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Editorialcorrespondence PaulA. Bov6, boundary2, University of Pittsburgh,526 Cathedralof Learning,FifthAvenue,Pittsburgh,PA 15260. Submissionsshould be preparedfollowingThe ChicagoManual of Style, 14thedition,and should be submittedon disk (IBM-compatible, MicrosoftWord)along withthree hard copies, double-spacedthroughout,and accompaniedby a large,stamped, self-addressed envelope. No simultaneous submissions willbe accepted. Subscriptions boundary2 (ISSN:0190-3659) is published three times a year-spring, summer,and fall-by DukeUniversity Press, 905 W. MainSt., #18-B, Durham,NC 27701. The annualsubscriptionrate is $29 forindividuals, $84 forinstitutions.Subscribersoutside the UnitedStates must add $9 per year forpostage. Single copies are $12 forindividuals,$28 forinstitutions; backvolumes are $84. Business correspondenceand subscription requests should be directedto boundary2, Box 90660, Duke University, Durham,NC 27708-0660. Foradditionalinformation,please call the Duke Press JournalsDivisionat 1-888387-5687 (toll-freein the U.S.) or at 919-687-3653. Permissions Requests forpermissionto republish copyrightedmaterialfromthis journal should be addressed to Permissions Editor,Duke UniversityPress, Box 90660, Durham,NC 27708-0660.
Photocopying Photocopiesfor course or research use that are suppliedto the end-user at no cost may be made withoutexplicitpermissionor fee. Photocopies that are providedto the end-userfor a photocopyingfee may not be made withoutpaymentof permissionsfees to Duke UniversityPress, at $2 per copy foreach articlecopied. Indexing & Abstract Listings Abstractsin EnglishStudies, Abstracts in PopularCulture,AmericanHumanities Index,Arts& HumanitiesCitation Index,CurrentContents,FilmLiteratureIndex(1990-), HumanitiesIndex, InternationalBibliography of Book Reviews, InternationalBibliography of PeriodicalLiteratureCoveringAll Fields of Knowledge,Indexof American PeriodicalsVerse,Indexof Book Reviews in the Humanities,MLA Bibliography. Libraryexchanges and ordersfor them should be sent to Duke UniversityLibrary,Giftand Exchange Department,Durham,NC 27708.
Copyright? 1998 by Duke University Press. ISSN 0190-3659; ISBN 0-8223-6459-X
a. 0
a.CL Special Issue EdwardW. Said Editedby Paul A. Bove boundary 2 an internationaljournal of literatureand culture Volume25, Number2 Summer1998
Duke University Press
boundary 2 an international journalof literatureand culture Founding Editor WilliamV.Spanos Editor PaulA. Bove Review Editor DanielO'Hara Managing Editor MargaretA. Havran EditorialCollective JonathanArac,Universityof Pittsburgh PaulA. Bove, Universityof Pittsburgh Joseph A. Buttigieg,Universityof NotreDame MargaretFerguson,Universityof California,Davis Nancy Fraser,New School forSocial Research MichaelHays, IndependentScholar,Providence,R.I. RonaldA. T Judy,Universityof Pittsburgh MarciaLandy,Universityof Pittsburgh DanielO'Hara,TempleUniversity DonaldE. Pease, DartmouthCollege WilliamV.Spanos, SUNYat Binghamton EditorialBoard ArifDirlik,DukeUniversity WladGodzich,Universityof Geneva, Switzerland StuartHall,Open University,U.K. FredricJameson, DukeUniversity KarlKroeber,ColumbiaUniversity Masao Miyoshi,Universityof California,San Diego EdwardW.Said, ColumbiaUniversity GayatriSpivak,ColumbiaUniversity CornelWest, HarvardUniversity AlanWilde,Retired,IndependentScholar,PrincetonJct., N.J. Advisory Editors John Beverley,Universityof Pittsburgh Rey Chow,Universityof California,Irvine EricClarke,Universityof Pittsburgh TerryCochran,Universityof Montreal ChristopherL.Connery,Universityof California,Santa Cruz CarolKay,Universityof Pittsburgh KathryneV.Lindberg,WayneState University Jim Merod,BluePortSound Archive,LaCosta, California R. Radhakrishnan,Universityof Massachusetts,Amherst LouisA. Renza, DartmouthCollege Bruce Robbins,RutgersUniversity HortenseSpillers,CornellUniversity Rob Wilson,Universityof Hawaii Corresponding Editor JenaroTalens,Universityof Valencia,Spain
Contents Paul A. Bove / Introduction/ 1 W. J. T. Mitchell/ The Panic of the Visual: A Conversation with EdwardW. Said / 11 GayatriChakravortySpivak / Race before Racism: The Disappearance of the American / 35 Jonathan Arac / Criticismbetween Opposition and Counterpoint / 55 TerryCochran / The Matterof Language / 71 LindsayWaters / In Responses Begins Responsibility:Music and Emotion / 95 Jim Merod/ The Sublime LyricalAbstractions of EdwardW. Said / 117 KojinKaratani/ Uses of Aesthetics: AfterOrientalism / 145 Rashid I. Khalidi/ EdwardW. Said and the American Public Sphere: Speaking Truthto Power / 161 BarbaraHarlow/ Sappers in the Stacks: Colonial Archives, Land Mines, and TruthCommissions / 179 Mustapha Marrouchi/ Counternarratives,Recoveries, Refusals / 205 Books Received / 259 Contributors/ 265
Introduction
Paul A. Bove I am fordialogue between cultures and coexistence between people: everything I have writtenabout and struggled for has pointed to that as the goal. But I think real principle and real justice have to be implemented before there can be true dialogue. -Edward W. Said, "The Limitsto Cooperation,"in Peace and Its Discontents 1 Said's work embodies three values essential to intellectual responsibility:breadth and depth of knowledge, historicaland scholarly rigor,and a profound basis in political moralityof a kind that alone makes civilization possible. Minus any one of these virtues intellectuals become clerks, professionals with specialized interests and career ambitions. These are character virtues that forma career. They transformworks into an oeuvre that depends on and projects the virtues of character, that embodies and forms them. They give the product of intellect shape and boundary2 25:2, 1998. Copyright? 1998 by Paul A. Bove. Printedby permission.
2 boundary2 / Summer1998 focus, and make it into a project that, despite its variations and appearances, has integritythat still needs to be identifiedand made exemplary. These virtues have guided Said in a career-long struggle to end conflict and furtherthe effort to build civilizations whose cultures benefit from the coalescence of various peoples and their histories. In the name of justice between equals, dialogue can advance the construction of institutions and the telling of stories that both promote greater understandingand recognize, especially in this age of globalism, the overlapping histories, the shared experiences, of differentpeople. No story is above criticism, especially those that attempt, monologically,to reduce a complex history involving many peoples to the story of the victor.Said has made the Israeliproject to absorb Jerusalem culturallyinto a single nationaltale that sets aside centuries of complexity, of the presence of other peoples, of the civilizational richness in Jerusalem's history- he has made this effort a particulartarget of both critique and political advice to those who want to struggle for the city. It would be wrong, I think, to make such efforts on Said's part merely aspects of a local nationalism. Of course, the Palestinian national needs, the struggle of a colonized or occupied people for national determination, cannot be given anything but a central place in all of his work. Yet even this struggle both rests on and gives power to sets of intellectual and cultural virtues that can be found elsewhere and that, in turn, often justify Said's "critiqueof the colonizers" stories and actions. So, for example, not only does Said frequentlyinvokethe accomplishments of Abbasid civilizationas something necessarily forgotten by American war makers intent on barbarizing the basin of the Tigrisand Euphrates, a culture of many crosscurrents and inventions, but he also appeals to the historicalexample of Andalusian society lest we forget that different peoples can share a common history and, together, coexist to produce institutions of civil justice and artworks of extraordinaryvalue and impact. We can say either that the struggles of Palestine have led Said to the Abbasid and Andalusian examples or that, being the erudite scholar of intellectual imaginationthat he is, knowing of these matters gives weight and force to his politicaland culturalarguments for the Palestinians and against the Israelis and their American allies. In other words, in the memory of Abbasid and Andalusian cultures, there are reservoirs of intellectual imagination and responsibilitythat, among other things, as memories, confirmthat the present disposition of force need not always be, since it has not always been. At times one feels in Said not nostalgia but, as in Walter Benjamin, more than a little commitment to the values of ruined parts of historythat, if we could just rememberthem at the
Bove / Introduction3 righttimes and talk about them in the rightways, might help us now to do better in our own immatureand sometimes cruel civilizations.They give us not just utopian confidence but actual knowledge of real, materialcultures of coexistence. So powerful does Said take storytelling to be that he urges it as a form of political action and testimony. Cultures have differing powers; they tell their tales better or worse or simply differently.And these differences have profound consequences in the secular movement of history. When the Israelis besiege and shell Beirut,Said calls for the people to find ways to narratetheir experiences, to make the horribleevents of their daily lives into experiences by giving them shape as stories that can be shared and remembered, and form a national memory and tradition.Culturesform themselves and, as formed, can claim respect and recognition,especially in conflict with or, better, in dialogue withthe peoples of other cultures. Better to be self-representing and to form one's own persistent traditionas part of the effortto throwoff subordination.Intellectuals'grand narratives,remembering Abassid and Andalusian alternatives, stand withtraditionsthat have broader and more organic indeed, the intellectual's formations--although, in is to be relation to those formations. responsibility very The same responsibilityobliges the intellectualto assess each and every narrativeas it emerges, especially those associated withpower;these must be treated suspiciously and, when necessary, bathed in acid so the truthsthey obscure and the powers they serve stand out. Characteristically, Said has become the most stringent critic not only of the Oslo Accord and hence of the so-called peace process that has renewed the disequilibrium of power in favor of the Israelis in Palestine but also of the stories told by Americans, Israelis, and the Palestine LiberationOrganization(PLO)about the "benefits"the "peace process" brings to Palestinians. In other words, although Said's work may study, criticize, and reinvoke the form of grand narratives-most obviously the narrativeof empire-as part of the necessary effortto achieve just dialogues among equals, this does not mean such dialogues stand free of critique.Said has made us understand that intellectual responsibilityinvolves becoming a stringent critic of national forms at the very moment of their success. Of course, the Oslo Accord offers little, if any, hope of national self-determinationfor the Palestinians, and, in fact and principle,the PLO leadership is not a national government since, it is Said's contention, it rests on no popular participatorymandate--nonetheless, the virtue of Said's position is that injustice must be made the object of criticism even, or especially, when it appears in the forms of national
4 boundary2 / Summer1998 identity or national stories. So all of this writing against the Oslo Accord represents a critiqueof a media- and state-supported monologue of praise for a "peace process" that segregates Palestinians into Bantustans but also stands as the tireless effortto promote another narrativewhile, organically, aligning itself with the history of Palestinian struggle-a history threatened with oblivion by the narrativesof the "victors." Said's project has always involved a struggle for authority.In many cases, certainlysince the publicationof Beginnings, Said has been involved in recasting the forms of modernity'sdominantnarratives,theirfiliativetimeshapes and linearstructures as much as theirdeceitful and violent contents, their tales of European supremacy, of the impossibility--as in Conradof imagining a world without empire. Said's vision is a wide one. If it is against injustice that he struggles, then we should understand the range and implicationsof that struggle. It involves, above all, the struggle for the Palestinians, but it also involves a struggle within,for,and against the West that often takes the form of changing the forms of Western narrative.When Said invokes Brahms or counterpoint and Conrad or affiliation,much the same project is at work. It is importantto understand Said when he makes these gestures. In certain circles, it has become fashionable simply to bash anyone who attends to figures of "EuropeanHighCulture"as elitistor "Eurocentric."Such remarks exemplify values even worse than those Said calls "the rhetoricof blame."It is of the essence of Said's virtuethat he searches out and does not turnaway fromthe cultural,civil,and politicalwork-wherever it can be found-that embodies either the material forms of human beings livingtogether in everyday lives richin meaning and accomplishment or the very figures by means of which we can learn how it is possible to thinktoward livingin such societies. Said is not a monologist. The historical mindfinds not only the limitsof European modernismvis-a-vis empire when it reads Conrad but also the resources for imaginingan alternativeshape to culturalinteraction,for the formationof a culture capable of dialogue when it hears the counterpoints of Bach or Brahms. This is the same consciousness that admires the writingof the Jewish American scholar Sara Roy, or the historicalimaginationof Ibn-Khaldun,or the use of Antonio Gramsci by Indian scholars of subalternity. Breadth and depth of scholarship, knowledge, and understanding means a certain catholicism, a cosmopolitanism that roams a world and its historical culture for the pleasure of identifying the resources needed to make interventions so the present society might be transformed to meet a higher set of almost impossible ethical ideals. Intellectuals who can do these things are themselves a resource. It is to
Bove / Introduction5 the great scholars that intellectuals, no matter how pressing or immediate their concerns, must turn if they are to learn, think, judge, and intervene. Presentism has its dangers, not least of those are a lack of sympathy and a foreshortened perspective that obscures both the long movements of a secular history and the effort and struggle needed to take part in its movements. Often, short perspectives and impatience lead intellectuals to jump to fundamentalist conclusions or to remove themselves into the safe and rewardingconfines of mere professionalism. Said, after all, engages figures of intellectualstature not merely because they mightconfirmsome already held assumption but because they offerpleasure to the intellect, knowledge to the understanding,and refinementto the will. Knowingof Andalusianaccomplishment, he can turnto the discussion of counterpoint,understanding how peoples fruitfullycoexist and judgingthe likelihoodthat certain material practices might further or hinder the effort to live productivelyin peace. There is no disjuncture between the study of Fidelio and the critique of Arafat,and the criticwho insists there must be cannot understandthe virtue of intellectual responsibility. Moreover,Said belongs to a great traditionof historicalthinkers extending from Vico to Benjamin and beyond. We should always read Said with Benjamin's"SixthThesis on the Philosophy of History"in mind:"Only the historianwill have the gift of fanning the spark of hope in the past who is firmlyconvinced that even the dead will not be safe fromthe enemy if he wins. And this enemy has not ceased to be victorious."Benjamin has put succinctly the politicaland human fact of Said's commitmentto scholarship, memory, and history.The struggle for history is a politicalstruggle, and in this light, Arafatappears as a traitorwho has damaged the past as he has the present: He has distorted, lost, and endangered all that was achieved by the intifada.His poor politicaljudgment effaces the complexities of material human experience and helps the victor maintainthe rule of injustice. The dead will be forgotten; their efforts will be lost; they will be defeated once more: They become what their enemies always called them, "terrorists" rather than "freedomfighters."The future is lost in the battle for the stories of the past. 2 Critics who take Said seriously recognize the central relation between history, narrative,and politics in his work, and they attempt to bring their own study into relation with Said's efforts. In this collection, for ex-
6 boundary2 / Summer1998 ample, Jonathan Arac presents us with some of his own arguments on HuckleberryFinn and shows us how Said's work can and should matter in the context of American literature,culture, and politics. For just as Said meditates on the quizzical complexities that formthe hypotheses of all critical work, so Arac's deeply historical tracings and judgments of the ways cultures work in forming its own icons let us see exactly what the role of criticismshould be. Itis Said's particulareffect that those who writewith him in mind must always confront this question: What should the critic do? In a unique and powerful essay on the problems of land mines and human rights, Barbara Harlowgives one exemplary answer to that question. She enacts in scholarly detail Said's lifelong injunction:Speak truth to power. Like Said, Harlow casts aside "epistemological"worries over what we can know to show that, at the level of politics and history, we can know certain and often quite deadly things -massacres, cover-ups, and the suppression of human rights-and intellectuals must use their special trainingand knowledge to speak of these matters as they speak about race and stories. GayatriChakravortySpivak is, of course, one of the leading essayists in the fields of Marxism,theory, feminism, and materialism.With Said and very few others, academics would credit her with the formationof postcolonial studies. Her impact in numerous fields of knowledge has been immense. Inthis volume, she returns us, topically,to America and, in reading Jack Forbes's Black Africans and Native Americans, she examines that most Saidian of all issues: the crossing of peoples and their differenthistories. Spivak takes Forbes's work as emblematic of the power of Said's Orientalismas a beginning, as a setting of an agenda for now nearly two generations of scholars in the social sciences as well as the humanities. Of course, Spivak makes of Forbes's work something very much her own, which, here and now, can be called simply a historical materialist reading of the liberalismthat always informs U.S. multiculturalism.As always, however, Spivak forces our attentionto the internationalarrangements of forces and invents for us a new and necessary way to read in light of globalism. Her essay can be importantlyplaced next to the final chapters of Culture and Imperialism. We need ways to understand Said's importance in so many fields, to so many projects, and in relationto so many other powerfulintellectuals and their thought. Mustapha Marrouchihas produced an extended study of essential elements of Said's thinking,especially in relationto Said's historical status as an exile in a metropolitanculture. He weighs Said in scale with
Bove / Introduction7 Frantz Fanon, Raymond Williams, and C. L. R. James and against those politically unsympathetic critics who do not read Said carefully enough. Marrouchiexplains Said's projectand the multisidedvalue of his workto his self-created role as a "strategicintellectual."This allows Marrouchinot only to explain why certain self-proclaimed figures of "resistance"misrepresent Said but also to separate him from those Marrouchicalls "his acolytes." This is an important point in understanding a critic who has polemically substituted affiliationfor filiationin his thinking.More important,it allows us to approach Said as a figure not to be imitated but read and studied. Like Williams,Said is a brilliantessayist, committed to the flexibilityof the form; the authorof books who detests dogma; and in what Marrouchirightlyidentifies as Said's impatience with the merely abstract, a writercommitted to elements of James's feeling for the materialitiesof life. Perhaps Said is better knownforhis fundamentalrole inthe struggles of the Palestinian people, a struggle that has, at times, brought him within the formal institutionsof resistance but more often has seen him involved in the intellectual'stasks of speaking truth against power and buildingthe severe poetic institutionsof freedom and justice. Morethan any other person, Said has changed, at least to some importantdegree, the way the U.S. media and American intellectuals must thinkabout and represent Palestinians, Islam, and the MiddleEast. Rashid I. Khalidihas played a vital role in changing the U.S. understandingof Palestinian historyand currentrealities. LikeSaid, Khalidihas thought out the vital role media representations play in U.S. foreign policy,in formingthe consensus of empire that, in this case, has cost the Palestinians so dearly. In his essay for this special issue, Khalidi, once more invokingSaid's commitment to speak truthto power, analyzes the ways Said has understood, made use of, and changed the American media. Khalidihelps us understand how vital Said's role has been in educating media and scholarly elites; often Said has been almost alone in this effort, but, as a result, many people now better understand the ignorance and prejudice,the workingsof "Orientalism"inthe U.S. media. Andfarbetter than before, we realize the consequences of such habits of ignorance and prejudice. Khalidinotices how Said has brilliantlyused the American commitmentto "democracy"as a lever to move U.S. media images of the Middle East conflictwhile letting us also see how, likeGramsci, an organic intellectual, Said's own values are deeply rooted in enhancing populardemocratic participationin power and choice. Of course, the aestheticization of politics has been a problem for intellectuals throughout this century. KojinKaratani,himself an important
8 boundary2 / Summer1998 theorist not only of the aesthetic but of Japan's status in the history of colonialism and imperialism, argues powerfullythat in Orientalism, Said has identified and subverted the role of the aesthetic in colonialism. Theorizing the aesthetic as a form of "sadistic invasion"allows Kojinto represent Conrad-likefigures-those who adopt an anti-imperialposition from within the seeming necessity of empire-as "aestheticentrists"whose own aesthetic commitments require deconstruction. Kojininsists that Said's work lets us realize that aesthetics allows even anti-imperialiststo obscure colonialism. In a very differentbut related vein of thinking, Lindsay Waters sets out to engage Said's speculations on figurationand representation as the basis for a renewed theory of the aesthetic. Indeed, implicitlyaccepting Kojin'ssuggestion that Western aesthetics has been discredited by history, Waters argues that nonetheless Said's work shows the need for an aesthetics and relegitimates the sphere itself. Waters situates Said's work in a contested relationto Adorno as a thinkingabout pleasure. Waters's essay opens this issue's effortto take seriously the place of music in Said's career and does so by giving attention to Said's own emphasis on the importance of experience, especially, in this instance, the experience by the human of that which moves us-even though it itself is not human. Such a line of thinkingcan be, as Waters knows, developed in many directions. Terry Cochran's essay pursues Said's thinking about the inhuman into the equally foundational domain of figuration.Cochran thinks throughthe theoretical implicationsof Said's writingto explain how Said has shown, irreversibly,that the conceptual and rhetoricaldevices for dealing with literaturemust be applied to all other domains of cultural production and that this fact has serious implications for the organization of knowledge. Cochran's own research into the materialityof knowledge production-especially his thinkingabout print-form part of the necessary historical context for his reading of Said. As Cochrantakes Said's thinkingabout music intothe topics of figure and materiality,Jim Merod places Said's work into a revealing relation to musical performance. Merod pursues Waters's interest in experience into the central Saidian domain of critical intelligence, taking seriously Said's participationin a "vast"realm of humanistic musical imagination. Merod's interest lies in what seems to be the excessive elements of Said's critical imaginationthat are played out or elaborated in such things as Glenn Gould's legendary nighttimeperformances. In other words, in the inhumanity of music, Merodgrounds Said's generous and overwhelminghumanism.
Bove / Introduction9 When W.J. T. Mitchellengages Said in questions about visual art, we to begin grasp, immediately,the very eccentric power that Merod identifies as the center of Said's persistent and expanding civilizationalsignificance. We can read Said's interviewwith Mitchellfor what they say about Goya, Caravaggio, and others, but most important,as Mitchellrepeatedly makes clear, is how, in talking about these great figures of our civilization, Said makes us see his own status. It is of the essence that we understand this word our as being inclusive. As Mitchelland Said laughingly insist, they are both secular leftists-and feel themselves an endangered species. It is vital, though, for an intellectual such as Said, for whom the greatness of culture matters just because it comes from coalescence and not from difference alone-for just this reason, Goya, although of Europe, can and needs to be read, studied, appreciated, and learned as one importantelement of a history that exists not just alone but in counterpointto all others. It is in this sense, in terms of the breadth, rigor,and ethical spiritthat motivate Said's generosity, courage, and openness, that we can follow Mitchell in naming Said as part of the same class of figures as Goya himself. Said once insisted that Goethe's greatness lies in his being open to influence. Said has made himself the modern version of this figure, and this extraordinary quality,which is a gift to all the rest of us, needs to be studied and accepted.
The Panic of the Visual: A Conversation with EdwardW. Said
W.J. T.Mitchell WJTM:I thoughtthatwe wouldjust startwiththe motivationforthis interview, whichwas to drawyou out about questionson visual arts and the media. When I firstbroachedthe idea about interviewingyou about the visualarts,yourfirstresponsewas thatyou mighthave nothingto say. Itwas also mysecond one. EWS:[Laughter] WJTM:I don'tbelieveit, of course.Andon the basis of that,I wantto pursue it. I wantto knowwhatyou makeof that as yourfirst-and secondreaction.Whydidyou seem to wantto holdit off? EWS:Well,because, I willtell you quitehonestly,because when it comes to the oraland the verbal,the auditoryand the verbal,I have a veryhighly developedvocabularyand considerableexperienceand practicein talking aboutthem.Whenitcomes to the visualarts,witha few exceptions,in my writing,I haven'tdealtwiththem,so Ifeel somewhattongue-tied. WJTM: Tongue-tied?Thisis a novelexperienceforyou. EWS:Itdefinitelyis. boundary2 25:2, 1998. Copyright? 1998 by EdwardW. Said. Printedby permission.
12 boundary 2 / Summer 1998 WJTM:Whatare the specific visual arts that you don'tfeel tongue-tied about?Yousaid therewere some exceptions. EWS:Yes, manyexceptions,in a sense, as I thoughtaboutthe questions things.But you sent me. Ican talkwithsome effectivenessaboutindividual a sends me into visual arts think about the to panic. generally just WJTM: Perhapswe shouldcallthisconversation"ThePanicof the Visual." Let'sstart by talkingabout museums.Are you a regularmuseum goer? Andwhichmuseumsdo you findyourselfrevisitingmost regularly? EWS:Well,I'mnot a regularmuseumgoer, actually.I tend to go to museums ifthey haveshows thatare of interestto me, and,occasionally,if Ifind I go to one, withoutplanningor premeditation, myselfin physicalproximity intoone. Thatwas the case a coupleof weeks ago. Iwas on FifthAvenue, and I hadn'tbeen to the Frickin a longtime,and I said to myself,"Well,let me justgo and look,"and I didthat.That'sthe kindof thingthatIdo. I don't visitgalleriesveryoften.I mightgo witha friendto see somethingspecific, but I could go to Parishalfa dozen times and not visit the Louvre.But I mightgo, as I did a couple of years ago, to see somethingat the Grand Palais. WJTM:Andas you walkintoa museum,do you findyoursteps going to department?Towardpainting,sculpture,photography? any particular morethansculpture.Although, EWS:Iwouldsay paintingandphotography I recalla periodaboutthirtyyears ago, when I became suddenly,tremendously,involvedin Rodin,whose workI had neverseen. It must'vebeen morethanthirtyyears ago. AndI visitedthe Rodinmuseumand startedto collect printsof the sculpturesI had seen. Butmostlyit'spaintings,and I wouldsay thatwithveryfew exceptions,most of my interestis focused on the period,let'ssay, fromthe late eighteenthcenturyto the present.I find that earlierpaintings,let'ssay Renaissancepaintings,on the whole,don't reallyexcite myvisualsenses. So historically, WJTM: basicallythe same intereststhatyou have in literature. EWS:Oh, except in literature,especiallyin English,I tend to go backconsiderablyto the earlierperiods.I'mvery fond of Langlandand much of ElizabethanandJacobeandrama.So my rangeinvisualartis less catholic thanliterature,Ithink.
Mitchell / PanicoftheVisual 13 WJTM:Now,you mentionedthe Louvrebefore.As you probablyknow,in recentyears, the Louvrehas inviteda numberof peoplewhoare not really curators,not expertson visualart, to curateexhibitions.Thatis, to make some kindof personalselection fromtheirarchives.Ifyou coulddo that, withthe Louvreor withsome museum,whatwouldyou do? EWS:Well, I haven'tthoughtabout that very much.The firstname that comes to mindis somebodywho has been a greatpassionof mineformost of myadultlife,andthatis Goya.AndI'dcertainlywantto do itaroundGoya and, to a great extent,all of his work.Includingthe earlierstuffand then the bullfighting picturesand the portraitsand then, of course, the rather visionary,and dramaticpicturesof his last years.There'ssomethingabout Goyathatstrikesme as absolutelyessential,at least in myexperience. WJTM: Canyou say a littlemoreaboutthat?Whatis itaboutGoya? EWS:I thinkit'sa numberof things.One is thatthere'sa kindof freedom andfantasy,and an almostmelodramatic sense. Youknow,likeSaturneating his children,or the variouspaintingsfromthe house of the dead, The Disastersof War,the paintingaboutthe executionof Maythe third-these are very compellingto me. There'sa kindof detachment.I mean, they're very involved,veryfree paintings,in manyways. ButIfeel the kindof ironic distancethathe has at the same timethathe's so passionatelyinvolvedin the subjectthathe cares about.There'sa kindof gentleness inthe middle of all the violencethat impressesme a greatdeal. Andthen, above all, to me, tremendouslyeffectivecolors.Youknowthe violenceof the colors,the swirlingof them,the freedomwithwhichhe throwsthemaroundthe canvas. It'svery powerful,and they stay in my mindas no otherpaintingsdo. WJTM:As I listen to you talk about this, I can't help associatingall the qualitiesyou findin Goyawith... EWS: Blake.
WJTM:No. Notreally.PerhapsBlake.But,no, withyou yourself. EWS and WJTM:[Laughter]
WJTM: Thatis, yourpositionwithrelationto a wholeset of veryconflicted and even violentsituationsin politics.Particularly in relationto the Palestinian movementwithwhichyou have kindof an ironicattachment,a gentleness and passionateskepticism.Yourposturetherehas been, can I say, Goyaesque?
2 / Summer 14 boundary 1998 EWS:Well,you can say that. But,I mean, I'mnot saying it. Butthe other thingthat I'vealso always been very impressedwith,especiallyrememberingone of Goya'spaintingsin the Frick,is his absolutelyunreverential qualitytowardsaristocratsand authority.There'salways,you know,some gig or some flawthatyou see that he seems anxiousto pointout, even in the kindsof paintingthat most paintersI knowof wouldnot actuallywant to do. I meangoinga step inthe directionof somebodylikeFrancisBacon. It'salmostlikethat,butit isn't. Yes. Ithinkthat'sa veryshrewdobservation,actually. WJTM: EWS:Ifindthatverycompelling.That'sanotherthingthatI identifywithin Goya . . . absolute unwillingness to take authorityfor anything more than
somethingthat is obviouslyput on and posed and dressed up and selfregarding.One of the things that you notice in all of his aristocratsis a sense thattheytakethemselvesveryseriouslyandthattheythinkof themselves as quitegrandpeople.Andyou get thatsense, butat the same time you get-Goya, somehow, I don't knowhow he does it-some sense of commenton that. Youknow,the way GlennGouldplayedBach or some composer-you're not only gettingthe music butalso a kindof intelligent commentaryon it.Andin Goya'scase, it'salwaysunreverential. WJTM:Yes. It'sas if he has foundsome kindof middlegroundbetween realismand caricature... EWS:Yes,exactly,exactly. WJTM: ... andis capableoftreatingpeoplewitha certainamountof sympaNotturningthemintoa totalstereotype, and detachment simultaneously. thy butcertainlynottakingthemat theirown estimationof themselves. EWS:Exactly.Thatwouldcertainlybe true. Andthen I wouldwantto put,since we'retalkingaboutSpain,you know,Velazquez,a painterwho doesn't reallyspeak to me as much as in the later paintings,the religiouspaintings El Greco does. Particularly and the still lifes, you know,the landscapes,the Viewof Toledo.There's somethingquitehauntedand almostfrighteningaboutthemthat'salways mystifiedand drawnme to them.Youknowthose greatelongatedfigures, the clericsand the churchfiguresthathe was so interestedin. particularly Allof whom,unlikeGoya,filledone withfearand a kindof mysteriousness. To someone likeme, who is quitesecularand unschooledin the ways of and the powerful the churchof his time,all this suggests hiddenlabyrinths
Mitchell/ Panicof the Visual 15 siege of the Inquisitionand the ordeals of faithand vision at the same time. So I would sort of associate the two, but then I would go forwardto include a certain kindof photography. WJTM:The most sustained piece of critical writingabout the visual arts that I know of by you is probablyyour collaborativephotographicessay with Jean Mohr,After the Last Sky. I wondered if you could talk a littlebit about the specific relationwith photography.When did you ... EWS: We've dropped the curatorialquestion that you asked me? WJTM:Well, we can stay with it if you like. I actuallydid have a second part to that which was ... EWS: No, no. I was just going to add Picasso, who also means a lot to me, particularlyin association with those visionary, unspeakably volatile paintings of Goya. And the almost ecstatic qualitythat you find in some of the El Greco paintings, you also find in the Demoiselles d'Avignon,for example, of Picasso and in some of those Cezanne paintings of the mountains and the scenery around Aix, which have meant a great deal to me. And then, also, the kindof semihysterical paintings of van Gogh, which, you know, have all kinds of literaryresonances. But to get to the reference about Jean Mohr.I never attempted anything like that, and it was, I think, at a period when I had been particularly involved in Palestinian politics and feeling very, very strongly about two things. One was the absence in what I was doing-which was speaking and writing-of any kindof personal dimension to it, and I found myself so involved in the collective and the official and the unofficialthat I felt there was something profoundlyaskew in what I was writingabout. And the second thing was a very strong feeling of exile, having been for many years, at that point, about twenty years, involvedpoliticallyand not having been able to go to the MiddleEast. This was also duringthe middle of the Lebanese civil war, so I couldn'tgo there. And I knew I was unable to go to Palestine, because I was a member of the National Council. Itried several times to go to the West Bank and Gaza, but when friends put out feelers to the Israelis, I was told I would not be allowed in or I would be put in jail immediately,or something of that sort. But I felt very strongly the sense of being unable to connect directly.And it was at that time in the early '80s that I met John Berger. I had writtena review of the book he did with Jean Mohr,Another Wayof Telling,which impressed me a great deal because it was reallyabout the way one could narratewith pictures.
2 / Summer 16 boundary 1998 WJTM:Yes.
EWS:Jean is a rathertaciturn,modest man, and he said, "Youknow,I have an archiveof eightor ninethousandphotographsof Palestiniansthat I'vebeen takingsince I workedforthe Red Cross,beginningin 1948."So I remembervisitinghimand goingthroughthis archive.Andthen therewas anotherevent, at that time, perhapsthe climaxof the whole thing,which was this1983UNconferenceon Palestine,forwhichIwas a consultant.So I suggested, havingseen his pictures,to the organizersin Genevathatwe hang some of his picturesin the entranceof the UN in Geneva,and they accepted, butthey said thatthe onlywaytheycouldget the Arabstates to thatwe not have any captions.I tell this story agree to this,was, ironically, at the beginning of After the Last Sky.
I rememberitwell. WJTM: EWS:So there'sthat sense of the silent pictureswithouta commentary, whichitselfwouldbe intrusiveand politicalfromthe pointof view of the Arabs.I was consideredto be a kindof unguidedmissile.TheythoughtI mightsay the "wrongthing."So Ifeltcompelled,ina sense, to do the book. And so we spent, or, rather,I spent weeks and weeks makinga selectionof the photographsfromhis enormousarchive.Andhe didn'tdemur.I mean, it wasn'this choice, it was my choice. Occasionally,he wouldsay, "Well,I'mnotso sure I see this picturequitethe wayyou do."AndI wasn't reallylookingforpictures-this is veryimportant-Iwasn'treallylookingfor photographsthat I thoughtwere exceptionallygood, as opposed to ones that were not exceptionallygood. I was just lookingat photographsthat I felt provokedsome kindof response in me. I couldn'tformulatewhat the responsewas. ButIchose them.Andthen, lookingat the photographsand havingthemspreadout all overthe floorforweeks on end, Ithen began to grouptheminseries. AndIcouldn't,at thatpoint,tellmyselforanyoneelse what the series were, but they seemed to belongtogether.Then I broke them down intofourgroupswithseries withinthem. And I felt that I was actuallydoingit ina kindof abstractway.That'sto say, Iwas reallyworking accordingto principlesthatare mucheasier forme to deal withwithinthe art of the Islamicworld.Youknow,wherethere were nonrepresentational certainkindsof patternsthatyou couldsee thatwere not representational in the sense, you know,thatthey had a subject,butthey had some motif and rathera musicalmotif.Andso I decidedthat I woulddo the book in fourparts.Then I devisedtopics foreach of the partsand proceededac-
Mitchell/ Panicof the Visual 17 cordingly.The last thing was that I arranged the pictures on the page in a particularway. At the top of the page, on the side of the page, lengthwise, full length, framed, unframed,that kindof thing. WJTM:I don't thinkI fully realized the extent to which this whole procedure was almost a musical operation. EWS: Yes, yes. Because I couldn't find a simple scheme for it that had a kind of narrative,or even a philosophical equivalent. WJTM:Yes. EWS: And so I ended up calling the first one "States" and the second one and the third one "Emergence" and the fourth one "Past and "Interior," which Future," are, you know, fairly innocuous and abstracting. I tried to fill them with the sense of the primitivemeaning of those things, in terms of Palestinian statements, the state of Palestinian life, the people. In the second part, for example, inside their houses, how they inhabitthese displaced places. The firstpicture,for example, which I thought was a wonderful photograph, was of a doorway in a refugee camp in Jordan, which had lots and lots and lots of scribblingand writingover it and a littlechild peeking through the door. And that struck me as the perfect example to start the thing off, because it all really had to do with the min al-dakhil,which is "fromthe interior"and what that means to Palestinians. WJTM:Yes. So in some sense there were photographs that you thought were just marvelous images in themselves for pulling out some essential feature ... EWS: Yes. WJTM:... of Palestinian identity. EWS: But I couldn't, and I still can't, with any certainty, talk about them with any confidence, talk about them as photographic objects. I couldn't analyze them. I was really more interested in how they corresponded to or in some way complemented what I was feeling. And, of course, underlying the whole thing was the theory that I had writtenabout in an essay that had appeared in the London Review of Books called "Permission to Narrate." And I talked about the difficulties of Palestinian narratives .
.
. that is to
say, we didn'thave and couldn't formulatea linear narrativein the national sense for all kind of reasons. There were too many obstacles, we were too divided over this and that, and the absence of a center made our lives
18 boundary2 / Summer1998 essentially fragmented. And so, you know, departing from that, then I said, well, I can't tell a story in a traditionalway or in an accepted way. And I had to do something else. WJTM:Was the dating of the photographs importantto you? Did it matter to you whether a photographcame from 1965 or 1975? EWS: No. I didn'tfind that at all important.I found, instead, that what was importantwas the face. I would look at it, and if the face said something to me, then I might, or might not, ask Jean who the person was, and he would inevitablythen tell me who the person was and what his story was-why he took the picture or what was interesting about him. But that wasn't always the case, and I chose a lot of the pictures precisely because you couldn't date them. There was a kind of, a kindof ... how shall I put it? There was a kindof... WJTM:Unknowability? EWS: Yes. Exactly. WJTM:On the issue of the unknowable:I think one of the most intriguing and moving moments in that book for me is when you describe looking at the photograph of a woman who's shown in a very close-up portrait.She has her chin in her hand, she's looking directlyat the camera ... EWS: ... and her face is full of lines. WJTM:Yes. You start talking about the picture of her as something that captures our life at home. EWS: Right. WJTM:And then I believe that it was your sister, or perhaps Mariam,who said to you, "No,that's Mrs. Farage." EWS: Yes, exactly. WJTM:And there was this moment in yourtext where you pause and realize you'd been caught with the unknowable suddenly turning into the knowable ... EWS: Exactly. WJTM:... and it reallythrew you off ... EWS:Also, feeling at the same time that, as Isaid, something had been lost.
Mitchell / PanicoftheVisual 19 WJTM:Yes.
EWS:Iwas interestedinthe slippagebetweennotrecognizingherandthen recognizingher,or,you know,suddenlybecause somebodysaid thatthat's whoshe was andthen Irememberedher.Andthen realizing,inbetweenthe two sensations,there was this quiterealface, and in thatface was somethingthat I couldn'tdescribe.I rememberthen dividingthatphotographoff fromthe rest of the chapter,the end of the chaptercalled"Interior." Aretheregoingto be anyphotographsorotherkindsof illustrations WJTM: inthe memoirthatyou'reworkingon? EWS:Yes. Lastweek, Italkedaboutthis withmyeditor,my Englisheditor, whowas here,and we wereworkingon the manuscript.I mean, I'veturned in aboutone hundredthousandwordsof it now,and so we have a pretty good sense of how it's going to end. And,hopefully,of when it's goingto end. Andwe thoughtthatitwouldbe necessaryto havesome photographs of a ratherpersonaltime frommy past. I don'treallyknowhow some of them got here, butthere are a lot of photos sittingin big boxes in one of our cupboardsthat I'veseemed to collect over the years, beginningwith picturesfromthe late '30s rightup untilthe present. Anddo youthinkyou'llbe addressingthose ortalkingaboutthem? WJTM: EWS:I do it in a funnyway in the text. In otherwords,there are certain things... Forexample,since you mentionedit,this morning,Iwas working on one of the greatcharactersof mymemoir,whichwas myfather.We had a very,to me, painfulandquitetraumaticrelationship. He was a verylaconic man. I neverknewreallyverymuchabouthis past. But,in addition,he was alwaysthere on top of me in the sense that he was tryingto makeme do certainkindsof things,all that had to do withmy body.I mean, I felt that fromthe age of eight-seven or eight-that therewere manythingswrong withme. UntilIwas twenty-one,he totallydominatedme. I rememberwhen I graduatedfromPrinceton,we wentto NewYork.He'dalwaysbeen, since Iwas a boy,complainingaboutthe factthatI hadverybad posture.He was alwaysafterme forthat.Andthen we wentfromPrincetonto NewYorkto shop in Manhattan.I don'trememberexactlywhere, but he boughtme a truss,whichIwore-I mean,it was straightout of Freud!... WJTM: [Laughter] EWS:... whichIworeto keep my backstraight.Andwe werethatkindof thing. There was always something wrong. Inthe passage I'mwritingnow,
2 / Summer 20 boundary 1998 aboutthingsfromthat same time, when I foundout in 1961-1 remember the momentvery,verywell--thathe had melanoma,whichultimatelykilled him ...
I mean, it took hold and then metastasized into lung cancer and
all the rest of it. When I realizedthat he was going to die-and that'sthe passage I'mwritingnow-it was likethe earthfelloutfromunderneathme. I realizedalso the particular kindof affectionI hadforhimand the relationI had. have a that we pictureof my fatherand me from1937 or 1938. ship child. It's a was a I pictureon the beach in Alexandria.He's standing tiny behindme, or rathersittingbehindme, and I'mstanding.And,you know, he's sustainingme, on the one hand,andyet one couldalso see the power and the authoritywhichdominatedme at thattime. Arethereotherkindsof imagesthattakeyoubackto these formative WJTM: moments? EWS:Yes. I had wantedto mentionthat because of yourhavingsent me these questionsaboutvisuality--arts,media,experiences,memories--that the visual culturethat did surroundus was almost all nonancientEgypand almostalways Islamic.Therewere no museums tian, non-Pharaonic, inJerusalem,and, in Cairo,myexperiencewas morewitharchitectureand thanwithperspective patternsand designsthatwere ultimately calligraphic of a figure,andwithiconography of the sortthatone andthe representation finds in Westernpictorialtraditions.So the painterlyand the picturesque were,to me, veryobscure.Therewere no keys to them. Then,thereweretwo verypowerfulvisualexperiencesof myyouth, and I rememberthem very well. One of them was the wax museum,to whichwe wouldgo often because I was so fascinatedby the scenes from Egyptianhistory.Youknow,the openingof the Suez Canal,the dynasties. Thiswas duringthe monarchicalperiod.Theywere lifelikefigures,and I rememberlookingat them--Iwas verysmall,five,six, seven at the time--and alwaysexpectingthem to move and say something,and, of course, they didn't.ButI keptgoingback.A close friendof my parents,a historian,who livedin Beirut,wouldcome to Cairoonce a yearortwicea year.I remember one of the greatpleasuresof those days was to go to the waxmuseumwith himand have himmakethe speech and makethe figuresseem to speak. WJTM:Yes.
Andthe second visualexperiencethatwas EWS:Thatwas veryimportant. fascinatingto me were the exhibitionsin the AgricultureMuseum,which musthavebeen builtbythe British,a series of threehuge buildingsinGiza.
Mitchell / PanicoftheVisual 21 The centralbuildinghad exhibitsof all the variouswheat, sugarcane,and products,and instructivedisplaysabout Egyptianecology,as agricultural wellas birdsandanimals,andso on. Butwhatfascinatedme the mostwere the glass cases withexhibitionsof variousdiseases, not lifelikeimages but anatomicalrepresentationsof the humanbody.I wouldgo back to them time aftertime aftertime to look at bilharzia,elephantiasis,and thingsof this sort. WJTM: Werethese picturesof peopleafflictedwith... EWS:Butthey weren'tpicturesonly.Therewere picturesand models. WJTM:I see.
EWS:Andthey grippedme with,of course, a terrifiedfascination. WJTM:Whenyou say "models," you mean models of the bacteria,themselves? EWS:Ofthe ... let'ssay... I remember,forinstance,an abdomenafflicted withelephantiasis. .. not onlyelephantiasis,butyaws. Youwouldsee the frontof itandthena cutaway,so youcouldsee the inside,thatkindof thing. Theywere likemedicalmodels. WJTM: Yes,yes. EWS:Iwas extremelytakenwiththese and,of course, readthe inscriptions manytimes over and felt myselfto be threatenedby them because they seemed to be all around.Aside fromthat, it wasn'tuntilI came to Europe forthe firsttime in the early'50s that I wentto art museums.Beforethat, museumssimplyweren'tpartof myexperienceat all. WJTM: So this does certainlymakeplausiblesome of yourreticence,your feelingthatyou came late to the Westernarttraditions. EWS:I came very late. And,of course, therewas such a heavyemphasis uponthe writingand the readingon the one handand the musicalon the otherin myefforts. WJTM:Yes. I findyouraccountof the Agricultural Museumin Giza particularlyfascinating,since it seems likethe most unlikelyimpressivevisual experiencefora child.Do you thinkthatthat has resonatedin any wayfor you later?Whatdoes it connectto foryou now? EWS: It may be that the influence and the images are now coming back to
22 boundary2 / Summer1998 me partly because of my disease, you know and the visualization one has of it. But the idea that one's body conceals withinit, in a way that becomes more and more visible, the progress of a disease, a dread sort of decomposing, or degenerative or distorting process, is to me, extremely compelling. And I remember very well, for instance, also, in my youth, seeing a movie of The Picture of Dorian Gray. WJTM:Oh, yes. EWS: I was in my early teens at the time, and I don't know whether you remember the film,but George Sanders was in it, and Dorianwas played by HurdHatfield.The painting, which was revealed in the last part of the film up in the attic, as he went on and became more decadent and more degenerate, and he remained as beautifulas ever, the paintingaged and became decomposed. There was a paintingwhich I researched, and it was by Ivan Albright-do you remember him?-an American artist of the '30s and '40s who was fascinated by images of decomposition and disease. They commissioned him for this film. I remember this because it resonated with my experiences at the AgriculturalMuseum. WJTM:Perhaps this also links back to your fascination with Goya and with El Greco, both of whom represent the deformationof the body ... EWS: Yes. WJTM:... so vividly. EWS: Absolutely. WJTM:Now, I want to ask you about the firsttime you saw an opera, as opposed to hearing one on records, and what the effect was of encountering opera as spectacle for the first time? Was that an importantexperience? EWS: Well, I remember exactly the first opera I saw. I must have been about, twelve or thirteen. It was in Cairo. There was a season of Italian opera every year in the winter. I think it must have begun around January and ended at the end of Februaryfor two months. My parents had a subscription. I was taken to the opera for the first time to see Andrea Chenier, which is, in my opinion, a third-rateopera by a fifth-gradecomposer [Laughter] called Giordano. I'd never heard of him or the opera, but I remember the first question I asked my parents, and I think maybe it was my father: "Do they sing all the way through, or is there any talking?"And they said, "No it's singing all the way through, no talking."So I was fairlyintimidated
/ PanicoftheVisual 23 Mitchell by this, because I didn'tknowItalian.Andwhen we went, I was muchoppressed by the notionof listeningto an opera,to music,to wordsI couldn't completelyunderstand.ButI rememberbeingcompletelyoverwhelmedby the spectacle forwhichI wasn'tat all prepared.I mean, I thoughtit would be just people. I hadn'tseen performancesor attendedperformancesof oratoriosand variouschoirs.Thatwouldhave been the limitof my musical experiences.Butto see it ... I rememberthe manwho playedGerard,who was the baritonevillaininthe opera,GinoBechi,who was a famousItalian opera singerof the '40s and '50s. Doingthe kindsof thingson stage that DouglasFairbankswoulddo in a movie-fencing, then slidingacross the table and doing it whilesingingall the time. It immenselypleased me. At the same time,Ithoughtthe musicwas uninteresting. I rememberalso later findingin our recordlibraryhis big aria,whichwas called "Enemyof the People,"sung by somebodyelse -I don'trememberwho,itwasn'tBechiand listeningto it over and over againforsort of confirmation and reliving of this opera that I'dseen only once. Of course, the last thingthat really impressedme andgrippedme, Ishouldsay,aboutthe experience,was that it was so rare.Itwasn'tsomethingyou couldgo backto, the wayyou can playa recordover again. Itwasn'tsomethingyou could look at again the way you couldlookat a paintingor an object.Itwas "intime,"and it was a veryfine moment,andthe onlywayyou couldrecaptureitwas by memory, and my musicalmemorywas quiteformidablein those days. I was able to playoverbitsof itagainin my head, and itwasn'tuntilI came to the United States as an undergraduate at PrincetonthatIwas ableto makethe further connectionwiththe score. WJTM: So whatdo you thinkis the importanceforyou of the spectacle in Is opera? this somethingyou findrelativelydispensable? EWS:Notat all. Infact,in recentyears, I'vebecome almostobsessed with it. Thatis to say, I realizethat most of my own experiences,most, butnot all, of my own experiencesof opera going have been ones in whichthe spectacleis absolutelyessential.Ihavealwaysbeen immenselytroubledby the originalidea of thatsettingand even the direction.The visualelements of the operawere meantsimplyto be a kindof backgroundto the singer. Throughoutmy earlyyears of opera going, both in Egyptand at the Met, I rememberdistinctlythe immensepowerof going to Bayreuthin 1958I was twenty-twoat the time and had just graduatedfromPrinceton-and seeing the effectof this rathermoreintegrated,this rathermoreinterpretive notionof directionandtheme in use bythe Wagnerbrothers.I mean,there
2 / Summer 24 boundary 1998 was a programmatic side to it,thatis to say, theywantedto stripawayfrom TheRing,from,lets say, allthe Germanicand realistic,inthe verisimilitudinous sense of the word,baggage of the opera.So therewere no helmets, therewere no spears, there were no chariots,therewere no furcoats, no huts and all the rest of it. It was very abstract.Mostof the effects were achievedby lightingandthis quiteremarkablenotionof a diskon whichthe actor stood, whichsometimes wouldbreakin half,wouldsometimes tilt, wouldsometimes be flat, dependingon the action. I thoughtthat kindof and eurythmic spectaclewas whatI had alwaysmissed in representational Andeversince then, Ithoughtthemout. I mean, I'vealways interpretation. triedto finddirectorateand theme designerswho thinkof those visualand dramaticaspects of the operaas equalwiththe musical,andthat'swhyI've of the visual, developedsuch an interestinopera.It'sto see the integration the dramatic,the musical,and, of course, the historical.I mean, howdoes historyget intothese things? WJTM: Perhapsthisis a goodtimeto bringupthe questionIraisedwithyou about Foucaultand his theoreticalstatementsaboutexactlythis problem. I'mthinkingparticularly of Deleuze'saccountof Foucaultas a thinkerwhose dividedbetweenthe seeable and analyticalcategories are fundamentally the sayable,or the articulableand the visible.Are these distinctionsthat makesense to you and thatyou feel are useful? EWS:Well,I'vealwaysfeltthatwhen Foucaultspoke aboutepistemology, he certainlydidn'thave in mindthe kindof epistemologyone associates, let's say, with Kantor even Wittgenstein.There is, however,a distinctly theatricalcomponentin his work,as if epistemologywere a theatricalinstrumentof some sort. WJTM:Yes. EWS: And I recall, in particular,in Les Mots et les choses-and
I think I
was one of the firstpeople to writeabout it afterit came out in FranceI rememberreadingit withtremendousexcitementand realizingthat Foucault'sepistemologyalwayshad a kindof visualcorrelative,the notionof the table,orthe tableau,the notionof the theme,the notionof transparency, and so on, whichyou couldn'talwaysyourselfvisualize. WJTM:Right. EWS: But at least there were hints towards a fundamental dimension of display or theatricalityin Foucault'swork. And then, in The Archaeology of
Mitchell / PanicoftheVisual 25 Knowledge, The Order of Things, and Discipline and Punish, it struck me
therethathe was particularly anxious,actually,to beginwiththe visible-in otherwords,itwas the visiblethatmadepossiblethe sayable.Forinstance, the dismemberment of Damiens,the regicide,whichopens the bookon the prison,and then,of course,the wholenotionin TheArchaeologyof Knowledge of the archive,whichbringsto mind,as Ithinkitwas intended,scenes fromsome of Borges.Andin the ratherspecialstatus,whichwas halfseeable, halfsayable,of the enonce, or the statement,and then, in TheOrder of Things,wherehe was dramatizing himself,wherehe talksaboutstanding in a place and speakingin a particular way,I findthatallverymuchpartof this kindof combinationtheaterand speech, whichwas quiteremarkable, quiteunique. WJTM:Right.AndI take it thatwhatFoucaultmeans by the "heterotopia" is the conjunctionof these modes of expressions,the seeable and the sayable... EWS: Yes. WJTM:... modalities that are not exactly commensurate, in that one can't
substitutedforthe other. just be straightforwardly EWS:Not at all, not at all. I mean, that'swhy I said correlative,not in the sense of interchangeablebutin the sense of one doingsomethingthatthe othercan'tdo ... WJTM:Exactly.
EWS:... and ifyou removeone, then somethingis missinginthe other. WJTM:Let me take you withthis topicto a slightlydifferentterritory, and that'sthe questionof space and geography--place,landscapedterritoryandthe wholeissue of the time-spaceproblematic inyourownwork.Idon't exactlyhave a formulatedquestionaboutthat ... EWS:No, butit's,you know... WJTM:... it'sclearlyveryimportantto you. EWS:It'sveryclearin my mind. WJTM: Okay.Please proceed. EWS:I once evolveda kindof typology,a kindof pedagogictypologyof thinkers who proceed according to temporalityand are gripped by it, and
26 boundary2 / Summer1998 that would include, of course, the Hegelian tradition,the deconstructive tradition-people like de Man, Derrida, Lukacs, and so on-and then what I call the spatial tradition,includingfigures like Vico and Gramsci. I find it in the Italianmaterialisttradition,going back to Lucretius, but includingVico and Gramsci. And there the conception of society is essentially territorial, and therefore, in criticismand philosophy,there's a whole question of how you cover one with the other, and how you move between different segments of a contested geography. And then I realized that I belong firmlyin the second camp, because a lot of my work really deals with geographical demarcations, geographical spaces. WJTM:Yes. EWS: In a way, I think it's part-at least in my own experience-of the universalityof the Palestinian experience, which is also about territoryand contested space and dispossession, which means you have to do certain things because you don't have the space or the place. It's hard to regain some substitute or equivalent for space ifyou don't have it. And the relationship between language and space becomes an issue, above all, the notion of writingand distance, which very much informsmy thinkingabout matters of exile and displacement. WJTM:So earlier,when you talked about narrativeand the Palestinian lack of a narrative,would you put that on the same side as the lack of the place, the lack of ... EWS: Absolutely. WJTM:... the space? EWS: The narrativehere is a function of speaking from a place. WJTM:I see. So narrativefor you is actually a kindof spatial notion. EWS: Absolutely. Not a temporal one. I mean, obviously, it has temporal elements-it would be silly not to acknowledge that. But it's principally,for me, the possibilityof producinga territorialobject, if you like, or a territorial location, as in Robinson Crusoe, where, in talking, he revisits, he repopulates, he reenacts both the shipwreckand the establishing of himself on the island. That's the core of it. WJTM:Could you say something now about visual imagery and your longstanding commitment to secular interpretation-to a secular politics. Like all leftist critics, includingmyself, you're ...
Mitchell/ Panicof the Visual 27 EWS: Our number is dwindling... WJTM: Well ... [Laughter] We'll survive somehow. You've often used con-
cepts like fetishism and idolatryto talk about certain kinds of identity politics, certain kinds of nationalism. I wanted to ask if you have any kind of theoretical reflections on the notions of fetishism and idolatry-that is, the moment when an image becomes an end in itself, becomes personified, becomes mystifying.Are there any limitsto your secularism? Do you have any fetishes or idols that you know of? EWS: Well, as few as possible. Let me start in a kindof humdrumway. I'm very interested in certain kinds of objects, both visually and tactilely,especially fabrics, particularlythe fabrics out of which clothes are made. These materials obsess me. I mean, I'malways interested in findingout ... WJTM:I've often remarkedthat your suitcase is at least three times as big as mine when you go on a trip. EWS:That's something else ... [Laughter]... but, Imean, I'mreallychoosy about the concept of the suitcases ... [Laughter]... of the sizes. WJTM:Me, too, but it's because you need all these fabrics with you, right? EWS: Yes. I don't know. I don't really understand what the origin of it is, but I have a fantastic interest in them and, of course, in style and fashion. I'vealways been interested in that. I know a great deal about it-costumes. But it goes back, I suppose, to the sense of engagement with those wax figures. Forme, they were lifelike,but foreign and strange. I recall that when I became interested in painting, I was also very interested in the texture. I mean the physical texture of what the painter was tryingto do. And one of the fascinations I had with Rodin, for example, was his representations of gowns, of folds, of density, of material.That was very interesting. WJTM:Yes, this is all beginning to come together for me, because I see this as also linked to your interest again in Goya, and the way the integument of the body, even the flesh itself, seems to become part of the paint and to flow off the frame of the body. EWS: Exactly. I mean, you could call that a fetish if you like, but what's importantfor me about it is that it's not inaccessible, it's not like a precious object. I've no interest in jewels, for example, at all. I mean, they don't say anything to me. And decoration-in the traditionfrom which I comeis very interesting to me, but it's decoration of a fairlyconsistent kind. It's
28 boundary2 / Summer1998 arabesque, it's floral ratherthan animal-that sort of thing. I'mfascinated by that. One of the ways I listen to music is to listen to that, as well. That's why I'm particularlyinterested in counterpoint. It's patterns against each other, with each other, not alone. The other thing has to do with the way I grew up and the place I grew up. Certainly after Palestine, well, even in Palestine, I was always conscious of prohibitionson places and objects to which I couldn't go. I mean, Jerusalem, for example, is a very hieratic and ritualizedcity, where one could go to certain places but one couldn't go to others. Particularlyin places likethe HolySepulcher, where Iwas very early made aware of not being able to go in or not being welcome into the Greek Orthodox, or the Catholic, or the Armenian Churches. It was a church of many divisions, and some of them were accessible and others were not. So there was always a sense of prohibitionand remoteness in those places. The same in Egypt, where we were foreigners, basically. There was our familiarspace at home, but once you came out of the house, the city was divided-this was duringthe monarchy-into areas that were hierarchicalwhere the king was and where the aristocracy lived. I remember one of my earliest experiences, which had a lot to do with the writingof Orientalism, when I was walking in the Gezira Club of which we were members. Itwas a famous enclave built by the British.The members were mostly foreign, although there were some local members. I was thrownout by the secretary, who was a friend of my father's. I tried to say to him ... He said, "Don'tyou know that Arabs are not allowed here?" And I said, "Yes, but we're members."And he said, "Don'targue with me boy, get out!"Itwas that sense of forbiddenspace that reallysowed, Ithink,the seeds of my rebellionagainst the hieraticand the fetishistic and the ritualizedand the idolatrous. I felt the need always to go against those prohibitionsand those statutes and those forbiddenplaces. The urge to enter those places usually cost me quite dear, going into places where I wasn't wanted, which is what I felt I was doing in Orientalism. WJTM:Youridea being to bring some illuminationinto those dark or inaccessible places? EWS: Illumination,but also some disposition to mock them and to show that they were, after all, constructions, and not divinely endowed or somehow spontaneously created. You understand what I mean? WJTM:Yes. Growing up a Roman Catholic, with veiled tabernacles and sacred icons, how could I not?
Mitchell/ Panicof the Visual 29 EWS: And that's why I've always been so interested in Vico, because Vico was the firstwriterwho taught me that human history is painstakinglymade the way you might make a model, or an object, and not endowed with any particularlysacred quality,and therefore, it was the province of the philosopher or the scientist to be able to look at any part of human historywith the same secular scrutiny without regard for idols. That's why he was a great admirerof Francis Bacon. I remember Ifirstread Bacon when Iwas a freshman or sophomore at Princeton, and he fascinated me with the notion of the idol and the tribe and the cave and so on and so forth. So the notion of de-idolizing has always been very importantto me. WJTM:But at the same time, it sounds to me as if you're conceding, at least to the possibilityof a certain limitedfetishism in yourself that you don't see as equivalent with this mystified, dominant ideology. EWS: You know, I'lltell you ... Ever since I got ill, I realize that all this stuff that I care about-for example, my interest in the piano, in my piano ... I don't use, as you know, computers; I use pens, and I have a very large collection of pens. All these objects that mean a lot to me I feel are easily dispensable tomorrow,because I realize how transitoryit is, and I find myself, in a funnyway, sort of livingthe way that passage describes -you know the passage, I've quoted it many times-from Hugh of Saint-Victor,where the person who is the stranger everywhere is somehow at home but not loving the worldtoo much-you know-you're moving on. WJTM:Yes. EWS: I have that sense, actually, quite strongly developed, perhaps since I've been ill. WJTM:Edward,there is one long, last question I want to ask you about the way you reconcile your aestheticism with your politics. I'm thinkingof the way you negotiate the tension between your identityas a "high-modernist aesthete," which Itake is not an insultforyou ... [Laughter]... and your role as a committed politicalactivist. One of the things that's always struck me as remarkable about your career, your writing, is your abilityto somehow negotiate the tension between those two things in a marvelous, intricate way. How do you conceive of the relation between art and politics? You consistently affirma respect for the formalautonomy of the arts and resist reductions of artistic forms to politicalor ideological issues. EWS: Right.
30 boundary2 / Summer1998 WJTM:Yet it's clear at the same time that all your criticism insists on the interweavingof aesthetics and politics,and Iwanted to ask how you feel, on reflection,you've negotiated this tension, and also to ask you, more personally,whether you've ever felt baffledor torn by your dual commitments to art and politics, or whether it has just seemed that they are, in your experience, one and the same thing?
EWS:Well,it'scertainlynotthe latter.They'renotone andthe same thing. And baffled is an excellent word for what I often feel with an art whose ideological or political origins are simply irreconcilablewith the aesthetic object. The example that always comes to my mind is Wagner. There's no question at all that Wagner was a horribleperson in every conceivable respect. But it's very, very difficultto negotiate the leap that you must make between his overt, explicit,endlessly repeated sentiments on the one hand and his music on the other. There's a, there's a . . . you could call it a
irreconcilable ... there is somemystery,you could call it fundamentally thingthere that simplydefies comprehension.I thinkthat'sprobablytrue worksand artistsand theirpoliticalbackground.On the of otherindividual otherhand, I mean, I don'tsee how one couldwriteaboutsomebodylike Wagneror Delacroix,forexample,withouttakingintoaccountthe political contextfromwhichthey emerge. So what I try to do-whether successfullyor not, I can'ttell-what I tryto do is, in the re-creationof the workor of the work,dramatizeand presentthe circumstancesthe interpretation I mean the politicalcircumstances,the historicalcircumstances,cultural circumstances,ideologicalcircumstances--andtryto makethe workmore interestingas a resultwithoutreducingit. I mean, it'smucheasier to see this inthe rereadingsof texts forme or inthe restagingand reconceivingof musicalworks,because thereyoucan activelyinterveneto pointthe workin a particular direction,to stress certainthings,to connect,as Itriedto do with Jane Austen,some of the problematicaspects of hertacitendorsementof slavery,notat allto blameherbutto connectherto an emancipatorystrain thatcomes afterherwithWest Indianwritersthemselves. of interpretation ToreadheralongwithC. L.R. James, alongwiththe historyof colonialism, the historyof slaveryand so on, tryingto reunderstandthat history,which in the case of her novels,is occludedor at best marginal.So, that'swhatI tryto do. It'svery hard,butit seems to be the most interestingthingabout of greatworksof art. the criticismand interpretation WJTM:I agree. It is very hard, and I'm struck by the fact that you, of all people, experience it as hard, because you seem to pull it off with such
Mitchell/ Panicof the Visual 31 virtuosityso many times, and Ithinkthe rest of us are all lookingto see how you do it. EWS: Yes. But I don't think there's any method or secret. There isn't any clue or pattern to it, except the basic one, which is that a great work of art is not an ideological statement, pure and simple. WJTM:Right. EWS: And vice versa. I mean, no ideological statement, pure and simple, can become a great work of art. I mean, it's very difficult.You know, it is as Sartre says about Paul Valery:that he was a petit bourgeois. But not every petit bourgeois is a Valery. WJTM:[Laughter] EWS: And that's very salutary to keep that in mind. And I think the final point, perhaps the most interesting point, is that there is a pleasure, there's a satisfaction of it's own, that comes with working through this particular type of irreconcilability.And that's why Adorno interests me so much and why the Hegelian traditionhas always made me feel suspicious, because there's always the subsumption of contradictions and irreconcilabilitiesin the higher synthesis, and I don't believe in that synthesis at all. So then you have to have a certain amount of skepticism, too ... WJTM:... ground ...
and a certain kind of willingness to stand on very precarious
EWS: Oh, absolutely. WJTM:This is why, for me, the figure of the tightrope walker ... capable of falling ...
You're
EWS: A walker,or the other one that I like is the circus performerwho has whirlingplates on those rods, which he has to keep twirlingaround, otherwise they'll fall .
. .
and there are always too many, and they are always in
danger of falling. But, I mean, if that's not what we're doing, then what the hell are we doing? WJTM:[Laughter]Droppingplates, breakingchina everywhere, I suppose. EWS: By the way, have we finished? WJTM:No. I wanted to follow up just one more step with this fascinating discussion and that's to push a littlefurtherto each side of the art/politics
32 boundary2 / Summer1998 division. Would you agree that if you're not capable of mediating or somehow serving these two masters that it's going to be in some way reductive to both your appreciation, your understanding,of art and the quality of the politics you profess? I think it's obvious with the artistic side that if you simply reduce art to ideology, it's not very interesting. EWS: No. WJTM:But I wonder about the opposite side. Suppose politics is just politics. Or is nothing but the art and craft of producing power. To what extent does politics need your kindof aesthetic sensibility,your kindof formalism, to be authentic politics? EWS: Now, that's a very good question, because, in the end, you see, if you get stuck in the trap into which Foucault inserted himself and was never able to get out except by exitingthroughsubjectivityand the care of the self and all the rest of it, which to me, is uninteresting,then you have to regard politics as not just the production/reductionof power but also as constituting a very complex and rich tapestry of historical experience. Most of which, alas, in the writings of political scientists and polemicists, simply is never given a chance. That's why, for example, I am much more interested in the politics of loss and dispossession than I am in the politics of triumphand fulfillment.I wrote a couple of years ago a long essay on lost causes, and it's clear that you can regard politics that way. I mean, you could look, for example, at E. P. Thompson's Makingof the English WorkingClass, which is a history of loss, but out of it comes ennobling and interesting experiences of the sort that don't make it into Parliamentor don't necessarily get recorded by historians. So politics has to be more than just the struggle for power. It's a struggle for fulfillment,it's a struggle for recognition, it's a struggle for acknowledgment, it's a struggle for survival, it's a struggle for betterment and liberation.That's what interests me in the end, not the people who are plottinga coup. I mean that sort of Blanquistview of politics. But the process by which civil institutionsare built-usually subverted and corrupted,at least in my experience of the politics of the ThirdWorld-with a renewed commitment to ideals of human emancipation, enlightenment, seems to me, in the end, that that's what it's all about. and community--it Now, of course, in that there is a terriblyimportantrole for the aesthetic. Not as an illustrationof it but as part of that same struggle. WJTM:Centralto the practice itself. EWS: I mean, that's the kind of politics that interest me.
Mitchell/ Panicof the Visual 33 WJTM:As you're speaking, I'm reminded of William Blake's name, his proper name for the artist and prophet. You remember the name of the character? His name is "Los." EWS: Oh, "Los."Yes, very good. And, of course, reversed, it's "Sol." WJTM:The traditionalApollonianartist who's above it all ... EWS: No, of course, one isn't above it. I mean, I don't believe that one is above it. WJTM:Right.Youare with Blake's Los, the prophet,down in the basement.
Race before Racism: The Disappearance of the American
GayatriChakravortySpivak Some years ago, Iwrotean essay on a singularbookthat I seemed to havebeen savingforjustthisoccasion:a tributeto EdwardSaid.JackD. Forbes's Black Africans and Native Americans, an ambitious and impres-
sive book,seemed to sketch a disappearanceof the "American," as much as Orientalismhad sketched the appearanceof an "Orient."' Of course, Said is a groundbreaker in our discipline;Forbesbelongsto the groupof social scientistswho have been chippingawayat the monolithicEurocentrismof theirdisciplinesfor at least the last twentyyears, duringthe two decades afterOrientalism, as itwere.2Therefore,Ispeakof Forbesintribute to Said. This essay appeared in an earlierform in PlantationSociety 3, no. 2 (summer1993): 24-50. 1. Jack D. Forbes, BlackAfricansand NativeAmericans:Color,Race and Caste in the Evolutionof Red-BlackPeoples (New York:Blackwell,1988);and EdwardW. Said, Orientalism(New York:Pantheon,1978). AllquotationsfromForbes'sworkare cited parenthetically. 2. Forthe general reader,MartinBernal,BlackAthena:TheAfroasiaticRoots of Classi225:2, 1998.Copyright boundary Spivak.Printedbypermission. ? 1998byGayatriChakravorty
36 boundary2 / Summer1998 How does Forbes restore the American moment in the history of Europe, NorthAfrica,and the Americas in the last five hundredyears (32122)? "American"in this book means "Indiansin the colonial era and 'African' . . . [means] presumably unmixed sub-Saharan Africans"(192). Workis used is like a ing this out in your head each time "African-American" child's lesson, by rote, of the unlearningof Eurocentrism.Forbes makes us rehearse the new meaning of the phrase relentlessly. By the time we come to the followingstatement, in the closing pages, we know what he means:
"Americansurvivorsand Africansurvivors... have merged togetherto create the basic modernpopulationsof much of the GreaterCaribbean and adjacent mainland regions" (270; author's emphasis). It is a mark of the intellectual boldness of Black Africans and Native Americans that the "adjacentmainland regions" happen effortlessly to include both the Americas. The book has earned the right to this bravuragesture, an undoing consonant with the doing of Orientalism. The book's strengths are in some sense its weaknesses. There is a certain panoramicqualityto the book, its theses stated over and over again. Lists-of runawayslaves, by color, in Valencia (44), of registered slaves in Seville (107), or of slaves sold in Las Palmas (154-55)-proliferate, interspersed with strikingsingle examples: "apale-colored woman withchestnut hair... reportedlyseen among the Americans of Vinland... in c. 1006" (18); Paul Cuffe, the early-nineteenth-century "American-Africanmixed-blood" (58); the two "Americansfrom Newfoundland... that [Thomas] More 'had probably seen .. . ' prior to . . . the publication of Utopia" (54); the Suri-
namese boy, "capturedin 1775 on a raidagainst the rebel leader Bonny ... [who] could not bear to be touched by any white person" (63); the "esclava lora named Catalina from Mauritania"(139); ElijahBass of South Carolina (197); and many, many others. Thus the book not only gives a sense of swarms of people moving over great expanses, it also guards the complementary sense of the starkly singular. The many citations of the usage of raciallydescriptive terms give us an additionalsense of the precarious dynamics of language. I never tired of this multitudinousaspect of the book. It is, however, possible that a more rigorous reader might find the book somewhat repetitive,confusing, and insufficientlytheorized. But then, Orical Civilization(New Brunswick,N.J.:RutgersUniversityPress, 1987);Johannes Fabian, Timeand the Other:HowAnthropologyMakesIts Object(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1983);and IvanVanSertima,TheyCame BeforeColumbus:TheAfricanPresence in AncientAmerica(New York:RandomHouse, 1977)are the best known.Titlesare now in this area of research. proliferating
Spivak/ RacebeforeRacism 37 entalismhas had its detractorsas well. Forthis reader,BlackAfricansand NativeAmericanshas the virtueof the watershed. Forbes'sbook attemptsto show, in its openingchapter,that there was sufficientcontactamongAfricansand Americans,andAmericansand Europeans,beforeColumbus.Columbusrepresenteda rupture,because he returned,and because he "wassingularin that he was, fromthe first, a dedicatedslaverand exploiterwithan extremelycallous and indifferent attitudetowardsculturallydifferenthumanbeings"(22). One misses the commonMarxistargumentthat he representsa rupturealso because he suitedthe worldhistoricalmoment.Butperhapsthatargumentis made in the breach. The second chaptersummarizestrans-Atlantic slavery and interactionafterColumbusand comes to the conclusionthat "twogreat mixed races havedevelopedinthe Americas.The one inwhichAfricanancestryis because itis mostcharacterstrongestwe can call'EasternNeo-American' isticof the eastern halfof the Americas.The otherone, in whichAmerican ancestry is strongest,we can call 'WesternNeo-American'because it is mostcharacteristic of the areafromChileandpartsof Argentinato western NorthAmerica"(64). The lastchapterdeals withAfricanAmericancontactsinthe modern periodand, in its conclusion,simplystates the book'smainobjective:to breakthroughthe isolationof the contemporary NativeAmerican:"Theancestryof modern-dayAmericans,whetherof 'black'or 'Indian'appearance, is often(orusually)quitecomplexindeed.Itis sad thatmanysuch persons have been forcedby racismintoarbitrary categorieswhichtend to render theirethnicheritagesimpleratherthancomplex"(271). Theintervening seven chaptersareaboutwords:Negro,Black,Moor, Loro, Pardo, Mestizo, Mulato,Mustee, Half-Breed,Zambo,and, finally, Peopleof Color.Mulatooccupiesthe threemiddlechaptersof these seven. Forbesworriesthe wordas a dog does a bone. He gets behinddictionaries to capturethe elusive lexicalspace between meaningshifts by sheer empiricalobstinacy.Heteases outusage to showthe emergenceofjuridicolegalpracticeand rationalclassification.Thisis an invaluablequarry,on the levelof aggregativeapparatuses(power)and propositions(knowledge),for a futureFoucauldianwho willdare to tryto take these furtherbelow,into the utterables(enonces)thatformthe archivalgroundlevel(notground)of forcefieldof power.3I cannot readily knowledgeand the nonsymbolizable 3. Itwould,forexample,be interestingto playthis narrativein counterpointwithHortense Spillers,"TheTragicMulatta,"in The DifferenceWithin:Feminismand CriticalTheory,
38 boundary2 / Summer1998 imagine such a person, for the pouvoir-savoir (abilityto make sense) in question involves "300 to 400 years (twenty generations) of intermixtureof a very complex sort, [and]varyingamounts of Africanand Americanancestry derived at different intervals and from extremely diverse sources-as fromAmericannations as differentas Narragansettor Pequot and the Carib or Arawak,or fromAfricannations as diverse as the Mandinka,Yoruba,and Malagasy"(270-71). For the perceptive reader, then, Forbes's book at once opens the horizons of Foucault'swork, shows the immense, indeed perhaps insuperable complexityof the task once we let go of "pure"European outlines, and encourages a new generation of scholars to acquire the daunting skills for robust culturalhistory,a relay where Said is a stalwart teammate. I am not particularlytroubledthat Forbes does not align himself with the critique of European humanism, as indeed Said does not, either.4As Said has argued in "TravelingTheory,"politicalwritingin the UnitedStates is usually better off withoutsuch alignments.5Forbes sets up, for example, an opposition between "evidence"and "myth,"as does Said between "world" and "text":"I have provided a critical and theoretical basis upon which a new approach to this subject can be erected, a basis informedby the empiricalexamination of the evidence relatingto the meaning of ethnic terms in given spatial or temporal realms as opposed to simply making deductive assumptions based upon myths of the recent past or of the present" (269). The critique of humanism would honor this impulse and, sensing and guarding its politicalimportance, would still question the adequate justifiabilityof the binary opposition between myth and evidence, and would question further the vanguardism of theory and the stability of evidence as such, without questioning the usefulness of evidence. Such a critique would interrogatethe complicity between the faithin theory, truth,and evied. ElizabethA. Meese and Alice Parker(Amsterdam:John Benjamin,1989), or with the moreextensive DeborahE. McDowelland ArnoldRampersad,eds., Slaveryand the LiteraryImagination:Selected Papers fromthe EnglishInstitute,1987 (Baltimore,Md.: Johns HopkinsUniversityPress, 1989). Fora more extended discussion of the Foucault in Outsidein the TeachingMachine material,see Spivak,"Moreon Power/Knowledge," York: 25-51. 1993), Routledge, (New because (1) it does 4. I preferthis phrase to the morecommonlyused poststructuralism not refermerelyto a momentin the historyof formsof explanation,and (2) it avoidsthe and whatis called post-Habermasianconfusionbetween what is called poststructuralism postmodernism. 5. EdwardW. Said, The World,the Text,and the Critic(Cambridge:HarvardUniversity Press, 1983), 178-247.
Spivak/ Race beforeRacism 39 dence on the one hand, and the fact that the racial other has been legally described as incapable of truthtelling, of giving, precisely, evidence (198, 214). We must not lose sight of the importance of reclaiming the place of giving evidence-of telling truths-of the importance, even, of truth;but in the process, we must not, paradoxically,advance that very vanguardism of truth-evidence-theorythat can generate oppression in its name, again and yet again. And I believe Said can, by the same impulse, be asked to honor the double bind of responsibilityand accountabilityto radical alterity,even as he reminds us of the importance of "work,intention, resistance, effort, or conflict."6 Like Said, Forbes does, in practice, go a long way to support such questioning. Here, let it suffice to say that those of us who share an interest in the critiqueof humanismwould do well simplyto add projects to Forbes's own sense of the vistas opened up by his book. Sometimes this sense appears impact of Americans upon Portuguese life has not incidentally--"theCamoens in his been studied although epic poem Lusiadas refers to the tristes brasis (sad Brazilians)arrivingin Lisbon"(39); "inAfricaitself, the impact of Americans and part-Americans,whether from Brazilor elsewhere, remains also to be studied" (60)-but usually it appears almost rituallyat the end of each solid chunk of work, each sprawlingchapter: It seems clear that many persons of Native American ancestry, in whole or part, have been at times classified as "negroes"or "blacks," in the several languages reviewed. This is a matter of considerable significance for the scholar seeking to understand the actual ethnic or racialidentityof non-whitepersons in the slave trade, in the American colonies and in the United States over the centuries. . . . This
necessity for radical reinterpretationwill become still clearer as we proceed to discuss terms used for browncolored persons. (91-92) Thus we have a sequence in which firstthe Europeans began with very general color terms ...; second, when they coined many more color terms ... ; thirdly,when they invented or adopted terms for various mixed-bloods ... ;fourth, when they attempted by means of such terms to individuallycategorize most types of mixed-bloods; and, fifth,when it all became so very complicated that they fell back upon very general terms such as pardo or made ones like mestizo very nebulous. Finally,all of this occurred withina realitywhere the 6. Said, The World,the Text,and the Critic,245.
40 boundary2 / Summer1998 great mass of colonial people probablyused all these terms in pragmatic ways based upon appearance and culture rather than upon actual ancestry. (130) Itis typicalof the panoramicconstructionof the book that this degree of abstraction is undone and concretized, again, some thirtypages later: It would appear that in the IndianOcean area, at least, the Portuguese were developing a system of nomenclaturedirectlyanalogous to what the Spaniards were doing in the same time period. That is, mestizo was being restrictedto part-Americanor part-Indianmixedbloods while mulato was being used for part-Africanmixed-bloods. But even as in the Americas mulatos were also of American-African mixture, so too in Asia it would appear that mulatos could be of African-Asianmixture. This same development does not seem to have occurred in Brazil where, as noted earlier, mestigo generally retained the very broad meaning of "mixed."(167) This leads to an importantgeneralization of work to come: "Itwould seem that we have established a good case for a reinterpretationof the early colonial history of the Caribbean, other parts of the Spanish Empire, and Brazil. If, as we have shown, mulatos in the first century of colonization were principallyof American-Africandescent, then, of course, the formative character of the slave cultures (plantationand otherwise) and of the early 'free colored' cultures must be re-examined"(181).Nearly forty pages later, another step forward:"Itwould seem that those many students of North American history and society who have been fascinated solely with the Black-Whitenexus or who have conceived of Black and Native American history as being two largely separate streams are going to have to re-examine theirassumptions. This willhave great implicationsforthe study of the diffusion of central traits in areas as diverse as folk-tales, music, social structure,folk language and religion"(219). I treasure the moment in Toni Morrison'sBeloved when the gang of runawayslaves find a camp of sick Cherokee, for whom a rose was named. Decimated but stubborn, they were among those who chose a fugitive life rather than Oklahoma. The illness that swept them now was reminiscent of the one that had killed half their number two hundred years earlier. In between that calamity and this, they had visited George IIIin London, published a newspaper, made baskets, led Oglethorpe through forests, helped Andrew Jackson fight Creek, cooked maize, drawn up a constitution, petitioned the Kingof Spain, been experimented on by Dartmouth,established
Spivak/ RacebeforeRacism 41 asylums,writtentheirlanguage,resistedsettlers,shot bear,andtranslated scripture.Allto no avail.7 "Scholars"may not perceivethe connection.But a writerof Morrison's sensitivitydoes, and it is notnews to mostAfricanAmericans(192).It was a televisionversionthat decidedto erase AlexHaley'sdiscussionsof his NativeAmericanancestry.AndForbeswantsthe right,forNativeAmericans, to a fullentryintothe contemporarypoliticaldescriptive"peopleof color"and not just as ethnographiccuriositiesfor ClaudeLevi-Straussor to unearthas modelsforthe times.8 Jean-FrangoisLyotard Forbescommentsin passingon the contribution of sanctionedignoranceto this state of affairs:"Whitepeople oftendo not actuallyknowthe correctancestryof non-whitesbutsimplymakeguesses (whichdoubtless are oftenveryinaccurate)" (232). The "tunnelvision"of seeing pre-CivilWar"freepersonsof color"as must simplya stage in the evolutionof modern-dayAfroamericans be revised in favorof a more complexanalysis which recognizes the tri-racial originsof the populationandwhichalso sees theirrelato both Afroamericans and NativeAmericans tionship contemporary andtheirrelevanceto comparativeresearchwithsimilarpopulations elsewhereinthe Americas.... The archaeology,ethnology,art,oral literatureand documentaryrecordsmustall be examinedfromIcelandand Irelandto southernAfricawitha view to the discoveryof evidencerelatingto Americaninfluences.The task has hardlycommenced.(264, 265) I,too, am ignorant,althoughIseek no sanction.Scholarshoundthe Ican onlypointat some of thewaysinwhichBlackAfricans groundbreakers. and NativeAmericanstouches some concernsfromwhichculturestudies are veeringawayandexpandson the implications on some of the positions above. I will first of its quoted speak paradoxicalempiricaldeconstruction 7. ToniMorrison,Beloved (New York:Plume, 1987), 111.For such limitsto scholarship, see also MartinHeidegger,"TheSayingof Anaximander," in EarlyWritings,trans. David FarrellKrelland FrankA. Capuzzi(San Francisco,Calif.:Harper,1984), 57, translation modified;and Jacques Derrida,Specters of Marx:The State of the Debt, the Workof trans. Peggy Kamuf(New York:Routledge,1994), Mourning,and the New International, 33-35. 8. The gentle Nambikwarain Claude L6vi-Strauss,TristesTropiques,trans. John and Doreen Weightman(Harmondsworth, England:Penguin,1976);and the Kashinahuain Jean-FrangoisLyotard,The PostmodernCondition,trans. Geoff Benningtonand Brian Massumi(Minneapolis:Universityof MinnesotaPress, 1984).
42 boundary2 / Summer1998 of lexicographic ground, its textualist critique of classificatory rationalism. Second, I willtouch on its relationshipto subaltern studies, its demonstration that the historyand semiotics of hybriditydo not begin withcolonialism. Third, I will comment on its interventionin the politics of identity.Finally,I will point at the work it assigns to feminism. First,then, the empirical intuitionof affirmativedeconstruction. The early Jacques Derridacriticized Levi-Strauss for apparently solving philosophical problems with a precriticalquantitativeempiricism.9I do not think Forbes is a candidate for such a critique;he is, rather,the man who does compute the distance from Piccadilly to Liverpool Street by Einsteinian physics, or, rather,puts that physics to the test of the timetable.10It is as if Forbes concludes that the realityof the body (race as visible markof human difference) and the soul (ethnos as the felt signature of human identity)is textual, simply by piling empirical example on empirical example to stage the shifting of meaning. The dictionarywas a sort of paradoxicalauthority for Freud's uncanny: that the Heimlichand the Unheimlichcome together in the speculative asymmetry of the Un. No such theoretical neatness for Forbes. We are left with the rocking back and forth of the vocabulary of racism untilthe very confusion mocks the structure of reference. Preto in Portuguese dictionaries from 1592-1784 (73-74, 118-20), Moorfrom 1571-1913(81-83), and mulato in the dictionaries of various languages from 1592-1824 (168-79) are three examples among many. Forbes sees the dictionary (by definitionthe white dictionary,but that is another matter)as a testament of desire and difference:"Theproblemis, of course, that Santamaria wanted to force the term to conform with prevailingwhite dictionary definitions when, in fact, he had the knowledge that it did not and told us as much. As we shall see below, more recent Spanish usage in the Americas does not conform with normal modern dictionarydefinitions either"(177). He sees the dictionary,therefore, as insufficient,a record of symptoms, condition and effect of meaning: "Itseems clear that the terms under review went through several changes of meaning which the above dictionary definitions do not completely clarify.Therefore, I will proceed to nondictionarydefinitions to roundout the picture"(222). Stepping out from his trans.GayatriChakravorty 9. Jacques Derrida,OfGrammatology, Spivak(Baltimore,Md.: Johns HopkinsUniversityPress, 1976), 107-18. 10. The possibilityand limitsof doing such a thingare discussed in Stephen Hawking's brilliantA Brief Historyof Time:Fromthe Big Bang to Black Holes (New York:Bantam, 1988).
Spivak/ Race beforeRacism 43 stance in front of those bound books, the dictionaries, he in fact begins to read the world as a library."Roundingout" the picture is creatively to blur its outlines: "Ofcourse, dictionariesare usually from50 to 100 years behind the actual speech practices of people, it would seem, and European dictionaries often were especially slow in reflecting usage in colonial areas. We must, therefore, look at a few examples of actual practice to understandthe meanings of mestizo" (128). The proliferationof examples leads to a sense of social polysemy. This empiricalproofof textualitycan take on boardthe more riskynotionthat "examples of actual practice"are not identical with practice, that practice cannot be infinitelyrepeated as the same. Fromthis proof it is but a step to the critiqueof rationalizedclassification, where the risks of "LegalDefinitions"are repeatedly disclosed, shading off and out into "Extra-LegalDefinitions"(such as Runaway Slave Advertisements) and "Definitionsby Inference"(195-218). Forbes fits the defining impulse to the Linnean aura of the eighteenth century: "In1735 Carl Linnaeus published the firstedition of his System of Nature. ... Humanbeings were divided intotwo species, Homo Sapiens and Homo Monstruos.Within Homo Sapiens were placed: (1) wildmen, (2) Americans (copper-colored), (3) Europeans (fair),(4) Asians (sooty), and (5) Africans(black).Homo Monstruos included Patagonians and flat-headed Canadians (both American groups) as well as 'Hottentots'and Chinese" (103). Here, since the agency is European, the Foucauldianprojectcan be expanded with greater ease. But even these "systems[,] developed some 200 or more years after the commencement of miscegenation[,] must inevitablybe extremely flawed, since an individualmightwell look 'black'but possess Americanand/or European ancestry, might look 'white'but possess American and/or Africanancestry, or might look 'Indian'and yet be part-Africanor part-European"(104-5). It is for us to insist that there is no such thing as a classification grounded in a temporallyimmediate visual access. And indeed, within its own conceptual protocol, the structureof this book offers us a web of words and terms, discontinuous in meaning-patched with history-a much mended textile center for which the historicalaccount is no more than a frame. "The concept of mixture"is, for Forbes, something like the writing in general that straddles the narrative-historicalcut of racism and inscribes identity: The same process which led to the concept of a number of biologically separate "races" then resulted in a desire to chart out what might happen when persons derived from these so-called biological
44 boundary 2 / Summer 1998 groupingsintermixedwitheach other.... This concept of mixture is, I believe,very significantfor our analysis of the terms used for intermediate colored people, ... because these terms did not imply
interracialmixturenor did they, in fact, make any assertion about ancestry.Itseems thatthe mixtureof nativeand foreigner,of tame and wild,was of some significancebutthe concept that racialdifferences (inthe modernsense) were moreimportantthanotherdifferences (nationality, religion,being a stranger)did not apparently exist. (106,101) I willdiscuss some implicationsof this passage at greaterlengthin the contextof the beginningof history.Followingthe uncertainthreadof empiricaldeconstructionhere,let us considerthe possibilitythatthe generof mixtureleads Forbesto proposemixtureat alityof the concept-metaphor the origin,where mixturebecomes a catachresis,since its possibilitycannot be derivedfroman unmixedpriormoment(let us trackthis withSaid's implicitundoingof the unitary"Orient"): Berbersof Nor can anyone reasonablyequate the brown-skinned NorthAfrica,the NativeAmericansorthe CanaryIslanderswithsuch CertainSpanishwritershave attemptedto a concept [as "mixed"]. between regardMuslimloros as being the productof intermixture NorthAfricansbutthe colorof the ancient blackAfricansand "white" wouldhavedoubtlessfallenwithin Egyptians,5,000 yearspreviously, the lororange.One cannotassume thatbrown-skinned peoples are have in white and "black" peoples may diverged hybrids,since, fact, humanstock."(111) froman originalbrown-intermediate I believe it is these unacknowledgedphilosophicalsympathiesthat "Astrongcase exists allowForbesto treata gap in evidence as "proof": intolatermulato.A gap forthe evolutionof muwallad(ormaula-muwallad) of documentationexists fromabout 1317to the early1500s, time enough to mulato"(147).Noticethe significant forthe change frommulado/mulad case andgap, the provenandthe absence used for both to verb existbeing of proof.On the next page, we jumpover this gap into a methodological 11.In fact, Forbes legitimizesdeconstructionitself by reversal.He turns browninto an unmixedorigin.To do this he has to invokethe ancient Egyptians.For a discussion of Freud'scomparablegesture withthe ancient Indians,see Jacques Derrida,"ToSpeculate-On 'Freud,'"in The Post Card:FromSocrates to Freudand Beyond,trans. Alan Bass (Chicago:Universityof Chicago Press, 1987), 369-75.
Spivak/ RacebeforeRacism 45 necessity:"Itseems clearthatwe cannotfurtherclarifythe originof mulato untilwe examineotherevidencerelatingto the use of the terminearlymodern times. As we shall see, there is a possibilitythat mulatowent through severalfairlysignificantchanges in meaningduringthe sixteenthcentury" (148).The nextstep, takenat the beginningof the nextchapter,is to leave behindthe questionof originaltogether:"Atthispointitseems best to leave the subjectof the originof the termmulatoin orderto proceedwithexplicit definitionsand actualusage, priorto 1650"(151).I have alreadynotedthat mulatois the most importantracialmarkerforForbes'sstudy. Itis notsurprisingthatthereis nota single"poststructuralist" bookin Forbes'sbibliography. Yetsuch is Forbes'ssense of the deconstructive(he neveruses the word)natureof his undertakingthat he summonsLudwig Wittgensteinon colorto be his witnessthatthe perceptionof color,and indeed colorwords,are notgrounded,althoughto summarizeWittgenstein's radicalinconclusiveness,he quotesthe altogethermorefoundational Josef Albers,who takes for grantedthe physicalbeing of color,howeverinaccessible: "Coloris almostneverseen as it reallyis"--wouldWittgenstein's passage, quotedimmediatelyabove this, endorse that it sometimesis?"as it physicallyis."(95). Again, Forbes'sown conclusionsare more in keepingwithdeconstruction,never answeringthe ontophenomenological questionmost importantforhis book("Whatis color?")resolutelyinthe affirmative, recalling the Nietzscheof "Truth and Falsity"12:"Tobe colored,to have color,is to be visible.Butwhat,indeed,is color?Is it a 'sensation'similarto hot and cold,sweet andsour,hardandsoft, and so on?"Therefollowsa statement of two alternativecancelingpositions,in a passage introducedby "Some wouldsay."Then comes the sentence of Nietzscheancast: "Inthe mind, in some manner,the message is decoded and transformedintoa colored, of the object."What"manner" is it? "Itis the reppresumedrepresentation resentationinthe mindwhichis colored,notthe objectitself."Whatis it "to be colored,"then? Andthen a couple of sentences that are ratherclose to the earlyDerrida,even invokingthe ce quireste or "whatremains"that remainsfromthe ruinsof the ontophenomenological answer.It is almost as if, if one speculatesthe originof identity,one is boundto be washed up on the uncertainshores of deconstruction: "Bymeans of color,we experi12. FriedrichNietzsche, "OnTruthand Lyingin an Extra-Moral Sense,"in FriedrichNietzsche on Rhetoricand Language,ed. Sander L.Gilman,CaroleBlair,and DavidJ. Parent (New York:OxfordUniversityPress, 1989), 246-57.
2 / Summer 46 boundary 1998 ence visibility, differentiation, spacing,andformingas a mentalfunction.Of course, one problemwiththistype of analysisis thatitfailsto deal withthe questionof whatis leftof an objectaftercoloris removed."Itis characteristicof Forbes'sintellectualstyle thathe putsa practicallidon the problem, by himselfand via Hattersley:"Buthoweverwe analyzethe perceptionof colorwe findthat it is an extremelycomplexinteractionwhichcannot be separatedfromhabitsof the mindwhichmaybe labeledas 'cultural' (social) or 'individual.'Hattersley argues that . . . 'There is a strange psychological
law..... Thingsthatare alikeinsome waysare actuallyalikeinallways until it is provedotherwise.... The lawof similarityis strongestwithrespectto pay littleattentionto'" (98). thingswe ordinarily and Again again Forbesshows the connectionbetweenfear of resistance on the one handandshiftsin meaningin racialdescriptiveson the other.As a result,the poresof his bookare filledwithaccountsof subaltern insurgency.His book does not concern itself withthe most problematic resaspect of SouthAsianistsubalternstudies:the callfora historiographic Infact,as Ihavesuggested, even the torationof subaltern"consciousness." textualized possibilityof subalternidentityis shownby himto be thoroughly and dispersedamong manynations,manycultures.YetForbes'swork,in the constantinvocationof historicalfigurationscunninglyobliteratedin the interestof dominanthistory,belongswiththe workof subalternisthistorians. Forbesis notafraidto speculatewherenecessary:"Negrosladinoshadalin 1526and, most likely,mulatosand loroswere now readybeen prohibited [1530]simplybeingaddedto the list.... Itmaywellbe thatmanymulatos in Spain by 1530 were half-American and were regarded (or half-canario) as beingespeciallydangerousbecause of theirpotentialconnectionswith both rebellious native groups and with Africans .... In 1585 a report to the
Chichimecosnotedthatthey[rebelAmericans]weregoingaboutarmed,on horseback,and carriedwiththem 'veryskillfulmestizos and mulatoswho lead them'"(161,165). But there is no doubtthat, in 1503, "further shipments [of Negroes to HaitifromSeville]were suspended because of the troubleswhichwere producedwhen the Africansunitedwiththe island's American rebels. . . . Slave rebellions took place on Borinquen in 1522, on
Haitiin 1527,in Panamain 1531,at Amatepequein Mexicoin 1537,and in Peru(as notedearlier).In1538slaves and Frenchpiratessacked Havana. From1533-43 the Americancacique Henriquezled a majorjointrebellion of Americansand Africanson Haiti"(185,188). I have oftenwonderedif subalternistworkcan ever be global,since
Spivak/ RacebeforeRacism 47 it is so mucha rejectionof worldsystems theory.13Forbes'sbookshows me the immense excitementand difficultyof "internationalizing" subalternist workfrombelow. One of the consequences of this enlargedsubalternismis a quiet demonstrationthat not only does historynot begin with colonialismbut that the pouvoir-savoir of the great diasporas,the movementof peoples across land,has notalwaysbeen "racist" inthe contemporary sense: "This in relationto the assumptionfosteredbysome issue is especiallyimportant scholarsthatBlackAfricansdid not experienceAmericanacculturative influences untilarrivingon Americansoil, butit is also significantin relation to the assumptionthat one can (or could)examineWest Africancultures fieldworkand assume thatwhatone findsis (or throughtwentieth-century has been) largelyunaffectedby externalinfluences"(61).14 In NorthAmericaitself, "anotherassociationgraduallyarose ... and that was between 'negro'and 'slave'" (84). Forbesoffersus a set of conclusionsthatmightsurprisemany: It seems highlylikelythat pre-CivilWarsociety was much more at least in so faras nonethnicallydiverseand culturally pluralistic, whites were concerned..... "FreeNegro"implies,I think,a much moreculturally and ethnicallyunifiedgroupof people, and also one thoroughly circumscribed by the black-white conflict. ...
I believe
thatthe evidence indicatesthatthe "freepeople of color"generally consisted in all non-Europeanpersons of whateverracialancestry except:(1) unmixedIndianslivingon a federalreservationor when livingas independentnations;(2) unmixedIndianslivingin recognizedIndiantownsina fewstates such as Massachusetts(butthisis onlya partialexception);and (3) free personsof unmixedAfricanan13. Spivak,"Askedto Talkabout Myself,"ThirdText19 (summer1992):11. 14. The groundbreakingworkof WinthropD. Jordan,beginningwith WhiteOverBlack: AmericanAttitudestowardthe Negro, 1550-1812 (ChapelHill:Universityof NorthCarolina Press, 1968), makes the Americancontact its starting point. His position on the historicityof racism is comparableto Forbes's,but less radical,confinedto difference ratherthan displacement:"Racialattitudesin this countryare very differentnow from what they were three hundredyears ago, and it is very importantthat we deal withour past, in so faras possible on its own terms"(The WhiteMan'sBurden:HistoricalOrigins of Racism in the UnitedStates [NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress, 1974],vii).Whereas Jordan'stake on race is scientistic(WhiteOverBlack,583-85), Forbes'sis, as I show in my text, deconstructive.
2 / Summer 48 boundary 1998 cestryaccordingto the usage commonin manysouthernstates.... Thus we cannotsuppose that the "freecolored"populationwas a "fixed" entity.(263;myemphasis) This importantpassage willrelateto the emergenceof the otherin as well as today'sblack-white(or different-same)liberalmulticulturalism, to the fact thatthe claimto the phrase "peopleof color"may be possible preciselybecause it has a flexibleprehistory.I have not the expertiseto check out the substantiveaccuracyof the passage, nor the accuracyof such statementsas, "Therewas apparentlyno concernor need to identify persons of 'mixedrace' [in the ChristianMiddleAges] since the concept of 'race' (as we knowit) did not exist and 'race'mixtureamong human beings was not an existentconcept"(100),or that "inthe 1200s-1400s in the Mediterranean region... no associationof colorwithservitudeexisted, since most slaves were Europeanor NorthAfrican"(102). But I have no doubtthatthe exercise in historicizingratherthanessentializingracismis absolutelycrucial,and Iam persuadedthatForbesgives us a modelof the scrupulousnesswithwhichit mustbe performed. I willspeak moreof this in connectionwithtrendswithinthe current politicsof identity.Herelet me pointoutthatForbes'sposition metropolitan not does go againstcontemporaryantiraciststruggles;it only undermines of raceas a radicalintellectual the universalizing category.(Inthishe seems workpreciselybeless extremethanColetteGuillaumin's groundbreaking This is markedin Forbes'srespectfulsituating cause it is moreempirical.15 of the AfricanAmericanmovementin the accepted sense: "Thelatterhalf of the nineteenthandthe firsthalfof the twentiethcenturiessaw manypersons equating'colored'with'negro'and 'negro'with'colored,'at least inthe UnitedStates. Such usage arose notonlyfromwhiteracisteffortsto place all non-whites(or at least persons of Africanancestry)in a single catcheffortsto secure internalunity..... all categorybutalso fromAfroamerican We must avoidthe mistakeof readingback intothe past contemporary definitions" (262;my emphasis). a displacement Forbesshows Europeancolonialismas inaugurating inthe discursivetextof racism:"Ancestry-based practices... discriminatory in the colonies"(102).This is, in a certainsense, a bit of arose primarily "Racistcaste systems"correlate"withthe rise the pre-textof Orientalism. of overseas colonialism" (125)."Theappearanceand evolutionof the term 15. Colette Guillaumin,Racism, Sexism, Power and Ideology (New York:Routledge, 1995).
Spivak/ RacebeforeRacism 49 mestizo in boththe Spanishand PortugueseEmpiresreflectsthe kindof caste-likeand racialistsocial orderswhichevolvedin the colonies"(130). "Asa reflectionof the developingcolonialcaste system in1571negras,free or slave, and mulataswere prohibited fromwearinggold,pearls,or silkbut an exceptionwas madeforthose marriedto Spaniards"(163). The idea of "caste"and a "racialcaste system"is favoredby Forbes to describedevelopmentsundercolonialismforthe consolidationof what we todayrecognizeas racismand is broughtforwardin his currentwork.16 Hisgeneralpointis thatthe nomenclatureof preracismand racismis nonscientificandfluid,as inallcaste systems, leavingroomformobility. Itneeds to be said, however,thatthe actualcaste system of Indiais so fine-tuned and rationalizedan instrumentof social functionalismthat the use of the termshouldperhapsbe modified.17 Forbesliftsthe historicalamnesia fromcontemporarymetropolitan culturalpoliticsof identity.M.AckbarAbbas,the HongKong-basedcultural critic,speaks of the disappearanceof identitiesin the new nomadismof the Asia-Pacificrim.18 Forbesgives us an accountof the disappearanceof the NativeAmericanmoment,lookingbackwardat 1492.Everyruptureis a repetition. The "agitat[ion] forthe termination of the GingaskinIndianReservationin Northampton in in County" Virginia 1780,because the absorptionof Americanswas beingcoded as extinction,has somethinglikea relationship with "morerecentattemptsto allot and acquireIndianlands"(88). Later we read that "whitesoften triedto deny theirIndianness"(90). People of Americandescent who were importedfromthe Caribbeanor exportedto Jamaicawere reclassifiedas "Black" (231).Forbesshows howAmericans get lost incensuses, intranslation,and inso-calledde-tribalization (see, for example,117,172, 242-43, 247). Itis a tributeto his sense of historythat NativeAmerican Forbes,himselfa NativeAmerican,sees the "authentic" 16. Jack D. Forbes, "TheManipulationof Race, Caste, and Identity--ClassifyingAfroamericans,NativeAmericansand Red-BlackPeople,"Journalof EthnicStudies17 (1990): 1-51. 17. AlthoughgenerallyOrientalistin its politics,LouisDumont'sHomoHierarchicus:The Caste System and Its Implications,trans. Basia Gulati(Chicago:Universityof Chicago Press, 1981)remainsthe most accessible study of the social functionalismof the Indian caste system. Foran analysis of the colonial/Orientalist constructionof caste, see Bernard S. Cohn, India:The Social Anthropologyof a Civilization(EnglewoodCliffs,N.J.: Prentice-Hall,1971),especially 124-41. 18. M.AckbarAbbas,HongKong:Cultureand the Politicsof Disappearance(Minneapolis: Universityof MinnesotaPress, 1997).
50 boundary2 / Summer1998 as a millennialimperialistconstruction. The productof this insight is a wonderful call to postcolonial solidarity,characteristicallymade in the name of a black historian: "Inan article published in the Journal of Negro History Johnston remarked:'Where the Negro was brought into contact with the American Indianthe blood of the two races intermingled,the Indianhas not disappeared from the land, but is now part of the Negro population of the United States.' The latter statement might offend many Indianstoday, who still survive, of course, in great numbers as Native Americans, but nonetheless the significance of Johnston's thesis as regards the extent of Native American-Africanintermixtureremains before us" (191). This point of view is to be contrasted with the persuasive and representative view that the Indianpopulationdwindled,was exported, and was replaced by Africans and imported slaves from the West Indies.19We have seen that it is in the pores of these arguments that Forbes discovers the survivalof the American, in the male and female line. The historicizationof racism, the deconstruction of the disappearance of the American,and the empiricalestablishment of textualityquestion the politicsof identityon both sides, be it the Brazilianor U.S. demand to be recognized as "white"cultures or the politics of alternative identities subsumed under multiculturalism.By focusing on the vast heterogeneity and textualityof the description of mixed groups, Forbes shows that the emergence of the other, as the other of the white, may be, at best, an unwitting legitimation by reversal of the very dominant positions it is supposed to contest. We know about Daniel Defoe's representation of the representation of colonial power in simulationin Robinson Crusoe.20What are we to make of the monolithic "othering"of the other of Europe in representation as such? Are we to caricature it ourselves by defining ourselves as the other (of the white dominant in metropolitanspace)?: "Itwould appear that both Americans and Africansbegan to appear in exotic pageants and entertainments staged in London during the seventeenth century. It is not always possible to clearly ascertain the ethnicity of the performers,since Africans were sometimes dressed up as Americans, or perhaps vice versa" (56). What are we to make of the Spanish official in the early 1560s who 19. This argumentis generallypresent in extantscholarship.Fora randomand superior of the LowcountryLaborForce, example, I offerRussell R. Menard,"TheAfricanization 1670-1730,"in Race and Familyin the ColonialSouth,ed. WinthropD.Jordanand Sheila L.Skemp (Jackson:UniversityPress of Mississippi,1987), 81-108. 20. DanielDefoe, RobinsonCrusoe(New York:Norton,1975),205-8.
Spivak/ RacebeforeRacism 51 "wasusing 'white'and 'black'in the sense of 'us'and 'them,'thatis, those who could be countedon to supportSpanishcontroland those who, because of theirstatus, mightaid an enemy"(78-79)? Inthe discontinuous narrativeof the developmentof racism,how are we to computethe relaState SupremeCourt tionshipbetweenthatusage and the 1854California statementthat "expressesa strongtendencyin the historyof the United States, a tendencyto identifytwo broadclasses of people:whiteand nonwhite,citizenand non-citizen(or semi-citizen)"(65)? Arewe, once again, to become complicitouswiththis tendencyby identifying ourselves,single ethnicgroupby single ethnicgroupor as migrantcollectivity,only as the otherof the whitedominant?Shallwe, "likeso manyEuropeans,[remain] utterlytransfixedby the black-whitenexus eitheras 'opposites'or as real people"(172)?Giventhat,in the literallypostcolonialareas such as Algeriaor India,whiteracismis no longerthe chiefproblem,Forbes'shistorical reasoningis yet anotherway of bringingtogetherthe intuitionsof global resistance. Because NorthAfrica,Brazil,and the Spanish Empireare important areas for Forbes'sargument,the heterogeneityof the Islamicworld, so often ignoredin contemporarydiscussionsof racismin general,is minutelydisclosedin BlackAfricansandNativeAmericans.Thephenomenon of slavery in Islamis introducedearly on (26). Soon we become aware of the specificityof Islamas opposed to the moreamorphoussources of enslavement:"Itis not possibleto tell whethera given loro(forexample) is fromthe Americas,fromthe CanaryIslands,fromnorthernAfrica,from India,or fromSpainitself.The majorexceptionis whenan Arabor Islamic propernameaccompaniesthe colordesignation"(40). A new phase in the narrativeof heterogeneityis introducedwhen we learnthat partof "theInca nobility. . were ... 'shippedto exile in Spanish Sahara' . . . after the abortive Tupak Amaru rebellion in Peru in
1781-3"(59).Weare taughtto ask newquestions:WhywereMuslimslaves called negros if they were not black(76)? We are taughtto discovernew connections;contraryto some establishedopinions,Forbesmakes a convincingcase that the crucialdescriptivemulatois a displacementof the Arabicmuwallad-maula (141-50).The importanceof Islamin discussions of imperialformationsis illustratedhere frombelow.We are used to such discussionsfromabove,whereIslamis the conqueringpower.21 21. Forthe general reader,the source books are SamirAmin,UnequalDevelopment:An Essay on the Social Formationsof PeripheralCapitalism,trans. BrianPearce (Boston:
52 boundary2 / Summer1998 In conclusion, a word of lament, yet once again, about the absence of a feminist impulse in many radical texts. (My friend Said routinely invokes feminism. But beyond drawing a dubious parallel with anticolonialism-as in his conversation with Catherine Davidat documenta xin 1997he withholds interest.) The Native Americanwoman, being legally free, was the enslaved man's access to "freedom."And slavery itself is "matrilineal." These two facts provide the motor for a great deal of Forbes's narrativeof interaction. Yet Black Africans and Native Americans, so resourceful and imaginative in probingthe pores of the hide of history,never questions the catachreses hidden in them. It is correctly mentioned that Native American practices included the thought of "individualfreedom [and] utopian socialism" (266). But it is not noticed that there is feminism in those practices as well. What is it to define as "free,"after enslavement, genocide, colonization, theft of land, tax imposition, those women who had, before these acts (masquerading today as social cohesion), been culturallyinscribed as "freer"?What is it to become, then, a passageway to freedom after the fact? (Forbes is able to deconstruct "free"in the field of race: "Ithas commonly been assumed by many writers that the so-called 'free' people of color livingin the United States priorto the CivilWarwere always of African ancestry and that the words 'Negro,''Black,'and 'African'or 'Afro-American' can be freely substituted for 'colored.'My research questions this assumption and also the assumption that such persons were 'free.'Infact, they were 'restricted' subjects of the British Crown and, later, of the United States. Their social character also requires empiricalstudy ratherthan a prioriassignment to a single racialor social category" [239].) What is the "meaning" of matrilineage in slavery, mentioned in parentheses- "(generallyslavery was inheritedin the female line)"(240)--where lineage itself is devastated? It is, of course, not surprisingthat there are no adequate answers to these questions. The record would have been more complete if there had been a single acknowledgement of that loss. This is not a text of criticalrace theory. It is a bold book by someone who has suffered definition.This is an effort by a Native American to open up the definitionof both native and American untilthey lose their outlines and become ethicopoliticallyproductive. In the process, this effort shares some flaws of passionate revisionarytexts: the historicalimaginationreaching beyond mere contextual scholarship, in this case Spain and Portugal. MonthlyReview,1976),and the last chapterof PerryAnderson,Lineagesof theAbsolutist State (London:New LeftBooks, 1974).
Spivak/ RacebeforeRacism 53 Scholars have caviledat Said as well, to theirdetriment.Indeed,just as Said is brilliantin teasing out the patternsin the representationof Islam in CoveringIslam,but is perhapsnot as adroitin noticingwhere religion, validated withthe withdrawal of allotherpossibilityof agency (institutionally action),becomesthe onlyagentialmodeleft,so also Forbes,obsessed with color,ignorespreciselyreligionas agentialrecourseof dephenomenalizing last resort,privilegingthe immanenceof racializationin the interpretation of data.22 Indeed, Columbus and Other Cannibals, the book writtenfor an im-
readerand more lyricalin idiom,has somethinglike a plied "American" relationshipwiththe impassionedgood sense of Afterthe Last Sky, almorecosmopolitanin tone, anchored thoughthe latteris characteristically in the visiblearchiveof a present.23 The organicintellectual,in the service of a paradigmshift,is sometimes forcedout of scholarlydistance. In praise of such destinerranceerrancyunderivedfromproperdestination,I offerForbes'sbook,withrespect, to the bettermaker.
22. I thankMoustafaBayoumifor expressingthe opinionthat allowedme to notice this characteristic.I thankhimespeciallyforshowingme the recordof the Actof 1682, which repeals "aformerlaw makingIndiansand others free"(W.W. Hening,ed., The Statutes at Large;being a collectionof all the laws of Virginia,fromthe firstsession of the legislature,in the year 1619 vol. 2 [NewYork:R&W&G Barton,1823],490), where distinctions by religionare clearlymarked. 23. Jack D. Forbes, Columbusand OtherCannibals:The W6tikoDisease of Exploitation, Imperialismand Terrorism(Brooklyn,N.Y: Autonomedia,1992); and EdwardW. Said, Afterthe Last Sky: PalestinianLives(New York:Pantheon,1986).
Criticism between Opposition and Counterpoint
Jonathan Arac My title signals a line of thought that has been provoked by the recent work of EdwardSaid. I willbegin by reflectingon some of the terms he deploys to characterize the activityof criticism,and then I will explore their uses as a perspective on my recent book, "HuckleberryFinn"as Idol and Target.This consideration of Said's work and my own proved surprisingly timely,as I was completing this essay, with new developments in the public sphere of my home state, Pennsylvania. I will conclude with these recent developments. Said has long insisted that the fundamental role of the critic is opposition. As he puts it in the introductionto The World,the Text,and the Critic, "Were I to use one word consistently along with criticism (not as a modiSeveral pages of this essay take their substance fromthe preface and introductionto "Huckleberry Finn" as Idol and Target: The Functions of Criticism in Our Time (Madi-
son: Universityof WisconsinPress, 1997), vii-ix, 3-15. Mydeep thanksto the Press for permissionto reprintthese materials. Portions of this essay appear in Jonathan Arac's book "HuckleberryFinn"as Idol and Target: The Functions of Criticismin Our Time (Madison: Universityof Wisconsin Press). Copyright
? 1997.
56 boundary2 / Summer1998 fication but as an emphatic) it would be oppositional."1Not all who know Said's later work realize that much the same view was expressed as early as 1975. In the conclusion of Beginnings, Said writes that Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze demonstrate that the intellectual'swork is "adversary" in its effort to "controvertthe dynastic role thrust upon him by history or habit."Thereby, he argues, Foucaultand Deleuze participatein "the adversary epistemological currentfound in Vico, in Marxand Engels, in Lukacs, in Fanon, and also in the radical political writings of Chomsky, Bertrand Russell, WilliamA. Williams,and others."2 Including both revolutionaryactivists and scholars from the disciplines of rhetoric, psychiatry, linguistics, philosophy, and history, this is a notably heterogeneous listing of oppositional figures. It conforms to no known orthodoxy of its time or since, but, in retrospect, its trio of "political" writers, along with "epistemological"theorists, suggests two points. First, as early as 1975, when Said had won renownonly as a leading figure of the emerging theory movement, he was already lookingto the politicalconcerns that have accounted for a substantial part of his writingin the last twenty years, and he evidently understood those concerns as intimately related to his work as a theorist. Second, Chomsky, Russell, and Williams were known as majorscholars who wrote against the American war in Vietnam. Because Said is such a cosmopolitan polymath, it is still a fairly unfamiliar point that the debates of U.S. politics in the 1960s helped to form his intellectualcommitments and style. Said has recently acknowledged the formativeimpact of oppositional American writers of the 1960s in his introductionto Representations of the Intellectual. Here he defines the appeal he found in James Baldwin and MalcolmX: "Itis a spirit in opposition, ratherthan in accommodation, that grips me, because the romance, the interest, the challenge of intellectual life is to be found in dissent against the status quo at a time when the struggle on behalf of underrepresented and disadvantaged groups seems so unfairlyweighted against them."3This emphasis on the imbalance in representation recalls Said's attention to problems of the mass media in 1. EdwardW. Said, The World,the Text,and the Critic(Cambridge:HarvardUniversity Press, 1983), 29. 2. EdwardW. Said, Beginnings:Intentionand Method(New York:Basic Books, 1975), 378. 3. EdwardW. Said, Representationsof the Intellectual:The 1993 ReithLectures(New York:Pantheon,1994), xvii.
Arac / CriticismbetweenOppositionand Counterpoint57 many essays and several of his books, notably Blaming the Victimsand Covering Islam. In Cultureand Imperialism,Said considerablycomplicates - ramifies and nuances-the notion of oppositional commitment. He expounds what he calls "contrapuntalcriticism."He explains his term, which is the adjective formed from counterpoint,in this way: "Inthe counterpoint of Western classical music, various themes play off against one another, with only a provisional privilege being given to any particularone; yet in the resulting polyphony there is concert and order, an organized interplay."Of course, the counter in counterpointis a term of opposition, and in the musical technique of counterpoint, such phrasings as "note against note" occur; Said argues that "inthe same way"counterimperialthemes may be read against the thus far predominant interpretationsof many great works of Western culture.4Nonetheless, the direction of meaning here seems to me quite different from adversarial opposition. One could map the terms onto the polarityof late Freud:Oppositional criticism is aggressive; it cuts. Contrapuntal criticism is loving; it joins. As Said says in Cultureand Imperialism, "Myprincipalaim is not to separate but to connect," his reason being pre5 But opposition is hard cisely that "culturalforms are hybrid,mixed, impure." to imagine except as a gesture of separation. He continues, "Ido not mean what people mean when they say glibly that there are two sides to every question."He associates "barriersand sides" with "theoriesof essentialism and exclusiveness." All of these "give rise to polarizations."6But so may opposition. In a 1993 interview, during which he looks back from the '90s on what is his most famous and influentialbook, Orientalism(1978), Said recounts how he came to contrapuntalcriticism. In a self-interpretationthat not all readers would agree with, he explains that in Orientalism,"theheroes are basically the novelists"--Gustave Flaubert notably.But, he points out, "there's an ambivalence," because "you could be an imperialist and an orientalistand also a great writer."He goes on, "That'sreallywhat I'minterested in, the co-existence of these two things."His interest makes him ask, "Whatdoes one do in the face of that?"He sees the main traditionsof literary study as having worked "to separate .
. .
completely" the great writing
4. Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York:Knopf, 1993), 51.
5. Said, Cultureand Imperialism,14. 6. Said, Cultureand Imperialism,31.
58 boundary2 / Summer1998 from the bad politics.7In contrast-or is it opposition?-to these traditions, contrapuntalcriticismbrings the writingand politicstogether. In Cultureand Imperialism,Said goes to great lengths to differentiate his position from what he calls the "politicsof blame,"in which a past writer is condemned for having participatedin the evils of slavery, imperialism,and so forth.8Instead, he argues, one needs "manyvoices"-as in musical polyphony-to "produc[e]a history."Britishnovelists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such as Jane Austen, Joseph Conrad, and RudyardKipling,are writers whom he "love[s]and admire[s]."9This ambivalence, and the commitmentit entails to develop criticalresources to honor the love, not simply to castigate the politics, have set a distance between Said and much of the work in colonial discourse theory that Orientalisminspired. Said is rightlyrecognized as a criticand theorist who has been continuously and fruitfullyconcerned with the relations of culture to politicsespecially at the level of the state. His powerfulchallenge twenty years ago to what he put down by means of scare quotes as so-called left American criticism is a landmarkbut by no means an isolated point in his work.10Yet the tension between opposition and counterpoint may be illuminatedby a distinction between politics and culture. I say a distinction;may it even be an opposition? Our intellectuallife struggles to findsufficientlycomplex and nuanced terms for relationships, no less than WilliamWordsworthdid in the nineteenth century when he argued that views which "seem opposite to each other"may have "a finer connection than that of contrast."11 Similarly, in Beginnings, Said values Foucault's work for developing terms such as "adjacency,complementarity,and correlation"to define "relationships"that are not "linear."12 In the last pages of Representations of the Intellectual,Said examines the works of Arab intellectuals in the West in the wake of the GulfWar. His purpose is to illustratethe harm it does when an intellectual signs on and After,"in A CriticalSense: InterviewswithIntellectu7. EdwardW.Said, "Orientalism als, ed. PeterOsborne(London:Routledge,1996), 68. 8. Said, Cultureand Imperialism,96. in EdwardW. 9. EdwardW. Said, "ThePen and the Sword:Cultureand Imperialism," Said, The Pen and the Sword:Conversationswith David Barsamian(Monroe,Maine: CommonCourage,1994), 71. 10. EdwardW.Said, "Reflectionson Recent American'Left'LiteraryCriticism," boundary 28, no. 1 (fall,1979):11-30. 11.WilliamWordsworth,"Essaysupon Epitaphs,"in Prose Works,ed. W.J. B. Owen and Jane Worthington Smyser,vol. 2 (Oxford:Clarendon,1974), 53. 12. Said, Beginnings,290.
Arac / CriticismbetweenOppositionandCounterpoint59 to the service of any "god-term"(to gloss Said by a phrase from Kenneth Burke).13The disabling problem is that "because you serve a god uncritically, all the devils are always on the other side." The criticalthinkingSaid recommends tries to get beyond sides. Instead of the binary oppositions that establish the structure of Orientalism, one would "thinkof politics in terms of interrelationshipsor of common histories such as, for instance, the long and complicated dynamic that has bound the Arabs and Muslims to the West and vice versa." He continues: "Real intellectual analysis forbids calling one side innocent, the other evil."To develop this thought, he adds, "Indeedthe notion of a side is, where cultures are at issue, highlyproblematic, since most cultures aren't watertightlittlepackages, all homogeneous, and all either good or evil."14 Notice what has happened in Said's sequence of four sentences. The complexity of culture is adduced to criticize a politicalchoice. Itwould be too simple to say what is nonetheless unavoidable here: Perhaps culture more readily allows for ambivalence, or polyphony,than politics does. One may reject the politics of blame because Austen, Conrad, Kipling,and company are dead, but even in the realm of culture, the politics of current criticism may require some decisiveness (a term, one will recall, that etymologically means "cuttingfrom").To conceive of culture as all-embracing points in the direction of various moments in recent criticismthat deny or minimizethe possibilities of opposition. I am thinkingof Foucault'spolemical assertion that Marxwas at home in the nineteenth century "likea fish in water,"his "opposition"to bourgeois economics simply contained within the era's largerstructureof possibility.I think,too, of WalterBenn Michaels, who argues for the foolishness of imagining that Theodore Dreiser could stand "outside capitalism"so as then to "have attitudes toward it."15 Said may approach such historicisttotalizationwhen, in an interview, he characterizes Conrad as follows: "He couldn't understand, as no one else in his time could either, that it was possible for natives to take over the governance of their own destiny. I'm not blaming him retrospectively.He 13. KennethBurke,The Rhetoricof Religion:Studies in Logology(1961;reprint,Berkeley and Los Angeles: Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1970),25. InBeginnings,Said cites "this and far-too-little-known work,"386 n. 33. extraordinary 14. Said, Representationsof the Intellectual,119. 15. MichelFoucault,TheOrderof Things:An Archaeologyof the HumanSciences, trans. unnamed(New York:Pantheon,1971),262. WalterBenn Michaels,The Gold Standard and the Logicof Naturalism: AmericanLiterature at the Turnof the Century(Berkeleyand Los Angeles: Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1987), 19.
60 boundary2 / Summer1998 lived in essentially a Eurocentricworld. For him, although imperialismwas in many cases bad .
. .
nevertheless
there was no alternative to it."16This
is, to us now, what Said calls the "almosttragic limitation"of Conrad, even as Conrad has also achieved "the most formidableworkof the imagination by a European about Africa,"a work that therefore demands engagement by later, postcolonial writers, such as Chinua Achebe in Things Fall Apart and Tayeb Salih in Season of Migrationto the North.17 The motifof the "alternative"-what Conradtragicallylacked-is crucial in what Said demands of the intellectual. Some alternatives, it seems, are too big to be imagined even by a great writersuch as Conrad, but other alternatives, even if lesser, may be brought to bear by intellectuals, and in doing so they define their oppositionality.In an interview,Said names one kind of work for "the secular intellectual, in opposition."This work is "to provide alternatives: alternative sources, alternative readings, alternative presentation of evidence."18To be in opposition, in this sense, is not simply to choose one side of a preexisting polarity.To provide-find, construct, invent-an alternative is an action simultaneously creative and oppositional. In politics and culture alike, it adds another voice. It complicates what had seemed a totalityby confrontingit with something discrepant from itself. For Said, a crucial instance of such a false totality is the affirmative nationalism endemic to modern states in their political and cultural selfrepresentations. The task of "moderncritical consciousness . .. of oppoThe opposition here is sitional criticism"is to challenge that "hegemony."19 exercised by a force within the nation that constitutes itself as somewhat different from the nation-for instance, citizens of the United States who refuse to be wholly accounted for by "Americanness."Said ends one of his best-known essays, "TravelingTheory,"by asking, "Whatis criticalconsciousness at bottom if not an unstoppable predilectionfor alternatives?"'20 These alternatives, we have seen, regularlytake the form of what he calls 16. Said, Pen and the Sword,69. Was it reallyimpossiblefor anyone in 1900 to imagine Africanself-rule?The largertheoreticalissue here is the questionof anachronism:Are formsof humanrelationthat no one in a given (earlier)periodof time is there ("modern") capable of conceiving?RichardStrierhas argued against the strictureof anachronism, againsttraditionalscholarshipand also against both Foucaultand new historicism,in Resistant Structures:Particularity, Radicalism,and Renaissance Texts(Berkeleyand Los Angeles: Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1995). and After,"69. 17.Said, "Orientalism and After,"78. 18. Said, "Orientalism 19. Said, The World,the Text,and the Critic,174. 20. Said, The World,the Text,and the Critic,247.
Arac / CriticismbetweenOppositionand Counterpoint61 "oppositionalknowledge."The purpose of such knowledge is highlyactivist: namely, "to challenge and change received ideas, entrenched institutions, questionable values."And it is crucialforSaid that such knowledge emerges not from what he calls in many negative usages system or method but ratherfrom"historicalresearch."21So our criticaluse of history is a resource for our present alternatives. The distinctionthat I referredto earlier between cultureand politics is one that we may find hard to make and yet that is also extremely important. At the end of my book on HuckleberryFinn, I insist on the distinction.At the time of Twain's death, WilliamDean Howells had memorialized Twain as and I have come to believe that much of the "the Lincolnof our literature,"22 I of what call hypercanonization(I will returnto this term) has come energy fromthose who would ratherplay out racialissues only in literature,treating the politicalquestions as already taken care of--as if, for example, we no longer need affirmativeaction providedthat Huck is in every classroom. So I oppose this displacement of politics into literature-not that it is a betrayal of literaturebut that it is a corruptionof politics. I conclude my book by asserting that ifwe reallywant to fightracism, then "theLincolnof our literature must yield to the Lincolnof our politics."23Inother words, HuckleberryFinn in the classroom is not appropriatelyused to fight racism. I had earlier argued that to say everythingmightbe connectedto politicswas not the same as saying that everything was political.This little verbal nuance-connection, not identity-is all the difference between metonymy and metaphor.24 Said's work, I have been arguing, through its inventive attention to tropes and modes of discourse, enlarges our resources for describing relations in terms that are differentfromthe same-versus-not-same, is-or-is-not,binary logic of identity. To amplifyfurtherour range of terms, I cite a programSaid set out for the renewal of Arab intellectual life. He speaks of developing a "critical language" that will be capable of "two things."The first is "to assess and critique power"-that is, a politicalthing. The second sounds cultural:"We 21. Said, The World,the Text,and the Critic,168. 22. WilliamDean Howells,MyMarkTwain(1910),in The Shock of Recognition:The Developmentof Literaturein the United States Recorded by the Men Who Made It, ed. EdmundWilson(GardenCity,N.Y.:Doubleday,1943), 741. 23. JonathanArac, "Huckleberry Finn"as Idoland Target:The Functionsof Criticismin OurTime(Madison:Universityof WisconsinPress, 1997),218. 24. JonathanArac,"ThePoliticsof TheScarletLetter,"in Ideologyand ClassicAmerican Literature,ed. Sacvan Bercovitchand MyraJehlen (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1986), 262.
62 boundary2 / Summer1998 need a language of appreciation,care, and attention"that willnot be based on orthodox religious values.25 In my book on HuckleberryFinn, I do refer to Said's contrapuntal criticism,but I did not write the book as a whole to illustratehis criticalprocedures. I am using this essay to think back over what I did to see how it may be illuminatedby the suggestions Said makes. It is in the very last chapter that I invoke his notion of counterpoint.Ido itto open the geopolitics of HuckleberryFinn to a perspective beyond that of American nationalism, even when the nationalism is so capacious as that of Ralph Ellison. My furtherexercise of care and attentionto Twain'sbook comes in earlierchapters, as I try to develop alternatives to the by now terriblystandard ways of treating the two most discussed pages in this very much discussed book. The opening page of chapter 19 sets forth how Huck and Jim "put in the time"as they made their escape downriveron the raft.This passage has been highlightedin critics'discussions of Huck'sAmerican"vernacular" language. I try, instead, to analyze the style in a way that opens up Twain's relations with European art prose practices of his age, from Flaubertto the decadents. This analysis goes beyond the nationalist bounds withinwhich so much discussion of HuckleberryFinnhas confined itself, and it resituates the argument for vernacular in relationto global processes of creolization, another instance of the connections between culture and imperialism. Then the even more famous passage: In the middle of chapter 31, Huck drafts a letter to Miss Watson about how she could recover her escaped slave, Jim, but he finds that he cannot send it and decides, "Allright, then, I'llgo to hell."This passage has been highlightedin countless critics' discussions of Twain'smoralvision. (I can't help remarkingon the dangers of disciplinarynarcissism when so many Englishteachers have decided that the greatest scene in American literatureis one in which a solitary writer broods over the composition and revision of a document.) The major point in my book was to open that passage to a range of alternative voices that Twain'stechnique did not allow to come into play and that in this context function oppositionally. My argument is that Twain deliberately simplified and restricted Huck's resources by eliminatingfrom his consciousness the languages of Christianlove and of republicanequality.By this means, Twain makes Huck's decision seem a miracle of the human heart. Huck's discovery of his power to be in opposition achieves tremendous comic power, 25. EdwardW. Said, The Politicsof Dispossession: The Struggle for PalestinianSelfDetermination,1969-1993 (New York:Pantheon,1994), 314.
Arac / CriticismbetweenOppositionandCounterpoint63 but it wholly obscures the actual alternatives by which individualsin American history came to act against the system of slavery. This restrictionis part of Twain'sliteraryart, but it tells very gravely against the long-repeated claims that this scene is the moral high point of American literature. So I have opened up lines of counterpointwhich restore Huckleberry Finn to a history that diverges from the consensus of liberal nationalism. But this goal of superior criticalcare, this dimension of counterpoint, was, in my intention, very much subordinated to opposition-opposition not to Twain'sbook but to the traditionsof criticismthat have made it play so large and yet so limitinga role in American life. My book, as I reimagine it in the light of these reflections, counts as a criticalgenealogy of the hypercanonization of HuckleberryFinn, of how it became an indispensable element of the liberalimagination. As a work of criticism, my book has a strong animus. I am fed up with reading that HuckleberryFinn is the "quintessentiallyAmerican book" and that it is a "devastatingattack on racism."These terms are not good descriptions of the book, and they are not the best terms for appreciating the book. I do not argue that HuckleberryFinn is racist or un-American. Rather, I explore how Twain'sbook came to be endowed with the values of Americanness and antiracism,and with what effects. In the later 1940s, there began a process I call hypercanonization. That is, within the canon of American classics that was defined in the academy at this time, HuckleberryFinn was placed at the very top. Academic excess would not itself be important,but in this case the academic judgments fueled newspaper and magazine articles when public controversy arose about the desirabilityof HuckleberryFinn as requiredreading in juniorhigh schools. The excessive media response in defense of Huckleberry Finn I call idolatry. My book details and analyzes the emergence of hypercanonization in the academy-it occurred in the years 1948-1964-and demonstrates its role in idolatry,largely since 1982. Like much of Said's writing,mine is a work of academic scholarship and criticalargument that aims to provide oppositional knowledge. I hope it may be useful for parents who want to fight the idolatrythat routinelyanswers them when they complain that their early teenage children are being made to study and admire a text in which the title character, hero, and narrator,Huck, hundreds of times uses the term nigger. I do not want to ban HuckleberryFinn. I do want to see fairer, fuller,better informeddebates when the book comes into question. As a road map, let me offer a very briefhistoricalsketch of the recep-
64 boundary2 / Summer1998 tion, by literaryauthorities, of Twainand HuckleberryFinn. Twainis widely valued nowadays for his opposition to the established cultureof his time; we recall that librarycommittees refused to allow their librariesto carry Huckleberry Finn because of its unsavory setting and uneducated language. But there are higher authorities than librarycommittees. Twainwas greatly admired by, and his career supported by, the two most importantand prestigious editors of the leading high-culturemagazines of his time. Inthe 1870s, Howells, as editor of the Atlantic Monthly,wrote highly favorable reviews of Twain's work and actively recruited Twain for his pages. In the 1880s, Richard Watson Gilder, as editor of Century magazine, made recruiting Twaina top priority,and Gilder published three excerpts from Huckleberry Finn. Twain'srelation to the genteel traditionmay be less opposition than counterpoint. As of the middle 1930s, one hundred years after Samuel Clemens had been born, fifty years after Huckleberry Finn had been published, twenty-five years after Twain'sdeath, the image of Twainheld a privileged place in American culturalmemory, but HuckleberryFinn had not yet become one of the great books of the world.Twainwas partof the atmosphere of American culture, not someone whose standing depended on closely attentive reading of whole works. In the last years before his death in 1910, Twainhad already been widely identifiedin the United States as "our"Mark Twainand represented by cartoonists in imagery that made him equivalent to the national icon of Uncle Sam. After Twain's death, Huckleberry Finn was admired by innovative writers as various as Gertrude Stein, H. L. Mencken, Sherwood Anderson, and Ernest Hemingway,but for the culture at large it was a beloved boy's book. The several decades after the Second WorldWar transformed the culturalstanding of HuckleberryFinn. In the 1940s, it became what it still remains: a universallyassigned college text and the focus of a huge amount of academic scholarship and criticaldiscussion. My research indicates that the turning point was 1948, with the first college text of HuckleberryFinn, introducedby LionelTrilling.Scholars and critics established terms for valuing HuckleberryFinnas a masterpiece of worldliteratureand as the highest image of America. This is the process I call hypercanonization. There is no sign that hypercanonizationis diminishing.In 1990, The Heath Anthology of American Literaturewas published, in two volumes. This fifty-eight-hundred-page collection avowedly grows from the radical concerns of the 1960s, and it asserts its commitmentto feminist and multiculturaltransformationsof the canon. The anthology enforced its principles
Arac/ CriticismbetweenOppositionand Counterpoint65 so strongly that in its contemporaryliteraturesection, out of over fiftypoets and fictionwriters it included who were younger than John Updike-that is, at the time under sixty years old-only two-Thomas Pynchon and Michael Herr-were white males. Yet in this same volume, which reaches from the CivilWarto the present, Twainoccupies nearly 10 percent of the total pages. No other writerof the nineteenth century has eighty pages; no twentiethcentury writerhas even fiftypages; WilliamFaulknerhas twenty-fivepages; and HuckleberryFinn is printedin its entirety. The formationof academic hypercanonizationtook place from 1948 to 1964, a period coinciding with the onset of the cold war and the emergence of the Civil Rights movement. Itended with the passage of the most importantCivilRights legislation since the Reconstruction, but also withthe simultaneous erosion of the cold war liberalcoalition. In1948, HarryTruman so effectively co-opted the Civil Rights concerns of Henry Wallace's thirdparty candidacy that Strom Thurmond,then the Democratic governor of South Carolina,led southern "Dixiecrats"in protest out of the partyconvention. In1964, things went the other way. LyndonJohnson was so worriedthat BarryGoldwatermightexploitwhat was already becoming knownas "white backlash" that Johnson refused to accept the challenge to the establishment convention delegates by the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party. In addition, the impact of the war in Vietnam, and the beginning of violent urbanagitation by AfricanAmericans, furthercontributedto end this historical phase. Yet the hypercanonizationpersists; I thinkit is a wishful residue of values that were once connected to concrete struggles to improve the life of the United States. There is a painful paradox that mobilizes my book. When, in 1948, Trillingdeclared and reiterated that Huck and Jim formed a "community of saints,'26 a new moral value was attributedto HuckleberryFinn and to America at a time when an increasing number of white people wanted to believe that racialprejudicewas a thing of the past. Yetthis interpretationof Huck and Jim, by idealizing their relation, powerfullyinvites complacency. When readers, teachers, and critics followTrillingin identifyingthe relation of Huck and Jim as the pinnacle of human community,it is as if an imaginary "we"uttered in self-congratulation:"Americanshave spirituallysolved any problems involved in blacks and whites living together as free human beings, and we did so already by the 1880s; all that remains is to work out 26. Lionel Trilling,"Huckleberry Finn" (1948), in The Liberal Imagination: Essays on Literature and Society (New York:Viking, 1950), 108, 110.
66 boundary2 / Summer1998 the details."But many AfricanAmericans have not wanted to join that "we." No sooner had HuckleberryFinn begun to achieve hypercanonization, in part because it could so effectively serve as an icon of Civil Rights consciousness, than it also began to be challenged in the schools by African Americans-the very people on whose behalf, it was imagined, the book was functioning. IfCivil Rights meant anything, shouldn't it mean that African Americans would have a real voice in publicdefinitionsof what counts as a model of enlightened race relations? What distresses me in these controversies in the media is the structure that I call idolatry-the journalistic by-productof hypercanonization. News about AfricanAmerican protests against the requiredplace of honor held by HuckleberryFinn in the classroom--especially at the junior high school level-began to appear in the press as early as 1957, in the very midst of the firstphase of southern white protests against school integration, but only in 1982 did this topic first become big news, rapidlyreaching television. John Wallace, an AfricanAmerican educator-he was based at the MarkTwain IntermediateSchool in Fairfax,Virginia!--denounced Huckleberry Finn as "racisttrash"-above all for its several hundred uses of the word nigger.27And the fight was on. Idolatrycontinues in the rhetoricwith which newspapers frame stories about challenges to the hypercanonical status of HuckleberryFinn. In the summer of 1995, the museum housed in the mansion that Twain built in Hartford,Connecticut, held a workshop for schoolteachers. Look at the headlines: in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, "MarkTwain Museum Mounts HuckleberryFinn Defense"; and in the New YorkTimes, "HuckFinn 101, or How to Teach Twainwithout Fear."The Post-Gazette casts the workshop as "comingto the rescue" of beleaguered teachers, and the Times explains that "forthe lovers of MarkTwain,the event is a pre-emptiveeffortto bolster the nerve of teachers." In the Post-Gazette story, a display quote from a scholar proclaims, "It'sa weapon in the battle against racism that we can't affordto take out of our classrooms."28 Why must the book be rescued from AfricanAmerican parents and students for their own good? Why must they be the objects of preemptive culturalstrikes? Why is it so obvious to so many authorities that their complaints cannot be taken seriously? Why must parents and students be told repeatedly by authorities that they are bad readers rather than being ac27. John Wallace, quoted in Molly Moore, "Behind the Attack on 'Huck Finn':One Angry Educator," Washington Post, 21 April1982, Metro sec., 1. 28. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 20 July 1995, A5; New YorkTimes, 25 July 1995, B1.
Arac / CriticismbetweenOppositionand Counterpoint67 knowledged as voices in a genuine debate over what works against racism in the classroom? In a theoretical essay on class and the category of race, the AfricanAmerican historianBarbaraJeanne Fields has argued that "ideology"does not consist in "the'handingdown'of the appropriate'attitudes'" but rather in "the ritualrepetitionof the appropriatesocial behavior."29Applyingher view to the controversies over HuckleberryFinn,what counts, I'm afraid, is not the attitudes of interracialgood feeling that the book supposedly teaches but ratherthe opportunitythe book provides for the incessant reiteration,the ritualrepetition,of practicalbehavior:When blacks complain about HuckleberryFinn,the authorities proclaimthat they are wrong. This is what the idolatryadds up to. Liberalwhite American opinion identifies with the wonderfulboy Huck. Even though his society was racist, he was not, and so "we"are not. For AfricanAmericans to challenge this view is to challenge "us,"just where "we"feel ourselves most intimately virtuous, and it is also to challenge Twain, and thereby the America he "quintessentially"represents. I am tryingto construct an alternativeto this structure. Most school instructiondoes not treat HuckleberryFinnsimply as an excellent aesthetic object. Ifit were read and taught only for pleasure, there would be much less passion in defending its classroom role. The identification of a book not just with a nation but with the goodness of the nation makes controversy so painful.Why can we not allow our selves to be better than our masterpieces? Toni Morrisonhas recently argued that every time HuckleberryFinn is removed from a classroom, Jim is reenslaved: "The cyclical attempts to remove the novel from classrooms extend Jim's captivityon into each generation of readers."30 In contrast, I look forwardto a time when we can leave this classic behind, that is to say, when we and our children live by standards that Twain and his society could not yet imagine, and when it no longer matters to anyone whether HuckleberryFinn is requiredor not. Itcan then be loved by many withoutbeing imposed on all. Recently in Pennsylvania- unbeknownst to readers of the New York Times national edition-it all began to happen again, but with some differences. On Monday,2 February 1998, kicking off Black History Month, the State Conference of NAACPBranches issued a proclamationfrom the steps of the statehouse, asking that HuckleberryFinnno longer be required 29. BarbaraJeanne Fields,"Slavery,Race, and Ideologyinthe UnitedStates of America," New LeftReview,no. 181(May-June,1990):113. 30. ToniMorrison,introduction to MarkTwain,Adventuresof HuckleberryFinn,The OxfordMarkTwain(New York:OxfordUniversityPress, 1996), xxxvi.
68 boundary2 / Summer1998 in schools. I have not had the chance to read the full document but have learned from news sources its majorconcerns, which arise from the word nigger. I found it very heartening that the document, to my knowledge, avoided the rhetoricof blame. It did not brand Twainor the book as racist. It simply insisted that the book created intolerable classroom situations. Moreover,to my understanding,this is not a FirstAmendment issue of book banning. The NAACPis very clear that it is not concerned about libraries, even school libraries.Its concern is educational policy:the place of mandatory honor that the work holds in many curricula.Ifone believed the line on politicalcorrectness that generated so much heat a few years ago, then one would imagine the NAACPas the massed forces of groupthinkmobilizing against Twain'smasterpiece of the free spirit.But the NAACPis not a very powerfulbody, and HuckleberryFinn is a very powerfulbook. And much of its power in the culture,and especially in the schools, comes fromthe belief that it is a "weapon against racism."So when such a group says it is not, I thinkwe need to pay attention. But look at the offensively dismissive frontpage headline in the state capital newspaper: "GroupTries to Sell Huck Finn Up the River."31 The firststory in the PittsburghPost-Gazette came off the Associated Press wire, and it, too, shows the idolatrythat I wrote my book to oppose, the utterfailureof culturalauthoritiesto be responsible and accurate in their own statements, even as they criticize others for being unsophisticated or anti-intellectual.In this case, the American LibraryAssociation (ALA)was the establishment source to which the Associated Press turned. Here is what Judith Krug, the director of the Association's Office for Intellectual Freedom, told them. They report her opinion that HuckleberryFinn is "a classic that benefited students so long as they place it in its propercontext." Then they quote her example of context: Twain"wrotethis book as a cry against slavery and he did it in the context of the world at that time."She continued, "Jim'sname is Nigger Jim in the book because that's exactly what he would have been called at that time."32Inother words, just likemany students, the ALAIntellectualFreedom officerspeaks as if slavery still had defenders when HuckleberryFinn was published, twenty years after the CivilWar ended. And like many culturalauthorities before her, Krugseeks to minimizethe impact of the term nigger by implying-some authoritiesas31. Harrisburg(Pa.) Patriot-News,3 February1998. 32. "NAACPWantsHuckOutof Classrooms,"PittsburghPost-Gazette,3 February1998, B6.
andCounterpoint betweenOpposition 69 Arac/ Criticism sert outrightbutwrongly-thatthe termmeantnothingspecialinthe 1840s, whenthe book'sactionoccurs,or inthe 1880s,whenTwainwrotethe book. Worsestill,yet most common,she uses herauthorityto tell the worldthat but Jimis namedNiggerJim.Ofcourse,Twainneveruses thatformulation, one wouldneverknowitfromthe publicrecord- includingthe workof many distinguishedprofessors,some very recent.So the decades-longpattern thatI had analyzedin my bookstillexercises force.33 I had the chance to speak my mind.I was interviewedbothby local TVnews stationsand by the PittsburghPost-Gazette,the majorPittsburgh newspaper,and the reportersactuallymade use of what I told them. In addition,I publishedan articlein the Sundayopinionsection of the PostGazette.Youalreadyhavethe gist of myviews. As the primaryintellectual authorityconsulted,I could affectthe overallcoverage. I gave the paper FinnI had the name of a highschool teacherwhose class on Huckleberry and she for became the lead their visited, big story.Mybackgroundinterview laidout historicalcontextsfromthree periods-Huck'stime, Twain's So alternativeknowledge time,andthe lastfiftyyearsof hypercanonization. was broughtto the discussion. Mygreatest pleasurein the events to date is the characterof the headlinesin the Post-Gazetteonce its reporterstook over the story.The firstis a bigfrontpager:"AWordof CautionaboutHuck."Inallmyresearch coveringthe last fiftyyears, I had neverseen a headlineso big yet so temFinn. peratefora storytreatingchallengesto the centralityof Huckleberry The headlinethat the copyeditorswrotefor my opinionpiece was in the FinnNotRequiredReading";inthe subhead,they same vein:"Huckleberry used the wordperhaps.34I believethatmyintervention inthis publicdebate has offeredan alternativethat has helpedto diminishpolarizationand to attenuatethe usualshrilldefensiveness. Thisepisode has helpedme understandwhathadearlierseemed a puzzlingemphasis in Said's modelof the intellectual.In an articleforthe New LeftReview,he uses the stirringbig wordsof the "secular,oppositionalintellectual," butthe rolehe definesforthem-for us-is cast ina very differentidiom:We need to be "informed and effectivewet blankets."35
33. Forexamples, see my "Huckleberry Finn"as Idoland Target,22, 24-29, 34, 78-80. 34. Sally Kalson, "AWordof Cautionabout Huck,"PittsburghPost-Gazette,4 FebruFinn:Not RequiredReading,"Pittsburgh ary 1998, Al, A10.JonathanArac,"Huckleberry Post-Gazette,8 February1998, C1, C4. 35. Said, Politicsof Dispossession, 359.
The Matterof Language
TerryCochran 1 Perhaps more than any other critic in the last half of the twentieth century, EdwardSaid has consistently engaged historicalissues that stress the overlap between literaryconcerns and politicalinterests. InSaid's case, this criticalorientationor necessity has generated endless controversy and reaction from across the political and literaryspectrum, seemingly giving credence to his assertion that literature,politics, and criticism are inextricably linked. More precisely, however, Said's most profoundcontributionto contemporarythought may reside in his painstakingdemonstrationthat the conceptual tools of literaryunderstanding are not only applicable to other cultural domains and productions but are necessary for coming to terms with their emergence, historicalsignificance, and politicaleconomy. In this context, for example, Said straightforwardlyproposes a conceptual model that involves thinking "both in political and above all theoretical terms."' This theoretical reflection incorporates and draws its impetus from literary 1. Edward W. Said, "Orientalism Reconsidered," Cultural Critique, no. 1 (fall 1985): 103. boundary2 25:2, 1998. Copyright? 1998 by Duke UniversityPress.
72 boundary2 / Summer1998 thinking, which since the invention of writinghas been central to forming political hegemonies and to the unfoldingof human traditions, as well as to the historical continuitythey provide. Ultimately,yoking the theories of literaryand linguisticproductionto analyses of politicalinterests inevitably leads to questions about potential materialistunderstandings of history. Before broaching these implicationsfor both Said's criticismand for criticalthinkingat large, the reference to literatureand literaryunderstanding requires furtherconsideration. Elaboratinga materialistunderstanding of written culture, including its ideas, concepts, and linguistic presuppositions, necessarily departs from the operative notions of literaturein modernity. The term literaturebears the burden of its institutionalizationin the epoch of modernityand, in its nationalistversions (forexample, French literature, Spanish literature,and so on), has been the linchpin of cultural hegemony since the beginnings of literary history in the late eighteenth century. In the modern structure of the universityas it was consolidated in the following century, literarydisciplines and, later, departments became identified with ahistorical humanist values, that is, universal qualities to which all human beings in all historical times should aspire.2 Despite the contemporary weakening of these ahistorical claims, literaryculture and understanding continue to play an important,though widely unacknowledged, ideological role in constituting collective consciousness. In virtually all present-day literaryhistories, the Renaissance marksthe moment when literature-that is, secular writing-became the vehicle both of abstract universal values and of the national or communal identitiesthat claim to share them. Consequently, every culturalgroup strivingfor national or communal hegemony in the epoch of modernityhas elaborated a secular literarytradition, complete with historicalaccount, grammarsof the literarylanguage, and dictionaries.3Inevitably in the service of a given collectivity, literary scholars-who have gone under many names, ranging from philologists to humanists, from intellectuals to literarycritics-have reinforced the institutionalscaffolding of literatureby creating criticaleditions of canonical works, reinterpretingtheir meanings, and generally underscoring their importance for universal values (thus the category of Weltliteratur)and for 2. Foran analysis of the productionof the universal"human"and the issues that derive from it, see Cochran,"TheEmergence of GlobalContemporaneity," Diaspora5, no. 1 119-40. (1996): 3. The historicallinksbetween the grammaticaland linguisticnotionsof this institutionalizationhave been traced in Cochran,"Cultureagainst the State,"boundary2 17, no. 3 (1990):1-68.
Cochran/ Matterof Language 73 the evolving collective consciousness of a people. In sum, the claim of literature as the bearer of universals effaced its politicalaspect and veiled its hegemonic role, just as the amalgamation of humanism with literature(the backbone of the "humanities")served to isolate it from political economy and epistemological claims.4 Against this schematic backdrop,Said's own literaryand criticalpractice, which closely follows contemporary developments of literaryunderstanding and involves divesting literatureof its ideological blinders, on the one hand, and reintroducingliteraryreflectionas a basis for criticalthought, on the other, becomes more urgentlyvisible. In the twentieth century, the place of literaturein the overall productionof culture has undergone radical transformation,and the literarypremises of modernityare under increasing scrutiny. Mass production, which has characterized literarydissemination since the early diffusion of printtechnology, has spread to other material culturaldomains that include painting, photography,film, television, radio, and software. In other words, literatureand the literarytraditionno longer single-handedly dominate cultural production, and the economic force of the culturalcommodity has upset the well-policed conjunctureof literature, universalism,and humanism. Withoutthis privilegedideological investment, its more modest place writing-shorn of its grandiose literary claims--takes other sectors of culture. This historical situation,which is as much alongside a productof politicaland economic transformationas a result of technological and culturalchange, casts an entirelydifferentlighton literaryreflection and on the conceptual concerns that constitute it. Questioning the historicityof writingor literatureis not an idle task. Across diverse historical epochs, the terms, concerns, and objects of (literary) reflection or interpretationseem to vary greatly according to social, political,and materialfactors. Forexample, the fundamental historicalconditions of biblical times certainly moved particulartextual problems into the foregroundand had an obvious effect on the means, procedures, and outcomes of interpretation.The elements determining the parameters of reflection are undeniably distinct if the text exists as words baked in clay, 4. Tamperingwiththis configurationposes problemsfor scholars who have internalized the modernprecepts of historicaland literaryunderstanding.Forexample,Said's questioningof this model,whichIwilldeal within greaterdetailbelow,has led to confusionon the partof manyof his critics.See AijazAhmad,In Theory:Classes, Nations,Literatures (London:Verso,1992), for a critiquethat cannot determinewhetherto qualifySaid (and his work)as being too humanistor too antihumanistand thereforeclaimsthat he is both at once and unableto resolvethe contradictionbetween the two (164).
74 boundary2 / Summer1998 carved in stone, writtenon parchment,or printedon paper; if the words are deemed to originate in a deity's voice, an emperor's court, or the activity of an autonomous individual;or if the text is recognized as belonging to a homegrown or foreign tradition.The way in which these factors are combined, in conjunctionwith others, includingthe size of the potential public and the institutionsthat produce, preserve, and perpetuate the meaning of the respective text, help configure the historical limits of interpretationin additionto the hegemony they institute. At the same time, however, the general questions that underlie literary reflection,that is, reflectionon writing(or, more generally,on inscriptions resultingfrom human intervention),are always of the same order.They derivefroma fundamental,almost scientific formulation:How does one determine the meanings of an object (in this instance, a writtentext) that exceeds the empirical moment of its origin? Itwas produced, and its existence as a materialobject (and the kind of material is importantif only because it defines its periodof empiricalaccessibility, if not legibility)outlasts its authoror creator. A numberof concerns and categories of thought have emerged to come to grips withthis massive question: concerns such as the relationship of the inscription(text) to the collectivitysharing its language, its pertinence to the present, its place in the networkof other extant writings(both similar and dissimilar),and its contributionto human understanding at large. Despite superficial differences, these concerns have-aside from the evident historical divergences alluded to above-remained constant since the advent of writingand attest to the daunting difficultiesof any literaryreflection as well as to its continued relevance. Just as the physicist uses "idealized experiments"5 to describe and understand the workings of what has come to be called "nature,"the (literary)theorist constructs discursive models to depict the polyvalent relationships between language, the interactions of human consciousness, and the world. In contrast with theoretical physics, however, acknowledgingthe idealizingor even ideological aspect of literary understanding as an object of reflection necessarily introduces questions about extraneous interference;this interference,which in shorthand can be called the "political,"encompasses constraints such as force, power, and the implementingdictates of an institutionalor individualagent. A relative awareness of the historical productionof ideas has been an essential component of critical thought since the nineteenth century, 5. This is the formulationof AlbertEinsteinand LeopoldInfeld,The Evolutionof Physics: FromEarlyConcepts to Relativityand Quanta(New York:Simonand Shuster,1938), 7.
Cochran/ Matter of Language75 withthe rise of literaryhermeneutics.This awareness constiparticularly tutes the landscapewithinwhichSaid'scriticalprojectis initiallyinscribed. In elucidatingthe historicalbases of ideas, for example, Said sketches the paradigmaticnatureof the literarytraditionand its concomitantcritical framework:"Eachage, for instance, re-interpretsShakespeare, not because Shakespearechanges, butbecause despite the existence of numerousand reliableeditionsof Shakespeare,there is no such fixedand non-trivialobject as Shakespeare independentof his editors,the actors who playedhis roles,the translatorswho put himin otherlanguages,the hundredsof millionsof readers who have read him or watched perfor6 Thispassage, which mances of his playssince the latesixteenthcentury." in text Said's as an advances various notionsthatbear illustration, appears closer inspectionandthat runcounterto the universalistor ahistoricalbias of modernliterature. Furthermore, elaboratingthe stakes boundupwiththe name and interpretation of Shakespeareoffersan importantglimpseinto the uniquelinguisticand historicalperspectivesthatorientSaid'swork. Inthe termsof literarythought,"Shakespeare" is a figurethathaphas long been an pens to be a propername.The figureof personification objectof considerationin the traditionof literaryreflection,beginningwith classicalmanualsof rhetoric(suchas those by Aristotle,Cicero,and Quintilian);oftendescribedby the termprosopopeia,ittook its place alongside a host of othervery technicalterms of signification,the majorityof which have todaybecome archaic.7Understanding as a technical personification or formallinguisticelement is deeply ensconced in the literarytradition, bothintheoryand inpractice,andtypicallyfollowsthe dictatesof commonsense realism.On comingacross a propername, markedin Englishwith a capitalletterbecause of its conceptualimportance,readersimmediately personifyit by assimilatingit to personalexperienceand to empiricalindividualstheyhaveactuallymet."Shakespeare," a groupof lettersprintedon a two-dimensional has arms, legs, a pointof view,and so page, suddenly on. Mostliterarydebates, whetheramongspecialists,inthe popularpress, or in the classroom,tend to turnaroundwhatkindof attributes--attitudes, actions,creations-can be justifiably assigned to a figure. rather than the Yet, pursuing formalistaspects of personification, 6. Said, "Orientalism Reconsidered,"92. 7. Aristotledescribedthe signifyingprocess of personificationas a subcategoryof metaphor; it involvedwhat he called "setting before the eyes" (pro ommaton)(Rhetoric, 3.11.1-4).
76 boundary2 / Summer1998 Said offers a larger perspective that stresses how the figure-in this case, Shakespeare's name-comes to be and how it is deployed in time. The presuppositions are as easy to enumerate as the repercussions are farreaching. As a name whose object rests out of reach, whose meaning can only be grasped through the mediation of countless descriptions and qualifications that are themselves no less linguistic than the name itself, Shakespeare and whatever its reference participate in a very precise linguistic economy. Its primarycharacteristiccan best be grasped in contrast to an idealized referentialsituation. In a straightforwardact of referentiality that takes place in an ideal present, a living individualpoints to an object and utters "Shakespeare." Referentialityis seemingly complete and utterly realized: It is guaranteed by the individualwho serves as a relay for the one-to-one correspondence. This classic model of referentialitylays out the elements but displays little communalitywith the complex discursive networks that give a semblance of life to historicaland literaryfigures. Moreover,in returningspecifically to the Shakespeare figure,the presumed empirical moment when the name WilliamShakespeare was bestowed on a newborn adds nothing whatsoever to our understandingof the figure and can only be rendered present by yet another layer of language (and, in any event, Shakespeare scholars continue to discuss the empirical identity of Shakespeare, includinghis authorshipof various literaryproductions). For a figure to signify as a figure, for it to take on the trappings of existence, for good. that from which it derives must be absent--preferably is which historical less reality, given substance bepalpable, Though tween the lines of written texts, is just as real as the most mundane of physical objects, and this notion of the figure extends ratherthan truncates or diminishes reality.On the contrary,maintainingthat language operates according to figurations,it presents a model of the way that language intervenes temporallyand spatially (given that absence connotes both aspects) to mediate between understanding and the empirical. This basic linguistic model sustains even the most rudimentaryhistorical interpretationof literarytexts and has been institutionalizedin the form of hermeneutics.8 Said's remarks on the Shakespeare figure implicitlydescribe this hermeneutic version of literaryunderstanding.The "object"of the Shakespeare figure has no fixed identity,no inert existence cut off from Shake8. Hans-GeorgGadamer,Truthand Method,2d ed., translationrevised by Joel Weinsheimerand DonaldG. Marshall(NewYork:Continuum,1994), offersthe most complete and best-knownaccountof this historicalmodel.
Cochran/ Matter of Language77 speare's multiplereceptionsthat varygeographicallyand chronologically, in space and in time.9At the same time, however,Said'scharacterization underscoresthe empiricalpresuppositionthat providesa methodological forinterpretation: framework Shakespearedoesn'tchange, buthis identity is inexhaustibleand neverceases becomingmanifestin new facets. Whatever Shakespeare'sempiricalexistence,itcan neverbe knowndirectlyand is tributary of the collectiveideathathistoricalactorsand discoursesmake of it. Althoughthis basic theoryof literaryunderstanding mayno longerdo justiceto the collectiveideaof Shakespearethatis todayinfullexpansion, the globeandtraversingallmedia,its conceptualand spreadingthroughout in methodologicalreign the epoch of scripturaldominancehas been incontrovertible.Inthis sense, it constitutesthe touchstoneof literary-and,by at the presenttime. extension,cultural--critique Whereas Said'scommentson Shakespearesuccinctlysummarize the traditional modelof literaryunderstanding, the continuation of the pasextends that model to include sage implicitly, politicalinstitutional--and, aspects: "Onthe otherhand,itis too muchto say thatShakespearehas no independentexistenceat all, andthathe is completelyreconstitutedevery timesomeone reads,acts, or writesabouthim.Infact,Shakespeareleads an institutional or culturallifethatamongotherthingshas guaranteedhis eminence."10 Inotherwords,the Shakespearefigureexists beyondthe individualrealizationsthataccrue historically. Fromthis perspective,the point of referenceforShakespeareis nota fictionaland unreachableplacesomewhereinthe distantpast;instead,the institutions of knowledgeandculture however the guide, unobtrusively, figure'songoingrealizations,the multiple that can to it.Shakespeare'slifeis real meanings legitimatelybe attributed and can neverbe reducedto some formof arbitrariness: Thereis no mere The immaterial interpretation. figure,the ideaof Shakespeare,comes about and subsists in conjunctionwithmaterialinterestsfueled,channeled,and thatgo fromthe microlevelof textualdebate,to guaranteedby institutions inthe respectivedisciplinesof knowledge,to macro reigninginterpretations views of historicalunderstanding and potentialinterpretation. 9. Privilegingthis aspect, for example, Hans Robert Jauss applies the hermeneutic method specificallyto the questionof collectivereception,a methodologicalorientation that has playedan importantrole in traditionalliterarycriticism.See his Towardan Aesthetic of Reception,trans. TimothyBahti (Minneapolis:Universityof MinnesotaPress, 1982). 10. Said, "Orientalism Reconsidered,"92.
78 boundary2 / Summer1998 2 In view of its peculiar relationship to history, writing (literature in the broadest sense) offers a synthesis of the material and immaterialtensions between historical understanding and contemporary transformation, individualaction and collective intransigence, the politicalstatus quo and revolution.Other means of recordingthe sediments of human thought and deed-means spanning the gamut of twentieth-century media-operate along the same axes as writing,but scrutiny of those processes of marking the world has, for obvious technological and historical reasons, been intertwinedwith literaryunderstanding. Because of his efforts to render an account of these tensions, Said's many critical texts that treat questions of literarytheory--including Beginnings and The World,the Text,and the Critic-incorporate an interest in and a response to wide-ranging political concerns. But Orientalism, undoubtedly Said's most widely read and influentialwork, stands as his sole extended systematic treatment of the links between the theoretical and the political, between the literary and the cultural.A work of ongoing relevance to understandingthe underside of literarytraditions,Orientalismresults from importantdeliberationon the historicalcapacities of language and on the politicalforce of its deployment in institutionsand knowledge production. Instead of simply presenting a counterstory of the "Orient,"Orientalism analyzes the idea of the Orient as it was linguisticallyasserted and historicallyelaborated. There are evident parallels between Said's characterization of the Shakespeare figure and the idea of the Orient, initiallya vague notion that is given body through numberless supporting texts that describe, personify,and endow it with intention.As with all knowledge, figures or ideas clasp together material and immaterialaspects; they undergird all historical understandingor interpretation.Withoutthe material-for example, writing-the idea dies withthe mindthat thinks it;withoutthe possibilityof thinkingbeyond the material, it is impossible to actuate past legacies, to renderthem pertinentto any given present. In regardto the Orient, Orientalismattempts to lay out the parameters of this complex but absolutely necessary interactionbetween the materialand the immaterial:"The Volumes could be appended Orient was almost a European invention."11 to this qualification,this "almost,"without ever exhausting the subject. Be11.Said, Orientalism(New York:Pantheon,1978), 1. Hereafter,this workis cited parenthetically.
Cochran/ Matterof Language 79 cause it emerges from historical awareness, it is not merely an invention or phantasmatic projection,nor is it an unambiguous, objective portrayalof what it names. Likeany linguisticfigure, the idea of the Orient possesses historical dimensions that exceed the ideal referentialmodel I sketched out earlier. In Orientalism'sintroductorychapter, Said elucidates the presuppositions of the study: "Ihave begun with the assumption that the Orient is not an inert fact of nature. It is not merely there, just as the Occident itself is not just there either"(4). Informedby an understandingof the specific linguistic character of writing,the figuralmodel Orientalismendorses, no matter how scientifically rigorous its application, contrasts with a model construed on the basis of an empiricalknowledge of nature. The Orient,whether idea or referent, is not "there,"the object of a pointing finger that indicates it for a present and discerning public. Although the "nature"model of knowledge may have useful applications in specific contexts, its potentialfor explaining the figurationof written language is severely limited owing to the infinite variables involvedand to their immateriality.Inthe case of the figure (of the Orient,for example), understandingis not a matterof clear and transparent perception, as if one were present before an object and had the power and voice to express it unequivocally. Grasping the workings of this figuration,whose implicationsfor historical understanding go well beyond the sense of any particularfigure, is fraught with difficulties.These obstacles come less from the enormous quantity of material than from the intricacy of analyzing historical figures that provide the very means of thinking. Orientalismhints at the historical magnitude of the problem:"Thereforeas much as the West itself, the Orient is an idea that has a historyand a traditionof thought, imagery,and vocabulary that have given it realityand presence in and for the West" (5). As an idea that takes form in time, the Orient is a product of historicalaccretion; once transcribed, it served as a virtualpointof reference for competing and coalescing discourses that flesh out its skeletal figure. The reality of that Western Orient is that of institutionswhose domain is largely immaterial, even if the authoritativeactions that reveal its reach have visible consequences. Yet not unlikethe figure of Shakespeare, which both channels and derives from countless institutional--and, today, commercial--forces and structures, its historicalexistence is unassailable. Althoughin Orientalism, Said's object of analysis is specifically defined, the economy of signification he delineates extends beyond any specific object. The "West"no less than the "East"(as well as any personified collectivityso common in liter-
80 boundary2 / Summer1998 ary and historicaldiscourse) necessarily participates in the same economy of meaning. Fromthe perspective of institutionalizedknowledge, the figure belongs to a configurationmerging multipleseries of interwoven vocabulary, a plethora of images, and historical accounts to marshal them into coherence. Moreover, as Said's remarks suggest, the figures tend to be defined in conjunctionwithother figures, supplementing, opposing, and becoming assimilated to them, thus increasing the labyrinthsof signification and the convoluted imbrication.Therefore, to read, interpret,and explicate this institutionalization,the process whereby a figure comes into existence, involves deciphering the "whole networkof interests" (3), coming to terms withthe concomitant "constellationof ideas" (5), and confrontingthe "sheer knitted-togetherstrength"(6) of discourses holdingthe figure in place. While the economy of the figure undeniably endorses the proverb that "historyis always written by the victors,"its force is more epistemological than physical. In the encapsulated view of the proverb, control of the past, its sequential unfoldingand meaning, follows on bodily subjugation. The figuralunderstanding of history,on the contrary,places struggle at the heart of the signifyingprocess as well, which cannot exist in isolation from its respective medium. The most controversial upshot of this way of perceiving struggle in language revolves around affirmationsof historical truth.As Said comments, culturaldiscourse circulates "not'truth'but representations" (21). Injectingreflectionon language intothe historicalequation indicates to what extent the Orient, even as a historicallydelimited category, becomes an epistemological question in addition to and alongside physical domination, just as knowing and knowledge reveal their political significance. The nature of language, its ephemeral orality and its inabilityas writingto transport to succeeding epochs whatever empirical meaning it might have expressed, imposes strong limitationson notions of historical truth.Inthis sense, Said's grapplingwiththe question of Orientalismcannot be separated from this larger investigation of the historical and linguistic sediment of knowledge. Applied to the figure of the Orient, Said's words constitute a general commentary on this tangle of conceptual relationships: "Itsobjective discoveries-the work of innumerabledevoted scholars who edited texts and translated them, codified grammars, wrote dictionaries, reconstructed dead epochs, produced positivisticallyverifiable learning-are and always have been conditioned by the fact that its truths, like any truths delivered by language, are embodied in language" (203). Historyinvolves institutions,ideal projections,and a complement of presuppositions,
Cochran/ Matterof Language 81 but its economy is determined by a linguisticprocess and the materialof its inscription(printed words, for example). Withoutthis rigorous scaffolding, historicaltruth is a meaningless concept, and the scaffolding is bound into form by language. Language, inseparable from its materiality,is the common denominatorforthese disparate elements that extend fromthe political to the theoretical. Ultimately,the entire edifice of historical understanding rests on the efficacy of the model of significationattributedto language. 3 Althoughthis fundamental reflectionon language has farfromdominated historicalthought in the West, it has been a recurringtheme among theorists at least since Dante, who addressed issues of the politicalrepercussions of language. Inevoking this tradition,Said cites brieflyNietzsche's "OnTruthand Lie in the ExtramoralSense" (203); although Said does not dwell on this text, mention of it has become de rigueurfor both critics and supporters of Orientalism'sclaims.12 In effect, Nietzsche's text advances a surprisinglycomplete hypothesis about the historicaland politicalworkings of language; it renders explicit the entangled politicaland epistemological ramificationsof critical practice, including that which characterizes Said's Orientalism. Circulatingjudgments about Nietzsche display such tenacity that they frequentlyreplace readingof texts attributedto him. Evokingthe "Nietzsche" name in describing individualsor their writings suffices to demean their motivationor challenge the validityof theiranalyses. Nietzsche's essay on truth and lying, which examines the representational capacity of language in isolation from the historical contingency of moral judgments, is often cited precisely in this context. For example, Jurgen Habermas considers Nietzsche (along with the Marquis de Sade) as one of "the really nihilistic dark writers of the bourgeoisie."13 The italicized darkness summons images of the closed room where nefarious events occur, as well as the opposite of "enlightenment,"the eighteenth-century ascendancy of 12. The listof such discussions wouldbe lengthy,and Iwilllimitmyselfto two paradigmatic references to Nietzsche's unfinishedessay in the conceptual context of Said's critical reading:the condemnationparadigmin Ahmad'sIn Theory,194-97, and HomiBhabha's en passant citationof one of Nietzsche's key phrases in The Locationof Culture(New York:Routledge,1994), 164. 13. J0rgen Habermas,"TheEntwinementof Mythand Enlightenment:Re-ReadingDialectic of Enlightenment," New GermanCritique26 (spring/summer, 1982):13.
82 boundary2 / Summer1998 reason. In a similarvein, as one of Said's critics affirms in referringto this essay to prove Said's irrationalism,antihumanism,and antihistoricism:"Ina Nietzschean world,virtuallyanythingis possible."14 Althoughthe grounds for this boundless possibilityare not rendered explicit,this sentence accurately iterates the standard allegory attached to Nietzsche's name. However,before writingNietzsche off as an irrationalthinkerof mythic proportions,it is essential to consider the text on truthand lyingin its entirety (the essay to which the two extant sections belong remains unfinished).This partialessay, which Nietzsche drafted in the context of teaching classical rhetoricand pre-Platonicphilosophy,presents a coherent hypothesis about the way language functions as a means for producingknowledge. Although all interpretation-whether of historyor of the empiricalworld-depends on hypothetical presuppositions, the assumptions leading to understandings or interpretationsof human culture (writingor other materialforms) are of a differentorder than those of experimentalscience. Whereas the lattermust by definitionadmit of empiricalverification,no matter how idealized the hypothesis and how tenuous or refractedthe linkestablished between the idea and its experimental realization,the presuppositions of culturalinterpretation can be judged only according to the efficacy in producinga framework for furtherinterpretation.Unlikescientific understanding,which has a builtin linearityrunningfrom relative human ignorance to greater magnitudes of human knowledge, culturalunderstanding(which encompasses all thought relatingto historicalartifacts,products of human activityand inscription)exhibitsless fixityin projectingthe origins and finalitiesof the collective human species. Presuppositions about historical knowledge (and, therefore, literary and culturalunderstanding) are distinguished by how they conjecture the relationshipbetween a human origin and its projected end, whether as divine creation awaiting its conclusion in a final judgment, as human consciousness moving toward absolute knowledge by virtue of its own efforts, or as successive social formations marching inexorablytoward a classless society. This larger set of concerns forms the context for Nietzsche's comments on the veracity of language, which propose a novel hypothesis about its epistemological role. For all its supposed irrationality,Nietzsche's essay proceeds methodically and analytically,staking out a series of philosophical positions by referringto the assumptions underlyingWestern views about the role of language in engendering human knowledge. In this sense, the basic ele14. Ahmad, In Theory, 197.
of Language83 Cochran/ Matter mentsof the essay are notnew;its noveltyresults,rather,fromtakingthose observationsdrawnlargelyfrompoliticalthinkersand placingthem intoan immanentmodelof historicalexplanation.The ironicopeningof the essay, whichrecountsa fable about how "cleverbeasts inventedknowing"and thus pavedthe way fortheirsubsequentdeath, underscoresthe fictional, narrativenatureof all conceptionsof the emergenceof humanconsciousness.15This beginning,no less than the firstgurglingsof language itself, can be recapturedonly in the formof a story;in any subsequenthistorical leftwithnothingmorethana process of moment,humansare unavoidably under institutionalization way.Nevertheless,howone thinksof this already it if even one denies entirely,has a decisive impacton the histori"origin," cal, linguistic,and cognitivepotentialof the humanagent. ForNietzsche, thatmomentof emergence is irrevocably and, infact,structurally lost,and forlanguage,humanconsciousall recuperationsthatclaima simultaneity ness, and subjectiveintentioncan only be ideological,subordinateto and supportiveof historicalinterests.In offeringa differenthypothesisof the of language,Nietzsche providesthe backbonefor an immanent irruption thatdrawsits impetusfromthe disparitybetween historicalunderstanding human an identifiable an unknowable without author,anda full-blown origin, reasonenjoyingthe unacknowledgedbenefitsof sociopoliticalinstitutions. Thishistoricalconceptionrests squarelyon Nietzsche'smaterialistviewof languagethat stands opposed bothto the positivistbelief in historyas a homogeneouscontinuumand to Heidegger'sphilosophyof historycharacterizedby effortsto catch glimpsesof an overlookedBeing. In Nietzsche's hypotheticalreasoning,the contrastbetween truth and lie, whichhas been at the core of moralcritiquesof the essay, comes to be as a by-productof sociolinguisticinstitutions.Lawsof truthemerge alongside linguisticlegislations.At this pointin the argument,Nietzsche reformulates the themes of the essay in a moreprecisefashion:"Andbesides, whataboutthese linguisticconventionsthemselves?Arethey perhaps productsof knowledge,that is, of the sense of truth?Are designa15. FriedrichNietzsche, "OnTruthand Lie in an ExtramoralSense," in Philosophyand Truth:Selections fromNietzsche's Notebooksof the Early 1870s, trans.and ed. Daniel Breazeale (AtlanticHighlands,N.J.:HumanitiesPress, 1979),79; forthe Germanedition, see "UeberWahrheitund LOgeim aussermoralischenSinne,"in Sjmtliche Werke;Kritische Studienausgabe,ed. GiorgioColliand MazzinoMontinari,vol. 1 (Munich:Walter de Gruyterand Co., 1967-1977), 875. Page referencesfor subsequent citationsappear in the text, withthe firstindicatingthe Englishtranslationand the second, the German original;Englishtranslationsare sometimes slightlymodified.
2 / Summer 84 boundary 1998 tions congruentwiththings? Is languagethe adequate expressionof all realities?"(81;878). Inthe logicof the essay, the upshotis that language, knowledge,and the sociopoliticalare inseparable,and no single element these questionsinreferenceto their enjoyseven relativepriority. Examining the historicalimportoccupies remainderof the essay. In the context of contemporarycritique,this batchof questionscan be restatedsomewhat Whattheoryof languagewouldenable one to accountforthe differently: role that languageitself plays in producingknowledge,on the one hand, and insettingupthe sociopoliticalinstitutions thatmonitorsuch knowledge, on the other? To address this issue, the essay posits that at the heartof human society lies a basic forgetfulnessof the epistemologicalsituationin which languageevolved.A farcry fromHeidegger'sdirewarningsaboutthe forgetfulness of Being, this assertion is nonetheless commonplaceamong Westernthinkerswhose concernscombinepoliticaland linguisticdeliberation. Prominentin this tradition,for example,are Dante and Machiavelli, whostress opposingaspects of the question.ForDante,whose philosophical role in providingargumentsfor modernnationallanguages has long been recognized,this originalforgetfulness(oblivio)anchorsthe secular process of humanactionand linguisticchange:"Allourlanguage-besides thatwhichGodcreatedat the same timeas man-is subjectto the reworkings of ourfree will(beneplacito),afterthatconfusionwhichwas no more thana forgettingof previouslanguage."16Inthe post-Babelworld,afterthe divinegiftof languagethat could only be the perfectexpressionof reality, languageis as unstableas humanactionis fickle;Dante'swell-knownproposal to counterthis deleterioustendencycalls for institutinga grammar of an idealizedItalianlanguage belongingto no particularcommunity.In thisway,an (institutionalized) sphereof collectivecultureand sociopolitical be demarcated. could writing occursas a resultof activestruggle ForMachiavelli, "forgetfulness" human or between betweensocieties beings and the elements of nature. Thus, insteadof a passive forgetting,the inabilityto ascertain,muchless to representpast plenitudewith any certainty-such as the creationof the worldaroundfive thousandyears ago, in Machiavelli's example-relike sultsfroman activeeffacementorannihilation, something the historical in takes that dictatorships.Whena new place twentieth-century rewriting ed. and tr.SergioCecchin(Turin, 16. Dante,De vulgarieloquentia,bilingual(Latin-Italian), Italy:Tea, 1988), chap. 9, 6.
Cochran/ Matter of Language85 religionemerges-a newculturalhegemony,as we wouldsay ittoday-the firsttask is to eliminatethe precedingreligion,a goaleasierto accomplishif it is simplya matterof substitutinga new language.Inthisway,Machiavelli concludes,humanand naturalevents (suchas floods,plagues,and so on) infavorof the oldinstitutions "wipeoutthe memoriesof things,""extinguish" the new.17 As is customaryin Machiavelli's analyses, historistraightforward cal outcomes are determinedby relationsof force in whichthe struggling actorscan be readilyidentified. and Dante'soriDespiteobviousdistinctionsbetween Machiavelli's entations,theirshared historicalconception,as well as its politicalimplications,are specificallymodern;the questionsthey raiseaboutculture,its social and conceptualinstitutions, and the need fora collectivewrittenlanguage havefurnishedthe parametersformodernpoliticalthought.Writing in the shadowsof this tradition,however,Nietzscheexpandsthis historical conceptionto includethe notionof knowing,thatis, languageas an institutionalizedprocessof knowing,whichis consequentlyalso subjectto historical transformation ratherthanjusta means to recordhistory.Thiscontrast betweenNietzscheandthe traditionfromwhichhis considerationsemerge succinctlyillustratesthe pointof contentionbetween interpreterswho endorse Nietzsche'smaterialistview of languageand those who exemptthe facultyof humanknowingfromthe forces of history.In its simplestterms, Nietzsche'sview of languageis summedup in his definitionof the word: "Whatis a word?It is the copy in sound of a nerve stimulus"(81;878). Wordsare not initiallyproductsof a masterfulconsciousness butare born outof interactionsand resultfromnervestimuli,outof the purviewof a conto the same trollinghumanmind.This hypothesisis obviouslyunverifiable extentas any otherstory aboutthe originof language,even those based on the most rigidbelief in a one-to-onecorrespondencebetween a word and a thing. Onceagain,though,Nietzsche'shypothetical discourseon language and knowingdoes not appearout of nowhere,and, as in the case of forgetfulness,his particularinflectionis significant.Jean-JacquesRousseau, anotherthinkerwhose writingstraversemanydomainsalong the literary17. Machiavelli,"Chela variazionedelle sette e delle lingue,insieme con I'accidentede' diluviio della peste, spegne le memoriedelle cose" (bk. 2, chap. 5), Discorsisopra la primaDeca di TitoLivio,vol. 2, Le grandiopere politiche,ed. Gian MarioAnselmi,et al. (Turin,Italy:BollatiBoringhieri,1993), 250-51. Machiavellispeculates that the only reason thatthe linguisticartifactsof classical civilizationremainedpartiallyextantis because the Christianshad no otherlanguageto impose and were forcedto adopt Latin.
2 / Summer 86 boundary 1998 politicalaxis, pursuesa similarseries of conjectures.His Essai surI'origine des languestells the storyof whathe calls the figuraloriginof language.18 This much debated text offers an example of Rousseau's hypothesisof languageformation,and the componentsof this accountare easily summarized:One humanbeing sees anotherand, havingno inklingof their resemblance,names hima "giant"(because his apprehensionat seeing someone else forthe firsttimeleads himto believethatthe otherwas much larger,stronger,and so on, than himself);after recurringsightingsof the other,however,he realizestheirsimilarityand inventsa new name to describe them both;at this point,humanbeings have a word,giant,withno Afterelaboratingthis example, referent,even thoughit was the firstword.19 Rousseau makesthe followingobservations:"Thisis howthe figuralword is bornbeforethe properword,whenpassionleaves us starry-eyedandthe firstidea it offersus is not thatof truth.... Withthe illusoryimageoffered by passion being the firstto show itself,the languagecorrespondingto it whenthe enlightwas also the firstinvented;then it became metaphorical ened mind,recognizingits priorerror,employedits expressionsonly for the same reasons that producedit."20Despiteits being heavilymarkedby the fundamental notionsof languageand signification, eighteenth-century differ of Rousseau's components onlyslightlyfrom linguisticunderstanding those of Nietzsche(even if Nietzschemighthave been shockedto see this WhatforNietzscheis an affinity,givenhis constantridiculeof Rousseau).21 utteranceprovokedbya nervestimulusbecomes in Rousseau'sdescription the resultof an involuntary passion.Just as withNietzsche'snervestimulus, incitinga reactionakinto a protozoon'sresponseto an electricshock, the passiondepictedby Rousseautakes placespontaneously,gratuitously, withoutthe interventionof thought.This intense reactionof passion transpires accordingto an unpredictablelogic of its own, not reducibleto an economy of truthfulrepresentation.Withthe engagementof reason (that of passion, is, the enlightenedmind:I'espriteclaire),the linguisticirruptions 18. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Quele p[remi]erlangage du etre figur6,"chap. 3 of Essai surl originedes langues, ed. Jean Starobinski,in vol. 5, Oeuvrescompl6tes,ed. Bernard Gagnebinand MarcelRaymond(Paris:Gallimard,La Pleiade, 1995), 381-82. 19. This passage was a key bone of contentionbetween Derrida'sand de Man'sconflictinginterpretationsof Rousseau. See Jacques Derrida,De la grammatologie(Paris: Minuit,1967), 381-97; and Paul de Man,"TheRhetoricof Blindness,"in Blindnessand Insight(Minneapolis:Universityof MinnesotaPress, 1983), 131-36. 20. Rousseau, Essai, 381-82. 21. See Starobinski'scommentson this chapter,Essai, 1544-46.
Cochran/ Matter of Language87 alongwiththe resultingidea and the experiencepromptingit, are deemed erroneousor flawed.At that moment,subsequentto the mindlessnessof passion,allentersintoorder:Truthopposes error,andpropermeaningwins precedence over the figural.Redressingthis disjuncture,whichis recognizedonlyas it is established,creates the linguisticspace of metaphor. In paring away the divergentdramatization,Nietzsche's version seems to endorsesimilarconclusions:Forreasonsthatbecomeclearas its argumentunfolds,Nietzsche'sessay stresses thatthe verydistinctionbetweentruthanderrorcomes fromthe legislatedregulationof reference.But Rousseau's portrayalof figurallanguages as error,whichan enlightened mindwilllatercorrect,privilegesindividual consciousness and experience, no matterhow mucha traumaticexperienceand the resultingexpression of this inmightdisruptits placidserenity.Intracingthe furtherimplications voluntarymodelof linguisticemergence,Nietzscheassigns the production of concepts to the linguisticprocess itself ratherthan to individualconsciousness alone, thus dispellingany ambiguityaboutthe absolute privilege of individualreason.As partof the linguisticprocess,any utteranceis caught up in the formationof concepts:"Everywordinstantlybecomes a conceptpreciselyinsofaras it is notsupposedto serve as a reminderof the uniqueand entirelyindividual originalexperienceto whichit owes its emerbut a a concept insofaras it simultaneously word becomes rather, gence; has to fit countless moreor less similarcases-which means, purelyand simply,cases whichare never likeand thus altogetherunlike"(83; 87980). Inadditionto echoingRousseau'saccountof the repeatedexperiences to realizethe errorof the word necessary ("apresbeaucoupd'experiences") and invent the of Nietzsche's giant category "man," analysistakes up the terms of Aristotle'slogicalconceptionof language,whichformsthe basis of Westernlinguisticthought.22 Contraryto Aristotelian logic,however,whichderiveslanguagefrom the about essences of thingsand aboutits capacityto absorb assumptions and representthem, the conceptualizationinherentto languagein Nietzsche's essay does not owe its existence to a presumedessence. As the 22. Rousseau, Essai, 381. ForAristotle'smodelof language,the primarysubstance (prote ousia) on whichthe entirephilosophyof language rests, is the absolutelyparticular:"For example, a particularman or a particularhorse"(Categories,2a, 13-14). Aristotlegoes on in the Categoriesto drawthe logicalconclusionthat "ifthese primarysubstances did not exist, nothingelse wouldexist either"(2b, 5-7). Howone conceives of that initialexperience enables and limitstheoriesof signification,history,and even politicalactionthat necessarilydepend on it.
2 / Summer 88 boundary 1998 essay continues, even the "contrastbetween individualand species is anddoes notstemfromthe essence of things" somethinganthropomorphic This the figuraldimensionof languagethat (83; 880). anthropomorphism, creates an interfacebetween consciousness and reality,is closely intertwinedwiththe conceptualcategoriesof humanthoughtthatbuildson the individual's experiences.Thisanthropomorphic particularizing impulsepermeates language as a networkof meaningproductionand surfaces repeatedlyas obligatoryfor linguisticanalysis (a tendencyreflectedin both Aristotle'sand Rousseau'suse ofthe humanfigureinanalyzingthe linksbetween thoughtand language).Ratherthanattributing humanspecificityto the abilityto use language,a historically commonassertion,Nietzscheemphasizes the capacityto manufacture concepts,a by-productof the amalbetween and whichdistinguishesman gam thought language:"Everything fromthe animalsdepends uponthis abilityto volatilizeperceptualmetaphors (die anschaulichen Metaphern)in a schema, and thus to dissolve a
this humanpenchantto figure(Bild)intoa concept"(84, 881).23Ultimately, virtue of which is of a whollydifferent conceptualizeoperatesby language, orderthan what it expresses. Nietzschecharacterizesthis disjunctureas a "suggestivetransference,a stammeringtranslationintoa commimicking pletelyforeigntongue."24Language,and the thoughtit permits,dissipates this incommensurability, just as the translationreplacesthe originalit can neverequal. Inits ownhighlyoriginalway,the essay on truthand lyingpresentsa modelof historicaland linguisticknowingwitha definedset of presuppositions.This insistenceon a modeldoes not signalthe relativeinterchangeAllmodels abilityof historicalmodelsandtheirconsequentinterpretations. or groupsof assumptionscohere withcompatibleinterestsand historical constraints,includingsocioeconomicand culturalformations,even if the dominanceor hegemonyof certainmodels is not whollyarbitrary. In this 23. Toa certainextentborrowingKantianterminology,this passage indicatesthe transfer of a perception(Anschauung,or "intuition" in English-languageKantianter("metaphor") Rousseau attemptsto grasp minology)intoa schema. Inexplainingthe coiningof "giant," this visual aspect by relating"passions"to an "idea,"whichturns out to be erroneously in conjunction assigned to the expression.Fora discussion of figureand Bild,particularly withWalterBenjamin'suse of the latterterm,see Cochran,"Historyand the Collapseof Eternity," boundary2 22, no. 3 (fall1995), esp. 44-55. 24. Benjaminaddresses these same questions,usingthe same conceptualelements and muchof the same terminology,in "TheTaskof the Translator," inIlluminations, trans.Harry Zohn(NewYork:Schocken,1969);and in "DieAufgabedes Ubersetzers,"in Gesammelte am Main:Suhrkamp,1980). Schriften,vol. 4 (Frankfurt
Cochran/ Matter of Language89 sense, the Aristotelianidea thatessences-by definitionintangibleand invisible-underlieappearances,a modelthat requiresa reinforcedand extensive networkof institutions to guaranteethe propercorrespondencebetween essences and appearances,meaningsand expressions,tends to produceregularand stable views of historythatproceedin orderlyfashion towardan orderlyand fulfillingend. In the same way, Nietzsche'smodel also has a highlychargedhistoricalcomponent,even if it stops farshortof the historicalwiththe breezynarrativeclaimingto representit. identifying 4 The extremeimportanceof this fragmentaryessay for Said's work and forcontemporary criticalthoughtgenerallyderivesmorefromthe consequences of Nietzsche'sformulationsthan fromthe formulationsthemselves. As Nietzsche'sessay makesclear,instretchingthis linguisticmodel concomitanthuman along a time line, history-and, no less significantly, a of sedimentation: "Even consciousness--becomes never-endingprocess the relationshipof a nervestimulusto the generatedfigureis not in itself a necessary one. Butwhen the same figurehas been generatedmillions of times and has been handeddownfor manygenerationsand finallyapthen it acquires pears on the same occasion everytimeforall humankind, at last the same meaningforhumanbeings itwouldhave if it werethe sole necessary figureand if the relationshipof the originalnerve stimulusto the generatedfigurewere a strictlycausal one"(87; 884). Thisdescription containsthe nucleusof a theoryof historythat resemblesmorea radical materialismthan an empty denialof externalreality.Whatis arbitraryat some longlost beginning,whatis notnecessary in itself(an sich),takes on a historicalnecessity throughtime.Historicalnecessities exist, butonlyas the resultof historyitself.Thefigure-of thought,of expression-cannot be divestedof its historyany morethana languagecan be freed of its meanof these figures, ingsandstillremaina language.Thegradualnaturalization thatis, the (toolsof) thoughtthey rendernatural,makeshumanconsciousness possible;at the same time, they pose formidableobstacles for any theoryof historythatwouldnot place humanconsciousness at its conceptual center.A rigorousmaterialisttheoryof historywouldinevitablyhave to take into accountthe matterof thought,whichmeans integratingconsiderationof languagewhilerefusingto grantabsoluteprimacyto human consciousnessandto the theoriesof representation andcausalitythatsuch primacy involves.
2 / Summer 1998 90 boundary This theoryof language-what I have called Nietzsche'smodelof and traversesthe passage Said cites historicalunderstanding-surrounds of his investigationintoOrientalto indicatethe theoreticalunderpinnings ism. This passage, certainlythe best knownparagraphof the essay and perhapsof Nietzsche'sworkas a whole,bothsummarizesthe essay and, because itis tornfromthe carefullyconstructedargument,misrepresentsit: "Whatthen is truth?A mobilearmyof metaphors,metonymies,and anthropomorphisms:in short,a sum of humanrelationswhichhave been poetiintensified,transferred,and embellished,and which, callyand rhetorically after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical,and binding. Truthsare illusionswhichwe have forgottenare illusions;they are metaphorsthathavebecomewornoutandhavebeen drainedof sensuous force, coins whichhave lost theirfigures(Bild)and are nowconsideredas metal and no longeras coins"(84; 880-81).25 The problemwithtruthis that it is inextricably tangledup withlanguage,butthe resultof this observation is to historicizeratherthan relativizetruth.Language,and the concepts thatfeed on it, definitelyestablishtruths;buttruthsare also the productof historicalforces and live on by virtueof social, political,and linguisticinstitutions,amongothers,whose longevitymasksthe figurationat the basis of all language.Thismodelof languageand consciousness,whichpresupposes that the economy of language is fundamentallymetaphoricaland figural,opens up new avenues of historicalcritiquethatextendto the concepts themselves. Institutions-understoodin the broadestsense-efface that figurationinto invisibility, just as time erodes the face of a coin;from calls forrecoveringthose figures this perspective,historicalunderstanding and decipheringthe forcesthatpromotedtheirdisappearance. of Said's Orientalism, Inthe last twentyyears, since the publication the theoryof historyputforthinNietzsche'sessay has hadsignificantrevercriticism.Whatevertheirultimategoals, however, berationsincontemporary these reactionsend upat the veryleast noddingto the politicalimplications 25. Thispassage has been translatedmanytimes, butthere is littleagreementabouthow to express Bildin English.The translationIcite, forexample,originallyrendersthe phrase in questionas "coinswhichhave lost theirembossing";WalterKaufmann,whose translation is most often cited and is used by Said and his commentators,prefers"coinswhich Sense," in ThePortable have lost theirpictures."See "OnTruthand Liein an Extra-Moral de Man Paul and York: Nietzsche (New provideshis own somewhat Viking,1968), 47; freertranslation:"metaphorsthat have been used up and have lost theirimprintand that now operate as mere metal, no longeras coins"(in Allegoriesof Reading:FiguralLanguage in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke,and Proust [New Haven, Conn.:Yale University Press, 1979],111).
Cochran/ Matter of Language91 of this materialistview of language. In an importantessay on anthropomorphism,forexample,Paulde Manremarkson Nietzsche'sdefinitionof truth:"Tropesare neithertrue norfalse butare bothat once. To call them an armyis howeverto implythattheireffectand theireffectivenessis not a matterof judgmentbut of power.Whatcharacterizesa good army,as distinctfor instancefroma good cause, is that its success has littleto do withimmanentjusticeand a greatdeal withthe propereconomicuse of its seeks to readthe figuresof Nietzsche's power."Althoughde Manprimarily text and to show how the anthropomorphism of its languageplaysout its assertions,his commentsare revealingof the dualpowerthatinhabitslanand "strategic," guage. De Manrefersto this poweras "epistemological" tied simultaneouslyto the productionof knowledgeand to persuading,to actions.Inotherwords,as a productof ongoinginconvincing,to provoking stitutionalization, languageenforces,cajoles,and convinces,butits power is also moreinsidiousbecause it lurksin its concepts, inthe verymatterof this poweris an antecedentto judgment,whichacts thought.Conceptually, in the name of that powereven as the judgecan do littlemorethanassert his or herimpartiality.26 Nevertheless,this powerfulparadigmof historicalunderstanding, groundedinthe linguisticmatterof concepts,carrieswithinitselfthe mechanismof critique.InNietzsche'stext,this critiquehas to do withmetaphors, those figuresalwayscaught up in the process leadingto concepts: "The drivetowardthe formationof metaphorsis the fundamentalhumandrive, whichone cannotfora singleinstantdispensewithinthought,forone would therebydispense withman himself.Thisdriveis not trulyvanquishedand scarcely subdued by the fact that a regularand rigidnew worldis constructedas a prisonfromits own ephemeralproducts,the concepts"(8889; 887). At bottom,the humanlinguisticprocess portrayedhere,certainly anti-Aristotelian and contraryto beliefs in mysticalessence, exceeds the conceptsthatwouldchanneland masterit. Inthatsense, it is a theoryconcerned withproductioncuttingacross conceptsthataccrueto themselves whiledenying-or forgetting -the historicalforcenecessaryfor universality themto come intobeing.Because figurationbelongsfundamentally to language and,consequently,to humanthought,the socialandcognitivepower of institutionslives by the same process thatenables unmasking,however fleetingly,the powerthey conceal. Ineffect,this conceptionof historicaland linguisticmatteracknowl26. Paulde Man,"Anthropomorphism and Tropein the Lyric," in The Rhetoricof Romanticism(New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress, 1984), 242.
2 / Summer 92 boundary 1998 edges a whollydifferentformof powerand no longerrelegatesdiscursive andculturalexpressionto simplya secondaryrolevis-a-visexecutiveforce. Thisbasicforceof linguisticfiguration, ofthe formation of metaphors,underscores the importanceof the matterof history-inscribedalmostexclusively on paperpriorto the late nineteenthcentury-and of literaryreflection.Itis not happenstancethatNietzschewas trainedas a classicalphilologist,the nineteenth-century equivalentof a literarycritic;norshouldit be surprising that AntonioGramsci,the twentieth-century thinkerwho has most deeply the of historical ramifications cultural andwhohas also production analyzed been a fundamentalreferencefor Said, was a universitystudentof literaturewho concentratedon linguistics.Gramsci'sview of metaphordisplays interestingaffinitieswiththatof Nietzsche,despitetheirwidedifferencesof historicalvision.Inclarifyingthe use of the termimmanencein materialist theory,Gramscicharacterizesthe status of metaphor:"Alllanguageis a continuousprocess of metaphors,and the historyof semantics is an aspect of the historyof culture:languageis botha livingthingand a museum of fossils of past life and civilizations."27 This historicalsedimentation,inscribedand reinscribedin the ongoingelaborationof figures,providesthe stuffof thought,of its hegemonicforce,and of the critiquethatsifts out the intereststhatcoverup theirfiguralnature. In Gramsci'sspeculations,the overlappingeffects of the linguistic and the politicalreceive greatest emphasis. Gramscilinksthese disjunctures between reigningmetaphoricallanguagesto the emergence of new worldviews(or new worldconceptions:He refersto a "nuovaconcezione del mondo"),therebymovingthe historicalquestionintothe foreground. Contraryto Nietzsche,whose concernwiththe powerof ideas and concepts takes a largelyepistemologicalturn,Gramscifocuses, in his work,on and of the ideologies the historicalsignificanceof historicaltransformation in subsequentworldorders.Languageis "alwaysmetaphorical.Although one may not be able to say exactlythat every discourse is metaphorical withrespectto the thingor materialobjectindicated(orto the abstractconcept), so as not to enlarge too muchthe concept of metaphor,one can nonetheless say that present-daylanguageis metaphoricalwith respect 27. AntonioGramsci,"Quaderno11,"in Quadernidel carceri,ed. ValentinoGerratana (Turin,Italy:Einaudi,1975), 1438. Partsof this passage were includedin an earliernotebook, which exists in vol. 2 of Gramsci'snotebooks in English(all the volumes are not onlyGramsci'slater yet available);Ihave thereforeadoptedthattranslation,incorporating modificationsto the passage. See PrisonNotebooks,trans.and ed. Joseph A. Buttigieg, vol. 2 (New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress, 1996), 159.
of Language93 Cochran/ Matter to the meaningsand ideologicalcontentthat the wordshave had in prior periodsof civilization." DespiteGramsci'shesitationaboutputtingintoquestionthe empiricalmodelof languagederivingfromAristotle,the historical trajectoryhe describes clearlyoperatesaccordingto a historicalmodelof Thereis no pureessence hidingandwaitingonlyto be meaningproduction: discovered.The explicitrecognitionthatmetaphoris also a conceptuncomfortablydovetailswithlanguage'sineluctableproductionof concepts and introducesan ironythat Nietzschewouldhave, no doubt,appreciated.But Gramsci'snotionof succeedingworldviews,withtheirconcomitanthegemoniesand supportingconstellationsof ideas, gives this theoryof history an overtlypoliticalface. Whilethe primaryoutcome may be to radicalize historicalunderstanding, to questionuniversalspresumedto continueunscathedbyhistory,inpracticethis linguisticmaterialism hintsat a newmode of historicalintervention.28 Atthe edge of the twenty-first century,the questionof historicalinterventiontakes on unforeseenmeanings,largelybecause of the historical conjunctureitself,the clash inworldviewsandthe technologicalmeansthat diffusethem. Inhis carefulreadingof the establishedtruthaboutthe Orient, a readingthat entailedlayingbare the gradualevolutionof the idea intothe statusof an existingthingwhose ideologicalfoundationshave been forgotten,Said'sanalysishas done considerablymorethandispelillusions. Inhis driveto unitethe theoreticaland the political,Said'sworkhas made contributions to bothrealms;his portrayal of certaintendenciesof historical intervention couldveryeasilyapplyto his ownwork:"Thecritiqueof objechow,inthe tivityand authoritydidperforma positiveserviceby underlining secularworld,humanbeings constructtheirtruths,and that,forexample, the so-calledobjectivetruthof the whiteman'ssuperioritybuiltand maintainedby the classical Europeancolonialempiresalso restedon a violent subjugationof Africanand Asian peoples."29But, even more importantly, his workhas irrefutably demonstratedthatinstitutions are morethansimply the buildingsthathavedoors,locks,fenced-inlawns,and localpolice.They are also nonempiricalinstitutionscomposed of language,concepts, and figures.
28. Gramsci, Quaderni, 1438, 1427. 29. Edward W. Said, Representations of the Intellectual (New York:Pantheon, 1994), 91.
In Responses Begins Responsibility: Music and Emotion
Lindsay Waters Koteks snarled, "is one word for it, yeah. What it really "Teamwork," is is a way to avoid responsibility.It'sa symptom of the gutlessness of the whole society." -Thomas Pynchon, The Cryingof Lot 49 He who would only recollect is a voluptuary,but he who wills repetition is a man. -Seren Kierkegaard, Repetition: An Essay in Experimental Psychology (Lowrietranslation)
1 One of the most pressing issues at the present moment in the field of criticismand aesthetics is the question of feeling. There was, untilvery Thisarticlewas firstdeliveredas a lectureat the Institutfordie Wissenschaftenvom Menschen, Vienna,28 July 1997. Thanksto my hosts KrzysztofMichalski,CorneliaKlinger, Jochen Fried,and NancyBlakestad.Myspecial thanksto PaulBove, HowardEiland,and MiguelTamen. @1998by DukeUniversity Press. boundary2 25:2, 1998.Copyright
96 boundary2 / Summer1998 recently,a "tabooon the sensual," as Adorno remarked.Adorno, himself an inconstant lover of the sensual in the arts, was given to saying things such as "theforce of pleasure" in aesthetic response "has an infantilequality."'If understandingand even encouraging a "New Robustness," as art historian Joseph Leo Koernercalls it, is on the agenda of a small but growing number of critics, there is still a fair amount of resistance to any such move by moralists of both conservative and progressive politicalorientationwho are convinced that wanton violence and pleasure in the arts begets wantonness in the beholders of the arts.2 For such people, art can be and ought to be uplifting.And so we find philosophers, such as Martha Nussbaum, devoting a great deal of attention to setting before us the ideas of Hellenistic philosophers, who hold that the rightphilosophy is all one needs to free oneself of harmfulemotions.3 That the emotions are involvedin our experiences in art is not a matter of doubt to the ordinaryperson who listens to rock or goes to a thriller or a gothic movie precisely in the hope of undergoing turbulence of a level that would cause the riderof a jet plane to panic. But at finer seminar and editorialtables, the emotions are still frequently unwanted guests, treated as if they were illegal immigrantstrying to take jobs away from the righteous, upstanding citizens of reason, the ideas. A great deal of the blame for this inhospitalitycould be leveled at our rulingconcepts of what Artwith a capital A is and ought to be. We still have not sufficientlyoutgrown "the concept of art, . . . a category which the nineteenth century, to a previously
unimaginable extent, but hardly more justificationat bottom, imposed on the creations of intellectualproductivity." 4Those who thinkof themselves as endowed with especially fine artistic consciences have hurled down, from the altar of art, curse upon curse on the emotions, like Prospero railingat Caliban, until the moment he comes to acknowledge Caliban and all he 1. TheodorW.Adorno,Aesthetic Theory,trans.and ed. RobertHullot-Kentor (Minneapolis: Universityof MinnesotaPress, 1997), 15, 14. 2. Foran explorationof the sorts of issues thatthe "NewRobustness"mighthave to contend with,see the catalog of the exhibitof HenryKoerner'spaintings,a show curatedby Joseph Leo Koerner,UnheimlicheHeimat(Vienna:OsterreichischeGalerie Belvedere, 1997). 3. See MarthaNussbaum, The Therapyof Desire: Theoryand Practice in Hellenistic Ethics(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1994), and especially her PoeticJustice: The LiteraryImaginationand PublicLife(Boston:Beacon, 1997), in whichshe promotes the idea of "rationalemotions." 4. WalterBenjamin,The Arcades Project,trans. HowardEilandand KevinMcLaughlin (Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress, forthcoming,1999), FolderF,sec. 3, pt. 1.
Waters/ InResponses BeginsResponsibility97 represents. Those dominating the arts scene have, to a too great extent, operated like Prospero before he takes his turn. Edward Said has never played the role of a lordly Prospero out of touch with the feelings of Caliban and locked in splendid and lonely isolation. If this is true-as I believe it is-it is due in no small part to the fact that Said, unlike some other great critics of the twentieth century, such as Georg Lukacs, has never made the aesthetic experience serve ideology. At a meeting of the Modern Language Association to discuss the merits of his then recent book Culture and Imperialismin Toronto in December 1994, Said was criticalof some of the words said in his praise by admirers who thought he was saying that politics trumps all other concerns. He said, "Ihave heard that there are some philosophers who think that the age of grand narrativessuch as the narrativeof liberationis over. I disagree. That narrativestill holds great power for me. But if that narrativedoes not have room for all the small narratives of liberation such as those I feel when reading a novel or listening to a work of music, then I want no part of it." One reviewerof Musical Elaborationssensed embarrassment in Said in the face of his own musical experiences, but I think this misreads Said.5 Said says that, of course, he realizes the dangers involvedfor someone (who is attacking the ways in which the arts have been made to appear autonomous from other social practices) to be emphasizing privacyand pleasure the way he does, most especially in chapter 3 of Musical Elaborations,a He says this because chapter entitled "Melody,Solitude, and Affirmation." both privacy and pleasure are "replete with the historical and ideological residue of that bourgeois individuationnow either discredited or fully under attack."6 Said defines the intellectualas a person who tells the truthto power. He takes this even further,into what is sometimes more touchy and difficult terrain, in insisting by his own actions that the job of the intellectual is to tell the truthto his followers and to himself. Ifthese aesthetic experiences that he has take a particularcourse, his job as philologist, first of all, is to try to understand them and to faithfullyrecord them. The account of a set of aesthetic experiences that Said gives us in chapter 3 has many virtues, 5. James Wood writes, "Acriticof leftish persuasion,one who believes that cultureis profoundlybound up withsociety . . . ,[Said] clearlyfinds music an affront.ForSaid's most genuine experiencesof musichave been privateand solitary,the imperialindividual at the piano"(The Guardian[Manchester,England],20 October1991,29). 6. EdwardW. Said, MusicalElaborations(New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress, 1991), 96. Subsequent referencesare cited parentheticallyin the text.
98 boundary2 / Summer1998 but they all flow from his willto account, withalmost total absorption, for the minute details of the experience. Because idealism and high modernism exiled feeling from arts talk for nearly two centuries, we do not have the words to talk about our experiences of art. In refusing to look down from the heavens of high theory on the sentient creature who undergoes a musical experience, I thinkSaid has done real theoretical work. Fortwo centuries, we have forthe most part valued the intellectual over the sensual, moralized the arts, devalued the role of the recipient of art in artistic judgment, and promoted the notion of the workof art as an organic whole whose workingscan be understood fully in terms of its internalorganization.The first line of Marcel Proust's Contre Sainte-Beuve reads: "Chaquejour j'attache moins de prix a I'intelligence." "Everyday I set less store on intellect."Proust's words form a line of light, a beacon to guide us home! "Thetruths of intellect are less precious than those secrets of feeling." Intellectand theory become names for what obstructs us from understanding the workings of art if we do not understand what Proust calls "this relative inferiorityof the intellect."7Note the word relative. It is not that we can do without theory or the intellect. It is foolish to suppose we must choose either theory or feeling, abstraction over community.Theory becomes the problem if we believe in a discursive solution for problems. As Miguel Tamen writes, "Being a critic for Said means primarilydescribing oneself in a position of empirical dissatisfaction without for that matter having to produce complete explanations of the causes or of the remedies for such dissatisfaction."8Theory and the intelligence still have their necessary roles to play.As Proust warns, "Ifintellect only ranks second in the hierarchyof virtues, intellectalone is able to proclaimthat the first place must be given to instinct."9 Said has refused the name of theorist.10Not for him the somber clothes of the literarytheorist, who might well be a Puritan divine rather 7. MarcelProust,ContreSainte-Beuve,in On Artand Literature,trans.SylviaTownsend Warner(New York:Carrolland Graf,1984; reprintof the 1957 Chattoand Windused.), 19-26. 8. MiguelTamen,personalcommunication,letterof 4 September1997. 9. Proust,ContreSainte-Beuve,26. 10. "Refused"may be too strong,but I thinknot. He is always waryof the title "theorist," Theory,as pursuedby many-even the best theorists,such as preferringthe title"critic." Lukacsand Foucault- has a predilectionforunitiesand totalitiesthat blindone to history. "Theoretical closure, likesocial conventionor culturaldogma, is anathemato criticalconsciousness" (EdwardW. Said, The World,the Text,and the Critic[Cambridge:Harvard UniversityPress, 1983],242).
Waters/ InResponses BeginsResponsibility99 than an enthusiast of the arts. Not for him what I might call art-theoryblack but a brighterplumage. WalterBenjaminwrites, "Grayis all theory; green, and not only green but also red, yellow, blue, is the golden tree of life. Inour predilection for the various shades of gray .
. .
running to black we find an
unmistakable social reflection of our tendency to privilege theory over all else in the formationof intellect."Always stylish, Said clearly pays attention to appearances. As Paul Valery has said, "Manis himself, is man, only at the surface."11 People who profess to pay no attention to appearances are not to be trusted. One risk Said takes in this thirdchapter is that of appearing to attend only to surfaces and thus seeming to be the voluptuaryKierkegaard speaks of. His book is so full of glitteringappearances by stars such as AlfredBrendel and Glenn Gould, and by colorfulfigures such as that captivating captive of Cairo,the exiled Polish Jew, Said's piano teacher when he lived in Egypt, Ignace Tiergerman,that one mighttake the essay as a grand display of cosmopolitan culture. This would be to cheat oneself of learning one of the many things that can be learned from Said, especially if one is interested, as I am, in the nature of the aesthetic experience and most especially in the experience of music. As Simon Frithargues in his recent PerformingRites, "The question underlyingthe last two hundred and fifty years' debate about music remains: What does a listener to music actually do?"12 This cunning essay of Said, an essay that evinces real humanist sprezzatura, says something very important.Its significance, I think, is hardly hinted at by its assured tone. There is no heavy breathing, but the "labor"he emphasizes in the title of the book in the word elaborations is all there. The exile of feeling is more significant, I believe, than the exile of evaluation that Barbara HerrnsteinSmith has analyzed in her Contingencies of Value.13Although they go hand in hand, feeling is even more basic than judgment, because it is or ought to be the basis of evaluation. "After Beethoven," writes Said, "music veered off from the social realm into the aesthetic almost completely" (12). Aesthetics, which (if the name of this area of inquiryis to be of any significance) ought to be about feelings, was 11.Benjamin,Arcades, FolderB, sec. 9, pt. 4; PaulValery,quoted by Benjamin,Arcades, FolderK,sec. 9, pt. 3. 12. Simon Frith,PerformingRites: On the Valueof PopularMusic(Cambridge:Harvard UniversityPress, 1996), 259. 13. BarbaraHerrnsteinSmith,Contingenciesof Value:AlternativePerspectivesforCritical Theory(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress, 1988).
100 boundary2 / Summer1998 hijackedabout the time the Jena Romantics dispersed to other places and other jobs. FriedrichSchlegel ended up workingfor one of the Kissingers of his day, Klemens, F rst von Metternich!These were the thinkerswho tried, I think,most seriously to develop the projectcontributedto by a host of thinkers in the eighteenth century to understand (the way people like KarlPhilipp Moritzand the group involved with the journal Gnothi sauton: oder, Magazin zur Erfahrungseelenkunde, published from 1783 to 1793, did)14 what it is that things can do to provoke responses withinhuman beings. How can a mere thing strike a mortalso strongly as music can do? My ulteriormotive here is to enlist Said in an effortto revive aesthetics after a hiatus for several centuries in the inquiryinto aesthetics, despite the efforts of people such as Benjamin,Theodor Adorno,and Paul de Man to resituate the field back on earth by shifting attention back to feelings. Interest in such matters among what some would call analytic philosophers has not been strong.15AlthoughSaid's chapter features much musical notation, professional musicological analysis is not what Said wants to offer nor what he provides, for the same reasons that in literarystudies he prefers the critic to the theorist. He means to give an exemplary reading not of music but of someone attending to music. That is the only score he wants to settle. He wants to attend to that experience as closely and finely as Glenn Gould does to a Bach score, note by note, avoiding legato, avoiding articulation.He wants to see musical experience in the light of all the other experiences or the relative paucity of experience at the present time. Music is too importantto us all to be left as the exclusive preserve of the musicologists. There is a role to play for what Said calls the "rankoutsider" (xvii),because "music'sautonomy fromthe social world has been taken for granted"for too long (xvi). As Said's much admired mentor, R. P. Blackmur, writes, "Criticism,I take it, is the formaldiscourse of an amateur."No more, no less. Such criticalpractice does blend intelligence with feeling in the way Proust desires and is truly theoretical. As Said comments, writing about Blackmur,"Ido not think it is wrong to call the form of this apprehension of intellect and experience fundamentallytheoretical."16 14. I owe this referenceto Jochen Fried.This groupwanted to understandwhat things outside us do to affect us. See Jochen Schulte-Sasse et al., eds., Theoryas Practice:A CriticalAnthologyof EarlyGermanRomanticWritings(Minneapolis:Universityof Minnesota Press, 1997). 15. Withthe exception of RichardMoran,"TheExpressionof Feeling in Imagination," PhilosophicalReview103 (1994):75-106. 16. R. P. Blackmur,