E S C H ATO LO G I C A L P R E S E N C E I N KAR L ¨ T TI N G E N T H E O LO G Y B A RT H ’S GO
This page intentional...
100 downloads
1505 Views
1MB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
E S C H ATO LO G I C A L P R E S E N C E I N KAR L ¨ T TI N G E N T H E O LO G Y B A RT H ’S GO
This page intentionally left blank
Eschatological Presence in Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology C H R I S TO P H E R A S P R EY
1
3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York # Christopher Asprey 2010 The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2010 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Library of Congress Control Number: 2010922495 Typeset by SPI Publisher Services, Pondicherry, India Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by MPG Books Group, Bodmin and King’s Lynn ISBN 978–0–19–958470–3 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2
For Nicholas and Bridget Asprey
This page intentionally left blank
Preface Barth studies have found a new lease of life in recent years, thanks in large measure to the release of previously unknown or unpublished works by Barth, as part of the Gesamtausgabe of his writings. The appearance of these works, in particular from the earlier parts of Barth’s career, has made it possible to get back behind the Church Dogmatics, to inquire more closely into his theological origins and to situate Barth more precisely against his own theological background. This research would hardly be worthwhile were it undertaken purely to further the interests and prestige of a Barthscholastik. Its rightful fruits, however, have been the kind of historical reconstruction of Barth’s theology that fosters both a certain critical distance from the dogmatic positions he came to defend, as well as the recovery of some fundamental theological insights, by which these positions can properly be explained and evaluated. The present book makes its contribution to this ongoing work by examining a cross-section of Barth’s theology from a transitional but highly productive five-year period, one that is less well known in English-language scholarship, when Barth was just embarking upon a career in academic theology. I am grateful to Theologischer Verlag Zu¨rich for granting me permission to reprint here a great deal of material from the Gesamtausgabe, as well as from other works by Barth. I am grateful too to the Karl Barth archive in Basel, for permission to use images of Barth’s manuscript for the cover design of the book, and especially to Hans Anton Drewes for his ready help and advice on a number of occasions. This book started out as a doctoral thesis at the University of Aberdeen. It would not have been written without the funding I received from the Arts and Humanities Research Council, throughout my Masters and doctoral studies. I should also like to thank Princeton Theological Seminary, where I spent a thoroughly rewarding semester, digging around in their libraries and archives, and enjoying many other benefits, thanks to their Doctoral Research Scholars Program. I received some expert advice there from Clifford
viii
Preface
Anderson, as well as from Bruce McCormack, with whom I was fortunate to have the chance to discuss my research. I also wish to mention here a number of other individuals whose friendship, advice, and support have contributed in different ways to the production of this book: my doctoral supervisor, John Webster, whose seminars were the most inspiring introduction to theological research one could wish for, and whose patience and encouragement never relented during the time I was researching and writing; my two examiners, Timothy Gorringe and Philip Ziegler, for an engaging viva that provided a thought-provoking conclusion to my doctoral work; Jean-Yves Lacoste and Marion Drobig, who read and discussed with me earlier versions of this book; Iain Taylor, who gave me the idea to work on Barth’s Go¨ttingen Dogmatics; Luigi Gioia, who encouraged me to take up theology in the first place. I also wish to thank some friends from Aberdeen—Brian Brock, Simon Gathercole, David Gibson, Morton Gould ({), Timothy Harvey, Brian Lugioyo, Francesca Murphy, Jonathan Norgate and his family—as well as various colleagues and friends who have supported me during my first two years of teaching at the Institut Catholique de Paris, above all Philippe Bordeyne, Camille de Belloy, Emmanuel Durand, and Jean-Louis Souletie. However, it is to my father, mother, brother, and sister that I owe the greatest debt of thanks, for their support particularly during some difficult months completing my thesis, while I was living with them in London. It is to my family, and most especially to my parents, that I wish to dedicate this book.
Contents List of Abbreviations of Barth’s Works
xi
Introduction
1
1. The Problem of Dualism 2. Barth’s Theology in Go¨ttingen 1. Eschatological Existence in Barth and Bultmann 1.1 Eschatological Existence and Theological Language 1.2 Resurrection and Christology 1.3 Conclusion: Christology and Revelation 2. Revelation and the Problem of Christian Preaching 2.1 Revelation as Disruption 2.2 The Doctrine of Revelation as Prolegomena to Dogmatics 2.3 Revelation as a Theological Problem 2.4 Revelation, Preaching, and Theology 2.5 Revelation and Nature 2.6 Conclusion 3. Dogmatics 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4
The Dogmatic Correlation Dogmatics as Problematik The Eschatological Horizon of Dogmatics The Concept of Witness in Barth’s Commentary on John’s Gospel
4. Reformed Theology 4.1 Reformation as Reflection 4.2 The Theology of Zwingli 4.3 The Theology of the Reformed Confessions
2 16 29 31 43 52 56 56 64 68 72 80 92 95 97 105 110 122 136 137 144 152
x
Contents
5. Christology 5.1 The Person of Christ 5.2 The Risen Christ 5.3 Christology and Reconciliation 6. Spirit, Religion, and the Christian Life 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4
‘Biblical Questions, Insights, and Vistas’ Religion and Freedom The Christian Life Sacramental Theology
164 167 175 185 194 197 204 216 243
Conclusion: Grace and Eschatology
260
Bibliography Index
267 281
List of Abbreviations of Barth’s Works AdT:
Die Auferstehung der Toten
CD:
Church Dogmatics
Chr. Dog.:
Die christliche Dogmatik
GD (UCR): Go¨ttingen Dogmatics (Unterricht in der christlichen Religion) TC:
Die Theologie Calvins
TRB:
Theologie der reformierten Bekenntnisschriften
TS:
Die Theologie Schleiermachers
TZ:
Die Theologie Zwinglis
This page intentionally left blank
Introduction The argument I will make in the following pages is that, in the period under examination, Karl Barth’s theology was driven by an overriding conviction that God’s presence is bestowed freely and actively, with the result that divine grace is never a stable reality in the world, but discontinuous with human history, a disruptive— ‘eschatological’—event whose effect is always to shake up, and hopefully to regenerate, the creatures with which it comes into contact. I make this case using texts taken, almost entirely, from between autumn 1921 and summer 1925, when Barth occupied his first academic post in Go¨ttingen. Apart from the second edition of the Commentary on Romans (Ro¨merbrief II), which was already complete on his arrival in Go¨ttingen, only one monograph was published during this time—a commentary on 1 Corinthians—together with a number of shorter, occasional essays and lectures. And yet, the years Barth spent teaching in Go¨ttingen were among the most productive of his career. From 1921 to 1924, almost every semester included an intense course of lectures on the history of Reformed theology and doctrine, together with exegetical lectures on a New Testament text. Then, in the summer of 1924, Barth began a first cycle of dogmatics lectures, known as the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics, which he completed in his first term at Munster in 1925–6. The period is not only a pivotal time in Barth’s development, but critical for understanding his theology as such. For it marks the turn from what is often referred to as his ‘dialectical’ theology—i.e. the theology which climaxed in Ro¨merbrief II, but arguably continued further into the 1920s, and perhaps beyond—to the dogmatic theology to which his subsequent theological career was dedicated.
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
2
1. THE PROBLEM OF DUALISM As soon as Barth began to make an impression upon the theological community, his writing was subjected to heavy criticism. Indeed, the waspish reactions to it were inevitable, and probably sought after by Barth who, as Eberhard Ju¨ngel has pointed out, ‘was provocative from the very beginning’.1 One of the earliest critical responses to his theology came from Paul Althaus, writing in the first edition of the Zeitschrift fu¨r systematische Theologie.2 It inaugurated a reading of Barth which continues to enjoy prestige among many scholars to this day, a reading which (I will argue) is fundamentally wrong-headed. For Althaus, writing in the early decades of the twentieth century, the key issue in the human sciences was the question of history, and the historicity of being which, for theology, meant reflecting on revelation as the doctrine of God’s presence in and with history. However, in Barth’s dialectical theology, according to Althaus, such reflection is systematically excluded from the outset. For in its sustained criticism of the cult of experience in modern religion, this theology appropriates the idea of a metaphysical dualism, or opposition, between eternity and time, and feeds this back into the doctrine of God, making any historical revelation impossible in advance. [The concept of God in dialectical theology] is arrived at in a thoroughly aprioristic way. The starting point is not the reality and material determination of biblical or Christian belief in God. Instead, the meaning of biblical certainty about God is forcibly interpreted by an idea of God that is presupposed. It is not that the idea of God is taken from the witness to revelation, but the other way round: what ‘revelation’ may or may not refer to is decided in advance by a presupposed, self-contained concept of God. And this is characterized by a fundamental intuition about the relation between time and eternity.3
1
Ju¨ngel, ‘Provozierende Theologie. Zur theologischen Existenz Karl Barths (1921–1935)’, 41. 2 Althaus, ‘Theologie und Geschichte: Zur Auseinandersetzung mit der dialektischen Theologie’. 3 Ibid., 742.
Introduction
3
Once the point has been grasped that the key to Barth lies in his initial adoption of this metaphysic, the remainder of Althaus’ rather long essay unfolds with all the dreary inevitability of the dualistic logic which supposedly drives Barth’s theology, punctuated only by brief moments of light when Luther is introduced as an alternative. It is simply a matter of going through Barth’s texts and showing how the opposition between time and eternity is played out in the detail of his presentation of Christian doctrine. Thus (to name only the most salient features) any relation between God and humanity naturally becomes impossible from the outset, since Barth has replaced ‘the personal correspondence of one will to another’4 in historical Christianity with a purely formal idea of God. It then follows that the twin notions of God’s love and judgement, together with justification and the conscience, rather than relating to real events in the history between God and creation, now become purely formal abstractions as well.5 Furthermore, because the eternity–time dialectic is also the opposition between positive and negative, human time—in its anti-relation to divine eternity—is sheer negativity; creation is identical with sin; anything approaching ‘salvation history’ is dispensed with altogether (along with the Resurrection as a real event in time); and the result is a total historical scepticism, and with it the loss of moral responsibility.6 While these conclusions can often be proof-texted against citations in Barth, in fact they all simply flow from ‘the formal opposition between the divine and the historical’7 that is allegedly the Denkform of his theology. This same allegation, first made by Althaus in 1923, has recurred ever since as a way of explaining Barth’s theology, especially his ‘dialectical’ theology. In particular, it has often been something of an axiom for many of the leading exponents of Trinitarian theology in the twentieth century, notably Wolfhart Pannenberg, Ju¨rgen Moltmann, Robert Jenson, and Colin Gunton. Barth’s theology, it is said, is built around an opposition between time and eternity, around a Greek rather than a Jewish conception of time. That claim is then worked out in various ways, depending on the individual concerns and positive interests of the theologian in question. And yet, insofar 4 6
5 Ibid., 754. Ibid., 757–60. 7 Ibid., 743ff., 781ff. Ibid., 769.
4
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
as the claim relates to Barth, the particular analyses converge over very similar territory. Therefore, rather than tackle a number of these theologians in turn, I shall take Jenson as my example. More than any other, he has sustained his own theological positions on the interpretation of Barth he worked out during his doctoral studies.8 Indeed, it has been observed that it is sometimes hard to tell where Jenson’s analysis of Barth ends and his own theology begins.9 For Jenson, the issue raised by Barth’s theology is as much a soteriological as a philosophical one: how to make sense of the claim that my life could be intrinsically bound up with that of a man, Jesus of Nazareth, who died two millennia ago.10 Yet the stakes in this question can only be sized up once we appreciate the sharp contrast Jenson draws between (Judaeo-Christian) faith and (gnostico-Platonic) religion. He interprets this contrast in terms of the doctrine of justification, read through something like an existential understanding of time. In the fearful anxiety caused by the experience of temporal flux, and especially by the unnerving onrush of an unknown future, ‘religion’ refers to the natural human impulse to seek refuge from history by positing the reality of our lives in an unchanging sphere of Being (‘God’). However, purchasing immunity in this way from time’s ravaging potential comes at the inevitable cost of being alienated from time, and condemned to remain the ones we are and always were. This is quite the opposite of the faith of Israel and the church. Above all else, faith means a life born out of divine promise, so that salvation does not involve retreat from time but the freedom from my past (forgiveness, justification) for a future in time, a future which God presents to me not as threat, but as opportunity. The word of the justification of the ungodly apprehends reality as history. If I am justified as ungodly, then my life is a constant departure from what I am toward what I am not yet. It is a choice for the insecurity of the non-given, for transcendence in time.11 8 See also the recent chapter, ‘Karl Barth’ in Ford (ed.), The Modern Theologians, 21–36. 9 Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth, 19, 21f. 10 Jenson, Alpha and Omega: A study in the theology of Karl Barth, 15. 11 Jenson, God after God: The God of the past and the God of the future in the work of Karl Barth, 19.
Introduction
5
The Greek contamination of late Judaism and early Christianity did not result in a total loss of historical faith. Nevertheless, it generated a peculiar hybrid in which the liberating promise of God came to be replaced by a moralized religion whose adherents were both impotent and guilt-ridden. Instead of being orientated towards ‘the God who comes from and for the future’, the Hellenized church became fixated upon ‘the God of frozen history, the God of what has happened’, a God it identified with the perfected history of Jesus of Nazareth. And yet, once Jesus’ history is frozen in the past like this, it is no longer the history of my liberation from sin, but of my condemnation to be what I always have been—i.e. the very opposite of the meaning of Jesus’ history. ‘For of all the modes of time, it is the past which can be changeless, if it is not appropriated into a life lived from the future.’12 In short, the Christian orientation towards history became infused with a timeless notion of eternity, and produced an ‘historical religion’, an unhistorical or a-historical history, a contradiction in terms. According to Jenson, Barth’s dialectical theology is to be read as the conclusive statement of precisely this oxymoron, this impossible and unsustainable contradiction. He reads Ro¨merbrief II as the final event of historical religion, in which it destroys itself from within the logic of its own incongruity. Barth achieves this by focusing his commentary around the notion of the ‘eternal future’ (futurum aeternum), for this enables him to create in a single concept a perfect synthesis between historical faith and the religion of eternity. Time receives a consistently eschatological orientation, in accordance with the gospel of justification, yet this eschatology is simultaneously eternalized, generating an unremittingly critical negation of time. ‘The only thing wrong—but then everything is wrong—is that we cannot live under the God of this dialectic; his justification of the ungodly is bad news, not gospel.’13 In the text’s eschatology, the gospel of forgiveness and liberation, and the religion of guilt and condemnation, have converged, cancelling each other out, and creating a spiritual dead-end. ‘Therewith our religious devotion to eternity, and our faith as life in history from the future, finally completely immobilize each other—and the inner impossibility
12
Ibid., 22.
13
Ibid., 52.
6
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
of the Christian religion becomes actual. This is the event in the Commentary on Romans.’14 Barth only moves beyond this impasse, Jenson thinks, when, in the Church Dogmatics, he grounds his theology in Christology and the Trinity. For taken together, these doctrines mean that ‘the event of eternity, and of eternity’s union with time, is no longer specifiable only by a play of abstractions, it is an event which can be narrated’.15 The doctrine of the Trinity becomes the grammar of an anti-religious theology, because it affirms that God’s very being is not ‘a drama played on the stage of infinity’,16 or removed wholly into past time, but the event of his history with his creatures in time. ‘God’s being is achieved temporal self-transcendence. God is the one who for the future leaves the past behind, without the past becoming a set of fixed conditions for his future, and without the future emptying the present.’17 Moreover, it is in the concrete story of Jesus of Nazareth that the narratives of human and divine life inseparably enmesh. Rather than our history being cancelled out by God’s in a purely conceptual clash between time and eternity, it becomes opened up in the narrative of Christ to the historical possibilities disclosed in the Resurrection. However, Jenson remains unsettled by recalcitrant elements in Barth’s dogmatic theology which indicate to him that the full integration of time and eternity is not being affirmed without qualification. Objections are levelled against an overblown doctrine of election,18 and a correspondingly attenuated pneumatology,19 which for Jenson is the sign that the ‘Platonizing’ impulse towards pre-temporality has not been fully quashed.20 It is no longer, of course, that divine eternity is being construed as a formless abstraction—Jenson explicitly rejects the 14 Jenson, God after God: The God of the past and the God of the future in the work of Karl Barth, 30. 15 Ibid., 78. 16 Ibid., 152. 17 Ibid., 128–9. 18 Jenson, Alpha and Omega, 81–3. 19 Jenson, God after God, 173–4. 20 Cf. the claim made by Jenson’s student, Colin Gunton, that in Barth ‘the history of God with man is telescoped, for the future is not understood eschatologically, as the year when there will take place new triune events, but seen to be merely the vehicle of the repetition of a timeless past’ (Becoming and Being: The doctrine of God in Charles Hartshorne and Karl Barth, 183).
Introduction
7
well-known allegation made by Berkouwer that Barth had made grace into a general principle 21—for eternity is given definite shape through the story of Jesus Christ. And yet, as Barth narrates it, this Urgeschichte of God with humanity somehow leaves no room for ‘life-stories distinct from that of Jesus’.22 More precisely, the problem comes down to Barth’s loss of nerve in Christology, where he seemingly allows a Nestorian separation of Christ’s ‘natures’ to occur, so that the single history of Christ, in which God and humanity are at one, becomes ‘the history between the two natures of Christ’.23 Put differently, the problem of mediating historically between past and present, Christ and us, is ultimately resolved by Barth by removing Christ from time. Human and divine histories come apart once again, the former being described merely as an ‘analogy’ of the latter, like the ‘copy’ of a Platonic ‘prototype’, with all the deleterious consequences for the gospel that rupture entails:24 The problem [of relating Christ’s past to our present] is systematically solved by making the great christological identifications—God is what happens with Christ; we are what we are for him; creation is the carrying out of his life—ambiguous, and so leaving a loophole for God’s transcendence. But the ambiguity is precisely the shimmering possibility of reading all these statements in terms of timeless eternity.25
In short, even though the Christological and Trinitarian dogmas now shape Barth’s doctrine of God, his dogmatics continues to drift 21
In Berkouwer, The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth; see Jenson, Alpha and Omega, 102. 22 Jenson, Alpha and Omega, 134. Similar criticisms are made by Balthasar, who argues that Barth ends up squashing human history into ‘the Procrustean bed of Barth’s Christological schema’ (The Theology of Karl Barth, 242); and Ford, arguing that diverse or particular human histories are ultimately crowded out in Barth’s theology by a ‘monism of the Gospel story’ (Barth and God’s Story: Biblical narrative and the theological method of Karl Barth in the ‘Church Dogmatics’, 13). 23 Jenson, Alpha and Omega, 130. Stadtland traces what he refers to as the ‘dividing up of the whole of world-reality’ in Barth’s dialectical theology (Eschatologie und Geschichte in der Theologie des jungen Karl Barth, 127) back to a docetic Christfigure, ‘of whom much can be stated, except that he is a human being or has anything to do with Jesus Christ’ (ibid., 97). 24 Cf. Roberts’ description of the Church Dogmatics as ‘a profound theological totalitarianism stemming from the application of the principle of the analogia fidei in a context bereft of any vestiges of natural theology (and thus of natural reality or the natural order itself)’ (A Theology on Its Way? Essays on Karl Barth, 56). 25 Jenson, God after God, 154.
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
8
ambivalently back towards the philosophical opposition between eternity and time, in keeping with what (for Jenson) is a seemingly unshakeable habit of thinking in Western theology. This same judgement—made initially by Althaus, and pursued with such consistently ingenious originality by Jenson—has at times been so commonplace as to be virtually taken for granted by commentators. It can then be used to support a large variety of different cultural– historical theories of how Barth’s theology is to be read. Albrecht Oepke, for instance, interpreting Barth as the representative figure of decline in post-war Europe, took his theology to be a cross between the mysticism of Eckhart and Sankara, typical of the kind of spiralling thought into which all cultures plunge when they lose confidence in the trajectory of their histories.26 Indeed, Barth’s mysticism (for Oepke) was not of the harmless, ‘affective’ type, which is common to any desire to deepen religious experience, but a ‘radical’ mysticism,27 built on an eschatological ‘theopanism’, the ultimate ontological annihilation of the creature’s history in eternity.28 Or again, in a rather different vein, it has been suggested that the strong opposition between eschatology and history was responsible for Barth’s disengagement from German politics in the 1920s and 30s.29 For example, Reinhold Niebuhr, who otherwise welcomed Barth’s criticism of the kind of naı¨ve historical optimism he disdained in Anglo-Saxon theology, nevertheless warned, as early as 1928, that his thought was beset by an ahistorical absolutism, which made it an impracticable guide amidst the trials and perplexities and tragic choices confronting human beings from day to day.30 The warning was confirmed, Niebuhr thought, by Barth’s ineffectiveness during the Nazi period, and then reissued subsequently when Barth refused to criticize communism in Hungary. Because
26
27 Oepke, Karl Barth und die Mystik, 81f. Ibid., 23–5. Ibid., 54. Balthasar borrowed the idea of ‘theopanism’, which he describes as a ‘monism of beginning and end’, in his own reading of Barth’s dialectical theology (Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth, 84, 94). 29 The allegation that Barth was disengaged is, in fact, highly debatable. For a brief re´sume´ of some of the main lines of Busch’s defence of Barth in his huge study, Unter dem Bogen des einen Bundes: Karl Barth und die Juden, 1933–1945, see his short essay, ‘Indissoluble unity: Barth’s position on the Jews during the Hitler era’. 30 The articles are collected in Niebuhr, Essays in Applied Christianity, 141–93. 28
Introduction
9
his theology was ‘constructed too much for the great crises of history’, Niebuhr held, by the time such crises occurred and Barth began to speak out, it was already too late.31 This was merely a reflection of the broad tendency in his theology for the historical and relative to be submerged by the eternal and absolute. ‘God, the will of God, and the Kingdom of God are conceived in such transcendent terms that nothing in history can even approximate the divine; and the distinctions between good and evil on the historical level are in danger of being reduced to irrelevancies.’32 A slightly different (and considerably more sophisticated) version of the same argument has been offered recently by German theological historians, who have tried to involve Barth in a wider ‘antihistorical’ tendency, said to pervade German culture in the 1920s.33 F. W. Graf, for example, taking up a thesis first proposed by Trutz Rendtorff,34 suggests that Barth developed a theory of God’s absolute subjectivity which was intent upon absorbing all historical reality into the divine life. By positing God as ‘an utterly unconditioned, voluntaristic, and uncompromisingly powerful acting subject’,35 the aim was to establish theology’s credentials as the total interpretative category of the real, thus robbing historical contingencies of any semantic value. Indeed: [t]hrough an act of semantic usurpation, Barth even de-historicizes the concept of history: empirical history is swallowed up by the divine ‘Urgeschichte’, ‘God’s eternal history’, ‘inner-divine history’, ‘the history of Jesus Christ’, ‘the history of revelation, ‘the history of God with humanity’,
31
Niebuhr, ‘We are men and not God’ (1948), in Essays in Applied Christianity, 172. See also Dannemann, Theologie und Politik im Denken Karl Barths, 118–20. 32 Niebuhr, ‘Barthianism and the Kingdom’ (1931) in Essays in Applied Christianity, 148. 33 Graf, ‘Die “anti-historische Revolution” in der protestantischen Theologie der zwanziger Jahren’; also, Novak, ‘Die “antihistorische Revolution”. Symptome und Folgen der Krise historischer Weltorientierung nach dem ersten Weltkrieg in Deutschland’. 34 Rendtorff ’s claim is that Barth’s theology should not be read as a post-Enlightenment revival of orthodoxy, but as the continuation of the Enlightenment project itself, albeit that the aim is now ‘not the freedom and autonomy of humanity, but the freedom and autonomy of God’ (‘Radikale Autonomie Gottes: Zum Versta¨ndnis der Theologie Karl Barths und ihre Folgen’, 164). 35 Graf, ‘Die “anti-historische Revolution”’, 395.
10
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
‘salvation history’, and ‘the history of the community’. Everything finite only has history to the extent that it participates in God’s history.36
However, Graf argues, by divinizing the notion of absolute subjectivity, Barth is in reality disguising the fact that the concept itself has been retained in his anthropology as well, where it re-emerges in the form of a ‘will for the present’.37 In other words, although God appears to be a salutary point beyond the crises of historical relativism and scepticism, the real drive behind Barth’s notion of divine U¨ bergeschichtlichkeit is a doctrine of immediacy which excises all historical relations, enabling the human subject to realize itself, unencumbered by any ulterior historical preoccupations. Not only, then, does the anti-historical theology practised by Barth (and others) in the 1920s make engagement in complex moral dilemmas impossible, as Niebuhr had claimed. The quest for a break with the past, combined with ‘the religious longing for a life beyond all mediations’, actually makes Barth’s theology structurally parallel with the totalitarian political theories of the day, with their ‘pretensions to universal cultural leadership’ based on ‘exclusive access to the truth’.38 Finally, mention should be made of Barth’s own self-criticisms. At various stages, and with varying motives, he was ready to issue retractions of his earlier work by characterizing it in terms of a general failure to properly construe the relation of eternity and time. In a famous passage of the Church Dogmatics, he describes his earlier theology as heading towards the ‘systematic . . . reduction of God’s eternity to the denominator of post-temporality’.39 Furthermore, he was subsequently happy to confess that he, along with the other dialectical theologians, had made a philosophical dualism
36
Graf, ‘Die “anti-historische Revolution”’, 396. Ibid., 383 (italics original). 38 Ibid., 404. Pannenberg has consistently linked what he refers to as Barth’s ‘authoritarian supernaturalism’ with an anti-historical doctrine of time and eternity (e.g. ‘Can Christianity do without an eschatology?, 31). There is some truth to Graf’s claim that a desire for immediacy and ‘the removal of historical distance’ (‘Die anti-historische Revolution’, 390) drives Barth’s theology in the 1920s. Yet it would be wrong to imply that Barth sees this as being embodied in his own theology. More ambivalently, as we shall see, his theology inhabits a space in which historical distances remain, and theological immediacy is always hoped for, rather than achieved. 39 Barth, CD II/1, 634. 37
Introduction
11
between God and world the basis of his theology: ‘We viewed this “wholly other” in isolation, abstracted and absolutised, and set it over against man, this miserable wretch—not to say boxed his ears with it—in such fashion that it continually showed greater similarity to the deity of the God of the philosophers than to the deity of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.’40 Nevertheless, for all that such readings (and the number could be multiplied many times over) can lead to highly suggestive theorizations of Barth’s theology—and notwithstanding the apparent authority lent to them by the author’s self-criticism—they rarely bother refer to the writings themselves in order to enquire whether the theory is actually borne out in them. Indeed, even when they do, this often just means lifting a quotation out of its context in order to prove the dualism the author already knows to underlie Barth’s work. To resort to a principle of timeless eternity, or the opposition between eternity and history, in explaining Barth’s theological writings in the early 1920s not only fails to deal with the complexity of the texts; it is a red herring, which talks past what is really happening in them. And yet, a similar claim can be expressed in rather different terms. Let us take, for example, the substantial early study of Barth made by H. W. Schmidt. Like Althaus, who is regularly referenced, Schmidt thinks that the idea of an opposition between time and eternity gives us access to the ‘ultimate presuppositions’ behind dialectical theology.41 However, his reading is philosophically better informed than that of Althaus, and the resulting analysis becomes considerably more challenging. Schmidt’s contention is that Barth’s theology is an attempt to move beyond the general historical and psychological categories used by liberal Protestantism to construe what he calls ‘the eschatological rhythm of history’,42 in God’s dealings with the world. ‘Where revelation is referred to,’ Schmidt agrees with Barth, ‘it is a matter of God, not of the pitiful remains and half-truths which historical criticism has clung onto from the old truths of faith, as it
40 41 42
Barth, The Humanity of God, 44f. Schmidt, Zeit und Ewigkeit: Die letzten Voraussetzungen der dialektischen Theologie. Ibid., 382ff.
12
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
anxiously tries to prove them.’43 And yet, Barth is ultimately unable to move beyond liberalism because, into the eschatological-historical dialectic of revelation, ‘a philosophical, or better, a rational moment [is] dragged in from the outside’.44 However, Schmidt carefully corrects himself here. For his argument is not that Barth is dependent upon any particular philosophy as such;45 simply that his theology is an instance of the trespassing of reason beyond its due limits—the intrusion of what is inevitably and invariably non-eschatological reason upon an eschatological reality.46 This is by no means a new problem in theology, however, but the re-emergence of an unresolved controversy from the Reformation. In their anxiety not to reduce revelation to history, Schmidt claims, the Reformed theologians appealed to a logical mantra—finitum non capax infiniti—which ended up closing off the possibility of revelation in advance. In their anxiety to protect the historical reality of revelation, on the other hand, the Lutherans countered with a formulation—finitum capax infiniti—which simply repeated the same rational logic, but from the opposite direction. In other words, rather than being an eschatological history, revelation was treated in theology either as an impossibility or as a possibility, which could be accounted for from within reason.47 Schmidt’s argument is that Barth’s conflict with liberalism can be seen in similar terms. On either side, the eschatological–historical reality of revelation becomes the victim of laws dictated by an anti-historical, anti-eschatological, rationalism. With the Lutherans and liberals, revelation seems to retreat back to the merely historical. With Barth and the Reformed, the eschatological nature of revelation looks like it resolves up into a non-historical reality. Here too, then, Barth is interpreted as stuck in that same dialectic between eternity and time, and is said to advocate ‘the dissolution of a historical notion of revelation, and the claim that redemption and salvation are unhistorical’.48 43
Schmidt, Zeit und Ewigkeit: Die letzten Voraussetzungen der dialektischen Theologie, 159. 44 Ibid., 20 (italics original). 45 Cf. the more recent finding of Beintker that Barth’s relation to philosophy was ‘critically eclectic’ (Die Dialektik in der «dialektischen Theologie» Karl Barths, 242) rather than being directly influenced by one strand of philosophy. 46 Schmidt, Zeit und Ewigkeit, 174, 178. 47 48 Ibid., 158. Ibid., 108.
Introduction
13
However, the grounds of Barth’s dialectic are traced back by Schmidt to the aporetic structures of reason itself. He concurs with what he thinks of as Barth’s attempt to maintain an ‘infinite qualitative distinction’ between God and creation. Barth ‘undoubtedly had a deep understanding of the indispensable fundamental truths of Christianity, and did not want to go along with the way in which modern mediating theology diluted these and thinned them out’.49 It is just that, in drawing on the dialectic of time and eternity to describe this truth, Barth in fact resorted to a rational category which ends up eliminating a distinction that can, finally, only be maintained by that history itself: We can almost say that the distance between eternity and time is reduced by dialectic, because the personal character of God’s relation with humanity is lost . . . We will best grasp God’s distance from all time by depicting it as beyond opposition [u¨bergegensa¨tzlich] and beyond dialectic [u¨berdialektisch].50
The problem with Barth’s theology is in fact the problem of theological rationality tout court: namely, it inevitably appears to contain God, by dictating in advance what is conceivably possible—even when this possibility is referred to as an ‘impossibility’.51 Thus, for Schmidt, Barth’s rhetoric about the ‘impossibility’ of revelation, salvation etc. is a clear indication of reason’s trespass into the domain of the eschatological, from where it can dictate terms over God. In turn, this means that the dialectical opposition of eschatology and history is merely symptomatic, a surface indication that theological reason has overreached itself. Although I believe this reading of Barth to be incorrect, it comes near to the heart of the issue. The acute pathos of Barth’s theology in Go¨ttingen stems, in fact, from his awareness of the danger Schmidt diagnoses: that theology might end up replacing the eschatological reality it intended to display. However, I shall argue (contra Schmidt) that Barth’s theological dialectic ought not be seen as evidence of this having occurred, but precisely as the struggle (albeit one whose outcome cannot be guaranteed from within the circle of theological argument) to prevent this occurring. Friedrich Seven has shown that 49
50 Ibid., 171. Ibid., 189. For Schmidt’s discussion of the philosophical notion of possibility, which Barth’s theology allegedly assumes, see ibid., 176ff. 51
14
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
the ‘metaphysics’ that Barth (like Heidegger) opposes, is the form or structure of reflection itself, as this brings Being into the presence of thought (im Akt des Gegenwa¨rtigens). Thinking, in other words, never occurs in the abstract, independently of a disposition of the human will, but by taking up a particular relation (Bezug) towards things. And so, it always remains plausible that thought might become governed by what Seven refers to as ‘the will to empower itself over Being’.52 Barth is, in fact, highly conscious of the risk of theological reason assuming control over, or replacing, God; and his theology at the beginning of the 1920s is to be understood as a sustained effort to avoid this happening.53 In and after Ro¨merbrief II, his writing developed into a self-aware and self-ironic process,54 designed to point up the inability of the rational human subject to tie God down conceptually. If Barth often resorts to a negative rhetoric in trying to depict the relation between God and humanity, the intention is to convey God’s non-containability, his capacity to evade the human will in thought. The eschatological disruption caused by God’s presence has nothing to do with any annihilation of history, as such, but concerns the ordering of the relation of creatures to the creator; an order registered, first of all, in theological reason itself. Barth’s theology is to be thought of as rigorously ‘anti-metaphysical’, in the sense that the possibility of reversing the order of that relation arises when thought operates a kind of double-objectification: of God apart from humanity, and of humanity apart from God. What he wants to avoid, above all, is a theology that describes God and humanity in abstraction from one another, for this is the gap into which human rationality is ready to insert itself in its efforts to escape the eschatological presence of God in thought. In the Church Dogmatics, it is the christocentrism of the doctrine of God which, together with theological ethics, guards against this abstraction. In CD II/2, } 33, for example, Barth at least gestures towards a position where the mysterium paschalis is definitive of the
52
Seven, Die Ewigkeit Gottes und die Zeitlichkeit des Menschen, 12. Thus, Barth’s theology in the 1920s is exactly the opposite of the ‘onto-theology’ Stadtland takes it to be (Eschatologie und Geschichte, 183, 188). 54 Frei refers to this as new mode of dialectic in Barth’s theology as the ‘dialectic of concepts or judgements’ (The Doctrine of Revelation in Karl Barth, 132). 53
Introduction
15
eternal togetherness of God with humanity, so that it becomes God’s very essence to be Deus pro nobis. However strongly we read that audacious move,55 it is ruled out in advance for Barth’s theology in Go¨ttingen because of his anxiety about dogmatic over-description of God. ‘God is God’ (UCR I, 164), he insists: any further statement about God is an abstraction from that tautology.56 And yet, to say that ‘God is God’ is not to say that God exists in isolation. Quite the reverse: it is the confession, based upon God’s presence to the theologian, that the God of whom the theologian speaks will not suffer being replaced by what the theologian says of him. In other words, this moment of encounter between God and humanity, in which each of them is theologically defined, is attested by the theologian’s loss for words. If God is not Deus pro nobis, in Barth’s theology in Go¨ttingen, he is nevertheless most emphatically Deus cum nobis. This Denkform might be seen as an instance of the ‘Chalcedonian pattern’ of Barth’s theology.57 However, its more direct antecedent is to be found in the doctrine of revelation Barth inherits from his teacher, Wilhelm Herrmann.58 For Herrmann, it was not so much the domestication of God within historical and psychological realities that constituted the major theological danger, as the abstraction of God from human reality. For any hint of a gap here means that human life remains bound by law, a striving after God, remote from God’s gracious turn to be with humanity. ‘The chief end of 55 For a strong reading of the identity between God’s immanent being and his election of humanity, see McCormack, ‘Grace and Being’; for a very different reading of Barth’s doctrine of the immanent Trinity, Molnar, Divine Freedom and the Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity, esp. 61–4. As McCormack points out (‘Grace and Being’, 102), Barth tended to guard against a total identification: ‘In Himself and as such [the Son] is not Deus pro nobis, either ontologically or epistemologically’ (Barth, CD IV/1, 52). 56 Migliore suggests that ‘God is God’ is ‘the theme of the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics’ (‘Karl Barth’s first lectures in dogmatics: Instruction in the Christian Religion’, xxvi). Busch goes further, arguing that it is the constant theme of Barth’s theology from 1916 to the end of his career (Die Anfa¨nge des Theologen Karl Barth in seinen Go¨ttinger Jahren, 21–2). 57 Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth, 185ff. 58 See Korsch, who shows how Barth’s doctrine of revelation takes up an aporia Herrmann left unresolved in his: namely, the grounds for the discontinuity of revelation within the continuity of the human consciousness (Korsch, ‘Fraglichkeit des Lebens und Evidenz des Glaubens. Karl Barth und Wilhelm Herrmann im Gespra¨ch u¨ber Offenbarung und menschliche Subjektivita¨t’, 135, 137ff.).
16
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
every religion’, Herrmann claimed, ‘is to secure God’s communion with each individual soul, and every devout man knows that he himself cannot bring about that communion, but that God does it for him.’59 This was the conviction that drove Herrmann’s sustained attack on the doctrinal orthodoxy of late-nineteenth-century Protestantism. So long as revelation is thought of, not as communion (Verkehr), but only as ‘information concerning God’, we are left in the ‘miserable condition’ of having in our own strength ‘to obtain the certainty of a real communion of God with ourselves’.60 Although Barth would come to regard as unnecessary the antithesis Herrmann describes between theological doctrine and the revelation of grace, his concept of revelation, in Go¨ttingen at any rate, shares the same conviction that revelation fundamentally means a communion—or rather, a coming together (for Barth wants to emphasize the eschatological novelty of this event)—between God and humanity, and that everything depends theologically on depicting them in this encounter. If Barth brings any ‘metaphysical’ presupposition to his theology, it is precisely the opposite of an abstract dualism whereby the reality of revelation is brought under threat. The distance between God and humanity is never an abstract transcendence of God and creatures, for Barth, but the distance between two counterparts bound in a personal encounter, an encounter which is constantly threatened by the human being’s attempt to become his or her own creator.
¨ T TINGEN 2. BARTH’S THEOLOGY IN GO The period of Barth’s work I analyse in this book—indeed, the wider period between 1921 and 1935 which he spent teaching in Germany—has lately come under new scrutiny from Barth scholars.61
59
Herrmann, The Communion of the Christian with God, 199. Ibid., 58. 61 See the collection of papers from the conference that took place in Emden earlier this decade, Beintker, Link, and Trowitzsch (eds.), Karl Barth in Deutschland (1921–1935): Aufbruch–Kla¨rung–Widerstand. 60
Introduction
17
This is largely down to the posthumous publication of the academic lectures Barth delivered during these years, which has cast new light on the development of his theology between Ro¨merbrief II and the Church Dogmatics. My analysis here is based almost exclusively on works Barth produced while teaching in Go¨ttingen, and especially on the academic lecture courses he gave there. These lectures may be divided into three categories: Reformed theology and history, biblical exegesis, and dogmatics. Strangely, Barth almost never makes explicit crossreference between these, so that part of the work of the interpreter is to draw out some of the appropriate connections. The texts were not published by Barth, nor intended to be. They were preparatory work, partly for the sake of the students whom Barth was preparing for ministry in the German Reformed church, partly for Barth’s own theological career. Although he would gather materials together in the vacation before the start of term, and make a preliminary study of the literature before the lecture course began, the lectures themselves were written as he went along, and often late into the night before they were to be delivered. They are, therefore, not finished statements so much as Barth’s intuitive and somewhat rushed dealings with subjects he was generally becoming acquainted with from scratch. That they are often highly readable, penetrating and original pieces of writing is testimony to his remarkable capacity to assimilate large quantities of theology and quickly penetrate the heart of the matter. The recent availability of all this material has moved Barth scholarship forwards in various ways. In particular, the Reformed theology lectures have made clear the importance of reading Barth as the Reformed thinker he quite consciously became in Go¨ttingen. In that respect, Matthias Freudenberg has given an important and welldocumented account of the status and internal politics of the German Reformed church that Barth encountered in the early 1920s, as well as of the academic rivalries Barth ran up against as a Reformed theologian in the overwhelmingly Lutheran faculty.62 In addition, John Webster has shown how some of the most characteristic themes of 62 Freudenberg, Karl Barth und die reformierte Theologie, 17–86. See also the historical background given by Busch, Die Anfa¨nge des Theologen Karl Barth in seinen Go¨ttinger Jahren, 8–12.
18
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
Barth’s writing, not least the connection between divine sovereignty and ethics, can be traced to Barth’s identity as a Reformed Christian.63 There has also been some recent interest in the exegetical lectures on 1 Corinthians (titled, Die Auferstehung der Toten), first published by Barth in 1923, soon after they were delivered in Go¨ttingen.64 However, most of Barth’s exegetical lecture courses are yet to appear in the Gesamtausgabe, and so they await further work. Of all the academic lectures from this period, the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics has received most attention, although this has primarily been as a means of indicating something about Barth’s development in the 1920s.65 One approach, for example in the introductory essays of Daniel Migliore and Hinrich Stoevesandt, has been to outline the continuities and differences between the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics and the Church Dogmatics.66 Stoevesandt, however, concludes his piece with the plea that the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics not only be read in terms of the later work, but given the chance to speak for itself. Indeed, he appeals for the two works to be granted ‘equal rights’, proposing that they be treated as complementary, even as ‘mutually corrective’.67 The ‘vertical open-endedness’ of the earlier lectures, he argues, might serve as a critical rejoinder to the rather more ‘finished’ CD, whose ‘tightly constructed architecture’ easily masks the ‘provisionality’ and the ‘venturesome nature’ of all dogmatic work.68 The most extensive analysis of the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics is by Bruce McCormack. Building on the work of Michael Beintker and Ingrid
63 Webster, ‘The theology of Zwingli’ and ‘The theology of the Reformed confessions’ in Barth’s Earlier Theology, 15ff., 41ff. 64 Fergusson, ‘Barth’s The Resurrection of the Dead: Further reflections’; Grieb, ‘Last things first: Karl Barth’s theological exegesis of 1 Corinthians’; Webster, ‘The resurrection of the dead’ in Barth’s Earlier Theology, 67ff. 65 In his study of Barth’s dialectic, for example, Beintker, contrasts the christological focus of dialectics in Barth’s Christliche Dogmatik im Entwurf (1927) with the dialectics in the GD (Beintker, Die Dialektik in der «dialektischen Theologie» Karl Barths, 177–82). 66 Migliore, ‘Karl Barth’s first lectures in dogmatics: Instruction in the Christian Religion’; Stoevesandt, ‘Die Go¨ttinger Dogmatikvorlesung: Grundri der Theologie Barths’. 67 Stoevesandt, ‘Die Go¨ttinger Dogmatikvorlesung’, 95. 68 Ibid., 96.
Introduction
19
69
Spieckermann, his major monograph has two main purposes.70 The first is to reassess the claim, established principally by von Balthasar, that Barth’s theological development throughout the 1920s can be described in terms of a shift from dialectic to analogy.71 By showing that elements of dialectic and analogy are present in both the earlier and later Barth—and, indeed, by pointing out that the terms are not really equivalent, in any case, so that to talk of a shift from the one to the other becomes conceptually meaningless— McCormack has demonstrated a far greater continuity in Barth’s writings than was often previously assumed to be the case.72 He describes only one major ‘break’, occurring during the First World War, before which Barth had been ‘a dedicated and convinced theological liberal’.73 From 1915 on, however, Barth began to develop a ‘critically realist’74 position, a position which emerged from the realization that the theologies of religious experience in which he had been educated had made God into a human possession.75 The subsequent shifts and turns Barth’s theology would continue to undergo for two decades were simply (contra Balthasar) internal adjustments made to sharpen up Barth’s initial intuition about the supreme priority of God. McCormack’s further aim was to discredit the idea, virtually axiomatic in certain circles of Anglo-Saxon scholarship, that Barth’s theology was correctly describable as a ‘repristinated’ (neo-)orthodoxy. By studying the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics, in which the sources upon which Barth constructed his dogmatics are still very close to the surface, he is able to show in detail just how much of an innovator Barth was within the scholastic tradition he was now working on. Although McCormack goes so far as to describe the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics as a kind of ‘sentence commentary’ on Heppe’s Reformed Dogmatics, his point is that ‘Barth’s use of his basic text, like the Sentence Commentaries of
69 Beintker, Die Dialektik in der «dialetkischen Theologie» Karl Barths; Spieckermann, Gotteserkenntnis. Ein Beitrag zur Grundfrage der neuen Theologie Karl Barths. 70 McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its genesis and development, 1909–1936. 71 Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth, 86–113. 72 McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology, esp. 16–20. 73 74 75 Ibid., 78. Ibid., 129–30. Ibid., 106–7.
20
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
centuries past, was an exercise in original thinking.’76 In fact, Barth’s ‘critical realism’ made any return to the metaphysical positivism so ruthlessly exposed by Kant in orthodox Protestant scholasticism impossible. Even if the critical epistemology through which Barth read the scholastics did not make him an unreconstructed Kantian—since the limits to human knowledge, McCormack is careful to stress, are derived by Barth from the revelation of the divine mystery, rather than from philosophical reason—‘the problem being addressed is described in Kantian terms’.77 McCormack’s analyses of Barth’s dogmatics in the 1920s are designed to show the modernity of Barth’s thought by indicating how he developed this critical doctrine of revelation by reading it through the classical dogmas of the Trinity and Christology, which form the doctrinal heart of his dogmatics. The claim that Barth (in the words of Richard Roberts) ‘transmitted the tradition virtually entire at the cost of its alienation’,78 therefore becomes untenable. Notwithstanding the boldness of the argument, and the precision of analysis, McCormack’s thesis has not found universal agreement among Barth scholars, especially in Germany. The criticisms turn around the claim that McCormack does not take enough ‘theological distance’ from Barth;79 and that by buying into Barth’s polemics against neo-Protestantism, he has failed to see that the rhetoric of total repudiation is, in this case, a dialectical move operated from within that tradition.80 In short, because Barth presupposed, and made his own, the problems surrounding the constitution of the religious and moral subject that had preoccupied liberal Protestantism, the
76 McCormack, A Scholastic of a Higher Order: The development of Karl Barth’s theology, 1921–31, 563. 77 McCormack, ‘Revelation and history in a transfoundationalist perspective: Karl Barth’s theological epistemology in conversation with a Schleiermacherian tradition’, 32. 78 Roberts, A Theology on Its Way?, xiv. 79 Korsch, ‘Bruce L. McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology’, 217. Cf. also the comment of Pfleiderer that McCormack’s argument ‘seems to presuppose what it wants to explain: namely, the particular theological Inhaltlichkeit of Barth’s theology’ (‘«Inkulturationsdialektik»: Ein Rekonstruktionsvorschlag zur modernita¨tstheoretischen Barthinterpretation’, 241). 80 As Harmut Ruddies observed in 1985, talk of a ‘Traditionsabbruch’, into which Barth sometimes liked to lapse, amounts, in the end, to a metaphor (Ruddies, ‘Karl Barth und Wilhelm Herrmann. Aspekte aus den Anfa¨ngen der dialektischen Theologie’, 52).
Introduction
21
idea of a turn away from liberal to dialectical theology becomes questionable.81 It needs pointing out that there is more at stake here than historical accuracy. Although one generally struggles to find a precise definition of what is meant by ‘neo-orthodoxy’, its detractors seem to have in mind something more fundamental than the repristination of supposedly obsolete theological categories. The serious charge is that orthodox dogmatics is rationalist, and usually involves abstracting in one way or another from human reality. That being so, acquitting Barth of this would have to mean more than attending to his epistemology. Indeed, if he were singularly preoccupied with the problem of the knowledge of God, this might just be evidence of a rather superficial interest in human existence, which in real experience emerges as a more complex and troublesome phenomenon. McCormack has responded to criticism by restating that the heart of Barth’s doctrine of revelation was not his Kantian epistemology (which McCormack finds problematic) but ‘the situation of the first disciples . . . who were directly confronted by the man Jesus’.82 And so, ‘[w]hat determined [Barth’s] theology from now on was not
81 The point has been made in different ways more recently. Folkart Wittekind, for example, seeks to show that even while he was studying with Hermann in Marburg, Barth was never content simply to reproduce his teacher’s position, in the controversy between Herrmann and Troeltsch, which was peaking around that time. From the beginning he tried to make an original and critical contribution of his own, from within the Ritschlian tradition (Wittekind, Geschichtliche Offenbarung und die Wahrheit des Glaubens, esp. 148–53). Thus, the idea of a complete break between ‘liberal’ and ‘dialectical’ theology becomes questionable, since Barth was never straightforwardly ‘liberal’ in the first place, and never finally ceased to be so either. Christophe Chalamet has made a similar case recently, categorizing Herrmann, along with his two students Barth and Bultmann, as ‘dialectical theologians’, all three (Chalamet, Dialectical Theologians: Wilhelm Herrmann, Karl Barth and Rudolf Bultmann). His argument suffers, however, from a rather formal use of the term ‘dialectical’, so that the attempt to suggest the continuities between Barth and Herrmann never quite pierce through the surface of the way in which each of them elaborates Christian doctrine. The real point about Barth’s continuity with liberalism is, in fact, that he shares with it the question about agency and subjectivity. This claim is not new. It dates back, at least, to Rentdorff ’s programmatic essay, ‘Radikale Autonomie Gottes. Zum Versta¨ndnis der Theologie Karl Barths und ihre Folgen’. However, it denotes an approach that has had strangely little impact on Anglo-Saxon readings of Barth. 82 McCormack, ‘Der theologiegeschichtliche Ort Karl Barths’, 29.
22
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
an “abstract epistemological theory” but the concrete material demands of the doctrine of the Trinity and Christology, which give the Subject of revelation his due.’83 And yet, as I shall be arguing, Barth’s worry about removing revelation from history ought to be understood within a broader, and more basic concern about the standing of the human subject in relation to God. His energies are devoted to describing the objective historical grounds of revelation and to what happens to the human being in revelation as well (an interest he shares with liberal Protestant theology). McCormack tends to emphasize the former when making the case for Barth as a ‘modern’ theologian. The most ingenious analysis of the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics comes from within a massive study by Georg Pfleiderer. Like McCormack, Beintker, and Spieckermann, Pfleiderer thinks that identifying what is modern about Barth means trying to establish his basic Denkform; but he is unsatisfied by their attempts to locate this in Barth’s epistemology. Instead, he wants to get at what he calls the ‘hidden architectural plan’84 below the surface of Barth’s writing, by demonstrating the ‘paradigmatic significance’85 of his cultural engagement as a systematic theologian. Pfleiderer’s approach—which might be read as an application of Wolfgang Iser’s reception theory to Barth’s theology86—involves a Rekonstruktion of the pragmatic ‘environment’ of Barth’s texts, in order to uncover the dilemmas which lie behind them. In the case of the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics, the dilemma concerns the production of what Pfleiderer calls ‘a scientifically teachable theology’.87 Rather like avant-garde theatre, the primary intention of the theology in Ro¨merbrief II had been to ‘chivvy away at the reader’ who, in the process, is ‘dispossessed of his role as spectator in theoretical control, and made into a religious–theological participant’.88 And yet, that commentary left behind a problem, which Barth would subsequently begin to tackle in Go¨ttingen: it ‘creates disciples rather
83
McCormack, ‘Der theologiegeschichtliche Ort Karl Barths’, 39. Pfleiderer, Karl Barths praktische Theologie: Zur Genese und Kontext eines paradigmatischen Entwurfes systematischer Theologie im 20. Jahrhundert, 460. 85 86 87 88 Ibid., 6. Cf. ibid., 11f. Ibid., 390. Ibid., 442. 84
Introduction 89
23
than students’. By systematically denying his readers any theoretical standpoint from where they would become religiously independent from God (or ‘from theology’, as Pfleiderer sometimes puts it) Barth’s theology can only become reproducible, or methodologically learnable, by betraying its deepest impulses. Therefore, the ‘turn to analogy’, or to dogmatics, when Barth is in Go¨ttingen, is not to be understood according to epistemological theory alone but, more comprehensively, in terms of the practical theological dilemmas now facing him in his new institutional location. Now that Barth was addressing students who were training to become part of a ‘church elite’, he had to make his theology learnable, and his method explicit—and yet, this obligation already contradicted Barth’s most fundamental intentions. By turning itself into a science, Barth’s theology was threatened by nothing less than the loss of its religious–political claim to reality, its claim to be realized in real life, which transcends the academic system of reflection. The explicit interest in becoming institutional runs the risk of being counterproductive. The actual conceptual and figural problem of the dogmatician is how it is possible for theology to turn itself into a science without resurrecting the ‘spectator’, who is notoriously at home in the academy, and whose elimination Barth’s theology as a whole aims at.90 Pfleiderer’s discussion of how Barth copes with this problem is, perhaps, unnecessarily abstruse. It is also over-determined by the suspicion that Barth’s dogmatics was a form of theological authoritarianism, which was simply of a piece with the political trends of the day. Possibly, it is Pfleiderer’s commitment to reception theory which generates an over-interpretation, since reading texts backwards from their Wirkungsgeschichte inevitably tends to reduce their polyvalent complexity to the role they play within a rather unilateral historical trajectory. That aside, Pfleiderer’s analysis of the tensions in the dogmatics is largely borne out, I think, in my own readings of the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics. As Pfleiderer puts it, Barth is constantly torn between the ‘binary logic’ of pragmatic theological discourse (i.e. preaching) and the ‘tertiary structure’ of scientific reflection, which involves stepping back from the direct heat of that event. This means that, in the end, 89
Ibid., 377.
90
Ibid., 395.
24
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
‘dogmatic statements are precisely not descriptive statements’ in this dogmatics,91 because Barth quickly resolves them into the binary logic of theological proclamation. ‘Dogmatics is preaching for preachers; it is inconceivable without its religious–persuasive meaning.’92 *** The argument being made here turns on the observation that Barth’s theology—like that of Rudolf Bultmann, who had also studied under Herrmann in Marburg—proceeds from the conviction that human beings exist before God eschatologically. Human ontology is not a settled condition, a ‘nature’ of any kind, but a response to the imposing presence of God, who summons me to live beyond myself. Therefore, what defines this God most fundamentally is not his superiority over all other beings, nor his providential governance of history, but his encounter with human beings as their God. Both aspects of this are indispensable: God is not conceived of in abstraction from his creation, yet he meets it with such commanding superiority that, just as importantly, it may not extract itself from him. This encounter is what is meant by revelation: a ‘dialogue’ between human beings and God through God’s Word. It is something of a fundamental perspective in Barth’s theology in Go¨ttingen, the single point towards which the entire economy between God and humanity tends. The singularity of Barth’s perspective, generates two major dilemmas. First, because revelation is the Word of God, which God himself utters by turning to human beings, and because this is the unique moment of theological ‘reality’, theology—indeed, Christian ministry as such—is caught between an obligation to minister to this moment and an inability to do so. It is when God addresses the human person that God is truly God, for he or she can now no longer keep God at arms’ length. Human language, however, is unable to convey God’s movement—more specifically, his movementtowards—and so must speak of God in such a way that he ceases to be God. The problem becomes especially acute because Barth wants to do more than reflect on religious language itself. As he
91 Pfleiderer, Karl Barths praktische Theologie: Zur Genese und Kontext eines paradigmatischen Entwurfes systematischer Theologie im 20. Jahrhundert, 404. 92 Ibid., 419.
Introduction
25
tries to shift towards a positive theological idiom, he finds it difficult to wrestle free from a purely contrastive account of divine presence and human witness in Christian ministry. In God’s revelation, the one seems to cancel out the other. The second difficulty concerns Christian existence itself. The real dilemma raised by Barth’s doctrine of revelation in Go¨ttingen is not that of its historicity (or otherwise), but of the grounding of Christian existence in God. Barth is anxious that Christian existence should remain eschatological—an occurrence, rather than an ontologically stable reality—since any stabilizing of the human condition potentially provides a footing for the human subject to assert control over itself, and thus over God. The eschatological orientation of the Christian life means that it has no interior grounds, but is (re-)created in an act of divine grace which awakens a new type of subjectivity in relation to God. And yet, in denying any other than an eschatological basis to human action, the danger arises that the freedom of the human act is not generated by God at all, but is a selfgrounding spontaneity whose real impulse, after all, is wholly subjective. In other words, eschatological anthropology might topple back into exactly the problem it was invoked to avoid: creaturely independence from God. In the Church Dogmatics, Barth will deal with this by developing a strong Christology, combined with a theological ethics. Because Jesus Christ has universal human significance, he can become the ontological ground of my existence; a ground which, while established extra me, genuinely contains my reality as well—a fact which is then verified in the ethical sections of the dogmatics. However, Barth’s wariness about reifying human ontology means that, in Go¨ttingen, the doctrine of revelation is not structured around Christology, but around the encounter with God in the Word; and this in turn means that any positive account of human action always risks supplanting the moment of response to God’s presence.93 Ethics is an ‘auxiliary 93 In his analysis of the early Barth, Cullberg argued that ‘dialectical theology stands in the sharpest opposition to the tendency to ethicise faith’ because this would make faith into ‘an ethical achievement’ (Cullberg, Das Problem der Ethik in der Gegenwart, 17). More recently, Webster has argued that elements of a more positive ethics can be found even in Barth’s dialectical theology (Webster, ‘“Life from the third dimension”: Human action in Barth’s early ethics’ in Barth’s Moral Theology, 11–39).
26
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
discipline’ (Hilfswissenschaft), Barth insists, ‘in no way to be confused with dogmatics’ (UCR I, 274). What must be avoided is obscuring the moral venture of human life with God behind a selfpossessed human identity, out of which a person becomes able to act etsi Deus non daretur, even if this human being continues to be construed as ‘religious’. However, this leaves Barth on a knife-edge: to give an account of human nature is to abstract from the eschatological encounter with God. And yet, not to do so leaves the human being exposed in the face of the sheer spontaneity of God’s Word, and so always ready to ground herself. This is the dilemma addressed by Barth’s doctrine of baptism, which I discuss in my final chapter. The argument of the book runs as follows. After this Introduction, I begin with a chapter comparing texts by Barth with others by Bultmann from the same period. Although there are certainly differences in approach which will prepare the way for later controversies between them, by setting Barth’s theology alongside Bultmann’s, my aim is to show that, at the outset, it confronts exactly the same problem as his: namely, the eschatological presence of God in revelation, and the character of Christian existence in that presence. Both of them share the sense that theology is deeply challenged to discover an idiom which will correspond to the reality of God, not because God is absent from the world, but because he is with it in all his otherness, and his presence remains ever-new. Although Barth does not presuppose the exaggerated dualisms between God’s Word and human language, and between objective and existential time, as Bultmann does, the comparison is also useful in preparing for the critiques of Barth’s theology I will make in subsequent chapters. In Chapter 2, I turn to the doctrine of revelation, around which the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics is structured. As I show, however, the primacy of this doctrine has little to do with epistemology; revelation, in fact, is Barth’s shorthand for talking of the eschatological presence of God. It is a formal, rather than a material doctrine, focusing theology onto the moment of encounter (or ‘dialogue’) between God and humanity in the Word. Barth works this out by making preaching the location of this event, as the church’s attempt to respond to the existential human question. By developing an account of the human person as ‘questioner’, Barth prevents his strong eschatology from implying the abstraction of any pure human nature. Surprisingly, this leads him to
Introduction
27
develop, in the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics, a kind of negative proof for God, based in the phenomenon of the fragmentariness of human existence: the more acute the experience of divine absence, the more sure is God’s presence. In Chapter 3, I show that Barth’s turn to dogmatics did not, initially, envisage a positive theology of any kind, but was a direct rebuttal of modern religious anthropology. First, Barth indicates an absurdity in the latter: by making the religious subject its theme, Religionswissenschaft makes God an object, thereby falling prey to exactly the criticism it made of classical theism. Secondly, Barth proposes that to make preaching, rather than religious sentiment, the ‘raw material’ for dogmatics is, in fact, to provide a far less esoteric point of departure—which therefore better meets the empirical standards of modern science. However, because he is worried about detracting from the eschatological presence of the Word of God, Barth finds it difficult to move beyond the choice between identifying or opposing dogmatics and revelation. As I show at the end of the chapter, he will start to develop an alternative conceptuality in 1925–6 (his first term teaching in Mu¨nster) when, through his lectures on John’s Gospel, Barth articulates an understanding of witness which enables him to shift out of that contrastive account of Christian ministry. In Chapter 4, I turn back to Barth’s lectures on Reformed theology which were the major preparation work for the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics. Here, I introduce the themes that will be to the fore in the latter part of the book. Barth becomes interested in the Reformed account of the Christian life, and increasingly in its sacramental and Christological controversies with Lutheran theology. Their inability to reach a consensus position is a kind of historical confirmation of the impossibility of giving a direct statement of divine revelation. Yet equally importantly, the controversies indicated to Barth the need for Christian existence to be grounded objectively if it was not to slip into some form of subjectivism. In Chapter 5, I turn to Barth’s Christology. We shall find that his doctrine of the anhypostatic human nature of Jesus Christ is not the anti-historical move in Christology it has often been taken to be. In fact, I argue, Barth’s dialectic of revelation as hiddenness demands (at least formally) that Jesus be fully human if revelation is to occur at all.
28
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
Similarly, in his doctrine of the Resurrection Barth does not simply locate the event beyond history, as he is often criticized for doing. On the other hand, I suggest that he does curtail the impact of the Resurrection, in effect making the doctrine identical with the ascension, because of his concern not to reify or stabilize the event, and so to detract from the novelty of divine presence. The problem, in other words, concerns the way in which Christology is related to his moral theology. Finally, in Chapter 6, I turn to Barth’s pneumatology. The chapter has three aims. First, I look at how Barth’s account of the Spirit is developed in opposition to modern Protestant exponents of ‘religion’ (Harnack and Schleiermacher). Secondly, I examine Barth’s doctrine of the Christian life, and suggest that it is the strong focus on revelation in Barth’s theology in Go¨ttingen which makes it difficult for him to develop the positive and wide-ranging account of Christian ethics he would articulate later in his career. Finally, I examine Barth’s sacramental theology which, far from being of secondary importance in Barth’s early dogmatics, is actually used to resolve a problem generated by the eschatological orientation he is working with here. Barth loses confidence in the ability of the eschatological Word to ground and sustain the existential act of the human subject, and so develops a baptismal economy of grace as well, in order to provide an objective ground for human freedom within the subject itself.94 94 For the sake of consistency, and because there are no English versions of a number of the texts I am using, all quotations of Barth are my own translations from the German editions.
1 Eschatological Existence in Barth and Bultmann I have two objectives in this chapter. The first is to examine the way in which Barth and Bultmann describe the form of existence to which the gospel summons Christians; the second, to indicate two issues which result from this (set out briefly in the introduction), showing how Barth and Bultmann approach these slightly differently. I do this by looking in detail at texts by each of them from the 1920s. For both theologians, to be a Christian is to be remade by God into a new type of subject, and therefore not to be defined by any possessed ontology or nature, but by the eschatological relation in which this subject now exists. However, because this mode of existence is inherently unstable, human beings are always liable to try to evade it where possible. Moreover, they seek to do so even by evoking ‘God’; indeed, especially by doing so, for it may be that what they bring to mind as they imagine the deity is not necessarily the God who truly is, but only the concept of an ideal Being designed to replace his reality. In that way, they succeed in offering themselves religious grounds for reasserting their ontological stability, isolated from God and securely protected from his presence. The first issue arises from this. It concerns the problem that theology might be abetting the process just outlined by supplying readers with a concept of God at which we can grasp, even as we are really emancipating ourselves from him. For Bultmann, avoiding this raises the challenge of a wholly different understanding of theological language. For Barth, on the other hand, the challenge will be to operate within the ordinary constraints of human language which, though not fit for purpose, must nevertheless try to develop
30
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
a sufficiently mobile theological rhetoric to counteract the reification of grace. A second matter is connected to this, in that it too concerns the problem of reification—not of God, but of history. Because the understanding of the Christian gospel shared by Barth and Bultmann emerges from their reading of the New Testament, Christian existence is always described in terms of the Resurrection. In 1 Corinthians, for example, ‘resurrection’ often refers to a new life of human beings with God, composed of God’s reconstitution of their identity and their free act of obedience towards him. In chapter 15 of the epistle, Paul sets this moral eschatology within an eschatological history book-ended by two events, the Resurrection and Parousia of Jesus Christ. However, these two conceptions can be played off against one another. The ‘history’ of human obedience to God in Christ can become something purely notional: the history of Christ through time, behind which I can actually hide as a historical subject. In response to this, Bultmann argues that Paul’s theology works with two different, and contrasting, notions of time, Christian–existential and ‘objective’ time; and he insists that the former, which is the most characteristic for Paul’s idea of the Christian life, must be allowed to criticize the latter, which Paul had simply picked up from the ancient Jewish conception of the world. Barth’s reading of 1 Corinthians is less drastic. He thinks that Paul is quite aware of the risk of abstracting the doctrine of the Resurrection from the moral existence he is focused on. Indeed, the fifteenth chapter of the epistle is to be read as a polemic against the tendency of the church in Corinth to do just that. And so, the challenge of interpreting that chapter simply becomes to draw out the moral significance already latent in Paul’s doctrine of Jesus’ Resurrection. The present chapter is organized as follows. Having examined the principal features of Bultmann’s most important early work, Jesus and the Word, I shall compare my findings with Barth’s lectures on Paul’s epistle to the Ephesians, delivered during his first semester in Go¨ttingen. Following that, I shall turn to Barth’s well-known commentary on 1 Corinthians, The Resurrection of the Dead, together with Bultmann’s review of Barth’s book. Finally, I shall offer some concluding remarks, designed to prepare the reader for the interpretation of Barth proposed in the remainder of the book.
Eschatological Existence in Barth and Bultmann
31
1.1 ESCHATOLOGICAL EXISTENCE AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE
1.1.1 Bultmann: Jesus and the Word The conception of revelation as the rebirth of the human subject in faith, which lies at the heart of Jesus and the Word, is likely to have been inspired by Wilhelm Herrmann. Indeed, it is possible to read Bultmann’s book as the attempt to bring historical-Jesus scholarship out of the impasse it had reached after Johannes Weiss, by reconfiguring Weiss’ findings on eschatology in early Christianity in the light of Herrmann’s construal of Christian subjectivity. Bultmann goes about this by drawing a tight connection between Jesus’ eschatological preaching and a Christian ethic (a link which Weiss had tended to sever),1 so that eschatology specifies precisely the moral and religious existence Jesus envisaged. The principle is as follows: An intrinsic connection of eschatological preaching and moral demand would evidently exist only if the coming Kingdom is so conceived that it becomes clear without further explanation that there can be no other condition except the one, radical obedience. On the other hand, this inner connection can exist only if in this demand for obedience nothing is involved which conflicts with the belief in the coming Kingdom, if rather the demand for obedience really coincides with the call to prepare for the future.2
The ‘demand for obedience’ describes, first of all, the ethos Jesus inherited from Judaism. According to Bultmann, it is to be distinguished, on the one hand, from the Greek principle of conformity to natural law, and on the other, from the modern idea of individual autonomy, where the good is understood in terms of self-realization.3 What characterizes both of these alternatives is that they abstract from the ethical moment itself, namely the moment in real time in which an 1 ‘That which is universally valid in Jesus’ preaching, which should form the kernel of our systematic theology is not his idea of the Kingdom of God, but that of the religious and ethical fellowship of the children of God’ (Weiss, Jesus’ Proclamation of the Kingdom of God, 135). 2 Bultmann, Jesus and the Word, 122. 3 Ibid., 72, 84.
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
32
individual actually takes a decision. Instead, they observe this moment ‘from the outside’. They seek to deduce a systematized code of conduct from one or more fundamental rational axioms, so that when the moment arises, the individual will not be at a loss for what ought to be done. By contrast, Bultmann argues, Jesus did not arrive at principles of action following a process of moral reasoning, but took the good to be ‘intrinsically intelligible’ in the ethical demands that ‘arise quite simply from the crisis of decision in which man stands before God’.4 Indeed, he suggests, ethical deliberation, which draws on categories such as ‘law’, ‘nature’, ‘virtue’, ‘character’ etc., is exactly the opposite of Jesus’ theological ethic because, in preparing me for moral decisionmaking, such an ethic secures me from the historical contingency of the moment. In practice, this means that, at the point of deciding, I am no longer really answerable to God either. This is the case even if the ethic is then set alongside a theistic metaphysic, one in which God is conceived, say, as the ‘final cause’ or the ‘creative, active, formgiving power’ of the world. For the initial standpoint is still practically an atheistic one, according to Bultmann: the nature of God here is being idealized, determined in advance by the self-understanding of the isolated subject. ‘Such a representation of God corresponds to the conception which the Greek man had of himself as a microcosm, receiving form from a law identical with the great cosmic law, a form which is present as an ideal norm in human will and knowledge.’5 For Jewish thought, however, God is the ‘sovereign will’ which immediately claims human allegiance at every particular moment in life, and for this reason cannot be controlled under the human gaze. In short, Jewish (and Christian) theology does not simply propose a different conception of God. It completely reverses the relation of the human being to God: rather than being in a position to contemplate God from a distance, the human subject finds itself already under the claim of the God who becomes present. And yet, far from the presence of God being restrictive, Bultmann insists that it is to be regarded primarily as the basis of a positive determination of human personhood. In the obedience of the
4
Bultmann, Jesus and the Word, 87.
5
Ibid., 134.
Eschatological Existence in Barth and Bultmann
33
moment, I am released from the need to construct a false identity, behind which I continually retreat from true decision-making. In real obedience to God, in other words, I become free, because I am now entirely disposed towards, and unreservedly engaged in, the demands set by the present moment in time: ‘the choice between the possibilities is not determined by insight into them, but is free and responsible.’6 This responsible freedom is lost where authentic choosing in time is substituted for objective descriptions of a ‘world’, upon which I act only subsequently. For the ‘insight’ I have then acquired makes me a spectator of the world, rather than an agent in it. ‘Action loses its absolute character as the moment of decision when subordinated to the view-point of the end, the ideal.’7 This notion of moral obedience as unreservedly self-involved commitment sets Bultmann in an ethical tradition which includes Kant and, further back, Luther. The moral act is invariably a free act here, which means that it is not performed under the shadow of any externally constraining factors (state coercion, religious or moral law etc.) but because a person is inwardly or personally engaged by it. Unreserved commitment requires that there be no residue of ‘self’ outside the act— in Bultmann’s case, the act of obedience to God’s will. This is why he specifies Christian obedience as ‘radical’ obedience, as distinguished from a mere uncomprehending allegiance to, say, biblical commandments held by convention to be universally—timelessly—valid: For so long as obedience is only subjection to an authority which man does not understand, it is no true obedience; something in man still remains outside and does not submit, is not bound by the command of God. Criticism can still arise: in itself this does not concern me, in itself these things are indifferent—but I choose to obey. In this kind of decision a man stands outside of his action, he is not completely obedient. Radical obedience exists only when a man inwardly assents to what is required of him, when the thing commanded is seen as intrinsically God’s command; when the whole man stands behind what he does; or better, when the whole man is in what he does, when he is not doing something obediently, but is essentially obedient.8
Obedience to a moral programme of any kind can, Bultmann thinks, easily be harmonized with the self ’s strategies for escaping the moral 6
Ibid., 88.
7
Ibid., 101.
8
Ibid., 77.
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
34
demands which arise from historical existence lived in the presence of God. Radical obedience, however, involves making a spontaneous response to the demands of God. Yet because of that, it will always take the form of a genuine existential freedom, my total self-presence in what I am doing. As Bultmann elucidates this idea, it is apparent that the turn towards God it involves is intrinsically eschatological: the call to obedience may be described as the impingement of the future upon the present. But this must be the real future, he insists, rather than one that is ‘subject to my own fantasies and wishes’.9 Indeed, the real future is exactly the opposite of an ideal utopia at some indefinite point in the future, because ‘so far as its essential nature is concerned [the latter] could already have been some time’.10 An indefinite or ideal future, in other words, removes the future from time as it is really experienced. This is what Bultmann finds creeping into later Jewish eschatology, and is to be strongly contrasted with the way in which Jesus envisaged the future. Whereas for Jesus the future was always the imminent and utterly new moment in time, summoning a person ‘to act in his present life in accordance with the will of God’,11 late Jewish apocalyptic tended to exchange this for an object of contemplation which could be observed from a distance. The contemplative space thus generated between the subject and the objective future can then be occupied by the idealized, a-temporal self, out of reach of the direct eschatological–moral claim of God in time. By contrast, the real future, the future I am actually faced by, does not permit this kind of withdrawal from existence, nor the self-isolated construction of identity; it always confronts me with the truth that my reality is to be present in the world. It should be noted here that Bultmann is not reducing external reality (‘world’) to the individual consciousness, as his critics have often supposed, but seeking to prevent precisely that from happening.12 His argument is that individualism is countered effectively only if the fundamental mechanisms of human subjectivity are reversed, 9
10 11 Bultmann, Jesus and the Word, 142. Ibid., 142. Ibid., 55. Contra, e.g., Moltmann, who thinks that Bultmann represents the ‘retreat into an individual chimney-corner’ where people ‘exist . . . only in relation to themselves’ (The Coming of God, 21). 12
Eschatological Existence in Barth and Bultmann
35
and the self-protective, self-controlling impulse of the subject in constructing its own world is subverted. Bultmann’s driving insight is that the propensity to evade the eschatological challenge of God, and to ‘retreat into one’s own world’, can involve constructing the external world as a system of related objects (including the self, and God, as objects) and substituting this for reality, a process which ultimately results in the enslavement of the self within its own thought processes. From that insight arises the dilemma which would occupy Bultmann and his school thereafter: if the human subject is always liable to supplant divine reality with theoretical content from the mind, how is it possible to communicate theologically without abetting this process? As he puts it at the start of his famous essay, ‘What does it mean to speak of God?’: ‘If “speaking of [von] God” is understood as “speaking about [u¨ber] God” then such speaking has no meaning whatever, for its subject, God, is lost in the very moment it takes place.’13 Talking about God appears to mean that God is treated as a He or an It, rather than as an ‘I’, a subject. The grammatical object reflects the status God has now acquired for the one speaking, which is precisely the reverse of the status God properly commands. Again, it is important not to over interpret Bultmann on this point, as commentators have often done, because they ontologize hermeneutical difficulties as he refused to do. The more one supposes, for example, that world-reality and the linguistic ‘world’ are nearly identical, the more it will appear that Bultmann’s reluctance to speak ‘objectively’ about God is of a piece with the idealist thought he was wanting to resist, a reduction of God to the contents of one’s own self-understanding. Yet Bultmann avoids this reductionism.14 On the other hand, the way out of the dilemma which he gestures towards at the end of Jesus and the Word, is not satisfactory either. He suggests that the problem arises only because we take ‘Word’ to mean selfexpression, rather than address, i.e. relatedness to an ‘other’.15 His 13
Bultmann, ‘What does it mean to speak of God?’ 53. That this reading is not warranted, at least in the case of the early Bultmann, is well illustrated by an essay in which he responds to Emmanuel Hirsch’s criticisms of Jesus and the Word (‘On the question of Christology’, in Faith and Understanding, 116–44). Here, Bultmann defends his choice not to reduce faith to experience, as Hirsch would have liked to see. 15 Bultmann, Jesus, 216–18. 14
36
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
theological ‘solution’ to the problem of religious language, then, is merely to draw attention to this distinction, and so to the limits of human language; i.e. only to talk around the Word-event itself, and in that way to anticipate it without impeding its spontaneity. In other words, the strict opposition between ‘speaking about God’ and ‘speaking of God’ simply remains in place. ‘Speaking of God’ simply describes an existential dispossession, achieved in me by God, whereby I speak obediently as I am summoned to by God’s presence.16 However, this only raises, albeit in sharper terms, the following question: if God is not an object of thought, certainly, but a living reality, and if (as Bultmann agrees) the event of his presence evokes a human response, what is then to be said of this God? Merely to describe the disposition required for someone to speak of God aright does not yet address the fact that human language, for better or worse, does always say something. Assuming this ‘something’ is not wholly indifferent, the fact itself bears consideration; unless, that is, one argues that the right language will simply emerge once the proper existential conditions are in place. And yet, that cannot be what Bultmann means either, for then we are apparently back to the idea of language as self-expression—the very concept of the ‘Word’ he wanted to avoid.17 The terms he actually uses in referring to God (the ‘Wholly Other’, the ‘God of the future’, ‘God the remote and the near’ etc.) are supposed to convey the eschatological spontaneity of divine presence, and so they carry predominantly negative, or formal meaning. God is not determined otherwise than by being commandingly present in his inalienable otherness, for to over specify his ‘nature’ is, practically speaking, to deny his reality. And yet, as Bultmann knows, his own terms are no less exposed to that risk than any other; to speak about God as the one whose eschatological presence may not be conceptually tied down is still to speak about God. 16
Cf. Bultmann, ‘What does it mean to speak of God?’ 61–2. The best criticism of Bultmann has asked whether he has axiomatically presupposed the very Cartesianism he then sets out to overcome (cf. Gollwitzer, The Existence of God as Confessed by Faith, 113). Does he, that is, nearly end up implying that there is no objective (gegensta¨ndlich) reality at all because he is so concerned to avoid the specific danger of rendering it an object (Objekt) of the mind? 17
Eschatological Existence in Barth and Bultmann
37
1.1.2 Barth: Doxology in Paul’s Epistle to the Ephesians I shall compare Bultmann’s book with Barth’s posthumously published course of lectures on Ephesians, prepared on his arrival at Go¨ttingen, in the winter semester of 1921–2. Barth was nowhere near completing his commentary on the epistle before the end of the semester, and the great majority of the time is devoted only to analysis of the opening doxology in Eph. 1.3–14. Although from a formal point of view Barth’s text is quite different to Bultmann’s— Bultmann’s book is a polished, carefully organized essay on New Testament eschatology, Barth’s lectures a hasty attempt to paraphrase a single epistle, structured only according to the order presented by the biblical text itself—materially there is substantial common ground. For what Barth is drawn to, in the epistle’s doxology, is the eschatological mode of existence generated by the gospel. And yet at the same time, he is also intent on grasping how Paul manages to articulate that gospel, in a rhetoric of sufficient conceptual mobility to counteract the kind of reifying tendencies in human language I have just been describing. As he reads the doxology in Ephesians, Barth is struck how its rhetorical value is not merely to introduce the moral theology that will preoccupy Paul in subsequent chapters. Paul is not paying ‘lipservice’ (Lippenwerk) to the opera Dei here,18 but praising God’s works in order to stimulate that praise among his readers. Indeed, it seems clear to Barth that ‘praising God’ is an act which Paul regards as being definitive of Christian existence as such. The text was ‘obviously addressed to his readers with the intention of summoning them to praise as he does, drawing them in, so to speak, to the fundamental orientation from which he will speak to them’.19 Furthermore, this orientation is an eschatological one, for praise is an act which bespeaks a new mode of existence: ‘If a person can PºªE, something new has happened to him.’20 To praise means to be personally caught up into the new self-definition one has received
18 Barth, ‘Erkla¨rung des Epheserbriefs’ in Erkla¨rungen des Epheser-und des Jakobusbriefes, 80. 19 20 Barth, Epheserbrief, 76. Ibid., 80–1.
38
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
through, and in relation to, the works of God briefly recalled by the doxology. Furthermore, because this self-definition takes the form of a reference or relation, human ontology remains an eschatological orientation. Paul never resolves it into a stable condition or essential ‘being’ of any kind. Consider what it must mean: obviously a lofty being-outside-oneself, more lofty than what we tend to refer to in psychology as ecstasy; obviously an action in which man reaches out radically beyond the possibilities he knows . . . How, at any moment in time, could PºªE not mean the most extraordinary transformation, light out of darkness, the dissolution of time? No, says Paul: the origin, the spontaneity, what is essential about the human disposition as indicated by PºªE, truly never really lies in him, in the human being living in time . . . Entering the scene here, real in all its extraordinariness, is the divine possibility of man, which as such is beyond all perceiving, beyond the limits of humanity [Grenzen der Humanita¨t].21 But the divine possibility is as such necessity. It cannot express itself other than in absolute action.22
This ‘being-outside-oneself ’ is always expressed, as Barth says, in ‘absolute action’ because it remains a ‘divine possibility’. It is never collapsible into an interior human capacity of any kind, for this existence is intrinsically new; its newness is not just a contingent moment in its coming to be. And so, it is not re-describable as an internal rearrangement of the individual constitution, a new human ‘nature’ (Humanita¨t), as an abstract capacity with any substance beyond the act itself. One point in the lectures where this understanding of Christian existence clearly emerges is in Barth’s reading of Paul’s ‘through Christ’s blood’ (Eph. 1.7). In the course of his analysis of the verse, Barth passes comment on J. T. Beck’s doctrine of Christ’s blood as the ‘life-blood’ (Lebenskraft) of the Christian.23 Barth regards this as an illegitimate materialization of grace, whereby ‘blood’ is turned into the animating principle in a quasi-natural calculus of salvation. Instead of it, he argues that Paul’s phrase is to be taken as a reference 21 Barth is punning here on the title of Natorp’s book, Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der Humanita¨t. Ein Kapitel zur Grundlegung der Sozialpa¨dagik (Freiburg i. Br./Leipzig, 1894). 22 23 Barth, Epheserbrief, 82–3. Ibid., 110.
Eschatological Existence in Barth and Bultmann
39
to Jesus’ Crucifixion, ‘the suffering and action of Jesus in his Passion, in which that acquittal is declared by God in astonishing invisibility and hiddenness’.24 By referring ‘Christ’s blood’ back to those historical events, Barth does not mean to imply an externalist notion of grace. Rather, he is seeking to avoid the complete coincidence of grace and nature in human life, an identification which he takes to be utterly foreign to the epistle. For grace is never ‘direct communication of life’ in Paul,25 nothing ‘thing-like’ (dinglich), but an eschatological life, one which comes to be by virtue of an ever-new relation to ‘our absolute beyond’.26 Barth’s reading of the Ephesians doxology is suggested to him by Paul’s play on the words PºªE/PºªÆ in v. 3: ‘Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has blessed us in Christ with every spiritual blessing in the heavenly places.’ By using the same terminology to refer to human action in relation to God and to the divine act in blessing humankind, Paul establishes a link between God’s action and the human praise that is to be its ‘echo’.27 In other words, there is a correspondence between the eschatological existence of the Christian (praise) and the set of divine acts Paul evokes in vv. 3–14, to which praise is the response. Moreover, Paul’s text itself becomes significant now, not just as a testimony to Christian existence, but insofar as it also seeks to state the acts of God by which that existence occurs. Paul has ‘something objective to communicate [eine sachliche Mittleilung]’.28 It is possible not just to ‘empathize with’ (nachempfinden) him, but also, and especially, to ‘follow him in thought’ (nachdenken) as well.29 Barth’s close textual commentary of Eph. 1.3–14 is the attempt to do just that. And yet, achieving that is not a straightforward task. Because Paul’s description is governed by the practical intention of summoning the reader to praise God, there is a ‘moment of surprise’ conveyed in Paul’s writing that must be captured by the interpreter.30 Barth is struck, for example, that Paul begins with a reference with which we might have expected his readers already to be familiar: ‘the God and Father [of Jesus Christ]’ (v. 3). He takes this as an indication that no ‘truth’ is to be regarded as familiar in theology, that all theological 24 28
Ibid., 109. Ibid., 56.
25 29
26 Ibid., 83. Ibid., 87. Ibid., 132 (Barth’s emphasis).
27 30
Ibid., 76. Ibid., 82.
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
40
knowledge has an eschatological character. A statement about God always needs to be heard, in amazement, as something utterly new and unexpected, for in that way theology is received, not just as truth, but as revelation: On close inspection, the power of Pauline statements lies in Paul always beginning at the beginning, even at the foundations of his so-called system, and by not taking anything for granted, as religious thinkers usually do. He assumes nothing: that God is the Father of Jesus Christ, and that the Father of Jesus Christ is God, is as new and surprising today as it was on the first day. This is to be acknowledged and expressed again and again as revelation, not as something that is already known.31
However, there is still the question of how Paul manages to capture the newness of revelation in words, without reducing revelation to an objectified system of truths. Barth observes that the doxology is a single statement in Paul’s Greek, which means that any subdivisions within it must not be seen as ‘a series of dogmatic loci’—which would be a ‘dilution and falsification of their content’—but must be taken ‘in just as unified and mobile a way’ by us as they were by Greek readers.32 By dividing up the content of the passage, in other words, there is the danger of dissolving grace into its different aspects. Or as Burnett puts it, in his analysis of Barth’s hermeneutics, ‘[i]f God is the Sache of the Bible, and God must be understood as something whole, then the Sache of the Bible must be understood as something whole as well’.33 Paul achieves this unified perspective in the doxology by describing the entire action of God as turning around a single Christological point (designated by the repeated particle phrase, ‘in him’). Moreover, it is because this point is ‘the face of Jesus of Nazareth, the Crucified one’, Barth remarks, that it cannot be distilled into a ‘religious or philosophical pseudo-truth’.34 And yet, although Jesus focuses the action of God, this action is then designated in the doxology from three separate vantage points, which Barth classifies according to the divisions in time between
31 33 34
32 Barth, Epheserbrief, 81. Ibid., 78. Burnett, Karl Barth’s Theological Exegesis, 78. Barth, Epheserbrief, 52.
Eschatological Existence in Barth and Bultmann
41
past, present, and future. It is the constant shifting of perspective in the passage that helps ensure that this singular reality exceeds its theological depiction: first, vv. 4–6: election (i.e. past tense); secondly, vv. 7–10: forgiveness and freedom (present); finally, vv. 11–12, 13–14: hope of inheritance and sealing with the Spirit (future). Moreover, Barth notes how Paul complicates this schema as well. Already at the end of the first section, the idea of ‘praising God’s glorious grace’ is introduced, i.e. the final telos of divine election. Again, even when salvation is described as something ‘we have’ (å—v. 7), Paul concludes the second section by pointing forwards to the ‘fullness of times’ and the ‘recapitulation’ of all things in Christ. And again in the final division, the future perspective is qualified by the use of two aorist verbs (KŒºÅæŁÅ—v. 11; KçæÆªŁÅ —v. 13). Even when speaking of the future, Paul is not merely referring to ‘a future being and having’ for ‘[w]hat does future mean if it is a matter of God’s future, of the future we already possess, even if only as future? Is it not clear that this future could just as well be called past or present?’35 Paul has a single focus throughout the doxology, the saving action of God for human beings. If this is then explored through a differentiated perspective, that is not because the focus has shifted, but because it is only by shifting perspective that the focus is not distorted. However, this means that Paul bears theological witness to the eschatological character of divine action, not by a process of negation, by stripping language bare, but by supplying a richer conceptual pattern. For it is this linguistic abundance that helps ensure that eschatological reality is not being exchanged for a theological monoconcept: Could [Paul] have made it any clearer than he does in this change [of tenses], that past, present and future, the ŒÆØæ (v. 10) are in themselves really only schemata for him, that he does not wish to speak of them but of the ºæøÆ H ŒÆØæH, of the end-time, of eternity, which one cannot even speak about as such, but only by way of the schemata of the ŒÆØæ, and paradoxically only by continuously switching between them and dissolving [Aufheben] them one after the other? How could our attention be diverted
35
Ibid., 121.
42
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
away from the human observer and onto that which is observed if we were somehow in a position to speak of it straightforwardly? It is precisely in the limit of our speaking and the recognition of this limit that we are guaranteed that it is appropriate. Paul is speaking of the åÆ , he is doing eschatology, quite irrespective of whether what he is speaking of begins æe ŒÆ Æ ºB Œı, whether he depicts it as something we have, or whether he depicts it as the inheritance for which we hope.36
In short, God’s eschatological reality is attested in Ephesians not apophatically but by a positive theology. And yet, this theology is also conceptually supple enough to ensure that its living subject matter is not condensed into a set of ‘truths’. The problem of the linguistic reification of grace is not circumvented by avoiding speaking about it altogether, but confronted by developing the selfsubverting mechanisms within a descriptive rhetoric. By piling up temporal perspectives, and allowing them to substitute for one another, even to the point of subverting the temporal schema altogether, Barth thinks Paul manages to find not a consummate theological language perhaps but at least one which, if carefully observed, is up to the task of speaking about God without its own conceptuality replacing divine reality. The question of language is therefore not merely a formal or methodological problem for Barth, but one generated by the reality of God himself. Moreover, unlike Bultmann, he does not regard the opposition between human language and divine revelation as absolute, but partially and imperfectly surmountable once sufficient mobility is generated in human language to prevent reification occurring. And yet, as we shall see in Chapter 3, Barth’s insistence in the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics that theology (and preaching) must aspire to become the event of eschatological revelation itself results in a more contrastive relation between religious language and revelation. Although he never approaches the kind of absolute opposition we have found in Bultmann, by making the eschatological Word the conceptual horizon of theology, he finds it difficult to move beyond an alternative between the total identification between theology and the Word, and an absolute difference between them.
36
Barth, Epheserbrief, 106–7.
Eschatological Existence in Barth and Bultmann
43
1.2 RESURRECTION AND CHRISTOLOGY We have seen so far that, although Barth and Bultmann share an eschatological, non-essentialist conception of Christian existence, Barth remains considerably more sanguine than Bultmann about the possibility of a positive theological expression of this. The immediacy of God’s presence, which is axiomatic for both of them, is not necessarily subverted by human language grasping to describe it, according to Barth. A similar distinction re-emerges as I turn now to Barth’s 1923 book on 1 Corinthians (published under the title The Resurrection of the Dead), together with Bultmann’s review essay on it.37 Although they both regard Paul’s moral theology as the key to understanding his eschatology, for Barth this is the meaning of Paul’s doctrine of the Resurrection and Parousia of Christ; for Bultmann, on the other hand, it is impossible to square the epistle’s teaching on Resurrection faith with an eschatology oriented by the linear ‘history’ of the risen Christ. Both Barth and Bultmann are in agreement that the theme which unifies 1 Corinthians is the Resurrection. By reminding the church in Corinth of this, Paul draws a sharp distinction between eschatological Christian faith, and the goings-on in the church, which are driven by personal religious attachment to different doctrines. And yet, Bultmann disagrees with Barth over whether chapter 15 can therefore be taken as the heart of the epistle. For Barth, it is the Schlu¨sselpunkt of the letter, ‘from where light descends upon the whole, and where it becomes comprehensible as a unity’.38 For Bultmann, on the other hand, the climax comes in chapter 13; chapter 15 is an unwelcome distraction from the main theme. In part, the difference may be put down to a hermeneutical issue. Bultmann argues that Barth’s exegesis ‘lacks a certain clarity and intellectual precision’,39 because although Barth rightly devotes his energy to teasing out that material unity across the first fourteen chapters, he neglects to submit the language Paul uses (especially in 37 38 39
Barth, AdT; Bultmann, ‘Karl Barth, The Resurrection of the Dead’. Barth, AdT, i. Bultmann, ‘Barth, Resurrection’, 69.
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
44
chapter 15) to a stringent Sachkritik. To Bultmann, this omission betrays a false divinization by Barth of the contingent linguistic forms of the biblical text, and entails a compromise of the rhetorical power of the Word it contains. He objects: We are not dealing here with a mere juxtaposition of genuine Pauline concepts and ideas which belong to the area of the thought of his time. The two interlace and interpenetrate. In my judgement there is need of much more rigorous exegetical work and of closer analysis of the text if assured results are to be attained.40
On the other hand, because Barth has a more positive (though not uncritical) appreciation of the part played by human language in the economy of revelation, content criticism becomes a less urgent (though not necessarily superfluous) task, considerably less important than textual commentary and paraphrase. Nevertheless, this hermeneutical point of difference reflects a deeper one, which Bultmann tends to skirt around in his review of Barth’s book. This can be illustrated by looking at what they each make of the Corinthian ‘heresy’. Barth sees the factions arising in Corinth as the result of ‘exchanging faith for particular human experiences, convictions, trends and hypotheses’.41 Rather than being oriented towards God, he surmises, Corinthian Christianity takes its rise from experiences or beliefs internal either to individuals or to particular groups. And so, the fractiousness this generates within the church is, in fact, symptomatic of a graver disease, which is at the bottom of all the issues discussed in chapters 1–14: rebellion against God. This is hinted at in the various particle phrases—Æ e F ŁF, KŒ ŁF, N Æ ŁF, etc.—sprinkled throughout the text, by which Paul tries to refer the Corinthian church back to its originator and Lord. Indeed, it is not only the more obviously worrisome aspects of Corinthian religion that are suspect to him, but the best of its spirituality too, as chapters 12–14 make clear. Everything, good and bad alike, is singled out by ‘the flashing sword of the Æ e F ŁF’42 wielded by Paul. For what compromises the whole lot is that Corinth has become a ‘Christian world’43 closed in upon itself; and since its religious life has become 40 42
Bultmann, ‘Barth, Resurrection’, 86. 43 Ibid., 15. Ibid., 55.
41
Barth, AdT, 3f.
Eschatological Existence in Barth and Bultmann 44
45
entirely self-referential, it amounts to ‘pious godlessness’, an ‘utterly intolerable IªøÆ ŁF’.45 ‘Paul sees people, Christians to be sure, but nevertheless human beings, exalting themselves against God. And he does not simply regard this as a danger, but as the absolute danger. Christianity itself is under threat.’46 Bultmann is not at odds with any of this. Like Barth he thinks that Paul replaces the churchly monism of Corinthian Christianity with an ‘eschatological proclamation’, by which the entirety of the Christian life is then redefined by faith and hope in the Resurrection. ‘[Faith and hope] define the whole of the Christian’s existence and bring him into a particular relation to the world. Consequently, every question which arises in the area of his existence in the world can rightly be dealt with only from the point of view of eschatology.’47 However, Bultmann’s understanding of eschatological existence is rather more sophisticated than Barth’s, and trades on an antithesis between faith and knowledge which is considerably more clear-cut. This can be seen from a difference over what to make of Paul’s polemics against çÆ and ªHØ (1 Cor. 1.17–2.5, 8.1–3). What Paul refers to as the ‘knowledge’ which ‘puffs up’ (8.1) is, for Barth, a reversal of the right order of knowledge. God becomes reified if it is a matter of my knowledge of him, rather than what Paul refers to as ‘love’: i.e. my being known by God (8.3). Barth remarks here, ‘love must mean the surrender of the subject of knowledge to its object, objective rather than subjective “objectivity” [Sachlichkeit—orientation to the object]’; love involves being known (cogitari) rather than knowing (cogitare).48 In other words, what is distinctive about ‘love’, for Barth, is not that it bypasses the ordinary subject–object relations of human knowledge, but that it reverses them, marking a different kind of relation between the knower and the known from the one Paul refers to as ªHØ . In Bultmann, it is a different matter. Paul’s proclamation of the cross is substantially different to the ‘knowledge’ being debated over in Corinth, since it mediates a new mode of existence which will not permit itself to be presented as a ‘piece of knowledge’. What Paul describes as the ‘foolishness’ (1 Cor. 1.21) of his message is to be 44 47
45 Ibid., 100. Ibid., 71. Bultmann, ‘Barth, Resurrection’, 67.
46
Ibid., 56. 48 Barth, AdT, 22–3.
46
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
understood as Paul objecting to the suggestion that knowledge, as such, could ever be a way to God: God’s saving act of the cross ( Æıæ ) cannot in any way be comprehended as a possibility of salvation; if it could be, it would not be an act of God. For men the Christian proclamation is ‘folly’ (øæÆ), and it cannot be legitimised to men’s reason as ‘wisdom’ (çÆ). As a comprehensible possibility, it would necessarily be no more than a possibility within the scope of man. Therefore, no relation to God is given in knowledge, in gnosis, as a human quality. Or as Barth says, God can be only subject, never the object in man’s relation to God.49
Bultmann’s cross-reference to Barth here disguises the fact that he has substantially reinforced Barth’s actual position. Barth makes much less heavy-handed use of the contrast between existential faith and objective knowledge than Bultmann does; indeed, he does not regard rightly ordered knowledge as being any different to Christian faith. It is just that he thinks that this ordering is not self-evident, not something given, but a reality generated by God’s initiative alone. This difference over the existential potential of religious knowledge plays out in a further difference over the connection between ethics and Christology in 1 Corinthians. For Bultmann, chapter 13 is the climax of the epistle because it is there, in Paul’s eschatological description of love, that the meaning of the Resurrection becomes most apparent: new life from God, beyond death; and that life, ‘not as an object of speculation but as a reality in the life of Christians . . . For when Paul speaks of the Resurrection of the dead, it is clear that he means to speak of us, of our reality, of a reality in which we stand.’50 If that is true, chapter 15 cannot be the high-point of the letter, as Barth had argued. Indeed, its eschatology is subject to the criticism that Paul has extrapolated from the reality of the Resurrection event itself, and divided it into ‘two temporal occurrences . . . objective “historical” events’:51 Jesus’ Resurrection and his final Parousia. Moreover, these 49 Bultmann, ‘Barth, Resurrection’, 69. When, later in chapter 2, Paul starts to speak of the cross as ‘secret and hidden wisdom’ (1 Cor. 2.7), Bultmann puts this down to ‘Paul’s pride’ (ibid., 72), a misguided attempt to play off the Christian gospel against the gnostic mysteries, even though the two are on wholly different planes, the existential versus the speculative. 50 51 Ibid., 80–1. Ibid., 84.
Eschatological Existence in Barth and Bultmann
47
events are not just harmless, even if scarcely credible, ideas for Bultmann, since to contemplate them puts me in exact contradiction to the true meaning of the Resurrection. If I am still a theoretical observer, the memory of Jesus’ Resurrection and the expectation of his final coming serve to reinforce my evasive objectification of the Resurrection, rather than my being grasped by God in the freedom of a completely selfinvolved decision. In other words, to cut the ties between Resurrection and Parousia, future and present, as Paul does, nearly amounts to a denial of Resurrection life altogether. For ‘this resurrection life is never something objective. It is between time and eternity’.52 This polemic against externality and objectivity in Bultmann is not to be understood as a total internalizing of the Resurrection, a deeschatologizing of the event, but an attempt to describe it as a historical movement. The Resurrection is always ‘between’, for Bultmann; an event in the happening, neither already nor not yet. ‘Christ is not the cosmic ground of a future condition of existence, but the historical foundation of the present life.’53 Bultmann does not claim a complete identity here between ‘Christ’ and ‘the present life’. And yet, if ‘Christ’ has any further external reality than as the founding event of the present life, human ontology risks being abstracted from the pressing immediacy of God’s presence. It is possible for the doctrine of the Resurrection to replace the eschatological instability of my history by setting before me a stable future condition, which underwrites my present existence. Once more, there is considerable convergence between Barth and Bultmann over this analysis. Indeed, if Barth devotes half his book to close exegesis of chapter 15, that is because, unlike Bultmann, he thinks Paul’s argument there can be read as resisting the disintegration of Resurrection-belief and eschatological Christian existence. Chapter 15 is not to be taken as an Endgeschichte, an effort on Paul’s part ‘to penetrate into the mystery of future existence’,54 and thus as a means of controlling the contingent, but as ‘methodology of the apostolic proclamation’. It is the Apostle’s attempt to describe the gospel movement itself—‘to depict the bird in flight’55—by standing back from the details of what he has to communicate to
52
Ibid., 94.
53
Ibid., 93.
54
Barth, AdT, 58.
55
Ibid., 62f.
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
48
the Corinthian community in particular, and giving a more general indication of his perspective, of the Resurrection history which grounds Christian moral history. He does this to oppose the way in which, in Corinth, the church has seemingly managed to reconcile a universal belief in the fact of the Resurrection of Christ (cf. 1 Cor. 15.12 et seq.) with its brand of religious ‘monism’. For in Corinth the Christians have peculiarly managed to distance themselves from the ethical impact of Jesus’ Resurrection, Barth suggests, by treating it as mere brute fact, a miracle undoubtedly, but nonetheless one event among others, trapped within its own time, ‘something finished and satisfactory in its own right’.56 And so, in effect, he concludes, their belief in the Resurrection amounts to this: ‘He is God there but not here, in Christ but not for us. Christ is risen, but we know and live only this unending life, without horizon or final promise.’57 This is what Paul sets out to oppose in chapter 15. Rather than being ‘the divine horizon of all things’, Jesus’ Resurrection has receded into ‘the vast ocean of life’,58 where it can still be formally acknowledged by the Christians in Corinth without having ‘primordial meaning for their lives’.59 On Barth’s reading, in other words, the argument in that chapter is quite in line with the existential thrust of Pauline eschatology in the rest of the epistle. If he is less suspicious of chapter 15 than Bultmann, that is because he does not operate with the same axiomatic antithesis between the objectively factual and the existential. Barth may not put much emphasis on the factuality of Jesus’ Resurrection, but nor does it occur to him to affirm anything other than that it happened ‘in history, to be sure’.60 And yet, although Barth does not labour under the same dualism as Bultmann between objective and existential histories, his strong concentration on the ethical dimensions of the Resurrection can lead to a compression of Resurrection history. Barth’s focus on the reconstitution of moral identity results in a highly ‘integrative’ Christology, one where Christ is little more than the point of reference in the elaboration of an eschatological moral ontology. In part, of course, that is because the epistle itself is so focused on that theme. Yet Barth is, on occasion, capable of opposing this moral/existential eschatology 56 59
57 Barth, AdT, 100. Ibid., 89. 60 Ibid., 88. Ibid., 77f.
58
Ibid., 90.
Eschatological Existence in Barth and Bultmann
49
to a more ‘contemplative’ perspective on the Resurrection and Parousia of Christ since, he thinks, it was by treating the Resurrection as an object to be observed that the Corinthian church was, in practical terms, able to deny it. ‘[Paul] tears the questioner and the spectator from their comfort zone and sets them right in the midst of a struggle in which the Resurrection is true . . . Not in theory, only in the practice of this struggle can it be comprehended that the Resurrection is true.’61 As in Bultmann, the movement in this theology proceeds in one direction: the overcoming of the distinction between Christ and me—not resolved into a finished state, of course, a full identification, but nevertheless one that is complete eschatologically—which in this case means not only ‘in time’, but ‘in God’. We can observe this more precisely in the following three characteristic passages from Barth’s commentary: Dead!—That is what we are. Risen!—That is what we’re not. But the Resurrection of the dead is what we are not being posited as identical to what we are: the dead living, time eternity, being truth, things real. None of that is given except in hope, and so this identity is not to be completed . . . but in hope and in God, the Resurrection of the dead, the identification of the former with the latter, is already completed.62 The person that God creates and the person that God creates (the difference is best expressed in this change of emphasis) are not two but one. There is an indirect identity between what was later known as the ºª ÆæŒ , on the one hand, and the creature on the other: and corporeality is the third element, the one they have in common, and it is in and as this that the indirect identity must become direct. The truth of God is that we human beings must and will really become what is written in 15.44: the change of predicates which involves the return of the creature to its origin [Ru¨ckkehr aus der Kreaturlichkeit in die Urspru¨nglichkeit], the transformation from being the Adam created by God to being the Adam created by God, the change which cannot occur anywhere else than in the tangible and physical life of the human body.63 The tension in Paul’s thinking is extraordinary. I don’t think I have exaggerated it; in fact, I fear the opposite. It is not the tension of two things alongside one another [ein Nebeneinander] but of one thing within another (ein Ineinander) . . . It is the tension of faith.64
61
Ibid., 122.
62
Ibid., 62.
63
Ibid., 119.
64
Ibid., 129.
50
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
In each of these passages, the point at which Barth is getting is the eschatological ontology of the Christian subject, situated in between two poles—death and Resurrection—which, although they are highly compressed, are nevertheless described as differentiated moments in time. It is important not to be misled by such idiosyncrasies as Barth’s dialectic of time and eternity, or his use of the term Ursprung, into supposing that he is simply Platonizing the Resurrection here. The language disguises the fact that he reads Paul’s teaching as deliberately anti-Platonic—in two respects. First, Paul refers to the soul as the predicate of the body (HÆ łıåØŒ—1 Cor. 15.44), not the other way round. Paul contradicts the Platonic priority of soul over body, Barth argues, because holding on to a more basic non-corporeal personal identity is one means of evading the divine claim. ‘To wish to belong to God without the body is to resist what God wants, secretly to deny God. For it is the body that suffers, sins, dies; and it is for the Resurrection of our bodies that we wait.’65 Secondly, Barth takes Paul’s ordering of ‘the spiritual’ after ‘the physical’ (1 Cor. 15.46) to be opposed to the Platonic doctrine of anamnesis. The creature’s connection with its origin (Urspru¨nglichkeit) is not achievable through any kind of psychic ascent, but only by the advent of ‘the second man from heaven’ (1 Cor. 15.47)—in that event of grace, rather than by the execution of a natural faculty. ‘Christ before us, coming, future: eternity is not a general truth’, Barth comments.66 In other words, Urspru¨nglichkeit is being used here to suggest the new relation to the creator, the eschatological restoration of the creature. In no way does it mean that the Resurrection event has become a timeless principle for Barth.67
65
66 Barth, AdT, 118. Ibid., 120. Moltmann’s claim that Barth’s 1 Corinthians book removes the Resurrection from history (The Way of Jesus Christ, 230f.) is sustained by the dubious allegation that his entire theology is underpinned by a metaphysical opposition between being and time which has beset Western thought since Plato. Even Stadtland, who is highly averse to all existential eschatology, does not find that opposition running through Barth’s book (even if it is practically everywhere else in Barth). Although the commentary ‘threatens to be obscured by an existential interpretation . . . the main emphasis now lies in insisting on a futuristic eschatology; it is a matter of emphasising the posttemporality of God’ (Eschatologie und Geschichte, 160). 67
Eschatological Existence in Barth and Bultmann
51
Nor should Barth’s language of ‘identity’ (e.g. ‘the resurrection of the dead is what we are not being posited as identical to what we are’) lead to the misapprehension that he is simply giving a theological rendition of Schellingian philosophy, carefully disguised by a set of negations which are, in the end, eschatologically negated themselves.68 The polemical weight of this claim of von Balthasar’s is relaxed somewhat in his later book on Barth, but if one refers back to the earlier study in Die Apokalypse der deutschen Seele it is obvious that this philosophical tradition raises a nearly demonic spectre in Balthasar’s mind. To set Barth’s dialectical theology in this line is to place him in a stream of thought which Balthasar can resume under Nietzsche’s epithet, ‘Dionysus against the Crucified’.69 However, contrary to this interpretation, Barth’s theology betrays no Promethean drive to divinize the human being here: the identity being posited is not between God and humanity tout court, but between the human being and Jesus Christ, the Logos ensarkos. Indeed, in that event, ‘identity’ language appears to find a warrant in Paul’s text: ‘Qualis terrenus tales et terreni; et qualis caelestis tales et caelesti’ (1 Cor. 15.48). For Paul, the human person ‘between’ Christ and Adam also is, or becomes, one with Christ. This is the ‘extraordinary tension’ Barth refers to in Pauline thought, the Ineinander of the Resurrection life: although Christ and the Christian are distinct, they are to become, and so to be thought of as (indirectly, eschatologically) identical. This eschatological union ensures, on the one hand, that Christ’s Resurrection is never reified or externalized in Paul and, on the other, that the Christian ethos is not merely a collection of discrete acts, but grounded in an ontological change in the human person by whom these acts are performed. Nevertheless, there is a tendency in the three passages cited above for Barth’s theology of the Resurrection to narrow down Christology to what is of consequence for the moral history between God and humankind—to restrict the doctrine of Christ to ‘Christus in 68 Balthasar, Theology of Karl Barth, esp. Part II, Ch. 2. See also Leuba, ‘Platonisme et Barthisme’, 84ff. Leuba thinks that, once the dust has settled from the negative dialectics of Barth’s earlier theology, a Platonic doctrine of identity continues unobtrustively to exercise a pivotal role in the denial of analogy—which Leuba takes to be the true meaning of the analogia fidei—in the CD. 69 Balthasar, Die Apokalypse der deutschen Seele, I, 8; III, 351–65.
52
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
nobis’. Naturally, this has nothing to do with the moralizing of Christology in theological liberalism: ‘Christ’ here stands for the total remaking of a person by God, the undoing of secure moral identity, rather than the shoring up of it in an exemplary Jesus-figure. Still, this Christology only refers to what is ingredient in that eschatological event. Of course, this might only reflect a difficulty in Paul’s text itself. The pro nobis/extra nos aspects of Christ’s work have little part to play; indeed, they tend to be avoided by necessity, insofar as they might attenuate the actualistic ontology described by the Resurrection of Christ. This observation is almost exactly the opposite of the oft-rehearsed accusation that, especially in the early Barth, ‘the ethical situation is elevated entirely into the realm of the eschatological, which means that human life as it is given in time must ultimately be understood as ethically irrelevant’.70 On the contrary, the effect of eschatologizing the temporal life as Barth does is, in fact, the danger of making the ethical situation, as it is eschatologically construed, the only important component in the make-up of human identity. Ebeling’s charge of ‘the ethicizing of Christianity . . . the transforming of dogmatics into ethics’71 in Barth’s theology is more along the right lines. It may be hard to prosecute in the case of the Church Dogmatics,72 where the scope of Christology is so expansively explored. And yet, it does describe quite well at least the drift of his theology in Go¨ttingen.
1.3 CONCLUSION: CHRISTOLOGY AND REVELATION It is true that, while Barth certainly does not describe an unmediated, direct relation between God and the individual, what he wishes to avoid, above all else, is isolating Christology within the economy of 70
Cullberg, Das Problem der Ethik in der dialektischen Theologie, 152; see also Roberts, ATheology on Its Way?, Ch. 6, esp. 191ff.; Willis, The Ethics of Karl Barth, 21–39. 71 Ebeling, ‘Karl Barths Ringen mit Luther’, 557. 72 See here Webster, ‘“The grammar of doing”: Luther and Barth on human agency’, in Barth’s Moral Theology, 176f.
Eschatological Existence in Barth and Bultmann
53
revelation. And so, as we shall see in more detail in later chapters, the ‘interval’ between Christ and Spirit is always a brief one: revelation is always a ‘mediated immediacy’, Christ present. When it comes to the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics there is always in the background to Barth’s christology a version of Lutheran theology which tended to turn Christology into a metaphysical principle of the human relatedness to God. Barth would soon learn to distance himself from this Christology, by working out a Reformed version of the doctrine of the Incarnation: by placing greater emphasis on the intactness of the two natures in the hypostatic union he could avoid collapsing revelation entirely into Jesus’ human history (UCR I, 194–7; III, 26–74). I shall discuss this in some detail in Chapter 5. Even so, in the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics Christology remains just one moment in a more comprehensive divine movement which includes the histories of human subjects. For that reason, Barth regards the Trinity as ‘the real heart of the concept of revelation’ (UCR I, 161),73 since it describes the entirety of that movement, which must always be understood as ‘the most positive relation of God to us’ (UCR I, 153). In that sense, he even advocates that ‘dogmatics . . . will have to . . . dare to be a little less Christocentric’ (UCR I, 110). His caution is to be explained in terms of the desire to avoid the ‘false objectivism’ (UCR I, 154) and ‘metaphysical claptrap’ (UCR I, 147) which results from arresting God’s eschatological movement and turning a single moment of it into a theory of his action in the world. There is an increasing move in the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics to lay greater emphasis upon the contingency of revelation, its historical otherness and non-assimilability into the time of the church. Revelation means a differentiated history, two moments (past and present) which are not collapsible into each other. And yet, as we shall see, the reason for this is not that Barth worries about the historicity of revelation as such, but that the immediacy of the eschatological fellowship between God and humanity might be manipulated by the human subject unless there is a historically contingent warrant for it. 73 Migliore points out that the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics is ‘best described as theocentric or trinitarian rather than simply christocentric’ (‘Karl Barth’s first lectures in dogmatics’, xlviii–ix).
54
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
For this to be the case, it is essential to Barth that Christ’s history and human history remain theologically distinct, even though they are eschatologically identified. To that extent, Christ’s ‘past-ness’ is not to be dissolved but retained. Christ’s history is not poured out, so to speak, into horizontal history like a cause with a stream of effects, but remains self-confined. Indeed, it is the very breach between Christ and the present which ensures that the present retains its eschatological aperture, for this prevents the relation to God from becoming automatic. At one point in the 1 Corinthians commentary, for example, Barth refers to the Resurrection as a ‘subterranean stream’.74 He means that, although it may run through horizontal time, the Resurrection remains a latent and hidden presence; it needs repeatedly to resurface. This introduces a discontinuity into the relation between Resurrection and history. We shall see something similar later in the way in which he construes the Resurrection (status exaltationis) in the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics. In anticipation of that, consider the following remark from a passage towards the end of the dogmatics: Only in departing does Jesus Christ come as revealer in the status exaltationis, which is the Aufhebung of the status exinanitionis. Only in opposition to the previous and next moments, only between the times in which he is not known, is he known as [the exalted one]. Only after his death, which inevitably means beyond, and at the limit of his historical appearance— precisely beyond this limit—does he live as this one. As the one who comes, is knowable and lives in this way—as he came, lived and was known in his resurrection—he was the one who left the world; and all that we who are in the world can do is to believe and acknowledge him. [UCR III, 442]
Dogmatically, the move Barth makes here is to merge into a single event Jesus’ Resurrection appearances and his departure in the ascension. Moreover, it is because his appearance is now simultaneously his disappearance that the Resurrection becomes discontinuous with time; it occurs, as Barth puts it, ‘between the times’, ‘in opposition’ to our times. It is this doctrine of Christ’s ascension which ensures that, while Christ remains the objective reference point of God’s relation with 74
Barth, AdT, 99.
Eschatological Existence in Barth and Bultmann
55
creation, this relation is only established by the divine movement across the rupture between eternity and time. Finally, it should be noted that the Resurrection is being construed, in this passage, in terms suggested by the doctrine of revelation. This is not because (as commentators have often assumed) Barth thinks life in grace is something ‘purely noetic’; nor because he has elevated a formal matter to ‘first order’ status in his theology;75 nor because he thinks that, after Kant, epistemology has become the theological topic. Rather, he hopes that, by foregrounding the doctrine of revelation, in which the moment of encounter between divine and human subjects is the theme, he will avoid the danger, to which he sees theology forever exposed, of reversing the order of being between creatures and creator, and thus providing an objectified account either of God or the history of grace. This is the theme of the next chapter. However, as my argument continues, I shall also show how exclusive attention to the eschatological recreation of the human person in Christ can also leave this person morally exposed. In Christ, my history is repeatedly opened from above, but this still leaves unsaid how my moral history has also been restored and is sustained by Christ. 75 Gunton, A Brief Theology of Revelation, 58f. (Gunton appears to retract the allegation in the footnote on the following page.)
2 Revelation and the Problem of Christian Preaching 2.1 REVELATION AS DISRUPTION ‘The doctrine of revelation is central to Barth’s interests in the 1920s.’1 The claim could easily be verified from almost any of the texts of this period, and most especially from the two dogmatic prolegomena, to the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics and the Christliche Dogmatik, which prepare for the first volumes of the Church Dogmatics in the 1930s. And yet, it is not so easy to establish why Barth devoted so much of his energy to this topic. What I shall be suggesting is that, contrary to what might be expected, the reason has less to do with theological epistemology as such, than because revelation helps him to specify, more broadly, the way in which God and creatures relate in general. Along with the doctrine of election, revelation has been the most widely discussed and most controversial aspect of Barth’s theology, for various connected reasons. Early criticism quickly saw it as a response to the crisis in theology induced by a creeping relativism in the human sciences. The doctrine was said to be Barth’s ingenious attempt to make theology immune to psychological and historical criticism by setting revelation in a different sphere altogether. However, it was argued that he achieved this by introducing into theology an unbiblical ‘relation of radical exclusivity between time and eternity’,2 borrowed from philosophy, at the cost of the very credibility of 1
McCormack, ‘Der theologiegeschichtliche Ort Karl Barths’, 23. Schmidt, Zeit und Ewigkeit, 21. Schmidt argues that ‘[Barth] tried to overcome relativism by taking it completely seriously. Historicism and psychologism were 2
Revelation and the Problem of Christian Preaching
57
Christian revelation. This analysis was reinforced in Germany by the epochal works of Moltmann and Pannenberg, whose attempts to suggest new points of departure for the doctrine of revelation were in large measure reactions against Barth’s work.3 In both writers, the contrast is drawn between biblical-Trinitarian revelation, in which divine disclosure is always bound up with unfolding historical events, and a Greek gnostic idea of revelation as theophanous intrusions of a deity into time; Barth’s theology was thought to amount to a somewhat Christianized version of the second.4 In Anglo-Saxon scholarship, interpretations of Barth’s doctrine of revelation often betray the influence of T. F. Torrance, his principal mediator to British theologians, who introduced Barth as the purveyor of a dogmatics that had succeeded in being scientifically credible.5 If one was suspicious of Torrance’s rather too untroubled presentation of rendered harmless to theology once it could be said that revelation has nothing to do with history, and that religion is anything but a psychic event or inner experience’ (ibid., 6). In the second edition of the Ro¨merbrief, however, Barth supplemented a conceptual dialectic, which in the first edition had legitimately registered the way in which theological language always lags behind the realities it describes, with an ontological dialectic between time and eternity which remains historically unresolved (ibid., 19–22). 3 See esp. Moltmann, Theology of Hope, 50–8; Pannenberg, ‘Introduction’ and ‘Dogmatic theses on the doctrine of revelation’ in Revelation as History, 3–21, 125–57. 4 Similarly, Gunton thinks that Barth is held back in his Trinitarian theology by a ‘residual Platonism’ which repeatedly gives the inference that divine action occurs not in history but in a timeless sphere above and beyond the world. ‘The root of the ambiguity would then seem to be a persistent tendency of Barth’s to contaminate the temporality of revelation with a conception of revelation as timeless theophany, which then reappears in the attempted combination of eminent temporality and timeless eternity. One is even tempted to wonder whether the very word revelation is not one of the chief culprits, in that it carries too heavy a load of inherited connotations to be able to bear the radical changes of meaning that Barth wishes to impose upon it’ (Becoming and Being, 181). 5 Torrance describes the ‘Copernican revolution’ of Barth’s theology as being the shift from an enslavement to the ‘unconscious dogmatisms’ of the modern human sciences and ‘the subtle determinisms of involvement in cultural heritage’ to the churchly freedom of ‘obedient discipleship to that primary Word’ (the Bible), which seems to parallel the ‘objectivity’ of the exact sciences. ‘It is sheer attachment to the object that carries with it detachment from all prior understanding and prejudicial thinking, and it is only in methodological pursuit of this detachment that we can achieve scientific objectivity.’ Karl Barth: An introduction to his early theology, 202. For a considerably more complex and historically nuanced account of Barth’s quest for a theological rationality, see MacDonald, Karl Barth and the Strange New World within the Bible: Barth, Wittgenstein and the metadilemmas of the Enlightenment.
58
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
Barth’s theology as an achievement parallel with those in the exact sciences, it was again to Barth’s idea of revelation that one could turn, in order to show that a neat theological Wissenschaftlichkeit had been purchased at the expense of theology’s public accountability. In this vein, Richard Roberts criticizes Barth’s systematic removal of revelation from temporal reality, paving the way for ‘his method of deriving all theological explanation from the posited “reality” of revelation, a reality that appears to demand conformity and submission rather than critical investigation’.6 Similarly, Rowan Williams presents Barth’s theology as driven by the characteristically modern anxiety over a quest for certain knowledge. Barth thinks of dogmatics as ‘the sole authentic science, because it alone conforms (necessarily conforms) to the truths of its object . . . The [Church] Dogmatics begins with the question of how the security of faith and talk about faith is to be grounded, how the nature of dogmatics as pure science can be demonstrated.’7 The way in which such interpreters of Barth’s doctrine of revelation have regularly erred is by reading him in terms of the familiar problem in modern philosophical theology of how reason and revelation are to be coordinated. Often, the dilemma is set up by asking what unaided reason alone can tell us, on the one hand, and what we can know only by revelation, on the other. From this perspective (which assumes, incorrectly, that Barth thought in terms of ‘pure nature’)8 it immediately appears that Barth is trying to make the extreme case that we know nothing of God a lumine rationis.9 6
Roberts, A Theology on Its Way? 2. Williams, ‘Barth on the triune God’, 187. More recently, Susannah Ticciati has made similar remarks about revelation in Barth, in connection with his interpretation of Job. She judges Barth’s writing on the Bible to be ‘monotheological ’ (Job and the Disruption of Identity, 31–2), incapable of making much positive use of the biblical sciences; but this can be traced back to a doctrine of revelation which introduces a disjunction between the eschatological Christ-event and historical realities. 8 Frei showed some time ago that the critical reception of Barth’s refutation of Brunner among British and American scholars was based on the inability of those scholars to move beyond the notion of a ‘purely natural’ sphere of reality, which Barth himself had long since left behind (Frei, The Doctrine of Revelation in Karl Barth, 180ff.). 9 This conclusion has often been reached in discussions of the natural theology controversy in the 1930s. Thus, James Barr establishes his terms early on as follows: ‘The disagreement between Karl Barth and Emil Brunner, which set the stage for so much modern theology . . . took this form: is there any human knowledge of God antecedent to his self-revelation in Jesus Christ?’ (Biblical Faith and Natural Theology, 3). 7
Revelation and the Problem of Christian Preaching
59
I suggest, however, that this is not a particularly illuminating way of reading what he has to say about revelation, since Barth (like Schleiermacher, against whom he is often reacting at precisely this point) simply refuses that initial dichotomy. As I shall show, Barth concentrates on revelation in Go¨ttingen not primarily because he feels the need to give an account of his epistemology—in other words, he is not following the familiar modern fallacy of giving priority to a formal, methodological or ‘second order’ theological locus10—but because he senses that this doctrine will enable him to depict his intuition about how creatures interact with God in the world. In some ways, then, it is misleading when Barth opens the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics (and subsequent dogmatics cycles) with the doctrine of revelation, in that it easily implies he has an independent interest in epistemological issues. In reality, though, the first volume of the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics is already underpinned by a quite definite concept of God; and in making revelation the first port of call Barth is drawing a dogmatic inference resulting precisely from that concept of God. In the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics, God is characterized by his ‘inexhaustible liveliness’ and ‘indissoluble subjectivity’ (UCR I, 120). He does not exist ‘as a still-only-objective God . . . enthroned in peaceful unity beyond his subjectivity, and at a safe distance from us’, but as ‘the object that turns and becomes a subject, wherever and however we may conceive it, if we are thinking of this object!!’ (UCR I, 123) In other words: God’s relation to man is not a contingent one. It is necessarily contained and grounded in God’s essence . . . there is nothing subsequent or episodic about God’s turning to man . . . God himself, the creator and redeemer, stands and falls with what takes place in time, in the outpouring and reception of the Holy Spirit, as God’s yes to man . . . God would not be God if the relation to man were not naturally intrinsic to him. [UCR I, 156–7]
Barth is not setting out here to develop a dynamic process metaphysics, rather than a ‘static’ Greek one,11 but to describe a God whose
10
Gunton, A Brief Theology of Revelation, 58. Jenson seems to read the Barthian project in terms of a shift from one metaphysical paradigm to another (e.g., Alpha and Omega, 15ff.). 11
60
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
presence makes any metaphysical conception of God impossible. He rounds on ‘spectators, shirkers and referees’ who think they can conceive of God by ‘quietly looking in from the outside’ (UCR I, 126); and reserves particularly sharp judgement for the ‘metaphysical claptrap’ of the ‘only superficially more Christian, so-called Christocentric way’ in which some contemporary Lutheran theologies were seeking to deduce a principle of divine fatherliness from Jesus’ relation to God (UCR I, 147). By contrast, Barth’s concept of God therefore has ‘strictly anti-metaphysical significance’12 in the sense that it is a protest against such ‘false objectivism’ in theology which fails to see that God’s presence is always ‘acute, existential, inescapably personal’ (UCR I, 154). For ‘God’s being-as-God [Gottsein] is always his being-as-person [Personsein], not merely a being-something, not even merely a being-someone or a being-him, but his being-I’ (UCR II, 13). When Barth speaks of revelation, then, he means that God’s being is always a disruptive presence, a reality which has not been described adequately until the deeply unsettling impact it makes upon my person is fully registered. Revelation is ‘an event which takes place in space and time, to be sure’; but, still more crucially, it is ‘qualified history’: ‘to the degree that it is [revelation] it is not part of the sequence of occurrences in space and time’ (UCR I, 72). Because revelation refers to the presence of God, it is not simply the impartation of new factual information, even concerning God, but God speaking in person (Dei loquentis persona): ‘The presupposition of the Bible is not that God is but that God spoke. We aren’t referred in it to God as such, but to the God who communicates’ (UCR I, 69). Moreover, this means that, in revelation, the mode of relation between God and creatures is ‘address’ (Anrede). God discloses himself not ‘in the form of an ambiguous being, but in the form of a Word which wishes to be known—and gives itself to be known—as 12 McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology, 358; also 245–7. However, Barth’s opposition to metaphysics here is less to do with any respect for the conditions dictated by philosophical empiricism—what McCormack refers to in another context as Barth’s ‘good faith effort to respect the proper limits the historicity of human knowing places upon theology’ (McCormack, ‘Grace and Being’, 93)—than with the constant threat that the human subject might reify God, and thus reverse the proper order of divine—human relating.
Revelation and the Problem of Christian Preaching
61
the bearer of truth’ (UCR I, 75). If that suggests that revelation means ‘Erkenntnis [i.e. personal knowledge], in the most pregnant sense of the word’ (UCR I, 74), the inference to be drawn here is not that Barth is attempting to secure the scientific ‘objectivity’ of his dogmatics. ‘Word’ is a suggestive category, rather, because it depicts God and humanity coming together, and doing so not within a religious synthesis, analysable in terms of emotion or feeling, but in a personal meeting; ‘word’—revelation—means ‘the encounter between an I and a Thou, between one person and another’ (UCR I, 69). For human beings, then, revelation involves a confrontation with God’s Word, yet because that Word has the full weight of divine authority behind it, its impact is directly personal, forceful and shocking. God’s Word means ‘the Word of God himself, God’s speech, of which he is the exclusive subject, and where no flesh speaks at the same time. He and he alone’ (UCR I, 68). Indeed, because the term refers to this direct human encounter with God, Barth thinks of it not just as one moment within the history between God and creatures, but as one way—indeed, perhaps, the best way—of referring to that history as a whole, and so of what happens at any given point in it. As he puts it later in the dogmatics, ‘in everything that is said about God, it is a matter of the God who per se addresses man, and in everything that is said about man, a matter of the man who per se is addressed by God’ (UCR II, 384). It could be said that revelation is the theological moment par excellence in this dogmatics, the point to which all theology refers and to which it aspires. One reason for this is that revelation describes a form of knowledge that is not innate or ‘natural’, and cannot be arrived at through mental processes (whether directly outward or inward) but which descends upon the knower from the outside, wholly unsolicited. And so, applied more broadly, it indicates that the relation to God is initiated at God’s liberty and sustained on God’s terms, rather than at the behest of a creature. If the whole history of God with humans is revelation, their relation must be seen as ‘utterly labile’, durable only as a ‘drama’, a ‘struggle’; it is not something ‘natural’ (naturhaft), a ‘constancy’ or ‘givenness’, with the ‘unchangeability of a mathematical relation’ (UCR I, 222). More strongly still, revelation hints at the wholly interruptive character of divine presence, so that the single—but overwhelmingly
62
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
radical—condition for a human person to relate to God is that his or her continuity of being is brought to an end in that relation, and reestablished only on quite different grounds. Barth suggests this at one point by setting God’s revelation within an aporia given by the philosophy of subjectivity. He writes: There is no other dissolution of the crux of all philosophy of religion— which is that either the object escapes the subject or the object blasts apart the subject—than revelation itself, strictly understood. Revelation means the knowledge of God through and from God; it means that the object to be known becomes the knowing subject. It is not man’s work, if he hears God’s address and knows God in faith, but God’s work in a man. Either the human work is shattered by this knowledge, or it is successful, in which case the result is—an idol. But revelation means that God’s work happens to a man, whose own work must end, one way or another. [UCR I, 74]
The philosophical dilemma to which Barth is alluding here is this: to know (i.e. to be the subject of a knowledge-event) is to be in a powerrelation over against that which is known, in the sense that it means ‘possessing’ it as the ‘object’ of knowledge. The difficulty arising in the case of religious knowledge, however, is that what is taken as being known (God) cannot, by very definition, be under my control in this way. If God, in Anselm’s phrase, is id quo maior cogitari non potest, then should this ‘id’ be a reality (rather than a mere concept) the relation of subject and object in thought has either been reversed, or negated altogether. Once it is granted that God is truly God (not an idol) this conclusion appears to follow by necessity. Either I am the subject of my knowledge of God—in which case it must be conceded that I do not know God—or I am not—in which case God is not known by me at all. In speaking of revelation in terms of this aporia, Barth is not giving voice to a theological scepticism which denies any knowledge of God at all; nor is he merely alluding to an aporia in religious epistemology. He is trying to indicate that coexisting with God as his creatures is considerably more demanding than we might otherwise assume. The stringent condition under which it is possible to be related to God is a complete reversal in the ordinary way of human relating. The oftrehearsed objection that Barth hereby reduces the scope of Christian
Revelation and the Problem of Christian Preaching
63
life to something ‘purely noetic’ fails to capture the severity of the dialectic. It is not that proper human action in response to God is merely ‘to listen’ to his Word (merely ‘to behold’ or ‘to follow’ the opera salutis divini); for what Barth refers to as ‘strictly understood’ revelation makes this impossible too. It means the end of all human self-origination, all self-grounding in one’s action—whether this self or this action are conceived only passively or not. Closer to the mark is to talk of divine revelation as bringing about ‘a deconstruction avant la lettre of the ontology of the subject’.13 Yet (as we shall see later) it does not follow that this ‘absolute attack on human beings’ is simply a denial of human reality as such.14 Quite the reverse; it is by undermining the natural and religious foundations of anthropology that Barth wishes to focus directly on the situation in which a person finds herself needing to take a real decision in the eyes of God. This focus is only achievable, he thinks, within an eschatological anthropology where structures of human being are not closed in upon themselves, but open out upon the moment in which the creature finds itself alongside God. In the context of this doctrine of revelation, I shall be examining the relation between God’s revelation and its human ministers— preaching and theology—in the first volume of the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics, and in some of the lectures and studies that surround it. We shall find Barth pulled in two directions at once, in ways that affect how that relation is described. On the one hand, he feels the meaning of theological witness to be intrinsically bound up with God’s movement in the Word, at whose eschatological power to topple the edifices of human self-presence this witness must set its sights. This means that the theological witness must seek to be part of the authoritative presence of that Word—and even to become identical with it, for otherwise the objectifying tendency of theological language would stand in direct contradiction to the commanding Subject of which it is to speak. 13
Roberts, A Theology on Its Way?, 191f. Cullberg, Das Problem der Ethik in der dialektischen Theologie, 38. It would only be true to state that Barth’s ‘(e)schatological ethics always threatens to annul the ethical “situation” itself ’ (ibid., 41) if it is recognized that this results precisely from the personal encounter between the ethical subject and God, not from any ‘dialectical opposition between God and man, eternity and time’ as Cullberg claims (ibid., 153). 14
64
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
On the other hand, when revelation is so much the rubric under which church ministry is discussed, Barth struggles to depict that ministry itself. There is, by necessity, an eschatological lag between the human word and the divine Word, such that although the former may aspire to the latter, this identity is incomplete. Where Barth has trouble is in granting sufficient positivity to that gap in which the movement towards identity occurs, and therefore to human language itself. In Bultmann, the sharp opposition between Reden von Gott and Reden u¨ber Gott signals that the gap has approached an absolute opposition. In Barth, however, this dualism is eschatologically surmountable. And yet, the more revelation is made the leading theological category for discussing human ministry, the harder it is for Barth to avoid the alternative of a complete merger between divine Word and human word or (which is only the other side of the same coin) a completely contrastive account of them. The argument in this chapter now continues as follows. I begin by examining the way in which Barth sets up the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics as the problematization of the presence of God in revelation. I then return to two well-known public lectures, delivered by Barth 1922, during the course of a summer vacation lecture tour in Germany. In spite of—or perhaps because of—their ambiguity, obscurity, and rhetorical bombast, they give the clearest possible explanation of what is at stake in this problematizing of revelation.
2.2 THE DOCTRINE OF REVELATION AS PROLEGOMENA TO DOGMATICS One of the difficulties for the interpreter of the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics, as with Barth’s other dogmatics, is what to make of the prolegomena (UCR I). The volume serves a very different function to comparable ones in modern dogmatics. It is not an apologetic argument from the general to the particular, from a universally agreeable basis in rational truth to revealed truths ‘known only to faith’. Nor is it a fundamental theology which attempts to establish the validity of an authoritative source, whether Scripture or the church. Barth already presupposes the realities of which he will give account, and he does not bother to
Revelation and the Problem of Christian Preaching
65
provide external grounds for agreement with him. What purpose, then, do the prolegomena really serve? An initial answer to this question is that he thinks the best way of giving an account of God’s turning in revelation is to make the difference between divine address and its human servants as explicit as possible, i.e. to problematize theological language. This can be shown through a brief examination of one passage in the doctrine of the Incarnation (UCR I, } 6). In the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics, revelation is only a reality (Wirklichkeit) as the work of the whole Trinity in consort (} 5). It follows from this that if revelation is broken down into objective and subjective components, the Incarnation of the Son (} 6) and the work of the Spirit in generating faith and obedience (} 7), these are to be thought of as, respectively, the objective and subjective possibilities (Mo¨glichkeiten) of revelation. Furthermore, when Barth turns in detail to the doctrine of the Incarnation, his discussion seems to take the form of an inductive argument: in order for there to be an objective possibility of revelation, Jesus would have to be fully God and fully human, without mixture or change of substance, and in a unique and non-repeatable way (} 6.2). At the end of that passage, Barth quickly adds that he has not been constructing a reality on the basis of a possibility, but begging the question all along by presupposing the reality, the conditions of whose possibility he has just laid out. ‘I have not spoken hypothetically about a hypothetical entity,’ he writes, ‘but about the possibility of revelation that in fact exists: about Jesus Christ and about the way in which God comes to us, which is known and confessed in the Christian church’ (UCR I, 173). This only raises the question, however, of why the argument needs to be made backwards like this, and in such a tortuous manner—why Barth has sought to demonstrate ‘the possibility of the possibility of revelation [sic]. . . the conditions under which it is possible to speak of this possibility’ (UCR I, 172), arguing from back to front, so to speak. The answer lies in Barth’s conviction about the hiddenness of revelation—not its non-reality, but the mysteriousness which surrounds God’s presence, and which theology may not be permitted to penetrate. Because revelation is not direct communication, dogmatics may not speak about it directly either, but must grant it its own ‘space’ from where its unmistakable uniqueness can remain apparent:
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
66
It must try to describe the reality of revelation, but for that reason not posit it. It must keep its distance from its object, and know its limit, which is given in the fact that its object is God’s indirect communication par excellence. [UCR I, 186]
The circuitousness of Barth’s argument, in other words, is intended to draw attention to the problematic character of revelation itself. The fact that revelation is a reality rather than a concept needs to be recorded somehow: this can only be achieved by repeatedly drawing attention to the distinction between the theological reality itself and the dogmatic description of it. The purpose of the prolegomena as a whole is to indicate the limits of theological language in relation to revelation, to counteract its tendency to normalize and stabilize revelation, and in that way to suggest the non-substitutable liveliness and mobility of revelation itself. The volume is not intended to prepare the epistemological ground for a positive dogmatics to follow in the next two volumes, for this would risk the theological displacement of revelation. Rather, its task is to put a minus sign in front of all theological positivity, by drawing attention to the non-identity of revelation and theological language. Revelation is eschatological, in the sense that it occurs beyond the language that attests it. This is the message of the whole dogmatics. Thus, as Hinrich Stoevesandt has put it, the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics is to be thought of as a work of ‘fundamental homiletics [Fundamentalhomiletik]’: [It] reflects the conditions of the possibility of preaching as such throughout, precisely by not offering any preaching content itself—which could then intrude into the immediate relation between the sermon and its [biblical] text. It resists the possibility of that sort of naı¨ve practical application, and instead at every turn, makes the preacher stand with renewed directness—and that means helplessness—before the kerygma which is hidden in the text.15
This is strikingly borne out at various points throughout the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics, for example in the doctrines of election and of Christ’s person, where Barth urges his listeners that those expositions
15
Stoevesandt, ‘Die Go¨ttinger Dogmatikvorlesung’, 97.
Revelation and the Problem of Christian Preaching
67
are to be thought of as background to their sermons (UCR II, 210–12; UCR III, 75–9), not material which they are to introduce directly.16 Or again, in the introductory paragraph (} 14) to UCR II—i.e. the point where it seems as though he is moving beyond dogmatic prolegomena into something like ‘positive’ theology (the doctrines of God and man). Barth is anxious to stress that the emphasis should not now be placed on the contents of what he will say, which in any case are largely drawn from the theological manuals he is using. He writes: The material itself is always somewhat unimportant. And for that reason we can approach it somewhat innocuously and without criticizing it. Everything depends on whether we manage to place it in the light in which it then becomes more than material, the light in which the church’s human word becomes transparent and its transcendental meaning finds voice and utterance: [the light of] God’s Word. [UCR II, 9]
A final example is Barth’s departing words to his students in Go¨ttingen: ‘the meaning and kernel of the theology I have been presenting to you here was and is, in its genesis and matter, nothing other than the utterly concrete and infinitely pressing question of the pastor: What must we do, and what can we do, as theologians?’ (UCR III, 377) In short, the purpose of this dogmatics from beginning to end is to introduce his listeners to the problem of preaching. For the theologian, this will involve both describing what he calls the ‘perplexity’ (UCR I, 321) of preaching (and with that, defining its place within the economy of God’s revelation),17 as well as the problematizing of 16 On the other hand, ‘One will say much else better and more convincingly when it is said with respect to God who can elect and reject, in whom alone is the power and the freedom to know him truly. The doctrine of predestination, when understood, is the death of all Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism’ (UCR II, 212). Again, he writes: ‘If the mystery of Christ’s person does not lie behind every statement of a sermon on his benefits, then it is not Christian preaching’ (UCR III, 78). 17 Barth’s term is not ‘economy’ but Offenbarungsverha¨ltnis—‘revelation relation’ (UCR II, 30 et passim. See index to UCR II for references). It suggests very well that he does not think of revelation in historical terms—even if it includes a past, present and future moment in it—but in terms of the I–Thou relation between God and the human person. It has been argued that ‘dialogical thinking’ like this cannot do justice to the complexities of historical life (see Welker, ‘Barth’s theology and process theology’, 388–9). Yet describing revelation in this way does not inevitably involve narrowing it. The Go¨ttingen Dogmatics might be taken as an attempt to conceive of revelation as fellowship with God (i.e. an I–Thou relation at some level), yet a
68
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
the material content of what is preached, which is to be referred back to the Word of God which it is supposed to convey. Here, I shall concentrate on the first of these, preaching itself, and so begin to build up a picture of Barth’s understanding of the revelation economy in the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics.
2.3 REVELATION AS A THEOLOGICAL PROBLEM The major move, which decisively determines how Barth sets about doing this, occurs at the very beginning of the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics, in the proposition that dogmatics is to be understood as ‘scientific reflection on the Word of God’ (UCR I, 8). This definition immediately indicates how Barth conceives of the identity and location, and therefore the responsibility and task, of Christian theology. It is defined by a twofold relation: to the university and to the church. Because theological reflection is ‘scientific’ (wissenschaftlich) it is to think of itself as an academic exercise. That dogmatics is to reflect upon the Word of God refers it to the church as well. More specifically, the task of dogmatics arises from the fact that the Word of God is ‘not buried in a book’ (UCR II, 4), but something living and present. It is not a datum of any kind, but the event in which God addresses human beings, and in so doing encounters them. In other words, ‘revelation is only revelation in full action’ (UCR I, 69). It is not a state of being, but something that must always occur, and then occur again; not ‘a direct being revealed [Offensein] of God’ but ‘always his becoming revealed [Offenwerden]’ (UCR I, 69). ‘Nothing, absolutely nothing, may coagulate or ossify, may come to a standstill or freeze’ (UCR I, 333). As we have seen, revelation is to be understood as a movement, on the part of God, towards humanity. Again, this movement is to be thought of as ‘Word’, not because revelation communicates a set of facts about historically mediated fellowship, which means one that is potentially open to complexity and multiplicity. (That is not to say that Barth is entirely successful here.)
Revelation and the Problem of Christian Preaching
69
God, but because God himself, rather than being an empty concept onto which human beings can project their highest ideals, is unambiguously real. Revelation ‘comes to us in the form which corresponds to the truth: not in the form of an ambiguous being, but in the form of a Word which wishes to be known, gives itself to be known, as the bearer of truth: Spirit speaking to the spirit through the Spirit’ (UCR I, 75). In a later chapter, I shall examine in some detail what this entails for Barth’s understanding of dogmatics. In order for this to be intelligible, however, it is necessary to look more closely at what Barth means by the ‘Word of God’ in UCR I. Although in one sense the term just describes the concept of revelation I have outlined already, its form is not simple in the prolegomena, but carefully differentiated by a threefold notion of time. Barth thinks of revelation itself as God’s Word in eternity, Scripture as the Word of God set down in the past, and Christian preaching as the Word of God becoming present. By making these distinctions, he generates the problem of the Word of God from which dogmatic theology takes its rise. That problem is first of all the problem of Christian preaching, the becoming-present of the Word. The task of church proclamation, and with it its problem, arises because the first two forms of the Word (eternal and past) do not yet constitute the connection of revelation with our time. Let us take the following statement: The Word of God is a divine address, it goes forth, namely as Christian preaching. As revelation as such it does not go forth. Revelation does not go, does not occur at all, and never has done. The statement, ‘God has revealed himself ’ says something specifically quite different than the statement, ‘revelation has occurred’. It is what it is in time, to be sure, but as the limit of all time. It is as far from us as heaven is from the earth. As Holy Scripture too, the Word of God does not go forth. It is certainly completely and utterly in time, the testimony to revelation which has been given and has occurred, but for that reason a self-enclosed piece of history which, as the past, is as far from us as everything historical. [UCR I, 20]
Note how Barth sets up the Word of God as a problem here, expanding on the title of the opening paragraph of the dogmatics
70
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
from which the citation is taken: ‘The Word of God as the Problem of Dogmatics’ (UCR I, } 1). The dilemma initially turns around the conceptual distinction he draws between revelation and Word: the Word of God seeks to ‘go forth’ (weitergehen), to occur again in the present as an event. Revelation, on the other hand, ‘does not go, does not occur at all, and never has done’; it is ‘as far from us as heaven is from the earth’. It would be overhasty to see these rhetorically charged descriptions of revelation as evidence of a metaphysical dualism in Barth, as though he considered that revelation were not in time at all: he states, precisely, that it is in time—but only as the limit of all time. The opposition is intended not to deny but to suspend its temporal presence, to introduce a rupture, such that access to it becomes acutely problematic. Its temporality cannot make it a historically available event, such that one could point to it and declare, ‘revelation has occurred’, for it is an event of which God always remains the initiating subject (‘God has revealed himself ’). Nevertheless, described as such, a fundamental problem remains: how can this revelation (which does not ‘occur’) become the divine Word (which does, or must)? This leads to a second form of the Word of God, now as Holy Scripture. If the Word of God is not an abstract idea, but a divine– human relation, an encounter ‘from person to person’ (UCR I, 69), then the fact that Scripture is ‘completely and utterly in time’ appears to be the first step in bridging the radical distance between heaven and earth which still lingers in revelation itself. And yet, that distance remains, albeit in a less radical way now, because Scripture so evidently belongs to the past, not to our time but to another time. As Barth will put it later, Scripture is a ‘relative heteronomy’, rather than an absolute one (UCR I, 256), but it is nonetheless heteronomous, so far as we are concerned, something external to ourselves. It is the church’s preaching which provides the ‘solution’ here, which finally overcomes the distance between eternity and time, past and present. In the church’s preaching the Word of God ‘goes forth’; it enters our time. It is through the church’s words (whether these be understood as the Sunday sermon, or just ‘what everyone “preaches” to himself in the quietness of his own room’ (UCR I, 20)) that what is
Revelation and the Problem of Christian Preaching
71
18
an event at the limit of time may take place in time as well. In other words, it is the words of the church that bridge the gap between the eternal Word and time, and between the past Word and revelation in the present. Barth adds that although these three forms of the Word are not mutually independent, but related in an order which may not be reversed or shortcut, all are forms of the Word of God, within that particular economy. ‘Revelation is only from God himself, Scripture is only from revelation, preaching is from revelation and Scripture. But there is no “prius” or “posterius”, no “maius” or “minus”. It is the Word of God in the same splendour in the first, second and third case: “unitas in trinitate” and “trinitas in unitate”’ (UCR I, 19). Nevertheless, the eternal movement of revelation must pass through Scripture and into preaching—the equality of the forms of the Word does not mean that the Word ever ceases to actuate itself in the form of preaching—otherwise its existential impact will be lost. That is what makes it critical that preaching is to become the Word of God. As we shall see, it is not hubris when Barth seems to elevate it to this position. Quite the reverse: the nobility of the summons to preach the Word of God ought to evoke a sense of awe and impotence in those to whom it is charged. ‘We cannot think and speak too bashfully, cautiously and humbly about this third presupposition [of revelation—i.e. preaching]’ (UCR I, 326). As with the Trinity, with which he draws an analogy here, there is a distinction within this unity of the Word of God: ‘revelation remains revelation, Scripture remains Scripture and preaching remains preaching’ (UCR I, 328). The identity between preaching and revelation is eschatological; it cannot be taken for granted. And yet, what Barth refers to as the ‘bold equation’ (UCR I, 325) between the Word which God alone speaks, and the words of the Christian which are supposed to convey it, is something he takes to be utterly central to understanding what preaching is—or is to be.
18
In the Christliche Dogmatik, which draws heavily upon the contents of the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics lectures, Barth is notably keen to expand more explicitly the scope of the church’s Word, so as to include not just its preaching, but all ‘Christian talk’ (christliche Rede) as such (Chr. Dog., 34ff.) This is an attempt to broaden out the general theological inferences Barth wants to draw from the phenomenon of preaching.
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
72
‘[T]o take it seriously means to take it as the Word of God, as the Word of God in the present for the future, based in the Word of God in the past, from which we come, in Holy Scripture, and in the eternal Word of God in revelation’ (UCR I, 44). The question is why this must be so? Why does taking preaching seriously make it necessary to assert its (indirect) identity with the Word of God? Could it not still be a serious and responsible enterprise, but as something less than the Word of God itself ? In order to understand this more fully, it is necessary to return to two wellknown lectures given by Barth during a summer vacation lecture tour in 1922, just after his arrival in Go¨ttingen: ‘The affliction and promise of Christian preaching’19 and ‘The Word of God as the task of theology’,20 delivered in Schulpforta and Elgersburg respectively.
2.4 REVELATION, PREACHING, AND THEOLOGY It is well-documented that Barth’s theology emerged out of his experience as a church minister in Switzerland, and in particular the difficulties he reports having had as a preacher in Safenwil. While he was in Go¨ttingen the direct link between his dogmatics and the practical dilemmas of Christian ministry is in evidence, although it would become less so later. Barth is highly conscious that those who attended his academic lectures were principally ones training to preach in the Reformed church. However, he decides he will best prepare them for the pulpit not by helping them out of the difficulties they will face there, but by assuming these as the problem of his dogmatics. ‘If the pathway of Christian preaching is a ridge between heaven and earth, the pathway of the science of its principles cannot be an easy country road’, he writes (UCR II, 6). This way of situating 19
Barth, ‘Not und Verheißung der christlichen Verku¨ndigung’. Barth, ‘Das Wort Gottes als Aufgabe der Theologie’. The title of the lecture is mistranslated in the English edition as ‘The Word of God and the Task of Ministry’ (Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, 183ff.)—although this usefully serves to indicate how little Barth wanted to disassociate preaching and theology in the lecture. 20
Revelation and the Problem of Christian Preaching
73
dogmatics in relation to the problem of preaching dates back to the two lectures he gave in Schulpforta and Elgersburg. Barth had been invited to Schulpforta in 1922 to address the conference of ministers which was taking place there that year. In the background to that conference, it can be inferred from remarks in Barth’s lecture, there seems to have been the earnest clamour among the Protestant churches for more ‘serious’, ‘competent’, and ‘devout’ pastors.21 And so it was that Barth had been invited to give an introduction to his theology. However, he immediately opens his talk with a disclaimer to these ministers: he has not come to them ‘armed with an astonishing new theology’,22 which they will be able to learn and then transmit to their congregations. Indeed, he does not have a ‘respectable theology’ (rechte Theologie) to impart, or any particular ‘standpoint’ (Standpunkt) at all. All he will do in the lecture is to give them a phenomenological description of the ‘perspective’ (Gesichtspunkt—i.e. point of view) they are already familiar with as preachers and which, since he is a theologian, is his own.23 And so, following this introduction, he begins to depict in vivid detail what happens on a Sunday morning. Bells ring, people are summoned to church, and as the organ begins to play and hymns are sung, a mood of ‘expectancy’ (Erwartung) grows. The expectation is directed with increasing intensity towards the minister, who is preparing to mount the pulpit to address his congregation.24 This is the moment Barth wants to capture as precisely as possible, the point of crisis for ministers where the meaning of their entire ministry crystallizes, which he describes as the ‘promise’—but also the ‘affliction’ (Not) and ‘perplexity’ (Bedra¨ngnis) of Christian preaching. Above all, Barth thinks of the situation both the preacher and the academic theologian are in, in dialogical terms. The public expectation of them (whether acknowledged or not) is that they are there to mediate the Word of God. As Barth puts it, ‘in the cherry tree, the symphony, the state, their daily toil’,25 people gain fleeting and vague intuitions of the divine—of some transcendent factor which appears in human life. It is to church ministers that they look to verify and
21 24
Barth, ‘Not und Verheißung’, 121. 25 Ibid., 104–5. Ibid., 112.
22
Ibid., 103.
23
Ibid., 99.
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
74
clarify this for them; which means that this ministry takes on truly eschatological proportions: People obviously don’t need us in life. But they do seem to need us in death, in the shadow of which their whole life takes place. History continues on its course without us; but when eschatological things, the last things, pop up on their horizon—and which problem in history does not lie on the threshold of the last things?—then we must obviously be there to say something revelatory and decisive.26
The ‘dialectic of question and answer’,27 which thus describes the kerygmatic situation, plays out in an encounter between the congregation and the Word of God in the Bible, which it is the task of the preacher to communicate to them. People are ‘brought to us by the ultimate and most difficult questions’, and will not be fobbed off with ‘penultimate and easy answers’,28 Barth insists. ‘[E]ven from a human perspective the situation is literally end-historical [end-geschichtlich], eschatological, leaving aside the Bible for the moment.’29 The term ‘eschatological’ is being used here to refer not to the end of worldhistorical time, but to the limits of an individual’s history. It is only from beyond these limits that God appears to this individual. The situation is eschatological, in the sense that the questioner is not simply enquiring after what the preacher (or theologian) has to say about God, a word that could then be integrated into her present understanding of things, but after God himself: an answer coming not from within the world, but from beyond it. Or as Barth puts it, a human being is not after ‘solutions’ (Lo¨sungen)—‘something human again’—but ‘salvation’ (Erlo¨sung)—‘God, but God as the saviour of his humanity.’30 It is instructive that in neither lecture is God described any further than that: he is God tout court, or God-with-humanity; but otherwise, a God without attributes. The extraordinary peremptoriness and formality of the reference is the consequence of the question– answer dialectic Barth is using: because the questioner is looking to 26 27 28 29 30
Barth, ‘Das Wort Gottes’, 159. Beintker, Die Dialektik in der «dialektischen Theologie» Karl Barths, 76ff. Barth, ‘Not und Verheißung’, 107. Ibid., 108. Barth, ‘Das Wort Gottes’, 160.
Revelation and the Problem of Christian Preaching
75
the preacher (or theologian) in order for God to communicate himself (rather than merely for the minister to talk about God) and because this questioner already has an intuitive knowledge of God (which was the basis of her questioning in the first place) the problem faced by the minister is apparently insurmountable. Two distinct, but related aporias arise. In the first place, there is a conflict between what Graham Ward has described as ‘two antithetical models of language’, a ‘communication model’ (God’s language) and a ‘semiotic model’ (human language).31 Barth puts it like this: We cannot speak of God. For speaking of God, if we mean that seriously, would mean speaking on the basis of revelation and faith. Speaking of God would mean speaking God’s Word, the Word that can only come from him, the Word that God becomes man. We can utter these four words, but in so doing we have not yet spoken the Word of God in which that is true. But it is our theological task to say this: that God becomes man, but as God’s Word, really as God says it.32
Because human language is bound to operate within a referential network of signs and objects, rather than as an event of pure communication, the divine self-communication sought by the questioner is simply not within the capability of the minister from whom she seeks it. Even in speaking of God’s turning towards humanity, the very structures of theological language cannot help conveying precisely the opposite of that event, an object at one remove at least. ‘God on his own is not God [Bloß Gott ist nicht Gott]. He might be something else. The God who reveals himself is God. The God who becomes man is God. And the dogmatician does not speak of this God.’33 Notice, however, that this does not result, as in Bultmann, in an absolute contrast between the two antithetical modes of language. The intention is still that their opposition will be overcome in an event where the minister communicates the arrival of God, really as God himself communicates this. A second dilemma is connected to the first one. Because the human question already contains an intuition of the divine answer, that answer cannot be external to the question: ‘Nothing else needs 31 32
Ward, Barth, Derrida and the Language of Theology, 28–9. 33 Barth, ‘Das Wort Gottes’, 166. Ibid., 169.
76
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
adding to the question. The question is the answer’,34 Barth asserts. Putting it like this perhaps recalls the way in which Wilhelm Herrmann developed the problem of revelation in his religious psychology.35 The rupture generated by the Word of God occurs within the individual, just as the question being asked is not accidental to the questioner but an Existenz- or Lebensfrage, a question ontologically definitive of the person. If the answer involves any sort of talking past that existential reality, it is still not the Word of God which, because it is uttered by God himself, immediately makes a commanding impact upon those who hear it.36 If that is so, however, this dilemma refers to another form of objectification in language. Because human words are always nonidentical with the reality to which they refer, the preacher-theologian’s ‘answers’ will always appear to talk past the ‘questions’ to which they were supposed to respond. This is how Barth puts it in the Elgersburg lecture: [T]he answer may not consist in pushing the question to one side, nor merely in underlining it and making it acute, nor ultimately even in the bold assertion that the question is itself the answer—which is quite true but either far too simplistic or too ambiguous when we come to say it. No, the question must precisely be the answer, and just so the fulfilment of the promise, the filling of the hungry, the opening of the eyes of the blind and the ears of the deaf. This is the answer we ought to be giving, and it is precisely this answer that we cannot give.37
Theological language seems bound to fail to give an authoritative answer. For if God’s ‘answer’ is truly salvation, it must be so intimately connected to the question(er) as to be identical with it (her/him). The answer cannot ignore the question; it must be what Barth calls a ‘reversal’ (Umkehrung) of it, an answer which lends the question ‘a real sharpness and meaning for the first time’.38 34
Barth, ‘Not und Verheißung’, 114. Korsch has shown how Barth has directly appropriated here the problem of revelation as it had been articulated by his teacher (Korsch, ‘Die Fraglichkeit des Lebens und die Evidenz des Glaubens’, in Dialektische Theologie nach Karl Barth, 130–45). Indeed, Barth refers to Herrmann by name at the beginning of the Schulpforta lecture. 36 Cf. Barth, ‘Biblische Fragen, Einsichten und Ausblicke’, 70ff. for similar remarks. 37 Barth, ‘Das Wort Gottes’, 166–7. 38 Barth, ‘Not und Verheißung’, 113. 35
Revelation and the Problem of Christian Preaching
77
Nevertheless, this involves more than simply the ‘assertion that the question is itself the answer’. It must mean the event in which this identification actually occurs; an event which Barth calls a ‘reversal’ because in it the human question is turned on its head. ‘Not only do human beings question God; all the more so, God questions human beings as well.’39 The human expectation of an answer from God is inverted, in God’s Word, and becomes God’s expecting something of the human being, so that the individual’s question to God, is now the very point at which she is confronted and questioned by God. This reversal, which is what occurs in the event of genuine questioning and answering, is beyond the scope of the preacher or theologian, and can only occur in the reality of God: ‘Only the Lord can talk thus, can make seeking and finding, questioning and answering, the same thing.’40 This double aporia just described is expressed in Barth’s famous syllogism from the Elgersburg address, ‘As theologians we must speak of God. But we are human beings and as such we cannot speak of God. We must know both these—our obligation and our inability—and in so doing give God the glory.’41 The twofold character of the aporia results from looking at the dialogue first from the point of view of the speaking, then of the hearing of the Word of God: from either perspective, the Word can be reified if its dynamic is brought to a halt. Two points should be emphasized here. First, Barth’s radical statement about the impossibility of theological language is not intended to absolve the theologian from the obligation to speak about God with which the discussion began, but sits alongside it. We have already observed that it is rather different to the settled opposition in Bultmann between two notions of ‘word’. As Ju¨ngel pointed out, in his analysis of the lectures, the aporia is prefatory to a career of speaking about God, not a resigned silence with which it concludes.42 Secondly, because Barth takes God to be in movement towards humanity, theological language (inadequate though it is) must refer 39 40 41 42
Beintker, Die Dialektik in der dialektischen Theologie Karl Barths, 77. Barth, ‘Not und Verheißung’, 115. Barth, ‘Das Wort Gottes’, 158. Ju¨ngel, Karl Barth: A theological legacy, 54–70.
78
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
to this by giving explicit attention to the encountered human being. It is a matter, not just of anthropology becoming a theological locus, but of catching what Barth, in the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics, calls ‘man’s reflection in revelation’ (UCR I, 86). Barth thinks of human reality as being always subjected to its own ontological reversal by God’s Word; but for this to be made plausible, the event must also be shown to occur. There is always the danger that the new human reality revelation generates will appear to be a second reality, and therefore not a reality at all, but a mere postulation.43 At all events, the double aporia results from a theology of the Word that places considerable emphasis on the need for an identification event between the preached word and the Word of grace itself. This emerges most clearly in the contrast Barth draws between the Protestant pastor and the Catholic priest, Word and sacrament. The purpose of the contrast (which is really an attack on the misconstrual of grace in the Protestant churches, rather than on a caricatured Roman Catholicism) is to reinforce Barth’s point about the necessary affliction of preaching, the irresolvable dialectic of its impossibility and its necessity. Unlike in the Protestant church, where salvation is communicated only through God himself speaking his Word, by virtue of ordination the Catholic priest enjoys power to administer grace ex opere operato in the sacramental elements, to make it available. Barth refers to this sacramental grace as ‘an ultimately provisional enormity [eine letzte enorme Vorla¨ufigkeit]’ in which ‘the equilibrium of souls and of the world’ remains ‘undisturbed’.44 The total identification between grace and sacrament brings to a halt the movement of grace, the movement in which it is a reality. By contrast, the Protestant preacher does not possess this power over grace. ‘Under no circumstances and in no way should we seek to be creatores creatoris. We are not to bear [erzeugen] God, but to bear
43 For a similar statement of the problem, see Ticciati, Job and the Disruption of Identity, 7. In Ticciati’s judgement, an overbearing Christology, especially in CD IV/3, results in a ‘disjunction’ between human eschatological reality ‘in Jesus Christ’ and our present historical reality. I am suggesting that, in Barth’s earlier work, the problem is almost the opposite one: because of Barth’s anxiety about such a disjunction, grace tends to become solely an event in a person’s moral history. 44 Barth, ‘Not und Verheißung’, 110.
Revelation and the Problem of Christian Preaching
79
45
witness [bezeugen] to him.’ Therein, however, lies the promise of preaching as well. For the reversal which the Word produces must occur first of all in the preacher himself, when he is confronted in the Bible by the Word with which he must answer his congregation’s question. And so, in his very person as preacher, he now serves as a sign of the thoroughly concrete reality of God’s turn towards humanity. In effect, then, the preacher or theologian is to become the ‘sacrament’ of grace, for as a ‘sign of distress [Notzeichen]’46 he represents the reversal of question and answer which occurs in the reality of the divine Word. If he did that, if he gave the answer to what people were asking, but gave this answer as a man who himself is questioned by God, then we can certainly say that he speaks the Word of God, which men are seeking from him and which God has commissioned him to speak. For as a man who is really questioned by God and who really questions God, he would know God’s answer and so be able to give people an answer, people who with their questions certainly await God ’s answer, even if they do not realize this.47
The preacher becomes the sacrament of grace here. He is not merely a substitute for the reality of grace itself (eine Vorla¨ufigkeit), but the living embodiment of the event (res) itself, whose dynamism is therefore fully apparent in him, its reflection (signum). To his congregation he has become the prototype of all human existence before God.48 Unlike ‘Catholic’ sacramentalism, the theology or proclamation of the Word does not claim the power to generate the total identification between grace and creation. And so, it leaves a space in which
45
46 Ibid., 122. Barth, ‘Das Wort Gottes’, 162. Barth, ‘Not und Verheißung’, 116. 48 That Barth thinks of the ministerium verbi divini as being universally significant of the meaning of the presence of God is evident from his response to the suggestion that the impossibility of theology ought to mean the end of it. ‘The perplexity of our task is simply the sign of the perplexity in all human tasks. If it did not fall to us, then it would befall other theologians to operate under the same circumstances. A woman must stick with her children, just as the cobbler must stick to his last, and we can be quite sure that dialectic in a child’s playroom is no less pressing than it is in the theologian’s study. Giving up on theology has as little sense as giving up on life: doing so changes absolutely nothing at all. We must simply persevere, nothing more’ (‘Das Wort Gottes’, 176). 47
80
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
God himself can make his move towards humankind. And yet, the eschatological reserve which is thus inscribed into this perspective by Barth extends, in fact, only to the point at which God utters his Word—at which point it is abolished in an event of total identification. The contrast between Word and sacrament Barth wishes to draw perhaps masks a fundamental similarity in the way in which he construes them. In each case, a final historical presence of grace is expected. Rather than God’s accompaniment of human history, grace interrupts it and turns it upside down.
2.5 REVELATION AND NATURE Barth makes use of this material in }} 3–4 of the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics, which set out the problem first from the preacher’s point of view (} 3), then from the perspective of ‘man and his question’ (} 4). In many respects, }} 3–4 are the crucial paragraphs of these dogmatics lectures. In calling dogmatics ‘scientific reflection on the Word of God’, Barth intends to define its job in relation to Christian speech (or ‘preaching’). ‘Dogmatics is quite specifically reflection upon the Word of God concerning this speech, insofar as it is and ought to be identical with this Word’ (UCR I, 30). A large portion of dogmatic work will then be to describe what we have called the ‘kerygmatic situation’ against which dogmatics itself makes sense, and to draw his listeners into this situation which is, in fact, their own.
2.5.1 Preaching and Christian Existence In the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics, Barth develops as tight a linkage as possible between revelation and preaching as an attempt to challenge the naturalistic understanding of human subjectivity. The fact that, in modern Protestant theology, preaching is correlated with quite different social or cultural ends—e.g. the maintenance of public order, moral education, intellectual formation—is an indication to Barth of the disappearance of God from that theology. In Schleiermacher’s school, it seems to belong merely within ‘the realm of the
Revelation and the Problem of Christian Preaching
81
beautiful, in aesthetics’ (UCR I, 330). By referring to the purpose of preaching as the communication of ‘pure doctrine’ (} 11), Barth aims to undermine the anthropology which permits that view to flourish. [Doctrine] expresses very well what’s going on here: that one person gives some information to another, which he does not know. Christian preaching is a synthetic act. The anti-intellectualist fear of the word ‘doctrine’ rests on a secret or (in Schleiermacher’s case) open naturalism: nothing new may enter a person. The Word of God brings something very new to him. [UCR I, 331–2]
By describing preaching as ‘doctrine’ Barth is connecting it with revelation, the impartation of something new to a person, from beyond her possessed capacities. It is thus a direct challenge to post-Cartesian religious anthropology. As Barth sees it, this anthropology thinks God can be known, and is in fact known, in what he refers to as the ‘basic religious act [religio¨ser Grundakt]’ (UCR I, 55): ‘Because the idea of God exists in us, God exists in reality [an sich]’. This is the rationalist version of the argument. In Romantic thought, which is based on the experience of God, rather than the concept of God, the second part of the argument is condensed into the first: ‘the “because” becomes an “insofar as”’ (UCR I, 56). In either case, this basic approach to religious knowledge is intrinsically flawed, in Barth’s view. In the first place, he argues, we might grant that I really am the subject of my own knowledge of God. And yet, if that is the case, God has then become the object of my knowledge; in which case whatever I might claim to know, I do not really know God as such, who is never an object.49 However, Barth
49 This sounds like a critique of rationalist metaphysics from within a rationalist perspective. And yet, Barth insists that the aporia is generated by revelation itself, not philosophically (cf. UCR II, 11–12). ‘What is called into question [in revelation] is a knowledge of God of which a human being is the subject. Human beings must permit themselves to be told that God is not an object, that their human knowledge of God can therefore only refer to [beziehen auf] that divine self-knowledge. What is given, given to human beings in revelation, is this divine self-knowledge’ (UCR II, 16). In other words, the actual knowledge of God of which God shows that he is its subject, is what makes the knowledge of God by a human subject impossible.
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
82
demonstrates that the argument comes apart from the opposite perspective too. For example, Schleiermacher claims that God is known in the ‘feeling of absolute dependence’, as the non-worldly ‘Whence’ of that feeling,50 and the claim rests on the absoluteness of the feeling—otherwise it would constitute a dependency upon another creature. Then, however, the question is whether actual human experience itself is capable of meeting this criterion. ‘How can I even arrive at the possibility of positing that object [i.e. God], when these are the demands placed on the subject?’ (UCR I, 57). Therefore, if preaching is thought merely to confirm the religious Grundakt that is structurally present within human subjectivity, it will have been based on an aporia, rather than any given reality. The knowledge of God always involves the upturning of the structures of the human subject, the Word of God which always communicates something new. Preaching, therefore, takes nothing for granted. It must be a ‘venture’ (UCR I, 55), an act of daring, since, if it truly communicates the Word of God, this will create a disturbance and a shock in those who hear it. Speaking of God does not fit into what people otherwise are and do, not even into what they are and do in their best moments. Within every human community, order and custom, speaking of God means the same thing the unsymmetrical window built into the front of many old Franciscan churches meant: a barb, a corrective, a reminder of eternity, the great divine disturbance to which alone hope can be attached. [UCR I, 59]
However, Barth’s argument goes further than that. It is not just that preaching shares some of the qualities of divine revelation itself. It is here, in preaching, that revelation is to be thought of as occurring, so far as the human subject is concerned. By suspending the reality of revelation until the kerygmatic event occurs, Barth aims to make reception of the preaching of the church the measure by which it can be judged whether I have accepted revelation as such. He declares: ‘Whoever fails to know the spoken Word today as this, does not belong to the Reformers but to the Baptists. He should check
50
Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, } 4.4.
Revelation and the Problem of Christian Preaching
83
whether, in denying the Word of God in preaching, he is not also denying it in Holy Scripture and in revelation’ (UCR I, 40–1).51 On the other hand, this immediately raises the spectre in his mind of the second type of reification of grace we referred to earlier. Although, from an objective point of view, the identity of revelation in the preached Word seems to ensure its reality, its actual impact upon the human subject still needs recording lest the knowledge of God is mistaken for a theoretical abstraction. Thus, Barth’s first statement about revelation in the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics appears in two paragraphs—‘Deus Dixit’ (} 3) and ‘Man and his question’ (} 4)—picking up on the dialectical structure of revelation we already identified in the Elgersburg and Schulpforta lectures. ‘[The preacher] claims to give the deepest answer to the deepest human question. He places in front of the I of the listener an incalculable, indissoluble and ineluctable Thou’ (UCR I, 54). In the ‘correlation between address and being-addressed’ or ‘between revelation and faith’ (UCR I, 80) both sides of the dialogue require specific theological attention. The challenge Barth faces here is to give a credible account of the impact made by revelation upon the human subject as she is seized and shaken up by the Word of God. He must avoid depicting a steady, continuous human essence, and instead must capture the critical moment in human subjectivity at which revelation occurs, and portray human beings as those who exist ‘essentially’, so to speak, in this instability. ‘What must man be because of revelation?’ is to be the defining anthropological question here (UCR I, 87). Once again, Barth approaches the topic through the dialectic of question and answer, and thus by referring back to the kerygmatic situation. The preacher is not to address people’s public persona— i.e. the social, cultural, religious, national etc. identities they either project or are assigned—but what Barth calls the Absconditum, ‘the humanity in man [der Mensch in den Menschen]’ (UCR I, 84). This Absconditum is not some interior essence that can be reached by a process of introspective examination, but the human person insofar 51 In justifying this ‘equation’ Barth appeals to the famous statement from the Second Helvetic Confession (art. 1.2): Praedicatio verbi divini est verbum divinum (see UCR I, 325).
84
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
as she is subjected to examination by the Word of God. To see human beings like this is to determine them not conceptually, but in their actual existence—in an Existenzbestimmung, not a Denkbestimmung (UCR I, 93). Furthermore, this existence in revelation is defined, above all, as an existential questioning: ‘God’s revelation, in which Christian preaching is based, is the answer to the human question about the overcoming of the contradiction in our existence’ (UCR I, 82; thesis statement). Barth derives two homiletic principles from this anthropology. First, in speaking of God, the preacher is to assume that his listeners already know the realities to which he bears witness: We must set out by presupposing that people know, understand and accept God’s Word; which means not presupposing man’s godlessness, his ignorance, his incomprehension, his contradiction . . . I must count him as God’s with the same axiomatic certainty with which I place myself under the ‘Deus dixit’ . . . Counting him as God’s means that I see him standing before God in his lostness, and know that he is addressed by God, trusting that I say nothing new or foreign to him, but the most intimate and personal thing, summoning him, and myself together with him, to remember that God is on the scene. [UCR I, 103–4]
It may not seem easy to square this principle with Barth’s proposal that preaching be regarded as a challenge to naturalistic religious anthropologies. However, ‘in trusting that I say nothing new or foreign’ to those to whom I preach, I am not presupposing the existence of a religious knowledge grounded in, or presupposed by, the basic act of the human subject, but a prior knowledge of God grounded in, and initiated by, God. Barth is not reverting back to a self-contained anthropology here, but proposing that to be human is to be always already confronted by God in revelation. Secondly, the human question is not merely a preliminary anticipation of faith, but the essence of faith itself, the human correspondence to revelation. Barth puts it like this: ‘The correlation between revelation and faith is not genuine without the other correlation between faith and question’ (UCR I, 80). In other words, it is in the human question concerning God (Frage nach Gott) that God has already taken the initiative in addressing humanity. Therefore,
Revelation and the Problem of Christian Preaching
85
preaching itself must directly refer to the human question, otherwise it speaks past the point at which God’s Word is real: [T]he question may not be stifled [tot gemacht]. Quite the opposite: it must be stimulated and kept alive. All answers that we could give must be given in the intention of placing people again and more truly in the question of their existence which they have perhaps, probably and even certainly forgotten again. [UCR I, 104]
Thus, although revelation is described as a rupture in the settled ontology of the human subject, Barth takes great care to ensure that this rupture does not take place over the head of the one in whom it occurs, but precisely within that person. God is not convincingly my God so long as grace remains an abstraction. ‘Doing away with the question would mean the same as doing away with revelation, not being addressed by God, or not any longer’ (UCR I, 104–5). In order to settle this point, Barth paints a picture of humankind as homo viator which deliberately alludes to passages in Goethe and Nietzsche, as well as to St Paul’s description of humanity in Rom. 7 (UCR I, } 4.2, esp. 87–9). He does not mean to suggest that this anthropology is based on a philosophical analysis. It is strictly a petitio principii, humanity in the image of revelation. And yet, ‘[t] he contact we make with philosophy here is to be welcomed as a subsequent confirmation to us of the fact that we have not described a phantom sub specie humani, but a figure which everyone can know’ (UCR I, 90).
2.5.2 Revelation and Natural Theology Barth’s concern not to allow his theology to slip into doctrinal abstraction emerges once again at the beginning of his chapter on the doctrine of God (UCR II, Ch. 4). Rather than launching directly into a discussion of the divine essence or attributes, he introduces this part of the dogmatics with a paragraph on the knowability (Erkennbarkeit) of God (UCR II, } 15), which concludes with a subsection on the natural knowledge of God (} 15.4). Although Barth makes considerable adjustments, this paragraph corresponds
86
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
to the locus on natural theology, which often introduced Reformed dogmatics in the rationalist period.52 McCormack takes this section to be an inconsistency in the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics, potentially even a contradiction of the doctrine of revelation Barth had been working out in the first volume.53 His explanation for it is that Barth had now begun to follow Heppe’s Reformed dogmatics textbook very closely (although not uncritically) in his own presentation of Christian doctrine.54 In other words, because Heppe begins with a chapter on natural and revealed theology, Barth feels the need to do so too, albeit with an important twist, in that Barth changes the order found in Heppe. ‘Barth does take up the subject of a natural knowledge of God at the same point Heppe does though significantly, in the reverse order: first, revealed theology and then natural theology.’55 Nevertheless, } 15.4 seems to McCormack to be an anomaly in Barth’s dogmatics, which comes close to ‘endangering his most basic principles’.56 It can only be put down to the ‘almost boundless confidence in the church’s teaching of the past’ which Barth had acquired by now.57 I am not sure, however, that Barth’s ‘respect for the confessionaltheological school’58 entirely explains what is going on in UCR II, } 15. In fact, Barth toyed with a natural knowledge of God here, because he was highly conscious of the danger of divorcing revelation from natural reality, a principle that is firmly rooted in the first volume. ‘People are to be spoken to, and to be collared, as those who can know God’, he declares (UCR II, 30). In this section, Barth wants to distinguish the way God is known in revelation from the way he is taken to be knowable in Lutheran dogmatics. Revelation is ‘real, sufficient and adequate knowledge of God’ (UCR II, 19), Barth agrees. In other words, although God does 52
Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, 1–11. I cite McCormack’s thesis here, which is the only place in the secondary literature to discuss in detail these passages in Barth. The expository sections from his thesis dealing with the second and much of the third volumes of the GD are omitted in Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology. 54 See McCormack, A Scholastic of a Higher Order, 564–5 for a table setting out in parallel Heppe’s dogmatic loci alongside Barth’s loci in UCR I and II. 55 McCormack, A Scholastic of a Higher Order, 579. 56 57 58 Ibid., 586. Ibid., 563. Ibid., 586. 53
Revelation and the Problem of Christian Preaching
87
not hand over control to the human knower, he nevertheless makes himself available to be known in revelation, for ‘whoever disputed that God enters into this conditionality [Bedingtheit], into this subject– object relation, and becomes knowable in it, would be denying revelation’ (UCR II, 17).59 And yet, this does not mean that God is available to be known directly, whether objectively in Jesus,60 or through my knowledge of myself.61 Barth thinks of both of these as instances of what, at one point, he refers to as ‘Lutheranism’s inability or unwillingness to wait’ (UCR III, 107). ‘They impatiently and chaotically drag into the relation of revelation [Offenbarungsverha¨ltnis], into the knowledge of Christ and knowledge of faith, what belongs to the end of all things as their fulfilment, and [what belongs] in eschatology as the limit and dissolution of dogmatics’ (UCR II, 28).62 However, the eschatological suspension of revelation here is not an absolute denial of its reality, but an analysis of it. Barth points to two 59 It is probably an exaggeration, therefore, when Hans Frei suggests that in this period (until after the publication of the Christliche Dogmatik in 1927) Barth was so anxious about objectifying God that he did not think that faith had any real content at all. According to Frei, either ‘the knowledge of God is simply ac-knowledgment of myself as being known’ (Frei, The Doctrine of Revelation, 198), i.e. self-knowledge in an ‘epistemic vacuum’, or it is taken ethically as personal ‘venture’ or ‘risk’ (ibid., 116). Barth certainly intends to draw attention to the existential character of knowledge (e.g., UCR I, 242). Indeed, his doctrine of revelation is that to know God is to participate in God’s self-knowledge, rather than to possess that knowledge for ourselves (UCR II, 15–16). When he posits himself as subject, however, God nevertheless posits himself; Barth intends to express both ideas (UCR II, 13). 60 Barth cites Paul Althaus and Werner Elert as instances of this postivism: ‘In the life of Jesus, or in distinct traits of his life, it is supposed that we have the divine subject immediately and directly available [ablesbar] before our eyes. But that would mean that the divine subject, the “I am who I am!” who reveals his name by refusing it, was made into a named object’ (UCR II, 22). 61 Here Barth refers to Horst Stephan, as well as Hegel and Schleiermacher. This epistemology involves ‘a breaking-through of the subject–object relation’ (UCR II, 24–5) in which God initiates the knowledge of himself. 62 Barth thinks that this eschatological reserve makes his doctrine of revelation similar to that in Roman Catholic theology (and specifically Thomas Aquinas). Catholic dogmatics draws a distinction between the lumen gratiae and the lumen gloriae: the former is indirect and historically mediated knowledge; the latter direct knowledge, ‘mediated’ only by the bestowal of the lumen gloriae itself upon the mind in the consummatio mundi (for references, see UCR II, 26–7). However, this eschatological economy of revelation is rather different to Barth’s eschatology, the horizon of which is less the consummation of the world than the eschatological advent of the divine Word.
88
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
well-known examples of God’s revelation of himself to Moses in Exodus. When Moses demands to know Yahweh’s name, he is not granted it directly, but referred to God’s irreducible subjectivity: ‘I am who I will be’ (Ex. 3.14). ‘Namensverweigerung als Namensoffenbarung’ (UCR II, 13), Barth observes; by refusing to hand over his name (i.e. who he really is), God really reveals it. Or again, when Yahweh shows himself to Moses, it is not God’s face that Moses is permitted to see, but his back, for ‘man shall not see me and live’ (Ex. 33.20–3). To know God in revelation can only mean to know ‘his mystery, the limitation [Grenze] he sets to our knowledge, the need to ask after him’ (UCR II, 19). Barth’s version of the ‘natural’ knowability of God is to be understood in the context of this doctrine of revelation. As Barth describes it, the human capax Dei cognitionis is something of a paradox. On the one hand, we are informed that, as a human capacity, it is never to be disconnected from its actual realization in revelation; it is asserted on the strictly theological basis of the knowledge of God which in fact is, not as an inductive philosophical argument (UCR II, 11–12, 32). It is based on the twofold premise that God in fact already addresses humanity, and that God does nothing in vain (UCR II, 31–2). In short, ‘natural’ does not refer to a possessed capacity which can be activated spontaneously by the human subject. As Christoph Schwo¨bel has stated it, ‘[t]he knowing subject does not determine the reality of the object of knowledge through the conditions for the possibility of knowledge’.63 And yet, on the other hand, Barth insists that ‘this capacity stands, even if . . . there is no actual knowledge of God’ (UCR II, 30); although it stands here not as a positive potentiality over against God, but as the existential question which a person actually is. In maintaining this distinction between the reality and its possibility, Barth is trying to make it clear that there is nothing subsequent or accidental about what a human being is, or becomes, in revelation; grace and nature never come apart. This is why it is not impossible that critical philosophy is capable of being in agreement with this
63
Schwo¨bel, ‘Theology’, 30.
Revelation and the Problem of Christian Preaching
89
theological anthropology: the existential disruption caused by God is not notional, but real. It is at this point that Barth introduces his equivalent of a proof for the existence of God although, as he points out, the ‘proof ’ serves rather a different function in this dogmatics. Rather than being an induction from a given, generally agreed foundation to the reality of a previously disputed hypothesis (which would entail the erasure of the eschatological limit of the knowledge of God), Barth simply reaffirms the existential phenomenon of the unsatisfied quest for God (Frage nach Gott), for this is the very thing disclosed in God’s revelation: [T]he natural knowledge of God consists . . . precisely in the ‘facultas’ of coming up against the mystery, of allowing oneself to be limited, made finite, by an unanswerable question. A proof of the existence of God, the conviction that we are thrust [angewiesen] upon God with absolute necessity, that we cannot escape God, would, instead of opening up that refuge, have to consist in showing that pitiless limitation, that immovable but unanswerable question in the possibility of knowledge as such. It would not demonstrate before [a person’s] eyes the satisfactory completion of his total worldview, but its most unsatisfactory presupposition. [UCR II, 44]
This is not to be thought of as a ‘negative natural theology’, if that is taken to mean a theological proposal not rooted in revelation itself.64 ‘The knowability of God is given and called into question in revelation’, Barth insists (UCR II, 11—thesis statement, my italics). We might categorize it as a negative transcendental proof of God: the reality of God—not simply an idea of God, but his very revelation— is the horizon of the experience of, or the rational conception of, God’s unknowability. For McCormack, UCR II, } 15.4 comes very close to Emil Brunner’s ‘eristics’ programme, which Barth himself would famously oppose less than a decade later, but which already stands in contrast to the real intentions of his own dogmatics.65 And so, it is worth
64 Stadtland argued that the negations in Barth’s dialectical theology were based on a ‘negative natural theology’ rather than on revelation (Eschatologie und Geschichte, 120). 65 McCormack, A Scholastic of a Higher Order, 585f.
90
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
comparing, briefly, this negative ‘proof ’ of God’s existence with the positions Brunner was busy developing at the same time.66 Brunner increasingly comes to see his own proposal as a response to the concern that Barth’s dogmatic theology was detaching itself from the concrete, existential environment in which the Word of God in fact occurs. Hence, in addition to providing an ‘objective science of the faith’,67 the theologian had a second task: to relate theological propositions to existence as it is actually lived out. Brunner elaborates his existential analysis in engagement with critical philosophy, which he decides to interpret through Kierkegaard rather than its neo-Kantian exponents. That is, the ‘seriousness’ (Ernst) of critical reason does not derive from a notion of pure science, from which Kant then derived his moral philosophy, but from the categorical imperative which is always present on the horizon of thought, and entails an original cleft between indicative and imperative, Ought and Is.68 Critical philosophy is theologically serious because it takes cognizance of the limits, the self-contradiction, the guilt, in which practical reason finds itself implicated, and thus demonstrates a ‘searching [fragendes] knowledge of God’69 Indeed, this can be seen from the fact that the more sophisticated this philosophy becomes, the more abruptly it comes up against the aporias which are built into its very structures: ‘The more reflection pushes through to its ultimate ground, the more the given and the non-given fall apart, and the deeper, graver and more unbearable the cleft becomes. In the knowledge of guilt or of radical evil, the critical principle reaches its completion.’70 This reading of critical philosophy seemingly has much in common with Barth’s positive reception of it in the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics. He refers to it, at one point, as ‘clean philosophical thinking’ (UCR II, 217), i.e. a philosophy conscious of rational limits, which therefore avoids giving a conceptually complete picture of how God and the world relate. Moreover, as we have seen, Barth regards the critical 66 Brunner’s theological eristics can be seen emerging in two essays published in Zwischen den Zeiten, ‘Das Grundproblem der Philosophie bei Kant und Kierkegaard’ (1924) and ‘Die andere Aufgabe der Theologie’ (1929). 67 Brunner, ‘Die andere Aufgabe’, 256. 68 Brunner, ‘Das Grundproblem’, 37f. 69 Brunner, ‘Die andere Aufgabe’, 262. 70 Brunner, ‘Das Grundproblem’, 41.
Revelation and the Problem of Christian Preaching
91
analysis of human existence as being the philosophical intuition about the limitedness of human creatureliness before God—and hence, as a kind of ‘proof ’ of revelation. And yet, there is a fundamental difference here from Brunner’s attempt to correlate theology and critical philosophy. In Barth, the unsatisfied existential ‘quest for God’ (Fragen nach Gott) is not so much the point of contact theology can make with natural reason, in order to resolve the dilemmas of the latter, as the condition to which all reason is consigned by revelation. Whereas Barth locates theology and faith within the limits and self-contradictions which attend human existence because God is, Brunner thinks that it is here that the existential struggle comes to an end. Theology, for Brunner, communicates the divine Logos in time, and so brings about ‘the contradiction of the contradiction of our existence’.71 ‘Faith is either the end of philosophy, or it is not faith at all . . . Faith knows (that is its witness, not philosophy’s) that it—that the divine Word of promise which creates it—is the fulfilment of the law, the fulfilment of critical thought.’72 For Barth, however, theology and faith are not exempt from that movement by which critical philosophy is afflicted, for it is precisely that affliction which attests a genuine knowledge of God. In short, to let theology or faith off the hook at this point is also to liberate them from God. Furthermore, if the search for God is therefore set by Brunner, not within the movement of faith, as it is by Barth, but as a necessary countermovement which precedes it and prepares for it, it becomes difficult to maintain that the initiative in grace is taken by God.73 71
72 Ibid., 45. Ibid., 46. It is clear that Brunner himself senses this problem, for he is quick to point out that human ‘nature’ is not simply identical with sin, but ‘borne by God and oriented towards God. And so, the “point of contact” for God in man is none other than God’s own creative work’ (‘Die andere Aufgabe’, 267 n. 7). In other words, he tries to maintain that the preliminary to the actual moment of grace is not a human work but providential grace: ‘Hearing, faith, assent are entirely God’s work, when they occur. But refusal is man’s work’ (ibid., 268). The claim remains unconvincing, however, when the overall flow of the argument is in exactly the opposite direction: unless Brunner can show that the process of human questioning occurs outside grace, as the autonomous movement of (practical) reason towards the realization of its own aporias, the worry that dogmatic theology can ever really lose its Existentialita¨t is unfounded, and there can be no ‘other task for theology’, as he proposes. 73
92
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
(This objection on the basis of the doctrine of grace will be at the heart of Barth’s ‘No’ to Brunner in the 1930s.) By contrast, because the existential contradictoriness of human life is directly revealed in the event of grace itself, for Barth it is evident that the apprehension of it by critical reason cannot be a self-driven process, but is a moment within faith itself, and therefore the rational response to a divine impulse. Coming, as it does, at the beginning of his doctrine of God, this paragraph on the knowability of God, and the negative ‘proof ’ of God’s existence, is not merely incidental to that doctrine. Barth wishes to make it clear that the dialectic in which he unfolds the doctrine—setting one attribute against another, so as to prevent any one of them becoming a comprehensive statement about God—is based in the eschatologically limited condition in which human thought finds itself because of revelation. Conversely, the limits of language which become apparent in that way of speaking about God are not merely abstract rational limits, but the limits generated by the confounding reality of God: If, in the book of Job, it is the questioner Job who is in the right . . . rather than the friends who answer him (Job 42.7), then this must mean that pointing to God, or proving God, so far as anything of that kind is humanly possible at all, is to be found where we come up against God’s mystery. [UCR II, 46]
In a sense then, the critical-philosophical proof of revelation is an anti-proof, the proof of the reality of the existence of God by affirming the impossibility of such a proof.
2.6 CONCLUSION ‘Christian preaching is God’s Word in the present, for the present, just as Holy Scripture is God’s Word in [past] time, and revelation is God’s eternal Word’ (UCR I, 327). What we have been observing in this chapter is not a denial, by Barth, of temporal, past-historical revelation. Rather, the introduction of a break between eternity and time, past and present, is designed to ensure that grace does not simply
Revelation and the Problem of Christian Preaching
93
‘flow’ into the present, but makes a disruptive arrival, stopping it in its tracks in order to set it on a new course. Barth decides to portray this event taking place in the aporia of what he calls ‘the painful and tragic riddle of Christian preaching’ (UCR I, 324): preaching must become nothing less than revelation itself, an impossible task. On the other hand, as we shall see more clearly in subsequent chapters, his deepest intention in describing the denaturalizing effects of revelation is not sheerly destructive, but the disclosure of a new kind of existence after grace, one that is genuinely human, and therefore genuinely free. And yet, Barth thinks that he cannot make that type of humanity fully apparent without, through the case of Christian ministry, claiming that it is to become eschatologically identical with revelation itself. Anything less than that aim would apparently indicate the kind of continuity between grace and history which revelation always resists: To be sure, if Christian preaching is something different than the Word of God then, precisely at that point, it is not a human task. It then stands on exactly the same plane as what occurs in nature. It is then an act of caprice, a product of the imagination, something which could be done in whatever way, or left undone as well. [UCR I, 330]
In other words, because preaching is directly responsible to the Word of God—and in this respect, it is to be thought of as paradigmatic of all human action—its freedom is not self-originating (caprice), but takes the form of a voluntary agreement of the individual’s will to a quite specific end. However, it is questionable whether the notion of an (indirect) ‘identity’ between preaching and revelation is really conducive to the full affirmation of the freedom of the human act. Unlike in Brunner, Barth insists upon an eschatological delay between the human word and the divine Word which it intends. Indeed, it is in the interstice between them that space is left in grace for human action. And yet, he finds it hard to express the delay in anything but negative terms: Preaching is precisely not there for its own sake, but to permit us, through human words, to see through to the present and living Word of God. The less they interpose a third thing between God’s Word and man, and the more
94
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
that they negate any third thing, setting aside all false divinities and all arrogant humanities, the more they seek, in their positivity, to be only an indication, only a pointer, compelling us to see that other thing with which they are, nevertheless, indirectly identical, the more clearly the hiddenness of the Word of God can shine through the human word which conceals it, the more it is pure doctrine. [UCR I, 332]
Because Barth thinks of the church’s readiness to accept the disruptiveness of the preached word as, at the very least, the concrete mark of its acceptance of the troubling disturbance caused by the Word of God, he wants to assert, eschatologically, a total identity of the two. Yet the result is a description where human speech and divine Logos are always potentially crowding each other out, trying to occupy the same restricted space. The metaphor of ‘transparency’ simply confirms the gravity of this concern: the doctrinal purity to which preaching must aspire is less to do with a coherency which reflects revelation, than an entirely insubstantial clarity which will not impede it. Preaching is to be ‘only an indication, only a pointer’. However, because this indication and this pointer are obliged to be equal with the Word of God (eine Gleichung—UCR I, 332), it is hard to see how they can be positively rendered. Hence, as we shall see in more detail in Chapter 3, the last thing dogmatics may do, in serving Christian preaching, is to provide it with a positive version of the gospel. It is only when Barth lectures on John’s Gospel, in the first semester after leaving Go¨ttingen, that he manages to develop a convincing emphasis on the positivity of the church’s ministry as witness, for this takes its rise in the Son’s ministry of witness to the Father.
3 Dogmatics In this chapter, I return to the issue raised earlier (see 2.2 above) concerning the relation between preaching and dogmatics. We have seen how Barth was conscious of the danger of dogmatics interceding between the Word of God and the preacher, for that would blunt the direct impact of that encounter, in which the minister becomes the ‘sacrament’ to his congregation of the eschatological presence of the Word. Because of that, Barth’s dogmatics totters on a knife-edge between a negative theology and an abstract positivism. In the Schulporfta and Elgersburg lectures, examined earlier, he refers to theology as a critical science, both in relation to preaching and to other disciplines. Rather like critical philosophy, it must serve as a reminder to the positive sciences of the shakiness of their foundations, the sign that ‘the supposed academic cosmos is in reality an eddy of scattered pages blowing over the edge of an abyss!’1 Its essence does not lie in its positivity, but in being a ‘pinch of spice’, a ‘marginal gloss’ on other theologies; in short, Korrektiv.2 And yet, it is only because it allows itself to be directly exposed to the criticism of the Word that theology has this critical function. Theology does not speak from above preaching or the positive sciences, but with them and alongside them. It is a critical science not because it possesses a criterion of judgement, but precisely because it recognizes that it does not. In the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics, Barth will use the Reformed scholastic theology, systematized by Heppe, to lend structure and substance to his dogmatics, especially 1 2
Barth, ‘Das Wort Gottes’, 162. Barth, ‘Not und Verheißung’, 100.
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
96
in the doctrines of God, creation, humanity in UCR II, and Christology and soteriology (UCR III). And yet, he still maintains that his theology is critical: the ‘worth and value’ of Reformed scholasticism, he points out in the concluding chapter of the dogmatics, depends on couching it in the ‘newly awakened understanding of eschatology’ (UCR III, 432). The moment dogmatics achieves ‘opacity’, or becomes a learnable language, it contradicts the eschatological reality of the Word which does not suffer that kind of containment. As Pfleiderer points out, the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics is intended to be ‘preaching for preachers’.3 However, this is not because of its ‘systematic and constructive potential’,4 but precisely because it seeks to draw attention to the eschatological interval between its own language and revelation. As I have suggested already, Barth’s dogmatics reflects a dialogical perspective on theological reality, the paradigm of which is the ‘dialogue’ between the preacher’s sermon and the congregation’s quest for God. And yet, it also applies to dogmatic discourse itself, which Barth plots quite consciously in relation to the dialogue. Dogmatics too is in an eschatological economy, structured by the expectation of God’s presence in the Word, and if it is a ‘critical science’ it is because it allows its limits to appear in that connection. It will be apparent that this eschatology must make it hard for Barth to construe the task of dogmatics in positive terms. To the extent that the reality of the Word—the horizon against which dogmatics takes place—moves into the foreground, the positivity of dogmatic assertions is cancelled out by the presence of the infinitely greater reality. We shall see that Barth tries to avoid this rivalry (not wholly satisfactorily) by extending the eschatological interval between dogmatics and this reality. A genuine conceptual advance occurs, however, in the lectures on John’s Gospel Barth gave at Mu¨nster in 1925–6 (the term after his departure from Go¨ttingen). In these lectures, Barth manages more convincingly to portray the positive luminary quality of the human witness—without that positivity being competitive with revelation itself—because he grounds this ministry in God, in the Son’s ministry of witness. The chapter concludes with an analysis of this commentary.
3
Pfleiderer, Karl Barths praktische Theologie, 419.
4
Ibid., 420.
Dogmatics
97
3.1 THE DOGMATIC CORRELATION Upon arriving in Go¨ttingen, Barth soon found himself invited to join what he referred to (not without irony) as the Stange-Kra¨nzchen, a closed circle of some of the Lutheran theologian Carl Stange’s colleagues from the theological faculty, which gathered at fortnightly intervals in Stange’s house for discussion and debate. On 22 January 1922, Stange proposed that at the next meeting he, Barth, and Emmanuel Hirsch each deliver short papers on the significance of Feuerbach for their own work. What we have of Barth’s paper is admittedly not much more than detailed, but informal notes,5 without the subtly and range of analysis we find in the well-known essay on Feuerbach Barth would later publish in Mu¨nster. And yet, the conclusions he draws about Feuerbach are essentially the same in the earlier piece as those he reaches in the later one. In both pieces, notwithstanding some criticism, Barth regards Feuerbach not as an opponent, but an ally. As he puts it in the later piece, ‘the position of Feuerbach the anti-theologian was more theological than that of many theologians, since in strict adherence to the old, accepted theological content, he wanted to say, not many things, but one thing with a tenacity which did not fear a thousand repetitions’.6 The 1922 paper is interesting, however, because it gives an important indication of how Barth thinks of dogmatics, not simply as a piece of discourse, but as situated within a particular strand of religious anthropology, from where it operates a dialectical negation. Feuerbach’s theological value, for Barth, is found in the consistently reductive psychology which he uses to generate his anthropological critique of religion. And yet, his reading of Feuerbach is somewhat complex. ‘Feuerbach saw something decisively true: what we call religion, even what we call Christianity, is a relative and a thisworldly phenomenon, across the whole spectrum in which it appears psychically and historically.’7 What Feuerbach perceived, that is, was that humanity is a singular reality, whose supposedly higher and 5 6 7
Barth, ‘Feuerbach’ (1922). Barth, ‘Ludwig Feuerbach’ (1926), 217. Barth, ‘Feuerbach’ (1922), 9.
98
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
lower functions are in fact in inextricable concert, so that the religious motions of the soul can be linked directly to the needs and operations of the body. And yet, that notwithstanding, he basically remained sympathetic to the religious synthesis between God and humanity taught by modern Protestantism, criticizing it only for not going far enough. By continuing to appeal to a divine presence over and beyond human consciousness (even if only notionally so), Feuerbach worried that theology was putting a ceiling on the elevation of humanity, which was the meaning of all true religion. In other words, expressed in dogmatic terms, the human dignity intended by religion was only possible on condition that the unio naturarum between God and humanity be total and unqualified.8 Barth’s objection here is not, as might be expected, that the synthesis Feuerbach posits between God and humanity makes God wholly immanent within the world—rather than transcendent over it—but that God’s immanence to the world has not been construed historically. This means that, in the final analysis, Feuerbach’s anthropology amounts to ‘naı¨ve humanitarianism’,9 a bourgeois faith in ‘humanity’ as an unchanging essence instantiated in every historical present:10 He saw human willing and longing and thinking as the last thing, even at the point where its actual end becomes visible, and beyond the end the new thing, the other thing which is not of this world. He did not see that the lines of perceptible [anschaulich] humanity, which he was often capable of depicting so movingly, coincide at the invisible point beyond all graves, where the new man stands.11
In a word, what Barth finds missing from Feuerbach’s anthropology is the concept of death (Todesgedanke)—the recognition that the complete synthesis between God and humanity is an eschatological event; and therefore one in which human self-realization meets its divine limits. Without this, Barth argues, Feuerbach’s ‘anti-theology’ is really 8 The 1926 essay shows the fruits of Barth’s studies on Reformed and Lutheran Christology in Go¨ttingen, in that he links Feuerbach’s doctrine of religion back to the Lutheran communicatio idiomatum (a connection Feuerbach himself drew quite readily), and appealing for the need for a ‘Calvinist corrective’ to Lutheran Christology to put a brake on Feuerbach’s reductionism (‘Ludwig Feuerbach’ (1926), 231). 9 10 11 Barth, ‘Feuerbach’ (1922), 13. Ibid., 11. Ibid., 12.
Dogmatics
99
only an unrestrained Lebensphilosophie, and his critique of religion merely superficial. ‘Without the complete seriousness of the concept of death, [there can be] no sense of the Resurrection. But the concept of death must be precisely the norm of critical negation, to be used against the world and against religion, its noblest flower.’12 And yet, once the concept of death is introduced, the radicalism of Feuerbach’s reductionism can be turned back onto the religious symbiosis of God and world—not to abolish it as such, but to negate it eschatologically, i.e. to suspend its reality. Moreover, Barth connects this dialectical reversal directly with the task of dogmatic theology (and theological ethics): In the light of the concept of death, which Feuerbach never countenanced, it is not impossible to conceive the concept of eternity, and therefore to see questions concerning God where he only saw human answers. The task which I think Feuerbach sets theology, is a dogmatics and an ethics which, after the example of late scholasticism, dare to take that which is historically given in Christianity as the occasion for raising the question concerning God at the limits of humanity, aware of the this-worldliness [Diesseitigkeit] of all its achievements, but also aware of the other-worldliness [Jenseitigkeit] of what they point to; i.e. a dogmatics and an ethics [which dare] to be quite simply and honestly problematic [Problematik] again.13
It should be noted here that Barth does not leap from the concept of death to that of the Resurrection. The Resurrection cannot be allowed to be an abstract state of grace, posited in a sphere beyond human reality, for then (as Barth thinks) its morally subversive power would be lost. Dogmatics and ethics are to begin at the place of the total synthesis Feuerbach asserted, and from that point ‘dare . . . to be Problematik’: i.e. to problematize the positivity of the given, by identifying its eschatological horizon, on which the actuality of God’s presence becomes possible again. This is exactly the challenge taken up in the Go¨ttingen Dogmatics. Barth will take what he refers to as the ‘raw material’, or ‘data’, that is Christian preaching—i.e. the teaching of the church ‘which is historically given in Christianity’—and problematize it. In so doing, it again becomes the possibility of a confrontation with the Word of 12
Ibid., 13.
13
Ibid., 13.
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
100
God, rather than abstract theory, cut loose from the encounter itself. This critical process is the essence of what Barth terms ‘scientific reflection on the Word of God [wissenschaftliche Besinnung auf das Wort Gottes]’ (UCR I, 8). However, that means carefully distinguishing this definition of dogmatics from the two alternatives into which theology can slip: (a) scientia de Deo (i.e. a medieval-scholastic conception) or (b) scientia de religione (the modern Protestantsubjective reaction against it). Each of these possibilities corresponds exactly, of course, to the two abstractions Barth always sets out to avoid: of the reality of God from the human subject, and of the human subject from the reality of God.
3.1.1 Scienta de Deo Barth’s acquaintance with medieval theology was largely secondhand at this stage in his career, mediated through the extracts contained in various manuals on the history of dogma, combined with a sharp perception of the ‘spirit’ of the Middle Ages, which he developed by observing the various churches and works of art from the period, with which he was familiar. In the lectures on Reformed theology (in which there are brief treatments of the Middle Ages) because scholasticism forms the background to his discussion of the meaning of the Reformation, he is inclined to read it, not on its own terms, but through Luther’s polemics in the Heidelberg and Wittenberg Disputations. In other words, he tends simply to import Luther’s objections into his own analysis of medieval theology. Initially, he claims to be impressed by the ‘dialectical courage and consistency’14 of scholasticism, by the ‘extraordinary peace’15 that breathes over its debates, and by the ‘firm Catholic ground of balance’16 which made the medieval Summa rather like the great cathedrals of the age. However, the encomium is tinged with considerable irony. For all these attributes indicate to Barth that the Middle Ages had only the dimmest awareness of the disruptive potency entailed in any reflection upon God. To be sure, these theologians knew about the great themes of the Reformation: predestination, the forgiveness 14
Barth, TC, 32.
15
Ibid., 50.
16
Ibid., 53.
Dogmatics
101
of sins, gratuitous justification etc. ‘But why were these concepts so harmless in their thinking, so lacking in relevance, so very much in the background?’ he wonders. ‘How did they manage to turn them into the foundations of a theological-ecclesial system in which grace was mediated in a harmonious order—the peaceful cohabitation of nature and grace, immanence and transcendence, human and divine freedom?’17 Above all, it seems to Barth that, until and in spite of the Occamist turn, God and creatures are connected as one massive, uninterrupted continuity (effectively the same critique he would continue to make of Catholicism throughout the 1930s):18 ‘what stamps medieval theology is the fundamental accessibility of the mystery of the glory, of the o´Æ Łf’.19 Barth describes the scholastic thought process as a horizontal line which, taking God’s revelation as its starting point, stretches onwards and upwards into infinity, ‘not considering how seriously it is threatened from behind’.20 Medieval scholasticism represents a mode of theology which either disregards or is unaware of the fact that intellectual reflection has its limits. What it successfully attempts is to communicate a knowledge of God in his glory, purity and majesty. In the biblical Word and church dogma it sees not only an indication and paraphrase of the Mystery itself, but signposts along a path that, with a little dialectical effort, leads to the heart of the Mystery, so that it is no longer mysterious for the one who takes this path. It knows no restriction or obligation making it halt in front of the object intended by the biblical Word or dogma.21
Scholastic theology itself is the path of salvation which, if pursued, leads reliably upwards into eternity. ‘It is the one thing necessary; it is the blessedness of man. You only need read the descriptions of heaven given by these theologians to understand what theology meant to people in the Middle Ages.’22 In short, it is the mystical–intellectual equivalent (for all the differences) of the anthropology represented by Feuerbach. Barth regards modern rationalist objections to all of this as justified. And yet, that is because he thinks that human knowledge is 17 19
Barth, TRB, 126. Barth, TC, 38.
E.g. Barth CD II/1, } 26 esp. pp. 79–84. 21 22 Ibid., 61. Ibid., 33–4. Ibid., 35.
18 20
102
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
bound, not by empirical limitations, but by moral ones, which go unacknowledged throughout the contemplative processes of scholastic thought. In that all knowledge always involves what he calls a ‘correlation’ (Korrelation) between subject and object, defining dogmatics as scientia de Deo, tout court, ‘does not give faith the rights it must have in fixing the object’ (UCR I, 13). As an approach to dogmatics, scientia de Deo suspends the incontrovertible principle that the human subject is to become thematic in any theological process. It should be noted here that we are a long distance away from the ‘disjunction and alienation of [Barth’s] theology from natural reality’,23 which some commentators have identified. The starting point of his dogmatics is the principle that revelation makes any such disjunction inadmissible.
3.1.2 Scienta de religione On the other hand, he insists, ‘recognizing this correlation does not yet mean the Copernican reversal from the divine to the human subject’ (UCR I, 13), i.e. making dogmatics scientia de religione. Although Barth does not think of Schleiermacher as the instigator of this development—he dates it back to earlier strands of Reformed theology, especially English Presbyterianism (UCR I, 11)—he was best acquainted with Schleiermacher’s version of it, having devoted a section from his 1923 lecture course on Schleiermacher to analysis of The Encyclopedia.24 As Barth notes, because Schleiermacher did not wish to follow Schelling by constructing theology on a purely speculative basis, and because (on the other hand) a purely empirical science of historical Christianity would not suffice to legitimate it, he had to demonstrate—if he still wanted to maintain that theology justified its place in the university (according to the Kantian concept)—that the concept of ‘religion’ was a necessary theme in philosophical ethics. As Barth points out, however, relating theology to ethics along these 23
Roberts, A Theology on Its Way, 57. Barth, TS, } 4. See Schleiermacher, Brief Outline of Theology as a Field of Study (New York: E. Mellen Press, 1990). 24
Dogmatics
103
lines, as the relation between the possible and the actual or given, immediately restricts theology’s critical scope in relation to the positive sciences: With the assurance that piety and the pious community are things which were also envisaged by ethics, a little lodging is generously provided for it within the scientific whole, just so long as it has given up any pretensions of being the science of revelation, as the real Master of the house desired, and contented itself with the theme of so-called ‘piety’ which is allotted to it instead.25
In other words, because theology’s academic legitimacy (for Schleiermacher) is derived from the capacity of religion to sustain a given order of practice, to unsettle this order, as revelation necessarily does, will involve calling its academic credibility into question. Barth discusses Schleiermacher’s efforts to get round the problem, by projecting Christian religion back to its historical origins. This relation gives the impression that ‘early Christianity’ has a certain normative value over the present, in his system. And yet, because Schleiermacher thinks of history as ‘a unity . . . within which there are only relative contrasts’,26 the ‘disturbance’ (Sto¨rung) created by referring religion to its historical origins is ‘not genuinely dangerous, and the consistency of Schleiermacher’s theology still wins through, even in this inconsistency’.27 As Barth keenly points out, to make dogmatics the study of religion ultimately fails to provide a justification for theology’s academic existence, in that it now becomes a fundamentally otiose and superfluous discipline (UCR I, 35–6). Its sole purpose is to record or paraphrase ideas which have arisen in church history, referring them back to the religious consciousness from which they have emerged. Since that consciousness is both the source and the norm of religious language, dogmatics loses its capacity to be self-critical, in any meaningful sense: ‘Here, in any case, man is measured by man, his pious words by his experience, his speech concerning God by his own psychological-historical determination’ (UCR I, 341).28 25 27
26 Barth, TS, 309–10. Ibid., 312. 28 Ibid., 313. Cf. ibid., 315–6.
104
Karl Barth’s Go¨ttingen Theology
At its most fundamental level, however, Barth’s objection to Schleiermacher is based on a reductio ad absurdum of the concept of religion itself. The problem with a dogmatics which takes its rise in the religious subject is that it returns theology to exactly the same dilemma it was trying to escape: the abstraction and objectification of God. Barth expresses it in terms of the same subject–object aporia I have pointed out in previous chapters: ‘If God were not subject, the one who speaks and creates faith through his Word, what else could he be than the object of metaphysical knowledge?’ (UCR I, 14) The only way round this dilemma, Barth insists, is to make God the subject of religion. In other words, the rejection of metaphysics by modern theology, in the name of anthropology, is turned back on modern theology itself—which is shown to be simply another form of metaphysics. Unless the ground of human religion is the divine subject, God becomes practically abstract from the human being once more (the metaphysical object of the human subject), the very thing that was being rejected at the outset. The dilemma is only escaped by grounding the religious subject outside itself. If dogmatics is to speak of God, if it wishes to do this only in the correlation between God and faith, as Protestant dogmatics does, there can nevertheless be no doubt that it must recognize its primary theme, which is to be placed at the highest point in principle, in this generative ground of faith, in this confidential divine turning and address, without which faith is nonsense. [UCR I, 15]
However, it should be noted that this reversal is rather more complex than a turn away from human subjectivity to the theological ‘Sache’, since the latter is being strictly coordinated with faith, as faith’s transcendent origin. In this sense, as Stacy Johnson has observed, Barth’s ‘focal point . . . strikes a formal parallel to that of Friedrich Schleiermacher, for whom, as well, the object of theology is never God in the abstract’.29 By making God the ‘generative ground’ of faith, Barth resolves the dilemma arising in the structures of human 29
Stacy Johnson, The Mystery of God, 13. For Frei, the quest to correlate the Word of God and experience (which he takes to characterize Barth’s theology between, approximately, 1916 and 1927) is a sign that Barth was still tied to some of the ‘relationist’ patterns of thought from which was trying to cut himself free (Frei, The Doctrine of Revelation, 107–8).
Dogmatics
105
subjectivity which, whether in its metaphysical or its subjectivist form, is always bound to make God into the object of human thought (and thus the victim of the human will as well). If God is conceived as faith’s originator, this difficulty is circumvented; for then the knowledge of God is not metaphysically released from the problematic character of human knowing, while on the other hand, faith does not ultimately cause its own knowledge.
3.2 DOGMATICS AS PROB LEMATIK As we have seen, Barth does not think of dogmatics as a self-contained study of God, or of the Word of God, but as a service performed in relation to the church’s preaching. This is not a circumstantial detail, nor simply a point about the institutional identity of theology.30 Barth’s consciousness that he is addressing future ministers is intrinsic to the way in which he develops his dogmatics. If preaching may be compared to front-line battle in the trenches, he writes, then dogmatics performs a behind-the-scenes communica¨ bung), which tions service (UCR I, 334). It is a form of training (U prepares pastors for their ministry (UCR I, 335). McCormack construes it like this: ‘Dogmatics has the quite modest task of providing the preacher with those dogmas, those loci which guide the preacher in doing everything he/she can do to ensure that what he/she says will be pure doctrine’.31 Or again:
30 From an historical point of view, of course, Pfleiderer’s institutionstheoretisch reading of the GD is quite accurate, even if Barth’s texts are stretched a little in justifying the point. That Barth’s theology was be