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ENGAGEMENT WITH NORTH KOREA
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ENGAGEMENT WITH NORTH KOREA A Viable Alternative
Edited by
SUNG CHULL KIM AND
DAVID C. KANG
The publication of this work was supported by the Academy of Korean Studies of the Republic of Korea (AKS-2008-CD-4003).
The Korea Foundation has provided financial assistance for the undertaking of this publication project. Published by
State University of New York Press, Albany © 2009 State University of New York All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher. For information, contact State University of New York Press, Albany, NY www.sunypress.edu Production, Eileen Meehan Marketing, Anne M. Valentine Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Engagement with North Korea : a viable alternative / edited by Sung Chull Kim and David C. Kang. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4384-2779-9 (hardcover) 1. Korea (North)—Foreign relations. 2. Nuclear nonproliferation—Korea (North) I. Kim, Sung Chull, 1956– II. Kang, David C. (David Chan-oong), 1965– JZ1748.E64 2009 327.5193—dc22
2008051368 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
CONTENTS
List of Figures and Tables Acknowledgments ONE
Introduction: Engagement as a Viable Alternative to Coercion Sung Chull Kim and David C. Kang
vii ix
1
PART I INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION TWO
Waiting to Reap the Final Harvest: U.S. Engagement Policy to Denuclearize North Korea Youngshik D. Bong
23
THREE
Looking East: China’s Policy toward the Korean Peninsula 47 Fei-Ling Wang
FOUR
Japan’s North Korea Policy: The Dilemma of Coercion Jung Ho Bae and Sung Chull Kim
73
FIVE
Russia and North Korea: The Dilemma of Engagement Leszek Buszynski
99
SIX
The Political Economy of North Korea’s External Economic Relations Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland
119
PART II INTER-KOREAN DIMENSION SEVEN
The State-Business Coalition for South Korea’s Engagement with North Korea Sung Chull Kim
147
vi EIGHT
NINE
TEN
ELEVEN
CONTENTS Business Advances to North Korea as Outward Foreign Direct Investment Eun Mee Kim and Yooyeon Noh
173
From Charity to Partnership: South Korean NGO Engagement with North Korea Edward P. Reed
199
North Korea’s South Korea Policy: Tactical Change, Strategic Consistency Charles K. Armstrong
225
Conclusion: Engagement in 2007 and Beyond David C. Kang
245
Editors and Contributors
255
Index
261
PREFACE
vii
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 6.1 Observed Commercial Merchandise Trade
121
Figure 6.2 Total Current Account Credits and Debits
133
Figure 6.3 North Korean Current Account Balance
134
Figure 6.4 North Korea Balance of Payments Statistical Discrepancy 135 Figure 6.5 Ratio of Balance of Payments Transactions to Licit Merchandise Exports
137
Figure 6.6 South Korean and Chinese Official Support
138
Table 1.1 Each Country’s Strategy of Engagement with North Korea
10
Table 4.1 Main Agreement Points at the 2002 Summit
81
Table 4.2 Different Positions at the Working Group Meeting in Hanoi, March 2007
92
Table 6.1 Partner Country Share of North Korean Commercial Trade
122
Table 6.2 Total Humanitarian Assistance, by Donor Organization
128
Table 6.3 Foreign Direct Investment in North Korea
130
Table 6.4 North-South Noncommercial Trade: South Korean Perspective
131
Table 8.1 Worldwide Distribution of South Korea’s OFDI
176
Table 8.2 Sectoral Distribution of South Korea’s OFDI, 2005
177
Table 8.3 Why South Korean Firms Choose to Invest Abroad
177
Table 8.4 Inter-Korean Trade and Commission-based Processing Trade, 1989–2006
182
Table 8.5 Overall Statistics of Inter-Korean Economic Transactions
185
Table 8.6 The Three Stages of the Plans for the Kaesong Industrial Complex
190
vii
viii
FIGURES CONTENTS AND TABLES
Table 8.7 Production in the Kaesong Industrial Complex
191
Table 8.8 Comparative Factor Prices in Kaesong, China, and South Korea
193
Table 9.1 Typology of Humanitarian NGOs Providing Assistance to North Korea
204
Table 9.2 South Korean NGO Matching Fund Allocations, 2000–2006.11
205
Table 9.3 South Korean Governmental and NGO Aid to North Korea, 1995–2006
208
PREFACE
ix
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This volume is the product of two conferences: one at the Hiroshima Peace Institute on December 11–12, 2006, and the other at the Center for Korean Research at Columbia University on June 8–9, 2007. We editors particularly appreciate the total cooperation of all contributors, especially for their cooperation on writing the papers and revising them at least three times. Their conscientious scholarship and diverse expertise highlighted the complex engagement with North Korea in the context of the interface between domestic politics, bilateral relations, and multilateral relations. Their contributions are not limited to exploring dilemmas of engagement, caused by divergent national interests between related countries, but extend to examining the ways and means for achieving progress in the positive inducement of North Korean cooperation. We editors should note that Stephen Haggard was not only a chapter contributor but also a critical reader of the introductory chapter and that Charles Armstrong kindly facilitated the New York conference, failing which it would otherwise have been difficult to invite certain scholars from North America. Along with the paper contributors, the following scholars made the debates at the conferences fruitful in one way or another: Peter H. Gries, Daniel Pinkston, Jong Chul Park, Suk Lee, Hiroshi Nakanishi, Chien-min Chao, Scott Snyder, Hyeong Jung Park, Joel Wit, and Arman Grigorian. Furthermore, we would like to note the project’s intellectual debt to Samuel S. Kim, Wada Haruki, Tun-jen Cheng, Edward Friedman, Kenneth Quinones, James Clay Moltz, Hazel Smith, Motofumi Asai, Haru Fukui, and finally but not least Byoung Yong Lee. All chapter contributors, as well as editors, benefited from two anonymous reviewers’ invaluable suggestions and comments for the improvement of the volume as a whole. We are thankful to many people who have been involved in the preparation of the conferences and in the production of this volume: the project assistant Jun Kajihama did an admirable job in the administration and coordination of the conferences; Michiko Yoshimoto, Yuko Otsuki, and Janet Jun kindly assisted the conferences in Hiroshima and New York respectively; Eileen Meehan and Michael Rinella at SUNY Press provided excellent editorial guidance. Finally, we acknowledge with deep gratitude the generous funding from the City of Hiroshima to host the two conferences that were held under the auspices of the Hiroshima Peace Institute. ix
x
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS CONTENTS
The publication of this work was supported by the Academy of Korean Studies of the Republic of Korea (AKS-2008-CD-4003).
INTRODUCTION
1
ONE
INTRODUCTION Engagement as a Viable Alternative to Coercion Sung Chull Kim and David C. Kang
Tension between North Korea and the outside world has drastically increased over the past few years. In 2006, North Korea tested an intercontinental ballistic missile and then a nuclear device; in response, the United Nations Security Council adopted two resolutions that sanctioned North Korea for its destabilizing behavior. However, the member countries of the Six-Party Talks—North Korea, South Korea, the United States, China, Russia, and Japan—reached an agreement in February 2007 about an initial step toward the denuclearization of North Korea. The agreement aimed at the shutdown and disablement of North Korea’s nuclear facilities and the complete declaration of all its nuclear programs, in exchange for an arrangement of heavy-oil aid. The actual shutdown in July and the disablement process that started in November are regarded as the first accomplishments of the five countries’ concerted engagement with North Korea for the common goal of dismantling this isolated country’s nuclear program. In a similar vein, North Korea declared its nuclear program in June 2008, and the five engaging countries, at the beginning, responded to this declaration positively. But how to continue to make progress—centered on, first, the verification of North Korea’s nuclear programs and then the dismantlement of weapons-grade materials and the weapons themselves by North Korea—has remained a big question, and the process will undergo ups and downs. Differences among the five states with regard to their policy toward North Korea, and the mutual distrust between North Korea and the United States and 1
2
ENGAGEMENT WITH NORTH KOREA
Japan, still work as an important distracting factor in the overall denuclearization process. Furthermore, the progress differs from the completion of the process. For the completion, there needs to be a paralleled substantive change in international relations centered on the Korean Peninsula, particularly between the United States and North Korea, as well as between Japan and North Korea. Inasmuch as the issue of the denuclearization of North Korea is complicated and unpredictable, there has been extensive controversy among policymakers and academics over the wisdom and legitimacy of engagement as a strategy in dealing with the issue. This disagreement over engagement can be traced back to differing assessments of the Clinton administration’s deal with Pyongyang in 1994, also known as the Geneva Agreed Framework. This deal was to end the first North Korean nuclear crisis by stipulating the provision of two light-water reactors to North Korea in return for freezing the country’s nuclear facilities. But the Republican-controlled U.S. Congress called the Agreed Framework “appeasement.”1 For more than a decade, critics and defenders of engagement debated the merits and the drawbacks of proposed policies toward North Korea.2 After North Korea’s nuclear test in October 2006, critics’ denunciations of engagement have become harsher. For example, Aaron Friedberg, former deputy national security advisor to Vice President Dick Cheney, characterized engagement with North Korea as “fanciful,” saying that “it is precisely the absence of sufficient pressure that has gotten us where we are today.”3 Critics also targeted the Bush administration’s abrupt policy shift from punishment to engagement after the nuclear test; John R. Bolton, former ambassador to the United Nations, accused the administration of having done a “complete U-turn” on the North Korean nuclear issue.4 On the other hand, there is a large group of scholars and analysts who have argued that engagement, as a strategic alternative to coercion, might resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. Leon Sigal advocated the position that “promises, not just threats” constitute the means to induce North Korea’s cooperation, and he assessed the Agreed Framework as an exemplary success of the engagement strategy.5 Joel Wit, Daniel Poneman, and Robert Gallucci stressed the significance of negotiations with an adversary, even if a deal should not be based on trust.6 Victor Cha, targeting hawkish policymaking audiences, maintained that engagement with a rogue state, indeed, carries with it a significant threat of future punishment in case the state violates any engagement-based promise, and Cha backed this assertion up by saying that “carrots today are the most effective sticks tomorrow.”7 Victor Cha and David Kang presented a comprehensive debate on engagement with North Korea. Even though they arrived at different prescriptions for how best to denuclearize the peninsula (Kang’s endorsement of greater open engagement versus Cha’s more hawkish approach), they commonly explored the rationale of engagement with North Korea as
INTRODUCTION
3
a part of America’s long-term strategy.8 Stressing the long-term ineffectiveness and irreversible damage of sanctions, Ruediger Frank recommended assistance, that is, incentives, for an alternative way of changing the operating environment for North Korea.9 Following the logic of constructivism, Son Key-young advocated the legitimacy of South Korea’s Sunshine policy toward the North, arguing that “comprehensive engagement was premised on the belief that identity shifts vis-à-vis an enemy state are possible . . . and that engagement is an integration initiative.”10 Especially after the eruption of the second nuclear crisis in 2002, debates about multilateral engagement have become more intense. James Laney and Jason Shaplen asserted that while not rewarding North Korea for its misdeeds, relevant countries should “guarantee the security of the entire Korean Peninsula.”11 Paying attention to the North’s economic atrophy, Michael O’Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki argued that a policy alternative, for the relevant countries, should be intended to “reduce the core threat that has existed in Korea for half a century” and “offer some hope that economic reform in the DPRK might begin to succeed.”12 James Moltz and Kenneth Quinones noted that, through multilateral engagement, the United States might gain political, military, and economic advantages.13 With the inauguration of President Barack Obama in January 2009, the logic of multilateral engagement seems to have gained stronger momentum than ever before. Both the debate and the controversy over the wisdom and legitimacy of engagement will continue until not only North Korean nuclear facilities undergo irreversible dismantling but also a consensus emerges regarding the dismantlement per se. Despite the extensive controversy, however, there has been little sustained effort either to explore the theoretical logic of engagement or to assess whether or not—and if so in what ways—engagement has worked on the Korean Peninsula. The question of engagement is a vital issue for both scholars and policymakers. How the world deals with North Korea will have ramifications for both regional and global stability, and it is thus all the more important that a policy be adopted and conducted from a sound theoretical and empirical basis. The purpose of this volume is to examine the nature and the effectiveness of the engagement strategy insofar as the neighbor states (and different actors in South Korea) have applied the strategy to North Korea. This volume deals with denuclearization as a critical subject but not as the only critical subject. Engagement with North Korea involves negotiations and economic relations between relevant states; in particular, the economic issue has mattered and will continue to matter in the denuclearization process. Therefore, this volume deals with political implications of the economic issue as well as of North Korea’s nuclear issue per se.
4
ENGAGEMENT WITH NORTH KOREA
This introductory chapter discusses both the theoretical basis and the practical questions related to the five states’ engagement with North Korea, and in connection with this discussion, the following chapters in this volume address two overarching questions. First, what are the goals, instruments, and logic of engagement with North Korea? Second, why has engagement succeeded, or why has it shown limitations, on the Korean Peninsula?
ENGAGEMENT AND COERCION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS In exploring ways to deal with a state’s undesirable behavior, the international relations literature has focused on coercive strategies, primarily on either deterrence or compellence.14 Coercive strategies in the form of deterrence or compellence have received extensive attention, especially during the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union.15 Rewards and punishments (carrots and sticks) are tools of both social interaction and foreign policy. However, while many of the other social sciences such as sociology and psychology pay equal attention to both rewards and punishments, the study of international relations has tended to focus on coercion-based punishments. In coercive strategies, deterrence functions to persuade an adversary not to take a certain action by demonstrating resolve and capabilities, whereas compellence uses threats and other punitive actions to persuade an adversary to undo an action that the adversary has taken or to change course.16 That international relations scholars place a substantively greater focus on coercion than inducement is somewhat surprising, because both coercion and inducement operate within a cost-benefit calculus and on the assumption of rational action and, theoretically, because both deserve equal attention. Most theories regarding coercive strategies rest on the presumption that a state’s preferences and identities are fixed and conclude that only punishment can correct an adversary’s destabilizing behavior. Insofar as a state’s preferences and identities are fixed, an adversary will refrain from a policy undesirable to other states only if the other states increase the costs that the adversary must endure to pursue the policy. According to proponents of the coercive strategies, deterrence and compellence, whether in the form of military moves or economic sanctions, raise the costs of the offending action and, in turn, modify a state’s behavior.17 Although there is logic behind coercive strategies, particularly economic sanctions, there is just as much skepticism in the literature about whether or not these strategies are effective.18 Indeed, even targeted economic sanctions are rarely strong enough to modify an adversary’s desta-
INTRODUCTION
5
bilizing behavior; the sanctions may actually reinforce that behavior by strengthening the adversary’s existing preferences and identities. External pressure often strengthens the links between the regime and its citizens by offering a convenient external target for anger at the punishment received. Miroslav Nincic notes that “negative sanctions should undermine domestic support for a regime, but the opposite can occur if they produce a rally-round-the-flag and if, in the context of foreign besiegement, the regime’s domestic opponents can be linked to hostile foreigners.”19 In this regard, economic sanctions may reinforce the adversary regime’s relevant preferences and identities—even while they prove incapable of correcting the destabilizing behavior. In contrast to the coercive strategies of deterrence and compellence, engagement is a strategy whose function is to defuse a potentially dangerous situation not through threats but through incentives. The distinguishing feature of engagement is the idea that positive inducements and the extension of benefits, rather than the promise of harm or the imposition of current costs, can either produce a change in the adversary’s actions or transform the target state by creating new interests in the long run. Within this broad approach to engagement are two variants: conditional engagement and unconditional engagement.20 First, unconditional engagement uses available incentives whose cumulative effects ultimately transform the target state’s policy preferences as well as its behavior. As Richard N. Haass and Meghan L. O’Sullivan note, unconditional engagement proceeds “without explicit agreement” that a reciprocal act will follow.21 Because it is necessarily a long-term strategy, unconditional engagement is politically vulnerable in the sense that it may not be accompanied in the short run by concessions. Perhaps the most widely studied aspects of this unconditional type of engagement are found in the literature on economic interdependence, which explores ways in which expanding economic ties between states tends to reduce adversarial relations.22 An increase in the benefits that the states might receive from crafting good economic relations can alter their overall policy objectives. The states may expect that, in the long run, economic interdependence will change the target state’s policy and reduce the possibility of military conflict.23 That is, economic interdependence may produce different objectives with respect to diplomacy: economic ties matter more than security. The discussion about economic interdependence has been expanded by addressing the possible relationship between the interdependence and a shift in the target state’s domestic coalition. Paying special attention to the grand strategy of national survival, Etel Solingen notes that a domestic coalition, composed particularly of outward-looking, internationalizing segments of the society, pursues domestic economic growth, regional cooperation and
6
ENGAGEMENT WITH NORTH KOREA
stability, and dependable access to global markets, capital, and technology.24 The internationalizing domestic coalition’s preference for openness and international stability is related “not merely to material interests but also to cultures, identities, and values.”25 A notable point is that, as Solingen notes, a domestic coalition with an outward-looking, internationalizing grand strategy may emerge not only in democracies but also in authoritarian regimes.26 Thus, the logic of engagement with a certain target state, addressing that state’s outward-looking grand strategy, lies in facilitating the structure of the positive inducement of improved international relations and in strengthening the target state’s domestic forces who hold internationalizing identities and values. Engagement aims also to sever the links among inward-looking backlash forces in the target state and to prevent a logrolling effect or a rally-round-the-flag effect among them. Engagement seeks to weaken the inward-looking forces in the target state by creating alternative incentives for the outward-looking forces and by encouraging the emergence of a ruling coalition that opposes confrontation. If successful, engagement as a strategy can be accompanied by changes in the target state’s preferences and identities as well as the state’s behavior. Unconditional engagement may also involve unilateral concessions designed to create new identities and values in international relations. An exemplary case concerns President of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev’s unilateral offer to U.S. Secretary of State James Baker in May 1989 in which he proposed that his decaying communist country withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from Eastern Europe. Gorbachev’s offer inspired the Malta Conference that December, when he and George H. W. Bush moved forward to an unprecedented agreement on nuclear arms control.27 Unconditional engagement may also involve purely humanitarian aid, as when a state intervenes because of a moral obligation to help citizens. The engaging state may expect changes over time in the target state’s public perception of the outside world. Humanitarian aid is usually accompanied by direct or indirect contacts, which induce greater positive perceptions among the public regarding the engaging state. Second, conditional engagement is accompanied by specific conditions and corresponding incentives that may affect the target state’s calculations about cost and benefit. One of the most famous examples is Robert Axelrod’s solution to “the prisoner’s dilemma.” He found that a tit-for-tat strategy of cooperative and noncooperative moves links the “shadow of the future” to current behavior and consequently best promotes stable cooperation between adversaries.28 Conditional engagement uses give-and-take practices, and thus it necessarily involves negotiation. As Leszek Buszynski notes in this volume, staged engagement is a model of engagement with negotiation. On the basis of both the engaging state’s and the target state’s respective imple-
INTRODUCTION
7
mentation of agreed points, both states attain a higher stage on the path to an ultimate goal that they have already identified. Staged engagement involves a sequence wherein the engaging state would offer incentives in phases in response to the target state’s cooperative acts. The February 13 agreement in 2007 at the Six-Party Talks has as its framework this type of staged engagement: the provision of fifty thousand tons of heavy-oil aid in response to the shutdown of nuclear facilities; the sending of nine hundred fifty thousand tons of heavy-oil aid as compensation for declaration of all nuclear programs and disablement of the facilities. The “grand deal” is another model of conditional engagement; with an exchange of packages arranged through a long negotiation process, relevant partners may open a new chapter in their relationship. The Paris Peace Accords in 1973, reached after three-year-long talks seeking a cease-fire during the Vietnam War, is a historic example of a grand deal—a deal that broke down with North Vietnam’s military occupation of the South.29 In sum, there exists a solid theoretical rationale for exploring engagement as an alternative to punishment or coercion in dealing with an adversary’s destabilizing behavior. Engagement as a strategy seems a practical and moral alternative to coercion, particularly in the post–cold war era.
HAS ENGAGEMENT WORKED? Regarding the Korean Peninsula, the sheer complexity of the issues, the number of states (and various actors, in the South Korean case) with direct interests in the outcome, and the differing nature of those interests have made crafting any policy toward North Korea prohibitively difficult. Although the shutdown of North Korean nuclear facilities has continued since July 2007, the question remains as to how momentum might be maintained for further progress in the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Skepticism remains as to how much North Korea will actually honor the Six-Party Talks’ agreements on its denuclearization. Also, an engagement strategy raises several practical issues with regard to the effectiveness of conditional engagement with North Korea; among them are North Korea’s response, the problem of coordination among engaging states, and the domestic politics of each engaging state. North Korea as Dynamic Actor The heart of concern over an engagement strategy is whether or not the Six-Party Talks and other forms of engagement (for instance, Chinese and South Korean economic engagement) can effectively induce North Korea’s cooperation. Changes in North Korea’s behavior or preferences and identity might start with the country’s cost-benefit calculations and perceptions of
8
ENGAGEMENT WITH NORTH KOREA
neighbor states. There are three notable problems. First, there is a huge gap between the five states’ nuclear disarmament demands and North Korea’s calculations regarding this issue. The then Japanese delegate at the Six-Party Talks, Sasae Kenichiro, aptly noted this point by declaring, “There are differences of opinion among the five nations, but there are greater differences between the five nations and North Korea.”30 North Korea has been a dynamic actor that has created a new gap with an ensuing negotiation structure that favors its own goals.31 There is ample evidence of North Korea’s approach: the two nuclear crises in 1993 and 2002, the missile launches in 1998 and 2006, and the nuclear test in 2006 have functioned to coerce Washington into having direct talks with Pyongyang. The point is to convince North Korea that by snowballing its demands and delaying the requested actions, it will fail to act in its best national interests; that is, to convince North Korea that the sooner it denuclearizes, the sooner it will receive rewards. Second, North Korea, never a passive actor, takes advantage of the five engaging states’ strategies, which differ from one state to the next. The multilateral engagement produces a triple-level diplomacy—multilateral talks, bilateral relations, and domestic politics; this situation complicates interactions among the states. In particular, there is a certain degree of tension between the Six-Party Talks (the multilateral level) and each of the five states’ relations with North Korea (the bilateral level) precisely because of the different interests among the states with regard to the North Korea issue, as shall be discussed later. North Korea is naturally tempted to use this situation to curb the binding power of any agreement achieved at the multilateral talks or, more ambitiously, to drive wedges between the five states. Therefore, coordination between the five states is an important task for the success of engagement in the multilateral context. Third, there is a close linkage between North Korea’s nuclear diplomacy and its national identity. Anti-imperialism, that is, anti-Americanism, has long been one pillar of North Korea’s national identity. Devastated by American aerial attacks during the Korean War and by economic sanctions afterward, North Korea considers itself a victim of imperialism. The image of a “nuclear state” targeting the United States permeates the consciousness of North Koreans, a people already familiar with the slogans of self-defense sustained by “military-first politics.”32 Therefore, the present U.S. conditional engagement has limitations regarding its ability to fully induce a positive North Korean response to the nuclear issue. The Six-Party Talks with a staged format are a crucial instrument of conditional engagement but not the only crucial instrument. The United States must act to lessen the existing North Korean animosity. To begin with, Washington needs to establish a negotiating foundation in which the peninsula may distance itself from the legacy of the Korean War, so that Washington and Pyong-
INTRODUCTION
9
yang eventually normalize relations with each other unencumbered by the past six decades. Engagement in a Multilateral Context The nature of an engagement strategy depends partly on whether the engagement is bilateral or multilateral. An agreement reached by multilateral engagement might be more effective than an agreement reached through merely bilateral relations, although this assertion presumes that multilateral states are all in agreement. One key issue worth exploring is whether or not multilateral negotiations introduce coordination problems that undermine the effectiveness of engagement. Thus, just as a lack of coordination can undercut sanctions, which is the standard finding, so too can this lack undercut engagement. The five states, anchored by the Six-Party Talks, have had a common goal, the nuclear disarmament of North Korea. However, this goal is not the first priority of each state; each state has its own additional—sometimes more important—goals for engagement with North Korea. Accordingly, the type and the logic of each state’s engagement strategy differ from those of every other state (see Table 1.1). In bilateral relations with North Korea, there are specific and important differences within these two types of engagement: conditional and unconditional. Japan takes a mostly coercive approach, and the United States maintains conditional engagement; China and Russia (and South Korea of the Roh administration) maintain unconditional engagement. The point is that all of these different types of engagement are in tension with one another. The five states’ effort to remain in concert as they try to end North Korea’s nuclear ambitions constitutes a challenging issue. The most notable difference existed between South Korea of the Roh administration on the one hand and Japan and the United States on the other. Considering the nuclear issue a troubling obstacle on the path toward the construction of an economic community on the peninsula, the Roh administration in South Korea tried to extend aid and economic projects in North Korea. Indeed, the South Korean government intended to change the identity of North Korea in the long run by way of inter-Korean dependence, namely, the formation of a “South-North Economic Community.”33 As inter-Korean relations developed, the emotional proximity or distance between the United States, North Korea, and South Korea changed. If one may use Theodore Caplow’s two-against-one formula,34 the triangular relations shifted from “against North Korea” to “against the United States.” This situation paralleled a weakened perception among South Koreans about the North Korean nuclear threat.35
• Nonproliferation, • Denuclearization
• Maintenance of influence on the peninsula, • Economic growth of the Russian Far East, • Denuclearization • Avoiding economic collapse in North Korea, • Maintenance of influence on the peninsula, • Denuclearization [1998–2007] • Changing North Korean identity • Avoiding North Korean collapse • Denuclearization [2008–present] • Denuclearization, • Reform and opening-up of North Korea
U.S.
Russia
South Korea
China
• Resolution to abduction issue, • Denuclearization
Japan
Goals
[1998–2007] • Unconditional [2008–present] • Conditional
• Unconditional
• Unconditional
[2000–2006] • None [2007–present] • Conditional
• Conditional
Type of Engagement
• High
• Low
• Low
• Low
• High
Domestic Relevance
Table 1.1 Each Country’s Strategy of Engagement with North Korea
• Persuasion and pressure, • Intervening between the U.S. and North Korea [1998–2007] • Interdependence [2008–present] • Preconditioning of denuclearization to economic assistance
• Persuasion, • Arbitration in differences
• Negotiation, • Disciplining
• Pressure, • Dialogue
Logic
[1998–2007] • Economic projects, • Humanitarian assistance, • Six-Party Talks [2008–present] • Consultation with U.S., • Six-Party Talks, • Economic projects, • Humanitarian assistance
• Economic aid and trade, • Six-Party Talks
• Six-Party Talks
• Sanctions, • Six-Party Talks, • Potential normalization if Japanese goals are met • Six-Party Talks, • Sanctions, • Normalization and lift of sanctions if U.S. goals are met
Instruments
10
ENGAGEMENT WITH NORTH KOREA
INTRODUCTION
11
The South Korean approach was unacceptable to the United States, which pursued a resolution to the North Korean nuclear issue in the contexts of both nonproliferation and the War on Terror. The United States called the North a member of the axis of evil in 2002 and invaded Iraq in 2003, arguably undermining South Korea’s engagement effort. The U.S. punitive approach continued until the beginning of 2007, when it lifted sanctions against North Korean accounts at Banco Delta Asia in Macau. In the process of imposing the sanctions and then lifting them, the United States demonstrated that it grasped the financial flow in relation to North Korea. Meanwhile, Japan consistently favored sanctions over engagement, withholding any offer of aid until the abduction issue is resolved. In response to North Korea’s missile launches in July 2006 and the nuclear test in October of the same year, Japan, along with the United States, initiated two strong UN Security Council Resolutions (Resolution 1695 on July 15 and Resolution 1718 on October 14). As many scholars have noted, the success of the five states’ engagement with North Korea depends on the coordination of those states’ strategies.36 Just as no unilateral coercive measure can either discipline North Korea or induce a positive response, no appeasement measure at the bilateral level can enhance the overall utility of engagement. The five states should coordinate their differences at the multilateral level. The coordination involves the confirmation of common goals and incentives that would link the five different sets of bilateral relations with North Korea to the multilateral engagement centered on the Six-Party Talks. Common goals for North Korea should include the following: Nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation; Neither unilateral use nor unilateral testing of weapons of mass destruction; Commercial practices in accordance with international norms and practices; Cooperative resolutions to outstanding bilateral issues, especially in U.S.-DPRK and Japan-DPRK relations. Common incentives to North Korea should include the following: A security guarantee to the DPRK; Facilitation of the normalization of U.S.-DPRK and Japan-DPRK relations; Facilitation of the integration of the DPRK into the international economy; Humanitarian aid, educational or training assistance, and energy assistance.
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While most of these elements already appeared in the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks issued in September 2005, the listed elements are not optional entries on a menu but necessary entries, both for North Korea and among the five states. Of the elements from the list, the third element stipulates that commercial practices in accordance with international norms and practices constitute a common objective both in each of the five states’ bilateral relations with the North and in the multilateral context. For example, South Korea’s economic engagement with North Korea should facilitate the North’s accommodation of international norms and practices, a situation that would lessen American worries that the South would be simply appeasing the North. On the other hand, the five states have to deepen discussions about the collective provision of incentives. For instance, North Korea’s normalization of relations with the United States and Japan comprises not merely two bilateral affairs but affairs of other states, as well. Both China and South Korea should assist Japan-DPRK normalization talks; this cooperation would, in turn, raise the Six-Party Talks to a higher level. In the same vein, the security guarantee is not a bilateral issue between the United States and North Korea but an issue for peace on the Korean Peninsula as a whole. If the United States pursued a military option against the North, then the South, for fear of war, could not become a genuine partner in the multilateral engagement and would have to pursue its own strategy of survival—for instance, the South might adopt a unilateral appeasement measure in relation to the North rather than remain faithful to the principled approach. The Domestic Politics of Engagement Under what conditions will engagement be sustainable in the domestic politics of each state? Each state’s engagement with North Korea constitutes a double-edged policy. Domestic politics in South Korea and Japan, for example, are more intense than in other states. In South Korea, the Kim administration and Roh administration undertook an unconditional engagement strategy to buy peace through changes in North Korea and then through inter-Korean dependence, whereas the then opposition party denounced the government’s leniency toward North Korea’s unprincipled practices, not to mention the missile launches and the nuclear test in 2006. In response to domestic pressure and criticism, the Roh government had to pay special attention to the promotion of the government policy; also, it tried to demonstrate the policy’s symbolic outcomes, such as trade volume increase, investment projects, and the railway connections crossing the inter-Korean border. South Korea’s polarized domestic politics and the government’s obsession with symbolic achievement undercut the effectiveness of the policy, whose purpose was to bring about the long-run transfor-
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mation of North Korea’s identity as well as its behavior. The Lee Myung Bak administration, newly launched in 2008, pursues conditional engagement with North Korea, reversing the previous two administrations’ policy, but the conditional engagement is criticized by the ruling-turned-opposition party. It is fair to note that whoever takes control of power, the North Korea policy in Seoul remains a politically divisive doubled-edged policy. In Japan, the domestically sensitive abduction issue has eclipsed the denuclearization issue. North Korean agents conducted abductions of Japanese citizens during the 1970s and the 1980s, and North Korean authorities’ admission of the abductions at the 2002 summit between Koizumi Junichiro and Kim Jong Il only fueled Japanese public anger. The admission exacerbated the Japanese people’s feelings of disgust that had arisen since the North Korean missile launch over Japanese territory in 1998. It is said that the domestic atmosphere in Japan after the North Korean admission of the abductions was similar to the sentiment of Americans after the September 11 terrorist attacks.37 Besieged by the abduction issue, the Japanese government has maintained the conditional position of “no progress in the abduction issue, no aid to North Korea,” reflecting exactly the standpoint of abductees’ families.38 This firm position seems unlikely to change significantly in the immediate future, because the forces in Japan that promote the bashing of North Korea have been strengthened since the end of the 1990s.39 In the same vein, the Japanese government did not welcome North Korea’s shutdown of nuclear facilities in July 2007 and, indeed, simply called it “no more than the first step.”40 Domestic politics are also tied up with credibility issues that arise in the course of conditional, tit-for-tat engagement. The North may doubt whether or not the American government, regardless of a new presidency, will follow through on its commitments. This is why the North is so concerned about presidential elections in the United States. In this regard, domestic politics is closely related to the consistency or inconsistency of engagement and to engagement’s overall effect.41 For the management of domestic politics to be successful, each government has to assign an exit point to the pending issue at hand. For instance, the Japanese government must define a minimally acceptable resolution to the abduction issue—that is, the minimal exit point for undoing Japan’s coercive measures against North Korea, whether this point is North Korea’s renewal of investigations into the abductions or its punishment of the abductions’ organizers. The important question is whether or not the Japanese government is willing to confront the media-framed trauma and can convince the public to reasonably separate its negative views of North Korea from its own foreign policy toward North Korea.42 In the South Korean case, the Lee administration has to lower tension in domestic politics with regard to the government’s North Korea policy; it needs to compromise with the
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present opposition party in order to avoid political and social polarization, which inevitably undercuts the effect of engagement.
THE FINDINGS OF THIS BOOK From a number of diverse perspectives, the chapters assembled for this volume examine North Korea–oriented engagement and North Korea’s responses, both at the international level and at the inter-Korean level. Core findings from this volume are as follows: (1) For each state, engagement in general is a viable alternative to coercive strategies for inducing North Korean cooperation. Inasmuch as engagement aims at creating an unprecedented value, it has undergone ups and downs. The key point is to narrow, through confirming common goals and incentives, the gaps between North Korea and the five states and between differing objectives and logic of the five states. (2) In order to achieve complete success of engagement in the multilateral context, relevant actors have to increase the degree of coordination among their diverse strategies. Engagement with North Korea is triple-edged, encompassing domestic politics concerning DPRK, bilateral relations with DPRK, and multilateral relations in the Six-Party Talks. There always exists tension between the three levels; the most important question for sustaining progress at the multilateral talks is how to prevent the various strategies from undercutting the positive effect of engagement. (3) The Six-Party Talks with a staged format is a crucial instrument of conditional engagement but not the only crucial instrument. The logic of quid pro quo in the current format has worked not based on trust but calculation; it will not be sufficient to convince North Korea that full cooperation for denuclearization would serve the country’s best national interest. In view of that there is a close linkage between North Korea’s nuclear diplomacy and its national identity, particularly with respect to anti-Americanism, the United States needs to construct foundations that will help the peninsula distance itself from the legacy of the Korean War and facilitate the normalization of relations between the two countries. The authors of the chapters in Part One examine four neighbor states’ engagement with North Korea and dilemmas that each confronts. To resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis, the role of the U.S. government is crucial. The government’s policy shift, as exemplified by its decision to lift sanctions on the North Korean accounts at Banco Delta Asia and to remove North Korea from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, had a significant effect on multilateral engagement with North Korea. But the U.S. engagement, as Youngshik Bong notes in his chapter, has to be extended in scope. The U.S. government has to pave the way for a resolution to longstanding bilateral concerns that have plagued North Korea since the Korean War: economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and fear of insecurity. China has been pleased to play the role of host for the Six-Party Talks, hoping for both
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denuclearization of North Korea and the maintenance of stability through continuation of the status quo on the Korean Peninsula. In adopting this approach, China proves that there are real shared strategic interests between Beijing and Washington regarding the peninsula and beyond. Fei-Ling Wang cautions here that China, as a rising power, deliberates on the North Korean issue in the context of broader global considerations. If the complications of Sino-American relations and of diverging Sino-Japanese interests develop further, then China is likely to alter its strategic calculations about the Korean Peninsula. In this type of scenario, China would not only prop up the existing regime in North Korea but also readily accept nuclear residuals in North Korea. Jung Ho Bae and Sung Chull Kim’s chapter on Japan shows that politicization of the abduction issue and its ensuing phenomenon, bashing of North Korea, in the past decade has limited Tokyo’s choices with regard to policy toward Pyongyang. If Japan continues to follow a coercive strategy and consider resolution of the abduction issue the precondition to other bilateral issues, then it cannot achieve that objective and will simply remain a negotiation breaker in the Six-Party Talks mechanism. In a similar vein, the motivations and the objectives that characterize Russia as it engages with North Korea constrain Russia’s ability to persuade Pyongyang to dismantle its nuclear program. Leszek Buszynski points out that Russia’s engagement under former president Putin, and his successor President Dmitri Medvedev, has functioned for two purposes: to maintain Russia’s influence on the Korean Peninsula in both the North and the South; and to contain the U.S. use of the military option. This type of engagement sustains North Korea, raising skepticism about Russia’s capacity to help induce Pyongyang’s complete dismantlement of the nuclear program. Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland illustrate changes in North Korea’s external economic relations and underscore the need for relevant states to extend “commercial” components in economic transactions with North Korea. North Korea accommodates Chinese and South Korean expansion of both trade and investment; however, North Korea seems to cautiously avoid dependence on South Korea while taking advantage of the South’s humanitarian aid and noncommercial transactions. This finding warns against a moral hazard operating in the politicized nature of the South’s economic engagement with the North. The authors of the chapters in Part Two explore various aspects of inter-Korean relations: both the South Korean engagement and the North Korean responses. South Korean engagement has wedded itself to the logic of buying peace; the partners in the engagement are the government, businesses, and NGOs. Despite progress in extending trade and investment to the North, the South Korean engagement has experienced difficulty in instituting economically interdependent relations between the two Koreas. Sung Chull Kim notes that both the government-business collusion at the initial
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stage of engagement and the following domestic political division in the South—not to mention the North Korean nuclear crisis—have degraded the effectiveness of the engagement strategy. The government has come to adhere to visible and symbolic short-term outcomes rather than pursue the establishment of a partnership in the North. Eun Mee Kim and Yooyeon Noh demonstrate that the corresponding business ventures have suffered from a lack of institutions, norms, and practices for commerce. But they argue that South Korean corporations have enjoyed in the North a certain comparative advantage over those of China, for example, cheap but high-quality labor and geographical proximity. Edward Reed finds that South Korean NGOs have gradually increased the influence of their reach into North Korean society, adding to the official engagement a dimension that has hitherto been missing. But he notes also that as the South Korean government expands its direct aid and economic projects in the North, the NGOs face new problems such as a lack of authentic counterparts in the North and the need to define their distinctive role there. Charles Armstrong argues that North Korea has not undergone the significant change to which, South Korea had hoped, the engagement strategy would give rise. The North has exhibited a tactical change but not a strategic transformation in relations with the South. Pyongyang’s official position toward Seoul has remained fundamentally consistent. Furthermore, since the crisis in U.S.-DPRK relations deepened in 2002, inter-Korean relations have reached a level at which Seoul is politically dependent on Pyongyang.
NOTES 1. Leon V. Sigal, “North Korea Is No Iraq: Pyongyang’s Negotiating Strategy,” Arms Control Today 32, no. 10 (December 2002): 8. 2. Victor D. Cha and David Kang, Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003). 3. Aaron Friedberg and David Kang, “How to Control a Nuclear North Korea?” Council on Foreign Relations, December 4, 2006. http://www.cfr.org/publication/12164/. Emphasis in original. 4. Mark Mazzetti and William J. Broad, “The Right Confronts Rice over North Korea Policy,” New York Times, October 25, 2007. 5. Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 252. 6. Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 405. 7. Victor D. Cha, “The Rationale for ‘Enhanced’ Engagement of North Korea: After the Perry Policy Review,” Asian Survey 39, no. 6 (November/December 1999): 859.
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8. Cha and Kang, Nuclear North Korea, 172–77. 9. Ruediger Frank, “The Political Economy of Sanctions against North Korea,” Asian Perspective 30, no. 3 (2006): 5–36. 10. Son Key-young, South Korean Engagement Policies and North Korea: Identities, Norms and the Sunshine Policy (London: Routledge, 2006), 43. 11. James T. Laney and Jason T. Shaplen, “How to Deal with North Korea,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 2 (March/April 2003): 16–30. 12. Michael O’Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki, “Toward a Grand Bargain with North Korea,” Washington Quarterly 26, no. 4 (Autumn 2003): 14–15. 13. James Clay Moltz and C. Kenneth Quinones, “Getting Serious about a Multilateral Approach to North Korea,” Nonproliferation Review 11, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 138. 14. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Stein, “Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable,” World Politics 42, no. 3 (April 1990): 336–69. 15. Barry Nalebuff, “Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World,” World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313–35. 16. Terence Roehrig, From Deterrence to Engagement: The U.S. Defense Commitment to South Korea (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 22. 17. Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990). 18. Robert Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work,” International Security 22, no. 2 (Fall 1997): 90–136; Daniel Drezner, “The Trouble with Carrots: Transaction Costs, Conflict Expectations, and Economic Inducements,” Security Studies 9, no. 1 (1999/2000): 188–218. 19. Miroslav Nincic, “The Logic of Positive Engagement: Dealing with Renegade Regimes,” International Studies Perspectives 7, no. 4 (2006): 321–41. 20. Miles Kahler and Scott Kastner present three different types: conditional engagement, unconditional engagement utilizing constraining effects of interdependence, and unconditional engagement utilizing transformative effects of interdependence. And David Shambaugh suggests different variants: constructive, conditional, and coercive engagements, depending on the degree of punitive measures. See Kahler and Kastner, “Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait,” Journal of Peace Research 43, no. 5 (2006): 523–41; Shambaugh, “Containment or Engagement of China?” International Security 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996): 184. 21. Richard N. Haass and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, “Introduction,” in Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, ed. Richard N. Haass and Meghan L. O’Sullivan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 4–5. 22. Michael Mastanduno, “The Strategy of Economic Engagement: Theory and Practice,” in Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate, ed. Edward Mansfield and Brian Pollins (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), 175–86; Joanne Gowa, Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Dale Copeland, “Trade Expectations and the Outbreak of Peace: Détente 1970–74 and the End of the Cold War 1985–91,” Security Studies 9, no. 1 (1999/2000): 15–58; Rawi Abdelal and Jonathan Kirshner, “Strategy, Economic Relations, and the Definition of National Interests,” Security Studies 9, no. 1 (1999/2000): 119–56.
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23. Kahler and Kastner, “Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence,” 523–41. 24. Etel Solingen, Regional Orders at Century’s Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 26–32; “Internationalization, Coalitions, and Regional Conflict and Cooperation,” in Economic Interdependence and International Conflict, ed. Mansfield and Pollins, 60–85. 25. Solingen, Regional Orders at Century’s Dawn, 22. 26. Ibid., 278–81. 27. Lawrence S. Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971 to the Present (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 429–33. 28. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984). 29. After three years of Henry Kissinger-Le Duc Tho talks, the United States and Vietnam reached a cease-fire deal, for which President Nixon secretly promised that the United States would provide North Vietnam with an aid package of $3.25 billion. See Frederick Z. Brown, “U.S.-Vietnam Normalization: Past, Present, Future,” in Vietnam Joins the World, ed. James W. Morley and Masashi Nishihara (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 204; Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin, 1983), 698–99. 30. “North Korea Talks ‘Stall over Energy,’ ” BBC News, February 11, 2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/em/-/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/6350007.stm. 31. As Victor Cha has noted, North Korea’s provocation has functioned, even if not to produce a military victory, to initiate “coercive bargaining,” which has resulted in outcomes whose advantages are greater than those resulting from the status quo. See Victor Cha, “Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula,” International Security 27, no. 1 (Summer 2002): 63. 32. Sung Chull Kim, North Korea under Kim Jong Il: From Consolidation to Systemic Dissonance (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006). 33. For example, President Roh Moo Hyun said at a cabinet meeting that inter-Korean economic dependence is the most important requirement for peace on the Korean Peninsula. Donga Ilbo, August 15, 2007. 34. Theodore Caplow, Two against One: Coalitions in Triads (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968). 35. A survey result shows that 41.5 percent of South Korean respondents do not feel threatened by North Korea’s 2005 declaration of possession of nuclear weapons. No doubt, this trend is more distinctive in the group self-identified as anti-American, a group that consists of 50.3 percent of the total respondents. Park Jong-chul and four others, 2005 nyo˘ndo tong’il munje kungmin yo˘ron chosa (Survey Analysis of Unification Issues, 2005) (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2005), 151–52. 36. Of many, see Sigal, “North Korea Is No Iraq”; Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs 79, no. 1 (January/February 2000): 45–62; Kent E. Calder, “The New Face of Northeast Asia,” Foreign Affairs 80, no. 1 (January/February 2001): 106–22; Dennis C. Blair, “From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-Pacific Security Arrangements,” Washington Quarterly 24, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 7–17; Victor D. Cha, “Korea’s Place in the Axis,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 3
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(May/June 2002): 79–92; Sebastian Harnisch, “U.S.-North Korean Relations under the Bush Administration: From ‘Slow Go’ to ‘No Go,’ ” Asian Survey 42, no. 6 (November/December 2002): 856–82; Phillip C. Saunders, “Confronting Ambiguity: How to Handle North Korea’s Nuclear Program,” Arms Control Today 33, no. 2 (March 2003): 11–15; Cheon Seongwhun, Cooperative Denuclearization of North Korea (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2006). 37. Lee Jong Won, “Datsureisen o mezashi nessen no shusenjo husenkyodotai ni: Taibei ippento kara takokukan kankei e” (“From the Main Battlefield of the Hot War to a War-free Community in Pursuit of Getting out of the Cold War: From the U.S.-only Approach to Multilateral Relations”), in Niccho kosho kadai to tenbo (Tasks and Prospects of the Japan-North Korea Negotiations), ed. Kang Sang Jung, Mizuno Naoki, and Lee Jong Won (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2003), 33–44. 38. Asahi Shimbun, February 14, 2007. 39. Wada Haruki, “Envisioning a Northeast Asian Community: Regional and Domestic Factors to Consider,” in Regional Cooperation and Its Enemies in Northeast Asia: The Impact of Domestic Forces, ed. Edward Friedman and Sung Chull Kim (London: Routledge, 2006), 52; Christopher W. Hughes, “The Political Economy of Japanese Sanctions towards North Korea: Domestic Coalitions and International Systemic Pressures,” Pacific Affairs 79, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 461–66. 40. Japan Times, July 16, 2007. 41. Shambaugh, “Containment or Engagement of China?” 206. 42. For a discussion on related media effects, see Hyung Gu Lynn, “Vicarious Traumas: Television and Public Opinion in Japan’s North Korea Policy,” Pacific Affairs 79, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 483–508.
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TWO
WAITING TO REAP THE FINAL HARVEST U.S. Engagement Policy to Denuclearize North Korea Youngshik D. Bong
Since the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) detonated a nuclear device on October 9, 2006, the Bush administration has increasingly departed from its previous policy aiming for a complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of all nuclear facilities inside North Korea as a precondition for meaningful bilateral negotiations. The administration’s decision to take gradual steps of engagement became evident at the second round of the fifth Six-Party Talks in Beijing on December 18–22, 2006. Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher R. Hill, the head of the U.S. delegation, met Kim Gye Gwan, his North Korean counterpart, and reiterated the message he had delivered during the bilateral talks on November 28–29, 2006: the United States would provide economic incentives in exchange for a freeze of North Korea’s nuclear activities. Since its inception, this new route of diplomacy was dubbed the “Early Harvest” proposal, a staged engagement strategy with North Korea that assumes that an early harvest (winning North Korea’s acquiescence to halt its nuclear programs and allow international inspections) will lead to a final harvest (complete dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program) in the near future.1 Critics of the Bush administration’s engagement with North Korea have called the Early Harvest approach a misplaced “faith-based nonproliferation” strategy, which they contend lacks reliable means to verify
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North Korea’s promises and sets a dangerous precedent for Iran.2 Proponents defend the engagement, declaring that the outcomes of recent DPRK-U.S. negotiations illustrate the likelihood that the two parties will continue on the diplomatic route toward a “big deal” that will culminate in the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, diplomatic normalization between the United States and North Korea, and a peace treaty to end the Korean War.3 These observations must be closely scrutinized and treated with great caution. On the one hand, by any reasonable standards, the U.S. engagement strategy since late 2006 may be construed as strong evidence that engagement with North Korea should be the default policy for the United States.4 On the other hand, there are questions as to whether the recent engagement strategy will ultimately lead to a final harvest that satisfies the United States. The current negotiations with North Korea will be considered a failure if they do nothing more than keep North Korea from transferring its nuclear materials and technologies outside the country. The success of the negotiations depends ultimately on forcing Pyongyang to abandon fissile materials that it has already produced. This chapter argues that the current staged engagement strategy of the United States toward North Korea is unlikely to succeed. If the final goal of U.S. diplomacy toward nuclear North Korea is complete denuclearization, Washington eventually must move from the current staged-engagement strategy to a full-engagement strategy. As opposed to a staged-engagement strategy, a full-engagement strategy is unilateral, proactive, and disproportionate in nature. It stipulates that, to complete a deal, one negotiating party should move beyond the tit-for-tat or action-for-action pattern and grant the other party a full spectrum of attractive incentives without demanding simultaneous reciprocation. As such, the United States would demand the completion of CVID of the North Korean nuclear program after the United States grants North Korea a full spectrum of incentives North Korea has insisted upon—a genuine security guarantee, reduction of U.S. forces across its border in South Korea, and the provision of light-water reactors. This chapter analyzes the recent phase of U.S. engagement with North Korea and examines why even a good early start might not guarantee a good ending. The chapter first summarizes the Early Harvest approach. It then compares the current engagement strategy to a full-engagement strategy and contends that the latter is a superior choice by which the United States can accomplish its goal of North Korean nuclear disarmament. The chapter argues that South Korea holds the key to the completion of a “big deal” between the United States and North Korea. South Korea’s own engagement policy toward North Korea has been driven predominantly by its fear of becoming entangled in a major armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula.5 If we assume that Seoul is genuinely interested in the denuclearization of
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the Korean Peninsula, a U.S. strategy of full engagement would help South Korea shift the focus of its North Korea policy from dodging entrapment in a DPRK-U.S. military conflict to preventing the United States from abandoning its role as South Korea’s security partner. The chapter concludes that the current nuclear standoff between the United States and North Korea will stop short of achieving the “big deal” because considerable uncertainty surrounds U.S. application of a full-engagement strategy.
STAGED ENGAGEMENT VERSUS FULL ENGAGEMENT Measuring the success of a U.S. strategy toward nuclear North Korea is a highly contestable exercise, depending upon one’s perception of what constitutes success. The Early Harvest approach is successful insofar as in late 2002 it turned the clock back to the time prior to the breakdown of the 1994 Agreed Framework. However, despite the early success, it still remains unclear whether or not the early phase of the nuclear negotiations bodes well for eventual denuclearization and not just for disablement and reporting. The Early Harvest Approach and the Initial Outcomes The Early Harvest approach adopted by the Bush administration has produced some early breakthroughs. At the round of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing held on February 8–13, 2007, the first talks since Pyongyang’s October 2006 nuclear test, the member countries signed the Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement of September 19, 2005. The February 13 Agreement in 2007 was particularly significant for bilateral negotiations between the United States and North Korea in that it affirmed the two countries’ agreement to “take coordinated steps . . . in line with the principle of ‘action for action.’ ” According to this statement, in the initial phase of the implementation, North Korea agreed to disable the Yongbyon nuclear facility and to permit International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials to verify the activity within sixty days after the agreement was signed. North Korea also promised to “discuss with other parties a list of all its nuclear programs,” as described in the 2005 Joint Statement. In return, the United States would begin the process of removing North Korea from its State Sponsors of Terrorism list and would terminate U.S. application of the Trading with the Enemy Act to North Korea.6 The bilateral negotiations between North Korea and the United States maintained their momentum in spite of the feud over financial sanctions imposed by the United States on Banco Delta Asia, a Macau-based bank that the U.S. Treasury Department accused of aiding Pyongyang’s illicit money-laundering activities. In protest of the U.S. sanctions, the North Korean delegation walked out of the next round of the Six-Party Talks
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held in March 2007 and demanded the release of the bank’s North Korean accounts—equivalent to approximately twenty-five million U.S. dollars. However, after receiving the previously frozen funds from Banco Delta Asia in June 2007, the North Korean government announced that it would begin implementing the February 13 Agreement and invited Secretary Hill to Pyongyang for a two-day visit, the first visit to the country by a senior American official in nearly five years. As it had been laid out in the Initial Actions, Pyongyang subsequently shut down its nuclear reactors in return for an initial shipment of fifty thousand metric tons of fuel oil under the February Agreement. On July 17, 2007, the ten-member team of IAEA inspectors who had been invited by the North Korean government monitored and verified the shutdown and the sealing of the five nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. At the second session of the sixth round of the Six-Party Talks on September 27–30, 2007, North Korea agreed to disable the three main nuclear facilities at its Yongbyon site and to provide a “complete and correct” declaration of all its nuclear programs by the end of 2007. In September, U.S. president George W. Bush authorized for the North an aid payment of US$25 million that would cover the cost of fifty thousand tons of heavy fuel, and he praised the outcome of the new round of the Six-Party Talks as reflective of the “common commitment” of all the parties to the complete denuclearization of North Korea. For its part, the United States would lead both the disablement activities, including initial funding for them, and the international provision of the remaining 950,000 metric tons of fuel oil for North Korea. In addition, Washington reiterated its willingness to begin the process of removing North Korea from the U.S. terrorism list in tandem with the North’s actions, though Washington did not offer a specific timetable. Such a give-and-take process has been significantly delayed as Pyongyang and Washington have not agreed on what constitutes a “complete and correct” declaration of North Korea’s nuclear programs. Only after bilateral negotiations in Geneva and Singapore past the original deadline for North Korea submitting the declaration, did the United States and North Korea reach a tentative deal that Washington would lift economic sanctions on North Korea in exchange for Pyongyang “acknowledging” the U.S. concerns and allegations of its involvement in a range of nuclear activities without having to publicly admit them.7 The deal quickly became subjected to heavy criticism inside the United States that the Bush administration gave up too much too early simply in order to keep the momentum of engagement with North Korea under the February 13 Agreement.8 On the other hand, the deal also allowed both Washington and Pyongyang to fulfill their respective ends of the agreement. In June 2008 North Korea demolished the cooling tower at its main nuclear power complex in Yongbyon. In return for Pyongyang’s decision to disable
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the plutonium plants and to resume the verification effort by international inspectors, the Bush administration in October removed North Korea from a list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. The Limits of the Early Harvest Approach The Early Harvest approach is about the increasing returns of small successes. Its overriding assumption is that successes made in an early phase of negotiations will reduce mutual distrust and increase the cost of defections for both Washington and Pyongyang. The approach is also based upon the principle of concurrent reciprocation. In the DPRK-U.S. nuclear negotiations, give-and-take is strictly simultaneous and equal: neither side gives first and takes later, or vice versa. One side gets only as much as it gives, and yields as much as the other side does. The main problem of the Early Harvest approach is that both the logic of increasing returns and the principle of simultaneous reciprocity may stop working when the negotiations between the United States and North Korea enter the final phase of the big deal. The strategy of a staged engagement in the Early Harvest approach does not provide Washington with effective means either to prevent these mechanisms from breaking down or to punish Pyongyang’s defection from them. First, nuclear weapons may have become too valuable for Kim Jong Il’s regime to trade away under the principle of simultaneous reciprocity. As Sung Chull Kim and David Kang contend in their chapter in this volume, North Korea’s status as a nuclear power has fostered a newfound national pride and sense of identity that will powerfully affect the psychology of decision making in Pyongyang. Testimony by South Korean journalists and officials who have met with Kim Jong Il and other high-ranking North Korean officials strongly corroborates this view.9 The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 has enormously increased the Kim regime’s obsession with nuclear weapons as the ultimate deterrent to possible U.S. attempts to trigger regime change in North Korea. Considering what nuclear weapons mean today for the Kim regime, Pyongyang is expected to delay the completion of the final phase of a “big deal” with the United States. At the same time, the Kim regime will insist that it receive from the United States genuine security assurance and normalization of DPRK-U.S. relations prior to any decision by North Korea to abandon nuclear weapons or weapons-grade materials. Furthermore, the Early Harvest approach does not leave the United States with an acceptable fallback position. For China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea, a breakdown in a conditional and staged engagement does not mean that North Korea has been caught red-handed. Any failure with a staged engagement will not be enough to convince all the members of the engagement coalition that every opportunity to resolve the nuclear issue
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through engagement has been exhausted. They might still disagree whether the time has come to turn to coercive methods. Consider a hypothetical situation in which Pyongyang rejects the current negotiations or sets off provocations, hoping to improve its bargaining position. To the United States, whose top priority is curbing nuclear proliferation, such defiance proves that Pyongyang has defected from the deal or clearly crossed the “red line.” However, to other members, who have different strategic priorities, Pyongyang’s actions are unlikely to amount to indisputable hard evidence justifying coercive means. Owing to their geographic proximity and political concerns, these members will judge Pyongyang’s behavior less harshly, hoping it will not lead to military consequences. To North Korea, breakdown of the negotiations is an undesirable but bearable outcome, as long as the country keeps its nuclear card and remains unpunished for its actions. In sum, a staged-engagement strategy would not create the conditions that would convince Pyongyang to agree to nuclear disarmament. The U.S. engagement strategy must convince the Kim regime that resisting the demand for nuclear disarmament is unnecessary, even detrimental, to its survival. It also must enable Washington to build a consensus, in the engagement coalition, that compromise on denuclearization is absolutely unacceptable. The current staged-engagement strategy does not appear to address these preconditions adequately. It will not help create a situation in which all members of the Six-Party Talks—including North Korea—could ever agree that all nonconfrontational avenues to resolve the nuclear issue with the North have been exhausted. Washington’s strategy of portraying North Korea as the deal breaker—even when it is Pyongyang that is actually accountable for breaking off the negotiations—will inevitably come up short.
SOUTH KOREA AND U.S. STRATEGIC CHOICES The five parties in multilateral engagement with North Korea through the Six-Party Talks have different aims, scopes, and preferences in their choice of instruments.10 The main goals of the U.S. engagement strategy have so far been nonproliferation and denuclearization of North Korea through discipline and strict and transparent reciprocity. However, its Asian partners China, Japan, and South Korea have remained unwilling to endorse in no uncertain terms Washington’s coercive approach toward Pyongyang. In particular, South Korea’s opposition to applying pressure and coercion on Pyongyang has emerged as the main stumbling block. Without a resolution to the disparity between U.S. and South Korean priorities, multilateral engagement with nuclear North Korea will not compel Pyongyang to undertake the complete nuclear disarmament that is necessary to achieve the “big deal.”
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For the United States, policy coordination with South Korea on the North Korea issue has never been an easy business. In contrast to the U.S. strategy, South Korea’s highest priority in the engagement strategy has been preventing a major armed conflict triggered by a DPRK-U.S. confrontation over the nuclear issue, not eliminating proliferation threats. Seoul also aims to induce behavioral and identity changes in North Korea through the enticement of national reconciliation and interdependence. With the Sunshine policy under the Kim Dae Jung administration and the succeeding Policy of Peace and Prosperity under the Roh Moo Hyun administration, South Korea has deprived the Bush administration of much of its autonomy to impose its preferred end game of engagement. In his 2006 Congressional testimony, Under Secretary of State R. Nicholas Burns explained that the dual-track strategy of the Bush administration is a creative and combined manipulation of sticks and carrots toward North Korea: “implementing fully the UN sanctions to penalize and isolate the regime” and “keeping the door open to discussions and a return to the Six-Party Talks.”11 The dual-track strategy has three main assumptions. First, exertion of pressure and provision of diplomatic incentives are mutually reinforcing; second, the United States freely chooses one method over the other to maximize its influence over North Korea’s intentions and behavior; third, there is a threshold, or a “red line,” that is universally accepted by all members in the coalition of engagement. It is assumed that the members share a set of reasonably common perspectives and measures to judge two matters: (1) whether or not the adversary has crossed that ultimate threshold; and if so, (2) whether or not the members should instantly replace engagement with compellence.12 Theoretically, the point at which engagement indisputably switches to compellence in the dual-track approach is not hard to imagine. But in reality, Washington has not been able to find a responsible exit strategy agreeable to South Korea. Seoul has had a very deep aversion to a compellence strategy because of South Korea’s psychological closeness with North Korea and its deep fear of massive retaliation and an accidental war. The past track record suggests that it is unlikely that Seoul will fully support the U.S. effort to achieve complete and verifiable dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear programs and facilities until it believes that its national security is in critical danger because of the North’s nuclear capability. Seoul’s Perspective on North Korea’s Nuclear Programs The South Korean government has explicitly and repeatedly affirmed its commitment to keeping nuclear weapons out of the Korean Peninsula. The most notable official document proclaiming this commitment is the 1992
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Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. However, despite its official position, South Korea has not absolutely prioritized the elimination of North Korean nuclear capability. The elimination constitutes only a secondary consideration in South Korea’s efforts to maintain peaceful coexistence with North Korea. In the history of the North Korean nuclear crisis since 1993, the South Korean government and public have demonstrated a persistent and manifest aversion to pressure and coercion as a solution to the nuclear issue. During the first nuclear crisis in the 1990s, in response to then U.S. president Bill Clinton’s message that hinted at U.S. intentions to launch a surgical strike on the Yongbyon nuclear facility and that the United States sought South Korea’s cooperation, then president of South Korea Kim Young Sam firmly rejected any type of South Korean involvement in that plan. Such deep aversion to the risk inherent in a coercive strategy has not declined; indeed, it has only increased. In response to President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address that branded North Korea as part of “the axis of evil” and a “regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens,” the South Korean Ministry of Unification toned down the rhetoric, stating in a press release that North Korea’s nuclear weapons were “not for the purpose of attacking the South, but to serve as a bargaining chip when negotiating with powerful countries. . . . Even if the North does possess nuclear weapons, she would be reluctant to make use of them in the small Korean Peninsula.”13 Furthermore, before the 2006 nuclear test, both the Kim Dae Jung administration and the Roh Moo Hyun administration defended their unconditional-engagement strategy toward the North and their refusal to participate in the U.S.-led attempts to pressure the North. They maintained that no available evidence indisputably proved that the North had crossed the red line. It is telling that, even after North Korea’s nuclear detonation in October 2006 and the passage of UN Resolution 1718 on October 14, 2006, the Roh administration declined to pressure Pyongyang by suspending the South’s participation in the Mt. Kumgang tourism project and the Kaesong Industrial Complex. The Roh administration also turned down the U.S. request to join the Proliferation Security Initiative at the meeting between Ban Ki-moon, then the foreign minister of South Korea (now the secretary general of the United Nations), and Condoleezza Rice, the U.S. secretary of state. The Bush-Roh summit during the 2006 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation conference held in Hanoi, Vietnam, failed to change Seoul’s position on this matter.14 There are three main reasons for Seoul’s defensive and conditional attitude toward the North’s nuclear programs. First, there is a collective perception among South Koreans that the North’s nuclear capability could be some sort of asset for a united Korea in the future. During the first North
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Korean nuclear crisis, the conservative and anticommunist Kim Young Sam administration displayed a permissive attitude toward North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear programs. The overriding assumption in the conservative camp was that, as the implosion of North Korea was imminent (and it followed that reunification or absorption would ensue), South Korea would naturally acquire North Korea’s nuclear capabilities.15 Thus, the Clinton administration’s conciliatory policy toward North Korea, after the 1994 Agreed Framework, was criticized as saving the failing regime from its not-so-distant demise and thus obstructing South Korea’s plans to inherit its own nuclear deterrence capabilities. Second, North Korea’s nuclear pursuits have served to vicariously satisfy some South Koreans, especially the so-called 386 generation, which holds a generally critical opinion of the United States. As Don Oberdorfer documents in his book The Two Koreas, South Korean president Park Chung Hee beat North Korea to the punch and aggressively pursued nuclear weapons and long-range missile systems in the 1970s. The fact that the Chun Doo Hwan administration, which succeeded Park’s authoritarian regime, terminated those military programs amid U.S. pressure served only to further enhance for South Korea the psychological appeal of possessing nuclear capability. Regardless of which Korea has them, the presence of nuclear weapons somewhere on the Korean Peninsula seemingly represents Korean people becoming more independent and powerful in the global arena.16 Finally, the geographic proximity of the two Koreas across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) affects South Koreans’ perception of a nuclear threat from the North. North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons would not comprise a serious threat per se; after all, the South is already well within the range of devastating conventional attacks from the North. What is more dangerous is a preemptive use of force by the United States as an antiproliferation measure, which would lead to war.17 The October 2006 nuclear test, with which Pyongyang declared its status as a new nuclear power, has only reinforced the South’s fear of entrapment. For instance, at the thirty-eighth Security Consultative Meeting on October 20, 2006, less than two weeks after the North’s nuclear test, the Roh administration of South Korea sought to remove the affirmation clause of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over South Korea from the Joint Communiqué.18 Nuclear independence is so deeply entrenched in South Korea’s collective psychology that domestic ideological differences and leadership changes in the South do not appear to significantly influence either its permissive attitude toward the North’s nuclear capability or its aversion to coercive solutions to denuclearization. Analysis of public opinion in South Korea supports the forecast that South Korea will not concern itself primarily about North Korea’s status as a nuclear power. In a national survey released in February 2005, 74.7 percent of South Koreans appeared to insist that the
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North Korean nuclear crisis must be resolved with persuasion; only 22.8 percent preferred pressure. More important, the level of support for persuasion over pressure was as dominant among the supporters of the Grand National Party, the conservative and anticommunist opposition party (68.8 percent for persuasion versus 30.7 percent for pressure).19 In short, the polls indicate that the fear of being victimized by a recalcitrant Pyongyang and a bullying Washington is the biggest concern for the absolute majority of South Koreans, regardless of one’s ideological bent or interest in denuclearization. The findings also demonstrate that the leadership change in South Korea after presidential elections in December 2007 will not significantly alter the default condition of the multilateral engagement strategy toward the North. Getting Seoul’s Support for Nonproliferation and Denuclearization Before February 2007, disparity and discord between U.S. policy toward North Korea and South Korean engagement policy produced frustration and a sense of hurt and anger among members of the Bush administration. It diverted the attention of analysts and policymakers from understanding the substantive characteristics of Seoul’s engagement strategy and its complex nature. On a number of occasions, U.S.-based Korea experts and U.S. government officials complained about South Korea’s standing as “a country without a coherent strategy for coping with its North Korea problem.”20 Likewise, many U.S. observers who were accustomed to the cold war mentality viewed South Korea’s own engagement with North Korea primarily with disdain for a perceived “breach of faith” and ungratefulness.21 The rise of anti-American sentiment in 2002–03 reinforced the perception that Seoul had begun to drift toward national unification with the North, prompting outcries over the possibly apocalyptic consequences that the end of the alliance would occasion.22 Unlike the arguments made by critics in the United States, Seoul’s engagement policy toward North Korea has been driven consistently by the logic of realpolitik, which accords the highest priority to national security in terms of preventing another war on the peninsula. By the same token, anti-Americanism in South Korea has been principally a manifestation of collective concern for national security, not the product of a pro–North Korean nationalistic agenda. South Korea’s engagement policy toward North Korea has been incompatible with neither the interests of the United States in general nor the spirit of the existing security alliance in particular. Charles L. “Jack” Pritchard, who served as U.S. representative to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and special envoy for negotiations with North Korea, explains in his book Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb that the U.S.
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engagement strategy should identify and cultivate elements that it shares with other participants’ strategies, rather than oppose the other participants’ strategic preferences.23 He suggests that U.S. engagement with nuclear North Korea move beyond accusations and threats. The task at hand is not to deal with South Korea’s strategy as it is but to transform the strategy so that U.S. priorities gain credence. Seoul will likely render genuine support for a big deal between North Korea and the United States only if two conditions are met: First, Seoul becomes convinced that Pyongyang alone is accountable for delays and derailments of multilateral engagement. Such a scenario will not be possible unless the United States accepts everything that South Korea deems essential to meet North Korea’s demand for abandoning its nuclear programs and materials. Second, Seoul begins to view denuclearization as an indispensable precondition for its own national survival. That is, South Korea must see the danger to its security of losing patron commitment. It must be convinced that the cost of being abandoned by the United States is far greater than the danger of being entrapped by the U.S. policy of nonproliferation.24 Contrary to some pessimistic views, the impossibility of persuading South Korea to move to the U.S. side is not a foregone conclusion. The key to success is to tap into the realpolitik logic of deterrence in Seoul’s engagement with the North. Analysis of the South’s anti-American mood and of Seoul’s security policy suggests that Seoul will likely support a complete nuclear disarmament of North Korea only when the South’s fear that the United States will abandon it outweighs the its fear that the United States, perhaps through a preemptive strike, will embroil it in a military conflict with the North. South Korea is not predisposed to prioritizing “nationalist” agendas at the expense of strategic material gains. Several findings indicate that Seoul adopts its engagement strategy with North Korea—whether the strategy is named the Sunshine policy or the Peace and Prosperity Policy—according to calculations of the strategy’s relative utility in achieving peaceful coexistence with the North. First, since peaking in late 2002, anti-American sentiment has, in fact, largely disappeared from the South Korean political scene. For instance, the general atmosphere between the United States and South Korea in 2002 was remarkably similar to the corresponding atmosphere in 2004. But a series of small and large events of the sort that had supposedly led to a spike in anti-Americanism in 2002 failed to produce the same outcome in 2004.25 South Korea’s attitude toward the United States is neither monolithic nor fixed.26 Furthermore, South Koreans’ emotional sentiment critical of the United States and South Korea’s actual policy choices are largely discrete. For example, Haesook Chae finds that young South Koreans distinguish between their feelings toward the North Korean people and their judgment of
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the North Korean leadership. Because of their significant antipathy toward the Kim regime, Chae concludes, young South Koreans are no less likely than older generations to regard the regime as a source of threats and oppression.27 Indeed, a Transaction Network Services survey in October 2007 found that South Koreans in their twenties and thirties appear to be less enthusiastic about the second inter-Korean summit held in October 2007 than older generations.28 Many young South Koreans, the main constituents of the anti-American movement in 2002–03, perceive withdrawal of U.S. forces mainly in symbolic terms, as a culmination of South Korea’s efforts to achieve selfreliance and independence in the area of national security. At the same time, they are aware of the intrinsic value of the U.S. forces and the financial and strategic implications of immediate and drastic changes in the military alliance. In this regard, it is not surprising that many young South Koreans who have denounced the U.S. invasion of Iraq as unjust have supported their government’s decision to dispatch troops as a prudent quid pro quo for maintaining the U.S.-South Korea security cooperation.29 It is not necessarily inconsistent that young South Koreans are discontented with the U.S. military presence in their country but still prefer to maintain that presence in.30 In bilateral negotiations for relocation and reconfiguration of the United States Forces Korea (USFK), South Korea has revealed a deep-seated concern for trade-offs between an independent national defense and a diminished U.S. security commitment.31 In response to the USFK troop relocation plans, the South Korean government attempted to acquire the U.S. government’s official affirmation of the Four Principal Preconditions for relocating the Second Division of the USFK.32 Widespread concern also emerged as to whether the dismantlement of the Combined Forces Command would in any way nullify the legal basis for automatic intervention of the USFK in an armed conflict against the South according to Article 3 of the Mutual Security Treaty.33 Likewise, when the Bush administration declared that the South Korean government would take over wartime operational control of the South Korean military from the USFK by 2009 rather than by the initially agreed-upon year of 2012, there was a public roar of concern about South Korea’s own capability for self-defense. In addition, at no point during the entire period of negotiations did the revision of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) emerge as a critical or viable issue. The wild fluctuation of the SOFA discourse is a remarkable turnaround. One opinion survey conducted from December 2002 to early 2003, at the peak of the anti-American movement, revealed that 63.5 percent of South Koreans believed that the SOFA should be immediately overhauled. But, six months later, support for a radical revision of the SOFA had dwindled to just 34.2 percent.34
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In sum, these findings suggest that Washington will receive the most cooperation from South Korea on the North Korea issue when Seoul is averse to the potential risk of going it alone in its relations with the North.35 A U.S. embrace of the full-engagement strategy appears to be the best option by which the United States can help Seoul depart from its default engagement strategy, which absolutely opposes coercive measures. Engagement with North Korea will be open-ended unless South Korea agrees both that all possible diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis have been exhausted and that the only remaining reasonable action must be punitive. Such an admission requires the United States both to preempt North Korea’s temptation to raise additional demands as a precondition to complete nuclear dismantlement and to create neither an excuse nor an incentive for South Korea to risk its alliance with the United States over North Korea. The post–presidential election situation in 2008 has not yet compelled South Koreans to take a definite and clear stance on denuclearizing North Korea. Unlike his predecessor, the newly elected president Lee Myung Bak sees concrete security ties with the United States as a vital tool for interKorean peaceful coexistence, not an obstacle to it.36 On the other hand, in numerous public statements, President Lee affirms that his government is still committed to drawing North Korea out of its shell by engaging it economically.37 He also proposes to open official liaison offices in both capital cities to continue and promote dialogue and exchange with the North at official levels.38 It appears that bilateral negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang near the end of the term of the Bush administration have enhanced the autonomy and leverage of the Lee government of South Korea over the relationship between the two countries.
A FULL-ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY IN REGIONAL DYNAMICS For all practical purposes, the limits and the merits of a full-engagement strategy should be examined in the context not just of Washington-Seoul relations but of regional dynamics as well. How can we forecast North Korea’s and its neighbors’ likely responses with reasonable confidence if the United States chooses a full-engagement strategy? There are four major objections to Washington’s adoption of a full-engagement strategy regarding a big deal with the North: (1) historical examples show that the strategy will not work with North Korea; (2) North Korea cannot make the strategy work; (3) the financial burden would be excessive; and (4) the strategy would destabilize regional security. Let us examine these objections one by one. First, the United States has no experience with applying a fullengagement strategy to the North. The U.S. experiences with Asian countries that come closest to possible DPRK-U.S. full engagement are the
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normalization of relations between the United States and China in the late 1970s and between the United States and Vietnam in the first half of the 1990s. One may question whether or not the U.S. engagement with China or Vietnam suggests that a full engagement with the North is likely to succeed. In comparison with China at the height of the cold war, North Korea’s strategic value is too small and its national capacity may seem too weak to justify a host of U.S. concessions. As John Lewis Gaddis has written, many key foreign policymakers in the United States during the cold war such as George Kennan and Henry Kissinger realized that moving China to the U.S. pole was an important strategic intervention under the U.S. containment strategy regarding the Soviet Union.39 There is no Soviet pole to counter in today’s balance of power politics. Unlike China, North Korea may be regarded basically as a failing regime whose days are numbered. As for the second objection, there is no guarantee that the North Korean system will be transformed. It is still very much a debatable question as to whether the North Korean regime is committed to meaningful economic reform. The risk is too high that North Korea, having received all the concessions stemming from the full-engagement strategy of the United States, might still refuse to fulfill its end of the bargain, including complete nuclear disarmament. In comparison with Vietnam, a country that had persistently been making inroads toward economic reform since undertaking the 1986 self-criticism of the socialist system, North Korea may be viewed as failing to have unequivocally demonstrated its commitment to opening its system to the outside world. Third, there is an issue of financial burden sharing among all related parties, once the United States agrees to pursue a full-engagement strategy. The Clinton administration’s struggle with the U.S. Congress in fulfilling the U.S. end of the 1994 agreement with North Korea suggests that the United States is unlikely to stomach a disproportionate share of the costs necessary to finance a big deal with the North. Finally, the full-engagement strategy may provoke China, whose sphere of influence includes the North, and it might, at the same time, send a message to Washington’s Asian allies that the United States is beginning to reduce its security commitment in Asia. As for the U.S.-Japan alliance, aggressive engagement by the United States might undermine Japan’s efforts to redress the abduction issue with North Korea. Regarding the U.S.-South Korea alliance, South Korea might perceive the U.S. action as abandonment and thus a betrayal that vindicates an imminent termination of the relationship. These concerns notwithstanding, the United States still stands to benefit substantially from a full-engagement policy. To begin, it must be stressed that the danger of a nuclear North Korea is not confined to regional balance of power considerations. North Korea today is certainly not China during the
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cold war. But North Korea’s strategic importance is not limited to a military confrontation that takes place across the DMZ. The more glaring concern for the United States is Pyongyang’s development and possession of nuclear capabilities and the related implications for international terrorism. The second objection hinges on the assumption that the demise of North Korea is imminent. There have been rising speculations about the coming crisis of the Kim Jong Il regime because of North Korea’s systemic food shortages, internal divisions among elites, succession struggles, and personal health problems among North Korean leaders. However, North Korea’s track record tells us that the country has defied all the odds against its survival for more than a half-century. As Chung-in Moon and Yongho Kim assert, to predict the implosion of North Korea by looking solely at numbers of refugees and defectors is to commit the fallacy of secondary causation. Economic crisis is certainly a significant challenge to Kim Jong Il’s regime, but the crisis by itself will not lead to the regime’s collapse.40 Studies on the origins of the North Korean state suggest that a North Korean regime with refugee problems is more comparable to Cuba, Vietnam, or China during the Cultural Revolution than to East Germany prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall. Ineffective leadership and political chaos in North Korea are unlikely to take root. If such a scenario were to arise, it would create problems with “loose nukes” or render less reliable the outcomes of denuclearization negotiations. The North Korean leadership appears to struggle with experimental economic reform measures, the effects of which are not entirely under its control.41 However, if it is in the national interest of the United States that North Korea open up to the international community and undergo systemic change, then the full-engagement policy should promote that trend.42 If dire economic conditions in North Korea were one of the underlying motives for the state’s development of nuclear capabilities, then helping the regime take measures necessary for tackling its economic problems would have direct bearing on defusing the nuclear crisis.43 Moreover, before we examine what steps would guarantee success of engagement, we must first define “success” in relation to nuclear North Korea. What constitutes a “satisfactory” outcome for a given North Korea policy? Is it the successful prevention of the North’s possible transfer of nuclear materials; is it the downfall of the Kim regime; or is it complete nuclear disarmament? If the primary goal of engagement is to disarm North Korea, then the issue of its economic reform and regime stability should be examined in the context of denuclearization. As for the third objection related to financial difficulties, perhaps what would be more crucial than China’s attitude would be Japan’s reaction to a big deal between the United States and North Korea. In comparison to its diplomacy in the first North Korean nuclear crisis of 1993–94, Japan has
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been increasingly assertive in its respective policies toward North Korea.44 Because of its economic power, Japan carries enormous weight in the prospects for full engagement. On the one hand, Tokyo can be a deal maker if it prioritizes normalizing its relations with North Korea, hoping to take advantage of a big deal struck between the United States and North Korea. On the other hand, Tokyo can be a deal breaker if Japan adamantly insists on tying the abduction issue with the nuclear issue and refuses to participate actively in financing the deal between the United States and North Korea.45 Resolving financial difficulties in a full engagement with North Korea critically depends on Japan’s prerogatives. Lastly, full engagement with North Korea might provoke China and alienate Japan, but these issues are largely manageable. China regards preventing both a sudden collapse of North Korea and a large-scale military conflict on the Korean Peninsula as top priorities. China appears to have accepted a world in which North Korea’s possession of primitive nuclear capability is fait accompli, so long as the North neither pursues full-fledged nuclear capability nor engages in proliferation.46 These are substantial strategic interests for China to accept in exchange for an increased U.S. presence in the northern part of the Korean Peninsula. On balance, regional dynamics are not prohibitively hostile to a full-engagement strategy toward North Korea. Full engagement may not be free of kinks, but managed properly and with patience, it could help foster a big deal between the United States and North Korea. Prospects for a Full Engagement with North Korea Aside from the theoretical imperative for a full-engagement strategy, severe obstacles exist for the U.S. government if it ever attempts to base its default North Korea policy on this strategy. On logical and historical grounds, a full-engagement strategy may be a sound course of action. But at a practical level, it is a political choice that is very hard to implement. It is questionable whether adopting a full-engagement strategy would be politically feasible for either the Bush administration or its successor. First, the context of DPRK-U.S. negotiations has become more problematic than it was during the first nuclear crisis. During the past six years, the two countries’ mutual distrust and hostility has only grown deeper. For the United States, North Korea is no longer a potential nuclear threat but a totalitarian regime actually in possession of tested nuclear capability. Second, there are numerous ongoing issues and numerous new ones that have the potential to derail negotiations. The two countries still need to address the broad differences between them regarding a number of big issues. These include how to disclose and define uranium enrichment programs in North Korea, what is to be done with the weapons-grade plutonium
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already in North Korean possession, and what kind of official steps the United States will take to assure North Korea of its national security. In addition, concern about North Korean nuclear proliferation was heightened by U.S. intelligence reports that hinted at the existence of a clandestine uranium-enrichment program and North Korea’s possible connections with Pakistan and Syria. As illustrated by the assiduous Congressional demand for the White House to report on the allegations about North Korea in April 2008, internal debate within the United States on this prospect is very contentious, and it remains unclear how far the United States will inflame the controversy over a possible link between Damascus and Pyongyang in relation to the potential transfer of nuclear technology, material, and knowledge.47 Third, and finally, there is danger that either Washington or Pyongyang could still be wrongfully accused of breaching the pacts, no matter how faithfully the two governments fulfill their end of the initial bargains set by the Early Harvest approach. For instance, investment by some U.S. corporations in North Korea may remain miniscule even after the U.S. government lifts economic sanctions. The heads of large private companies who were part of the South Korean delegation to the second inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang in October 2007 held a negative view of the Roh government’s promise to aggressively undertake new economic cooperation projects. Citing a “significant absence of North Korea’s readiness for economic cooperation,” these companies disclosed their deep reservations regarding oil exploration and mining projects, shipbuilding, and construction of another special industrial complex at the city of Haeju.48 At the same time, President Roh’s post-summit interview revealed that the North Korean elite, including Kim Jong Il and Kim Young Nam, remain deeply wary of the political effect of economic reforms and liberalization on the regime’s stability.49 Judging from these observations, it is unlikely that U.S. corporations will consider a slightly open North Korea an attractive business opportunity because of low profitability and the regime’s guarded attitude toward foreign elements. If the outcome that follows any termination of U.S.-led economic sanctions fails to satisfy the North Korean government, its suspicion that the United States is still conspiring to suffocate the regime may gain traction, a situation that fuels Pyongyang’s obsession with maintaining an independent nuclear capability. Conversely, the Barack Obama administration inherited the burden of moving nuclear diplomacy beyond the declarations and the disablement to which the North has acceded. Any resistance or additional demands made by Pyongyang regarding movement toward the next round of negotiations for concluding a big deal will instantly push the new administration back to the logic of anticipatory breach, especially if the new president feels the
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need to burnish his or her foreign policy credentials by getting tough on Iran or North Korea. Should any of the presidential candidates who were painted by their opponents as “the weak reed who wants to cozy up to dictators” get elected, there would be pressure to play tough on proliferation threats.50 Other candidates, given their lack of attention on the North Korean issue in their election platforms, may simply dismiss the need to urgently seek a big deal with nuclear North Korea. In turn, lack of progress in nuclear talks will frustrate Pyongyang and lead it to seek respect and attention, the implications of which were made dangerously clear with the 1998 missile launches and the 2006 nuclear test. The second inter-Korean summit in October 2007 illustrated the chasm between the two Koreas and the Bush administration regarding how to proceed toward the conclusion of a big deal. At the summit, the head of each Korean state pressed for international support for a peace treaty officially ending the Korean War. Such a gesture proves once again how deeply concerned they are with winning irrevocable assurances from the United States that military options are now off the table. On the other hand, President Bush reacted to the two Koreas’ joint action by resolutely denying the possibility of reaching any peace agreement prior to denuclearization.51 Such contrast between the two Koreas and the United States presages a long and tumultuous path for all parties involved in the Six-Party Talks. The shadow of mutual anticipatory breach is still very real for both the United States and North Korea. These two sides would have strong reasons to assume that the other has no intention of fulfilling its agreements and therefore to shape policy around that assumption. Neither side wants to look like the dupe in a nuclear standoff.
CONCLUSION A “big deal” is possible between Washington and Pyongyang. In this deal, Washington would get what it wants: a disarmed North Korea. And in this same deal, Pyongyang would get what it wants: a formal end to the Korean War through normalized relations with the United States. But the deal will occur only through a full-engagement strategy. This chapter proposes that the United States must adopt a full-engagement strategy and make a grand bargain with North Korea if it is to achieve complete denuclearization peacefully. In no way do I make this proposal to minimize the major achievement that North Korea’s decision to declare and to disable its nuclear capability constitutes for the Bush administration’s new North Korea policy. My proposal concerns chiefly the limitedness that may characterize the current staged-engagement strategy toward the North; that is, I question how effectively the strategy can convince North Korea that abandoning nuclear
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weapons is an absolute precondition for a big deal with the United States. I also caution that the United States needs to make sure to persuade South Korea to move to the U.S. side when the negotiations deal with the issue of nuclear disarmament of the North. A staged-engagement strategy is unlikely to help the United States indisputably determine whether South Korea is genuinely interested in a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, as it said it has been, or whether it never was and never will be. In practical terms, any diplomatic effort to deal with nuclear North Korea is likely to meet huge resistance as soon as North Korea has agreed not to transfer its nuclear capabilities and to partially dismantle its nuclear facilities and the United States waives North Korea from its terrorism list and the Trading with the Enemy Act. The best outcome that the current engagement strategy would likely yield is that Pyongyang would agree to include its clandestine uranium-enrichment programs in the “complete and correct” declaration. It would cost Pyongyang little to give up the program, which many analysts suspect is very much in an elementary research and development stage. But the concession could be regarded as a huge symbolic prize for Washington, a possibility that Pyongyang may be tempted to exploit.52 The choice that the United States now faces—between a stagedengagement strategy and a full-engagement strategy—will depend on the two strategies’ prospective merits, including the feasibility of their implementation. Domestic politics and regional dynamics create rare opportunities and significant constraints that the United States must deal with when implementing the full-engagement strategy. But without reaping a final harvest, there is no chance that current U.S. engagement strategy will be considered a great nonproliferation victory.
NOTES 1. Bill Powell, “North Korea Takes the Bait,” Time, February 15, 2007. http:// www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1590171,00.html. 2. “The Pyongyang Precedent,” The Wall Street Journal, October 5, 2007, A16. 3. James T. Laney and Jason Shaplen, “Disarming North Korea,” Author Update of James T. Laney and Jason Shaplen, “How to Deal with North Korea.” Foreign Affairs 82 (March/April 2003, 16–30): February 21, 2007. http://www. foreignaffairs.org/20070221faupdate86176/james-t-laney-jason-t-shaplen/disarmingnorth-korea. 4. Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 4. 5. Meredith Woo-Cumings, “Unilateralism and Its Discontents: The Passing of the Cold War Alliance and Changing Public Opinion in the Republic of Korea,” in Korean Attitudes toward the United States: Changing Dynamics, ed. David I. Steinberg (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2005), 46–55.
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6. For the content of the Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement, see http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/february/80479.htm. 7. “U.S. Ready to Ease Sanctions on N. Korea,” Washington Post, April 11, 2008. 8. Winston Lord and Leslie H. Gelb, “Yielding to N. Korea Too Often,” Washington Post, April 26, 2008; “North Korea Documents Make Debut, at a Distance.” New York Times, May 14, 2008. 9. Interviews with officials in the foreign ministry of South Korea and editors of major newspaper companies who participated in the post-summit meeting with Chairman Kim Jong Il in August 2000, Seoul, South Korea, June 25–July 11, 2007. 10. Michael Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 118; James T. Laney and Jason T. Shaplen, “How to Deal with North Korea,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 2 (March/April 2003): 18–19; Gilbert Rozman, “Japan’s North Korean Initiative and U.S.-Japanese Relations,” Orbis 47, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 527–39. 11. R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Policy toward North Korea,” Testimony to the House International Relations Committee, Washington, DC, November 16, 2006, http://www.state.gov/ p/us/rm/2006/76178.htm. 12. See Burns, “U.S. Policy toward North Korea”; Victor D. Cha, “Korea’s Place in the Axis,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 3 (May/June 2002): 79–92; “Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula,” International Security 27, no. 1 (Summer 2002): 40–78. 13. Hakjoon Kim, “Sunshine or Thunder? Tension between the Kim and Bush Administrations in Historical Perspective,” Korea Observer 34, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 33. 14. Joong-ang Ilbo, October 11, 2006, http://article.joins.com/article/article. asp?total_id=2909805; Joong-ang Ilbo, November 20 and 21, 2006, http//article.joins. com/article/article.asp?total_id=2514489. For a critical opinion of the effectiveness of the PSI, see Gerald Geunwook Lee, “A Phantom Menace: Proliferation by North Korea and Cases against the PSI,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 18, no. 4 (Winter 2006): 51–71. 15. Interview with Chong-Sik Lee, March 12, 2003, Seoul, Korea. 16. Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 69–73. 17. Joong-ang Ilbo, February 9, 2003. Such a fear was heightened earlier, in 1994, when South Korea learned that the Clinton administration was on the verge of launching a preemptive strike against the Yongbyun nuclear facilities without consultation with Seoul. 18. “Tokcho˘m int’o˘byu: Mikukpangbu Asia·t’aep’yo˘ngnyang ch’onggwal Richard Lawless ka palkin Han-Mi tongmaeng u˘i chinsil” (Interview: Richard Lawless on the Reality of the U.S.-ROK Alliance), Sin Dong-a, no. 575 (August 2007): 82–104. 19. Transaction Network Services (TNS) National Survey of seven hundred respondents with 95 percent confidence, with a margin of error of 3.7 percentage points, February 15, 2005.
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20. Nicholas Eberstadt, “North Korean Nuclear Question and U.S.-Korea Alliance: Some Implications of Future ‘Scenarios,’ ” Paper for the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)-Korea University Conference on the U.S.-Korea Alliance and the Future of Northeast Asia, Washington, DC, December 6–7, 2004, 1–19, esp. 3. 21. Cha and Kang, Nuclear North Korea, 171. 22. Nicholas Eberstadt, “Our Other Korea Problem,” National Interest 69 (Fall 2002): 113; Ah-Young Kim, “Old Waves or a New Surge? Anti-Americanism from a South Korean Perspective,” Pacific Forum CSIS Report (2003), 8–14. 23. Charles L. Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 2007), 134–35. 24. Victor D. Cha, “Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and Korea,” International Studies Quarterly 44, no. 2 (2000): 261–91; Glenn Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36, no. 4 (1984): 461–96. 25. For discussion of some controversial bilateral issues in 2003–04, see Youngshik Bong and Katharine H. S. Moon, “Rethinking Young Anti-Americanism in South Korea,” in The Anti-American Century, ed. Ivan Krastev and Alan McPherson, 90–101 (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2007). See also Chosun Ilbo (English edition), “Oprah Winfrey’s Negative Remarks about Korean Women Spark Storm,” October 15, 2004. http://news.kbs.co.kr/ispecial/ps00204.php?id=512. 26. Chang Hun Oh and Celeste Arrington, “Democratization and Changing Anti-American Sentiments in South Korea,” Asian Survey 47, no. 2 (March/April, 2007): 327–50. 27. Haesook Chae, “Understanding Anti-Americanism among South Korean College Students,” International Journal of Korean Studies 9, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2005): 107–26. 28. Only 4 percent of South Koreans in their twenties and 6 percent in their thirties watched the first day of the summit in Pyongyang. The figures are far lower than the average rates for those in their fifties (19 percent) and sixties (54 percent). Joong-ang Ilbo, October 3, 2002. 29. Of South Koreans, 88.3 percent viewed the U.S. war in Iraq as an “invasion” and 4.7 percent considered it a “just war” in October 2003. However, 72.2 percent said that their national interests required South Korea to participate in the U.S.-led alliance. Yonhap, October 8, 2003. In his April 2004 speech to a national audience on the government’s decision to send troops to Iraq, President Roh reiterated the same pragmatic principle: “Are we going to risk a war by being different from the United States? We must be different on some issues but also be able to coordinate our differences to prevent the crisis of war.” Joong-ang Ilbo, April 17, 2004. 30. According to a survey, 78.1 percent of Koreans in their twenties and 84.3 percent of those in the thirties agree that the presence of U.S. forces in South Korea is “important for the security of South Korea.” Dong-a Ilbo, April 1, 2003. 31. Chang-Hee Nam, “Relocating the U.S. Forces in South Korea: Strained Alliance, Emerging Partnership in the Changing Defense Posture,” Asian Survey 46, no. 4 (July/August 2006): 615–31. 32. Joong-ang Ilbo, August 27, 2006, http://article.joins.com/article/article. asp?total_id=2429404. The four preconditions are: preserving the U.S.-South Korean
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Mutual Security Treaty; keeping the USFK stationed in the South and guaranteeing any needed reinforcements; sharing USFK reconnaissance information with the South Korean military; and maintaining joint deterrence capability and readiness on the Korean Peninsula. Joong-ang Ilbo, October 29, 2006. http://article.joins.com/ article/article.asp?total_id=2490425. 33. Joong-ang Ilbo, September 14, 2006. http://article.joins.com/article/article. asp?total_id=2448083. 34. East Asia Institute (EAI)-Joong-ang Ilbo Survey, “Han-Mi kwan’gye yo˘ron chosa” (Public Opinion of South Korea-U.S. Relations), No. 1 (December 2002) and No. 2 (June 2003). http://www.eai.or.kr/korean/archive/feq/KU_01.pdf. 35. Nicholas Eberstadt, Aaron L. Friedberg, and Christopher Griffin, “Toward an America-Free Korea,” The Wall Street Journal, October 6, 2007, A21. 36. “South Korea’s President Looks to Repair U.S. Ties,” New York Times, April 11, 2008. 37. “South Korean President Pledges Pragmatism,” New York Time, February 26, 2008. President Lee declared what he called a “Denuclearization-Opening-3,000” program toward North Korea. The program stipulates that, once North Korea gives up its nuclear program and chooses reforms and openness, South Korea will provide massive economic aid and know-how to help North Korea raise its annual per capita income to $3,000 from about $900 within ten years. 38. “South Korean President Discusses U.S.-South Korea Relations: President Lee Myung-bak Takes Questions From Washington Post Editors and Reporters,” Washington Post, April 17, 2008. 39. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War, 2nd edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 40. Chung-in Moon and Yongho Kim, “The Future of the North Korean System,” in The North Korean System in the Post-Cold War Era, ed. Samuel Kim (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 221–58. 41. Christopher D. Hale, “Real Reform in North Korea? The Aftermath of the July 2002 Economic Measures,” Asian Survey 45, no. 6 (November/December 2005): 823–42. 42. Cha and Kang, Nuclear North Korea, 102; Chung-in Moon, “Managing Collateral Catastrophe: Rationale and Preconditions for International Economic Support for North Korea,” in A New International Engagement Framework for North Korea? Contending Perspectives, ed. Choong-yong Ahn, Nicholas Eberstadt, and Young-sun Lee (Washington, DC: Korea Economic Institute, 2004), 117–58. 43. Michael O’Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki, Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to Deal with a Nuclear North Korea (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003). 44. Linus Hagstrom, “The Dogma of Japanese Insignificance: The Academic Discourse on North Korea Policy Coordination,” Pacific Affairs 79, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 387–410. 45. In his responses to questions in the Diet, former Prime Minister of Japan Abe Shinzo reiterated that Japan’s policy would link the abduction issue with the improvement of Japan’s economic relations with North Korea: “We must not be isolated and we are not in fact isolated. . . . Other countries understood our decision not to provide oil unless progress is made in the abduction case.” Norimitsu
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Onishi, “South Korea and Japan Split on North Korea Pact,” New York Times, February 15, 2007. 46. Speech by former ROK ambassador to the United States Han Seung-joo, Sigur Center of Asian Studies at George Washington University, April 25, 2007. 47. “U.S. Sees N. Korean Links to Reactor,” New York Times, April 24, 2008; “Bush Administration Releases Images to Bolster Its Claims About Syrian Reactor,” New York Times, April 25, 2008. 48. “Pangbuk kyo˘ngjeindu˘l Puk kyo˘nghyo˘p chunbi mihu˘p” (Business Elite Are Concerned about North Korea’s Readiness), Dong-a Ilbo, October 6, 2007. 49. “No taet’ongnyo˘ng: kaehyo˘k kaebang Pugi araso˘ hal il” (President Roh Said Reform and Opening Is Nobody’s but the North’s Business), Dong-a Ilbo, October 6, 2007. 50. Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton’s vote in October 2007 in support of a confrontational U.S. policy against Iran’s Revolutionary Guard is one example. See Maureen Dowd, “Bomb, Bomb Iran,” New York Times, October 10, 2007, A23. 51. At a joint press conference with President Roh of South Korea, U.S. president Bush tersely responded to Roh’s insistence that the United States clarify its position regarding a potential peace treaty with Pyongyang: “I said it’s up to Kim Jong Il as to whether or not we’re able to sign a peace treaty to end the Korean War. He’s got to get rid of his weapons in a verifiable fashion.” “Nuclear Experts to Inspect Sites in North Korea,” New York Times, September 7, 2007; “No-Bush APEC kongdonghoegyo˘n ‘p’yo˘nghwa hyo˘pcho˘ng’ chuldarigi ohae wa chinsil” (Misunderstanding and Truth about the Tug-of-War on the “Peace Accord” at Roh-Bush APEC Joint Press Conference), Joong-ang Ilbo, September 10, 2007. 52. Selig Harrison, “Did North Korea Cheat?” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 1 (January/February 2005): 99–110; David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “U.S. Concedes Uncertainty on North Korean Uranium Effort,” New York Times, March 1, 2007; “North Korea Nuclear Talks Face Uncertain Hurdles,” New York Times, September 25, 2007.
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THREE
LOOKING EAST China’s Policy toward the Korean Peninsula Fei-Ling Wang
Rapidly rising in power, China is playing an increasingly active and important role in its neighborhood, especially in East Asia. Beijing’s general policy thrust in the immediately surrounding areas is to seek a “harmonious world” with the measures of mulin (good neighbors) and fulin (enriching the neighbors). This is, arguably, a conformist and peaceful policy that helps to advance China’s ambition of a peaceful rise to becoming a world-class great power.1 A key component of China’s diplomacy in the region is its ties with the two Koreas. Beijing’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula, crucially important to peace and stability in Northeast Asia and illuminating overall Chinese foreign policy, prefers the status quo through engagement while quietly preparing for undesirable developments that may be inevitable; it also brews new demands that are likely to become more noticeable and even challenging as Chinese power grows. So far, Beijing’s effort at engaging North Korea has appeared to be effective in facilitating steps toward a resolution of the nuclear issue and bringing the United States closer to dealing with Pyongyang to stabilize the Peninsula. Overall, Chinese ties with the Koreas have been fundamentally conditioned by the Sino-American relationship that has motivated Beijing to pursue a pro–status quo policy in the region.2
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From Beijing’s point of view, the Korean Peninsula currently offers great strategic maneuverability and enormous economic benefits. North Korea provides a main stage for Beijing’s multilateral diplomacy and is the focal point of the major common interest of denuclearizing the Peninsula that Beijing shares with Washington. South Korea, with its technology and manufacturing industries, has formed an efficient production chain with Chinese labor to power China’s booming exports to the United States; this cooperation is a key ingredient of both Chinese and Korean economic growth. None of China’s other neighbors is so vital to Beijing’s security and economic concerns. Given growing Sino-Korean economic integration and cultural exchange, the recurring historical and territorial disputes, and the complex geopolitical interplay with the two Koreas, Beijing’s strategic thinking shows a great degree of patience and uncertainty, as well as an interesting array of diverse pursuits, highly conditioned by China’s overall strategic consideration of the world and its own domestic needs. In the near term, barring any major changes in the Sino-American relationship and any catastrophic development inside the People’s Republic of China (PRC), China’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula is expected to be stable and conservative: Beijing prefers the continued survival of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) for its political and strategic needs while developing ever-closer relations with the Republic of Korea (ROK) for important economic interests and geopolitical considerations of cultivating some counterweight to Japan and the United States. Nominally supporting Korean unification, the PRC seeks to maintain the political status quo and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula: No Nukes, No Unification. The American military presence on the peninsula is now viewed as a dwindling concern to Beijing. However, the uncertainties and complications of Sino-American relations, the Sino-Japanese discord, and the Taiwan issue may develop further to profoundly alter China’s strategic calculation about the Korean Peninsula and hence Beijing’s policy of status quo and denuclearization. While basically successful so far, Beijing may need or be forced to change its Korea policy in the not too distant future. On the one hand, a pro–status quo China could be ready to accept a Seoul-dominated united Korea, even with nuclear capabilities, as long as it is stable and friendly to Beijing, On the other hand, an aggressive exercise of Chinese power could seek to quietly or even overtly establish its own sphere of influence on the peninsula, starting in North Korea, which, in that case, could well become just a pawn on Beijing’s chessboard. To discuss these points, this chapter outlines the basics of China’s foreign policy toward the two Koreas with an emphasis on Beijing’s recent conduct, main concerns, and key constraints. It will first describe the key concerns and constraints in the making of Chinese foreign policy in general: the peculiar incentives in Beijing and the relations China has with
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the United States. In line with its overall objective in diplomacy, Beijing is seeking shared strategic interest with the United States and other major external powers on the Korean Peninsula, amid profound differences and uncertainties. Patient and eyeing the long term, Beijing’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula demonstrates both challenges and opportunities.
INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS: A RISING POWER WITH PECULIAR MOTIVATIONS In the past three decades, the PRC has managed to achieve two seemingly impossible goals: remarkable sociopolitical stability and record-shattering economic growth. After surviving the political turmoil of 1989, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) perpetuates a monopoly of political power in China with a still poor, albeit improving, record of social liberty and human rights. The Chinese economy has been experiencing a major boom that promises the rise of China as a world-class power in the foreseeable future. China’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has grown at the speed of more than 9 percent annually for the past twenty-five years and over 10 percent from 2003 to 2008, becoming the world’s number four or number two (by purchasing power parity) economic power.3 With this impressive record of economic growth, Beijing has successfully justified its one-party authoritarian political system to the Chinese, especially the elites (mainly the politically potent urban population), forming a new ruling alliance and a new developmentalist political consensus that monopolizes political power.4 It seems that political legitimacy can indeed be effectively purchased, at least for the time being. More active Chinese participation in the management of international affairs and a more evenly constructed multipolar world seem to appeal highly to a rising China. Many PRC analysts prefer the country to be, first, given daguo (great power) responsibility in the Asia Pacific region, to ensure a “just and rational” new security order in the region. In pursuit of “enriching the neighbors,” Beijing has indeed effectively purchased great amount of goodwill and legitimacy as well as influence in the region. Its pragmatic attitudes toward territorial and other disputes with its neighbors and its effective control of domestic opinions and voices have also pleased most of the PRC’s neighbors. Beyond that, Beijing hoped to take advantage of the differences between the United States and its allies in Europe by forging more ties between the “rising Asia” and the European Union5—or form a ChinaIndia-Russia alliance to counter the U.S.-EU-Japan dominance.6 In 2005, Beijing made a somewhat surprising move to support New Delhi’s bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council while it openly and repeatedly rejected Japan’s similar aspiration.7 Eventually, many in Beijing hope
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that China’s rise will make it a new world leader, able to provide new norms and create a new history for itself and for the world.8 One analyst put the economic reasons for the expansion of Chinese power very bluntly: “China’s sustained development in the future can not be sufficiently supported by (our) domestic resources, we must have the right to share the world’s resources and use it to support China’s development.”9 At one extreme of Chinese strategic views, there is now a powerful attempt to revitalize the Tianxia (under-the-heaven) system, an old Chinese imperial notion that the whole world should be united and governed like an orderly and harmonious family with layers and ranks under one centralized ruler, a benevolent dictator, a “son of heaven” whose rule is based on “earning people’s hearts” with ethics rather than law. Essentially, this would mean that the long stagnation and despotism that marked the Chinese world order in East Asia before the late nineteenth century be repackaged as China’s alternative to the West-dominated, Westphalian system of international relations.10 Yet, the rising Chinese power faces important and rather peculiar concerns and constraints. Internally, Beijing’s top concern in foreign policy remains the preservation of the one-party political system of the CCP. Short of effective political reforms to produce better governance, the necessity for self-preservation remains the top objective for Beijing. Tangible and continued economic prosperity has become the avenue to reach that goal; international acceptance and approval have become major sources of legitimacy for the CCP at home, while nationalistic demands for more Chinese power and prestige have presented Beijing with an additional opportunity for and a new challenge to its political preservation. Together, a peculiar incentive structure of political preservation, economic prosperity, and national power/ prestige now fundamentally motivates China’s foreign policy. All these have indeed made the rising “superpower” of the PRC rather fragile inside.11 For the CCP’s political survival, China’s foreign policy remains basically conservative, pragmatic, pro-status quo, and reactive. External respect itself has become a leading source of political legitimacy, hence Beijing cultivates hard its peaceful and cooperative posture in international relations. But China’s conservative foreign policy for political preservation and its drive for economic prosperity have combined to generate fuel for a rising sense of Chinese nationalism that necessitates assertive and even aggressive actions on the international stage. Rapid economic growth and technological advances have powered nationalistic sentiments and demands, but Beijing’s preservation-oriented conservative foreign policy has frustrated many Chinese nationalists. The pressure to exercise greater power in international relations is creeping up inside China as an increasingly strong factor to be reckoned with. Although the official line in Beijing remains mild and benign “peaceful development,” the new and more majestic idea of “peaceful rise” reemerged after the power transition from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao.12
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Practically, China has developed an unprecedented dependence on international trade. In 2004, 20 percent to one-quarter of China’s GDP was directly related to foreign trade; and China increasingly imports more oil from the troubled region of the Middle East.13 Economic globalization, hence, appears to Beijing a worthwhile gamble. A senior CCP official argues that as long as China seizes the currently available “development opportunity that presents itself only once in a thousand years so to ride the tide to catch the express train of economic globalization, we will realize our ideals of having a frog-leap development and having a powerful nation and rich people.”14 For that, China clearly needs to be part of the existing international economic institutions, trade aggressively with everyone, and, especially, maintain a good relationship with the developed nations. So Beijing has been interested in the construction of a free trade zone that includes basically all of East and Southeast Asia, the so-called “ten plus three” scheme. Starting in 2004, Beijing has joined the meeting of financial ministers and central bank governors of the G-7 countries.15 It seems to the CCP that selective embrace of globalization pays and political legitimacy can be purchased internationally as well. Guided by the incentive structure of Preservation, Prosperity, and Power (3-P),16 Beijing believes that the post–September 11 War on Terror and the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq have provided a “period of strategic opportunity” for the CCP to concentrate on its strategy of stability and development in the first two decades of this century.17 A continuation of the currently stable U.S.-China relationship and a peaceful international environment remains a key objective.18 It is worthwhile to note that many Chinese analysts are now increasingly candid about the inadequacy of Chinese power, primarily defined as China’s lack of military capabilities. While the PLA may be capable of safeguarding the CCP-PRC political system against foreseeable domestic threats, it is clearly underequipped and poorly trained to carry out missions outside of China’s borders, with perhaps the exception of nuclear capable land- and sea-based ballistic missiles.19 Consequently, increasingly many now in the PRC are calling for the steady buildup and exercise of China’s military power, to seek the appropriate Chinese “sphere of influence” and “regain” China’s rightful but deprived greatness and influence.20 Leading Chinese economists also argue for a “massive increase of military spending” by as much as 50 percent in the near future so to make China a world class power by the mid-twenty-first century.21
EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS: U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS In the late 2000s, the basics of Sino-American relations, widely believed to be the most important bilateral relationship to both countries, remained stable as the second Bush administration openly sought to build “a candid,
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cooperative and constructive relationship with China that embraces our common interests.” The Obama administration, so far, has followed the same cooperative and pragmatic engagement policy, especially in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. However, as then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told the U.S. Senate, there are “considerable differences about values” between Washington and Beijing.22 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, under the pragmatic doctrine of “smart power,” has also been quite blunt about such differences, especially concerning human rights in China. Indeed, there are several explosive mines that could seriously damage the U.S.-China relationship, among which the Taiwan issue is a major one.23 Stability with considerable uncertainties that have great consequences seems to be the proper characterization of the current U.S.-PRC relationship, which serves as the most powerful external constraint on Chinese foreign policy, especially on the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, rising international scrutiny and suspicion have led to concrete moves by some leading powers to hedge against rising Chinese power. Apprehension and even fear about the rising dragon is seen in China’s neighboring areas.24 The latest of great powers’ hedging efforts is the formation of the quasi-military alliance among the United States, Japan, Australia, and India.25 With their similarities in sociopolitical values and their location and resources, the emerging four-nation concert, and its vast networks of allies throughout the region, could serve as a serious counterforce to China’s ambition and expansion, as well as impacting CCP’s political survival. Motivated by its 3-P objectives, outlined above, Beijing has been seeking to avoid direct conflicts with the United States, at least for now, by pursuing a conservative, pro–status quo, and risk-averse policy that is quite unusual for a rapidly rising power. Beijing appears to be betting its future on its efforts within the current international political and economic system and its focused program of economic development by taking advantage of Western capital, technology, and markets to make the PRC an equal to the West. In addition, after more than two decades of opening to the outside world (mainly the West) and as new Chinese élites who tend to have great vested interest in a good relationship with the United States increase in number, China is now increasingly and genuinely developing some shared values, interests, and even perspectives with reigning Western powers.26 The United States, as the lone superpower that can realistically undermine or accept, and hence legitimize, Beijing’s political system and help or hinder Beijing’s economic and foreign pursuits, remains greatly influential in the PRC, and Beijing shows great deference to American power and leadership.27 The United States is viewed in Beijing as “the largest external factor affecting China’s national reunification and national security.”28 Finding the current status quo in their interest, Washington and Beijing have developed some shared strategic interests in the global war on terrorism and
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in handling regional or UN-related issues, such as the control of weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear armed and deemed by many to be condemned into a hopeless course of collision between the reigning power and the rising power, America and China appear to be surprisingly peaceful and cooperative with each other, so far.29 A de facto alliance of antiterrorism and antirecession now exists between Beijing and Washington. One authoritative analyst wrote to educate PRC officials that, although the United States has not changed its policy of concurrently engaging and containing China after September 11, [r]ight now, the tip of the U.S. spear is not all pointed at China. This brings a rare opportunity for us to concentrate on economic construction and create beneficial international and neighboring environments. We must seize upon this rare opportunity after more than ten years since the end of the Cold War. [We] should not stand out diplomatically so to avoid drawing fires to ourselves; instead, [we] should concentrate on doing a good job internally, speed up economic construction, accelerate development, to strive for a larger elevation of China’s comprehensive national power in the first ten to twenty years of the new century.30 Yet, as the CCP’s foreign policy guru Qian Qichen vented, Beijing harbors deep resentment toward American hegemony.31 There are significant uncertainties between Beijing and Washington that may make the U.S.-China relationship just another repeat of the tragic history of great power politics. While not unavoidable yet, a more confrontational crossPacific relationship will necessarily produce profound shocks and costs to the whole world, especially the Korean Peninsula. American criticism of China in the areas of Beijing’s human rights record, however, is largely rhetorical, so far. To the dismay of Chinese political exiles as well as opposition groups such as the Falun Gong, American ideological criticisms of Beijing are mainly for domestic consumption and are unlikely to lead to concrete actions against China beyond words. The more urgent, real American need is to get China to cooperate on fighting international terrorism and resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. Making the PRC President Hu Jintao the first peer he met at the APEC Summit Meeting in September 2007, U.S. president Bush told reporters that despite the many differences with China, Washington especially appreciated the Chinese cooperation on the DPRK nuclear issue.32 Out of all the uncertainties between the United States and China, the most explosive problem remains the Taiwan issue. Taiwan, a de facto independent entity that seeks a full or de jure independence, is of core interest to China as it directly affects the CCP’s political preservation, China’s
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economic prosperity, national power, and prestige. No Chinese ruler, communist or not, can afford to “let Taiwan go” without risking the collapse of his own regime. Wary of the cost of “swallowing” a democratic Taiwan, which will pose a great threat to the CCP’s one-party political monopoly, Beijing hence sincerely prefers the status quo to be stabilized with the nominal reunification of “one country, two systems” for its own domestic consumption. But Beijing is nonetheless also preparing to fight a war with even the United States to keep Taiwan within a “one-China” framework. Regarding Taiwanese independence, one detects very little difference in attitude among Chinese élites, street people, and even political exiles. However, by 2009, the tensions in the Taiwan Strait have calmed down considerably. The defiant Taiwanese president Chen Shui-Bian failed to seek a provocative referendum on Taiwan’s application for United Nations membership in May 2008 and has been disgraced and discredited by his own legal problems since then. The new Taiwanese president Ma Ying-Jeou has successfully restored the framework of “one China” and actively improved relations, especially economic ties, with Beijing. A strong show of consensus between Beijing and Washington in maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait seems to have worked. It has been very comforting for Beijing to see President Bush, who promised in 2001 that he would do everything to protect Taiwan, in 2007 publicly shun the Taiwanese leaders for their push for formal independence.33 Will Beijing trade the DPRK for Taiwan? Chinese officials and analysts seem to see the futility and danger of making such a connection. Nonetheless, one hears frequently from Beijing comments such as this: “Of course, the American strategy towards China [mainly on the Taiwan issue] strongly shapes the Chinese attitude [toward the Korean Peninsula].”34
BEIJING AND THE TWO KOREAS: A SKETCH More than a half-century after the Korean War, the major powers in the region, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia, continue to hold the key to the political future of the Korean Peninsula. Currently, China and the United States have demonstrated a shared interest in peace and stability in Northeast Asia through maintaining the status quo and pursuing denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. After “joining the great powers” on the question of how to deal with the nuclear ambitions of the DPRK and on the Korean unification issue in general in the 1990s,35 the PRC has continued to play its happy role of hosting and participating in the Six-Party Talks, which seems to help stabilize the situation. This position and role well fit Beijing’s overall diplomatic objectives as analyzed earlier. An analyst in Beijing gladly and candidly concluded:
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The future new international political order in Northeast Asia depends on the relations among the four major powers: the U.S., Japan, China, and Russia. The interests of the four major powers will affect the issue of Korean reunification. Korean reunification will be decided by inter-Korean factors under the influence of the political attitudes of the four major powers.36 Ever since the demise of the Soviet Union, Beijing has pursued a separate relationship with the two Koreas by viewing them as co-surviving entities and has attempted to develop good but very different ties with each. With skillful management, highly pragmatic policies, and huge investment, China now is the only outside power that enjoys a close and amicable relationship with both Koreas at the same time, while mainly paying lip service to the course of Korean unification. Over the objections of Pyongyang, China established full ties with South Korea in 1992, without first securing cross-recognition of the DPRK by the U.S. and Japan. There has been a phenomenal, explosive growth of economic exchange between the ROK and the PRC ever since. Trade grew at an astonishing speed of 40 percent annually in the 1990s. By 2004, the PRC became South Korea’s largest trade partner and ROK became China’s third largest.37 Sino-South Korean exchanges of students and culture products grew at a breathtaking pace, to make the ROK a major source of education, cultural influence, and even culinary taste for millions of Chinese. Every week, there are about eight hundred flights between the two countries (versus only about three hundred between the ROK and the United States). More than thirty thousand Chinese students now study in the ROK while a similar number of ROK students are studying the PRC. At the end of 2004, China opened a cultural center in Seoul, its sixth in the world and first in Asia.38 Dozens of Korean companies now provide up to 70 percent of the entire online electronic gaming industry in China. One study reports that Korean snack food, Chocopie, now occupies about 40 percent of China’s pie industry. A hallyu (Korean trend, meaning fever for Korean culture products) has been developing extensively in China. ROK-made TV programming, movies, and music videos have become a cultural phenomenon in the PRC, so much so that Beijing decided in 2004 to step up its regulation of Korean culture products to protect Chinese “pride.”39 PRC-ROK exchanges have been so significant that Chinese analysts themselves have been openly asserting that the ROK is now economically dependent on the PRC and the two countries have already formed a high degree of economic integration, closer than that in the old tributary days. The “comradeship” between Beijing and Pyongyang has experienced rocky moments in the past two decades as China engaged in its internal
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economic reforms and its process of opening to the outside. The thorniest issue remains the DPRK’s resentment of what it sees as China’s abandonment of North Koreans. However, Beijing has continued its “obligation” to Pyongyang by spending billions of dollars to help the financially troubled DPRK. For example, during one visit to Pyongyang by PRC president Hu Jintao in 2006, Beijing openly pledged US$2 billion in aid to the DPRK, 50 percent more than DPRK’s total export volume in 2005. Beijing is now the major even if not sole supporter of the DPRK’s failed economy and its political regime. More than one-third of DPRK’s exports go to China and more than 42 percent of its imports come from China.40 In fact, Beijing has often served on the international stage as Pyongyang’s agent and protector, even though Pyongyang has been seeking all possible opportunities to make independent deals with the United States and other countries. China’s engagement with North Korea, stable, quiet, and successful as it has been, however, has not produced the kind of closeness and mutual dependence that has now emerged between Seoul and Beijing, despite the professed ideological comradeship. Beijing seems to have noticed clearly that “Pyongyang is trying everything possible to make up with Washington at our expense,”41 but nonetheless has stuck to its engagement with the often annoying DPRK. The most recent example is that Pyongyang seems to have indicated its desire to exclude China from the future peace settlement of the Korean War in the Kim Jong Il and Roh Moo Hyun Joint Declaration on October 4, 2007. The document, very curiously, specified in Item 4 that “[t]he South and the North have also agreed to work together to advance the matter of having the leaders of the three or four parties directly concerned to convene on the Peninsula and declare an end to the war.”42 That statement rightfully prompted speculation (later specifically confirmed by Seoul) that Pyongyang was trying to exclude Beijing.43 While leading Western media did not even pick up that nuanced but unmistaken sign,44 pro-Beijing Web sites quickly geared up to protest it with angry words such as “this is very dangerous” and “China found it totally unacceptable.”45 Displeased but discreetly, however, Beijing still officially welcomed the Kim-Roh Declaration.46
CHINESE OBJECTIVES: NO UNIFICATION AND NO NUKES, FOR NOW Currently, Beijing’s dominant interest is in a peaceful and stable Korean Peninsula, divided or unified, though preferably divided. It is also strongly interested in seeing the peninsula free of nuclear weapons.47 To avoid the entanglement and shocks at a time when Beijing is worrying about its own political stability and desires to avoid conflict with the United States, China is happy to play a passive, arguably indispensable, role in dealing with the
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North Korean nuclear program and the process of Korean reunification. While openly professing its preference that the Korean Peninsula should remain nuclear-free, Beijing insists that the United States should not use that issue to destroy the DPRK or cause a military confrontation in Northeast Asia. “After all,” a PRC scholar wrote in mid-2005, “DPRK’s nuclear program imposes a threat to the U.S., not to China.”48 The PRC now exhibits a clear ambivalence toward the unification of Korea: a unified Korea might create stability and peace on the peninsula over the long run, and might eliminate the existence of external military and political forces in the region; a united and stronger Korea would likely serve as an important force countering Japan in East Asia—to constitute the new multipolar structure desired by Beijing; Korean reunification also echoes the similar desire China has for Taiwan. However, Beijing has a strong sense of uncertainty and serious reservations about Korean reunification. A military alliance between a united and perhaps nationalistic Korea and the United States clearly makes Beijing uncomfortable. The following official statement by the PRC a decade ago still holds true today. China takes maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula as the fundamental principle in its handling of peninsula affairs. . . . China has dedicated itself to maintaining peace and stability there, endorsing the improvement of relations between the North and South of Korea and supporting an independent and peaceful reunification.49 Practically, China is likely to continue its active role as a good host to the Six-Party Talks aiming at the control, if not resolution, of the Korean nuclear issue, and tries hard to give it a good spin every time. It appears to be in Beijing’s interest to exert more pressure on Pyongyang to have a realistic and timely peaceful end to the U.S.-DPRK dispute over Pyongyang’s nuclear ambition but secure the survival of the DPRK,50 before the United States shifts its full attention to Northeast Asia after pulling out of the quagmire of Iraq. To have the whole weight of a freedom-promoting and tyranny-fighting America concentrated on its border area is not in the CCP’s core interests. Moreover, an acute and prolonged DPRK nuclear dispute has already given Tokyo the reason and context for its resurgence in military and political capabilities. Thus, instead of just blaming the United States for the deadlock of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing frequently uses “the mistrust between the DPRK and the United States” as the official explanation,51 a coded criticism directed against Pyongyang. Finally, the DPRK’s testing of nuclear devices in 2006 has been viewed by Beijing with great displeasure.52 It seems to have delayed and threatens
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to derail Chinese plans. The recent moves by Tokyo on the way toward its so-called political and military “normalization,” such as amending Japan’s peace constitution and rearming itself, and the prospects of a united and nuclear capable Korea have seriously alarmed Beijing. So much so that Beijing, for the first time, used very harsh language to publicly criticize its “comrades” in Pyongyang and put into place some sanctions against the DPRK for “not listening to our advice.”53 No nukes on the Korean Peninsula is indeed a shared interest with the United States; no unification of the Koreas and no confrontation with the United State on the peninsula seem to be Beijing’s higher goal, in the name of stability and peace. For that, Beijing is learning from the United States what its analysts have called a “dual strategy of coaxing and coercing” in carrying out its Korea policy.54 One PRC scholar candidly described the “dilemmas” Beijing now faces in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue: It has strong concerns over the consequence of a nuclear Korea and beyond (“China worries about Japan’s nuclear capability more than North Korea’s”); it also clearly opposes the use of force on the Korean Peninsula by the United States. Furthermore, Beijing is obviously not very happy with Pyongyang on many issues and actions, as few in China “have good feelings toward North Korea” and “huge distrust exists between China and North Korea . . . and North Korea will remain suspicious of China’s intentions”; yet it earnestly wants to preserve the DPRK regime. In the final analysis, “what China worries about the most is that the U.S. will help Japan and Taiwan to build up theater missile defense systems using the excuse of the North Korean nuclear threat.” Hence, Beijing worries about being “used” by the United States and seeks low-key efforts first to maintain the status quo and then to address the DPRK nuclear program peacefully, so to escape from the dilemma and the “American trap.”55 There are obvious limits to how far a multilateral relationship in Northeast Asia can go. Beijing thus continues to watch attentively the U.S. policy and action in the region, among which a key aspect is the U.S.-ROK military alliance.56 The recent redeployment of U.S. forces in Korea has been interpreted by some in Beijing as an innovative use of the U.S.-ROK alliance that may have implications for Taiwan and elsewhere in the region. The popular belief, official announcements, and actions in Tokyo treating China and the DPRK as the two major security threats to Japan may have caused Beijing to ponder in considerable displeasure, and to feel hurt at being viewed in the same light as Pyongyang, an international outcast, by the Japanese.57 The PRC Foreign Ministry spokeswoman called the Japanese concerns hyped and objectionable; and in turn accused the Japanese of “affronting China’s sovereignty and territory integrity.”58
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As China grows stronger and more confident, especially when the need to preserve a CCP one-party regime becomes less pressing, Beijing may conceivably develop different views and policies. In practice, it may worry much less about the possible destabilizing effect Korean reunification could produce. The sine qua non that may change Beijing’s views and policies remains the overall state of Sino-American relations and the status of China’s own reunification with Taiwan. If Washington and Beijing are on good terms, China makes satisfactory progress in its own reunification effort with Taiwan, the U.S.-ROK military alliance fades and even disappears as Korean unification proceeds, and a unified Korea is at least neutral in the major power games in East Asia, Beijing may throw in its weight to facilitate Korean unification.59 Otherwise, China is expected to simply continue to play a passive role and let the United States do the heavy lifting through leading the international effort aimed maintaining the status quo on the Korean Peninsula. Beijing contributes to this effort by supporting the Kim Jong Il regime in the North, and cultivating a good relationship with the South. Beijing also eyes attentively what Washington may do to the DPRK.60 So long as Beijing worries about an American threat to its political stability and even its national security, China’s support for Korean reunification or a U.S.-DPRK relationship is likely to be very limited. Beijing is anxious to see the DPRK on its own feet economically through Chinese-style reform and proactive “help” from the PRC.61 Beijing may even militarily intervene (as some ROK analysts have speculated) to prevent a rapid unification of Korea,62 especially if the U.S. military presence, as viewed by most observers, is to be continued on the peninsula beyond Korean unification, or if Pyongyang and Washington get too close. It will be difficult for Beijing to accept a united Korea (most likely on the ROK terms) with a fully functioning U.S.-ROK military alliance as long as the United States is viewed as a political and ideological challenger to Beijing and an obstacle to China’s own unification effort. The most recent, fairly tense exchanges between Washington and Taipei on the latter’s ambition for legal independence may signal that Washington is aware of the important link between the shared Sino-American interest on the Korean Peninsula and a cooperative management of the Taiwan issue. Some strategic reciprocity with the United States regarding the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan is an idea not that far-fetched. If Washington were willing to help more to preserve the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, as it has been signaling since the spring of 2004, then Beijing would show willingness to work more actively with the United States to pressure its comrades in Pyongyang concerning the DPRK nuclear programs, especially if it feels that the No Nukes and No Unification objectives on the peninsula are in jeopardy.
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POLICIES AND INTERACTIONS By the late 2000s, as “a responsible great power,” Beijing has kept its Korea policy “nearly unanimous and consistent” for nearly two decades, according to foreign policy analysts in Beijing, in line with its overall foreign policy and reflecting the largely stable U.S.-China relationship. Officially supporting the independent and peaceful unification of Korea in principle, but unsure of its consequences and apprehensive about the possible negative impact associated with a likely continuation of U.S. military forces in a united Korea, China has continued to advocate a “balanced” policy that aims at the preservation of the status quo of political division on the Korean Peninsula. Having been “tricked into entering the Korean War” more than fifty years ago, the PRC harbors strong, though well hidden, resentment and distrust toward Pyongyang. Beijing has felt deep frustration and constant irritation with its Pyongyang comrades, who have not only failed to reform the North Korean economy, but have also attacked China’s unorthodox reforms.63 In recent years, the DPRK has created considerable thorny diplomatic problems for the PRC: repeated North Korean defectors seeking protection in Japanese and ROK diplomatic missions in the PRC have continuously put Beijing in an awkward position. There is also the costly problem of how to repatriate the significant number of North Korean refugees in China’s Northeast, which is creating local problems and tensions with the South Koreans. Beijing is especially unhappy with the DPRK’s use of a nuclear test since it not only threatens China’s core interest of preferring peace and stability in Northeast Asia, but also has already led to Japan’s efforts to rearm itself to be a “normal power” and hence offset rising Chinese power in the region. Unable to control or abandon Pyongyang yet clearly unwilling to fight the United States and its allies for the DPRK, Beijing is caught between two tough choices. The best way out is to muddle through by trying to preserve the status quo and prevent a showdown. Hence, Beijing continues its vital assistance to the DPRK for mainly geopolitical concerns, cloaking it in humanitarian and ideological rhetoric, insisting that it “has always maintained close contacts and cooperation” with the DPRK.64 When Chinese scholars published an article criticizing the North Koreans for their domestic polices and external adventures in September 2004 in the influential Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and Management), Beijing ordered the magazine recalled and the journal banned indefinitely.65 In the multilateral negotiations of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing tries hard to be an “honest broker” between the United States and the DPRK and an inconspicuous but consistent agent and spokesman for its North Korean comrades. By late 2007, Beijing’s effort seems to be paying off, as Washington appreciates its help and, arguably,
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rewards it on the Taiwan issue, while the nuclear issue may be going away so as not to give Tokyo reason to rearm further. Great economic and cultural ties with the ROK have affected Beijing’s policy toward the two Koreas greatly. Beijing is now often seen bending over backward to maintain the image of a good relationship with Seoul. Even though it appears that bilateral negotiations and give-and-take between Pyongyang and Washington have been the key to any real progress in addressing the nuclear issue so far, China nonetheless has performed well in mediating between the DPRK and the United States, projecting China’s rising power and prestige, and perpetuating the multilateral forum. China’s positive role has earned itself great credit in South Korea, where growing mistrust and resentment of the United States have powerfully enhanced favorable feelings toward China, clearly rationalized by the massive and highly lucrative China-ROK economic exchange. Through its booming trade with China, the ROK has enjoyed a large trade surplus almost every year, and has accumulated a total of more than $200 billion in foreign currency reserves as a result. In the foreseeable future, the PRC-ROK trade looks vitally profitable to South Korea, although Chinese analysts have started to believe that it will eventually turn around as China catches up with the ROK technologically. “[South] Koreans will soon not be able to make so much money from us so easily,” commented a PRC analyst in private in 2007. “To balance the United States” and “to offer a different kind of new leadership” now seem to be a major strategic attraction of the rising China to many, especially those on the left, in South Korea; Beijing has gladly and consciously marketed a new image, that of a new Chinese power and leadership promising lasting stability, peace, prosperity, and cultural confirmation without the humiliation of the old tributary system or the American imperialist lectures. China has been quite successful on the Korean Peninsula in contrasting itself with the United States as a kind of alternative, a caring but hands-off big brother. Beijing argues that it has had no troops stationed on the peninsula since 1958, unlike the intrusive military presence of the United States. Furthermore, Beijing has been paying close attention to what might irritate the Koreans and sometimes goes the extra mile to satisfy Korean demands over substantive or symbolic issues such as the Chinese translation of the name of Seoul and the effort to hush Chinese voices that speak out about territorial disputes with the Koreans. Beijing has quietly banned the publication of translated Korean novels that “demonize” Chinese emperors; it also quickly closed down Chinese Web sites posting nationalist sentiments against Koreans. However, not everything is rosy in the Sino-Korean relationship. Chinese analysts have long known that Pyongyang harbors strong resentment and suspicions toward Beijing on nationalistic and ideological grounds. The
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Kim-Roh Declaration in October 2007 is yet another piece of evidence. Beijing often indeed treats the DPRK with cynicism and even open contempt. There have also been many frictions and open, serious disputes between the ROK and the PRC, ranging from symbolic issues, such as the characters for Seoul in Chinese,66 to highly emotional disagreements about ancient history, involving the state of Koguryo kingdom, which existed in the northern part of the Korean Peninsula and part of China’s Northeast region between 37 BC and AD 668,67 to growing trade frictions and piracy issues, to the problems associated with massive numbers of Chinese workers in South Korea (many are illegal immigrants), to the Chinese handling of massive numbers of North Korean refugees, to real disputes over territorial claims in the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea and along the Korean-Chinese border.68 In early 2009, a commentary on an influential Chinese Web site even listed South Korea as the fourth most likely warring state with the PRC after India, the United States, and Vietnam and ahead of Japan.69 After Pyongyang’s nuclear test in 2006, the deeply annoyed Beijing reacted unusually harshly toward Kim Jong Il and pressured the DPRK to back down, albeit largely quietly, leading to subsequent progress and moves in 2007 to shut down nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, after American concessions and promises. Relaxed somewhat, leaders and analysts in Beijing now are nonetheless developing a strong sense of inevitability regarding Pyongyang’s likely rapprochement with the United States at China’s expense, the Korean reunification process, and Japan’s rearming and even nuclearization. But for now, for the CCP leadership, the key objective is still how to best preserve itself at home, rather than scoring nationalist victories on the Korean Peninsula. Beijing’s handling of the dispute over the history of Koguryo is quite telling. After the Koreans, in both the ROK and the DPRK, emotionally objected to China’s rewriting its border area history, Beijing managed to reach a five-point agreement with Seoul to effectively shelve the dispute and exclude the Chinese claim from the PRC’s official teaching materials. That conciliatory act barely quieted the Koreans70 and, very interestingly, was never reported to the Chinese public, in line with the PRC policy of keeping factual but sensitive information away from its own people. When two Chinese Web sites published a story about the five-point agreement, they were reported to have been ordered shut down by the PRC police.71 In late 2007, the Chinese effort to revise history, the “Northeastern Project” that ignited the controversy, was declared to be continuing by the project’s leaders because, they said, “this is about the truth of history and about Chinese national interests.” Yet, it now lacks both government funding and publicity inside the PRC. To Koreans, however, the Koguryo dispute has been a “turning point for China-Korea relations” that may signal a more competitive and sensi-
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tive era for the PRC and ROK.72 Other uncertainties and new problems still pop up. On January 18, 2005, a Korean newspaper angrily called for a “second look at China” and questioned Beijing’s stated policy of peace and friendship.73 In return, many Chinese, albeit mostly in private, criticized Koreans for their “narrow nationalism.”74 The long, close, and complicated relationship between China and the two Koreas, especially the confident South Korea, has always been a mixture of emotions and will continue to offer both great opportunities and consequential uncertainties for them and for the United States in the years ahead.75 American media may be correct to conclude that, sometimes, there seems to be a somewhat sophisticated, calculated, even coordinated strategic action by Pyongyang, Beijing, or both together. The DPRK’s open show of defiance may be just a preemptive act to guard against a possible “sell-out” by the PRC. Beijing appears to have recognized that, and quietly shows its unhappiness, as the rather uncharacteristically “free” criticisms of Pyongyang by the Chinese media have demonstrated at times.76 The tortured suspensions and resumptions of the Six-Party Talks constitute rounds of the diplomatic game. Then it takes the U.S. flexibility in dealing with the DPRK bilaterally on what really matters to move the negotiations forward. Having gotten its frozen funds back, Pyongyang finally suspended its nuclear program and opened it to external inspections in the fall of 2007. Beijing’s denuclearization objective may indeed be achievable, while preserving the divided stability of the peninsula, as long as the parties keep their promises.
CHANGING COUNTRY, CHANGING VIEWS China is now both rising and changing. As shown earlier, domestic needs ultimately determine China’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, emerging socioeconomic diversity and the weakening of the PRC political system suggest important new developments to watch.77 In the medium to long term, China’s overall strategic thinking about the Korean Peninsula is likely to include more competing conceptualizations, ranging from a special, even hierarchical Sino-Korean relationship similar to the one that existed before the twentieth century, to coexistence and cooperation resembling regional integration, to forming an East Asian community in the style of the European Union, to a concert of great powers in the region (that may conceivably include a united Korea as a member of the club), to possible competition and rivalry involving disputes over land, resources, and power. At one end of the spectrum, early signs are suggesting that China is quietly preparing for a united, democratic, and even possibly nuclear Korea down the road. A new Korean power that is nationalistic and maintains strong ties with the United States remains a major concern for Beijing. This
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is akin to a worst-case scenario but Beijing may be willing to accept it so long as the CCP’s political preservation is intact. At the other end, while there is little clear-cut evidence yet, there are unofficial arguments for a possible restoration of the old Chinese world order in East Asia, based on a very realist, heavily power-centered calculation about the Korean Peninsula that assumes a Chinese superpower will “naturally and inevitably” draw the two Koreas or a united Korea into its orbit. For now, to be sure, the No Nukes and No Unification dual objective still seems to be the mainstream party line in Beijing. Historically, China’s Korea policy has long been regarded as a “forbidden zone” by the PRC’s foreign policy analysts. As a subfield of Beijing’s policy toward the United States, China’s Korea policy and Korean studies in general have been highly controlled and consistent. Decades of economic reform and development have, however, now led to growing localized and sectarian opinions and preferences about the two Koreas. Divergent players are emerging inside the PRC to affect Chinese strategic thinking on the Korean Peninsula, if still not publicly for the most part. A careful reading of archival materials since the 1990s already shows differences between different government agencies and various regions. Interviews further substantiate that observation. This is especially true regarding the implementation of policies, to the point that there are often complaints about “poor coordination” and the fact that one agency might be creating “unnecessary headaches” for others inside the PRC government in dealings with the two Koreas. The now much-watched Northeastern Project that ignited the emotional reaction in Korea about the history of the Koguryo kingdom is one of those headaches often cited by Chinese interviewees. What is more interesting is that there now seems to be room for internal debate about options in dealing with the Korean Peninsula. There are reported disagreements between the PLA, the foreign ministry, trade officials, and the security apparatus over what to do about “disobedient” and “unappreciative” North Koreans and what should be done to pressure Pyongyang to address the nuclear issue. Senior leaders and analysts also seem to disagree about the nature of the PRC-DPRK relationship: some conservatives insist on the ideological comradeship that was “cemented with blood,” while others are semi-openly talking about treating Pyongyang simply as a client and a pawn.
CONCLUSION Ever since the late 1990s, the PRC has managed to have a stable working relationship with the United States, despite the existence of differences and uncertainties, as the central piece of its foreign policy that is motivated by the pursuit of political preservation, economic prosperity, and national
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power. Beijing has gingerly joined the United States and other major powers in forming a “consensus” to maintain peace and stability through maintenance of the status quo on the Korean Peninsula. This policy has sufficiently enabled the PRC to keep its long time official commitment to Korean reunification while enjoying a stable, manageable, and profitable division of the Korean Peninsula. As one senior policy analyst commented in private, with China’s political shouwan (skills), Beijing has managed to sustain the Korean division while, among the four major external powers, enjoying “the only good relationship” with both Seoul and Pyongyang. The Six-Party Talks, expected to be long and hard, are welcomed by Beijing, promising further sustenance to the status quo through a protracted dialogue toward a final cross-recognition process and a peace treaty to replace the often shaky armistice agreement, thus institutionalizing stability on the peninsula. The talks also allow Beijing to prove to Washington that there are real shared strategic interests between them regarding stability and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and beyond.78 The PRC is glad to be viewed as a valued help to the United States and continues to enjoy the best strategic position on the Korean Peninsula among all major powers. In general, Beijing’s engagement policy has been working well for its purposes. In the near future, while enjoying its success in pursing its No Nukes, No Unification dual objectives through engaging both Koreas, Beijing is likely to leave the leadership and initiatives, as well as the burden, to the United States. The agreement of principles reached at the Six-Party Talks in 2005 and the new progresse toward denuclearization in 2007 showed how Beijing can work to help smooth the process. However, that decade-long PRC policy toward Korea could change should the U.S.-PRC relationship sour or even enter a probable crisis over, chiefly, the Taiwan issue; or should Beijing fail in maintaining its domestic political stability. The Korean Peninsula has historically been a major playground and battlefield to the major powers; it now tests the future of China’s foreign policy in close association with the all-important U.S.-China relationship.79 Beijing may trade the DPRK for Taiwan or for its own political survival; it may also think, as one Chinese posted on the Internet, that “the enemy of your enemy is your friend. Nobody likes North Korea, but we should support everyone who opposes the United States.”80 Many inside China are now increasingly pondering if China should be more aggressive on the Korean Peninsula,81 to seek its “traditional” sphere of influence there. It is indeed a highly interesting, yet highly uncertain time to observe China’s growing and evolving influence and role on the Korean Peninsula.82 How long will and can Beijing continue its engagement with both Koreas for its No Nukes, No Unification dual policy objective? To stabilize the Sino-American relationship, avoid a showdown over the Taiwan issue, and maintain a peaceful neighborhood remain the core of PRC’s
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diplomatic interest. The No Nuke policy has served Beijing well through cultivating shared interest with the United States and preventing a chain reaction of nuclearization in East Asia that would greatly limit Chinese power and ambitions. But that policy could backfire. Coercing Pyongyang into denuclearization may defeat the No Unification policy as the DPRK, already impoverished and now being deprived its most potent bargaining chip, would be much more susceptible to a Seoul-dominated unification process. Worse, a desperate and distrustful DPRK could quickly become a new, willing anti-China ally to the United States if Washington could manage to overcome its loathing of Pyongyang on ideological grounds.83 Aware of that, Beijing may choose to deemphasize the nuclear issue so to maintain Pyongyang as a useful ally for as long as possible. “Like it or not, the world will probably have to accept North Korea’s nuclear status,” predicted a PRC senior scholar in 2005.84 On the other hand, it may not be that difficult for China to accept a South Korea–dominated Korean unification.85 After all, the ties between the ROK and the PRC now are at their historical best and a united Korea is probably nuclear weapons-free and unlikely to treat China as its main enemy. In its grand games with Japan and, mainly, the United States, Beijing wants to cultivate and could use any help.86 A friendly and stable Korean Peninsula, expected to be nationalistic toward Japan and America, united or not and preferably denuclearized, appears to Beijing as the desirable future in Northeast Asia, so long as the CCP regime is safe and China keeps rising, peacefully. What a leading Chinese Korea hand wrote commenting on the 2007 Kim-Roh summit meeting nicely illuminates Beijing’s Korea policy: China is the good neighbor of the Korean Peninsula, China has always been for the two parties of the South and North to independently and peacefully unite without external interventions. China has an irreplaceable, constructive role to play in promoting the process of détente and unification on the Korean Peninsula. If the leaders of the ROK and DPRK could simultaneously pursue inter-Korean relations and a friendly relationship with China, organically combining the pursuit of Peninsula unification with geopolitics, it would accelerate the pace of Korean unification and benefit peace, stability, and prosperity in Northeast Asia.87
NOTES This chapter is an extensively revised version of the previously published article, “A Regional Play of the Global Game: China’s Korea Policy and the SinoAmerican Relationship,” International Journal of Korean Unification Studies (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification) 14, no. 2 (2005): 141–70.
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1. Critics may suggest that Beijing’s policy of peace and prosperity in its neighborhood may be simply bidding for time and acquiring power by granting favors, much like the imperial policy of constructing a benevolent tributary system. 2. Fei-Ling Wang, “Changing Views: Chinese Perception of the United States-South Korea Alliance,” Problems of Post-Communism (formerly Problems of Communism) 43, no 4 (July–August, 1996): 25–34; Tacit Acceptance and Watchful Eyes: Beijing’s Views about the U.S.-ROK Alliance, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA: The U.S. Army War College (January 1997); “China and Korean Unification: A Policy of Status Quo,” Korea and World Affairs 22, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 177–98; “Joining the Major Powers for the Status Quo: China’s Views and Policy on Korean Reunification,” Pacific Affairs 72, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 167–85. 3. Charles Hutzler, “China May Be on Course To Overtake U.S. Economy,” The Wall Street Journal, January 24, 2005; PRC State Statistical Bureau, PRC Statistical Report of 2006 (Beijing: SSB, 2007); CIA: The World Factbook 2006 (Washington DC: CIA, 2007). 4. Kang Xiaoguang, “Weilai 3–5 nian zhongguo dalu zhengzhi wendingxing fengxi” (Analysis of the Political Stability Issue in Chinese Mainland in the Next 3–5 Years), Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and Management) 3 (2003): 1–2. 5. In the early 2000s, the PRC started to actively participate in the AsiaEurope Meeting (ASEM), a dialogue between the EU and East and Southeast Asia nations created in 1996. In 2004, China participated in the thirty-nine-nation dialogue. Huang Haiming et al “ASEM Enhances Overall Asia-Europe Relations,” Xinhua, October 6, 2004; and Xiao Chenglin “Asia, Europe Move Closer in Cooperation,” Xinhua, October 5, 2004. 6. Author’s interviews in Beijing, 2004. The Russians, however, seem to deeply doubt this. “Alliance between Russia, China, and India Hardly Possible According to Expert Opinion,” Russian News and Information Agency, January 20, 2005. 7. Indo-Asian News Service, “Shift in China’s Foreign Policy under Hu,” October 21, 2004. For China’s objection to Japan’s bid, see, for example, Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), “Four Barriers on Japan’s Way to ‘Permanent Seat,’ ” September 26, 2004, in FBIS-NES-2004-0927. 8. Zhang Feng, “Zhongguo fuxin kaiqi xin lishi” (China’s Rejuvenation Creates New History), Global Times, August 30, 2004. 9. Zhang Wenmu, “Quanqiuhua jincheng zhong de zhongguo guojia liye” (China’s national interest in the process of globalization), Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and Management) 1 (2001): 63. 10. Fei-Ling Wang, “Heading Off Fears of a Resurgent China,” International Herald Tribune, April 11, 2006. 11. Susan Shirk, China Fragile Superpower: How China’s Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 12. Zheng Bijian (former executive vice president of the CCP’s Central Party School) first officially proposed the concept in his speech in November of 2003. Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao advocated in 2004 the new concept of “peaceful rise” as it was customary in the PRC for a new leadership to come up with a new slogan. See http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2004-03/26/content_1386611.htm. However, presumably under pressure and after second thoughts, the phrase disappeared from
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PRC official speeches, statements, and reports by fall of 2004. The phrase was reused by Zheng (who finally retired in summer of 2007) and many others again in 2006 and 2007. 13. “Asia’s Great Oil Hunt,” BusinessWeek, November 15, 2004. 14. Qiu Yuanping “Minaxiang shijie de xunyan” (Declaration to the World), Qiushi 3 (2003): 27–28. 15. Financial Times, September 22, 2004. 16. Fei-Ling Wang, “Preservation, Prosperity, and Power: The Motives behind China’s Foreign Policy,” Journal of Contemporary China 14 (November 2005): 669–94. 17. Jiang Zemin, Political Report to the 16th CCP National Congress, Beijing, November 2002. Under Hu Jintao, Beijing kept this estimate but rephrased it as a “coexistence of opportunity and challenges.” The Communiqué of 4th Plenum of the 16th CCP Central Commission (Beijing), September, 19, 2004. 18. For more discussion of the Chinese foreign policymaking in the 2000s, especially Beijing’s peculiar incentive structure, see Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang, eds., China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005). 19. David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 10, 330–32. 20. Tang Shiping, “Zailun zhongguo d da zhanlue” (Another Threat on China’s Grand Strategy), Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and Management) 4 (2001): 29– 37; Zhang Wenmu, “Quanqiuhua jincheng zhong de zhongguo guojia liye” (China’s National Interest in the Process of Globalization), Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and Management) 1 (2002): 52–64; Lou Yaoliang, Diyuan zhengzhi yu zhongguo guofang zhanlue (Geopolitics and China’s National Defense Strategy) (Tianjin: Tianjin Remin Press, 2002), 255; Yan Xuetong, “Zhongguo zonghe guoli shangbu pingheng” (China’s Comprehensive Power Is Not Balanced), Global Times, August 24, 2004. 21. Hu Angang and Meng Honghua, “Zhongmeirieying youxing zhanlue ziyuan bijiao” (A Comparison of Tangible Strategic Resources among China, the US, Japan, Russia, and India), Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and Management) 2 (2002): 26–41. 22. Rice’s statement at her U.S. Senate confirmation hearing, January 18, 2005. 23. Richard Armitage’s TV interview, December 10, 2004. Released by the U.S. Department of State on December 30, 2004. 24. Jane Perlez, “China Shoring Up Image as Asian Superpower,” International Herald Tribune, December 2, 2004; “Fear of the Dragon,” The Economist, November 17, 2004, 34 and 37. 25. Chisa Fujioka, “China, India Focus of U.S., Japan, Australia Talks,” Reuters, September 8, 2007. It is interesting to notice that the ROK, a long-time U.S. ally in the region, is not part of this so-called “Asian NATO.” 26. See Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang, eds., In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999); Li Shengming and Wang Yizhou, eds., 2003 Nian quanqiu zhengzhi yu anquan baogao (2003 Yellow Book of International Politics and Security) (Beijiing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Press, 2003), especially 1–15 and 84–105.
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27. Ding Gang, “Tuo meiguohua: buke huibi de wenti” (De-Americanization: An Unavoidable Question), Global Times, September 13, 2004; Wang Jisi “Gailun zhongmeiri sanbian guanxi” (On the Triangular Relationship among China, the U.S. and Japan), in Lin Rong, Xinshiji de sikao (Thinking in the New Century), Vol. 1 (Beijing: Central Party School Press, 2002), 3; Tang Shiping, “2010–2015 nian d zhongguo zhoubian angquan huangjin” (China’s Neighboring Security Environment in 2010–2015), Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and Management) 5 (2002): 40. 28. See Zhu Tingchang et al., eds., Zhongguo zhoubian anquan hunagjin yu anquan zhanlue (China’s security environment and strategy in the neighboring areas) (Beijing: Shishi Press, 2002), 5. 29. See Samuel Kim, ed., The International Relations of Northeast Asia (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004). 30. He Dalong, “9.11 hou guoji xingshi d zhongda bianhua” (Major Changes in International Situations after 9/11), Shishi ziliao shouce (Handbook on Current Affairs) 4 (2002): 12 and 15. 31. Qian Qichen, “U.S. Strategy Seriously Flawed,” China Daily, November 1, 2004. 32. NPR reporting from Sydney, Australia, September 8, 2007. 33. Thomas J. Christensen, “A Strong and Moderate Taiwan,” Speech to U.S.-Taiwan Business Council Defense Industry Conference, Annapolis, MD, September 11, 2007. 34. Wang Yiwei, “China’s Role in Dealing with the North Korean Nuclear Issue,” Korea Observer 36, No. 3 (Autumn 2005), 465–88. 35. Fei-Ling Wang, “Joining the Major Powers for the Status Quo: China’s Views and Policy on Korean Reunification,” Pacific Affairs 72, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 167–85. 36. Guo Xuetang, “Chaoxian bandao tongyi: wenti yu qianjing” (The Reunification of the Korean Peninsula: Issues and Prospects), Guoji guancha (International Observation) 5 (1996): 26–29. 37. Zhongguo Waijiao Gailang (Survey of Chinese Diplomacy), several volumes (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Press, 1997 to 2000); Xinhua News, August 24, 2007. 38. Xinhua News Dispatch, December 28, 2004. 39. Mary Han, “Northeast Asia: A New Center of Culture,” unpublished paper, Georgia Tech, Atlanta, December, 2004. 40. CIA, World Factbook 2006. 41. Author’s interview with a PRC analyst, July 2007. 42. Released by ROK Ministry of Unification. October 5, 2007. Italics added. 43. “Multilateral Summit ‘Would Mark Start of Peace Process,’ ” Chosun English News, October 8, 2007. 44. Norimitsu Onishi, “Korean Summit Results Exceed Low Expectations,” New York Times and International Herald Tribune, October 4, 2007; “The Koreas: It’ll Cost you,” The Economist, October 6, 2007, 50. 45. “Zhongguo: wufa jieshou meiyou zhongguo canjia de sanfang shounao huitan” (China: Cannot Accept a Trilateral Summit Meeting without China), this and several other similar postings were widely published in many PRC-based or pro-PRC overseas Chinese Web sites such as http://www.3mt.com.cn, http://www, tianya.cn, http://www.cqzg.cn, and http://www.tycool.com, October 7–12, 2007.
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46. The statement by PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesman, Liu Jianchao. Reported by Xinhua News Agency, October 4, 2007. 47. Nina Hachigian, “China’s Stake in a Non-nuclear Korea,” Christian Science Monitor, February 17, 2005. 48. Wang Yiwei, “China’s Role in Dealing with the North Korean Nuclear Issue,” 469. 49. Xinhua Daily Telegraphy, December 9, 1997. 50. You Ji, “Understanding China’s North Korea Policy,” China Brief 4, issue 5 (March 2004). 51. “Xinhua Yearend, Mistrust Between DPRK and the U.S. Snags Six-Party Talks,” December 18, 2004, in FBIS-CHI-2004-1218. 52. For a report on China’s deep displeasure and harsh reactions to the DPRK nuclear testing, see Gregory J. Moore, “How North Korea Threatens China’s Interests: Understanding Chinese ‘Duplicity’ on the North Korean Nuclear Issue,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 8, no. 1 (January 2008), 1–29. 53. Author’s interview with PRC analysts, July 2007. 54. She He, “Coaxing and Coercing in International Politics,” Guangming Ribao (Guangming Daily), January 12, 2005. 55. Wang Yiwei, “China’s Role in Dealing with the North Korean Nuclear Issue,” 477. 56. Wang Mian, “A Reshaping US-ROK Alliance,” Xinhua News Agency, December 19, 2004. 57. “Who’s Japan’s New Defense Program Outline Intended to Defend Against?” Xinhua Commentary, December 11, 2004. 58. Xinhua News Dispatch, November 10, 2004. 59. One Chinese scholar somewhat wishfully asserted, for example, that Korean unification is good to Beijing because it is likely to form a new alliance with China opposing the U.S. and Japan. Zhang Quanyi, “What Korean Unification Means to China,” Policy Forum Online, The Nautilus Institute, October 12, 2007. 60. Victor D. Cha, “Korea’s Place in the Axis,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 3 (May/June 2002). 61. John Park, “China Takes ‘Xiaokang’ Approach to North Korea,” The Strait Times, May 5, 2004. 62. For a report on the possible PRC military “taking over” of North Korea, see Hamish McDonald, “Beijing Considers Its Korean Options,” The Age, September 7, 2003. 63. Wang Yiwei, “China’s Role in Dealing with the North Korean Nuclear Issue,” 483. Some senior CCP officials commented in private that the North Koreans are “really a shame for socialism” because they have failed to pursue Chinese or Vietnamese-style reforms and criticized the Chinese as “revisionists,” who had become a group of “socialist paupers.” 64. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, News Release on DPRK, October 23, 2004. 65. Clearly, however, the article in question might have been used as an excuse to shut down an outlet that had published numerous pieces showing dissenting views on a host of sensitive political and policy issues.
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66. Xin kuai bao (New Express News), January 20, 2005. 67. Donald Kirk, “Chinese History: A Cause that Unites the Two Koreas,” South China Morning Post, February 28, 2004. 68. For recent Chinese takes on the territorial disputes with the Koreans, see Guoji xianqu daobao (International Herald News), December 7, 2006 and Xin kuai bao (New Express News), August 9, 2007. 69. Li Fengxian, “Zui you keneng yu zhongguo jiaozhan de you ne shige guojia” (Which Ten Countries Are Most Likely to Have War with China?), http://opinion.nfdaily.cn/content/2009-01/16/content_4848120.htm. 70. Seo Hyun-jin, “Controversy Lingers despite Korea-China Agreement,” Korea Herald, August 24, 2004; Ryu Jin “China’s No. 4 Man to Visit Seoul Thursday,” Korean Times, August 25, 2005. 71. “PRC Closes Two Internet Sites Reporting PRC-ROC Agreement on Koguryo History,” China Times (Taipei), August 30, 2004. 72. Scott Snyder, “A Turning Point for China-Korea Relations?” Comparative Connections (October 2004), 109–16. 73. “A Second Look at China,” Editorial of Korea Herald, Seoul, January 18, 2005. 74. For example, www.xinjunshi.com/Article/wangyou/200501/5315.html. 75. Michael Yoo, “China Seen from Korea: Four Thousand Years of Close Relationship,” Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry, Tokyo, Specialized Article, February 10, 2003. 76. Keith Bradsher and James Brooke, “Chinese News Media Critical of North Korea,” New York Times, February 13, 2005. 77. For diversity and fragility of the PRC internal sociopolitical and economic situation, see, for example, Shirk, China Fragile Superpower, and Bates Gill, Rising Star: China’s New Security Diplomacy (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007). 78. Doug Bandow, “Enlisting China: The Battle for Nuclear Free Koreas,” National Review, April 29, 2003. 79. Phillip C. Saunders and Jing-dong Yuan, “Korea Crisis Will Test Chinese Diplomacy,” The Asian Times, January 8, 2003; Liu Aicheng, “U.S. Foreign Policy Tend to Be More Hardline,” Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), November 11, 2004. 80. Keith Bradsher and James Brooke, “Chinese News Media Critical of North Korea,” New York Times, February 13, 2005. 81. Zhu Feng, “China’s Policy on the North Korean Nuclear Issue,” China Strategy 3 (July 2004); “DPRK’s Nuclear Test and Troubling China-North Korea Ties,” conference paper, Beijing, 2006; Tao-Wezhao, “Six-Party Talk Moves Forward,” China Daily, July 22, 2007. 82. David C. Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (New York, Columbia University Press, 2007). 83. A PRC analyst said in private that Beijing “already knew” that Pyongyang had proposed such to Washington. July 2007. 84. Shen Dingli, “Accepting a Nuclear North Korea,” Far Eastern Economic Review, March 2005, 54. 85. Wang Yiwei, “China’s Role in Dealing with the North Korean Nuclear Issue,” 481.
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86. Michael Hirsh and Melinda Liu, “North Korea Hold ‘Em,’ ” Newsweek, October 5, 2005. 87. Li Dunqiu, “Chohan tongyi, zhangai hezai?” (Where Is the Obstacle to Korean Unification), Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times), October 10, 2007. Italics added.
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FOUR
JAPAN’S NORTH KOREA POLICY The Dilemma of Coercion Jung Ho Bae and Sung Chull Kim
For Japan, North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: DPRK) has not been a distant country, although it remains the only country with which Japan has no normalized relations. After the end of the Korean War, Japan began to seek influence over the two political entities on the Korean Peninsula. Despite officially denying the statehood of the DPRK, Japan gradually expanded cultural and trade relations with the country. As early as 1955, the then prime minister Hatoyama Ichiro, a nationalist but adventurous politician who initiated diplomacy with the Soviet Union despite American worries and restrictions,1 allowed a private-level agreement with North Korea for the promotion of trade and cultural exchange. Japan’s normalization of relations with South Korea (Republic of Korea: ROK) in 1965 temporarily constrained Tokyo’s political room to act regarding the North. But Tokyo’s North Korea policy continued to pursue expansion of economic exchange, so that the policy came to be thought of as separating economic matters from political matters. Détente in the early 1970s rendered the Japanese government proactive in its approach to North Korea. After relations suffered a downturn in the mid-1970s owing to North Korean delays in paying debts, a Korean-Japanese person’s attempt to assassinate ROK president Park Chung Hee, and the fall of South Vietnam, Japan-DPRK relations improved so significantly that, in May 1977, Tokyo accepted for the first time a visit by members of the North Korean Supreme People’s Assembly.
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As the cold war thawed, Japan became even more serious in its approach to North Korea. Encouraged and alarmed by South Korea’s Nordpolitik, which was inspired by then president Roh Tae Woo’s July 7 declaration in 1988, Japan and North Korea hastened to normalize their previously limited bilateral relations. Japan was willing to resolve the last remaining post–World War II issues, and North Korea was abandoning its diplomatic isolation; consequently, the two states’ interests merged with each other to produce eight rounds of normalization talks in 1991 and 1992. It is true, however, that the talks yielded nothing of official consequence owing to the North Korean nuclear crisis and emergence of the alleged-abduction issue. It took a decade, until Japan and North Korea held the historic 2002 summit in Pyongyang, to achieve a breakthrough in the stalemate of the normalization talks. But since the summit, the abduction issue has taken center stage in Japan’s North Korea policy, a situation that neither of the two governments originally expected. The political instability, exemplified by frequent prime-minister change to Abe in 2006, to Fukuda in 2007, and to Aso in 2008, made a shift of the North Korea policy extremely difficult. This chapter points out that the Japanese position that regards resolution of abduction issue as the precondition for normalization indeed interferes with resolution of the abduction issue per se and impedes solutions to broader issues pertaining to regional security and peace. We argue in this chapter that resolution of pending bilateral issues, including the abduction issue, is linked to and depends on the denuclearization process of the North. With the February 13 Agreement in 2007, the Six-Party Talks, a multilateral mechanism for engagement with nuclear North Korea, have opened room for direct Japan-DPRK contact as one of five working groups, an outcome that otherwise would have seemed impossible for the two grudging countries. The Japanese government has to extensively alter its North Korea policy; in particular, it should try to resolve the contradiction between existing coercive strategy at the bilateral level and continued participation in the Six-Party Talks.
THE ATTEMPT AT NORMALIZATION At the initial stage of the post–cold war era, Japan’s interest in normalizing relations with the DPRK concurred with North Korea’s desperate need to escape diplomatic isolation. Japan-DPRK relations, however, suffered difficulties in the 1990s owing to pending issues, including North Korean nuclear development and the alleged-abduction issue, as well as disagreements on the compensation for history issue; therefore, relations in this period have been characterized either as contacts plagued by troubles or as troubles peppered with contacts.2 Japan’s North Korea policy before the Koizumi Junichiro-Kim Jong Il summit in 2002 underwent three phases.
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First Phase: A Forward-looking Attempt at Normalization, 1990–92 South Korea’s Nordpolitik, a bold diplomatic effort to establish normalized relations with the Soviet Union and China, had a significant effect on North Korea. In order to offset South Korea’s attempts, North Korea intensified its diplomacy with South Korea. North and South Korea started high-level talks in September 1990, after eight rounds of preliminary meetings between February 1989 and July 1990. Soon after foreign minister of the Soviet Union Eduard Shevardnadze notified North Korea in September 1990 of Gorbachev’s plan to normalize relations with South Korea beginning in January 1991, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung made an informal visit to China to meet Chinese leaders, including Jiang Zemin and Deng Xiaoping.3 Against this backdrop, as well as observed global level changes in 1989 and 1990, Japan swiftly and proactively moved to pursue Japan-DPRK normalization, whose absence constituted one of Japan’s last unresolved post–World War II diplomatic issues. Kanemaru Shin, a kingmaker in Japanese politics, led a group of Japanese Diet members, composed of members of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), to Pyongyang on September 24–28, 1990.4 Insofar as normalization between the Soviet Union and South Korea seemed imminent, the Kanemaru group’s visit was an important diplomatic mission rather than a courtesy visit by legislators, as evidenced by the fact that foreign ministry officials accompanied the group, although the visit was not a government-level one. North Korean leader Kim Il Sung tried to use this opportunity to begin normalized relations with Japan. Kim had a private meeting with Kanemaru at the Mt. Myohyang resort and proposed starting normalization talks immediately.5 This proposal sharply differed from the previous position that normalization would imply Japan’s recognition of two Koreas on the peninsula.6 At the conclusion of the visit, the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), the LDP, and the JSP laid out the “Joint Declaration of Three Parties” on September 28. The declaration stipulated that “diplomatic relations be established as soon as possible.” After returning to Japan, Kanemaru, who was suffering political difficulties due to corruption scandals, repeated that the declaration would not bind the Japanese government’s North Korea policy. Nevertheless, the declaration became the foundation of the government’s ensuing normalization talks with the DPRK. After three preliminary meetings in November 1990, Japan and North Korea held the first normalization talks in Pyongyang on January 30–31, 1991, and continued the talks until the eighth round in Beijing on November 5–6, 1992, which ended with a standoff. The two countries narrowed the gap on how to resolve the history-clearance issue; for instance, North Korea eventually requested not war reparations but compensation for
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Japanese colonial rule.7 However, normalization talks were troubled by newly emerging issues. Japan raised international inspection of North Korea’s clandestine nuclear facilities as a precondition to normalization talks. Also, Japan requested that North Korea clarify its role, if any, in the alleged abduction of the Japanese woman Takuchi Yaeko, whose Korean name is Lee Un Hye, and to investigate other missing Japanese citizens. North Korea, in response, placed the comfort-woman issue front in direct opposition to the alleged-abduction issue.8 Second Phase: Troubled Contacts, 1993–98 Despite the standoff in the normalization talks, Japan maintained informal working level contacts with North Korea in Beijing to create an atmosphere conducive to a resumption of normalization talks. Particularly at working level meetings, the division directors in each foreign ministry became partners: the director of the Northeast Asia Division from Japan became the counterpart of the director of the Japan Division from North Korea. The second phase in bilateral relations extended from the end of 1992, when a standoff surfaced in normalization talks, to August 1998, when North Korea tested a Taepodong-1 missile. This second phase was considered a period of ups and downs and of contacts plagued by troubles. As the North Korean nuclear crisis abated under the 1994 Agreed Framework, Japan decided in December 1995 to participate in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), an organization promoting energy aid for North Korea. Parallel to this development, Tokyo and Pyongyang had more frequent contacts with each other to create new momentum for normalization talks. At a Japan-DPRK working level meeting held in Beijing in August 1996, the two sides discussed Japan’s rice aid and the size of Japan’s “colonial past” compensation to North Korea. Japan’s hint that the compensation would amount to five trillion U.S. dollars helped the atmosphere recover, but only barely.9 Japan’s expectation that normalization talks would resume was dashed in February 1997, when Hwang Chang Yop—North Korea’s prominent ideologue and the master of the Chuch’e idea (the idea of self-reliance)—defected to South Korea on his way home from a visit to Japan. Pyongyang dealt with Hwang’s case in a surprisingly low-key way, for the purpose of domestic social control,10 whereas Tokyo grew cautious about inviting North Korean officials to Japan. More important, the publicizing of an alleged abduction shocked Japanese society and undercut bilateral relations. In an interview with Sankei Shimbun on March 12, 1997, Ahn Myong Jin, who had been a North Korean agent but who was a South Korean resident at the time of the interview, stated that he had seen a Japanese woman, Yokota Megumi, at the Kim
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Il Sung National War College in the Pyongyang area in October 1988.11 (Yokota had disappeared in 1977 at the age of thirteen on her way home from a badminton class at school.) Ahn’s statement stirred the Japanese public’s sentiment about the previously possible and now seemingly probable role that North Korea played in the kidnapping of such a young girl. The statement affected the political arena also: Diet members made inquiries into the case and demanded that the Japanese government extend its related investigations to unsolved missing person cases that might involve North Korea. In 1997, three organizations emerged to raise public awareness about the issue and to lay out a related plan for political pressure on North Korea. Families of the missing persons organized the Association of Families of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea (AFV) on March 26. Diet members who supported the association’s cause formed the Diet Members Union for the Rapid Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea (DUR) on April 18. And right-wing journalists organized the National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea (NAR) on October 4.12 Given this situation, the Japanese government grew more reluctant than ever before to engage in bilateral relations with North Korea. Using their working level channels, Japan and North Korea worked to break through the impasse. At a meeting held in Beijing on August 21–22, 1997, the two countries restarted discussion about all pending issues. Postponing the alleged-abduction issue for “further discussion,” the meeting reached a certain degree of settlement on Japanese food aid to North Korea, on North Korea’s alleged drug smuggling, and on Japanese wives’ visit to their home towns in Japan. (It is said that there were approximately 1,831 Japanese women who married Korean men in Japan during and after World War II and later followed their husbands to North Korea after kikokujigyo (the repatriation project) started in 1959.)13 Also, the two countries agreed on early resumption of the normalization talks. At a Red Cross meeting on September 9, 1997, Japan and North Korea agreed to permit the Japanese wives to visit their home towns. The first group of fifteen wives arrived in Japan on November 8, 1997. Japanese media treated their arrival as headline news and praised this visit as the starting point in efforts to ensure that all North Korea–bound Japanese wives could visit Japan. But Japanese media also sarcastically noted that the fifteen women, being model members of North Korean society, had undergone a screening process that would ensure their loyalty to the DPRK regime. And Japanese media warned that any North Korean attempt either to use this first group’s visit as diplomatic leverage or to prevent follow-up visits would harm Japan-DPRK relations. In contrast to this media coverage, the two governments praised the first group’s visit and expressed the opinion that it would possibly pave a way toward normalization talks. This cautious but optimistic appraisal at the governmental level was followed by
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the arrangement of a hometown visit of a second group of twelve Japanese wives between January 27 and February 2, 1998.14 The ameliorating mood in Japan-DPRK relations owing to the hometown visits of Japanese wives cooled down when the alleged-abduction issue arose yet again. The Japanese government declared on April 16 that there would be no more governmental-level talks unless Japan received a clear explanation of the abduction issue.15 In response, in June, the North Korean Red Cross made an official statement refuting the allegations that North Korea had abducted Japanese citizens. Given this context, the negotiations over the pending visit by a third group of Japanese wives collapsed. North Korea’s firing of a Taepodong-1 on August 31 over Japanese territory decisively paralyzed bilateral relations. This firing helped empower hard-line viewpoints in Japan; the testing of this three-stage missile convinced Japanese that the perceived security threat occasioned by the 1993–94 North Korean nuclear crisis now was a reality. Given this atmosphere, the Japanese government felt it had no choice but to stop the food aid and the direct charter flights to North Korea; moreover, the government suspended its contribution to KEDO. In response, North Korea closed both official and unofficial channels to Japan. The frozen bilateral relations further deteriorated when a North Korean fushinsen (suspicious boat) infiltrated Japanese territorial waters in March 1999. Japanese viewed this series of events not as simple provocative North Korean behavior but as a serious threat to Japan’s security—a threat that would require new legal provisions.16 Third Phase: Resumed Normalization Talks with No Result, 1999–2001 Given the progress made at the September 1999 U.S.-DPRK talks in Berlin regarding the North Korean missile issue, which resulted in a North Korean moratorium on missile tests and an easing of U.S. sanctions on North Korea,17 and given the continuation of South Korea’s engagement policy toward North Korea, Japan and the DPRK again attempted to thaw their frozen relations. The two governments held a division directors’ meeting in Singapore on October 18–20,18 and accordingly, the Japanese government stated that it would resume the charter flights between the two countries. Also, a group of Diet members led by former prime minister Murayama Tomiichi visited Pyongyang on December 1–3 and reached a three-point agreement with their North Korean counterparts: (1) the two governments would resume the normalization talks in the near future, and for this resumption, they would hold a preliminary meeting by the end of the year; (2) the two governments would continue to discuss humanitarian issues (apparently meaning the abduction issue for Japan and humanitarian aid for North Korea); and (3) the two governments would strengthen the effort to expand bilateral exchanges and visits. With this agreement, bilat-
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eral relations seemed to enter a new phase.19 But the NAR, the pressure group concerned with the alleged-abduction issue, denounced the agreement and, on December 13, demanded that the Japanese government include the abduction issue on the official agenda of the normalization talks, offer North Korea no food aid in the absence of progress on the abduction issue, and prepare for the collapse of the North Korean regime.20 At a Red Cross meeting held in March 2000, the two countries still revealed sharp differences regarding the alleged-abduction issue; however, as North Korea expressed its willingness to cooperate with Japan in reinvestigating the “still missing” Japanese citizens, Japan agreed to hold the ninth normalization talks in Pyongyang on April 4–8. The normalization talks, the first held in seven years, ended with no concrete agreement, but Ambassador Chong Tae Hwa of the DPRK pledged North Korea’s assistance in the reinvestigation issue, and Ambassador Takano Kojiro of Japan stressed the significance and, indeed, the necessity of the development of the Japan-DPRK relationship and agreed to hold the tenth normalization talks in Tokyo in May.21 The date of the tenth normalization talks was delayed because of the North Korean side’s preparation for the first inter-Korean summit in June and because of the Japanese side’s preparation for a general election scheduled for June 25. In the midst of this preparation period, the upbeat expectation in Japan for a development of bilateral relations manifested itself with the establishment, on July 3, of the Citizens Council for the Promotion of Japan-DPRK Normalization. The tenth normalization talks, held in Tokyo on August 24–25, ended without any tangible agreement point, but there were two developments. First, Japan suggested that its compensation to North Korea for Japanese colonization of Korea be of the “economic cooperation” type, akin to the compensation specified in the 1965 Japan-ROK normalization agreement; second, North Korea alleviated Japanese concern over the missile issue by suggesting a possible moratorium on tests depending on the results of the ongoing U.S.-DPRK agreement.22 The two governments again pursued contacts both on and below the surface in the following months. The most notable results of these contacts were the visit of the third group of Japanese-born wives to Japan on September 12–18 and Japan’s decision to send a half-million tons of food aid to North Korea on October 5.23 Each side intended that its measure function as a positive response to the other side’s concern: Tokyo’s humanitarian concern and Pyongyang’s economic concern. In particular, Japan’s measure reflected a rapid change in the international relations centered on the Korean Peninsula. U.S.-DPRK relations shifted rapidly in 2000 after Washington’s adoption of the 1999 Perry Initiative. In this initiative, the United States aimed to resolve the problem of North Korean weapons of mass destruction while prioritizing negotiations over coercion. Equally
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important, inter-Korean relations after the June 2000 summit between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il improved, especially in economic affairs. With the approval of North Korean leader Kim, Hyundai Asan, a South Korean company affiliated with the Hyundai group, launched construction of an industrial complex in Kaesong, just above the inter-Korean border. In this changing atmosphere, the eleventh normalization talks were held in Beijing on October 30–31, 2000. But the talks achieved no concrete result and closed without even fixing the date of the next talks. Since then, the two governments have continued informal contacts only. Relations between Japan and North Korea deteriorated again owing to two factors: first, the Japanese police investigation in November 2001 regarding alleged illicit activities by Tokyo Chogin (Korean Tokyo Credit Union), which had been affiliated with North Korea and which had gone bankrupt in May 1999; and second, an extended investigation of the headquarters of Chongryon (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan).24 North Korea considered the actions “organized oppression” of Koreans in Japan; accordingly, the North Korean Red Cross declared an end to the reinvestigation into still-missing Japanese citizens—an issue whose resolution the Japanese government had awaited eagerly. The bilateral relations further worsened when the North Korean fushinsen intruded into Japanese territorial waters in December. Even though the official North Korean news source, the Korea Central News Agency, denied the incident, the belongings of two searched crew members strongly suggested that the boat was North Korean.25 In sum, Japan’s strategic considerations on the Korean Peninsula and its desire to solve the long-standing diplomatic issue stemming from Japanese colonial rule led Tokyo to engage with Pyongyang through the normalization talks. Before the September 2002 summit, Japan and North Korea held eleven normalization talks and worked together through a number of working level meetings. But the issue of North Korea’s alleged abduction of Japanese citizens—as well as the security-related issues, including nuclear development and missile testing—bedeviled the Japanese government’s North Korea policy.
KOIZUMI-KIM SUMMITS AND POLITICS OF THE ABDUCTION ISSUE Japan’s North Korea policy during the tenure of Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro (2001–06) was preoccupied with the domestically sensitive abduction issue. As Japanese political scientist Fujiwara Kiichi aptly notes, the abduction issue became the first case in which public opinion has significantly altered the course of foreign policy.26 Since the 2002 summit, the abduction issue has prevailed over, and preconditioned, all other issues related to North Korea. Because of the issue, Koizumi could not realize normalization
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that he desired within his tenure of prime minister, which ended in 2006 with the termination of his presidency of the LDP. The First Summit and Its Aftermath The frozen bilateral relations slowly recovered some warmth in 2002; both a Red Cross meeting in April and foreign minister talks in Brunei in July contributed to this recovery. This new turn paralleled a secret contact between the two countries for the preparation of a summit. The North Korean side first approached Tanaka Hitoshi, director general of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau in the Japanese foreign ministry, at the end of 2001.27 Informed of the contact by Tanaka, the resolute prime minister Koizumi Junichiro took an action to gear up the bilateral talks from ambassador-level normalization discussions to a summit in order to resolve the abduction issue, to address security-related issues, and to pave a way to normalization.28 Koizumi audaciously but cautiously planned the first summit; finally he flew to Pyongyang for a one-day summit on September 17, 2002. The summit opened in a tense atmosphere; however, after Kim Jong Il’s surprising admission of North Korea’s abduction of Japanese citizens and his apology for it, the summit brought about a comprehensive agreement that included Japan’s apology and compensation for its colonial rule, the abduction issue, and North Korean nuclear and missile programs. The agreement was announced as the “Pyongyang Declaration” (see Table 4.1 for main agreements). Table 4.1 Main Agreement Points at the 2002 Summit Issues
Agreements
Abduction
• Kim Jong Il’s admission and apology • Eleven abductees: five alive and six dead (figures later corrected to be thirteen abductees: five alive and eight dead) • Continuation of investigation; visit of five survivors to Japan
History issue and compensation
• “Deep remorse and heartfelt apology”: follow-up of the 1995 Murayama declaration • Compensation method similar to the one used in the 1965 Japan-ROK normalization of relations • Economic cooperation through three modalities: grant, lowinterest long-term loans, and assistance through international financial institutions
Nuclear and missile
• Extension of the moratorium on missile tests • Commitment to the 1994 Agreed Framework with regard to resolution of the nuclear issue
Normalization talks
• Immediate resumption of normalization talks
Source: Japan Times, September 18, 2002.
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The Japanese public seemed to support Koizumi’s first summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. According to an opinion poll, his popularity rose dramatically from 43 percent in August to 67 percent right after the summit.29 But the news that only five abductees were alive and that there was a dearth of information about the deceased abductees raised harsh public sentiment against North Korea. Also, the criticism extended to Japan’s ministry of foreign affairs, particularly to Tanaka Hitoshi, who had prepared the summit, for his having concealed the dates of eight abductees’ deaths from these abductees’ families, who learned of the information only after Japanese media reported it. Now, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe Shinzo, a hawkish politician with regard to Japan’s North Korea policy, was placed in charge of the abduction issue. North Korea finally sent the five surviving abductees to Japan on October 15 in order to dampen Japan’s fervent criticism of Pyongyang and to create a warmer atmosphere for the twelfth normalization talks. A week after the five abductees’ arrival, however, the Japanese government decided that they would remain in Japan, an act that apparently breached Japan’s agreement with the North to send them back in two weeks. And then, the Japanese government asked the North Korean side to grant the abductees’ children, still in North Korea, the freedom to choose where they would live. It was, therefore, no surprise that the twelfth normalization talks held in Kuala Lumpur on October 29–30 advanced neither the abduction issue nor the history issue, nor yet again the nuclear development issue.30 Koizumi’s Pyongyang visit, whatever his intention may have been, marked a turning point in Japanese policy toward North Korea. The admission by Kim Jong Il that North Korea had abducted Japanese citizens in the 1970s and the 1980s infuriated the Japanese public, a development that was an unintended outcome for Pyongyang. Only a month after the summit, Koizumi expressed his changed position that the Japanese government would not discuss aid to North Korea unless progress was made on both the abduction issue and the nuclear issue.31 This radical policy shift was based on Japanese society’s nearly exclusive focus on the abduction issue, to the exclusion of almost all other issues related to North Korea. Indeed, public opinion about the abduction issue came to play an unprecedented role in the policy toward North Korea. The annual poll conducted by the cabinet office at the end of 2002 found that 83.4 percent of respondents considered the abduction issue the most important concern in Japan’s relations with North Korea.32 Accordingly, how to cope with the issue became the Japanese government’s top priority. Not only right-wing media but also moderate media in Japan stoked the fires of anti–North Korea sentiment. As the Japanese government announced the five returned abductees’ permanent stay in Japan, TV stations aired as many as three to five programs per day about their lives in
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their hometown in Japan and stories about North Korea. As a former NHK news analyst noted, the TV programs suffered from many general problems: lack of evidence in reports, use of the content for possible political propaganda, emphasis on emotional aspects of the issue, and so on.33 After December 2002, many TV channels aired related programs that instigated the public’s outrage against North Korea and demonized Kim Jong Il. In line with this change, right-wing journalism defined Japanese people who worked to improve Japan-DPRK relations as “pro–North Korean groups,” whether the groups were intellectuals, politicians, or government officials.34 There were two organizations behind the North Korea bashing: DUR and NAR. The families association of abductees, AFV, echoed the calls by NAR and by DUR for Tokyo’s imposition of sanctions on Pyongyang. It is known that NAR is represented by Sato Katsumi, the director of Gendai Koria Kenkyusho (Modern Korea Institute), and that its regional groups are linked to Nippon Kaigi, Japan’s largest nationalist organization, which has rejected postwar pacifism, embraced the imperial system, and defended Japan’s past wars in Asia.35 Although aware of the ideological orientation of NAR and Sato Katsumi, the families of the abductees nevertheless had to rely on these organizations in a desperate attempt to raise public awareness about the abduction issue.36 Given this highly charged atmosphere, it was considered political suicide for Japanese politicians to state that the nuclear issue was more important than the abduction issue.37 When the Iraq War broke out in March 2003, Japan’s post-summit discourse spiraled into one whose core assimilated to the American-made image of the “War on Terror.”38 In the public discourse, particularly in the media, the word terror became a central notion, in which the abduction issue came to occupy a significant part, even though the traditional meaning of terror differed from its meaning relative to the North Korean kidnapping of Japanese citizens.39 The Japanese government’s shift in its North Korea policy, attributable mostly to the abduction issue, accorded with the Bush administration’s reliance on coercion when dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue. A month after Prime Minister Koizumi’s Pyongyang visit, North Korea reportedly admitted the existence of a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program on the occasion of Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly’s visit to Pyongyang in October. Although North Korea later denied the admission, the reported HEU brought about the “second nuclear crisis.” In the midst of rising tension in the U.S.-DPRK relationship, Prime Minister Koizumi and President George W. Bush held a summit in Crawford, Texas, on May 23, 2003, and agreed on taking tougher measures to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue.40 Soon, Japan joined the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative to interdict and inspect ships suspected of carrying weapons of mass destruction, an act that apparently targeted North Korea. And the Japanese
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government began to expand safety inspections and searches for illicit goods from and to North Korea. There followed Japan’s preparation of several legal provisions to sanction both North Korea and Chongryon, a pro–North Korean residents organization in Japan. On February 9, 2004, the Diet passed a revision of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law, which allowed the government independently to impose trade sanctions on Pyongyang and to ban Chongryon’s remittance to Pyongyang.41 In the same vein, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, run by Ishihara Shintaro, declared in July 2003 that it would collect fixed-asset taxes from Chongryon facilities, and the Kyoto Municipal Government stated that it had already started reviewing tax breaks enjoyed by the organization after 1976.42 The Japanese government’s coercive stance, prioritizing the abduction issue, surfaced also at the multilateral nuclear talks. At the first round of the Six-Party Talks held in Beijing in August 2003, the Japanese representative not only stressed a no-tolerance policy toward North Korea’s development, possession, and transfer of nuclear capacity, but also suggested that the abduction issue be the precondition to Japan-DPRK normalization. Furthermore, Japan began to strategically raise the abduction issue in international forums, such as the UN General Assembly and an APEC summit meeting. In response, North Korea maintained that the abduction issue had already been resolved and that Japan’s decision to raise the issue at the nuclear talks was counterproductive. The Second Summit and Beyond As the abduction issue prevailed over other issues without showing any progress, the audacious politician Koizumi prepared another visit to Pyongyang. Whereas the first visit had aimed at overall development of the bilateral relationship, including a resolution of the abduction issue, the second visit was to bring families of the returned abductees and to further press Kim Jong Il on the issue of still-missing people. Critics warned that the visit would be illegitimate in that there was no return visit by North Korean leader Kim. But Koizumi made a perilous trip to Pyongyang again on May 22, 2004, declaring that he would resolve all pending issues—the abduction issue, the nuclear issue, and the normalization talks issue. Koizumi returned home with several agreements from Pyongyang: the return of five children of former abductees (two children of Chimura Yasushi and Fukie and three children of Hasuike Kaoru and Yukiko) and an arranged meeting in a third country between Soga Hitomi, returned abductee, and her husband Charles Jenkins and their two children, still in North Korea; a full-scale reinvestigation into the circumstances of ten Japanese (eight reportedly deceased abductees and two alleged abductees); peaceful resolu-
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tion of the nuclear issue; and reconfirmation of North Korea’s moratorium on missile testing. In response, Koizumi pledged Kim Jong Il humanitarian aid, including 250,000 tons of food and US$10 million worth of medical supplies, suspension of Japan’s economic sanctions on the North under the condition of the North’s commitment to the “Pyongyang Declaration,” and a pledge of no discrimination against Koreans living in Japan.43 The Japanese public exhibited again relatively high support for Koizumi’s second visit to Pyongyang. An opinion poll on May 15–16, conducted before the summit, showed that 73 percent of the public supported the summit.44 A survey on May 23, one day after the summit, showed that 67 percent of the public assessed the summit positively and that support of the cabinet had reached 54 percent, a rate significantly higher than the 40 percent approval rate that the cabinet had enjoyed before the summit.45 However, the public’s support for the summit was not followed by a change in public perception about the government’s North Korea policy. The public continued to level severe criticism at the government, for instance that the summit had taken place in only one and a half hours under conditions favoring the North Korean side, and that there was no concrete conclusion that addressed the reinvestigation. In particular, the parents of Yokota Megumi told reporters that the summit had brought about “the worst imaginable results” and that they felt “betrayed [by the government].”46 Other families of the abductees, in the same vein, expressed strong discontent regarding the prime minister’s decision to pledge massive aid to the North before obtaining convincing information about the deceased abductees and the still-missing people. The controversy over the returned remains of Yokota Megumi may be recorded as the worst case of confrontation at the official level of Japan-DPRK relations. The Japanese government officially announced on December 8 that the remains were not Yokota Megumi’s, and in turn, North Korea refuted the announcement, stating that the Japanese government was ignoring Pyongyang’s sincerity. It is noteworthy that the authoritative science journal Nature later wrote an editorial declaring that the DNA test method used for the remains was anything but definitive. Regardless of the credibility of the test results, the issue of Yokota’s remains evolved into an emotional war between the two countries.47 In this deteriorating atmosphere, the LDP-New Komeito ruling coalition and the main opposition Democratic Party of Japan enacted seven War Contingency Laws in the Diet on June 14, 2004. The laws, supplementing a set of three laws enacted a year earlier, were intended to facilitate cooperation between Self-Defense Forces and U.S. forces and to permit Japan’s execution of certain domestic measures in case of an emergency. The laws were formulated long before the abduction issue became an important political consideration, but the timing of the legislation was noteworthy. Along
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with the three laws, the Diet passed a law to enable the government to ban port calls by ships deemed to pose a threat to public safety. The passage of the law seemed a reaction to the Mangyongbong-92, a North Korean ferry shuttling between Niigata and Wonsan.48 Also, the Diet enacted a revised law on March 1, 2005, that required vessels entering Japanese ports to carry liability insurance sufficient to defray expenses incurred by oil pollution. The revised law has served as an instrument that enables Japan to impose economic sanctions on North Korea. Owing to the law, North Korean ships made only twenty-nine port calls in March, down from 115 in March of the previous year. This was a sharp decline in comparison to overall port calls by foreign ships, which decreased to 9,120 from 9,820 in the same period.49 Some observers considered these legal measures a stick with which Japan would force North Korea both to support the reinvestigation of ten missing Japanese and to cooperate over the nuclear issue; others considered the legal measures a simple punishment of the North in the context of Japan’s North Korea bashing.50 The Japanese government, despite these legal measures, tried to find an exit point in the multilateral nuclear negotiations, the Six-Party Talks. On the eve of the fourth round of the talks, scheduled to be held in Beijing on September 13–19, 2005, Prime Minister Koizumi sent to North Korean leader Kim Jong Il a message that voiced his desire for normalization; the message passed through the Japanese representative Sasae Kenichi and then his North Korean counterpart Kim Gye Gwan. Koizumi’s effort seemed to yield fruit. The Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks not only envisioned principles and frames for the denuclearization of North Korea but also stipulated support for U.S.-DPRK and Japan-DPRK normalization. With this rising tide, the foreign ministries of Japan and North Korea reconnected their hot line. With the governmental channel back up and running, the two countries held two meetings in Beijing in November and December and reached an agreement on the establishment of three committees to participate in normalization talks dealing with the abduction issue, the clearance of history issue, and the nuclear and missile issue. The thirteenth normalization talks, held in Beijing in February 2006, proceeded with the operation of the three committees.51 While the Japanese strategy was to focus on the abduction issue as the precondition to dealing with other issues, the North Korean approach was to call attention to unresolved historical issues, namely, those related to Japan’s colonial rule. The talks ended again simply with each side having identified the other side’s views. The bilateral relations were damaged by the worsening U.S.-DPRK relations, centered on Washington’s financial sanctions on North Korean accounts at Banco Delta Asia, and by the North Korean missile firings. In response to a flurry of news in June that North Korea was assembling the
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multistage ballistic missile Taepodong-2,52 neighboring countries requested that Pyongyang exercise restraint. But on July 5, North Korea defied the requests by firing seven missiles, including a Taepodong-2, on the East Sea (the Sea of Japan, in its Japanese name).53 It was apparent that the tests were intended to startle the United States, which had been ignoring North Korea’s demand that Washington lift its financial sanctions. Alarmed particularly by the repeat of a ballistic missile test within eight years, Tokyo not simply suspended its approach to Pyongyang but also became the prime mover, along with the United States, in drafting a UN Security Council resolution to sanction the North. In an attempt to counter this unfavorable situation, Pyongyang on July 6 allowed Kim Young Nam, former husband of Yokota Megumi, and their daughter Kim Eun Gyong to participate in an interview with Japanese media.54 But the attempt proved to be too late and in vain.
NORTH KOREA POLICY SUBSUMED UNDER THE NUCLEAR TALKS During the tenure of the two prime ministers Abe Shinzo and Fukuda Yasuo (from 2006 to 2008), there have appeared two notable developments. One is that Japan’s North Korea policy has situated itself in the Six-Party Talks mechanism. As the Japanese government desired, a working group for normalization was formed in accordance with the February 13 Agreement at the nuclear talks in 2007. In this working group, Japan and North Korea have been able to address each other’s concerns. The other development is that the United States and Japan have diverged from each other regarding strategic dealings with North Korea. Before the February 13 Agreement, U.S.-Japan cooperation rested on a common strategy, coercion, even if for different reasons. Since the February 13 Agreement, Tokyo has maintained the coercive strategy despite Washington’s sudden shift away from strict coercion. In these developments, Japan has found itself in a dilemma: how to pursue broader national interests and regional security, while coping with empowered domestic forces concerning the abduction issue. Sanctions: A Double-edged Sword Japan’s sanctions on North Korea, which closely followed the missile firings on July 5, 2006 and the nuclear test on October 9, were prepared in advance and applied when Abe Shinzo was in office as chief cabinet secretary (from October 2005 to September 2006) and prime minister (from September 2006 to September 2007). Abe was a leading conservative, nationalist politician among postwar generation politicians. He popularized a slogan “building a beautiful country,” stressed patriotism in education,
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and proclaimed the replacement of the sixty-year-old sengo rejimu (postwar regime). He reiterated his call for revision of the constitution, particularly the war-renouncing Article 9, and for collective security through a strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance.55 Abe rose to the post of prime minister owing to popularity that originated largely from his passionate efforts to transform the abduction issue into an important item on the political agenda. Before his appointment to the position of prime minister, Abe’s harsh stance toward North Korea supplemented his predecessor Koizumi’s audacious diplomatic overture, as shown in an anecdote: on his trip to Pyongyang for the 2002 summit, Koizumi told Abe, “I definitely want you, of the hard-line stripe.”56 Abe’s policy preference for pressure-only over his predecessor Koizumi’s combination of dialogue and pressure clearly appeared in Abe’s cabinet appointments. To his most important posts, Abe appointed people who had been hard-liners on North Korea policy, particularly on the abduction issue. He assigned his closest political ally, Shiozaki Yasuhisa, to the position of chief cabinet secretary and concurrently to the position of minister in charge of the abduction issue; and Abe assigned former finance ministry official Nakayama Kyoko to the position of special advisor in charge of the abduction issue.57 Also, he ordered the establishment of the Headquarters for the Abduction Issue, whose function would be to comprehensively deal with the issue at the governmental level, and appointed himself the head of the organization.58 After the North’s missile firings in July 2006, the Japanese government started using the prearranged measures, chiefly to disconnect Chongryon’s assistance to the North. Within a month, the government rejected a request by five North Koreans to enter Japan, on the grounds that some of the North Koreans were under suspicion of having links to North Korean intelligence activities.59 Also, the government imposed a six-month ban on port calls by the Mangyongbong-92, and began deliberation over restrictions on remittance of money and financial assets to the North.60 With the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law (revised in 2004), the government heightened its level of surveillance over exports to North Korea via third countries. Furthermore, the government prepared a revision of trade-control regulations that affect information technology and other high-tech products; the revision included a change from “notification” of exports of these products to the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry to “permission” from the ministry.61 In September, the government identified fifteen organizations and one person subject to restrictions under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law and banned any transfer of funds and any overseas remittance to them.62 The police started searching suspicious North Korean cargo ships; for example, police raided a ship anchored at Sakai Port in Tottori Prefecture and investigated crew members for possessing two counterfeit US$100 bills.63
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When North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test on October 9, 2006, the Japanese government considered it a threat to Japan’s security, which the July missile tests had already given the appearance of jeopardizing. The cabinet meeting held two days after the test led to a decision to impose a series of sanctions on North Korea.64 Included were a suspension of all North Korean ships’ port calls, stoppage of all North Korean imports, and an expanded ban on all North Korean visitors, including government officials. Because the volume of Japan-DPRK trade had already shrunk before the sanctions took effect and because North Korea’s share in Japan’s trade was so minor, the effect of sanctions on the North Korean economy was not decisive. For instance, the total import volume from North Korea from January to July in 2006 reached only US$55.8 million. For North Korea, the decrease in the bilateral trade was offset by a sharp increase in trade with China and South Korea.65 However, if counted together with the ban on remittance from the pro–North Korean Chongryon, the sanction might have doubled the foreign currency shortage in Pyongyang. In January 2007, the government proposed a revision of Customs Law to the Diet in order to curb illegal trade with North Korea amid the economic sanctions. The proposed bill increased the punishment for violators of the law: the penalty for a false declaration about shipment rose from up to a year in prison or a one million yen fine to five years in prison or a five million yen fine.66 At the United Nations, Japan, along with the United States, introduced sanctions against North Korea. At the initial stage of drafting a UN Security Council resolution, Japan demanded a quotation of Article 42 of UN Charter 7, which stipulates use of force, and called for Chinese and Russian cooperation for the inclusion.67 UN Security Council resolution 1718, even though it excluded the use of force provision, included unprecedented provisions: inspection of vessels and financial sanctions in order to prohibit transfer of WMD-related materials and an export ban on luxury goods in order to pressure North Korean elite who had grown accustomed to such extravagance. In accordance with the resolution, Japan immediately placed an embargo on exports of Japanese luxury products, such as cigarettes and liquor, and on exports of electrical appliances.68 Also, the Japanese government started an inquiry into the feasibility of applying to North Korea the War Contingency Laws, which the Diet had enacted in 2003 and 2004. Furthermore, the Japanese government examined whether or not it should adopt a special law for interdiction and inspection of North Korean vessels in international waters. However, the government found many limitations in both the law enforcement and the possible new legislation regarding interdiction and inspection of North Korean vessels on the high seas. As the then Defense Agency Director Kyuma Fumio noted, it was difficult to define the North
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Korean nuclear test an emergency covered by the War Contingency Laws. The laws revealed limits in Japan’s permissible use of force against suspected North Korean vessels. Given the limits, segments of the LDP discussed legislating a special law for the inspection of North Korean vessels; but support for this proposal soon waned because of its possible breach of the constitution. Japan’s only viable option was to rely on U.S. forces to interdict and inspect North Korean vessels; that is, the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) could provide the U.S. forces with logistical assistance, such as use of ports and airbases, fuel for American warships, and protection of Japan-based U.S. military facilities. Even in this case, the SDF could not assist the U.S. forces if the latter came under attack by North Korea, because the Japanese constitution excludes the right for collective self-defense.69 What were the sanctions intended to achieve? Was the aim to pressure North Korea and curb its provocative behavior? Certainly, the sanctions aimed at that. The sanctions, however, had a distinct political function on the domestic scene. The Japanese government took seriously the demands from abductees’ families and from related organizations, as well as the public’s loathing for North Korea. Over the years since the 1997 publicization of the abduction issue and then the 2002 North Korean admission of culpability in the abductions, the families have received the support of both the DUR and the NAR and have successfully attracted international attention as well as domestic attention to the issue; in turn, the groups have kept pressure on the government concerning North Korea policy.70 Of great importance in this process was the story of Yokota Megumi, a girl whom North Korea kidnapped in 1977, when she was thirteen, and who reportedly died in North Korea. Megumi’s mother Yokota Sakie’s visit to the White House and meeting with President George W. Bush on April 28, 2006, became one of the top news stories in Japan and the United States. A film entitled “Abduction: The Megumi Yokota Story” was released and honored with many awards at international film festivals in 2006. Koike Yuriko, special national security advisor to Prime Minister Abe, attending the World Economic Forum held in Davos in January 2007, brought this film and showed it to attendees of the forum.71 And American singer Noel (“Paul”) Stookey dedicated “Song from Megumi” to her parents in February 2007.72 Tapping into the increased public awareness, the Web site of Japan’s ministry of foreign affairs presented in April 2006 a file entitled “Abductions of Japanese Citizens by North Korea: Awaiting the Day When We Will Be Reunited.” And posted on the Web site of kantei (the prime minister’s office) was a video clip entitled “Abduction: Unforgivable Crime,” which was translated into eight languages. These occasions were perhaps the first time official Japanese government Web sites featured files with such unusually emotional titles. In the same vein, in November 2006 Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications Suga Yoshihide, under the Broadcast Law that had taken
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effect in 1950, ordered the NHK to increase its shortwave reporting of North Korea’s abduction of Japanese; the minister ignored criticisms that the order would threaten freedom of the press. The minister defended the order on the grounds that it was based on Article 33 of the law, which allows the state to instruct NHK to air overseas programs on issues deemed important to the country, and that the order might send important messages to living abductees in North Korea.73 In this context, the government’s sanctions on North Korea resonated with many abductees’ families and their supporters, who considered the sanctions “absolutely reasonable.”74 Bilateral Talks in the Six-Party Talks Mechanism With the adoption of the February 13 Agreement at the Six-Party Talks in 2007, Japanese policy toward North Korea and the ensuing bilateral relations entered a new phase, featuring a close connection to the multilateral nuclear talks. The agreement laid out initial but important steps for denuclearization: first, North Korea should shut down its nuclear facilities and, later, should disable the facilities and completely declare its nuclear program. And the agreement called for establishing five working groups, one of which would be the “working group for normalization of DPRK-Japan relations.” This working group is what Japan had sought as a last resort in efforts to resolve the abduction issue, which had been crucial to Japan but secondary in the nuclear talks.75 Indeed, the working group created space in which the two countries could continue normalization talks, otherwise an impossible thing owing to the recently worsened relationship. But the Japanese position continued to be cold on this development in the nuclear talks. Japan had already decided that, if the scheduled Six-Party Talks in February yielded no progress in the abduction issue, Japan would provide North Korea neither food aid nor energy aid.76 Foreign Minister Aso Taro stated on the eve of the talks that “even if we are asked to provide energy, money, or food [to the North], we won’t easily contribute it”; Prime Minister Abe reiterated on February 8, the date on which the talks resumed, that progress in the abduction issue was the precondition to energy aid.77 Furthermore, in April the cabinet approved a six month extension of the sanctions on North Korea. The decision reflected two things: first, Japan’s suspicion of North Korea’s apparent failure to meet the deadline for the shutdown of nuclear facilities—a failure that stemmed from a technical delay of Banco Delta Asia’s transferring of North Korean accounts to Pyongyang—and second, Japan’s impression that North Korea lacked a “sincere attitude” in addressing the abduction issue.78 Japan’s prioritizing the abduction issue indeed was unable to produce progress in the issue per se. The normalization talks in Hanoi in March 2007, which were held for the first time as a working group for DPRK-Japan
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normalization in the frame of the Six-Party Talks, ended with reiteration of each side’s own important issue: the abduction issue for Japan and the compensation issue related to Japan’s colonial rule for North Korea (see Table 4.2). In the meantime, there was political change in Japan. Suffering from declining popularity, the Abe cabinet lost the upper house election held on July 29. Of its many campaign strategies, the LDP played the North Korea–bashing card to incite popular sentiment and to ensure support for the ruling LDP-New Komeito coalition.79 But voters’ attention concentrated on the recent scandals related to pensions and political money; in the end, the opposition, the Democratic Party, enjoyed a landslide win. The election results proved that a campaign resting on the abduction issue’s emotional appeal but lacking a direction forward on the issue could not guarantee electoral victory. The LDP’s defeat in the election, and the ensuing cabinet reshuffle, brought a slight change in the government’s approach to North Korea. Under an ameliorated atmosphere, the normalization talks took place in Ulan Bator in September, which functioned again as a working group of the Six-Party Talks. Whereas the two sides still differed from each other regarding the prioritization of issues (the abduction issue and the history clearance issue), both sides pledged a continuation of discussions and a
Table 4.2 Different Positions at the Working Group Meeting in Hanoi, March 2007 Agenda
Japan’s position (represented by Ambassador Haraguchi Koichi)
North Korea’s position (represented by Ambassador Song Il Ho)
Abduction issue
• No normalization without resolution of the issue • Return of survivors, overall reinvestigation into the incident, extradition of criminals, investigation into still-missing people
• Already-resolved issue • Reinvestigation into the still-missing people depending on Japanese stance over the economic sanctions and the history issue
History issue
• Following the Pyongyang Declaration (abandonment of claim type, adoption of economic-cooperation type)
• Discussion about forced laborers and comfort women, separate from economic cooperation
Source: Jung Ho Bae, Abe chongkwo˘n u˘i kungnae cho˘ngch’i wa taeoejo˘llyak mit taebukjo˘llyak [Abe Administration’s Domestic Politics, External Strategy, North Korea Policy] (Seoul: KINU, 2007), 110.
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deepening of understanding. It is noteworthy that Mine Yoshiki, Japanese ambassador in charge of normalization talks, expressed a softened position, saying, “I said that for us, a solution to the abduction issue is essential . . . and that both of those topics must be dealt with.”80 Mine’s position reflected a minor but nuanced change in Japanese stance after the ruling coalition’s loss in the upper house election. Abe’s abrupt resignation on September 12 and the inauguration of Fukuda Yasuo as prime minister on September 25 raised expectations about progress in Japan-DPRK relations. Declaring that “I am willing to resolve the issue with my full determination” during the party president election, Fukuda suggested that he adopt flexible means to find an exit point on the issue.81 In this context, the North Korean ambassador to the normalization talks, Song Il Ho, welcomed the inauguration of the new cabinet led by Fukuda.82 However, under the pressure of the pending abduction issue, the Japanese government extended for another six months its economic sanctions on North Korea,83 which immediately prompted North Korea’s strong protest.84 This decision on the extension demonstrated the limitations of Japan’s policy choice. Despite Fukuda’s preference for flexibility, Japan’s North Korea policy was consistent in its application of coercive measures and has centered on the abduction issue. The Japanese sanction-only strategy has been continued by the succeeding prime minister, Aso Taro, who rose to power in September 2008 owing to Fukuda’s sudden resignation. But the strategy has lost its potency in the mechanism of multilateral talks because of a shift in the U.S. strategy to engagement from 2007.
CONCLUSION This chapter sheds considerable light on two critical issues: the trajectory of worsening relations between Japan and North Korea and, what may be even more subtle, the dilemma of Japan’s coercive strategy. Japan’s policy has changed over time. The abduction issue has prevailed in the Japanese political arena and, consequently, has dominated the Japanese government’s North Korea policy. Leaving behind broader national interests both in bilateral and multilateral contexts, the Japanese government has been forced to concentrate on the abduction issue in Japan-DPRK relations. With a high stake in the North Korean nuclear issue, Japan has participated in the Six-Party Talks, but has focused on sanctions. Japan’s rejection of further engagement—beyond participation in the talks—was particularly acute at the critical juncture where progress was made after the February 13 Agreement in 2007. As noted in this volume’s introductory chapter, each country’s policy priorities and objectives have differed from those of every other country, but all the countries, with the exception of Japan,
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have stepped up the degree of engagement for the common objective of denuclearization. There are two policy implications of Japan’s present stance. First, progress in the abduction issue is closely linked to progress in the denuclearization of North Korea. North Korea appears to be postponing its cooperation in the resolution to the abduction issue until the Six-Party Talks produce a certain progress that guarantees North Korea long-desired political and economic payoffs. Therefore, if Japan continues to rely on sanctions on North Korea and to consider resolution of the abduction issue the precondition to normalization, then Japan appears unlikely to achieve its objective in the bilateral relations and likely to remain a negotiation breaker in the multilateral mechanism of the Six-Party Talks. Second, Japan’s North Korea policy is a unique case that reflects profound naiatsu (pressure from inside), in contrast to the pattern of Japan’s cold war foreign policy, which has yielded to gaiatsu (pressure from outside), particularly from the United States. This naiatsu indeed interferes with the government’s articulation of a strategic shift with regard to the North Korea policy. The important question for the Japanese government is how to cope with increased domestic pressure stemming from the abduction issue, as much as it is how to deal with North Korea.
NOTES 1. Michael Schaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 114–23. 2. Jung Ho Bae, “T’alnaengjo˘ngi Pugil kwangae u˘i pyo˘ncho˘n kwa Ilbon u˘i tae Pukhan ‘taehwa wa o˘kji’ cho˘ngchaek” (Changes in the Japan-DPRK Relationship in the Post–Cold War Era and Japan’s Dialogue-and-Coercion Policy toward the DPRK), Korean Journal of International Studies, 39, no. 1 (1999): 115–35. 3. Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 213–18. 4. For the details of the visit, see Tanabe Makoto, “Yato gaiko no rekishiteki seika: Niccho kankei no atarashii jyuritsu” (The Historic Diplomatic Achievement by the Opposition Party: Establishment of a New Era in the Japan-DPRK Relationship), Gekkan Shakaito (Japan Socialist Party Monthly) (December 1990). 5. Wada Haruki and Takasaki Soji, Kensho Nicchokannkei 60 nensi (Verification of Sixty Years of Japan-DPRK Relations) (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2005), 200. 6. Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 222. 7. North Korea had demanded war reparations from Japan at the first normalization talks on the grounds that the guerrilla warfare led by Kim Il Sung in Manchuria in the 1930s was a war between Korea and Japan. But the North Korean side later withdrew this argument. Asahi Shimbun, February 2, 1991; Asahi Shimbun, February 3, 1992. 8. Asahi Shimbun, May 15, 1992; Asahi Shimbun, November 5, 1992.
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9. The amount corresponded to five hundred million dollars that Japan had paid to South Korea in 1965 for normalized relations between the two states. 10. Right after Hwang’s defection, there temporarily emerged new tension between the two Koreas. But with the North Korean foreign ministry spokesman’s February 17 statement that the “DPRK would not care about defection of betrayers,” the tension seemed to abate five days after the incident. 11. Sankei Shimbun on March 13, 1997, treated as headline news the abduction of Yokota Megumi and of other Japanese citizens. Pyongyang Broadcast, the North Korean state broadcast, refuted on March 18 the Sankei report as a vicious political conspiracy and denounced the report as “garbage” journalism. 12. Wada Haruki, Chosen yuzi o nozomunoka (Expecting an Emergency in the Korean Peninsula?) (Tokyo: Sairyusha, 2002), 115–16. 13. Wada Haruki and Takasaki Soji, Kensho Nicchokannkei 60 nenshi, 117. 14. Takasaki Soji, Kensho Nicchokosho (Verification of Japan-DPRK Negotiations) (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2004), 124. 15. Wada Haruki, Chosen yuzi o nozomunoka, 119. 16. David Leheny, Think Global, Fear Local: Sex, Violence, and Anxiety in Contemporary Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 158–60. 17. Korea Times, September 20, 1999. 18. The Japanese team was led by the director of the Northeast Asian Affairs Division in the Foreign Ministry, Umemoto Kazuyoshi, and the North Korean team was represented by the director of the Japan Affairs Division in the Foreign Ministry, Song Il Ho. 19. Dong-a Ilbo, December 3 and December 4, 1999; Asahi Shimbun, December 1, December 2, December 3, and December 4, 1999. 20. Wada Haruki, Chosen yuzi o nozomunoka, 122. 21. Asahi Shimbun, April 7, 2000. 22. Japan Times, August 25, 2000; Asahi Shimbun, August 25, 2000. 23. Japan Times, October 5, 2000. 24. BBC News, November 29, 2001. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asiapacific/1682527.stm. 25. BBC News, December 23, 2001. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/ 1725934.stm. 26. Japan Times, November 19, 2007. 27. For more details about the secret contacts, see Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 8–15. 28. Gavan McCormack and Wada Haruki, “Forever Stepping Back: The Strange Record of 15 Years of Negotiation between Japan and North Korea,” in The Future of US-Korean Relations: The Imbalance of Power, ed. John Feffer (London: Routledge, 2006), 83–84. 29. Mainichi Shimbun, September 23, 2002. 30. For more details about the twelfth normalization talks, see http://www. mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/nt/round12.html. 31. Japan Times, October 27, 2002. 32. Japan Times, December 23, 2002.
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33. Yamamuro Hideo, “Terebi hodo ni tsuite omou” (Thinking about TV Broadcasting) in Donaru Niccho kokko kosyo (What the Japan-DPRK Normalization Talks Will Be?), ed. Citizens Council for the Promotion of Japan-DPRK Normalization (Tokyo: Sairyusha, 2003), 43–46. 34. The main targets were Nonaka Hiromu, Nakayama Masaaki, Yoshida Yasuhiko, Tanaka Hitoshi, and Wada Haruki. See Wada Haruki, “Ushinatta kanosei no kaifuku o: Iraku senso no nakade Nicchokosyo o kangaeru” (Recovering a Lost Opportunity: Thinking about Japan-DPRK Negotiations in the Wake of the Iraq War], Sekai (May 2003): 136–44. 35. See http://nyt.trycomp.com:8080/modules/news/article.php?storyid=5827. 36. In this context, Yokota Shigeru, whose daughter Megumi is alleged to have committed suicide after having been abducted by North Koreans, stated, “We know Sato is a rightwinger, but we need all the help we can get from whoever we get it from.” Japan Times, April 15, 2003. 37. International Crisis Group, “Japan and North Korea: Bones of Contention,” Crisis Group Asia Report, No. 100 (June 27, 2005), 11. 38. Leheny, Think Global, Fear Local, 157, 167. 39. An exemplary book in this regard is Nishioka Tsutomu, Tero kokka: Kitachosen ni damasareruna (Terrorist State: Don’t Be Cheated by North Korea) (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyusho, 2002). 40. For the joint press conference at the U.S.-Japan summit, http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030523-4.html. 41. The revision removed a restriction stating that the Japanese government may apply trade sanctions to another country only with the authorization of a UN Security Council resolution. Mark E. Manyin, Emma Chanlett-Avery, and Helene Marchart, “North Korea: A Chronology of Events, October 2002–December 2004” CRS Report for Congress, January 24, 2005, 7; Hong Nack Kim, “Japanese-North Korean Relations under the Koizumi Government,” in North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival, ed. Young Whan Kihl and Hong Nack Kim (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2006), 170. 42. Japan Times, July 26, 2003. 43. Japan Times, May 23, 2004. 44. Mainichi Shimbun, May 17, 2004. 45. Asahi Shimbun, May 24, 2004. 46. Japan Times, May 23, 2004. 47. For details about the controversy over the remains, see McCormack and Wada, “Forever Stepping Back,” 88–93. 48. Japan Times, June 15, 2004. 49. Japan Times, April 6, 2005. 50. Richard P. Cronin, “The North Korean Nuclear Threat and the U.S.Japan Security Alliance: Perceived Interests, Approaches, and Prospects,” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 29, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 66. 51. Asahi Shimbun, February 5, 2006. 52. Yomiuri Shimbun, June 16, 2006. 53. Yomiuri Shimbun, July 6, 2006; Mainichi Shimbun, July 6, 2006. 54. Japan Times, July 7, 2006.
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55. See his book Utsukushii kuni (Beautiful Country) (Tokyo: Bungeishunjyu, 2006). 56. Japan Times, September 18, 2002. 57. Kyodo News, September 27, 2006. 58. Asahi Shimbun, September 30, 2006. 59. Japan Times, July 26, 2006. 60. Japan Times, July 29, 2006. 61. Japan Times, July 28, 2006. 62. Japan Times, September 20, 2006; September 24, 2006. 63. Japan Times, September 24, 2006. 64. Yomiuri Shimbun, October 12, 2006; Sankei Shimbun, October 12, 2006. 65. Lee Suk, Pukhan kyo˘ngje u˘i taeoe u˘ijonso˘ng kwa Hanguk kyo˘ngje u˘i yo˘nghyangryo˘k (Foreign Dependence of the North Korean Economy and the Influence of the South Korean Economy) (Seoul: KINU, 2006). 66. Japan Times, January 21, 2007. 67. On his trip to Washington, DC, in early October 2006, Japan’s vice foreign minister Yachi Shotaro agreed with the United States undersecretary of state Nicholas Burns on the need for tough sanctions on North Korea if the latter were to go ahead with a nuclear test. They mentioned Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which stipulates international economic sanctions and military options. Japan Times, October 6, 2006. 68. Yomiuri Shimbun, October 16, 2006. 69. Mark J. Valencia, “Maritime Interdiction of North Korean WMD Trade: Who Will Do What?” Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network, Policy Forum Online, November 3, 2006, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0698Valencia.html. 70. For a conceptual discussion of logrolling, see Christopher W. Hughes, “The Political Economy of Japanese Sanctions towards North Korea: Domestic Coalitions and International Systemic Pressures,” Pacific Affairs 79, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 45–4