some of them are dysfunctional and some are dominated by self-serving authoritarian leaders or forces indifferent about or harmful to fellow members’ lives and basic human securities. This argument rules out granting privileges to members to pursue activities that violate fellow members’ (or non-members’) life and basic securities. If members of the Falun Gong sect were found to engage in activities violating members (or non-members’) rights to life and basic securities, e.g. physically forcing them not to seek medical care, or forcing them to set themselves on fire as an act of protest, such activities should not fall under the protection of ‘cultural rights.’ Likewise, cultural rights do not grant ‘privileges’ to leaders or powerful members of a Muslim community to force young women to undergo female circumcision. Granting ‘privileges’ to engage in such activities would give permission to some members to violate other members’ life or basic securities. Such ‘privileges’ would also contribute to violence (in this case, against women), animosity and fear, which tend to undermine the community, which may have developed other mechanisms of safeguards (such as education and assistance to the needy, provided in some mosques). Cultural rights, understood as exclusive membership rights to pursue practices that safeguard members’ lives and basic securities, or contribute to the development of such safeguards (or do not harm such safeguards), are two-pronged claims. They are, (1), claims by all members of a cultural community against the larger society or the state, and (2) claims by sub-groups and individuals within such a community against their own leaders and fellow members. Both claims define the substance (content) of the right to culture. Kymlicka has explored the tension between these claims. He refers to them respectively as the outward and inward claims.24 The outward claims against the larger society and the state are claims to privileges or
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exceptions not generally available to non-member citizens of the state. The inward claims against fellow members and community authorities hold them accountable for respecting individual members’ constitutional and human rights to which all citizens are entitled in a liberal democracy. Both types of claims are essential for the survival and flourishing of indigenous minority communities in a liberal society, according to Kymlicka. In my extended application, Muslims in the Sudan should have a justifiable claim against the Sudanese society and the state for protecting them in exercising their beliefs and customs. However, sub-groups in the Muslim community also have a justifiable claim against leaders and fellow members for protecting them in practicing their interpretations, unpopular perhaps, or developing less-known ideas in the Koran, e.g. those that oppose forcing girls to undergo genital cutting. Likewise, practitioners of the Falun Gong should justifiably have claims against the Chinese state for protecting them in practicing beliefs. But homosexuals and women practitioners of Falun Gong also have justifiable as claims against fellow members and leaders for protecting them from discrimination, e.g. on the basis that their interpretation of Falun Dafa, basic principles of the sect, particularly its principle of ‘tolerance,’ opposes sexual and gender discrimination. What this two-pronged view of cultural rights has argued for is that the fear for cultural rights to grant permission for intra-community repression and violation of basic human rights is unfounded. Even when cultural rights are granted as exclusive membership rights, sufficiently distinguishing them from other human rights, they still need grant such a permission – they can still be compatible with and integral to human rights. To further clarifications on such a compatibility and integrity, I now turn.
Prerequisites for viable communities Certain associational prerequisite rights, i.e. rights to freedom of association, expression, assembly, conscience, and religion, are necessary, if not sufficient, preconditions for the exercise and enjoyment of cultural rights. When these liberty rights are unprotected in the larger society and by the state, members of cultural communities (including but not limited to those that offer particularly suited safeguards) would not be able to pursue their cultural beliefs and practices, nor to preserve and develop their communities. In addition to associational prerequisite rights, there is a range of internationally recognized human rights that are beneficial to cultural
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diversity and integrity, including the right to enjoy the arts for the conservation, development and diffusion of culture, the protection of cultural heritage, the right to freedom for creative activity, the right to education and to non-discrimination, as well as the right to cultural participation. However, these additional rights demand for their own protection the protection of the associational prerequisite rights. Without protecting the prerequisite rights, the safeguards of these rights cannot be achieved. A cultural community may lose its vitality and viability, hence any particularly suited safeguards it may have developed, if it lacks the internal space needed for members to express opinions, revise old norms, reinterpret orthodoxies, and incorporate their experiences in all their diversity. Intra-group dynamics and critical self-reflection allow members to creatively interpret their traditions and adjust any time-honored safeguards to changing local and global circumstances.25 Critics cite the international human rights framework’s emphasis on rights of individual human beings as evidence of its cultural Western bias. They assume that traditional communities and indigenous peoples are more concerned about preserving their communities and ways of life, including their presumably non-legalistic traditional approaches to securing responsibilities and entitlements. Some cultural anthropologists also have argued that culture itself is a necessary good for the realization and development of humanity. One interpretation of this view is that persons can only find meaning and security by identifying with a culture and attaching to a cultural community. Any moral ideals, such as human rights, can only become meaningful and appealing if they are meaningful and desirable from the perspective of their culture(s).26 If we acknowledge that cultural community is a good for providing basic safeguards of life and that protecting cultural community from standard modern threats is thus desirable from the perspectives of members of such a community, then human rights must also be desirable from the same perspective since human rights provide similar safeguards – especially when cultural communities have declined. Human rights help to protect traditional communities and the indigenous safeguards that sustain them in the face of state coercion and unaccountable agencies in the modern world.27 This argument is a consequentialist one in that it defends certain associational prerequisite human rights because of their utility to members of cultural communities. Two ideas are crucial for further developing this argument, which I have only sketched: the ideas of ‘standard modern
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threats’ and basic liberty rights as ‘associational’ prerequisites to viable associations (including cultural or communities). ‘Standard modern threats’ The human rights theorist Jack Donnelly acknowledges that ‘traditional culture’ usually provides some protection for human dignity. He contends that human rights advocates should tap into this resource of ‘traditional checks.’ (Donnelly, 1989, p. 121) He defends human rights essentially along the following line of argument outlined above: [I]n the conditions of modern society human rights are a particularly appropriate mechanism to protect human dignity. The modern state, the modern economy, and associated ‘modern’ values tend to create communities of relatively autonomous individuals who lack the place and protections provided by traditional society. Moreover, regardless of the relative degree of individual autonomy, people today face the particularly threatening modern state and the especially fierce buffeting of the ever-changing modern economy. Rights held equally by all against the state – rights that both limit its legitimate range of actions and require positive protections against certain predictable economic, social, and political contingencies – are a seemingly natural and necessary response to typically modern threats to human dignity and basic human values, traditional and modern alike. (Donnelly, 1989, p. 122) Some of Donnelly’s underlying assumptions are debatable. The decline of traditional communities together with their traditional protective mechanisms does not mean the disappearance of communities. Alternative or renewed communities may offer new protective mechanisms. Civil society associations (churches, voluntary organizations, unions, professional associations, etc.) in modern societies, in theory at least, are not necessarily less capable of protecting their members against standard modern threats than their pre-modern counterparts. Moreover, the ‘typical modern threats to human dignity and basic human values,’ today include nonstate actors like multinational corporations and dominant forces inside a community. A human rights framework primarily holding the state accountable is no longer adequate. Donnelly makes the important observation that the sustainability and viability of local safeguards tend to be romanticized. Many of these communities had already declined, leaving their members powerless and vulnerable to abuses, naked against modern threats without any
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effective local safeguards to soften their blunt blow, even before human rights reached their shores. (Donnelly, 1989, pp. 118–19) However, Donnelly goes on to contend that, ‘[S]uch civil rights as freedom of conscience, speech, and association may be a bit more relative’ to culture than the right to life, because civil rights ‘assume the existence and positive evaluation of relatively autonomous individuals,’ while the right to life does not make such an assumption. He also says that these civil rights need not be protected in ‘strong, thriving traditional communities’ because ‘members of such a community simply will not have the desire or need to claim such civil rights.’ (Donnelly, 1989, p. 123) This could be true only if a ‘strong and thriving’ cultural community were homogenous in beliefs or opinions. If not, it is likely to have its internal dissent, contestation, and protest. In such a community, members in the minority will surely want such protection as the rights to free conscience and expression. If a ‘strong and thriving’ community has functioning traditional mechanisms to protect minorities or dissenters, then, instituting civil rights may indeed be redundant. But the presence of functioning local safeguards for civil rights does not mean the absence on the part of members of a ‘desire or need to claim’ safeguard rights, nor does it mean an objection to civil rights’ relevance. If traditional protections decline or prove ineffective, in such a case, these civil rights are applicable in principle to such a community. And they are not judged valid or invalid relative to the local culture. This argument for human rights from the perspective of members of vulnerable communities is thus historically contingent. Its validity depends on certain historical developments – the rise of the modern state and multinational actors in the globalization age have undermined traditional safeguards sustained in cultural and indigenous communities and made their members vulnerable to life’s standard modern threats. Standard modern threats refers to the specific threats to human life, security, and dignity posed by forces in the globalizing modern world, including the modern state, tyrannical social majorities, and unscrupulous multi-national corporations. Standard modern threats are on the rise and may replace conventional (local authoritarian or dominant social) threats as the main source of threats, as a by product of the rapid growth in the transportation across borders of goods, people, ideas, practices, and technology. If such threats had not become so imminent and urgent, threatening to overwhelm indigenous or traditional communities, such communities might have their own ways to protect the associational prerequisite rights. (However, as argued earlier, this does not mean the validity of
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these rights are culturally relative.) In pre-modern societies, traditional cultural customs and practices, as Donnelly notes, usually provide each person with a place in society and a certain amount of dignity and protection because ‘there usually are reciprocal bonds between rulers and ruled and between rich and poor.’ (Donnelly, 1989, p. 121) Such protections may have functioned sufficiently well to safeguard life and dignity in the absence of typical modern threats. In such a community, if it ever existed or could be recreated, it would be conceivable that life, security, and dignity could be safeguarded without introducing the institution of associational prerequisite rights. The penitentiary systems (as stipulated in Article 10(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), might be unnecessary, as Donnelly points out, since certain customary punishments might have been adopted on the basis of community consensus and these might serve the purpose fairly well in the specific context. Certain traditional, possibly non-legalistic, mechanisms perhaps once employed in pre-colonial African villages or Native American tribes, Islamic societies, or Confucian kinship clans, for example, might once have sufficed to protect members, or at least some of them. However, these mechanisms may have since declined and the communities that once sustained them may have been dying.28 The seemingly improbable affinity between cultural-indigenous communities and human rights is thus explained by the response of these communities to the particular threats posed in the modern world. The modern states, while claiming guardianship and representation for local traditions, have been one major source of rights violation of these communities. As Donnelly notes: Government officials denounce the corrosive individualism of Western values – while they line their pockets with the proceeds of massive corruption, drive imported luxury automobiles, and plan European or American vacations. Leaders sing the praises of traditional communities – while they wield arbitrary power antithetical to traditional values, pursue development policies and systematically undermine traditional communities, and replace traditional leaders with corrupt cronies and party hacks. (Donnelly, 1989, pp. 119–20) However, a diagnosis focusing on the modern states is no longer adequate. The standard threats since before the inception of the international before human rights framework half a century ago had mutated, or more precisely, found new collaborators. The initial framework of human rights and accountability inadequately anticipated the rise of
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multinational players in economic globalization and the ways they could inflict harm. For purpose of clarification, the more general notion of ‘standard threats,’ of which ‘standard modern threats’ is a sub-category, is used by Henry Shue to elucidate the concept of ‘moral rights.’ (Shue, 1980, p. 13) By ‘standard threats,’ Shue refers for ‘the more devastating and more common of life’s threats,’ including ‘loss of security and loss of subsistence.’ (Shue, 1980, pp. 18, 29–34) Such threats could conceivably rise in any societies at any given time. Donnelly’s ‘typical modern threats’ and what I refer to as ‘standard modern threats’ are the modern equivalent to Shue’s general term, ‘standard threats.’ Moreover, as mentioned above, Donnelly’s ‘typical modern threats’ is narrower than ‘standard modern threats.’ The former focuses on the threats posed by the modern state. In comparison, sometimes ‘standard modern threats’ emphasizes a wider range of heterogeneous, mutually re-enforcing, threats posed by both state and non-state forces.29 The new types of threats can be as coercive and as potent as those posed by the state. It is naïve to think that vulnerable communities can survive in the face of such threats relying solely on any safeguards. They need the protection of the international human rights framework against the power of states and multinational forces. ‘Associational prerequisites’ This crucial idea for developing the consequentialist argument for human rights from the perspective of members of vulnerable communities is inspired by the idea of ‘associationist social form’ of human life used by Rawls in his argument for international protection of basic liberal rights. (Rawls, 1999, p. 68) Rawls contends that the associationist form of human life, in which human beings cooperate in pursuit of their heterogeneous goods, requires viable associations or communities; and these associations and communities cannot survive or flourish if persons are not protected in their equal freedom of association, assembly, expression, and conscience. He concludes, What have come to be called human rights are recognized as necessary conditions of any system of social cooperation. When they are regularly violated, we have command by force, a slave system, and no cooperation of any kind. (Rawls, 1999, p. 68) Rawls is responding here to the communitarian critique of liberal rights on the ground that liberal rights conceive persons as first and foremost
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autonomous individuals, neglecting their ties in specific social and cultural communities. Rawls argues that certain liberal rights of individuals can be defended precisely because they are necessary for conducting and preserving social–cultural associations and socially cooperative forms of human life.30 Rawls tries to identify an alternative to the comprehensive liberal justifi