ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY S - Z, Index

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EDITOR IN CHIEF

James R. Millar George Washington University SENIOR ASSOCIATE EDITOR

ED ITO RI A L BOA RD

Ann E. Robertson George Washington University ASSOCIATE EDITORS

Daniel H. Kaiser Grinnell College Louise McReynolds University of Hawaii Donald J. Raleigh University of North Carolina Nicholas V. Riasanovsky University of California, Berkeley Ronald Grigor Suny University of Chicago ADVISORY BOARD

Marianna Tax Choldin University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign Gregory L. Freeze Brandeis University Paul R. Gregory University of Houston Lindsey Hughes University College London Paul R. Josephson Colby College Janet L. B. Martin University of Miami Bruce W. Menning U.S. Army Command and Staff College Boris N. Mironov Russian Academy of Science Reginald E. Zelnik University of California, Berkeley

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RUSSIAN HISTORY VOLUME 4: S-Z, INDEX JAMES R. MILLAR, EDITOR IN CHIEF

Encyclopedia of Russian History James R. Millar

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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA Encyclopedia of Russian history / James R. Millar, editor in chief. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-02-865693-8 (set hardcover) — ISBN 0-02-865694-6 (v. 1) — ISBN 0-02-865695-4 (v. 2) — ISBN 0-02-865696-2 (v. 3) — ISBN 0-02-865697-0 (v. 4) 1. Russia—History—Encyclopedias. 2. Soviet Union—History—Encyclopedias. 3. Russia (Federation)—History—Encyclopedias. I. Millar, James R., 1936DK14.E53 2003 947’.003—dc21

2003014389

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POWER, POLITICS, & T E C H N O LO G Y

A makeshift memorial stands before the Chernobyl nuclear plant in Ukraine, 1992, six years after the accident. Ironically, the testing of security equipment triggered a malfunction, blowing the roof off the reactor, and causing the worst nuclear disaster in history. © GROCHOWIAK EWA/CORBIS

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Below: The Chernobyl nuclear plant, 1986, six months after the accident. An estimated 3.5 million people continue to live in the 100,000-square-mile contaminated zone. © AFP/CORBIS

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Top: A serviceman passes by an opened SS-18 intercontinental ballistic multiplewarhead Satan missile silo in the town of Kartaly in Russian’s Chelyabinsky region, August 16, 2002. Western intelligence experts fear lax security at Russia’s 15,000 non-strategic tactical nuclear weapons sites present a greater danger than an accidental launch. © REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS Middle: The Kursk nuclear submarine in its mooring in the base of Vidyayevo. The Kursk sank in the Barents Sea on August 12, 2000, killing all 118 aboard. © AFP/CORBIS Bottom: Deactivation of nuclear missiles in Surovatikha, Russia, January, 1995. Following the collapse of the USSR, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine surrendered all the Soviet nuclear weapons stationed on their soil to Moscow. © EPIX/ CORBIS

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Top: Soviet troops parade through Palace Square, Leningrad, under the watchful gaze of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Vladimir Lenin. The square was the starting point for both the Revolution of 1905 (Bloody Sunday) and the October Revolution in 1917. © ELIO CIOL/CORBIS

Bottom: A unit of Soviet soldiers march in Red Square on the 70th anniversary of the Russian Revolution. Moscow, 1987. © PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS

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Top left: The Russian Flag. Peter the Great returned from the Netherlands with plans for a Russian navy and introduced a tricolor flag inspired by the Dutch flag. Originally adopted as the national flag in 1799, the tricolor returned in 1991 after the fall of the Soviet Union. © ROYALTY-FREE/CORBIS Below: Demonstrators take to the streets of Moscow to defend democracy during the anti-Gorbachev coup, August 1991. Key Soviet leaders, including the vice president, feared Gorbachev’s policy of democratization would mean the end of the Soviet Union, and their own power, and placed him under house arrest. The coup was thwarted by its planners’ incompetence, popular resistance, and Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who banned the Communist Party from all Russian territory. © DAVID TURNLEY/CORBIS

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Top: Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev stands at the podium with U.S. President Ronald Reagan at a White House summit, December 7, 1987. The two leaders ushered in the end of the Cold War, which had seen the two nations at odds since the ending of World War II. © PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS Middle: U.S. President Bill Clinton (right) laughing with Russian President Boris Yeltsin during a press conference after their meeting at Hyde Park, October 23, 1995. © AFP/CORBIS

Bottom: Russian President Vladimir Putin after adjusting the ribbon on a wreath placed outside the mausoleum of late president Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi, March 2, 2001. The Soviet Union had backed Vietnam (Indochine) in its struggle for independence from France, and during the war against the United States. © REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS

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Top left: Two Chechen rebels, armed with a heavy machine gun, rest from patrolling the city. They are fighting Russian troops for their independence. © PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS Below: A woman cries after another woman is badly injured by a Russian shell in Grozny, Chechnya. © PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS

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Top right: A Proton rocket carrying the Zvezda (meaning "star" in Russian) service module is being prepared at the launch pad at Baikonur, Kazakhstan, July 8, 2000. Zvezda, an integral part of the International Space Station, is responsible for the crew living quarters, life support systems, electrical power distribution, data processing systems, flight control systems, and propulsion system. © AFP/CORBIS Below: The Russian Space Station MIR (meaning both “peace” and “world” in Russian) photographed from the cargo bay of the U.S. Space Shuttle Atlantis. The first module of MIR was launched February 20, 1986. After far exceeding its expected service life, the station was destroyed through controlled re-entry over the Pacific Ocean on March 23, 2001. CORBIS

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SAINTS In addition to the saints inherited from the Early Church and Byzantium, the Orthodox Church in Rus soon began to create its own objects of veneration. The saints belonged to three main categories: (1) spiritual and secular leaders who rendered significant service to the Church; (2) martyrs; and (3) those who exhibited extraordinary spiritual gifts, specifically the power to perform miracles, especially through their relics. Although the miracles were not a formal precondition under canon law, popular Orthodoxy placed a high value on this quality, primarily if manifested in “uncorrupted remains” (netlennye moshchi). The miracle of physical preservation, attested by an official examination of the crypt, reinforced belief in the power to perform miracles and hence intercede on behalf of the disabled and distressed. Canonizations in the Russian Orthodox Church have proceeded in a highly uneven fashion. In early medieval Russia (from Christianization in 988 to the 1547 Church Council), the Russian Church canonized only nineteen figures; the first to be so honored were the princes Boris and Gleb, whose nonresistance to a violent death amidst the fratricidal warfare made them the very model of kenoticism. The first major burst of canonizations came during the Church Councils of 1547 and 1549, which, reflecting Muscovy’s new self-assertion as the Third Rome, recognized thirty-nine new saints. Subsequently the church slowly expanded the number of saints, but that process came to a virtual halt in 1721: It canonized only five new saints before Nicholas II ascended the throne in 1894 and sought to bolster autocracy by favoring canonization and emphasizing the religious foundations of autocracy. The Bolshevik Revolution brought all of that to an end; the new regime actively engaged in de-canonization, opening scores of saints’ crypts (to demonstrate that the “uncorrupted relics” were frauds) and consigning relics to museums and storage. Although the Church was able to canonize five saints in the 1960s and 1970s, an era of large-scale canonizations opened in 1988. Over the next decade the church canonized a long list of prominent medieval figures (i.e., Grand Prince Dmitry Donskoy and the icon-painter Andrei Rublev) as well as many martyred during the Soviet era.

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By 1999 the Russian Orthodox Church had a total of 1,362 saints. The majority came from the hierarchy (11.5%) and monastic orders (49.9%); few of the parish clergy were canonized (1.8%), all,

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indeed, on the basis of marytyrdom. In addition to a substantial number of princes and tsars (6.9%), the church canonized ordinary lay martyrs (24.5%), some “fools-in-Christ” (3.2%), and laypersons venerated for their extraordinary spirituality (2.3%). These saints are, moreover, overwhelmingly male (96.4%). Since 1999, the church has begun to change these proportions, chiefly because of the ongoing canonization of martyrs (e.g., more than a thousand in August 2000). While some decisions have been exceedingly controversial (above all, the canonization of Nicholas II and his family), the church seeks to pay homage to the ordinary priests and parishioners who paid the ultimate price for their unswerving faith during the merciless repressions of the first decades of Soviet rule.

See also: HAGIOGRAPHY; ORTHODOXY; RELIGION; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

ing stranger. The Russians arriving in the seventeenth century adopted the Evenk word for the local population. The capitol of the Republic of Sakha is Yakutsk, its largest city. Russians sent to gather fur and other riches for the tsar, made Yakutia a stopping point on their way to the Pacific Ocean during the eighteenth century. They brought new agricultural techniques to the Sakha, who were primarily cattle and horse breeders, but the local population paid a price in fur tax for these innovations. In 1923 Soviet power was established in Yakutsk. It was declared an autonomous republic under the name of Yakutia, but was still economically and politically controlled by the Soviet Union. It received its official name (Republic of Sakha) when the Declaration of Sovereignty of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) was signed on September 27, 1990. The Republic of Sakha has a president, elected for a term of five years.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Freeze, Gregory. (1996). “Subversive Piety: Religion and the Political Crisis in Late Imperial Russia.” Journal of Modern History 68:308–50. Grunwald, Constantin de. (1960). Saints of Russia. London: Hutchinson. GREGORY L. FREEZE

SAKHA AND YAKUTS The famous folklore scholar G. V. Ksenofontov has compared the once nomadic Sakha people to a branch of an apple tree carried around the world by the wind and finally taking root. The Sakha, or Yakut, people are the descendants of Turkic nomads and originated in the region around Lake Baikal in what is now Russia. But in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries Mongols arrived from the south, along with other peoples, and the Sakha moved north and east, settling eventually in the basin of the river Lena, later called Yakutia. In the early twenty-first century, Yakutia or the Republic of Sakha is an autonomous republic within Russia in the far northeast, five times the size of France. Known as the “Land of Soft Gold” for the rich furs that come from the region, Yakutia is home to the Sakha people, as well as four other indigenous cultural groups (the Even, the Evenki, the Yukagir, and the Chukchi). The name “Yakut” comes from the Evenk word yako, mean-

A Yakut cook peers out from a restaurant window encased in frozen snow. © DEAN CONGER/CORBIS

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Always a resource-rich region, Yakutia plays a large role in Russia’s economy. The main industry in the republic is mining. The Republic of Sakha produces 99 percent of Russia’s diamonds, 24 percent of its gold, and 33 percent of its silver. It is also a major producer of coal, natural gas, tin, timber, fish, and other natural resources. The diamond mining industry is the main source of Russia’s foreign currency income; the multinational De Beers company partnership with the Russian company Almazy Rossii-Sakha (Diamonds of Russia and Sakha) was established in 1992. The Sakha summer festival, Ysyakh, is held in June, celebrating the ancestors’ movement of their cattle to pasture in the steppe. The festival opens with the solemn ritual of feeding the fire and includes sport contests and horse races, as well as kumys, a traditional beverage made of fermented mare’s milk. Since 1991, the Sakha language has been a mandatory class in primary schools, and some 92 percent of ethnically Sakha people speak their own language. It is not considered to be an endangered language, unlike the Chukchi, Even, or Evenki languages. The some 400,000 Sakha people living and working in the Republic of Sakha take pride in their strong and unique heritage.

See also:

CHUKCHI; EVENKI; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SO-

VIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Argounova, Tatiana. (2000). “Republic of Sakha (Yakutia).” . Hiller, Kristin. (1997). “Big River of Siberia.” Russian Life 9:16–24.

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Andrei Sakharov was born into an intelligentsia family in Moscow in 1921. Following in the footsteps of his physicist father, he enrolled at the physics faculty of Moscow University in 1938. Exempted from military service in World War II, Sakharov graduated in 1942 and spent the war years as an engineer at a munitions factory. There he met and married Klavdia Vikhireva (1919–1969), a laboratory technician. After the war Sakharov undertook graduate work in the laboratory of Igor Tamm. He received his candidate’s degree (roughly equivalent to a Ph.D.) in 1947. In the late 1940s, Sakharov conducted research that led to the explosion of the Soviet hydrogen bomb in 1953. The same year, he was elected a full member of Academy of Sciences. At thirty-two, he was the youngest member in the history of that institution. Sakharov began to support victims of political oppression as early as 1951 when he sheltered a Jewish mathematician fired from the Soviet weapons program. In 1958 he published two papers on the effects of nuclear explosions and appealed for a ban on atmospheric testing. With this work he began to move beyond physics into political activism. The 1968 publication in the New York Times of Sakharov’s essay “Reflections on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom” marked, he wrote in his memoirs, a “decisive step” in his development as a dissident. The essay called for disarmament and rapprochement with the West. As a result of the essay, Sakharov was banned from all weapons research. His wife died shortly thereafter, and Sakharov returned to Moscow and academic physics.

SAKHAROV, ANDREI DMITRIEVICH

Sakharov became involved in the emerging human rights movement, cofounding the Moscow Human Rights Committee in 1970. Through articles, petitions, interviews, and demonstrations, Sakharov and others in the movement aided political prisoners and advocated the abolition of censorship, an independent judiciary, and the introduction of contested elections. Sakharov married fellow human rights activist Yelena Bonner in 1972. She represented him at the Nobel Prize ceremony in 1975. The Nobel Committee’s citation emphasized Sakharov’s linkage of human rights and international cooperation.

(1921–1989), physicist, political dissident, and member of the Council of People’s Deputies; recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1975.

Sakharov’s denunciation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 led to his exile to Gorky in January 1980. He maintained ties with

Slezkine, Yuri. (1994). Arctic Mirrors: Russia and the Small Peoples of the North. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Vitebsky, P. (1990). “Yakut.” In The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union, ed. Graham Smith. London: Longman. ERIN K. CROUCH

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Lourie, Richard. (2002). Sakharov: A Biography. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England. Sakharov, Andrei. (1989). Moscow and Beyond, 1986 to 1989, tr. Antonina Bouis. New York: Vintage Books. Sakharov, Andrei. (1990). Memoirs, tr. Richard Lourie. New York: Knopf. LISA A. KIRSCHENBAUM

SALT See

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATIES.

SALTYKOV-SHCHEDRIN LIBRARY See NATIONAL LIBRARY OF RUSSIA.

SALTYKOV-SHCHEDRIN, MIKHAIL YEVGRAFOVICH (1826–1889), one of Russia’s greatest satirists.

Andrei Dimitrievich Sakharov. AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED

BY PERMISSION.

Moscow and the West via Bonner until her exile in 1984. In 1986 Mikhail Gorbachev invited Sakharov to return to Moscow. Sakharov immediately became an important and ubiquitous figure in the democratization movement. He was elected to the Congress of People’s Deputies in 1989. He participated in drafting a new constitution. He lent his personal support to numerous causes, advocating amnesty for political prisoners, disarmament, peaceful solutions to ethnic conflicts, and limits on Gorbachev’s emergency powers. On the eve of his death in December 1989, he was working to abolish Article 6 of the Soviet constitution, which enshrined the Communist Party’s monopoly on power. The article was abolished in March 1990.

See also:

BONNER, YELENA GEORGIEVNA; CONGRESS OF

PEOPLE’S DEPUTIES; DISSIDENT MOVEMENT; GLASNOST; HUMAN RIGHTS

Writing for leading radical journals of his time, Sovremennik (The Contemporary) (1862–1865) and Otechestvennye zapiski (Notes of the Fatherland) (1868–1889), Saltykov (pen name Shchedrin) created the most biting satires in Russian literature. Among his best-known books are Istoriia odnogo goroda (History of a Town) (1869–1870) and Gospoda Golovlevy (The Golovlyov Family) (1875— 1880). History is an account of despotic mayors’ rule of a fictitious town Glupov (Foolsville). The mayors can be distinguished from each other only by the degree of their incompetence and ill will. The book is a satire on the whole institution of Russian statehood and the very spirit that pervades the Russian way of life: routine mismanagement, needless oppression, and pointless tyranny. At the same time, it is an attack on the Russian people for their passivity toward their own fate, for their acceptance of violence and oppression of their rulers. The Golovlyov Family is a study of the institution of the family as cornerstone of society. In this novel, Saltykov describes moral and physical decline of three generations of a Russian gentry family. The nickname of the novel’s protagonist, Iudushka (“Little Judas”), whose treacherous behavior toward his nearest family is a matter of daily business, became part of Russian speech.

Bonner, Elena. (1986). Alone Together, tr. Alexander Cook. New York: Knopf.

Among Saltykov’s other better-known works are Pompadur i pompadurshi (Pompadours and Pompadouresses) (1863–1874), Sovremennaia idilliia

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(Contemporary Idyll) (1877–1883), and Skazki (Fairy Tales) (1869–1886).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

all Sami publications destroyed. Ten years before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Sami became again an optional subject in Lujaur schools, and some basic texts were published. A Kola Sami association was formed in 1989 and later joined the worldwide Sami Council.

Draitser, Emil. (1994). Techniques of Satire: The Case of Saltykov-Shchedrin. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

See also: FINNS AND KARELIANS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES,

See also:

INTELLIGENTSIA; JOURNALISM

Saltykov-Shchedrin, M. E. (1977). The Golovlyov Family. Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis. Saltykov-Shchedrin, M. E. (1984). The Pompadours. Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis. EMIL DRAITSER

PEOPLES BIBLIOGRAPHY

Beach, Hugh. (1994). “The Sami of Lapland.” In Polar Peoples: Self-Determination and Development, ed. Minority Rights Group. London: Minority Rights Publications. Slezkine, Yuri. (1994). Arctic Mirrors: Russia and the Small Peoples of the North. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

SAMI The fifty- to eighty thousand Sami (Lapps) live mostly in northern Norway and Sweden, some in Finland, and only about 3 percent (1,600) in the Kola peninsula of the Russian Federation. They represent less than 0.2 percent of the Murmansk oblast population. They reached the Gulf of Bothnia around 1300. Sami and Finnic languages are not mutually intelligible, having split some three thousand years ago. Three to ten Sami languages are distinguished, and the standard literary Sami in the Nordic countries is difficult to understand for the Kola (Kild) Sami, who are also unfamiliar with its Latin script. The reputed Asian features are actually encountered in only 25 percent of the Sami population. Inhabiting most of present Finland and Karelia one thousand years ago, the Sami were pushed toward the Arctic Ocean by Scandinavian, Finnish, Russian, and Karelian booty seekers. Those in the west were forced to adopt Catholicism and later Lutheranism. Greek Orthodoxy was imposed on the Kola Samis in the early 1500s, after they were subjected by Novgorod around 1300. The first western Sami book was printed in 1619, and the Bible in 1811, while the first Kola Sami book appeared in 1878. Reindeer herding remains a major occupation. The Soviet Russian authorities annihilated the traditional Kola Sami settlements in the 1930s, relocating them repeatedly to ever larger state or collective farms, where overgrazing severely reduced the number of reindeer. By now Lujaur (Lovozero in Russian) in central Kola remains the only partly Sami district. In 1937 Moscow ordered

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Taagepera, Rein. (1999). The Finno-Ugric Republics and the Russian State. London: Hurst. REIN TAAGEPERA

SAMIZDAT The term samizdat is most often translated as “selfpublishing.” It refers to the clandestine practice in the Soviet Union of circulating manuscripts that were banned, had no chance of being published in normal channels, or were politically suspect. These were generally typescripts, mimeograph copies, or handwritten items. The practice got its primary impetus in the mid to late 1950s, a period that in a socio-literary context is often referred to as The Thaw. This itself is linked to Nikita Khrushchev’s campaign of deStalinization, which provided an opening for literary themes previously disallowed. The opening was frequently arbitrary as the case of Boris Pasternak’s novel Dr. Zhivago proved in 1958. The novel could not be published in the Soviet Union, and Pasternak was brutally vilified despite being awarded the Nobel Prize for literature. The fact that broad categories of literature and sociopolitical themes still could not be addressed moved much of this output underground into samizdat. Sometimes this mode of literary output was systematic as with later journals and chronicles. But much of this was done spontaneously on an individual basis. Of key importance is that samizdat is inextricably linked to what came to be the dissident movements in the Soviet Union.

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These, in turn, were linked with other groups seeking, in early manifestations, protection of human rights, greater religious freedom, and more ethnic autonomy. As Scammell notes (1984, p. 507), samizdat “had come into existence in the late fifties as a result of the clash between the intellectuals’ post-Stalinist hunger for more freedom of expression and the continuing repressiveness of the censorship.” Freedom of expression was one thing, but it was deadly to the state’s perception of what could be allowed when the political admixture was included. The fact that samizdat and dissent were coeval is impossible to avoid and had great consequences for Soviet history. From the early 1960s to the collapse of the Soviet regime in 1991, samizdat had an uneven history. There were periods of extreme repression, for instance in 1972–1973. But samizdat was not quelled. Very often, trials were benchmarks in the advancement of samizdat and its many causes. The February 1966 trial of two writers, Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel, who had been publishing abroad for several years using pseudonyms, was a sensation since they were given seven and five years respectively at hard labor for allegedly writing anti-Soviet material. Their arrest led to public protests by dissidents. A number of them were then arrested, and this, in turn, led to further protests and corresponding arrests. Books and pamphlets with documents from these trials were frequently compiled and circulated widely in secret. These added much fuel to the fire, and a constant cycle was created. The Soviet government was also severely criticized worldwide because of a new policy of punishing dissident writers by confining them to mental hospitals.

and sporadically thereafter. Other notable publications included the Ukrainian Herad, the Chronicle of the Catholic Church of Lithuania, and historian Roy Medvedev’s Political Diary (which ran from 1964 to 1971). This is by no means to minimize the huge number of individual contributions. Together they undercut the power and prestige of the Soviet state.

See also: CENSORSHIP; DISSIDENT MOVEMENT; GOSIZDAT; JOURNALISM; SINYAVSKY-DANIEL TRIAL

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bukovsky, Vladimir. (1978). To Build a Castle. London: Deutsch; New York: Viking. Meerson-Aksenov, Michael, and Shragin, Boris. (1977). The Political, Social and Religious Thought of Russian ‘Samizdat’—An Anthology, tr. Nickolas Lupinin. Belmont, MA: Nordland. Reddaway, Peter, ed. and tr. (1972). Uncensored Russia: Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union. New York: American Heritage. Scammell, Michael. (1984). Solzhenitsyn: A Biography. New York: Norton. NICKOLAS LUPININ

SAMOILOVA, KONDORDIYA NIKOLAYEVNA (1876–1920), Bolshevik; leader of Communist Party Women’s Department. Konkordiya Samoilova was one of the founders of the Soviet Communist Party’s programs for emancipating women. Born into a priestly family in Irkutsk, she studied in the Bestuzhevsky Courses for Women in St. Petersburg in the 1890s. In 1901 Samoilova became a full-time member of the Social-Democratic Labor Party.

Samizdat and dissent grew despite all impediments. It was a cultural opposition, an independent subculture, as Meerson-Aksenov (1977) called it, and it signified that social and political judgments stemming from sources other than the state were seen to be critically significant. In reality, the Soviet state was stymied by this phenomenon because it no longer knew quite how to handle it. The blanket executions of the 1930s were out of the question. The breadth of the criticism was also sometimes incomprehensible to the government. It could include everything from opposing the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 to the latest broadsides against modern art.

Samoilova spent sixteen years in the revolutionary underground, mostly in St. Petersburg. An editor of Pravda (Truth) in 1913, she created a column on the female proletariat and, in 1914, with Inessa Armand, Nadezhda Krupskaia, and Lyudmila Stal, founded Rabotnitsa (Female Worker), a newspaper devoted to working-class women. In 1913 she also organized the first celebration in Russia of International Woman’s Day.

The most famous of the systematic publications was The Chronicle of Current Events, which was issued without interruption from 1968 to 1972

In 1917 Samoilova revived Rabotnitsa, which had been closed by the tsarist government. In 1918 she worked closely with Inessa Armand and Alexan-

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dra Kollontai to establish a women’s department (the Zhenotdel) within the Communist Party. While Armand and Kollontai developed the program for women’s emancipation, Samoilova concentrated on building the department from the ground up. Always an enthusiastic supporter of Vladimir Lenin and a reliable, hard-working, efficient Bolshevik, Samoilova was trusted by the party leadership, despite the fact that she was as ardent an advocate for work among women as the more flamboyant Kollontai. She was also an able propagandist who crafted vivid, accessible speeches and pamphlets. Samoilova died of cholera on a propaganda trip down the Volga in 1920.

See also:

FEMINISM; KOLLONTAI, ALEXANDRA MIKHAIL-

OVNA; ZHENOTDEL

Clements, Barbara Evans. (1997). Bolshevik Women. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Wood, Elizabeth A. (1997). The Baba and the Comrade: Gender and Politics in Revolutionary Russia. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. BARBARA EVANS CLEMENTS

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tion strategies to improve their operations and performance. Enterprise performance was to be gauged relative to long-run plans and norms. A system of state orders (goszakazy) was to replace compulsory output targets, although the distinction between state orders and plan targets was never clarified. Enterprises were granted the right to exchange goods, with contracts negotiated between firms to include output, delivery, and price components agreed upon by both firms. Enterprises were also allowed to retain a greater share of their planned profits to distribute as bonuses or to invest in additional capital. Samoupravlenie was an attempt to make Soviet managers responsible for the final results; that is, producing the quantity and quality of output desired by customers, whether firms or individual consumers.

See also:

BIBLIOGRAPHY

S T E F A N O ,

PERESTROIKA

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aganbegyan, Abel. (1988). The Economic Challenge of Perestroika. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Gregory, Paul R. (1990). Restructuring the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy. New York: Cambridge University Press. SUSAN J. LINZ

SAMOUPRAVLENIE

SAN STEFANO, TREATY OF

Samoupravlenie, or self-management, was introduced during Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika as a mechanism to induce enterprises to produce quality products desired by customers and as a way of extending democratization to the workplace. Soviet enterprises were placed on full economic accounting (polny khozraschet), which meant that current operations had to be self-financed from sales revenues rather than subsidized by central or ministerial authorities, and any change or expansion in operations had to be financed from retained earnings. Managers were to be elected by the employees and to work directly with a council selected from among the workers. The objective of samoupravlenie was to reduce “petty tutelage,” the phrase for interference in day-to-day enterprise operations by planning or other administrative officials. Samoupravlenie was part of a larger effort to promote initiative and responsibility in Soviet enterprises. For example, the number of compulsory plan targets given to enterprises was reduced, providing more flexibility for them to select produc-

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The Treaty of San Stefano, signed March 3, 1878, ended the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878). On January 31, 1878, with Russian victory over Turkey a foregone conclusion, the belligerents agreed to an armistice at Adrianople, followed by peace negotiations at San Stefano, a village near Constantinople. There, Count Nikolai Pavlovich Ignatiev, former ambassador to the Porte, and Savfet Pasha worked out final terms for signature on March 3, the anniversary date of Tsar Alexander II’s imperial accession. Accordingly, Turkey agreed to pay reparations of 1.41 billion rubles, of which 1.1 billion would be cancelled by cession to Russia in Asia Minor of Ardahan, Kars, Batumi, and Bayazid. In the Balkans, Turkey ceded northern Dobrudja and the Danube delta to Russia for ultimate transfer to Romania, in return for Romanian agreement to Russian occupation of southern Bessarabia. With a seaboard on the Mediterranean and an elected prince, Bulgaria remained under nominal Turkish control,

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while Bosnia and Herzegovina received autonomy. Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro received their independence, along with territorial enlargement. Turkey was obliged strictly to observe concessions for local participation in government that were inherent in the Organic Regulation of 1868 on Crete, while analogous regimes were to be implemented in Thessaly and Albania. The Porte was also to introduce reforms in Turkish Armenia. The San Stefano Treaty formally went into effect on March 16, 1878, but concerted opposition from Great Britain and Austria-Hungary, together with Russia’s growing diplomatic isolation, meant that the agreement remained only preliminary. Indeed, its main provisions subsequently underwent substantial revision at the Congress of Berlin in July 1878.

See also:

BERLIN, CONGRESS OF; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS;

TURKEY, RELATIONS WITH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Jelavich, Barbara. (1974). St. Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1814–1974. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. OLEG R. AIRAPETOV

SARMATIANS Between the sixth and fourth centuries B.C.E., the Sarmatians settled in what is today southern Russia, eventually replacing the Scythians as the dominant tribe in this region. They vanished from the historical record after their land was overrun by the Huns in the late fourth century C.E., and little is known about them. They rose again, however, in the realm of mythology. According to a legend which gained popularity in Poland in the fifteenth century, the ancient Sarmatians rode into the Polish lands and gave order and stability to the primitive local population. This myth helped justify serfdom, allowing the nobles to imagine that they were of a superior racial lineage. The Sarmatian story became enormously popular, leading some to call Copernicus the Sarmatian Ptolemy.

state fought against non-Catholic foes outside the country, the legend mutated to include the idea that the Sarmatians had a mission from God to spread and defend the True Faith. By the end of the seventeenth century, Sarmatianism had developed a xenophobic character, as many Polish nobles turned away from all “foreign” influences to glory in their indigenous Sarmatian heritage. This myth even influenced the style of clothing, art, and architecture of Poland during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as the nobles came to fancy pseudo-oriental designs that they felt evoked their racial heritage. The intellectuals of the Polish Enlightenment blamed Sarmatianism for the crises of the eighteenth century and for Poland’s eventual destruction and partition. Although some of the stylistic features lived on a bit longer, the broader ideology of Sarmatianism faded away in the nineteenth century or lived on as a trace element within new ideological formations.

See also:

HUNS; POLAND; SCYTHIANS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bogucka, Maria. (1996). The Lost World of the “Sarmatians”: Custom as the Regulator of Polish Social Life in Early Modern Times. Warsaw: Polish Academy of Sciences. Grabowska, Bozena. (1993). “Portraits after Life: The Baroque Legacy of Poland’s Nobles.” History Today 43:18. BRIAN PORTER

SARTS Former term for Turkic-speaking Muslim residents of cities along the Syr Darya River, the Ferghana Valley, and Samarkand.

Sarmatianism did not have any specific religious content at first, but during the CounterReformation, as Catholics worked to stamp out religious diversity in the Polish Republic and as the

According to Russian Imperial sources, Sarts exceeded 800,000 people and comprised 26 percent of the population of Turkestan and 44 percent of the urban population of Central Asia in 1880. The term was the subject of lively debate in the late-nineteenth century when Russians colonized Central Asia. Vasily Bartold described the Sarts as settled peoples in Central Asia, Turkicized Old Iranian population, emerging from a conglomeration of Saka, Sogdian, Kwarazmian, and Kush-Bactrians.

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The ancient Turkic word Sart, originally meaning “merchant,” was used by Mongols and Turks by the thirteenth century to identify the Iranian population of Central Asia. In the sixteenth century, Uzbeks who conquered Central Asia used “Sart” to distinguish the sedentary population of Central Asia from the nomadic Turkic groups settling in the region. By the nineteenth century, the urban Sart population had merged cultural, linguistic, and ethnic elements from their Persian and Turko-Mongolian lineage. They remained distinct from Uzbeks even though their language belongs to the Chagatay-Turkic group. On the eve of the Russian Revolution, “Sart” was a self-denomination distinguished from Uzbeks and Tajiks despite the cultural synthesis in Turkestan. Soviet nationality policies made the term obsolete. Following the first counting of the 1926 census, Sarts were listed as a questionable nationality. By the end of 1927, the majority of Sarts were designated as Uzbek and others were named Sart-Kalmyks. They were not considered Tajik because they were Turkic-speaking. Of the 2,880 Sart-Kalmyks listed in the 1926 census, there were 2,550 in Kirgiz ASSR, fewer than 250 in Uzbek SSR (all located in Andijan), and none in Tajik ASSR. By the 1937 census, the ethnic marker disappeared.

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viet Union. The Ministry of Finance directly controlled this network until 1963, when it was incorporated into Gosbank (the state bank of the USSR). Sberbank’s main task was to collect the individual deposits and invest them with the state. In addition, Soviet citizens paid their bills and picked up their pension checks at their local Sberbank offices. After the breakup of the USSR, Sberbank Russia became a quasicommercial savings bank, with the Central Bank of Russia as its majority shareholder. Sberbank continued to invest a high percentage of its resources with the government (e.g., in government securities), giving it the nickname “the Ministry of Cash.” Although commercial banks began to compete with Sberbank for retail deposits, Sberbank’s share of the retail market never fell below 60 percent in the 1990s. This occurred for three reasons. First, no new bank could compete with Sberbank’s extensive branch network. Second, the government explicitly insured deposits in Sberbank, while commercial banks had no deposit insurance system. Third, repeated commercial banking crises made Sberbank appear to be a safer choice than other banks. However, it bears noting that the vast majority of Russians chose to keep their savings outside of the banking system entirely.

CENTRAL ASIA; ISLAM; NATIONALITIES POLICIES,

SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

See also: BANKING SYSTEM, SOVIET; GOSBANK; STROIBANK

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bregel, Yuri. (1978). “The Sarts in the Khanate of Khiva,” Journal of Asian History 12 (2):120–151.

Johnson, Juliet. (2000). A Fistful of Rubles: The Rise and Fall of the Russian Banking System. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Schoeberlein, John. (1994). “Identity in Central Asia: Construction and contention in the conceptions of ‘Özbek,’ ‘Tâjik,’ ‘Muslim,’ ‘Samarqandi’ and other groups.” Ph.D. diss. Harvard University. MICHAEL ROULAND

Tompson, William. (1998). “Russia’s ‘Ministry of Cash’: Sberbank in Transition.” Communist Economies and Economic Transformation 10(2):133–155. JULIET JOHNSON

SBERBANK

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY

Sberbank (the Savings Bank) was the monopoly, state-owned household savings bank of the USSR. It retained both its state ownership and its dominance of the retail banking market in the postSoviet period, despite increasing competition from commercial banks. In the Soviet period, Sberbank’s retail banking network encompassed approximately 70,000 branches and smaller “cash offices” (sberkassy) on almost every corner across the So-

Leading scientists and policy makers in the Soviet Union rapidly reached an accommodation after the revolution in October 1917. The scientific community was decimated by deaths and emigration that resulted from World War I, revolution, and civil war. Those scientists who remained recognized that the new regime, unlike the tsarist government, intended to support scientific research. They quickly established a number of research institutes and

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stitutes whose focus was basic research fell under the jurisdiction of Glavnauka, while those of an applied profile fell under NTO. When Josef Stalin rose to power in the late 1920s, fundamental changes in science policy occurred that largely held sway until the collapse of the USSR. The changes reflected crash programs in rapid industrialization and collectivization of agriculture. First, officials intended that scientists emphasize applied research at the expense of basic research. This led to the removal of many of the institutes under the jurisdiction of the Glavnauka to the Commissariat of Heavy Industry and the establishment of a technical division within the Academy of Sciences. Second, the Communist Party began a concerted effort to place personnel loyal to it in research institutes. It forced the relatively independent Soviet Academy of Sciences to create many new positions, or chairs, for permanent members in such new fields as the social sciences, and insisted that party members be voted in during elections.

A 1966 experiment in a chemistry laboratory at Akademgorodok—the Siberian “Academic City.” © DEAN CONGER/CORBIS

received gold rubles to buy journal subscriptions, equipment, and reagents abroad. Government officials, for their part, believed that scientific and engineering expertise was critical to the establishment of communism. Hesitantly at first, they offered academic freedom as well as financial and administration support to the scientists. They remained skeptical about the value of fundamental research. Party officials also believed that scientists, most of whom were trained in the tsarist era, required close supervision by loyal communists. Several different bureaucracies were responsible for the administration and funding of science, and scientists were deft at playing them off against each other to increase their funding. The major ones were the Main Scientific Administration of the Commissariat of Education (Glavnauka) and the Scientific Technical Department of the Supreme Economic Council (NTO). Generally speaking, in-

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Third, officials required that scientists produce detailed one-year and five-year plans of research activity. Since the Commissariat of Heavy Industry was relatively flush with funding, scientists found leeway in planning and financial documents to embark on research in several important new directions, for example, nuclear physics and cryogenics in the 1930s. Finally, officials insisted upon strict ideological control over the content of science and effectively established autarchy (international isolation) that persisted until the late 1980s. Party officials had indicated their intention to control scientists in a series of show trials in 1929 and 1930 where they used forced confessions of engineers to prove “wrecking” of plans. They punished wrecking with long prison terms and in some cases execution. During the Great Terror of the mid-1930s, scientists, no less than other members of society, also faced arrest, interrogation, internment in labor camps (there were several special labor camps for scientists and engineers), and execution. Scientists’ professional associations were subjugated to party organizations. Several fields of science suffered from ideological meddling. In the most notorious case, Trofim Lysenko, a biologist who rejected modern genetics, came to dominate the Soviet biology establishment from the 1940s until the early 1960s. The authorities ordered references to genetics removed from textbooks, and many geneticists lost their jobs.

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World War II had a direct and long-term impact on Soviet science policy. First, it ensured continued emphasis on applied research, in particular military technology. Second, with the advent of the atomic bomb project and then rocket technology, it ensured large-scale approaches to research and development. The average size of programs and institutes in the USSR grew to several times larger than similar programs or institutes in other countries. Third, the evacuation of entire institutes and personnel from areas under the siege of German armies led to the dispersal of institutes to the Ural Mountains region and Siberia. Nikita Khrushchev, who followed Stalin, initiated a series of reforms in Soviet society, abandoning some aspects of Stalinism (although maintaining one-party rule). The reforms had an impact on science policy as well. The most significant impact was the growth of the scientific enterprise. The total number of scientists increased from 162,500 in 1950 to 665,000 in 1965, including an increase in the number of senior and junior specialists from 62,000 to 140,000. A second aspect of reform was decentralization of the scientific enterprise, in part because of the growth of the nuclear establishment. The most significant sign of decentralization was the construction of Akademgorodok, a city of science built in the early 1960s with twenty-one institutes, library, and university, near Novosibirsk in Siberia. Another aspect of decentralization was the removal of the technical division of the Academy of Sciences and the placement of its institutes under the jurisdiction of industrial ministries. Under Leonid Brezhnev a number of the Khrushchev-era reforms were abandoned. While there had been such great achievements in science as the first artificial satellite (Sputnik) and successes in nuclear power, Soviet science performed poorly by such measures as scientific citation indices, Nobel prizes, and assimilation of discoveries in production. Rather than experiment with new forms of organization or new directions of research, however, the Brezhnev administration further centralized policy making in major bureaucracies, raised the level of ideological control, and established renewed vigilance toward contact with Western scientists. While the scientific enterprise grew to massive proportions—on the eve of its breakup the USSR had one-third of the world’s engineers and one-quarter of its physicists—it continued to perform poorly.

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Mikhail Gorbachev championed “acceleration” (uskorenie) of the achievements of research into the production process. Like leaders before him, he believed in the power of science to help solve the social, economic, and other problems facing the country. As part of glasnost and perestroika, Gorbachev’s policies encouraged rapid decentralization of science policy and increasingly open discussion of the poor performance of the sector. Scientists reorganized professional societies for the first time since the 1930s. They gained the opportunity to travel abroad to conferences. Only the collapse of the USSR facilitated significant reevaluation of science policy in Russia. At the same time, because of rapid inflation and decline in government revenues, the scientific establishment lost much of its funding and stability for the first time since the 1920s. Salaries were not paid for months at a time, and research monies disappeared. International organizations offered aid programs to discourage emigration. In general, however, the Russian scientific community has been slow to recover from the political and economic shocks of the 1990s.

See also:

ACADEMY OF SCIENCES; LYSENKO, TROFIM

DENISOVICH; SPACE PROGRAM BIBLIOGRAPHY

Balzer, Harley. (1989). Soviet Science on the Edge of Reform. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Graham, Loren. (1967). The Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Communist Party, 1927–1932. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Graham, Loren. (1987). Science, Philosophy, and Human Behavior in the Soviet Union. New York: Columbia University Press. Joravsky, David. (1970). The Lysenko Affair. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lubrano, Linda, and Solomon, Susan. (1980). The Social Context of Soviet Science. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Parrott, Bruce. (1983). Politics and Technology in the Soviet Union. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. PAUL R. JOSEPHSON

SCIENCE FICTION Science fiction is a literary genre that extrapolates from existing knowledge about the real world to speculate about alternative worlds. It always includes an element of the fantastic, since it aims to go beyond what is, to give a literary model of

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“what if?” Unlike pure fantasy or utopian literature, however, science fiction posits a rational exploration of as-yet inexplicable phenomena and unknown corners of the human psyche. In Russia the most important works of science fiction have usually been viewed as subversive to the regime in power because of their ability to model alternative realities, to evade censorship by displacing political allegories to the juvenile realm of cosmic adventure, and to tap into the Russian readership’s persistent longings for a more just society. The first, mid-nineteenth century works of Russian science fiction blend the rational utopianism of European models with the age-old Russian folk vision of communal justice and abundance for all. The idea that Western-oriented scientific and technological progress might be combined in Russia with egalitarian values, avoiding the evils of both autocracy and capitalism, is one of the strongest and most consistent strains in Russian science fiction. Nikolai Chernyshevsky’s 1862 novel What Is to Be Done? created a fictional model of this idea that inspired generations of Russian revolutionaries, including Lenin. Alexander Bogdanov’s The Red Star (1908) depicts a socially and scientifically progressive society on Mars that is superior to existing earthly alternatives. In the decade following the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, many stories extolled a cosmic revolution, anticipating the victorious spread of classless societies to other planets with the help of futuristic technology and radically evolved human consciousness. As late as the 1970s, the writers Arkady and Boris Strugatsky countered official literary depictions of Soviet society with science fiction imaginings of alternative societies where rationality, science, and human freedom are not at odds. A second, and opposing strain, is the dystopian vision of society dehumanized by the relentless rationalization of work, health, social, and spiritual life. Yevgeny Zamyatin’s novel We (1924, unpublished; 1989) is a brilliant philosophical satire depicting “mathematically happy” workers in the One State, where free will has been all but eliminated. Extrapolating tendencies from both bourgeois and socialist systems of conformity, We insists on the paramount value of individual free will. Zamyatin’s novel, and later Western novels based on similar ideas (e.g., George Orwell’s 1984 ) were banned in the Soviet Union. After 1957, the launch of Sputnik and the gradual relaxation of ideological restrictions inaugurated a new era of Soviet science fiction. In the immensely popular works of Ivan Yefremov and the brothers Stru-

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gatsky, Russian readers found a forum in which their authentic political and cultural aspirations were given a voice—along with an exciting plot. They offered richly imagined histories of the future to remind the reader of the outcome of ethical choices made in the present. Russian literature has often served as the conscience of the nation, and twenty-first century Russian science fiction continues the tradition of ideological engagement, by addressing such themes as contemporary social malaise and the search for a new, post-Soviet Russian cultural identity.

See also:

CHERNYSHEVSKY, NIKOLAI GAVRILOVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Fetzer, Leland, ed. (1982). Pre-Revolutionary Russian Science Fiction: An Anthology. Ann Arbor: Ardis. Gomel, Elana. (1999). “Science Fiction in Russia: From Utopia to New Age.” Science Fiction Studies 26(3): 435–441. Howell, Yvonne. (1994). Apocalyptic Realism: The Science Fiction of Arkady and Boris Strugatsky. New York: Peter Lang. Suvin, Darko. (1979). “Russian SF and Its Utopian Tradition.” In Metamorphoses of Science Fiction: On the Poetics and History of a Literary Genre. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. YVONNE HELEN HOWELL

SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM The term scientific socialism was used by Friedrich Engels to characterize the doctrines that he and Karl Marx developed and distinguish them from other socialist doctrines, which he dismissed as utopian socialism. Engels regarded the Marx-Engels doctrines as scientific in that they laid bare the secret of capitalism through the discovery of surplus value, and explained (with a theory known in the USSR as historical materialism) how capitalism would inevitably be overthrown and replaced by socialism. The concept “scientific socialism” made Marxist doctrines more attractive to many than rival socialist doctrines by suggesting that equality and the end of exploitation were not only desirable but also inevitable. Scientific socialism was introduced to Russia in the late ninenteenth century. After the Bolshevik victory in the civil war, scientific socialism became

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part of the official ideology of the USSR. The term itself was frequently used loosely to designate a doctrine concerning the development of a Soviet type of society. Much of the actual content of the doctrine varied over time in accordance with the concrete policies of the Soviet state. Socialism as a comprehensive social system failed to spread to the advanced capitalist countries (although “pension fund socialism,” the growth of government welfare and regulatory programs, the expansion of employee rights, state-owned industries, public education, and universal suffrage, were widespread and important). This failure, along with other developments such as the collapse of the USSR, indicated that scientific socialism was an imperfect guide to the future. By the end of the twentieth century, the term was mainly of historical interest.

See also:

IDEALISM; MARXISM; SOCIALISM

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Engels, Frederick. (1880). Socialism: Utopian and Scientific. . Lichtheim, George. (1962). Marxism. New York: Praeger. MICHAEL ELLMAN

SCISSORS CRISIS The Scissors Crisis occurred in the Soviet Union during the New Economic Policy (NEP) era of the 1920s and refers to the movements, over time, of the relative prices of industrial and agricultural products. When the movements of relative prices are presented graphically, the observed patterns resemble the open blades of a pair of scissors; hence the term Scissors Crisis. The observed price movements in the Soviet Union during the 1920s can be explained by the relatively quicker recovery of the agricultural sector (the relative prices of agricultural products falling) vis-à-vis the apparently slower recovery of the industrial sector (the relative prices of industrial goods increasing). This recovery occurred after the collapse of the Soviet economy during the tumultuous era of war communism (1917–1921). Such a pattern of recovery following collapse is not unusual. Moreover, the observed changes in relative prices would be expected in a market economy

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where the degree of decline and the subsequent rate of recovery differ by sector of the economy. The underlying issues of the Scissors Crisis are important to the understanding of Soviet economic policy in the 1920s, especially the response of the Soviet state to these price changes. Soviet agriculture during the NEP was based largely on a private peasant economy. The development of modern agriculture was a major focus, cast within the framework of socialist economic thought. Although industry was recovering after war communism, it was hampered by substantial state ownership and the concentration of industry in the form of trusts, allowing for the exercising of monopoly power. In light of Josef Stalin’s dramatic economic changes beginning in the late 1920s (full nationalization, collectivization of agriculture, and the replacement of markets by the administrative command system), the issues and discussions of the 1920s assume great importance in one’s understanding of Soviet economic history. First, if agriculture is a major component of total output in the economy, and agricultural output is to be both a source of food and a source of financing to promote the process of industrialization, the terms of agricultural production (amount, source, and means of distribution) have a major impact on the size and the distribution of the share dedicated to the financing of industrialization. Second, the nature of property rights and the organizational arrangements in the agricultural sector were both matters of contention during the Soviet pre-plan era. Specifically, during the 1920s, experimentation with different forms of cooperative farm organizations was intended to change production arrangements as well as state access to the agricultural product; these changes could limit or eliminate market forces. Third, Stalin argued, as a major justification for collectivization (beginning in 1929), that in fact the pace of industrialization would be limited by the ability of peasants under private property arrangements to withhold production in part to manipulate (increase) prices. According to Stalin, this would affect the terms of trade between the city and the countryside and thus reduce the pace at which industrialization could be pursued. Fourth, the policies chosen for addressing the Scissors Crisis form an important component of the assessment of the NEP economy of the 1920s. Specifically, it was argued that there was a significant element of monopoly in Soviet industry at

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this time. State policy focused on this issue, threatening good intervention or the introduction of competing imports to force a reduction of industrial prices. In addition, threats were made to limit the access of industry to capital and thus change the behavior of the industrial sector. Although the behavior of agricultural and industrial prices in the Soviet Union during the 1920s can be explained by the underlying market forces of supply and demand, nevertheless within the context of events of the 1920s and subsequent behavior by Stalin, the events of the Scissors Crisis have assumed major importance for understanding the NEP period. Moreover, the issues involved are fundamental components of contemporary theorizing about the process of economic development.

See also:

NEW ECONOMIC POLICY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Gregory, Paul R., and Stuart, Robert C. (2001). Russian and Soviet Economic Performance and Structure, 7th ed. New York: Addison Wesley Longman. Nove, Alec. (1982). An Economic History of the U.S.S.R. New York: Penguin. Sah, R. K., and Stiglitz, J. E. (1984). “The Economics of Price Scissors.” The American Economic Review 74(1): 125–138. ROBERT C. STUART

region. By the third century B.C.E., the Scythians came under pressure of the nomadic Sarmatians who destroyed and absorbed most of them into their loosely-organized tribal structure. Nomadic in origins, the Scythian peoples and the “Scythian” culture also included agriculturalists and hunter-gatherers who paid tribute to their nomadic lords with grain and other goods that the nomads could not produce themselves. In turn, these items were traded with the Greek colonial cities of the northern Black Sea region for wine, precious metals, and other goods. While Scythia proper, as it was known in GrecoRoman sources, was located to the north of the Black Sea region (from the Danube to the lower Don and Volga), “Scythic” culture occupied a much greater territory of Eurasia, stretching as far east as southwestern Siberia and eastern Kazakhstan. Elements of this culture can be summarized as follows: the use of (1) iron; (2) short swords; (3) conservative artistic motifs (especially the animal style, e.g., the stag and the animal combat); (4) nomadic lifestyle organized around a patriarchal, little centralized social structure; (5) improved compound bows; (6) bronze cauldrons; (7) making of deerstones; and, (8) complex horse harness. All of these components were shared across a huge area not only by Iranian-speakers, but also by Turkic and Mongolian nomads of steppelands of Inner Eurasia.

See also:

SCYTHIANS The Scythians were a large confederation of Iranian-speaking (or headed by an Iranian-speaking military-political elite) tribal unions, known in classical sources since around the eighth century B.C.E. or about the time they migrated to the North Pontic steppe zone where they supplanted and apparently absorbed some of the Cimmerians who occupied the region. As with their predecessors, it is not clear from where the Scythians migrated, but their most likely homeland was Central Asia from where they moved under pressure of other nomadic peoples. Organized in supra-tribal confederations, the Scythians made raids and full-blown invasions from the northern Caucasus into Media and Assyria in northern Mesopotamia, reaching as far as Palestine and Egypt throughout the period of 670–610 B.C.E. After suffering major defeats towards the end of the seventh century, they transferred their locus of power to the North Pontic

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Christian, David. (1998). A History of Russia, Central Asia and Mongolia Vol. 1: Inner Asia from Prehistory to the Mongol Empire. Oxford, UK/Malden, MA: Blackwell. Golden, Peter B. (1990). “The Peoples of the South Russian Steppe.” In The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia. ed. Denis Sinor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Talbot-Rice, Tamara (1957). The Scythians [Ancient Peoples and Places, vol. 2], ed. G. Daniel. London: Thames and Hudson. ROMAN K. KOVALEV

SECOND ECONOMY The second economy of the USSR included economic activities that supplemented the command, or first, economy. As defined by Gregory Gross-

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man, the second economy consisted of all production and exchange undertaken directly for private gain, knowingly illegal in some substantial way, or both. This definition encompassed both legal and illegal activities, but most studies focus on the illegal part, also referred to as underground, unofficial, or shadow economy, or the black market. The legal second economy was made up mainly of private agriculture, small-scale construction services, extraction of precious metals, hunting of valuable wild animals, and certain professional services, such as those provided by physicians, dentists, and tutors. The illegal economy was significantly larger than the legal part of the second economy. Legal private activities often served as fronts for illegal ones. The most common illegal economic activity in the USSR was theft of state property. Presumably the second-most widespread illegal activity was the corruption that reached into the highest echelons of power; one purpose of corruption was to protect the functioning of the rest of the illegal economy. Another major illegal activity was speculation, defined as resale of goods by individuals for profit. Unlike theft from the state sector and corruption, which would be illegal anywhere, speculation was a crime only in socialist economies. Illegal production by individuals or by teams was also significant. Much of the illegal production for private purposes took place at state enterprises. Output was usually sold privately, but sometimes it was distributed through the official retail trade network. Private manufacturing without an official facade also existed. None of the major conditions giving rise to the existence of a large underground economy were unique to the USSR, but the way they came together in Soviet society was unusual and created a highly favorable environment for an illegal economy. These conditions included price controls on virtually all consumer goods, the prohibition of many private economic activities and high taxes on others, the ubiquity and poor protection of public property, the immense discretionary power of poorly paid bureaucrats, and social attitudes that tolerated theft of state property, corruption, and many other economic illegalities. While the Soviet second economy was large, its magnitude, especially in the illegal sphere, is difficult to ascertain. One widely used way to estimate the extent of the second economy was based on interviewing emigrants from the USSR about their

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lives prior to emigration. Three major surveys were performed in Israel and the United States in the 1970s and 1980s. The Berkeley-Duke household budget survey, the only one focused explicitly on the second economy, implied that about 27 percent of urban household income in Russia in the late 1970s was derived from the second economy. The corresponding estimates from the other two surveys were about half that amount. Evaluating second economy dynamics is even more difficult. One methodology infers the growth of the second economy from comparisons of electricity consumption with the official Gross Domestic Product. This approach indicates that Russia’s second economy grew by more than 80 percent between 1979 and 1989. The rise of the second economy amounted to an implicit market reform within the Soviet system, but it also facilitated or even compelled the partial reforms of perestroika, which expanded the scope of the legal second economy. Nonetheless, the illegal and quasi-legal economy also mushroomed, undermining central planning and leading to the economic transition to markets starting in 1992. During the transition, the notion of a second economy was restricted to illegal activities, the growth of which continued throughout the 1990s. The reasons for this growth included persistent excessive regulation of the economy, high statutory tax rates, weakening of official institutions and their inability to protect property rights protection and enforce contracts, lack of credibility of government reform policies, and continued corruption. The illegal second economy may have benefited from the emergence of the mafia, which taxes underground firms but also provides property rights protection for its victim/clients. The existence of a large second economy, and particularly its illegal part, had important implications for Russia’s economy both before and after the collapse of the USSR. First, underground activity hinders an accurate understanding of the economy and impedes policy-making by distorting various statistics, including GDP data, household incomes and their distribution, and employment. Additionally, the illegal economy weakens the feedback to policy-makers on government decisions and actions, undermines official institutions, and promotes corruption. From an efficiency point of view, the illegal economy suffers from the black market’s need for secrecy, which results in poor flows of information, greater operational uncertainty, and suboptimally small-scale production.

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Economic distortions also appear because some activities are easier to hide than others. At the same time, the second economy often benefits a centrally planned economy by improving incentives and resource allocation. During the post-Soviet transition, the existence of the second economy restricted the government’s ability to tax and regulate excessively. On the margin, the net balance between the second economy’s costs and benefits to society depends on its size and other factors, and is a difficult empirical question.

See also:

BLACK MARKET; COMMAND ADMINISTRATIVE

ECONOMY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alexeev, Michael, and Pyle, William. (2003). “A Note on Measuring the Unofficial Economy in the Former Soviet Republics.” Economics of Transition 11(1): 153–175. Grossman, Gregory. (1977). “The ‘Second Economy’ of the USSR.” Problems of Communism 26(5):25–40. Grossman, Gregory. (1979). “Notes on the Illegal Private Economy and Corruption.” In Soviet Economy in a Time of Change, Vol. 1, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Grossman, Gregory. (1982). “The ‘Shadow Economy’ in the Socialist Sector of the USSR.” In The CMEA FiveYear Plans (1981–1985) in New Perspective. Brussels: NATO Colloquium. Johnson, Simon; Kaufmann, Daniel; and Shleifer, Andrei. (1997). “The Unofficial Economy in Transition.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2:159–239. Leitzel, Jim. (1995). Russian Economic Reform. New York: Routledge. Schneider, Friedrich, and Enste, Dominik. (2000). “Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences.” Journal of Economic Literature 38(1):77–114. Treml, Vladimir, and Alexeev, Michael. (1994). “The Growth of the Second Economy in the Soviet Union and Its Impact.” In Issues in the Transformation of Centrally Planned Economies, ed. Robert Campbell. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. MICHAEL ALEXEEV

Committee headquarters (“the Center”) in Moscow at the top to the republics, provinces, and cities below, secretariats were the Party’s hands-on executive organs. They controlled the work of more than 200,000 full-time officials and employees, known collectively as the nomenklatura. The second secretaries were key figures because at every level of authority they controlled the appointment of Party and government officials. The topmost secretary in Moscow was general secretary, or sometimes called the first secretary. The latter term was likewise applied to local number-one secretaries at the middle and lower rungs of the Party hierarchy. Second-in-command in these secretariats was the second secretary. His function was to administer crucial personnel matters throughout the given political-administrative region or locale in the USSR. In republics or other units where the first secretary was drawn from a titular ethnic group, the second secretary was always a Russian for oversight. The second secretary had the authority to appoint and dismiss nomenklaturists at the various levels of Party and government rule. Any number of Party functionaries who were later promoted from below to Moscow Center earned their status by having served as second secretaries. In Josef Stalin’s time, one of the most powerful officials of this kind was Georgy Malenkov, who functioned largely as Stalin’s number-two man-in-charge of personnel, or de facto second secretary. Like other second secretaries, top to bottom, Malenkov was also a member of the Party’s most important political organ, the Politburo, which at the local levels was called the “Buro.” After Stalin’s death in March 1953, Malenkov functioned briefly as first secretary and then was transferred to the office of prime minister of the USSR. It was not unusual for former secretaries, especially second secretaries, to assume high government office at some level of Party or state administration. Any number of important Party officials and members of the central Politburo were first secretaries at one time or another, and many were also once second secretaries on lower rungs of the Party hierarchy.

The second secretary was the number-two position at every level, from top to bottom, of the administrative apparatus (secretariat) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). From Central

In the final period of Soviet rule (after 1985), Yegor Ligachev was perhaps the best-known second secretary. After serving as a second secretary in various provincial administration, he was transferred to Moscow in 1983. There, because he was in charge of personnel affairs at the top, Ligachev became the second most powerful figure in the

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party when Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary in 1985. Ligachev was soon embroiled in policy and personnel disputes with both Gorbachev and the then first secretary of the Moscow Party apparatus, Boris Yeltsin. As second secretary, Ligachev remained a key figure in the regime down to the demise of communist and Soviet rule in Russia in late 1991.

tee. Attention usually focused on the General Secretary, and to a lesser degree, the dozen or so Secretaries who worked with him, rather than the larger bureaucracy that constituted the Secretariat.

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; GEN-

Huskey, Eugene. (1992). Executive Power and Soviet Politics: The Rise and Decline of the Soviet State. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.

ERAL SECRETARY; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

See also:

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Nogee, Joseph L., ed. (1985). Soviet Politics: Russia after Brezhnev. New York: Praeger.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Reshetar, John S. (1971). The Soviet Polity Government and Politics in the USSR. New York: Dodd, Mead.

Smith, Gordon B. (1992). Soviet Politics: Struggling with Change, 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Towster, Julian. (1948). Political Power in the USSR, 1917–1947: The Theory and Structure of Government in the Soviet State. New York: Oxford University Press. Weeks, Albert L. (1987). The Soviet Nomenklatura: A Comprehensive Roster of Soviet Civilian and Military Officials. Washington, DC: Washington Institute Press. ALBERT L. WEEKS

SECRETARIAT The Secretariat of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was the administrative arm of the Communist Party. Initially a handful of party workers, the Secretariat evolved into a powerful bureaucracy with oversight of the entire Soviet political system and economy. Although the size of the Secretariat was modest in comparison to the giant governmental bureaucracy, its power was not. It was the apparat and those who worked in the Secretariat were the apparatchiki. Headed by the General (or First) Secretary and the other Secretaries of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Secretariat became the body that ensured that Soviet political and economic organs followed party policy. Josef Stalin was responsible for building the Secretariat, and Nikita Khrushchev was responsible for reaffirming and renewing its power. Its influence diminished only under Mikail Gorbachev, who in his final years, turned to the power of the Presidency and a Presidential Cabinet of Ministers, which was created in 1990. At the height of its power, the Secretariat headed by its powerful General Secretary determined the agenda of the Politburo and the Central Commit-

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SECTARIANISM Religious dissent from the Russian Orthodox Church. The word sect entered the Russian language in the eighteenth century from the Latin word secta. Long used in the Catholic Church to indicate groups or parties that had separated themselves from orthodox teaching, the word was adopted by the Russian Orthodox Church during the reign of Peter the Great (r. 1682–1725) to label the increasing numbers of religious dissenters. The first substantial movement of Christian dissent occurred only in the seventeenth century in response to the liturgical and bureaucratic innovations of Patriarch Nikon of Moscow (r. 1652–1658). By the 1680s, those who opposed these new reforms called themselves “Old Believers”; many of them withdrew from the Church and society to create their own purified communities on the outskirts of the Muscovite state. Although Old Believers were sometimes tarred with the label “sect,” by the late nineteenth century Russian Orthodox heresiology began to reserve the word sectarian for the growing numbers of religious dissenters who had separated themselves from the state church for reasons other than Nikon’s reforms. In accordance with this usage, this article deals only with those sectarians who were not Old Believers. It also does not deal with the fourteenth-century Judaizers and its predecessors.

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THE FAITH OF CHRIST (FLAGELLANTS) AND THE CASTRATES

The Faith of Christ (khristovshchina) arose in the seventeenth century. Its members continued to visit the Orthodox state church, but also met in secret assemblies where they repeated the Jesus prayer (Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God, have mercy on me, a sinner) until the Holy Spirit descended upon them and they danced, prophesied, and spoke in tongues. In their secret assemblies, they believed that they had recovered the original faith and practice of Christ. Following a realized eschatology, they also believed that Christ had returned spiritually to dwell in their leaders whom they called Christs and Mothers of God. They composed a rich repertoire of spiritual songs celebrating these leaders and their faith. The adherents of the Faith of Christ practiced an intense asceticism that included celibacy, restricted diet, long periods of prayer, and fasting. Over time, some of them flagellated themselves, and so they became known as flagellants. This label was applied indiscriminately to many different sectarians, most of whom did not practice flagellation. The Faith of Christ established broad religious, social, and economic networks across the Russian Empire. The grave of the monastery peasant Danilo Filippov (d. c. 1700), one of the early leaders of the sect, was located in a small village near Kostroma; it attracted pilgrims from cities and towns all over central Russia for at least two centuries. The members of the Faith of Christ used money earned in the textile trade to support their co-religionists who entered Orthodox monasteries. In 1733 and again in 1745, extensive state investigations sought to eliminate the movement by arresting and sentencing hundreds of suspects. By forcing the defendants to confess falsely to horrible crimes of secret mass orgies, infanticide, and cannibalism, the inquisitors of the second commission helped to create a powerful myth that envisioned the flagellants as a dangerous, homicidal, sexually perverted fifth column within Russian society. By the 1760s, some members of the Faith of Christ, not satisfied with vows of celibacy, began castrating themselves. Under the leadership of the fugitive peasant Kondraty Selivanov (d. 1832), these castrates broke away from the Faith of Christ and created their own peculiar rituals and eschatology. In its rich tradition of spiritual songs, the Castrates claimed that their leader Selivanov was actually Emperor Peter III (r. 1762)—the unfortunate husband of Catherine the Great (r. 1762–1796).

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Though the real Peter III was killed in Catherine’s 1762 coup, the Castrates held that he actually escaped to Orel province where, as the peasant Kondratii Selivanov, he was arrested and exiled to Siberia. After Catherine’s death, the legend claims that Emperor Paul (r. 1796–1801) recalled Selivanov to St. Petersburg, where he recognized him as his father. Although Selivanov lived and taught freely in St. Petersburg from 1802 to 1820, he spent the last twelve years of his life in a monastery prison in Suzdal. Thanks in part to their severe asceticism, many of the Castrates became wealthy merchants. Because they were severely persecuted, the Castrates outwardly adhered to the Orthodox Church and often proved to be generous patrons. SPIRITUAL CHRISTIANITY: DUKHOBORS AND MOLOKANS

Spiritual Christianity, another powerful strain of sectarianism, arose as an apocalyptic movement in the 1760s in the black-earth region of Tambov province. Preaching that the day of the Lord was imminent, Ilarion Pobirokhin (fl. 1762–1785) called on true Christians to stop venerating icons and to reject the Orthodox sacraments and priesthood. Instead of kissing icons, they kissed one another, and especially their leader, as the image of God. They met together regularly to read the Bible, sing spiritual psalms of their own composition, and listen to their teachers’ sermons. Despite state efforts to repress them, the Spiritual Christians, who were also called the Dukhobors (Spirit-Wrestlers), survived. In an effort to isolate them from their Orthodox neighbors, the Russian state in 1802 first resettled them in Melitopol in Crimea, and then in 1841–1845 forcibly moved them to the Caucasus. In these isolated colonies, the Dukhobors largely governed themselves and followed their own folkways. Led by charismatic descendants of Pobirokhin and a Council of Elders, the Dukhobors preached that God’s Spirit lived in all people, both men and women. Although they used the Bible, they emphasized their own oral tradition of spiritual psalms, which they called the Living Book. By the 1880s, the Dukhobors numbered about twenty thousand. A radical group of Dukhobors led by Petr Verigin (d. 1935) preached pacificism, rejected military service, and struggled to take over the community in 1886–1898. In 1898, Verigin led his followers to immigrate to Canada.

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A second group of Spiritual Christians, known as the Molokans (milk-drinkers, because they did not observe the Orthodox fasting periods in which milk was forbidden), broke away from the Dukhobors. Semen Uklein (d. 1809), an erstwhile follower of Ilarion Pobirokhin, insisted on the authority of the Bible, and went on to preach his own version of Spiritual Christianity throughout the provinces of the lower Volga in 1790s. Like the Dukhobors, the Molokans rejected icons, sacraments, and priesthood. But as serious students of the Bible, Uklein’s followers also observed Old Testament holidays and dietary restrictions. In the 1830s, a group of inspired apocalyptic Molokan prophets predicted that the world would end in 1836 and introduced ecstatic dancing and singing into the Molokan meetings. Lukian Petrov Sokolov (d. 1858) led his followers to Mount Ararat to await the return of Christ. Despite the failure of this prophecy, these Molokan “Jumpers” retained their ecstatic practices and regrouped under a new charismatic leader, Maksim Rudometikin (d. 1877). From the late nineteenth century, new prophets taught pacifism and their new apocalyptic visions encouraged the Jumpers to emigrate and establish colonies in California, South America, Mexico, and Arizona. WESTERN RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

In the 1830s, German pietists introduced a revival in the German colonies of the Ukraine. By the 1860s, this revival, which emphasized personal prayer and a Bible study hour [Stunde in German], had been adopted by Ukrainian and Russian peasants who lived near the German colonists. Although initially these Shtundists, as they came to be called, wanted to remain in the Orthodox Church, the Orthodox hierarchy rejected their independent Bible studies and the Protestant doctrine of salvation through faith alone. Ultimately, many of these Ukrainian and Russian peasants turned away from Orthodoxy to embrace Baptism. In 1867, Nikita Voronin, a convert from Molokanism, was the first Russian to receive baptism. A Russian Baptist Union was created in 1884. Other Protestant movements also gained Russian adherents. German and American preachers brought Seventh-Day Adventism into Russia in the 1880s. In the 1870s in the northern capital of St. Petersburg, the pietistic preaching of the English Lord Radstock established a pietistic following that later helped to support the formation of a Union of Evangelical Christians in 1909.

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Overwhelmed by the 1905 revolution, the tsarist government issued an edict of religious toleration that allowed much greater freedom of worship—though not of proselytizing—to most sectarians. Baptists, Molokans, Seventh-Day Adventists, and Evangelical Christians created their own legal organizations, published newspapers, books, and journals. A 1912 census counted 393,565 sectarians (not including the Old Believers). Taken together, Baptists and Evangelical Christians were the largest group, with more than 143,000 adherents; Molokans represented the next largest group with 133,935.

THE SOVIET PERIOD

After the 1917 revolution, the Bolshevik government initially courted sectarians, but this policy came to an end in 1929 with the First Five Year Plan. In the 1930s, the Soviet Union attempted to eliminate religion altogether by closing and destroying churches and arresting religious leaders. This policy failed, and resistance to the forced collectivization of agriculture actually provoked new apocalyptic sectarian movements which attacked the Soviet state as the “red dragon” of the Apocalypse. Persecution of the Orthodox Church forced some of its members underground to form the True Orthodox Church. Rejecting the Moscow Patriarchate as hopelessly compromised, the members of the True Orthodox Church claimed that they alone maintained the true faith. The German invasion of the USSR in 1941 forced Josef Stalin to moderate his antireligious policies and to allow limited legal existence of sectarian groups. In 1944, Baptists and Evangelical Christians formed the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians and Baptists, and soon Adventists also were granted a national organization. Dissatisfaction with the limits on religious freedom and a renewed antireligious campaign under Nikita Khrushchev led some Baptists and Adventists to form independent, underground organizations in the 1960s: the Council of Churches of Evangelical Christian Baptists and the True and Free Seventh-Day Adventists. The Soviet period also witnessed the vigorous growth of Pentecostals, who had first appeared in Russia in 1913. In the 1970s and 1980s, circles of educated urban intellectuals sometimes faced persecution for their interest and participation in Eastern religions, including Tibetan Buddhism and the Hare Krishna movement.

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In 1990 the Soviet parliament passed a law allowing complete religious freedom and ushered in a new, open spiritual marketplace. Missionaries from the United States and Western Europe helped to establish and finance Mormon ward, Jehovah’s Witnesses kingdom halls, and charismatic and evangelical churches. Underground movements, such as the True Orthodox Christians, the International Society of Krishna Consciousness, and the Baptist Council of Churches, emerged to compete in the new atmosphere. The new freedom, and the collapse of the Soviet economic and political systems, also encouraged the formation of new sectarian movements. Distressed by the moral degeneration of Russian society, prophets from the Church of the Transfiguring Theotokos claimed that the Mother of God had appeared to warn Russia and the world of an impending judgment. The White Brotherhood, a syncretic movement, combining elements of Hinduism and Orthodox Christianity, gathered to witness the end of the world in Kiev in 1993. Alarmed by these apocalyptic movements and by the influx of foreign missionaries, the Russian parliament in 1997 passed a new law that favored the traditional religions of Russia. Local administrations have interpreted the law quite differently, so that the Jehovah’s Witnesses, who have peacefully established their headquarters in St. Petersburg, have also had to defend themselves in Moscow courts. Sectarianism first became significant in Russia in the seventeenth century. On the one hand, sectarianism represented the growth of individual initiative and freedom, as religious virtuosi took upon themselves the responsibility of constructing and living out new religious visions. But on the other hand, the classification and enumeration of sects reflect the growth of bureaucratic systems of social control in both state and church. The continued vitality of sectarianism in the twenty-first century is a product of the dialectic between these two opposite trends.

See also:

OLD BELIEVERS; ORTHODOXY; PROTESTANTISM

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Anderson, John. (1994). Religion, State and Politics in the Soviet Union and Successor States. New York: Cambridge University Press. Bolshakoff, Serge. (1950). Russian Nonconformity: The Story of “Unofficial” Religion in Russia. Philadelphia: Westminster Press.

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Conybeare, Frederick C. (1962). Russian Dissenters. New York: Russell and Russell. Engelstein, Laura. (1999). Castration and the Heavenly Kingdom: A Russian Folktale. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Sawatsky, Walter. (1981). Soviet Evangelicals since World War II. Scottdale, PA: Herald Press. Witte, John, and Bourdeaux, Michael, eds. (1999). Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia: The New War for Souls. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Press. J. EUGENE CLAY

SECURITY COUNCIL The April 1991 law creating the office of president of the Russian Federation also created a Security Council, succeeding the security council created by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in November 1990 and presumably modeled after the National Security Council in the United States. Formally established by a March 1992 law, the Security Council was chaired by the president and met once per month, with a staff of about two hundred and half a dozen commissions working at its direction. Since 1993 its membership has varied, at the discretion of the president, from seven officials in 1996 to more than twenty-five since 2000, when it included the prime minister and the heads of the “power ministries” (defense, foreign affairs, interior, emergencies, Federal Border Service, and Federal Security Service) plus the justice minister, the procurator-general, the heads of the two houses of parliament, and the governors of the seven federal districts created by President Vladimir Putin. Back in 1992 the Security Council was supervised by State Secretary Gennady Burbulis, and its first secretary was the industrialist Yuri Skokov. It was seen as a conservative counter-balance to the liberal foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev. Some speculated that it might become a new Politburo, well-insulated from democratic accountability. In practice the council never became a decision-making forum, but merely provided analysis and advice to the president. It was supposed to exercise a coordinating role and enforce and extend presidential control, but in practice the ministries of defense and foreign affairs jealously guarded their autonomy. The council was periodically tasked with drawing up guidelines or concepts for Russian foreign policy, but these did not have much

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influence on actual decision-making. And far from being a springboard for ambitious politicians, it was more a tool for Boris Yeltsin to balance rival figures. Skokov was replaced as secretary in June 1993 by a former Soviet general, Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, and then in October 1993 by a Yeltsin crony, Oleg Lobov. In June 1996 Alexander Lebed was appointed secretary, in return for his support of Yeltsin in the second round of the presidential election. Lebed was assigned to end the war in Chechnya, and much to everyone’s surprise he succeeded, signing a peace accord and withdrawing Russian troops. Concerned about Lebed’s growing popularity, Yeltsin created a separate Defense Council in July and fired Lebed in October, accusing him of plotting a military coup. Lebed was replaced by the anodyne politician Ivan Rybkin, with the controversial oligarch Boris Berezovsky as his deputy, in charge of reconstructing Chechnya. (Berezovsky quit in November 1997.) From March to September 1998, the Security Council was headed by an academic, Andrei Kokoshin. He was replaced by a KGB general, Nikolai Boryuzha, who in turn was followed in March 1999 by Vladimir Putin, who was simultaneously head of the Federal Security Service (FSB). In November 1999 Putin was replaced at the council by his deputy at the FSB, Sergei Ivanov. In March 2001 Ivanov became defense minister, and the former interior minister, Vladimir Rushailo, became Security Council secretary. During Vladimir Putin’s presidency, the Security Council became slightly more visible as a forum through which he tried to press forward with military reforms obstinately resisted by the generals. The new National Security Concept drawn up by the council in 2000 stressed internal threats, such as Chechen terrorism, over traditional security concerns, such as nuclear deterrence.

See also:

POLITBURO; PRESIDENCY; PRESIDENTIAL COUN-

CIL

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adams, Jan. S. (1996). “The Russian National Security Council.” Problems of Post-Communism 43(1):35–42. Derleth, J. William. (1996). “The Evolution of the Russian Polity: The Case of the Security Council.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 29(1):43–58. PETER RUTLAND

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SERAPION BROTHERS The Serapion Brothers were a group of poets and writers who insisted on the political autonomy of the artist and the affirmation of imagination and creative art. They argued that in order to remain authentic, the writer’s voice needed freedom from all social or political constraints. They denounced the use of literature for utilitarian purposes and never adopted a specific model of literary production. The Serapion Brothers began meeting in 1921 at the Petrograd House of Arts at the suggestion of Viktor Shklovsky. The group, which eventually included Konstantin Fedin, Ilya Gruzdev, Vsevolod Ivanov, Veniamin Kaverin, Lev Lunts, Nikolai Nikitin, Elizaveta Polonskaya, Vladimir Pozner, Mikhail Slonimsky, Nikolai Tikhonov, and Mikhail Zoshchenko, adopted its name after a tale by E. T. A. Hoffmann. Shklovsky occasionally participated, and Maxim Gorky supported members with material assistance and help in publishing their work. The group met weekly to read and discuss one another’s work, focusing on the refinement of the craft of writing and leaving each member to develop his or her own message, sometimes engaging in heated debates about the purpose or meaning of literature. The closest the Brotherhood came to publishing a manifesto was Lev Lunts’s “Why We are the Serapion Brothers” (Pochemu my Serapionovy Bratya, 1922), in which he proclaimed that “Art is real, like life itself. And, like life itself, it is without goal and without meaning: It exists because it cannot help but exist.” This statement of the group’s purpose sparked a sharp debate with Marxist critics who insisted on the utilitarian use of literature for common ideological purposes. Lunts, however, stressed the autonomy of literature from political purposes or control and, simultaneously, the preservation of diverse ideological positions within the brotherhood. The one collective work the group published, the First Almanac (Serapionovy Brat’ia. Al’mankh pervy, 1922) demonstrates this wide range of style and philosophy. Throughout the 1920s they promoted a nonpolitical approach to literature, tolerance, and friendship, and their connections continued after the group’s dissolution in 1929.

See also:

CULTURAL REVOLUTION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hickey, Martha Weitzel. (1999). “Recovering the Author’s Part: The Serapion Brothers in Petrograd.” Russian Review 58(1):103–123.

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Kern, Gary, and Collins, Christopher, eds. (1975). The Serapion Brothers: A Critical Anthology. Ann Arbor: Ardis. ELIZABETH JONES HEMENWAY

SERBIA, RELATIONS WITH From the first days of the initial Serb uprising in 1804 (against the tyranny of the Janissaries, military units that had evolved from being the elite troops of the Ottoman Empire into semi-independent occupiers) until 1878 (when Belgrade obtained complete independence from the Porte at the Congress of Berlin), relations with Serbia were central to Russia’s foreign policy. However, as Serbia pursued both independence from Istanbul and expansion of the state to include all Serb lands (Bosnia, Hercegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Vojvodina), Russia often found itself drawn into Serbian foreign affairs as Belgrade came to depend upon (and use) Russian support for its own ends. This led to a relationship that offered Serbia the greatest advantages as St. Petersburg became captive to two critical forces: 1) the emergence of Panslavism, a movement that stressed the solidarity of the Slavic peoples ostensibly under Russian leadership, and 2) the Eastern Question, the increasing vacuum in southeastern Europe brought about by the rapid decay of the once great Ottoman Empire, which presented an inviting target of opportunity for the great powers. The romantic image of Orthodox Christians fighting the Muslim Turks for freedom continuously vexed St. Petersburg. On the one hand, advisers generally supported a policy of moderation in the region and a concentration on domestic needs. However, Panslavists, who had a powerful effect upon Russian public opinion, attacked the notion of passivity toward their Christian and Slavic brethren who, they claimed, were suffering at the hands of either the Turks or the Habsburgs.

the Serbian army, and by 1876 Serbia was at war with the Porte. The conflict however was disastrous for Serbia. Not only was the country poorly prepared for war, but friction arose between the Russian and Serbian forces as Chernyayev proved to be an inept commander. While events inside Serbia deteriorated, St. Petersburg concluded a series of agreements with Vienna, providing that in the event Russia went to war with the Turks, the Habsburgs would be neutral. In April 1877, Panslavist pressure forced Russian Foreign Minister Alexander Gorchakov to join the conflict, the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878. Despite military setbacks, Russia forced the Turks to sign the Treaty of San Stefano. However, Russia’s victory proved to be short-lived as the other great powers quickly blocked St. Petersburg’s designs to obtain primacy in the region through the creation of a “big” Bulgaria. At the 1878 Congress of Berlin, the powers compelled Russia to concede on the issue of an enlarged Bulgarian state, while the Turks were forced to grant complete independence to Serbia (as well as Romania and Greece). However, Russian support for Bulgaria had alienated Belgrade. For the next quarter-century, Serbia distanced itself from Russia. Only the murder of King Alexander Obrenovic in 1903 and the assumption of power by Peter Karadjordjevic led to a reorientation of Serbian policy back to regional cooperation and a reliance on Russia (especially after the Bosnian crisis of 1908–1909, which saw the formal annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina by Austria-Hungary).

After the disastrous Crimean War and the subsequent humiliating Treaty of Paris in 1856, Russia was confronted by conflicting goals: the need to deal with internal problems as well as to restore its influence in the Balkans. When a revolt began in Hercegovina against the Turks in 1875, the lore and lure of Slavic Christians rising up against their Muslim occupiers proved to be intoxicating. Russians immediately volunteered to support the insurrection. General M. G. Chernyayev took command of

Weakened by the events of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 and the Revolution of 1905, Russia could not challenge Vienna in 1908 on behalf of its Serbian client state. Nevertheless, the Bosnian crisis pushed Belgrade and St. Petersburg closer together. The former became solely dependent upon Russia for support among the great powers, while the latter realized that it had to support its Serbian ally in the future lest it lose influence in the region. Russia now sought to foster a regional alliance between Serbia and Bulgaria, an act that led to the formation of a Balkan League and subsequently the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913. These wars, the unintended consequence of Russia’s attempt to create a defensive alliance in the region to counter the Habsburgs, further destabilized southeastern Europe and left Russia even more tethered to Belgrade.

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During the days and weeks following the assassination of Habsburg archduke Franz Ferdinand in June 1914, Russia steadfastly backed its sole remaining Balkan ally, a critical factor leading to the outbreak of World War I. In its attempt to support Belgrade against Austro-Hungarian demands, Russia now found itself immersed in a conflict for which it was ill prepared and that would lead to the destruction of the Romanov monarchy.

See also: BULGARIA, RELATIONS WITH; MONTENEGRO, RELATIONS WITH; PANSLAVISM; TURKEY, RELATIONS WITH; YUGOSLAVIA, RELATIONS WITH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Glenny, Misha. (2000). The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804–1999. New York: Viking Penguin. Jelavich, Barbara. (1974). St. Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1814–1974. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Jelavich, Charles, and Jelavich, Barbara. (1977). The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804–1920. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Rossos, Andrew. (1981). Russia and the Balkans: InterBalkan Rivalries and Russian Foreign Policy, 1908–1914. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. RICHARD FRUCHT

SEREDNYAKI The serednyaki, or middle peasants, were peasants whose households in the 1920s had enough land to support their extended family (dvor) and sometimes even the hiring of one of the poorer bednyaki or landless batraki of the neighborhood in busy seasons. In practice, some of the middle peasants lived no differently from the poorer classes; they too had no draft horse (malomoshchnyi) and might likewise hire out a family member in the village community or send him to a nearby city or rural enterprise as wage labor. Many were illiterate. Other members of this intermediate stratum of peasants, however, were prosperous (zazhitochnye or krepkie) and thus close to the richer kulaks who constituted about 5 to 7 percent of the peasantry. These better-off peasants would sell some surplus grain if provided an incentive in the form of manufactured goods, and thus were crucial to the alliance of workers and peasants (smychka) that was supposed

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to be the political basis of the New Economic Policy (NEP) of 1921 to 1928. Although the Marxist-Leninist categories barely fit the complex reality of the Russian countryside, Vladimir Lenin expected the serednyaki to be tolerant of Bolshevik power and policies in the rural areas, and saw them as a temporary ally until such time as the regime could afford to incorporate them into more modern collective farms. There was a danger, however, that industrious middle peasants who prospered would became petty bourgeois allies of the kulaks and thus would oppose Soviet industrialization and the heavy taxes and price discrimination it required. The Marxist-Leninist category of middle peasant, unlike the traditional terms bednyak or kulak, meant little to the peasants themselves. Many other factors besides ownership of productive capital influenced their behavior. Populist students of the peasantry, notably A. V. Chayanov, and later sociologists have challenged this conceptualization of the NEP village as too static. The schematic class analysis of the Soviet countryside was not merely ideological. Depending on one’s class, one could obtain benefits or avoid penalties. Poor peasants enjoyed tax exemptions and preferential admission to schools and Communist Party organizations; kulaks (along with priests and the bourgeois) were deprived of these and even of the right to vote. Late in the NEP, taxes on middle peasants increased, though not as much as those imposed on the kulaks. Not surprisingly, middle peasants endeavored to be officially identified as poor—for example, by referring to past proletarian occupations. They would sometimes try to hide their prosperity by hiring out some labor or a horse. Nonetheless, when forced requisitioning of grain was reinstated in 1928, the prosperous peasants were affected adversely. “Dekulakization” and collectivization in 1929 to 1931 made it even more important to avoid official identification with the richest peasant stratum.

See also:

KULAKS; PEASANT ECONOMY; PEASANTRY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Fitzpatrick, Sheila. (1991). “The Problem of Class Identity in NEP Society.” In Russia in the Era of NEP, ed. Sheila Fitzpatrick, Alexander Rabinowitch, and Richard Stites. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Lewin, Moshe. (1968). Russian Peasants and Soviet Power. London: Allen & Unwin.

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Shanin, Teodor. (1972). The Awkward Class: Political Sociology of Peasantry in a Developing Society, Russia, 1910–1925. London: Oxford University Press. MARTIN C. SPECHLER

SERFDOM Serfdom is the name of the condition of a peasant who does not enjoy the rights of a free person, but is not a slave. While the slave is an object of the law, the serf is still a subject of the law. The classic definition of serfdom in the Russian context is given in Jerome Blum’s Lord and Peasant in Russia (pp. 6–8). Thus a serf is a peasant who (1) is bound to the land; or (2) is bound to the person of a lord; and (3) is not directly subject to the state, but is subject to a lord who in turn is subject to the state (such as it may be). Thus a serf bound to the land cannot be moved by any lord, and is supposed to be a “fixture” on that land regardless of who owns or holds the land. But if a serf is bound to the person of a lord, he essentially begins to resemble a slave in that the lord nearly becomes the owner of the serf: the lord can move the serf from one plot of land to another (or even into his household), and may even be able to sell the serf to a third party. The first and second conditions are mutually exclusive, for a serf cannot be bound to the land and simultaneously bound to the person of a lord. The third condition is most difficult to comprehend, but can arise under one of two circumstances: either state power does not exist (as during the manorial era of Russia in the early period of the “Mongol yoke,” from 1237 to 1300 or even 1350) and thus the sole extant conflict-resolution power is exercised by a large estate owner, or the existing state power has abdicated or ceded judicial or taxing authority to the owner or holder of land. The third condition can exist by itself or in conjunction with the first or second conditions.

the reigning system of slash-and-burn (assartage) agriculture, peasants were accustomed to farming a new plot of land every three years and could freely move away from any manorial lord who was the slightest bit oppressive. Thus no one views any of the peasants of Russia as “serfs” until the second half of the fifteenth century. Serfdom began as a result of the civil war of 1425–1453, which left much of Russia in ruins. Selected monasteries were allowed to forbid their peasant debtors to move at any time except around St. George’s Day (November 26—compare with the U.S. Thanksgiving holiday), the day in the pagan calendar when the harvest was completed and thus debts could be collected. In 1497 the St. George’s Day limitation was extended to all peasants; they were bound to the land and could not legally move at other times of the year. Lords were limited to collecting the traditional rent and had no authority over the peasants. Ivan IV’s mad Oprichnina (1565–1572) was responsible for initiating changes in the status of the peasant. Ivan gave his special Oprichnina troops, the oprichniki, control over the peasants living on the lands they possessed, which allowed them to raise their rents to whatever level they pleased. As a result the oprichniki “collected as much rent in one year as previously had been collected in ten.” This and other barbarous acts of the Oprichnina resulted in the depopulation of much of old Muscovy as the peasants fled to newly annexed areas (colonial expansion). Certain landholders (pomestie) then successfully petitioned the government to repeal the peasants’ right to move on St. George’s Day. In 1592 this repeal was temporarily extended to all peasants. Thus serfdom became the temporary legal status of all peasants.

Whether there was serfdom of the third category in the early Mongol period, after the collapse of Russian princely power and during the period when the sole authority may have been the owner of a large estate (votchina) or manor, is an issue. While there may have technically been serfdom between 1237 and 1300 or 1350, the reality was certainly such that no peasant knew he was a serf. In those decades most peasants lived on land they considered their own, not on a manor. Moreover, given

Limitations were placed on the recovery of fugitive peasants in 1592, but they were repealed in the Law Code of 1649 (Ulozhenie). According to Chapter 11, Article 1, of the Ulozhenie of 1649, any peasants who had been recorded as living on state, court, or peasant taxable lands could be returned to those lands without any time limits. Article 2 stated the same for peasants living on seignorial lands. Thus all peasants in Russia within the reach of the Ulozhenie were serfs. The code also specified how runaways should be returned, and especially what should happen if male and female fugitives married. The Orthodox Church held that marriage was inviolable, so the couple had to be returned to the lord of one of them. The most ra-

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Serfs line up to draw water from a village well. © HULTON ARCHIVE

tional solution to this problem was that the lord who received a fugitive lost the couple, as punishment for having received the runaway. If the couple was on neutral territory, the contesting lords cast lots; the winner got the couple and paid the loser 10 rubles for the serf he had lost. The serf family was not inviolable, however, and under certain circumstances could be broken up. Other articles of the Ulozhenie established rules that led to the further abasement of the serfs, ultimately to a change in their status to something resembling slaves. It started with owners of hereditary estates, who were allowed to manumit their serfs (a practice ominously borrowed from slavery) and transfer them from one estate to another. This seemed innocent enough, as the state was primarily concerned about service landholdings and having the serfs there to support whichever cavalryman might be holding it at the moment. Both

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logical and juridical problems automatically arose when service landholdings were converted into hereditary estates in 1714. Prior to that time, however, it appears that the process of converting the serf from a peasant bound to the land to a peasant bound to the person of a lord was under way. Between the Ulozhenie and the introduction of the soul tax in 1721, the extent to which this had progressed is disputed. Some transactions appear to have been concealed sales of peasants, for example. After 1721, conditions worsened. Lords were held responsible for the collection of the soul tax, which putatively gave them additional power over the serfs. Then in 1762 lords were freed from twenty-five-year (essentially lifetime) compulsory military service, so that many of them spent most of their lives on their estates and took an interest in the management of those estates. This was the coup de grace, which often

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An illustration of serfs toiling in the field. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

converted seignorial serfdom into near slavery. Serfs were auctioned, traded, moved to wherever their lords wanted them to live, and even compelled to breed. However, lords did not own a serf’s inventory, clothing, personal property, and so on. These features increasingly distinguished seignorial serfs from serfs living on state and court lands, who came to be called “state peasants” even though they were still really serfs. Serfdom was abolished in stages, depending on which category peasants belonged to. In 1861 serfs serving in lords’ households (house serfs [dvorovye lyudi], nominally, and probably frequently literally, descendants of house slaves who had been put on the tax rolls in 1721) and possessional serfs (those assigned to work in factories, typically textile and metallurgical, whose output collapsed in 1861) were freed in all respects

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immediately. Seignorial serfs were immediately freed from landlord control (from being bound to the person of their lord) and were instead bound to the commune (i.e., to the land). This was done to avoid flooding the cities (officials knew the Manchester phenomenon) and to ensure stability (the same officials believed the commune was a stabilizing factor in the countryside). A separate emancipation freed the state serfs and peasants in 1863. Serfdom was finally abolished in 1906 and 1907, when communal control over the former seignorial peasants was abolished and they were allowed to move wherever they desired. Many peasants believed that serfdom was reinstituted when the Soviets collectivized agriculture at the end of the 1920s.

See also:

EMANCIPATION ACT; ENSERFMENT; LAW CODE

OF 1649; OPRICHNINA; PEASANTRY; SLAVERY

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Blum, Jerome. (1961). Lord and Peasant in Russia: From the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Emmons, Terence. (1968). The Russian Landed Gentry and the Peasant Emancipation of 1861. London: Cambridge University Press. Field, Daniel. (1976). The End of Serfdom: Nobility and Bureaucracy in Russia, 1855–1861. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hellie, Richard. (1971). Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Hellie, Richard, ed. and tr. (1967 and 1970). Muscovite Society. Chicago: The University of Chicago Syllabus Division. Hellie, Richard, editor and translator. (1988). The Muscovite Law Code (Ulozhenie) of 1649. Irvine, CA: Charles Schlacks, Jr., Publisher. Moon, David. (2001). The Abolition of Serfdom in Russia, 1762–1907. New York: Longman. RICHARD HELLIE

S T .

The fractured Orthodox Church declined under renewed persecution in the 1930s but experienced rebirth during World War II. The day of the German invasion (June 22, 1941), Sergei issued a message asking all believers to rally to the defense of the nation. He subsequently encouraged large-scale offerings by Orthodox parishes for the war effort. In September 1943, Josef Stalin met with Sergei and two other metropolitans for the purpose of reestablishing the church’s national organization. That month, a council of bishops elected Sergei as patriarch of Moscow and All Russia. He served until his death on May 15, 1944.

See also:

LIVING CHURCH MOVEMENT; PATRIARCHATE;

RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; TIKHON, PATRIARCH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Curtiss, John S. (1952). The Russian Church and the Soviet State, 1917–1950. Boston: Little, Brown. Innokentii, Hegumen. (1993). “Metropolitan Sergii’s Declaration and Today’s Church.” Russian Studies in History 32(2):82–88. EDWARD E. ROSLOF

SERGEI, PATRIARCH (1867–1944), twelfth patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, 1943–1944. The son of a provincial priest, Ivan Nikolaevich Stragorodsky graduated from the St. Petersburg Theological Academy. He became the monk Sergei in 1890 and was consecrated bishop in 1901. He presided over the famous religious-philosophical seminars in St. Petersburg (1901–1903) before becoming archbishop of Finland (1905–1917). After 1917, he wielded great influence as a metropolitan while causing controversy with his willingness to seek political compromise. Sergei recognized the schismatic Living Church Movement in June 1922, although he later publicly repented to Patriarch Tikhon for this error in judgment. The Soviet government prevented election of a new patriarch when Tikhon died in 1925. Metropolitan Peter Poliansky served as the locum tenens (guardian of the patriarchate) and chose Sergei as his deputy. Sergei became de facto leader of the church after Peter’s arrest. Under pressure from the state and rival bishops, Sergei issued a declaration in July 1927 that proclaimed the church’s loyalty to the Soviet government and brought a temporary halt to religious persecution. Orthodox leaders in the USSR and abroad condemned Sergei’s declaration, however, and renounced his authority.

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SERGIUS, ST. (c. 1322–1392) Saist, founder of the Trinity monastery near Moscow, leader of a monastic revival, participant in political and ecclesiastical politics, and subject of a cult as intercessor for the Russian land. Information about Sergius’s early life and much of his later public career comes from the Life composed by Epifany “the Wise” in 1418 and revisions of it by Pakhomy “the Serb” from 1438 to 1459. Baptized Varfolomei, he was the second of three sons of a boyar family of Rostov. In 1327 and 1328 the Mongols devastated Rostov, ruining his family. In 1331 Prince Ivan I “Kalita” of Moscow annexed Rostov and resettled the family in Radonezh. Varfolomei’s brothers married, but he remained celibate. When his parents died, he and elder brother Stefan, a monk since the death of his wife, went to live as hermits in a nearby “wilderness” in 1342. They built a chapel, dedicated to the Trinity, and Varfolomei was tonsured as the monk Sergius. Stefan left for Moscow, where he met the future Metropolitan Alexei and became confessor to magnates at court. Sergius lived alone in poverty two years, sharing food with animals, tormented

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ably in 1377, at Metropolitan Alexei’s behest and blessed by Patriarch Philotheos of Constantinople, Sergius established a cenobite rule at Trinity modeled on the rule of the Studios Monastery in Constantinople. It mandated communal living and control of property supervised by an elected abbot. Some monks led by Stefan, who earlier had returned probably expecting to become Trinity’s first abbot, opposed this. Instead of resisting, Sergius left. This caused defections and appeals from other monks at Trinity to Metropolitan Alexei and Grand Prince Dmitry, who intervened to reaffirm a cenobite rule there and to restore Sergius as abbot. Sergius’s example inspired a wave of monastic foundings. He assisted in establishing six houses and, reportedly, four more. Biographies of at least seven other founders said their subjects were Sergius’s disciples or inspired by him. These houses became engines of agricultural, industrial, and commercial development, as well as spiritual centers, contributing to the economic and cultural integration of the Russian state. In 1422 Abbot Nikon instituted worship at Trinity of Sergius’s sanctity and probably originated the story related by Pakhomy that the Mother of God appeared to Sergius and put his house under her protection.

Icon of St. Sergius of Radonezh by Ivan Kholshevnikov. © REPRODUCED

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by demons and the devil, an ordeal replicating narratives of hermit saints of early Christianity. He attracted twelve disciples and in 1353 acceded to their entreaties and became abbot. Sergius’s example of humility, manual labor, and disdain for material things attracted more monks and brought to his house the support of neighboring peasants and landowners. While Sergius lived a simple life, and he and his disciples sought an intense spirituality resembling that of Hesychast solitaries in Byzantium, there is no evidence that he knew or practiced formal Hesychast methods of prayer.

According to Pakhomy and later sources, Alexei and Grand Prince Dmitry wanted Sergius to be metropolitan upon Alexei’s death in 1378, but Sergius refused. In reality a metropolitan-designate named Kiprian, installed by Constantinople to assure the unity of the eparchy in Moscow and Lithuania, was waiting in Kiev. Also Dmitry and Alexei had a candidate, Dmitry’s confessor and former court official Mikhail (“Mityai”). Kiprian’s three letters to Sergius and his nephew Fyodor, requesting or acknowledging their assistance, and other evidence make clear that Sergius supported his candidacy, which eventually was successful. The letters cause some to argue that Sergius, like Fyodor, was Dmitry’s confessor.

Sergius became a historical person when a source other than his Life recorded that he founded a monastery at Serpukhov for Prince Vladimir Andreyevich and baptized Yuri, the second son of Grand Prince Dmitry I of Moscow, in 1374. Prob-

Sergius is most famous as intercessor for Dmitry’s Russian army that defeated the Mongols on Kulikovo Field near the Don River in 1380. It was the first Russian victory over the Mongols, and Sergius’s intercession was taken to mean that God favored Russia’s liberation from the Mongol yoke. Although the earliest text mentioning Sergius’s intercession is Pakhomy’s revision of Sergius’s Life in 1438, the episode became widely accepted, and Sergius was recognized throughout Russia as a saint at some point between 1448 and 1450. Thenceforth

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this episode was embellished many times in tales and histories and gave rise to legends of subsequent interventions by Sergius against Russia’s enemies. Sergius remains for many the personification of Russian exceptionalism. On July 29, 1385, Sergius baptized Dmitry’s son Pyotr. That same year Dmitry asked Sergius to reconcile him with Grand Prince Oleg of Ryazan and to compel Oleg to recognize Dmitry as his senior, a task he performed successfully. A story that Sergius similarly intervened for Moscow in 1365 in Nizhny Novgorod is probably apocryphal.

See also:

TRINITY ST. SERGIUS MONASTERY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Fedotov, G. P. (1965). A Treasury of Russian Spirituality. New York: Harper Torchbooks. Fedotov, G. P. (1966). The Russian Religious Mind, vol. 2. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Meyendorff, John. (1981). Byzantium and the Rise of Russia. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Miller, David B. (1993). “The Cult of Saint Sergius of Radonezh and Its Political Uses.” Slavic Review 52: 680–699. DAVID B. MILLER

SERVICE STATE The service state has been the major factor in the past half millennium of Russian history. It has saved Russia from foreign conquest by mobilizing and controlling at crucial moments the basic factors of the economy—land, labor, and capital. It has used major ideologies to legitimize itself and then has proceeded to try to control most areas of artistic and intellectual life. The service state has gone through three major phases which may be described as “service class revolutions” and serve as classic illustrations of path dependency. Each service class revolution has been a response by Russia’s rulers to perceptions of significant military threats from foreign adversaries. The first can be dated roughly to 1480, when Russia threw off the Mongol yoke. From then the independent state was on its own and faced foreign threats from various quarters, but the major one was from Lithuania, the largest state in Europe with holdings in Vyazma, about 100 miles (160

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kilometers) from Moscow. Moscow’s conquest of the Republic of Novgorod in 1478, the execution and deportation of its secular and religious elite, and the annexation of their vast lands created the opportunity for the creation of a service class, the backbone of the new service state. The Novgorodian lands were handed out as service landholdings (pomestie) to provincial cavalrymen for their maintenance. These cavalrymen had no independent base and were totally beholden to Moscow. They were ranked according to perceived service performance and compensated accordingly. In exchange for the pomestie, they had to serve Moscow for life. As Moscow annexed other territories, it converted them to pomestie tenure. In time, Moscow had a corps of 25,000 pomestie cavalrymen at its beck and call to confront any military emergency. This method of fielding an army was deemed so effective that in 1556 the government mobilized all seignorial land and required estate owners to provide the army with one fully equipped, outfitted cavalryman for each 100 cheti (1 chet ⫽ 11/3 acres) of populated land. In 1480 a master ideology was lacking to support the forming service state, but it did not take long for one to appear. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, Joseph, the abbot of Volokolamsk Monastery, advanced the precept of Agapetos (fl. 527–548) that “in his person the ruler is a man, but in his authority he is like God.” This conflicted with the views of Grand Prince Ivan III, who wanted to annex all church lands and convert them into pomestie holdings; his son Basil III, who preferred to let the church continue to own a third of all the populated land of Russia; and other churchmen who believed that the church should not be so involved in “the world.” This variation on the divine right of kings gave the Russian ruler unquestioned control over everything. The idea reigned at least until 1905, probably until 1917. Such military might and autocratic pretensions needed financial means and bureaucratic coordination to support them. After 1300 the government apparatus was part of the Moscow ruler’s household, but around 1480 specialization began to develop in the grand princely household administration. Around 1550 special chancelleries with their own record-keeping apparatus began to develop to keep track of the service land fund, the provincial cavalry, the new infantry arquebusiers who had been created to complement the cavalry, and the taxes needed to support these activities. By

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the mid-seventeenth century there were about forty of these chancelleries, which seemingly were as efficient and professional as any similar, contemporary organs on Earth. The last element in the construction of the service state was the inclusion of the masses. To support the cavalry, the peasantry was definitively enserfed between the 1580s and 1649. In an attempt to ensure the stability of the government’s cash receipts, the townsmen were bound to their urban places of residence and granted monopolies on trade and industry and the right to own urban property. By 1650 the service state was fully formed. Its completion had been forced by the June 1648 Moscow rebellion against the corrupt regime of Boris Morozov, which compelled the government to convoke the Assembly of the Land, whose product was the Law Code of 1649. During the Thirteen Years’ War (1654–1667), the old military service class’s obsolescence was revealed, and it was replaced by new formation regiments commanded by foreign officers. Yet the old landed service class retained its privileges and its monopolies over much of the country’s land and peasant labor. This proved to be the trajectory of all service classes: creation, hegemony, decline, and obsolescence—yet retaining all privileges. The second service class revolution was the product of Peter the Great’s perception that Sweden’s Charles XII desired to annex Russia. After losing to Charles at Narva in 1700, Peter completely revitalized the service state. All the surviving military servicemen were put back in harness, the dependency of the serfs on the landowners was strengthened, the army was reformed, the Table of Ranks of 1721 told the service state’s agents where they belonged in the merit-based hierarchy, and the government apparatus was reformed. The Orthodox Church, which had been created by the state in 988 and was nearly always the state’s obedient servant, was converted into a department of the state government with the creation of the Holy Synod in 1721. This continued the secularization of the church administration that had been introduced in 1649 but had been halted when Tsar Alexei died in 1676. Alexei’s son Peter made the clergy more active members of the service state by requiring them to report to the police what they heard in confessions as well as to read government edicts to the populace from the pulpit.

long as he performed the duties demanded of him. This was absolutely crucial in holding together an ever-expanding multinational empire. Peter articulated this in comments about his foreign minister, Pyotr Shafirov, a Jew, and other Jewish people in his administration: “I could not care less whether a man is baptized or circumcised, only that he knows his business and he distinguishes himself by probity.” In the perfectly operating service state, there was no place for nationalism (such as Russification) or persecution of national minorities or alien religions (e.g., Jews). Those occurred only at times when the service state was in decline. The Petrine service state was very successful in defeating Sweden and putting Russia’s other major adversaries—the Rzeczpospolita and the Crimean Khanate—on the defensive and ultimately exterminating them. These successes lessened the demands on the service state, and in 1762 Peter III freed the gentry land- and serf-owners from compulsory military service. Need for revenue forced most younger gentry to render military service anyway. The other major personnel segment of the service state, the peasantry, was not freed in 1762, and the condition of the seignorial serfs was abased to the extent that they became akin to slaves by 1800. Defeat during the Crimean War (1853–1856) did not provoke Russia to initiate another service class revolution, although a dozen major reforms were enacted between 1861 and 1874. In 1861 all seignorial serfs were freed from slavelike dependency on their owners, but were bound instead to their communes and were allowed to move freely only in 1906. This largely ended the second service class revolution, although the autocratic monarchy persisted until February 1917.

Peter articulated one of the basic principles of the service state: anyone was eligible to serve, as

Certain features of the service state did not die in 1762, 1861, or even 1906. The government maintained its pretensions to control all higher culture by censoring literature, the theater, all art exhibitions, and musical performances. Secret police surveillance was continuously strengthened as the government used repression, jailing, and exile in its attempts to cope with the rising revolutionary movement opposed to the autocracy and serfdom. The industrialization of Russia launched by Minister of Finance Sergei Witte during the 1890s was a demonstration of service state power reminiscent of Peter I and anticipating Josef Stalin.

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The October Revolution abolished Christianity and the Agapetos formula as the regime’s ideology. The Bolsheviks replaced it with Marxist-Leninist dialectical historical materialism. Stalin, sensing a threat from the United Kingdom in 1927, used the new ideology to legitimize his launching of the third service class revolution in 1928. The Soviet service state proved unable to manage the economy efficiently, but the service class remained during the Leonid Brezhnev (1964–1982), Yuri Andropov (1982–1984), and Konstantin Chernenko (1984–1985) years. The Soviet service class had already begun to generate into a privileged elite (what Milovan Djilas termed “the new class”) by the end of the 1930s, and this degeneration had turned into a rout by 1985. By the middle of the 1970s “the working class pretended to work and the state pretended to pay them.” The general trend was for people to go to work to socialize with their friends, not to produce anything. By the time of the coup of August 19, 1991, attempting to overthrow Mikhail Gorbachev, the privileged elite (the “nomenklatura”) rode around in their own private motorcars and went straight to the head of long lines for ordinary consumer goods such as newspapers and magazines while getting most of their goods from closed stores open only to the privileged elite. It was obvious that the Soviet service state was no longer working, could not make the economy grow or improve the lives of its subjects, and was little more than a debauchery of corruption. Gorbachev, another believer in socialism, tried to reform the system, but it proved impossible. The service state lost its teeth when he repealed Article 6 of the Brezhnev constitution, which had given the Communist Party a monopoly on Soviet political life. The Communist Party had also assumed a monopoly on all elite positions, so that one had to be a member of the CPSU to hold many jobs. That had not been true during the times of Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev. This change was another sign of the degeneration of the service state under Brezhnev. When Gorbachev delivered the coup de grace to the Soviet service state, no one wept. The service state was a major Russian “contribution” to the human experience. Whether there ever will be a fourth service class revolution remains to be seen.

See also:

ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; ECONOMY,

TSARIST; INDUSTRIALIZATION; MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; SERFDOM

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Hellie, Richard. (1971). Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hellie, Richard. (1987). “What Happened? How Did He Get Away with It? Ivan Groznyi’s Paranoia and the Problem of Institutional Restraints.” Russian History 14:199–224. Hellie, Richard. (2002). “The Role of the State in Seventeenth-Century Muscovy.” In Modernizing Muscovy, ed. J. T. Kotilaine and Marshall T. Poe. Leiden: Brill. Kliuchevskii, V. O. (1960). A History of Russia. 5 vols., tr. C. J. Hogarth. New York: Russell & Russell. Swianiewicz, Stanislaw. (1965). Forced Labor and Economic Development: An Enquiry into the Experience of Soviet Industrialization. London: Oxford University Press. Tucker, Robert C. (1990). Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928–1941. New York: Norton. Voslensky, Michael. (1984). Nomenklatura: The Soviet Ruling Class, tr. Eric Mosbacher. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. RICHARD HELLIE

SEVASTOPOL City and naval base on the southwestern tip of the Crimean Peninsula in Ukraine. With its excellent harbors and anchorages, Sevastopol has an advantageous location from which to conduct operations in the Black Sea. The city stands on the southern shore of Sevastopol Bay and has a population of 390,000—75 percent Russian and 20 percent Ukrainian. The site of ancient settlements, modern Sevastopol was founded by Prince Grigory Potemkin in 1783 after the conquest of the Crimean Khanate. Admiral F.F. Mekenzy, commander of the newly created Black Sea Fleet, placed a naval station there, and in 1784 the settlement was named Sevastopol. In 1804 Alexander I’s government declared Sevastopol the primary naval base of the Black Sea Fleet. The naval base and the city grew significantly during the second quarter of the nineteenth century when Admiral Mikhail Lazarev served as fleet commander. By 1844 the city had a population of more than forty thousand, making it the largest city in Crimea. Sevastopol became the major base for fitting out and repairing warships. Its defenses grew in extent and quality. In 1853 Admiral Pavel Nakhimov’s squadron sailed from there to Sinope, where it annihilated a

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Turkish squadron. During the Crimean War, Anglo-French forces besieged Sevastopol. The defense was immortalized by Leo Tolstoy, one of the defenders, in his Sevastopol Tales. Sevastopol fell to the Anglo-French forces in September 1855. Following the Crimean War, Sevastopol suffered decline, because the peace treaty denied Russia the right to maintain a fleet in the Black Sea. With the remilitarization of the Black Sea after 1870 Sevastopol regained its importance as a naval base for a modern ironclad fleet. Sevastopol was associated with rebellion, mutiny, and civil war. In 1830 government restrictions to combat a cholera epidemic set off a revolt among sailors and civilians. In June 1905 the battleship Potemkin sailed from Sevastopol on its way to mutiny over bad meat. During the Russian civil war Sevastopol was the headquarters of Baron Peter Wrangel’s White Army. The Red Army under Mikhail Frunze stormed Crimea in October 1920, and Wrangel evacuated his army to Istanbul. During World War II Sevastopol was the site of an eight-month siege by German and Rumanian forces under Field Marshal Erich von Manstein and fell in July 1942. On May 9, 1944, the Soviet Fourth Ukrainian Front under the command of Marshal Fyodor Tolbukhin liberated the city. Following the end of the existence of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia and Ukraine entered into negotiations over Sevastopol. During the early twenty-first century the city is a special region within Ukraine, not under the government of Crimea, and the Russian and Ukrainian navies share the naval base.

See also:

feasible, leaving the country without a perspective plan for the first time in three decades. In one of his many reorganizations, Khrushchev substituted a Seven-Year Plan to run from 1959 to 1965. It included his new priorities for a much larger chemical industry, more housing, substitution of oil and gas for coal in the production of electricity and for powering the railroads, and more emphasis on agriculture, especially in the eastern areas. Planned targets for 1965 were ambitious, and some were even raised in October 1961. Despite considerable growth of housing construction, meat production, and consumer durables, fulfillment was not achieved in many areas. Khrushchev had grand hopes for the chemical industry and agriculture, but the targets for mineral fertilizers, synthetic fibers, and the grain harvest were all missed. Civilian investment rates fell, and national income (defined in Marxist concepts) was underfulfilled by four to seven percent. Gross production volume of producers goods did exceed the long-term plan, with an index (1959⫽100) of 196 achieved versus 185–188 planned, while consumer goods fell below it, 160 actual versus 162–165 planned. The shortfalls can perhaps be explained by the strain of increased expenditures on space and military ventures in these years and the complexity of planning for more tasks. The continual sovnarkhoz (regional economic council) reorganizations, which put considerable strain on Gosplan to coordinate supplies, probably also had a negative impact on overall results.

See also:

FIVE-YEAR PLANS; GOSPLAN

BLACK SEA FLEET; CRIMEA; CRIMEAN WAR;

UKRAINE AND UKRAINIANS; WHITE ARMY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Nove, Alec. (1969). An Economic History of the U.S.S.R. London: Allen Lane.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Curtiss, John Shelton. (1979). Russia’s Crimean War. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

MARTIN C. SPECHLER

Tolstoy, Leo. (1961). Sebastopol. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. JACOB W. KIPP

SEVEN YEARS’ WAR

Following the rise of Nikita Khrushchev to primacy among the leaders of the Soviet Union, the sixth five-year plan (1956–1960) was abandoned as in-

The Seven Years’ War (1756–1763) involved nearly every European state and was watershed in world history. It arose as a result of the Anglo-French colonial rivalry and because of the growing might of Prussia in central Europe, which threatened the interests of Austria, France, and Russia. The out-

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come ensured that England became the dominant power in North America, and the war consolidated the growing power and prestige of Frederick the Great’s Prussia. For this, he could thank Russia and its bizarre participation in the war. Internally, Russian actions in the Seven Years’ War also brought about a palace coup and the subsequent rule of Catherine II. Prussia had emerged as a potential European power by the middle of the eighteenth century. Under Frederick II (r. 1740–1786), Prussian policies became increasingly ambitious. Frederick wanted to consolidate his power and territories gained at the expense of Austria during the 1840s. Austria, for its part, desired a return of territories such as Silesia. Russia and France also worried over Prussian power and potential incursions near their respective borders. When war broke out between France and England over their North American territories, Prussia signed an alliance with England in January 1756. The alliance brought a rapprochement between France and Austria. By the end of 1756, Russia signed a new alliance with its traditional ally, Austria. The sides had been drawn. After war broke out in 1756 on the continent, Frederick’s forces enjoyed success against the Austrians. By April 1756 the Prussians reached Prague. In the Bohemian capital the Austrians rallied, and Frederick’s forces retreated. At that point Austria’s allies, including Russia, entered the conflict. Despite the numbers stacked against him, Frederick continued to win surprising victories, and 1757 established his reputation as a brilliant commander. The following year brought mixed results and mounting casualties for the Russians, who lost twelve thousand troops at August’s Battle of Zorndorf. In 1759 the allies, and particularly Russia, ratcheted up the pressure. Led by General Pyotr Saltykov, the Russian army occupied Frankfurt in June 1759. By 1760 Frederick had only half the numbers of his Russian and Austrian opponents, who began to close the circle against Frederick. Russian commanders in particular focused on Berlin, and even occupied the Prussian capital for three days in September and October 1760. Exhausted by the continuous marching demanded of eighteenth-century warfare, the two sides fought no serious battles for the rest of 1760 and most of 1761. Frederick’s situation, however, was grave. Russia and Austria could count on more soldiers and supplies, and Prussia was cut off from Silesia, a major supplier of food.

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Then the situation changed dramatically. On January 5, 1762, the Empress Elizabeth died. Her successor, Peter III, was a fervent admirer of Frederick II and all things Prussian. When he took the throne, Peter ended the war with Prussia, called his troops back, and returned all territorial gains. As a result, Frederick recovered and defeated the Austrians. France, defeated in North America and more disinterested about the continental war, also signed a treaty with Prussia. Frederick’s “miracle” had resulted from Russia’s flip-flop, and his victory brought the first step toward Prussian domination of Germany. At home, Peter III’s decision ran counter to Russia’s strategic and political interests. Contemporaries called the conflict the “Prussian War,” and even popular prints of the time depicted the war as a struggle solely between Russia and Prussia. The decision to hand Frederick victory thus did not go over well within any segment of the population. Catherine, Peter’s German wife, led a palace coup against her husband that toppled him from power on July 9, 1762. Catherine II’s rise to power would have been inconceivable had it not been for Russia’s participation in the war.

See also:

AUSTRIA, RELATIONS WITH; CATHERINE II; ELIZ-

ABETH; FRANCE, RELATIONS WITH; PETER III; PRUSSIA, RELATIONS WITH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Anderson, Fred. (2001). Crucible of Empire: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754–1766. New York: Vintage. Keep, John L. H. (2002). “The Russian Army in the Seven Years’ War.” In The Military and Society in Russia, 1450–1917, ed. Eric Lohr and Marshall Poe. Leiden: Brill. Leonard, Carol. (1993). Reform and Regicide: The Reign of Peter III of Russia. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. STEPHEN M. NORRIS

SHAHUMIAN, STEPAN GEORGIEVICH (1878–1918), Bolshevik party activist and theorist on the nationality question; principal leader of the Bolsheviks in Baku during the Russian Revolution who perished as one of the famous Twenty-Six Baku Commissars. Born into an Armenian family in Tiflis (Tbilisi), the young Shahumian was educated in local

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schools before entering the Riga Polytechnic Institute in 1900. Active in Armenian student political circles, he turned toward Marxism in Riga. Expelled for his political activities, Shahumian continued his studies at the University of Berlin, where he joined the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party (RSDRP). He grew close to Vladimir Lenin and the Bolsheviks, translated the Communist Manifesto into Armenian, and was elected a delegate to the Fourth (Stockholm) and Fifth (London) Congresses of the RSDRP. Shahumian was active in the strike movement in Baku during the first Russian revolution (1905–1907) and throughout the years of reaction and repression of the labor movement, and was arrested and imprisoned several times. When the February Revolution broke out, he returned from exile in Astrakhan and assumed leadership of the Baku Bolsheviks. Elected chairman of the Baku Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, Shahumian was the most important figure in Baku politics in 1917 and 1918. After the October Revolution, Lenin’s government appointed him Extraordinary Commissar for the Affairs of the Caucasus. Shahumian headed the Council of People’s Commissars, the de facto government of the Baku Commune, from April through July 1918. Although he was moderate in temperament and tolerant of diverse political parties, his brief tenure was marked by a brash attempt to expand Soviet power throughout the Caucasus by military means. As the Turkish army approached Baku, the soviet voted to invite Persiabased British forces to defend the city. Shahumian’s government stepped down and soon was arrested. On September 20, 1918, anti-Bolsheviks brutally executed twenty-six commissars, among them Shahumian, in the deserts of Transcaspia (now Turkmenistan). The Soviet government blamed the British for their deaths and commemorated them as martyrs to the revolution. Reburied in a mass grave in Baku, they became the inspiration for paintings, songs, poems, and films. But with the fall of the Soviet Union, anticommunist Azerbaijanis disinterred their corpses and destroyed their monuments.

See also: ARMENIA AND ARMENIANS; BAKU; BOLSHEVISM; CAUCASUS; SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC WORKERS PARTY BIBLIOGRAPHY

Suny, Ronald Grigor. (1972). The Baku Commune, 1917–1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. RONALD GRIGOR SUNY

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SHAKHRAI, SERGEI MIKHAILOVICH (b. 1956), lawyer and former minister of nationalities. Sergei Shakhrai trained as a lawyer at Rostov State University and attained the rank of candidate of juridical sciences from Moscow State University (MGU) in 1982. He then taught law at MGU until 1990. Shakhrai was a Party member from 1988 to August 1991. In 1990, Shakhrai was elected to the new RSFSR Congress of People’s Deputies, where he quickly became chair of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Legislation. He simultaneously served Boris Yeltsin as a counselor for legal and nationalities affairs. In 1992 he was named a member of the Russian Federation Security Council and deputy chair responsible for nationality issues. During the November–December 1992 ethnic unrest in North Ossetia and Ingushetia, Shakhrai served as head of the temporary regional administration. A Terek Cossack, he also chaired the Russian parliamentary committee on the rehabilitation of the Cossacks. In November 1992, Shakhrai was appointed a deputy prime minister. In legal matters, Shakhrai argued Yeltsin’s case in the 1992 Constitutional Court hearings on the legality of the president’s banning of the CPSU, a decree written by Shakhrai himself. He also served as Yeltsin’s representative to the 1993 Duma commission drafting a new Russian constitution and negotiated many of the subsequent federal powersharing treaties. Shakhrai became leader of the Party of Russian Unity and Accord in October 1993, running on their ticket in the December 1993 Duma election. However, he resigned from the party when the party joined the Our Home is Russia movement in August 1995. Shakhrai was transferred from deputy prime minister to minister of nationalities and regional policy in January 1994. This move was soon overturned; by April he was reappointed deputy prime minister and in May removed as minister of nationalities. However, he continued to influence the decisions of his replacement, Nikolai Yegorov. Shakhrai’s work in law and nationality affairs combined in the issue of Chechnya. Despite Chechen president Dzhokar Dudayev’s assertions otherwise, Shakhrai insisted that Chechnya remained an integral part of the Russian Federation. When Dudayev refused to ratify the new constitution, despite Shakhrai’s repeated attempts at negotiation, he

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provided the legal pretext for an invasion. Shakhrai and minister of defense Pavel Grachev convinced Yeltsin that an attack on Chechnya would be quick and painless; ultimately, the attack was launched in December 1994. Shakhrai’s prediction proved false, however, as the first Russo-Chechen war lasted until August 1996. Yeltsin summarily fired Shakhrai in June 1998, when the lawyer questioned the constitutionality of a possible third term as president for Yeltsin. However, Shakhrai was not unemployed for long. In October, prime minister Yevgeny Primakov appointed Shakhrai as his own legal advisor. Shakhrai also won a Duma seat for Perm oblast during the 1999 election. As of 2003 he was a member of the influential Russian Foreign and Defense Policy Council and was teaching at Moscow State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO).

See also: AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH; PARTY OF RUSSIAN UNITY AND ACCORD

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Dunlop, John B. (1998). Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict. New York: Cambridge University Press. Lieven, Anatol. (1998). Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power. New Haven: Yale University Press. ANN E. ROBERTSON

SHAKHTY TRIAL This famous trial based on fabricated charges was used by Stalin to start a three-year attack on the technical intelligentsia of the USSR and to discredit moderates within the political leadership. Fiftythree mining engineers and technicians, including some top officials and three German engineers, were accused of acts of sabotage and treason dating back to the 1920s and taking part in a conspiracy directed from abroad (involving French

Courtroom scene from the Shakhty sabotage trial in 1928. © TASS/SOVFOTO

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finance and Polish counterespionage). The story of conspiracy was fabricated by the Unified State Political Administration (OGPU) officials in the North Caucasus mining district known as the Donbass and focused on such acts as wasting capital, lowering the quality of production, raising its costs, mistreating workers, and other forms of “wrecking.” Held in a large auditorium at the House of Trade-Unions in Moscow, this six-week-long trial was arranged for maximum publicity, with movie cameras, a hundred journalists in attendance, and a different public audience each day. The presiding judge over the specially organized judicial presence was Andrei Vyshinsky, famous for his appearance as prosecutor at the major show trials of the 1930s; the prosecutor at the Shakhty trial was the Bolshevik jurist Nikolai Krylenko. For evidence, the prosecution relied on confessions of the accused, but twenty-three of the defendants proclaimed their innocence, and a few others retracted their confessions at trial. As a political show trial Shakhty was imperfect. Still, all but four of the accused were convicted, and five of them executed. In the wake of the Shakhty trial, non-Marxist engineers and technicians were placed on the defensive and many fell victim to persecution. “Specialist baiting” ranged from verbal harassment to firing from jobs, not to speak of arrests and convictions in later trials, including the well-known “Industrial Party” case. By 1931, when Stalin called a halt to the anti-specialist campaign, Soviet engineers had been tamed and any nascent threat of technocracy defeated. On the political level, the Shakhty trial served Stalin as a vehicle for radicalizing economic policy and sending a message of warning to moderates in the leadership (such as Alexei Rykov and Nikolai Bukharin). If nothing else, the persecution of the “bourgeois specialists” weakened one of the constituencies that supported a relatively cautious and moderate approach to industrialization. With hindsight it is clear that the Shakhty trial, along with the renewal of forced grain procurements, signaled the coming end of the class-conciliatory New Economic Policy and the start of a new period of class war that would culminate in the forced collectivization from 1929 to 1933. An important manifestation of the new class war was the Cultural Revolution from 1928 to 1931, in which young communists in many fields of art, science, and professional life were encouraged to attack and supplant their non-Marxist senior colleagues.

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SHOW TRIALS; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bailes, Kendall. (1978). Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin: Origins of the Soviet Technical Intelligentsia, 1917–1941. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Fitzpatrick, Sheila. (1978). “Cultural Revolution as Class War.” In Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928–1931, ed. Sheila Fitzpatrick. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Kuromiya, Hiroaki. (1997). “The Shakhty Affair.” South East European Monitor 4(2):41–64. PETER H. SOLOMON JR.

SHAMIL (1797–1871), the most famous and successful antiRussian Islamic resistance leader during the nineteenth century; lionized by Chechen and Dagestani nationalists and co-opted by Russian literature and the public consciousness as a sign of tsarist imperial expansion and the Russian mission in Asia. Born in Gimri, modern Dagestan, Shamil demonstrated an early skill with weapons and horses. He entered a madrassah where he learned grammar, logic, rhetoric, and Arabic. There he joined the Murids, of the Naqshbandi-Khalidi Sufi order, in 1830. Following the transfer of Dagestan from Persia to the Russian Empire, Murids initiated a jihad against Russia under the leadership of Shamil’s mentor, the first imam of Dagestan, Ghazi Muhammed. After his death and the brief leadership of Hamza Bek, Shamil became the third imam of Dagestan and declared it an independent state in 1834. His personal charisma, political acumen, state building, and military ability as well as his blending of an egalitarian interpretation of Shari’a (Islamic Law) with proclamations of jihad against the Russian advance made him a popular political and religious leader (even among the non-Muslims of the North Caucasus). For twenty-five years (1834–1859), Shamil led raids on Russian positions in the Caucasus. He reached the peak of prestige in 1845 devastating the advance of Mikhail Vorontsov, who organized an army to complete the final conquest of the Caucasus. In these years of struggle, Shamil unified the disparate communities of the North Caucasus, built a state, organized a regular army, and completed the Islamicization of Dagestan and Chechnya. In

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1857, the Russian Empire took a more aggressive stance; Generals Alexander Baryatinsky and Nikolai Evdokimov overwhelmed the weaker and exhausted forces of Shamil. By April 1859 his fortress at Vedeno fell and Shamil retreated to Mount Gunib. On September 6, 1859, Shamil surrendered to the Russians and the resistance movement never recovered. He was taken to St. Petersburg for an audience with Tsar Alexander II, paraded around Russia as a hero and menace, and then exiled to Kaluga. In March 1871 he died and was buried in Medina. Drawing from the rich literary tradition of Alexander Pushkin, Mikhail Lermontov, and Alexander Bestuzhev-Marlinsky, Shamil emerged as a Caucasian hero of Russian Romanticism and a symbol of Russian expansion and its civilizing mission. Shamil was an international celebrity; his exploits serialized in numerous languages. Soviet historians initially lauded Shamil as a hero of a national liberation movement against tsarist imperialism; this became problematic when his name was linked with anti-Russian and anti-Bolshevik opposition. Thus, Shamil was depicted by Soviet historians during the second half of the twentieth century as personally progressive while his movement was corrupted by anti-popular and religious elements.

See also: CAUCASUS; ISLAM; NATIONALISM IN THE TSARIST PERIOD

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Gammer, Moshe. (1994). Muslim Resistance to the Tsar: Shamil and the Conquest of Chechnia and Daghestan. London: Frank Cass.

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planner or intelligence officer. He next served on the Worker’s and Peasants’ Red Army (RKKA) staff, then from 1925 to 1928 commanded the Leningrad and Moscow military districts. From 1928 to 1931 he was RKKA chief of staff, followed by a tour as commander of the Volga Military District. From 1933 to 1935 he headed the Frunze Military Academy, after which he commanded the Leningrad Military District. From 1937 to 1940 he served as second chief of the newly created Red Army General Staff, followed by appointment after the Winter War (1939–1940) as deputy Defense Commissar. At the end of July 1941, despite ill health, he replaced Georgy Zhukov to serve as chief of the General Staff until May 1942. While recovering from either nervous exhaustion or malaria, he reverted to assignment as deputy defense commissar, followed in 1943–1945 by tenure as chief of the Academy of the General Staff. An officer of intellect and experience, Shaposhnikov left his mark on nearly every important military organizational and doctrinal innovation of the 1920s and 1930s. His most important scholarly work was Brain of the Army (published in three volumes, 1927–1929), in which he studied the Austrian model of Conrad von Hoetzendorf and the tsarist experience in 1914 to argue for the creation of a modern Soviet general staff headed by an “integrated great captain.” The consummate general staff officer, Shaposhnikov was one of the few officers who enjoyed Josef Stalin’s open respect, and nearly every subsequent chief of the Red Army/Soviet General Staff considered himself Shaposhnikov’s disciple.

See also:

MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET

MICHAEL ROULAND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Erickson, John. (1962). The Soviet High Command. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

SHAPOSHNIKOV, BORIS MIKHAILOVICH

BRUCE W. MENNING

(1882–1945), marshal (1940), general staff officer, military theorist, and chief of the Red Army General Staff. Originally a career officer in tsarist service, Shaposhnikov graduated in 1910 from the Nicholas Academy of the General Staff, then served in Turkestan, where he possibly contracted malaria, and in the Warsaw Military District. He attained regimental command during World War I, joined the Red Army in 1918, and occupied high staff positions during the Russian civil war, usually as

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SHATALIN, STANISLAV SERGEYEVICH (1934–1997), Soviet economist; advocate of decentralization and market reforms. Born in a family of upper-level functionaries of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Stanislav Shatalin graduated from the economics department of the Moscow State University and

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entered academia in the era of the Thaw. In 1965 he joined an influential school of economists at the Central Economics and Mathematics Institute (TsEMI) who were developing and advocating the System of Optimal Functioning for the Economy (SOFE) based on mathematical modeling. He shared the highest-ranking State Award, served as deputy director of the All-Union Institute for Systems Studies and director of the Institute for Economic Forecasting that had separated from TsEMI, and became full member of the Academy of Sciences in 1987. In 1989 and 1990, he emerged as a key advisor to Mikhail Gorbachev and a rival to the government economic team of Leonid Abalkin, and was appointed to the Presidential Council. He coauthored the Five-Hundred-Day Plan, a reform program that was eventually declined by Gorbachev, partly because of its emphasis on the decentralization of the Union, but was widely acclaimed in the West. This program contained, albeit in a different sequence, the essential elements of the subsequent reforms of the 1990s (although some argue that the five hundred days was more gradual and mindful of the social consequences of drastic deregulation). After briefly taking part in liberal politics, Shatalin established and chaired the Reforma Foundation. His twilight years were overshadowed by the Audit Chamber’s inquiry into a mutually profitable relationship between a bank affiliated with his foundation and government managers of social security funds.

See also:

FIVE-HUNDRED-DAY PLAN

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hough, Jerry F. (1997). Democratization and Revolution in the USSR, 1985–1991. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Shatalin, S.; Petrakov, N.; Aleksashenko, S.; Yavlinsky, G.; and Fedorov, B. (1991). 500 Days: Transition to the Market. New York: St. Martin’s Press. DMITRI GLINSKI

SHCHARANSKY, ANATOLY NIKOLAYEVICH (b. 1948), prominent Jewish dissident. Anatoly Shcharansky was arrested on March 15, 1977, after being denied permission to emigrate from the Soviet Union. A twenty-nine-year-

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old computer expert at the time, Shcharansky had been a leading figure in the Helsinki Group, the oldest human rights organization in the Soviet Union, founded by Yuri F. Orlov on May 12, 1976, for the purpose of upholding the USSR’s responsibility to implement the Helsinki commitments. The Helsinki Agreement had been promulgated a year earlier (August 1975), its text published in full in both Pravda and Izvestia. The formation of the Moscow Helsinki Group sparked the creation of several human rights organizations throughout the Soviet Union. Shcharansky was a founding member of the group, along with Yelena Bonner (Andrei Sakharov’s wife), Anatoly Marchenko, Ludmilla M. Alexeyeva, and others. In the first three years of the group’s work, nearly all of its members were arrested or sentenced to psychiatric hospitalization as a way to repress their activities. Shcharansky’s arrest was part of a Soviet campaign against dissidents begun in February 1977. Others were arrested before him: Alexander Ginsburg (February 4), Ukrainian dissidents Mikola Rudenko and Olexy Tikhy (February 7), and Yuri Orlov (February 10). In June 1977, Shcharansky was charged with treason, specifically with accepting CIA funds to create dissension in the Soviet Union. After a perfunctory trial, he was sentenced to fourteen years in prison. He was finally released in February 1986, when he and four other prisoners were exchanged for four Soviet spies who had been held in the West. Shcharansky finally emigrated to Israel, where he first changed his name to Natan Shcharan before settling on Natan Shcharansky. He is active in Israeli politics.

See also:

JEWS; REFUSENIKS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Gilbert, Martin. (1986). Shcharansky, Hero of Our Time. New York: Viking. Goldberg, Paul. (1988). The Final Act: The Dramatic, Revealing Story of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group. New York: Morrow. Shcharansky, Anatoly; Bonner, Elena; and Alekseeva, Liudmilla. (1986). The Tenth Year of The Watch. New York: Ellsworth. Shcharansky, Anatoly, and Hoffman, Stefani. (1998). Fear No Evil: The Classic Memoir of One Man’s Triumph Over a Police State. New York: Public Affairs. JOHANNA GRANVILLE

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SHCHERBATOV, MIKHAIL MIKHAILOVICH

(1788–1863), an actor from the serf estate who revolutionized acting styles with his realistic portrayals.

(1733–1790), historian, publicist, and government servitor.

Born in Ukraine into a family owned by Count G. S. Volkenshtein, the young Mikhail Shchepkin began performing in the private theater maintained on the estate. Indeed, many nobles used their serfs’ skills for entertainment, and Shchepkin represented an important source of talent for the professional stage. Especially gifted, by 1800 he was allowed to participate in amateur productions in nearby Kursk. Though still a serf, he joined several provincial touring companies as he rose to stardom. Finally, in 1822, one of his noble fans, Prince N. G. Repin, persuaded his owner to free him. Later that year Shchepkin made his debut in Moscow, and in 1824 he began his legendary rule at the imperial Maly Theater, where he dominated in comedy and drama, including William Shakespeare’s corpus, for the next forty years. From his theatrical base in Moscow, he also toured the provinces and appeared on St. Petersburg’s imperial stage. Shchepkin’s artistic significance lies in his influence over the transformation of acting styles, developing multi-dimensional characters instead of simulating the single stereotype. His breakthrough came in 1830, in his characterization of the fatuous Muscovite nobleman Famusov in Alexander Griboyedov’s Woe from Wit. Six years later, Shchepkin’s rendition of Khlestakov, the petty bureaucrat mistakenly identified by corrupt provincial officials as one of the tsar’s investigators in Nikolai Gogol’s The Inspector General, assured the move toward realism. His great talent, and popularity on stage, gave him access to Russia’s highest literary circles, where he helped novelist Ivan Turgenev write for the stage. Ironically, though, he surrendered his place at center stage when he refused to modify his style to accommodate the next level of realism, plays written in colloquialisms by Russia’s historically most popular playwright Alexander Ostrovsky from the 1860s.

See also:

Mikhail Mikhailovich Shcherbatov was a scion of one of Russia’s oldest families of the nobility. His father-in-law, Prince Ivan Shcherbatov (1696–1761), was Russian minister to the court of St. James from 1739 to 1742, and from 1743 to1746. Upon retirement from military service in 1762 following Peter III’s Manifesto on the Freedom of the Nobility, Mikhail Shcherbatov went on to serve as a deputy to Catherine II’s Legislative Commission (1766–1767), and then as Russia’s official historiographer, beginning in 1768. Shcherbatov is perhaps best known for his publication On the Corruption of Morals in Russia (O Povrezhdenii Nravov v Rossii), in which he criticizes Peter the Great’s introduction of the Table of Ranks (1722). He argued that the rank system reduced the prestige of the old nobility and allowed the rise of a mediocre and materialistic class of servitors. “By the regulations of the military service, which Peter the Great had newly introduced,” he wrote, “the peasants began with their masters at the same stage as soldiers of the rank and file: It was not uncommon for the peasants, by the law of seniority, to reach the grade of officer long before their masters, whom, as their inferiors, they frequently beat with sticks. Noble families were so scattered in the service that often one did not come again in contact with his relatives during his whole lifetime.” Shcherbatov believed in the innate inequality of human beings and genetic superiority of the noble aristocracy. He lamented the decline of the pre-Petrine nobility’s influence during the eighteenth century, because he did not believe one could achieve the genetic superiority of the latter by meritorious service alone. While he did advocate a constitutional form of government, he urged that Russia be ruled by a hereditary monarch, who would be constrained only by a constitution and checked only by a Senate composed of the old nobility with extensive financial, judicial, and executive powers.

See also:

KULTURNOST; TABLE OF RANKS

THEATER BIBLIOGRAPHY

Senelick, Laurence. (1984). Serf Actor: The Life and Art of Mikhail Shchepkin. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Cross, A. G., and Smith, G. S., eds. (1994). Literature, Lives, and Legality in Catherine’s Russia. Cotgrave, Nottingham, UK: Astra Press.

LOUISE MCREYNOLDS

JOHANNA GRANVILLE

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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SHEVARDNADZE, EDUARD AMVROSIEVICH (b. 1928), foreign minister coincident with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Eduard Shevardhadze was minister of internal affairs of the Georgian Republic from 1965 to 1972, first secretary of the republic from 1972 to 1985, foreign minister of the Soviet Union from 1985 to 1990 and again in 1991, and president of the Republic of Georgia from 1992 onward. Until 1985, Eduard Shevardnadze’s career had been entirely within the Soviet republic of Georgia. The character traits he brought with him from Georgia would serve him well during his years as foreign minister. He was a man of considerable vi-

sion, with a strong sense of purpose. He was also a superb politician—opportunistic, flexible, pragmatic, and ruthless. He was a natural actor, as every great politician must be, and he was a man of action, a problem-solver impatient with obstacles, and a brutal political infighter. Perhaps most important, he was a Georgian with cosmopolitan leanings, not a Russian who distrusted the West. Shevardnadze used the available instruments of power to advance his career and further his policy objectives in Georgia at the outset of his career. He repressed dissidents and removed real and potential opponents. An outstanding Soviet apparatchik, he acted the role of sycophant to the leaders of the Soviet Union, extolling the virtues of those in a position to help him. But he brought to the Foreign Ministry in Moscow a commitment to radical change, a willingness to implement reform in an unorthodox manner, and the political skills and strength to accomplish his goals. When Shevardnadze was appointed foreign minister of the Soviet Union in 1985, it was widely assumed that he would be little more than a mouthpiece for Mikhail Gorbachev, who would conduct his own foreign policy. In turning to a regional party leader with no foreign-policy background, however, Gorbachev was relying on personal instinct and political acumen. As party leader in Georgia during the 1970s and early 1980s, Shevardnadze battled corruption and introduced the most liberal political and economic reforms of any Soviet regional leader. Gorbachev’s long association with Shevardnadze was rooted in shared frustration with the inefficiencies and corruption of the communist system, and he believed that his friend had the understanding and political skills necessary to formulate and implement a new foreign policy.

As foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze implemented Gorbachev’s “new thinking” in international relations. ARCHIVE PHOTOS, INC. REPRODUCED

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Shevardnadze played a critical role in conceptualizing and implementing the Soviet Union’s dramatic about-face during the 1980s. Considered the moral force behind “new political thinking” in the former Soviet Union, Shevardnadze was the point man in the struggle to undermine the forces of inertia at home and to end Moscow’s isolation abroad. Two U.S. secretaries of state, George Shultz and James Baker, have credited him with convincing them that Moscow was committed to serious negotiations with the United States. Each became a proponent of reconciliation in administrations that were intensely anti-Soviet; each concluded that the history of Soviet-U.S. relations and the end of the Cold War would have been far different had it not been for Shevardnadze.

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Commitment to the nonuse of force became Shevardnadze’s most important contribution to the end of communism and the Cold War, permitting the virtually nonviolent demise of the Soviet empire and the Soviet Union itself. Shevardnadze was more adamant on this issue than was Gorbachev; he opposed the use of force in Tbilisi, Georgia, in 1989 and in the Baltics in 1990. Shevardnadze recognized from his Georgian experience that the use of force against non-Russian minorities would be counterproductive, and particularly opposed Gorbachev’s reliance on the military. Shevardnadze resigned as foreign minister because of Gorbachev’s turn to the political right wing and, during his resignation speech in December 1990, he predicted that the use of force would undermine perestroika. The violence in Lithuania and Latvia three weeks later, condoned by Gorbachev, proved him right. When Shevardnadze returned to Georgia, he initially ruled by emergency decree, without the legitimacy of law and with the support of corrupt and brutal paramilitary forces. Finally elected Georgia’s second president in 1995 (and reelected in 2000), he embarked on another campaign to rid Georgia of corruption, reform the economy, and restore political stability. In 1992 Shevardnadze returned to an independent Georgia that was far worse off than when he had departed for Moscow nearly seven years earlier. His predecessor, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, an ultra-nationalist who was both inept and corrupt, used his office to restrict civil liberties and to accumulate great personal wealth. Civil strife was destroying the country, and the economy was in ruins. As the head of the state, Shevardnadze was forced to pursue a humiliating course, taking Georgia into the Russian-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States in 1993 and requesting a Russian military presence in western Georgia to counter secessionist forces in Abkhazia. Just as he had been accused of favoring Western interests when he was Soviet foreign minister, now he was charged with betraying Georgian interests as chairman of his ancestral homeland. Shevardnadze survived at least two wellorganized assassination attempts in 1995 and 1998 as well as bloody conflicts with ethnic separatists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Russian wars in nearby Chechnya led to increased pressure on his government from Moscow and a greater Russian presence along Georgia’s borders. Increased Russian involvement in the Caucasus, instability in Central Asia, and weak neighboring

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governments in Armenia and Azerbaijan added to the pressures on Shevardnadze. Numerous scandals within the Georgian military weakened national security and gave Russian forces greater opportunities to penetrate the Georgian military. Increased U.S. involvement in Central Asia because of the war against terrorism, the Russian interest in the Caucasus because of the war in Chechnya, and the overall political and military weakness of the states of the Caucasus had the potential to contribute to Shevardnadze’s vulnerability. Shevardnadze, who could have retired from public life in 1991 as an honored statesman, engaged in yet another battle, this time to keep his country from self-destruction. The opposition of high-ranking Russian general officers, who blamed Shevardnadze for the demilitarization and breakup of the Soviet Union, were likely to contribute to the discontinuity of his government in Tbilisi. Unlike Gorbachev, who turned to writing books and delivering lectures, Shevardnadze chose a different path—one that nearly cost him his life on more than one occasion. With its breathtakingly beautiful Black Sea coast, mountains, ancient culture, rich agricultural land, and energetic people, Georgia could certainly emerge as a peaceful and prosperous modern state, and Shevardnadze’s first priority was to advance the country toward that goal.

See also:

GEORGIA AND GEORGIANS; MOVEMENT FOR DE-

MOCRATIC REFORMS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ekedahl, Carolyn McGiffert, and Goodman, Melvin A. (2001). The Wars of Eduard Shevardnadze. Washington, DC: Brassey’s. Palazchenko, Pavel. (1997). My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze: The Memoir of a Soviet Interpreter. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press. Shevardnadze, Eduard. (1991). The Future Belongs to Freedom. New York: The Free Press. Shevardnadze, Eduard. (1991). My Choice: In Defense of Democracy and Freedom. Moscow: Novosti. MELVIN GOODMAN

SHEVCHENKO, TARAS GREGOREVICH (1814–1861), Ukraine’s national poet. Born a serf, Taras Shevchenko was orphaned early in life. His owner noticed his artistic ability

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while he was serving as a houseboy and apprenticed him to an icon and mural painter. In 1838 some Russian and Ukrainian intellectuals in St. Petersburg organized a lottery and used the proceeds to buy his freedom. Afterwards, Shevchenko studied under Karl Briullov at the Academy of Fine Arts, graduating in 1845. While still a student, he published a short collection of romantic poems, Kobzar (The Bard, 1840), that established his reputation as a poet. His early folklorism and idealization of the Cossacks soon gave way to poetry of social critique that prophesied rebellion. Shevchenko’s poems of the 1840s denounced serfdom and the Russian autocracy and celebrated Slavic brotherhood. In 1847 he was arrested in Kiev on the charge of belonging to the secret Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood. A search by the gendarmes discovered his satirical poems, including an unflattering portrayal of Nicholas I and his wife, and in consequence the tsar sentenced Shevchenko to military service in Central Asia, adding a special prohibition on writing and painting. Following his release in 1857, Shevchenko was not permitted to reside in Ukraine. He settled in St. Petersburg, where he died in 1861.

Shevchenko, Taras. (1964). Poetical Works, trans. C. H. Andrusyshen and Watson Kirkconnell. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Shevchenko was a realist artist of note. Even during his lifetime, his contribution to the development of modern Ukrainian culture and national consciousness earned him the reputation of Ukraine’s “national bard.” His sophisticated poetical works transformed folk idioms into a modern literary product, while his vision of popular justice and democracy influenced generations of Ukrainian activists. After Shevchenko’s death, Ukrainian patriots transferred his remains to Chernecha Hill near Kaniv, in Ukraine, which immediately became a place of pilgrimage. The cult of Shevchenko continued to grow in Ukraine during the twentieth century, for patriots viewed him as a symbol of national culture and statehood. In the eyes of the communists, however, Shevchenko was a symbol of social liberation and friendship with Russia. In post-Soviet Ukraine Shevchenko is the most revered figure in the pantheon of the nation’s “founding fathers.”

In February 1917 Shlyapnikov led the Bolshevik Party organization in Petrograd and became a member of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ Deputies. Subsequently Shlyapnikov became chairman of the All-Russian Metalworkers’ Union (1917–1921). He became commissar of labor (1917–1918) after the October 1917 Revolution. During the Russian civil war, Shlyapnikov was chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caspian-Caucasian Front (1918–1919).

See also:

CYRIL AND METHODIUS SOCIETY; NATIONALISM

IN THE SOVIET UNION; NATIONALISM IN TSARIST EMPIRE; UKRAINE AND UKRAINIANS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Zaitsev, Pavlo. (1988). Taras Shevchenko: A Life. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. SERHY YEKELCHYK

SHLYAPNIKOV, ALEXANDER GAVRILOVICH (1885–1937), highly skilled metalworker, trade union leader, and revolutionary. Alexander Shlyapnikov, an ethnic Russian from the town of Murom in central Russia, joined the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party in 1902 and became a Bolshevik in 1903; he was imprisoned in 1904 and 1905–1907. From 1908 to 1916 he lived in Western Europe. During World War I, Shlyapnikov organized a route through Scandinavia into Russia for smuggling illegal Marxist literature and Bolshevik correspondence.

From 1919 to 1921 Shlyapnikov led the Workers’ Opposition and advocated the role of unionized workers in directing and organizing the economy. Shlyapnikov continued to criticize Soviet economic policy and treatment of workers throughout the 1920s. In 1933 he was purged from the Communist Party. In 1935 he was arrested on false charges, imprisoned, and sent into internal exile. In 1936 he was arrested again. In September 1937, in a closed session, the Military College of the USSR Supreme Court found Shlyapnikov guilty of terrorist activities, based on false testimony from compromised witnesses, and ordered his execution. Shlyapnikov was rehabilitated of criminal charges in 1963 and restored to membership in the Communist Party in 1988.

Grabowicz, George G. (1982). The Poet as Mythmaker: A
Study of Symbolic Meaning in Taras Ševcenko. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute.

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Daniels, Robert. (1988). The Conscience of the Revolution: Communist Opposition in Soviet Russia. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Shliapnikov, Alexander. (1982). On the Eve of 1917, tr. Richard Chappell. London: Allison and Busby. BARBARA ALLEN

SHOCK THERAPY The term shock therapy has come to arouse a great deal of controversy. Its original use was related to the use of electrical shocks as therapy in psychiatric treatment. In economic policy, it has been used to describe powerful austerity measures designed to break spirals of very rapid inflation. More recently, it has been used as a blanket term for policies designed to reform the postsocialist economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The latter also is where the main controversies have arisen. The divergence of opinion concerning reform policy can be attributed in large part to the disparate nature of the tasks involved. Setting out to break inflation is different from seeking to undertake a broad socioeconomic transformation from failed centrally planned economies into functioning market economies. Above all, the political implications are very different. In a first stage, beginning after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, postsocialist governments in Central Europe embarked on economic reform programs that featured rapid liberalization and broadbased privatization. It has been held by some that those who succeeded did so because they applied shock therapy. Others, notably so people from the region, have rejected such claims, arguing that foreign advice had little to do with their achievements. The main test of shock therapy came in the first half of 1992, when the Russian government of Yegor Gaidar sought to implement rapid and radical systemic change. The bulk of all prices were liberalized and state owned enterprises were informed that their life support systems, in the form of direct financial links to the state budget, would be terminated. It was believed that this “shock” to the system also would bring a form of therapy in its wake. As enterprise managers realized that they could no longer count on automatic subsidies from the state

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budget, they would be forced into producing goods that could be sold on real markets, at prices that would cover their costs. It was expected that within a period of one-half of one year or so the transition should be completed. From there on the Russian economy would be growing at a healthy pace, and no more foreign economic support would be needed. By the summer of 1992 it became painfully evident that the project was failing. Enterprises had responded to the government’s austerity measures not by cultivating markets, but by developing a subsequently chronic practice of non-payments. Losses of government subsidies were met by reduced payments on due taxes and wages. Failures to receive payments from customers were met by refusals to pay suppliers. Reduced government orders were met by reductions in output, but could not result in closures since there was no bankruptcy law. It was also clear that the associated ambitions of bringing stability to government finance had met with equal disaster. Inflation was spiraling out of control, ending up at well more than 2,000 percent for the year as a whole, and persistent deficits in the state budget would come to haunt the government for several years to come. Ten years later the evidence remains fairly bleak. Between 1991 and 1998, the Russian economy lost around 40 percent of GDP and more than 80 percent of capital investment. There was mass impoverishment of the population, serious decay of the country’s infrastructure, and a general widening of the technology gap against the industrialized world. In August 1998, a brewing financial crisis produced a massive crash, leaving investors with tens of billions of dollars in losses. In the policy debates that surrounded the initial failures of rapid systemic change, two different sides emerged. One side, representing many market analysts, argued that the reason behind the initial failures was linked to insufficient shock. In their view, the crash of 1998 actually was a good thing, laying the groundwork for the economic upturn in 2000 and 2001. The other side, representing mainly non-economists and a minority of uninvolved academic economists, held that the policy of shock therapy as such has been at fault, and that a set of alternative policies would have allowed much of the destruction to be avoided. Today it would seem fair to say that the latter represents the majority view.

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ECONOMY, CURRENT; GAIDAR, YEGOR TIMURO-

VICH; PRIVATIZATION; YELTSIN, BORIS.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aslund, Anders. (1995). How Russia Became a Market Economy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Hedlund, Stefan. (1999). Russia’s “Market” Economy. London: UCL Press. Nelson, Lynn D., and Kuzes, Irina. (1995). Radical Reform in Yeltsin’s Russia. New York: M.E. Sharpe. STEFAN HEDLUND

tion (known as “storming”) associated with shockwork was ill suited to complex and interrelated production processes. Shockwork became a regular feature of Soviet industrial and agricultural life in the post-Stalin era as a result of the responsibility placed on lower-level trade union, Komsomol, and party officials to exercise leadership and record progress along bureaucratically predetermined lines. Workers seeking to extract favors from these organizations or demonstrate their suitability for promotion into their ranks went along with the game.

See also:

INDUSTRIALIZATION, SOVIET; STAKHANOVITE

MOVEMENT; SUBBOTNIK

SHOCKWORKERS Shockworkers (udarniki), a term originating during the Russian Civil War to designate workers performing especially arduous or urgent tasks, reemerged during the late 1920s and was applied thereafter to all workers and employees who assumed and fulfilled obligations over and above their work assignments. The rise of the Stakhanovite movement in 1935 reduced the prestige of the shockworker title, and it all but disappeared during the late 1940s and early 1950s, only to resurface again under the guise of shockworkers of Communist labor. From about ten million in 1966, the number of such workers increased to 17.9 million in 1971 and twenty-four million (or twentysix percent of all wage and salary workers) by 1975. The checkered history of shockwork in the USSR faithfully mirrors changing approaches by the Communist Party to the task of mobilizing workers and stimulating their commitment to raising labor productivity. If during the Civil War it was associated with voluntary Communist Saturdays (subbotniki), then during the late 1920s it arose primarily among young industrial workers who were eager to demonstrate their skills on new equipment and methods of production. From 1929 onward, shockwork invariably was linked with socialist competitions in which brigades of workers overfulfilling production quotas or meeting other obligations assumed in competition agreements were rewarded with prizes and privileged access to scarce goods and services.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kuromiya, Hiroaki. (1988). Stalin’s Industrial Revolution: Politics and Workers, 1928–1932. New York: Cambridge University Press. LEWIS H. SIEGELBAUM

SHOLOKHOV, MIKHAIL ALEXANDROVICH (1905–1984), Russian writer and Soviet loyalist who won the Nobel Prize for literature in 1965. Mikhail Sholokhov was born in the Don Cossack military region in 1905. During the civil war he joined the Bolsheviks, twice being on the verge of execution for his views. In 1922 he moved to Moscow to pursue a career as a writer. In 1924 he published his first short story and then published regularly throughout the 1920s. After 1924 he moved back to the Cossack regions to remain close to his stories. The first volume of his most important work, the Quiet Flows the Don (Tikhii Don, 1928–1940) was published in 1928. It is a portrayal of the struggles of the Don Cossacks against the Red army in Southern Russia, and is noted for its objectivity and lack of positive Bolshevik characters. The work was an instant success. Sholokhov would publish three more volumes in the course of his lifetime. This work has been tainted by unsubstantiated claims of plagiarism.

But as the number of shockworkers increased to slightly more than forty percent of all industrial workers, the value of the title became debased. Moreover, the brief period of extra physical exer-

His second major novel was the story of the triumph of collectivization in the early 1930s, entitled Virgin Soil Upturned (Podnyataya tselina, 1932–1960). This work was trumpeted as one of the masterpieces of Socialist Realism.

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Sholokhov joined the Communist Party in 1932 and was a loyal adherent to the party line for the rest of his life, though outspoken in his criticism of the quality of Soviet writing. He was one of the most honored authors of the Soviet period. His short stories and novels were published in massive editions. He was a member of the Supreme Soviet and Central Committee, awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor, and won both the Lenin and Stalin Prizes. He was acknowledged for his writing in the West as well, receiving the Nobel Prize of literature in 1965 for Tikhii Don.

See also:

SOCIALIST REALISM

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ermolaev, Herman. (1982). Mikhail Sholokhov and His Art. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Sholokhov, Mikhail. (1959). Virgin Soil Upturned, tr. Stephen Garry. New York: Knopf. Sholokhov, Mikhail. (1996). Quiet Flows the Don, tr. Robert Daglish. New York: Carroll & Graf. KARL E. LOEWENSTEIN

SHORT COURSE The central text of the Josef Stalin-era party catechism, The History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)—Short Course was compulsory reading for Soviet citizens of all walks of life between 1938 and 1956. This textbook traced the origins of the Russian revolutionary movement to tsarist industrialization efforts after 1861. Early agrarian populists gave way during the 1880s to Marxist Social Democrats, who acted in the name of the nascent working class. By the mid-1890s, Vladimir Ilich Lenin had emerged to guide this movement through police persecution and internal division (versus the Mensheviks, “Legal Marxists,” and Economists); his leadership allowed the Bolsheviks to seize power in 1917. Subsequently, Lenin plotted a course through civil war and foreign intervention toward the construction of a socialist economy. After Lenin’s death in 1924, Stalin navigated the USSR successfully through shock industrialization, agricultural collectivization, and the defense of the revolution’s gains against internal and external enemies. All but several sections on dialectical materialism were actually drafted by E. M. Yaroslavsky, P. N. Pospelov,

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and V. G. Knorin before being edited for publication by Stalin and members of his entourage. A seminal text, the Short Course epitomized a belief held by Soviet authorities after the early 1930s that history ought to play a fundamental role in party indoctrination efforts. This was signaled by a letter Stalin wrote to the journal Proletarskaya revolyutsia (Proletarian Revolution) in 1931 in which he denounced party historians for daring to question even minor aspects of Lenin’s leadership. Party historians floundered in the wake of this scandal, forcing Soviet authorities to clarify the party’s new expectations on “the historical front.” Existing party histories were too inaccessible and insufficiently inspiring for what was still a poorly educated society. A long-standing focus on anonymous social forces and abstract materialist analysis was to be replaced by a new emphasis on heroic individuals, pivotal events, and the connection of party history to that of Soviet society as a whole. These demands reflected the Soviet leadership’s intention to treat both party and state history as motivational propaganda. Editorial brigades under Yaroslavsky, Knorin, P. P. Popov, Lavrenti Beria, and others struggled to address these new demands, although the situation was complicated by the Great Terror. Repeated exposure of traitors within the Soviet elite between 1936 and 1938 made it difficult to write a stable narrative about the party. A lack of progress led the party leadership to ask Yaroslavsky, Pospelov, and Knorin to combine forces on a single advanced text. Knorin’s arrest during the summer of 1937, however, forced Yaroslavsky and Pospelov to focus exclusively on the jointly authored manuscript, redrafting it under the supervision of Stalin, Andrei Zhdanov, and Vyacheslav Molotov. Released in the fall of 1938, the Short Course was hailed as an ideological breakthrough that succeeded in situating party history within a broader Russo-Soviet historical context. Moreover, its tight focus on Lenin and Stalin ensured that the text would survive future purges (although at the cost of conflating party history with the cult of personality). Ubiquitous after the printing of more than forty-two million copies, the Short Course reigned over party educational efforts for eighteen years, authoritative until Nikita Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin and the personality cult in 1956.

See also:

STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

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Brandenberger, David. (1999). “The ‘Short Course’ to Modernity: Stalinist History Textbooks, Mass Culture, and the Formation of Russian Popular National Identity, 1934–1956.” Ph.D. diss, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. DAVID BRANDENBERGER

SHOSTAKOVICH, DMITRI DMITRIEVICH (1906–1975), highly controversial composer, at the same time outstanding musical representative of the Soviet Union and tragic figure in tension between acceptance and rejection of his music by the Soviet regime. Dmitry Shostakovich’s acculturation and his musical training at the Petrograd, then Leningrad, conservatory took place in the new Soviet state. Overnight Shostakovich rose to fame with a rousing performance of his first symphony in 1926. He was seen as a beacon of hope in Soviet music. The young composer succeeded in fulfilling the highflying expectations in the following years. Overwhelming applause was given to the opera Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk District (1934). This coarsely realistic work based on a novel by Nikolay Leskov was celebrated as a first milestone in the development of a genuine Soviet musical theatre. In 1936, however, a devastating review based on ideological criteria was published in Pravda. Shostakovich was caught—after Josef Stalin had watched the opera with greatest displeasure—in the trap of the aggressive, intrigue-dominated cultural policy. The composer was branded in public as aesthetizing formalist and his work as extreme left abnormality. These typical expressions of Soviet politico-cultural discourse meant that his music was too dissonant and complicated for Party taste. Ensuing condemnations not only by the officialdom but even by previously enthusiastic fellow composers greatly worried Shostakovich, as did the arrest and execution of his friend and patron Soviet Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky in the course of the Great Terror in 1937. Nonetheless, during the same year he managed to rehabilitate himself with his fifth symphony. In fact, the work signals a clear stylistic turn to a more moderate musical language, but to attribute this exclusively to political pressure seems misguided. Previous works indicate a break with aesthetic radicalism; moreover, Shostakovich practiced all his life through diverse styles of composi-

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tion. He even wrote operetta-like light music, which cannot be dismissed simply as reluctantly performed commissioned work. From the end of the 1930s, however, Shostakovich successfully developed forms of musical expression that realized his aesthetical ideas and at the same time met the demands of Socialist Realism for comprehensibility and popular appeal. His individuality and heterogeneity, his inclination toward the grotesque and sarcasm, and the profound seriousness and expressiveness of his works left the audience fascinated, but again and again provoked conflicts with the official state organs. In spite of vehement accusations in 1948, he soon was integrated again into the Soviet music elite, but only the Thaw following Stalin’s death made general conditions more favorable for the composer and his oeuvre. During his last two decades he could act as a respected personality of Soviet cultural life. Shostakovich and his work have been highly disputed and exposed to ideologically charged interpretations. Shostakovich was seen as a faithful communist, an opportunistic conformist, a secret dissident, or an oppressed genius. In any case, he was a Soviet citizen, who, like many others, stood by his home country but also got in trouble with its officials. Regardless of all political factors, he was one of the outstanding composers of the Soviet Union and perhaps the last great symphonist of music history.

See also:

CULTURAL REVOLUTION; MUSIC; PURGES, THE

GREAT; THAW, THE BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bartlett, Rosamund. (2000). Shostakovich in Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fanning, David, ed. (1998). Shostakovich Studies. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Fay, Laurel E. (2000). Shostakovich: A Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ho, Allan B. (2000). Shostakovich Reconsidered. London: Toccata Press. MATTHIAS STADELMANN

SHOW TRIALS Staged trials of opponents of the Soviet regime held in Moscow between 1936 and 1938. The most visible aspect of Josef Stalin’s Great Purges was a series of three Moscow show trials

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staged in August 1936, January 1937, and March 1938. Former leading members of the Bolshevik Party were put on trial for treason and generally confessed, often after being physically tortured, to participation in elaborate terrorist conspiracies against the Soviet state, ranking officials of the Communist Party, and Stalin personally. The trials were carefully staged and scripted, covered in the national and international press, and intended to justify in public the purges of the Party and the state apparatus that Stalin was implementing in 1937 and 1938. The sixteen defendants at the first trial, including Lev Kamenev and Grigory Zinoviev, described by the prosecutors as the “Trotskyity-Zinovievite Terrorist Center,” were charged with plotting to kill Stalin and several of his top lieutenants, including Sergei Kirov, who had been assassinated in 1934, very likely on Stalin’s orders. All sixteen were found guilty and shot within twenty-four hours of the verdict. The defendants at the second trial, including Yuri Piatakov, Karl Radek, and fifteen other prominent Old Bolsheviks, termed the “Parallel Center” by the prosecutors, were charged with plotting terrorist acts and engaging in active espionage in the service of Japan and Nazi Germany. Thirteen of the defendants were shot. The final and most important of the three trials included several of the most prominent members of the Bolshevik old guard: Nikolai Bukharin, Politburo member and chief theorist of the NEP; Alexei Rykov, chair of the Council of People’s Commissars; and Genrikh Yagoda, head of the Secret Police (NKVD) until 1936. The twenty-two defendants in this trial, members of a putative Anti-Soviet Right-Trotskyite Bloc, confessed under extreme physical pressure to terrorism, conspiracy to kill Party leaders, espionage, the murder of Maxim Gorky, and the attempted murder of Vladimir Lenin in 1918, among other crimes. Bukharin, the most important defendant, accepted responsibility for all the crimes named in the indictment but refused to confess to specific criminal actions; nonetheless, he was sentenced to death along with eighteen of the other defendants. Stalin and his secret police tightly controlled all three trials from behind the scenes; the outcome was preordained. The term show trials usually refers to the Moscow trials, but it can also denote the numerous other trials staged throughout the USSR in 1937 and 1938, under orders from Stalin and the

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Politburo. The Bolsheviks organized these provincial show trials, at least seventy of which were approved by the Politburo, to show the people that saboteurs, “wreckers,” and traitors were a threat even at the local level. Finally, the term can also describe any number of staged political trials held throughout the early Soviet period, especially between 1921 and 1924 and again from 1928 to 1933, such as the Industrial Party trial of 1930, in which eight prominent technical and engineering specialists were accused of sabotage and espionage and were sentenced to terms in prison.

See also:

GREAT PURGES, THE; GULAG; STALIN, JOSEF VIS-

SARIONOVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Conquest, Robert. (1990). The Great Terror: A Reassessment. New York: Oxford University Press. Fitzpatrick, Sheila. (1993). “How the Mice Buried the Cat: Scenes from the Great Purges of 1937 in the Russian Provinces.” Russian Review 52:299–320. Medvedev, Roy. (1989). Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism. New York: Columbia University Press. PAUL M. HAGENLOH

SHUISKY, VASILY IVANOVICH (1552–1612), tsar of Russia (1606–1610). Vasily Ivanovich Shuisky was a descendant of one of the oldest and most illustrious princely families of Russia. His uncle, Ivan Petrovich Shuisky, was one of the regents of the mentally retarded Tsar Fyodor I, and Vasily became a boyar at Fyodor’s court. During the late 1580s, Boris Godunov (Tsar Fyodor’s brother-in-law) managed to become sole regent, and Shuisky clan members were banished from Moscow; some of them died mysteriously while in exile. By 1591, however, Vasily and his three younger brothers (sons of Ivan Andreyevich Shuisky) were back in the capital, where Vasily became the leader of the family and resumed his place in the boyar council. When Dmitry of Uglich (Tsar Ivan IV’s youngest son) died mysteriously in 1591, Vasily Shuisky was chosen to lead the investigation; he concluded that the boy accidentally killed himself.

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Upon the death of Tsar Fyodor in 1598, Shuisky made no attempt to prevent Boris Godunov from becoming tsar; nevertheless, Tsar Boris feared and persecuted the Shuisky clan. During False Dmitry’s invasion of Russia, however, Tsar Boris turned to Vasily Shuisky for help. In January 1605 Shuisky took command of the tsar’s army fighting against False Dmitry and defeated Dmitry’s forces at the battle of Dobrynichi. Shuisky then waged a terror campaign against the population of southwestern Russia that had sided with False Dmitry. In the meantime, the rebellion in the name of the true tsar spread like wildfire. After Tsar Boris’s death in April 1605, Shuisky was recalled to Moscow by Tsar Fyodor II, and he did not participate in the rebellions that overthrew the Godunov dynasty. At the outset of Tsar Dmitry’s reign, Shuisky was convicted of treason but was only briefly exiled. Back in Moscow, he secretly plotted to overthrow Tsar Dmitry, claiming that Dmitry was an impostor named Grigory Otrepev. During the celebration of Tsar Dmitry’s wedding to the Polish Princess Marina Mniszech in May 1606, Shuisky created a diversion while his henchmen killed the tsar. Shuisky managed to seize power, but many Russians were unwilling to accept the usurper Tsar Vasily IV. His enemies circulated rumors that Tsar Dmitry had survived the assassination attempt and would soon return to punish the traitors. Within a few weeks, Tsar Vasily was confronted by a powerful civil war that spread from southwestern Russia to over half the country. In the fall of 1606, rebel forces under Ivan Bolotnikov besieged Moscow and nearly toppled Shuisky. Tsar Vasily’s armies drove the rebels back and eventually defeated Bolotnikov in late 1607, but by then another rebel army supporting the second false Dmitry challenged Shuisky’s weak grip on the country. For many months Russia had two tsars and two capitals, and chaos reigned throughout the land. In desperation, Tsar Vasily eventually turned to Sweden for support. In 1609 King Karl IX sent military forces into Russia to aid Shuisky and seize territory. That prompted Polish military intervention, and in June 1610 Tsar Vasily’s army was crushed by Polish forces at the battle of Klushino. In Moscow a rebellion of aristocrats (including the Romanovs) toppled Tsar Vasily, forcing him to become a monk. Soon Moscow opened its gates to the Polish army, and Shuisky was shipped off to Poland, where he was imprisoned and died in September 1612.

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See also:

BOLOTNIKOV, IVAN ISAYEVICH; DMITRY, FALSE;

FILARET ROMANOV, PATRIARCH; MNISZECH, MARINA; TIME OF TROUBLES

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bussow, Conrad. (1994). The Disturbed State of the Russian Realm, tr. G. Edward Orchard. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s. Dunning, Chester. (2001). Russia’s First Civil War: The Time of Troubles and the Founding of the Romanov Dynasty. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. Massa, Issac. (1982). A Short History of the Beginnings and Origins of These Present Wars in Moscow, tr. G. Edward Orchard. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Skrynnikov, Ruslan. (1988). The Time of Troubles: Russia in Crisis, 1604–1618, tr. Hugh Graham. Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press. CHESTER S. L. DUNNING

SHUMEIKO, VLADIMIR FILIPPOVICH (b. 1945), Russian legislator. Vladimir Shumeiko graduated from Rostov Polytechnical Institute with an engineering degree in 1972. He made his early career as an engineer in Krasnodar. After working at the Krasnodar Electrical Measurement Instruments Factory (1963–1970), he moved to the All-Union Research Electrical Measurement Instruments Institute (1970–1985), then returned to Krasnodar as head of the electrical instruments production association. Shumeiko’s political career began in 1990, when he was elected to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies. He followed that victory with a seat in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. Also in 1990, he was named deputy chair of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Economic and Property Reform. As “shock therapy” reforms unfolded, Boris Yeltsin brought several industrial directors into his government. Shumeiko, president of the Confederation of Associations of Entrepreneurs, was appointed first deputy prime minister in June 1992; in December the new prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin reappointed him as first deputy chair. In the fall of 1993, the Supreme Soviet began investigating several members of Yeltsin’s cabinet for corruption, including Shumeiko. He briefly resigned from the government on September 1 and

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joined Yeltsin in plotting what to do with the recalcitrant legislature. Shumeiko returned to the government on September 22, after Yeltsin’s order to dissolve parliament. The next month, Yeltsin named him Minister of Press and Information. Shumeiko switched to the newly created Federation Council, becoming chair of that house in January 1994, a post that also gave him a seat on the Russian Security Council. He formed his own political movement, Reforms—New Course, in December 1994. Shumeiko lost his seat in January 1996, when Yeltsin changed the basis of membership in the Federation Council. Since then, Shumeiko has unsuccessfully tried to return to a legislative office. As of 2003 he was chairman of the petroleum company Evikhon.

See also:

YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

ANN E. ROBERTSON

SIBERIA Often called the “Wild East,” beautiful but austere, Siberia is one of the least populated places on earth. Western Siberia is the world’s largest and flattest plain, across which tributaries of the Ob and Irtysh rivers wend their way north to the Arctic Ocean. This orientation means that in spring the mouths of the rivers are yet frozen while their upper reaches thaw, creating the world’s largest peat bog in the middle of the plain; thus, the lowland is arable only in the extreme south. Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East tend to be rugged and mountainous, with thin soils at best. Beneath this chiefly soil-less veneer lies some of the world’s oldest rock. Higher mountains and active volcanoes rise along the easternmost edge, where the Pacific Ocean plate subducts beneath Asia. Here also the majority of the rivers drain northward, perpendicular to the main eastwest axis of settlement. Only along the Pacific seaboard do the rivers flow east, the longest of which is the Amur, which, together with its tributaries, forms the boundary between China and Russia. On the border between Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East, the region boasts the world’s oldest and deepest lake, Baikal. Including some of the purest water on earth, Lake Baikal holds more than twenty percent of the globe’s freshwater resources. Human settlement resembles a mostly urban, beaded archipelago strung along the Trans-Siberian

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Railroad from the Urals cities of Chelyabinsk and Yekaterinburg to Vladivostok, 4,000 miles away in the east. In between, rest the large cities of Novosibirsk, Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk, and Khabarovsk. Novosibirsk, which means “New Siberia,” is largest of all with 1.5 million people. The densest settlement pattern conforms to Siberia’s least severe climates, which align themselves in parallel belts from harsh to harshest at right angles to a southwest-northeast trend line. Deep within the interior of Asia and surrounded by mostly frozen seas, Siberia experiences the most continental climates on the planet. One-time maxima of more than ninety degrees Fahrenheit (35 degrees Celsius) are possible in the relatively short Siberian summers except along the coasts, whereas one-time minima of minus-ninety degrees Fahrenheit (–68 degrees Celsius) have been recorded in the long winters of Sakha (Yakutia). This broad range of temperatures is not recorded anywhere else. Fortunately, the winter frost is typically dry and windless, affording some relief to the isolated towns and hamlets located in the sparsely populated northeast. Although western geographers accept the entire northeastern quadrant of Eurasia as the region known as Siberia, Russian geographers officially accept only Western and Eastern Siberia as such, excluding the Russian Far East, or Russia’s Pacific Rim. Including the Russian Far East, Siberia spans 5,207,900 square miles (13,488,400 square kilometers) and makes up more than three-fourths of the Russian land mass. By this definition, Siberia is a fourth bigger than Canada, the world’s second largest country. It extends from the Ural Mountains on the west to the Pacific Ocean on the east. North to south it spans an empty realm from the Arctic Ocean to the borders of Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and China. It is empty because, although it occupies 23 percent of Eurasia, it environs less than 1 percent of the continent’s population. Siberia is so massive that citizens of the U.S. state of Maine are closer to Moscow than are residents of Siberia’s Pacific Coast. The Russian word Sibir has at least six controversial origins, ranging from Hunnic to Mongolic to Russian. The Mongol definition is “marshy forest,” which certainly typifies much of the Siberian landscape. To many Westerners, the name evokes a popular misconception that people who live in Siberia are exiles or forced laborers. Although it is accurate

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Schoolchildren cross-country ski on the frozen Tura River near Tyumen. © DEAN CONGER/CORBIS

to suggest that the region became a place of exile as early as the 1600s and remained that way long after, most Siberians freely migrated there. The Great Siberian Migration, which occurred between 1885 and 1914, witnessed the voluntary movement of 4 million Slavic peasants into the southern tier of the area, facilitated by the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway (1891–1916). In fact, the tributary area of that railway became, and remains, the primary area of Siberian settlement. The rest of Siberia represents a vast underdeveloped backwater, containing fewer than one person per square mile.

harshest regions. After 1991, when the incentives were terminated, hundreds of thousands of residents departed for more hospitable and economically stable destinations.

Soviet dictator Josef Stalin successfully endeavored to force the development of the “backwater” by creating a vast system of labor camps, further tarnishing Siberia’s image. At least 1.5 million forced laborers and convicts occupied the region’s north and east between 1936 and 1953. Some of the camps remained in use until the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991). Between 1953 and 1991, extraordinary financial and material incentives lured the vast majority of migrants to the

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Although Siberia’s future is unpredictable, the region remains rich in resources. Most lie in austere, largely unexplored areas far from potential consumers. Thus, like their relatives of the past, modern Russians continue to refer to Siberia as the future or cupboard of the nation. Unfortunately, although teeming with natural wealth, the cupboard remains locked. CHINA, RELATIONS WITH; FAR EASTERN REGION;

NORTHERN PEOPLES; PACIFIC FLEET; TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bobrick, Benson. (1992). East of the Sun: The Epic Conquest and Tragic History of Siberia. New York: Poseidon. Bychkova-Jordan, Bella, and Jordan-Bychkov, Terry. (2001). Siberian Village: Land and Life in the Sakha Republic. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

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Hudgins, Sharon W. (2003). The Other Side of Russia: A Slice of Life in Siberia and the Russian Far East. College Station: Texas A&M University Press. Lincoln, W. Bruce. (1994). The Conquest of a Continent: Siberia and the Russians. New York: Random House. Marx, Steven G. (1991). Road to Power. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.. Mote, Victor L. (1998). Siberia Worlds Apart. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Thubron, Colin. (1999). In Siberia. New York: Harper Collins. Treadgold, Donald W. (1957). The Great Siberian Migration. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Tupper, Harmon. (1965). To the Great Ocean. Boston, MA: Little, Brown. VICTOR L. MOTE

He settled in the United States in 1919, eventually founding the Sikorsky Aero Engineering Corporation, the forerunner of the Sikorsky Division of United Technologies. In the early twenty-first century the corporation manufactures helicopters for sale around the world. Continually designing aircraft, Sikorsky received many other patents, including patents for helicopter control and stability systems. He grasped the humanitarian advantages of helicopters over airplanes. “If a man is in need of rescue,” he said, “an airplane can come in and throw flowers on him, and that’s just about all . . . but a direct-lift aircraft could come in and save his life.” In the 1930s, Sikorsky designed and manufactured a series of large passenger-carrying flying boats that pioneered the transoceanic commercial air routes in the Caribbean and Pacific.

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SIGNPOSTS See

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Cochrane, Dorothy. (1989). The Aviation Careers of Igor Sikorsky. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Hunt, William E. (1998). ’Heelicopter’: Pioneering with Igor Sikorsky: Based on a Personal Account. Shrewsbury, UK: Airlife Pub.

SIKORSKY, IGOR IVANOVICH (1889–1972), scientist, engineer, pilot, and entrepreneur. Igor Sikorsky designed the world’s first fourengined airplane in 1913 (precursor to the most successful bomber of World War I) and the world’s first true production helicopter. His single-rotor design, a major breakthrough in helicopter technology, remains the dominant configuration in the early twenty-first century. The winged-S emblem still signifies the world’s most advanced rotorcraft. Born in Kiev, Russia, Sikorsky was the youngest of five children. His father, a medical doctor and psychologist, inspired him to explore and learn. He developed a keen interest in mechanics and astronomy. While still a schoolboy he built several model aircraft and helicopters, as well as bombs. After completing formal education in Russia and France, Sikorsky attracted international recognition in 1913 at the age of twenty-four when he designed and flew the first multimotor airplane. In 1918, Sikorsky decided to flee his native country: “What were called the ideals and principles of the Marxist revolution were not acceptable to me.” He left Petrograd (St. Petersburg) by rail for Murmansk and from there boarded a steamer for England. Having lost all his savings, he arrived in England with only a few hundred English pounds.

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Sikorsky, Igor Ivan. (1941). The Story of the Winged-S: With New Material on the Latest Development of the Helicopter; an Autobiography by Igor I. Sikorsky; with Many Illustrations from the Author’s Collection of Photographs. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co. Spenser, Jay P. (1998). Whirlybirds: A History of the U.S. Helicopter Pioneers. Seattle: University of Washington Press. JOHANNA GRANVILLE

SILVER AGE From the late nineteenth century until World War I, the Russian visual, literary, and performing arts achieved such creative brilliance that observers— not least the critic and poet Sergei Makovsky (1878– 1962)—described the period as a “Silver Age.” Many individuals, institutions, and ideas contributed to this renaissance: Sergei Diaghilev (1872–1929) and the St. Petersburg World of Art; painters Lev Bakst (1866–1924), Viktor Borisov-Musatov (1870–1905), and Mikhail Vrubel (1856–1910); writers Konstantin Balmont (1867–1942), Andrei Bely (pseudonym of Boris Bugayev, 1880–1934), Alexander Blok (1880–1921), Valery Bryusov (1873–1924),

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and Vyacheslav Ivanov (1866–1949); the Ballets Russes; the new theaters with their repertoires of Ibsen and Maeterlinck; and the architecture of the style moderne—all shared the eschatological mood of the fin de siècle heightened by the disasters of the RussoJapanese War and the 1905 Revolution. There was a climactic and ominous sense in the culture of the Russian Silver Age, for its poetry spoke of femmes fatales and fleshly indulgence, and its painting depicted twilights and satanic beasts. Perhaps even more than the Western European Symbolists, the Russian poets, painters, and philosophers made every effort to escape the present by looking back to an Arcadian landscape of pristine myth and fable or by looking forwards to a utopian synthesis of art, religion, and organic life. For Russia’s children of the fin de siècle, Symbolism became much more than a mere esthetic tendency; rather, it represented an entire worldview and a way of life that informed the intense visions of Bely, Blok, and Vrubel; the religious explorations of the priest, mathematician, and art historian Pavel Florensky (1882–1937); the decorative flourishes of Bakst and Alexandre Benois (1870–1960); and even the abstract systems of Vasily Kandinsky (1866–1944) and Kazimir Malevich (1878–1935). Bely’s novel Petersburg, Blok’s poem “The Stranger,” Vrubel’s images of torment and distress, and the galvanizing music of Alexander Skryabin (1872–1915) all express the nervous tension and febrile energy of the Russian Silver Age. Its most original artist was Vrubel, whose fertile imagination produced disconcerting pictures such as Demon Downcast (1902, Tretiakov Gallery, Moscow; hereafter “TG”). While the definitions “Art Nouveau” and “Neo-Nationalism” come to mind in the context of his work, Vrubel approached the act of painting as a constant process of experimentation, returning to his major canvases again and again, erasing, repainting, altering. His releasing of the energy of the ornament and his intense elaboration of the surface even prompted future critics to consider his painting in the context of Cubism, for his broken brushwork strangely anticipated the visual dislocation of the late 1900s.

this interdisciplinarity, the principal artistic and intellectual society with which many of them were associated was called the “World of Art.” Hostile toward both the Academy and nineteenth century Realism, the World of Art owed its singular vision, practical organization, and public effect to Diaghilev, who in 1898 launched the famous magazine of the same name (Mir iskusstva, 1898–1904), sponsored a cycle of important national and international exhibitions, and propagated Russian art and music successfully in the West. The World of Art artists and writers never issued a written manifesto, but their attention to artistic craft, cult of retrospective beauty, and assumed distance from the ills of sociopolitical reality indicated a firm belief in “art for art’s sake” and a sense of measured grace, which they identified with the haunting beauty of St. Petersburg. The fame of several World of Art painters, particularly Bakst and Benois, rests primarily on their set and costume designs for Diaghilev’s Ballets Russes (1909–1929), which, with its emphasis on artistic synthesis, evocation of archaic or exotic cultures, and invention of a new choreographic, musical, and visual communication, can be regarded as an extension of the Symbolist platform. The ease with which the World of Art transferred pictorial ideas from studio to stage (for instance, productions such as Cléopatre of 1909, designed by Bakst, Petrouchka of 1911, designed by Benois, and Le Sacre du Printemps of 1913, designed by Nicholas Roerich [1874–1947]) was indicative of a general tendency toward “theatralization” evident in the culture of the Silver Age. Here was an exaggerated sensibility, but also a conviction that artistic movement was the common denominator of all “great” works of art. This could take the form of physical movement, such as dance, rhythm, and gesture, or of abstract equivalents, such as poetical meter and music, which, for all the Symbolists, was the highest form of expression, the most intense and yet the most minimal material.

Even so, a characteristic of the Russian Symbolists was more recreative than experimental in nature, characterized by the aspiration to restore an esthetic unity to the disciplines through the rediscovery of a common philosophical and formal denominator. To this end, they often explored more than one medium simultaneously. In keeping with

A bastion of the Symbolist cause, the World of Art encompassed a multiplicity of artistic phenomena: the consumptive imagery of Aubrey Beardsley and the stylizations of the early Kandinsky; the Art Nouveau designs of Charles Rennie Mackintosh and Elena Polenova (1850–98); and the Decadent verse of Zinaida Gippius (1869–1945) and Dmitry Merezhkovsky (1866–1941). The World of Art fulfilled the practical function of propagating Russian art at home and abroad and of granting the Russian public access to the work of modern

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Improvisation V. by Vasily Kandinsky. The abstract works by Kandinsky can be traced to the symbolism of the Silver Age. © GEOFFREY CLEMENTS/CORBIS

Western artists through exhibitions and publications. The Russian Silver Age was not confined by strict geographical or social boundaries, for it also flowered—and perhaps more luxuriously—in Moscow and the provinces. Even Saratov, a small town to the south of Moscow, became a major center of Symbolist enquiry, thanks to the activities of the painter Borisov-Musatov, who, together

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with Vrubel, exerted a profound and permanent influence on the evolution of Russian Modernism. Impressed by Puvis de Chavannes and the Nabis during his residence in Paris, Borisov-Musatov incorporated their monumentalism and subdued palette into his elusive depictions of such wraithlike women as in Gobelin (1901, TG) and Reservoir (1902, TG). Evoking a gentler and more tranquil age, Borisov-Musatov shared the Symbolists’ desire to escape from their troubled time, and one of

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his central motifs, the “Eternal Feminine,” aligned him with poets such as Bely and Blok. Borisov-Musatov also established a short-lived but crucial school of painters, for he was the direct instigator of the “Blue Rose,” a movement which can be considered the real beginning of the avantgarde in Russian art. Apologists of Bely’s esthetics and Blok’s poetry, the Blue Rose artists, especially their leader, Pavel Kuznetsov (1878–1968), used a particular repertoire of symbols (blue-green foliage, fountains, and vestal maidens) in order to evoke the global orchestra that they heeded beyond the world of appearances. Concerned with the oblique and the intangible, they dematerialized nature and thereby heralded the radical concept of the picture as a self-sufficient, abstract unit. The Symbolist journals, Vesy (Scales,1904–1909 [last issues appeared only in 1910]), Iskusstvo (Art, 1905) and Zolotoe runo (Golden Fleece, 1906–1909 [last issues appeared only in 1910]), did much to promote their ideas and imagery. Reference to the Symbolist heritage helps to explain a number of subsequent developments in Russian art, especially the abstract investigations of Kandinsky and Malevich, for in many respects they expanded ideas supported by the Russian intelligentsia of the Silver Age. As Kandinsky explained in his major tract On the Spiritual in Art, the intuitive and the occult, not science, were the path to true illumination. Like the Symbolists, Kandinsky also felt that music could undermine the cult of objects and that the inner sound could be apprehended at moments of supersensitory or deviant perception. Similarly, Kandinsky was fascinated with the synthetic aspect of the esthetic experience and aspired to reintegrate the individual arts into a Gesamtkunstwerk. Reasons for this approach differed from person to person, although Benois, Diaghilev, and V. Ivanov agreed that Wagner was to be admired for the way in which he had combined narrative, musical, and visual forces in the operatic drama so as to produce an expressive whole. For Kandinsky, Wagner was a source of visual inspiration and, similarly, Skryabin’s efforts to draw distinct parallels between the seven colors of the spectrum and the seven notes of the diatonic scale prompted him to investigate the possibility of a total art.

tablishing a fragile alliance with a new generation of Moscow artists such as Natalia Goncharova (1881–1962) and Mikhail Larionov (1881–1964). Praising the color and simplicity of Gauguin and Matisse, on the one hand, and the vitality of indigenous art forms, on the other, the “new barbarians” rejected Symbolist mystery in favor of the concrete and the material. Their first major exhibition, “The Jack of Diamonds” of 1910–1911, signaled the tarnishing of the Silver Age, for it showed the vulgar and the ugly, promoting graffiti, children’s drawings, and store signboards as genuine works of art instead of the impalpable visions of the astral plane and religious ecstasy. The destiny of the Russian Silver Age was both full and empty. On the one hand, the Symbolists left a positive construction, because some of their ideas and artifacts prefigured the linguistic and visual experiments of the avant-garde in the 1910s and 1920s, including the geometric reductions of Malevich known as Suprematism. Even the notion of a single and cohesive style joining architecture and the applied arts, promoted by the Constructivists in the wake of the October Revolution, can be viewed as outgrowths of the Symbolists’ concern with the total, organic work of art. On the other hand, if the Russian Symbolist poets and painters glimpsed beyond the veil, they rarely completed the voyage to the other shore. As they journeyed, they erred in bold transgressions and called for synthesis and synaesthesia as they sought a spiritual equilibrium for their uneasy era. Ultimately, if their fine antennae did pick up the celestial signals, the sound was so powerful that it caused a “dérèglement de tous les sens”—and not just metaphorically, but in the literal meaning of that phrase.

See also:

DIAGILEV, SERGEI PAVLOVICH; FUTURISM;

GOLDEN AGE OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE; KANDINSKY, VASILY VASILIEVICH BIBLIOGRAPHY

Even as he was writing On the Spiritual in Art, Kandinsky also pointed the way toward new esthetic criteria, for he emphasized the value of the primitive, the ethnographic, and the popular, es-

Bowlt, John E. (1982). The Silver Age: Russian Art of the Early Twentieth Century and the “World of Art” Group. Newtonville, MA: Oriental Research Partners. Brumfield, William C. (1991). The Origins of Modernism in Russian Architecture. Berkeley: University of California Press . Elliott, David, ed. The Twilight of the Tsars: Russian Art at the Turn of the Century. Catalog of exhibition at the Hayward Gallery, London, March 7–May 19, 1991. Engelstein, Laura. (1992). The Keys to Happiness. Sex and the Search for Modernity in Fin-de-siècle Russia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

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Kandinsky, Vasily. (1946). On the Spiritual in Art. New York: Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation.

located to his sons as hereditary appanages. On April 26, 1353, Simeon died from the plague.

Proffer, Carl and Proffer, Ellendea, eds. (1975). The Silver Age of Russian Culture: An Anthology. Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis.

See also: APPANAGE ERA; GRAND PRINCE; MOSCOW; MUSCOVY

Pyman, Avril. (1994). A History of Russian Symbolism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Richardson, William. (1986). “Zolotoe runo” and Russian Modernism. Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis .

Fennell, John L. I. (1968). The Emergence of Moscow, 1304–1359. London: Secker and Warburg.

Rosenfeld, Alla, ed. (1999). Defining Russian Graphic Arts 1898–1934: From Diaghilev to Stalin. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Martin, Janet. (1995). Medieval Russia, 980–1584. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. MARTIN DIMNIK

Salmond, Wendy, ed. The New Style: Russian Perceptions of Art Nouveau. Special issue of the journal Experiment 7 (2001). JOHN E. BOWLT

SIMONOV, KONSTANTIN MIKHAILOVICH (1915–1979), Russian writer and Writers’ Union official who specialized in describing the Great Patriotic War.

SIMEON (1316–1353), prince of Moscow and grand prince of Vladimir. Like his father Ivan I Danilovich “Moneybag,” Simeon Ivanovich (“the Proud”) collaborated with the Tatar overlords and secured a preferential status. After Ivan I died in 1340, Simeon and rival claimants visited the Golden Horde in Saray to solicit the patent for the grand princely throne. Khan Uzbek gave it to Simeon, who became the khan’s obedient vassal and was thus able to wield at least limited jurisdiction over rival princes. He also obtained the khan’s backing for his campaigns against Grand Prince Olgerd of Lithuania who, in the 1340s, increased his incursions into western Russia. Simeon waged war on Novgorod and forced it to recognize him as its prince and to pay Tatar tribute to him. With the help of Metropolitan Feognost he asserted greater control over the town than his father had done. During Simeon’s reign the principality of Suzdal–Nizhny Novgorod replaced Tver in the rivalry for supremacy with Moscow. Although the Tatars helped Simeon fight foreign enemies, after 1342 Khan Jani-Beg refused to help him become stronger than his rivals in northeast Russia. Specifically, he prevented Simeon from increasing the size of his domain and his power as grand prince. Simeon’s agreement with his brothers in the late 1340s alludes, for the first time, to the appanage system of Moscow. The document describes the relationship between the grand prince and his brothers and recognizes the domains that Ivan I al-

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Konstantin Mikhailovich Simonov was born in Petrograd, the son of a military schoolteacher. He entered a factory school and began working in various factories while he began writing poetry. He published his first poems in 1934 and enrolled in the Gorky Literary Institute. After graduation in 1938, he worked as a journalist and served as a correspondent for Red Star (Krasnaya zvezda) during the war. During the war, he began to write plays and fiction about his experiences and became quite popular during the 1940s and 1950s. The novel Days and Nights described the battle of Stalingrad in a realistic, natural manner. His other work was noted for its adherence to dictates of Socialist Realism. He won numerous awards, including six Stalin prizes, a Lenin prize, and the Hero of Socialist Labor medal. Simonov served in many editorial and administrative positions during his career. He was editor-inchief of Literaturnaia Gazeta (1950–1953), a secretary of the Union of Soviet Writers (1946–1950, 1967–1969), a member of Central Committee of Communist Party (1952–1956), and a deputy to the Supreme Soviet. Most interestingly, he was editor-in-chief of Novyi mir from 1954–1958, where he presided over the publication of Vladimir Dudintsev’s Not by Bread Alone (Ne khlebom edinim). Under attack, he soon retreated from this liberal position and thereafter remained within the official bounds of propriety. In his posthumous memoirs, Through the Eyes of a Man from My Generation (Glazami cheloveka moego pokoleniia), Simonov provides great insight

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into the world of Soviet literary politics under Stalin and after. His life and work demonstrate the compromises some writers chose as they negotiated the contours of official Soviet culture.

tices, it typified many other Russian monasteries. Of the many famous people buried there, one of the better known is the nineteenth-century writer Ivan Aksakov.

See also:

See also:

JOURNALISM; NOVY MIR; WORLD WAR II

CAVES MONASTERY; KIRILL-BELOOZERO MO-

NASTERY; MONASTICISM; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; SERGIUS, ST.; TRINITY ST. SERGIUS MONASTERY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Simonov, Konstantin. (1945) Days and Nights, tr. J. Barnes. New York: Simon and Schuster.

NICKOLAS LUPININ

Simonov, Konstantin. (1989). Always a Journalist. Moscow: Progress Press. KARL E. LOEWENSTEIN

SIMONOV MONASTERY The Simonov Monastery in Moscow was founded in 1370 by Fyodor, a disciple of Russia’s greatest and most influential medieval saint, Sergius. Over the centuries, the Simonov was to become one of the richest monasteries in Russia. Early twentieth century official church records place the Simonov in the top 10 percent based on wealth. The monastery had six major churches on its grounds. Among them were churches dedicated to The Tikhvin Icon of the Mother of God, to the Dormition of the Virgin, and to St. Nicholas the Miracle Worker. Many churches had attached side chapels (or side altars) as well. The Tikhvin Icon church had, for example, side chapels dedicated to Basil the Blessed, a famous holy fool; to the martyrs Valentina and Paraskeva; to St. Sergius; to Athanasius of Alexandria and the martyr Glykeria; and to saints Xenophont and Maria. This indicated a complex and intricate pattern of church structure, one that pertained to the larger, better endowed monasteries.

SINODIK The sinodik pravoslaviya corresponds to the synodicon adopted at the council of the Greek Orthodox Church in 843 that condemned the iconoclasts. By the twelfth century, the term also came to mean “memorial book.” The sinodik pravoslaviya contains the decisions of the seven ecumenical councils, the names of those under anathema, and a list of important persons who deserve “many years of life,” that is, to be remembered eternally. The text was read only once per year in the Orthodox rite, on the first Sunday of Lent. In addition to the Greek version, there are also more recent Georgian, Serbian, and Bulgarian versions. The Russian Primary Chronicle mentions a sinodik under the year 1108, but the Greek form was probably not replaced by a Russian translation until 1274. Starting around the end of the fourteenth century, the names of fallen warriors were also entered in the sinodik pravoslaviya. In 1763, the metropolitan of Rostov, Arseny Matseyvich, read aloud the anathema in the sinodik pravoslaviya on those who touch church property as a protest against Catherine II’s planned secularization of church landholdings.

During the War of 1812 the Simonov was looted by the Napoleonic armies when they entered a burning Moscow. However, it quickly regained its material well-being. Much of its income was derived from visitors, pilgrims, and donations. Land holdings outside Moscow generated income from the production and milling of grain. In these prac-

The word sinodik took on a second meaning in twelfth-century Novgorod and later in Muscovite Russia. In this second sense it refers to a memorial book, corresponding to the Greek Orthodox diptych, containing the names of dead persons who are to be commemorated in the daily liturgical cycle. Around the end of the fifteenth century, when the number of donors began to grow rapidly, Muscovite monasteries developed a system not found in other Orthodox countries: Donors’ names were entered in books organized around the size of the donation. So-called eternal sinodiki listed the names of donors who had given relatively modest gifts and were read throughout the day. “Daily lists”

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Two of the Simonov Monastery’s leading figures became patriarchs of the Russian Church. Job, who was appointed abbot of Simonov in 1571, was the first patriarch in Russia (1589). In 1642, Joseph, the archimandrite of the Simonov Monastery, was elected to the patriarchy.

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(the names vary) commemorated the donors of more substantial gifts and were read only at certain fixed points in the liturgical cycle. This segmented system flourished until the beginning of the seventeenth century. Beginning in the late fifteenth century, and quite often in the seventeenth, sinodiki included “introductions” that detailed the importance and value of care for the deceased. Many Russian monasteries and churches still maintain sinodiki.

See also:

DONATION BOOKS; ORTHODOXY; PRIMARY

CHRONICLE; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

LUDWIG STEINDORFF

T R I A L

officer Slade, who brought news of the defeat to Constantinople. Ottoman losses totaled 15 ships and 3,000 men with the Russians taking 200 prisoners; on the Russian side, 37 were killed and 235 wounded. Osman Pasha, wounded in the engagement, was taken prisoner.

See also: MENSHIKOV, ALEXANDER DANILOVICH; MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; NAKHIMOV, PAVEL STEPANOVICH; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS; TURKEY, RELATIONS WITH BIBLIOGRAPHY

Daly, Robert Welter. (1958). “Russia’s Maritime Past,” In The Soviet Navy, ed. Malcolm George Saunders. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. JOHN C. K. DALY

SINO-SOVIET SPLIT See

SINOPE, BATTLE OF The battle of Sinope, fought on November 30, 1853, was the last major naval action between sailing ship fleets. The battle resulted from worsening relations between the Ottoman and Russian empires. For naval historians, the battle is notable for the first broad use of shell guns, marking the end of the use of smooth bore cannon that had previously been the primary naval weapon for nearly three centuries. In the spring of 1853 Tsar Nicholas’s emissary Admiral Alexander Menshikov broke off negotiations with the Ottoman Empire. Menshikov opposed plans for a preemptive strike against the Bosporus, and the Russian Black Sea Fleet subsequently prepared for a defensive war within the Black Sea. The Ottoman government ordered a squadron of Vice Admiral Osman Pasha to the Caucasus coast in early November 1853 in support of Ottoman ground forces, but bad weather forced the ships to seek shelter at Sinope. A Russian squadron under Vice Admiral Pavel Stepanovich Nakhimov on his flagship Imperatritsa Maria-60 decided to attack. Following a war council, Nakhimov ordered his officers in an evocation of Nelson at Trafalgar: “I grant you the authority to act according to your own best judgment, but I enjoin each to do his duty.” With six ships of the line and two frigates with 720 guns, Nakhimov attacked an Ottoman squadron of seven frigates, three corvettes, two steamers, two brigs, and two transports mounting 510 guns under shore defenses with 38 pieces of artillery. The shell guns proved lethal in Nakhimov’s two-columned assault; the only Ottoman vessel that managed to escape the carnage was the steam frigate Taif-20 carrying the British

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SINYAVSKY-DANIEL TRIAL In September 1965, Soviet authorities arrested a well-known literary critic, Andrei Sinyavsky, and a relatively obscure translator, Yuly Daniel, and charged them with slandering the Soviet system in works published abroad pseudonymously. The works in question were often satirical but in no sense anti-Soviet; in his essay On Socialist Realism, for example, Sinyavsky (or “Abram Tertz”) advocated nothing more radical than a return to the adventurous style of Vladimir Mayakovsky. Nonetheless, following a January 1966 press campaign of vicious denunciations, the pair was convicted at a show trial in February. Sinyavsky received seven years, and Daniel five, in a strict-regime labor camp. Conservative elements in the Leonid Brezhnev– Alexei Kosygin regime, determined to crack down on the intellectual experimentation of the Nikita Khrushchev years, presumably intended the affair as the signal of a stricter cultural line and as a warning to intellectuals to keep quiet. But the signal was ambiguous—the conservatives were not yet firmly in control—and the warning ineffectual. Sinyavsky and Daniel refused to play their assigned roles, pleading not guilty and defending themselves in court vigorously. A public Moscow protest against the arrests in December 1965 was followed by a petition campaign, an increase in open protest and samizdat, and, ultimately, the appearance of the Chronicle of Current Events in April 1968. In fact, the Sinyavsky-Daniel case is widely viewed as a

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spark that galvanized the dissident movement by raising the specter of a return to Stalinism and by convincing many intellectuals that it was futile to work within the system.

See also: DISSIDENT MOVEMENT; MAYAKOVSKY, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH; SHOW TRIALS; THAW, THE

others) and as a narrative device present in most world literatures. Since the beginning of the 1980s and the rediscovery of Bakhtin’s work, his concept of skaz has served as a starting point for further debate: for instance, over whether the relationship between author and narrator is mutual and interactive.

See also:

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hayward, Max, ed. and tr. (1967). On Trial: The Soviet State versus “Abram Tertz” and “Nikolai Arzhak,” revised and enlarged edition. New York and Evanston, IL: Harper & Row. JONATHAN D. WALLACE

SIXTH PARTY CONGRESS See

OCTOBER REVOLU-

TION.

BYLINA; LESKOV, NIKOLAI SEMENOVICH; BAKH-

TIN, MIKHAIL MIKHAILOVICH; GOGOL, NIKOLAI VASILIEVICH BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hodgson, Peter. (1983). “More on the Matter of Skaz: The Formalist Model.” In From Los Angeles to Kiev: Papers on the Occasion of the Ninth International Congress of Slavists, Kiev, September, 1983, ed. Vladimir Markov and Dean S. Worth. Columbus, OH: Slavica Publishers. Terras, Victor, ed. (1985). Handbook of Russian Literature. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

SKAZ A literary term originally defined as “orientation toward oral speech” in prose fiction, can also indicate a type of oral folk narrative. Boris Eikhenbaum first described skaz, derived from the verb skazat (“to tell”), in a pair of 1918 articles as a kind of “oral” narration that included unmediated or improvisational aspects. Formalists and other critics developed this analytical tool during the 1920s, including Yuri Tynianov (1921), Viktor Vinogradov (1926), and Mikhail Bakhtin (1929). Tynianov analyzed the effect of skaz, arguing that it enabled the reader to enter the text, but did not really clarify the mechanism through which it worked. Vinogradov and Bakhtin helped refine the concept of skaz as a stylistic device. Vinogradov developed the idea that skaz comprised a series of signals that aroused in the reader a sense of speech produced by utterance, not writing. Bakhtin placed skaz within his own larger theory of narration, defining it as one kind of “double-voiced utterance” (the others being stylization and parody) in which two distinct voices—the author’s speech and another’s speech—were oriented toward one another within the same level of conceptual authority. The effect of oral speech is, therefore, not the primary characteristic of skaz for Bakhtin.

Titunik, I. R. (1977). “The Problem of Skaz (Critique and Theory).” In Papers in Slavic Philology, ed. Benjamin A. Stolz. Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Publications. ELIZABETH JONES HEMENWAY

SKOBELEV, MIKHAIL DMITRIYEVICH (1843–1882), famous officer in the Russian imperial army active in the conquest of Turkestan and in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1888. Born to a Russian noble family, Mikhail Skobelev became a member of the officer corps of the Russian army. In 1869, having received an education in military schools, he joined Russian forces completing the conquest of Central Asia.

Since the 1920s skaz has been identified both as a distinctive characteristic of Russian literature (in the work of Gogol, Zamiatin, Zoshchenko, and

He first distinguished himself in military operations in the Fergana Valley (now in Uzbekistan), where in 1875 anti-Russian rebel forces had overthrown the khan of Kokand (allied with Russia). He quickly formulated his own strategy of colonial war, summed up in the guidelines “slaughter the enemy until resistance ends,” then “cease slaughter and be kind and humane to the defeated enemy.” He destroyed several rebel towns during his campaign, leaving thousands of dead among the rebels and the civilian population. When leaders of the revolt surrendered, he recommended to the tsar that they be pardoned. As a reward for his military triumph, he was promoted to the rank of major general and, at the age of thirty, became the military ruler of the Fergana Valley.

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When the Russian Empire declared war on the Ottoman Empire in 1877, Skobelev joined the Russian armies moving against the Turks. His bravery and military skill earned him the command of one of the Russian armies in the campaign. He led his troops in the capture of the key Ottoman-fortified city along the western Black Sea coast protecting Constantinople. His desire for rapid victory resulted in heavy losses among his troops, but his exploits preserved his image in Russia as the triumphant “White General.” Skobelev’s final military triumph came in another war in Central Asia. Faced with the revolt of nomadic Turkmen tribes, the tsarist government sent him in 1880 to force the nomads to submit to imperial rule. He was successful, applying once again his brutal strategy of colonial warfare. In early 1881 his troops stormed the major Turkmen fortress of Geok-Tepe (now in Turkmenistan), slaughtering half of the defenders as well as many civilians. His reputation among Russian imperialists was at its peak. However, the new tsar, Alexander III, was suspicious of his desire for fame and his political ambitions. Following Skobelev’s triumph in Turkestan, the government sent him to a remote military post in western Russia. There he began a public campaign to restore his reputation, but died shortly afterward of a heart attack.

See also: CENTRAL ASIA; MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; RUSSOTURKISH WARS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Meyer, Karl, and Brysac, Shareen. (1999). Tournament of Shadows: The Race for Empire and the Great Game in Central Asia. New York: Counterpoint Press. Rich, David. (1998). The Tsar’s Colonels: Professionalism, Strategy, and Subversion in Late Imperial Russia. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. DANIEL BROWER

SKRYPNYK, MYKOLA OLEKSYOVYCH

M Y K O L A

O L E K S Y O V Y C H

life of a professional revolutionary, organizing the Bolshevik underground in Saratov, Odessa, Kiev, and Moscow. During this period, Skrypnyk was arrested fifteen times and repeatedly exiled to Siberia, and spent more than a year in voluntary exile in Switzerland. During the October Revolution he was a prominent member of the Military Revolutionary Committee in Petrograd. In 1918, on the suggestion of Vladimir Lenin, Skrypnyk moved to Ukraine to counterbalance the Russian chauvinism of the local Bolshevik leadership. He served there as people’s commissar of labor and later as head of the People’s Secretariat, the first Soviet government in Ukraine, and in April 1918 he was instrumental in the creation of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine. After the Bolsheviks were forced to withdraw from Ukraine by the terms of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, Skrypnyk joined the Cheka, but he returned to Ukraine when the Civil War ended. As people’s commissar of justice of the Ukrainian Republic (1922–1927), Skrypnyk helped to build a Soviet Ukrainian state and ensure its rights within the Soviet Union. Starting in 1923, when the Kremlin introduced the policy of nativization, he actively promoted the implementation of its Ukrainian incarnation or ukrainization. During his tenure as people’s commissar of education (1927–1933), he was active in ukrainizing the republic’s press, publishing, education, and culture. Although Skrypnyk remained an orthodox Bolshevik and an enemy of Ukrainian nationalism, he stood out as the Ukrainian leader who was most vocal in his opposition to Moscow’s centralism and great-power chauvinism. He also distinguished himself by engineering the standardization of Ukrainian orthography— the socalled Skrypnykivka system (1927)—and founding the Ukrainian Institute of Marxism-Leninism (1928). In 1933, when Josef Stalin condemned his ukrainization policies as nationalistic, Skrypnyk committed suicide. He was rehabilitated in the mid-1950s, and in post-Soviet Ukraine he is respected as a defender of Ukrainian culture and sovereignty.

See also:

BOLSHEVISM; NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET

UNION; UKRAINE AND UKRAINIANS

(1872–1933), Ukrainian Bolshevik leader and advocate of ukrainization. Born in Ukraine, Mykola Skrypnyk joined the revolutionary movement in 1901 as a student at the St. Petersburg Technological Institute, from which he never graduated. Until 1917 he lived the

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Mace, James. (1983). Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918–1933. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute.

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Martin, Terry. (2001). The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. SERHY YEKELCHYK

SLAVERY Slavery in one form or another has been a central feature of East Slavic and Russian history from at least the very beginning almost to the present day. Its presence and its offshoots have lent a particular coloration to Russian civilization that can be found in few other places. One common social science definition of slavery is that the slave is an outsider; namely, that he or she is of a different race, religion, caste, or tribe than that of his or her owner. In cases where that was not true, slaveholders resorted to fiction, which made the slave (usually an infant abandoned by its parents) appear to be an outsider. Or a slave might be a lawbreaker who by his crime had placed himself outside of society: one who, in Orlando Patterson’s phrase, was “socially dead.” This could include debtors, who were regarded as thieves because they could not or would not repay borrowed money or goods, or criminals who could not pay fines. Russia included such outsiders as slaves, but (along with Korea) also enslaved its own people. This was unusual and made Russian slavery distinctive. Because of its atypical nature, some people have questioned whether Russian rabstvo and especially kholopstvo were in fact “really slavery.” However, a thoughtful examination indicates that all such individuals in fact were slaves. All varieties of slaves were treated equally under the law.

indentured laborer could be sold into slavery as recompense for crimes. As in all slave systems, the owner was responsible for a slave’s offenses, much as an owner is responsible for his dog. The heyday of medieval Russian slavery followed the collapse of political unity after 1132, and each of the dozen or so independent principalities waged civil war against each other as well as the steppe nomads and neighboring sedentary peoples to the west. As always—until probably the 1880s—Russia was a labor-short country, so those desiring extra hands often enslaved them. Much of twelfth-century farming was done by slaves living in barracks. The Mongol invasion and conquest made the situation worse. The Mongols enslaved skilled individuals and dispatched them to Karakorum, Sarai, and other corners of the earth. The dozen or so principalities of Rus in 1237 fragmented into fifty, perhaps even one hundred—each enslaving the labor of other principalities. Many of these slaves were shipped to Novgorod, whose famous slave market was at the busy intersection of Slave and High Streets, where professional readers and writers set up their business composing and reading for customers the famous birch-bark letters. Slaves from Novgorod were shipped into the Baltic, to England, to other Atlantic countries, and into the Islamic lands of the Mediterranean.

From the dawn of Russian history, as everywhere else on Earth at the time, slaves were typically products of warfare—East Slavic tribes fighting with each other or with neighboring Turkic, Iranian, Finnic, Hungarian, Lithuanian, Polish, Germanic, and other peoples. Such victims were true outsiders who could be either enslaved in Rus itself or taken abroad into the international slave trade. Slaves were mentioned in every Russian law code. As the earliest such code, the Russkaia pravda, grew in size from its earliest redaction compiled in about 1016 to its full size, the so-called Expanded Pravda a special section on slavery was added. It enumerated some of the avenues into slavery, such as sale of prior slaves, self-sale, becoming a steward, and marriage of a free person to a slave. An

While the unification of the East Slavic lands by Moscow put an end to the capture of other East Slavs into slavery, Russia was still short of labor, and the appetite for slaves did not decline. In Kievan Rus the Orthodox Church had provided charity, but this diminished with the rise of Moscow. In order for the impoverished to survive, the practice began to develop of those in need selling themselves into what was described as “full slavery.” This was a form of perpetual, lifelong slavery in which offspring were described as hereditary slaves. Most societies could not withstand the tension inherent in enslaving their own people, but this did not seem to bother the Russians. From the outset Russian society had consisted not only of East Slavs, but also the ruling Varangian/Viking element, conquered indigenous Iranians, Finns, and Balts, plus any Turkic, Mongol, or other people who wanted to live in Rus. There were no barriers to intermarriage among these peoples, and the sole distinction came to be (perhaps after 1350, or even the 1650s) those who allegedly were Orthodox Christians and those who were not. Thus the insider-outsider dichotomy was weakly developed, and this perhaps permitted Russians to enslave their own people.

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Russian Slave Life by Sergei Vladimirovich Ivanov. © SUPERSTOCK

In the sixteenth century full slavery came to be replaced by what is best translated as limited service contract slavery (kabalnoye kholopstvo), known elsewhere (in Parthia) as antichresis. It worked as follows: A person in need or who did not desire to control his own life found a person who would buy him. (Two-thirds of the cases involved primarily young males, the other third females.) They agreed on a price; the slave took the money from his buyer and agreed to work for him for a year in lieu of paying the interest on the money. If he did not repay the loan (or a third person—presumably another buyer—did not repay it for him), he defaulted and became a full slave. By the 1590s there were many such slaves. Serfdom was in full development, and the slave had the advantage that he had to pay no taxes, whereas the serf did. Slavery was becoming so popular that the powerful government unilaterally changed the terms of limited service contract slavery: The limitation was changed from the one year of the loan to the life of the person giving the loan. There was a dual expropriation here: The person taking the loan (i.e., selling himself) could no longer pay it off, and the person

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granting the loan (i.e., buying the slave) could not pass the slave to his heirs. This became the premier form of slavery until the demise of the institution in the 1720s. Two changes were introduced: in the 1620s a maximum price of two rubles, and in the 1630s an increase of the maximum to three rubles. This meant that some would-be slaves could find no buyer because their price was too high, whereas others were forced to sell themselves for less than their “market price” would have been without the price controls. Regardless, slavery introduced a form of dependency such that those who were manumitted almost always resold themselves upon the death of the owner, often to the deceased owner’s heirs. About 10 percent of the entire population were slaves. Russia was the sole country in the world with a central office (the Slavery Chancellery) in the capital controlling the institution of slavery. All slaves had to be registered. In the 1590s a reregistration of all slaves was required, in which about half of all slaves were limited service contract slaves and the others were of half a dozen other varieties. There were military captives, subject to return

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home upon the signing of a peace treaty with the enemy belligerent. There were debt slaves, who had defaulted on a loan which could be “worked off” at the rate of 5 rubles per year by an adult male, 2.50 rubles per year by an adult female, and 2 rubles per year by a child over ten. There were indentured slaves, who agreed to work for a term in exchange for cash, training, and often a promise that the owner would marry them off before the end of the term. Those who married slaves were themselves enslaved, as were those who worked for someone else for over three months. There were hereditary slaves, those born to slaves and their offspring. The very complex practices of the Slavery Chancellery were codified into chapter 20 (119 articles) of the Law Code of 1649. Slavery had a profound impact on the institution of serfdom which borrowed norms from slavery. Farming slaves were converted into taxpaying serfs in 1679. Household slaves (the vast majority of all slaves) were converted into house serfs by the poll tax in 1721. After 1721 serfdom increasingly took on the appearance of slavery until 1861.

See also:

BIRCHBARK CHARTERS; EMANCIPATION ACT; EN-

SERFMENT; FEUDALISM; GOLDEN HORDE; KIEVAN RUS; LABOR; LAW CODE OF 1649; MUSCOVY SERFDOM

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hellie, Richard. (1982). Slavery in Russia, 1450–1725. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Hellie, Richard, ed. and tr. (1988). The Muscovite Law Code (Ulozhenie) of 1649. Irvine, CA: Charles Schlacks. Patterson, Orlando. (1982). Slavery and Social Death. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. RICHARD HELLIE

SLAVO-GRECO-LATIN ACADEMY

lines of the curriculum and formal structure of contemporary Jesuit colleges. The Leichoudes divided the curriculum into two parts: The first part included grammar, poetics and rhetoric; the second comprised philosophy (including logic) and theology. The grammar classes were divided into three levels: elementary, middle, and higher. The middle and higher levels were themselves divided into sublevels. Instruction was in Greek and Latin, with an attached school that provided basic literacy in Church Slavonic. The Leichoudes authored their own textbooks, largely adapted from contemporary Jesuit manuals. As in Jesuit colleges, the method of instruction included direct exposure to ancient Greek and Latin literary and philosophical texts, as well as an abundance of practical exercises. Student work included memorization, competitive exercises, declamations, and disputations, as well as parsing and theme writing. On important feast days, students exhibited their skills and knowledge in orations before the Patriarch of Moscow or royal and aristocratic individuals. Students were both clergy and laymen, and came from various social and ethnic backgrounds, from some of Russia’s top princely scions and members of the Patriarch’s court, down to children of lowly servants in monasteries, and included Greeks and even a baptized Tatar. Several of these students made their careers in important diplomatic, administrative, and ecclesiastical positions during Peter I’s reign. In 1701 the Academy was reorganized by decree of Tsar Peter I and staffed with Ukrainian and Belorussian teachers educated at the Kiev Mohylan Academy. Until the end of Peter’s reign, the student body betrays a slight “plebeianization”: Fewer members of the top aristocratic families attended classes there. In addition, many more of the students were clergymen. The curriculum retained the same scholastic content, but the language of instruction now was exclusively Latin.

Titled in its first fifty years variously as “Greek School,” “Ancient and Modern Greek School,” “Greco-Slavic School,” “Slavo-Latin School,” and “Greco-Latin School,” the Slavo-Greco-Latin Academy was the first formal educational institution in Russian history. Established in 1685, the Academy became the breeding ground for many secular and ecclesiastical collaborators of Tsar Peter I. Its founders and first teachers were the Greek brothers Ioannikios and Sophronios Leichoudes. From its inception, the Academy followed the well-established

Reorganized in 1775 under the supervision of Metropolitan Platon of Moscow (in office, 1775–1812), the Academy expanded its curriculum to offer classes in church history, canon law, Greek, and Hebrew. Finally, in 1814, the Academy was transferred to the Trinity St. Sergius Monastery and was restructured into the Moscow Theological Seminary.

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See also:

EDUCATION; LEICHOUDES, IOANNIKIOS AND

SOPHRONIOS; PETER I; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Chrissidis, Nikolaos A. (2000). “Creating the New Educated Elite: Learning and Faith in Moscow’s Slavo-GrecoLatin Academy, 1685–1694.” Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, New Haven, CT. NIKOLAOS A. CHRISSIDIS

increasingly nationalistic, many ardently supporting Panslavism after Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War (1854–1856). However, these thinkers were not united, except insofar as they were radically opposed to the Westerners, and individually their ideas differed. CLASSICAL SLAVOPHILISM

SLAVOPHILES The origins of Slavophilism can be traced back to the ideas of thinkers such as Prince Mikhail Shcherbatov, Alexander Radishchev, Poshkov, Nikolai Novikov, and Nikolai Karamzin, all of whom contrasted ancient pre-Petrine Russia with the modern post-Petrine embodiment, stressing the uniqueness of Russian traditions, norms, and ideas. Most exponents of this school of thought were of noble birth, and many held government posts, so they were quite familiar with the workings of the tsarist autocracy. They were prominent during the reign of Nicholas I (1825–1855) and emerged after the Decembrist uprising of 1825 and the Revolutions of 1848 in Europe. Peter Chaadayev’s (1794–1856) ideas in the Philosophical Letter (1836) and other works acted as a catalyst for the emergence of Slavophile ideology. Chaadayev gave special emphasis to the need for Russia to link up with Europe and the Roman Catholic Church. His views on religion, nationality, tradition, and culture stimulated the famous Slavophile-Westerner debate. Building on Chaadayev’s legacy, the Slavophiles developed three main beliefs: samobytnost (originality), the importance of the Orthodox Church, and a rejection of the ideas of Peter the Great and his followers. In addition, they promoted respect for the rule of law, opposed any restriction on the powers of the tsar, and advocated freedom of the individual in terms of speech, thought, and conduct. The Slavophiles believed that Russian civilization was unique and superior to Western culture because it was based on such institutions as the Orthodox Church, the village community, or mir, and the ancient popular assembly, the zemsky sobor. They supported the idea of autocracy and opposed political participation, but some also favored the emancipation of serfs and freedom of speech and press. Alexander II’s reforms achieved some of these goals. Over time, however, some Slavophiles became

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The Slavophiles, by and large, can be grouped into three categories: classical, moderate, and radical. Like their opponents, the Westerners, they had a particular view of Russia’s history, language, and culture and hence a certain vision of Russia’s future, especially its relations with the West. Perhaps their greatest concern, from the 1830s onwards, was that Russia might follow the Western road of development. They were vehemently opposed to this, arguing that Russia must return to its own roots and draw upon its own strengths. Most Slavophiles opposed the reforms introduced by Peter the Great on the grounds that they had destroyed Russian tradition by allowing alien Western ideas (such as the French and German languages) to be imported into Russia. They also maintained that Russia had paid too high a price to become a major European power, namely, moral degradation. Furthermore, the bureaucracy established by Peter the Great was a source of moral corruption, because the Table of Ranks stimulated personal ambition and subordinated the nobility to the bureaucracy. These views were in many ways shaped by the social and political conditions that prevailed during the reign of Nicholas I (1825–1855). In general, the Slavophiles saw the Westward swing as a threat to the church, the peasant and village community, and other Russian institutions. Many classical Slavophiles were initially influenced by Nicholas I’s Official Nationality slogan: “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality.” The most important proponent of classical Slavophilism was Ivan Kireyevsky (1806–1856), who could read French and German, had traveled in Russia,. and understood the importance of Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (1835). Kireyevsky rejected the main intellectual developments of the time (rationalism, secularism, the industrial revolution, liberalism) and argued that Russia, as a backward young nation, was not in a position to imitate a civilized Europe. He pointed, for example, to the differences in religion (Catholicism versus Orthodox Christianity) and to the fact that Russian society consisted of small peasant communes founded upon common land tenure. Like

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Kireyevsky, Alexei Khomiakov (1804–1860) also warned against blindly following the West and criticized the impending emancipation of the serfs (1861). He emphasized spiritual freedom (sobornost) and Russia’s unique historical mission. Whereas the West was built upon coercion and slavery, he said, Russia was founded and maintained by consent, freedom, and peace. Yuri A. Samarin (1819–1879) supported Khomiakov’s view, arguing that society, if left to its own devices, would be torn apart by division and conflict because individualism only promoted selfishness and isolation, and thus a strong centralized state and leader were needed to maintain order. This was a clear reference to the danger that Russia would see a rerun of the Revolutions of 1848. As he saw it, chaos would ensue if Russia followed the example of Western liberalism by introducing constitutionalism and a system of checks and balances. Other proponents included the Aksakov brothers, Ivan and Konstantin. Ivan, at the height of his influence in the late 1870s, favored the liberation of the Balkan Slavs, whereas Konstantin advocated the emancipation of the serfs and was a proponent of the village commune (mir). Both wanted to preserve Russian traditions and maintain the ties between the Slavic peoples. In Ivan Aksakov in particular, one sees clear evidence of the emergence of Panslavism, which advocated the political and cultural unity of the Slavic peoples.

MODERATE AND RADICAL SLAVOPHILISM

Classical Slavophilism eventually gave way to two other variants of the doctrine. The moderate wing of the Slavophile movement is associated with Mikhail P. Pogodin (1800–1875) and Fyodor I. Tyutchev (1808–1873). Pogodin, a historian and publisher whose conservative journal The Muscovite (1841–1856) defended the policies of Nicholas I, was professor of Russian history at Moscow University (1835–1844) and wrote a history of Russia (7 vols., 1846–1857) and a study of the origins of Russia (3 vols., 1871). Tyutchev was a lyric poet and essayist who spent most of his life (1822–1844) abroad in the diplomatic service and later wrote poetry of a nationalist and Panslavist orientation.

aims only received limited government support, Panslavism became stronger than ever in the postNapoleonic period and especially after Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War. From the mid-nineteenth century onward, as Prussia tried to assimilate the Slavs, the Slavophiles called for solidarity against foreign oppression, and with this goal in mind many advocated the establishment of a federation. This was necessary, in Danilevsky’s view, in order to protect all Slavs from European expansion in the east. The Russian government in the 1870s used these ideas to justify russification and an increasingly expansionist policy. All in all, with the advance of Russian liberalism and constitutionalism at the end of the nineteenth century, the Panslavists tried to distance themselves from the classical and moderate Slavophiles. THE SLAVOPHILE LEGACY

The demise of Slavophilism in the nineteenth century was primarily due to the widespread divisions between those favoring conservative reform and those advocating a more extremist Panslavism. Like the populists, many Slavophiles argued that Nicholas I was incapable of reform, as shown by his repressive reign, and thus a more nationalist stance was needed. Between the Russian Revolution and the rise of Josef Stalin, this ideology was largely rejected by the Soviet regime, but following the rise of National Socialism in Germany, Panslavism was revived, and it became very prominent during World War II. In the late Soviet period and especially in the postcommunist era, the Slavophile ideology was once again promoted by Vladimir Zhirinovsky and other nationalists who sought to put Russia first and to protect it against a hostile West. Many neoSlavophiles wished to see the restoration of the USSR and the Soviet Empire, and a return to Orthodoxy. Thus the legacy of the Slavophiles remains important and influential in contemporary Russia.

See also:

MIR; NATIONALISM IN TSARIST EMPIRE; NATION

AND NATIONALITY; PANSLAVISM; NICHOLAS I; PETER I; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; RUSSIFICATION; TABLE OF RANKS; WESTERNIZERS

The radical wing of slavophilism was epitomized by Nikolai Y. Danilevsky (1828–1855). As outlined in his Russia and Europe (1869), Danilevsky’s aim was to unite all the countries and peoples who spoke Slavic languages on the grounds that they possessed common cultural, economic, and political goals. Whereas in the seventeenth century such

Devlin, Judith. (1999). Slavophiles and Commissars: Enemies of Democracy in Modern Russia. London: Macmillan.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Walicki, Andrei. (1975). The Slavophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-Century

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S L U T S K Y ,

Russian Thought, tr. Hilda Andrews-Rusiecka. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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Williams, Christopher, and Hanson, Stephen E. (1999). “National Socialism, Left Patriotism or Superimperialism? The Radical Right in Russia.” In The Radical Right in East-Central Europe, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet. University Park: Penn State University Press.

tion of his society from youthful idealism through terrible trials to decline and imminent fall. He created a distinctive poetic language, purged of conventional poetic ornament, that has been highly influential. His prose memoirs about his military service, equally plain and unconventional, were only published fifty years after the end of the war.

CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS

See also: THAW, THE; UNION OF SOVIET WRITERS; WORLD WAR II BIBLIOGRAPHY

SLUTSKY, BORIS ABROMOVICH (1919–1986), Russian poet and memoirist. Brought up in Kharkov, Boris Abramovich Slutsky moved to Moscow in 1937 to study law and soon began a simultaneous literature course. On the outbreak of World War II he volunteered and went into battle as an infantry officer. Soon wounded in action, he spent the remainder of the war as a political officer, joining the Party in 1943. He ended up as a highly decorated Guards major, having campaigned all the way to Austria. In 1945 he returned to Moscow and after convalescence made a living writing radio scripts, but in 1948 he was deprived of this work because of his Jewish origin. Sponsored by Ilya Erenburg, he was accepted in the Union of Writers in 1957 and thereafter was a professional poet. He made a lasting reputation with unprecedentedly unheroic poems about the war, but he was soon upstaged by the more flamboyant younger poets of the Thaw under Nikita Khrushchev, poets more concerned with the future than with the past. Slutsky steadily continued publishing original poetry and also translations, until on the death of his wife in 1977 at which point he suffered a mental collapse, which was underlain by the lingering effects of his wounds. Thereafter he was silent. From the beginning of his career Slutsky acquiesced in the censoring of his work, never moving into dissidence; notoriously, in 1958 he spoke and voted for the expulsion of Pasternak from the Union of Writers, an action for which he privately never forgave himself. After Slutsky’s death, it was found that well over half of his poetry had never been published. The appearance of this suppressed work in the decade after he died revealed that Slutsky had been by far the most important poet of his generation. In hundreds of short lyrics he had chronicled his life and times, paying attention to everything from high politics to the routines of everyday life and tracing the evolu-

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Slutsky, Boris. (1999). Things That Happened, ed. and tr. G. S. Smith. Glas (Moscow, Russia), English; v. 19. Moscow, GLAS; Chicago: Ivan Dee. GERALD SMITH

SLUTSKY, YEVGENY YEVGENIEVICH (1880–1948), mathematical statistician and economist. The most profoundly original of all Russian contributors to economic theory, Yevgeny Slutsky was born in Yaroslavl and studied mathematics in Ukraine. His first major publications were in the field of statistics and on the importance of cooperatives. In 1915 he published a seminal article on the theory of consumer behavior. This demonstrated how the consequence of a price change on the quantity of a good demanded could lead to a residual variation in demand, even with a compensating increase in income. John Hicks rediscovered this work in the West in the 1930s, naming the Slutsky equation the “Fundamental Equation of Value Theory.” After 1917 Slutsky worked on analyzing the effects of paper currency emission, on the axiomatic foundations of probability theory, and on the theory of stochastic processes. This yielded a new conception of the stochastic limit. As a consequence, in 1925 Nikolai Kondratiev asked Slutsky to join the Conjuncture Institute in Moscow, for which he wrote his groundbreaking paper on the random generation of business cycles. This opened up a new avenue of cycle research by hypothesizing that the summation of mutually independent chance factors could generate the appearance of periodicity in a random series. In the 1920s Slutsky also worked on the praxeological foundations of economics, but with the closure of the Conjuncture Institute in 1930, he turned back to statistics. He subsequently worked in the Central

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Institute of Meteorology, in Moscow University, and in the Steklov Mathematical Institute. Here Slutsky computed the functions of variables, which led to the posthumous publication of tables for the incomplete Gamma-function and the chi-squared probability distribution. He died of natural causes in 1948.

See also:

KONDRATIEV, NIKOLAI DMITRIEVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allen, R. G. D. (1950). “The Work of Eugen Slutsky.” Econometrica 18:209–216. Slutsky, E. E. (1937). “The Summation of Random Causes as the Source of Cyclic Processes.” Econometrica 5:105–146. Slutsky, E. E. (1953). “On the Theory of the Budget of the Consumer.” In American Economic Association, Readings in Price Theory. London: Allen & Unwin. VINCENT BARNETT

SMOLENSK ARCHIVE The Smolensk Archive comprises the Smolensk regional records of the All-Union Communist Party from the October Revolution in 1917 to the German invasion of the USSR in 1941. The German Army captured the Smolensk Archive when it invaded Russia in 1941 and in 1943 moved the contents to Vilnius. They were subsequently recovered by the Soviet authorities in Silesia in March 1946. American intelligence officers removed the files to a restitution center near Frankfurt am Main in 1946. The archive contains the incomplete and fragmentary records of the Smolensk and Western Oblast (regional) committees (obkom). These include the minutes of meetings, resolutions, decisions, and directives made by Communist Party officials, as well as details on Party work relating to agriculture, especially collectivization policy, machine tractor stations, trade unions, industry, armed forces, censorship, education, women, the control commission, and the purges. The archive also contains secret police, procuracy, court, and militia reports as well as private and personal files and the miscellaneous records of the city (gorkom) and district (raikom) committees. Between 5 and 10 percent of the archive does not pertain to Smolensk, but comprises material seized by the Germans in other parts

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of the USSR. The originals of these documents were presented to the National Archives in Washington, D.C. Pursuant to an agreement made at the 1998 Washington Conference on Holocaust Era assets, the United States returned most of the archive to Russia on in December 2002. The archives were especially important to Western scholars because they provided an insider’s perspective on many historical developments that would otherwise have been unavailable in the era before Mikhail Gorbachev raised the restrictions on access to Soviet archival materials.

See also:

ARCHIVES; COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET

UNION BIBLIOGRAPHY

Fainsod, Merle. (1958). Smolensk under Soviet Rule. London: Macmillan. Getty, J. Arch. (1999). Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered, 1933–38. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Grimsted, Patricia Kennedy. (1995). “The Odyssey of the ‘Smolensk Archive’: Plundered Communist Records for the Service of Communism.” In Carl Beck Occasional Papers in Russian and East European Studies, No. 1201. Pittsburgh: Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Pittsburgh. National Archives and Records Service. (1980). Guide to the Records of the Smolensk Oblast of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1917–41. Washington, DC: Author. CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS

SMOLENSK WAR This unsuccessful campaign to recover the western border regions lost to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at the end of the Time Of Troubles marked Muscovy’s first major experiment with the new Western European infantry organization and line tactics. The Treaty of Deulino (1618) ended the Polish military intervention exploiting Muscovy’s Time Of Troubles and established a fourteen-year armistice between Muscovy and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. But it came at a high price for the Muscovites: the cession to the Commonwealth of most of the western border regions of Smolensk, Chernigov, and Seversk. This was a vast territory, running from the southeastern border of Livonia to just beyond the Desna River in northeastern

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Ukraine. It held more than thirty fortress towns, the most strategic of which was Smolensk, the largest and most formidable of all Muscovite fortresses and guardian of the principal western roads to Moscow. Upon his return from Polish captivity in 1619, Patriarch Filaret, father of Tsar Mikhail, made a new campaign to recover Smolensk, Chernigov, and Seversk from the Poles the primary objective of Muscovite foreign policy. Most of the diplomatic preconditions for such a revanche appeared to be in place by 1630, and by this point the Muscovite government had succeeded in restoring its central chancellery apparatus and fiscal system. It was now able to undertake a massive reorganization and modernization of its army for the approaching war with the Commonwealth. It imported Swedish, Dutch, and English arms to the cost of at least 50,000 rubles; it offered large bounties to recruit Western European mercenary officers experienced in the new infantry organization and line tactics; and it set these mercenary officers to work forming and training New-Formation Regiments—six regiments of Western style infantrymen (soldaty), a regiment of heavy cavalry (reitary), and a regiment of dragoons (draguny). These regiments were drilled in the new European tactics and outfitted and salaried at treasury expense, unlike the old Pomestie-based cavalry army. The New Formation infantry and cavalry would comprise a little more than half of the 33,000-man expeditionary army on the upcoming Smolensk campaign. Muscovy had never before experimented with New Formation units on such a scale. The death of Polish King Sigismund III in April 1632 led to an interregnum in the Commonwealth and factional struggle in the Diet. Patriarch Filaret took advantage of this confusion to send generals M. B. Shein and A. V. Izmailov against Smolensk with the main corps of the Muscovite field army. By October, Shein and Izmailov had captured more than twenty towns and had placed the fortress of Smolensk under siege. The Polish-Lithuanian garrison holding Smolensk numbered only about two thousand men, and the nearest Commonwealth forces in the region (those of Radziwill and Gonsiewski) did not exceed six thousand. But the besieging Muscovite army suffered logistical problems and desertions; their earthworks did not completely encircle Smolensk and did not offer enough protection from attack from the rear. Meanwhile the international coalition against the Commonwealth began to unravel, with the result that in August 1633, Wladyslaw IV, newly elected King

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of Poland, arrived in Shein’s and Izmailov’s rear with a Polish relief army of 23,000 and placed the Muscovite besiegers under his own siege. In January 1634 Shein and Izmailov were forced to sue for armistice in order to evacuate what was left of their army. They had to leave their artillery and stores behind. On their return to Moscow, Shein and Izmailov were charged with treason and executed. By the terms of the Treaty of Polianovka (May 1634) the Poles received an indemnity of twenty thousand rubles and were given back all the captured towns save Serpeisk. The next opportunity for Muscovy to regain Smolensk, Seversk, and Chernigov came a full twenty years later when Bogdan Khmelnitsky and the Ukrainian cossacks sought Tsar Alexei’s support for their war for independence from the Commonwealth.

See also:

FILARET ROMANOV, METROPOLITAN; NEW-

FORMATION REGIMENTS; POLAND; THIRTEEN YEARS’ WAR BIBLIOGRAPHY

Fuller, William C., Jr. (1992). Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600–1914. New York: Free Press. BRIAN DAVIES

SMOLNY INSTITUTE Catherine II (the Great) founded the Smolny Institute for Girls, officially the Society for the Upbringing of Noble Girls, in 1764. Its popular name comes from its site in the Smolny Monastery on the left bank of the Neva River in St. Petersburg. Inspired by Saint-Cyr, a boarding school for girls in France, Smolny was part of Catherine’s educational plan to raise cultured, industrious, and loyal subjects. Ivan Betskoy, the head of this reform effort, was heavily influenced by Enlightenment theorists. Drawing on the ideas of John Locke and JeanJacques Rousseau, Betskoy’s pedagogical plan for Smolny emphasized moral education and the importance of environment. Girls lived at Smolny continuously from age five to eighteen without visits home, which were deemed corrupting. As at all-male schools such as the Corps of Cadets and the Academy of Arts, Smolny stressed training in the fine arts, especially dance and drama. The curriculum also included reading, writing, foreign languages,

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physics, chemistry, geography, mathematics, history, Orthodoxy, needlepoint, and home economics. The range of subjects led Voltaire to declare Smolny superior to Saint-Cyr. In 1765, a division with a less extensive curriculum was added for the daughters of merchants and soldiers. Catherine held public exams and performances of plays at Smolny, and took her favorite pupils on promenades in the Summer Gardens. Portraits of these favorites were commissioned from the painter Dmitry Levitsky. Smolny also became a stop for visiting foreign dignitaries. Its graduates were known for their manners and talents and were considered highly desirable brides. Some became teachers at the school, and a few were promoted to ladies-in-waiting at court. Peter Zavadovsky, who directed Catherine’s commission to establish a national school system, succeeded Betskoy as de facto head of Smolny in 1783. He replaced French with Russian as the school’s primary language and altered the curriculum to emphasize the girls’ future roles as wives and mothers. After Catherine’s death in 1796, Maria Fedorovna took over the institute and made changes that set Smolny’s course for the rest of its existence. The school’s administration became less personal and more bureaucratic. The age of admittance was changed from five to eight, in recognition of the importance of mothering during the early years of a child’s life, and the rules forbidding visits home were relaxed. Throughout the nineteenth century, Smolny maintained its reputation as the most elite educational institution for girls. Its name was regarded as synonymous with high cultural standards, manners, and poise, although sometimes its graduates were considered naive and ill-prepared for life outside of Smolny. The many references to Smolny in the Russian literature of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries attest to the school’s cultural significance. In October 1917, Vladimir Lenin and the Bolsheviks appropriated the Smolny Institute and made it their headquarters until March 1918. Since then, the Smolny campus has continued to be used for governmental purposes, eventually becoming home to the St. Petersburg Duma. Several rooms have been preserved as a museum of the institute’s past.

See also: CATHERINE II; EDUCATION; ENLIGHTENMENT, IMPACT OF; ST. PETERSBURG

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Black, Joseph L. (1979). Citizens for the Fatherland: Education, Educators, and Pedagogical Ideals in Eighteenth Century Russia. New York: Columbia University Press. Nash, Carol. (1981). “Educating New Mothers: Women and the Enlightenment in Russia.” History of Education Quarterly 21:305–306. ANNA KUXHAUSEN

SMYCHKA Smychka, meaning “alliance” or “union” in Russian, was used during the New Economic Policy (NEP), particularly by those Bolsheviks who supported a moderate policy toward the peasantry, to describe a cooperative relationship between workers and peasants. In 1917 the revolutionary alliance of proletariat and peasantry against the tsarist ruling classes led to victory, but by the end of the Civil War the smychka had been severely weakened by harsh War Communism policies of forcible confiscation of grain. Vladimir Lenin introduced the NEP in 1921 to restore the smychka, ending confiscatory policies toward the peasantry and allowing limited private enterprise. The Bolsheviks were in the awkward position of claiming to represent the proletariat but actually ruling over a peasant population that they regarded as potentially bourgeois. In the 1920s they debated what policies should be applied to the peasantry, that is, what the smychka should mean. In his last writings, particularly “On Cooperation” and “Better Fewer, But Better” (both 1923), Lenin argued that the smychka meant gaining the peasants’ trust by recognizing and meeting their needs. Through cooperatives, he said, the vast majority of peasants could be gradually won over to socialism. Nikolai Bukharin, Alexei Rykov, and others members of the right built their program of gradual evolution to socialism on Lenin’s last writings, seeing the smychka as a permanent feature of Soviet life and calling for concessions to the peasantry. The left feared that the peasant majority could swallow the revolution and resisted concessions, hoping that rapid industrialization would end the need for alliance with the peasantry. The inherent tensions between Bolshevik goals and peasant needs threatened to rupture the smychka. In the 1923 Scissors Crisis, prices for agri-

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cultural products plummeted at the same time that those of state-produced manufactured goods rose sharply, opening a price gap that discouraged peasants from marketing agricultural products. Adjustments kept the smychka in place, and 1925 was the high point of pro-peasant policies. The Grain Crisis of 1928 and subsequent defeat of the right weakened the smychka, and the massive collectivization drive of 1929–1930 ended it completely.

See also: COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE; GRAIN CRISIS OF 1928; NEW ECONOMIC POLICY; SCISSORS CRISIS; WAR COMMUNISM BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cohen, Stephen F. (1971). Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution. New York: Random House. Lewin, Moshe. (1968). Russian Peasants and Soviet Power. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. CAROL GAYLE WILLIAM MOSKOFF

SOBCHAK, ANATOLY ALEXANDROVICH (1937–2000), law professor; mayor of St. Petersburg. Anatoly Sobchak was one of the leading liberal politicians of the perestroika era. Born in Chita, he completed a law degree at Leningrad State University in 1959. He settled permanently in Leningrad in1962 and joined the faculty of Leningrad State University in 1973, heading the economic law institute and rising to be dean. Unusually for so senior an academic, Sobchak was for many years not a member of the Communist Party. He only joined during the presidency of Mikhail Gorbachev, becoming a candidate member in May 1987, and a full member in June 1988. The next year he was elected to the Congress of People’s Deputies, where he became a leader of the Inter-Regional Deputies group and chaired the committee investigating the massacre of demonstrators by Soviet troops in Tiflis in April 1989. A loyal supporter of Boris Yeltsin, Sobchak was elected mayor of Leningrad in June 1991, the same day that a referendum approved changing the city’s name to St. Petersburg. He opposed the August 1991 coup attempt and persuaded the army not to deploy troops in the city. Sobchak presided over the liberalization of the city’s economy, whose many defense plants had suffered greatly from the Soviet

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Russian politician Anatoly Sobchak was a mentor to President Vladimir Putin. © VITTORIANO RASTELLI/CORBIS

economic collapse. On the recommendation of the rector of Leningrad State University, Stanislav Merkouriev, Sobchak hired a young ex-KGB officer, Vladimir Putin, to handle relations with foreign investors. Putin had been a student in one of Sobchak’s classes but they were not personally acquainted. Putin became Sobchak’s deputy in 1993 and ran his re-election campaign in July 1996. Sobchak, surprisingly, lost to a challenge from his former deputy, Vladimir Yakovlev. The next year Yakovlev (known as governor rather than mayor) filed a libel suit against Sobchak after the latter accused him of ties to organized crime in a newspaper interview. In October 1997 Sobchak suffered a heart attack while being questioned by police about corruption allegations, mainly pertaining to the distribution of city-owned apartments. Sobchak went to France for medical treatment and remained there in voluntary exile— beyond the reach of investigators. The rise of Putin (who became head of the Federal Security Service in July 1998) and the dismissal of Procurator Yuri Skuratov in April 1999 enabled

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Sobchak to return to Russia in July 1999. The charges against him were dropped, but his public image was tarnished, and he failed to win a seat in the State Duma in the December 1999 elections. Sobchak died of a heart attack in February 2000 while on a trip to Kaliningrad as Putin’s envoy. An emotional Putin attended his funeral and pledged revenge on his enemies, blaming them for his death. Observers took this as referring to Vladimir Yakovlev, but Putin failed to prevent Yakovlev’s reelection as St. Petersburg governor in May 2000. Sobchak’s career, in which he evolved from a principled liberal to a defender of Russian capitalism and backer of Vladimir Putin, reflected the broader hopes and disappointments of the Russian transition from communism. Sobchak himself was aware of the contradictions, commenting just before his death that “We have not achieved a democratic, but rather a police state over the past ten years.”

See also: PERESTROIKA; PUTIN, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH; ST.

PETERSBURG;

YAKOVLEV,

ALEXANDER

NIKO-

LAYEVICH; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Holiman, Alan. (2000). “Remembering Anatoly Sobchak.” Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 8(3):324–329. PETER RUTLAND

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC WORKERS PARTY Social democracy was a product of capitalism in Imperial Russia around 1900. Until the 1890s, Russian socialism meant agrarian Populism, an illegal, conspiratorial, and terrorist movement of the educated intelligentsia that placed its faith in the peasant village commune. After state-funded railroad building inspired rapid industrial growth in Russia, many intellectuals became Marxist Social Democrats. Social Democrats believed that they could combine socialism with democracy, without any centralized state nationalization of property. Karl Marx had criticized capitalism as both inefficient and unjust, a cause of violent class struggle that would lead inevitably to a proletarian class seizure of power from the property-owning bourgeoisie, or capitalist class. Industrial capitalism would cause its own demise.

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The Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party (RSDWP) originated in 1898 in Minsk. The party’s central organizer and later source of internal division was Vladimir Ilich Lenin (V. I. Ulyanov). The RSDWP modeled itself after the Socialist Party of Germany (SPD), whose Marxist orthodoxy was then challenged by revisionism. Revisionists argued that reform, not revolution, would best serve worker interests, and favored elections over strikes. The RSDWP split into Menshevik (minority) and Bolshevik (majority) factions in 1903. The Mensheviks believed that workers should lead the party and constitute its membership. The Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, believed that well-organized professional revolutionaries could better organize the party against the imperial police. Such revolutionaries would force revolutionary consciousness upon workers, who might otherwise turn to revisionism and reform. The RSDWP played a minimal role in the 1905 Russian Revolution. Tsar Nicholas II legalized labor unions and allowed a new freely elected parliament, or Duma. But as police cracked down on radical peasants, workers, and non-Russian nationalities seeking independence, party members went underground. Many emigrated to Europe. The Mensheviks broadened their base among factory workers inside Russia. The Bolsheviks robbed banks, fled to Europe, and disagreed over whether or not to participate in elections to the bourgeois Duma. The police succeeded in penetrating the party, arresting many members (including Josef Stalin) and recruiting police agents. By 1914 the RSDWP was divided and weak, competing for support with rival liberal (Constitutional Democrat), agrarian socialist (Social Revolutionaries), and national (Jewish Bund) parties. In February 1917, Imperial Russia collapsed under the pressures of World War I. A Provisional Government tried to continue the war and carry out democratic and agrarian reforms. But the army began to disintegrate, and the urban and rural masses, organized in soviets (councils), moved increasingly leftward, seizing factories and land. The Bolsheviks slowly developed into a mass party. In April 1917, Lenin returned to Petrograd (St. Petersburg) from Swiss exile. He immediately declared war on the bourgeois Provisional Government. In November, the Bolsheviks seized power in Petrograd, Moscow, and other towns. Lenin headed a new socialist government advocating workers

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control of factories, peasant land reform, and peace with the Central Powers. Russia then became the world’s first socialist state, led by a single party, the Bolsheviks, renamed the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), or (RKP (b)) in 1918, then the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1924. Lenin quickly created his own police state and arrested, tried, and exiled old political enemies, especially Mensheviks, Kadets, and Social Revolutionaries. Many ordinary citizens died in war, civil war, famine, and terror as a new party ruled in their name. After the Bolshevik-Menshevik split, the RSDWP became essentially two parties. The Bolsheviks led Russia down a separate path to civil war, industrial growth, collectivization of agriculture, and totalitarianism. The Mensheviks became exile critics of a revolution they helped create and barely survived. In 1991, the RSDWP’s greatest achievement, the Soviet Union, collapsed.

See also:

BOLSHEVISM; FEBRUARY REVOLUTION; LENIN,

VLADIMIR ILICH; MENSHEVIKS; OCTOBER REVOLUTION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ascher, Abraham. (1972). Pavel Axelrod and the Development of Menshevism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Liebich, Andre. (1997). From the Other Shore: Russian Social Democracy after 1921. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Service, Robert. (2000). Lenin: A Biography. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Williams, Robert C. (1986). The Other Bolsheviks: Lenin and His Critics, 1904–1914. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. ROBERT C. WILLIAMS

SOCIALISM Broadly speaking, socialism is the ideology of collective ownership of the means of production and the joint distribution of goods. There were two principal currents in Russian socialism. One held that the peasants, who comprised more than 80 percent of the population, would be the driving force in the creation of the new society; and the other assigned that role to the industrial proletariat. The first current was initially advocated by Alexander Herzen (1812–1870), who had been a supporter

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of the Decembrists and left Russia for the West in 1847 to escape persecution. The failure of the Revolutions of 1848, which he attributed to the conservatism and attachment to private property of most Europeans, disappointed him deeply. He concluded that the chances for socialism were much better in his native country because the peasant commune had accustomed the Russian people to communal life and egalitarianism. The Russian peasant, Herzen contended, “has no morality save that which flows instinctively, naturally, from his communism.” These ideas came to be known as narodnichestvo, which literally means “populism” but is perhaps better translated as “Russian socialism.” Taken up by such thinkers and activists as Mikhail A. Bakunin (a radical anarchist), Nikolai K. Mikhailovsky, and Nikolai G. Chernyshevsky, the populists gained a substantial following among the intelligentsia by the 1860s and 1870s. Although all populists agreed that Russia could by-pass capitalism in its evolution toward socialism, there was considerable disagreement over the means to achieve the final goal. Toward the end of his life, Herzen believed that socialism could be attained by peaceful means. Peter I. Lavrov was another strong advocate of peaceful methods; from the 1860s until his death in 1900 he argued that it was the obligation of intellectuals to educate the people politically and thus prepare them to undertake their own liberation. Chernyshevsky, on the other hand, did not believe that force could be avoided. The failed attempt by the populist DmitryV. Karakozov to assassinate Alexander II in 1866 and the ensuring repression prompted many revolutionary intellectuals to opt for peaceful tactics. Early in the 1870s, idealistic young narodniki launched the Go to the People movement; hundreds of them moved to the countryside and lived with the peasants in order to teach them to read and write as well as the rudiments of modern technology. But the ultimate goal of the populists was to prepare the masses for the revolution. Many peasants were baffled by the visitors and feared they were trying to lead them astray. Some peasants even turned them in to the police, who in the mid1870s arrested many of the populists, bringing the well-intentioned project to a close. But the ideas of the populists remained alive and were incorporated by the largest socialist movement in Russia, the Socialist Revolutionary Party (SRs), founded in 1902. The SRs advocated the transfer of all land to peasant communes or local associations, which in turn would assign it on an egalitarian basis to all who wished to earn their living by farming. Industry

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would be similarly socialized. Although the Socialist Revolutionaries insisted that the final goal, socialism, must be achieved by means of persuasion, they tolerated the “Combat Organization,” an independent organ of the party that carried out dozens of political assassinations. Political terror, many believed, was necessary to bring about the dismantling of the autocratic regime. In the meantime, in the late 1870s, a small group of intellectuals led by Georgy V. Plekhanov founded a Marxist movement in the name of the industrial working class, and this represented the second major current in Russian socialism. The Marxists contended that Russia’s development would be similar to trends in Central and Western Europe. The country would be industrialized, and would undergo a bourgeois revolution during which the autocratic system would be replaced by a constitutional order dominated by a middle class committed to capitalism. Eventually, when industrialization had reached maturity and the proletariat had become a powerful force, it would stage a second, socialist revolution. In 1898, the Russian Marxists founded the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party, which five years later split into two factions. The split occurred over the seemingly minor question of how to define a party member, but it soon turned out that the differences between the Bolsheviks (majoritarians) led by Vladimir I. Lenin and the Mensheviks (minoritarians) led by Yuli O. Martov and Paul B. Axelrod touched on fundamental issues. Lenin, in keeping with views he had expressed in 1902 in What Is to Be Done?, favored a highly centralized, elitist, hierarchically organized political party, whereas the Mensheviks stressed the necessity and desirability of broad working-class participation in the movement’s affairs and in the coming revolutionary events. In short order, it also became evident that while both factions subscribed to a revolutionary course, the Mensheviks tended to adopt more moderate tactics than did the Bolsheviks.

Lenin sought to placate the peasants, still the vast majority of the population, by adopting the SR land program. He ordered the abrogation of the property rights of the nobility and placed land in the rural regions at the disposal of land committees and district soviets of peasants’ deputies for distribution to the peasants. But the Bolsheviks also remained faithful to their own program by introducing workers’ control in industry and in commercial and agricultural enterprises, abolishing distinctions and special privileges based on class, eliminating titles in the army, and outlawing inequality in wages. Lenin was convinced that the economically more advanced countries of Europe with large proletarian populations would soon follow Russia’s example in adopting socialism. When this did not happen, his successor, Josef V. Stalin, in 1924 formulated the doctrine of “socialism in one country,” according to which Russia was strong enough economically to reach the final goal of socialism by itself. Four years later, the Soviet government launched a second revolution by forcing the peasants into collectives and speeding up the process of industrialization. Much more so than ever before, the major economic decisions were now made by officials in Moscow. Then, in 1936, Stalin formally declared that the goal of socialism had in fact been attained. This claim was disputed by Leon D. Trotsky, the man he had defeated in the struggle over the leadership of the country after Lenin’s death in 1924. Trotsky maintained that socialism could triumph only on a worldwide basis. Stalinist socialism remained the regnant ideology of the country until 1991, although many Stalinist methods of rule were gradually abandoned following Stalin’s death in 1953.

See also:

BOLSHEVIKS; HERZEN, ALEXANDER IVANOVICH;

LENIN, VLADIMIR ILLICH; MARXISM; MENSHEVIKS; POPULISM; SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC WORKERS PARTY; SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY; SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARIES; STALIN, JOSEPH VISSARIONOVICH; TROTSKY, LEON DAVIDOVICH

On November 7, 1917, after the country had endured three years of war that caused untold devastation and loss of life and eight months of revolutionary turbulence, the Bolsheviks overthrew the Provisional Government, which consisted of moderates committed to democracy and had been formed when the tsarist regime collapsed earlier that year, in March. Then, on November 8, one day after the Bolsheviks had formed a new government,

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Baron, Samuel H. (1963). Plekhanov: The Father of Russian Marxism. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Haimson, Leopold H. (1955). The Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lampert, Evgenii. (1965). Sons against Fathers: Studies in Russian Radicalism and Revolution. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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Malia, Martin. (1961). Alexander Herzen and the Birth of Russian Socialism, 1812–1855. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Venturi, Franco. (1960). Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Walicki, Andrzej. (1995). Marxism and the Leap to the Kingdom of Freedom: The Rise and Fall of the Communist Utopia. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Woehrlin, William F. (1971). Chernishevskii: The Man and the Journalist. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wolfe, Bertram D. (1948). Three Who Made a Revolution: A Biographical Study. New York: Dial Press. ABRAHAM ASCHER

SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY The question of whether socialism could be built in the USSR provoked a great ideological and political debate in the Soviet Union that lasted from 1924 to 1927. In response to Leon Trotsky, who, on the basis of his theory of “permanent revolution,” believed that “the genuine rise of socialist economy in Russia will become possible only after the victory of the proletariat in the most important countries of Europe,” Josef Stalin first propounded his doctrine of “socialism in one country” in a newspaper article of December 1922. The difference between the two theories was based on a distinction between the processes of making a socialist revolution and a socialist economy. Every Bolshevik believed that the revolution that had proved victorious in October 1917 was a socialist revolution, but according to party doctrine it was impossible to build a socialist economy in a lone backward country, even though it was now clear that the foundations of a socialist economy were being laid. Stalin did not deny the importance of the international revolution or its likelihood in the near future because of the crisis in capitalism. But seizing on a few scattered passages of Lenin, including, from the last speech Lenin ever made, the quote, “NEP [New Economic Policy] Russia will become socialist Russia,” Stalin argued that because the “dictatorship of the proletariat” had been established in Russia through the peculiar conditions of the 1917 revolution—the alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry—the complete organization of a socialist economy in the USSR was possible, as part of the process of building social-

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ism. He qualified this by saying that “for the final victory of socialism, for the organization of Socialist production, the efforts of one country, particularly of a peasant country like Russia, are insufficient” (Problems of Leninism, 1926), and, moreover, that the victory of socialism could not be considered secure while the USSR was encircled by hostile capitalist powers. Stalin developed the theory over the next two years, particularly in Problems of Leninism (1926). It was a very effective formula. Politically it was used as a stick with which to beat Trotsky, the Left, Leningrad, and United Oppositions: Stalin condemned his critics for lack of faith in the possibility of building socialism in the Soviet Union. Economically it was used as a basis for the industrialization of the USSR through the Five-Year Plans and the collectivization of agriculture, and it came to mean the opposite of NEP. It provided a slogan expressive of Bolshevik self-confidence after victory in the civil war and the establishment of the new regime, and in contrast to “permanent revolution” held out the prospect of stability. Its appeal lay partly in its reawakening of national pride in the self-sufficiency of the Russian revolution of 1917 and in the potential and destiny of the Russian people to become the progenitor of a new civilization. Through “socialism in one country” Stalin established himself as an ideologue, and the theory became the supreme test of loyalty in the Stalinist party and state.

See also:

NEW ECONOMIC POLICY; STALIN, JOSEF VISSAR-

IONOVICH; TROTSKY, LEON DAVIDOVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Carr, Edward Hallett. (1970). A History of Soviet Russia: Socialism in One Country, 1924–1926, Vol. 2. Harmondsworth, UK: Pelican. Deutscher, Isaac. (1966). Stalin: A Political Biography. Harmondsworth, UK: Pelican. Stalin, Josef Vissarionovich. (1959). Works, Vol. 8: 1926, January–November. Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House. DEREK WATSON

SOCIALIST REALISM On April 23, 1932, the Party Central Committee of the USSR adopted socialist realism (SR) as the official artistic mandate for Soviet literature (de facto

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for art, music, film, and architecture as well), a practice that, theoretically, governed the production of any work of art until the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. While most frequently associated with literature (especially since the adoption of SR occurred practically simultaneously with the dissolution of all literary groups and their subjugation into one Union of Writers), socialist realism provided the guidelines according to which any artist should craft his work. Yet the very concept of socialist realism problematizes the process of definition. Over the course of its implementation socialist realism’s practitioners and critics have referred to it as a method, doctrine, framework, or style. Precisely the inability to definitively label it points to its inherent contradictions. Indeed, the best label for socialist realism could well be critic Yevgeny Dobrenko’s term—an aesthetic system. This moniker implies that socialist realism dictated far more than the form of an artistic work; in addition, socialist realism strove to control how an artist worked and how an audience received and perceived any work of art. Just as events in the Soviet Union unfolded, so, too, did socialist realism adjust to the new demands of changing times. Consequently, socialist realism was realized as a totalizing system that would inculcate Soviet citizens into the new ideological system, the result of the Bolshevik revolution, and the emergence of Stalinism. Andrei Zhdanov, then Leningrad Party boss and frequent spokesman for Party policy, delineated the program of SR at the First Congress of Soviet Writers in 1934. Increasingly critics identify the Soviet writer Maxim Gorky as the true instigator behind the movement given his active role in establishing journals (such as Nashi Dostizheniya [Our Achievements]) and literary series (such as The History of Factories and Plants), as well as his editorship of volumes such as The History of the Construction of the Stalin White Sea–Baltic Canal. Indeed many of Gorky’s polemical and didactic articles of the time delineate how writers were called to document, applaud, and encourage the building of the new Soviet state, especially vis-à-vis the first two Five-Year Plans, even though Gorky himself produced no original works of literature during this final period of his career. In addition, as had been proposed most vociferously by RAPP (the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers) in the 1920s, common workers should emerge as the chief arbiters of artistic production. It was believed that if properly trained, any worker could become a So-

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viet writer or artist, especially because, ideologically speaking, only workers had the appropriate class pedigree. Not surprisingly, although attempts were made to reforge (a common metaphor of the early 1930s) workers into masterful artists, much of this activity was in vain. As readers in the early 1930s were quick to point out, badly written or executed SR art was neither appealing nor inspiring. Indeed, recently some critics have noted that the reading and viewing public of the early 1930s played a much larger role in determining what kind of art would be produced, thanks to their active response to any artistic production that did not meet with their aesthetic sensibilities or did not conform to their conception of a typical work of Soviet art. This did not imply, however, that subsequent works of socialist realist art had uniformly high quality and were superior works of art; most were not. Hence, mounting pressure was applied to members of the various artistic establishments to embrace the new aesthetic model of socialist realism. In the literary arena some writers, most notably Mikhail Bulgakov, Osip Mandelshtam, Yevgeny Zamyatin, and Anna Akhmatova to name but a few, consistently resisted the pressure to produce Party-mandated art; consequently they found it essentially impossible to have their work published. Others such as Mikhail Zoshchenko, Viktor Shklovsky, and Valentin Katayev attempted to find a compromise position that enabled them to continue to be published while maintaining a modicum of personal artistic style and integrity. Yet others, among them Alexander Fadeyev, Alexei Tolstoy and Vera Inber, subscribed completely to the Party mandate by producing literary works that strove to comply as closely as possible with socialist realism. Here, too, the issue of artistic quality emerged as a concern. Yet the outline above should not suggest that the divisions among artists were black and white categories that did not allow for subversions of the socialist realist canon or deviations from the “Party line” within an artist’s oeuvre. Consequently, it is not uncommon to find musical comedies in the 1930s, which, while celebrating the heightened class consciousness and loyalty of Soviet citizens, also featured musical production numbers, slapstick comedy, and lighthearted romance (e.g., Volga, Volga, The Jolly Fellows, Circus). In addition, in literature the early “canonical” works of socialist realism, which were posited as models for future works, predated the adoption of the socialist

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realist aesthetic. These include Gorky’s novel Mat (Mother, 1906), Fyodor Gladkov’s post-Civil war story Tsement (Cement,1925), Dmitry Furmanov’s Civil War epic Chapayev (1923), and Alexander Fadeyev’s Bolshevik drama Razgrom (The Rout, 1927) all of which presented the struggle for socialism from authors who understood how to present Soviet reality in its revolutionary development. As these examples illustrate, in literature the socialist realist genre of choice was the novel. Similarly, in music the symphony reigned supreme, while in tactile art, sculpture, and architecture massive, grandiloquent, and neoclassical exemplars managed to concretize the physical manifestations of socialist realism. Indeed, in one respect socialist realism’s lineage harkened back to the nineteenth century since its foundation rested on the aesthetic principles of realism and its purported ability to truthfully depict life as it was happening. Moreover, the populist movements of the second half of the nineteenth century, which greatly appealed to Bolshevik ideologists, including Vladimir Lenin, provided the prototypes not only for the appropriate psychological makeup of a character. In addition, these populist models served to situate socialist realist aesthetics in a revolutionary context that applauded the development of socialism. In addition, some critics have traced socialist realism’s genealogy through early twentieth-century Russian symbolism, a development that thereby enabled the Russian artistic and political avantgarde movements to share the notion of a perfect future life. The artistic avant-garde drew on the work of the Russian symbolist philosopher Vladimir Soloviev as the basis of its doctrine, while the political avant-garde followed Marxist ideology on its path to create a new Soviet society. Both avantgarde projects shared many of the same ideas, metaphors, and terminology in describing the “new world” they hoped to create. For example, while Soloviev espoused the idea that art was an instrument for creating the future, Marxists maintained that art was an instrument for transforming life, a process that, by its very nature, would create new men and women. Indeed, the Left Front Futurist theorist Nikolai Chuzhak links Solovievian symbolist principles with Marxist ideology, thereby creating a Marxist aesthetic that blended the theurgic impulse of Solovievian thinking with Marxist dialectics. Chuzhak labels this end product “ultrarealism,” a construct that “would express the dialectical collision between ‘what is’ and ‘what will

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be’” (Gutkin, 1999, p. 46). According to this interpretation, the artistic and political avant-garde movements already had sown the seeds of socialist realism long before its actual adoption. Similarly, the critic Boris Groys has argued, among other notions, that socialist realism was more avant-garde than the avant-garde itself. Whereas the avant-garde provided numerous theoretical models, mandates, and pronouncements for how the future world should be, they were neither willing nor able to completely replace or even destroy the traditions that preceded and produced them. In fact this futuristic vision could never fully be realized, precisely because the avant-garde sought to construct it on the existing cultural structure. Conversely, socialist realism was, according to Groys, able to achieve that which the avant-garde never could—to reject traditional cultural structures and in their place to construct a new system of artistic production that reflected the new society that was supposedly being created in the Soviet Union. Critics such as Herman Ermolaev and C. Vaughan James have argued that the basis for socialist realism rests firmly on Communist Party ideology and its desire to control cultural production to serve its ideological and propagandistic needs. Finally, the writer and literary critic Andrei Sinyavsky has proposed that the aesthetic system after which socialist realism was modeled harkened back not to nineteenth-century realism, but rather to the neoclassicism of the late eighteenth century. As Sinyavsky notes, the necessity to produce statemandated art; the directive to applaud the glory, power, and vision of the State, especially vis-à-vis its own citizens and other cultures; the proclivity to build, write, paint, or compose works of art that were massive in structure, grandiose in their praise, and fraught with visions of how life should be, not as it actually was—these elements paralleled the demands put to socialist realism. Clearly the development and historical precedents in Russian cultural history for socialist realism are richer and more complicated than originally thought. In fact, even the proposed elements that had to be included in an artistic production to make it truly socialist realist were reconfigured and reemphasized as this aesthetic system continued through successive eras in the development of the Soviet Union. Initially a number of characteristics were required of a work of socialist realism. First, it had to depict Soviet life not as it was, but as it should be. Hence, any work of socialist realist art would

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exemplify for its reader or viewer a behavior, event, or image that captured an “ideal” rather than reality. As stated in Literaturnaya gazeta (September 3, 1934), “Socialist realism, being the basic method of Soviet literature and literary criticism, demands from the artist the truthful, historically concrete depiction of reality in its revolutionary development. At the same time, truthfulness and historical concreteness of the artistic depiction of reality must be combined with the task of ideologically remolding and educating the working people in the spirit of socialism.” While this statement specifically refers to literature, the parameters it sets forth were applicable to any artistic production. In essence, any work of socialist realism should depict the bright future that Soviet public rhetoric continually promised its citizens, provided that they followed the socialist realist model. The epitome of this model was the “new Soviet man/woman” who through his or her Party-mindedness, intensive labor, class identity, and singlemindedness achieved great feats that resulted in a happy ending and that glorified the Soviet Union, thereby demonstrating the correctness of its ideology. In literature these new Soviet men and women were created by Soviet writers, the “engineers of human souls,” as Josef Stalin called them. Hence, almost from its inception Socialist realism was redolent with industrial metaphors and images. Writers, indeed all artists, were engineers charged with “reforging” or reconstructing characters, images, words, and deeds into manifestations of Party policy and Soviet power. Originally a work of socialist realism should contain four key elements. The first was ideinost— the work must be anchored in and resonate with Soviet ideology, i.e. Marxism-Leninism. Second, the work must convey klassovost—class-consciousness. The socialist realist heroes and heroines must personify their class heritage. Preferably they were to be members of the working class or, more rarely, enlightened peasants or intellectuals, who embraced the new ideology and demonstrated through their lives and work their allegiance to their class, and, ultimately, to the Soviet Union. Third, a socialist realist work must contain partynost—Party-mindedness. This meant that the firm, guiding hand of the Communist Party of the USSR constantly exerted its presence in a work of socialist realism, either in the character of an ideal Party member in a work of literature, or through the visual or aural presentation of a theme or motif that exuded strength, decisiveness, and grandiosity. Finally, works of socialist realism should have

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narodnost—the content of a work of art should represent the interests and viewpoint of the people (narod) rendered in an intelligible, approachable manner. Throughout the 1930s the aforementioned guidelines were strictly applied to artistic production. Whereas in the early 1930s collective heroism and collective labor (consonant with the goals of the first two five-year plans) were glorified and promoted, in the latter half of the 1930s up to the advent of World War II, individual heroes, from Stalin to polar explorers, from collective farm workers to Stakhanovites, were extolled. As the war years unfolded, the official enforcement of socialist realist imperatives lessened but definitely did not disappear. The slight flexibility, afforded writers in particular, to depict the brutality of battle during World War II (but not any mistakes of Stalin or his military commanders) was counterbalanced by the heroic music, art work, and films that understandably lauded the honest heroism displayed by common Soviet citizens in the face of the war. Nonetheless, when the war concluded, a redoubling of efforts to enforce strict principles of socialist realism emerged. Primary responsibility for this enforcement fell, once again, to Andrei Zhdanov, then chair of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Zhdanov’s most virulent wrath fell on poet Anna Akhmatova and writer Mikhail Zoshchenko, whose work Zhdanov aggressively attacked in the press. Consequently, the canonical elements of socialist realism reemerged and prevailed until the so-called Thaw in the late 1950s. This period (1953–1963) witnessed another lessening of the paradigmatic strictures that defined socialist realism. During this period relatively greater flexibility marked artistic endeavors. In particular, literary works were permitted to explore previously untouchable topics—the Soviet concentration camps, the difficulties of life in the countryside, the trauma of the post-war years— in a more humanely artistic, less formulaic way. This did not mean that Party supervision of artistic production diminished completely, nor were all works of literature written at this time permitted to be published (e.g., Lidia Chukovskaya’s Sofia Petrovna, Solzhenitsyn’s First Circle). Rather, a slight lessening of the controls enabled some artists to produce works that stretched the boundaries of socialist realism. This short-lived easing of control over artistic production ended with a further tightening of the

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parameters that defined socialist realism. While these parameters never approached the strictness of the early years of Soviet power, they persisted nonetheless. Ironically during this ensuing period—called Stagnation (1964–1985)—a number of interesting, original films, works of literature, art, and music appeared either through official channels or through the burgeoning artistic underground. This underground phenomenon permitted a host of officially censored or unacceptable works to be circulated among appreciative audiences through samizdat (self-publication) or tamizdat (publication abroad). Consequently, with each passing year, the hold that the socialist realist aesthetic exerted on Soviet culture gradually lessened until it dissolved into the period of glasnost in the mid-1980s. Nonetheless, the village and urban prose movements of the 1960s and 1970s demonstrated that socialist realism’s elasticity was greater than one might have imagined. Indeed, the traditional view that the artistic value of any work of socialist realism was compromised by virtue of the fact that it was Party-mandated, has lost some of its urgency. While not all works of socialist realism deserve attention and appreciation, many do. When coupled with the non–socialist realist works of this period, most notably Mikhail Bulgakov’s novel The Master and Margarita, we are left with a rich, variegated artistic legacy. Moreover, the fundamental fact that socialist realism changed with the ideological and political demands of a particular time period argues for an inherent organicity that infused the system since its inception. Our understanding and, perhaps, even appreciation of socialist realism has grown thanks not only to the post-glasnost flood of archival texts and documents, but also thanks to the broader vision that hindsight provides.

See also:

BULGAKOV, MIKHAIL AFANASIEVICH; GORKY,

MAXIM; MOTION PICTURES; RUSSIAN ASSOCIATION OF PROLETARIAN WRITERS; SAMIZDAT; SILVER AGE;

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tural Revolution in Russia, 1928–1931, ed. Sheila Fitzpatrick. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Clark, Katerina. (1985). The Soviet Novel: History as Ritual. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Dobrenko, Evgeny. (1997). The Making of the Soviet Reader. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Dobrenko, Evgeny. (2001). The Making of the Soviet Writer. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Ermolaev, Herman. (1963). Soviet Literary Theories, 1917–1934: The Genesis of Socialist Realism. University of California Publications in Modern Philology, no. 69. Berkeley: University of California Press. Golomshtock, Igor. (1990). Totalitarian Art in the Soviet Union, the Third Reich, Fascist Italy, and the People’s Republic of China, tr. Robert Chandler. London: Collins Harvill. Groys, Boris. (1992). The Total Art of Stalinism: AvantGarde, Aesthetic Dictatorship, and Beyond, tr. Charles Rougle. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Gunther, Hans, ed. (1990). The Culture of the Stalin Period. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Gutkin, Irina. (1999). The Cultural Origins of the Socialist Realist Aesthetic, 1890–1934. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. James, C. Vaughan. (1973). Soviet Socialist Realism: Origins and Theory. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Lahusen, Thomas. (1997). How Life Writes the Book: Real Socialism and Socialist Realism in Stalin’s Russia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Lahusen, Thomas, and Dobrenko, Evgeny, eds. (1997). Socialist Realism without Shores. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Reid, Susan E. (2001). “Socialist Realism in the Stalinist Terror: The Industry of Socialism Art Exhibition, 1935–1941.” Russian Review 60:153–184. Robin, Regine. (1992). Socialist Realism: An Impossible Aesthetic, tr. Catherine Porter. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Tertz, Abram [Andrei Sinyavsky]. (1982). The Trial Begins and On Socialist Realism, tr. Max Hayward and George Dennis. Berkeley: University of California Press.

SOLOVIEV, VLADIMIR SERGEYEVICH; THAW, THE;

CYNTHIA A. RUDER

ZHDANOV, ANDREI ALEXANDROVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brooks, Jeffrey. (1994). “Socialist Realism in Pravda: Read All About It.” Slavic Review 53(4):973–991. Carleton, Greg. (1994). “Genre in Socialist Realism.” Slavic Review 53(4):992–1009. Clark, Katerina. (1978). “Little Heroes and Big Deeds: Literature Responds to the First Five-Year Plan.” In Cul-

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SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARIES The Russian Socialist Revolutionary (SR) Party arose between 1900 and 1902. Industrial growth, peasant unrest, and the rise of the Marxist Social Democratic movement spurred an array of leaders

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from the earlier populist movement, as well as new figures, to create a party that adapted the older movement’s traditions to the new realities. Socialist Revolutionary ideology, organizational base, and personnel therefore reflected, but was not identical to nineteenth-century, Russian populism. The prime mover was Victor Chernov, the educated grandson of a serf. Chernov hailed from the Volga region, the new party’s first bastion. Chernov’s neo-populist theory maintained that industrialization had created a sizable proletariat and that the peasants had become a revolutionary class. In the SR view, a coalition of the radical intelligentsia, the industrial proletariat, and the peasants would make the coming revolution, whereas Russia’s middle class would remain quiescent. Consequently, the revolution would be socialist, hence the party’s title. This complex of views gave birth to a program aimed at propagandizing and recruiting workers, peasants, and intelligentsia. In addition, the SRs utilized terrorism to destabilize, rather then overthrow, the existing regime. The actual revolution, they insisted, would result from hard organizational work and a popular uprising. During the early 1900s, the party laid down a network of peasant-oriented organizations and in the cities challenged the Social Democrats among the proletariat. The SR Party won over some of the Social Democrats’ following through its popular terror program and appeal to both peasants and urban workers and as a result of splits within Social Democracy. By the 1905–1907 Revolution, the latter party still had an edge among the proletariat, but the SRs operated virtually unchallenged among the peasants. The SRs’ special attention to arming workers and peasants allowed them to play a lively role in armed struggles in Moscow, Saratov, and elsewhere during 1905. However, as Chernov later admitted, none of the socialists proved capable of uniting the opposition to overthrow the regime. Beginning in 1908, the Stolypin repression damaged all socialist organizations and destroyed SRoriented national peasant, railroad, and teachers’ unions. Debates and splits characterized party life, as the party put the terror program into abeyance. Furthermore, the revelation that party leader Evno Azev was a police spy further demoralized party cadres. Yet the party survived and plunged into the nascent labor movement. This tactic brought the SRs to virtual parity with the Social Democrats in many industrial areas and provided them with the means to become fully involved in the post-1912 revival of the revolutionary movement.

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The outbreak of the war in 1914 gave the regime its last opportunity to suppress the radical movement. Like the Social Democrats, the SRs split over the war issue. Leftists, known variously as Left SRs or SR-Internationalists, opposed the war, whereas Right SRs supported the government’s war effort. By 1916 the government’s ability to control the revolutionary movement waned. SR organizations opposed the war and propagandized revolution, often in coordination with Social Democrats. The February 1917 Revolution reflected protracted, sustained revolutionary activity, not least by SRs, who were also the revolution’s prime early beneficiaries. After tsarism’s fall, the SRs strove to reunite the party’s left, right, and center in order to dominate the new revolution. Moderate SRs and Mensheviks, in alliance with the liberals, soon led the Provisional Government, which the SR Alexander Kerensky headed after July. Still, the dedication of the moderate socialist-liberal coalition to pursuing the war gave ammunition to the Bolsheviks and the Left SRs, who began to call for soviet, socialist power. Leftist SRs gradually moved away from the moderate leadership, which by then included Chernov and other former radicals. By the fall of 1917, the SR-Mensheviks’ cooperation with the liberals discredited those parties in the eyes of many workers and soldiers, who supported the Bolsheviks and other leftists. During the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks removed the Provisional Government from power in the name of the soviets. Deprived of the reins of government, the SRs’ residual support from the peasantry held them in good stead in the November 1917 Constituent Assembly elections, a success that proved untranslatable into political power. After the Soviet government dismissed the Constituent Assembly in early January 1918, many SR delegates, including Chernov, formed a government in Samara that sought legitimacy in association with the Constitutional Assembly. This government, like other SR-oriented governments in Arkhangelsk and Siberia, failed to stand up to Red and White military forces, in part owing to the shift of peasant support to the Left SRs, now a separate party. By late 1918 the SR Party had once again become an underground resistance movement, in this case against the communists, a status that party leaders managed to sustain until 1922. Massive arrests and the famous SR trials of that year effectively ended the party’s existence inside Soviet Russia. Chernov and many leaders escaped and lived in the European and North American emigration but had no real influence from abroad. Although the SR approach had initially won the party a huge back-

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ing during 1917, its combined worker, peasant, and intelligentsia program proved too broad to exercise power. Likewise, Chernov’s post-October 1917 “third way,” which hoped to unite democratic elements of the population between the two extremes of Bolshevism and the reactionary Whites failed, to catch hold in the chaos of civil war.

See also: BOLSHEVISM; CHERNOV, VIKTOR MIKHAILOVICH; CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; FEBRUARY REVOLUTION; LEFT SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARIES; MENSHEVIKS; OCTOBER REVOLUTION; POPULISM; PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT; REVOLUTION OF 1905; SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC WORKERS PARTY BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hildermeier, Manfred. (2000). The Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party before the First World War. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Melancon, Michael. (1990). The Socialist Revolutionaries and the Russian Anti-War Movement, 1914–1917. Columbus: Ohio State University Press. Perrie, Maureen. (1976). The Agrarian Policies of the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party from its Origins through the Revolution of 1905–1907. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Radkey, Oliver. (1958). The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism: Promise and Default of the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries, February–October 1917. New York: Columbia University Press. Rice, Christopher. (1988). Russian Workers and the Socialist Revolutionary Party through the Revolution of 1905–1907. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan. MICHAEL MELANCON

SOKOLOVSKY, VASILY DANILOVICH (1897–1968), marshal of the Soviet Union (1946), military commander, and theoretician. Native of the Hrodna region, from a peasant family, Vasily Sokolovky entered the Red Army in February 1918 and studied in a short course for commanders. During the Civil War, he served with cavalry units. He later was transferred to central Asia and was attached to the Turkestan Military District and commanded units in Samarkand and Fergana, which were engaged in fighting against the Basmashi guerrillas. In 1921 he graduated from the military academy. Between 1922 and 1930, he served as chief of staff of a division and corps, and from 1930 to 1935 as commander of a division and chief of staff of the Volga, Ural, and Moscow Mili-

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tary Districts. He joined the Communist Party in 1931. Sokolovsky was fortunate not to come under suspicion during the Great Terror. In May 1940 he received the rank of lieutenant general. In February 1941 he was appointed as deputy chief of staff of the Red Army. In the beginning of the war, after Stalin ordered the arrest and execution of the leadership of the shattered West Front, Sokolovsky was appointed chief of staff of this front (July 1941– January 1942 and May 1942–February 1943). Along with these appointments, he was also the chief of staff of the Western Theater (July–October 1941 and May 1942). After the Battle of Moscow, the West Front, under Georgy Zhukov and Ivan Konev, failed in repeated attempts to break through the enemy lines, suffering massive losses for little gain, except for preventing the German units from being deployed elsewhere. Sokolovsky was involved in all these battles, and in February 1943, he was appointed commander of the West Front. His tenure in this position was marked by a lack of success even in sectors where the Red Army enjoyed a 10-1 superiority over the enemy. Sokolovsky was removed from command in April 1944 and replaced by Ivan Chernyakhovsky, and it was under his leadership that the West Front, now renamed the Third Belorussian Front, managed to roll over the enemy lines. During the great summer offensive of 1944, Sokolovsky returned to staff positions. He was attached to the First Ukrainian Front in April 1945 and took part in the Berlin Operation. Despite a rather undistinguished record during the war, Sokolovsky’s star rose in the postwar years. In 1945 he was Deputy Commander of the Soviet forces in Germany, and after Zhukov’s departure in 1946, the commander. In 1945 he also received the title of hero of the Soviet Union, a rarity for a staff officer. In 1946 Sokolovsky was elected to the Supreme Soviet. From 1946 to 1949 he was a member of the Allied Control Commission. In March 1946 he was the first deputy minister of the armed forces (from February 1950, war minister). In June 1952, he headed the General Staff and continued to hold the position after Stalin’s death until April 1960. He was also the first deputy war minister (from 1953, minister of defense). In 1952 he was elected to the Central Committee, but was demoted to candidate member in 1961. He was removed from active command in June 1960 and was attached to the Red Army inspectorate. He is buried at the Kremlin Wall. Sokolovsky’s fame rests mainly on his views on military strategy, published first in 1963, which have been studied in depth by Western strategists as the “Bible” of Soviet military doctrine.

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See also:

M O V E M E N T

MILITARY ART; MILITARY DOCTRINE; MILITARY,

SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET; WORLD WAR II BIBLIOGRAPHY

Sokolovskii, V. D. (1963). Soviet Military Strategy. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. MICHAEL PARRISH

SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT In the summer of 1980, Poland experienced labor unrest on an unprecedented scale. Faced with nationwide strikes, the ruling Communist Party was forced to sanction, for the first time in a Sovietbloc country, the creation of independent trade unions, free of state control. The emergence of the Solidarity trade union movement was viewed with acute anxiety by the leaders of Poland’s neighboring socialist states, the USSR in particular. How, given that the living and working conditions of Soviet workers were at least as bad as those of their Polish counterparts, could the development of similar labor unrest be forestalled in the USSR? The rise of Solidarity accordingly contributed to a far-reaching debate over political and economic reform in the USSR. The debate was even more significant since it occurred at a moment when the Soviet leadership was facing a major generational shift and concomitant power struggle. The aging leadership of Leonid Brezhnev had allowed social and economic problems to accumulate to such an extent that the USSR was experiencing stagnation in economic growth. This threatened the informal social contract between leaders and rank-and-file workers. In the early months of the Polish crisis (late 1980 and early 1981), after deciding against an invasion, the Brezhnev leadership adopted a series of stopgap measures to ward off the danger of contagion. For example, the jamming of Western radio broadcasts was resumed, while government financial priorities were revised to put increased emphasis on consumption. By the time martial law was declared in Poland in December 1981 it was clear that the danger of spillover to the USSR—if it ever existed—had been averted. Apart from a few isolated strikes and scattered leafleting in the USSR’s western republics, the Polish events evoked little sympathy among Soviet workers, who were inclined to believe that the USSR was subsidising its Warsaw Pact allies anyway.

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Faced with a continuing slowdown in the rate of economic growth, which was leading to stagnation, if not actual reduction, of popular living standards, the Soviet leadership abandoned carrots for sticks. This was exemplified by the brief leadership of Yuri Andropov (1982–1983), who launched a massive campaign to raise workplace discipline and crack down on crime, corruption, and alcoholism, with only limited results. The Polish events continued to reverberate when, in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became leader of the Soviet communist party. Gorbachev publicly identified himself with reformist Soviet academics who argued that the Polish crisis was attributable not simply to the mistakes of Poland’s leaders but to a general weakness afflicting all single-party, planned economies of the Soviet type. Members of the reformist camp used the Polish example to press for radical reforms of the Soviet political and economic system. The Polish experience can accordingly be said to have acted as a catalyst to Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring). Gorbachev’s efforts to persuade Soviet workers and managers to take responsibility for the quality of their work, in return for enhanced rewards, met first with apathy, then with hostility and resistance. Gradually he adopted more radical measures, culminating in his efforts to strip the communist party of its monopoly on power. In attacking the party, however, Gorbachev was attacking the mainspring of the Soviet system. The result was the collapse of the USSR itself.

See also:

GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; LABOR;

POLAND; TRADE UNIONS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Andrew, Christopher, and Mitrokhin, Vasili. (1999). The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West. London. London: Allen Lane/The Penguin Press. Teague, Elizabeth. (1988). Solidarity and the Soviet Worker: The Impact of the Polish Events of 1980 on Soviet Internal Politics. London: Croom Helm. ELIZABETH TEAGUE

SOLOVIEV, VLADIMIR SERGEYEVICH (1853–1900), philosopher, theologian, journalist, poet, literary critic.

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At the end of the nineteenth century, Vladimir Soloviev sought to counter the secular trend in Russian thought by articulating a world view grounded in Christianity. As a young man, Soloviev seemed destined to become the foremost academic philosopher of the Slavophile school, and his early works, such as The Crisis of Western Philosophy: Against the Positivists (1874), reflected Slavophile themes, but in time he gravitated from Slavophilism to Westernism, much like his father, the renowned historian Sergei Mikhailovich Soloviev. When Alexander II was assassinated in 1881, Soloviev called upon the new tsar to set an example of Christian forgiveness by sparing the lives of the terrorists. The ensuing scandal led to his exile from Russia’s government-controlled universities, a lifelong career as an independent writer, and eventually an association with the liberal journal Vestnik Evropy (European Messenger). Soloviev led an unconventional life as a kind of secular monk dedicated to intense intellectual work; the result was a remarkable output of philosophy, theology, poetry, literary criticism, and social commentary. Soloviev’s philosophical approach was a synthesis of Western philosophy (particularly German idealist thought) and the Orthodox faith in which he had been raised. His philosophical system emphasized the integration of science, philosophy, and religion. At the center of his philosophical outlook was the concept of the unity of all—the idea that the world was an Absolute in the process of becoming. On this basis, he developed a unique Christian metaphysics in his Lectures on God-Manhood (1877–1881). He argued that reality had been fractured by the Fall, and that history, the center of which was the Incarnation of Christ (the “Godman”), was a process leading to renewal of the unity of all. In this work, he also introduced the elusive concept of Sophia, which at various times he referred to as the “world soul,” the ideal of a perfect humanity, and the “eternal feminine” principle in the Divine. Soloviev’s fascination with Sophia was reflected in personal mystical experience. His reputation as a mystic derived from his poetry, most famously the poem “Three Meetings,” in which he described three encounters with Sophia, first as a young boy, then during his studies in the British Museum, and finally in the Egyptian desert. Meanwhile Soloviev was developing a liberal theology similar to the Social Gospel movement in the West. He criticized conservative intellectuals for compromising the moral claims of the Gospels, and

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advocated unification of the Roman Catholic and Russian Orthodox churches. Soloviev’s enthusiastic ecumenism provoked a nationalist backlash, which in turn led to his Christian critique of nationalism (The National Question in Russia, 2 vols., 1888, 1891). Soloviev went on to produce a wideranging ethical treatise, The Justification of the Good (1897), in which he provided an overall theory as well as practical discussion of such issues as nationalism, capitalism, and war. He also contributed to the development of a liberal philosophy of law in Russia. In the year of his untimely death at age fortyseven, Soloviev published Three Conversations on War, Progress, and the End of History, a controversial work of fiction that questioned the efficacy of human action in an evil world. The work concluded with “The Short Tale of the Anti-Christ,” a futuristic story about the end of the world. Some scholars argue that Soloviev here rejected his liberal theology, but others contend that the central meaning of the story is consistent with his earlier work, because a unified, truly ecumenical humanity triumphs. A uniquely independent thinker during his life, Soloviev had great influence after his death. His theology inspired social activism among some Orthodox clergy, a trend cut short by the Bolshevik Revolution. His philosophy paved the way for Orthodox thinkers like Sergei Bulgakov and Pavel Florensky. His mystical poetry inspired symbolists like Alexander Blok and Andrei Bely. And after the Soviet Union came to an end, many Russians returned to Soloviev as a guidepost for creating a new Russian philosophy.

See also:

BELY, ANDREI; BLOK, ALEXANDER ALEXAN-

DROVICH; BULGAKOV, SERGEI NIKOLAYEVICH; ORTHODOXY; SILVER AGE

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Copleston, Frederic C. (1986). Philosophy in Russia: From Herzen to Berdyaev. Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press. Gaut, Greg. (1998). “Can a Christian Be a Nationalist? Vladimir Soloviev’s Critique of Nationalism.” Slavic Review 57:77–94. Groberg, Kristi A. (1992). “The Feminine Occult Sophia in the Russian Religious Renaissance: A Bibliographic Essay.” Canadian-American Slavic Studies. 26:197–240. Kline, George L. (1985). “Russian Religious Thought.” In Nineteenth Century Religious Thought in the West. Vol.

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2, ed. Ninian Smart. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Kornblatt, Judith, and Gustafson, Richard, eds. (1996). Russian Religious Thought. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Sutton, Jonathan. (1988). The Religious Philosophy of Vladimir Soloviev: Towards a Reassessment. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

ers. Abandoned soon afterward, Solovki was reopened as a museum in the 1970s, then closed again until the end of Soviet rule, when it was reopened to the public.

See also:

KIRILL-BELOOZERO MONASTERY; MONASTICISM;

OLD BELIEVERS; SIMONOV MONASTERY; TRINITY ST. SERGIUS MONASTERY

Walicki, Andrzej. (1987). Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. GREG GAUT

SOLOVKI ISLAND See

GULAG.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Michels, Georg. (1992). “The Solovki Uprising: Religion and Revolt in Northern Russia.” Russian Review 51:1–15. Spock, Jennifer B. (1999). “The Solovki Monastery, 1460–1645: Piety and Patronage in the Early Modern Russian North.” Ph.D. diss. Yale University. JENNIFER B. SPOCK

SOLOVKI MONASTERY Located on the Solovki Archipelago in the White Sea, the Solovki (Solovetsk) monastery was founded between 1429 and 1436 by the hermits Savaty and German, followed by the monk and future abbot Zosima. By the early sixteenth century, Savaty and Zosima had become the patron saints of the White Sea region. Solovki, also a garrison, was one of Russia’s most important cloisters with extensive territories, earning income from trade, salt, fishing, and rents. Metropolitan Phillip II of Moscow contributed significantly to Solovki’s architectural development while serving as abbot (1546–1566). Its monastic rule, formulated in the late sixteenth or early seventeenth century, became a template for later communities. Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich’s troops besieged Solovki from 1668 to 1676 in a conflict traditionally linked to Old Belief. Solovki’s leaders and a large part of the brotherhood first accepted, then rejected, Patriarch Nikon’s liturgical reforms. However, rebellion against central authority combined religious concerns with anti-Moscow sentiment fostered by political exiles imprisoned at Solovki. After their defeat, many monks left, ultimately to swell the number of trans-Volga elders—hermits who served as spiritual fathers to disaffected Orthodox communities.

SOLZHENITSYN, ALEXANDER ISAYEVICH (b. 1918), Nobel Laureate for Literature, one of the most prominent Soviet dissidents of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Alexander Solzhenitsyn was born in the southern resort town of Kislovodsk. His father, a tsarist officer, died before his birth, and he was raised by his mother in Rostov-On-Don. He studied math and physics at Rostov University and was married in 1940 to his first wife, Natalia Reshetovskaya. Solzhenitsyn served as an artillery officer in the Red Army during World War II and was arrested by the secret police in February 1945 for criticizing Josef Stalin in his personal correspondence.

Solovki remained an active monastery and popular pilgrimage site until the October Revolution, after which the Soviet government transformed it into a military training camp. It became a labor camp in the 1920s and 1930s for political prison-

Solzhenitsyn was sentenced to eight years, which he served in a number of facilities, including a sharashka (a special scientific installation/ prison) and a labor camp in Kazakhstan. He was released from the camp system in February 1953, and then was sent into enforced internal exile in rural Kazakhstan, where he taught high school. Solzhenitsyn was diagnosed and treated for cancer during this period. He also reconciled with his wife, from whom he was divorced during his imprisonment. He was allowed to move to Ryazan, where he taught physics, after his conviction was overturned in 1957.

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ONE DAY IN THE LIFE OF IVAN DENISOVICH

Solzhenitsyn burst abruptly onto the national and international stages in November 1962, with the publication of his novella One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, in the journal Novy mir (New World). This deceptively simple novella describes a normal day in the life of a prisoner in a Soviet forcedlabor camp in the early 1950s. It was the first work he had submitted for publication, though he had been writing for thirty years. Novy mir’s chief editor, Andrei Tvardovsky, passed the story on to one of Nikita Khrushchev’s aides. Khrushchev, who had started a second round of de-Stalinization in 1961, personally approved its publication, which would have been impossible otherwise. The publication of Ivan Denisovich caused a sensation. Although millions of Soviet citizens had been released from the camps or internal exile in the late 1950s, the topic had never been discussed publicly. The novella immediately sold out several press-runs totaling almost a million copies, provoking widespread discussion. Many liberal Soviet intellectuals hoped, in vain, that its appearance presaged a further loosening of artistic controls. It was also translated into numerous foreign languages and held up as a triumph of Soviet art. The combination of the novella’s content and artistic quality made Solzhenitsyn an internationally recognized writer. He published several short stories in the months that followed, all in Novy mir.

SOLZHENITSYN AS A DISSIDENT

The ten years after 1963 saw a rapid deterioration of the relationship between Solzhenitsyn and the Soviet leadership, devolving into open hostility by 1969. A crackdown against outspoken writers began in late 1963 and intensified greatly after Khrushchev was ousted from power in 1964. In this new environment, Solzhenitsyn was unable to publish anything, including two new semiautobiographical novels: The First Circle, based on his sharashka experiences, and Cancer Ward, both of which were highly critical of the Soviet system. Their publication, even in revised form, was blocked by Party hardliners, who instead tried to coerce Solzhenitsyn to write more positive works about the Soviet Union. In the meantime, some of Solzhenitsyn’s works began to circulate in samizdat, and a few were published abroad without his permission. These developments, along with the accidental discovery by

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Alexander Solzhenitsyn holds his first press conference in the West after being expelled from the Soviet Union in 1974. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS

the KGB of some of his most critical writings in 1965, led to a hardening of official attitudes towards Solzhenitsyn. In 1967, Solzhenitsyn attacked the powerful Union of Soviet Writers, criticizing it for persecuting writers on behalf of the state, instead of protecting their artistic freedom. Solzhenitsyn’s approval of the foreign publication of Cancer Ward, The First Circle, and other works, created further friction. Party and state officials responded by launching an escalating campaign of harassment, slander, and threats, including his expulsion from the Writers’ Union in 1969. Although Solzhenitsyn was part of a larger dissident movement of the 1960s and 1970s, he was unique in a number of ways. His international prominence, which only grew after he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1970, protected him from arrest, and allowed him to be more confrontational in his actions than most other dissidents. It also allowed him access to Western reporters.

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Solzhenitsyn also had his own unique political agenda. While most Soviet dissidents focused on the need for basic human rights, by the early 1970s Solzhenitsyn began to focus on the issue of morality. He believed that the Russian people could only be saved by a rejection of Bolshevik ideas and the resurrection of what he considered a unique set of moral values developed in Russia over centuries under the influence of Orthodox Christianity. He looked to pre-Revolutionary Russia for guidance, not to the West; indeed, he believed that these Russian spiritual values could save the West as well. Solzhenitsyn criticized Western culture for its decadence and argued it was weakening the United States to the point where it would soon no longer be able to stand up to the communist threat. He denounced the policy of détente, saying that the Soviet Union was using the process to take advantage of the United States’ weakness. Solzhenitsyn’s religiously tinged nationalism was similar to that of the nineteenth-century Slavophile movement. Although hinted at in interviews, Solzhenitsyn’s philosophical opinions only became widely known after his arrival in the West in 1974.

THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO

In the mid-1960s, Solzhenitsyn began work on a project titled The Gulag Archipelago. The title referred to the extensive system of prisons and forcedlabor camps that had begun shortly after 1917 and expanded dramatically under Stalin; the term Gulag was the Russian acronym for the Main Directorate for Camps. The book, which Solzhenitsyn termed “an experiment in literary investigation,” was based on his own experiences and those of over two hundred former prisoners. This epic work eventually ran to three large volumes. Although the manuscript was completed and copies smuggled to the West in 1968, Solzhenitsyn delayed its publication abroad until the end of 1973, when his hand was forced by the KGB’s seizure of a manuscript copy. The Gulag Archipelago was by far Solzhenitsyn’s most damning work on the Soviet system. It described, in horrifying detail, the ordeal that prisoners underwent, from arrest through life in the camps, including the systematic use of torture and attempts to dehumanize prisoners. It also argued that the organized use of state terror was an integral part of Soviet communism from the start, and that Stalin only expanded the system created by Vladimir Lenin. Solzhenitsyn predicted, correctly,

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that the appearance of this work would intensify state actions against him; he was arrested and expelled from the Soviet Union shortly after its publication in the West. The publication of the Gulag Archipelago’s first volume had a huge impact outside the Soviet bloc, particularly in Europe and the United States, where it sold millions of copies. It is widely considered to have done more than any other single book to shatter Western illusions about the nature of the Soviet dictatorship. The term Gulag entered widespread use in many languages. The book’s influence was particularly strong in France, where many intellectuals had remained sympathetic to Soviet communism until its publication. The book’s impact was heightened by its presentation, which mixed fiery rhetoric with literary skills, separating it from standard historical writings. Appropriately, Solzhenitsyn used his profits from the project to aid the families of jailed Soviet dissidents. Many readers were overwhelmed by the book’s size, however, and sales of the next two volumes were considerably lower. Although some of Solzhenitsyn’s specific facts and details are now contested, the Gulag Archipelago remains one of the definitive works on the Soviet prison system.

EXILE AND RETURN

In February 1974 Solzhenitsyn was arrested, charged with treason, stripped of his Soviet citizenship, and expelled to West Germany. Party leaders believed that exiling Solzhenitsyn would be less damaging to their international reputation than sending him to prison. His second wife, Natalia Svetlova, and their sons were allowed to follow him a short time later. After a brief period in Europe, Solzhenitsyn moved to the United States, settling in Vermont. After a tumultuous reception, Western sympathies towards Solzhenitsyn cooled after he articulated his moral philosophy in a series of articles and lectures, which concluded with his 1978 Graduation Address at Harvard. His attacks on Western culture alienated many, and he eventually withdrew into self-imposed seclusion in Vermont, where he worked on his Red Wheel series of novels. Solzhenitsyn also engaged in heated polemics with members of the dissident and emigré communities who disagreed with his views and tactics. In 1989 Solzhenitsyn’s writings began to appear in the Soviet Union, starting with The Gulag

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Archipelago. Although he published some additional articles in the Soviet press, his absence from the scene limited his influence during the period of transition. Solzhenitsyn finally returned to Russia, amid great publicity, in 1994. Upon his return, he had a short-lived television talk show (1994–1995) and published several books. His didactic style has limited his audience, however, and he has had relatively little influence on Russian society since his return. Solzhenitsyn continues writing; one of his works, Dvesti let vmeste (Two Hundred Years Together, 2000), revived old accusations of antiSemitism, charges which Solzhenitsyn and many observers reject as false.

See also:

DISSIDENT MOVEMENT; GULAG; NATIONALISM

IN THE ARTS; NOVY MIR; SAMIZDAT; SLAVOPHILES; UNION OF SOVIET WRITERS BIBLIOGRAPHY

Pearce, Joseph. (1999). A Soul in Exile. London: HarperCollins. Remnick, David. (1997). Resurrection: The Struggle for a New Russia. New York: Random House. Scammell, Michael. (1984). Solzhenitsyn: A Biography. New York: Norton. Scammell, Michael, ed. and intro. (1995). The Solzhenitsyn Files, tr. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick et. al. Chicago: Edition. Solzhenitsyn, Alexander Isaevich. (1963). One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, tr. Ralph Parker. New York: Dutton. Solzhenitsyn, Alexander Isaevich. (1968). Cancer Ward, tr. Nicholas Bethell and David Burg. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Solzhenitsyn, Alexander Isaevich. (1968). The First Circle, tr. Thomas P. Whitney. New York: Harper & Row. Solzhenitsyn, Alexander Isaevich. (1974–1978). The Gulag Archipelago. 3 vols., tr. Thomas P. Whitney (vol. 1–2), H. T. Willets (vol. 3). New York: Harper & Row. Solzhenitsyn, Alexander Isaevich. (1980). East and West. New York: Harper Perennial. Solzhenitsyn, Alexander Isaevich. (1980). The Oak and the Calf: A Memoir, tr. Harry Willetts. New York: Harper & Row.

R U S S I A N

The fifth daughter of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich and his first wife Maria Miloslavskaya, Sophia spent her youth in the terem, where her freedom was restricted, but she also came into contact with the new cultural trends of Tsar Alexei’s later years. Many historians describe her as a pupil of Simeon Polotsky, but, although she was literate, there is no hard evidence that she studied with him. Those who regard Sophia as ambitious believe that she prepared for power during the reign of her brother Tsar Fyodor (r. 1676–1682) by attending his sickbed and making political alliances, notably with Prince Vasily Golitsyn, whose lover she is said to have became. However, evidence of an intimate relationship, which would have seriously breached Muscovite moral codes, rests mainly on hearsay and rumor, as do Sophia’s early political ambitions. Following Fyodor’s death in 1682, in the absence of mature males of royal blood, Sophia entered the political arena, as Muscovite conventions allowed royal women to do. She was motivated by the decision to make her half-brother Peter (b. 1672) sole ruler in preference to the elder, but physically and mentally handicapped, Tsarevich Ivan (b. 1666). Exploiting the Moscow militia’s (musketeers’) action to air grievances and take revenge on unpopular officers and officials in Peter’s government, in May 1682 Sophia and her party were able to secure Ivan’s accession as joint tsar with Peter. Most historians refer to Sophia as regent to her brothers, although she was never formally appointed as such. Even so, she was widely regarded as ruler and consolidated her authority by successfully quelling the continuation of musketeer unrest in 1682 during the period known as the Khovanshchina. She began to add her name to those of her brothers in royal edicts and to take part in public ceremonies and receptions, discarding some of the restrictions of the terem.

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Thomas, D. M. (1998). Alexander Solzhenitsyn: A Century in His Life. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

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(1657–1704); regent to Tsars Ivan V and Peter I, 1682–1689.

The dual monarchy required a new configuration of power at court in order to defuse tensions and achieve a consensus. Many additional men were promoted to boyar status. The ascendancy of the Miloslavsky clan was marginal, and by the late 1680s they lost ground to Peter’s maternal relatives the Naryshkins and their clients. Sophia relied on Prince Vasily Golitsyn to spearhead both her foreign and her domestic policy, although later the

Solzhenitsyn, Alexander Isaevich. (1995). The Russian Question at the End of the Twentieth Century, tr. Yermolai Solzhenitsyn. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

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higher education, the Slavo-Greco-Latin Academy, founded in 1685, also relied on foreign teachers. Like many powerful women, Sophia has been accused of Machiavellian tendencies. Although there is no evidence that she intended Peter harm, she did adopt a highly visible rulership profile and began to use the feminine form of the title “autocrat” (samoderzhitsa). She sponsored an impressive building program in the fashionable Moscow Baroque style and had her portrait with crown, orb, and scepter painted and reproduced in prints. Poets praised her, playing on the associations of her name (Sophia the Holy Wisdom). All this fueled fears that she planned to be crowned and spawned rumors of plots against Peter and his mother. Ultimately, her regime was undermined by the failure of two military campaigns against the Crimea in 1687 and 1689, leading to a standoff provoked by Peter’s supporters. This time the musketeers’ support for Sophia was lukewarm and did not quell her opponents. Some of her supporters were executed, and Sophia herself was banished to a convent. In 1698 the musketeers rebelled again. Rumors circulated that Sophia was the instigator, but the evidence was inconclusive. Nevertheless, Peter forced her to take the veil under the name Susannah. She died in the Novodevichy convent in Moscow in 1704. Portrait of Regent Sophia Alexeyevna by Ilya Repin. © ARCHIVO ICONOGRAFICO, S.A./CORBIS

See also:

FYODOR ALEXEYEVICH; GOLITSYN, VASILY

VASILIEVICH; IVAN V; PETER I; STRELTSY

secretary Fyodor Shaklovity rose to prominence. The regime’s crowning achievement was the 1686 treaty with Poland, which ratified the Treaty of Andrusovo (1667) in return for Russia’s agreement to sever relations with the Ottoman empire and enter the Holy League, a stepping-stone toward Russia’s ascendancy over Poland, achieved later in Peter I’s reign. At home, efforts continued to maximize the fulfillment of service requirements and the payment of tax liabilities and to maintain law and order. Mildness in some areas, for example banning the cruel practice of burying alive women who murdered their husbands, was offset by savage penalties against Old Believers (edict of 1685). At the same time, developments in foreign policy forced the regime to relax restrictions on non-Orthodox foreigners, which annoyed conservatives. Russia offered sanctuary from persecution to French Protestants and made concessions to foreign merchants and industrialists to encourage them to set up businesses. In 1689 commercial treaties were signed with Prussia. Russia’s first institute of

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hughes, Lindsey. (1988). “’Ambitious and Daring Above her Sex’: Tsarevna Sophia Alekseevna (1657–1704) in Foreigners’ Accounts.” Oxford Slavonic Papers 21: 65–89. Hughes, Lindsey. (1990). Sophia: Regent of Russia, 1657–1704. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Thyret, Isolde. (2000). Between God and Tsar. Religious Symbolism and Royal Women of Muscovite Russia. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. LINDSEY HUGHES

SORGE, RICHARD (1895–1944), Soviet spy. Richard Sorge was born to a German family in Baku. His father was a petroleum engineer and his grandfather, Friedrich Sorge (1828–1906), a col-

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league of Marx. In 1910 the family returned to Germany, where Sorge later studied in Berlin and Hamburg Universities. Drafted into the German army, he was a participant in World War I, and the combat experience converted him to socialism. In 1919 he joined the Communist Party of Germany. He held various positions as teacher and miner before returning to the Soviet Union in 1924, where a year later he joined the Communist Party and worked for various institutions before joining the military intelligence (GRU) in 1929. His duties took him to London and Los Angeles, and in 1930 to China. Returning to Germany, he established contacts with the military intelligence and Gestapo and was sent undercover as a journalist to Tokyo, and eventually as the press attaché in the German embassy. His scandalous life, which included heavy drinking and several affairs, served as a cover for his activities as a Soviet agent. The German military attaché was the source of much information, and through him, Sorge found out the plans for Operation Barbarrossa and duly informed Moscow. This news went counter to Josef Stalin’s belief, who did not anticipate war in 1941, and he even thought Sorge was a double agent. Beria also discounted similar reports from his own agents in Germany, which confirmed Sorge’s warnings. The end result was the greatest military disaster to befall the Soviet Union, when Hitler attacked as Sorge had reported. In his work, Sorge received help from the Japanese communists and from his radio operator, Max Klausen (1899–1979). Born in Germany, Klausen immigrated to the Soviet Union in 1927 and a year later joined the military intelligence. After serving in China, he was sent to Japan in September 1935, where he joined up with Sorge. Like Sorge, he was arrested in 1941, but he survived and lived in East Germany. Sorge’s loose life finally brought him to the attention of the Japanese counterintelligence, which arrested him in October 1941. After two years in prison, Sorge was sentenced to death on September 29, 1943, and was hanged. There is no evidence that the Soviet government in any way intervened in his behalf, and in fact, Sorge’s long-suffering wife, E. A. Maximova (1909–1943), was arrested (September 4, 1942) by the NKVD and perished in prison camp. Only during Nikita Khrushchev’s Thaw were Sorge’s services to the Soviet Union recognized, and on November 11, 1962, he was posthumously awarded the title of hero of the Soviet Union, and his wife was rehabilitated. Sorge’s life has been subject of numerous books, but his legacy remains that of one of the greatest intelligence

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coups of all time gone to waste because those in the position of power failed to heed it.

See also: MILITARY INTELLIGENTSIA; STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF; WORLD WAR II BIBLIOGRAPHY

Johnson, Chalmers. (1990). An Instance of Treason: Ozaki Hotsumi and the Tokyo Spy Ring. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Whymant, Robert. (1996). Stalin’s Spy: Richard Sorge and the Tokyo Spy Ring. London: I. B. Tauris. MICHAEL PARRISH

SOROKOUST The sorokoust, or forty divine liturgies (i.e., eucharistic services), is a series of orthodox liturgical commemorations celebrated in memory of a dead person. The number forty derives from the Orthodox tradition that it takes the soul forty days to reach the throne of God. Because of the similarity in sound, it is sometimes thought that the term is connected to the Russian sorok, “forty,” and usta, “month,” but in fact it derives from the Middle Greek sarakoste, “forty” (ancient Greek thessarakoste). The forty liturgies are part of the standard Orthodox ritual for the dead, corresponding genetically and functionally to the Catholic tricenarius, or thirty masses. A tale from the Dialogues of Pope Gregory the Great (590– 604) about the helpfulness of the thirty masses for the souls of the departed (bk. IV, chap. 57) appears in Greek and Russian manuscripts with the number changed to forty. The first Old Russian sources that mention the sorokoust date from twelfth-century Novgorod. Canonical texts decry the practice of arranging for sorokousty in advance of a person’s death or even of celebrating them while the person is still alive. Last wills and testaments from Muscovite Russia frequently provide for comparatively small donations to be distributed by the departed’s executor to as many as forty churches where sorokousty were to be celebrated for the departed. A more limited version of the sorokoust, a commemoration in the regular liturgy for forty days, is still practiced in the early twenty-first century in Russian Orthodox churches.

See also:

ORTHODOXY; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH;

SINODIK

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Steindorff, Ludwig. (1994). Memoria in Altrußland. Stuttgart: Steiner. LUDWIG STEINDORFF

SOSKOVETS, OLEG NIKOLAYEVICH (b. 1949), industrialist, inventor, powerful minister in the Russian government from 1993 to 1996. Trained as a metallurgical engineer, from 1971 until 1991 Oleg Soskovets worked at the Karaganda Metallurgical Factory in Kazakhstan, rising from the shop floor to become the general director in 1988. In 1991 a police investigation of financial abuses led to the arrest of several of his colleagues, but he himself was not prosecuted. In 1989 he was elected to the newly formed USSR Congress of People’s Deputies, and in 1991 he served briefly as minister of metallurgy in the USSR government. In January 1992 President Boris Yeltsin named him to head a state metallurgy commission, but that spring he was made deputy prime minister and minister of industry in the government of Kazakhstan. Again, he left after a few months, when the attorney general’s office reopened the factory corruption case.

work for the Association of Financial-Industrial Groups, of which he became chairman in 1995. Press and TV exposés linked him to allegedly criminal activity by the Mafia-connected brothers Mikhail and Lev Chernoi, colleagues of his in the metals industry. Although he made no effective response to the charges, he was not prosecuted.

See also: KORZHAKOV, ALEXANDER VASILIEVICH; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH BIBLIOGRAPHY

Reddaway, Peter, and Glinski, Dmitri. (2001). The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press. PETER REDDAWAY

SOSLOVIE By the mid-nineteenth century, the term soslovie (pl. sosloviya) had come to designate hereditary groups such as the nobility, clergy, townspeople, and peasantry. Although soslovie is often regarded as the Russian equivalent to West European terms (the English estate, the French état, and the German Stand), it differed from these in several important respects.

After this, Soskovets became an assistant to Mayor Yuri Luzhkov of Moscow and continued his

Above all, the term appeared quite belatedly— in its modern sense only in the early nineteenth century. In contrast to medieval Europe, where estates had long been the basis of the social hierarchy, medieval Muscovy knew nothing similar—in language or social reality—to the corporate estates of Western Europe. Instead, just as the Muscovite state had “gathered in” principalities and lands, so too had it accumulated but not amalgamated disparate status groups based on occupation, residence, and ethnicity. Indeed, one lexicon of Muscovite language recorded nearly five hundred status groups. Although Muscovy sometimes used generic terms like chin (rank) to designate elite groups and bifurcated society into “service” (sluzhilye) and tax-bearing (tiaglye) categories, it recognized the distinct status of individual groups. Characteristically, even the nobility lacked a collective name; the service people (sluzhilye liudi) remained kaleidoscopic: elite princely clans and aristocratic boyars at the apex, with marginal, interstitial groups such as singlehomesteaders (odnodvortsy) and musketeers (streltsy) at the bottom. The peasantry, similarly, consisted of various groups, from serfs and indentured slaves to crown and state peasants.

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Named to head a state committee on metallurgy, Soskovets returned to Moscow in October 1992, only for Yeltsin five months later to appoint him deputy prime minister and overseer of Russian industry. He became close to Yeltsin’s security aide Alexander Korzhakov and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, and chaired government meetings in the latter’s absence. He was a hawk on the first Chechnya war, and in February 1995 Yeltsin sent him to Chechnya with the thankless task of restoring economic and social life in the still war-torn republic. Later, unanswered allegations suggested that he had profited handsomely from the government cash sent to Chechnya for reconstruction. Over time, Korzhakov started pressing Yeltsin to replace Chernomyrdin with Soskovets. In January 1996 Yeltsin named him to head the campaign for Yeltsin’s reelection. However, Soskovets and Korzhakov favored postponement of the election, fearing that Yeltsin might lose. Eventually forced into a runoff, Yeltsin fired them both in June.

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Desperate to mobilize human resources, the eighteenth-century state sought to simplify this social order. One key impulse came from Peter the Great’s new poll tax, which forced the state to identify the specific subgroups of the privileged and to merge the numerous categories of the disprivileged. Amalgamation was first apparent in collective terms for the privileged nobility, initially as shlyakhetstvo (a Polish loanword) and by midcentury as dvoryanstvo, the modern term. From the 1760s, chiefly in an effort to transplant West European models of an urban third estate, some officials groped for a new terminology, but did not settle upon a generic term to describe and aggregate the smaller social units. Only in the first decades of the nineteenth century did the term soslovie finally emerge in its modern sense. The word had earlier denoted “gathering” or “assembly,” but nothing so abstract as corporate estate. In the early nineteenth century, however, the term soslovie came to signify not only formal institutions (such as the Senate), but also corporate social groups. Although other, competing terms still existed (such as zvanie and sostoianie to designate occupation and status groups), the term soslovie became—in law, state policy, and educated parlance—the fundamental category to describe huge social aggregates such as the nobility. The new terminology gained formal recognition in a new edition (1847) of the Academy dictionary of the Russian language, which defined soslovie as “a category of people with a special occupation, distinguished from others by their special rights and obligations.” The term not only persisted, but conveyed extraordinary intensity and complexity. Soslovie was more than a mere juridical category; it signified a group so hermetically sealed, so united by kinship and culture that some lexicographers invoked the word caste (kasta) as a synonym. The estate system, moreover, proved highly adaptable: New status groups—privileged subgroups (i.e., merchants), ethnic groups (i.e., Jews), and new professions (i.e., doctors)—became distinct sosloviya. The proliferation of estates reflected the regime’s desire to fit other groups into the existing soslovie order, as well as the ambition of these groups to gain formal legal status. Hence the complex of Russian sosloviya was far more differentiated and protean than a simplistic four-estate paradigm would suggest. The soslovie system reached its apogee, in legal recognition, lexical clarity, and social reality, in

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the mid-nineteenth century, but it was increasingly subject to erosion and challenge. In part, the regime itself—which had celebrated the soslovie as a bulwark of social stability against the revolutionary forces sweeping Western Europe—concluded that some social mobility and change was essential for the country’s development and power. To be sure, the Great Reforms of the 1860s made the inclusion of all estates (vsesoslovnost) a fundamental principle; the reforms sought not to abolish estates but to mobilize them all, whether for supporting new institutions (e.g., the organs of local self-government) or for supplying soldiers and officers for the army. But the emergence of revolutionary movements increased the regime’s concern about social stability and, especially from the 1880s, inspired much rhetoric and some measures to reaffirm the soslovie order. At the same time, modernizing processes like urbanization and industrialization were steadily eroding the soslovie boundaries. Rapid economic growth, in particular, had a critical, corrosive impact: the plethora of new professions and semiprofessions, together with the rapid growth of the industrial labor force, undermined the significance of the estate marker. Not that the soslovie was irrelevant; it was still the only category in passports, it was often correlated with opportunity and occupation, and it bore connotations of prestige or stigma. Nevertheless, social identities became blurred and confused; profession and property, not estate origin, became increasingly important in defining status and identity. As a result, by the early twentieth century, the distinctive feature of Russian society was the amorphousness and fluidity of social identities. In contrast to the traditional Western paradigm (“estates into classes”), Russian society exhibited a complex of “estates and classes,” with mixed and overlapping identities. The government itself, with its franchise laws and policies in the wake of the 1905 Revolution, came increasingly to count upon property, not hereditary status, in allocating electoral power and defining its social base. The privileged, such as conservative nobles, fought to preserve the soslovie order; the propertied and progressive deemed abolition of sosloviya a precondition for the creation of a modern civil society. Although the Bolshevik regime on October 28, 1917, dissolved all estate distinctions (one of its first acts), it did not in fact dispense with this category as it endeavored to identify adversaries. Hence personnel documents, from university applications to judicial

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records, regularly required information about the prerevolutionary soslovie status—an unwitting testimony to the enduring significance ascribed to soslovie in the formation of social identities.

See also:

ALEXANDER II; ALEXANDER III; CLASS SYSTEM;

GREAT REFORMS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Freeze, Gregory L. (1986). “The Soslovie (Estate) Paradigm and Russian Social History.” American Historical Review 91:11–36. Wirtschafter, Elise K. (1997). Social Identity in Imperial Russia. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. GREGORY L. FREEZE

SOUL TAX The soul tax (podushnaya podat) was a capitation or poll tax levied on peasant communes and some urban inhabitants according to the number of males of all ages, as estimated by the periodic censuses (revizy) that began in 1718. Enacted by Peter the Great by decree on January 11, 1722, the poll tax was intended to maintain the armed forces in the peasants’ vicinity. For example, the support of an infantry soldier required payments from about thirty-six “souls.” During the Muscovite and early Petrine period there were numerous exemptions to the land and household (dvor) taxes, but by the mid-eighteenth century all peasants, whether private, state, or church, were supposed to pay around eighty kopeks. The latter two categories of enserfed peasants also paid rent (obrok) of 1.5 (later, 2) rubles, as well as some dues in kind. They could be drafted for work on roads and canals, for example.

tax even though it would have been more in their interest to raise rents instead. Since some males were either too young or too old to have income, the head of household had to pay for everyone. While the soul tax appeared to be per head, the village commune often distributed the burden on an ability-to-pay basis. The rate of tax per male soul, however, was fixed, as increases were considered politically dangerous, so higher yields came mainly from population growth. Efforts were made at each census, or revisia, to reduce the taxexempt population. All “idling” and “free” persons were included, as well as peasants of many kinds, including bondsmen (kholopi). The revenue from tax and rents, however, failed to cover the cost of the standing army during peacetime, not to mention the great expenditures of the Northern War, which may have actually reduced the taxable population. Owing to the tax and labor burdens imposed on them, then as well as later on, many peasants fled to the borderlands and across the frontier. The soul tax had obvious administrative advantages over the previous household tax. Under the new system, young men could not avoid paying tax simply by postponing their departure from the ancestral home, as they could under the household tax. Nor could peasants combine nuclear families into one extended household for the purpose of avoiding tax.

At first the soul tax was collected by military units directly. Subsequently the serf owners had to collect the tax for their private serfs, and district administrators collected it for state or church serfs in their jurisdiction. Landowners collected the soul

Russian historians of an earlier era considered the poll tax an increased burden on peasant households, but this seems unlikely, since the apex of war expenses and innovative kinds of taxes was reached in the years 1705 to 1715. For most serfs the monetary liability (as distinct from taxes in kind) under the poll tax appears to have been slightly lower than under the household tax. Furthermore, because the poll tax was the same regardless of the amount of land cultivated, there was an incentive to increase arable land at the expense of waste, and, in fact, the amount of cultivated land did increase during this period. That the poll tax is remembered as harsh is explained by the poor grain harvests of the time, which required peasants to buy food at high prices. After Peter’s death in 1725 the poll tax rate was lowered to seventy-four, then seventy kopeks, but during Catherine II’s reign it was raised to one ruble. The highly destructive Napoleonic Wars saw a further increase to two, then three rubles. The poll tax was eliminated between 1883 and 1886, but land taxes and redemption payments continued to the end of the empire.

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The rates of money taxation differed considerably depending on the class of taxpayer. Court, ecclesiastical, and state peasants, including free settlers (odnodvortsy), were supposed to pay about four times the rate for private serfs; merchants and burghers paid somewhat less—about triple the rate for private serfs. Nobles, officials, and clergy were exempt from the poll tax.

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See also:

CATHERINE II; GREAT NORTHERN WAR; PEAS-

ANTRY; PETER I; TAXES

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See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; FEBRUARY REVOLUTION; OCTOBER REVOLUTION; PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT; REVOLUTION OF 1905

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kahan, Arcadius. (1985). The Plow, the Hammer, and the Knout: An Economic History of Eighteenth-Century Russia. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Anweiler, Oskar. (1974). The Soviets: The Russian Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers Councils, 1905–1921, tr. Ruth Hein. New York: Pantheon Books.

Lyashchenko, Peter I. (1949). History of the National Economy of Russia to the 1917 Revolution, tr. Leon M. Herman. New York: Macmillan. MARTIN C. SPECHLER

DAVID PRETTY

SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR See

AFGHANISTAN, RELA-

TIONS WITH.

SOVIET

SOVIET-FINNISH WAR

Soviet (sovet) is the Russian word for “council” or “advice.”

The Soviet-Finnish War of 1939–1940, which lasted 103 days and is commonly known as the “Winter War,” had its origins in the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939. The secret protocols of that non-aggression accord divided Eastern Europe into German and Soviet security zones. Finland, which had been part of the Russian Empire for more than a century prior to gaining its independence during the Russian Revolution, was included by that agreement within the Soviet sphere. Shortly after the dismemberment of Poland by Germany and the USSR, the Soviet government in October demanded from Finland most of the Karelian Isthmus north of Leningrad, a naval base at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland, and additional land west of Murmansk along the Barents Sea. The USSR offered other, less strategically important, borderland as compensation. After Finnish President Kiosti Kallio rejected the proposal, the Red Army, on November 30, invaded along the extent of their border as the Soviet Air Force bombed the Finnish capital, Helsinki.

Its political usage began during the Revolution of 1905 when it was applied to the councils of deputies elected by workers in factories throughout Russia. Although suppressed in 1905, the soviets reappeared in nearly every possible setting immediately following the February Revolution of 1917. With the soviet in Petrograd setting the tone, they very quickly became the organs of power that the majority of the population saw as legitimate. Although the moderate socialists who initially led the soviets were reluctant to take executive power from the Provisional Government, most Russians seem to have favored rule by the soviets alone; the Bolsheviks’ call for “All Power to the Soviets” may well have been their most successful slogan. The October Revolution was timed to coincide with the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, both to forestall its taking power without Bolshevik initiative and to gain legitimacy from its approval. The new Bolshevik-led government was thus initially based on soviets, and the state structure formally remained so until Mikhail Gorbachev. For most of the Soviet era, the Supreme Soviet was theoretically the highest legislative organ, although the Communist Party held practical power. Throughout their history, soviets generally proved too large for day-to-day governance, a role filled by a permanent executive committee elected by the full soviet. Some scholars have suggested that the soviet became so popular an institution because it was an urban counterpart to the village commune assembly, a governing system with which most Russians, even in the cities, were familiar.

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Finland’s most formidable defenses were a line of hundreds of concrete pillboxes, bunkers, and underground shelters, protected by anti-tank obstacles and barbed wire, which stretched across the Karelian Isthmus. General (and later Field Marshal) Carl Gustaf Mannerheim, a former tsarist officer, had organized these defenses, and he commanded Finland’s armed forces during the war. During the first two months of conflict, Finland astonished the rest of the world by defeating the much larger and more heavily armed Soviet forces, especially along the Mannerheim Line. In snow—at times five to six feet deep—with temperatures plunging to -49° F,

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A Finnish village burns after a February 1940 air raid by Soviet planes. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS

the Finnish defenders were clad in white-padded uniforms, and some attacked on skis. The Red Army troops were entirely unprepared for winter combat. In early February, the USSR enlarged its forces to 1.2 million men (against a Finnish army of 200,000) and increased the number of tanks and aircraft to 1,500 and 3,000, respectively. In March the Red Army broke through the Mannerheim Line and advanced toward Helsinki. Finland was compelled to accept peace terms, which were signed in Moscow on March 12, 1940. The USSR acquired more territory than it had demanded before the war, including the entire northern coastline of Lake Ladoga and parts of southwestern and western Finland. Approximately 420,000 Finns fled from the 25,000 square miles of annexed territories.

revealed that 127,000 Soviet combatants had been killed or gone missing in action. The Red Army overwhelmed Finnish defenses with massive formations. For example, to take one particular hill, the USSR attacked its thirty-two Finnish defenders with four thousand men; more than four hundred of the Soviet assault troops were killed. Material losses were similarly lopsided in the war. Altogether, the Soviet Air Force lost about one thousand aircraft; Finland around one hundred.

Soviet victory, however, came at a very high cost. Whereas Finland lost about 25,000 killed in the war, Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov acknowledged that immediately after the war almost 49,000 Soviet troops had perished. In 1993 declassified Soviet military archives

The world’s attention was focused on the SovietFinnish War, because at that time despite British and French declarations of war against Germany in September 1939 over Germany’s invasion of Poland, there was no other fighting taking place in Europe. Finland was much admired in the democratic West for its courageous stand against a much larger foe, but to Finland’s disappointment, that admiration did not translate into significant outside assistance. By contrast, Soviet aggression was widely condemned, and the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations. More importantly, So-

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viet military weakness was exposed, which served to embolden Hitler and confirm his belief that Germany could easily defeat the USSR. Defeated Finland became increasingly worried when in the summer of 1940 the USSR occupied Estonia, which lay just forty miles across the Baltic Sea. Finland found a champion for its defense and a means to regain the lost territories when Germany attacked the Soviet Union in Operation Barbarossa on June 22, 1941. The USSR provided a convenient pretext for the start of the “Continuation War” (as the resumed hostilities are known in Finland), when it bombed several Finnish cities, including Helsinki, on June 25. While the Red Army retreated before the Nazi blitz to within three miles of Leningrad and twenty of Moscow, Finland invaded southward along both sides of Lake Ladoga down to the 1939 boundary. During the nearly nine hundred day siege of Leningrad, Finnish forces sealed off access to the city from the north. Close to one million Leningraders perished in the ordeal, primarily from hunger and cold in the winter of 1941–1942. Finland, which relied heavily on German imports during the war, rebuffed a Soviet attempt through neutral Sweden in December 1941 to secure a separate peace and relief for Leningrad. At the same time, the Finnish government refused German requests to attempt to cross the Svir River in force to link up with the Wehrmacht along the southeastern side of Ladoga. The lake remained Leningrad’s only surface link with the rest of the USSR during the siege. Finland’s position in southern Karelia became increasingly vulnerable as its ally Germany began to lose the war in the USSR in 1943. In late February 1944, a month after the Red Army smashed the German blockade south of Leningrad, the Soviet Air Force flew hundreds of sorties against Helsinki and published an ultimatum for peace, which included, among other things, internment of German troops in northern Finland and demobilization of the Finnish Army. After Finland refused the harsh terms, the Red Army launched a massive offensive north of Leningrad on June 9. In early August Mannerheim managed to shore up Finnish defenses near the 1940 border at the same time that the Finnish parliament appointed him the country’s president. However, continued German defeats and Soviet reoccupation of Estonia convinced President Mannerheim to agree to an armistice on September 19. The agreement restored the 1940 boundary, forced German troops out of Finland, leased to the USSR territory for a military base a few miles

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from Helsinki (which was later returned), and saddled Finland with heavy reparations. Although the Soviet Union basically controlled Finnish foreign policy until the Soviet collapse in 1991, of all of Nazi Germany’s wartime European allies, only Finland avoided Soviet occupation after the war and preserved its own elected government and market economy.

See also:

FINLAND; FINNS AND KARELIANS; NAZI-SOVIET

PACT OF 1939; WORLD WAR II BIBLIOGRAPHY

Mannerheim, Carl. (1954). Memoirs. New York: Dutton. Trotter, William R. (1991). A Frozen Hell: The RussoFinnish Winter War of 1939–1940. Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill. RICHARD H. BIDLACK

SOVIET-GERMAN TRADE AGREEMENT OF 1939 After declining relations throughout the 1930s and then a flurry of negotiations in the summer of 1939, Germany (represented by Karl Schnurre) and the Soviet Union (represented by Yevgeny Babarin) signed a major economic agreement in Berlin in the early morning hours of August 20. The treaty called for 200 million Reichsmark in new orders and 240 million Reichsmark in new and current exports from both sides over the next two years. This agreement served two purposes. First, it brought two complementary economies closer together. To support its war economy, Germany needed raw materials—oil, manganese, grains, and wood. The Soviet Union needed manufactured products—machines, tools, optical equipment, and weapons. Although the USSR had slightly more room to maneuver and a somewhat superior bargaining position, neither country had many options for receiving such materials elsewhere. Subsequent economic agreements in 1940 and 1941, therefore, focused on the same types of items. Second, the economic negotiations provided a venue for these otherwise hostile powers to discuss political and military issues. Hitler and Stalin signaled each other throughout 1939 by means of these economic talks. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Nazi-Soviet Pact was signed a mere four days after the economic agreement.

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Because raw materials took less time to produce, Soviet shipments initially outpaced German exports and provided an important prop to the German war economy in late 1940 and 1941. Before the Germans could fully live up to their end of the bargain, Hitler invaded.

See also:

FOREIGN TRADE; GERMANY, RELATIONS WITH;

NAZI-SOVIET PACT OF 1939; WORLD WAR II

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ericson, Edward E. (1999). Feeding the German Eagle: Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany, 1933–1941. Westport, CT: Praeger. EDWARD E. ERICSON III

SOVIET MAN For many years, the term novy sovetsky chelovek in Soviet Marxism-Leninism was usually translated into English as “the new Soviet man.” A translation that would be more faithful to the meaning of the original Russian would be “the new Soviet person,” because the word chelovek is completely neutral with regard to gender. The hope of remaking the values of each member of society was implicit in Karl Marx’s expectations for the progression of society from capitalism through proletarian revolution to communism. Marx reasoned that fundamental economic and social restructuring would generate radical attitudinal change, but Vladimir Lenin and Josef Stalin insisted that the political regime had to play an active role in the transformation of people’s values, even in a socialist society. It remained for the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, adopted at the party’s Twenty-Second Congress in 1961 in accordance with the demands of Nikita Khrushchev, to spell out the “moral code of the builder of communism,” which subsequently was elaborated at length by a wide variety of publications. The builder of communism was expected to be educated, hard working, collectivistic, patriotic, and unfailingly loyal to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. During the transition to a fully communist society, as predicted by Khrushchev, such vestiges of past culture as religion, corruption, and drunkenness would be eradicated. The thinking associated with the Party Program of 1961 represented the last burst of revolutionary optimism in the Soviet Union.

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Over time, it became increasingly difficult to ascribe “deviations from socialist morality” to the influence of pre-1917 or pre-1936 social structures. Indeed, testimony from a variety of sources suggested that reliance on connections, exchanges of favors, and bribery (which had by no means disappeared in the Stalin years) were steadily growing in importance during the post-Stalin decades. In the mid-1970s Hedrick Smith’s book The Russians described the members of the largest nationality in the USSR as impulsive, generous, mystical, emotional, and essentially irrational, behind the facade of a monochromatic ideology imposed by an authoritarian political regime. Though the Brezhnev leadership still insisted that the socialist way of life (sotsialistichesky obraz zhizni) in the Soviet Union was morally superior to that in the West with its unbridled individualism and moral decay, the sense of optimism concerning the future was slipping away. Ideologists complained ever more about amoral behavior by citizens, and the political leaders seemed to become more tolerant of illegal economic activity and corruption. Despite those general trends, problematic as they were, some Soviet citizens did strive actively to serve their fellow human beings, including the most vulnerable members of society.

See also:

KRUSCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH; LENIN, VLADI-

MIR ILLICH; MARXISM

BIBLIOGRAPHY

DeGeorge, Richard T. (1969). Soviet Ethics and Morality. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Evans, Alfred B., Jr. (1993). Soviet Marxism-Leninism: The Decline of an Ideology. Westport, CT: Praeger. Mehnert, Klaus. (1962). Soviet Man and His World, tr. Maurice Rosenbaum. New York: Praeger. Smith, Hedrick. (1983). The Russians, updated edition. New York: Times Books. ALFRED B. EVANS JR.

SOVIET-POLISH WAR The Soviet-Polish War was the most important of the armed conflicts among the East European states emerging from World War I. The Versailles settlements failed to delineate Poland’s eastern border. The Entente powers hoped that the Bolshevik Revolution was temporary, and that a Polish-Russian

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border would be established after the victory of White Russian forces. As the eastern command of the German Army withdrew after the armistice of November 11, 1918, Vladimir Lenin in Moscow and Józef Pilsudski in Warsaw planned to fill the vacuum. Lenin hoped to export revolution, Pilsudski to lead an East European federation. In early 1919, Lenin’s main concern was the White Russian forces of Anton Denikin. Pilsudski did not support Denikin, a Russian nationalist who treated eastern Galicia as part of a future Russian state. In late 1918, Pilsudski watched as the Red Army moved on Vilnius and Minsk. Pilsudski’s offensive began in April 1919, his forces taking Vilnius on April 21 and Minsk on August 8. In collaboration with Latvian troops, Poland took Daugavpils on January 3, 1920, returning the city to Latvia. By then Denikin was in retreat, and the Red Army could turn to an offensive against the remnants of independent Ukrainian forces.

led to the establishment of the Soviet Union as a nominal federation in December 1922. During the 1930s, Josef Stalin blamed Polish agents for shortfalls in Ukrainian food production, and he ethnically cleansed Poles from the Soviet west. These preoccupations flowed from earlier defeat. Riga divided Belarus and Ukraine between Poland and the Soviet Union. The Red Army seized western Belarus and western Ukraine from Poland in September 1939 thanks to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty, undoing the consequences of Riga and encouraging forgetfulness of the Polish-Bolshevik War. Yet more than any other event, the PolishBolshevik War defined the political and intellectual frontiers of the interwar period in eastern Europe.

See also:

CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; POLAND; WORLD

WAR I

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Ukrainian National Republic of Symon Petliura allied with Poland in April 1920. With Ukrainian help, Pilsudski took Kiev on May 7, 1920, only to find his troops overwhelmed by the forces of Soviet commanders Mikhail Tukhachevsky and Semen Budenny. On July 11 Great Britain proposed an armistice based upon the Curzon Line, which left Ukraine and Belarus to Moscow. These terms displeased Pilsudski, but Polish prime minister Stanislaw Grabski had agreed to similar ones in negotiations with British prime minister David Lloyd George. Moscow’s replies questioned the future of independent Poland, and the Red Army encircled Warsaw in August.

D’Abernon, Edgar Vincent. (1931). The Eighteenth Decisive Battle of the World. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

With the exception of its Ukrainian ally, Poland faced this attack alone. The French sent a military legation, but its counsel was unheeded. Pilsudski himself planned and executed a daring counterattack against the Bolshevik center, shattering Tukhachevsky’s command. He then drove the Red Army to central Belarus. The Battle of Warsaw of August 16–25, 1920, was called by D’Abernon “the eighteenth decisive battle of the world.” It set the westward boundary of the Bolshevik Revolution, saved independent Poland, and ended Lenin’s hopes of spreading the Bolshevik Revolution by force of arms to Germany.

TIMOTHY SNYDER

The Soviet-Polish frontier, agreed at Riga on March 18, 1921, was itself consequential. Poland abandoned its Ukrainian ally, as most of Ukraine was still under Soviet control. Yet the war forced the Soviets to reconsider nationality questions, and

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Davies, Norman. (1972). White Eagle, Red Star. New York: St. Martin’s. Gervais, Céline, ed. (1975). La Guerre polono-soviétique, 1919–1920. Lausanne: L’Age de l’Homme. Palij, Michael (1995). The Ukrainian-Polish Defensive Alliance. Edmonton, AB: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. Ullman, Richard H. (1972). The Anglo-Soviet Accord. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Wandycz, Piotr. (1969). Soviet-Polish Relations, 1917–1921. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

SOVKHOZ The sovkhoz, or state farm, the collective farm (kolkhoz), and the private subsidiary sector, were the three major organizational forms used in Soviet agricultural production after the collectivization of Soviet agriculture, a process begun by Josef Stalin in 1929. Although the concept of the state farm originated earlier under Vladimir Lenin during the period of war communism, the serious development of state farms began during the 1930s as the Soviet state exercised full control over the agricultural sector. The state farm might be described as a factory in the field in the sense that it was full state property,

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financed by state budget (revenues flowed into and expenses were paid by the state budget), and subject to the state planning system, and workers (rabochy) on state farms were paid a contractual wage. All of these major characteristics of the state farm distinguished it from the collective farm. The sovkhoz was organized in a fashion similar to an industrial enterprise. The farm was headed by a state-appointed director, and the connection between labor force and sovkhoz resembled the structure of the industrial enterprise. Most important, capital investment for the sovkhoz was funded by the state budget. Thus, although prices paid by the state for sovkhoz produce were lower than for compulsory deliveries from collective farms, state farms were in a financially much better position. This was a major reason for the subsequent conversion of weak collective farms into state farms in the post–World War II years, a process enhanced by the Soviet policy of agroindustrial integration and the ultimate development of the agroindustrial complex comprising collective and state farms and industrial processing capacity. The role of state farms in Soviet agriculture grew steadily during the Soviet era. The number of state farms grew from less than 1,500 in 1929 to just over 23,000 by the end of the Gorbachev era in the late 1980s. This expansion resulted partly from state policy—the amalgamation and conversion of collective farms to state farms—and partly from the use of state farms in special programs expanding the area under cultivation, such as the Virgin Lands Program. State farms were large. During the 1930s, for example, state farms were on average roughly 6,000 acres of sown area. By the 1980s, they averaged more than 11,000 acres of sown area per farm. There were considerable differences in the output patterns between collective and state farms, and state farms were viewed as more productive and more profitable than collective farms. Generally speaking, the role of the state farms increased over time from modest proportions in the early 1930s. The sovkhoz came to be important in the production of grain, vegetables and eggs, less important for meat products. During the transition era of the 1990s, state farms were reorganized using joint stock arrangements, although the development of land markets remained constrained by opposition to private ownership of land.

See also:

AGRICULTURE; COLLECTIVE FARM; COLLECTIVI-

ZATION OF AGRICULTURE

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Davies, R. W.; Harrison, Mark; and Wheatcroft, S. G., eds. (1994). The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913–1945. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Gregory, Paul R., and Stuart, Robert C. (2001). Russian and Soviet Economic Performance and Structure, 7th ed. New York: Addison Wesley Longman. Volin, Lazar. (1970). A Century of Russian Agriculture. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ROBERT C. STUART

SOVNARKHOZY Regional bodies that administered industry and construction in the USSR. The Sovnarkhozy (acronym for Sovety Narodnogo Khozyaistva, or Councils of the National Economy) were state bodies for the regional administration of industry and construction in Russia and the USSR that existed from 1917 to 1932 and again from1957 to 1965. The first Sovnarkhozy were created in December 1917 by the Supreme Council of the National Economy. Each of them had power over areas ranging in size from small districts up to several provinces. They were associated with local institutions such as soviets and were responsible to the Supreme Council for restoring the economy of their area after World War I and then the civil war. As the Soviet economy developed during the 1920s, control of industry was divided between the Supreme Council of the National Economy (which retained control of important strategic industries) and the Sovnarkhozy. The Sovnarkhozy were abolished in 1932 when the Supreme Council was divided into three separate industrial commissariats. Sovnarkhozy were reintroduced during Nikita Khrushchev’s 1957 effort to decentralize the economy. The USSR was divided into 105 Sovnarkhozy responsible to republican Councils of Ministers for the industry in the regions, except armaments, chemicals, and electricity, which at first remained under central control. The system had a fundamental weakness due to the lack of centralized direction and coordination, and Sovnarkhozy often pursued local interests and considered only the needs of their own region. In 1962 and 1963 attempts were made to reform the system, such as amalgamating the Sovnarkhozy and reviving the

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Supreme Council of the National Economy, but in 1965 Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin abolished the Sovnarkhozy and reestablished the central industrial ministries.

See also:

ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; KOSYGIN RE-

FORMS; REGIONALISM

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Nove, Alec. (1982). An Economic History of the U.S.S.R. Basingstoke, UK: Penguin. Prokhorev, Aleksandr M., ed. (1975). Great Soviet Encyclopedia: A Translation of the Third Edition. New York: Macmillan. DEREK WATSON

F A C T I O N

given membership. By 1936 the number of commissariats had risen to twenty-three, and by 1941 to forty-three. A major trend was the replacement of an overall industrial commissariat by industryspecific bodies. The 1936 constitution granted Sovnarkom membership to chairpersons of certain state committees. It also formally recognized Sovnarkom as the government of the USSR, but deprived it of its legislative powers. By this time the institution was and remained a high-level administrative committee specializing in economic affairs.

See also:

COMMISSAR; COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, SOVIET;

LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; MOLOTOV, VYACHESLAV MIKHAILOVICH; RYKOV, ALEXEI IVANOVICH; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

SOVNARKOM Acronym for Sovet Narodnykh Komissarov (Council of People’s Commissars), the government of the early Soviet republic. Sovnarkom was formed by Vladimir Lenin in October 1917 as the government of the new revolutionary regime. The word commissars was used to distinguish the new institution from bourgeois governments and indicate that administration was being entrusted to commissions (commissariats), not to individuals. Initially membership included Lenin (chairperson), eleven departmental heads (commissars), and a committee of three responsible for military and naval affairs. Until 1921, under Lenin, Sovnarkom was the real government of the new Soviet republic—the key political as well as administrative body—but after 1921 political power passed increasingly to Party bodies. With the creation of the USSR in 1924, Lenin’s Sovnarkom became a union (national) body. Alexei Rykov was chairperson of the Union Sovnarkom from 1924 to 1930, then Vyacheslav Molotov from 1930 to 1941, and Josef Stalin from 1941 to 1946, when the body was renamed the Council of Ministers. There were two types of commissariats: six unified (renamed “union-republican” under the 1936 constitution), which functioned through parallel apparatuses in identically named republican commissariats, and five all-union with plenipotentiaries in the republics directly subordinate to their commissar. In 1930 Gosplan was upgraded to a standing commission of Sovnarkom and its chairperson

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Rigby, Thomas Henry. (1979). Lenin’s Government: Sovnarkom, 1917–1922. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Watson, Derek. (1996). Molotov and Soviet Government: Sovnarkom, 1930-41. Basingstoke, UK: CREES-Macmillan. DEREK WATSON

SOYUZ FACTION The Soyuz faction was a group of hardliners in USSR Congress of People’s Deputies at the end of the Soviet era. Its leaders, Viktor Alksnis and Nikolai Petrushenko, had been elected as deputies from Latvia and Kazakhstan respectively, regions with large ethnic Russian populations that conservatives were trying to mobilize (in organizations called “interfronts”) to counter the independence movements that had sprung up under perestroika. While nationalists and communists dominated the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies elected in March 1989, democratic forces won the upper hand in the Russian Federation Congress of People’s Deputies, elected in the spring of 1990, which chose Boris Yeltsin as its leader. Alksinis came up with the idea of the Soyuz faction in October 1989. It was launched on February 14, 1990, but only became highly visible toward the end of the year, when conservatives mobilized to deter Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev from adopting the Five-Hundred Day economic reform program. Soyuz had close ties to the

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army and security services, and its goal was to preserve the USSR. At its formal founding congress on December 1, 1990, Soyuz claimed the support of up to one quarter of the deputies in the USSR Congress. Its sister organization in the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet was Sergei Baburin’s Rossiya faction. Soyuz put increasing pressure on Gorbachev to end democratization by introducing presidential rule, suppressing disloyal political parties, and cracking down on nationalist movements in the non-Russian republics. It reportedly persuaded Gorbachev to fire Soviet Interior Minister Vadim Bakatin, who had agreed to the creation of separate interior ministries in each of the union republics. On November 11, 1990, Alksnis persuaded Gorbachev to address a meeting of one thousand military personnel elected as deputies to various soviets; he got a hostile reception. A week later, speaking in the USSR Supreme Soviet on November 17, Alksinis effectively called for Gorbachev’s overthrow. Still, no one could be sure whether Gorbachev would stick with democratization or opt for an authoritarian crackdown. In January 1991 KGB teams tried to overthrow the independent-minded governments in Latvia and Lithuania. This drew fierce international criticism, and Gorbachev disowned it. Apparently he had given up the idea of using force to hold the USSR together, for he now began pursuing a new union treaty with the heads of the republics that made up the USSR. In response, a Soyuz conference in April 1991 called for power to be transferred from Gorbachev to Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov or Anatoly Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Clearly the Soyuz group was laying the political and organizational groundwork for the coup attempt of August 1991, but the failure of the putsch sealed the fate of the USSR and of Soyuz, its most loyal defender. Alksnis was later one of the defenders of the anti-Yeltsin parliament in the violent confrontation of October 1993. Interviewed in 2002, he insisted that the USSR could have been saved if Gorbachev had acted more resolutely and not been “afraid of his own shadow.”

The XXVIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, ed. E. A. Rees. New York: St. Martin’s. Teague, Elizabeth. (1991). “The ‘Soyuz’ Group.” Report on the USSR 3(20):16–21. PETER RUTLAND

SPACE PROGRAM The Russian space program has a long history. The first person in any country to study the use of rockets for space flight was the Russian schoolteacher and mathematician Konstantin Tsiolkovsky. His work greatly influenced later space and rocket research in the Soviet Union, where, as early as 1921, the government founded a military facility devoted to rocket research. During the 1930s, Sergei Korolev emerged as a leader in this effort and eventually became the “chief designer” responsible for many of the early Soviet successes in space in the 1950s and 1960s. Under Korolev’s direction, the Soviet Union in the 1950s developed an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), with engines designed by Valentin Glushko, which was capable of delivering a heavy nuclear warhead to American targets. That ICBM, called the R-7 or Semyorka (“Number 7”), was first successfully tested on August 21, 1957. Its success cleared the way for the rocket’s use to launch a satellite.

Dunlop, John B. (1995). The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union had announced their intent to launch an earth satellite in 1957 during the International Geophysical Year (IGY). Fearing that delayed completion of the elaborate scientific satellite, intended as the Soviet IGY contribution, would allow the United States to be first into space, Korolev and his associates designed a much simpler spherical spacecraft. After the success of the R-7 in August, that satellite was rushed into production and became Sputnik 1, the first object put into orbit, on October 4, 1957. A second, larger satellite carrying scientific instruments and the dog Laika, the first living creature in orbit, was launched November 3, 1957. Three Soviet missions, Luna 1–3, explored the vicinity of the moon in 1959, sending back the first images of its far side. Luna 1 was the first spacecraft to fly past the moon; Luna 2, in making a hard landing on the lunar suface, was the first spacecraft to strike another celestial object.

Rees, E. A. (1992). “Party Relations with the Military and the KGB.” In The Soviet Communist Party in Disarray:

Soon after the success of the first Sputniks, Korolev began work on an orbital spacecraft that

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See also:

AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH; DEMOCRATIZATION;

GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH BIBLIOGRAPHY

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A Soyuz-TM rocket sitting on its launch pad at the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan on April 2, 2000. © REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS. REPRODUCED

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could be used both to conduct reconnaissance missions and to serve as a vehicle for the first human space flight missions. The spacecraft was called Vostok when it was used to carry a human into space. The first human was lifted into space in Vostok 1 atop a modified R-7 rocket on April 12, 1961, from the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan. The passenger, Yuri Gagarin, was a twenty-sevenyear-old Russian test pilot. There were five additional one-person Vostok missions. In August 1961, Gherman Titov at age twenty-five (still the youngest person ever to fly in space) completed seventeen orbits of Earth in Vostok 2. He became ill during the flight, an incident that caused a one-year delay while Soviet physicians investigated the possibility that humans could not survive for extended times in space. In August 1962, two Vostoks, 3 and 4, were orbited at the same time and came within four miles of one another. This dual mission was repeated in June 1963; aboard the Vostok 6 spacecraft was Valentina Tereshkova, the first woman to fly in space. As U.S. plans for missions carrying more than one astronaut became known, the Soviet Union worked to maintain its lead in the space race by modifying the Vostok spacecraft to carry as many as three persons. The redesigned spacecraft was known as Voskhod. There were two Voskhod missions. On the second mission in March 1965, cosmonaut Alexei Leonov became the first human to carry out a spacewalk. Korolev began work in 1962 on a secondgeneration spacecraft, called Soyuz, holding as many as three people in an orbital crew compartment, with a separate module for reentry back to Earth. The first launch of Soyuz, with a single cosmonaut, Vladimir Komarov, aboard, took place on April 23, 1967. The spacecraft suffered a number of problems, and Komarov became the first person to perish during a space flight. The accident dealt a major blow to Soviet hopes of orbiting or landing on the moon before the United States. After the problems with the Soyuz design were remedied, various models of the spacecraft served the Soviet, and then Russian, program of human space flight for more than thirty years. At the start of the twenty-first century, an updated version of Soyuz was being used as the crew rescue vehicle— the lifeboat—for the early phase of construction and occupancy of the International Space Station.

also made several attempts to convince the Soviet leadership that a cooperative lunar landing program would be a better alternative. But no positive reply came from the Soviet Union, which continued to debate the wisdom of undertaking a lunar program. Meanwhile, separate design bureaus headed by Korolev and Vladimir Chelomei competed fiercely for a lunar mission assignment. In August 1964, Korolev received the lunar landing assignment. The very large rocket that Korolev designed for the lunar landing effort was called the N1. Indecision, inefficiencies, inadequate budgets, and personal and organizational rivalries in the Soviet system posed major obstacles to success in the race to the moon. To this was added the unexpected death of the charismatic leader and organizer Korolev, at age fifty-nine, on January 14, 1966. The Soviet lunar landing program went forward fitfully after 1964. The missions were intended to employ the N1 launch vehicle and a variation of the Soyuz spacecraft, designated L3, that included a lunar landing module designed for one cosmonaut. Although an L3 spacecraft was constructed, the N1 rocket was never successfully launched. After four failed attempts between 1969 and 1972, the N1 program was cancelled in May 1974, thus ending Soviet hopes for human missions to the moon. On July 20, 1969, U.S. astronaut Neil Armstrong stepped from Apollo II Lunar Module onto the surface of the moon. By 1969, the USSR began to shift its emphasis in human space flight to the development of Earthorbiting stations in which cosmonaut crews could carry out observations and experiments on missions that lasted weeks or months. The first Soviet space station, called Salyut 1, was launched April 19, 1971. Its initial crew spent twenty-three days aboard the station carrying out scientific studies but perished when their Soyuz spacecraft depressurized during reentry. The Soviet Union successfully orbited five more Salyut stations through the mid-1980s. Two of these stations had a military reconnaissance mission, and three were devoted to scientific studies. The Soviet Union also launched guest cosmonauts from allied countries for short stays aboard Salyuts 6 and 7.

While committing the United States in 1961 to winning the moon race, President John F. Kennedy

The Soviet Union followed its Salyut station series with the February 20, 1986, launch of the Mir space station. In 1994–1995, Valery Polyakov spent 438 continuous days aboard the station. More than one hundred people from twelve countries visited

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Mir, including seven American astronauts between 1995 and 1998. The station, which was initially scheduled to operate for only five years, supported human habitation until mid-2000, before making a controlled atmosphere reentry on March 23, 2001.

an added charge, aviation efforts. It later was renamed the Russian Aviation and Space Agency.

The Soviet Union in the 1980s developed a large space launch vehicle, called Energiya, and a reusable space plane similar to the U.S. space shuttle, called Buran. However, the Soviet Union could no longer afford an expensive space program. Energiya was launched only twice, in 1987.

TECHNOLOGY POLICY; SPUTNIK; TSIOLKOVSKY, KON-

To continue its human space flight efforts, Russia in 1993 joined the United States and fourteen other countries in the International Space Station program, the largest ever cooperative technological project. Two Russian cosmonauts were members of the first crew to live aboard the station, arriving in November 2000, and it is intended that at least one cosmonaut will be aboard the station on a permanent basis. Russian hardware plays an important role in the orbiting laboratory. Russia’s role was increased when the U.S. space plane Challenger burned up on entry in February 2003. The Soyuz “lifeboat” became the only way in or out until regular U.S. flights were resumed. In addition, the Soviet Union has carried out a comprehensive program of unmanned space science and application missions for both civilian and national security purposes. Spacecraft were sent to Venus and Mars. Other spacecraft provided intelligence information, early warning of missile attack, and navigation and positioning data, and were used for weather forecasting and telecommunications. In contrast to the United States, the Soviet Union had no space agency. Various design bureaus had influence within the Soviet system, but rivalry among them posed an obstacle to a coherent Soviet space program. The Politburo and the Council of Ministers made policy decisions. After 1965, the government’s Ministry of General Machine Building managed all Soviet space and missile programs; the Ministry of Defense also shaped space efforts. A separate military branch, the Strategic Missile Forces, was in charge of space launchers and strategic missiles. Various institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences proposed and managed scientific missions. After the dissolution of the USSR, Russia created a civilian organization for space activities, the Russian Space Agency, formed in February 1992. It quickly took on increasing responsibility for the management of nonmilitary space activities and, as

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See also:

GAGARIN, YURI ALEXEYEVICH; INTERNATIONAL

SPACE STATION; MIR SPACE STATION; SCIENCE AND STANTIN EDUARDOVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Dickson, Paul. (2001). Sputnik: The Shock of the Century. New York: Walker. Hall, Rex, and Shayler, David J. (2001). The Rocket Men: Vostok and Voshkod, the First Soviet Manned Spaceflights. New York: Springer Verlag. Harvey, Brian. (2001). Russia in Space: the Failed Frontier? New York: Springer Verlag. Oberg, James. (1981). Red Star in Orbit. New York: Random House. Russian Aviation and Space Agency web site. (2002). . Siddiqi, Asif. (2000). Challenge to Apollo: The Soviet Union and the Space Race, 1945–1974. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. JOHN M. LOGSDON

SPANISH CIVIL WAR In July 1936, after months of unrest and politically motivated assassinations, a junta of nationalist generals, including Francisco Franco, led an uprising against the Spanish Republic. When Franco had difficulty transporting his forces from Africa to Spain, he appealed for aid from Germany and Italy. Hitler and Mussolini were only too happy to oblige. The Republicans also asked for help from the Western powers and the Soviet Union. Britain, France, and the United States decided to adopt a strict policy of nonintervention, but Josef Stalin began secretly supplying the Republic with the weapons it needed to survive. Soviet aid, however, came with a price. Stalin provided thousands of Red Army, NKVD, and GRU (secret police) officers who often furthered his aims while acting as advisers for the Republicans. Meanwhile the Spanish government shipped its vast gold reserves to Moscow, where the Soviets deducted the cost of armaments for the war, at exorbitant prices, from the bullion. Yet without Soviet tanks and

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airplanes it is certain that the Republic would have fallen much more quickly than it did.

Howson, Gerald. (1998). Arms for Spain: The Untold Story of the Spanish Civil War. London: J. Murray.

Stalin and the Stalinist Spanish Communist Party wanted a say over the political future of Spain. From the start of the war, the Soviets pushed the Republicans to eliminate anyone who did not follow the party line. This hunt for Trotskyists was tolerated by the Republican governments in order to retain the favor of their only great power supporter. Most Spanish leaders, however, were able to resist Soviet attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of their country, and steered their own course during the war.

Radosh, Ronald, and Habeck, Mary R., eds. (2001). Spain Betrayed: The Soviet Union in the Spanish Civil War. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

The Soviet Union and the Comintern also took a direct hand in combat. The European Left sent more than 30,000 enthusiastic volunteers to fight for the Republicans, some of whom came to Spain to support a revolution, on the model of the Soviet Union, while others wanted only to defend democracy. A large number of the commanders for these International Brigades were regular Red Army officers, although their origins were disguised and never acknowledged by the Soviet Union. The Internationals, and armaments sent by the Soviets, were critical for the Republicans’ successful defense of Madrid in December 1936. The Republican cause also benefited from Soviet and International participation in other engagements, including the battle of Jarama in February 1937 and the defeat of Italian troops at Guadalajara in March 1937, while Soviet tank operators and pilots were of crucial importance throughout the war.

The twentieth century saw a great upsurge in the interest in and use of military special forces, both in war and for peacekeeping, antiterrorist, and other missions. The Soviets were ardent advocates of such forces, and created many, tasked with a large and varied array of missions. This reflected three main considerations. First of all, small, highly motivated and well-trained units were vital to carry out operations beyond the capabilities of the USSR’s mass conscript army, which demanded speed, precision, or finesse. Secondly, the Soviets approached warfare in an intensely political way, seeing the aim as being not necessarily to win on the battlefield, but to destroy the enemy’s will and ability to fight in the first place. Special forces could play a key role in this. Thirdly, the Soviets regarded their armed forces also as integrated elements of their apparatus of rule, and specialized forces emerged to meet particular needs that had less to do with war-fighting but political control. The post-Soviet regime has upheld this tradition. Indeed, the proportion of special purpose units within the Russian military actually increased, not least because at a time when the majority of the armed forces were virtually unusable, at least these elements retained the discipline, training, and morale to fight.

Of the Soviet soldiers who saw action in the Spanish arena, dozens were recalled to Moscow and executed during the military purges of 1937–1939. At the same time others, such as Konstantin Rokossovsky, Ivan Konev, Alexander Rodimtsev, and Nikolai Kuznetsov, had brilliant careers during World War II and after.

Thomas, Hugh. (1977). The Spanish Civil War. New York: Harper and Row. MARY R. HABECK

SPECIAL PURPOSE FORCES

Alpert, Michael. (1994). A New International History of the Spanish Civil War. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan.

Special forces of a fashion had existed during the civil war (1918–1921), including the elite Latvian Rifles who guarded Vladimir Lenin, but these units tended to be essentially ad hoc elements of Bolshevik militants and Cossack horsemen. They subsequently either dissolved or were incorporated into the Red Army or police, losing their identity and élan in the process. The true genesis of Soviet special purpose forces took place in 1930, when the USSR became only the second nation in history to experiment with a military parachute drop. Excited by the possibilities, the Soviet high command immediately began training paratroop units: The first battalions were formed a year later.

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In the end, Soviet aid could not alter the outcome of the war. As the international climate worsened, Stalin decided to withdraw support for the Spanish government in 1938 and by the end of the year could only offer his condolences as the Republic faced utter defeat.

See also:

COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL; STALIN, JOSEF

VISSARIONOVICH

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This was the genesis of the Air Assault Troops, this also led to the rise of true special purpose forces. After all, while the paratroopers and other formations such as the Naval Infantry (marines) were a cut above the regular conscript infantry, they could hardly be considered “special forces” in the modern sense of the term. As the army began raising its paratroop forces, so too smaller, more specialized units began to be created within them, given the name Special Designation forces (Spetsialnogo naznacheniya, Spetsnaz for short). Elite units were also formed by the NKVD, the political police force (which had a sizable parallel army of paramilitaries), that instead called its forces Osnaz, for Osobennogo naznachneniya, or Specialized Designation. During World War II, these forces would see extensive action. Army and navy reconnaissance commandos penetrated German lines and, along with NKVD Osnaz saboteurs and infiltrators, organized partisan units, targeted collaborators and attacked supply routes.

prestige to have such units, so they have also been joined by such new units as the Justice Ministry’s Fakel commando team (which specializes in breaking prison sieges). Thus, if anything, special purpose forces are becoming even more important in the post-Soviet era.

This duality continued after the war and into the post-Soviet era. The armed forces maintain substantial Spetsnaz forces under the overall command of the GRU, military intelligence. Their main roles are to operate behind enemy lines gathering intelligence and launching surprise attacks on strategic assets such as headquarters and nuclear weapons. There are eight brigades of regular Spetsnaz and four of Naval Spetsnaz. However, most of these ostensibly elite units are still largely manned by conscripts, albeit the pick of the draft. There is thus an elite within the elite, largely made up of professional soldiers. Generally a single company within each brigade is kept at this standard, as well as a company in each of the paratroop divisions. These elements include athletes and linguists trained to pass themselves off as nationals of target nations and are genuinely comparable to such units as the U.S. Green Berets or British SAS.

Zaloga, Steven. (1995). Inside the Blue Berets. Novato, CA: Presidio.

Meanwhile, the security apparatus also retains its own smaller Osnaz elements. The KGB created several specialized teams, including Alfa (an antiterrorist strike force), Zenit and Vympel (trained for secret missions abroad), and Kaskad (a covert intelligence team). All served during the war in Afghanistan (1979–1989), and all survived the end of the USSR and the dismemberment of the KGB, being attached to new, Russian security agencies. The same is true of the Osnaz elements within the Interior Troops and the security arm of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as the Border Troops. Indeed, it has become almost a mark of institutional

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE; STATE SECURITY, OR-

GANS OF

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Galeotti, Mark. (1992). “Special and Intervention Forces of the Former Soviet Union.” Jane’s Intelligence Review 4:438-440. Schofield, Carey. (1993). The Russian Elite. London: Greenhill. Strekhnin, Yuri. (1996). Commandos from the Sea. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. Suvorov, Viktor. (1987). Spetsnaz. London: Hamish Hamilton.

MARK GALEOTTI

SPERANSKY, MIKHAIL MIKHAILOVICH (1772–1839), Russian statesman, one-time adviser to Tsar Alexander I. Mikhail Speransky attempted during the years 1807–1811 to influence the Russian monarch in the direction of instituting major political reform in Russia’s government. Only a few of his carefully drafted plans ever saw the light of day. Born into a family of a poor Russian Orthodox clergyman, Speransky, called by one Russian historian a “self-made man,” won the attention of the tsar and rose to become a count. He was considered brilliant and well-read in the study of European governmental structures, becoming in effect Alexander’s unofficial prime minister. Working in secret (on the tsar’s orders), he drew up a number of reforms. His idea, which the tsar evidently did not wholly endorse, was to retain a strong monarchy but reform it so that it would be based strictly on law and legal procedures of the type found in some European monarchies of the time. Speransky’s reform plans did not closely resemble, say, the English or French governmental

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systems. Yet while Speransky could probably not be considered a liberal reformer on West European terms, by Russian standards his reformism bordered on the radical. This made Speransky extremely unpopular with the tsar’s court, causing the tsar to keep such plans under wraps lest they unduly alienate his court. In 1809 and 1812, Speransky drew up the draft of a Russian constitution that bore some resemblance to those of West European monarchies. In one of his projects Speransky even proposed separation of the powers of legislature (in the Duma), judiciary, and the governmental administration. Yet all three were to branch out from the crown. Suffrage would be based on property, at least in the beginning. Election of the Duma would be indirect and necessitate a cautious, four-stage electoral process. Speransky also supported a program for future abolition of serfdom in Russia, reform that he viewed as crucial for any serious top-tobottom governmental change. Historians note that certain measures enacted in 1810–1811 brought “fundamental change to the executive departments of government.” Personal responsibility, it is noted, was to be imposed on ministers, while the functions of executive departments were precisely delimited. Unwarranted interference with legislative and judicial functions would be eliminated. Comprehensive rules were actually enacted for the administration of the ministries. Although Speransky’s efforts to reform the antiquated Russian court system failed, his administrative reforms overall modernized the whole bureaucratic machine. These structures remained in effect until the Bolshevik coup d’état, or October Revolution, of late 1917. After serving as the tsar’s close adviser for some five years, Speransky left St. Petersburg as the appointed Governor-General of the Siberian region. In that post he continued to author reform plans. Some of these were adopted and changed the governmental structure of that large administrative area. But it was in the period of his service as the tsar’s adviser that Speransky made his name in the annals of Russian history, especially as recounted by the famous early nineteenth-century Russian historian, Nikolai M. Karamzin. In 1821 Speransky returned to the Russian capital to become a founder of the Siberian Committee for Russian Affairs Beyond the Urals.

See also:

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Raeff, Marc. (1956). Siberia and the Reform of 1822. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Raeff, Marc. (1957). Michael Speransky, Statesman of Imperial Russia, 1772–1839. The Hague: M. Nijhoff. Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. (1963). A History of Russia. New York: Oxford University Press. ALBERT L. WEEKS

SPIRIDONOVA, MARIA ALEXANDROVNA (1884–1941), Socialist Revolutionary terrorist and Left Socialist Revolutionary leader who spent most of her life in prison or exile because of her popular appeal as a revolutionary heroine. Maria Spiridonova, daughter of a non-hereditary noble in Tambov Province, became a public symbol of heroic martyrdom during the first Russian revolution of 1905–1907. In January 1906 she shot provincial councilor G. N. Luzhenovsky at the Borisoglebsk Railroad Station, carrying out the death sentence that the Tambov Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) had passed on Luzhenovsky for his cruel suppression of peasant unrest in the district. Spiridonova’s case excited national interest, thus distinguishing her from the many other SR terrorists throughout the empire. A letter Spiridonova wrote from prison was published in a liberal newspaper and debated widely in the national press because it described her torture at the hands of police officials, hinting as well at sexual abuse. Liberal newspapers in particular waxed eloquent about the brutalities inflicted on this beautiful and chaste young woman of the Russian upper classes who had killed a sadistic bureaucrat. In March 1906, however, a court-martial sentenced Spiridonova to hanging, then commuted her sentence to life imprisonment, the usual practice in cases of females convicted of political crimes until mid-1906. Eleven years of incarceration in the Nerchinsk penal complex in Siberia followed, during which Spiridonova suffered from depression, nervous prostration, and frequent flareups of tuberculosis, her chronic illness. The Provisional Government’s amnesty of all political prisoners shortly after the February Revolution allowed Spiridonova to return to European Russia in the spring of 1917. Here she was welcomed, given her reputation as heroine and martyr, into the highest level of revolutionary politics in Petrograd and Moscow.

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March 1918. But when Russian concessions to Germany led to a food supply crisis that the Bolsheviks attempted to resolve with stringent grain-procurement measures in May, Spiridonova repudiated the treaty along with Bolshevik policy. She took a leading role in planning the Left SRs’ assassination of the German ambassador, an attempt to break the treaty and spark a popular uprising that was aborted by the Bolsheviks in July. With her party’s consequent banishment from Soviet politics, a second martyrdom began for Spiridonova. From 1920 on she lived either in prison, under house arrest, in Central Asian exile, or in sanatoria, up to her execution on Josef Stalin’s orders during the German invasion in 1941.

See also:

BREST-LITOVSK PEACE; LEFT SOCIALIST REVOLU-

TIONARIES; SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARIES; TERRORISM

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Rabinowitch, Alexander. (1995). “Maria Spiridonova’s ‘Last Testament.’” Russian Review 54(3):424–446. Radkey, Oliver H. (1958). The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism: Promise and Default of the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries, February to October 1917. New York: Columbia University Press.

Maria Spiridonova endorsed violence for revolutionary goals and was a leader of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries. BROWN BROTHERS. REPRODUCED

Steinberg, Isaac. (1935). Spiridonova: Revolutionary Terrorist. tr. and eds. Gwenda David and Eric Mosbacher. London: Methuen.

BY PERMISSION.

As a leader of the Left SR Party, Spiridonova employed the aura of her martyrdom, along with her personal charisma and oratorical skills, to sway peasants, workers, and soldiers against the Provisional Government and to popularize the October Revolution. While she did not hold an official post in the first Soviet government, a Bolshevik-Left SR coalition, she was elected chairperson of the Peasant Section of the Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) of the second, third, and fourth Soviet Congresses. Indeed it was her lifelong concern for the peasants and their welfare that ultimately turned Spiridonova against the Bolsheviks. Spiridonova had been an early supporter of Vladimir Lenin’s push to sign a separate peace with Germany, however punitive, because the Russian population was opposed to continuing the war. She adhered to this position despite her party’s objections to the “shameful” Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and withdrawal from the government in protest in

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Radkey, Oliver H. (1963). The Sickle under the Hammer: The Russian Socialist Revolutionaries in the Early Months of Soviet Rule. New York: Columbia University Press.

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SALLY A. BONIECE

SPIRITUAL ELDERS The spiritual elder (starets in Russian, geron in Greek) first appeared in the earliest days of monasticism in Asia Minor. Some elders had far-ranging reputations and attracted other monks who emulated their way of life, sought their counsel, and profited from their experience in acquiring the Holy Spirit. One of the signs of the Spirit is the gift of discernment (diorasis), which means, first, knowledge of the mysteries of God, and, second, an understanding of the secrets of the heart. One who has the gift of discernment can undertake the spiritual direction of others. In the opinion of some Eastern writers, the same gift allows the Spirit to work miracles through the God-bearing practitioners of perfect prayer.

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In fourteenth-century Byzantium the spiritual elder became central to the hesychast movement associated with Gregory Palamas (1296–1359). The hesychasts combined the practice of the so-called Jesus Prayer (“Lord Jesus Christ, have mercy on me”) with the doctrine of theosis, or deification. Mount Athos became their chief center, and from there eldership spread to the Slavic world, producing Russia’s most famous medieval spiritual elder, Nil (Maikov, 1433–1508). After a long period of decline, eldership revived first in Ukraine and then in Russia through the efforts of several remarkable elders: Paisy (Velichkovsky, 1722–1794), translator of the Philokalia, a basic collection of texts on pure prayer; Serafim (Mashnin, 1758–1833) of Sarov, Russia’s most important modern saint; and Amvrosy (Grenkov, 1812–1891), the hermit model for Elder Zosima in Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s Brothers Karamazov. The popular impact of eldership is recorded in a remarkable anonymous work, The Pilgrim’s Tale. By 1900, the contemplative renaissance had reached its peak, although its creative power could still be seen in the lives of the parish priest John (Sergiev, 1829–1908) of Kronstadt and Mother Yekaterina (1850–1925) of Lesna, who worked among the poor.

See also:

BYZANTIUM, INFLUENCE OF; MONASTICISM;

RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Nichols, Robert L. (1985). “The Orthodox Elders (Startsy) of Imperial Russia.” Modern Greek Studies Yearbook 1:1–30. Pentkovsky, Aleksei, ed. (1999). The Pilgrim’s Tale. New York: Paulist Press. ROBERT L. NICHOLS

SPORTS POLICY The Soviet Olympic program, which would produce more medalists than any other country from 1952 through 1992, got off to a slow start internationally. Early Soviet contacts with foreign competitors were sparse, as the Soviet Union avoided international federations in the 1920s and stayed out of the Olympics, which it regarded as a means of turning workers’ attention from the class struggle and of preparing them for war. This was paralleled domestically by the banning of bourgeois from sports societies.

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In a 1929 resolution, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union condemned what it called “record mania.” However, by the 1930s party slogans began to call for breaking bourgeois sports records. After World War II, the Soviet Union, perhaps because it now could compete with the capitalist countries on an even footing, began an effort to do so and thereby to demonstrate the virtues of its social system. Accordingly, beginning in 1946 Soviet sports associations joined international federations, including, in 1951, the International Olympic Committee. By 1946, weightlifter Grigory Novak became the first Soviet world champion in any sport, and in December 1948, the Central Committee explicitly stated as a goal the achievement of “world supremacy in the major sports in the immediate future.” At first the Soviet Union participated mainly in sports in which it had a good chance to win, but at the 1952 Summer Olympics Soviet athletes competed in all sports except field hockey. The Soviet Union first participated in the Winter Olympics in 1956. The Soviet drive to surpass the capitalist countries could not always override domestic political considerations. In the late 1940s, some athletes who had competed against foreigners before the war were arrested. Purges, including executions, occurred in 1950, some as part of the anticosmopolitan campaign carried out by the government. Similarly, many officials and athletes had been victims of the purges of the 1930s. REASONS FOR SOVIET SUCCESS

One likely reason for the rise of Soviet sports was the urbanization of the country. As elsewhere, sport in the Soviet Union was predominantly urban and remained so even after the Soviet government began to push rural sport in 1948. As late as 1972, it was reported that only ten of the 507 Soviet athletes at the Munich Olympics belonged to rural sports clubs. This was partly a result of rural attitudes and partly because of lack of facilities. Another reason for Soviet successes was the relative lack of disapproval of women athletes, a phenomenon matched in Soviet society by the presence of women in heavy labor, both urban and rural. For example, Soviet domination of bilateral track and field competitions with the United States—the Soviets won eleven of thirteen from 1958 to 1975— was largely due to the superior athleticism of Soviet women, as they defeated the American women

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Soviet athletes perform as part of the celebrations for Moscow’s 800th birthday in 1947. © YEVGENY KHALDEI/CORBIS

twelve times while Soviet men won only three times. Thus it was for practical as well as propaganda reasons that in 1956 and 1960 the Soviet Union proposed the expansion of the Olympic program, especially to include more women. On the other hand, just as sexism coexisted with celebration of women’s achievements in Soviet society, for a long time there was Soviet opposition to female participation in such allegedly harmful sports as soccer, judo, and karate. The Soviets also looked for special opportunities to excel, as when they made a concerted (and successful) effort to field an Olympic champion in team handball when that sport was introduced into the Olympics. TRAINING PROGRAMS

Domestically there were a number of programs designed to encourage athletic talent. Perhaps the best known was GTO (Gotov k Trudu i Oborone—Prepared for Labor and Defense), which was established in 1931 and granted badges of various kinds to people in different age brackets who had achieved certain government-set athletic goals. As in other areas

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of Soviet life, quotas were set for the earning of badges, and also as in other areas of Soviet life, the setting of quotas often led to falsification of results, in this case leading to the granting of unearned awards. Stricter, no doubt, were the standards for the All-Union Sports Classification System established in 1949 with its five categories. At the top was Merited (Zasluzhenny) Master of Sport, followed by Master of Sport, then Classes A, B, and C. Masters of Sport were expected not only to achieve but also to serve as political and ideological examples and to pass on their experience to younger athletes. On a national scale, elite athletes were showcased in the Spartakiads. The first Spartakiad was held in 1928, to be revived on a regular basis in 1956, then held quadrennially from 1959. By 1963 the Soviet Union already had fifteen institutes of physical education and a much larger number of special secondary schools (tekhnikumy) as well as departments of physical education at pedagogical institutes and schools. There were also scientific research institutes in Moscow, Leningrad,

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and Tiflis. Despite this, physical education instructors often complained that their subject was given insufficient emphasis in schools compared with academic subjects. Moreover, N. Norman Shneidman has described physical education in Soviet schools as “generally poor,” contrasting this with the excellent boarding schools, extended day schools, regular sport schools, clubs, and organizations for the best school-age athletes. The special schools were introduced in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Graduate departments of the leading institutes of higher learning were responsible for developing methods of training and new equipment and wrote most of the physical education textbooks and reference books. In addition, many leaders and coaches of Soviet national teams had advanced degrees and authored scholarly publications. Under Khrushchev, the Soviet Union showed a renewed willingness to learn from the West after the extreme xenophobia of the late Stalin years. Sports was no exception here, as the Soviets invited the American Olympic weightlifting champion Tommy Kono to the Soviet Union in order to interview and film him. The Soviets accorded similar treatment to speed skater Eric Heiden in the late 1970s. In turn, the Soviet Union aided other countries, furthering propaganda goals in the process, by providing training, camps, facilities, and equipment to athletes from Africa and Asia, often for free. Soviet coaches also shared their expertise with other socialist countries, some of which surpassed the Soviet Union in certain sports and went on to send their own coaches to other countries. A notable example of this is Bulgaria in weightlifting. During glasnost there was considerable criticism of the regimentation of child athletes. Specialization and rigorous training occurred as early as age five, and former Olympic weightlifting champion and future member of Parliament Yuri Vlasov referred to “inhuman forms of professionalism” among twelve- and thirteen-year-old gymnasts, swimmers, and other athletes. Young teenagers often had to spend considerable time away from their families and had to choose a specialty at this young age. However, it should be noted that these phenomena also existed in the United States. GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIZATION OF ATHLETES

teurism, occurred as early as the 1930s. By 1945 the Council of People’s Commissars established a system that paid cash bonuses for records. In May 1951, in their successful attempt to gain admission to the International Olympic Committee (IOC), Soviet delegates to an IOC meeting falsely stated that bonuses were no longer paid. Many of the athletes were employed by the three largest sports organizations, Dinamo (Dynamo), run by the security forces; the Soviet Army; and Spartak, run by the trade unions. As in other countries, rival sport societies often lured athletes away from other societies. The best athletes were freed from military and other duties so that they could devote full time to their sports. The result was that Soviet athletes enjoyed a privileged lifestyle, at least while they were bringing glory to the state; after they retired, their standard of living often declined steeply. Of course it was forbidden for Soviets, whether journalists, athletes, or anyone else, to discuss any of this publicly. Whatever internal politics (e.g., cronyism) may also have been involved, another phenomenon not unknown in the United States, selection to international teams was based primarily on the likelihood that the athlete would place highly, irrespective of recent victories in national championships. The final selection would be made on the basis of the athlete’s condition at training camp before departure for the competition. Supporting this sporting activity for both practitioners and fans was an extensive Soviet press dedicated to sport. Sovetsky Sport was the most prominent among over a dozen Soviet sports newspapers and periodicals. The publishing house Fizkultura i sport, founded in 1923, published 40 percent of all Soviet titles on sports. According to certain unofficial Soviet sources, articles submitted for publication in scholarly journals were carefully screened to keep important research findings from the Soviets’ competitors. SCARCITY OF RESOURCES

Despite their outstanding success, the Soviets often lacked resources. As late as 1989 there were only 2,500 swimming pools in the Soviet Union, compared with more than one million in the United States. There were shortages of gynmasiums and equipment, and many schools lacked athletic play areas.

Soviet government subsidization of elite athletes, notorious during the era of allegedly pure ama-

Preference for elites over the masses sometimes provoked popular resentment alongside national

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Soviet athletes march through Red Square during the “physical culture” portion of a May Day parade. © HULTON ARCHIVE

pride. Even Soviet leaders were sometimes critical of the neglect of mass physical fitness in favor of elite athletes, although obviously the latter were too valuable for propaganda purposes for the situation to be changed. At the same time, facilities, equipment, and sports clothing were sometimes lacking even for elites, leading to relative Soviet weakness in downhill skiing, for example. Moreover, Soviet athletes often found it necessary to use foreign equipment in international competition. Sports historian Robert Edelman has praised the Soviets for “using limited resources efficiently,” pointing out that Soviet Olympic victories were achieved “on a shoestring.”

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In addition to demonstrating their athletic superiority, the Soviets used sports internationally to make political statements. The Soviet Union was among the leaders in isolating South Africa from international sport because of its policy of apartheid. It also canceled bilateral track and field meets with the United States from 1966 through 1968, giving the Vietnam War as the reason. The Soviet boycott of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, on the other hand, was almost certainly intended as retaliation for the American boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics, which had protested the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

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Even before the American boycott, however, the Soviet Union had already seen the political implications of hosting the Olympics. For example, one of the members of the USSR Olympic Organizing Committee was G. P. Goncharov, the head of the Communist Party propaganda machine. Moreover, in the fall of 1979 the government arrested dissidents and warned other people who complained even mildly about conditions. In Moscow there was a campaign to remove drunks, the unemployed, and even teenagers and children from the city during the Olympics. CONCLUSION

Soviet sports actually survived the Soviet Union in a sense, as in the 1992 Olympics athletes from the former Soviet Union competed together on what was known as the Unified Team. Although afterward the separate independent nations fielded separate teams, the memory persisted into 1996, as some Russian newspapers could not resist a brief mention that, added together, the former Soviet republics combined for the highest number of medals of any country. Economic problems would persist for the former Soviet sports programs, sometimes interfering with athletes’ training, but so would national pride and excellence, as the Russian Federation, for example, won 88 medals, second only to the United States with its larger population, in the 2000 Summer Olympics.

See also:

MOSCOW OLYMPICS OF 1980

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Booker, Christopher. (1981). The Games War: A Moscow Journal. London: Faber and Faber. Edelman, Robert. (1993). Serious Fun: A History of Spectator Sports in the USSR. New York: Oxford University Press. Morton, Henry W. (1963). Soviet Sport: Mirror of Soviet Society. New York: Collier Books. Peppard, Victor, and Riordan, James. (1993). Playing Politics: Soviet Sport Diplomacy to 1992. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

SPUTNIK On October 4, 1957, Soviet space scientists launched the first manmade Sputnik, or satellite, to orbit the earth. Sputnik had great significance on several counts. It indicated that the USSR was a world leader in science and engineering. It was a great propaganda achievement, enabling the nation’s leaders to claim both scientific preeminence and the superiority of the Soviet social system. Sputnik also triggered the space race, as the United States and the USSR committed to an expansive effort to be the first in a series of other space firsts. The USSR followed Sputnik with several other achievements: the first man in space (Yuri Gargarin); the first woman in space (Valentina Tereshkova); the first two-person and three-person orbital flights; the first space walk; and so on. Sputnik also revealed that the USSR was or would soon be capable of launching intercontinental ballistic missiles. Sputnik was important to the Soviet people as well. It demonstrated to them that after years of sacrifice under Stalin the nation was truly on the road to communism based on the achievements of science. Tens of thousands of citizens gathered in the evenings to track Sputnik through the sky, using binoculars or amateur radios to pick up its signal. School children sang odes to Sputnik; poets wrote poems to Sputnik. Sputnik was only the first Soviet satellite: More than 2,700 others followed into space. While their primary purposes were military, they also served such ends as communication, meteorology, and global prospecting.

See also:

GAGARIN, YURI ALEXEYEVICH; SPACE PROGRAM; UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

McDougall, Walter A. (1985). The Heavens and the Earth. New York: Basic Books. PAUL R. JOSEPHSON

Riordan, James. (1977). Sport in Soviet Society: Development of Sport and Physical Education in Russia and the USSR. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Shneidman, N. Norman. (1978). The Soviet Road to Olympus: Theory and Practice of Soviet Physical Culture and Sport. Toronto: The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education. VICTOR ROSENBERG

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STAKHANOVITE MOVEMENT On August 31, 1935, Aleksei Stakhanov, a thirtyyear-old miner in the Donets Basin, hewed 102 tons of coal during his six-hour shift. This amount represented fourteen times his quota, and within a few

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days his feat was hailed by Pravda as a world record. Anxious to celebrate and reward individuals’ achievements in production that could serve as stimuli to other workers, the party launched the Stakhanovite movement. The title of Stakhanovite, conferred on workers and peasants who set production records or otherwise demonstrated mastery of their assigned tasks, quickly superseded that of shockworker. Day by day throughout the autumn of 1935, the campaign intensified, culminating in an All-Union Conference of Stakhanovites in industry and transportation that met in the Kremlin in November. At the conference, outstanding Stakhanovites mounted the podium to recount how, defying their quotas and often the skepticism of their workmates and bosses, they applied new techniques of production to achieve stupendous results for which they were rewarded with wages that reached dizzying heights. Josef Stalin captured the upbeat mood of the conference when, by way of explaining how such records were only possible in the land of socialism, he uttered the phrase, “Life has become better, and happier too.” Widely disseminated, and even set to song, Stalin’s words served as the motto of the movement. The Stakhanovite movement thus encompassed lessons not only about how to work, but also about how to live. In addition to providing a model for success on the shop floor, it conjured up images of the good life. Many of the same qualities Stakhanovites were supposed to exhibit in the one sphere—cleanliness, neatness, preparedness, and a keenness for learning—were applicable to the other. These qualities were associated with kulturnost (culturedness), the acquisition of which marked the individual as a New Soviet Man or Woman. Advertisements for perfume, articles about Stakhanovites on shopping sprees, photographs of Stakhanovites sharing their happiness with their families, newsreels showing them driving new automobiles—presented to them as gifts—and moving into comfortable apartments all symbolized kulturnost. Wives of male Stakhanovites had an important part to play in the movement as helpmates preparing nutritious meals, keeping their apartments clean and comfortable, and otherwise creating a cultured environment in the home so that their husbands were well-rested and eager to work with great energy. It was also important to demonstrate that Stakhanovites were admired by their comrades and considered worthy of holding public office. Notwithstanding the enormous publicity surrounding Stakhanovites and their achievements,

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they were not necessarily popular. Even before the raising of output norms in early 1936, workers who had not been favored with the best conditions, and consequently struggled to fulfill their norms, expressed resentment of Stakhanovites by verbally and even physically abusing them. Foremen and engineers, only too well aware that record mania and the provision of special conditions for Stakhanovites created disruptions in production and bottlenecks in supplies, also on occasion sabotaged the movement. At least that was the accusation made against many who often served as scapegoats for the failure of the Stakhanovite movement to fulfill its promise of unleashing the productive forces of the country. Nevertheless, the Stakhanovite movement continued into the war and even enjoyed something of a revival in the postwar years, when it was exported to Eastern Europe.

See also:

INDUSTRIALIZATION, SOVIET; KULTURNOST; SO-

VIET MAN

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Siegelbaum, Lewis H. (1988). Stakhanovism and the Politics of Productivity in the USSR, 1935–1941. New York: Cambridge University Press. Thurston, Robert. (1993). “The Stakhanovite Movement: The Background to the Great Terror in the Factories, 1935–1938.” In Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives, eds. J. Arch Getty and Roberta T. Manning. New York: Cambridge University Press. LEWIS H. SIEGELBAUM

STALIN CONSTITUTION See

CONSTITUTION OF

1936.

STALINGRAD, BATTLE OF The Battle of Stalingrad (July 17, 1942–February 2, 1943) was the most significant Red Army victory during World War II. It included the Red Army’s defense against Operation “Blau” (Blue), the German Army’s summer 1942 advance to Stalingrad, and offensive operations in the fall of 1942 and winter of 1943 to defeat German and other Axis forces in the Stalingrad region. The defensive phase of the battle began on July 17, after German Army Groups “A” and “B” smashed the defenses of the Red Army’s Briansk,

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A Red Army soldier waves a flag while trucks gather in the square below during the Battle of Stalingrad. © HULTON ARCHIVE

Southwestern, and Southern Fronts in southern Russia and advanced to the Don River west of Stalingrad. Initially, the newly formed Stalingrad Front, commanded by marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko, defended the Stalingrad region with the 21st, 62d, 63d, 64th, and 57th Armies, the 1st and 4th Tank Armies, and the 8th Air Army, which opposed the 6th Army and 4th Panzer Army of Army Group “B.” After overwhelming the 62nd and 64th Army’s defenses west of the Don River in late July and defeating a major counterstroke by the 1st and 4th Tank Armies, in late August General Friedrich Paulus’s Sixth Army broke through Soviet defenses along the Don River and reached the Volga River north of Stalingrad, while General Hermann Hoth’s Fourth Panzer Army reached the city’s southwestern suburbs. The twin blows isolated the Soviet 62d and 64th Armies in Stalingrad and initiated two months of vicious and costly fighting for possession of the city. The fighting consumed the bulk of German forces and forced them to deploy weak Italian and Rumanian armies along their

overextended flanks north and south of the city. While Stalin fed enough forces into Stalingrad to tie German forces down, the Stavka planned a counteroffensive, Operation “Uranus,” orchestrated by General A. M. Vasilevsky, to encircle and destroy Axis forces at Stalingrad.

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The offensive phase of the battle commenced on November 19, 1942, when the forces of General N. F. Vatutin’s and A. I. Eremenko’s Southwestern and Stalingrad Fronts pierced Axis defenses north and south of the city and joined west of Stalingrad on November 23, encircling more than 300,000 German and Rumanian forces in the city. Offensives by the Southwestern and Stalingrad Fronts along the Chir, Don, and Aksai Rivers in December destroyed the Italian 8th Army and frustrated two German attempts to rescue their forces besieged in Stalingrad. On February 2, 1943, after Bryansk, Voronezh, Southwestern, and Southern (former Stalingrad) Front forces attacked westward from the Don River and toward Rostov, General K. K.

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Rokossovsky’s Don Front defeated and captured Paulus’s 6th Army and almost 100,000 men. At a cost of more than one million casualties, including almost 500,000 dead, missing, or captured, during the battle the Red Army destroyed or badly damaged five Axis armies, including two German, totaling more than fifty divisions, and killed or captured more than 600,000 Axis troops. The unprecedented German defeat was a turning point indicative of eventual Red Army victory in the war.

See also:

WORLD WAR II

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Beevor, Antony. (1998). Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege, 1941–1943. New York: Viking Erickson, John. (1975). The Road to Stalingrad. New York: Harper & Row. Glantz, David M. (1995). When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. DAVID M. GLANTZ

STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH (1879–1953), general secretary of the Communist Party, Soviet dictator. Josef Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili, who in revolutionary work was called Koba before adopting the nom de plume Stalin, was born in Gori, Georgia, to a working-class family; his father was a cobbler and his mother a domestic servant. Many of the details of his early life remain in dispute, but his education was gained at a local church school and the Tiflis (Tbilisi in Georgian) Orthodox seminary, from which he was expelled in 1899. He joined the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party soon after its foundation, and in 1901 was elected to the Tiflis Social Democratic Committee. Following the split in the party in 1903, Stalin became a Bolshevik. For the following decade and a half, he was involved in a variety of revolutionary activities, including the publication of illegal materials, organizational work among workers and within the party, and bank raids to garner funds to sustain party work. He met Vladimir Lenin in 1905, and briefly traveled abroad on party business to Stockholm, London, Kracow, and Vienna. In 1912

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he was elected in his absence onto the party Central Committee and became an editor of the party newspaper, Pravda. In 1913 he wrote his most important early work, Marxism and the National Question. His revolutionary work was interrupted by arrest in 1902, 1909, 1912, and 1913; he escaped from the first three bouts of exile and returned to Petrograd from the last one when the tsar fell in February 1917. In 1903 he married his first wife, Yekaterina Svanidze, his son Yakov was born in 1904, and his wife died of tuberculosis in 1907. When Stalin returned to Petrograd soon after the tsar’s fall, he was one of the leading Bolsheviks in the city. He was elected to the newly established Russian bureau of the party and to the editorial board of Pravda. Along with Vyacheslav Molotov and Lev Kamenev, he championed the policy of support for the Provisional Government and a defensist position on the war, until Vladimir Lenin returned in April and overturned these in favor of a more revolutionary stance. Stalin went along with Lenin’s views. During the revolutionary period, Stalin seems to have spent most of his time on organizational work. He was not a stirring speaker like Trotsky or someone with the presence of Lenin, and therefore after the return of Lenin and the emigrés, he was not seen as one of the leading lights of the party. Nevertheless, following the seizure of power in October, Stalin became people’s commissar for nationalities, a position that from April 1919 he held jointly with the post of people’s commissar of state control (from February 1920, the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate). The latter post was concerned with the elimination of corruption and inefficiency in the central state machine. During the civil war, Stalin was active on a series of military fronts, and it was at this time that his first major clash with Leon Trotsky occurred. More importantly, when the Politburo, Orgburo, and Secretariat of the Central Committee were established in March 1919, Stalin became a member of all three. He was the only member simultaneously of these bodies and the CC, and was therefore in a place of significant organizational power. In April 1922 he was elected general secretary of the party, and therefore the formal head of the party’s organizational machine. With Lenin’s illness from May 1922 and his death in January 1924, Stalin was able to make use of this power to consolidate his control at the top of the party structure. Lenin’s death was followed by intensified factional conflict among his would-be successors.

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revolutionary attempt to build socialism, were two of the most important of such policies. Thus through a combination of the weaknesses of his opponents, the strength of his organizational power, and the attractiveness of many of the positions he espoused, Stalin was able to triumph over his more fancied rivals for leadership; he was even able to overcome the negative evaluation of him in Lenin’s so-called Testament.

Josef Stalin in January 1946. ASSOCIATED PRESS. REPRODUCED

BY

PERMISSION.

Between 1923 and 1929, Stalin and his supporters successively outmaneuvered Trotsky and his supporters, the Left Opposition, the United Opposition, and the Right Opposition, so that by the end of the decade, Stalin was primus inter pares. Stalin’s success in these factional conflicts has usually been attributed to the organizational powers stemming from his ability to use the machinery of the party to promote his supporters and exclude the supporters of his opponents. This was clearly a significant factor in his ability to outflank his opponents at party meetings and use those symbolically to defeat them through a party vote. Stalin was the source of jobs, and therefore someone who was attractive to many with ambitions in Soviet politics. But Stalin was also a person who espoused the sorts of policies that would have appealed to many rankand-file Bolsheviks: The ability of the USSR to build socialism in one country rather than having to wait for international revolution and the need to shift from the gradualist framework of NEP into a more

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Stalin’s defeat of his more prominent rivals did not mean that he was secure in the leadership of the party in the early 1930s. At the end of 1927, at Stalin’s behest the party adopted the first of a series of decisions that led to the abandonment of the moderation of the New Economic Policy and its replacement by an increasingly rapid pace of industrialization and agricultural collectivization. This produced continuing strains within the party, even when the most prominent opponents of this new course—the Right Opposition led by Nikolai Bukharin, Alexei Rykov, and Mikhail Tomsky— had been defeated in 1929. In late 1930 the SyrtsovLominadze group and in 1932 the Ryutin Platform were two important instances of high-ranking party members criticizing the course of economic policy, with the latter even calling for Stalin’s removal. For many within the party’s leading ranks, the gamble on forced pace industrialization and agricultural collectivization, while justifiable in terms of the achievement of the ultimate goal of a socialist society, was in practice proving to be more costly and disruptive than they had been led to believe. The reports of widespread popular opposition to collectivization raised the specter of the increased isolation of the party within the society; the trials of so-called saboteurs in 1930 and 1931 only increased this sense. They were not reassured by the increasing glorification of Stalin personally that began on his fiftieth birthday in December 1929. The cult of Stalin that thus emerged was clearly an attempt to shift the basis of political legitimacy away from the party and onto the person of Stalin. At this time of political uncertainty, in November 1932 Stalin’s second wife, Nadezhda Allilueva who he had married in 1919, died. At the time it was announced that she had died of a heart attack, but it was widely believed that she had shot herself. There have also been rumors that Stalin himself killed her, but the truth is still not known. In 1933 a party purge, or chistka, was announced. This was to be a bloodless affair involving a check on the performance of all party members and the expulsion of those whose per-

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formance was found to be deficient. This was followed by similar campaigns in 1935 and 1936. Against this background of suspicion of the true beliefs and commitment of some party members, the seventeenth congress of the party was held in January–February 1934. This congress, the so-called Congress of Victors, announced the successful completion of collectivization, and although there was a significant level of public glorification of Stalin, there was also evidence of some high-level dissatisfaction with him. In December of that year, Leningrad party boss and close associate of Stalin, Sergei Kirov, was assassinated. Kirov’s death was used as an excuse to crack down on various elements including so-called Trotskyites and Zinovievites. In January 1935, Kamenev, Grigory Zinoviev, and seventeen other members of a reputed “center” were tried and convicted of moral and political responsibility for the death of Kirov, and were sentenced to imprisonment. This wave of purging tapered off by the middle of 1935. However, it surged once again in 1936, paradoxically at the time of the discussion of the new Stalin state Constitution adopted in December 1936, lasting unabated until the end of 1938. The so-called Great Terror, symbolized by the show trials of Old Bolsheviks in August 1936, January 1937, and March 1938, destroyed all semblance of opposition to Stalin and left him supreme at the apex of the party. He was now the unchallenged leader of the country, the vozhd, untrammelled by considerations of collective leadership, the absolute arbiter of the futures of all of those who worked with him in the leadership and in the country as a whole. The personal primacy of Stalin, symbolically celebrated in a new peak of adulation at the time of his sixtieth birthday, occurred at a time of increasing international tension. In August 1939 the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact was signed, an agreement that Stalin had actively sought. The results of that pact were played out in the following two years, with Soviet territorial gains on its western border. In May 1941 Stalin became chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, or prime minister, to add to his position as General secretary. The following month, Germany attacked the Soviet Union, ushering in a new phase in Stalin’s leadership, that of the war leader. From the time of the attack, Stalin was closely involved in organizing the defense of the Soviet Union. The long public delay in any announcement from him following the opening of hostilities led many to claim that Stalin, who had seemingly ig-

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Josef Stalin attends a meeting commemorating the completion of the first segment of the Moscow subway system in 1935. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS

nored all warnings about the likelihood of German attack, had been mentally paralyzed by the attack and took no part in the initial Soviet response. However, it has now become clear that Stalin was busy in meetings during this time, participating as he did right through the war in the resolution of issues not just of civil government but of military strategy and tactics. Throughout the conflict, Stalin was closely involved in a practical capacity in directing the Soviet war effort. He was also important symbolically. By mobilizing Russian nationalism and presenting himself as its personification, Stalin became the ultimate symbol of both the Soviet populace and its armed forces. His refusal to leave

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Moscow, even when German troops were at its gates, reinforced this image. It is probable that the war ushered in the highest point of Stalin’s real, as opposed to cult-presented, popularity. Stalin became known as the Generalissimo. With the end of the war, the Soviet Union was clearly one of the leading powers remaining and Stalin was an international figure, as symbolized by his presence at the conferences with the British and U.S. leaders in Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam. He ruled over not only the Soviet Union, but also the newly established socialist states in Eastern Europe. At home, there was a return to orthodoxy as controls were tightened once again following the relaxation of the wartime period. Stalin’s personal control remained undiminished. The leadership functioned as Stalin demanded; formal party organs were largely replaced by loose groupings of individual leaders summoned at Stalin’s whim and carrying out whatever tasks he accorded to them. Always a suspicious man, Stalin’s sense of paranoia seems to have grown in the post-war period, something fueled by the Cold War. Although there were no purges on the scale of the 1930s, the more limited use of coercion and terror occurred in the Leningrad affair of 1949–1950, the Mingrelian case of 1951–1952, and the Doctors’ Plot of 1952–1953. As in the 1930s, such purging occurred against a backdrop of the apogee of the Stalin cult at the time of his seventieth birthday in 1949. In this period, Stalin was probably more detached from the daily process of political life than he had ever been. But this does not mean that he was any less powerful; he still set the tenor of political life, and he was in a position to be able to decide any issue he wished to decide, which is the true measure of a dictator. His colleagues, really subordinates, may have maneuvered among themselves for increased power and for particular policy positions, but none challenged his primacy. Stalin died on March 5, 1953, probably of natural causes; some have argued that some of his leadership colleagues may have poisoned him, but there has been no evidence to sustain this accusation.

through his father’s patronage quickly rose to a leadership position. He subsequently became an alcoholic. Yakov was in the army and was captured by the Germans; reports suggest that Stalin refused a prisoner swap that would have returned Yakov to him. After Stalin’s death, Svetlana married a citizen of India, and when he died in 1966 she took his body to India and decided to remain abroad, returning briefly in 1984. Stalin was the longest-serving leader of the Soviet Union and clearly left a major imprint on its development. He has been described as cruel, secretive, manipulative, opportunistic, doctrinaire, paranoid, devoid of human feelings and sentiment, single-minded, and power-hungry. All of these descriptions can find sustenance in different aspects of Stalin’s biography. Where the balance lies remains a matter of debate. What is clear is that when he believed it was required, he could be ruthless in the actions he took against both enemies and supposed friends. In this sense, he was a man of action. He was not an intellectual, despite the claims of the cult. His literary output was moderate in size and generally both turgid in prose and mechanical in its arguments, but it did gain the status of orthodoxy within the USSR, a function of his political dominance rather than the intrinsic merit of his work. Stalin’s life remains the subject of debate. Many aspects are still highly controversial, with scholars disagreeing widely on them. The following are among the most important of these.

Both of Stalin’s wives died at an early age, and he seems to have had difficult relations with his children. From his second marriage he had a son, Vasily (b. 1921) and a daughter Svetlana (b. 1926), both of whom outlived him. Stalin seems to have had little personal contact with either of these children or with Yakov, his son by his first marriage. Vasily joined the air force during the war and

Why was Stalin victorious? This question has often been posed in a broader form: Why did the Stalinist system emerge in the Soviet Union, the first attempt to create a socialist society on a national scale? Debate on this question has been vigorous precisely because of the implications its answer was seen to have for socialist aspirations more generally. Many, particularly on the right of the political spectrum, argued that such a system was a logical, even inevitable, result of revolution and the sort of system that Lenin set in place. Others argued that, while the Leninist system may have made a highly coercive, undemocratic system more likely, this was neither the necessary nor inevitable outcome of either the revolution or Leninism. Many argued the primacy of organizational factors, especially the power Stalin was able to gain and exercise within the party apparatus. Others emphasized the importance of Stalin’s personality, skills, and talents, especially in contrast to those of

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his opponents. Another strand of argument focused upon the regime’s desire to bring about substantial socioeconomic change in an economically and politically backward society, a situation requiring a high level of centralization and coercion. Others noted the role of the party’s isolation in Soviet society and the nature of the recruits flowing into its ranks. This question remains unresolved, but an answer, most now agree, involves elements of all of the arguments noted above. Was Stalin responsible for Kirov’s assassination? Those supporting the view that Stalin was responsible argue that Kirov was seen as a possible challenge to or replacement for Stalin, and accordingly Stalin had him assassinated. Other suggestions have been that Kirov’s killer was indeed working for a bloc of oppositionists as Stalin and his supporters claimed, that he was working alone, or that it was the security apparatus who had planned a failed assassination attempt to boost their institutional stocks but that this went wrong. Despite research in the archives, no definitive answer has been forthcoming, and all cases remain circumstantial. There is now no doubt about Stalin’s responsibility for the terror. This was not a normal party purge that went off the rails. Given Stalin’s position in the party organization and the position occupied by his supporters, this could not have gone ahead without his permission. He probably did not have an exact idea of how many people suffered during the terror, but he must have had an idea of the general dimensions, and he certainly knew of some of the individuals who perished, because he signed lists of victims submitted to him. Ultimately Stalin was responsible, even if the primary role in the direction of it lay with his henchmen. Was Stalin planning another major purge when he died? Those who argue in favor of this point to the buildup of pressure through the Leningrad affair, the Mingrelian case, and the Doctors’ Plot, and the enlargement of the party Presidium at the nineteenth congress of the party in October 1952. This was seen as preparatory to purging some of the older established leaders and bringing newer ones forward. Many of those who accept this logic also accept that Stalin was poisoned. There is no firm evidence about Stalin’s intentions either way, and unless compelling evidence comes from the archives, this will remain a moot point. Finally there is the question of the costs and benefits of Stalin and his regime. Under his rule,

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the Soviet Union moved from being a backward, predominantly agricultural country to one of the two superpowers on the globe. The living standards of many of its people rose significantly, as did literacy and education levels. Urbanization transformed the landscape. And the Soviet Union won the war against Hitler, something that would have been highly unlikely without high-level industrialization. But critics point to the costs: millions killed as a result of famine, terror, and collectivization; the massive wastage of resources; the establishment of an economic system that ultimately could not sustain itself; the development of a society which crushed individual initiative and free thinking. This was an ambiguous legacy, and one that therefore was difficult for the regime to handle. Under Khrushchev, destalinization was a limited policy that refused to come to grips with the reality of the Stalin regime. When discussion was again permitted, under Mikhail Gorbachev, the political circumstances of the time prevented a balanced evaluation from emerging. Russia still must broach this question, but it is likely that this will only happen in a satisfactory way when the Stalin issue is not seen to have contemporary political relevance. That may be some time off.

See also:

COLD WAR; COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICUL-

TURE; CULT OF PERSONALITY; DE-STALINIZATION; ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; INDUSTRIALIZATION, SOVIET; KIROV, SERGEI MIRONOVICH; NAZI-SOVIET PACT OF 1939; PURGES, THE GREAT; SHOW TRIALS; STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF; WORLD WAR II BIBLIOGRAPHY

Gill, Graeme. (1990). The Origins of the Stalinist Political System. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Hingley, Ronald. (1974). Joseph Stalin: Man and Legend. New York: McGraw-Hill. Tucker, Robert C. (1973). Stalin as Revolutionary 1879–1929: A Study in History and Personality. London: Chatto & Windus. Tucker, Robert C. (1990). Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928–41. New York: Norton. Ulam, Adam B. (1989). Stalin: The Man and His Era. Boston: Beacon. Volkogonov, Dmitri. (1991): Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove. GRAEME GILL

STALIN REVOLUTION See

INDUSTRIALIZATION,

SOVIET.

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STANISLAVSKY, KONSTANTIN SERGEYEVICH (1863–1938), actor, director, acting teacher. The first creator of a comprehensive guide to actor training, Stanislavsky emerged as one of the most influential theater personalities of the twentieth century. His work continues to shape theatrical discourse into the twenty-first century. Born Konstantin Sergeyevich Alexeyev to the wealthy Alexeyevs, he first performed in a fully equipped home theater outside Moscow. Because of his social class, he limited his theatrical ambitions to the amateur sphere. In 1888 he founded The Society of Art and Literature, a critically acclaimed theater club, where he established himself as an outstanding actor and emerging director. As his talents became known, he adopted “Stanislavsky” (1884) to protect his family name. In 1897 Vladimir Nemirovich-Danchenko, playwright and head of the only acting school in Moscow, invited Stanislavsky to cofound The Moscow Art Theater (MAT) as a professional venture. The two agreed to produce plays of contemporary import, bring European stage realism to Russia, and ensure that the work of directors, designers, and actors would embrace unified dramatic visions. The theater opened with an historically researched production of Alexei Tolstoy’s Tsar Fyodor Ioannovich (1898). Anton Chekhov’s The Seagull (1898) secured the company’s fame. Stanislavsky directed and acted in productions such as premieres of Chekhov’s plays (1898–1904), Henrick Ibsen’s An Enemy of the People (1902), and Maxim Gorky’s The Lower Depths (1902). In 1906 Stanislavsky lost inspiration as an actor and retreated to Finland in despair. The crisis induced his passionate desire to systematize acting. He devoted the rest of his life to collecting, developing, and teaching ways to control inspiration. His “System” went through continuous evolution incorporating the experience of great actors, behaviorist psychology, yoga, and other sources that illuminate the creative process. Stanislavsky’s experimental stance caused friction, which ignited in 1909 when he applied his ideas to Ivan Turgenev’s A Month in the Country. Nemirovich’s hostility prompted Stanislavsky to transfer his experiments into a series of studios, adjunct to the main company, even as he continued to act and direct at MAT. The First Studio, founded in 1911, became his most famous laboratory, because it laid the System’s foundation.

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With the Bolshevik revolution, Stanislavsky and MAT were reduced to poverty. From 1922 to 1924, Stanislavsky toured Europe and the United States with the company’s earliest and most famous productions in an effort to recoup financial stability. During this period, he also began to write, publishing My Life in Art in 1924. This period guaranteed his international influence. Upon returning to Moscow, Stanislavsky faced growing Soviet control over the arts. His connections with the West and his production of Mikhail Bulgakov’s play about White Russians, The Days of the Turbins (1926), came under attack. From 1934 to 1938, during the Soviet purges, Stanislavsky was weakened by an enlarged heart and confined to his home. Stalin simultaneously canonized the director’s realistic work as the vanguard of Socialist Realism. Isolated from the wider world, Stanislavsky continued to write, teach, and develop his ideas in his home until his death in 1938 of a heart attack.

See also:

BULGAKOV, MIKHAIL AFANASIEVICH; CHEKHOV,

ANTON PAVLOVICH; MOSCOW ART THEATER; SOCIALIST REALISM; THEATER

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Benedetti, Jean. (1990). Stanislavski: A Biography. New York: Routledge. Carnicke, Sharon Marie. (1998). Stanislavsky in Focus. London: Harwood/Routledge. Smeliansky, Anatoly. (1991). “The Last Decade: Stanislavsky and Stalinism.” Theatre 12(2):7–13. SHARON MARIE CARNICKE

STARCHESTVO See

SPIRITUAL ELDERS.

STAROVOITOVA, GALINA VASILIEVNA (1946–1998), martyred political figure and human rights activist. Galina Starovoitova was one of Russia’s leading human rights advocates and served in the first post-Soviet Russian government. Murdered by unknown assailants on November 20, 1998, in St. Petersburg, she was eulogized as “a symbol of courage and outspokenness,” “one of the brightest lights of Russian independence and reform move-

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ment,” and a leader with an “uncompromising dedication to democracy.” Starovoitova was born in Chelyabinsk, earned B.A. and M.A. degrees in social psychology, and in 1980 received a Ph.D. from the Institute of Ethnography, USSR Academy of Sciences. She worked as an ethnographer and psychologist, and published scientific works in both fields, with a specialization in inter-ethnic relations and cross-cultural studies. Her political activities began in the late 1980s with the Moscow Helsinki Group, a human rights organization led by Andrei Sakharov and other prominent dissident leaders. She joined with Sakharov to campaign for the rights of Armenians in the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, and in 1989, in appreciation, was elected to the USSR Congress of Peoples’ Deputies from Yerevan, the capital of Armenia. The Congress elected her to serve in the Supreme Soviet, where she became one of the cofounders of the pro-reform Inter-Regional Group of Deputies. A year later, she was elected to the Russian parliament from a constituency in St. Petersburg and became a co-chair of the Democratic Russia Party. After the USSR collapsed, Starovoitova became an adviser to President Boris Yeltsin on interethnic affairs, but she resigned in 1992 because of disagreements over policy in the Caucasus region and frustration with a government still beholden to elements of the old Soviet system. From 1993 to 1994 she was a fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C., and the following year she taught at Brown University. In 1995 Starovoitova was elected to the Russian Duma, where she became a prominent spokeswoman on human rights, the war in Chechnya, the environment, women’s rights, wage issues, housing, antisemitism, and religious freedom. In 1996, she ran for the presidency, the first Russian woman to do so. She talked of running again in 2000, and before her death announced that she would run for governor of Leningrad oblast. Starovoitova saw Russia’s communists and nationalists as standing in the way of democratization, and they in turn were her main opponents. Shortly before her death, she spoke out forcefully about political corruption, and many speculate that her investigations in this area precipitated her murder. Millions of Russians mourned Galina Starovoitova’s death, and a kilometer-long line of people waited in the cold to pay their respects. The inves-

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Democratic activist Galina Starovoitova was murdered outside her apartment in St. Petersburg. © ANTONOV/RPG/CORBIS SYGMA

tigation of her murder was turned over to the highest authorities, but despite the interrogation of hundreds of witnesses, the detention of hundreds of suspects, and pledges to catch those guilty of the crime, no one was charged. Several Russians view the murder as a political assassination perpetrated either by organized crime or corrupt political officials.

See

also:

ORGANIZED

CRIME;

SAKHAROV,

ANDREI

DMITRIEVICH BIBLIOGRAPHY

Diuk, Nadia. (1999). “Galina Starovoitova.” Journal of Democracy 10:188–190. Powell, B. (1998). “Requiem for Reform.” Newsweek. December 7, 1998, p. 38. PAUL J. KUBICEK

START See

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS.

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STASOVA, YELENA DMITRIEVNA (1873–1966), Bolshevik, secretary of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, 1919–1920. Yelena Stasova belonged to a prominent St. Petersburg intelligentsia family. In the early 1900s she became a secretary of the illegal St. Petersburg committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party. Stasova was an effective administrator and conspirator, as well as a staunch supporter of Vladimir Lenin. Arrested in 1907, she spent the next ten years in exile, first in the Caucasus and then in Siberia. After the revolution, in 1917 and 1918, Stasova was a secretary of the Petrograd party committee. She chose to concentrate on the mundane but crucially important work of administration, keeping records, dispersing funds, and handing out job assignments. In 1919, when Central Committee Secretary Yakov Sverdlov died, Lenin tapped Stasova to replace him. She struggled to improve the organization of the party’s central administration, but her efforts did not dispel charges of chronic inefficiency in the Secretariat. In 1920, Lenin responded by replacing Stasova with three male secretaries. She left the party leadership having played an important part in building the Communist Party’s apparatus. For the rest of her long life Stasova took insignificant assignments. In the 1930s she headed the International Organization for Aid to Revolutionaries. Her obscurity probably helped her survive the party purges and aid some of its victims. In the 1950s and 1960s she published several versions of her memoirs, all dedicated to restoring the reputation of the party’s founders. Stasova died of natural causes.

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; FEMINISM BIBLIOGRAPHY

Clements, Barbara Evans. (1997). Bolshevik Women. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Born into a prominent upper-class family (his father was a noted architect), Vladimir Stasov graduated in 1843 from the elite St. Petersburg School of Jurisprudence and also studied piano. After a period in various undistinguished civil service jobs, he was appointed secretary to Prince Antaoly N. Demidov in 1851 and spent almost three years in the West, mostly in Florence. Back in Russia he found employment in the Imperial Public Library in the capital, and from 1872 until his death he headed its arts department. Stasov’s voluminous writings consist of polemical feuilletons, monographs on individual musicians and painters, and long overviews of developments in the arts (both in Russia and the West), as well as on Russian architecture and archeology. Inspired by the radical literary critic Vissarion Belinsky, Stasov promoted realist and national artistic forms that would engage the public in current social and historical issues. His original, liberal, and open-minded stance in opposition to the regnant academicism invigorated the cultural scene. But by the 1890s his aesthetics had turned conservative and chauvinistic, condemning as decadent the new artistic trends that were challenging national realism, which had by then become a new form of academicism. With the publication of his monograph on Mikhail Glinka in 1847, which stressed the composer’s originality in using folk motifs, Stasov began to advocate Russianness in music. Thereafter he consistently championed young, independent composers—Miliy A. Balakirev, Alexander P. Borodin, César A. Cui, Modest P. Musorgsky, and Nikolai A. Rimsky-Korsakov—whom he jointly called “The Mighty Five” (moguchaya kuchka). They all were self-taught, opposed the hidebound rules of the conservatory, and strove to create, in Glinka’s footsteps, a distinctly Russian school of music. Stasov supported these composers with polemical publications and contributed significantly to their creative work, suggesting topics, supplying historical documentation, and commenting on compositions. He was especially close to Musorgsky, whose genius he was the first to recognize.

(1824–1906), music and art critic whose aesthetics of realist and national expression in the arts served as a model for socialist realism.

In the 1860s Stasov began to comment regularly on the situation in the pictorial arts, questioning the authority of the Imperial Academy of Arts with its Italianate tastes. Instead, he advocated art that depicted Russian subjects in a manner that would instruct the public about the country’s realities. He became closely associated with young painters who in 1863 had quit the academy in protest against its outdated routines and in 1871

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founded the independent Association of Traveling Art Exhibits. Commonly known as the peredvizhniki (wanderers or itinerants), these artists painted Russian landscape, social genre, or historical scenes that were literally read by both Stasov and the public as critical commentary on current events. Stasov was very closely associated with Ilya Repin, the foremost painter of the school.

many, and big-government systems such as the United States that rely on Keynesian and other macromanagement methods, are often classified as state capitalist. Post-Soviet Russia, which describes itself as a mixed social economy, combining state and private ownership of the means of production with an autocratic state, can also be listed under this heading.

In the 1890s, as aestheticism began to supplant national realism, Stasov’s renown and influence waned. Prior to World War I and during the first decade of the Soviet regime, Stasov’s views were not respected, and were even derided, by the creative intelligentsia. His standing was restored by the Communist Party after the imposition of socialist realism as the guiding ideology for literature and the arts in 1932. But Stasov’s views were increasingly distorted to legitimate a narrow politicization of the arts and cultural isolationism that bore little resemblance to his original position in his creative period from 1860 to 1890. The pedestal on which Stasov stood as the preeminent art and music critic was toppled during the period of glasnost.

Even states dominated by administration and planning, with restricted markets such as the Soviet Union during the era of the New Economic Policy (NEP) 1921–1929, have been accused of being state capitalist by alleging that self-serving bureaucrats, or capitalist roaders had subverted and co-opted the state. Post-Maoist China provides a good example of how a socialist society governed by a Communist Party can serve the interests of property holders from the perspective of MarxistLeninism.

See also:

ACADEMY OF ARTS; MIGHTY HANDFUL; MUSIC;

OPERA; SOCIALIST REALISM BIBLIOGRAPHY

Curran, M. W. (1965). “Vladimir Stasov and the Development of Russian National Art, 1850–1906.” Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin. Olkhovsky, Vladimir. (1983). Stasov and Russian National Culture. Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research Press. Stasov, Vladimir Vasilievich. (1968). Selected Essays on Music, tr. Florence Jonas. New York: Praeger.

These distinctions are devoid of any rigorous economic content. They may serve some useful purpose for ideologues, but the classification reveals nothing about the productive potential, economic efficiency, or welfare characteristics of any particular state capitalist regime, or even whether the system relies primarily on markets or plans. The burden of the term is to place most economies outside the hallowed pale of Marxist socialism. Only North Korea and Cuba appear to be mostly directive regimes, with strong states and a socialist credo, in the twenty-first century.

See also: CAPITALISM; COMMAND ADMINISTRATIVE ECONOMY; ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; MARKET SOCIALISM

ELIZABETH K. VALKENIER BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bettelheim, Charles. (1975). The Transition to Socialist Economy. Hassocks: Harvester Press.

STATE CAPITALISM The term state capitalism was coined by political economists to describe market economies heavily regulated or controlled by the state, on behalf of property owners. Unlike stateless capitalism, where markets function without governmental assistance, commonly called “free enterprise,” political authorities play a powerful role in state capitalist systems. The government is the agent of property holders, and functions as the executive committee of the capitalist class, even though it usually claims to rule in the interests of all the people. Social democratic regimes such as those of France and Ger-

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Buick, Adam, and Crump, John. (1986). State Capitalism: The Wages under New Management. Houndmills, UK: Macmillan. Cliff, Tony. (1974). State Capitalism in Russia. London: Pluto Press. Coleman, Kenneth M., and Nelson, Daniel N. (1984). State Capitalism, State Socialism and the Politicization of Workers. Pittsburgh: Russian and East European Studies Program, University of Pittsburgh. Crosser, Paul K. (1960). State Capitalism in the Economy of the United States. New York: Bookman Associates. Dunayevskaya, Raya. (1992). The Marxist-Humanist Theory of State-Capitalism: Selected Writings. Chicago: News and Letters.

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Gallik, Dmitri; Kostinsky, Barry; and Treml, Vladimir. (1983). Input-Output Structure of the Soviet Economy. Washington DC: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. James, Cyril Lionel Robert. (1969). State Capitalism and World Revolution. Detroit: Facing Reality. Raiklin, Ernest. (1989). After Gorbachev: A Mechanism for the Transformation of Totalitarian State Capitalism Into Authoritarian Mixed Capitalism. Washington, DC: Council for Social and Economic Studies. STEVEN ROSEFIELDE

STATE COMMITTEES The first state committees in the USSR, STO (Sovet truda i oborony, the Council of Labor and Defense) and Gosplan (State Planning Committee) were standing commissions of Sovnarkom (Council of People’s Commissars). Their number grew during the 1930s, and the 1936 constitution granted Sovnarkom membership to the chairpersons of the All-Union Committee for the Arts (Komiskusstv or Vsesoyuzny komitet po delam iskusstv) and the All-Union Committee for Higher Education (Komvysshshkol or Vsesoyuzny komitet po delam vysshei shkoly). Chairpersons of other committees, such as the AllUnion Committee for Physical Culture and Sport (Komfizkult or Vsesoyuzny komitet po delam fizkultury i sporta), were not granted this status. During World War II, the State Defense Committee (GKO or Gosudarstvenny komitet oborony), chaired by Josef Stalin, was created as the extraordinary supreme state body to direct military and civilian resources and the economy, in order to achieve victory. This body was very significant during the war, and was the most powerful of all state committees during the USSR’s existence. In the 1950s and 1960s, with the increasing complexity of the economy of the USSR, and the increased importance of science and technology, the system of state committees developed rapidly as central interdepartmental agencies that coordinated and supervised the work of ministries and other state departments in their areas of responsibility. Although the state committees were formed theoretically by the Supreme Soviet, and their structure was approved by the Council of Ministers, the real decisions concerning their existence and structure lay with the Politburo. State committees were allocated administrative powers to organize, coordinate, and supervise the state departments with

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which they were concerned, their instructions having the force of law within the area of their jurisdiction. Like ministries, they could be either all-Union, with plenipotentiaries in the republics, or union-republic, functioning through parallel apparatuses in the republics. The State Committee of the USSR on Defence Technology (GKOT or Gosudarstvenny komitet SSSR po oboronu tekhnike) was created in 1957 but incorporated into a newly created Ministry of General Machine Building in 1965. The committee was responsible for all strategic ballistic missiles, spacecraft, and satellites developed in the USSR. By 1973 the following state committees existed: State Planning Committee (Gosplan or Gosudarstvenny planovy komitet). State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for Construction (Gosstroi or Gosudarstvenny komitet soveta ministrov SSR po delam stroitelstva). Formed in 1950 to secure increased efficiency in construction. State Committee on Labor and Wages (Gosudarstvenny komitet po voprosam truda i zarabotnoi platy). Formed in 1955 to oversee wages and working conditions. Committee for State Security (KGB or Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti.) Formed in 1954 when the police apparatus was reorganized. The much feared secret police acted with more autonomy than most other government bodies and with a large degree of independence from the Council of Ministers. State Committee on Foreign Economic Relations (Gosudarstvenny komitet po vneshnim ekonomicheskim svyazam). Formed in 1957 to develop economic cooperation with foreign countries and ensure the fulfilment of obligations. It was also responsible for overseeing organizations responsible for exporting equipment to socialist and developing countries. State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for the Supervision of Work Safety in Industry and for Mining Supervision (Gosgortekhnadzor or Gosudarstvenny komitet po nadzoru za bezopasnym vedeniem raboty promyshlennosti i gornomu nadzoru). Established in 1958. State Committee for Vocational and Technical Education (Gosudarstvenny komitet po professionalno-tekhnicheskomu obrazivaniyu). Formed in 1959 to implement and

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supervize policy for training skilled workers both in vocational and technical institutions and in the workplace, to develop a system of educational institutions in this area, and to watch over students in these institutions. State Committee for Science and Technology (Gosudarstvenny komitet po nauke i tekhnike). Formed in 1965 to coordinate policy to maximize the development and utilization of science and technology for economic purposes. State Committee for Material and Technical Supply (Gossnab or Gosudarstvenny komitet po materialno-tekhnicheskomu snabzheniyu). Formed in 1965 to supervise distribution to consumers, coordinate cooperation in delivery, and ensure fulfilment of plans for supply of output. State Price Committee (Gosudarstvenny komitet tsen). Formed in 1965 as a subcommittee of Gosplan, it became a full state committee in 1969. Its tasks included price regulation, pricing policy, and the use of prices to stimulate production. State Forestry Committee (Gosudarstvenny komitet lesnogo khozyaistva). Formed in 1966 to manage state forests and coordinate the activities of forest agencies. State Committee for Television and Radio (Gosudarstvenny komitet po televideniyu i radioveshchaniyu). Formed in 1970. State Committee on Standards (Gossstandart or Gosudarstvenny komitet standartov). Established in 1970 to encourage standardization and ensure standards in the quality of output. State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers on Cinematography (Gosudarstvenny komitet po kinematografii). Created in 1972, its main task was to supervise the activities of film studios in the USSR. State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers on Publishing, Printing, and the Book Trade (Gosudarstvenny komitet po pechati). Established in 1972 to supervise publishing and the content of literature in the USSR. State Committee for Inventions and Discoveries (Gosudarstvenny komitet po delam izobreteny i otkryty). Established in 1973. A law of 1978 granted membership in the Council of Ministers to all chairpersons of state committees.

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After the fall of the USSR, the RSFSR continued the use of state committees, forming the State Committee of the Russian Federation on Communications and Informatization (Goskomsvyaz or Gosudarstvenny Komitet Rossisskoi Federatsii po Svyazi i Informatizatsii) in 1997 from its Ministry of Communications. It was responsible for state management of communications and the development of many forms of telecommunications and postal services, including space communication in conjunction with the Federal Space Program of Russia.

See also:

CONSTITUTION OF 1936; GOSPLAN; POLITBURO;

SOVNARKOM; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Prokhorev, A. M., ed. (1975). Great Soviet Encyclopedia: A Translation of the Third Edition, vol. 7. New York: Macmillan. Unger, Aryeh. (1981). Constitutional Development in the USSR: A Guide to the Soviet Constitutions. London: Methuen. Watson, Derek. (1996). Molotov and Soviet Government: Sovnarkom, 1930–41. Basingstoke, UK: CREESMacmillan. DEREK WATSON

STATE COUNCIL The State Council was founded by Alexander I in 1810. It was the highest consultative institution of the Russian Empire. The tsar appointed its membership that consisted of ministers and other high dignitaries. While no legislative project could be presented to the tsar without its approval, it had no prerogatives to initiate legislation. Ministers sent bills to the State Council on the tsar’s command, reflecting the Council’s ultimate dependence on the tsar for its institutional standing and activity. Since the right of legislation belonged to the autocratic tsar, the State Council could only make recommendations on bills sent to it that the tsar could accept or reject. Additionally the State Council examined administrative disputes between the different governmental organs. After the Revolution of 1905 and the October Manifesto the State Council’s role changed: It became the upper house of Russia’s new parliamentary system. Every legislative bill needed the

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Council’s approval before becoming law. It also had the right to review internal policy of the Council of Ministers, the state’s budget, declarations of war and making of peace, and ministerial reports. Several departments under the State Council’s jurisdiction prepared briefs and more importantly analyzed legislation proposed by the Council of Ministers.

body “all the power and authority of the state are vested in it.” Its decisions and resolutions had the force of law. The initial membership was composed of Stalin as Chairman, Vyacheslav Molotov as Deputy Chairman, Kliment Voroshilov, Georgy Malenkov, and Lavrenti Beria. Stalin added Nikolai Voznesensky, Lazar Kaganovich, and Anastas Mikoyan in February, 1942.

The State Council, like all upper houses in Europe at the time, served as a check on the lower house, the Duma. The tsar appointed half of the Council’s members, while the other half were elected on a restricted franchise from the zemstvos, noble societies, and various other sections of the elite, making it by nature more conservative. In the period 1906–1914 the State Council, with the support of Nicholas II, played a large role in checking the authority and activities of the Duma, which led to general discontent with the post-1905 system.

The GKO met frequently, but informally, sometimes on short notice and often without a prepared agenda but acted on issues that were foremost on Stalin’s mind. Meetings always included people additional to the GKO, usually some Politburo members, members of the Central Committee, officers of the High Command, and various others with special knowledge requested to help address specific issues. The GKO did not develop its own administrative apparatus, but primarily implemented its decisions through the existing government bureaucracy, especially the Council of Peoples’ Commissars (Sovnarkom), the individual commissariats, and the State Planning Commission (Gosplan). Emulating Vladimir Lenin and his use of the Defense Council during the crisis years of the civil war, Stalin and the GKO often relied on plenipotentiaries endowed with broad powers to handle critical tasks. Decision-making bodies of the Communist Party and government were no longer asked for input and were seldom called upon to ratify the GKO’s decisions.

Following the failed coup of August 1991, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev created a State Council consisting of himself and the leaders of the remaining Union Republics. Gorbachev hoped the State Council could craft a reconfigured USSR, but republic representatives increasingly failed to attend Council meetings. By the end of 1991, the State Council—and the USSR—had petered out. Russian President Vladimir Putin created his own State Council in 2000, consisting of the leaders of Russia’s eighty-nine administrative components.

See also:

ALEXANDER I; DUMA; FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF

1906; PUTIN, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Seton-Watson, Hugh. (1991). The Russian Empire 1801–1917. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Yaney, George. (1973). The Systemization of Russian Government. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Each GKO member had specific areas of responsibility to supervise and obtain results. Molotov was to oversee tank production; Malenkov aircraft engine production and the forming of aviation regiments; Beria armaments, ammunition, and mortars, Voznesensky heavy and light metals, oil, and chemicals; Mikoyan supplying the Red Army with food, gasoline, pay, and artillery. Rather less specific was the requirement that each member of the GKO assist in inspecting fulfillment of decisions of Peoples’ Commissars in the course of their work.

With the intent of more effectively coordinating decision-making for the war effort, on June 30, 1941, Josef Stalin created the State Defense Council (also known as State Defense Committee or GKO). According to his speech in which he announced this

The chief strengths of the GKO were that it provided for quick decision-making on critical issues and speedily disseminated vital information to those at the top who needed to use it. The weaknesses of the GKO were that a few men were burdened with a multitude of tasks without a supporting administrative structure to distribute authority rationally and evenly, or to allow initiative. By relying on the existing Party and government structures, which had proven inefficient and prone to parochialism in defending their bureaucratic turf, the GKO was unable to capitalize fully on the unity at the top.

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Furthermore, the commissariats other government offices through which the GKO implemented its decisions had been evacuated to the interior of the USSR while the GKO remained in Moscow. The physical distance between the GKO and the commissariats hindered communication and efficient supervision. The government apparatus did not begin returning to the capital until 1943. With the end of the war, the GKO was formally dissolved on September 4,1945.

See also:

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION;

STALIN, JOSEPH VISSARIONOVICH; WORLD WAR II BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barber, John, and Harrison, Mark. (1991). The Soviet Home Front 1941–1945. London: Longman. Werth, Alexander.(1964). Russia at War. New York: Carrol and Graf. ROGER R. REESE

STATE DEFENSE COUNCIL See

STATE DEFENSE

O R D E R S

countability, these provisions were designed to assure that enterprises produced what the public really wanted to buy. But, perhaps inevitably, the centralized supply organs would still have to check whether the correct volumes, assortments, and qualities of goods had been delivered on time to essential operations, such as the military-industrial complex. Ministries would retain some influence through norms and other indirect instruments, if not direct orders. Aside from some minor products, the State Standards Committee would still set minimum quality requirements. Moreover, party control of personnel and promotions remained untouched until the end of Soviet rule.

See also:

GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; PERE-

STROIKA BIBLIOGRAPHY

Gregory, Paul R., and Stuart, Robert C. (1998). Russian and Soviet Economic Performance and Structure, 6th ed. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Spechler, Martin C. (1989). “Gorbachev’s Economic Reforms: Early Assessments.” Problems of Communism 47(5):116–120.

COMMITTEE; WORLD WAR II.

MARTIN C. SPECHLER

STATE ENTERPRISE, LAW OF THE Of the many pieces of legislation passed during the period of Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika, the Law of the State Enterprise (enacted 1987) was perhaps the most important. It represented yet another effort to separate long-term perspective planning from day-to-day operational control of enterprises. The latter function was to be the exclusive responsibility of the management, without the petty tutelage characteristic of the Soviet system. Enterprises could now enter into contracts (direct links), make quality improvements, and sell over-plan output without the approval of superior agencies. Local party organs would be banned from using enterprise personnel and materials for their own purposes. The centralized system of supply would control only the essential minimum necessary through orders (zakazy) from customers, rather than plan targets, as before. Accordingly, legal enforcement of contracts through arbitrazh (civil arbitration) courts and other legal institutions would be enhanced. A new agency was instituted, Gospriyemka (State Acceptance), independent of enterprise management along the military model, with the duty to check whether quality met state standards. Along with enhanced managerial ac-

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STATE ORDERS The introduction of state orders, as a part of perestroika, was an attempt to move from a total state control over the economy toward introduction of some market elements. During the mid-1980s, the Soviet communist leadership realized that the country was losing the economic competition to the West. The last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, introduced cautious policies designed to set up some market elements. One such change was the introduction of state orders. Prior to perestroika, state enterprises were supposed to produce goods according to the state plan and deliver them to the state for distribution. Gorbachev’s idea was to replace the state plan with state orders. Enterprises first had to produce and sell to the state production to fulfill their state orders. However, the state order should be for only part of their production. After enterprises fulfilled the state order—a guaranteed quantity of products that would be purchased by the state and production for which the state provided necessary resources—they

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could sell the remainder to customers at negotiated prices. The state order was supposed to constitute only a portion of a plant’s potential output. It was included in the state plan, and the resources for its implementation were supposed to be allocated by Gosplan. The percentage of state orders of total output was supposed to decline, giving way to a marketlike economy.

See also:

GOSPLAN; MARKET SOCIALISM; PERESTROIKA.

by Muscovite princes, dating the beginning of this process as early as possible, in the early fourteenth century (e.g., Cherepnin, 1960). Since the 1950s, well into the 1980s, it was much debated who had been allies and enemies of Muscovite centralization, but “centralization” itself was still perceived as an absolute good. In spite of its teleological and nationalistic implications, the state principle can be detected in post-Soviet Russian historiography as well.

See also:

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Gregory, Paul R., and Stuart, Robert C. (2001). Russian and Soviet Economic Performance and Structure. Boston, MA: Addison Wesley.

HISTORIOGRAPHY; KIEVAN RUS; MUSCOVY;

SOLOVREV, VLADIMIR SERGEYEVICH; TIME OF TROUBLES

MIKHAIL M. KROM PAUL R. GREGORY

STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF STATE PRINCIPLE State principle is the leading principle of writing and explaining Russian history in nineteenthcentury and, with some modifications, twentiethcentury national historiography. Professor Johann Philipp Georg Ewers (1781– 1830) was the first to apply to the study of ancient Russian law the Hegelian theory of peoples’ evolution from family or kin phase to that of a state. This idea was adopted and further elaborated by the founders of the so-called state (or juridical) school in Russian historiography, Konstantin Kavelin (1818–1885) and Sergei Soloviev (1820– 1879). According to Soloviev, the transition from kin relations as the dominant system to the strong state organization in Russia took about four hundred years, from the end of the twelfth century till the reign of Ivan IV. Only after that, having endured severe experience in the Time of Troubles, the young Russian state found its place among other European powers. Thus the whole course of Russian history was presented as a progressive and logically necessary movement toward the modern centralized and autocratic state. Though Soviet scholars, unlike Soloviev, considered Kievan Rus to be a feudal state, and thus found state organization even in the ninth century, they remained loyal to the state principle in their own way. Thus, disunity of the Rus lands in the twelfth through fourteenth centuries was regarded as a negative phenomenon, and historians explicitly sympathized with the process of gathering Rus’

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The political police and other organs of state security have played a prominent role in Russian and Soviet history. For almost two hundred years they have served a variety of state interests, including among their functions the surveillance of the population; censorship; the quashing of political and intellectual dissent; foreign and domestic espionage; and the guarding of borders. At times they have shared duties or been subsumed within the Ministry (or Commissariat) of Internal Affairs, and at other times they have been self-standing organs, often operating in parallel with the regular police or militia. Although the political police in the modern understanding of the term originated in Russia in the early nineteenth century, various forms of special security forces existed well before this. The first such organ to play a prominent role was Ivan IV’s (the Terrible) infamous oprichniki, who terrorized the Russian aristocracy in the late sixteenth century in order to root out Ivan’s real and imagined foes. In the mid-seventeenth century Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich (r. 1645–1676) made use of a “Secret Department” (tainy prikaz) to keep him informed of events in the capital and to confirm the accounts of his foreign embassies. Crimes of “word and deed,” that is, either speech or action deemed inimical to the tsar, were vigorously investigated. Alexei’s successors continued to keep private security forces. Peter I (the Great) (r. 1682–1725) maintained the “Preobrazhensky Department” and later a “Secret Investigative Chancellery” staffed with

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close friends and trusted allies to maintain his personal power and to guard against insurrection. These institutions were preserved in various forms throughout the century, despite occasional gestures toward limiting their power; their agents became powerful instruments of the throne and were often feared and loathed among court circles. Despite reaffirming her ill-fated husband Peter III’s (r. 1761– 1762) abolition of the Secret Chancellery, Catherine II (the Great, r. 1762–1796) made much use of an agency called the “Secret Expedition” to root out opposition. Its leader, Stepan Sheshkovsky, was particularly noted for his brutal methods of interrogation, especially in the latter years of Catherine’s reign, when the French Revolution prompted an intensification of repression. These institutions (in general) had a narrower focus and scope than would the genuine political police that originated in the nineteenth century. This had its root not only in the ideals of the Enlightenment-era “well-ordered police state,” but also, ironically, in the French Revolution, which attempted to protect itself through institutions such as the Committee for Public Safety. Hence the organs of state security in Imperial Russia were concerned not only with the possibility of immediate rebellion within court circles, but with dissent in a more general sense. The early reforming efforts of Alexander I (r. 1801–1825) included the aspiration to establish a more rational government system. Of course this did not appear all at once, but it did involve the creation of a ministry system, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which soon acquired competence over all policing matters. In the latter years of Alexander’s reign, several different groups functioned as secret police forces, including the Secret Chancellery within the Ministry of the Interior. The true consolidation of a secret police force came early in the reign of Nicholas I (r. 1825– 1855). Nicholas’s accession had been met with a revolt of military officers known to history as the Decembrist uprising, and Nicholas became adamant that such an occurrence not repeat itself. As part of his efforts to strengthen his own autocratic powers vis-à-vis the ministerial system erected by his brother Alexander, he had formed a set of agencies under his own personal dominion, known collectively as His Majesty’s Own Chancery. The infamous “Third Section” of His Majesty’s Own Chancery formed the first modern secret police force in Russia. It was originally headed by General Alexander Benckendorff and included much of the

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staff of Alexander’s Secret Chancery. The Third Section vastly expanded the range of surveillance functions and incorporated other government officials in its scope, using army gendarme units to spy on the populace; the censors within the Ministry of Education to detect subversive writings; and the postal service to begin the practice of perlustration, or examining the contents of letters. Benckendorff also served as the head of the Corps of Gendarmes, an army unit that came to serve as the Third Section’s information-gathering apparatus. The power of Nicholas’s secret police grew during a time when political opposition in Russia was relatively muted. It concentrated therefore on rooting out intellectual dissidents. During the European Revolutions of 1848, the Gendarmes rounded up members of the so-called Petrashevsky circle, including the young Fyodor Dostoyevsky. It was under Alexander II (r. 1855–1881), the Tsar-Liberator who at last emancipated the serfs, that revolutionary opposition began truly to appear. In the early 1860s, student riots broke out at St. Petersburg University, and in 1866 a demented ex-student attempted to assassinate the tsar. From this time the Third Section under Count Peter Shuvalov was given immense powers to eradicate subversives. It soon became involved in a number of high-profile prosecutions, including the notorious Nechayev Affair. Despite the judicial reforms of 1864, Shuvalov continued to use extralegal means whenever security and expediency required it. Through the 1870s, however, public sympathy increasingly rested with the defendants in a series of celebrated trials prosecuting revolutionary terrorists and other radicals. This culminated in the scandalous acquittal in 1878 of the man who had shot and wounded the muchloathed St. Petersburg police chief General Trepov. Political crimes were soon transferred to military courts to better control the outcome. In 1880, in an effort to better consolidate control, Alexander II transferred the responsibilities of the Third Section to a newly created Department of State Police within the Ministry of Interior, then headed by the moderate Count Mikhail Loris-Melikov. On March 1, 1881, Alexander II was assassinated by a conspiracy of the People’s Will terrorist organization led by Andrei Zhelyabov and Sofia Perovskaya. His son and successor, Alexander III (1881–1894), and his chief advisor Konstantin Pobednostsev demanded a firm accounting. The remnants of People’s Will and other terrorist groups of the late 1870s were ruthlessly sought out and expunged. Loris-Melikov was replaced by

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Nikolai Ignatiev, who soon promulgated a set of temporary measures providing for greater emergency policing powers. Establishing a system of quasi-martial law, these measures were renewed periodically until 1917, and they were used by the government when necessary to circumvent its own legal institutions. Henceforth the minister of the Interior would have broad powers to quell real and potential disturbances and dissent to maintain public order. Within the Interior Ministry’s Police Department was formed a new section in charge of political crimes, called the Division for the Protection of Order and Public Security, better known as the Okhrana. During the 1880s, political proceedings were much less publicized than they had been, and the authorities began to expand the practice of administrative exile of political prisoners—that is, deportation with no trial at all. The Okhrana expanded the business of state surveillance further than it had ever been before, using undercover agents to infiltrate revolutionary organizations. It also established a Foreign Agency to operate among emigré groups conspiring against the Russian government. From the assassination of Alexander II to the fall of the Romanov dynasty, the regime and its opponents were thus locked in a bitter struggle replete with murder and intrigue. Revolutionary terrorists, and in particular the Socialist Revolutionary Party (SR), carried out several spectacular assassinations, including several ministers of the interior—Dmitry Sipiagin in 1902 and the much-loathed Vyacheslav von Plehve in 1904. In response, the Okhrana increasingly used double agents to gather information on and control subversive groups, especially with the explosion of terrorist activity during and after the Revolution of 1905. The most infamous of the agent provocateurs was Evno Azev, who served the Okhrana while heading the SR’s Combat Organization, completely unbeknownst to his comrades, until his dramatic exposure by the rabble-rousing journalist Vladimir Burtsev. After 1908, there were increasingly fewer assassinations of top tsarist officials, with the major exception of the assassination of Prime Minister Peter Stolypin in 1911.

aries, and intellectuals. Many officials sympathized with the politics of right-wing organizations, which after all were bent on defending the monarchy, and the Okhrana became involved in the printing of anti-Semitic materials and condoned pogroms; but others were leery of permitting popular disorder. There was also disagreement over to what degree the police could circumvent the rule of law in its efforts to disrupt revolutionary activities. In the end, the tsarist organs of state security were unable to prevent the overthrow of the imperial regime, despite a marked increase in surveillance during World War I. The growing unpopularity of the tsar and his government was greatly exacerbated by the quixotic influence of Grigory Rasputin, whose rise to prominence concerned leaders of the Okhrana proved powerless to prevent. After the February Revolution in 1917, the Provisional Government abolished the Okhrana and Gendarmes and sponsored a series of hearings into the abuses of power that had occurred during the previous regime. The Council of People’s Commissars established the first Soviet organ of state security in December 1917, creating the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage, better known by its Russian acronym as the Cheka. It was headed by the inimitable Felix Dzerzhinsky, recognized as the founder of the Soviet secret police. Under Dzerzhinsky’s leadership the Cheka, headquartered in the Lubyanka in central Moscow, quickly became a critical part of the Bolshevik efforts to stamp out all opposition in the difficult early days of power. Opponents of Soviet power were targeted starting soon after it was founded. The Red Terror began after the assassination of the Petrograd Cheka chief M. S. Uritsky and an unsuccessful attempt on Lenin’s life, both on August 30, 1918. Hundreds of real and imagined enemies were shot in an effort to quell all opposition, including Socialist Revolutionaries, landlords, capitalists, and other people associated with the old regime. Both the Bolsheviks and the various counterrevolutionary governments that formed during the civil war established intelligence services and made ample use of terror in attempting to win the struggle.

Despite the Okhrana’s successful efforts at infiltrating revolutionary groups and the awe and fear it inspired among the public, security officials faced several important obstacles. There was division over how to deal with the vigilante violence of radical nationalists, aimed at Jews, revolution-

At the end of the civil war, some voices from within the Bolshevik leadership began to press for the establishment of revolutionary legality and a reduction in the extralegal methods of the Cheka. With Vladimir Lenin’s support, the Cheka was abolished in February 1922 and replaced with the

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KGB bodyguards ride on a ZIL government car through the streets of Moscow. © TASS/SOVFOTO

State Political Administration, or GPU. The GPU was to be made nominally subordinate to the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs, or NKVD, and subject to the laws of Soviet Russia. However, from the start this proved more illusion than reality. Dzerzhinsky remained both commissar of internal affairs and head of the GPU, and within a year and a half the GPU had reacquired most of its former powers and been removed from NKVD oversight (and renamed the OGPU). The transformation from Cheka to OGPU, from civil war extraordinary to ordinary organ, marked the institutionalization of the security police in the Soviet system. During the 1920s the OGPU competed with several other Soviet institutions for control of political policing operations. The system of administrative exile was reestablished along with a growing system of forced labor camps known as gulags. Political prisoners soon populated these destinations as they had under the old regime, and many individuals who had been exiled under the tsars found themselves once again in prison. In addition, the

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OGPU and the other organs of state security created a system of surveillance that would soon dwarf that of its tsarist predecessors. State censorship was unified in 1922 under a new organ, called Glavlit, which also worked closely with the secret police. At the same time, infiltration of Russian emigré groups and external espionage commenced. A dramatic intensification of secret police activity marked the end of the 1920s, when Josef Stalin solidified his hold on power. Dzerzhinsky and his successors as head of the OGPU, Vyacheslav Menzhinsky and Genrikh Yagoda, allied themselves with Stalin and were instrumental in helping purge the opposition centering on Leon Trotsky. At the end of the decade, a series of show trials were orchestrated with OGPU support in which purported opponents of Soviet power were exposed and eliminated. This period ushered in the rapid intensification of Soviet industrialization campaigns and the collectivization of agriculture. It also featured the expansion of the system of administrative exile and prison camps, most notably through the campaign against the wealthier peasants, or kulaks, who were thought to

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be congenitally resistant to collectivization. The OGPU conducted a campaign of rooting out and deporting several hundred thousand kulaks and their families in the early 1930s in order to eliminate opposition to the collectivization of agriculture.

based on requests from the localities. The Gulags were expanded dramatically. The exact number of victims has been a measure of some dispute and is still being debated by scholars more than a decade after the fall of the Soviet Union.

By 1931–1932 the OGPU had vastly expanded its extralegal authority and had gained primary competence over the rapidly growing penal apparatus. Its ability to control and observe the population was augmented through the introduction of an internal passport system in 1932. The 1930s and in particular the latter half of the decade are the period in which the punitive functions of the Soviet organs of state security reached their notorious zenith. Driven by a desire to purge the country of all real and imagined enemies, Stalin and his henchman in the secret police unleashed a wave of arrests, deportations, and executions, later known as the Great Terror.

The start of World War II exacerbated the felt need to remove potential fifth columns and intensified the deportation of ethnic groups, including Koreans, Poles, Germans, the Baltic peoples, Chechens, and Tatars. Yezhov had been removed and been replaced with the powerful Central Committee member Lavrenti Beria, marking yet another purge of leading NKVD cadres. Under the leadership of Beria and his equally notorious lieutenants, the organs of state security changed names several times, eventually reconstituting as the People’s Commissariat for State Security (NKGB), which was renamed the Ministry of State Security (MGB) in 1946, functioning alongside and sharing some duties with the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD).

In 1934 the OGPU was transformed once again into the Main Administration of State Security (GUGB) within a reconstituted Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), under the leadership of Genrikh Yagoda. The first wave of purges focused on Stalin’s former colleagues in the Politburo who had been part of the several oppositions in the previous decade. The pretext for these purges was the December 1934 murder of the Leningrad Party chief Sergei Kirov, an event that, according to some historians, was actually ordered by Stalin himself. In any event, the increasingly militant atmosphere following Kirov’s death, in which accusations against loyal Leninists reached infamously absurd proportions, culminated in the show trials of 1936–1938. Such well-known old Bolsheviks as Lev Kamenev, Grigory Zinoviev, and Nikolai Bukharin were accused of plotting against the Soviet state and executed. Yagoda himself was caught up in the wave of purges; he was replaced as NKVD chief by Nikolai Yezhov in September 1936 and arrested along with a number of his colleagues the following year. Toward the end of the decade, the NKVD-led purges changed dramatically in tone and scope. Starting in 1935, mass deportations of particular ethnic groups deemed potentially unreliable had begun, and in 1937–1938 Stalin and Yezhov unleashed the most concentrated wave of the Terror. Hundreds of thousands of Party officials, former oppositionists, intellectuals, military officers, and ordinary citizens were arrested and imprisoned, deported, or summarily executed under Article 58 of the criminal code. Arrest numbers were approved a priori from the center but consistently increased

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In 1953, soon after Stalin’s death, the two ministries were fused, and a separate Committee for State Security (KGB) was established the following year. Beria was arrested by his anxious colleagues and executed toward the end of the year. Thus the three most notorious heads of the state security apparatus during the height of repression, Yagoda, Yezhov, and Beria, were all eventually removed by the system they had turned into an instrument of mass terror. The collective leadership that emerged took careful steps to reestablish Party control over the state security apparatus, and the security and regular police were now separate organs. The period of de-Stalinization under Nikita Khrushchev brought with it the gradual end of the terror and camp system that had characterized the Stalin period, and Khrushchev’s exposure of the excesses of Stalin’s rule changed the nature of the security organs. At the same time, the transition did not by any means diminish the authority of the KGB under the leadership of Ivan Serov, Alexander Shelepin, and their successors. While the abuses of the previous period were decried, and socialist legality once again stressed, the infiltration and surveillance of society by the security organs continued to intensify. In addition, the foreign counterespionage apparatus now reached a position of supreme importance in the tense atmosphere of the Cold War and the establishment of Soviet client states in Eastern Europe and around the world. That the KGB had emerged again as a powerful force in Kremlin politics is evidenced by the fact that Shelepin and his handpicked successor, Vladimir

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Semichastny, were instrumental in the coup that overthrew Khrushchev in October 1964. The KGB enjoyed increased prestige and a further expansion of extralegal powers under the Brezhnev-led collective leadership that followed. In conjunction with high Party leaders, the KGB began the well-known crackdown on internal dissidents in 1965 with the arrest of the writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel and the expulsion of Alexander Solzhenitsyn in 1974. Under the leadership of Yuri Andropov, who chaired the KGB from 1967 until 1982, it became a stable and critical part of Brezhnev-era mature socialism. The reforms of the Gorbachev era, with their emphasis on openness and legality, threatened the central tenets of the security police, as did its loss of control over the Soviet satellite empire. The dissolution of the Soviet Union marked the formal end of the KGB, which was replaced with several successor institutions within Russia, the most important of which came to be called the Federal Security Service (FSB). Nevertheless, despite the changed political circumstances in post-Soviet Russia, the FSB has maintained a great deal of authority, as is evidenced by the rise of former FSB chief Vladmir Putin to the presidency. While critics of the security police can now complain about its abuses, the legacy of centuries of powerful state security organs continues in the early twenty-first century.

See also: AUTOCRACY; OPRICHNINA; NICHOLAS I; PURGES, THE GREAT; RED TERROR; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH; TERRORISM

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Conquest, Robert. (1985). Inside Stalin’s Secret Police: NKVD Politics, 1936–1939. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. Daly, Jonathan. (1998). Autocracy under Siege: Security Police and Opposition in Russia, 1866–1905. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. Dziak, John J. (1988). Chekisty: A History of the KGB. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. Gerson, Lennard D. (1976). The Secret Police in Lenin’s Russia. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Hingley, Ronald. (1970). The Russian Secret Police: Muscovite, Imperial, Russian and Soviet Political Security Operations, 1565–1970. New York: Simon and Schuster. Knight, Amy W. (1988). The KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet Union. Winchester, MA: Allen & Unwin. Leggett, George. (1981). The Cheka: Lenin’s Political Police: The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for

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Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage, December 1917 to February 1922. New York: Oxford University Press. Monas, Sidney. (1961). The Third Section: Police and Society under Nicholas I. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Ruud, Charles A., and Stepanov, Sergei A. (1999). Fontanka 16: The Tsars’ Secret Police. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Squire, Peter S. (1968). The Third Department: The Establishment and Practices of the Political Police in the Russia of Nicholas I. New York: Cambridge University Press. Waller, J. Michael. (1994). Secret Empire: The KGB in Russia Today. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Zuckerman, Frederic S. (1996). The Tsarist Secret Police in Russian Society, 1880–1917. New York: NYU Press. STUART FINKEL

STATE STATISTICAL COMMITTEE See GOSKOMSTAT.

STATUTE OF GRAND PRINCE VLADIMIR Allegedly authored by Grand Prince Vladimir (r. 980–1015), who is credited with the conversion of Kievan Rus to Christianity, the Statute established the principle of judicial separation between secular and clerical courts and forbade any of the Prince’s heirs from interfering in the church’s business. The Statute provided that all church personnel would be tried in church courts, no matter what the subject under litigation. The text scrupulously lists those who qualified for clerical jurisdiction, identifying not only monastics and members of church staffs, but also various social outsiders: pilgrims, manumitted slaves, and the blind and lame, for instance. In addition, the Statute granted church courts exclusive jurisdiction over certain offenses, even if secular subjects of the prince were involved. Divorce, fornication, adultery, rape, incest, disputes over inheritance, witchcraft, sorcery, charmmaking, church theft, and intrafamilial violence were among the subjects assigned to church courts. Over and above the income generated by church courts, the Statute assigned the church a tithe from all the Rus land and a portion of various fees that the Prince collected. Finally, the text authorized bishops to supervise the various weights and measures employed for trade.

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More than two hundred copies of the Statute survive, but none is older than the fourteenth century, a relatively late date for a document of such ostensible importance. In addition, the text includes some obvious errors that have helped undermine confidence in the legitimacy of the Statute. For instance, in the opening section the Statute reports that Grand Prince Vladimir accepted Christian baptism from Photius, Patriarch of Constantinople, who died almost a century before Vladimir converted to Christianity. The most recent study of the Statute, however, has concluded that, if not in Vladimir’s own time, then very soon thereafter, something like the Statute must already have existed. Archetypes of different parts of the Statute probably did originate in the reign of Vladimir, but the archetype of the entire Statute seems not to have arisen before the mid-twelfth century. This document, no longer extant, fathered two new versions in the late twelfth or early thirteenth century, and each of these, in turn, contributed to a host of local reworkings, especially during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. As many as seven basic versions of the Statute survive, each evidently revised to correspond to local circumstances and changing times. No later than early in the fifteenth century, however, the Statute had come to enjoy official standing in the eyes of both churchmen and secular officials. In 1402 and again in 1419 Moscow Grand Prince Basil I (1389–1425) confirmed the judicial and financial guarantees laid out in the Statute. As a result, most extant copies survive along with other texts of secular and canon law in manuscript books like the Kormchaya kniga (the chief handbook of canon law) and miscellanies of canon law. Medieval secular codes, such as the Novgorod Judicial Charter and Pskov Judicial Charter, confirm that church courts in Rus did exercise independent authority, just as the Statute of Vladimir decreed.

See also:

KIEVAN RUS; NOVGOROD JUDICIAL CHARTER; PSKOV JUDICIAL CHARTER; STATUTE OF GRAND PRINCE YAROSLAV; VLADIMIR, ST.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Shchapov, Yaroslav N. (1993). State and Church in Early Russia, Tenth–Thirteenth Centuries, tr. Vic Shneierson. New Rochelle, NY: A. D. Caratzas. DANIEL H. KAISER

STATUTE OF GRAND PRINCE YAROSLAV The Statute is reported to have come from the hand of Grand Prince Yaroslav (r. 1019–1054), son of Kievan Grand Prince Vladimir, who is credited with the conversion of Rus to Christianity and also with the authorship of the Statute of Grand Prince Vladimir, which instituted church courts in Kievan Rus. Inasmuch as no copy of Yaroslav’s Statute from before the fifteenth century survives, many historians doubted the authenticity of the document, but modern textological study has rehabilitated the Statute. Scholars now know of some one hundred copies of the Statute, which may be divided into six separate redactions that reflect changes in the document’s content as it developed in different parts of the Rus lands in the medieval and early modern period. The archetype of the Statute evidently did appear in Rus in the reign of Yaroslav, and gave birth to the two principal versions that dominated all later modifications in the text. The archetype of the Expanded version came into being in the late twelfth or early thirteenth century, then spawned a host of specially adapted copies in the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries. The Short version seems to have arisen early in the fourteenth century, also stimulating many further variations in the document’s content and organization in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. No later than early in the fifteenth century the Statute came to enjoy official standing in the eyes of both churchmen and secular officials. In 1402 and again in 1419 Moscow Grand Prince Basil I (1389–1425) confirmed the judicial and financial guarantees laid out in the Statute. Most extant copies, consequently, survive along with other texts of secular and canon law in manuscript books such as the Kormchaya kniga (the chief handbook of canon law).

Kaiser, Daniel H., ed., tr. (1992). The Laws of Rus’: Tenth to Fifteenth Centuries. Salt Lake City, UT: Charles Schlacks, Jr.

According to the statute’s first article, Grand Prince Yaroslav, in consultation with Metropolitan Hilarion (1051–1054), used Greek Christian precedent and the example of the prince’s father to give church courts jurisdiction over divorce and to extend to the church a portion of fees collected by the

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Grand Prince. The various versions of the statute contained additional provisions, whose specifics depended upon the place and time that the version was created. Among other subjects, articles consider rape, illicit sexual intercourse, infanticide, bigamy, incest, bestiality, spousal desertion and other issues of family law and sexual behavior. The Statute also attempted to regulate Christian interaction with Muslims, Jews, and those who were faithful to indigenous religions. Finally, the Statute confirmed the precedent articulated in the Statute of Grand Prince Vladimir, according to which both monastic and church people would be subject exclusively to the authority of church courts. Later versions sometimes provided for punishment by secular authorities, but in the main version the Statute relied upon monetary fines to punish wrongdoers. No records of litigation that employed the Statute survive from Kievan Rus, but similar statutes that arose in Novgorod and Smolensk suggest that something like Yaroslav’s Statute existed in Kiev. In addition, secular codes such as the Novgorod Judicial Charter and Pskov Judicial Charter confirm that church courts in Rus did exercise jurisdiction independent of secular courts.

See also: BASIL I; KIEVAN RUS; STATUTE OF GRAND PRINCE VLADIMIR; YAROSLAV VLADIMIROVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kaiser, Daniel H. (1980). The Growth of the Law in Medieval Russia. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kaiser, Daniel H., ed., tr. (1992). The Laws of Rus’: Tenth to Fifteenth Centuries. Salt Lake City, UT: Charles Schlacks, Jr. Shchapov, Yaroslav N. (1993). State and Church in Early Russia, Tenth–Thirteenth Centuries, tr. Vic Shneierson. New Rochelle, NY: A. D. Caratzas. DANIEL H. KAISER

(successively at Baranovichi, Mogilev, and Orel) of the Supreme Commander. A succession of incumbents, including Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich, Tsar Nicholas II, and Generals Mikhail Alexeyev, Alexei Brusilov, and Lavr Kornilov, wielded broad powers over wartime fronts and adjacent areas. The scale, scope, and impact of modern wartime operations demonstrated the need for such a command instance to direct, organize, and coordinate strategic actions and support among lesser headquarters, functional areas, and supporting rear. However, for reasons ranging from failed leadership to inadequate infrastructure and poor communications, the organizational reality never completely fulfilled conceptual promise. Between 1914 and March 1918, when Vladimir Lenin abolished a toothless version of Stavka upon conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk agreement, the headquarters grew from five directorates and a chancery to fifteen directorates, three chanceries, and two committees. In 1917, before occupation by the Bolsheviks in December, Stavka also served as an important center of counterrevolutionary activity. During World War II, a Soviet version of Stavka again constituted the highest instance of militarystrategic direction, but with a mixed military-civilian composition. Known successively as the High Command, Supreme Command, and Supreme High Command, Stavka functioned under Josef Stalin’s immediate direction and in coordination with the Politburo and the State Defense Committee (GKO). Stavka’s role was to evaluate military-strategic situations, to adopt strategic and operational decisions, and to organize, coordinate, and support actions among field, naval, and partisan commands. The General Staff functioned as Stavka’s planning and executive agent, while all-powerful Stavka representatives, including Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky, frequently served as intermediaries between Moscow headquarters and major field command instances.

See also:

MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET; WORLD

WAR I; WORLD WAR II

STAVKA

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Stavka was the headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the Russian armed forces (SVG, 1914–1918), or of the Supreme High Command of the Soviet armed forces during World War II. During World War I, the Imperial Russian version of Stavka constituted both the highest instance of the tsarist field command and the location

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Jones, David R. (1989). “Imperial Russia’s Forces at War.” In Military Effectiveness, Vol.1: The First World War, eds. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray. Boston: Unwin Hyman. Shtemenko, S. M. (1973). The Soviet General Staff at War. 2 vols. Moscow: Progress Publishers. BRUCE W. MENNING

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STEFAN YAVORSKY, METROPOLITAN (1658–1722), metropolitan of Ryazan and first head of the Holy Synod. Born to a poor noble family in Poland, Yavorsky and his family moved to Left-Bank Ukraine to live in a territory controlled by Orthodox Russia. After studying in the Petr Mohyla Academy in Kiev, Yavorsky temporarily converted to Byzantine-Rite Catholicism so he could continue his education in Catholic Poland. In 1687, he returned to Kiev and the Orthodox Church and became a monk. As a teacher in the Kiev Academy, Stefan’s eloquence attracted the favorable attention of Peter I, who made him metropolitan of Ryazan in 1700. After the death of Patriarch Adrian I in 1700, Peter made Stefan the locum tenens of the Patriarchal throne. Initially Stefan supported Peter’s reform program. But over time, Peter’s treatment of the Orthodox Church elicited Stefan’s criticism and brought a corresponding decline in his influence. Stefan quietly objected to the secularization of church property and new restrictions on monasticism. Tensions between Peter and Stefan were only exacerbated by Stefan’s zealous prosecution of the Moscow apothecary Dmitry Tveritinov, whose heresy trial lasted from 1713 to 1718. Influenced by Lutheran ideas, Tveritinov rejected icons and sacraments and claimed that the Bible alone provided sufficient guidance for salvation. The heresy trial naturally brought up unpleasant questions about Western Protestant influence in Peter’s reforms. Indeed, Stefan’s attack on Lutheranism, The Rock of Faith, completed in 1718, could not be published until 1728, after Peter’s death. To make matters worse, Stefan’s political reliability came in to question after Alexei, Peter’s son, fled abroad; in one of his sermons shortly before Alexei’s flight, Stefan called him “Russia’s only hope.”

embodied the contradictions of early eighteenthcentury Russia. One of several learned Ukrainian prelates who became prominent under Peter, Stefan both promoted Westernization and sought to limit it. He was deeply influenced by the thought of the Catholic Counter-Reformation, and helped to introduce this theology into Russian Orthodoxy through his writings.

See also:

HOLY SYNOD; PETER I; PROKOPOVICH, FEOFAN;

RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cracraft, James. (1971). The Church Reform of Peter the Great. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. J. EUGENE CLAY

STENKA RAZIN (c. 1630–1671), leader of a Don Cossack revolt and hero of folksong and legend. Stepan Timofeyvich Razin, also known as Stenka Razin, is the hero of innumerable folksongs, legends and works of art. The most popular motif is his (legendary) sacrifice of his bride, a Persian princess, whom he throws into the Volga River for the sake of Cossack solidarity. Over the past three centuries, the name of Stepan Razin has been associated in the Russian popular mind with freedom, social justice, and heroic and adventurous manhood. The philosopher Nikolai A. Berdyaev, assessing the phenomenon of communism in Russia, characterized it as a synthesis of Marx and Stenka Razin.

A transitional figure between the patriarchal and the synodal periods of the Orthodox Church, Stefan

Stepan Razin, the son of a Don Cossack ataman (military leader) and, it is said, a captive Turkish woman, rose to prominence among the Cossacks at a relatively young age. Thus there was no shortage of volunteers when he led a series of brigandage expeditions to the lower Volga in 1667 and the Caspian Sea in 1668 and again in 1669, especially from among the many impoverished newcomers to the Don region, mostly former peasants escaping serfdom. Unlike other Cossack leaders, Razin welcomed the newcomers and cultivated the spirit of Cossack brotherhood and equality (obsolete by his time) among his men. His expeditions were unusually successful—Russian and Persian caravans were plundered, Persian commercial settlements and towns were devastated, a Persian fleet was defeated, and Razin’s warriors won riches and glory.

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In the meantime, Peter’s new favorite, Feofan Prokopovich, authored the Spiritual Regulation, a radical church reform that replaced the office of Patriarch at the head of the Orthodox Church with a Holy Synod—a council of bishops and priests. In a vain attempt to halt the rise of his rival, Stefan accused Feofan of heresy, but was forced to withdraw the charge and apologize. In 1721 Peter nevertheless appointed Stefan to become the first presiding member of the new Holy Synod. He died a year later.

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Upon returning to Russia, Razin departed from tradition by keeping his band intact and not sharing his booty with the established Cossack leaders. Moreover, as he passed through the lower Volga cities of Astrakhan and Tsaritsyn, hundreds of townsmen, fugitive peasants, and even regular soldiers flocked to his standard. The commanders of the Russian garrisons did not dare to stop the popular hero and let him and his men return to the Don region unimpeded. Having raised an army of perhaps seven to ten thousand, Razin announced a new campaign in 1670, aimed at settling scores with the tsar’s boyars and officials, the “traitors and oppressors of the poor.” The towns of Saratov and Samara opened their gates to him; Russian peasants and indigenous peoples rose up in revolt by the tens of thousands throughout the lower and middle Volga region. The rebels intended to march on Moscow, although they maintained that they were loyal to the tsar. They were defeated, however, when they besieged the next large town, Simbirsk, crushed by the government’s regular army, which exploited the lack of coordination between Cossacks and peasants. Stenka Razin fled to the Don region, where in 1671 he was captured by the men of his godfather, Kornilo Yakovlev, a leader of the Don Cossacks. Stenka Razin and his younger brother Frol were delivered to Moscow in an iron cage and executed on June 6, 1671.

See also:

COSSACKS; FOLKLORE; PEASANTRY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Field, Cecil. (1947). The Great Cossack: The Rebellion of Stenka Razin against Alexis Michaelovitch, Tsar of All the Russias. London: H. Jenkins. Fuhrmann, Joseph T. (1981). Tsar Alexis: His Reign and His Russia. Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press.

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Sergei Stepashin joined the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union and served there until 1990. He graduated from the Military Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In his last years in the Ministry of Internal Affairs he was involved in the Ministry’s response to such “hot spots” as Baku, the Fergana Valley, NagornoKarabakh, and Sukhumi. In 1990 he was elected to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet from Leningrad, and he served as chairman of the Committee on Defense and Security. He served in the Russian parliament until 1993. A political ally of President Boris Yeltsin, Stepashin was also appointed deputy minister of security in 1991 and held that post until 1993. In 1993 Stepashin supported Yeltsin in his struggle with the Russian parliament; Yeltsin appointed him deputy minister, then, in March 1994, minister, of the Counter-Intelligence Service. Stepashin played a leading role in unsuccessful covert efforts to overthrow the Dudayev government in Chechnya in the fall of 1994. In 1995 Yeltsin officially fired Stepashin for the fiasco in handling the Chechen raid on Budennovsk in Russia but continued his involvement in counter-intelligence activities. In 1997 Yeltsin appointed him minister of Justice. In the administrative turnover of the last years of Yeltsin’s second term, Stepashin moved up rapidly. He was appointed minister of Internal Affairs in April 1998 and then prime Minister in May 1999 to replace Yevgeny Primakov. Stepashin directed the government’s initial response to the raid of Chechen bands into Dagestan, but was replaced as prime minister by Vladimir Putin in September 1999. In 2000 Putin appointed Stepashin to head the State Auditing Commission.

See also:

CHECHNYA AND CHECHENS; MILITARY, SOVIET

AND POST-SOVIET; PUTIN, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH; YABLOKO; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

ELENA PAVLOVA BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bohlen, Celestine. (1999). “Yeltsin Dismisses Another Premier: KGB Veteran Is In.” The New York Times (August 10, 1999).

STEPASHIN, SERGEI VADIMOVICH (b. 1952), general-lieutenant of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, member of Supreme Soviet and chair of the Defense and Security Committee, head of the Counter-Intelligence Service, minister of Internal Affairs, prime minister, and head of State Audit Commission.

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Bohlen, Celestine. (2002). “Sergey Vadimovich Stepashin.” National Politics. . Shevtsova, Lilia. (1999). Yeltsin’s Russia: Myths and Reality. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. JACOB W. KIPP

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STEPENNAIA KNIGA See

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STEPPE To the forest-dwelling, inland-looking Eastern Slavs (Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarus), the steppes of Central Russia and Eurasia historically were much like the oceans and seas to maritime civilizations. In song and verse, these vast grasslands were the dikiye polya (wild fields) inhabited by the equivalent of untamed, bloodthirsty pirates. Between 700 B.C.E. and 1600 C.E., the steppes were the realm of marauding horse-riding nomads, scions of the Völkerwanderungen (peoples’ migrations), such as the Scythians, Sarmatians, Alans, Huns, Avars, Magyars, Pechenegs, Polovtsy, Mongol-Tatars, and multi-cultural free-booting Cossacks. Indeed, until the invention of the steel-tipped, moldboard plow in the nineteenth century, Eastern Slavic farmers were unable to cultivate the rich black-earths (chernozems) of the steppes, and they confined their settlements mainly to the forest zones. Steppe climates are sub-humid, semiarid continental types. Summer lasts from four to six months. Average July temperatures range from 70 to 73.5 degrees Fahrenheit (21 to 23 degrees Celsius). Winter, by Russian standards, is mild, with January averaging between -4 and 32 degrees Fahrenheit (-13 and 0 degrees Celsius). It generally persists for three to five months. There is a distinctive lack of soil moisture. Average annual precipitation is 18 inches (46 centimeters) in the north and 10 inches (26 centimeters) in the south. Most of it derives from summer thunderstorms. The depth of snow cover in winter ranges from 4 inches (10 centimeters) in the south to 20 inches (50 centimeters) in the north. Steppe ecology exhibits subtle diversity. Herbaceous vegetation abounds. The only natural forests follow the river valleys and ravines, but shelterbelts, planted since the 1930s, parallel the roads and farms to trap snow in winter. Salinized soils (solonets) occasionally interrupt the predominant chernozems and chestnut soils. Small mammals typify the steppe, including marmots, hamsters, social meadow mice, jerboas, and others.

sia’s Altay Foreland and in northern Kazakhstan (the “Virgin Lands”); thus most of the natural steppe is gone. Common crops are wheat, barley, sunflowers, and maize.

See also:

CLIMATE; GEOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Gregory, James S. (1968). Russian Land, Soviet People. New York: Pegasus. Jackson, W. A. Douglas. (1956). “The Virgin and Idle Lands of Western Siberia and Northern Kazakhstan.” The Geographical Review 46:1–19. Shaw, Denis J. B. (1999). Russia in the Modern World: A New Geography. Malden, MA: Blackwell. VICTOR L. MOTE

STILIAGI A Soviet youth subculture that emerged in the late 1940s and extended into the early 1960s. The term stiliagi first appeared in the Soviet press in 1949 to provide a negative characterization of young men who pursued what they believed to be Western models of behavior, leisure, clothing, and dance styles. Stil’ (style) was essential for them and the very first stiliagi—almost exclusively men—sported elaborate haircuts and colorful suits and ties. In the early 1950s the stiliagi clothing style became more subdued as they adopted a more “American” look and wore narrow black pants and thick-soled shoes. The stiliagi, displaying a pronounced American orientation, called themselves shtatniki (United States-niks). They listened to American jazz, smoked American cigarettes, and used American slang. In the late 1950s and early 1960s some stiliagi embraced rock culture as it began to spread in the West. Nightlife was important for the stiliagi and they regularly gathered in public and private spaces to listen to jazz and dance Western dances.

This zone and the wooded-steppe to the north yield Russia’s best farmland. Between 1928 and 1940, most of the steppe was converted to state and collective farms. In the 1950s, long-term fallow lands (perelog and zalezh) were plowed in Rus-

The stiliagi phenomenon is most strongly associated with the ideological relaxation and the growing material well-being in the post-Stalin period. The predominant majority of the stiliagi were students of higher educational institutions in major urban centers. They came from families of the Soviet professional, political, and managerial elite, also known as the nomenklatura. Under Stalin and later Soviet leaders, the nomenklatura received a

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number of privileges (e.g., access to special stores, trips abroad, better housing, financial bonuses) in exchange for political conformity. The stiliagi phenomenon reflected the growing consumerist and leisure-oriented mentality of the upper crust of Soviet society. The stiliagi culture was widely denounced by the Soviet media. The official Komsomol campaign targeted their “parasitic” and immoral attitude toward work, lack of political involvement and loyalty, and pro-Western spirit. In individual cases, the stiliagi were forced to change their dress and hairstyles and were expelled from the Komsomol. In the mid-1980s, parallel to glasnost and perestroika, there was a revival of the stiliagi culture. The new stiliagi included girls and adopted a dress code of black suits, white shirts, and narrow ties. They were fans of the Soviet rock ‘n’ roll bands “Brigada S” and “Bravo.” This new generation of stiliagi was part of the growing number of neformaly (non-formal), youth groups that emerged outside of the official youth culture controlled by the Komsomol and reflected the growing crisis of cultural and political identity among Soviet youth.

See also:

NOMENKLATURA

Trade at the Moscow Stock Exchange, August 29, 1998.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Edele, Mark. (2002). “Strange Young Men in Stalin’s Moscow: The Birth and Life of the Stiliagi, 1945–1953.” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 50(1):37–61. Kassof, Allen. (1965). The Soviet Youth Program: Regimentation and Rebellion. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Pilkington, Hilary. (1994). Russia’s Youth and Its Culture. A Nation’s Constructors and Constructed. New York: Routledge. LARISSA RUDOVA

STOCK EXCHANGES Stock market exchanges are a real or virtual location for the sale and purchase of private equities. A way for private enterprises to raise investment funds. The first stock market exchange in post-Soviet Russia was primarily trade in privatization vouchers. As privatization proceeded apace, so did the volume of transactions on Russian exchanges. Shares

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in certain Russian enterprises, particularly those of oil and gas companies, were also increasingly offered on the market, but the stock market or markets in Russia have yet to offer enterprises significant sources of either domestic or foreign investment funds. Initially, the Russian stock exchanges were wild and risky places to venture funds. The early days witnessed two major boom and bust cycles: 1994–96 and 1996–98. Following the financial crisis of 1989, the Russian stock market almost ceased to exist. The Russian government sought to regulate the market step by step. Prior to 1996 enterprises were not required by law to maintain independent, public registries of stock outstanding, and both domestic and foreign investors learned to their dismay that they could be defrauded of their equity claims. The 1996 Russian Federal Securities Act required public registries and created the Federal Securities Commission and charged it with coordinating the various federal agencies that were

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responsible for governing the securities market. Conditions have improved for investors, but much remains to be done to create a reasonable market in equities comparable with those in more advanced capitalist countries. It remains more a site for speculation than for raising significant amounts of investment funds.

See also:

ECONOMY, POST-SOVIET

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Gregory, Paul R., and Stuart, Robert C. (2001). Russian and Soviet Economic Performance and Structure, 7th ed. New York: Addison Wesley. Gustavson, Thane. (1999). Capitalism Russian-Style. New York: Cambridge University Press.

government promoted Lutheran missionary activity among the Orthodox inhabitants and encouraged settlement from other Swedish dominions. The Stolbovo settlement was reconfirmed by the 1661 Treaty of Kardis, but overturned by the Treaty of Nystad (1721) that ended the Great Northern War. Sir John Merrick, an English merchant, helped to negotiate the treaty, testifying to Russia’s growing links with Western Europe. The treaty is also connected with a famous relic, the Tikhvin Icon of the Mother of God, a copy of which was brought to Stolbovo for the negotiations.

See also:

NOVGOROD THE GREAT; ROMANOV, MIKHAIL

FYODOROVICH; SHUISKY, VASILY IVANOVICH; SMOLENOK WAR; SWEDEN, RELATIONS WITH; TIME OF

JAMES R. MILLAR

TROUBLES

BIBLIOGRAPHY

STOLBOVO, TREATY OF Signed February 27, 1617 in Stolbovo village, this treaty terminated Swedish intervention in Russian affairs after the Time of Troubles. King Gustavus Adolphus recognized Mikhail Romanov as the legitimate tsar of Russia; withdrew the claim of his brother Charles Philip to the Russian throne; and evacuated Novgorod. Russia ceded eastern Karelia and Ingria to Sweden, foregoing direct access to the Baltic Sea, and paid an indemnity of twenty thousand rubles. King Charles IX had initially intervened in 1609 to provide aid against Polish attempts to place a pretender on the Russian throne. Following the deposition of Vasily Shuisky in 1610, the boyars’ council agreed to accept Prince Wladyslaw, son of King Sigismund III, as the next tsar of Russia. Sweden declared war and advanced the candidacy of Charles Philip to the vacant throne. Novgorod was seized in July 1611. Sweden found it difficult to control northwestern Russia effectively, and its occupation drained away military resources needed to protect Swedish interests in Central Europe. The Stolbovo terms met Sweden’s primary objective, ensuring that the Baltic coast—and with it, the primary east-west trade routes remained in Swedish hands.

Küng, Enn. (2001). “The Swedish Economic Policy in the Commercial Aspect in Narva in the Second Half of the 17th Century.” Ph.D. diss. Tartu University, Estonia. NIKOLAS GVOSDEV

STOLNIK The highest general sub-Duma rank of military and court servitors in Muscovy. Literally meaning “table-attendant,” stolnik first appears in 1228 and 1230 for episcopal and princely court officials. As Moscow grew, younger and junior memoirs of the top families and provincial serving elites needed a place at court. Accordingly stolnik lost its earlier meaning and was granted to many members of these strata. Above it was the much smaller number of postelniks (chamberlains), and below a large contingent of striapchis (attendants, servants—a term that appears by 1534), and Moscow dvorianins. The service land reforms of the 1550s and 1590s assigned Moscow province estates to these ranks.

Stolbovo marks the high point of Sweden’s eastward expansion beyond the border first confirmed by the 1323 Treaty of Nöteborg. The Swedish

From the end of the sixteenth century to 1626, the numbers of stolniks, striapichis, and Moscow dvorianins grew respectively from 31–14–174 to 217-82-760, plus another 176 stolniks of Patriarch Filaret, much of that growth occurring during the Time of Troubles. After measured growth to 1671, the numbers of stolniks mushroomed from 443 to

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1307 in 1682 and 3233 in 1686. By this time an elite category of chamber stolniks arose, growing from 18 in 1664 to 173 in 1695. Some stolnik were always in the tsar’s suite, attending to his needs. In 1638, the average stolnik land-holding was seventy-eight peasant households, sufficient to outfit an elite military servitor and several attendants, as opposed to 24 and 28–29 respectively for the average striapchiu and Moscow dvorianin, and 520 for the average Duma rank. The most eminent family names virtually filled the stolnik rosters in the early seventeenth century. Among those on the 1610–1611 list were Prince Dmitry Pozharsky, the military hero of 1612 and the young “Mikhailo” Romanov, elected tsar in 1613. The percentage of non-aristocratic stolniks surpassed two-thirds toward the end of the century. Under Peter I (the Great) these terms disappeared, but former stolniks and their progeny constituted the critical mass of the upper ranks of his service-nobility.

See also:

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Jewish, German, and other communities rendered privileged Russians a distinct minority. Stolypin’s nationalism, a hallmark of his later political career, cannot be understood apart from this early experience of imperial Russian life. As did an increasing number of his noble contemporaries, Stolypin attended university, entering St. Petersburg University in 1881. Unlike many noble sons intent on the civil service and thus the study of jurisprudence, Stolypin enrolled in the physics and mathematics faculty, where among the natural sciences the study of agronomy provided some grounding for a lifelong interest in agriculture. Married while still a university student to Olga Borisovna Neidgardt (together the couple would parent six children), the young Stolypin obtained a first civil service position in 1883, a rank at the imperial court in 1888, but a year later took the unusual step of accepting an appointment as a district marshal of the nobility near his family estate in Kovno. He spent much of the next fifteen years immersed in provincial public life and politics.

BOYAR; DUMA; MUSCOVY; ROMANOV, MIKHAIL

FYODOROVICH; TIME OF TROUBLES

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hellie, Richard. (1971). Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. DAVID M. GOLDFRANK

STOLYPIN, PETER ARKADIEVICH (1862–1911), reformist, chairman of the Council of Ministers, 1906–1911. Peter Arkadievich Stolypin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers from 1906–1911, attempted the last, and arguably most significant, program to reform the politics, economy, and culture of the Russian Empire before the 1917 Revolution. Stolypin was born into a Russian hereditary noble family whose pedigree dated to the seventeenth century. His father was an adjutant to Tsar Alexander II, and his mother was a niece of Alexander Gorchakov, the influential foreign minister of that era. Spending much of his boyhood and adolescence on a family estate in the northwestern province of Kovno, Stolypin came of age in an ethnically and religiously diverse region where Lithuanian, Polish,

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Peter Stolypin introduced key agrarian reforms under Nicholas II. © HULTON ARCHIVE

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Scholars generally agree that these years shaped an understanding of imperial Russia, and the task of reform that dominated his later political career. Of primary importance was his experience of rural life. For much of the 1890s the young district marshal of the nobility also led the life of a provincial landowning gentleman. Residing on his family estate, Kolnoberzhe, Stolypin took an active interest in farming, managing income earned from lands both inherited and purchased. He also experienced the variety of peasant agriculture, perhaps most notably the smallholding hereditary tenure in which peasant families of nearby East Prussia often held arable land. Stolypin’s understanding of autocratic politics also took shape in the provinces. There he first encountered its peculiar amalgam of deference, corruption, bureaucracy, and law. In 1899 an imperial appointment as provincial marshal of nobility in Kovno made him its most highly ranked hereditary nobleman. Within three years, in 1902, the patronage of Viacheslav von Pleve, the Minister of Internal Affairs, won him appointment as governor of neighboring Grodno province. Early 1903 brought a transfer to the governorship of Saratov, a major agricultural and industrial province astride the lower reaches of the Volga river valley. An incubator of radical, liberal, and monarchist ideologies, and the scene of urban and rural discontent in 1904–1905, Saratov honed Stolypin’s political instincts and established his national reputation as an administrator willing to use force to preserve law and order. This brought him to the attention of Nicholas II, and figured in his appointment as Minister of Internal Affairs, on the eve of the opening of the First State Duma in April 1906. When the tsar dissolved the assembly that July and ordered new elections, he also appointed Stolypin to chair the Council of Ministers, a position that made him the de facto prime minister of the Russian Empire.

gence of the law to dominate political opponents and assert the preeminence of a superficially reformed monarchy. Hence, in August 1906, he established military field court-martials to suppress domestic disorder. More drastically, he undertook the so-called coup d’état of June 3, 1907, dissolving what was deemed an excessively radical Second State Duma and, in clear violation of the law, issuing a new electoral statute designed to reduce the representation of peasants, ethnic minorities, and leftist political parties. A second view, shared by a minority of his contemporaries but a majority of historians, accepted that Stolypin never entirely could have escaped the authoritarian impulses widespread in tsarist culture and especially pronounced among those upon whom Stolypin’s own influence most depended— moderate public opinion; the hereditary nobility, the imperial court; and ultimately the tsar, Nicholas II. Given such circumstances, without order the far-reaching “renovation” (obnovlenie) of the economic, cultural, and political institutions of the Empire envisioned by Stolypin would have been politically impossible. Of central importance to this interpretation was the Stolypin land reform, first issued by administrative decree in 1906 and approved by the State Duma in 1911. This major legislative accomplishment aimed to transform what was deemed to be an economically unproductive, politically destabilizing peasant repartitional land commune (obshchina) and eventually replace it with family based hereditary smallholdings. Yet, the reform initiatives of these years were not limited only to this “wager on the strong,” but extended into every important arena of national life: local, rural, and urban government; insurance for industrial workers; religious toleration; the income tax; universal primary education; university autonomy; and the conduct of foreign policy.

His tenure from 1906 through 1911 was tumultuous. Typically, historians have assessed it in terms of a balance between the conflicting imperatives of order and reform. Ironically enough, contemporary opponents of Stolypin’s policies, most notably moderate liberals and social democrats who pilloried Stolypin for sacrificing the possibilities of constitutional monarchy and democratic reform to preserve social order, offered opinions of his politics that found their way, however circuitously, into Soviet-era historiography. In this view, Stolypin favored punitive force, police power, clandestine financing of the press, and a general negli-

In September 1911, Stolypin’s career was cut short when Dmitry Bogrov assassinated him in Kiev. Once a secret police informant, Bogrov’s background spawned persistent rumors of right-wing complicity in the murder of Russia’s last great reformer, but by all authoritative accounts the assassin acted alone. Some scholars argue that Stolypin’s political influence, and especially his personal relationship with Nicholas II, was waning well before his death, in large measure as a result of the western zemstvo crisis of March 1911. Yet, Abraham Ascher, Stolypin’s most authoritative biographer, credits the claims of Alexander Zenkovsky that Stoylpin was contemplating further substan-

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tive reforms of the empire’s administrative and territorial structures in the last months of his life. Stolypin’s historical reputation continues to be the subject of scholarly debate, the character and consequences of his policies intertwined with larger debates about the stability and longevity of the tsarist regime.

See also: AGRARIAN REFORMS; DUMA; ECONOMY, TSARIST; NICHOLAS II

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ascher, Abraham. (2001). P. A. Stolypin: The Search for Stability in Late Imperial Russia. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Conroy, Mary Schaeffer. (1976). Peter Arkad’evich Stolypin: Practical Politics in Late Imperial Russia. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Macey, David A. J. (1987). Government and Peasant in Russia, 1881–1906: The Prehistory of the Stolypin Reforms. De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press. Von Bock, Maria Petrovna. (1970). Reminiscences of My Father Peter A. Stolypin, tr. and ed. Margaret Patoski. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press. Waldron, Peter. (1998). Between Two Revolutions: Stolypin and the Politics of Renewal in Russia. London: UCL. Wcislo, Francis W. (1990). Reforming Rural Russia. State, Local Society, and National Politics, 1855–1914. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Zenkovsky, Alexander. (1986). Stolypin: Russia’s Last Great Reformer, tr. Margaret Patoski. Princeton, NJ: Kingston Press. FRANCIS W. WCISLO

ST. PETERSBURG From 1712 until 1918, St. Petersburg was the capital of the Russian Empire. Peter I (the Great) began the construction of the city as his “Window on the West” in 1703. During the subsequent three centuries, St. Petersburg was identified with the three major forces shaping Russian history: Westernization, industrialization, and revolution. The city was renamed Petrograd in 1914, at the beginning of World War I, because it sounded less German, was then named Leningrad after the death of Vladimir Lenin in 1924, and again became St. Petersburg in 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed. Confusingly, the surrounding region (oblast) is still known as Leningrad.

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In the early twenty-first century, with a metropolitan population of 4.8 million people, St. Petersburg is the second-largest city in Russia and the fourth-largest in Europe (behind Moscow, London, and Berlin). It is also Russia’s second-most important industrial center, having benefited from Soviet investment in heavy industry, research and development, military-industrial production, and military basing and training. The city is a major international port and tourist destination, with tourists flocking there in May and June for the legendary “White Nights,” during which the sun seems to never set.

CAPITAL OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE

Peter the Great seized control over the confluence of the Neva River and the Gulf of Finland from Sweden in 1703. Inspired by a visit to Amsterdam, he decided to build a major city on this barren marshland to better integrate Russia into Western Europe and secure a Baltic port. Thousands of peasants and prisoners-of-war were pressed into service to build the city’s numerous canals and palaces. When the harsh climate combined with malaria to kill tens of thousands of them, their bodies were dumped into the construction sites, leading to St. Petersburg’s nickname as the “city built on bones.” Construction was hampered by floods, which also ravaged the city in 1777, 1824, 1924, and 1955. Empress Elizabeth, Peter’s daughter, improved upon her father’s vision by commissioning European architects such as Bartolomeo Rastrelli to construct baroque landmarks, including Winter Palace, the Smolny Institute, and the palaces of Tsarskoe Selo. Catherine II (the Great) subsequently purchased the paintings, drawings, and other priceless artworks that are now the core of the Hermitage Museum’s holdings. She also established the Russian Academy of Arts to further aesthetic production, and she commissioned the Pavlovsk Palace, the Hermitage, and the Tauride Palace, later the meeting place of the first Duma and the Provisional Government. The city’s remarkable transformation from swamp to showcase paralleled the emergence of Russia as a major European power, from Peter’s 1709 victory over the Swedes at Poltava to Alexander I’s 1814 arrival in Paris. The city came to represent precisely this change from isolation to European integration. Petersburg’s growing symbolic dominance preoccupied the country’s intelligentsia and nobility alike, with Tsar Nicholas I

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An eighteenth-century engraving of Peter the Great supervising the construction of St. Petersburg. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

complaining that “Petersburg is Russian but it is not Russia.” During the imperial era, Russia’s leading politicians, intellectuals, and cultural figures were brought together by the major institutions based in St. Petersburg to generate events that vitally affected the life of every member of Russian society. The Decembrist uprising of 1825 culminated in Senate (now Decembrist) Square. In January 1905, Father Gapon led a peaceful march of workers and their families to the Winter Palace to petition the tsar; the resulting slaughter is remembered as Bloody Sunday. Following that tragedy, the workers of St. Petersburg became increasingly militant. Forced to live and work in squalor due to Russia’s rapid forced industrialization, they began to protest and strike for improved conditions.

as representative of imperial Russia’s new military and industrial might. But with industrialization there also emerged a surging revolutionary movement, and “Red Petrograd” soon became the “cradle of the Revolution.” UNDER THE SOVIETS

By the dawn of the twentieth century, the city was the fifth-largest in Europe, behind London, Paris, Vienna, and Berlin, and was widely viewed

With the outbreak of World War I in August 1914, Nicholas II russified the capital city’s name to Petrograd. In the early days of the war, the streets of Petrograd were filled with young men volunteering for military service. But as Russian losses mounted and the economy declined still further, Petrograd became the focus of anti-tsarist sentiment. The Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, founded in 1917 and modeled on a 1905 organization, was the most active. In March (February O.S.) 1917, workers struck and soldiers mutinied, leading to the eventual abdication of Nicholas II. A Provisional Government was in-

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stalled, but constantly battled the Petrograd Soviet for control of the city. During the “July Days,” the Soviet nearly succeeded in gaining power. On November 7 (October 25, O.S.), members of Trotsky’s Red Guards stormed the Winter Palace, and the Provisional Government fled. For the next seventyfour years, the communists would control Russia. The Soviet regime’s shift of its seat of government to Moscow in March 1918 stripped Petrograd of many of its most creative and powerful institutions and prominent individuals. The city was renamed Leningrad after the death of Lenin in 1924. Its standing was further undermined by the December 1934 assassination of Leningrad Party leader Sergei Kirov in his office at the Smolny Institute, which precipitated Josef Stalin’s mass purges. Mass graves containing the victims were still being discovered outside the city as recently as 2002. World War II took a particularly heavy toll on Leningrad. For nine hundred days the Germans laid siege to the city, and there were anywhere from 700,000 to more than 1 million civilian deaths from attack and starvation. Although the Nazis never entered the city proper, they looted and burned many of the palaces in the environs, including Peterhof and the Catherine Palace. During the post-Stalin era Leningrad was an important economic and intellectual center, though still trailing Moscow. Aside from Kirov, one of Leningrad’s best-known political leaders was the rather ironically named Grigory Romanov. As first secretary of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee from 1970 to 1983, Romanov encouraged production and scientific associations, as well as links among such groups to innovate and implement new technologies. As a result, Leningrad achieved enviable production levels. Romanov also made use of the city’s extensive scientific establishment, linking the research and production sectors to improve production.

THE POST-SOVIET ERA

Although Romanov eschewed Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms, other Leningrad leaders embraced the changes. Anatoly Sobchak was elected to the first USSR Congress of People’s Deputies in 1989 and in 1991 became the city’s first elected mayor. A major figure in Russia’s democratic movement, Sobchak oversaw a difficult transition in his city. His resistance to the hardline August 1991 putsch was critical to its defeat. Following the coup’s collapse,

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Sobchak immediately renamed the city St. Petersburg. As the city’s economy suffered under the national shift to capitalism, St. Petersburg experienced a severe rise in organized crime. Sobchak was unable to eradicate corruption, and in 1996 lost his bid for reelection to Vladmir Yakovlev. St. Petersburg is the cultural capital of Russia. Among its most famous residents were the painters Marc Chagall and Ilya Repin; the writers Nikolai Gogol, Alexander Pushkin, Anna Akhmatova, and Fyodor Dostoevsky; the composers Peter Tchaikovsky and Dmitry Shoshtakovich; and the choreographers Marius Petipa and Sergei Diaghilev. Among its many art galleries, the Hermitage, the Russian Museum, and the Stieglitz boast collections unparalleled in the world. St. Petersburg is the home of the renowned Mariinsky ballet company (known as the Kirov in Soviet times). Shostakovich named his Seventh Symphony Leningrad. Falconet’s Bronze Horseman sculpture of Peter the Great, located in Decembrist Square, was commissioned by Catherine the Great and immortalized by Pushkin in a poem of the same name. Many palaces and Orthodox churches have been restored, including the Romanovs’ Winter Palace, St. Isaac’s Cathedral, and the Kazan Cathedral. On the north bank of the Neva, the Peter and Paul Fortress has a long history as both a prison and, in the Cathedral of Saints Peter and Paul, the burial site of all the Romanov tsars from Peter I to Nicholas II. St. Petersburg had begun to recapture some its lost splendor by 2003. UNESCO designated the city a World Heritage site. Extensive renovation, funded in part by a $31 million loan from the World Bank, took place in preparation for the city’s tercentennial celebration in May 2003. Partly contributing to the city’s renaissance was the fact that President Vladimir Putin was born in St. Petersburg. In addition to promoting the tercentennial commemoration, Putin oversaw the renovation of the Peterhof Palace into a world-class conference center. There was also talk of creating a presidential residence in St. Petersburg and even some sentiment to move the capital from Moscow. Whether or not St. Petersburg regains the political eminence of a century ago, it remains a vibrant, culturally rich European city, much as Peter envisioned.

See also:

ACADEMY OF ARTS; ADMIRALTY; BLOODY SUN-

DAY; CATHERINE II; DECEMBRIST MOVEMENT AND REBELLION; ELIZABETH; MUSEUM, HERMITAGE; PETER I; PETER AND PAUL FORTRESS; WINTER PALACE

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Glantz, David M. (2002). The Battle for Leningrad, 1941–1944. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. McAuley, Mary. (1991). Bread and Justice: State and Society in Petrograd, 1917–1922. New York: Oxford University Press. McKean, Robert B. (1990). St. Petersburg between the Revolutions, June 1907–February 1917. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Ruble, Blair A. (1989). Leningrad: Shaping a Soviet City. Berkeley: University of California Press. Sablinsky, Walter. (1976). The Road to Bloody Sunday: Father Gapon and the St. Petersburg Massacre of 1905. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Salisbury, Harrison E. (1969). The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad. New York: Harper & Row. ANN E. ROBERTSON BLAIR A. RUBLE

Carter withdrew his support after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. While the SALT agreements represent important progress in terms of quantitative arms limitation, a significant flaw was that they failed to address the issue of qualitative advancements in weapons systems—which threatened the utility of the MAD regime. This qualitative problem was addressed in the subsequent Strategic Arms Reduction Talks.

See also:

ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY; ARMS CON-

TROL; DÉTENTE; STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS; STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Payne, Samuel B., Jr. (1980). The Soviet Union and SALT. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Wolfe, Thomas W. (1979). The SALT Experience. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger. MATTHEW O’GARA

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATIES Coming on the heels of the 1968 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the two components of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT) represented a willingness by the United States and the Soviet Union to constrain an arms race that both recognized was costly and potentially destabilizing. Soviet nuclear advantage in the early 1970s concerned the United States, and the Soviets recognized that American fears would likely translate into a massive weapons program aimed at regaining nuclear superiority. Thus the Soviet Union chose to forsake short-term advantage in favor of guaranteed parity over the long term. Both sides agreed that strategic parity would significantly contribute to stability. The chief products of SALT I were the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 1972, and an interim agreement which set limits on the total number of offensive missiles allowable (further addressed in SALT II). The ABM Treaty limited the number of defensive weapons, indicating that both the United States and the Soviet Union accepted the idea that mutual vulnerability would increase stability— thereby institutionalizing mutual assured destruction (MAD). SALT II limited the total number of all types of strategic nuclear weapons. However, although agreed upon by both countries, SALT II was never ratified because American President Jimmy

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STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) were predicated on the concept of “minimum deterrence”—a regime in which both the United States and the Soviet Union would reduce nuclear arsenals to the minimum level needed to deter the other from attempting a first strike. As with previous bilateral nuclear weapons treaties between the United States and the USSR, the goal of START was to reduce the costs associated with a gratuitous arms buildup, while simultaneously increasing system stability by ensuring mutual vulnerability. Prior agreements limited the number of weapons each nation possessed, but advancements in technology made these previously agreed upon levels untenable to the United States; in the early 1980s it was perceived that the Soviet Union was close to a first strike capability—the ability to attack enough targets in the United States so as to prevent a retaliatory strike. This perception of a “window of vulnerability” prompted the Reagan Administration to undertake a massive weapons modernization program, in addition to pursuing the proposed Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The Soviets believed that SDI was destabilizing and therefore were willing to make cuts in offensive nuclear arms in exchange for re-

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strictions on American research and development of space-based defensive systems. As with the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT), the Soviet Union was once again forsaking short-term superiority in favor of long-term stability. START mandated cuts in the number of nuclear delivery systems by about 40 percent, reduced the number of warheads by roughly 30 percent, and also established more complete verification procedures. The treaty was signed by President George Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on July 31, 1991 in Moscow.

See also:

ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY; ARMS CON-

TROL; DÉTENTE; STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kartchner, Kerry M. (1992). Negotiating START: Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and the Quest for Strategic Stability. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Mazarr, Michael J. (1991). START and the Future of Deterrence. New York: St. Martin’s Press. MATTHEW O’GARA

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After Reagan’s SDI speech, General Secretary Yuri Andropov denounced the program, telling a Pravda reporter that if Washington implemented SDI, the “floodgates of a runaway race of all types of strategic arms, both offensive and defensive” would open. Painfully aware of U.S. scientific and engineering skills, the Soviet leadership sought to eschew a costly technological arms race in which the United States was stronger. With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and USSR, signing of the START I and II treaties, and the 1992 presidential election of Bill Clinton, the SDI received lower budgetary priority (like many other weapons programs). In 1993 Defense Secretary Les Aspin announced the abandonment of SDI and its replacement by a less costly program that would make use of ground-based antimissile systems. The SDIO was then replaced by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). In contrast to the actual expenditures on SDI (about $30 billion), spending on BMDO programs exceeded $4 billion annually in the late 1990s.

See also:

ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY; ARMS CON-

TROL; DÉTENTE; STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Anzovin, Steven. (1986). The Star Wars Debate. New York: Wilson.

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was a United States military research program that President Ronald Reagan first proposed in March 1983, shortly after branding the USSR an “evil empire.” Its goal was to intercept incoming missiles in midcourse, high above the earth, hence making nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete.” Nicknamed “Star Wars” by the media, the program entailed the use of space- and ground-based nuclear X-ray lasers, subatomic particle beams, and computer-guided projectiles fired by electromagnetic rail guns—all under the central control of a supercomputer system. The Reagan administration peddled the program energetically within the United States and among NATO allies. In April 1984 a Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) was established within the Department of Defense. The program’s futuristic weapons technologies, several of which were only in a preliminary research stage in the mid-1980s, were projected to cost anywhere from $100 billion to $1 trillion.

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Boffey, Philip M. (1988). Claiming the Heavens: The New York Times Complete Guide to the Star Wars Debate. New York: Times Books. FitzGerald, Frances. (2000). Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the End of the Cold War. New York: Simon & Schuster. FitzGerald, Mary C. (1987). Soviet Views on SDI. Pittsburgh, PA: Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Pittsburgh. Teller, Edward. (1987). Better a Shield than a Sword: Perspectives on Defense and Technology. New York: Free Press. JOHANNA GRANVILLE

STRAVINSKY, IGOR FYODOROVICH (1882–1971), Russian composer. Among the most influential composers of the twentieth century, Igor Fyodorovich Stravinsky epitomized the new prominence of Russian emigré

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creative artists and their presence on the international scene in the years following the 1917 Revolution. Like the contributions of his emigré colleague writer Vladimir Nabokov and choreographer George Balanchine-Stravinsky’s enormous contribution to his art significantly altered the course of twentieth-century music. Stravinsky’s compositions encompass every important musical trend of the period (neonationalism, neoclassicism, and serialism, to name a few) and include examples of all the major Western concert genres (opera, ballet, symphony, choral works, solo works, and numerous incidental works, including a polka for circus elephants). The son of a St. Petersburg opera singer, Stravinsky attained international fame with his early ballet, The Firebird (1910), composed for Sergei Diagilev’s Ballets Russes (with choreography by Michel Fokine). Several important ballets followed, including Petrushka (1911, also with Fokine) and the seminal Rite of Spring (1913, choreography by Vaslav Nijinsky), among the most famous works of art of the twentieth century. Stravinsky’s compositions for the theater continued to trace a path through the most significant musical and theatrical idioms of his century, and include Les Noces (1923, choreography by Bronislava Nijinska), Apollon musagète (1928), and Agon (1957, both choreographed by Balanchine). Although Stravinsky was a supremely cosmopolitan figure, his music nonetheless retained traces of its Russian origins throughout his long career.

See also:

DIAGILEV, SERGEI PAVLOVICH; FIREBIRD; MUSIC;

PETRUSHKA BIBLIOGRAPHY

Stravinsky, Vera, and Craft, Robert. (1978). Stravinsky in Pictures and Documents. New York: Simon and Schuster. Taruskin, R. (1996). Stravinsky and the Russian Traditions. Berkeley: University of California Press. White, Eric Walter. (1979). Stravinsky: the Composer and His Works. Berkeley: University of California Press.

armed with firearms, organized into tactical units of five hundred, commanded and trained by officers from the nobility. These units were based from the beginning in towns, and eventually took on the character of garrison forces. Over time their numbers grew from three thousand in 1550 to fifty thousand in 1680. Militarily, they were ineffectual, mainly because of their economic character. The musketeers were a hereditary class not subject to taxation, but to state service requirements, including battlefield service, escort, and guard duties. During the seventeenth century, the state provided them with grain and cash, but economic privileges, including permission to act as merchants, artisans, or farmers, became their principal support. One particular plum was permission to produce alcoholic beverages for their own consumption. They also bore civic duties (fire fighting and police) in the towns where they lived. Pursuing economic interests reduced their fighting edge. Throughout the seventeenth century the musketeers proved to be fractious, regularly threatening, even killing, officers who mistreated them or represented modernizing elements within the military. By 1648 it was apparent that they were unreliable, especially when compared with the new-formation regiments appearing prior to the Thirteen Years War (1654–1667) under leadership of European mercenary officers. Rather than disband the musketeers entirely, the state made attempts to westernize them. Many units were placed under the command of foreigners and retrained. Administrative changes were made during and after the war, including placing certain units under the jurisdiction of the tsar’s Privy Chancery, which appointed officers and collected operations reports. The Privy Chancery, and by extension, the tsar, was at the center of the attempt to transform the musketeers into more thoroughly trained westernstyle infantry.

The musketeers, or streltsy (literally “shooters”), were organized as part of Ivan IV’s effort to reform Russia’s military during the sixteenth century. In 1550 he recruited six companies of foot soldiers

Further pressure to reform included official neglect, even to the point of refusing to give the musketeers weapons. Later decrees (1681, 1682) replaced cash payments with grants of unsettled lands as compensation for service. This change in support reduced their status, without improving their overall military effectiveness, and the musketeers vehemently opposed it. By 1680, many regiments had been retrained and officered by foreigners, but the conservative musketeers were anxious to be rid of the hated foreigners and regain their eroded

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prestige. Thus, in 1682, they were willing to believe rumors that Tsar Fyodor Alexeyevich had been poisoned, and were anxious to punish those responsible with death. Peter I’s (the Great) reign was marred by an uprising in 1698 of military units stationed in Moscow called musketeers or streltsy (literally, “shooters”). The musketeers disliked the tsar’s westernizing policies and governing style. Peter rejected traditional behaviors and practices, including standards of dress, grooming, comportment, and faith, but more importantly, he sought to reform Russia’s military institutions, which threatened the musketeers’ historical prerogatives. Peter crushed the rebellion with great severity, executing nearly twelve hundred musketeers, and flogging and exiling another six hundred. The Moscow regiments were abolished and survivors sent to serve in provincial units, losing privileges, homes, and lands. They carried with them seeds of defiance that eventually bore fruit in Astrakhan in 1705–1706, and among the Cossacks in 1707– 1708. Although the last Moscow regiments of musketeers disappeared before 1713, the musketeers continued to exist in the provinces until after Peter’s death. Peter’s response to the 1698–1699 uprising may have arisen from his memories of the 1682 musketeer revolt. The musketeers suspected the Naryshkins (Peter’s mother, Natalia’s family) of having poisoned Tsar Fyodor and of planning to kill the Tsarevich Ivan, both sons of Tsar Alexei’s first wife, Maria Miloslavskaya. The Miloslavskys encouraged these suspicions in order to use their regiments against the Naryshkins. On May 25, 1682, the musketeers attacked the Kremlin. Natalia Naryshkina showed Ivan and Peter to the rioting musketeers to prove they were still alive. Nonetheless, the rebellion was bloody, and the government was powerless because it had no forces capable of stopping the musketeers. From this rebellion came the joint reign of Ivan and Peter with their sister and half-sister, Sophia, who issued decrees in their names, and who was a favorite of the musketeers.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hellie, Richard. (1971). Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Hughes, Lindsey. (1990). Sophia, Regent of Russia 1657–1704. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Hughes, Lindsey. (1998). Russia in the Age of Peter the Great. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. W. M. REGER IV

STRIKES See

WORKERS.

STROIBANK Stroibank USSR (the All-Union Bank for Investment Financing) managed and financed government investment in the Soviet period. Founded as Prombank (the Industrial Bank) in October 1922, it merged with several smaller banks and became Stroibank during the April 1959 banking reform. The USSR Council of Ministers appointed its board of directors, and it was officially part of the Gosbank (State Bank of the USSR) network. It supported government investment both through direct (nonrepayable) financing and through short- and long-term credits. In 1972 Stroibank had over 1,200 subsidiary components throughout the USSR.

In 1698 the streltsy were unable to see that Peter I was implacable in his rejection of conservatism and that the musketeers represented for him a dangerous and disloyal element. In the final clash, the musketeers were unable to reshape their world, and eventually disappeared.

In 1988 a series of economic reforms created a two-tiered banking system in Russia. Gosbank became a central bank, while three specialized banks split from Gosbank. During this process, Stroibank USSR became Promstroibank USSR (the IndustrialConstruction Bank). During the battle for sovereignty between Russian and Soviet leaders in 1990 and 1991, Promstroibank USSR was commercialized and individual branches given the opportunity to strike out on their own or form smaller networks with other Promstroibank branches. The largest remnant of the Promstroibank network, Promstroibank Russia, remained under the control of former Promstroibank USSR director Yakov Dubnetsky. Promstroibank Russia remained a large and powerful bank throughout the 1990s, while many reorganized Promstroibank USSR branches retained strong positions in Russia’s regions and continued to serve their traditional clients. In the late 1990s, the state-owned energy giant Gazprom acquired a controlling interest in Promstroibank Russia.

See also: FYODOR ALEXEYEVICH; IVAN IV; PETER I; SOPHIA;

See also:

WESTERNIZERS

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BANKING SYSTEM, SOVIET; ECONOMY, POST-

SOVIET; GOSBANK; SBERBANK

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S T A N I S L A V

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Johnson, Juliet. (2000). A Fistful of Rubles: The Rise and Fall of the Russian Banking System. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Nove, Alec. (1969). The Soviet Economy. An Introduction, 2nd ed. New York: Praeger. JULIA OBERTREIS

Kuschpèta, Olga. (1978). The Banking and Credit System of the USSR. Leiden, Netherlands: Nijhoff Social Sciences Division. JULIET JOHNSON

STRUVE, PETER BERNARDOVICH (1870–1944), liberal political leader, economist, and author.

STRUMILIN, STANISLAV GUSTAVOVICH (1877–1974), economist, statistician, and demographer. Stanislav Gustavovich Strumilo-Petrashkevich was a Social Democrat (Menshevik) before 1917. Involved in revolutionary activities, he was arrested several times. In the Soviet period, Strumilin held various high positions in the State Planning Board Gosplan (deputy chairman several times, chairman of the economic-statistical section during the 1920s) and in the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (1931 full membership and doctor of economics honoris causa). For decades he also worked as a professor. Strumilin published on economic planning, the economics of labor, industrial statistics, and economic history, and he took sides in all important economic debates. He combined theoretical argumentation with empirical statistics and also incorporated sociological perspectives (e.g., in his pioneering time-budget studies). During the politicized economic debates of the 1920s, he was a radical advocate of a planned economy and responsible for the drawing up of the First FiveYear-Plan. He opted for the teleological method of planning, which takes the final (production) targets as a starting point. His demographic works, among them a prediction regarding the number and age–sex composition of the population of Russia for 1921–1941, were influential in the Soviet Union and gained international attention. Strumilin managed to survive the purges of the Josef Stalin period and benefited from the rehabilitation of the economists after World War II. He then concentrated on labor issues and the impact of education on wage differentials, participated actively in the economic debates of the 1950s and 1960s, and published until 1973. He represented the first generation of Soviet Marxist economists.

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As a young man Peter Bernardovich Struve rose to prominence on the liberal left. In the 1890s he joined the Social Democratic party and authored its manifesto. He was then a proponent of a moderate legal Marxism. Struve, however, was not a doctrinaire. He was dedicated to learning and loved literature and poetry. By contrast, the Russian militants saw such a pursuit as a distraction from the task of revolution. As Russia moved toward revolution Struve moved toward a liberal conservatism. From 1902 to 1905 he edited the journal Osvobozhdenie (Liberation), a liberal publication. He eventually joined the Constitutional Democratic party (Cadet). In 1906 he won election as a deputy to the second Duma. In 1909 he contributed to Vekhi (Landmarks) as one of a group of prominent intellectuals who broke sharply with the militant leftists, seeing them as a threat to Russia’s liberation from despotism and its transformation into a liberal and democratic constitutional state. He was deeply patriotic as well as liberal in orientation. In 1911 he wrote a series entitled Patriotica. From 1907 to 1917 he engaged in scholarship as well as politics as a professor at the St. Petersburg Polytechnic Institute. After the 1917 October Revolution Struve briefly joined an antiBolshevik government in southern Russia and then was forced to emigrate to the West where he spent the remainder of his life as a scholar and writer on economics and politics.

See also:

CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY; SOCIAL

DEMOCRATIC WORKERS PARTY; VEKHI

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Pipes, Richard. (1970). Struve: Liberal on the Left, 1870– 1905. Russian Research Center Studies, no. 64. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Pipes, Richard. (1980). Struve: Liberal on the Right, 1905–1944. Russian Research Center Studies, no. 80. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. CARL A. LINDEN

FIVE-YEAR PLANS; GOSPLAN; MENSHEVIKS

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STUKACH From the common slang word stukachestvo, stukach was widely used in the Soviet period to describe “squealing,” or informing on people to the government authorities. The word is evidently derived from stuk, Russian for the sound of a hammer blow. The government, and especially the security police, in all communist-ruled or authoritarian countries, depended on informers in order to keep tabs on the loyalty of the populace. In the Politics, Aristotle had observed that tyrannical regimes must employ informers hidden within the population in order to keep their hold on absolute power. In such countries as the USSR, Nazi Germany, Maoist China, Cuba, and so forth, informers were sometimes made heroes by the regime. Thus, in the Soviet Union, Pavlik Morozov, a twelve-year-old boy living in the Don farming region when Stalin was enforcing collectivization of the peasants’ farms in the early 1930s, became a stukach. He informed on his parents when they allegedly concealed grain and other produce from the authorities. The boy was killed by vengeful farmers. He was thereupon iconized as a martyr by the communist authorities. Statues of Pavlik sprang up throughout the country. The Soviet writer Maxim Gorky urged fellow writers to glorify the boy who had exposed his father as a kulak and who “had overcome blood kinship in discovering spiritual kinship.” Another well-known Soviet novelist, Leonid Leonov, depicted a fictitious scientist of the old generation who as a stukach had nobly betrayed his son to the authorities. Stukachestvo was expected of any and all family members, schoolchildren, concentration-camp prisoners, factory workers—in short, every Soviet citizen, all of whom were expected to place loyalty to the State above all other linkages.

See also: GORKY, MAXIM; MOROZOV, PAVEL TROFIMOVICH; STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Galler, Meyer. (1977). Soviet Prison Camp Speech: A Survivor’s Glossary: Supplement. Hayward, CA: Soviet Studies. Heller, Mikhail, and Nekrich, Aleksandr. (1986). Utopia in Power: The History of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the Present, tr. Phillis B. Carlos. London: Hutchinson.

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Preobrazhensky, A. G. (1951). Etymological Dictionary of the Russian Language. New York: Columbia University Press. ALBERT L. WEEKS

STÜRMER, BORIS VLADIMIROVICH (1848–1917), government official who reached the rank of president of the State Council, or premier, of the Russian Empire. Boris Stürmer studied law at St. Petersburg University and then entered the Ministry of Justice. He was appointed governor of Novgorod Province in 1894 and of Yaroslav Province in 1896. In 1902 he became director of the Department of General Affairs of the Ministry of the Interior and in 1904 was appointed to the Council of State. From January to November 1916 he was president of the Council of State, serving simultaneously as minister of the interior (March–July) and minister of foreign affairs (July–November). Nicholas II dismissed Stürmer after Paul Milyukov’s famous “Is this stupidity or is it treason?” speech in the Duma, in which Milyukov accused Stürmer of being a German agent. In fact, he was not. Arrested after the February Revolution of 1917 and placed in the Peter and Paul Fortress, Stürmer died there in August 1917. Stürmer owed his rise to his arch-conservatism and friends in high places, including the Empress Alexandra Fyodorovna and Grigory Rasputin, who reputedly referred to Stürmer as “a little man on a leash” and to whom Stürmer reported weekly and received instructions. Stürmer has received universal scorn. Contemporaries called him a “nonentity” (Vasily Shulgin), “totally ignorant of everything he undertook” (Milyukov), “a man of extremely limited mental gifts” (Nikolai Pokrovsky, his successor as minister of foreign affairs), “a man who had left a bad memory wherever he occupied an administrative post” (Sergei Sazonov), and “an utter nonentity” (Mikhail Rodzianko). Historians have seen Stürmer as “an instrument of the personal rule of the Empress [and Rasputin]” (Mikhail Florinsky), “a reactionary [who] brought discredit on the extreme Right” (Marc Ferro), and “an obscure and dismal product of the professional Russian bureaucracy” (Robert Massie).

See also:

ALEXANDRA FEDOROVNA; RASPUTIN, GRIGORY

YEFIMOVICH

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Florinsky, Mikhail. (1931). The End of the Russian Empire. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Fulop-Muller, Renee. (1929). Rasputin: The Holy Devil. New York: Viking Books. Miliukov, Paul. (1967). Political Memoirs. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. SAMUEL A. OPPENHEIM

SUBBOTNIK Communist subbotniki (Communist Volunteer Saturday Workers) were shockworkers who volunteered their free Saturdays for the Bolshevik cause. Subbotniki were lauded as heroes of socialist labor, as prototypes of the new unselfish man, and role models for the working class. Their actions may have reflected spontaneous enthusiasm among some workers, but they were also encouraged by the Communist Party to mobilize effort. The phenomenon was a mixture of socialist idealism and coercion. The KS (Communist subbotniki) movement is said to have started by the communists on April 12, 1919 at the Moscow-Kazan railway depot, and was praised by Vladimir Lenin in an article entitled “Velikii pochin,” July 28, 1919. During the summer and autumn of 1919, KS mobilized to defeat Denikin, and surmount the “fuel crisis.” During World War II, the KS and voskresniki (Sunday volunteers) are said to have inspired the war effort. Celebrations commemorating their achievements and encouraging the movement’s continuation were held frequently during the seventies.

See also:

SOVIET MAN; STAKHANOVITE MOVEMENT

number of passengers carried daily increased from 177,000 to more than six million, making the Moscow system the world’s busiest. The Moscow metro organization also reproduced its various structures in similar metro systems across the former Soviet Union and behind the Iron Curtain. It became, in the words of one official, “the mother of all socialist metros.” Symbols of Soviet power accompanied riders in the metros of Leningrad, Kiev, Kharkov, Baku, Tiflis, Tashkent, Minsk, Gorky, Erevan, Novosibirsk, Sverdlovsk, and Volgograd—not to mention those systems built partly by Moscow engineers and architects in Poland and Czechoslovakia. For Soviet leaders, Soviet subways were more than transportation systems. The metro provided what one Soviet propagandist called “a majestic school in the formation of the new man.” For the 1935 inaugural line of the Moscow metro, the Soviets constructed each of the stations on different themes of socialist life. Stations celebrated Soviet leaders, the Communist Party, Soviet achievements in education, and the supposed superiority of the Soviet system. The Soviets lavished scarce resources on the first thirteen stations, including 23,000 square meters of marble facing, chandeliers, and crystal. Metro builders boasted that they used more marble in the first line of the Moscow metro than had been used in the entire Tsarist period. Through the end of the Stalin era, stations became more ornate and monumental as the metro grew. Like a mirror held up to Soviet self-perceptions, an elaborate political iconography reflected a sense of approaching perfection in Soviet society. To convey this message, architects calculated that a passenger would spend roughly five minutes per station. In the words of one: “Within that time the architecture, emblems, and entire artistic image should actively influence him.” Soviet subway systems thus celebrated Soviet socialism, provided a pulpit for preaching its values, and offered an effective way to get to work in the morning.

The original line of the Moscow metro, completed in May 1935, laid the foundation for one of the world’s most impressive subway systems. In its first fifty years, the Moscow metro grew from thirteen stations to more than 120, and the average

Lazar Kaganovich, a ruthless Bolshevik leader of working-class origin, assumed managerial responsibility for construction of the original metro line. His chief deputy on the project was Nikita Khrushchev, who later became general secretary of the Communist Party. Kaganovich believed that the metro “went far beyond . . . the typical understanding of a technological construction. Our metropolitan is a symbol of the new socialist society being built.” Under his management, the Soviets deployed a variety of improvised Western tech-

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niques to build the metro in the treacherous geology of Moscow’s subsoil, which was laced with underground rivers and quicksand. Builders bored through layers of Jurassic clay and fissured limestone, soaked with water. Khrushchev recalled that the builders had only “the vaguest idea of what the job would entail.” The party mobilized public opinion to gather necessary resources and labor. Days of voluntary labor became festive occasions as bands played and able-bodied Muscovites roamed the shafts looking for work. Prominent officials picked up shovels and joined Moscow’s masses. Compared to the construction of the New York subway system, however, only a handful of Soviet workers died—and the Soviets trumpeted the successful construction as proof of the superiority of the socialist order. Nonetheless, the Soviets benefited greatly from the long experience of foreign engineers who had helped construct the world’s other great subway systems. They used the drafts of a failed 1908 Moscow subway plan, whose backers were unable to secure financing. Soviet engineers visited the Berlin subway, studied engineering plans for the London and Paris subways, and hired American engineers as consultants. The story of the first Soviet subway was as much the subject of Soviet propaganda as the actual metro stations. Soviet memoirs, official histories, metro architecture, and newspaper accounts wove the events and personalities of the metro’s construction into a mythical microcosm of the new Soviet society. The epic tale of its construction, which was recounted in two elaborately bound volumes published in 1935, relayed an ideal conception of socialist engineering and its ability to conquer and transform nature (human and otherwise). In this story, successful technological construction did more than fulfill the party plan for transportation; it proved the inevitable success of the revolution and the party’s vision of itself as an instrument of a supposedly scientifically determined historical destiny.

See also:

KAGANOVICH, LAZAR MOYSEYEVICH; KHRUSH-

L A W

O N

Josephson, Paul. (1995). “‘Projects of the Century’ in Soviet History: Large-Scale Technologies from Lenin to Gorbachev.” Technology and Culture 36:519-559. ANDREW JENKS

SUCCESSION, LAW ON Peter I published the Law on Succession, a manifesto on the succession to the Russian imperial throne, on February 16, 1722. The Law on Succession was the first such written law in Russian history. Russia’s rulers in the fifteenth through seventeenth centuries favored primogeniture (inheritance by the first-born son), although this custom could be bypassed for pragmatic reasons. Peter, prompted by the defection of his eldest son Alexei (condemned to death for treason in 1718), and by the death of his only surviving son in 1719, rejected primogeniture and issued a succession law. The new law required the reigning monarch to nominate his successor with regard to worthiness. It placed no restrictions on age or gender, but it did not specifically direct the reigning monarch to look beyond the imperial family, by raising a commoner, for example. The work The Justice of the Monarch’s Right to Appoint the Heir to the Throne (1722), attributed to Feofan Prokopovich, justified the new law with reference to scripture, history, and natural law. Peter himself died without nominating a successor, but Alexander Menshikov claimed to be implementing Peter’s wishes by choosing his widow Catherine, thereby inaugurating a period of female rule. Catherine I, Anna, Elizabeth, and Catherine II all nominated their own successors, while Elizabeth and Catherine II took the throne from legally nominated emperors on the pretext of protecting the common good. Paul I repealed the law in 1797, replacing it with a new law based on primogeniture.

CHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH; SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY

See also:

PAUL I; PETER I; PROKOPOVICH, FEOFAN

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bobrick, Benson. (1981). Labyrinths of Iron: A History of the World’s Subways. New York: Newsweek Books.

Lentin, Antony, ed. and tr. (1996). Peter the Great: His Law on the Imperial Succession: The Official Commentary. Oxford: Headstart History.

Jenks, Andrew. (2000). “A Metro on the Mount: The Underground as a Church of Soviet Civilization.” Technology and Culture 41:697-724.

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SUCCESSION OF LEADERSHIP, SOVIET Like other authoritarian systems, the USSR did not adopt a formal system of succession. Over time, the system developed an informal process of succession, which eventually evolved into a predictable pattern. In 1922, at the age of 52, Vladimir Lenin, the first Soviet leader, suffered a major stroke from which he never fully recovered. After his death in 1924, there was considerable struggle within the Politburo of the Communist Party before Josef Stalin emerged as the top leader. Since Lenin had functioned as chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars (later called the Council of Ministers), the emergence of the general secretary as the preeminent leader was not predictable. Lenin’s position was equivalent to that of prime minister. The general secretary initially had been considered an administrator with little policy responsibility. Despite the fact that Stalin led the USSR for almost thirty years, it was not clear after his death that the position of general secretary of the CPSU would remain the preeminent one. Stalin had been prime minister also since 1941, and it was hard to say where his power base lay. After Stalin’s death, Georgy Malenkov chose to be prime minister when forced to select between the positions of chairman of the Council of Ministers or general secretary of the Communist Party. The less well-known Nikita Khrushchev emerged as the top leader in the succession struggle that ensued during the next five years through his role as first (renamed from general) secretary of the Communist Party. By 1958 Khrushchev was both prime minister and first secretary, although not with the degree of power that Stalin had had before him. Leonid Brezhnev also used the position of general secretary to rise to the top position within the collective leadership after Khrushchev was deposed. Although he wanted to be prime minister as well, the Politburo denied him that title in the interest of maintaining collective leadership. In 1977 Brezhnev became president of the USSR (chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet), a nominal position that gave him the position of chief of state in international protocol, even though his power base remained the CPSU. With the death of Brezhnev (1982), the process flowed smoothly in the appointment of Yuri Andropov as both general secretary and president, and a short time later both titles passed to Konstantin Chernenko after Andropov’s death (1984). Within

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the Politburo there appeared to be agreement on a successor and on giving the top leader both a party and government position. There was nothing in either the Party Charter or the Soviet Constitution to guarantee that the process would remain the same. After the death of Chernenko in 1985, power passed to a younger generation. Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary, after serving as de facto second secretary under both Andropov and Chernenko. Gorbachev, however, did not become president. The title went to an elder statesman, Andrei Gromyko. Only in 1988 did Gorbachev assume the presidency, which was subsequently restructured as part of perestroika (restructuring) and demokratizatsiya (democratization). Gorbachev had the real power, not merely the title, of chief of state and functioned as president in both domestic and international politics. Had the Soviet system continued, it is fair to say that succession would probably have been institutionalized in the constitution. Even under Gorbachev, however, the Soviet president was not popularly elected. Gorbachev was selected by the restructured parliament, the Congress of People’s Deputies; a new Supreme Soviet, selected from the Congress, was a working parliament, not merely a rubber stamp that met once or twice per year. Even without formal institutionalization, political succession had become predictable, especially by the 1980s when the ailing Andropov and Chernenko were successively chosen to lead the USSR. The selection process was concluded within days of the leader’s death. The selection of Gorbachev seemed to be equally smooth, but when one examines the difficult road that Gorbachev pursued to undertake reform, one realizes how superficial consensus was. Gorbachev faced opposition from the conservatives and liberals within the Politburo and the CPSU throughout his tenure. Political succession, although never formalized in writing, became, nonetheless, a well-established and even reasonably predictable process in the mature Soviet Union. The failure to establish a constitutional succession process, even after Gorbachev’s democratization, was one of many contributing factors in the rapid demise of the USSR after the 1991 attempted coup.

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; GENERAL SECRETARY; POLITBURO; PRIME MINISTER

E N C Y C L O P E D I A

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H I S T O R Y

S U D E B N I K

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bialer, Seweryn. (1980). Stalin’s Successors: Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union. New York: Cambridge University Press. Breslauer, George W. (1982). Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders. London: George Allen and Unwin. Brown, Archie. (1996). The Gorbachev Factor. Oxford: Oxford University Press. D’Agostino, Anthony. (1988). Soviet Succession Struggles: Kremlinology and the Russian Question from Lenin to Gorbachev. Boston: Allen and Unwin. Hough, Jerry F. (1980). Soviet Leadership in Transition. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Hough, Jerry F., and Fainsod, Merle. (1979). How the Soviet Union Is Governed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Mitchell, R. Judson. Getting to the Top in the USSR: Cyclical Patterns in the Leadership Succession Process. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. Simmonds, George W., ed. (1967). Soviet Leaders. New York: Crowell. NORMA C. NOONAN

SUDEBNIK OF 1497 The 1497 Sudebnik was Russia’s first national law code. Unlike earlier immunity charters, which pertained only to a private landholder and his land, and the Dvina Land Charter (1397) and White Lake Charter (1488), which pertained only to particular localities, it promulgated rules of general application for Muscovite courts. Adopted after Ivan III had gathered in the lands of Novgorod, Tver, and other principalities, the Code is usually interpreted as part of Ivan’s policy of nationbuilding. The short preamble states that the Code was adopted by Grand Prince Ivan with his children and boyars. Thus, unlike some of Muscovy’s other legislation, it was not associated with an assembly of important prelates and servicemen. A single copy of the Code has come down to us, which was found and published by Pavel Stroev in 1817. Most modern editors divide it into sixtyeight articles, but the original also contains thirtyseven chapter headings. Articles 1 through 25, in general, concern courts presided over by boyars and okolnichy, the two highest service ranks, with some attention also to the court of the grand prince. Clerks (dyaki) were to sit with the boyars and okol-

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nichy in these courts, and were to prepare not only a written trial record but also a written judgment. These courts were to exercise jurisdiction over major crimes, such as murder, robbery, and theft, and the death penalty was provided for certain crimes. Articles 26 through 36 concern judicial documents such as summonses, warrants, and default judgments, as well as the duties of judicial officials such as bailiffs. The bailiffs were charged not only with serving such judicial documents but also with interrogating suspected criminals. Articles 37 through 45 concern the courts of the namestniki and volosteli, the grand prince’s vicegerents in rural areas. The jurisdiction of these courts depended on whether the judge was granted full jurisdiction. Many of the provisions of the first section are repeated in the third. The Code thus either established or confirmed the previous existence of at least three levels of courts: that of the grand prince, that of the boyars and okolnichy, and that of the vicegerents. These were probably not permanent or standing courts in the modern sense, because the officials serving as judges had substantial other administrative and military duties. All courts used documents at nearly every stage of judicial proceedings: to initiate the lawsuit, to summon the defendant, to procure attendance of witness, and to record the judgment. The first three sections of the code are largely devoted to the procedural and more specifically the financial side of litigation. No less than thirty-six articles deal with fees and payments to be made to the court, and another fifteen concern damages and payments to private persons. Prohibition of bribery is mentioned several times. Plainly one of the priorities of the Code was to prevent bribery and the exaction of excessive fees. There are also numerous provisions on judicial duels, but actual court records indicate that such duels were seldom used to resolve litigation. Eyewitnesses and torture are also prescribed to resolve certain types of matters. The 1497 Code thus represents the transition, albeit incomplete, from so-called archaic law, characterized by composition (bloodwite), no judicial officials, and irrational modes of proof (trial by ordeal and combat), to a modern system of criminal penalties, judges and other judicial officials, and the use of witnesses and documents as evidence. The Code was also significant in introducing or confirming a document-based system of litigation. The fourth section, starting at article 46, contains miscellaneous rules of substantive versus

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procedural law, the most famous of which is article 57, which requires a peasant to pay his lord a certain fee in the week before or the week after St. George’s day if he is to have the right to move elsewhere. There are also various provisions on inheritance, manumission of slaves, loans, and boundaries. The fourth section, however, does not contain all of the substantive rules of law that would be necessary to administer justice. For example, most of the reported cases of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries deal with title to and ownership of land, but the Code contains virtually no rules or standards for deciding such cases. Because the Code is primarily a procedural statute and contains only an incomplete listing of substantive rules of law, one might ask where the judges would look to find the substantive rules. Commentators have suggested that the judges would look to customary law or to certain Byzantine law manuals. Another possibility is that, in most cases, judges simply applied their own rough sense of justice, and that litigation was not generally conceived as the application of published or even customary rules.

See also:

IVAN III; LAW CODE OF 1649; LEGAL SYSTEMS;

MUSCOVY; OKOLNICHY; SUDEBNIK OF 1550; SUDEBNIK OF 1589

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Dewey, Horace W. (1956). “The 1497 Sudebnik: Muscovite Russia’s First National Law Code.” The American Slavic and East European Review 15:325–338. Dewey, Horace W., ed. (1966). Muscovite Judicial Texts, 1488–1556. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Dept. of Slavic Languages and Literature. GEORGE G. WEICKHARDT

deals with the central courts, held before the grand prince, his boyars, and his okolnichy; the second (articles 45–61) deals with judicial documents and the duties of bailiffs; the third (articles 62–75) deals with the provincial and rural courts held before the tsar’s vicegerents; and the fourth (starting with article 76) contains provisions of substantive law on such subjects as slavery, disputes over land, inheritance, and the sale of chattels and other goods. Like the 1497 Code, the 1550 Sudebnik is primarily a procedural statute, and a large number of its provisions deal with the financial side of litigation: fees, penalties, amounts to be recovered in civil disputes. The 1550 Code is, however, more than twice the length of the 1497 Code. Its additional and different provisions probably reflect what its draftsmen thought was in need of amendment: that is, where the previous statute was perceived as not working or in need of clarification. While the 1497 Code simply prohibits bribery and favoritism, the 1550 Code provides specific penalties for these offenses, including fines and knouting. One new set of provisions (articles 22–24) deals with bringing suit in the central courts against vicegerents, which probably indicates that corruption and misfeasance by rural officials was perceived as an important problem. Procedure in the provincial and rural courts was also regulated in much more detail. One of the obvious goals of the 1550 amendments was thus to strengthen the provisions designed to counter corruption and favoritism. Another provision prohibits the issuance of new immunity charters, under which landholders, usually monasteries, had received jurisdiction over all legal cases except major crimes. The prohibition of further immunity charters increased the centralization of the administration of justice and reduced the legal rights of the monasteries.

The structure of the text closely follows that of the 1497 Code: the first section (articles 1–44)

Two other new provisions (25–26) provide that assault without robbery is to be treated as dishonor (beschestie), an offense that also included defamation. The amount to be recovered by the dishonored party is set forth. Various rational modes of proof, such as an inquest (obysk) in the community, are set forth in greater detail than in the earlier code. Some changes from the 1497 Code are, however, only as to form and provide additional detail. For example, articles 8–14 of the 1497 Code, which deal with prosecuting various crimes, were expanded and moved, somewhat illogically, to the second section of the 1550 Code (articles 53–60). The 1550 Code nevertheless represents a more advanced and complete transition from archaic law,

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SUDEBNIK OF 1550 The 1550 Sudebnik was a law code compiled by Ivan IV (the Terrible) and his boyars. In 1551 it was submitted for confirmation to the Hundred Chapters Church Council (Stoglav), on which sat the highest clerical officials. It proclaims that it is to govern all criminal and civil litigation. While the protograph is not extant, forty-three remarkably consistent copies survive. In all copies the text is divided into ninety-nine or one hundred articles.

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which was characterized by composition, irrational modes of proof, and the absence of judicial officials, to a relatively modern system of criminal penalties, rational modes of proof, and the use of judges to resolve disputes. It nonetheless still contains several provisions on judicial duels (although, in fact, such duels were seldom used). There were several significant additions to the provisions on substantive law in the fourth section. Six sections on slavery describe in detail how one becomes a slave, such as by selling oneself to pay a debt; how a slave can be manumitted; the documents associated with slavery; and new provisions that create a rule of caveat emptor with respect to purchase of a fugitive slave. Section 85 codified the right to redemption by the seller’s clan as to land sold by any clan member. Such land could be redeemed by a clan member within forty years at the original purchase price. While the provisions of substantive law are set forth in more detail than in the 1497 Code, the 1550 Code still does not purport to set forth all principles of substantive law. Important rules, such as how to resolve disputes over the ownership of land, remained subject to customary rules or to the discretion of the judge. In its attempt to deter corruption and its greater detail as to both procedural and substantive matters, the 1550 Code demonstrates the progress of the Muscovite legal systems to a system more predictable and rational.

See also:

CHURCH COUNCIL, HUNDRED CHAPTERS; IVAN

IV; LAW CODE OF 1649; LEGAL SYSTEMS; SUDEBNIK OF 1497; SUDEBNIK OF 1589 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Dewey, Horace W. (1962). “The 1550 Sudebnik as an Instrument of Reform.” Jahrbuecher fuer Geschichte Osteuropas 10(2):161–180. Dewey, Horace W., ed. (1966). Muscovite Judicial Texts, 1488–1556. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Dept. of Slavic Languages and Literature.

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1497 and 1550, the last in 1606. This series of legal compilations was crowned by the Ulozhenie of 1649, one of the greatest of all Russian legislative documents and one of the most impressive in the entire early modern world. The codes of 1497, 1550, 1606, and 1649 were all promulgated by governments in Moscow, but the Sudebnik of 1589 was compiled anonymously in the Russian North, the Dvina Land, for unknown purposes. The 1550 Sudebnik remained the major operational legal code throughout Muscovy for the next ninety-nine years—to the extent that there was one during and after the Time of Troubles. Few copies of the 1589 document are extant, but it is known that it was occasionally cited by others— probably because it contained the 1550 Sudebnik and its seventy-three supplemental articles, as well as special laws of interest to the Dvina Land. The Sudebnik of 1589 has been thoroughly studied, and it is known which of its 289 articles originated in which of the sixty-eight articles of the Sudebnik of 1497 and in which of the one hundred articles of the Sudebnik of 1550. About 64 percent of the 1589 code’s articles originated in 1550 (some of them were expanded), about 9 percent came from statutes of 1556, and about 27 percent were new. By 1589 Russian law had completed the move from the medieval dyadic legal system to the more modern triadic system. In the medieval era, state authority barely existed, and law was as much a device for raising revenue by officials as it was a tool for conflict resolution. In the first third of the sixteenth century, state officials began to play a much more active, inquisitional role in the judicial process and tried both to deter and to solve crimes. Medieval wrongs were treated as torts, but by 1589 they were regarded as crimes. Crimes included murder, arson, battery, robbery, theft, treason, bribe-taking, rebellion, recidivism, sacrilege, slander, and perjury. Sanctions included fines, capital and corporal punishment, mutilation, and incarceration.

GEORGE G. WEICKHARDT

SUDEBNIK OF 1589 The Sudebnik of 1589 was the third in a series of four Russian legal monuments by that name. They comprise the core of middle Muscovite jurisprudence. The first two Sudebniki were compiled in

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Around 1550 the importance of literacy increased dramatically, and Muscovy began its transition from an oral society to one in which documents were increasingly important. The evolution was crucial in the laws of evidence, as faithbased evidence such as oaths, ordeals, and the casting of lots began to yield to written evidence. Witnesses, visual confrontations, general investigations, and confessions also grew in importance.

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The law as a revenue instrument for officials remained strong in 1589, and those officials were not supposed to be corrupt. The 1589 code paid considerable attention to establishing judicial procedures. There was considerable social legislation in the 1589 Sudebnik. Slaves of various sorts were mentioned, as was the fact that the peasants, discussed frequently, were in the process of being enserfed. Only perhaps 2 percent of the population were townsmen, but commerce was important in the Dvina Land. The collection of interest was permitted, at a maximum of 20 percent per year. Like most law, the Sudebnik of 1589 was concerned with cleaning up “social messes” and providing an infrastructure for the orderly resolution of conflicts in property and inheritance disputes, especially important in the Dvina Land where peasants still owned most of the land. Priority was also given to the preservation of the social order, particularly male dominance and other gender distinctions.

See also: LAW CODE OF 1649; LEGAL SYSTEMS; MUSCOVY; SUDEBNIK OF 1497; SUDEBNIK OF 1550

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hellie, Richard. (1965). “Muscovite Law and Society: The Ulozhenie of 1649 as a Reflection of the Political and Social Development of Russia since the Sudebnik of 1589.” Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago. Hellie, Richard. (1992). “Russian Law From Oleg to Peter the Great.” Foreword to The Laws of Rus’: Tenth to Fifteenth Centuries, tr. and ed. Daniel H. Kaiser. Salt Lake City, UT: Charles Schlacks.

to local authorities and received higher compensation when dishonored. However, Sukonnaya sotnya members were not allowed to purchase estates of patrimonial land or to travel abroad. Less prosperous than their counterparts in the other two corporations, Sukonnaya sotnya members tended to assist other government merchants and administer smaller enterprises. However, they were held responsible for shortfalls in revenue collection. In the early seventeenth century, there were 250 members of the Sukonnaya sotnya This figure declined to 130 in 1630 and to 116 by 1649, despite the appointment of 156 members between 1635 and 1646. In spite of the government’s demands, not all members of the Sukonnaya sotnya had houses in Moscow. Sukonnaya sotnya steadily declined in importance in the second half of the seventeenth century. By 1678 there were only fifty-one houses belonging to Sukonnaya sotnya members in the capital. Apparently, the corporation was effectively disbanded in the 1680s, and many of its members joined the Gostinaya sotnya. By the early eighteenth century, all members of the Sukonnaya sotnya were registered in guilds, in 1724 in Moscow and four years later in the rest of the country.

See also:

GOSTI; GOSTINAYA SOTNYA; MERCHANTS

JARMO T. KOTILAINE

RICHARD HELLIE

SULTAN-GALIEV, MIRZA KHAIDARGALIEVICH SUKONNAYA SOTNYA A privileged corporation of merchants. Sukonnaya sotnya (Cloth[iers’] Hundred) was a privileged corporation of merchants who were ranked third in importance and wealth below the gosti and members of the Gostinaya sotnya. Sukonnaya sotnya was formed in the late sixteenth century and based on previously extant corporations of clothiers in Moscow and elsewhere.

(1892–1940), prominent Tatar Bolshevik and Soviet activist during the Russian Revolution and civil war. Mirza Khaidargalievich Sultan-Galiev’s rapid rise to prominence, sudden fall from grace, and subsequent vilification in Stalin’s Russia has provided several generations with a metaphor for the promise and frustrations of early Soviet nationality policy.

The legal status of Sukonnaya sotnya members was defined by a charter issued to them at the turn of the seventeenth century. Members were exempt from direct taxation. They were not subject

Born in Ufa province in 1892, Sultan-Galiev had brief careers as a schoolteacher, librarian, and journalist, turning to revolutionary activities around 1913. In July 1917 he joined the Bolshevik party in Kazan, but maintained ties to many intellectuals and moderate socialists in the Muslim community.

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Sultan-Galiev played a major role in the establishment of Soviet power in Kazan and helped suppress an anti-Bolshevik Tatar nationalist revolt there in the first part of 1918. He was an early advocate of the ill-fated Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic, promulgated in March 1918 but never implemented, and of the Tatar Autonomous Republic founded in 1920 (today the Republic of Tatarstan). An able organizer and public speaker, Sultan-Galiev served the Soviet state during the civil war as chairman of the Central Muslim Military Collegium, chairman of the Central Bureau of Communist Organizations of Peoples of the East, and member of the collegium of the People’s Commissariat of Nationality Affairs. This last position made him the highest-ranking member of a Muslim nationality in Soviet Russia. Sultan-Galiev’s numerous newspaper articles and speeches outlined a messianic role for Russia’s Muslim peoples, who would bring socialist revolution to the subject peoples of Asia and help them overthrow the chains of European empires. Chief theorist of the so-called right wing among the Tatar intelligentsia, he hoped to reconcile communism with nationalism. Although personally an atheist, he advocated a cautious approach toward anti-religious propaganda among Russia’s Muslim population. These views cause some emigré and foreign scholars to characterize Sultan-Galiev as a prophet of the national liberation struggle against colonial rule. By the end of 1922 Sultan-Galiev had come into direct conflict with Josef Stalin’s nationality policy, which he openly attacked in party meetings. He was particularly concerned with two issues, (1) plans for the new federal government (USSR), which would disadvantage Tatars and other Muslim groups that were not granted union republic status, and (2) the persistence of Russian chauvinism and of a dominant Russian role in governing Muslim republics. In an effort to silence this criticism, officials acting on Stalin’s initiative arrested Sultan-Galiev in May 1923 and charged him with conspiring to undermine Soviet nationality policy and with illegally contacting Basmachi rebels. Although Sultan-Galiev was soon released—stripped of his party membership and all positions—a major conference on the nationality question in June 1923 emphasized that Stalin’s policies in this area were not to be challenged. By the end of the 1920s, Sultan-Galievism (sultangalievshchina) had become a common charge leveled against Tatars and other Muslims and was later deployed widely during the purges. SultanGaliev was rearrested in 1928 and tried with seventy-six others as part of a “Sultan-Galievist

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counterrevolutionary organization” in 1930. His death penalty was soon commuted, and he was released in 1934 and permitted to live in Saratov province. However, his third arrest in 1937 was followed by execution in January 1940. The case of Sultan-Galiev was reviewed by the Central Committee in 1990, leading to his complete rehabilitation and emergence as a new and old national hero in post-Soviet Tatarstan.

See also: ISLAM; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; PEOPLE’S COMMISSARIAT OF NATIONALITIES; TATARSTAN AND TATARS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bennigsen, Alexandre A., and Wimbush, S. Enders. (1979). Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union: A Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. DANIEL E. SCHAFER

SUMAROKOV, ALEXANDER PETROVICH (1717–1777), playwright and poet. Ranked with Racine and Voltaire during his day, Alexander Petrovich Sumarokov was a founder of modern Russian literature, and arguably one of Russia’s first professional writers. Together with Mikhail Lomonosov and Vasily Tredyakovsky, Sumarokov helped introduce syllabotonic versification, created norms for the new literary language, and established many literary genres and tastes of the day. Sumarokov created the first Russian tragedies, comedies, operas, ballet, and model poetic genres including the fable, romance, sonnet, and others. He established the national theater in 1756, with the help of Fyodor Volkov’s Yaroslav troupe (it became a court theater in 1759, and lay the foundation for the Imperial Theaters). Sumarokov published the first private literary journal, Trudolyubivaya pchela (The Industrious Bee, 1759), inspiration for the “satirical journals” of the late 1760s and 1770s. An early supporter of Catherine II, after her ascension to power (or coup) he was given the right to publish at her expense, of which he made prolific use. Despite poetic admonitions to fellow noblemen to treat their serfs humanely, when Catherine asked his opinion of freeing the serfs at the time of the Nakaz, Sumarokov was dismissive. Gukovsky (1936) and others have tried to link Sumarokov to a so-called noble “fonde” and to

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the “Panin party,” not altogether convincingly. Sumarokov’s reputation went into total eclipse in the nineteenth century, when the literary movement he spearheaded was declared merely “pseudoClassicism.” It was not until the Soviet period that his achievement began to be reevaluated.

See also: CATHERINE II; LOMONOSOV, MIKHAIL VASILIEVICH; THEATER

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Levitt, Marcus C. (1995). “Aleksandr Petrovich Sumarokov.” Dictionary of Literary Biography 150: 370–381. Detroit: Bruccoli Clark Layman and Gale Research. MARCUS C. LEVITT

SUPREME SOVIET The Supreme Soviet was described in the 1936 and 1977 constitutions as the “highest organ of State power.” In the USSR, the bicameral Supreme Soviet was the chief, central legislative organ of the Soviet state. The constitutions of 1936 and 1977 followed closely the wording of the two preceding constitutions of 1918 and 1924 in describing the powers and functions of this body (earlier known as the Congress of Soviets) and its executive Presidium. As in preceding years, the deputies to the Supreme Soviet, elected to four-year terms throughout the republics, regions, provinces and other political-administrative subdivisions of authority throughout the USSR, were said to represent the interests of the workers, peasants, soldiers, and intellectuals. That the deputies would faithfully serve those interests, it was claimed in documents explaining the workings of the central legislature, was guaranteed by fact that the Communist Party at all levels played the determining role in selecting the single-list candidates for election to the legislative body. By the 1936 and 1977 constitutions, non-Party deputies could run for election and be elected. These deputies, too, were carefully vetted by the Party “aktivs.” Polling places for election of deputies seldom provided voting booths.

based on national, or ethnic, territorial units. The rationale given for this in official documents was that in this way the Soviet people would be represented both by geographic location as well as by ethnicity. Representation was based on one deputy per every 300,000 of the population. There was no class restriction as found in the first, 1918, constitution. The numbers of deputies in each body tended to increase over the years. This reflected the growth in population. No officially recognized cap was put on the total number of deputies, yet a limit nevertheless seemed to be in effect. The Soviet authorities apparently preferred to keep both bodies at approximately equal and manageable size. In that sense, the Communist Party leadership exercised control over the size of the legislative bodies as well as the texts of the bills submitted to it for enactment—always enacted unanimously by a show of hands. From 1937 to the 1960s, the Soviet of the Union increased from 569 to 791 deputies. The members of the second, or lower, chamber during the same period climbed from 574 to 750. The increase in the latter came from the addition of several new Union Republics to the USSR. These were the result of territorial annexations made before and during World War II. Both chambers met either separately or in joint session in the Supreme Soviet building within the Kremlin. They would meet jointly especially when the powerful executive Presidium of the Supreme Soviet was elected (every four years) along with elections of the USSR Supreme Court and of the Council of Ministers (formerly, Council of People’s Commissars), or government and cabinet. The chairman of the Presidium was considered to be, as head of state, the Soviet President. By the constitution the chambers were to meet twice per year in which the closely regulated sessions lasted only about a week. Prior to the 1950s, the two Soviets sometimes met more than twice per year.

The USSR Supreme Soviet was divided into two chambers, called the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. The former was based on representation by geographic, political-administrative territorial units nationwide; the latter was

Besides effecting indirect Communist Party control over the legislative proceedings, each chamber of the Supreme Soviet established a Council of Elders. This body, though unmentioned in the constitution, served as a further conduit for Party control. Each council numbered approximately 150 elders. It consisted of leading figures from the republics, territories, and provinces. Besides proposing legislation, the councils supervised the formation of legislative committees, known as commissions,

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The Yakutsk delegation to the Supreme Soviet in 1938 included secret police chief Nikolai Yezhov, bottom left. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS

within both houses. The committees oversaw affairs concerned with the State budget, legislation, the courts, foreign affairs, credentials, and so forth. The work of the committees was closely regulated. Often a leading member of the Communist Party Central Committee would chair a committee, such as that concerned with foreign affairs. Soviet propaganda aimed at a foreign audience boasted of the heterogeneous, democratic makeup of the USSR Supreme Soviet. One such document, Andrei Vyshinsky’s Law of the Soviet State (Gosudarstvo i pravo), noted that in the 1930s and 1940s. the Soviet legislature had a far greater proportion of women deputies than Western parliaments or the U.S. Congress. The alleged working-class backgrounds of the deputies was also touted. Party representation in the legislature stood at around 18 percent, or several times that of the percentage of Party members within the population at large. Government officials were said to constitute some 15 percent of the deputies. Soviet juristic writings explicitly denied that the Soviet Union’s political system recognized the

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Western principle of the separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial organs. Instead, it was claimed, the Soviet political system stressed the merging of executive, legislative, and judicial functions that was further afforded by the system’s centralized structure. Such unity was further enhanced by the parallel Communist Party hierarchy that was likewise structured to emphasize unity of function at all levels of administration and political authority. When the time came for voiced criticism of the system—beginning to surface within the illegal reform movement, or samizdat, of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s—the dissidents, some of whom were put on trial and served sentences in the labor camps, called in some instances for retaining the basic structure of the soviets. Yet they demanded radical overhaul of the functions of the soviets at all levels of authority as well as elimination of exclusive Communist Party supervision of soviet elections and legislative deliberations. Some reformers called for incorporation of the principle of separation of powers.

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See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; CONGRESS OF PEOPLE’S DEPUTIES; CONSTITUTION OF 1936; CONSTITUTION OF 1977; DISSIDENT MOVEMENT; PRESIDIUM OF SUPREME SOVIET; STATE COMMITTEES

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Reshetar, John Stephen, Jr. (1978). The Soviet Polity Government and Politics in the USSR, 2nd ed. New York: Harper & Row. Towster, Julian. (1948). Political Power in the U.S.S.R., 1917–1947: The Theory and Structure of Government in the Soviet State. New York: Oxford University Press. Vyshinsky, Andrei Y. (1979). The Law of the Soviet State. Westport, CT: Greenwood. ALBERT L. WEEKS

SUSLOV, MIKHAIL ANDREYEVICH (1902–1982), high-ranking Communist Party leader. Mikhail Suslov was a member of the Politburo from 1955 to 1982 and headed the agitation and propaganda department of the Central Committee from 1947 to 1982. An ideologist of the Stalinist school, Suslov was a reactionary and doctrinaire defender of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. Like many in his generation of party leaders, Suslov had humble origins. He was born into a peasant family in 1902 in the village of Shakhovskoye, within presentday Saratov oblast. From 1918 to 1920 he served as assistant secretary of the Committee of Poor Peasants (Kombed) and organized a Komsomol branch in his village. In 1921 he joined the Communist Party and enrolled in a school for workers in Moscow. He went on to study economics at the Institute of Red Professors and the Plekhanov Economics Institute before entering the party-state apparatus in 1931. Suslov was a ruthless player in the party purges of the Josef Stalin era and rose through the ranks by moving into positions opened up by mass arrests. In 1937 he became a Rostov oblast party committee secretary. Two years later he headed the Stavropol regional party committee, a position he held until 1944. In 1944, as chairman of the Central Committee’s bureau for Lithuanian affairs, he supervised the incorporation of Lithuania into the USSR and the subsequent deportation of thousands of people.

Mikhail Suslov, shown here in 1956, headed the Communist Party’s agitation and propaganda department from 1946 until his death in 1982. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

In 1947 Suslov became a secretary of the Central Committee in charge of shaping, protecting, and enforcing official ideology. He also held au-

thoritative positions in foreign affairs and was noted for his demand for strict adherence to Soviet foreign policy by foreign communist parties. In 1949, at a Cominform meeting in Budapest, he denounced the Yugoslav Communist Party for its independent stance and in 1956 went to Hungary with Anastas Mikoyan and Marshal Grigory Zhukov to supervise the suppression of the Hungarian uprising. Suslov was a shrewd political operator who served three Soviet leaders: Josef Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev, and Leonid Brezhnev. Very different from Khrushchev in temperament and outlook, he opposed de-Stalinization and economic reform, but supported him in 1957 against the antiparty group. In 1964, however, he turned on his former boss and was instrumental in the removal of Khrushchev and the installation of Brezhnev as first secretary of the Communist Party. Eschewing the limelight, Suslov did not seek the highest party or state positions for himself, but was content to remain chief party theoretician and ideologist.

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Deeply conservative, Suslov oversaw the official press and personally scrutinized publications to ensure conformity. According to Fedor Burlatsky (1988), he would also comment on everything written by members of the Central Committee departments. In 1969 he directed the dismissal of the progressive Novy mir editorial board. A hardline supporter of communism, he disliked the company of Westerners. At one Kremlin reception he placed tables between himself and foreign diplomats. Known as the “sea-green incorruptible of the Soviet establishment,” Suslov protested against increasing corruption in the party. In 1982 he died from a stroke that reportedly followed a heated discussion with an individual who was trying to cover up Brezhnev family scandals.

See also:

AGITPROP; CENTRAL COMMITTEE; COMMITTEES

OF THE VILLAGE POOR; COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION; COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Burlatsky, Fedor. (1988). Khrushchev and the First Russian Spring, tr. Daphne Skillen. New York: Scribners. McCauley, Martin. (1997). Who’s Who in Russia since 1900. London: Routledge. Tatu, Michel (1968). Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev to Kosygin, tr. Helen Katel. New York: Viking. ELAINE MACKINNON

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portunities provided by a relaxation of tsarist censorship in 1865, the demands of an increasingly literate population, the mass production made possible by the new printing technology, and fast reporting of news by means of the telegraph. As a seasoned literary critic and aspiring playwright, Suvorin in 1895 started his own theatrical company and installed it in his own theater. He wrote the revealingly personal Diary of A. S. Suvorin (1923), an account of the literary and political life of his time never translated into English. Suvorin recognized the literary promise of Anton Chekhov when he first published stories in small Russian publications. During their thirteenyear collaboration from 1886 to 1899, Chekhov published major stories and plays with Suvorin. The two became close friends, and that bond eased for Suvorin the tragedies of his own family life. Both his first wife and a son committed suicide, while another son and a daughter died of illnesses.

See also:

CHEKHOV, ANTON PAVLOVICH; JOURNALISM

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ambler, Effie. (1972). Russian Journalism and Politics: The Career of Aleksei S. Suvorin, 1861–1881. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. Bartol, R. (1974). “Aleksei Suvorin: Russia’s Millionaire Publisher.” Journalism Quarterly 51:411–417. CHARLES A. RUUD

SUVORIN, ALEXEI SERGEYEVICH (1834–1912), publisher, editor, critic, playwright. Alexei Sergeyevich Suvorin was born into a provincial military family and, by becoming a journalist, made his greatest contribution to Russia as publisher and editor of its most influential pre-Revolution conservative daily newspaper, New Times, and as publisher of Chekhov. First commissioned in the military, Suvorin resigned at age nineteen to concentrate on teaching, journalism, and literature. After working for several Russian newspapers and periodicals over the next fifteen years, he and a partner acquired the faltering St. Petersburg daily, New Times, in 1867. It became the flagship of a financially successful business that came to include book publishing, sales in company bookstores and railway station kiosks, and a school for printers. Suvorin grasped the op-

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SUVOROV, ALEXANDER VASILIEVICH (1730–1800), generalissimo (1799), prince, field marshal, and count. Perhaps the greatest Russian military leader of all time, Alexander Suvorov never lost a battle. He is generally credited among the founders of the Russian school of military art. Suvorov entered service in 1748 and first saw conventional combat during the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763). As a regimental commander from 1763 to 1769, he devised a regulation that became a model for combat training and service practices. As a brigadier and major general from 1768 to 1772 he was instrumental in defeating the Polish Confederation of Bar. During Catherine II’s First Turkish War (1768–1774)

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he won ringing victories at Turtukai and Kozludji (both 1773). Suvorov subsequently (1776–1779, 1782–1784) campaigned in the Crimea and the Kuban, where he imposed greater Russian control and where he refined unconventional tactics appropriate to circumstance and enemy. During Catherine’s Second Turkish War (1787–1792), he defended Kinburn (1787), fought at Ochakov (1788), won battles of near-annihilation at Fokshani and Rymnik (1789), and successfully stormed Izmail (1790). After service against the Swedes in 1791, he returned to the southwest, where in 1794 and 1795 he subjugated rebellious Polish patriots. Though briefly banished under Paul I (1796– 1801), Suvorov served in the war of the Second Coalition against revolutionary France. In Italy during 1799, he led Austro-Russian armies to dazzling victories on the Adda and the Trebbia and at Novi. After disagreement with the Austrians, Suvorov in September 1799 successfully extricated Russian forces from northern Italy over the Swiss Alps in a campaign that probably exceeded the achievements of Hannibal two millennia before. Suvorov left three important legacies to his military heirs. First, he insisted on progressive, realistic training tailored to the characteristics of the peasant soldier. Second, he left in his Art of Victory (1795–1796) a set of prescriptions for battlefield success. He saw the primary objective in war as the enemy’s main force. He counseled commanders in pursuit of victory to observe his triad of “speed, assessment, and attack.” Speed was all-important: “One minute decides the outcome of battle, one hour the success of a campaign, one day the fate of empires . . . I operate not by hours but by minutes” (Menning, 1986, pp. 82–83). Third, Suvorov’s record in the field inspired emulation from subsequent generations of Russian military officers. However, many would-be inheritors forgot his admonitions about flexibility, and sought slavish imitation rather than flexible adaptation.

See also:

MILITARY ART; MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; RUSSOTURKISH WARS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Longworth, Philip. (1965). The Art of Victory. The Life and Achievements of Field-Marshal Suvorov, 1729–1800. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Menning, Bruce W. (1986). “Train Hard, Fight Easy: The Legacy of A. V. Suvorov and His ‘Art of Victory.’” Air University Review 38(1):79–88. BRUCE W. MENNING

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SVANS Svans call themselves Mushwän (plural Shwanär). Nominally Georgian Orthodox, they preserve many pagan beliefs and practices. They inhabit a high mountainous area in northwestern Georgia beneath the main Caucasus chain, in the upper reaches of the rivers Ingur (Upper Svanetia) and Tskhenis-Tsqali (Lower Svanetia). Svan was first to split from the Common Kartvelian that also produced Georgian, Mingrelian, and Laz. The four main (and divergent) dialects are: Upper and Lower Bal (Upper Svanetia); and Lent’ekh and Lashkh (Lower Svanetia), although linguistic particularities characterize virtually each hamlet. The language is not taught, and all Svans educated in Svanetia since the introduction of universal schooling by the early Soviets have received instruction in Georgian. The largely mono-ethnic population of Svanetia is usually estimated at 50,000, although the disastrous winter of 1986–1987 caused many to abandon the region, especially Upper Svanetia. In the 1926 Soviet census, 13,218 declared Svan nationality, although thereafter all Kartvelian speakers became classified as Georgians. Annual heavy snowfalls meant that Svans were historically excluded from the outside world for months, penned up with their livestock inside appropriately compartmentalized stone dwellings, alongside which stood the unique, twelfth-century, square towers for which Svanetia, especially Upper Svanetia, is famous. While rich in forests and minerals, the limited arable areas produce little apart from grass and hay, potatoes, and barley, the source of the local hard liquor (haräq’). Goiters were frequent through iodine deficiency; the difficulties associated with providing another staple were depicted in the silent film Salt for Svanetia. Ibex, chamois, and bears have long been hunted. Svan men often served as migrant laborers in Mingrelia during the winter months. During the early nineteenth century, Lower Svanetia became part of Dadiani’s Mingrelia. In 1833 the Dadishkelian princes of western Upper Svanetia accepted Russian protection, governing their own affairs until the princedom was abolished in 1857. The eastern part of Upper Svanetia acknowledged no overlord, thus becoming known as “Free Svanetia.” Later in the century, Russia took control of the area through military action, completely destroying the village of Khalde, as described in a moving short story by Sergo Kldiashvili.

See also:

CAUCASUS; GEORGIA AND GEORGIANS; MINGRELIANS

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Freshfield, Douglas. (1896). The Exploration of the Caucasus. 2 vols. London: E. Arnold.

I

MILITARY ART; MILITARY DOCTRINE; MILITARY,

SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET; TUKHACHEVSKY, MIKHAIL NIKOLAYEVICH

Hewitt, George. (1996). A Georgian Reader: with Texts, Translation, and Vocabulary. London: SOAS.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Palmaitis, Letas, and Gudjedjiani, Chato. (1985). SvanEnglish Dictionary. New York: Caravan Books.

Naveh, Shimon. (1997). In Pursuit of Military Excellence. London: Frank Cass.

Phillipps-Wolley, Sir Clive. (1883). Savage Svanetia. 2 vols. London: R. Bentley and Son.

Schneider, James J. (1994). The Structure of Strategic Revolution: Total War and the Roots of the Soviet Warfare State. Novato, CA: Presidio.

B. GEORGE HEWITT

Svechin, A. A. (1992). Strategy, ed. Kent D. Lee; introductory essays by Andrei A. Kokoshin, et. al. Minneapolis, MN: East View Publications. JAMES J. SCHNEIDER

SVECHIN, ALEXANDER ANDREYEVICH (1878–1938), military theorist and intellectual. Alexander Svechin was one of the key intellectual leaders of the Red Army during the golden age of Soviet military theory (1918–1937). Svechin, an artilleryman, was a crucial figure in establishing a new and revolutionary understanding of modern war. Drawing on military thinkers of the nineteenth and late eighteenth century and his own intense study of the imperial Russian military experience, Svechin reformulated the meaning of the term strategy. Classically, strategy meant the art of conducting military campaigns. With the coming of the Industrial Revolution, war became thoroughly mechanized and industrialized—and total. Svechin was one the earliest theorists to recognize that the material and creative challenges of total war would revolutionize the very concept of strategy. Svechin published his views in print under the title Strategy. The work was published in two editions in 1926 and 1927. Here he defined strategy as “the art of combining preparations for war and the grouping of operations for achieving the goal for the armed forces set by the war.” Through much of his professional career Svechin carried on a lengthy debate with another important Soviet theorist, Mikhail N. Tukhachevsky. Svechin’s work in Strategy and elsewhere informed his view that modern war would be characterized by attrition (izmor). Tukhachevsky argued a contrary view, that with the help of technology, states could still fight swift decisive wars of annihilation (sokrushenie). In the end, history decided the argument in Svechin’s favor. A prolific writer, Svechin was also a brilliant teacher who educated a generation of Soviet military leaders who helped win World War II. He was executed as an enemy of the state on July 29, 1938.

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SVYATOPOLK I (c. 980–1019), grand prince of Kiev, replacing Vladimir Svyatoslavich, the Christianizer of Rus. The identity of Svyatopolk’s father is uncertain. Around 980, after Vladimir had his halfbrother Yaropolk killed, he slept with Yaropolk’s Greek wife, a former nun, and she gave birth to Svyatopolk. Because he was born of adultery, the chronicler explains, Svyatopolk (“the Cursed,” by which appellation he came to be known) was stigmatized for the rest of his life. Nevertheless, Vladimir treated him as his son. Before 988, it appears, he gave Svyatopolk the town of Turov. While there, Svyatopolk established friendly relations with the Poles and, around 1013, married the daughter of Boleslaw I and accepted Latin Christianity. Later he plotted with the Poles against Vladimir, and the latter imprisoned him. After Vladimir died in 1015, Svyatopolk, allegedly his eldest surviving son, bribed the Kievans to accept him as their prince, even though many preferred his halfbrother Boris, perhaps in keeping with Vladimir’s wish. Because Svyatopolk’s succession was challenged, he initiated a fierce campaign to eradicate his half-brothers, who posed a threat to his rule. Thus he had Boris, Gleb, and Svyatoslav killed. In 1016, however, Yaroslav of Novgorod and his Varangians defeated Svyatopolk and his Pechenegs near Lyubech. Svyatopolk fled to the Poles, where Boleslaw I joined him; together they evicted Yaroslav from Kiev in July 1018. In 1019, after the king departed, Yaroslav attacked Svyatopolk and defeated him. As Svyatopolk fled, his reason and strength failed him, and he died somewhere between the Polish and the Czech lands.

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See also:

I I

GRAND PRINCE; KIEVAN RUS; VLADIMIR, ST.;

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Dimnik, Martin. (1994). The Dynasty of Chernigov, 1054–1146. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

YAROSLAV VLADIMIROVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

MARTIN DIMNIK

Dimnik, Martin. (1996). “Succession and Inheritance in Rus’ before 1054.” Mediaeval Studies 58:87–117. Franklin, Simon, and Shepard, Jonathan. (1996). The Emergence of Rus 750–1200. London: Longman. MARTIN DIMNIK

SVYATOPOLK II (1050–1113), prince of Polotsk, Novgorod, and his patrimony of Turov, and grand prince of Kiev. Svyatopolk, son of Izyaslav and grandson of Yaroslav Vladimirovich (the Wise), became grand prince in 1093 after the death of his uncle Vsevolod. He and his cousin Vladimir Vsevolodovich (Monomakh) of Pereyaslavl sought to unite the princes of Rus against the nomads, but their cousin Oleg Svyatoslavich of Chernigov refused to cooperate. In response, they evicted Oleg from Chernigov and, in 1097, forced him to accept their terms at a congress of princes at Lyubech. They all pledged loyalty to each other and agreed that each one would retain the patrimony of his father. Soon after, Svyatopolk broke his pledge by ordering the blinding of Vasilko Rostislavich of Terebovl, whom David Igorevich falsely accused of plotting against Svyatopolk. When Monomakh and Oleg waged war against Svyatopolk, he promised to punish David, but instead attempted to seize Galician towns from Vasilko and his brother. When the latter cut off the wheat and salt supply to Kiev, Svyatopolk confiscated salt from the Caves Monastery and sold it at inflated prices. In 1100, at Vitichev (Uvetichi), he concluded peace with Monomakh and Oleg, and punished David by appropriating his patrimony of Vladimir in Volyn. After that, he and his cousins campaigned against the Polovtsy in 1103, 1107, and 1111. Their resounding victories forced the nomads to stop their incursions for over a decade. Svyatopolk died on April 16, 1113, and was buried in the Church of St. Mikhail in Kiev, which he had built.

See also: CAVES MONASTERY; GRAND PRINCE; KIEVAN RUS;

SVYATOSLAV I (c. 942–972), son of Igor and Olga; nominal grand prince of Kiev. Svyatoslav I Igorevich became the nominal grand prince of Kiev in 945, after his father Igor’s death. He expanded Kievan Rus to its furthest limits, but overreached himself and failed to consolidate his rule. Svyatoslav was the first prince with a Slavic name, but he remained a Varangian at heart and refused to adopt Christianity. According to the Primary Chronicle, he assumed power between 956 and 964 when his mother, the regent, was deposed. Around 963 he attacked the Khazars on the lower Don and eventually destroyed their state and opened the steppe to other nomads. He also defeated the Vyatichi and the Volga Bulgars in the northeast, and the Yasians (Ossetians) and Kasogians (Cherkasses) in the Kuban region. His southeastern campaigns took him to the Caspian Sea. He thus secured control of all the trade routes between the Dnieper and the Volga. In 967 he captured northern Bulgaria and made Pereyaslavets his headquarters. The Pechenegs attacked Kiev in 968, forcing him to return home and drive them into the steppe. At that time he partitioned Rus between his sons: Yaropolk received Kiev, Oleg the Derevlyane, and Vladimir Novgorod. He then returned to Pereyaslavets, which he proposed to make his capital. He campaigned against the Greeks in Bulgaria and Thrace until 971, when Emperor John I Tzimisces forced him to accept humiliating peace terms. While Svyatoslav was returning to Kiev in 972, the Pechenegs attacked and killed him. They used his skull as a drinking cup.

See also:

KIEVAN RUS; PECHENEGS; PRIMARY CHRONICLE; RURIKID DYNASTY; VLADIMIR, ST.; YAROPOLK I

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Vernadsky, George. (1948). Kievan Russia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. MARTIN DIMNIK

NOVGOROD THE GREAT; VLADIMIR MONOMAKH

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SVYATOSLAV II (1027–1076), grand prince of Kiev and progenitor of the dynasties of Chernigov, Murom, and Ryazan. Before Svyatoslav’s father Yaroslav Vladimirovich the Wise died in 1054, he gave Svyatoslav Yaroslavich the patrimony of Chernigov, including Murom, Ryazan, and Tmutarakan. After his father’s death, Svyatoslav and his brothers Izyaslav and Vsevolod ruled as a triumvirate for some twenty years. They asserted their authority over all the other princes and defended Rus against the nomads, primarily the Polovtsy (Cumans). In 1068 Svyatoslav scored a great victory over the Polovtsy, after which he formed alliances with them. The following year the Kievans invited him to replace Izyaslav as prince, but he refused to depose his brother. Svyatoslav became the most powerful prince in the land. In addition to his patrimonial lands, he established his rule over the Beloozero region and Novgorod. In 1072, when the brothers translated the relics of Saints Boris and Gleb in Vyshgorod and issued the Law Code of Yaroslav’s Sons (Pravda Yaroslavichey), he expressed solidarity with Izyaslav for the last time. The following year he evicted Izyaslav from Kiev and therewith disobeyed his father’s directive to live at peace with his brothers. By doing so, however, he gave his heirs the right to rule Kiev after him. Four years later, in 1076, he died in Kiev. Svyatoslav was a patron of culture, learning, and the Church. He commissioned two miscellanies and founded monasteries in Chernigov and Kiev. He probably completed building the Cathedral of St. Savior in Chernigov where he was buried.

See also: IZYASLAV I; KIEVAN RUS; VSEVELOD I; YAROSLAV VLADIMIROVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Dimnik, Martin. (1994). The Dynasty of Chernigov, 1054–1146. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. MARTIN DIMNIK

SWEDEN, RELATIONS WITH The establishment, starting in the late eighth century, of a number of Swedish settlements in the eastern Baltic led to regular interaction with East-

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ern Slavs. Staraya Ladoga (Aldeigjuborg) became an important Scandinavian center on the southeastern shore of Lake Ladoga, but the Varangians gradually extended their operations southeastward along the Novgorod-Kiev axis. Many of them served in Gardariki (the “land of towns”) territory as dukes, merchants, and mercenaries and were collectively known as Rus (the basis for the word Russia). The local princes, starting with Rurik (Rörik) who became the ruler of Novgorod (Holmgard), had exclusively Scandinavian names. Even as the Scandinavian elite became Slavicized by the tenth century, a special relationship—in the form of dynastic marriages and joint military campaigns—continued into the early twelfth century. However, almost endemic conflict soon followed as Finland became a focus of the expansionist impulses of Sweden and the Grand Duchy of Novgorod alike. The Karelian tribes were baptized by Novgorod, whereas Swedish crusades into southwestern Finland began in the 1150s. By the late thirteenth century, the Swedes reached Karelia and established the fortress of Viborg (Vyborg in Russian), as well as Landskrona in the Neva estuary. The 1323 Treaty of Orekhovets/Nöteborg between the two rivals drew a border stretching across central Finland to the Viborg district, but did little to stall Swedish expansionism into northern Finland. A century and a half of relative calm was followed by renewed warfare in the late fifteenth century, but protracted peace negotiations with the newly independent Vasa Sweden and a growth of trade led to a gradual normalization of relations after the 1520s. The weakening of the Livonian Order created a power vacuum in the eastern Baltic and the basis for renewed conflict between Sweden and Muscovy. Gustav Vasa’s 1555 attack on Russia marked the beginning of Swedish aspirations for regional hegemony. The “Great Eastern Program” was designed to turn Sweden into a pan-Baltic power that could enrich itself by taxing the rapidly growing trade flows between Eastern and Western Europe. The Livonian War of 1533–1584 ultimately left Sweden in control of the northern coast of Estonia, while Muscovy gained temporary control of Narva, which became the country’s leading export port. The Teusina/Tiavzino peace (1595) formally recognized Swedish control of Finland. Sweden intervened during the Russian Time of Troubles, initially in support of the Moscow government but soon as a conqueror of the Novgorod region (in 1611–1612). Following the failure of

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efforts to place a Swedish candidate on the Russian throne, Gustav Adolf (Gustavus Adolphus) sought to force a union between Novgorod and Sweden and directed his expansionist attention at the Kola and White Sea coast, albeit unsuccessfully. The 1617 treaty of Stolbovo marked the peak of Swedish expansion into Russia, leaving the country in control of Ingria (Ingermanland; roughly today’s St. Petersburg region) and the Western half of Lake Ladoga. Novgorod was returned to Russia. Russian-Swedish relations were strong after the war, and the new Romanov rulers subsidized Swedish involvement in the Thirty Years’ War in 1630–1634, among other things. In spite of a steady expansion of trade, political ties deteriorated under Queen Christina. Russia renewed its attempts to gain access to the Baltic in the 1650s and attacked Sweden in 1658. In spite of some initial territorial gains, the Peace of Kardis in 1661 ratified the prewar status quo. The closing decades of the century saw a steady expansion in Russian trade via Swedish possessions, even in the face of periodic diplomatic disputes. Tsar Peter I (the Great) in the late 1690s managed to assemble an international alliance designed to challenge Swedish supremacy in the Baltic region. The Great Northern War of 1700–1721 led to the Swedish loss of its Baltic provinces and the establishment of Russian hegemony in the region. Russia in the eighteenth century took an active interest in Sweden’s internal affairs. Although Russian engagement on the Ottoman front led to alliance treaties with Sweden, Swedish revanchism triumphed at home, and a campaign against Russia from 1741 to 1743 sought to regain the lost eastern territories. The catastrophic war was followed by the loss of southeastern Finland to Russia. A defensive alliance was signed between the two countries, and the absolutist regime of Gustav(us) III in the 1770s sought Russian support for a Swedish conquest of Norway. A lack of success eventually led to another war against Russia from 1788 to 1790. The Peace of Värälä reaffimed the prewar status quo, while Gustav crowned his career by establishing an alliance with Russia. Sweden and Russia were allies against Napoleon until the French managed to use the Treaty of Tilsit to induce Alexander I to conquer Finland in the last Russo-Swedish war of 1808–1809 (Treaty of Fredrikshamn). Royal attempts to continue the war were made impossible by a bourgeois revolution in Sweden. The French Marshall Jean Baptiste Bernadotte (Karl Johan) was elected Swedish heir to the

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throne in 1810 in order to gain Napoleon’s support for the reconquest of Finland. However, he instead turned to France’s opponents in order to make possible a Swedish takeover of Norway. In 1812, Sweden declared itself neutral in European conflicts, but a secret alliance was signed with Russia. Popular Russophobia increased in the 1830s and 1840s, and Oskar I began to pursue closer ties with Great Britain and Denmark. A border dispute with Russia in the 1850s led Sweden to seek British-French guarantees. The two powers in 1856 forced Russia to demilitarize the Åland Islands. Anti-Russian sentiment was further boosted by the Polish uprisings and the Russification measures adopted in Finland toward the end of the century. In spite of this, the government defined its neutrality even more strictly in 1885. Nonetheless, Russia’s recognition of Norwegian independence in 1905 was caused by suspicions of pan-Nordic union and Sweden’s pro-German stance. The gradually more tense political relations did not prevent the establishment of growing economic and cultural ties. Russia accounted for 5 to 6 percent of Swedish imports in the late nineteenth century, but in the years leading up to the October Revolution, Russia was the third- or fourth-largest destination of Swedish exports. Swedish direct investment grew and, for instance, Nobel Industries developed a substantial presence in Russia. Sweden harbored many intellectual refugees from Russia. Sweden remained neutral in World War I, in spite of popular pressures for an alliance with Germany. The neutral position allowed Sweden, as the first Western power, to establish relations with the new Bolshevik regime. A Swedish-Soviet trade treaty was signed in the autumn of 1918, although formal diplomatic recognition only followed in 1924. Ties again deteriorated in the 1930s but, following the rise of fascism, Sweden backed Soviet membership in the League of Nations. In spite of an official position of neutrality during World War II, Sweden openly supported its neighbor during the Soviet-Finnish Winter War of 1939–1940. A brief conflict with the Soviets in 1942 followed Soviet efforts to sink Swedish freight ships carrying German goods. Another source of tension came from the flight of many Balts (mainly Latvians and Estonians) to Sweden. While 160 Baltic military officers were returned to the USSR in 1945 and 1946, civilian refugees were permitted to stay in Sweden. The Soviets strongly opposed Swedish efforts to establish Nordic security cooperation after the

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war, and Sweden returned to its policy of nonalignment, albeit with secret cooperation with the West. Moscow valued Sweden’s decision not to acquire nuclear weapons, and the two countries often found themselves adopting similar positions regarding international disputes. Sweden gained further favor by staying out of the European Economic Community and by supporting the ESCE (European Coal and Steel Community) process. Growing tensions were caused by Afghanistan and sightings of Soviet submarines in Swedish waters, one of which was stranded in 1981. Ties were normalized under Gorbachev. Commercial relations were relatively modest during the Soviet and postSoviet period.

sovereign for life in the field army, in the garrisons, and in the lower levels of provincial administration. A few deti boyarskie owned some allodial land, but most depended primarily upon the sovereign’s bounty in service-conditional land and cash and grain issues to outfit themselves and their retainers for duty. The syn boyarsky’s bounty entitlements were determined in part by his service capacity as assessed at inspection and in part by his past service, past rank, and the services and ranks of his forebears. The average syn boyarsky owned no more than five or six peasant tenants. Upon retirement his son or another male kinsman usually received part or all of his service lands and took over his service obligations.

See also:

See also: BOYAR; MESTNICHESTVO; MUSCOVY; POMESTIE;

DENMARK, RELATIONS WITH; FOREIGN TRADE;

GREAT NORTHERN WAR; LIVONIAN WAR; NARVA,

STRELTSY

TREATY OF; NORWAY, RELATIONS WITH; NYSTADT, TREATY OF; STOLBOVO, TREATY OF

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hellie, Richard. (1971). Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kirby, David. (1990). Northern Europe in the Early Modern Period: The Baltic World, 1492–1772. London: Longman. Kirby, David. (1995). The Baltic World, 1772–1993: Europe’s Northern Periphery in an Age of Change. London: Longman. JARMO T. KOTILAINE

SYN BOYARSKY A ranking in the Muscovite state service system, held by provincial petty noble cavalrymen who comprised the bulk of the campaign army up to the middle of the seventeenth century. The syn boyarsky (pl. deti boyarskie) comprised Muscovy’s middle service class, below the metropolitan nobility but higher in status than the contractually recruited commoner cossacks and musketeers. Syn boyarsky literally means “boyar’s son,” reflecting this group’s mixed origins (younger sons of Moscow boyars, slave or free retainers of formerly independent appanage princes, sons of clergymen or peasants, etc.) in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. The syn boyarsky was legally free in the sense that he was exempt from taxes, and he was entitled to own peasants and to sue in defense of his precedence honor. But he was required to serve the

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SYTIN, IVAN DMITRIEVICH (1851–1934), Russia’s leading pre-Revolution publisher of books, magazines, and the top daily newspaper, Russian Word (Russkoye slovo). Ivan Dmitrievich Sytin, had literate but poor peasant parents and only two years of schooling in his native village of Gnezdnikovo, Kostroma Province. Venturing first to the Nizhny Novgorod Fair at fourteen as helper to a fur-trading uncle, he apprenticed at fifteen to a Moscow printer-merchant who helped him start a business in 1876, the year of his marriage to a cook’s daughter who would be vital to his success. Like his mentor, Sytin issued calendars, posters, and tales that itinerant peddlers sold to peasants throughout the countryside. When in 1884 Leo Tolstoy needed a publisher for his simple books (the Mediator series) meant to edify the same readership, his choice of Sytin raised this unknown to respected status among intellectuals. Sytin then began to publish for well-educated readers and branched into schoolbooks, children’s books, and encyclopedias by investing in the new mass-production German presses that cut per-unit costs. His rise as an entrepreneur who exploited the latest technol-

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ogy led contemporaries to tag him “American” in method. Sytin claimed that he became a newspaper publisher in 1894 at Anton Chekhov’s urging, and he hired able editors and journalists who made his Russian Word the most-read liberal daily in Russia. Lessening censorship and rapid industrialization in the last decades of the tsarist regime helped Sytin add to his publishing ventures and kept him a millionaire through the economic disruption of World War I. After the 1917 Revolution, Sytin received assurances from Vladimir Lenin that he could publish for the Bolshevik regime, only to be cast off as a capitalist after Lenin died in 1924. The final decade of his life was marked by gloom, austerity, and obscurity, offset only by his church attendance and his writing of memoirs (published in

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the USSR in 1960 in a shortened edition). His downtown Moscow apartment is today an exhibition center in his honor.

See also:

JOURNALISM

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Lindstrom, Thaïs. (1957). “From Chapbooks to Classics: The Story of Intermediary.” American Slavic and East European Review 16:190–201. Ruud, Charles A. (1990). Russian Entrepreneur: Publisher Ivan Sytin of Moscow, 1851–1934. Montreal: McGillQueen’s University Press. Watstein, J. (1971). “Ivan Sytin—An Old Russian Success Story.” Russian Review 30:43–53. CHARLES A. RUUD

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TABLE OF RANKS The Table of Ranks [or rankings] of all official posts (Tabel’ o Rangakh Vsekh Chinov) divided government service into three vertical columns: military (voinskie), civil (statskie), and court (privdvornye). The military column was further subdivided into infantry, guards, artillery, and navy. These vertical columns were divided horizontally into ranks or classes (klassy), from rank fourteen up to rank one, each containing a variable number of posts or offices (chiny). The most crowded ranks were the civilian ones, with sometimes a dozen or more posts packed into each to accommodate newly created central and provincial officials, whereas each rank in the guards column contained just one post. Nineteen explanatory points accompanied the chart. Like many of Peter I’s modernizing reforms, the Table of Ranks rationalized changes that had already occurred piecemeal and replaced the old overlapping ranking systems inherited from the seventeenth century, which did not differentiate between civilian and military posts. It incorporated titles such as general, major, and colonel that had been in use in certain regiments since the 1630s, new offices such as chancellor and vice-chancellor, and court grades introduced after Peter’s marriage in 1712 for use in the new tsaritsa’s court. The 1722 edict also contained points from foreign ranking systems, especially from Prussia, Denmark, and Sweden. Peter himself edited the final version and incorporated suggestions from the Senate and governmental departments.

T

As the grid layout made plain, one of the purposes of the Table of Ranks was to correlate status across different branches of service. For example, chancellor in the civil service and field marshalgeneral in the army both held rank one. To occupy a position on the table at all was to be privileged, for the fourteen ranks related only to the officer class in the armed forces and its equivalent in the civil service. Noncommissioned officers, regular troops, and their civilian equivalents were not included. The table was strict about qualifications for jobs. Neither post nor rank could be inherited or bought. At the same time, birth and marriage continued to confer privilege. The first of the accompanying explanatory points confirmed the precedence of princes of the blood and royal sonsin-law. Point eight allowed sons of princes, counts, barons, and other aristocrats free access to places

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where the court assembled before others holding lowly office (chin), but the sovereign still wished to see them distinguish themselves from others in all cases according to their merit. Even the highest born would not be awarded any rank until they had served the tsar and the fatherland. Conversely, non-nobles who managed to enter the table received hereditary noble status upon attaining military rank fourteen or civilian rank eight. Civil offices in ranks nine to fourteen conferred personal noble status only. Women were ranked according to their husbands or fathers, depending on their marital status, apart from ladies-in-waiting, holding court service ranks in their own right. The Table of Ranks endorsed the belief that nobles were the natural leaders in a society of orders composed of categories with unequal rights. It did not demonstrate a consistent commitment to meritocracy to the detriment of lineage, nor did it specifically raise commoners at the expense of nobles. Nobles who failed to attain a post on the table did not lose their noble status. The Holstein envoy H. F. de Bassewitz writes: “What [Peter] had in mind was not the abasement of the noble estate. On the contrary, all tended towards instilling in the nobility a desire to distinguish themselves from common folk by merit as well as by birth.” The final explanatory point specified that people were to have clothing, carriages, and livery appropriate to their office and calling. Peter did not intend to diminish the traditional elite in principle, nor did he do so in practice. In 1730, of the 179 army and navy officers and officials in ranks one through four of the table, ninetenths were descended from old Muscovite noble clans and a third from men who recently had been boyars. Over the centuries, some posts on the table were abolished and others were created to accommodate the staff of academies, universities, and other new institutions. Orders and medals became associated with various grades. It became harder for non-nobles to enter the table. But the basic principles established by Peter I continued until 1917, and consciousness of rank and striving for promotion and honors left a deep imprint on Russian society and culture.

See also:

PETER I

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Meehan-Waters, Brenda. (1982). Autocracy and Aristocracy. The Russian Service Elite of 1730. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. LINDSEY HUGHES

TAGANKA The Taganka emerged in 1964, under the leadership of Yuri Lyubimov, as one of the young theaters reflecting the generational split within the Soviet intelligentsia following the year of protest (1956). A theater of young comrades-in-arms, Taganka believed in its mission: making audiences aware of contemporary moral, political, and social dilemmas. Aesthetically, it revived Meyerhold’s tradition. A theater of synthesis, it mobilized various resources: music, dance, pantomime, acrobatics, masks, the shadow-play, and others. Many shows began outside and proceeded through the lobby into the auditorium. The Taganka opened with Bertolt Brecht’s The Good Person of Szechwan, putting into practice Brecht’s own theory of epic theatre. The Taganka’s approach to the repertoire was unique: it often produced prose adaptations (A Hero of Our Time, 1964; Master and Margarita, 1977); and poetic montage (Antiworlds, 1965; Listen! Mayakovsky!, 1967). Lyubimov’s Taganka, with its brilliant actors, such as Vladimir Vysotsky, Veniamin Smekhov, and Valery Zolotukhin, and no less brilliant designer, David Borovsky, quickly became a cultural landmark. Despite continuous battles with censorship, it was never closed down and was held out to the West to display artistic freedom in the USSR. However, Lyubimov lost his Soviet citizenship in 1984, while in London. The Theater’s new leader, Anatoly Efros, a follower of Konstantin Stanislavsky, took it in a different direction. Whereas Lyubimov had developed shows, Efros developed actors. Under perestroika, the Taganka lost its status as gadfly of the society. Lyubimov’s return in 1989 did little to reinstate the status. A split within the theater, initiated by N. Gubenko, dealt a serious blow to the Taganka and it never recovered the status that it held before 1984.

See also:

PERESTROIKA

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hughes, Lindsey. (1998). Russia in the Age of Peter the Great. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Beumers, Birgit. (1997). Yury Lyubimov at the Taganka Theatre 1964–1994. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers.

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Gershkovich, Alexander. (1989). The Theater of Yuri Lyubimov: Art and Politics at the Taganka Theatre in Moscow. New York: Paragon House. MAIA KIPP

TAJIKISTAN AND TAJIKS The Tajiks are the most prominent indigenous nonTurkic population in Central Asia. They are of Persian/Iranian ethnic descent, although their exact origin is subject to debate. Legends link the Tajiks with Alexander the Great and his campaign in the region north of Afghanistan and west of China— what is today Tajikistan. More likely, contemporary Tajiks are descendants of the Persian-speaking population that resided in the sedentary regions of what is now Central Asia, particularly in the country of Tajikistan. Tajikistan had a population of 6,719,567 in 2002, of which approximately 4,361,000 were ethnic Tajik (64.9%). However, if one adds to that the million or so Tajiks that live in Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, respectively, the number increases to well above six million Tajiks in Central Asia. What makes these calculations difficult is the fact that defining oneself as a Tajik is a construct of the Soviet era. Prior to the early twentieth century, people in the region defined themselves more on tribal and clan affiliations or by their adherence to Islam than to an ethnic identity. In neighboring Uzbekistan, for example, ethnic Tajiks claim that they are actually more prominent than the official statistics of that country suggest. Within the Republic of Tajikistan, other significant minorities include Uzbeks (25.0%) and Russians (3.5%). Many Russians emigrated from Tajikistan immediately after the break-up of the Soviet Union, particularly during the period of the civil war (1992–1997). Most of the Uzbeks live in the northern region of Sogd, previously known as Leninobod (Leninabad). The remaining Russians live in the capital city of Dushanbe, which in 2002 had an overall population of 590,000, although that figure undoubtedly was an underestimation. The Tajiks speak an eastern dialect of Farsi, the language of Iran. The languages are mutually intelligible; although as modern Tajik is written in the Cyrillic script and not in the Arabic script, there can be difficulties between the two. Indeed, throughout the past century, Tajik has been writ-

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An elderly Tajik man drinks tea as another plays a traditional musical instrument at a Dushanbe street market. © AFP/CORBIS

ten in Arabic, Latin, and Cyrillic scripts. It is the intention of the current government to return to the Arabic script, although the practical difficulties of such a move have slowed any such effort. In contrast to the Iranians, the Tajiks are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi School, not Shi’a Muslims like Iranians. This is the result of the history of religious centers in the region, such as Bukhara and Samarkand in Uzbekistan, where a number of ethnic Tajiks live. More importantly, the Safavid dynasty that made Shi’a Islam the official religion of Persia did not control the traditional Tajik territories. There is a small sect of Isma’ili Shi’a in the Badakhshon area of eastern Tajikistan that is loyal to the spiritual leader of the Aga Khan. In addition, the non-Tajiks in the country practice a range of religions. Tajiks point to the Sassanid dynasty of the early tenth century as a founding moment in their history. Traditionally, the Tajiks—or Tajik speakers— occupied urban areas of Central Asia, especially the key trading cities of Samarkand and Bukhara.

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Indeed, many were the economic and political elite of the Bukharan Emirate, which was prominent in the sixteenth to the early twentieth centuries. The Emirate eventually became a Protectorate of the Russian Empire in the 1870s and until 1917 was closely associated with the tsarist regime. After the Bolshevik Revolution and Russian Civil War, which brought about the Uzbek S.S.R., the Tajik Autonomous S.S.R was established. On October 5, 1929, the Soviet government officially declared it a full-fledged Union Republic. At 143,000 square kilometers, Tajikistan is one of the smaller countries in the region. It is largely mountainous, with the Pamirs dominating the eastern part of the coun-

try (the region known as the Badakhshon Autonomous Region).

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Within a year of independence from the USSR, the Tajik government collapsed due to infighting among rival groups and a five-year civil war ensued (1992–1997). The war was largely seen as a struggle between regional rivals. In 1997, the opposing sides agreed to form a National Reconciliation Committee (NRC) that set the stage for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. President Imomali Rakhmonov successfully consolidated his authority in the postwar era and in the early twenty-first century has a firm control of the coun-

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try, which continues to be dominated by regional and clan rivalries. Tajikistan is an overwhelmingly mountainous country that has few natural resources other than mineral wealth. Tajikistan was the source of strategic minerals for the Soviet nuclear program and continues to be a supplier of other minerals for export. In particular, aluminum is deemed important and is the foundation for one of the region’s largest aluminum processing plants in Tursun-Zade. There are modest oil and gas deposits, but these are used exclusively for domestic consumption. Cotton is also a product traditionally exported. Because of the civil war, economic development in the country has been abysmally low. It is estimated that the production levels of the country are less than half of the 1991 figures. Since 2001, international financial institutions have increased their commitments to Tajikistan to begin the process of rebuilding the economy. Of particular interest are the possibilities in hydroelectric energy and continued development of mineral reserves. The total gross national product (GNP) for 2001 was $7.5 billion, giving an estimated purchasing power parity (PPP) at $1,140 per capita. Per capita income is actually less than $600, with many earning as little as $10 per month in actual salary. Because it is a landlocked country that requires open access to outside trade routes, Tajikistan is dependent upon building strong relations with its neighbors—China, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and the Kyrgyz Republic. Of particular importance is the fact that Tajiks are prominent in neighboring Uzbekistan, especially in the historic cities of Bukhara and Samarkand. Another key issue for Tajikistan is the fact that Iran feels some affinity toward the country. Iran played a key role in facilitating the peace talks in the mid-1990s and, at least at that time, felt it could be a more significant player in the country. Finally, Tajik support of the U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan has paid modest returns. There is currently a small U.S.-base facility in Dushanbe and strategic assistance from the United States to Tajikistan has increased substantially. Tajikistan is now part of the NATO Partnership for Peace program. The Tajik government hopes that these increased external relations will eventually translate into increased economic assistance. In turn, this aid will help stabilize a very precarious domestic situation.

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See also:

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ISLAM; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NA-

TIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abdullaev, Kamoludin and Barnes, Catherine, eds. (2001). Politics of Compromise: The Tajikistan Peace Process, Accord No. 10. London: Conciliation Resources. Akiner, Shirin. (2002). Tajikistan: Disintegration or Reconciliation? London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. Allworth, Edward, ed. (1994). Central Asia: 130 Years of Russia Dominance, A Historical Overview. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Atkin, Muriel. (1989). The Subtlest Battle: Islam in Soviet Tajikistan. Philadelphia: The Foreign Policy Research Institute. Atkin, Muriel. (1997). “Thwarted Democratization in Tajikistan.” In Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus, ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Bennigsen, Alexandre and Wimbush, S. Enders. (1985). Muslims of the Soviet Empire: A Guide. London: C. Hurst. Cummings, Sally, ed. (2002). Power and Change in Central Asia. London: Routledge. Rakowska–Harmstone, Teresa. (1970). Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of Tadzhikistan. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press. ROGER KANGAS

TALE OF AVRAAMY PALITSYN The Tale of Avraamy Palitsyn is one of the earliest, most popular and widely diffused (over 200 manuscript copies are known to exist) narratives about the Time of Troubles. Although the author was a monk, he took part in many important events of the period such as the negotiations with the Poles in 1610. He used eyewitness accounts and official documentation to compose the tale some time around 1617. The first six chapters, which some scholars attribute to another author, narrate the onset of the Troubles from the time of Ivan IV to the reign of Vasily I. Shuisky. The core of the tale (in chapters seven through fifty-two) is comprised of an epic, eyewitness description of the siege of the Trinity St. Sergius monastery between 1608–1610 by Polish forces. The last chapters are

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devoted to the liberation of Moscow, the process of electing Mikhail Fyodorovich Romanov, and the end of the conflict with the Poles. The text emphasizes the important role played by the Trinity monastery in stopping the Polish advance and organizing resistance. Avraamy also stresses the role he played in inspiring the liberation movement and assisting it with his deeds and prayers. The tale exists in several versions, but scholars disagree over the extent to which variations represent authorial interventions. Like other works of the period, the tale displays both stylistic and structural innovations. It has long been appreciated by scholars for its range of linguistic registers, use of direct speech, rhythmic prose, and rhetorical skill.

See also:

IVAN IV; ROMANOV, MIKHAIL FYODOROVICH;

SHUISKY, VASILY IVANOVICH; TIME OF TROUBLES; TRINITY ST. SERGIUS MONASTERY

BRIAN BOECK

a new German command team of Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff time to develop plans already outlined by staff officers on the ground— to concentrate their entire force against the Second Army. After five days of hard fighting, between August 26 and August 30, there were 50,000 Russian casualties, and 90,000 prisoners. Samsonov committed suicide and the Germans turned on Rennenkampf, driving the First Army back over the frontier between September 7 and 14, in the Battle of the Masurian Lakes. The Russians came closer to victory in East Prussia than is generally realized. Their failure was primarily a consequence of attempting a campaign of maneuver arguably beyond the capacity of any army under the tactical conditions of 1914. But while the losses in men and material were replaced, the blow Tannenberg inflicted on Russian national morale was never restored throughout the war.

See also:

TAMBOV UPRISING See

WORLD WAR I

ANTONOV UPRISING. BIBLIOGRAPHY

TANNENBERG, BATTLE OF The Battle of Tannenberg, in August 1914, was the consequence of Russia’s commitment to an immediate offensive during World War I. On the grand strategic level, the tsarist empire’s major problem involved making sure its major continental ally, France, was not forced out of the war before Russia could bring its full strength to bear. That in turn justified taking strategic risks. The principal question was whether the attack should concentrate on Germany or Austria, and the Russian army seemed to have ample strength to pursue both options. Russia’s war plan against Germany involved sending two armies against the exposed province of East Prussia, defended by what seemed little more than a token force. The First Army, under General Pavel Rennenkampf, advanced west across the Niemen River; the Second Army, under General Alexander Samsonov, moved northwest from Russian Poland. Both initially achieved local successes against indecisive opposition. The Russian commanders, however, failed to coordinate their movements and to press their advantage. Poor logistics and intelligence further slowed the advance, particularly in the Second Army’s sector. That gave

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Golovine, N. N. (1934). The Russian Campaign of 1914, tr. A. G. S. Muntz. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: The Command and General Staff School Press. Showalter, Dennis. (1991). Tannenberg: Clash of Empires. Hamden, CT: Archon. DENNIS SHOWALTER

TARKOVSKY, ANDREI ARSENIEVICH (1932–1986), Russian film director. Tarkovsky was born in the village of Zavrazhye on the Volga river in the Ivanovo province, northeast of Moscow. His father, Arseny Alexandrovich (1907–1989), was a poet, at that time working as a translator before achieving acclaim in later years. His mother, Maria Ivanovna (Vishnyakova), had studied with Arseny at the Moscow Institute for Literature but was working as a proofreader for First State Publishing House in Moscow. Soon after the family moved to Moscow in 1935, Tarkovsky’s parents separated and later divorced. Tarkovsky remained with his mother and sister, but his father continued to play an important role in his intellectual and emotional development. Tarkovsky started school in Moscow in 1939, but after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union was

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evacuated in 1941 to relatives in the town of Yuryevets, near his birthplace. In 1951 Tarkovsky entered the Institute for Oriental Studies but soon abandoned his academic life. In 1953 he joined a geological expedition to Siberia. On returning, he enrolled the following year at the All-Union State Institute of Cinematography, where he studied under the supervision of the renowned Soviet director Mikhail Romm. Fellow students included Andrei Konchalovsky, who also later achieved international fame as a director, and Vadim Yusev, who worked as director of photography on several of Tarkovsky’s early films. In 1957 Tarkovsky married classmate Irma Rausch. In 1960 he graduated from film school with honors. For his diploma work, he wrote and directed a fifty-minute feature film called The Steamroller and the Violin, which treats several themes— childhood, innocence and loss, male friendship, and the redemptive power of art—which later become central to his work. In 1961 Tarkovsky started work on a Mosfilm commission, released the following year under the title Ivan’s Childhood. This film, which explores the relationship between a young boy and two adult soldiers experiencing the physical and psychological dislocations of war, immediately won international acclaim. Tarkovsky’s next film, Andrei Rublev, is considered by many to be his masterpiece. This long, complex account of the life of the early fifteenth-century Russian icon painter took five years to complete (1961–1966) and, because of its unconventional treatment of national history, its vivid depiction of medieval cruelties, and its central concern with the relationship between spirituality and artistic creation, encountered the hostility of the Soviet authorities, who delayed its release by another three years. During this period, Tarkovsky left his first wife and, in 1970, married the actress Larisa Pavlovna (Yegorkina), who worked in many of his later films. During the next decade, Tarkovsky directed three more films in the Soviet Union, each intellectually challenging and stylistically innovative: Solaris (1972), a profound reflection, in a sciencefiction setting, on human relationships, mortality, and the nature of existence; Mirror (1975), a kaleidoscope of autobiographical episodes exploring themes of childhood, maternal love and marriage, time, memory, and loss, which provoked official disapproval for its subjective nature but won widespread critical acclaim; and Stalker (1979), a grim allegory of the human quest for moral salvation. Tarkovsky’s next film, Nostalghia (1983) was a

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joint Soviet-Italian production. Following its completion, the director decided to remain in Western Europe. He finished his final film, Sacrifice (1986), while already suffering from lung cancer. He died in Paris at the end of the year. In the late 1980s Mikhail Gorbachev’s new cultural policy inaugurated a posthumous celebration of Tarkovsky’s work in the Soviet Union. Since 1991 his reputation, both in Russia and internationally, as one of cinema’s great artists has not diminished.

See also:

MOTION PICTURES; RUBLEV, ANDREI

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Green, Peter. (1993). Andrei Tarkovsky: The Winding Quest. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan. Johnson, Vida T., and Graham Petrie. (1994). The Films of Andrei Tarkovsky: A Visual Fugue. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Tarkovsky, Andrey. (1986). Sculpting in Time: Reflections on the Cinema. London: The Bodley Head. Turovskaya, Maya. (1989). Tarkovsky: Cinema as Poetry. London: Faber. NICK BARON

TASHKENT Tashkent is the capital city of the Republic of Uzbekistan, a country located in the region of Central Asia between the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers. The city itself is located on the Zarafshan River, just to the west of the Ferghana Valley. The history of Tashkent goes back more than 2,500 years, to a time when there was evidence of habitation in the region. The name itself means “city of stone,” perhaps indicative of the stones used in its construction. It grew to be a significant stop on the great silk road in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, yet remained in the shadows of the more important city of Samarkand, which is approximately 300 kilometers (185 miles) to the south. The city’s fall to Russian forces in 1865 signaled the beginning of Imperial Russian rule over the region. It was designated as the capital city of the Turkestan Governor-Generalship and was the Russian capital of Central Asia. Indeed, as the city grew in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, distinct districts were formed, for both indigenous peoples and for the European colonizers. Tashkent was the scene of some of the bitterest

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Boy selling musical instruments at a Tashkent market. © NEVADA WIER/CORBIS

fighting during the Russian Revolutions of 1917 and the subsequent civil war. For much of this period, Tashkent was a Red bastion, surrounded by anti-Bolshevik forces. The political importance of Tashkent continued through the Soviet period. While Samarkand was initially designated as the capital of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (UzSSR), in 1929 the honor was given to Tashkent. During World War II, numerous factories and industries were moved to Tashkent from areas within Russia and Ukraine that were threatened by invading German forces. Consequently, Tashkent became industrialized from the 1940s onward, giving the city a strong economic importance to Central Asia and the Soviet Union as a whole. In 1966 Tashkent experienced a devastating earthquake that left significant portions of the city in ruins. The Soviet government made the city’s reconstruction a national effort, and citizens from all parts of the country moved to Tashkent to help in the rebuilding, with a number staying afterward.

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As a result, the population of the city quickly exceeded one million, and by the late 1980s was more than 2.5 million. As of 2002 the official population of the city was 2.6 million residents, although some estimates are closer to 3.0-3.5 million, or 12–14 percent of Uzbekistan’s total population. While Samarkand and Bukhara make claims to be the cultural centers of Uzbekistan, Tashkent remains the political and economic power of the country. Moreover, it is a major transportation and trade hub for Central Asia.

See also: CENTRAL ASIA; ISLAM; UZBEKISTAN AND UZBEKS BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allworth, Edward, ed. (1994). Central Asia: 130 Years of Russia Dominance, A Historical Overview. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Bennigsen, Alexandre, and Wimbush, S. Enders. (1985). Muslims of the Soviet Empire: A Guide. London: C. Hurst and Company. Bulatov, M. (1979). Tashkent. New York: Smithmark Publishing.

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MacLeod, Calum, and Mayhew, Bradley. (1999). Uzbekistan: The Golden Road to Samarkand. London: Odyssey. Sahadeo, Jeff. (2000). “Creating a Russian Colonial Community: City, Nation, Empire in Tashkent, 1865–1923.” Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign. ROGER KANGAS

T A T A R S

bulletins to Soviet leaders during the late 1920s and most likely for most of Soviet history.

See also:

JOURNALISM; SOVNARKOM

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hopkins, Mark W. (1970). Mass Media in the Soviet Union. New York: Pegasus Publishing. Mueller, Julie Kay. (1992). “A New Kind of Newspaper: The Origins and Development of a Soviet Institution, 1921–1928.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of California-Berkeley.

TASS TASS, the Telegraph Agency of the USSR, was founded in July 1925 with the goal of centralizing control over the distribution of foreign news in the Soviet Union under the oversight of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the Soviet of Peoples’ Commissars (Sovnarkom). Until the collapse of the USSR, TASS remained the single most important supplier of foreign news to the Soviet mass media, a major producer of domestic news, and a key instrument for conveying information and propaganda from the Soviet government to foreign governments and populations. After 1991 TASS became ITAR-TASS (Information Telegraph Agency of Russia), the central information distributor for the Russian Federation. TASS’s predecessor, the Russian Telegraph Agency, or ROSTA, was founded by the Bolsheviks in September 1918 and charged with an array of functions including provision of news reports to the Soviet press, instruction of journalists in training, and supervision of provincial newspapers. ROSTA staff and financial resources were clearly not adequate to these huge tasks and, in fact, the provincial press was run by local initiatives during the civil war. In the winter of 1921 to 1922 the newly created Press Section of the Party Central Committee’s Agitprop Department took over supervision of the provincial press and ROSTA was restricted to wire service functions. TASS never had a monopoly on the collection and distribution of either foreign or domestic news. Until the late 1920s RATAU, the Ukrainian Republic’s official wire service, maintained correspondents abroad and engaged in a series of turf wars with ROSTA/TASS over distribution of foreign news in Ukraine. Major newspapers such as Pravda, Izvestia, and Trud (the central labor union newspaper) generally posted several correspondents abroad. In addition to its public news distribution functions, TASS supplied “Not for Press” information

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TATARSTAN AND TATARS Tatarstan is a constituent republic of the Russian Federation, located at the confluence of the Volga and Kama rivers, with its capital at Kazan. Originally formed as the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1920, it was renamed the Republic of Tatarstan in 1990. Tatars, sometimes referred to as the Volga Tatars or Kazan Tatars, form the indigenous population of Tatarstan. They form the second largest nationality in Russia (5.5 million in 1989) and one of the largest in the former Soviet Union. As of 1989, about one quarter of Tatars lived in Tatarstan (1.8 million), with large communities in Bashkortostan (1.1 million) and other republics and provinces of the Volga-Ural region and Siberia. Additionally, about one million Tatars lived in other republics of the former Soviet Union, primarily in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and elsewhere in Central Asia. The Tatar language belongs to the Kipchak branch of the Turkic language family and has several dialects. Most Tatars are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi legal school, with smaller numbers of Kriashen, or Christianized Tatars. Finno-Ugric tribes, the earliest known inhabitants of Tatarstan, were joined by Turkic-speaking settlers after the third century C.E. Most important were the Volga Bulgars, who arrived in the seventh century and by the 900s had established a state that soon dominated the entire Middle Volga. Bulgar economic life combined agriculture, pastoralism, and commerce, making the Bulgar state one of the most important trading partners of Kievan Rus. The Volga Bulgars officially adopted Islam in 922 during the visit of Ibn Fadlan, an emis-

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In the 1440s, as the Golden Horde disintegrated, a separate khanate emerged at Kazan, in what some scholars see as a restoration of Bulgar statehood. In 1552 the Kazan Khanate was conquered and destroyed by Muscovy, marking the first Russian incorporation of large Muslim populations into their expanding empire. Under Russian rule, intense Christianization campaigns alternated with periods of greater toleration. In the late eighteenth century, Catherine II granted the Tatars the right to trade with the Muslims of Central Asia and allowed them to form a spiritual board at Ufa to regulate the religious affairs of Muslims in European Russia. With their superior knowledge of Turkic language and customs, Tatar merchants quickly established a virtual monopoly over trade between Russia and Central Asia. This contributed to the formation of Tatar commercial and industrial classes, urbanization, formation of a small industrial working class, and emergence of a secular national intelligentsia. These factors made the Tatars, like the Azerbaijans in the Caucasus, one of the most economically integrated Muslim groups in the empire.

Tatars of Kazan. © JAMIE ABECASIS/SUPERSTOCK

sary of the Caliph. In 1236 their capital at Great Bulgar was captured and destroyed during the Mongol invasion, and Bulgars subsequently became a subject people of the Mongol empire and the Golden Horde. Russians and Europeans often referred to these invaders as Tatars, a term that originated with a Turkic tribe in the Mongol army but by the nineteenth and early twentieth century was applied by Russians to several different Turkic Muslim groups, including ancestors of today’s Kazan or Volga Tatars, Crimean Tatars, and Azerbaijans. The implication that these peoples are descended from the Mongol invaders was long commonplace. While scholars agree that Mongols and their allied tribes may have played some part in the formation of today’s Tatar people, most also assert that contemporary Tatars owe a much larger debt both genetically and culturally to the Volga Bulgars, with an admixture of local Finno-Ugric peoples and several Turkic tribes that migrated to the region over ensuing centuries.

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The nineteenth century saw important intellectual and cultural changes, most importantly the Jadid movement to reform Islamic education by introducing the secular subjects taught in Russian schools, and the emergence of Western forms of culture such as novels, plays, theater, and newspapers. The development of national identity and cultural nationalism proceeded as well with the creation of a standard Tatar literary language. However, the broader questions of national language and the parameters of the nation remained controversial. Intellectuals who imagined all or most Turkic-speakers as belonging to a single nation of Turks quarreled with those who defined a narrower Tatar nationality, while others emphasized the larger Islamic community. Nevertheless, as Russia drifted toward revolution in the early twentieth century, most members of the educated elite shared a belief that their community formed the natural leadership of Russia’s Muslim Turkic population. Tatars were divided by the same social and political conflicts as Russians during the revolutionary period. The question of national autonomy was intertwined with these conflicts, with a serious division emerging in 1917 between supporters of extraterritorial cultural autonomy and those favoring the autonomy of a large territorial Idel-Ural (Volga-Ural) state within a Russian federation. Local Bolsheviks and Left SRs (Socialist Revolutionaries), both Russian and Tatar, secured Soviet power

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Engraving of a Tatar family in their home. © JAIME ABECASIS/SUPERSTOCK

through Moscow’s proclamation of a Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic in March 1918 and suppression of anti-Bolshevik Tatar factions. Throughout the civil war, Tatar leftists such as Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev supported Soviet power in part because of its positive attitude toward ethnic federalism, though many other prominent Tatar leaders, such as the writer Ayaz Iskhakov, sympathized with the Whites. Moscow’s decision to create a Bashkir republic in 1919 lead to abrogation of the TatarBashkir republic and promulgation of a separate Tatar republic in 1920. Tatarstan experienced all the economic trials of the Soviet period, including famine in 1921 and 1922 and the collectivization of agriculture, but also notable industrial development with the emergence of an oil industry since the 1940s, construction of the immense Kama automobile factory (KAMAZ) in Naberezhnye Chelny (1970s), and significant urban growth. Cultural policies were similarly inconsistent: The Tatar language was shifted from the Arabic alphabet to the Latin in the 1920s

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but then Cyrillicized in 1938; and elements of Tatar history and culture that were celebrated in the 1920s were vilified under Stalin’s rule, only to be carefully rehabilitated in Tatar journals in the 1960s and 1970s. During the Gorbachev years, new Tatar political organizations raised concerns about the survival and perpetuation of Tatar national culture, both within Tatarstan and in the extensive Tatar diaspora, where assimilation was more common. The governing circles of Tatarstan responded by declaring the republic’s sovereignty and unilaterally raising its status to union republic (1990), writing a new authoritative constitution (1992), and signing a treaty (1994) and other agreements with the Russian federal government that delineated division of powers, responsibilities, and resources in a form widely studied as the Tatarstan model. There was relatively little interethnic violence in the republic, in part because Russian residents (43.3% of the population in 1989, compared to 48.5% Tatar) benefited from many of these steps as well.

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One continuing political problem in the 1990s was concern over the status of Tatars living in neighboring Bashkortostan.

See also:

CENTRAL ASIA; ISLAM; KAZAN; NATIONALITIES

POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bennigsen, Alexandre, and Lemercier-Quelquejay, Chantal. (1967). Islam in the Soviet Union. New York: Praeger. Broxup, Marie Bennigsen. (1996). “Tatarstan and the Tatars.” In The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States, 2nd ed., ed. Graham Smith. London: Longman. Bukharaev, Ravil. (1999). The Model of Tatarstan: Under President Mintimer Shaimiev. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Prior to the establishment of the Russian Empire, most taxation came from the revenues of the tsar’s estates. As a major serf owner, he collected rent from them. Following the reduction of the independent boyar class, the Russian state demanded service from pomeschiki, nobles and gentry, in exchange for their property in land and serfs. The state also monopolized the export of certain commodities, such as grain, farmed out the sale of alcohol, and minted silver and copper coins. Where deficits persisted, the Muscovite princes simply defaulted on state obligation. Quantitative estimates are, however, nearly unavailable until the eighteenth century, when some quantitative studies of the state budgets were written, most notably those by Paul N. Milyukov and S. M. Troitsky.

DANIEL E. SCHAFER

The main taxes in the 1700s were the fixed poll (soul) tax, excise taxes on alcohol and salt, revenues from the export monopoly of certain commodities, tax on iron and copper, customs tariffs, and mint revenues. During emergencies these were supplemented by special taxes (such as on beards of religious dissenters), debasement of the coinage, or printing paper money (assignats). The last two, which caused an inflation tax on holders of cash, occurred mostly during the frequent wars of those times. All peasants paid the poll tax according to population estimates, except during periods of natural hardship or on the accession of a new ruler, when rates were temporarily reduced. Throughout the century the government increased the rate of indirect taxes on alcohol, as well as demanding customs duties in hard currency. On the other hand, burdens on miners and iron-masters appeared to slacken in the post-Petrine period.

Taxation of the population is the basic way governments raise the revenue necessary to carry out their functions, including administration of justice, defense, and construction of infrastructure, such as canals, roads, and public buildings. When taxes are inadequate, as they often were in Russia, they were supplemented by domestic and foreign borrowing (possible after the 1770s), confiscations, or disposal of state property. The various modes and objects of taxation also clearly demonstrate the level of economic development of Russia through the centuries, as well as the shifting class basis of state power.

To collect net fiscal revenue the Russian state employed either tax farmers, agents who paid for the privilege of collecting levies, or direct distribution of salt and alcohol. For these monopolized commodities the tax was simply the difference between the retail price and the cost of production. In 1754 the state granted gentry and members of the aristocracy its former monopoly in the sale of alcohol, from which incomes increased steadily, unlike those on salt, a prime necessity. The salt tax was actually abolished in 1881. Despite these measures, tax payments were frequently in arrears (nedoimki), particularly during wars or famine. Peasants would try to avoid taxes by emigrating to the frontier areas of Siberia and the southern steppes, but the system of joint responsibility meant that fellow villagers would try to prevent their leaving. Little seemed to change in the tsarist

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Bukharaev, Ravil. (2000). Islam in Russia: The Four Seasons. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Frank, Allen J. (1998). Islamic Historiography and “Bulghar” Identity Among the Tatars and Bashkirs of Russia. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill. Rorlich, Azade-Ayse. (1994). “One or More Tatar Nations?” In Muslim Communities Reemerge: Historical Perspectives on Nationality, Politics, and Opposition in the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, ed. Edward Allworth. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Rorlich, Azade-Ayse. (1986). The Volga Tatars: A Profile in National Resilience. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. Zenkovsky, Serge A. (1960). Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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regime during the more than half a century from Catherine’s rule to the Crimean War and the subsequent Emancipation. Exemptions from taxation and a stagnant industrial economy meant that tax revenues did not increase much. Transcaucasia began to supply customs revenues from the 1830s, but the new areas of the southern fringe were expensive to conquer and hold. Fiscal inadequacy became painfully clear when Russia’s poorly supplied troops were defeated at Sevastopol by English, French, and Turkish forces. That the Russian roads and river routes were so obviously inadequate for mobilization led to great interest in expensive and extensive railroad projects, requiring both more money and new industries. The late nineteenth century was a period of rapidly rising governmental outlays, doubling between 1861 and 1890, and again between 1901 and 1905. Railroad building in this vast country accelerated, primarily for military purposes; debt service, health, and education also increased their share in state expenses, though the latter two were still small by international standards. To meet these expenditures, the government was able to increase indirect tax revenues, chiefly on vodka, but also by its monopoly on the sale of sugar, tobacco, kerosene, and matches. As was understood, reduced peasant net incomes meant more grain for export. Royalties and transportation tariffs on coal and iron also increased. Customs duties rose significantly, both as a result of higher rates and larger import volumes. Tax policy protected industry at the expense of agriculture, as direct taxes on company profits and capital plus redemption payments hardly increased at all between 1890 and 1910. Despite some discussion of this possibility before World War I, most individual incomes were not taxed, but apartment rents and salaries of civil servants and joint-stock company employees were. This pattern points to the strongly regressive nature of tsarist taxation. According to estimates by Albert L. Vainstein, the tax burden on peasants averaged 11 percent of their total income in 1913, but probably more than one-quarter of their cash receipts. Following the October Revolution, the Bolshevik government depended on confiscations and fiat money, but this chaotic strategy of covering expenditures soon led to peasant uprisings, and the government had to switch to a tax in kind (prodnalog)—replaced by cash in 1924—on the peasantry. After meeting their obligations, rural agriculturists could sell their surpluses on the local market. How-

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Table 1. 1940

1965

1984

Total Revenue (billion rubles) Turnover tax

18.0 59%

102.3 38%

376.7 27

Payments from profits Cooperatives’ taxes

12 2

30 1

31 1

5 5

<1 8

<1 8

5 12

5 17

7 27

Mass bond sales Direct taxes Social insurance contributions “Other”

SOURCE: Narodnoe Khoziaistvo (National Economy), 1973, 1978,

and 1984. Courtesy of the author.

ever, government efforts to keep the procurement price for grain low increased the actual surplus taken. Moreover, the nepmen had to pay a temporary tax on super-profits starting in 1926. During the Stalinist period the government greatly increased the burden of taxation to an estimated 50 percent of household income. As shown, the principal mode of taxation was on the nationalized manufacturing and mining sectors, plus heavy exactions in kind from the collective and state farms. The Finance Ministry also conducted compulsory bond sales, but these were phased out during the 1950s. In more recent Soviet times the regime imposed a mild income tax on employees, with a top rate of 13 percent above a certain exempt amount. But authors, physicians in private practice, tutors, landlords, craftsmen and like independents would pay at treble these rates or up to a marginal rate of 81 percent. Bachelors (and small families until 1958) paid a 6 percent surtax, but military personnel, students, and dwarfs were exempt. There was also a fairly stiff tax (from 12 to 48% by 1951) on money and imputed incomes from private plots in addition to a small tax on kolkhoz net income. This was in addition to forced deliveries at lower than market prices. Soviet authorities strongly preferred indirect taxes over those imposed directly on persons. Apparently they believed workers would be more sensitive to their wages and wage differentials than to the prices they paid—money illusion. However, after 1947 they also endeavored to reduce official prices on goods of mass consumption. While the turnover tax remained the single largest source of revenue until the 1960s, the type

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A female entrepreneur watches as a Moscow tax-police inspector confiscates goods from her unlicensed shop. PHOTOGRAPH ALEXANDER SALYUKOV/ASSOCIATED PRESS. REPRODUCED

of tax which increased the most during later Soviet times was that on profits. In 1950 the turnover tax accounted for 56 percent of the total, while deductions from profits provided only about 10 percent. By 1970, however, turnover tax declined to 32 percent, while deductions from profits rose to 35 percent of the consolidated USSR budget. However, the distinction between these two taxes is not sharp: both are enterprise taxes unrelated to the ability of citizens to pay. To these taxes on profits, which after all belong to the state as owner, might be added retained profits devoted to state-mandated investments. After 1965 the regime added a small charge on net capital and broader rental payments in addition to remittances of the free remainder of profits. The miscellaneous category included large and rising profits from foreign trade—for example, on imported grain or exported oil—a stamp duty on legal documents, an inheritance tax, a local property tax, and a tax on automobiles, boats, and horses. All this added up to a considerable burden of tax-

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BY PERMISSION.

ation—approximately 45 percent of Soviet national income in the postwar period, about half again as much as in the United States and among the top tax-collection rates on the European continent. Nevertheless, except in oil boom years, the budget usually concealed a 2 to 8 percent deficit, financed by monetary emissions and resulting in inflation during the 1980s especially. Some of the revenues mentioned above are retained by local or republican governments for their own expenditures. This was particularly high in the less developed regions of Central Asia, as part of the regional subsidy characteristic of Soviet welfare colonialism, as it has been called.

See also:

ALCOHOL MONOPOLY; BEARD TAX; TAX,

TURNOVER

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Gregory, Paul, and Stuart, Robert. (1998). Russian and Soviet Economic Performance and Structure, 6th ed. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

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Holzman, Franklyn D. (1955). Soviet Taxation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Kahan, Arcadius. (1985). The Plow, the Hammer, and the Knout. An Economic History of Eighteenth-Century Russia. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. MARTIN C. SPECHLER

TAX, TURNOVER Turnover tax (nalog s oborota) was a tax on enterprise gross output, the main source of government revenue during the first several decades of Soviet planned economy, officially considered part of the surplus product in Marxist terms. It was introduced in 1930 for the purpose of unifying previously diverse taxes. The difference between the final retail price for consumer goods (and most fuels) and the industry’s wholesale price, as set by the Soviet pricing authorities, less any handling charges, is the turnover tax. (Before 1949 this tax was also applied to producer goods for reasons of fiscal control.) Sometimes this levy was imposed as a unit tax, as a percentage of the sale price, or in other ways. Regardless of the method of collection, the turnover tax rate is thus the difference divided by the wholesale (or retail) selling price. These rates differed widely. In the case of agricultural products, the turnover tax comes from the difference between the procurement price and that at which the produce is resold by state organs. On salt and vodka, the turnover tax resembled an excise tax. In 1975 about one-third of the entire revenue from turnover taxes came from wines and spirits, hence any effort to reduce drinking, to the extent they were successful, posed a fiscal dilemma, as the Mikhail Gorbachev campaign discovered. The turnover tax was administratively simple. Collecting the tax was easier from the relatively small number of industrial enterprises and wholesale organizations, most of which had decent accounts. Income taxes would have had to be collected from millions of citizens, many of whom were still illiterate or at least innumerate. The variable markup allowed retail prices to be changed when inventories warranted, without altering the industry wholesale price on which planning indices depended. For example, turnover taxes on food were lowered several times during the 1950s to allow the state to pay higher procurement prices without affecting politically sensitive retail prices. A

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similar situation applied to fuels for household consumption. From 1954 until the late 1960s, official retail prices were held approximately constant, quite probably to save administrative effort. It also permitted certain prices to be disproportionately low, such as those on children’s clothing and approved reading material. As compared to other sources of revenue, the turnover tax was quite large in the 1930s, but fell in relation to taxes on profits and incomes during the 1950s.

See also:

TAXES

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bergson, Abram. (1964). The Economics of Soviet Planning. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Holzman, Franklyn. (1974). “Financing Soviet Economic Development.” In William L. Blackwell, ed., Russian Economic Development from Peter the Great to Stalin. New York: New Viewpoints. Nove, Alec. (1986). The Soviet Economic System, 3rd ed. Boston: Allen & Unwin. MARTIN C. SPECHLER

TBILISI See

TIFLIS.

TCHAIKOVSKY, PETER ILYICH (1840–1893), Russian composer. Arguably the most famous Russian composer, Tchaikovsky was the first to achieve renown beyond Russia’s borders and establish a place for Russian music in the repertories of Western concert halls and musical theaters. The first professional Russian composer to receive a thorough musical education, the import of Tchaikovsky’s achievement owes much to his mastery of the dominant nineteenth-century musical genre: the symphony. Yet Tchaikovsky’s enormous range, versatility, and output—he composed in all the major genres, including symphonies, operas, ballets, chamber works, songs, as well as compositions for solo instruments—assure the composer’s place among the most popular and prolific European composers of his day. Tchaikovsky’s virtual dominance of the Russian musical scene by the end of his life aroused

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the envy of the nationalist composers known as the Mighty Handful, yet Tchaikovsky’s ability to adapt native folk material to established Western compositional structures proved more successful than their more earnest attempts to craft from those materials a unique native musical language. Four Tchaikovsky masterworks, representing three genres in which Tchaikovsky particularly excelled, were the fruits of an unprecedented final creative flourish: the opera Queen of Spades (1891), the ballets Sleeping Beauty (1889), The Nutcracker (1892), and the Sixth Symphony (1893). Although Tchaikovsky’s music was deemed bourgeois in the relatively radical period following the 1917 Revolution, these criticisms faded in the Josef Stalin era, when the monumental art of the previous century once again found favor, and Tchaikovsky was hailed as a symphonist par excellence—the composer’s homosexuality, the perceived melancholy of his music, and his conservative politics notwithstanding. Tchaikovsky died of cholera in St. Petersburg in 1893, though a very active party of mostly Russian researchers allege the composer’s death was the result of a suicide brought about by a crisis over his homosexuality.

See also:

MUSIC

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brown, David. (1978–1992). Tchaikovsky: A Biographical and Critical Study. London: Gollancz. Orlova, A., ed. (1990). Tchaikovsky: A Self-Portrait. New York: Oxford University Press. Poznansky, Alexander. (1991). Tchaikovsky: The Quest for the Inner Man. New York: Simon and Schuster Macmillan. Poznansky, Alexander, and Brett Langston. (2002). The Tchaikovsky Handbook: A Guide to the Man and His Music, comp. Alexander Poznansky and Brett Langston. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

prehensive document, the techpromfinplan (technical-industrial-financial plan), which they were required by law to fulfill. Divided into quarterly and monthly subplans, the techpromfinplan governed the operation of the firm by specifying output targets and input allocations, as well as a large number of financial characteristics, delivery schedules, capacity utilization norms, labor staffing instructions, planned increases in labor productivity, and other targets. In total, as many as one hundred targets were specified in the techpromfinplan, the most important of which involved output targets. Fulfilling output targets, measured either in quantity or value, formed the basis for calculating bonus payments for managers and workers. In a very broad sense, the techpromfinplan was the means by which Soviet planners’ preferences were implemented. Social and economic goals set at the highest level of the political bureaucracy and conveyed to Gosplan, the State Planning Committee, were disaggregated by sector, region, and industry, and sent to individual firms. More narrowly, the techpromfinplan specified the scope of the firm’s operations for the year. The production component of the annual enterprise plan identified the quantity, ruble value (valovaia produktsia), and commodity assortment of output to be produced. Input allocations, supply schedules, capacity and resource utilization norms, as well as other technical indicators, were devised to support the firm’s ability to fulfill the production targets. Current production targets were typically based on a percentage increase in the firm’s past performance, adjusted for quality-improvement targets. The process of planning from the achieved level meant that Soviet enterprises were subject to a “ratchet effect” in terms of quantity targets.

In the final stage of the annual central planning process, Soviet enterprises received each year a com-

The financial component of the enterprise plan consisted of profitability norms, planned cost reductions, credit plans for purchasing inputs, a wage bill, and other financial indicators. The comprehensive nature of the financial plan paralleled the production plan, allowing planners to monitor the firm’s monthly and quarterly output performance. Moreover, through the financial plan, ministerial officials exercised ruble control (kontrol’ rublem) over the enterprise by restricting access to financial resources, as well as by redistributing profits. Unlike managers of firms in market economies, however, whose performance is measured in terms of financial indicators, Soviet man-

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Taruskin, Richard. (1997). Defining Russia Musically: Historical and Hermeneutical Essays. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. TIM SCHOLL

TECHPROMFINPLAN

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agers placed highest priority on fulfilling the production plan targets. In addition to production, financial, and distribution components, the techpromfinplan also specified a variety of labor staffing targets, including the distribution of labor force by wage classifications, the total amount of wages that the firm could pay, average wages by occupational category, and planned increases in labor productivity, but left the manager with some discretion over staffing issues within these constraints. Legally obligated to fulfill the techpromfinplan and motivated by large monetary bonuses paid for fulfilling output targets, Soviet enterprise managers nonetheless exhibited a significant degree of flexibility in both the production and distribution activities of the firm.

P L A N N I N G

of relief for the Red Army was a major victory. Considerable discussion of the question of Poland’s postwar boundaries produced no definitive solution, though there was a consensus that Poland’s eastern boundary would be the Curzon line and that Poland would be compensated in the West with territories to be taken from Germany. Stalin successfully pressed for confirmation of Soviet gains as a result of the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of 1939. In turn Stalin agreed to engage Japanese forces in the Pacific theater after the defeat of Germany. There was also agreement to cooperate in a postwar United Nations organization to maintain peace. In a separate protocol the Big Three agreed to maintain the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Iran.

See also:

NAZI-SOVIET PACT OF 1939; POTSDAM CONFER-

ENCE; WORLD WAR II; YALTA CONFERENCE

See also:

CENTRAL PLANNING; PLANNERS PREFERENCES BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Dyker, David. (1984). The Future of the Soviet Economic Planning System. Beckenham-Kent: Croom Helm. Kushnirsky, Fyodor. (1982). Soviet Economic Planning, 1965–1980. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Zaleski, Eugene. (1980). Stalinist Planning for Economic Growth. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Mayle, Paul D. (1987). Eureka Summit: Agreement in Principle and the Big Three at Teheran, 1943. Newark: University of Delaware Press. Sainsbury, Keith. (1985). The Turning Point: Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill, and Chiang-Kai-Shek: the Moscow, Cairo and Teheran Conferences. Oxford: Oxford University Press. JOSEPH L. NOGEE

SUSAN J. LINZ

TELEOLOGICAL PLANNING TEHERAN CONFERENCE The Teheran Conference was the first summit meeting between U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet Premier Josef Stalin. It met from November 28 through December l, 1943, in Teheran, Iran. The general purpose of the conference was to strengthen the cooperation between the Big Three allies in the conduct of the Second World War and to determine the outlines of a postwar global order. Though the Western allies—particularly Roosevelt—sought to conciliate the Soviet dictator, the conference was marked by underlying tension over differences among the allied leaders. The major agreement reached was the decision to launch the long-awaited invasion of Europe (Operation Overlord) as a cross-channel invasion of France in May 1944 (later changed to June). For Stalin, this promise

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The concept of teleological planning refers to national economic planning that is directive in character (planners determine plan directives), as opposed to genetical planning, indicative in character, in which plan targets are influenced by market (demand) forces. The discussion of alternative approaches to national economic planning was an important component of the early development of planning in the Soviet Union. The teleological school was represented by major economists such as S. Strumilin, G. L. Pytatakov, V. V. Kuibyshev, and P. A. Fel’dman, while the geneticists were represented by N. D. Kondratiev, V. A. Bazarov, and V. G. Groman, all well-known economists. The debate ended with Stalin’s adoption of the teleological approach. The distinction between the two different approaches remains important. The teleological concept

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implies that planners’ preferences prevail; that is, planners determine the objective function of the economy (e.g., the mix of output by sector or product) with consumer preferences being passive. The genetical approach, on the other hand, has important implications for planning in a pluralistic political setting, in that consumer preferences can prevail and serve as the basis for plan directives. The geneticist view is effectively the foundation for the contemporary development of indicative planning.

See also:

CENTRAL PLANNING; ECONOMIC GROWTH, SO-

VIET

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Carr, Edward Hallett, and Davies, R. W. (1969). Foundations of a Planned Economy, 1926–1929, vols. 1–2. London: Macmillan. Gregory, Paul R., and Stuart, Robert C. (2001). Russian and Soviet Economic Structure and Performance. 7th ed. New York: Addison Wesley Longman. Spulber, Nicolas. (1964). Soviet Strategy for Economic Growth. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. ROBERT C. STUART

over the media, mainly due to Russia’s matter-offact accession to international politics, and liberal values. In 2002 the Ministry of Press, Broadcasting, and Mass Communications (MPTR) registered 3,267 television channels and 2,378 radio stations, more than half wholly or partly state owned. Almost every Russian household owns at least one television set, whereas a radio can be found in four out of five households. Many listeners still rely on the old wire radio through which state-run Radio Mayak and Radio Rossiya have been broadcasting their programs. The fact that no fees need to be paid for broadcast reception contributes to a high penetration of the population and dominance over the print sector. Less than a quarter of Russians read newspapers on a daily basis, and almost half of those age thirty and younger do not read newsprint at all. State-owned national TV Channel One (ORT) and Television Rossiya (RTR) reach practically all viewers, and together with private channel NTV achieve 60 percent viewer ratings. The radio audience ratings are dominated by Radio Mayak, Radio Rossiya, and private Radio Europe Plus, Russkoye Radio, and Echo Moskvy.

SOVIET EXPLOITATION OF MEDIA POTENTIALS

TELEVISION AND RADIO Present-day Russian television and radio have come a long way. Today’s domestic news and entertainment broadcasts can hardly be told from their Western counterparts. The successors of Soviet television and radio are characterized by a state-of-theart style of presentation, modern advertising, and professional journalism. The Russian mass media have undergone a series of profound transformations, notably since the end of the Soviet era, but they continue to be under the influence of powerful interest groups. Journalism, especially news coverage, is subject to various restrictions. There is a wide gap between the official policy, its provision for the freedom of the media, and the actual situation. The regulation of television and radio in the Russian Federation has shown indications reminiscent of the centralized media control during the Soviet regime. But economic influences and the opinion-leading value of television both create a competitive environment considered irrevocable and therefore immune to attempts to reinstate a Soviet-like authoritarian rule

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The media’s assignment life was plotted by mass communication experts from the Politburo and pursued with measures like enforced subscriptions to print media and various obstructions to diversity of broadcast programs. From the 1920s on, wire radio receivers were installed in almost every household, whereas small and remote villages received collective loudspeakers. Because they could not be switched off, only muted, these primitive mass information instruments already bore the sign of inescapability, which transcended into the 1980s. Soviet wireless radio started its career with its first transmission in 1924 and quickly developed into a public voice of the party. In the early Soviet days, broadcasting owned its significance to widespread illiteracy. Not only could radio and later television reach large masses of people without them being able to read, broadcasting influenced how information was perceived and accepted by the audience. Television’s potential, though being experimentally tested since the 1930s, was not acknowledged until decades later. In 1960 the Central Committee commanded broadcasting to actively support the propagation

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TV6 anchors Andrei Norkin (right) and Vladimir Kara-Murza (left) speak to the media on January 11, 2002, after judges ordered the closure of the last independent channel on Russian national television. PHOTOGRAPH BY IVAN SEKRETKAREV/ASSOCIATED PRESS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

of Marxist-Leninist ideas, and the mobilization of the working class. Major investments in technical infrastructure followed and by the end of the decade Moscow neighborhood Ostankino became home to the national broadcasting organization. It provided the Soviet population with two television and four radio programs. Later accessibility was enhanced, and further television programs were added. Until the late 1980s the Soviet Union boasted a uniform information sphere designed to reach most of its 285 million inhabitants. Television was broadcast in forty-five union languages, and radio in seventy-one. The programs were centrally produced in Moscow and transmitted to the far reaches of the Soviet world. They incessantly stressed the political meaning of each news item. As there was no other medium of information, and no access to foreign news sources, the audience was inescapably exposed to propaganda through mass media.

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BROADCAST PROGRAMMING AND AUTONOMY

In Soviet times the majority of television and radio programming was dedicated to broadcasts of party sessions and statements by government officials. Next in importance was news from the economic sector. Educational and cultural programs followed. The only television news show, Vremya, contained coverage of international events. All programming was subject to austere censorship and depended on one sole information source, the government. The fact that people’s values and their image of the world were given a one-sided direction through mass indoctrination enhanced the impact of the new freedom the media experienced when Soviet society started to unravel. From 1986 to 1993 the media won a hitherto unknown autonomy owing to their role in the per-

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estroika reforms, and the dissolution of political structures that rigidly controlled mass communication. While Mikhail Gorbachev encouraged the investigation and discussion of state problems, new leaders fought against old bureaucrats and economic obstructions; first the press, then television and radio, gained momentum. The Russian society broke into a fragmented mass of people hungry for Western achievements and individual liberties, and the media made use of the vacuum created by the loss of a uniform ideology and morals. Most did not aim to serve democratic ideals but looked for financial profits. Not many of the exceptions to this rule have survived the struggles. Independent broadcasters, NTV Television, and TV6, formerly controlled by oligarchs, were recently restrained by court orders referring to their financial situation. Radio Echo Moskvy, founded in August 1991, has retained its independence, although still harrassed by occasional interferences by the authorities.

PROBLEMS OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL

Privatizations of media outlets during the first years of the newly founded Russian Federation created opportunities not only for the staffs of media organizations. State-controlled plants and the new business elite soon profited from the hardships imposed on the media by repeated financial crises. Even in the early twenty-first century, most television and radio stations were dependent either on state subventions or on financing by oligarchs. Their influence relates to formalities such as licensing and provision of technical equipment, as well as to media content. Reporting often reflects only two positions, that of the government and the ruling businessmen. The media may convey oppositional messages, but not on behalf of society. This is even more pronounced in the vast regions of the Russian Federation, where local governors and plant owners exercise arbitrary power over the struggling local media industry.

Chernomyrdin, Deputy Prime Ministers Anatoly Chubais and Boris Nemtsov, and Moscow’s mayor Yuri Luzhkov. After President Vladimir Putin’s concerted actions to reinstate central power over opinion-leading mass media, private competitors retreated to the print sector and own minor stakes in broadcasting. Nevertheless, the ownership structures in the media industry have been characteristically intransparent. It remains difficult to discern the origin of financial and ruling power over a great number of media outlets. In Soviet times the usurpation of the right to intervene in daily media business was based on the well-oiled censorship apparatus. Journalists had to be party members and follow guiding principles that adhered to government interests. Russian journalism bears some of these traits into the twentyfirst century. On the one hand, many of the Soviet journalists have remained in their profession. On the other hand, many journalists are young, have put the historical past behind them, and aspire to meet modern professional standards. They, too, have to make amends to the kind of censorship imposed on them by the special interests of the owners of the media organization. The positive coverage of state or oligarch activities, or the rumor-based reporting on competitors’ faults, are also often ordered and paid for, not selected by journalistic processes.

MODERN MEDIA POLICIES

Until 1990 there were no specific laws concerning the mass media. More than thirty laws and dozens of decrees have been passed since then. Under the Soviet regime, two constitutions (1936 and 1977) alluded to the freedom of expression, which had to be in accordance with interests to develop the socialist system. Such ideological baggage was discarded by the constitution of the Russian Federation adopted in 1993, and the Supreme Soviet had in 1990 already passed a law to lift censorship from the media.

This competition has led to media wars between businessmen like Boris Berezovsky, Vladimir Gusinsky, and Vladimir Potanin, who during President Boris Yeltsin’s quest for voting consensus acquired liberties through behind-the-scenes arrangements. In Yeltsin’s 1996 campaign, television was recognized as effective to influence voters. Other major players who contributed to the broadcasting media being used as instruments of power were at times Prime Minister Viktor

In 1991 the Russian Federation adopted the Law on Media of Mass Information, which allowed for fundamental freedoms of the media. It was revised in 1995 and significantly limited the media’s choice of diversity for the portrayal of political parties. Such undemocratic hindrances, along with the lack of a law conceding to the specific needs of broadcasting media, continue to the present day. Other laws are On Procedure of Media Coverage of State

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Authorities by State Media (1994); On the Defense of Morality in Television and Radio Broadcasting (1999); On Licensing of Certain Activities (2001); and the Doctrine of the Information Security of the Russian Federation (2000), which links media autonomy with national security.

See also:

R E G U L A T I O N S

Nerone, John C., and McChesney, Robert Waterman eds. (1995). Last Rights: Revisiting Four Theories of the Press. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. LUCIE HRIBAL

PERESTROIKA

TEMPORARY REGULATIONS BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aumente, Jerome, et al., eds. (1999). Eastern European Journalism: Before, during, and after Communism. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press. Belin, Laura. (1997). “Politicization and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media.” . Casmir, Fred L., ed. (1995). Communication in Eastern Europe: The Role of History, Culture, and Media in Contemporary Conflicts. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. De Smaele, Hedwig. (1999). “The Applicability of Western Media Models on the Russian Media System.” European Journal of Communication 14:173-89. Dewhirst, Martin (2002). “Censorship in Russia, 1991 and 2001.” The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 18(1):21-34. European Audiovisual Observatory. (2003). “Television in the Russian Federation: Organisational Structure, Programme Production and Audience.” . Jakubowicz, Karol. (1999). “The Genie Is Out of the Bottle. Measuring Media Change in Central and Eastern Europe.” Media Studies Journal 13(3):52–59. Krasnoboka, Natalya. (2003). “The Russian Media Landscape.” European Journalism Centre. . McCormack, Gillian, ed. (1999). Media in the CIS—A Study of the Political, Legislative and Socio-Economic Framework, 2nd ed. Düsseldorf: The European Institute for the Media. McNair, Brian. (1991). Glasnost, Perestroika, and the Soviet Media. London: Routledge. Michel, Lutz P., and Jankovski, Jaromir. (2000). “Russia.” In Radio and Television Systems in Europe, ed. European Audiovisual Observatory. Strasbourg. Mickiecz, Ellen, and Richter, Andrei. (1996). “Television, Campaigning and Elections in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Russia.” In Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy. An International Study of Innovations in Electoral Campaigning and Their Consequences, eds. David L. Swanson and Paolo Mancini. Westport, CT: Praeger.

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In response to the assassination of Tsar Alexander II, Tsar Alexander III enacted a statute enabling the government to crack down on the political opposition by imposing emergency regulations more extensive than any that had previously been enforced. Although the statute was initially enacted as a temporary measure, it remained on the books until 1917 and has been regarded by historians as the real constitution of the country. Its implementation demonstrated, perhaps more than anything else, that Russia was not a state based on law. The statute provided for two kinds of special measures, Reinforced Security (Usilennaya okhrana) and Extraordinary Security (Chrezvychaynaya okhrana). The first could be imposed by the Minister of Internal Affairs or a governor-general acting with the minister’s approval. The second could be imposed only with the approval of the tsar. Vague concerning what conditions could justify placing a region in a state of emergency, the statute gave the authorities in St. Petersburg and the provinces considerable leeway in applying it. The arbitrary powers invested in local officials (governors-general, governors, and city governors) under the exceptional measures of 1881 were enormous. Under Reinforced Security, officials could keep citizens in prison for up to three months, impose fines, prohibit public gatherings, exile alleged offenders, transfer blocks of judicial cases from criminal to military courts, and dismiss zemstvo (regional assembly) employees. Under Extraordinary Security, a region was placed under the authority of a commander in chief, who could dismiss elected zemstvo deputies, suspend periodicals, and close universities and other centers of advanced study for up to one month. Implementation of the exceptional measures depended largely on the inclinations of local officials: in some provinces they acted with restraint, whereas in others they used their powers to the utmost. At times up to 69 percent of the provinces and regions of the Russian Empire were either completely or partially subjected to one of the various emergency codes.

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See also:

ALEXANDER III; AUTOCRACY; CENSORSHIP;

NICHOLAS II; ZEMSTVO

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Daly, Jonathan W. (1998). Autocracy under Siege: Security Police and Opposition in Russia, 1866–1905. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. Zuckerman, Frederic S. (1996). The Tsarist Secret Police in Russian Society, 1880–1917. London: Macmillan. ABRAHAM ASCHER

TEREM The separate living quarters of women in Muscovite Russia; also, the upper story of a palace, often with a pitched roof, as in the Terem Palace in the Moscow Kremlin. Historians have generally used the word terem to denote the room or rooms to which Muscovite royal and boyar women were confined to separate them from men, both to underpin the custom of arranging marriages without the couple meeting in advance and to preserve women’s chastity before and after marriage. The Mongols are said to have introduced the terem between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, but this theory is questionable: The practice of female seclusion reached its height in the seventeenth century, long after the Mongol occupation of Russia ended. Recent reassessments also argue that the terem in the sense of apartments where women were imprisoned like slaves is partly a construct of foreign travelers, who were unlikely ever to have seen or entered one. It matched foreign expectations concerning Muscovite orientalism and servitude. Revisionist historians perceive the royal terem not as a sign of women’s helplessness and marginalization, but rather as the physical representation of a separate sphere of influence or power base, with its own extensive staff, finances and administrative structure. From within it, royal women dispensed charity, did business, dealt with petitions, and arranged marriages. These arrangements were replicated on a smaller scale in boyar households. This does not mean that Muscovite elite women were not subjected to restrictions when compared with their Western counterparts. With the exception of weddings and funerals, they took no part in major court ceremonies and receptions, which were all-male affairs. Balls, masques, and other

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mixed-sex entertainments were out of the question, and the Muscovite court knew no official cult of beauty. Women used curtained recesses in church, traveled in carriages shielded by curtains, and wore concealing clothing. Married women always covered their hair. Girls were not to be seen by their fiancés until their wedding. The taboos extended to portraits from life. Portraits of Muscovite men are rare, but those of women almost nonexistent. In the Kremlin the sense of exclusiveness and mystery cultivated by the tsar naturally extended to the women, whose quarters were out of bounds to all except designated noblewomen, priests, and family members. Attached to the terem, the Golden Hall of the Tsaritsy, decorated with frescoes featuring women rulers from Biblical and Byzantine history, provided a space for female receptions. Outside the Kremlin, in the few surviving boyars’ mansions, it is difficult to identify rooms specifically designated as a terem, but noblewomen were expected to behave modestly. Lower down the social scale segregation was impractical, but at all levels marriages were arranged by parents. Peter I (r. 1682–1725) is credited with abolishing the terem, to the extent that he forced women to socialize and dance with men, take part in public ceremonies, and adopt Western fashions. Even so, as elsewhere in Europe, Russian royal palaces preserved the equivalents of the king’s and queen’s apartments, while in the provinces older traditions of female modesty survived.

See also:

MUSCOVY; PETER I, WESTERNIZERS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Boskovska, Nada. (2000). “Muscovite Women during the 17th Century.” Forschungen zur osteuropäische Geschichte 56:47–62. Kollmann, Nancy S. (1983). “The Seclusion of Elite Muscovite Women.” Russian History 10(2):170–187. Thyret, Isolde. (2001). Between God and Tsar: Religious Symbolism and the Royal Women of Muscovite Russia. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. LINDSEY HUGHES

TER-PETROSSIAN, LEVON (b. 1945), Armenian philologist and statesman. The first president of the second independent republic of Armenia (1991–1998), Levon Ter-

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Petrossian was born in Aleppo, Syria, and migrated to Soviet Armenia with his family in 1946. TerPetrossian graduated from Yerevan State University and received his doctorate in philology from Leningrad University. Until 1988 he was an academic researcher in Yerevan. In 1988 he joined and became a leader of the Karabakh Committee that led the movement in support of the rights of Armenians in NagornoKarabakh—the Armenian-populated enclave in Azerbaijan—and eventually in support of Armenia’s independence. In 1989, having spent six months in prison in Moscow, he was elected member, and in 1990 president, of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR. Having successfully managed the peaceful transition of power from the Communists, in 1991 he was elected president of Armenia and reelected in 1996. He resigned in February 1998 and currently lives as a private citizen in Yerevan. Ter-Petrossian has received honorary doctorates from a number of academic institutions, including the universities of Sorbonne and Strasbourg, in recognition of his scholarly research in ancient and medieval philology and history, as well as his contribution to modern Armenian statehood. The dominant figure in Armenia’s history from 1988 to 1998, Ter-Petrossian initiated fundamental institutional, political, and economic reforms, including a radical land privatization program. He guided the drafting and adoption of a constitution in 1995 that has proven effective in resolving major political crises. In foreign policy Ter-Petrossian advocated the speedy integration of Armenia in international institutions and processes, and the normalization of relations with all neighbors—including Turkey—as the best guarantee for Armenia’s long-term security and prosperity. In the process, Ter-Petrossian’s pursuit of a special relationship with Russia led to the 1997 comprehensive Treaty of Cooperation and Friendship, which, among other provisions, formalized and regulated the presence of the Russian military base in Armenia. Ter-Petrossian led the Nagorno-Karabakh war to a successful conclusion with a cease-fire agreement in 1994. He also considered peace with Azerbaijan a necessary precondition for the economic and social development of Armenia. The absence of a final solution to the status problem, which he pursued aggressively, stymied political and economic transformation; it also prevented the

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normalization of relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Ter-Petrossian’s pragmatic policies invited the opposition of extremist forces. After 1995, criticisms of his administration, including charges of corruption, abuse of power by some ministries, and tampering with elections, increased. His acceptance in 1997 of a compromise solution to the Karabakh problem, opposed by some of his closest associates in the executive branch, led to his resignation.

See also:

ARMENIA AND ARMENIANS; AZERBAIJAN AND

AZERIS; NAGORNO-KARABAKH; NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION; TURKEY, RELATIONS WITH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Curtis, Glenn E. (1994). Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Washington, DC: Library of Congress. Herzig, Edmond. (1998). The New Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. Libaridian, Gerard J. (1999). The Challenge of Statehood: Armenian Political Thinking Since Independence. Watertown, MA: Blue Crane Books. GERARD J. LIBARIDIAN

TERRITORIAL-ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was established on December 30, 1922, on the basis of a union treaty that was subsequently incorporated into the USSR constitution of January 31, 1924. The new federal state consisted of a complicated hierarchy of territorial-administrative units. This hierarchy was subsequently modified by amendment, by the adoption of new constitutions in 1936 and 1977, and by federal law. By the time Mikhail S. Gorbachev became Soviet leader in 1985, the hierarchy consisted of 15 Soviet socialist republics (SSRs, or union republics), 20 autonomous Soviet socialist republics (ASSRs), 8 autonomous oblasts (AOs), and 10 autonomous districts (okruga), for a total of 53 ethnically defined administrative units. There were in addition 120 nonethnically defined administrative units—the oblasts and 7 kraya. In addition, Moscow and Leningrad (St. Petersburg) were designated federal cities with an administrative status equal to that of the oblasts and kraya. With the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991, the fifteen union republics became independent states.

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The Soviet successor state with by far the greatest number of territorial-administrative units within it was Russia (known in the Soviet period as the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, or RSFSR, and renamed the Russian Federation in late 1991). Russia, which was also the only Soviet successor state that was formally designated a federation, included 31 ethnically defined administrative units—16 autonomous republics, 5 autonomous oblasts, and 10 autonomous okruga— which together covered approximately one-half of the territory of the RSFSR. In addition, the Russian Federation was made up of 49 oblasts, 6 kraya, and the federal cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg. Transforming Russia into a genuine federation with a well-designed and constitutionally protected division of powers between the federal government and the subjects of the federation has significantly complicated Russia’s transition from Soviet socialism. In 1991, the 16 autonomous republics and 4 of the 5 autonomous oblasts were given the status of republics. The remaining subjects of the federation—the 49 oblasts, 7 kraya, the federal cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, the Jewish autonomous oblast, and the 10 autonomous okruga—were in effect equalized under law and became known as Russia’s regions. In April 1992, the Russian legislature recognized the division of Checheno-Ingushetia into separate Chechen and Ingush republics, which brought the total number of republics under Russian law to twenty-one. However, the refusal of Chechnya to accept its status as a constituent unit of the federation, and Chechnya’s insistence on recognition as an independent state, helped precipitate a war between Chechen independence supporters and the federal government in 1994 and again in 1999.

See also:

CHECHNYA AND CHECHENS; RUSSIAN FEDERA-

TION; UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Constitution of the Russian Federation: With Commentaries and Interpretations by American and Russian Scholars, eds. Vladimir V. Belyakov and Walter J. Raymond. (1994). Lawrenceville, VA: Brunswick Publishing Company, and Moscow: Russia’s Information Agency-Novosti. Gleason, Gregory. (1990). Federalism and Nationalism: The Struggle for Republican Rights in the USSR. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Lapidus, Gail W., and Walker, Edward W. (1995). “Nationalism, Regionalism, and Federalism: CenterPeriphery Relations in Post-Communist Russia.” In The New Russia: Troubled Transformation, ed. Gail W. Lapidus. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Unger, Aryeh L. (1981). Constitutional Development in the USSR: A Guide to the Soviet Constitutions. New York: Pica Press. EDWARD W. WALKER

TERRORISM A half-century of Russian history was bloodstained by revolutionary terrorism. Its first outburst was the abortive April 1866 assassination attempt against Tsar Alexander II by Dmitry Karakozov. From then on, extremists of different ideological persuasions, with varying degrees of success, resorted to acts of terror as part of their struggle against the contemporary sociopolitical order. Terrorist activity had a particularly strong impact on the country’s life during two distinct periods. The first was the so-called heroic period, between 1878 and 1881, when the Party of the People’s Will (Narodnaya Volya)—the first modern terrorist organization in the world—dominated the radical camp. Its campaign against the autocracy culminated in the assassination of Alexander II on March 1, 1881. Alexander III’s government succeeded in disintegrating the People’s Will; yet, after a twenty-year period of relative and deceptive calm, a new wave of terrorism erupted during the reign of Russia’s last tsar, Nicholas II (1894–1917). Its perpetrators were members of various newly formed left-wing organizations, who implicated themselves in terrorist acts even when their parties in theory rejected terrorism as a suitable tactic. As radical activity reached its peak during the 1905–1907 crisis, terrorism became an all-pervasive phenomenon, affecting not only the elite civil and military circles but every layer of society. During the first decade of the twentieth century, the terrorists were responsible for approximately 17,000 casualties throughout the empire. Their attacks were indiscriminate, directed at a broad category of alleged “watchdogs of the old regime” and “oppressors of the poor.”

Kaiser, Robert J. (1994). The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Although terrorism subsided by late 1907, largely as a result of severe repressive measures employed by Prime Minister Pyotr Stolypin, until the collapse of the imperial order in 1917 it remained

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a threatening weapon in the hands of extremists seeking the demise of the tsarist regime.

See also:

NICHOLAS II; PEOPLE’S WILL THE; RED TERROR;

ZHELYABOV, ANDREI IVANOVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Footman, David. (1968). Red Prelude: A Biography of Zhelyabov. London: Barrie & Rockliff. Geifman, Anna. (1993). Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894–1917. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ANNA GEIFMAN

THAW, THE The Thaw describes the loosening of restrictions over the arts when Nikita Khrushchev served as general secretary of the Communist Party, after the death of Josef Stalin in 1953 until the mid-1960s. Although associated with the Secret Speech at the Twentieth Congress in 1956 when Khrushchev denounced some of Stalin’s dictatorial activities, the name derives from Ilya Ehrenburg’s 1954 book The Thaw. The novel hinted that Stalin’s death signaled an end to the long winter of sacrifice and persecution, and that a new era for socialism was emerging in which individuals’ private lives were valued as much as industrial productivity. Censorship eased, but its intensity varied as party leaders struggled to redefine the priorities of Soviet society. During the Thaw, all artistic media offered new themes and stylistic innovation that had been banned under Stalin. Literary magazines, called “thick” journals, published a wide array of new works. Most notably, in 1961 Novy mir, edited by Alexander, published Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, a portrayal of a labor camp inmate’s efforts to survive and maintain his dignity over the course of one day. Theater also flourished, especially with the 1956 creation of the Sovremennik, a troupe of recent graduates of the School of the Moscow Art Theater led by Oleg Efremov. The company championed the work of Viktor Rozov and young dramatists. Yuri Lyubimov directed Shchukin Theater School students in a watershed production of Bertolt Brecht’s The Good Person of Sechuan and in 1964 assumed the leadership of the Taganka Theater, which subsequently premiered several controversial plays.

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Theaters were increasingly able to stage synthetic theater, a movement that uses lights, sets, and music to evoke meaning rather than the rigid naturalist approach of accurate historical detail. Amateur student troupes, both traditional dramatic and sketch comedy, thrived. A new generation of poets emerged, including those whose works were later staged as poetic theater by Lyubimov. One of those poets, Yevgeny Yevtushenko, penned “Babi Yar” (1961), which commemorated the Nazi slaughter of Jews and alluded to ongoing Soviet anti-Semitism. The poem became the basis of Dmitri Shostakovich’s Thirteenth Symphony, which premiered in late 1962 and was sharply criticized in the press. A new musical genre, with performers known as bards, performed private concerts of their guitar poetry. Films also appeared that focused on the difficulties of private lives, often with respect to the enormous losses of World War II: Mikhail Kalatozov’s Cranes are Flying (1957), Georgi Chukhrai’s Ballad of a Soldier (1958), and Andrei Tarkovsky’s Ivan’s Childhood (1961). There were definite limits to the party’s toleration of this expression. Boris Pasternak’s novel Dr. Zhivago was published in Italy in 1957 after it was banned at home. Awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1958, Pasternak declined the aware after he was attacked in the press and expelled from the Writers’ Union. In 1964 poet Joseph Brodsky was charged with parasitism, spent over two years in an Arctic labor camp, and later emigrated. When young painters and sculptors, including Ernst Neizvestny, showed their abstract works at the Manezh exhibition hall in late 1962, Khrushchev and other leaders expressed their acute dislike. On various occasions, Pasternak, Shostakovich, Neizvestny, Yevtushenko, and others apologized for works that were deemed unacceptable. In spite of the expanded opportunities, the absence of freedom of expression and other civil liberties led some intellectuals, labeled “dissidents” by the Party, to more direct opposition to the status quo. Beginning in this era, they circulated essays, memoirs of labor camps, and literature in manuscript form, known as samizdat, rather than submit their work to censors. They smuggled other works, referred to as tamizdat, abroad for publication. Although this group of intellectuals was small in number, it included scientist Andrei Sakharov, who called for an end to nuclear testing in the late 1950s and won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1968. When it became clear that the Thaw had been temporary, these individuals grew increasingly active

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and were persecuted and sometimes imprisoned by the KGB. Scholars disagree on the end date of the Thaw. Some argue that it was 1964, when Khrushchev was ousted. Others maintain that the 1966 trial of dissidents Andrey Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel marks its end. A third interpretation suggests 1968, when Soviet-led troops invaded Czechoslovakia, where the Thaw threatened the hegemony of its Communist Party.

See also:

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION;

EHRENBERG,

ILYA

GRIGOROVICH;

KHRUSHCHEV,

NIKITA SERGEYEVICH; TAGANKA; THEATER

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alexeyeva, Ludmilla, and Goldberg, Paul. (1993). The Thaw Generation: Coming of Age in the Post-Stalin Era. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. Brown, Deming. (1978). Soviet Russian Literature since Stalin. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Johnson, Priscilla, and Leopold Labedz, eds. (1965). Khrushchev and the Arts: The Politics of Soviet Culture, 1962–1964. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Rothberg, Abraham. (1972). The Heirs of Stalin: Dissidence and the Soviet Regime, 1953–1970. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Spechler, Dina R. (1982). Permitted Dissent in the USSR: Novy mir and the Soviet Regime. New York: Praeger Publishers. Taubman, William. (2003). Khrushchev: The Man and His Era. New York: W. W. Norton and Company.

petry, acrobatics, and animal acts included bawdy material that was reviled by the Russian Orthodox Church. Western-style theater arrived in Russia in the mid-seventeenth century when Tsar Alexei and his court enjoyed numerous foreign performers in various genres, and the first court theater operated from 1672 to 1676. Theater expanded as westernization accelerated in the eighteenth century. In addition to court theater, public theaters flourished in many cities in the first half of the century. The Kunst-Fuerst theater, considered the first public theater, staged translations using German actors from 1702 to 1706. Educational institutions established school theaters, the most influential of which operated in the Land Forces Cadet School. Its productions in the early 1750s included the works of Alexander Sumarokov (1718–1777), who also translated and directed plays in the style of classicism, the dominant trend in Europe at that time. Fyodor Volkov (1729–1763) organized a theater in Yaroslavl and moved his troupe to St. Petersburg in 1752. In 1756 Tsarina Elizabeth incorporated Volkov’s troupe into the Russian State Theater (the future Alexandrinsky Theater). Sumarokov directed this first state-subsidized theater, and Volkov played the leads. Dramatic works of the era included comedies, chivalry tales, biblical adaptations, and plays that glorified the monarchy and Russian Empire. Monarchs typically believed that theater should serve a didactic function, an assumption that continued well into the twentieth century.

Although modern theater in Russia was imported from Europe in the seventeenth century, earlier traditions demonstrate the importance of spectacle in Russian lives. Russians participated in numerous rituals associated with life transitions, such as marriages, births, and deaths, as well as seasonal agricultural rites. These rituals had both pre-Christian and Christian origins. From the eleventh until the mid-eighteenth century, both elite and peasant Russians were most often entertained by skoromokhi, musicians whose singing, dancing, pup-

These trends continued during the reign of Catherine II in the second half of the eighteenth century. She built the Hermitage Theater in the Winter Palace. After the creation of the Imperial Theatrical School in 1779, Russian-born professional actors increasingly appeared on stage. Beginning in 1783 the Administration of Theaters oversaw and censored public theatrical activity. In addition to court theaters, St. Petersburg (and Moscow early in the next century) boasted heavily subsidized imperial theaters. Many provincial cities also maintained popular public (narodnye) theaters that reached a broad audience with a diverse repertoire. Count Peter Sheremetev and other wealthy nobles also operated private serfs’ theaters, which did not come under state supervision. Playwright Denis Ivanovich Fonvizin (1745–1792) is credited as the founder of authentically Russian drama, best exemplified by his comedy The Minor (1781). Classicism eventually gave way to sentimentalism, a style that emphasized emotion over reason.

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Woll, Josephine. (2000). Reel Images: Soviet Cinema and the Thaw. London: I. B. Tauris and Company. SUSAN COSTANZO

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Under Nicholas I, who reigned from 1825 to 1855, the Imperial Theater Administration developed an extensive series of rules and regulations for all aspects of theatrical activity. In spite of severe censorship, several outstanding dramas were written in an increasingly realist style. Alexander Griboedov (1794–1829) completed Woe from Wit (1824), an examination of the alienation of young disillusioned army officers who were scorned by a corrupt and superficial Russian elite after the Napoleonic wars. Other major Russian writers of this era wrote plays along with other genres. Alexander Pushkin (1799–1837) penned dramatic scenes, most notably his tragedy Boris Godunov (1825), in verse form. Nikolai Gogol (1809–1852) wrote The Government Inspector (1836), his most acclaimed work that satirizes corrupt officials and the supercilious elite of a Russian provincial town who mistake a stranger for a government inspector. Ivan Turgenev (1818–1883), also a well-respected novelist, wrote several plays, including A Month in the Country (1849–1850), that depict the everyday life of the elite. As plays achieved greater realism, the role of actors in the theatrical process changed. They too attempted to portray characters with greater naturalism, and as a result relied more on the author’s original intention and less on their own embellishment of roles. This evolution occurred in influential theater schools affiliated with the Alexandrinsky Theater in St. Petersburg and the Maly Theater in Moscow. The latter trained Mikhail Shchepkin (1788–1863), who is considered one of the greatest Russian actors. In the later part of the nineteenth century, new stars further developed the naturalist approach. The ranks increasingly included actresses, such as Maria Yermolova (1853–1928), Glikeria Fedotova (1846–1925), and Maria Savina (1854–1915). Their popularity was enhanced by the repertory system, whereby a theater with a permanent company alternated many productions, rather than the single, long-running play with contractual performers. Alexander Ostrovsky (1823–1886) dominated playwriting in the 1860s and 1870s. His innovative depiction of all levels of society in his dramas was called “national realism” and often contrasted cruel, self-serving individuals with their simple, decent victims. He wrote almost fifty plays, including his most acclaimed, The Forest (1870). Another prominent playwright, Alexander SukhovoKobylin (1813–1906), followed the tradition of Gogol’s satirical commentaries in Krechinsky’s Wed-

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ding (1854), The Case (1861), and The Death of Tarelkin (1869). Later in the century, Leo Tolstoy (1828–1910), better known for his novels, wrote plays and adapted many of his didactic short stories for theater. Popular and provincial theaters complemented developments in the nineteenth century. Circuses, Petrushka puppet shows, and fairground theaters (balagany) amused spectators. Provincial theaters offered a wide variety of genres in an effort to appeal to a wide audience. In the latter part of the century after the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 and their increasing migration to urban areas, the people’s theater movement emphasized theatrical performance as a means to enlighten the masses. Beginning in 1882, private commercial theaters, such as the Korsh, were allowed in the capital cities and elsewhere, but censorship continued to hinder problematic plays. Amateur troupes provided added opportunities for performances. The undisputed turning point in Russian theater occurred when Konstantin Stanislavsky (1863–1938), an amateur actor and director, and Vladimir Nemirovich Danchenko (1858–1943), a playwright who also taught at the Philharmonic Drama School, joined forces and created the Moscow (Popular) Art Theater in 1898. In productions that reflected trends in Europe at the time, an overall conception of the director united all parts of a production: script, actors, movement, costumes, sets, and lights. They also tried to create the impression that audiences were observing real people with psychological depth in realistic circumstances by incorporating historically accurate costumes, sets, and props. These hallmarks of naturalism were most successful in productions of Anton Chekhov’s (1860–1904) plays, but the theater also staged works by Maxim Gorky (1868–1936), Henrik Ibsen (1828–1906), Gerhart Hauptmann (1862–1946), and many others in its long history. The theater fostered many outstanding performers, including Ivan Moskvitin (1874–1956), Olga Knipper (1868–1959), and Mikhail Chekhov (1891–1955). In a series of studios, Stanislavsky experimented with actors’ training and developed his “system,” also known as the Method, which has had a profound impact on theater and film in the West. The era of 1898 to 1929 was the richest period for Russian theater. Stanislavsky’s pupil, Vsevolod Meyerhold (1874–1940), rejected naturalism and strove to maximize the theatrical elements of performances, an approach that did not always enamor him to the public or to performers

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such as Vera Kommissarzhevskaya (1864–1910), a great actress of the day. Evgeny Vakhtangov’s (1883–1922) brief career culminated in his Princess Turandot (1922), an example of his style of fantastic realism, which bridged Vsevolod Meyerhold’s abstractions and Stanislavsky’s naturalism. At the Kamerny Theater, Alexander Tairov (1885–1950) created an atmosphere for the expression of the deepest emotions of performers through movement rather than naturalistic acting. While writing plays and theatrical theory, Nikolai Evreinov (1879–1953) directed at Kommissarzhevskaya’s theater and his own Crooked Mirror, an example of popular small theaters at that time. Symbolism, a neoromantic movement that arose in reaction to realism and emphasized aesthetics and the spiritual, influenced some of the era’s important playwrights, including Leonid Andreyev (1871–1919), Fyodor Sologub (1863–1927), and Alexander Blok (1880–1921). Following the Russian Revolution in October 1917, theater experienced an outpouring of innovation. Theaters were divided into two groups: former important theaters became academic theaters with substantial subsidies and considerable freedom, while smaller theaters received less support with greater controls. In 1923 the government established Glavrepertkom, the organization responsible for censorship over theaters. Meyerhold developed his theory of movement known as biomechanics. Increasingly influenced by cubism and constructivism, he and other directors of the day often turned to abstract artists, such as Lyubov Popova (1889–1924) for set designs. The Jewish Habima Theater and the Moscow State Yiddish Theater also flourished. Important playwrights including Vladimir Mayakovsky (1893–1930), Mikhail Bulgakov (1891–1940), Nikolai Erdman (1901–1970), and Sergei Tretyakov (1892–1939) offered critiques of the young Soviet society. Popular participation in theater exploded at this time. Proletkult, an organization that called for a new culture by and for workers, supported such activities as TRAM (Theaters for Working Youth), whose actors worked in chosen professions by day and rehearsed and performed during their free time. Other amateur troupes formed in army units, factories, and local clubs. Their performances sometimes involved courtroom scenarios, known as agit-trials, with audiences as juries to debate current issues. Traveling companies of “living newspapers” and “blue blouses” performed a series of short skits of news and other issues to illiterate au-

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diences. Amateurs and professionals worked together to realize “mass spectacles” that recreated major historical events, such as The Storming of the Winter Palace (1920), which involved five hundred musicians, eight thousand performers, and over one hundred thousand spectators. As Communist Party controls tightened in the 1930s, theater and all arts were expected to follow the guidelines of socialist realism, which called for upholding Communist Party policies in an easily understandable realist style. This highly didactic formula presented “positive heroes” for the public to emulate, and plays always pointed toward an optimistic socialist future. Experimentation in text and technique ended. In this environment playwrights such as Nikolai Pogodin (1900–1962), Alexander Afinogenov (1904–1941), Vsevolod Vishnevsky (1900–1951), and Alexei Arbuzov (1908–1986) managed to create meaningful dramas in spite of the limitations. A new generation of directors also attempted to offer interesting but safe productions: Nikolai Okhlopkov (1900–1967), Yuri Zavadsky (1894–1977), and Nikolai Akimov (1901–1968). Others suffered. Accused of “formalism,” a euphemism for nonconformity, Meyerhold was executed in 1940. Playwrights Tretyakov and Vladimir Kirshon (1902–1938) met a similar fate. Tairov struggled to stage permissible plays. TRAM theaters came under state control as professional Komsomol theaters. Although many professional troupes performed for frontline troops and new plays supported the war effort during World War II from 1941 to 1945, strict controls were reestablished after the war until Josef Stalin’s death in 1953. Tairov was removed as director of his Kamerny Theater in 1949. As part of the rootless cosmopolitan campaign predominantly against Jews, Solomon Mikhoels (1890–1948), a famous actor and head of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, was killed. Dramatists were expected to adopt the no-conflict theory that corresponded to the supposedly new level of socialist achievement in the Soviet Union: no longer was society divided into bad opponents of the system and good supporters. Now socialism and drama reflected struggles between the good and the better. Without meaningful conflict, the quality of drama declined. Theater attendance fell, and the party renounced the theory in 1952. The period following Stalin’s death is considered the Thaw in Soviet society and culture. In the theatrical realm Glavrepertkom was abolished, and

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the Ministry of Culture assumed responsibility for censorship. Although socialist realism continued, theaters increasingly staged productions with nonrealist sets and pessimistic or ambiguous endings. Productions also began to breach the “fourth wall” by incorporating the audience in the action. Two important theaters emerged: the newly created Sovremennik under the leadership of Oleg Efremov (1927–2000) and the Taganka led by Yuri Lyubimov (b. 1917), whose group of recent theater school graduates performed Bertolt Brecht’s Good Person of Sechuan and revived the moribund troupe. Its later productions included adaptations of Yuri Trifonov’s (1925–1981) prose works and recent poetry by Andrey Voznesensky (b. 1933) and Yevgeny Yevtushenko (b. 1933). The Sovremennik emphasized new playwrights such as Viktor Rozov (b. 1913) and Vasily Aksenov (b. 1932). At the same time, talented directors Anatoly Efros (1925–1987) and Georgy Tovstonogov (1915–1989) took the helm at reputable theaters. Arbuzov and young dramatists, such as Alexander Vampilov (1937–1972), Alexander Volodin (b. 1919), and Eduard Radzinsky (b. 1936), explored the dilemmas of everyday life. Many recent foreign dramatists were published in translation. Student theaters thrived. After Nikita Khrushchev’s fall from power in 1964, a more conservative approach to the arts ensued, but innovation continued. Although important directors continued to work, Efros and Lyubimov repeatedly had their productions banned or censured by the press. While socialist realism represented official policy, synthetic theater, which emphasized the use of music and lighting to augment the emotions and messages of a production, allowed greater flexibility in staging. By the early 1980s most professional theaters in Leningrad and Moscow created “second stages” that allowed for further experimentation. In this venue promising directors, such as Lev Dodin (b. 1944), Kama Ginkas (b. 1941), and Peter Fomenko (b. 1932), could stage new works, and young actors gained valuable experience because important roles on the main stage were reserved for senior performers. On the Taganka’s small stage, Anatoly Vasilev (b. 1942) staged Viktor Slavkin’s Cerceau, considered one of the most innovative productions of the 1980s. Ludmilla Petrushevskaya’s (b. 1938) plays, whose language has been described as “tape recorder” for its ability to copy natural speech, were first performed by amateurs. Both playwrights addressed the elusive nature of a meaningful life in modern Soviet society. Amateur stages provided rich alternatives for both pro-

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fessional and amateur directors as well as spectators who were seeking new approaches to theater. The final decade of the Soviet era began with severe censorship, but the twentieth century ended with almost complete freedom. In 1982 Yuri Andropov became General Secretary of the party, and initiated a strict anti-Western policy that adversely affected theatrical repertoires. Under his successor, Konstantin Chernenko, Yuri Lyubimov was forced into exile in 1984. Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost policy reversed this trend, and by 1989 theaters operated without political censorship. Theaters attempted to operate under self-financing, which removed governmental subsidies. Lenin Komsomol Theater director Mark Zakharov (b. 1933) led the effort to establish independence for troupes. The number of theaters mushroomed when the government allowed the formation of theaters without official supervision. However, the success of some troupes depended on those earlier conflicts with the state, and Lyubimov’s return to the Taganka in 1989 could not revive its former glory. The Moscow Art Theater split into two companies: Chekhov MAT, led by Oleg Efremov, who had led the combined troupe since 1970; and Gorky MAT, led by Tatyana Doronina (b. 1933). In the 1990s Vasilev and Fomenko formed their own troupes to accommodate their unorthodox approaches to rehearsals and performances. Like many troupes desperate for funds, Dodin’s theater toured abroad extensively and was awarded the Europe Theater prize in 2000. However, most troupes, including former amateur companies, discovered the near impossibility of surviving without some government subsidy and sought to receive some support while retaining repertory freedom. Since the end of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russian theater has operated under an economic censor, as in the West.

See also:

ANDREYEV, LEONID NIKOLAYEVICH; BOLSHOI

THEATER; CHEKHOV, ANTON PAVLOVICH; GOGOL, NIKOLAI VASILYEVICH; GORKY, MAXIM; GRIBOEDOV, ALEXANDER SERGEYEVICH; MEYERKHOLD, VSEVOLOD YEMILIEVICH; PUSHKIN, ALEXANDER SERGEYEVICH; SHCHEPKIN, MIKHAIL SEMEONOVICH; SUMAROKOV, ALEXANDER PETROVICH; TAGANKA; THAW, THE; TOLSTOY, LEO NIKOLAYEVICH; TURGENEV, IVAN SERGEYEVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Braun, E. (1995). Meyerhold: A Revolution in Theatre. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press.

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Gorchakov, Nikolai A. (1957). The Theater in Soviet Russia, tr. Edgar Lehrman. New York: Columbia University Press. Karlinsky, Simon. (1985). Russian Drama from its Beginnings to the Age of Pushkin. Berkeley: University of California Press. Leach, Robert, and Borovsky, Viktor, eds. (1999). A History of the Russian Theatre. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Mally, Lynn. (2000). Revolutionary Acts: Amateur Theater and the Soviet State 1917–1938. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Segel, Harold B. (1993). Twentieth-Century Russian Drama from Gorky to the Present, updated ed. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Slonim, Mark. (1962). Russian Theater from the Empire to the Soviets. New York: Collier Books. Smeliansky, Anatoly. (1999). The Russian Theatre after Stalin, tr. Patrick Miles. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Warner, Elizabeth. (1977). The Russian Folk Theatre. The Hague: Mouton. Worrall, Nick. (1989). Modernism to Realism on the Soviet Stage: Tairov-Vakhtangov-Okhlopkov. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. SUSAN COSTANZO

Vladimir Andreevich. The most important surviving projects in Moscow are the main icons (1405) for the iconostasis of the Annunciation Cathedral, Cathedral Square, and the Moscow Kremlin. Here he was assisted by the Elder Prokhor of Gorodets and Andrei Rublev, according to the Troica Chronicle. Another separate icon attributed to him is the Bogomater Donskaya (Virgin of the Don) and on the back, the Dormition of the Virgin, 1380s (Tretyakov Gallery). A very expressive early fifteenth-century Transfiguration of Christ icon (Tretyakov Gallery) has been attributed to Theophanes as well. His figures tended to be very tall and severe, with dark faces and long, thin arms. Mystical elements in his paintings are believed to reflect the influence of Hesychasm. Theophanes was truly one of the greatest of the early Russian icon painters.

See also:

DIONISY; ICONS; RUBLEV, ANDREI

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cheremeteff, Maria. (1990). “The Transformation of the Russian Sanctuary Barrier and the Role of Theophanes the Greek.” In The Millennium: Christianity and Russia, A.D. 988–1988, ed. Albert Leong. Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press. A. DEAN MCKENZIE

THEOPHANES THE GREEK (c. 1340–1410), renowned artist and philosopher. Theophanes the Greek began his career as an artist in the Byzantine capital, Constantinople. He worked in the media of fresco, egg tempera for panel painting (icons), and tempera for book illustration. In the 1380s he immigrated to Russia, first of all to Novgorod. An important source for his life is a letter written by Hieromonk Ephiphanius to Cyril around 1415. He states that Theophanes was an artist, a sage, and a philosopher. The stone churches he decorated with frescoes include several in Constantinople, Chalcedon, Galata, and Caffa. Altogether, he painted frescoes in over forty churches. In Russia his most important surviving frescoes are to be found in the Church of the Savior of the Transfiguration, Novgorod (1378). He worked swiftly without the use of pattern books. Nor did he mind spectators. As his fame spread, he was invited to Moscow in the 1390s. Among other projects in the 1390s, he painted a panorama fresco of Moscow (nonextant) in the stone palace of Prince

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THICK JOURNALS For more than two hundred years, Russian and Soviet “thick” journals (tolstye zhurnaly)—a term alluding to their usually 200-plus pages per issue —played the role of social and cultural trendsetters. Traditionally, prose works and poetry were first published in such journals and only later as books. Published among the literary works were nonfiction articles and essays on a large variety of topics. Literary reputations were fostered mainly through thick journals. Some, such as the twentieth century’s Novyi mir, were considered more prestigious than others. Edited by Gerhard Friedrich Mueller of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences, the first independent Russian journal was Ezhemesiachnye sochineniya, k pol’ze i uveseleniyu sluzhashchie (Monthly Writings Serving Purpose and Enjoyment; 1755–1797). Inspired by the principles of the European Enlightenment, it was followed by an ever-increasing number of similar undertakings on different subjects, includ-

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ing literature. Nikolai Karamzin’s Moskovskii Zhurnal (Moscow Journal; 1791–1792) already could count Russia’s leading authors among its contributors. The early nineteenth century saw another increase in the number of thick journals, most of which were short-lived. However, some boasted sizable circulations; the prestigious Vestnik Evropy (Messenger of Europe) had about 1,200 subscribers; Biblioteka dlia chteniya (Library for Reading) had 4,000; and Otechestvennye zapiski (Notes of the Fatherland) had close to 4,000. Despite strictly enforced censorship, the leading thick journals managed to develop a recognizable aesthetic and ideological profile. For example, Sovremennik (The Contemporary; 1836–1866), founded by Alexander Pushkin, catered to the liberal public, whereas Russkaia beseda (Russian Conversation; 1856–1860) targeted Slavophile readers. In the aftermath of the 1861 Reforms that included some censorship relief, hundreds of new thick journals emerged, providing a multifaceted forum for Russian public discourse. Most influential were Russkii vestnik (Russian Messenger), in which Ivan Turgenev, Leo Tolstoy, and Fyodor Dostoyevsky published major works, and Russkaia mysl’ (Russian Thought; 1880–1900), to which Vladimir Korolenko, Dimitri Mamin-Sibiriak, Nikolai Leskov, and Anton Chekhov contributed. By the end of the nineteenth century, illustrated weekly journals outnumbered the thick monthlies. Then the 1917 Bolshevik coup destroyed this pluralistic journalistic scene in less than a year. The New Economic Policy (NEP) of the 1920s reconstituted some variety, but all within a framework of loyalty to the Soviet regime. Thus Krasnaya nov’ (Red New Soil; 1921–1942) in the 1920s was the forum of the less politicized poputchiki (fellowtravelers), whereas Kuznitsa (The Smithy; 1920– 1922) belonged to militant proletarian writers. No other period of Russian history increased— or inflated—the importance of thick journals more than Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika, which caused a veritable explosion in circulation, with several journals printing more than a million copies each month. Glasnost transformed decades-old, dogmatic publications into thought-provoking, open intellectual forums. In hindsight, the formation and formulation of diverse viewpoints would have been impossible without journals such as Novy mir (New World; 1925–), Druzhba narodov (People’s Friendship; 1939–), and Znamia (Banner; 1931) on the liberal side, and Nash sovremennik (Our Contemporary;

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1964–) and Molodaia gvardiia (Young Guard; 1922–) on the conservative. However, with the meltdown of the Soviet system, thick journals rapidly lost their significance. Despite the press law of August 1, 1990, which formally abolished censorship and gave these journals economic and legal independence, few of them survived commercial pressure, competition against electronic media, and overall cultural disintegration.

See also:

GLASNOST; INTELLIGENTSIA; JOURNALISM; NEW

ECONOMIC POLICY; PERESTROIKA; THIN JOURNALS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Frankel, Edith Rogovin. (1981). Novy mir: A Case Study in the Politics of Literature, 1952–1958. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Ruud, Charles. (1982). Fighting Words: Imperial Censorship and the Russian Press, 1804–1906. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. PETER ROLLBERG

THIN JOURNALS Whereas “thick” journals circulated among the intelligentsia and established a critical forum for political discussion among Russia’s elites, “thin” journals were marketed toward those developing a civic consciousness and awareness of the outside world in post–Great Reform society. Combining the journalistic tradition of specialized, entertaining journals such as the humorous Oskolki (Splinters) or Teatr i zhizn’ (The Theater and Life) for theatergoers with informative and educational features, thin journals helped to give the reading public a broad worldview. The most successful of these journals was A. F. Marx’s Niva (The Cornfield), founded in 1870. Though Marx was aiming for a family audience, he quickly tapped into the expanding provincial audience, especially schoolteachers and those whom they educated, Russia’s burgeoning middle classes. Offering Russia’s literary classics as supplements, Niva enjoyed a circulation of 200,000 by the turn of the twentieth century. Readers who could not afford even its modest price could still find this and other thin journals in their village libraries. Eventually, Niva faced competition from other journals that adapted its formula of combining di-

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dactic and entertaining features. A. A. Kaspari’s Rodina (The Motherland), for example, founded in 1879, appealed specifically to members of the lower classes who desired self-improvement. Two preeminent newspaper publishers also entered the thin journal market, S. M. Propper and I. D. Sytin, both of whom lowered prices and increased the news component. Propper’s Ogonek (The Flame), founded in 1908, ultimately became the most widely circulated of these journals, reaching 700,000 subscribers by 1914. Sytin purchased Vokrug sveta (Around the World) in 1891, and though circulation never topped 50,000, the journal offered a vision of life beyond Russia’s borders. Both of these journals continued publication into the Soviet era, with modified editorial content. Thin journals stimulated the voracious Russian reading appetite, which the subsequent Soviet government fed with its own variety of thin journals, from the satirical Krokodil (The Crocodile) to the informational Za Rubezhem (Abroad). Despite censorship, the tradition of thin journals helped many Russians develop interest and glean information about the world.

See also:

GLASNOST; INTELLIGENTSIA; JOURNALISM; NEW

sulting from domestic and international events of the 1430s and 1520s. The monk Filofei of the Pskov-Eliazarov monastery formulated it in one or two epistles, written between 1523 and 1526, which were then reworked during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Neither epistle survives in its original form or a manuscript assuredly from Filofei’s time. The first, probably written in 1523 to 1524 to the statesecretary administrator of Pskov, Mikhail MisiurMunekhin, attacks astrology, the Roman Catholic Church, and the claims of the Holy Roman Empire, and in this connection asserts that Russia, with Moscow’s Dormition Cathedral at its center, is the third and final Roman Empire according to the prophetic books. Filofei’s unnamed opponent was Basil III’s German physician Nicholas Bülew, who promoted astrology and Church union with Rome. The second epistle, addressed to an unnamed tsar— perhaps Basil III (1524–1526) or possibly Ivan IV (1533–1584)—and conceivably not by Filofei at all, calls upon the addressee to enforce the proper application of the sign of the cross by his subjects; protect church wealth; suppress homosexuality; be an ethical, just, and pious ruler; and, in oblique form, fill hierarchical vacancies.

ECONOMIC POLICY; PERESTROIKA; THICK JOURNALS

KHRUSHCHEV,

Third Rome thinking served to elevate Russia’s conception of its place within the Orthodox Christian world and the requirement to preserve the faith and its rituals in unadulterated form. If this potentially messianic doctrine played a role in the establishment of the Russian patriarchate in 1589, and may have helped Russians acquire a sense of responsibility toward the Orthodox and later Uniate subjects of Poland-Lithuania and the Ottoman Empire, at no time did it figure in aggressive policies toward non-Orthodox or non-Uniate peoples. Modern attempts to enshrine it as an essential element of Russian consciousness since the early 1500s have no basis.

Third Rome refers to the doctrine that Russia or, specifically, Moscow succeeded Rome and Byzantium Rome as the ultimate center of true Christianity and of the Roman Empire. This is the most generally misunderstood and abused of the several expressions of Russia’s new place in the world re-

The Christian notion of migrating sacrosanct goes back to the foundation of Constantinople as New Rome (still in the official title of the patriarch of Constantinople) and its subsequent claims to be a New Jerusalem, the center of a messianic kingdom. In the course of competing with Byzantium, even before the Eastern and Western Churches separated (over the course of the 860s to 1054), the German (Holy Roman) emperors also claimed to represent the true Rome. Similarly, while the Byzantine Empire still existed, among the Orthodox Slavs, Bulgarians claimed that their capital, in

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brooks, Jeffrey. (1985). When Russia Learned to Read: Literacy and Popular Literature, 1861–1917. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Lovell, Stephen. (2000). The Russian Reading Revolution: Print Culture in the Soviet and Post-Soviet Eras. London: Macmillan. LOUISE MCREYNOLDS

THIRD PARTY PROGRAM See NIKITA SERGEYEVICH.

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this case, Trnovo, was the New Imperial City (Constantinople) in the 1300s. Russians did not seriously dispute Byzantium’s pretenses until after the Council of Ferrera-Florence, from 1438 to 1439, when factions of the Greek and Russian Orthodox church accepted union with Rome. By defending Orthodoxy against Roman Catholicism, the Moscow metropolitans treated first Basil II and then Ivan III as new Constantine. With the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans in 1453, Muscovy/Russia became the Orthodox monarchy. As Ivan III discarded the legal and ceremonial remnants of subordination to the Qipchak (Golden Horde) khans during the period of 1476 to 1480, Archbishop Vassian Rylo of Rostov argued the absurdity of an inviolable oath from a genuine tsar to a false one of brigand descent. In presenting new Eastern tables for the years following the year 1492 C.E., which Orthodox calendars considered to be the millennial year 7000 since Creation, Metropolitan Zosima declared Moscow to be the new Constantinople, which itself was the New Rome in one early copy and New Jerusalem in several others. Ivan’s diplomacy vis-à-vis Imperial German pretenses on the 1480s to 1490s and the coronation ceremony of his grandson Dmitry in 1498 emphasized the historic equality of Russia and Byzantium’s rulers. In the 1510s Joseph of Volok, while claiming that the Orthodox Tsar is in power like unto God, asserted that any wavering from Orthodoxy would lead to the fall of Russia, as other Orthodox kingdoms had ended due to apostasy. Historical works produced in the 1520s by this school of thought (Russian Chronograph, Nikon Chronicle) underscored the preeminence of Russia among Orthodox realms, while genealogical inventions used for state diplomacy asserted Roman dynastic origins of Russia’s ruling house.

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Poe, Marshall. (2001). “Moscow, the Third Rome: The Origins and Transformation of a ‘Pivotal Moment.’” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 49:412-29. DAVID M. GOLDFRANK

THIRTEEN YEARS’ WAR The Thirteen Years’ War (1654–1667) consisted of three phases of conflict between Muscovy, PolandLithuania, and Sweden. Its roots can be found in Bogdan Khmelnitsky’s Cossack revolt against Poland-Lithuania, which began in 1648. The Russians supported the Cossacks initially with favorable trade contacts and military supplies, and then eventually, following the 1653 Polish invasion of Ukraine, the Russians allied themselves formally with the Cossacks and entered the war in 1654. Muscovy’s Tsar Alexei led around 100,000 men, including his Zaporozhian Cossack allies, into Polish-Lithuanian territory and thus began the first phase of the war. The Russians enjoyed initial success, overwhelming the Polish forces and taking several important towns, such as Smolensk, Mogilev, and Vitebsk. Russian and Cossack forces regained much of the Ukrainian territories and even invaded Poland as far as the town of Brest. The Polish-Lithuanians counterattacked but could not dislodge the Russians. Poland’s King John II Casimir, who had fled the country, managed to negotiate a truce with the Russians, and hostilities temporarily ended between the two nations with a threeyear truce (1656).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

At this point, while Sweden was involved in the First Northern War (1655–1660) against Poland and Denmark, Muscovy sought to regain territory it had formerly lost to the Swedes and moved to capture several towns, including Dinaburg, Dorpat, and Keksholm. The Russians failed, however, to take Riga, which they besieged during the summer of 1656, because they had no naval force and could not cut Riga off from its lines of supply. The Swedes launched a powerful counterattack, scattering the Russian army and forcing the tsar to flee for his life. When the war with Denmark took a turn for the worse in 1657, the Swedes sought peace with Muscovy (Truce of Valiesari, 1658).

Ostrowski, Donald. (1998). Muscovy and the Mongols: Cross-Cultural Influences on the Steppe Frontier, 1304–1589. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

The third and final phase of the war began when the truce between Muscovy and PolandLithuania ended in 1658. The Russians fought a se-

Filofei was not the only Russian churchman of his time to oppose Bülew’s ideas; so did Metropolitan Daniel and Maksim Grek. Others also asserted a new world-historic claim for Russia.

See also:

BASIL II; BASIL III; CATHEDRAL OF THE DORMI-

TION; IVAN III; IVAN IV; PATRIARCHATE; POSSESSORS AND NON-POSSESSORS

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ries of fierce battles with the Poles in Lithuania and Belarus, defeating them at Vilnius, Kaunas, and Grodno, but losing twice at Mogilev (1661, 1666), and Vitebsk (1664). In the Ukrainian lands, the Russians suffered significant defeats at Konotop (1659), Lubar (1660), and Kushliki (1661). Complicating factors in the south included the defection of the Russians’ Cossack allies under Vyhovsky, which isolated the Russians against the Poles, and Lubomirsky’s Rebellion, which weakened the government of King John II Casimir at a critical moment and forced the Poles to accept peace with Muscovy. Early in 1664, the tsar approached the Poles to begin negotiations, but it was not until 1667 that a provisional peace agreement was signed at Andrusovo. Despite its losses, Muscovy came out of the war with sizeable gains in territory, not least of which included the key cities of Smolensk and Kiev.

and Germany and to prevent friction between Austria-Hungary and Russia over territorial claims in the Balkans. Both of these goals are apparent in the terms of the agreement. Article 1 addresses the potential of a Franco-German conflict by stating, “In case one of the High Contracting Parties should find itself at war with a fourth Great Power, the two others shall maintain towards it a benevolent neutrality and shall devote their efforts to the localization of the conflict.” The issue of potential conflict over the Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire is dealt with in Article 2. It states, “The three Courts, desirous of avoiding all discord between them, engage to take account of their respective interests in the Balkan Peninsula. They further promise one another that any new modifications in the territorial status quo of Turkey in Europe can be accomplished only in virtue of a common agreement between them.”

See also:

Ultimately, this alliance foundered over the issue of Balkan territorial claims. The Austro-Hungarian Empire contained a sizeable number of Slavs who were sympathetic to the plight and aspirations of their Balkan brothers in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Simultaneously, the Russian tsar was under pressure from the Pan-Slavs to intervene in the Balkans because the Pan-Slavic movement regarded Russia as the protector of the Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire.

NEW-FORMATION REGIMENTS; SMOLENSK WAR

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Longworth, Philip. (1984). Alexis, Tsar of All the Russias. New York: Franklin Watts. O’Brien, Carl Bickford. (1963). Muscovy and the Ukraine, 1654–1667. Berkeley: University of California Press. Rady, Martyn. (1990). Russia, Poland, and the Ukraine, 1462–1725. London: Hodder and Stoughton. W. M. REGER IV

THREE EMPERORS’ LEAGUE The Three Emperors’ League, or Dreikaiserbund, was part of the diplomatic web created by Otto Bismarck (1815–1898) to keep France isolated. An initial agreement between Alexander II of Russia, William I of Prussia, and Francis-Joseph of Austria-Hungary was reached in September 1873. This phase of the Three Emperors’ League is sometimes referred to as the Three Emperors’ Treaty. The agreement was renewed in June 1881, with the same signatories for Prussia and Austria-Hungary, but with the new tsar, Alexander III, representing Russia.

A series of uprisings against the Ottoman Empire and reprisals by the Turkish forces occurred in the Balkans in the mid-1870s. These events led to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877. Although the Russians decisively defeated the Turkish forces, opposition from Austria-Hungary and Great Britain led to the final settlement being decided at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Under the auspices of the honest broker Bismarck, much of the fruit of the Russian military victory was plucked from their hands. The Russians felt that they had won the war but lost the diplomatic negotiations. Both the Balkan nationalists and the Russian Pan-Slavists felt a lingering resentment toward Austria-Hungary and Germany for depriving them of the fruits of the Russian military victory.

The dual goals of the league were to prevent intervention by Austria-Hungary or Russia in the event of an outbreak of hostilities between France

The Three Emperors’ League was not renewed when it expired in 1884. Instead, Russia moved closer diplomatically to France. This shift culminated in the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894. The dissolution of the Three Emperors’ League took Europe a step closer to the outbreak of World War I.

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See also:

AUSTRIA, RELATIONS WITH; GERMANY, RELA-

TIONS WITH; PANSLAVISM; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS; WORLD WAR I

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Avalon Project at Yale Law School. (2003). “The Three Emperors’ League.” . Eyck, Erich. (1968). Bismarck and the German Empire. New York: Norton. Glenny, Misha. (2001). The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804–1999. New York: Penguin.

sia’s vast spaces and poor system of transportation meant that most peasants did not have the access to markets required for relatively perishable products (as opposed to grain, which peasants did market). As railroads improved access to markets, many peasants did adapt. As late as 1920, however, for most peasants, abandoning the three–field system meant pursuing illusory gains and running unacceptable risks. It was not yearning for profits but the pressure of population on land that brought the three-field system into crisis. What peasants perceived as a problem of land shortage fueled the revolutions of 1905 and 1917.

See also:

AGRICULTURE; PEASANT ECONOMY

JEAN K. BERGER BIBLIOGRAPHY

Moon, David. (1999). The Russian Peasantry, 1600–1930: The World the Peasants Made. London: Addison Wesley Longman.

THREE-FIELD SYSTEM The three-field system predominated in Russian peasant agriculture until the Stalin era. Plowland was divided into three sections: each year one section was sown in the winter, a second was sown to another grain in the spring, and a third was left fallow to restore its fertility. The following year the section that had been sown in the winter was sown in the spring, the section sown in the spring was left fallow, and the previous year’s fallow was sown in the winter. Land not sown to grain was kept outside the three-field system. Similar forms of rotation prevailed across Europe well into the eighteenth century. These forms were displaced by systems that promised higher productivity and money profits. In Russia, however, the Agricultural Revolution did not make significant inroads on the three–field system, though it prompted learned landowners to reproach peasants for superstitiously clinging to an outmoded system. In fact, the three–field system remained an appropriate adaptation to Russian conditions for a long time. It assumed a relative abundance of land and took into account the harshness of the climate and (often) the poor fertility of the soil. In contrast to profit–seeking farmers, Russian peasants sought, above all, to avert the threat of starvation. The forms of rotation practiced in the West entailed the intensive application of fertilizers, in the form of manure and of crops such as clover. The animals that provided the manure and ate the clover produced dairy and meat products for the market. Rus-

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Robinson, Geroid Tanquary. (1932). Rural Russia under the Old Régime. London: Macmillan. DANIEL FIELD

TIFLIS Tiflis (Tbilisi in Georgian) is the capital of the Republic of Georgia. Its legendary origins begin with the early medieval king of eastern Georgia (Kartli), Vakhtang Gorgasali (c. 447–522), who is said to have shot a deer that fell into a pool of hot spring water on the spot where he then decreed his capital to be built. The city’s name derives from the Georgian word for “warm” (tbili). From its origins, Tiflis was in the Iranian sphere of cultural influence, as was much of eastern Georgia, and even today the oldest parts of the city, around Maidan (square) and stretching up the Holy Mountain (Mtatsminda) have a Middle Eastern appearance with their narrow winding streets and elaborately carved balconies. From the arrival of the Arab conquerors in the seventh century, the city was often in the hands of Muslim rulers. Indeed, in 853 the caliph of Baghdad sent an army to put down the rebellious Muslim emir of Tiflis and had the city burned to the ground, thus ending any pretension of the town becoming the center of a rival Islamic state. After nearly four hundred years in Muslim hands, Tiflis was taken by the Georgian king David

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The ancient buildings of Tiflis (Tbilisi) are shown in this lithograph from 1849. © HISTORICAL PICTURE ARCHIVE/CORBIS

the Builder (1089–1125) and reached its medieval zenith in the reigns of Queen Tamar (1184–1212) and her son Giorgi the Resplendent. In the centuries that followed the Mongol invasions (thirteenth– fourteenth centuries), Georgia suffered a long, slow decline, and Tiflis and eastern Georgia came under the hegemony of Iran. In the mid-eighteenth century the last great king of eastern Georgia, Erekle II (1744–1798), recaptured the city, which became the center of a multinational empire that reached north to the Great Caucasus and south into Armenia. After a devastating invasion by the Persians that destroyed large parts of the city, the Russians marched into Tiflis (1800), which soon became their principal administrative center in Caucasia. The city was then largely Armenian in population, but through the century the percentage of Georgians increased steadily until they became a majority in Soviet times. In the twentieth century

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Tiflis (Tbilisi) was successively the capital of the Transcaucasian Federation (1918), the first independent Georgian Republic (1918–1921), the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia (1921–1991), and the second independent Republic of Georgia (since 1991). Today it is a city of more than one million people, but since the end of the Soviet Union Tiflis has lost much of its cosmopolitan flavor as Armenians, Russians, and Jews have steadily migrated elsewhere. The post-Soviet disintegration of Georgia and the collapse of its economy have taken a toll on the town, but the beauty of its buildings and natural setting remains intact.

See also:

CAUCASUS; GEORGIA AND GEORGIANS; ISLAM;

TRANSCAUCASIAN FEDERATIONS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Suny, Ronald Grigor. (1986). “Tiflis, Crucible of Ethnic Politics, 1860–1905.” In The City in Late Imperial Rus-

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sia, ed. Michael F. Hamm. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Patriarchate at the Church Council of 1917–1918.” Slavic Review 50:497–511.

Suny, Ronald Grigor. (1994). The Making of the Georgian Nation. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Roslof, Edward E. (2000). “Russian Orthodoxy and the Tragic Fate of Patriarch Tikhon (Bellavin).” In The Human Tradition in Modern Russia, ed. William B. Husband. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources.

RONALD GRIGOR SUNY

EDWARD E. ROSLOF

TIKHON, PATRIARCH (1865–1925), eleventh patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, 1917–1925. The son of a provincial priest, Vasily Ivanovich Bellavin attended the Pskov seminary and the theological academy in St. Petersburg. He took monastic vows in 1891, adopting the name “Tikhon,” and was elevated to the episcopacy in 1897. Over the next twenty years, he served dioceses in Russia and North America. He became the first popularly elected Metropolitan of Moscow in July 1917 and president of the national church council that convened in August. After the October Revolution, the council chose Tikhon as the first Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia since 1701. Patriarch Tikhon anathematized the Bolsheviks and their supporters in January 1918, but then backed away from direct confrontation in the face of government reprisals, adopting a strictly neutral political stance during the civil war. Nonetheless, the Bolsheviks saw Tikhon as a counterrevolutionary. They split the church in 1922 by supporting the Living Church Movement. Tikhon spent a year under arrest and interrogation. He was released in mid-1923 after signing a statement repenting his political crimes and condemning foreign church leaders. Tikhon’s last years were spent under constant threat of arrest as he worked to reunite the Church. His death in April 1925 led to new schisms when the government prevented election of a new patriarch and promoted rivalries among Orthodox bishops. Despite official Soviet depictions of Tikhon as an arch–reactionary, Orthodox believers revered him due to his suffering at the hands of the Communists in defense of the faith. The Russian Orthodox Church canonized Patriarch Tikhon in 1989.

See also:

LIVING CHURCH MOVEMENT

TILSIT, TREATY OF The Treaty of Tilsit is the name of the document signed by Emperor Napoleon I of France and Tsar Alexander I of Russia on July 7, 1807, following a famous meeting between the two on a raft in the Niemen River. The treaty focused on three questions: (1) the peace terms between Russia and France; (2) how to handle a war that had erupted between Russia and Turkey; (3) the status of the defeated kingdom of Prussia, which had risen up against Napoleon only the year before. For Alexander, negotiating on behalf of the Prussian king, Frederick William III, Tilsit was a decisive moment. Not only had he experienced murderous military reversals at Danzig and Friedland in June, he was now confronted by the prospect of intrigue and disorder at home, and in this his brother, the Grand Duke Constantine, figured conspicuously and ominously. Most of all, Alexander desired in the most intimate way to bring peace to Europe, and he came to realize that this could only be done if Britain, alone now against Bonaparte, was brought to heel. The treaty was an extremely onerous instrument—a prize example, in fact, of the ruthless brutality of Napoleonic power. The treaty left Russia untouched, but it reduced Prussia to a makeshift territory east of the River Elbe, occupied by Napoleon’s troops, and ringed by his puppet states old and new. It tore away one-third of Prussia’s territory and placed it under the control of the king of Saxony in a new Napoleonic satellite called the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. It pledged Russia would go to war with Britain if the latter did not accept Napoleon’s peace terms; it pledged Napoleon would do the same with respect to Turkey. It was at Tilsit that the whole of Napoleon’s unconscionable ambition found its fullest and most virulent expression.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Evtuhov, Catherine. (1991). “The Church in the Russian Revolution: Arguments for and against Restoring the

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ALEXANDER I; NAPOLEON I

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lllustration of Napoleon I of France, Frederick William III of Prussia, and Alexander I at Tilsit, July 7, 1807.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Schroeder, Paul. (1994). The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. DAVID WETZEL

TIME OF TROUBLES In the decade and a half before the founding of the Romanov dynasty in 1613, Russia endured what has been known ever since as the Time of Troubles, a period of severe crisis that nearly destroyed the country. It followed the death of Tsar Fyodor I in 1598 and ended with the election of Tsar Mikhail Romanov in 1613. The Time of Troubles has long fascinated and puzzled the Russian people and has inspired scholars, poets, and even musicians. To

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many Russians who lived through the Troubles, it was nothing more or less than God’s punishment of their country for the sins of its rulers or its people. Others since then have sought more secular explanations, noting that at the center of the Troubles was the most powerful uprising in Russian history prior to the twentieth century, the so-called Bolotnikov rebellion (named after the rebel commander, Ivan Bolotnikov). Focusing on that event, historians erroneously concluded long ago that at the heart of the Troubles was Russia’s first social revolution of the oppressed masses against serfdom. Recently, that interpretation has been decisively overthrown; instead of a social revolution, the Time of Troubles produced Russia’s first civil war, a conflict that split Russian society vertically instead of horizontally. The long and bloody civil war occurred in two distinct phases: 1604–1605 and 1606–1612. The Time of Troubles began with the extinction of Moscow’s ancient ruling dynasty. After

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Tsar Fyodor I’s death in 1598, Boris Godunov (regent for mentally retarded Fyodor) easily defeated his rivals to become tsar. Nevertheless, many people questioned the legitimacy of the new ruler, whose sins supposedly included having Tsar Ivan IV’s youngest son, Dmitry of Uglich, killed in 1591 in order to clear a path to the throne for himself. During Tsar Boris’s reign Russia suffered a horrible famine that wiped out up to one-third of the population. The effects of the famine, coupled with serious long-term economic, social, demographic, fiscal, and political problems, contributed to the decline in legitimacy of the new ruler in the eyes of many Russians. Then in 1604 the country was invaded by a small army headed by a man claiming to be Dmitry of Uglich, miraculously saved from Godunov’s assassins. Many towns, fortresses, soldiers, and cossacks of the southern frontier quickly joined Dmitry’s forces in the first popular uprising against a tsar. When Tsar Boris died in April 1605, resistance to the Pretender Dmitry (also known as “False Dmitry”) broke down, and he became tsar—the only tsar ever raised to the throne by means of a military campaign and popular uprisings. Tsar Dmitry reigned for about a year before he was murdered by a small group of aristocrats. His assassination triggered a powerful civil war, essentially a duplicate of the civil war that had brought Dmitry to power. The usurper Vasily Shuisky denounced the dead tsar as an impostor, but Dmitry’s supporters successfully put forward the story that he had once again miraculously escaped death and would soon return to punish the traitors. So energetic was the response to the call to arms against Shuisky that civil war raged for many years and produced about a dozen more pretenders claiming to be Tsar Dmitry or other members of the old ruling dynasty. Starting in 1609, Russia’s internal disorder prompted Polish and Swedish military intervention, resulting in even greater misery and chaos. Eventually, an uneasy alliance was formed among Russian factions, and the Time of Troubles ended with the establishment of the Romanov dynasty in 1613. ORIGINS OF THE TROUBLES

The origins of the Time of Troubles were very complex. In the age of the gunpowder revolution, the princes of Moscow unified Russia, quickly transformed their country into a highly effective state geared to war, and expanded their realm with dizzying speed. In the process of building the largest

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country in Europe, however, they created a coercive central state bureaucracy that subjugated virtually all elements of Russian society and grossly overburdened the bulk of the population. Russian autocracy and imperialism contributed significantly to the development of a serious state crisis by the beginning of the seventeenth century. Tsar Ivan IV (“the Terrible”) personally deserves some of the blame for the Time of Troubles. His unsuccessful Livonian War (1558–1583) and his dreaded Oprichnina contributed to Russia’s serious problems, as did his imposition of high taxes and his decision to allow the lords to collect taxes directly from their peasants. Ivan’s policies and actions retarded Russian economic activity and resulted in the massive flight of peasants and townspeople to untaxed lands or to the southern frontier. That in turn contributed to declining state revenue and to the weakening of the tsar’s gentry militia, which was heavily dependent on peasant labor. In spite of clear signs of economic and social distress, Tsar Ivan’s successors continued Russia’s imperial drive to the south. Acting as Fyodor I’s regent, Boris Godunov took drastic steps to shore up state finances and the gentry cavalrymen in order to continue Russia’s rapid expansion to the south and east. In the 1590s, Godunov enserfed the Russian peasants, bound urban taxpayers to their taxpaying districts, and converted short-term contract slavery into real slavery. Those harsh measures did not solve Russia’s fiscal problems and actually made things much worse. Many towns became ghost towns, and Russia’s already staggering economy continued to decline. Godunov’s harsh policies of exploiting the population of the southern frontier and harnessing the cossacks to state service also contributed to the country’s problems. By the time Tsar Fyodor I died, Russia was suffering from a severe economic and social crisis, and many blamed Boris Godunov for their misery. THE FIRST PHASE OF THE TROUBLES

The Time of Troubles began with the political struggle following the extinction of the old ruling dynasty in 1598. Godunov easily defeated his rivals, including Fyodor Romanov (the future Patriarch Filaret, father of Mikhail Romanov), and quickly became tsar; but his reputation suffered badly in the process. Boris was accused by his rivals of having arranged the murder of Dmitry of Uglich in 1591 in order to clear a path to the throne for himself. He also suffered from a commonly held view that boyars were supposed to advise tsars,

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not become tsars. During the reign of Tsar Boris (1598–1605), Russia’s severe state crisis continued to deepen. In addition, Boris’s harassment of certain aristocratic families caused some of them to enter into secret conspiracies against him. It was the great famine of 1601–1603, however, that ruined Tsar Boris’s reputation and convinced many of his subjects that God was punishing Russia for the sins of its ruler. Successive crop failures resulted in the worst famine in Russian history, which wiped out up to a third of Russia’s population. When a man claiming to be Dmitry of Uglich appeared in Poland-Lithuania in 1603 seeking support to overthrow the usurper Godunov, many of Tsar Boris’s subjects were inclined to believe that this man really was Dmitry, somehow miraculously rescued from Godunov’s assassins and now returning to Russia to restore the old ruling dynasty—and God’s grace. Tsar Boris and Patriarch Job denounced the Pretender Dmitry as an impostor named Grigory Otrepev, but that did not stop enthusiasm for the true tsar from growing, especially on the southern frontier and among the cossacks. Russia’s first civil war started with the invasion of the country by the Pretender Dmitry in October 1604. Helped by self-serving Polish lords such as Jerzy Mniszech (father of Marina Mniszech), Dmitry managed to field a small army for his campaign for the Russian throne. As soon as he crossed the border into southwestern Russia, Dmitry was greeted with enthusiasm by much of the frontier population. Several towns voluntarily surrendered to him, and many Russian soldiers (and their commanders) quickly joined Dmitry’s army. Large numbers of cossacks also swelled the Pretender’s forces as he advanced. In December 1604, Dmitry’s army defeated Tsar Boris’s much larger army near Novgorod-Seversky, but in January 1605 the Pretender was decisively defeated at the battle of Dobrynichi. Dmitry hastily retreated to Putivl while Tsar Boris’s army wasted time waging a terror campaign against the local populations that had dared to support the Pretender. By the spring of 1605, Dmitry had recovered, and his forces were growing rapidly. Tsar Boris’s army, by contrast, got bogged down trying to capture rebel-held Kromy, a key fortress guarding the road to Moscow. The death of Boris Godunov in April 1605 paved the way to tsardom for Dmitry. Boris was succeeded by his son, Tsar Fyodor II, but the rebellion of Fyodor’s army at Kromy on May 7 sealed the fate of the Godunov dynasty. On June 1, 1605, a bloodless uprising in Moscow overthrew Tsar Fy-

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odor. Dmitry then entered the capital in triumph, and he was crowned on June 20. THE SECOND PHASE OF THE TROUBLES

Tsar Dmitry ruled wisely for about a year before being assassinated by Vasily Shuisky, whose seizure of power reignited the civil war. Dmitry’s reign is controversial; many historians have been convinced that he was an impostor named Grigory Otrepev who never commanded the respect of the aristocracy or of the Russian people. In fact, Tsar Dmitry was not the monk-sorcerer Otrepev; instead, he impressed his contemporaries as an intelligent, well-educated, courageous young warriorprince who truly believed that he was Ivan the Terrible’s youngest son. Tsar Dmitry was also a popular ruler. He did, however, open himself up to criticism for his lack of zealousness in observing court rituals and for a perceived laxity in his commitment to Russian Orthodox Christianity. Criticism notwithstanding, it is significant that Tsar Dmitry was toppled by a coup d’état involving a small number of disgruntled aristocrats, not by a popular uprising. His assassination, during the celebration of his wedding to the Polish Princess Marina Mniszech in May 1606, shocked the nation and very quickly rekindled the civil war that had brought him to power. The renewed civil war in the name of the true tsar Dmitry raged for years and nearly destroyed Russia. Within a few hours of Tsar Dmitry’s assassination, his supporters successfully put forward the story that he had once again miraculously escaped death and would soon return to punish Shuisky and his co-conspirators. One of Tsar Dmitry’s courtiers, Mikhail Molchanov, escaped from Moscow and assumed Dmitry’s identity as he traveled to Sambor (the home of the Mniszechs) in Poland-Lithuania. There he set up Tsar Dmitry’s court and began seeking support for the struggle against Shuisky. Molchanov sent letters to Russian towns and to the cossacks of the southern frontier declaring that Tsar Dmitry was still alive and urging them to rise up against the usurper Tsar Vasily. Those appeals had a powerful effect. Enthusiastic rebel armies led by Ivan Bolotnikov and other commanders quickly pushed Tsar Vasily’s forces out of southern Russia and reached the suburbs of Moscow by October 1606. During the siege of the capital, however, Shuisky bribed two rebel commanders to switch sides. Istoma Pashkov’s betrayal of the rebel cause occurred during a major battle on December 2, forcing Bolotnikov’s men to break off the siege and re-

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treat south. After enduring long sieges in Kaluga and then Tula, Bolotnikov was finally forced to surrender to Tsar Vasily in October 1607, but his men (with their weapons) were allowed to go free. Many of them immediately rejoined the civil war against Shuisky by entering the service of the second false Dmitry, an impostor who suddenly appeared in southwestern Russia during the summer of 1607. The second false Dmitry was nothing more than a puppet of his Polish handlers, but his name attracted men from far and wide. Soon Dmitry took up residence in the village of Tushino and waged war against Shuisky in Moscow. The second false Dmitry managed to attract many Russian aristocrats into his service; Filaret Romanov became Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church in Tushino. When Marina Mniszech was released by Tsar Vasily, she, too, went to Tushino where she recognized her putative husband and eventually produced an heir, little Ivan Dmitriyevich. For over a year, war-torn Russia had two tsars and two capitals. Just as Shuisky’s luck appeared to be running out, however, the excesses of Tsar Dmitry’s foreign troops and cossacks caused a fullscale revolt against the second false Dmitry throughout much of northern Russia. Starting in late 1608, ordinary townspeople began fighting back against constant pillaging by Tsar Dmitry’s troops and heavy taxes collected by his rapacious agents. Tsar Vasily eventually turned to Sweden for assistance against the second false Dmitry. In early 1609, troops raised by King Karl IX crossed the border and assisted Shuisky’s forces in clearing Dmitry’s supporters out of north Russia. Karl also gobbled up Russian territory for himself, immediately provoking Polish intervention in Russia. The Polish king Sigismund III invaded Russia and laid siege to the great fortress of Smolensk. Under pressure from all sides, the Tushino camp broke up during the winter of 1609–1610. The second false Dmitry and Marina fled to Kaluga, but some Tushinite courtiers traveled to Smolensk to beg Sigismund to permit his son, Wladyslaw, to become tsar of Russia. The king seemed to agree, and soon a Polish army headed toward Moscow. In June 1610, at the battle of Klushino, the Poles decisively defeated Tsar Vasily’s army. In July, exasperated Russian aristocrats seized Tsar Vasily and forced him to become a monk. Eventually, the powerful Russian lords who gained control of Moscow (the Council of Seven) agreed to allow the Poles to occupy the capital in the name of Tsar Wladyslaw.

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A grand procession of Russian dignitaries (including Filaret Romanov and Vasily Shuisky) was then sent to parley with King Sigismund about Wladyslaw’s accession, but the king threw them in prison. Sigismund had decided to conquer Russia and not to rule it indirectly through his son. In Moscow, the Council of Seven was unceremoniously shoved aside as a brutal military dictatorship was established by the Poles. The Polish occupation of Moscow shocked much of Russia, and soon ordinary people began to organize to oust the foreigners. The murder of the second false Dmitry in December 1610 was celebrated by the Poles, but it actually removed the chief obstacle to unifying the Russian people against foreign intervention. A powerful but still disjointed patriotic movement slowly began to develop throughout the land and even in Moscow. Various Russian factions warily reached out to one other and with great difficulty coordinated operations against the hated Catholic Poles. Inside Moscow, protests against the Latin heretics by Patriarch Hermogen got him thrown into prison; but, before he starved to death, Hermogen sent letters to many towns urging his fellow Orthodox Christians to rise up and throw the evil foreigners out of Russia. Hermogen’s call to arms was highly effective. By early 1611, a patriotic Russian commander, Dmitry Pozharsky, forged an uneasy alliance with forces that had been loyal to the second false Dmitry, including the cossack commander Ivan Zarutsky, who championed the cause of Marina Mniszech and Ivan Dmitriyevich. Pozharsky attempted to liberate Moscow in March; but, after bitter street fighting during which the Poles burned much of the outer city, Pozharsky’s patriots were forced to retreat and regroup. By June 1611, the patriots managed to form a highly representative council of the entire realm to coordinate military operations against the foreigners and to lay the foundation for a temporary national government. Pozharsky and others made sure that militarily useful cossacks who were willing to join the national militia received adequate food and the promise of freedom even if they had formerly been serfs or slaves. Such unprecedented promises attracted many new recruits to the patriot cause. Due to rivalry among its commanders, however, the national liberation movement stumbled during the following months. The unscrupulous Zarutsky tried to take over as militia commander, but other patriots wanted nothing to do with his unruly cossacks or little Ivan Dmitriyevich. Unfor-

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tunately, various factions ended up fighting against each other, and for many months chaos reigned in Russia. Shortly after the Poles captured Smolensk in June 1611 and the Swedes captured Novgorod in July, some beleaguered Russians asked the king of Sweden to consider putting his son on the Russian throne. Most patriots, however, dreamed of a Russian tsar. By late 1611, a new patriotic movement and a new military force capable of salvaging Russia’s national sovereignty began to take shape in Nizhny Novgorod. There a butcher named Kuzma Minin convinced his fellow citizens to raise money for an army to liberate Russia and to restore order to the realm. Minin chose Prince Pozharsky to be the commander-in-chief of the new militia, and Minin himself became the patriotic movement’s treasurer with very broad powers. Many Russian towns and villages quickly joined the movement, and Yaroslavl soon emerged as the headquarters of the provisional government. Pozharsky succeeded admirably in getting cossacks and others to join his growing militia; and once Zarutsky broke with the national liberation movement and rode off to the south with Marina Mniszech and Ivan Dmitriyevich, Pozharsky was able to concentrate on the siege of Moscow. The Polish garrison in Moscow surrendered on October 27, 1612. As soon as the capital was liberated, urgent and unprecedented messages were sent throughout the country calling for representatives of all free men (nobles, gentry, soldiers, townspeople, clergy, peasants from crown and state lands, and cossacks) to come as quickly as possible to Moscow. Soon the most representative Assembly of the Land (Zemsky sobor) in Russian history gathered to choose a new tsar. Under intense pressure from the cossacks (who by then made up half of the national militia), Filaret Romanov’s son Mikhail was elected on February 7, 1613.

Adolphus agree to negotiate with Tsar Mikhail. The Treaty of Stolbovo (1617) restored Novgorod to the Russians, but the Swedes kept enough captured territory to block Russian access to the Baltic Sea until the time of Peter the Great. After 1613, Polish armies tried repeatedly to try to put Tsar Wladyslaw on the Russian throne. The sturdy defense of Moscow in 1618 by Prince Pozharsky, the capital’s civilian population, and the cossacks (who were very badly treated by the Romanov regime) finally convinced the Poles to negotiate. Poland gained many west Russian towns (including Smolensk) from the Truce of Deulino (1618), but Filaret Romanov was released from Polish captivity. In many ways, the celebration of Patriarch Filaret’s return to Moscow in 1619 marked the real end of the Time of Troubles. The Time of Troubles had been a terrible nightmare for the Russian people. By the time the Troubles ended, Russia’s economy was shattered and many towns were ruined. As a result, the early Romanovs faced serious fiscal problems. The conditions of overtaxed townspeople, serfs, and gentry cavalrymen actually worsened during the early seventeenth century and set the stage for sharp conflicts under Tsar Mikhail’s son, Tsar Alexis. Ironically, the rapid expansion of the Romanov empire after 1613 caused many people to conclude incorrectly that the Time of Troubles did not have much long-term impact. In fact, the terrifying experience of the Troubles produced a powerful consensus within Russian society in favor of enhancing the already great authority and prestige of the tsar (and the patriarch). That consensus significantly strengthened Russian autocracy and imperialism, and it also slowed down the development of capitalism and the emergence of civil society in Russia.

See also:

ASSEMBLY OF THE LAND; BOLOTNIKOV, IVAN

ISAYEVICH; DMITRY OF UGLICH; DMITRY, FALSE; FEDOR IVANOVICH; FILARET ROMANOV, PATRIARCH; GODUNOV, BORIS FYODOROVICH; IVAN IV; OPRI-

The Time of Troubles officially ended with the crowning of Tsar Mikhail on July 21, 1613, but it took several years to restore order to a devastated land. While bureaucrats and members of the Assembly of the Land worked feverishly to rebuild the Russian government, Tsar Mikhail dispatched military forces to destroy Zarutsky, Marina Mniszech, and Ivan Dmitriyevich. They were finally captured and executed in 1614. Kicking the Poles and Swedes out of Russia proved to be far more difficult. Only after a Swedish invasion was stalled by the heroic defense of Pskov in 1615–1616, did King Gustavus

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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CHNINA; OTREPEV, GRIGORY; POZHARSKY, DMITRY MIKHAILOVICH; ROMANOV, MIKHAIL FYODOROVICH; SHUISKY, VASILY IVANOVICH

Barbour, Philip. (1966). Dimitry Called the Pretender: Tsar and Great Prince of All Russia, 1605–1606. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Bussow, Conrad. (1994). The Disturbed State of the Russian Realm, tr. G. Edward Orchard. Montreal: McGillQueen’s.

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Dunning, Chester. (2001). Russia’s First Civil War: The Time of Troubles and the Founding of the Romanov Dynasty. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. Howe, Sonia, ed. (1916). The False Dmitri: A Russian Romance and Tragedy Described by British Eye-Witnesses, 1604–1612. London: Williams and Norgate. Margeret, Jacques. (1983). The Russian Empire and Grand Duchy of Muscovy: A Seventeenth-Century French Account, tr. and ed. Chester S. L. Dunning. Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh University Press. Massa, Isaac. (1982). A Short History of the Beginnings and Origins of These Present Wars in Moscow under the Reigns of Various Sovereigns down to the Year 1610, tr. G. Edward Orchard. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Perrie, Maureen. (1995). Pretenders and Popular Monarchism in Early Modern Russia: The False Tsars of the Time of Troubles. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Platonov, S. F. (1970). The Time of Troubles, tr. John T. Alexander. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Skrynnikov, Ruslan. (1982). Boris Godunov, tr. Hugh Graham. Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press. Skrynnikov, Ruslan. (1988). The Time of Troubles: Russia in Crisis, 1604–1618, tr. Hugh Graham. Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press.

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the new, they leveled the existing walls down to the foundations and commissioned the architect Vasily Stasov to construct a neo-Byzantine church. This church was demolished by the Soviets in 1935 and the site covered with pavement. From twentieth-century excavations, however, there emerged a plausible notion of the original plan, with the arms of a cross delineated by the aisles at the center of the church. While there is no way of determining with any accuracy the church’s appearance, some sense of its decoration may be gleaned from the salvaged fragments of mosaics, frescoes, and marble ornaments. The walls were probably composed of alternating layers of stone and flat brick in a mortar of lime and crushed brick.

See also: ARCHITECTURE; CATHEDRAL OF ST. SOPHIA, KIEV; KIEVAN RUS; VLADIMIR MONOMAKH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brumfield, William Craft. (1993). A History of Russian Architecture. New York: Cambridge University Press. Rappoport, Alexander P. (1995). Building the Churches of Kievan Russia. Brookfield, VT: Variorum. WILLIAM CRAFT BRUMFIELD

Zolkiewski, Stanislas. (1959). Expedition to Moscow, tr. and ed. J. Giertych. London: Polonica. CHESTER DUNNING

TKACHEV, PETR NIKITICH (1844–1886), revolutionary Russian writer.

TITHE CHURCH, KIEV The most ancient church in Kiev was built between 989 and 996 by Prince Vladimir, who dedicated it to the Virgin Mary and supported it with one-tenth of his revenues. Destroyed by a fire in 1017 and reconstructed in 1039, the church was looted in 1177 and in 1203 by neighboring princes, and it was finally destroyed in 1240 during the siege of Kiev by the Mongol armies of Khan Batu. Various stories exist concerning the cause of the structure’s collapse; as one of the last bastions of the Kievans, it came under the assault of Mongol battering rams, and it may have been further weakened by the survivors’ attempt to tunnel out. Nonetheless, part of the eastern walls remained standing until the nineteenth century, when, in 1825, church authorities decided to erect a new church on the site. Rejecting the idea of incorporating the old walls into

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The voluminous writings of the revolutionist Petr Nikitich Tkachev were considered by Vladimir Lenin to be required reading for his Bolshevik followers. Lenin said that Tkachev, a Jacobin-Blanquist revolutionary in Russia of the 1870s, was, “one of us.” Indeed, Soviet publicists in the 1920s (before Lenin’s death) treated Tkachev, once a collaborator of the terrorist Sergei Nechayev, as a prototypical Bolshevik. As one writer put it, he was “the forerunner of Lenin.” This apposition was dropped, however, after 1924, when Stalin introduced the Lenin Cult. This Stalinist line did not acknowledge any pre–1917 revolutionary as a match for Lenin’s vaunted status as mankind’s unique, genius thinker. The proto-Bolshevik concepts developed by Tkachev in such publications as the illegal newspaper Nabat (Tocsin) and in publications in France,

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where he resided as an exile, consisted of the following points: 1) a revolutionary seizure of power under Russian conditions must be the work of an elitist group of enlightened, vanguard thinkers; to wait for the “snail-like . . . routine-ridden” people themselves spontaneously to adopt true revolutionary ideas was a case of futile majoritarianism; 2) the revolutionary socialist elite would establish a dictatorship of the workers and a workers’ state; 3) new generations of socialists could thus be reeducated and purged of old, private-property mentality; 4) rejecting Hegel and his protracted dialectic, Tkachev called for a proletarian revolution tomorrow, claiming that to wait for private propertymindedness to sink deeper within the Russian population was unacceptable; instead, a revolutionary jump (skachok) must be made over all intermediate socioeconomic stages (Tkachev parted with the Marxists on this point, describing Hegelianism as metaphysical rubbish); 4) to ensure the purging of old ways, the new workers’ state must set up a KOB (Komitet Obshchestvennoi Bezopasnosti), or Committee for Public Security, modeled on Maximilien Robespierre’s similar committee in striking anticipation of the Soviet Cheka, later OGPU and KGB.

terred since the cemetery plot in the Cimètiere Parisien d’Ivry was not adequately financed. His remains were cremated.

See also:

BOLSHEVISM; ENGELS, FRIEDRICH; LENIN,

VLADIMIR ILICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Volkogonov, Dmitri. (1994). Lenin: A New Biography. New York: Free Press. Weeks, Albert L. (1968). The First Bolshevik: A Political Biography of Peter Tkachev. New York: New York University Press. ALBERT L. WEEKS

TOGAN, AHMED ZEKI VALIDOV (1890–1970), prominent Bashkir nationalist activist during the early Soviet period and wellknown scholar of Turkic historical studies.

When Tkachev died in a psychiatric hospital in Paris in 1886 (he was said to have suffered paralysis of the brain), the well-known Russian revolutionist Petr Lavrov delivered the eulogy together with others such as the French Blanquist Eduard Vaillant. Years later, Tkachev’s body was disin-

Born in a Bashkir village in Ufa province and educated at Kazan University, Ahmed Zeki Validi (Russianized as Validov) had begun a promising career as an Orientalist scholar before the revolution. In May 1917 Validov participated in the All Russian Muslim Congress in Moscow, where he advocated federal reorganization of the Russian state and criticized plans of some Tatar politicians for extraterritorial autonomy in a unitary state. By the end of the year, Validov had emerged as primary leader of a small Bashkir nationalist movement that promulgated (in December 1917) an autonomous Bashkir republic based in Orenburg. Arrested by Soviet forces in February 1918, Validov escaped in April and joined the emerging anti-Bolshevik movement as full-scale civil war broke out that summer. Attempts to organize the Bashkir republic and separate Bashkir military forces under White auspices flagged, particularly after Admiral Kolchak took charge of the White movement. In February 1919 Validov and most of his colleagues defected to the Soviet side in return for the promise of complete Bashkir autonomy. However, sixteen months of increasingly frustrating collaboration with Soviet power ended in June 1920 when Validov departed to join the Basmachis in Central Asia, hoping to link the Bashkir search for autonomy to a larger movement for Turkic independence from Russian colonial rule. These hopes were dashed with Basmachi defeat.

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In a famous letter written to Tkachev by Friedrich Engels, the latter disputed Tkachev on the Tkachevist notion that Russia could become a global pacesetter by independently making the social revolution in Russia, a backward country, in Marxist terms, building socialism directly on the basis of the old Russian commune (obshchina). In his letter to Engels in 1874, Tkachev had lectured Marx’s number one collaborator to the effect that Karl Marx simply did not understand the Russian situation, that Marxist strategies were “totally unsuitable for our country.” Ironically, this allegation became the mirror image of Georgy Plekhanov’s point d’appui in his dispute with Russian Jacobins in the mid-1880s, since Plekhanov, basing himself on Hegelian historical teaching of orthodox Marxism, regarded Jacobinism and Blanquism as a distortion of true Marxian revolutionism. For his part, years later Lenin, echoing Tkachev, retorted by describing Plekhanov as a feeble, wait-and-see gradualist.

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After leaving Turkestan in 1923, Validov taught at Istanbul University in Turkey (1925–1932), where he adopted the surname Togan. He went on to earn a doctorate at the University of Vienna (1932–1935) and taught at Bonn and Göttingen Universities (1935–1939). Togan returned to Istanbul University in 1939 and remained there until his death in 1970. Togan’s scholarly output was prodigious, with over four hundred publications, largely in Turkish and German, on the history of the Turkic peoples from antiquity to the twentieth century, including his own remarkable memoirs (Hatiralar). During these years of exile, Validov and Validovism (validovshchina) lived on in the Soviet lexicon as the epitome of reactionary Bashkir nationalism, and accusations of connection with Validov proved fatal for hundreds if not thousands of Bashkirs and other Muslims in Russia. Since the early 1990s Togan’s name has been rehabilitated in his homeland, where he is now recognized as the father of today’s Republic of Bashkortostan.

See also:

BASHKORTISTAN AND THE BASHKIRS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Paksoy, H. B. (1995). “Basmachi Movement from Within: Account of Zeki Velidi Togan.” Nationalities Papers 23:373–399. Schafer, Daniel E. (2001). “Local Politics and the Birth of the Republic of Bashkortostan, 1919–1920.” In A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Era of Lenin and Stalin, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin. New York: Oxford University Press. DANIEL E. SCHAFER

TOLSTAYA, TATIANA NIKITICHNA (b. 1951), Russian writer. Tolstaya is an original, captivating fiction writer of the perestroika and post-Soviet period. Born in 1951 in Leningrad, she graduated from Leningrad State University with a degree in Philology and Classics, then worked as an editor at Nauka before publishing her first short stories in the early 1980s. Their imaginative brilliance and humane depth won success with both Soviet and international readers. Her activities expanded subsequently to include university teaching (at Skidmore College, among other institutions), journalistic writing, and completion of a dark futuristic novel, The Slynx.

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Tolstaya’s initial impact on Russian letters was made by a series of short stories centering on the conflict between imagination, spirit, and value, on the one hand, and a bleak social order of conformity and consumerism, cultural and spiritual degradation, and rapacious and cynical materialism on the other. Although she draws on the texture of late Soviet reality with witty, acerbic penetration, her critique of modern society travels well. The mythical dimensions of this conflict are highlighted in her stories by frequent use of fantastic elements and folkloric allusions, such as the transformation of the self-centered Serafim into Gorynych the Dragon (Serafim), or the bird of death, Sirin, symbolizing Petya’s loss of innocence in “Date with a Bird.” Her most notable stories are works of virtuosic invention. Denisov of the Dantesque “Sleepwalker in the Mist” awakens in mid-life surrounded by dark woods and takes up the search for meaning; his various attempts at creation, leadership, and sacrifice ending in farce. Peters of “Peters” is a lumpish being without attraction or charm (one coworker calls him “some kind of endocrinal dodo”) who spends his life in quixotic search of romantic love; in old age, beaten down by humiliation, he triumphs by his praise of life: “indifferent, ungrateful, lying, teasing, senseless, alien—beautiful, beautiful, beautiful.” Sonia of “Sonia” is a halfwitted, unattractive, but selfless creature, tormented by her sophisticated friends through the fiction of a married admirer, Nikolai, whom she can never meet. The fabrication is kept up through years of correspondence in which the chief tormentor, Ada, finds her womanhood irresistibly subverted. In the Leningrad blockade Sonia gives her life to save Ada/Nikolai, without realizing the fiction. The fantastic elements in Tolstaya’s works have led to comparisons with the magical realism of modern Latin American fiction, comparisons which are only roughly valid. The association of Tolstaya’s work with the women’s prose (zhenskaya proza) of late Soviet literature also requires qualification: although women are frequently protagonists in her stories as impaired visionaries and saints, they are just as often the objects of bitter satire, implacable enforcers of social conventionality. Tolstaya’s remarkable novel The Slynx depicts a post-nuclear Moscow populated by mutants, combining the political traits of the Tatar Yoke and Muscovite Russia with characteristics of Stalinist

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and later Soviet regimes. The narrative, displaying to advantage Tolstaya’s humor and ear for popular language, presents a negative Bildungsroman. The uncouth but decent and robust protagonist, Benedikt, given favorable circumstances including a library, leisure to read, and friends from the earlier times, fails to develop and cross the line from animal existence to spiritual, and as a consequence the culture itself fails to regain organic life. This pessimistic historical vision seems rooted in the disappointments of post-Soviet Russian political and social life.

See also:

PERESTROIKA

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Goscilo, Helena. (1996). The Explosive World of Tatyana N. Tolstaya’s Fiction. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Tolstaya, Tatiana. (1989). On the Golden Porch, tr. Antonina W. Bouis. New York: Knopf. Tolstaya, Tatiana. (1992). Sleepwalker in a Fog, tr. Jamey Gambrell. New York: Knopf.

Russian State, from which he lifted passages verbatim for his own work. Tolstoy’s lyric poetry, most notably “Against the Current” (1867) and “John Damascene” (1858), were strongly influenced by German romanticism. He also wrote satirical verse. Collaborating with the Zhemchuzhnikov brothers, he created the fictional writer Kozma Prutkov, a petty bureaucrat who parodied the poetry of the day and wrote banal aphorisms. Karamzin’s History also served as the inspiration for Tolstoy’s History of the Russian State from Gostomysl to Timashev, a parody of Russian history from its founding until 1868, which contained vicious characteristics of the Russian monarch. The manuscript circulated privately between 1868, when it was completed, and 1883, when it first appeared in print.

See also:

KARAMZIN, NIKOLAI MIKHAILOVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Tolstaya, Tatiana. (2003). Pushkin’s Children: Writings on Russia and Russians, tr. Jamey Gambrell. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Bartlett, Rosamund. (1998). “Aleksei Konstantinovich Tolstoi 1817–1875.” In Reference Guide to Russian Literature, ed. Neil Cornwell, 806–808. London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers.

Tolstaya, Tatiana. (2003). The Slynx, tr. Jamey Gambrell. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Dalton, Margaret. (1972). A. K. Tolstoy. New York: Twayne.

HAROLD D. BAKER

ELIZABETH JONES HEMENWAY

TOLSTOY, ALEXEI KONSTANTINOVICH (1817–1875), writer of drama, fiction, and poetry; considered to be the most important nineteenthcentury Russian historical dramatist. A member of the Russian nobility, Alexei Tolstoy was expected to serve at court and in the diplomatic service, which prevented him from writing full time until relatively late in his life (1861). Nevertheless, he managed to produce a novel (Prince Serebryanny, 1862) and a dramatic trilogy (The Death of Ivan the Terrible, 1866; Tsar Fyodor Ivanovich, 1868; Tsar Boris, 1870), both based on the time of Ivan the Terrible. Although, by the time Prince Serebryanny was published, the fad for historical novels had long passed, it nevertheless enjoyed some popularity. Due to censorship restrictions, only the first of the three plays was performed during the author’s lifetime, but all three were produced numerous times during the Soviet period. For all these works, Tolstoy relied on Karamzin’s History of the

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TOLSTOY, LEO NIKOLAYEVICH (1828–1910), Russian prose writer and, in his later years, dissident and religious leader, best known for his novels War and Peace and Anna Karenina. CHILDHOOD AND YOUTH (1828–1852)

The fourth son of Count Nikolai Ilich Tolstoy and Princess Maria Nikolaevich Volkonskaya, Tolstoy was born into the highest echelon of Russian nobility. Despite the early deaths of his mother (1830) and father (1837), Tolstoy led the typically idyllic childhood of a nineteenth-century aristocrat. He spent virtually every summer of his life at his family’s ancestral estate, Yasnaya Polyana, located about 130 miles (200 kilometers) south of Moscow. Although he initially flunked entrance exams in history and geography, Tolstoy entered Kazan University in 1844. He was dismissed from the department of Oriental languages after failing his first

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Leo Tolstoy sitting at his desk in Yasnaya Polyana in 1908. © CORBIS

semester’s final examinations. He reentered the next year to pursue a law degree, and, two years later, knowing that he was about to be dismissed once again, he requested leave for reasons of spoiled health and domestic circumstances. Tolstoy returned to Yasnaya Polyana with grandiose plans for self-improvement, experiments in estate management, and philanthropic projects. Over the next few years, he made little headway on these plans, but he did manage to acquire large gambling debts, a bad reputation, and several bouts of venereal disease. He also began keeping a detailed diary that, with some significant lapses, he kept for his entire life. These journal entries occupy twelve volumes, each several hundred pages long, of his Complete Collected Works.

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Tolstoy’s first published work, Childhood (1852), appeared in the influential journal The Contemporary, and was signed simply “L.N.” The work was enthusiastically praised for the complex psychological analysis and description conveyed by the work’s seemingly simple style and episodic, nearly plotless, structure. The five years after the publication of Childhood saw Tolstoy’s literary star rise: he published sequels to Childhood (Boyhood [1852–1864] and Youth [1857]) and a handful of war stories. (Tolstoy had enlisted as an artillery cadet in 1852 and seen action in the Caucasus and later in the RussoTurkish war). Almost without exception, the stories enjoyed success with both critics and readers.

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In 1857 Tolstoy left the army as a decorated veteran and traveled Europe, where he wrote a run of poorly received stories and novellas that were praised for their artistry but sharply criticized for their plainspoken condemnation of civilization and apathy toward the burning questions of the day. In part because of this criticism Tolstoy announced in 1859 his renunciation of literary activity, declared himself forevermore dedicated to educating the masses of Russia, and founded a school for peasant boys at Yasnaya Polyana, which he directed until its closure in 1863. Tolstoy produced few literary works during this time, though he wrote several articles on pedagogy in the journal Yasnaya Polyana, which he published privately. This was not the last time Tolstoy was involved in education. A decade after closing the second Yasnaya Polyana school he began an educational series The New Russian Primer for Reading, and spent nearly two decades working on it. The primer sold more than a million copies, making it the most read and most profitable of Tolstoy’s works during his lifetime. MARRIAGE AND THE GREAT NOVELS (1862–1877)

heroes of the war, the novel contends, were instead individual Russians—soldiers, peasants, nobles, townspeople—who reacted instinctively and unconsciously, yet successfully, to an invasion of their homeland. In 1873 Tolstoy began his second great novel, Anna Karenina (1873–1878), which has one of the most famous first lines in world literature: “All happy families resemble one another, each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” The novel’s unhappy families are the Karenins, Aleksey and Anna, and the Oblonskys, Stiva (Anna’s brother) and Dolly. Anna feels herself trapped in marriage to her boring if devoted husband, and begins an affair with an attractive if dim officer named Vronsky. Aleksey denies Anna’s request for a divorce, and she decides defiantly to live openly with Vronsky. Their illicit affair is simultaneously condemned and celebrated by society. Stiva is a charismatic sybarite who philanders through life taking advantage of Dolly’s innocence and preoccupation looking after the household. The third, happy couple of the novel, Konstantin Levin and Kitty (Dolly’s youngest sister), are unmarried at the beginning of the story. Their inconstant courtship and eventual marriage take place mostly as the background to the drama of the Oblonskys and Karenins. The novel ends with Anna, nearly insane from guilt and stress, throwing herself beneath a train. Levin, now a family man, undergoes a religious conversion when he realizes that his constant preoccupation with questions of life and death, combined with an innate inclination to philosophize, had prevented his seeing the miraculous simplicity of life itself.

In the fall of 1862 Tolstoy married Sofya Andreevna Behrs, the daughter of a former playmate and a girl half his age. Their marriage of nearly fifty years produced ten offspring who survived childhood and several who did not. Though tumultuous, their early relationship was mostly happy. In 1863 Tolstoy closed his school and commenced work on his magnum opus, War and Peace (1863–1869). Partly a historical account of the period from 1805 to 1812, partly a novelistic description of quotidian life of fictional characters, and partly a historiographical animadversion on conventional historical accounts, War and Peace was initially perceived as defying generic convention, sharing characteristics with the didactic essay, history, epic, and novel. Perhaps reflecting its chaotic structure, War and Peace portrays war as intensely chaotic. It ridicules the tsar’s and military strategists’ self-aggrandizing claims that they were responsible for the Russians’ victory over la Grande Armée. The sole effective commander was General Mikhail Kutuzov, who in previous historical accounts had been portrayed as an inept blunderer. In the novel he is depicted as the ideal commander inasmuch as his modus operandi derives from the maxim “patience and time”—that is, he relies little on plans and military science, and instead on a mix of instincts and resignation to fate. The true

Notwithstanding his sensual temperament, Tolstoy had always suffered from sporadic bouts of intense desire to adopt an ascetic’s life. While still at work on Anna Karenina, Tolstoy began A Confession (1875–1884), the first-person narrative of a man— very similar to Levin at the end of Anna Karenina— who, despite his success and seeming happiness, finds himself in the throes of depression and suicidal thoughts from which he is rescued by religion. Although the rhetoric of the work suggests a radical conversion—Tolstoy later described the time as an “ardent inner perestroika of my whole outlook on life”—some critics have cast doubt on the fundamentality of the conversion. As early as 1855, for instance, Tolstoy wrote in his diary plans to create a new religion “cleansed of faith and mys-

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tery, a practical religion, not promising future bliss, but giving bliss on earth.” Tolstoy spent the 1880s and 1890s developing his religious views in a series of works: A Critique of Dogmatic Theology (1880), A Translation and Unification of the Gospels (1881), What I Believe (1884), and The Kingdom of God Is within You (1893). Most of these works were banned by the religious or secular censor in Russia, but were either printed illegally in Russia or printed abroad and clandestinely smuggled in, thus adumbrating the fate of many Soviet works printed as samizat or tamizdat. The core of Tolstoy’s belief is contained in God’s commandments in the Sermon on the Mount: do not resist evil, swear no oaths, do not lust, bear no malice, love your enemy. Tolstoy is everywhere and at pains to point out that adherence to these injunctions, especially nonresistance to evil, inevitably leads to the abolition of all compulsory legislation, police, prisons, armies, and, ultimately, to the abolition of the state itself. He described his beliefs as Christian-anarchism. Vladimir Nabokov described them as a neutral blend between a kind of Hindu Nirvana and the New Testament, and indeed Tolstoy himself considered his beliefs as a syncretic reconciliation of Christianity with all the wisdom of the ages, especially Taoism and Stoicism. Following this creed, Tolstoy became a vegetarian; gave up smoking, drinking, and hunting; and partially renounced the privileges of his class—for instance, he often wore peasant garb, embraced physical labor as a necessary part of a moral life, and refused to take part in social functions that he deemed corrupt. His new life led to increased strife with his wife and family, who did not share Tolstoy’s convictions. It also attracted international attention. Beginning in the 1880s, hundreds of journalists, wisdom-seekers, and tourists trekked to Yasnaya Polyana to meet the now-famous Russian writerturned-prophet. Tolstoy, who had always kept up extensive correspondence with friends and family, was inundated with letters from the curious and questing. In his lifetime he wrote 10,000 letters and received 50,000. In 1891 he renounced copyright over many of his literary works. Free of copyright restriction and royalties, publishing houses around the world issued impressive runs of Tolstoy’s works almost immediately upon their official publication in Russia. In 1901 his international fame was increased when Tolstoy was excommunicated for blasphemy from the Russian Orthodox Church.

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In addition to works on philosophy, religion, and social criticism, Tolstoy penned during the last decades of his life a number of works of the highest literary merit, notably the novella The Death of Ivan Ilich (1882), the affecting story of a man forced to admit the meaninglessness of his own life in the face of impending death; and Hadji Murat (1896–1904, published posthumously), a beautifully wrought but uncompleted novel set during the Russian imperialistic expansion in the Caucasus. Tolstoy’s third long novel, Resurrection (1889–1899), though inferior in artistic quality to his other novels, is a compelling casuistical account of a man’s attempt to undo the wrongs he has committed. Tolstoy also wrote an influential and debated body of art criticism. What Is Art? (1896–1898) attacked art for not fulfilling its true mission, namely, the uniting of people into a universal collective. His On Shakespeare and Drama (1903–1904) dismissed Shakespeare as a charlatan. Increasingly distressed by domestic conflict and angst over the incommensurability of his life with his beliefs, Tolstoy left home in secrecy in the autumn of 1910. His flight was immediately broadcast by the international media, which succeeded in tracking him down to the railway stop Astapovo (later renamed Leo Tolstoy), where he lay dying of congestive heart failure brought on by pneumonia. What could only be described as a media circus was assembled outside the stationmaster’s house when Tolstoy died early in the morning of November 7, 1910. His final words were “Truth, I love much.”

See also:

ANARCHISM; GOLDEN AGE OF RUSSIAN LITERA-

TURE

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Eikhenbaum, Boris. (1972). The Young Tolstoy, tr. Gary Kern. Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis. Eikhenbaum, Boris. (1982). Tolstoi in the Sixties, tr. Duffield White. Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis. Eikhenbaum, Boris. (1982). Tolstoi in the Seventies, tr. Albert Kaspin. Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis. Gustafson, Richard F. (1986). Leo Tolstoy: Resident and Stranger: A Study in Fiction and Theology. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Morson, G. S. (1987). Hidden in Plain View: Narrative and Creative Potentials in War and Peace. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Orwin, Donna Tussing. (1993). Tolstoy’s Art and Thought, 1847–1880. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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Orwin, Donna Tussing, ed. (2002). Cambridge Companion to Tolstoy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Wasiolek, Edward. (1978). Tolstoy’s Major Fiction. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Wynn, Charters. (1996). From the Factory to the Kremlin: Mikhail Tomsky and the Russian Worker. Washington, DC: National Council for Soviet and East European Research.

Wilson, A. N. (1988). Tolstoy. New York: W. W. Norton and Company.

ALISON ROWLEY

MICHAEL A. DENNER

TORKY TOMSKY, MIKHAIL PAVLOVICH (1880–1936), Russian union activist. Tomsky was a leading Old Bolshevik and trade union activist who committed suicide before he could be tried during Josef Stalin’s purges. Tomsky was born Mikhail Efremov into a workingclass environment. He began to work in a factory in adolescence and eventually became a printer. He joined the Social Democrats in 1904 and soon turned to union organizing. Between 1906 and 1909 his activities led to a series of arrests that was interspersed with party work whenever he was free. During this period he adopted the pseudonym Tomsky. In 1911 he began a five-year term of hard labor that was followed by exile to Siberia. After the collapse of the monarchy, Tomsky returned to Petrograd and his union work. In 1919 he was elected to the Central Committee and chosen to head the Central Trade Union Council. Three years later he became a member of the Politburo. He was one of the eight pallbearers at Vladimir Lenin’s funeral in 1924. The next year he sided against Leon Trotsky and his followers in the party struggles that followed Lenin’s death. In 1928 he joined with Nikolai Bukharin and Alexei Rykov to protest the pace and methods of collectivization. After this opposition group was defeated, Tomsky was expelled from the Politburo and removed from his position as trade union leader. In 1931 he was appointed head of the State Publishing House. Tomsky shot himself after learning that he had been implicated in one of Stalin’s show trials. At Bukharin’s trial two years later fabricated evidence named Tomsky as the link between members of the Right Opposition and an oppositional group in the Red Army.

See also:

BUKHARIN, NIKOLAI IVANOVICH; POLITBURO;

RYKOV, ALEXEI IVANOVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The nomadic Torky (known as Torky in Rus and Oghuz in Eastern sources) spoke a Turkic language and probably practiced shamanist-Täri religion. They formed into a tribal confederation in the eighth century in the Syr Darya–Aral Sea steppe region. In the late ninth century, joined by the Khazars, they expelled the Pechenegs from the Volga-Ural area and forced them to migrate to the South-Russian steppe. In 965, joined by the Rus, the Torky destroyed the Khazar state, and in 985 the two allies attacked Volga Bulgharia. The migration of the Polovtsy, Torky’s eastern neighbors, forced the latter into the South-Russian steppe by 1054 or 1055. In 1060, the Rus staged a major offensive and scored a victory over the Torky. While many Torky fled west, some remained in the South-Russian steppe zone and joined other nomadic peoples to later develop into Rus border guards known as Chernye Klobuky or Black Hoods. From around 1060 to 1140, Chernye Klobuky remained outside the formal political boundaries of the Rus state and maintained a largely nomadic lifestyle. During this period, they were often involved in the military affairs of the Rus princes and, at times, came to settle within the Rus borders in return for their services. After 1140 the institution of Chernye Klobuky became formalized, and they came to be viewed as mercenaries and vassals of the Kievan Grand Princes. As vassals, the Chernye Klobuky maintained allegiance not to any particular branch of the royal Rus family, but to the holder of the title of Grand Prince of Kiev.

See also:

KHAZARS; KIEVAN RUS; POLOVTSY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Golden, Peter B. (1990). “The Peoples of the South Russian Steppe.” In The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia, ed. Denis Sinor. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Sorenson, Jay B. (1969). The Life and Death of Soviet Trade Unionism, 1917–1928. New York: Atherton Press.

Golden, Peter B. (1992). An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Peoples. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag.

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Golden, Peter B. (1996). “Chernii Klobouci.” In Symbolae Turcologicae: Studies in Honour of Lars Johanson on his Sixtieth Birthday, 8 March 1996, eds. Á. Berta; B. Brendemoen; and C. Schönig (Transactions / Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, v. 6). Stockholm: Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul. ROMAN K. KOVALEV

TOTALITARIANISM The concept of totalitarianism was used to describe the more extreme forms of the hypertrophic states of the twentieth century, with their ideologies, elaborate mechanisms of control, and uniquely invasive efforts to diminish or even obliterate the distinction between public and private. The term was coined in the early 1920s, in Fascist Italy, by Mussolini’s opponents and was expanded in the early 1930s to include National Socialist Germany. Although the term was coined by opponents of Fascism and early usages were largely hostile, it was also episodically employed by supporters of the Italian and German regimes, such as Giovanni Gentile and Mussolini himself, to differentiate their governments from the allegedly decadent liberal regimes they so detested. The very early Italian usages connoted extreme violence, but as Italian Fascism evolved from its movement phase and became an ideology of government, the term increasingly suggested the intent of the state to absorb every aspect of human life into itself. This notion was in harmony with the philosophy of Giovanni Gentile. The term was most systematically and positively used in Germany by Carl Schmitt, but Hitler eventually forbade its positive use, since it evoked an Italian comparison, which he disliked. Even in the 1920s and early 1930s, there were a number of people who suggested that the Soviet Union bore certain similarities to both Italy and Germany. After Hitler’s blood purge in 1934, the similarities between the Soviet Union, Germany, and Italy became the subject of frequent and systematic comparison; after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (1939), such comparisons became widespread. Only in strongly pro-communist circles was there an understandable reluctance to conclude that the Soviet Union had degenerated so badly that it could be compared with Nazi Germany. In the aftermath of World War II, however, this comparison came to dominate the term’s us-

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age, right up to the end of the Cold War. The Truman administration suddenly began discussing the Soviet Union as a totalitarian regime when it had to justify the strongly anti-Soviet turn in American foreign policy that began in 1947, expressed most vividly in the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Prewar usages in the 1920s and 1930s had been unsystematic and largely journalistic, though such dedicated students of Russia as William Henry Chamberlin had compared the Soviet Union and Germany more systematically as early as 1935. But World War II and the development of the Cold War created a community of Russian experts in academia, where the term became thoroughly institutionalized in the early 1950s. The first systematic and grand-scale comparison, however, was not by an American academic, but by a German-Jewish émigré, Hannah Arendt, whose brilliant but uneven Origins of Totalitarianism was a sensation when it appeared in 1951. The most influential academic treatment of the term was Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy by Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, which appeared in 1956 and had a long and controversial life. Brzezinski and Friedrich’s account provided what was variously called a syndrome and a model to classify states as totalitarian. To be accounted, a state had to exhibit six features: an all-encompassing ideology; a single mass party, typically led by one man; a system of terror; a nearmonopoly on all means of mass communication; a similar near-monopoly of instruments of force; and a centrally controlled economy. Although Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy achieved wide acceptance in the 1950s, the restricted nature of its comparison, as well as the changing political times, made it highly controversial in the following two decades, with most of the academic community turning against it. Its fate was intimately bound up with the Cold War, which lost its broad base of popular support among Western academics and intellectuals during the 1960s. The viability of a term as value-laden as totalitarianism, in light of the demand for analytical rigor in the social sciences, was now considered highly debatable. In addition, as American historians of Russia became more and more enamored of social history, the focus of the totalitarian point of view on the politics of the center seemed far too restrictive for their research agenda, which was more focused on the experiences of ordinary people and everyday life, especially in the provinces.

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During the Reagan years, the term was revived by neoconservatives interested in a more aggressive political and military challenge to the Soviet Union and also in distinguishing the Soviet Union and its satellites from the (allegedly less radical) rightist states whom the Reagan administration regarded as allies against Communism. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, the term has become less politically charged and seems to be evolving in a more diffuse fashion to suggest closed or antidemocratic states in general, particularly those with strong ideological or religious coloration.

See also:

AUTOCRACY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Arendt, Hannah. (1973). The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich. Friedrich, Carl J., and Brzezinski, Zbigniew. (1965). Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Gleason, Abbott. (1995). Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press. Halberstam, Michael. (2000). Totalitarianism and the Modern Concept of Politics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Havel, Vaclav. (1985). “The Power of the Powerless.” In The Power of the Powerless: Citizens Against the State in Central-Eastern Europe, ed. John Keane. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Lifka, Thomas E. (1988). The Concept “Totalitarianism” and American Foreign Policy, 1933–1949. New York: Garland. Orwell, George. (1949). 1984. New York: New American Library.

the country; a number of these bureaus later developed into scientific-research bodies such as the Central Museum-Excursion Institute in Moscow. The two major organizations for Soviet tourism— the Society for Proletarian Tourism (OPT RFSFR, created by decree of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) and the joint-stock society Soviet Tourist (created by Narkompros in 1928)—merged in 1930 under the name of the All-Union Society of Proletarian Tourism and Excursions (OPTE) under the direction of N. V. Krylenko. It was also at this time that mass tourism began to develop as a movement among Soviet youth, marked by the establishment of a separate bureau within the Komsomol in 1928. Students, pioneers, and other young Soviets went on tours of the country organized under themes such as “My Motherland—the USSR.” Excursions were designed to acquaint citizens with national monuments, the history of the revolutionary movement, and the life of Vladimir Lenin. This so-called sphere of proletarian tourism was thus intended as an integral aspect of the construction of socialism within the Soviet Union. The importance of travel was not limited, however, to shaping Soviet ideology within the country. The state recognized that foreigners visiting the Soviet Union also represented a significant means through which socialism might gain expression and adherents throughout the world; additional consideration was given to the inflow of capital from international tourists. Though certain privileged groups of udarniki, fine arts performers, musicians, students, and government officials traveled beyond Soviet borders in the country’s initial years, millions of visitors ultimately toured the Soviet Union throughout its roughly seventy-year history.

Though tourism was not a product of the Russian Revolution, the Bolshevik emphasis on raising the cultural level of the masses and educating through practical experience made tourism one of the concerns of the new regime. The government created a number of institutions to encourage development in this field. Within Narkompros and Glavprolitprosvet, excursion sectors were established as early as 1919 to organize educational trips throughout

To aid in the maintenance of foreign tours and international travel to the Soviet Union, on April 12, 1929, the Council for the Labor and Defense of the USSR adopted the decree “On the organization of the All-Union Joint-Stock Company for Foreign Tourism in the USSR.” Otherwise known as Intourist (an acronym of Gosudarstvennoe aksionernoe obshchestvo po innostrannomu turizmu v SSSR and an abbreviated form of Inostrannyi turist), the company was supported by a number of Soviet organizations such as the People’s Commissariat of Trade, Sovtorgflot, the People’s Commissariat of Rail Transport, and the All-Union Joint-Stock Company Otel’. A. S. Svanidze was its first chairman. Though Intourist was occasionally responsible for organizing the visits of more

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prominent foreigners such as Bernard Shaw and Theodore Dreiser, in its initial years it played host primarily to international labor delegations as part of the movement to acquire foreign technical assistance. Only in the post-World War II period did Intourist experience rapid growth and an expansion of its services. This was the result, first, of the general postwar spirit of internationalism and faith in international organizations and, second, of the new friendships between the Soviet Union and the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. Intourist became a member of numerous national and international bodies such as the World Tourism Organization and participated in various conferences on tourism such as those hosted by the United Nations. More importantly, however, was the creation of a unified commercial organization for international tourism and satellite travel bureaus in each of the socialist Eastern Europe nations. This network facilitated exchanges among worker delegations, students, theater troupes, trade unions, kolkhozes, and other social groups. It was also during this time that Intourist constructed the basic infrastructure of hotels, autoparks, and restaurants used by foreign visitors until 1989, when the organization was withdrawn from the control of the central state apparatus and restructured as an independent enterprise. Intourist’s operations raise numerous questions about the meaning of leisure and privilege in a socialist society. Its advertisements and exhibit materials throughout the Soviet period spur consideration of the various messages the state promoted about itself to the outside world. And its list of itineraries that, at one point, covered 150 cities of the Union republics—with cruises along the Dniepr from Kiev to Kherson, along the Black Sea to Odessa, along the Dunau to Rus in Bulgaria or to Dzurduz in Romania—give credence to the geopolitical power of the entity that was the Soviet Union. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Margulies, S. (1968). The Pilgrimage to Russia: the Soviet Union and the Treatment of Foreigners, 1924–1937. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Ostrovskii, I., and Pavlenko, M. (1998). Intourist 1929–1999. VAO Inturist. State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF) Fond 9612, opis 1, delo 2 and 123; opis 3, delo 557. SHAWN SOLOMON

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TRADE ROUTES Three-fourths of Russia is more than 250 miles (400 kilometers) away from seas and oceans; Russia is the world’s most continental country. Even though Russia’s coastline is the second longest (after Canada), the presence of sea ice hampers traffic in and out of the country’s few ports during much of the winter. Murmansk, for example, Russia’s only warm-water port, is plagued by shorefast ice for two months out of the year. These and other factors hampered the development of a Russian navy until the eighteenth century, when Peter the Great built St. Petersburg, his famed “Window on the West.” Accordingly, Russian historic trade routes have been negotiated largely within its vast interior. EARLY ROUTES

Commerce in the Black Sea Basin may be traced to intercourse between the Scythians and Greeks circa 250 B.C.E. Scythian nomads extracted grain, fish, and slaves from their sedentary subjects and traded them in the Greek ports for wine, cloth, metalware, and luxury items. Before the Hun invasion (375 C.E.), Persian Alans and Germanic Goths established a commercial confederation between the Baltic and Black Seas. International trade in Eastern Europe after 850 literally created Kievan Rus. Using the interlocking system of rivers and portages on the Russian plain, Varangian (Viking) traders and soldiers sought the markets of the lower Volga and Don rivers, where they traded fur, slaves, and wood items for silver coins and spices from Central Asia, Arabia, and Byzantium. Originally traversing the Saracen Route between the Gulf of Finland, Lakes Ladoga and Onega, down the Volga River to the Caspian Sea and beyond, the Vikings eventually preferred trade with Byzantium, which was in its heyday. After the founding of Kievan Rus in 879, the Dnieper (Dnipro) trade route from the Varangians to the Greeks carried flax, hemp, hides, slaves, honey, wax, grain, and furs from the north in exchange for silks, naval equipment, wine, jewelry, glassware, and art items (particularly icons after the introduction of Orthodox Christianity in 988). C.E.

The collapse of the Khazar Empire (600–900 opened the steppes to menacing Kypchak Turks, who eventually cut off Kievan Rus from the all-important salt deposits (virtually the only food preservative) of the Crimea; thus, the major trade routes shifted from a north-south orientation to C.E.)

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east-west paths. Beginning in the eleventh century, salt was hauled from Halych in Galicia-Volhynia to Kiev. Later, the importance of the salt of Galicia-Volhynia to not only the Kievan Rus, but also the Teutonic Knights of the Baltic coast, brought a reemphasis of the north-south Baltic-Black Sea trade west of the Crimea. Galicia-Volhynia’s power and influence, based on the salt trade, lasted well into the second century of Mongol-Tatar domination of the rest of Russia (1237–1387).

the bone-jarring Great Siberian Tract. Between 1891 and 1916, Russian laborers built the TransSiberian Railway, which is still the only transcontinental thoroughfare in the country. Between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries, a trade route flourished between Russia and China at the border crossing of Kyakhta. Chinese tea, silks, furs, and luxuries were imported in exchange for Russian raw materials.

The Mongol Yoke (1237–1556) isolated the Russians from the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the High Gothic period, among other major changes in the West. Because they survived on tribute paid by their Russian subjects and the customs duties paid by those involved in international trade, the Mongols permitted merchants the use of the north-south trade routes, this time between the Baltic, Novgorod, and Muscovy (in the north) and the Arabic Middle East and the Black Sea (in the south). They even encouraged the revival of the Crimean ports, which were then under the leadership of Italian merchants from Venice, Pisa, and Genoa; cities with Greek names then became Italian.

SOVIET TRADE POLICY

POST-MONGOL TRADE

Ivan the Terrible’s defeat of the Astrakhan Tatars in 1556 largely sealed the fate of the former Golden [or Kypchak] Horde. The Volga trade route was now in Muscovy possession all the way to Central Asia, from which the tsar could import horses, which would serve in his Swedish campaigns. Ivan also sought trade with Great Britain: in the second half of the sixteenth century, he established commerce between the White Sea port of Arkhangelsk (logs and lumber) and Hull in eastern England (finished products). An unlikely servant of Tsar Ivan was a cossack named Yermak, who raided the Volga riverboats laden with horses from Central Asia. Yermak and his minions would later defeat the Siberian Tatars and claim Western Siberia in the name of the tsar in the 1580s. This event opened Siberia and the Russian Far East to Russian expansion and trade.

For much of the period that it existed, the Soviet Union was an island that strove for self-sufficiency while remaining insulated from the rest of the world. Like that of imperial Russia, Soviet foreign trade was limited in total value, in quantity of commodities exchanged, and in number of trading partners. Between 1917 and 1991, Soviet trade with other socialist countries never fell below 67 percent. By the late 1980s, trade with the developed world was approximately 22 percent, with the balance going to developing countries. Throughout the Soviet period, military strategists sought to expand the Soviet navy, which by extension included the merchant marine. An especially important goal was the development of a northern sea route through the use of heavy reinforced—ultimately atomic—icebreakers. By the 1980s, such icebreakers had successfully negotiated the Soviet Union’s vulnerable Arctic coast between Murmansk and the Bering Strait. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, Russia’s foreign trade was more open than ever before, but, as in the distant past, its own exports continued to be raw materials or crudely processed finished goods, while its imports consisted of quality finished products. Major trading partners include China, Germany, the United States, and Japan.

See also:

EXPLORATION; FOREIGN TRADE; GEOGRAPHY;

TRADE STATUTES OF 1653 AND 1667

BIBLIOGRAPHY

First using the river and portage method, cossacks and merchants traversed Siberia from west to east, reaching the Pacific coast within a century. Along the way, they traded trinkets to the natives for valuable furs. The Russian quest for fur led them to Alaska, down the North American Pacific coast to San Francisco (Fort Ross), and even to Hawaii. Later, coach transportation was used on

Brigham, Lawson W. (1991). The Soviet Maritime Arctic. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.

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Gibson, James R. (1969). Feeding the Russian Fur Trade. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Magocsi, Paul Robert. (1985). Ukraine: A Historical Atlas. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. VICTOR L. MOTE

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TRADE STATUTES OF 1653 AND 1667 The Trade Statutes of 1653 and 1667 governed domestic and foreign trade in seventeenth-century Russia, and streamlined a highly complex and confusing system of some seventy different internal customs duties that added to transportation costs and created ample opportunity for corruption and cheating. Subjecting all goods and merchants to a uniform and consistent set of customs duties promoted efficiency by making long-distance trade more profitable and predictable. The statutes also became key elements in the implementation of a mercantilist agenda designed to promote the interests of domestic merchants. The commercial code (Torgovy ustav) of October 1653 was adopted in direct response to an August 1653 petition by leading Russian merchants against transit duties and for a unified rate of customs duty. The code combined a uniform internal rate with an overall increase in imposts. It further adopted uniform measures of weight and length throughout the country. A basic 5 percent impost was levied on sold goods, with the exception of salt (double the rate), furs, fish, and horses (old duties applied). No duties were levied on foreign currency sold to the government at a fixed rate. A special duty of 2.5 percent was applied to goods offered exclusively in border towns for export. Under the 1653 code, foreign merchants were required to pay a 6 percent duty in the Russian interior, in addition to a 2 percent transit duty. However, exports from Arkhangel’sk were taxed at only 2 percent. A related 1654 decree (Ustavnaya gramota) abolished transit duties on noble and church lands. The dual agendas of mercantilism and protectionism culminated in the New Commercial Code (Novotorgovy ustav) of 1667, again in an apparent response to a petition by Muscovite merchants. The New Commercial Code was apparently primarily authored by Afanasy Lavrentevich OrdinNashchokin, G. Dokhturov, and L. Golosov, and signed by ninety Russian merchants. The statute consists of a preamble, ninety-four main articles, and a seven-article appendix, Ustav torgovle, governing foreign trade. The introduction of the New Commercial Code spells out the leading principles of the government’s commercial policy and constitutes the most elaborate expression of mercantilist ambitions in seventeenth-century Russian policy making. In addition to increasing government revenues, the statute sought to support do-

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mestic merchants by organizing facilities for credit and by promoting companies combining largeand small-scale merchants in an attempt to reduce the influence of foreign traders. However, the practical importance of these pronouncements remained marginal at best. The new statute significantly increased the tax burden facing foreign merchants and made a further attempt to confine them to border cities through both restricted access to the interior and prohibitive transit duties. The New Commercial Code designated Arkhangel’sk, Novgorod, Pskov, Smolensk, Putivl’, and Astrakhan’ as “border towns” beyond which foreigners could operate only with special permission. Foreign specie receipts were to be maximized not only through higher tax rates, even on unsold goods, but also through a compulsory system of exacting those payments in foreign specie at a rigged exchange rate. The basic impost was increased to 5 percent on weighed goods and 4 percent on unweighed goods. An additional 9 percent was levied on transit by foreigners into the Russian interior. A sales tax of 6 percent, imposed in the towns of the interior, took the overall duty facing foreigners to an unprecedented 20–21 percent. Exacting the duty in foreign silver coin at a rigged rate yielded the crown two rubles in pure profit for every seven rubles collected. Emulating Western practices, the New Commercial Code imposed quality controls on import and export goods alike, although this measure appears to have been implemented with mixed success at best. Slightly preferential treatment was given to Asian merchants in the interior. The immediate impact of the New Commercial Code was negative. Customs receipts declined, and tensions between Westerners and hostile gost (privileged merchant) administrators increased, as confiscations of goods as “contraband” multiplied. The concessions to Russia’s elite merchants may in fact have been based on unrealistically rosy expectations at a time when a commercial treaty with Persia was set to ensure an increase in silk trade, while a peace treaty with Poland put an end to prolonged warfare in the West. A period of protectionism under Fyodor Alexeyevich’s reign severely limited the right of Western merchants to operate in the Russian interior and sought to change the terms of trade at Arkhangel’sk in favor of Russians. This policy was only relaxed in the 1680s when Peter I’s government finally conceded some key demands of Western merchants. The more hostile business environment at Arkhangel’sk not only deterred

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Western merchants but also contributed to a general diversion of Russian trade to the Baltic. The New Commercial Code remained in force, with minor modifications, until the adoption of the 1755 customs code.

See also:

ECONOMY, TSARIST; FOREIGN TRADE; GOSTI;

MERCHANTS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Burton, Audrey. (1997). The Bukharans: A Dynastic, Diplomatic and Commercial History, 1550–1702. Richmond, Surrey, UK: Curzon Press. Bushkovitch, Paul. (1980). The Merchants of Moscow, 1580–1650. New York: Cambridge University Press. Dukes, Paul. (1990). The Making of Russian Absolutism, 1613–1801, 2nd ed. London: Longman. JARMO T. KOTILAINE

TRADE UNIONS The trade union movement in Russia had its origins in the strike movements of the nineteenth century. Labor organizations, originally modeled on village institutions, spontaneously formed around particular grievances, but proved temporary in nature. More permanent labor representation in the form of delegates, starostas, eventually took hold at the factory, local, and industry levels. By the late nineteenth century local broad-based organizations gave way to associations by industry or occupation, along with the adoption of more institutionalized negotiation methods between labor and capital. Trade unions first gained legal recognition after the Revolution of 1905. Unions adopted principles of class identity (membership being restricted to workers) and independence from state institutions and political parties. During the period immediately following the Revolution, attempts to establish central labor organizations produced both soviets of workers’ delegates and trade union councils, which sought to unite extant unions and provide support for new ones. Unions remained relatively weak, with union activity declining significantly during World War I in response to governmental restrictions.

eventually secured power over the councils, but only as they underwent their own transformation. As a result, three features were to characterize trade unions throughout the Soviet period: branch unionism, union subordination to both the state and Bolshevik Party, and the assumption of dual functions on the part of all unions. This meant that every employee in a particular industry or branch of the economy belonged to one union and that trade unions as state organizations were to fulfill a twin purpose: to mobilize workers to meet production targets and to defend workers’ rights, as defined by the state, against arbitrary managerial actions. The particular methods employed by unions shifted over time, with emphasis on discipline and punishment in the 1930s giving way to positive incentives and greater job protection rights by the 1950s. At the enterprise level, union activity was integrated into a larger triangular relationship, known as the union-management-party troika. The union worked chiefly with management to increase labor productivity. Its control over the distribution of nonwage benefits to the workforce ensured labor cooperation, while its control over the grievance process and its mandatory participation in all personnel decisions provided the means to defend workers’ legal rights. Simultaneously, the union coordinated efforts with party officials to direct the cultural life of the factory. In this capacity, the union acted as a transmission belt between party and society, orientating the workforce to the goals of the state. At the national level, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) was the supreme agency within a complex trade union bureaucracy. In its role as administrator, it maintained control over two parallel hierarchical structures, one based on branch-level union committees, with the central committee of each union as the leading institution, and an all-union hierarchy organized geographically, with the republican all-union councils as the governing bodies. The primary union agency, the factory-level committee, was responsible to both groups. Union resources came from three critical sources: membership dues, the national social insurance fund, and considerable property holdings associated with the social and welfare benefits distributed to the workforce.

The period from 1917 to 1920 saw the reemergence of the old trade unions in competition with autonomous factory-level worker councils. Unions

The post-Soviet period has been marked by two important developments: the plurality of trade union organizations and the declining power of unions in general. Alternative trade unions, orga-

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nized along occupational and professional lines, have challenged the monopoly of the traditional union bureaucracy, the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (FNPR), the successor to AUCCTU. Although FNPR remains by far the dominant institution, the alternative unions function as catalysts for organizational change. In addition, trade unions have lost considerable power, deepening their subordination in practice to management and the state. Declining union membership and the loss of income and important administrative duties have undermined the traditional base of union power.

See also:

TRADE STATUTES OF 1653 AND 1667

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ashwin, Sarah, and Clarke, Simon. (2003). Russian Trade Unions and Industrial Relations in Transition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan Press. Ruble, Blair. (1981). Soviet Trade Unions: Their Development in the 1970s. New York: Cambridge University Press. Turin, S. P. (1968). From Peter the Great to Lenin: A History of the Russian Labour Movement with Special Reference to Trade Unionism. New York: A. M. Kelley Press. CAROL CLARK

TRANSCAUCASIAN FEDERATIONS Federalism would be a rational enterprise for the three states that occupy Transcaucasia. The Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani peoples have always been interconnected by trade, transport, and even culture, despite religious differences. Under the Russian Empire, the three peoples were incorporated into a Caucasian administrative region. After the 1917 February revolution, the Transcaucasian leaders tried to maintain political and economic unity through the formation of regional Transcaucasian Soviets, a Transcaucasian Revolutionary Committee (Revkom), and finally, a few days before the October Revolution, by a Transcaucasian Committee of Public Safety. After the October Revolution, an anti-Bolshevik coalition of Transcaucasian leaders formed a Transcaucasian Commissariat. This was the first attempt to create a proper federal structure, though the vertical and horizontal divisions of authority

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were unclear. The Commissariat, which governed alongside a Transcaucasian Seim (parliament), was divided within itself by the war with Turkey and Germany. It collapsed after five months, in April 1918. Newly independent Transcaucasian states were formed, but were soon overthrown by the Red Army. The independent Georgian republic was the last to fall, in February 1921. Soviet power, with its emphasis on large, efficient territorial units and class solidarity, reestablished unified Transcaucasian organizations, such as the Transcaucasian Economic Bureau. In March 1922, despite resistance from regional leaders, and the Georgians in particular, Moscow established a Federation of Socialist Soviet Republics of Transcaucasia (FSSRZ) in February 1922. Its supreme organ was a plenipotentiary conference of Transcaucasian representatives. In December 1922 this loose federation of republics was transformed into a single federated republic, or the Transcaucasian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (ZSFSR). The new federation was highly centralized, and the republics were given only six commissariats (ministries). The remainder were given to the federal Transcaucasian government. The Transcaucasian Central Executive Committee (ZtsIK) was the executive organ of the federation and, along with the Transcaucasian Council of People’s Commissariats (Sovnarkom), could overrule the republics on almost any issue. The Transcaucasian republics were subject to dual authority, from the Transcaucasian central organs and from Moscow. However, the real power was in the unitary Communist Party, an organization hostile to the idea of federation. In 1936 the Stalin constitution dismantled the ZSFSR and established separate union republics in Transcaucasia. Administratively, they were now directly subordinate to Moscow, with no intermediate Transcaucasian administration. However, within the republics, the autonomous republican or regional status of a number of national minorities was retained. Azerbaijan included the NagornoKarabagh Autonomous Region and the Autonomous Republic of Nakhichevan. Georgia incorporated three separate administrative units: the South Osetian Autonomous Region and the Abkhazian and Ach’aran Autonomous republics. Although Azerbaijan and Georgia were never described or operated as federations, they resembled them administratively. There was a division of power which devolved considerable social and cultural authority to the national minority governments within the

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union republics. This remained the case until the breakup of the USSR, itself a quasi-federation, in December 1991. After the collapse of the USSR, the Transcaucasian states reclaimed their independence; Armenia and Azerbaijan fought a war over NagornoKarabagh. This war, and intense competition over scarce resources, made the concept of a new Transcaucasian Federation unrealized, although there were half-hearted discussions and calls from the new leaders for a common Caucasian Home or Forum of Caucasian Peoples. President Shevardnadze of Georgia spoke of a federation within Georgia to end the country’s interethnic problems. However, despite encouragement from Western powers for more Transcaucasian cooperation, there is no significant Transcaucasian political movement calling for federation today.

See also:

ARMENIA AND ARMENIANS; AZERBAIJAN AND

AZERIS; CAUCASIA; GEORGIA AND GEORGIANS

STEPHEN JONES

TRANS-DNIESTER REPUBLIC The label Transnistria has historically applied to lands that today lie inside both the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, but it now refers specifically to the area between the Dniester River and the Ukrainian border. Since 1990, residents of this territory have claimed independence from Moldova. Despite a lack of international recognition, the Dniester Moldovan Republic (DMR) functions as a de facto sovereign state. The DMR sits upon a thin strip of land, less than thirty kilometers wide and only 4,118 square kilometers in area. Although the political and economic elite is primarily of Slavic origin, 39.9 percent of the population are ethnic Moldovan (Romanian speaking). Ukrainians form the largest minority with 28.3 percent, and 25.5 percent of the population claim Russian heritage. There is a Slavic concentration in the urban centers, particularly in the capital of Tiraspol. The Moldovan population constitutes a majority in the countryside.

manian lands to the west of the Dniester. The region formed part of Kievan Rus and then the Galicia-Volhynian Kingdom between the ninth and fourteenth centuries. It was subsequently drawn into the Ottoman Empire before being annexed by the Russian Empire in 1812. Following the Bolshevik Revolution and ensuing civil war, Transnistria was briefly incorporated into Soviet Ukraine. In 1924, land stretching from the Dniester in the west to the Bug River in the east was carved off of Soviet Ukraine to form the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR). The creation of the MASSR formed part of the Soviet Union’s policy of national liberation, which was designed to draw bordering states (Bessarabia) away from the influence of bourgeois neighbors (Romania). Tiraspol was named capital of the MASSR in 1929, though the right was reserved to shift the capital to Chisinau upon reunification with rump Moldova. Following the Soviet Union’s annexation of Bessarabia in 1940, six western districts were integrated with Bessarabia to form the Moldovan Soviet Social Republic (MSSR). The remaining MASSR territory reverted to Soviet Ukraine. Despite the merging of Transnistria and Bessarabia between 1940 and 1991, social, political, and economic differences between the two regions remained. Having been significantly sovietized between World War I and World War II, the Transnistrian political elite was considered by Moscow to be more reliable than its Bessarabian counterpart. Moldovan Communist Party (CPM) members from Transnistria were, therefore, relatively overrepresented in the Moldovan Soviet structure. Transnistria was the focus of Soviet industrial expansion in the region, particularly the steel industry, while Bessarabia remained agrarian. Sizable Ukrainian and Russian immigration also shifted the demographic balance during this period, though ethnic Moldovans remained in the majority. From 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of perestroika allowed ethnic Moldovans to seek a redress of the socioeconomic imbalance in the MASSR. A devolution of power from Moscow to the constituent republics, and the introduction of direct elections to the Moldovan Supreme Soviet in 1989, enabled Bessarabians to increase their influence over national policy.

Despite its plurality of Romanian speakers, Transnistria has never been part of the greater Ro-

Conflict between Chisinau and Tiraspol began to mount from 1989. Tensions were exacerbated

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by the introduction of a number of restrictive language laws that favored the Moldovan language over Russian. Sporadic violence began in 1989 and continued intermittently until a peace accord was signed in July 1992.

O’Loughlin, J.; Kolossoc, V.; and Tchepalyga, A. (1998). “National Construction, Territorial Separatism, and Post-Soviet Geopolitics in the Transdniester Moldovan Republic.” Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 39(6):332–358.

Transnistrian resistance was initially led by the United Council of Work Collectives, under the leadership of Ukrainian national Igor Smirnov. Protests swiftly became violent, as industrial managers mobilized their workers against Moldovan police forces. An autonomous Dniester Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic was proclaimed on September 2, 1990. This proclamation was followed by a declaration of full independence on August 27, 1991, with Smirnov as president.

JOHN GLEDHILL

Conflict peaked in the summer of 1992 following the intervention of the Russian Fourteenth Army, which was stationed in Transnistria. Although Moscow claimed credit for taking swift action, the decision to engage was likely taken by Fourteenth Army commander Yuri Netkachev, without official sanction from the Russian government. Netkachev was soon replaced by Alexander Lebed. Throughout the conflict, the Fourteenth Army provided troops and armaments to the Transnistrian forces. With a disorganized defense— led by poorly armed police forces—Moldovan troops were unable to retain control of their positions in Transnistria and suffered considerably more casualties than Transnistrian and Russian forces. Overall casualties have been estimated at between seven hundred and one thousand. A pact signed on July 21, 1992, between Russian president Boris Yeltsin and Moldovan president Mircea Snigur ended armed hostilities, and Russian forces began to withdraw in 1994. At the turn of the century, the DMR remained autonomous, though the international community refused to recognize its claims to statehood.

See also:

LEBED, ALEXANDER IVANOVICH; MOLDOVA AND

MOLDOVANS; PRIMAKOV, YEVGENY MAXIMOVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hill, Ronald J. (1979). Soviet Political Elites: The Case of Tiraspol. New York: St. Martin’s Press. King, Charles. (2000). The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture. Stanford, CA: Hoover Press. Kolstø, Pal. (1993). “The Dniester Conflict: Between Irredentism and Separatism.” Europe-Asia Studies 45(6):973–1000.

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TRANSITION ECONOMIES The term transition has been applied to the countries that have abandoned the Soviet-type political and economic system at the end of the twentieth century. As it suggests a passage from one state to another, it is important to define both the point of departure and the point of arrival. The point of departure may be considered the communist system that appeared in Russia following the October 1917 Revolution, and which was imposed on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe under Soviet rule after World War II. The core of this system may be described in terms of three features. First, economic life was under the control of a single party. In the USSR, this was the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union). All the national parties in Central and Eastern Europe were subordinate to the CPSU until the very end of the system, notwithstanding some crises, even though not all were officially labeled communist. The two exceptions were Yugoslavia and Albania, whose leaders broke with the Soviet system in 1948 and 1961, respectively. The second feature was that the economic institutions were based upon state ownership of the means of production. The private sector was nonexistent or negligible, and market ways of operating could only be found in an illegal underground economy. Finally, the third feature was compulsory central planning that regulated production, trade, and distribution of incomes. The transition process began as a rejection of these three foundations of the communist economic system. The initial shock came with the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, which triggered the collapse of the communist parties and the beginning of a threefold process: from one-party rule to democracy, from state ownership to private property, and from plan to market. In the Soviet case, the transition process also included the collapse of the Soviet state as a federation of republics; this led to the independence of the three Baltic states, and later of the other twelve former republics. Officially the Soviet Union was dissolved

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in December 1991. The Russian Federation was the biggest Soviet Republic and the dominant one, both economically and politically. All the former communist countries in the world, with the exceptions of North Korea and Cuba, became engaged in a transition process. In the case of the Asian countries, particularly China and Vietnam, the transition process was well under way in the beginning of the twenty-first century. Although perhaps more advanced economically than in some former European communist countries, the transition did not touch the political system, which remained communist. Can one still speak of transition? The question is debated. In all the countries the basic transition policies were identical in their economic design. They were prepared by the new governments with the help of Western experts and international organizations, with the dominant influence of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the first institution created solely for the purpose of assisting the transition). The building blocks of the transition were again threefold. First, there was an overall liberalization of the economic activities. Prices that had been fixed or controlled by the state were freed, as were the rates of exchange (for converting foreign into local currencies and vice-versa) and the rates of interest. People became free to undertake business activities and engage in domestic and foreign trade. Second, a stabilization program was instituted to eradicate inflation, control the budget deficit, and limit the foreign debt. Third, a structural transformation was intended to create the institutions of a market economy. The main component of the transformation was privatization: the task not only of putting the former state ownership into private hands—individual or corporate—but also of creating a new private sector. Transformation also implied a banking reform, which would put an end to the monopoly of a single state bank and allow the new private sector to be financed by credit. Tax reform and the building of a modern financial market were on the agenda. In order to replace the former social security system where the citizens were in complete charge of the state through subsidized health, education, housing, and even recreation systems, a markettype social security safety net only partly financed by the state was needed.

under a program that started with Boris Yeltsin’s first term on January 2, 1992, and was conducted by a team of reformers headed by Yegor Gaidar. Liberalization was swift and stabilization was achieved, albeit with difficulties and some crises. However, structural transformation progressed slowly and unevenly, and, ten years later, it could not be considered finished. The private sector was dominant, but the restructuring of the former state enterprises had not been completed, and monopolies prevailed in such crucial sectors as energy. The private companies were not applying the rules of a transparent corporate governance. The banking reform continued, with the banking sector suffering as a result of the financial crisis of 1998. The social security reform was not implemented. The former Soviet Republics were in a still more difficult position. They were hit by the collapse of the USSR. Their links with Moscow and among themselves, defined by the former central plan, were disrupted. Most of them, except for states rich in oil and natural resources, such as Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan, could only rely on foreign assistance to conduct their reforms. Some of them, such as Belarus, or to a lesser extent Ukraine, hardly began their structural transformation. Some others, such as the Caucasian states, or the southern republics of Central Asia, are still plagued by ethnic conflicts or border wars. The full transition to a market economy was not yet completed in Russia ten years after its beginning. Why has it been a much more chaotic process than in the countries of Central Europe, or even Eastern Europe? Several factors may explain these differences: the length of the Communist rule in Russia; Russia’s size and diversity; paradoxically, its huge natural resources, which relieved the state of the need for more radical reforms and allowed a small minority of corrupt businessmen to grab these resources through the mechanisms of privatization; and, the lack of incentives and assistance, which were provided to Central and Eastern Europe through the European Union enlargement process but were not available to the CIS countries.

See also:

ECONOMY, POST-SOVIET; MARKET SOCIALISM;

PRIVATIZATION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

These measures were applied in Russia as in most of the Central and East European countries,

Aslund, Anders. (1995). How Russia Became a Market Economy. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.

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Braguinsky, Serguey, and Yavlinsky, Grigory. (2000). Incentives and Institutions: The Transition to a Market Economy in Russia. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. (1999). Transition Report 1999: Ten Years of Transition. London: EBRD. Kolodko, Grzegorz W. (2000). From Shock to Therapy: The Political Economy of Postsocialist Transformation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lavigne, Marie. (1999). The Economics of Transition: From Socialist Economy to Market Economy, 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin’s Press. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. (2000). Economic Survey of Europe, vol. 1. New York: UNECE. MARIE LAVIGNE

TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY The construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway between 1891 and 1916 ended the era of great transcontinental railway building. The TransSiberian stretches 5,776 miles between Moscow’s Yaroslavsky Station and Vladivostok (6,117 miles from St. Petersburg). It takes a minimum of a week to traverse that distance by train. The longest railway in the world, the TransSiberian project was mired in controversy from the moment Tsarevich Nicholas shoveled an inaugural spade full of dirt into an awaiting wheelbarrow in Vladivostok on May 31, 1891, until the completion of the Amur River Bridge at Khabarovsk in 1916. A technological marvel at the time, it soon bore the reputation of “a monument to bungling.” The rails and crossties were too light, causing frequent derailments; the wooden bridges were flimsy; and, since the builders were mostly exiles and convicts, there was justifiable reason to believe that much of the line had been sabotaged. Moreover, the estimated costs in 1916 U.S. dollars ranged from $770 million to $1 billion, which represented one-fifth of Russia’s national debt at the time. During its construction, the Trans-Siberian was a serious drain on the Russian economy and, between 1914 and 1916, on the war effort. Despite the criticism, the great railway more than paid for itself during the twentieth century. Still the only transportation artery to span Siberia and the Russian Far East, the Trans-Siberian has solidified Moscow’s hold on Russia’s eastern periphery.

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Fanatically supported by high-ranking tsarist officials like Count Sergei Witte (1849–1915) and Anatoly Kulomzin (1838–1924), the Trans-Siberian’s influence was immediate. The annual number of migrants to Siberia and the Russian Far East doubled (to 88,000) between 1896 and 1904 and then doubled again (to 174,000) between 1905 and 1914. Between 1895 and 1916, a total of 2.5 million land-poor peasants migrated to the region from European Russia. This Great Siberian Migration represented 57 percent of everyone who had migrated to Siberia and the Russian Far East since 1796. Additionally, the Siberian economy, which had been almost nonexistent, exploded. New settlers rapidly cultivated West Siberia’s virgin black earth, doubling the sown area. The region quickly became one of Russia’s major breadbaskets. Flour mills sprang up like mushrooms. West Siberia’s butter industry jumped from nonexistence to becoming the second leading butter exporter behind Denmark. Virtually every railhead had sawmills, stockyards, and slaughterhouses. Without the Trans-Siberian Railroad, Siberia’s industrial revolution never would have succeeded. The Trans-Siberian’s principal commodities are coal, oil and oil products, and wood and wood products. Major non-Russian users of the railway, which is now double-tracked and electrified for much of its distance, are China, Japan, and South Korea.

See also:

RAILWAYS; SIBERIA; TRADE ROUTES

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Marks, Steven G. (1991). Road to Power. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Mote, Victor L. (1998). Siberia: Worlds Apart. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Treadgold, Donald. (1957). The Great Siberian Migration. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Tupper, Harmon. (1965). To the Great Ocean. Boston: Little, Brown. VICTOR L. MOTE

TRIANDAFILLOV, VIKTOR KIRIAKOVICH (1894–1931), military theorist and intellectual. Triandafillov was one of the key intellectual leaders of the Red Army during the inter-war period (1918–1939). Triandafillov was instrumental

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in formulating a new and revolutionary understanding of modern war. Up until the Industrial Revolution, military campaigns had consisted of a single decisive battle or series of inconclusive combats. The industrialization of war set in motion a revolutionary change in the means and methods of waging war. Campaigns became more protracted, battles were less decisive, and armies were more widely distributed in a theater of operations. Triandafillov, along with Mikhail N. Tukhachevsky, Alexander A. Svechin, Boris M. Shaposhnikov, Mikhail V. Frunze, and G. S. Isserson, recognized that the material transmutation of war demanded a corresponding conceptual transformation. He believed that one could no longer think about modern war using a Napoleonic paradigm. Triandafillov’s unique contribution was to help overturn the old Napoleonic cut that framed war in the dual strategy-tactics creative structure. The German military theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) had associated each of the levels of military art with a particular activity. Strategy was concerned with campaigns and tactics with battles. Other Soviet theorists argued that the complexity of war demanded a new creative component that they referred to as operational art (operativnoe iskusstvo). The creative domain of operational art became the operation (operatsiia). Triandafillov made his seminal theoretical contribution concerning the modern operation in a book entitled The Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies (1929, 1932, 1936, and 1937). Triandafillov defined the modern operation as a distinct military activity consisting of a “mosaic” of battles and maneuvers, distributed in space and time but unified by aim and purpose, conducted for the object of strategy. Triandafillov was killed in a plane crash in July 1931 while he was in the process of revising his work to consider the practical problems of creating a mass mechanized Red Army.

See also:

MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET

BIBLIOGRAPHY

TRINITY ST. SERGIUS MONASTERY Sergius and his brother Stefan founded the monastery in 1342 in an uninhabited forest, thirty five miles northeast of Moscow, now the city of Sergiev Posad, and dedicated it to the Trinity. When Stefan left, Sergius lived as a hermit. His piety attracted disciples who in 1353 made him abbot. As their numbers grew, Sergius introduced a cenobite rule based on that of the Studios Monastery in Constantinople. It mandated communal property, prayer, work, and meals presided over by an elected abbot. Until his death in 1392, Sergius maintained strict discipline and vows of poverty. His example inspired the founding of other houses. Destroyed by the Mongols in 1408, Trinity was reestablished by Sergius’s disciple Abbot Nikon. In 1422 Nikon inaugurated worship of Sergius’s sanctity. Helped by the local prince and the brother of Moscow’s ruler, whom Sergius had baptized, he built a stone church to house Sergius’s tomb and commissioned Andrei Rublev and Danyl Cherny to decorate it with frescoes. Andrei painted his famous icon of the Trinity for its iconostasis. Thenceforth pilgrims flocked to Trinity to be healed, to request feasts and prayers for their souls and those of their family and ancestors, and to be buried. In return they gave Trinity land and money. Princes also favored Trinity with immunities from taxes and other obligations. In 1446 Grand Prince Vasily II of Moscow unsuccessfully sought refuge at Trinity during a dynastic war. Nevertheless, after his victory in 1447, he returned to bask in Sergius’s charisma and be its patron. Tsaritsas went to Trinity to pray for heirs. Tsar Ivan IV “the Terrible” made many pilgrimages and provided state monies for construction and lavish personal gifts. Tsar Boris Godunov was buried there. During the Time of Troubles the monastery’s walls withstood a Polish siege from September 1608 to January 1610. Afterward Archimandrite Dionisy and Cellarer Avramy Palitsyn sent appeals throughout Russia to organize an army to free Moscow from the Poles and reconstitute the Russian state. In gratitude Mikhail Romanov stopped at Trinity in 1613 en route to his coronation in Moscow.

Naveh, Shimon. (1996). In Pursuit of Military Excellence. Schneider, James J. (1994). The Structure of Strategic Revolution: Total War and the Roots of the Soviet Warfare State. Triandafillov, Viktor K. (1994). The Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies. JAMES J. SCHNEIDER

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By the 1640s Trinity housed 240 monks organized in a social order that was a microcosm of Russian society. It controlled numerous subsidiary monasteries and owned over 570,000 acres of tilled land, 100,000 serfs, and many urban properties throughout European Russia. The original communal order became relaxed, and wealthy monks

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Exterior view of the Trinity St. Sergius Monastery. © DAVE BARTRUFF/CORBIS

controlled their own property. As of 1561, Trinity’s abbot held the rank of Archimandrite, senior to the heads of all Russian monasteries. Trinity again was important in 1682 when child co-tsars Ivan V and Peter I “the Great” and Ivan’s sister and regent Sophia hid there until a military revolt was pacified. In 1689 Peter fled to Trinity from Sophia and her soldier allies, rallied support, and returned to Moscow as sole ruler. Neither the Law Code of 1649, nor the religious reforms of rulers Peter I and Anna I Ivanovna, materially diminished Trinity’s status. It was designated a lavra in 1744, the highest class of monastery, one of four in Russia, and a seminary was established there. Catherine II “the Great,” however, ordered that monastic lands and serfs be turned over to the state in 1764. Trinity was limited to one hundred monks and a state subsidy. It recovered during the 1800s, aided by a religious revival and the easing of restrictions on monastic landholding. In 1814 the Moscow Theological Academy took residence at Trinity. When Russia celebrated the five-hundredth anniversary of Sergius’s death in 1892, the Trinity Monastery had

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over four hundred monks and novices and controlled five new monastic communities. After the Russian Revolution, the Soviets confiscated Trinity’s properties, disinterred Sergius’s remains, dispersed its monks, and closed the theological academy. It became a museum of Russian history and art. Many of its treasures and most of its archive were brought to Moscow. In 1946 Stalin allowed the monastery to reopen and rebury Sergius’s remains. When Soviet power ended in 1991, Trinity flourished anew as a cult center. The Trinity Sergius Monastery remains a treasure-house of Russian art and architecture. The Church of the Trinity (1422–1427) and the Church of the Holy Spirit with its graceful bell tower (1486) are the oldest buildings. The ceremonial center is the five-domed Cathedral of the Dormition (1559–1585). The huge refectory with a church of St. Sergius (1686–1692), the tsars’ palace (c. 1690) in the Moscow Baroque style, and the five-tiered bell tower (1740–1770) are also noteworthy. Trinity’s scriptorium and workshops produced impor-

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tant chronicles and religious writings, clothing, icons, and religious utensils to supplement equally lavish gifts from its patrons. In 1993 UNESCO recognized the ensemble as a World Heritage site.

See also: KIRILLO-BELOOZERO MONASTERY; MONASTERIES; SERGIUS (SAINT); SIMONOV MONASTERY; SOLOVETSK MONASTERY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kenworthy, Scott M. (2002). “The Revival of Monasticism in Modern Russia: The Trinity-Sergius Lavra, 1825–1921,” Ph.D. diss., Brandeis University, Waltham, MA. Miller, David B. (1997). “Donors to the Trinity-Sergius Monastery as a Community of Venerators: Origins, 1360s–1462.” In Kleimola, A. M., and Lenhoff, G. D., eds., Culture and Identity in Muscovy, 1359–1584. Moscow: ITZ-Garant. DAVID B. MILLER

TROTSKY, LEON DAVIDOVICH (1879–1940), number-two leader of the Bolshevik Revolution, and subsequent rival of Stalin. A prominent left-wing Menshevik after his leading role in the Revolution of 1905, Leon Trotsky (né Lev Bronstein) joined the Bolsheviks in 1917, became Vladimir Lenin’s de facto second in command during the October Revolution and the civil war, and then went into opposition until he was exiled and eventually murdered at Josef Stalin’s behest. PREREVOLUTIONARY CAREER

Trotsky was born in the village of Yanovka in what is now Ukraine on November 7 (October 26, O. S.), 1879. His father was a prosperous farmer of Russified Jewish background. Young Bronstein was sent to school in Odessa, where he lived with a relative who belonged to the intelligentsia, and he began to display the intellectual brilliance that marked his entire life. He was attracted to the revolutionary movement and Marxism, helped organize an illegal workers’ movement, and was arrested in 1898. He spent four years in prison and in Siberian exile, but escaped in 1902 (under the pseudonym Trotsky), leaving behind a wife and two baby daughters.

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Making his way to Western Europe, Trotsky joined Lenin in publishing the Marxist paper Iskra (Spark), but at the Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Party in 1903 he sided with the Mensheviks and spoke out against Lenin’s authoritarian concept of the party. Meanwhile he married Natalia Sedova, by whom he had two sons. When revolutionary uprisings shook the tsarist regime in 1905, Trotsky returned to Russia. He joined the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers’ Deputies and became its most vocal leader. For this he was arrested, put on trial, and again sent to Siberia. In jail he wrote Results and Prospects, setting forth his theory of permanent revolution to predict that a bourgeois revolution would go on permanently until it turned into a workers’ revolution in Russia and triggered proletarian revolution elsewhere. After escaping from Siberia again in 1907, Trotsky settled in Vienna to work as a journalist (notably during the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913) and to participate in émigré Social-Democratic politics as a left-wing Menshevik. With that group he opposed Russian participation in World War I, a position for which he was expelled from one European country after another, and he found himself in New York when the February Revolution broke out. REVOLUTION AND CIVIL WAR

Trotsky welcomed the fall of the tsarist regime as the beginning of the permanent revolution he had predicted. Following a brief detention in Canada he made his way back to Russia in May 1917. There he took the lead of the left Mensheviks who called themselves the Interdistrict Group and agreed with the Bolsheviks on opposing the war and pushing for a new revolution. Although jailed by the Provisional Government after the abortive July Days uprising, Trotsky and his group were absorbed into the Bolshevik Party at the Sixth Party Congress in August 1917, and Trotsky was elected to the Central Committee. Released from jail after the failed right-wing putsch by General Lavr Kornilov, and responding to the upsurge in popular revolutionary sentiment, Trotsky took the lead in agitating for a revolutionary takeover by the Petrograd Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies. Yet, like most of the Bolshevik leaders, he resisted Lenin’s call for an armed coup prior to the Second Congress of Soviets that was scheduled for late October 1917. As

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chairman of the Petrograd Soviet from September on, Trotsky is generally credited with being the organizer of the October Revolution, though how deliberately the Bolshevik takeover was prepared is debatable. Evidence of a planned uprising is lacking, apart from improvised steps to mobilize proBolshevik troops and workers’ Red Guards to defend the Soviet against the Provisional Government. When the government attempted a preemptive raid on October 24, Trotsky sent troops and workers’ Red Guards out to take over the city of Petrograd; proclaimed the overthrow of the Provisional Government; and presented the Congress of Soviets with a fait accompli when it convened on October 25. Subsequently he denied that he had differed with Lenin about waiting for the Congress of Soviets, claiming that his statements to that effect had only been intended to deceive the government. Immediately after the Bolsheviks’ takeover of Petrograd and their capture of the Winter Palace, the Congress of Soviets approved a new Soviet government with Lenin as Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars. Trotsky became Commissar of Foreign Affairs. In the next few days he directed pro-Bolshevik forces in beating back an attempt by Alexander Kerensky to regain power, and he supported Lenin in rejecting a government coalition with the moderate socialists. As foreign commissar Trotsky directed diplomatic overtures to end the war, and, failing that, to negotiate a separate peace with the Central Powers. Repelled by Germany’s demands, he and his supporters abstained in the crucial 7-4 vote in the Central Committee to accept the Treaty of BrestLitovsk, and he resigned the foreign affairs portfolio in protest. However, he was immediately made Commissar of War, and in this capacity set about organizing a new, disciplined Red Army to replace the old army that had virtually disintegrated. He rejected the guerrilla tactics favored by many Bolsheviks and made the controversial decision to employ former tsarist officers as military specialists under the supervision of political commisssars. When civil war broke out in May 1918, Trotsky commanded the communist Red forces and turned back offensives by the counterrevolutionary White forces that year and the next. He became a member of the Communist Party Politburo when it was created in 1919. Once victory had been won over the Whites in 1920, Trotsky proposed a military approach to rebuilding the country’s economy, including militarization of labor and absorption of the trade unions into the state, an approach that

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Born Lev Davidovich Bronstein, Leon Trotsky became Stalin’s principal rival for power. ARCHIVE PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

led later commentators to regard him as a precursor of the Stalinist planned economy. However, in the Trade Union Controversy of 1921, Trotsky and his friends were defeated by Lenin in the name of a more moderate policy of state capitalism, presaging the New Economic Policy (NEP). Lenin was supported by Trotsky’s future rivals Josef Stalin and Grigory Zinoviev, with whom Trotsky had already clashed during the civil war. Nevertheless, Trotsky took charge of suppressing the March 1921 rebellion at the Kronstadt naval base near Petrograd that had been brought on by Communist abuses. IN OPPOSITION

Set back at the Tenth Party Congress in March 1921, Trotsky remained Commissar of War during Lenin’s subsequent illness, while the troika of Stalin, Zinoviev, and Lev Kamenev maneuvered to keep him from succeeding Lenin as party leader. In his celebrated Testament, Lenin noted Trotsky’s exceptional abilities, but faulted his too far-reaching self confi-

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lution to denounce Zinoviev and Kamenev as failed revolutionary leaders. This act triggered a new outburst of official denunciation of Trotskyism and the theory of permanent revolution as anti-Leninist heresy. In January 1925 the leadership went further and removed Trotsky from the Commissariat of War. When Zinoviev and Kamenev broke with Stalin later in 1925, Trotsky sat on the sidelines. After their defeat, he belatedly joined them in the United Opposition, vainly fighting Stalin in 1926 and 1927 over the issues of party democracy, excessive concessions to the peasantry, and Stalin’s theory of “socialism in one country” that downplayed world revolution. Trotsky was removed from the Politburo in October 1926 and from the Central Committee just one year later. After attempting a demonstration on the tenth anniversary of the revolution in November 1927, he was expelled from the party. The same fate awaited his followers at the Fifteenth Party Congress in December, where not a single voice was heard in defense of the opposition.

Leon Trotsky at Brest-Litovsk, 1918. THE ART ARCHIVE/MUSÉE

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dence. He nevertheless invited Trotsky to lead an attack on Stalin, but Trotsky passed up the opportunity (fearing anti-Semitism, as archives opened in 1990 revealed). Some months later, in October 1923, Trotsky launched a behind-the-scenes attack on the rest of the communist leadership for violating democratic procedures within the party. Going public with a series of articles, “The New Course,” Trotsky was in turn denounced by his rivals for violating the party’s rule against factionalism. While Trotsky fell ill, his supporters were crushed in the New Course controversy and condemned at the Thirteenth Party Conference in January 1924 as a petty-bourgeois Menshevik deviation. Coming barely a week before Lenin’s death, this was the decisive defeat for Trotsky and his friends, and for political pluralism within the Communist Party. Trotsky’s subsequent struggle against Stalin was futile and anti-climactic. Denounced again at the Thirteenth Party Congress in May 1924, Trotsky sarcastically affirmed the infallibility of the party. He took the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the Bolshevik Revo-

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Despite his declining political fortunes, Trotsky wrote widely during the mid-1920s, producing such works as Literature and Revolution and Problems of Life, along with a series of books on international politics and a stream of platforms and polemics that remained unpublished in his lifetime. EXILE AND DEATH

In January 1928 Trotsky and many of his followers were exiled; many were sent to Siberia and Central Asia, Trotsky himself to Alma Ata in Kazakhstan. There he continued to correspond with his sympathizers and to criticize Stalin’s new industrialization drive. As a result, in January 1929, he was deported from the Soviet Union to Turkey, where he continued to write, completing his autobiography and his History of the Russian Revolution. In 1933 he moved to France, and in 1934 he proclaimed the formation of a Fourth International challenging the legitimacy of the Third Communist International. In many countries Trotskyist parties split off from the communists, including the Socialist Workers’ Party in the United States and, in Spain, the POUM (Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista), suppressed by Stalinist sympathizers in the course of the Spanish Civil War. Expelled from France in 1935, Trotsky moved to Norway, whence he was expelled under Soviet

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pressure in 1936. He then settled in Mexico, in the town of Coyoacán, where he lived until his assassination in 1940. Trotsky was virtually expunged from official Soviet history, becoming an “unperson” in George Orwell’s term; writings by or about him were completely suppressed. During the Moscow Trials of 1936–1938 he was vilified in absentia as a counterrevolutionary traitor, a charge of which he was absolved by an American investigating committee headed by the philosopher John Dewey. Trotsky fired back in numerous writings, notably The Revolution Betrayed, charging that Stalin’s regime was a bureaucratic perversion of socialism and calling quixotically for a new workers’ revolution. Trotsky was murdered on August 20, 1940, by an undercover agent of the Soviet secret police, a Spanish communist named Ramón Mercader, who had gained entry to the victim’s household under a pseudonym. The Soviet government denied involvement, though its role has since been well established. Mercader served a twenty-year prison sentence. Trotsky continued to be demonized in the Soviet Union, and the Gorbachev government never got around to rehabilitating him officially as it did other purge victims. His personal archive has been preserved at Harvard University. Trotsky was a brilliant writer and a charismatic revolutionary leader. As a politician, however, he was by all accounts arrogant and arbitrary, and he antagonized most of his communist associates in the years when personal opinions still counted. His military methods during the civil war are often regarded as an anticipation of Stalinism, though in later years he protested the violation of democratic procedures and the growth of bureaucratic privilege in the Soviet Union. He is often viewed as an apostle of world revolution, in contrast with Stalin’s nationalism. In any case, Stalin became obsessed with destroying Trotsky and anyone connected with him, including family members.

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S O V I E T

The Case of Leon Trotsky: Report of Hearings on the Charges Made against Him in the Moscow Trials. (1937). New York. Daniels, Robert V. (1960). The Conscience of the Revolution: Communist Opposition in Soviet Russia. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Daniels, Robert V. (1991). Trotsky, Stalin, and Socialism. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Deutscher, Isaac. (1954). The Prophet Armed: Trotsky, 1879–1921. London: Oxford University Press. Deutscher, Isaac. (1959). The Prophet Unarmed: Trotsky, 1921–1929. London: Oxford University Press. Deutscher, Isaac. (1963). The Prophet Outcast: Trotsky, 1929–1940. London: Oxford University Press. Howe, Irving. (1978). Leon Trotsky. New York: Viking Press. Knei-Paz, Baruch. (1978). The Social and Political Thought of Leon Trotsky. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Molyneux, John. (1981). Leon Trotsky’s Theory of Revolution. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Trotsky, Leon. (1930). My Life: An Attempt at an Autobiography. New York: Scribners. Trotsky, Leon. (1975). The Challenge of the Left Opposition (1923–1925), ed. Naomi Allen. New York: Pathfinder Press. Volkogonov, Dmitri A. (1996). Trotsky: The Eternal Revolutionary. New York: Free Press. Wolfe, Bertram D. (1948). Three Who Made a Revolution: A Biographical History. New York: Dial Press. Wolfenstein, E. Victor. (1967). The Revolutionary Personality: Lenin, Trotsky, Gandhi. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ROBERT V. DANIELS

TRUDODEN See

LABOR DAY.

TRUMAN DOCTRINE See

COLD WAR.

BOLSHEVISM; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; MENSHE-

VIKS; PERMANENT REVOLUTION; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

TRUSTS, SOVIET BIBLIOGRAPHY

Breitman, George, and Reed, Evelyn, eds. (1969–) Writings of Leon Trotsky. 14 vols. New York. Brotherstone, Terry, and Dukes, Paul, eds. (1992). The Trotsky Reappraisal. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

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At the behest of Vladimir Lenin, war communism, which was introduced during the civil war and sought to achieve full state ownership and operation of the economy immediately, was abandoned as unwieldy, unworkable, and premature. It was replaced by the NEP, under which state industry

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was divided into two categories: the commanding heights and a decentralized sector. The former industries, which included fuel, metallurgy, the war industries, transportation, banking, and foreign trade, remained under direct supervision of the government in the form of the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh). These industries continued as part of the central budget and were subject to centralized allocations of supplies and outputs. The decentralized industries, consisting mainly of firms serving ordinary consumers, were encouraged to form into trusts. VSNKh created sixteen new departments, which replaced the fifty or so glavki, to supervise the largest and most important trusts. About a quarter of the trusts, mainly involved in light industry, were supervised at the decentralized level of the sovnarkhozy. By mid-1923 there were 478 trusts composed of 3,561 enterprises and employing about 75 percent of the total industrial workforce. Subsequently, many trusts were amalgamated into even larger units, known as syndicates. The consolidation of industries into trusts and of trusts into syndicates was obviously intended to make control and coordination of the economy simpler and more effective. These large-scale organizations posed certain problems, especially when their managers sought to use the monopoly power they provided against consumers or other sectors of the economy. The Soviet trust disappeared with the beginning of rapid industrialization and the five-year plan era of the 1930s.

See also: COMMITTEE FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY; NEW ECONOMIC POLICY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Maurice Dobb. (1948). Soviet Economic Development since 1917. New York: International Publishers. Gregory, Paul R., and Robert C. Stuart, Soviet Economic Structure and Performance, 4th ed. New York: HarperCollins. JAMES R. MILLAR

on the site of a conquered Finnish village, not long after the founding of St. Petersburg. The first railroad in Russia, opened in 1837, connected Tsarskoye Selo to the capital, about twenty-five kilometers (fourteen miles) away. In 1887 Tsarskoye Selo also became the first European town to be illuminated by electricity. Tsarskoye Selo (literally “the Tsar’s Village”) was among the residences of the imperial family from the time of its founding until 1917. Celebrated as the Russian Versailles, the town’s layout and culture owed much to the admiration that the Emperor Peter the Great and his successors felt for the French original and other European models. Initially, between 1708 and 1724, Tsarskoye Selo served as the residence of Peter’s wife, the Empress Catherine I. The original Catherine Palace, named after her, was constructed at that time. Substantial rebuilding of the complex was undertaken during the reign of the Empress Elizabeth (1741–1762), with many famed architects and artists taking part in the project. The most famous example is the architect Francesco Bartolomeo Rastrelli’s work on the imperial palace. It is acknowledged as a masterpiece of Russian baroque. The stucco decorations of the facade of the immense palace were gilded so lavishly that, according to contemporaries, in sunlight one could not bear to look at the building directly. To correct this defect and reduce maintenance costs, the gilding was soon replaced by ochre paint. The contrast between the azure paint of the walls and the ochre color of the decorations continues to define the palace’s look. Further notable changes and additions were made during the reign of Empress Catherine II (1762–1796). Among them was the construction of the classicist Alexander Palace, commissioned by the empress to honor her favorite grandson and future monarch, Alexander I. Aside from the elaborate palaces decorated with impressive art works, Tsarskoye Selo also featured lavish parks and the quarters for various regiments of the imperial guard. In the words of the poet Nikolai Gumilev, “barracks, parks, and palaces” defined the appearance of the town.

Tsarskoye Selo (known as Detskoye Selo between 1918 and 1937, Pushkin thereafter) is a suburb of St. Petersburg best known for its imperial palaces and its lyceum. The town was established in 1708

Numerous grand dukes lived in Tsarskoye Selo throughout its existence, but the town gained greater official stature after 1905, when Nicholas II made it his permanent residence. It was in Tsarskoye Selo that the last emperor of Russia was arrested by the Provisional Government during the February Revolution of 1917, and it was from there that he was exiled with his family to Siberia in July of that year.

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View of the Catherine Palace at Tsarkoye Selo, from an 1807 publication by Georg Reinbeck in which he describes his 1805 travels from St. Petersburg through Moscow and other Eastern European destinations to Germany in a series of letters. THE ART ARCHIVE/BIBLIOTECA NAZIONALE MARCIANA VENICE/DAGLI ORTI (A)

The Lyceum, a school for the offspring of the nobility, opened in Tsarskoye Selo in 1811. The stated mission of this prestigious school was to train young men for service to the state. Between 1817 and 1895 the Lyceum produced fifty-one classes, shaping the crème de la crème of the empire’s political and cultural elite. The most famous graduate was the poet Alexander Pushkin, whose poetry featured repeated allusions to his alma mater and immortalized Tsarskoye Selo as a literary image. Among the numerous other prominent alumni were literary figures Anton Delvig, Lev Mei, and Mikhail Saltykov-Shchedrin; scholars Grigory Danilevsky, Yakov Grot, and Alexander Veselovsky; Decembrists Wilhelm Küchelbecker and Ivan Pushchin; and counselor Alexander Gorchakov. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the poets Anna Akhmatova, Gumilev, and Innokenty Annensky made Tsarskoye Selo their home. Nu-

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merous painters, attracted by the allure of the Russian Versailles, were also drawn to the town. Among them were Alexandre Benois, Mstislav Dobozhinsky, Alexander Golovin, Yevgeny Lansere, and Konstantin Somov. During the Soviet period, Tsarskoye Selo was the subject of both passive neglect and active destruction. The town’s central church (St. Catherine’s Cathedral, erected in 1840, designed by Konstantin Ton) was detonated in 1939. A large statue of Lenin, erected in 1960, still stands in its place. During World War II, the town was captured and looted by the Nazis. Much of its artistic heritage was destroyed and only partially reconstructed in the postwar period. Despite all this, Tsarskoye Selo remains an important tourist destination. Retaining an aristocratic aura, the town constitutes a cultural preserve of literary and artistic traditions.

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See also: ARCHITECTURE; NICHOLAS II; PUSHKIN, ALEXAN-

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Iskenderov, A. A., and Raleigh, Donald J., eds. (1996). The Emperors and Empresses of Russia: Rediscovering the Romanovs. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.

DER SERGEYEVICH BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kurth, Peter. (1995). Tsar: The Lost World of Nicholas and Alexandra. Boston: Little, Brown.

Lincoln, W. Bruce. (1981). The Romanovs: Autocrats of All the Russias. New York: Dial Press.

Wortman, Richard S. (1995). Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy, Vol. 1: From Peter the Great to the Death of Nicholas I. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

ANN E. ROBERTSON

ANNA PETROVA ILYA VINKOVETSKY

TSIOLKOVSKY, KONSTANTIN EDUARDOVICH TSAR, TSARINA

(1857–1935), Russian space technology expert.

The term tsar and its variants derive from the Latin word caesar, or emperor. During the fifteenth century, Muscovite grand prince Ivan III began using the term to introduce an added level power and majesty to his rule. In 1547 his son, sixteen-year old prince Ivan IV, crowned himself tsar of all Russia. Indicating the increased significance of Orthodoxy, Ivan adopted other conventions from the Byzantine Empire at the same time, including a variety of court rituals and the double-headed eagle emblem. The eagle signified the uniting of eastern and western Christianity through Ivan III’s marriage to Sophia Paleologue, a niece of the last Byzantine emperor, Constantine XI.

Born in Izhevskoye, Tsiolkovsky was a pioneer of rocket technology and astronautics, known in Russia as cosmonautics. Tsiolkovsky might be termed the “Robert Goddard of Russia,” after the American rocket expert, who, like Tsiolkovsky, began testing rockets in the first decade of the twentieth century.

Russian leaders continued to be tsars until 1721, when Peter the Great styled himself as “Emperor of All Russia.” Peter chose the more Western style because he wanted to reflect Russia’s observance of the rule of law and entry into the Age of Reason. However, the term tsar remained in common usage to designate the Russian ruler. Tsar is used for the male sovereign; his consort is the tsarina. In the event of a female sovereign, such as Catherine the Great, she is crowned tsaritsa. The heir to the throne is designated the tsarevich a word derived from tsar plus the male patronymic suffix “evich.” The term itself has outlived the Russian monarchy. Russian leaders who exhibit autocratic tendencies, most notably Boris Yeltsin, have been derided or lampooned as tsars (e.g., Tsar Boris). Even in the United States, individuals with considerable personal authority have been dubbed tsar. For example, the leader of U.S. drug policy was informally known as the drug tsar.

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Tsiolkovsky is generally credited with deducing for the first time the laws of motion of a rocket as a body of a variable mass in space without gravity. This, in turn, demonstrated the possibility of using rockets for interplanetary exploration. He also investigated the effect of air drag on rocket motion. Such theories and research became subjects of his writings, which included Space Rocket Trains, published in 1929, which explored the theory of multistage rockets. Among Tsiolkovsky’s major influences on future space flight, and in particular on the successful orbiting of the world’s first sputnik (in October 1957), was his work on liquid-propellant engines. In such research and writing he developed the specifications for rocket-engine design. Modern rocket engines still incorporate many of his basic ideas. Much attention is given in Tsiolkovsky’s writings to problems of organizing interplanetary travel and its prospects. He argued that beginning with artificial earth satellites (sputniks), interplanetary stations and flights to the planets could become a way of establishing communities in outer space and adapting space for human needs. With the advent of Soviet power in Russia, Tsiolkovsky’s work received the full support of the state. In 1918 he was elected to the Socialist Academy of Science. Later honors included membership

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in Russia’s main cosmonautics society and the Zhukovsky Air Force Academy. His collected scientific writings appeared in the USSR from 1951 through 1964.

See also:

ACADEMY OF SCIENCES; SPACE PROGRAM

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Petrovich, G. V. (2002). The Soviet Encyclopedia of Space Flight. Seattle, WA: University Press of the Pacific. ALBERT L. WEEKS

TSSU See

CENTRAL STATISTICAL AGENCY.

TSUSHIMA, BATTLE OF In the early twentieth century Russia expanded its economic and military presence in the Far East, inspired by Minister of Finance Sergei Witte and Russian nationalists close to Nicholas II. Three events were interpreted by Japan as a direct assault on its own continental expansion: the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, begun in 1892; its subsequent shortcut, the Chinese Eastern Railway, built across Manchuria at the turn of the century; and the Russian acquisition of Port Arthur to the south as a naval base. After diplomatic efforts yielded little satisfaction, the modern Japanese navy suddenly struck at the two major Russian bases, Vladivostok and Port Arthur, in February of 1904. By this action they destroyed most of the Russian Far Eastern fleet, and blockaded what remained of it. Russia fared badly in the ensuing Russo-Japanese War on land, because of poor leadership and geography, and because of the domestic unrest that resulted in the Revolution of 1905. Belatedly, and as a classic example of poor planning, Russia dispatched the much larger Baltic fleet, under the command of Admiral Rozhdestvenski, to sail around Africa to the Pacific with the goal of regaining naval dominance in its Far Eastern waters. Large, unwieldy, and exhausted after the long voyage, the Russian fleet entered the Straits of Tsushima (between Japan and Korea) on its way to Vladivostok in May 1905. The new, modern Japanese navy, under the command of Admiral Togo, was waiting for it. The result was one of the worst disasters in naval history, with most of the

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Russian ships quickly sunk or immobilized, and with little loss on the other side. Only a few Russian ships, including the cruiser Aurora, of 1917 revolutionary fame, managing to escape. The consequences of this defeat were enormous. The battle signaled the end of the war and a search for peace, negotiated through the arbitration of President Theodore Roosevelt at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. The loss was a major blow to Russian military prestige, lowering morale especially in the navy. Moreover, it prepared the background for the June 1905 mutiny of the battleship Potemkin when it was rumored to be among the next ships to be sent to the Pacific. The defeat also fomented antigovernment agitation that crystallized in the October Uprising and the Moscow Uprising in November. The navy, often referred to, subsequently, as the Tsushima department, never recovered, and was prone to radical revolutionary activism in 1917.

See also:

POTEMKIN MUTINY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hough, Richard. (1958). The Fleet that Had to Die. London: H. Hamilton. Pleshakov, Konstantin. (2002). The Tsar’s Last Armada: The Epic Journey to the Battle of Tsushima. New York: Basic Books. NORMAN E. SAUL

TSVETAEVA, MARINA IVANOVNA (1892–1941), twentieth–century poet, playwright, translator, and essayist. Marina Tsvetaeva, one of the most original and complex poets of the twentieth century, led a life of fierce passion, material hardship, and ostracism. Her “poetry of whirling and staccato rhythms” (Obolensky, 1965) stands outside the trends of her time, though it shares some of the mysticism of the Symbolists, the bold experimentation of the Futurists, and the directness of the Acmeists. Tsvetaeva was born in Moscow. Her father was a professor of art history; her mother, a talented but frustrated pianist who wanted Marina to follow in her footsteps. Tsvetaeva began writing verse at age six. In 1902 the family moved to Europe to

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her complex friendship with poet Osip Mandelshtam and abounds with innovation. Tsvetaeva rejected the Russian Revolution, but her views would prove complex over time: She would come into conflict with reactionary émigré circles. At the onset of the Russian civil war, Efron joined the White Army and lost contact with the family. Tsvetaeva and her daughters spent five years of poverty in Moscow. Tsvetaeva sent her younger daughter, Irina, to an orphanage, only to learn later that she had died there. Tsvetaeva’s collection Demesne of the Swans (Lebediny stan), unpublished until 1957, expresses support for the White Army. Other work during this period includes the collections Mileposts II (Versty II) and Remeslo (Craft). In 1922 Tsvetaeva and Alya emigrated to join Efron, who was in exile. They lived in Berlin, then Prague, then Paris. She gave birth to her son Georgy (Moor) in 1925. Her creative output during this period includes the poetry collections After Russia (Posle Rossii) and Verses to My Son (Stikhi k synu) and the plays Ariadne and Phaedra. Alienated from both her homeland and the Parisian émigré circles, Tsvetaeva suffered extreme isolation.

Poet Marina Tsvetaeva lived in Switzerland, Germany, Prague, and France before returning to Russia. © SOVFOTO

seek tuberculosis treatment for Tsvetaeva’s mother. They returned to Russia in 1905 and settled in Yalta (Crimea), where Tsvetaeva’s mother died in 1906. At age eighteen Tsvetaeva wrote her first collection of poems, Evening Album (Vecherny albom), which drew praise from critics such as Valery Bryusov and Maximilian Voloshin. In 1912 Tsvetaeva married Sergei Efron and bore her first child, Ariadna (Alya). Her second collection, Magic Lantern (Volshebny fonar), and a collection of her early poetry, From Two Books (Iz dvukh knig), received lukewarm response. In her next collection, Juvenilia (Yunosheskie stikhi)-not published during her lifetime-she embarked on new forms and treated unconventional themes, including her affair with Sophia Parnok, a literary critic and lesbian. (Tsvetaeva’s affairs and passionate friendships played a key role in her poetry, as did her feverish devotion to her husband.) Juvenilia was followed by Mileposts I (Versty I), which celebrates

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Efron’s political sympathies shifted, and he became a spy for the Soviet Union. Alya, who shared his views, returned to the Soviet Union in 1937; Efron followed later that year. Tsvetaeva and her son joined them in 1939. Boris Pasternak helped her find translation work, but she was otherwise ostracized by the government and by established poets. In 1941 Efron was shot and Alya sent to a labor camp. Tsvetaeva and her son were evacuated to Yelabuga (Tatar Republic), where they lacked means of support. Tsvetaeva committed suicide on August 31, 1941.

See also:

GULAG

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Feinstein, Elaine. (1987). A Captive Lion: The Life of Marina Tsvetaeva. London: Hutchinson. Karlinsky, Simon. (1985). Marina Tsvetaeva: The Woman, Her World, and Her Poetry. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Obolensky, Dimitri. (1976). The Heritage of Russian Verse. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Tsvetaeva, Marina. (1993). Selected Poems, 4th ed., trans. and intro. Elaine Feinstein. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. DIANA SENECHAL

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TUGAN-BARANOVSKY, MIKHAIL IVANOVICH

TUKHACHEVSKY, MIKHAIL NIKOLAYEVICH

(1865–1919), political economist and social theorist.

(1893–1937), prominent Soviet military figure; strategist, commander, weapons procurer.

The most significant prerevolutionary Russian and Ukrainian contributor to economics, TuganBaranovsky was born near Kharkov, Ukraine, and attended Kharkov University. As a leading member of the Legal Marxist group, Tugan attempted to reform orthodox Russian Marxism by adding a large dose of neo-Kantian ethics, together with insights from British classical economics and a dash of the German historical school. In economic theory Tugan’s most significant work was Industrial Crises in Contemporary England (1894). This pioneered the detailed empirical description of trade cycles—together with concern for their social consequences— alongside a theoretical explanation combining maldistribution of income, disproportion between industrial branches, and a mechanistic steam engine analogy using free loanable capital as the motor force. This approach influenced Western macroeconomic theorists such as John Maynard Keynes, Dennis Robertson, and Michal Kalecki. Tugan also wrote a major work examining the history of the Russian factory using legislative and business history sources, a widely read account of the principles of political economy, and a study of cooperative institutions. In addition, Tugan made notable contributions to social theory, monetary economics, conceptions of socialist planning, and the history of economics. Towards the end of his life Tugan’s allegiance shifted from Russia back to Ukraine, and he was Ukrainian Minister of Finance from August to December 1917. During 1918 he helped to establish the Academy of Science in Kiev, and died on a train headed for Paris the following year.

See also:

INDUSTRIALIZATION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barnett, Vincent. (2001). “Tugan-Baranovsky as a Pioneer of Trade Cycle Analysis.” Journal of the History of Economic Thought 23(4):443–466. Crisp, Olga. (1968). “M.I. Tugan-Baranovskii.” In International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. D. L. Sills, vol. 16. New York: Macmillan. Tugan-Baranovsky, M. I. (1970). The Russian Factory in the Nineteenth Century, tr. Arthur Levin and Cleora S. Levin. Homewood, IL: R. D. Irwin for the American Economic Association. VINCENT BARNETT

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Mikhail Tukhachevsky is one of the most important and controversial figures in the history of the Soviet armed forces. Born into aristocracy, he attended prestigious imperial military schools and academies before joining the communist cause and becoming a fervent Bolshevik. He served in World War I and was taken prisoner by the Germans. He escaped, and later commanded Red Army troops in the civil war. Tukhachevsky held numerous important posts within the Red Army, including chief of the Red Army Staff, Chief of Armaments, and Commander of the Leningrad Military District. In 1935 he was awarded the highest military honor of Marshal of the Soviet Union. Tukhachevsky was an innovative and shrewd military strategist who theorized combat scenarios for future wars, created new means of employing forces, and worked tirelessly for the implementation of his ideas into the rearmament and reform of the armed forces. He incessantly called for more resources to be devoted to rearmament, in spite of numerous competing demands on limited resources from other state sectors. Tukhachevsky wrote many articles about military tactics and strategy, the most important of which was Future War (1928). This 700-page treatise surveyed the combat potential of all countries neighboring the USSR, offering a range of combat scenarios in the event of war. Together with his military colleagues, Tukhachevsky developed the tactical force employment concept of deep battle. This maneuver involved the use of tanks and aircraft to penetrate deep into the enemy’s defense and destroy his forces. The deep battle concept was incorporated into Soviet 1936 Field Regulations and was utilized in the Red Army’s combat operations against the German Army in the second half of World War II. The deep battle concept also found expression in NATO military doctrine in the 1980s. Tukhachevsky’s contributions arguably rendered him the most prescient and talented strategist in the Red Army in the 1920s and 1930s. While commander of troops in the Leningrad Military District, Tukhachevsky worked closely with designers and theorists to develop a variety of new weapons and methods for employing them. In addition, he mastered the technical details of

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complex weapons systems, from aircraft engines to dirigibles and rocket propulsion systems. Tukhachevsky also oversaw aspects of the secret military collaboration with German aircraft and chemical weapons experts, urging the Germans to share more of their knowledge and experience than they were sometimes willing. When tensions developed in Manchuria in 1931, presenting the threat of war to the Soviet Union from East and West, defense production became a higher priority, and many of Tukhachevsky’s projects came to fruition. Tukhachevsky’s relationship with Josef Stalin, who ordered his execution in 1937 during the Great Terror, is controversial and unresolved. The origins of the tension between Stalin and Tukhachevsky have been traced to several events, documents, and rumors. Possible factors include: conflicts between Stalin and Tukhachevsky over the command of the Battle for Warsaw in 1920; Tukhachevsky’s criticism of the role of the cavalry army in the civil war for which Stalin served as chief political commissar; Tukhachevsky’s warnings of the German military threat to the USSR; and documents falsified by Germans or Czechoslovak agents alleging Tukhachevsky’s intent to overthrow the Soviet leadership together with Nazi forces.

See also:

MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET; PURGES, THE GREAT

Soviet nonferrous metal aircraft construction, and he developed more than fifty original aircraft designs and over 100 modifications. In addition to fighter aircraft and heavy long-range bomber aircraft, Tupolev also designed aero-sleighs, dirigibles, and torpedo boats. Educated at the prestigious Bauman Technical School in Moscow, he was one of the founders of the Central Aviation Institute in 1918 and created a design bureau within it. He spent most of his career at the design bureau and in 1936 received orders from the Heavy Industry Commissariat to transfer to GUAP (State Directorate of Aviation Industry) as their chief engineer who oversaw aircraft production. In May 1937, Tupolev’s ANT-7 flew to the North Pole successfully. One month later, he was accused of being an enemy of the state and was arrested for his alleged role in espionage. After serving one year in regular prison, Tupolev was permitted to continue his design work in a special prison as a means of avoiding hard labor. Although his name was temporarily withdrawn from public, his stature was restored in the post-Stalin era.

See also:

AVIATION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Saukke, M. B. (1993). The Little-Known Tupolev (Neizvestnyi Tupolev). Moscow: Original. Yakovlev, A.S. (1982). Soviet Aircraft (Sovetskiye samolety). Moscow: Nauka.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

SALLY W. STOECKER

Alexandrov, Victor. (1963). The Tukhachevsky Affair. London: MacDonald. Samuelson, Lennart. (1999). Plans for Stalin’s War Machine: Tukhachevskii and Military-Economic Planning. New York: St. Martin’s. Stoecker, Sally. (1998). Forging Stalin’s Army: Marshal Tukhachevsky and the Politics of Military Innovation. Boulder, CO: Westview.

TURGENEV, IVAN SERGEYEVICH (1818–1883), Russian novelist, playwright, and poet.

Andrei Tupolev was one of the most important aircraft designers in the Soviet Union during the interwar period and was awarded the honor of “Hero of Socialist Labor” three times in his career. Tupolev is considered by many to be the father of

Turgenev was born into an extremely wealthy family on an estate with 500 serfs near Oryol, in the Mtsensky uezd, in central European Russia. His mother, a tyrannical shrew, savagely beat her serfs and her sons and despised all things Russian. The family spoke only French in the home. His father was an attractive and dissipated rake. Turgenev’s childhood nurtured in him an animosity toward the institution of serfdom and a profound understanding of the culture of rural, aristocratic culture of pre-Reform Russia—the very cultural wellspring from which so many of the characters in his novels were to emerge.

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Turgenev is nearly universally mentioned, along with Fyodor Dostoyevsky and Leo Tolstoy, as one of the great masters of the psychological novel, although Turgenev himself disparaged more than once the emphasis on psychological analysis that marks the works of the other two members of that triumvirate. Turgenev further distinguished himself from Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky by beginning his career as a poet: his first major work was the long poem Parasha, published in 1843—a year before Dostoyevsky’s entrée into literature and nearly a decade before Tolstoy’s. Parasha was followed by a handful of other significant verse works, though Turgenev later wrote that he felt a nearly physical antipathy toward his verse works. Although his poetry was enthusiastically received by Vissarion Belinsky, the leading literary critic of the time, Turgenev’s first work of lasting influence was a series of sketches of what Turgenev knew first-hand from his childhood: the manorial, rural, and peasant milieus. The brief, episodic descriptions were initially published separately, beginning in 1847, and then as a single work, A Huntsman’s Sketches, in 1852. The work exercised a profound influence on the public that is often likened to that of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin, published the same year. Turgenev’s work is one of the highest artistic quality—exquisite, tightly crafted descriptions of the physical world combined with engaging and complex portraits of peasants (generally positively portrayed) and gentry (generally negatively portrayed). Beginning soon after the death of Nicholas I in 1855, Turgenev, always sensitive to the winds of change, wrote his four most significant novels: Rudin (1856), Home of the Gentry (sometimes translated, more literally, as Nest of Gentlefolk) (1859), On the Eve (1860) and Fathers and Sons (more precisely Fathers and Children) (1862). All are penetrating chronicles of the quickly shifting alliances, mores, and institutions that marked the initiatory period of the Great Reforms, with all its optimism and surety of a brighter future. The greatest of these, Fathers and Sons, depicts the intergenerational conflict between the liberal men of the 1840s, with their refined, European (more specifically, Gallic) sensibilities and an inclination toward incrementalism in social and political change; and the new people of the younger generation, nihilists (a word Turgenev brought into coinage), men of science who embraced German-inflected positivism, disparaged aesthetics per se, and believed in the creative potential of destruction. The older generation

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Ivan Turgenev, engraving from a French publication of 1881. THE ART ARCHIVE/MUSÉE CARNAVALET PARIS/DAGLI ORTI

found Turgenev’s portrait of their brethren dismissive and patronizing, and the younger generation found their reflection insulting and patronizing. Turgenev, criticized from nearly every political angle, responded by quitting Russia for Western Europe. From his refuge in Baden-Baden, Turgenev wrote Smoke (1867), a venomous satire that attacked, inter alia, the radicalized intelligentsia in exile, the Europeanized Russian aristocracy, and the conservative Slavophiles. Poems in Prose, Turgenev’s final work, sealed his reputation as the first Russian stylist. The final poem famously praises the Russian language as great, powerful, truthful, and free, a tribute perhaps nowhere truer than when the Russian words flowed from Turgenev’s own pen. He died near Paris in 1882, and, according to his wishes, his body was transported back to St. Petersburg where it was interred in perhaps the largest public funeral in Russian history.

See also: DOSTOYEVSKY, FYODOR MIKHAILOVICH; GOLDEN AGE OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE; TOLSTOY, LEO NIKOLAYEVICH

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allen, Elizabeth Cheresh. (1992). Beyond Realism: Turgenev’s Poetics of Secular Salvation. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Costlow, Jane T. (1990). Worlds within Worlds: The Novels of Ivan Turgenev. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Magarshack, David. (1954). Turgenev: A Life. New York: Grove Press. Schapiro, Leonard Bertram. (1978). Turgenev, His Life and Times. New York: Random House. Seeley, Frank Friedeberg. (1991). Turgenev: A Reading of His Fiction. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. MICHAEL A. DENNER

TURKESTAN Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and southern Kazakhstan cover the territory of former Turkestan. The region is mostly desert and semi-desert, with the exceptions of the mountainous east and the river valleys. The major rivers are the Amu Darya, Zeravshan, Syr Darya, Chu, and Ili. Of the five major ethnic groups, most Turkmen, Kyrgyz, and Kazakhs were still nomads in 1900, but most Uzbeks had taken up agriculture or urban life, the traditional pursuits of the Tajiks. Russia was drawn into Turkestan by the need for a stable frontier and the desire to forestall British influence. The Turkestan oblast was formed in 1865, subject to the Orenburg governor-general, from territories recently conquered from the Kokand khanate. These included Tashkent, one of the two largest towns in the region (the other was Bukhara). In 1867 the Turkestan government-general was established, consisting of two oblasts—Syr Darya and Semireche—responsible directly to the war minister, with Tashkent as its capital. Further annexations from the Uzbeg khanates expanded the government-general. Bukhara’s defeat in 1868 added the Zeravshan okrug, including Samarkand. The right bank of the lower Amu Darya was annexed to the Syr Darya oblast as a result of Khiva’s defeat in 1873, and the remainder of Kokand was annexed as the Fergana oblast in 1876. In 1882 Semireche was transferred to the new Steppe government-general, reducing Turkestan to two oblasts, but four years later the Zeravshan

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okrug, enlarged at the expense of Syr Darya, was renamed the Samarkand oblast. In 1898 Semireche was returned to the Turkestan government-general and the Transcaspian oblast was added to Tashkent’s jurisdiction. Turkestan’s value to Russia was primarily strategic until the late 1880s. In the wake of the construction of the Central Asian Railroad, connecting the Caspian seacoast with Samarkand in 1888 (extended to Tashkent in 1898), the government-general’s importance as a source of cotton grew rapidly. It supplied almost half of Russia’s needs by 1911. The opening of the OrenburgTashkent railroad in 1906 facilitated imports of grain to deficit areas like Fergana, where 36 to 38 percent of the sown area was given over to cotton by World War I. To the same end the construction of a line from Tashkent to western Siberia was begun before the war. Cotton fiber and cottonseed processing were the major industries. As of the 1897 census, Turkestan’s five oblasts contained 5,260,300 inhabitants, 13.9 percent of them urban. The largest towns were Tashkent (156,400), Kokand (82,100), Namangan (61,900), and Samarkand (54,900). By 1911, 17 percent of Semireche’s population and half of its urban residents were Russians, four-fifths of them agricultural colonists. In the other four oblasts in the same year, Russians constituted only 4 percent of the population, and the overwhelming majority lived in European-style settlements alongside the native quarters in the major towns. The Soviet government reorganized the government-general in 1918 as the Turkestan ASSR of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. In 1924 the Turkestan republic was abolished. Its northern districts, inhabited by Kazakhs, were incorporated in the Kazakh ASSR of the Russian republic; its eastern districts, inhabited by Kyrgyz, were joined to the Kazakh republic as the Kyrgyz Autonomous Oblast. The remainder of Turkestan was divided into the Turkmen and Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republics, the latter’s southeast forming the Tajik ASSR.

See also:

CENTRAL ASIA

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Becker, Seymour. (1988). “Russia’s Central Asian Empire, 1885–1917.” In Russian Colonial Expansion to 1917, ed. Michael Rywkin. London: Mansell Publishing.

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Pierce, Richard A. (1960). Russian Central Asia, 1867–1917: A Study in Colonial Rule. Berkeley: University of California Press. SEYMOUR BECKER

TURKEY, RELATIONS WITH

Following World War I, when the communists seized control of Russia and Kemal Attaturk took power in Turkey, there was a brief warming of relations as Moscow supplied weapons to help Turkey drive out the armies of their common enemies, France and Britain. During World War II, Turkey was ostensibly neutral but appeared sympathetic to the Germans, and at the end of the war Stalin demanded bases in the Turkish Straits and Turkish territory in Transcaucasia. Stalin, however, was unable to implement Russian demands because of U.S. support for Turkey. At the same time, however, by solidifying its control over the Eastern Balkans, Moscow posed a threat to Turkey on its border with Bulgaria. Throughout the early stages of the Cold War, Turkey was a loyal member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), sending troops to help the United States in the Korean War–much to

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the anger of Moscow. Relations between Moscow and Ankara, however, began to warm in the 1970s (in part because of the U.S.-Turkish conflict over Cyprus) and in the 1980s the two countries negotiated an important natural gas agreement. Still, at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, relations could be seen as correct if not particularly friendly.

RELATIONS SINCE THE COLLAPSE OF

Through most of the 500 years preceding the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia and Turkey were enemies. Initially it was an expanding Ottoman Empire that conquered traditionally Russian lands, but then as the Ottoman Empire weakened, it was tsarist Russia’s turn to expand at the expense of the Ottomans. Highlighting Russian expansion was the Treaty of Kuchuk Karnadji in 1774, which not only gave Russia the Crimea, but also the right to intervene in the Ottoman Empire to protect orthodox believers. Then, in the nineteenth century, it was Russian military pressure, in cooperation with Britain and France, that helped free Greece from Ottoman control in 1827. While the Russian drive against the Ottoman Empire and Moscow’s efforts to control the Turkish Straits failed during the Crimean War (1853–1853), twenty years later (in 1876–1877) Russia helped free the Bulgarians from Ottoman control in a war against the Ottoman Empire. During World War I, Russia and the Ottoman Empire were on opposite sides, with Russia’s ally Britain promising the straits to Moscow to help keep it in the war.

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Since the end of 1991, when the Soviet Union was dissolved, Turkish-Russian relations have gone through three stages. The first period, 1991 to 1995, saw a mixture of economic cooperation and geopolitical confrontation; the second period, 1996 to 1998, witnessed an escalation of the geopolitical confrontation, and the third period, 1998 to 2003, following the economic crisis in Russia in August through September 1998, saw the relationship transformed into a far more friendly and cooperative one. In the first period trade was the primary factor fostering the relationship. By the time of the Russian economic crisis of 1998, trade had risen to $10 billion per year, making Turkey Russia’s primary Middle East trading partner and at the same time creating a strong pro-Russian business lobby in Turkey, composed of such companies as Enka, Gama, and Tekfen. Indeed, Turkish companies even got the contract to rebuild the Russian Duma, damaged in the 1993 fighting, and Turkish merchants donated $5 million to Yeltsin’s 1996 reelection campaign. Moscow also sold military equipment to Turkey, including helicopters (prohibited for sale to Turkey by NATO) that the Turks could use to suppress the Kurdish uprising in Southeast Turkey. If economic and military cooperation was evident during this period, so was competition. With the collapse of the USSR, Moscow feared Turkish inroads into Central Asia and Transcaucasia seen by the Russian leadership as the soft underbelly of the Russian Federation. Reinforcing this concern were Turkish efforts to promote the Baku-TbilisiCeyhan oil pipeline route for Caspian Sea oil that would rival Moscow’s Baku-Novorossisk route. For its part, Turkey complained about the Russian military buildup in Armenia and Georgia, about the ecological dangers posed by Russian oil tankers going through the straits, and about Russian aid to the Kurdish rebels. On the other hand, once the first Chechen war had erupted in December 1994,

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Moscow complained about Turkish aid to the Chechen rebels. Relations between Turkey and Russia sharply deteriorated in 1996 after Yevgeny Primakov became Russia’s foreign minister. Primakov sought to create a pro-Russian grouping of states such as Greece, Armenia, Syria, and Iran to outflank Turkey. Furthermore, he supported the sale in January 1997 of a very sophisticated SAM 300-PMU-1 surface-to-air missile system to the Greek portion of Cyprus, something that, if deployed, would threaten the airspace of a large part of southern Turkey. Turkey took the proposed SAM-300 sale seriously and threatened to destroy the missiles if they were deployed. Finally, Moscow stepped up its diplomatic support for the Kurdish rebellion, allowing Kurdish conferences to be held in Moscow. The only bright spot in Turkish-Russian relations during this period came in December 1997 when then Russian prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin came to Ankara to sign the Blue Stream natural gas agreement, which would increase the amount of natural gas Turkey would import from Russia from 3 billion cubic meters per year in 2000 to 30 billion cubic meters per year in 2010, with 16 billion cubic meters coming from the Blue Stream pipeline under the Black Sea and 14 billion cubic meters coming from enlarged pipelines through the Balkans. Following the Russian economic crisis of August-September 1998, confrontation gave way to cooperation in the Russian-Turkish relationship. This was due to a number of causes. First, Primakov’s efforts to build an alignment of Iran, Armenia, Syria, and Greece against Turkey fell apart as Greece and Turkey had a major rapprochement. Second, the economic crisis weakened Russia so that Primakov, who had become prime minister in September 1998, realized that Russia simply did not have the economic resources to implement the multipolar diplomatic strategy he had sought to promote, at least until Russia had rebuilt its economy. The consequences for Russian-Turkish relations were almost immediate, as Russia began to prize Turkey as an economic partner instead of confronting it as a geopolitical rival. Thus in October 1998, Russia refused to grant diplomatic asylum to Kurdish rebel leader Abdullah Ocalan. Next, Moscow acquiesced in the deployment of the SAM300 system on the Greek island of Crete instead of on Cyprus. Then, Moscow indicated it would not oppose the Baku-Tibilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. Finally,

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Moscow stepped up its efforts to find external funding for the Blue Stream natural gas pipeline, which it made the centerpiece of its policy toward Turkey. This change in policy direction toward Turkey was reinforced after Vladimir Putin became Russia’s president in January 2000. In October 2000 Russian prime minister Mikhail Khazyanov came to Ankara and stated that cooperation, not confrontation, was the centerpiece of Russian policy toward Turkey, and in November 2001, at the United Nations, then Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem and Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov signed an action plan for Turkish-Russian cooperation in Eurasia. Tensions remained over Kurdish and Chechen issues, over Russian military deployments in Transcaucasia, and over the passage of Russian oil through the straits. However, by the beginning of 2003, even with an Islamist now heading the Turkish government, Russian-Turkish relations were better than at any time in the last 500 years. Whether this rather halcyon condition will continue is a question only the future can decide.

See also:

CENTRAL ASIA; FOREIGN TRADE

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Freedman, Robert O. (2002). Russian Policy toward the Middle East since the Collapse of the Soviet Union. University of Washington. Freedman, Robert O. (2002). “Russian Policy toward the Middle East under Putin.” Demokratizatsia 10 (4). Harris, George. (1995). “The Russian Federation and Turkey.” In Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia, ed. Alvin Z. Rubinstein and Oles Smolansky. New York: M. E. Sharpe. Insight Turkey: Special Issue Devoted to Turkey and Russia from Competition to Convergence 4 (2), April–June 2002. Sezer, Duygu Bazoglu. (2001). “Russia: The Challenges of Reconciling Geopolitical Competition with Economic Partnership.” In Turkey in World Politics, ed. Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirisci. Boulder, CO: Lynne Riener. Sezer, Duygu Bazoglu. (2000). “Turkish-Russian Relations: From Adversity to ‘Virtual Rapprochement’.” In Turkey’s New World, ed. Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari. Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy. ROBERT O. FREEDMAN

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TURKMENISTAN AND TURKMEN The Turkmen are probably the least–known major ethnic group in Central Asia, as they are a tribal–based people who live in the desert region between Iran and Uzbekistan. Turkmen are Sunni Muslims, although the affinity with Islamic practices is weaker than those of other ethnic groups in the region. Linguistically, the Turkmen language is part of the larger Turkic language group, and is considered to be closer to Azeri and Turkish, to the point of being mutually intelligible. The Turkmen are known in the region as being nomadic peoples who have rarely been incorporated into regional empires. While a significant percentage of Turkmen live in the country of Turkmenistan, many live in bordering states. It is estimated that more than one million Turkmen live in Iran, slightly fewer in Iraq and Afghanistan, respectively, and nearly 500,000 live in Uzbekistan. The country of Turkmenistan itself is home to 4.8 million people, of whom 3,696,000 (77%) are ethnic Turkmen. The significant minorities in Turk-

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menistan are Uzbeks (9.2%), Russians (6.7%), and Kazakhs (2.0%). The capital city of Ashgabat has an estimated population between 600,000 (official) and one million (unofficial). This discrepancy belies a rather unusual problem in the country: there has not been an official census since the Soviet–era census of 1989, thus it is difficult to ascertain with some level of confidence most population figures. The government declared at the beginning of 2000 that the population would exceed five million as a result of significant return migration of Turkmen from around the world. Non-governmental observers have not corroborated this figure, nor have they done the same for the current government claim that there are 5.7 million Turkmen living in the country. The early history of the Turkmen is generally told by outside writers and observers. Turkmen (or Turcomen) tribes were noted by early travelers in the region and were often the source of concerns, for the Turkmen were noted for looting caravans and raiding settlements. Such stereotypes plagued the Turkmen up through the nineteenth century,

Women walking along a street in Turkmenistan, one of the most isolated regions of the Soviet empire. © GÉRARD DEGEORGE/CORBIS

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when the Russian Empire expanded to the region known as Transcaspia. Since the 1700s, Russian officials had heard complaints of Turkmen raiders taking Russian settlers in what is now Kazakhstan and selling them into slavery. In the 1870s, it was decided that the Russian empire should incorporate the region of Transcaspia into their southern holding. In 1880, Russian forces launched from the port of Fort Alexandrovsk along the eastern banks of the Caspian Sea and headed eastward. Initially repelled at the fortress of Goek Tepe, they regrouped under the leadership of General Skobelev and subdued the Turkmen resistance in the following year. The final southernmost border of the Russian empire was established in 1895 in a treaty with Great Britain, effectively ending any competition over Central Asia in the so–called Great Game.

However, tsarist control of Transcaspia was short–lived. With the outbreak of World War I, there was a concurrent increase in tribal activity against their Russian overlords. Turkmen participated in the 1916 draft law rebellion and effectively became autonomous with the collapse of the Russian empire in 1917. Throughout the Russian Revolution and Civil War, the region of Transcaspia was under the control of various competing powers, including a Turkmen tribal leader named Juniad Khan, as well as forces from the British Army who were sent to protect Allied interests in the region.

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Eventually, the region fell under the control of the Red Army as the Bolshevik Revolution and civil war came to a close. The actual notion of a Turkmen state was not realized until the twentieth cen-

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tury, with the creation of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic in 1924. Carved out of the territories between Uzbekistan and the bordering countries of Iran and Afghanistan, Turkmenia, later called Turkmenistan, was created for the tribal groups in the region. These nomadic tribes, from the Tekke, Yomud, and others, slowly developed a common Turkmen identity. Through the period of Soviet rule, Turkmenistan was one of the least–integrated union republics in the Soviet Union. It was noted for providing raw materials such as cotton and gas to the country’s planned economic system. It was also viewed as the strategic front line against U.S.–supported Iran. In 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed and, like the other union republics, Turkmenistan became an independent state. The First Secretary of the Turkmen Communist Party was declared president, first of the Turkmen S.S.R. and later the Republic of Turkmenistan. Saparmurad Niyazov has been president ever since. In the process, he has created a strong cult of personality that includes evervisible displays of his pictures, statues, and overall domination of the state–run media. His work of the late 1990s, the Rukhnama, has become a spiritual foundation for the Turkmen state and is something that all Turkmen must learn. Indeed, any opposition to Turkmenbashi Birigi (Father of the Turkmen, the Great) centers on challenging this personalistic rule. Economic development in the country remains a paradox. In spite of a great potential in energy wealth, it remains mired in poverty. And while there are magnificent new buildings in the center of the capital city of Ashgabat, the countryside is dotted with substandard housing and living conditions. Turkmen traditionally have been nomadic herders, with an economy that is relatively autarkic. However, since independence, there has been a push to exploit the oil and gas reserves of the country. Because of an inability to find reliable, paying customers, Turkmenistan has not been able to benefit greatly from this natural resource. As of the early twenty–first century, Turkmenistan is listed as having 150 trillion cubic feet of gas, which is one of the top ten deposits in the world. However, a lack of firm agreements with energy companies has resulted in much of this remaining unexplored. The estimated 2002 gross national product (GDP) of the country was $21.5 billion, resulting in an estimated purchasing power parity (PPP) of $4,480 per capita. However, real per capita income was closer to $1,000 with most living on less than

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$200 per annum. An artificial exchange rate, vast corruption, and the concentration of wealth at the top level all have created conditions of abject poverty for the majority of Turkmen. Trade remains limited to countries such as Russia and Ukraine, the latter of which uses barter deals to finance Turkmen gas imports. There are also modest trade relations with neighboring Iran, capitalizing on a rail link that crosses the Turkmen–Iranian border. Because Turkmenistan neighbors Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to the north, and Afghanistan and Iran to the south, these four states, plus Russia, play a decisive role in Turkmen foreign policy. However, tempering any effort at expanding relations is the current Turkmen foreign policy of “positive neutrality,” which was declared in December 1995. According to this concept, Turkmenistan is not to be part of regional alliances and security arrangements. Thus, while it is technically part of the NATO Partnership for Peace program and the Commonwealth of Independent States, Turkmenistan rarely participates in conferences and meetings and never participates in joint security exercises. The magnitude of internal problems, though, may eventually compel the Turkmen government to more actively engage with outside states, particularly if it ever hopes to benefit from the energy reserves that have been underutilized.

See also:

CENTRAL ASIA; ISLAM; NATIONALITIES POLICIES,

SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allworth, Edward, ed. (1994). Central Asia: 130 Years of Russia Dominance, A Historical Overview. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Bennigsen, Alexandre and Wimbush, S. Enders. (1985). Muslims of the Soviet Empire: A Guide. London: C. Hurst. Capisani, Giampaolo R. (2000). The Handbook of Central Asia: A Comprehensive Survey of the New Republics. New York, I. B. Tauris. Cummings, Sally, ed. (2002). Power and Change in Central Asia. London: Routledge. Kangas, Roger. (2002). “Memories of the Past: Politics in Turkmenistan.” Analysis of Current Events 14(4): 16–19. Niyazov, Saparmurat. (1994). Unity, Peace, Consensus, 2 vols. New York: Noy Publishers. Niyazov, Saparmurat. (2002). Rukhnama. Ashbagat, Turkmenistan: Government of Turkmenistan.

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Ochs, Michael. (1997). “Turkmenistan: The Quest for Stability and Control.” In Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus, ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. ROGER KANGAS

TUR, YEVGENIA (1815–1892), Russian journalist, writer, critic, and author of children’s books. Born Elizaveta Vasilievna Sukhovo-Kobylina, Tur was a well-known salon hostess, prose writer, journalist, critic, and author of children’s fiction. The sister of the playwright Alexander SukhovoKobylin and the artist Sofia Sukhovo-Kobylina, she was the first woman to win a gold medal from the Imperial Academy of Arts. Her son, Yevgeny Salias, became a popular author of historical fiction. Tur began her career in Russian letters as a translator and proofreader for Teleskop (Telescope), a prominent journal in the 1830s. She was romantically involved with its editor, and her tutor, Nikolai Nadezhdin, but her family forbade the match because they did not want her to marry a seminarian. In 1837 she reluctantly married Count Andrei Salias de Tournemire, a French citizen. After spending her dowry, Salias was exiled to France in 1844 for fighting a duel. Tur became a writer, in part, to support their three children. She was one of the first women in Russia to earn a living by writing. Tur’s salon in Moscow included some of the most important intellectuals of the day: the authors Konstantin Leontiev and Ivan Turgenev, the poet Nikolai Ogarev, the historians Timofei Granovsky and Peter Kudriavtsev, and the journalist Mikhail Katkov. Salons were fruitful ground for cultural production, and Tur’s was no exception. Her first published fiction was a novella, Oshibka (A Mistake) in 1849. She then published several novellas and novels, the most famous of which is Antonina (1851). These stories had a large readership. They were published in the most widely circulated journals of the day (Otechestvennye zapiski, Russkii vestnik, and Sovremennik), as well as in separate editions, and her works were reviewed by such luminaries as Ivan Turgenev and Nikolai Chernyshevsky.

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Tur edited the fiction section of Katkov’s Russky vestnik from 1856 to 1860 and then published and edited a journal, Russkaya rech (Russian Speech), in 1861. The journal’s subtitle indicates its scope: “A Review of Literature, History, Art, and Civic Life in the West and in Russia.” Tur stopped publication in 1862 and, to avoid investigation by the Third Section, moved to Paris, where she lived for ten years and again hosted a salon. In these years she worked closely with Alexander Herzen; she also published a regular column, “Paris Review,” in Andrei Kraevsky’s newspaper Golos (The Voice). As a critic, Tur’s intellectual range was broad—she wrote articles on Jules Michelet, George Sand, Mme. de Recamier, Charlotte Brontë, and Elizabeth Fry, as well as Turgenev, Dostoevsky, and Leo Tolstoy. Each of her essays is a rich engagement with aesthetic and social issues. In her fiction, criticism, and journalism Tur addressed the “woman question,” one of the foremost social issues of the day. In her fiction she often reversed common cultural stereotypes about women (such as making the unmarried woman the arbiter of moral goodness in Oshibka and creating a superfluous man who is not noble in Antonina). In her journal Tur often published fiction by women writers. In her criticism she addressed the issue of the position of women in society, both through ironic, incisive assessments of Michelet, Proudhon, and others and in a debate with the educator Natalia Grot. In 1866 Tur began writing exclusively for children. These works were extraordinarily well received and went into many editions. Tur’s children’s fiction, too, became an important cultural influence, mentioned as formative by Zinaida Gippius, Marina Tsvetaeva, and others.

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JOURNALISM

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Costlow, Jane. (1991). “Speaking the Sorrow of Women: Turgenev’s ‘Neschastnaia’ and Evgeniia Tur’s ‘Antonina.’” Slavic Review 50 (2): 328–35. Gheith, Jehanne. (2003). Finding the Middle Ground: Krestovskii, Tur, and the Power of Ambivalence in Nineteenth-Century Russian Women’s Prose. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Gheith, Jehanne. (1996 ). “The Superfluous Man and the Necessary Woman: A ‘Re-vision’.” Russian Review 55 (2): 226–44. JEHANNE M. GHEITH

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TUVA AND TUVINIANS The Tuva Republic in southern Siberia is one of the twenty-one nationality-based republics within the Russian Federation that was recognized in the Russian constitution of 1993. Previously called the Tuva Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR), the constitution recognized it as Tyva, the regional form of the name. With an area of 65,810 square miles (170,448 square miles), Tuva lies northwest of Mongolia and directly east of Gorno-Altai. Tuva’s capital is Kizyl, and its other key cities are Turan, Chadan, and Shagonar. Drained by the headstreams of the Yenisey River, the western part of Tuva lies in a mountain basin, walled off by the Sayan and Tannu Olga ranges, which rise to 10,000 feet. The eastern portion is dominated by a wooded plateau. The climate is extreme, with summer temperatures reaching 43º C (110º F) and winter temperatures dropping to –61ºC (–78ºF). However, the region’s three hundred sunny, arid days per year help the people withstand the summers and winters.

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Tuva is inhabited by a majority of Tuvinians (more than 64%); the remainder are primarily ethnic Russians (32%). More than 200,000 Tuvinians live in the Russian Federation, and smaller communities live in Mongolia and China. The Tuvinians are hardy Mongol natives, related to the Kyrgyz ethnic branch. Because it is difficult to specify physical features that are common to all the Turkic peoples, it is the shared cultural feature of language that identifies members of a particular group. The Turkic languages strongly resemble one another, most of them being to some extent mutually intelligible. The peoples of Siberia fall into three major ethno-linguistic groups: Altaic, Uralic, and Paleo-Siberian. The Tuvinians are one of the Altaic peoples, and the Tuvin language belongs to the Uighur-Oguz group of the Altaic language family. Together with the ancient Uighur and Oguz languages, these linguistic groups form the subgroup of Uighur-Tüküi. Even if a special Decree on Languages in the Tuva ASSR had not been ratified in 1991 stipulating that all academic subjects be taught in Tuvinian, the Tuvinian language would

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not be forgotten. The indigenous language is most widely spoken in rural areas, where 67–70 percent of Tuvinians live. The official lingua franca (Russian) is spoken mainly in Tuva’s four major towns. For roughly 150 years Tuva formed part of the Chinese Empire, and later was subject to Mongol rule. An independent state, called Tannu Tuva, was established on August 14, 1921. Tuva nevertheless voluntarily joined the USSR in 1944 as an autonomous oblast. In 1961 Tuva became an autonomous republic. Tuvinians are mostly engaged in agricultural activities, such as cattle raising and fur farming. Oats, barley, wheat, and millet are the principal crops raised. Recently, farmers from northern China have introduced the Tuvinians to vegetable farming. Many Tuvinians still live as nomadic shepherds, migrating seasonally with their herds. Those who inhabit the plains traditionally live in large round tents, called gers (yurts), made from bark. The main industrial activity in the Tuvinian Republic is mining, especially for asbestos, cobalt, coal, gold, and uranium. Other Tuvinians are engaged in processing food, manufacturing building materials, and crafting leather and wooden items. Most Tuvinians were illiterate until the advent of the Russians. Thus, the Tuvinian culture is noted for its rich, oral epic poetry and its music (throat singing). The Tuvinian use more than fifty different musical instruments, and traveling ensembles often perform outdoors. The Tuvinians in East Asia have never been affected by Islam. In the early twenty-first century, one-third of the Tuvinians are Buddhists, one-third are shamanists (believing in an unseen world of gods, demons, and ancestral spirits), and the remaining one-third are non-religious.

See also:

CENTRAL ASIA; KYRGYZSTAN AND KYRGYZ; NA-

TIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST BIBLIOGRAPHY

Balzer, Marjorie Mandelstam. (1995). Culture Incarnate: Native Anthropology from Russia. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Diószegi, Vilmos, and Hoppál, Mihály. (1998). Shamanism: Selected Writings of Vilmos Diószegi. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó. Drobizheva , L. M. (1996). Ethnic Conflict in the Post-Soviet World: Case Studies and Analysis. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.

Vainshtein, S. I. (1980). Nomads of South Siberia: the Pastoral Economies of Tuva. New York: Cambridge University Press. Wangyal, Tenzin, and Dahlby, Mark. (2002). Healing with Form, Energy and Light: The Five Elements in Tibetan Shamanism, Tantra, and Dzogchen. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications. JOHANNA GRANVILLE

TWENTY-FIVE THOUSANDERS At the November 1929 plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, it was decided to mobilize 25,000 industrial workers to help with collectivization and provide the countryside with thousands of loyal cadres. Over 70,000 workers volunteered to serve as Twenty-Five Thousanders (Dvadsatipiatitysiachniki). The All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (VTsSPS) directed and organized the mobilization campaign, set selection criteria, and established regional quotas. Of the 27,519 workers selected, nearly 70 percent were members or candidate-members of the party, and over half were under thirty years old. Following short preparatory courses, the Twenty-Five Thousanders arrived in the countryside during the first phase of forced collectivization in early 1930. Most were assigned to work as chairmen of large collective farms. Others were to work in state farms, machine tractor stations (MTS), village soviets, or various local Party organizations. However, owing to the hostility of local officials, a great many Twenty-Five Thousanders were put to other tasks or ignored, and often not given adequate food or housing. Some were assaulted or murdered by angry peasants. Despite the obstacles, many farms headed by Twenty-Five Thousanders earned awards from party and collective-farm organs for being model collective farms. The Twenty-Five Thousanders were expected to remain in the countryside until the end of the First Five-Year Plan in 1932. However, only 40 percent finished out their terms. Nonetheless, the TwentyFive Thousanders were hailed as heroes of socialist construction. Many were promoted into rural party and government work, and several earned the distinguished honor of Heroes of Socialist Labor.

Leighton, Ralph. (1991). Tuva or Bust! Richard Feynman’s Last Journey. New York: W. W. Norton.

See also:

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COLLECTIVE FARM; COLLECTIVIZATION; COLLEC-

TIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE

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T Y U T C H E V ,

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Viola, Lynn. (1987). The Best Sons of the Fatherland: Workers in the Vanguard of Soviet Collectivization. New York: Oxford University Press. KATE TRANSCHEL

TYUTCHEV, FYODOR IVANOVICH (1803–1873), Russian poet. Widely considered one of the greatest poets in world literature, Tyutchev can be classified as a late romantic, but, like other persons of surpassing genius, he was strikingly unique. Tyutchev’s literary legacy consists of some three hundred poems (about fifty of them translations), usually brief, and several articles. Although recognition came slow to Tyutchev, in fact, he never had a regular literary career, eventually books of his poetry came to be the treasured possessions of every educated Russian. Many of Tyutchev’s poems deal with nature. Some of them offer luminous images of a thunderstorm early in May or of warm days at the beginning of autumn. Others express the pantheistic beliefs of romanticism (“Thought after thought / Wave after wave / Two manifestations / Of one element”), particularly its preoccupation with chaos. Indeed, the philosopher Vladimir Soloviev considered Tyutchev’s treatment of chaos, which he represented as the dark foundation of all existence, whether of nature or human beings, to be the central motif of the poet’s creativity, more powerfully expressed than by anyone else in all literature. Tyutchev’s poem Silentium can be cited as the ultimate culmination of the desperate romantic effort to, in the words of William Wordsworth, “evoke the inexpressible.” A somewhat different, small, but unforgettable group of Tyutchev’s poems deals with the hopelessness of late love (“thou art both blessedness and hopelessness”), reflecting the poet’s tragic liaison with a woman named Mademoiselle Denisova. An aristocrat who received an excellent education at home and at Moscow University, Tyutchev was a prime example of cosmopolitan, especially

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French, culture in Russia. Choosing diplomatic service, he spent some twenty-two years in central and western Europe, particularly in Munich. The service operated in French, and Tyutchev’s French was so perfect that, allegedly, other diplomats, including French diplomats, were advised to use Tyutchev’s reports as models. Tyutchev was prominent in Munich society and came to know Friedrich Schelling and other luminaries. He married in succession two German women, neither of whom spoke Russian. Politically, Tyutchev belonged to the Right. Not really a Slavophile in the precise meaning of that term, he stood with the Petrine imperial government, where he served as a censor (a tolerant one, to be sure) as well as a diplomat. He may be best described as a member of the romantic wing of supporters of the state doctrine of Official Nationality and, later, as a Panslav. Tyutchev’s most prominent articles, as well as a number of his poems, were written in support of the patriotic, nationalist, or Panslav causes. They lacked originality and even high quality, at least by the poet’s own standards. Yet Tyutchev’s power of expression was so great that occasionally these items became indelible parts of Russian consciousness and culture: One cannot understand Russia by reason, Cannot measure her by a common measure: She is under a special dispensation— One can only believe in Russia.

See also:

GOLDEN AGE OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Mirsky, D. S. (1949). A History of Russian Literature. New York: Knopf. Nabokov, Vladimir. (1944). Three Russian Poets: Selections from Pushkin, Lermontov and Tyutchev in New Translations by Vladimir Nabokov. Norfolk, CT: New Directions. Pratt, Sarah. (1984). Russian Metaphysical Romanticism: The Poetry of Tiutchev and Boratynskii. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. (1992). The Emergence of Romanticism. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. NICHOLAS V. RIASANOVSKY

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U-2 SPY PLANE INCIDENT On May 1, 1960, an American high-altitude U-2 spy plane departed from Pakistan on a flight that was supposed to take it across the USSR to Norway. Shot down near Sverdlovsk, with its pilot, Francis Gary Powers, captured, the flight triggered a Cold War crisis, aborted a scheduled four-power summit meeting, and poisoned Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s relations with U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower. Aware that U-2 spy flights constituted a grave violation of Soviet sovereignty, Eisenhower reluctantly approved them beginning in 1956 to check on the Soviet missile program. Even after the May Day 1960 flight was shot down, Khrushchev hoped to proceed with the summit scheduled for May 16 in Paris. But by not revealing he had shot down the plane and captured its pilot, and by waiting for Washington to invent a cover story and then unmasking it, Khrushchev provoked Eisenhower to take personal responsibility for the flight. After that, Khrushchev felt he had no choice but to wreck the summit, cut off relations with Eisenhower, and await the election of Eisenhower’s successor. It is highly uncertain whether the Paris summit could have produced progress on Berlin and a nuclear test ban. Russian observers such as Fyodor Burlatsky and Georgy Arbatov contend that Khrushchev used the U-2 incident as an excuse to scuttle what he anticipated would be an unproductive summit. More likely, Khrushchev was lured by the flight and its fate into a sequence of unintended consequences that undermined not only his foreign policy but his position at home.

See also:

U

COLD WAR; KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Beschloss, Michael R. (1986). Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair. New York: Harper and Row. Taubman, William. (2003). Khrushchev: The Man and His Era. New York: W. W. Norton. WILLIAM TAUBMAN

UDMURTS Of the 747,000 Udmurts (1989 census), formerly called Votiaks, approximately 497,000 live in the Udmurt Republic, north of Tatarstan, but many live in Bashkortostan. Their language belongs to

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the Finno-Ugric family and is mutually semiintelligible with Komi, further north. Most are Caucasian, with a remarkable number of redheads, but Asian features also occur. Southern Udmurts were subjected to the Bolgar Empire from 1000 C.E. on, and later to the Kazan Khanate. After annexing the multinational Viatka Republic (1489), Moscow laid formal claim to all Udmurt lands but controlled only the north. The south was occupied after the destruction of Kazan (1552), yet massive uprisings continued up to 1615. Most Udmurts were forcibly baptized in the mid-1700s, but spectacular anti-animist trials flared as late as 1894–1896, and 7 percent of Udmurts declared themselves animist in the 1897 census. An Udmurt-language calendar started in 1904 and the first newspaper in 1913. An Udmurt national congress convened in 1918. A Votiak Autonomous Oblast was formed in 1920 and upgraded to Udmurt Autonomous Republic in 1934. Native-language schooling developed rapidly, but as early as 1931 a trumped-up anti-Soviet “Finno-Ugric plot” decimated the elites. Udmurtia itself became the site of numerous slave labor camps. All Udmurt textbooks were ordered destroyed around 1970. Udmurtia (population 1.6 million), on the borderline of forest and steppe, is dominated by its capital, Izhkar (Izhevsk in Russian; population 600,000), a major center of Soviet military industry. Russian immigration reduced the Udmurts from 52 percent of the Republic population in 1926 to 31 percent in 1989. Russian passersby chastised those few who dared to speak Udmurt in city streets. Within the Republic 76 percent of Udmurts consider the ancestral language their main one. Liberalization enabled an Udmurt cultural society to form in 1989. Later called Demen (Together), it spawned an activist youth organization, Shundy (The sun). Udmurtia’s Russian-dominated Supreme Soviet proclaimed Russian and Udmurt coequal state languages, but implementation has been limited. In 1991 an Udmurt National Congress established a permanent Udmurt Kenesh (Council). Udmurtlanguage schooling began to develop slowly.

See also: FINNS AND KARELIANS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

Taagepera, Rein. (1999). The Finno-Ugric Republics and the Russian State. London: Hurst. REIN TAAGEPERA

UEZD The uezd is an administrative-territorial unit that was used in pre-Soviet Russia and the early Soviet Union. During the formation of the Moscow state during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries it designated an area that included both a town and its hinterland, and which came under the jurisdiction of a namestnik (governor). From the late sixteenth century, the uezd was under the jurisdiction of a voyevod (military governor). Under Peter I, the uezd became a subdivision of governments and provinces. Between 1775 and 1780, Catherine II’s reform of the Russian Empire’s territorial administration recreated the uezd as the primary subdivision of a guberbiya (government), based on a (male) population of between twenty and thirty thousand. Each uezd, which was itself subdivided into volosti (boroughs), came under the jurisdiction of an ispravnik (district captain) who was elected every three years by the district assembly of the nobility. The district captain held responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and for fiscal administration. In European Russia, the 1864 zemstvo reform created assemblies at the uezd level, elected on a restrictive property-based franchise. Every three years, the uezd assembly elected an executive board responsible for district administration. It also elected delegates to an assembly at the guberniya level. Provincial governors had to ratify the appointment of the president of each uezd board and, from 1890, of all its members (at the same time the assembly franchise was further narrowed). After the February Revolution in 1917, the Provisional Government introduced the office of district commissar to represent the central state in the localities; after the Bolshevik revolution authority passed to the executive committee of the uezd soviet. At the end of the 1920s, the Soviet government dissolved both the uezd and volost levels of territorial administration, subdividing the new oblasti (regions) directly into raiony.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Lallukka, Seppo. (1982). The East Finnic Minorities in the Soviet Union: An Appraisal of Erosive Trends. Helsinki: Annales Academiae Scientarum Fennicae.

See also:

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NICK BARON

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UGRA RIVER, BATTLE OF The decisive moment of the defensive campaign led by Ivan III against the horde of Khan Ahmad, in October-November 1480. Relations between the Great Horde and Moscow entered a crisis in the 1470s. Ivan III refused to acknowledge the sovereignty of Akhmad or to pay him tribute. Entering into an anti-Muscovite alliance with the grand prince of Lithuania and the Polish King Casimir, Ahmad started to campaign in the late spring of 1480. Ivan III adopted defensive tactics: In July he marched to the town of Kolomna and ordered his troops to guard the bank of the Oka River, but Ahmad made no attempt to force the Oka; instead he moved westward to the Ugra River where he hoped to meet his ally, King Casimir. The latter, however, never came. For several months both sides temporized, and only in October did fighting break out. Muscovite troops, led by Ivan’s III son Ivan and brother Andrew, repulsed several Tatar attempts to cross the Ugra. Clashes alternated with negotiations which, however, met with no success. Finally, on November 11, 1480, the khan withdrew, thus acknowledging the failure of his attempt to restore his lordship over Rus. In Russian historical tradition this event is celebrated as the end of the Mongol yoke. The roots of this tradition date back to the 1560s, when anonymous author of the so-called Kazan History wrote of the dissolution of the Horde after the death of Ahmad (1481) and hailed the liberation of the Russian lands from the Moslem yoke and slavery. In modern historiography, Nikolai Karamzin was the first to link the liberation with the events of 1480. Later, Soviet publications echoed this view. Another judgment of the same events was pronounced by the famous nineteenth-century Russian historian, Sergei Soloviev, who ascribed the downfall of the yoke not to the heroic deeds of Ivan III but to the growing weakness of the Horde itself. The same argument was put forward by George Vernadsky (1959), who maintained that Rus freed itself from dependence on the Horde not in 1480 but much earlier, in the 1450s. In Anton Anatolevich Gorskii’s view, the liberation should be dated not to 1480 but to 1472, when Ivan III stopped paying tribute to the khan. Military aspects of the 1480 event also remain controversial. Some scholars consider the battle a

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large-scale military operation and honor the strategic talent of Ivan III; but others stress his hesitations or even deny that any battle took place, referring to the events of 1480 as merely the “Stand on the Ugra River” (Halperin, 1985).

See also:

GOLDEN HORDE; IVAN III

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Halperin, Charles. (1985). Russia and the Golden Horde: The Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian History. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Vernadsky, George. (1959). Russia at the Dawn of the Modern Age. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. MIKHAIL M. KROM

UKAZ A decree, edict, or order issued by higher authority and carrying the weight of law. In English, ukase. The Dictionary of the Imperial Russian Academy (1822) defined ukaz (plural ukazy) as “a written order issued by the Sovereign or other higher body.” Senior churchmen and the Senate, for example, could issue an ukaz, but no one had power independent of the ruler. An edict or order signed personally by the ruler was known as imennoi ukaz. Up to the end of the seventeenth century, the tsar’s ukazy were recorded by scribes, but from the 1710s onwards the more important ones were printed, either as individual sheets or in collections. In 1722 Peter I issued an ukaz on the orderly collection, printing, and observance of existing laws. It ended: “Let this ukaz be printed, incorporated into the regulations, and published. Also set up display boards, according to the model supplied in the Senate, to which this printed ukaz should be glued, and let it always be displayed in all places, right down to the lowest courts, like a mirror before the eyes of judges. . . . This ukaz of His Imperial Majesty was signed in the Senate in His Majesty’s own hand.” The very sheets of paper bearing the ruler’s printed command were imbued with his authority. Given the significance attached to the Russian sovereign’s written command and signature, the anglicized term “ukase” has connotations of absolutism. It is often coupled with other instruments

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of autocratic rule, such as the knout and exile to hard labor, as a symbol of despotic government.

See also:

PETER I

LINDSEY HUGHES

UKRAINE AND UKRAINIANS Ukraine is a country in Eastern Europe, the second most populous among the Soviet successor states and Europe’s second largest country after Russia. Its population in 2001 was 48,457,100, with ethnic Ukrainians comprising 77.8 percent of the total. Russians constitute by far the largest ethnic minority in the country (17.3%). Ukrainians are an Eastern Slavic people who speak the Ukrainian language, which is closely related to Russian and uses the Ukrainian version of the Cyrillic alphabet. The capital of Ukraine is Kiev (Kyiv). Geographically, Ukraine consists largely of fertile level plains that are ideal for agriculture. The country’s main river is the Dnieper (Dnipro). EARLY HISTORY

Ukraine did not exist in its current territorial form until the twentieth century. In ancient times, different parts of Ukraine were inhabited by the Scythians and Sarmatians, but Slavic tribes moved into the area during the fifth and sixth centuries. During the ninth century, the Varangians, who had controlled trade on the Dnieper, united the East Slavic tribal confederations into the state known as Kievan Rus. During the late tenth century, the Rus princes accepted Christianity and began developing a high culture in Church Slavonic. Scholars, however, believe that modern Ukrainian is a lineal descendent of the colloquial language that was spoken in Kievan Rus. The power of Kievan Rus began declining during the twelfth century, and during the thirteenth it was conquered by the Mongols. After the fall of Kiev, linguistic divergences between the languages spoken by Eastern Slavs in the Ukrainian and Russian lands began to harden.

cept Galicia, which was claimed by Poland. But the East Slavic lands preserved considerable autonomy, and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania even adopted the local Ruthenian language as its state language. This changed in 1569, when the dynastic union between Lithuania and Poland evolved into a constitutional union. The indigenous nobility gradually became Polonized, cities came to be dominated by Poles and Jews, and the local peasantry was enserfed and exploited. In 1596 a crisis in the Orthodox Church and pressure from Polish Catholics prompted the majority of Ukrainian Orthodox bishops in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to sign an act of union with Rome, resulting in the creation of the Uniate Church and a religious rift between the Orthodox and Uniate churches. From that time, social grievances of the Ukrainian lower classes coalesced with religious and national anxieties. These growing tensions found their expression in the Cossack rebellions. The Cossacks were a class of free warriors that emerged during the sixteenth century on Ukraine’s southern steppe frontier. Although originally employed by Polish governors to defend steppe settlements against the Crimean Tatars, the Cossacks, many of whom had been peasants fleeing serfdom, identified with the religious and social concerns of lower-class Ukrainians. In 1648 a large Cossack revolt turned into a peasant war. Led by a disgruntled Cossack officer named Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the rebels, who had secured Tatar support and had seen their ranks swelled with peasant recruits, inflicted several crushing defeats on the Poles. Khmelnytsky, who had been elected the Cossack leader, or hetman, and calling himself a defender of Orthodoxy and the Ruthenian people, soon began building a de facto independent Cossack state. Looking for allies against Poland, in 1654 Khmelnytsky concluded the Pereiaslav Treaty with Muscovy; the significance of this treaty remains a subject of controversy.

Indigenous state tradition in the Ukrainian territories was extinguished during the early fourteenth century with the decline of the GalicianVolhynian Principality in the west. During the second half of this century, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, a rising Eastern European empire at the time, annexed virtually all the Ukrainian lands ex-

Whether it was intended as a temporary diplomatic maneuver or a unification of two states, according to the treaty, the Cossack polity accepted the tsar’s suzerainty while preserving its wideranging autonomy. In the long run, however, the Russian authorities gradually curtailed the Cossacks’ self-rule and, by the late eighteenth century, had established their direct control of Ukraine. The last serious attempt to break with Russia took place under Hetman Ivan Mazepa, who joined Charles XII of Sweden in his war against Tsar Peter I, but

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the Russian army and the loyalist Cossacks defeated the united Swedish-Ukrainian forces in the Battle of Poltava (1709). The last hetman, a largely symbolic figure, was forced to resign in 1764, and in 1775 the Russian army destroyed the Zaporozhian Host, the principal bastion of the Ukrainian Cossacks. IMPERIAL RULE

Poland remained the master of Galicia, Volhynia, and other Ukrainian lands west of the Dnieper until its partitions in the years from 1772 to 1795. Following the disappearance of the Polish state, Galicia became part of the Austrian Empire, while other Ukrainian territories were incorporated into the Russian Empire, ruled by the Romanov Dynasty. The Ukrainian people’s experience within the two empires was markedly different.

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The Romanovs abolished the administrative distinctiveness of Ukrainian territories and promoted the assimilation of Ukrainians. The apogee of this policy was the 1863 official ban on Ukrainianlanguage publications, which was reinforced in 1876. Yet, the Russian conquest of the Crimea in 1783 opened up the southern steppes for colonization, thus greatly expanding Ukrainian ethnic territory. Following the abolition of serfdom in 1861, industrial development began in earnest in southeastern Ukraine, resulting in the creation of large coal and metallurgical centers in the Donbas and Kryvyi Rih regions. The Russian cultural physiognomy of cities and industrial settlements produced an assimilated working class, which would identify politically with all-Russian parties. Like elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the Ukrainian national revival began with the discovery of a

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new notion of nationality as a cultural and linguistic community. Literature soon emerged as the primary vehicle of cultural nationalism, and the great poet Taras Shevchenko came to be seen as its high priest. Together with other members of the Cyril and Methodius Society (1845–1847), Shevchenko also laid the foundations of Ukrainian political thought, which revolved around the idea of transforming the Russian Empire into a democratic federation. Such was the reasoning of the hromady (communities), secret clubs of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, which spearheaded the Ukrainian national movement during the second half of the century. Ukrainian political parties began emerging at the turn of the twentieth century, yet could not built a mass support base during the short period of legal existence between the Revolution of 1905 and the beginning of World War I. The Habsburg Empire, in contrast, was based simultaneously on accommodating its major nationalities and pitting them against each other. In addition to Transcarpathia, which for centuries had been part of the Hungarian crown, during the late eighteenth century the Habsburgs acquired two other ethnic Ukrainian regions: Eastern Galicia and Northern Bukovyna. In Galicia the landlord class was overwhelmingly Polish, whereas in Bukovyna Ukrainians competed with Romanians for influence. Although they were never Vienna’s favorites, the Ruthenians of the Habsburg Empire did not experience the repressions against their national development that were suffered by the Little Russians (Ukrainians) in the Russian Empire. Ukrainians benefited from educational reforms that established instruction in their native language, and by the official recognition of the Uniate Church, which would become their national institution. Ukrainians emerged as a political nationality during the Revolution of 1848, when they established the Supreme Ruthenian Council in Lviv and put forward a demand to divide Galicia into Ukrainian and Polish parts. The abolition of serfdom in 1848, however, did not lead to the industrial transformation of Ukrainian territories, which remained an agrarian backwater. Land hunger and rural overpopulation resulted in mass emigration of Ukrainians to North America, beginning in the 1880s. Modern political parties began emerging during the 1890s, and the introduction in 1907 of a universal suffrage provided Ukrainians with increasing political representation. However, the Ukrainian-Polish ethnic conflict in Galicia deepened during the early twentieth century. Developments

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in Bukovyna largely paralleled those in Galicia, while Transcarpathia remained politically and culturally dormant. WORLD WAR I AND THE REVOLUTION

Galicia and Bukovyna were a military theater during much of World War I. The annexation of these lands and the suppression of Ukrainian nationalism there was one of Russia’s war aims, but Russian control of Lviv proved short-lived. In the Russian Empire, the February Revolution of 1917 triggered an impressive revival of Ukrainian political and cultural life. In March of that year representatives of Ukrainian parties and civic organizations formed the Central Rada (Council) in Kiev, which elected the distinguished historian Mykhail Sergeyevich Hrushevsky as its president. Instead of a dual power, the situation in the Ukrainian provinces resembled a triple power, with the Russian Provisional Government, the Soviets, and the Rada all claiming authority. With the Rada’s influence steadily increasing, the Provisional Government was forced to recognize it and, in July 1917, grant Ukraine autonomy. Following the Bolshevik coup in Petrograd on November 7, the Rada refused to recognize the new Soviet government and proclaimed the creation of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, in federation with a future, democratic Russia. Meanwhile, at the first All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets (Kharkiv, December 1917), the Bolsheviks proclaimed Ukraine a Soviet republic. In January 1918 Bolshevik troops from Russia began advancing on Kiev, prompting the proclamation by the Central Rada of full independence on January 22. Following the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Bolsheviks were forced to evacuate their troops from Ukraine. The Rada government returned with the German and Austro-Hungarian armies, but it was too left-leaning for the Central Powers. In April 1918 a German-supported coup installed General Pavlo Skoropadsky as Hetman of Ukraine. This conservative monarchy lasted in Ukraine until December, when the defeated Central Powers withdrew their troops, and was replaced by the Directory of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. The new government was at first a dictatorship of several Ukrainian socialists and nationalists, who had previously been associated with the Rada, but later all power became concentrated in the hands of Symon Petliura. As the Austro-Hungarian Empire began disintegrating in October 1918, the Ukrainian political

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leaders there declared the creation of the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic. On January 22, 1919, the two Ukrainian republics proclaimed their unification, which, however, was never carried through. The Western Republic found itself fighting a civil war against the Poles, who claimed all of Galicia for their new state and eventually defeated the Ukrainian forces in July 1919. In the meantime, the Eastern Republic was being torn apart in an even more confusing and brutal civil war fought among the Directory, the Reds, the Whites, and various anarchist armies. The collapse of civic order in 1919 resulted in Jewish pogroms, which were committed by all the participating armies, but especially by unruly peasant rebels. By early 1920 Soviet forces controlled all Ukrainian territories of the former Russian Empire except Volhynia and Western Podolia, which were occupied by Poland. A PolishSoviet war in the spring and summer of 1920 briefly restored the Petliura government in Kiev, but ultimately resulted in the affirmation of Ukraine’s division between the USSR and Poland. Northern Bukovyna became part of the Kingdom of Romania, while Transcarpathia found itself within a newly created Czechoslovak republic. INTERWAR UKRAINE

The Ukrainian territories under Bolshevik control had been constituted as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, which in 1922 became a founding member of the Soviet Union. Although it possessed all the structures and symbols of an independent state, Soviet Ukraine was effectively governed from Moscow. During the early years of Bolshevik rule, the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine, or CP(b)U, was predominantly Russian and Jewish in its ethnic composition. The proportion of Ukrainians increased to some 20 percent only in 1920, after the absorption of the Borotbisty, a nonBolshevik communist party in Ukraine. Still, the CP(b)U always remained an integral part of the AllUnion Communist Party. During the 1920s, in order to reach out to the overwhelmingly peasant population and disarm the appeal of Ukrainian nationalism, the Bolsheviks pursued the policy of Ukrainization. This affirmative action program fostered education, publishing, and official communication in the Ukrainian language, and sponsored the recruitment of Ukrainians to party and government structures. By the late 1920s the proportion of ethnic Ukrainians in the CP(b)U exceeded 50 percent. The Ukrainization drive eventually caused resis-

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tance among Russian bureaucrats in Ukraine and uneasiness in Moscow. Yet, some Ukrainian Bolsheviks, led by the vocal Mykola Skrypnyk, defended the policy of Ukrainization. Peasant resistance to the forcible collectivization of agriculture during the First Five-Year Plan (1928–1932) led to Moscow’s denunciation of Ukrainization and its defenders. Skrypnyk killed himself in 1933, the same year that millions of Ukrainian peasants died in a catastrophic famine, which was caused by state policies. Ukrainian cultural figures suffered disproportionately during the Great Terror. Stalinist-era industrialization, however, turned the Ukrainian republic into a developed industrial region. In interwar Poland and Romania, Ukrainians experienced discrimination and assimilationist pressure. By the mid-1930s, popular discontent with the inability of mainstream Ukrainian political parties, such as the National Democrats, to counter Polish oppression, propelled Ukrainian radical nationalists to prominence. The conspiratorial Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN, founded in 1929) became increasingly influential among Ukrainian youth. The situation was different in Czechoslovakia, where the government promoted multiculturalism and modernized the economy in Transcarpathia. When Hitler began dismembering Czechoslovakia in 1938, this region was granted autonomy and briefly enjoyed independence as Carpatho-Ukraine before being occupied by Hungary. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (August 1939) transferred Poland’s Ukrainian territories and Romania’s Northern Bukovyna to the Soviet sphere of influence. The USSR occupied these regions in September 1939 and June 1940, respectively, under the guise of reuniting the Ukrainian nation within a single state structure. The OUN had just split into a more moderate wing led by Andrii Melnyk and a more radical one under the leadership of Stepan Bandera. The infighting between the OUN(M) and OUN(B) effectively prevented radical nationalists from putting up any resistance. WORLD WAR II AND THE LATE SOVIET PERIOD

The surprise Nazi attack on the USSR in June 1941 turned the Ukrainian republic into a battlefield. The Germans scored one of the war’s biggest victories when they took Kiev in September at a cost of 600,000 Soviet fatalities and an equal number of soldiers who were taken prisoner. By the end of 1941 the German armies controlled practically all

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of Ukrainian territory. In Lviv on June 30, 1941, the OUN(B) attempted the proclamation of a Ukrainian state, but the Gestapo soon began arresting the leading Banderites. The German administration divided Ukraine into several administrative entities and discouraged Ukrainian national aspirations. The economy was exploited and the population brutalized. The Nazis exterminated between 600,000 and 900,000 Ukrainian Jews, including 34,000 who were machine-gunned during a two-day massacre in the ravine of Babi Yar in Kiev (September 1941). The Red Army began the liberation of Ukraine in mid-1943, and completed it by October 1944. In Western Ukraine, Soviet troops encountered fierce resistance from the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which continued its guerilla war in the region until the early 1950s. In 1945 Czechoslovakia ceded Transcarpathia to the Soviet Union, thus completing the unification of all Ukrainian ethnic lands within the Ukrainian SSR. The first postwar decade was characterized by economic reconstruction and the Sovietization of Western Ukraine. In 1946 the authorities forcibly dissolved the Uniate Church, the national institution of Galician Ukrainians. In Ukraine, the Zhdanovshchina (Zhdanov’s time) campaign from 1946 to 1948 was aimed primarily at real and imaginary manifestations of Ukrainian nationalism, and to reinstall in Soviet culture Bolshevik values. In 1949 the long-serving first secretary of the CP(b)U, Nikita Khrushchev, left for a higher position in Moscow, but continued to consider the republic as his power base. Therefore, his ascendancy to power in the Kremlin after Stalin’s death signaled the Ukrainians’ promotion to the status of the Russians’ junior partner in running the USSR. This change was sealed by the celebrations in 1954 of the tercentenary of Ukraine’s “reunification” with Russia and the transfer of the Crimea from Russia to Ukraine. By 1959 ethnic Ukrainians constituted more than 60 percent of the membership of the Communist Party of Ukraine (renamed the CPU in 1952) and dominated its Central Committee and Politburo. Following a long line of nonUkrainian party leaders, after 1953 all first secretaries were Ukrainian. In particular, Petro Shelest, who headed the CPU from 1963 to 1972, distinguished himself as a defender of the republic’s economic interests and culture until his removal on charges of being soft on nationalism.

From the late 1950s Ukraine was a hotbed of the dissident movement. In addition to human rights issues, Ukrainian dissidents focused on the defense of the Ukrainian language and culture. In 1975 the movement acquired more political coloration, when the writer Mykola Rudenko founded a Helsinki Watch Group. However, by the late 1970s the KGB succeeded in breaking up organized dissent in the republic. The Shcherbytsky regime promoted Russification and consumerism, but could do nothing to halt the deterioration of the economy. The crisis was brought home by the world’s worst nuclear accident, at Chernobyl power plant near Kiev in April of 1986. Glasnost was slow to develop in Ukraine due to Shcherbytsky’s perseverance in his post, but the first mass demonstrations in Lviv and Kiev took place in 1988. The next year saw the emergence of a mass popular front, Rukh (Movement), and the defeats of many prominent party leaders in free elections. The elections to the Ukrainian Parliament in 1990 broke the Communist Party’s hold on political power, while Rukh openly proclaimed independence as its ultimate aim. INDEPENDENT UKRAINE

His replacement and Leonid Brezhnev’s faithful client, Volodymyr Shcherbytsky (1972–1989) began his rule with a purge of patriotic intellectuals.

In the wake of a failed coup in Moscow, on August 24, 1991, the Ukrainian Parliament proclaimed the republic’s full independence, an act endorsed by more than 90 percent of voters in a referendum in December 1991. Under President Leonid Kravchuk (1991–1994), Ukraine experienced hyperinflation and a sharp drop in the gross national product. The state promoted Ukrainization of education and culture and in foreign affairs sought to develop closer ties with the West. In the elections of 1994 Kravchuk lost to Leonid Kuchma, who advocated economic reform and the restoration of Ukraine’s special relationship with Russia. By dividing the Black Sea Fleet between Russia and Ukraine (1995), Kuchma resolved the tension between the two countries. In 1997 he signed a comprehensive friendship treaty with Russia. Kuchma was re-elected in 1999 and, after a long period of decline, the economy began to recover during Victor Yushchenko’s tenure as prime minister from 1999 to 2001. For most of the 1990s Ukraine was among the largest recipients of U.S. financial aid. Relations between the West and Kuchma’s administration cooled in 2001 and 2002 due to rampant corruption in Ukraine, as well as the president’s alleged involvement in a journalist’s murder and the sale of a sophisticated radar system to Iraq.

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See also:

BOROTBISTY; COSSACKS; CRIMEA; CRIMEAN

TATARS; CYRIL AND METHODIUS SOCIETY; ENSERFMENT; KRAVCHUK, LEONID MAKAROVICH; MUSCOVY; ROMANOV DYNASTY; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; SKRYPNYK, MYKOLA OLEKSIIOVYCH; UNIATE CHURCH; WORLD WAR I; WORLD WAR II

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Armstrong, John A. (1990). Ukrainian Nationalism, 3rd ed. Englewood, NJ: Ukrainian Academic Press.

C H U R C H

Potichnyj, Peter J., and Aster, Howard, eds. (1987). Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press. Potichnyj, Peter J.; Raeff, Marc; Pelenski, Jaroslaw; and Zekulin, Gleb N., eds. (1992). Ukraine and Russia in their Historical Encounter. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press. Rudnytsky, Ivan L. (1987). Essays in Modern Ukrainian History. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press.

D’Anieri, Paul; Kravchuk, Robert S.; and Kuzio, Taras. (1999). Politics and Society in Ukraine. Boulder, CO: Westview.

Shkandrij, Miroslav. (2001). Russia and Ukraine: Literature and the Discourse of Empire from Napoleonic to Postcolonial Times. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

Dyczok, Marta. (2000). Ukraine: Movement without Change, Change without Movement. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers.

Subtelny, Orest. (2000). Ukraine: A History, 3rd ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Harasymiw, Bodhan. (2002). Post-Communist Ukraine. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press. Himka, John-Paul. (1988). Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth Century. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press. Kappeler, Andreas. (1994). Kleine Geschichte der Ukraine. Munich: C. H. Beck. Kappeler, Andreas; Kohut, Zenon E.; Sysysn, Frank E.; and Von Hagen, Mark L., eds. (2003). Culture, Nation, and Identity: The Ukrainian-Russian Encounter, 1600–1945. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press.

Szporluk, Roman. (1982). Ukraine: A Brief History, 2nd ed. Detroit: Ukrainian Festival Committee. Szporluk, Roman. (2000). Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. Wilson, Andrew. (2000). The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation. New Haven: Yale University Press. Yekelchyk, Serhy. (2003). Stalin’s Empire of Memory: Russian-Ukrainian Relations in the Soviet Historical Imagination. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. SERHY YEKELCHYK

ULOZHENIE OF 1649 See

LAW CODE OF 1649.

Kuzio, Taras. (1997). Ukraine under Kuchma: Political Reform, Economic Transformation, and Security Policy in Independent Ukraine. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Kuzio, Taras. (1998). Ukraine: State and Nation Building. New York: Routledge. Kuzio, Taras, and Wilson, Andrew. (1994). Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Kuromiya, Hiroaki. (1998). Freedom and Terror in the Donbas: A Ukrainian-Russian Borderland, 1870s-1990s. New York: Cambridge University Press. Magocsi, Paul R. (1985). Ukraine: A Historical Atlas. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Magocsi, Paul R. (1996). A History of Ukraine. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Marples, David. (1991). Ukraine under Perestroika: Ecology, Economics and the Workers’ Revolt. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Motyl, Alexander J. (1993). Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press.

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UNIATE CHURCH The traditional name for Eastern or Byzantine rite churches in communion with the Roman Catholic Church. The largest church within the Uniate Church is Ukrainian Catholic Church, which emerged as a result of the church union of Berestia (BrestLitovsk) in 1596. Of the Soviet successor states, smaller pockets of Byzantine-rite Catholics also exist in Belarus. Although the historic term “Uniates” is still widely used in Russia, Ukrainian Catholics in the early twenty-first century considered it imprecise and pejorative. By the end of the sixteenth century, a crisis within the Orthodox Church in the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, combined with pressure from Polish

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authorities, prompted some Orthodox bishops to advocate union with Rome. Part of their motivation was to ensure the equal treatment of Orthodox believers and clergy in the Catholic Commonwealth. Having received assurances that the Byzantine liturgy, rites, and entitlement of priests to marry would be respected, in 1595 four Orthodox bishops and the metropolitan of Kiev agreed to recognize the pope’s supreme authority in matters of faith and dogma. Following the approval of Pope Clement VIII, the union was proclaimed in October 1596 at a synod in Berestia. Opposition from other bishops within the Kiev metropoly and the Orthodox nobility sparked a fierce religious polemic. The Ukrainian Cossacks proved themselves to be staunch opponents of the union. During the Cossack-Polish wars of 1648–1657, the Cossacks often massacred Uniates en masse. The Cossack state under Bohdan Khmelnytsky dissolved the Uniate Church, but it continued to exist in Poland. The partitions of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century split the Uniate church between the Russian and Austrian empires. Russian tsars encouraged the conversion of Uniates to Orthodoxy until 1839, when Nicholas I declared the Union of Berestia null and void, thus forcing all Uniates into the fold of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Ukraine. As of 2003, the Ukrainian Catholic Church had 3,317 parishes in Ukraine and was headed by Major Archbishop Lubomyr Cardinal Husar.

See also:

CATHOLICISM; ORTHODOXY; UKRAINE AND

UKRAINIANS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bociurkiw, Bohdan R. (1996). The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Soviet State, 1939–1950. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press. Halecki, Oskar. (1958). From Florence to Brest (1439–1596). New York: Fordham University Press. Himka, John-Paul. (1999). Religion and Nationality in Western Ukraine: The Greek Catholic Church and Ruthenian National Movement in Galicia, 1867–1900. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. SERHY YEKELCHYK

UNION OF RIGHT FORCES

In April 1945, with Western Ukraine under Soviet control, Stalin ordered the entire Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy imprisoned. In March 1946 the authorities convened in Lviv a spurious sobor (church council), which reunited the Uniates with the Orthodox Church. However, the Uniate Church continued to exist underground, as well as in the Ukrainian diaspora. A mass movement to restore the Ukrainian Catholic Church began during the glasnost period and culminated in the church’s legalization in December 1989. It quickly regained its position as a dominant church in Western

The Union of Right Forces (Soyuz Pravykh Sil, or SPS) was a political party that grew out of an association, geared toward the 1999 Duma elections, of a number of leaders’ structures, not one of which was able to enter the previous Duma on its own. The SPS included: the democratic bloc “A Just Cause”; the bloc “Voice of Russia,” founded as a gubernatorial bloc; and the movement “New Force” of the ex-premier Sergei Kiriyenko. “A Just Cause” brought a number of groups together around the party Russia’s Democratic Choice: the movement “Forward, Russia!,” “Common Cause,” the movement “Democratic Russia,” the party “Democratic Russia,” and an array of smaller organizations. In “Voice of Russia,” which originally consisted of seven organizations, only two, with Samara governor Konstantin Titov at the head, joined with the SPS; the others entered “All Russia.” “A Just Cause” had less severe losses at the time of the association: it only lost “Forward, Russia!” with Boris Fyodorov, who joined with Our Home Is Russia (NDR). The SPS list was headed by reformers from the second wave: Kiriyenko (“New Force”), ex-deputy prime minister and former Nizhegorod governor Boris Nemtsov (Russia’s Democratic Choice), and ex-minister Irina Khakamada (“Common Cause”). In the organization of the campaign and the elaboration of the program, a leading role was played

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In contrast, the Uniate Church in Austria was granted equal status with the Roman Catholic Church. In 1807 Pope Pius VII created the Uniate metropoly of Halych with its see in Lviv, the capital of Galicia. Austrian rulers established educational institutions and provided support for the clergy of what they renamed the Ruthenian Greek Catholic Church. During the nineteenth century it became the national church of Galicia’s Ukrainians, culminating in the long tenure of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky (1900–1944), who achieved the stature of a national symbol. In 1939 the church had some 5.5 million faithful.

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by veteran reformers Anatoly Chubais and Yegor Gaidar. The SPS leaders, presenting themselves as liberal statists, unequivocally supported the incipient war in Chechnya and entered into a full-format union with the Kremlin, using the patriotic sentiment in society and the growing popularity of premier Vladimir Putin (the campaign slogan was “Putin for president, Kiriyenko in the Duma!”). Alongside massive stadium shows as part of the “You’re Right!” campaign aimed at youth, the SPS advertised with a collection of signatures in support of a referendum to be held with four questions: concerning the protection of private property, the removal of immunity from the deputies of the Federal Assembly, limitation of military participation to those in service or under contract, and limitations on the president’s right to dismiss members of the government. After the elections, the Central Electoral Commission rejected almost one million of the 3.6 million signatures collected and refused to hold the referendum. The SPS candidates balloted in sixty-five majority districts and won in five, winners including Nemtsov and Khakamada. The original count was small (thirty-two delegates), but the experienced SPS did not become head of the pro-government coalition. Although in the second half of the term it gained control of several important committees, the SPS, under the leadership of Nemtsov (in May 2000, Kiriyenko, the original leader, was appointed plenipotientary to the president in the Privolga federal district), started to move in a highly oppositional direction. The SPS political council included Gaidar and Chubais, as well as Nemtsov, Khakamada, and Kiriyenko, who had suspended his membership. Deeming the years of activity of the government formed in 2000 as a time of squandered possibilities, the SPS proposed a formula for success consisting of three components: a strong and effective state, a private competitive economy, and individual freedom. The SPS considered the following tasks of primary importance: (1) the defense of federalism (prohibition of a third term for governors, nationwide elections of the members of the Soviet Federation, and guaranteed funds for local self-government); (2) the creation of conditions for the attraction of capital and the return of emigrés to Russia; (3) immediate realization of the following constitutional rights of citizens: the right to ownership of land, the right to move and to choose one’s place of residence, the right to information, which presupposes the defense of the independence

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of the media organizations (SMI), and the right to an independent and fair trial; (4) the introduction of a cumulative pension system, liberalization of labor relations, and effective restructurings in the Residential-Communal Management (ZhKKh) sphere; (5) guarantee of equal access to education, introduction of a single exam into the VUZy (institutions of higher learning); (6) creation of political conditions for full-scale regulation in Chechnya; and (7) military reform, providing for six-month service and transition to a contracted army no later than 2005. Positioning itself as the mouthpiece of business interests, the SPS had an array of serious sponsors (including the energetic monopolist RAO UES of Russia, headed by the unofficial leader of the SPS, Anatoly Chubais, “Alpha-Group,” “Interros,” and so forth), allowing it to act with relative independence.

See also: CHUBAIS, ANATOLY BORISOVICH; DUMA; GAIDAR, YEGOR TIMUROVICH; KIRIYENKO, SERGEI VLADILENOVICH; NEMTSOV, BORIS IVANOVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

McFaul, Michael. (2001). Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. McFaul, Michael, and Markov, Sergei. (1993). The Troubled Birth of Russian Democracy: Parties, Personalities, and Programs. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. McFaul, Michael; Petrov, Nikolai; and Ryabov, Andrei, eds. (1999). Primer on Russia’s 1999 Duma Elections. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Reddaway, Peter, and Glinski, Dmitri. (2001). The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms: Market Bolshevism against Democracry. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press. NIKOLAI PETROV

UNION OF SOVEREIGN STATES Gorbachev’s last effort to reconfigure and maintain the territorial integrity of the USSR. During 1990 and 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev led efforts to reconfigure center-periphery relations in the USSR. He sought a new Union Treaty that would give more autonomy to the union republics and make the Soviet Union an actual functioning

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federation. Working with the recently elected presidents of the union republics, Gorbachev fashioned a Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics. However, six republics (Armenia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldova) refused to participate in the treaty negotiations and announced that they were seeking outright independence. The nine remaining union republics reached agreement on June 17, 1991. A Party plenum approved the new treaty and scheduled a signing ceremony for August 20. But on August 19, hard-liners staged a coup in order to prevent the imminent demise of the USSR. When the coup failed, Gorbachev attempted to save some semblance of union. As an interim solution, a State Council, consisting of Gorbachev and the presidents of the remaining republics, was announced on September 5. Ten republics attended the first State Council session on September 6 and voted to recognize the independence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Georgia and Moldova did not attend. In mid-September, the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies voted to work toward forming a Union of Sovereign States. The republics would receive much greater autonomy, while currency, defense, and foreign affairs would remain centrally controlled. There would be a USSR president and prime minister, but with fewer powers than under the Soviet system. Gradually, Boris Yeltsin took the initiative away from Gorbachev. Yeltsin dissolved many USSR structures and reassigned others to Russian control. At a November 25 State Council meeting, he argued for a confederal structure in which the members conducted their own diplomacy and could form their own militaries. Outraged, Gorbachev stormed out of the room. Most republic leaders had been stalling until Ukraine’s referendum on independence, scheduled for December 1. When Ukraine voted for independence, the union’s fate was sealed. Meeting in the Belovezh forest on December 8, Yeltsin, Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk, and Belarusian parliamentary chair Stanislav Shushkevich nullified the 1922 USSR Union Treaty. The remaining republics were caught by surprise, but they quickly signed onto the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) structure formed by the Belovezh Accords. Gorbachev was left out of the discussion and not invited to the first CIS meeting on December 21. Faced with the inevitable, Gorbachev resigned on December 25. Barely 40 of the 173 Council of Republic deputies reported to work

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on December 26, where they formally voted to dissolve the USSR. The Soviet Union was no more.

See also:

AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH; UNION TREATY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Beissinger, Mark R. (1991). “The Deconstruction of the USSR and the Search for a Post-Soviet Community.” Problems of Communism 40(6):27–35. Brown, Archie. (1996). The Gorbachev Factor. New York: Oxford University Press. Dunlop, John B. (1993). The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Matlock, Jack F., Jr. (1995). Autopsy on an Empire. New York: Random House. ANN E. ROBERTSON

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS Although the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia in November 1917, it was not until 1922 that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was formed. At that time there were only four Soviet republics—the Russian republic (officially called the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic or RSFSR), Ukraine, Belorussia, and Transcaucasia. The name, USSR, was chosen deliberately to avoid that of any particular nation or country, since the hope of its founders was that, gradually, more and more countries throughout the world would join its ranks. The USSR came to embrace almost every part of the Russian Empire at its most expansive. The Baltic states were forcibly incorporated in 1940, and in the post-World War II Soviet Union there were fifteen Union Republics. Some of them contained so-called Autonomous Republics which, like the Union Republics, were named after a nationality for which that territory was a traditional homeland. According to the Soviet Constitution the USSR was a federation, but in reality many of the basic features of a federal system were lacking. The deficits included the lack of a clear definition of what lay within the jurisdiction of the component parts of the federation and what was the sole responsibility of the central authorities, the lack of any real autonomy for the fifteen republics, and the absence of an independent judicial body that

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could adjudicate in cases of dispute between the republics and Moscow. Moreover, the doctrine of democratic centralism that governed relations within the Communist Party (and in Brezhnev’s time was made a principle of the organization of the entire Soviet state) made a mockery of the federal principle. Democratic centralism was interpreted by Soviet communists to mean that the decisions of higher party organs were unconditionally binding on lower party bodies, and that they applied to the subjects of the federation, such as Ukraine, Kazakhstan, or Latvia, just as much as to a Russian province. In practice, the degree to which the nationals of the various Soviet republics ran their republics, and the extent to which they were given some latitude to introduce local variation, changed over time. It was, however, only during the perestroika period that the federal forms gained legitimacy. Pressure grew from below, burgeoning from arguments in favor of a genuine federalism to press for a loose confederation and culminated in demands for complete independence. With the liberalization and partial democratization of the Soviet system after 1985, the fact that the Soviet Union had been divided administratively along nationalterritorial lines gained immense significance. Institutions that had made modest concessions to national consciousness in the case of nations of long standing (such as Armenia) and had contributed, unwittingly, to a process of nation-building in parts of Soviet Central Asia, began to use the resources at their disposal to pose fundamental challenges to the federal authorities in Moscow. Not all the republics demanded independence, however, the three Baltic republics of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were in the vanguard of the independence movement, and separatist sentiments also grew in Georgia. Ukraine was divided and only later fully embraced independent statehood. The Central Asian republics had independence virtually thrust upon them when Boris Yeltsin joined the leaders of Ukraine and Belorussia in December 1991 to proclaim that the USSR would cease to exist. Surveys of public opinion in Russia both before and after 1991 showed a majority of Russians in favor of preserving the Union, but in the aftermath of the failed coup against Mikhail Gorbachev of August 1991, Yeltsin chose to assert Russia’s independence from the USSR. Since Russia comprised approximately three-quarters of the territory of the USSR and roughly half of its population, this was the final blow to the state. The flag of the Union

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was lowered from the Kremlin on December 25, 1991, and replaced by the Russian tricolor. By the end of the month the USSR had ceased to exist. A distinction can be drawn between the dismantling or transformation of the Soviet system, and the disintegration of the USSR. From the standpoint of democracy, the former was a necessity. The breakup of the Soviet Union was more ambiguous in respect of democratic developments. Some of the republics—notably the three Baltic states—became relatively successful democracies once they had gained their independence. A number of other successor states to the USSR became more authoritarian than they were in the last years of the Soviet Union. During most of its existence the USSR was a major player on the international stage. While maintaining a highly authoritarian regime—except for the years of high Stalinism, when it is more appropriately termed totalitarianism, and the perestroika period that saw the development of political pluralism—the Soviet state was able to project its power and influence abroad. Its success in doing so depended more upon military might than on its economic achievements or political attractiveness. Nevertheless, the USSR played the major part in the defeat of Nazi Germany in Europe in World War II and earned the gratitude of many citizens of Western Europe. The Soviet “liberation” of Eastern Europe, by contrast, led to the imposition of Soviet-style dictatorial regimes in that half of the continent and the suppression of freedom within East-Central Europe for another four decades. The interaction between the Soviet Union and what was known as the Communist bloc led ultimately, however, to important two-way influence once serious reform got underway in Moscow in 1987–1988. The changes in the USSR emboldened reformers and advocates of national independence in East-Central Europe. The fact that Soviet troops stayed in their barracks as the countries in the Eastern part of the continent broke free of Soviet tutelage in 1989 encouraged the most disaffected nationalities within the USSR itself, with the Lithuanians in the vanguard, to demand no less for themselves than had been attained by Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs. Thus, the Soviet control over Eastern Europe that had once seemed a source of strength of the USSR turned out, in the last years of the Soviet regime, to add to its own entropic pressures.

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Following the disintegration of the Union, the permanent place on the United Nations Security Council, which had belonged to the USSR since the formation of the United Nations, passed to the largest of the Soviet successor states, Russia.

See also:

BOLSHEVISM; COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SO-

VIET UNION; ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION; UNION OF SOVEREIGN STATES

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kotkin, Stephen. (2001). Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse 1970–2000. Oxford: Oxford University Press. McAuley, Mary. (1992). Soviet Politics 1917–1991. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nove, Alec. (1993). An Economic History of the USSR 1917–1991. New York: Penguin. Schapiro, Leonard. (1971). The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 2nd ed. New York: Random House. Service, Robert. (1998). The History of Twentieth Century Russia. New York: Penguin. Suny, Ronald G. (1994). The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. ARCHIE BROWN

UNION OF SOVIET WRITERS The Union of Soviet Writers (Soiuz sovetskikh pisatelei) was the first creative union organized by the Communist Party to solidify its influence on the arts. The Party leadership considered literature and other arts to be potent weapons which could work for or against them. For almost sixty years, the Union employed a mixture of enticements to mobilize writers behind the Party’s agenda, and punishments to discipline those believed to have transgressed. The Union’s creation marked the final step in the politicization of Soviet literature. It replaced the less-inclusive Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP), which was dissolved in 1932. The new Union was open to all loyal Soviet writers. Although the Union’s creation was announced in May 1932, its founding Congress did not occur until August 1934. In the interim, an Organizational Committee dominated by Party officials developed the vaguely defined aesthetic doctrine of Socialist

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Realism, which became the guiding tenet of Soviet literature. Maxim Gorky was also involved in the Union’s creation, though scholars disagree about his actual role. The Union’s First Congress was a widely publicized event, with speeches by leading writers and prominent political figures. The Union had chapters at the All-Union, republic, regional, and city level; however, there was no Russian Republic chapter until 1955. In theory, the Union’s activities were funded by membership fees; in reality it was heavily subsidized by the Soviet state. The Union’s controlling body was known at different times as the Presidium, Secretariat, or Litburo (Literary Bureau). Appointments to this body were controlled by the Communist Party’s Central Committee. Union leaders, who were often little-known writers, were expected to ensure the implementation of Party policies in literature. By having writers police one another, the Central Committee created the illusion of peer review and undermined group solidarity. The Union oversaw Soviet literary journals and ran its own publishing house, Sovetskii pisatel. It organized meetings where writers were encouraged to discuss themes favored by the Party, and local chapters sometimes held preliminary readings of members’ works. Its main task, however, was to reward or punish writers, depending on their level of cooperation with the Party’s agenda. The Union controlled many aspects of its members’ everyday lives, from housing, medical care, and vacations, to access to consumer goods; the quality and extent of these benefits depended on writers’ cooperation. Rewards could be considerable. As a result, election to the Union was a coveted prize. On the other hand, the Union could publicly censure members or prevent the publication of their work. Under Stalin, Union leaders were expected to sanction members’ arrest or execution. After 1953, however, the Union’s worst sanction was expulsion from its ranks. Not only were expelled members deprived of access to Union resources, but they could no longer publish in the Soviet Union. Only Union members could engage in writing as their main profession. The poet Joseph Brodsky, who was not a Union member, was arrested in 1964 as a social parasite. The Writers’ Union provided the template for other creative unions, such as those for composers, filmmakers, and artists. The Union’s influence ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union, though some branches have reconstituted themselves. The

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Russian Federation branch has become a bastion of extreme nationalism.

See also:

BRODSKY, JOSEPH ALEXANDROVICH; GORKY,

MAXIM

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Brown, Edward J. (1982). Russian Literature Since the Revolution, rev. ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Garrard, John and Carol. (1990). Inside the Soviet Writers’ Union. New York: The Free Press. Soviet Writers’ Congress. (1934). The Debate on Realism and Modernism in the Soviet Union. London: Lawrence and Wishart, Ltd. BRIAN KASSOF

UNION OF STRUGGLE FOR THE EMANCIPATION OF LABOR Although preceded by several smaller groups, the Union of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class was the first important Marxist revolutionary organization founded inside Russia in the 1890s. Established in 1895 in St. Petersburg, it adopted its permanent name in December of that year. Its twenty or so members, mainly students and student-age intellectuals, included future leaders of Social Democracy, the movement that gave birth to Bolshevism, Menshevism, and the October Revolution. Among them were Vladimir Ulyanov (Lenin), the future Bolshevik, and Iuly Tsederbaum (Martov), the future Menshevik. Some workers were associated with the Union, but not with membership rights. During its first years the Union’s most noteworthy activity was the distribution of agitational leaflets to Petersburg workers in support of their strike actions. As a matter of caution, the Union tended to avoid leaflets that were overtly political or revolutionary, but because strikes were still illegal, even leaflets confined to workers’ economic grievances were treated as acts of rebellion by the police. In the winter of 1895–1896 and again that summer, the Union was weakened by arrests, anticipating many more arrests and hence frequent turnovers in its membership and a weakening of its effectiveness. Nevertheless, it continued functioning, and in early summer 1896 and January 1897 it played a major role in supporting the mil-

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itant textile strikes that forced the government to recognize the power of workers and to reduce the length of the workday (law of June 2, 1897). During this period the Union spawned similar organizations in other cities and maintained contact with revolutionaries abroad. In 1896 and 1897 the successes of the Petersburg workers’ movement precipitated conflicts within the Union. Younger members (molodye) believed that the time was ripe to open the organization’s ranks to worker representatives chosen by participants in the grassroots labor movement, while the somewhat older “veterans” (stariki), including exiled founders of the Union such as Lenin, while not opposing the admission of individual workers who met their political and ideological standards, balked at the admission of workers chosen by worker groups lest their presence dilute the Union’s political ideology. Tensions over this issue persisted, but as Lenin and the stariki became less influential, the organization became increasingly worker-friendly. From 1898 to 1902 it was run mainly by worker-phile Marxists whose position was subjected to intense and exaggerated criticism by Lenin, Martov, and others, who accused it of economism. Although the influence of the Union waxed and waned, it managed to survive this period of internal disagreement, rivalry, and fragmentation among Russia’s Marxists, remaining a focal point of organized Social Democracy in St. Petersburg. Until the summer of 1902, when it briefly and tentatively adhered to the organization “Iskra”—then dominated by Leninist fears of worker spontaneity—the Union was mainly a close ally of workers’ organizations. By 1903, however, its independent identity was lost, as its niche in the organizational life of Russian Marxism became indistinguishable from that of the Petersburg Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party.

See also:

BOLSHEVISM; MENSHEVIKS; SOCIAL DEMOCRA-

TIC WORKERS’ PARTY; WORKERS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Frankel, Jonathan, ed. (1969). Vladimir Akimov on the Dilemmas of Russian Marxism, 1895–1903. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Haimson, Leopold H. (1955). The Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Keep, John L. H. (1963). The Rise of Social Democracy in Russia. London: Oxford University Press.

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Pipes, Richard. (1963). Social Democracy and the St. Petersburg Labor Movement, 1885–1897. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wildman, Allan K. (1967). The Making of a Workers’ Revolution: Russian Social Democracy, 1891–1903. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. REGINALD E. ZELNIK

UNION TREATY The Union Treaty, often referred to as the new Union Treaty, represented an attempt by Soviet party leader and president Mikhail Gorbachev to renegotiate the terms of the original treaty that established the USSR in December 1922 in the hope of precluding the disintegration of the country. The first of several drafts of the new treaty was made public in November 1990, but it was never signed. The notion that a new Union Treaty was necessary to redress the balance between the central authorities in Moscow and the fifteen constituent republics of the USSR was first advanced in the Baltic republics in 1988. By early 1990 even the conservative party leadership in Ukraine recognized that a new Union treaty would be required. Initially Gorbachev and his team resisted demands for a new basic document that would give the republics more rights and prerogatives within the Soviet federation. At the long awaited plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, convened in September 1989 to discuss interethnic relations, the platform adopted by the party on nationalities policy specifically rejected the need for a new Union treaty, arguing that the Soviet constitution itself was a treaty document and that it was sufficient to guarantee the rights of the republics.

suggested that different constitutional arrangements were possible with individual republics. But it was not until mid-June of that year that the USSR Council of the Federation—a body created the previous March and initially composed of the presidents or parliamentary chairmen of the fifteen Union republics—decided to set up a working group of representatives from the Union republics to draft the treaty. Toward the end of the month the working group held its first session. The decision to begin work on a new Union Treaty was prompted by the belated realization that the relatively democratic parliamentary elections held in the republics in the spring would result in legislative bodies that would be much more forceful in defending their national rights and much less willing to compromise with Moscow than their predecessors. Interestingly the Council of the Federation acted on the same day (June 12) that the Russian republic proclaimed its sovereignty. In the meantime, pressure had been building in the republics, most of which were no longer satisfied with a looser federation and were now insisting on confederation. The Baltic representatives, for their part, refused to even participate in the working group.

The first indication that Moscow was prepared to consider a new federative arrangement came at the February 1990 plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. In his report to the plenum, Gorbachev, although not conceding that a new document should be drawn up, referred to the need for a further development of the treaty principle and

The first draft of the new Union Treaty was made public at the end of November 1990. It consisted of a brief introduction and three sections devoted to (1) fundamental principles, (2) the structure of the Union, and (3) the organs of power and administration. The draft omitted references to socialism and proposed that the country be renamed the Union of Sovereign Soviet Republics. It enhanced the role of the Council of the Federation, which was upgraded from a consultative body to a policymaking organ with the power to make decisions, and abolished the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies. Although the document contained some concessions to the republics that had been legislated earlier in the year, it fell far short of the expectations that had already been voiced by almost all of the republics. Most importantly the draft was completely out of step with the sovereignty declarations of the republics and it continued to retain the federative principle. It also upgraded the status of the autonomous units, most of which were in the Russian republic. This was seen as a calculated step directed against the Union republics. In sum, the new draft treaty was very much a product of decisions made by the central leadership rather than an agreement between the republics and the center.

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By the end of 1990 the three Baltic republics, Armenia, and Georgia had either declared their independence or stated that they would regain independence after a transitional period—that is, they were not prepared to sign the new Union Treaty under any circumstances. Most of the autonomous formations had declared sovereignty. In Ukraine student demonstrations in October brought down the government and resulted in a parliamentary decision not to sign a new Union treaty until the political and economic situation in the republic was stabilized and a new constitution was adopted. In practice this meant indefinite postponement. Once again Gorbachev was offering too little, too late. Gorbachev seems not to have understood the nature of the national mobilization that was rapidly gaining momentum throughout the Soviet Union, confidently predicting that the new Union Treaty would be signed by the end of the year. In December he gained approval from the Congress of People’s Deputies to hold a referendum on a renewed federation on March 17, 1991, the results of which he hoped would pressure the republics into signing a new treaty. A second draft of the treaty, which gave more rights to the republics but still retained the federal structure, was published in early March and sent to the republics for approval. It was the product of negotiations among eight Union republics (the RSFSR, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan), over a dozen autonomous units, and representatives of the center; Azerbaijan participated as an observer. The document was immediately dismissed by the Russian and Ukrainian leaders, Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kravchuk. Although the referendum yielded a 76 percent majority in favor of a renewed federation (the Baltic states, Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova boycotted the vote), negotiations on the new Union Treaty remained stalled. In response Gorbachev convened a meeting in Novo-Ogarevo outside of Moscow on April 23 with representatives of the nine Union republics that took part in the referendum. The result, a five-point statement known as the 9+1 agreement, was considered to be a major breakthrough to the extent that it recognized the sovereignty of the republics and recognized the need for a cardinal increase in their role. In the final analysis, however, it was nothing more than an agreement about the need for an agreement. In June the Ukrainian parliament ruled that it would postpone negotiations until after mid-September. The ensuing negotiations throughout the summer in Novo-Ogarevo, commonly referred to as the Novo-

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Ogarevo process, were difficult and contradictory, but an agreement was finally reached that five republics (the RSFSR, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan) would initial the draft treaty on August 20; Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan said they would sign in September. The abortive coup in Moscow on August 19, whose organizers wanted to forestall the signing of the treaty, effectively brought the Novo-Ogarevo process to an end. In the radically transformed political situation after the attempted coup, with Gorbachev’s standing severely diminished and one after another of the republics declaring their full independence, prospects for a new Union Treaty seemed remote. In particular, Ukraine’s declaration of independence on August 24 stunned observers both within and outside the USSR. Thereafter, Ukraine refused to partake in any discussions about the future of the country until after its referendum on independence scheduled for December 1. Nevertheless, Gorbachev pressed ahead, threatening to resign and predicting global catastrophe if a new treaty was not signed. In October he and the leaders of eight republics, including Yeltsin, issued an appeal to the Ukrainian parliament to reconsider. Ukrainian lawmakers responded that they would not entertain the prospect of being included in another country. By November Kravchuk was saying that a new Union Treaty was nonsense. Russia, in contrast, continued to support the idea of some kind of union until the very end. In mid-November it agreed in principle (along with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Azerbaijan) to sign the latest version of the treaty, which now foresaw a confederation called the Union of Sovereign States. The text was published by Izvestia on November 25. On the same day, seven republics met again with Gorbachev—this time Azerbaijan was absent but Uzbekistan was present—who expected the draft to be signed by those attending. Instead the session broke up in rancor and the representatives of the republics revised the text once again, without Gorbachev. After December 1, 1991, when more than 90 percent of Ukraine’s voters endorsed their parliament’s independence declaration, discussion about a new Union treaty became irrelevant. The following week the Soviet Union ceased to exist.

See also:

AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH; UNION OF SOVEREIGN

STATES

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Beissinger, Mark R. (2002). Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Hahn, Gordon M. (2002). Russia’s Revolution from Above, 1985–2000: Reform, Transition, and Revolution in the Fall of the Soviet Communist Regime. New Brunswick, NJ, and London: Transaction Publishers. Solchanyk, Roman. (2001). Ukraine and Russia: The Post Soviet Transition. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. ROMAN SOLCHANYK

UNITED NATIONS The United Nations, successor to the League of Nations, was conceived and created by the allies during World War II. In 1944 the USSR and the United States, with other major nations, met at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington, D.C., to plan a postwar organization that would provide a forum for the settlement of disputes. Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill solidified plans for the United Nations at Yalta (1945), compromising on substantive issues regarding voting procedures, territorial trusteeships, and the admission of various countries. In April 1945 the allies met in San Francisco and wrote the charter of the new organization, and the United Nations officially came into existence on October 24, 1945, following the charter’s ratification by the major powers. All member nations received one vote in the General Assembly, but the five major powers enjoyed the right of veto in the Security Council. Disputes in the United Nations between the Soviet Union and the United States paralleled the growing bitterness of the Cold War. In 1946 the Soviet Union and the United States clashed over the issues of Soviet troops in Iran and the control of atomic weapons. In both cases American victories led to increasing Soviet disaffection from the international body. The United States scored another success in 1950, when a boycott of the Security Council by Soviet ambassador Yakov Malik over the seating of China allowed the United States to win United Nations support for military assistance for South Korea. The United Nations remained largely impotent in the face of a determined superpower. When Soviet troops moved to crush the Hungarian uprising in 1956, appeals for assistance from the

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freedom fighters to the United Nations were ignored. Nevertheless the USSR and the United States agreed that same year to allow United Nations monitors into the Middle East to help end the Suez Crisis. In the fall of 1960 Khrushchev attended the opening session of the General Assembly and delivered a speech attacking the Western powers. During a reply to the Soviet leader, members of his delegation hit their fists on the desk in protest; Khrushchev proceeded to bang the table with his shoe, creating one of the more memorable images of the Cold War. In October 1962, when the USSR denied that it had placed offensive missiles in Cuba, the United States presented photographic evidence of the missile sites at the United Nations and convinced world opinion of its position. The Soviet view of the United Nations slowly changed over the next two decades, as the emergence of new nations in Africa and Asia shifted the balance of power in the General Assembly away from the United States. After seeing the United Nations as an unfriendly body for its first twenty years of existence, and thereby exercising its right to veto many United Nations resolutions, the Soviet Union began to perceive the General Assembly as a more sympathetic body. Both the USSR and the United States continued to use the United Nations as a forum for influencing other nations. Fierce arguments continued over the Middle East, surrogate wars in Africa, Korean Airline 007, and other issues. During the Gorbachev era the USSR sought better relations with the West and became more cooperative at the United Nations. The first major test of this new policy occurred when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, and Gorbachev brought Soviet policy into line with that of the Western powers. Since that time, Russia has attempted to maintain cordial relations with the United Nations.

See also:

COLD WAR; LEAGUE OF NATIONS; UNITED

STATES, RELATIONS WITH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

United States. (1945). United States Statutes at Large (79th Congress, 1st Session, 1945), 59(2):1033–1064, 1125–1156. United States. Department of State. (1944). Department of State Bulletin, vol. 11. Washington, DC: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs. United States. Department of State. (1945). Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Foreign Relations of the

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United States diplomatic papers 6), 969–984. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. United States. Department of State. (1945). Department of State Bulletin, vol. 13. Washington, DC: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs. HAROLD J. GOLDBERG

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Carr, E. H., and Davies, R. W. (1971). Foundations of a Planned Economy, 1926–1929. 2 vols. New York: Macmillan. Deutscher, Isaac. (1963). The Prophet Unarmed: Trotsky, 1921–1929. London: Oxford University Press. KATE TRANSCHEL

UNITED OPPOSITION

UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH

Formed in April 1926, the United Opposition was an alliance between Leon Trotsky, Lev Kamenev, and Grigory Zinoviev. These former foes headed a loose association of several thousand anti-Stalinists, including remnants of other opposition groups, as well as Vladimir Lenin’s widow, Nadezhda Krupskaya. The United Opposition’s main goal was to offset support for Josef Stalin among rank-and-file party members.

The history of the interactions between the two great powers of the last half of the twentieth century ranged from a close and mutually beneficial understanding to intense hostility, yet they never fought directly against each other. For long periods, in fact, their experience was one of similar goals, of respect, and even of adulation, tempered by periods of fear—the American fear of a threat to its free and democratic way of life from an “evil empire,” whether Russian or Communist, and the Russian fear of encirclement by a superior power taking advantage of its transitional weaknesses and vulnerability. The relations of Russia—as an empire, a Soviet socialist state, or as a fledgling democracy— with the United States have had a profound impact upon the history of both countries and on the whole world. Already in the seventeenth century, Russian expansion overland through Siberia had reached the Pacific coast and contact with Asian powers such as China. Peter the Great, endowed with great energy and curiosity, commissioned Vitus Bering to explore the waters and determine whether Asia (Russia’s Siberia) was connected by land to North America. This drew political and economic attention to the region, especially for the valuable sea otter skins (for exchange with China for tea), and Russian hunting camps soon appeared on the Aleutian Islands and along the Alaskan coast and would result in direct relations with American colonies settled by Europeans from across the North Atlantic.

In July 1926, United Oppositionists openly clashed with Stalin at a Central Committee plenum. Chief among their many complaints was the failure of state industry to keep pace with economic development, thus perpetuating a shortage of goods. They advocated a program of intensified industrial production and the collectivization of agriculture, the same program that Stalin would adopt two years later. The Central Committee responded by charging Zinoviev with violating the Party’s ban on factions and removed him from the Politburo. Thus blocked in the Central Committee, the United Opposition took its case directly to the factories by staging public demonstrations in late September. Within a month, under fire from Stalin’s supporters, Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinoviev capitulated and publicly recanted. Trotsky was removed from the Politburo, and Kamenev lost his standing as a candidate member. Further machinations and conflicts resulted in the expulsion of the trio from the Central Committee in October 1927. The following month Trotsky and Zinoviev were purged from the party altogether, followed by Kamenev’s removal from the party in December 1927. The defeat of the United Opposition set the stage for Stalin to move against what he labeled the Right Opposition, thereby consolidating his power.

See also:

KAMENEV, LEV BORISOVICH; LEFT OPPOSITION;

STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH; TROTSKY, LEON DAVIDOVICH; ZINOVIEV, GRIGORY YERSEYEVICH

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A mutually advantageous and friendly distant friendship between Russia and the American colonies began in the 1760s and was based on Russian hostility toward British supremacy. At the time, Britain dominated oceanic trade and a huge empire that included India near the Russian southern borderland, Britain’s American colonies, and most of the world’s open water. Both Russia and the colonies were deeply involved economically in an Atlantic trade system that brought cargoes of rice,

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tobacco, sugar, and other products to Russia from the Americas in exchange for iron products (anchors, chains, and nails), coarse linen (sailcloth), and processed hemp (rope). This direct trade benefited the growing American economy considerably, especially since it avoided the restrictions of the British Navigation Acts. Inspired by Catherine the Great, Russia continued to explore the waters of the North Pacific, through the voyages of Vitus Bering and Ivan Chirikov, to discover not only that America and Asia were separated by water, but that there existed a large continental land mass just east of the Russian Empire. Moreover, Russia was rich in fur-bearing animals that would advance Russia’s lucrative Siberian fur industry. The BritishSpanish imperial rivalry along the western North American coast (the Nootka Sound controversy of 1788) instigated a more clearly defined Russian presence in what would become known as Russian America, later Alaska. During the American Revolutionary War, Russia intervened against Britain with Catherine the Great’s declaration of Armed Neutrality (1780), a treaty signed by several European countries that attempted to protect neutral shipping from Britain’s

high-handed policies at sea, to the benefit of those North Americans seeking independence. Moreover, several Russians, most notably Fyodor Karzhavin, directly assisted the American cause and inspired an American effort to consolidate a diplomatic union with Russia with the mission of Francis Dana (1781). Though nothing came of this, the notion of a community of interests remained, both politically and commercially. Direct commerce steadily increased in the aftermath of the Revolutionary War, reaching a zenith during the Napoleonic period of continental blockade and embargo between Britain and France (1807–1812). During this time full diplomatic relations were established, with John Quincy Adams serving as the first American minister in St. Petersburg. This period of diplomatic relations also provided a precedent for a quasi-alliance between Russia and the United States that would prevail until late in the nineteenth century. The alliance was confirmed by a Treaty of Commerce in 1832 that assured each country of reciprocity in economic and political relations, and indicated the importance that each country attached to their mutual interests. In 1797 the Russian government chartered the Russian America Company, under the capable management of Alexander Baranov, to oversee and develop its barely occupied territories in North America from headquarters first at Kodiak, then at Sitka. The main goal was economic: to preserve access to the rich sea otter fur sources along the coast as far south as California. Russia’s fur trade depended especially on New England ship captains, such as John D’Wolfe of Bristol, Rhode Island, but it also involved intense, and often hostile, relationships with Native Americans and the establishment of a costly, distant supply base in Northern California (Fort Ross) from 1812 to 1841. Russians and Americans thus very soon became the dominant on the West Coast of North America; this led Russians and Americans to refer to “their manifest destinies”—one eastern, the other western.

ARCHIVE PHOTOS.

Mutual economic and political interests continued through the Crimean War (1854–1856) with large shipments of cotton, sugar, rice, weapons, and other American products to Russia. The American import of Russian products slackened, however, as new sources replaced Russian rope and iron, and cotton canvas replaced linen sailcloth. Nevertheless, trade between the United States and Russia in the Pacific expanded through the middle of the nineteenth century, with American shippers providing essential services for the distant Russian

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General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan greet the White House press corps. WHITE HOUSE PHOTOS/

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bases in Alaska. During the Russian conflict with France and Britain, the United States provided valuable military and other supplies, and more than thirty Americans served as physicians to the Russian Army, thus reducing the isolation of Russia and augmenting the sense of a common interest. The coincidence of a liberal, reformist government in Russia under Alexander II (1856–1881) and the U.S. Civil War formed an even closer bond, resulting in Russian naval squadrons visiting New York and San Francisco in 1863 to demonstrate support for the North. Their presence may have been influential in restraining France and Britain from more overt support of the Confederacy, thus ensuring Union victory. The aftermath witnessed several much-publicized exchange visits that included that of Assistant Secretary of the Navy Gustavus Fox to Russia in 1866 and Grand Duke Alexis hunting buffalo in Nebraska and Colorado with George Armstrong Custer and William (Buffalo Bill) Cody in early 1872. These visits may have marked the peak of the unlikely friendship of autocratic Russia with republican America. In the cultural arena there were at first relatively few direct contacts, despite a Russian fascination with the works of James Fenimore Cooper, Washington Irving, and Harriet Beecher Stowe. Later in the century, Americans reciprocated with an appreciation of Ivan Turgenev, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, and especially Leo Tolstoy, whose works produced in America a veritable craze for things Russian. This was accompanied by renewed Russian interest in American life as portrayed in stories of Mark Twain and the art of Frederic Remington, among others. Russia’s amerikanizm (obsession with American models for society and technological advance) was demonstrated especially by the adoption of Hiram Berdan’s rifle design for the Russian army and the considerable Russian presence at the Chicago World’s Fair (Columbian Exposition) in 1893. American companies, primarily Singer and International Harvester, served the Russian quest for modernization in exchange for monopolistic rights and independent factories. By 1914 they numbered among the very largest private concerns in Russia, employing more than thirty thousand each. New York Life Insurance Company, dominating that sector in Russia, was reported to be the largest holder of Russian stocks. Westinghouse and the Crane (plumbing) businesses partnered to produce air brakes for the Trans-Siberian Railroad, launched in 1892. A result was that the manager of the Russ-

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Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev confer during a walkabout in Red Square, near St. Basil’s Cathedral, May 31, 1998. ASSOCIATED PRESS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

ian enterprise, Charles R. Crane, became devoted to Russian culture and religion and promoted its appreciation in America by sponsoring lectures by the liberal historian Pavel Milyukov, endowing a chair at the University of Chicago, and financing tours of Russian choirs and other artistic groups through the United States. His advocacy of preserving the true Russian culture would continue through the Russian Revolution, civil war, and purges. By the 1880s two major issues clouded the earlier harmony in relations. One was the Russian arrest and prosecution of political dissenters after the assassination of Alexander II in 1881 and the resulting Siberian exile system that George Kennan so eloquently depicted in a series of articles for American Mercury in the 1880s. This elicited considerable American sympathy for those Russians

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who were challenging the autocratic regime for their democratic and socialist causes and suffering at the hand of a police state. The other was Russian policy toward its Jewish population, which required the Jews to abide by strict limitations on activities, to emigrate, or to convert to another, more acceptable religion. Encouraged by American immigrant Jewish aid societies, many Russian Jews departed for the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These factors not only produced a generally negative opinion of religious and political rights in Russia, but also resulted in the abrogation of the Commercial Treaty of 1832. The agreement had stipulated that Americans would be assured the same rights in Russia as Russians, but Russia took this to mean that American Jews could only have the same restricted rights as Russian Jews. The Russian effort to alleviate the problem by denying entry visas to American Jews on grounds of religion only aggravated the situation. After considerable debate, the U.S. Senate formally abrogated the treaty in 1912, but this had practically no effect on commerce between the two countries. In World War I (1914–1918), the United States and Russia were intimately involved and eventually on the same side. As one of the initial participants, Russia suffered a series of defeats. With the cutting off of regular trade routes through the Black and Baltic Seas and overland across Europe, Russia faced severe economic shortages and a breakdown of transportation. Its relations with the United States also intensified as Washington agreed under terms of the Geneva Convention to supervise German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman prisoners of war in Russia, resulting in a considerable number of additional Americans traveling through the country to inspect the Russian camps. Russia also depended upon supplies of munitions and transportation equipment, unfortunately delayed by America’s own needs and a higher priority for the Western Front.

Government, first headed by Paul Milyukov and then by Alexander Kerensky, with a symbolic show of American support. Railroad, American Red Cross, and other missions followed, but little could be done while the Allies placed higher priority on the Western Front. The radical left wing of the revolution seized power in October, thus dashing American expectations that Russia was headed down the path toward representative democracy. After considering aid to the new Bolshevikdominated Soviet government, a policy urged by American Red Cross mission director Raymond Robins, the American embassy essentially broke off direct relations by moving to Vologda at the end of February 1918, when the Soviet government moved to Moscow. When the Soviets departed from the war by signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany in March, the Allies, hardened by a sense of Russian betrayal, opted for armed intervention to prevent the vast arsenal of supplies at ports from falling into German hands and to assist a considerable anti-Bolshevik resistance in Russia. Reluctant to participate in intervention, but mindful of Communist-inspired disruptions (the “Red Scare” of 1919), the United States created a massive relief program (1921–1923) but stipulated that the aid be administered directly by the American Relief Administration.

The February 1917 Revolution that brought an end to the Russian autocracy facilitated American entry into the war “to make the world safe for democracy.” Large American loans delivered vital goods to the Russian ports of Vladivostok, Archangel, and Murmansk. Unfortunately, the steadily deteriorating state of rail transport left most of the deliveries piled up at the ports. American delegations came to advise and bolster Russia’s continuation of the war. One delegation, led by elder statesman Elihu Root, sought to strengthen the Provisional

The American offer and Soviet acceptance were grounded in humanitarian concerns, but both Russian and American interests were disappointed that it did not result in full diplomatic relations. The United States withheld recognition during the 1920s because of the general American isolationism after the war (and disillusionment with the peace), concerns about violations of religious rights, Bolshevik renunciation of imperial debt, and, more vaguely, a belief that the Soviet Union did not deserve recognition because of its abuse of human rights and the Soviet-sponsored Communist International’s support of the American Communist Party. However, some Americans argued that Communism could be tempered by contacts, that much good business could be done, and that new international developments of the 1930s (the rise of an aggressive Japan and Germany) required accommodations. This led to formal diplomatic recognition (1933) and eventually to the “grand alliance” of World War II. The success of the Big Three (Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin) and their countries in forging victory in Europe and the Pacific was a major accomplishment of the twentieth century.

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That achievement was soon diminished by postwar conflict. The Red Army’s occupation of a large part of Central Europe, and the agreements (Yalta and Potsdam) granting Soviet control of much of the area, resulted in a line across Europe, designated by Winston Churchill as the “Iron Curtain.” Instability across Europe and in the former colonial regions aggravated the divisions and produced a series of political and military conflicts: the Berlin blockade (1948–1949), Communist seizures of power in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and the Korean War (1950–1953). Western Europe, fortunately, was stabilized by the Marshall Plan (1948) and the establishment of NATO (1949). The postwar period was still dominated by a risky and unpredictable arms race escalating into enormous productions of nuclear, biological, and other weapons of mass destruction. Fortunately, saner heads prevailed on both sides and resulted in the post-Stalin “spirit of Camp David” (Khrushchev and Eisenhower summit meetings). One important result of Khrushchev’s “peaceful coexistence” was the inauguration of cultural exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1950s that would continue without interruption and expand. Unfortunately, additional frictions—the U-2 spy plane incident (1960), building of the Berlin wall (1961), the Cuban missile crisis (1962), Soviet suppression of the Czechoslovak “socialism with a human face” (1968), repression of internal dissent, the Vietnam War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979), and the Korean Airliner incident (1983)—kept the Cold War alive into the 1980s. The Brezhnev-era détente, however, had produced a number of softer, more realistic policies that led to expanded exchanges, arms limitations talks, additional Soviet-American summit meetings, and limited emigration of Jews and other voices of Soviet dissent. Throughout the Cold War, mutual respect prevailed in regard to cultural and scientific achievements, creating pressure in both countries for more communication and efforts at understanding. This culminated in the Gorbachev-era relaxations of the once officially closed society. The rewriting of distorted history, the opening of archives, the liberation of Eastern Europe, the unification of Germany, and, finally, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the collapse of Communism seemed to herald the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a new era in Soviet-American relations. This conclusion, however, is clouded by an unfinished and indistinct search for new identity and purpose in both countries.

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See also:

S T A T E S ,

R E L A T I O N S

ALASKA; ALLIED INTERVENTION;

W I T H

ARMS CON-

TROL; COLD WAR; CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS; DÉTENTE; GRAND ALLIANCE; JEWS; U-2 SPY PLANE INCIDENT; WORLD WAR I; WORLD WAR II

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allen, Robert V. (1988). Russia Looks to America: The View to 1917. Washington, DC: Library of Congress. Bohlen, Charles E. (1973). Witness to History, 1929–1969. New York: Norton. Bolkhovitinov, Nikolai. (1975). The Beginnings of RussianAmerican Relations, 1775–1815, tr. Elena Levin. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Dukes, Paul. (2000). The Superpowers: A Short History. London: Routledge. Foglesong, David S. (1995). America’s Secret War Against Bolshevism: U. S. Intervention in the Russian Civil War, 1917–1920. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Gaddis, John Lewis. (1978). Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States: An Interpretive History. New York: John Wiley and Sons. Gaddis, John Lewis. (1997). We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. New York: Oxford University Press. Hoff Wilson, Joan. (1974). Ideology and Economics: U. S. Relations with the Soviet Union, 1918–1933. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. Kennan, George F. (1956, 1958). Soviet-American Relations, 1917–1920. 2 vols. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kennan, George F. (1961). Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin. Boston: Little, Brown. LaFeber, Walter. (1997). America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–1996. New York: McGraw-Hill. Laserson, Max M. (1962). The American Impact on Russia, 1784–1917: Diplomatic and Ideological. New York: Collier. Saul, Norman E. (1991). Distant Friends: The United States and Russia, 1763–1867. Lawrence: University of Press Kansas. Saul, Norman E. (1996). Concord and Conflict: The United States and Russia, 1867-1914. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Williams, Robert C. (1980). Russian Art and American Money, 1900–1940. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Williams, William Appleman. (1952). American-Russian Relations, 1781–1947. New York: Rinehart. NORMAN E. SAUL

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UNITY (MEDVED) PARTY Boris Yeltsin’s second and final term as president would expire in June 2000, and he anxiously searched for a viable successor. In summer 1999 a serious challenge emerged from two powerful regional leaders, Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov and Tatarstan president Mintimer Shaimiev. They merged the two movements they headed, Fatherland and All Russia, into an alliance headed by Yevgeny Primakov, the prime minister whom Yeltsin had fired in March. Victory for Fatherland/All Russia in the State Duma election in December 1999 would give Luzhkov or Primakov a good chance of defeating the Kremlin’s candidate for the presidency in June 2000. In response the presidential staff hastily created a new loyalist party, Yedinstvo (Unity), also known as Medved or Bear (from its official name, Interregional Movement “Unity,” whose first letters spell MeDvEd). Unity was launched in September 1999, just three months before the election. Unity mobilized the administrative resources of government ministries and regional governors, thirty-two of whom backed the new electoral alliance. Unity’s philosophy was simple: support for Prime Minister Putin, who was leading the fight against Chechen bandits. Putin declined to lead Unity; its official head was the ambitious young minister for emergency situations, Sergei Shoigu. In 1999 Unity was helped by oligarch Boris Berezovsky, whose television station ORT launched relentless personal attacks on Unity’s rivals, Luzhkov and Primakov. Ironically, a year later Berezovsky fell out with the Kremlin and was forced into exile. Apart from Gennady Zyuganov’s Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Russian political parties were exceptionally weak and unstable. Previous attempts to create a pro-government party, such as Russia’s Choice (1993) or Our Home is Russia (1995), had failed. People were willing to vote for a strong president but voiced their discontent by voting for opposition parties in parliamentary elections. About 20 to 30 percent of voters supported the communists, and a similar number supported the various democratic parties. Unity hoped to pull support from across the spectrum, especially from voters who were skeptical of all ideologies and preferred pragmatic leaders.

nists’ 24 percent, and ahead of Fatherland/All Russia at 13 percent. This cleared the way for Putin’s successful run for the presidency. Unity then forged a tactical alliance with the Communists in parliament, and in 2000 and 2001 the Duma passed nearly all of Putin’s legislative proposals, from START II ratification to land reform. Surveys suggested that Unity was maintaining its electoral support and gaining some influence in regional elections. In July 2001 Luzhkov’s Fatherland party, recognizing Unity’s administrative muscle and fearing defeat in the next election, reluctantly merged with Unity. Shaimiev’s AllRussia later followed suit. The three parties held a founding congress to form a new party, called United Russia, on December 1. The party claimed to have 200,000 members, but its support seemed to derive entirely from Putin’s popularity. In November 2002 legislator Alexander Bespalov was replaced as head of United Russia by Interior Minister Boris Gryzlov, signalling the Kremlin’s desire to keep tight control over the party as it prepared for its main test: the December 2003 State Duma elections. A new July 2002 law introduced party list elections for half the seats in regional legislatures, giving Unified Russia a chance of establishing a presence at a regional level throughout Russia.

See also:

PUTIN, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Malyakin, Ilya. (2003). “The ‘United Russia’ Project: Snatching Defeat from the Jaws of Victory.” Russia and Eurasia Review 2, No. 5 (March 4). June 20. . PETER RUTLAND

UNIVERSITIES

Much to everyone’s surprise, Unity did well in the December 1999 election, winning 23 percent on the national party list, close behind the Commu-

In 1725 Peter the Great founded the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences, which, unlike its Western models, included a school of higher education known as the Academic University. The primary task of the university was to prepare selected young men to enter the challenging field of scientific scholarship. The university encountered difficulties in attracting and retaining students. Because all instructors— members of the Academy—were foreigners, there

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Students gather for class at Moscow State University. © MICHAEL NICHOLSON/CORBIS

was also a serious language barrier. The general atmosphere did not favor the new teaching venture, and the university folded before the end of the century.

ulation. In 1855, on the occasion of the centenary celebration of its existence, the university published an impressive volume on its scholarly achievements.

After a slow start, Moscow University, founded in 1755, ended the century as a dynamic enterprise with a promising future. The initial charter of the university guaranteed a high degree of academic autonomy but limited the enrollment to free estates, which excluded a vast majority of the pop-

The beginning of the nineteenth century manifested a vibrant national interest in both utilitarian and humanistic sides of science. During the first decade of the century, the country acquired four new universities. Dorpat University, actually a reestablished Protestant institution, immediately

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began to serve as a link to Western universities and as an effective center for training future Russian professors. The universities at Kharkov, Kazan, and St. Petersburg benefited from an initial appointment of Western professors displaced by the Napoleonic wars. St. Petersburg University also benefited from the presence of the Academy of Sciences in the same city. It was not unusual for the members of the Academy of Sciences to offer courses at the university. Kiev University was founded in 1833 with the aim of contributing to the creation of a new Polish nationality favorably disposed toward the spirit of Russia, a quixotic government plan that collapsed in a hurry allowing the university to follow the normal course of development. The 1803 university charter adopted the Western idea of institutional independence and opened up higher education to all estates. Conservative administrators, however, continued to favor the upper levels of society. The liberalism and humanism of government management of higher education was a passing phenomenon. In the 1820s, the Ministry of Public Education, dominated by extreme conservatism, encouraged animosity toward foreign professors and undertook extensive measures to eliminate the influence of Western materialism on Russian science. Geology was eliminated from the university curriculum because it contradicted scriptural positions. In a slightly modified form, extreme conservatism continued to dominate the policies of the Ministry of Public Education during the reign of Nicholas I (1825–1855). The 1833 university charter vested more authority in superintendents of school districts—subordinated directly to the Minister of Public Education—than in university rectors and academic councils. Professors’ writings were subjected to a multilayered censorship system. Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War in 1855–1856 stimulated rising demands for structural changes in the nation’s sociopolitical system; in fact, the Epoch of Great Reforms—as the 1860s were known—was remembered for the emergence of an ideology that extolled science as a most sublime and creative expression of critical thought, the most promising base for democratic reforms. As Ivan Petrovich Pavlov, the famed neurophysiologist, noted, the Nihilist praise for the spirit of science as an epitome of critical thought sent young men in droves to university natural-science departments.

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Inspired by the waves of liberal thought and sentiment, the government treated the universities as major national assets. Budgetary allocations for the improvement of research facilities reached new heights, as did the official determination to send Russian students to Western universities for advanced studies. New universities were founded in Odessa and Warsaw. In 1863 the government enacted a new university charter with a solid emphasis on academic autonomy. At the same time, the government abrogated the more crippling provisions of the censorship law inherited from the era of Nicholas I. This reform, however, had a short history: In response to the Nihilists’ and related groups’ growing criticism of the autocratic system, the government quickly restored a long list of previous restrictions. This development, in turn, intensified student unrest, making it a historical force of major proportions. The decades preceding the World War I were filled with student strikes and rebellions. The 1884 university charter was the government’s answer to continuing student unrest: It prohibited students from holding meetings on university premises, abolished all student organizations, and subjected student life to thorough regimentation. The professors not only lost their right to elect university administrators but were ordered to organize their lectures in accordance with mandatory specifications issued by the Ministry of Public Education. Student unrest kept the professors out of classrooms but did not keep them out of the libraries and laboratories. The waning decades of the tsarist reign were marked by an abundance of university contributions to science. Particularly noted was the pioneering work in aerodynamics, virology, chromatography, neurophysiology, soil microbiology, probability theory in mathematics, mutation theory in biology, and non-Aristotelian logic. World War I brought so much tranquility to universities that the Ministry of Public Education announced the beginning of work on a new charter promising a removal of the more drastic limitations on academic autonomy. The fall of the tsarist system in early 1917 brought a quick end to this particular project. During the preceding twenty years new universities were founded in Saratov and Tomsk. The last decades of Imperial Russia showed a marked growth of institutions of higher education outside the framework of state universities. To bol-

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ster the industrialization of the national economy, the government both improved the existing technical schools and established new ones at a university level. The St. Petersburg Polytechnical Institute was a major addition to higher education. There was also a successful effort to establish Higher Courses for Women financed by private endowments and treated as equal to universities. Shaniavsky University in Moscow, established by a private endowment, presented a major venture in higher education. In the admission of students, it was less restrictive than the state universities and was the first institution to offer such new courses as sociology. In 1899 the total enrollment of students in state universities was 16,497. Forty percent of regular students sought law degrees, 28 percent chose medicine, 27 percent were in the natural sciences, and only 4 percent chose the social sciences and the humanities. Law was favored because it provided the best opportunity for government employment. The February Revolution in 1917 placed the Russian nation on a track leading to a political life guided by democratic ideals. The writer Maxim Gorky greeted the beginning of a new era in national history in an article published in the popular journal Priroda (Nature) underscoring the interdependence of democracy and science. The new political regime wasted no time in abolishing censorship in all its multiple manifestations and granted professors the long-sought right to establish a national association for the protection of both science and the scientific community. A government decision confirmed the establishment of a university in Perm. Immediately after the October Revolution in 1917, the Bolshevik authorities enacted a censorship law that in some respects was more comprehensive and penetrating than its tsarist predecessors. The new government began to expand the national network of institutions of higher education; in 1981, the country had 835 such institutions, including eighty-three universities. The primary task of universities was to train professional personnel; scholarly research was relegated to a secondary position. This policy, however, did not prevent the country’s leading universities with research traditions from active scholarship in selected branches of science. The universities also concentrated on Marxist indoctrination. The curriculum normally included such Marxist sciences as historical materialism, dialectical materialism, dialectical logic, and Marxist ethics. To be admitted to postgraduate

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studies, candidates were expected to pass an examination in Marxist theory with the highest grade. Marxist theory was officially granted a status of science, and Marxist philosophers were considered members of the scientific community. In their organization and administration, Soviet universities followed the rules set up by institutional charters, specific adaptations to a governmentpromulgated model. Faculty councils elected high administrators, but, according to an unwritten law, the candidates for these positions needed approval by political authorities. Local Communist organizations conducted continuous ideological campaigns and tracked the political behavior of professors. In the post-Stalin era political control and ideological interference lost much of their intensity and effectiveness. During the last two decades of the Soviet system the government encouraged a planned expansion of scientific research in all universities. Selected universities became pivotal components of the newly founded scientific centers, aggregates of provincial research bodies involved primarily in the study of acute problems of regional economic significance. Metropolitan universities expanded and intensified the work of traditional and newly established research institutes. Leading universities were involved in publishing activity, some on a large scale. In university publications there was more emphasis or theoretical than on experimental studies. Mathematical research, in no need of laboratory equipment, continued to blossom in Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev universities.

See also:

ACADEMY OF SCIENCES; EDUCATION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kassow, Samuel D. (1961). Students, Professors, and the State in Tsarist Russia. Berkeley: University of California Press. Vucinich, Alexander. (1963–1970). Science in Russian Culture. 2 vols. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. ALEXANDER VUCINICH

UNKIAR SKELESSI, TREATY OF Signed July 8, 1833, between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi reflected the interest of Tsar Nicholas I in preserving

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legitimate authority and the territorial integrity of existing states in Europe and the Near East. Nicholas was concerned about the domino effect of successful revolutions against dynastic states. Unable to contain the rebellion of Muhammad Ali in Egypt, the Ottoman state was threatened by his advance across Syria and Anatolia in 1832. In response, on February 20, 1833, a Russian naval squadron arrived in Constantinople, followed by Russian ground forces, with the intent of protecting the Sultan’s capital from the rebels. The treaty created an eight-year alliance between Russia and the Ottomans and provided for Russian aid in the event of an attack against the Sultan. It reconfirmed the 1829 Treaty of Adrianople, which recognized Russian gains in the Balkans and the Caucasus as well as providing free access through the Straits for Russian merchant ships. A secret addendum to the treaty also required the Ottoman Empire to close the Straits to foreign warships. Nicholas and his foreign minister, Count Karl Nesselrode, preferred to see the Straits remain in Ottoman hands rather than risk the disintegration of the Ottoman state whereby another European power such as France or Britain might take control of this strategic waterway. The treaty appealed to Nicholas’s sense of Russia as the premier defender of legitimism in postNapoleonic Europe. It also confirmed Russian supremacy in the Black Sea basin and guaranteed the free passage of Russian commercial vessels into the Mediterranean, an important point given the growing importance of Russia’s export trade from ports such as Odessa. The treaty was superseded by the Straits Convention of July 13, 1841, when a five-power consortium guaranteed the permanent closure of the Straits to all warships. Hopes for a more permanent Russo-Ottoman alliance were dashed, however, when the alliance was not renewed, helping to lay the groundwork for the Crimean War.

See also:

NICHOLAS I; TURKEY, RELATIONS WITH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Fuller, William C., Jr. (1992). Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600–1914. New York: Free Press. Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. (1984). A History of Russia. Oxford: Oxford University Press. NIKOLAS GVOSDEV

1624

USHAKOV, SIMON FYODOROVICH (1626-1686), renowned Russian artist. Simon Ushakov has been called the last great master of Russian painting. At the age of twentytwo (1648) he was appointed court painter and entrusted with the state icon painting studios in the Armory Palace. He not only painted icons, but made signs, did jewelers’ work, embroidered, and even designed coins. In addition, he became an expert on fortifications, mapmaking, and engraving. As the head of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich Romanov’s (r. 1645–1676) workshop, he painted several portraits of the tsar and the royal family. The tsar had a profound interest in western European culture and hired foreign actors and musicians to perform at court. Western architecture also held the ruler’s interest, so it is understandable why Ushakov’s westernized icon style became the most acceptable form in court circles. Ushakov became involved in theoretical art discussions. He wrote “Words to the Lovers of Icons,” which advanced his views on painting with an emphasis on naturalism. The idealization of the saints’ faces in his icons led others to refer to him as a Slavic Raphael. The colors Ushakov favored included rose pink, olive green, pale lilac, occasionally sky blue, and shades of tans and brown. Western influence can be seen not only in the saints’ lifelike faces but also in the use of classical architecture, as well as landscapes and scenery borrowed from German paintings and etchings. One of themes that Ushakov painted frequently was the Mandilion (Spas Nerukotvorny or “The Savior Painted without Use of Human Hands”). Even though he continued to use egg tempera, rather than the new oil painting broadly adopted in the West, he nevertheless abandoned the traditional two-dimensional, bright-colored style that emphasized intense inner spirituality. Instead he prettified the faces, creating images that in many ways resembled the Madonnas painted by the Italian Renaissance master, Raphael. A mixed style characterizes Ushakov’s work at this time. His style became the official Orthodox style, copied by many contemporary Russian icon painters. Ushakov’s most famous and revolutionary icon is the Vladimir Mother of God and the Planting and Spreading of the Tree of the Russian State, painted in 1668. This is a blatantly political icon. A huge rosebush symbolizes the Muscovite state; within it is a

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representation of the most venerated icon in Russia, the Vladimir Mother of God. Christ appears at the very top, directing his angels to spread his sheltering cloak. The rosebush springs out of the Kremlin; Metropolitan Peter and Grand Duke Ivan Danilovic water it. The tsarist family appears near the planting, while within the spreading branches are medallions depicting Russia’s secular and ecclesiastical princes and her most famous saints. With his mixed technique Ushakov had a very strong impact on the development of icon painting in Russia. Among his pupils who became famous icon painters were Georgy Zinoviev, Ivan Maximov, and Mikhail Malyutin. After Ushakov’s time, the traditional style that had preceded him survived, but progressive artists adapted his more Western style up to the twentieth century.

See also:

ARCHITECTURE; ICONS

S E R G E I

S E M E N O V I C H

he was appointed people’s commissar of armaments. In this capacity he played a leading role in organizing production of Soviet defense industries and was a leading member of Stalin’s war cabinet, the State Committee of Defense. In 1944 he was promoted to the military rank of colonel-general. In the postwar period Ustinov continued his leadership of Soviet defense industries down to 1957. He held the posts of deputy chairman of the Council Ministers and first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers from 1957 to 1965. From 1965 to 1976 he served in the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, where he directed the activities of research institutions, design bureaus, and enterprises. Ustinov was a candidate member of the Politburo in 1976 and a Full Member from 1976 until his death in 1984. In April 1976 he was appointed minister of defense. During his tenure as minister, the Soviet Union began its ill-fated intervention in Afghanistan.

See also: BREZHNEV, LEONID ILICH; MILITARY, SOVIET AND

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Onasch, Konrad. (1963). Icons. London: Faber and Faber.

POST-SOVIET; STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE; WAR

Hamilton, George H. (1990). The Art and Architecture of Russia. London: Penguin Group.

ECONOMY

A. DEAN MCKENZIE

USSR See

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barber, John, and Harrison, Mark. (1999). The Soviet Defence-Industry Complex from Stalin to Khrushchev. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Gelman, Harry. (1984). The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Détente. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Spielmann, Karl F. (1978). Analyzing Soviet Strategic Arms Decisions. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

USTINOV, DMITRY FEDOROVICH

Ustinov, Dmitry. (1983). Serving the Country and the Communist Cause. Oxford: Pergamon Press.

(1908-1984), marshal of the Soviet Union; Soviet minister of defense; member of the Politburo, leader of wartime production in the Soviet Union during World War II; Hero of the Soviet Union. Dmitry Ustinov was born in Samara before the Bolshevik Revolution. In 1922, at the age of fourteen, he volunteered for service in the Red Army. In 1923 he was demobilized and attended a polytechnical institute in Makarev and then began to work in defense industry. A member of the emerging Soviet technical intelligentsia, he joined the Communist Party in 1927, graduated from the Military Mechanical Institute in 1934, and joined the Scientific-Technical Institute for Naval Artillery the same year. In 1937 he began work as a design engineer at the Bolshevik defense industry complex in Leningrad and in 1938 became the plant director. With the German invasion of the Soviet Union

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UVAROV, SERGEI SEMENOVICH (1786-1855), minister of education (1833–1849) and Academy of Sciences president (1818–1855). Sergei Uvarov was the longest-tenured and most influential minister of education and Academy of Sciences president in Imperial Russian history. From 1810 to 1821, he also served as superintendent of the St. Petersburg Educational District. Indeed, Uvarov spent his entire life involved with the arts and sciences. He published poetry in his teens; actively participated in the literary quarrels of his day; authored two dozen essays on literary and

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historical topics; and in retirement, completed the work for a doctorate in classical studies. As a statesman, from the 1810s Uvarov acted upon a certainty that Russia was in its youth and developing into a West European-style nation. He was determined, however, that the process of maturation would occur without European-style revolutions and that the educational system would provide the map for following this special path. He gave his system a slogan, “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality” (Pravoslavie, Samoderzhavie, Narodnost). This tripartite formula offered a simple, accessible, patriotic affirmation of native values and an antidote against revolutionary ideas. Devotion to the Russian Orthodox Church would offset modern materialism. Autocracy would provide stability with patriarchal but progressive tsarist leadership. The concept of nationality promoted an indigenous attempt to answer the problems of modern development, a quest, though, that was to be defined and guided by the state, not the narod, or people. Uvarov believed that raising the Russian educational system to a level of excellence was the sine qua non for the empire’s progress toward maturity. He transformed the Academy of Sciences from a shambles into a world-renowned center of learning. Uvarov created two first-rate universities, St. Petersburg (1819) and St. Vladimir’s (1833) and brought the others to a golden age. He reformed the gymnasia by introducing the classical curriculum and the study of Russian grammar, history, and literature. He patronized a new emphasis on technology and science in education, and he oversaw the birth of Oriental, Slavic, classical, and philological studies. For these accomplishments, he received the title of count in 1846. While Uvarov’s accomplishments are notable, his reputation suffered during his lifetime because of his personal traits, such as greed and arrogance, and his autocratic handling of his ministry, especially in the area of censorship. Historians have tended to dismiss Uvarov as a liberal during the reign of Alexander I and a reactionary during the time of Nicholas, ascribing this to his groveling before the powers-that-be. This interpretation is gainsaid by the fact that he resigned twice, in 1821 and 1849, when tsarist policy turned reactionary and threatened the aim of educational excellence to which he had dedicated his life.

See also:

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. (1959). Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825–1855. Berkeley: University of California Press. Whittaker, Cynthia H. (1984). The Origins of Modern Russian Education: An Intellectual Biography of Count Sergei Uvarov, 1786–1855. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. CYNTHIA HYLA WHITTAKER

UZBEKISTAN AND UZBEKS The Uzbeks are a people who settled in the oases regions of Central Asia more than five hundred years ago. Early references to Uzbeks suggest that they were nomadic peoples who lived in the steppes of what is today Kazakhstan and southern Siberia, although there is conflicting evidence as to their origin. Gradually moving southward, they became a political force in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and were associated with the region between the great rivers of the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya. During the early twenty-first century, ethnic Uzbeks can be found in Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, as well as smaller communities in Turkey and China. The majority of Uzbeks live in the country of Uzbekistan, which is located among the states noted above in the region between the Aral Sea to the west and the Tien Shan and Pamir mountains to the east. Uzbekistan has an area of 447,400 square kilometers (172,700 square miles) and a population estimated at 25,563,441 people. Approximately 20,450,000 of these citizens are ethnic Uzbeks (80%). Significant minorities in Uzbekistan include Russians (5.5%), Tajiks (5.0%), Kazakhs (3.0%), Karakalpaks (2.5%), and Tatars (1.5%). The capital city of Uzbekistan is Tashkent, which has an estimated population of 2.6 million, although unofficial counts place the number at nearly 3.5 million people. Other significant cities include Samarkand, Bukhara, Andijon, Namangan, and Fergana. The majority of Uzbeks are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi School. Given that several key cities of Uzbekistan, specifically Bukhara and Samarkand, were centers of learning in the Islamic world for centuries, the traditions of that faith are strong in the country. Even during the Soviet period, when there were stringent restrictions on Islamic practices, the religion was practiced in the country.

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Uzbekistan, 1992. © MARYLAND CARTOGRAPHICS. REPRINTED

WITH PERMISSION

Other religions coexist in Uzbekistan and reflect the ethnic minorities, such as the Russians. Linguistically, Uzbek is a Turkic language and, to varying degrees, is mutually intelligible with the other Turkic languages in the region such as Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Karakalpak, and Turkmen. Originally Uzbek was written in the Arabic script. During the Soviet period, this was switched to the Latin script in the 1920s and later to the Cyrillic script in 1940. In the post-Soviet period, the Uzbek government decided to return to a Latin script, using Turkish orthography. There are significant discussions as to the origins of the Uzbeks and when they arrived in the region they occupy today. Indeed, it is accepted that Tamerlane (Timur the Lame) was an Uzbek and the first Uzbek unifier of Central Asia. Interestingly,

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the Timurid dynasty under Babur (Tamerlane’s grandson) was defeated by Shaybani Khan, an Uzbek leader, at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Many international historians consider this event to be the true introduction of Uzbeks to the region and the first Uzbek state in Central Asia. For the next four centuries, three main Uzbek states developed in Central Asia—the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanates of Khiva and Kokand. Identity at this time focused on which city one belonged to, or more importantly, to one’s faith—Islam. At the time, these states were not really identified with the ethnic group of Uzbeks, which was seen as a population more divided by and distinguished among tribal sub-groupings. Up through the twentieth century, these states more often used Persian as the court languages, while Uzbek was used among the common people.

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Eventually, the region was consolidated under Bolshevik rule and new political structures were created. The first entity called Uzbekistan appeared in 1924 with the National Delimitation in the Soviet Union. The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic actually included the Tajik Autonomous Republic. This easternmost portion was granted full Union Republic status in 1929. With modest border adjustments over the ensuing decades, the Uzbek S.S.R. was considered to be the homeland for the Uzbeks living in the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the Uzbek S.S.R. declared its independence and has henceforth been called the Republic of Uzbekistan.

An elderly woman and children in Muyank, Uzbekistan, in 1989. © DAVID TURNLEY/CORBIS

During the 1850s and 1860s the Russian empire began to aggressively seek control over the various regions of Central Asia. This has often been couched in terms of the Great Game with the British Empire, which was a contest for dominance in the region. In 1865 Russian military forces systematically took over cities in the Kokand Khanate and Bukharan Emirate, beginning with the sacking of Tashkent in that year. By 1876 the Khanate of Kokand was dissolved and incorporated into the Governor-Generalship of Turkestan. The Khanate of Khiva in the west and the Bukharan Emirate were reduced to the status of protectorates. During the next forty years, this region was part of the Russian empire. In general, the Russian overlords sought to obtain taxes and raw materials from the region and left the indigenous populations to their own social and cultural traditions.

For much of the Soviet period, Uzbekistan was the primary cotton-producing region of the Soviet Union, with annual quotas exceeding four and five million metric tons by the 1980s. In addition, Uzbekistan was a major supplier of gold, strategic minerals, gas, and agricultural products. In the post-Soviet period, these commodities remain the foundation for Uzbekistan’s economy. Uzbekistan is one of the few states of the former Soviet Union that did not experience a radical drop in production and income during the 1990s, largely because of its reliance on exporting these goods. However, the country’s economy has not rebounded quickly because of difficulties in the currency market and the obstacles faced by foreign investors. Moreover, the steady increase in population has resulted in a growing labor force that continues to experience a high unemployment rate. Politically, there was also continuity at the time of independence. In 1991 the president of the Uzbek S.S.R., Islam Karimov, was elected President of Uzbekistan. In 1999 and 2000 the militant Islamic Movement for Uzbekistan (IMU) unsuccessfully attempted to destabilize the country. The government since considers Islamic extremism to be a major security concern for the country, whether it is in the guise of the IMU or the broader, internationallybased group Hezb-ut Tahrir.

The Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Civil War resulted in radical changes for Central Asia.

Throughout the 1990s and the early twentyfirst century, Uzbekistan has tried to assert itself as a leading state in Central Asia. Of great importance was the desire to reduce the influence of Russia and remove the notion of an elder brother in the region. Consequently, Uzbekistan has diplomatic and economic ties with a number of important powers, such as China, India, the United States, the European Union, Turkey, and Iran. Since the events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent U.S. led actions in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan has been

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more active in NATO Partnership for Peace programs and bilateral security relations with the United States. Ultimately, Uzbekistan would prefer to see a greater emphasis on a Central Asian regional security arrangement, with itself as the key member.

Gleason, Gregory. (1997). The Central Asian States: Discovering Independence. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

See also:

Karimov, Islam. (1997). Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century. Surrey, UK: Curzon Press.

CENTRAL ASIA; ISLAM; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

Kangas, Roger. (2002). Uzbekistan in the Twentieth Century: Political Development and the Evolution of Power. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Levitin, Leonid, with Carlisle, Donald S. (1995). Islam Karimov: President of the New Uzbekistan. Vienna: Agrotec.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allworth, Edward. (1990). The Modern Uzbeks: From The Fourteenth Century To The Present: A Cultural History. Stanford, CA: Hoover University Press.

MacLeod, Calum, and Mayhew, Bradley. (1999). Uzbekistan: The Golden Road to Samarkand. London: Odyssey.

Babushkin, L. N., ed. (1973). Soviet Uzbekistan. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

Melvin, Neil. (2000). Uzbekistan: Transition to Authoritarianism on the Silk Road. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers.

Bohr, Annette. (1998). Uzbekistan: Politics and Foreign Policy. London: RIIA.

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VALUE SUBTRACTION Value subtraction, or negative value added, occurs when resources and other inputs used in the production process generate output with a lower value than that of the original resources and inputs. The management of Soviet state-owned enterprises, focusing on fulfilling plan targets in order to receive a bonus, tended to fulfill the main plan target, quantity of output, with little regard for cost or efficiency considerations. At the same time, enterprises faced centrally determined prices for both the input used and the output produced. Soviet centrally determined prices were not based upon supply and demand conditions in either the domestic or global market, nor were they adjusted in response to obvious surplus or shortage conditions. Consequently, neither the prices nor the corresponding profits or losses generated in the planning process provided meaningful information to Soviet firms in terms of whether to expand or contract their operations. The primary obligation of each firm was to fulfill annual output plan targets. Value subtraction characterized the operation and performance of Soviet firms when their inputs and output were valued at world market prices. World market prices were more accurate reflections of the economic cost of producing an item than Soviet centrally determined prices, because they incorporated marginal rather than average costs of production, and because they adjusted to surplus and shortage conditions generated by ever-changing actions of buyers and sellers. Typically, Soviet prices were well below world market prices for the majority of resources and other inputs used in the production process. Consequently, when world market prices were applied by Western researchers and analysts to the actual resources and inputs used in the Soviet production process, the newly calculated costs of production were much higher. These higher costs were not offset by applying world market prices to the produced output, however, because the technological level of Soviet enterprises and abject quality assessments kept Soviet output valuations low in comparison to world standards. The existence of value subtraction, or negative value added, was confirmed by Soviet economists and analysts when glasnost and perestroika in the late 1980s allowed more frank and detailed discussions of actual conditions in the Soviet economy.

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HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS; RATCHET EFFECT;

VIRTUAL ECONOMY

nist Party and won. He won re-election in 2000 and serves as chairman of the parliamentary Committee on Veterans’ Affairs.

SUSAN J. LINZ

See also:

VARANGIAN See

AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH; MILITARY, SOVIET AND

POST-SOVIET VIKINGS. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Gorbachev, Mikhail. (1991). The August Coup: The Truth and the Lessons. New York: Harper Collins.

VARENNIKOV, VALENTIN IVANOVICH (b.1923), commander-in-chief of the Soviet Ground Forces; deputy minister of defense; General of the Army; Hero of the Soviet Union; member of the State Duma. Valentin Krasnodar was born on December 13, 1923, in Krasnodar in the Kuban region of South Russia. He joined the Red Army in 1941 as an officer cadet and was commissioned in 1942. He took part in the defense of Stalingrad as an artillery officer and served in that capacity through the war to the assault on Berlin. Varennikov was a standbearer at the Victory Parade in Red Square in 1945. After the war he commanded artillery and infantry units. In 1954 he graduated from the Frunze Military Academy. Varennikov advanced in the army leadership and graduated from the Voroshilov Military Academy of the General Staff in 1967. During the late 1960s and early 1970s he commanded an army and served as deputy commander of the Soviet Group of Forces in Germany and as commander of the Carpathian Military District. In 1979 he was head of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, which planned the military intervention in Afghanistan. In 1984 he assumed the post of deputy chief of the Soviet General Staff with responsibility for direct oversight of operations in Afghanistan; he later oversaw the withdrawal of Soviet forces.

Kipp, Jacob W. (1989). “A Biographical Sketch on General of the Army Valentin Ivanovich Varennikov.” Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office. Odom, William E. (1998). The Collapse of the Soviet Military. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. JACOB W. KIPP

VARGA, EUGENE SAMUILOVICH (1879–1964), major figure in the Soviet economics establishment and expert on the world capitalist system who fell afoul of Stalinist dogma. Eugene Varga was educated at the universities of Paris, Berlin, and Budapest, receiving a doctoral degree from the last in 1909. He joined the Hungarian Social Democratic Party in 1906 and was a writer and editor on economic matters for its central organ. When the communists came to power in Hungary in 1919, he served as commissar of finance and then as chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy. After the regime fell he moved to the USSR.

In January 1989 Varennikov was made commandor of Soviet Ground Forces. In August 1991 he was an active participant in the conspiracy to remove Mikhail Gorbachev and prevent the proclamation of a new union treaty. During the attempted coup Varennikov was in Kiev. Arrested and jailed when the coup collapsed, Varennikov refused to accept an amnesty when it was offered in March 1994. Later that year, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court ruled that he was not guilty of treason. In December 1995 he ran for election to the State Duma as a candidate from the Commu-

Varga’s specialty was capitalist political economy and economic conditions in the capitalist world, on which he was an influential and authoritative spokesman during the interwar period. He was elected a full member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in 1939 and was director of its Institute of World Economics and Politics until 1947, when the institute was shut down because of the views he expounded in Changes in the Capitalist Economy as a Result of the Second World War. Varga defended himself vigorously at a conference of economists held to attack him, but was forced to recant. In the post-Stalin period Varga was ultimately restored to a position of honor, and in 1959 his eightieth birthday was celebrated as a notable jubilee presided over by Academician Konstantin Ostrovitianov, who had orchestrated the attack on him in 1947. In 1963 he was awarded the Lenin

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Prize for “scientific treatment of the problems of modern capitalism.” Despite his independence in analyzing economic developments in the capitalist world, and his courage in fighting Stalinist dogmatism, Varga was a thoroughly orthodox Marxist, and a critic of the ideas of Soviet econometricians and mathematical economists.

See also:

MARXISM

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Domar, Evsey. (1950). “The Varga Controversy.” American Economic Review 40:132–151. ROBERT W. CAMPBELL

VASILEVSKY, ALEXANDER MIKHAILOVICH (1895–1977), Soviet military hero of World War II. A member of the Communist Party from 1938, Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky was born in the village of Novo-Pokrovka, now Ivanovo Oblast. He graduated from military school in 1914. He served as a junior officer in the tsarist army during World War I. From 1918 to 1931 he commanded a company, then a battalion, then an infantry regiment in the Red Army. From 1931 to 1936 Vasilevsky held executive posts in combat training organs within the People’s Commissariat of Defense and Volga Military District. From 1937 to 1941 he served on the General Staff, from 1941 to 1942 as deputy chief, and from 1942 to 1945 (during World War II or the Great Patriotic War) as Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces and concurrently, deputy people’s commissar of defense of the USSR. Upon instructions from the Supreme Command Headquarters, Vasilevsky helped to elaborate many major strategic plans. In particular, Vasilevsky was among the architects (and participants) of the 1943 Stalingrad offensive. He coordinated actions of several fronts in the Battle of Kursk and the Belorussian and Eastern-Prussian offensive operations. Under Vasilevsky’s leadership, a strategic operation aimed at routing the Japanese Kwantung army was successfully carried out between August and September of 1945. Increasingly, after the German invasion of June 1941, officers with world-class military skills, who

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either emerged unscathed by Stalin’s purges or were retrieved from Stalin’s prisons and camps, came to the fore. Vasilevsky was among these men. Although Stalin was loath to trust anyone fully, this innate distrust did not prevent him from tapping the resources of his most talented military strategists during World War II. In the first year of the war, when the USSR was on the defensive, Stalin often made unilateral decisions. However, by the second year, he depended increasingly on his subordinates. As Marshal Vasilevsky has recalled, He came to have a different attitude toward the General Staff apparatus and front commanders. He was forced to rely constantly on the collective experience of the military. Before deciding on an operational question, Stalin listened to advice and discussed it with his deputy [Zhukov], with leading officers of the General Staff, with the main directorates of the People’s Commissariat of Defense, with the commanders of the fronts, and also with the executives in charge of defense production.

His most astute generals, Vasilevsky and Georgy Zhukov included, learned how to nudge Stalin toward a decision without talking back to him. While serving as a member of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party between 1952 and 1961, Vasilevsky also held the post of first deputy minister of defense from 1953 to 1957. Twice named Hero of the Soviet Union, he was also twice awarded the military honor, the Order of Victory, and was presented with many other orders, medals, and ceremonial weapons. He retired the following year and died fifteen years later.

See also:

MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET; WORLD

WAR I; WORLD WAR II

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Beevor, Antony. (1999). Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege, 1942–1943. New York: Penguin Books. Colton, Timothy. (1990). Soldiers and the Soviet State. Princeton: Princeton University Press. JOHANNA GRANVILLE

VAVILOV, NIKOLAI IVANOVICH (1887–1943), internationally famous biologist. Nikolai Ivanovich Vavilov achieved international fame as a plant scientist, geographer, and geneticist before he was arrested and sentenced to death

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on false charges of espionage in 1940. Born into a wealthy merchant family in pre-revolutionary Russia, Vavilov was renowned for his personal charm, integrity, and international scientific prestige. He graduated from the Moscow Agricultural Institute in 1911, continued his studies of genetics and horticulture in Europe the following year, and in 1916 led an expedition to Iran and the Pamir Mountains to search for ancestral forms of modern agricultural plant species. “The Law of Homologous Series in Hereditary Variation,” his first major theoretical contribution, published in Russia in 1920 and then in the Journal of Genetics, argued that related species can be expected to vary genetically in similar ways. Vavilov spoke many languages and traveled extensively throughout the United States and Europe to meet with colleagues and study scientific innovations in agriculture. He is best known for The Centers of Origin of Cultivated Plants (1926), in which he established that the greatest genetic diversity of wild plant species would be found near the origins of modern cultivated species. Until 1935 he organized expeditions to remote corners of the world in order to collect, catalog, and preserve specimens of plant biodiversity. In the Soviet Union Vavilov was a powerful advocate and organizer of scientific institutions, and he tirelessly promoted research in genetics and plant breeding as a means of improving Soviet agriculture. Vavilov was director of the Institute of Applied Botany (1924–1929), a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, director of the All-Union Institute of Plant Breeding (1930–1940) and the Institute of Genetics (1933–1940), president and vice-president of the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences (1929–1938), and president of the All-Union Geographical Society (1931–1940).

Krementsov, Nikolai. (1997). Stalinist Science. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Popovskii, Mark Aleksandrovich. (1984). The Vavilov Affair. Hamdon, CT: Archon Books. YVONNE HOWELL

VECHE The veche was a popular assembly in medieval Russian towns from the tenth to the sixteenth centuries. Veches became particularly active at the turn of the twelfth century, before falling into decline except in the towns of Novgorod, Pskov, and Viatka. At times, the veche in Novgorod participated in selecting or dismissing the posadniks (mayors) and tysiatskiis (thousandmen). Originally, one tysiatskii was head of the town militia but over time, several were chosen and became judicial and civil officials. The veche also chose the archbishop, and the heads of the major monasteries. It also tried cases, ratified treaties, and addressed other public matters. Meetings sometimes turned violent. In Imperial and Soviet historiography, the veche was often used as an example to demonstrate whether Russia had any democratic tradition or had always been autocratic. The veche remains an enigmatic phenomenon. The word is rooted in the words ve and veshchati, the latter meaning: to pontificate, play the oracle, or to lay down the law. However, medieval chroniclers used the term not only to mean popular assemblies, but also to speak of crowds or mobs. Primary sources are often silent as to the origin or demise of the veche, the scope of its authority, its specific membership, or the rules and procedures governing its activities.

Graham, Loren R. (1993). Science in Russia and the Soviet Union. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Primary sources indicate that, at least in the cities of Novgorod and Pskov, the veche may have had a broad social base. In the case of the veche that confirmed the Novgorod Judicial Charter in 1471, its members included the Archbishop-elect, the posadniks, the tysiatskiis, the boyars, the zhitye liudi (the ranking or middle class citizens), the merchants, the chernye liudi (lit. black men, referring to the lower class or tax-paying citizens), and “all the five ends (boroughs), and all Sovereign Novgorod the Great.” Other documents show veches of narrower membership. For example, a 1439 treaty signed between Novgorod and the Livonian city of Kolyvan (Tallinn) lists only the posadniks and tysiatskiis as being members of the veche. A commercial document signed the same

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Vavilov’s increasingly vocal and uncompromising opposition to the falsification of genetic science propagated by Trofim Lysenko and his followers culminated in his arrest in 1940. His death sentence was commuted to a twenty-year prison term in 1942; he died of malnutrition in a Saratov prison one year later. Vavilov is considered a founding father in contemporary studies of plant biodiversity. He left an important legacy as one of the great Russian scientific and intellectual figures of the early twentieth century. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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year between Novgorod and the German merchants lists only one posadnik, one tysiatskii, and “all Lord Novgorod the Great” as constituting the veche. The different composition of these veches indicate that there probably was no set membership, or that veches were perhaps more democratic when the entire city needed to reach consensus, as when the city’s Judicial Charter needed ratification, but were smaller and more oligarchic (or republican rather than democratic) in nature when the entire city did not need to ratify a decision, such as with commercial treaties or peace treaties. Valentin Lavrentivich Ianin and other scholars argue that Novgorod’s government was oligarchic rather than republican in nature, and that the veche had no real power. They argue that it was an oligarchy of landowners who wielded real power in the city. Some argue it is these landowners who are referred to in the Rigan chronicle as the threehundred golden-girdled men and made up the Council of Lords (Soviet gospod) that ran day-today government in Novgorod. However, the Rigan chronicle is the only such reference to the threehundred golden-girdled-men, and Russian sources mention neither the Council nor the three hundred. The veche lasted longest in Pskov, and was disbanded by Grand Prince Basil III in 1510, when he brought that city under the direct rule of Moscow.

See also:

GRAND PRINCE; KIEVAN RUS; MUSCOVY; NOV-

GOROD THE GREAT

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Birnbaum, Henrik. (1981). Lord Novgorod the Great: Essays on the History and Culture of a Medieval City. Los Angeles: Slavica Publishers. Ianin, Valentin Lavrentevich. (1990). “The Archaeology of Novgorod.” Scientific American 262(3):84–91. Tikhomirov, Mikhail Nikolaevich. (1959). The Towns of Ancient Rus, tr. Y. Sdovnikov. Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House. MICHAEL C. PAUL

VEKHI Vekhi (“Landmarks” or “Signposts”), a collection of seven essays published in 1909, ran through five editions and elicited two hundred published rejoinders in two years. Historian Mikhail Gershenzon proposed the volume reappraising the Russian in-

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telligentsia, wrote the introduction, and edited the book. Pyotr Struve selected the contributors, five of whom had contributed to a 1902 volume, Problems of Idealism, and had attended the 1903 Schaffhausen Conference that laid the foundation for the Union of National Liberation. Himself a founder of the Constitutional Democratic (Cadet) Party in 1905, Struve had served in the Second Duma in 1907, then went on to edit the journal Russian Thought. In his essay he argued that the intelligentsia, because it had coalesced in the 1840s under the impact of atheistic socialism, owed its identity to standing apart from the government. Thus, when the government agreed to restructure along constitutional lines in 1905, the intelligentsia proved incapable of acting constructively toward the masses within the new framework. Bogdan Kistyakovsky discussed the intelligentsia’s failure to develop a legal consciousness. Their insufficient respect for law as an ordering force kept courts of law from attaining the respect required in a modern society. Alexander Izgoyev (who, like Gershenzon, had not contributed to the 1902 anti-positivist volume) depicted contemporary university students as morally relativist, content merely to embrace the interests of the long-suffering people. Russian students compared very unfavorably to their French, German, and British counterparts, lacking application and even a sense of fair play. Nikolai Berdyayev, considering the intelligentsia’s philosophical position, found utilitarian values had crowded out any interest in pursuing truth. Sergei Bulgakov showed how the intelligentsia had undertaken a heroic struggle for socialism and progress but lost sight of post-Reformation Europe’s gains with respect to individual rights and personal freedom. For Semen Frank, as for Gershenzon and Struve, the intelligentsia’s failure of leadership in the 1905 revolution warranted a reappraisal of their fundamental assumptions. His essay emphasized the nihilistic sources of the intelligentsia’s utilitarianism: material progress, national education, always viewed as a means to another end. Moreover, he saw Russian Marxists as obsessed by a populist drive to perfect society through redistribution and faulted them for their penchant for dividing all humanity into friends and enemies. Gershenzon asserted, in the book’s most controversial sentence, that “so far from dreaming of union with the people we ought to fear the people . . . and bless this government which, with its prisons and bayonets, still protects us from the people’s fury.”

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The essays suggested Russia had reached a milestone and was ready for turning. Five of the contributors had earlier abandoned Marxism under the influence of neo-Kantian concerns over personal freedom and morality. They had participated in the establishment of a liberal political party, but now recoiled at the Cadet Party’s recklessness and ineffectiveness in parliamentary politics. A modernist document, Vekhi called for a rethinking of the enlightenment project of acculturation and proposed exploration of the depths of the self as an alternative to venerable populist and nihilist programs.

See also:

BERDYAYEV, NIKOLAI ALEXANDROVICH; CON-

STITUTIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY; DUMA; INTELLIGENTSIA; STRUVE, PETER BERNARDOVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Boobbyer, Philip. (1995). S. L. Frank: The Life and Work of a Russian Philosopher. Athens: Ohio University Press. Brooks, Jeffrey. (1973). “Vekhi and the Vekhi Dispute.” Survey 19(1):21–50. Schapiro, Leonard. (1987). “The Vekhi Group and the Mystique of Revolution.” In Russian Studies, ed. Ellen Dahrendorf. New York: Viking Penguin. GARY THURSTON

VERBITSKAYA, ANASTASIA ALEXEYEVNA (1861-1928), prose writer, playwright, scenarist, and publisher. Anastasia Verbitskaya enjoyed a lengthy career in which she first published prose fiction in serious “thick journals,” but then turned to writing novels in a popular vein, garnering herself a wide reading public on the eve of World War I. At this time she also embarked on a film career, writing scripts for several movies that brought her even more renown. Most of Verbitskaya’s writing centers around the keys to happiness for the modern woman caught between competing desires and interests—work, love, sexuality, and motherhood.

Conservatory to study voice, leaving after only two years to accept a job as a music teacher at her former boarding school. In 1882 she married Alexei Verbitsky, an engineer, with whom she had three sons. The family needed money, so Verbitskaya worked at various jobs, in 1883 obtaining her first stint at a newspaper. Her inaugural fiction, a novella entitled “Discord,” appeared in 1887 in the thick journal Russian Thought. It contains many of the themes that will appear subsequently in much of Verbitskaya’s work. The story encompasses the roles that can often be found in left-leaning fiction espousing women’s liberation—economic independence and service to the downtrodden—but also establishes new roles and goals for the heroine. Verbitskaya and other contemporary women writers would develop these themes further in the 1890s and early twentieth century: the search for self-fulfillment in relations with men, including sexual fulfillment and an exploration of one’s artistic creativity. During the 1890s Verbitskaya’s fictional works became longer, and she produced her first novel, Vavochka (1898). She also wrote plays, the best of which is the comedy Mirages (1895), which was staged at the Maly Theater. By 1902, Verbitskaya had decided to become independent of others’ literary tastes and created her own publishing house, issuing her own work and the translated novels of Western European writers concerned with the woman question. Not only did this venture show her quest for independence, it also showed her interest in literature as a commercial venture. Verbitskaya continued to demonstrate her commitment to the woman question through extra-literary activities. She was a member of various charitable and civic organizations that helped women, in 1905 becoming the chair of the Society for the Betterment of Women’s Welfare.

Verbitskaya was the middle child of a professional military man stationed in Voronezh and a mother who was born to a provincial actress but who confined herself to performances in amateur productions. Verbitskaya was eventually sent off to boarding school, the Elizavetinsky Women’s Institute in Moscow. In 1879 she entered the Moscow

In the politically charged atmosphere after the 1905 revolution and with the censorship greatly curtailed, Verbitskaya embarked on the first of her popular novels, Spirit of the Time (1907–1908). She seems to have found a formula that would render this and her next novel, The Keys to Happiness (1908–1913), bestsellers. She combined highbrow political, philosophical, and aesthetic concerns with frequent, titillating scenes of sexual seduction. Both these novels sold in numbers that were unheralded in Verbitskaya’s day. She also managed to produce an interesting two-volume autobiography To My Reader (1908 and 1911) while she was writing Keys to Happiness.

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In 1913 when Verbitskaya had completed Keys, she was invited to write the screenplay for a fulllength film based on the novel. The film was a great box-office success, breaking all previous records, and catapulted Verbitskaya into a movie career. After the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, Verbitskaya’s career suffered because of official scorn for her “boulevard” novels. She died in 1928. However, with the revival of the commercial book market in post-Soviet Russia, Verbitskaya has made a bit of a comeback: Three of her popular novels were reprinted in 1992 and 1993.

See also:

FEMINISM; THICK JOURNALS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Engelstein, Laura. (1992). The Keys to Happiness: Sex and the Search for Modernity in Fin-de-Siecle Russia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Holmgren, Beth, and Goscilo, Helena. (1999). “Introduction” to Keys to Happiness. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Marsh, Rosalind. (1998). “Anastasiia Verbitskaia Reconsidered.” In Gender and Russian Literature: New Perspectives. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Rosenthal, Charlotte. (2003). “Anastasiia Alekseevna Verbitskaia.” In Russian Writers in the Age of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, ed. Judith E. Kalb and J. Alexander Ogden. Dictionary of Literary Biography, vol. 593. Detroit: Gale Group. CHARLOTTE ROSENTHAL

VIENNA, CONGRESS OF The Vienna Congress provided the conclusion to the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. Negotiations took place in France from February to April of 1814, in London during June of that year, in Vienna from September 1814 to June 1815, and then again in Paris from July to November of 1815. The chief representatives included Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereigh of Britain; his ally, Klemens Wenzel Nepomuk Lothar von Metternich of Austria; Fürst Karl August von Hardenberg of Prussia; and Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, Prince de Bénévent of France. Tsar Alexander I directed the Russians, aided and influenced by his diverse multinational coterie of assistants: Count Andreas Razumovsky, who was ambassador to Austria; the Westphalian Graf Karl Robert von Nesselrode, who served as a quasi-foreign minister; the Corfu Greek

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Count Ioánnis Antónios Kapodstrias; the Corsican Count Carlo Andrea Pozzo di Borgo; the Prussian Heinrich Friedrich Karl vom und zum Stein; the Alsatian Anstedt; and the Pole Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski. At the peak of his influence in early 1814, Alexander directed the non-punitive occupation of Paris and the exile of Napoleon I to Elba. The Treaty of Chaumont established the Quadruple Alliance to contain France, while the first Treaty of Paris restored the French monarchy. Alexander also helped block a Prussian scheme to frustrate France and Austrian designs on Switzerland and PiedmontSardinia, but supported the attachment of Belgium to the Netherlands and part of the Rhineland to Prussia as checks on French power. In London, however, he frightened the British with plans to reunite the ethnic Polish lands as his own separate kingdom. At Vienna, the British, Austrians, and French thwarted this scheme, which was supported by a Prussia bent on annexing all of Saxony. By January 1815 Alexander was ready to compromise, an attitude strengthened by Napoleon’s temporary return to power in March. The Final Act of June 4, 1815, drawn up by Metternich’s mentor, Friedrich Gentz, reflected this spirit of compromise. Austria retained Galicia, and Prussia regained Poznan and Torun, and also acquired part of Saxony and more of the Rhineland. Most of the Napoleonic Duchy of Warsaw became the tsarist Kingdom of Poland. Denmark obtained a small duchy as partial compensation for Norway, which the Swedish crown acquired as Russian-sponsored compensation for the loss of Finland. A German Confederation dominated by Austria and, to a lesser extent, Prussia, but with Russian support for such middle-sized states as Württemberg, replaced the defunct Holy Roman Empire. The Ottomans remained outside the Final Act, refusing to allow Anglo-French-Austrian mediation of differences with Russia as a precondition of a general guarantee. Back in Paris, Alexander promoted the Holy Alliance, which Metternich insisted be an ideal brotherhood of Christian sovereigns, not peoples, as the Russian emperor envisioned. Of the Europeans, only the British, the Papacy, and the Ottomans refused to sign it. The (Congress of) Vienna system weathered revolutions and diplomatic crises. Except for Belgian independence in 1830, Europe’s borders remained essentially stable until 1859.

See also: ALEXANDER I; FRENCH WAR OF 1812; NAPOLEON I

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Grimsted, Patricia Kennedy. (1969). The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I. Berkeley: University of California Press. Schroeder, Paul. (1994). The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848. Oxford: Oxford University/ Clarendon. DAVID M. GOLDFRANK

VIETNAM, RELATIONS WITH The Soviet Union began its relationship with Vietnam through the Communist International (Comintern), one of whose purposes was to support the liberation of colonized peoples from Western colonial powers. From the last half of the nineteenth century until 1954, the formerly unified nation of Vietnam was divided into three segments (Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina), along with Cambodia and Laos, within the French colony Indochine (Indochina).

the brief power vacuum that followed Japan’s surrender and withdrawal from the region, Ho Chi Minh led a small band of ICP controlled guerrillas, though under the guise of its political front, the Viet Minh, to seize power in a Bolshevik-style coup d’état. He proclaimed the independence of the so-called Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in September 1945. The DRV was not recognized by any nation, and France’s return to reclaim its former Asian colonies led to the outbreak of war between France and the DRV/Viet Minh at the end of 1946. Geography prevented the Soviet Union from effectively aiding Ho Chi Minh until 1950, when the victory of the Chinese communists in the Chinese civil war changed the balance of power in Asia. In January 1950 Josef Stalin agreed to Ho’s request for increased aid. Thus in early 1950 all of the Soviet bloc nations recognized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and China undertook the Soviet Bloc’s task of direct military, economic, and political assistance to the Vietnamese communists.

From 1930 until 1950 the Soviet Union’s relations with the Vietnamese revolutionaries in French Indochina were limited mainly to training and political advice. At the end of World War II, during

Following the Geneva Conference of 1954, of which the Soviet Union was cochair, France agreed to abandon its former colonies, and Indochina was divided into the independent nations of Cambodia and Laos, with Vietnam temporarily divided at the seventeenth parallel into the communist controlled DRV (North) and the noncommunist Republic of Vietnam (South). The United States replaced the French as the patrons of the noncommunist Vietnamese in South Vietnam, and the Soviet Union along with its then-ally China, maintained substantial political, economic, military, and diplomatic support to North Vietnam. During the late 1950s the Vietnamese communists in Hanoi began an uprising against the government in South Vietnam. The Soviet Union supported the DRV against the American-backed South. This Soviet commitment to the Vietnam War increased during the era of Brezhnev and Kosygin, as China’s split with the Soviet Union, which had emerged publicly in 1963, caused a competition between Moscow and Beijing for influence in Hanoi. Thousands of Soviet citizens were sent to Vietnam as military and economic advisers during the 1960s. After 1968 Hanoi turned more toward Moscow as its principle source of aid and advice. Yet the USSR, fearing that it would be dragged by the Vietnamese into a direct confrontation with the United States, wanted to find a political rather than a military settlement to the Vietnam War. However, the domestic opposition to the war within the United States caused a cutback of American aid to South Vietnam during

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Prior to 1930 some politicized members of Vietnamese society had a connection to the Soviet Union through membership in the French Communist Party or its political fronts. During the 1920s the Comintern invited several radical Vietnamese political activists to Moscow for political education and training. The most prominent of these was a man of many aliases whose most frequent alias prior to World War II was Nguyen Ai Quoc, a founding member of the French Communist Party who later became better known through his final alias, Ho Chi Minh. Quoc became a fulltime functionary of the Comintern and, on their instructions, founded the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) in 1930. Although most of its members were Vietnamese, the ICP staked a claim to succeed France politically in all of its Southeast Asian colonies. The idea of an Indochinese Federation, modeled on the Soviet Union—with the Vietnamese playing the same dominant role vis-a-vis the Cambodians and Laotians as the Russians did with the other nationalities and republics within the USSR—was a Comintern political concept that was to both guide and bedevil the politics of the Southeast Asian region for much of the twentieth century.

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1974–1975, and a precipitate military collapse of South Vietnam to the North Vietnamese army in April 1975. During the 1970s Moscow and Hanoi increased their ties, at Beijing’s expense. The Soviet Union acquired access to the former U.S. military base at Cam Ranh Bay, and thus was able to project its naval and air power into Asia on a scale never before realized. A Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) was signed in November 1978. When the SRV came into conflict with the China-backed Cambodian communists (known in the West as the Khmer Rouge), Soviet arms facilitated the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978. Moscow and its allies supported Vietnam’s subsequent decadelong occupation of Cambodia, but the rest of the members of the United Nations condemned the occupation. Vietnam became a diplomatic as well as an economic liability for Moscow. With the transformation of Soviet foreign policy under Mikhail Gorbachev, away from confrontation and toward meaningful cooperation with the West, Vietnam ceased to have much value to the Kremlin. Deciding to reduce its commitments to Hanoi, Moscow encouraged a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, as well as a political settlement under United Nations auspices. The Russian Federation, founded in 1991, was focused on its own economic transformation, not with subsidizing impoverished Third World clients. Yet it had inherited an unpaid debt of $10 billion from Vietnam. Overcoming the massive debt that had resulted from the failed political-ideological crusades of the twentieth century assumed greater significance than any other goal for Russia in its relations with Vietnam at the beginning of the twenty-first century. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Gaiduk, Ilya. (1996). The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. Gaiduk, Ilya. (2003). Confronting Vietnam. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Morris, Stephen J. (1999). Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia: Political Culture and the Causes of War. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Quinn-Judge, Sophie. (2003). Ho Chi Minh: The Missing Years. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press. STEPHEN J. MORRIS

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VIKINGS From the 750s to the 1050s, the Vikings were warriors, pirates, and traders from Scandinavia who employed the most sophisticated naval technology of the time in Northern Europe to launch extensive raiding and trading expeditions stretching west to Canadian Labrador and east to the Caspian Sea. Vikings (called Rus in the Arabic and Varangians in the Greek sources), primarily from Sweden and the Isle of Gotland, first entered European Russia in small groups in search of trade and tribute in the second half of the eighth century. By the ninth century, the Rus had established a complex commercial network stretching from the Baltic to the Islamic Caliphate. By the tenth century, the Rus extended this network southward to the Byzantine Empire via Kiev, continuing the eastern trade through intermediaries on the middle Volga in Volga Bulgaria. Also by the tenth century, the Vikings traveling through Russia had entered the service of the Byzantine Emperor (tenth through twelfth centuries) and helped found the first East Slavic kingdom, Kievan Rus. The Russian Primary Chronicle relates that in 862 the Viking Rurik and his kin were invited by Slavic and Finnic tribes to come and rule over them, after which they developed a system of tribute that encompassed northwestern Russia, Kiev, and its neighboring tribes. The Chronicle’s account is substantiated by finds of Scandinavian-style artifacts (tortoise shell brooches, Thor’s hammer pendants, wooden idols, armaments), and in some cases graves, found at Staraya Ladoga, Ryurikovo Gorodishche, Syaskoe Gorodishche, Timerevo, and Gnezdovo. These sites were tribal and commercial centers and riverside waystations, typical of those found along trade routes used by the Rus, most notably that of the Volga Route to the Islamic Caliphate and the Route to the Greeks along the Dnieper. In contrast to Viking activity in the West, which is characterized primarily by raiding and large-scale colonization, the Rus town network and subsequent tribal and political organization was designed for trade. Subject tribes living along river systems supplied the Rus with the furs, wax, honey, and slaves that they would further exchange for Islamic silver (especially dirhams), glass beads, silks, and spices in southern markets. The Rus expansion into Byzantine markets began in earnest in the early tenth century, with Rus attacks

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on Constantinople in 907, 911, and 944, which resulted in trade agreements. By the end of the century, in 988–989, Vladimir I (ruled 980–1015), a quarter Viking through his father Svyatoslav, had married into the Byzantine royal family and converted to Byzantine Christianity, thereby laying the foundation for the Eastern Slavic relationship with the Greek world. The tenth century marks the high point of Viking involvement in the East. Much of the Scandinavian-style jewelry found in European Russia and a majority of the Scandinavian-style graves date to the second and third quarters of the tenth century. Vladimir I and his son Yaroslav the Wise (ruled 1019–1054) enlisted Viking mercenary armies in internecine dynastic wars. In the eleventh century, however, the Viking foot soldier armies had become obsolete as the Rus princes were forced to adapt to another enemy in the south, the Turkic nomads who fought on horseback. The defeat of Yaroslav’s Viking mercenaries by a nomadic army at the Battle of Listven (1024) is indicative of this trend.

See also: GNEZDOVO; KIEVAN RUS; NORMANIST CONTROVERSY; PRIMARY CHRONICLE; ROUTE TO GREEKS; VLADIMIR, ST.; YAROSLAV VLADIMIROVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Franklin, Simon, and Shepard, Jonathan. (1996). The Emergence of Rus, 750–1200. London: Longman. Noonan, Thomas S. (1997). “Scandinavians in European Russia.” In The Oxford Illustrated History of the Vikings, ed. Peter Sawyer. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pritsak, Omeljan. (1981). The Origin of Rus’. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. Stalsberg, Anne. (1988). “The Scandinavian Viking Age Finds in Rus: Overview and Analysis.” In Bericht der Römisch-Germanischen Kommission 69. Mainz am Rhein, Germany: Philipp Von Zabern. HEIDI M. SHERMAN

up about 20 percent, Poles 19 percent, Belarusians 5 percent, and Jews 2 percent. Jews, who according to the Russian census of 1897 had constituted a plurality of the population, have called “Vilna” (or in Yiddish “Vilne”) the “Jerusalem of the North,” a center of rabbinic learning. Poles considered “Wilno” Polish in culture. Some Belarusians, pointing to the Grand Duchy’s multinational character, insist that Vilna should be part of their state. Under Russian rule in the nineteenth century, Vilna was the administrative center of the empire’s Northwest Region. When the great Eastern European empires collapsed at the end of the World War I, Vilnius became a bone of contention between the newly emerging states. Between 1918 and 1923, the flag symbolizing sovereignty over the city and region changed at least eight times. The two major contenders were Lithuania and Poland, although the city also briefly served as the capital of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic and then the LithuanianBelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic. In July 1920, as part of its recognition of Lithuanian independence, Soviet Russia agreed with Lithuania’s claims to Vilnius, but in October 1920 Polish forces seized the city, establishing the rogue state of Central Lithuania. In 1923, Poland formally incorporated the territory, but Lithuania refused to recognize Polish sovereignty. Still claiming Vilnius as their capital, the Lithuanians called Kaunas their provisional capital and insisted that Poland and Lithuania were in a state of war. After Soviet forces had occupied Eastern Poland in September 1939, the Soviet government turned Vilnius over to the Lithuanians. The Polish government in exile protested the Lithuanians’ move into Vilnius, but after the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, the western powers chose not to challenge the Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland. In 1940, and again from 1944 to 1945, Soviet troops occupied Lithuania, and Vilnius was the capital of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic until 1991.

The capital of the Lithuanian Republic and historically the capital of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Vilnius occupies a special place in a number of national cultures. Lithuanians constitute a majority of the city’s 543,000 inhabitants. Russians make

Under Soviet rule, Lithuanians dominated the city’s cultural life. Before World War I, when Lithuania lay on the border between Imperial Russia and Imperial Germany, the Russians had limited the economic growth of the region and the development of the city. Therefore few Lithuanians had come to the city from the countryside. After 1945 the Soviet government permitted and even encouraged Poles to emigrate from the USSR to the Polish People’s Republic, and Lithuanians flowed to the city. The decade of the 1960s, when the

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Lithuanian population reached 45 to 47 percent, was decisive in the development of the city’s Lithuanian character. In January 1991 Soviet troops in Vilnius seized a number of public buildings in an unsuccessful effort to crush Lithuanian independence, and the city became a symbol of the failure of Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of perestroika.

See also:

JEWS; LITHUANIA AND LITHUANIANS; POLAND

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cohen, Israel. (1992). Vilna. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society. Senn, Alfred Erich. (1966). The Great Powers, Lithuania, and the Vilna Question. Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill. ALFRED ERICH SENN

VINIUS, ANDREI DENISOVICH See WINIUS, ANDRIES DIONYSZOON.

VIRGIN LANDS PROGRAM Nikita Khrushchev promoted two major agricultural programs in his first years as general secretary: the corn program and, as he called it, the virgin and wasteland program. These two programs were interrelated. An important objective of agricultural policy was to increase the production of meat and milk significantly to meet the demands of the population. To produce more meat and milk required more feed. His solution was to expand greatly the production of corn (maize) throughout the Soviet Union. The virgin lands program was created to prevent the reduction of the wheat area as the corn area increased. This aspect of the virgin lands program is often missed, but in a speech on February 14, 1956, Khrushchev highlighted it: “The interests of increasing production of grain required a change in the structure of acreages, for the purpose—while extending the acreage under wheat, groats, and other crops—of sharply increasing acreage under corn.” He noted that in 1955 there were 18 million hectares of corn sown, some 13.6 million hectares more than in 1954. Without the virgin lands program, the area of wheat would have been substantially reduced, and a crisis in the bread supply would have occurred. The new lands were located primarily in Khazakstan and Siberia, areas of limited rainfall.

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Khrushchev’s objective had been to reclaim 28 to 30 million hectares of virgin land and wasteland. The estimated area of virgin and fallow land developed from 1954 to 1956 was 36 million hectares. Prior to institution of the virgin lands program, the sown area of grain in the USSR was approximately 100 million hectares; in 1954 it was 102 million. By 1956 the grain area had increased to 128 million hectares, while the wheat area had increased from 48 million hectares in 1953 to 62 million hectares in 1956, and maize sown for grain from 3.5 to 9.3 million hectares. Thus he achieved his objective of increasing the total cropped area and increasing both wheat- and maize-sown areas. Not all of the increase in grain area came from plowing up virgin and wasteland. Aradius Kahan concluded that 10 million hectares of the increased sown area could be attributed to the reduction of the area of fallowed land—land that was in cultivation but cropped only every other year. In areas of limited rainfall, land is often fallowed as a way of accumulating moisture and nitrogen from one year to the next, which both increases and stabilizes yields. The practice of fallow is to leave land idle for a year, but cultivate it to prevent the growth of weeds that would utilitize the available moisture. The accumulation of moisture and nitrogen through fallow will increase the yields by 50 or more percent, and, with the saving of seed, the increase in net yield is even greater. In this light, more than a quarter of the reported increase in sown area represented a fraud: The land was neither virgin nor waste. Was the virgin lands program successful by Khrushchev’s criteria, namely, increasing the output of wheat and other grains as the corn area expanded? It appears so. In part this was due to good luck—the weather in the virgin land area in the late 1950s was quite favorable. The national yield of grain per hectare, as estimated by the government, was actually higher from 1955 to 1959 than from 1950 to 1954, even though the virgin land area normally had a somewhat lower yield than the national average. One positive feature of the virgin lands program was that annual yields in the area generally were negatively correlated with the yields in the European area of the USSR. This meant that the yearto-year variations in yields tended to be offsetting to a significant degree, thus adding stability to the national average. The average of the official (and exaggerated) estimates of grain production from 1956 to 1960 was 121 million tons, or 41 percent more than in 1954. Not all of this increase was due to the virgin lands program, but much of it was.

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The corn program, however, was a dismal failure and was later largely abandoned. Corn requires a relatively long and warm growing season and much more moisture than wheat or most other grains. Most of the farm areas of the USSR were short on all three of these. Hardly any of the corn grown in new areas reached maturity—it had to be utilized as green feed or silage. Overall grain production in the USSR more than doubled between the early 1950s and the late 1980s. Part of this increase was due to the virgin lands program, but most was due to increased yields from seed improvements and increased applications of fertilizer. However, with the demise of the USSR, grain production has fallen by about 40 percent, while fertilizer use declined by much more.

See also:

As Russia’s transition process progressed in the 1990s, purchases between manufacturing firms increasingly involved barter and other non-monetary transactions, reducing the cash available for firms to acquire materials or pay taxes. In a virtual economy, barter and other non-monetary transactions play an important role in sustaining ongoing operations which transfer value from productive activities to loss-making sectors of the economy. Reliance on barter transactions restricts the firms’ ability to restructure their operations in order to produce higher value-added output.

AGRICULTURE; ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET;

KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH

See also:

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kahan, Arcadius. (1991). Studies and Essays on the Soviet and East European Economies, Vol 1: Published Works on the Soviet Economy. Newtonville, MA: Oriental Research Partners. Laird, Roy D., ed. (1963). Soviet Agriculture and Peasant Affairs. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. D. GALE JOHNSON

VIRTUAL ECONOMY The term virtual economy has been used to describe conditions in Russia’s transition economy where privatized enterprises continued to engage in valuesubtracting production because they maintained buyers from the Soviet era who were willing to purchase goods at prices that failed to accurately reflect production costs or market value. Relying on relational capital, contacts and connections with other managers and government officials developed in the Soviet economy, enterprise directors in Russia’s transition economy were able to acquire resources and goods without cash payments either prior to, or after, the acquisition. Since neither the privatization process nor their ongoing operations provided Russian manufacturing firms with funds to renovate their obsolete capital stock, enterprise managers faced few options for upgrading product quality or changing the firms’ production assortment in order to compete effectively in domestic and global markets. In effect, the term virtual econ-

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omy refers to the situation where Russian privatized firms continued to operate as they had in the Soviet economy despite the facade that profitability considerations and market forces governed their activities.

VALUE SUBTRACTION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ericson, Richard E, and Ickes, Barry. (2001). “A Model of Russia’s ‘Virtual Economy.’” Review of Economic Design 6(2):185–214. Gaddy, Clifford, and Ickes, Barry. (2002). Russia’s Virtual Economy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Krueger, Gary, and Linz, Susan J. (2002). “Virtual Reality: Barter and Restructuring in Russian Industry.” Problems of Post-Communism 49(5):1–13. Marin, Dalia. (2002). “Trust versus Illusion: What is Driving Demonetization in the Former Soviet Union.” Economics of Transition 10(1):173–200. SUSAN J. LINZ

VKLADNYE KNIGI See

DONATION BOOKS.

VLADIMIR MONOMAKH (1053–1125), one of the ablest grand princes of Kiev and the progenitor of the Monomashichi of Vladimir in Volyn, Smolensk, and Suzdalia. Born Vladimir Vsevolodovich, he inherited his sobriquet “Monomakh” from his Greek mother, a relative of Emperor Constantine IX Monomachus. In reporting his early career in his autobiographical “Instruction” to his sons, Monomakh writes how his father Vsevolod, a son of Yaroslav Vladimirovich the Wise, had him administer

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Pereyaslavl, Rostov, Smolensk, Turov, and Novgorod, and how he campaigned against Polotsk and the Czechs. In 1078, when Vsevolod became grand prince of Kiev, he transferred Monomakh from Smolensk to Chernigov, therewith depriving his nephews, Svyatoslav’s sons, of their patrimony. In 1093, when his father died, Monomakh declined the Kievans’ invitation to be their prince, evidently not wishing to violate the ladder system of succession allegedly introduced by Yaroslav the Wise. He deferred to his genealogically elder cousin Svyatopolk Izyaslavich, with whom he formed an alliance against the Polovtsy. The latter attacked the cousins, inflicted a crushing defeat on them, and then intensified their raids on Rus.

from their domains and replacing them with his men. Thus, before his death, in addition to Kiev he controlled Pereyaslavl, Smolensk, Suzdalia, Novgorod, Vladimir in Volyn, Turov, and Minsk. Moreover, he hoped to secure his family’s supremacy in Rus by persuading the Kievans to accept his eldest son Mstislav and his heirs as their hereditary dynasty. By doing so, he attempted once again to break the system of lateral succession to Kiev allegedly instituted by Yaroslav the Wise. He died on May 19, 1125.

In 1094 Oleg Svyatoslavich and the Polovtsy evicted Monomakh from Chernigov, forcing him to occupy his father’s patrimony of Pereyaslavl. Because Oleg refused to join him and Svyatopolk against the nomads, the two drove him out of Chernigov. After Oleg fled to Murom, where he killed Monomakh’s son Izyaslav, Monomakh wrote him an emotionally charged letter (the text of which survives) pleading that he be pacified. Oleg responded by pillaging Monomakh’s Suzdalian lands. In response, Monomakh’s son Mstislav of Novgorod marched against Oleg, defeated him, and forced him to attend a congress of princes in 1097 at Lyubech, where Oleg submitted to his cousins. Soon afterward, Svyatopolk broke the Lyubech agreement by having Vasilko Rostislavich of Terebovl blinded. Monomakh therefore joined his cousins, the Svyatoslavichi of Chernigov, against Svyatopolk, and the princes met at Uvetichi in 1100 to settle the dispute. After that, all the cousins, led by Monomakh, campaigned successfully against the Polovtsy in 1103, 1107, and in 1111, when they inflicted a crushing defeat on the nomads at the river Don.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

After Svyatopolk died in 1113, Monomakh hesitated to occupy Kiev, but the citizens rioted, allegedly forcing him to assume power. He thus preempted the Svyatoslavichi who were higher in seniority. After occupying the throne he issued laws, the so-called “Statute of Vladimir Monomakh,” to alleviate exorbitant interest rates on loans and to stop other abuses. During his twelveyear reign Monomakh continued his campaigns against the Polovtsy, and in 1116 he captured three of their towns on the river Don. He also waged war against the Poles, the Chud, the Lithuanians, and the Volga Bulgars. He devoted much of his energy to consolidating his rule by evicting disloyal princes

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See also:

GRAND PRINCE; KIEVAN RUS; NOVGOROD THE

GREAT; POLOVTSY; YAROSLAV VLADIMIROVICH

Dimnik, Martin. (1994). The Dynasty of Chernigov, 1054–1146. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. Franklin, Simon, and Shepard, Jonathan. (1996). The Emergence of Rus, 750-1200. London: Longman. Vernadsky, George. (1948). Kievan Russia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. MARTIN DIMNIK

VLADIMIR, ST. (d. 1015), grand prince, best known for his role in the Christianization of Kievan Rus. Sources about Vladimir are scanty, and the most comprehensive one (generally though inaccurately called the Russian Primary Chronicle) is full of spurious material. Still the following cautious sketch of the prince’s career is probably accurate for the most part. Vladimir’s male ancestors, though Scandinavian, had been ruling the largely Slavicspeaking land of Rus for at least two generations by the time of his birth. His grandmother Olga had been baptized, probably in Constantinople at some time during the 950s, but had failed to convince his father Svyatoslav to follow her lead. In 970 Svyatoslav installed Vladimir (perhaps still a child) as his subordinate prince in Novgorod. Two years later Svyatoslav died, leaving Vladimir’s brother Yaropolk to become grand prince. In 976 a power struggle between Yaropolk and a third brother, Oleg, led to Oleg’s death and caused Vladimir to flee Novgorod for Scandinavia. Vladimir returned to Novgorod in 980, presumably with Scandinavian troops, and marched against Yaropolk. In the

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same year he or his advisers ordered the assassination of Yaropolk at a peace conference. Yaropolk’s death left Vladimir in undisputed control of the Kievan realm. In the year that he came to power, Vladimir erected several idols in Kiev and allegedly authorized that humans be sacrificed to them. He remained a pagan for roughly the first eight years of his reign, during which time he, like his father, expanded and consolidated his power through a series of wars against neighboring tribes. He also fathered several sons including Boris and Gleb, Russia’s two most important native saints, and Yaroslav the Wise, who would eventually succeed him. Vladimir’s conversion to Christianity is described at considerable length in the Primary Chronicle, but many details of this account are dubious. However, as the Chronicle suggests, the prince was probably influenced by missionaries and possibly by memories of his Christian grandmother. Political considerations were also important in his decision to convert. Vladimir’s own baptism was certainly a condition for his final marriage (the one that forced him to annul multiple prior marriages) to Anne, sister of the Byzantine emperor Basil II. There is some controversy over the precise date of this baptism, as well as the location (the Greek city of Cherson, according to the Chronicle, or Kiev). In any case, Vladimir’s personal baptism in 987 or 988 was followed almost immediately by the official Christianization of Rus. After baptism the prince seems to have embarked enthusiastically on a program of destroying pagan temples, building churches, and educating new clergy. The latter two projects were to be vigorously continued by his son Yaroslav. Although there were Christians in the Kievan state before Vladimir’s time, the prince’s official conversion of the land marked a historical turning point. As Christians, Vladimir’s successors had a religion in common with their counterparts in the rest of Europe, fostering communication and political alliances. The conversion also stimulated the development of literacy in Kievan Rus and its successor states. The conversion had problematic aspects as well. Vladimir’s decision to adopt the religion from Byzantium rather than Rome would separate Russia culturally from the West in many respects. The schism between the Western and Eastern churches, already underway in Vladimir’s time, became official in 1204 and continues into the early twenty-first century. Moreover, while literate Westerners of all nationalities would communicate with each other freely in Latin for

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centuries to come, the primary written language of Russia would be Slavic. These factors contributed greatly to the exclusion of Russia (and, to some extent, of Ukraine and Belarus) from many Western European intellectual and cultural developments up to the end of the seventeenth century. During the Muscovite period Vladimir was regularly represented as the founder of the Russian state. This practice ended with the death of his last ruling descendant through the male line in 1598. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, his reign was romanticized in poems, paintings, and novels. He may also be the prototype of a folkloric ruler named Vladimir in Russia’s oral epic poetry.

See also: CHRISTIANIZATION; KIEVAN RUS; OLGA; PRIMARY CHRONICLE; SAINTS; YAROPOLK I; YAROSLAV VLADIMIROVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cross, Samuel Hazzard, and Sherbowitz-Wetzor, Olgerd P., trs. and eds. (1953). The Russian Primary Chronicle: Laurentian Text. Cambridge, MA: Mediaeval Academy of America. Hollingsworth, Paul, tr. (1992). The Hagiography of Kievan Rus’. Cambridge, MA: Distributed by Harvard University Press for the Ukrainian Research Institute of Harvard University. Obolensky, Dimitri. (1971). The Byzantine Commonwealth: Eastern Europe, 500–1043. New York: Praeger. Obolensky, Dimitri. (1989). “Cherson and the Conversion of Rus: An Anti-Revisionist View.” Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies 13:244-256. Poppe, Andrzej. (1976). “The Political Background to the Baptism of Rus’: Byzantine-Russian Relations between 986–989.” Dumbarton Oaks Papers 30:195–244. Reprinted in his The Rise of Christian Russia (1982). London: Variorum Reprints. FRANCIS BUTLER

VLASOV MOVEMENT The Vlasov Movement (Vlasovskoye Dvizhenie), or Russian Liberation Movement, designates the attempt by Soviet citizens in German hands during World War II to create an anti-Stalinist army, nominally led by Lieutenant-General Andrei Andreyevich Vlasov (1900–1946), to overthrow Stalin. Vlasov gave his name to the movement and died for his role in it. He did not create the situation and had little influence over developments.

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Vlasov has been interpreted both as a patriotic opponent of Communism and as a treacherous opportunist. The Vlasov movement illustrates the way in which Nazi policy towards the USSR was developed by the competing requirements of ideology and military expediency and the various agencies involved in policy. The outbreak of war witnessed popular disaffection within the territories of the USSR. Many opposed to Stalinism hoped that the Germans would come as liberators. Hitler saw the war in racial terms, and his main aim was to acquire living space (Lebensraum). A successful commander, Vlasov had impressed Stalin. Having fought his way out of the Kiev encirclement, he was appointed to repulse the German attack on Moscow in December 1941. In March 1942 Vlasov was made deputy commander of the Volkhov front and then commander of the Second Shock Army. For reasons that are still unclear, the Second Shock Army was neither strengthened nor allowed to withdraw. On June 24, Vlasov ordered the army to disband and was captured three weeks later. As a prisoner-of-war, Vlasov met German officers who argued that Nazi policy could be altered. Relying on his Soviet experience, Vlasov believed that their views had official sanction and agreed to cooperate. In December 1942 the Smolensk Declaration was issued by Vlasov in his capacity as head of the so-called Russian Committee, and was aimed at Soviet citizens on the German side of the front. In response, Soviet citizens began to sew badges on their uniforms to indicate their allegiance to the Russian Liberation Army, which in fact did not exist although the declaration referred to it. In the spring of 1943, Vlasov was taken on a tour of the occupied territories and published his Open Letter, which attracted much support among the population. Hitler was opposed to this and ordered Vlasov to be kept under house arrest as there was no intention of authorizing any anti-Stalinist movement. Dabendorf, a camp near Berlin, became the main focus of activity. Mileti Zykov was particularly influential in developing some of the program at Dabendorf. Finally, on September 16, 1944, Vlasov met Heinrich Himmler, who authorized the formation of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (KONR, Komitet Osvobozhdeniya Narodov Rossii). The Manifesto was published in Prague on November 14, 1944. Two divisions were formed, but Soviet soldiers already serving in the Wehrmacht were not allowed to join.

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In May 1945, the KONR First Division deserted their German sponsors and fought on the side of the Czech insurgents against SS troops in the city. Vlasov wished to demonstrate his anti-Stalinist credentials to the Allies, but when it became clear that the Americans would not be entering Prague, the First Division was eventually ordered to disband. Vlasov was captured, taken back to Moscow, tried, and hanged as a traitor in August 1946. For many years, mention of Vlasov and the anti-Stalinist opposition was taboo in the USSR. Since the 1980s more material has been published. An attempt to rehabilitate Vlasov and to argue that he had fought against the regime—not the Russian people—was turned down by the Military Collegium of the Russian Supreme Court on November 1, 2001.

See also:

STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH; WORLD WAR II

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Andreyev, Catherine. (1987). Vlasov and the Russian Liberation Movement. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Dallin, Alexander. (1981). German Rule in Russia, 1941–1945: A Study in Occupation Politics, 2nd ed. London: Macmillan. CATHERINE ANDREYEV

VODKA Prior to the twentieth century, the Russian word vino indicated the class of beverages known in English as vodka. The term refers to all alcoholic drinks made from distilling grain. (Confusingly, vino could also mean wine.) The Russian word vodka usually referred to the higher grades of spirits. Precisely when spirits appeared in Russia is difficult to discern. Some historians note references to vodka in written chronicles as early as the twelfth century. Others argue that spirits arrived in Russia in the late fourteenth century. One source claims that Livonians and Germans were granted permission to sell aqua vita, or vodka, in certain areas of Moscow in 1578. A commonly held view is that drinks such as present-day vodka spread to Russia only in the sixteenth century when Russians learned the art of distilling grain from the Tatars. The most widely held consensus is that vodka came from the west in the first half of the sixteenth century, but its consumption was initially limited to foreign mercenaries.

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From the outset, the government exercised control over the trade in spirits. Beginning in 1544, the state owned and regulated drink shops (kabaki) that distilled and sold vodka in the towns. The Law Code of 1649 extended state control to all the Russian provinces and established a monopoly over production, distribution, and sale of spirits, from which the nobility were exempt. In the mid-sixteenth century, the state began farming out the rights to collect taxes on vodka, and by 1767 liquor tax farming spread throughout the empire as the primary means of extracting revenues from vodka until an excise system was set up in 1863. The excise system, however, made regulation difficult, so in 1892, Minister of Finance Sergei Witte introduced a reformed state monopoly. Except for a brief experiment with prohibition from 1914 to 1925, the state retained a monopoly over the vodka trade until 1989. Throughout most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, liquor taxes comprised between 26 and 33 percent of all state revenues. Historically, peasants drank mead, ale, and beer on festive occasions. Since vodka involved distilling, peasant households did not have the equipment, technology, or resources to produce their own. In its quest for revenues, the state expanded commercial production and sale of vodka to the rural population throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. With the expansion of the vodka trade, the use of beer was increasingly replaced by vodka as the favored ceremonial drink among the lower classes. By the nineteenth century, vodka was the single most important item in lower-class diets. In the villages, peasants drank vodka at church festivals, rites of passage, family celebrations, weddings and funerals, and any special occasions in the life of the rural community. Such ceremonial drinking was as much an obligation as it was a pleasure. Tradition and custom demanded drunkenness on certain occasions, and those failing to respond dishonored themselves before the community. In order to avoid this stigma, families often spent their last pennies, and even sold property, to purchase vodka for an upcoming event. A funeral could not be arranged, a wedding conducted, or a bargain sealed without the required amount of vodka. To be binding, every type of transaction had to conclude with all parties wetting the bargain—sharing a drink of vodka. Custom established firm norms on the amount of vodka to be provided, below which a peasant family could not go without being shamed.

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Vodka was also a valuable exchange commodity used to maintain networks of patronage and manipulate village politics. Often decisions concerning the levying of taxes, election of officials, or the punishment of offenders depended upon who bought whom how much vodka. A defendant or petitioner could ply village elders with vodka to insure a favorable outcome; this was known as softening up the judge. Once a punishment had been decided upon, the perpetrator often treated the village to vodka in order to win forgiveness and readmittance into the community. It was also common for the victim to treat the community to vodka, thereby affirming his or her acceptance of the punishment. The political and economic uses of vodka were linked in the important village institution of work parties. Seeking to gather as many people as possible to get an urgent task done, such as repairing a road or bridge, building a church, or bringing in the harvest, the host would supply copious amounts of vodka. The provision of drink signaled his respect for the peasants, and they reciprocated by working for respect. Vodka was the reward for their labor, but more importantly, it symbolized the mutuality of the exchange, reinforcing the web of interdependent relationships in the community. From the 1890s, as Russia embarked upon a course of modernization, vodka retained its centrality in the everyday lives of the working classes. With the beginning of industrialization, millions of peasants entered the urban workforce bringing their traditions with them, especially the practice of wetting the bargain. In the village, sharing a drink of vodka signified an equitable economic arrangement had been made. In the hiring market, former peasants forced potential employers to wet the bargain before they would agree to the terms of employment. The toast was a type of social leveling, forcing employers (at least symbolically) to respect the workers’ dignity and humanity. Practices at the workplace centered on drinking vodka strengthened shop solidarities, reinforced hierarchies among workers, and symbolized a rite of passage into the world of real workers. Among male workers in shops, commercial firms, and factories, each new man underwent an initiation rite, which involved obligatory buying and drinking of vodka. Often, a newcomer was not addressed by name but called “Mama’s boy” until he provided the whole shop with vodka.

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With the accelerated growth of the urban working class during the rapid industrialization of the First Five-Year Plan (1928–1933), the practice of treating with vodka took on greater significance, and in most factories it became nearly impossible for workers to receive training or secure the proper tools without bribing foremen with vodka. It was quite common for skilled workers to demand payment in vodka for training new recruits. As with rural communities, in the factories custom set firm limits on the amount of drink required. So prevalent was the practice of treating, a nationwide survey conducted in 1991 revealed that the workplace was the primary place for imbibing. Moreover, in 1993 average consumption levels were placed at one bottle of vodka for every adult Russian male every two days.

See also:

ALCOHOLISM; ALCOHOL MONOPOLY; FOOD

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Christian, David. (1990). ’Living Water’: Vodka and Russian Society on the Eve of Emancipation. Oxford: Clarendon. Christian, David, and Smith, R.E.F. (1994). Bread and Salt: A Social and Economic History of Food and Drink in Russia. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Herlihy, Patricia. (2002). The Alcoholic Empire: Vodka and Politics in Late Imperial Russia. New York: Oxford University Press. Phillips, Laura. (2000). The Bolsheviks and the Bottle: Drink and Worker Culture in St. Petersburg, 1900–1929. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. Transchel, Kate. (2000). “Liquid Assets: Vodka and Drinking in Early Soviet Factories.” In The Human Tradition in Modern Russia, ed. William B. Husband. Wilmington, DE: SR Books. KATE TRANSCHEL

(1928–1995), Soviet and Russian military and political figure, historian, and philosopher. Colonel General Volkogonov was born in Chita province, the son of a minor civil servant who was shot in 1937. Without knowledge of his father’s true fate, Volkogonov entered military service in 1949 and rose rapidly in rank. As a political officer after 1971, he held various posts within the Soviet Min-

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istry of Defense, eventually becoming deputy chief (1984–1988) of the Main Political Administration. Although known as an ideological hardliner, Volkogonov’s foreign experiences gave rise to grave doubts about the Soviet system. Travels in the Third World taught him that revolutionary leaders sought only cynical advantage from the Soviets. An academic visit to the West convinced him that capitalist societies had produced greater equalities than their supposedly egalitarian socialist counterparts. He was already reading suppressed writers when he learned the truth about his father’s death—that he had been executed as an enemy of the people. Hence sprang the desire to expose the truth about Stalin and his times. Estrangement from the military-political leadership precipitated Volkogonov’s transfer to the USSR Institute of Military History. There, while chief from 1988 to 1991, his subordinates’ revisionist draft history of the Great Patriotic War, coupled with his growing adherence to democratic ideals and an unorthodox evaluation of the Stalinist legacy, provoked clashes with the Ministry of Defense. Following the Soviet collapse, he served from 1991 to 1995 as security adviser to President Boris Yeltsin, while simultaneously championing democratic causes and chairing several parliamentary commissions as a Duma deputy associated with the Left-Centrist Bloc. Before his turn against Soviet convention, Volkogonov’s more significant works, including Marxist-Leninist Teachings about War and the Army (1984) and The Psychology of War (1984) reflected orthodox zeal. However, his subsequent conviction that the Soviet system had been flawed from the beginning permeated his historical works, including a revisionist biography of Stalin, Triumph and Tragedy (1990), and later volumes on Trotsky, Lenin, and other significant early Soviet leaders.

See also:

VOLKOGONOV, DMITRY ANTONOVICH

D M I T R Y

STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Menning, Bruce W. (2003). “Of Outcomes Happy and Unhappy.” In Adventures in Russian Historical Research, eds. Catherine Freirson and Samuel Baron. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Volkogonov, Dmitri. (1991). Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy, tr. and ed. Harold Shukman. New York: Grove Weidenfeld. Volkogonov, Dmitri. (1994). Lenin: A New Biography, tr. and ed. Harold Shukman. New York: Free Press.

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Volkogonov, Dmitri. (1998). Autopsy for an Empire: The Seven Leaders Who Built the Soviet Regime, tr. and ed. Harold Shukman. New York: Free Press. BRUCE W. MENNING

VOLSKY, ARKADY IVANOVICH (b. 1932), political leader and industrial lobbyist in the 1990s. Arkady Ivanovich Volsky began his career in the military-industrial sector as deputy chief of the Department of Machines from 1978 to 1984. He became active in politics by serving on several highprofile committees dealing with industry and gained national recognition as Mikhail Gorbachev’s special representative in Nagorno-Karabakh during the crises there from 1988 to 1990. Volsky is best known for founding the Union of Science and Industry in 1990, which he renamed the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs after the failed 1991 coup. He used this position to establish the perception that he spoke for the interests of managers and business entrepreneurs during the crucial era of privatization and transition to capitalism. In mid-June 1992 he was a central figure in the formation of the Civic Union, a broad alliance of political parties and parliamentary factions that played an important role in forcing alterations to the program of rapid privatization and economic reform presented by Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar. Volsky was widely seen as one of the key forces behind the June 1993 replacement of Gaidar with Viktor Chernomyrdin and others who favored a slower transition with a greater role for incumbent managers. Although Volsky continued to head the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, its influence, and his, peaked in 1993 and rapidly declined thereafter. By the late 1990s privatization had transformed the economic and political landscape, bringing power and influence to a small and shifting group of wealthy, wellconnected oligarchs, deeply undermining his claim to speak for the business class.

See also:

CIVIC UNION; PRIVATIZATION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Lohr, Eric. (1993). “Arkadii Volsky’s Political Base.” Europe-Asia Studies 45:811–829. ERIC LOHR

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VORONTSOV, MIKHAIL SEMENOVICH (“Minga”) (1782–1856), leading statesman during the reigns of Alexander I and Nicholas I. Although Mikhail Vorontsov was considered a military hero (his portrait hangs in the Hero’s Hall of the Hermitage), mainly for his generalship at the Battle of Borodino (1812) and his command of the Russian occupation army in France (1815–1818), his historical significance is due to his rule as governor-general and viceroy in New Russia and Caucasia from 1823 to 1854. Born a count in an illustrious and wealthy family of imperial servitors, he was awarded the titles of field marshal and most illustrious (Svetleyshy) prince of the Russian Empire for his service. Vorontsov was an unshakably loyal servitor to the emperors, yet thanks to his upbringing in England (his father, Semen Vorontsov, was the Russian ambassador) and an excellent education, as well as his high social status and fabulous wealth, in attitude and action he was more Western, liberal, and business-minded than his conservative Russian colleagues. The poet Pushkin out of spite called him “half lord and half merchant.” He was one of Russia’s largest serf-owners. Although he supported emancipation in principle, he spurned overtures to join the Decembrist plotters, many of whom received their inspiration in France under his command. The serfs, he said, could be freed only when the Emperor decided to do so. Indeed, he was named by Nicholas I to serve on the commission set up in 1826 to investigate the Decembrist conspiracy. Vorontsov excelled in the field of imperial administration. In New Russia, from its capital Odessa, and in Caucasia from Tbilisi, his government brought vast improvements to the economic life and sheer physical appearance of these southern regions. He attempted, with limited success, to improve the operation of the notoriously corrupt and inefficient imperial bureaucracy. He decentralized decision making in these peripheral territories of the empire, partly by bringing educated locals into the civil service. He also fought constantly, with limited success, for some autonomy from the jealous central ministries in St. Petersburg. He encouraged local businesses. He brought steamboats from England to improve transportation up the rivers and on the Black Sea. He established and supported educational and cultural institutions. He personally supervised the design and construction of parks and public buildings in the major cities.

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VORONTSOV-DASHKOV, ILLARION IVANOVICH (1837–1916), viceroy of the Caucasus. At a moment of great danger to the regime Tsar Nicholas II appointed his friend and councilor, Illarion Ivanovich Vorontsov-Dashkov, viceroy (namestnik) of the Caucasus in 1905. A loyal courtier, Count Vorontsov-Dashkov faced open rebellion, with most of western Georgia in the hands of insurgent peasants led by the Marxist Social Democrats. Harsh policies toward the Armenian Church (in 1903 their properties had been seized by the government), repression of the workers and peasants, and general disillusionment with the autocracy as the RussoJapanese War went badly, led to the collapse of tsarist authority south of the Caucasian mountains. The new viceroy agreed to ameliorate the state’s policies, return the Armenian church properties, and negotiate with the rebels. The tsar did not approve of these moderate policies and thought the best place for rebels was hanging from a tree. “The example would be beneficial to many,” he wrote. But the viceroy prevailed, using both conciliatory and repressive measures to pacify the region. An engraving of Mikhail Semenovich Vorontsov that appeared in the London News. © MARY EVANS PICTURE LIBRARY

A bitter opponent of the Crimean War and the unexpected enmity with his beloved England, Vorontsov retired in 1854 in failing health, after a third of a century of service, and died two years later. In an unusual expression of public admiration for Imperial Russia, public subscriptions paid for commemorative statues of him in Odessa and Tbilisi. A beautiful museum dedicated to his good works and lasting memory, currently open to the public, is located in one of his former palaces, the famous Bloor-designed palace in Alupka, not far from Yalta on the “Russian Riviera,” the beautiful Crimean coast.

See also:

CAUCASUS; DECEMBRIST MOVEMENT AND RE-

BELLION; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Rhinelander, Anthony. (1990). Prince Michael Vorontsov: Viceroy to the Tsar. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press. ANTHONY RHINELANDER

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The liberal methods of the viceroy improved relations among the various nationalities in the Caucasus. He was thought by many to be proArmenian, and did favor that nationality as it was well represented in local representative institutions and possessed great wealth and property. VorontsovDashkov wrote to the tsar that the government had itself created the “Armenian problem by carelessly ignoring the religious and national views of the Armenians.” But he also attempted to placate the Georgians and the Muslims and permitted education in the local languages. By the time Russia went to war with Turkey in 1915, Armenians formed volunteer units to fight alongside the Russian army against the Turks. Although there was resistance to the draft among Caucasian Muslims, and Georgians were unenthusiastic about the war effort, no major opposition was expressed. In 1915 VorontsovDashkov left the Caucasus and was replaced by Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich. As VorontsovDashkov departed Tiflis, he was made an honorary citizen of the city by the Armenian-dominated city duma, but neither the Georgian nobility nor Azerbaijani representatives appeared to bid him farewell.

See also:

CAUCASUS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kazemzadeh, Firuz. (1951). The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917–1921). New York: Philosophical Library.

Erickson, John. (1962). The Soviet High Command. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Suny, Ronald Grigor. (1988). The Making of the Georgian Nation. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

BRUCE W. MENNING

RONALD GRIGOR SUNY

VOTCHINA

VOROSHILOV, KLIMENT EFREMOVICH (1881–1969), leading Soviet political and military figure, member of Stalin’s inner circle. A machinist’s apprentice who joined the Bolsheviks in 1903, Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov spent nearly a decade underground and in exile, then emerged in late 1917 to become the commissar of Petrograd. In 1918 he assisted Felix Dzerzhinsky in founding the Cheka, then fought on various civil war fronts, including Tsaritsyn in 1918, where he sided with Josef V. Stalin against Leon Trotsky over the utilization of former tsarist officers in the new Red Army. A talented grassroots organizer, Voroshilov was adept at assembling ad hoc field units, especially cavalry. Following the death of Mikhail V. Frunze in late 1925, Voroshilov served until mid-1934 as commissar of military and naval affairs, and subsequently until May 1940 as defense commissar. Known more as a political toady than a serious commander, he served in important command and advisory capacities during World War II, often with baleful results. During the postwar era he aided in the Sovietization of Hungary, but at home was relegated to largely honorific governmental positions. To his credit Voroshilov objected to using the Red Army against the peasantry during collectivization, and, despite complicity in Stalin’s purges, he occasionally intervened to rescue military officers. Notwithstanding a cavalry bias, he oversaw an impressive campaign for the mechanization of the Red Army during the 1930s, including support for the T-34 tank over Stalin’s initial objections. After Stalin’s death in 1953 Voroshilov was named chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, a post he held until he was forced to resign in 1960 after participating in the anti-Party group opposed to Nikita Khrushchev.

See also:

MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET; STALIN,

JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

1650

Literally, “patrimony” (the noun derives from Slavonic otchy, i.e. belonging to one’s father); in medieval Russia, inherited landed property that could be legally sold, donated or disposed in another way by the owner (votchinnik). In the eleventh through thirteenth centuries, the term mainly indicated the hereditary rights of princes to their principalities or appanages. Thus, according to Nestor’s chronicle, the princes who gathered at Lyubech in 1097 proclaimed: “Let everybody hold his own patrimony (otchina).” It was in this sense that Ivan III later applied the word votchina to all the Russian lands claiming the legacy of his ancestors, the Kievan princes. In the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries, as land transactions became more frequent, the word votchina acquired a new basic meaning, referring to estates (villages, arable lands, forests, and so forth) owned by hereditary right. Up to the end of fifteenth century, votchina remained the only form of landed property in Muscovy. The reforms of Ivan III in the 1480s created another type of ownership of land, the pomestie, which made new landowners (pomeshchiki) entirely dependent on the grand prince who granted estates to them on condition of loyal service. In the sixteenth century, Muscovite rulers favored the growth of the pomestie system, simultaneously keeping a check on the circulation of patrimonial estates. Decrees of 1551, 1562, and 1572 regulated conditions under which alienated patrimonies could be redeemed by the seller’s kinsfolk. The same legislation stipulated that each case of donation of one’s patrimony to a monastery must be sanctioned by the government. (In 1580, the sale or donation of estates to monasteries was totally prohibited.) Historians have stressed the growing similarity between votchina and pomestie. On the one hand, as Vladimir Kobrin points out, pomestie from the very beginning tended to become hereditary property; on the other hand, the owners of patrimonies were obliged to serve in the tsarist army (legally, since 1556), just as pomestie holders did.

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S. B. Veselovskii cites some cases from the 1580s, when the authorities ordered the confiscation of both pomestia (pl.) and votchiny (pl.) of those servicemen who had ignored the military summons. But some difference between the two forms of landed property remained: In the eyes of landowners, votchina preserved its significance as the preferable right to one’s land. As O. A. Shvatchenko put it, votchiny formed the material basis of the Russian aristocracy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In spite of governmental regulations and limitations and severe blows of the Oprichnina, the votchina system survived the sixteenth century, and after the Time of Troubles experienced new growth. Beginning with Vasily Shuisky (1610), the tsars began to remunerate their supporters by granting them the right to turn part of their pomestie estates into votchiny. Thus, new types of votchina appeared in the seventeenth century. The Law Code of 1649 also stipulated the possibility of exchanging pomestie for votchina, or vice versa. Finally, pomestie and votchina merged during the reforms of Peter the Great: specifically, in the 1714 decree on majorats.

See also:

GRAND PRINCE; IVAN III; LAW CODE OF 1649;

OPRICHNINA; PETER I; POMESTIE

MIKHAIL M. KROM

VOTIAKS See

UDMURTS.

VOYEVODA In texts from the era of Kievan Rus, the term voyevoda designated the commander of a military host of any significant size, be it an entire field army, a division, or a regiment. It might also be used to refer to the administrator or governor of some territory. Researchers therefore frequently encounter the term as a translation of the Greek archon and satrapis as well as strategos. By the 1530s, the practice of annually stationing regimental commanders (godovye voyevody) on the Oka River defense line to protect Moscow from Tatar raids had begun to blur the distinction between the military command responsibilities of the regimental commanders and the administrative re-

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sponsibility of the vicegerents and fortifications stewards of the towns: first siege defense, then fortifications labor and fiscal administration were gradually shifted to the former. By the 1560s and 1570s, general fiscal and judicial as well as military authority in certain southern and western frontier districts was entirely in the hands of these godovye voyevody; the vicegerents and fortifications stewards were eliminated or subordinated to them. Godovye voyevody had evolved into town governors (gorodovye voyevody). During the Time of Troubles, the breakdown of central chancellery authority left responsibility for mobilizing military resources and coordinating the struggle against the Pretenders and foreign interventionists largely up to the town governors of the upper Volga and North. The town governor system of local administration was therefore universalized after the liberation of Moscow and the foundation of the new Romanov dynasty. By the 1620s most districts were under a town governor, usually appointed for two to three years from the lower ranks of the upper service class (stolniki, Moscow dvoryane) and given a working order (nakaz) from the appropriate chancellery. The town governors had broad responsibilities: They commanded district garrison forces and defended their districts from attack; they helped mobilize district military manpower into the regiments of the field army; they supervised fortifications corvee; they policed and combated banditry; they investigated and adjudicated civil and criminal cases and registered deeds; they searched out, tried, and remanded fugitive peasants; they conducted reviews determining service entitlement awards, paid out cash and grain service subsidies, and implemented chancellery instructions to assign pomestie allotments; they helped surveying and cadastral inventorying; and they supervised repartitions of communal property to reapportion tax burdens. The quality of their administrative service was often deficient, however, as they were not administrative specialists but notables appointed to governorships most often as a respite from their command responsibilities in the field army or their ceremonial duty at court; governorships were less likely to give them rank promotions than field army duty or court duty. They received no special additional salary for service as governors (even raises to their regular service subsidies, in recognition of meritorious service, were rare), and they therefore sought out their compensation on their own by soliciting bribes and arranging for community feeding prestations (kormlenie).

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Moscow did develop practices and institutions to reinforce central chancellery control over the town governors. The compulsory service ethos and the precedence (mestnichestvo) system had some restraining influence on them; they were usually removed from their posts after their third year, unless the community petitioned for their retention; their working orders were made increasingly specific and comprehensive; and it was general practice to reduce the range of decisions left to their discretion so that most of their actions required explicit preliminary authorization from the chancelleries. Over the course of the seventeenth century, additional control procedures were developed: the multiplication and refinement of record forms; the introduction of end-of-term audits; and the organization of special investigative commissions to respond to community complaints of abuses of authority.

See also:

FRONTIER FORTIFICATIONS; KORMLENIE; LOCAL

GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Davies, Brian L. (1987). “The Town Governors in the Reign of Ivan IV.” Russian History/Histoire Russe 14 (1-4):77–143. BRIAN DAVIES

VOZNESENSKY, NIKOLAI ALEXEYEVICH (1903–1950), Soviet economic official who for many years was close to Stalin. Born into a foreman’s family near Tula on December 1, 1903, Nikolai Alexeyevich Voznesensky was appointed chief of Gosplan, the USSR State Planning Commission, in January 1938. He subsequently became first deputy prime minister, a member of Stalin’s war cabinet, and a Politburo member, and until his arrest in March 1949 remained at the center of Soviet politics and economics. Voznesensky advanced in the Soviet hierarchy because of his aptitude for economic administration, his undeviating loyalty to the party line, the patronage of Leningrad party chief Andrei Zhdanov, and good luck. He sponsored several measures designed to improve the economic outcome of the command system, including new monitoring systems to identify and manage the most acute short-

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ages, the realignment of industrial prices with production costs, and detailed long-term plans. As a party loyalist he expertly rationalized each new turn in official thinking about the economic principles of socialism and capitalism. While many competent and loyal officials were repressed, Voznesensky benefited from Zhdanov’s protection and had the good fortune to gain high office just as Stalin’s purges were beginning to taper off. Voznesensky’s first task was to revive the Soviet economy, which had been stagnating since 1937. He was still trying when World War II broke out in 1941. The war exposed the inadequacy of prewar plans for a war economy, and for a while the planners lost control. While war production soared, the civilian sector neared collapse. The victory at Stalingrad in 1942 and Allied aid made it possible to restore economic balance in 1943 and 1944. Voznesensky was involved in every aspect of this story of failure and success. By the end of the war Voznesensky had become one of Stalin’s favorites. Stalin relied on his competence, frankness, and personal loyalty. The same attributes led Voznesensky to fall out with others, in particular Georgy Malenkov and Lavrenti Beria. The rivalry was personal; there is no serious evidence of differences between them on political or economic philosophy. After Zhdanov’s death in September 1948, Voznesensky’s good luck ran out. Malenkov and Beria were soon able to destroy Stalin’s trust in him. He became ensnared in accusations relating to false economic reports and secret papers that ended in his dismissal, arrest, trial, and execution. Voznesensky was not the only prominent figure with connections to Zhdanov to disappear at this time in what was later known as the Leningrad affair.

See also:

ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; LENINGRAD AF-

FAIR; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH; ZHDANOV, ANDREI ALEXANDROVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Gorlizki, Yoram, and Khlevniuk, Oleg. (2004). Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945–1953. New York: Oxford University Press. Harrison, Mark. (1985). Soviet Planning in Peace and War, 1938–1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sutela, Pekka. (1984). Socialism, Planning, and Optimality: A Study in Soviet Economic Thought. Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica. MARK HARRISON

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VSEVOLOD I (1030–1093), grand prince of Kiev. Although Vsevolod was grand prince of Kiev, son of the eminent Yaroslav Vladimirovich the Wise, and father of the famous Vladimir Monomakh, his own career was not outstanding. He was allegedly Yaroslav’s favorite son and married to a relative of Byzantine emperor Constantine IX Monomachus.

M A N I F E S T O

In 1169 Vsevolod, son of Yury Vladimirovich “Dolgoruky,” participated in the sack of Kiev organized by his elder brother Andrei “Bogolyubsky.” Four years later he ruled Kiev briefly as Andrei’s lieutenant. After his boyars assassinated Andrei in 1174, his relatives fought for the throne of Vladimir; in 1176, Vsevolod won. He adopted Andrei’s centralizing policy and stifled all opposition from the neighbouring princes of Murom and Ryazan. He destroyed Polovtsian camps on the river Don and waged war against the Volga-Kama Bulgars and the Mordva tribes to secure the trade route from the Black Sea. He increased his domains by strengthening the defenses on the middle Volga, building outposts along the Northern Dvina, seizing towns from Novgorod, and appropriating its lands along the Upper Volga. He had limited success, however, in bringing Novgorod itself under his control.

Before his death in 1054, Yaroslav bequeathed southern Pereyaslavl to Vsevolod along with territories in the upper Volga, including Rostov, Suzdal, and Beloozero. Yaroslav also designated him heir to Kiev, along with his elder brothers Izyaslav and Svyatoslav. For some twenty years the three acted as a triumvirate, asserting their authority over all the other princes, including their brothers Vyacheslav of Smolensk and Igor of Vladimir in Volyn. As prince of Pereyaslavl, Vsevolod had to defend his domain against attacks from the nomads, especially the Polovtsy (Cumans). In 1068 after the latter defeated the three brothers, the Kievans forced Izyaslav to flee to the Poles. Vsevolod joined Svyatoslav in persuading the citizens to reinstate Izyaslav in Kiev. In 1072 Vsevolod and his brothers translated the relics of Saints Boris and Gleb into a new church in Vyshgorod and together issued the Law Code of Yaroslav’s Sons (Pravda Yaroslavichey). In 1073, however, they quarreled, and Vsevolod helped Svyatoslav evict Izyaslav from Kiev. After Svyatoslav died in 1076, Vsevolod succeeded him briefly in Kiev until Izyaslav reclaimed the throne. In 1078 Izyaslav was killed in battle, and Vsevolod occupied Kiev, where he ruled until his death. His most difficult task was to satisfy his many nephews with territorial allocations. He died on April 13, 1093.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

See also:

Fennell, John. (1983). The Crisis of Medieval Russia, 1200–1304. London: Longman.

GRAND PRINCE; IZYASLAV I; POLOVTSY; SVY-

ATOSLAV

II;

VLADIMIR

MONOMAKH;

Around 1199, when Vsevolod secured pledges of loyalty from the Rostislavichi of Smolensk and the Mstislavichi of Vladimir in Volyn, they recognized him as the senior prince in the dynasty of Monomakh. The Olgovichi of Chernigov, for their part, acknowledged his military superiority and formed marriage alliances with him. In this way Vsevolod asserted his primacy over the southern dynasties and the grand prince of Kiev. Before his death, however, he divided his domain among all his sons and designated the second eldest Yury his successor. These actions weakened the power of the prince of Vladimir. Vsevolod died on April 13, 1212.

See also:

BOYAR; GRAND PRINCE; NOVGOROD THE GREAT;

POLOVTSY; YURI VLADIMIROVICH

YAROSLAV

MARTIN DIMNIK

VLADIMIROVICH BIBLIOGRAPHY

Dimnik, Martin. (1994). The Dynasty of Chernigov, 1054–1146. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. MARTIN DIMNIK

VSEVOLOD III (1154–1212), Vsevolod Yurevich “Big Nest,” the last grand prince of Vladimir on the Klyazma to rule all of Suzdalia, including Rostov and Suzdal.

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VYBORG MANIFESTO The Vyborg Manifesto (“To the People from the People’s Representatives”) was an appeal given by a group of members of the First State Duma to the people of Russia, on July 23, 1906, in the city of Vyborg. It was intended as a sign of protest against the dissolution of the Duma. After the dissolution of the Duma, on July 21, 1906, deputies of the Labor Group (Trudoviks) called for an assembly in

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St. Petersburg with the purpose of issuing a manifesto of insubordination to the act of dissolution and calling for the people to support them. Holding an assembly in St. Petersburg was impossible, because both the Duma building and the Cadet (Constitutional Democrat) Party Club were surrounded by police and military forces. At the proposition of the Cadets, between 220 and 230 Duma deputies, mostly Cadets and Trudoviks, met in Vyborg, Finland, on the eve of July 22. The chairman was the chairman of the Duma, Sergei Muromtsev. During the night, the deputies discussed two possible versions of the manifesto. The first, prepared by the Trudoviks and the Social Democrats, called for the army and navy to support the cause of the revolution and for the people not to follow the orders of the government. The second, prepared by the Cadets and written by Pavel Milyukov (who was not a deputy), called for passive resistance: ignoring military service, not paying taxes, and refusal of state loans unless the Duma approved. The final draft of the Manifesto, processed by the approval committee, was close to the Cadets’ version. Despite the remaining controversies, on July 23 the final revision of the appeal was signed, because an order came from St. Petersburg of the dissolution of the assembly and the danger of “fatal consequences for Finland.” The Vyborg Manifesto was signed by 180 deputies, later to be joined by 52 more. It was printed in the form of a leaflet on July 23, 1906, in Finnish and then Russian in 10,000 copies, and was reprinted abroad. The reprint of the Vyborg Manifesto by Russian newspapers was punished with the confiscation of the press run, and spreading the leaflets was punished with arrests. On July 29, 1906, a court case was started against those who signed the Manifesto, which called for the nation to oppose the law and the lawful orders of the government. The Vyborg Manifesto had no significant impact on the people. In December 1907, the so-called Vyborg trial was held in St. Petersburg. At the trial, 167 of the 169 former deputies of the Duma were sentenced to three months of incarceration, which meant that they were bereft of the right to run for position in the Duma and other civil services.

Maklakov, V.A. (1964). The First State Duma. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. OLEG BUDNITSKII

VYSHINSKY, ANDREI YANUARIEVICH (1883–1955), prosecutor, scholar, diplomat; best known for conduct of show trials during the Great Terror. Andrei Yanuarevich Vyshinsky distinguished himself as a prosecutor (prosecutor-general of Russia, 1931–1933; deputy prosecutor general of the USSR, 1933–1935; prosecutor general of the USSR, 1935–1939); as a scholar (author of authoritative legal texts, including The Theory of Evidence in Soviet Law, published in three editions); and as a diplomat (deputy foreign minister, 1940-1949, 1953–1955; foreign minister and Soviet representative to the United Nations, 1949–1953). In all of these roles he displayed unfailing loyalty to his master and sometime confidant, Josef V. Stalin. Erudite and a brilliant orator, as skilled in sarcasm as in logic, the dapper Vyshinsky was trained as a jurist. He belonged to the Menshevik party before becoming a Bolshevik in 1920. While working in educational administration during the 1920s, Vyshinsky proved his political mettle in performances as judge in early show trials (such as Shakhty). Later, as prosecutor-general, Vyshinsky continued to develop the political show trial, serving as prosecutor at the major show trials of 1936 through 1938, at which leading politicians from the past (e.g., Grigory Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev, Grigory Pyatakov, Nikolai Bukharin, and Alexei Rykov) were humiliated and forced to confess to extraordinary acts of betrayal. Archival sources reveal that Vyshinsky worked closely with Stalin in manufacturing the charges and writing the scripts. Vyshinsky was also a member of the Special Board of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) that during the years 1936 through 1938 processed most of the contrived cases of alleged saboteurs and counterrevolutionaries.

Ascher, Abraham. (1992). The Revolution of 1905: Authority Restored. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

As Stalin’s prosecutor, Vyshinsky also helped to restore the authority of law in the postcollectivization era, eliminate the influence of antilaw Marxists such as Yevgeny Pashukanis, and develop a jurisprudence that supported the use of terror against political enemies. Long after leaving the administration of justice, Vyshinsky remained

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See also:

CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY; DUMA;

REVOLUTION OF 1905

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the top authority in legal theory, and he is remembered for reviving the pre-1845 doctrine of “confession as the queen of evidence” in political cases. During Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization, Vyshinsky’s theory of law was condemned, and his position as a legal authority undermined.

See also:

PURGES, THE GREAT; SHOW TRIALS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Sharlet, Robert, and Beirne, Piers. (1990). “In Search of Vyshinsky: The Paradox of Law and Terror.” In Revolution in Law: Contributions to the Development of Soviet Legal Theory, 1917–1938, ed. Piers Beirne. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Vaksberg, Arkady. (1991). Stalin’s Prosecutor: The Life of Andrei Vyshinsky. New York: Grove Weidenfeld. PETER H. SOLOMON JR.

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least profitable railways, support of domestic industry, and preparation of a monetary reform. By increasing indirect taxes, converting state loans and reducing interest payments on them, encouraging grain exports and limiting imports, and increasing railway freight rates, Vyshnegradsky managed to balance the budget, accumulate gold reserves, strengthen the paper ruble, and prepare the introduction of gold circulation. In 1891 a new tariff, the most protectionist in Europe, was introduced. It signified the transition from a safeguard system of tariffs to a consistently protective one. In order to ease criticism on the part of landowners and rightists, Vyshnegradsky described his course as nationalist and supported landlords through the Nobleman’s Bank (Dvoryansky bank). In 1892 he was discharged from office for health reasons.

See also:

ECONOMY, TSARIST; MINISTRIES, ECONOMIC

BIBLIOGRAPHY

VYSHNEGRADSKY, IVAN ALEXEYEVICH (1831–1895), scientist and mechanic, Russian finance minister from 1887 to 1892. Ivan Vyshnegradsky was born into a priest’s family. After graduating from the Tver Theological Seminary and later from the Main Pedagogical Institute, he taught mathematics and mechanics (engineering) at St. Petersburg military educational institutions, headed the department of mechanics at the St. Petersburg Technological Institute, and served as the Institute’s director from 1875 to 1878. Vyshnegradsky is known as a prominent scientist in the sphere of mechanics and mechanical engineering and also as the author of several fundamental works and manuals. He participated in managing a number of joint-stock companies and earned fame as a talented entrepreneur. By the time he was appointed a government minister, his fortune amounted to nearly a million rubles. In 1884 Vyshnegradsky became a member of the Council of the Minister of Public Instruction. He drew up a program for technical education and participated in the composition of the university code. In 1886 he was appointed a member of the State Council and in 1887 became the head of the Ministry of Finance. In this post, Vyshnegradsky, like his predecessor Nikolai Bunge, pursued a policy aimed at settlement of the budget deficit, stronger government interference in setting freight rates for private railways, nationalization of the

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Stepanov, Valery Leonidovich. (1996). “Three Ministers of Finance in Postreform Russia.” Russian Studies in History 35(2). BORIS N. MIRONOV

VYSOTSKY, VLADIMIR SEMYONOVICH (January 25, 1938–July 25, 1980), poet, actor, singer. Vladimir Semyonovich Vysotsky was born and brought up in central Moscow. He made his living as an actor, joining Yuri Lyubimov’s company at the Taganka Theatre in 1964 and performing there to the end of his life. He was a mainstay of the theatre’s ensemble style, but also took the leading role in several epoch-making productions, notably as Galileo in Brecht’s play, and then as a generationdefining Hamlet. Besides the theatre, Vysotsky regularly appeared in films, usually playing “bad boy” roles. Part of his stock-in-trade as an actor was the performance of songs to guitar accompaniment, and it was in this genre, delivering his own words, that he became more famous in his own lifetime than any other Russian creative artist. The beginning of Vysotsky’s professional life coincided with the appearance of guitar poetry, which in its turn was enabled by the availability of the portable tape recorder in the USSR. Vysotsky’s songs could therefore be recorded free of

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most dubious songs from the official point of view concern criminals; they are violent in their actions and crude and direct in their thoughts. The second, and on the whole later, segment of Vysotsky’s repertoire consists of songs in which the author speaks from an explicitly autobiographical stance. These songs express mounting frustration and despair; they were driven by Vysotsky’s addictive personality and the ravages it inflicted on his physical and mental stability.

Singer-actor Vladimir Vysotsky performing one of his popular ballads. © TASS/SOVFOTO. REPRINTED WITH PERMISSION

official controls, and the results duplicated. The popularity of these homemade tapes, and the semilegal appearances Vysotsky made in clubs and other institutions, brought him to the attention of the authorities. He was subjected to harrassment because, in official eyes, the content and especially the style of his songs, saturated with robust humor, were unacceptable even within the relatively permissive boundaries of Socialist Realism in its later phases. Vysotsky was regularly censured by various official bodies, but, shielded by his unprecedented popularity, he was never subjected to serious reprisals. Vysotsky was a prodigious creator of lyrics, consistent with his extravagant, extravert personality. His songs fall broadly into two successive chronological phases and two generic categories. In the earlier phase, he created hundreds of songs in which the author speaks through a persona. They include songs about military life, which formed the most officially acceptable segment of the repertoire and were in many cases created for theatre productions or films. Then there were songs about sport (running, soccer, weightlifting, even chess). There was also a series of love songs, which portray relationships in either a disenchanted, even cynical manner, or else idealize the female. The

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While there was constant disagreement during his lifetime about whether Vysotsky was a mere entertainer or merited serious consideration as a poet, his work illustrated the arbitrariness of this distinction. The literary establishment regarded him as an embarrassment, often out of envy and resentment for his genuine popularity, and connived with their political masters in denying Vysotsky access to the public media. His spectacular marriage, his third, to the French film star Marina Vlady was another source of friction. Vysotsky made a few records in the USSR, most of them bowdlerized, but he was never allowed to publish a book. This attitude changed only after his death, especially with the onset of glasnost; a small collection of lyrics appeared in 1982, and since then there has been a torrent of publication and discussion. Vysotsky’s songs imply a crude but coherent system of values whose core is masculinist individualism. The consequences may be tragic for him, but he still rises to the test. The appeal of this hero, to men and women alike throughout the social spectrum of Soviet Russia, made Vysotsky an idol who was felt to speak for the people more genuinely than any other contemporary; there is no more telling case of the discontinuity between popular acclaim and official recognition in the Brezhnev period.

See also:

DISSIDENT MOVEMENT; MUSIC; OKUDZHAVA,

BULAT SHALOVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Beumers, Birgit. (1997). Yury Liubimov at the Taganka Theatre, 1964–1994. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic. Shkolnikova, Mariya. (1996-2002). Vladimir Vysotsky: The Official Site. Smith, Gerald Stanton. (1984). Songs to Seven Strings: Russian Guitar Poetry and Soviet “Mass Song.” Bloomington: Indiana University Press. GERALD SMITH

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WAGES, SOVIET Wages in the Soviet Union were supposed to conform to Marx’s notion of the lower stage of communist society in which workers would be paid according to their contributions to the social product and on the basis of equal rewards for equal work. Factors taken into account in the assignment of wage levels typically included the arduousness and dangerousness of work, skill levels or necessary qualifications, and the degree of responsibility. Occupations in which women predominated, such as teaching, medicine, infant care, cleaning, and clerical and sales work, invariably were graded below male-dominated occupations. In early 1918 Lenin advocated the use of piecework as opposed to time-based wages as an appropriate system to stimulate labor discipline and productivity. He also grudgingly acknowledged the necessity of paying specialists (e.g., managers and engineers) more than ordinary workers. Although these policies were opposed by the Left Communist faction and many rank-and-file Bolsheviks, they were incorporated into the wage scales constructed by respective trade unions. During the years of war communism, labor was in effect an obligatory service to the embattled state, which in turn assumed the responsibility to provide work and at least a caloric minimum in the form of employee rations. Payment in kind was ubiquitous, and no sooner did workers receive their wage than they repaired to the black market to barter it for other goods.

W

The semblance of a normal monetary system of wages, based on contractual agreements between trade unions and corresponding trusts, developed under the New Economic Policy, and wages rose steadily. By 1927 nominal wages were estimated to be about 11 percent above the 1913 average, and this did not include the socialized wage consisting of free medical care, social insurance, and other welfare provisions. Whereas the First Five-Year Plan envisioned a further increase in nominal wages of 44 percent and real wages of nearly 68 percent— in fact, the standard of living of wage earners plummeted. It is estimated that by 1932 real wages were at about 50 percent of their 1928 level. Moreover, shortages in cooperative stores drove workers to rely on the private market, where prices of agricultural produce were approximately eight times higher than in 1928. The prevailing labor shortage caused employers to resort to various sleights of hand to attract and retain workers. They included paying workers at grades higher than

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those outlined in wage handbooks, granting special bonuses that amounted to permanent additions to their basic pay, paying for fictitious piece work and defective output, and manipulating the use of the progressive bonus system for overfulfillment of production quotas. Despite their technical illegality, these practices became permanent features of Soviet economic life. In 1931 the state introduced a wage-scale reform under the banner of combating petty bourgeois egalitarianism that widened differentials between lower and higher wage-tariff categories. Simultaneously it expanded the use of progressive piece-rates that would rise with the increase of individual workers’ actual output. This approach remained in force until the late 1950s when a new wage reform was gradually phased in. It entailed increases in basic wages and production quotas, the reduction in the number of wage scales and the simplification of rates within each scale, the elimination of progressive piece-rates, and a modest shift of pieceworkers to time-based wages. The major objective of the reforms—to create a stable and predictable system of incentives—appears to have failed largely because of the uncertainties and irregularities of supplies and managerial collusion with workers in compensating for them. Hence the Brezhnev-era aphorism, “They pretend to pay us, and we pretend to work.”

See also: ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; MONETARY OVERHANG; WAR COMMUNISM

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Filtzer, Donald. (1986). Soviet Workers and Stalinist Industrialization: The Formation of Modern Soviet Production Relations, 1928–1941. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Filtzer, Donald. (1992). Soviet Workers and De-Stalinization: The Consolidation of the Modern System of Soviet Production Relations, 1953–1964. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

nism for the economic system of Soviet Russia during the civil war that followed this revolution. This term, not used at the time, was first applied when the civil war had already drawn to a close. In the spring of 1921, advocating a shift toward a more liberalized internal market, Lenin described the system as “that peculiar war communism, forced on us by extreme want, ruin and war.” He went on to define its core as the centralized system of confiscating all of the peasants’ food surpluses, and more, in order to feed the urban workers and the soldiers of the Red Army. He meant that war communism was a temporary phenomenon—not real communism—just a necessary evil required by wartime circumstances. He intended thereby to distance himself from it and inaugurate a more relaxed regime later known as the New Economic Policy (NEP). A few years later, however, Stalin adopted policies that resembled war communism in several features, including specifically the confiscation of peasant food surpluses. Consequently many historians now reject Lenin’s claim that war communism was an unintended consequence of special circumstances, and argue that the Bolsheviks always intended to build a society based on centralization and force. It took more than six months for a full-scale civil war to break out after the October 1917 revolution. The Bolsheviks did not try immediately to centralize the economy. They negotiated for a separate peace with Germany to take Russia out of World War I. They brought representatives of the non-Bolshevik left into a coalition government. While they legislated to nationalize the landed estates of the aristocracy, they sought a coexistence of capitalist and commercial private property with state regulation and workers’ rights of inspection.

The Bolshevik Party seized power in Russia in October 1917. Historians use the term war commu-

The results, however, threatened the Bolsheviks with a loss of control on each front. The peace treaty signed with Germany in March 1918 provoked military intervention by Russia’s former allies. Its humiliating terms drove the Bolsheviks’ coalition partners toward the monarchist counterrevolution. Under the treaty, Russia lost the Ukraine; this cut the food available to Russia’s nonfarm population. The wartime system of food distribution that the Bolsheviks had inherited from the imperial government was ineffective: While the urban population was entitled to receive a food ration at low fixed prices, at the same prices the peasants would not sell food to the government for distribution. As the situation worsened, many groups of

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LEWIS H. SIEGELBAUM

WANDERERS, THE See GOLDEN AGE OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE; NATIONALISM IN THE ARTS.

WAR COMMUNISM

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workers blamed the factory owners, expelled them, and declared the factories to be state property. In the countryside, instead of government takeover of the great estates, the peasants divided the land among themselves.

1918 decree. By November 1920 public ownership extended to many artisan establishments with one or two workers. Public-sector management was centralized under a command system of administrative quotas and allocations.

As of 1918 the Bolsheviks began to travel a path of extreme political and economic centralization. They nationalized the banks in January. In April they enacted state monopolies in foreign trade as well as internal trade in foodstuffs. In June they brought the commanding heights of industry into the public sector. This path ended in a one-party state underpinned by a secret police and a demonetized command economy with virtually all industry nationalized and farm food surpluses liable to violent seizure. The Bolsheviks traveled willingly, justifying their actions in the name of socialism. They blamed their difficulties on a minority of speculators and counterrevolutionaries with whom there could be no compromise. This intensified the polarization between Reds and Whites that ended in civil war.

War communism was not an economic success. Food procurements rose at first, but industrial production and employment, harvests, and living standards fell continuously. The fact that the Bolsheviks emerged victorious from the civil war owed more to their enemies’ moral and material weaknesses than to their own strengths. Despite this, they did not abandon war communism immediately when the war came to an end. By the spring of 1920, fighting continued only in Poland and the Caucasus. Still, war communism was upheld. While Lenin defended the system of food procurement against its critics, other Bolsheviks advocated extending control over peasant farming through sowing plans and over industrial workers through militarization of labor.

Food shortages drove this process along. Shortages were felt first by the towns and the army, because peasants fed themselves before selling food to others. Shortages arose primarily from the wartime disruption of trade, the loss of the Ukraine, and the government’s attempts to hold down food prices. The Bolsheviks overestimated peasant food stocks; this meant that when they failed to raise food they blamed the peasants for withholding it. They specifically blamed a minority of richer peasants, the so-called kulaks, for speculating in food by withholding it intentionally so as to raise its price. Between April and June of 1918 they slid from banning private trade in foodstuffs to a campaign to seize kulak food stocks and then to confiscate their land as well. Since rural food stocks were smaller and more scattered than the government believed, such measures tended to victimize many ordinary peasants without improving supplies. Under war communism between the summer of 1918 and the spring of 1921, goods were distributed by administrative rationing or barter; with more than 20 percent monthly inflation, prices rose in total by many thousand times, and the money stock lost most of its real value. The government seized food from the peasantry, but, as there was not enough to meet workers’ needs, black markets developed where urban residents bartered their products and property with peasants for additional food. Industry was nationalized far more widely than the commanding heights listed in the June

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Such dreaming was rudely interrupted in early 1921 by an anti-Bolshevik mutiny in the Kronstadt naval base and a wave of peasant discontent concentrated in the Tambov province. It was not the end of the civil war, but the threat of another, that brought war communism to an end. This does not prove that the Bolsheviks had always intended to introduce something like war communism; however, it shows that Lenin was disingenuous to suggest that war communism was only a product of circumstances. In the case of war communism, the Bolsheviks willingly made virtues out of apparently necessary evils, then took them much further than necessary. Moreover, one product of civil war circumstances was never abandoned: the one-party state underpinned by a secret police.

See also: CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; NEW ECONOMIC POLICY; OCTOBER REVOLUTION; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH BIBLIOGRAPHY

Boettke, Peter J. (1990). The Political Economy of Soviet Socialism: The Formative Years, 1918–1928. Boston: Kluwer Academic. Carr, Edward Hallett. (1952). The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923, vol. 2. London: Macmillan. Davies, Robert W. (1989). “Economic and Social Policy in the USSR, 1917–41.” In The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, vol. 8: The Industrial Economies: The Development of Economic and Social Policies, eds. Peter Mathias and Sidney Pollard. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

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Lih, Lars T. (1990). Bread and Authority in Russia, 1914–1921. Berkeley: University of California Press. Malle, Silvana. (1985). The Economic Organization of War Communism, 1918–1921. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Nove, Alec. (1992). An Economic History of the USSR, 1917–1991, 3rd ed. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books. Zaleski, Eugene. (1962). Planning for Economic Growth in the Soviet Union, 1918–1932. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. MARK HARRISON

WAR ECONOMY The German invasion of June 22, 1941, was an event for which the Soviet Union had been preparing for fifteen years. Soviet war preparations were started in the mid-1920s at a time when no immediate threat of war existed. Stalin and other Bolshevik leaders were preoccupied by the fate of the Russian Empire in World War I. Although Russia entered that war with a substantial food surplus, its economy was destabilized by the mobilization of industry; this deprived the countryside of manufactured commodities, and peasant farmers ceased to sell food in exchange. As a result, the towns and military units went increasingly hungry to a point where industry and the army collapsed. Stalin intended to avoid a repetition. Forced industrialization would raise the economy’s capacity for producing weapons, while farm collectivization would prevent the peasants from retreating again into self-sufficiency. Although brutally and wastefully executed, these policies contributed significantly to Soviet resistance when Germany attacked. At first the war went worse than envisaged in the most pessimistic prewar plans. Soviet territory was deeply invaded; the real output of the territory under Soviet control fell by one-third; and the burdens of defense increased both relatively and absolutely. By 1943 three-fifths of Soviet output was devoted to the war effort, the highest proportion observed at the time in any economy that did not subsequently collapse under the strain. A railway evacuation of factories and machinery from the zones threatened by occupation shifted the geographical center of the war economy hundreds of kilometers to the east. The production of weapons rose to a level that exceeded Germany’s throughout the war.

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There was little detailed planning behind this; the important decisions were made in a chaotic, uncoordinated sequence. The civilian economy was neglected and it declined rapidly. By 1942, food, fuels, and metals produced had fallen by half or more. Living standards fell on average by two-fifths while millions were severely overworked and undernourished; however, the state procurement of food from collective farms ensured that industrial workers and soldiers were less likely to starve than peasants. Still the process might have ended in another economic collapse without the stunning victory over the German army at Stalingrad at the end of 1942. This enabled a return to economic planning and a partial restoration of resources to civilian uses. Foreign (mostly American) aid, which added about 5 percent to Soviet resources in 1942 and 10 percent in 1943 and 1944, also relieved the pressure. The war had lasting economic consequences. It took the lives of one in six Soviet citizens living at its outset, and destroyed perhaps one quarter of the Soviet prewar capital stock. Economic and demographic recovery took decades. The success of the war effort also had lasting consequences: It confirmed the authority of Stalin, as well as that of a new generation of wartime industrial and political managers who survived him and remained in power for thirty more years. The success of the war economy was used to discourage critical thinking about basic economic policies and institutions. For example, Stalin claimed that the war demonstrated the superiority of the Soviet system over capitalism for organizing economic life in both wartime and peacetime.

See also:

COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE; STALIN-

GRAD, BATTLE OF; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH; WORLD WAR I; WORLD WAR II BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barber, John, and Harrison, Mark. (1991). The Soviet Home Front: A Social and Economic History of the USSR, 1941–1945. London: Longman. Harrison, Mark. (1996). Accounting for War: Soviet Production, Employment, and the Defence Burden, 1940–1945. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Harrison Mark, ed. (1998). The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Samuelson, Lennart. (2000). Plans for Stalin’s War Machine: Tukhachevskii and Military-Economic Planning, 1925-1941. London: Macmillan.

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Simonov, Nikolai S. (1996). “’Strengthen the Defence of the Land of the Soviets’: The 1927 ‘War Alarm’ and Its Consequences.” Europe-Asia Studies 48(8): 1355–64. MARK HARRISON

See also:

T R E A T Y

ALEXANDER

I;

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AUSTERLITZ,

BATTLE

OF;

NAPOLEON I; TILIST, TREATY OF

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Mackesy, Piers. (1957). The War in the Mediterranean, 1803–1810. London: Longmans, Green. Saul, Norman E. (1970). Russia and the Mediterranean, 1797–1807. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

WAR OF THE THIRD COALITION

NORMAN E. SAUL

One of the Napoleonic wars, the War of the Third Coalition, occurred between 1805 and 1807. Russia first participated in the conflicts arising from France’s efforts to expand its dominance over continental Europe and the Middle East in 1798, in the War of the Second Coalition, along with Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and the Ottoman Empire. Most of the direct Russian involvement was in the Eastern and Northern Mediterranean, with Admiral Fedor Ushakov occupying the Ionian Islands and General Alexander Suvorov campaigning through Italy. Emperor Paul, however, became annoyed with his allies, especially Britain. In 1800 he withdrew and formed an alliance with France, led by Napoleon Bonaparte. This dramatic reversal contributed to a reaction and the assassination of Paul in March 1801. His successor, Alexander I, influenced by proBritish and anti-French advisers such as Adam Czartoryski, signed an alliance with Britain in April 1805. This was the linchpin of a third coalition war against Napoleon that also included Austria, Naples, and Prussia. Russian action again centered on the Mediterranean, with a fleet under Admiral Dmitri Seniavin sent from the Baltic to assure dominance of the Adriatic Sea and curb French expansion into the Balkans, especially at the fortressstronghold of Ragusa (Dubrovnik). Though the British reaffirmed their supremacy over the French at sea at the Battle of Trafalgar (September 1805), poor Russian and Austrian leadership on land in Central Europe led to Napoleon’s decisive victories, especially at Austerlitz in December 1805. Austria was forced to sign a peace treaty, while Russia suffered additional defeats. Finally, at a historic meeting between Napoleon and Alexander I at Tilsit in July 1807, Russia agreed to peace terms that abandoned its Mediterranean positions to Napoleon and joined the French Continental System against Britain, thus leaving all of Europe except Russia under French dominance. Napoleon’s effort to expand that dominance to Russia in 1812 provoked another coalition war that led to his eventual defeat.

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WARSAW, BATTLE OF See

WORLD WAR II.

WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION The Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), also referred to as the Warsaw Pact, was created on May 14, 1955, by Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union. Officially known as the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, it was a Soviet-led political and military alliance intended to harness the potential of Eastern Europe to Soviet military strategy and to consolidate Soviet control of Eastern Europe during the Cold War. The organization was used to suppress dissent in Eastern Europe through military action. It never enlarged beyond its original membership, and was dissolved in 1991, prior to the disintegration of the Soviet Union itself. The Soviet and East European governments presented the WTO as their response to the creation of the Western European Union and the integration of West Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1955. Though often described as an alliance, the facade of collective decision-making in WTO masked the reality of Soviet political and military domination. The 1955 treaty established the Joint Command of the armed forces (Article 5) and the Political Consultative Committee (Article 6), both headquartered in Moscow. In practice, however, the Joint Command, as well as the Joint Staff drawn from the general staffs of the signatories, were part of the Soviet General Staff. Both the Pact’s commander in chief and its chief of staff were Soviet officers. The Joint Armed Forces had no command structure, logistics, directorate of operations, or air defense network separate from the Soviet defense ministry.

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Over the years the military structure of the Warsaw Pact was adjusted to reflect the evolution of Soviet strategy and changes in military technology. During the first decade of the organization’s existence, political control over the non-Soviet forces was its principal focus. Following Stalin’s death, East European militaries were partly renationalized, including the replacement of Soviet officers in high positions with indigenous personnel, and a renewed emphasis on professional training. The Polish October of 1956, and the Hungarian revolt that same year, raised serious concerns in Moscow about the reliability of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces. In the 1960s the lessons learned from deStalinization, as well as Albania’s defection from the Warsaw Pact, brought about greater integration of the WTO through joint military exercises, intensified training, and the introduction of new Soviet equipment. The most significant reorganization of the WTO took place in 1969, including the addition of the Committee of Defense Ministers, the Military Council, the Military Scientific Technical Council, and the Technical Committees. These and subsequent changes allowed increased participation from the East Europeans in decision making, and helped the Soviets better coordinate weapons research, development, and production with the East Europeans. In addition to its external defensive role against NATO, the Warsaw Pact served to maintain cohesion in the Soviet bloc. It was used to justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and again to prepare for an invasion of Poland in 1980 or 1981 if the Polish regime failed to suppress the Solidarity movement. The Warsaw Pact was also an instrument of Soviet policy in the Third World. In the 1970s and 1980s the Soviet Union relied on several non-Soviet WTO members to assist client states in Africa and the Middle East.

hastened the WTO’s demise was the unification of Germany, which constituted an irreparable breach in the Pact’s security perimeter. Under pressure from Eastern Europe, the decision to abolish the military structures of the Pact was taken at a Political Consultative Committee meeting in Budapest in late February 1991; the remaining political structures were formally abolished on July 1, 1991. The overall value of the Warsaw Pact to the Soviet Union during the Cold War remains a point of debate. Clearly, the organization legitimized the continued Soviet garrisoning of Eastern Europe and provided additional layers of political and military control. In addition, the potential contributions of the East European armed forces to Soviet military strategy, as well as the use of the members’ territory, were significant assets. On the other hand, throughout the Warsaw Pact’s existence, the ultimate reliability and cohesion of its non-Soviet members in a putative war against NATO remained in question. In addition, the declining ability of the East Europeans to contribute to equipment modernization, especially as their economies deteriorated in the late 1970s and 1980s, raised doubts about the overall quality of the WTO armed forces.

See also:

COMMUNIST BLOC; NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

ORGANIZATION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Herspring, Dale R. (1998). Requiem for an Army: The Demise of the East German Military. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Johnson, A. Ross; Dean, Robert W.; and Alexiev, Alexander. (1982). East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier. New York: Crane Russak. Jones, Christopher D. (1981). Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact. New York: Praeger Publishers.

The alliance began to unravel with the introduction of Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika in the Soviet Union, and his attendant redefinition of Soviet-East European relations. Though the alliance was renewed in 1985, as required by the treaty, deteriorating economic conditions and the rising national aspirations in Eastern Europe put its future in question. The Soviet military attempted to adjust to the shifting political landscape. In 1987 the WTO modified its doctrine to emphasize its defensive character, but this and other proposed changes proved insufficient to arrest the decomposition of the alliance. The key development that

Michta, Andrew A. (1990). Red Eagle: The Army in Polish Politics, 1944–1988. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.

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Nelson, Daniel N. (1986). Alliance Behavior in the Warsaw Pact. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. The Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact. (2003). . Volgyes, Ivan. (1982). The Political Reliability of the Warsaw Pact Armies: The Southern Tier. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. ANDREW A. MICHTA

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WESTERNIZERS The word Westernizers appeared in Russia at the turn of the eighteenth century as the antonym to Easternizers and was used to denote Russian religious figures who minimized the difference between Catholicism and Orthodoxy. The Orthodox Easternizers interpreted the term West as “sunset,” “decline”; hence for them Westernizers embodied decline and darkness. In the 1840s, in the course of a heated discussion held in the Russian press as well as in St. Petersburg and Moscow literary salons, Russian thinkers discussed the specific character of Russian culture, the interrelation of Russia and Europe, and the further development of Russia—either with Europe or along its own special path. Those who advocated rapprochement between Russia and Western Europe and adoption of the European way of life were called Westernizers. Those who defended a nativist course for Russia’s development were called Slavophiles. These terms born in polemics were widely used in the press, literature, and everyday language of the intelligentsia. They were used for the division of people into allies and opponents. They were also used to mobilize the public under one banner or the other. After the 1860s, the term Westernizers was applied to the representatives of a variety of ideological trends whose pedigree could be traced to the Westernizers of the 1840s. In modern scholarly literature, the term Westernizers is used in both a broad and a narrow sense. In its broad meaning the term denotes all people of a pro-Western orientation, irrespective of historical period, from the ninth century to the present time who, unlike Slavophiles, regard Russia and western European countries as indivisible parts of a united Europe, with common cultural and religious roots and a common destiny. In the narrow sense the term is used to denote Westernizers of the first post-Decembrist generation of the 1830s through the 1860s, and in this case they are called classical Westernizers. Classical Westernizers had European education and largely belonged to the privileged nobility estate and intellectual elite—publicists, literary men, scientists, and university professors. In St. Petersburg of the late 1840s, some of them formed a group known to society as the Party of St. Petersburg Progress, which mainly consisted of young officials.

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The philosophical views of Westernizers were formed under the influence of Western enlighteners and philosophers such as Georg Hegel, Johann Herder, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Schelling, Johann Fichte, and Auguste Comte. As a way of thinking, Westernism was based on the recognition of the leading role of human intellect. Intellect pushed back faith, offering an opportunity to conceive of the world (including the world of social relations) as a system of cause-and-effect relations, governed according to laws common to animate and inanimate nature. The historical views of Westernizers were largely derived from the contemporary western European scholars Henry Buckle, François Guizot, Barthold Niebuhr, Leopold Ranke, and Auguste Thierry. Westernizers perceived historical process as the progress of society, a chain of irreversible qualitative changes from worse to better. They asserted the value of the human being as the carrier of intellect. They opposed individualism to traditional social corporatism (korporativnost) and defined a just society as one that held all the conditions for the existence and selfrealization of the individual. The views of the Westernizers cannot be contained in a single work or document because these views had numerous shades and peculiarities. Some views differed substantially. As early as the 1840s two trends took shape among Westernizers: a radical one (A. I. Gertzen and N. P. Ogarev were its brightest representatives) and a liberal one comprising the overwhelming majority of Westernizers. Representatives of the first trend were not numerous. Some lived as emigrants and justified the use of violence for changing the existing political system. Representatives of the second trend were advocates of peaceful reforms. They advised bringing the pressure of the public opinion upon the government and spreading their views in society through education and science. Despite differences, however, the Westernizers’ sociopolitical, philosophical, and historical views shared common features. They denounced serfdom and put forward plans for its abolition. They demonstrated the advantages of hired over serf labor. They criticized censorship, the absence of legal rights, and persecutions on ethnic and religious grounds. They contrasted the Russian autocratic system with the constitutional orders of western European countries, especially those of England and France. They advocated civil rights, democracy, and representative government. They called for a speedy development of industry, commerce, and railways, and

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supported the replacement of protectionism with a free-trade economic policy. Nevertheless, many Westernizers maintained a critical attitude toward the sociopolitical system of western European countries, which they regarded as a point of reference and not an ideal for blind imitation. During the reign of Nicholas I, when practical political activities outside the frame of official ideology were impossible, Westernism was a purely ideological trend. Under Alexander II, Westernizers seized new opportunities for practical work: They played an active role in the preparation and implementation of the Great Reforms of the 1860s and early 1870s. In the post-reform era, Westernism provided the theoretical basis for the politics of liberalism. It also became the ideology of radical theories, which promoted ideas for changing an unjust society, based on belief in the value of the individual and the inadequacy of the official Orthodox religion. After 1985 Westernism experienced a rebirth in Russian social thought. Polemics between supporters and opponents of Russia’s rapprochement with the West continue to rest on arguments first articulated by the classical Westernizers and Slavophiles.

See also: GREAT REFORMS; INTELLIGENTSIA; SLAVOPHILES; THICK JOURNALS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Edie, James M.; Scanlan, M. P.; and Zeldin, Mary-Barbara, eds. (1965). Russian Philosophy, Vol 1: The Beginnings of Russian Philosophy: The Slavophiles; The Westernizers. Chicago: Quadrangle Books. Roosevelt, Priscilla R. (1986). Apostle of Russian Liberalism: Timofey Granovsky. Newtonville, MA: Oriental Research Partners. Treadgold, Donald. W. (1973). The West in Russia and China: Religious and Secular Thought in Modern Times, Vol. 1: Russia, 1472–1917. New York: Cambridge University Press. Walicki, Andrzej. (1975). The Slavophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-Century Russian Thought, tr. Hilda Andrews-Rusiecka. Oxford: Clarendon. Walicki, Andrzej. (1979). A History of Russian Thought: From the Enlightenment to Marxism, tr. Hilda Andrews-Rusiecka. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE? The question “What Is To Be Done?” crystallized critical issues inherent in the Russian revolutionary movement between 1850 and 1917. Specifically, it defined the focus and direction of the struggle to reform and modernize Russia’s archaic political, economic, and social structure of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, which had subsequently given rise to the Russian autocracy and Russian state. Ultimately, two distinct responses emerged, generated by Nikolai Gavrilovich Chernyshevsky in 1863 and Vladimir Ilich Lenin in 1902. Interestingly, each was titled “What Is To Be Done?” Although the works were separated by forty years, they had much in common. As a proponent of change in pre-industrial, populist Russia, Chernyshevsky accepted the peasant obshchina (commune) as the basis for the new Russia. He believed that the obshchina not only represented a truly democratic (egalitarian) socialist society, but also enabled Russia to avoid the evils of capitalism that existed in European industrial societies. However, Chernyshevsky insisted that revolution, not gradualism, was necessary for the transformation of Russia, and even then it could occur only through the dedicated commitment of revolutionary activists, which he called the new revolutionary archetypes. By 1902 proletarian (Marxian) socialism had replaced agrarian populism within the Russian revolutionary movement. Faced with a declining socialist revolutionary radicalism, Lenin sought its revitalization. Like Chernyshevsky, Lenin favored the overthrow of the tsarist government and rejected the economic gradualism (called economism) of his time. Lenin did more than create a new revolutionary prototype; however, he formulated a new revolutionary catechism (Bolshevism) for conducting the revolution, one that eventually overthrew the tsarist government in 1917.

See also: CHERNYSHEVSKY, NIKOLAI GAVRILOVICH; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH BIBLIOGRAPHY

Tucker, Robert C., ed. (1975). The Lenin Anthology. New York: Norton. Venturi, Franco. (1966). The Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia. New York: Grosset’s Universal Library.

BORIS N. MIRONOV

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WHITE ARMY Within weeks of the October 1917 Revolution, thousands of tsarist officers and supporters of the Provisional Government began armed resistance against the new regime. The Bolsheviks, who saw the anticommunists as more united than they actually were, named these men “White,” a term taken from the reactionary forces during the French Revolution (the communist forces against which the Whites fought were called the Reds). There were, in fact, many disparate White armies, each under its own commander and with its own objectives. They lacked a central authority to coordinate action or policies on the far-flung battlefields of the Civil War. Politically they were just as divided because some White officers were monarchists while others wanted re-establishment of the Provisional Government. In the end the White armies were bound only by a common hatred of the communists and a shared desire to retain the old borders of the Russian Empire. The lack of unity among the White armies was but one of the reasons for their defeat. When they were successful on the battlefield, the Allied powers (Britain, France, and the United States) provided critical military assistance, but as the Whites began to lose, the aid disappeared, consigning the Whites to their fate. The fluid nature of the civil war also meant that the Whites never created permanent institutions. Matters were not helped by the officers’ reluctance to involve themselves in political matters, leaving chaos and banditry to reign in much of their territory. Thus, although it was not deliberate policy, White troops were allowed to commit atrocities during the war, such as pogroms against the Jews who lived in White-occupied lands. None of this endeared Whites to the population. Most devastating for the Whites was a paucity of new solutions to the problems that their country faced and a consequent inability to rally ordinary Russians and other nationalities to their cause. The best known of the White armies were those led by Anton Denikin, Alexander Kolchak, and Nikolai Yudenich. Large Cossack units also fought alongside several of the White armies. One of the first anticommunist forces was the Volunteer Army, commanded first by Mikhail Alekseev and then Lavr Kornilov. When Kornilov was killed in battle, Denikin took command and led an offensive that came within 300 kilometers (186.4 miles) of Moscow. The Red Army, with twice as many men

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and strong cavalry units under Semeon Budenny, stopped him and forced the Volunteer Army into headlong retreat. Denikin resigned and was replaced by Peter Wrangel, whose counteroffensive was also pushed back. The tattered remnants of the Volunteer Army were evacuated from the Crimea in March 1920. Denikin never coordinated his attacks with Kolchak’s forces, which in 1919 made spectacular gains against the Bolsheviks in eastern Russia. Kolchak claimed to represent the legitimate authority of Russia, but when Red units led by Mikhail Tukhachevsky defeated his men (including Siberian and Western armies), his bid to win the recognition of the Allied powers was doomed. Yudenich meanwhile tried and failed to capture Petrograd with his Northern (later “Northwestern”) Army. The collapse of their armies forced most White officers into exile in Germany and Paris, where they would plot their return to Russia for the next seventy years.

See also:

CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; COSSACKS; DENIKIN,

ANTON IVANOVICH; KOLCHAK, ALEXANDER VASILIEVICH; YUDENICH, NIKOLAI NIKOLAYEVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Lincoln, Bruce. (1989). Red Victory. A History of the Russian Civil War. New York: Simon and Schuster. Luckett, Richard. (1971). White Generals. An Account of the White Movement and the Russian Civil War. New York: Viking Press. Mawdsley, Evan. (1987). The Russian Civil War. Boston: Allen & Unwin. Wade, Rex A. (2001). The Bolshevik Revolution and Russian Civil War. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. MARY R. HABECK

WHITE MOVEMENT See

CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922;

WHITE ARMY.

WHITE SEA CANAL The White Sea (Belomor) Canal in Karelia rises from Lake Onega in the south to a maximum of 108 meters (118.1 feet) at Lake Vyg and then descends to the White Sea in the north. The canal, which is 227 kilometers (141.1 miles) long (including thirty-seven artificially constructed waterways, nineteen locks, fifteen dams, and forty-nine dikes),

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was constructed in twenty months (November 1931–July 1933) by more than 100,000 gulag prisoners using local natural resources (rock, peat, dirt, timber), an endless supply of slave labor, and primitive tools (pickaxes, wheelbarrows, shovels, horses, and wooden pulleys). Because the shipping season is limited to six months and the canal is often shallow and narrow, traffic consists mainly of barges and small passenger or cargo vessels. Contemplated since the sixteenth century and constructed under Josef V. Stalin, the canal shortened the journey from Leningrad to Arkhangelsk from twenty days to eight. Originally a secret military project, it was designed to enable northern troops and supply transports and sea access should Leningrad face a Baltic blockade. Economically, the canal was intended to exploit Karelia’s natural resources. Politically, it was a signature forced-labor, large construction project of the first Five-Year Plan. The government promoted the waterway as emblematic of Soviet power and Stalinist ideology, and as exemplifying reforging, the process through which hard labor re-education programs, supervised by the secret police, remade common criminals and political prisoners into model Soviet citizens. Many reforged workers perished during the construction of the canal; the survivors were transferred to the Moscow-Volga Canal project or freed. The White Sea Canal embodies the excesses of Stalinism and immortalizes the thousands who died there.

See also:

FIVE-YEAR PLANS; GULAG

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Baron, Nick. (2001). “Conflict and Complicity: The Expansion of the Karelian Gulag, 1923–1933.” Cahiers du Monde Russe 42:615-648. Ruder, Cynthia A. (1998). Making History for Stalin: The Story of the Belomor Canal. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. CYNTHIA A. RUDER

WINIUS, ANDRIES DIONYSZOON

dochter Vekemans. He married Geertruyd van Rijn in 1628 and had three children: Andreas, Maria, and Matthias. Winius began to trade in Russia in 1627. He was granted a patent (zhalovannaya gramota) for trade in the Russian interior in 1631 and exported 100,000 chetverti of Treasury grain the same year. In 1632 Winius, together with his brother Abraham and his partner Julius Willeken, were authorized to build an iron mill in the Tula district. The partners admitted Peter Marselis and Thomas de Swaen to their company and were given a ten-year monopoly on iron and weapons production. The water-driven Tula works was the first industrial iron producer in Russia. Following a petition, Winius received a new patent in 1634 for trade, with improved conditions, and was appointed gost (privileged merchant). In the same year, Winius moved with his family to Moscow. The Tula partnership appears to have disintegrated by 1638; in 1639 Winius and Marselis, together with Thielman Akkema, became the holders of the charter of privilege. The new arrangement lasted until 1647, by which time a serious conflict arose between Winius and his partners. In 1648 Marselis and Akkema took control of the ironworks. Winius, in contrast, withdrew from iron production altogether. The same year, he petitioned to become a Russian subject. As compensation for his losses in Tula, Winius was granted a monopoly on tar production and trade, which he held between 1649 and 1654. He enjoyed the exclusive right to produce tar in the Northern Dvina and Sukhona valleys. In 1652 Winius and his second wife, Gertrud Meyer (married in 1648), converted to Orthodoxy and became Russian subjects. In 1653 Winius and Ivan Yeremeyev Marsov were dispatched by the tsar to the Netherlands to acquire weapons, munitions, and woollen cloth for uniforms, as well as to hire military officers for service in the Muscovite army. They sold Treasury grain and potash to finance these purchases. Winius returned to Russia in 1654. He served as a diplomatic representative of the Russian government in the Netherlands, Italy, and Germany.

Known in Russia as Andrei Denisovich Vinius, Andries Winius was born in Amsterdam in 1605 and died in Russia in 1662. His parents were Dionysius Tjerckszoon Winius and Maritgen Andries-

Winius’s eldest son Andreas (known as Andrei Andreyevich Vinius) served as an interpreter at the Diplomatic Chancellery as of 1664. He was sent to France, Spain, and England for diplomatic service from 1672 to 1674. He served in the Apothecary Chancellery from 1677 to 1689. He was ennobled

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(1605–1662), merchant and factory owner.

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in 1685 and headed the diplomatic postal service thereafter. Deputy head of the Diplomatic Chancellery from 1689 to 1695, he was appointed Duma Secretary in 1695. He headed the Siberian Chancellery from 1697 to 1703 and the Artillery Chancellery as of 1701, and built iron mills on the Urals. He was dismissed from government service in 1703 for embezzlement and delay in supplying the army. He escaped to the Netherlands in 1706 but, pardoned by Peter I, returned to Russia in 1708. He translated foreign books about military matters and technology and was an important bibliophile and art collector. He died in 1717.

See also:

FOREIGN TRADE; GOSTI; MERCHANTS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Fuhrmann, Joseph T. (1972). The Origins of Capitalism in Russia: Industry and Progress in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Chicago: Quadrangle Books. JARMO T. KOTILAINE

WINTER PALACE The institution of the Winter Palace dates from the first decade of St. Petersburg’s existence, when the first Winter House was constructed for Peter I in 1711. With the transfer of the capital from Moscow in 1712, the winter residence of the tsaremperor acquired the status of a major state building. The next Winter Palace was built on the Neva River embankment in 1716–1719 to a plan by Georg Mattarnovi and was expanded in the 1720s by Domenico Trezzini. In 1732 Bartolomeo Francesco Rastrelli began work at the command of Empress Anna on a third version of the Winter Palace, which was under construction for much of the 1730s. The planning of a new Winter Palace for Empress Elizabeth began in the early 1750s under the direction of Rastrelli, who intended to incorporate the existing third Winter Palace into the design of a still larger structure. However, as work proceeded in 1754, he concluded that the new palace would require not simply an expansion of the old, but would have to be built over its foundations. Construction continued year round despite the severe winters, and the empress—who viewed the palace as a matter of state prestige during the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763)—continued to issue orders for

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its rapid completion. The 859,555 rubles originally allotted for construction of the Winter Palace were to be drawn, in a scheme devised by the courtier Pyotr Shuvalov, from the revenues of state-licensed taverns. (Most of Rastrelli’s army of laborers earned a monthly wage of one ruble.) Cost overruns were chronic, and work was occasionally halted for lack of materials and money at a time when Russia’s resources were strained to the limit by the Seven Years’ War. Ultimately the project cost some 2,500,000 rubles, drawn from alcohol and salt taxes placed on an already burdened population. Elizabeth did not live to see the completion of the palace: She died on December 25, 1761. The main state rooms and imperial apartments were ready the following year for Tsar Peter III and his wife Catherine. The basic plan of the Winter Palace consists of a quadrilateral with an interior courtyard decorated in a manner similar to the outer walls. The exterior facades of the new imperial palace—three of which are turned toward public spaces—were decorated in a late baroque style. On the Neva River facade the palace presents, from a distance, an uninterrupted horizontal sweep of more than 200 meters, while the opposite facade (on Palace Square) is marked in the center by the three arches of the main courtyard entrance—immortalized by the film director Sergei Eisenstein as well as by artists who portrayed, in exaggerated form, the “storming of the Winter Palace.” The facade overlooking the Admiralty is the one area of the structure that contains substantial elements of the third Winter Palace. A strict symmetry reigns over the facades. Two hundred fifty columns segment some seven hundred windows, not including those of the interior court. The palace has three main floors situated over a basement level, and the structure culminates in an elaborate cornice supporting 176 large ornamental vases and allegorical statues. The original stone statuary, corroded by Petersburg’s harsh climate, was replaced in the 1890s by copper figures. The sandy color that Rastrelli intended for the stucco facade has vanished under a series of paints ranging from dull red (applied in the late nineteenth century) to turquoise in the early twenty-first century. The interior of the Winter Palace, with its more than seven hundred rooms, has undergone many changes, and little of Rastrelli’s rococo decoration has survived. Work on the interior continued for several decades, as rooms were changed and

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The Marshals’ Salon displays the ornate decor typical of the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg. THE ART ARCHIVE/BIBLIOTHÈQUE DÉCORATIFS PARIS/DAGLI ORTI. REPRODUCED

DES

ARTS

BY PERMISSION.

refitted to suit the tastes of Catherine the Great and her successors. Still more damaging was the 1837 palace fire that burned unchecked for more than two days and destroyed the interior. During the reconstruction most of the rooms were decorated in eclectic styles of the mid-nineteenth century or restored to the neoclassical style used by Rastrelli’s successors in decorating the palace, such as Giacomo Quarenghi. Only the main, or Jordan, staircase and the corridor leading to it (the Rastrelli Gallery) were restored by Vasily Stasov in a manner close to Rastrelli’s original design. Yet the Winter Palace remains associated above all with the

name of Rastrelli, the creator of this baroque masterpiece.

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In 1918 the Winter Palace and its art collection were nationalized, and in 1922 most of the building became part of the State Hermitage Museum. Substantial restoration work was interrupted by the outbreak of war, during which the museum staff performed heroically. The State Hermitage Museum reopened in 1945, and since that time the former Winter Palace has become the object of scrupulous preservation efforts devoted to one of the world’s greatest museums.

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See also:

ELIZABETH; FRENCH INFLUENCE IN RUSSIA; MU-

SEUM, HERMITAGE; RASTRELLI, BARTOLOMEO; ST. PETERSBURG BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brumfield, William Craft. (1993). A History of Russian Architecture. New York: Cambridge University Press. Orloff, Alexander, and Shvidkovsky, Dmitri. (1996). St. Petersburg: Architecture of the Tsars. New York: Abbeville Press. WILLIAM CRAFT BRUMFIELD

WITCHCRAFT Russian witchcraft is best seen as a remnant of East Slavic, pre-Christian, pagan practices, elements of which survived into modern times. The earliest written record that mentions witchcraft dates to 1024 and appears in a chronicle describing the execution of sorcerers in Suzdal. Literary sources continued to speak of sorcery in later centuries and, in most cases, were connected to allegations of witchcraft causing inclement weather, droughts, crop failure, and other phenomena that resulted in famine and pestilence. During the Kievan era (roughly 900 to 1240) the most common form of popular (extralegal) witch trial appears to have been ordeal by cold water and execution by burning at the stake. As early as the second half of the eleventh century, however, Rus princes granted the Church official authority over witchcraft trials. Contrary to the Byzantine canonical practice of executing suspected witches, the Rus princes established relatively nominal monetary penalties for practicing sorcery. Despite this, unofficial persecutions of sorcerers continued to take place on occasion. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Muscovy saw a marked increase in the preoccupation with witchcraft. With the 1551 Stoglav Council headed by Ivan IV (1533–1584), the Muscovite government and church took an active interest in battling witchcraft. The council recommended that the state impose the death penalty for sorcerers, and that the church excommunicate such offenders. Ivan IV’s Decree of 1552, while disregarding the recommendation of imposing the death penalty, transferred witch trials to state jurisdiction, thereby transforming witchcraft into a civil offence. This formed the background for the use of allegations of criminal witchcraft for political purposes. Dur-

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ing the reign of Ivan IV, and more so through the subsequent Time of Troubles, the Muscovite ruling elite invoked charges of witchcraft to persecute their political enemies, both at court and outside of Moscow. Witchcraft trials saw their heyday during the seventeenth century, when the death penalty came to be systematically applied to the guilty. However, the Muscovite witch hunts were much smaller in scale than those that were occurring in contemporary communities of Western Europe. Although the tsars sent directives to the provinces to fight sorcery until 1682, the orders were not systematic and organized, nor were the persecutions. This, in large part, is because of the deep-rooted dvoeverie (dualfaith, the holding of conflicting belief systems) among most Russians, including the ruling elite, who had ambivalent views toward remnants of pagan practices. Also, unlike in the West, where much of the “witch craze” was directed against women, the Muscovite “witch scare” charged a proportional number of men (warlocks) with sorcery. This was probably connected to the occupation of the accused—unlike in the West, Muscovy men often acted as herbalists and village healers, which were professions commonly associated with witchcraft. During the reign of Catherine II (1762–1796), the death penalty for witchcraft was abolished and the crime lowered to the level of fraud. In 1775 she transferred cases dealing with witchcraft to courts handling such affairs as popular superstition, juvenile crimes, and the criminally insane. Sorcery, however, persisted among the East Slavic peasants into the nineteenth century, in large part because of their continued use of charms, spells, potions, and herbs in folk medicine.

See also:

IVAN IV; KIEVAN RUS; TIME OF TROUBLES

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Zguta, Russell. (1977). “Witchcraft Trials in Seventeenth-Century Russia.” The American Historical Review 82(5):1187–1207. Zguta, Russell. (1978). “Witchcraft and Medicine in PrePetrine Russia.” The Russian Review 37(4):438–448. ROMAN K. KOVALEV

WITTE, SERGEI YULIEVICH (1849–1915), minister of communication (1892); minister of finance (1892–1903); chairman of the

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thropic Society. Here he became a friend to Mikhail Katkov, an influential right-wing journalist. Witte also published feuilletons under a pen name. In 1881 and 1882 he participated in the pro-monarchist secret aristocratic society Svyataya Druzhina (The Holy Retinue) organized on Witte’s advice by his uncle General Rostislav Fadeyev, a well-known military historian and publicist of Slavophile views. In 1882 the society was liquidated.

Sergei Witte, a gifted Russian statesman, drafted the 1905 October Manifesto. THE ART ARCHIVE/MUSÉE DES 2 GUERRES MONDIALES PARIS/DAGLI ORTI

In 1887 Witte was appointed director of the Railway Department of the Ministry of Finance. In 1892 he advanced to the post of minister for railways and then to minister of finance. Witte soon became the most influential minister in the government, and his ministry the center of the entire state government. Witte proved to be an outstanding politician, capable of getting his bearings in the most complicated situations, designing longterm programs, and then carrying them out effectively. Soon Witte gave up his Slavophile views and turned into a modernizer of the European type. He sought to accelerate the industrial development of Russia with the aid of state support and foreign capital. He contended that Russia would catch up with advanced Western countries industrially within a decade and would secure a strong position for Russian manufactured goods in the markets of the Near, Middle, and Far East.

In the 1870s Witte fell under the sway of Slavophile ideas. He took a great interest in the theological writings of Alexei Khomyakov and participated in activities of the Odessa Slavic Philan-

The program of industrialization, “the Witte system,” as he called it, included (1) intensive railway building; (2) protectionism and state subsidies for private entrepreneurs; and (3) a great influx of foreign capital to industry, banks, and state loans. Never before in Russia had state economic intervention been used so widely and effectively. The state acted by purely economic means through the state bank and institutions of the Ministry of Finance, which monitored the activities of joint-stock commercial banks. In order to penetrate the markets of China, Mongolia, Korea, and Persia, the Ministry of Finance founded the Russo-Chinese, Russo-Korean, and Loan and Discount Banks. Witte’s program achieved the desired results. In the period from 1892 to 1902, state finances were strengthened, foreign investment capital poured in (over 3 billion rubles or 1.544 billion dollars), and a stable monetary system was formed. The highest rates of economic development in Europe were attained (from 1883 to 1904 the volume of industrial output increased 2.7 times, or 6% per year). The annual growth rate of the national income averaged nearly 3.5 percent. The intensive economic development of Russia was accompanied by the improvement of the living stan-

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Committee of Ministers (1903–1905); prime minister (1905–1906); responsible for program of industrialization and political reforms. Sergei Witte descended from russified Lutheran Germans on his father’s side and from Russian nobility on his mother’s side. He was born in Tbilisi. In 1865 he finished a Tbilisi gymnasium and in 1870 graduated from the Department of Physics and Mathematics at Novorossysk University (Odessa). He dreamt of an academic career, but on his relatives’ insistence he entered the state service on the Odessa Railway. In 1877 Witte moved to the privately owned Society of Southwestern Railways and there made a brilliant career, soon becoming its manager. In 1883 he published a book The Principles of Railway Tariffs for the Transportation of Goods, which earned him renown as a railway expert.

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dards of the broad masses of the population, as data on the increase in the height of recruits testify. After setting industry on its feet and ensuring its self-development, Witte planned to carry through an agrarian reform. His attempts, however, met fierce resistance of conservatives. He was able only to simplify passport rules and abolish the rules on shared responsibility for taxes and other obligations laid on the peasants. The other aspects of the agrarian program designed by Witte were later introduced by his successor, Petr Stolypin. Although Witte was transferred to the less influential post of Chairman of the Committee of Ministers in August 1903, the deteriorating political situation in the country, caused by Russian defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, and the insistence of public opinion brought him back to active service in the summer of 1904. Witte led the Russian delegation that concluded peace with Japan in the Treaty of Portsmouth. He then participated in preparing the October Manifesto of 1905, in which the emperor granted civil freedom. Witte took the post of prime minister in the new government and ran political affairs in a European style. He paid attention to public opinion, regarded the Russian and foreign presses as representative of public opinion, and exerted influence upon the public through the press. His government introduced the political rights granted by the October Manifesto, worked to appease the population and win it over to the government’s side, curbed punitive excesses and pogroms, and conducted the elections to the Duma. Witte’s activities, however, received criticism from all sides. The emperor viewed him as a rival in influence and popularity. The wealthy were disappointed in the Duma elections, whose results proved unfavorable for them. Revolutionaries cursed Witte for his repressive measures. Liberals censured him for his defense of the monarchical prerogatives in the Basic Laws and his other concessions to rightists. Conservatives were dissatisfied with Witte’s participation in the demolition of the old political system and transition to a new one. After Witte had concluded the Portsmouth Peace Treaty with Japan, brought troops from the Far East back to European Russia, restored public order in the country, prepared the Basic Laws, organized elections to the Duma, and secured a big loan in Europe (843.75 million rubles or 434.16 million dollars) that brought stability to government finances, he was forced to resign. Until his final days Witte hoped to return to power. In order not to be forgotten, he used all

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means available to him: the rostrum of the State Council, the press, intrigues, and connections in the West. Witte died in 1915 at the age of 66, his health undermined by hard work and forebodings. He opposed Russia’s participation in World War I and predicted grave consequences similar to the upheavals that occurred after the Russo-Japanese War.

See also:

ECONOMY, IMPERIAL; INDUSTRIALIZATION; OC-

TOBER MANIFESTO; PORTSMOUTH, TREATY OF; RAILWAYS; TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Gindin, I. F. (1972). “Russia’s Industrialization under Capitalism as Seen by Theodore von Laue.” Soviet Studies in History 11(1):3-55. Gurko, Vladimir Iosifovich. (1939). Features and Figures of the Past: Government and Opinion in the Reign of Nicholas II. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Judge, Edward. (1983). Plehve: Repression and Reform in Imperial Russia, 1902–1904. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Kokovtsov, Vladimir Nikolaevich. (1935). Out of My Past: The Memoirs of Count Kokovtsov, Russian Minister of Finance, 1904–1914, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, 1911–1914, ed. H. H. Fisher; tr. Laura Matveev. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Laue, Theodore von. (1963). Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia. New York: Columbia University Press. Mehlinger, Howard, and Thompson, John. (1972). Count Witte and the Tsarist Government in the 1905 Revolution. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Weissman, Neil B. (1981). Reform in Tsarist Russia: The State Bureaucracy and Local Government, 1900–1914. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Weissman, Neil B. (1987). “Witte, Sergei Iul’evich.” The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History 44:9–14. Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press. Witte, Sergei. (1921). The Memoirs of Count Witte, tr. Abraham Yarmolinsky. London: Heinemann. BORIS N. MIRONOV

WOMEN OF RUSSIA BLOC Women of Russia (Zhenshchiny Rossii, or ZhR) was formed as a political movement on the eve of the 1993 Duma elections. It contained the Union of Russia’s Women (formerly the Committee of

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Soviet Women), Association of Russia’s Women Entrepreneurs, and the Union of Women of the Navy. The movement was headed by Alevtina Fedulova, leader of the Union of Women; Yekaterina Lakhova, adviser to Boris Yeltsin on matters of family, childbearing, and children; and the popular actress Natalia Gundareva, and received 4.4 million votes (8.1%, or fourth place) and twentyone Duma seats in 1993. The success was due to the amorphousness of the political scene, where the lack of parties and transience of elections made a good flag sufficient. In the Duma, the ZhR faction, which was called the first of its kind in the history of world parliamentism, basically supported the government and did not distinguish itself in any way. At the beginning of the 1995 campaign, ZhR was regarded as a potential participant in a broad left-centrist coalition, but it chose to enter independently. In the end it did not attain the 5 percent threshold required to merit proportional representation, winning 3.2 million votes (4.6%, fifth place); three candidates, including Lakhova, were elected in single-mandate districts. At the time, incidentally, most electoral associations included their women candidates in the top three places on the lists. In 1997, Lakhova, leaving ZhR, founded her own Sociopolitical Movement of Russia’s Women (OPDZh). In the beginning of the 1999 campaign, both Fedulova of ZhR and Lakhova of OPDZh entered Yuri Luzhkov’s Fatherland, then the bloc Fatherland-All Russia (OVR). After Lakhova was included in the central part of the OVR list, and Fedulova was not, ZhR announced its departure from the bloc, with the explanation that OVR, in assembling its list, had demonstrated its traditional, conservative approach to women’s role in society. The ZhR results (2.0%, eighth place) were much lower than expected, partly because “women” diverged: some stayed in the OVR; in addition, ZhR had a double, the Russian Party for the Defense of Women (0.8%). Moreover, social problematics fundamental to ZhR were actively exploited by more powerful electoral associations: the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) and OVR. On the threshold of the 2003 elections, a paradoxical situation arose, when Fedulova’s virtual ZhR, having met for the last time in an all-Russian conference in the summer of 1999, and not having shown a sign of existence since that time, gathered 4 to 7 percent support in a social referendum. Lakhova’s OPDZh, having dissolved into United Russia, tried to resurface politically, entering the April 2003 elections with the somewhat vague bill

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See also:

CONSTITUTION OF 1993; FATHERLAND-ALL RUS-

SIA; FEMINISM

BIBLIOGRAPHY

McFaul, Michael. (2001). Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. McFaul, Michael, and Markov, Sergei. (1993). The Troubled Birth of Russian Democracy: Parties, Personalities, and Programs. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. McFaul, Michael, and Petrov, Nikolai, eds. (1995). Previewing Russia’s 1995 Parliamentary Elections. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Reddaway, Peter, and Glinski, Dmitri. (2001). The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms: Market Bolshevism against Democracry. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press. Remington, Thomas. (2002). Politics in Russia, 2nd ed. New York: Longman. NIKOLAI PETROV

WOMEN’S DEPARTMENT See

ZHENOTDEL.

WORKERS In the general sense of the term, there have of course been workers present since the dawn of Russian history, including slave laborers and serfs. Viewed more narrowly to mean persons employed in industry and paid a wage, however, workers became important to the Russian economy only in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, especially during the reign of Peter the Great (1682–1725), who placed a high priority on Russia’s industrial development. But even under Peter most workers employed in manufacturing and mining were unfree labor, forced to toil long hours either in privately owned enterprises or in factories owned by the government. The continued coexistence of free and forced labor at a time when forced labor, except for convicts, had virtually vanished from the European scene was a noteworthy and notorious characteristic of Russian society until as late as 1861, when serfdom was abolished and almost all labor was placed on a contractual footing.

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With the abolition of serfdom, Russia began a new spurt of industrial development. In the 1890s Russian industry expanded rapidly, growing at an average rate of 8 percent per annum. The number of industrial workers, if viewed as a percentage of the overall population, was still small by the end of that decade; according to the 1897 census, the Empire’s population was over 125 million, while the number of workers was roughly two million. However, their social and political importance became increasingly evident, in part because of their concentration in politically sensitive areas such as St. Petersburg (the capital), Moscow, the port city of Baku, and the industrial regions of Russian-occupied Poland. The most dramatic manifestation of the workers’ importance was their participation in strikes and demonstrations. If strike is loosely understood as any work stoppage in defiance of management, then strikes certainly took place in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but they began to be taken seriously by Russian officials, publicists, and political activists only in the 1870s and especially the 1890s. By the early twentieth century a fierce and sometimes agonizing competition had begun between radicals of various persuasions (Social-Democrats, Socialist Revolutionaries, etc.), liberals, religious organizations, and the government for working-class political support. In the 1905 Revolution, radicals emerged as the clear winners in this competition, though with no single faction dominating. At least in major urban industrial centers, workers played the leading role in the revolutionary struggles of that year. Their moment of greatest triumph came with the October general strike and the creation of citywide workers’ councils (soviets), one of which virtually became the governing body of the city of St. Petersburg. However, the bloody suppression of the armed uprising of Moscow workers in December 1905 marked the end of the workers’ triumphant period. Although labor unrest continued in 1906, workers ceased to pose a serious threat to the Russian government until the labor movement revived in the period between 1912 and 1914. Nevertheless, the 1905 Revolution did bear some fruit for Russia’s workers, including the government’s recognition for the first time of their right to form unions and engage in strikes (albeit within very tight restrictions) and the right to elect their own delegates to the new Russian Parliament, the Duma (albeit under a very restricted franchise). Russian industry soon began to recover from the

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setbacks it had undergone in the first few years of the century, and by 1910 was again experiencing a robust expansion. As the position of workers in the labor market became more favorable, workers grew less and less tolerant of management misconduct and government repression. A government massacre of Russian goldminers in the spring of 1912 resuscitated the dormant labor movement and ushered in a two-year period of militant strike activity and demonstrations in many parts of Russia, most dramatically in St. Petersburg and, in 1914, Baku. Politically, this worker militancy worked to the tactical advantage of the Bolsheviks and, to a lesser extent, the Socialist Revolutionaries, while working to the disadvantage of the more moderate Mensheviks, who feared that workers’ passions had been aroused to a degree that could prove counterproductive. Some historians have argued that Russian industrial centers were on the cusp of a new revolution when the onset of World War I, in the summer of 1914, put a temporary damper on worker unrest. However, it must also be acknowledged that the labor movement was dying down before war was declared. Be that as it may, once the war began to go badly for Russia, there were growing signs of a revival of the labor movement, especially in 1916. By late February 1917, St. Petersburg workers (women textile workers as well as the traditionally militant, mainly male, metal and munitions workers) were joining with other elements of the urban population, including the military garrison, in increasingly confrontational demonstrations. Workers now played a prominent role in the overthrow of the tsarist regime and, in cooperation with the radical intelligentsia and their party activists, resurrected an updated version of the soviets of 1905, this time with the crucial participation of soldiers. Over the next few months, worker militancy in the form of strikes, street demonstrations, factory occupations, and participation in the organizations of the revolutionary parties added enormously to the difficulties of the new Provisional Government, which was simply unable to satisfy worker demands under wartime conditions. Hence when the Bolsheviks succeeded in overthrowing the Provisional Government in October 1917 and dispersing the recently elected Constituent Assembly the following January, they would do so with a great deal of working-class support, though this support was not for Bolshevik single-party rule but for a soviet government consisting of a coalition of left parties and supportive of worker democracy within the factory. The ensuing Civil War of 1917–1921

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was a period of bloodshed, hunger, and, eventually, draconian measures such as the militarization of labor and the introduction of strict one-man management, inflicted by a relentless Bolshevik regime on recalcitrant workers. Though indispensable to the Reds in their struggle against the Whites in these years of civil war, workers emerged from the war demoralized and, in many cases, thanks to the damage suffered by Russian industry, declassed. Workers now ceased to be a significant independent force in the country’s political life.

See also:

CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; FEBRUARY REVOLU-

TION; LABOR; OCTOBER GENERAL STRIKE OF 1905; OCTOBER REVOLUTION; REVOLUTION OF 1905; SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY; UNION OF STRUGGLE FOR THE EMANCIPATION OF LABOR

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bonnell, Victoria E. (1983). Roots of Rebellion: Workers’ Politics and Organizations in St. Petersburg and Moscow, 1900–14. Berkeley: University of California Press. Haimson, Leopold H. (1964-1965). “The Problem of Social Stability in Urban Russia, 1905–1917.” Slavic Review 23 (4): 619–642; 24(1):1–22. Johnson, Robert E. (1979). Peasant and Proletarian: The Working Class of Moscow in the Late Nineteenth Century. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Wildman, Allan K. (1967). The Making of a Workers’ Revolution: Russian Social Democracy, 1891–1903. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Zelnik, Reginald E. (1971). Labor and Society in Tsarist Russia: The Factory Workers of St. Petersburg, 1855–1870. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Zelnik, Reginald E., ed. and tr. (1986). A Radical Worker in Tsarist Russia: The Autobiography of Semen Ivanovich Kanatchikov. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Zelnik, Reginald E., ed. (1999). Workers and Intelligentsia in Late Imperial Russia: Realities, Representations, Reflections. Research Series, no. 101. Berkeley: International and Area Studies, University of California. REGINALD E. ZELNIK

cialism. The program called for the proletariat to seize and operate the capitalists’ factories and to plan and manage production and distribution throughout Russian industry. The concept had its roots in nineteenth-century European socialism and especially in the syndicalist movement, which espoused economic units organized and run by workers. Immediately after the February 1917 Revolution, demands for workers’ control began to spread among activist workers in large enterprises. The slogan attracted growing support in the summer and fall of 1917 as economic conditions worsened, real wages fell, and some factories closed, while workers were locked out of other plants. Several Bolshevik leaders espoused workers’ control as early as April 1917, and Lenin, recognizing the slogan’s broad appeal, adopted it as part of the Bolshevik platform in June, encouraging its use in Bolshevik propaganda. In August, September, and October 1917, workers seized some factories, and more were taken over after the Bolsheviks came to power. But faced with shortages of basic supplies, chaotic markets, labor absenteeism, and inadequate technical and managerial know-how, proletarian owners had little success in getting factories back into production. Lenin soon soured on the practice of workers’ control, and beginning in early 1918 he started centralizing economic decision-making. He also called for unitary or one-man management (edinonachalie) in industries and individual enterprises as well as use of bourgeois specialists—former engineers, technicians, and managers—to help operate the factories and reenergize the economy. Although workers’ control was largely dropped, a faction within the Bolshevik party known as the Workers’ Opposition campaigned unsuccessfully during 1919 and 1920 for trade unions to have a greater role in running the Soviet economy.

See also: EDINONACHALIE; FEBRUARY REVOLUTION; WORKERS’ OPPOSITION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

WORKERS’ CONTROL

Smith, Stephen A. (1983). Red Petrograd: Revolution in the Factories, 1917–1918. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The slogan “workers’ control,” popular among radical Russian workers during the 1917 Revolution and the early years of Bolshevik rule, designated a program that was supposed to lead directly to so-

Wade, Rex. (2000). The Russian Revolution, 1917. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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WORKERS’ OPPOSITION The Workers’ Opposition (Rabochaya oppozitsia) was a group of trade union leaders and industrial administrators within the Russian Communist Party who opposed party leaders’ policy on workers and industry from 1919 to 1921. The group formed in the fall of 1919, when its leader, Alexander Shlyapnikov, called for trade unions to assume leadership of the highest party and state organs. Leading members of the Metalworkers’ Union supported Shlyapnikov, who criticized the growing bureaucratization of the Communist Party and Soviet government, which he feared would stifle worker initiative. The Workers’ Opposition advocated management of the economy by a hierarchy of elected worker assemblies, organized according to branches of the economy (metalworking, textiles, mining, etc.). Shlyapnikov, the chairman of the All-Russian Metalworkers’ Union, was the most prominent leader of the Workers’ Opposition. Thirty-eight individuals signed the theses of the Workers’ Opposition in December 1920. Most of them had been metalworkers; they represented the Metalworkers’ Union, Miners’ Union, and the leading organs of heavy industry. Alexandra Kollontai advised the Workers’ Opposition and was a spokesperson for it. She wrote a pamphlet about the group (Rabochaya oppozitsia), which circulated among delegates to the Tenth Communist Party Congress in 1921. Leaders of the Opposition used the resources and organizations of major trade unions (metalworkers, miners, textile workers) to mobilize support. Many meetings were arranged by personal letter or word of mouth. Metalworkers or former metalworkers composed the membership, all of whom were also Communists. The Workers’ Opposition drew attention to a divide between Soviet industrial workers and the Communist Party, which claimed to rule in the name of the working class. Party leaders feared that the Workers’ Opposition would inspire opponents of the regime. At the Tenth Party Congress in March 1921, the party banned the Workers’ Opposition.

See also:

CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; KOLLONTAI, ALEXAN-

DRA MIKHAILOVNA; SHLYAPNIKOV, ALEXANDER GAVRILOVICH

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Holmes, Larry E. (1990). For the Revolution Redeemed: The Workers Opposition in the Bolshevik Party, 1919–1921 (Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, no. 802). Pittsburgh, PA : University of Pittsburgh Center for Russian and East European Studies. Kollontai, Alexandra. (1971). The Workers Opposition in Russia. London: Solidarity. BARBARA ALLEN

WORKERS’ AND PEASANTS’ INSPECTORATE See RABKRIN.

WORLD REVOLUTION When Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels implored workers of the world to unite, they announced a new vision of international politics: world socialist revolution. Although central to Marxist thought, the importance of world revolution evoked little debate until World War I. It was Vladimir Lenin who revitalized it, made it central to Bolshevik political theory, and provided an institutional base for it. Although other Marxists, such as Nikolai Bukharin and Rosa Luxemburg, devoted serious attention to it, Lenin’s ideas had the most profound impact because they persuasively linked an analysis of imperialism with the struggle for world socialist revolution. In Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (1916), Lenin argued that modern war was due to conflicts among imperialist powers and that any revolution within the imperialist world would weaken capitalism and hasten socialist revolution. The contradictions of capitalism and imperialism provided the soil that nourished world revolution. In the fall of 1917, when Lenin cajoled his comrades to seize power, he argued that the Russian Revolution was “one of the links in a chain of socialist revolutions” in Europe. He believed in the imminence of such revolutions, which he deemed essential to the Bolshevik revolution’s survival and success. His optimism was not unfounded, as revolutionary unrest engulfed Central and Eastern Europe in 1918–1920. In 1919 Lenin helped to create the Communist International (Comintern) to guide the world revolution. As the revolutionary wave waned in the 1920s, Stalin claimed that world revolution was not essential to the USSR’s survival. Rather, he argued,

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developing socialism in one country (the USSR) was essential to keeping the world revolutionary movement alive. Other Bolshevik leaders, notably Leon Trotsky, disagreed, but in vain. Nonetheless, until it adopted the Popular Front policy in 1935, the Comintern pursued tactics for world revolution. Unlike previous Comintern policies, which sought to spark revolution, the Popular Front was a defensive policy designed to stem the rise of fascism. It marked the end of Soviet efforts to foment world socialist revolution.

ognizing that mobilization meant war, he refused to order a general call-up that would force a German response. Then Vienna declared war on Serbia, Nicholas’s own efforts to negotiate with Kaiser William II collapsed, and on July 30 he finally approved a general mobilization. When St. Petersburg ignored Berlin’s demand for its cancellation within twelve hours, Germany declared war on August 1. Over the next three days Germany invaded Luxembourg, declared war on France on August 4, and by entering Belgium, added Britain to its enemies.

See also:

THE WAR OF MOVEMENT:

LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH

SUMMER 1914–APRIL 1915 BIBLIOGRAPHY

McDermott, Kevin, and Agnew, Jeremy. (1997). The Comintern: A History of International Communism from Lenin to Stalin. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Nation, R. Craig. (1989). War on War: Lenin, the Zimmerwald Left, and the Origins of Communist Internationalism. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. WILLIAM J. CHASE

WORLD WAR I Imperial Russia entered World War I in the summer of 1914 along with allies England and France. It remained at war with Germany, Austria, Hungary, Italy, and Turkey until the war effort collapsed during the revolutions of 1917. In 1914 military theory taught that new technologies meant that future wars would be short, decided by initial, offensive battles waged by mass conscript armies on the frontiers. Trapped between two enemies, Germany planned to defeat France in the west before Russia, with its still sparse railway net, could mobilize. Using French loans to build up that net, Russia sought to speed up the process, rapidly invade East Prussia, and so relieve pressure on the French. Berlin therefore feared giving Russia a head start in mobilizing and, rightly or wrongly, most statesmen accepted that if mobilization began, war was inevitable.

Some Social Democrats aside, Russia’s educated public rallied in a Sacred Union behind their ruler. Strikes and political debate ended, and on August 2, crowds in St. Petersburg cheered Nicholas II after he signed a declaration of war on Germany. Local problems apart, the mobilization proceeded apace as 3,115,000 reservists and 800,000 militiamen joined the 1,423,000-man army to provide troops for Russian offensives into Austrian Galicia and, as promised, France and East Prussia. Although Nicholas II intended to command his troops in person, he was pressured into appointing instead his uncle, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich the Younger. Whatever its merits, this decision split the front administratively from the rear thanks to a new law that assigned the army control of the front zone. This caused few problems when the battle line moved forward in 1914 and early 1915. However, without the tsar as a civil-military lynchpin, it led to chaos during the later Great Retreat.

On June 28, 1914, a nationalist Serbian student shot Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, at Sarajevo. To most statesmen’s surprise, this provoked a crisis when Austria, determined to punish the Serbs, issued an unacceptable ultimatum on July 23. Over the next six days, pressure mounted on Nicholas II but, rec-

The Grand Duke established his skeleton Stavka (Supreme Commander-in-Chief’s General Headquarters) at Baranovichi to provide strategic direction to the Galician and East Prussian offensives. These were to open on August 18-19 under the direct supervision of the separate operational headquarters of the Northwest and Southwest Fronts. Yet on August 6 Austria-Hungary declared war and on the next day invaded Russian Poland. This forestalled the Southwest Front (Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Armies, with 52% of Russia’s strength) and it opened its own Galician offensive on August 18. Despite early enemy successes, the Front’s armies trounced the Austrians and captured the Galician capital of Lvov (Lemberg) on September 3. A week later the Russians won decisively at Rava Ruska, and by September 12 they had foiled an Austrian attempt to retake Lvov. By September

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16 they had besieged the major fortress of Przemysl and reached the San River. Resuming their offensive, they then pushed another 100 miles to the Carpathian passes into Hungary. Over seventeen days the Austrians lost 100,000 dead, 220,000 wounded, 100,000 prisoners, and 216 guns, or one-third of their effective strength. The Northwest Front (First and Second Armies, with 33% of Russia’s forces) was less successful. Ordered forward to aid the desperate French on August 13, Pavel Rennenkampf’s First Army advanced slowly into East Prussia, was checked at Stalluponen, then defeated the Germans at Gumbinnen on August 20, and turned against Konigsberg. To the south, Alexander Samsonov’s Second Army occupied Neidenburg on August 22, and all East Prussia seemed open to the Russians. But by August 23, when the new German commander Paul von Hindenburg arrived with Erich von Ludendorff as chief of staff, General Max von Hoffmann had implemented plans to defeat the Russians piecemeal. Accordingly, on August 23–24 the Germans checked Samsonov and, learning his deployments through radio intercepts, withdrew to concentrate on Tannenberg. When the Second Army again advanced on August 26, it was trapped, virtually surrounded, and then crushed. Samsonov shot himself, and by August 30 the Germans claimed more than 100,000 prisoners. This forced Rennenkampf’s withdrawal, and during September 9–14, he too suffered defeat in the First Battle of the Mansurian Lakes. Despite German claims of a second Tannenberg and 125,000 prisoners, the First Army escaped and lost only 30,000 prisoners, as well as 70,000 dead and wounded. The Germans then advanced to the Niemen River before the front stabilized in mid-September. Again alerted by radio intercepts, they forestalled a Russian thrust at Silesia by a spoiling attack on September 30. Counterattacking in Galicia, the Austrians then cleared the Carpathian approaches and relieved Przemysl before being halted on the San in mid-October. The Russians, repulsing a secondary attack in the north, finally held the Germans before Warsaw. As the latter withdrew, devastating the countryside, the Russians again drove the Austrians back to Kracow and reinvested Przemysl. This set the pattern for months of seesaw fighting all along the front. In the north, despite German use of poison gas in January 1915, the Russian Tenth Army withstood the bloody Winter Battles of Mansuria and held firm until April. In the south, by Decem-

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ber they again were deep into the Carpathians, threatening Hungary, and holding positions 30 miles from Kracow. When relief efforts failed, Przemysl finally fell (with 117,000 men) in March 1915, leaving the Russians free to force the Carpathians. Meanwhile, on October 29–30, 1914, two German-Turkish cruisers had raided Russia’s Black Sea coast. On declaring war, the tsar set up an autonomous Caucasian Front in which the talented chief of staff Nikolai Yudenich exercised real command. As he prepared the Caucasian Army to meet a Turkish invasion, the Turkish Sultan-Khalifa’s call for jihad (holy war) fueled pro-Turkish uprisings in the borderlands. Then on December 17 Enver Pasha launched his Third Army, still in summer uniforms, on a crusade to recover lands ceded to Russia in 1878. By December 25 the Russians were fully engaged in the confused battles known as the Sarykamysh Operation. In twelve days of bitter winter combat Yudenich’s troops, despite heavy losses, decisively crushed the Turks, and in January 1915 they invaded Ottoman Turkey. During this period, the Russians held their own against three enemies in two separate war zones and showed that they had capable generals by routing two enemies and fighting a third, the Germans, to a draw. For most, the heavy losses at Tannenberg and other locations were overshadowed by the stunning victories elsewhere. Like other combatants, Russia was slow to recognize that it faced a long war, but it had avoided the trench warfare that gripped the French front. Yet Grand Duke Nikolai already had complained of shell shortages in September 1914. The government responded by reorganizing the Main Artillery Administration, and a special chief assumed responsibility for completely guaranteeing the army’s needs for arms and munitions by both state and private production. If this promise was illusory, and other ad hoc agencies proved equally ineffective, for the moment the Russian command remained confident of victory.

THE GREAT RETREAT: MAY–SEPTEMBER 1915

On May 2 the seesaw struggle in the East ended when the Austro-Germans, after a four-hour “hurricane of fire,” broke through the shallow Russian trenches at Gorlice-Tarnow. This local success quickly sparked the disastrous Great Retreat. As the Galician armies fell back, a secondary German strike in the north endangered the whole Russian

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The Russian 10th Army, February 1915. Fighting in heavy snow, one Russian corps is defeated at Masuria while the others stood firm until April. © SEF/ART RESOURCE, NY

front. Hampered by increasing munitions shortages, rumors of spies and treason, a panicked Stavka’s ineffective leadership, administrative chaos, and masses of fleeing refugees, the Russians soon lost their earlier conquests. Despite Italy’s intervention on the Allied side, Austro-German offensives continued unabated, and in midsummer the Russians evacuated Warsaw to give up Russian Poland. Some units could still fight, but their successes were local, and overall, the tsar’s armies seemed overwhelmed by the general disaster. The only bright spot was the Caucasus, where Yudenich advanced

to aid the Armenians at Van and held his own against the Turks.

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The munitions shortages, both real and exaggerated, forced a full industrial mobilization that by August was directed by a Special Conference for Defense and subordinate conferences for transport, fuel, provisioning, and refugees. Their creation necessitated the State Duma’s recall, which provided a platform for the opposition deputies who united as the Progressive Bloc. Seeking to control the conferences, these Duma liberals renewed attacks on the regime and demanded a Government of Public

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Russian soldiers lie in wait ahead of their final assault on the Turkish stronghold Erzurum, April 1916. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

Confidence (i.e., responsible to the Duma). Yet by autumn Nicholas II had weathered the storm, assumed the Supreme Command to reunite front and rear, and prorogued the Duma. As the German offensives petered out, the front stabilized, and a frustrated opposition regrouped. With the nonofficial voluntary societies and new War Industries Committees, it now launched its campaign against the Dark Forces whom it blamed for its recent defeats.

RUSSIA’S RECOVERY: AUTUMN 1915–FEBRUARY 1917

In early December 1915, Stavka delegates met the allies at Chantilly, near Paris, to coordinate their 1916 offensives. Allied doubts about Russian capabilities were somewhat allayed by a local assault on the Strypa River and operations in support of Britain in Persia. Still more impressive was Yudenich’s renewed offensive in the Caucasus. He opened a major operation in Armenia in January 1916, and on February 16 his men stormed the strategic fortress of Erzurum. Retreating, the Turks abandoned Mush, and by July, the Russians had captured Erzingan. V. P. Lyakhov’s Coastal Detachment, supported by the Black Sea Fleet, also advanced and on April 17–18, in a model combined-

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arms operation, captured the main Turkish supply port of Trebizond. In autumn 1916 the Russians entered eastern Anatolia and Turkish resistance seemed on the verge of collapse. Assuming the mauled Russians would be inactive in 1916, Germany opened the bloody battle for Verdun on February 21. Yet increased supplies had permitted a Russian recovery, and on March 18, Stavka answered French appeals with a twopronged attack on German positions at Vishnevskoye and Lake Naroch, south of Dvinsk. Two days of heavy shelling opened two weeks of mass infantry assaults over ice, snow, and mud. The Germans held, and the Russians lost heavily but, whatever its impact on Verdun, this battle showed that trench (or position) warfare had arrived in the East. And like generals elsewhere, Russia’s seemed convinced that only a single, concentrated infantry assault, preceded by heavy bombardments, and backed by cavalry to exploit a breakthrough, could end the deadlock. Some saw matters differently. One was Yudenich, who repeatedly smashed the Turks’ German-built trench lines. Others included Alexei Brusilov and his generals on the Southwest Front. Like Yudenich, they devised new operational and

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tactical methods that gained surprise by avoiding massed reserves and cavalry, and by delivering a number of simultaneous, carefully prepared infantry assaults, at several points along an extended front, with little or no artillery preparation. Despite Stavka’s doubts, Brusilov won permission to attack in order to tie down the enemy forces in Galicia. When Italy, pressed by Austria in the Trentino, appealed for aid, Brusilov struck on June 4, eleven days before schedule. With no significant artillery support, his troops achieved full surprise on a 200-mile front, smashed the Austrian lines, and advanced up to eighty miles in some sectors. On June 8 they recaptured Lutsk before fighting along the Strypa. Again the Germans rushed up reserves to save their disorganized ally and, after their counterattack of June 16, the line stabilized along that river. In the north, Stavka’s main attack then opened before Baranovichi to coincide with Britain’s Somme offensive of July 1. But it relied on the old methods and collapsed a week later. The same was true of Brusilov’s new attacks on Kovno, which formally ended on August 13. Even so, heavy fighting continued along the Stokhod until September. Brusilov had lost some 500,000 men, but he had cost the Austro-Germans 1.5 million in dead, wounded, and prisoners, as well as 582 guns. Yet his successes were quickly balanced by defeats elsewhere. Russia had encouraged Romania to enter the war on August 27 and invade Hungarian Transylvania, after which Romania was crushed. By January 1917 Romania had lost its capital, retreated to the Sereth River, and forced Stavka to open a Romanian Front that extended its line 300 miles. This left the Russians spread more thinly and the Central Powers in control of Romania’s important wheat and oil regions. Yet the Allied planners meeting at Chantilly on November 15-16 were optimistic and argued that simultaneous offensives, preceded by local attacks, would bring victory in 1917. Stavka began implementing these decisions by the Mitau Operation in early January 1917. Without artillery support, the Russians advanced in fog, achieved complete surprise, seized the German trenches, and took 8,000 prisoners in five days. If a German counterstrike soon recovered much of the lost ground, the Imperial Army’s last offensive shows that it had absorbed Brusilov’s methods and could defeat Germans as well as Austrians.

rifle production was up by 1,100 percent and shells by 2,000 percent, and in October 1917 the Bolsheviks inherited shell reserves of 18 million. Similar increases occurred in most other areas, while the numbers of men called up in 1916 fell and, by December 31, had numbered only 3,048,000 (for a total of 14,648,000 since August 1914). Yet their quality had declined, war weariness and unrest were rising, and, in late June 1916, the mobilization for rear work of some 400,000 earlier exempted Muslim tribesmen in Turkestan provoked a major rebellion. By 1917 a harsh winter, military demands, and rapid wartime industrial expansion had combined to overload the transport system, which exacerbated the tensions brought by inflation, urban overcrowding, and food, fuel, and other shortages. Despite recent military and industrial successes, Russia’s nonofficial public was surprisingly pessimistic. If war-weariness was natural, this mood also reflected the political opposition’s propaganda. Determined to gain control of the ministry, the liberals rejected all of Nicholas II’s efforts at accommodation. As rumors of treason and a separate peace proliferated, the opposition dubbed each new minister a candidate of the dark forces and creature of the hated Empress and Rasputin, whose own claims gave credence to the rumors. This “assault on the autocracy,” as George Katkov describes it, gathered momentum when the Duma reopened on November 14. Liberal leader Paul Milyukov’s rhetorical charges of stupidity or treason were seconded by two right-wing nationalists and longtime government supporters. The authorities banned these seditious speeches’ publication, but the opposition illegally spread them throughout the army, and some even tried to suborn the high command. The clamor continued until the Duma adjourned for Christmas on December 30, when a group of monarchists murdered Rasputin to save the regime. Yet the liberal public remained unmoved and its press warned that “the dark forces remain as they were.” REVOLUTION AND COLLAPSE: FEBRUARY 1917–FEBRUARY 1918

By this date Russia had mobilized industrially with the economy expanding, not collapsing, under wartime pressures. Compared to 1914, by 1917

Russia therefore entered 1917 as a house divided, the dangers of which became evident as a new round of winter shortages, sporadic urban strikes and food riots, and military mutinies set the stage for trouble. On February 27 the Duma reconvened with renewed calls for the removal of “incompetent” ministers, and 80,000 Petrograd workers went on strike. But the tsar, having hosted an In-

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Russian troops land at Salonika, Greece, to fight Bulgarian forces. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS

ter-Allied Conference in Petrograd, returned to Stavka confident that his officials could cope. Events now moved rapidly. On March 8, police clashed with demonstrators protesting food shortages on International Women’s Day. Over the next two days protests spread, antiwar slogans appeared, strikes shut down the city, the Cossacks refused to fire upon protestors, and the strikers set up the Petrograd Soviet (Council). When Nicholas II ordered the garrison to restore order, its aged reservists at first obeyed. But on March 12 they mutinied and joined the rebels. The tsar’s ministers were helpless before two new emergent authorities: a Provisional Committee of the State Duma (the prorogued Duma meeting unofficially) and the Petrograd Soviet. This list now included soldier deputies, and on March 14 the Petrograd Soviet issued its famous Order No. 1. This extended its power through the

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soldiers’ committees elected in every unit in the garrison, and in time in the whole army. For the moment, the Soviet supported a newly formed Provisional Government headed by Prince Georgy Lvov. When Nicholas tried to return to personally restore order, his train was diverted to the Northwest Front’s headquarters in Pskov. There he accepted his generals’ advice and on March 15 abdicated for himself and his son. His brother, Grand Duke Mikhail, followed suit, the Romanov dynasty ended, and the Imperial Army became that of a de facto Russian republic. At first both the new government and soviets supported the war effort, and the army’s command structure remained intact. Plans for the spring offensive continued, although the changing political situation forced its delay. By April antiwar agitation was rising, discipline weakening, and Stavka was demanding an immediate offensive to restore

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the army’s fighting spirit. Hopes for success rose when Brusilov was named commander-in-chief, and a charismatic radical lawyer, Alexander Kerensky, War and Naval Minister. Finally, on July 1, the Southwest Front’s four armies, using Brusilov’s tactics, opened Russia’s last offensive. Initially successful, it collapsed after only three days, and the Russians again retreated. In two weeks they lost most of Galicia and more than 58,000 officers and men, while a pro-Bolshevik uprising in the capital (the July Days) threatened the government. Kerensky survived the crisis to become premier, while Lavr Kornilov, who advocated harsh measures to restore order, replaced Brusilov. The Bolshevik leaders were now imprisoned, underground, or in exile in Finland, but their antiwar message won further soldier-converts on all fronts. The Germans tested their own Brusilov-like tactics by capturing Riga during September 1–6, but otherwise remained passive as the revolutionary virus did its work. Riga’s fall revealed Russia’s inability to fight even defensively and helped provoke the muchdebated Kornilov Affair. When Stavka ordered units to disperse the Petrograd Soviet, Kerensky (whatever his initial intentions) branded Kornilov a traitor and used the left to foil this Bonapartist adventure. Bolshevik influence now made the officers’ position impossible. Desertion was massive, and units on all fronts dissolved. After Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky took power on November 7, the army became so disorganized that a party of Baltic sailors easily seized Stavka and murdered General Nikolai Dukhonin, the last real commander-in-chief. The army no longer existed as an effective fighting force and, with peace talks underway at Brest-Litovsk, the so-called demobilization congress of December sanctioned the harsh reality. In February 1918 the army’s remnants mounted only token resistance when the Austro-Germans attacked and, despite desperate attempts to create a Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, forced the Soviet government to accept the diktat (dictated or imposed peace) of Brest-Litovsk on March 3. CONCLUSION

Western accounts of Russia’s war are dominated by the Tannenberg defeat of 1914, the Great Retreat of 1915, and the debacle of 1917. Yet the Imperial Army’s record compares favorably with those of its allies and its German opponent, and

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surpassed those of Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey. Despite many real problems, the same is true of efforts to organize the war economy. But the regime’s failures were exaggerated, and its successes often obscured, by a domestic political struggle that undercut the war effort and helped bring the final collapse.

See also:

BREST-LITOVSK PEACE; JULY DAYS OF 1917;

KERENSKY, ALEXANDER FYODOROVICH, KORNILOV AFFAIR; NICHOLAS II; STAVKA; TANNENBERG, BATTLE OF; YUDENICH, NIKOLAI NIKOLAYEVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allen, W. E. D., and Muratoff, Paul. (1953). Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828–1921. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Brusilov, Aleksei A. (1930). A Soldier’s Note-Book, 1914–1918. London: Macmillan. Florinsky, Michael T. (1931). The End of the Russian Empire. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Gatrell, Peter. (1986). The Tsarist Economy, 1850–1917. London: Batsford. Golder, Frank A. [1927] (1964). Documents of Russian History, 1914–1917. New York: Appleton-Century; reprint, Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith. Golovin, Nicholas N. (1931). The Russian Army in the World War. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Heenan, Louise Erwin. (1987). Russian Democracy’s Fatal Blunder: The Summer Offensive of 1917. New York. Praeger. Jones, David R. (1988). “Imperial Russia’s Forces at War.” In Military Effectiveness, 3 vols., ed. A. R. Millet and W. Murray. London: Allen and Unwin. Jones, David R. (2002). “The Imperial Army in World War I, 1914–1917.” In The Military History of Tsarist Russia, ed. F.W. Hagan and R. Higham. New York: Palgrave. Katkov, George. (1967). Russia 1917: The February Revolution. London: Longmans. Kerensky, Alexander F. (1967). Russia and History’s Turning Point. New York: Duell, Sloane and Pearce. Knox, Alfred W. F. (1921). With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 2 vols. London: Hutchinson. Lincoln, Bruce W. (1986). Passage Through Armageddon: The Russians in War and Revolution, 1914–1918. New York: Simon and Schuster. Pares, Bernard. (1939). The Fall of the Russian Monarchy. New York: Knopf. Showalter, Dennis E. (1991). Tannenberg: Clash of Empires. Hamden, CT: Archon.

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Siegelbaum, Lewis H. (1983). The Politics of Industrial Mobilization in Russia, 1914–17: A Study of the War Industries Committees. London: Macmillan. Stone, Norman. (1975). The Eastern Front, 1914–1917. New York: Scribner’s Sons. Wildman, Allan K. (1980, 1987). The End of the Russian Imperial Army, 2 vols. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. DAVID R. JONES

WORLD WAR II World War II began in the Far East where Japan, having invaded China in 1931, became involved in full-scale hostilities in 1937. In Europe the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, brought Britain and France into the war two days later. Italy declared war on Britain on June 10, 1940, shortly before the French surrender on June 21. Having defeated France but not Britain, Germany attacked the Soviet Union a year later on June 22, 1941. Then the Japanese attacked United States naval forces in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and British colonies in Hong Kong and Malaya the following day. The subsequent German and Italian declarations of war on the United States completed the lineup: Germany, Italy, and Japan, the Axis powers of the Anti-Comintern Treaty of 1936, against the Allies: the United States of America, the British Empire and Dominions, and the Soviet Union. Only the Soviet Union and Japan remained at peace with each other until the Soviet declaration of war on August 8, 1945, two days after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. The pattern of the war resembled a tidal flow. Until the end of 1942 the armies and navies of the Axis continually extended their power through Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. Toward the end of 1942 the tide turned. The Allies won decisive victories in each theater: the Americans over the Japanese fleet at Midway and over the Japanese army on the island of Guadalcanal; the British over the German army in North Africa at el Alamein; and the Soviet army over the German army at Stalingrad. From 1943 onward the tide reversed, and the powers of the Axis shrank continually. Italy surrendered to an Anglo-American invasion on September 3, 1943; Germany to the Anglo-American forces on May 7, 1945, and to the Red Army the following day; and Japan to the Americans on September 7, 1945. The war was over.

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EVENTS LEADING TO THE WAR

Why did the Soviet Union become entangled in this war? German preparations for an invasion of the Soviet Union began in 1940, following the French surrender, for three reasons. First, the German leader Adolf Hitler believed that the presence of the Red Army to his rear was the main reason that Britain, isolated since the fall of France, had not come to terms. He expected that a knockout blow in the east would finish the war in the west. Second, if the war in the west continued, Hitler believed that Britain would use its naval superiority to blockade Germany; he planned to ensure Germany’s food and oil supplies by means of overland expansion to the east. Third, Hitler had become entangled in the west only because of his aggression against Poland, but Poland was also a means to an end: a gateway to Ukraine and Russia where he sought Germany’s “living space.” Thus an immediate attack on the Soviet Union promised to overcome all the obstacles barring his way in foreign affairs. At the same time the Soviet Union was not a passive victim of the war. Soviet preparations for a coming war began in the 1920s. They were stepped up following the war scare of 1927, which strengthened Josef Stalin’s determination to accelerate military and industrial modernization. At this stage Soviet leaders understood that an immediate war was unlikely. They did not fear Germany— which was still a democracy and a relatively friendly power—but Poland, Finland, France, or Japan. They feared for the relatively distant future, and this is one reason why Soviet rearmament, although determined, was slow at first; they understood that the first task was to build a Soviet industrial base. In the early 1930s Stalin became sharply aware of new real threats from Japan under military rule in the Far East and from Germany under the Nazis in the west. In the years that followed he gave growing economic priority to the needs of external security. However, for much of the decade Stalin was much more concerned with domestic threats; he believed his external opponents to be working against him by plotting secretly with his internal enemies rather than openly by conventional military and diplomatic means. In 1937–1938 he directed a savage purge of the Red Army general staff and officer corps that gravely weakened the armed forces in which he was simultaneously investing billions of rubles. The same purges damaged his own credibility on the world stage; as a result those

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countries with which he shared common interests became less likely to see him as a worthy ally, and his external enemies became more likely to attack him. Stalin therefore approached World War II with several deadly enemies, few friends in foreign capitals, and an army that was growing and well equipped but morally broken. Conflict between the Soviet Union and Japan was different from conflict with Germany. Japan first: From their base in north China in May 1939,

the Japanese armed forces began a series of probing border attacks on the Soviet Union that culminated in August with fierce fighting and a decisive victory for the Red Army at Khalkin-Gol (Nomonhan). After that, deterred from encroaching further on Soviet territory, the Japanese shifted their attention to the softer targets represented by British and Dutch colonial possessions in southeast Asia. In April 1941 the USSR and Japan concluded a treaty of neutrality that lasted until August 1945;

Map shows Operation Barbarossa and subsequent Nazi advances into the USSR, late 1941. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

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Soviet tanks roll into action to repel the Nazi invasion of June 22, 1941. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS

it lasted because, while Japan was fighting America and the Soviet Union was fighting Germany, neither wanted war on a second front. In contrast to Japan, Germany was too near and too powerful for the Soviet Union to be able to deter single-handedly. Stalin’s difficulty was that he lacked willing partners. Therefore, when Hitler unexpectedly offered the hand of friendship in the summer of 1939 Stalin accepted it. The result was the notorious nonaggression pact of August 23, 1939, that secretly delineated the Soviet and German spheres of influence in eastern Europe, giving western Poland to Hitler and eastern Poland and the Baltic to Stalin. Germany was to move first. When Germany did so, Britain and France entered the war. For nearly two years Stalin stood aloof from the war in the west, exploiting the conditions created by the pact with Hitler. He traded with Germany while still preparing for war. The preparations were costly and extensive. The Red Army continued to rearm and recruit. Stalin annexed Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and the northern part of

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Romania, and moved his defensive lines toward the new western frontier with Greater Germany. Attacking Finland he won a few kilometers of extra territory with which to defend Leningrad at a cost of nearly 400,000 casualties, one-third of them dead or missing. The utility of these preparations appeared doubtful. The communities living in the Soviet Union’s new buffer zone were embittered by the imposition of Soviet rule; when war broke out the territory passed almost immediately into the hands of the invader. Moreover, Stalin believed these preparations to be more effective than his enemy did. He thought he had postponed war several years into the future just as Hitler was accelerating forward plans to end the peace with a surprise attack. Stalin’s true intentions, had he successfully put off a German attack in 1941, are still debated. Some have read his speeches and the plans of his generals as indicating that he envisaged launching an aggressive war on Germany; beyond that lay a future in which a defeated Germany and an exhausted Britain would leave it open to him to dominate the whole continent. Some of Hitler’s generals pro-

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moted this idea after the war in order to justify themselves. While Stalin’s generals sometimes entertained the idea of a preemptive strike, and Soviet military doctrine supported attack as the best means of defense, the Russian archives have demonstrated clearly that Stalin’s main concern was to head off Hitler’s colonial ambitions on Soviet territory; he had no plans to conquer Europe himself. At all events it is clear that Hitler caught Stalin and the Red Army by surprise. Stalin’s culpability for this has been much debated. His view of Hitler’s intentions was strongly held and incorrect, and he did not permit those around him to challenge it. Still, it is worth recalling that democratic leaders could also be taken by surprise. For example, U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt, though not a brutal dictator, was surprised by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. COURSE OF THE WAR

Barbarossa, the German operation to destroy the Red Army and seize most of the European part of Russia, began on June 22, 1941. For the next three years Hitler committed no less than 90 percent of his ground forces to the campaign that followed. German troops quickly occupied the Baltic region, Belarus, Ukraine, now incorporating eastern Poland, and a substantial territory in Russia. Millions of Soviet soldiers were surrounded. By the end of September, having advanced more than a thousand kilometers on a front more than a thousand kilometers wide, the invaders had captured Kiev, established a stranglehold around Leningrad, and stood at the gates of Moscow. The Germans advanced rapidly but suffered unexpectedly heavy casualties and equipment losses to chaotic and disorganized Red Army resistance. They were met with a policy of scorched earth: The Soviet authorities removed or destroyed industrial facilities, food stocks, and essential services before the occupiers arrived. German supply lines were stretched to breaking point. In the autumn of 1941 Stalin rallied his people by appealing to Russian nationalism and imposing harsh discipline. Soviet resistance denied Hitler his chance of a quick victory at the cost of hideous casualties. Moscow was saved, and Leningrad did not surrender. In December Stalin ordered the first strategic Soviet counteroffensive. It was too ambitious and only achieved a few of its goals, but for the first time the Germans were

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caught off balance and had to retreat. There followed a year of inconclusive moves and countermoves on each side, but the new German successes appeared more striking. In the spring and summer of 1942 German forces advanced hundreds of kilometers further across the south of Russia towards Stalingrad and the Caucasian oil fields. Then, at the end of the year, these forces were largely destroyed in the Red Army’s defense of Stalingrad and its winter counteroffensive. After Stalingrad the position of the German forces in the south became untenable, and they were compelled to retreat. In the summer of 1943, Hitler staged his last strategic offensive in the east on the Kursk salient; the offensive failed and was answered by a more devastating Soviet counteroffensive. The German Army could no longer hope to force a stalemate, and its eventual defeat became certain. Even so, the liberation of Soviet territory from German occupation took an additional eighteen months. The German army did not collapse in defeat. As a result, the Red Army’s journey from Kursk to Berlin occupied two years of bloody fighting. THE ALLIANCE

The German invasion not only turned friends into enemies but also enemies into friends. In July 1941 the British signed a pact with the Soviet Union for mutual assistance. In September President Roosevelt authorized the supply of aid to the Soviet Union under the terms of the Lend-Lease Act. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December, the United States joined the war against Germany and the three countries formed an alliance that laid the foundation for the United Nations. The Alliance was held together by a common interest in the defeat of the Axis powers. Moreover, the Soviet resistance to Hitler electrified world opinion, nowhere more than in the Allied countries. The courage of the Soviet people in the face of suffering aroused respect and admiration. Much of this was focused on the figure of Stalin, who thereby gained an extraordinary political advantage. Behind the scenes the Alliance was fraught with tension. This was for two reasons. One was the division of labor that quickly emerged among the Allies: The richer countries supplied economic aid to the Soviet Union, which did most of the fighting. It could not be done more efficiently in any other way. Still, not all Russians felt grateful, and Stalin repeatedly demanded that the British and Ameri-

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Winston Churchill, Harry Truman, and Josef Stalin confer at the 1945 Potsdam Conference. © SNARK RESOURCE/ART RESOURCE

cans open a second front to draw off the German ground forces to the west. This did not happen until the Allied invasion of France in June 1944. The other source of tension was a difference in conceptions of the postwar world. The Americans sought a liberalized global economy without empires, while Stalin wanted secure frontiers and a wide sphere of influence across eastern Europe. The British wanted to defend their own empire but were also committed to an independent postwar Poland, their reason for entering the war in 1939. Anxieties increased as it became clear that Stalin intended eastern Europe generally, and Poland in particular, to become subservient to Soviet interests after the war. THE WAR EFFORT

The outbreak of war in 1941 brutally exposed Stalin’s miscalculations. Although badly shocked,

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he was not paralyzed. Among his first measures he created a Chief Headquarters, the Stavka, and began to evacuate the armor steel rolling mills on the Black Sea coast. While ordering ceaseless, often futile counterattacks, he also authorized the establishment of a broader framework for the evacuation of people and assets from the frontline regions. On June 28 his nerve gave way, and he gave in briefly to depression. On the afternoon of June 30, other leaders came to urge him to form a war cabinet, and he pulled himself together. The result was the State Defense Committee (GKO). The progress of the war forced Stalin to change his style of leadership. At first he closely involved himself in the detail of military operations, requiring the Red Army to attack continually and ordering vengeful punishments on all who authorized or advocated retreat. He executed several generals. Communications with the front were so poor that a degree of chaos was inevitable, but on a number

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of occasions Stalin prevented large forces from extricating themselves from encirclement and capture. Evidently he came to recognize this style as counterproductive, because he eventually drew back from micromanaging the battlefield. He gave his generals greater freedom to decide operational details and speak their minds on strategy, although he retained unquestioned authority where he chose to exert it. This led to more effective decision making and, combined with the growing experience and confidence of his officers, laid the foundations of later victories.

personally but more generally to Soviet institutions. The bureaucratic allocation system did not collapse, and planners went on churning out factory plans and coordinating supplies, but these soon became irrelevant. On the supply side, many important military-industrial centers were lost, and the capacities they represented existed only on paper. On the demand side, army requirements to replace early losses with new supplies of soldiers and equipment were far greater than the plans. For some time the gap between real needs and real resources could not be bridged.

Soviet victory in World War II is often cited as the justification for Stalin’s prewar policies of industrialization and rearmament. From a comparative standpoint the success of the Soviet war effort is nonetheless surprising. Why did the Soviet Union not simply fall apart under massive attack, as Russia had done under rather less pressure in World War I? As industrial production was diverted to the war effort, farmers withdrew from the market. Food remained in the countryside, while the war workers and soldiers went hungry. The burdens of war were not distributed fairly among the population, and this undermined the Russian war effort both materially and psychologically. In World War II the Soviet Union was still relatively poor. Other poor countries such as Italy and Japan also fell apart as soon as the Allies seriously attacked them. Italy and Japan were relatively reliant on foreign trade and thus vulnerable to blockade. The Soviet Union depended on getting food from tens of millions of low-productivity farm workers to feed its armies and industries; this supply could easily have failed under wartime pressures.

The first phases of mobilization were carried out in an uncontrolled way, and this proved very costly. Munitions production soared, but the production of steel, fuel, and other basic industrial goods collapsed. In 1942 an economic crisis resulted not just from the successful German offensives but also from uncontrolled mobilization in 1941. The heart of the war economy now lay in the remote interior, where many defense factories had been relocated from the west and south. But these regions were unprepared for crash industrialization: They lacked transport, power, sources of metals and components, an administrative and commercial infrastructure, and housing and food for the new workforce. Without these there was no basis for a sustained war effort.

Stalin and his subordinates did not allow the Soviet government and economy to disintegrate. The Soviet institutional capacity for integration and coordination matched that of much more developed economies. As a result, despite still being relatively poor, the USSR was able to commit a significant share of national resources to the war effort. After a wobbly start, war production soared. Food was procured and rationed effectively: Enough was allocated to soldiers and defense workers to permit sustained effort in disastrous circumstances. There was not enough to go around, and millions starved, but morale did not collapse in the way that had destroyed the tsarist monarchy. Thus collective agriculture, although a disaster in peacetime, proved effective in war.

After 1942 several factors allowed the situation to ease. Soviet victory at Stalingrad changed the military balance and the growing Allied air offensive against Germany from the west also helped to draw German resources away from the eastern front. More resources also relaxed the pressure: These came from the recovery of output from its post-invasion trough, the completed relocation of defense industry, and greater pooling of Allied resources through economic aid. It is estimated that in 1943 and 1944 the U.S. Lend-Lease program contributed roughly 10 percent of the total resources available to the Soviet economy. From the soviet consumer’s point of view, 1943 appears to have been even worse than 1942, but in 1944 and 1945 there were marked improvements.

Things nearly went the other way. The outbreak of war was a huge shock not only to Stalin

In the most dangerous periods of the war, Soviet society was held together by a combination of individual voluntarism, national feeling, and brutal discipline. There were crucial moments when the army wavered. In August 1941 and July 1942, Stalin issued notorious orders that stigmatized those who allowed themselves to be taken prisoner as traitors, penalized their families, and ordered the summary execution of all who retreated without

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Steel-helmeted German soldiers play drums as they march through the streets of Riga, Latvia. © HULTON ARCHIVE

orders. By these barbarous methods, order in the armed forces was restored. In the civilian economy minor offenses involving absence from work as well as unauthorized quitting were ruthlessly pursued, resulting in hundreds of thousands of criminal cases each year; those convicted were sent to prison or labor camps. Food crimes involving abuse of the rationing system were severely punished, not infrequently by shooting. Spreading defeatist rumors was punished in the same way, even if it was the truth. It is not so much that everyone who supported the war effort was terrorized into doing so; rather, such measures made it much easier for individuals to choose the path of collective solidarity and individual heroism. The barbarity of German occupation policies also contributed to this outcome.

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WAR LOSSES

The Soviet experience of warfare was very different from that of its Allies, Britain and the United States. Large in territory and population, the Soviet Union was poorer than the other two by a wide margin in productivity and income. It was Soviet territory that Hitler wanted for his empire, and the Soviet Union was the only one of the three to be invaded. Despite this, the Soviet Union mobilized its resources and contributed combat forces and equipment to Allied fighting power far beyond its relative economic strength. These same factors meant that the Soviet Union suffered far heavier costs and losses than its Allies. After victory, Hitler planned to resettle Ukraine and European Russia with Germans and

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Women farmers line the road to greet Red Army soldiers riding atop a captured Nazi tank, October 31, 1943. ASSOCIATED PRESS. REPRODUCED

BY PERMISSION.

to divert their food supplies to feeding the German army. He planned to deprive the urban population of food and drive much of the rural population off the land. Jews and communist officials would be killed and the rest starved into forced migration to the east. The Soviet Union suffered roughly 25 million war deaths compared with 350,000 war deaths in Britain and 300,000 in the United States; many war deaths were not recorded at the time and must be estimated statistically after the event. Combat losses account for all U.S. and most British casualties; the German bombing of British cities made up the rest. The sources of Soviet mortality were more varied. Red Army records suggest 6.4 million known military deaths from battlefield causes and half a million more from disease and accidents. In addition,

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4.6 million soldiers were captured, missing, or killed or presumed missing in units that failed to report. Of these approximately 2.8 million were later repatriated or reenlisted, suggesting 1.8 million deaths in captivity and a net total of 8.7 million Red Army deaths. But the number of Soviet prisoners and deaths in captivity may be understated by more than a million. German records show a total of 5.8 million prisoners, of whom 3.3 million had died by May 1944; most of these were starved, worked, or shot to death. Considering the second half of 1941 alone, Soviet records show 2.3 million soldiers missing or captured, while in the same period the Germans counted 3.3 million prisoners, of whom 2 million had died by February 1942. Subtracting up to 10 million Red Army war deaths from a 25-million total suggests at least 15

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million civilian deaths. Thus many more Soviet civilians died than soldiers, and this is another contrast with the British and American experience. Soviet sources have estimated 11.5 million civilian war deaths under German rule, 7.4 million in the occupied territories by killing, hunger, and disease, and another 2.2 million in Germany where they were deported as forced laborers. This leaves room for millions of civilian war deaths on territory under Soviet control, primarily from malnutrition and overwork; of these, one million may have died in Leningrad alone. In wartime specifically Soviet mechanisms of premature death continued to operate. For example, Soviet citizens continued to die from the conditions in labor camps; these became particularly lethal in 1942 and 1943 when a 20 percent annual death rate killed half a million inmates in two years. In 1943 and 1944 a new cause of death arose: The deportation and internal exile under harsh conditions of ethnic groups such as the Chechens who, Stalin believed, had collaborated as a community with the former German occupiers. The war also imposed severe material losses on the Soviet economy. The destruction included 6 million buildings that previously housed 25 million people, 31,850 industrial establishments, and 167,000 schools, colleges, hospitals, and public libraries. Officially these losses were estimated at one-third of the Soviet Union’s prewar wealth; being that only one in eight people died, it follows that wealth was destroyed at a higher rate than people. Thus, those who survived were also impoverished.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR

The war had a greater effect on the external position of the Soviet Union than on its internal organization and structure. The Soviet Union became a dominant regional power and quickly thereafter an atomic superpower. The wartime alliance soon fell apart, but the Soviet Union soon replaced it with a network of compliant neighboring states in central and eastern Europe and remodeled them in its own image. This set the stage for the Cold War. In the process the popular sympathy in the west for the Soviet Union’s wartime struggle quickly dissipated. Within the country, the victory of the wartime alliance gave rise to widespread hopes for political relaxation and an opening outward but these hopes

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were soon dashed. Living conditions remained extremely tough. Millions were homeless; it was just as hard to restore peacetime production as it had been to convert to a war footing; and the pressure to restore food supplies on top of a bad harvest led to one million or more famine deaths in Ukraine and Moldavia in 1946. In addition, Stalin used the victory not to concede reforms but to strengthen his personal dictatorship, promote nationalism, and mount new purges although with less publicity than before the war. After an initial phase of demobilization, the nuclear arms race and the outbreak of a new conventional war in Korea resulted in resumed growth of military expenditures and revived emphasis on the readiness for war. Not until the death of Stalin did the first signs of real relaxation appear. After the famine of 1946 the Soviet economy restored prewar levels of production of most commodities with surprising speed. It took much longer, possibly several decades, to return to the path that the economy might have followed without a war. It also took decades for the Soviet population to return to demographic balance; in 1959 women born between 1904 and 1924 outnumbered men of the same generation by three to two, despite the fact that women also fought and starved. One of the most persistent legacies of the war resulted from the wartime evacuation of industry. After the war, despite some reverse evacuation, the war economy of the interior was kept in existence. Weapons factories in the remote interior, adapted to the new technologies of nuclear weapons and aerospace, were developed into closed, self-sufficient company towns forming giant, vertically integrated systems; they were literally taken off the map so that their very existence became a well kept secret. Thus, secretiveness and militarization were taken hand in hand to new levels. It is easier to describe the Soviet Union after the war than to say what would have happened if the war had gone the other way. World War II was a defining event in world history that engulfed the lives of nearly two billion people, but the eastern front affected the outcome of the war to a much greater extent than is commonly remembered in western culture and historical writing.

See also:

COLD WAR; LEND LEASE; MILITARY, SOVIET AND

POST-SOVIET; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH; WAR ECONOMY; WORLD WAR I; YALTA CONFERENCE

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barber, John, and Harrison, Mark. (1991). The Soviet Home Front: A Social and Economic History of the USSR in World War II. London: Longman. Erickson, John. (1962). The Soviet High Command: A Military-Political History, 1918–1941. London: Macmillan. Erickson, John. (1975). Stalin’s War with Germany, vol. 1: The Road to Stalingrad. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. Erickson, John. (1983). Stalin’s War with Germany, vol. 2: The Road to Berlin. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

and the Road to War, 1933–1941. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan. Roberts, Geoffrey. (2000). Victory at Stalingrad: The Battle That Changed History. London: Longman. Salisbury, Harrison. (1969). The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad. London: Pan. Suvorov, Viktor [Vladimir Rezun]. (1990). Ice-Breaker: Who Started the Second World War? London: Hamish Hamilton. Urlanis, B. Ts. (1971). Wars and Population. Moscow: Progress. Volkogonov, Dmitri. (1991). Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson.

Erickson, John. (1997). “Red Army Battlefield Performance, 1941–1945: The System and the Soldier.” In Time to Kill: The Soldier’s Experience of War in the West, 1939–1945, eds. Paul Addison and Angus Calder. London: Pimlico.

Weeks, Albert L. (2002). Stalin’s Other War: Soviet Grand Strategy, 1939–1941. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Erickson, John, and Dilks, David. (1994). Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Wegner, Bernd, ed. (1997). From Peace to War: Germany, Soviet Russia, and the World, 1939–1941. Providence, RI: Berghahn.

Glantz, David M. (1991). From the Don to the Dnepr: Soviet Offensive Operations, December 1942–August 1943. London: Cass.

Weinberg, Gerhard L. (1995). A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Glantz, David M., and House, Jonathan. (1995). When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Werth, Alexander. (1964). Russia at War, 1941–1945. London: Barrie & Rockliff. MARK HARRISON

Gorodetsky, Gabriel. (1999). Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Harrison, Mark. (1996). Accounting for War: Soviet Production, Employment, and the Defence Burden, 1940–1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Harrison, Mark, ed. (1998). The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

WRANGEL, PETER NIKOLAYEVICH (1878–1928), general and commander-in-chief of the anti-Bolshevik forces in South Russia and leader of the White emigrant movement.

Roberts, Geoffrey. (1995). The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War: Russo-German Relations

One of the most talented, determined, and charismatic of the anti-Bolshevik generals (and one of the few who was authentically—and unashamedly— aristocratic), Peter Wrangel was born in St. Petersburg into a Baltic family of Swedish origin. He graduated from the St. Petersburg Mining Institute in 1901, but then joined a cavalry regiment as a private before volunteering for service at the front during the Russo-Japanese War, where he served with a unit of the Trans-Baikal Cossacks. In 1910 he graduated from the General Staff Academy and in World War I commanded a cavalry corps. He took no significant part in the events of 1917, but after the October Revolution he went to Crimea, where he was arrested by local Bolsheviks and narrowly escaped execution. He joined General Mikhail Alexeyev’s anti-Bolshevik Volunteer Army in August 1918 and rose under General Denikin to command the Caucasian Army (largely made up of

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Haslam, Jonathan. (1984). The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe, 1933–39. London: Macmillan. Haslam, Jonathan. (1992). The Soviet Union and the Threat from the East, 1933–41: Moscow, Tokyo, and the Prelude to the Pacific War. London: Macmillan. Kershaw, Ian, and Lewin, Moshe, eds. (1997). Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Moskoff, William. (1990). The Bread of Affliction: The Food Supply in the USSR during World War II. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Overy, Richard. (1997). Russia’s War. London: Allen Lane. Reese, Roger R. (2000). The Soviet Military Experience. London: Routledge.

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Kuban Cossacks) of the Armed Forces of South Russia. In that role he led a successful offensive against the Red Army on the Volga, capturing Tsaritsyn in July 1919. However, the haughty Wrangel never liked the plebian Denikin and, after a fierce quarrel with him over strategy during the Whites’ Moscow offensive of the autumn of 1919, he was accused of conspiracy, dismissed, and exiled to Constantinople. Following the collapse of Denikin’s efforts, Wrangel was recalled and found enough support among other senior generals to be chosen, in March 1920, to succeed Denikin as commander-in-chief of the White forces in South Russia, which were now largely confined to Crimea. As a political leader, he was intolerant of opposition, distrusted all liberals, and remained a convinced monarchist, but he nevertheless promulgated a radical land reform in a belated attempt to win the support of the population (and the western Allies, who were by then despairing of the Whites). As commander, he was a strict disciplinarian, and he successfully reorganized the army (renaming it the Russian Army). However, a quarrel over command undermined a projected alliance with Pilsudski’s Poland. Although Wrangel’s forces managed during the summer of 1920 to pour out of Crimea into Northern Tauria, once the Bolsheviks had made peace with Poland in October, the Red Army was able to concentrate its vastly superior forces on the south and to drive the Russian Army back into Crimea. In November 1920 Wrangel organized a very remarkable and orderly evacuation of over 150,000 of his men and their dependents to Turkey, which was then under Allied control. They were poorly treated by the British administration of the Constantinople district and were subsequently scattered around Europe but remained unified through their shared experiences, their resentment of the Allies, and their veterans’ organization, the Russian All-Military Union (ROVS), forged by Wrangel in 1924. Through ROVS Wrangel hoped to offer financial and social support to his men and to keep the émigré soldiers battle-ready and pure of political affiliation, while striving to unite monarchists and republicans under the banner of non-predetermination (i.e., by not prejudging issues regarding the future, post-Bolshevik, government of Russia). However, in November 1924, he announced his recognition of the claim to the Russian throne of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich. Wrangel died in Brussels in 1928, just as he and his associates were planning the creation of terrorist organizations to

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An experienced veteran of the Russian Imperial Army, Baron Peter Wrangel commanded the White forces during the civil war. © CORBIS

be sent into the USSR. His children believed he had been poisoned by the Soviet secret police. He is buried in the Russian Cathedral in Belgrade.

See also:

CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; WHITE ARMY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kenez, Peter. (1971, 1977). Civil War in South Russia, 2 vols. Berkeley: University of California Press. Robinson, Paul. (2002). The White Russian Army in Exile, 1920–1941. Oxford Historical Monographs. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Wrangel, Alexis. (1987). General Wrangel: Russia’s White Crusader. London: Leo Cooper. Wrangel, Baron Peter N. (1929). The Memoirs of General Wrangel, the Last Commander-in-Chief of the Russian National Army, tr. S. Goulston. London: Williams & Norgate. JONATHAN D. SMELE

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YABLOKO Yabloko was one of the leading liberal opposition parties in the newly democratic Russia of the 1990s. Yabloko’s founder and leader was Grigory Yavlinsky, a liberal economist who had stayed aloof from the new democratic political movements being formed between 1989 and 1991. A strong critic of Boris Yeltsin’s privatization program, Yavlinsky condemned both the anti-Yeltsin rebellion by the Congress of People’s Deputies in September 1993 and Yeltsin’s use of force to suppress it in October. In the wake of the October crisis, Yavlinsky teamed up with Yuri Boldyrev, an anticorruption campaigner, and Vladimir Lukin, ambassador to Washington until September, to form a bloc to run in the December 1993 State Duma election. Taking their three initials (Y, B, L), they named their alliance Yabloko (which means “apple”). Three small parties also joined Yabloko: the Republican Party, the Social Democratic Party, and the Russian Christian-Democratic Union. The three founders of Yabloko were allies of convenience: They had a liberal orientation but were not part of Yeltsin’s team. Lukin wanted a foreign policy that was less pro-Western than that pursued by Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, an aspiration that contradicted Yavlinsky’s proWestern orientation. Boldyrev subsequently quit Yabloko in 1995.

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Yabloko’s candidates were mostly young professionals and intellectuals. In the December 1993 election they won 7.9 percent of the vote and twenty seats in the national party-list race, and seven single-mandate districts. They were the sixth-largest party in the 450-seat Duma. Yabloko took up a position of principled opposition to the Yeltsin government. It opposed the new December 1993 constitution, refused to sign Yeltsin’s Civil Accord in May 1994, and repeatedly voted against government-proposed legislation. Yavlinsky ran Yabloko as a tight ship. Deputies who did not vote the Yabloko line were expelled from the party. In January 1995 Yabloko formally converted itself from an electoral bloc into a party. It claimed branches in more than 60 regions of Russia, although its most visible strength was in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and, curiously, the Far East. Yabloko projected an image that was partly liberal and partly social democratic, but nearly always critical of the government. They competed

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for the liberal electorate with the pro-government reform party (at first Russia’s Choice, then Union of Right Forces). Party identification among Yabloko voters was rather weak, and surveys indicate that they were scattered across the entire political spectrum. In the December 1995 Duma election Yabloko maintained its position, finishing fourth with 6.9 percent of the vote, thirty-one seats on the party list, and fourteen seats in single-mandate races. Yabloko established a visible presence in the parliament through articulate young leaders such as Alexei Arbatov, deputy chair of the defense committee. In November 1997 Yabloko’s Mikhail Zadornov, the head of the Duma’s budget committee, joined the government as finance minister. In May 1999 Yabloko voted for impeaching Yeltsin because of his actions in the first Chechen war. In August 1999 former prime minister and anticorruption campaign Sergei Stepashin chose to join Yabloko rather than the rival Right Cause. But in the December 1999 Duma elections Yabloko’s support slipped to 5.9 percent (yielding sixteen seats, plus four in the single mandates). It was probably hurt by Yavlinsky’s criticism of the government’s new war in Chechnya. Yabloko mainly existed as a vehicle for its leader, Yavlinsky. The rise of Vladimir Putin sunk Yavlinsky’s presidential chances, leaving Yabloko as a visible but relatively powerless voice of opposition.

See also:

CONSTITUTION OF 1993; YAVLINSKY, GRIGORY

ALEXEYEVICH; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

later the Social Democratic Party (December 1907). In 1912 he was arrested and exiled to Simbirsk. After returning from exile, he joined the army as a soldier and corporal in the Fifth Corps (1914–1917) and was wounded in action. In 1917, Yagoda worked with the journal, Soldatskaya Pravda, before taking part in the October Revolution in Petrograd. He entered the Cheka (military intelligence service) in November 1919 and was attached to the Special (00) Branch (watchdog of the military), and by July 1920 was a member of the Cheka Collegium. He worked his way up in the Cheka-GPUOGPU (Obyedinennoye Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravlenie, forerunner of the KGB), heading the Special Branch and later the Secret Political Department (watchdog of the intellectual life). In July 1927 he was the First Deputy Chairman of OGPU, but was later replaced by Ivan Akulov and demoted to deputy chairman. During the last two years, serving under the sickly Vyacheslav Menzhinsky, Yagoda actually ran the punitive organs. Taking an active part in working against Josef Stalin’s enemies, he was rewarded by being elected as candidate member of the Central Committee (1930) and later as a full member (1934). After Menzhinsky’s death in May 1934, the OGPU was re-formed as NKVD (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) on July 10, 1934, and Yagoda became its first commissar, the only Jew to hold this position. In 1935, when the rank of marshall of the Soviet Union was introduced in the Red Army, Yagoda received the equivalent rank of commissar general of state security, held by only two others (his successors Nikolai Yezhov and Lavrenti Beria).

Genrikh Grigorevich Yagoda was a native of Rybinsk, the son of an artisan and the second cousin of the revolutionary leader Yakov Sverdlov, to whose niece he was married. He finished eight classes of gymnasium in Nizhni Novgorod before joining an anarchist-communist group (1907), and

For the next two years, Yagoda faithfully served Stalin and played a major part in organizing the Great Terror. He worked closely with Andrei Vyshinsky in organizing the first show trials and in the slaughters of the Red Army high command. More than a quarter of a million people were arrested during 1934 and 1935. The Gulag was vastly expanded under Yagoda’s stewardship, and the use of slave labor became a major part of the Soviet economy. Stalin, however, was not satisfied with Yagoda’s performance and organized a campaign to remove him, using, among others, Lazar Kaganovich, who began to complain about the organs’ laxness toward “Trotskyists.” Stalin’s telegram of August 25, 1936, from Sochi to members of the Politburo, sealed Yagoda’s fate. Yagoda was then appointed as the Commissar of Communications (1936–1937). Arrested on March 28, 1937,Yagoda was tried as a member of the “Right-Trotskyist Bloc” in the last of the show trials. Yagoda and other

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Yabloko website, English version. (1999). . PETER RUTLAND

YAGODA, GENRIKH GRIGOREVICH (1891–1938), state security official, general commissar of state security (1935).

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defendants had to face Vyshinsky and the hanging judge, Vasily Ulrikh, with whom Yagoda had worked closely in the past. The former chief of the secret police remained stoical despite the obvious measures used to extract the necessary confessions. Sentenced to death, he was executed on March 15, 1938, a fate shared by several members of his family, but his son miraculously survived. Yagoda has not been rehabilitated.

See also:

PURGES, THE GREAT; SHOW TRIALS; STATE SECU-

RITY, ORGANS OF

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Andrew, Christopher, and Gordievsky, Oleg. (1990). KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev. New York: HarperCollins. MICHAEL PARRISH

YAKOVLEV, ALEXANDER NIKOLAYEVICH (b. 1922), secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (March 1986 to mid-1990) and member of the Politburo (mid-1987 to mid-1990). Alexander Yakovlev was General Secretary Gorbachev’s closest advisor and most loyal supporter in the Soviet leadership during the first five years of perestroika. During the 1960s and early 1970s Yakovlev held a series of responsible positions in the propaganda department of the Central Committee. In 1972, while serving as the acting director of the department, he published a scathing attack on the growing Russophile tendency within the Communist Party; this alienated a segment of the party leadership and led to his exile as ambassador to Canada, where he remained until 1983. When Gorbachev visited Canada that year as the head of a delegation from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, he was reportedly so impressed with Yakovlev that he named him the director of the USSR Academy of Sciences’s major research institute on international affairs. With Gorbachev’s selection as General Secretary in 1985, Yakovlev emerged as Gorbachev’s most influential advisor on both foreign and domestic policies. Yakovlev was often characterized as the architect of perestroika, but it is impossible to determine the accuracy of this assertion. He was

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Alexander Yakovlev drew upon his time in the United States and Canada to help formulate Gorbachev’s reforms. © PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS

named the director of the propaganda department of the Central Committee in 1985 and was a member of the small Soviet delegation to the first summit conference with President Reagan in November of that same year. He attended all subsequent summit meetings. In early 1986 Yakovlev was named a Secretary of the Central Committee and soon became locked in a battle with Secretary Yegor Ligachev for control of the party’s ideological and cultural policies. Over the next two years he emerged as an articulate supporter of Gorbachev’s new thinking in international relations, championed democratization and glasnost at home, defined the objectives of cultural life in humanist rather than socialist terms, and challenged orthodox definitions of MarxismLeninism. He often proved more radical than Gorbachev in his definition of democratization, his enthusiasm for the establishment of cooperatives, and for private economic activity.

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Yakovlev’s orientation seemed to change after the reform of the Secretariat and apparat in the fall of 1988, which led to his appointment as the director of the Central Committee’s new commission on international policy. Over the next two years he emerged as a social democrat and political liberal who insisted that the extension of individual freedom was the true objective of reform. After his selection as a deputy to the Congress of People’s Deputies in 1989, he championed the extension of electoral politics, expressed doubts about the capacity of the Communist Party to lead reform, and endorsed a multiparty political system. With Gorbachev’s selection as President of the USSR in March 1990, Yakovlev was named to Gorbachev’s advisory council and retired from his positions as Secretary of the Central Committee and member of the Politburo in mid-1990. Increasingly disillusioned with the Communist Party, in mid1991 he helped to form an alternative, rival political movement, publicly repudiated Marxism, and resigned as Gorbachev’s advisor. In August 1991 he quit the Communist Party and warned of an impending coup against the President.

See also:

tween the three parties, the Yalta Conference reached agreement on most issues, and the Big Three came away convinced that allied unity had been preserved. Germany, it was agreed, would be divided into three zones of occupation (a fourth zone was carved out of the British and American zones for France). Occupation policy would be made by a Four Power Allied Control Commission to be located in Berlin. Reparations were to be extracted from Germany, with the details to be determined by an Allied Reparations Commission in Moscow. Nazism and German militarism were to be extinguished, and war criminals were to be justly and swiftly punished. Poland proved to be an intractable problem. Churchill and Roosevelt sought unsuccessfully to persuade Stalin to recognize the London-based government in exile, but he continued to support the government installed by the Soviet Union in Lublin. At most, the Western leaders secured from Stalin a commitment to free and unfettered elections as soon as possible. No decisions were reached re-

CENTRAL COMMITTEE; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL

SERGEYEVICH; LIGACHEV, YEGOR KUZMICH; PERESTROIKA

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Harris, Jonathan. (1990). “The Public Politics of Aleksandr Nikolaevich Yakovlev, 1983–1989.” The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies. Pittsburgh, PA: Center for Russian and East European Studies. Yakovlev, Alexander. (1993). The Fate of Marxism in Russia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. JONATHAN HARRIS

YALTA CONFERENCE The Yalta Conference was the second wartime summit meeting between U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet Premier Josef Stalin. It met from February 4 through February 11, 1945, in the Crimean city of Yalta. A mood of optimism prevailed at the conference because German armies were in retreat throughout Europe and victory was assured. The principal agenda item was Germany. Although there were sharp policy differences be-

Josef Stalin and Winston Churchill are shown laughing in the conference room of Livadia Palace, during the Yalta Conference. ASSOCIATED PRESS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.

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The “Big Three” at Yalta in February 1945: Winston Churchill, a gravely ill Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Josef Stalin. COURTESY RARE BOOKS

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garding Poland’s postwar boundaries, although it was understood that the eastern boundary would be the Curzon line. As to the liberated countries in Eastern Europe, the conferees pledged in a Declaration on Liberated Europe to respect “the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live.” A secret protocol stipulated that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan within three months after Germany’s surrender. As compensation, Russia’s losses to Japan resulting from the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 and 1905 would be restored. These included southern Sakhalin, adjacent islands, and the Kuril Islands. The Soviet Union also received the lease of Port Arthur, internationalization of the port of Dairen, and partial control over the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian railroads as concessions.

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Regarding the United Nations, it was agreed that a United Nations conference would be held in the United States on April 25, 1945. The United States and Britain agreed to accept Ukraine and Belorussia as original members, thus giving the Soviet Union three votes in the General Assembly. Also, important provisions related to the voting rules of the Security Council were formulated, including a provision for the veto power of the five permanent members. Because Stalin ultimately succeeded in imposing communist regimes on the peoples of Eastern Europe, some critics have accused Roosevelt of “selling out” Eastern Europe. However, the consensus of scholarly opinion is that the superior military position of the Red Army at the end of the war virtually guaranteed Soviet predominance, regardless of the decisions made at Yalta.

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G E N N A D Y

I V A N O V I C H

POTSDAM CONFERENCE; WORLD WAR II

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Buhite, Russell D. (1986). Decisions at Yalta: An Appraisal of Summit Diplomacy. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources. Clemens, Diane Shaver. (1970). Yalta. New York: Oxford University Press. Mastny,Vojtech. (1979). Russia’s Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism. New York: Columbia University Press. Snell, John L. (1956). The Meaning of Yalta: Big Three Diplomacy and the New Balance of Power. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

conviction—or his inebriation. Along with Yeltsin’s appearance atop a tank, Yanayev and his shaking hands became a central image of the putsch. Yanayev was arrested immediately following the coup’s collapse and was amnestied by the Duma in February 1994. He went on to become a pension fund consultant.

See also:

AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Gorbachev, Mikhail. (1991). The August Coup: The Truth and the Lessons. New York: Harper Collins. Remnick, David. (1993). Lenin’s Tomb: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire. New York: Random House.

JOSEPH L. NOGEE

ANN E. ROBERTSON

YANAYEV, GENNADY IVANOVICH

YARLYK

(b. 1937), USSR vice president, coup plotter.

A decree or pronouncement by a Mongol khan.

Gennady Yanayev graduated from Gorky Agricultural Institute in 1959 and earned a history degree from the All-Union Law Institute in 1967. Before joining the Party in 1962, Yanayev worked in the agro-industry sector. After securing Party membership, he soon began working in the Gorky Komsomol organization (1963–1968). He was promoted to chairman of the USSR Committee of Youth Organizations (1968–1980) and later to deputy chair of the Presidium of the Union of Soviet Friendship Societies (1980–1986). He switched to working in the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions in 1986, becoming chair in 1990.

The yarlyk (Mongolian jarligh; Tartar yarligh) was one of three types of non-fundamental law (jasagh or yasa) pronouncements that had the effect of a regulation or ordinance, the other two being debter (a record of precedence cases for administration and judicial decisions) and bilig (maxims or sayings attributed to Chinghis Khan). The yarlyki provide important information about the running of the Mongol Empire.

Yanayev rose following the Twenty-eighth CPSU Party Congress. In July 1990 he was named to the Central Committee and Politburo and given the Central Committee foreign policy portfolio. Following the creation of the Soviet presidency in late 1990, Mikhail Gorbachev nominated Yanayev as his vice president on December 27. The Congress of People’s Deputies approved him on the second ballot. He then resigned from his Central Committee and Politburo posts effective January 31, 1991.

From the mid-thirteenth to mid-fifteenth centuries, all Rus princes received yarlyki authorizing their rule. Initially, those yarlyki came from the qaghan in Karakorum, but after Batu established his khanate, they came from Sarai. None of these yarlyki, however, is extant. In the mid-fifteenth century, Basil II began forbidding other Rus princes from receiving the yarlyk from Tatar khans, thus establishing the right of the Moscow grand prince to authorize local princely rule.

Yanayev disagreed with Gorbachev’s reforms and was the public face of the group that plotted the abortive coup of August 19–21, 1991. He went on international television to claim that, as vice president, he had assumed the acting presidency of the Soviet Union. His quivering hands, constant sniffling, and stilted delivery suggested his lack of

In the Rus metropolitan archive are preserved six yarlyki (constituting the so-called Short Collection) considered to be translations into Russian of authentic patents issued from the Qipchaq Khanate: (1) from Khan Tiuliak (Tulunbek) of Mamai’s Horde to Metropolitan Mikhail (Mitia) (1379); (2) from Khatun Taydula to the Rus’ princes (1347); (3) from Khan Mengu-Temir to Metropolitan Peter (1308); (4) from Khatun Taydula to Metropolitan Feognost (1343); (5) from Khan Berdibek to Metropolitan Alexei (1357); and (6) from Khatun

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Taydula to Metropolitan Alexei (1354). A seventh yarlyk, which purports to be from Khan Özbeg to Metropolitan Peter (found in the so-called full collection) has been determined to be a sixteenthcentury forgery. The yarlyki to the metropolitans affirm the freedom of the Church from taxes and tributes, and declare that the Church’s property should be protected from expropriation or damage as long as Rus churchmen pray for the well-being of the khan and his family.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

See also:

YAROSLAV VLADIMIROVICH

GOLDEN HORDE

DONALD OSTROWSKI

YAROPOLK I (d. 980), son of Svyatoslav and the grandson of Igor and Olga; fourth grand prince of Kiev. The date of Yaropolk Svyatoslavich’s birth is unknown, but the Primary Chronicle reports that in 968 he and his two brothers were under Olga’s care. In 970 their father Svyatoslav gave Kiev to Yaropolk, the Derevlyane lands to Oleg, and Novgorod (after Yaropolk and Oleg rejected it) to their half-brother Vladimir. Yaropolk married a Greek woman, a former nun whom Svyatoslav had taken captive. In 973, after the death of his father, Yaropolk became the grand prince of Kiev. In 977, after Oleg killed the son of Yaropolk’s commander Sveneld while on a hunting trip, Yaropolk avenged his death by attacking Oleg. The latter died in battle, and Yaropolk appropriated his domain. When Vladimir learned of Oleg’s fate, he feared for his own life and fled to Scandinavia to seek aid from the Varangians. Yaropolk then appointed his man to Novgorod and became sole ruler in all Rus. In 980 Vladimir returned to Novgorod and attacked Yaropolk because the latter had killed Oleg and refused to divide Oleg’s domain with him. On June 11, 980, Vladimir’s men treacherously killed Yaropolk. Vladimir then took Yaropolk’s pregnant wife to himself, and she gave birth to Svyatopolk, who would later have Vladimir’s sons Boris and Gleb murdered. In 1044 Vladimir’s son Yaroslav “the Wise” exhumed the bodies of Yaropolk and Oleg, baptized them, and buried them in the Church of the Mother of God (the Tithe Church) in Kiev.

See also:

GRAND PRINCE; KIEVAN RUS; OLGA; PRIMARY

CHRONICLE; SVYATOPOLK I; VLADIMIR, ST.; YAROSLAV VLADIMIROVICH

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(c. 980–1054), Yaroslav “the wise”; grand prince of Kiev which he secured for his family; the main agent of the so-called Golden Age of Kievan Rus. Yaroslav’s father was Vladimir Svyatoslavich, the Christianizer of Rus, and his mother was Princess Rogneda of Polotsk, of Scandinavian ancestry. Vladimir first sent Yaroslav to Rostov, but around 1010 transferred him to Novgorod. While there, he developed close ties with the townspeople and the Varangians of Scandinavia. He also minted coins and issued two charters granting the Novgorodians special privileges. In 1014 Yaroslav rebelled against his father by refusing to pay the annual tribute. He summoned Varangians to help him fend off the expected punitive attack, but before Vladimir could set out from Kiev, he died. Svyatopolk, his eldest surviving son succeeded him and decided to consolidate his rule by eliminating his half-brothers, beginning with Boris, Gleb, and Svyatoslav. After Yaroslav learned of his father’s death and Svyatopolk’s treachery, he marched south with the Varangians and the Novgorodians. In 1016 his forces confronted Svyatopolk and the Pechenegs around Lyubech and defeated them. Svyatopolk fled to the Poles, and Yaroslav occupied Kiev. In 1018, however, Svyatopolk returned with his father-inlaw, Boleslaw I, and forced Yaroslav to flee to Novgorod. In 1019, after the king returned home, Yaroslav evicted Svyatopolk from Kiev once again and occupied it a second time. Nevertheless, his rule was not secure. Taking advantage of his absence from Novgorod, Bryacheslav Izyaslavich of Polotsk captured the town and took many captives, forcing Yaroslav to attack him and free the Novgorodians. A greater threat to his power came in 1024, when Yaroslav’s brother Mstislav of Tmutarakan attempted to take Kiev from him while he was looking after northern affairs. Yaroslav brought the Novgorodians against Mstislav, but the latter defeated him at Listven west of Chernigov. All the

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same, Mstislav did not occupy Kiev but took Chernigov and the entire left bank of the Dnieper. In 1026, therefore, Chernigov and Kiev became two autonomous domains, with Yaroslav, the elder brother, enjoying seniority in Kiev. When Mstislav died without an heir around 1034, Yaroslav repossessed Chernigov and the left bank. After he imprisoned his only surviving brother Sudislav, he became sole ruler of the entire land except for Polotsk, which remained independent of Kiev. Yaroslav also waged war against external enemies. In the early 1030s he recaptured the Cherven towns that Boleslaw I had seized. In the 1040s he strengthened his ties with Casimir I by forming marriage alliances with him and by sending him military aid. He was also the first prince of Kiev to form marriage ties with the Germans and the French. He was married to Ingigerd, the daughter of the King of Sweden. In the 1030s and 1040s he expanded Novgorod’s western and northern frontiers into the neighboring lands of the Lithuanians and the Chud, where he founded the outpost of Yurev (Tartu). To the south, Yaroslav encountered no serious aggression from the Pechenegs after 1036, when they failed to capture Kiev. In 1043, however, he organized an unsuccessful expedition against Constantinople. Historians do not concur on his motive for attacking the Greeks. Nevertheless, he restored good relations with them and concluded a marriage alliance with the imperial family three years later. Yaroslav made Kiev his political and ecclesiastical capital and strove to make it the intellectual, cultural, and economic center in imitation of Constantinople. He founded monasteries and churches such as the Cathedral of St. Sophia in Kiev, the metropolitan’s church. Around 1051, evidently in an unsuccessful attempt to assert the independence of the Church in Rus from Constantinople, he appointed Hilarion as the first native metropolitan of Kiev. Yaroslav promoted the writing and translation of religious and secular texts, assembled a library, and brought scribes and master builders from Byzantium. His secular building projects, such as the new court and the defensive rampart around Kiev, its Golden Gate adorned with a chapel, enhanced the capital’s prestige. Yaroslav issued a Church Statute and the first version of the first written code of civil law (Russkaya Pravda). He bequeathed to each of his sons a patrimonial domain. In an effort to ensure a peaceful transition of power in the future, and to keep the land unified, Yaroslav issued his so-called Testament. In it he outlined the

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order of succession to Kiev that his sons and their descendants were to follow. He designated Izyaslav, his eldest surviving son, as his immediate successor. Yaroslav died on February 20, 1054, and was buried in the Cathedral of St. Sophia.

See also: CATHEDRAL OF ST. SOPHIA, KIEV; GRAND PRINCE; KIEVAN RUS; HILARION, METROPOLITAN; MSTISLAV; NOVGOROD THE GREAT; PECHENEGS; SVYATOPOLK I; VIKINGS; VLADIMIR, ST.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cross, Samuel Hazzard, and Sherbowitz-Wetzor, Olgerd P., eds. (1973). The Russian Primary Chronicle: Laurentian Text. Cambridge, MA: The Mediaeval Academy of America. Dimnik, Martin. (1987). “The ‘Testament’ of Iaroslav ‘The Wise’: A Re-examination.” Canadian Slavonic Papers 29(4):369–386. Dimnik, Martin. (1996). “Succession and Inheritance in Rus’ before 1054.” Mediaeval Studies 58:87–117. Franklin, Simon, and Shepard, Jonathan. (1996). The Emergence of Rus 750–1200. London: Longman. Martin, Janet. (1995). Medieval Russia 980–1584. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Vernadsky, George. (1948). Kievan Russia. New Haven: Yale University Press. MARTIN DIMNIK

YAROSLAV VSEVOLODOVICH (d. 1246), grand prince of Vladimir and grand prince of Kiev. Before dying in 1212, Yaroslav’s father Vsevolod Yurevich “Big Nest” gave Yaroslav the patrimony of Pereyaslavl Zalessky. In 1215 Yaroslav also occupied Novgorod, but lost control of it in 1216 when he joined Yuri against their senior brother Konstantin, who defeated them at the river Lipitsa. After the latter died in 1218, Yuri replaced him as grand prince of Vladimir. Although Yaroslav helped Yuri campaign against the Polovtsy and the Volga Bulgars, his main objective was to assert his rule over Novgorod. He helped the citizens by marching against the Lithuanians, the Chud, and other tribes. In his quest for more power over the town, he antagonized many Novgorodians to the point where, in 1224, they asked Mikhail Vsevolodovich of Chernigov for

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help. After the latter occupied Novgorod and curtailed Yaroslav’s authority, he developed a lifelong hatred for Mikhail. In 1232 Yaroslav finally secured his rule in Novgorod; in 1236 he briefly occupied Kiev. After the Tatars killed his brother Yuri in 1238, Yaroslav became grand prince of Vladimir and appointed his sons Alexander “Nevsky” and Andrei to Novgorod. In 1243 Yaroslav traveled to Saray, where he was the first prince to submit to the khan Batu. Although the khan made him the grand prince of Kiev, Yaroslav did not occupy it. More important was his acquisition of Batu’s patent for Vladimir, through which he secured the town for his heirs. Two years later the Tatars summoned Yaroslav to Mongolia, to the Great Khan’s court in Karakorum, where they poisoned him. He died on September 30, 1246.

See also: ALEXANDER YAROSLAVICH; BATU KHAN; GOLDEN HORDE; GRAND PRINCE; NOVGOROD THE GREAT; VSEVOLOD III; YURI VSEVOLODOVICH

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Following this victory, the Novgorodians asked him to be their prince; in 1265 he agreed to rule according to their terms. While waging war against Novgorod’s enemies and concluding treaties with German merchant groups on its behalf, he also increased his power over the town. His heavy-handed measures, however, antagonized the citizens, and they expelled him in 1270. Yaroslav attacked Novgorod, and, after Metropolitan Cyril intervened, the townspeople accepted him as prince. Yaroslav was summoned to Saray but died on September 16, 1271, while traveling from the Tatars.

See also:

ALEXANDER YAROSLAVICH; GOLDEN HORDE;

GRAND PRINCE; KIEVAN RUS; NOVGOROD THE GREAT; POLOVTSY; YAROSLAV VSEVOLODOVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Fennell, John. (1983). The Crisis of Medieval Russia, 1200–1304. London: Longman. Martin, Janet. (1995). Medieval Russia, 980–1584. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

MARTIN DIMNIK

Fennell, John. (1983). The Crisis of Medieval Russia, 1200–1304. London: Longman. MARTIN DIMNIK

YAROSLAV THE WISE See

YAROSLAV VLADIMIRO-

VICH.

YAROSLAV YAROSLAVICH (d. 1271), grand prince of Vladimir, the first independent prince of Tver, and the progenitor of the town’s dynasty. Yaroslav Yaroslavich became prince of Tver in 1247 when his uncle Svyatoslav gave patrimonies to all his nephews, the sons of Yaroslav Vsevolodovich. Soon after, Yaroslav’s elder brothers, Alexander “Nevsky” and Andrei, quarreled over succession to the patrimonial capital of Vladimir. Yaroslav sided with Andrei. In 1252 the khan Batu sent a punitive force against them, and they were defeated at Pereyaslavl Zalessky. Nevertheless, Yaroslav remained at odds with Alexander and had to flee from Tver two years later. In 1255 the Novgorodians invited him to rule, but he withdrew from the town after Alexander threatened to attack. Later he was reconciled with his brother, and, in 1258, he traveled to the Golden Horde and received the patent for Tver. After Alexander died in 1262, Yaroslav challenged his elder brother Andrei for control of Vladimir and sought help from Saray. In 1263 Khan Berke appointed him grand prince of Vladimir.

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YAVLINSKY, GRIGORY ALEXEYEVICH (b. 1952), liberal economist and party leader. Grigory Alexeyevich Yavlinsky was a prominent advocate of economic reform under Mikhail Gorbachev and went on to found Yabloko, one of the few liberal parties to survive the turbulent 1990s. Yavlinsky was a consistent advocate of market reform, liberal democracy, and partnership with the West, but his principled stance meant that he declined repeated invitations from President Boris Yeltsin to take up a government position. Yavlinsky was born into a teacher’s family in Lvov (Ukraine) and studied labor economics in Moscow, finishing a graduate degree in 1976. He worked at various research institutes before being appointed deputy head of the new State Commission for Economic Reform in 1989. The next year he coauthored the bold “400 days” reform plan (later renamed “500 days”), which was never implemented because of the political chaos that preceded the Soviet collapse.

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During the August 1991 coup, Yavlinsky joined the defenders of the White House, and afterwards he became deputy prime minister in the new Soviet government, which fell when the USSR was dissolved in December. Rival economist Yegor Gaidar joined Yeltsin’s team in the Russian Federation government, and it was he, not Yavlinsky, who oversaw Russia’s transition to a market economy. Yavlinsky was left criticizing the program of what he called “nomenklatura privatization” from the sidelines. Yavlinsky’s consuming ambition was to be elected as president. Intelligent, articulate, and principled, he had some important admirers in the West. But he was less successful in forging alliances with other politicians (i.e., regional leaders, or retired general Alexander Lebed) that could have brought him closer to power.

the words of one commentator, he was “the best president Russia never had.”

See also:

AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH; YABLOKO

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Rutland, Peter. (1999). “The Man Who Would Be King: A Profile of Grigorii Yavlinskii.” Problems of PostCommunism 46: 48–54. PETER RUTLAND

YAZOV, DMITRY TIMOFEYEVICH (b. 1923), minister of defense and marshal of the Soviet Union.

Yavlinsky comes across as a man of integrity and ambition who failed to realize his potential. In

A veteran of the Great Patriotic War, Dmitry Yazov joined the army as an enlisted man before he was commissioned in 1942 and served as a combat infantry officer. In the postwar decade Yazov rose through the officer ranks and attended the Frunze Military Academy from 1956 to 1958. He spent the next decade in service with Soviet Group of Forces in Germany, in the Leningrad Military District, and in Cuba during the missile crisis. From 1968 to 1970 he attended the Voroshilov Military Academy of the General Staff. Yazov went on to command the Thirty-fourth Army Corps and Fourth Army. From 1976 to 1979 he headed the Main Directorate for Cadres in the Ministry of Defense. There followed a series of senior positions: deputy commander of the Far Eastern Military District, commander of the Central Group of Force, and commander of the Central Asian Military District. In 1987, in the aftermath of the Rust Affair, Yazov was appointed minister of defense to replace Marshal Sokolov. Yazov oversaw the Ministry during the final days of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the negotiation of key arms control agreements, and a period of mounting criticism of the military under glasnost and perestroika. During his tenure Soviet forces were used to intervene in domestic hot spots in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Baltic Republics. In 1991 Yazov joined an eight-man junta, the State Committee of the Emergency Situation, composed of senior party, military, and security service personnel, who gambled on a putsch to remove Gorbachev and prevent the dismemberment of the Union. Between August 19 and 21, Yazov was responsible for the movement of forces to ensure an orderly transfer of power.

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Given the absence of an obvious successor, had Yeltsin resigned on health grounds, Yavlinsky would have had a good shot at the presidency. However, the sickly Yeltsin soldiered on. In the first round of the presidential election on June 16, 1996, Yavlinsky placed a disappointing fourth with 7.3 percent. Yavlinsky reportedly received substantial financial backing from banks such as Most and Menatep; he was certainly able to mount an expensive TV ad campaign. Yavlinsky refused to support Yeltsin in the second round of the election, thereby deeply angering the Yeltsin camp. Yavlinsky hung on, waiting for Yeltsin’s resignation. After the August 1998 financial crisis brought down Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko, the communists in the Duma refused to approve the return of Viktor Chernomyrdin as prime minister. Yavlinsky resolved the impasse by proposing Yevgeny Primakov as a compromise candidate. But then, in typical Yavlinsky fashion, he refused to join Primakov’s cabinet. When Yeltsin resigned in December 1999 he was able to hand over the presidency to his chosen successor, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who easily won election in March 2000. Yavlinsky ran once again, but finished a distant third, with 4.8 percent. He then stood by as Putin went on to introduce many of the reforms that Yavlinsky had advocated for years: a flat tax on income and profits, land reform, and tighter control over oil revenues.

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He failed and the coup collapsed. Yazov was arrested for his part in the coup and sent to jail, but in February 1994 he received a parliamentary amnesty. In 1998 Yazov was appointed as an advisor to the Directorate of International Cooperation in the Ministry of Defense.

See also:

AFGHANISTAN, RELATIONS WITH; ARMS CON-

TROL; AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brusstar, James H., and Jones, Ellen. (1995). The Russian Military’s Role in Politics. McNair Paper No. 34. Washington, DC: Institute of National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.

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Yeltsin was known for encouraging innovation, and his production successes made a name for him in Moscow. In 1976 he was named first secretary of the Sverdlovsk Obkom. Among his notable policies from this period, he ordered the midnight bulldozing of the Ipatiev House, the execution site of Nicholas II and his family, as the Kremlin feared it was becoming a shrine. He built a reputation for honesty and incorruptibility mixed with impatience and a tendency toward authoritarian leadership.

Herspring, Dale. (1990). The Soviet High Command; 1964–1989: Politics and Personalities. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Yeltsin’s Party career continued to flourish as he moved up the ranks. He served as a deputy in the Council of the Union (1978–1989), a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Transport and Communications (1979–1984), a full member of the CPSU Central Committee (1981–1990), member of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet (1984–1985), and chief of the Central Committee Department of Construction (1985).

Odom, William E. (1998). The Collapse of the Soviet Military. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

AGAINST THE GRAIN

Green, William C., and Karasik, Theodore, eds. (1990). Gorbachev and His Generals: The Reform of Soviet Military Doctrine. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Democrat or impatient revolutionary, corrupt schemer or populist, Boris Yeltsin displayed a certain recklessness from his childhood through his rise to the presidency of Russia. While Yeltsin orchestrated the peaceful breakup of the Soviet Union, he succumbed to poor health and personal rule and failed to build a strong new Russian state.

Yeltsin soon became part of the new team of young, reform-minded communists under new CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. On the advice of CPSU ideology and personnel secretary Yegor Ligachev, Gorbachev brought Yeltsin to Moscow in April 1985. Yeltsin quickly grew restless at a desk job and welcomed his promotion to first secretary of the Moscow City CPSU Committee, succeeding the aging Viktor Grishin. Subsequently, Yeltsin also was elected a candidate member of the Politburo (February 1986) and a member of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet (1986). Yeltsin was extremely popular as Moscow’s de facto mayor, known for riding the subways, dropping in unannounced at local shops, and championing architectural preservation, while exposing and criticizing the privileges enjoyed by the Party elite.

Yeltsin was born on February 1, 1931, and raised in Sverdlovsk (Ekaterinburg) Oblast in the Ural Mountains. He received a degree in construction engineering from Urals Polytechnical Institute in 1955 and spent the early years of his career in a variety of construction and engineering posts in Sverdlovsk, moving from project manager to top leadership positions in the building administration. He joined the CPSU in 1961 and in 1968 became chief of the Construction Department of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Party Committee (obkom). In 1975 he was appointed industry secretary of the Sverdlovsk Obkom.

Eventually Yeltsin clashed with key members of the Party leadership. Yeltsin complained openly about the pace of perestroika, criticizing the senior Kremlin leadership for complacency and lack of accountability and Gorbachev for timidity. In particular, he locked horns with Ligachev. Yeltsin’s campaign to remove complacent Grishin cronies infringed upon Ligachev’s personnel portfolio. Ligachev also pointedly objected when Yeltsin began to close Moscow’s special shops and schools for Party officials. Yeltsin became so frustrated that he tendered his resignation in the summer of 1987. Gorbachev refused to accept it, asking him to hold

JACOB W. KIPP

YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH (b. 1931), charismatic anticommunist reformer, first president of post-Soviet Russia.

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his complaints until after the upcoming celebration for the seventieth anniversary of the October Revolution so that a united front would lead the festivities. Yeltsin declined to heed this advice. Yeltsin aired his grievances at the Central Committee Plenum on October 21, 1987. The plenum agenda included approving Gorbachev’s anniversary speech, but that was not the presentation that attracted the most attention. Following Gorbachev’s presentation, Yeltsin delivered an impromptu speech, lasting for about ten minutes, complaining about the slow pace of reforms, Ligachev’s intrigues, and a new cult of personality emerging around Gorbachev. Yeltsin charged that leaders were sheltering Gorbachev from the harsh realities of Soviet life. Though this secret speech was not published at the time, its contents soon became public. The plenum itself turned into three hours of criticism heaped on Yeltsin. He was criticized not so much for the content as for the style and the timing of his comments. Yeltsin regularly had opportunities to voice such concerns at weekly Politburo meetings; that he had chosen this particular forum against the direct order of Gorbachev indicated Yeltsin’s immaturity and arrogance. Gorbachev now accepted Yeltsin’s prior resignation from the Moscow Party Committee and asked the Central Committee to enact appropriate resolutions for his removal. He was also stripped of his seat on the Politburo. Yeltsin thus became the first high-level Gorbachev appointee to lose his position. Yeltsin was not exiled back to Siberia, however. Gorbachev appointed Yeltsin to be first deputy chair of the USSR State Committee for Construction, a post that allowed him to remain in Moscow and in the political limelight. Yeltsin also remained popular with Muscovites, many of whom felt they had lost an ally. Almost one thousand residents of the capital staged a rally to support Yeltsin, which had to be broken up by police. Yeltsin was unavailable. As would frequently occur during his political career, times of high political drama tended to incapacitate him. At the time of the Central Committee Plenum, Yeltsin was hospitalized for an apparent heart attack. He was literally taken from his hospital bed to attend the session of the Moscow City Committee to be formally fired. Yeltsin reappeared in public at the 1988 May Day celebration, joining other Central Committee members to watch the annual parade. He was selected as a delegate from the Karelian Autonomous

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Socialist Republic for the extraordinary Nineteenth CPSU Conference in June; Party officials may have selected the remote constituency to reduce publicity for Yeltsin. Instead, the publicity came on the last day of the Conference. Gorbachev allowed Yeltsin to speak at the Conference in order to clear the air of rumors regarding the October affair and to see what this “man of the people” had to say. On live television, Yeltsin began by responding to criticisms recently levied against him by his fellow delegates and then tried to clarify his physical and mental condition at the Moscow City Plenum. He repeated his criticism of the slow pace of reform and of privileges for the Party elite. Then, for the first time in Soviet history, a disgraced leader publicly asked for rehabilitation. Yeltsin was followed to the podium by Ligachev, who continued to criticize and denigrate the fallen Communist. When the Conference ended, Yeltsin had not been reinstated. But in a move suggesting that Gorbachev had some respect for Yeltsin’s point of view, Ligachev was soon reassigned to agriculture. RISING DEMOCRAT

Yeltsin began a remarkable political comeback with the March 1989 elections to the first USSR Congress of People’s Deputies (CPD). Although the Central Committee declined to put Yeltsin on its slate of candidates, some fifty constituencies nominated him. Yeltsin opted to run from Moscow—not Sverdlovsk—and won almost 90 percent of the vote, despite an official smear campaign. When the CPD announced candidates for the new Supreme Soviet, Yeltsin was not on the ballot. Large popular protests began in Moscow, and delegates were swamped with telegrams and telephone calls supporting Yeltsin. Ultimately Alexei Kazannik, a deputy from Omsk, offered to relinquish his seat to Yeltsin—and Yeltsin only. Yeltsin became cochair of the opposition Inter-Regional Group and called for a new constitution that would place sovereignty with the people, not the Party. Further signaling his break with Gorbachev, during the July 1990 Twenty-eighth Party Conference, Yeltsin dramatically resigned from the CPSU, tossing his party membership card aside and striding out of the meeting hall. He had cast his lot with the Russian people. Meanwhile, Yeltsin had established roots in the RSFSR, giving him a political base to challenge Gorbachev. He was elected to the Russian Congress of

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People’s Deputies in March 1990 and became chair of the Russian Supreme Soviet in May 1990. He declared Russia sovereign in June 1990, triggering a war of laws between his institutions and those of Gorbachev. In June 1991 Yeltsin was elected to the newly created office of RSFSR President. Unlike Gorbachev as president of the USSR, Yeltsin had been popularly elected, a mandate that gave him much greater legitimacy than Gorbachev could claim for himself. He even called for Gorbachev’s resignation in February 1991. During the negotiations for a new union treaty in early 1991, Yeltsin demanded that key powers devolve to the republics. Eventually the two leaders came to an agreement, and Yeltsin planned to sign the new Union Treaty on August 20, 1991. When hard-line communists tried to block the treaty and topple Gorbachev, Yeltsin sprang into action. While Gorbachev was under house arrest in the Crimea, Yeltsin was at his dacha outside Moscow. Refusing his family’s and advisers’ pleas that he go into hiding, Yeltsin eluded the commandos surrounding his dacha and went to the Russian parliament building, known as the White House. Climbing atop one of the tanks surrounding the White House, Yeltsin denounced the coup as illegal, read an Appeal to the Citizens of Russia, and called for a general strike. Yeltsin’s team began circulating alternative news reports, faxing them out to Western media for broadcast back into the USSR. Soon Muscovites began to heed Yeltsin’s call to defend democracy. Thousands surrounded the building, protecting it from an expected attack by hard-line forces. Throughout the three-day siege, Yeltsin remained at the White House, broadcasting radio appeals, telephoning international leaders, and regularly addressing the crowd outside. When the coup plotters gave up, Yeltsin had replaced Gorbachev as the most powerful political figure in the USSR. Yeltsin banned the CPSU on Russian soil, effectively endings its operations, but did not call for purges of communist leaders. Instead, he left for his own three-week Crimean vacation. While Yeltsin inexplicably left the capital at this critical time, Gorbachev was unable to rally support to himself or his reconfigured Soviet Union. Upon his return to Moscow, Yeltsin seized more all-union assets, institutions, and authorities until it became obvious that Gorbachev had little left to govern. Then, on the weekend of December 8, 1991, Yeltsin met with his counterparts from Belarus (Stanislau Shushkevich) and Ukraine (Leonid Kuchma). The three men drafted the Belovezhskaya

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Accords, in which the three founding republics of the Soviet Union declared the country’s formal end. THE STRUGGLE FOR RUSSIA

Yeltsin began the simultaneous tasks of establishing a new state, a market economy, and a new political system. Initially the new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) served to regulate relations with the other Soviet successor states, although Ukraine and other western states resented Yeltsin’s argument that Russia was first among equals. Yeltsin, for example, commanded the CIS military, which he initially used in lieu of creating a separate Russian military. Domestically, he faced secessionist challenges from Chechnya and less severe autonomist movements from Tatarstan, Sakha, and Bashkortostan. Radical economic policy was implemented as Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar’s economic shock therapy program freed most prices as of January 1, 1992, and Anatoly Chubais led efforts to privatize state-owned enterprises. The two policies combined to bring Russia to the brink of economic collapse. Not only did Yeltsin face public criticism on the economy, but his own vice president, Alexander Rutskoi, and the speaker of parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov, also denounced his policies. On the political front, Yeltsin found himself in uncertain waters. Although work was underway to draft a new constitution, the process had been interrupted by the collapse of the USSR. Russia technically still operated under the 1978 constitution, which vested authority in the Supreme Soviet. However, the Supreme Soviet had granted Yeltsin emergency powers for the first twelve months of the transition. As these powers neared expiration, Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet became locked in a battle for control of Russia. As a compromise, Yeltsin replaced Gaidar with an old-school industrialist, Viktor Chernomyrdin, but that did not appease the Congress, which stripped Yeltsin of his emergency powers on March 12. Narrowly surviving an impeachment vote, Yeltsin threatened emergency rule and called a referendum on his rule for April 25, 1993. Yeltsin won that round, but the battle between executive and legislature continued all summer. On September 21, 1993, Yeltsin issued decree number 1400 dissolving the Supreme Soviet and calling for elections to a new body in December. Parliament, led by Khasbulatov and Rutskoi, refused, and members barricaded themselves in the

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Russian president Boris Yeltsin and Polish president Lech Walesa confer, August 25, 1993. © PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS

White House. Rutskoi was sworn in as acting president. Attempts at negotiation failed, and on October 3, the rebels seized the neighboring home of Moscow’s mayor and set out to commandeer the Ostankino television complex. Yeltsin then did what the hardliners did not do in August 1991: He ordered the White House be taken by force. Troops stormed the building, more than one hundred people died, and Khasbulatov, Rutskoi, and their colleagues were led to jail. Parliamentary elections took place as scheduled in December. Simultaneously, a referendum was held to approve the super-presidential constitution drafted by Yeltsin’s team. If the referendum failed, Russians would have voted for an illegitimate legislature. Fearing rivals for power, Yeltsin had eliminated the office of vice president in the new constitution, but he also refused to create a presidential political party. As a result, there was no obvious pro-government party. Gaidar and his liberal democrats lost to the ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Vladimir Zhirinovsky and the

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Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF). Rumors persist that turnout was below the required 50 percent threshold, which would have invalidated the ratification of the constitution itself. The Duma, the new bicameral parliament’s lower house, began with a strong anti-Yeltsin statement. In February it amnestied the participants in the 1991 putsch and the 1993 Supreme Soviet revolt. Yeltsin tried to accommodate the red-brown coalition of Communists and nationalists in the Duma. Economic liberalization eased, privatization entered its second phase, and a handful of businessmen—the oligarchs—snatched up key enterprises at deep discount. Yeltsin reached out to regions for support, with mixed results. A series of bilateral treaties were signed with the Russian republics, especially Tatarstan, giving them greater autonomy than specified in the federal constitution. However, one republic, Chechnya, remained firm in its refusal to recognize the authority of Moscow, and a showdown became imminent. A group of hardliners

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within the Yeltsin administration orchestrated an invasion of Chechnya on December 11, 1994. Although they had expected a quick victory, the bloody war continued until August 1996. Yeltsin approached presidential elections scheduled for June 1996 with four key problems. First was the ongoing and highly unpopular war in Chechnya. Second, the communists dominated the 1995 Duma elections. Third was his declining health. (He had collapsed in October 1995, triggering a succession crisis in the Kremlin.) Fourth, his approval ratings were in the single digits, and advisors Oleg Soskovets and Alexander Korzhakov urged him to cancel the election. But yet again, Yeltsin launched an amazing political comeback. He fired his most liberal Cabinet members, including Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev whose pro-West policies had angered many, and floated a new peace plan for Chechnya. In a campaign organized by Chubais and Yeltsin’s daughter Tatiana Dyachenko, Yeltsin barnstormed across the country, delivering rousing speeches, handing out lavish political favors, and dancing with the crowds. The campaign was bankrolled by the oligarchs—a group of seven entrepreneurs who had amassed tremendous wealth in the privatization process under questionable circumstances and wanted to protect their interests. The Kremlin boldly admitted to exceeding the campaign-spending cap. Yeltsin failed to win a majority of the votes in the election, forcing him into a run-off with CPRF candidate Gennady Zyuganov. Between the first election and the run-off, Yeltsin suffered a massive heart attack. This news was kept from the Russian population, who went to the polls unaware of the situation. Only after Yeltsin had secured victory was news of his health released. He underwent quintuple bypass surgery in November 1996, contracted pneumonia, and was effectively an invalid for months. During this time, access to the president and the daily business of running the country fell to Yeltsin’s closest advisors: Chubais and Dyachenko, known as “The Family.” Yeltsin’s last years in office were marked by a declining economy, rising corruption, and frequent turnover in the office of prime minister. The oligarchs soon turned on each other, fighting for assets and access. Yeltsin’s immediate family was implicated in a variety of graft schemes. With the economy declining, Yeltsin embarked on prime minister roulette. He fired Chernomyrdin, replacing

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Russian president Boris Yeltsin appeals to the people to vote in the 1993 referendum. © PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS

him with Sergei Kiriyenko (March–August 1998), Chernomyrdin again (August 23–September 10), then Yevgeny Primakov (September 10, 1998–May 12, 1999), and Sergei Stepashin (May 12–August 8). In August 1998 the ruble collapsed, and Russia defaulted on its foreign loan obligations. Next in line as prime minister came ex-KGB agent Vladimir Putin. In 1999 Yeltsin associates floated the idea of his running for a third term. They argued that the two-term limit imposed by the 1993 constitution might not count Yeltsin’s 1991 election, as it occurred under different political and legal circumstances. Yeltsin’s health was a key concern, as was his family’s complicity in a growing number of corruption schemes. Before Yeltsin could leave office he needed a suitable successor, one that could protect him and his family. On New Year’s Eve, 1999, Yeltsin went on television to make a surprise

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announcement—his resignation. According to the constitution, Prime Minister Putin would succeed him, with elections called within three months. As acting president, Putin’s first action was to grant Yeltsin immunity from prosecution. Yeltsin retired quietly to his dacha outside of Moscow. Unlike Gorbachev, he did not form his own think tank or join the international lecture circuit. Instead, Yeltsin wrote his third volume of memoirs, Midnight Diaries, and largely kept out of politics and public life.

See also:

AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH; CHECHNYA AND THE

CHECHENS; CHUBAIS, ANATOLY BORISOVICH; DYACHENKO, TATIANA BORISOVNA; GAIDAR, YEGOR TIMUROVICH; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; KHASBULATOV, RUSLAN IMRANOVICH; KORZHAKOV, ALEXANDER VASILEVICH; OCTOBER 1993 EVENTS; PUTIN, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH; RUTSKOI, ALEXANDER VLADIMIROVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Breslauer,George W. (2002). Gorbachev and Yeltsin As Leaders. New York: Cambridge University Press. Dunlop, John B. (1993). The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Shevtsova, Lilia. (1999). Yeltsin’s Russia: Myths and Reality. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Yeltsin, Boris. (1990). Against the Grain. New York: Summit. Yeltsin, Boris. (1994). The Struggle for Russia. New York: Random House. Yeltsin, Boris. (2000). Midnight Diaries. New York: Public Affairs. ANN E. ROBERTSON

YELTSIN CONSTITUTION See

CONSTITUTION OF

1993.

paign are still disputed. Most sources indicate that he was a Volga Cossack who fled north in 1581 in order to escape punishment for piracy; Ruslan Skrynnikov, however, argues that Yermak was fighting in the Livonian War in 1581 and went to Siberia in 1582. Yermak and his Cossack band were hired by the Stroganovs, a family of wealthy Urals merchants, to protect their possessions against attacks by the Tatars and other indigenous peoples of Siberia. Thereafter Yermak and his band of a few hundred men set off along the Siberian rivers in lightweight boats; it is not clear whether the Stroganovs sent them to attack the Siberian khanate, or whether the decision to go on to the offensive was taken by the Cossacks. In October 1582 they defeated the Siberian khan, Kuchum, and occupied his capital, Kashlyk (Isker). The local peoples recognized Yermak’s authority and rendered him tribute. In 1585, however, Khan Kuchum launched a surprise attack on the Cossack camp and killed most of the band. Yermak himself, according to legend, drowned in the River Irtysh, weighed down by a suit of armour that he had received as a gift from the tsar. Subsequent expeditions continued the Russian annexation of Siberia that Yermak had pioneered. After his death Yermak became a folk hero; his achievements were celebrated in oral tales and songs, and later depicted in popular prints (lubki).

See also:

IVAN IV; SIBERIA

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Armstrong, Terence, ed. (1975). Yermak’s Campaign in Siberia: A Selection of Documents, tr. Tatiana Minorsky and David Wileman. London: Hakluyt Society. Perrie, Maureen. (1997). “Outlawry (Vorovstvo) and Redemption through Service: Ermak and the Volga Cossacks.” In Culture and Identity in Muscovy, 1359–1584, ed. A. M. Kleimola and G. D. Lenhoff. Moscow: ITZ-Garant. Skrynnikov, R. G. (1986). “Ermak’s Siberian Expedition.” Russian History / Histoire Russe 13:1–39. MAUREEN PERRIE

YERMAK TIMOFEYEVICH (d. 1585), Cossack chieftain, leader of an expedition that laid the basis for Russia’s annexation of Siberia.

YESENIN, SERGEI ALEXANDROVICH

Little is known about Yermak’s early biography, and many of the details of his Siberian cam-

(1895–1925), popular poet of the Soviet period, known for his evocations of the Russian countryside and the Soviet demimonde.

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Sergei Alexandrovich Yesenin (also spelled Esenin) born in 1895 in Konstantinovo, a farm village in the Riazan province, where he attended school. He came to prominence in Petrograd in 1915 as part of a group of “Peasant Poets.” His early work was noted for its elegiac portrayal of rural life and religious themes. Yesenin was an ambivalent supporter of the October Revolution and the Soviet state. He tried to write on revolutionary themes, but his explorations of intimate relationships, urban street life, and the disappearance of old rural Russia were more popular. Yesenin was also known for his charisma, heavy drinking, and scandalous behavior. He was married three times, once to the American dancer Isadora Duncan. Yesenin committed suicide in December 1925, shortly after writing his final poem, “Good-bye, My Friend, Good-bye,” in his own blood. Yesenin’s popularity continued after his death, as readers were drawn to his unconventional lifestyle and introspective poetry. This concerned the Communist leadership, who believed that Yesenin had both reflected and encouraged a growing sense of disaffection and “hooliganism” among Soviet youth. Numerous attacks on “Yeseninism” appeared in the Soviet press in 1926 and 1927. He was also criticized by the so-called proletarian writers for his anti-urban bias and individualism. As a result, official policy toward Yesenin’s works was ambivalent, and no new editions of his work were published between 1927 and 1948. There was increased interest in Yesenin’s work in the 1960s and 1970s. His influence was evident on the rising generation of bard-singers, such as Vladimir Vysotsky, and also on the emerging “Village Prose” movement. One of Yesenin’s illegitimate sons, Alexander Volpin-Yesenin, was an early dissident and human rights advocate. Major collections of Esenin’s work include Radunitsa (1916), The Hooligan’s Confession (1921), and Selected Works (1922).

(b. 1932), Russian poet, playwright, novelist, essayist, photographer, film actor; member of Congress of People’s Deputies, 1989–1991. Yevgeny Yevtushenko was brought up in Siberia by his mother; when she moved with him to Moscow in 1944 she registered his date of birth as 1933. He published his first poem in 1949 and his first book in 1952. Yevtushenko studied at the Union of Writers’ training school, the Gorky Literary Institute, Moscow, in the early 1950s. He emerged after 1956 as one of the leading lights of the Thaw under Nikita Khrushchev, in many ways epitomizing its values and aspirations, and has remained a public figure ever since. His personal lyrics expressed a new and liberating sense of passionate individuality, and his poems on public themes called for and declared a fresh commitment to revolutionary idealism, in the spirit of Mayakovsky. His attitudes were underpinned by a frequently asserted commitment to the supremacy of Russia as a fountainhead of positive human values, notwithstanding Russia’s own dark history and the blandishments of Western civilization. Yevtushenko declaimed his poetry in a histrionic manner that has reminded some Americans of U.S. fundamentalist preachers. In the early 1960s Yevtushenko became hugely popular in Russia, and his recitals (often in the company of his then wife Bella Akhmadulina, Andrei Voznesensky, and Bulat Okudzhava) attracted large crowds to the stadiums in which they were characteristically held. Yevtushenko’s national and international reputation was established by two poems in particular, “Baby Yar” (published September 1961) and “The Heirs of Stalin” (published in Pravda, October 1962), which call respectively for unrelenting vigilance against antiSemitism and the recurrence of Stalinism in Russia.

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Slonim, Marc. (1977). Soviet Russian Literature: Writers and Problems, 1917–1977, 2nd rev. ed. London and New York: Oxford University Press.

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McVay, Gordon. (1976). Esenin: A Life. Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis.

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Yevtushenko soon began travelling abroad, a proclivity that has eventually taken him by his own count to ninety-five different countries. More than any other aspect of his activities, his freedom and frequency of travel led others to question the fundamental nature of his relationship with the Soviet authorities. His own protestations about how he was continually censored, rebuked, and restricted, and how he persistently used his position to plead for others in more parlous situations, have increasingly been interpreted as part and parcel of his conniving in being used as a licensed dissident

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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whose fundamental adherence to the Soviet system and willingness to accommodate himself to it never wavered. His outstanding poetic mastery has never been in doubt, but beginning in the 1970s, the rise of poets who rejected Yevtushenko’s flamboyant style, public posturing, and acceptance of privilege led to a growing view of him as a figure of the hopelessly compromised past. Partly in response, Yevtushenko branched out into other areas of creativity. During the later 1980s he demonstratively led the way in publishing Russian poetry that had been censored during the Soviet period. Since the collapse of the USSR he has lived mainly in the United States, regularly traveling back to Russia for public appearances, and has continued to publish prolifically in a variety of genres and argue his case in media interviews.

See also:

MAYAKOVSKY, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH;

OKUDZHAVA, BULAT SHALOVICH; THAW, THE

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Yevtushenko, Yevgeny. (1991). The Collected Poems, 1952–1990, ed. Albert C. Todd. New York: Holt. Yevtushenko, Yevgeny. (1995). Don’t Die Before You’re Dead. New York: Random House. GERALD SMITH

YEZHOV, NIKOLAI IVANOVICH (1895–1940), USSR State Security chief (1936–1938); organizer of the Great Terror of 1937–1938. Of humble origins and scant education, Nikolai Yezhov rose from tailor to industrial worker, soldier, and Red Army and Communist Party functionary. Since the early 1920s he was a provincial party secretary in Krasnokokshaisk (Mari province), Semipalatinsk, Orenburg, and Kzyl-Orda (Kazakh republic). In 1927 he was transferred to Moscow to become involved in personnel policy for the party Central Committee and the USSR People’s Commissariat of Agriculture. In 1930 he was promoted to chief of the Personnel Department of the Central Committee. In 1934 he was included in the Central Committee and appointed chief of the party Control Commission.

security service, and its investigation of Leningrad party chief Sergei Kirov’s murder, as well as with organizing major purge operations in the party in order to curb the party apparatus, which Josef Stalin deemed too independent. From 1936 on he organized major show trials against Stalin’s rivals in the party. On September 25, 1936, Stalin appointed him People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs. This was followed by a large purge operation in the NKVD involving the liquidation of his predecessor Genrikh Yagoda and his supporters, as well as mass arrests within the party. On July 30, 1937, by order of Stalin and the Party Politburo, Yezhov issued NKVD Order 00447, “Concerning the Operation Aimed at the Subjecting to Repression of Former Kulaks, Criminals, and Other Anti-Soviet Elements.” The operation was to involve the arrest of almost 270,000 people, some 76,000 of whom were immediately to be shot. Their cases were to be considered by “troikas,” or bodies of the party chief, NKVD chief, and procurator of each USSR province, who were given quotas of arrests and executions. In return, the regional authorities requested even higher quotas, with the encouragement of the central leadership. Another mass operation was directed against foreigners living in the USSR, especially those belonging to the nationalities of neighboring countries (e.g., Poles, Germans, Finns). The Great Terror was intended to liquidate elements thought insufficiently loyal, as well as alleged “spies.” All in all, from August 1937 through November 1938, more than 1.5 million people were arrested for counterrevolutionary and other crimes against the state, and nearly 700,000 of them were shot; the rest were sent to Gulag concentration camps. By order of Yezhov, and with Yezhov personally participating, the prisoners were tortured in order to make them “confess” to crimes they had not committed; the use of torture had the approval of Stalin and the Politburo.

From 1935 on, as Secretary of the Central Committee, he was in the top echelon of the party. He was charged with supervising the USSR People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), or state

In April 1937, Yezhov was included in the leading five who in practice had taken over the leading role from the Politburo, and in October of that same year he was made a Politburo candidate member. In April 1938, the leadership of the People’s Commissariat of Water Transportation was added to his functions. But in fact, it was the beginning of his decline. In August, Stalin appointed Lavrenty Beria as his deputy and intended successor. After sharp criticism, on November 23, 1938, Yezhov resigned from his function as NKVD chief, though for the time being he stayed on as People’s Commissar of

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Water Transportation. People close to him were arrested, and under these conditions his wife, Yevgenia, committed suicide; Yezhov abandoned himself to even more drinking than he was accustomed to. On April 10, 1939, he was arrested. He could not bear torture and during interrogation confessed everything: spying, wrecking, conspiring, terrorism, and sodomy (apparently, he had maintained frequent homosexual contacts). On February 2, 1940, he was tried behind closed doors and sentenced to death, to be shot the following night. His fall was given almost no publicity, and during the ensuing months and years he was practically forgotten. Only since the 1990s have details about his life, death, and activities become known. In spite of this, during the de-Stalinization campaign of the 1950s, he was brought up as nearly the only person responsible for the terror; the term Yezhovshchina, or the time of Yezhov, was brought into use. Some historians of the Stalin period indeed tend to stress Yezhov’s personal contribution to the terror, relating his dismissal to his overzealousness. As a matter of fact, Stalin suspected him of disloyal conduct and of collecting evidence against prominent party people, including even Stalin himself. Others believe that he obediently executed Stalin’s instructions, and that Stalin dismissed him when he thought it expedient.

See also:

GULAG; PURGES, THE GREAT; STALIN, JOSEF VIS-

SARIONOVICH; STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Conquest, Robert. (1990). The Great Terror: A Reassessment. London: Hutchinson. Getty, J. Arch, and Naumov, Oleg V. (1999). The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932–1939, tr. Benjamin Sher. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Jansen, Marc, and Petrov, Nikita. (2002). Stalin’s Loyal Executioner: People’s Commissar Nikolai Ezhov, 1895–1940. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. Khlevnyuk, Oleg (1995). “The Objectives of the Great Terror, 1937–1938.” In Soviet History, 1917–53: Essays in Honour of R.W. Davies, ed. Julian Cooper et al. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan. Medvedev, Roy. (1989). Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism, rev. and expanded ed., tr. George Shriver. New York: Columbia University Press. Starkov, Boris A. (1993). “Narkom Ezhov.” In Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives, eds. J. Arch Getty and

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Roberta T. Manning. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. MARC JANSEN

YUDENICH, NIKOLAI NIKOLAYEVICH (1862–1933), general in the Imperial Russian Army, hero of World War I, and anti-Bolshevik leader. Of noble birth, Nikolai Yudenich began his glittering military career upon graduating, with firstclass marks, from the General Staff Academy in 1887. He served on the General Staff in Poland and Turkestan until 1902, participated in the RussoJapanese War (earning a gold sword for bravery), worked as deputy chief of staff from 1907, and became chief of staff of Russian forces in the Caucasus in 1913. During World War I, Yudenich distinguished himself as Russia’s most consistently successful general, inflicting numerous defeats upon Turkey, notably at Sarikamish (December 1914) and, in August 1915, repulsing Enver Pasha’s invasion in 1915, and in capturing Erzurum, Trebizond, and Erzincan (February–July 1916). He consequently figured prominently in Russian wartime propaganda. With the overthrow of the Romanovs in February 1917, Yudenich regained overall command of the Caucasus Front. However, dismayed by the revolution and reluctant to cooperate with the Provisional Government, he was retired from active service in May. He returned to Petrograd and lived underground for a year after the October Revolution, before fleeing to Finland. Thereafter he headed anti-Bolshevik forces in the Baltic region, as commander-in-chief of the Northwest Army. Like other White leaders, Yudenich failed to establish an effective political regime or to attract sufficient support from the Allies, and suffered strained relations with the non-Russian peoples of his base territory. Nevertheless, he masterminded the Whites’ advance to the outskirts of Petrograd in the autumn of 1919. However, Trotsky pushed his forces back into Estonia, where they were interned before being disbanded in 1920. Yudenich was briefly arrested by the Estonian government, but was allowed to settle into exile in France. He largely shunned émigré politics until his death, in Saint-Laurent-du-Var.

See also: CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; WHITE ARMY; WORLD WAR I

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Mawdsley, Evan. (2000). The Russian Civil War. Edinburgh: Birlinn. JONATHAN D. SMELE

YUGOSLAVIA, RELATIONS WITH The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was proclaimed on December 1, 1918, and was renamed Yugoslavia on October 3, 1929 by Alexander Karadjordjevic. The creation of the new enlarged South Slav state and the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia together ruptured the once-strong bonds between Russia and the South Slav lands, especially Serbia. Russian support for Serbia in the summer of 1914 had helped precipitate World War I, which destroyed the Romanov dynasty and eventually brought the Bolsheviks to power. Like its neighbors,

the new Yugoslav state was fiercely anticommunist. In 1920 and 1921 the kingdom joined Romania and Czechoslovakia in a series of bilateral pacts that came to be known as the Little Entente. The alliance was primarily aimed at thwarting Hungarian irredentism (one country’s claim to territories ruled or governed by others based on ethnic, cultural, or historic ties), since the former kingdom of Hungary had lost approximately 70 percent of its prewar territory. The Little Entente also served as part of France’s eastern security system designed to contain both Germany and Bolshevik Russia. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, relations between Moscow and Belgrade were but a shadow of that which had preceded World War I. Not only was Yugoslavia a supporter of the postwar settlements that had aggrandized its territory, but it also sought to isolate the Bolshevik revolution; moreover, it had little trade with the new Soviet state, in part because prewar relations between St. Petersburg and Belgrade had been based almost entirely on diplomatic and cultural rather than economic links. In addition, the rise of Nazi Germany left much of Yugoslav trade within the Third Reich’s orbit. In 1941 Germany occupied Yugoslavia. Two groups, the Chetniks, led by Dra a Mihailovic, and the Partisans, under Josip Broz Tito, a Moscowtrained communist, fought the Germans and at the same time vied for supremacy within Yugoslavia. Although Tito emerged victorious and Stalin’s so-called Percentages Agreement with Winston Churchill gave Moscow 50 percent influence in Yugoslavia, the Red Army had not occupied the country, and thus the Soviet Union was unable to influence developments there as it could in other areas of central and southeastern Europe. Tito’s popularity and mass following stood in contrast to the situation in the other countries of the future “bloc,” where there were at best small native communist parties dominated by the Soviet Union.

COLLECTION/CORBIS

As a result, the communist state created in Yugoslavia in 1946 was independent of Soviet stewardship even though its constitution was initially modeled on the Soviet constitution. From the outset, Tito pursued an independent domestic policy and an aggressive foreign one. His ambitions threatened both Stalin’s leadership (by his promotion of national communist movements) and also peace in Europe (by such actions as the shooting down of American planes during the Trieste Affair, the Italian-Yugoslav border dispute, and his support for the communists in the Greek Civil War). When Tito attempted to create a separate customs

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Marshal Josip Broz Tito defied Stalin and introduced his own brand of communism in Yugoslavia. © HULTON-DEUTSCH

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union with Bulgaria without consulting the Soviet Union beforehand, and refused to abandon the effort as Stalin demanded, a break, usually referred to as the Tito-Stalin split, quickly followed. On June 28, 1948, the Cominform, the umbrella communist propaganda organ directed by Moscow, expelled Yugoslavia, charging Tito with betraying the international communist movement. Stalin hoped that this would force Yugoslavia to submit to Soviet leadership, but he miscalculated. Instead, Tito turned to a West that was all too willing to forget his ideology and past actions and provide assistance to enable Yugoslavia to pursue its own command economy and an independent diplomatic and political stance that served as a counterforce to the Soviet leader. Yugoslavia, for example, supported the United Nations resolution authorizing resistance to the invasion of South Korea in June 1950. Tito soon became one of the founders of the nonaligned movement, which held its first conference in Belgrade in 1961. Stalin’s death in 1953 opened the door for a partial rapprochement with Belgrade. Issues such as navigation and trade along the Danube River were resolved, but the ideological rift never entirely healed. In May 1955 Nikita Khrushchev visited Belgrade, and the following year Tito visited to Moscow, and the Cominform, which dissolved in April 1956, renounced its earlier condemnations. Despite seemingly cordial relations, however, the strains between Moscow and Belgrade persisted, especially after the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, which saw the independent-minded Hungarian revolt crushed, and the arrest and subsequent murder of Imre Nagy, the Hungarian prime minister, who had taken refuge in the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest from 1956 until 1958. In 1957 Tito angered Moscow by refusing to sign a declaration commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. In the wake of the Sino-Soviet split of the early 1960s, another reconciliation took place, most notably in the area of trade. However, Yugoslavia continued to develop economic ties with western Europe, as witnessed by the hundreds of thousands of Yugoslavs who went west for employment as well as by western investment in Yugoslavia. For Belgrade, improved relations with Moscow were but one part of a foreign policy that also looked to the West (despite anti-American rhetoric), China (after a reconciliation in the early 1970s), and the Third World for influence and economic advantages. Soviet leaders in turn realized that the ideological squabble with Belgrade served little purpose.

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The death of Tito in 1980 began the fracturing of a Yugoslav state strained by economic problems and national resentments, and by 1990 the country fragmented. Similarly, the Soviet Union lost its empire in eastern Europe in 1989, and by 1991 the Soviet Union itself dissolved. The break-up of the two states ironically brought both of them full circle. During the nineteenth century, Russia had been the sole great power supporter of Serbia. Although a “Yugoslavia” continued to exist after 1990, the name denoted a rump state that comprised only Serbia and Montenegro. As the wars in the former Yugoslavia raged, Moscow again served as Belgrade’s principal benefactor, citing historical, religious, and cultural ties. From military aid to peacekeeping in the wake of Slobodan Milosevic’s failed attempt to promote Serb authority through the brutal suppression of the Albanian Kosovars, Russia had regained an influence in Belgrade that it had not seen since the early days of World War I.

See also: BALKAN WARS; COMMUNIST BLOC; COMMUNIST INFORMATION BUREAU; MONTENEGRO, RELATIONS WITH; SERBIA, RELATIONS WITH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Djordjevic, Dimitrije. (1992). “The Yugoslav Phenomenon.” In The Columbia History of Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, ed. Joseph Held. New York: Columbia University Press. Glenny, Misha. (2000). The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804–1999. New York: Viking Penguin. Hupchick, Dennis P. (2002). The Balkans: From Constantinople to Communism. New York: Palgrave. Jelavich, Barbara. (1974). St. Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1814–1974. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Rothschild, Joseph, and Wingfield, Nancy M. (2000). Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central Europe Since World War II. 3rd edition. New York: Oxford University Press. RICHARD FRUCHT

YURI DANILOVICH (d. 1325), grand prince of Vladimir and the prince of Moscow who initiated the rivalry for supremacy between Moscow and Tver in northeastern Russia.

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In 1303 Yuri succeeded his father Daniel Yaroslavich to Moscow. After Grand Prince Andrei Alexandrovich of Vladimir died in 1304, Yuri challenged Mikhail Yaroslavich of Tver for the grand princely throne. He visited Khan Tokhta in Saray, intending to buy the patent for Vladimir with gifts, but Mikhail won. Because Yuri rejected the decision, Mikhail attacked Moscow unsuccessfully in 1305 and 1308. His son Dmitry also marched against Yuri, but Metropolitan Peter, who supported Moscow, stopped him. The Novgorodians also preferred Yuri and invited him in 1314 to be their prince. Mikhail, however, repossessed the town in Yuri’s absence in 1316 when Yuri visited the Golden Horde. On that occasion the khan gave him the patent for Vladimir. He returned home with Tatar troops to consolidate his rule, but, when he attacked Mikhail in 1318, the latter defeated him. To resolve the stalemate, they rode to Saray for a judgment. Khan Uzbek appointed Yuri grand prince once again and had Mikhail put to death. In 1322, while Yuri helped defend Novgorod against the Germans, Mikhail’s successor and son Dmitry persuaded the khan, with the usual bribes, to give him Vladimir. After Yuri assisted the Novgorodians by building a fortress on the river Neva and by capturing Ustyug on the Northern Dvina, he traveled to Saray to challenge Dmitry’s appointment. On November 21, 1325, Dmitry murdered Yuri at the Golden Horde to avenge his father’s death.

1125 Yuri moved his capital from the older Rostov to Suzdal, probably to gain more freedom from the well-established boyar families. He also asserted Suzdalia’s independence from Kiev, which was ruled by his eldest brother Mstislav. In consolidating his rule, he founded new towns and fortified existing ones such as Pereyaslavl Zalessky, Dmitrov, Yurev Polsky, Galich, Zvenigorod, and perhaps Kostroma. He appropriated Moscow from a local boyar. He campaigned against the VolgaKama Bulgars to gain control of the trade route from the Caspian Sea, and he attempted to assert his influence over Novgorod’s Baltic trade. Yury, who began the tradition of building churches in Suzdalian towns in 1152, is credited with erecting some five churches. After his brother Mstislav died in 1132, he became the champion of the Monomashichi against the Mstislavichi (rival dynasties) for control of Kiev. That is, in keeping with the system of lateral succession to Kiev allegedly drawn up by Yaroslav Vladimirovich “the Wise” in his so-called testament, Yuri held that Monomakh’s younger sons had prior claims over their nephews, Mstislav’s sons. In his many battles against the latter, he was supported by the princes of Chernigov and the Polovtsy. In 1155, after his elder brother Vyacheslav died in Kiev, Yuri successfully seized the town. However, he was unpopular with the Kievans, and they poisoned him. He died on May 15, 1157.

See also: See also: DANIEL, METROPOLITAN; DMITRY MIKHAILOVICH;

BOYAR; GRAND PRINCE; MSTISLAV; VLADIMIR

MONOMAKH

GOLDEN HORDE; GRAND PRINCE; MOSCOW; MUSCOVY; NOVGOROD THE GREAT

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Fennell, John L. I. (1968). The Emergence of Moscow, 1304–1359. London: Secker and Warburg.

Hellie, Richard. (1987). “Yurii Vladimirovich Dolgorukii.” The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History, ed. Joseph L. Wieczynski, 45:73–76. Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press.

Martin, Janet. (1995). Medieval Russia, 980–1584. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Martin, Janet. (1995). Medieval Russia 980–1584. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

MARTIN DIMNIK

MARTIN DIMNIK

BIBLIOGRAPHY

YURI VLADIMIROVICH

YURI VSEVOLODOVICH

(d. 1157), prince of Suzdalia and grand prince of Kiev; nicknamed “Long-arms” (“Dolgoruky”) probably because he meddled in the affairs of distant Kiev.

(1189–1238), grand prince of Vladimir on the Klyazma, in northeast Russia, when it was attacked by the Tatars.

Yuri’s father Vladimir Vsevolodovich “Monomakh” gave him Suzdalia as his patrimony. In

In 1211 Yuri’s father Vsevolod Yurevich “Big Nest” had him marry Agafia, daughter of Vsevolod

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Svyatoslavich “the Red,” grand prince of Kiev and member of the Olgovich dynasty. The alliance would serve both dynasties well. Before his death in 1212, Vsevolod designated Yuri, the second son in seniority, as his successor to Vladimir. Yuri’s elder brother Konstantin challenged his succession and defeated Yuri and his brother Yaroslav at the river Lipitsa in 1216. Konstantin ruled as grand prince until his death in 1218, at which time Yuri reclaimed Vladimir. After 1221 he sent his lieutenants to Novgorod, but the townspeople rejected them. Three years later he attempted to appease the Novgorodians by inviting his brother-in-law Mikhail Vsevolodovich, senior prince of the Olgovich dynasty in Chernigov, to act as his mediator with them. They accepted his offer but his brother Yaroslav objected. Yuri therefore washed his hands of Novgorod affairs in 1226 and turned them over to Yaroslav. Although Yuri was less powerful than his father had been, he took effective military action to stop the Volga Bulgars from attacking Suzdalia. In 1221 he concluded peace with them. After

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that, he organized campaigns against the Mordva tribes and, in 1232, subdued them. Moreover, to secure his eastern frontier he built the outpost of Nizhny Novgorod. In February 1238, when the Tatars devastated Vladimir, his wife and sons perished. Later the invaders confronted Yuri and his troops at the river Sit, where he was waiting in vain for Yaroslav to bring reinforcements. On March 4 of that year he fell in battle.

See also: GOLDEN HORDE; GRAND PRINCE; NOVGOROD THE GREAT

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Dimnik, Martin. (1987). “Yurii (Georgii) Vsevolodovich.” The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History, ed. Joseph L. Wieczynski. Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press. Fennell, John. (1983). The Crisis of Medieval Russia 1200–1304. London: Longman. MARTIN DIMNIK

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ZADONSHCHINA Zadonshchina (roughly, The Battle Beyond the Don) is the conventional title for a medieval literary work about the historically important Battle of Kulikovo Field (1380). Written some years after the historical event, in the late fourteenth or possibly the beginning of the fifteenth century, it is attributed in one of the surviving copies to a Sofonia of Ryazan about whom nothing is known. The text is preserved in a longer and a shorter redaction, giving rise to the usual arguments in these cases over which was the “original.” Primacy is important to the crucial question of Zadonshchina’s relationship to the Lay of Igor’s Campaign. The short redaction appears to be an incomplete extract and not the author’s text. There can be no doubt of a close association with the Lay in view of extensive similarities that go beyond any mutual dependence on some third source or tradition. Zadonshchina was almost certainly written as an imitation of the Lay and a response to it, treating the victory at Kulikovo as revenge for the defeat of Igor at the hands of a different steppe enemy. The writer sought to reverse circumstances of 1185 as described in the Lay, turning Igor’s unsuccessful campaign upside down, so to speak. In the process he distorted history: For example, by exaggerating the unity of the princes in 1380 in order to counterbalance the disunity of 1185. Most of his figures of speech are borrowed from the Lay and often ineptly combined and overused. For these reasons, Zadonshchina is considered derivative and inferior.

See also:

Z

FOLKLORE; LAY OF IGOR’S CAMPAIGN

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Jakobson, Roman, and Worth, Dean S., eds. (1963). Sofonija’s Tale of the Russian-Tatar Battle on the Kulikovo Field. The Hague: Mouton. Zenkovsky, Serge A., tr. and ed. (1974). Medieval Russia’s Epics, Chronicles, and Tales, 2d ed. rev. New York: Dutton. NORMAN W. INGHAM

ZAGOTOVKA State agricultural procurement. The term zagotovka refers to the process through which agricultural products (e.g., grain) were pro-

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cured by the Soviet state, usually from collective farms (kolkhozes) in the form of compulsory deliveries (obyazatelnye postavki) at low prices set by the state. The procurement process was important in that the underpinning of the Soviet strategy of industrialization was the extraction of grain and other agricultural products from the countryside for use as a source of domestic food and as a means to finance industrialization through export. Moreover, beginning under Lenin during the period of War Communism, when forced requisitioning (prodrazverstka) was introduced, the role of the state in the production, acquisition, and distribution of agricultural products increased, especially after the collectivization of agriculture in the late 1920s. In addition to the earlier use of forced requisitioning and the subsequent introduction of compulsory deliveries extracted from collective farms, deliveries were also made by state farms (sdacha sovkhozov), payments in kind (naturoplata) were required for the services of the Machine Tractor Stations (MTS), and taxes in kind (prodnalog) were levied. The mechanisms of procurement introduced by the Soviet state served, in part, to eliminate the market of the New Economic Policy (NEP) of the 1920s in order to organize the interaction between the agricultural and the industrial (urban) sector. Moreover, as state controls replaced the NEP market, the terms of trade between the countryside and the urban industrial sector could increasingly be dictated by the state.

See also: AGRICULTURE; ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; INDUSTRIALIZATION, SOVIET

1950 and became a member of the Communist Party in 1954. She completed a doctoral thesis for the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics, Department of Agriculture, where she worked until 1963. In that year, Zaslavskaya moved to the Novosibirsk Institute of Industrial Economics to work with Abel Aganbegyan. She subsequently became head of the Institute’s Sociology Department, in 1968. At the same time, Zaslavskaya became a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, becoming a full member in 1981. From the late 1960s she headed the Social Problems department of the Siberian branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, where she remained until the mid-1980s. During this period, Zaslavskaya developed a model capable of predicting trends in Soviet agriculture. Zaslavskaya came to prominence in early 1980s, when her Novosibirsk report was leaked to the public. Later on, when Mikhail Gorbachev was introducing his policies of glasnost and perestroika, Zaslavskaya became a key player and senior government adviser in the field of socioeconomic and agricultural reform, from 1985 to 1987. She was elected to the Congress of People’s Deputies in 1989 as Russian Academy of Sciences representative. In 1986 Zaslavskaya was elected President of the Soviet Sociological Association, before moving on to head to the new Institute of Sociology in 1987 and the Centre for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM) in 1988. In 1990 Boris Yeltsin elected Zaslavskaya to his consultative council. Since then Zaslavskaya has gone on to become head of the Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences.

See also:

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Gregory, Paul R., and Stuart, Robert C. (2001). Russian and Soviet Economic Performance and Structure, 7th ed. New York: Addison Wesley Longman. Volin, Lazar. (1970). A Century of Russian Agriculture. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ROBERT C. STUART

ACADEMY OF SCIENCES; NOVOSIBIRSK REPORT;

PERESTROIKA

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Yanowitch, Murray, ed. (1989). Voices of Reform: Essays by Tatiana I. Yaslavskaya. Armonk, NY and London: M. E. Sharpe. CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS

ZASEKA See

FRONTIER FORTIFICATIONS.

ZASULICH, VERA IVANOVNA ZASLAVSKAYA, TATIANA IVANOVNA (b. 1927), economist and influential sociologist.

(1849–1919), Russian revolutionary.

Tatiana Ivanovna Zaslavskaya graduated from the Economics Faculty of Moscow University in

Born into a relatively poor noble family, Vera Ivanovna Zasulich became a populist as a young woman. She had a keen sense of social justice, sym-

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pathized with the downtrodden and the oppressed, and opposed autocracy. An active participant in the populist movement, she was imprisoned from 1869 to 1871 and was in administrative (internal) exile from 1871 to 1875. She spent most of her life in poverty and poor health, with a bohemian lifestyle. Her partner, Lev Deich, was arrested in 1884 for smuggling revolutionary literature to Russia and was exiled to Siberia, where he remained until 1901. While in Siberia, he married another woman. Zasulich achieved fame and heroine status for shooting Fyodor Trepov (Governor of St. Petersburg) in 1878, in an assassination attempt (Trepov survived). Acquitted at a jury trial, she fled abroad to escape rearrest and lived in political exile (in Switzerland, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany) from 1878 to 1905 (with the exception of two brief returns to Russia for four months in 1879–1880 and for three months in 1899–1900). She corresponded with Karl Marx and was a friend of Friedrich Engels. She was one of the founders of the first Russian Marxist organization, the Liberation of Labor (Osvobozhdenie truda) group in Geneva in 1883. Author of numerous books, articles, and translations, she was an editor of Iskra (“Spark”) from 1900 to 1905. A participant in the 1903 second congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party, she helped found the Menshevik movement and made frequent attempts to reconcile factions of the revolutionary movement. After 1905 Zasulich retired from revolutionary activities. She was in her late fifties, in poor health, and there was an amnesty for political exiles. She subsequently supported Russian participation in World War I. As an old Menshevik and supporter of the war, she naturally opposed the October Revolution.

of the people by reforming popular religious practices, improving the liturgy, introducing sermons, and strengthening the role of the clergy. The reformers gathered around Stefan Vonifatiev, archpriest of the Annunciation Cathedral in the Kremlin and confessor to Tsar Alexis Mikhailovich. Individuals associated with the Zealots included leading figures at court, such as the Boyar Boris Ivanovich Morozov and gentrymen (dvoryane) Fyodor Rtishchev and Simeon Potemkin. The head of the Printing Office, Prince Alexei Mikhailovich Lvov, supported the Zealots, as did several of the correctors (spravshchiki), including Mikhail Rogov (archpriest at the Archangel Cathedral), Ivan Nasedka (priest at the Dormition Cathedral) and Shestak Martemianov (layman). Nikon, archimandrite of the New Savior Monastery in Moscow (patriarch from 1652) was also a participant. Ivan Neronov, a provincial reformer, became archpriest of the Kazan Cathedral in Moscow in 1649 and took his place among the Zealots of Piety. Other representatives of the provincial secular clergy active in the group included the archpriests Avvakum of Yurev, Daniil of Temnikov, Login of Murom, and Daniil of Kostroma. Traditional historiography opposed the Zealots to Patriarch Iosif and the Church Council, although some historians have questioned this opposition. Nikon, a leading Zealot, became patriarch in 1652, and his actions split the circle. Avvakum led several members of the group in opposition that ultimately led to schism and the emergence of Old Belief.

See also:

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ENGELS, FRIEDRICH; MARXISM; MENSHEVIKS

See also: AVVAKUM PETROVICH; MOROZOV, BORIS IVANOVICH; NERONOV, IVAN; NIKON, PATRIARCH; OLD BELIEVERS; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

Lobachev, S.V. (2001). “Patriarch Nikon’s Rise to Power.” Slavonic and East European Review 79(2):290–307.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bergman, Jay. (1983). Vera Zasulich. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Shanin, Teodor, ed. (1983). Late Marx and the Russian Road: Marx and “The Peripheries of Capitalism.” New York: Monthly Review Press. MICHAEL ELLMAN

CATHY J. POTTER

ZEMSKY NACHALNIK See ZEMSKY SOBOR See

LAND CAPTAIN.

ASSEMBLY OF THE LAND.

ZEALOTS OF PIETY

ZEMSTVO

The Zealots of Piety (1646–1653) were a group of clergy and laity who energetically sought to elevate the religious consciousness and spiritual life

Zemstvo was a system of local self-government used in a number of regions in the European part of Russia from 1864 to 1918. It was instituted as

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a result of the zemstvo reform of January 1, 1864. This reform introduced an electoral self-governing body, elected from all class groups (soslovii), in districts and provinces. The basic principles of the zemstvo reform were electivity, the representation of all classes, and self-government in the questions concerning local economic needs. The statute of January 1, 1864, called for the institution of zemstvos in thirty-four provinces of the European part of Russia. The reform did not affect Siberia and the provinces of Archangel, Astrakhan, and Orenburg, where there were very few noble landowners. Neither did the reform affect regions closest to the national borders: the Baltic States, Poland, the Caucasus, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia. According to the statute, zemstvo institutions in districts and provinces were to consist of zemstvo councils and executive boards. The electoral system was set up on the basis of class and possessions. Every three years, the citizens of a district elected between fourteen to one hundred or so deputies to the council. The elections were held in curias (divisions), into which all of the districts’ population was divided. The first curia consisted of landowners who possessed 200 or more desiatinas of land (about 540 acres), or other real estate worth at least 15,000 rubles, or had a monthly income of at least 6,000 rubles. This curia consisted mainly of nobles and landlords, but members of other classes (merchants who bought nobles’ land, rich peasants who acquired land, and the like) eventually grew more and more prominent. The second curia consisted of city dwellers who possessed merchant registration, or who owned trading and industrial companies with a yearly income of at least 6,000 rubles, or held real estate in worth at least 500 rubles (in small cities) or 2,000 rubles (in large cities). The third curia consisted mainly of representatives of village societies and peasants who did not require a special possession permit. As a result of the first of these elections in 1865 and 1866, nobles constituted 41.7 percent of the district deputies, and 74 percent of the province deputies. Peasants accounted for 38.4 and 10.6 percent, and merchants for 10.4 and 11 percent. The representatives of district and provincial assemblies were the district and provincial marshals of nobility. Zemstvo assemblies became governing institutions: They elected the executive authorities: the provincial and district executive boards (three or five people).

services, roads, statistics, and so on). Zemstvo taxes ensured the budget of zemstvo institutions. The budget was to be approved by the zemstvo assembly. It was compiled, mainly, from taxes on real estate (primarily land), and in this case the pressure was mainly on peasant land. Within the limits of their power, zemstvos had relative independence. The governor could only oversee the legitimacy of the zemstvo’s decisions. He also approved the chairman of the uezd executive board and the members of the provincial and uezd executive boards. The chairman of the provincial executive board had to be approved by the minister of the Interior. As a result of the zemstvo counterreform of 1890, the governor gained the right not only to oversee the reasonableness of the zemstvo’s decisions. A special supervising institution was created, called the Governor’s Bureau of Zemstvo Affairs. Over half of the voters in 1888 were bereft of electoral rights. The composition of zemstvo assemblies was changed in favor of the nobles. In the 1897 zemstvo elections, nobles constituted to 41.6 percent of district deputies and 87.1 percent of provincial deputies. The peasants obtained 30.98 and 2.2 percent.

The power of the zemstvo was limited to local tasks (medicine, education, agriculture, veterinary

The structure of zemstvo institutions contained no “minor zemstvo unit,” understood to mean a volost (rural district) unit that would be closest to the needs of the local population of all classes. Neither was there a national institution that would coordinate the activity of local zemstvos. In the end, zemstvos became “a building without a foundation or a roof.” The government opposed cooperation between zemstvos, fearing constitutionalist attitudes. Zemstvos did not have their own institution of compulsory power, which made them rely on the administration and police. All this soon made zemstvos stand in opposition to autocracy. They were especially active in the 1890s, when a socalled third element (professionals employed by zemstvos, or predominantly democratic members of the intelligentsia) became influential. In the early twentieth century, liberal zemtsy became overtly political, and in 1903 they formed the illegal “Union of Constitutionalist-Zemtsy.” In November of 1904, an all-Russian assembly of zemstvos was held in St. Petersburg, and a program of political reforms was developed, including the creation of a national representation with legislative rights. Later, many members of the movement joined the leading liberal parties, the Constitutional Democrats and the Oktobrists.

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By 1912 zemstvos had established 40,000 primary schools, approximately 2,000 hospitals, a network of libraries, reading halls, pharmacies, and doctors’ centers. Their budget increased to 45 times its 1865 level, amounting to 254 million rubles. In 1912, 30 percent of zemstvo expenditure went to education, 26 percent went to healthcare, 6.3 percent went to the development of local agriculture and the local economy, and 2.8 percent went to veterinary services. In 1912 zemstvos employed approximately 150,000 specialist teachers, doctors, agriculturists, veterinarians, statisticians, and others. By 1916 zemstvos were operating in 43 of the 93 provinces and regions. After the beginning of World War I, on August 12, 1914, zemstvos created the National Union of Zemstvos in aid to sick and wounded soldiers. In 1915 this Union united with the National Union of Cities. For the coordination of the two organizations, a special committee called “Zemgor” was created. Besides aiding the wounded, it also helped supply the army and helped refugees. After the March Revolution of 1917 the Zemgor chairman, prince Georgy Lvov, became the prime minister of the Provisional Government. The chairmen of the zemstvo executive boards were appointed the plenipotentiaries of the Provisional Government in their districts and provinces. Zemstvos were instituted in 19 more provinces and regions of Russia and volost zemstvos were created, forming the lowest institutions of local self-government. Re-elections were held in all levels of the zemstvo on the basis of universal, direct, equal, and secret voting. After the October Revolution, on January 17, 1918, by decree of the Soviet Government (Sovnarkom), the main committees of the Zemstvo and City Unions were dismissed and their possessions were given to the Supreme Council of National Economy. By July 1918 zemstvos in the territories controlled by the Bolsheviks were removed, but were reinstated in territories controlled by the White Armies and abroad. In 1921 a Committee of Zemstvos and Cities, once again called Zemgor, was established in Paris to provide aid to Russian citizens living abroad. Divisions of the Zemgor also operated in Prague and the Balkans. The Paris Zemgor exists to this day.

See also:

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Eklof, Ben, Bushnell John, and Zakharova Larissa, eds. (1994). Russia’s Great Reforms, 1855–1881. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

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Emmons, Terence, and Vucinich, Wayne S., eds. (1982). The Zemstvo in Russia: An Experiment in Local SelfGovernment. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press. Starr, Frederick S. (1972). Decentralization and SelfGovernment in Russia, 1830–1870. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Zaionchkovskii, Petr Andreevich. (1976). The Russian Autocracy under Alexander III. Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press. OLEG BUDNITSKII

ZERO-OPTION Originally conceptualized in 1979 by the Social Democratic party of West Germany, the concept of a “zero option” led to the first, albeit more symbolic than substantive, nuclear disarmament treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although it began as a simplistic rhetorical slogan among West German anti-nuclear activists, the concept of having zero nuclear missiles on the European Continent was embraced by U.S. President Ronald Reagan and eventually codified as the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. On November 18, 1981, Reagan announced the United States’ support for canceling the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe, in exchange for Soviet withdrawal of nuclear missiles already positioned in its Eastern European satellite states. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev immediately dismissed the idea, noting its asymmetric nature: The Soviets were being asked to dismantle an entire class of weapons (from Asia as well as Europe) in exchange for the United States’ nondeployment in Europe alone. As a result of a continued stalemate, Reagan ordered the deployment of nuclear missiles into Western Europe in 1983. Neither Reagan nor Brezhnev and his successors, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, were willing to compromise. Credit for the eventual success of the zero-option concept, as solidified through the signing of the INF Treaty, rests largely in the hands of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, who applied a new spirit to Soviet foreign policy. Gorbachev offered a series of unilateral concessions that essentially meant acceptance of a final treaty mirroring Reagan’s initial 1981 proposal. Ironically, as the 1980s progressed and the INF Treaty gained political momentum, it was the Western European nations that balked, voicing fears about Soviet conventional superiority in Europe.

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Such fears were quelled by the non-inclusion of British and French nuclear weapons in the final treaty, which was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union on December 8, 1987.

See also: ARMS CONTROL; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; INTERMEDIATE RANGE; NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bennett, Paul R. (1989). The Soviet Union and Arms Control: Negotiating Strategy and Tactics. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. Risse-Kappen, Thomas. (1988). The Zero Option: INF, West Germany, and Arms Control, tr. Lesley Booth. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. MATTHEW O’GARA

ZHDANOV, ANDREI ALEXANDROVICH (1896–1948), Soviet political leader. Andrei Zhdanov was one of Stalin’s most prominent deputies and is best known as the leader

of the ideological crackdown following World War II. After the assassination of Leningrad leader Sergei Kirov in 1934, Zhdanov became head of the Leningrad party organization. Also in 1934 he became a secretary of the party’s Central Committee and in 1939 a full Politburo member. He spent most of World War II leading Leningrad, which was besieged by Hitler’s troops. Zhdanov was transferred to Moscow in 1944 to work as Central Committee secretary for ideology and began playing a growing leadership role, which intensified his rivalry with Central Committee Secretary Georgy Malenkov. Zhdanov, as chief of the Central Committee’s Propaganda Department, became identified with official ideology, while Malenkov, chief of the party’s personnel and industrial departments, was identified with management of party activity and industry. In the maneuvering between these leaders, Zhdanov scored a victory over his rival by starting an ideological crackdown in August 1946, denouncing deviations by some literary journals and harshly assailing prominent writers. During Zhdanov’s campaign, Malenkov lost his leadership posts and fell into Stalin’s disfavor, while Zhdanov became viewed as Stalin’s most likely successor. Zhdanov’s role in the harsh postwar ideological crackdown earned him the reputation of the regime’s leading hardliner; the wave of persecution of literary and cultural figures became known as the Zhdanovshchina. In June 1947 Zhdanov denounced ideological errors and softness toward the West in Soviet philosophy. At a September 1947 conference of foreign communist parties, Zhdanov laid out the thesis that the world was divided into two camps: imperialist (Western) and democratic (Soviet). Zhdanov’s pronouncements fostered development of the Cold War and an assertion of basic hostility between Soviet and Western ideas.

Andrei Zhdanov, leader of the Leningrad Communist Party from 1934 to 1948. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS

However, the worst excesses of the Zhdanovshchina ironically were committed after Zhdanov’s death and were directed against Zhdanov’s allies. Zhdanov refused to back biologist Trofim Lysenko’s attacks on modern genetics, and Zhdanov’s son, who was head of the Central Committee’s Science Department, actually denounced Lysenko’s ideas in April 1948 and was later forced to recant publicly. In July 1948 Zhdanov was sent off for an extended vacation, during which he died on August 31, 1948. Malenkov returned to power in mid-1948, and, as Zhdanov was dying in August 1948, Lysenko was given free reign in science and

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initiated the condemnation of genetics and other allegedly pro-Western scientific ideas. In 1949 a campaign against Jews as cosmopolitans began. Also in 1949 Zhdanov’s proteges in Leningrad were purged (the Leningrad Case), many of them eventually executed. Zhdanov himself was spared public disgrace, unlike his proteges and his Leningrad party organization, which was cast into disfavor for years. Zhdanov continued to be treated as a hero, and when Stalin concocted the Doctors’ Plot in 1952, he cast Zhdanov as one of the victims of the Jewish doctors, who allegedly had poisoned the Leningrad leader. Although the symbol of intolerance in literature and culture and of hostility toward the West, Zhdanov was probably no more hard-line than his rivals. His denunciations of ideological deviations appeared largely motivated by his struggle to retain Stalin’s favor. But Stalin turned to a crackdown and a break with the West and drove the Zhdanovshchina into its extremes of anti-Semitism, Lysenkoism, and the execution of Leningrad leaders and Zhdanov proteges.

See also: JEWS; LYSENKO, TROFIM DENISOVICH; MALENKOV, GEORGY MAXIMILYANOVICH; PURGES, THE GREAT; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Graham, Loren. (1972). Science and Philosophy in the Soviet Union. New York: Knopf. Hahn, Werner G. (1982). Postwar Soviet Politics: The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation, 1946–53. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Medvedev, Zhores. (1969). The Rise and Fall of T.D. Lysenko. New York: Columbia University Press. WERNER G. HAHN

ZHELYABOV, ANDREI IVANOVICH (1851–1881), Russian revolutionary narodnik (populist) and one of the leaders of the People’s Will party. Andrei Zhelyabov was born in the village of Sultanovka in the Crimea to the family of a serf. He graduated from a gymnasium in Kerch with a silver medal (1869) and attended the Law Department of the Novorossiysk University in Odessa. He was expelled in November of 1871 for being involved in student-led agitation, and was sent home

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for one year. Upon returning to Odessa, in 1873 and 1874 he was a member of the Chaikovsky circle and spread revolutionary propaganda among workers and the intelligentsia. In November 1874, he was arrested but bailed out before the trial. Zhelyabov faced charges of revolutionary propaganda as part of the Trial of 193 (1877–1878) in St. Petersburg. He was declared innocent on the basis of insufficient evidence. After his release, he lived in Ukraine, where he spread revolutionary propaganda among the peasants. Disappointed with the ineffectiveness of his propaganda, Zhelyabov concluded that it was necessary to lead a political struggle. In June 1879 he took part in the Lipetsk assembly of terrorist politicians and was one of the authors of the formulation of the necessity of violent revolt through conspiracy. He joined the populist organization Zemlya i Volya (Land and Freedom) and became one of the leaders of the Politicians’ Faction. After the split of Zemlya i Volya in August 1879, Zhelyabov joined the People’s Will and became a member of its executive committee. On August 26, 1879, he took part in the session of the executive committee where emperor Alexander II was sentenced to death. He supervised the preparation of the assaults on Alexander II near Alexandrovsk in the Yekaterinoslav province in November 1879, where an attempt was made to blow up the tsar’s train. Zhelyabov also supervised the assault on the tsar in the Winter Palace on February 17, 1880, and an unsuccessful attempt to blow up Kamenny Most (Stone Bridge) in St. Petersburg while the tsar was passing there in August 1880. Zhelyabov took part in the devising of all program documents of the party. He is also credited with the creation of the worker, student, and military organizations of the People’s Will. He was one of the main organizers of the tsar’s murder on March 13, 1881, but on the eve of the assault he was arrested. On March 14, he submitted a plea to associate him with the tsar’s murder. During the trial, Zhelyabov, who refused to have a lawyer, made a programmatic speech to prove that the government itself, with its inappropriately repressive means of dealing with peaceful propagandists of socialist ideas, forced them to take the path of terrorism. Zhelyabov was sentenced to death and hanged on April 15, 1881, at the Semenovsky parade ground in St. Petersburg.

See also: ALEXANDER II; LAND AND FREEDOM PARTY; PEOPLE’S WILL, THE

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Figner, Vera. (1927). Memoirs of a Revolutionist. New York: International Publishers. Footman, David. (1968). Red Prelude: A Life of A. I. Zhelyabov. London: Barrie & Rockliff; The Cresset Press. Venturi, Franco. (1983). Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. OLEG BUDNITSKII

ZHENOTDEL The Women’s Section of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (1919–1930). In November 1918 Alexandra Kollontai, Inessa Armand, Nadezhda Krupskaya, Konkordia Samoilova, Klavdia Nikolayeva, and Zlata Lilina organized the First National Congress of Women Workers and Peasants. This was not actually the first national women’s congress, as Russian feminists had held a huge conference in St. Petersburg in December 1908. Kollontai and her comrades, however, explicitly rejected any parallels to the earlier conference, arguing that they sought not to separate women’s issues from men’s but rather to weld and forge women and men into the larger socialist liberation movement. Despite serious ambivalence over whether to create a separate women’s organization, the Congress passed a resolution requesting the party Central Committee to organize “a special commission for propaganda and agitation among women.” The organizers limited their designs for this commission, however, initially claiming that it would serve “merely as a technical apparatus” for implementing Central Committee decrees. This was not, they insisted, a feminist organization. The Central Committee now sanctioned the formal creation of women’s commissions at the local and central levels. In September 1919 the Central Committee passed a decree upgrading the commissions to the status of sections (otdely) within the party committees, thus creating the zhenotdel, or women’s section.

top women Bolsheviks (especially Kollontai and Armand) had begun their social activism by working among women, while others (including Krupskaya, Samoilova, Nikolayeva, and Lilina) had worked on the party’s journal The Woman Worker (Rabotnitsa) in 1913 and 1914. One reason motivating Kollontai in particular as early as the spring of 1917 was a fear that if the Bolshevik Party did not organize an effective women’s movement, Russian women living under conditions of war and privation might well be drawn into the remnants of the prerevolutionary feminist or Menshevik movements. Related to that was a persistent anxiety among Bolsheviks of all outlooks that if they did not recruit women into the official party, their (i.e., women’s) backwardness would make them easy targets for all manner of counterrevolutionary forces. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the early party-state desperately needed to mobilize every woman and man to support the Red Army in the Civil War. Nonetheless, the ambivalence of the 1918 Congress dogged the women’s section for the whole of its existence. The leaders themselves expressed ambivalence about the project on which they were embarking. Were they creating special sections and special conferences so that, in the long run, they could eliminate the need for such sections and conferences? Many female activists, moreover, had personally chosen socialist organizing and activism because they sought an escape from gender stereotyping; they did not want to be thought of as women, let alone as professionally responsible for women’s advancement. From the outset the top leadership of the zhenotdel faced a wide range of organizational problems. These included constant turnover of their personnel as their best members were siphoned off for other projects; communication difficulties between Moscow and the regions; resistance of rural and urban women to outside organizers; and resistance of male party members who thought this work completely unnecessary.

Several factors played into the creation of the women’s sections. The top leadership of the party, including Vladimir Ilich Lenin, were well aware of the German Women’s Bureau and International Women’s Secretariat created by Clara Zetkin and the German Social Democratic Party. Many of the

Despite all these difficulties the zhenotdel made significant gains in the area of organization-building during the period from 1919 to 1923. Often working in special interdepartmental commissions, they established relations with the Maternity and Infant Section (OMM) of the Commissariat of Health, as well as with the Commissariats of Education, Labor, Social Welfare, and Internal Affairs. They addressed issues of abortion and motherhood, prostitution, child care, labor conscription, female unemploy-

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ment, labor regulation, and famine relief. They argued vehemently with the trade unions that there should be special attention to female workers. They published special “women’s pages” (stranichki rabotnitsy) in the major newspapers, two popular journals (Rabotnitsa and Krestyanka), and Kommunistka, which was geared toward organizers and instructors working among women. With the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921, zhenotdel activists faced a whole host of new problems: rising and disproportionately female unemployment; cutbacks in budgeting for local party committees which prompted them to try to liquidate their women’s sections altogether; cutbacks in the social services (child care, communal kitchens, etc.) that zhenotdel activists had hoped would assist in the emancipation of women from the drudgery of private child care and food preparation. Kollontai and her colleagues now began insisting, in Kollontai’s words, on not eliminating but strengthening the women’s sections. They wanted the women’s sections to have more representatives on the factory committees and Labor Exchanges (which handled job placements for unemployed workers), in trade unions, and in the Commissariats. The party responded to this increased insistence with charges of feminist deviation. In February 1922 Kollontai (now tainted as well by her involvement in the Workers’ Opposition) was replaced as head of the zhenotdel by Sofia Smidovich. Smidovich, a contemporary of Kollontai, was much more socially conservative and less adamant about all the injustices to women. Kollontai and her close assistant, Vera Golubeva, did not cease to sound the alarm about women’s plight, even when Kollontai was reassigned to the Soviet trade union delegation in Norway. From her exile in 1922, Kollontai, calling the New Economic Policy “the new threat,” expressed fears that women would be forced out of the workforce and back into domestic subservience to their male companions. She now even began to question whether feminism was such a negative term. The Twelfth Party Congress in April 1923 reacted vehemently against the possibility of any such feminist deviations. At the same congress, Stalin (normally reticent on women’s issues) now praised women’s delegate meetings organized by the zhenotdel as “an important, essential transmission mechanism” between the party and the female masses. As such, they should be used to “extend and direct the party’s tentacles in order to under-

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mine the influence of the priests among youth, who are raised by women.” Through such tentacles, the party would be able to “transmit its will to the working class.” Three months later Smidovich announced that Kommunistka would no longer carry theoretical discussions of women’s emancipation. Unfortunately, the historical record of the zhenotdel for the period after 1924 is less clear than the earlier record because the relevant files of the women’s section are missing from the party archives. The women’s section in 1924–1925 was headed by Nikolayeva, herself a woman of the working class and long-time activist in the Leningrad women’s section. In May 1924 the Thirteenth Party Congress again attacked the zhenotdel, accusing it this time of one-sidedness (odnostoronnost) for focusing too much on agitation and propaganda rather than working directly on issues of women’s daily lives. Soon thereafter Nikolayeva, Krupskaya, and Lilina became embroiled in the Leningrad Opposition. It is quite likely that the zhenotdel records were purged because of this. Alexandra Artyukhina, newly appointed as director of the section (replacing Nikolayeva), made a point of arguing that the women’s sections should propagandize against the Leningrad Opposition on the grounds that otherwise female workers would fall for their false slogans in favor of “equality” and “participation in profits.” Now more than ever the women’s sections strove to prove their original contention that they had “no tasks separate from the tasks of the party.” During the second half of the 1920s the women’s section toed the party line, participating in military preparedness exercises for women workers during the war scare of 1927, as well as in the collectivization and industrialization drives of 1928–1930. In January 1930 the Central Committee of the CPSU announced that the women’s sections were being liquidated as part of a general reorganization of the party. While the decree declared that work among the female masses had “the highest possible significance,” this work was now to be done by all the sections of the Central Committee rather than by special women’s sections. In some parts of the country, especially Central Asia, the women’s sections were replaced by women’s sectors (zhensektory). Kommunistka was completely closed down. Lazar Kaganovich, Stalin’s spokesman for this move, claimed that since the women’s section had now completed the circle of its development, it was no longer necessary. The historic “woman question” had now been solved.

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The impossible position of the women’s sections can be clearly seen in resolutions and criticisms of the last years of their existence. They were sometimes criticized for devoting too little attention to daily life (byt), while other times they were attacked for too much of a social welfare bias in helping women in their daily lives. If they were too outspoken, they were accused of feminist deviations, while if they were not visible enough in their work, they were accused of passivity. Ultimately, the untenable position of the women’s sections arose from their position as transmission belts between the party and the masses. While the founders of the zhenotdel had hoped that they could carry women’s voices and needs to the party, the party insisted that the principal role of the women’s sections was to convey the party’s will to the female masses.

See also: ABORTION POLICY; ARMAND, INESSA; FEMINISM; KOLLONTAI, ALEXANDRA MIKHAILOVNA; KRUPSKAYA, NADEZHDA KONSTANTINOVNA; MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIFE; SAMOILOVA, KONDORDIYA NIKOLAYEVNA

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Clements, Barbara Evans. (1992). “The Utopianism of the Zhenotdel.” Slavic Review 51:485–496. Clements, Barbara Evans. (1997). Bolshevik Women. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Elwood, Ralph C. (1992). Inessa Armand: Revolutionary and Feminist. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Goldman, Wendy Z. (1996). “Industrial Politics, Peasant Rebellion, and the Death of the Proletarian Women’s Movement in the USSR.” Slavic Review 55:46–77. Hayden, Carol Eubanks. (1976). “The Zhenotdel and the Bolshevik Party.” Russian History 3(2):150–173. Massell, Gregory. (1974). The Surrogate Proletariat: Moslem Women and Revolutionary Strategies in Soviet Central Asia, 1919–1929. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Wood, Elizabeth A. (1997). The Baba and the Comrade: Gender and Politics in Revolutionary Russia. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. ELIZABETH A. WOOD

lize the Soviet people around issues concerning their lives. Involvement in trades unions, comrades courts, and citizens’ volunteer detachments was also encouraged during this period. The zhensovety were part of Khrushchev’s “differentiated approach” to politics, according to which women’s organizations were now acceptable again on the grounds that they targeted one particular group of citizens, just as other organizations dealt with particular groupings, such as youth and pensioners. From 1930 when Stalin declared the “woman question” to be solved, separate organizations for women, with the exception of the movement of wives (dvizhenie zhen), were closed down on the grounds that they smacked of “bourgeois feminism” and were divisive of working-class unity. Now it was recognized that the political education of women was one of the weakest areas of party work and in need of attention. Zhensovety were formed in factories and offices and on farms. They were set up at regional (oblast), territory (kray), and district (rayon) levels of administration. Their sizes varied from around thirty to fifty members at regional levels and fifteen to twenty at district level to smaller groups of five to seventeen in factories and farms. There was no uniform pattern across the women’s councils, as some were closely affiliated with the party, others with the soviets, and still others with the trade union. They divided their work into sections such as daily life, culture, mass political work, child care, health care, and sanitation and hygiene. Their activities usually reflected official party priorities for work among women. The zhensovety continued to exist on paper in the years of Leonid Brezhnev’s leadership but in fact did very little. They were formal in most areas rather than active. As part of his policy of democratization, Mikhail Gorbachev revived and restructured them. In 1986, at the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress in Moscow, Gorbachev called for their reinvigoration. By the spring of 1988, 2.3 million women were active in 236,000 zhensovety. As in the past, each women’s council was preoccupied with issues of local concern. Their work was divided into the typical sections of “daily life and social problems,” “production,” “children,” and “culture.”

The zhenskie sovety (women’s councils), or zhensovety in shortened form, were set up after 1958 under Nikita Khrushchev as part of his attempt to mobi-

At the nineteenth All-Union Conference of the CPSU in June 1988, Gorbachev argued that women’s voices were not heard and that this had been the case for years. He regretted that the women’s movement was at a “standstill,” at best “formal.” He placed the zhensovety for the first

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time under the hierarchical umbrella of the Soviet Women’s Committee. In 1989 Gorbachev reformed the electoral system. In the newly elected Congress of People’s Deputies, the zhensovety had 75 “saved” seats among the 750 seats reserved for social organizations.

See also:

FEMINISM; MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIFE

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Browning, Genia. (1987). Women and Politics in the USSR. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Browning, Genia. (1992). “The Zhensovety Revisited.” In Perestroika and Soviet Women, ed. Mary Buckley. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Buckley, Mary. (1989). Women and Ideology in the Soviet Union. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Buckley, Mary. (1996). “The Untold Story of Obshchestvennitsa in the 1930s.” Europe-Asia Studies 48(4):569–586. Friedgut, Theodore H. (1979). Political Participation in the USSR. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. MARY BUCKLEY

Ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky rails against the United States during a January 19, 2003, rally in Moscow. © AFP/ CORBIS

ZHIRINOVSKY, VLADIMIR VOLFOVICH (b. 1946), founder and leader of the LiberalDemocratic Party of Russia, deputy speaker of the State Duma. Born in Alma-Ata in Kazakhstan, Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovsky was the son of a Jewish lawyer from Lviv and a Russian woman. After his father’s death he was raised by his mother. He graduated from Moscow State University in 1969, then served in the army in Tiflis, where he worked in military intelligence. From 1973 to 1991 Zhirinovsky worked at various jobs in Moscow and at night attended law school at Moscow State University. In the 1980s he directed legal services for Mir publishing. With the coming of perestroika Zhirinovsky began his political career. In 1988 he founded the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), the second legal party registered in the Soviet Union. In 1991 he ran for the presidency of Russia and received 6 million votes. Emphasizing populism and great-power chauvinism and denouncing corruption, he built up a loyal party organization. In the December 1993 parliamentary elections, Zhiri-

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novsky parlayed discontent with Boris Yeltsin into a plurality in the State Duma. In the complex election system for individual candidates and party slates, the LDPR received 23 percent of the total vote, fifty-nine of the party seats in the Duma, and five individual seats. In the December 1995 Duma elections, the LDPR vote fell sharply to 11.1 percent, and the party won only fifty-five seats in the parliament, well behind the resurgent Communist Party. In 1996 Zhirinovsky ran for president again, but this time he finished fifth (5.7 percent) in the first round of voting and was eliminated. In the Duma elections of 1999 the LDPR drew 6.4 percent of the vote and got nineteen seats. Zhirinovsky was elected deputy speaker of the Duma. In the 2000 presidential election he ran again and drew only 2.7 percent of the vote, or a little more than 2 million out of the 75 million who voted. Zhirinovsky supported both the first and the second Chechen War. An acute student of mass media, he remained in the national spotlight by combining outlandish behavior, populist appeal, and authoritarian nationalism. His antics included fist fights on the floor of the Duma and throwing

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orange juice on Boris Nemtsov during a television debate. He made headlines by threatening to take Alaska back from the United States and to flood the Baltic republics with radioactive waste. Zhirinovsky has called for a Russian dash to the south that would end “when Russian soldiers can wash their boots in the warm waters of the Indian Ocean.”

See also:

LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Fraser, Graham, and Lancelle, George. (1994). Absolute Zhirinovsky: A Transparent View of the Distinguished Russian Statesman. New York: Penguin Books. Kartsev, Vladimir, with Todd Bludeau. (1995). Zhirinovsky! New York: Columbia University Press. Kipp, Jacob W. (1994).“The Zhirinovsky Threat.” Foreign Affairs 73(3):72-86. Zhirinovsky, Vladimir. (1996). My Struggle: The Explosive Views of Russia’s Most Controversial Public Figure. New York: Barricade Books. JACOB W. KIPP

ZHORDANIA, NOE NIKOLAYEVICH (1868–1953), Menshevik leader; president of Georgia. The most important leader of the Georgian Social Democrats (Mensheviks), Noe Nikolayevich Zhordania was born in western Georgia to a petty noble family. Educated at the Tiflis Orthodox Seminary (just years before Josef Stalin entered that institute that bred so many revolutionaries), Zhordania went on to Warsaw for further education and there was introduced to Marxism. His writings in the Georgian progressive journal kvali (trace) in the early 1890s inspired young radicals soon to be known as the mesame dasi (third generation). Zhordania combined a Marxist critique of Russian autocracy and the Armenian-dominated capitalism of his native Georgia with a patriotism that appealed broadly to workers, students, and peasants. By 1905 he had affiliated with the more moderate wing of Russian Social Democracy, the Mensheviks, and took the bulk of Georgian Social Democrats along with him. Radicals like the young Stalin were isolated in the Georgian party and eventually made their careers outside the country.

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During the first Russian Revolution in 1905– 1906, the Mensheviks dominated Georgia, essentially routing tsarist authority in the country, but brutal repression restored the rule of the government. In 1906 Zhordania was elected to the first State Duma, the new parliament conceded by the tsar. But within a few months the tsar dissolved the duma, and Zhordania and other radicals signed the Vyborg Manifesto protesting the dissolution. Zhordania was forced into the political underground, writing for clandestine newspapers and sparring in print with Stalin over the question of non-Russian nationalities. With the outbreak of the revolution in 1917 Zhordania became the chairman of the Tiflis Soviet. He was an opponent of the Bolshevik victory in Petrograd in October of that year and was instrumental in the declaration of an independent Georgian republic on May 26, 1918. Zhordania was elected president of the republic and served until the invasion of the Red Army in February 1921. From exile in France he planned an insurrection against the Communist government, but the revolt of August 1924 was bloodily suppressed by the Soviets. Zhordania spent his last years in exile, largely in France, writing his memoirs, conspiring with Western intelligence agencies against the Soviets in Georgia, still the acknowledged leader of a movement whose members fought bitterly one with another.

See also:

CAUCAUS; GEORGIA AND GEORGIANS; MENSHE-

VIKS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Jones, Stephen. (1989). “Marxism and Peasant Revolt in the Russian Empire: The Case of the Gurian Republic.” Slavonic and East European Review 67(3): 403–434. Suny, Ronald Grigor. (1994). The Making of the Georgian Nation. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. RONALD GRIGOR SUNY

ZHUKOV, GEORGY KONSTANTINOVICH (1896–1974), marshal of the Soviet Union (1943), four-time Hero of the Soviet Union, and the Red Army’s “Greatest Captain” during the Soviet Union’s Great Patriotic War (World War II). Stalin’s closest wartime military confidant, Georgy Zhukov was a superb strategist and prac-

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titioner of operational art who nonetheless displayed frequent tactical blemishes. Unsparing of himself, his subordinates, and his men, he was renowned for his iron will, strong stomach, and defensive and offensive tenacity. A veteran of World War I and the Russian Civil War, Zhukov graduated from the Senior Command Cadre Course in 1930 and became deputy commander of the Belorussian Military District in 1938 and commander of Soviet Forces in Mongolia in 1939. After Zhukov defeated Japanese forces at Khalkhin Gol in August 1939, Stalin appointed him commander of the Kiev Special Military District in June 1940 and Red Army Chief of Staff and Deputy Peoples’ Commissar of Defense in January 1941. During World War II, Zhukov served on the Stavka VGK (Headquarters of the Supreme High Command) as First Deputy Peoples’ Commissar of Defense and Deputy Supreme High Commander, as Stavka VGK representative to Red Army forces, and as front commander. In June 1941 Zhukov orchestrated the Southwestern Front’s unsuccessful armored counterstrokes near Brody and Dubno against German forces in Ukraine. As Reserve Front (army group) commander from July to September, Zhukov slowed the German advance at Smolensk, prompting Hitler to delay his offensive against Moscow temporarily. Zhukov directed the Leningrad Front’s successful defense of Leningrad in September 1941 and the Western Front’s successful defense and counteroffensive at Moscow in the winter of 1941–1942. In the summer of 1942, Zhukov’s Western Front conducted multiple offensives to weaken the German advance toward Stalingrad and, in November-December 1942, led Operation Mars, the failed companion piece to the Red Army’s Stalingrad counteroffensive (Operation Uranus), against German forces west of Moscow. During the winter campaign of 1942–1943, Zhukov coordinated Red Army forces in Operation Spark, which partially lifted the Leningrad blockade, and Operation Polar Star, an abortive attempt to defeat German Army Group North and liberate the entire Leningrad region. While serving as Stavka VGK representative throughout 1943 and 1944, Zhukov played a decisive role in Red Army victories at Kursk and Belorussia, the advance to the Dnieper, and the liberation of Ukraine, while suffering setbacks in the North Caucasus (April-May 1943) and near Kiev (October 1943). Zhukov commanded the First Belorussian Front in the libera-

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Marshal Georgy Zhukov led the Red Army to victory in World War II and helped bring Nikita Khrushchev to power in 1953. © HULTON ARCHIVE

tion of Poland and the victorious but costly Battle of Berlin. After commanding the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces, Germany, and the Soviet Army Ground Forces, and serving briefly as Deputy Armed Forces Minister, Zhukov was “exiled” in 1946 by Stalin, who assigned him to command the Odessa and Ural Military Districts, ostensibly to remove a potential opponent. Rehabilitated after Stalin’s death in 1953, Zhukov served as minister of Defense and helped Khrushchev consolidate his political power in 1957. When Zhukov resisted Khrushchev’s policy for reducing Army strength, at Khrushchev’s instigation, the party denounced Zhukov, ostensibly for “violating Leninist principles” and fostering a “cult of Comrade G.K. Zhukov” in the army. Replaced as minister of Defense by Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovsky in October 1957 and retired in March 1958, Zhukov’s reputation soared once again after Khrushchev’s removal as Soviet leader in 1964.

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N I K O L A I

Y E G O R O V I C H

KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH; STALIN,

JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH; WORLD WAR II

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Anfilov, Viktor. (1993). “Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov.” In Stalin’s Generals, ed. Harold Shukman. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Glantz, David M. (1999). Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat: The Red Army’s Epic Disaster in Operation Mars, 1942. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich. (1985). Reminiscences and Reflections. 2 vols. Moscow: Progress. DAVID GLANTZ

ZHUKOVSKY, NIKOLAI YEGOROVICH (1847–1921), scientist whose research typified the innovative avionics of prerevolutionary Russia. Like a number of other outstanding Russian scientists of the early Soviet period, Nikolai Yegorovich Zhukovsky was trained in the tsarist era and began his scientific career before the revolution. A specialist in aerodynamics and hydrodynamics, he supervised the construction of one of the world’s first experimental wind tunnels in 1902 and founded the first European institute of aerodynamics in 1904. He was a corresponding member of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences. Early in the Soviet period, Zhukovsky was chosen to head the new Central Aero-Hydrodynamics Institute. Zhukovsky developed the principal concepts underlying the science of space flight, and in that sense he was a pioneer, not only of aviation in prerevolutionary Russia, but of the later strides made by Soviet scientists. One of his innovations was the testing of intricate aerial maneuvers (e.g., loop-theloop, barrel rolls, spins) based on his earlier studies of the flight of birds. Vladimir I. Lenin called Zhukovsky the “father of Russian aviation.” He died of old age at seventy-four.

See also:

AVIATION; SPACE PROGRAM

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Oberg, James E. (1981). Red Star in Orbit. New York: Random House. Petrovich, G. V., ed. (1969). The Soviet Encyclopedia of Space Flight. Moscow: Mir. ALBERT L. WEEKS

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ZINOVIEV, GRIGORY YEVSEYEVICH (1883–1936), Bolshevik revolutionary leader and associate of Lenin who after 1917 became first an ally, then rival, of Stalin and later fell victim to the Great Purge. Grigory Yevseyevich Zinoviev was born as Yevsei-Gershon Aronovich Radomyslsky in Yelizavetgrad (later renamed Zinoviesk, now Kirovohrad, Kherson province, Ukraine). Of lower-middle-class Jewish origin, and with no formal education, he joined the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party in 1901. When the party split in 1903, Zinoviev followed Vladimir Lenin’s Bolshevik faction. Having gained experience as a political agitator in St. Petersburg during the 1905 Revolution, he became a member of the party’s Central Committee in 1907. After a brief term in prison the following year, Zinoviev was released because of his poor health and joined Lenin in western European exile. A fiery orator and provocative political writer, during the next ten years Zinoviev edited numerous Bolshevik publications and supported Lenin against opposition from both within the party and other revolutionary groups. In April 1917, after the overthrow of the tsar at the end of February, Zinoviev returned with Lenin to Russia on the “sealed” train through Germany and took over editorship of the Bolshevik newspaper Pravda until it was banned in July. During the year, however, Zinoviev increasingly took issue with Lenin’s confidence in Bolshevik strength and his refusal to collaborate with other socialist groups. In October, Zinoviev together with Lev Kamenev opposed the Bolshevik leader’s plans for an armed seizure of power. When Lenin the following month refused to include representatives of other socialist parties in the new Soviet government, Zinoviev (with four others) resigned from the Bolshevik Central Committee in protest. He was readmitted only a few days later after publication of his “Letter to the Comrades” in Pravda, in which he submitted to Party discipline. In January 1918, Zinoviev became head of the Petrograd Revolutionary Committee. In March 1919 he was elected chairman of the Executive Committee of the newly founded Communist International (Comintern). By 1921, he was a full member of the Politburo, chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, and leader of the regional Party organization. After Lenin’s death in January 1924, Zinoviev and Kamenev joined with Josef Vissarionovich Stalin in a tactical “triumvirate” to counter the aspirations of Leon Trotsky to the Party leadership. After Trot-

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sky’s defeat in 1925, Stalin turned against his former allies, who strove to maintain their authority by realigning themselves with Trotsky in the United Opposition against Stalin. Politically outmaneuvered, Zinoviev lost control of the Leningrad party organization and the Comintern in 1926 and in November the following year was expelled from the Communist Party. By publicly recanting his opposition to Stalin on several occasions, Zinoviev strove in vain to rehabilitate himself. In January 1935 he was arrested on charges of “moral complicity” in the assassination of Leningrad Party leader Sergei Mironovich Kirov, tried in secret, and sentenced to ten years in prison. In August 1936, Zinoviev was brought before the public in the first Moscow show trial. Abjectly accepting all the charges of terrorism and treason levelled against him, Zinoviev was condemned to death and executed on August 25, 1936. He was rehabilitated by the Soviet government in 1988.

See also: COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; SHOW TRIALS; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH; UNITED OPPOSITION; ZINOVIEV LETTER

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Haupt, Georges, and Marie, Jean-Jacques, eds. (1974). Makers of the Russian Revolution. London: Allen and Unwin. Hedlin, Myron W. (1975). “Zinoviev’s Revolutionary Tactics in 1917.” Slavic Review 34(1):19–43. NICK BARON

ZINOVIEV LETTER Letter of mysterious provenance purporting to have been sent by Grigory Zinoviev, head of the Communist International (Comintern), to the British Communist Party with instructions to prepare for revolution. The letter was first published on October 25, 1924, four days before a general election, in the British newspaper Daily Mail under the headline “Civil War Plot by Socialists’ Masters.” Its appearance caused great embarrassment to the Labour government of Ramsey MacDonald, which on February 2 of that year had bestowed diplomatic recognition on the Soviet Union and on August 10 had concluded a series of trade treaties, now awaiting parliamentary ratification. A conservative vic-

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tory in the October 29 elections signaled instead the launch of a vigorously anti-Soviet line, culminating in the abrogation of diplomatic ties in May 1927. Denounced immediately by the Soviet government as a forgery, investigations at the time and since have failed to discover conclusive proof of the letter’s authorship, which has been variously attributed to White Russian émigrés, Polish spies, the British secret services, communist provocateurs, or possibly even to Zinoviev. In January 1999, the British government published a report on the letter based on research in British and Russian secret service archives. This proposed that the document was a forgery instigated by White Russian agents in Berlin, carried out in Riga, Latvia, drawing on genuine intelligence information concerning Comintern activities, and channeled by British intelligence to Britain, where certain right-wing members of the security service proved eager to vouch for its authenticity and ensure it reached the press. The letter and subsequent “Red scare” did not, however, cause Labour’s electoral defeat or discredit the party, which had already suffered a parliamentary vote of no confidence and loss of Liberal support. Indeed, the Labour party’s vote in 1924 grew by one million over the previous year’s election.

See also:

GREAT BRITAIN, RELATIONS WITH; ZINOVIEV,

GRIGORY YEVSEYEVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Andrew, Christopher. (1977). “The British Secret Service and Anglo-Soviet Relations in the 1920s, Part 1: From the Trade Negotiations to the Zinoviev Letter.” The Historical Journal 20:673–706. Bennett, Gill. (1999). “A Most Extraordinary and Mysterious Business.” In The Zinoviev Letter of 1924. London: Foreign & Commonwealth Office, General Services Command. Chester, Lewis; Fay, Stephen; and Young, Hugo. (1967). The Zinoviev Letter. London: Heinemann. NICK BARON

ZUBATOV, SERGEI VASILIEVICH (1864–1917), senior security police official. Born and raised in Moscow, the son of a military officer, Sergei Zubatov was a staunch defender of the Russian monarchy who reorganized the Russian security police and created progovernment

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labor organizations. These activities earned him fear and anger from the revolutionary activists with whom he matched wits, as well as from more conservative government officials. Zubatov had exceptional rhetorical talents and a magnetic personality. He was the best-read student in his high school and the leader of a discussion circle. Although he associated with radical intellectuals, he advocated reform and opposed revolution. A self-proclaimed follower of Dmitry Pisarev, he believed that education and cultural development offered the best path to social improvement. He left high school before graduation, in 1882 or 1883, worked in the Moscow post office, and married the proprietress of a private selfeducation library that stocked forbidden books. Yet he developed monarchist views and became a police informant in 1885. He openly joined the security police in 1889 after radical activists discovered his dual role. As director of the Moscow security bureau from 1896, Zubatov led the antirevolutionary fight. Activists who fell into his snares found a well-read official who argued passionately that only revolutionary violence was preventing the absolutist monarchy from implementing reforms. Using charm and eloquence, he recruited talented, and sometimes dedicated, secret informants who laid bare the revolutionary underground. He systematized the use of plainclothes detectives, created a mobile surveillance brigade staffed with two dozen such detectives, and trained gendarme officers from around the empire. The major revolutionary organizations found it hard to withstand Zubatov’s sophisticated assault. Zubatov himself was not a gendarme officer, but a civil servant who attained only the seventh rank (nadvornyi sovetnik), or lieutenant colonel in military terms. Had he risen through the hierarchical, regimented military, he probably would not have conceived of “police socialism.” This policy advocated not the redistribution of wealth but the backing of workers in economic disputes with employers. In 1901, with the patronage of senior Moscow officials, he organized societies that provided cultural, legal, and material services to factory workers. Within a year, analogous societies sprang up in other cities, including Minsk, Kiev, and Odessa.

Department in St. Petersburg, he created a network of security bureaus in twenty cities from Vilnius to Irkutsk. He staffed many of them with his proteges trained in the new methods of security policing and encouraged to deploy secret informants within the revolutionary milieu. Meanwhile, however, his worker societies slipped out of control. In July 1903 a general strike broke out in Odessa and labor unrest swept across the south. Zubatov advocated restraint, but the Minister of Interior, Vyacheslav Plehve, used troops to restore order. Disillusioned with Zubatov’s labor policies and suspecting him of personal disloyalty, Plehve banished him from the major cities of the empire. Zubatov refused invitations to return to police service after Plehve’s assassination in 1904. A monarchist to the last, he fatally shot himself following the emperor’s abdication in 1917.

See also:

PLEHVE, VYACHESLOV KONSTANTINOVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Daly, Jonathan W. (1998). Autocracy under Siege: Security Police and Opposition in Russia, 1866–1905. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. Ruud, Charles A., and Stepanov, Sergei. (1999). Fontanka 16: The Tsar’s Secret Police. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Schneiderman, Jeremiah. (1976). Sergei Zubatov and Revolutionary Marxism: The Struggle for the Working Class in Tsarist Russia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Zuckerman, Frederick S. (1996). The Tsarist Secret Police in Russian Society, 1880–1917. New York: New York University Press. JONATHAN W. DALY

ZYUGANOV, GENNADY ANDREYEVICH (b. 1944), Russian politician, chair of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and head of its parliamentary faction since 1993.

In the fall of 1902 Zubatov was invited to reorganize the nerve center of the Russian security police. As chief of the Special Section of the Police

Gennady Andreyevich Zyuganov was born on June 26, 1944, in Mymrino, Russia. A member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union’s (CPSU) ideological department from 1983, Gennady Zyuganov sympathized with the conservative opposition to Gorbachev and helped found the anti-reform Russian Communist Party within the

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CPSU in 1990. He first gained notoriety as an antiGorbachev polemicist on the eve of the August 1991 coup and as a defender of the Russian Communist Party when Yeltsin banned it (from August 1991 to November 1992). As a prolific opposition publicist from the early 1990s, Zyuganov’s achievement was the rehabilitation of communism as a serious intellectual and political force. Ideologically, however, his “conservative communism” came to owe less of a debt to its Marxist-Leninist forebears and instead drew heavily from the idea of a Soviet “national Bolshevism,” which justified communist rule more for its service to national greatness than for its promise of a classless future. Zyuganov argued that Marxism was only one of the methods necessary for analyzing modern society, in which defense of Russian cultural and historical traditions, preservation of a global zone of influence, and the forging of broad alliances with national capitalists against the West took precedence over class revolution within Russia itself. Zyuganov realized that the communists urgently needed new ideas and allies merely to survive during and after the ban on their party, and that following the collapse of the USSR they could ignore issues of personal, ethnic, and national security only at their peril. More perceptively, he judged that Russia’s post-1991 intellectual commitment to market liberalism was deeply equivocal and offered in its stead a kind of “state patriotism,” based on the idea that communists and non-communists alike could unite in defending Russia’s state as the cradle of their common cultural heritage. This, he believed was a unifying vision that could fill the “ideological vacuum” left by Marxism-Leninism. Indeed, Zyuganov sought to reverse the liberal consensus that the period from 1917 to 1991 was a “Soviet experiment.” To achieve this, he argued that liberalism itself was the imposition alien to the collectivist and spiritual traditions that had been best expressed under communism. Simultaneously, Zyuganov was an energetic and practical politician; his alliance-building with nationalist and other opposition politicians helped him to become Communist Party leader in February 1993 and to formulate a consistent theme. He based his presidential bids on broad “national-patriotic fronts” that sought to extend the communists’ appeal. Zyuganov has presented a complex figure, whose leadership, ideas, and personality have been

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Gennady Zyuganov, chair of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, was Boris Yeltsin’s foe in parliament and for the presidency. PHOTOGRAPH BY MISHA JAPARIDZE. AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED

BY PERMISSION.

much critiqued. The prevalent Western view of him as a plodding party bureaucrat is a caricature, highlighting his lack of charisma while underestimating his tactical and organizational skill. The view of Zyuganov as a fascistic nationalist, most trenchantly argued by academic Veljko Vujacic, identifies his dalliance with Stalinism and anti-Semitism, while underplaying his moderate conservatism. Marxist charges that he renounced socialism and radicalism entirely correctly identify his debts to conservative Russian nationalism, while underestimating the necessity he faced of making ideological and electoral compromises. Even judged by his own aims, Zyuganov remains a paradoxical figure. His leftist critics have alleged that he failed to move Russia “forward to socialism” by failing to provide an intellectually coherent socialist alternative. While his arguments have found increasing appeal, particularly in governing circles, and his party was the most popular in parliamentary elections in the 1990s, he lost to Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential election run-off, and Vladimir Putin beat him by over twenty percent in the first round of the presidential election in March 2000.

See also:

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERA-

TION; PUTIN, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Lester, Jeremy. (1995). Modern Tsars and Princes: The Struggle for Hegemony in Russia. London; New York: Verso. March, Luke. (2002). The Communist Party in Post-Soviet Russia. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.

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Vujacic, Veljko. (1996). “Gennadiy Zyuganov and the ‘Third Road’.” Post-Soviet Affairs 12: 118–154. Zyuganov, Gennady A. (1997). My Russia: The Political Autobiography of Gennady Zyuganov. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. LUKE MARCH

E N C Y C L O P E D I A

O F

R U S S I A N

H I S T O R Y

A Abalkin, Leonid, 15, 431–432 Abashidze, Aslan, 20 Abatis Line, 525 Abbas Mirza, 1336 Abdication of Nicholas II, 484, 1052, 1298 Abkhazians, 1–2, 549, 551 Abortion, 2–3, 476 Abstract art Kandinsky, Vassily, 721 Malevich, Kazimir, 890 Abuladze, Tengiz, 977 Academic Affair, 1185 Academic University, 1620–1621 Academy of Arts, 3–4, 650 Academy of Russian Ballet, 117 Academy of Sciences, 4–8, 5 archives, 74 Communist Academy, competition with, 299–300 Complete Collection of Russian Chronicles, 255 Dashkova, Yekaterina Romanovna, 365 ethnography, 467 Folklore Committee, 509 historiography, 637 Institute of Russian Literature, 509, 1253–1254 Kantorovich, Leonid, 722 Lomonosov, Mikhail, 872 Pallas, Peter-Simon, 1132–1133 photography, 1178–1179 Platonov, Sergei Fyodorovich, 1185 polar expeditions, 1196 Ponomarev, Boris Kharitonovich, 1206 Shatalin, Stanislav Sergeyevich, 1380 universities, 1620–1622 Uvarov, Sergei Semenovich, 1625–1626 Zaslavskaya, Tatiana Ivanovna, 1720 Acceleration program, 15 Accounting systems, 744–745 Acmeism, 22, 620

Activists Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers, 294–295 Cultural Revolution, 350–352 environmentalists, 462–463 feminism, 493–496 Gamsakhurdia, Zviad, 538–539 Grigorenko, Peter Grigorievich, 609 Islam, 682 Korolenko, Vladimir Galaktionovich, 774–775 Petrov, Grigory Spiridonovich, 117 Actors and actresses Mikhalkov, Nikita Sergeyevich, 924 Orlova, Lyubov Petrovna, 1116–1117 Shchepkin, Mikhail Semeonovich, 1381 theater, 1537 training, 1460 Administration for Organized Recruitment, 8–9 Administrative command economic system. See Command administrative economy Administrative Russification, 1331–1332 Admiralty, 10, 10–11, 72, 1036–1037 Adoption, 474–475, 641 Adult education, 440 Adyge, 11 Adzhubei, Alexei Ivanovich, 12, 694–695 Aeroflot, 12–13 Afanasev, A. N., 508 Afanasiev, Yuri, 674, 675 Afghanistan, 13–14 Basmachis, 129–130 British invasion, 598 Soviet invasion, 940, 971, 1129–1130 Tajik support of U.S.-led campaign, 1515 Aganbegyan, Abel Gezevich, 14–15, 505 Agitprop, 15–16, 238, 818 Agni Yoga, 1291 Agrarian Party of Russia (APR), 16

INDEX Boldface page numbers refer to the main entry on the subject. Italic page numbers refer to illustrations, tables, and figures. Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

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A G R E E M E N T

Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, 502 Agriculture, 17–19 agrarian crisis, 427 agrarian reform, 16–17, 434, 1671 Armenia, 77 auxiliary plots, 822 babi bunty, 110 barshchina, 124 bednyaki, 133 black earths, 151 Civic Union, 264 economics, 230–231, 434, 1034 Estonia, 465 famine of 1932-1933, 479–480 Free Economic Society for the Encouragement of Agriculture and Husbandry, 520–521 geography, 546 Grain Crisis of 1928, 593–594 grain requisitions, 1233 growing seasons, 272 imperial era, 426–428 industrialization, 125, 284, 661–663, 765 Khruschev’s policy, 390–391, 747, 884 khutor, 749–750 Kievan Rus, 753 labor day, 815 land ownership, 822–823 Lysenko, Trofim Denisovich, 880–882 Machine Tractor Stations, 883–884 Moscow Agricultural Society, 966 New Economic Policy (NEP), 179 post-collectivization, 19 production, 434, 1152–1153 reform, 434 Scissors Crisis, 1355–1356, 1410–1411 Shari, 18 sovkhoz, 1437–1438 steppes, 1478 three-field system, 1545 virgin lands program, 1641–1642 voluntary cooperatives, 328 zagotovka, 1719–1720

O F

F R I E N D S H I P

See also Collective farms; Collectivization of agriculture; Peasantry Agrobiology, 881–882 Ahmad, 688 Air Assault Troops, 1445 Aircraft design Sikorsky, Igor Ivanovich, 1393 Tupolev, Andrei Nikolayevich, 1584 Air defense, 119 Airlift, Berlin, 143 Airlines, 12–13 Ajarian Autonomous Republic, 20 Ajars, 20 Akademgorodok, 94, 1352 Akayev, Askar Akayevich, 21, 21 Akhmad, 1599 Akhmatova, Anna Andreyevna, 21–22, 258, 1418 Akhromeyev, Sergei Fyodorovich, 22–23 Akhundov, Mirza Fath Ali, 23–24 Akkerman, Convention of, 24 Aksakov, Ivan Sergeyevich, 24–30, 668, 710, 1134, 1406 Aksakov, Konstantin Sergeyevich, 25–26, 668, 1406 Aksakov, Sergei, 460 Akselrod, Pavel Borisovich, 913–914 Alash Orda, 26 Alaska, 26–28 colonialism, 288 purchase, 27 Russian development, 1616 Albania Balkan Wars, 116 China, alignment with, 277–278 Albanian Church, 28 Albanians, Caucasian, 28 Alcohol alcoholic beverages, 512 alcoholism, 28–29, 30, 1160 alcohol monopoly, 29–31, 1646 anti-alcohol campaign, 580–581 Russians, 1325 Alexander I, 31–35, 32 Academy of Sciences, 4 Alaskan/United States relations, 27 architecture, 72 Battle of Austerlitz, 99–100

Cathedral of Christ the Savior, 200 censorship, 216 Chernyshev, advancement of, 243 Congress of Vienna, 1637 Czartoryski, relationship with, 356 Finland, 500–501 foreign policy, 639 French War of 1812, 524–525 Governing Senate, 592–593 Holy Alliance, 639 journalism, 708–709 language policy, 824 military, 9, 929–930 Napoleon and, 992–994, 993 Napoleonic Wars, 518, 805, 929 nationalism, 1004 nationalities policy, 1020–1021 neoclassicism, 1036–1037 Nesselrode’s foreign policy, 1039 Novosiltsev, relationship with, 1076 occultism, 1083 Old Believer committee, 1102 Pale of Settlement, 1131 Poland, relations with, 1193 Quadruple and Quintuple Alliances, 1259–1260 Romanticism, 1302 Secret Chancellery, 1469 secret police, 1469 serfdom, 458 Speransky’s reform plans, 1445–1446 State Council, 1465 Treaties of Paris, first and second, 1136 Treaty of Tilsit, 176, 1547, 1548 War of the Third Coalition, 1661 Alexander II, 35–38, 37 assassination, 39, 154, 495, 1162, 1469 Baryatinsky, relationship with, 125 censorship, 217 Emancipation Act, 447–448, 458 Ems Decree, 824 journalism, 709–710 legal system, 841 local government administration, 870

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Loris-Melikov, advice of, 873–874 military, 9–10, 930, 936, 943 Nikolayevich’s support of, 767 Old Believers, 1104 Perovskaya’s participation in assassination of, 1166 Reitern, administrative role of, 1281–1282 serfs, emancipation of the, 36 Three Emperors’ League, 1544 Treaty of Paris, 1135 zemstvo system, 870 Zhelyabov’s assaults on, 1725 See also Great Reforms Alexander III, 38–41, 39 censorship, 217 counterreforms, 336–337 Katkov’s influence, 726 Loris-Melikov’s reforms, rejection of, 874 military modernization, 930–931 Montenegro, relations with, 960 nationalism, 1007–1008 Old Believers, 1104 Pobedonostsev, influence of, 1188 Russification, 1023 state vodka monopoly, 30 temporary regulations, 1531 Alexander Mikhailovich, 41 Alexander Nevsky. See Alexander Yaroslavich Alexander Nevsky (movie), 443, 976 Alexander the Great, 106 Alexander Yaroslavich, 41–42, 58–59, 1703 Alexandra Fedorovna, 42–43, 49, 1297 Nicholas, relationship with, 1049–1050, 1052 Rasputin, relationship with, 1269–1270 Alexandrov, Grigory Alexandrovich, 43, 975, 1116 Alexandrova, Maria, 35 Alexei I, Patriarch, 43–44, 712, 1148, 1370 Alexei II, Patriarch, 44 Alexei Mikhailovich, 45, 45–48 Avvakum and, 104 Copper Riots, 329 Matveyev, appointments of, 907

monetary reform, 768 Morozova, arrest of, 962 Morozov’s role in administration, 963 Nikon, relationship with, 1056–1057 Old Believers, 1103 Secret Department, 1468 Thirteen Years’ War, 1543–1544 Alexei Nikolayevich, 42, 48–50, 49, 1297 Alexei Petrovich, 50 Alexeyev, Mikhail Vasilievich, 50–51, 381 Alexeyevna, Elizabeth, 32 Alim, Emir, 178 Alimony, 474, 475 Aliyev, Heidar, 51–52, 107 Alksinis, Viktor, 1439–1440 Alliance of World War II, 1686–1687 Allied intervention, 52–54, 267, 765, 1618 Alliluyeva, Svetlana Iosifovna, 54, 369 Allocation, funded resources, 511, 562 Allocation of goods, 904–905 All Russia bloc, 482 All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, 1090 All-Russian Church Council, 317 All-Russian Congress of Artists, 650 All-Russian Congress of Soviets, 321 All-Russian Constituent Assembly, 317–318 All-Russian Executive Committee of Peasants’ Deputies, 1090 All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating CounterRevolution and Sabotage. See Cheka All-Russian Extraordinary Commission on the Struggle Against Counter-Revolution, Sabotage, and Speculation (VCHk), 422, 616, 877 All-Russian Famine Relief Committee, 56 All-Russian Metalworkers’ Union, 1675

A N N A

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All-Russian Society for Conservation (VOOP), 461–462 All-Russian Union of Equal Rights for Women, 495 All Sorts of Things (journal), 708 All-Union Arctic Institute (VAI), 1197 All-Union Association of Proletarian Writers. See Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP) All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion, 581 All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), 1566 All-Union Conference of Stakhanovites, 1453 All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians-Baptists (AUCECB), 1239, 1361 All-Union ministries, 946 All-Union Society of Proletarian Tourism and Excursions (OPTE), 1562 All-Union Sports Classification System, 1449 Alphabets, 354, 354–355, 824–825 See also Language Al-Qaeda, 14 Altai, 54–55 Altyn, 55 Alveze Lamberti de Montagnano, 203 Amalrik, Andrei Alexeyevich, 55–56, 399 Amateur photographers, 1180 American Museum of Natural History, 469–470 American Red Cross, 1618 American Relief Administration (ARA), 56–57, 1618 Amin, Hafizulla, 13 Amu Darya, 177 Amvrosy, 1448 Anarchism, 57–58 Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich, 114 Kaplan, Fanya, 722–723 Kropotkin, Pyotr Alexeyevich, 790 Makhno, Nestor Ivanovich, 888 Tolstoy, Leo, 1559 Anatomy, 1181 Anderson, Anna. See Romanova, Anastasia Nikolayevna

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Andrei Alexandrovich, 58 Andrei Kobyla, 1296 Andrei Rublev (movie), 1517 Andrei Yaroslavich, 41–42, 58–59 Andrei Yurevich, 59–60, 753 Andreyev, Andrei Andreyevich, 1262 Andreyev, Leonid Nikolayevich, 60 Andreyev, Vasily, 115, 510 Andreyeva, Nina Alexandrovna, 60–61 Andropov, Yuri Vladimirovich, 61, 61–62 dissidents, 400–401 Gorbachev, promotion of, 578–579 succession of leadership, 1494 Andrusovo, Peace of, 62–63, 1113 Animism, 262 See also Paganism Anna Ivanovna, 63–64 ballet, 117 Bestuzhev-Ryumin, relationship with, 147 Biron, relationship with, 150 Elizabeth and, 446 Anna Karenina (Tolstoy), 570, 1558 Anno Domini (Akhmatova), 22 Antarctic exploration, 1197 Anthony, St., 214, 955 Anthony Khrapovitsky, Metropolitan, 64–65 Anthony Vadkovsky, Metropolitan, 65–66 Anti-alcohol campaign, 580–581 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, 66–67, 86 Anti-Bolsheviks Chernov, Viktor Mikhailovich, 242 Committee of the Constituent Assembly (KOMUCH), 761, 764–765 Constitutional Democratic Party, 320 Kerensky, Alexander, 735 Krasnov, Pyotr Nikolayevich, 783 Rodzianko, Mikhail Vladimirovich, 1290–1291 Wrangel, Peter Nikolayevich, 1692–1693 Antichresis, 1403

Anti-Comintern Pact, 67 Anticosmopolitanism, 331–332 Anti-Enlightenment, 651 Antifascism, 303–304, 1207–1208 Anti-Hitlerite Coalition. See Grand Alliance Anti-Mafia investigators, 1115 Antinuclear activists, 280–281 Anti-Party Group, 67–68 Kaganovich, Lazar, 716 Kozlov’s support of Khruschev, 782 Malenkov, Georgy, 778, 889–890 Antirevolutionaries, 1733–1734 Anti-Semitism Black Hundred movement, 152 cosmopolitanism, 331–332 Doctors’ Plot, 404–405 imperial era, 705 Pamyat, 1133 Poland, 1008 Russian National Unity Party, 1319 Soviet era, 1002 Stalin, Josef, 150 Anti-Stalinism Ryutin, Martemyan, 1340 Vlasov Movement, 1644–1645 Antonescu, Marshall Ion, 1293 Antonov, Alexander, 607, 608 Antonov Uprising, 68–69 Apocallyptic movements, 1362 “Apologia of a Madman” (Chaadayev), 223–224 Appanage era, 69, 1397 Apparat, 70 “Appeal to the Soviet People,” 97 April Theses (Lenin), 70, 853 Arabs, 79 Arakcheyev, Alexei, 33, 34 Arbitration Procedure Code, 338 Archaeology birchbark charters, 148–149 Gnezdovo, 565 Normanist Controversy, 1060–1062 Archbishop of Novgorod, 1068–1069 Architecture, 70–73 Admiralty, 10–11 Byzantine influence, 191

Cathedral of Christ the Savior, 200 Cathedral of St. Basil, 200, 201 Cathedral of St. Sophia, Kiev, 201, 201–202 Cathedral of St. Sophia, Novgorod, 202–203 Cathedral of the Archangel Mikhail, 203 Cathedral of the Dormition, 203–204 Catherine II, 207 Catherine Palace, 1578 constructivism, 325, 890 futurism, 529 Gatchina palace, 541 gigantomania, 557 Kiev, 754 Kremlin, 784–787, 785 Makary’s construction projects, 887 Melnikov, Konstantin Stepanovich, 911 Moscow Baroque, 968–969 nationalism, 999 neoclassicism, 1036–1037 Peter and Paul Fortress, 1175–1176 Peter I, 1170–1171 Rastrelli, Bartolomeo, 1270 subway system, 1492 suprematism, 890 Trinity St. Sergius Monastery, 1573 Winter Palace, 1667–1668 Archival Service of the Russian Federation, 74 Archives, 73–75 Memorial, 912 Smolensk Archive, 1408 Arctic exploration, 1196–1197 Arid Continental climate, 272 Armand, Inessa, 75–76, 1348–1349 Armenia and Armenians, 76–82, 77 Armenian Apostolic Church, 82–83 Caucasus, 1649 colonialism, 289 Dashnaktsutiun, 366 genocide, 545 Karabakh conflict, 81–82, 107 Lazarev Institute, 832

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Nagorno-Karabakh, 989–990 nationalism, 1007 Russification, 1008 Ter-Petrossian, Levon, 1532–1533 Armenian Apostolic Church, 82–83 Armenian National Movement, 81 Armory, 84–85, 650 Arms control, 85–88 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 66 Cold War, 279–281 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, 23, 86–87, 326–327 détente, 389–390 Hague Peace Conferences, 625 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 23, 672–673 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), 279 Moiseyev, Mikhail Alexeyevich, 951–952 Reykjavik Summit, 1288–1289 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT), 66, 389, 1486 Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), 1486–1487 zero option, 1723–1724 See also Cold War Army Nicholas II, 931–932 Peter I, 928 territorial army, 937 World War I, 931, 931–932 See also Military; Red Army; Warfare Arne, T. J., 1060 Around the World (journal), 1542 Ar-Rus, 1060 Art abstract, 721, 890 Academy of Arts, 3, 650 Armory, 84 Blue Rose movement, 1396 Byzantine influence, 191 chernukha, 242–243 futurism, 529 gigantomania, 557 Hermitage Museum, 984–985 icons, 649–651 lubki, 876 Makary, Metropolitan, 887

Malevich, Kazimir Severinovich, 890 Moscow Baroque, 968–969 nationalism, 997–1000 palekh painting, 1130 Prince Ivan and the Grey Wolf, 508 reality and, 244 religious, 396–397 Russians, 1326 Silver Age, 1393–1396 socialist realism, 1415–1419 Stasov, Vladimir Vasilievich, 1462–1463 World of Art, 139401395 See also Painters Artashesids, 79 Artek, 88–89 Artel, 3, 1130 Article 58, Soviet Criminal Code, 617 Article 6 of the 1977 Constitution, 89 Art of Victory (Suvorov), 1504 Artyukhina, Alexandra, 1727 Arutiunov, Grigor, 80 Ascription, 603 Ashkenazi, 703 Assassinations Alexander II, 38, 39, 154, 495, 1162, 1469 Bobrikov, Nikolai Ivanovich, 158 Demirjian, Karen, 82 Ferdinand, Francis, 101 Gapon, Georgy Appollonovich, 540 Gertsenshtein, Mikhail, 152 Iollos, Grigory, 152 Kirov, Sergei Mironovich, 759, 1457, 1459 Mirbach, Count, 839 Paul I, 1150 Sargisian, Vazgen, 82 Stolypin, Peter, 1482 Trotsky, Leon, 1577 Assemblies of the Land, 89–91 Law Code of 1649, 829–830 Mikhail Romanov, selection of, 1296, 1300 Minin, Kuzma, 945

N

I N D E X

Assembly of Russian Factory and Mill Workers of St. Petersburg, 157 Association of New Architects (ASNOVA), 911 Association of Russia’s Women Entrepreneurs, 1672 Association of State Publishing Houses (OGIZ), 588–589 Association of the Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON), 1066 Association of Traveling Art Exhibits, 3, 1463 Assortment plans, 91–92 Astana, Kazakhstan, 729 Astrakhan, Khanate of, 92–93, 690 Atheism, 834–835 Athletes, 1448–1452, 1449, 1451 Atomic energy, 93–96 See also Chernobyl Atommash Factory, 95 August 1991 Putsch, 96–99 Bakatin, Vadim Viktorovich, 111 Cabinet of Ministers, 195 Communist Party of the Soviet Union, demise of, 308 glasnost, 561 Lukyanov, Anatoly, 878–879 Pavlov, Valentin Sergeyevich, 1152 Pugo, Boris Karlovich, 1246–1247, 1247 Union Treaty, 1613 Varennikov, Valentin Ivanovich, 1632 Yanayev, Gennady Ivanovich, 1700 Yazov, Dmitry Timofeyevich, 1704–1705 Yeltsin, Boris, 1707 Austerlitz, Battle of, 99–100, 992 Austria Anna Ivanovna, 64 Balkan Wars, 115–116 Battle of Austerlitz, 99–100, 992 Bukovina, rule of, 180 Catherine II, 208 Congress of Vienna, 1637 Holy Alliance, 639 Prussia, relations with, 1242

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Austria (continued) Quadruple and Quintuple Alliances, 1259–1260 Russian/Austrian relations, 100–101 Seven Years’ War, 1375 Treaties of Paris, first and second, 1136 Uniate Church, 1606 Austria-Hungary Bosnia-Hercegovina, annexation of, 960 Congress of Berlin, 143–144 Convention of Berlin, 144 German alliance with, 556 Three Emperors’ League, 1544 Treaty of San Stefano, opposition to, 1350 World War I, 1676–1680 Austrian school of economics, 627 Autarky, 516, 662 Autocracy, 101–102 Anna Ivanovna, 63–64 Basil III, 128–129 Black Hundred, 151–152 capitalism, 198 education, 439–440 Fundamental Laws, 527 Loris-Melkov’s suggested reforms, 873–874 Nicholas I, 1047–1048 service state, 1371–1372 Automobiles, stolen, 1115 Avant-garde movement Blue Rose movement, 1396 Kandinsky, Vassily Vassilievich, 721 motion pircutres, 974 socialist realism, 1417 Avars, 102–103 Aviation, 103 aircraft design, 1393, 1584 Baltic Fleet, 120 Chkalov, Valery Pavlovich, 250–251 Dudayev, Dzhokhar, 412 KAL 007, 717 Sikorsky, Igor Ivanovich, 1393 Zhukovsky, Nikolai Yegorovich, 1732 Avvakum Petrovich, 104–106, 962, 1102

Azef, Evno, 1186 Azerbaijan and Azeris, 106–108, 107 administrative units, 1567 Aliyev, Heidar, 51 Armenia, relations with, 80, 1533 Baku, 113 Lezgins, 857–858 Musavat, 981–982 Nagorno-Karabakh, 989 Nakhichevan, 991 Narimanov, Nariman, 994 Azeris. See Azerbaijan and Azeris

B Babel, Isaac Emmanuyelovich, 109–110 Babi bunty, 110 Baer, Karl Ernst von, 4, 468–469 Bagratid dynasty, 79, 549–550 Bagration, Peter I., 524 Bahram Gur, 681 Baidukov, Georgy, 12 Baikal-Amur Magistral Railway (BAM), 110–111 Bakatin, Vadim Viktorovich, 111–112 Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich, 112–113, 1400 Baku, 113, 1376 Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich, 114 anarchism, 57–58 intelligentsia, 668 Nechayev, collaboration with, 1032 Balakirev, Mily, 920, 1290 Balakirev Circle. See Mighty Handful Balaklava, Battle of, 114–115 Balalaika, 115 Balans stoimostnykh obmenov mezhdu gorodom i derevnei (Barsov), 125 Baliev, Nikita, 193–194 Balkans Austrian policy, 100–101 Congress of Berlin, 143–144 Russian-Italian relations regarding, 685 Three Emperors’ League, 1544

Balkan Wars, 115–117, 116 Montenegro, 960–961 Romania, 1292–1293 Serbia, 1364 Balkar-Karachay, 213 Balkars, 117 Ballet, 117–119 Ballets Russes, 118, 392, 393 Bolshoi Theater, 162 The Firebird, 504 nationalism, 999 Nijinsky, Vaslav Fomich, 1054, 1054–1055 Pavlova, Anna Matveyevna, 1150–1151, 1151 Silver Age, 1394 Ballistic Missile Defense Orbanization (BMDO), 1487 Baltic Fleet, 119–120 Makarov, Stepan Osipovich, 886 Russo-Japanese War, 1333–1334 Baltic Germans, 826–827 Baltics German settlers, 554 Livonian War, 867–869 nationalism, 1002–1003 Popular Fronts, 1016–1017 Pugo’s crackdown, 1247 Sweden, relations with, 1507–1508 tsarist nationalities policy, 1020–1021 See also Estonia; Latvia and Latvians; Lithuania Banking system post-Soviet, 433 Russian Federation, 220–221 Sberbank, 1351 Soviet, 120–121, 958–959 Stroibank, 1489 tsarist, 121–122 See also Gosbank; Monetary policy Banquet campaign, 1286 Banya, 122–123 Baptists, 1239, 1361 Barannikov, Viktor Pavlovich, 123 Barclay de Tolly, Mikhail B., 523–524 Bardas Phokas, 252–253 Barkhin, Grigory, 72

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H I S T O R Y

B I S M A R C K ,

Barma, 201 Barnet, Boris, 974 Barone, Enrico, 123–124 Baroque architecture, 71 Barshchina, 124 Barsov, Alexander Alexandrovich, 124–125 Barthous, Louis, 865–866 Baryatinsky, Alexander Ivanovich, 125, 212 Baryshnikov, Mikhail, 370 Bashkortostan and Bashkirs, 126–127 nationalities policy, 1019–1020 Togan, Ahmed Zeki Validov, 1554–1555 Basic Legislature of the Russian Federation on the Archival Fond of the Russian Federation and Archives, 74 Basil I, 127–128, 265 Basil II, 128, 265–266 Basil III, 128–129, 362, 1132 Basil the Blessed, 71 Basil Yurievich, 265 Baskirs. See Bashkortostan and Bashkirs Basmachis, 129–130, 496–497, 1001 “Bat” (cabaret), 193–194 Bathory, Stephen, 869 Battle of Austerlitz, 99–100, 992 Battle of Balaklava, 114–115 Battle of Borodino, 33, 164–165, 524, 993 Battle of Chesme, 246 Battle of Khalkin-Gol, 737 Battle of Kulikovo Field, 408–409, 796, 1719 Battle of Kursk, 802–803 Battle of Leipzig, 34, 843–844 Battle of Lesnaya, 857 Battle of Moscow, 969–971 Battle of Mukden, 1333 Battle of Nations. See Battle of Leipzig Battle of Navarino, 1027–1028 Battle of Poltava, 601, 601, 1203, 1601 Battle of Sinope, 1399 Battle of Stalingrad, 1293, 1453–1455, 1454

Battle of Tannenberg, 1516, 1677 Battle of the Three Emperors, 99–100 Battle of Tsushima, 1335, 1581 Battle of Ugra River, 1599 Battle of Verdun, 1679 Battle of Warsaw, 1437 Battle of Zboriv, 742 The Battleship Potemkin (movie), 442 Battles of Narva, 995 Batu, 130–131, 572 Bauer, Yevgeny Frantsevich, 131–132, 972–973 Bayer, Gottlieb Siegfried, 637 Bazarov, Vladimir Alexandrovich, 132–133 Bazhenov, Vasily, 1036 Beard tax, 133, 1104, 1104 Bednyaki, 133 Bednye liudi (Dostoyevsky), 410 Beklemishev Tower, 785 Belarus and Belarusians, 133–136, 134 Lukashenko, Alexander, 878 Russia-Belarus Union, 1313 Russification, 1331 Belarusians. See Belarus and Belarusians Belgorod Line, 525 Belinsky, Vissarion Grigorievich, 136–137 golden age of Russian literature, 569 intelligentsia, 668 journalism, 709 narodnost, 1025 raznochintsy, 1273 Bell, James, 1 The Bell (newspaper), 710 Bell Tower of Ivan the Great, 786 Belovezh Accords, 137–138, 296, 1608 Beluga caviar, 215 Bely, Andrei, 138–139, 998 Belyakov, Alexander, 12 Bem, Józef, 1005 Benes, Eduard, 358 Bennigsen, Leonty, 32 Berdyayev, Nikolai Alexandrovich, 139–140, 642, 1635 Berezovsky, Boris, 420–421, 776, 777

O T T O

V O N

N

I N D E X

Beria, Lavrenti Pavlovich, 140–141, 141 Armenia, 80 execution of, 1472 Khrushchev and, 67, 746 nationalities policy, 1015 office of, 877 Bering, Vitus Jonassen, 142 Alaska, 27 Kamchatka expedition, 250 Berlin Berlin Wall, 553–554 Checkpoint Charlie, 278 Cold War, 278 Berlin, Congress of, 143–144, 1364 Berlin, Convention of, 144 Berlin Blockade, 142–143 Berlin conference, 38 Berseniev Witness, 750 Beschestie, 145 Bessarabia, 145–146 cession of, 176, 952 German settlers, 555 Romania, 1292–1293 Transnistria, merging with, 1568 tsarist nationalities policy, 1021 Bestuzhev-Marlinsky, Alexander, 23 Bestuzhev-Ryumin, Alexei Petrovich, 146–147 Besy (Dostoyevsky), 411 Betskoy, Ivan, 1409–1410 Beverages, 1325 Bezhin Meadow (movie), 443 Bezmin, Ivan, 84 Bible Church Slavonic Bible, 824 Ostroh Bible, 533 Russian translation, 498 Bierut, Boleslaw, 1195 Big Three, 1686–1687 Biology, 7, 1633–1634 Biomechanics, 919 Birchbark charters, 148–149 Birman, Igor, 1285 Birobidzhan, 149–150 Biron, Ernst Johann, 150–151 Birth rate decline, 900 Bishops, 1119 Bismarck, Otto von Congress of Berlin, 143–144

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I N D E X

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B O O K

Bismarck, Otto von (continued) German-Russian relations, 556 Gorchakov, support of, 584 Russian support of, 1242–1243 Black Book of Russian Jewry (Grossman), 612 Black earths, 151 Black Hundred, 151–152 Black market, 152–153 Black Repartition, 38, 133, 153–154 Black Sea Russo-Turkish Wars, 1336 Treaty of Jassy, 701 Treaty of Paris, 1135 Black Sea Fleet, 154–155 Nakhimov, Pavel Stepanovich, 991–992 Potemkin mutiny, 1214–1215 Blat, 155 Blaue Reiter group, 721 “The Blind Musician” (Korolenko), 774 Bliokh, Ivan Stanislavovich. See Bloch, Jan Bloch, Jan, 155–156 Bloch, Jean de. See Bloch, Jan Blok, Alexander Alexandrovich, 139, 156–157 Bloody Saturday. See Novocherkassk uprising Bloody Sunday, 157–158, 539–540, 1051, 1286 Blue Rose movement, 1396 Blue Stream natural gas agreement, 1588 Boas, Franz, 469–470 Bobrikov, Nikolai Ivanovich, 158 Bogdanov, Alexander Bazorov and, 132 Lenin’s break with, 160, 852 Lunacharsky and, 879 Proletkult, 1235–1236 science fiction, 1354 Bogolyubsky, Andrei Yaroslavich. See Andrei Yaroslavich Bogomolov, Oleg, 371 Bogrov, Dmitry, 1482 Boldyrev, Yuri, 316, 1695 Bolotnikov, Ivan Isayevich, 159, 1155, 1550–1551 Bolotnikov rebellion, 1548

O F

R U S S I A N

J E W R Y

Bolshevik Revolution Afghanistan, 13 Alash Orda, 26 British reaction, 599 country estates, destruction of, 337 Dzerzhinsky, Felix Edmundovich, 422 economic development levels, 660 internal disputes, 160–161 Mayakovsky, Vladimir Vladimirovich, 908–909 See also Bolshevism and Bolsheviks Bolshevism and Bolsheviks, 159–161 Allied intervention, 52, 267 anti-anarchism, 58 April Theses, 70 Armenia, 80 bednyaki, 133 black market, 152–153 Catholic Church, repression of the, 209 Caucasus, 214 class system, 271 commanding heights of the economy, 293 Committees of the Village Poor, 295 Constitutent Assembly, dissolution of, 764 Constitutional Democratic Party’s anti-Bolshevik movement, 320 cooperative societies, 328 cyrillic alphabet, 354 Decree on Land, 368–369 deportations, 384–385 education, 440, 670, 1623 elections of 1917, 318 episcopates, 464 Family Code on Marriage, the Family, and Guardianship, 474–475 fellow travelers, 492 feminism, 493–496, 762–763 foreign debt default, 513 foreign famine relief, 478–479 Genoa Conference, 544 Green Movement, 607–608 Gumilev, execution of, 620

( G R O S S M A N )

higher education policy, 440 human rights, 642 intelligentsia, 160, 670 internationalism, 1010 Izvestiya, 694 July Days of 1917, 713–714 Kerensky’s move against, 735 KOMUCH opposition to, 761 land policy, 821 language policy, 825 leaders, 1089 Left Opposition, 837–838 motion pictures, 973 nationalism, 1000 nationalities policy, 1010–1013 newspapers, 1044 October Revolution of 1917, 1088–1096 Orthodox Church, 269 party congresses, 1138–1139 People’s Commissariat of Nationalities, 1158–1159 Plekhanov’s opposition to, 1186 Pravda, launch of, 711 Provisional Government, 485 Red Army, 936–937 Red Terror, 1276 Right Opposition, 1289 Russian Communist Party, 298 Russian Orthodox Church, 1320–1321 Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party split, 1412 self-determination, 1332 smychka, 1410–1411 Soviet-Polish War, 1436–1437 soviets, 1433 State Political Administration (OGPU), 1471–1472 state security, organs of, 1470–1473 subbotniki, 1492 subversion, fear of, 1248–1249 Temporary Instructions on Deprivation of Freedom, 616 Tikhon, Patriarch, 1547 trade, 516 Ukrainization, 1603 women’s movement, 1726–1727 workers’ control, 1674

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See also Bolshevik Revolution; Civil War of 1917-1922; Mensheviks; October Revolution of 1917; Russian Revolution; War communism; Specific leaders Bolshoi Ballet, 119 Bolshoi Theater, 118, 161, 161–162 Boltin, Ivan, 637 Bombings, People’s Will, 38, 39 Bonner, Yelena Georgievna, 162–163, 399, 1345 Book of Degrees of the Royal Genealogy, 163–164, 256, 887–888 The Book of Denunciation, or the Eternal Gospels (Avvakum), 105 “The Books of Genesis of the Ukrainian People” (Kostomarov), 353–354 Boretskaya, Marfa Ivanovna, 164 Boris Godunov (Pushkin), 1537 Borisov-Musatov, Viktor, 1395–1396 Borodin, Alexander, 920, 1109, 1290 Borodin, Ivan, 461 Borodino, Battle of, 33, 164–165, 524, 993 Borotbisty, 165 Bosnia-Herzegovina, 144 Bosoi, Kassian, 707 Bourgeois disenfranchisement, 397–398 engineers, 350–352 Shakhty trial, 1377–1378 Boyar duma, 166–167, 414, 421 Boyars, 166 Golitsyn, Vasily Vasilievich, 575 Novgorod, 1073 Romanovs, 1295–1296, 1300–1301 Boycott, Olympic, 971, 1451–1452 Brain of the Army (Shaposhnikov), 1379 Brat’ia Karamazovy (Dostoyevsky), 411 Brazauskas, Algirdas, 167, 167–168 Bread, 1326 Breeder reactors, 94–95 Brenna, Vincenzo, 541 Brest-Litovsk Treaty, 168–169 Allied intervention, 52 British reaction, 599

Left Socialist Revolutionaries, 266–267 Spiridonova’s repudiation of, 1447 Brezhnev, Leonid Ilich, 170, 170–173 Andropov’s succession to, 62 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 66 Armenia, 81 Baikal-Amur Magistral Railway (BAM), 111 Chernenko, advancement of, 238 Constitution of 1977, 323 cult of personality, 349 détente, 389 developed socialism, 391 dissidents, 400 Friendship of Nations, 1002 general secretary position, 542 government corruption, 172, 196 Helsinki Accords, 632 intelligentsia, 671 Kosygin, subordination of, 779 Kunayev, relationship with, 797 motion pictures, 977 nationalities policy, 1016 party congresses, 1141–1142 Podgorny, relationship with, 1188–1189 samizdat, 560 science and technology policy, 1353 service state, 1373 Solidarity Movement, 1422 Soviet narod, 1027 strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT I), 86 succession of leadership, 1494 zero option, 1723 Brezhnev Doctrine, 169–170 Brezhnev generation, 352 The Brigadier (Fonvizin), 511 Briullov, Karl, 998 Broadsides, 876 Brodsky, Joseph Alexandrovich, 173–174 Bromlei, Yuly, 470, 1026–1027 The Brothers Karamazov (Dostoyevsky), 411 Brown, Walter Lyman, 56 Broys, Boris, 1417

M O U N D S

N

I N D E X

Bruce, James David, 174–175 Bruni, Fyodor, 1037 Brushvit, I. M., 765 Brusilov, Alexei Alexeyevich, 175, 932 Bryullov, Karl, 1037 Bryusov, Valery Yalovlevich, 175–176 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 1561 Bubonic plague, 1117 Bucharest, Treaty of, 24, 176–177 Buddhism, 189 Budenny, Semeon Mikhailovich, 177 Budget system, 959 Bukei, 731 Bukhara, 177–178 Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich, 178–180, 179 agriculture and industrialization, 661 Brest-Litovsk Peace, 267 execution of, 694 internationalism, 1011 Kalinin’s support of, 719 party congresses, 1139–1140 Pravda, 1217, 1217–1218 Right Opposition, 1289 show trial, 1389 Bukovina, 180–181 Bulavin, Kondrat, 1155, 1156 Bulgakov, Mikhail Afanasievich, 181 Bulgakov, Sergei Nikolayevich, 181–182, 1635 Bulganin, Nikolai Alexandrovich, 182–183 Anti-Party Group, 67–68 prime minister position, 1227 Bulgaria, 115–116, 183–185, 1364 Bulgarian Communist Party, 184 Bulgarians, 183 Bulgars, 751 Bulla family, 1179 Bund, Jewish, 185–186, 705, 1009 Bunin, Ivan Alexeyevich, 186 Burbulis, Gennady, 1362 Bureaucracy, economic, 186–188 Bureaucracy, government. See Government administration Burial mounds, 565

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T H E

Burnt by the Sun (movie), 978 Buryats, 188–189 Bush, George H. W., 66, 87–88 Bush, George W., 677, 890–891 Business and industry American/Russian business partnerships, 1617 Buryatia, 188 corporations, Russian, 330–331 Federal Property Fund, 489–490 Mafia capitalism, 884–885 merchant guilds, 615–616 Production Sharing Agreement, 1234 trusts, 1578 See also Commerce; Economic development; Industrialization; Soviet enterprise; Trade, foreign Butashevich-Petrashevsky, Mikhail Vasilievich, 189–190, 1176 Bylina, 190 Byzantine calendar, 196 Byzantine Empire Eastern Christianity, 252–253, 606 Georgia, 548–549 icons, 649 influence, 190–192, 1447–1448, 1542–1543 Kiev, relations with, 754 Leontiev, Konstantin, 855 Paleologue’s marriage to Ivan III, 1131–1132 Route to Greeks, 1305–1306

C Cabaret, 193–194 Cabinet of Ministers, Imperial, 64, 194–195 Cabinet of Ministers, Soviet, 195 Cadets. See Constitutional Democratic Party (Cadets) Cadres policy, 195–196 Calendar, 196–197, 1106 Cameron, Charles, 71, 1036 Campaign of Pruth River, 1243 Camp literature, 388 Camps, 88–89 Cancer, 240

S U N

( M O V I E )

Cancer Ward (Solzhenitsyn), 1425 Canning, Stratford, 176 Canonization Alexandra Fedorovna, 42 Alexei Nikolayevich, 49–50 Cyril, 757 Donskoy, Dmitry Ivanovich, 408, 409 Joseph of volotsk, 708 Kosmodemyanskaya, Zoya, 777 Makary, 888 Maxim the Greek, 908 Olga, 1107 Romanovs, 1298 Russian Orthodox Church, 1343–1344 Tikhon, Patriarch, 1547 Cantonists, 197 Capital investment, foreign. See Foreign debt Capitalism, 197–198 Hegelian theory, 631 labor theory of value, 815–816 laws of capitalist development, 903 state capitalism, 1463 Varga, Eugene Samuilovich, 1632 Capitalist accumulation, 1227–1228 Capital (Marx), 816 Capital stock, 430–431 Carol II, 146 Carpathians, 1677 Carpatho-Rusyns, 198–200 Caspian Sea caviar, 215 energy development, 675 Castlereagh, Viscount, 1259–1260 Castrates, 1360 Castro, Fidel, 345, 347, 746 Catechism, 498 Catechism of a Revolutionary (Nechayev), 1032, 1209 Cathedral of Christ the Savior, 72, 200 Cathedral of Divine Wisdom, 71 Cathedral of St. Basil, 200, 200–201, 1275 Cathedral of St. Sophia, Kiev, 201, 201–202 Cathedral of St. Sophia, Novgorod, 202, 202–203, 1073

Cathedral of the Archangel Mikhail, 203, 786 Cathedral of the Dormition, 203–204, 396, 1309 Cathedral of the Intercession on the Moat. See Cathedral of St. Basil Cathedral of the Kazan Mother of God, 71–72 Cathedral of the Trinity at Zagorsk, 1309 Catherine I, 204–205 Catherine II, 205–209, 206, 208, 1193 Academy of Arts, 3 Alexander I, influence on, 31–32 architecture, 71–72 Armed Neutrality, declaration of, 1616 ballet, 117 Bestuzhev-Ryumin, relationship with, 147 Castrates, 1360 censorship, 216 Charter of the Cities, 228–229 Charter of the Nobility, 229–230 colonialism, 287–288 coup, 1175 Crimean Khanate, annexation of, 341 Dashkova, relationship with, 365 Declaration of Armed Neutrality, 833 Derzhavin’s ode to, 387 dvorianstvo, 420 education policy, 437 The Enlightenment, 454 Free Economic Society for the Encouragement of Agriculture and Husbandry, 520 Freemasonry, 1074 French influence, 522 Gatchina palace, 541 goverment administration, 615 government reform, 287–288 Great Instruction, 842 guilds, 615 health care services, 628 hermitage, 984 immigration, 555 Imperial Russian Academy, 4 Imperial Russian Navy, 929 Instructions, 667–668

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journalism, 708 Kremlin, 786 Legislative Commission of 17671768, 842 local government administration, 870 Manifesto of 1763, 892–893 military, 928–929 Moldavia, liberation of, 1292 monasticism, 956 Montenegro, relations with, 960 music, 985 nationalities policy, 1020 National Library of Russia, 996 neoclassicism, 1036 Novikov and, 521, 1072–1073 Old Believers, 1104 Orlov, relationship with, 1117 Pale of Settlement, 1130–1131 Paul, relationship with, 1148–1149, 1174 Platon, relationship with, 1183–1184 populationism, 892 Potemkin, relationship with, 1213–1214 Preobrazhensky Guards, 1218–1219 Procuracy, 1232 Prussia, relations with, 556 Pugachevshchina, 1245–1246 Radischev, arrest of, 859, 1264 religious tolerance, 679–680 rise to power, 1375 Russian Orthodox Church, 1320 Russification, 1331 Russo-Turkish Wars, 1336 security force, 1469 serfdom, 458 Smolny Institute, 1409–1410 St. Petersburg, 1483 succession, 1173 Sumarokov’s support of, 1499 theater, 511–512, 1536 Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji, 793 Tsarskoye Selo, 1578, 1579 vodka industry, 30 witchcraft, penalties for, 1669 Woe from Wit, 608 Catherine the Great. See Catherine II Catholicism, 209–210

Belarus, 135 Council of Florence, 506–507 Gordon, Patrick Leopold, 585 Uniate Church, 1605–1606 Westernizers, 1663 Caucasian Albanians, 28 Caucasian Wars, 210–212, 214, 286 Caucasus, 212–214, 468 Armenians, 1649 Baryatinsky, Alexander Ivanovich, 125 Civil War of 1917-1922, 270 colonial expansion, 286, 289 Dagestan, 361–362 Kabardians, 715 Karachai, 723 Kurds, 799 Mingrelians, 944–945 nationalism, 289, 1003 Osetins, 1122 Russian expansion into Muslim territory, 678 Shahumian, Stepan Georgievich, 1375–1376 Shamil, 102, 361, 1378–1379 tsarist nationalities policy, 1021 Vorontsov-Dashkov, Illarion Ivanovich, 1649 World War I, 1677–1678 Caucasus Mountains, 211 Cavalry Cossacks, 333 Durova, Nadezhda Andreyevna, 418 service state, 1371 The Cavalry Maiden (Durova), 418 Caves Monastery, 214–215 Hilarion, Metropolitan, 635 Kievan Caves (patericon), 750 Caviar, 215–216 Ceausescu, Nicolae, 1294 Censorship, 216–218 Academy of Sciences, 6 Aksakov, Ivan Sergeyevich, 25 Bulgakov, Mikhail Afanasievich, 181 chapbooks, 228 de-Stalinization, 388 Glavlit, 563 intelligentsia, 671

C O M M I T T E E

N

I N D E X

newspapers, 1044 Nicholas I, 1048 opera, 1109 reform, 604 Solzhenitsyn, Alexander, 1425 The Thaw, 1535–1536 Censuses. See Demography Center for Russian Environmental Policy, 463 The Centers of Origin of Cultivated Plants (Vaviolov), 1634 Central America, 347–348 Central Asia, 218–220 China, relations with, 247–248 colonial expansion, 286 Dungans, 417 Ferghana Valley, 496–497 Huns, 646 Islam, 680 Jadidism, 682, 698–699 Karakalpaks, 724 Khiva, 740 Kurds, 799 Muslim spiritual administrations, 683 Normanist Controversy, 1060–1061 Russian expansion into Muslim territory, 678–679 Tashkent, 1517–1518, 1518 Tatar exiles, 342 tsarist nationalities policy, 1021–1022 See also Specific countries Central Bank of Russia (CBR), 220–221, 587–588, 1309–1310 Central Committee, 221–222 Agitprop, 15 Akhmatova, denunciation of, 22 Andropov, Yuri Vladimirovich, 61–62 Dzerzhinsky, Felix Edmundovich, 422 Frunze, Mikhail Vasilievich, 526 Glavlit, 563 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 578 Gosizdat, 588 Grishin, Viktor Dmitrievich, 609 Gromyko, Andrei Andreyevich, 611 Higher Party School, 634

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C O N T R O L

Central Committee (continued) Ilyukhin, Viktor, 979 July Days of 1917, 713–714 Kalinin, Mikhail Ivanovich, 718 Kamenev, Lev Borisovich, 720 Kollontai, Alexandra Mikhailovna, 763 Kosygin, Alexei Nikolayevich, 778 Krupskaya, Nadezhda Konstantinovna, 791 Kunayev, Dinmukhammed Akhmedovich, 797 Ligachev, Yegor Kuzmich, 861–862 Malenkov, Georgy, 889–890 Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich, 925 Nazarbayev, Nursultan Abishevich, 1028–1029 October Revolution, 1090–1092 “On the Policy of the Party in the Area of Belles Lettres,” 1315 “On the Restructuring of LiteraryArtistic Organizations,” 1315 Ordzhonikidze, Grigory Konstantinovich, 1113–1114 overview, 309 party congresses and conferences, 1136–1143 plenum, 1186–1187 Podgorny, Nikolai Viktorovich, 1188–1189 Ponomarev, Boris Kharitonovich, 1206 Primakov, Yevgeny Maximovich, 1223 Rabkrin, 1262 Radek, Karl Bernardovich, 1263 Romanov, Grigory Vasilievich, 1299 Ryzhkov, Nikolai Ivanovich, 1341 Stasova, Yelena Dmitrievna, 1462 Suslov, Mikhail Andreyevich, 1502–1503 Trotsky, Leon, 848 Union Treaty, 1612–1613 United Opposition, 1615 Vasilevsky, Alexander Mikhailovich, 1633 Yagoda, Genrikh Grigorevich, 1696 Yakovlev, Alexander Nikolayevich, 1697–1698

C O M M I S S I O N

Yanayev, Gennady Ivanovich, 1700 Yeltsin, Boris, 1705–1706 Yezhov, Nikolai Ivanovich, 1712 Zhdanov, Andrei Alexandrovich, 1724 zhenotdel, 1726–1728 Zinoviev, Grigory Yevseyevich, 1732 Central Control Commission, 222, 1159 Central Economics and Mathematics Institute (TsEMI), 1380 Central Electoral Commission, 858 Central Executive Committee abortion, 476 Constitution of 1918, 321 Kamenev, Lev Borisovich, 720 Central Penal Department (TsKO), 1229 Central planning, 430, 528, 543 Central Siberian Plateau, 547–548 Central Statistical Agency, 222–223, 589, 1207 Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), 1129 Chaadayev, Peter Yakovlevich, 223–224 First Philosophical Letter, 997 idealism, 651–652 intelligentsia, 668 Kireyevsky, influence on, 756 Slavophilism, 1405 Chagall, Marc, 224 Chaikovsky Circle, 790 Challenger accident, 1443 Chancellery system, 225–226 chancellery clerks, 1189 dyaks, 421 podyachy, 1189 service state, 1371–1372 Changes in the Capitalist Economy as a Result of the Second World War (Varga), 1632 Channel-graphite reactors, 95 Chapayev, Vasily Ivanovich, 226–227 Chapayev (Furmanov), 226–227 Chapbook literature, 227–228 Chaplygin, Sergi Alexeyevich, 103 Charles XII (Sweden) Battle of Lesnaya, 857

Battle of Poltava, 1203 Battles of Narva, 995 Great Northern War, 600–601, 1169 Mazepa’s defection to, 909 Charskaya, Lydia Alexeyevna, 228 Charter for State Peasants, 229 Charter of the Cities, 228–229 Charter of the Nobility, 229–230, 820 Chastushka, 230 Chayanov, Alexander Vasilievich, 230–231, 1152–1153 Chebrikov, Victor Mikhailovich, 231–232 Chebyshev, Lvovich, 5 Chechnya and Chechens, 232–235 Dagestan, 102 deportation, 214, 234 Dudayev, Dzhokhar, 412–413, 413, 1477 independence, 489, 490 language, 213, 232 reconstruction, 1430 Yeltsin, Boris, 1708–1709 Chechnya Wars Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers, 294 Democratic Union of Russia, 372 human rights violations, 642 Lebed, Alexander, 1363 Memorial, 912 Shakhrai, Sergei Mikhailovich, 1376–1377 Chechoslovak Legion, 765 Checkpoint Charlie, 278 Cheka Dzerzhinsky, Felix Edmundovich, 422 Gulag, 616 Lubyanka, 877 Red Terror, 1276 state security, 1470 Chekhov, Anton Pavlovich, 235–237, 236 environmentalism, 460 golden age of literature, exlusion from, 570 journalism, 711 Moscow Art Theater, 967–968

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

1748

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C H U R C H

nationalism, 998 Suvorin, collaboration with, 1503 Chelomei, Vladimir, 1442 Chemistry, 912–913 Cheremis. See Mari El and the Mari Cherepnin, Lev, 89 Cherkess, 237 Chernenko, Konstantin Ustinovich, 62, 238, 579, 1494 Chernigov, 1507, 1702, 1717 Chernobyl, 95, 238–240, 239 Chernomyrdin, Viktor Stepanovich, 240–241, 241, 532, 1126 Chernov, Viktor Mikhailovich, 241–242, 838–839, 1420–1421 Chernukha, 242–243 Chernyayev, M. G., 1364 Chernye Klobuky, 1560 Chernyi Peredel, 669 Chernyshev, Alexander Ivanovich, 243 Chernyshevsky, Nikolai Gavrilovich, 244–245 journalism, 710 Petrashevtsy, 1177 Pisarev’s criticism of, 1182 Westernizers, 1664 What Is To Be Done?, 1354 Chervonets, 245–246 Chesme, Battle of, 246 Chetki (Akhmatova), 22 Chiang Kai-shek, 248 Chichagov, Dmitry, 72 Chicherin, Boris, 859–860 Chicherin, Georgy Vasilievich, 246–247, 833–834, 1268–1269 Childbirth, 1324 Childhood (Tolstoy), 570, 1557 Children Artek, 88–89 corporal punishment, 330 homeless, 640–641 “soldiers’ children,” 197 Children’s literature, 259, 1592 China, 247–250 Cold War, 277–278 Cultural Revolution, 391–392 Daurs, 736 Karakhan Declaration, 724 Khrushchev, Nikita, 748 Korean War, 769, 770

Popular Front, 1208 Port Arthur, 1210 Russian Far East, 481–482 Stalin, Josef, 275 Treaty of Aigun, 19–20 Treaty of Nerchinsk, 1037–1038 Treaty of Peking, 1157 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 248 Chinese Cultural Revolution, 391–392 Chinese Eastern Railway, 724 Chingis Khan, 340, 755 Chirac, Jacques, 519 Chirikov, Alexzei Ilich, 27, 142, 250 Chivalry, 233 Chkalov, Valery Pavlovich, 12, 250–251 Chkheidze, Nikolai Semenovich, 251 Chol-Khan, 41 Chorni, Daniel, 1309 Christianity activism, 1177 Byzantine, 190–191, 252–253, 605, 606 Christian metaphysics, 1423 Council of Florence, 506–507 culture and, 754 Dostoyevsky, Fyodor Mikhailovich, 412 dvoeverie, 418 Georgia, 548 literature, 754 Novgorod, 754 Olga, 1107 Ostromir Gospel, 1123–1124 Soloviev’s theology, 1423 Third Rome, 1542–1543 Tosltoy, Leo, 1559 Vladimir’s adoption of, 751 See also Specific branches Christianization, 190–191, 252–253, 985 Christology of the Council of Chalcedon, 83 The Chronicle of Current Events (journal), 253–254, 781, 1348 Chronicle of Human Rights in the USSR (journal), 254 Chronicles, 255–256 Chubais, Anatoly Borisovich, 256–257, 1709

R E F O R M

N

I N D E X

Chuikov, Vasily Ivanovich, 257 Chukchi, 257–258 Chukokvsky, Kornei Ivanovich, 258–259 Chukovskaya, Lydia Korneyevna, 258 Church administration Consistory, 316–317 Holy Synod, 639–640 Living Church Movement, 866–867 metropolitans, 918–919 Nikon, Patriarch, 1057 nineteenth century, 1320 Platon, 1184 secularization, 1372 Church and state, 887, 1473–1475 Church councils, 259–260, 261–262, 1320 Church courts, 1473–1475 Churches architecture, 70–71 destruction of, 200 Novgorod, 1073 St. Petersburg, 1485 See also Specific churches Churchill, Winston, 1687 Grand Alliance, 597 Iron Curtain speech, 677 Potsdam Conference, 1215–1216 Soviet relations, 599 Tehran Conference, 1527 Yalta Conference, 1698, 1698–1699, 1699 The Church Is One (Khomyakov), 743 Church of Christ the Savior, 72, 200 Church of St. Theodore Stratilates on the Brook, 71 Church of the Nativity of the Virgin, 396–397 Church of the Transfiguration, 71, 73 Church of the Twelve Apostles, 786 Church reform Alexei Mikhailovich, 46–48 Anthony Vadkovsky, Metropolitan, 65 church councils, 259–260, 261 episcopate, 463–464 Joakim, Patriarch, 706

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H I S T O R Y

1749

I N D E X

N

C H U R C H

S L A V O N I C

Church reform (continued) Living Church Movement, 866–867 Neronov, Ivan, 1038 Nikon, Patriarch, 1056–1058 nineteenth century, 1320 Peter I, 1170 See also Old Believers Church Slavonic Bible, 533, 824 Church Union of Brest, 135 Churilova, Lydia Alexeyevna. See Charskaya, Lydia Alexeyevna Chuvash, 262–263 Chuzhak, Nikolai, 1417 Cimmerians, 263 Circular-post system, 1213 Circus, 263–264 Cities. See Urbanization; Urban life The Citizen (newspaper), 711 Civic Union, 264 Civil Procedure Code of 2002, 338 Civil rights Catherine II, 667 colonialism, 289 Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 321 Constitution of 1936, 321–322 Constitution of 1977, 323 Emancipation Act, 448 Fundamental Laws, 528 Civil script, 354 Civil Union, 1648 Civil War of 1425–1450, 265–266, 1366 Civil War of 1917–1922, 266–271 Chapayev, Vasily Ivanovich, 226–227 Committee of the Constituent Assembly (KOMUCH), 764–765 Crimea, 339 Denikin, Anton Ivanovich, 380–381 emigration, 656 Kolchak, Alexander Vasilievich, 761–762 Left Socialist Revolutionaries, 839 Lenin, Vladimir, 853 Makhno, Nestor Ivanovich, 888 Mensheviks, 914 motion pictures, 973 party congresses, 1139

B I B L E

Proletkult, 1236 Red Army, 937 Social Revolutionary Party, 1420–1421 state security, organs of, 1470 Trotsky, Leon Davidovich, 1575 Ukraine, 1602–1603 White Army, 1665 workers, 1673–1674 Wrangel, Peter, 1692–1693 Yudenich, Nikolai Nikolayevich, 1713 See also War communism Civil War (United States), 1617 Classical Slavophilism, 1405–1406 Classical Westernizers, 1663 Classicism Derzhavin, Gavryl Romanovich, 387 Romantic-Classic debate, 1302 Class system, 271–272 bednyaki, 133 corporal punishment, 330 dishonor compensation, 145 dvorianstvo, 419–420 Emancipation Act, 448–449 Jews, 704 kulaks, 793–795 Marxism, 903 merchants, 916 mestnichestvo, 918 Muscovy, 983 Novgorod, 1072 passports, 1144 serednyaki, 1365 service state, 1373 Shakhty trial, 1377–1378 soslovie, 1430–1432 sukonnaya sotnya, 1498 syn boyarsky, 1509 townsmen, 830 working class, 812, 814 See also Service state Clergy Orthodoxy, 1119 Statute of Grand Prince Vladimir, 1473–1474 Statute of Grand Prince Yaroslav, 1474–1475 Climate, 272–274, 273 Armenia, 77

Caucasus, 213 Kazakhstan, 728 Koryak territory, 775 Nakhichevan, 991 Siberia, 1391 steppes, 1478 Tuva, 1593 Clinton, Bill, 673 Clowns, 263–264 Code of Precedence, 530 Code of Punishments of 1845, 330 Codrington, Edward, 1027 Cold War, 274–281 Akhromeyev, Sergei, 23 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 66 atomic energy, 93 Azerbaijan, 107 Cuban Missile Crisis, 345–347, 346 defectors, 370 development of, 143 France, relations with, 519–520 Geneva Summit of 1985, 543–544 Great Britain, relations with, 599 Iron Curtain speech, 677 Japan, relations with, 700 Khrushchev, Nikita, 748–749 Korean War, 769 military, 940 motion pictures, 975–976 Shevardnadze’s role in ending, 1382–1383 Stalin era, 274–276, 1458 totalitarianism, 1561 United Nations, 1614 U-2 spy plane incident, 1597 See also Arms control; Détente; United States; Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) Collective farms, 281–283 grain requisitions, 1233 labor day, 815 Machine Tractor Stations, 883–884 sovkhoz, 1437–1438 Twenty-Five Thousanders, 1594 See also Agriculture; Collectivization of agriculture; Peasantry Collective responsibility, 283 Collective security, 685, 834

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1750

E N C Y C L O P E D I A

O F

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H I S T O R Y

C O M M U N I S T

P A R T Y

Collectivization of agriculture, 283–284 babi bunty, 110 Khruschev, Nikita, 390–391 khutor, 750 kulaks, 793–795 Morozov murder, 963–964 party congresses, 1140–1141 party opposition to, 1456 peasant economy, 1153 peasants, 1154, 1155 Scissors Crisis, 1355 sovkhoz, 1437–1438 Twenty-Five Thousanders, 1594 voluntary cooperatives, 328 zagotovka, 1719–1720 See also Agriculture; Collective farms; Peasantry Collins, Samuel, 508 Colloquy of Lovers of the Russian Word, 387 Colonial expansion, 284–286 Colonialism, 286–291 COMECON. See Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) Cominform. See Communist Information Bureau Comintern. See Communist International (Comintern) Command administrative economy, 291–293 khozraschet, 744–745 material balances, 904–905 Material Product System (MPS), 905 Commanding heights, 293, 1040 Commerce Alaska, 288 Jews, 703 Khazars, 739 Khiva, 740 Kievan Rus, 754, 755 New Statute of Commerce, 1044–1045 Novgorod, 1071–1072 See also Business and industry; Economic development; Merchants; Trade, foreign Commerce Statute, 1044–1045 Commercial banks, 121–122

O F

T H E

S O V I E T

U N I O N

Commissariat for Nationality Affairs, 1012 Commissariat of Education, 1352 Commissariat of Heavy Industry, 1352 Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), 1472 Commissars, 293–294, 321, 937 Commission for State Control, 1262 Commission for the Study of the Ethnic Composition of the Borderlands (KIPS), 470 Commissions on the Affairs of Minors, 476 Committee for State Security (KGB). See KGB (Committee for State Security) Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia, 1645 Committee for the Operational Management of the National Economy (COME), 294 Committee for the Stewardship of Russian Icon Painting, 650 Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly (KOMUCH), 761, 764–765 Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers, 294–295 Committee on Constitutional Review, 324 Committees, state, 1464–1465 Committees of the Village Poor, 295 Commodities, funded, 528–529, 562 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 296–297 Belovezh Accords, 138 Movement for Democratic Reforms, 978–979 Yeltsin, Boris, 1707 See also Russian Federation Commonwealth of Socialist Countries. See Communist bloc Communes Herzen, Alexander, 633 land tenure, 820–821 Communism, 297–299 dictatorship of the proletariat, 394–395 Hegelian theory, 631 Zyuganov, Gennady Andreyevich, 1734–1735

( C P S U )

N

I N D E X

See also Marxism; MarxismLeninism; Socialism Communist Academy, 6–7, 299–300, 351 Communist bloc, 300–301 Communist Information Bureau, 301–302 Communist International (Comintern), 302–305 Anti-Comintern Pact, 67 antifascism, 303–304 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 248 Executive Committee (ECCI), 304 general staff, 1917, 303 Popular Front policy, 1207–1208 Vietnam, 1638 world revolution, 1675–1676 Communist Manifest (Marx and Engels), 297 Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 356–359 Communist Party of the Russian Federation, 305–306 Agrarian Party of Russia, 16 Movement in Support of the Army, 979 People’s Party of Free Russia, 1161 political party system, 1200 Zyuganov, Gennady Andreyevich, 1734–1735 Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), 306–313 Andreyeva, Nina Alexandrovna, 60–61 Andropov, Yuri Vladimirovich, 62 archives, 74, 1408 Article 6 of the 1977 Constitution, 89 Bakatin, Vadim Viktorovich, 111 cadres policy, 195–196 Central Control Commission, 222 Chebrikov, Victor Mikhailovich, 231–232 Chernenko, Konstantin Ustinovich, 238 Communist International, 304 congresses, 309 Congress of People’s Deputies, 314–315 Constitution of 1918, 320–321

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1751

I N D E X

N

C O M M U N I S T

Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) (continued) Constitution of 1977 amendments, 323 cult of personality, 348–349 democratic centralism, 310 democratization, 373–374 divisions, 307 economic authority, 291–292 education, 437, 440 founding, 161, 306–307 funding, 312 general secretary, 542 Gorbachev’s admission, 578 Great Purges, 1249–1250 Higher Party School, 634 ideology, 310–311 Kaganovich, Lazar Moyseyevich, 716 Kozlov, Frol Romanovich, 782 leadership style, 307–308 Luzhkov, Yuri, 879–880 Main Political Directorate, 885 membership, 312 name change, 1413 nomenklatura, 310, 312, 1059, 1358, 1478–1479 Orgburo, 1116 party congresses and conferences, 1136–1143, 1137 party history, 1387 party program, 311 plenum, 1186–1187 police and security forces, 948 Political Administration of the Red Army, 937 Ponomarev, Boris Kharitonovich, 1205–1206 Preobrazhensky, Yevgeny Alexeyevich, 1219 Primary Party Organization, 1226 Rabkrin, 1262 rules, 310 second secretary, 1358–1359 secretariat, 309–310, 1359 service state, 1373 socialist realism, 1417 Soviet breakup, 453 Soviet man, 1436 structure, 308–310

P A R T Y

O F

U K R A I N E

succession of leadership, 1494 Union of Soviet Writers, control of, 1610 Women’s Department, 75, 496, 763, 1348–1349 Yeltsin, Boris, 1705–1706 zhenotdel, 1726–1728 See also Central Committee; Politburo Communist Party of Ukraine, 165, 692–693, 784, 1604 Communists, 298 Communist subbotniki, 1492 Communist Youth League, 314–315 Communist youth organizations, 313–314, 351 Compensation for wrongs, 1318–1319 Complete Collection of Russian Chronicles, 255 Composers Dunayevsky, Isaak Osipovich, 416–417 Prokofiev, Sergei Sergeyevich, 1234 Rachmaninov, Sergei Vasilievich, 1262–1263 Rimsky-Korsakov, Nikolai Andreyevich, 1290 Shostakovich, Dmitri Dmitrievich, 1388 Stravinsky, Igor Fyodorovich, 1487–1488 Tchaikovsky, Peter Ilyich, 1525–1526 See also Glinka, Mikhail Ivanovich; Mighty Handful; Music Computing center, 223 Concerning the Spiritual in Art (Kandinsky), 721 Conference at the Imperial Court, 447 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 502 A Confession (Tolstoy), 1558 Conflict resolution, 1318–1319 Congresses, Communist Party, 309 Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1260 Congress of Berlin, 143–144, 1364 Congress of Paris, 1135, 1292, 1293 Congress of People’s Deputies, 314–315 Article 6 amendments, 89

Constitution of 1977 amendments, 323 democratization, 374 Federal Assembly, 486 glasnost, 560 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 580 Inter-Regional Deputies’ Group, 674–675 Khasbulatov, Ruslan Imranovich, 738 Kovalev, Sergei, 781 Referendum of April 1993, 1277 Soyuz faction, 1439–1440 Supreme Soviet conversion into, 1221 Yeltsin, Boris, 1706–1707 Congress of Russian Communities, 315–316 Congress of Vienna, 1004, 1242, 1637–1638 Conjuncture Institute, 1407 “The Conquest of Kazan,” 636 Conscription, 158, 294–295, 936 Conservative intelligentsia, 670 Conservative nationalism, 653 Consistory, 316–317 Constantine Porphyrogenitus, 1107, 1306 Constantinople, 252, 1542–1543 Constituent Assembly, 267, 317–318 Constitution, Estonian, 465 Constitutional Court, 318–319 Constitutional Democratic Party (Cadets), 319–320 intelligentsia, 670 Milyukov, Paul Nikolayevich, 941–942 monarchy, moratorium on opposition to, 1090 Provisional Government, 485 Struve, Peter Bernardovich, 1490 Vyborg Manifesto, 1654 Constitutionalism, 1290–1291 Constitutionality matters, 339 Constitutional Law on Arbitration Courts of 1995, 338 Constitution of 1918, 320–321 class system, 271 disenfranchised persons, 397 Constitution of 1924 nationalism, 1001

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1752

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Constitution of 1936, 321–323 legal system, 841–842 voting rights, 398 Constitution of 1977, 323–324 Article 6, 89, 374–375 Communist Party functions, 311 Constitution of 1993, 324–325 Federal Assembly, 486–488 Federation Treaty, 489 free speech, 712 human rights, 642 land ownership, 822–823 language policy, 825 referendum, 1277–1278 Construction, subway, 1492–1493 Constructivism, 72, 325, 890 Consumer goods, 957 Containment, Soviet, 301, 518 The Contemporary (journal), 709, 710 Contract slavery, 1403 A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Marx), 902 Control figures, 325–326 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, 23, 86–87, 326–327 Convention of Akkerman, 24 Convention of Berlin, 144 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 544–545 Conversion of Jews, 712–713 Cooperatives, Law on, 327 Cooperative societies, 327–328 Copeck newspapers, 1044 Copper Riots, 328–329 The Cornfield (journal), 711, 1541 Corn program, 1641–1642 Coronations Cathedral of the Dormition, 204 Ivan IV, 689 Nicholas II, 1050, 1050 Corp of Cadets, 438 Corporal punishment, 329–330 Corporations, Russian, 330–331 Corpus Domini procession, 702 Corruption Brezhnev’s administration, 172 cadres policy, 196 Chernomyrdin, Viktor Stepanovich, 241

A N D

P U N I S H M E N T

( D O S T O Y E V S K Y )

Dyachenko, Tatiana Borisovna, 421 Kunayev’s dismissal for, 797 Mafia capitalism, 884–885 Morozov, Boris Ivanovich, 963 second economy, 1357 Soskovets, allegations against, 1430 Yeltsin, Boris, 777 Yetlsin’s cabinet, 1390–1391 Cosmology Evenki, 471 Khanty, 738 Cosmonauts. See Space program Cosmopolitanism, 331–332 Cossacks, 332–334, 333 Dezhnev, Seven Ivanovich, 392 Khmelnitsky, Bohdan, 741–742 Krasnov, Pyotr Nikolayevich, 783 Mazepa, Ivan Stepanovich, 909 Moskvitin, Ivan Yurievich, 972 Muscovy, 983 nationalities policy, 1019–1020 peasant uprisings, 1155–1156 Pugachev, Emelian Ivanovich, 1245–1246 Stenka Razin, 1271–1272, 1476–1477 Time of Troubles, 1551–1552 Ukraine, 1600 White Army, 1665 Yermak, Timofeyevich, 1710 Cottage workers, 804 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), 334–335 Bulgaria, 184–185 Hungary, 645 trade with members, 516 Council of Chalcedon, 83 Council of Florence, 506–507 Council of Ministers, Soviet, 335–336 economic bureaucracy, 186–187 economic ministries, 946 funded commodities, 528 Gosplan, 589–590 Malenkov, Georgy, 889 Ministry of Foreign Trade, 947 Sovnarkom, 1439 state committee chairpersons, 1465

N

I N D E X

See also Cabinet of Ministers, Imperial; Commissars Council of Nationalities, 1016 Council of People’s Commissars. See Sovnarkom Council of State, 1491 Council of the Duma, 488 Council of the Federation, 1612 Councils, church, 259–260, 261–262 Councils of the National Economy. See Sovnarkhozy Counterpart-trade, 517 Counterreforms, 336–337 Counterrevolution, 773–774 Country estates, 337–338 Courland, 826 Court of Ivan IV, 689–690 Court system Constitutional Court, 318–319 High Arbitration Court, 338 Kievan Russ, 840 Oprichnina, 1111 reform, 604 Statute of Grand Prince Vladimir, 1473–1474 Statute of Grand Prince Yaroslav, 1474–1475 Sudebnik of 1497, 1495–1496 Supreme Court, 338–339 volost courts, 818 See also Criminal justice; Legal systems Crafts, 755 Crane, Charles R., 1617 The Cranes Are Flying (movie), 976 Credit rating, Russian, 514–515 Crime corporal punishment, 329–330 delinquents, 640–641 gypsies, 620–621 organized crime, 884–885, 1114–1115 See also Criminal justice Crimea, 339–341 Cimmerians, 263 Ivan IV, 690 Muscovite expansion, 285 Polovtsy, 1202 Crime and Punishment (Dostoyevsky), 410

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I N D E X

N

C R I M E A N

K H A N A T E

Crimean Khanate, 340–341 Crimean Tatars, 341–342, 342 frontier fortifications, 525 Gaspirali, Ismail Bey, 540–541 Islam, 680, 681 Crimean War, 343, 343–344 Battle of Balaklava, 114–115 Imperial army and navy, 930 Nakhimov, Pavel Stepanovich, 992 Nicholas I, 36, 1048–1049 Sevastopol, 1374 Treaty of Paris, 1135 Triple Entente, 599 Criminal justice guba administration system, 614 Lefortovo prison, 836–837 Procuracy, 1232 Pskov Judicial Charter, 1243–1244 Russian Justice, 1318–1319 See also Court system; Crime; Legal systems Criminal Procedure Code of 2001, 338 The Crisis of Western Philosophy: Against the Positivists (Soloviev), 1423 Crony capitalism, 344–345 Crop rotation, 1545 Cuba, 347–348 Cuban Communist Party, 347 Cuban Missile Crisis, 345–347, 346 Cold War, 278–279 détente, as turning point for, 389 Khrushchev, Nikita, 749 Cui, Cesar, 920 Cuisine, 512–513, 1325 Cult of personality, 348–350, 388, 849 Cultural Revolution, 350–352 motion pictures, 974–975 Russian Association of Proletarian Writers, 1315 Culture Catherine II, patronization by, 207 chernukha, 242–243 China, relations with, 249–250 colonialism, 288 country estates, 337 Cultural Revolution, 350–352, 974–975, 1315

de-Stalinization, 388, 389 Elizabeth, 447 French influence, 518–519, 522–523 Gorky, Maxim, 586–587 gypsymania, 621–622 Jews, 703 korenizatsya, 771–772 Likhachev, Dmitry Sergeyevich, 862–863 Moscow, 965 nationalism, 997–1000 Novgorod, 1072–1073 people’s houses, 1160–1161 Peter I, 1170–1171 Proletkult, 1235–1236 Romanticism, 1302–1303 Russian influence in the United States, 1617 Russians, 1321–1326 Russification, 1007, 1331 Scythic, 1356 Silver Age, 1393–1397 socialist realism, 1415–1419 St. Petersburg, 1485 stagnation, 1419 structuralism, 874–875 United States, influence of the, 1617 See also Folklore; The Thaw Currency altyn, 55 chervonets, 245 copper, 328–329 denga, 380 five-ruble banknote, 1307 grivna, 610 kopeck, 768, 958 ruble, 958, 1306–1307 See also Monetary policy Custine, Astolphe Louis Leonor, 352–353 Customary law, 469, 840 Customs books, 353 Customs duties, 1565 Cuza, Alexander Ion, 1292 Cyprus, 606 Cyril, St., 757 Cyril and Methodius Society, 353–354 Cyrillic alphabet, 354, 354–355, 825

Cyril of Turov, 355 Czartoryski, Adam Jerzy, 32, 355–356, 1005 Czech Legion, 53 Czechoslovak Communist Party, 356–359 Czechoslovakia, 357–359, 1714 Czechoslovakia, invasion of, 172, 356–357, 357, 358 Czech Republic, 359

D Dagestan, 361–362 Avars, 102 Chechens, 102 Dargins, 364–365 language, 213 Lezgins, 857–858 Shamil, 1378 Daguerreotypes, 1178–1179 Daily life, 407, 1322 Dal, V. I., 508 Dan, Fedor, 914 Dancers. See Ballet Danchenko, Vladimir Nemirovich, 1537 Daniel, Metropolitan, 362–363, 707 Daniel, Yuli Markovich, 363, 671, 1348, 1399–1400 Danilevsky, Nikolai Yakovlevich, 363–364, 1006, 1134, 1406 Dargins, 364–365 Dashkova, Yekaterina Romanovna, 365–366 Dashnaktsutiun, 366–367 Data manipulation, demographic, 377–379 Daurs, 736 David Igorevich, 1506 Day (periodical), 710 Days of Liberty, 1286 Dead Souls (Gogol), 568, 569 Death rituals, 1324–1325 Decembrist movement, 367–368 autocracy, 102 Lovers of Wisdom and, 875 Muraviev, Nikita, 980–981 Nicholas I, 1046

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1754

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D I S S I D E N T S

Pestel, Pavel Ivanovich, 1167–1168 Pushkin’s implication in, 1252 Radischev, Alexander, 859 Romanticism, 1303 Ryleyev, Kondraty Fyodorovich, 1339–1340 Vorontsov, Mikhail, 1648 Decentralization of scientific enterprise, 1353 “Declaration of Loyalty,” 464 Declaration of the Rights of the People of Russia, 1000 De Clerc, Nicholas Gabriel, 873 The Decline of Capitalism (Preobrazhensky), 1219 Decree on Land, 368–369 Decree on Red Terror, 616 Dedovshchina, 369 Deep battle concept, 1583 Defectors, 369–370 Alliluyeva, Svetlana Iosifovna, 54 Kurbsky, Andrei Mikhailovcih, 797–798 Mazepa, Hetman Ivan Stepanovich, 909 Defense industrial complex. See Military industrial complex Definitions capitalism, 197–198 communism, 297 dissidents, 398 dvoeverie, 418 feudalism, 497 genocide, 545 intelligentsia, 668 liberalism, 859 mir, 948–949 narod, 1025 narodnost, 1025 nation and nationality, 1024–1027 natsiya, 1025 second economy, 1356–1357 serfdom, 1366 Sibir, 1391 slavery, 1402 sobor, 89–90 socialism, 1413 socialist realism, 1416 soslovie, 1431

structuralism, 874 ukaz, 1599 De Gaulle, Charles, 519 Deichman, E. I., 29 Dej, Gheorghe Gheorghiu, 1294 Delinquents, 640–641 Demirjian, Karen, 81, 82 Democracy, 318 Democratic centralism, 310 Democratic Party of Communists of Russia, 1161 Democratic Party of Russia (DPR), 370–371 Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 1638–1639 Democratic Russia (DR), 371–372 Democratic State Council, 1092 Democratic Union (DS), 372–373 Democratization, 373–375, 580, 1164–1165 Demography, 375–380 DemRussia, 372 Denga, 380 Denikin, Anton Ivanovich, 53, 380–381, 381, 1437, 1665 Denis, 712 Denmark, 381–383, 1242 Department stores, 619 Deportations, 383–386 Estonians, 466 ethnic groups, 214, 234 Great Purges, 1250 Jews, 405 Kalmyks, 719 Karachai, 723 kulaks, 794–795, 1471–1472 Meskhetian Turks, 917 nationalities policy, 1001–1002, 1014 See also Emigration and immigration; Exiles; Migration Derevlyane, 653 Deryabin, Peter, 370 Derzhavin, Gavryl Romanovich, 386–387 De-Stalinization, 276, 387–389, 747, 909–910 Détente, 389–390 Brezhnev, 172–173 France, relations with, 519–520 See also Cold War

N

I N D E X

Detention camps, 219–220 Detskoye Selo. See Tsarskoye Selo Developed socialism, 390–392 Developing countries, 748 The Development of Capitalism in Russia (Lenin), 850 The Devils (Dostoyevsky), 411 Dezhnev, Seven Ivanovich, 392 Diagilev, Sergei Pavlovich, 118, 392–393, 576, 1150 Dialectical materialism, 6, 393–394, 454 Diary of a Writer (Dostoyevsky), 411 Dictatorship of the proletariat, 320, 394–395, 631 Didelot, Charles-Louis, 117 Diderot, Denis, 522 Diet, 512–513, 1325 Diocese, 395–396 Dionisy, 396–397 Diplomacy. See Foreign policy Directors, film Alexandrov, Grigroy Alexandrovich, 43 Bauer, Yevgeny Frantsevich, 131–132 Eisenstein, Sergei Mikhailovich, 442, 442–443 Kuleshov, Lev Vladimirovich, 795 Mikhalkov, Nikita Sergeyevich, 924 Protazanov, Yakov Alexandrovic, 1238–1239 Tarkovsky, Andrei Arsenievich, 1516–1517 See also Motion pictures Directors, stage, 919 Disarmament. See Arms control “Discord” (Verbitskaya), 1636 Disenfranchised persons, 397–398 Dishonor compensation, 145 Disraeli, Benjamin, 143 Dissident movement, 398–402 The Chronicle of Current Events (journal), 253–254, 781 Chronicle of Human Rights in the USSR (journal), 254 Dissidents Amalrik, Andrei Alexeievich, 55–56 Bolshevik punishment of, 616

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1755

I N D E X

N

D I V I S I A

I N D E X

Dissidents (continued) Bonner, Yelena Georgievna, 162–163 Central Asian exile, 219–220 Chukovskaya, Lydia Korneyevna, 258 Gamsakhurdia, Zviad, 538–539 Georgian, 551 Grigorenko, Peter Grigorievich, 609 Gumilev, Lev Nikolayevich, 619 Gumilev, Nikolai Stepanovich, 619–620 Herzen, Alexander Ivanovich, 632–633 Kovalev, Sergei Adamovich, 781 Medvedev, Roy Alexandrovich, 909–910 psychiatric confinement, 609 Sakharov, Andrei Dmitrievich, 162–163, 1345–1346, 1346 samizdat, 1347–1348 Shcharansky, Anatoly Nikolayevich, 1380 Sinyavsky-Daniel trial, 1399–1400 Solzhenitsyn, Alexander Isayevich, 1424–1427, 1425 Supreme Soviet, reform of the, 1501 The Thaw, 1535–1536 Ukrainian, 1604 United States concern about, 1617–1618 See also Exiles Divisia index, 658 Divorce, 474–476, 900–901 Djadids, Bukharan, 178 Dmitrov, Georgi, 1208 Dmitry, False, 403 Bolotnikov and, 159 Filaret and, 499 Godunov and, 567 Job, exile of, 707 Mniszech, marriage to, 951 Otrepev, Grigory, 1125–1126 Shuisky’s opposition, 1390 Time of Troubles, 1549, 1550 Dmitry, Metropolitan, 624 Dmitry Alexandrovich, 58, 402 Dmitry Ivanovich, 1132 Dmitry Mikhailovich, 403–404, 1716

Dmitry of Uglich, 403, 404, 530, 567 Dmowski, Roman, 1008, 1010 Dnevnik pisatelia (Dostoyevsky), 411 Dniester Moldovan Republic, 1568–1569 Dobrenko, Yevgeny, 1416 Doctors’ Plot, 332, 404–405 Doctor Zhivago (Pasternak), 671, 1144 Dolgans, 405–406, 1066 Dolgorukaia, Ekaterina, 37 Dolls, matryoshka, 906 Domostroi, 406–407 Donation books, 408, 1398–1399 Donskoy, Dmitry Ivanovich, 408–409, 796, 1370–1371 Donskoy, Mark, 975 Dormition Cathedral on Gorodok, 1309 Dormition of the Virgin, 786 Doroshevich, Vlas, 711 Dostoyevsky, Fyodor Mikhailovich, 409–412, 411 Academy of Sciences, 5 golden age of Russian literature, 569–570 nationalism, 998 Pisarev’s influence, 1182 Dovzhenko, Alexander, 165, 974, 975 Dr. Zhivago (Pasternak), 748, 1347, 1535 Drambalet, 119 Drankov, Alexander, 972 Drone (journal), 708 Drought, 477–478 Dual belief, 418, 1129 Dubcek, Alexander, 172, 356–357, 358 Dubrovin, Alexander, 151–152 Dudayev, Dzhokar, 412–413, 413, 1376 Dugin, Alexander Gelevich, 413–414 Dukhobors, 1360 Duma, 414–416, 415 Communist International, 305, 306 Congress of Russian Communities, 316 Constitutional Democratic Party, 320

Constitution of 1993, 324 Democratic Party of Russia (DPR), 370–371 Democratic Russia, 371–372 electoral commissions, 444 Fatherland-All Russia, 482–483 Federal Assembly, 486 formation of, 1286–1288 Fundamental Laws, 527–528 Fyodorov, Boris Grigorievich, 532 Kokoshin, Andrei Afanasievich, 761 Korzhakov, Alexander Valisievich, 776–777 Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), 858, 1729–1730 Milyukov, Paul Nikolayevich, 941–942 Movement in Support of the Army, 979 nationalism, 1009–1010 Octobrist Party, 1097 organization, 488 Our Home Is Russia party, 1126 Party of Russian Unity and Accord, 1143 political party system, 1200–1201 post-Soviet era, 486–487 Production Sharing Agreement, 1234 Provisional Government, formation of the, 1240–1241 Russian Movement for Democratic Reform (RMDR), 979 Russia’s Democratic Choice, 1329–1330 Rybkin, Ivan Petrovich, 1338 Shakhrai, Sergei Mikhailovich, 1377 State Council, 1466 Union of Right Forces, 1607–1608 Vyborg Manifesto, 1653–1654 Women of Russia, 1671–1672 World War I, 1677–1678 Yabloko, 1695–1696 Dunayevsky, Isaak Osipovich, 416–417 Duncan, Isadora, 118 Dungans, 417–418 Durman, Karel, 726

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

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E C O N O M I C

Durova, Nadezhda Andreyevna, 418 Durov brothers, 263 Duties, customs, 1565 Dvenadtsat (Blok), 157 Dvoeverie, 418–419, 1129 Dvorianstvo, 419–420 Dyachenko, Tatiana Borisovna, 420–421, 1709 Dyak, 421 Dystopian novels, 1354 Dzerzhinsky, Felix Edmundovich, 422, 422–423 Lenin’s tomb, 849 Lubyanka, 877, 877 state security, organs of, 1471–1472 Dzhirvelov, Ilya, 370

E East-Central Europe, 276–280 Easter eggs, Fabergé, 473 Eastern Europe Cold War, 275–276 Nazi-Soviet Pact Secret Protocol, 1029–1031, 1195, 1198 Stalin’s annexation, 1685 transitional economies, 1570 Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), 1661–1662 Yalta Conference, 1699 Eastern Orthodox Christianity, 907–908 See also Byzantine Empire Eastern religion, 1361 Eastern Slavs Maslenitsa, 903–904 steppes, 1478 East Germany. See German Democratic Republic East Prussia, 717 Ecclesiastical Regulation, 639–640 Ecclesiastical Regulation (Feofan), 639–640, 1235 Eco-Defense, 463 Ecology, 1478 Economic and Social History of the Roman Empire (Rostovtsev), 1304 Economic and Statistical Research Institute, 223

Economic assistance. See Foreign aid Economic bureaucracy, 186–188 Economic development agriculture, 17, 19, 434 Azerbaijan, 107–108 Bulgaria, 183 Emancipation Act, effect of the, 604 extensive, 425–426, 430 Feldman’s theory, 491 imperial, 426–428 index number relativity, 658 intensive, 428 Kazan, 733 Kondratiev, Nikolai Dmitrievich, 765 Kyrgyzstan, 808 Moscow, 965 Muscovy, 983 Nakhichevan, 991 Russian Far East, 481–482 Soviet era, 428–431, 429 Tajikistan, 1515 Turkmenistan, 1591 Tuva, 1594 Uzbekistan, 1628 See also Business and industry; Commerce; Industrialization; Trade, foreign Economic planning central planning, 430, 528 control figures, 325–326 fund holders, 511 geneticists, 543, 1527–1528 Goskomstat, 223, 589 indicative planning, 658–659 industrialization, 660 input-output analysis, 665–666, 946, 1207 Kornai, Janos, 773 Kosygin reforms, 779–780 market socialism, 895 material balances, 904–905 Material Product System (MPS), 905 military-economic planning, 927 ministries, economic, 946–947 planners’ preferences, 1183 ratchet effect, 1270–1271 Seven-Year Plan, 1374 sovnarkhozy system, 779–780

P O L I C Y

N

I N D E X

Strumilin, Stanislav Gustavovich, 1490 techpromfinplan, 460, 1526–1527 teleological planning, 543, 1527–1528 value subtraction, 1631 See also Five-Year Plans; Gosplan Economic policy acceleration program, 15 Alexander III, 40 assortment plans, 91–92 banking system, Soviet, 120–121 banking system, tsarist, 121–122 black market, 152–153 blat, 155 Bulgaria, Soviet era, 184–185 Catherine II, 207 Central Control Commission, 222 chancelleries, 225 Civic Union, 264 command administrative economy, 291–293 commanding heights, 293, 1040 Committee for the Operational Management of the National Economy (COME), 294 Commonwealth of Independent States, 296 Communist Party, 307 cooperatives, 327, 328 corporations, 330–331 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), 334–335 crony capitalism, 344–345 East-Central Europe, 276 East Germany, 553–554 edinonachalie, 436 Emancipation Act, 448–449, 603–604 enterprise, 459–460, 516–517 famine of 1891-1892, 477 famine of 1921-1922, 478 famine of 1932-1933, 479 Free Economic Society for the Encouragement of Agriculture and Husbandry, 520–521 French/Russian alliance, 40 full economic accounting, 526–5 27 funded commodities, 528, 562 fund holders, 511 GKOs, 558–559

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

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1757

I N D E X

N

E C O N O M I C

Economic policy (continued) glavki, 562 Godunov, Boris, 566 goods famine, 577 Grain Crisis of 1928, 593–594 grain trade, 594–597 guilds, 615–616 imperial era, 426–428, 434–436 indicative planning, 659 Interrepublican Economic Committee (IEC), 294 Kaliningrad, 718 Kasyanov, Mikhail Mikhailovich, 726 khozraschet system, 744–745 Khruschev, Nikita, 747 kormlenie, 772–773 Kornai, Janos, 773 Kritzman, Lev Natanovich, 788 labor allocation, 814–815 labor camps, 617–618 Law of the State Enterprise, 1467 Left Opposition, 837–838 Lenin, Vladimir, 853–854 marketization, 432–434 Material Product System (MPS), 1039–1040 mathematical methods, 1034 mercantilism, 915–916 military expenditures, 431 ministries, economic, 946–947 Moldova, 953 monetary overhang, 957 nationalities policy, 1013 Nemchinov, Vasily Sergeyevich, 1033–1034 Nemtsov, Boris Ivanovich, 1034–1035 net material product (NMP), 1039–1040 Pavlov, Valentin Sergeyevich, 1152 Peter I, 1170 petty tutelage, 1178 Popov, Pavel Ilich, 1207 post-Soviet, 432–434 post World War II, 142, 1691 Primitive Socialist Accumulation, 1227–1228 private economic activity, 327, 328

R E F O R M

Production Sharing Agreement, 1234 Provisional Government, 485 rapid industrialization, 661–662, 663, 1089, 1456 rapid marketization, 431 Reitern, Mikhail, 1281–1282 repressed inflation, 1285–1286 rural economy, 16–17 Russian Federal Securities Commission, 1316 Russian Federation, 758 Russian Justice, 1318–1319 Ryzhkov, Nikolai Ivanovich, 1341 samoupravlenie, 1349 Scissors Crisis, 1355–1356, 1410–1411 second economy, 1357–1358 servile economy, 603–604 shock therapy, 1034–1035, 1385–1386 smychka, 1410–1411 Soviet empire, 452 sovnarkhozy system, 779–780, 1438–1439 speculation, 153 Stalin, Josef, 1456 state orders, 1467–1468 System of National Accounts (SNA), 1039–1040 transferable ruble price, 335 transition economies, 1569–1570 trusts, 1578 Ukraine, 784, 1604 virtual economy, 1642 Voznesensky, Nikolai Alexeyevich, 1652 Vyshnegradsky, Ivan Alexeyevich, 1655 war communism, 269, 1658–1660 war economy, 1660 Witte, Sergei, 1670–1671 Yeltsin, Boris, 1707 See also Agriculture; Banking system; Collectivization of agriculture; Foreign debt; Monetary policy; New Economic Policy (NEP); Privatization; Taxation; Trade, foreign Economic reform Alexei Mikhailovich, 48

Andropov, Yuri Vladimirovich, 62 Chubais, Anatoly Borisovich, 256 command administrative economy, 291 Committee for the Operational Management of the National Economy, 294 Economic Reform Commission, 431–432 Fyodorov, Boris Grigorievich, 531–532 Gaidar, Yegor Timurovich, 537–538 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 580–581 imperial era, 427 Kosygin reforms, 172, 779–780 Novosibrisk Report, 1075 post-Soviet era, 432–434 Stroibank, 1489 Yavlinsky, Grigory Alexeyevich, 1703–1704 Economic Reform Commission, 431–432 Economic rights, 321, 323 Economics and economists Aganbegyan, Abel Gezevich, 14–15 agricultural economics, 125, 230–231 Barone, Enrico, 123–124 Bazarov, Vladimir Alexandrovich, 132 Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich, 178–179 Bulgakov, Sergei Nikolayevich, 181–182 capitalism, 197–198 Chubais, Anatoly Borisovich, 256 exchange value of commodities, 816 Feldman, Grigory Alexandrovich, 491 Five-Year Plan, 125, 428–429 Fundamental Equation of Value Theory, 1407 general equilibrium theory, 124 gradualism, 179 Hayek, Friedrich, 627 Kantorovich, Leonid Vitaliyevich, 722 Kondratiev, Nikolai Dmitrievich, 765–766 Kornai, Janos, 773

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

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E M I G R A T I O N

Kritzman, Lev Natanovich, 788–789 labor theory of value, 815–816 Liberman, Yevsei Grigorevich, 861 marginal productivity theory, 124 market socialism, 124, 895 mass privatization, 256 Novozhilov, Viktor Valentinovich, 1077 optimal planning, 722 peasant economy, 231, 1152–1153 planning methods, 132 Popov, Gavriil Kharitonovich, 1207 second economy, 1356–1358 Shatalin, Stanislav Sergeyevich, 1379–1380 Slutsky, Yevgeny Yevgenievich, 1407–1408 soft budget constraint, 773 Soviet economics, 1041 state capitalism, 1463 Strumilin, Stanislav Gustavovich, 1490 surplus value of commodities, 816 Tugan-Baranovsky, Mikhail Ivanovich, 1583 Varga, Eugene Samuilovich, 1632–1633 Voznesensky, Nikolai Alexeyevich, 1652 Yavlinsky, Grigory Alexeyevich, 1703–1704 Zaslavskaya, Tatiana Ivanovna, 1720 Economism, 432 Edelman, Robert, 1451 Edinonachalie, 436 Education, 436–441 access, 438 Bolsheviks, 670 cantonist system, 197 Communist Academy, 299–300 Communist Party functions, 311 compulsory, 4 conservation movement, 461 Cultural Revolution, 351 Free Economic Society for the Encouragement of Agriculture and Husbandry, 520

A N D

Gaspirali, Ismail Bey, 540 Gorky, Maxim, 586 Higher Party School, 634 Institute of Red Professors, 666–667 Jews, 703 Klyuchevsky, Vasily Osipovich, 760 Komsomol, 313 Krupskaya, Nadezhda Konstantinovna, 791 Lazarev Institute, 832 Narimanov, Nariman, 994 nationalities policy, 1015–1016 physical education, 1449–1450 Pobedonostsev, Konstantin, 1187–1188 raznochintsy, 1273 russians, 1324 Short Course, 1387 Slavo-Greco-Latin Academy, 843, 1404–1405 Smolny Institute, 1409–1410 Soviet Koreans, 768 Turkic languages, 653–654 Universities, 1620–1623 Uvarov, Sergei Semenovich, 1626 Education reform Alexander II, 604 Gaspirali, Ismail Bey, 540 jadidism, 698–699 Khrushchev, Nikita, 747–748, 1015–1016 Peter I, 1170 Pirogov, Nikolai Ivanovich, 1181 Efron, Sergei, 1582 Egypt, 277 Ehrenburg, Ilya Grigorovich, 405, 441–442 Eisenhower, Dwight D. Cuba, relations with, 347 Kruschev, meeting with, 276 U-2 spy plane incident, 1597 Eisenstein, Sergei Mikhailovich, 43, 442, 442–443, 973–975 Ekk, Nikolai, 975 Elections Akayev, Askar Akayevich, 21 Armenia, 82 Belarus, 136 Central Committee, 309

I M M I G R A T I O N

N

I N D E X

Communist Party of the Russian Federation, 305, 306 Congress of People’s Deputies, 315 Congress of Russian Communities, 316 Constitutional Democratic Party, 320 Constitution of 1936, 322 Constitution of 1977 amendments, 323 counterreforms, 336 democratization, 373–374 electoral commissions, 443–444 Lithuania, 819 Ukraine, 784 zemstvo, 1722 See also Duma Electoral commissions, 443–444 Electoral system, 487 Electricity grids, 444–445 Elite units. See Special purpose forces Elizabeth, 445–447, 446 ballet, 117 Bestuzhev-Ryumin, relationship with, 147 Rastrelli’s palaces, 1270 regency of, 692 St. Petersburg, 1483 Emancipation Act, 447–449 Baryatinsky, Alexander, 125 Konstantin, Nikolayevich, 767 Milyutin’s role in, 944 overview, 602–604 See also Serfdom, abolition of Emancipation of Labor, 154 Embargoes, 347 Emergency Committee, 97–99 Emigration and immigration, 654–656 Akhmatova, Anna, 22 Baltics, 1014 East German, 553 France, 523 German settlers, 554–555 Greece, 606–607 Huns, 646–647 Jews, 1009 Koreans, 768–769 Manifesto of 1763, 892–893

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

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1759

I N D E X

N

E M P I R E ,

U S S R

Emigration and immigration (continued) Poles, 1004–1005 post-Soviet era, 921–922 refuseniks, 1279 See also Deportations; Migration Empire, USSR as, 449–453 Employment economic growth, 429, 430 Jews, 703 women, 1323 See also Labor Ems Decree, 824 Energiya, 1443 Energy policy electricity grids, 444–445 nuclear energy, 93–96, 238–240 Russian-Iranian relations, 675 Engels, Friedrich, 453–454 communism, 297 dialectical materialism, 393, 454 dictatorship of the proletariat, 394 Hegel, influence of, 630–631 scientific socialism, 1354–1355 Tkachev, correspondence with, 1554 Engineering, 1493 Engineers, 350–352, 1377, 1377–1378 England. See Great Britain Enlightener (Joseph of Volotsk), 707–708 The Enlightenment, 454–455 fanaticism, 680 French influence in Russia, 522 idealism, 651 Enserfment, 455–459, 830 Enterprise, Soviet, 459–460 economic ministries, 946–947 full economic accounting, 526–527 glavki, 562 khozraschet, 744–745 Kosygin reform, 779–780 Law of the State Enterprise, 1467 material balances, 904–905 petty tutelage, 1178 production output, 626 ratchet effect, 1270–1271 samoupravlenie, 1349

A S

state orders, 1467–1468 techpromfinplan, 1526–1527 trade, 516–517 value subtraction, 1631 Entertainment cabaret, 193–194 circus, 263–264 motion picutres, 974 movies, 43 people’s houses, 1160–1161 Petrushka, 1177–1178 Raikin, Arkady Isaakovich, 1265 Taganka, 1512 See also Folklore; Motion pictures; Theater Environmentalism, 460–463 Environmental issues, 96, 817 Epic songs, 190, 508–509, 636–637 Epifany Slavinetsky, 104, 105 Epiphanius the Wise, 624 Episcopate, 463–464 “The Epoch of Great Reforms,” 4–5 Equality, women’s, 475, 493–496 Erisman, E. F., 29 Eritrea, 466–467 Ermler, Fridrikh, 974, 975 Ermolaev, Herman, 1417 Ermolin, Vasily, 785 Espionage, 274, 987 Estate system. See Soslovie Estonia and Estonians, 464–466, 465 German settlers, 554 Great Northern War, 601–602 migration, 1015–1016 nationalism, 1008 Ethics, 112 Ethiopian civil war, 466–467 Ethnicity Abkhazians, 1–2, 551 Adyge, 11 Ajars, 20 Albanians, Caucasian, 28 Altai, 54–55 assimilation, 452 Avars, 102–103 Balkars, 117 Buryats, 188–189 Carpatho-Rusyns, 198–200 Caucasus, 213–214

Chechens, 232 Cherkess, 237 Chukchi, 257–258 Chuvash, 262–263 Cimmerians, 263 colonialism, 289 Crimea, 339 Crimean Tatars, 341–342 Dagestan, conflict in, 362 Dargins, 364–365 deportation, 220, 234, 383–386, 384, 385 Dolgans, 405–406 Dungans, 417 Evenki, 471 Finns and Karelians, 503–504 Gagauz, 536–537 genocide, 544–545 Georgia, conflict in, 551 gypsies, 620–621 inorodtsy, 664 Islam, 682 Jadids, 682 Kabardians, 715–716 Kalmyks, 719 Karachai, 723 Karakalpaks, 724 Kazakhs, 728–732 Khakass, 736–737 Khanty, 737–738 Khazars, 739–740 Komi, 764 Koreans, 768–769 korenizatsya, 771–772 Koryaks, 775–776 Kumandas, 55 Kurds, 798–800, 799 Kyrgyz, 807–809 Mansi, 893–894 Mari, 894–895 merchants, 916 Meskhetian Turks, 917 migration, 921–922 Mingrelicans, 944–945 Mordvins, 961–962 multiethnicity and empire, 449–452 Nenets, 1035, 1035–1036 Normanist Controversy, 1060–1062

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E X I L E S

Northern Peoples, 1065–1067 Osetins, 1122 Poles, 1197–1198 Polovtsy, 1202–1203 Polyane, 1203–1204 Provisional Government, 485 Russians, 1321–1327 Sakha and Yakuts, 1344, 1344–1345 Sami, 1347 Sarts, 1350–1351 Svans, 1504–1505 Tajiks, 1513–1514 Tatars, 1519–1522 Telengits, 55 Teleuts, 55 Torky, 1560–1561 Turkmen, 1589–1591 Tuvinians, 1593–1594 Udmurts, 1597–1598 Uzbeks, 1626–1629 See also Ethnography Ethnographic Anthology (journal), 469 Ethnographic Division, Russian Geographical Society, 468 Ethnographic Review (journal), 469 Ethnography folk music, 510 Gumilev, Lev Nikolayevich, 619 Russian and Soviet, 467–471 Etiquette, 1325–1326 Eucharist, 706, 1119 Eugene Onegin (Pushkin), 569, 1253 Eugenius IV, Pope, 506 Euler, Leonhard, 4 Euphrates River, 76–77 Eurasianism, 414 Eurobonds, 514 Eurocommunism, 279 European détente, 390 The European (Kireyevsky), 756 European Lowland, 546–547 European Union Kaliningrad, 718 Russian-EU summit meeting, 606 Evangeliaries, 1123–1124 Evangelical Christians, 1361 Evenings on a Farm near the Dikanka (Gogol), 569

Evenki, 471 Evolutionist theory, 469 Evreinov, Nikolai, 1538 Ewers, Johann Philipp Georg, 1468 Excursions, 1562 Executions bishops, 464 Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich, 180, 1289 Chernyshevsky, Nikolai Gavrilovich, 245 Decembrists, 368, 1046 Great Purges, 1250 Kamenev, Lev, 1389 Khovanskys, 744 Kolchak, Alexander Vasilievich, 762 Kondratiev, Nikolai Dmitrievich, 765 Krasnov, Pyotr Nikolayevich, 783 Leningrad Affair, 846 Medvedev, Sylvest Agafonikovich, 910 Meyerhold, Vsevolod yemilievich, 919 Mniszech, Marina, 951 Myasoedov, Sergei A., 987 Nicholas II, 1053 Night of the Murdered Poets, 332 Perovskaya, Sofia Lvovna, 1166 Pestel, Pavel Ivanovich, 1168 Petrashevtsy, 1176 Preobrazhensky, Yevgeny Alexeyevich, 1219 Pytatkov, Georgy Leonidovich, 1257 Red Terror, 1276 Romanovs, 1298 Rykov, Alexei Ivanovich, 1289, 1339 Ryleyev, Kondraty Fyodorovich, 1340 Ryutin, Martemyan, 1340 Shein and Izmailov, 1409 Shlyapnikov, Alexander Gavrilovich, 1384 Spiridonova, Maria Alexandrovna, 1447 Sultan-Galiev, Mirza Khaidargalievich, 1499 Svechin, Alexander Andreyevich, 1504

N

I N D E X

Twenty-Six Baku Commissars, 1376 Voznesensky, Nikolai Alexeyevich, 1652 Yezhov, Nikolai Ivanovich, 1713 Zhelyabov, Andrei Ivanovich, 1725 Zinoviev, Grigory, 1389 Exhibition of the Achievements of the Socialist Economy, 93 Exiles Amalrik, Andrei Alexeievich, 55–56 Anthony Khrapovitsky, 64–65 Anti-Party Group, 68 Avvakum Petrovich, 105, 962 Berdyayev, Nikolai Alexandrovich, 139 Biron, Ernst Johann, 150–151 Bonner, Yelena Georgievna, 163 Boretskaya, Marfa Ivanovna, 164 Brodsky, Joseph Alexandrovich, 174 Butashevich-Petrashevsky, Mikhail Vasilievich, 189 Chayanov, Alexander Vasilievich, 231 Chernov, Viktor Mikhailovich, 241–242 Chernyshevsky, Nikolai Gavrilovich, 244–245 Chkheidze, Nikolai Seminovich, 251 corporal punishment, 330 Cyril and Methodius Society, 354 Dashkova, Yekaterina Romanovna, 365–366 Decembrists, 1047 Dostoyevsky, Fyodor Mikhailovich, 410 Dzerzhinsky, Felix Edmundovich, 422 ethnography, 469 Filaret Romanov, Patriarch, 499 France, 523 Golitsyn, Vasily Vasilievich, 575 Gorgy, Maxim, 586–587 Greeks, 606–607 Herzen, Alexander Ivanovich, 632–633 Hrushevsky, 641 Jews, 655

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

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1761

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Exiles (continued) Kamenev, Lev Borisovich, 720 Kropotkin, Pyotr Alexeyevich, 790 Left Opposition, 838 Lenin, Vladimir Ilich, 850, 1412 Lopukhin family, 446–447 Mandelshtam, Osip Emilievich, 891, 892 Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, 954 Morozov, Boris Ivanovich, 963 Oprichnina, 1111–1112 Platonov, Sergei Fyodorovich, 1185 Pushkin, Alexander Sergeyevich, 1252 Radek, Karl Bernardovich, 1263 Radischev, Alexander Nikolayevich, 1264 Romanov, Mikhail Fyodorovich, 1300 Rykov, Alexei Ivanovich, 1339 Sakharov, Andrei, 162–163, 560, 671–672, 1345–1346 Shamil, 1379 Siberia, 1392 Skrypnyk, Mykola Oleksyovych, 1401 Solzhenitsyn, Alexander Isayevich, 1424, 1426–1427 Spiridonova, Maria Alexandrovna, 1446–1447 Tatars, 341–342 Trotsky, Leon Davidovich, 1574, 1576–1577 Zasulich, Vera Ivanovna, 1721 Zhordania, noe Nikolayevich, 1730 See also Deportations; Dissidents Expansion Alexander II, 37 Catherine II, 208 China, 247–248 colonial expansion, 284–286 Georgia, 550–551 Gorchakov, Alexander Mikhailovich, 583 Ivan III, 687–688 map, 287, 290 Muslim territory, 678–679 Paul I, 1149

Shamil’s resistance, 1378–1379 Siberia, 19–20 Slavophilism, 364 Sweden, 1507–1508 Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji, 793 Exploration and explorers Bering, Vitus Jonassen, 142 Chirikov, Alexzei Ilich, 250 Dezhnev, Seven Ivanovich, 392 ethnography, 467, 469 Great Northern Expedition, 250 Kamchatka, 250 Khabarov, Yerofei Pavlovich, 736 Moskvitin, Ivan Yurievich, 972 polar, 1196–1197 Roerich, Nicholas Konstantinovich, 1291 Exports. See Trade Extensive economic growth, 425–426, 430 Extortion, 884–885 Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counterrevolution and Sabotage (Cheka), 268 Extraordinary Security, 1531

F Fabergé, Peter Carl, 473–474 Fables, 792 Factory workers, 813 Fadeev, Rostislav Andreyevich, 1134 Fairy tales, 509 Faith of Christ, 1360 Family family life, 407, 896–901 housing, 694 land tenure, 819–820 Russians, 1322–1324, 1323 Tatars, 1521 Family Code of 1926, 474, 640–641 Family Code on Marriage, the Family, and Guardianship, 474–475 Family Edict of 1944, 476 Family law, 474–477, 640–641, 898–900 Family laws of 1936, 476–477 Famine Bolsheviks, 269 demographic trends, 377, 378

famine of 1601–1603, 567, 1550 famine of 1891–1892, 477 famine of 1921–1922, 477–479 famine of 1932–1933, 479–480 famine of 1946, 480–481 famine relief, 56, 477–478 Fanaticism, 680 Far eastern region, 481–482 Fascism, 1207–1208, 1561 Fashion, 447, 1326 Fast-food chains, 513 Fasting, 512 Fatherland-All Russia, 482–483 Fatherland movement, 316 Fathers and Sons (Turgenev), 570, 669, 1053, 1182, 1585 Feast Books, 483 February Revolution of 1917, 483–486 Bolsheviks, 160 Constitutional Democratic Party, 320 Kerensky, Alexander Fyodorovich, 734 Kornilov Affair, 773 Provisional Government, 1090 Federal Assembly, 324, 486–488 Federalism, 488–489 Bolsheviks, 1011–1012 Civil War, 269–270 Union Treaty, 1607–1608, 1612–1613 Federal Property Fund, 489–490 Federal Securities Commission, 1479–1480 Federal Securities Law, 1316 Federal Security Bureau (FSB), 836–837, 877 Federal Security Service, 1255 Federation Council, 96, 324, 486, 488, 1391 Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (FNPR), 1567 Federation treaties, 489, 490–491, 1281 Fedor Nikitich Romanov. See Filaret Romanov, Patriarch Fedotova, Glikeria, 1537 Fedulova, Alevtina, 1672 Feeding system, 90 Feldman, Grigory Alexandrovich, 491

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F O R E I G N

Feldman, Pavel, 543 Feldshers, 491–492 Fellow travelers, 492, 1315 Feminism, 493–496 Armand, Inessa, 75 Kollontai, Alexandra Mikhailovna, 762–763, 763 Samoilova, Kondordiya Nikolayevna, 1348–1349 Tur, Yevgenia, 1592 zhenotdel, 1726–1728 zhensovety, 1728–1729 Fennell, J. L. I., 691 Feodalizm v Drevnei Rusi (Pavlov-Silvansky), 638 Ferdinand, Francis, 101 Ferghana Valley, 496–497 Fertility, 378, 379 Festivals Maslenitsa, 903–904 Ysyakh, 1345 Feudalism, 497 Filaret Drozdov, Metropolitan, 498 Filaret Romanov, Patriarch, 498–500 Mikhail Romanov, relationship with, 1300 patriarchate, 1147 Romanov dynasty, 1296, 1297 Smolensk War, 1409 Time of Troubles, 1551, 1552 Film directors. See Directors, film Filofei, 1542 Final Act, 1637 Finance Ministry, 1160 Finland, 500–503, 501 Bobrikov, Nikolai Ivanovich, 158 Great Northern War, 601–602 nationalism, 1007–1008 self-determination, 1000 Soviet-Finnish War, 1433–1435, 1434 Swedish relations, 1507, 1508 tsarist nationalities policy, 1021 Finnmark, 1068 Finns, 503–504 Fioravanti, Aristotele, 203–204, 786 Firebird, 504 The Firebird (Stravinsky), 1488 First All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, 1090

First Almanac (Serapion Brothers), 1363 The First Circle (Solzhenitsyn), 1425 First Congress of Soviet Writers, 109 First International, 114 First Lithuanian Statute of 1529, 135 First Military Statistical Department in the Main STaff, 934 First Philosophical Letter (Chaadayev), 997 “First Philosophical Letter” (Chaadayev), 223, 756 Fischer, Stanley, 426 Five. See Mighty Handful Five-Hundred-Day Plan, 504–505 Aganbegyan, Abel Gezevich, 15 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 581 Shatalin, Stanislav Sergeyevich, 1380 Five-Year Plans, 505–506 control figures, 326 economics, 125, 428–429 Gosplan, 590 industrialization, 663 labor, 813–814 military production, 937–938 party congresses, 1140–1141 Strumilin, Stanislav Gustavovich, 1490 writers, 109 Flagellants, 1360 The Flame (journal), 1542 Florence, Council of, 506–507 Fock, Vladimir Alexandrovich, 7 Fokine, Michel, 118 Folk art matryoshka dolls, 906–907 palekh painting, 1130 symbolism, 1326 Folklore, 507–509 ethnography, 467–469 Firebird, 504 historical songs, 636–637 Lay of Igor’s Campaign, 831–832 Propp, Vladimir Iakovlevich, 1237 Stenka Razin, 1271–1272, 1476–1477 Folk medicine, 1324 Folk music, 509–510

P O L I C Y

N

I N D E X

bylina, 190 chastushka, 230 Folk theater, 194 Fondoderzhateli, 511 Fonvizin, Denis Ivanovich, 511–512 Food, 512–513, 1325 Food supply Committees of the Village Poor, 295 famine of 1891–1892, 477 famine of 1932–1933, 479 war communism, 1659 Food tax, 1232–1233 Forced industrialization, 661–662, 663, 1660 Foreign Affairs Chancellery, 225 Foreign aid Afghanistan, 13 Cuba, 348 transitional economies, 1570 Foreign debt, 513–515 France, 522 Genoa Conference, 544 gold standard, 574 imperial era, 427–428, 435, 436 Kyrgyzstan, 808 lend lease program, 845 post-Soviet era, 433–434 trade, 517 Foreign news, 1519 Foreign policy Alexander III, 40 Anna Ivanovna, 64 Berlin blockade, 142–143 Brezhnev, 169–170, 172–173 Catherine II, 207, 208 Chicherin, Georgy Vasilievich, 246–247 collective security, 685, 834 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), 334–335 détente, 172–173, 389–390, 519–520 Elizabeth, 447 Geneva Summit of 1985, 543–544 Genoa Conference, 544 Godunov, Boris, 565–566 Golitsyn, Vasily Vasilievich, 575 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 582

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1763

I N D E X

N

F O R E I G N

T R A D E

Foreign policy (continued) Gorchakov, Alexander Mikhailovich, 584 Grand Alliance, 597 Gromyko, Andrei Andreyevich, 611 Hague Peace Conferences, 625 Helsinki Accords, 631–632 Holy Alliance, 34, 639 Ivan III, 688 Kellogg-Briand Pact, 733 Khrushchev, Nikita, 748–749 Kollontai, Alexandra Mikhailovna, 763 Konstantin Nikolayevich, 767 Kosygin, Alexei, 779 Kotoshikhin, Grigory Karpovich, 780–781 Kozyrev, Andrei Vladimirovich, 782–783 Kremlinology, 787 Kyrgyzstan, 808–809 League of Natnions, 833–834 Litvinov, Maxim, 865–866 Malta Summit, 890–891 Matveyev, Artamon, 907 Milyukov, Paul Nikolayevich, 942 Milyutin, Dmitry, 943 Moiseyev, Mikhail Alexeyevich, 951–952 Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, 954–955 near abroad, 1031–1032 Nesselrode, Karl Robert, 1038–1039 New Political Thinking, 1042–1043 Nogai, 1059 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1062–1063 Ordin-Nashchokin, Afanasy Lavrentievich, 1113 Paul I, 1149 Persian Gulf War, 1166–1167 Popular Front policy, 1207–1208 Potemkin, Grigory Alexandrovich, 1214 Primakov, Yevgeny Maximovich, 1223 Putin, Vladimir, 1256 Quadruple and Quintuple Alliances, 1259–1260

Security Council, 1362–1363 Shevardnadze, Eduard Amvrosievich, 1382–1383 Sklarska Poreba conference, 301–302 Soviet containment, 301, 518 United Nations, 1614 Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), 326, 1661–1662 See also Cold War; Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939; Treaties and international agreements; Specific countries Foreign trade. See Trade, foreign Foreign Trade Organizations (FTOs), 947 Forest Code, 460 Forest soil, 1189 Fortifications, frontier, 525 Fortunatov, B. K., 764 Foundations of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia (Dugin), 414 France, 518–520 Congress of Vienna, 1637 containment policy, 518 détente, 390 Genoa Conference, 544 indicative planning, 659 influence of, 522–523 Kellogg-Briand Pact, 733 Litvinov, Maxim, 865–866 Popular Front, 1208 Quadruple and Quintuple Alliances, 1259–1260 Russia, 40 Seven Years’ War, 1375 Suez crisis, 277 Treaties of Paris, first and second, 1136, 1637 Treaty of Tilsit, 1547 Triple Entente, 599 Vietnam, 1638 See also Napoleon; Napoleon I Francis-Joseph, 1544 Franco, Francisco, 1443 Frank, Semen, 1635 Frederick II (Prussia), 1193, 1375 Frederick William III (Prussia), 1547, 1548 Free Art Studio, 721 Free Cossacks, 332–333

Free Economic Society for the Encouragement of Agriculture and Husbandry, 520–521 Freemasonry, 367, 454, 521–522, 1074, 1083 Free speech, 709–710, 712 Freight, railway, 1266 French Revolution, 522, 1637 French War of 1812, 164–165, 523–525, 805 Friazin, Bon, 786 Friazin, Marco, 785, 786 Friedrich, Carl, 1561 Friendship of Nations, 1002 Frolov, 785 From the Other Shore (Herzen), 633 Frontier fortifications, 525 Frunze, Mikhail Vasilievich, 525–526, 926, 936 Full economic accounting, 526–527 Full slavery, 1402 Functional Cargo Block, 673–674 Functional Method of architecture, 325 Fundamental Equation of Value Theory, 1407 Fundamental Laws of 1906, 527–528 The Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire, 635 Funded commodities, 528–529, 562 Fund holders, 511 Furmanov, Dmitry, 226 Fur trade Alaska, 288 Novgorod, 625–626 Sakha and Yakuts, 1344 “Future War” (Tukhachevsky), 1583 Futurism, 175, 529, 908 Fyodor, Alexeyevich, 529–530 Fyodor II, 530 Fyodor Ivanovich, 531 Fyodorov, Boris Grigorievich, 531–532 Fyodorov, Ivan, 532, 532–533 Fyodorovich, Mikhail, 90–91

G Gadar, Yegor, 1330 Gagarin, Yuri Alexeyevich, 535–536, 536, 1442

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1764

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G L A V K I

Gagauz, 536–537 Gagauz-Yeri, 952 Gaidar, Yegor Timurovich, 264, 537–538, 538, 581, 1385 Gakkel, Yakov M., 103 Galicia, 1601–1602, 1676–1682 The Gambler (Dostoyevsky), 410–411 Gamsakhurdia, Zviad, 20, 538–539, 551 Gapon, Georgy Apollonovich, 157, 539–540 Gaspirali, Ismail Bey, 341, 540–541, 681, 698, 1008 Gatchina, 31–32, 541–542 Gazprom, 240–241 Geiden, L. P., 1027–1028 Gendarme Corps, 636 Gender roles, 1322–1324 General equilibrium theory, 124 General secretary, 542, 1494 General staff of Comintern, 303 General strike of October 1905, 1086–1087 Geneticists, 543, 1527–1528 Genetics Lysenko, Trofim, 881 Nemchinov, Vasily, 1034 Stalin’s attack on, 7 Vavilov, nikolai, 1634 Zhdanov, Andrei, 1724–1725 Geneva Conferences on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, 93 Geneva Summit of 1985, 543–544 Gennady, Archbishop, 712, 713 Genoa Conference, 544 Genocide, 544–545 Armenian, 80, 83, 366 Jews, 612, 1604 Lithuania, 864 Poles, 727 Genshtab, 932 Geography, 546–548 Armenia, 76–77 Caucasus, 212–213 Nakhichevan, 991 name changes, 220 regional, 1280 Russian Geographical Society, 1317 Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), 1327 Siberia, 1391

Geology, 76, 546 Geometry, 869–870 Georgia and Georgians, 548–552 Abkhazians, 2 administrative units, 1567 Ajars, 20 annexation, 210 Beria, Lavrenti Pavlovich, 140 colonialism, 289 Gamsakhurdia, Zviad, 538–539 languages, 213 map, 550 Meskhetian Turks, 917 Mingrelicans, 944–945 Muslim rule, 552 nationalism, 1007 Shevardnadze, Eduard Amvrosievich, 1382, 1383 Svans, 1504 Tiflis, 1545–1547, 1546 Zhordania, Noe Nikolayevich, 1730 Georgian Helsinki Group, 538 Georgian Orthodox Church, 552–553 Georgian Social Democrats, 1730 Gerashchenko, Viktor, 221 German Democratic Republic, 553–554, 556–557 German Federal Republic, 554–555 German historical law school, 637 Germans deportations, 386 dissidents, 400 emigration, 655 German settlers, 554–555 Germany, 553–554, 555–558 Anti-Comintern Pact, 67 armistice negotiations, 168–169 Battle of Kursk, 802–803 Battle of Moscow, 969–970 Battle of Stalingrad, 1453–1455 Battle of Tannenberg, 1516, 1677 Berlin Blockade, 142–143 Collective Security policy, 685 Convention of Berlin, 144 détente, 390 East Prussia, 717 Genoa Conference, 544 German Democratic Republic, 553–554, 556–557

N

I N D E X

Japanese/German relations, 67 Jews, extermination of, 545, 612, 1604 League of Nations, 833–834 Lithuania, invasion of, 864 Mirbach assassination, 839 Northern Convoys, attacks on, 1064 Operation Barbarossa, 1110–1111, 1429, 1435, 1684, 1686 Poland, 1195 relations with, 555–558 reunification, 554 Russia, 143 Siege of Leningrad, 846–848, 847, 985 Smodemyanskaya, capture and hanging of, 777 Soviet-Finnish War, 1433–1435 Soviet-German Trade Agreement of 1939, 1435–1436 Soviet Union, invasion of, 597, 1683–1686, 1684, 1685 Stalin’s relationship with Hitler, 1685 Three Emperors’ League, 1544 Treaty of Rapallo, 1268–1269 Vlasov Movement, 1644–1645 World War I, 1676–1680 World War II, 938–940, 1683–1691, 1689 Yalta Conference, 1698 See also Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 German Yard, 625 Gershenzon, Mikhail, 1635 Ghenghis Khan, 340, 755 Gigantomania, 557–558 Ginzburg, Evgenia Semenovna, 558 Ginzburg, Moisei, 72, 325 Giray dynasty, 340, 341 Girls, education of, 1409–1410 GKOs, 558–559 Glagolitic, 354 Glasnost, 559–562 Afghanistan, war in, 14 chernukha, 242–243 environmentalism, 462 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 580 thick journals, 1541 Glavki, 562

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

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1765

I N D E X

N

G L A V L I T

Glavlit, 218, 563, 1471 Glavnauka. See Commissariat of Education GlavPUR, 937 Glavrepertkom, 1538 Glaziev, Sergei, 316, 371 Glinka, Mikhail Ivanovich, 563–564 Mighty Handful, 920 national music, 510, 986, 999 opera, 1107–1108 Romanticism, 1303 Stasov’s monograph on, 1462 Glinskaya, Yelena Vasilyevna, 564–565 Glushko, Valentin, 1440 Gnezdovo, 565 Godovye voyevody, 1651 Godunov, Alexander, 370 Godunov, Boris Fyodorovich, 565–567, 566 Assembly of the Land, 90 Dmitry of Uglich, death of, 403, 404 Filaret’s exile, 499 Fyodor II, succession of, 530 Job, support by, 707 Moscow patriarchate, 1147 Red Square, 1275 Romanov clan, 1296, 1300 rule of, 531 Shuisky, relationship with, 1390 Time of Troubles, 1549–1550 Gogol, Nikolai Vasilievich, 567–568, 569, 998, 1537 Goikhbarg, Alexander, 474 “Going to the People,” 669, 818 Golden age of Russian literature, 568–571 Golden Horde, 571–573 Alexander Yaroslavich’s visits to, 41–42 Andrei’s visits to, 58 Astrakhan, 92 Basil I, 127 Battle of Ugra River, 1599 Dmitry Alexandrovich, 402 Donskoy, Dmitry Ivanovich, 408–409 Islam, 678 Ivan I, 686 Ivan II, 686–687

Ivan III, 688 Simeon, visit of, 1397 Volga Bulgars, 1519–1520 Yuri’s visit to, 1716 See also Mongol era Goldfaden, Avraam, 703 Gold standard, 573–574 Golikov, Ivan, 1130 Golitsyn, Alexander, 34, 216 Golitsyn, Anatoly, 370 Golitsyn, Vasily Vasilievich, 574–575 Golosov, Ilya, 72 The Golovlyof Family (SaltykovShchedrin), 1346 Gomulka, Wladyslaw, 1195 Goncharov, G. P., 1452 Goncharov, Ivan Alexandrovich, 576–577 Goncharova, Natalia Sergeyevna, 575–576, 1252–1253 Goods famine, 577 Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeyevich, 577–583, 579, 1164, 1616, 1617 Afghanistan war, 13–14 Andreyeva’s criticism of, 60–61 Andropov’s support of, 62 anti-alcohol campaign, 31, 580–581 Armenia, 81 arms control, 86–87 atomic energy, 95–96 Bakatin’s support of, 111 banking system, 587 Belovezh Accords, 138 Brezhnev, criticism of, 173 cadres policy, 196 Catholicism, 210 Chebrikov and, 232 Chernenko, rivalry with, 238 chernukha, 242–243 Church relations, 1180 Cold War, end of the, 281 Congress of People’s Deputies, 315 Constitution of 1977 amendments, 323–324 cooperative societies, 328 Council of Ministers, dissolution of, 195

Cuba, relations with, 348 cult of personality, 349 Czechoslovakia, relations with, 359 democratization, 373–375 economic reform, 15, 432 five-hundred-day plan, 504–505, 581 Five-Year Plans, 506 foreign policy, 582 France, relations with, 520 full economic accounting, 526–527 general secretary position, 542 Geneva Summit of 1985, 543–544 Green Cross International, 463 Grishin, rivalry with, 609 human rights, 642 intelligentsia, 672 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 672–673 Israel, relations with, 684 Japan, relations with, 700 Kremlinology, 788 Kryuchkov’s criticism of, 792–793 land leasing, 822 Law of the State Enterprise, 1467 legal system, 842 Ligachev’s criticism of, 862 Lithuania, 865 Lukyanov’s role in attempted coup, 879 Malta Summit, 890–891 military policy, 940 motion pictures, 977 Movement for Democratic Reforms, 978 nationalities policy, 1016–1017 New Political Thinking, 1042–1043 Nobel Peace Prize, 582 Novosibrisk Report, 1075 party congresses, 1142 Pavlov’s role in administration, 1152 People’s Control Committee, 1160 Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World, 1163–1164 Persian Gulf War, 1166–1167

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G O V E R N M E N T

political pluralism, 1163 Presidential Council, 1221 Primakov’s role in administration, 1223 Referendum of March 1991, 1278–1279 Reykjavik Summit, 1288–1289 Russian Orthodox Church, 1321 Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), 1327–1328 Sakharov’s return, 1346 samoupravlenie, 1349 science and technology policy, 1353 Shevardnadze’s role in administration, 1382–1383 Solidarity Movement, 1422 Soyuz faction, 1439–1440 state orders, 1467–1468 succession of leadership, 1494 temperance campaign, 29 trade, 517 Union of Sovereign States, 1607–1608 Union Treaty, 1607–1608, 1612–1613 United Nations, 1614 Yakovlev’s role in administration, 1697–1698 Yanayev’s disagreement with, 1700 Yeltsin, post-Soviet relationship with, 582 Yeltsin’s role in administration, 1705–1706 zero option, 1723–1724 zhensovety, 1728–1729 See also August 1991 Putsch; Glasnost; Perestroika; Soviet breakup Gorbachev, Raisa Maximovna, 578, 583 Gorbachev Foundation, 582 Gorchakov, Alexander Mikhailovich, 143, 583–584 Gordeyev, Alexei, 16 Gordievsky, Oleg, 370 Gordon, Patrick Leopold, 584–585 Goremykin, Ivan Longinovich, 585 Gorky, Maxim, 586, 586–587 golden age of Russian literature, 570

A D M I N I S T R A T I O N

science and democracy, 1623 socialist realism, 1416 stukach, 1491 Union of Soviet Writers, 1610 Gorky Institute of World Literature, 509 Gorsky, Alexander, 118 Gosbank, 587–588 banking system, 120–121, 221 economic bureaucracy, 187 enterprises, 460 khozraschet system, 745 monetary system, 959 Stroibank, 1489 Gosizdat, 588–589 Goskomstat, 223, 589 See also Central Statistical Agency The Gospel as the Foundation of Life (Petrov), 1177 Gosplan, 589–590 Bazarov, Vladimir Alexandrovich, 132 Central Statistical Agency (TsSU), 589 control figures, 326 economic bureaucracy, 187–188 Feldman report, 491 funded commodities, 528 indicative planning, 659 material balances, 904–905 military-economic planning, 927 ministries, economic, 946–947 Ministry of Foreign Trade, 947 Sovnarkom, 1439 TsUNKhU, 223 Gospoda Golovlevy (SaltykovShchedrin), 1346 Gossnab SSSR, 187 Gosti, 590–591 Gostinaya sotnya, 591 Gosudaryev dvor, 591–592 Gothic Yard, 625 Go to the People movement, 1413 Gottwald, Klement, 358 Gouzenko, Igor, 370 Governing Senate, 592–593 Government administration Assemblies of the Land, 89–91 Azerbaijan, 107 Belarus, 878 chancellery system, 225–226

N

I N D E X

church/state relations, 259–260, 261 colonialism, 287–289 commissars, 293–294 Council of Ministers, 335–336 dyaks, 421 glavki, 562 Governing Senate, 592–593 guberniya, 614–615 His Majesty’s Own Chancery, 635–636 Ivan IV, 690 Jews, 703–704 Kievan Rus, 752–753 kormlenie, 772 land captains, 818 local government, 870–871 Milyutin’s reforms, 944 Moldova, 953 Muscovy, 983 Nicholas I, 1047, 1048 Novgorod, 1070, 1071 Novosiltsev’s recommendations, 1076 okolnichy, 1100–1101 Peter I, 1169–1170 podyachy, 1189 posadnik, 1211 Presidential Council, 1220–1221 Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, 1221–1222, 1222 prime minister, 1226–1227 Qipchaq Khanate, 572–573 Rabkrin, 1262 raionirovanie, 1268 regionalism, 1280–1281 Russian Federation, 324–325 second secretary, 1358–1359 Secretariat, 1359 soviets, 1433 Sovnarkom, 1439 Speransky, Mikhail, 1445–1446 state committees, 1464–1465 State Council, 1465 Supreme Soviet, 1500–1501, 1501 territorial-administrative units, 1533–1534 Transcaucasia, 1567–1568 uezd, 1598 veche, 1634–1635

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1767

I N D E X

N

G O V E R N M E N T

Government administration (continued) Vorontsov, Mikhail Semenovich, 1648–1649 voyevoda, 1651–1652 Yeltsin, Boris, 1084–1086 zemstvo, 1721–1723 Government corruption. See Corruption The Government Inspector (Gogol), 1537 Government reform Andropov, Yuri Vladimirovich, 62 Catherine II, 207, 287–288 colonial administration, 287–289 democratization, 373–375 de-Stalinization, 388 Duma, 415–416 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 486, 579–582 Inter-Regional Deputies’ Group, 674–675 Ivan IV, 690 Khrushchev, Nikita, 747–748 New Political Thinking, 1042–1043 Provisional Government, 485 Speransky, Mikhail, 1445–1446 Turkestan, colonial, 288–289 zemstvo reform, 604–605, 615, 1722 Govorukhin, Stanislav, 370–371 Gozhansky, Shmuel, 185 GPU (State Political Administration), 616, 1471–1472 Grain Crisis of 1928, 593–594 Grain procurement Committees of the Village Poor, 295 famine of 1932-1933, 480 famine of 1946, 481 grain crisis of 1928, 593–594 grain requisitions, 1233 Green Movement, 607 imperial era, 427 Kaganovich, Lazar Moyseyevich, 716 New Economic Policy (NEP), 1041 zagotovka, 1719–1720 Grain production, 1641–1642 Grain trade, 594–597, 595 Grand Alliance, 597, 599 Grand Army, 994

C O R R U P T I O N

Grand Prince, 598 Granovsky, Antonin, 867 Granovsky, Timofei, 859 Graves, William S., 53 “Great Break,” 350 Great Britain Alliance, 1686–1687 Battle of Balaklava, 114–115 Battle of Navarino, 1027–1028 Bukhara, 177 Central Asia, 219 Congress of Berlin, 143–144 Congress of Vienna, 1637 Crimean War, 343–344 Genoa Conference, 544 Gordon, Patrick Leopold, 584–585 Grand Alliance, 597, 599 “The Great Game,” 219 League of Armed Neutrality, 833 Nesselrode, Karl Robert, 1039 Quadruple and Quintuple Alliances, 1259–1260 relations with, 598–600, 1615–1616 Russia Company, 1314 Seven Years’ War, 1375 Suez crisis, 277 Treaty of Paris, 1135, 1136 Treaty of San Stefano, 1350 Triple Entente, 599 War of the Third Coalition, 1661 Zinoviev letter, 1733 Great Eastern Program, 1507 “The Great Game,” 219 Great Horde. See Golden Horde Great Instruction (Catherine II), 842 Great Kremlin Palace, 786 Great Menology (Macarius), 624, 887 Great Northern Expedition, 250 Great Northern War, 600–602 Battle of Poltava, 1203 Battles of Narva, 995 Menshikov, Alexander Danilovich, 915 Peter I, 1169, 1169 Prussia, 1242 Treaty of Nystadt, 1078–1079 Great Purges, 1247–1251, 1248 Cultural Revolution activists, 352 deportations, 385–386

Kaganovich, Lazar Moyseyevich, 716 political prisoners, 617 Right Opposition, 1289 See also Purges; Show trials Great Reforms, 602–605 Alexander II, 36–37 Alexander III, 40 education, 1622 Milyutin’s support of, 943 nationalities policy, 1022 Westernizers, 1664 Great Retreat, 1677–1679 Great Terror Litvinov, Maxim, 866 Memorial, 912 nationalities policy, 1014 Pasternak, Boris, 1145 scientists, 1352 Stalin, Josef, 1457, 1459 state security, organs of, 1472 Vyshinsky, prosecutor, 1654–1655 Yezhov, Nikolai Ivanovich, 1712–1713 Greece Armenian history, 77–78 Balkan Wars, 115–116 Battle of Navarino, 1027 Oleg, 1106 relations with, 605–606 trade route, 1305–1306 Greek Orthodox Church, 1398 Greek-Ottoman civil war, 1027 Greeks, 212, 606–607 Green Cross International, 463, 582 Green Movement, 68–69, 269, 607–608 Gregorian Calendar, 196 Grekov, Boris, 497 Griboedov, Alexander Sergeyevich, 569, 608–609, 1303, 1537 Grigorenko, Peter Grigorievich, 399, 609 Grishin, Viktor Dmitrievich, 609 Grivna, 610 Groman, Vladimir, 543 Gromov, Boris Vsevolodovich, 610–611 Gromyko, Andrei Andreyevich, 579, 611, 611–612

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H I S T O R I A N S

Gronsky, Ivan, 694 Gross domestic product, 425, 433 Grossman, Gregory, 291, 1356–1357 Grossman, Vasily Semenovich, 612 Gross national product economic growth, 429 index number relativity, 658 net material product/gross national product differences, 1040 Tajikistan, 1515 Turkmenistan, 1591 Grot committee, 1228–1229 Growing seasons, 272 GTO, 1449 Guardianships of Popular Temperance, 30, 1160 Guards, Regiments of, 612–614 Guba administrative system, 614 Guberniya, 614–615 Guchkov, Alexander, 1097 Guilds, 615–616 Guitar poetry, 1101 Gulag, 616–619, 617 The Gulag Archipelago (Solzhenitsyn), 1426 Kovalev, Sergei, 781 One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich (Solzhenitsyn), 1425 Siberia, 1392 Yagoda, Genrikh Grigorevich, 1696 The Gulag Archipelago (Solzhenitsyn), 1426 GUM, 619 Gumilev, Lev Nikolayevich, 619 Gumilev, Nikolai Stepanovich, 22, 619–620, 670 Gundareva, Natalia, 1672 Gurri Brotherhood, 654 Gustav III (Sweden), 1508 Gustavus Adolphus, (Sweden), 1480, 1552 Gyprian, Metropolitan, 624 Gypsies, 620–621 Gypsymania, 621–622

H Habsburg Empire, 645, 1602 Hadji Murad (Tolstoy), 214

Hagiography, 623–624 Hague Peace Conferences, 625 Haile Selassie, 466 Halloway, Christopher, 785 Hanseatic League, 625–626 Hanti-Mansi Autonomous Region, 893 Hard budget constraints, 626–627 Hard labor as punishment, 330 Harutiunian, Suren, 81 Hashimoto, Ryutaro, 700 Haskalah, 703 Haskell, William N., 56 Havel, Vaclav, 398 Hayek, Friedrich, 627 Hazing, military, 369 Health alcoholism, 28–29 Chernobyl, 239–240 demographic trends, 377 Health care services feldshers, 491–492 imperial era, 627–629 Russians, 1324 Soviet era, 629 See also Public health Health Ministry, 629 Heavy industry, 663–664 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 630, 630–631 Heiden, Eric, 1450 Helicopters, 1393 Helsinki Accords, 631–632 Helsinki Union, 538 Helsinki Watch, 399–400, 632, 1380, 1461 Helskinki Final Act, 390 Herberstein, Sigismund von, 100, 129 Herder, Johann, 510 Hereditary working class, 812, 814 Heresy Joseph of Volotsk, St., 707–708 Judaizers, 712–713 Kuritsyn, Fyodor Vasilevich, 800–801 Tveritinov, Dmitry, 1476 Hermeticism, 1083 Hermitage Museum, 984, 984–985 Hermogen, Patriarch, 1551 Herodotus, 77

N

I N D E X

Heroic period, 1534 A Hero of Our Time (Lermontov), 856 Herriot, Edouard, 518 Herzen, Alexander Ivanovich, 632–634 Alexander II and, 36 intelligentsia, 668 journalism, 710 nationality, 1025 socialism, 1413 Herzl, Theodor, 1009 Hesychast movement, 1448 Hetmanate, 1020 High Arbitration Court, 338 Higher education Bolshevik policy, 440 ethnography, 470 feminism, 494–495 imperial era, 438 universities, 1620–1623 University Statute, 336 vydvizhentsy, 440 Higher Party School, 634 Higher State Artistic and Technical Studios (VKhUTEMAS), 911 Hilarion, Metropolitan, 634–635 Hilferding, A. F., 508 Himmat, 981 His Majesty’s Own Chancery, 635–636, 1469 Historians feudalism, claims of, 497 Hrushevsky, Mikhail Sergeyevich, 641 Karamzin, Nikolai Mikhailovich, 725 Klyuchevsky, Vasily Osipovich, 759–760 Likhachev, Dmitry Sergeyevich, 862–863 Medvedev, Roy Alexandrovich, 909–910 Milyukov, Paul Nikolayevich, 941–942 nationalist views, 653 Platonov, Sergei Fyodorovich, 1184–1185 Pogodin, Mikhail Petrovich, 1190 Pokrovsky, Mikhail Nikolayevich, 1191–1192 Ponomarev, Boris Kharitonovich, 1205–1206

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

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1769

I N D E X

N

H I S T O R I C A L

Historians (continued) Radzinsky, Edvard Stanislavich, 1264–1265 Rostovtsev, Mikhail Ivanovich, 1304 Shcherbatov, Mikhail Mikhailovich, 1381 Volkogonov, Dmitry Antonovich, 1647 Historical Letters (Lavrov), 1209 Historical materialism, 297, 393–394, 497, 631 The Historical Roots of the Magic Tale (Propp), 1237 Historical songs, 636–637 Historiography, 637–638 Book of Degrees of the Royal Genealogy, 163–164 Cultural Revolution, 350 Karamzin, Nikolai Mikhailovich, 725 Milyukov, Paul Nikolayevich, 941 nationalities policy, 1018 Platonov, Sergei Fyodorovich, 1184–1185 state principle, 1468 Vladimir, conversion of, 252–253 History of a Town (SaltykovShchedrin), 1346 A History of Russia (Riasanovsky), 568–569 History of Russia since Ancient Times (Pokrovsky), 1191 History of Russia since Ancient Times (Soloviev), 5 The History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)—Short Course, 1387–1388 History of the Kazan Khanate, 571–572 History of the Russian State (Karamzin), 725, 1556 History of Ukraine-Rus’ (Hrushevsky), 641 History of Ukrainian Literature (Hrushevsky), 641 Hitler, Adolf Siege of Leningrad, 846–848 Soviet Union, invasion of, 1683–1690, 1684, 1685 Stalin, relations with, 556 World War II, 1685–1690 See also Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939

L E T T E R S

( L A V R O V )

Ho Chi Minh, 1638 Hoffman, Karel, 1005 Holidays, 196–197, 1325 Holocaust Lithuania, 864 Russian territories, 612 Holy Alliance, 34, 100, 639, 1637 Holy Places dispute, 1135 Holy Synod, 639–640 archives, 73 censorship, 216–217 creation of, 463–464, 1372 diocese, 395–396 establishment, 1147 Stefan Yavorsky, Metropolitan, 1476 See also Russian Orthodox Church Homeless children, 640–641 Homosexuality, 443, 1526 Honecker, Erich, 554 Hoover, Herbert, 56, 478 Hospitality, 1325–1326 Hôtel Lambert, 356 Hotline, 389 Hot Line Agreement, 279 Households money, 959 peasant economy, 1152–1153 savings, 120 House serfs, 1368 Housing izba, 693–694 reform, 747 Russians, 1324 Hramada, 136 Hrushevsky, Mikhail Sergeyevich, 641, 1013 Hulak, Mykola, 354 Human capital development, 427 Humanitarian relief, 56–57, 477–478, 1618 Human rights, 642–643 Bonner, Yelena Georgievna, 162–163 Chronicle of Human Rights in the USSR (journal), 254 Gamsakhurdia, Zviad, 538–539 Grigorenko, Peter Grigorievich, 609 groups, 642–643 Helsinki Accords, 631–632

Helsinki Watch, 399–400, 400, 632, 1380, 1461 intelligentsia, 671 Kovalev, Sergei Adamovich, 781 Memorial, 912 Sakharov, Andrei, 162–163, 1345 Shcharansky, Anatoly Nikolayevich, 1380 Starovoitova, Galina Vasilievna, 1460–1461 Human space flight, 1442 Human trafficking, 1115 Humid Continental Warm-to-Cool Summer climate, 272 Hundred Chapters Church Council, 261–262 Hungarian Communist Party, 645 Hungarian Revolution, 643–644, 644, 646 Hungary economics, 773 New Economic Mechanism, 659 relations with, 644–646 Soviet military invasion, 276–277, 643–644 Huns, 646–647 Hunting, 460 Huss, Magnus, 28 Hygiene, 122–123 Hypatian Chronicle, 255

I “I Cannot Forsake My Principles” (Andreyeva), 60 Ichan-Kala, 741 Icons, 649–651 Dionisy, 396–397 Makary, Metropolitan, 887 Moscow Baroque, 969 Rublev, Andrei, 1308–1309 Sergius, St., 1370 Theophanes the Greek, 1540 Ushakov, Simon Federovich, 1624 Idealism, 7, 651–653 Ideology Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 310–311 developed socialism, 390, 391 Soviet Union, 450, 453

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

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I M P E R I A L

Idiot (Dostoyevsky), 411 Ignatiev, Nikolai, 19, 143, 1157, 1470 Igor, 653, 1106–1107 Igrok (Dostoyevsky), 410–411 Ilia II, Catholicos-Patriarch, 552, 553 Illegal economic activity, 1357–1358 Illuminated Compilation, 256, 888 Illyrian Firm, 895 Ilminsky, Nikolai Ivanovich, 653–654 Ilya Muromets, 103 Ilyukhin, Viktor, 979 Ilyumzhinov, Kirsan, 719 The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government (Lenin), 853 Immigration. See Emigration and immigration Impeachment of Yeltsin, 1084 Imperial Academy in St. Petersburg, 998 Imperial era Afghanistan, relations with, 13 agriculture, 17, 18–19 Alaska, 27–28 alcoholism, 28–29 architecture, 71–72 ballet, 117–118 banking system, 121–122 Bashkirs, 126 Bolshoi Theater, 161–162 Bulgaria, relations with, 184 Cabinet of Ministers, 194–195 cantonist system, 197 capitalism, 198 Carpatho-Rusyns, 199 Cathedral of Christ the Savior, 200 censorship, 216–217 chapbook literature, 227–228 China, relations with, 247–248 circus, 263 colonialism, 286–289 Cossacks, 333–334 counterreforms, 336–337 country estates, 337–338 Crimean Tatars, 341 Crimean War, 343–344 Dashnaktsutiun, 366

demographic data, 376–377 demographic trends, 377–378 Denmark, relations with, 382–383 dvorianstvo, 420 economic growth, 426–428 economic policy, 434–436 education, 436–438 environmentalism, 460–461 ethnography, 468–470 expansion, 286 family law, 474–475 feminism, 493–496 Finland, rule of, 500–501 food, 512–513 foreign policy, 943 France, relations with, 518 French influence, 522–523 Georgia, 550–551 German settlers, 554–555 Germany, relations with, 555–556 golden age of literature, 568–571 gosti, 590–591 gostinaya sotnya, 591 Governing Senate, 592–593 government administration, 614–615 grain trade, 594–597 Great Britain, relations with, 598–599 health care services, 627–629 His Majesty’s Own Chancery, 635–636 human rights, 642 illiteracy, 436–437 immigration and emigration, 654–656 industrial production, 427, 435, 811–812 intelligentsia, 668–670 Islam, 678–682 Jews, 701–705 journalism, 708–711 Kazakhstan, 730–731 land captains, 818 land tenure, 819–821 language policy, 823–825 legal system, 840–841 marriage and family, 897–899 merchants, 916

E R A

N

I N D E X

mestnichestvo, 918 military, 928–932 military intelligence, 934 military reform, 935–936, 943 Ministry of Internal Affairs, 947–948 monasticism, 956 Montenegro, relations with, 960 nationalism, 25, 1003–1010 nationalities policies, 1018–1025 new-formation regiments, 1041–1042 obshchina, 1082–1083 Old Believers, 1104–1105 opera, 1107–1109 Orthodoxy, 1120–1121 people’s houses, 1160–1161 Poland, relations with, 1193–1194 prisons, 1228–1229 prostitution, 1237–1238 Rabbinical Commission, 1261–1262 religious pluralism, 1282 Revolution of 1905, 1286–1288 Russian/American relations, 1615–1618 Russian Geographical Society, 656–657 Russian Orthodox Church, 1320 Russification, 1007–1008, 1330–1331 service state, 1372 Slavophilism, 1405–1406 soslovie, 1430–1431 St. Petersburg, 1483–1484 State Council, 1465–1466 state security, 1468–1470 Sweden, wars with, 500 taxation, 1522–1523 terrorism, 1534–1535 trade, 515–516 Tsarskoye Selo, 1578–1579 Turkey, relations with, 1587 uezd, 1598 Ukraine, 1601–1602 universities, 1620–1623 vodka monopoloy, 30 Westernizers, 1663–1664 zemstvo, 1721–1723 See also Specific rulers

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

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I N D E X

N

I M P E R I A L

G U A R D S

Imperial Guards, 612–614 Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (Lenin), 852, 1675 Imperial Public Library, 996, 1328 Imperial Russian Academy of Sciences, 4 Imperial Russian Bible Sociey, 824 Imperial Russian Geographical Society, 656–657 Imperial Russian Navy, 929, 931–932 Imperial Russian Technological Society, 657–658 Improvisation V. (Kandinsky), 1395 Independence Armenia, 81 Azerbaijan, 107 Estonia, 466 Finland, 501–502 Georgia, 551 Hungary, 646 Kyrgyzstan, 808 Lithuania, 865 Russian Federatiaon, 1316 Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), 1327–1328 Ukraine, 1604 Union Republics, 1280–1281 Uzbekistan, 1628 See also Nationalism; Self-determination Index number relativity, 658 India, 1129–1130, 1291 India Mutiny, 1135 Indicative planning, 658–659 Indigenous Peoples, 1065–1067 Indochinese Communist Party, 1638 Indo-Europeans, 78 Industrial Crises in Contemporary England (Tugan), 1583 Industrial enterprise. See Enterprise, Soviet; Industrialization; Industrial production Industrialists, 155–156 Industrialization, 659–661 agriculture, 18–19, 125, 284, 661–663, 765 Armenia, 80 Brezhnev, Leonid, 172 command administrative economy, 292 economic effects, 434–435

Five-Year Plans, 505–506 imperial era, 426, 427–428 korenizatsya, 771 New Economic Policy (NEP), 179 post serfdom, 1673 post-World War II, 1691 rapid, 661–662, 663, 1089, 1456 Scissors Crisis, 1355–1356, 1410–1411 Social Democrats, 1412 Soviet era, 663–664 Tatarstan, 1521 trade, 515–516 vodka, 1646–1647 voluntary cooperatives, elimination of, 328 war production, 1688 Witte, Sergei, 434–435, 1670–1671 workers, 1672 working class, demands of the, 40 youth, 313 See also Business and industry; Economic development; Soviet enterprise Industrial ministry, 1178 Industrial production assortment plans, 91–92 Brezhnev, Leonid, 172 command administrative economy, 292 edinonachalie, 436 enterprises, 459–460 imperial era, 427, 435, 811–812 index number relativity, 658 input-output analysis, 293, 665–666 military production, 937–938, 1680 ministries, economic, 946–947 ratchet effect, 1270–1271 Romanov, Grigory Vasilievich, 1299 samoupravlenie, 1349 Stakhanovite movement, 1452–1453 state orders, 1467–1468 techpromfinplan, 1526–1527 value subtraction, 1631 war mobilization, 927, 1660 Infantry, 1488–1489

Infectious diseases, 377, 379 Inflation, 433, 559, 957 Information access, 73–75 Informers, 1491 Ingots, 610 Ingria, 600 Ingush deportation, 214, 234 language, 213, 232 Inheritance, 819–820, 1650–1651 Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights, 538 Inner Horde, 731 Inorodtsy, 664–665 Input-output analysis, 665–666 economic ministries, 946 Popov, Pavel Ilich, 1207 ratchet effect, 1270–1271 techpromfinplan, 1526–1527 value subtraction, 1631 Inspector General (Gogol), 569 Institute of Artist Culture (INKhUK), 721 Institute of Economics and the Organization of Industrial Production, 15 Institute of Ethnography, 470 Institute of Red Professors, 351, 666–667 Institute of Russian Literature, 509, 1253–1254 Institute of Transition Economies, 538, 1330 Instructions (Catherine II), 667–668 In Support of the Army, War Industry, and War Science (DPA), 979–980 Intelligence, 370, 933–935 Intelligentsia, 668–672 Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich, 112 Belinsky, Vissarion Grigorievich, 136–137 Berdyayev’s criticism of, 139 Bolsheviks, 160 Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich, 178–179 Cultural Revolution, 350, 351 de-Stalinization, 388 fellow travelers, 492 Gaspirali, Ismail Bey, 540–541 Gumilev, Lev Nikolayevich, 619

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

1772

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I V A N

Gumilev, Nikolai Stepanovich, 619–620 Katkov, Mikhail Nikiforovich, 726 Lunacharsky, Anatoly Vasilievich, 879 Musavat, 981–982 nationalism, 1002 nihilism, 1053–1054 raznochintsy, 1273 red intelligentsia, 440 Sakharov, Andrei Dmitrievich, 1345–1346, 1346 The Thaw, 748 Vekhi, 1635 Intensive economic growth, 428 Intercession on the Moat, 71 Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 86–87, 1440 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 23, 672–673 International Congress of Russian Communities, 315–316 International Court of Justice, 545 International Geophysical Year, 1440 Internationalism, 1010 International law, 544–545 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 514–515 International Olympic Committee (IOC), 1450 International Space Station, 673–674, 950, 1443 Internet archives access, 75 Eurasianism, 414 The Interpreter (newpaper), 540 Inter-Regional Deputies’ Group, 374–375, 674–675, 1207 Interrepublican Economic Committee (IEC), 294 Intourist, 1562–1563 Inventors, 1206 Ioffe, Abram Fyodorovich, 7 Iran arms supply, 675, 684 relations with, 106, 675–676 Tajikistan, 1515 Iran-Iraq War, 675, 676 Iraq, 676–677, 1166–1167 Iron Curtain, 677–678 Isidore, Metropolitan, 507

Islam, 678–683 Adyge, 11 Afanasy’s conversion, 1055–1056 Ajars, 20 Armenia, 79 Azerbaijan, 106 Basmachis, 129–130 Berke’s conversion, 131 Catherine II, 288, 679–680 Caucasian Wars, 210–212 Caucasus, 214 Chechnya, 232 Cherkess, 237 Crimean Tatars, 341 Dagestan, 361 Dargins, 364–365 Dungans, 417 education, 540 extremism, 1628 Ferghana Valley, 496 forced conversion to Christianity, 1020 Georgia, 548–549, 552 jadidism, 681–682, 698–699 Kabardians, 715 Karachai, 723 Khiva, 740 Kyrgyz, 807 Muslims at Moscow mosque, 679 nationalities policy, 1018–1019, 1021–1022 Peter I, conversion campaign of, 679 reform, 681–682, 698–699 religious education, 680, 681 religious tolerance, 288, 289 Russification, 1008 Shamil, 1378–1379 Soviet antireligious campaign, 682–683 Sultan-Galiev, Mirza Khaidargalievich, 1498–1499 Tajiks, 1513 Tatars, 1520 Uzbeks, 1626–1627 Wahhabism, 715 The Island of Sakhalin (Chekhov), 236 Israel, 684–685 Istoriia Gosudarstva Rossiiskogo (Karamzin), 637

I V

N

I N D E X

Istoriia odnogo goroda (SaltykovShchedrin), 1346 Istoriia Rossii S Drevneishikh Vremen (Soloviev), 637–638 Istoriia Rossiiskaia (Tatischev), 637 Istoriia Russkogo Naroda (Polevoi), 637 Italian Communist Party, 686 Italy, 685–686 Ittifaq-i Müslimin, 682 Ivan Dmitriyevich, 1551–1552 Ivan I, 686 Ivan II, 686–687 Ivan III, 687, 687–689 Battle of Ugra River, 1599 Boretskaya’s arrest and exile, 164 Greek influence, 606 Judaizers, 712 Kuritsyn and, 800, 801 merchants, 916 Moscow, 964 New Rome, 1543 Novgorod Judicial Charter, 1069–1070 succession, 1131–1132 Sudebnik of 1497, 1495 Ivan IV, 689–691 Assembly of the Land, 90 Astrakhan Khanate, conquest of the, 93 Book of Degrees of the Royal Genealogy, 163 Cathedral of St. Basil, 200–201 chancelleries, 225 Domostroi, 407 Filaret and, 499 Glinskaya as regent for, 564 guba administrative system, 614 historical songs, 636 Hundred Chapters Church Council, 261 Illustrated Compilation, 256 Kazan, conquest of, 678 Kurbsky’s letter to, 798 Livonian War, 867–868 Makary, relationship with, 886–887 nationalities policy, 1018 oprichniki, 1468 Oprichnina, 456, 1111–1112, 1366

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

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1773

I N D E X

N

I V A N O V ,

I V A N

Ivan IV (continued) pomestie system, 1205 Protestantism, 1239 reign, 531 Romanova, marriage to, 1294–1295 Sudebnik of 1550, 1496–1497 Time of Troubles, 1549 trade routes, 1564 Ivanov, Ivan, 1032 Ivanov, Sergei Vladimirovich, 1403 Ivan’s Childhood (movie), 976–977 Ivan the Terrible (movie), 443, 975 Ivan V, 692, 1427–1428 Ivan VI, 692 Ivashko, Vladimir Antonovich, 692–693 Izba, 693–694 Izbavlenie ot KGB (Bakatin), 111 Izgoyev, Alexander, 1635 Izmailov, A. V., 1409 IZO Narkompros, 721 Izvestiya (newspaper), 12, 694–695, 711 Izyaslav I, 695, 1507, 1653 Izyaslav Mstislavich, 695–696 Izyuma Line, 525

J Jack of Diamonds group Goncharova, Natalia, 575 Kandinsky, Vassily, 721 Malevich, Kazimir Severinovich, 890 Silver Age, 1396 Jackson, Henry, 697 Jackson-Vanik Agreement, 697–698 Jadidism, 681–682, 698–699 James, C. Vaughan, 1417 James, Richard, 508 Janin, Maurice, 761–762 January Uprising. See Polish rebellion of 1863 Japan Anti-Comintern Pact, 67 Battle of Khalkin-Gol, 737 Chinese-Japanese conflict, 248 German/Japanese relations, 67

indicative planning, 659 Kuril Islands, 800 League of Nations, 834 Nicholas II, 1050–1051 Potsdam Conference, 1215–1216 relations with, 699–701 Siege of Port Arthur, 1210 Sorge, arrest and execution of, 1429 Treaty of Portsmouth, 1210–1211 World War II, 1684–1685 Yalta Conference, 1699 See also Russo-Japanese War Japanese Peace Treaty, 700 Jaruzelski, Wojciech, 280, 1195 Jassy, Treaty of, 701 Jessup North Pacific Expedition, 469 Jewelers, 473 Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (JAC), 331–332 Jewish Bund, 185–186, 705, 1009 Jews, 701–705, 704 Ashkenazi, 703 Belarus and Jewish culture, 135 Birobidzhan, 149–150 Black Book of Russian Jewry (Grossman), 612 Bukovina, 180 cantonists, 197 Catherine’s nationalities policy, 1020 Corpus Domini procession, attack on Jews at, 702 cosmopolitanism, 331–332 deportation, 384, 385 dissidents, 400 Doctors’ Plot, 332, 404–405 education, 438 emigration, 655–656, 684, 697, 1003, 1009 expulsion, 384 extermination, 545, 612, 1604 Haskalah, 703 inorodtsy, 665 intelligentsia, 669–670 Jackson-Vanik Agreement, 697 Khazaria, 739 Lithuania, 864 Manifesto of 1763, 893 nationalities policy, 1014–1015

Pale of Settlement, 701–703, 1130–1131, 1191 persecution, 1002 pogroms, 1 86, 1190–1191 Poland, 1195 Rabbinical Commission, 1261–1262 refuseniks, 1279 Russification, 1008–1009, 1331 service state, 1372 Shcharansky, Anatoly Nikolayevich, 1380 Stalin era, 1014–1015 United States concern about, 1618 Joakim, Patriarch, 705–706, 910, 1147 Job, Patriarch, 706–707, 1147 John of Kronstadt, 1448 Joint Command, 1661 Joint-stock banks, 122 Joseph of Volokolamsk, 259, 362, 1371 Joseph of Volotsk, St., 707–708, 712, 801, 955 Journalism, 708–712 Adzhubei, Alexei Ivanovich, 12 chernukha, 242–243 Izvestiya, 694–695 journalism of the person, 694–695 Katkov, Mikhail Nikiforovich, 726 nationalism, 1005–1006 Pravda, 1216–1218 Suvorin, Alexei Sergeyevich, 1503 TASS, 1519 television and radio, 1528, 1530 thick journals, 1540–1541 thin journals, 1541–1542 See also Newspapers The Journey Beyond Three Seas (Afanasy), 1055 A Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow (Radishchev), 859, 1264 Journey into the Whirlwind (Ginzburg), 558 Journey of My Brother Alexei to the Land of Peasant Utopia (Chayanov), 231 Jubilee Bishops’ Council, 44 Judaizers, 712–713

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K H A Z A R I A

Judeophobia, 705 Judicial system land captains, 818 Novgorod Judicial Charter, 1069–1070 Pskov Judicial Charter, 1243–1244 reform, 604, 841 Russian Justice, 1318–1319 Russian Orthodox Church, 316–317 Statute of Grand Prince Vladimir, 1473–1474 Statute of Grand Prince Yaroslav, 1474–1475 Julian calendar, 196, 1106 Julio Jurentino (Ehrenburg), 441 July Days of 1917, 713–714 July uprising, 1091 Jumpers, 1361 Jung-Stilling, Johann, 34 Juries, 604 Juvenile crime, 476

K Kabardians, 715–716 Kádár, János, 643, 644, 646 Kadets. See Constitutional Democratic Party (Cadets) Kaganovich, Lazar Moyseyevich, 67–68, 716–717, 1492–1493 Kahals, 704 Kalatozov, Mikhail, 976 Kalinin, Mikhail Ivanovich, 718–719 Kaliningrad, 119–120, 717–718 Kalmyks, 719, 1019–1020 Kamchatka expedition, 250 Kamenev, Lev Borisovich, 720–721, 721 American Relief Administration, 56 July Days of 1917, 713 October Revolution, 1090–1095 party congresses, 1140 show trial, 1249, 1389 Stalin, break with, 838, 1576 United Opposition, 1615 Kandinsky, Vassily Vassilievich, 721–722, 1395, 1396

Kantorovich, Leonid Vitaliyevich, 722 Kapitsa, Peter Leonidovich, 7 Kaplan, Fanya, 722–723 Karabakh, 81–82, 107 Karachai, 723 Karachay-Balkar language, 117 Karakalpaks, 724 Karakazov, Dmitry, 37 Karakhan Declaration, 724–725 Kara-Murza, Vladimir, 1529 Karamzin, Nikolai Mikhailovich, 725 historiography, 637, 1556 Ivan IV and, 691 journalism, 708 language policy, 824 Karelians, 503–504, 1665–1666 Karpinsky, Alexander Petrovich, 6 Kartli, 548 Kaspari, A. A., 1542 Kassian, 713 Kasyanov, Mikhail Mikhailovich, 725–726 Kasym Khan, 729 Katanian, R., 15 Katkov, Mikhail Nikiforovich, 710, 726, 1006 Katyn Forest massacre, 726–727 Kaufman, Konstantin Petrovich, 680, 727–728 Kavelin, Konstantin, 1468 Kazachkovsky, O. D., 94–95 Kazakh Party, 1028 Kazakhstan and Kazakhs, 728–732 Alask Orda, 26 Dungans, 417 Islam, 680 Kunayev, Dinmukhammed Akhmedovich, 797 map, 731 Nazarbayev, Nursultan Abishevich, 1028–1029 overview, 219–220 Kazakov, Matvei, 72, 786, 1036 Kazan, 732–733 Basil III, 129 conquest of, 678 Ivan IV, 690 nationalities policy, 1018–1919 Tatars, 1520

N

I N D E X

Kazan Khanate, 1520 Kazan Temperance Socieyy, 29 Kazan Translating Commission, 654 Kazan University, 869–870 Kazym War, 738 Keenan, Edward, 691, 798 Kekkonen, Urho, 502 Kelles-Krauz, Kazimierz, 1008 Kellogg-Briand Pact, 733 Kemerovo Railway, 1266 Kennedy, John F. Cold War, 278–279 Cuban Missile Crisis, 345–347 space program, 1442 Kennedy, Robert, 346 Kerensky, Alexander Fyodorovich, 734, 734–735, 735 Allied intervention, 52 Kornilov Affair, 773–774 October Revolution, 1093–1094 Provisional Government, 1241 World War I, 1682 The Keys to Happiness (movie), 972 The Keys to Happiness (Verbitskaya), 1636–1637 KGB (Committee for State Security), 1471 Andropov, Yuri Vladimirovich, 61–62 breakup, 111 Chebrikov, Victor Mikhailovich, 231–232 defectors, 370 establishment of, 948 Kryuchkov, Vladimir Alexandrovich, 792–793 Lubyanka, 877 power of, 1472–1473 Khabarov, Yerofei Pavlovich, 736 Khachaturov, Tigran, 506 Khakass, 736–737 Khalkin-Gol, Battle of, 737 Khanin, Grigoriy, 1285 Khanty, 737–738 Kharintonov, Nikolai, 16 Kharuzin, Nikolai, 469 Khasavyurt Treaty, 234–235 Khasbulatov, Ruslan Imranovich, 738–739, 1084, 1707 Khatami, Mohammed, 675–676 Khazaria, 751

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1775

I N D E X

N

K H A Z A R S

Khazars, 739–740 Khiva, 740–741, 741 Khlebnikov, Velimir, 529 Khlopova, Maria Ivanovna, 1301 Khmelnitsky, Bohdan, 741–742 Khomyakov, Alexei Stepanovich, 25, 668, 742–744, 1134, 1406 Khorezm, 740 Khovanshchina, 744 Khovansky, Ivan, 744 Khozraschet, 744–745 Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyevich, 745–749, 746, 747 Adzhubei, cultivation of, 12 agriculture policy, 390–391, 884 Anti-Party Group, 67, 716 anti-religious campaign, 43 Armenia, 81 arms control, 85–86 Beria, arrest and execution of, 141 Berlin crisis, 278 Brezhnev and, 171 Bulganin’s support of, 182–183 censorship thaw, 218, 671 Cold War, 276–278 communism, 390 Cuban Missile Crisis, 345–347, 389, 749 cult of personality, 348–349, 388 de-Stalinization, 276, 388–389 détente, 389 dissident movement, 398–399 economic policy, 390–391 Eisenhower, meeting with, 276 Five-Year Plans, 506 general secretary position, 542 India, relations with, 1129 intelligentsia, 671 Kalmyks, 719 Koslov and, 782 Kosygin’s turn against, 778–779 Malenkov’s power struggle against, 889–890 Mao and, 249, 277 merger of nations, 1015–1016 motion pictures, 976–977 nationalism, 1002 nationalities policy, 1015–1016 party congresses, 1141 Party-State Control Committee (PSCC), 1159–1160

Podgorny’s role in administration, 1188–1189 prime minister position, 1227 reform, 747–748 resignation, 749 science and technology policy, 1353 Secret Speech, 348–349, 388, 643, 746–747 Seven-Year Plan, 1374 Sovnarkhozy, 1438–1439 sports policy, 1450 state security, organs of, 1472–1473 succession of leadership, 1494 U-2 spy plane incident, 1597 virgin lands program, 1641–1642 zhensovety, 1728 See also The Thaw Khrushcheva, Rada, 12 Khutor, 749–750 Kiev Andrei Yurevich, 59–60 architecture, 754 Cathedral of St. Sophia, 201, 201–202 Caves Monastery, 214–215 Oleg, 1106 Rotislav, 1303–1304 Tithe Church, 1553 Yaroslav’s devlopment of, 1701–1702 Yuri Vladimirovich, 1716 Kievan Caves monastery Anthony, 955 hagiography, 623, 624 Theodosius, 955 Kievan Caves (patericon), 623, 750 Kievan Rus, 750–755 architecture, 70–71 Byzantium, relations with, 190–191, 252–253, 754 Caves Monastery, 214–215 Christianization, 190–191, 252–253 commerce, 754, 755 crafts, 755 culture and Christianity, 754 Cyril of Turov, 355 formation of Kievan Rus, 751 grand prince, 598

Hilarion, Metropolitan, 634–635 Igor, 653 interdynastic conflict, 753 Islam, 678 Izyaslav I, 695 Izyaslav Mstislavich, 695–696 labor, 811 legal system, 840 literature, 754 marriage and family, 896 military administration, 9 monasticism, 955 Mongol conquest of Kiev, 755, 1312 Mstislav, 980 Normanist Controversy, 1060–1062, 1190 Novgorod the Great, 1070–1071 Pechenegs, 1156–1157 Polovtsy, 1202 Polyane, 1203–1204 Primary Chronicle, 252, 255 rota system, 1304–1305, 1312 Route to Greeks, 1305–1306 Rurikid dynasty, 1311–1312 Russian Justice, 1318–1319 Statute of Grand Prince Vladimir, 1473–1474 Statute of Grand Prince Yaroslav, 1474–1475 succession, rules of, 752–753 Svyatopolk I, 1506 Svyatopolk II, 1506 Svyatoslav I, 1506 Svyatoslav II, 1507 trade routes, 1563–1564 Vikings, 1639–1640 Vladimir Monomakh, 1642–1643 witchcraft, 1669 Yaroslav Vladimirovich, 1701–1702 Kiev University, 1622 Kim Il Sung, 770 Kinship, 1324 Kiprensky, Orest, 1037, 1303 Kireyevsky, Ivan Vasilievich, 668, 743, 755–757, 1405–1406 Kireyevsky, Peter, 468 Kirgiz. See Kyrgyzstan Kirgiz-Kazakhs, 729

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

1776

E N C Y C L O P E D I A

O F

R U S S I A N

H I S T O R Y

K U S T A R

Kirill-Beloozero Monastery, 756–757, 1058 Kirill Vladimirovich, 1298–1299 Kiriyenko, Sergei Vladilenovich, 758 Kirov, Sergei Mironovich, 758–759, 759, 1457, 1459, 1472, 1485 Kirov Ballet, 118 Kiselev, Paul, 1048 Kishinev pogrom, 1191 Kistyakovsky, Bogdan, 1635 Klausen, Max, 1429 Klimov, Elem, 977 Klimushkin, P. D., 765 Klyuchevsky, Vasily Osipovich, 90, 167, 638, 759–760 Knorin, V. G., 1387 Knyazev, Vsevolod, 22 Kocharian, Robert, 82 Kochinian, Anton, 81 Koghbatsi, Eznik, 83 Koizumi, Junichiro, 701 Kokoshin, Andrei Afanasievich, 761 Kola Peninsula, 1065, 1067–1068 Kolbin, Gennady, 1160 Kolchak, Alexander Vasilievich, 53, 761–762, 1665 Kollontai, Alexandra Mikhailovna, 762–763, 763 feminism, 493, 495 Samoilova and, 1348–1349 zhenotdel, 1726–1727 Kolokol (periodical), 633 Koltsov, Mikhail, 1179 Komarov, Vladimir, 1442 Komi, 764 Kommunistka, 1727 Komsomol, 313–314, 351, 1479 Komsomolskaya pravda, 12 KOMUCH (Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly), 761, 764–765 Kondratiev, Nikolai Dmitrievich, 543, 765–766 Konev, Ivan Stepanovich, 766–767 Kongress Russkikh Obshchin. See Congress of Russian Communities Kono, Tommy, 1450 Konstantin Nikolayevich, 767, 767–768 Konstantin Vsevolodovich, 1717 Kontorovich, Leonid, 506

Kopeck, 768, 958 Korchnoy, Viktor, 370 Korea, 717, 770–771 Korean Airlines, 717 Koreans, 768–769 Korean War, 769–770 Korenizatsya, 771–772, 1001, 1012–1013 Kormchaya Kniga, 772 Kormelenie, 772 Kornai, Janos, 773 Kornilov, Lavr, 381, 773–774, 1682 Kornilov Affair, 485, 773–774, 853 Korobov, Ivan, 10 Korolenko, Vladimir Galaktionovich, 774–775 Korolev, Sergei, 1440–1442 Korovin, A. M., 29 Korsh Theater, 775 Koryaks, 775–776 Korzhakov, Alexander Valisievich, 776–777 Koshevnikov, Grigory, 461 Koshkin clan, 1296 Kosmodemyanskaya, Zoya, 777–778 Kossuth, Lajos, 645 Kostomarov, Mykola, 353 Kosygin, Alexei Nikolayevich, 171–172, 187, 778–779 Kosygin reforms, 779–780 Kotoshikhin, Grigory Karpovich, 780–781 Kotov, Fedot Afanasievich, 571, 572 Kovalev, Sergei Adamovich, 781 Kovalevskaya, Sofia Vasilievna, 781–782 Kovalevsky, Maxim, 523 Kozintsev, Grigory, 973, 975 Kozlov, Frol Romanovich, 782 Kozlovsky, Mikhail, 1037 Kozyrev, Andrei Vladimirovich, 782–783 Kraevsky, Andrei Alexandrovich, 710 Kramskoy, Ivan, 3 Krasnitsky, Vladimir, 867 Krasnov, Pyotr Nikolayevich, 783 Kravchenko, Viktor, 370 Kravchuk, Leonid Makarovich, 137–138, 783–784

N

I N D E X

Kremer, Arkady, 185 Kremlin, 203–204, 784–787, 785 Kremlin Armory, 84 Kremlinology, 787–788 Kremlin Palace of Congresses, 787 Kremnev, Ivan. See Chayanov, Alexander Vasilievich Krestinin, Vasily, 1280 Kritzman, Lev Natanovich, 788–789 Krivitsky, Walter, 370 Krizanic, Juraj, 1134 Kronstadt Uprising, 119, 269, 789 Kropotkin, Pyotr Alexeyevich, 57–58, 789–790 Krupskaya, Nadezhda Konstantinovna, 791, 791–792, 848, 850 Kruptsov, Valentin, 305 Krylenko, Nikolai, 1378 Krylov, Alexei Nikolayevich, 6 Krylov, Ivan Andreyevich, 792 Kryuchkov, Vladimir Alexandrovich, 97, 792–793 KS (Communist stubbotniki), 1492 Kuchma, Leonid, 784, 1604 Kuchuk Kainarji, Treaty of, 793 Kuibyshev, Valerian Vladimirovich, 1262 Kulaks, 793–795, 1471–1472 Kuleshov, Lev Vladimirovich, 795–796, 973, 974 Kulikovo Field, Battle of, 408–409, 796, 1719 Kulturnost, 796–797 Kumandas, 55 Kunayev, Dinmukhammed Akhmedovich, 732, 797 Kurbsky, Andrei Mikhailovich, 797–798 Kurchatov, Igor, 93 Kurds, 798–800, 799 Kuril Islands, 699–700, 800 Kuritsyn, Fyodor Vasilevich, 712, 713, 800–801 Kuropatkin, Alexei Nikolayevich, 801–802, 1333 Kur River, 76 Kursk, Battle of, 802–803 Kursk submarine disaster, 803–804 Kurs Russkoii Istorii (Klyuchevsky), 638 Kuskova, Yekaterina, 432 Kustar, 804

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

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H I S T O R Y

1777

I N D E X

N

K U T U Z O V ,

M I K H A I L

Kutuzov, Mikhail Ilarionovich, 33, 99–100, 164–165, 524, 804–805 Kuybyshev, Valerian Vladimirovich, 805–806 Kuzichkin, Vladimir, 370 Kuzmich, Fyodor, 34 Kuznetsov, Alexei, 846 Kuznetsov, Edward, 399, 401 Kuznetsov, Nikolai Gerasimovich, 806–807 Kuznetsov, Pavel, 1396 Kyrgyzstan and Kyrgyz, 21, 417, 807–809, 808 Kyukhelbeker, Wilgelm, 876

L Labor, 811–815 Administration for Organized Recruitment, 8–9 economic growth, 430 factory and mining workforce, 812 gulag, 617–618 oil production, 113 payment, 815 productivity, 435 slaves, 1402 women, 495 See also Employment; Trade unions; Workers Labor Books, 814–815 Labor camps. See Gulag Labor day, 815 Labor dues. See Barshchina Labor movement, 1673–1674 Labor strikes Bloody Sunday, 157–158 Lena Goldfields Massacre, 844 Novocherkassk uprising, 1074–1075 October general strike of 1905, 1086–1087 Putilov Works, 539 Revolution of 1905, 1286 Labor theory of value, 815–816 Labor unions. See Trade unions Ladder system. See Rota system Ladovsky, Nikolai, 529

I L A R I O N O V I C H

Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk District (Shostakovich), 1388 LaHarpe, Frederick Cesar, 31 Lake Baikal, 462, 817 Lakhova, Yekaterina, 1672 Lamsdorf, Matthew I., 1046 Land allotments, 427, 434, 603–604, 1273–1274 Land and Freedom party, 37–38, 153, 817–818 Land-based empire, 450–451 Land captains, 40, 337, 818–819 Land Code of 1922, 750 Landé, Jean-Baptiste, 117 Land Forces Cadet School, 1536 Land policy Decree on Land, 368–369 imperial era, 819–821 khutor, 749–750 land leasing, 822 Law Code of 1649, 830 monastic, 955–956 peasantry, 1153–1155 pomestie system, 1204–1205 possessors and non-possessors, 1211–1212 Provisional Government, 485 Regulations on Peasants Set Free, 449 Soviet and post-Soviet eras, 821–823 Stolypin, Peter, 1482 votchina, 1650–1651 Landsbergis, Vytautas, 819 Lange, Oskar, 895 Language Abkhazians, 1 Adyge, 11 Ajars, 20 Albanians, Caucasian, 28 Altai, 55 Armenians, 78 Avars, 102 Balkars, 117 birchbark charters, 148 Bulgarian, 183 Buryats, 189, 190 Caucasus, 213 Chechens, 232 Cherkess, 237 Chukchi, 257

Chuvash, 262 Dagestan, 361 Dargins, 364 Dolgans, 406 Estonian, 465 etiquette, 1325 Evenki, 471 Finnish, 503 Gagauz, 537 Georgians, 548 Ilminsky’s missionary work, 653–654 Imperial Russian Academy, 4 Islam, 681, 682 Kabardians, 715 Kalmyks, 719 Karachai, 723 Karelian, 503 Khakass, 737 Khanty, 738 Kipchak, 126 Komi, 764 Korean immigrants, 768 Kurdish, 799 Kyrgyz, 807 language laws, 452, 823–825 Lezgin, 857–858 Mansi, 893 Mari, 894 Mingrelicans, 944–945 nationalities policy, 1015, 1025–1206 Osetins, 1122 Russian, 1332 Sakha, 1345 Sami, 1347 structuralism, 874–875 Svans, 1504 Tajiks, 1513 Tatars, 341 theory of, 112 transliteration, 355 Tuvinians, 1593–1594 Udmurts, 1597–1598 Uzbeks, 1627 Lapps. See Sami Lapshin, Mikhail, 16 Large Horde, 729–731 Larionov, Mikhail, 575–576 Laspeyres index, 658

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

1778

E N C Y C L O P E D I A

O F

R U S S I A N

H I S T O R Y

L A W S

Latin America, 347–348 Latvia and Latvians, 826–828 German settlers, 554 German soldiers, 1689 Great Northern War, 601–602 map, 827 migration, 1015–1016 nationalism, 1008 Laurentian Codex, 255 Lavrov, Peter, 1209, 1413 Law Code of 1497. See Sudebnik of 1497 Law Code of 1649, 828–831 Assemblies of the Land, 91 criminal law, 840 enserfment, 457–458 guba system, 614 mobility restrictions, 921 Monastery Chancellery, 956 movement constraints, 811 pomestie, 1205 serfs, rules relating to, 1366–1367 Slavery Chancellery, 1404 vodka, control of, 1646 Law Code of 1833, 1047 Law Code of Yaroslav’s Sons, 1653 Law of Lübeck, 625 Law of Single Inheritance, 820 Law of Succession, 1172 Law of the State Enterprise, 1467 Law on Cooperatives, 327 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, 1321 Law on Individual Labor Activity, 327 Law on Land, 822 Law on Media of Mass Information, 1530 Law on Primogeniture, 1714, 63 Law on Property, 822 Law on Referenda, 1278 Law on Succession, 1493 Law on the Constitutional Court, 319 Law on the Procuracy, 1232 Law on the State Enterprise, 580 Laws Arbitration Procedure Code, 338 Article 58, Soviet Criminal Code, 617

Basic Legislature of the Russian Federation on the Archival Fond of the Russian Federation and Archives, 74 Charter of the Cities, 228–229 Charter of the Nobility, 229–230 Civil Procedure Code of 2002, 338 Code of Punishments of 1845, 330 codification of Russian law, 46 Commerce Statute, 1044–1045 Conscription Act, 158 Constitutional Law on Arbitration Courts of 1995, 338 On the Court, 841 Criminal Procedure Code of 2001, 338 Decree on Land, 368–369 Emancipation Act, 447–449 Ems Decree, 824 Family Code of 1926, 474 Family Code on Marriage, the Family, and Guardianship, 474–475 Family Edict of 1944, 476 Family laws of 1936, 476–477 Federal Securities Law, 1316 First Lithuanian Statute of 1529, 135 Forest Code, 460 Fundamental Laws of 1906, 527–528 The Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire, 635 Land Code of 1922, 750 On Land Reform, 822 Law Code of Yaroslav’s Sons, 1653 Law of Single Inheritance, 820 Law of Succession, 1172 Law of the State Enterprise, 1467 Law on Cooperatives, 327 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, 1321 Law on Individual Labor Activity, 327 Law on Land, 822 Law on Media of Mass Information, 1530 Law on Property, 822 Law on Referenda, 1278

N

I N D E X

Law on the Constitutional Court, 319 Law on the Procuracy, 1232 Law on the State Enterprise, 580 Legal Code of 1550, 166 mass media, 1530–1531 New Commercial Code, 1565 New Decree Statutes on Theft, Robbery, and Murder Cases, 614 New Statute of Commerce, 1044–1045 “On the Delineation of Powers Between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation,” 96 Ordinance Book of the Robbery Chancellery, 614 Pauline Law of Succession, 1298 Regulations on Peasants Set Free, 449 Russian Federal Securities Act, 1479 Russian Justice, 1318–1319 Russkaya Pravda, 752, 840 slavery, 1402 Soviet Land Code, 821 On the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia, 537 State on the Inorodtsy, 664 Statute Concerning Land Captains, 818 Statute of Grand Prince Vladimir, 1473–1474 Statute of Grand Prince Yaroslav, 1474–1475 Statute of Vladimir Monomakh, 1643 Succession, Law on, 1493 Sudebnik of 1497, 456, 1495–1496, 1496 Sudebnik of 1550, 614, 887, 1496–1497 Sudebnik of 1589, 1497–1498 Sudebnik of 1606, 829 Temporary Laws of May 1882, 701–702 Temporary Regulations, 1531 Third Lithuanian Statute in 1588, 135 Trade Statutes of 1653 and 1667, 1565–1566 ukaz, 1599 Universal Conscription Act, 936

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

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H I S T O R Y

1779

I N D E X

N

L A Y

O F

I G O R ’ S

Ivan IV (continued) University Statute, 336 Urban Statute of 1846, 944 yarlyki, 1700–1701 See also Law Code of 1649 Lay of Igor’s Campaign (anonymous), 831–832, 863, 1719 Lazarev Institute, 832–833 Lazarevskaya, Yulianya Ustinovna. See Osorina, Yulianya Ustinovna League of Armed Neutrality, 833 League of Nations, 833–834 League of the Militant Godless, 834–835 Lebed, Alexander Ivanovich, 316, 835–836, 1363 Le Blond, Jean Baptiste, 71 Lectures on God-Manhood (Soloviev), 1423 Lefortovo, 836–837 Left Hegelianism, 630–631 Left Opposition, 837–838 Pytatkov, Georgy Leonidovich, 1257 Radek, Karl Bernardovich, 1263 Left Socialist Revolutionaries, 838–840 Brest-Litovsk Peace, 168–169 Civil War of 1917–1922, 266–268 elections of 1917, 318 Kaplan, Fanya, 722–723 October Revolution, 1092–1096 Socialist Revolutionary Party, 1420 Spiridonova, Maria Alexandrovna, 1446–1447 Legal Code of 1550, 166 Legal issues collective responsibility, 283 Constitutional court, 318–319 dishonor compensation, 145 Jews, status of, 704–705 speculation, 153 See also Court system; Criminal justice; Laws Legalists, 400 Legal systems, 840–842, 1232 See also Court system; Criminal justice; Laws Legislative Commission, 207, 667–668, 842

C A M P A I G N

( A N O N Y M O U S )

Legislative process, 487 Leibnitz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 4 Leichoudes, Ioannikios and Sophronios, 842–843, 910, 1404 Leipunsky, A. I., 94–95 Leipzig, Battle of, 843–844 Lelewel, Joachim, 1004–1005 Lemkos. See Carpatho-Rusyns Lena Goldfields Massacre, 844 Lend lease program, 513, 844–845 Lenin, Vladimir Ilich, 849–854, 850, 851 agriculture, state control of, 283–284 American Relief Administration (ARA), 56 anti-British sentiment, 599 April Theses, 70, 853 archives, 73 Armand and, 75 assassination attempt, 722–723 Bund, criticism of the, 185–186 Chicherin, influence of, 247 communism, 298–299 Constituent Assembly, dissolution of, 318, 764 Constitution of 1918, 320 cult of personality, 348–349 Cultural Revolution, 350 dictatorship of the proletariat, 394–395, 631 disarmament, 85, 625 disenfranchised persons, 397 dispute with other Bolsheviks, 160–161 economism, criticism of, 432 federalism, 1327 fellow travelers, 492 foreign debt default, 513 foreign famine relief, 478–479 general secretary, creation of, 542 Hegel, influence of, 631 July Days of 1917, 713–714 Krupskaya and, 791 Left Socialist Revolutionaries, 839 legal system, 841 Martov’s opposition to, 901–902 motion pictures, 973 nationalism, 1010 nationalities policy, 1011–1012, 1158

New Economic Policy (NEP), 1040 October Revolution, 1090–1096 party congresses, 1138–1139 party radicalization, 307 penal system, 616 prime minister position, 1226 Proletkult, attack on the, 1236 Provisional Government, 485 Red Army, 267, 936–937 Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party (RSDWP), 1412 serednyaki, 1365 smychka, 1410 Soviet-German armistice negotiations, 168–169 Soviet-Polish War, 1436–1437 Sovnarkom, formation of, 1439 Spark, 711 Stalin and, 308, 1455 on Tkachev, 1553 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 52, 266–267 wages, 1657 war communism, 1658–1659 What Is to Be Done?, 1414, 1664 workers’ control, 1674 world revolution, 1675 Zinoviev, relationship with, 1732 Leningrad. See St. Petersburg Leningrad, Siege of, 846–847 Leningrad Affair, 845–846 Leningrad Oblast Party Committee, 1299 Leningrad Opposition, 1727 Leninism-Stalinism, 364, 449 Lenin’s Testament, 848–849, 1575–1576 Lenin’s tomb, 849, 1275 Leon II, 1 Leonov, Alexei, 1442 Leontiev, Konstantin Nikolayevich, 855–856 Leontiev, Wassily, 506, 666 Lermontov, Mikhail Yurievich, 569, 856, 998 Leskov, Nikolai Semenovich, 856–857 Lesnaya, Battle of, 857 Leszczynski, Stanislaw, 100 Let History Judge (Medvedev), 909–910

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

1780

E N C Y C L O P E D I A

O F

R U S S I A N

H I S T O R Y

L Ü B E C K

Letter of an Old Bolshevik (Nikolayevsky), 787 “A Letter on the Uses of Glass” (Lomonosov), 872 Letters of a Russian Traveler (Karamzin), 725 Letter to Agitators (Gozhansky), 185 Levchenko, Stanislav, 370 Levitan, Isaak, 998 Levitsky, Sergei, 1179 Levshin, Peter. See Platon Lewenhaupt, Adam Ludvig, 8587 Lezgins, 857–858 Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (DPR), 858–859, 1729 Liberal intelligentsia, 670 Liberalism, 859–861, 1490 Liberalization, 1164–1165 Liberal nationalism, 653 Liberation (journal), 860 Liberman, Yevsei Grigorevich, 861 Libraries Kirillov Monastery, 757 National Library of Russia, 996–997 Russian State Library, 1328–1329 Library for Readers (journal), 709 Lieven, Anatol, 369 Lieven, Dominic, 449 Life and Fate (Grossman), 612 Life (Avvakum Petrovich), 104, 105 Life expectancy, 378, 379 A Life for the Tsar (Glinka), 563–564, 1108, 1109 Life of Theodosius, 750 Life [or Tale] of Yulianya Lazarevskaya (Osorin), 1123 Ligachev, Yegor Kuzmich, 861–862, 862 glasnost, 560 Gorbachev and, 579–580 second secretary, 1358–1359 Likhachev, Dmitry Sergeyevich, 691, 862–863 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), 279 Linear programming, 722 Linguistic groups. See Language Lipitsky, Vasily, 1161 Liquid metal fast breeder reactors (LMFBRs), 94–95 Lishentsy, 397

Literacy, 436–438, 571 Literary criticism Belinsky, Vissarion Grigorievich, 136–137 Leontiev, Konstantin Nikolayevich, 855–856 Pisarev, Dmitry Ivanovich, 1182–1183 Literature Book of Degrees of the Royal Genealogy, 163 chapbook literature, 227–228 chernukha, 242–243 Decembrists, 367 fairy tales, 509 fellow travelers, 492 folklore, 508–509 Georgian, 550, 551 golden age of Russian literature, 568–571 Great Menology, 887 gypsymania, 621 hagiography, 623–624 intelligentsia, 670 Kievan Rus, 754 Lay of Igor’s Campaign (anonymous), 831–832, 863 nationalism, 997–998 Novy Mir, 1077–1078 occultism, 1083 Pushkin House, 1253–1254 Romanticism, 569, 875–876 Russian Association of Proletarian Writers, 1314–1315 Russian State Library, 1328–1329 samizdat, 560, 671, 1347–1348, 1425 science fiction, 1353–1354 semiotics, 874 Serapion Brothers, 1363 skaz, 1400 socialist realism, 1415–1419 Stagnation, 1419 structuralism, 874–875 The Thaw, 1418, 1535–1536 theory, 112–113 thick journals, 709, 1077–1078, 1540–1541 thin journals, 711, 1541–1542 Literature and Revolution (Trotsky), 492

N

I N D E X

Lithuania and Lithuanians, 863–865 Basil III, 129 Brazauskas, Algirdas, 167–168 Ivan II, 687 Ivan III, 688 map, 864 Polish-Lithuanian Union, 134–135 Sajudis, 819, 865 Soviet breakup, 168 Ukraine, 1600 Vilnius, 1640–1641 Lithuanian Communist Party (LCP), 167–168 Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party (LDLP), 168 Lithuanian Statute, 829 Little Entente, 1714 Little Ice Age, 233 Liturgy Joakim, Patriarch, 706 Nikon, Patriarch, 1057 Old Believers, 1102 Orthodoxy, 1118–1119 Litvinov, Maxim Maximovich, 56, 834, 865–866, 1029 Litvinov Protocol, 733 Liubov Orlova (movie), 43 Livestock, 461 Living Antiquity (journal), 469 Living Church Movement, 866–867 Livonia, 382, 826 Livonian War, 690, 867–869 Lobachevsky, Nikolai Ivanovich, 869–870 Lobnoe mesto, 1275 Local government, 870–871 Locke, John, 815 Lomonosov, Mikhail Vasilievich, 4, 5, 871–873, 872 London School of Economics and Politics, 627 Loris-Melikov, Mikhail Tarielovich, 873–874, 1469 Losenko, Anton, 1037 Lotman, Yuri Mikhailovich, 874–875 Louis XVIII (France), 1136 Lovers of Wisdom, 875–876, 1098, 1190 Lübeck, 625

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

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1781

I N D E X

N

L U B O K

Lubok, 876 Lubyanka, 877–878 Lukashenko, Alexander Grigorievich, 136, 878, 1313 Lukin, Vladimir, 1695 Lukyanov, Anatoly Ivanovich, 878–879 Lunacharsky, Anatoly Vasilievich, 879, 966 Lunts, Lev, 1363 Lutherans, 1239 Luzhkov, Yuri Mikhailovich, 482, 879–880, 880 Lvov, Nikolai, 542 Lyalin, Oleg, 370 Lyapunov, Alexander Mikhailovich, 6 Lyceum, 1579 Lysenko, Trofim Denisovich, 880–882, 881 Nemchinov and, 1034 science policy, 1352 Vavilov and, 1634 Zhdanov and, 1724 Lyubchenko, Panas, 165 Lyubech, conference at, 752–753 Lyubimov, Yuri, 370, 1512

M Macarius, Metropolitan. See Makary, Metropolitan Macedonia, 115–116 Machine Tractor Stations, 883–884, 884 Madame Sans-Gene (Sardou), 775 Mafia capitalism, 884–885 Magic tales, 509 Mail service, 1212–1213 Maimi, 409 Main Administration of State Security (GUGB), 1472 Main Administration of the Northern Sea Route (GUSMP), 1197 Main Archival Administration of the USSR, 74 Main Directorate of the General Staff, 934 Main Political Directorate, 885 Main Prison Administration (GTU), 1228–1229

Main Scientific Administration, Commissariat of Education, 1352 Main Staff, 934 Makarov, Stepan Osipovich, 885–886 Makarova, Natalia, 370 “Makar’s Dream” (Korolenko), 774 Makary, Metropolitan, 886–888 Book of Degrees of the Royal Genealogy, 163 Cathedral of St. Basil, 201 hagiography, 624 Hundred Chapters Church Council, 261 Ivan IV, as advisor to, 690 Makhno, Nestor Ivanovich, 270, 607, 608, 888 Male mortality, 379 Malenkov, Georgy Maximilyanovich, 888–890, 889 Anti-Party Group, 67–68 Beria, alliance with, 141 Kosygin and, 778 party congresses, 1141 prime minister position, 1227 second secretary, office of, 1358 Zhdanov’s rivalry with, 846, 1724 Malevich, Kazimir Severinovich, 224, 890, 1396 Malta Summit, 890–891 Mamai, 796 Mamonova, Tatyana, 399 Manchu dynasty, 736 Manchuria, 248, 700, 1333 Mandelshtam, Nadezhda Yakovlevna, 891–892 Mandelshtam, Osip Emilievich, 891, 892 Mandilion (Ushakov), 1624 Manifesto of 1763, 892–893 Manifesto of Peter III, 1174 Manoukian, Vazgen, 82 Mansi, 893–894 Mansur, Shaykh, 210 Manufacturing. See Industrial production Manuscript Division, Russian State Library, 1329 Manuscripts, 996 Mao Zedong, 248, 249, 275, 277, 748

Maps Armenia, 77 Azerbaijan, 107 Belarus, 134 Caucasus, 468 climate, 273 Estonia, 465 expansion, 287, 290 Finland, 501 Georgia, 550 Kazakhstan, 731 Kyrgyzstan, 808 Latvia, 827 Lithuania, 864 Russia, 547 Tajikistan, 1514 Turkmenistan, 1590 Ukraine, 1601 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1985, 451 Uzbekistan, 1627 “March for Compassion,” 294 Marconi, Guglilmo, 1206 Marginal productivity theory, 124 Maria Fyodorovna, 39, 1410 Mari El and the Mari, 894–895 Marina Mniszech, 1551–1552 Maritime law, 833 Market economy Emancipation Act, 449 Five-Hundred-Day Plan, 504–505, 581 hard budget constraints, 626, 627 Marketization, 432–434, 581 Market socialism, 124, 895–896 Markov, Andrei Andreyevich, 6 Markov, Nikolai, 152 Marks, Adolf Fyodorovich, 711 Marriage, 896–901 family law, 474–476 Orthodox ceremony, 898 Russians, 1324 wedding party in Red Square, 900 Martin, 521, 712 Martos, Ivan, 1037 Martov, Yuli Osipovich, 901–902, 913–914 Martynov, I. I., 708 Martyrs Morozova, Feodosya Prokopevna, 962

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Spiridonova, Maria Alexandrovna, 1446–1447 Starovoitova, Galina Vasilievna, 1460–1461 Marx, A. F., 1541 Marx, Karl Bakunin, relationship with, 114 communism, 297–298 dialectical materialism, 393, 454 dictatorship of the proletariat, 394 Engels influence on, 454 Hegel, influence of, 630–631 labor theory of value, 815–816 Marxism, 902–903 economism, 432 education, 1623 Emancipation of Labor, 154 intelligentsia, 669 Mikhailovsky’s criticism of, 924 orthodox, 160 Plekhanov, Georgy Valentinovich, 1186 Pokrovsky, Mikhail Nikolayevich, 1191–1192 science, philosophy of, 6–7 social evolution theory, 497 Tkachev, Petr Nikitich, 1554 Union of Struggle for the Emancipation of Labor, 1611 world revolution, 1675–1676 See also Communism; MarxismLeninism; Socialism Marxism-Leninism Communist Party of the Russian Federation, 305–306 dialectical materialism, 393–394, 454 proletarian dictatorship, 320 Soviet man, 1436 split with Western socialism, 903 study of, 441 See also Communism; Socialism Maryinsky Theater, 162 Maslenitsa, 903–904 Massacre at Tiflis Municipal Council, 1287 Mass privatization, 256 Mass song, 416–417 Master and Margarita (Bulgakov), 181 Material balances, 904–905

Materialism, 244, 902 Materialism, dialectical, 393–394, 454 Material Product System (MPS), 905–906, 1039–1040 Mathematicians Kantorovich, Leonid Vitaliyevich, 722 Kovalevskaya, Sofia Vasilievna, 781–782 Lobachevsky, Nikolai Ivanovich, 869–870 Matryoshka dolls, 906–907 Matveyev, Artamon Sergeyevich, 907 Matyukhin, Georgy, 221 Mausoleums imperial, 203 Lenin, Vladimir, 849 Maximilian, Duke of Leuchtenberg, 3 Maxim the Greek, St., 907–908 Maxwell, James Clerk, 4 Mayakovsky, Vladimir Vladimirovich, 529, 908–909, 1315 May Day, 298 Mayors, 965, 1207 Mazepa, Hetman Ivan Stepanovich, 909 McClintock, George N., 57 Media, 1256, 1528–1531, 1529 Medical and Surgical Academy, 1181 Medical care. See Health care services Medvedev, Roy Alexandrovich, 909–910 Medvedev, Sylvester Agafonikovich, 706, 910 Medvedev, Zhores Alexandrovich, 910–911 Medved Party. See Unity Party Meeting on the Elba (movie), 43 Melnikov, Konstantin Stepanovich, 72, 911 Membership, Communist Party, 312 Memoir on Ancient and New Russia (Karamzin), 725 Memoirs, 891 Memorial, 912 Mendeleyev, Dmitry Ivanovich, 5, 912–913

N

I N D E X

Mengistu Haile-Mariam, 466–467 Mengli Giray I, 340 Mensheviks, 913–914 Bolshevik/Menshevik split, 159–160, 1414 Chkheidze, Nikolai Seminovich, 251 Civil War of 1917–1922, 266–267 Communist Party division with the Bolsheviks, 307 Georgian, 551 Kremlinology, 787 Martov, Yuli, 901 October Revolution, 1092–1096 Provisional Government, 485 Ray, 711 Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party split, 1412 Social Revolutionary Party, 1420 Trotsky, Leon Davidovich, 1574–1575 Zasulich, Vera Ivanovna, 1720–1721 Menshikov, Alexander Danilovich, 915 Battle of Lesnaya, 857 Battle of Sinope, 1399 Catherine I and, 204, 205 Mazepa, storming of headquarters of, 909 Peter II and, 1173 Mercader, Ramón, 1577 Mercantilism, 915–916 Merchants, 916–917 gosti, 590–591 gostinaya sotnya, 591 guilds, 615–616 Hanseatic League, 625–626 Nikitin, Afanasy, 1055–1056 sukonnaya sotnya, 1498 See also Commerce Merder, K. K., 35 Merrick, John, 1480 Meshchersky, V. P., 711 Meskhetian Turks, 917 Messenger of Europe (newspaper), 708, 725 Messenger of Zion (newspaper), 708–709 Mestnichestvo, 918 Metallurgy, 1430

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1783

I N D E X

N

M E T A L W O R K E R S

Metalworkers, 812, 1384 Metaphysics, 1324, 1423 Metro line. See Subway systems Metropolitans, 918–919 Meyerhold, Vsevolod Yemilievich, 118, 919, 1537–1538 Michael (Romania), 1293–1294 Mickiewicz, Adam, 1005, 1302 Microeconomic disequlibria, 292 Middendorf, A. F., 656 Middle Ages architecture, 70–71 Byzantine influence, 191 veche, 1634–1635 Middle East, 277 Middle Horde, 729–731 Middle service class, 1205 Middle Volga, 1271–1272, 1476–1477 Mighty Handful, 919–921 nationalism, 986, 999 opera, 1109 Rimsky-Korsakov, Nikolai Andreyevich, 1290 Stasov, Vladimir Vasilievich, 1462 Migration, 921–923, 922 nationalities policy, 1015–1016 passport system, 1143–1144 Trans-Siberian Railway, 1571 See also Emigration and immigration Mikhailov, Boris, 1180 Mikhailov, Nikita A., 405 Mikhailovsky, Nikolai Konstantinovich, 166, 710, 923–924 Mikhail Vsevolodovich, 1716, 1717 Mikhalkov, Nikita Sergeyevich, 924, 977–978 Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich, 81, 925 Militants, cultural, 350–351 Military administration, 9–10, 243 Air Assault Troops, 1445 aircraft, 103 Baltic Fleet, 119–120 Bruce, James David, 174 Brusilov, Alexei Alexeyevich, 175 cantonist system, 197 chancellery system, 225

Chernyshev, Alexander ivanovich, 243 Chuikov, Vasily Ivanovich, 257 Cold War, 940 Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers, 294–295 Commonwealth of Independent States, 296 Cossacks, 332–334 dedovshchina, 369 Durova, Nadezhda Andreyevna, 418 dvorianstvo, 419 enserfment, 456–457 expenditures, 431 frontier fortifications, 525 Frunze, Mikhail Vasilievich, 525–526 Golitsyn, Vasily Vasilievich, 574–575 Gordon, Patrick Leopold, 584–585 Grand Alliance, 597 Gromov, Boris Vsevolodovich, 610 imperial era, 928–932 inorodtsy, 664–665 Kaufman, Konstantin Petrovich, 727–728 Khmelnitsky, Bohdan, 741–742 Kolchak, Alexander Vasilievich, 761–762 Konev, Ivan Stepanovich, 766 Konstantin Nikolayevich, 767–768 Krasnov, Pyotr Nikolayevich, 783 Kurbsky, Andrei Mikhailovich, 797–798 Kuropatkin, Alexei Nikolayevich, 801 Kutuzov, Mikhail Ilarionovich, 804–805 Kuznetsov, Nikolai Gerasimovich, 806–807 Lebed, Alexander Ivanovich, 835–836 Main Political Directorate, 885 Main Staff, 934 Makarov, Stepan Osipovich, 885–886 Makhno, Nestor, 888 Matveyev, Artamon Sergeyevich, 907

Mazepa, Ivan Stepanovich, 909 mestnichestvo, 918 Milyutin’s reform, 936 modernization, 23 Moiseyev, Mikhail Alexeyevich, 951–952 morale, 369 Muraviev, Nikita, 980–981 NATO, 1062, 1063 new-formation regiments, 1041–1042, 1409 Nicholas I, 1046 Obruchev, Nikolai Nikolayevich, 1082 Ogarkov, Nikolai Vasilevich, 1100 Ordin-Nashchokin, Afanasy Lavrentievich, 1112–1113 Orlov, Grigory Grigorievich, 1117 paratroop units, 1444–1445 Pavliuchenko, Lyudmila Mikhailovna, 1150 pomestie system, 1204–1205 Pozharsky, Dmitry Mikhailovich, 1216 Preobrazhensky Guards, 1218–1219 purges, 1444 reforms under Alexei Mikhailovich, 47–48 Regiments of Guards, 612–614 Rumyantsev, Peter Alexandrovich, 1310 service state, 1371–1372 Shaposhnikov, Boris Mikhailovich, 1379 Skobelev, Mikhail Dmitriyevich, 1400–1401 Sokolovsky, Vasily Danilovich, 1421 sovereign’s court, 592 Soviet and post-Soviet eras, 449–450, 936–942 special purpose forces, 1444–1445 Stalin and World War II, 1457–1458 Stavka, 1475 stolniks, 1480–1481 Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), 940 streltsy, 1488–1489 Suvorov, Alexander Vasilievich, 1503–1504 Svechin, Alexander Andreyevich, 1504

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1784

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M O N A S T E R I E S

syn boyarsky, 1509 tank regiment, 939 Ustinov, Dmitry Fedorovich, 1625 Varennikov, Valentin Ivanovich, 1632 Vasilevsky, Alexander Mikhailovich, 1633 Volkogonov, Dmitry Antonovich, 1647 Voroshilov, Kliment Efremovich, 1650 voyevoda, 1651–1652 Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), 1661–1662 women, 937 Wrangel, Peter, 1692–1693 Yazov, Dmitry Timofeyevich, 1704–1705 Yudenich, Nikolai Nikolayevich, 1713 Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich, 1730–1731 See also Army; Red Army; Table of Ranks Military aid Cuba, 348 lend lease program, 513, 844–845 Spanish Civil War, 1443–1444 Military art, 925–926 Military colonies, 34 Military Committee, NATO, 1062 Military doctrine, 926–927, 1421 Military-economic planning, 927 Military industrial complex, 932–933 Military intelligence, 933–935 Military law, 243 Military reform, 935–936 Chernyshev, Alexander Ivanovich, 243 Frunze, Mikhail Vasilievich, 526 inorodtsy, 664 military industrial complex, 933 Milyutin, Dmitry, 943 Peter I, 1489 Third Duma, 415–416 Military Revolutionary Committee, 422, 1093–1094 Military Scientific Department, 934 Military strategy deep battle concept, 1583

Suvorov, Alexander Vasilievich, 1504 Svechin, Alexander Andreyevich, 1504 Triandafillov, Viktor Kiriakovich, 1571–1572 Tukhachevsky, Mikhail Nikolayevich, 1583–1584 Vasilevsky, Alexander Mikhailovich, 1633 Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich, 1730–1731 Miliukov, Paul, 638 Miller, Gerhard Friedrich, 467 Miloslavskys, 1489 Milyukov, Paul Nikolayevich, 860, 941–942 Milyutin, Dmitry Alexeyevich, 942–943 administration, 10 Caucasian Wars, 212 Kaufman and, 727 military reform, 930, 934, 936 Milyutin, Nikolai Alexeyevich, 943–944 Mineral resources, 1345, 1515 Mingrelicans, 944–945 Minin, Kuzma, 945, 1552 Mining, 844 Ministries, economic, 946–947 Ministry of Atomic energy, 95 Ministry of Education, 1626 Ministry of Finance, 187 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 74 Ministry of Foreign Trade, 947 Ministry of Internal Affairs, 947–948, 1477 Ministry of Press, Broadcasting, and Mass Communications (MPTR), 1528 Ministry of Public Education, 1622 Ministry of State Security (MGB), 948 Ministry of the Interior, 1185–1186, 1240, 1469–1470 The Minor (Fonvizin), 511–512, 1536 Minsk Agreement. See Belovezh Accords Mir, 948–949 Mironov, Sergei, 488 Mirovich, Vasily, 207

N

I N D E X

Mir space station, 949–951, 950, 1442–1443 Missionaries Alaska, 27 Ilminsky, Nikolai Ivanovich, 653–654 Mitau Operation, 1680 Mitterrand, François, 520 Mnemozina (periodical), 876 Mniszech, Marina, 951 Mobilization, military. See War mobilization Mock institutions, 1171 Modernism, 175 Modernity and Jadidism, 681–682, 698–699 Modernization communist bloc, 300–301 military, 930 Soviet era, 451–452 Modigliani, Amedeo, 22 Moiseyev, Mikhail Alexeyevich, 951–952 Molchanov, Mikhail, 1550–1551 Moldavia, 145–146 Moldova and Moldovans, 537, 952–954, 1568–1569 Molkov, A. V., 29 Mollisols, 151 Molokans, 1361 Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, 954–955 Anti-Party Group, 67–68 Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939, 1029–1031, 1030 prime minister position, 1227 Romania, relations with, 1293 Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty. See Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 Monarchists, 1734 Monasteries Caves Monastery, 214–215, 635 Kiev Cave Monastery, 623, 624 Kirill-Beloozero Monastery, 756–757, 1058 peasant labor, 456 Simonov Monastery, 1398 Solovki Monastery, 1424 Trinity St. Sergius Monastery, 624, 1370, 1572–1574, 1573 Volokolamsk Monastery, 707–708

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1785

I N D E X

N

M O N A S T I C I S M

Monasticism, 955–957 Anthony Vadkovsky, Metropolitan, 65 Feast Books, 483 Filaret Drozdov, Metropolitan, 498 hagiography, 623–624 Joseph of Volotsk, 708 Kievan Caves (patericon), 750 Nil Sorsky, St., 1058 Orthodoxy, 1118–1119 Sergius, St., 1369–1371 spiritual elders, 1447–1448 Monastic Rule (Joseph of Volotsk), 708 Monetary overhang, 957, 959 Monetary policy Central Bank of Russia, 220–221 chervonets, 245 command administrative economy, 292 Copper Riots, 328–329 denga, 380 GKOs, 558–559 gold standard, 573–574 kopeck, 768 post-Soviet era, 513–515 Reitern, Mikhail, 1281 ruble, 1306–1307 ruble control, 1307–1308 ruble valuation, 517 ruble zone, 1309–1310 Soviet era, 957–960 See also Currency; Economic policy Möngke, 131 Mongol era appanage era, 69 Basil I, 127–128 Basil II, 128 Battle of Ugra River, 1599 chronicles, 255–256 Crimean Khanate, 340 Dmitry Alexandrovich, 402 Dmitry Mikhailovich, 403 Donskoy, Dmitry Ivanovich, 408–409 end of, 1599 Kazakhstan, 728–729 Kiev, conquest of, 755 military administration, 9 monasticism, 955

Orthodoxy, 1119–1120 Qipchaq Khanate, 573 Rurikids, 1312 seniority system, 408–409 serfdom, 1366 slavery, 1402 trade routes, 1564 yarlyk, 1700–1701 Yuri Danilovich, 1716 See also Golden Horde Mongolia, 737 Montage, 442 Montenegro, 960–961 Montgerrand, Auguste, 72 A Month in the Country (Turgenev), 1537 Monument to the Third International, 890 Moonshine production, 30 Morality, socialist, 1436 Morbidity, 239–240 Mordvins, 961–962 Mori, Yoshiro, 699 Mormonenko, Grigory A. See Alexandrov, Grigory Alexandrovich Moroz, Valentyn, 399 Morozov, Boris Ivanovich, 45–46, 457, 963 Morozov, Pavel Trofimovich, 963–964, 1491 Morozova, Feodosya Prokopevna, 962–963 Morphology of the Folktale (Propp), 1237 Mortality famine of 1891–1892, 477 famine of 1921–1922, 478 famine of 1932–1933, 479, 480 famine of 1946, 481 imperial era, 377–378 Moruzi, Demetrius, 176 Moscow, 964–965 architecture, 72 banks, 121–122 Basil II, 128 “Bat,” 193–194 Bolshoi Theater, 161, 161–162 burning of, 33–34, 524 Cathedral of St. Basil, 200, 200–201

Cathedral of the Archangel Mikhail, 203 Cathedral of the Dormition, 203–204 churches, 71 Church of Christ the Savior, 200 colonial expansion, 284–286 factory workers, 812 Khruschev, Nikita, 745 Korsh Theater, 775 Kremlin, 784–787, 785 liberation of, 1216 Luzhkov, Yuri, 879–880 Moscow Art Theater, 1537 Muslims at Moscow mosque, 679 overview, 1316 Popov, Gavriil Kharitonovich, 1207 Red Square, 1275–1276 Russian State Library, 1328–1329 Simonov Monastery, 1398 subway system, 1492–1493 Third Rome, 1542–1543 Moscow, Battle of, 969–971 Moscow Agricultural Society, 966 Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, 73 Moscow Art Theater (MAT), 236, 966–968, 1460, 1537 Moscow Baroque, 968–969 Moscow Bulletin (newspaper), 710 Moscow City Plenum, 1706 Moscow Helsinki Group, 609 Moscow Olympics of 1980, 971–972 Moscow (periodical), 710 Moscow riots of 1648, 46 Moscow school of historiography, 638 Moscow Slavic Benevolent Committee, 25, 1134 Moscow Society for Improving the Lot of Women, 75 Moscow State University, 439, 1621, 1621 Moscow Stock Exchange, 1479 Moscow Treaty of 1562, 382 Moscow University, 578, 760 Moskovsky vestnik (periodical), 876 Moskvitin, Ivan Yurievich, 972 Mosques, 680

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1786

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M Y T H O L O G Y

“The Most Humble and Loyal Address,” 157, 539 The Motherland (journal), 1542 Motion pictures, 972–978 Alexandrov, Grigroy Alexandrovich, 43 avant-garde experimentation, 442 Bauer, Yevgeny Frantsevich, 131–132 Chapayev, 227 chernukha, 242–243 Eisenstein, Sergei Mikhailovich, 442, 442–443 Orlova, Lyubov Petrovna, 1116–1117 Rachmaninov scores, 1263 scores, 416–417 Zoya, 778 See also Directors, film Mount Elbrus, 212 Movement for Democratic Reforms, 978–979 Movement in Support of the Army, 979–980 Mozhaisky, Alexander Fyodorovich, 103 Mstislav, 980, 1701–1702 Mujahedeen, 13–14 Mukden, Battle of, 1333 Müller, Gerhard Friedrich, 637 Multiethnicity and empire, 449, 450 Municipal Charter of 1870, 870 Municipal government, 870–871 Münnich, B. C., 692 Muraviev, Mikhail N., 1006 Muraviev, Nikita, 367, 980–981 Muraviev, Nikolai, 19–20, 248 Muromets, 103 Musar Movement, 703 Musavat, 981–982 The Muscovite (journal), 1099 Muscovy, 982–984 alochol industry, 29–30 architecture, 70–71 Armory, 84–85 Assembly of the Land, 90–91 Basil III, 128–129 Book of Degrees of the Royal Genealogy, 163–164 boyar duma, 166–167 Byzantine influence, 191 chancellery system, 225–226

chronicles, 256 collective responsibility, 283 colonial expansion, 284–286 Cossacks, 332–333 court hierarchy, 592 Denmark, relations with, 382 dishonor compensation, 145 Dmitry, False, 403 donation books, 408 dvorianstvo, 419 dyaks, 421 Feast Books, 483 feeding system, 90 Filaret Romanov, Patriarch, 498–500 frontier fortifications, 525 Glinskaya, Yelena Vasilyevna, 564–565 grand prince, 598 guba administrative system, 614 Islam, 678 Kazakhstan, 729–730 Kazan, 732–733 Khovanshchina, 744 Kotoshikhin, Grigory Karpovich, 780–781 legal system, 840 marriage and family, 896–897 merchants, 916 migration, 654 monasticism, 955–956 Nizhny Novgorod, 945 Orthodoxy, 1120 Peace of Andrusovo, 62–63 Poland-Lithuania, relations with, 1192–1193 Russian Orthodox Church, 1320 service state, 1371–1372 slavery, 1401–1403 Smolensk War, 1408–1409 stolniks, 1480–1481 syn boyarsky, 1509 terem, 1532 Thirteen Years’ War, 1543–1544 Time of Trouble, 1548–1553 Treaty of Stolbovo, 1480 witchcraft, 1669 See also Law Code of 1649; Specific leaders Muscovy Company. See Russia Company

N

I N D E X

Museums Armory, 84 ethnography, 469 Gatchina palace, 542 Hermitage Museum, 984, 984–985, 1668 Musharraf, Pervez, 1130 Music, 985–986 balalaika, 115 bylina, 190 chastushka, 230 criticicism, 1462 Dunayevsky, Isaak Osipovich, 416–417 folk music, 508, 509–510 gypsymania, 621–622 historical songs, 636–637 Kandinsky on, 1396 mass song, 416–417 nationalism, 920–921, 999 national school, 510 Okudzhava, Bulat Shalovich, 1101 opera, 1107–1110 oral epic songs, 509 prison songs, 1230 Romanticism, 1303 The Thaw, 1535 See also Composers; Mighty Handful Musketeers. See Streltsy Musketeers Chancellery, 744 Muslims of Russia (Gaspirali), 1008 Mussolini, Benito, 685 Mussorgsky, Modest, 920, 999, 1109 Myagkov, Alexei, 370 Myasnitsky, I. I., 775 Myasoedov Affair, 987 My Name Is Ivan (movie), 976–977 My Past and Thoughts (Herzen), 633 Mysticism Alexander I, 34 occultism, 1083–1084 Rasputin, Grigory Yefimovich, 1269 Roerich, Nicholas Konstantinovich, 1291 Soloviev, Vladimir Sergeyevich, 1423 Mythology, 1350

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1787

I N D E X

N

N A D E Z H D I N ,

N Nadezhdin, Nikolai, 469 Nagorno-Karabakh, 51, 989–990 Nagrodskaya, Evdokia Appolonovna, 990 Nagy, Imre, 643 Nakhichevan, 991 Nakhimov, Pavel Stepanovich, 991–992, 1399 Name changes, geographic, 220 Napoleon I, 992–994, 993 Battle of Austerlitz, 99–100 Battle of Borodino, 164–165 Battle of Leipzig, 843 Congress of Vienna, 1136, 1637 French War of 1812, 523–525 Kutuzov’s victory over, 805 Quadruple and Quintuple Alliances, 1259–1260 Swedish/Russian alliance, 1508 Treaties of Paris, first and second, 1136, 1637 Treaty of Tilsit, 176, 1547, 1548 War of the Third Coalition, 1661 war with Alexander, 518 Napoleonic Wars Austria, 100 Congress of Vienna, 1637 Imperial Guards, 613 Kutuzov, Mikhail Ilarionovich, 805 Prussia, 1242 Russian involvement, 33–34, 929 War of the Third Coalition, 1661 Narimanov, Nariman, 994–995 Narkomnats, 1012, 1159 Narkompros, 440, 721, 879 Narod, 1025, 1027 Narodnaya Volya. See People’s Will Narodnost, 1025 Narodnye doma. See People’s houses Narodovoltsy, 1162 Narratives, 1515–1516 Narva, Battles of, 995 Naryshkina, Maria, 32 Naryshkina, Natalia Kirillovna, 995–996 Naryshkin Baroque, 968–969 Naryshkins, 1489 Nasiri, Qayyum, 681

N I K O L A I

Nasser, Gamel Abdel, 277 National-Bolshevik Party, 414 National history, 163–164, 256, 887–888 Nationalism Aksakov, Ivan Sergeyevich, 25 Armenia, 81 arts, 997–1000 Asian, 1335 Azerbaijan, 981–982 Baskirs, 126 Belarus, 135–136 Bessarabia, 146 Caucasus, 289 Civil War of 1917-1922, 269–270 conservative, 653 Decembrists, 367 deportations, 386 environmentalism, 462 Estonians, 465–466 geography, 656 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 581 Ilminsky’s missionary work, 654 Islam, 682–683 Jews, 1008–1009, 1279 Katkov, Mikhail Nikiforovich, 726 Kireyevsky, Ivan Vasilievich, 756–757 Komi, 764 korenizatsya, 771–772 Latvia, 826–827 liberal, 653 Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, 859 Lithuanian Movement, 865 Mighty Handful, 919–921 Mordvins, 961–962 Musavat, 981–982 Nicholas I, 1048 Ostrovsky, Alexander Nikolayevich, 1125 Pamyat, 1133 Polish, 37 political parties, 1200–1201 Rimsky-Korsakov, Nikolai Andreyevich, 1290 Romanticism, 1099, 1303 Russian, 1001–1002 Russian National Unity Party, 1319

Rutskoi, Alexander Vladimirovich, 1337–1338 Shakhrai, Sergei Mikhailovich, 1376 Shevchenko, Taras Gregorevich, 1384 socialism, 450 Soloviev’s critique, 1423 Soviet Union, 1000–1003 Sultan-Galiev, Mirza Khaidargalievich, 1499 Tatars, 1521 Togan, Ahmed Zeki Validov, 1554–1555 tsarist empire, 1003–1010 Ukrainian, 354, 641, 1401, 1601–1602 Zhirinovsky, Vladimir Volfovich, 1729 See also Independence; Self-determination Nationalities policies deportations, 384–386 empire, 450–453 official nationality, 1098–1100 raionirovanie, 1268 Soviet, 450–451, 1010–1018 tsarist, 1018–1025 National Library of Russia, 996–997 National school of Russian music, 510 National Union of Zemstvos, 1723 Nation and nationality, 1024–1027 Nation building, 784 Natural history, 1132–1133 Natural resources Central Asia, 219–220 Russian Far East, 481 Soviet empire, 452 Natural School, 137 Nature preserves, 461–462 Naval fleets Baltic Fleet, 119–120 Black Sea Fleet, 154–155 Northern Fleet, 1064–1065 Pacific Fleet, 1127–1128 Navarino, Battle of, 1027–1028 Navigator’s Chart, 772 Navy Battle of Navarino, 1027–1028 Battle of Sinope, 1399

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

1788

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O F

R U S S I A N

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N I C H O L A S

Imperial era, 929, 930 Konstantin Nikolayevich, 767 Kuznetsov, Nikolai Gerasimovich, 806 Makarov, Stepan Osipovich, 885–886 modernization, 930–931 Nakhimov, Pavel Stepanovich, 991–992 Potemkin mutiny, 1214–1215 Sevastopol, 1373–1374 Nazarbayev, Nursultan Abishevich, 732, 1028, 1028–1029 Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939, 1029–1031 Communist International, 304 Germany, relations with, 556 Hitler, Adolf, 834 Polish reaction, 1195 Romania, 1293 Secret Protocol, 1029–1031, 1198 Soviet-Finnish War, 1433, 1435 Soviet-Polish War, 1437 Stalin, Josef, 1457 Ukraine, 1603 Near abroad, 1031–1032 Nechayev, Sergei Geradievich, 1032–1033, 1209 Nedvedev, Roy, 399 Nekrasov, Niklai Alexeyevich, 258, 1033 Nemchinov, Vasily Sergeyevich, 1033–1034, 8631 Nemirovich-Danchenko, Vladimir, 966–968 Nemtsov, Boris Ivanovich, 1034–1035 Nenets, 1035, 1035–1036 Neoclassicism, 71–72, 1036–1037 Nerchinsk, Treaty of, 1037–1038 Neronov, Ivan, 104, 1038, 1102 Nesselrode, Karl Robert, 1038–1039 Nestor, 253 Nestor (Schlözer), 637 Net material product (NMP), 1039–1040 Nevsky, Alexander Yaroslavich. See Alexander Yaroslavich New Commercial Code, 1565 New Course controversy, 1576 The New Course (Trotsky), 837

New Decree Statutes on Theft, Robbery, and Murder Cases, 614 New Economic Mechanism, 659 New Economic Policy (NEP), 1040–1041 agrarian reform, 17 agriculture, 19, 284 bednyaki, 133 Bukharin’s path to socialism, 179 chervonets, 245 Chicherin, Georgy Vasilievich, 246 class system, 271 cooperative societies, 328 Dzerzhinsky, Felix Edmundovich, 422 establishment, 269 food tax, 1233 geneticists, 543 goods famine, 577 Gosizdat, 588 grain production, 593 industrialization, 660 Kalinin, Mikhail Ivanovich, 718–719 Left Opposition, 837–838 Lenin, Vladimir, 853 nationalities policy, 1013 organized labor recruitment, 8 party congresses, 1139–1140 Primitive Socialist Accumulation, 1227–1228 Right Opposition, 1289 Scissors Crisis, 1355–1356, 1410–1411 Shakhty trial, 1378 smychka, 1410–1411 taxation, 1365 trusts, 1577–1578 wages, 1657–1658 zhenotdel, 1727 See also Economic policy; Gosplan The New Economics (Preobrazhensky), 1219 New-formation regiments, 1041–1042, 1409 New Gazette (newspaper), 712 New Political Thinking, 1042–1043 New Russia, 555 The New Russian Primer for Reading (Tolstoy), 1558

I I

N

I N D E X

New Russian School. See Mighty Handful Newspapers, 1043–1044, 1216–1218 News service, TASS, 1519 New Statute of Commerce, 1044–1045 New Times (newspaper), 711 New Union Treaty. See Union Treaty Nicaragua, 1045 Nicholas I, 1045–1049, 1047 Academy of Arts, 3 Academy of Sciences, 4 accession to the throne, 368 Akkerman Convention, 24 Alexander II, training of, 35 architecture, 72 army, 930 censorship, 216–217 Chernyshev, advancement of, 243 Crimean War, 343 death, 36 Decembrist movement, 980–981 education policy, 438 Great Britain, relations with, 598–599 Hermitage, 984–985 His Majesty’s Own Chancery, 635–636, 1469 journalism, 709 Kremlin, 786 Montenegro, relations with, 960 nationalism, 1005–1006 Nesselrode’s foreign policy, 1039 Old Believers, 1104 Poland, relations with, 1194 Romanticism, 1303 Russia in 1839 (Custine), 352–353 Russification, 1331 secret police, 1469 serfdom, 458 theater, 1537 Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, 1623–1624 Nicholas II, 415, 931, 1049–1053, 1052, 1297 abdication, 484, 1052, 1298 Anastasia, daughter, 1295, 1297, 1299 Bloody Sunday, 157

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

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1789

I N D E X

N

N I C H O L A S

I I

Nicholas II (continued) censorship, 217–218 church reform, 65, 464 coronation, 1050, 1050 Council of Ministers, 194–195 counterreforms, 337 Duma, establishment of the, 414 execution, 1298 Goremykin, selection of, 585 Hague Peace Conferences, 625 icon painting, 650 journalism, 710–711 liberals, 860 military, 931–932 nationalism, 1009–1010 October Manifesto, 1087–1088, 1286 Plehve, support for, 1186 Pobedonostsev, influence of, 1188 prohibition of alcohol, 30 Protopopov’s role in administration, 1240 Rasputin, relationship with, 1269 Rodzianko, advice of, 1290–1291 Russo-Japanese War, 1333 Ryleyev, execution of, 1340 Stolypin, reforms of, 1482 Stürmer, arrest of, 1491 terrorism during reign of, 1534 Tsarskoye Selo, 1578–1579 World War I, 1676–1681 Nicholas II People’s House, 1160 Night of the Murdered Poets, 332 Nihilism and nihilists, 1053–1054 education, 1622 feminism, 494 intelligentsia, 669 legal system, 841 Pisarev, Dmitry Ivanovich, 1182 raznochintsy, 1273 Nijinsky, Vaslav Fomich, 118, 1054–1055 Nikitin, Afanasy, 1055–1056 Nikolayeva, Klavdia, 1727 Nikolayevich, Lev, 22 Nikolayevsky, Boris, 787 Nikon, Patriarch, 1056–1058 Alexei Mikhailovich, 46–47 Avvakum’s opposition to, 104–105

P E O P L E ’ S

H O U S E

church councils, 259 Church of the Twelve Apostles, 786 Hundred Chapters Church Council, 261 Kirillov, confinement in, 757 Kormchaya Kniga, 772 Old Believers, 1102, 1103 patriarchate, 1147 Nikon Chronicle, 256 Nil Sorsky, St., 259, 955, 1058 Nineteenth century Academy of Arts, 3 Academy of Sciences, 4–5 anarchism, 57–58 chapbook literature, 227 nationalism, 998–999 See also Imperial era Niva (journal), 711, 1541 Nixon, Richard, 66 Niyazov, Saparmurad, 1591 Nizhegorodtsev, N. M., 29 Nizhny Novgorod, 127, 945 NKVD (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs). See People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) Nobel Prize Gorbachev, Mikhail, 582 Kantorovich, Leonid Vitaliyevich, 722 Pasternak, Boris, 1146 Pavlov, Ivan Petrovich, 1151 Sakharov, Andrei, 1345 Sholokhov, Mikhail Alexandrovich, 1387 Solzhenitsyn, Alexander, 1425 Nobility Anna Ivanovna’s concessions to, 63 Charter of the Nobility, 229–230 country estates, 337 education, 438 Emancipation Act, 448 French influence, 522 land captains, 818 land tenure, 820–821 marriage and family, 897 nationalities policy, 1019 Peter III, manifesto of, 1174 serfdom reform, 602–603 stolniks, 1480–1481

Table of Ranks, 1381, 1512 terem, 1532 Nobility Bank, 121 Nogai, 1059 Nomads nationalities policy, 1019–1022 Pechenegs, 1156–1157 Nomenklatura, 1059 Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 310, 312 second secretary, 1358 stiliagi, 1478–1479 Nomocanon, 772 Nonaggression pacts. See Treaties and international agreements Non-Euclidean geometry, 869–870 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 462–463 Non-possessors and possessors, 1211–1212 Norilsk prison, 1229 Norkin, Andrei, 1529 Normanist Controversy, 1060–1062, 1190 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1062–1064 Conventional Foreces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, 326 Great Britain, 600 Italy, 685 near abroad, 1031–1032 Poland, 1196 Suez crisis, 277 Warsaw Treaty Organization’s formation, 1661, 1662 Northeast Asian region, 481–482 Northen Peoples, 1065–1067 Northern Bee (newspaper), 709 Northern Camps of Special Designation, 616 Northern Convoys, 1064 Northern Fleet, 1064–1065 Northern Messenger (newspaper), 708, 710 Northern Society, 367, 981, 1339–1340 North Korea, 769 North Pole, 1197 Northwest Front (World War I), 1677 Norway, 382, 1067–1068 Nosenko, Yury, 370

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

1790

E N C Y C L O P E D I A

O F

R U S S I A N

H I S T O R Y

O N E

Notes from the House of the Dead (Dostoyevsky), 569 “Notes from the Underground” (Dostoyevsky), 410 Notes of the Fatherland (journal), 709, 710 Notes on the Book of Genesis (Filaret), 498 Novak, Grigory, 1448 Novels, 112–113, 139, 228 Novgorod Alexander Yaroslavich, 41, 1703 birchbark charters, 148–149 Boretskaya, Marfa Ivanovna, 164 Cathedral of St. Sophia, 202, 202–203 Christianity, 754 commerce, 754 Dmitry Alexandrovich, 402 hagiography, 623, 624 Hanseatic League, 625–626 Ivan III, 687–688 Judaizers, 712–713 merchants, 916 posadnik, 1211 Rurik, 1311 Sweden, relations with, 1507–1508 veche, 1634–1635 Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, 1702–1703 Novgorod, archbishop of, 1068–1069 Novgorod Chronicles, 255–256, 1224–1225 Novgorod Judicial Charter, 1069–1070 Novgorodskaya, Valeria, 372–373 Novgorod the Great, 1070–1073 Novikov, Nikolai Ivanovich, 1073–1074 Freemasonry, 521 intelligentsia, 668 journalism, 708 Platonov and, 1184 Novocherkassk uprising, 1074–1075 Novogrudok, 134 Novo-Ogarevo process, 1613 Novorossiysk (ship), 155, 806 Novosibrisk Report, 1075, 1720 Novosiltsev, Nikolai Nikolayevich, 1076

S T E P

F O R W A R D ,

T W O

Novozhilov, Viktor Valentinovich, 1077 Novy, Aleviz, 786 Novy letopisets, 256 Novy Mir (journal), 1077–1078 Noxchmaxkxoi, 232 Nuclear energy, 93–96, 238–240 See also Chernobyl Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 389 Nuclear submarines, 1065 Nuclear weapons Cuban missile crisis, 278–279 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), 1440 military art, 925–926 zero option, 1723–1724 See also Arms control; Weapons Nureyev, Rudolph, 369–370 Nystadt, Treaty of, 1078–1079

O Oblomov (Goncharov), 576–577 Obrok, 1081 Obruchev, Nikolai Nikolayevich, 1082 Obshchina, 949, 1082–1083 Occultism, 1083–1084, 1291 Ocherki Po Istorii Russkoii Kultury (Milyukov), 638 October 1993 events, 123, 1084–1086, 1085 October general strike of 1905, 1086–1087 October Manifesto, 1087–1088 Bolshevism, 160 Fundamental Laws of 1906, 527 Revolution of 1905, 1286 Witte, Sergei, 1671 October Revolution of 1917, 1088–1096, 1093, 1094 ballet, 118–119 Civil War, as starting point of, 266 Lenin, Vladimir, 853 Red Guards, 1274 Trotsky, Leon Davidovich, 1574–1575 Octobrist Party, 1096–1097, 1290 The Odessa Tales (Babel), 110

S T E P S

B A C K

N

I N D E X

Odoyevsky, Vladimir Fyodorovich, 875, 1098, 1303 Odoyevsky Commission, 829–830 Official nationality, 1098–1100 Ogaden conflict, 466–467 Ogarkov, Nikolai Vasilevich, 1100 Oghuz. See Torky Ögödeids, 131 Ogonek (journal), 1542 OGPU (Unified State Political Administration), 616, 948, 1471–1472 Ogurtsov, Bazhen, 785 Oil industry Azerbaijan, 106–108 Baku, 113 crony capitalism, 345 prices, 335 Russian Far East, 481 Okhrana, 1470 Okolnichy, 110–1101 Oktiabrsky, F. S., 154–155 Okudzhava, Bulat Shalovich, 1101–1102 Okulov, Valery, 12 Old Believer committee, 1102 Old Believers, 1102–1106, 1104 Avvakum Petrovich, 104–105 beard tax, 133 Khovanshchina, 744 Morozova, Feodosya Prokopevna, 962 Platon, 1184 Russian Orthodox Church, 1320 sectarianism, 1359 Solovki Monastery, 1424 Old Style, 1106 Olearius, Adam, 123 Oleg, 1106 Oleg Svyatoslavich, 1506, 1643, 1701 Olga, 1106–1107 Oligarchs, 344–345, 420–421 Olympics, 971, 1448–1452 On Agitation (Kremer), 185 On Early Tains (Pasternak), 1146 One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich (Solzhenitsyn), 388, 1425 One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The Crisis in Our Party (Lenin), 851

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1791

I N D E X

N

O N

L A N D

R E F O R M

On Land Reform, 822 On Russia in the Regin of Alexis Mikhailovich (Kotoshikhin), 780 On the Corruption of Morals in Russia (Shcherbatov), 1381 On the Court, 841 “On the Delineation of Powers Between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation,” 96 On the History of Bolshevik Organizations in Transcaucasia (Beria), 140 “On the Poet’s Calling” (Blok), 157 “On the Policy of the Party in the Area of Belles Lettres” (Central Committee), 1315 “On the Regulation of Land Relations and the Development of Agrarian Reform in Russia” (Yeltsin), 822 “On the Restructuring of LiteraryArtistic Organizations” (Central Committee), 1315 On the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia, 537 On the Spiritual in Art (Kandinsky), 1396 Ooestra caviar, 215 Opera, 162, 563–564, 1107–1110 Operation Barbarossa, 1110–1111, 1429, 1435, 1684, 1686 Operation Kutuzov, 802 Operation Rumyantsev, 802 Opinion on the Eastern Question (Fadeev), 1134 Oprichniki, 1468 Oprichnina, 456, 592, 1111–1112, 1366 Optimal planning, 722 Oral epic songs, 636–637 Ordinance Book of the Robbery Chancellery, 614 Ordin-Nashchokin, Afanasy Lavrentievich, 1112–1113 Ordzhonikidze, Grigory Konstantinovich, 1113–1114 Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, 1603 Organized crime, 884–885, 1114–1116 Orgburo, 1116 Orgnabor, 8–9 Orio-Kalmyks, 730 Orlov, Aleksei Grigroyievich, 246

Orlov, Alexander, 370 Orlov, Grigory Grigorievich, 541, 1117–1118 Orlov, Yuri, 399, 400 Orlova, Lyubov Petrovna, 43, 1116–1117 Orphans, 474, 475, 640–641 Ortega, Daniel, 1045 Orthodox Church of Georgia, 552–553 Orthodox Judaism, 1262 Orthodoxy, 1118–1121 Archbishop of Novgorod, 1068–1069 Armenian Church’s split from, 83 Belarus, 134 Bulgakov, Sergei Nikolayevich, 182 Carpatho-Rusyns, 199 Caves Monastery, 214–215 Church Union of Brest, 135 Council of Florence, 506–507 cyrillic alphabet, 354 Cyril of Turov, 355 The Enlightenment, 454, 455 hagiography, 623–624 Ivan IV, 690–691 Kievan Caves (patericon), 750 Kirill-Beloozero Monastery, 757 Leontiev, Konstantin, 855 sinodik, 1398–1399 sobornost, 743 Solzhenitsyn, 1426 sorokoust, 1429 Statute of Grand Prince Vladimir, 1473–1474 Statute of Grand Prince Yaroslav, 1474–1475 Third Rome, 1542–1543 Uniate Church, 1605–1606 western Christianity, separation from, 756 See also Georgian Orthodox Church; Russian Orthodox Church Orthography reform, 824–825 Oruzheinaya Palata. See Armory Osetins, 1122 Osipovich, Gennadi, 717 OSLO peace agreements, 684 Osnaz elements, 1445 Osorina, Yulianya Ustinovna, 1123

Ossetes, 213 Osterman, Heinrich, 692 Ostpolitik, 390 Ostrogradsky, Mikhail Vasilievich, 4 Ostroh Bible, 533 Ostromir Gospel, 1123–1124 Ostrovsky, Alexander Nikolayevich, 1124–1125, 1125, 1537 Otrepev, Grigory, 1125–1126 Ottoman Empire Akkerman Convention, 24 Anna Ivanovna’s foreign policy, 64 Armenia, 79 Battle of Chesme, 246 Battle of Sinope, 1399 Congress of Vienna, 1637 Crimean Khanate, 340 Crimean Tatars, 341 Crimean War, 343–344, 1048–1049 genocide, 545 immigration of Caucasians, 214 Khmelnitsky, Bohdan, 741–742 Russo-Turkish Wars, 1336–1337 Three Emperors’ League, 1544 Treaty of Pruth River, 1243 Treaty of San Stefano, 38, 584 Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, 1623–1624 Young Turk Revolution, 116 See also Turkey Oubril, Pavel P., 144 Our Home Is Russia, 1126 An Outline of Church-Biblical History (Filaret), 498 Output and input targets. See Inputoutput analysis Overcentralization in Economic Administration (Kornai), 773 Over-procurator, office of, 640 Ownership, private, 815 Oyrats, 719

P Paasche index, 658 Pachomius the Logothete, 624 Pacific Fleet, 1127–1128 Paganism, 418, 1128–1129

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

1792

E N C Y C L O P E D I A

O F

R U S S I A N

H I S T O R Y

P E A S A N T R Y

Pahlen, Peter, 32 Painters Chagall, Marc, 224 Painters and painting Jack of Diamonds group, 575, 721, 890, 1396 Painting and painters Dionisy, 396–397 Goncharova, Natalia Sergeyevna, 575–576 icons, 649–650 Kandinsky, Vassily Vassilievich, 721–722 Malevich, Kazimir Severinovich, 890 nationalism, 998 neoclassicism, 1037 palekh painting, 1130 Peredvizhniki, 1284 Repin, Ilya Yefimovich, 1284–1285 Roerich, Nicholas Konstantinovich, 1291–1292 Rublev, Andrei, 1308–1309 Theophanes the Greek, 1540 Ushakov, Simon Federovich, 1624–1625 Vrubel, Mikhail, 1394 Paisy, 1448 Pakhomy, 1370 Pakistan, 1129–1130 Palekh painting, 1130 Pale of Settlement, 701–703, 1130–1131, 1191 Paleologue, Sophia, 1131–1132 Pallas, Peter-Simon, 467, 1132–1133 Pamyat, 1133 Pannonia, 647 Pan-Russism, 363–364 Panslavism, 1133–1135 Danilevsky, Nikolai Y., 1406 Khomyakov, Alexei Stepanovich, 742–743 Pogodin, Mikhail Petrovich, 1190 Serbian relations, 1364 Three Emperors’ League, 1544 Tyutchev, Fyodor Ivanovich, 1595 See also Slavophilism and Slavophiles Parallel Center, 1389

Parasha (Turgenev), 1585 Paratroop units, 1444–1445 Paris, first and second Treaties of, 1136, 1637 Paris, Treaty of, 36, 599, 1135, 1294, 1637 Paris Peace Conference, 358 Parks, 1322 Parland, Alfred, 72 Parliament, Yeltsin’s dissolution of, 1084–1086 Parliamentary system, 102 Parthia, 79 Partible inheritance, 820 Party congresses, 1136–1143, 1137 Party of People’s Freedom. See Constitutional Democratic Party (Cadets) Party of Russian Unity and Accord, 1143 Party-State Control Committee (PSCC), 1159–1160 Pasco, Gregory, 712 Pasha, Enver, 130 Pasha, Osman, 1399 Pashkov, Afanasy, 104 Pashkov, Istoma, 159, 1550 Pashkov House, 1329 Pashukanis, E., 841 Passport system, 921, 1143–1144, 1472 Pasternak, Boris Leonidovich, 1144–1146, 1145 intelligentsia, 671 Khrushchev and, 748 samizdat, 1347 The Thaw, 1535 Paternalism, 101 Patriarchate, 896–898, 1147–1148 Patrimonial property, 819–820 Paul I, 1148–1150, 1149 Alexander I, influence on, 31–32 army, 929 Catherine II, as successor to, 208 Gatchina palace, 541–542 law of succession, 1298 reign of, 32 serfdom, 458 Pauline Law of Succession, 1298 Pavliuchenko, Lyudmila Mikhailovna, 1150

N

I N D E X

Pavlov, Ivan Petrovich, 6, 7, 1151 Pavlov, Valentin Sergeyevich, 195, 1152, 1440 Pavlova, Anna Matveyevna, 118, 1150–1151, 1151 Pavlovich, Konstantin, 31 Pavlov-Silvansky, Nikolai, 497, 638 Pavlovsky, Gleb, 414 Peace of Andrusovo, 62–63 Peace of Noteborg, 500 Peace of Riga, 1195 Peasant economy, 1152–1153 Peasant Farm Organization (Chayanov), 231, 1152–1153 Peasantry, 1153–1155, 1154 agricultural economics, 231 babi bunty, 110 bednyaki, 133 black repartition, 153–154 chapbook literature, 227 chastushka, 230 Committees of the Village Poor, 295 communes, 633 dvorianstvo, 419–420 Emancipation Act, 427 enserfment, 455–459, 830 ethnography, 469 folk music, 509–510, 510 Free Economic Society for the Encouragement of Agriculture and Husbandry, 520 Gorgy, Maxim, 587 Go to the People movement, 1413 Grain Crisis of 1928, 593–594 grain requisitions, 1233 Green Movement, 269, 607–608 industrial workers, 812 izba, 693–694 khutor, 749–750 kulaks, 793–795 kulturnost, 796–797 kustar, 804 Land and Freedom, 818 Land Captains, 337 land tenure, 820–821 marriage and family, 897–898 migration, 921, 922 mir, 948–949 movement restriction, 811 obrok, 1081

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

E N C Y C L O P E D I A

O F

R U S S I A N

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1793

I N D E X

N

P E A S A N T S ’

Peasantry (continued) obshchina, 1082–1083 Provisional Government, 485 Razin Rebellion, 1271–1272, 1477 recovery of fugitive peasants, 1366–1367 redemption payments, 1273–1274 serednyaki, 1365 serfdom, 448 service state, 1372 smychka, 1410–1411 soul tax, 1432 three-field system, 1545 Village Messenger (newspaper), 711 vodka, 1646 See also Agriculture; Serfdom Peasants’ Land Bank, 121 Peasant uprisings, 1155–1156 Pechenegs, 1156–1157 Pekarsky, Peter, 5 Peking, Treaty of, 1157 Pelevin, Viktor Olegovich, 1157–1158 Pentecostals, 1361 People’s Commissariat for Enlightenment, 440, 721, 879 People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), 140–141, 370, 948, 1229, 1712 People’s Commissariat of Nationalities, 1158–1159 People’s Commissariat of State Security (NKGB), 948 People’s Commissariat of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection. See Rabkrin People’s Commissariat of Transport, 716 People’s Control Committee, 1159–1160 People’s houses, 1160–1161 People’s Party of Free Russia, 1161–1162 People’s Will, 1162–1163 Alexander II, 38 Black Repartition, 153 intelligentsia, 669 Mikhailovsky, Nikolai, 923–924 Perovskaya, Sofia Lvovna, 1166 populism, 1209

L A N D

B A N K

terrorism, 1534 Zhelyabov, Andrei Ivanovich, 1725 Peredvizhniki, 1284 Perestroika, 1163–1165 cooperative societies, 328 economic reform, 15, 580–581 France, 520 full economic accounting, 526–527 Gosbank, 587 Law of the State Enterprise, 1467 Law on Cooperatives, 327 media, 1529–1530 monetary policy, 958 Novosibrisk Report, 1075 petty tutelage, 1178 ratchet effect, 1271 religion, 1283–1284 samoupravlenie, 1349 second economy, 1357 state orders, 1467–1468 trade, 517 Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (Gorbachev), 1163–1164 Pereyaslav Agreement, 742 Periodical table of elements, 913 Perm-35, 617 Permanent Commission on Nature Preservation, 461 Permanent Revolution, 1165 Perovskaya, Sofia Lvovna, 1166 Perrot, Jules, 117 Persia Armenia, rule of, 79 Georgia, 550 Russo-Persian Wars, 1335–1336 Persian Gulf War, 1166–1167 Pervuhkin, Mikhail, 67–68 Pessimism, 1008–1009 Pestel, Pavel Ivanovich, 367, 980–981, 1167–1168 Peter and Paul Fortress, 1175–1176 Peter I, 1168–1173 Academy of Arts, 3 Academy of Sciences, 1620–1621 Alexei Petrovich, relationship with, 50 architecture, 71 army, 928

art, 84 Battle of Poltava, 1203 Battles of Narva, 995 beard tax, 133 Book of Degrees of the Royal Genealogy, 164 Bruce’s advisory capacity, 174–175 calendars, 196 Catherine I, marriage to, 204 civil script, 354 conversion campaign, 679 corporal punishment, 329–330 cultural revolution, 997 cultural synthesis, 651 Denmark, relations with, 382 dvorianstvo, 420 education policy, 437 enserfment, 458 expansion, 286 exploration, 27 Feofan, relationship with, 1235 forced labor, 618 General Regulation of 1720, 73 Golitsyn, arrest of, 575 Gordon, relationship with, 585 government administration, 615 Great Northern War, 600–602, 1169, 1169 guilds, 615 health care services, 627–628 historiography, 637 Holy Synod, 639 imperial, 426 Imperial Guards, 612–613 Imperial Russian Academy of Sciences, 4 Imperial Russian Navy, 929 industrialization, 811 Ivan V and, 692 Joakim and, 706, 1147 journalism, 708 kormlenie, 772 language laws, 823–824 Law of Single Inheritance, 820 Law on Succession, 1493 legal system, 840 Lesnaya, battle of, 857 local government administration, 870 Mazepa, defection of, 909

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

1794

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A

P O C K E T

Medvedev, execution of, 910 Menshikov, relationship with, 915 mercantilism, 915–916 merchants, 916 military administration, 9 military reform, 935 mock institutions, 1171 Moldavia, attempted liberation of, 1292 monasticism, 956 monetary reform, 768 Moscow, 964–965 music, 985 Natalia, clash with, 995 non-Byzantinism, 191–192 Old Believers, 1103–1104, 1104 Peter and Paul Fortress, 1175–1176 play regiments, 1218 poll tax, 811 pomestie, 1205 Procuracy, 1232 Russian Orthodox Church, 463, 1320 security force, 1468–1469 service state, 1372 Slavo-Greco-Latin Academy, 1404 Slavophiles, 1405 Sophi’s regency, 1427–1428 soul tax, 458, 1432 St. Petersburg, 1483, 1484 state principle, 743 Stefan’s criticism of, 1476 streltsy, 1489 succession, 1298 Table of Ranks, 420, 935, 1381, 1511–1512 terem, abolition of the, 1532 Treaty of Pruth River, 1243 ukaz, 1599 Peter II, 1173 Peter III, 1173–1175, 1174 Catherine’s marriage to, 205–206 coup, 365 Pugachevshchina, 1245–1246 serfdom, 458 Seven Years’ War, 1375 Petersburg (Bely), 139 Peter the Great. See Peter I Petipa, Marius, 118

D I C T I O N A R Y

O F

F O R E I G N

Petrashevsky, Mikhail. See Butashevich-Petrashevsky, Mikhail Vasilievich Petrashevsky Circle Danilevsky, Nikolai Yakovlevich, 364 Dostoyevsky, Fyodor Mikhailovich, 410 intelligentsia, 668 Petrashevtsy, 1176–1177 Petrograd. See St. Petersburg Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, 484, 694, 1090 Petroleum industry. See Oil industry Petropavlovsk (battleship), 886 Petrov, Grigory Spiridonovich, 1177 Petrovsky-Sitnianovich. See Polotsky, Simeon Petrunkevich, Ivan, 860 Petrushka, 1177–1178 Petty tutelage, 1178 Phalanx, 721 Philanthropy, 494 Philip, St., 1056 Philosophy Berdyayev, Nikolai Alexandrovich, 139–140 Chaadayev, Peter Yakovlevich, 223–224 dialectical materialism, 6–7 economic, 181–182 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 630, 630–631 Khomyakov, Alexei Stepanovich, 742–743 of literature, 136–137 Polish, 1005 of science, 6–7 Soloviev, Vladimir Sergeyevich, 1422–1423 Westernizers, 1663 Philosophy of Economy: The World as Household (Bulgakov), 182 Photography, 1178–1180 Photopropaganda, 1179 Physical education, 1449–1450 Physical idealism, 7 Physicians, 627–628 Physics, 7 Physiology, 1151 Piatakov, Yuri L., 1249

T E R M S

N

I N D E X

Piatnitsky, Mitrofan, 510 The Pilgrim’s Tale, 1448 Pilot’s Book, 772 Pilsudski, Józef, 1437 Pimen, Patriarch, 1180–1181 Pipes, Richard, 670 Pirogov, Nikolai Ivanovich, 1181 Pisarev, Dmitry Ivanovich, 710, 1053, 1182–1183 Piskarev Codex, 256 Planners’ preferences, 1183 Plan targets, 459 Platform of the Forty-Six, 837 Platform of the Thirteen, 838 Platon, 1183–1184 Platonov, Sergei Fyodorovich, 691, 1112, 1184–1185 Playwrights Amalrik, Andrei Alexeievich, 55–56 Andreyev, Leonid Nikolayevich, 60 Chekhov, Anton Pavlovich, 235–237, 236 Fonvizin, Denis Ivanovich, 511–512 Griboedov, Alexander Sergeyevich, 608 Khomyakov, Alexei Stepanovich, 742–743 Mayakovsky, Vladimir Vladimirovich, 908–909 Ostrovsky, Alexander Nikolayevich, 1124–1125 Radzinsky, Edvard Stanislavich, 1264–1265 See also Theater; Writers Plehve, Vyacheslav Konstantinovich, 1185–1186, 1734 Plekhanov, Georgy Valentinovich, 1186, 1414 Plenum, 1186–1187 Pletnev, Peter, 1099 Pluralism, political, 1043, 1163 Pobedonostsev, Konstantin, 1187–1188 Alexander III, 40 Filaret and, 498 Holy Synod, 640 nationalism, 1007 Pobirokhin, Ilarion, 1360 A Pocket Dictionary of Foreign Terms, 1176

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E N C Y C L O P E D I A

O F

R U S S I A N

H I S T O R Y

1795

I N D E X

N

P O D G O R N Y ,

Podgorny, Nikolai Viktorovich, 1188–1189 Podnyataya tselina (Sholokhov), 1386 Podrostok (Dostoyevsky), 411 Podyachy, 1189 Podzol, 1189 Poema bez geroya (Akhmatova), 22 Poems in Prose (Turgenev), 1585 Poets Akhmatova, Anna Andreyevna, 21–22 Bely, Andrei, 138–139 Blok, Alexander Alexandrovich, 156–157 Brodsky, Joseph Alexandrovich, 173–174 Bunin, Ivan Alexeyevich, 186 Derzhavin, Gavryl Romanovich, 386–387 Gumilev, Nikolai Stepanovich, 619–620 Jewish, 703 Lermontov, Mikhail Yurievich, 856 Lomonsov, Mikhail Vasilievich, 871–872 Mandelshtam, Osip Emilievich, 891, 892 Mayakovsky, Vladimir Vladimirovich, 908–909 Medvedev, Sylvester Agafonikovich, 910 Nekrasov, Niklai Alexeyevich, 1033 Okudzhava, Bulat Shalovich, 1101 Pasternak, Boris Leonidovich, 1145–1146 Polish nationalism, 1005 Polotsky, Simeon, 1201–1202 Pushkin, Alexander Sergeyevich, 1251–1253, 1252 Romanticism, 1302–1303 Ryleyev, Kondraty Fyodorovich, 1339–1340 Serapion Brothers, 1363–1364 Shevchenko, Taras Gregorevich, 1383–1384 Slutsky, Boris Abromovich, 1407 Tsvetaeva, Marina Ivanovna, 1581–1582, 1582 Turgenev, Ivan, 1585

N I K O L A I

V I K T O R O V I C H

Tyutchev, Fyodor Ivanovich, 1595 Vysotsky Vladimir Semyonovich, 1655–1656, 1656 Yesenin, Sergei Alexandrovich, 1710–1711 Yevtushenko, Yevgeny Alexandrovich, 1711–1712 Poets’ Guild, 22 Pogodin, Mikhail Petrovich, 876, 1134, 1190, 1406 Pogroms, 1190–1191 Armenians, 990 Black Hundred movement, 151–152 Jewish Bund, 186 Plehve, Vyacheslav Konstantinovich, 1186 Pokrovsky, Dmitry, 510 Pokrovsky, Mikhail Nikolayevich, 497, 1013, 1191–1192 Poland, 1192–1196 anti-Semitism, 1008 Catholicism, 209 Czartoryski, Adam Jerzy, 355–356 Dzerzhinsky, Felix Edmundovich, 422–423 East Prussia, 717 Great Northern War, 600 indicative planning, 659 January Uprising, 1194,1198–1199 Kaliningrad Oblast, 119–120 Katyn Forest massacre, 726–727 Konstantin Nikolayevich, 767 language policy, imperial era, 824 Lithuania and, 134–135, 863 Livonian War, 868–869 Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty, 1437 Moscow’s liberatio from, 1216 nationalism, 37, 1004–1010 partitions of, 100, 135, 1004, 1193–1194, 1198 Potsdam Conference, 1215 Prussian interest in, 1242 Sarmatianism, 1350 Secret Protocol, 1029–1031 self-determination, 1000 Smolensk War, 1408–1409 Solidarity Movement, 280, 1195–1196, 1422

Soviet-Polish War, 1436–1437 Tehran Conference, 1527 Thirteen Year’s War, 62–63 Time of Troubles, 1515–1516, 1551 Treaty of Andrusovo, 1428 tsarist nationalities policy, 1020–1023 Ukraine, relations with, 48, 937, 1600–1603 Union of Lublin, 863 Vilnius, 1640 World War I, 1677–1678 Yalta Conference, 1698–1699 Poland-Lithuania, 1192–1193, 1543–1544 Polar aviation, 251 Polar climate, 272 Polar explorers, 1196–1197 Poles, 1197–1198, 1331 Polev, Nil, 707 Polevoy, Nikolai, 637, 1302, 1303 Police socialism, 1734 Policing, 614, 947–948 Policy making Communist Party, 311–312 Council of Ministers, 336 Polikarp, 750 Polish Democratic Society, 1004–1005 Polish National Democrats, 1008 Polish rebellion of 1863, 1006, 1022, 1198–1199 Polish Socialist Party, 1008 Politburo, 1199–1200 Brezhnev, Leonid, 171–172 Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich, 179 churches, destruction of, 200 Czechoslovakia, invasion of, 356–357 decision making authority, 311 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 578–579 Grishin, Viktor Dmitrievich, 609 Gromyko, Andrei Andreyevich, 611 Kalinin, Mikhail Ivanovich, 718 Kamenev, Lev Borisovich, 720 Kirov, Sergei Mironovich, 759 Kosygin, Alexei Nikolayevich, 778 Kunayev, Dinmukhammed Akhmedovich, 797

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

1796

E N C Y C L O P E D I A

O F

R U S S I A N

H I S T O R Y

P O S T - S O V I E T

Ligachev, Yegor Kuzmich, 862 Malenkov, Georgy, 889–890, 1358 Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich, 925 overview, 309–310 Right Opposition, 1289 Romanov, Grigory Vasilievich, 1299 Tomsky, Mikhail Pavlovich, 1560 Trotsky, Leon Davidovich, 1575 Yakovlev, Alexander Nikolayevich, 1697–1698 Yanayev, Gennady Ivanovich, 1700 Yezhov, Nikolai Ivanovich, 1712 Zinoviev, Grigory Yevseyevich, 1732 Political Administration of the Red Army, 937 Political Advisory Council, 1338 Political party system, 1200–1201 Article 6 of the 1977 Constitution, 89, 374–375 intelligentsia, 669 Russian Federation, 1338–1339 See also Specific parties Political police, 1468, 1469 Political prisoners. See Dissidents; Exiles; Gulag Political Testament, Lenin’s, 848–849, 854 Politika (Krizanic), 1134 Politkovskaya, Anna, 712 Poll tax. See Soul tax Pollution, 462–463 Polotsk, 134–135 Polotsky, Simeon, 104, 135, 910, 1201–1202 Polovtsy, 752, 1202–1203 Poltava, Battle of, 601, 601, 1203, 1601 Polyakov, Valery, 950, 1442 Polyane, 1203–1204 Polyphony, theory of, 112 Pomerantsev, Alexander, 72 Pomestie, 1204–1205, 1650–1651 Ponomarev, Boris Kharitonovich, 1205–1206 Pontic steppe, 332–333 Poor Folk (Dostoyevsky), 569 Popkov, Pyotr, 846 Popov, Alexander Stepanovich, 1206–1207

Popov, Gavriil Kharitonovich, 1207 Popov, Pavel Ilich, 1207 Popov, Vyacheslav, 803 Popular culture, 999 Popular Front policy, 303–304, 1016–1017, 1207–1208 Popular music, 986 Population demography, 375–380 Family Edict of 1944, 476 growth, 427 loss, 379 population by age and sex, 2002, 376 Populationism, 892 Populism, 1208–1210 Herzen, Alexander, 633, 1413 idealism, 652 intelligentsia, 669 Lenin, Vladimir, 850 Mikhailovsky, Nikolai, 923–924 nationalism, 1006–1007 nihilism/populism distinction, 1054 socialist realism, 1417 Zhelyabov, Andrei Ivanovich, 1725 Populist groups Black Repartition, 38, 153–154 Land and Liberty, 37, 38, 153 People’s Will, 38, 153 Port Arthur, 931, 1210, 1333 Portrait painting, 84, 1285 Portsmouth, Treaty of, 1210–1211, 1671 Poruka. See Collective responsibility Posadnik, 1211 Posnik, 201 Posokhin, Mikhail, 787 Pospelov, P. N., 1387 Possessional serfs, 1368 Possessors and non-possessors, 1211–1212 Postal system, 1212–1213 Postivism, 760 Post-Soviet era Abkhazians, 2 Academy of Sciences, 8 Aeroflot, 12–13 agrarian reform, 17 agriculture, 19

E R A

N

I N D E X

Aliyev, Heidar, 51 Andreyeva, Nina Alexandrovna, 61 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, U.S. withdrawal from, 66 arbitration courts, 338 archives, 74–75 Armenia, 81–82 arms control, 87–88 atomic energy, 96 Avars, 102 banking crisis, 433 Bolshoi Theater, 162 Bulgaria, 185 Carpatho-Rusyns, 199 Catholicism, 210 Central Asia, 220 Chechnya, 234–235, 412–413 China, relations with, 249–250 circus, 264 Civic Union, 264 Committee for the Operational Management of the National Economy (COME), 294 Commonwealth of Independent States, 296–297 Crimea, 339–340 crony capitalism, 345 cult of personality, 349 Dagestan, 362 democratization, 375 demographic data, 377 demographic trends, 379 Dugin, Alexander Gelevich, 413–414 economy, 432–434 electoral commissions, 443–444 electricity, 445 environmentalism, 462–463 Federal Property Fund, 489–490 Finland, 503 food, 513 foreign debt, 513–515 Georgian Orthodox Church, 553 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 582 Greece, relations with, 606 human rights, 642–643 industrialization, 660–661 intelligentsia, 672 Iran, relations with, 675–676 Islam, 683

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

E N C Y C L O P E D I A

O F

R U S S I A N

H I S T O R Y

1797

I N D E X

N

P O T E M K I N ,

Post-Soviet era (continued) Israel, relations with, 684 land tenure, 821–823 legal system, 842 legislative-executive relations, 487–488 Mafia capitalism, 884–885 military, 940–941 Old Believers, 1105 privatization, 12231 railways, 1266–1267 religious freedom, 1362 ruble zone, 1309–1310 Russian Orthodox Church, 44, 464 Sberbank, 1351 second economy, 1358 sectarianism, 1362 shock therapy, 1385 special forces, 1445 St. Petersburg, 1485 state security, organs of, 1473 stock exchanges, 1479 trade, 517 transition economies, 1569–1570 women’s status, 1323 See also Russian Federation; Soviet breakup Potemkin, Grigory Alexandrovich, 1213–1214 Catherine II and, 208 Caucasus, 210 Second Turkish War, 928–929 Treaty of Jassy, 701 Potemkin mutiny, 1214–1215 Potsdam Conference, 717, 1215–1216, 1687 Powers, Gary, 1597 Poyarkov, Vasily, 736 Pozharsky, Dmitry Mikhailovich, 945, 1216, 1551–1552 Prague Spring, 356, 358, 779 Pravda (newspaper), 179, 711–712, 954, 1216–1218, 1217 Pravda Russkaya. See Russian Justice “Prayer Letter” of Alexei Mikhailovich, 47 Prayer to Vladimir, 253 Precedence and mestnichestvo, 918 Preobrazhensky, Yevgeny Alexeyevich, 837, 838, 1219–1220, 1227

G R I G O R Y

A L E X A N D R O V I C H

Preobrazhensky Guards, 613, 1218–1219 Presidency, 324–325, 1220 Presidential Council, 1220–1221 Presidential Security Service (PSS), 776 Presidium of Supreme Soviet, 1221–1222, 1222 Prestuplenie i nakazanie (Dostoyevsky), 410 Pretender Dmitry. See Dmitry, False Prices command administrative economy, 292 enterprises, 459 foreign trade, 517 grain, 593, 596–597 monetary overhang, 957, 959 oil, 335 repressed inflation, 1285–1286 Scissors Crisis, 1355–1356, 1410–1411 Prikazy. See Chancellery system Primakov, Yevgeny Maximovich, 1223, 1223–1224 Fatherland-All Russia, 482 Iraq, 676 Israel, 684 Turkey, 1588 Primary Chronicle, 1224–1226, 1225 Caves Monastery, 215, 216 ethnography, 467 Kievan Rus, formation of, 751 Normanist Controversy, 1061 Olga, 1106–1107 paganism, 1128–1129 Polyane, 1203–1204 Route to Greeks, 1305–1306 Rurik, 1311 Vikings, 1639 Vladimir, 252, 255, 1643–1644 Primary education, 437 Primary Party Organization, 308–309, 1226 Prime minister, 1226–1227 Primitive Socialist Accumulation, 1227–1228 Primogeniture, succession by right of, 1297–1298 Primordial view of nations, 1013–1014, 1026–1027

Prince Ivan and the Grey Wolf (engraving), 508 Princes boyars, relationship with, 166 court hierarchy, 591–592 grand prince, title of, 598 The Principles of Chemistry (Mendeleyev), 913 Printing Fyodorov, Ivan, 532, 532–533 lubok, 876 newspaper, 710 See also Publishing Priory, 541–542 Prison camps. See Gulag Prisons, 841, 1228–1230 Lefortovo, 836–837 Lubyanka, 877 Peter and Paul Fortress, 1176 Prison songs, 1230 Private commercial banks, 121–122 Private economic activity, 327, 328 Private education, 438–439 Private publishing, 216–218 Privatization, 1231 Civic Union, 264 crony capitalism, 345 Federal Property Fund, 489–490 mass, 256 media outlets, 1530 post-Soviet, 433 virtual economy, 1642 Volsky, Arkady Ivanovich, 1648 Privilege athletes, 1450 Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 312 inorodtsy, 664–665 Table of Ranks, 1511–1512 Problems in Leninism (Stalin), 1415 Procopius, 1128 Procuracy, 1232 Prodnalog, 1232–1233 Prodrazverstka, 1233–1234 Production. See Industrial production Production associations, 459 Production Sharing Agreement, 1234 Productivity imperial era, 435 Soviet era, 429, 430–431

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

1798

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O F

R U S S I A N

H I S T O R Y

P U S H K I N

Profits, enterprise, 459–460 Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom (Sakharov), 560 Progressive Bloc, 942 Prohibition of alcohol, 29–30 Prokofiev, Sergei Sergeyevich, 1234 Prokopovich, Feofan, 1235 Prokopovich, Sergei, 432 Proletarian dictatorship. See Dictatorship of the proletariat Proletarians, 350–352 Proletkult, 1235–1237, 1538 Prombank, 1489 Promstroibank, 1489 Pronatalism, 476 Propaganda Agitprop, 15, 238, 818 Constitution of 1936 as, 322 developed socialism, 391–392 Fatherland-All Russia, 482–483 Five-Year Plan, 505 League of the Militant Godless, 834–835 nationalities policy, 1013–1014 photography, 1179 quality of life, 391 subway system, 1493 television and radio, 1528–1529 Property rights, 474–475, 819–823, 1650–1651 See also Inheritance; Land policy Propp, Vladimir Iakovlevich, 1237 Propper, S. M., 1542 Prostitution, 1237–1238 Protazanov, Yakov Alexandrovic, 1238–1239 Protestantism, 1235, 1239–1240, 1361 Protestant Reformation, 135 Protopopov, Alexander Dmitrievich, 1240 Provisional Government, 1240–1241 Constituent Assembly, 318 establishment of, 484 Kerensky, Alexander Fyodorovich, 734–735 KOMUCH, 761, 764–765 Left Socialist Revolutionaries, 839 Mensheviks, 914 Milyukov, Paul Nikolayevich, 942, 1241

Social Revolutionary Party, 1420 White Army, 1665 women’s rights, 495–496 workers, 1673 zemstvos, 1723 Prusak, Mikhail, 371 Prussia, 1242–1243 Congress of Vienna, 1637 German unification, 556 Holy Alliance, 639 Peter III, 1174–1175 Quadruple and Quintuple Alliances, 1259–1260 Russian-Prussian relations, 556 Russian/Prussian relations, 100 Seven Year’s War, 1375 Three Emperors’ League, 1544 Treaties of Paris, first and second, 1136 Treaty of Tilsit, 1547 Pruth River, Campaign and Treaty of, 1243 Pskov, 128–129, 1634–1635 Pskov Judicial Charter, 1243–1244 Psychiatric confinement, 609, 911 Psychological Data in Favor of Free Will and Moral Responsbility (Anthony Khrapovitsky), 64 Public baths, 122–123 Public health demographic trends, 377–379 smallpox, 207 See also Health care services Public opinion Constitution of 1936, draft of, 321–322 Gorbachev/Yeltsin popularity, 581 Japanese dislike of Russia, 700 Jews, 705 quality of life, 391–392 studies, 1245 Public Russian Television, 776 Publishing Agitprop, 15 Avars, 102 Balkars, 117 Belarusian, 135–136 broadsides, 876 censorship, 216–218 chapbook literature, 227

H O U S E

N

I N D E X

Dargins, 364 Glavlit, 563 Gosizdat, 588–589 Novikov, Nikolai Ivanovich, 1073–1074 private, 216–218 samizdat, 560, 671, 1347–1348, 1425 Suvorin, Alexei Sergeyevich, 1503 Sytin, Ivan Dmitrievich, 1509–1510 Pudovkin, Vsevolod, 973–974, 975 Pugachev, Emelian Ivanovich, 208, 733, 1245–1246 Pugachev rebellion, 1156 Pugachevshchina, 1245–1246 Pugo, Boris Karlovich, 1246–1247, 1247 Pulkovo Astronomical Observatory, 4 Punishment, corporal, 329–330 Puppet theater, 1177–1178 Purges Ginzburg, Evgenia Semenovna, 558 Greeks, 606–607 Izvestiya staff, 694 Kazakhs, 732 Komsomol, 313 Left Opposition, 838 Leningrad Affair, 845–846 Malenkov, Georgy, 889 mass graves, 1485 military, 938, 1444, 1683–1684 nationalities policy, 1013 Stalin’s opposition, 1456–1457, 1458 Tatars, 341 See also Great Purges Purishkevich, Vladimir, 152 Pushkin, Alexander Sergeyevich, 1251–1253, 1252 Akhundov’s “Oriental Poem,” 23 Boris Godunov, 1537 Chaadayev, relationship with, 223 Eugene Onegin, 569 Lyceum, 1579 nationalism, 998 Romanticism, 1302, 1303 Pushkin House, 1253–1254

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

E N C Y C L O P E D I A

O F

R U S S I A N

H I S T O R Y

1799

I N D E X

N

P U T E S H E S T V I E

Puteshestvie iz Peterburga v Moskvu (Radishchev), 1264 Putiatin, Count E. V., 19 Putilov, Alexander, 122 Putilov Works, 157, 539 Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich, 519, 1254–1256, 1255, 1256 alcohol industry, 31 Constitutional Court, 319 cult of peronality, 349 Dugin’s criticism of, 414 economic reform, 433 environmentalism, 462 Federation Chamber member selection, 487 Gorchakov, recognition of, 584 Israel, relations with, 684 Japan, relations with, 701 Kasyanov, praise of, 726 Kursk submarine disaster, 803 land policy, 823 language policy, 825 legislative-executive relations, 487–488 Luzhkov, defeat of, 880 Moiseyev, appointment of, 952 Mori and, 699 Pakistan, relations with, 1130 presidency, 1220 Primakov and, 1223–1224 regionalism, 1281 Russia-Belarus union, 1313 Russian influence, 301 Russian Orthodox Church, 1321 Security Council, 1363 Sobchak’s support of, 1411–1412 St. Petersburg, 1485 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), 88 Turkey, relations with, 1588 Unity Party, 1620 Yavlinsky’s challenge to, 1704 Pyatnitsky choir, 510 Pyatov, Yuri, 1011 Pyrev, Ivan, 975 Pytatakov, Georgy Leonidovich, 1257

Q Qarachi beys, 572–573 Qing dynasty, 248

I Z

P E T E R B U R G A

V

Qipchaq, 131, 571–572, 796 Quadruple Alliance, 1259–1260 Quality of life, 391 Qué Viva México! (movie), 43, 442 Quiet Flows the Don (Sholokhov), 1386 Quintuple Alliance, 1259–1260 Quoc, Nguyen Ai, 1638 al-Qursavi, Abdunnasir, 681

R Rabbinical Commission, 1261–1262 Rabkrin, 222, 1262 Rabochaia Mysl (newspaper), 432 Rabochee Delo (journal), 432 Rabotnitsa (newspaper), 75, 1348–1349 Racconigi Agreement, 685 Rachmaninov, Sergei Vasilievich, 1262–1263 Rada government, 1602 Radek, Karl Bernardovich, 1011, 1263–1264 Radicals feminist, 494–495 raznochintsy, 1273 Slavophiles, 1406 Radioactive waste, 96 Radischev, Alexander Nikolayevich, 642, 668, 859, 1264 Radzinsky, Edvard Stanislavich, 1264–1265 Raikin, Arkady Isaakovich, 1265–1266 Railways, 1266–1268 economic development, 426 economic effects, 435 grain trade, 595 Lake Baikal, 817 Russian Far East, 481 trade, 515–516 Trans-Siberian Railway, 53, 1267, 1571 Rainbow Keepers, 463 Raionirovanie, 1268 Rakhmonov, Imomali, 1514–1515 Rákosi, Mátyás, 643, 645 Rapallo, Treaty of, 544, 1268–1269 Rapid economic growth, 428–431

M O S K V U

Rapid industrialization, 661–662, 663, 1089, 1456 Rasputin, Grigory Yefimovich, 1269, 1269–1270 Alexandra Fedorovna, relationship with, 42, 49, 1052 death of, 152 Protopopov, relationship with, 1240 Russian Orthodox Church, 65 Rastrelli, Bartolomeo, 71, 1270, 1667 Ratchet effect, 1270–1271 A Raw Youth (Dostoyevsky), 411 Ray (newspaper), 711 Razin Rebellion, 1155, 1271–1272, 1476–1477 Raznochintsy, 1273 Reading about the Life and Murder of the Blessed Passion-sufferers Boris and Gleb (Nestor), 253 Reagan, Ronald, 1616, 1617 Cold War, 280–281 Geneva Summit of 1985, 543–544 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 672–673 Reykjavik Summit, 1288–1289 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 66, 86, 1486, 1487 totalitarianism terminology, 1561–1562 zero option, 1723–1724 Realism golden age of Russian literature, 569–570 Moscow Art Theater, 967 photography, 1179 Repin, Ilya Yefimovich, 1284–1285 theater, 1538 See also Socialist realism Rebellions Antonov Uprising, 68–69 Bolotnikov rebellion, 159, 1548 Copper Riots, 328–329 Green Movement, 68–69, 269, 607–608 Imperial Guards, 613 January Uprising, 1198–1199 July Days of 1917, 713–714 Kronstadt Uprising, 119, 269, 789

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1800

E N C Y C L O P E D I A

O F

R U S S I A N

H I S T O R Y

R E P U B L I C S

Novocherkassk uprising, 1074–1075 peasant uprisings, 1155–1156 Polish Uprising of 1863, 1006, 1022, 1198–1199 Pugachev rebellion, 1156, 1245–1246 Razin Rebellion, 1271–1272, 1476–1477 streltsy, 1489 See also Decembrist movement Recreation, 1160–1161 Red Army Battle of Kursk, 802–803 Battle of Stalingrad, 1453–1455, 1454 Budenny, Semeon Mikhailovich, 177 Civil War of 1917–1922, 267–269 Frunze, Mikhail Vasilievich, 526 intelligence, 934 military reform, 936 Operation Barbarossa, 1110 overview, 936–937 Shaposhnikov, Boris Mikhailovich, 1379 Sokolovsky, Vasily Danilovich, 1421 Soviet-Finnish War, 1433–1434 Trotsky, Leon Davidovich, 1575 World War II, 938–940, 1687–1691, 1690 Zhukov, Georgy, 1731 See also Military; Warfare Red Cavalry (Babel), 110 Redemption payments, 1273–1274 Red Guards, 1274–1275 Red Square, 900, 1275–1276, 1322 The Red Star (Bogdanov), 1354 Red Terror, 268, 1276 Referendum of April 1993, 1277 Referendum of December 1993, 1277–1278 Referendum of March 1991, 1278–1279 “Reflections on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom” (Sakharov), 1345 Reform Alexander I, 32–33 Alexander II, 36–37

Alexander III, 40 Catherine II, 207, 287–288, 667, 842 censorship, 217–218, 604 Decembrists, 367 Dubcek, Alexander, 356–357, 358 Emancipation Act, 448 family law, 898–899 Free Economic Society for the Encouragement of Agriculture and Husbandry, 520 Fyodor, Alexeyevich, 530 Islam, 681–682 judicial, 604, 841 Loris-Melikov’s Constitution, 873–874 Nicholas II, 1051–1052 Paul I, 1149 Peter I, 1169–1170 serfdom, 602, 1048 Stolypin, Peter Arkadievich, 1482 Union of Right Forces agenda, 1607 See also Church reform; Economic reform; Education reform; Government reform; Great Reforms; Military reform Refugees, 990 Refuseniks, 1279–1280 Refutation of the Sects (Koghbatsi), 83 Regionalism, 1268, 1280–1281 Registration Directorate, 934 Regulations on Peasants Set Free, 449 Rein Commission, 628 Reindeer herding Chukchi, 257 Evenki, 471 Nenets, 1035–1036 Sami, 1347 Reinforced Security, 1531 Reinsurance Treaty, 556 Reitern, Mikhail Khristoforovich, 1281–1282 Relief. See Humanitarian relief Religion, 1282–1284 Albanian Church, 28 Bakunin’s opposition to, 114 Bolshevik assault on, 1282–1283 Catherine II, religious tolerance of, 679–680

N

I N D E X

church/state relations, 259–261, 887, 1473–1745 clergy, procession of, 1283 conversion campaign of Peter I, 679 dvoeverie, 418 freedom of, 1282 inorodtsy, 665 Khomyakov, Alexei Stepanovich, 743 Russians, 1324–1325 science and, 872–873 sectarianism, 1359–1362 sobornost, 743 Tolstoy, Leo, 1559 See also Specific religions Religious education Filaret Drozdov, Metropolitan, 498 Islam, 680 jadidism, 698–699 Religious tolerance Catherine II, 288 Khazaria, 739 sectarianism, 1361–1362 Turkestan, 289 Rennenkampf, Pavel, 1677 Renovationist Movement. See Living Church Movement Renovation of St. Petersburg, 1485 Rent, 1081 Reparations, 1215 Repentance (movie), 977 Repin, Ilya Yefimovich, 998, 1284–1285 Reply (Makary), 887 Repressed inflation, 957, 1285–1286 Republican ministries, 946 Republic of Azerbaijan. See Azerbaijan and Azeris Republic of Latvia. See Latvia and Latvians Republic of Moldova. See Moldova and Moldovans Republic of Sakha. See Sakha and Yakuts Republics independence, 1280 nationalities policy, 450–453, 1012 Soviet nationality policy, 450–453

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1801

I N D E X

N

R E Q U I E M

( A K H M A T O V A )

Republics (continued) Union of Sovereign States, 1607–1608 Union Treaty, 1607–1608, 1612–1613 See also Specific republics Requiem (Akhmatova), 22 Research Academy of Sciences, 7 Free Economic Society for the Encouragement of Agriculture and Husbandry, 520 public opinion studies, 1245 Research Institute for Agricultural Economics and Policy, 230–231 Research Institute for Computer Based Forecasting, 223 Resurrection Cathedral, 71 Revolutionaries, 1095 Butashevich-Petrashevsky, Mikhail Vasilievich, 189 Chernov, Viktor Mikhailovich, 241–242 Chicherin, Georgy Vasilievich, 246–247 Chkheidze, Nikolai Semenovich, 251 Dzerzhinsky, Felix Edmundovich, 422, 422–423 feminism as part of wider revolution, 493–494 general strike of October 1905, 1086–1087 Gorky, Maxim, 586 Jews, 705 Kamenev, Lev Borisovich, 720–721 Kaplan, Fanya, 722–723 Kirov, Sergei Mironovich, 758 Kropotkin, Pyotr Alexeyevich, 789–790 Krupskaya, Nadezhda Konstantinovna, 791 Land and Freedom party, 818 Mayakovsky, Vladimir Vladimirovich, 908–909 Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, 954–955 Nechayev, Sergei Geradievich, 1032–1033 The People’s Will, 1162 Perovskaya, Sofia Lvovna, 1166

Preobrazhensky, Yevgeny Alexeyevich, 1219 Radek, Karl Bernardovich, 1263 Rykov, Alexei Ivanovich, 1339 Shlyapnikov, Alexander Gavrilovich, 1384 Skrypnyk, Mykola Oleksyovych, 1401 Spiridonova, Maria Alexandrovna, 1446–1447 state security, 1470 Tkachev, Petr Nikitich, 1553–1554 Zasulich, Vera Ivanovna, 1720–1721 Zhelyabov, Andrei Ivanovich, 1725 Revolutionary Communists, 267 Revolutionary Defensism, 485 Revolutionary War (American), 833, 1616 Revolution of 1905, 1286–1288, 1287 autocracy, 102 Black Hundred movement, 151–152 Bloody Sunday, 157–158 general strike, 1086–1087 Governing Senate, role of, 593 Lenin, Vladimir, 852 nationalism, 1009 Nicholas II, 1051–1052 Social Democrats, 160 workers, 1673 See also October Manifesto Reykjavik Summit, 1288–1289 Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 1029–1030, 1030 Rigan chronicle, 1635 Right Hegelianism, 630 Right Opposition, 179–180, 1289–1290, 1339 Right Social Revolutionaries, 1420 Riigikogu, 465 Rimsky-Korsakov, Nikolai Andreyevich, 920, 1109, 1290 Rinaldi Antonio, 541 The Rise and Fall of the Lysenko Regime (Medvedev), 911 Robbery Chancellery, 614 Rocketry, 1580 Rock Flower (opera), 1108

Rock music, 1479 Rodina (journal), 1542 Rodzianko, Mikhail Vladimirovich, 1290–1291 Roerich, Nicholas Konstantinovich, 1291–1292 Rogozhsky Chronicle, 255 Rogozin, Dmitry, 315–316 Rom, Mikhail, 975 Roma. See Gypsies Romania Bessarabia, 146, 176, 952 Bukovina, rule of, 180 Little Entente, 1714 Moldova, 953 relations with, 1292–1294 Romanov, Grigory Vasilievich, 1299, 1485 Romanov, Mikhail Fyodorovich, 1299–1302, 1300 Filaret Romanov and, 499 rule of, 1296–1297 selection of, 1552 Treaty of Stolbovo, 1480 Romanova, Anastasia, 1294–1295 Romanova, Anastasia Nikolayevna, 1295, 1297, 1299 Romanov dynasty, 1295–1299, 1601 Romanticism, 1302–1303 literature, 569 Lovers of Wisdom, 875–876 nationalism, 1099 Polish, 1005–1006 Tyutchev, Fyodor Ivanovich, 1595 Rome, 79 Romen Theater, 620 Room, Abram, 974 Roosevelt, Franklin D. Grand Alliance, 597 Tehran Conference, 1527 Yalta Conference, 1698–1699, 1699 Roosevelt, Theodore, 1210 Rosicrucians, 521 Rossi, Carlo, 72, 1037 ROSTA (Russian Telegraph Agency), 710, 1519 Rostovtsev, Mikhail Ivanovich, 1304 Rota system, 1304–1305, 1312

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1802

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Rotislav, 1303–1304 Round Table-Free Georgia Bloc, 538 Route to Greeks, 1305–1306 Rozanov, Vasily Vasilevich, 711 Rtishchev, Fyodor, 104 Rubakin, Nikolai, 1025–1026 Rubinstein, Nikolai and Anton, 999 Ruble, 958, 1306–1307 devaluation, 514–515 gold standard, 574 monetary policy, 958–959 valuation, 517 Ruble control, 1307–1308 Rublev, Andrei, 649–650, 1308–1309 Ruble zone, 1309–1310 Rumor (newspaper), 711 Rumyantsev, Nikolai, 1328 Rumyantsev, Peter Alexandrovich, 793, 928–929, 1310–1311 Rural economy, 16–17, 18–19 Rural medicine, 628 Rurik, 1106–1107, 1311 Rurikid dynasty, 1311–1312 appanage era, 69 Ivan IV, 689 Kievan Rus, 751 Novgorod, 1071 Rus Batu, 130–131 birchbark charters, 148–149 Normanist Controversy, 1060–1062 Polish-Lithuanian Union, 134–135 See also Kievan Rus Rusilov, Alexei, 1679–1682 Rus (journal), 25 Rusnaks. See Carpatho-Rusyns Russia, map of, 547 Russia and Europe: An Inquiry into the Cultural and Political Relations of the Slavs to the Germano-Latin World (Danilevsky), 363–364 Russia and Europe (Danilevsky), 1134 Russia-Belarus union, 1313 Russia Company, 1314 Russia in 1839 (Custine), 352–353 Russian Academy of Sciences, 6, 365

Russian All-Military Union (ROVS), 1693 Russian-American Company, 288, 1616 Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP), 350, 351, 1314–1315 Russian Banner (newspaper), 711 Russian Bible Society, 34 Russian-Chechen War, 233, 234, 234 Russian Communist Party, 161, 298 Russian corporations, 330–331 Russian culture Bulgaria, influence in, 184 Soviet era, 452–453 Russian ethnography, 467–471 Russian Far East, 481–482 Russian Federal Securities Commission, 1316, 1479 Russian Federation, 1316–1317 Baltic Fleet, 119–120 Buryatia, 188, 189 Central Bank of Russia, 220–221 Communist Party of the Russian Federation, 305–306 Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, 319 Constitution of 1993, 324–325 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty compliance, 327 Crimea, 339–340 Cyrillic alphabet, 825 economic policy, 531–532, 758 federalism, 488–489 Federal Securities Commission, 1479–1480 Federation treaties, 490–491 food tax, 1233 free speech, 712 Gaidar, Yegor Timurovich, 537–538 Gromov, Boris Vsevolodovich, 610 High Arbitration Court, 338 Kaliningrad, 717–718 Kasyanov, Mikhail Mikhailovich, 725–726 Khakass, 736–737 Kiriyenko, Sergei Vladilenovich, 758

F E D E R A T I O N

N

I N D E X

Koreans, 769 Kozyrev, Andrei Vladimirovich, 782–783 language policy, 825 Law on Property, 822 liberalism, 861 military, 932–933, 940–941 Moldova, relations with, 953 motion pictures, 977–978 Movement in Support of the Army, 979 near abroad, 1031–1032 October 1993 events, 1084–1086, 1085 Olympics, 1452 Our Home Is Russia party, 1126 Pakistan, relations with, 1131 Party of Russian Unity and Accord, 1143 People’s Party of Free Russia, 1161 political party system, 1200–1201 presidency, 1220 privatization, 1231, 1648 Procuracy, 1232 Production Sharing Agreement, 1234 Promstroibank Russia, 1489 railways, 1266–1267 Referendum of April 1993, 1277 Referendum of December 1993, 1277–1278 Russian Far East, 481–482 Russian Federal Securities Commission, 1316 Russian Movement for Democratic Reform (RMDR), 979 Russian National Unity Party, 1319 Russia’s Democratic Choice, 1329–1330 Russification, 1332 Rutskoi, Alexander Vladimirovich, 1337–1338 Rybkin, Ivan Petrovich, 1338–1339 Security Council, 1362–1363 Shakhrai, Sergei Mikhailovich, 1376–1377 shock therapy, 1034–1035, 1385 Shumeiko, Vladimir Filippovich, 1390–1391

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E N C Y C L O P E D I A

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1803

I N D E X

N

R U S S I A N

F O L K

Russian Federation (continued) Stepashin, Sergei Vadimovich, 1477 stock exchanges, 1479–1480 Supreme Court, 338–339 television and radio, 1528, 1530–1531 territorial-administrative units, 1534 transition economy, 1570 Turkey, relations with, 1587–1588 Union of Right Forces, 1606–1607 Unity Party, 1620 Vietnam, relations with, 1639 virtual economy, 1642 Women of Russia, 1671–1672 Yabloko, 1695–1696 Zyuganov, Gennady Andreyevich, 1734–1735 See also Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR); Specific leaders Russian folk orchestra, 510 Russian Geographical Society, 4, 461, 468, 656–657, 1317–1318 Russian Justice, 1318–1319 Russian Liberation Movement. See Vlasov Movement Russian mafia. See Organized crime Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, 96 Russian Movement for Democratic Reform (RMDR), 979 Russian Musical Society, 998 Russian National Unity Party, 1319 Russian Nights (Odoyevsky), 1098 Russian Orthodox Church, 1319–1321 administration, 316–317 Alexander III, 40 Alexandra, canonization of, 42 Alexei I, Patriarch, 43–44 Alexei II, Patriarch, 44 Alexei Nikolayevich, canonization of, 49–50 Anthony Khrapovitsky, Metropolitan, 64–65 Anthony Vadkovsky, Metropolitan, 65

O R C H E S T R A

antireligious policies, Soviet, 834–835 beard tax, 133 calendars, 196 chapbook literature, 227 church and state, 887 church councils, 259–260, 261, 1320 church law, 772 colonial expansion, 284–285 colonialism, 288 consistory, 316–317 Daniel, Metropolitan, 362–363 “Declaration of Loyalty,” 464 diet, 512 diocese, 395–396 Donation books, 408 Ecclesiastical Regulation, 639–640 Enlightener (Joseph of Volotsk), 707–708 episcopate, 463–464 famine relief, 269 Feast Books, 483 Filaret Drozdov, Metropolitan, 498 Filaret Romanov, Patriarch, 498–500 Godunov, loyal toward, 566 hagiography, 623–624 heresy, 712–713 Holy Synod, 639–640 Joakim, Patriarch, 706 Joseph of Volotsk, St., 707–708 Jubilee Bishops’ Council, 44 judicial matters, 316–317 Kormchaya Kniga, 772 Law Code of 1649, 830 Living Church Movement, 866–867 marriage and family, 475, 896, 898 metropolitans, 918–919 Muscovy, 982–983 nationalism, 1007 Neronov, Ivan, 1038 Nikon, Patriarch, 46–47 Old Belief, 104–105 organization, 395–396 Ottoman Empire, 37–38 over-procurator, office of, 640 patriarchate, 1147–1148

Petrov, Grigory Spiridonovich, 117 Polotsky, Simeon, 1201–1202 possessors and non-possessors, 1211–1212 printing, 532–533 Prokopovich, Feofan, 1235 Rasputin’s influence, 65 religious education reform, 498 Russians, 1324 saints, 1343–1344 semi-secularization of, 830 Sergei’s declaration of loyalty, 1369 sinodik, 1398 Slavophilism, 1405 Soloviev’s theology, 1423 sorokoust, 1429 static religious identity, 1282 statistics, 1284 Stefan Yavorsky, Metropolitan, 1476 Tikhon, canonization of, 1547 Tolstoy, Leo, 1559 Trinity, representation of the, 1309 Westernizers, 1663 woman lighting candles, 730 Zealots of Piety, 1721 See also Christianity; Church administration; Church reform; Holy Synod; Old Believers; Orthodoxy; Religion Russian Public Library, 996 Russian Revolution April Theses, 70 archives, 73 Babel, Isaac Emmanuyelovich, 109 Bashkirs, 126 Kerensky, Alexander, 734–735 Red Guards, 1274 Ukraine, 1602–1603 workers, role of, 813 World War I, 1681–1682 See also Civil War of 1917–1922; February Revolution; October Revolution of 1917; Revolution of 1905 Russians, 1321–1327 Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP), 307

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1804

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O F

R U S S I A N

H I S T O R Y

S A M O I L O V A ,

Russian Social Democratic People’s Party, 1161 Russian Social Democratic Workers Party (RSDWP) Bolshevik/Menshevik schism, 913–914, 1138, 1414 Bolshevism, 160 Dzerzhinsky, Felix Edmundovich, 422 Jewish Bund, 185–186 party congresses, 1138 Plekhanov, Georgy Valentinovich, 1186 See also Social Democratic Workers Party Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), 1327–1328 Congress of People’s Deputies, 315, 486 Constitution of 1918, 320 nationalities policy, 1012, 1016–1017 regionalism, 1280 Yeltsin’s presidency, 1707 See also Russian Federation Russian Space Agency, 1443 The Russians (Smith), 1436 Russian State Library, 1328–1329 Russian state school of historiography, 637–638 Russian style architecture, 72 Russian Technological Society, 657–658 Russian Telegraph Agency (ROSTA), 710, 1519 Russian Thought (journal), 710 Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, 1648 Russian Wealth (journal), 710 Russian Word (periodical), 710, 711, 1182 Russia’s Choice, 371–372, 538, 781 Russia’s Democratic Choice, 538, 1329–1330 Russification, 1330–1333 Estonia, 465–466 imperial era, 1007–1009 tsarist nationalities policy, 1022–1023 Russkaya Pravda, 752, 840 Russkoye Znamya (newspaper), 152 Russo-Japanese War, 1333–1334

K O N D O R D I Y A

Battle of Tsushima, 1581 Kuropatkin, Alexei Nikolayevich, 801–802 Makarov, Stepan Osipovich, 886 military reform, 934 Nicholas II, 1050–1051 Russian military, 931 Siege of Port Arthur, 1210 Treaty of Portsmouth, 700, 1210–1211 Russo-Persian Wars, 1335–1336 Russo-Swedish War, 1508 Russo-Turkish Wars, 1336–1337 Alexander II, 38, 39 Battle of Chesme, 246 Catherine II, 208 Congress of Berlin, 143–144 Kutuzov, Mikhail Ilarionovich, 804 Makarov, Stepan Osipovich, 886 naval blockade, 1027–1028 Obruchev, Nikolai Nikolayevich, 1082 Orlov, Grigory Grigorievich, 1117 Panslavism, 1134 Potemkin, Grigory Alexandrovich, 1214 Rumyantsev, Peter Alexandrovich, 1310 Skobelev, Mikhail Dmitriyevich, 1401 Three Emperors’ League, 1544 Treaty of Bucharest, 176 Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji, 793 Treaty of San Stefano, 1349–1350 Rust, Mathias, 1276 Ruthenians. See Carpatho-Rusyns Rutskoi, Alexander Vladimirovich, 1337, 1337–1338 October 1993 events, 1084 People’s Party of Free Russia, 1161 Yeltsin and, 1707–1708 Rybkin, Ivan Petrovich, 487, 1338–1339 Rybnikov, P. N., 508 Rykov, Alexei Ivanovich, 1339 party congresses, 1140 prime minister position, 1227 Right Opposition, 1289 show trial, 1389

N I K O L A Y E V N A

N

I N D E X

Ryleyev, Kondraty Fyodorovich, 1303, 1339–1340 Ryutin, Martemyan, 1340 Ryzhkov, Nikolai Ivanovich, 15, 580, 1340–1341

S Saburov, Maxim, 67–68 Sacraments, 1103 Sacred biographies, 623–624 Sacred music, 985 Safarik, Pavel Jozef, 1134 Saint-Léon, Arthur, 117 Saint-Martin, Claude, 521 Saints, 623, 1343–1344 Sajudis, 819, 865 Sakha and Yakuts, 1344, 1344–1345 Sakhalin, 700, 768 Sakharov, Andrei Dmitrievich, 1345–1346, 1346 Bonner and, 162–163 Chernobyl, 95 dissident movement, 399, 401 exile, 671, 672 glasnost, 560–561 Helsinki Watch, 632 Inter-Regional Deputies’ Group, 674, 675 Kovalev, friendship with, 781 liberalism, 861 Memorial, 912 Starovoitova and, 1461 Saltanov, Bogdan, 84 Salt trade, 1563–1564 Saltykov, Boris and Mikhail, 1301 Saltykov, Nikolai Ivanovich, 31 Saltykov-Shchedrin, Mikhail Yevgrafovich, 1346–1347 Salyut, 1442 Samara, 764–765, 1271–1272, 1477 Samarin, Yuri A., 25, 1406 Samborsky, Andrei, 31 Sami, 1347 Samizdat, 560, 671, 1347–1348, 1425 Samoilova, Kondordiya Nikolayevna, 1348–1349

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1805

I N D E X

N

S A M O U P R A V L E N I E

Samoupravlenie, 1349 Samsonov, Alexander, 1677 SAM-300 system, 1588 Sandinistas, 1045 San Stefano, Treaty of, 1349–1350 Saratov, 1271–1272, 1477 Sardou, Victorien, 775 Sargisian, Vazgen, 82 Sarmatians, 1350 Sarts, 1350–1351 Sarykamysh Operation, 1677 Sassanid dynasty, 79, 1513–1514 Satellites, 1440, 1452 Satire Akhundov, Mirza Fath Ali, 23–24 circus, 263 Krylov, Ivan Andreyevich, 792 Novikov, Nikolai Ivanovich, 1073–1074 Pelevin, Viktor Olegovich, 1158 Protazanov, Yakov Alexandrovic, 1239 Saltykov-Shchedrin, Mikhail Yevgrafovich, 1346–1347 Savaty, 1424 Savina, Maria, 1537 Savings Bank, 121, 1351 Savrasov, Alexei, 998 Sawr Revolution, 13 Sazonov, Sergei, 116 Sberbank, 121, 1351 Scandinavians Kievan Rus, 751 Normanist Controversy, 1060–1062 Novgorod, trade with, 1072 Vikings, 1639–1640 Schelling, Friedrich, 651, 652 Schlözer, August Ludwig, 637 Schwarz, Johann-Georg, 521 Science and technology conservation movement, 460–461 dialectical materialism, 6–7 The Enlightenment, 454 idealism, Stalin’s attack on, 7 Imperial Russian Technological Society, 657 Kosygin reform, 779 Lomonsov, Mikhail Vasilievich, 871–872 Medvedev, Zhores, 910–911

Mendeleyev, Dmitry, 913 Pallas, Peter-Simon, 1132–1133 Pavlov, Ivan Petrovich, 1151 poetry, scientific, 872 policy, 1351–1353 Popov, Alexander Stepanovich, 1206 religion and, 872–873 Russian Geographical Society, 1317 Tsiolkovsky, Konstantin Eduardovich, 1580–1581 Vavilov, Nikolai Ivanovich, 1633–1634 Zhukovsky, Nikolai Yegorovich, 1732 See also Academy of Sciences; Universities Science fiction, 1353–1354 Scientific socialism, 1354–1355 Scientific Technical Department, Supreme Economic Council, 1352 Scissors Crisis, 1355–1356, 1410–1411 Sculpture Admiralty, 11 gigantomania, 557 neoclassicism, 1037 Scythians, 1356 The Seagull (Chekhov), 236 Seclusion, female, 1532 Secondary schools, 437 Second economy, 1356–1358 Second International, 154 Second Opium War, 1157 Second secretary, 1358–1359 Second Turkish War, 928–929 Secretariat, 309–310, 1359 Secret police Beria, Lavrenti Pavlovich, 140–141 Gulag, 616 Katyn Forest massacre, 726–727 Secret Protocol, 1029–1031, 1195, 1198 Secret societies Chernyi Peredel, 669 Cyril and Methodius Society, 353–354 Narodnaya Volya, 669 Northern Society, 367, 981, 1339–1340

Petrashevtsy, 1176–1177 Southern Society, 367 Union of Salvation, 367 Union of Welfare, 367 Zemlya i Volya, 669 See also Decembrist movement; Freemasonry “Secret Speech” (Khruschev), 348–349, 388, 643, 746–747 Sectarianism, 1359–1362 Secularization, 956 Security, state, 1445, 1468–1473 Security Council, 1362–1363 Security police, 1733–1734 Seignorial serfs, 1368 Seimas, 819 Selected Passages from My Correspondence with Friends (Gogol), 569 Seleznev, Gennady, 487 Self-dekulakization, 794 Self-determination, 269–270, 1000, 1010–1011 See also Independence; Nationalism Selfhood, 112 Selivanov, Kondraty, 1360 Semenov, Nikolai Nikolayevich, 7 Semenovsky Guards Regiment, 613 Semenovsky Life Guard Regiment, 1218 Semenov-Tian-Shansky, Venyamin, 461 Semiarid Continental climate, 272 Senate, 786, 840, 1169 Seniority system, 408–409 September 11 attacks, 1256 Serafim of Sarov, 1448 Serapion Brothers, 492, 1363–1364 Serbia, 1364–1365 Akkerman Convention, 24 Austria-Hungary, conflict with, 556 Balkan Wars, 115–116 Montenegro, 961 Yugoslavia, creation of, 1714, 1715 Serednyaki, 1365–1366 Serfdom, 1366–1369 agriculture, 17, 18 barshchina, 124 country estates, 337 dvorianstvo, 419–420

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1806

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O F

R U S S I A N

H I S T O R Y

S H U V A L O V ,

economic aspects, 426–427, 448 enserfment, 455–459, 830 forbidden years, 456 fugitives, 457 obrok, 1081 peasant uprisings, 1155–1156 reform, 602, 1048 serfs, 1367, 1368 slavery’s impact on, 1403, 1404 soul tax, 458 St. George’s Day, 456 See also Peasantry Serfdom, abolition of agrarian reform, 17 censorship reform, 217 dvorianstvo, 420 economic effects, 426–427, 434 family structure, 897–898 migration, 921 Milyutin’s support of, 943 nationalism, 1006 peasants’ status after, 1154 redemption payments, 1273–1274 service state, 1372 stages, 1368 See also Emancipation Act Sergei, Patriarch, 464, 1148, 1369 Sergius, St., 955, 1369–1371, 1370, 1572 Sermon on Law and Grace (Hilarion), 635 Sermons, 355, 635 Service class, 456–457, 1204–1205, 1509 Service state, 1371–1373 Servitude economy, 603–604 manifesto of Peter III, 1174 Peter I, 1171 Settlement and settlers geography of, 546 German settlers, 554–555 Jews, 701–703 Russian Far East, 481 Siberia, 1391–1392 Sevastopol, 344, 1373–1374 Seventh-Day Adventists, 1361 Seven-Year Plan, 1374 Seven Years’ War, 447, 1174, 1374–1375

Sevruga caviar, 215 Seward, William H., 28 Shafirov, Pyotr, 1372 Shahumian, Stepan Georgievich, 1375–1376 Shakhmatov, Alexei, 255 Shakhrai, Sergei Mikhailovich, 1143, 1376–1377 Shakhty trial, 1377, 1377–1378 Shamanism, 189, 471, 739 Shamil, 1378–1379 Avars, 102 Caucasian Wars, 211–212, 214 Chechnya, 233–234 Dagestan, 361 Shaposhnikov, Boris Mikhailovich, 1379 Shatalin, Stanislav Sergeyevich, 15, 432, 1379–1380 Shcharansky, Anatoly Nikolayevich, 1380 Shchedrin, Feodosy, 11 Shchepkin, Mikhail Semeonovich, 1381, 1537 Shcherbatov, Mikhail Mikhailovich, 1381 Shcherbytsky, Volodymyr, 1604 Shchusev, Alexei V., 849 Shein, M. B., 1409 Shekhtel, Fyodor, 72 Shelekhov, Grigroy, 27 Shemyaka, Dmitry, 128, 265–266 Shepilov, Dmitry, 67–68 Shervud, Vladimir, 72 Sheshkovsky, Stepan, 1469 Shevardnadze, Eduard Amvrosievich, 1382, 1382–1383 August 1991 Putsch, 96 Georgia, 551 Gromyko, replacement of, 579 Japan, relations with, 700 Lukyanov, criticism of, 878 Persian Gulf War, 1166–1167 Shevchenko, Arkady, 370 Shevchenko, Taras Gregorevich, 1383–1384 Cyril and Methodius Society, 353, 354 intelligentsia, 669 Panslavism, 1134 Ukraine, 1602

I V A N

N

I N D E X

Shevtsova, Lilia, 375 Shishkin, Ivan, 998 Shishkov, Alexander, 824 Shlyapnikov, Alexander Gavrilovich, 1384–1385, 1675 Shock therapy, 1034–1035, 1385–1386 Shockworkers, 1386 Sholokhov, Mikhail Alexandrovich, 1386–1387 Short Course, 1387–1388 Shostakovich, Dmitri Dmitrievich, 370, 1388 Show trials, 1248, 1388–1389 Daniel, Yuli Markovich, 363 dissidents, 400–401 engineers, 1352 Great Purges, as beginning point of the, 1249 Kamenev, Lev Borisovich, 721 Kaplan, Fanya, 723 Pytatkov, Georgy Leonidovich, 1257 Radek, Karl Bernardovich, 1263 Radischev, Alexander Nikolayevich, 1264 Rykov, Alexei Ivanovich, 1339 Shakhty trial, 1377, 1377–1378 Sinyavsky, Andrei, 363 Sinyavsky-Daniel Trial, 1399–1400 Vyshinsky, prosecutor, 1654–1655 Yagoda, Genrikh Grigorevich, 1696–1697 Zinoviev, Grigory Yevseyevich, 1733 Shternberg, Lev, 469–470 Shuisky, Vasily Ivanovich, 1389–1390 Bolotnikov and, 159 Dmitry Mikhailovich and, 404 Filaret Romanov and, 499 Time of Troubles, 1549, 1550–1551 Shukhov, Vladimir, 72 Shumeiko, Vladimir Filippovich, 1390–1391 Shumsky, Olexandr, 165 Shumyatsky, Boris, 443 Shushkevich, Stanislav, 136–138 Shuvalov, Ivan, 3

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1807

I N D E X

N

S H U V A L O V ,

Shuvalov, Peter, 143–144, 1469 Siberia, 1391–1393 Allied intervention, 53 Buryats, 188–189 colonists, 285 deportations, 384–386 expansionism, 19–20 exploration, 142, 392, 736 hard labor, 618 inorodtsy, 664–665 Khakass, 736–737 Khanty, 737–738 Koryaks, 775–776 Kropotkin, Pyotr Alexeyevich, 789 Lake Baikal, 817 Moskvitin, Ivan Yurievich, 972 nationalities policy, 1019 Nenets, 1035–1036 oil pipeline, 701 regionalism, 1280 Tuva and Tuvinians, 1593, 1593–1594 Yermak, Timofeyevich, 1710 Siege of Leningrad, 846–847, 985 Siege of Port Arthur, 1210 Sigismund II, 797–798, 868 Sigtuna Doors of Cathedral of St. Sophia, 202, 203 Sikorsky, Igor Ivanovich, 103, 1393 Silentium (Tyutchev), 1595 Silver, 1072 Silver Age, 1393–1397 Silvestr, 1224 Simeon, 1397 Simeon Bekbulatovich, 690 Simeonov chronicle, 255 Simon of Vladimir-Suzdal, 750 Simonov, Konstantin Mikhailovich, 1077, 1397–1398 Simonov Monastery, 1398 “Sinews of Peace” speech (Churchill), 677–678 Singers, 1655–1656, 1656 Sinodik, 1398–1399 Sinope, Battle of, 1399 Sinyavsky, Andrei intelligentsia, 671 samizdat, 1348 show trial, 363, 1399–1400 socialist realism, 1417

P E T E R

Sinyavsky-Daniel Trial, 1399–1400 Skaz, 856, 1400 Sklarska Poreba conference, 301–302 Skobelev, Mikhail Dmitriyevich, 1400–1401 Skokov, Yuri, 316, 1362 Skorpion Publishing House, 175 Skrypnyk, Mykola Oleksyovych, 1401–1402 Slansky, Rudolf, 358 Slave Life (Ivanov), 1403 Slavery, 340, 1367–1368, 1402–1404, 1403 Slavery Chancellery, 1403–1404 Slavic paganism, 1128–1129 Slavo-Greco-Latin Academy, 843, 1404–1405 Slavonic Bible, 533 Slavophilism and Slavophiles, 1405–1407 Aksakov, Ivan, 24–25 Aksakov, Konstantin, 25 cultural and political development, 652 Danilevsky, Nikolai, 363–364 historiography, 638 intelligentsia, 668 Khomyakov, Alexei Stepanovich, 742–743 Kireyevsky, Ivan Vasilievich, 755–757 narodnost, 1025 nationalism, 1005–1006, 1099 Odoevsky, Vladimir Fyodorovich, 1098 Romanticism, 1303 Witte, Sergei, 1670 See also Panslavism Slavs, 693–694 SLON, 616 Slovakia, 359 Slovo o polku Igoreve, 831–832 Slowacki, Juliusz, 1005 Slutsky, Boris Abromovich, 1407 Slutsky, Yevgeny Yevgenievich, 1407–1408 The Slynx (Tolstaya), 1555–1556 Small Horde, 729–731 Smallpox, 207 Smidovich, Sofia, 1727 Smirdin, Alexander Filippovich, 709

Smirnov, Igor, 953 Smith, Hedrick, 1436 Smolensk, 1303–1304 Smolensk Archive, 1408 Smolensk War, 91, 1408–1409 Smolny Convent, 71 Smolny Institute, 1409–1410 Smychka, 1410–1411 Sobchak, Anatoly Alexandrovich, 1254, 1411, 1411–1412, 1485 Sobornost, 743 Sobornoye ulozhenie. See Law Code of 1649 The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World (Rostovtsev), 1304 Social class. See Class system Social control, 311, 438 Social criticism, 223–224, 1182 Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPiL), 422 Social Democratic Party Osipovich, Martov, 901–902 Social Democratic Workers Party, 1412–1413 Shlyapnikov, Alexander Gavrilovich, 1384 Social Democrats Comintern’s policy, 303 industrialization, 1412 Jewish Bund, 185–186 Russian Federation, 1200 Socialist Revolutionaries’ challenge, 1420 Spark, 711 Social evolution, 297, 393–394, 497, 631 Socialism, 1413–1415 alcoholism, 29 communism, as first stage of, 297–298 Danilevsky, Nikolai Yakovlevich, 363–364 developed socialism, 390–392 dialectic materialism, 393–394 dictatorship of the proletariat, 394 economism, 432 Engels, Friedrich, 453–454 February Revolution, 484 fellow travelers, 492

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

1808

E N C Y C L O P E D I A

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R U S S I A N

H I S T O R Y

S O V I E T

Hegelian theory, 631 intelligentsia, 669 labor theory of value, 816 market socialism, 895 nationalism, 450 Novosibrisk Report, 1075 Permanent Revolution, 1165 Provisional Government, 485 scientific socialism, 1354–1355 workers’ control, 1674 See also Communism; Marxism; Marxism-Leninism Socialism in one country, 1414, 1415 Socialist Academy. See Communist Academy Socialist realism, 1415–1419 Alexandrov, Grigory Alexandrovich, 43 music, 986 Novy Mir, 1077 Prokofiev, Sergei Sergeyevich, 1234 Stasov, Vladimir Vasilievich, 1462–1463 theater, 1538–1539 Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 1639 The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination (Lenin), 1011 Socialist Revolutionaries-International. See Left Socialist Revolutionaries Socialist Revolutionary Party, 1419–1421 Chernov, Viktor Mikhailovich, 242 Civil War of 1917–1922, 266–267 Committee of the Constituent Assembly (KOMUCH), 761, 764 elections of 1917, 318 Kaplan, Fanya, 722–723 People’s Will, 1162 Provisional Government, 485 socialism, 1413–1414 terrorism, 1470 See also Left Socialist Revolutionaries Socialist Unity Party, 553, 1339 Socialized medicine, 629 Social mobility, 440

Social philosophy, 855–856 Social reform, 540 Social transformation, 834–835 Society for the Love of Wisdom, 875–876, 1098, 1190 Society for the Restoration of Leninist Principles, 609 Society for the Spread of Literacy among the Georgians, 551 Society for the Upbringing of Noble Girls. See Smolny Institute Society of Friends of Natural History, Anthropology, and Ethnography (OLEAE), 469 Society of Salvation, 1168 Society of Welfare, 1168 Sociology, 923–924 Sodruzhestvo sotsialisticheskikh gosudarstv. See Communist bloc Sofia Alexeyevna, 744, 910 Soil, 1189 Sokolov, Lukian Petrov, 1361 Sokolovsky, Vasily Danilovich, 1421–1422 Solari, Pietro Antonio, 785–786 “Soldiers’ children,” 197 Solidarity Movement, 280, 1195–1196, 1422 Soloviev, Mikhail, 138–139 Soloviev, Sergei Mikhailovich, 5, 638, 1468 Soloviev, Vladimir Sergeyevich, 138, 652, 1417, 1422–1424 Solovki Monastery, 1424 Solzhenitsyn, Alexander Isayevich, 1424–1427, 1425 deportation, 671, 672 de-Stalinization, 388 dissident movement, 399–401 Novy Mir, 1078 Somalia, 466–467 Song. See Music Son of the Fatherland (newspaper), 710 Sophia, 692, 1427–1428, 1428, 1489 Sophia First Chronicle, 255 Sophia Second Chronicle, 256 Sophia Slekseyevna, 575 Sophiology, 182 Sorge, Richard, 1428–1429 Sorokoust, 1429–1430

E N T E R P R I S E

N

I N D E X

Sorsky, Nil, 707 Soskovets, Oleg Nikolayevich, 1430 Soslovie, 1430–1432 Sosstatizdat, 223 Sotsialistichesky vestnik (newspaper), 902 Soul tax, 458, 811, 1367, 1432–1433, 1522 South Africa, 1451 Southern Society, 367 South Korea, 769 Sovereignty Brezhnev Doctrine, 169–170 republics’ independence, 1280 Union of Sovereign States, 1607–1608 Union Treaty, 1612–1613 Sovetsky Sport (newspaper), 1450 Soviet, 1433 Soviet-American Trade Bill, 697 Soviet breakup causes, 453 communism and, 299 communist bloc, 301 democratization, 375 economic policy, 294 Great Britain, relations with, 600 Lithuania, 167–168 Malta Summit, 890–891 nationalities policy, 1016–1017 perestroika, 1164–1165 ruble zone, 1309–1310 state bank, 221 Union of Sovereign States, 1607–1608 Union Treaty, 1607–1608, 1612–1613 Soviet Constitution of 1918, 271 Soviet Criminal Code, Article 58, 617 Soviet enterprise, 459–460 economic ministries, 946–947 full economic accounting, 526–527 glavki, 562 khozraschet, 744–745 Kosygin reform, 779–780 Law of the State Enterprise, 1467 material balances, 904–905 petty tutelage, 1178 production output, 626

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

E N C Y C L O P E D I A

O F

R U S S I A N

H I S T O R Y

1809

I N D E X

N

S O V I E T

E R A

Soviet enterprise (continued) ratchet effect, 1270–1271 samoupravlenie, 1349 state orders, 1467–1468 techpromfinplan, 1526–1527 trade, 516–517 value subtraction, 1631 Soviet era Abkhazia, 2 abortion, 2–3 Academy of Arts, 3 Academy of Sciences, 6–8 adult education, 440 Aeroflot, 12 Afghanistan, invasion of, 940, 971, 1129–1130 Afghanistan, relations with, 13–14 agrarian reform, 17 Alash Orda, 26 alcoholism, 29 alcohol monopoly, 31 Aliyev, Heidar, 51 architecture, 72 archives, 73–74 Armenia, 80–81 Artek, 88–89 assortment plans, 91–92 atomic energy, 93–95 Austrian/Soviet relations, 101 autonomous republics, 1012 aviation, 103 Azerbaijan, 106–107 babi bunty, 110 Baikal-Amur Magistral Railway (BAM), 110–111 ballet, 119 banking system, 120–121 Bashkortostan, 126–127 Basmachis, 129–130 Belarus, 136 Belovezh Accords, 137–138 Bessarabia, 146 Birobidzhan, 149–150 black market, 152–153 Bolshoi Theater, 162 Brezhnev Doctrine, 169–170 Bulgaria, 183, 184–185 Cabinet of Ministers, 195 Cadres policy, 195–196

Carpatho-Rusyns, 199 Catholicism, 209–210 Caucasus, 214 Central Asia, 219–220 Chechnya, 234 Cherkess, 237 Chernobyl, 95, 238–240 chervonets, 245 China, relations with, 248–249 The Chronicle of Current Events (periodical), 253–254, 254 circus, 263–264 class system, 271–272 colonialism, 289–290 commissars, 293–294 communist bloc, 300–301 Constitutional Court, 318 Constitution of 1936, 322 cosmopolitanism, 331–332 Cossacks, 334 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), 334–335 Council of Ministers, 335–336 Crimean Tatars, 341 Cuba, relations with, 347–348 Czechoslovakia, relations with, 358 “Declaration of Loyalty,” 464 defectors, 369–370 democratization, 373–375 demographic data, 377 demographic trends, 378–379 Denmark, relations with, 383 deportations, 385–386 developed socialism, 390–392 disenfranchised persons, 397–398 dissident movement, 398–402 economic bureaucracy, 186–188 economic growth, 428–431, 429, 658 economic ministries, 946–947 education, 440–441 electricity grids, 444–445 empire, 449–453 environmentalism, 461–462 ethnography, 470 extensive economic growth, 425–426 Family Code of 1926, 474 family law, 475–477 Ferghana Valley, 496–497

feudalism, historians’ claims of, 497 Finland, relations with, 501–503 folklore, 508–509 folk music, 510 food, 513 food tax, 1232–1233 foreign debt, 513–514 foreign policy, 865–866 France, relations with, 518–520 full economic accounting, 526–527 fund holders, 511 gender equality poster, 494 general secretary, 542 genocidal policies, 545 Georgia, 551 Georgian Orthodox Church, 552 gigantomania, 557 glavki, 562 goods famine, 577 Greece, relations with, 605–606 guards regiments, 613–614 Gulag, 616–618 health care services, 629 Helsinki Accords, 632 hired labor prohibition, 816 ideological power, 450, 453 immigration and emigration, 656 indicative planning, 658–659 industrialization, 660, 663–664 Institute of Red Professors, 666–667 intensive economic growth, 428 Inter-Regional Deputies’ Group, 674–675 Iran, relations with, 675 Islam, 682–683 Israel, relations with, 684 Izvestiya, 694–695 Japan, relations with, 699–700 Jewish persecution, 1002 Kazakhstan, 731–732 Korea, relations with, 769, 770 korenizatsya, 771–772, 1001 Kosygin reforms, 779–780 kulturnost, 796–797 labor, 813–814 labor books, 814–815 land tenure, 821–823 language policy, 452, 825

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

1810

E N C Y C L O P E D I A

O F

R U S S I A N

H I S T O R Y

S O V I E T

Latvia, 827–828 Law of the State Enterprise, 1467 League of the Militant Godless, 834–835 legal system, 841–842 Leningrad Affair, 845–846 Lithuania, 819, 863–865 Living Church Movement, 866–867 local government administration, 871 Lubyanka, 877 Machine Tractor Stations, 883–884 Main Political Directorate, 885 map, 451 marriage and family, 899–901 material balances, 904–905 Material Product System (MPS), 905 media, 1528–1530 migration, 921 military, 936–941, 939 military administration, 10 military art, 925–926 military doctrine, 926 military-economic planning, 927 military expenditures, 431 military intelligence, 934 military reform, 936 Ministry of Foreign Trade, 947 Ministry of Internal Affairs, 948 modernization, 451–452 monasticism, 956 monetary overhang, 957, 959 monetary system, 957–960 Mordvins, 961 Morozov murder, 963–964 Moscow, 965 motion pictures, 973–977 movies, 43 nationalism, 1000–1003 nationalities policies, 1010–1018 nation building, 450–451 net material product (NMP), 1039–1040 New Political Thinking, 1042–1043 newspapers, 1044 nomenklatura, 1059, 1358, 1478–1479

Northern Peoples, 1066–1067 Novocherkassk uprising, 1074–1075 Novosibrisk Report, 1075, 1720 Novy Mir, 1077–1078 Old Believers, 1105 organized labor recruitment, 8 Orgburo, 1116 Orthodoxy, 1121 Pakistan, relations with, 1130 party congresses, 1136–1142 passport system, 921, 1143–1144, 1472 People’s Commissariat of Nationalities, 1158–1159 People’s Control Committee, 1159–1160 petty tutelage, 1178 photography, 1179–1180 plannes’ preferences, 1183 plenum, 1186–1187 Poland, relations with, 1194–1196 polar exploration, 1197 Popular Front policy, 1207–1208 population losses, 378 Pravda, 1216–1218 Presidential Council, 1221 Presidium of Supreme Soviet, 1221–1222, 1222 Primary Party Organization (PPO), 1226 prime minister, 1226–1227 primordial view of nations, 1013–1014, 1026–1027 prisons, 1229–1230 Procuracy, 1232 prodrazverstka, 1233 prostitution, 1238 Rabkrin, 1262 raionirovanie, 1268 Referendum of March 1991, 1278–1279 refuseniks, 1279 regionalization, 1268 religion, 1282–1283 repressed inflation, 1285–1286 Romania, 1294 Russia and the Soviet empire, 452–453 Russian culture, 452–453

E R A

N

I N D E X

Russian nationalism, 1001–1002 Russian Orthodox Church, 43–44, 44, 1321 Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), 1327–1328 Russification, 1331–1332 samizdat, 560, 671, 1347–1348, 1425 science and technology policy, 1351–1353 science fiction, 1354 Scissors Crisis, 1355–1356, 1410–1411 second economy, 1356–1358 second secretary, 1358–1359 Secretariat, 1359 secret police, 140–141 sectarianism, 1361–1362 service state, 1373 Seven-Year Plan, 1374 shockworkers, 1386 Slavophilism, 1406 socialist realism, 1415–1419 Soviet-American Trade Bill, Jackson-Vanik Amendment, 697 soviets, 1433 Soyuz faction, 1439–1440 special purpose forces, 1444–1445 sports policy, 1448–1452 St. Petersburg, 1484–1485 state committees, 1464–1465 State Defense Committee (GKO), 1466–1467 state finance, 959 state security, 1472–1473 stiliagi, 1478–1479 Stroibank, 1489 stukach, 1491 subway systems, 1492–1493 succession of leadership, 1494 Supreme Soviet, 1500–1501, 1501 taxation, 1523–1524 techpromfinplan, 460, 1526–1527 teleological planning, 1527–1528 territorial-administrative units, 1533 three-field system, 1545 totalitarianism terminology, 1561–1562 tourism, 1562–1563 trade, 516–517, 1564

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

E N C Y C L O P E D I A

O F

R U S S I A N

H I S T O R Y

1811

I N D E X

N

S O V I E T - F I N N I S H

Soviet era (continued) trusts, 1577–1578 Turkey, relations with, 1587 turnover tax, 1523–1524, 1525 Twenty-Five Thousanders, 1594 Union of Socialist Republics, 1608–1609 United Nations, 1614 United States, relations with, 1618–1619 universities, 1623 Vietnam, relations with, 1638–1639 Vilnius, 1640–1641 virgin lands program, 1641–1642 wages, 1657–1658 Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), 1661–1662 women’s status, 899, 1323 Yugoslavia, relations with, 1714–1715 zagotovka, 1719–1720 zhensovety, 1728–17229 See also Censorship; Cold War; Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU); Dissidents; Economic planning; Soviet enterprise; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; Specific leaders Soviet-Finnish War, 1433–1435, 1434 Soviet General Staff, 1100 Soviet Germans, 656 Soviet-German Trade Agreement of 1939, 1435–1436 Soviet Ground Forces, 1632 Soviet Land Code, 821 Soviet man, 1436 Soviet narod, 1027 Soviet of People’s Commissars (SNK), 293 Soviet-Polish War, 1436–1437 Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, 713 Soviet State Price Committee, 1285 Soviet Transcauscasian Federation, 80 Soviet trusts, 1577–1578 Sovkhoz, 1437–1438 Sovnarkhozy, 779–780, 1438–1439 Sovnarkom, 1439, 1470 Sovremennik, 1539

W A R

Soyuz, 1442, 1443 Soyuz faction, 1439–1440 Soyuz-TM rocket, 1441 Space program, 1440–1443 Gagarin, Yuri Alexeyevich, 535–536 International Space Station, 673–674 Mir space station, 949–951, 950 Russian-U.S. collaboration, 673–674 Soyuz-TM rocket, 1441 Sputnik, 171, 1452 Tsiolkovsky’s influence, 1580–1581 Space shuttle, U.S., 950 Spain Popular Front, 1208 Spanish Civil War, 1443–1444 Spanish Civil War, 1443–1444 Spark (periodical), 711 Spartakiads, 1449 Special Commission on Alcoholism and the Means for Combating It, 29 Special purpose forces, 1444–1445 Speculation, economic, 153 Speransky, Mikhail Mikhailovich, 33, 841, 1445–1446 Speshnev, Nikolai, 1177 Spiridonova, Maria Alexandrovna, 1446–1447, 1447 Spiritual Christianity, 1360–1361 Spiritual elders, 1447–1448 Spiritualism, 1083 Spiritual Regulation (Peter I), 316 Sportsman’s Sketches (Turgenev), 569 Sports policy, 971, 1448–1452 Sputnik, 171, 1440, 1452 St. George’s Day, 456, 1366 St. Isaac’s Cathedral, 72 St. Petersburg, 1483–1486, 1484 Admiralty, 10–11 architecture, 71, 72 ballet, 117–118 banks, 122 factory workers, 812 Maryinsky Theater, 162 National Library of Russia, 996–997 Peter I, 1170–1171

Sobchak, Anatoly, 1411–1412 Union of Struggle for the Emancipation of Labor, 1611 Winter Palace, 1667–1669 St. Petersburg Bulletin (newspaper), 708, 710 St. Petersburg Clean Baltic Coalition, 463 St. Petersburg Gazette (newspaper), 711 St. Sergius Theological Academy, 182 Stage entertainers, 1265 Stagnation, 1419 Stakhanovite movement, 1452–1453 Stalin, Josef Vissarionovich, 1455–1459, 1456, 1457, 1687 Academy of Sciences, 6–7 agricultural production, 1153 Ajars, 20 alcoholism, position on, 29 anti-Semitism, 1014–1015 archives, 73–74 ascent to power, 787 autarky, 516 Battle of Moscow, 970 Beria, relationship with, 140 Berlin blockade, 143 Bolshevism, 160–162 Bukharin’s criticism of, 179 cadres policy, 195 censorship, 218 Central Control Commission, 222 Chapayev, 227 children of, 1458 Chkalov’s death, 251 Churchill, rebuke of, 677–678 Church of Christ the Savior, demolition of, 200 Cold War, 274–276 collective farms, 17, 19, 281–282 collectivization of agriculture, 284 Constitution of 1936, 321 cult of personality, 348–349, 388, 1456, 1458 Cultural Revolution, 350–351 daughter of, 54 death, 54 deportations, 220, 386 dialectic materialism, 394

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

1812

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O F

R U S S I A N

H I S T O R Y

S T A T E

dictatorship of the proletariat, 395 disenfranchised persons, 397 Doctors’ Plot, 404–405 economic policy, 1658 education policy, 441 famine of 1932–1933, 479 Five-Year Plans, 505–506 forced industrialization, 661–662, 663 foreign policy, 301–302 Frunze, death of, 526 general secretary position, 542 genocidal policies, 545 Germany, relations with, 556–557 goods famine, 577 Grain Crisis of 1928, 593–594 Grand Alliance, 597 Great Britain, relations with, 599 Gulag, 616–617 health care services, 629 Hitler, relationship with, 1685 industrialization, 1355 intelligentsia, 671 Izvestiya, 694 Kalinin and, 718–719 Kaliningrad, 717 Kamenev, arrest and execution of, 720–721 Katyn Forest massacre, 727 Khrushchev’s Secret Speech, 747 Kirov, murder of, 759 Konev, support of, 766 kulaks, liquidation of the, 794–795 Kuybyshev’s support of, 805 Kuznetsov, removal and reinstatement of, 806 League of Nations, 834 legacy, 1459 legal system, 841–842 Lenin and, 308, 349 Lenin’s Testament, 848 Lysenko’s role in administration, 881 Malenkov’s role in administration, 889 military strategy, 1687–1689 Molotov, relationship with, 954 Moscow Art Theater, 967 motion pictures, 975

C O M M I T T E E

O N

C O N S T R U C T I O N

nationalism, 1010 nationalities policy, 1012–1015, 1026, 1158–1159 Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939, 1030 opera, 1109 Ordzhonikidze, relationship with, 1114 party congresses, 1138–1141 party domination, 307–308 patriarchate, 1148 People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD)9, 84 People’s Commissariat of Nationalities, 1158–1159 Pokrovsky, relationship with, 1192 Politburo, 1199 post-World War II policies, 1691 Potsdam Conference, 1215–1216 prime minister position, 1227 purge of the officer corps, 938 Right Opposition, 1289 Russian culture and the republics, 451–452 Russian nationalism, 1002 Russian Orthodox Church, 1321 Ryutin’s opposition to, 1340 Shakhty trial, 1377–1378 Short Course, 1387 show trials, 1388–1389 socialism, 1414, 1975 socialism in one country, 1415, 1675–1676 South Korea, attack on, 769, 770 Spanish Civil War, 1443–1444 State Defense Committee (GKO), 1466 succession of leadership, 1015, 1494 Tehran Conference, 1527 Tito, relationship with, 302, 1714–1715 Trotsky’s opposition to, 1575–1576 Tukhachevsky, relationship with, 1584 United Opposition, 1615 Vasilevsky’s military advice, 1633 Voroshilov, relationship with, 1650 Voznesensky, relationship with, 1652 war economy, 1660

N

I N D E X

war mobilization, 1683–1685, 1688 White Sea Canal construction, 1666 wife’s death, 1456 World War II military operations, 938–940 Yagoda, arrest of, 1696–1697 Yalta Conference, 1698, 1698–1699, 1699 Yugoslav relations, 302 zhdanovshchina, 1146 Zhdanov’s role in administration, 1724–1725 Zhukov’s role in administration, 1730–1731 Zinoviev, relationship with, 720, 1732–1733 Stalin, Nikolai Ivanovich, 1712–1713 Stalin Constitution. See Constitution of 1936 Stalingrad, Battle of, 1293, 1453–1455, 1454 Stalinism Andreyeva, Nina Alexandrovna, 60–61 Krushchev’s attack on, 67–68 Malenkov, Georgy, 889–890 North Korea, 770 Stanislav (Poland), 1193 Stanislavsky, Konstantin Sergeyevich, 919, 966–968, 1460, 1537 Starovoitova, Galina Vasilievna, 1460–1461, 1461 Stasov, Vladimir Vasilievich, 920, 1462–1463 Stasova, Yelena Dmitrievna, 1462 The State and Anarchy (Bakunin), 114 State and Revolution (Lenin), 853 State Archival Fond, 73–74 State Bank (Gosbank), 120–121, 187, 221, 587–588 State capitalism, 1463–1464 State Commission for Electrification of Russia (GOELRO), 444 State Commission on Economic Reform, 431–432 State Committee for Statistics, 589 State Committee on Construction, 188

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

E N C Y C L O P E D I A

O F

R U S S I A N

H I S T O R Y

1813

I N D E X

N

S T A T E

C O M M I T T E E

State Committee on Labor and Wages, 188 State Committee on Prices, 187–188 State Committee on Science and Technology, 188 State Committee on Standards, 188 State committees, 1464–1465 State Council, 527–528, 1465–1466 State Defense Committee, 1466–1467, 1625, 1687–1688 State Duma. See Duma State Enterprise, Law of the, 1467 State farm. See Sovkhoz State finances Alexander II, 1281–1282 Soviet era, 959 State Hermitage Museum, 1668 The State in Future Society (Lavrov), 1209 State Institute for Social Hygiene, 29 State on the Inorodtsy, 664 State orders, 1349, 1467–1468 State Political Administration, 616, 948, 1471–1472 State principle, 1468 State Property Committee, 489 State school of historiography, 637–638 State security, 1468–1473 Lefortovo, 836–837 Ministry of Internal Affairs, 948 Plehve, Vyacheslav Konstantinovich, 1185–1186 temporary regulations, 1531 Yagoda, Genrikh Grigorevich, 1696 Yezhov, Nikolai Ivanovich, 1712–1713 Statistical analysis, 1407–1408 Statistics Abkhazians, 2 Adyge, 11 Aeroflot-Russian International Airlines, 12–13 Afghanistan, foreign aid to, 13 Afghanistan, war in, 13–74 Ajars, 20 alcohol revenue, 30 Armenians, expulsion of, 990 Avars, 102 Baku, 113

O N

L A B O R

A N D

Balkars, 117 banks, 121, 122 Bashkirs, 126 Battle of Balaklava, 115 Battle of Kulikovo Field, 796 Battle of Poltava, 1203 Battle of Stalingrad, 1455 Battle of Tannenberg, 1516 Bukhara population, 177 Bulgarian employment, 183 Bulgarian religions, 183 Buryats, 188 Catholicism, 209 chancellery clerks, 1189 Chechen demographic losses, 235 Chuvash, 262 collective farms, 282–283 Communist Party of the Soviet Union membership, 312 Constitutional Democratic Party membership, 319 corporations, 331 Crimean population, 339 Dagestan, 361 deportations, 385–386 disenfranchised persons, 397–398 Dniester Moldovan Republic, 1568 Dungans, 417 economic growth, 425, 426, 427 education, 438, 1324 electricity, 444, 445 emigration, 921–922 Estonia, 464–465 ethnicity, 1018 famine of 1891-1892, 477 famine of 1921-1922, 478 famine of 1932-1933, 479, 480 famine of 1946, 481 Finns and Karelians, 503 forced laborers in Siberia, 1392 foreign investment, 427–428 funded commodities, 528 Gagauz population, 537 Georgia and Georgians, 548 Gostinaya sotnya, 591 grain prices, 596–597 grain procurements, 480 grain production, 1641 grain trade, 594 Great Purges, 1250

W A G E S

Greeks, 606–607 gross domestic product, 425, 433 gulag, 616–618 gypsies, 620 health care personnel, 628 illiteracy rates, 427 Interior Troops (VV), 948 Jewish emigration, 697, 1279 Jews, 701 Kabardians, 715 Kalmyks, 719 Karachai, 723 Kazakhs, 732 khutor, 750 Kiev, population of, 755 Komi, 764 Koreans, 768–769 Koryaks, 776 kulak deportation, 795 labor, 812 Latvia population, 828 lend lease weapons and equipment, 845 Lezgins, 857 literacy, 436–437, 438, 571 Lithuania, 863 Machine Tractor Stations, 883 Mansi, 893 Mari, 894 Meskhetian Turks, 917 migration, 921–922 military industrial complex, 933 monasticism, 956 Mordvins, 961 Moscow population, 965 Nagorno-Karabakh, 989 nomenklatura, 1059 organized crime, 1114 organized labor recruitment, 8 Osetin population, 1122 peasant population, 1154 Poles, 1198 Poles, execution of, 727 Polish, repression of the, 727 population by age and sex, 2002, 376 postal system, 1213 prisons, 1229 Protestants, 1240 purge of the officer corps, 938

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

1814

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H I S T O R Y

S U C C E S S I O N

Putin, election of, 1317 railways, 1266 Referendum of April 1993, 1278 Referendum of December 1993, 1278 Referendum of March 1991, 1278 religion, 1282, 1283, 1284 Russian Federation population, 1321 Russian Orthodox Church, 1320, 1321 saints, 1343–1344 Sarts, 1350, 1351 scientists, 1353 Sevastopol population, 1373 Siege of Leningrad, 846 Soviet-Finnish War, 1434 Soviet Germans, 555 Soviet Jews, 149, 150 Soviet Jews, extermination of, 1604 sovkhoz, 1438 stolniks, 1480–1481 Tajikistan population, 1513 Tashkent population, 1518 Tatars, 1519 Tatarstan population, 1521 taxation, 1523, 1523–1524 television and radio, 1528 trade, 516 Trans-Siberian Railway, 1571 Trinity St. Sergius Monastery, 1572 Turkestan population, 1586 Turkmenistan, 1589 Turkmenistan gross national product, 1591 Tuva, 1593 Udmurts, 1597–1598 Ukraine, population in, 1600, 1603 Ukrainians, 1604 universities, 1623 Uzbekistan, 1626 Vilnius, 1640 World War I, 1680 World War II losses, 1690 zemstvos, 1723 zhensovety, 1728–1729 Statute Concerning Land Captains, 818

Statute of Grand Prince Vladimir, 1473–1474 Statute of Grand Prince Yaroslav, 1474–1475 Statute of Vladimir Monomakh, 1643 Stavka, 1475, 1678–1681 Stefan, Elsabeth. See Armand, Inessa Stefan Yavorsky, Metropolitan, 1476 Steiner, Rudolf, 139 Steklov, Yuri, 694 Stenka Razin, 1155, 1271–1272, 1476–1477 Stepashin, Sergei Vadimovich, 1477 Steppe, 1478 colonial expansion, 285 Cossacks, 332–333 frontier fortifications, 525 Huns, 646 Islamization, 680 Sterlet caviar, 216 Stevenson, Adlai, III, 697 Stikhi o prekrasnoy dame (Blok), 156 Stiliagi, 1478–1479 Stock exchanges, 1316, 1479–1480 Stoeckl, Edouard de, 28 Stoglav, 887 Stolbovo, Treaty of, 500, 1480, 1552 Stolniks, 1480–1481 Stolypin, Peter Arkadievich, 1481, 1481–1483 agricultural reform, 434 Duma, 415–416 economic growth, 427 khutor, 749–750 land reform, 821, 1154–1155 nationalism, 1010 Nicholas II, role in administration, 1051 Octobrists, alliance with, 1097 Stoph, Willie, 554 Stores, 619 The Storm (Ostrovsky), 1124 The Story of My Dovecot (Babel), 110 Strabo, 77–78 Straits Convention, 1624 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT), 66, 86, 389, 1486 Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), 87–88, 1486–1487

N

I N D E X

Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 66, 86, 543, 1486, 1487 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), 88 Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), 940 Strategy (Svechin), 1504 Stravinsky, Igor Fyodorovich, 504, 1487–1488 Streltsy, 1488–1489 Streshneva, Evdokya, 1301 Strike (movie), 973 Strikes. See Labor strikes Stroganov Palace, 71 Stroibank, 1489–1490 Structuralism, literary, 874–875 Strugatsky, Arkady and Boris, 1354 Strumilin, Stanislav Gustavovich, 543, 1490 Struve, Frederick G. W., 4 Struve, Peter Bernardovich, 432, 860, 1490, 1635 Student unrest, 1622 Studies in the History of the Troubles in the Muscovite State in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Platonov), 1184 Stukach, 1491 Stürmer, Boris Vladimirovich, 1491–1492 Style Moderne architecture, 72 Subarctic climate, 272 Subbotnik, 1492 Submarines, 803–804, 1065, 1127–1128 Subsidization of athletes, 1450 Subway systems, 1492–1493 Succession Alexander I, 367–368 grand prince, 598 Kievan Rus, 752–753 Kremlinology, 787–788 Law of Succession, 1172 Lenin’s Testament, 848, 854 Lyubech, conference at, 752–753 Muscovite, 265 Paul I, 1298 primogeniture, 1297–1298 Romanovs, 1296–1298, 1300 rota system, 752, 1304–1305, 1312 Rurikid dynasty, 1312 Soviet leadership, 1494–1495

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

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1815

I N D E X

N

S U C C E S S I O N ,

Succession (continued) Testament of Yaroslav, 1702 vertical system, 1305, 1312 Yaroslav Vladimirovich, 695 Succession, Law on, 1493 Sudebnik of 1497, 456, 1495–1496, 1497 Sudebnik of 1550, 614, 887, 1496–1497 Sudebnik of 1589, 1497–1498 Sudebnik of 1606, 829 Suez crisis, 277 Suffrage, 322, 495 Sufism, 361 Sukhomlinov, Vladimir A., 936, 987 Sukhovo-Kobylin, Alexander, 1537 Sukonnaya Sotnya, 1498 Sultan-Galiev, Mirza Khaidargalievich, 1498–1499 Sumarokov, Alexander Petrovich, 1499–1500, 1536 Supersonic airliners, 12 Suprematism, 890, 1396 Supreme Church Administration, 867 Supreme Commander of the Russian armed forces, 1475 Supreme Commission on Press Affairs, 217 Supreme Council of National Economy, 562 Supreme Court, 338–339 Supreme Economic Council (NTO), 1352 Supreme Executive Commission, 873 Supreme Privy Council, 63, 64 Supreme Soviet, 1500–1502, 1501 Congress of People’s Deputies, replacement by, 315 Federal Assembly, 486 Presidium, 1221–1222, 1222 Surikov, Vasily, 998 Surprisingness, 112 Suslov, Mikhail Andreyevich, 787–788, 1502, 1502–1503 Suvorin, Alexei Sergeyevich, 710, 711, 1503 Suvorov, Alexander Vasilievich, 928–929, 1503–1504 Suzdalia, 1716

L A W

O N

Svans, 1504–1505 Svechin, Alexander Andreyevich, 925, 1505 Svod zakonov rossiskoi imperii (Speransky), 841 Svyatopolk I, 1505–1506 Svyatopolk II, 1506 Svyatopolk Izyaslavich, 1643 Svyatoslav I, 1506 Svyatoslav II, 1507 Sweden, 1507–1509 Battle of Poltava, 1203 Battles of Narva, 995 Danish-Muscovite relations, 382 Estonia, 465 Finland, rule of, 500 Great Northern War, 600–602 Livonian War, 868–869 Peter I, 1169 Thirteen Years’ War, 1543 Treaty of Nystadt, 1078–1079 Treaty of Pruth River, 1243 Treaty of Stolbovo, 1480, 1552 Ukraine, relations with, 1600–1601 Sykes-Picot Agreement, 80 Sylvester, 406–407 Symbolism Bely, Andrei, 139 Blok, Alexander Alexandrovich, 156–157 Bryusov, Valery Yalovlevich, 175 Moscow Art Theater, 967–968 Russians, 1326 Silver Age, 1394–1396 socialist realism, 1417 Symbolism, de-Stalinization, 388 Syn Boyarsky, 1509 Synthetic theater, 1539 System of National Accounts (SNA), 905, 1039–1040 Sytin, Ivan Dmitrievich, 227, 711, 1509–1510, 1542

T Table of Ranks, 1511–1512 dvorianstvo, 420 military reform, 935

Peter I, 1170 service state, 1372 Shcherbatov’s criticism of, 1381 Taganka, 1512–1513, 1539 Tairov, Alexander, 1538 Tajikistan and Tajiks, 1513–1515, 1514 Tale and Passion and Encomium of the Holy Martyrs Boris and Gleb, 253 Tale of Avraamy Palitsyn, 1515–1516 “Tale of How Ivan Ivanovich Quarrelled with Ivan Nikiforovich” (Gogol), 567–568 Taliban, 14 Talleyrand, Charles Maurice de, 1136 Tambov, 68–69 Tamm, Igor Yevgenievich, 7, 95 Tannenberg, Battle of, 1516, 1677 Tariffs, 1655 Tarkovsky, Andrei, 977 Tarkovsky, Andrei Arsenievich, 1516–1517 Tartu-Moscow Semiotic School, 874 Tartu Peace Treaty, 466 Tashkent, 1517–1519, 1518 Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security, 296–297 TASS, 1519 Tatarstan and Tatars, 1519–1522, 1520, 1521 Alexander Yaroslavich’s collaboration with, 41–42 Baskhirs, relations with, 126–127 Catherine’s nationalities policy, 1021 Crimean, 339–340, 341–342, 525, 540–541, 680–681 Federation Treaties, 490–491 Kazan, 732–733 nationalities policy, 1019 Sultan-Galiev, Mirza Khaidargalievich, 1498–1499 ulama, 680–682 See also Crimean Tatars Tatischev, Vassily, 637 Tatlin, Vladimir, 890 Taverns, 29–30 Taxation, 1522–1525, 1523 alcohol, 29–31, 580–581

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

1816

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H I S T O R Y

T O L S T A Y A ,

beard tax, 133, 1104 chancelleries, 225 collective responsibility, 283 Copper Riots, 328–329 food tax, 1232–1233 households as basis of, 530 Jews, 704 middle peasants, 1365 Old Believers, 1104 Peter I, 915 soul tax, 458, 811, 1367, 1432–1433, 1522 tax collection, 1522–1523 vodka, 1646 Tax-farming system, 30 Taymyr, 406 Tchaikovsky, Peter Ilyich, 986, 999, 1525–1526 Technology. See Science and technology Techpromfinplan, 460, 1526–1527 Tehran Conference, 1527 Telegraph Agency of the USSR (TASS), 1519 Telengits, 55 Teleological planning, 1527–1528 Teleologists, 543 Telescope (journal), 223 Teleuts, 55 Television and radio, 1206, 1528–1531, 1529 Temperance campaigns, 29, 30 Temporary Instructions on Deprivation of Freedom, 616 Temporary Laws of May 1882, 701–702 Temporary regulations, 1531–1532 Tenant farmers, 1244 Terem, 1532 Ter-Petrossian, Levon, 81, 1532–1533 Territorial-administrative units, 1533–1534 Terrorism, 1534–1535 anarchistic, 58 Civil War of 1917–1922, 267–268 communist bloc, 300–301 Kaplan, Fanya, 722–723 Nechayev, Sergei Geradievich, 1032–1033 People’s Will, 154, 1162

T A T I A N A

Socialist Revolutionary Party, 1470 Spiridonova, Maria Alexandrovna, 1446–1447 Testament, 752 Textbooks Filaret Drozdov, metropolitan, 498 Leichoudes, Ionnaikiosand Sophronios, 843 Short Course, 1387 Thaden, Edward C., 1330 The Thaw, 1535–1536 Khrushchev, Nikita, 748 motion pictures, 976–977 Pasternak, Boris, 1146 samizdat, 1347 socialist realism, 1418 theater, 1538–1539 Yevtushenko, Yevgeny Alexandrovich, 1711 The Thaw (Ehrenburg), 441 Theater, 1536–1540 Elizabeth, 447 Korsh Theater, 775 Meyerhold, Vsevolod Yemilievich, 919 Moscow Art Theater (MAT), 966–968 Romen Theater, 620 Shchepkin, Mikhail Semeonovich, 1381 Silver Age, 1394 Stanislavsky, Konstantin Sergeyevich, 1460 Taganka, 1512 The Thaw, 1535 See also Opera Theaters for Working Youth (TRAM), 1538 Theft, 1115, 1357 Theodosius, 214, 623, 955 Theology Orthodoxy, 1118 Soloviev, Vladimir Sergeyevich, 1422–1423 See also Religion Theophanes the Greek, 649, 1540 Theosophy, 1083 The Theotokos (Dionisy), 396 Thick journals, 709, 1077–1078, 1540–1541

N I K I T I C H N A

N

I N D E X

Thin journals, 711, 1541–1542 Third Lithuanian Statute in 1588, 135 Third Rome, 1542–1543 Third Section, 37, 635–636, 1469 Thirteen Years’ War, 1543–1544 dvorianstvo, 420 monetary policy, 328 new-formation regiments, 1042 Peace of Andrusovo, 62–63 Thon, Constantine, 72 Thoughts of a Modern Pole (Dmowski), 1008 Three Conversations on War, Progress, and the End of History (Soloviev), 1423 Three Emperors, Battle of, 99–100 Three Emperors’ League, 556, 1544–1545 Three-field system, 1545 Thyroid cancer, 240 Tiflis, 548–549, 1545–1547, 1546 Tiflis Municipal Council massacre, 1287 Tikhii Don (Sholokhov), 1386 Tikhon, Patriarch, 65, 866–867, 1148, 1547 Tilsit, Treaty of, 33, 176, 992–993, 993, 1547–1548 Time of Troubles, 1548–1553 Dmitry of Uglich, 404 enserfment, 457 Kirillov Monastery, 757 Moscow patriarchate, 1147 Platonov’s study of, 1184 Poland interference, 1192–1193 Tale of Avraamy Palitsyn, 1515–1516 Tithe Church, 1553 Tito, Josip Broz, 275, 1714–1715 Titov, Gherman, 1442 Titulescu, Nicolae, 1293 Tkachev, Petr Nikitich, 1209, 1553–1554 Togan, Ahmed Zeki Validov, 1554–1555 Togo, Heihachiro, 1333, 1335 Tokamak, 95 Tokhtamish, 796 Tokyo Declaration, 700 Tolstaya, Tatiana Nikitichna, 1555–1556

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

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1817

I N D E X

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T O L S T O V ,

S E R G E I

Tolstov, Sergei, 470 Tolstoy, Alexei Konstaninovich, 1556 Tolstoy, Dmitry, 40 Tolstoy, Fyodor, 1037 Tolstoy, Leo Nikolayevich, 1556–1560, 1557 anarchism, 57–58 chapbooks, 227 idealism, 652 nationalism, 998 realism, 570 Tomsky, Mikhail Pavlovich, 1140, 1289, 1560 Ton, Karl, 84 Ton, Konstantin, 786, 1303 Toporkov, Dosifey, 707 Torky, 1560–1561 Total factor productivity, 430 Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Freidrich and Brzezinski), 1561 Totalitarianism, 1561–1562 Tourism, 1562–1563 See also Travel Town Cossacks, 332 Townsmen, 830 Trade, foreign, 515–518 Alaskan fur trade, 288 Alexei Mikhailovich, 48 Astrakhan, 92–93 Central Asian trade routes, 219 Commonwealth of Independent States, 296 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), 334–335 customs books, 353 Danish, 382, 383 Evenki, 471 Foreign Trade Organizations (FTOs), 947 German-Soviet Trade Agreement of 1939, 1435–1436 grain trade, 594–597 Greece, 1106 Hanseatic League, 625–626 imperial era, 435 Japan, 700–701 Kievan Rus, 916 Korea, 770–771 Ministry of Foreign Trade, 947

Muscovy, 983 New Statute of Commerce, 1044–1045 Nikitin, Afanasay, 1055 Norway, 1067–1068 Novgorod, 1071–1072 Peter I, 915–916 Polovtsy, 1202 price determination, 517 Route to Greeks, 1305–1306 Russia Company, 1314 Russian Far East, 481 Russo-Bukharan, 178 Sweden, 1508 Tatars, 1520 Trade Statutes of 1653 and 1667, 1565–1566 Turkey, 1587–1588 United States, 389, 697, 1615–1617 Winius, Andries Dionyszoon, 1666–1667 Yugoslavia, 1715 See also Commerce Trade routes, 1563–1564 Kievan Rus, 754 Route to Greeks, 1305–1306 Trade Statutes of 1653 and 1667, 1565–1566 Trade unions, 1566–1567 Gapon, Georgy Appollonovich, 539 imperial era, 435 Jewish Bund, 185–186 Shlyapnikov, Alexander Gavrilovich, 1384 Solidarity Movement, 1422 Tomsky, Mikhail Pavlovich, 1560 Trade Union Controversy, 1575 Workers’ Opposition, 1675 TRAM (Theaters for Working Youth), 1538 Transcaspia, 1590 Transcaucasia, 80, 832 Transcaucasian federations, 994, 1567–1568 Trans-Dniestria, 146, 952–953, 1568–1569 Transferable ruble price, 335 Transition economies, 1569–1571 Transliteration, 355

Transnistria. See Trans-Dniestria Transportation Aeroflot, 12–13 Baikal-Amur Magistral Railway (BAM), 110–111 boats, 1306 grain trade, 595–596 roads, 595–596 subway systems, 1492–1493 workers, 716 See also Railways Trans-Siberian Railway, 53, 1267, 1571 Trauberg, Leonid, 973, 975 Travel, 522 See also Tourism Travels through Various Provinces in the Russian Empire (Pallas), 1132 Treasury bills, 558–559 Treaties and international agreements Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, 502 Akkerman Convention, 24 Andrusovo treaty, 1113 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, 66–67, 86 Anti-Comintern Pact, 67 Belovezh Accords, 137–138, 296, 1608 Blue Stream natural gas agreement, 1588 Congress of Vienna, 1637 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, 23, 86–87, 326–327 Convention of Berlin, 144 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 544–545 Federation Treaties, 489, 490–491, 1281 Final Act, 390, 1637 first and second Treaties of Paris, 1136, 1637 Helsinki Accords, 631–632 Holy Alliance, 639 Hot Line Agreement, 279 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 23, 672–673

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

1818

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H I S T O R Y

T R E A T Y

Jackson-Vanik Agreement, 697 Japanese Peace Treaty, 700 Kellogg-Briand Pact, 733 Khasavyurt Treaty, 234–235 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), 279 Litvinov Protocol, 733 Moscow treaty of 1562, 382 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 389 OSLO peace agreements, 684 Peace of Andrusovo, 62–63 Peace of Noteborg, 500 Peace of Riga, 1195 Pereyaslav Agreement, 742 Portsmouth Peace Treaty, 1671 Racconigi Agreement, 685 Rapallo Treaty, 544 Reinsurance Treaty, 556 Soviet-Finnish Non-Aggression Pact, 502 Soviet-German Trade Agreement of 1939, 1435–1436 Straits Convention, 1624 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT), 86, 389, 1486 Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), 87–88, 88, 1486–1487 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), 88 Sykes-Picot Agreement, 80 Tartu Peace Treaty, 466 Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security, 296–297 Tokyo Declaration, 700 Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation, 466, 676, 770, 1639 Treaty of Adrianopole, 1292 Treaty of Aigun, 19–20 Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Russo-Korean, 770 Treaty of Andrusovo, 1428 Treaty of Berlin, 144, 960 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 52, 168–169, 266–267, 599, 1447 Treaty of Bucharest, 24, 176–177, 1293 Treaty of Chaumont, 1259 Treaty of Commerce, 1616, 1618 Treaty of Deulino, 1408 Treaty of Georgievsk, 550

O F

Treaty of Golestan, 1336 Treaty of Jassy, 701 Treaty of Karasu Bazaar, 341 Treaty of Kiakhta, 247 Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji, 793, 1292 Treaty of Kücük, 341 Treaty of London, 116 Treaty of Nerchinsk, 247, 1037–1038 Treaty of Nystadt, 500, 601–602, 1078–1079 Treaty of Paris, 36, 599, 1135, 1294 Treaty of Peking, 1157 Treaty of Portsmouth, 700, 800, 1210–1211, 1334, 1335 Treaty of Pruth River, 1243 Treaty of Rapallo, 1268–1269 Treaty of Saint Germain, 180 Treaty of San Stefano, 38, 143, 584, 960, 1349–1350 Treaty of Shimoda, 699, 800 Treaty of St. Petersburg, 800 Treaty of Stolbovo, 500, 1480, 1552 Treaty of Tilsit, 33, 176, 992–993, 993, 1547–1548 Treaty of Torkamanchay, 1336 Treaty of Turkmanchai, 106 Treaty of Turku, 500, 501 Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, 1623–1624 Treaty of Yazhelbitsy, 1069, 1071 Treaty on Forming a Community, 1313 Truce of Altmark, 465 Two plus Four Treaty, 554 Union Treaty, 1280, 1607–1608, 1608, 1612–1614 Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, 1661–1662 Washington Treaty, 1062 See also Foreign policy; Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 Treaties of Paris, first and second, 1136, 1637 Treaty of Adrianopole, 1292 Treaty of Aigun, 19–20 Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Russo-Korean, 770

Y A Z H E L B I T S Y

N

I N D E X

Treaty of Berlin, 144, 960 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 168–169 Allied intervention, 52 British reaction, 599 Left Socialist Revolutionaries, 266–267 Spiridonova’s repudiation of, 1447 Treaty of Bucharest, 176–177, 1293 Treaty of Chaumont, 1259 Treaty of Commerce, 1616, 1618 Treaty of Deulino, 1408 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, 770 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, 466, 676 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (Vietnam/USSR), 1639 Treaty of Georgievsk, 550 Treaty of Golestan, 1336 Treaty of Jassy, 701 Treaty of Karasu Bazaar, 341 Treaty of Kiakhta, 247 Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji, 793, 1292 Treaty of Küçük, 341 Treaty of London, 116 Treaty of Nerchinsk, 247, 1037–1038 Treaty of Nystadt, 500, 601–602, 1078–1079 Treaty of Paris, 36, 599, 1135, 1294 Treaty of Peking, 1157 Treaty of Portsmouth, 700, 800, 1210–1211, 1334, 1335 Treaty of Pruth River, 1243 Treaty of Rapallo, 1268–1269 Treaty of Saint Germain, 180 Treaty of San Stefano, 38, 143, 584, 960, 1349–1350 Treaty of Shimoda, 699, 800 Treaty of St. Petersburg, 800 Treaty of Stolbovo, 500, 1480 Treaty of Tilsit, 33, 176, 992, 993, 1547–1548 Treaty of Torkamanchay, 1336 Treaty of Turkmanchai, 106 Treaty of Turku, 500, 501 Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, 1623–1624 Treaty of Yazhelbitsy, 1069, 1071

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

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1819

I N D E X

N

T R E A T Y

O N

Treaty on Forming a Community, 1313 Tretyakov, Pavel, 998 Trezzini, Domenico, 71, 1175 Trial of the Twenty-One, 180 Triandafillov, Viktor Kiriakovich, 1571–1572 Triandafillov, Vladimir, 925 Trifon, Abbort, 757 Trinity St. Sergius Monastery, 624, 1370, 1572–1574, 1573 Triple Alliance, 685 Troika, 617 Trotsky, Leon Davidovich, 1574–1577, 1575, 1576 Bolshevism, 160 fellow travelers, 492 Frunze and, 526 industrialization policy, 661 July Days of 1917, 713 Kremlinology, 787 Left Opposition, 837–838 Lenin’s break with, 852 Lenin’s Testament, 848 military doctrine, 926 murder, 838 party congresses, 1139–1140 Permanent Revolution, 1165, 1415 Preobrazhensky’s alliance with, 1219 Red Army, 267 socialism, 1414 Soviet-German armistice negotiations, 168–169 Stalin’s rivalry with, 1455–1456 triumvirate, defeat by, 720 United Opposition, 1615 Trotskyites, 1249 Trubetskoy, Sergei, 368 Truce of Altmark, 465 True Orthodox Church, 1361 Truman, Harry, 1215–1216, 1687 Trusts, Soviet, 1040, 1577–1578 Tsar and tsarina, 1580 Tsarina. See Tsar and tsarina Tsar’s Archive, 73 Tsarskoye Selo, 1036, 1578–1580, 1579 Tsereteli, Irakli, 485, 902 Tsiolkovsky, Konstantin Eduardovich, 1440, 1580–1581

F O R M I N G

A

C O M M U N I T Y

Tsitsianov, Paul, 1335 TsSU, 223 Tsushima, Battle of, 1335, 1581 Tsvetaeva, Marina Ivanovna, 22, 1581–1582, 1582 Tsvibak, M. M., 497 Tsyganshchina, 621–622 Tugan-Baranovsky, Mikhail Ivanovich, 1583 Tukhachevsky, Mikhail Nikolayevich, 927, 936, 1437, 1583–1584 Tupolev, Andrei Nikolayevich, 1584 Tur, Yevgenia, 1592 Tura River, 1392 Turchin, Valery, 1303 Turgenev, Ivan Sergeyevich, 1584–1586, 1585 golden age of Russian literature, 569–570 intelligentsia, 669 A Month in the Country, 1537 nationalism, 998 nihilism, 1053 Turkestan, 1586–1587 Basmachis, 129–130 colonialism, 288–289 Kaufman, Konstantin Petrovich, 727–728 Skobelev’s military triumph, 1401 Turkey Akkerman Convention, 24 Armenia, relations with, 79–82, 1533 Armenian genocide, 80, 83, 366 Balkan Wars, 115–116 Congress of Berlin, 143–144 Crimean Tatars, 342 Crimean War, 343–344 dvorianstvo captivity, 420 genocide, 545 nationalism, 981–982 Nesselrode, Karl Robert, 1039 relations with, 1587–1588 Togan, Ahmed Zeki Validov, 1554–1555 Treaty of Bucharest, 176 Treaty of Jassy, 701 Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji, 793 Treaty of San Stefano, 38, 1349–1350

Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, 1623–1624 World War I, 1677, 1678–1679 See also Ottoman Empire; RussoTurkish Wars Turkmenistan and Turkmen, 1589, 1589–1592, 1590 Turnover tax, 1523–1524, 1525 Tuva and Tuvinians, 1593, 1593–1594 Tvardovsky, Alexander, 1077 Tver, 41 Tveritinov, Dmitry, 1476 Twelfth International Congress of Physicians, 29 Twenty-Five Thousanders, 1594–1595 Twenty-One points, 302–304 “The Two Ivans” (Gogol), 567–568 Two plus Four Treaty, 554 Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Russian Revolution (Lenin), 852 Typography Chronicle, 255 Tyutchev, Fyodor Ivanovich, 1406, 1595

U Udarny prison, 1228 Udmurts, 1597–1598 Uezd, 1598–1599 Ugra River, Battle of, 1599 Ukaz, 1599–1600 Uklein, Semen, 1361 Ukraine and Ukrainians, 1600–1605 annexation by Russia, 1001 Baptists, 1361 Borotbisty, 165 Bukovina, 180 Carpatho-Rusyns, 199 Chernobyl, 238–240, 239 Civil War of 1917–1922, 270 Cossacks, 332 Crimea, 339 Crimean Tatars, 341 Cyril and Methodius Society, 353–354 dissidents, 400 famine, 478, 479, 545

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

1820

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H I S T O R Y

U N I T E D

Hurshevsky, Mikhail Sergeyevich, 641 independence, 783–784, 1613 Ivashko, Vladimir Antonovich, 692–693 Khmelnitsky, Bohdan, 741–742 Khruschev, Nikita, 745–746 Kievan Rus, legacy of, 1190 Kravchuk, Leonid Makarovich, 783–784 language policy, imperial era, 824 map, 1601 nationalism, 1002 nationalities policy, 1015–1016 pogroms, 1190–1191 Poland, alliance with, 1437 populism, 1006 Rumyantsev, Peter Alexandrovich, 1310 Russification, 1331 Shevchenko, Taras Gregorevich, 1383–1384 Shtundists, 1361 Skrypnyk, Mykola Oleksyovych, 1401 Thirteen Years’ War, 62–63 tsarist nationalities policy, 1019–1020 Ukrainization, 1401 Uniate Church, 1605–1606 war with Poland, 47–48 Ukrainian Catholic Church, 1605–1606 Ukrainian Communist Party, 692–693 Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries. See Borotbisty Ukrainian Scientific Society, 641 Ulama, 680–682 Ulbricht, Walter, 553–554 Ulmanis, Karlis, 828 Ulozhenie law code. See Law Code of 1649 Ulyanova, Maria, 1217, 1217–1218 The Unfading Light (Bulgakov), 182 Uniate Church, 135, 1605–1607 Unifed State Political Directorate (OGPU), 948 Unification Congress at Stockholm, 914 Unified Energy Systems (UES), 256, 445

Unified State Political Administration (OGPU), 616, 948, 1471–1472 Union of Cinematogrpahers, 977 Union of Contemporary Architects, 325 Union of Lublin, 863 Union of Railwary Workers, 1095 Union of Right Forces, 1200, 1330, 1606–1607 Union of Russia’s Women, 1671 Union of Salvation, 367 Union of Science and Industry, 1648 Union of Social Democrats Abroad, 432 Union of Societies of Physicians’ Assistants, 492 Union of Sovereign States, 1607–1608 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1608–1609 formation, 1001, 1012 territorial-administrative units, 1533 See also Soviet era Union of Soviet Writers, 1610–1611 Akhmatova, Anna Andreyevna, 22 Ehrenburg, Ilya Grigorovich, 441 fellow travelers, 492 Pasternak, Boris, 1145, 1146 Russian Association of Proletarian Writers, replacement of, 1315 Simonov, Konstantin Mikhailovich, 1397 Slutsky, Boris Abromovich, 1407 Solzhenitsyn’s criticism of, 1425 Union of Struggle for the Emancipation of Labor, 1611–1612 Union of the Russian People, 151–152, 711 Union of Unions, 495, 941 Union of Welfare, 367 Union of Women of the Navy, 1672 Union-Republican Ministry, 946 Union Treaty, 1280, 1607–1608, 1612–1614 United Council of Work Collectives, 1569 United front policy of Comintern, 303

S T A T E S

N

I N D E X

United Nations, 1614–1615 Iraq weapons inspections, 676–677 Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, 954 South Korea, defense of, 769 Yalta Conference, 1699 United Opposition, 720, 838, 1615 United States Afghanistan, war in, 14 Alaska, purchase of, 27 Alliance, 1686–1687 Allied intervention, 52–54, 267 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 66 arms control, 85–88 boycott of Moscow Olympics, 971 Cuba, relations with, 347 Cuban Missile Crisis, 345, 347 détente, 172–173, 389–390 famine relief, 478 German/U.S. relations, 142–143 grain trade, 596 Grand Alliance, 597 International Space Station, 673–674 Iran, relations with, 675–676 Iraq, sanctions against, 677 Japan, relations with, 700 Kellogg-Briand Pact, 733 Khrushchev’s foreign policy, 749 Korean War, 769, 770 League of Armed Neutrality, 833 lend-lease, 844–845 Litvinov’s ambassadorship, 866 Malta Summit, 890–891 Nicaragua, relations with, 1045 Olympic boycotts, 1451–1452 Pakistan, relations with, 1129 Persian Gulf War, 1166–1167 Putin, relationship with, 1256 relations with, 1615–1619 Revolutionary War, 833 Reykjavik Summit, 1288–1289 Russian culture, 1617 Shevardnadze, Eduard, 1382 Shuttle-Mir mission, 950 Solzhenitsyn’s residency, 1426 Soviet-American Trade Bill, Jackson-Vanik Amendment, 697 Soviet containment, 301 space program, 1442

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

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H I S T O R Y

1821

I N D E X

N

U N I T E D

T E A M

United States (continued) Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT), 1486 Strategic Arms Reducation Talks (START), 1486–1487 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 1486, 1487 Tajikistan, relations with, 1515 United Nations, 1614 U-2 spy plane incident, 1597 Vietnam War, 1638–1639 See also Cold War United Team, 1452 Unity and Fatherland, 483 Unity Party, 1201, 1620 Universal Conscription Act, 936 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 642 Universities, 1620–1623 University Statute, 336 Unkiar Skelessi, Treaty of, 1623–1624 Unplanned Russification, 1330–1331 Upper Svanetia, 1504 Urartu, 77–78 Urban administration, 229 Urbanization Armenia, 80–81 command administrative economy, 292 migration, 921 sports, 1448 Urban life marriage and family, 897, 898 parks, 1322 passport system, 1143–1144 Russians, 1322 Urban registration system, 1143–1144 Urban Statute of 1846, 944 Urban stratification, 830 Urozhai Collective Farm, 282 U.S. Board of Geographic Names, 355 Ushakov, Simon Fyodorovich, 84, 1624–1625 U-2 spy plane incident, 1597 USSR in Construction (periodical), 1179 Ustinov, Dmitry Fedorovich, 927, 1625

Utopianism, 1354 Uvarov, Sergei Semenovich, 1625–1626 autocracy, 1047 education, 438 nationalism, 1005 nationality, 1098, 1099 Russification, 1331 Uvarov Codex, 255 Uzbekistan and Uzbeks, 1626–1629 Karakalpaks, 724 Khiva, 740–741, 741 map, 1627 Tashkent, 1517–1518, 1518 Uzbek woman and children, 1628 Uzbek Khan, 403

V Vainakh languages, 213 Vakhtang, 548–549 Vakhtangov, Evgeny, 1538 Vakulenchuk, Grigory, 1214 Validov, Ahmed Zeki, 126 Value subtraction, 1631–1632 Valuev, Peter, 824 Vanik, Charles, 697 VAPP. See Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP) Vardøhus, 1067 Varennikov, Valentin Ivanovich, 1632 Varga, Eugene Samuilovich, 1632–1633 Varlaam, 214 Vasilevsky, Alexander Mikhailovich, 1633 Vasiliev, Alexander, 869–870 Vasiliev Brothers, 975 Vasily Tatishchev, 467 Vassian Patrikeyev, 707 Vavilov, Nikolai Ivanovich, 1633–1634 Vazeh, Mirza Shafi, 23 Veche, 1634–1635 Vecher (Akhmatova), 22 Vegetables, 1325 Vekhi, 670, 1635–1636 Venetsianov, Alexei, 998

Venevitinov, Dmitry, 876 Vengeance justice, 1318 Verbitskaya, Anastasia Alexeyevna, 1636–1637 Verdun, Battle of, 1679 Verigin, Petr, 1360 Vernadsky, Vladimir Ivanovich, 6, 7 Vertical succession, 1305, 1312 Vertov, Dziga, 973–974 Vesnin, Leonis, Viktor and Alexander, 72 Vienna, Congress of, 1637–1638 Vietnam, 1638–1639 Vikings, 751, 1061, 1639–1640 Vikzhel, 1095 Village Messenger (newspaper), 711 Vilnius, 1640–1641 Vinius, Andrei Andreyevich, 1666–1667 Vinogradov, Viktor, 1400 Violence, anarchistic, 58 Virgin lands program, 1641–1642 Virgin Soil Upturned (Sholokhov), 1386 Virtual economy, 1642 Viskovaty, Ivan, 887 Visual Arts Section, People’s Commissariat for Enlightenment, 721 Vitae, 623 Vitebsk Popular Art School, 224 Vladikavkaz, 1122 Vladimir, St., 1643–1644 Andrei Yaroslavich, 58–59 Andrei Yurevich, 59 Byzantine Christianity, 190–191, 252–253, 605–606, 751, 1319 Donskoy, Dmitry Ivanovich, 408 Orthodoxy, 1119 rule of, 751–752 Rurikid dynasty, 1311 Svyatopolk, relationship with, 1505 Vladimir Monomakh, 980, 1506, 1642–1643, 1716 “Vladimir Mother of God,” 649 Vladimir Mother of God and the Planting and Spreading of the Tree of the Russian State (Ushakov), 1624–1625 Vladimir Svyatoslavich, 1701 Vladivostok, 1127

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

1822

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H I S T O R Y

W H A T

Vlasov, Yuri, 1450 Vlasov Movement, 1644–1645 Vodka, 29–30, 1645–1647 Voguls. See Mansi Voice (newspaper), 710 Vokrug sveta (journal), 1542 Volga Bulgars, 1519–1520, 1653 Volga Germans, 555 Volga region Kazan, 732–733 Khazars, 739 Razin Rebellion, 1271–1272, 1476–1477 Volga Tatars nationalities policy, 1019–1020 Russification, 1008 Volk, Ivan, 713 Volkogonov, Dmitry Antonovich, 1647–1648 Volkov, Fyodor, 1536 Volokolamsk Monastery, 707–708 Volsky, Arkady Ivanovich, 1648 Voltaire, 522 Voluntary cooperatives, 327–328 Vonifatiev, Stefan, 104 Von Krudener, Julie, 34 Voronikhin, Andrei, 71–72 Vorontsov, Mikhail Semnovich, 211–212, 1648–1649, 1649 Vorontsov-Dashkov, Illarion Ivanovich, 1649–1650 Voroshilov, Kliment Efremovich, 67–68, 1650 Voskhod, 1442 Voskresenk Chronicle, 256 Vospominaniia (Mandelshtam), 891 Vostok, 535, 1442 Votchina, 1650–1651 Votiaks. See Udmurts Voucher privatization, 489 Voyevoda, 1651–1652 Voznesensky, Nikolai Alexeyevich, 846, 1652 Vrubel, Mikhail, 1394 Vsevlod I, 598, 1653 Vsevold Yurevich, 1716–1717 Vsevolod III, 1653 Vsevolozhsky, Ivan, 128 Vtoraia kniga (Mandelshtam), 891 Vuchetich, Yevgeny, 557 Vvedensky, Alexander, 867

I S

T O

B E

D O N E ?

( C H E R N Y S H E V S K Y )

VVER reactors, 95 Vvsevolod, 1643 Vyazemsky, Peter, 1302, 1303 Vyborg Manifesto, 1653–1654 Vydvizhentsy, 440 Vygotsky, Lev Semenovich, 7 Vyshinsky, Andrei Yanuarievich, 1378, 1654–1655 Vyshnegradsky, Ivan Alexeyevich, 515, 1655 Vysotsky Vladimir Semyonovich, 1655–1656, 1656

W Wages dyaks, 421 enterprises, 460 imperial era, 435 Soviet era, 1657–1658 Wahhabism, 715 Walesa, Lech, 1708 The Wanderers, 998 War and Peace (Tolstoy), 570, 1558 War communism, 1658–1660 Antonov Uprising, 68–69 cooperative societies, 328 economics, 178–179 industrialization, 660 monetary system, 959 policies, 269 prodrazverstka, 1233 wages, 1657 See also Civil War of 1917-1922 War economy, 927, 1660–1661, 1691 Warfare Abkhazians, 2, 2 Bloch’s analysis, 156 European tactics, 1409 New Formation infantry, 1409 slaves, 1402 Triandafillov, Viktor Kiriakovich, 1571–1572 Tukhachevsky, Mikhail Nikolayevich, 1583–1584 War heroes, 777–778 War mobilization World War I, 1676, 1680

N

I N D E X

World War II, 938, 1683–1685, 1688 See also War economy War of Independence, Estonian, 466 War of Polish Succession, 64 War of the Third Coalition, 99–100, 1661 Warsaw, Battle of, 1437 Warsaw Pact. See Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), 326, 646, 1661–1662 See also Cold War Washington Treaty, 1062 Waste, radioactive, 96 Weapons manufacturing, 664 organized crime, 1115 Tukhachevsky, Mikhail Nikolayevich, 1583–1584 See also Nuclear weapons Weber, Max, 197–198 Weitzman, Martin, 426 Welfare, 197 Western countries, trade with, 516 Western culture Romanticism, 1302 Solzhenitsyn’s criticism of, 1426 stiliagi, 1478–1479 Western Europe, 279–280 Westernization idealism, 652 intelligentsia, 668 Leichoudes, Ionnaikiosand Sophronios, 843 Peter I, 1171–1172 Soloviev, Vladimir Sergeyevich, 1423 theater, 1536 Ukrainian influence, 48 Westernizers, 1663–1664 Western religion, 1361 West Front, 1421 West Georgia, 548 West Siberian Lowland, 547 We (Zamyatin), 1354 Whaling, 257 What Is Art? (Tolstoy), 570 “What Is Progress?” (Mikhailovsky), 923 What Is to Be Done? (Chernyshevsky), 244, 1354, 1664

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

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H I S T O R Y

1823

I N D E X

N

W H A T

I S

T O

What Is to Be Done? (Lenin), 850, 1414, 1664 White Army, 268, 1665 Alexeyev, Mikhail Vasilievich, 51 Allied intervention, 53, 267 Civil War of 1917–1922, 266–269 Denikin, Anton Ivanovich, 380–381 Kolchak, Alexander Vasilievich, 761–762 Yudenich, Nikolai Nikolayevich, 1713 White Horde, 728–729 White House revolt. See October 1993 events White Sea Canal, 1665–1666 “Why We are the Serapion Brothers” (Lunts), 1363 Wiepolski, Aleksander, 1198 Wilhelm II, 556 William I (Prussia), 1544 Wilson, Woodrow, 52 Winius, Andries Dionyszoon, 1666–1667 Winter Palace, 71, 1667–1669, 1668 Winter War. See Soviet-Finnish War Wireless telegraphy, 1206 Witchcraft, 1669 Within the Whirlwind (Ginzburg), 558 Witte, Sergei Yulievich, 1669–1671, 1670 alcohol policy, 30 censorship, 217–218 Council of Ministers, 194–195 Duma, establishment of the, 414 equality of rights, 289 Fudamental Laws, 527 Goremykin, replacement by, 585 industrialization, 434–435 October Manifesto, 1087 rapid industrialization, 1089 reform, 40, 65 trade, 515–516 Wladislaw, Prince, 499 Woe from Wit (Griboedov), 569, 608, 1537 Wolff, Cristian, 4 The Woman Worker (Krupskaya), 791

B E

D O N E ?

( L E N I N )

Women abortion policy, 2–3 athletes, 1448–1449 babi bunty, 110 Chechen society, 233, 233 dishonor compensation, 145 education, 438 employment, 1323 equality, 475 family law, 474–475 feldshers, 491 gender roles, 1322–1324 Jews, 703 Komsomol, 313 Novgorod, 1073 prostitution, 1237–1238 roles, 897 Russian, 1322–1324 seclusion, 897 soldiers, 937 Soviet family policies, 899 status of, 1322–1324 terem, 1532 trafficking, 1115 working, 813 working-class, 495 zhenotdel, 1726–1728 zhensovety, 1728–1729 See also Feminism Women of Russia, 1671–1672 Women’s Department, Communist Party, 75, 496, 763, 1348–1349 Wooden architecture, 72–73 “Words to the Lovers of Icons” (Ushakov), 1624 Workers, 1672–1674 Comintern’s united front policy, 303 economism, 432 February Revolution, 483–484 July Days of 1917, 713 Kaganovich’s repression of, 716 kustar, 804 Lena Goldfields Massacre, 844 Red Guards, 1274 Shlyapnikov, Alexander Gavrilovich, 1384 shockworkers, 1386 Stakhanovite movement, 1452–1453

Union of Struggle for the Emancipation of Labor, 1611 vodka, 1646 See also Labor Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate, 1159 Workers’ control, 1674 Workers’ Militia. See Red Guards Workers’ Opposition, 1384, 1675 Workers Temporary Committeeof the State Duma, 484 World grain market, 596–597 World of Art, 1394–1395 The World of Art (Diagilev and Benois), 570 World revolution, 1675–1676 World War I, 1676–1683, 1678, 1679, 1681 Alexeyev, Mikhail Vasilievich, 50–51 Allied intervention, 52–54, 267, 765, 1618 American Relief Administration (ARA), 56–57, 1618 Armenia, 80 Austria, 101 aviation, 103 Battle of Tannenberg, 1516 Bolsheviks, 160 cooperative societies, 328 deportations, 384 Genoa Conference, 544 Great Britain, 599 Hungary, 645 Kola Peninsula, 1065 Lenin’s attitude toward, 852 Mensheviks, 914 military headquarters, 1475 Montenegro, 961 motion pictures, 972–973 Myasoedov Affair, 987 National Union of Zemstvos, 1723 Nicholas II, 1051, 1052 Poland, 1194 popular support for, 1089–1090 Provisional Government, 1240–1241 Romania, 1293 Russian military, 931, 931–932 Social Revolutionary Party, 1420 Soviet Germans, 555

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

1824

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O F

R U S S I A N

H I S T O R Y

W R I T E R S

Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 52, 168, 266–267 Treaty of Rapallo, 1268–1269 Ukraine, 1602 United States, relations with, 1618 Yudenich, Nikolai Nikolayevich, 1713 See also Treaty of Brest-Litovsk World War II, 1683–1692 Akhromeyev, Sergei Fyodorovich, 23 aviation, 103 Azerbaijan, 106–107 Battle of Kursk, 802–803 Battle of Moscow, 969–970 Battle of Stalingrad, 1293, 1453–1455, 1454 Belarus, 136 Beria, Lavrenti, 141 Birobidzhan, 150 Black Sea Fleet, 154–155 Budenny, Semeon Mikhailovich, 177 Bulgaria, 184 Chuikov, Vasily Ivanovich, 257 Churchill, Winston, 677–678 civilian deaths, 1690–1691 Communist subbotniki, 1492 Cossacks, 334 deep battle concept, 1583 Denmark, 383 deportations, 386 economic policy, 1652 emigration, 656 Estonia, 466 extermination of Ukrainian Jews, 1604 Finland, 501–502, 1435 Five-Year Plans, 506 France, relations with, 519 German/Finnish relations, 501–502 German invasion of Soviet Union, 1683–1690, 1684, 1685 German/Japanese relations, 67 German soldiers march through Latvia, 1689 Grand Alliance, 597, 1686–1687 Great Britain, 599 industrialization, 664

Italy, 685 Japan, 700 Jews, extermination of, 545, 612 Khrushchev, Nikita, 746 Komsomol, 313–314 Konev, Ivan Stepanovich, 766 Kuznetsov, Nikolai Gerasimovich, 806 lend lease program, 513, 844–845 Lithuania, 863–864 mobilization, 927, 938, 1660 motion pictures, 975 nationalities policy, 1014 Northern Convoys, 1064 Northern Fleet, 1065 Operation Barbarossa, 1110–1111, 1429, 1435, 1684, 1686 Pavliuchenko, Lyudmila Mikhailovna, 1150 Poland, 1195 Potsdam Conference, 717, 1215–1216, 1687 Romania, 1293 science and technology policy, 1353 Sevastopol, 1374 Siege of Leningrad, 846–848, 847, 985 Smodemyanskaya, Nazi capture and hanging of, 777 socialist realism, 1418 Sokolovsky, Vasily Danilovich, 1421 Soviet-German Trade Agreement of 1939, 1435–1436 Soviet military, 938–939 St. Petersburg, 1485 Stalin, Josef, 1457–1458 Stalingrad, siege of, 1293 State Defense Committee, 1464, 1466–1467 Stavka, 1475 Tehran Conference, 1527 Ukraine, 1603–1604 United Nations, creation of the, 1614 United States, relations with, 1618 Vasilevsky, Alexander Mikhailovich, 1633 Vlasov Movement, 1644–1645

N

I N D E X

war economy, 1660 weapons manufacturing, 664 Western Fron, 766 Yalta Conference, 1698–1699 Zhukov, Georgy, 1731 Woronicz, Janusz, 1005 Worship, 1119 Wrangel, Peter Nikolayevich, 53, 269, 381, 1692–1693, 1693 The Wrath of Dionysus (Nagrodskaya), 990 “The Wrath of Ivan the Terrible against His Son,” 636 Writers Akhundov, Mirza Fath Ali, 23–24 Amalrik, Andrei Alexeievich, 55–56, 60 Babel, Isaac Emmanuyelovich, 109–110 Bely, Andrei, 138–139 Bryusov, Valery Yalovlevich, 175–176 Bulgakov, Mikhail Afanasievich, 181 Bunin, Ivan Alexeyevich, 186 Charskaya, Lydia Alexeyevna, 228 Chekhov, Anton Pavlovich, 235–237, 236 Chernyshevsky, Nikolai Gavrilovich, 244–245 Chukovskaya, Lydia Korneyevna, 258 Chukovsky, Kornei Ivanovich, 258–259 Custine, Astolphe Louis Leonor, 352–353 Cyril of Turov, 355 Daniel, Yuli Markovich, 363 Dashkova, Yekaterina Romanovna, 365–366 Dostoyevsky, Fyodor Mikhailovich, 409–412, 411 Durova, Nadezhda Andreyevna, 418 Ehrenburg, Ilya Grigorovich, 441–442 fellow travelers, 492 Fonvizin, Denis Ivanovich, 511–512 Gamsakhurdia, Zviad, 538–539 Ginzburg, Evgenia Semenovna, 558

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

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H I S T O R Y

1825

I N D E X

N

W R I T I N G S

O F

Writers (continued) Gogol, Nikolai Vasilievich, 567–568 Goncharov, Ivan Alexandrovich, 576–577 Gorky, Maxim, 586, 586–587 Griboedov, Alexander Sergeyevich, 608–609 Grossman, Vasily Semenovich, 612 Herzen, Alexander Ivanovich, 632–633 intelligentsia, 670 Karamzin, Nikolai Mikhailovich, 725 Khomyakov, Alexei Stepanovich, 742–743 Korolenko, Vladimir Galaktionovich, 774–775 Kovalevskaya, Sofia Vasilievna, 781–782 Krylov, Ivan Andreyevich, 792 Lermontov, Mikhail Yurievich, 856 Leskov, Nikolai Semenovich, 856–857 Lovers of Wisdom, 875–876 Makarov, Stepan Osipovich, 885–886 Mandelshtam, Nadezhda Yakovlevna, 891–892 Mandelshtam, Osip Emilievich, 891, 892 manuscript collections, 1328 Mayakovsky, Vladimir Vladimirovich, 908–909 Medvedev, Sylvester Agafonikovich, 910 Medvedev, Zhores Alexandrovich, 910–911 Nagrodskaya, Evdokia Appolonovna, 990 Natural School, 137 Novikov, Nikolai Ivanovich, 1073–1074 Odoyevsky, Vladimir Fyodorovich, 1098 Okudzhava, Bulat Shalovich, 1101 Ostrovsky, Alexander Nikolayevich, 1124–1125 Pasternak, Boris Leonidovich, 1144–1146, 1145

T H E

H O L Y

F A T H E R S

Pelevin, Viktor Olegovich, 1157–1158 Poets, 186 Proletkult, 1236 Pushkin, Alexander Sergeyevich, 1251–1253, 1252 Radzinsky, Edvard Stanislavich, 1264–1265 Russian Association of Proletarian Writers, 1314–1315 Saltykov-Shchedrin, Mikhail Yevgrafovich, 1346–1347 samizdat, 560, 671, 1347–1348, 1425 Serapion Brothers, 1363–1364 Sholokhov, Mikhail Alexandrovich, 1386–1387 Simonov, Konstantin Mikhailovich, 1397–1398 Solzhenitsyn, Alexander Isayevich, 1424–1427, 1425 Sumarokov, Alexander Petrovich, 1499–1500 Tkachev, Petr Nikitich, 1553–1554 Tolstaya, Tatiana Nikitichna, 1555–1556 Tolstoy, Alexei Konstaninovich, 1556 Tolstoy, Leo Nikolayevich, 1556–1560, 1557 Tur, Yevgenia, 1592 Turgenev, Ivan Sergeyevich, 1584–1586, 1585 Verbitskaya, Anastasia Alexeyevna, 1636–1637 Yevtushenko, Yevgeny Alexandrovich, 1711–1712 See also Union of Soviet Writers Writings of the Holy Fathers In Russian Translation (Filaret), 498

Y Yabloko, 1200, 1695–1696 Yablokov, Alexei, 463 Yagoda, Genrikh Grigorevich, 1389, 1472, 1696–1697 Yakovlev, Alexander Nikolayevich, 96, 579, 978, 1697, 1697–1698 Yakovlev, Vladimir, 482, 1411, 1412

I N

R U S S I A N

Yakutia, 1344–1345 Yakuts. See Sakha and Yakuts Yalta Conference, 1698–1700 Yanayev, Gennady Ivanovich, 96–98, 1700 Yarlyk, 1700–1701 Yaropolk I, 751, 1701 Yaropolk Vladimirovich, 753 Yaroslavsky, Emilian, 835, 1387 Yaroslav Vladimirovich, 1701–1702 Cathedral of St. Sophia, 202 Hilarion, appointment of, 635 rota system, 1305 rules of, 752 succession, 1312, 1643 Vsevlod, 1653 Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, 1702–1703, 1717 Yaroslav Yaroslavich, 1703 Yasnaya Polyana School, 1558 Yavlinsky, Grigory Alexeyevich, 15, 1695, 1703–1704 Yazov, Dmitry Timofeyevich, 1704–1705 Yefremov, Ivan, 1354 Yefremov, Oleg, 967 Yekaterina of Lesna, 1448 Yeltsin, Boris Nikolayevich, 1705–1710, 1708, 1709 Alexei II, relationship with, 44 August 1991 Putsch, 97–99, 98 Barannikov, relationship with, 123 Belovezh Accords, 137–138, 1608 Cabinet of Ministers, dismissal of, 195 Chechnya War, 1377 Chernomyrdin, advancement of, 240–241 Communist Party of the Russian Federation’s criticism of, 306 Congress of People’s Deputies, 315 Constitutional Court, suspension of the, 318 Constitution of 1993, 324 corruption, 777 democratization, 375 Dyachenko, Tatiana, 420–421 economic policy, 1034–1035 economic reform, 294 Federation Treaty, 490

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1826

E N C Y C L O P E D I A

O F

R U S S I A N

H I S T O R Y

Z H E L Y A B O V ,

five-hundred-day plan, 504–505 Gaidar and, 537–538 Gorbachev, relationship with, 560–561, 581, 582 Gosbank, 587–588 human rights, 642 Inter-Regional Deputies’ Group, 674–675 Iraq, relations with, 676 Japan, relations with, 700 Khasbulatov’s opposition to, 738–739 Kiriyenko, appointment of, 758 Kokoshin, appointments of, 761 Korzhakov, aide, 776–777 Kovalev, appointment of, 781 Kozyrev and, 783 Kremlinology, 788 land policy, 822 liberalism, 861 Luzhkov, support from, 880 Ministry for Internal Affairs, 948 near abroad, 1031–1032 October 1993 events, 1084–1086 oligarchs, 420–421 party congresses, 1142 People’s Party of Free Russia’s opposition to, 1161 Political Advisory Council, 1338 presidency, 1220 Primakov, relationship with, 1223 Putin’s role in administration, 1254–1255 railways, 1267 Referendum of April 1993, 1277 Referendum of December 1993, 1277–1278 RSFSR Congress and Supreme Soviet, dissolution of, 486 Russian Movement for Democratic Reform (RMDR), 979 Russian Orthodox Church, 1321 Rutskoi and, 1337–1338 Shumeiko’s role in administration, 1390–1391 Soskovets, appointments of, 1430 State Secretary appointments, 1362 Stepashin’s support of, 1477

A N D R E I

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), 87–88 Treaty on Forming a Community, 1313 Union Republics’ sovereignty, 1280–1281 vodka industry, 31 Yavlinksky’s challenge to, 1704 Yeni Musavat Partiyasi, 982 Yerevan, 1336 Yermak, 1564 Yermak, Timofeyevich, 1710 Yermolin Chronicle, 255 Yermoova, Maria, 1537 Yesenin, Sergei Alexandrovich, 1710–1711 Yevtushenko, Yevgeny Alexandrovich, 1711–1712 Yezhov, Nikolai Ivanovich, 1472, 1712–1713 Yiddish, 149–150, 185–186, 703 Young-Guardists. See Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP) Young Pioneers, 88–89, 314 Young Russia (Zaichnevsky), 1209 Young Turks, 80, 116, 545, 795 Youth Communist Youth Organization, 313–314 stiliagi, 1478–1479 Ysyakh, 1345 Yudenich, Nikolai Nikolayevich, 1677–1679, 1713–1714 Yugoslavia Communist Information Bureau, 302 indicative planning, 659 Khrushchev, Nikita, 748 market socialism, 895 relations with, 1714–1715 Soviet split with, 275–276 Yurchenko, Vitaly, 370 Yuri Danilovich, 403, 1715–1716 Yuri Dmitrievich, 128, 265 Yuriev, Boris N., 103 Yuriev clan, 1296 Yuri Velten, 984 Yuri Vladimirovich, 695–696, 753, 1716 Yuri Vsevolodovich, 1716–1717 Yusupov, Felix, 1270

I V A N O V I C H

N

I N D E X

Z Zadonshchina, 1719 Zagotovka, 1719–1720 Zaichnevsky, Peter G., 1209 Zaikonospassky monastery, 910 Zakharins, 1296 Zakharov, Andreian, 10–11, 72, 541, 1036–1037 Zakharova, Larissa, 38 Zamyatin, Yevgeny, 1354 “Zapiski iz podpol’ia” (Dostoyevsky), 410 Zapiski (journal), 5 Zarutsky, Ivan, 951, 1216, 1551–1552 Zaseka. See Frontier fortifications Zaslavskaya, Tatiana Ivanovna, 1075, 1720 Zasulich, Vera Ivanovna, 1720–1721 Zavadovsky, Peter, 1410 Zboriv, Battle of, 742 Zealots of Piety, 104, 1056–1057, 1147, 1721 Zechariah, 712 Zemgor, 1723 Zemlya i Volya, 669 Zemshchina, 1111 Zemstvo, 1721–1723 Alexander II, 870 health care services, 628 limitation of powers, 40 Milyutin’s role in establishment of, 944 reform, 604–605, 615 zemstvo movement, 337 Zero-option, 1723–1724 Zhdanov, Andrei Alexandrovich, 1724, 1724–1725 Akhmatova and, 22 Communist Information Bureau, 302 economics, 1652 Kosygin and, 778 Malenkov, power struggle with, 846 socialist realism, 1416, 1418 Zhdanovshchina, 1146 Zhelyabov, Andrei Ivanovich, 1725–1726

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

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1827

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Z H E N O T D E L

Zhenotdel, 75, 496, 763, 1726–1728 Zhensovety, 1728–1729 Zhirinovsky, Vladimir Volfovich, 858, 1406, 1729, 1729–1730 Zhivkov, Todor, 184–185 Zhordania, Noe Nikolayevich, 1730 Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich, 737, 766, 970, 1730–1732, 1731 Zhukovsky, Nikolai Yegorovich, 6, 103, 1732 Zhukovsky, Vasily, 35, 1302, 1303

Zimin, Alexander, 128 Zimmerwald movement, 902, 1263 Zinin, Nikolai Nikolayevich, 5 Zinoviev, Grigory Yevseyevich, 1732–1733 July Days of 1917, 713 party congresses, 1140 show trial, 1249, 1389 Stalin, break with, 720, 838, 1576 United Opposition, 1615 Zinoviev letter, 1732, 1733

Zionism, 705, 1003, 1009 Zorkin, Valery, 318 Zoshchenko, Mikhail, 1418 Zosima, Metropolitan, 712, 713, 1424, 1543 Zoya (movie), 778 Zubatov, Sergei Vasilievich, 539, 1185–1186, 1733–1734 Zubov, Platon, 32 Zvezda, 673–674 Zyuganov, Gennady Andreyevich, 305–306, 1734–1735, 1735

Volume 1, pp: 1–424; Volume 2, pp: 425–882; Volume 3, pp: 883–1342; Volume 4, pp: 1343–1828

1828

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