1 SiVir^irvLT-BL LEVINAS CiUTICAL ASSESSMENTS CF LEADING PHILOSOPHERS
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EMMANUEL LEVINAS C...
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1 SiVir^irvLT-BL LEVINAS CiUTICAL ASSESSMENTS CF LEADING PHILOSOPHERS
ÌHùiì:d by CLAIRE EL3SE KATZ
EMMANUEL LEVINAS Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers
Edited by Claire Katz with Lara Trout
Volume IV Beyond Levinas
¡3 Routledge % Taylor & Francis Group LONDON AND NEW YORK
First published 2005 by Routledge 2 Park Square, M ilton Park, A bingdon, Oxon, 0 X 1 4 4R N Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by R outledge 29 West 35th Street, N ew York, N Y 10001 Routledge is an imprint o f the Taylor & Francis Group Editorial Matter and Selection €> 2005 Claire Katz; individual owners retain copyright in their own material
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication D ata A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library o f Congress Cataloging in Publication Data ISBN 0 -4 1 5 -3 1 0 4 9 -0 (Set) ISBN 0 -415-31054--7 (Volume IV) Publisher’s Note References within each chapter are as they appear in the original complete work
CONTENTS
vii
Acknowledgemen ts
Introduction: Who is the other? Moving beyond Levinas’s ethics
1
59 Who is my neighbor? Who is the Other? Questioning ‘the generosity of Western thought9
5
ROBERT BERNASCONI
60 Lévinas, Daniel Webster, and us: radical responsibility and the problem of evil
31
JEFFREY BLOECHL
61 Violence and the vulnerable face of the other: the vision of Emmanuel Levinas on moral evil and our responsibility
49
ROGER BURGGRAEVE
62 Hyperbolic justice: deconstruction, myth, and politics
67
JOHN D . CAPUTO
63 Levinas’s political judgement: the Esprit articles 1934-1983
85
H O W A R D CAYGILL
64 Ontological difference, sexual difference, and time
101
TINA CHANTER
65 Post-structuralism, the ethical relation, and the law
136
D R U C ILLA CORNELL
66 Facing nature: Levinas beyond the human
176
CHRISTIAN DIEHM
67 The possibility of an ethical politics: from peace to liturgy JOHN D RABINSKI
v
188
CONTENTS
68 Nameless memory: Levinas, witness and politics
213
JAMES HATLEY
69 Is liberalism “all we need”? Levinas’s politics of surplus
235
ANNABEL HERZOG
70 Reinhabiting the house of Ruth: exceeding the limits of the feminine in Levinas
259
CLAIRE ELISE KATZ
71 Am I obsessed by Bobby? (Humanism of the other animal)
283
JOHN LLEW ELYN
72 Thinking the Other without violence? An analysis of the relation between the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas and feminism
296
ROBERT JOHN SHEFFLER M A NN IN G
73 Fatherhood and the promise of ethics
307
KELLY OLIVER
74 A singular justice: ethics and politics between Levinas and Derrida
325
DIANE PERPICH
75 Repeating the parricide: Levinas and the question of closure
343
JOHN PROTEVI
76 Aesthetic totality and ethical infinity: Levinas on art
356
JILL ROBBINS
77 Writing as a man: Levinas and the phenomenology of Eros
369
STELLA SA N D FO R D
78 Faceless women and serious others: Levinas, misogyny, and feminism
388
CRAIG R . VASKY
79 Traumatic response: Levinas’s legacy
400
TINA CHANTER
414
80 Adieu JACQUES DERRIDA
81 In memoriam Emmanuel Levinas
427
PAUL RICOEUR
vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The publishers would like to thank the following for permission to reprint their material: The Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center for permission to reprint R obert Bernasconi, 'W ho is My Neighbor? W ho is the Other? Questioning “the Generosity of W estern T hought” ’, Ethics and Responsibility in the Phenomenological Tradition (Pittsburgh: Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center, D uquesne University, 1992), pp. 1-31. Fordham University Press for permission to reprint Jeffrey Bloechl, ‘Levinas, Daniel W ebster, and Us: Radical Responsibility and the Problem o f Evil’, International Philosophical Quarterly, 38, 3, 1998, pp. 259-73. Blackwell Publishing Ltd for permission to reprint Roger Burggraeve, ‘Violence and the Vulnerable Face of the Other: The Vision of Emmanuel Levinas on M oral Evil and O ur Responsibility’, Journal o f Social Philosophy, 30, 1, 1999, 29 -45. Brill Academic Publishers for permission to reprint John D. Caputo, ‘Hyperbolic Justice: D econstruction, M yth, and Politics’, Research in Phe nomenology, 21, 1991, pp. 3-20. Radical Philosophy Ltd for permission to reprint H oward Caygill, ‘Levinas’s Political Judgement: The Esprit articles 1934-1983’, Radical Philosophy, 104, Nov./Dec. 2000, pp. 6-15. Stanford University Press for permission to reprint Tina Chanter, ‘O nto logical Difference, Sexual Difference, and Time’, in Time, Death, and the Feminine: Levinas with Heidegger (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 37 -74. Copyright © 2001 by the Board of Trustees o f the Leland Stanford Jr. University. Used with permission of Stanford University Press, www.sup.com Cardozo Law Review for permission to reprint Drucilla Cornell, ‘PostStructuralism, the Ethical Relation, and the Law’, Cardozo Law Review, 9, 1988, pp. 1587-628.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
DePaul University for permission to reprint Christian Diehm, ‘Facing Nature: Levinas Beyond the H um an’, Philosophy Today, 44, 1, 2000, pp. 51-9. Sage Publications Ltd for permission to reprint John Drabinski, T h e Possib ility of an Ethical Politics: F rom Peace to Liturgy’, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 26, 4, 2000, pp. 49-73. Copyright © Sage Publications Ltd, 2000. Transaction Publishers for permission to reprint James Hatley, ‘Nameless Memory: Levinas, Witness and Politics’, in G. Ricci (ed.) Justice and the Politics o f M em ory, pp. 33-54. Volume 33 of Religion and Public Life (Piscataway, N J: Transaction Publishers, 2003). Copyright 2003 by T rans action Publishers. Sage Publications, Inc. for permission to reprint Annabel Herzog, Ts Liber alism “All We N eed”?: Levinas’s Politics o f Surplus', Political Theory, 30, 2, 2002, pp. 204-27. Copyright 2002 Sage Publications, Inc., reprinted with permission of Sage Publications, Inc. T he Pennsylvania State University Press for permission to reprint Claire Elise Katz, ‘Reinhabiting the House o f Ruth: Exceeding the Limits o f the Feminine in Levinas’, in T ina C hanter (ed.) Feminist Interpretations o f Emmanuel Levinas, University Park, Pa., Penn State University Press, 2001, pp. 145-70. Copyright 2001 by The Pennsylvania State University Press. Reproduced by Permission of the publisher. Continuum International Publishing G roup and Indiana University Press for permission to reprint John Llewelyn, ‘A m I Obsessed by Bobby? (Hum anism o f the O ther A nim al)’, in R. Bernasconi and S. Critchley (eds) Re-Reading Levinas (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), pp. 234-45. T he Pennsylvania State University Press for permission to reprint R obert Jo h n Sheffler M anning, ‘Thinking the O ther W ithout Violence? An A na lysis of the R elation Between the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas and Fem inism ’, The Journal o f Speculative Philosophy, 5, 2, 1991, pp. 132-43. Copyright 1991 by The Pennsylvania State University Press. Reproduced by Permission of the publisher. T he Johns H opkins University Press for permission to reprint Kelly Oliver, ‘Fatherhood and the Promise o f Ethics’, Diacritics, 27, 1, 1997, pp. 45 57. © The Johns H opkins University Press. D ePaul University for permission to reprint D iane Perpich, ‘A Singular Justice: Ethics and Politics Between Levinas and D errida’, Philosophy Today, 42, supplement, 1998, pp. 59 -70. Jackson Publishing for permission to reprint John Protevi, ‘Repeating the Parricide: Levinas and the Question of C losure’, Journal o f the British Soci ety fo r Phenomenology, 23, 1, 1992, pp. 21-32.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
L'Esprit Créateur for permission to reprint Jill Robbins, ‘Aesthetic Totality and Ethical Infinity: Levinas on A rt’, L ’Esprit Créateur, 35, 3, 1995, pp. 6 6 79. Radical Philosophy Ltd for permission to reprint Stella Sandford, ‘W riting as a M an: Levinas and the Phenomenology of Eros5, Radical Philosophy, 87, Jan./Feb. 1998, pp. 6-17. State University of New Y ork Press for permission to reprint Craig R. Vasey, ‘Faceless Women and Serious Others: Levinas, Misogyny, and Femin ism’, in A. B. Dallery and C. E. Scott (eds), with P. H. Roberts, Ethics and Danger: Essays on Heidegger and Continental Thought (Albany: State University o f New Y ork Press, 1992), pp. 317-30. Reprinted by permission from Ethics and Danger: Essays on Heidegger and Continental Thought, edited by Arleen B. Dallery and Charles E. Scott, the State University of New Y ork Press. © 1992 State University of New Y ork. All rights reserved. DePaul University for permission to reprint Tina Chanter, ‘Traum atic Response: Levinas’s Legacy’, Philosophy Today, 41, supplement, 1997, pp. 19-27. Stanford University Press and Jacques D errida for permission to reprint Jacques Derrida, ‘A dieu’, in Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas, translated by Pascale-Anne Brault and M ichael N aas (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univer sity Press, 1999), pp. 1—13. Originally published in French in 1997 as Adieu à Emmanuel Levinas by Editions Galilée. Copyright © 1997 Editions Galilée; English translation © 1999 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University. Used by permission of Stanford University Press, www.sup.org DePaul University for permission to reprint Paul Ricoeur, ‘In Memoriam: Emmanuel Levinas’, Philosophy Today, 40, 3, 1996, pp. 331-3.
Disclaimer The publishers have made every effort to contact authors/copyright holders of works reprinted in Emmanuel Levinas: Critical Assessments o f Leading Philosophers. This has not been possible in every case, however, and we would welcomc correspondence from those individuals/companies whom we have been unable to trace.
INTRODUCTION Who is the other? Moving beyond Levinas’s ethics
Levinas’s early com m entators sought to elucidate the multiple aspects or dimensions o f his project. However, over the past decade and a half, a sig nificant am ount of scholarship has been devoted to going beyond Levinas, either by addressing questions Levinas did not himself examine adequately or by applying Levinas’s analyses to domains that he did not consider at all. M uch o f this scholarship turns around the following question: ‘W ho is the other in Levinas’s project?’ Does our answer contribute something new to the question for ethics and politics? We can begin to see the problem o f nam ing the other with Levinas’s use of the term the 'feminine’, which punctuates his work from the 1940s through the 1970s (cf. Chalier, Chanter, Ainley, Irigaray). The status o f the feminine in Levinas’s project generated questions about philosophical essentialism, a female other as radically other and the significance of sexuality in ethics and philosophy in general. There were of course those who were disappointed with the ambiguities in the treatm ent of the feminine as figure and reality. The feminine was nam ed as eros, dwelling, the other of desire and then, finally, the privileged figure (maternity), the sensual experience of responsibility - the ambiguities are clear and still being debated. The ambiguities of the figure punctuate Levinas’s philosophical career. In Time and the Other, a long essay published in 1947, Levinas had not yet named the ethical relationship for which he is famous. In that essay, how ever, he defined the feminine no t only as the other, but also as the absolutely other to £him s But by the time his m ajor work, Totality and Infinity (1961), was published, the ethical relationship appeared to exclude the feminine in favour o f the factical other whose alterity was presumably beyond gender. In his m agnum opus, the feminine played a transcendental role, providing the m aterial and reproductive conditions that make the ethical relationship possible. It did not participate in the ethical relationship itself. So even in these two early works, the status of the feminine and its relationship to the ethical is already at issue. First, the feminine is nam ed the other, which is problematic, even though the other occupies a place of priority in Levinas’s 1
IN TRO DUC TIO N
project; then the feminine is excluded from the ethical relation, or at least positively defined in terms o f how it m akes the ethical relation possible. F ro m the questionable status of the feminine emerge several other problems. How the feminine is construed and w hat position it occupies forces the question, ‘W ho is or can be the other in Levinas’s ethical project?’ A lthough the status of the feminine gave rise to an abundance of commentary, the question of who can be an other can also be asked, for example, o f the no n hum an. Levinas specifies th at the face of the other is a hum an face; however, m any scholars wish to go beyond Levinas’s own words and apply his ethical relation to anim als and to the environm ent in general. The responsibility to an animal opens the possibility of anthropom orphism so that responsibility to animals proceeds from the ethical relation to humans. One can see how this application further complicates the relationship between ethics and politics. If the political addresses problems of distributing goods and services, the possibility o f w ar and the nature of choice involved in all these decisions, who and how such decisions are made, w hat does it mean to add the environ m en t including animals to those political beings to whom we are most obligated? The question of the political opens the question of mediation, the third party and how infinite responsibility can be limited. The interrogation of mediation also opens the question o f the status of art. If art has an ethical vocation, w hat is the relationship between the viewer of art and the one who is called by the face? Is there a line there th at circumscribes what can be considered an Other? M any people would conceive art as having an ethically critical, sometimes edifying vocation, but this opens the question o f how we see art and how it calls to us. Is it the sam e as a hum an face? F or Levinas it entails a different temporality. So can we draw a line that circumscribes who or w hat can be considered an other? Is there a way that Levinas’s reminder o f the other dem ands that we rethink how we view the environment, animals and so forth? A nd so we are led to the most contentious question to emerge from Levinas’s project: w hat does the political mean to and for Levinas’s ethics? H ere we find the m ost complex discussions in Levinas scholarship. Scholars working in this area are keen to see if Levinas’s work gives rise to a politics; if so, what would this politics be like? Is it based upon a utopic promise? D oes it pose the question of distributive justice? Should it limit itself to questions o f hum an (and others’) rights, outside the framework of the state? M any scholars are concerned with com ments that Levinas makes in his interviews, com ments that m ight otherwise be considered offhand remarks, b u t which are intensified by the nature of his own philosophical com m it m ent to the question of ethics and our responsibility to the other. A nd other scholars who remain sceptical that Levinas was not concerned with the political examine Levinas’s writings to engage directly political concerns. Finally, several scholars explore the remaining question: even if we have a conception o f the political that would com plem ent Levinas’s ethical project, 2
INTRODUCTION
what would be the relationship between ethics and politics? Those who criticize Levinas by claiming he does not address the political forget that for Levinas ethics is first philosophy. Politics is prescriptive and it introduces the third, thus placing it at the level of ontology. The essays collected in this volume represent the issues that extend beyond Levinas’s ethical project and critically probe into areas that concern feminism, environmentalism, aesthetics, politics and beyond. This volume also includes three memorial pieces w ritten just after Levinas died. Because these pieces also engage Levinas’s w ork philosophically, and have become essays often cited in the scholarship, it was appropriate to include them.
3
59
WHO IS MY NEIGHBOR? WHO IS THE OTHER? Questioning “the generosity of Western thought” Robert Bernasconi Source: R. Bernasconi, Ethics and Responsibility in the Phenomenological Tradition, Pittsburgh: Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center, Duquesne University, 1992, pp. 1-31.
Levinas is the philosopher of the other hum an being, or of the “other m an” as he tends to say in a form ulation whose sexist character is misleading but not, as will emerge, insignificant. The other hum an being is the “wholly other,” the Other. But who is the Other? In an early work, Time and the Other, Levinas wrote that “the O ther is w hat I myself am n o t” (TA 75; TO 83). This form ulation brings to mind a question that D errida, in “Violence and M etaphysics,” had addressed to Levinas’s language o f alterity: “Other than m ust be other than myself. Henceforth, it is no longer absolved of a relation to an ego. Therefore, it is no longer infinitely, absolutely other” (ED 185; W D 126). The dilemma is correctly posed by D errida, but in accordance with the order of a traditional logic that Levinas always denies can be applied to the face to face relation. The question of the present essay is somewhat different. Or, rather, it is a reversal of D errida’s question, cast now in an ethical, rather than a logical mode: m ust not the O ther have a relation to the ego precisely to the extent that the O ther is absolute, in the sense of com manding and challenging? In other words, the question con cerns the way in which the transcendent relation bears on the concrete. It is in p art a question of levels, a question that pervades Levinas’s work. The separation of the infinite order of transcendence from the empirical order of history is clearly m arked in Levinas and characterized in a num ber o f differ ent ways, for example in terms of desire and need, the saying and the said, and the absolutely O ther and the “other than.” A nd yet, given that Levinas locates the ethical, not away from the concrete, but in the concrete distur bance that transcendence creates within history, then the question of ethics 5
BEYOND LEVINAS
is always a question of the way that the “beyond” is reflected within experi ence without being reduced to it (Tel xi; TI 23). The O ther and the “other th a n ” at some point intersect, w ithout their being equated. This can be shown by even the most elementary paraphrase o f Levinas’s account of the face to face relation. The O ther is approached only in desire, an d yet not “with empty hands” either, for that would reduce the face to face as an ethical relation to a spiritual relationship, somewhat like Buber’s I-Thou. Thus, although Levinas contrasts, on the one hand, “strangers who are not wanting to one another,” with, on the other hand, “the plane o f the needy being . . (Tel 78; T I 104), he acknowledges that the two planes intersect: “To recognize the O ther is to recognize a hunger” (Tel 48; TI 75). M y hunger for the O ther might be insatiable, but the O ther has a hunger th a t it is my responsibility to satisfy. This, at its simplest level, is ethics for Levinas and it shows it as arising at the m om ent where the O ther interrupts m y complacency. The purpose of this essay is to complicate the picture somewhat. The focus of my recent work on Levinas has been to attem pt to develop a reading of his philosophical texts that finds in this intersection o f levels a response to concerns associated with the suspicion of ethics asso ciated with such thinkers as Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida. I have presented Levinas’s thought as an “ethics o f suspicion” and an “ethics against ethics.” 1 Nevertheless, at various points this reading meets a certain resist ance from Levinas’s own texts. An example, one am ong many, can be found in Levinas’s use of the phrase “norms o f m orality” (H H 56; CP 101) in the course of his attem pt in “M eaning and Sense” to answer the question of how we judge cultures. I shall return to this phrase later and offer more directly disturbing examples. The present essay, undertaken in the convic tion that Levinas’s texts provide one o f the m ost promising resources for addressing the enigma of persecution, haired, and violence, nevertheless finds those texts at times flawed or myopic in their treatm ent of these very issues. To paraphrase Derrida, my purpose here is to pose Levinasian ques tions to Levinas in an effort to develop his thought in a way different from th a t which can be found in his writings. I shall attem pt to do so by focusing attention on the O ther as ethnically other in a way that Levinas refuses m ost strenuously at the very m om ents when he comes closest to inviting it. On this occasion I shall limit myself to posing the question only in the context o f Lcvinas’s works, but it should not go unrecognized that the ethical as th a t which is custom ary am ong one’s own has long been haunted by the ethnic as that which is strange, foreign and alien. Among Jews, in a usage taken up by the Christian Church Fathers, it is the question o f the Gentiles. T he hunger of the O ther reflects back on me. It challenges my identity and, above all, my complacency and self-assurance. This has to be under stood in terms of the asymmetrical character o f the face to face relation, a relation which, it should not be forgotten, is introduced in Totality and Infinity as a “concrete,” even commonplace, moral experience (T el 24; 6
W H O IS MY N E I G H B O R ? W H O IS THE OTHE R?
TI 55). My needs and problems dissolve in the face of the needs and problems of the Other. This observation underlies the passage in Time and the Other in which Levinas declared that “the O ther is w hat I myself am not.” The phrase is ill-understood if read only as a com ponent p art of an ontology of social relations. W hen Levinas says that the O ther is “for example, the weak, the poor, ‘the widow and the orphan,’ whereas I am the rich or the powerful” (TA 75; TO 83), he means that I am rich because the O ther has needs. The needs of the Other, combined with w hat Levinas calls my desire for the Other, reconstitutes me as rich and powerful, whatever my empirical status may actually be. This means that in the face of the O ther I can no longer identify myself with what I have. M y power and wealth no longer confirms me. It is no longer mine. It is to be put at the O ther’s disposal. “The rela tionship with the other puts me into question, empties me o f myself and empties me without end, showing me ever new resources. I did not know I was so rich, but I no longer have the right to keep anything for m yself” (HH 46; CP 94). The O ther acts as my conscience. The descriptive terms that identify the O ther in his or her needs are not being employed solely descript ively, as they would be if they simply referred to character, physiognomy and psychology (TA 75; TO 83), or, for that m atter, to the sociological level. N o calculation or other assessment determines who is “better o ff” and so decides who is the O ther and who is obliged to the Other. Such calcula tions would be a question of justice and not of ethics for Levinas. Issues of responsibility are without proportion, as is clear from the m ost extreme form of responsibility, that where the one who is persecuted answers for the persecutor. Such is the enigma of the face. Even the hatred of the persecutor appears as something pitiful (AQ 141; OB 111). Nevertheless, the descriptive terms Levinas uses to refer to the O ther— as the weak, the widow, the stranger, the orphan and the needy— do more than determine the asymmetrical character of the relation. These terms are labels. They have a rhetorical force which needs to be examined. They are more than examples. They evoke a specific tradition and so give a historical determinacy to the way the issues are presented that cannot be ignored. Indeed, does not the introduction of these labels constitute a far from innocent imposition on the Other? Is there not a violence, almost to the point of oppression, in the resonances their application brings? Levinas is not unaware o f the violence of the face, even if he is less than clear how this relates to the ideologically charged faces to which he often appeals. “Ideology and Idealism” acknow ledges the M arxist critique o f ideology and the way it has been combined with Nietzsche and Freud (DV1 18; LR 237). There Levinas attem pts to give an ethical meaning to the twentieth century’s suspicion o f morality. But this does not free Levinas’s readers from the task of submitting his languageand their own—to the same suspicion. One should not underestim ate the difficulty. Levinas himself admits that his acknowledgement o f the imposs ibility of preaching after Auschwitz remains a form of preaching.2 7
BEYOND LEVINAS
The reference to the “widow and the orp h an ” is, of course, Biblical. So is the evocation o f the stranger, whose presence is m ost pronounced in Total ity and Infinity (Tel 47, 50, 188, 190, 222, 223, 229; TI 75, 78, 213, 215, 244, 245, 251). Nevertheless, Levinas’s appeal to the stranger is more than conventional or cultural. There is also a phenom enology at work, albeit a phenom enology beyond the phenom ena and at the level of the enigmatic. T he enigma bears an “exorbitant m eaning” which is “already effaced in its apparition” (ED E 209; CP 66). Its figure is the stranger as the one who produces a disturbance. The disturbance does not take the form o f a shock in which “a provisional incom prehension” is quickly turned into under standing (ED E 210; CP 67). This is im portant because, as I shall show later, the category o f understanding recurs in Levinas’s discussion o f the alien o r the foreigner in their m ost literal sense. Levinas draw s here on Ionesco’s The Bald Soprano where the doorbell rings but there is no certainty whether there is someone there or not (ED E 203; CP 61). The stranger “has come, to be sure, but left before having come, ab-solute in his manifestation. ‘A t the same tim e’ would not be enough for the breakup of order. In order th a t the tearing up from order not be ipso facto a participation in order, this tearing up, this ab-straction, must by a supreme anachronism , precede its entry into order; the past of the other m ust never have been present” (E D E 210-11; CP 68). The final phrase recalls the terms that Levinas uses to introduce the notion of the trace in “ M eaning and Sense,” in the course of underlining the point that the beyond is beyond disclosure and understanding. The face is abstract in the sense of disturbing immanence “w ithout settling into the horizons of the w orld” (HH 57; CP 102). T h at the face is abstract— “or, more exactly, absolute”—means to Levinas th at it is n o t integrated into the w orld (H H 46; CP 95). It is “w ithout any cultural ornam ent” (H H 48; CP 96). Does that mean that one m ust approach the O ther w ithout reference to his or her cultural identity, ju st as I am in rela tion to the O ther “without identity?” A t first sight it seems so. Just as the best way of encountering the O ther is not even to notice the color o f his or her eyes (Eel 89; El 85), so it seems clear that to encounter the O ther one must overlook the color o f that person’s skin. W hat could be less con troversial than the claims that abstract hum anism makes on behalf of the other as a hum an being? A nd yet, while skin color is of itself a superficial m arker, is there no t a violence implicit in the reduction of the alterity of the O ther to the status o f a hum an being like mel The question o f ethnic difference cannot be reduced to differences in appearances, which are m ore o r less visible depending on the groups or individuals involved. Has one welcomed the victim of color-prejudice when one still welcomes him or her only as hum an and w ithout recognizing, the positivity of th at which has previously been devalued?3 “Being hum an” is an idea with a content. Is it not imposed on the O ther by an “imperialism and egoism” th at “the hum anism o f the other m an” is supposed to counteract (HH 50; CP 97).
W H O IS MY N E I G H B O R ? W H O IS THE OTHER ?
Does it not compromise alterity? Does Levinas’s claim about the abstract ness o f the face m ark a certain continuity with abstract hum anism and its complicity with homogenization? Levinas’s emphasis on the O ther as étranger— stranger, foreigner, alien— offers a natural starting-point from which to develop such questions. A lthough Levinas occasionally writes o f my obligations to those I have never seen and those who will come after me, he most often follows the usage o f the Bible where the stranger is found nearby.4 This makes it less significant than it might otherwise be when in Otherwise than being the term “neighbor” came into prominence, largely at the expense of the term “stranger.” The O ther is the neighbor, albeit desire is still directed to “the stranger in the neighbor” (AE 157; OB 123). Levinas appears to appeal to the sense o f the proximity of the O ther to stress the immediacy o f my responsibility as a form of vulnerability, just as he appeals to the idea of strangerhood in an effort to convey the O ther’s needs. The conjunction of the two ideas contributes to the sense of w hat it means that I above all am the one responsible for the Other. “In proximity, the absolutely other, the stranger whom I have ‘neither conceived nor given birth to ,’ I already have on my arms, already bear, according to the Biblical formula, 'in my breast as the nurse bears the nurseling’ (Num bers XI, 12). He has no other place, is n ot autochthonous, is uprooted, w ithout a country, not an inhabit ant, exposed to the cold and the heat of the seasons. T o be reduced to having recourse to me is the homelessness or strangeness o f the neighbor. It is incumbent on me” (AQ 116; OB 91). In spite of having no connection or contract with the Other, almost as if it was because of it, responsibility for the stranger falls on me. For Levinas, there is not an other who is the Other. There is not simply the stranger and the neighbor. Ricoeur makes a similar point about the neighbor in his 1954 essay “The Socius and the N eighbor.” H e does it in a way that can serve as a valuable introduction to Levinas’s ideas, in spite o f the fact th at he is drawing on a text from the New Testament, Ricoeur’s essay takes up Jesus’s response to the question “And who is my neighbor?” Jesus answered the question by telling the parable of the G ood Sam aritan culminating in the com m and “Go and do likewise.” In the course of the parable, the term “neighbor” ceases to function as a sociological category and becomes “a pattern for action.” “Thus there is no sociology o f the neighbor. The science of the neighbor is thw arted by the praxis o f the neighbor. One does not have a neighbor; I make myself som eone’s neighbor” (HV 100; H T 99). The priest and the Levite of the parable correspond to categories. By contrast, being a Sam aritan is, according to Ricoeur, a “non category.” It is to be a “m an w ithout a past of authentic traditions; impure in race and in piety; less than a gentile; a relapse.” Ricoeur concludes that the neighbor “is characterized by the personal m anner in which he encoun ters another independent o f any social mediation” and that the meaning o f 9
BEYOND LEVINAS
the encounter “does not come from any criterion immanent to history” (HV 110; HT 109). This is his explanation of why there cannot be a sociology of the neighbor. Even if ignorance and prejudice exclude access to the neighbor as such, understanding is not sufficient to provide it. H ad Levinas identified the stranger as literally a foreigner, one whose country of origin is other th an my own, he would have neglected the disruptive sense of being a stranger and reduced the term to a sociological category. And yet there are still questions to be raised about Levinas’s apparent exclusion o f the encounter between cultures from the dimension of alterity. Levinas’s blunt refusal to apply the discourse of alterity to cultural or ethnic designations was displayed quite starkly in the course of a radio discussion held in 1982. In the afterm ath o f the massacres of Palestinian refugees at Sabra and C hatila by the Phalangists, during which the Israeli Defence Forces failed to intervene, the issue o f identifying the O ther was raised in a concrete context. Addressing Levinas as the philosopher o f the other, Shlomo M alka, the host, asked him whether, given that history o f politics is the site of the encounter with the “other,” the “other” of the Israeli w as not “above all the Palestinian” (IEP 5; LR 294). Levinas turned his back on this possibility in no uncertain terms. His answer is worth quoting in full. “My definition of the other is completely different. The other is the neighbor, who is not necessarily kin, but who can be. And in that sense, if yo u ’re for the other, you’re for the neighbor. But if your neighbor attacks another neighbor or treats him unjustly, w hat can you do? Then alterity takes on another character, then in alterity we can find an enemy, or at least then we are faced with the problem o f knowing who is right and who is w rong, who is ju st and who is unjust. There are people who are w rong” (IE P 5; LR 294). The second part of the quotation addresses the need to judge the O ther for the sake of the neighbor of the Other, an issue that m arks the passage from ethics to justice through the third party (AQ 200; OB 157). Hence the emphasis on a judgm ent as to who is in the wrong. As for the first part, one need not be shocked by Levinas’s apparent refusal o f M alk a’s invitation to embrace the Palestinian as the Other, as if he were somehow being inconsistent. The Palestinian is indeed other than the Jew. B ut that would only allow the Palestinian to be the O ther of the Jew if Levinas allowed such categories to operate at the level of transcendence, which he does not. It is true that Levinas m ight be thought to have missed an opportunity to intervene in the dispute between Jews and Arabs by disturbing the way the lines had been draw n and by introducing the idea th a t there m ight even be special ethical obligations to the Palestinian. But Levinas, one can say initially, attem pts to look beyond ethnic categories. This is not to deny that a Palestinian m ight be the O ther for a Jew, but it excludes the possibility that the Other o f the Jew is the Palestinian as such,5 W hen Levinas wrote that “the O ther is w hat I myself am not,” he did not w an t that proposition to be applied to cultural, national, religious, or racial 10
W H O IS MY N E I G H B O R ? W H O IS THE OTHER?
terms. And yet it is worth recalling that Levinas did in Time and the Other apply this phrase to sexual difference. To be sure, he did so in a disturbing m anner that has provoked extensive com m entary ever since Simone de Beauvoir brought Levinas’s account of the woman as O ther to instant notori ety on the grounds that “he deliberately takes a m an’s point o f view, disregarding the reciprocity of subject and object.”6 It is true th at Levinas had referred to the feminine as “the contrariety that permits its terms to remain absolutely other” (TA 77; TO 85). But it would perhaps be possible to argue th at by writing of the O ther of m an as a woman, w ithout exploring what it m ight mean for the O ther of a woman to be a man, Levinas was simply preserving the asymmetry of a relation that necessarily excludes reciprocity. In other words, it could be argued that in terms o f the social or face to face relation, as Levinas understands it, it would have been more objectionable for Levinas to attem pt to write from the perspective o f a woman. If that is granted, then de Beauvoir’s criticisms may not have been dismissed, but it has at least been shown that they were not couched in appropriate terms, De Beauvoir charged Levinas with “in fact” asserting “masculine privilege,” whereas he “intended to be objective.” But whatever Levinas’s intention was, it was certainly not that. The objective perspective is that of the third party and is blind to the transcendent relation that is at issue. As soon as it is a question of sexual difference, Levinas can write of the O ther only by writing as a man. To repeat, this is not to exonerate Levinas. It remains the case that Levinas was extraordinarily insensitive to a history, written from the phallocentric point of view, which has cast women as the other in order to marginalize them. However, it is not my intention here to take up the profound and complex discussion that attem pts to balance those considerations against Levinas’s acknowledgement o f the im portance of sexual difference as a formal structure that “conditions the very pos sibility of reality as multiple, against the unity of being proclaimed by Parmenides” (TA 78; TO 85).7 1 shall limit myself in the present context to noting a rem ark Levinas added in a Preface written in 1979 on the occasion of the republication of Time and the Other. There Levinas explained that he had initially sought the notion of a transcendent alterity starting with an alterity-content. Femininity was that alterity-content (TA 14; TO 36). In the present context, that suggests a way of rendering the issue more precise. The question is now: Should the notion of an alterity-content be revised? Indeed, can it ever be avoided when one writes of the Other? And, finally, might not other forms of difference, specifically ethnic difference, have an alterity-content? This is not to suggest that Levinas’s O ther is a Palestinian because Levinas is a Jew, any m ore than my O ther is poor because I am rich. Just as it is the need of the O ther that, in the face to face relation, enables me to discover myself as rich, so it m ight be said that in the face of the victim I discover myself as an oppressor. But even that fails to get to the heart o f the matter. It may be true that in a world governed by racism one 11
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cannot evoke the encounter between W hite and Black or between Gentile an d Jew w ithout recalling the deep effects of persistent persecution, but th a t does not exhaust the meaning of ethnicity. Levinas said it well with reference to Sartre's Anti-Semite and Jew: “We do not owe Judaism to anti semitism, no m atter what Sartre may say” (D L 290; D F 225). The best context within Levinas’s philosophical writings for raising the question th at there might be an “alterity-content” to ethnic and cultural differences is perhaps provided by the 1964 essay “M eaning and Sense.” I shall not attem pt here to outline the argum ent of “M eaning and Sense,” either in its introduction o f the trace or in its attem pt to confront M erleauP o nty ’s ontology of decolonization and its cultural pluralism with an insistence on an ethical orientation or sense that is prior to culture. The latter is in any event something I have recently attem pted elsewhere.8 On th a t occasion I focused on Levinas’s dissatisfaction with the way M erleauP o nty ’s philosophy of language challenged the Platonic justification of colonization,9 and not only because it led to the pluralist conviction o f an equivalence o f cultures that seemed to rule out the possibility of judging cul tures. M erleau-Ponty was also said to have neglected the fact th at this cultural pluralism was itself the effect of an orientation. Levinas’s focus on th a t orientation led him to recognize a sense or direction prior to culture, a position th at he identified as “a return to Platonism in a new way” (H H 5 5 56; CP 101). But if one w ants to question this “affirmation of the hum an independently of culture” (H H 56; CP 101), it is as im portant to focus on Husserl as on M erleau-Ponty. It is true that the reference to Husserl in “Meaning and Sense” is somewhat guarded. Or, rather, it has all the appearance o f being gratuitous. The reader is simply told that “we are not obliged to follow him [Husserl] down the way he took to rejoin this Platonism ” because “we think we have found the straightforwardness o f meaning by another m ethod” (H H 56; CP 101). But in an autobio graphical essay, “ Signature,” Levinas acknowledged a debt to Husserl and cast him in a favorable light: “In spite of his intelleclualism and his con viction about the excellence of the West, Husserl has thus brought into question the Platonic privilege, until then uncontested, o f a continent which believes it has the right to colonize the w orld” (DL 374; D F 292). It is, to put it mildly, something of a surprise to find Levinas praising H usserl in precisely these terms when it is the latter’s so-called “Vienna Lecture” th at seems to be the m ost obvious place to look for Husserl’s approach to this issue. It is a text which seems to be anything but a m ani festo of decolonization. The “Vienna Lecture” is an extraordinary document. It presents itself as a discussion of “the philosophical-historical idea (or the teleological sense) of European hum anity” inspired by a sense of “the European crisis” (K 314; C 269). In spite of the fact that the lecture was delivered in 1935, by the end of the text the word crisis is in quotation m arks as if in the course o f reflecting on these issues the crisis had somehow 12
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diminished. The failure of rationalism is only apparent, because the failure does not belong to the essence of rationalism but only to its superficial entanglement in naturalism and objectivism (K 347; C 299). Freed from these entanglements the possibility arises of grounding a purely self-enclosed and general science of the spirit. In keeping with the goals of this science, there is “no zoology o f peoples” because they are spiritual entities (K 320; C 275), Europe itself is not defined geographically as territory, but according to its spiritual shape: “In the spiritual sense the English D om inions, the United States, etc., clearly belong to Europe, whereas the Eskimos or Indians presented as curiosities at fairs, or the Gypsies, who constantly wander about Europe, do n o t” (K 318-19; C 273). “E urope” is thus “the unity of a spiritual life, activity, creation, with all its ends, interests, cares, and endeavors, with its products of purposeful activity, institutions, organiza tions.” In spite of the fact that he had experienced at first hand the ambitions of those who would exclude Jews, no doubt in his view on the basis o f a false philosophical idea, Husserl clearly believed that the Jews had a place in Europe understood according to its spiritual shape, or what he insisted on calling, “our Europe.” And so eventually would the gypsies, it seems. F o r Husserl’s approach is totalizing. “Beginning, as is necessary, with ourselves and our n ation,” one proceeds back into prehistoric times and allegedly discovers m ankind as “a single life of men and peoples bound together by only spiritual relations, with a plenitude o f hum an and cultural types which nevertheless llowingly interpenetrate one another” (K 319; C 274). H usserl’s illusions stretch further than his image of the “particular inner kinship of spirit” which runs through European nations, transcending national dif ferences (K 320; C 274). This sense of kinship was certainly about to express itself in extraordinary ways. If Levinas was right that Husserl had brought into question the right of Europe to colonize the world, it seems th at it was only by claiming that we recognize in all other hum an groups “a motive for them to Europeanize themselves even in their unbroken will to spiritual self-preservation” (K 320; C 275). Notice that “we” recognize this in “them .” Furthermore, “we, if we understand ourselves properly, would never Indianize ourselves, for example” (K 320; C 275). These may appear ju st to be ethno centric prejudices or “feelings,” but for Husserl they are “the expression of a vital presentiment which arises through unprejudiced reflection” (K 321; C 275). One does not have to look hard to see the effects of H usserl’s adoption of the Enlightenm ent’s teleological history of humanity. It appears in the hierarchy which emerges in the context o f the traditional definition of m an as a rational animal, when Husserl finds it necessary to say that “in this broad sense even the Papuan is a m an and not a beast” (K 337; C 290). The effect o f this teleology is, it is clear, the sense that Europeans, including Americans, are more hum an than, for example, gypsies. To be sure, Husserl is aware of the dangers o f the “fateful internal division of the folk unity 13
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into the educated and the uneducated” (K 333; C 286), but he believes th a t it is offset by the tendency of philosophy to spread. It spreads much in the same way that “the G reek nation” draws all of humanity under its spell (K 322-23; C 277) and so leads to the “supranationality” th at is on its way (K 336; C 289). How Levinas could not fail to have been scandalized by the “Vienna Lecture” is unclear, particularly when one thinks of him as the critic of Hegel and of a history w ritten only from the standpoint of the survivors or victors (Tel 218; TI 240). T hat in “Signature” he praised Husserl for questioning the W est’s right to colonize the world is mysterious, given the fact that neither o f them go very far in questioning th at privilege. But per haps even m ore striking is the fact that Levinas draws on Husserl’s lecture in constructing his own philosophy. The concept of the “norms o f m oral ity ” , Levinas’s answer in “M eaning and Sense” to the question of how it is possible to judge cultures (H H 56; CP 101), is drawn from Husserl. Husserl believed th at when the spiritual telos of E uropean hum anity becomes con sciously recognized, as it appears “we” can, it becomes practical as a goal of the will under the guidance o f norm ative ideas (K 321; C 275) that function in the spirit o f self-critique (K 336; C 289). Levinas’s debt to the “Vienna Lecture” is further apparent in the way he appears to identify the orientation prior to culture with Western thought. H e refers to “this so much disparaged W estern civilization, which was able to understand the particular cultures, which never understood themselves” (H H 55; CP 101). The claim is problem atic on a num ber of counts. First, it locates in the W est a privileged culture that exemplifies a direc tion or sense th at is allegedly prior to culture and history. Secondly, Levinas not only accepts w ithout question th at there is an iden tity to Western culture,10he even refers to “the generosity of Western thought” (H H 55; CP 101). This is a strange phrase for a Jew who has suffered persecution at first hand, first in Lithuania before the Russian Revolution an d then under the Nazis. But, for Levinas, Judaism is not the O ther of W estern culture. One of the benefits o f assimilation is that Western Jews became conscious of their p art in the birth of values that had become com m o n currency in the West (D L 358; D F 279). W estern culture is for him b oth Greek and Jewish, and the West excels on account of its capacity to understand other cultures. Thirdly, had not Levinas provided the basis for a radical questioning o f the correlation of knowledge and being as the basis of W estern philo sophy (EPP 41; L R 76)? Did not Levinas in Totality and Infinity expose the connection between the dominance within W estern philosophy of “the com prehension of being” and the concept o f totality, on the one hand, and totalitarianism , the tyranny of imperialist dom ination, on the other (Tel 17; TI 46-47)? Why does this thought, which challenges the ideal of com prehension because it reduces the otherness of the known in the course 14
W H O IS MY N E I G H B O R ? W H O IS THE OTHE R ?
of appropriating and grasping it (EPP 41; LR 76), nevertheless privilege W estern culture by appealing to its power to appropriate other cultures through its pursuit of a certain kind of knowledge? Finally, it is not always clear that Westerners move so easily between two cultures, except within the framework of appropriating or exploiting them. One way in which so m any Western philosophers appropriate other cultures is simply by attem pting to understand them within their own categories, w ithout disturbing the self-evidence of those categories. Even where, as was the case with Husserl, it is acknowledged that the idea of Indian philosophy was a falsification because it interpreted India in a European way (K 331; C 284-85), W estern philosophy still tends to understand all thought in its own terms, as prefiguring it or falling short o f it, but not as challenging it. C ontrast the oppressed minority which is required to learn to negotiate the dom inant culture while at the same time retaining a hold on its own. And yet, does not Levinas, in his confessional writings, recognize this as clearly as anyone? He writes, “Loyalty to a Jewish culture closed to dialogue and polemic with the W est condemns the Jews to the ghetto and to physical extermination. Admission into the City makes them disappear into the civilization of their hosts” (QLT 24; N T R 9). Levinas’s project o f trans lating the wisdom o f the Talm ud into a m odern idiom was presented from the outset as an always risky attem pt to address this dilemma, one that arises for any “m inority” culture that has not yet entirely lost its language. In this context there is no suggestion of the generosity that, according to “M eaning and C ulture,” is the hallm ark of W estern culture. Just as in White America there is almost total ignorance about a vibrant Black culture th at is often only a few streets away, so the Jewish ghetto kept alive “a world whose existence remained unsuspected by the surrounding society, which contented itself with a few summary notions about it” (QLT 25; N T R 10). Who is the stranger in this context? Levinas warns against a certain com fort that the dom inant culture can receive from the very language of strangerhood. These summary notions can keep the dom inant culture “from asking itself questions about the secret o f hum an beings it declared strangers in order to account for their strangeness.” T hat is to say, Western culture is not challenged by the stranger. It regards the stranger as a barbarian who has nothing to say precisely because he or she cannot speak “G reek,” cannot speak the language of the University. Levinas’s acknowledgement within his confessional writings o f the ap p ar ent complacency of G reek thought is hard to reconcile with his apparent celebration in “M eaning and Sense” of Western civilization’s ability to understand cultures that never understood themselves (H H 55; CP 101). At times it is difficult to avoid the conclusion th at Levinas’s own insistence on the generosity of European culture is itself a prime example of European complacency. It can be seen particularly in his interviews. W hereas Levinas is prepared to celebrate pluralism in the sense of the multiplicity of hum an 15
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beings, he showed something less than enthusiasm when in 1980 an inter viewer invited him to applaud the multiplicity o f cultures: not ju st Jewish an d Greek culture, but also those of the M ongols or the Indians. C haracter istically Levinas responded, n o t by showing enthusiasm for the plurality of cultures, but by repeating his praise o f the excellence of Europe: “It is E urope which, alongside of its atrocities, invented the idea of ‘deeuropeanization;’ th at is a victory for european generosity. F o r me, certainly, the Bible is the model of excellence; but I say that while knowing nothing of Buddhism.”11 A nother interview, this one with François Poirié in 1986, asked ab o u t Levinas’s relation to structuralism and elicited a similar response. Levinas conceded that, although he did not understand structuralism , nor see the point o f Levi-Strauss’s vision, he still recognized Lévi-Strauss as the preeminent m ind of the twentieth century. Levinas proceeded to say th at structuralism corresponded from the m oral point of view to “decolonization” an d the end o f Europe’s dominance. H e continued, “But my reaction is primarily— it is I know worse than prim itive— can one compare the sci entific intellect of Einstein with the savage m ind (la Penseé sauvage)Tn This gesture, which calls itself primitive while dismissing w hat it truly regards to be primitive, is, of course, another way in which some Europeans retain their sense of superiority, thereby allowing themselves a sense of cultural mastery. Finally, the m ost shocking indication of Levinas’s failure to appreciate oth er cultures and his privileging of the G reek and Judaic at their expense, is found in some gratuitous remarks m ade in the course of an interview conducted in G erm an.13 Asked whether the idea o f ethics as “first philo sophy” implies a distinction of levels, in which ethics is accorded a higher value over ontology, Levinas replied, “I always say— but in private— that the Greeks and the Bible are all that is serious in humanity. Everything else is dancing.” He added that this was true the world over, and, as if he had n o t already said enough, he uttered the phrase that too often in the history o f the last two centuries has served to confirm w hat it denies: “this is not racism .” Wolzogen, the interviewer, in part, one suspects, in an effort to m ove the discussion on to the question of Levinas’s relation to Nietzsche, b u t also perhaps in an effort to give Levinas an opportunity to salvage his remarks, offered Levinas the possibility o f giving a Nietzschean interpreta tion of the introduction of a reference to dancing here. Levinas refused the invitation to have his rem ark raised to a form al level and in its place pro vides the m ost concrete justification of it. He described how when television shows the terrible things going on in South Africa, people can be seen dancing in the middle of a funeral. W ithout any hint o f the power o f W est erners to understand other cultures, Levinas simply reiterated his surprise: “H ave you seen it? T hat is some way o f expressing sadness.” In the face of W olzogen’s response that it nevertheless still is a form of expression, Levinas replied: “Yes, certainly, to that extent I am still a philosopher. But it gives 16
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the impression of a dancing civilization in which they cry in another way.” These remarks were not a m om entary aberration. A nother interview con tains these lines: “I often say, though it’s a dangerous thing to say publicly, that hum anity consists of the Bible and the Greeks. All the rest can be translated: all the rest—all the exotic—is dance.”14 These quotations draw n from interviews reveal an aspect o f Levinas’s thought that is reflected in the rich and complex analyses to be found in his philosophical texts. However, it would be a mistake to assume th at the philosophical texts conceal behind their complexity the same appalling mes sage that is said so directly in the interviews. Levinas himself already warned in the Preface to Totality and Infinity that “philosophical research . . does not answer questions like an interview, an oracle, or wisdom” (Tel xviii; TI 29), The philosophical texts need to be read in a way appropriate to them. Nevertheless, at a very basic level—depressingly basic—these interviews do confirm w hat was already suspected on the basis of a reading of “M eaning and Sense,” that Levinas’s privileging of W estern culture, and specifically its capacity to understand other cultures, is at the expense of non-European or non-W estern cultures. It also invites two more far-reaching objections. First, does not Levinas give the impression of being too com fortable with terms like “the W est” and “W estern philosophy” for a thinker who has set himself against totalizing? Secondly, does not any attem pt to approach the O ther as outside o f culture (H H 46; CP 95), including this “hum anism o f the other m an,” not repeat the violence, long since exposed, of a hum anism that reduces the other to nothing m ore than a man, thereby depriving the O ther of his or her cultural identity? Is abstract humanism not the contem porary form of W estern ethnocentrism, sustained by its tendency to define and measure the hum anity of m an in terms of approxim ation to a European model? In this way is it not found to be complicitous with the racism it is supposed to contest? To put the same issue another way, having located the face to face encounter at another level from that of culture, Levinas seems to ignore the possibility that one of the ways in which the O ther might challenge my selfsufficiency is for the stranger to put in question my cultural identity. Did not even Descartes recognize as much when in the Discourse on Method he described how in his youth abandoned study and took to travelling? Having seen many extravagant and apparently ridiculous things commonly accepted “by other great peoples,” Descartes learned not to believe too firmly those things which he had been persuaded to believe by example and custom only.15 It m ight be objected th at w hat I am attem pting here is a distortion of the very basis of Levinas’s thought. It might seem that the introduction of the question of ethnicity from outside th at thought confuses the distinc tion between levels which separates ethics from justice, responsibilities from rights. A nd yet ethnicity is in one sense anything but at the periphery of Levinas’s thought. In the face to face relation I discover myself as other 17
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th a n the Other: the Other is w hat I myself am not. Could it not be that, where there is ethnic—or sexual—difference, then the ethnic—or sexual— identity of the O ther belongs to his or her very alterity as the O ther’s “alterity-content?” And yet n o t in such a way as to confirm me in my own identity. The O ther is not to be limited by stereotypes that I inherit and impose on him. or her. Or, m ore decisively, if one wants to find resources in Levinas to counteract w hat is m ost totalizing in Levinas and dismissive of ethnic difference, cannot one find it in his own understanding of w hat it means to be a Jew? It will not be an easy task to do so, especially as there are dangers in overvaluing particularity as one appeals to it to place a brake on the seemingly relentless process of universalization. Levinas broaches the question of Jewish identity in numerous places, b u t one that is particularly w orth pursuing in the present context can be found among his Talmudic commentaries. The Talm udic passage in ques tion reads: “One day, Rabbi Johanan ben M athia and to his son: G o hire som e workers. The son included food am ong the conditions. When he came back, the father said: My son, even if you prepared a meal for them equal to the one King Solomon served, you would not have fulfilled your obligation tow ard them, for they are the descendants of A braham , Isaac, and Jacob” (SS 17; N T R 98). Levinas’s com mentary reads in part, “In question is the other man, who descends from A braham , Isaac, and Jacob. But do not become alarmed. We are no t in the presence of a racist idea here” (SS 18; N T R 98). On this occasion it seems that Levinas’s denial of racism is more innocent than it was in the interview with Wolzogen. The idea is not racist because it can be given a universalist reading, which would overtake the particularist reading. W hat appears particular in the dem and is in fact also universal: “I have it from an eminent master: each time Israel is mentioned in the Talmud one is certainly free to understand by it a particular ethnic group which is probably fulfilling an incom parable destiny. But to inter p ret in this m anner would be to reduce the general principle in the idea enunciated in the Talmudic passage, to forget that Israel means a people w ho has received the Law, and, as a result, a hum an nature which has reached the fullness of its responsibilities and its self-consciousness.” O f course, the appeal to self-consciousness seems to be a legacy of the Enlighten m en t’s teleological histories o f mankind, as becomes even clearer if one continues the passage: “The descendants of A braham , Isaac, and Jacob are hum an beings who are no longer childlike. Before a self-conscious hum an ity, no longer in need of being educated, our duties are limitless.” Already then, immediately following the denial o f racism, there is a differentiation of m ankind into peoples, some of whom are self-conscious and some of whom are more “childlike.” And the distinction seems to be loaded with m oral implications. Is there not a suggestion here that our m oral obligations are greater to those peoples who are already educated than they are to, for example, gypsies or Papuans? 18
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Levinas’s own point in this context, however, is that the designation “Jew” is, at very least primarily, not to be understood as an ethnic term. The term Israel applies to “all hum anity.” “All men are on the verge of being in the situation of the State of Israel. The State of Israel is a category” (SS 170; N T R 191). Or, rather it is what Ricoeur called a “non-category.” To be a Jew, or rather, as Levinas would perhaps prefer to say, to be a Jew after Auschwitz, is not a particularity, but a modality. “Everyone is a little Jewish, and if there are men on M ars, one would find some Jews there.”16 This is the very meaning of Judaism, as Levinas understands it. At the moment when Levinas’s appeals to Judaism appear to make his work particular or ethnic in its own way, he gives a universalist meaning to Judaism th at is clearly apparent both in his confessional and philosophical works. In its vocation to address all m ankind, Judaism relies on the G reek language in which, allegedly, everything can be said. Levinas likes to say of his con fessional writings that he is attem pting to translate the Judaic wisdom of the Bible into the G reek language, the logos, the language of the University.17 But to translate the particulars of the Talm ud into a m odern language is to extricate its “universal intentions” from its “apparent particularism .” Levinas’s universalism am ounts to finding the word th at will enable the ancient Talmudic text to address “the problems preoccupying a person schooled in spiritual sources other than those of Judaism ” (QLT 15; N TR 5). The philosophical writings are in some ways an extension of this. So the references in “M eaning and Sense” to Platonism and to “a return to Greek wisdom” mediated by the development of contem porary philosophy (H H 56; CP 101) are misleading as well as unusual, because it is not really Greek wisdom that is at issue, but Judaic wisdom, albeit that Levinas m ust trans late it into the Greek language. This does not mean that the confessional writings direct the philosophical texts. If the nature of Judaism lies precisely in its capacity to overcome particularism, then Levinas’s philosophical writings are in a sense m ore Judaic—more consonant with the aspirations of Judaism —than the confessional writings. W hereas the commentaries on the Talm ud are only at one remove from the H ebraic text, his original philosophical works would be, if this is all that there was to them, a trans lation o f a translation and as such closer to “the original message” than the original. But can Judaism really be identified with such a universalism? Is Jewish identity functioning here only as another name for hum anity in its inner kinship, somewhat like H usserl’s European humanity? W ould this not be an extreme example of the totalizing Totality and Infinity exposed? Judaism ’s universality is not for Levinas only that of a generality imposed teleogically on humanity. Rewriting the famous saying of Latin playwright Terence, Levinas does no t say that it is because he is hum an th at nothing hum an is alien to him. It is as a Jew that he counts no hum an a stranger to him .18 Judaism retains a sense of its particularity, but a particularity that non-Jews can also share in, thereby conferring upon Judaism w hat Levinas 19
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tentatively calls “a meaning beyond universalism” (SS 47; N TR 115). The privilege Levinas accords to Judaism over W estern culture in general seems to lie precisely in its belief in a universalism that does not lose sight of particularity (ADV 232; L R 286). It is, therefore, never an easy m atter gauging the sense of Levinas’s references to Judaism. Or, rather, it is some w h at incautious to confine them to a single meaning. Particularly as the universal, as is not unusual also am ong hum anist philosophies, does not simply embrace its object. It carries its own standard, that admits o f grada tions within the universal. T o understand Levinas’s discussion of universalism one must understand the twin dangers to which it is a response. They are w hat another culture w ould call the dangers of segregation and integration. F o r Levinas, they are the choice between annihilation and assimilation. Loyalty to a Jewish cul tu re closed to dialogue condemns the Jews “to the ghetto and to physical exterm ination,” whereas “admission into the city makes them disappear into the civilization of their hosts” (QLT 24; N T R 9). This is the problem to w hich Levinas sees Zionism and the translation o f H ebraic wisdom into G reek as the solution. Levinas does not simply equate Israel with the U ni versal. There is also the Israel of Fact, “a particular reality that has traversed history as a victim, bearing a tradition and certainties that did not wait to win acclaim from the end o f H istory” (D L 288; D F 223). It is by reference to the particular history o f Israel therefore, th at Levinas departs from the idea of Israel as a universal, as if it were equivalent to the teleological idea o f the West from Enlightenment hum anism to Husserl. If Israel incorpor ates Western values, but goes beyond W estern universalism without returning to “religious particularism ,” it is not only because Judaism addresses its “exceptional message” to all (ADV 232; LR 287). It is also because Israel cannot be equated with humanity without one recalling in addition, as Levinas reminds us elsewhere, that one must think not only o f the highest forms of hum anity, but o f the fact th at “hum anity includes the Inhum an” (D L 288; D F 223-224). A nd then the term Israel refers also to the Jewish people, their language, their books, their law and their land, all of which are to be understood to be at stake in the persecution o f the Jews. One can reach a similar point by another route by following Levinas’s attem pt to address the difference between Greek wisdom and the wisdom o f the m onotheistic religions. Greek logic established harmony between peoples on the condition that the interlocutor agrees to speak, but, for the Greeks, no one could oblige the O ther to enter into discourse. By contrast, monotheism has “the word that one cannot help but hear, and cannot help b u t answer” (D L 232-33; D F 178). M onotheism is therefore what is lacking to Greek wisdom. But w hat is monotheism? It is found in the de facto com munity of Jews, Muslims and Christians who, whatever their disagree m ent, taught universalism to the world. “It is the perhaps supernatural gift o f seeing th at one man is absolutely like another m an beneath the variety of 20
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historical traditions kept alive in each case. It is a school o f xenophilia and anti-racism ” (D L 232; D F 178). These remarks are extraordinary, but not for the reason that allows Levinas himself to think that these “pious thoughts and generous thoughts” might be found extraordinary: that he unites Jews, Christians, and Muslims, against their wishes perhaps, into a community. W hat is even more extraordinary is Levinas’s virtual neglect on this occa sion o f the fact that this xenophilia and anti-racism was accompanied by, and perhaps often only a distorted echo of, an acute and violent racism. The omission is bizarre because Levinas elsewhere not only highlights the fact o f anti-semitism, he also elevates it to the level of a philosophical category. It is in the notion of anti-semitism that one m ust look for Levinas’s unique contribution to the discussion of ethnic difference, in spite of the extreme paradoxes and problems to which this notion gives rise. Certainly Levinas’s decision to give the name “anti-semitism” to all “hatred for a man who is other than oneself” (DL 361; D F 281) is at very least contentious.19 It is arguably quite brutal. Sometimes Levinas explains this gesture by appealing to the historical claim that the Jews were the first to feel the fragility of humanism in W estern liberalism. But how does the general term “hatred” come to be translated by the m ore particular word, “anti-semitism”? This can hardly be described as translation into Greek or into the language of the university. A nd w hat kind of universalism is this by which a Jew appears to appropriate for his own people all the w orld’s suffering so that anti-semitism becomes “the archetype of all internm ent” (D L 201; D F 153)? Levinas writes in “Politics After!”: Anti-semitism is not simply the hostility felt by a m ajority towards a minority, nor only xenophobia, nor any ordinary racism, even if it were the ultimate rationale of these phenom ena that are derived from it (throughout her work, Eliane Lévy-Amado argues for this quasiontological structure of anti-semitism). It is a repugnance felt for the unknown within the psyche of the Other, for the mystery of its interiority or, beyond any agglomeration within an ensemble or any organization within an organism, a repugnance felt for the pure proximity of the other man, for sociality itself. (ADV 223; LR 279)20 This analysis places a shadow around the notions of Otherness, interiority and proximity as they are found within Levinas’s thought, and it will be particularly puzzling to those of Levinas’s readers who have not appreciated quite how insistent Levinas is that the face solicits violence, as well as for bidding it (e.g. Eel 90; El 86). But at the same time as locating racist violence within the face to face, Levinas seems to privilege anti-semitism and so threatens to reproduce that violence. This gesture by which the name o f anti-semitism is taken as the title of hatred of one for another wherever and 21
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whenever it occurs can, however, be read differently, so long as the chain linking anti-semitism to persecution and thus to responsibility is maintained. Levinas writes that “To be persecuted, to be guilty w ithout having com m itted any crime, is not an original sin, but the obverse of a universal responsibility— a responsibility for the O ther— that is more ancient than any sin. It is an invisible universality!” (D L 290; D F 225). This move from persecution to responsibility places Levinas’s whole discussion o f anti semitism within the discourse of asymmetry. Levinas on such a reading is n o t to be taken to be recommending that, for example, all victims o f racism the world over should themselves embrace the name anti-semitism, which as a proposal would be almost as violent a denial of the victim’s particularity as the racist attack itself. It is rather th at Levinas finds in the experience of anti-semitism the explanation o f a sense o f election: “The traum atic experi ence of my slavery in Egypt constitutes my very hum anity, a fact th at immediately allies me to the workers, the wretched, and the persecuted peoples of the w orld” (DL 44; D F 252). In this it bears comparison with the claim that “in the essence o f blackness all injustices against all people are com batted,” where the emphasis, somewhat differently, is on the com batting o f injustice rather than the suffering of the victim.21 Levinas’s discussion of anti-semitism thus points beyond a point to which he would want to take it, a point where it would reassert the ethnic identity of the victim. Racial persecution is an experience of total passivity, by its very intention paralys ing any flight and refusing any conversion (DL 26; D F 12). So if racism docs call its victim to his or her “ultimate identity,” it is not an identity that can in all cases be given the name “anti-semitism.” It is only the Jew who can discover in anti-semitism, not a racial identity which separates him or her from the members o f other races, but “an invisible universality” (D L 290; D F 225). Blacks could make the same discovery only under some such name as anti-blackness. A nd so on. But perhaps this is the point. The language o f the victim is not a universalizable language. N ot so much because it is one from which torm entors, persecutors and racists are excluded, although there is some truth to that, as because it is discovered only in responsibility, my responsibility for the entire universe. If the per secuted alone can discover this responsibility, it is perhaps because “to be responsible despite oneself” is itself “to be persecuted” (SS 46; N T R 114). A nd just as 1 am not persecuted for being hum an, it is not simply as human, one of many, that I am responsible at the level of responsibility that Levinas’s thought envisages. But even if the way I have just outlined of addressing these issues were judged to be reconcilable with a dimension of Levinas’s texts,22 does it go far enough? Levinas’s own notion of responsibility can be the measure of that. It is a hard measure, given that it is a question of an infinite and inexhaustible responsibility. Although Levinas’s notion of responsibility might seem to be excessive within the context o f a fram ew ork set by individualist 22
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presuppositions, it provides the best resources for addressing institutional and established injustices in which I am implicated, although I never willed them and found them already in place. It is here in a responsibility divorced from guilt, “the responsibility o f those ‘who have done nothing,”’ but who “prior to any act” are concerned with the O ther (IEP 2; L R 290), that the evasions o f those who excuse themselves on the grounds that they did not create the inequity are addressed. Such evasions are themselves not only lim ited to individuals, as is clearly apparent when one examines the linguistic juggling to which Levinas m ust have recourse in order to challenge the dom inant ethical language. Traditional m oral language is put under strain as soon as one attem pts to use it to address the legacy o f a past th at I may not have participated in, but which I may inherit as a beneficiary. And so the question m ust be posed again: is Levinas’s account of the encounter with the Other as stranger sufficiently nuanced as to be able to welcome the O ther in his or her ethnic identity beyond the prejudices that divide ethnic groups? A passage from “M eaning and Sense” highlights the problem. MerleauPonty had observed that one learns a second language w ithout passing through the intermediary of esperanto and had concluded that cultural plur alism am ounted to a belief in the equivalence o f cultures. Levinas responded th at there is nevertheless an orientation that leads one to learn another language and to prefer speech to war (H H 36—37; CP 88). Indeed the belief in the equivalence o f cultures was itself an effect o f this orientation, the orientation Levinas identified as “the generosity of W estern thought.” But beyond this orientation, the Greek language came to serve Levinas as a kind of esperanto, providing the universal tongue in which everything can be said, unlike esperanto, w ithout loss. The problem is not only that Levinas writes as if it was the glory of the W est that the French learn Chinese, as if he had forgotten that the Chinese also learn French. There is more than reciprocity. There is mastery. It emerges very clearly at the point where, in sisting that a slave can reach the same geometrical truths as the master, Levinas adds the proviso, borrowed from P lato’s Meno (82b), that the slave “ ‘understands G reek’ which enables him to enter into relationship with the m aster” (HH 33; CP 86). In the case o f M eno’s slave, whose nam e inciden tally is never given, there is no problem. He was born in his m aster’s house. But the requirem ent recalls the familiar practice whereby the m aster is apparently not under the same obligation to learn the language o f the slave th at the slave is under to learn the language o f the master. It is one thing to philosophize about the stranger who disturbs one’s self-complacency. It is another to be identified at birth by the dom inant culture as an outsider, an outcast, an other. Although Judaism is a constitutive com ponent of W estern culture this did not stop many W estern Europeans from considering the Jew not just a stranger, but even as the archetypical alien. Levinas only rarely approaches 23
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Judaism from th at standpoint, although he does introduce his first volume o f Talmudic readings by recalling the tendency to declare Jews “strangers in order to account for their strangeness” as a way o f avoiding seeking a m ore intimate knowledge (Q LT 25; N T R 10). N or does Levinas negotiate the dialectic whereby one is a stranger to oneself because one belongs to a culture which constitutes one as other. A nd yet this alienation would seem to identify, albeit in very different ways, the fundam ental experience of being Jewish am ong Gentiles, or being a Palestinian in Israel, or being one o f the colonized am ong colonialists, or being Black in a W hite m an’s world, or being a w om an in a m an’s world. Levinas identifies as the Bible’s “per m anent saying” the fact that the “ uncondition” of being strangers and slaves in the land of Egypt brings m an close to his neighbor (H H 97; CP 148-49). B ut Levinas moves so quickly, particularly in the philosophical context, to understanding this as a universal condition, that he minimizes the sense in which it is emphatically, though certainly not uniquely, a Jewish condition. For however much one might w ant to insist on this as the hum an condition, or the basis of W estern experience, or even the experience of modernity, one cannot deny th at different ethnic groups know it in different degrees, if at all, and know it differently. In a Baptist church in the U nited States, only a black pastor, n o t a white pastor, could tell his congregation that they are in danger o f having forgotten w hat it was like to live as a slave in Egypt. Everyone is responsible, but not everyone is a victim. This suggests that there are limits to translation that G reek as the universal language does not acknowledge. Levinas allow himself the luxury of the promise of this universal lan guage of the West. This encourages him, it seems, to take the step, learned perhaps from Husserl, whereby being hum an reaches its fulfillment in being W estern. “Being a W esterner” is the title of an essay Levinas wrote on Leon Brunschvicg, but even if Levinas repudiates Brunschvicg’s version o f the idea, he does n o t deny the idea (DL 69-73; D F 46-49). Where Levinas departs from Brunschvicg is in proposing that Jewish universalism can save humanism from the empty universalism into which it sometimes falls. Being a W esterner is, for Levinas, n o t something confined to the West. It is open to all. To say Judaic wisdom in Greek is to say a universal message—the responsibility o f all for all— in a universal language. Denying an alterity-content to other cultures, there is nothing to make this new colonialism hesitate. Meanwhile, Levinas never denies that Jewish univer salism reveals itself in particularism (D L 216; D F 164). The problem lies less w ith this appreciation of Judaism , than— as I tried to suggest above— with Levinas’s appreciation o f other cultures, although the two may n o t be unconnected. One might from outside Judaism grant Judaism a certain uniqueness both to its universal message and to its particular status as victim, but it is precisely the latter th a t should cause Levinas to pause. In trying to explain “the ultim ate essence o f Israel,” Levinas refers to a 24
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universal history, a history for all, that derives from “its innate pre disposition to involuntary sacrifice, its exposure to persecution” (D L 290; D F 225). Levinas continues in the same paragraph to refer this persecution to responsibility in a passage I cited earlier with the suggestion th at the language of responsibility was in Levinas always a language o f asymmetry. Thus precisely at the point where Levinas makes the move identifying the Jew with the Westerner, and indeed with the hum an being as such, he evokes the asymmetry of responsibility. How then is one to understand this move to the universal th at still speaks “in the name of that original responsibility, in the nam e o f this Judaism ” (DL 291; D F 225)? Is this still a uniquely Jewish discourse with all the strengths and lim itations that that implies? Or has persecution in the process of universalization been taken out of history to form a kind of “trace?” That would be to deny the real victims of history the recognition that Levinas, in opposition to a universal history of the Hegelian type, would w ant to give them. It would be to succumb to the “humanism for the arrogant” o f Western trium phalism at the price of “the humanism of the suffering servant— the History of Israel” (DL 223-224; D F 170-171). Or is Levinas not acknowledging an asymmetry at the cultural level? Asymmetry can perhaps be conveyed in Greek, but the Greek logos revolts against its appar ent incoherency, as shown for example in Dostoevsky’s phrase, quoted by Levinas: “every one of us is responsible for every one else in every way, and I m ost of all.”23 Is not Levinas saying something parallel in the con fessional writings, and in the process introducing alterity into the heart of his discussion of culture? As a Jew, he says to Jews that they find themselves more responsible than the others, not because of w hat they have done, but because o f w hat they have suffered. The question is how that might be given a universal significance in philosophical texts without imposing a Jewish destiny on all peoples and imposing the label of anti-semitism on all victims. How can one universalize a particularity w ithout denying other particularit ies, the particularities of Others? Is this really a move “beyond universalism?” W ould not the acknowledgment of the alterity-content of other cultures better meet that description? It is never short of presum ptuous to attem pt to improve upon original thinkers by reminding them of other possibilities their thought contains, as if they might have forgotten an earlier insight in the haste of writing.24 The situation here is more sensitive still for entirely different reasons, reasons arising from the history of Judaism. It would probably be inappropriate for a non-victim to do m ore than make tentative suggestions to Levinas here where his own experience has been m ost telling. In any event, the point th at has to be made does not pertain to his understanding o f Judaism, but to the hint o f Western triumphalism that remains in his discussion. The best way o f approaching the issue might therefore be to set Levinas against himself once more, by citing the discussion in Difficult Freedom that appears under 25
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the heading “Messianism and Universality” (D L 122-129; D F 91-96). There Levinas asks if messianism with its sense o f the absurd element in history is still possible. The question is a condem nation of the hypocrisy o f “the messianic prophetism of the com fortable bourgeois,” but it is also a reflec tio n on Judaism ’s opening onto politics. It is often suspected, when one reads only Levinas’s philosophical texts, that Levinas leaves only a very subsidiary space for politics. The confessional writings with their Zionist “aspirations” tell a different story. This is n o t the place to present that story, to reread the philosophical texts in terms o f it, or even to question its con sistency with the philosophical texts. The point here is only to suggest th at it was perhaps Levinas’s Zionism that led him to say of history what he would never have adm itted in Totality and Infinity: “But since the Emancipation, we can no longer separate reason and history so radically—perhaps because since the eighteenth century, reason has penetrated H istory” (D L 127; D F 95). Here is perhaps the source of Levinas’s rehabilitation of the West, a move made all the more compelling to him because however much the Jew has been considered the stranger and the outcast by Western society, Judaism became a com ponent part o f the West. The West “displays itself as the com m on inheritance of humanity: every m an and all peoples can enter on the same terms to occupy a place at the level suited to their innate powers an d to their calling” (ADV 231; LR 285). The West is conceived o f as the unity of philosophy and the Bible, the conjunction of Greek and Jew, to the exclusion or diminishment of everyone and everything else--especially dancers. All other cultures are reduced to the level of folklore and local color (ADV 230-231; LR 284-285. D L 76; D F 52).25 The idea of the West seems to be w hat protects Levinas from an encoun ter between cultures at the level of alterity. There are times when Levinas comes close to allowing for a cultural pluralism of the kind that the plural ism among individuals found in Totality and Infinity would seem to invite (Tel 93 -94 and 195-196; T I 121 and 220-221). It happens, for example, in an essay called “From the Rise of Nihilism to the C arnal Jew.” There, in the midst o f a discussion of the vocation o f Israel, he steps back and allows every nation the consciousness of an exceptional destiny: “Every nation w orthy of the nam e is chosen” (DL 289; D F 224). Every people is a chosen people. But instead o f allowing th a t to introduce a m om ent o f self questioning, Levinas appealed to the notion of responsibility to suggest that “each nation m ust behave as though it alone had to answer for all” (DL 289; D F 224). A lthough Levinas seems to mean no more than th at each nation has a universal responsibility, the slippage between having to answer for all and having the answer for all is particularly acute. O f course, in dem anding this responsibility for Israel, whether it be that of answering or th a t of giving an answer, Jews are simply dem anding w hat had been denied them before the State of Israel was revived in 1948. Outsiders have no right to expect more from Israel than from other nations. W hat is worthy of note 26
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is simply how quickly the reference to other nations and their consciousness o f an exceptional destiny disappears. If there is an answer in Levinas to the question of w hat judges cultures, it remains the classic Enlightenment answer, the idea of the West. A nd it determines, within a schema which is Levinas’s, but which is perhaps n ot properly Levinasian, the question of the identity or non-identity o f the O ther as neighbor and stranger. And this in spite of the tendency of the W est to approach Judaism primarily in its strangeness, notw ithstanding the fact th at the W est has in no small measure been constituted by Judaism. W ith the idea o f the West and the exaltation o f W estern philosophy, Levinas allowed his “humanism of the other m an” to share some of the characteristics o f a more classical humanism, the humanism of cultural, social, and educational elites. But although these are grounds for hesitating before Levinas’s explicit exclusion o f ethnicity from the encounter with the O ther at the same time th at he thinks of that encounter explicitly with reference to Judaism, it is not to deny the resources his thought offers for breaking through the dom inant schema of W estern dogmatism. One can say more justly of Levinas w hat he himself said of Husserl, that he shows the way to question the privilege th at the West accords to itself to colonize the world. If at times Levinas still seems to judge other cultures simply by their proximity to his own, this should n ot be considered sufficient reason to dismiss his thought, before the resources of that thought have been explored. Forem ost am ong those resources is Levinas’s acknowledgement that the self-questioning th at originates from the gaze of the O ther always takes place as an interruption o f my complacency. W hat disturbs the self-evidence that supports my unquestioned attachm ent to my own cultural values is not ju st the O ther as such. It is the O ther in his or her specific cultural difference from me that presents a direct challenge to my own cultural adherences and calls me to respond w ithout any certainty of the appropriate way in which to respond or the idiom in which to do so.26
Key to abbreviations ADV AE C CP DF DL DV1
V au-delà du verset. Paris, Editions de M inuit, 1982. Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de Tessence. The Hague, M artinus Nijhoff, 1974. The Crisis o f European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Trans. David Carr. Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1970. Collected Philosophical Papers. Trans. A lphonso Lingis. The Hague, M artinus Nijhoff, 1987. Difficult Freedom. Trans. Sean Hand. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, 1990, Difficile Liberté. 2nd ed. Paris, Albin Michel, 1976. De Dieu qui. vient à l’idée. Paris, Vrin, 1982. 27
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ED EDE E el El E PP
HH HT HV IE P K
LR NTR OB QLT SS TA T el TI TO WD
L ’écriture et la différence. Paris, Seuil, 1967. En découvrant Vexistence avec Husserl et Heidegger. Paris, Vrin, 3rd ed., 1974. Éthique et Infini. Paris, Librairie A rthèm e Fayard, 1982. Ethics and Infinity. Trans. R ichard Cohen. Pittsburgh, Duquesne University Press, 1985. “Ethique comme philosophie prem iere,” Justifications de Véthique. X IX Congres de l’association des sociétés de philosophie de langue française. Bruxelles: Editions de TUniversité de Bruxelles, 1984, pp. 41-51. Humanisme de Vautre homme. M ontpellier, F ata M organa, 1972. History and Truth. Evanston, N orthwestern University Press, 1965. Histoire et vérité. Paris, Seuil, 1955. “Israël: éthique et politique” (with Alain Finkielkraut and Shlomo M alka), Les nouveaux cahiers 71, 1982-83, pp. 1-8. Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transcendentale Phänomenologie. Edited by W alter Biemel. The Hague, M artinus Nijhoff, 1962. The Levinas Reader. Edited by Seân Hand. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1989. Nine Talmudic Readings. Trans. Annette Aronowicz. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1990. Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. Trans. Alphonso Lingis. The Hague, M artinus Nijhoff, 1981. Quatre lectures talmudiques. Paris, Editions de M inuit, 1968. Du sacré au saint. Paris, Editions de M inuit, 1977. Le temps et Vautre. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1983. Totalité et Infini. The Hague, M artinus Nijhoff, 1961. Totality and Infinity. Trans. Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh, Duquesne University Press, 1969. Time and the Other. Trans. Richard Cohen. Pittsburgh, Duquesne University Press, 1987. Writing and Difference. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1978.
Notes 1 See in particular, “The Ethics o f Suspicion,” Research in Phenomenology vol. 20, 1990, pp. 3-18 and “Levinas and the Ethics o f Conscience,” Krisis, forthcoming. 2 See “Diachronie et représentation,” University o f Ottawa Quarterly vol. 55, no. 4, 1985, p. 99; trans. “Diachrony and Representation” in TA 120. 3 See Frantz Fanon, Peau noire, masques blancs, Paris: Seuil, 1975, ch. 5, pp. 9 0 116; trans. Charles Lam Markmann, Black Skin, White M asks, New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1967, pp. 109-140.
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W H O IS MY N E I G H B O R ? W H O IS THE OTHER? 4 “Love your neighbor as yourself.” But who is the neighbor? Le prochain or le lointain? The precept o f Leviticus XIX, verse 18, is rewritten soon after in verse 34 as a command to love as oneself the stranger that “stays in your land” and to count such a person as native to the land. The reason given is because “you were once strangers yourselves in Egypt.” Levinas participated in a brief discussion o f this passage in a conference held in 1959. He introduced the precept in an attempt to move discussion away from the problem o f the relations between Jews and Arabs and in an effort to insist on the universalist character o f “the chosen people.” La conscience juive, Vendôme: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963, p. 114. It is precisely his desire to universalize while at the same time bypassing the question o f ethnic difference that is under scrutiny in this essay. 5 For a discussion by another o f the participants in the radio interview that con tributes to an understanding of the issues it raises see Alain Finkielkraut, “Le risque du politique,” Emmanuel Levinas, ed. Catherine Chalier and Miguel Abensour, Paris: Editions de l’Herne, 1991, pp. 468-476. 6 Le deuxième sexe, Paris: Gallimard, 1949, vol. one, p. 15; trans. H, M. Parshley, The Second Sex, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953, p. xvi n. 7 See Tina Chanter, “Feminism and the Other,” in The Provocation o f Levinas, edited by Robert Bernasconi and David W ood, London: Routledge, 1988, pp. 32-56; and also the essays by Luce Irigaray, Jacques Derrida and Tina Chanter in Re-reading Levinas, edited by Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991. 8 “One-Way Traffic: The Ontology of Decolonization and its Ethics,” Ontology and Alterity in Merleau-Ponty, edited by Galen A. Johnson and Michael B. Smith, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1990, pp. 67-80. 9 This characterization o f Platonism is based on a translation o f Plato into a modern idiom, so that Plato is said to believe in a privileged culture that is “capable o f understanding the provisional and as it were infantile character o f historical cultures” (HH 31; CP 84). It is a culture “that would consist in depre ciating the purely historical cultures, and in as it were colonizing the world” through a philosophy which goes beyond cultures. 10 Cf. “Etre occidental” DL 69-73; trans. “Being a Westerner” DF 4 6 -49. 11 Entretiens avec Le Monde. 1. Philosophies Paris: Editions La Découverte, 1984, p. 147. 12 François Poirié, Emmanuel Levinas. Qui êtes-vous? Lyon: La Manufacture, 1987, p. 131. See also the reference to “the absolute indifferentism o f Tristes Tropiques” at DL 259; D F 201. 13 “Intention, Ereignis und der Andere. Gespräch zwischen Emmanuel Levinas und Christoph von Wolzogen am 20. Dezember 1985 in Paris.” Humanismus des anderen Menschen. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1989, p. 140. 14 Raoul Mortley, French Philosophers in Conversation, London: Routledge, 1991, p. 18. 15 Discours de la M éthode, Oeuvres VI, ed. C. Adam and P. Tannery, Paris: Vrin, 1982, pp. 9-10. 16 Entretiens avec le Monde, p. 147. 17 See, for example, A l'heure des nations Paris: Minuit, 1988, pp. 63-65. 18 “La renaissance culturelle juive en Europe continentale,” in Moshe Davis et a l , Le renouveau de la culture juive, Brussels: Editions de l’institut de Sociologie de TUniversité Libre de Bruxelles, 1968, p. 27. Cf. Terence, The Self-Tormentor, trans. John Sargeaunt, London: Heinemann, 1920, p. 125. 19 See also the dedication to Autrement qu’être: “To the memory of those who were closest among the six million assassinated by the National Socialists, and o f the
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20 21
22
23 24
25 26
millions on millions o f all confessions and all nations, victims of the same hatred o f the other man, the same anti-semitism.” The fact that these words stand, if not in Levinas’s most important and original philosophical book, at least within its covers, makes the problems caused by the gesture all the more complex. The distinction between confessional and philosophical writings cannot be appealed to here. See also the 1970 essay “Séparation des biens,” in Emmanuel Levinas, ed. Catherine Chalier and Miguel Abensour, p. 467n. The quotation is from Reginald Martin’s discussion o f Eldridge Cleaver in Ishmael Reed and the New Black Aesthetic Critics, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988, p. 19. I put it no more strongly than that because I cannot wholly withdraw the sus picion that Levinas perhaps in part identifies all hatred as anti-semitism because he would regard hatred as an offence against the universal message o f Judaism, that is to say as an offence against a teaching that is uniquely Jewish, or at least originally Jewish. This would return us to the other meaning o f Judaism which, however ineradicable from Levinas’s writings, can be understand as its sole mean ing only by setting Levinas irresolvably against the possibilities that his thought opens up, possibilities that I continue to call Levinasian so as not to belittle the originality and profundity with which he approaches the ethics of asymmetry. F. Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, trans. David Magarshack, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1958, vol. 1, p. 339. It might be thought that I have forgotten an essay in which Levinas does give another meaning to culture apart from its more conventional meanings and in a way that might seem in certain respects to be applicable to some of the issues found here. The essay is “Détermination philosophique de l’idée de culture,” Philosophy and Culture. Proceedings o f the XVIIth World Congress o f Philosophy, Montreal: Editions du Beffroi, 1986, pp. 7 3 -82. However, I consider Levinas’s discussion too sketchy to be built on. See my “One-Way Traffic: The Ontology o f Decolonization and its Ethics,” pp. 76--80. See also “La Bible et les Grecs,” A l’heure des nations, Paris: Minuit, 1988, p. 156. Some o f the ideas found in this paper were developed in the course o f three presentations: at DePaul University in February 1991, at the Simon Silverman Center at Duquesne University in March 1991, and at Brigham Young Univer sity in June 1991. I am grateful to the audiences on those occasions, and particularly to Paul Davies, John Llewelyn, David Krell, Charles Scott, Michael Zimmerman, James Faulconer, Travis Anderson, Terry Warner, and Amit Sen for their comments.
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LÉVINAS, DANIEL WEBSTER, A ND US Radical responsibility and the problem of evil Jeffrey Blocchi Source: International Philosophical Quarterly 38(3) (1998): 259-73.
W hen Jabez Stone agreed with the Devil to exchange his soul for seven years o f prosperity, he expressed a conviction that evil not only walks this earth but also has a power all its ow n.1 When, however, at the end o f those seven years and then three more, Stone enlisted Daniel W ebster to challenge the legitimacy of th at pact before a court of law, he placed his hopes in the somewhat different idea that justice is received from beyond the reach of evil and its allure. The Devil, poor Stone tries to believe, has power over him not by any alleged right but instead simply because he himself, in choosing to live by crude am bition, has also given up the capacity to resist him. So he appeals to Daniel Webster, the one m an sure to have kept his wits and powers about him. The outcome of the story is well-known: W ebster’s tireless and impassioned oratory convinces even a jury of hell’s own inmates to decide in favor of Stone, thereby depriving the Devil o f a soul and sending him on his way to new seductions. The storyteller’s faith in Daniel W ebster’s capacity to overcome even the m ost profound evil is, we know, a distinctly modern one—at least where “m odern” has stood for a com mitm ent to our own ability to transcend actual conditions and achievc a perfect world in fa c t} Surely, this sort of confidence is with us still, even after we have abandoned every other u to pian aspiration. Ours continues to be an age o f faith in one’s fellow hum an being, expressed perhaps as follows: “Deep down, beneath all o f the petti ness and am bition instilled in him by a world run dry of responsibility and compassion, my neighbor is kind and merciful,” or “The hum an heart itself is first and foremost good, if also constantly besieged.” These are familiar sentiments. So too are the shock and confusion which so many o f us have 31
o ur own? Unexpectedly, this same optimism is also to be found in the philosophy of Emmanuel Lévinas, who is otherwise know n as a sharp and insightful critic o f the same m odern ethos with which we have just identified him. Indeed, b o th Lévinas’s optimism and his anti-m odern stance can be found together a t the very core of his argument, where he commits us to the concrete attainm ent of a just act which suspends any and all self-interest in favor of the concerns of the other person. Is this really possible? The question is unavoidable and indeed weighs heavily on Lévinas’s work as a whole. It also allows us to be very precise: if m odernity has sometimes tended tow ard a utopism of the state or society, Lévinas would seem to rely on a utopism o f the individual act. Still, since that perfect society would obviously be built on the possibility of perfect acts, a critique of the latter might well shed some light on the former. The target here, to speak plainly, is a certain optim ism in ethics which is, I contend, distinctly m odern, even if it is also present in such a formidable critic o f m odernity as Emmanuel Lévinas. Hence, my hypothesis: should it be necessary to abandon this optimism as it occurs in the arguments o f Lévinas, it m ight also be necessary to re-consider n o t only the m odern ethos which he himself puts in question but also at least the single response to it which he has led many o f us to adopt. I leave it an open question (for discussion elsewhere) as to whether some o f the so-called m oderns might themselves come to our aid in resisting Lévinas. Lévinas’s dispute with modernity is unm istakable, if not always worked o u t in great detail. Confronted by K a n t’s m oral philosophy, for instance, he objects to the way in which religious transcendence— or what he prefers to call “infinity”— appears only as an “ideal of reason,” thus defined in function of hum an finitudc as “a projection of its exigencies in a beyond, the completion of w hat is given incom plete.. . ”3 Against this Lévinas insists on the reverse order o f analysis, such that it m ust be the idea of infinity which defines hum an finitude, and not the contrary. It is in this line, then, th at he defines his ethical subject not by the ideal of autonom y but by the sheer fact of an original and irrecusable heteronom y. The argument in support o f this claim is dialectical, appearing first to cede to the position o f his opponent, only to reverse it by uncovering a still deeper, opposed phenomeno logical datum. This movement is plainly evident in Totality and Infinity: Lévinas approaches human life beginning from a tension observed between the individual subject in its spontaneous self-concern and the relation w ith the other person which that very self-concern seems to resist or even to exclude. But even as he thus seems to concede that we do indeed relate first to ourselves, he remains a virulent opponent o f any claim for the primacy of 32
to have overlooked or even to have closed itself to that deeper relation, with the result that we its progeny com fortably assume ourselves to be the origin o f our acts and the center of our world. The operative distinction here bears repeating: while Levinas himself clearly acknowledges the innocence of a spontaneous self-centeredness at the level of lived experience, he also speaks of a “violence” in the idea th at it is irreducible or inevitable. This involves the indictment of two prom inent concepts, each of which is the alleged focus of a m ajor strand o f W estern thought. On the one hand, by submitting to the G reek dem and th at every thing which is to be thought m ust become present, or manifest itself, traditional theology has claimed to supply the meaning o f even religious transcendence, hence enclosing us within the totality of w hat can be grasped by the exercise of reason. On the other hand, with its great attention to themes such as moods, corporeal sensibility, and the intersubjective dim en sion of all meaning, phenomenology will have uncovered numerous indications o f a passivity or vulnerability at the heart of our drive for autonom y, only to cover it over again by shifting the locus of existence and experience from autosnomos to solus ipse (deeper, no doubt, yet still within the self). A t stake in both o f these disputes is the definition of religious transcendence— first, where it is, according to Levinas, submitted to our limited ability to think it, and second, where a philosophy of individual finitude is made the basis and reference point of not only reflection but also experience. Together, these two arguments define a position which is as simple as it is reductive: whether crystallizing in ontotheology or culminating in egology, W estern thought has with few exceptions been a long adventure of immanence whose structure is judged negative or, again, “violent.” W hat I have called Levinas’s “optim ism ” shows up first in the fact th at these criticisms are predicated on the real possibility of opening ourselves to an otherness beyond any and all concern for ourselves. If there is to be any sense to his use o f the ethically pejorative word “violence,” we must also conceive of a “peace” which somehow suspends or even eradicates it, if only for a moment. Concretely, it m ust be possible in fa ct and not merely in theory to place the concerns of the other person before my own, before my entire being and thus w ithout any concern for myself. Unless I can, if only for the briefest o f moments or in the simplest of acts, put every private interest or higher aim aside and attend to the other person before myself, it cannot be contended, as Levinas does, that my very existence, precisely as mine, excludes the other person. N or, of course, can he condemn the think ing which tries to describe something in us that is immune to the question of openness and closure to the other person. Levinas’s critique of “violence” is 33
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accom panied by an argum ent that that imm unity is actually a sort o f recal citrance. His vision of “peace” seeks to overcome it. Lévinas considers the difference between openness and closure to the other person to be specifically ethical because he interprets the other's strange ness to me as a lack of everything familiar and sustaining to me.4 W hat permits us to assume that this strangeness constitutes poverty and not wealth, o r even excess? The only possible confirm ation for this m ust be a sim ultane ous definition o f the whole o f individual existence by a tendency to satisfy itself. For Lévinas the subject is inherently and thoroughly imperialistic. It lives for itself, devouring the world that it meets as if it were offered for the taking. Hence, the m etaphor of an interrupted meal provides Lévinas with his interpretation o f the encounter with another person. His or her face does n o t merely stop my chewing or catch my hand as it reaches across the table; it confronts me with a poverty that indicts even the acts by which I have already begun to feed myself. This person who lacks anything that I recog nize as nourishing is comprised of a hunger which “tears the bread from my m o u th .” Because I am first and m ost deeply in relation with the other per son, he or she will have been there not only during but also before I have m ade anything my own. Because he or she has this otherness anterior to the life I live for myself, his or her face alone is enough for me to learn that, before I have taken these things for myself, there has already been this other person whose claim on things is prior to my own. It is in this sense that the face of the other expresses an ethical com m and which takes hold o f the deepest root of my being. This is where Lévinas’s confidence in the individual, ethical subject reaches its peak. If, as we have seen, his ethics o f absolute alterity is also an ethics of radical responsibility, then its final p ro o f m ust rest, paradoxically enough, on the most rem arkable of individual achievements: as the price o f peace an d justice, the same subject which Lévinas has hitherto defined by its selfinterest will now commit itself, in at least a single act, solely to the concerns o f the other person. These two principles—radical responsibility and the selfless act which embodies it— fram e Lévinas’s general definition of evil. Evil, we are now to think, consists in any act, process, or condition which results in a qualifica tion of the absolute responsibility denoted in the simple fact that the otherness o f the other person is anterior to everything making up and referring to myself. There is, in short, the goodness of transcending all such qualifica tions, and the evil which hinders or even resists that movement. If we accept this still quite classical definition of evil as a privation o f good5 and then set aside the evil o f natural events which cause suffering, we come finally to the specifically ethical problem o f evil as it occurs in hum an action. As opposed to the inexplicable character of earthquakes and tidal waves, the evil hum an act involves not only the corporeal aspect of life but also its spiritual aspect, where it is a m atter of the hum an will and intellect. Vladimir Jankélévitch 34
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has made this distinction rather clearly: whereas there is something terribly “absurd” in the evil o f natural events violating a previous peace, there is “scandal” in the evil of an act contrary to an order which I must give to myself.6 Lévinas complicates this scheme by indicating as ethical not only the clearly scandalous evil of deliberately ignoring or neglecting the other person in need, but also— and already at the same time— a sense in which each of us is always culpable in our very being insofar as it refers to itself and not the other. While there is no contesting the assertion that it is evil to use another person for personal gain, one will certainly hesitate before the idea that life itself, in the innocence of eating and breathing, is nonetheless also guilty of overstepping the prior claims o f the other person. Bearing in m ind that both of these definitions result directly from Lévinas’s strong emphasis on the otherness o f the other person— in effect, placing both individual being and the individual act under ethical pressure7—that hesitation takes shape in a twofold objection. On one hand, one cannot help wondering whether the full scope of w hat we spontaneously recognize as moral evil can be adequately brought out and addressed if thus immersed within the ego’s relation to itself. To be sure, Lévinas himself serves notice that this self-concern is not a m atter simply of exaggerated pursuit of autonomy. There is powerlessness in the very experience o f having to pursue autonom y, of having to re-assert or re-establish ourselves in a constantly changing world. Evil, then, like all other acts, has roots beyond or perhaps beneath our control. But in order to account for this, is it sufficient for Lévinas to go only one step deeper, where it can be seen that individual life, for better or for worse, operates on the narcissistic assum ption that all things refer to oneself? In order to under stand the meaning and experience of that narcissism, and thus not only to describe an act which is evil but also to explain why it is that we do it, is it n o t necessary to seek the roots of that narcissism, the dynamism o f our being, in relation to something else— something at w ork in me before or ap art from my relation with the other person? On the other hand, and at the opposite extreme of the spectrum on evil, one m ust also ask about the sense of making culpable a dynamism which is indispensable and (for Lévinas, at any rate) “innocent” and “sincere.”8 Even if it is true that individual life serves itself before the other person, w hat sense can it make to indict it alongside neglect or outright aggression? Here it is not so much a question of a failure to appreciate the real difference between what is unavoidable and what is deliberate, as a question o f the m an ner in which that difference is articulated. In question is the establishment - -inevitable from the m om ent that Lévinas defines being by a tendency to close itself to the o th e r—of an unbroken continuum from the unavoid able to the deliberate, with the result that the difference between them would seem to be one only of degree. While the evil in simply being is no doubt minimal, and while w hat is thus evil (being) is at the same time a capacity 35
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eventually to choose for the good, it remains the case that for Lévinas each o f us begins from a situation not merely of finitude but of guilt. M oreover, in the absence o f effective intervention (in face of the other person), it w ould seem that this guilt can only grow. O ur innate tendency to relate first to ourselves will, he leads us to think, pass necessarily from the spontaneous pursuit of autonom y through acts of petty violence and then (how to stop it?) greater ones, arriving finally at m urder, genocide, and the m onstrous evil o f pretending to justify it. Is the difference between basic self-interest an d legislated genocide merely one of degree? This returns us to our first line o f objection. A re there no essential differences between the many faces o f evil?9
II In question, then, is the necessity of an essential distinction between the evil inhering in the finitude o f the responsible person and the evil which th at person may actively commit against other people. According to the ethics o f absolute otherness, which is necessarily also an ethics o f radical responsibil ity, n o t only is individual existence always already guilty o f having sustained itself on nourishm ents claimed first by the other person, but the act which turns explicitly away from th a t prior claim can bring nothing new to that original guilt except, of course, a greater intensity. If at this point one recog nizes that it can be meaningful to speak of an evil which permeates the entirety of being only by also defending a G ood wholly beyond being, then one will also see a similar com plem entarity between Lévinas’s unbroken continuum o f evil and the idea that there is no way out o f it—no way fully to live up to radical responsibility—except by leaving behind the conditions o f one’s own existence. This is a dangerous teaching: where the ideal o f true respect resides in an unreserved and unqualified com m itm ent o f oneself to the other person, the good life peaks on the verge of self-annihilation. Faced by the insatiable need of the other person— insatiable because, according to Lévinas, his or her otherness will always appear to me precisely as need— how will the line be drawn between my responsible life and my death for the other, if not according to a decision which, as mine, is evil? U nder w hat conditions do I ever have the right, and no t merely the capacity or the innate tendency, to say “this is too much to ask”? The pertinence o f such questions is confirmed by the fact that Lévinas him self seems to have anticipated them. Suicide, he tells us, is never ethical, n o t least because it still falls within the scope of acts governed by the indi vidual’s own perspective and intentions. T o take one’s life into one’s own hands, even out o f concern for the other person, is to arrogate for oneself the authority to determine the content of responsibility. It is, in other words, to mistake a desire for responsibility for responsibility itself, which always 36
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exceeds and puts in question each and every form that it may take for us.10 We are thus served warning against a com mon misconception: Levinas can not speak of dying for the other except in terms of his own original conviction th at any single act is always already for the other whether one realizes it or not— a conviction which in fact makes the idea o f literal self-sacrifice ethically suspect, to say the least. W hat is difficult about Levinas’s position, we can conclude, lies not with a law satisfied only with suicide but instead with one that not even suicide could reach.11 This prohibition of suicide is only apparently at odds with the previous idea that Levinas’s definition of responsibility admits no limits. The real target of the argument, we have already seen, is freedom conceived as the right to determine the content of that responsibility.12 To include the extreme selfsacrifice o f suicide for the other person under that conception is thus to call us to a point where even that possibility is surrendered as egocentric and therefore unjust. It is to require us, as the price of true respect, to relinquish all claims, present and future, to decide for ourselves w hat the other person needs, and instead to commit the whole of our being—again, present and future— to him or her. To be sure, Levinas nowhere pretends th at this could ever be a final and lasting conversion, as if one could become justly selfless once and for all. The argument is rather for a life o f constant vigilance against itself, against the narcissism of being oneself. Such will be the terrible decision for the good life: henceforth I will live by the idea th at everything I am and do is subject to an immediate ethical rectification, with that very rectification itself also requiring further rectification, and so forth. The deci sion for justice, in other words, is a decision not for death but for a tireless obsession. Like all obsessions, this one is divided between a drive to redeem oneself and a scruple at every attem pt to do so.13 The path to this conclusion is by now familiar. Absolute otherness denotes radical responsibility, which in turn places the responsible subject under a com m and to justice which it can neither truly evade nor finally satisfy. Assenting to this command means surrendering all claims to determining the content o f one’s responsibility, or justice. Concretely, this means com mitting one’s every act—indeed, one’s entire being— to a task which is by definition endless. W hatever I may do for the other person, in the end he or she is still other, still needy; hence, the obsession. There is always an appeal for more and thus always an obligation to renew one’s efforts. My sense of guilt can only deepen. There is no conversion and no rite o f purification. Even the act dedicated to goodness is contam inated by evil. W hat is perhaps less evident is the way in which all of this— and indeed the entire argument—flirts with divinizing the other person. Levinas’s utm ost candor on this point underscores its importance: the face of the other is the self-expression of absolute exteriority, a transcendence which can only be called religious.14 One then immediately anticipates Levinas’s conception of religious blasphemy, that gravest of evils in which one claims to speak in the 37
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place of G od Himself: how else could he conceive of this than as an exten sion o f one’s own self-centeredness beyond merely granting oneself a m om entary exemption from one’s responsibility, all the way to claiming th a t it is in fact proper for all o f us to do so? Blasphemy thus exceeds simple im m orality by universalizing a transgression, whether by denying that it was ever prohibited or by openly advocating it for everyone. Since this am ounts to speaking in place of the law, which for Lévinas is the strict contrary of w hat the law itself commands, it can be said that blasphemy does not merely resist the G ood bu t goes so far as to oppose it. The evil of blasphemy is a “dem onic” evil.15 The “dem onic” is thus to be found whenever we submit to the ever present tem ptation to draw essential limits for our responsibility, whenever we give in to the idea that hum an finitude is defined elsewhere th an in the face o f the other person, whenever, in short, we allow ourselves to believe that G od himself has determined that we need go only a certain distance, and this for the benefit of everyone involved. Need it be said that the true meaning o f this blasphemy is self-idolatry? F or Lévinas, to commit oneself elsewhere than to the other person is, quite simply, to take m atters wholly into one’s own hands. It is to place oneself in charge, to bow before no one and nothing, except one’s own urges and abilities. It is interesting to note how closely together this brings the just act, which commits itself to the Good, and the diabolical evil, which is decidedly opposed to it. Faced by the other person and cognizant of everything which this requires, one is at a “crossroads” beyond which it is necessary to choose the G o o d not merely here and now but also with a resolution to m ake this choice the rule for all future behavior.16 To embrace peace and justice truly is to make m ore than a m om entary com mitm ent. One m ust accept forever the radical responsibility which alone determines the good life. One must inscribe it at the heart of every expectation and intention. One must give oneself the law, once and forever. Such, at any rate, would seem to be the unavoidable conclusion. Yet, is this not also the very sort of thought that Lévinas has led us to consider as demonic? Can he really distinguish between these two? Lévinas’s ethics of radical responsibility refers us to a law which infinitely tra n s cends and thus has always already w ithdrawn from each and every form in which it is said to be incarnate. How is this very claim not itself a single example of the contrary idea that our relation to the law in fact requires some such incarnation? W ith Lévinas, it is difficult not to raise the trans cendental question: is his notion of a G ood transcending every incarnation n o t itself a particular incarnation of the G ood? On one level, this question challenges the universal scope o f Lévinas’s ethics centered on a Good beyond all context. If the G ood is always already incarnate, we have no relation to it which does not begin from within an historical and personal context. On another level, we m ust also ask about the proper status of what Lévinas him self agrees is inevitable— the establishment of our relation to absolute 38
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transcendence in a tangible formula or image. This is not w ithout immediate consequences for an approach to the problem of evil. Bear in mind th at we can actually live by the G ood only insofar as it is somehow incarnated, only insofar as our relation to it is concretized. On Lévinas’s own account this occurs not by some choice or intention but according to an act rooted in the same spontaneous narcissism which he would have us consider as the com mon denom inator of all evil. We finite creators cannot help b ut grasp the G ood. The G ood is always a G ood insofar as we can understand it, even if we also know that that understanding certainly does not exhaust it. Does this not mean that the G ood in fact requires this alleged evil? Why, then, speak o f it solely as evil? W hy the pronounced emphasis on guilt and expia tion?17 Or, conversely, and even accepting this harsh vision, why call Good w hat touches us only to insure that everything we are and do necessarily includes at least some cause for apology and regret?
Ill If there is an aporia in Lévinas’s approach to the problem of evil, it certainly does n ot lie in a failure to work out the extreme consequences o f the posi tion he has taken. Because the otherness of the other is absolute, responsibility can only deepen one’s sense of an indebtedness prior to any origin or ground. “The m ore I answer the more I am responsible. . . the more ju st I am the more guilty. .” 181 am always already for the other person, always already responding to him or her even in my m ost selfish moments— a fact which is changed not at all by the just act com mitted in good conscience, except th at I now move directly and wittingly tow ard the otherness which I have presupposed all along. If, as Lévinas would have it, m oral evil is simply original responsibility in retrograde, then, conversely, a life is good—it overcomes all evil— only to the extent that it conforms to a responsibility which is pre-ordained. If there is evil clinging to even the m ost dedicated act, then the possibility of perfect conformity will have been ruled out in advance. The G ood which transcends anything and everything that we may m ake o f it is also a G ood which affords us no consolation. M oreover, for Lévinas, precisely this infinite withdrawal and the rigors which it implies for existing and thinking constitute the positivity of this extraordinary tran scendence. W hat only the righteous am ong us seem to have understood is nonetheless true for everyone: we can never have the G ood beyond being— beyond the surge of narcissism—because, says Lévinas, even as we attem pt to do so, it is the G ood which has us.19 Still, from virtually any other perspective, w hat does seem to be lacking in this position is an account of the motivations behind either the act which would put aside all personal interest in favor o f this G ood or the previous act in which the G ood itself will have made such a demand. While the latter of these two concerns would certainly be dismissed by Lévinas as 39
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nonsensical, the former touches on a point th at he would be hard-pressed to deny is essential. How could one become m otivated actually to serve the other person before oneself? This could, for instance, be a m atter o f such innate sentiment as pity or compassion. Y our face, then, would stir in me a spontaneous feeling which puts me on my way to helping you. This is already problematic. To begin with, it is immediately necessary to distin guish the sentiment itself (pity, compassion) from the ensuing act. It seems clear that w hat Lévinas has led us to call the respectful or conscientious act m ust be reserved for the latter. But this would seem to make the act follow a personal sentiment and not the ethical appeal which gives rise to it. Even if Lévinas is willing to re-define the full gam ut of such affective responses by a more profound susceptibility which is strictly ethical— and there is no m istaking this intention on his part—there remains the difficulty of explain ing how it is that only some of those affections are conducive to ethical respect and, furtherm ore, only in some cases, w ithout making that respect depend first on individual disposition. T o Lévinas’s credit, this never becomes a serious problem for him because he recognizes in dispositions a readiness which serves a still deeper com m it m ent only awakened or perhaps threatened in certain situations. My reaction to seeing you facing me thus has the character of responsibility already w hen I feel concerned or irritated or even bored, because, he contends, I am in relation with you even before any question of ever realizing it. This, however, is n o t yet responsibility in its fully m oral or committed form. Responsibility, as the subjectivity of Lévinas’s heteronom ous subject, is not yet the work o f trying to live by it. This difference—the difference between guilt and expiation—requires a clear and decisive shift into action. One no longer lives simply as if one were the origin o f one’s own actions; instead, one is now guided by a conviction th a t the tendency to do so, even if innate, is nonetheless pretentious. Lévinas bars us from thinking o f this as anything m ore than a change of heart, the birth o f new willingness to dedicate oneself first and above all to the other person. Yet this is already enough to ask how we are to explain even the inclination to such a change if n o t in terms o f convictions already in place. How do we explain the fact th a t an appeal not only reaches us but, further, moves us to a conscientious response? Can there be a com m itted act w ithout a desire to appease the law th a t commands it? Now, Lévinas has certainly indicated th at the exercise of any such desire can be truly ju st only if it is itself com mitted in advance to the necessity for an immediate ethical critique. He is also clearly aware o f the fact that one always makes that same com mitm ent at great risk of crossing over into the dem onic evil, which docs not merely exempt itself from infinite responsib ility but which, by deciding for itself the content of th at responsibility, in fact closes itself to that responsibility. Lévinas seems n o t to have considered closely enough, however, the fact that both the just act and evil at its m ost 40
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extreme have in com mon a single desire to abolish any and all differences between who one is as oneself and w hat the law specifies as goodness. The work o f justice, we have noted, approaches such differences as obstacles to unqualified responsibility and therefore tries to convert them into gifts. W hat we have called demonic evil, even on Lévinas’s own account, bypasses this entire effort, simply usurping for the individual the place of absolute authority. In both cases the difference— or perhaps better, distance— between the individual and the absolute disappears. W ithout it there is neither the transcendence o f w hat always exceeds the desire seeking it nor the immanence of a desire which always has something m ore to seek. Free of every limit, a desire for the transcendent is contradictory; it destroys both itself and w hat it aims at. But since we are evidently saved from it, there must already be limits in place. W here do we find such limits if not in the hum an faces which, as Lévinas himself admits, call us ceaselessly to particular acts which concretize that desire? The face, then, does not call me to an unlimited responsibility so much as it saves me from what might otherwise consume me. Let us be precise with this observation: even if responsibility is unqualified, it also always has a real and recognizable content. However uncompromising, your appeal for help reaches me only here and now, which is thus where I must always begin. The face is not only imperious and com manding but also flesh and blood. It not only stands over us but also exposes itself to blows or caresses. It is not only the law but also the bearer o f the law. If, as Lévinas has argued, it is indeed first or m ost o f all the law, this primacy is nonetheless itself impossible w ithout the support o f the very dimension which it subordinates. The corporeality of the face, the aspect of the ethical appeal which enters our experience, m ak ing it comprehensible, is a necessary condition for ethics. So too is the local here and the punctual now, which Lévinas would similarly submit to the primacy of futurity— to the sense in which an otherness beyond com prehen sion arrives from beyond every projected horizon. If the desire which Lévinas has led us to think of as religious takes aim at the cleft between individual hum an life and absolute transcendence, and if, as he has also contended, only the relation with that transcendence saves us from the unrestrained violence of wills competing w ithout any external limit, then precisely this ambiguity in the face m ust be retained. If Lévinas has rightly detected a transcendence in the face o f the other person, he has per haps also gone too far where his account of it undermines our sense of the goodness of its incarnation. The face, we must insist, permits us to concretize a desire which, so long as it is unconcretized, threatens to become excessive. It is n o t the aim and focal point of religious desire but in fact a relief from it. Even if it is true that there is a responsibility com manded in the face of the other person, we m ust also insist that it centers not on that other’s otherness alone but on its entanglement with the flesh and language which we two have in common. Imploring eyes may well make it impossible for me 41
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to be truly self-absorbed, but not w ithout also calling me immediately into a dom ain of recognizable needs and concrete tasks. As for the specific problem at hand, we can now argue that the absolute object of desire which Lévinas calls “G o o d ” is also profoundly evil, and in the double sense that the desire aiming at it is both a desire for death and a desire to be G od. This contention agrees with our insistence that what Lévinas has called the G ood must always be incarnated: darkest evil may be seen wherever that incarnation either erodes or falls away, both threatening the life o f the individual and occluding the absoluteness o f the absolute. Here it becomes necessary to distinguish sharply between the absolute as such and its specific incarnation as the G ood, with only the latter now to be contrasted with extreme evil. If there is goodness in the incarnation, calling us to a respect which is literally life-giving, so too m ust there be evil in a secondary incarnation, urging us against that respect. G ood and evil m ust be held up to one another and opposed at the limit o f hum an finitude as it moves toward the absolute. This is no longer Lévinas’s “crossroads” : the evil which menaces our attem pts to live a good life is not exhausted by selfishness and narcissism; it m ust also include a drive toward dangerous excess. The good act, in other words, does not merely suspend the evil which encompasses everything from falling short o f it to actively resisting it; it m ust also overcome a tem ptation to go still further, or always further, until there is neither a G ood to live by nor a life to seek it. In taking this position, I pretend to nothing more than a reinstatement, now within an anthropology, o f the theological concept of the Devil, as the contrary but not the equal o f God. Furtherm ore, against both Lévinas and the popular m odernity with which I have associated him, I consider this anthropology to be the proper heir to that theology, if indeed it is in need of one. More specifically, the debate with Lévinas seems to have brought into view an anthropology which is “religious” neither in the post-ontotheological sense that he describes nor in the traditional sense, either as m atching his accounts o f it or not. The fact that this is specifically an anthropology is evident since plainly it begins by parsing desires which are irreducibly individual, hum an, and personal. As it happens, the implicit definition of religion which this involves is perhaps nowhere clearer than in the present context, where it has become necessary to resist Lévinas’s rival theory of religion, especially as it is applied to the problem of evil. After all, we have ju st seen th at the latter culminates in a definition of blasphemy, the usurpa tio n of divinity. F o r Lévinas a primary form of blasphemy occurs in religious imagery, w hich he charges with courting idolatry.20 While we would certainly do well to heed this warning, our own hesitations at the argument supporting it warn us equally against his insistence that we can and should try to do entirely w ithout such imagery. Even granted a certain vigilance against the propen sity o f images and icons to obscure the very distance they mark, doubts that 42
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we can do w ithout them lead immediately beyond a mere difference o f accent to a wholly different theory of religion. F or me to render good and evil in personal figures is to adm it that I cannot help but attribute motives and a desire even to the G ood which, as Lévinas puts it, has chosen me before I could ever have chosen it. Here w hat is readily confirmed in our everyday relations with other people is extended to our relation to the absolute. The opposition between G od and the Devil, between absolute good and extreme evil, n o t only gives each of them a certain form but also attributes to each a will. Opposed to God, the loving creator, is Satan, the seducer. Just as G od desires th at we bow before divine transcendence, so Satan desires that we violate it. The erotic dimension of these form ulations is unmistakable: God, I believe, loves me from before creation and beyond understanding; Satan wants only to use me for himself, for his own perverse objectives. This dimension, let us immediately insist, is not absent from Lévinas’s ethics of radical responsibility but only relegated to the background o f his overt focus on the G ood. One does not notice an original attachm ent to the G ood— indeed, Lévinas argues everywhere against it— because the G ood is, from the first, alleged to reach us before and beyond any sort of contact. W hat the anthropology of the Devil forces us to see, Lévinas would thus seem to have taken great pains to avoid: the incarnation of the religious absolute is a self-offering which, by making itself susceptible to our inter pretations and decisions, implies in it a vulnerability which we for our p art are always striving to integrate in one or another way. Christian theology, for instance, addresses this vulnerability as the infinite and eternal love of a C reator who desires, but does not pre-determine, that we actively emulate Him. To put it somewhat differently, when Lévinas denies us the right to such positive statements about the G ood, he can be seen as protecting a rather more severe definition of transcendence, namely, w ithout either desire or vulnerability of any kind. It is precisely this conception o f an ¿«vulnerable transcendence which instructs Lévinas to detach the seat of authority from any incarnation as this or that “law.” Because the absolute has always already w ithdraw n from anything that we may take as its incarnation, we are primordially open and therefore ordered to the other person prior to any arche, responsible to him or her before any question of care for ourselves. Because the G ood has always already withdrawn from us, we are always already on our way to it, which for Lévinas is also on our way to the other person. One can never do enough and therefore cannot but fall short. F or Lévinas the transcendence of the transcendent— the goodness o f the “G ood”— necessarily implies (let us not say “causes”) the inescapable and irremediable evil o f simply being. Because G od is w ithout any desire -hence, invulnerable— we creatures arc made up of a desire whose proper aim is always already out o f reach. The lack which has been purged from the absolutely other has re-surfaced to consume each individual person. 43
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T o take the opposite tack in ethics would mean attributing desire to opposed (but again, not equal) figures of the absolute and centering our responsibility on how we relate to the two of them .21 It would be, for instance, to conceive of the figure of the Devil—the personification o f evil, possessed of his own desire— as an expression of the m ost destructive of allures: the com plete satisfaction which would coincide with immersing our finitude in the absolute “object.” T o adopt this perspective would mean recognizing a susceptibility in each of us to take either o f those two paths: a conflict o f tendencies, one seeking life and pleasure, and the other— subterranean and excessive—moving tow ard death. Moreover, it would mean th a t the task o f ethics is to teach us how to manage these conflicting tend encies, how to accept them as one’s own, how to be alone with one’s desire as it serves life and, beyond life’s limits, death. Finally, this perspective m ust also furnish an explanation for deliberate m o ral evil, an explanation which Lévinas himself has never fully provided. Ethics, he has argued, attends first to the simple fact that the otherness of the other person commands a respect which is unconditional. A nything short of this involves treating humans as objects or ideas, which, says Lévinas, is an infinitely different m atter from the misuse of those objects and ideas. T o treat the other person in the same way as one treats an object or idea is to treat that person as if he or she were not a person at all. In this sense ethical disrespect is “m urder.” The first and only statem ent o f our respons ibility is thus to be found in the Decalogue: “T hou shall not kill.” F or Lévinas, to ask whether this has been unavoidable, and then also whether the acts of violence which may have been avoided were committed by neglect or aggression, is already to m istake questions of civil legislation for fundam ental ethics. In response to this, have we not learned that the definition o f our responsibility has to do not only with our relation to the other person but also with a distinct but inseparable relation with religious transcendence? H ave we not also come to suspect that the conflation o f these two relations in the ethics of radical responsibility expresses, first, a refusal to concede the necessity o f an incarnation of th at transcendence and, second, but m ore deeply, an unwillingness to address a lack in it— an unwillingness to recognize a desire in “G od” that we com m it our own individual desires to praise and respect? To have come to this point, emphasizing now the role which one’s own desire plays in religious attitudes and imagery, is to have come to the threshold o f an ethics entangled in the erotics o f rela tions not only with other people and images of the absolute but also with ourselves. There is no d oubt much to learn from Lévinas’s attunem ent o f ethics to a desire which is religious. But it is necessary to expand the scope o f that desire beyond the divine matrix which links us to the absolute: the very form ulation o f th at matrix, it m ust be contended, responds to an experience 44
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o f the desire itself, as something that defines us from a place which we cannot grasp or make secure. We begin not simply in the wake of an “object” which we can never have (cannot touch) but also with an interpretation o f th at inaccessibility and thus of the “object” itself. Thus we begin not in false security, as Lévinas has claimed, but m ore deeply in an all too real insecur ity which we could hardly be more anxious to avoid. M urder, then, m ust be m ore than an extravagant exercise o f individual vitality. To the contrary, one strikes out against one’s neighbor, whether in weakness or fury, out o f a deeper solitude, which only the m ost fortunate am ong us have learned to accept comfortably. Killing is more than an affair of aggression, even if there is always a kind o f aggression in it. Before it is social and imperial, killing is solitary and insecure. One begins alone and helpless, in need of com pany and shelter. Life takes hold only by salving a pain which never fully abates. W hat Lévinas calls “violence” expresses first our incapacity ever to forget it. It is not merely its enjoyment but also its hollow core which make our deepest commitments indispensable. “K illing” said the poet, “is a form o f our wandering sorrow. ”22
Notes * This work was supported by the Belgian National Fund for Scientific Research (Flanders). 1 Stephen Vincent Benêt, The Devil and Daniel Webster (Weston: Countryman Press, 1937). 2 In contrast, Socrates’s perfect city was to be achieved only “in speech,” and Augustine referred such aspirations to the divine counterpart of this world where we feel them, namely, the “City of G od.” 3 E. Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. A. Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1969) p. 196, The relationship between Lévinas and Kant is too important, complex, and lacking in documentation to be addressed here at any serious length. For the sake of clarity, I offer the following marginal remarks on Kant. (1) Whereas his moral philosophy clearly defends at least the ideal of an unqualified moral act, Kant later describes in the Religion a “propensity” ( propensio) to evil which belongs to each individual human will and which might well be considered to stand in the way of actually achieving that act. (2) Accepting this then means sparing Kant from the judgment that he himself has been as “optimistic” or “utopie” as some o f his fellow moderns and their successors. But it calls for a rereading o f the Second Critique in particular, and not only where it allegedly (according to Lévinas) makes infinity dependent for its concretion on the indi vidual act but also where the section entitled “Dialectic o f Pure Practical Reason” moves in the direction o f a “pure practical faith,” in which an innate disposition to the good guides our choice for the law. Either the Religion, with its thematization o f radical evil, makes clear that Kant’s moral philosophy wagers on what can never be more than an ideal (in which case Kant is anything but optimistic about our prospects o f doing the good), or this later text’s willingness to con front separate propensities to good and evil simply rejects the earlier position. In any case, my concern in this essay is not with interpreting Kant but with examining, via a reading o f Lévinas, one possible dimension of contemporary
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ethics. One thing that the work of Lévinas has surely made urgent is a careful reading o f Kant. In Totality and Infinity Lévinas uses the term “Stranger” (VEtranger) in both this more phenomenological sense (p. 39) and the familiar parlance of inter-cultural difference (p. 75). His apparent willingness or capacity to conflate these two phenomena must not be taken for granted, but it deserves separate attention. As is well known, this formula appears first in Augustine, who already goes so far as to deny that evil is a substance ( Confessions VII, 12.18). It is Aquinas, however, who brings this idea to completion: “Evil, opposed to good as darkness to light, cannot signify any being, form , or nature, but only some absence o f g o o d ” (Summa theologiae 1.48.1). This “good,” we are told elsewhere, is particu lar and fitting to the moral agent, and yet in the case o f evil, it is absent. See De malo 1.1 and Contra Gentiles III.8. V. Jankélévitch, Le mal (Paris: Arthaud, 1947) pp. 8-9. In truth, this distinction between being and acting is not as clear for Lévinas as one might wish. Already in his earliest work, devoted to Heidegger, Lévinas insists on the active, or “verbal,” sense o f Sein and speaks o f authentic existence as the endpoint of a “task,” See “Martin Heidegger et l’ontologie” (1932), reprinted in E. Lévinas, En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger (Paris: Vrin, 1988) p. 59. From there would grow steadily a powerful dissatisfaction with the innate self-relatedness of the individual being (rendered variously as letre, lex iste n t, and even l étant), thus conceived as active and, eventually, “violent.” This second term in particular occupies an important place in Lévinas’s two books focused on subjectivity: Existence and Existents (1947), trans. A. Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), and Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (1974), trans. A. Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981). Yet, whereas in the former Lévinas is content to link subjectivity with the spontaneity in which we “live from the elements” (to be distinguished from Heidegger’s more prag matic relation to tools; cf. p. 45), in the latter, where his ethicization o f that elemental subjectivity has come to the fore, it is explicitly assigned the sort o f ambivalence that I wish to point out here. Contrasting the innate contentment o f simply living from the elements with the deeper “restlessness for the other” which that contentment presupposes and yet covers over, Lévinas speaks o f the “scandal o f sincerity”—the impossibility o f not falsely answering one’s own con cerns first (p. 143). One finds this reading o f Lévinas both in Roger Burggraeve, “Het kwade als keerzijde van het goede” in H et Vele Gezichten van het Kwaad: Meedenken in Iiet Spoor van Emmanuel Lévinas, ed. R. Burggraeve and L. Anckaert (Leuven: Acco, 1996) pp. 11-56, and in C. Chalier, La persévérance du mal (Paris: Cerf, 1987). See Totality and Infinity, p. 149: “Before defining man as the animal that can commit suicide it is necessary to define him as capable o f living for the other and o f being on the basis of the other who is exterior to him.” As will become clearer, this extraordinary inaccessibility renders problematic the very word “law,” which can be taken to imply the tangible presence o f transcend ence. See “The Transcendence o f Evil” (1978) in K. Lévinas, Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. A. Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987) pp. 175-86 passim . Unwilling simply to yield to this claim on our language, I will retain the word until compelled to do otherwise. In addition to his straightforward ethical censure of this notion o f freedom, Lévinas also challenges its coherence. For him true freedom consists not in the sort o f rootless detachment that is rendered most vividly in Sartre’s subject
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for-itself, but instead in a primordial “investment” in responsibility for the other person. The freedom which would do without its own root in that responsib ility is the absurd freedom o f von Münchhausen, who tries vainly to raise himself up by his own hair. For this perspective on Sartre, see T o ta lity a n d in fin ity , p. 303. Lévinas introduces the term “obsession” in O th erw ise than B ein g or B e y o n d E ssen ce . Although there it designates the primordial ambivalence o f a subject at once comprised o f its responsibility to another and constantly serving itself first, I use it here to signify the more conscious ambivalence of a subject aware o f that tendency in itself a n d committed to redressing it at every instant. Needless to say, the ethical imperative for choosing this “second” obsession presupposes that the first is indeed our original and irreducible condition. T o ta lity a n d In fin ity , pp. 78-81. True, in O th e rw ise than B ein g o r B e y o n d E sse n c e , Lévinas conceives o f a “G od” to be distinguished from the other person, but this is a “G od” with whom we can have no contact except through the ethical relation which, moreover, is our only evidence for Him. This word comes, not by chance, from Kierkegaard. Lévinas’s two short essays on Kierkegaard deal with precisely this problem and accuse him o f precisely this blasphemy. Cf. “Existence et éthique” and “A propos de K ie rk e g a a rd vivan t ,” con secutively in E. Lévinas, N o m s P r o p r e s (Paris: Fata Morgana, 1976) pp. 109-15. On this “crossroads” see O th e rw ise than B ein g o r B e y o n d E sse n c e , p. 197 n24. The word is by no means a h a p a x leg o m e n o n , In addition to the obvious link between its sense here and Lévinas’s celebrated expression “a religion for adults” (see the 1957 essay by that name in his D ifficile L ib e r té [Paris: Albin Michel, 1976] pp. 2 5 -41), it also evokes his occasional references in O th e rw ise than B ein g or B e y o n d E ssen ce to the “fine risk” (le b ea u risq u e) to be run in attempting to communicate ethically— that is, in attempting to respond to the other person j u s t l y , as other (p. 120). This sort of language appears throughout O th e rw ise than B ein g or B e y o n d E ssence. From the perspective o f classical theology, it is a matter o f Lévinas’s interpretation o f “original sin,” ostensibly “original goodness of creation” (p. 121), and yet only insofar as that classical expression is re-defined in terms o f an “accusation preceding the fault, borne against oneself d e sp ite o n e ’s in n ocen ce ” (p. 113, emphasis added). One sees immediately that the risk o f what I have already called a “divinization of the other person” is also a risk o f conflating religion and ethics. Perhaps this is more evident in T o ta lity a n d I n fin ity , where justice, the establishment of a respectful relationship with the other, is said to “produce” infinite otherness— to bring it to light. To embrace one’s responsibility is thus to invert the order of a world falsely closed to the infinity which it presupposes. “M an,” writes Lévinas, “redeems creation” (p. 104). O th e rw ise than B eing o r B e y o n d E sse n c e , pp. 93, 112. Consider the programmatic remarks at O th e rw ise than B ein g or B e y o n d E sse n c e , p. 122: “If ethical terms arise in our discourse, before the terms freedom and non-freedom, it is because before the bipolarity o f good and evil presented to choice, the subject finds himself committed to the G ood in the very passivity of supporting. .. This antecedence o f responsibility to freedom would signify the Goodness o f the Good: the necessity that the G ood choose me before I can be in a position to choose, that is, welcome its choice,” In “Reality and Its Shadow” (1948) the image is interpreted as an “idol.” Opaque, it folds the gaze back on itself, truncating the movement o f the eye toward the transcendencc o f what is already on its way toward us even before we begin to look, Lévinas does not hesitate to draw religious conclusions: “The proscription
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BEYOND LEVI NAS o f images is truly the supreme command o f monotheism, a doctrine that over comes fate . ( C o lle c te d P h ilo so p h ic a l P a p e r s , p. 141, and repeated in O th e rw ise than B eing o r B e y o n d E sse n c e , p. 191 n21). 21 The importance o f these relations and negotiations is also emphasized in the work of Paul Valadier. See, e .g ., his E lo g e d e la co n scien ce (Paris: Seuil, 1994), esp. pp. 179f. 22 “ T öten ist ein e G e sta lt un seres w an d ern d en T ra u eren s (Rilke, S o n n e ts to O rph eu s II. 11).
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VIOLENCE AND THE VULNERABLE FACE OF THE OTHER The vision of Emmanuel Levinas on moral evil and our responsibility Roger Burggraeve T ranslated by Jeffrey Bloechl
Source: Journal o f Social Philosophy 30(1) (1999): 29-- 45,
According to the French-Jewish thinker Levinas (1905-1995), ethics begins with the appearing of the other person, or, as he calls it in his first m ajor work, Totality and Infinity (1961), with his or her “face.” Let us follow Levinas in his attem pt to describe this central ethical phenom enon. In this way, we will be led to pay special attention to the problem o f violence, hate, and murder, since every ethics is ultimately concerned with the difference between m oral good and evil. Through this analysis—which o f course can explain only some aspects of Levinas’s many-sided and at the same time single-minded thinking— we still hope to make clear the power and im port ance o f his ethics for, am ong other things, the contem porary discussion on racism.
From the human countenance to the face of the other If we go in search of w hat Levinas means by the term “fac e/’ we immedi ately encounter a great, but obvious misunderstanding. When we hear the word “face,” we spontaneously associate it with “countenance,” with the physiognomy, facial expression, and, by extension, character, social status, situation, and past, that means the “context” from which the other person becomes visible and describable for us. The face of the other thus seems to coincide perfectly with w hat his appearance and behavior offers to “seeing” 49
BEYOND LEVI NAS an d “representing.” By taking literally an “option” regarding the other person, we suppose ourselves able to “define” him, whereupon we then also delimit our reactions and behavior. Likewise, in all sorts o f forms of counseling (medical, psychological, therapeutic), we begin from a “dia gnosis,” from a methodically and technically professionalized “observation” through which, based on our foreknowledge of symptoms—the images o f sickness— we can propose a diagnosis w ith an eye to prognosis and treatm ent. W hat Levinas really means by the “face o f the other” is not his physical countenance or appearance, but precisely the noteworthy fact that the other— no t only in fact, but in principle- -does not coincide with his appearance, image, photograph, representation, or evocation. “The other is invisible” (T I 6). According to Levinas, we therefore can not properly speak of a “phenom enology” of the face since phenom enology describes what appears. T he face is nonetheless w hat in the countenance of the other escapes our gaze when turned toward us. The other is “otherwise,” irreducible to his appearing, and thus reveals himself precisely as face. Surely, the other is indeed visible. Obviously, he appears and so calls up all sorts of impres sions, images, and ideas by which he can be described. And naturally, we can come to know a great deal about him or her on the basis of w hat he or she gives us “to see.” But the other is m ore than a photograph, or rather not only is he factually more not only m ore in the sense where there is always m ore for me to discover - b u t he can never be adequately reproduced or summarized by one or another image. The other is essentially, and not merely factually or provisionally, a movement of retreat and overflowing. I can never bind or identify the other with his plastic form (El 90-91). Paradoxically, the other’s appearing is executed as a withdrawal, or literally, as retraite or anachorese. The epiphany o f the other is always also a break ing through and a throwing into confusion o f that very epiphany, and as such the other always remains “enigmatic,” intruding on me as the “irreduc ible,” “separate and distinct,” “strange,” in short as “the other” (AS 81), T he other is insurm ountably otherwise because he escapes once for all every effort at representation and diagnosis. The epiphany of the face makes all curiosity ridiculous (TI 46). Still, for Levinas it is precisely in this insurm ountable irrcducibility of alterity that is the vulnerability of the face (TI 275), and through which the lighting up o f its ethical significance is m ade manifest. As “countenance,” the other is vulnerable, and can very easily be reduced to his appearing, as social position, “accomplishments,” and image of health or illness. The appearance of the face as countenance, as it were, invites the “I,” or “ego,” to reduce the other to that countenance. This “invitation to reduction” de pends not only on the vulnerability of the face but also on the way o f being o f the I to whom the face appears. Borrowing an expression from Spinoza,
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VI OLENCE AND THE VULNERABL E FACE OF THE OTHER Levinas describes the I as conatus essendi—as effort and tension o f existing (AE 4-5). As an individual being, the I is persistent in its concern with its own existence, and tries obstinately to m aintain itself (AS 63 -64). The “ n at ural” or spontaneous being of the I is self-interest: its esse is interesse. This implies th at the I also approaches the other person from an “interested” position, which is to say that it tries to integrate the other into its project of existing as a function, means, or meaning. This also goes with the m anner in which I approach the face o f the other. On the basis of my perception—whether spontaneous or permeated by m ethod— “vision” in the literal sense of the word— I strive to grasp the other in an image and to keep him in my sights. And this perception takes place not out of “contemplative” consideration that wishes only to respect fully “m irror” the other or “let him be seen,” but according to self-interested concerns. When 1 thus succeed in discovering or “dis-closing” the other person, I can also know how I can interact with him, and how I can include him in the realization of my autonom y and right to freedom. Hence does the face appear as preeminently vulnerable, in so far as it can be reduced— based on its appearing and on the ground of my perception—precisely to its countenance. In this respect, Levinas takes the paradoxical position that the other presents himself to me as the “tem ptation to m urder” (El 90). In its appearing, the face presents itself to me naked; it is, as it were, handed over defenseless before the “shameless gaze” that observes and explores it. The nudity of the face is an “uncom fortable” nudity, one that testifies to an essential destitution. The proof of this is in the fact that the other tries to camouflage his poverty by taking on airs, by posing or posturing, making and dressing himself up, grooming and preening. This makes it clear that the other is naked, and by its appearing the basic onlooking—literally “voyeuristic” —1 is as it were invited to violence. By its “countenance,” its visibility, the face challenges my self-interested effort of existing to imprison the other there, in w hat 1 see, or, to invoke a play o f words, the other who is seen, “is seen” (AE 113-15). But in this very fascination, says Levinas, there lies the ethical signific ance of the face. A t the moment in which I am attracted by the naked “countenance” of the other to reduce him to that countenance, I simul taneously realize that that which can be actually must not. This is the core of the fundam ental ethical experience beginning from the face- namely, the prohibition against committing the other solely to his own countenance (LC 44). Levinas expresses this as a categorical imperative em anating from the facc: “Thou shall not kill.” In my self-sufficient effort o f existing, which on the ground of perception and representation aims to become the expres sion and realization o f individual freedom, I am not merely limited from the outside but at my deepest— in the very principle of my freedom— shocked and placed in question: “D o I not kill by being?” (E l 129).
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An ethics of goodness It is through its countenance and its naked poverty that the face can be killed. And the fact that this is not only a possibility but an everyday—or even banal—reality is abundantly clear from our newspaper and television reports of violence, homicide, and war. In this sense, the face as an ethical appeal is not an ontological or natural “necessity,” like an object that, when let go, must fall, according to the law o f gravity. The “m ust” that asserts itself in the face— and by which the face is precisely a face— is n o t the “cannot be otherwise” of natural necessity, but to the contrary a “can be otherwise” that, on the other hand, m ust not. The com m andm ent against m urder does not make m urder impossible, even when its “authority” is m aintained in bad conscience over evil com m itted (NLT 22-23). In this respect, the ethical “m ust” is absolutely opposed to “com pulsion” or “inevit ability.” The face as com mand does not force compliance, but only appeals. The face presents itself to me as an “authority,” but one that cannot compel me to anything, but can only ask and appeal, an authority that requires only by beseeching. The authority that reaches me from the face as a prohibition against m urder is an “unarm ed authority” (AS 69) that can call only upon my free, good will for help. The term “appeal” expresses both the uncondi tionally obliging character o f a categorical imperative in the K antian sense, and a call to hum an freedom as good will -that is to say, as a will that can override its own self-interest and stand essentially open for the other than itself, but th at can also, again as free will, cast this appeal to the wind. The face of the other signifies for me the experience of violence as continuous enchantm ent and real possibility, and thus immediately the ethical “shame” th a t I must n o t be the m urderer of the other (E l 91). W hen Levinas offers a positive analysis of this putting into question of the ego’s self-interested effort of existing, he speaks of a call to responsibil ity for the other. This responsibility consists in the first place in taking care not to violate or destroy (“kill”) the other in his otherness, which is to say n ot to reduce the other to his countenance, but instead to recognize, respect, and do justice to him in his otherness. W hen we look at an other and see eyes, nose, a forehead, a chin, and so forth, all of which can be described, then we consider the other only as an object. A nd this is precisely a form of lack of respect, hence a form o f violence. In his evocative language, Levinas can then also propose that the best m anner in which to meet the other consists not in the least in taking note of the color of his eyes (EÏ 89). W hen one sees the color o f the eyes, the other becomes a “spectacle” by which his irreducible and infinite otherness is violated. In contrast with the shameless intrusion that breaks in on the other w ithout em barrassm ent, we can, with Levinas, designate the ethical relation supposed in the com mandm ent “Thou shall not kill” as “holding back” : le mouvement apparemment négatif de la retenue [the seemingly negative m ovem ent of holding back] (NLT 96).
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VI OLENCE AND THE VUL NE RABL E FACE OF THE OTHER Confronted with the vulnerability of the face, I am thereby called to restrain myself and to pull back— in other words, to not do something, or con cretely, not to do the other violence, which in fact runs counter to the spontaneous dynamics of my effort of existing that presses brutally forward (comme une force qui va [like a force that goes]). This makes possible a better grasp of the m anner in which the “good will” m entioned above relates itself to the “effort of existing.” As “aimed at the good” one might think that the good will is to be found wholly outside of the conatus essendi. Indeed, such a dualistic interpretation is put forth easily by num erous interpreters of Levinas, inspired not least by Levinas himself, particularly in Totalité et Infini. In that work, “the Same” (le Même) and “the O ther” (I’A utre), “the effort of existing” (l'intéressement) and “respons ibility” (la responsabilité par Autrui), and “being” (être) and the “otherwise than being” (autrement qu'être) are held apart from one another as two different and distinct fields of meaning that can also be radically contrasted. However, since Levinas never speaks o f the Same or the O ther, but of the Same and the O ther (le Même et l ’A utre), the question is really how they do indeed relate to each other. A correct understanding of this relation can be clarified via the Husserlian method to which Levinas often refers. This m ethod consists in first w ith drawing from w hat appears and is given to everyday perception, in order to— from a position of systematic and methodical doubt—return zu den Sachen selbst, or to w hat is covered over or forgotten in the perceived phenomena, and thus to return to “true reality”— to the thing itself—of the phenomenon. W hat is immediately obvious in our everyday perception of the dynamic of hum an existence is that it is driven by the conatus essendi. On closer inspection, this description of the subject appears too hasty. Accord ing to Levinas— and here we come upon w hat is in my opinion the real originality of his ethical thinking— our characterization o f the I by selfinterest and effort of existing has covered something up, something already at w ork in that very effort of existing. Concretely, there is at work in the effort o f existing itself—in the Same, and not outside it— a scruple th at places the conatus essendi in question from inside out and breaks it open to the other than itself. Literally, the word scruple means a pebble in one's shoe making it impossible to stand still, and instead moving or inciting one to take another step. It is therefore not by chance that Levinas speaks of “the O ther in the same” (AE 141). This scruple that disturbs even the effort of existing comes to light through an encounter with the face, but it is not introduced or created by that encounter. The confrontation with the appeal of the naked and vulnerable face awakens in the conatus the scruple over itself through which the “being” of the I reveals itself as also “otherwise than being.” As paradoxical as it may sound, this “otherwise than being” is not introduced by the face but in fact is manifested as essentially belonging to the dynamic of the conatus. The scruple over itself that operates from 53
BEYOND LEVI NAS inside out within the conatus means precisely the “good will” as an ethical event. As orientation to the good, the good will is not a “natural necessity” - n o r is the effort of existing— in the sense th at a person can do nothing other than choose either for the other or for self-interest. The good will enacts itself precisely as scruple, as placing in question, as a discomfort with itself in the effort o f existing. As conatus essendi, I am uneasy about my own conatus essendi; I realize that the evidence o f my striving to exist is not at all evident, that I might not outlive my self-interest after all. In the exercise of my effort o f existing it occurs to me that, left to itself, that effort is brutal, an d leaves everything behind it, in its own wake. There is also a certain “natural impulse or inclination” in the conatus to think and act from its own interest, though this still does not mean that it is abandoned to itself as an inevitable m echanism of natural necessity. It is because it can be m arked by an internal scruple or reserve about itself that the conatus is ethical, and by this it exceeds nature—nature being understood here as moderated or exer cised in accord with natural law. A nd through the crisis that it bears within itself—la crise de l'être [the crisis of being]— it is not abandoned to itself as fatality, but can exceed itself to the other than itself. Through the internal scruple a choice is put before it between self-interest and the otherwise than being, by which it exceeds itself as “involvement with the good,” and is thus “good will.” In short, the paradox of being hum an is that as the effort of existing we are n o t abandoned to our nature as to a natural impulse, but, through the scruple—through our conscience as mauvaise conscience [bad conscience]—we can arise above ourselves to choose for the good, that is to say for “unselfishness.” In this way, the effort o f existing in itself also already m arked and touched by the good, not as necessity but as pos sibility and call. It is not for nothing that Levinas cites this as le miracle de Vhumain [the “miracle of the hum an”]: the other in the same, transcendence in immanence, the “extraordinary” in the “ordinary,” the other that affects the same and unsettles it, or more forcefully, throws it into such disorder th a t the effort o f existing is turned inside out and exposed as vulnerable to the other than itself, which is to say the face o f the other (AT 141-43). The apparently negative movement o f reserve and placing oneself in ques tion in the effort of existing, so to speak, makes room for the positive movement of attention and responsibility for the other. This responsib ility, which establishes the nonkilling o f the other and which begins as from the sum m ons of the face— and, finally, which is therefore radically heleronom ous— Levinas characterizes time and again throughout his w rit ings as “goodness.” “Responsibility” is a term very dear to him, and the highest realization of it consists in existing close to the other in his extreme vulnerability, that is, not to leave the other alone in his exposure to the inexorability o f his death. A nd although 1 can do no more for the other, he cannot reim burse me for my goodness. As countenance, the face is also “in the sights” o f death as the ultimate and inescapable menace making all 54
VI OLE NCE AND THE VUL NE RABL E FACE OF THE OTHER will-to-live ridiculous. This, then, is goodness as nonindifference, one that is also asymmetrical and that thus in no way takes as a precondition for goodness any paym ent or reward from the other. Levinas sometimes tries to clarify the “unselfishness” of the responsibility for the other as “pure goodness,” “love w ithout eros,” charity w ithout reciprocity— “to fear for the other” without this fear beginning from “fear for myself.” I this respect, for Levinas this “fear for the other pursued and stricken by death” is the foundation and even modality of responsibility-to-and-for-the-other as good ness (E l 128).
Goodness as inverted world W ith this strong accent on goodness—not merely surprising but also moving — Levinas himself is nonetheless also conscious of a possible reproach, namely that his ethics of goodness is in fact a cheap, rom antic, and naive philosophy. Levinas resists this charge vehemently. His ethics of responsibil ity is a very realistic philosophy that departs precisely from the m oral evil of violence and injustice (NLT 23-24). Levinas concedes that on first sight the idea of goodness seems simple, even banal. But for him it loses its simplicity in light o f the evil that wishes to transgress it. Levinas’s basic ethical idea o f care for the other—who is always essentially “other” and thus “foreign”—acquires its full force in light o f the denial and destruction of the other. This latter point has already been touched on when analyzing the call to responsibility going out from the face in connection with the command “Thou shall not kill” and through the definition of the ethical as the scruple in the conatus essendi itself. This com m and points directly to the possibility and reality of violence and m urder as evil. M oreover, there arise no norms in hum an society, and few prohibitions, unless reality is such that they become either necessary or at least desirable. Were each o f us spontaneously and, as it were, inherently nonviolent, there would exist neither ethics nor any prohibition against m ur der. Only when a specific evil has a certain factual evidence— which is not to say “necessity” !—do there come to be ethical values and norms, form ulated for the m ost part in the form of prohibitions, precisely in order to make clear that such values (which in fact are often and easily violated) m ust not be violated. Were there always and everywhere respect for the otherness of the other person, then there would also be no ethics, which is also to say th at there would be no need for an obligation to respect, or to form ulate a prohibition against m urder as the minimal expression of that respect. In this sense, goodness as nonviolent relation to the other that tries to do him or her justice is anything but a cheap and naive thought, good only for pious souls or idealistic adolescents not yet familiar with life’s hard realities. Goodness as the path to the other is not at all a self-evident, “natu ral” idea th at would emerge spontaneously in our everyday struggles. It is anything 55
BEYOND LEVI NAS b u t self-evident. On the contrary, it establishes an “inverted order,” an Umwertung aller Werte [a “revaluation of all values”], for it is possible only as a radical transgression of our “ordinary” striving to be that, according to its self-interest, orders the other to itself with the greatest self-evidence. The naivete, in other words, lies not on the side of goodness, but on that of freedom and the I, which in its “n atural” or spontaneous “being” acts as if everything were there “for him ” alone. Only when we have understood goodness as the overcoming o f our “quasi-natural” self-interest that, on the basis of our neediness, seems rather m ore evident than does “being for the other,” can its true, revolutionary, and counterintuitive character emerge. T o employ one useful image—an image th at comes from Levinas himself — goodness goes so far that it keeps the cold in and for itself while we by nature rather appreciate the warmth. The true meaning and real value o f goodness, understood as the unconditional o f the other despite its “otherness,” consists precisely in overcoming the evil threatening the other w ith reduction and destruction, instead establishing another relation with him or her, one resting on attention and devotion to the other. In this sense, the Levinasian idea of responsibility for the other can never be thought of or explained w ithout also pointing to its counterpart, its negative inverse, which it resists in particular, namely the evil o f reducing the face of the other person to his countenance, which is also to say indifference before, or rejection o f the other—not o f the hum an in general, but of the other person, o f the alterity of the other person (C A J 78).
Use, consumption, and misuse of the other T o make clear th at goodness is not a weak concept but an iron-strong ethical one, I find it im portant to pause for a m om ent over the attention th at Levinas pays to moral evil, and specifically to the evil that one person perpetrates against another. On one hand, he discovers in evil the same basic structure, namely the “reduction of the other to the same” (TI 6). On the other hand, he distinguishes in it different forms. These can be arranged in ascending order, starting from the “com prehending” and thus grasping consideration o f the other, through tyranny, the passion of m urder and hate, and finally coming to an end at w hat for Levinas is evil in the extreme, namely racism and, more particularly, anti-Semitism as a “horribly perfect” form of racism. I go into each of these different forms of evil because they illustrate unam biguously the ethical refusal to put one’s effort of existing in question. A first form o f evil lies in considering the other as a potentiality or func tion of the establishment and affirmation of my ego, or I. In a state o f “w ant,” I have need of the other—I cannot be w ithout others. It is from there that my spontaneous, natural consideration o f others is always selfinterested and self-involved. This we can call the economic relation to the 56
VI OLENCE AND THE VUL NE RABLE FACE OF THE OTHER other, which develops de facto into an economic regime of reciprocal, wellunderstood private interests in the sense th at people relate to each other on the basis of satisfying one another’s needs, in which case they are thus also “interesting” for one another. One can go so far in this that the otherness o f the other is no longer respected but, to speak with K ant, reduced to a mere means. Concretely, this happens whenever I try to m ake the other person subordinate to me as “food” or “pow er,” or to press him into one or another form of service, hence to “consume” the other, to instrumentalize him and to use him: to cannibalize, whether under a hard form or a milder one. F or this, I can of course apply all the riches and power th at I have assembled for myself in my struggle for existence. I can use all possible means— or better put, misuse them—to draw the other to myself, to extort from him, to intimidate him or buy him, in short to subject him to myself— and w ithout there arising a direct expression of brutality or enslavement (TI 209, LC 268). At first glance, this would seem to indicate a milder form of evil, but in essence this modality already contains the possibility of a stronger and even an extreme form of evil, for it, too, displays what we have seen as the fundam ental dynamic of all evil: the reduction o f the other to oneself. Now, this reduction of the other on the practical plane is usually accom panied by, and is in any case also strengthened by, a reduction on the noetic plane. Concretely, I try to gain access to the other by stripping him o f his alterity via concepts, categories, and thematization. In this way, I can make “images” or photographs of the other person so that I suppose myself to know him. In doing so, I approach the other not according to his otherness itself, but from a horizon, or another totality (Q LT 77). I look the individu ality o f the other, so to speak, up and down, forming a conception o f him not as this-individual-here-and~now but only according to the generality of a type, an a priori idea, or an essence. Still more concretely, this means th at the other conceived within this reductive form of thinking is seen from out o f the wider horizon of his history, culture, environm ent, customs, and traditions, personal past, characterological properties, sociological condi tioning and (depth-) psychological structures. The “com prehending” I, or ego, negates the irreducible uniqueness o f the other and tries to conceive of him in the same way as he does the world. Comprehensive knowledge is thus also no innocent phenom enon but a violent phenom enon of power. By my “penetrating insight” I gain not only access to the other, but also power over him. Through my knowledge, I not only can fix the other to his phys ical, psychological, and sociological appearance at a particular m oment, b ut can also m anipulate and blackmail him. From this, it is clear how knowledge, which is indispensable for my separation and is thus a good for me, nonetheless at the same time brings evil for the other. This is the tragedy of hum an understanding. The development of my noetic identity is not without wrinkle or blemish, exhibiting a dark underside, namely, a 57
BEYOND LEVI NAS disrespectful and essentially merciless exercise o f power over the other. By applying my cognition to understand the other, there occurs “a determ ina tion of the other by the same, w ithout the same being determined by the o th e r” (TI 145).
The effort of existing as potentially violent T he economic pursuit of autonom y, which makes not only the world but also the other person a “means of existence and self-development,” brings us immediately to another, radical form o f evil: interhum an violence. N o t w ithstanding the fact that this reductive interaction am ong people lies in the same line as the reduction o f the world to economic concerns, Levinas also points explicitly to their difference: Though both have a certain resistance to worldly facts, both also always submit in one or another m anner to my project of existing. But in the case of one’s fellow hum ans this includes a specific difficulty. F or insofar as they, too, are “I’s,” or “alter egos,” they exhibit the same self-interested effort o f existing as do I myself, and thus also act just as reductively. All I ’s in pursuit o f autonom y want to ensure, establish, and expand their own identity as much as possible. Hence does my primitive egoism sooner or later strike up against the primitive egoism of other i’s, or alter egos (TH 93). This implies the inevitable existence o f a general situation of conflict: The many I’s who inhabit one and the same w orld cannot all at the same time be at the absolute center to which all else is m ade to refer. According to their ontological nature, or effort of existing, they measures themselves and exert themselves with all power and every possible means against one another (D E H H 173). It becomes a struggle for pow er of all against all, w ar in the m ost general sense of the word (AE 5). A nd this is a w ar waged openly and directly, or indirectly, either from a subtly laid am bush, or m ore circuitously, taking the other by surprise (T I 200-01). Hence does the effort of existing, necessary for life and seeking autonom y, strike against its own contrary.
Violence as tyranny and enslavement A nother form of the reduction of the other to the same, and thus also o f violence, is, according to Levinas, tyranny, a despotic and unlimited expres sion of the effort o f existing (LC 264-66). Tyranny consists in an I trying to subjugate the others- w ithout killing them— in such a way th at in one or another m anner they give up to him their freedom. The tyrant attem pts by persuasion, rhetoric, propaganda, seduction, trickery, diplomacy, demagoguery, (threats of) torture or physical violence, brainwashing, plagiarism, intim idation, or bribery to bring other free subjects to abandon the au to nom ous exercise o f their freedom in exchange for satisfaction of their needs (“bread and gam es”) (TI 42, 205). 58
VI OLENCE AND THE VUL NE RAB LE FACE OF THE OTHER This tyrannical penetration into and seizure o f freedom makes of its victims n ot only “slaves,” but in its extreme form also “enslaved spirits.” Incarnated freedom can indeed allow itself to be appropriated by the intrigues o f another and by doing so become its slave. In this way, one’s freedom is abandoned to that other person. One no longer has an individual will; one loses his freedom to think and act. In its consistent form, this means th at even the “capacity” to obey an order, which implies freedom, is eradicated. There is only a degenerate form of heteronomy. An enslaved spirit acts out of “blind” obedience. Here, “blind” means literally th at the obedience in question is not in the least bit cognizant of obedience. The enslaved subject loses the experience of his autonom y and o f his obedience. There is no longer any “conscious” obedience, but only an inner, irresistible “inclination” and “drive” to accommodate oneself to the powerful (TI 2 1 3 14). This inclination, which can grow into masochistic “desire,” is marked by an extreme submissiveness and compliance, by an “extreme weakness” that in everyday language is indicated as slavish dependence, or “canine trust and which in a fascist situation becomes trust for trust, sacrifice for sacrifice, obedience for obedience” (DL 197). The inclination to submit becomes second nature. The subject overwhelmed and possessed is no longer conscious of being overwhelmed; the two now radically coincide. The enslaved spirit no longer feels the strange and unreasonable like a slap in the face. The tyrant, no m atter precisely which form, in fact no longer finds anyone against him, but only a mass of material w ithout any substantial core or resistance, at which point he can give full rein to his passions to his heart’s content. Love of the “m aster” fills the enslaved spirit so completely that he is w ithout any distance or even the capacity to seek it. Fear o f the powerful “lord” takes possession of him to such an extent that he no longer sees it for the simple reason that he sees only “from out o f ” that very fear (LC 265 -66).
The passion of murder and hate F rom the forms of reduction of the other to the same described up to now it follows th at the consistent exercise of willpower of my effort of existing emerges in a denial of the other of which m urder is the physical incarnation, though not the only one (DVI 244-45). M urder manifests itself not so much as a fact taking place once and for all, but as a passion driven by a well-determined intentionality—namely, to destroy the other totally. The “denial” occurring in the “consum ption” and “use” o f others still remains partial. In the “grasp” that I exert on them, I do indeed contest their independence but I still preserve their existence in reality so that they are and continue to be “for me.” Killing is radical: One does not dominate (appropriate, use, and consume) the other, but clears him out o f the way, or destroys him; the other is driven even from existing. 59
BEYOND LEVI NAS M urder, then, renounces absolutely all “com prehension” of the other, for one no longer wishes to include the other in the “sam e,” that is, in one’s own project o f existing, but, on the contrary, to exclude him, because he is “ too much” in the way of one’s struggle for identity. M urder manifests itself as the effort and realization o f an inexorable struggle for omnipotence: The I plays not “all or nothing” but “all and nothing.” It prom otes itself to “all” so th at the other m ust be reduced to “nothing” or “no one,” which is also to say to “is-no-longer,” in no t only the factual but also, and above all, the active sense o f “is” no longer (étre understood not formally as existence but qualitatively as conatus essendi, thus as “capacity” ; T I 172). Levinas points out how hate is another form of denial that is at the same tim e related to m urder and in a certain sense worse (though, of course, from an other perspective it is also less serious). H ate is an extremely paradoxical m anner of denying the other, for one w ants a t the same time both to rad ically negate the other and also not to do so entirely. From its offensive height, hate wishes to humiliate and crush the other, but w ithout destroying him completely. On one hand, hate aims at making the other suffer, such th a t he would then be reduced to pure passivity. But on the other hand, hate wishes that the other in this passivity w ould remain at his most active, so th a t he could bear witness to this hate. Still more, hate wants not only that the other undergoes it but also that he suffers from it, for it is only by this suffering that he can testify to the hate. Only the suffering of the other reveals the destructive, reductive power of the “same” at work in hate. Hate does not always wish the death of the other, or at least it wishes his death to come only as the highest form of suffering. W hoever hates wants to be the cause o f a suffering o f which the hated person is the living proof. T o make the other suffer through one’s hate is not simply to reduce him to an object, but on the contrary to enclose him forcefully in his subjectivity. O r better, hate at one and the same time both does and does not objectify the other. In his suffering, the other m ust realize his objectification, and for this very reason remain a subject. H ate w ants both of these two aspects, which ensures that it is insatiable. It is sated precisely when it is not. The other gives satisfaction to the one who hates him only by being an object, an d yet he can never be object enough, for hate dem ands that, at the same tim e the hated one falls, he nonetheless also remains clearheaded and bears witness. This is w hat makes hate so absurd and sordid. H ate wants the d eath of the other, yet w ithout killing him; it holds the other, still living, at the verge o f destruction, so th at through the terrible pain of rejection and denial the other testifies to the trium ph of hate (TI 216)!
Racism as denial of the otherness of the other Levinas also considers all o f the forms of m oral evil discussed up to this po in t to return in an extreme but consistent way to racism (VA 100). Strictly 60
VI OLENCE AND THE VULNERABLE FACE OF THE OTHER speaking, racism takes the view that one group o f people is morally or culturally superior to another group, based on a hereditary difference in race. Racism considers the racial origin of an individual or a community as the factor determining not only the appearance but also the way o f think ing and acting. Moreover, racism accords value to one race above all others, and one who is racist usually reckons himself am ong the superior race. According to racist thinking, people are considered in the first place or even exclusively in terms o f their belongingness to a different race, m ost often visible in color of skin and other physical features (figure, nose, eyes, and so forth). On the basis o f these features, they are then judged and above all con demned. And these condemnations are in turn nourished and strengthened by all sorts of “images of the enemy” cast against the “other” race. F o r Levinas, it is clear that racism was incarnated in an “exceptional” way in the persecution of the Jews by the N ational Socialism o f Hitler and his followers (AS 60), which he therefore designates as “the diabolical criminality of absolute evil” (CCH 82). In his work Mein Kampf\ H itler argued for the superiority of the so-called A ryan race, the race o f the Über mensch [“Superm an”]. Only those who belonged to the “pure” A ryan race, who all the more so embodied this race purely, had the right to live and reproduce. The Nazis therefore not only developed ingenious, scientifically designed program s to “solve” the Jewish question (the Endlösung, or Shoah) by means o f concentration camps and gas chambers (of which Auschwitz in Poland was only one, but the m ost famous). They also developed and enacted complex, extensive sterilization program s aimed specifically at the physically and mentally handicapped so that the A ryan race would not be stained by begetting “im pure” children. And there were also the infamous euthanasia program s established in order to remove “gently” the incurably ill and mentally handicapped, who were thus less valuable and unnecessary members of the A ryan race. Because homosexuals did not contribute to the furthering of the pure A ryan race they were severely persecuted, and the gypsies were eradicated because they did not belong to the Aryan race and therefore represented a threat to its purity. In a wider sense, one also speaks of racism when one recognizes and relates to others on the basis o f their belonging to another culture, language group, or religion. As contem porary examples of this, we can point to the m anner in which people today reject immigrants from the A rab world and wish to expel them because of their origin in another religion, specifically Islam and its related traditions. O r think of the long-standing suppression and discrimination against African Americans in the United States, many o f whose ancestors were brought over from Africa as slaves. According to Levinas, the core of racism consists not in the denial of, or failure to appreciate, similarities between people, but in the denial of, or better said, failure to appreciate and value, people’s differences, or better still, the fundam ental and irreducible otherness by which they fall outside of 61
BEYOND LEVI NAS every genre and are thus “unique”: “A lterity flows in no sense out o f dif ference, to the contrary difference goes back to alterity” (VA 92). A racist relation wants to recognize and value only the “sam e,” or one’s “ow n” [het eigene], and therefore excludes the “foreign.” O ut of self-defense, we are easily inclined to accept and consider positively only th at which agrees with, or is “similar” to, ourselves. One finds the other embarrassing, threaten ing, and frightening. One therefore tries to expel him from oneself, to place him outside so that he can be considered as the “enemy” from whom one “m ay” defend oneself, and whom one may even “destroy” as w hat brings life and well-being under pressure, unless one can reduce him to oneself or m ake him a p art of oneself. One wants to accept “others” (or “strangers,” o r “foreigners”) only to the extent that they belong to one’s own “genre” or “ kind,” which is to say to one’s own blood and soil, to the same family, tribe, sex, clan, nation, church, club, or com m unity, do the same work, have the same birthplace and date. O ne’s “ow n” is praised and even divinized a t the price o f the “other,” which is vilified. The “stranger” becomes the scapegoat on w hom we blame all of our problem s and worries. One accepts differences only insofar as they are a m atter o f accidental particularities or specificities w ithin a same genre or basic design, in which individuals differ from one another within a same “sort” only very relatively (for example, character, taste, intellectual level), and in which their deeper affinity is n o t at all tested (VA 97). A gainst this background, it is clear that for Levinas anti-Semitism, as a specific and advanced form of racism, takes aim at the Jew as the intolerable other. F or anti-Semitic thinking and sentiment, the Jew is simply the enemy, just as for every racism the other is the enemy as such, th a t is to say not on the basis of personality, one or another character trait, or a specific act considered morally troublesome or objectionable, but due only to his very otherness. In anti-Semitism, the Jew, as “other,” is always the guilty one. It is never “oneself,” the em bodim ent of the “sam e” th a t not only arranges everything around itself but also profiles itself as principle of m eaning and value (CAJ 77-79). From this perspective on racism as rejection of the other, it appears, according to Levinas, that racism is not a rare and im probable phenom enon existing in the heart and thought of only some “perverse” people th at has nothing to do with us. Insofar as one is, according to the spontaneous dynam ic of existing, or conatus essendi, directed toward the “same,” toward m aintaining and fortifying one’s “own”— all such as I have just sketched it--o n e must be considered “by nature” potentially racist, though o f course w ithout being “predestined” for it. In itself, this adm its no question o f psychological or pathological deviation. According to Levinas, this implies th a t one cannot simply dispense with the racism of H itler and the Nazis, in contrast to something instead occurring only once, as a wholly distinct and incom parable phenom enon, at least if one views it not quantitatively but qualitatively, which is to say in terms o f its roots and basic inspiration. 62
VI OLE NCE AND THE VUL NE RABL E FACE OF THE OTHER In an attem pt to hold open a pure— in fact, M anichean— distinction between “good” (us) and “b ad” (the “others”), thus keeping oneself out of range of the difficulties in question, it happens all too often that Hitlerism is described as something completely unique that has nothing in com mon with the aims and affairs o f the com mon m ortal. The perspective of Levinas shows that Hitlerism, with its genocide and other program s o f eradication, is only a quantitative extension, th at is to say a consistent, systematic, and inexorably refined outgrow th of racism in its pure form, one that, in its turn, represents a concretization of the effort of existing, which, as the reduction o f the other to the same, is the nature of our existence (without, on the other hand, our being abandoned to this nature as a fatality, since as ethical beings we can overcome it). N o one is invulnerable; any of us is a potential racist, and at least sometimes a real racist. Racism, like Hitlerism, does not occur by chance, or by an accidental turn. N or is it an exceptional perver sion occurring in a group of psychologically disturbed people. It is a perm anent possibility woven into the dynamic of our very being, so that whoever accedes to and lives out the dynamic o f his own being inevitably extends racism in one or another form (AS 60-61). We can no longer blame racism and anti-Semitism on “others,” for both their possibility and the tem ptation to them are borne in the dynamic o f our own being, as “non reciprocal determ ination of the other” (TI 99), which is precisely the kernel of our freedom (TI 97). It is specifically to unm ask this racist violence, and all forms of violence as modalities of denial o f the other as other, that Levinas discerns the basic ethical norm in the com m andm ent mentioned and explicated above, “T hou shall not kill,” which is to say in the com m andm ent to respect the otherness of the other. In com mitting to the possible overcoming o f evil, and of racism in particular, through the ethical choice for the good, Levinas certainly realizes how vulnerable this “overcoming” of evil is. By rejecting the idea that every objective system, through its ironclad, mechanistic laws and coer civeness, might be able to render evil impossible forever, and instead basing everything on the ethical call to the good, he makes clear that abuse, viol ence, and the racist exclusion and elimination of the other are constantly possible and can never be definitively overcome. In ethics, there is no eschatology, in the sense of a guaranteed “better w orld” or “world w ithout evil.” There is only the “good will” that m ust always prove itself in a choice against evil that is neither evident nor easy. Only in this way can there be a good future and justice for the other: only through ethical vigilance with respect to all forms of violence, tyranny, hate, and racism, and a society that nurtures in both our upbringing and education a “sensibility” for the other as “stranger.” Such a sensitivity takes in full seriousness the ethical essence o f the hum an person, and serves always to put us back on the path to a culture “where the other counts more than I do,” and where the most foreign enjoys our complete hospitality. 63
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The Jewish wisdom of love Levinas designates as “the wisdom of love” [la sagesse de I’amour] the con nection just described between the com m andm ent “T hou shall not kill” and the com mitm ent to responsibility and goodness for the other. For him, love is n o t a subjective feeling bubbling up in the ego’s heart or “good sentiment,” like an expression of my personality, but is, in contrast, a com m andm ent descending on me “from elsewhere”—from the alien, irreducible face o f the oth er—specifying the “invested” and developed personality in which I “feel com fortably m yself” and am able to function well, turning me upside down in order to abandon myself for the other. Love is obedience to the respect com manded by the other— th a t is to say, respect for hum an rights w ithout such a turn to the other also requiring as its precondition any tendency, predestination, or capacity already in place. Levinas calls this love a “wisdom” insofar as it is also a form o f know ledge, though a knowledge of a completely different sort than the “com prehension” that manifests itself as a form of reduction and violence. Paradoxically, Levinas contends that justice is prior to truth (TI 62). Con cretely, this means that to speak the truth, as the response to the other insofar as the other is real, presupposes the w ork of justice. Responsibilityto-and-for-the-other, as Levinas describes it, consists precisely in “letting an d making be.” Obeying the appeal that goes out from the face means not reducing the other to his countenance, but in contrast doing absolutely conscientious justice to his infinitely w ithdraw ing transcendence or irreduc ible alterity. H ere there emerges a special sort of wisdom, namely the wisdom o f gratitude. A nd this gratitude is at once a fundam ental ethical posture and a form o f knowledge m ade possible by that very ethical posture. By opening oneself to the other and doing right by his otherness, one takes up the fundam ental ethical posture o f justice. This justice is at the same time a form of truth to the degree that one wants not at all to m anipulate or reduce the otherness of the other, but on the contrary to recognize and therefore also “know” according to the (ethical) truth. Love is wise because it is essentially conscious of an obedience th at makes each truth possible. According to Levinas, we meet with the wisdom of love primarily in Jerusalem, which is to say, for him, in the biblical tradition of Torah [Law] (EN 212-13). W hereas in the so-called first tablet of the decalogue our relationship with G od is central, the second tablet focuses on worldly relation ships and behavior. The first com m andm ent of the second tablet reads: “T h o u shall not kill.” This priority is not to be taken purely formally and externally, but also in terms of content and quality. “Thou shall not kill” is the foundation of all the other com m andm ents and prohibitions, and is thus the source of a hum ane society that consists precisely in respect ing the other person. The T orah “exposes ethical meaning as the ultim ate intelligibility o f the human, and even o f the cosmic” (SaS 10). By this,
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VI OLE NCE AND THE VUL NE RABL E FACE OF THE OTHER Levinas does not at all m ean to say th at Jerusalem or the Bible has some sort o f monopoly on the priority of the other person, ethics, and hum an rights. Indeed, it is not that it is true because it stands in the Bible, but th at it is in the Bible because it is true—if it is true. This latter qualification means that a check against experience and reflection is always necessary. In these, the insightful accessibility and general hum an communicability of the expression in question can appear (EFP 110-11). It is for this reason th at Levinas pays constant attention to a phenomenological disclosure o f how “Thou shall not kill” is the foundation of ethics, responsibility, and goodness (EA 12-13).
Conclusion Although Emmanuel Levinas is certainly not the only one in philosophy who pays attention to the hum an face, he is indeed the only one who makes of it a central category. Moreover, he gives to it a very specific meaning that departs markedly from the available qualifications based on physi ognomy, visibility, and describability. F o r Levinas, the “face” is precisely th at which radically and infinitely exceeds the “countenance,” not as inac cessible b ut as exceptionally vulnerable. It is this vulnerability that exposes the ethical meaning of the face: the simultaneous tem ptation to violence and the prohibition “T hou shall not kill.” The goodness that is nothing other than the positive inverse of this prohibition is then also anything b u t a banal or simplistic idea, good for pious and naive souls. It signifies, in contrast, the difficult and arduous struggle against m oral evil, o f which racism, as ostracization and extermination of the “foreigner,” is the extreme but con sistent expression. The nonviolent and nonracist recognition o f the other in his otherness incarnates the “wisdom of love,” which as an ethical option is never guaranteed but always returns to present itself anew as a must. This wisdom of love is the criterion of hum an culture, insofar as it does not draw the tru th and the ethical good out from the interiority or immanence or the same or the own, but in contrast brings it in from the radical transcendence of the other or “stranger,” as criterion of justice and truth.
Abbreviations AE:
AS: AT: CAJ:
Autrement quêtre ou au-delà de Vessence, D en Haag, Nijhoff, 1974. [English translation (ET): Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. A. Lingis. The H ague/Boston, Nijhoff, 1981.] Autrement que savoir (Interventions in the discussions and Débat général), Paris, Osiris, 1988. Altérité et transcendance, M ontpellier, F ata M organa, 1995. “Conversation avec un juste” (interview by D. S. Schiffer), in L'événement du jeudi, 1996, no. 585: 76-79. 65
BEYOND LEVI NAS CCH: DEHH:
DL:
DVI: EFP: El:
EN: LC:
N LT: Q LT:
SaS:
TH:
TI:
VA:
“Comme un consentement à l’horrible,” in Le Nouvel Obser vateur, 1988, no. 1211: 82-83. En découvrant Texistence avec Husserl et Heidegger, Paris, Vrin, 1949 (1st ed.), 1967 (2nd exp. ed. with “Essais nouveaux”). [ET: Discovering Existence with Husserl, trans. R. Cohen. Blooming ton, Indiana University Press, 1988.] Difficile Liberté. Essais sur le Judaïsme, Paris, Albin Michel, 1963 (1st ed.), 1976 (2nd rev. and exp. ed.). [ET (2nd ed.): Difficult Freedom, trans. S. H and. L ondon, A thlone, 1994.] De Dieu qui vient à l'idée (Essais), Paris, Vrin, 1982. “Entretiens,” in F. Poirie, Emmanuel Lévinas. Qui êtes-vous? Lyon, La M anufacture, 1987, pp. 62-136. Ethique et Infini Dialogues avec Philippe Nemo, Paris, F ay ard / R adio France, 1982. [ET: Ethics and Infinity. Conversations with Philippe Nemo, trans. R. A. Cohen. Pittsburgh, Duquesne U ni versity Press, 1985.] Entre Nous. Essais sur le penser-à-l autre, Paris, Grasset, 1991. “Liberté et com m andem ent,” in Revue de métaphysique et de morale 58 (1953): 264-72. Republished in book form, with foreword by P. Hayat: Liberté et commandment, Paris, F ata M organa, 1994 (also includes the essay “Transcendance et hauteur,” originally published in Bulletin de la Société française de philosophie 56 (1962), no. 3: 89 -113, with discussion and cor respondence). [ET: “Freedom and C om m and,” in E. Levinas, Collected Papers, trans. A. Lingis, pp. 15-23.] Nouvelles lectures talmudiques, Paris, M inuit, 1996. Quatre lectures talmudiques, Paris, M inuit, 1968. [ET in E. Levinas, Nine Talmudic Readings, trans. A. Aronowicz. Bloom ington/Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1990, pp. 1 89.] Du Sacré au Saint. Cinq nouvelles lectures talmudiques, Paris, M inuit, 1977. [ET in E. Levinas, Nine Talmudic Lectures, trans. A. Aronowicz, Bloom ington/Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1990, pp. 89-197.] “Transcendance et hauteur,” in Bulletin de la Société française de philosophie 56 (1962), no. 3: 89-113, with discussion and correspondence. (Cf. also LC.) Totalité et Infini. Essai sur Vextériorité, Den Haag, Nijhoff, 1961. [ET: Totality and Infinity, trans. A. Lingis. Pittsburgh, Duquesne University Press, 1969.] La vocation de Vautre, in E. Hirsch, ed., Racismes. L'autre et son visage, Paris, Cerf, 1988, pp. 89-102.
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HYPERBOLIC JUSTICE Deconstruction, myth, and politics John D. Caputo Source: Research in Phenomenology 21 (1991): 3 -2 0 .
The deconstruction of political philosophy The oldest desire (philia) of philosophy is for the arche, the principium, the overarching principle. The arche supplies unity which rules over m ulti plicity, necessity which drives out chance, order which subdues the chaos. Political philosophy shares philosophy’s taste for the arche, its love of principia, its desire for rule. Indeed it cannot resist the tem ptation to lift the crown from the hand of philosophy and set it upon its own head, to annoint itself the ruling science.1 The science of ruling w ants to be the ruling sci ence; th at is its desire. Political philosophy, which is not to be confused with politics and still less with the polls itself, wants to provide the arche for politics and the polls, to draw up the blueprints according to which the polls should be constituted. It is for just this reason that H annah A rendt says, from a standpoint which is not precisely deconstruction’s but which bears significantly on deconstruction, that political philosophy represents a flight from politics, from the complexity and unregulatability of acting in the polls.2 F or A rendt, political philosophy attem pts to escape from w hat she calls the “frailty of action,” by which she means both the unforeseeable initiatives and fresh choices that are made by agents (the “natality” of action) and the unpredict able, uncontrollable outcomes of their actions, the chains of consequences th at run beyond the agent’s control.3 Faced with such unforeseeability and uncontrollability, with such unregulated, shall we say anarchic, conditions, political philosophy seeks to impose order, to set out a frame o f regularity around the shifting, mobile scene of action, to write a kind o f regulae ad directionem civitatls.
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BEYOND LEVI NAS Political philosophy is an exercise in fashioning or making a city, of building walls around the polis; it is, quite literally, statecraft. Political philosophy m eans to turn out m aster builders, philosopher-architects, archi-constructors. In its earliest version, the philosopher-architects keep an eye on a heavenly pattern which, being heavenly, is not itself m ade but serves as the basis for making, which is not an Abbild but an Urbild. Just so, the archi-constructors must someday be prepared— and they say this with g reat humility, this is not a grab for power, it is even against their will— to be called upon to put in time as the philosopher-king. This was the first m odest proposal put forth by political philosophy. It completes the coup: as political philosophy would be the first am ong philosophical sciences, the political philosophers would be the first am ong politicians. First in thought an d first in action; principium principiorum; first philosophy. Such a project, objects A rendt, reconceives praxis in terms o f techne and thereby subjects action to the metaphysics o f making. Political philo sophy treats the polis as an artifact, as a made object. T hat makes the state— this is the point which Lacoue-Labarthe pursues—a work o f art, m aybe even a Gesamtkunstwerk, a m onum ental film or building or massive canvas, governed by the laws of mimesis.4This is to transpose action into the term s o f construction, to take acting in technical terms and to subm it it to an architectonic. This subjugates the m obility and subtlety o f action— the “frailty” o f acting—to a m aster plan, which requires a master name, which authorizes master builders, m aestros o f all sorts, a whole caste of masters. T hat is why political philosophy deserves deconstruction. There is a need to loosen the hold of architectonics over action, of techne over praxis, to slacken the constraints on the mobility of action. Every political-philosophical fabrication is a construct ju st begging for deconstruction. Law-making and state-crafting are exercises in construction which seek to conceal the unset tling and destabilizing effects o f differance over which they are stretched as across an abyss. Still, philosophy is inescapable and the desire (philia) for the arche is (almost) irresistible, (almost) a natural tendency, if there were such a thing. The need for a wall of structure around the frailty o f action can n o t be simply denied, above all not now, in a world that has grown as dangerous and violent as ours. We are always inside/outside political struc tures. T hat is why political philosophy deserves deconstruction in another sense, in the sense that it is w orth it. We should, out of sheer love for the polis, which is our mother, w ant to deconstruct the constructions o f polit ical philosophers whose training makes them adepts in wall-building and city-planning, in m aster plans and master names and mastering generally. T he deconstruction of political philosophy is not bad news. Political philo sophy is necessary even as it necessarily betrays action; its walls are both unavoidable and dangerous. D econstruction wants to keep political philo sophy on its feet, if also just slightly off balance. T hat is the civic duty of 68
H Y P E R B O L I C J USTI CE deconstruction and the good that it does for the polls. Deconstruction is good news for politics and the polis, even if the philosopher-kings have an unfortunate propensity to m istreat the bearers of such messages.
The myth of justice Deconstruction itself, if there is such a thing, inhabits the gap between political statecraft and the frailty o f action. It does not seek to fill this gap but to inhabit it, to move around within it, to operate within the difference. Action belongs in the element o f justice. Political philosophy does not insure justice; it finds justice very elusive. That, I will argue here, is because justice is less an arche than an an-arche, so that when it concerns justice the archiconstructors are out of their element. If there were justice, it justice existed, we would not need an arche. If justice existed, the political philosophers and politicians would be unemployed or, since unem ployment is unjust, employed otherwise. Polis and praxis would need no walls, and statecraft would have withered away. We are tempted to say that justice would be the only rule except that justice is not a rule or a pattern. Justice is w hat rules w ant to have but which they do not possess necessarily, i.e., structurally. Structurally, the “rule” o f law and the “reign” of justice are not to be con fused. (Does justice “reign”? Or is justice less royal and more democratic? Does it hold sway gently? Or should it simply flow across the land like water?) Laws should be nourished by justice; they should yearn for justice; but it is very dangerous for them to confuse themselves with justice. T hat is why the revisability and repeatability of law, even the resistance to law, is structurally part of the law. The deconstructibility o f laws is part o f the structure of the law. So deconstruction is not bad news but old news. Laws w ithout resistance, undeconstructible laws, represent the nightm are o f per fect terror.5 Justice eludes law and philosophy. Justice is beyond them, exceeds them, transcends them, and often enough even transgresses them. For often enough it is necessary, for the sake of justice, to break the law and even to spend some time in jail. Philosophy is the desire for the arche, the love o f law and order, rules and regulae. But justice is to be found amidst the chaos and singularity of action, the idiosyncrasies o f hum an interaction, the unreproducible exchanges between people. If there were justice, th at would mean that we would be willing and able to live with the frailty o f action and that we would have allowed action to follow its own course. Political philosophy needs to be disturbed by justice. T hat would be good for it, and that is the good that deconstruction wants to do for it. Political philosophy, like all philosophy generally, needs to be disturbed from within, in its m ost interior recesses, by its other, which is justice. Philosophy con ducts its business in the element o f the universal, in the sphere o f principles, archai, rules, or maxims that it wants to make into rules. But justice is 69
BEYOND LEVI NAS “ older” than that, older than any rules. It belongs to a time immemorial, to a past that has never been present and th at has taken hold of us w ithout our consent. We have always already been delivered over to the element of justice. We were never consulted about the claims of justice; there is no m anager with w hom we can register a com plaint.6 Justice is not up to us: it is older, m ore primeval than us, even if it does not exist, or only barely exists, or has n o t quite managed to exist. It belongs to a past that was never present and to a future that will never be present. T h at means that justice is a myth, that it belongs to a mythic past and an equally mythic future, that it is the stuff of a mythic desire. I do n ot mean th a t justice is a “fiction” in the sense of Lacoue-Labarthe, a mimetic myth, a m yth of im itating and making, a f e tu s , a work o f formative, plastic art. The m yth o f justice is no t the m yth o f an ideal pattern, a heavenly picture. It is a m yth of another sort, one th a t I hope here to identify, a m yth o f a nonmimetic, nonrepresentational sort, a myth that has to do not with m aking but with action, not a mytho-technics but a m ytho-praxis.7 B ut what sort of myth is that? A myth (mythos) is, at the least, a story, a m emorable story, a tale we tell about som ething that belongs to time immemorial. W hen it comes to justice, it is best to tell a story, about a m an or woman who effects justice, or who suffers for it, or who presumes to run roughshod over it. Such stories make their point although they fall short o f philosophy’s love of the logos, of theoria, its desire for the arche} Philosophy dwells in the element o f universals, o f archai, of principia, while the stories o f justice have to do w ith particular m en and women—like A ntigone or A braham — with the rad ically singular, if that were possible. W hich it is not. F o r it is impossible to address the singular in an absolutely singular way. Story telling, like every form o f discursivity, slips back inevitably, structurally- -it cannot help itself—into the element o f the universal, of the repeatable. But always in such a way as to remind us all the more persistently o f the singular. Stories ab o u t justice cling persistently to the singular, even as they belong inevitably to the universal. Antigone is not just some particular sister, but some thing like “the” sister, a mythic sister, a sister in mythic space, in ju st the same way th at A braham and Isaac are n o t ju st a particular father and son. So the myth o f justice tosses back and forth between universality and sin gularity. It is inevitably affected by a logos, inevitably mytho-logical. T hat is the best it can do. The stories of justice are stories about something (im possible, about an ancient, immemorial desire. Wc must have justice even though justice is nowhere to be found. Justice m ust be possible; it is w hat we desire, yet it everywhere eludes us. W hat is justice? W hat sort of m yth is this? W hat sort o f impossible desire is it that we have, or th a t has us? W hat do we desire? O f w hat do we dream when we dream about justice? W hat is it that does not exist even as it belongs to our m ost imm emorial past? 70
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The undeconstructibility of justice D errida has recently m ade a startling revelation: he too believes in myths, at least in one, in the m yth of “undeconstructible justice.” The tru th is out and deconstructors everywhere are red-faced. The archi-deconstructor, the unflagging adversary o f the dream o f perfect presence, is a dream er and a myth-maker. A big one. He has had a dream that is every bit the m atch of M artin Luther K ing’s, or maybe even Descartes’. He has embarrassed a whole generation of Franco-Am erican academics who pride themselves on their resistance to the lure of Being-in-itself and on their tough-minded antioneiricism. Here is the hard saying: Justice in itself, if such a thing exists, outside or beyond law, is not deconstructible. N o m ore than deconstruction, if such a thing exists. Deconstruction is justice.9 U ndeconstructible justice; what can this be if not an ageless truth, an unshakeable foundation, a fundamentum inconcussum lying beneath the surface o f deconstruction? It is not as if D errida does not know what he is doing, as if he does not realize the scandal he is causing his friends and how m any academic gowns will be rent by the saying: If I were to say that I know nothing m ore just than w hat I today call deconstruction (nothing more just, I’m not saying nothing m ore legal or m ore legitimate), I know that I w ouldn’t fail to surprise or shock not only the determined adversaries of said deconstruction or w hat they imagine under this nam e but also the very people who pass for or take themselves to be its partisans or practicioners. (FL, 957) This is a text that will repay a closer look. D errida is distinguishing between “law” (idroit; also loi) and justice. Laws he says are essentially deconstructible, and this because they have been constructed in the first place. The possib ility o f deconstruction is “ built into” laws: laws are “drawn u p ,” “m ade,” “w ritten”: they do not fall from the sky but are woven from the fabric of écriture. But the deconstructibility of laws is not “bad news,” D errida adds, because it is the only way for politics and the polis to make historical progress. T hat is where deconstruction comes in: But the paradox that I ’d like to submit for discussion is the following: it is this deconstructible structure of law {droit), or if you prefer of justice as droit, that also insures the possibility of deconstruction. (FL, 945) The deconstructibility of law is the enabling legislation o f deconstruction; it gives deconstruction its orders, gives it gainful employment. But th at is 71
BEYOND LEVI NAS (literally) only half the paradox. For D errida likewise insists that the undeconstructibility o f justice—this is really scandalous—is likewise a condition o f deconstruction, also part o f its enabling charter. Deconstruction is possible only insofar as justice is undeconstructible, for justice is w hat deconstruction aim s at, what it is about, w hat it is. There are thus two conditions for deconstruction: 1. The deconstructibility o f law (for example) or of legitimacy makes deconstruction possible. 2. The undeconstructibility of justice also makes deconstruction possible, indeed is inseparable from it. 3. The result: deconstruction takes place in the interval that separates the undeconstructibility o f justice from the deconstructibility o f law (authority, legitimacy, and so on). (FL, 945) D econstruction moves back and forth, traverses the terrain, explores the territory, between undeconstructible justice and deconstructible law, look ing for the cracks and crevices in the wall o f the law through which the flowers of justice have begun to grow. The aim of deconstructing the law is n o t to level the law, to bring down the wall— because it is the strong arm of the law which holds oppressive, unjust forces in place— but to give the law flexibility and “give.” To deconstruct something is not to swing a wrecking ball at it, b ut to reform ulate it, rewrite it, redo it, remake it, or rather it deconstructs itself, auto-deconstructively (FL, 981). Deconstruction thus is essentially positive, an affirmation of everything that we want to dig out from under the constructions under which it labors, in order to prevent the distinction between justice and law from becoming hard and fast.10 T he interval between undeconstructible justice and deconstructible law is the distance between the singular—which is somehow beyond or in excess o f the law—and the universal. Justice concerns the call of the “singular,” i.e., the dem and o f the singular, of the other one: justice always addresses itself to singularity, to the singularity o f the other, despite or even because it pretends to universality. (FL, 955) T he law can never do that, because, as Levinas points out, and D errida on this point is repeating Levinas (FL, 949), the law concerns the “th ird ” one. Justice is w hat I owe you, in your singularity. It is the responsibility I have to the dem ands you place upon me with the full force of the singular dem and which you, in your unique and unreproducible individuality, have always already put upon me. The dem ands of justice issue neither from a Platonic Good nor from a K antian Ideal, but from this singular one, here, now, who lays claim to me. 72
HY P E R B OL I C J US T I CE The law is necessary because there is a third person, besides you, so that you cannot claim everything from me; it forces me to distribute my respons ibility am ong many. The law arises, on this Derridean-Levinasian account, not only in order to restrain injustice, but in order to restrain justice, so that justice will not be spent entirely in one place. So the law is form ulated as a universal— that is w hat the law is, w hat it means to be— and thus it neces sarily, structurally, loses sight of the singular. Laws belong in the element of calculation (FL, 947). We m ust calculate a law carefully and precisely— the I.R.S. code is a good example of a law, even if it is not an example o f a good law (unless you are wealthy)—in order to allow it to take account o f as many cases as possible, in order to insure a certain proportion between the law and the individual cases. But if we were, per impossibile, to write a perfect set of laws, that would look like a m ap so detailed as to be the same size as the region it is mapping. The task of deconstruction is to keep the singular one in view, to keep traversing the space between the universal and the singular, between the law and justice, between the calculable and the incalculable, to keep the lines of com munication open between them. The law lives on credit: it promises to take justice into account, and laws are only as good as they are able to deliver on their promises. But the authority of the law is borrow ed from the authority o f the singular one who calls to us from beyond the law and in the nam e of whom we have erected the law. The task of deconstruction is to hear that call and in so doing to suspend the credit of the law, to suspend its authority, and thereby to risk an epoché, or even a teleological suspension, th at fills us with anxiety: This m om ent o f suspense, this period o f epoché, w ithout which, in fact, deconstruction is not possible, is always full of anxiety, but who pretends to be just by economizing with anxiety? A nd this anxietyridden m oment of suspense—which is also the interval or space in which transform ations, indeed juridico-political revolutions take placecannot be m otivated . . except in the dem and for an increase in or supplement to justice, and so in the experience of an inadéquation or an incalculable disproportion. (FL, 955-57) D econstruction holds the law up for scrutiny, lets it waver in instability. F o r D errida, conduct m ust be both regulated—we always already act within a tradition of laws— and unregulated -we w ant always to be responsive to the singular one who calls from beyond the law, w hom the law misses. But trying to keep one’s balance on such shifting terrain leads to aporias, D errida says, at least three of them. Let us call the first the aporia of phronesis: mere conformity to a law does not insure justice. R ather the law requires a “fresh judgm ent,” a judgm ent 73
BEYOND LEVI NAS w hich “conserve[s] the law and also destroy[s] it or suspend[s] it long enough to have to reinvent it in each case” (FL, 961). Otherwise the judge is a calculating machine. W hat is to be done cannot simply be calculated— it m ust be judged. Furtherm ore, a just decision, which is never a merely p ro grammed, calculated application of a rule, is always m ade in the element of undecidability, m ust always pass “through the ordeal o f the undecidable” in which our respect for the universal trembles before “the unique singularity o f the unsubsumable example” (FL, 963). Every decision worthy o f the name, every decision which “cuts,” which m ust give itself up to the “impossible decision,” is haunted by the ghost, by the aporia o f undecidability. Finally, one must decide; one cannot deliberate forever. Justice cannot wait for all the results to come in. We are pressed by the urgency of the m om ent of decision, precipitated into action. “The instant of decision is a madness, says K ierkegaard,” delivered over to “acting in the night of non-knowledge an d non-rule,” (FL, 967) always implicated in the “irruptive violence” that cuts off deliberation and acts in a m om ent o f “precipitate urgency” (FL, 988) (the aporia o f decision). W ith the m ention of K ierkegaard a certain D erridean cat peeks out o f the deconstructive bag. The whole analysis of undeconstructible justice sounds like a citation o f Fear and Trembling, a repetition of distinctly K ierkegaardian motifs. D errida’s analysis takes the form of a discussion o f three problem ata (aporias) which surround the decision in which the singular one exceeds the universal. It describes a m om ent of “anxiety-ridden suspension.” It thematizes the decisive “cu t” (of A braham ) which passes through the “ordeal” (the proper category for A braham and Job, whom G o d was testing) of undecidability and which is exposed to fear and trem bling. It invokes the madness o f an infinite economy which confounds the stockbrokers of the finite.11 There are very prophetico-mythic voices in this rem arkable essay: that o f Kierkegaard and A braham , not to m ention the (silent) voice of Johannes de Silentio, who suffers from the disadvantage that he does not exist, which is n o t necessarily a disadvantage if justice is a myth. It may even be a clue to the nature o f the m yth of justice. M aybe even a decisive one. Perhaps there are other prophets haunting this text on mystical forces.
Hyperbolic justice W e are perhaps inching closer to the m eaning of the m yth of justice. But to get any further we m ust clear our heads and raise tough questions. F or, given the presuppositions of deconstruction, we need to ask w hat undeconstructible justice can possibly be (or not be). Is it not an undisguised metaphysical postulate, one which threatens at every point to adorn itself w ith capital letters, to crown itself the arche? W hat is the Being of undeconstructible justice, if it indeed exists? O r should we understand that it 74
H YP E R BOL I C J US T I CE is altogether beyond Being, otherwise than Being? In short, w hat has D errida wrought? Has he gone mad (over justice)? Unless he has lost his senses, D errida cannot mean that justice in itself, were there such a thing, is a kind of Platonic agathon, an absolute being in itself (Ansichseiri), a subsistent absolute against which all sensible, particular actions and transactions should be measured. T hat would be precisely, paradigmatically, w hat D errida once called the metaphysics of presence, the very exemplar of metaphysics in its m ost uncritical and innocent form, the form o f pure and perfect presence, which likewise formed the basis o f the whole mimetic m yth of the state. N or can he mean that the undeconstructibility of justice represents an Idea in the K antian sense, a regulative ideal which m onitors the empirical search for justice (FL, 965-967). F or that is more o f the same thing, more philosophical idealism, even if the Idea has ceased to be a subsistent entity and has become instead an inexistent ought. It is no less believable that such justice has the status o f an absolute, categorical command, of K an t’s famous “categorical imperative.” F or K an t’s imperative is the issue of pure reason, of reason which has made a “clean cut” 12 with every empirical and pathological impulse, and it issues in what is absolutely universalizable. But undeconstructible justice concerns the singular, and it is full of pathos and very empirical. The one com parison that D errida allows (aside from Kierkegaard) is to Levinas, and even this is to be held at a distance (FL, 959, 969). Justice in Levinas’s sense is the claim of the absolute Other, the singular one who, meeting us face to face, places us in a situation of absolute responsibility, or better, who awakens us to the fact that we have never not been placed in such a situation. F or Levinas, it is not politics that is first philosophy but ethics; politics on the other hand is war. (That is not a deconstruction of politics, I think, but a riding roughshod over it that will not do because it does not take account of the fact that we are always inside/outside political totalities.) For if we are to understand w hat truly is and is truly, Levinas says, if we wish to reach w hat we have called from of old “first philosophy,” then we m ust acknowledge the ethical. We m ust grant that the ethical comes first, that it does not float skittishly outside reality like a de-ontological “value” or “ought” outside the “is” and that it is not something merely “ontic” which m ust wait for ontology to clear its way and make it possible. The ethical is there from the start and does not require either ontological preparation (the Heidegger of Being and Time) or a de-ontological founda tion (value theory). The ethical does not w ait and does not need to have a space prepared for it. The ethical comes first, comes at us and towards us, like a kind o f physis and An-wesen, which rises up and surges tow ards us, concerning us and lay ing claim to us. But it comes towards us by confronting us frontally and unequivocally, face to face, which is not physis at all, but something more. 75
BEYOND LEVI NAS T h a t is w hat Levinas calls the meta-physical: me ta, because it is m ore than physis, infinitely more, because its claim exceeds and excels physis, because in surging up and coming tow ards us, it lays claim to us absolutely, in a way th a t is denied to physis. F o r physis is finite, is not transcendent, does not truly exceed us, is not fully, infinitely ex-cellent. Physis is still visible, phe nomenal being. Physis can be seen and secured, owned and eaten, apportioned an d appropriated. Physis cannot resist us, cannot withdraw into the secrecy o f its hidden recess, cannot com mand us to stop the assault, to halt the aggression. Physis lies helpless before us, vulnerable, visible, edible. But the other person exceeds our grasp, resists our assaults, commands us to stop. T he other person exceeds the visible world, exceeds physis, is more than and beyond physis. The other person introduces us to metaphysics, leads us into it, shocks us out o f our self-enclosed immanence w ith a command that issues from a sphere beyond physis, beyond Being, if Being means physis. But can this be the status enjoyed by “undeconstructible” justice? I would say most assuredly not, and for the following reason. F or Levinas, the com m anding claim of the other which comes from beyond is literally extra terrestrial, for it cannot have to do with the paganism, the sacré,13 o f earth an d sky. It is neither on the earth nor under the sky; it is otherwise than physis. So we are not to think that it is beyond Being because it is merely normative, a mere value that has been super added to facts and th at some how fails to be. It is not beyond Being because it is less than Being, but rath er because it is more than Being, because it exceeds Being. It is beyond Being because it is so radically, so absolutely, so fully, that it cannot be contained by Being (so long as Being m eans physis). N ow this is not without philosophical precedent: “W hen I said th at God was not a Being and was above Being,” M eister E ckhart said, “I did not thereby contest his Being, but on the contrary attributed to him a more elevated Being.” 14 That, I would say, pace Levinas, is the Levinasian gesture. A gainst Levinas’s deepest desire, at the risk o f heresy and of being shown the talmudic door, I would say it is impossible for w hat is otherwise-thanBeing to avoid being-otherwise.15 To say the O ther comes to us from on high, in a way th at is higher and more em inent than Being (physis), is to attribute to the O ther a higher being, a being higher. Across the curved space which the O ther traverses there stretches the via eminentiorae, the path o f excess, i.e., o f eminence beyond negation, of supereminence and tran scendence, as a certain hyperphysis or hyperousia. The gesture is completely classical: the other is a phenom enonal face (via affirmationis); but this is to be denied, for the O ther is m ore than that, m ore than a visible phenom enon, m ore than being (via negationis); so the O ther com mands from on high in a way that is beyond Being as phenom enality (via eminentiorae). T h at is why undeconstructible justice cannot be assimilated to this infinity, to Levinas’s, which, if it is neither Platonic, Cartesian nor K antian, is rather more N eoplatonic, like the One beyond nous, like an inexhaustible 76
H Y P E R B O L I C J USTI CE N eoplatonic infinity. T hat is why I do not think that D errida can quite believe Levinas, why he m ust hold him at a distance, why he cannot accept the infinity of Levinas (although he perhaps would like to and is willing at least to offer Levinas as a point of comparison). F or if it is neither a Platonic G ood nor a N eoplatonic One, neither a Cartesian infinity nor a K antian noumenon, there is just no accounting for Levinas’s infinity. Except to say that it is a hyperbole, th at this discourse on excess is an excessive, em phatic discourse.16 Except to say that it is (to be deconstructed down to) a hyperbolic infinity. T hat is, I think, w hat it is and w hat D errida makes of it. The work of Levinas comes over us today like the voice of an Old Testam ent prophet, like the cry of Amos dem anding that justice flow over the land like water. We are awed, shocked, even scandalized by the moral sublimity, by the excess, o f w hat Levinas demands, which is clearly too much. W ho can endure these hard words? W hat he asks is not possible. It is even perhaps not a little m ad, exorbitant, off its axis, an irrational economy o f excess, o f the expenditure of self w ithout dem anding a return. It is even violent— towards oneself: one is held hostage, one allows oneself to suffer deprivations and outrages that one would protest if it befell the other. I would say that this is prophetic hyperbole. If it is taken seriously, held to the canons of philosophical discursivity, it cannot be believed or defended and it lapses at strategic points into the m ost classical N eoplatonic m eta physics and negative theology.17 So it is a mistake to take Levinas on his own terms, meta-physically, for then Levinas is swallowed up by all o f the criticisms which beset metaphysics. His is instead a prophetic voice, one which soars and sears with prophetic hyperbole, one which tells unbeliev able stories. We do not believe the stories the prophets tell, and it is a degradation and a distortion of prophetic discourse to treat it as if it were a record of eyewitnessed events, to measure it in terms of truth taken as adequatio. We are rather to be instructed otherwise by their impossible tales, which have to do always with justice—which is, I have been arguing, im/possible. These stories belong to the myth of justice. The prophets use their stories to make impossible, m ad demands on everyone, especially themselves. The voice o f the prophet interrupts the self-assured voices of the powerful, of the arche, the princes of this world, bringing them up short, calling them to account for themselves. T hat is why the prophets had a habit of getting themselves killed, which was one of their m ost serious occu pational hazards. They were not a little mad, m ad for justice, m ad about injustice, and maybe just a little plain mad. But then is D errida’s undeconstructible justice prophetic justice? Is D errida the latest in a long line of Jewish prophets? T hat would be mad, excessive, too much, too scandalous, and he has warned us against such exaggerations (FL, 965-966). I do not w ant to risk saying anything that mad lest I too be mistaken for the follower of a prophet and risk incurring 77
BEYOND LEVI NAS a prophetic fate for which I have no taste. (“I do not know the m an.”) But I would say th at this discourse on undeconstructible justice is “not far away” from prophetic discourse,18 though it has no strings attached to G od or to divine revelation and still less to any institutional religion. D errida would certainly demythologize any such myths, but in the nam e of another, per h ap s post-religious myth and of prophesying differently. F or I would say the discourse on undeconstructible justice has the ring o f prophetic justice, th a t it traffics w ith prophetic myth, that this is its g t o . 19This is not, strictu sensu, prophetic religion or prophetic hyperbole, but a kind of deconstmctive hyperbole cut to fit the needs of ethics and politics, which for D errida always have to do with singularity. I would say th a t at the point D errida begins to speak o f undeconstructible justice he is reproducing, in terms of ethics and politics, his discourse on singularity and the proper name. The whole thing has the ring (glas) o f Glas. F ro m its opening passages, which are already a repetition, the citations of the opening passage o f Hegel’s Phenomenology o f Spirit and G enet’s “W hat Remains of a R em brandt,” Glas is implicated in im/possibility, in the imposs ible movement between the singular and the universal. Glas has chosen to slip and slide on the treacherous terrain th at stretches between the unrepeat able, incommunicable being o f the individual and the system of universals, o f repeatability, which communicates across many particulars. The singular is from the start im/possible, a failed project, deferred: what, after all, of the remain(s), today, for us, here, now, of a Hegel?20 The aim o f the language o f immediacy, the thrust of its intentional arrow, is the absolutely singular: w hat is immediately present, here and now. Here: w ithout spatial difference (displacement); now: w ithout temporal difference (deferral). The immediate w ithout mediacy, w ithout difference, without differance. This is a dream, the dream o f being w ithout differance, of laying aside difference, o f un-veiling Being in its naked beauty, its immediate Being. Which is a pure m yth, the m yth of pure immediacy. For we are always already too late for such unveilings. As soon as language has arrived on the scene the singular has already fled, already slipped out the back door. T he singular one is gone, vorbei, passed on, past, absolutely past. It belongs to a past th at was never present to begin with. The absolutely singular one is not a past presence but absolutely past; not a future presence, but absolutely unforeseeable, unforegraspable, unforehaveable. The immediacy o f the singular is blocked off by the massive m ediation o f “here” and “now ” whose intervention has m ade the singular an impossible dream. “Here, n o w ” are in uncontrollable slippage; they arc always different. N o two heres ever occupy the same place; no two nows are ever simultaneous. It is never now twice even though it is always now. The individual is always already in flight. The singular always already steals away, is always stolen, like the 78
H YP E R B O L I C J USTI CE watches that G enet lightly lifts from our pockets. The lure of singularity is a useless passion. Yet, on the other hand— in the other column, shifting to the other leg— the tranquil surface o f the universal is likewise always already disturbed from within. The universal is insistently, consistently haunted by the ghost o f its other, the singular. The smooth glide of the eagle’s flight is disrupted by an alien power. The universal never fits, can never find an absolutely appropriate application. The concrete situation is always more complicated, and it was never possible to anticipate, to have in advance, the idiosyn crasies o f the particular. It is never possible to prepare the universal for the disruptiveness of the singular. The universal cannot fold its eagle wings around the individual and lift it up to its heavenly home, cannot enfold the m anifold o f intuition, cannot embrace, circumscribe, encompass the singu lar. The gto-m achine w on’t work. It gets jam m ed, clogged, every time we press it against the surface of the singular; it cannot digest these particulars, cannot m ake its gears mesh on the terrain of singularity. It always leaves something behind, a rem nant, a residue, an undigestible fragment which will not yield its materiality to this powerful spirit. The singular resists. The lure o f the concrete universal is likewise a failed project. The concrete universal and the absolutely singular belong to the same broken system. It is only in virtue of having a language at all, a set o f coded repeatable traces, a network of universals, that it is possible to pick out the singular, to sound their names, to summon them up, to call upon them, to call their glas. So the call fails. The singular escapes, is lost before we open our m outh. Language is nothing but a system of universals. The gears of the system are jam m ed by the glue of the singular, by singular glue, gluey singles. The singular always steals away even as the concrete universal always leaves something singular out. Singularity and universality, two impossibilities, two unerectable columns, belong to the same (non)system. Such impossible singularity is w hat interests Glas, which is punctuated with figures of singularity. In the one column, A braham , Jesus, Antigone: all o f whom take the side of singularity against the universal. A braham , the fearsome father of faith, the father o f fear and trembling, who breaches and ruptures everything heimlich, everything that ties him to home; Jesus, who takes the side o f withered hands and lepers against the Law; Antigone, the absolutely unique sister who takes her stand on behalf of the corpse of an irreplaceable brother, who sides with nighttime singularity against the daylight law of the polis and the father. A column o f prophets and religious madness! In the other column, the exceptional fags with names like nuns. We cannot say their names, cannot call them up, cannot give them a family name, cannot enter them on a register or a roll call— not w ithout killing them. If we ever call their names, class, Gattung, Geschlechl, they are dead men, and the fate of these undecidables is decided (Glas 86b). They are classic (glas) exceptions. We do not know their proper names. How shall we 79
BEYOND LEVI NAS call them? W hat shall we call them? How will they answer? How will they know their nam e when they hear it? How will they answer our call? W hat bell will call them to order, line them up in an order o f rank? D econstruction traverses the terrain between the failed universal and the inaccessible singular, swings across the abyss which opens up between the impossible universal and the singular th at steals away. It moves within the space o f two impossibles, and that tw ofold impossibility constitutes the condition o f its possibility. This abyss is likewise the interval between law and justice. The discourse on justice is isom orphic (iso-amorphic) with the discourse on singularity and the proper name. They trade in the same impossibilities, the same am orphousness; they dream the same dreams, aw aken to the same realities, traffic with the same myths. T h at explains the prophetic tone. It has nothing to do with God or institu tional religion; it has no backups from “on high.” It is a m atter of prophetic exasperation, of prophetic hyperbole, o f the prophetic demand for justice “here, now,” for this one, for this broken body or ruined life, w ithout w ait ing, without delay, without deferral. Even as the law soars with serene ease in the element of the universal and, spreading its eagle wings, swings over earthbound singulars. The undeconstructibility o f justice has to do with the impossibility of singularity; it is a function o f it. Justice in itself, if there is such a thing: that is a hyperbolic dem and for justice for this one, here and now. The m yth of justice is a hyperbolic myth and it turns on a hyperbolic, not true, infinity. Unlike in Levinas, it has no divine backup, no veritable Infinity, Platonic or N eoplatonic, Cartesian or K antian, Jewish or Christian, which leaves its trace in the visible world. D econstruction lacks Levinasian assurances, Levinasian depth, and it traffics in a more uncertain, more finite world. This is no t divine hyperbole or prophetic religion. The point of deconstructive hyperbole is not ethico-religious but ethico-political. It has not written o ff politics as war or made war on politics; it means merely to deconstruct politics.21 The ethico-political in deconstruction does not sail off into a reli gious, apolitical infinity; it does not let the arrow o f its longing land in heaven. It is not God th at com mands but the singularity of the situated other who always slips away. If the other commands w ithout a divine backup, then so be it. T h at is as m uch com m anding as we get. Where is it written th a t our every desire must be filled? The call of undeconstructible justice dem ands imm ediate justice, justice for this singular one here. It calls for justice, for w hat it cannot say, for w hat it is impossible to say, for w hat eludes saying, for what saying causes to slip away. The oldest desire of philosophy is for the arche. But the desire for justice is an-archic, for it has to do with the (im)possible singular. But this is not simply anarchic, a simple anarchy which inverts and reverses the arche. D econstruction is always the deconstruction of such simplicity. Justice is the desire to respond to the anarchic, to the singularity which eludes or is beaten 80
H YP E R B O L I C J USTI CE dow n by principles. But th at means that the desire of ethics is impossible, for the desire of the absolutely singular is an impossible desire, a mythic desire which courts ineffability. As soon as we open our m ouths it is already too late. The singular has withdrawn, is deferred, put off; always and already. So justice has no choice except to adopt the prophetico-m ythic mode, which m eans to call for justice, and to tell stories. Justice calls from an impossible place and it calls for something impossible, something we cannot say, some thing we can only broach by way of impossible stories. D o we call for justice or does justice call for itself? W ho can say? In either case, justice is called for. W hat is the call o f justice? W hat does it say? The call says “Come!” T hat is all. The call is indefinite, because justice is inde finite, and that is because of the indefiniteness and frailty of action. Justice does not call for a plan, even though plans are called for. It only calls for justice. Plans are draw n up; plans are constructions. The call for plans is the call upon which deconstruction insistently intervenes in order to keep the plans just, in order to keep the plans pliable. The role of deconstruction is to expose all such constructions to their own deconstructibility. F ar from building from a plan, the projection of justice is utterly w ithout a plan, utterly devoid of patterns, heavenly or earthly. The projection of justice has to do with action, not making. Its projection upon the possible is not a remodeling of the world according to a model or arche. Justice is unforeseeable, so the m ytho-prophetic tone in deconstruction has nothing whatever to do with telling the future. (See FL, 969-71.) Justice is unrepresentable, unmakable, unmodelable. It is not a m atter of executing a plan, reproducing a design. It has nothing to do with mimetics. We do not know what we want when we w ant justice because it has to do with singularities and has no “w hat,” even though justice is what we want. Justice, come! T hat is a quasi-prophetic call, a call from nowhere, a call to nowhere, a call for no-thing, a mythic call from time immemorial. The call o f justice cultivates the possible as possible.22 The future towards which it calls us is n ot definite, not future-actual, which would reduce it to a m atter o f predic tion and o f working towards a preset goal, of reaching a m ark which we set for ourselves, an articulated telos towards which we need only strain our wills (although that is hard enough). This call m aintains itself resolutely in the sphere of the possible, of radical openness and flexibility, in a kind of mythic space. It is not a call for chaos, but a call to stay open to the frailty and fragility of the future, to refuse to be taken in by the enormous prestige o f accum ulated actuality. H yperbolic-prophetic justice does not mean to foretell the future, as if we were predicting an earthquake. The call of hyperbolic justice is a wail, a cry against injustice. We do not know what we want. We cannot lay it out, because it depends upon the contingencies of the situation, the idiosyn crasies o f the details, the multiple frailties of action.
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BEYOND LEVI NAS Justice is im/possible. A myth. A story we tell about the fate of singulars. H yperbolic justice is neither legal nor philosophical justice, both o f which desire the arche, both of which can subsist only in the element of the univer sal. Still it m ust inform politico-philosophical justice, waxing the strings o f the law lest they be draw n into too tight a knot. Hyperbolic justice is an-archic. It calls from beyond the universal, from the abyss of singularity. It calls upon us, calling for a response, calling upon our m ost secret respons iveness and responsibility. W hat does the call say? W ho calls? W hat is called? Abyssus abyssum invocal.
Notes 1 Aristotle, N ic o m a c h e a n E th ic s , I, 2. 2 Hannah Arendt, The H u m a n C o n d itio n (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 222; cf. 220-30 and 192-97. 3 N ot to mention the abyss within the agent, the destabilization of agency