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ENGINEERING INVENTION
EN GINEERING INVENTIO N Frank J. Sprague and the U.S. Electrical Industry
FREDERICK DALZELL
The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England
© 2010 Massachusetts Institute of Technology All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher. For information about special quantity discounts, please email special_sales@ mitpress.mit.edu. This book was set in Bembo by Graphic Composition, Inc. Printed and bound in the United States of America. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Dalzell, Frederick. Engineering invention : Frank J. Sprague and the U.S. elecrical industry / Frederick Dalzell ; foreword by W. Bernard Carlson ; afterword by John Sprague p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-262-04256-7 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Sprague, Frank J. (Frank Julian), b. 1857. 2. Inventors—United States—Biography. 3. Electrical engineers—United States—Biography. 4. Electric utilities—United States— History—20th century. I.Title. TA140.S7D35 2010 621.3092—dc22 [B] 2009011083 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
CONTENTS
Foreword by W. Bernard Carlson Acknowledgments xi
vii
INTRODUCTION: TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION AT THE TURN OF A CENTURY 1
21
1
MOTIVE POWERS AND MECHANISMS
2
GETTING TRACTION, 1884 TO 1888: SPRAGUE ELECTRIC RAILWAY AND MOTOR COMPANY AND THE RICHMOND UNION PASSENGER RAILWAY 59
3
ASSESSING RICHMOND: BEYOND INVENTION
4
RESTLESS AND RISING: SPRAGUE AND SPRAGUE ELECTRIC ELEVATOR COMPANY, 1890 TO 1898 113
5
FIGHTING FOR CONTROL: MULTIPLE UNIT, THE SOUTH SIDE ELEVATED RAILROAD, AND THE FORMATION OF SPRAGUE ELECTRIC COMPANY 145
v
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CONTENTS
6
ELUSIVE CONTROL: THE CONTEST WITH GENERAL ELECTRIC 173
7
MAINLINE ELECTRIFICATION: EMINENCE AND THE CHALLENGES OF “RETIREMENT” 201 AFTERWORD: THE BARN BY JOHN SPRAGUE
Notes Index
237 263
vi
233
FOREWORD W. Bernard Carlson
Disruptive technologies have played a decisive role in American history. Eli Whitney’s cotton gin, Thomas Edison’s phonograph, and the Wright brothers’ airplane not only changed how people lived, worked, and played but created entirely new industries. In more recent times, we have seen how the integrated circuit, the personal computer, and the Internet have also changed daily routines while disrupting the status quo of economic and social life. Yet disruptive technologies are based on a fundamental paradox. Revolutionary inventions are often unexpected—they seem to come out of nowhere—but these inventions succeed only when they are connected to existing business practices, capital, manufacturing know-how, and marketing channels. For wild ideas to become widely used products, the revolutionary and unexpected must be linked to the familiar, the tried-and-true. One of the marvels of the
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W. BERNARD CARLSON
American economy is that, for over two centuries, it has been able to stimulate new ideas while delivering the resources needed to shape these ideas into successful products. But how are disruptive technologies created and ultimately tamed? On the one hand, Americans love to celebrate heroic inventors and entrepreneurs and to talk about how disruptive technologies are the result of hard work,Yankee ingenuity, and luck. On the other hand, we know that mass-produced products only come about when large-scale organizations—either private corporations or the state—mobilize significant amounts of capital, science, and manufacturing capability. As the pioneering sociologist Max Weber would have argued, disruptive technologies require both charisma and bureaucracy. In this new study, Fred Dalzell shows us how disruptive technologies are created and tamed by narrating the life of the inventor and entrepreneur, Frank J. Sprague. By tracing how Sprague introduced several radical inventions—electric streetcars, elevators, and the controllers needed to operate electric trains—Dalzell explores the challenges that Sprague faced in converting his ideas into products. As he invented new technology, Sprague also had to create new companies, find capital, and build relationships with customers. Most notably, Dalzell reveals how Sprague’s ability to “stage” new technology—to build persuasive demonstration systems—permitted Sprague to win over investors and customers. At the same time, while he recounts how Sprague acted decisively as a creative inventor-entrepreneur, Dalzell also shows us where larger forces—urbanization, the rise of big business, and the dynamics of capital markets—constrained Sprague’s actions and ultimately tamed his unruly creations. Overall, Dalzell shows how disruptive technologies are shaped by both the
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FOREWORD
charismatic individual and the bureaucratic corporation. As Americans confront the economic challenges of today, Dalzell’s study of Frank Sprague offers valuable lessons into the innovation process, lessons that can help create the disruptive technologies that will be vital to the American economy in the years ahead.
ix
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
During the long process of researching and writing this book, John L. Sprague (grandson of Frank J. Sprague) provided invaluable assistance in the form of ideas, recommendations, contacts, and access to material not readily available from public sources.These included his personal recollections, family papers, and especially the six letterbooks (now available at the Williams College Chapin Library) that were presented to Frank Sprague on his seventy-fifth birthday in 1932. While respecting my independent critical analysis absolutely, he has corrected any number of factual errors in early drafts. My friend and mentor Davis Dyer supplied continuous guidance in framing (and re-framing!) the project, as well as constant encouragement in seeing it through. Without his support, this book would never have been completed.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
W. Bernard Carlson offered input and contextual perspective at an early stage in the project, and vital encouragement along the way as my ideas slowly cohered. Robert F. Dalzell, Jr., has read drafts of chapters and provided helpful input, combining the rigor of a scholar and the sensitivity of a father. Electrical / Railway Engineering Historian Joseph J. Cunningham lent his encyclopedic knowledge of Sprague’s inventions and their enduring relevancy. Robert J. Lobenstein, General Superintendent of Power Operations for the New York City Transit (subway) System, also provided critical insight, testifying to the enduring legacy of Sprague’s multiple unit control systems in New York’s subway to this day. Robert W. Walker, Director of Operating Capital Project for the Metro-North Railroad, provided information on numerous systems, where Sprague’s work continues to hum. M. Julian Pepinster, President of the Association d’Exploitation du Material Sprague, offered detailed information concerning the Sprague-Thomson subway cars used in the Paris Metro Line, Le Sprague. Piers Conner, former President of the London Underground Railway Society, also lent invaluable expertise, including a series of articles published in the (London) Underground News starting in 2005. Finally, Mary-Elise, Abby, and Molly have added vital love, support, and faith.To everyone who helped, but particularly to these last three: Thank you. Frederick Dalzell Newton, Massachusetts
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ENGINEERING INVENTION
INTRODUCTION: TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION AT THE TURN OF A CENTURY
In 1883, Electrical World declared with characteristic appetite that the latest technological wonder dazzling the public was already old news. Thomas Edison and his partners had just brought the world’s first central power station on line at Pearl Street in New York City, only a few years after the Wizard of Menlo Park had unveiled his incandescent light to rapt audiences. As chronicler and booster of all things electric, Electrical World had been relentlessly promotional. Now, the journal’s editors proclaimed, it was time to look ahead to the next technological triumph, the next set of heroic inventors, the next round in an accelerating cycle of wondrous innovation: “The electric light has long ceased to be a curiosity or even a novelty. It has become a common every-day affair.To the scientist, to the electrician, it looms up even as a thing of the past. The question to which he now turns is: What shall we do next? The inventor, who finds his services
1
INTRODUCTION
no longer in such great demand in the field of electric lighting, also considers the same question.What shall it be?”1 It was a brash summons, heady and hyperbolic, but Electrical World was writing for a highly charged readership. An expectant public awaited electrical invention. Technical innovation of all kinds, on all fronts, was coming to seem not only inevitable but imminent. And this assumption was generating a swelling sense of opportunity. Aspiring inventors and entrepreneurs were testing new electrical technologies and launching new electrical start-up companies. One of these aspirants was Frank Julian Sprague. An intense, fiercely ambitious young electrical engineer who had recently joined Edison’s burgeoning team of collaborators, Sprague had been soaking up everything he could learn about this emergent technology. As a student at the U.S. Naval Academy, as an avid visitor to several international exhibitions that showcased new electrical inventions, as (briefly) an apprentice to Moses Farmer (pioneer of arc lighting in the United States), and now as an employee of Edison, Sprague had made his way determinedly into the middle of the excitement. For several years, he had been filling notebooks with invention ideas. He was preparing his own bid at heroic invention. As for the question “What shall it be?” Sprague had reached the same conclusion offered by Electrical World, which predicted: “The answer is ‘the electric railway’! That, in our opinion, is the great achievement that will next come to the surface to proclaim the grand properties of the force at our command and the genius of those whose task it is to deal with their utilization.”2 This was precisely where Sprague intended to stake his claim. By the time EW alerted its readers to the opportunity, he had already sketched out preliminary blueprints. He was poised, he was fiercely convinced, on the brink of big things.
2
TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION AT THE TURN OF A CENTURY
Indeed, Sprague was beginning what would be a remarkably fertile career of invention and innovation.3 Between 1884 (when he broke with Edison to begin assembling his own designs for electric motors) and 1902 (when he sold his third company to General Electric), Sprague designed and commercialized a string of electrical technologies. From pioneering work in self-governing motors (motors that worked at constant speeds despite varying loads), he moved into the development of electric railway systems (including networked aspects of the technology, such as motor, railway car, and carriage architecture; control systems; and power transmission solutions). This work coalesced in Richmond, Virginia, in 1887 as the world’s first functional, full-scale electric railway system. From there, Sprague turned to the apparently promising (but technologically more contested) field of electric elevators, exploring ways to apply his work in electric motors and control systems and supplant the steam-powered lifts then in use. In the middle of this work, he intuited and began engineering a multiple-unit control system (MU, he called it) that, when installed on urban elevated railway lines (and eventually, subway and mainline railroads), would wire systems for mass transit on an urban scale of operation. By the time Sprague went into semiretirement at the turn of the twentieth century, his technical work was thoroughly embedded in the industrial urban landscape. As inventions or artifacts, Sprague’s designs and solutions were largely invisible, buried inside complex technological networks and systems. But as vital components of those networks, they were humming busily, carrying traffic, reorganizing geographies, and refashioning the material and cultural patterns that defined daily lives. Sprague thus participated in a remarkably prolific burst of innovation that, in a few dozen years over the late nineteenth century, transformed
3
INTRODUCTION
the technologies of electricity. He circulated among, learned from, shared ideas with, and competed within a community of peers that became famous in their lifetimes, legendary in later years, and fascinating as episodes in the history of technology: Thomas Edison, Elihu Thomson, Nicolas Tesla, Charles Brush, Elmer Sperry, George Westinghouse, and William Stanley. And those were just the luminaries. Working among them, with them, and against them, vying for attention and opportunities, was a minor host of would-bes and almosts. A rich cluster of new technologies emerged from this environment, forming within a highly compressed framework of iterative innovation. Within the space of several decades, breakthroughs in telegraphy and telephony, arc lighting, incandescent lighting, direct-current power generation and transmission, phonographs, and alternatingcurrent power generation and transmission took form as artifacts and stabilized as technological systems. And those are just the technologies that achieved successful innovation—that “took.” Any number of other ideas, designs, and inventions failed to stabilize themselves in the marketplace or the material culture, connect to their contexts, and achieve adoption. It was not just the technology that was changing, though. The processes and possibilities by which the technology was made—and made to happen—also underwent profound, rapid transformation during Sprague’s career. He came of age at the coevolution of major shifts in the social, economic, and cultural landscape. He joined the fray just as big business took form, firms began to organize industrial research capabilities, and scientists and engineers internalized and institutionalized professional identities. The development of the industrial corporation (itself a cluster of organizational and financial technologies) became a powerful engine of technology formation.
4
TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION AT THE TURN OF A CENTURY
Product development became a platform for invention and a vehicle of innovation. And scientists and engineers began to organize themselves into professional associations. These transformations helped organize the technology, sort it out, and assemble it in workable forms. And organization proved increasingly important in the case of electrical technologies, for these were technologies that could not be designed and built in isolation, marvel by marvel, novelty by novelty, apparatus by apparatus. Designs and solutions tended to be iterative. Inventions came to signify highly complex clusters of technologies assembling interlocking components. Technical progress toward any given system was also iterative, incorporating numerous designs and solutions. The technology, in other words, was networked, requiring the process of innovation to become networked.To take one of the most evident examples, Sprague couldn’t “invent” an electric railway until a system of power generation and transmission had been invented and built out.4 In all of these events, Sprague participated, promoted, parlayed— and at the same time negotiated, sometimes uncomfortably. His sense of technology and his cultural assumptions about concepts such as invention and progress were shaped in the mid-nineteenth century in an era of technology making that was already giving way as he started work. He instinctively held to the concept of technology articulated by Electrical World when it called on the “genius” of those capable of summoning “the grand properties of the force at our command . . . to the surface.” That concept would be challenged, though. Sprague would have to learn how to reconcile it with very different modes of technology. Sprague created a career that offers, in short, a rich case for historical study—a case that this book uses to examine a cluster of closely
5
INTRODUCTION
related issues. Sprague’s story situates the historian at the heart of the formation of the electrical industry (the second industrial revolution), in the early, formative stages of the first U.S. industrial corporations, and at a fertile nexus of technology and economic growth. Operating amid all these forces, Sprague stayed in constant motion, inventing and venturing, pursuing one opportunity after another. ECONOMIC CONTEXT: THE BUSINESS OF ELECTRICAL INNOVATION
In 1870, the U.S. government marked the emergence of a new industry when the federal census listed a set of four manufacturing firms engaged in the production of “electro-magnetic machines.” The business was tiny. With a total capitalization of $16,500, the industry aggregated about as much capital as the manufacture of cigar boxes (ten establishments, $16,500 total capitalization) or beehives (twelve firms, $18,900 in financing).5 Yet it was poised on the brink of rapid growth. Ten years later, census takers broke out the manufacture of telegraph equipment as a separate category (forty firms, $636,458 in capital) and tallied an additional three dozen firms competing in more generalized “Electrical Apparatus and Supplies” (deploying $873,300 in capital). Even more significantly, with the Brush Electric Company beginning to promote arc lighting systems and Edison and his backers moving from successful demonstration of incandescent lighting to preparations for the construction of a pilot power station, three firms received separate listings under the category “Electric Lights” ($425,000 in capital).6 The changing census designations revealed an industry in the throes of rapid definition and articulation. By 1890, after a decade of
6
TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION AT THE TURN OF A CENTURY
entrepreneurial ferment, the number of firms competing in “Electrical Apparatus and Supplies” had climbed to 189. Investors had piled in, too: the capital behind these firms had swelled to just under $19 million.7 Ten years later, notwithstanding a sharp economic slowdown followed by a halting, slow recovery, the industry had come of age. The census of 1900 tallied no fewer than 580 businesses engaged in the production of “Electrical Apparatus and Equipment,” representing a total capital investment of just over $83 million. By this time, too, the pressures of expanding scale and scope were also refashioning the terms of ownership and management. Only 167 of the nearly 600 electrical manufacturing companies were individually owned and operated; more than half (311) now took the form of incorporated companies.8 The number of companies proliferated rapidly. Paradoxically, over the same period, the industry consolidated.The total number of firms multiplied, but several companies quickly grew to colossal size, attained first-mover status, and became industry heavyweights. In 1899, Edison and his partners merged what had been a loose clump of companies into Edison General Electric Company.Three competitors were contending for industry leadership at this point.Two of them merged several years later when EGE joined forces with Thomson-Houston Electric Company in 1892 to form General Electric. Meanwhile, on a parallel track, Westinghouse ramped up and out to attain comparable proportions. As Alfred Chandler has pointed out, it took only ten years from the opening of the Pearl Street power station for industry leaders to emerge.9 The scale of business, on this tier of the industry, reached massive proportions.The formation of GE in 1892 combined EGE’s $10.9 million in sales with Thomson-Houston’s $10.3 million.10 By 1902, when Sprague was preparing to sell off his third company, General Electric
7
INTRODUCTION
(which would absorb Sprague’s venture) was doing over $30 million in sales,11 and only Westinghouse was offering serious competition. Other companies in other industries also grew colossal during this period. Across the economic landscape, in fact, an improved infrastructure, the emergence of a functionally national market, and the development of powerful new technologies of production were transforming the parameters of industrial enterprise. This was the era when railroads and telegraph lines knitted the country together and business became “big business.” So, for example, in industries as diverse as steel making, meatpacking, wheat and cereal milling, and the manufacture of consumer goods ranging from cigarettes to kitchen matches to soap, the implementation of new continuous process techniques created efficiencies of scale that drove rapid, brutally efficient industry shakeouts.12 But the electrical companies scaled up for different reasons in response to distinct industry dynamics. As W. Bernard Carlson has pointed out, electrical manufacturing offered only limited opportunities for efficiencies of scale.13 The industry did not achieve major breakthroughs in continuous process manufacturing. Most electrical equipment, particularly major components such as dynamos, turbines, and large motors, required individual or batch machining and assembly. GE’s gigantic works at Schenectady, New York, and Westinghouse’s at Pittsfield, Massachusetts, became hangars filled with works in progress rather than assembly-line operations. If the economies of scale proved elusive, however, economies of scope soon became critical.What companies like Thomson-Houston, Westinghouse, General Electric, and Sprague’s various ventures were making and marketing were systems—highly complex arrays of apparatus, embodying clusters of rapidly evolving technology. To sell
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TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION AT THE TURN OF A CENTURY
electric lights, Edison and his partners needed to build or sponsor the building of power stations.To promote the building and usage of power stations, in turn, they needed to expand usage of electricity, and so they pushed into other applications, including electric motors and railways. Legally as well as technically, putting products on the market required gaining control over interlocked bundles of technology—in particular, over patents, the applicable boundaries of which were ambiguous and overlapping. To sell their products, moreover, the major firms found it necessary to assemble substantial marketing organizations, deploying technically skilled agents in major urban markets across the country and abroad. Developing full product lines became a key way of leveraging all of those investments. For a host of related reasons, the major competitors expanded horizontally into adjacent electrical markets. As electrical technologies matured and grew commercially viable, consequently, they tended to gravitate into the hands of the largest enterprises.14 These pressures rapidly drove up the costs of doing business in the electrical industry. It took a large and growing amount of capital to build out the new systems and networks (a prospect that included, at least indirectly, the financing of local power station construction), to develop or acquire the necessary technologies, and to bring the advantages of scope and an established market presence to bear. In 1880, as noted, the total capital invested in electrical manufacturing (excluding telegraph apparatus but including lighting) amounted to only a little under $2 million. Over the next decade, that sum bulked up to $19 million in “electrical apparatus” and $34 million in “electric light and power,” as major financiers began assembling blocks of investors and building businesses to scale.15 The turning point came in the late 1880s, when several large companies began absorbing
9
INTRODUCTION
rivals to expand their product lines and fill their technology portfolios. Marshaling the financial backing of the Boston brokerage firm Lee, Higginson & Co., Thomson-Houston embarked on a wave of acquisitions between 1888 and 1892 to prepare for competition with Edison General Electric, which for its part drew on the resources of financiers Henry Villard and J. P. Morgan to underwrite its own acquisitions. The merger of Thomson-Houston and EGE to form General Electric in 1892 culminated the process. In effect, the Boston and New York financiers had taken measure of the new technologies and emerging industry dynamics and elected to pool their resources in a single investment, capitalized in 1892 at $25.4 million.16 Thus the industry became a dynamic new arena of investment, though not a familiar or tightly structured one. There was, as yet, no established financial market for industrial equities. The stockmarkets of the day were still oriented toward government securities and railroads, and inventors still preferred bonds to stock. Here, too, the people constructing the electrical companies had to break new ground and devise novel solutions to unfamiliar problems.They were the first industrialists outside the railroads and related businesses to go to capital markets for funds. Much as inventors like Frank Sprague and Thomas Edison were crafting new technologies, the financiers and investors who threw their lot behind them were crafting new capital relationships—new ways of assembling investors and owning business.17 THE HIGH-TECHNOLOGY IMPERATIVE
Above all, survival and growth in the electrical industry required skillful management of innovation. It was a technology business— indeed, a high-technology business, meaning that it churned con-
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TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION AT THE TURN OF A CENTURY
stantly with technological changes that fed those firms that learned how to adapt continuously and punished those firms that grew technologically stale. Again, the U.S. Census marked and quantified the development. “A steady stream of new and radical ideas” was flowing into this sector, Special Agent Thomas Commerford Martin reported in an industry analysis in 1900. In part, the flux reflected a shifting focus, a constantly expanding sphere of application. The 1850s had seen a surge of innovation in telegraph technologies; the 1860s, in dynamo construction; the 1870s, in numerous new devices such as stock tickers and burglar alarms; the 1880s, in lighting; and the 1890s, in “the vast exploitation of the electric railway.” Like a chain reaction, electricity had migrated from field to field—or rather, widened from field to field, for while new areas of application opened, ongoing technological developments continued to overhaul older ones. The sheer number of patents generated in all the commotion was impressive. Martin cited data indicating that between 1870 and 1895, the U.S. Patent Office issued over 3,500 patents in the field of electric lighting, over 3,000 in telegraphy, nearly 2,500 in telephony, and over 2,000 in electric railways. The total figure for electrical inventions of all kinds surpassed 17,500 over that twenty-five-year span. And the rate of invention showed no signs of slowing. Indeed, it was accelerating. Authorities issued nearly 6,800 electrical patents of one kind or another from 1896 through the first half of 1900, the census reported,“evidencing a great rise in the activity with which electrical inventors were still prosecuting their endeavors in the newer fields of discovery and application.” Here indeed was an industry “subject to rapid and violent changes.”18 In this respect, the electrical industry—along with a handful of other lines of business, notably telecommunications (a closely related
11
INTRODUCTION
industry, technologically speaking) and chemicals—represented a new phenomenon in American business history.True, technological adaptation challenged many companies doing many kinds of business in the late 1800s.The advent of railroads and refrigeration, for example, upended and thoroughly rearranged the meatpacking industry. Conversion from Bessemer to open-hearth steelmaking triggered violent restructuring in the steel industry.The implementation of automatic, all-roller gradual-reduction mills created the machinery for rapid consolidation in the flour milling industry. In these and numerous other cases, firms either mastered new technologies and capitalized on the disruption they wreaked or found themselves engulfed. Yet as profoundly disruptive as these episodes of technological transformation were, they were singular events for any given generation in the lives of most businesses. Most industries adapted to a wave of new technology and then resettled. In the electrical industry, on the other hand, the press of change was relentless, the imperative to innovate and adapt constant. The early telegraph companies were the first to come to grips with the implications of this new reality. Initial breakthroughs followed by a round of refinement achieved, by the mid-1800s, a technology robust enough to form the basic platform for large business.The telegraph companies were, in fact, the first businesses to achieve national scopes of operation in the United States.19 But even after the empire builders consolidated their networks in the form of imposing corporate giants, technological developments continued to roil the strategic landscape. Duplex and then quadruplex telegraph capability, for example, made the basic technology far more potent, rattling loose the barriers of entry and creating windows of opportunity for new entrants. Well into the 1880s, the business remained technologically
12
TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION AT THE TURN OF A CENTURY
volatile. Indeed, infamously, the emergence of telephonic technologies during ongoing telegraphic development complicated strategic calculations, with far-reaching implications. Western Union was offered Bell’s patents and rejected them. This was high technology, difficult to stay on top of and too dangerous to ride complacently.20 Similar volatility shaped and continuously reshaped the electrical equipment industry that started to emerge in the 1870s. Competing lighting technologies—notably, the contest between Brush’s arc lighting and Edison’s incandescent lighting (and Edison’s, by the way, was not the only incandescent lighting entrant)—had to be sifted, while a multitude of competing dynamo designs, motor models, and power-generation schemes presented themselves, and a debate surfaced in the 1880s over direct current versus alternate current. And these were only the most prominent among the multitude of technology decisions and strategic challenges (or, depending on one’s point of view, opportunities) facing industry contenders. To remain competitive, companies like Westinghouse and General Electric had to do more than just put new technologies on the market. They had to constantly refresh the technologies that they already had on the market and anticipate or at least be prepared to respond effectively to swarming external technological threats. They had to master or at least manage the challenge of continuous innovation. This challenge made the electrical companies vanguard enterprises. The solutions they improvised and devised for commercializing, capitalizing, structuring, and managing technology and business became formative aspects of the modern industrial corporation. General Electric, in particular, laid groundwork that was foundational.The formation of GE, as business historian Alfred Chandler observes, marked a turning point in American business history. GE represented the first
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INTRODUCTION
major consolidation of machinery-making companies in this country, one of the earliest companies to erect a centrally administered plan of organization with embedded middle management, and the first American company to build a major industrial research laboratory (in 1900). It was also a charter member of the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the first nonrailroad industrial investment to earn the backing and brokerage of J. P. Morgan.21 More than any other single U.S. company, GE pioneered the modern industrial corporation. FRANK SPRAGUE: INVENTION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Yet GE did not, either by itself or in concert with Westinghouse, account for, generate, or manage to channel all of the energies unleashed by electrical innovation. Electrical technology was too tumultuous, the markets too fluid, the opportunities too expansive to be brought easily or entirely under general control. Even as the industry giants scrambled to gather emerging technologies under their umbrellas, new technologies continued to heave into view, many of them disrupting the competitive landscape significantly. In short, the industry was continuously churned at a subterranean level by what sociologist /economist Joseph Schumpeter has famously termed “creative destruction.” This critical aspect of the story—this multitudinous, chaotic, entrepreneurial force within it—is nearly as difficult to capture historically as it was to tame corporately. Naturally and perhaps inevitably, most historians of the early electrical industry have been drawn to those individuals who emerged as its triumphant winners and those companies that became its colossi.The figure of Thomas Edison towers in our historical imagination, flanked by a relatively small sup-
14
TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION AT THE TURN OF A CENTURY
porting cast including George Westinghouse, Elihu Thomson, and perhaps Nikola Tesla.There is less and less room for others on the podium, as the history recedes. Correspondingly, in institutional terms, accounts of General Electric and Westinghouse stand in to tell the tale. So, for example, the recent mainstream account by Jill Joness dramatizes and telescopes the story as Empires of Light: Edison, Tesla, Westinghouse, and the Race to Electrify the World.22 Yet this mainstream version of the history leaves substantial lapses in coverage and significant gaps in understanding. As Joness’s title suggests, it tells us more about electric lights than it does about electrical motors. More generally, it tends to describe the process of industry definition as one of shakeout, consolidation, the imposition of professional management, and the tightening of corporate control— all of which formed important dimensions of the story, but none of which fully plumb the entrepreneurial energy seething beneath.The story of the electrical industry cannot be told without describing the broad, powerful forces that were shaping the major corporate enterprises emerging from this crucible—or without accounting for agents like Frank Sprague. Sprague and GE (including its predecessor companies) went through a long, storied, complex relationship with each other. At various times, Sprague was an informally affiliated strategic partner (of the Edison interests), an executive officer (of EGE), an in-house technology consultant (of both EGE and GE), a competitor (again, of both EGE and GE), an acquisition (several times over), a customer, and a supplier. At virtually every stage, he was a virtually ungovernable force—a brilliant engineer and compulsive entrepreneur who never existed comfortably within the corporate structures that GE assembled around itself. He sensed that he did not belong, in some
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INTRODUCTION
fundamental way, within an institution like the one that GE rapidly became. He drove himself, instead, to achieve something more dramatic and more personal. He saw himself, in fact, much in the role that Electric World cast in 1883 when it called forth “the great achievement that will next come to the surface to proclaim the grand properties of the force at our command and the genius of those whose task it is to deal with their utilization.” He saw himself as a heroic inventor. Academic historians of technology and business have grown instinctively skeptical of the notion of heroes. Indeed, from the outset of his first venture, Sprague found himself struggling to manipulate forces well beyond his control or capacity. He was guided by a deep conviction in the inevitability of technology itself. As an engineer, he assumed that if a technology were simpler and more efficient, then it would carry the day against any resistance or any extrinsic obstacles. As a businessperson trying to commercialize his technologies, on the other hand, he learned that innovation rarely proved so simple. Nevertheless, he and others like him played vital roles in the technological transformations that companies such as GE would eventually claim and try to control.Throughout his career, Sprague took on larger, better-established, better-financed rivals. And in each case, he managed to bring them to terms, forcing them to buy out his companies and incorporate his technologies. If GE represents the grand, corporate consolidation that capped what historians have called the second industrial revolution as well as a pioneering force in the advent of the United States’ first high-tech economy, then Sprague represents the roiling violence, dislocation, and adaptation beneath the surface. For all of his engineering precision, he was an agent of creative destruction. And if none of his ventures achieved what
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TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION AT THE TURN OF A CENTURY
Chandler describes as first-mover status as businesses in their own right, all of them became vital components in the larger enterprises that absorbed them in the process of attaining or defending their first-mover status. The narrative that follows tries to capture this complex dynamic. It focuses on sectors and figures within the electrical industry that have been obscured and overshadowed. It tells a story of venturing during industry formation and of doing business during massive economic changes. It tells a story of innovation at a time when innovation became the basis of enterprise. It tells a story of invention in an era when personal convictions of the potential for heroic invention helped to drive significant technological transformation. TECHNOLOGY CONTEXT: ALIGNING INVENTION WITHIN CONTEXTUAL CONSTRUCTION
Recent scholarship in the history of technology has complicated the project of biography. The conceit that technology springs into being in some pure, unmediated way directly from the vision of heroic inventors has been challenged—indeed, thoroughly debunked. Historians now emphasize that technologies are social constructions, neither technically determined nor passively received. They are shaped by economic agendas and cultural contexts in processes that extend (in both directions) well beyond the vision or control of the purported inventors who manage to stake claims to them. For example, in analyzing the emergence of electrical technologies in the late nineteenth century, Thomas Hughes frames the subject as the evolution of electrical systems, stressing the broad scale of events and extrapersonal dynamics that gave momentum to technological
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INTRODUCTION
development. “Technological affairs contain a rich texture of technical matters, scientific laws, economic principles, political forces, and social concerns,” Hughes observes.“The historian must take the broad perspective to get to the root of things and to see the patterns.”23 In a similar vein, David Nye cautions against becoming seduced by the image of “the heroic ‘lone inventor,’” a figure that “has largely disappeared from scholarship.”24 When he turns to electrification circa Sprague, Nye concerns himself not so much with how technologies were first conceived or designed as with how they were received and, in the process, given larger meaning. Nye posits technology as an organic phenomenon that takes form in continual negotiation. Accordingly, in a chapter devoted to the electric railway (Sprague’s first major technology project), Nye credits Sprague with being the first to assemble the key technical solutions that together constituted a single, successful system. But the electric railway was not Sprague’s alone to call masterfully into being or to define ultimately as a technology and an artifact, Nye reminds us. As it went into operation, the railway became more than “merely functional transportation.” Like all technology, it acquired meaning “through its being experienced as part of many human situations which collectively define[d] its meaning.”25 Fair enough. Analytical approaches such as Hughes’s and Nye’s have undeniable merit. Indeed, they enrich the study of the history of technology. It is not the intent of the study that follows to overturn contextualist perspectives on the subject. Rather, this biography tries to situate a single inventor within the larger contextual dimensions of technology formation. Returning to a biographical point of view does open new perspectives on the process of technology formation. Inventors may not have
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TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION AT THE TURN OF A CENTURY
been as heroic or masterful as they imagined, but they were most definitely inventing, and they were imagining themselves inventing. In fact, neither Hughes nor Nye proposes ignoring figures like Sprague— or Sprague himself. Technologies are socially constructed, but they are also built by individuals and small teams working on the ground, trying to solve technical problems and also to achieve technological impact and transformation. As Sprague’s career makes evident, innovation required not just inventing but building, manufacturing, commercializing, promoting, marketing, professionalizing, and institutionalizing—all of which Sprague undertook energetically, influentially, and with a striking (though uneven) degree of success. He recognized that his ideas had to be engineered to become technologies, and he threw himself repeatedly into the effort. In his twilight years, Sprague’s peers recognized and lauded precisely this aspect of his career. Maurice Coster (vice president of Western Electric International) put his finger on an important dimension of Sprague’s career when he described him as “the greatest constructive electrical engineer of the age.” Frederick Feiker (of the U.S. Department of Commerce) characterized Sprague as “an inventor-coordinator.” And H. H. Westinghouse, singling out a particular technology (the multiple-unit control system), observed “not only” that “the apparatus . . . exhibit[ed] a high order of inventive genius” but also that the invention owed itself to “the capacity of the inventor to establish its practicality.”26 More specifically, Sprague found that his technologies needed to be staged—converted into performances, trials, and contests that were technical and at the same time deeply personal. These dramas became heroic constructions that figured centrally in Sprague’s conceptions of his career. Repeatedly, he framed invention as an arena in
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INTRODUCTION
which a new technology was (at least implicitly) challenged, demonstrated, and thus triumphantly vindicated. This staging dimension of technological engineering appealed powerfully to Sprague’s own convictions about invention. It also resonated with contemporary audiences, promoting technological adoption. The stagings that Sprague engineered figured centrally in dramatizing not just a series of inventions but, ultimately, the process of inventing. A biography of an inventor in the early electrical industry may seem like a revisionist or old-fashioned effort, but it remains one worth pursuing. As a case study, Sprague’s career creates an opportunity to recalibrate the possibilities for individual agency within the broad, impersonal currents of recent scholarship. It opens an “internalist” perspective on the history of technology that, when read in conjunction with bird’s-eye contextual points of view, remains essential to fully understanding the dynamics of innovation. Sprague’s career ultimately amounts to a narrative with an inventor as a protagonist who imagined himself as a hero in a social context that he perceived to be unusually open to heroic possibilities. From the perspective of social and cultural historians, heroic invention may have been a conceit, but it was a potent conceit that exerted strong influence and became a real force in the history of these technologies. “The life of the engineer is all more or less of a romantic nature,” Sprague insisted late in his career, speaking to an audience of young engineers.27 The sentiment may say more about Sprague than it does about the “life of the engineer,” but it remains nevertheless a rich and revealing insight into the period and the larger process of technology formation.
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1
MOTIVE POWERS AND MECHANISMS
When people met Frank Julian Sprague, they tended to notice first the sheer intensity of the man. “A virile and aggressive person,” General Electric executive E. Wilbur Rice (a sometime adversary, sometime colleague) called him. “You wanted what you wanted when you wanted it and were going to get it,” fellow engineer (and early collaborator) W. H. Sawyer reminisced. “He seems to be full of wire springs that constantly coil and uncoil inside of him,” another colleague observed. “His eyes are bright and full of motion. His face is alive with insistency and driving force. It is the face of a fighter who is unable to recognize defeat. His sentences end with a click, like the snapping of a switch. He roams, lightfooted, about the room and appears to be literally magnetized.”1 Indeed, something fiercely compulsive and powerfully propulsive drove Sprague. He invented and ventured incessantly—in electric motors, railways, elevators, train systems, signals, and dozens of sideline
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projects. He achieved a string of technological breakthroughs, undertook successive rounds of entrepreneurial building, and assembled a succession of companies that earned him (and cost him) fortunes several times over.Yet he never seemed to feel satisfied or finished for long. Something worked within Frank Sprague to send him obsessively, again and again, to the proving ground of invention and the theater of venturing. Sprague sustained his projects by fits of manic energy and framed them as episodes of high drama—drama that Sprague himself, more often than not, created as he invented. At various points in his career, Sprague left autobiographical accounts of his youth. As a scientifically trained engineer, he might well have distrusted any effort at biographical analysis along “softer” psychological or cultural lines. But certainly the engineer would have appreciated that to understand what drives an engine, the mechanism has to be taken apart and put back together again. What had wound those “wire springs” that were constantly coiling and uncoiling in Frank Sprague? The question reaches beyond Sprague himself, for his work was ultimately bound up in a generational phenomenon. Over the last several decades of the nineteenth century, electrical inventions proliferated and electrical innovation churned at a highly accelerated rate, attracting inventors, engineers, entrepreneurs, and other agents and accessories. At the heart of this activity, a major new category of technology acquired what historians have characterized as technological momentum,2 a development in which Sprague and his peers figured centrally. Large social, economic, and cultural forces shaped the direction and outcome of their work. But at the same time, inventors and entrepreneurs (and would-be inventors and entrepreneurs) were
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MOTIVE POWERS AND MECHANISMS
working actively on the ground, individually and in teams, to generate, sustain, and help steer that momentum. FAMILY BACKGROUND
Sprague was born in Milford, Connecticut, on July 25, 1857, to Frances Julia King and David Cummings Sprague. Both of his parents came from old Yankee families that had settled in New England in the seventeenth century. Ralph Sprague, a patrilineal ancestor, had been one of the founders of Charleston, Massachusetts, and became one of its most prominent citizens. Subsequent generations lived primarily in Massachusetts, many in Malden, as landowners, farmers, and millers. Some were devout, and many played locally notable civic roles in their communities. (Ralph’s son, John, became a captain in the Malden militia and fought in King Philip’s War in 1676.) Others were adventurers, like Uncle Joshua, who headed west to seek his fortune in the California gold fields and crossed the plains in a prairie schooner.Two Sprague men—Frank’s father and his father’s brother, George Washington Sprague, died in railroad accidents.3 Perhaps Frank’s later interest in trolley and railway safety and control came from the fact that he lost both an uncle and his father in train accidents. None of Frank Sprague’s forebears seems to have exhibited scientific or inventive inclinations. They were respectable citizens and middle-class property holders in a world that was largely agricultural and preindustrial. Frank J. Sprague’s parents began to make the transition to a different economic and social environment. One of ten children, David Sprague took a job as superintendent of a hat factory in Milford just before Frank was born.Young Frank was named after his mother, Frances. An
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older brother, Seaver, died in infancy, and a younger brother, Charles, joined the family in 1860. What had been an entirely normal existence collapsed in early 1866, however, when Frances Sprague died.The impact of his mother’s death on Frank, who was eight years old, must have been devastating. Certainly it undid his father, who within a matter of months withdrew from the stricken family and went west to seek his fortune. Young Frank and Charles were passed into the care of relatives who lived in North Adams in the hills of western Massachusetts. Years later, a poignant recollection of Frank Sprague’s departure from Milford surfaced. “One day word came that sudden death had taken the mother of one of our little boys,” a classmate remembered.“Soon after, the father decided to move his family from Milford and the little boy came for his books. I can see him now, a pathetic figure standing in the doorway, with spelling book, reader and slate under his arm, while we at the teacher’s bidding all shouted in unison: ‘Goodbye, Frank.’”4 NORTH ADAMS
David Sprague’s departure must have seemed like abandonment, and Sprague’s subsequent relationship with his father was cool.5 The move may have been a blessing in disguise, though. The two boys were put in the care of one of David’s sisters, Elvira Betsy Ann Sprague, who lived in North Adams, Massachusetts, where she made a living as a part-time schoolteacher. Aunt Ann was thirty-eight, intelligent, and unmarried when Frank and Charley came to live with her (she married Samuel Parker several years after the boys arrived). An early 1850s photograph depicts a severe and unsmiling young woman with a round face, high forehead, and jet black hair parted in the middle
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MOTIVE POWERS AND MECHANISMS
and pulled back tightly behind her head. Her dark eyes are penetrating. She was strict, by Sprague’s account, and exacting on matters such as politeness, good manners, honesty, and cleanliness. Yet her sternness was tempered with affection, and he became devoted to her. “She was a woman of the finest New England type and striking beauty,” he would later attest. “Living in a modest, frugal way as an occasional school teacher, with great sacrifice she devoted herself to her charges with sanity of judgment, but with high regard for much needed oversight. She was indeed a stern disciplinarian, but I think that something vital must have been instilled in me by this devoted woman which race inheritance alone could not account for.”6 Life with Ann appears to have restored domestic stability and some measure of emotional security to the boys. In later years, Sprague described Aunt Ann as an exceptional foster mother and North Adams as his first home. Other relatives may have helped Ann care for the children. Ann’s father (and Frank’s paternal grandfather), Joshua Sprague, had settled in North Adams in 1836 and set up shop as a builder and carpenter. Of Joshua’s ten children, at least half lived in North Adams. His oldest daughter, Lucy, married Henry Whitney and had seven children, including Martin Whitney, who worked in the Print Works (later the Arnold Print Works).7 Yet if other Spragues helped out with the boys, they apparently made little emotional impact on Frank: nearly everything he later said or wrote about his life in North Adams focused on the life that he and Charley had with Aunt Ann. The only hint that other family members might have been involved in their upbringing can be found in some personal notes that he wrote just before he died. In later accounts, he indicated that he lived “most of the time” with Aunt Ann,8 yet the 1870 U.S. Census indicates that both Frank
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and Charley were living with a first cousin, Martin Whitney and his family, on Prospect Street and no longer with Aunt Ann on Eagle Street. This appears to have been a temporary arrangement, which took place sometime after she became Ann Parker, since later town records show Charley living at Aunt Ann’s house during the 1880s long after Frank had left and even after Aunt Ann died in 1884.9 During Frank’s early years in North Adams, the town was a community in transition. From a small and relatively isolated village outpost in the hilly northwestern corner of Massachusetts, the place was transforming into an industrialized and economically expanding community by the mid-nineteenth century, when Frank and Charley arrived. Abundant sources of waterpower, particularly the Hoosac River, attracted a variety of industrial enterprises.The Windsor Print Works, a cotton mill, introduced textile manufacturing in the region early in the nineteenth century.That venture had collapsed in the Panic of 1857, but others followed. The largest and most successful of these was the Arnold Print Works, a relatively sophisticated textile manufacturing business that John, Harvey, and Oliver Arnold moved from Rhode Island in the 1860s. Listed as “Calico Print Manufacturers” in business directories of the day, the Arnolds’ mill operated complex machinery and employed a skilled workforce. Dunn & Bradstreet’s agent calculated the firm’s profits in 1874 at $100,000, indicating a substantial and successful establishment.10 North Adams during Sprague’s boyhood was a somewhat isolated inland town, then, but it was by no means an agricultural hamlet. In addition to the textile mills, other small to midsize manufacturing businesses thrived. These included shoe manufacturers, dyeing businesses, and numerous ancillary industrial establishments such as makers of leather belting,“manufacturers’ supplies,” lime and cement,
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MOTIVE POWERS AND MECHANISMS
rope and cordage, and so on.This was a community connected to and embedded in a wider marketplace.The town boasted three hotels and several oyster dealers. North Adams stores sold “Fancy Toilet Articles,” gloves and mittens, gas fixtures, locks, “Meridan Plated Ware,” millinery goods, hats and caps,“Parisian vases and statuettes,” patent medicines, “carriage trimmings,” and a multitude of other commodities.11 Sprague joined the economic bustle. “While attending . . . High School,” he later recalled, “I tried to add to the [household’s] meager income, selling lemonade from a can carried by a shoulder strap, or apples from a basket to shoe shop workers, as well as collecting newspaper and doctor’s bills and soliciting orders for papers and book bindings.”12 Such jobs would have required him to circulate throughout town. Given his subsequent work in motors and other mechanisms, it is easy to picture him drawn to the machinery of the town’s textile mills or perhaps more generally to the larger impressions that they suggested—of energy, of enterprise, of motive power harnessed, of complex mechanisms meshed in coordinated systems. The local episode that Sprague himself singled out as a formative experience, though, was the engineering spectacle of building the Hoosac Tunnel. THE HOOSAC TUNNEL
An ambitious underground passage boring nearly five miles through the base of the Green Mountain range to open direct rail linkage from North Adams east to Boston and (via Troy and the Hudson River) south and west to New York City, the Hoosac Tunnel was in its day a massive undertaking and a newsworthy engineering accomplishment. Schemes for constructing a tunnel of this sort dated back as far as 1819 (when it was conceived as a canal project), and digging began in
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1851.When the railroad undertaking the project ran out of funds, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts took over, but the state ran out of funding when construction was less than one-third complete. Intervening priorities (not the least of them the Civil War effort) preoccupied the Commonwealth.Then just as the Sprague brothers arrived in North Adams, the project revived, this time under the energetic and resourceful leadership of Walter Shanely, a Canadian engineer.13 For the next six years, as Frank Sprague grew from boyhood into adolescence, work on the tunnel steadily progressed. Shanely imported state-of-the-art machine drills to burrow into the mountains’ slate and mica core, employed elaborate compressed air systems, and pioneered with nitroglycerine blasting techniques. An average of five hundred workers toiled on the project at any given time. By the time they were done, costs on the project had risen to $17 million, an astronomical figure for the period, and nearly two hundred men had died in workplace fatalities, most of them in violent accidents. A final blast in 1873 completed the initial digging. According to contemporary accounts, “as the deafening thunder from the explosion” of the final blast “died away, a shout announcing the successful opening between the headings rang from the crowds assembled in the sections. The wildest enthusiasm prevailed; a headlong rush followed, each eager to be the first that should step through the opening.”14 In February 1875, the first train of cars passed through the tunnel. “A royal pathway has been made,” declared a journalist observer.15 Sprague would have been sixteen years old and in his last year in high school. It is hard not to imagine him deeply engaged in the project’s progress. “I was particularly interested in the [tunnel project],” he later recounted,“courting the acquaintance of the engineers
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MOTIVE POWERS AND MECHANISMS
in charge and the contractor, Walter Shanely, [who] later proved a most valued friend.” Perhaps it was witnessing the completion of the Hoosac Tunnel that drew Sprague to the central problem of making rail transportation work. The episode certainly planted a distinctly bold and heroic impression of engineering in his imagination. TO ANNAPOLIS
Sprague, meanwhile, had his own pathway out of North Adams to excavate. After finishing his primary education in the local public schools, he entered Drury Academy, a local private preparatory school where he received his first formal introduction to the sciences. Intelligent and hard-working, he excelled in mathematics and attracted the attention of several local patrons. In 1874, the superintendent of Drury Academy urged Sprague to travel to Springfield, Massachusetts, to take a competitive examination for admission to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York.When Sprague arrived in Springfield, he learned that the examination was not for West Point but for appointment as a cadet to the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland, from the district of Congressman Thomas Dawes. Undaunted (and in any event in no position to pick and choose his opportunities), Sprague sat for the examination. Competing “against a large field of boys, the majority of whom had had greater educational advantages,”16 he won. To help finance his enrollment at Annapolis, several North Adams citizens (unfortunately now unidentified) loaned him $400.17 The choice of Annapolis may have been reached circumstantially, but it proved fateful and fortuitous for Sprague. It carried him out of North Adams, of course, but more significantly, it equipped Sprague for invention and primed him for innovation.
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Historians tend to characterize the U.S. Navy in the decades immediately following the Civil War as an institution that was indifferent and indeed hostile to innovation. Elting E. Morison, for example, has described the 1870s as an interlude of “little science, less technology, little invention and fewer ideas” for the U.S. Navy. Annapolis, by implication, is easily overlooked as an institution of higher learning. But Morison’s characterization is not entirely fair. Innovation and technological trials were nourished within the navy during this period, including significant work in torpedoes, electric dynamos, and naval architecture.18 The United States Naval Academy participated in and helped to nurture some of this spirit. The curriculum included not only seamanship, navigation, naval strategy, and tactics but also relatively sophisticated science and technology-oriented coursework. Sprague’s arrival in 1874 coincided with the appointment of a new superintendent, Rear Admiral C.R.P. Rodgers, who oversaw an overhaul of the curriculum, including adding upper-level electives in mathematics, mechanics, physics, and chemistry. In 1878 (the year of Sprague’s matriculation), Annapolis received international recognition as the “best system of education in the United States” when it earned the Diplome de Medaille d’Or.19 Courses at the Academy were conducted by the recitation method and supplemented, at upper levels, by problem-solving exercises. After entering a classroom, midshipmen “drew slips” with written problems or questions and “manned the boards,” working out answers on blackboards around the room.20 The program was rigorous. In 1877, “plebe” Harry Phelps wrote home reporting: “I stayed at the library all yesterday afternoon and I find that they have nearly every book that there is. I have been writing up a ‘skinny’ [slang for physics and
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MOTIVE POWERS AND MECHANISMS
chemistry] lecture all this afternoon and I will have to bone calculus as soon as I get through this letter.” A few weeks later, Phelps elaborated: “The lessons are easy but we have so much outside work that all our time is taken up.We have to copy up note books, write skinny lectures every week and work a problem in descriptive.”21 The program may have entailed considerable make-work, but it also focused students on problem solving, creating a potent blend of theory and practice. In one famous example, Albert A. Michelson, an instructor in physics and chemistry who joined the faculty in 1875, set up a classroom project to measure the speed of light by terrestrial measurement using equipment on hand, such as a heliostat and a mirror.22 (In 1907, Michelson, who moved to the Case School of Applied Science in 1882, became the first American to win a Nobel Prize; his was in physics.) Sprague entered the Academy on September 29, 1874, in a class of 104 and graduated four years later as a “passed midshipman.” He was ranked seventh (in a final enrollment of fifty) and earned honors in math, chemistry, and physics. At Annapolis, he later recounted, “I developed something of a flair for mathematics, and particularly for naval architecture and physics, the latter under the teaching of that great Admiral, William T. Simpson, one of the Navy’s most brilliant officers.”The formal academic training in both physics and mathematics provided him with a sound theoretical approach to grasping electrical technologies. At the same time, the practical, problem-solving framework prepared him for the concrete, mechanical challenges of invention, including assembly, improvisation, and refinement of designs. Sprague came out of Annapolis equipped with both a fundamental grasp of scientific electrical theory (circa 1878) and a resourceful capability for “craft knowledge” (in the sense of hands-on trial and error) as a means of working toward technical solutions.
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Exactly how much formal instruction in electricity the Academy offered is not entirely clear.Virtually no higher-education programs offered programs dedicated specifically to the physics of electricity or electrical engineering. In the classification of the period, electricity was typically covered within chemistry. Still, the subject featured in various problems and lectures, and years later Sprague recalled “taking an electricity course” at the Academy.23 Indeed, the program at Annapolis seems to have led a number of young men to work in the field. “One of the most striking features of recent electrical development in America,” Electrical World observed in 1888, “has been the close connection between the United States Navy and the various electrical industries. It was humorously remarked the other day that no electrical establishment now considered itself complete that did not number at least one former navy man on its staff, and that electricity would not have been so far advanced here but for the fact that the United States Navy was not large enough to afford occupation to all the brilliant young officers trained at Annapolis.”24 TOWARD ELECTRICITY
Sprague would be one of these “young officers.”“I hope and feel that you have a very bright future before you,” Sprague’s father wrote, formally and somewhat awkwardly after learning that his son would be attending Annapolis. “Who can say but you may carve out a name in the country’s history equal to a Perry or Farragut.”25 The prospects for a naval career were not promising in the 1870s, though, as the navy downsized from its Civil War dimensions. Sprague, in any event, was drawn in other directions. In the summer of 1876, he found a consuming focus for his talents and ambition when he traveled to
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Philadelphia with several classmates to visit the Centennial Exposition. By his own account, the trip was a pivotal episode that put him on the path of electrical invention as a career and a life’s work. Sponsored by the U.S. Congress to celebrate the nation’s one hundredth anniversary and held in Philadelphia from May to November 1876, the Centennial Exposition was one of a series of international exhibitions that staged displays of economic, cultural, and technical accomplishment. Hundreds of thousands of spectators from across the country and around the world attended. The Exposition’s central buildings included an iron and glass Main Building (occupying a twenty-acre footprint), a Machinery Hall (fourteen acres), an Agricultural Hall, a massive Art Gallery (also called Memorial Hall), and many smaller buildings. A multitude of attractions and exhibits filled these structures. Industrial machinery was arrayed in artful displays. (“There is the sense of too many sewing machines,” William Dean Howells wearily observed. “A whole half mile of sewing machines seems a good deal; and is there so very much difference between them?”) Agricultural exhibits piled lush cornucopias of fruits, vegetables, and grains. Costumed tableaus depicted cultures and people from around the world in room-size set pieces. New mechanical inventions and other technologies were exhibited, demonstrated, tested in competitive trials against each other. Sprague was drawn particularly to Machinery Hall. He likely paused to admire the Hall’s most prominent exhibit, where a 1,400 horsepower Corliss steam engine powered many of the Hall’s mechanical displays and awed visitors. (Here Howells was more impressed, marveling at the engine’s “vast and almost silent grandeur. It rises loftily in the centre of the huge structure, an athlete of steel and iron with
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not a superfluous ounce of metal on it; the mighty walking-beams plunge their pistons downward, the enormous fly-wheel revolves with a hoarded power that makes all tremble, the hundred life-like details do their office with unerring intelligence.”)26 Sprague gravitated toward the Exposition’s electrical exhibits. There was a lot to take in.The Western Union Telegraph Company set up a large display featuring sounders, registers, relays, keys, insulators, and other apparatus. Duplex and quadruplex telegraph machines demonstrated their capacity to transmit and receive two or four messages simultaneously. The Western Electric Manufacturing Company exhibited a complete set of railway signaling equipment.Various British firms displayed cables and other apparatus that were used in transatlantic submarine telegraph cables. Electric burglar alarms, fire alarms, and household annunciators also vied for attention. On one especially momentous occasion (which, nevertheless, drew less publicity than the Corliss engine), Professor Alexander Graham Bell of Boston demonstrated three of his new telephone devices, inspiring an “astonished and delighted” panel of judges to proclaim the invention “perhaps the greatest marvel hitherto achieved by the electric telegraph.”27 Sprague was probably unable to attend Bell’s demonstration. (He recorded no recollections, at least.) On the other hand, he certainly studied another, equally significant display in Philadelphia—the electric dynamos exhibited by both the Gramme Electric Company and Farmer-Wallace that supplied the power for arc lighting that illuminated part of Machinery Hall.The Farmer-Wallace dynamo, designed by Moses Farmer and manufactured by Wallace & Sons, represented state-of-the art technology in that the machines were self-excited, meaning that they used permanent magnets to produce a magnetic field. Even more impressively, Farmer’s design enabled the dynamo
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MOTIVE POWERS AND MECHANISMS
to feed part of the current that it generated in the coils of its rotating armatures back into the coils of the electromagnets, increasing the magnetic strength. It was much more powerful than other designs—a quality demonstrated conclusively in an “official examination of Magneto-Electric Machines” in June, which pitted several dynamo designs against each other, measuring how much power they generated for the Exposition’s arc lighting. Whether or not Sprague managed to be on hand for the “official examination,” the dynamo exhibits evidently made a big impression: Within a few years after graduating from Annapolis, he found his way into Farmer’s laboratory in the navy’s Newport Torpedo Station (where Farmer was stationed as the electrician). More generally, the Centennial Exposition created a sense of technology that Sprague imbibed deeply and definitively. In Philadelphia, the cadet joined the crowd marching along a grand, panoramic view of progress. Inventions, mounted on pedestals and put to work, glittered and dazzled. “Technology” within this framework took on a seemingly abstract, disembodied form. Apparatuses were set off and exhibited as artifacts—spot-lit, disassociated from immediate context, and yet at the same time showcased in tableaus signifying the inexorable progress of civilization. The effect was to create a staged enactment of self-evidently new and seemingly inevitable technology. On Sprague as on so many around him, the impact was potently theatrical and deeply compelling. At Philadelphia in 1876, electricity was still a largely latent idea. It lurked on the threshold of popular awareness, occupying a position within Machinery Hall that was a few stages removed from center stage. The Centennial Exposition, as historian David Nye has observed, was “the last great exposition based upon steam power.”
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Within a few years, at future fairs, electricity assumed pride of place in main-stage attractions, positioned “quite conspicuously at the apex of an evolutionary framework.”28 Three ensuing fairs over the next half dozen years marked the transition—and figured centrally in Sprague’s career.The Corliss engine may have garnered more press than the electricity exhibits, but Sprague saw clearly what the next big thing was going to be and fixed his sights on participating in it.Within a few years, he would be serving on a panel judging electrical exhibitions. Within a few years after that, he would be staging exhibitions of his own. He returned to Annapolis full of zeal, meanwhile,“putting in a good deal of time on possibly impossible inventions” whenever he found the opportunity, stealing out of his quarters “during study hours,” he later recalled, to “seclud[e] myself in a blacksmith’s shop, where I was busily engaged cutting into telephone discs, some ferrotype plates which I had wheedled out of the official photographer.”29 GATHERING CURRENTS: SPRAGUE IN CONTEXT
The specific circumstances of Sprague’s background, youth, and education doubtless shaped his subsequent career in idiosyncratic and significant ways .The experience, for example, of losing one parent at an early age (or both, if one counts the withdrawal of Sprague’s father from his two sons’ lives) must have had a major effect on him. Being installed in a second household that was economically strained and perhaps occasionally emotionally unreliable could help to explain the man’s drive—the intensity of Sprague’s ambition and perhaps as well the streaks of insecurity and iconoclastic stubbornness that characterized much of his career. As an inventor and as an entrepreneur,
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Sprague often seemed to seek out confrontation, manufacture it, and use it to pursue a personal form of vindication. The larger social context is also instructive, though.When Sprague’s circumstances are lined up against those of contemporary parallel figures, significant patterns appear. By the time he arrived at adulthood and the brink of bigger things, Sprague was preparing to plunge into a crowding field of technological ferment. “Ours is the age of electricity,” observed the editors of Electrical World in 1883: “everywhere electricity is fast becoming the all-inspiring, all-controlling influence. It may be said to be ‘fashionable’ in the extreme just now as the most popular agent at the disposal of man. It fills everybody with interest and curiosity.” Indeed, new technologies in telegraphy, in arc lighting, in incandescent lighting, in electric motors and railways, in telephony and phonographs and motion pictures, in power generation and transmission—in a host of experiments and applications—were appearing everywhere. They were transforming the material landscape and attracting inventors and entrepreneurs—would-be “Wizards”— by the dozens, hundreds, perhaps thousands. Between 1870 and 1895, the U.S. Patent Office issued over 17,500 electrical patents.30 Sprague, in short, was preparing to join a significant generational phenomenon. In addition to being an “age of electricity,” the editors of Electrical World continued, “ours is also an ‘age of inventors.’”31 Sprague was to be part of a movement—scrambling for position among what Electrical World characterized (in 1883) as “a whole tide of immigration.” This influx of talent, ambition, and energy itself generated a potent, if not exactly quantifiable, measure of technological impetus. Sprague and his peers were intent on invention. They were primed for innovation, and they helped to catalyze a culture that enabled, recognized, and drove technological transformation. They pooled their
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efforts, learned and stole from each other, argued with each other, and competed against each other—and in the process sustained the momentum that was building behind technological churn. The core population driving this phenomenon was diverse and difficult to characterize or categorize collectively. Nevertheless, some broad generalizations suggest themselves.To begin with, Sprague and many of his peers came out of distinctly industrial environments. Sprague grew up in mill towns among the textile manufacturing establishments that were emblems of the first industrial revolution. As a curious boy, he may well have had gained access to the machinery that powered North Adams’s textile mills. In any event, they dominated his immediate landscape. A striking number of other electrical inventors came out of similar landscapes. Hiram Maxim (b. 1840) apprenticed as a coachbuilder and then worked in his uncle’s machine works at Fitchburg, Massachusetts. Charles Brush (b. 1849), who played a pioneering role in arc lighting, was the son of a woolens manufacturer in Euclid, Ohio.32 Charles J.Van Depoele (b. 1846) was working as a furniture manufacturer in Detroit when he began experimenting with electrical apparatus.33 George Westinghouse (b. 1846) worked for his father’s agricultural implements manufacturing business, haunting the machine shop and conducting mechanical experiments.34 Elmer Sperry (b. 1860), Alexander Meston (b. 1866), and Charles Meston (b. 1868) (the Mestons founded Emerson Electric Company) worked as young men for the railroad car manufacturer Michigan Car Company in Detroit.35 The electrical innovations that these people introduced came out of a distinct milieu. This generation’s technology, as Thomas Hughes observed of Sperry’s work, was “expressed through the conception and construction of things.”36 Many of their innovations, in fact, were
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designed and prototyped in the machine shops and workshops that adjoined factories, and these factories thus became both platforms of technology-making and engines of economic expansion—emblems of mechanical and technical possibility. Although Sprague was an American, a significant number of his peers worked in or immigrated from European countries. Leo Daft (an early inventor of electric streetcar systems who immigrated from England as a young boy), Charles Van Depoele (Belgium), Nikola Tesla (Croatia), Elihu Thomson (England), and the Meston brothers (Scotland) all settled in the United States, either as boys or young men. Other inventors remained in Europe and did important work there— perhaps most notably, Werner Siemens in Germany. And Sprague, like many of his contemporaries, crossed the Atlantic repeatedly to pursue projects and sustain the process of innovation. The electrical revolution was a distinctly transatlantic phenomenon that benefited from cross-pollination. These inventors came from a wide range of educational backgrounds. Sprague’s college education at the U.S. Naval Academy allowed him to enter the field with more formal training and a stronger theoretical grasp of electricity than many. Others arrived similarly advantaged.Tesla worked his way through electrical engineering courses at the Austrian Polytechnic in Graz and at the University of Prague. William Stanley attended Williston Academy in Massachusetts, followed (briefly) by a period at Yale University. Elihu Thomson, after studies at Central High School in Philadelphia, attained the position of “professor of chemistry” (in what resembled a high school setting more than a university) and began inventing in collaboration with another faculty member, E. J. Houston.37 Charles Brush earned a chemistry degree from the University of Michigan and set himself
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up as a chemical consultant in Cleveland before embarking on innovation in dynamos and arc lighting. On the other hand, the science was still raw and the field still unorganized, which allowed amateurs with far less formal education to make their marks in the field. Edison worked his way toward “wizardry” largely by dint of assiduous self-education, reading classic works by people like Michael Faraday and tinkering incessantly with apparatus. Sperry was educated at the Courtland Normal School and afterward continued to read and attend lectures.38 The field of invention that Sprague encountered as he came out of Annapolis, in other words, was beginning, but only beginning, to become professional and permanent. Electricity was moving from the phase of novelty and stage show into a force that could be harnessed within larger systems that could generate powerful applications. Sprague and his peers made this cluster of inventions into a distinct program of academic study, a tightly organized profession, a cluster of invention and business ventures, a sector of investment, and ultimately an industry—in short, an economic and social system that was capable not just of generating innovation but of sustaining it. TOURS OF DUTY
By the time Sprague emerged from Annapolis (he later recalled),“the creative urge had the full possession, and in the following two years . . . I was guilty of nearly three score inventions.”39 Few of these designs got beyond the drawing board. Most remained unbuilt and undeveloped. Sprague at this stage was creating abstractions, not artifacts; technical ideas, not technologies. As he himself later acknowledged,
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“many of these inventions were really worth while, but neither naval duties nor available money made possible their development then.” He was already inventing but only beginning to confront the more complicated, multifaceted dimensions of constructing or engineering technology. Over the next few years, bursting with ideas, Sprague searched for ways to launch a career and develop his designs into artifacts. The range and pace of his efforts at invention in the years immediately following Annapolis indicated a strong theoretical grasp of the basic science and a busy technical imagination. But finding ways to build out his designs, prototype them, test them, translate them into commercial prospects, refine them technically, promote them, make them viable and persuasive as technological alternatives, and cultivate acceptance for them: all of that was less familiar. Sprague spent the next few years not just inventing but looking for points of entry, useful contacts, and ways and resources for carrying his ideas past the stage of abstract invention. He would cobble together a critical period of improvised apprenticeship. And in the process, he began to piece together ways to engineer not just electricity but also innovation. The hurdles before him were formidable, but the timing was fortuitous. Sprague was coming on the scene at a distinct point of technical inflection in a cultural context that was primed for the introduction of new technologies, particularly electrical ones. A series of incidents shaped Sprague’s early technological projects. These tightly clustered developments helped to generate a vital measure of momentum behind Sprague’s work and, indeed, the development of electrical technologies and systems generally. Notable among these developments was the ascendance of the electrical inventor as a figure of fame and influence. The emergence
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of Alexander Graham Bell’s telephone, staged in events such as the Centennial Exposition, was already whetting the popular appetite for electrical marvels. Thomas Edison’s invention of the phonograph several years later ratcheted enthusiasm to yet a higher pitch—captivating the popular imagination, catapulting its inventor to celebrity status, and throwing open the process of invention as a public spectacle. Edison did not merely tolerate journalistic coverage of his inventions; he courted it. As a telegrapher, he had worked closely with newspapers. He appreciated their powers of promotion and was comfortable in journalists’ company. Affable, accessible, and quotable, he made good copy. And he readily invited journalists into the process of invention—showing them around his laboratory, demonstrating apparatuses, and describing how they worked. In the middle of projects and indeed as he first set to work on them, he did not hesitate to predict confidently (and sometimes prematurely) that he would solve the technical problems they presented in, say, six months (as he did, for example, when he took up the challenge of adapting his phonograph design to developing a hearing aid technology—a prediction that proved rash).40 And as he closed in on breakthroughs, he rushed announcements to press, even before he had fully worked out or refined his designs. (“I have it now!” he declared to a reporter of the New York Sun in September 1879 of the incandescent light, though significant technical problems remained unsolved at that point.)41 In short, Edison made a very public performance of invention, cultivating an atmosphere of excitement that fed (and was fed by) an avid press and readership. By the late 1870s, dozens of magazines and newspapers were covering Edison and Menlo Park, New Jersey. Recent scholarship in the history of technology has picked away at the conceit of heroic invention. Technology, historians point out,
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is rarely if ever fashioned by a single will or vision. It takes shape organically in relation to its larger technical, social, cultural, and political contexts. “Invention,” in these broader dimensions, almost always entails a period of refinement and a process of development in which numerous players, including other inventors and engineers, economic agents, public policy makers, and consumers all participate. The final product ends up being a many-layered construct—all of which is true, and all of which would have direct bearing on the work of Bell, Edison, Sprague, and their colleagues. Nevertheless, the concept of the heroic inventor played a critical, galvanizing role in driving the technology of Sprague’s generation— and worked a powerful influence on Sprague personally. The myth gripped the popular imagination, encouraging anticipation of new technologies, and it gave vital impetus—psychological and social— to those aspiring to take up the role of heroic inventor. It drove people like Sprague to experiment, to design, to venture.The concept may have been a conceit, but it generated real (if not quantifiable) motive power. “Menlo Park is the electrical Mecca,” Newark Daily Advertiser observed. “Thitherward will the pilgrims of science turn their expectant eye, . . . [to] Mr. Thomas A. Edison, the high priest of the temple.”42 The year 1878 marked Edison’s ascendancy as a mythical figure in the popular imagination. That year, the New York Daily Graphic bestowed on him the title of “Wizard of Menlo Park.” And 1878 was also the year that Sprague emerged from Annapolis and embarked on his own career of invention. On the way from Maryland to North Adams, Massachusetts, for leave before his final cruise, Sprague made the pilgrimage to Menlo Park to call on Edison. Edison received the midshipman courteously and took him on a tour of the laboratory.
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Edison was reaching the threshold of momentous technological transformations. The year 1878 also marked his visit to William Wallace at Ansonia, Connecticut, to inspect Wallace’s and Moses Farmer’s work on electrical generator designs. Wallace and Farmer had designed what they called a “telemchon,” a generator that was capable of lighting eight arc lamps. As crude as the design was, Edison perceived at once the significance of a distribution system that supplied electric power from a central generator to multiple apparatuses.When he returned to Menlo Park, he threw himself into work on an incandescent light—the beginning of a larger project that ultimately encompassed a central power station, a grid, and the first major electrical system architecture.43 AT SEA
At this critical juncture, when Sprague was on the threshold of joining the excitement, he found himself taken off the scene and transported to the other side of the world. After completing class work at the Naval Academy, midshipmen undertook a two-year cruise before returning to Annapolis for examination and a final rating. Sprague was assigned to the Asiatic squadron and the USS Richmond. “A year ago yesterday I left Boston,” he wrote to a friend from Manila, Philippines, in December 1879. “Who would have thought that I would be in this port, four or five hundred miles and more in the Tropics, spending my Christmas ’neath a burning sun. But so it is.”44 For Sprague, the posting was a mixed blessing—more accurately, a frustrating displacement. He traveled to exotic ports (including Gibraltar, Naples, Singapore, Hong Kong, Manila, and Nagasaki) and earned extra money filing dispatches from Asia for the Boston Herald. But the
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voyage removed him from the United States (as well as Europe, which would have been preferable to Asia) at a time of gathering technological momentum and historic episodes of invention. He was separated by thousands of miles, for example, from Edison’s very public breakthrough in incandescent lighting. Sprague felt the distance keenly. He chafed at the interruption in his efforts to participate directly in the technological ferment and searched futilely for ways to escape his assignment. “I have introduced a new application of a lately discovered principle, the same as used in Edison’s carbon telephone, and I hope to meet with success,” he wrote to a young woman named Frances Scott in summer 1879 (six months into the cruise). “Since there is not a satisfactory governor in the service, and as, furthermore, it is of great importance that there should be, I rely on being able to be ordered home on that plea, if on no other.” His desire to return to the United States was urgent by this point: “I must,” he wrote, “and if living, I will be in the United States next summer, if it is possible to get there.”45 Sprague’s correspondence with Frances Scott had by this point developed a warm and perhaps a romantic rapport, creating an unusually intimate view into the young man’s plans and aspirations. Sprague ached to achieve and to be recognized. “Why do I tell you this?” his letter continued. “It seems natural to confide my ambitions to you, perhaps because I feel some ways, that you have at least a silent sympathy in my work, if not a confidence in its successful accomplishment. That confidence, none can have as I possess it, and I cannot blame them. Let me have but breath, and I will prove to all, that I have not spoken quite in vain.” The urgency of his ambition is plain, and beneath it, there is an undercurrent of insecurity. Sprague for much of his career was repeatedly driven by the feeling that he had to “prove” himself and the value of his ideas “to all.”46
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Meanwhile, with what materials he could scrounge together and with the focus of a resourceful and disciplined technical imagination, Sprague invented—or imagined—electrical inventions. He sketched them and drew them on paper.While at sea circuiting the Pacific, he filled 169 pages of a notebook with plans, diagrams, and schematics. These were the “nearly three score of inventions” that he later referred to, and they chronicle a feverish mind at work. The range of apparatus is striking. Sprague drew out blueprints of lighting applications (“Electric Light, Yokohama plan,” “Electric Light, self-regulating and independent of current variation,” “Self regulating Electric Light, Similar to that of July 17, in main principle”), telegraph equipment (“Duplex telegraph,” “Single current recorder, Quadruplex system,” “Arrangement of Printing Telegraph Using Magpict System and Varying Current of Multiplex System, with Inductible Coil,” “Shunting Resistance Coils, Quadruplex Telegraph,” “Vibratory Telephonic Octuplex,” “Facsimilist, or Writing Telegraph,” “Proposed Decaplex,” “Data for Quadruplex System”), motor and generator components and systems (“Electric Motor,” “Diagrams for Steam Turbine,” “Electric Governor,” “Reversible & Adjustable Commutator,” “Sections of Armature Ring with Armature,” “Diagram of Action of Electric Motor,”“Constant Force Electric Governor”), and a multitude of other miscellaneous inventions. A few had naval or shipboard applications (“Marine Governor,” “Reversible Pump,” “Water Cooler and Filterer”). Many others looked far beyond the USS Richmond and the Asiatic squadron. Some of these inventions were loosely sketched. Others were highly detailed and carefully drawn. Sprague dated most of them (the span runs from May 1879 through February 1880) and usually indicated a location (“Richmond,” “at sea,” or the names of specific ports). A
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number of them he had witnessed by shipmates, clearly anticipating or at least keeping open the possibility of eventually developing them as proprietary claims. Taken as a whole, the notebook conveys a vivid impression of inventive fecundity. The work demonstrates that Sprague had by this point acquired a technically sound grasp of electrical engineering and a wide-ranging awareness of recent applications—even though he had a limited store of equipment and material at his disposal with which to model or test these inventions. They were taking mental shape as his mind turned over what he had learned and (presuming he had access to texts, journals, or papers, which seems likely) what he was still picking up. The voyage must have been an exhilarating period for the midshipman—and a supremely frustrating one, too, because most of this work necessarily remained abstract. He had no laboratory or machine shop at his disposal on board and probably only minimal equipment. Alongside this remarkable bloom of imaginative ideas, the more prosaic nautical pages—descriptions and drawings of sails, yards, masts; notes on navigation; and log data for the cruise—are easily overlooked. This was the kind of stuff that usually appeared in volumes titled “Midshipman’s Note Book.” Still, this material reveals important aspects of Sprague’s outlook. He never considered himself much of a seaman, but one senses that Sprague took at least indirect lessons from his naval experience.The ships (and other sailing vessels) on which he served were themselves complex technological systems that meshed highly articulated social organisms (crews, ranks, roles) with intricate technical apparatuses (sails, rigging, hull) that were capable of navigating natural, oceanographic force vectors (winds, tides, currents). Midshipmen were taught to think concretely, abstractly, and above all
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systemically. The connection between these aspects of Sprague’s apprenticeship and the episodes of system building that were to come is entirely conjectural, but those future episodes of electrical invention would require analogous feats of orchestration. SHORE STATIONS
Sprague did not manage to extract himself from the Asiatic squadron until March 1880, when he was ordered to return to Annapolis for examination. Over the next several years of his naval career, he took various shore assignments, angling constantly for ways to continue working on his electrical inventions. He managed to get a short leave, for example, to “experiment . . . with a new type of arc light mechanism” at the Stevens Institute of Technology in Hoboken, New Jersey.47 Here he made initial contact with several important people in the field, including Dr. Henry Draper,William Wallace, and Professor Moses Farmer. The Farmer connection proved particularly important a few months later when the vessel to which Sprague was assigned, the USS Minnesota, was restationed to Newport, Rhode Island, which provided Sprague with access to the Newport Torpedo Station, where Sprague found opportunities to continue his research. Established by the U.S. Navy in 1869, the Newport Torpedo Station had grown into a naval research and development center for the study of technologies with potential naval applications. A staff of twenty-five manned the station, including a chemist, a “pyrotechnist,” and Moses Farmer, the facility’s electrician. In Farmer, Sprague encountered a mentor, a highly accomplished inventor, and something of a kindred spirit. A civil engineer and teacher
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originally, Farmer had been delving in electrical investigations since the 1840s, developing in the process a series of telegraph inventions, an electric fire alarm system, a method for electroplating, an incandescent light (employing a galvanic battery for power), and a miniature electric train that he built in the yard of his house. Most significantly, Farmer in 1866 had designed a “self-exciting dynamo” (which fed some of the current from the generator back into a coil around the magnet).Years later, Sprague recognized the important contributions that this “distinguished scientist” made to the field.48 Working partly under Farmer’s guidance (though largely on his own), Sprague during this period developed the design that would result in his first patent, for a “Dynamo-Electric Machine” (filed October 4, 1881, and issued August 26, 1884). Aiming (as Sprague himself put it in the patent application) “generally at compactness, efficiency, economy, and steadfastness of the current generated,”49 Sprague’s design put the field magnet inside the armature (rather than in an external magnetic field assembly), enclosing the coils with “an outside shell of iron wire and inwardly projecting ribs.”50 The novel construction impressed Farmer, who supported the young midshipman when Sprague applied to the navy for permission to attend an international electrical exhibition in Paris in 1881. Despite Farmer’s endorsement, permission was denied. Sprague seized a second opportunity, however. After arranging an assignment on the USS Lancaster in the Mediterranean squadron, he reached Europe and promptly took a three-month leave—too late to reach Paris but in time to attend another electrical exhibition in London early the next year. He arrived, he later recounted, “with about $20 and the necessity of presenting urgent needs to the U.S. Despatch Agent.” Reaching the Crystal Palace, he secured an
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appointment on the Exhibition’s Jury of Awards as secretary for the panel testing gas engines, dynamos, and electric lights. CRYSTAL PALACE: “THE ENGINES OF THE FUTURE”
Sprague eventually submitted a meticulously precise report to the navy on the Crystal Electrical Exhibition. The midshipman credibly surveyed the technologies on display and neatly summarized the state of the art circa 1882 as it had been assembled for display in London. Sprague explained the mechanical, chemical, and physical principles at work in various apparatus designs, tabulated and quantified the results of rigorous, carefully controlled testing, and ranked their performance. He indulged in no romantic rhetoric about wizardry or the sublime here but spoke in the cool, scientific voice of a professional engineer. Yet the entire report was nevertheless imbued with a strong belief in the transformative power of the technology that it was assessing. As a secretary of a panel of judges, Sprague was sorting out performance—and in the process, he revealed important underlying assumptions about technology and the dynamics of innovation. So, for example, in the section covering the performance of gas engines displayed at the Exhibition, Sprague began with an assessment of existing engine technologies—notably, steam engines. Here, Sprague asserted, was a technology that faced imminent, inevitable obsolescence: “While very perfect as a machine, its economy is very low, and always will be.” The basic technology was inherently inefficient, Sprague explained: “the very best engines” managed to convert only between nine and thirteen percent of the coal energy they consumed into mechanical power. In short,“the steam engine has nearly reached its maximum theoretical efficiency.”51
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An unspoken assumption was at work here, and it was common to many of Sprague’s peers and indeed to their entire generation—a faith in linear progress and technological determinism. New technologies, when they offered superior performance and technical advantage, would in the natural course of things supplant older ones. Briskly, matter-of-factly, and confidently, Sprague redirected readers’ attentions in more promising directions: “We must look, then, to other forms of heat engines in the hope of higher economy,” he concluded. The steam engine had proven serviceable in its day. Now, its dusk was approaching as newer, more efficient technologies became available—as if summoned by society’s need for them. As Sprague described the situation: “such are the promises of other methods that scientific men already predict that in the coming century at farthest the steam-engine will take its place among the things of the past, and the engines of the future will be probably neither the solar or the hot-air engines, but either a flame engine . . . or the gas engine.” (Sprague added, as if to ground the whole discussion back in solid, empirical terms: “Of these forms I will speak of one type only, as it is with this that I have any practical experience.”)52 In dismissing the steam engine as a technology that was facing imminent and inevitable obsolescence, Sprague was expressing a general consensus that had begun forming in scientific and engineering circles several decades earlier. “The necessities of the age require a new motive power,” Mining Magazine had declared as early as 1853. “The steam engine has become burdensome to man; it has had its day; the progress of the age requires a more portable and powerful agent.” Historians Louis Hunter and Lynwood Bryant sound almost as though they are paraphrasing Sprague (though they are not) when they observe, “By the 1870s . . . there was general awareness among
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informed engineers of the theoretical and practical limitations of the steam engine and a growing interest in proposals for improving the process of converting heat energy into mechanical power.”53 And as things turned out, the prediction in this case was largely accurate: gas engines have proven more serviceable than steam engines. The deeply rooted assumptions that framed Sprague’s pronouncements indicate that he saw himself as being part of one technological age that was on the cusp of another. He subscribed to a distinctly nineteenth-century notion of progress, and he believed in the power of technology to evolve on a “pure,” technical basis of what worked “best.” Old technologies, in the scheme of things, would become obsolete. New technologies would take their place, and “scientific men” would judge, sort, and guide the transformation. Similar language and the same basic convictions colored Sprague’s account of the lighting technologies that were exhibited at the Crystal Palace. “I consider that the incandescent lamp is the lamp of the future for all purposes except where very large and powerful lights are desired at one focus,” Sprague pronounced, “and that the arc lamp will surely be replaced for general lighting purposes.” Following a brief technical explanation of the physical principles at work behind both arc and incandescent lighting, he provided an account of the recent emergence of successful (meaning, as far as Sprague was concerned, technically sound and commercially viable) incandescent lighting designs. Earlier would-be inventors (“Starr, King, Staite, and others”) had worked on the problem. Solutions proved elusive, however, until “Edison and Swan began the investigations which have wrought the great change which the last four years has witnessed.” Edison’s work—specifically, the attempt to employ platinum wire—had “marked the era of a great advance,” in Sprague’s
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view. Subsequently, Edison had discarded platinum in favor of carbon filaments—a decision that Swan reached independently and more or less simultaneously. “Since then both inventors have worked for the perfection of the incandescent lamp,” Swan concentrating on refining his lamp designs while Edison (Sprague noted approvingly) “sought to make domestic lighting of the most practical character by also working out a most elaborate system.”54 WORKING FOR EDISON
Clearly, Sprague was drawn to the idea of developing and building that “most elaborate system,” meaning not just the light bulb or the lamp but the central power station and grid that would feed them electricity. He recognized that this larger system architecture would become the core infrastructure of the technology. And when he saw a chance to work on it, he leapt at the opportunity.While in London, Sprague met Edward H. Johnson, one of Edison’s business partners and managerial lieutenants who was in England to supervise the exhibition of incandescent lighting entry at the Crystal Palace. Johnson, impressed by Sprague’s technical knowledge, recommended him to Edison. A short, awkward interim followed. Johnson encouraged Sprague to resign his commission in the U.S. Navy, which he did (with a year’s leave) in March 1883.55 But back in the United States, Edison delayed. “I hear nothing from you as to young Sprague,” Johnson prodded Edison in April. “An ensign in the U.S. Navy doesn’t have enough surplus pocket money to allow him to loaf long. Beside, he is not one who can endure it long. He is very anxious to get to work.” Sprague, Johnson added for effect, had already received “good offers from outside parties . . . but will not go into anything except Edison.”56
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“I received your favor of the 11th this morning and at once cabled you ‘Send Sprague,’” Edison replied.“I propose using him in connection with the establishment of the ‘Small Town Plants.’”57 Work in Edison’s Construction Department was not Sprague’s first choice. He and Johnson had been discussing the possibility of putting Sprague to work on other development projects. Sprague “was telling me a few days ago about some excellent ideas he has in re to electric motors and railways, & was asking me to advise him in the matter,” Johnson had informed Edison. But Edison’s operation needed skilled electrical engineers to work on power station construction.“I arrived home on the day the Brooklyn Bridge opened,” Sprague later reminisced,“and promptly reported to my employer, who seemed to think that a salary of $2,500 was per year unduly munificent.”58 He was sent first to Sunbury, Pennsylvania, to assist with the final stages of installing Edison’s pilot overhead three-wire system and then to Brockton, Massachusetts, to oversee construction of the first underground three-wire system. The assignment stationed Sprague in the field rather than at Menlo Park near Edison and moreover put him under the supervision of Samuel Insull (one of Edison’s lieutenants), an arrangement under which Sprague soon began to chafe.59 Nevertheless, the work proved an invaluable experience. It put Sprague on the ground and immersed him in the challenges of constructing a functional system. Installation entailed a host of technical adjustments and refinements, most of which were minor and some of which Edison weighed in on from New Jersey as the system took physical form. Soon Sprague was figuring out how to wire particularly narrow streets, how to cope with the objections of neighbors (and competing telegraph interests) to putting up new poles, and how to structure usage so that the system would not just work but operate profitably.
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All of these extratechnical aspects of the project were vital to the success of the system and ultimately the technology itself, taking the technology from the stage of invention into the wider work of innovation. And they prepared Sprague for future projects of his own. Arguably, he managed successfully to construct a full-scale electric railway system in Richmond,Virginia, in just a few years in no small part due to lessons that he had acquired managing similar work for Edison during this period. Meanwhile, Sprague also found opportunities to make academic contributions to Edison’s operation. Discovering that the Construction Department had been determining the size of a given system’s mains and feeders by constructing scale models and testing the equipment in miniature, Sprague proposed a more efficient and elegant solution.Taking a planned layout for Ithaca, New York, as a test case, he devised a formula for making the necessary calculations mathematically. “I proceeded,” he explained, “on the theory that there should be a like maximum drop of potential at the low voltage points of all mains, and that feeder resistances should be inversely proportional to the loads they had to carry.” When this method proved sound and converted what had been the work of days into a matter of hours, Sprague inherited responsibility for running the calculations to map out future installations.60 MOTORS
Sprague’s apprenticeship with Edison thus gave him opportunities to exercise both his academic training and his engineering skills. It also provided him with enough apparatus and free time to pursue independent projects. And the work at Brockton, in particular, surrounded
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Sprague with access to a nearby machine shop as well as a supply of electrical materials and components. Restless and ambitious, he surveyed his options and prepared to build. He chose to develop his electric motor designs. Other electrical applications—telegraphy, lighting, and dynamos—were beginning to look too crowded to permit the kind of dramatic breakthrough and heroic impact of invention that Sprague was seeking. He was looking for bigger, bolder fields of enterprise. His work on power plant systems, meanwhile, implied that broad new categories of electrical application were opening—categories that looked both heroic and feasible from an engineering point of view. Not yet in a position to accomplish substantive work on a large-scale project such as an electric railway, Sprague could at least work on smaller apparatus. If he did pull out his USS Richmond notebook, it was his motor designs that he studied most intently. The motors that Sprague assembled during this period (the last few months of 1883 and the first few months of 1884) drew in part on existing motor designs as well as Sprague’s dynamo ideas. Like all motors, they operated on the basic principle of exposing a current sent through a wire (creating one magnetic field) to another magnet, generating mechanical power as the two magnetic fields repelled each other. Sprague made important breakthroughs, however, as he broke down and reengineered the electrical forces that were at work inside the apparatus. At sea on the USS Richmond, he had displayed (and probably further developed) an uncanny ability to map the abstract electrical forces working in electrical designs. As he worked on the motor problem, this ability produced a critical insight: Sprague realized that on a constant circuit, the mechanical effects of the motor action—
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variations of speed and power output—could be controlled by (in his words) “inverse variation of the strength of the magnetic field to determine the differential of the line and motor electromotive forces.” Using a pair of magnetizing field coils,“one of high resistance across the line for the main field excitation and another of a few turns in opposition to it and in series with the armature,” Sprague devised a motor with reverse wiring in proportions that would equip it to operate at the same speed regardless of the size of the load that it was carrying.61 This design represented an entirely new approach to motor design, with significant implications for application. Because they were “selfregulated,” Sprague’s motors could be bent to such speed-sensitive tasks as industrial uses and transportation. And they revealed what was becoming a distinctive approach to the challenge of invention. In his subsequent patent application, Sprague explained that he had developed the idea by first devising and following what he called “Sprague’s laws” aligning E (initial electromagnetic force), e (counter electromagnetic force), m (magnetic movement of the motor’s main shunt coil), and u (magnetic movement of the differential series coil).62 Characteristically, Sprague had developed the theory from mathematical principles, made dynamo and motor prototypes, measured their performance, and adjusted his “laws” accordingly. THE BREAK AND THE BRINK
By April 1884, Sprague was feeling that he was poised on the threshold of substantial technological accomplishment. He may well have been looking for some way to withdraw gracefully from Edison’s employ. Matters soon came to a head when Edison (perhaps gathering
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wind of Sprague’s motor work) asked him (in Sprague’s words) to “take up certain problems relative to the transmission of power.”The request put Sprague in a quandary. He had been pursuing “experimental work” in this area, he revealed to Edison, and “advanced far enough to wish it entirely apart from whatever duties are owing to you.” In other words, Sprague wanted this work to be recognized as his own rather than considered the product of Menlo Park or Edison. “You will surely understand me,” Sprague continued, “when I say that I desire to identify myself with the successful solution to this problem.” Indeed, he admitted, he was “actuated by the same spirit with which you attacked the electric light, with the result of making yourself world-famous.”63 There it was, stated as baldly as Sprague ever admitted: he wanted, he hungered for, the acclaim of heroic invention. He yearned to become “world-famous.” Sprague had nurtured that ambition for some time, at least since emerging from Annapolis and likely well before. It had led him through a brief, busy, improvised period of apprenticeship. And now it had carried him to the brink—of inventing in his own name, of independent venturing, of innovation in the wider world.
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GETTING TRACTION, 1884 TO 1888: SPRAGUE ELECTRIC RAILWAY AND MOTOR COMPANY AND THE RICHMOND UNION PASSENGER RAILWAY
In April 1883, one year before Frank Sprague broke with Edison, Electrical World had predicted that “the electric railway” would be “the great achievement that will next come to the surface to proclaim the grand properties of the force at our command and the genius of those whose task it is to deal with their utilization.”1 Sprague himself was keenly aware of the opportunity. “Electricity was in the air,” he later remembered of this period in his life, “and a belief was growing that it would eventually take the place of horse-power on street cars.”2 The technological potential of electricity (and some of its potential problems) first struck him in 1882 when he was riding on London’s Metropolitan District underground railway. Steam-driven and encased in tunnels, the Metropolitan’s “dingy, smoky” trains certainly stood to benefit from electrical conversion.What really animated the idea of the project as Sprague turned it over in his mind, though, was visualizing how to feed an electric current into and through the
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system.The motors would be set up on the cars, Sprague figured, and the cars somehow connected to a central power source. Initially, he considered using the railway’s running rails as conductors, with an “automatically tensioned mid-located wire, or ‘working conductor’ connected ladder wise to a main conductor”3 on the tracks running between the rails. That architecture looked problematic, though, when Sprague observed “the complication of switches on certain sections of the road.”4 Weaving a main conductor through a railway’s twists, turns, crossovers, and on- and off-sidings would be cumbersome. Then Sprague had another idea.“I visioned,” he later recounted,“the freedom of movement of a car between two contact planes, . . . [with] an overhead conductor following the center lines of all, the circuit of the motors being completed through the wheels and an overhead selfadjusting upward-pressing contact.”5 By Sprague’s later account, that flash of insight—that “visioned” stroke of electrical engineering— sparked the idea to break the plane and redesign the system (mentally, of course) in three rather than two dimensions. He did not yet have a motor that was capable of doing this kind of work (no one did) or suitable trains. Even the power station component of the system was still under development. “For a moment” Sprague entertained “the wild thought of resigning from the Navy and undertaking this laudable but under the then conditions impossible project,” he later recounted. Several years later—with one Edison power station up and running in New York City, others (two of which Sprague was helping to build) going up in other locations, and his own work on motors beginning to yield new levels of performance—Sprague returned to the idea of an electric railway. Between 1884 and 1890, he threw himself into efforts to design and construct a workable system. In Richmond,Virginia, in
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1887 and 1888, he built it in full-scale—and in the process, staged the technology. This staging began the process of its adoption, a process that Sprague extended through an aggressive campaign of promotion and marketing. And along the way, he worked out the technical solutions that made an electric railway function and the broader, extratechnical solutions that transformed the technology into a commercially viable prospect. In other words, Sprague simultaneously designed an electric railway system and engineered its technological adoption. This latter challenge took the form of building out the technology as a business venture—a capitalized enterprise that was capable of commercializing and ultimately financing the costs of installation across the landscape.This technology had to be built, sold, and paid for, which entailed the formation of new alignments of invention, business, and finance. Electrical railways remained unproven as a business proposition, both to make and sell and to buy and run, and systems capable of doing so were just beginning to coalesce. There was no “business model” (to borrow an anachronistically modern term) for this sort of thing.The technology and its practitioners had not yet attracted anything like the capital that would be required to build fullfledged systems. None of the mechanisms of production, marketing, or financing that actual construction required had been assembled, and these as yet scattered resources were substantial and manifold. There was, in short, a substantial amount of innovation to be engineered, alongside the technical, electrical engineering. Nevertheless, Sprague’s first venture, the Sprague Electric Railway and Motor Company (SERM), was a success. Between 1884 and 1890, working its way from bootstrap capitalization, almost total obscurity, and jury-rigged solutions for production and distribution, SERM established itself as the leading firm in the field of railway electrification.
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The venture skirted financial disaster more than once. Eventually, Sprague undertook a bold, bet-the-company gambit in an effort to establish the viability of the technology and break open the electric railway market. The maneuver nearly wrecked the business, but after harrowing episodes, he created the attention and momentum that he needed to pry open the opportunity to invent. Meanwhile, he invented. By the time that Sprague got his chance— or, rather, engineered his chance—to build out a full-scale electric railway system in Richmond, Virginia, in 1887, he had worked out the rudiments of his motor and railway design on paper and in smallscale prototype runs. Getting cars up and running and putting them to work carrying passenger traffic systemwide, regularly and reliably, took a second round of inventive effort. Some elements of the original design performed admirably. Others broke down, requiring urgent troubleshooting, redesign, and reinvention. Under enormous pressure, Sprague and his small team of engineers and mechanics assembled, took apart, and reassembled motors, railway cars, and electrical track components.The effort took nearly a year, but Sprague emerged with a major technical achievement. In the Richmond Union Passenger Railway, Sprague set in motion not just electrically powered streetcars but a full-scale electric railway system. And as he did so, he also assembled the elements from which he would craft his own narrative of heroic invention. THE SALIENT FORMING
The idea of using electricity (as opposed to horses, mules, or steam engines) to power local railway systems had been in the air for decades. As early as 1834, a Vermont blacksmith named Thomas Daven-
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port began the process of inventing an electric railway system by mounting a small motor on wheels and running it around a small circular railway. Other isolated experiments repeated the feat on larger scales in following decades. Moses Farmer, for example, put an experimental car into electrical motion in Rhode Island at the Newport Torpedo Station in 1847. None of these initial efforts amounted to much more than trial projects, however, largely because they relied on batteries as fuel sources and therefore remained severely limited in capacity. Only in the late 1870s, with the emergence of more efficient dynamo technologies, did centrally powered electrified railway networks become a commercially and technologically viable prospect.6 The turning point came in 1879 in a cluster of disconnected developments. At the Berlin Exhibition in Germany, Werner Siemens installed a “modern motor” (Sprague’s phrase)7 on a railway car, fed it with current from a stationary dynamo, and carried passengers along a track a third of a mile long. Meanwhile, working more or less simultaneously (and independently of each other) in the United States, several American inventors were making progress along largely the same lines. Stephen Field managed to establish the first formal American claim to the idea, filing a caveat with the U.S. Patent Office in 1879 and a patent application the following year. Siemens filed a patent application in 1880, as did Thomas Edison. Sprague later characterized Edison as being “perhaps nearer the verge of great electric-railway possibilities than any other American” in 1880.8 The track that Edison built at Menlo Park, New Jersey, ran over a mile, sending current through the rails of the track to the wheels of cars that reached speeds of forty miles per hour. Edison invited various railroad investors and managers to inspect the project and drew Henry Villard into plans for a joint venture developing the technology.
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The demands of building out his electric light and power stations soon consumed both Edison’s and Villard’s energies, however.9 In key technical respects, meanwhile, other would-be inventors of electric railways ran into problems as they tried to scale up their designs. In some cases, motor designs were not up to the heavy task of hauling large cars. Many of the “motors” for these prototype designs, including Edison’s, were in fact dynamos that were jury-rigged for the job. All of these projects pumped the necessary current through railway tracks, creating “live” rails that posed potential hazards. Most efforts rigged up cumbersome chain or belt drives to transmit power from motors to axles. And all of these early designs (including the designs of Siemens, Field, and Edison) used locomotives to pull passenger cars. The initial round of efforts at electrification, in other words, inherited existing railway architectures, substituting electric motors for steam engines or horse teams. Even so, by the early 1880s, it seemed possible, even probable, that electrification would transform railway networks. As technological momentum built behind Edison’s power and lighting systems, the impetus to develop adjacent direct current electrical applications intensified. Sprague himself picked up on the opportunity, as did other would-be inventors. Observers were predicting “a vast amount of money for the inventor who produces a motor” capable of driving electric railways, and a number of inventor-entrepreneurs were racing to seize the prize.10 Among these, the most important figures in 1884, when Sprague entered the field, were Charles Van Depoele, Leo Daft, and the team of Walter Knight and Edward Bentley. Van Depoele, a Belgian immigrant who originally was a cabinet maker, incorporated the Van Depoele Electric Light Company in Chicago in 1881, backed by
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Chicago capitalist Aaron K. Stiles. Despite its name, the firm shifted in 1882 from an initial focus on arc lighting to motors and electric railways, setting up a test track for pilot experimentation near its factory. The following year, Van Depoele assembled an operational demonstration in the form of a locomotive powered by a thirty horsepower dynamo that ferried passengers to the Chicago Industrial Exhibition. By the time that Sprague was organizing Sprague Electric Railway and Motor Company, Van Depoele had set up a second pilot railway in an exhibition in Toronto and was preparing to extend that line to link with one of the city’s existing horse-car lines.11 Bentley and Knight were also making progress on their own electric railway designs. Following initial development within the shops of the Brush Electric Company in Cleveland, the two inventors secured a contract in 1883 to electrify a mile-long section of the East Cleveland Street Railway Company. By July 1884, Bentley-Knight trains were up and running as the first commercially operated electric railway in the United States (although one that was electrically powered along only one mile’s worth of track). In September 1884, the venture organized as the Bentley-Knight Electric Railway Company and unveiled plans to electrify the entire East Cleveland line.12 Daft, too, was jostling for position. After establishing the Daft Electric Light Company in Greenville, New Jersey, he began supplying motors to several industrial clients in the region. Despite his firm’s name, Daft, like Van Depoele, Bentley-Knight, and Sprague, targeted electric railways as an emergent technology and was running several small-scale pilot projects by the end of 1884, including one on Coney Island and another on a section of track in Boston.13 Sprague, in short, was entering a rapidly developing field of invention and enterprise. Electric railways represented a highly anticipated
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technology. By the time SERM was launched, several competitors had already designed pilot projects and attracted local seed capital. Even as Sprague began to cast about for partners and financial backing, his rival inventors were assembling prototypes, impressing local audiences, and attracting guarded interest from financiers and street railway companies. Major investors were still waiting for clear front runners to emerge, although the field was taking shape. Both the industry and the technology were in formative and very plastic stages.The situation remained fluid. All of Sprague’s competitors (at least after Edison dropped out of the field) were essentially start-ups that were built around single inventors who were working with local sources of capital, funding operations that had not yet scaled up to industrial proportions. Pilot projects had been put into operation, but a platform set of technology standards or a consensus system architecture had not yet coalesced. More basically, the underlying technology remained abstract, untested, and unlocated. No one had taken on the challenges and unknowns of actually building out a full-scale system that was embedded in a real landscape and was functioning profitably. This point underscores how much of this technology remained unconstructed. Motors were being bolted onto cars and sent running on tracks, but those tracks were essentially unconnected loops that were removed from wider environments. These closed systems were novelties and promises, not products that were available in the marketplace. Momentum was building behind the technology, but it had, literally, nowhere to run. The new technology did, however, have new power sources that could be tapped. The successful installation of central power station systems after 1880 was accelerating technological innovation and de-
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velopment. Historian Thomas Hughes has identified the environment that surrounded Sprague and his competitors as a “reverse salient” that formed at a critical point in the evolution of the larger technological system. Edison’s direct current power and lighting systems were gathering compelling momentum. As such systems evolve, Hughes explains, critical problems emerge that threaten to check growth.These reverse salients in turn draw inventors, engineers, and other innovation agents to work out solutions in an effort to maintain the evolution and growth of the larger system. Sprague, Hughes concludes, provides “a superb example of a critical-problem-solving inventor and engineer who was obviously informed about reverse salients.”14 Hughes’s metaphor provides an important contextual perspective on the broader dynamics that surrounded and shaped Sprague’s work. The opportunity for invention was indeed being shaped by social circumstances. External as well as internal forces were at work here. But from Sprague’s perspective, the situation assumed a different aspect. The inventor considered himself to be breaking away from Edison’s gravitational pull. He considered himself to be forging a new field of enterprise and a new technology on his own terms—and very much on his own. He felt himself to be undertaking invention heroics. SPRAGUE LAUNCHES
Sprague entered the field brimming with confidence and scrambling for resources.“When I separated from Mr. Edison in 1884 and formed my own company,” Sprague confided years later,“it was at considerable risk.”15 Indeed, he was abandoning a promising position in Edison’s entourage at the very nexus of technological developments and plunging into a churning field of competing start-ups and technological
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upheaval. He was twenty-seven years old, had no capital and few resources, and would be challenging rivals who were already building out their own designs and establishing themselves in a rapidly forming market. Yet Sprague focused on the opportunities that he sensed were before him, not the risks. He sensed the momentum that was building behind the technology and believed in the possibility of heroic invention. He may have lacked the resources that his competitors were amassing, but Sprague had technical ideas and a few critical resources to tap. The prototype that he had assembled in Brockton, Massachusetts, represented a significant breakthrough in electric motor design and a highly saleable product, and Sprague was confident in his ability to build an electric railway system around it. He would have to move fast, create chances to put his inventions to trial, and get to market. He had to build a business, in other words, to continue developing his designs, construct a working system, and make a name for himself. He had to venture in order to invent. The most pressing need, as Sprague emerged from Edison’s shop, was financial backing. He capitalized his venture at $100,000, but he had nothing like that sum at his disposal. Sprague sold a few shares to several friends, raising funds “which quickly went for personal needs.” Then he turned to Edward H. Johnson, one of the partners who managed Edison’s lighting company, for substantial backing.The two partners struck a verbal agreement in which Johnson agreed to fund Sprague’s expenses “for a portion of the profits.”16 Johnson did not bring much money to the table.Though Sprague was later vague about the figures, he appears to have launched SERM with roughly $16,000 of paid-in capital.17 But Johnson represented more to Sprague than merely venture capital. He was a resourceful
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marketer, skilled manager, and well connected, having worked with Edison in various capacities since the 1870s. By 1884, Johnson was running the Edison Electric Light Company and serving in executive capacities in several other Edison-affiliated firms.18 Johnson did not relinquish his Edison positions when he partnered with Sprague. He took on SERM as a side project, assuming the title of president and fostering Sprague’s work with periodic cash infusions (via Edison connections) and occasional strategic direction but minimal direct managerial participation. Nevertheless, Sprague’s new partner played a key role in the enterprise. Johnson brought shrewd business savvy to the venture. He positioned SERM for strategic partnership with the Edison companies and connected Sprague, at least indirectly through Edison, to potential financiers such as J. P. Morgan and Henry Villard. More generally, Johnson’s role conferred an invaluable imprimatur on SERM. Even as a figurehead (and his role went beyond a titular one), Johnson provided Sprague from the outset with a currency that he needed nearly as desperately as he did cash—credibility. For credibility was Sprague’s other consuming priority as he prepared to launch his company. He was entering a burgeoning new market, a field of rapidly multiplying competitors, and a fierce battle to establish technological standing. Even as he and Johnson hammered out a financial structure for their company, Sprague went to work promoting himself and his inventions. Fortunately, he had a familiar forum close at hand. On September 2, 1884, the Franklin Institute opened an International Electrical Exhibition in Philadelphia, the biggest event of its kind to date in the United States. Seizing the chance, Sprague contributed a display exhibiting several “self-regulating motors . . . to run at constant speed under varying loads” and a “motor for Electric Railway purposes, with self-contained means for varying
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the mechanical effects, as speed and power and means for reversing direction of rotation.” One of Sprague’s motors powered a loom. The appearance of nonsparking direct-current motors that operated at constant speeds (as opposed to slowing down when pulling heavier loads) represented a significant breakthrough in the field, and Sprague came out of Philadelphia with several important endorsements. Most notably, the Wizard of Menlo Park offered up a handsome testimonial.“The problem of transmission of electrical force has been pretty well worked out,” Edison declared to reporters covering the Exhibit. “A young man named Sprague, who resigned his position as an officer of our Navy to devote himself to electrical studies, has worked the matter up in a very remarkable way. His is the only true motor. . . . His machine keeps at the same rate of speed all the time, and does not vary with the amount of work done, as others do.”19 Thus fortified, the partners formally launched the Sprague Electric Railway and Motor Company on November 24, 1884. At an initial meeting, the firm’s shareholders (essentially, Sprague and Johnson, at this point, with several other minor holders), appointed three “trustees”—Johnson, Sprague, and John Tomlinson. SERM then convened its first board meeting, electing Johnson president, Sprague treasurer, and William Hammer secretary. Sprague was in business.20 BREAKING IN: BOOTSTRAP STRATEGIES IN A NETWORKING ECONOMY
Despite the endorsement from Edison, Sprague did not emerge from Philadelphia as the leading figure in the United States in electric motor technology. Higher-profile names received greater attention at the Philadelphia exhibition. The Van Depoele Electric Light Company
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mounted “a very extensive exhibit” that included an array of electric motors at Philadelphia (according to Electrical World). The Daft Electric Light Company displayed a series of motors of its own (including one that drove a Cotterell press printing the Electrical World—a deft promotional move). Competing motors from Stockwell,Weston, Brush, Knight-Bentley, and Ayrton & Perry also vied for attention in the Exhibition Hall.21 Together, these displays described an emergent but rapidly heating field of competition that surrounded Sprague. SERM, meanwhile, remained little more than a paper company and a one-man R&D project.“One small room sufficed for our business requirements,” Sprague remembered later.22 The venture did, however, hold a critical advantage over its rivals—its affiliation with the Edison interests. Although Sprague left Menlo Park to strike out on his own, he had not left Edison,Villard, and company entirely behind. The fact that Johnson, a key Edison executive, took on at least nominal oversight of SERM suggests that something more intricate was developing. And Johnson soon reinforced the linkages connecting the network of ventures.To create instant capacity for production, he arranged to outsource SERM’s manufacturing to Bergmann & Company Electrical Works, a New York–based firm that had been supplying electrical equipment to the Edison companies (lamp components, fixtures, and so on) since 1876.23 The move enabled SERM to get into business without having to build, buy, or lease plant capacity. It also signaled Johnson’s instinct to nest SERM, at least informally, within the loose cluster of companies that comprised Edison’s various electrical ventures at this stage. Johnson, not coincidentally, was also a partner in Bergmann & Company—as was Edison himself. Partnership made sense both for Sprague (who was in no position to finance a factory) and for the Edison companies. In the early
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1880s, Edison’s people were too hard-pressed to develop motor technologies and markets themselves; they had their hands full building out their lighting and power station systems. On the other hand, once a power station was built, the operators—the franchisees who took ownership of the local stations—were naturally anxious to promote power usage, particularly in the daytime hours, when few lighting customers were drawing on power. Expanding the menu of electrical applications thus made Edison’s lighting and power systems more readily marketable. SERM fit symbiotically into the long-term strategic plans that were coalescing around Edison. Indeed, seen from the perspective of Edison and his partners, Sprague and SERM represented an intriguing strategic play. The technology was unsettled. It was difficult to decide what specific designs would create which specific applications, opening which markets. Although they had their hands full at the time, Edison’s partners certainly recognized the potential in Sprague’s designs. If this particular inventor did in fact manage to solve this particular set of technical problems, he could potentially unlock the markets that lay beyond. Under these circumstances, maintaining friendly relations and, if possible, an embedded financial and operational relationship made strategic sense. Given both the stakes involved and the extent of the unknowns, lending Johnson’s managerial talents on a part-time basis amounted to putting an insider on the scene. SERM offered Edison et al. a contingency venture, something akin to a spin-off venture, letting Edison and his financial partners put development in play with a minimum of investment and a potentially huge payoff. The historical record does not allow for precise accounting, but various sources indicate that Edison-affiliated investment would play a key role in sustaining SERM at several critical junctures, including
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its precarious infancy in 1884 and 1885 and after a technological breakthrough in 1887 during an attempt to scale up railway production. Charles Batchelor (one of Edison’s assistants and business partners, who managed the Edison Machine Works from 1884 to 1888) bought in.24 So too did Sigmund Bergmann (running Bergmann & Company Electrical Works, which manufactured much of Edison’s equipment).25 Edison was exaggerating, but not wildly, when he asserted in 1909 (writing to Samuel Insull): “My recollection re trolley is that we built all the motors etc. . . . & in fact financed the pioneering of the Trolley.”26 What was taking shape around Sprague, SERM, and any number of other ventures jostling for position with related and competing technologies would be strikingly familiar to a later generation of technology entrepreneurs—a networked high-technology economy. The technological ferment was volatile and fluid. Capital remained cautious. Where would definitive, successful innovation come from? Which of the aspirant new technologies would stick? Which design and which cluster of patents would manage to align start-up resources, stabilize technically, attract a critical mass of financing and then customers, and establish itself as the platform architecture of the new technology? There was no way of controlling the rapid and unpredictable technological shifts, the entrepreneurial energies, or the strategic unknowns. In this environment, the best strategy was to remain flexible, disperse one’s risks, and spread one’s plays—to structure loosely in ways that permitted coordinated action but left options open. One way for a cluster of potential investors and informal partners to lend support without sinking substantial funds was to help generate marketing momentum. In May 1885, the Edison Electric Light
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Company issued a circular to its power station licensees endorsing Sprague’s motor as “the only practical and economic Motor existing today” and recommending its active promotion in the field. Edison himself reinforced the message, repeating and amplifying the personal endorsement that he had delivered at Philadelphia. Meanwhile, Sprague contributed to the gathering promotional impetus, publishing a series of detailed articles in Electrical World that described the design and operational principles of his motors.27 Things were cranking up. In May 1885, Sprague heard from A. H. Rennie, a contractor for Edison’s Electric Light Wiring at Pearl Street who had agreed to act as an agent for the new venture. “Today broke the ice & made sale of one of your motors,” Rennie wrote. “Had to shade a little in making connections, etc. How soon can you let me have the motor?”28 BUILDING THE MOTOR BUSINESS
By mid-1885, SERM was booking sales and delivering motors. It was a small beginning but a critical point of entry. Although Sprague and Johnson ultimately intended to design and market electric railway systems, the bulk of their business through SERM’s early years of operation came in electric motors that were designed for stationary purposes (mainly powering warehouse elevators and industrial machinery). Much as he had improvised production capacity by outsourcing manufacturing, Johnson jury-rigged distribution by setting up arrangements with independent sales agents who either made their initial sales without any product or (as the business grew) carried their own inventory.29 Sprague was still essentially buying time,
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accumulating a performance record, and meanwhile developing the motor elements of his railway system. The first few months were touch and go. Sprague betrayed how uncomfortably narrow the firm’s margin of operation was in a letter to a customer (a manager of an Edison power station in Pennsylvania) in mid-June 1885. SERM had shipped William Brock a motor several weeks before “under special conditions as to trial and price” and as yet received no payment, Sprague complained. “The special price ($189) was offered solely on condition of prompt cash sale” once the motor had tested satisfactorily.30 The fact that SERM was shipping product on spec and offering “special price[s]” for “prompt cash sale” was as revealing as Sprague’s anxiousness to receive payment. Also telling was the fact that the customer was one of Edison’s power stations. The motor business eventually stabilized, however. The Edison Company endorsement carried enormous weight. (“Probably no reference we could make would be as strong,” Sprague replied in answer to a query from a potential customer in July 1885.)31 And the motor itself, in various sizes and permutations, performed admirably. Over the next six months, SERM grew into a humming little business with an expanding customer base and a cash flow that was sufficient to pay the roughly $600 per month that Sprague needed to cover salaries, patent fees, overhead, and “some payments to the machine works.”32 Continued growth through 1886 brought SERM to critical mass sometime around January 1887, when Sprague issued a catalog listing his most powerful and effective motors to date, including models ranging up to twenty horsepower.33 Business in the New England region, energetically developed by agent George E. Harding in Boston, was
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especially strong; Sprague motors from one-half to fifteen horsepower were driving elevators, mill machinery, printing presses, and other industrial equipment in Boston, Lawrence, Pawtucket, Fall River, and Springfield. Farther afield, SERM had found customers in New York City, Pittsburgh, Detroit, Chicago, St. Louis, New Orleans, and St. Paul. A few foreign orders had come in, as well, from Canada, Argentina, Milan, and Berlin.34 Encouraged, Sprague and Johnson made arrangements to expand. In January 1887, the company increased its capital stock from $100,000 to $1 million (both figures still nominal, at this point)35 and made arrangements to lease factory space within the Union Lead Works building on West 30th Street in New York. AN INTERLUDE
One notable event interrupted Frank Sprague’s busy venturing and invention, at least briefly. In early 1885, during a short vacation in New Orleans, he met and immediately began courting Mary Keatinge. The daughter of William Keatinge (who owned an engraving company) and Harriette G. Keatinge (who, notably, was one of the pioneering woman physicians in the United States), Mary had already been married once. After a brief engagement, Sprague (then twentyseven) and Keatinge (twenty-one) married on April 25, 1885.36 The couple moved to New York, and Sprague promptly threw himself back into business. In all likelihood, the young bride saw relatively little of her husband in the coming years.The couple had a son, Desmond, in 1888. Mary seems to have taken little direct interest in Sprague’s work, however, while Sprague, in these years of his life, seems to have taken little interest in anything but his work. In any event, the couple divorced, amicably, in 1895.
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DEVELOPING A RAILWAY MOTOR SYSTEM
By early 1887, SERM had established itself as a leading provider of electric motors, and Sprague’s electric railway experiments were rapidly outgrowing their blueprint and workbench origins.The company planned to devote its new facilities within the Union Lead Works “to the manufacture of special types of motors,” a reporter learned, as well as “experimental work. Mr. Sprague will spend a large portion of his time in the factory.” Sprague “schemed out” (in his words)37 the basic architecture of his railway system in 1885. He employed shunt-wound motors of his own design, which enabled the cars to return current to the line as they reduced speeds. Motors were mounted in pairs on each car of his train, rejecting the locomotive system that Daft, Field, Edison, and other inventors had been using. Sprague placed the motors underneath his cars, wheelbarrow-style, rather than inside the carriages. This made the motors harder to access for maintenance or control purposes but enabled Sprague to gear the motors directly to the axles, removing the need for inefficient and unreliable chain drives.This approach also freed up more room within the motor cars, increasing capacity.38 The result was an architecture that marked a significant step forward in electric railway technology. Sprague’s railway motor designs were better engineered than his rivals’: the motors sparked less and (as with his stationary motors) maintained constant speed regardless of the load they were carrying. A superior, series-parallel control system allowed cars to be controlled from either end.To transmit power from the motors to the axles, Sprague rigged up double-reduction gears that were pinion-driven and meshed with gears that were added to the axle.
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(Later the double-reduction gears were replaced by more efficient single-reduction gears.) At the same time, the inventor sketched (though he was not yet able to build or test) plans for a power supply system that delivered current via an overhead feed line to the motor. To collect this current, Sprague’s design hung the motor beneath the railway car (or “truck”) carriage between the transom (with two bearings) and axle (with a third bearing). (At this stage, Sprague used small wheels as current collectors, spring-loaded to maintain constant contact with the centrally positioned current rail.) These basic features—including the undercarriage motor mounting, the current delivery system, the motor control apparatus, and the motor brushes (which were fixed in position)—were to become basic architectural elements of traction systems in the United States and Europe throughout the twentieth century. Indeed, the essential elements of the design remain in use today. Sprague unveiled the system blueprint in a paper to the Society of Arts in Boston in December 1885, making a pitch for installation in the Manhattan Elevated Railway. The following year he conducted a series of tests demonstrating a prototype in New York City, first on a tiny track running between several buildings at a sugar refinery on East 24th Street and then on a section of the 34th Street Elevated Railway. By the end of 1886, refined versions were driving cars up and down grades and along curves, stopping and starting midgrade without shocks or jars and without using handbrakes, absorbing what the inventor characterized as “severe and exceptional strains.” These pilot demonstrations attracted tentative interest and further capital commitment from Edison-affiliated sources. After witnessing a trial demonstration in early 1886, for example, C. E. Chinnock, who ran Edison’s Pearl Street power station, offered to purchase a one-sixth
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share in SERM for $30,000. Sprague declined the offer, despite the fact (as he later told the story) that “I probably did not have money enough to pay my board for a month.”39 Several months later, when Johnson managed to pique the interest of industrialist /investor Cyrus Field, Sprague assembled a more elaborate demonstration on the 34th Street branch of the Manhattan Elevated Railroad. Still impressed, Chinnock returned with more attractive terms—$25,000 for a onetwelfth share.This time Sprague took him up on the investment.40 Another demonstration went less well, however. As Sprague moved his experiments to the Manhattan Elevated Railway, Johnson rounded up key executives, including financier Jay Gould, for a visit. “Keenly alive [Sprague would later recall] to the importance of the visitor, and confident in the possibilities of the machinery,” the inventor drove the car himself. Unfortunately, when he suddenly reversed the current, he blew a safety catch, triggering a loud explosion and a shower of sparks. Startled, Gould attempted to jump off the train. The only injury was to his dignity, but that turned out to be a serious blow: the Manhattan Elevated Railway declined to consider electrification for several years afterward.41 In fact, Gould’s pride was not the only issue at stake.The hesitation of the Manhattan Elevated Railway Company to plunge into electrification made it clear that hard strategic realities were still inhibiting the potential market for electric railway systems. Through the mid-1880s, none of the major streetcar lines, in fact, proved willing to risk the substantial capital expense of electrification. Notwithstanding the boosterish enthusiasm of promoters like Sprague, street railway operators were adopting a wait and see attitude. The businessmen who owned and ran lines needed to see more than motors driving cars. They needed to see a large-scale system in operation.
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They required hard numbers—data on how a system performed over the long haul and what it would cost to operate. By early 1887, it was becoming clear that Sprague would have to somehow stage the technology—in operation on a system scale—to overcome lingering technological inertia. THE RICHMOND OPPORTUNITY
The opening came from an industry outsider, a new streetcar company in a small southern city that was looking for a way to make an unworkable project work. In the winter of 1886 to 1887, a group of New York investors led by Maurice B. Flynn reached Richmond,Virginia, scouting for a factory site. Sizing up the city, Flynn detected an unexpected opportunity: Richmond was served by only one street railway, an inadequate horse- and mule-car line. In short order, Flynn formed a syndicate of investors and obtained a franchise from municipal authorities to build and operate a twelve-mile road along a prescribed route. As the project moved into the construction phase, however, serious problems emerged.The steep grades and sharp turns of Richmond’s topography, its unpaved streets, and its clay soil rendered the route a “horse killer” that was ruinously expensive to operate by traditional technologies. Unable to build a standard streetcar line, Flynn cast about for alternatives. Recalling the publicity surrounding Sprague’s experimental runs in New York City, he approached the young inventor. Flynn, however, was not prepared to underwrite development of a full-scale system. The Richmond Union Passenger Railway was, like SERM, a start-up venture, thinly financed though run by a shrewd and opportunistic set of capitalists. Flynn may have found himself in
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a difficult position on the ground in Richmond, but he recognized the leverage that he held over Sprague, who urgently needed an opportunity to stage his technological designs. The Union Passenger Railway drove a hard bargain. SERM was to provide a fully equipped system, complete with a steam and electric central station plant (375 horse power capacity), forty cars, and eighty motors. The system was to run along a track of twelve miles, mounting grades of up to eight percent. SERM was to bear all risk and expense upfront; Sprague would be paid $110,000 only after the system was up and running with thirty cars in operation at a time. “In terms, price, and guarantees,” Sprague would later observe, it was a contract “which a prudent business man would not ordinarily assume.” Sprague was taking a massive risk. He was contracting to build “nearly as many motors as were in use on all the cars throughout the rest of the world.” He was binding himself to develop a system in which a basic motor design had been worked out but in which innumerable technological problems remained unsolved. He was giving SERM only ninety days to deliver on a project that dwarfed anything it or any other worldwide competitor had accomplished to date. He was betting the company, committing SERM to up-front expenditures far beyond any resources actually on hand.“Failure in Richmond,” he recognized, “meant blasted hopes and financial ruin.”42 He had not even been to Richmond to tour the site, yet he signed without hesitation. The overtones of heroic invention, which Sprague himself would craft and cultivate in subsequent telling and retelling of the tale, clearly color the account.43 Biography, recovering the story, tends to slip into the same narrative patterns. Still, those patterns convey an essential quality of Sprague’s frame of mind and the frame of mind of those who joined his venture.The myth of heroic invention worked powerfully
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as one of the internal forces helping to drive this technology. Years later, one of Sprague’s assistants relished the memory of the mood: “We were all intoxicated—drunk with the work inspired by your indomitable energy, your penetrating intelligence, your bold pioneering through obscure problems. Out of the woods you emerged, flags flying, as we captured Richmond, Wilmington, Scranton, St. Joe. Great days! Technical difficulties, financial difficulties, professional jealousies, nothing could daunt the man.”44 Nostalgia and the rhetorical expectations of the occasion (the remarks came in a gala celebration marking Sprague’s seventy-fifth birthday) colored the characterization. Still, the memory seems vivid enough. Sprague had a small grace period before the ninety-day timetable began while the tracks were laid in Richmond. Preparing for the onslaught that he knew was coming, he hired two assistant engineers. Ensign S. Dana Greene had just graduated from Annapolis, and Lieutenant Oscar T. Crosby was a recent West Point graduate. Neither man had much experience in electrical engineering, but they quickly picked up working knowledge. Greene, stationed in Richmond, and Crosby, at the Edison Machine Works in Schenectady, New York, both demonstrated critical “pluck, enthusiasm, and endurance,” Sprague later observed, as “difficulties multiplied” in the frantic months ahead. The team needed all the time they could get. “We had only a blue print of a machine and some rough experimental apparatus,” Sprague later admitted, “and a hundred and one essential details were undetermined.” He still had to figure out how to gear his motors independently to each axle, for example; how to suspend the motors under the car; how to rig controls operable from either end of a car; how to wire “a four-hundred-and-fifty volt constant-circuit, with track and
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ground return, under conditions which were stated by electricians to be impracticable.”45 “We are working from lose sheets, only partially finished, because of the rush of work which is on our draughtsmen,” Sprague informed Johnson in late March. “We are making changes in the machines; and it would be suicidal to send these half finished drawings of machines about which we are not yet certain to the Machine Works.”46 Then, as if he needed to heighten the drama that was building around him, Sprague contracted typhoid fever. For three critical months, as contractors finished the tracks in Richmond and SERM’s deadline countdown began, Sprague convalesced in bed and then embarked (because his wife feared he would plunge back into work otherwise) on an extended trip out west. Only in September did he manage to make his way to Richmond. What he found there, when he surveyed the ground for the first time, was disheartening. The sheds built to house the cars were little better than shacks.The tracks were a mess—poorly jointed, unevenly laid in Richmond’s red clay, and insecurely fastened. Curves on the road were dangerously sharp, some with radii of as little as twentyseven feet. Most alarming of all, however, was the topography. Richmond’s grades rose as high as ten percent, significantly more than Sprague had contracted to climb.“I shall never forget my feelings,” he would write much later, “when, after inspecting the car sheds at one end of the line, I reached the foot of the steepest hill.” “THE INSTRUMENTS”
The first order of business was to determine whether cars would be able to scale the grade. At this point, Sprague was not even sure that
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the weight of the cars on the rails would give them enough traction to climb without backsliding. Back in New York, he gathered his team for consultation. Someone proposed installing a cable mechanism on the steepest hill, winching cars up using a separate electric motor, at which point Johnson, sitting in on the session (and doubtless growing concerned about cost implications), broke in: “Guess the best thing to do is to find out whether the car can get up the grade at all.”47 Sprague returned to Richmond to make the critical experiment as soon as a car could be outfitted with several motors. Hoping to keep a low profile, he waited until nine o’clock in the evening before climbing aboard with the superintendent representing the railway syndicate and a few other employees to begin the ascent. The motors strained dangerously, but the car held the rails up the first hill, up a second, and around several curves. By the time they reached the city center, Sprague knew that his motors “must be pretty hot.” He stopped, hoping to give them time to cool, but when he tried to start them up again, the passengers felt “a peculiar bucking movement,” and Sprague knew that the engines had burned out. The cover of darkness, meanwhile, had not prevented a crowd of onlookers from gathering. Coolly, “unwilling to admit serious trouble,” Sprague turned to Greene and stated “in a tone that could be overheard by those near, that there was some slight trouble with circuits, and he would better go for the instruments, so that we could locate it.” Greene, catching on, went off into the night while Sprague turned off the lights on the car and sat down to wait. Gradually, the crowd began to disperse. “After waiting a long time for Greene’s return with those ‘instruments,’” Sprague later recalled, “inwardly praying that he would be late, he came in sight with four of them—big, powerful mules, the
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most effective aids which could be found in Richmond under the circumstances.”48 The successful ascent allayed fears that SERM’s cars would be unable to climb Richmond’s hills, and the team managed in the process to avoid what would have been an unfortunate public relations setback. But at the same time, the experiment exposed serious mechanical flaws in Sprague’s motor design. The motors were too small and underpowered and moreover would need intermediate gearing. “Thoroughly at a loss what to do,” he later confessed, Sprague retreated to Providence, Rhode Island, where he exhorted machinists at Brown & Sharpe to put “as many men and as much money and material at my command for 24 hours a day as will be needed until I recover the position we have lost.”49 Overhauling the motor design continued through 1887. To introduce double-reduction gearing, the engineering team had to shift the motor on the axle to create space for a new cast axle gear with inside shrouded teeth that engaged with an intermediate pinion and gear, mounted on a stud anchored in one of the motor’s keepers.This apparatus had to mesh accurately with the motor pinion. It was a difficult mechanical job and only the first of what turned out to be a series of technical setbacks and improvised solutions. Sprague’s customer, the Richmond Union Passenger Railway syndicate, was soon “clamoring for operation,” while SERM’s team worked their way through what the inventor called “a witch’s cauldron of troubles.” The motors’ commutators—spinning drums of bare copper segments that pressed against the brushes—proved particularly troubleprone. In the shop, they performed adequately. Subjected to operating conditions on the tracks, however, they broke down constantly— burning, blistering, and, if not cleaned and filed down immediately,
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short circuiting the motors. Sprague attacked the problem by taking apart burned out and pitted elements, studying them, trying different bronze and brass alloys in place of the copper bars, moving motor circuits to try to disperse arcing damage, and reengineering the metal brushes that rubbed against them. Nothing substantially improved performance. At one point, desperate to get the problem under control, Sprague had the copper bars ripped out of every motor on the line (“somewhat hurriedly,” he later confessed),50 reequipping them with special bars and commutators of hard cast brass, which seemed marginally less likely to burn out. In fact, Sprague never satisfactorily solved this particular problem. The Richmond brushes had to be checked after every half trip. Worse, because the rough contact bars sheared off the ends of the brushes, material costs climbed. In the thick of development, Sprague later admitted, “we were using about nine dollars’ worth of brass per day.” Paying this kind of operating expense was painful, but as things stood, SERM could not afford not to pay: “the road must be kept in operation somehow,” the inventor maintained, “while other experiments were being made.”51 So the commutator problem remained unsolved. (Subsequent technical refinement on other roads proved the superiority of carbon brushes, a solution pioneered by Charles Van Depoele.) Fortunately, other problems yielded to solution. The team managed, for example, to jury-rig an impressively effective system of overhead contact.The question of how to supply current to the motors was one of the biggest unknowns going into Richmond. Many leading authorities, including Edison, argued that current should flow through the rails. Sprague (like others working on actual systems) rejected this solution, convinced that “third rails” (to borrow
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an anachronistic term) would inevitably cause accidents, undermining popular acceptance of railway electrification. Instead, he favored an overhead system in which a single, small trolley line ran over the center of the track to carry current. It was reinforced by a main conductor and supplied at distribution points by feeders from the central station, with return current flowing through reinforced rails tied into the street mains. The mechanical problem became keeping cars connected to the wire. At first, Sprague outfitted cars with vertical poles, running from the centers of the cars to the line overhead. One of his draftsmen, Eugene Pommer, worked up a better design—an inclined pole that pivoted around a trunion supported over the center of the car, with tension springs holding the trolley wheel against the wire. PRESSURE BUILDS
By late January 1888, after intense work in machine shops at Brown & Sharpe in Rhode Island and the Edison works in Schenectady and repeated trips back and forth to Richmond, Sprague’s team was nearly ready to put cars into regular operation. “I am completely overwhelmed with work,” Sprague wrote a friend on January 15, “so much so that I hardly know whether I stand on my head or on my heels at times.”52 He was racing frantically, but time was already running out: the deadline spelled out by SERM’s contract with the Richmond syndicate slipped by, forcing Sprague and Johnson to renegotiate with Flynn and his partners. That encounter was tense. The two sides met on January 23. The syndicate, which was not yet earning significant revenues, was prepared to take full advantage of the additional leverage it now held. “After more or less sparring,” Sprague reported to Greene, “Johnson
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cut the Gorgian [sic] Knot by asking Flynn bluntly how much he wanted off the contract—just how many dollars—saying he wanted to know just how much we had to carry.”The answer was, a lot. Flynn got the final price for the system knocked down from $110,000 to $92,000. Far more seriously, half of that sum became payable in bonds of the railway rather than cash.53 Sprague griped about the new terms—“about $8,000 more than they would have any moral right to claim,” by his accounting—but he and Johnson were cornered. Everything now depended on getting twenty cars up and running reliably for thirty days (the new condition for payment). “Bend every effort to the equipment of the cars,” Sprague directed Greene; “as regards terms of settlement, keep mum.”54 The company was coming under intense financial pressure. The costs of developing the Richmond system had already outstripped revenues from the motor business. In January, both Sprague and Johnson were forced to take out personal loans, secured by their SERM stock, to keep the project moving forward.55 The next month, local papers in Richmond and New York announced “the opening of the electrical line of the Union Passenger Railway.” This coverage, evidently prepared by Sprague and his colleagues,56 proclaimed that the project was an unqualified success and reported that SERM’s cars were managing grades fully loaded, without sanding the tracks, in wet and icy conditions. Behind the scenes, however, glitches and bugs continued to plague the motors and cars. The commutator problem was giving Sprague’s team “the Devil’s own time,” and cars were frequently jumping the tracks. After the initial, scripted burst of promotion, Sprague advised George Prescott, “I do not want too much publicity to be made of the thing down there yet.”57
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By mid-March, the pressure was growing acute. When Greene reported to Sprague that they had thirteen cars running smoothly, Sprague responded with weary congratulations that betrayed the seriousness of SERM’s condition. “We must get twenty cars moving at the earliest possible moment and keep them there at all hazards,” he implored, directing Greene to “at once cut down every available man that it is in your power to get rid of. . . . Every dollar which can possibly be saved there must be saved, and every bill which you can well avoid any immediate payment of wants to be staved off.” The firm’s finances had reached a crisis point. In a postscript underscoring his anxiety, Sprague added: “DON’T PAY A BILL THAT YOU CAN HELP UNTIL AFTER APRIL 1ST.”58 Fending off creditors, scrounging for operating capital, eking by, SERM made its way into April, when Greene and the team in Richmond at last managed to put twenty cars into regular operation, allowing Sprague to notify the Richmond syndicate that the system’s thirty-day trial was underway.“Of course, it now becomes us,” Sprague wrote Greene, “to have as few accidents that we can avoid as possible.” His nerves were clearly strained. When Greene telegrammed the New York office to “send the new trolleys as soon as possible,” without explaining why, Sprague complained: “A telegram means expedition. . . .We are left to infer that everything has suddenly gone wrong, and that rattles us.”59 A final push saw the trial through. For a grim moment in early May, it looked as though Flynn would claim that the system was still not performing satisfactorily and withhold payment. Sprague fumed, accusing Flynn and the syndicate (the details are murky) of trying to seize the railway’s property from the other investors. By this point, the railway had been collecting fares and carrying passengers for three months,
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the inventor pointed out, earning its investors $18,000. SERM’s cars and motors had averaged nearly eighty miles of operation a day, totaling 11,000 miles carrying 40,000 passengers a week, on average. Clearly on edge, Sprague speculated that Flynn intended “to have all the cars run in except a few, and then publish all over the country that we had failed, and to get the Daft Company to put their machines in.”60 Whatever Flynn may have been up to, on May 15 the Richmond Union Passenger Railway Company formally notified Johnson “of our acceptance of the electrical equipment of the Richmond Union Passenger Railway.”61 SERM had made it up the hill.
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ASSESSING RICHMOND: BEYOND INVENTION
Viewed in historical perspective, the Richmond Union Passenger Railway represented as much a cluster of technical solutions and adaptations as it did a distinct stroke of heroic “invention.” Sprague had not developed all of the technical design, nor had he achieved the technology in a single “eureka!” episode of genius. Sprague had sketched as much of the system as he could on paper, assembled the pieces, and then adapted his ideas in the course of building it out on the ground. As he did so, he had in mind the plans and projects by rival inventors. Certain technical aspects of the system, moreover, continued developing in the aftermath of Richmond, as Sprague and other engineers refined the initial design. Nevertheless, the Richmond project marked a turning point in the evolution of the technology. Sprague had accomplished a formidable feat of technological engineering and a dramatic staging of the innovation. At Richmond,Virginia, Sprague designed, built, and
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sold the first electric railway to operate successfully as a full-scale system. In the process, he established the basic platform architecture— including carriage-mounted motors slung underneath cars on either end “wheelbarrow” style, with series-parallel controllers, current delivered via overhead wires, and tracks forming return circuits—on which future trolley systems would be based for the next hundred years. Most critically, he had assembled the whole as a system—with tracks, power lines, motors, cars, and an extended line of tracks—that operated in the real world of an urban landscape, a community of commuters, and a commercial marketplace. As Nikola Tesla observed nearly half a century later, Sprague had launched “a true pioneering enterprise inaugurating a new epoch.”1 To the extent that any single individual invented electric trolley trains, Sprague did at Richmond. The fact that he had managed to stage the technology so publicly and compellingly, moreover, catalyzed the process of adoption. The installation of a fully operational electric railway system in Richmond conclusively demonstrated the functionality of the technology. Vigorous promotion from Sprague subsequently broke the market wide open. In early 1887, when he had taken on the project, eight electric or partially electrified railways were operating in the United States, running a total of sixty-five cars on some thirty-five miles of track, none of them operating on the scale that Sprague Electric Railway and Motor Company achieved in Richmond. Sprague established definitively that the technology could be made to work on the scale of a full urban system and at a fraction of the operating cost of a horse-drawn railway. Over the next three years, several hundred electric railways began construction in the United States. As the technology spread, however, it outgrew the financial control, proprietary grasp, market management, technical manipulation,
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and cultural meanings of Sprague’s operation at Richmond. What began as (at least in Sprague’s view) a dramatic feat of heroic invention multiplied and ramified. Electric railways became part of a larger industrial and urban landscape and in the process mingled in a confluence of contextual technological meanings. These aspects also form a vital dimension of the history of this technology. CAPITALIZING
In terms of performance and cost of operation, electric railways offered clear advantages to horse-drawn railways. As historian David Nye has pointed out, horse cars were expensive to maintain, requiring multiple animal teams and high upkeep costs. (Horses, Nye observes, “annually ate their value in feed,” needed stable hands, blacksmiths, and veterinarians, and wore out every four years or so.) Moreover, electric cars averaged twenty miles per hour, twice the speed of the horse cars, and extended over wider spans of operation. Cable cars offered a third technological alternative, though they were expensive to build and operate. In short, once Richmond put the new technology on display, astute capitalists could cost out the advantages. Sprague was promoting but not blandishing when he touted Richmond’s numbers. So long as potential streetcar operators could gain access to sufficient capital, innovation made eminent and evident economic sense.2 Sprague and his partners fully expected to exploit the commercial possibilities that their gambit had created. Late in April 1888, with cars running reliably in Richmond, Sprague summoned S. Dana Greene back to New York for a week-long strategy session with Edward H. Johnson and Oscar T. Crosby. “We wish to go over a very great many things looking to future work, which is now going to be
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very largely increased,” Sprague explained, “and we want to get all the combined knowledge and experience of the crowd together.”3 With Richmond under its belt, SERM was apparently poised for breakout success.The time was “ripe,” Sprague wrote, “for this Company to launch forth.” SERM had passed through “the most critical period of its existence, and by reason of its successful fulfilment [sic] of an unprecedented contract, its reputation as the foremost motor company in the country has been fully established.”4 Capitalizing on the opportunity that Sprague had opened, however, created a new round of challenges. SERM was already financially overextended, as were both Sprague and Johnson personally. Later Sprague estimated that the company had absorbed a net loss of $75,000 developing and delivering the Richmond project.5 In January 1888, straining to keep development going, both executives had taken out personal loans for $45,000 and $40,000 respectively, pledging SERM stock as security. Payment from the syndicate covered close to half that sum. Sprague tallied just over $40,000 “in cash and notes” in the company treasury in May, along with $46,000 of Richmond bonds. Meanwhile, “hundreds of thousands of dollars of business are within our reach,” Sprague wrote Johnson,“and we must have capital to push it.”6 Johnson went to work lining up new investors. Edison came in, along with railroad baron Henry Villard: together the two bought up twenty percent of SERM’s common stock (previously unissued) and all of its preferred stock. J. P. Morgan also took a block of common shares. Sprague touted Richmond energetically, whipping up publicity for the project—trying “to boom things,” as he put it—both in the popular press and in electrical and railway circles.7 Inquiries and then orders flowed in: “business is rushing, and increasing all the
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while,” Sprague exulted to his brother in July 1888.8 SERM revenue climbed from just under $30,000 in 1887 (all of that representing only motor sales) to nearly $365,000 in 1888 and $1.5 million in 1889. By the time that SERM had ramped up to peak production a year after Richmond, the company had over 300 machines under order and was delivering them at a rate of four or five a day.9 As the market broke open, the competitive landscape surrounding SERM rapidly reformed. Daft gave way, and Bentley-Knight soon fell behind too. But SERM did not manage to claim the field for itself. A formidable new competitor emerged. Back in January 1888, Charles Van Depoele had approached Sprague and Johnson and offered to sell out to them. With SERM’s hands full, Sprague passed on the offer, letting the Thomson-Houston Electric Company, based in Lynn, Massachusetts, acquire Van Depoele. This development had decisive implications.Thomson-Houston, under the management of Charles A. Coffin, had already battled aggressively for markets in arc lighting, incandescent lighting, and alternating current equipment. Coffin was a fierce and wily competitor, and in getting hold of Van Depoele’s assets he gained control over important electric railway patents, including a critical one for the overhead trolley system.Thomson-Houston went head to head against SERM, fighting for virtually every contract.10 Initially, SERM held its own. Exploiting his first-mover advantage, Sprague secured roughly half of the 200 electric railway projects that went into construction between 1888 and 1890, according to the calculations of historian Harold Passer.11 But Coffin countered with several advantages of his own. His company enjoyed the backing of powerful investors, including Boston financier Henry Higginson, whose sponsorship gave Coffin access to wealthy investors in Boston. This reservoir of capital enabled Thomson-Houston to accept the bonds
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of railway lines as payment for its equipment—a strategy that SERM could not afford.12 Moreover, Thomson-Houston enjoyed powerful political influence in key local markets. The fact that his company’s major investors were well-connected in large northeastern municipalities gave Coffin and his colleagues leverage in securing contracts. By 1889,Thomson-Houston was beginning to overtake SERM. The competitive situation, including both Sprague’s initial advantage and Coffin’s effective counter tactics, played out in microcosm as the two companies battled for the biggest prize in the field—Henry Whitney’s West End Street Railway in Boston, Massachusetts. In 1887, the West End was the nation’s largest urban railway system, running 1,700 cars behind 8,000 horses along more than 200 miles of track.13 The line was bearing heavy operating costs, however, and Whitney was laying plans to convert to a cable system when he heard about the Richmond project and traveled down to Virginia for a visit. Sprague, alert to the opportunity, hurried there to meet Whitney’s party and lead them through a tour of the system. His guests were curious but cautious. The general manager of the West End expressed reservations, wondering how the system would bear up when large numbers of cars bunched up badly—as happened on a daily basis in systems as large as Boston’s.To reassure the railway executives, Sprague prepared a demonstration, assembling twenty-two cars and arraying them in a close-packed row along a section of the line. He had never before tried to start that many cars at once and knew that the load was going to put a serious strain on the system. Pulling the engineer aside and telling him “to load the feeder safety-catches, to raise the pressure to five hundred volts, and to hold on, no matter what happened,” Sprague gave the signal. “Twenty-two motormen started their cars at the end of a section of line designed for four distributed cars,” he
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later recounted. “The lights went down and the potential dropped to about two hundred volts. But it gradually rose, and all the cars were soon merrily running out of reach of signals.”14 Round one to Sprague. Whitney returned to Boston persuaded that the West End should electrify. SERM received a contract to supply equipment. THE DYNAMICS OF ADOPTION
Attracting customers like the West End Railway was essential for SERM’s viability, allowing Sprague to continue developing, marketing, and building out his version of an electric railway system. More generally, the support of capitalists like Henry Whitney played a decisive role in sustaining the momentum behind the technology. Whatever the technical merits of Sprague’s system, eventual adoption ultimately hinged on deeper, largely extrinsic social and cultural factors. Any new technology has to overcome an inherent inertia to gain acceptance. In the case of the electric railway, successful innovation was going to require nothing less than the reconfiguration of existing city and town transit systems and, indeed, geographies.Whether electrifying an existing line or building a new one, installing an electric railway represented a substantial undertaking, entailing complicated political maneuvering as well as expensive investment.15 All of this took the process of developing and further defining the technology increasingly out of Sprague’s hands as the number of electric railway projects multiplied.The company needed customers, but even more basically, the technology needed to attract the support and active agency of financiers, politicians, local operators (the railway companies), and ultimately consumers (the trolley riders) to become
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reality. Sprague’s successful entrepreneurship carried the technology through initial deployment, early commercialization, and the first round of technical refinement. Beyond these steps, though, there was little he could do to make electric railways continue to happen. In the final analysis, adoption overcame technological inertia because electric railways succeeded as social constructions. In this case, the technology and the process of social construction fed into and off of each other.The development of electric railways fit into larger plans and projects. As the effective reach of metropolitan living, working, and commuting expanded, developers perceived and grasped the opportunity to buy property along planned routes, build new swathes of commercial and residential real estate, and sell it off at profit. Coming just as developers were acquiring the financial capacity to put such ambitious projects into effect, the infrastructure technology achieved rapid adoption. Within less than two decades,“walking cities” built electric railways and became what urban historians have referred to as “networked cities.”16 The decision by Whitney and the West End Railway to adopt Sprague’s design underscored how widely dispersed and deeply layered the process of technological adoption became as Sprague set out to drum up customers. Whitney and his partners were by this point tangled in contentious negotiations and fierce competitive struggles with local rivals over whether the West End would be permitted to undertake the construction and extensions that would give the railway comprehensive metropolitan coverage in Boston. All kinds of economic and political interests were in play. Competing lines were trying to block the West End. Existing independent lines were trying to keep it at bay.The construction of (steam-driven) elevated lines in New York City had triggered intense debate in Boston and at the state government level about whether “els” should be erected in the Hub.
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The issue was coming to something of a head by 1888 and 1889 as the implications of Sprague’s accomplishments in Richmond, Virginia, spread. Whitney and the West End had pressing reasons to sponsor and champion Sprague’s work. In public hearings before the Massachusetts state legislature, railway officials, attorneys, and allies marshaled the technological promise of electrification as a lynchpin argument in their bid for public support. Lines had to be remunerative, they argued, or they would fail, abandoning their cumbersome infrastructures to become eyesores and roadblocks embedded in the city. Electrified railways, however (and only electrified railways), would enable the West End and its customers to avoid this fate. Spokespeople for the West End cited statistics (possibly Sprague’s own) indicating that electric railways cut route times in half and carried four times as many passengers as railways driven by existing technologies.17 Ventures such as the West End Street Railway, in other words, mobilized electrification—and in the process both invested in it and promoted it to the general public.Thus, in an afternoon of speeches at “ladies day with the Cambridge Club” in April 1889, Professor Elihu Thomson was brought in to lecture on “Electricity in Harness.” “We speak of electricity as a mysterious power,” Thomson proclaimed, “but before long children will contemplate the works of electricity with as little wonder as they now do the water which flows from our faucets.” Following Thomson, Whitney then addressed the audience, urging political support for the West End’s efforts to secure permission to extend its electrification construction through Cambridge.18 The specific dynamics of electric railway construction varied from locale to locale. One distinctly American aspect of the process that held true in many places across the United States, however (an aspect that probably helped to accelerate adoption), was the privatized context
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of construction. In America, as historians have observed, electric railway construction became projects that were undertaken and therefore driven by private railway companies—capitalized enterprises that either upgraded facilities from horse-drawn omnibus to electric railway equipment or replaced those earlier antecedents with electric alternatives. In Europe, by contrast, municipal-owned lines mediated the process of technological adoption. This distinction had dramatic implications. European municipalities tended to build electric railways slowly, contentiously, and ambivalently after protracted public debate and under relatively tight public regulation. American railways, by contrast, encountered less effective regimens of public regulation and therefore more easily overrode safety concerns or environmental objections. In John McKay’s words: “electrification shot through the American street railway industry like current through a copper wire. Within two short years after Sprague’s Richmond installation, onesixth of all street railway track in the United States was electrified.”19 INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT AND CORPORATE ABSORPTION
Elihu Thomson’s presence beside Henry Whitney at that “ladies day” at the Cambridge Club had not been coincidental. His own company, Thomson-Houston, was also bidding in competition with SERM for work on the West End Railway—and bidding successfully, as things turned out. Exploiting the political leverage that his Boston financiers gave him, Coffin managed to wrest a major piece of the West End project from Sprague. Thomson-Houston “now have about five hundred thousand dollars invested in railway interests,” Sprague wrote Johnson in February 1889 after traveling to Boston and talking to people there. “In New England, and especially in Boston, they have
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exceedingly strong affiliations, and I think it will be necessary to make some deal with them as regards the Boston work.” Indeed, Sprague was strongly urged to consider combining with Thomson-Houston and other players in more general strategic terms.“If they are a party of the combination [along with SERM and the Edison interests], I think we can raise in Boston not less than one million dollars cash for the organization,” Sprague informed Johnson. “It would be a combination of the New York and Boston financial interests with whatever strength can be gained by affiliations. . . . I have been advised in Boston that the very wisest thing for us to do is to make this combination.”20 “Combination,” indeed, was rapidly acquiring compelling strategic logic across the electrical industry.The aggressive arrival of ThomsonHouston signaled the emergence of a new stage of evolution for larger electrical firms. Between 1888 and 1891, Thomson-Houston spent $4 million acquiring competing and adjacent firms, absorbing seven arc lighting and street railway manufacturers (including Van Depoele and the Bentley-Knight Electric Railway Company). Westinghouse also undertook rapid horizontal expansion, moving into incandescent lighting (by acquiring the United States Electric Lighting Company and the Consolidated Electric Light Company) and into arc lighting (by picking up the Waterhouse Electric Light Company). Edison and his financial partners, meanwhile, were preparing to draw together their scattered ventures in a single corporate structure. In April 1889, they combined the Edison Electric Light Company, the Edison United Manufacturing Company, the Canadian Edison Manufacturing Company, and several smaller auxiliary businesses to form Edison General Electric (EGE) Company.21 Behind all of these moves lay the growing recognition that competing in this industry, building out systems, and more generally
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sustaining technological momentum would take both scale and scope. Installing lighting and railway systems and the power stations that were needed to run them required massive amounts of capital. Only by financing their customers could equipment manufacturers like SERM get major projects off the ground. As Sprague found out, electrical manufacturers had to be prepared to accept the bonds of power and railway companies in payment for equipment—which meant being able to transform those bonds into liquid forms of operating capital. In the absence of established markets for these kinds of transactions, the backing of well-connected financiers who were able to tap everlarger resources became crucial, and figures such as Higginson, Villard, and Morgan came to the fore of the industry. This development was momentous—as epochal as the new electrical technologies that it was midwiving. The deepening commitment of figures like Morgan signified profound shifts in the organization of the electrical industry and in the arrangements structuring technology, investment, and business generally. Financiers had been wary observers and dabblers in 1884, when Sprague launched. By 1888, as the electric railway market broke, they were being drawn in to something much larger—a wider migration from investments such as government securities and railroads into industrial ventures. The participation by Morgan, who would soon become the preeminent capitalist of the industrial corporate era, was especially significant. He, his partners, and his clients were beginning to internalize the microeconomic metrics of mass production, mass distribution, and mass marketing. At the same time, they were gaining confidence in the stability of the new electrical technologies that people like Sprague were assembling. At the confluence of these two developments, they were beginning to fashion new techniques (in-
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deed, new technologies) of investing in, managing, owning, and operating industrial enterprise. As business historian Alfred Chandler notes, “the electrical manufacturers . . . were the first American industrialists not intimately connected with the railroads who found it necessary to go to the capital markets for funds in order to build their initial enterprise.”22 Sprague had found himself operating at the epicenter of this seismic shift in both capitalism and the crafting of technology. Through SERM, his engineering created the tools of venturing that he needed to invent.What he did not anticipate was that he was, at the same time, assembling projects that would ultimately require more sophisticated tools of finance and enterprise and more highly articulated and professionally managed solutions for ongoing technology engineering. Like any number of other electrical inventors (Tesla,Van Depoele, or Edison himself), he had scrambled inelegantly and inexpertly for seed capital as he started out. In the process, they had unwittingly created the conditions for an entirely new market for future capital. All of this bore directly on SERM’s viability as a business. The intimations of “combination” that Sprague was receiving by early 1889 rapidly materialized in corporate form. In February, Johnson and Sprague sold off another large block of common stock to the Edison companies. “The trouble with this Company,” Sprague explained to a colleague in the navy who had taken a small share early in the venture,“has always been that it was doing too much work on too small a capital. Perhaps this may be forcibly illustrated by the fact that we have taken a quarter of a million dollars worth of work within the past thirty days.” Drawing the Edison interests more deeply into partnership had raised $400,000, he added, “which is nearly one hundred thousand dollars more than we have heretofore had in our whole history.”23
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At this point, Sprague evidently still thought of the arrangement as an affiliation of distinct companies. But he had turned over what proved to be a fateful degree of financial control.Villard and his backers were creating, in Edison General Electric, an expanded enterprise that would be able to compete in multiple markets against ThomsonHouston, Westinghouse, and any other entrants. What had been a networked, entrepreneurial technological nexus circled by cautious investors was becoming an industry and a corporate marketplace, both financially and technologically. The Edison restructuring rapidly overtook SERM and Sprague. In November 1889, after Sprague returned from an extended stay in Europe, the fact of absorption sank in. Presented with a plan to merge SERM with EGE, he made one last bid to reclaim control. It was too late: “I had hoped to be able to step in and make a counter proposition backed by plenty of capital, to offset the propositions made by the Edison Company,” he wrote an ally. “But the powers on the other side, Drexel, Morgan & Co., together with the uncertain element on which it is important to count, have forced me, practically, to the necessity of accepting their proposition.”24 So financial realities eventually impinged on Sprague, forcing him to acknowledge that he had created something bigger than his limited financial resources allowed him to contain. The invention had outgrown the venture. Ironically, Sprague himself had hastened the process along. The technical solutions that he and his team had assembled in Richmond, Virginia, had expanded the electrical industry substantially. Indeed, the emergence of electrical railways can be said to mark the sector’s coming of age. In historical perspective, the Richmond railway ranks with other foundational electrical systems of the period such as Edi-
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son’s Pearl Street Station (incandescent lighting and direct-current power transmission) and the alternate-current power and lighting system assembled (much more quietly) in Great Barrington, Massachusetts, by William Stanley (working under the sponsorship of Westinghouse) in 1886. All of these pilot projects both developed and staged their respective technologies. Each demonstrated the feasibility of key electrical applications and did so, critically, as working systems rather than single sets of apparatus. Each designed, within a few years of each other, a basic component of larger enterprise opportunities. Sprague, working in close proximity to competitors, had worked his way through a reverse salient and, at the same time, broken open an adjacent market that confronted managers like Coffin and investors like Villard with a new set of strategic permutations. The race to establish platform technologies was quickly narrowing, and as it did, it was replaced by a new race—to gain some measure of control over those technologies and use them, if possible, to check the growth of competing electrical giants. THE ONGOING EVOLUTION OF THE INVENTION
Meanwhile, technical developments on electric railways ensued. Sprague himself continued to refine his designs. In November 1888, a circular informed SERM agents that the company was sending them information on a new motor, “as much in advance to that used in Richmond as the one in Richmond was ahead of everything else in the world at that time.” Scripting a pitch for selling the new motors, the circular explained that “From our experience in Richmond and other cities, we learned many points about electric railroading which was [sic] not known to anybody before that time.” Managing
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to craft language that both celebrated the Richmond invention yet touted the new, improved design, the circular continued: “In fact, we can say, that a year ago it was not in the mind of man to conceive and devise such a machine as we now offer you.The Street-car men were not familiar with electricity; the electrical engineers had not been thoroughly educated in the practical part of street-car work, but in the Richmond road they came together, and this new machine embodies in its mechanical and electrical construction the result of our experience and is a machine that could only be built from such trials and practical workings as we went through in Richmond.”25 The Richmond design had been hastily assembled, leaving a lot of room for improvement. S. W. Huff, who joined the railway in 1890 (fresh out of Cornell University with an improvised degree in electrical engineering), found things there “in wretched condition.” Only “with the greatest difficulty and most strenuous work . . . could [we] keep thirteen [cars] on the road.”The motors’ copper brushes had to be repaired after virtually every run: “A man was kept on the corner in front of the shop and every time a car made a round trip, first one and then the other motor was cut out and the car was run backwards and forwards while he filed the commutator with a coarse file,” Huff related. Other design limitations compounded the effort. In the rush to cobble the motors together, parts had been manufactured without gigs, meaning that the parts were not interchangeable. As Huff put it, “We had been interchanging them with a sledge hammer.”The original motors proved too small, resulting in “the constant burning out of armature and fields” (though replacing them with “Sprague No. 6 motors did subsequently improve performance”). And the windings on the armatures also required constant, expensive attention: “It took five armature winders to keep thirteen cars running.” All told, Huff
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concluded, “we considered ourselves fortunate to keep the required number of cars running regardless of the amount of help or the expenses involved.”26 CULTURAL MEANINGS
As an electrical engineer, Sprague doubtless expected ongoing refinement of his system and perhaps realized that he would not be able entirely to supervise or control the process. But he also tended to conceive of the technology in functionalist terms as a form of transportation. As far as Sprague was concerned, he had “invented” the technology and bequeathed it to its users: it was literally a vehicle. But the vehicle was not ridden passively. As recent historians have pointed out, technology takes form and meaning not only in how it is “delivered” by inventors and engineers but ultimately in how it is “received” by its adopters, commercial investors, promoters, and users. David Nye has taken electric railways as a particularly rich case of this insight.“Riding the streetcar,” he argues,“was not a passive experience, but one that offered a complex bundle of perspectives.” In rearranging urban geographies, the streetcars rearranged urban experience itself.27 Streetcars became emblems for the industrial, expanded urban and suburban communities that they connected and carried.Thus, in novels such as Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle and Theodore Dreiser’s Sister Carrie, electric streetcars figured centrally in describing both the assembly of larger industrial and commercial settings and the social conflict attending that assembly. The plot device was not coincidental, for it located and highlighted the technologies at the heart of the scene. Streetcars, like other emblems of the era, became political arenas in which the meanings of the technology ramified well beyond
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its functional uses and purposes. Sprague did not entirely intend or influence these effects, but he participated in all of them. CLAIMING THE TECHNOLOGY
Both SERM and the technology that the enterprise had been assembled to stage and engineer passed from Sprague’s proprietary grasp. There are several ways to interpret these outcomes. In broad terms, SERM’s fate can be understood as part of a larger set of trends in business and technology. Beginning in the late 1880s, a wave of consolidation and incorporation engulfed American industry. Sprague’s story was typical: a string of entrepreneur-founders gave way to financiers and professional managers during this period as the scope and scale of American industrial activity grew to colossal, corporate proportions. In SERM’s case, the company created a market that it proved unable to exploit. Sprague had unleashed forces that he could not contain or channel. Like other inventor-entrepreneurs from his era, he eventually found himself financially outmaneuvered as the technology he had played a central role in fostering was amalgamated into a larger structure of ongoing corporate development. Figures such as Morgan and Villard were not the kind of investors that tolerated wide-open, technologically free-wheeling market conditions. They were venturing unprecedented amounts of capital in a novel industry, and as the scale of their investments grew, they applied pressure to establish proprietary control over key technologies and bring the industry under some form of control. Within fairly short order, they and the managers they selected to operate their enterprises set up internal capacities to extend, refine, and generate new iterations of proprietary technologies.
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In short, the new corporations quickly moved to assert corporate control over the technologies that they were making and selling and over the process of making new technologies. In addition to being one of the first enterprises to tap capital markets for corporate industrial equity, Edison General Electric was also one of the first to erect a full-scale laboratory dedicated to research and development—and the two developments were not coincidental.28 In the case of the electric railway, the result was a remarkably rapid, thoroughgoing campaign of technological conversion. In 1890, the federal census counted 5,700 miles of horse-car track in the United States, 500 miles of cable-car track, and 1,260 miles of the new electric trolleys. Over the next three years, more than 250 electric railways were incorporated. By 1903, some 30,000 miles of street railway lines were running, 98 percent of them electric. The dramatic overhaul occurred far more rapidly and more comprehensively than, say, the spread of the steam railroad. Indeed, one historian has characterized the conversion to electric railways as “one of the most rapidly accepted innovations in the history of technology.”29 A powerful tidal pull of urbanization helped impel the conversion. It is difficult to imagine that earlier technologies (notably horsedrawn railways) would have been able to bear the burgeoning traffic of the new cities and their satellite communities—the suburbs that were sprouting on their edges. New solutions were needed urgently. Meanwhile, new forms of corporate enterprises were emerging to handle such solutions. As they amassed financial resources and acquired expanding technological capabilities, companies such as EGE both accelerated and were accelerated by social transformations such as urbanization. Alongside mass production and mass distribution, they were learning how to mass-market mass technologies.
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The story of the electric railway thus ramifies: the technology helped shape and was itself shaped by larger social and economic trends. Sprague’s ability to engineer this technology successfully through development and initial adoption, as heroic as it may have felt and been, certainly hinged on any number of nested social circumstances and conditions. There is another way to read the story, however. This technology was not developed in a corporate lab. It came together at the periphery of the industry and was brought into being by means of individual invention that was aligned within a dramatic feat of entrepreneurship. Outside financial interests had abetted but neither entirely sponsored nor corporately controlled the venture. Broad social constructs had created the conditions that made innovation possible. Yet from the inventor’s perspective, the electric railway had sprung from Sprague—imagined and then improvised through design into manifest artifact. Sprague had managed to pull together the resources he needed to develop his technology, stage it publicly, and cultivate its adoption. And all of these accomplishments had played a pivotal role in deciding the specific design of the technology and the initial path and pace of its adoption. For Sprague personally, these latter aspects of the episode reverberated profoundly. The Richmond experience vindicated his faith in the possibilities of heroic invention. This fundamental perception of the event (one that was verified repeatedly by Sprague’s peers and audience) framed his subsequent career, fortifying his sense of himself and fueling successive efforts to reprise the experience. At Richmond, Virginia, Sprague wrote (literally wrote, in the years ahead) a narrative that became itself a substantial motive force that drove future efforts at invention and innovation.
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In May 1888, Sprague wrote a letter to Johnson that opened a revealing window into the personal, psychological dynamics that had driven SERM and the Richmond Union Passenger Railway. The Sprague Electric Railway and Motor Company had emerged from Richmond triumphant, and the company was scrambling to capitalize on the market boom that it had triggered. At this crossroads, poised for breakout, Sprague hoped to persuade Johnson to resign from the Edison companies and cast his lot with SERM. He pulled out all the stops and, in doing so, laid himself bare. Johnson had earned an “enviable position” for himself within Edison General Electric, Sprague allowed, “a position of influence and pecuniary profit.” But as Sprague saw it, the exciting, meaningful work in that field had already been accomplished. “Initiative and independence are largely taken out of your hands,” he pointed out,“by the fact that no important act is performed by you without consultation with one or more committees.” Meanwhile, SERM presented Johnson with what Sprague reckoned was a far more compelling prospect: “you are President of a young, virile, varied and promising company, which stands foremost in the development of a new, varied and wide-spreading industry.”30 The Victorian masculinity that laced Sprague’s language was entirely conventional, but he felt the underlying sentiment deeply. He understood and undertook business as a personal quest. He was a masterful engineer, an incisive inventor, an inveterate builder of businesses—but not an entirely successful manager, in the long run, and certainly not an individual who adapted comfortably to corporate management. He was an entrepreneur by necessity, a venturer by instinct, and, at heart, a swashbuckler and an adventurer-inventor. Such were the forces, outlook, and motivation that fostered this technology and had driven its initial deployment.The role that Sprague
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carved out for himself is complex but vital to understanding the process of innovation in the high-technology economy of the late nineteenth century. In the final analysis, he was not merely a heroic inventor, stereotypically brilliant in the abstract ways of electricity but naïve in the ways of business. Nor was he an industrialist, per se. He was a hybrid figure, a heterogeneous engineer who was able to design the technology and then hammer together a business that was capable of constructing it.This technology “happened,” ultimately, not exactly in the lab or in a corporate marketplace but somewhere in between in a space straddling and connecting the two spheres.The pivotal transformation that carried the technology from blueprint to pilot project to fully operational streetcar line to marketable innovation happened because Sprague managed to cobble together the multiple resources that were needed to translate technology from idea into tangible, local function. More telling was that Sprague’s appetite for heroic invention was not sated. Even as EGE absorbed SERM, Sprague was casting about for new opportunities to flex his “initiative and independence.” He by no means considered himself marginalized. He was determined to find his way autonomously back into the technological ferment for he continued to believe that the forces he was channeling would not, finally, be containable within corporate structures. Future ventures—in electric elevators, mass-transit control systems, and other electrical technologies—would test these assumptions.They would ultimately bear out Sprague’s faith in his continuing relevance as an agent of innovation—and delineate the limits of that relevance. The environment remained highly fluid. Even as the industry consolidated, incorporated, and staffed up internal research and development functions, potent and disruptive invention energies continued to swirl at the edges of technological evolution.
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RESTLESS AND RISING: SPRAGUE AND SPRAGUE ELECTRIC ELEVATOR COMPANY, 1890 TO 1898
Edison’s absorption of Sprague Electric Railway and Motor Company (SERM) left Frank Sprague in limbo. He had staged a new technology, engineering it through the process of commercialization and setting it on course for adoption, and then watched as his venture was folded into an integrated corporate enterprise. Initially, Edison General Electric (EGE) Company maintained SERM as a separate subsidiary and invited Sprague into its executive ranks. Sprague entered EGE in an ambiguous capacity, however. He became a director and member of the subsidiary’s executive committee, but not a manager with any real decision-making authority or influence. In 1890, he found himself caught in an anomalous corporate position, surrounded by ongoing technological development and rapid industry growth and looking for new ways to participate. He had been effectively relegated to the periphery of a field that was still churning with innovation and opportunity. He had earned a respectable amount
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of money, if not exactly a fortune, and a high degree of professional recognition, if not exactly popular fame. Nevertheless, it was not a position in which someone like Sprague could be comfortable. He quickly realized that the corporate managers who had taken control of EGE intended to give him no significant strategic role in the business he had created and only limited opportunities for meaningful technical input. Within six months, he was ready to strike out on his own again. He spent the next eight years throwing himself into a new venture—Sprague Electric Elevator Company (SEEC). At the same time, he continued to search restlessly for a way back into urban electric transportation—the field that he had begun to open but over which he had been unable to assert commercial control. Sprague was thirty-two years old when he emerged from EGE.What lay ahead was a period of intense peaks and valleys that was by turns exhilarating and demoralizing. Between 1890 and 1899, he plunged into another technological challenge and, after years of diligent hustling, built a new business into another busy company. Nevertheless, he alternated during this period between stretches of diffusion, in which he picked at grand projects that seemed to go nowhere, and phases of intense focus in which he continued to engineer effectively and venture resourcefully. His first marriage fell apart. Meanwhile, whether by instinct or necessity or some alchemy of the two in combination, he kept himself on the entrepreneurial edge. His experiences did not completely shatter his faith in his powers of heroic invention. Neither did they entirely bear out that faith. The most prominent work that Sprague accomplished during this period was to adapt his electrical work to designing and developing electric elevators for the new “skyscrapers” that were rising in major cities such as New York and Chicago. As with his work on electric
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railways, the technology’s social context was dynamic.With American cities mushrooming in size, downtowns were becoming much more densely configured. Urban sprawl was radiating outward and upward as well—in the form of buildings that climbed past existing four-, five-, and six-story levels. Other technologies, notably steel-framed building construction techniques, made skyscrapers feasible, creating favorable conditions for the parallel development of another technological reverse salient. Electric elevators, which promised more efficient, less costly, and safer operation than existing steam and hydraulic counterparts, looked like an idea whose time was arriving.1 The situation bore all the appearances of offering another shot at “the great achievement that will next come to the surface” (to borrow, again, the phrasing that Electrical World had employed to anoint electric railways in the early 1890s). Sprague’s efforts to assemble and deploy the new technology and thereby lay claim to “inventing” electric elevators proved to be considerably more problematic, however, and the outcome distinctly ambiguous. Electric elevators did indeed represent an emergent technology that was on the cusp of development and deployment. But Sprague struggled to marshal the resources that were necessary to commercialize the innovation in business form and to usher in a dramatic round of technological adoption. The accomplishment of invention proved to be accordingly elusive. This technology proved to be far more difficult to stage and thus to engineer than electric railways had been. SPRAGUE WITHIN EDISON GENERAL ELECTRIC
The formation of Edison General Electric Company from several existing Edison companies signaled the maturing of the electrical industry.
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A new set of corporate contours was taking form. Shaky ventures that were based on untested technologies had opened markets; several rounds of shakeout had identified viable platform technologies and winnowed the competitive field; and diversified, integrated electrical manufacturers (including Thomson-Houston and Westinghouse) were massing by the late 1880s. In response, Edison and his financial backers restructured their operations, drawing together the various overlapping ventures that they had launched (the loosely affiliated manufacturing companies, for example, that actually assembled equipment) and acquiring parallel businesses to fill out their product line. Edison’s control of Sprague Electric Railway and Motor Company represented a particularly important piece of the whole; SERM’s orders for motors comprised nearly two-thirds of the work in the Edison machine works at the time. Inevitably, the next step was to mesh the separate units. Within a year of acquiring SERM in 1890, EGE announced plans to consolidate operations among its various units, including manufacturing functions and selling agencies.2 Inside these tightening corporate confines, Sprague quickly grew uncomfortable. He was still deeply invested in SERM, psychologically if not financially, and wary from the start about whether the business he had brought into EGE was going to be nurtured by its new parent company. In January 1890, he sent a long, carefully composed letter to Henry Villard, a principal financial power behind the formation of the new electrical colossus, laying out a series of “suggestions concerning the future conduct of the business.” Sprague started out by assuring Villard that he appreciated that SERM was “now a department of the Edison General Company, and must be conducted under their general fiscal policy, and in accordance with their general business schemes.” Nevertheless, Sprague argued that the subsidiary
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should retain a degree of autonomy. In particular, he argued that it would be a mistake to dismantle the network of agents who had been selling his railways. The agents, he reasoned, had “spent a large amount of time in establishing their offices, and exploiting their territory. They have a knowledge of the local conditions, of the personality of railway people, and oftentimes of local officials, which is invaluable.” The railway business, Sprague insisted, was “a class of work requiring special attention.”3 Building on this thought, Sprague urged that the subsidiary be put in the hands of its own senior-level management. “This Company has suffered seriously from the lack of an Executive Head who was free to give his entire time to its affairs,” he maintained. The business was still dynamic and fluid; it “has not yet settled down to that steady going demand for standard material which means the simple supplying of orders which come in, without exertion.” Competition in the industry was intense, Sprague observed, and SERM’s rivals were proving resourceful and aggressive. EGE should be protecting its railway and motor patents more actively, forcefully prosecuting infringements. Perhaps an executive board, dedicated specifically to the railway business, should be formed. In any event, Sprague expressed misgivings about giving Edison manager Samuel Insull supervision of the unit: “Mr. Insull, in his present position, is judge and jury of his own work, with no authority over him, and no power superior to his. What this Company [meaning, SERM] needs is some one to give it full time and service.” The subtext was clear: Sprague was concerned about what was happening to SERM and beginning to feel personally disconnected from it. Over the coming months, he grew more unsettled. In April, Sprague wrote to SERM’s board complaining that Thomson-Houston
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was ignoring agreements that it had struck with SERM about pricing and market allocation and was setting up rigged bids via a proxy company.4 He also warned that Westinghouse was preparing to enter the railway market. The Pittsburgh interlopers had already enlisted former SERM talent, including H. Harding and several sales representatives.5 A few days later, Sprague wrote the directors again with a follow-up report. Having done a little poking around, he had learned that Westinghouse had attracted Harding and a particularly effective sales agent who was well-connected in the western territories “by offer of large salary and stock interests.” As far as Sprague could tell, the company had developed no motors of its own, its new circulars notwithstanding. Nevertheless, he predicted that Westinghouse was “going to sell everything on promises, about $500.00 under our own prices,” adding that Harding was vigorously wooing former SERM agents (whom EGE had cut loose).6 These developments were worrisome. Far more troubling was Sprague’s inability to stir up what he felt was an appropriate level of urgency within EGE. Whatever his title, it soon became inescapably clear that Sprague was not going to gain admittance to EGE’s inner circle, where real strategic authority now lay. He found himself occupying an office that called for a manager, not an inventor or engineer, and that under the new scheme of organization was empty: “a sinecure, carrying with it neither authority nor influence in the management of its affairs, but yet as restrictive in the obligations imposed as if it were an active office.” Worse, the position gave Sprague no opportunity to continue inventing, and as far as Sprague could see, EGE did not seem committed to sustaining its technological lead.The subsidiary’s technical committee rarely met, no workshop or laboratory had been set up for “experimental work,” and EGE management seemed
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content with the “present state of apparatus.” On June 7, Sprague tendered his resignation as SERM’s vice president.7 Sprague’s frustration was not entirely of his own making. His restlessness within EGE stemmed from the undefined nature of the position that he held within the company, and this status reflected EGE’s ambivalence about the role that figures like Sprague were supposed to hold in enterprises like the one that Edison General Electric was becoming. Sprague sensed that he did not fit in at EGE, and indeed, he did not. Although EGE was a technology company, its managers were still figuring out how to strategically and structurally configure a capacity for continuous technological innovation. The concept of R&D, as later generations of executives and engineers at GE and likeminded enterprises would know the term, was still coalescing. EGE’s managers were just beginning to realize that they not only had to “do something about” but in fact to “do something with” figures like Sprague. But what? Answers to this question were starting to emerge by 1890. In 1875, the Pennsylvania Railroad made the unprecedented move of hiring a doctor of chemistry onto its staff.The following year, Edison set up shop at Menlo Park, New Jersey, creating a full-fledged industrial laboratory, albeit one that was independent of any particular enterprise or industry. Bell Telephone went some way toward internalizing the impulse several years later in 1883, when the company established an experimental shop. Sprague was not in a position to appreciate the fact, but he passed through EGE right on the cusp of a larger industry transformation. As far as Sprague was concerned, resignation from executive office did not entirely sever his ties with EGE. Several people within the company persuaded him to accept, somewhat reluctantly, a less formal
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status as consultant, for which he received an annual salary in return for giving EGE first right of refusal on his inventions. After agreeing to this, Sprague retreated from the scene and took another trip to Europe. The final, definitive break with EGE came soon after he returned. In early December 1890, Sprague learned that the corporation was removing his name from its motors and marketing them under Edison’s name. Deeply wounded, he fired off a long, bitter letter in which he resigned from the company and castigated its management. EGE circulars “known by every railway man in this country to be untrue” claimed credit for developing his motor technologies, Sprague complained. Announcements at professional meetings heralded the “Edison Company” as “the pioneer of electric railway work.” The product once known as “The Standard Sprague Stationary Motor” was now being marketed as the “Old Style Edison Motor.” Sprague had even picked up rumors “that word has been sent to certain publishers that in discussing electric railway matters Mr. Sprague’s name must be suppressed” on threat of losing EGE’s advertising spending. In short, Sprague fumed, “The Edison fetich [fetish] must be upheld, the Sprague name must be abolished; that is the law.”8 Contending with increasingly formidable competition, EGE’s move to brand its product line represented straightforward business logic, particularly if the brand could lend some of Thomas Edison’s incandescence to the rest of EGE’s product line. Sprague may have been overreacting, in other words, to what was a marketing strategy, not a personal attack. But from Sprague’s point of view, the shift in policy was deeply personal. His name was at stake, literally. Sprague had put everything on the line to make SERM happen and had done so above all to establish his professional reputation.That name on those motors
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represented his claim to having accomplished heroic invention. He identified with the technology; it identified him. And now his name was being erased. Sprague closed his resignation with aloof resolve but with words that fairly quivered with indignation. “Family quarrels are undignified, and covert attacks are cowardly,” he wrote. “I do not care to be mixed up in the former, and I will not remain quiet under the latter. I neither fear Mr. Edison’s criticism nor seek his approval. He is indebted to me quite as much as I can possibly be to him. If any attack on me is advisable or necessary let it be made in a manly and open fashion. I am able to reply to it as befits my reputation and dignity.”9 ENGINEERING RICHMOND AS NARRATIVE
First, there was his historical legacy to protect. In the course of promoting their electric railway, Sprague and SERM had generated considerable press as the Richmond Union Passenger Railway system went into operation. In 1891, Sprague took the next step, beginning to craft Richmond as a public, historical narrative—a fable of heroic invention that would secure his identification with the technology. “The commercial history of the electric railway is well known,” he recounted in 1891, addressing the National Electric Light Association, “while, perhaps, some of the inside history of it you do not know.” Sprague went on to describe his experience as a U.S. Navy midshipman who was stationed with the Asia squadron, his return to the United States and tenure with Farmer and Wallace (he pointedly did not mention the subsequent period in Edison’s employ), and, at length, his adventures in Richmond,Virginia.10 Sprague was an engaging, effective raconteur. Here as in later versions, he adopted a nontechnical, colorful tone, stressing “the inside
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difficulties with which we had to deal in the history of the electric railway enterprise, and the amount which it was necessary to conceal from the general public.” Specific anecdotes included his first encounter with the grades that the railway would have to scale (“My heart fell within me, and I said, ‘It is utterly impossible for any car to climb that hill’”) and the summoning of the “instruments” (mules) that rescued the cars after their initial ascent. Sprague played up the drama of the story (“I said to the foreman, ‘We have met the worst obstacle I have ever seen, in Richmond. We have got 60 cars we are under contract to run. If we fail there it will delay the electrical development in this country. . . . I have got everything at stake. My associates have got every dollar at stake. The road has got to go, and go it must’”). Although in technical formats (his Exhibition report, for example, which is discussed in chapter 1) his discourse conveyed a strong streak of technological determinism, when telling the Richmond story Sprague stressed the obstacles that he overcame, the improbability of success, and the vital influence that he believed individual heroics played in the outcome. “I think that people would have looked on electric railways as out of the question,” he recounted in 1891, “if they had known of the straits we were going through.”11 Sprague would tell and retell the Richmond story in coming years, embellishing the account with more details and further popularizing the story by pitching it to broader audiences in mainstream formats. Already in 1891, however, the essential components of the narrative were solidifying. Sprague’s account stressed the role of the inventor as an agent of innovation. He tied the fate of the technology to that of the enterprise that became the instrument of its adoption. And he stressed not just the technical design of the invention but its staging
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as a commercial prospect as the pivotal shift in its technological success. He constructed the innovation as a drama of staging. A FREE AGENT
Even before he broke with EGE, Sprague had been searching for ways to reenter the innovation arena and get back to inventing. As he let SERM go, he had secured formal release from any obligation to turn over future inventions to EGE (as he had been bound to do for SERM)—a stipulation that he argued left him “free in the matter of invention,” despite the fact that he was still an officer of EGE when he made the claim.12 By 1891, Sprague was an entirely free agent, ready and anxious to find new projects. These projects took several forms. Sprague formed an engineering consulting firm with two colleagues, Louis Duncan and Cary T. Hutchinson. He also undertook an experimental project for Henry Villard (who was himself growing disenchanted with EGE’s management), designing and building a massive electric locomotive that was capable of pulling freight trains and long-haul passenger trains. This sixty-ton, 1,000 horsepower behemoth came together relatively smoothly and performed encouragingly. Unfortunately, Villard’s finances collapsed before the locomotive could enter active service. It lay idle on a siding for several years before being sold for scrap. Another project that was closer to Sprague’s heart was his growing conviction that the future of public transportation for major metropolitan areas, and particularly New York City, lay in the development of electrified underground rail networks. Sprague unveiled his ideas in a series of public papers in the early 1890s. After an initial
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blueprint in 1890 failed to generate interest, he issued a public announcement offering to build and install a pair of electric trains on the Manhattan Elevated Railway and to electrify a section of the line at his own expense. If the new equipment failed to perform, Sprague grandly declared, he would absorb the costs himself.13 That gesture had worked before, in Richmond, Virginia, and it would work again. But it failed to impress Jay Gould or the other directors of the Manhattan Elevated. Sprague’s design was visionary and, as things eventually turned out, prophetic. At the same time, the prospect of installing an actual railway raised imposing logistical, technical, and financial problems. Sprague’s impassioned advocacy made no apparent headway. THE ELEVATOR OPPORTUNITY
Meanwhile, another project caught Sprague’s interest during this fitful period, one that quickly acquired more substantial form. In 1889, George F. Steele, a local SERM sales agent, heard that a young engineer named Charles Pratt had designed and installed an elevator that was driven by an electric motor in the Tremont House in Boston. Steele passed the information along to Sprague, who alerted EGE. An MIT graduate in mechanical engineering, Pratt had worked as an assistant superintendent for a Boston sugar refinery and then as an engineer for the Whittier and Otis elevator companies. His apparatus was innovative and, at least on paper, technically sound: Pratt rigged a horizontal sheave elevator, using an electric motor to drive a crosshead along an ordinary nut and screw. Unfortunately, once installed, the machine did not work particularly well, largely because Pratt
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knew less about electric motors than he did about elevator mechanics. Eventually, the Tremont House had the elevator removed, and EGE passed on investing any money in the idea. Sprague remained intrigued with its possibilities, though.14 The idea of using electric motors to power elevators was not in itself novel. Siemens had exhibited a system at the Paris Exhibition in 1881, for example. Indeed, Sprague’s own motors had already been bent to this purpose: In the 1880s, SERM motors had been installed at various sites, including a freight lift in the Pemberton Mills at Lawrence, Massachusetts, another to hoist building materials for the construction of the state capitol building in Topeka, Kansas, and another to serve a mine in Colorado. Pratt’s drive mechanism, however, added sophisticated and versatile refinements to the device’s basic principle. Earlier iterations had been relatively crude, successfully lifting and lowering platforms and cars but doing so in a slow, lurching fashion that would never suit, for example, passenger elevators in one of the new ten- or twelve-story “skyscrapers” that were beginning to rise in large cities like New York. Pratt’s design, on the other hand, if meshed with a motor and a control system that were properly adapted to the purpose, could be made to stop and start smoothly at precise locations while traveling up and down at rapid rates. Looking over the apparatus, Sprague decided that the architecture had potential. He introduced Pratt to Edward H. Johnson, and the three began laying plans to collaborate. Drawing on venture funding initially provided by Sprague himself (he later estimated he put $50,000 into the venture during this first phase),15 the team built its first experimental model in Sprague’s laboratory at 23rd Street in New York. By fall 1891, they were undertaking their first commercial installation in the Grand Hotel at 31st St. and Broadway.
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REFINING THE TECHNOLOGY
Technical problems emerged as the partners refined and reengineered Pratt’s basic system design. In particular, the control systems that Sprague had developed to operate his trolley cars required substantial modification to smooth out motor starts and stops. Working closely with Pratt, Sprague eliminated a centrifugal clutch and brake mechanism that Pratt had connected to a double spur gear and instead mounted the motor directly on the end of the elevator’s screw shaft. Sprague also added an improved control mechanism, employing a pilot motor to operate a rheostat to govern the flow of electricity to the motor. In addition, he designed a much more elaborate set of resistance grids. Thus modified, the motor controls operated more smoothly, although the new grids burned out frequently and increased stress on the controllers, making them prone to burning and pitting.16 As Sprague and Pratt’s various technical contributions coalesced, the result was an elevator that combined the features of both horizontal and vertical machines. At this early stage, the partners adopted and only slightly adapted the existing lifting apparatus that was employed by existing hydraulic elevators (with hoisting cables wound around multiplying sheaves, running up to the top of the shaft, over a second set of sheaves, and down to the car). While Sprague and Pratt refined their design and worked out operational kinks, the Grand Hotel pressed to open the elevators to passenger traffic.With some misgivings, Sprague agreed. Everyone grew more sober, however, in October, when a car carrying six passengers overrode systems controls and sank suddenly to the basement. No one was hurt, but a team of visiting inspectors from a prominent New York
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architectural firm was on site when the accident occurred and was invited to participate in the subsequent investigation. It turned out that the elevator’s operator had slammed the motor from full speed in one direction to full speed in the other, disarranging the safeties.The inspectors were able to report that backup systems had prevented serious injury even after the main system had malfunctioned. Meanwhile, Sprague and Pratt, after considerable trial and error, worked their way through the problem of resistor burnout and controller failure. The critical breakthrough came when Sprague suggested, on an impulse, that the team rig up a cast iron set of resistors, which performed reliably and proved durable. Other technical problems also gave way. By December, Sprague was convinced that they had worked out the kinks and were ready to develop a full-scale system. It was now time to formalize the company, too. In a series of agreements made in December 1891 and January 1892, Pratt sold his patents to Sprague for a nominal fee, Sprague returned the favor, and both assigned relevant patents and inventions to a new entity, the Sprague Electric Elevator Company. Sprague was back in business.17 ENGINEERING ELECTRIC ELEVATOR TECHNOLOGIES: STRATEGIC CONTEXT
In many respects, the effort to engineer electric elevator innovation— that is, to overcome technological inertia and to assemble an enterprise capable of commercializing the invention, including marketing and promoting the innovation—paralleled Sprague’s development of the electric railway. In both cases, he needed to design and exhibit new electrical technologies to establish them as standard platforms for motive power.With SEEC as with SERM, he was beginning with
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unproven ideas and unbuilt designs. Moreover, Sprague would attempt to establish the elevator company much as he had his motor company—by taking on a high-profile, bet-the-company project. He would try to catalyze the process of technological adoption, in other words, by staging the technology as an invention and a venture. He now was equipping vehicles that moved vertically, not horizontally, but Sprague was not entering entirely unfamiliar territory as he launched his second major company. In several important respects, however, the circumstances surrounding the elevator venture were unfamiliar. First, Sprague was entering a different competitive landscape, both commercially and technologically. Establishing a position in the street railway market had entailed displacing a technology that was defended by scattered and unorganized traditional suppliers (the various teamsters working horsedrawn railways, essentially) and contending against competitors (other electric railway manufacturers) who were also trying to develop businesses that were capable of operation on a national scope. When he ventured into the elevator market, on the other hand, he was taking on a handful of well-entrenched companies—the manufacturers of hydraulic elevators—who operated businesses of imposing scale, held strong leverage on the market, and had honed ruthlessly effective competitive tactics. Specifically, he was challenging the Otis Elevator Company. Otis’s partners had spent the 1880s consolidating a commanding grip on the industry through an intricate network of alliances and overlapping stock purchases (some open, others covert). Sprague was entering a market that was already an oligopoly and in the process of transforming itself into a classic late-nineteenth century trust.18
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He was in for a fierce fight. Against Otis’s imposing advantages, Sprague could claim to offer a new technology that outperformed the hydraulic systems that Otis provided. Still, taking on this colossus required attracting substantial capital to back the technology, and that imperative ran up against another strategic circumstance. Sprague’s timing was dreadful. In 1893, just as he and his team were assembling their breakthrough showcase project, the nation plunged into economic depression.Within a matter of weeks, hundreds of banks failed, and by the end of the year, 14,000 businesses had gone under. Finances everywhere grew strained or snapped altogether. Even General Electric Company, the corporate giant formed in the merger of EGE and Thomson-Houston in 1892, nearly collapsed. It was the worst depression the nation had ever experienced, and it mired technology capital and investment in particular for four long years. Sprague was coming to market, financially speaking, at the worst possible time for a new technology venture. Simply holding SEEC together through this crisis pressed him, his partners, and their fledgling enterprise to their limits well after Sprague had demonstrated the essential soundness of his elevator systems. SEEC’s counterbalancing assets, on the other hand, were not insubstantial. With SERM, Sprague had been starting from scratch. Now he had resources at his disposal. He had connections on which to draw, both for seed capital and for technical talent. He also had a store of personal funds to underwrite his startup costs, and this modest pool of operating capital proved critical. And there were his less tangible assets—the confidence and public status that Richmond had conferred and Sprague’s belief in the possibility of heroic invention. In the difficult years ahead, if Sprague ever doubted that he would
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overcome the opposition of “the hydraulic trust” and the collapse of the technology sector, he never admitted it. In any event, he could not have known what was in store when he launched SEEC. “I have got a magnificent machine,” he declared to one correspondent inquiring about investing, “and it is going to be a success.”19 The claim was a pitch that was made to attract financial backers. But the expansive sense of opportunity that underlay it was both infectious and, in Sprague’s case, instinctive. Flush with the confidence that he was on the verge of staging a revolutionary new technology, Sprague touted the coming of electric elevators as a bountiful business opportunity. No less than 4,000 elevators (most of them steam-powered or hydraulic) were operating in New York City alone, he estimated, and probably ten times that figure in the United States as a whole. Meanwhile, the spread of electric power stations (750 of them up and running, by his count) had brought a remarkable new means of motive power to this potential market. The electric machines that he and Pratt had designed matched or exceeded existing steam-powered and hydraulic elevators in performance, Sprague claimed, while taking up far less space within buildings, occupying footprints a fraction as big as their bulky counterparts. Moreover, Sprague assured potential investors, the technology was already proven: the Grand Hotel installation was running smoothly twentyfour hours a day.20 On the basis of these assumptions, SEEC’s founding partners devised a financial plan that envisioned liberal prospects. They capitalized the company at $1 million, apportioned in 10,000 shares valued at $100 apiece. Of these, 4,550 shares were allocated among the partners, with Sprague receiving the lion’s share in recognition both of the value of the patents that he contributed and the seed capital
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that he had already invested in the venture. A second block of 4,550 shares was placed in the treasury to be sold for operating capital.The balance, 1,000 shares, was placed in trust in the treasury to be sold at par or above should more operating capital be needed. By Sprague’s reckoning, proceeds from the initial stock sale, $200,000 of which was to be called in by May 1, 1893, should cover the costs of producing “at least 100 high duty elevators per annum.”21 That was the plan. Within months, however, the national financial picture had darkened dramatically. In April 1893, the gold reserves held by the U.S.Treasury fell below $100 million, triggering a financial panic.The successive failures of several major industrial businesses triggered chain-reaction collapses in a string of banks in the American west and south and then in New York City, convulsing money markets. The worst depression that the American economy had ever experienced hit Sprague’s infant venture like a tidal wave. The timing could not have been worse. In anticipation of proceeds from SEEC’s first round of stock sales, Sprague had ordered an elaborate and expensive collection of machinery for the company shop (then located on West 30th Street in New York). He was tooling up to develop and install an elevator project that would establish the supremacy of electric elevators conclusively and put SEEC on the map. STAGING THE TECHNOLOGY: THE POSTAL TELEGRAPH BUILDING
Sprague’s basic strategy for wedging open the elevator market and deploying his technology was to try to reprise the gambit that had gotten SERM off the ground and an electric railway assembled on a public stage—to build a high-profile system on speculation, taking on
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whatever risk had to be incurred to create the opportunity to prove the technology. He would bet the company, if necessary, to build a showcase. His opening came in the form of the Postal Telegraph Building, a new fourteen-story skyscraper rising at the intersection of Murray Street and Broadway in New York City in 1892. Learning of plans to erect the building, Sprague approached the building committee and its architect, George E. Harding, to propose that they consider installing SEEC’s electric elevators. Other potential clients might have been reluctant to entrust such a vital and potentially dangerous aspect of a building to a largely untested technology. In the coming months, many of the architects and building committees that Sprague approached opted for more familiar alternatives. But in the case of the Postal Telegraph Company—the new building’s lead occupants—Sprague was addressing a technology company, and the suggestion that its building should embody state-of-the-art technologies won him a sympathetic hearing. Harding and his team conducted what Sprague described as “an exhaustive examination of the Twenty-Third Street and Grand Hotel Elevators”22 and awarded the contract to SEEC. “The contract with the Postal Telegraph people is a good one,” Sprague assured his brother a few days later. “I never had a more pleasant and satisfactory interview and the contract was closed without any competition.” At the same time, he admitted that he had accepted a high degree of risk to make the deal happen. The contract called on SEEC to install six elevators—four local (or “way”) and two express cars. The system was to match hydraulic elevators “in smoothness and steadiness of operation, and [be] equal or superior . . . in smoothness of starting and stopping.” It also had to match hydraulic counterparts in speed, capacity, safety, and ease of control, while
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operating on a smaller footprint for less maintenance. In other words, SEEC had had to guarantee in contractual language all of Sprague’s promotional claims. Half of the contract fee, $36,300, became due on delivery of elevator machinery to the building, another quarter on installation, and the balance “when the elevator has been running satisfactory for thirty days.”23 Sprague had learned at least one lesson from Richmond: he would collect some of the payment in the middle of the project and not be held hostage to the client’s good will. But the undertaking was bold, even so: “To clinch the matter quickly, it being the first contract,” Sprague revealed to his brother, “I guaranteed that if we didn’t supply a satisfactory elevator service we would put in a hydraulic instead.”24 He had negotiated a project through which he could stage the technology. Collecting a small team of engineers and assistants, Sprague and Pratt intensified development, tooling machinery and beginning to produce the multitude of parts (most of which had to be designed and manufactured from scratch, tested, redesigned, and tested again) that were going to make up the nuts and bolts of the system. They had already designed and built several elevators by this point—the experimental one in their shop and the Grand Hotel elevator. The Postal Telegraph Building project was a much bigger and more intricate system, however, entailing six elevators (compared to just one in the Grand Hotel) and a host of new engineering problems and solutions. The Postal Telegraph installation went relatively smoothly, technically speaking.The development team, led by Sprague himself, labored hard, encountering setbacks and sometimes struggling to overcome them. But they worked in an atmosphere that was less crisis-prone than the one that had enveloped Richmond. Delays occasioned by
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structural problems in the building’s foundations, moreover, created a welcome grace period before SEEC was able to actually install cars and beginning running them experimentally between floors.25 One terrifying episode punctuated progress early in the installation process. As soon as the team had finished rigging cables for the first express elevator and hooked up the car’s motor and controller, Sprague ran the car down to the basement and invited his colleagues aboard for a ride. Most of the team climbed aboard, and Sprague hit the lever. The car rose on command, rapidly attaining its maximum speed, reached the top floor, and kept rising. Sprague frantically worked the control lever, but the motor failed to respond: the contacts had welded themselves together, and he had lost control.“There flashed a vision,” he later remembered, “of heading into the overhead sheaves at 400 feet a minute, the snapping of the cables, then a foursecond, fourteen-story free drop . . . with a tangled mass of humanity and metal the object of a coroner’s inspection.” Fortunately, a technician who had stayed behind in the basement noticed that the hoisting mechanism had run to its full limit and, acting impulsively, opened the master switch, bringing the elevator far above to a halt. That incident ended travel on the cars until safety circuits had been installed and tested. STEERING THROUGH THE STORM
Even