Education and Democracy in Senegal

Education and Democracy in Senegal

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Education and Democracy in Senegal Michelle T. Kuenzi

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EDUCATION AND DEMOCRACY IN SENEGAL

Copyright © Michelle T. Kuenzi, 2011. All rights reserved. First published in 2011 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN: 978–0–230–62233–3 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kuenzi, Michelle T., 1967– Education and Democracy in Senegal / Michelle T. Kuenzi. p. cm ISBN 978–0–230–62233–3 (hardback) 1. Political participation—Senegal. 2. Civil society—Senegal. 3. Democracy—Senegal. 4. Non-formal education—Senegal. 5. Democracy and education—Senegal. 6. Senegal—Politics and government—2000– I. Title. JQ3396.A91K84 2011 3239.04209663—dc22

2010045452

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: May 2011 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

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To my mother, whose great wisdom I have only now come fully to appreciate.

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Contents

List of Tables

ix

Acknowledgments

xi

1 Introduction and Theory

1

Modernization Theory, Education, and Democracy How Does Literacy Affect Citizenship? Education in Africa Education, Civil Society, and Democracy Purpose of the Book Hypotheses about the Effects of NFE on Political Attitudes and Behavior Looking Ahead 2 The Politics of Senegal

3

3 5 11 14 17 21 24 27

Background Senegalese Politics in Historical Perspective From “Semi-Democracy” to Democracy? The Senegalese Presidential Election of 2000 and Its Consequences Wade and the Post-Alternation Era Ethnicity and Religion Particularism, Neopatrimonialism, and Political Parties Prospects for the Future

37 40 45 48 51

Historical Overview of the Senegalese Educational System

55

The “Civilizing Mission” The Roots of Public Education in Senegal

56 58

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Contents

Assessing the Results of Colonial Education The Current Educational System in Senegal The Four NFE Programs of Study 4 Studying Political Behavior and Attitudes in Rural Senegal

60 64 66 73

Sample Design Conceptualization and Operationalization Qualitative Research Applicability to Other Contexts

73 75 79 79

5 NFE and Political Attitudes and Behavior

83

Civic Participation Social and Political Attitudes 6 Explaining Political Attitudes and Behavior Education and Civic Participation Education and Attitudes The Effects of NFE by Program Ruling out Rival Hypotheses 7 Implications and Conclusions Civic Participation Progressive and Democratic Attitudes Policy Implications Conclusion

84 91 101 101 110 118 123 131 131 133 134 138

Appendix A: Supplemental Information on the Survey Methodology

141

Appendix B: Question Wording and Operationalization

149

Notes

157

References

167

Index

181

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Tables

2.1 Ethnic composition of the population 5.1 Summary of findings regarding the relationship between having NFE and exhibiting certain civic behaviors and attitudes 5.2 Crosstabulation of number of community organizations in which one has membership and NFE 6.1 Determinants of different types of civic participation 6.2 The effects of NFE on the likelihood of high community participation for rural Senegalese citizens 6.3 Determinants of political and social attitudes 6.4 The effects of NFE on the likelihood of having non-authoritarian/progressive orientation in politics for rural Senegalese citizens 6.5 The effects of NFE on the likelihood of being highly supportive of democratic values for rural Senegalese citizens 6.6 NFE programs and civic participation 6.7 NFE programs and democratic attitudes 6.8 Crosstabulation of highest level of community participation and level of NFE 6.9 Crosstabulation of electoral participation and level of NFE 6.10 Crosstabulation of highest score on the authoritarianism/ progressiveness index and level of NFE 6.11 Crosstabulation of highest level of support for democratic values and level of NFE A.1 Number of villages by region and program A.2 Number of respondents by region and program

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85 89 103 106 111

113 115 119 121 124 125 128 129 142 143

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Acknowledgments

I

have many people to thank for contributing to the successful completion of this book. I would like to thank John Tuman, David Damore, and Fred Monardi for providing feedback on parts of this book. Kenneth Fernandez answered sundry questions on a number of topics. I am grateful to Tiffiany Howard and the other members of the “Book Club,” David Fott, Mark Lutz, and Rebecca Wood, for helping to keep me on task. Iain McGaw was a good proofreader. I appreciated Gina Lambright Somodevilla’s encouraging texts and e-mails. My graduate research assistants, Brendan Morris and Birame Ndao, were always of help. I am grateful to the professors with whom I worked at Michigan State University for supporting my research efforts. Mike Bratton provided me with critical advice on my survey effort in Senegal as well as insightful feedback on earlier versions of this work. Brian Silver has kindly entertained innumerable questions from me over the years. Nicolas van de Walle provided me with helpful suggestions, information, and assistance when I conducted fieldwork in Senegal. Mark Jones provided me with excellent suggestions with regard to the methods I employed in this study. I am indebted to many people in Senegal for their generous help and cannot begin to name them all here. I wish to acknowledge the members of ARED for all of the support they have given me in my study of NFE. I am very grateful to Sonja Fagerberg Diallo for providing me with many opportunities to do research on NFE and showing me generous hospitality. Sonja was an inspiration for much of my research on NFE. Although she is no longer with us, her tremendous legacy in Pulaar literacy and literature lives on. Mamadou Ly has facilitated my research efforts and been a kind and unwavering friend. Awa Ka, Kebe, Sow, Diol, Njora,

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Nancy, and the other members of the team have always been kind and helpful. Mamadou Ndiaye has always been willing to lend a hand when I have needed help. Aminata Sy is a great Pulaar instructor and friend. Numerous members of the PDS leadership facilitated my study of the 2000 presidential election. I am grateful to Kader Sow, Mbaye Ndiaye, and several other members of the PDS in this regard. His Excellency President Wade allowed me to follow the Marche Bleu and granted me a couple of interviews. I am very grateful to many other political leaders, such as Abdoulaye Bathily and Landing Savané, for graciously allowing me to interview them. My first experience with NFE was in Medina Cherif. I wish to thank the honorable El Hadji Kiekoto Baldé for all of his kindness. Abdoulaye Baldé was a perfect host, and, his wives, Kutuyal Mballo and Juldé Baldé, rendered my experience a wonderful one. I wish to acknowledge the kindness of all of my friends in Medina Cherif although I can only name but a few here: Juhé Baldé, Daouda Baldé, Kajjatu Baldé, and Aissatou Baldé. I wish to acknowledge the Fulbright IIE Program, Social Science Research Council and the Senegal USAID mission for their support of my research. The NFE/Civic Participation Survey was made possible through funding from USAID. I would like to thank the many people who contributed to the successful completion of the survey. Boubacar Tall did an exceptional job acting as project coordinator for the survey effort. It is hard to imagine how the survey could have been administered without all of his efforts. The interviews were conducted by eight enumerators: Saidou Norou Sall, Hamet Ly, Rougiatou Dia, Penda Sy, Cheikh Seck, Cheikh Aidara, Fatou Diop, and Saliou Ciss. Saidou Norou Sall’s diligent and careful work during the project was much appreciated. Alhousseynou Sy meticulously entered the data from the questionnaires. Sidy Cissokho, Alioune Ndiaye, Marie-Claire Sow, and Roger Yochelson at USAID were very helpful and supportive throughout the research effort, as was the entire USAID team. Thanks are due to the leadership of PIP and all the members of PIP who facilitated the survey work, especially Ismaila Diawo and Moussa Niang. I thank Thierrno Ba for making our research in PIP villages possible. The leadership of Tostan was most supportive of our efforts. Molly Melching is due special thanks for having faith in my abilities and incorporating me into “the team” when I first went to Senegal as an inexperienced but enthusiastic Watson Fellow and volunteer 21 years ago. Meissa

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Diegne served as a much needed resource person for the research team while we worked in Thies, and Abdoulaye Thiam generously made his assistance available. Saidou Balde of Tostan assisted us during part of our work in St. Louis. Those at DAEB were very helpful and forthcoming with information. The members of PAPA have always graciously provided assistance and information upon my visits to this organization. I wish to especially thank Mr. Monteiro, Abdoulaye Conte, and Mr. Diagne. My thanks to the leadership of PAPF for allowing our research to be conducted and to the PAPF teachers who facilitated our research in the villages of study. The members of CIED, especially Bocar Sy, were helpful throughout the project. The people in the villages included in our study made conducting this research not only possible but also a pleasure. It is impossible for me to express sufficient gratitude to the innumerable people in all of the villages of study who freely and generously offered their assistance to the research team. I do take this opportunity, however, to offer my heartfelt thanks to them. Earlier versions of some of this work have appeared in three articles: “Nonformal Education, Political Participation, and Democracy: Findings from Senegal.” Political Behavior 2006 28(1): 1–31; “Nonformal Education and Community Development in Senegal.” Community Development Journal 2006 41(2): 210–222b; “The Role of Nonformal Education in Promoting Democratic Attitudes: Evidence from Senegal.” Democratization 2005 12(2): 1–21. I thank the publishers for allowing me to use this copyrighted material I also wish to thank my family for always supporting me. My father demonstrated the virtues of hard work, honesty, and integrity. My mother is due very special thanks for the constant and complete support she has given me throughout my academic career and life in general. She demonstrated the virtues of tolerance and compassion. Although she was never able to travel there, Senegal found a special place in her heart. This book is dedicated to her.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction and Theory

T

he breadth of the “third wave” of democratization far surpassed the expectations of political scientists. The vast majority of subSaharan African countries experienced some type of political transition in the 1990s. Following the end of the exuberant decade of Africa’s “democratic” transitions, the 1990s, scholarly attention turned to the consolidation of democracy in Africa. Given the frequent democratic reversals that have beset the countries of some regions of the world and the seemingly inauspicious conditions for democracy that existed in many African countries, an obvious question was whether these democratic regimes would survive. Once the survival of most of the regimes produced by the transitions seemed likely, political observers began puzzling over the true nature of these regimes as well as their likely trajectories (see van de Walle 2002; Herbst 2001). “Illiberal democracy” (Zakaria 1997), “electoral autocracy” (van de Walle 2002) and “hegemonic electoral authoritarian” (Diamond 2002) are some of the terms that have been applied to various “hybrid regimes” (see Diamond 2002) in Africa. The state of democracy in Africa today appears much better than the early prognosis. Around 19 African countries are now considered electoral democracies, and Freedom House 2010 rates nine African countries as “free.”1 Nonetheless, evaluations of democratic progress in Africa vary. For example, Bratton (2008) observes that electoral campaigns in Africa largely come down to mass mobilization and electoral manipulation (221). Bratton also notes that corrupt elections will tend to have the

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effect of selecting the least civic-minded of individuals as the political representatives. In contrast, Lindberg (2006) argues that recurring elections, even when not free and fair, have advanced democracy in Africa (139). Similarly, Posner and Young (2007) offer a somewhat optimistic assessment of constitutionalism in Africa and note that the “formal rules of the game” have gained importance and shape the behavior of political elites in ways hitherto unseen in Africa. Although scholars may debate the implications of the democratic transitions and subsequent elections in Africa, most would agree that there is still much room for democratic development. Echoing some of the tenets of cultural theorists, scholars, such as Bratton and van de Walle (1997) and Diamond (1999), point out that the practices and attitudes of a country’s citizens are a critical aspect of the consolidation of democracy.2 Indeed, Diamond contends that the consolidation of democracy comprises “a shift in political culture” (65).3 What factors help produce a democratic political culture? Can democratic attitudes and behavior be promoted in the emerging democracies of sub-Saharan Africa? The focus of this book is on the role nonformal education (NFE) plays in the context of the African country of Senegal in fostering the types of attitudes and behaviors among citizens that are critical for the consolidation of democracy. In this study, NFE refers to the programs intended to impart basic literacy and numeracy skills on participants, usually adults who have been left out of formal educational systems, or dropouts from formal schools. Education has long been seen as one of the key factors that drives democracy. The modernization theorists pointed to the ways in which formal education promoted behavior and attitudinal change at the level of the individual, and many studies have linked formal education to political participation or democratic attitudes (e.g., see Lerner 1958; Lipset 1959; Inkeles 1983). On the other hand, little attention has been paid to the relationship between nonformal education (NFE) and democracy. Given the prominence that NFE has gained in countries with non-performing formal educational systems, such as those in Africa, this inattention is unfortunate. What is the impact of NFE on political participation and attitudes? How does NFE affect the civic4 behavior of women, who often constitute the target population of NFE programs? Do more “authentic” forms of education, such as NFE, affect political participation and attitudes differently than does formal education? Do NFE programs reinforce

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traditional norms and increase the insularity of the villages in which they are found? Using data from a survey involving a probability sample of 1,484 Senegalese citizens, this book examines the relationship between education and political participation and attitudes in rural Senegal. Although the principal focus of this book is on NFE, within the purview of the study are three types of education: NFE, formal education, and Koranic education. The results indicate that NFE and formal education tend to have similar effects on several political behaviors, but the effect of NFE generally appears to be stronger. NFE has a positive impact on political participation. NFE increases the likelihood that one will vote and contact officials regarding community and personal problems. In addition, NFE has a strong, positive impact on community participation. Both NFE and formal education increase the likelihood that people will embrace democratic, tolerant attitudes in Senegal. In contrast, Koranic education has little influence on political behaviors and no influence on political and social attitudes. Modernization Theory, Education, and Democracy A certain level of education among the population of a country has been considered a requisite for democracy. As Hadenius observes, for the modernization theorists, consciousness and openness, emanating not only from literacy, but also from exposure to mass media, along with other positive aspects of modernization, such as industrialization and urbanization, would pave the way for the formation of democratic regimes (1992, 78–9). Lerner’s The Passing of Traditional Society (1958) is an excellent exemplar of the modernization school of thought. Lerner describes the process by which traditional societies are transformed into modern democratic states and focuses on the Middle East, in particular. He explicates how literacy is linked to active political participation. Literacy increases one’s participation in every form of mass communication, and opens up the possibility of vicarious experience through the printed media, allowing one to experience different worlds. It is the interaction between the variables of literacy and mass media that lead to political participation in the form of voting. Consumption of mass media not only increases the spread of “empathy,” but also heightens demands that one expresses through participant institutions, such as voting. Lerner concludes, “Thus literacy becomes the sociological pivot in the activation of

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psychic mobility, the publicly shared skill which binds modern man’s varied daily round into a consistent participant lifestyle” (1958, 64). In his study, which involved data from 54 countries, Lerner finds that the correlations of literacy with urbanism, voting, and media were .64, .80, and .82, respectively (1958, 58). As Lerner notes, other studies had already established a link between literacy and economic development. Lipset (1959) clearly explicates how the levels of economic development and education help determine whether democracy will emerge and take root in a particular country. Although the tenets associated with modernization theory were thoroughly excoriated for their Eurocentric and teleological assumptions, they have been largely revalidated in recent years. Diamond (1992) reassesses Lipset’s thesis that democracy and economic development are related. He finds a significant relationship between regime type and level of development, especially when the Human Development Index (HDI)5 is used to measure development instead of gross national product (GNP) (Diamond, 1992, 458). Diamond notes the consistent manner in which Lipset’s thesis has stood the test of time. Numerous studies have generated the same finding, that there is a strong positive relationship between economic development and democracy. In his words: Given the considerable variation in quantitative methods, in countries and years tested, in measures of democracy employed, and the vast array of different regression equations (testing more than 20 different independent variables), this must rank as one of the most powerful and robust relationships in the study of comparative national development. (468) Hadenius (1992) has also reconsidered the tenets of the modernization theory and attempted to test the relationship between 17 of the variables associated with modernization, including exposure to the media, level of education, and literacy. Employing an index of democracy based on the dimensions of elections and political liberties, Hadenius regresses these indicators against degree of democracy for 132 of the world’s third-world countries. He finds that the literacy rate is the most definitive of the indicators of democracy (although, as he continues his analyses, the effects of literacy wash out a bit) (Hadenius, 1992).

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Other, more recent studies also offer support for modernization theory. Based on data for 43 countries, Inglehart (1997) finds support for the modernization thesis that level of economic development and democracy are integrally linked and positively correlated. Vanhanen (1997) also finds that modernization6 and democracy are positively linked. While both of these studies have been attacked on methodological grounds, they do offer support for the modernization thesis. Przeworski and his co-authors have perhaps mounted the greatest challenges to modernization theory. Przeworski and Limongi (1997) attempt to clarify the relationship between democracy and economic development, arguing that democracy can emerge at any stage of economic development but is simply much more likely to take root in richer countries. They find empirical support for this argument. Similarly, based on their analyses of an extensive data set that covers 141 countries between the years 1950 and 1990, Przeworski and others (2000) also find that economic development does not increase the likelihood of transitions to democracy but has a strong stabilizing effect on democratic regimes. However, Coppedge (2003) observes in his review of this work that “. . . their own best analysis . . . finds that lagged per capita income has a very significant (t ratio = 3.953, p = .00008), positive impact on the transition to democracy” (124). Perhaps more significantly, Epstein and others (2006) reexamine the modernization thesis and the findings of Przeworski and others using longitudinal data for 169 countries for the period from 1960 to 2000. After their rigorous analysis of the data, Epstein and others (2006) conclude that “Contrary to Przeworski et al. (2000) we find that the modernization hypothesis stands up well” (551). How Does Literacy Affect Citizenship?7 From the “autonomous” theoretical perspective,8 the very process of becoming literate engenders certain changes in psychological and cognitive processes that have implications for how people perceive themselves and others. Oxenham (1980) offers many reasons for why literacy makes people better citizens than they would otherwise be. According to Oxenham, people’s sense of personal efficacy is increased as they gain confidence and a sense of control over their lives. Such is the case because they are able to do more for themselves than they were prior to attaining literacy skills. They begin to think more for themselves and

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not just accept things on authority. To this extent, they seem have more of a tendency to become involved in voluntary associations and politics.9 Moreover, they become less parochial and less intolerant of others as they are able to have vicarious experience through reading material (1980, 51). These ideas are consistent with those of the modernization theory. As Benavot (1996) notes, “Thus, modernization theories suggest that the aggregate effects of mass education expansion on democracy are largely via education’s socializing influences on individuals” (384). Education and Political Participation In several U.S. studies, education has been shown to increase political participation (e.g., Teixeira 1987; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Milligan, Moretti, and Oreopoulos (2004) find that education has a strong, positive effect on voting in the United States but not in the United Kingdom. They find, however, that, in both countries, education has a positive effect on political interest and engagement (1667). Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) point out that formal education actually encapsulates many attributes and processes. Formal education enhances cognitive skills that allow an individual to understand and learn about politics. Reading is an obvious example. Formal education also increases one’s ability to handle complex and abstract material. In addition, education increases the skills an individual needs to manage the logistical demands surrounding political participation. Moreover, American schools incorporate messages related to citizenship into the curriculum, and thus, education might help instill feelings of civic duty. Further, because the better educated tend to be more skilled at grappling with political information and issues, they often obtain more psychological gratification from voting than those who are not as well educated. Years of formal schooling also tends to capture family background. Those with high levels of education often have relatively more prosperous, well-educated, politically aware parents than those with low levels of education (18–20). Similarly, Brady, Verba, and Schlozman (1995) describe the “direct and indirect” effects of education on political participation. Within the school, students acquire communication and organizational skills, as well as, perhaps, an interest in politics. They might also assimilate civic values in this setting. Education also indirectly affects political

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participation in numerous ways. Among all variables, level of education has the strongest influence on the type of occupation one will have. One’s job largely determines the type of civic skills one will use and hone, as well the type of social networks to which one will be exposed. In short, “. . . educational attainment thus has an indirect impact on the acquisition of several crucial political resources” (420). Moreover, they point out that education also has a positive affect on involvement in organizations, which, in turn, affects civic skills. La Due Lake and Huckfeldt (1998) observe that the production of human capital and the production of social capital10 are often correlated. Those with high levels of education are likely to find themselves in milieus where they have the opportunity to be included in the type of social networks in which “politically relevant social capital” abounds. In short, very similar to the processes described by Brady, Verba, and Schlozman (1995), education has a positive relationship with social capital, which, in turn, increases political participation. Numerous factors render the effects of both formal education and NFE uncertain. While studies have consistently found relationships between years of formal education and political participation and democratic attitudes, the strongest effects often appear to manifest themselves at the highest educational levels. For example, Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) report that only 38 percent of the respondents in their study with fewer than five years of formal education voted, compared to 69 percent of those who had only completed high school, 86 percent of those who completed college, and 91 percent of those who completed at least one year of graduate school (17–18). Education and Political Attitudes At the level of the individual, myriad studies have linked education to democratic behavior and attitudes. Education has been shown to have a significant influence on civic culture (Almond and Verba 1965). Although the time frame required to develop a civic culture is, according to Almond and Verba, a long one, they duly note that many of the “new nations” do not have this kind of time to dedicate to the development of a civic culture. In such a case, Almond and Verba see education as the best substitute for time. Indeed, according to their data, education is the most important determinant of political attitudes (370).

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After controlling for such characteristics as income, status of occupation, and gender, among others, Almond and Verba (1965) still find that educational groups differ in each of the five nations studied on nine dimensions of political orientation. These dimensions include level of political knowledge, subjective feelings of political competence, frequency of engaging in political discussion, level of interpersonal trust and trust in the social environment (316–318). Interestingly, Almond and Verba (1965) find that differences among lower educational groups on the nine relationships are much more substantial than differences among higher educational groups. They conclude, “That higher education tends to reduce national differences suggests that the nature of political culture is greatly determined by the distribution of education” (320). This finding would tend to support Lerner’s contention that education is associated with some type of “universal transformatory effect.” In trying to explain the impact of education, Almond and Verba note that education has numerous effects. They point out that students actually do learn in school, be it about the political system, democratic norms, etc. In addition, at school, individuals have an opportunity to interact with others of the same educational level, which tends to reinforce political lessons (316). Indeed, the fact that differences among educational groups decreases as level of education increases would seem to indicate that education is a strong socializing force that tends to blot out the effects of national cultures. Many early studies also established a link between education and democratic attitudes. Stouffer (1955) found that education had a positive impact on the willingness to tolerate nonconformists. Williams, Nunn, and St. Peter (1976) had the same findings when they reanalyzed Stouffer’s 1954 U.S. data set and when they replicated his study using data collected in a 1974 nationwide survey (n = 3546). Muller, Seligson, and Turan (1987) found that, although the effects of political participation on support for democratic norms varied across contexts, the effect of education on support for democratic norms was positive in the United States (New York), Costa Rica (San Jose), and Turkey. More recently, Gibson and others (1992) attempt to assess the extent to which the “cultural requisites to democracy” existed in the former USSR by looking at levels of “support for core democratic rights, liberties, and institutions” (329). Based on survey data of 504 Moscow Oblast citizens, they find, “The best predictors of attitudes toward general democratic

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values are education, gender, and age. The better educated, males, and the young tended to be more supportive of democratic institutions and processes” (329). However, among the explanatory variables just mentioned they find that “the strongest predictor of democratic attitudes is level of education . . .” (359). Similarly, based on their public opinion survey of seven republics of the former Soviet Union, Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992) find that the more educated, men, and the young are most likely to support political change. Karpov (1999) finds that education predicts tolerance in Poland in much the same way that it does in America (1525). However, the relationship between education and democracy is more complex than the above would imply. Indeed, the effects of education on democratic processes are not straightforward and unidirectional. Several studies find the effects of education on democratic attitudes to be more variable than those just described and point to the role context plays in determining the effects of education. Based on the results of a nation-wide study (n = 1,507), Phelan and others (1995) find that education has a positive effect on tolerance for the homeless, but a negative effect on support for aiding the homeless economically. They conclude that the results support the socialization model in that “education socializes students to the ‘official culture,’ which in the United States includes values of equal opportunity and respect—but not equal outcomes” (126). Using data from the United States, France, Germany, and Austria, Weil (1985) looks at the effects of education on anti-Semitism and finds that the effect of education on liberal attitudes varies across countries, supporting the idea that “socialization” is what drives the effects of education. Even more startling findings have been reported based on survey data from Africa. In his study on the support for democracy in South Africa, based on a national survey of more than 3,000 South Africans, Gibson (2003) finds that education is not associated with democratic attitudes among “Africans, ‘Coloureds,’ and those of Asian origin” (772). Others report similar findings, based on public opinion surveys in Southern Africa. While most U.S. studies support the notion that education promotes political tolerance and democratic political values (e.g., see Prothro and Grigg 1960; McClosky 1964; Lawrence 1976; Dee 2004), in their study of political culture in Zambia, Bratton and Liatto-Katunda (1994) find that, on average, respondents with higher levels of education tended to

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be “less attached to political equality” than their less well-educated counterparts. Bratton and others (1999) had similar findings in their study of Ghana.11 People may indeed become more tolerant of those from the outside because of the vicarious experiences made possible through reading, as Oxenham suggests (1980, 51). However, Street notes that in the current international political and social climate, non-literate people are being denigrated partly as the result of the extreme rhetoric employed in zealous literacy campaigns (1995). It seems that such rhetoric might only heighten the intolerance of those who have achieved some education toward those who have not. Finally, much like with political participation, although studies have found relationships between years of formal education and democratic attitudes with relative consistency, the strongest effects often appear to manifest themselves at the highest educational levels. With reference to support for the new democratic regimes in post-communist countries, Rose and others (1998) find that it is only between those who have university degrees and those that do not that one sees a difference between educational groups. Their study is based on the data emanating from the New Democracies Barometer 1993–1994 survey implemented by the Paul Lazarfeld Society (n = 9,087). With reference to support for nondemocratic alternatives, they find that: “Among university graduates, 70 percent reject all undemocratic alternatives; the proportion falls to half among those with academic and secondary qualifications and to less than two-fifths among those with no academic qualifications” (132). Benavot (1996) observes, “. . . while modernization theories generally emphasize the impact of mass education, institutional theories stress the political impact of elite education to a greater degree since the universitytrained elites are directly involved in creating and running political institutions and in guaranteeing basic political liberties and civil rights” (386). The results of Benavot’s own longitudinal study on the relationship between education and democracy involving between 107 and 148 countries support the institutional theories. Indeed, Benavot (1996) finds that the effects of mass education on democracy are “negligible, perhaps even negative,” while those of higher education are relatively strong and positive in the period from 1980 to 1988 (400). In contrast, based on 1999 Afrobarometer survey data for Malawi, Evans and Rose (2007) find that primary schooling alone fosters support for democracy and rejection of nondemocratic forms of rule (904).

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In fact, they find that those with primary education do not differ from those with secondary education, in terms of their support for democracy (907). They observe, “this on its own suggests that primary schooling is sufficient to promote endorsement of democracy government” (907). This finding is surprising, given that the authors note the authoritarian teaching styles prevalent in Malawi schools. The results of this study therefore support both modernization theory and the autonomous model of literacy. Education in Africa Many of the processes and attributes that underlie the relationship between education and political participation, however, do not exist in some African countries. In the case of countries like Senegal, formal educational systems have their roots in colonial times, and the language of learning is not the maternal language of the learners. Many argue that, in these types of situations, learning in a second language obstructs the cognitive development of children (e.g., Vandewiele 1983; Magnus 1984; Awoniyi 1976). Magnus (1984) also observes that formal education creates a schism between the schooled and unschooled, and particularly between children and their unschooled parents. Sabatier notes that West African villagers tended to be indifferent or antagonistic toward Western education or those associated with it through the mid-1940s (1977, 7). In fact, during the colonial period, according to Boahen (1987, 67), one of the ways rural Africans resisted colonialism was by shunning colonial “innovations” such as formal schools. The school experience appears to be an especially stressful one for most students largely because of the aforementioned discontinuity. A 1981 study conducted by Vandewiele finds that “school fears” were much more important among students in Senegal than among students in the United States and France (1981, 281).12 In the context of rural Senegal, where only a minority of adults have any formal schooling and where those that do have, on average, six or fewer years, one must question whether formal education would generate the skills, political interest, and social capital needed to stimulate political activity. It is worth noting that years of formal education do not serve as a proxy for socio-economic class in contexts like that of rural Senegal.13 Indeed, there is no relationship between years of formal education and income in this sample.

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NFE (Nonformal Education) The inability of formal education to reach the educational needs of the majority of the population of many developing countries has led to the emergence of NFE programs. NFE is probably most closely associated with the Brazilian educational thinker Paulo Friere, who saw “dialogue” and the emergence of consciousness as being critical elements of an educational experience that would empower the oppressed. Nonformal education or adult education programs are spread across the globe, and exist in significant numbers in the developing and developed world, alike. Because of the need to address low literacy rates in developing countries, NFE has gained a certain salience in such countries, and NFE programs are found in the majority of sub-Saharan African countries. Nonformal education has also been a prominent force in Latin America since the 1970s (Kane 2001). Moreover, NFE has also become a presence in Asia (e.g., see Subasi and Kehrberg 1998). The literature on NFE in Latin America emphasizes the effect of NFE on community participation. Much like the effects reported in Senegal, those writing on NFE in Latin America point to increased selfesteem as one of the effects of NFE, especially on women. As Fink notes with regard to NFE in Latin America, “Nonformal and popular education programs often become a key meeting place for women, offering a support group and a sense of community” (1992, 177). At the group level, Fink also finds that “a sense of community and common purpose is forged” through these educational programs (189). Indeed, she finds that popular education provides “the building blocks for continued organizing and networking on community and regional levels by helping women develop leadership skills and play a greater role in grassroots organizations” (189). Van der Westen observes that, with regard to the literacy education programs following the welfare approach, “Social participation and integration in community activities is promoted in order to improve the welfare of the family and the community and for the women to acquire more self esteem as mother, wife and citizen” (1994, 267). Christian base communities14 (CEBs) in Latin America have also been influenced by the philosophy of Paulo Freire, and many of the effects attributed to NFE are also attributed to CEBs. According to Hewitt, “CEBS have typically been described as parish-based, informal Catholic

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lay groups, consisting of anywhere from 20 to 100 participants” (2000, 3). CEBs may gather in churches, homes, or community centers. The meaning of different scriptures and the social and political conditions encountered by CEB members might be discussed at such gatherings (Cavendish 1994, 180). CEBs are thought to have helped promote the democratization process in Latin American countries such as Chile and Brazil (see, for example, Cavendish 1994; Mainwaring and Viola 1984; Hewitt 2000). Hewitt’s “study shows that through their various activities, the CEBs over time have offered women opportunities for empowerment within the context of their own groups” (2000, 1). CEBs are said to nurture civic and leadership skills, self-confidence, political participation, and democratic attitudes among members. CEBs have also been reported to increase cooperation within communities. Hewitt (1990) also finds that CEBs promote an appreciation for the public good (cited in Cavendish 1994). NFE in Africa Nonformal education is often considered a more culturally relevant form of education than formal education in Africa, since it is usually conducted in African languages and is informed by the culture and exigencies of the learners. Given the reality that large proportions of the populations of many African countries have failed to master the “official” language (the former colonial language), many of those involved in the educational arena contend that most people can be reached only through “mother tongue language programs” (e.g., see Bamgbose 1976; Akoha 2001). These NFE classes are usually held in the target village itself, and often the “facilitator” (as opposed to teacher) is from the village. Participatory methods are emphasized, and many times these programs are associated with the goal of empowering the target population. Nonformal education is thought to increase feelings of efficacy among participants and, therefore, to inspire their active participation in civil and political life. There is some empirical support for these notions. For example, a pilot study (n = 333) of Pulaar speakers in northern Senegal found that those who had had NFE were more likely to engage in behaviors related to community participation and personal empowerment than those without NFE (Kuenzi 1997). Nonetheless, the effects of NFE have not been established firmly.15

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Some NFE skeptics fear that NFE may actually reinforce the parochialism of villages, rendering them further removed from national political institutions or political representatives. Others note that many of the village facilitators are poorly trained and equipped and, therefore, tend to replicate the authoritarian teaching style of teachers in formal schools. As many have pointed out, the level of reading and writing skills attained through these programs is usually quite shallow. Thus, the NFE experience may fail to produce the feelings of efficacy and self-esteem as well as the civic skills thought to inspire community and political participation. In addition, many of those who complete an NFE program find themselves in a nonliterate environment where their newfound capacities are in no way reinforced. Oxenham notes, It seems to be the case also that many adults who complete literacy courses do not make much use of their laboriously acquired skills either because reading matter is not easily available or because the occasions for writing are infrequent. Relapses into illiteracy are apparently not uncommon. (1980, 43) Between the dearth of reading materials in African languages and shallow literacy skills produced by NFE, neophytes are not likely to have the vicarious experiences that broaden their vision. Many of those spearheading the Pulaar literacy movement are committed Muslims who are conservative on social issues. This conservative outlook is somewhat in conflict with many of the ideas and models on which NFE is based. Traditional messages are often passed to students in NFE situations.16 In addition, according to the socialization “postulate” of the political culture perspective, those experiences one has in childhood serve as a filter for later experiences (Eckstein 1988). Much of the socialization literature posits that there will be significant continuity in political behaviors and attitudes throughout an individual’s lifetime. Based on socialization theory, we would therefore not expect NFE to have a significant effect on political behaviors and attitudes, since the NFE experience takes place in adulthood. Education, Civil Society, and Democracy One important consideration is the link between education, civil society, and democracy. Increasingly, political scientists are giving serious

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attention to examining the development and maintenance of the social capital within states and communities. Indeed, a lively debate has emerged concerning the role played by various factors in what Francis Fukuyama (1995) refers to as “spontaneous sociability” and Robert Putnam calls “social capital.” In his seminal work on governance in northern and southern Italy, Putnam claims that social capital is “the key to making democracy work” (1993, 185). Putnam defines social capital as “ . . . features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions . . . ” (167). Coleman (1990) observes that social capital allows goals to be achieved that could not otherwise be achieved. Putnam notes that in small, highly personalized communities, the threat of expulsion from the socio-economic system is a powerful threat that induces economic cooperation among people (1993, 168). Social trust must exist in order for cooperation to occur. According to Putnam, social trust is generated via norms of reciprocity and civic engagement. Social capital is fostered primarily in civil society.17 In fact, participation in civil society should mediate and intensify other educational effects. Brady and others (1995) find that education increases ones involvement in voluntary organizations and activities, which increases one’s civic skills, which in turn increases one’s level of political participation. In the long run, participation in the community is theorized to increase interpersonal trust and support for democratic values. However, Goody and Watt note that differentiating people on the basis of the degree to which they have mastered reading and writing skills becomes an important means of social stratification with the introduction of literacy (1968, 58). Borrowing an expression from Durkheim, Goody and Watt note that oral cultures manifest “mechanical solidarity,” but literacy tends to produce individualization (1968, 62). Oxenham (1980) and Ong (1991) have claimed that simply being able to read and write renders one more self-conscious and introspective. Coleman contends that the stability of a social structure is a critical variable in the creation and destruction of social capital. In his words, “Disruptions of social organization or of social relations can be highly destructive to social capital” (1990, 320). In Street’s scathing critique of the literacy imperative,18 he points out that those associated with the literacy movement have created “. . . the construction of a ‘stigma’ where [previously] many people operated in the oral domain without feeling that it was

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a problem” (1995, 14). In the African context, where competition for scarce resources is fierce and often zero-sum in nature, perhaps obtaining literacy skills through nonformal education programs can be seen as one way in which people maximize their advantage relative to others. Street claims that literacy (i.e., NFE) programs do not create jobs and thus they may actually lead to a situation in which those who have gained literacy skills through NFE simply “leap frog” over those who have not (18). Although scholars have emphasized the positive nature of civil society, some students of Africa tend to be skeptical of the positive characteristics associated with civil society. Deth and Zmerli (2010) observe that the negative effects of social capital do not receive much attention. Even the social capital enthusiasts, however, acknowledge the “dark side” of social capital (e.g., see Putnam 2000; Fukuyama 1999, 2002), and they, among many others, note that high levels of social capital can be found in uncivil groups. In the case of Africa, Woods notes that ascriptive associations often compete with civic organizations. Ethnic based associations, he contends, are likely to persist in Africa. While such organizations drive solidarity and collective action, in many cases they also enhance the threat of ethnic violence (Woods 1992, 94). In the words of Woods (1992): In many African countries, it is ascriptive, vertically organized associations which have so far played an important role in shaping the character of civil society. Social organizations in Africa are still conditioned by clientelistic interactions. They are limited in geographic scope; therefore, these groups can best be understood as subnational or local in nature. (94) Fatton (1995)strongly cautions against seeing civil society in solely positive terms and comments on its often regressive nature in Africa. Fatton’s concerns are relevant to the case of Senegal. Based on her observations of rural Senegalese organizations, Patterson (1998) argues that participation in civil society does not engender democratic values because “legitimate, inclusive and accountable” modes of decision-making are not employed (423). MacLean (2004) reports somewhat counterintuitive findings based on her study of civil society associations in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. She finds that the multiethnic cocoa producer and mutual assistance associations tended to strengthen “vertical patronage networks based on

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narrower ethnic identities” (589). On the other hand, ethnically homogenous church associations in Ghana foster “the development of democratic values and practices at the local level that mediate the potential for ethnic conflict and support for the consolidation of a democratic regime” (589). Thus, predicting the effects of civil society participation on democracy does not seem straightforward. In the case of Africa, many scholars recognize the important role that civil society has played in the process of democratic transitions and could play in the democratic consolidation processes (e.g., Gyimah-Boadi 1996; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Mw Makumbe 1998). Bratton and van de Walle (1997) note that organizational strength and resource base are determining factors in the amount of influence an association will have. If education boosts involvement in voluntary organizations as many claim, civil society could be one of the vehicles through which education facilitates the consolidation of democracy. On the other hand, if education serves to accentuate hierarchy and social cleavage, it could lead to associations which fail to nurture the norms of reciprocity Putnam deems so critical to a healthy democracy. Purpose of the Book The primary purpose of this book is to examine the effects of NFE on political attitudes and behavior in Senegal. Including formal education and Koranic education in this study allows for some useful comparisons to be made across educational types in Chapter 6, which presents the results of the multivariate analysis. NFE has, in some ways, served as a compensatory measure taken to help improve the situation of those who have been left out of the formal educational system, especially women. There has been a great deal of debate over whether the effects of NFE are in any way similar to those of formal education. Assessing whether NFE affects political behaviors and attitudes in a manner similar to formal education is, therefore, of particular interest. In short, this study will look at the impact of NFE, formal education, and Koranic education on the political behaviors and attitudes of interest. The Setting Senegal, West Africa, is an ideal context in which to look at these issues. Through the establishment of a network of patron-client relationships

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involving the ruling party/government, marabouts19 and Senegalese citizens, the first president of Senegal, Léopold Senghor, was able to consolidate his power (Boone 1990) and establish a de facto one party during the first 15 years after Senegal’s independence from France. The economic distortions emanating from these networks eventually led to enough peasant “malaise” to force the government to engage in political liberalization (Boone 1990). Senghor began this process in 1976, and true “multipartyism” was established by his successor, Abdou Diouf, in 1981 (Vengroff and Creevey 1997, 206–207). Already being a “semi-democracy” (Coulon 1995), Senegal did not undergo a democratic transition in the early 1990s, but the government did undertake several initiatives which appeared to enhance the possibilities for the establishment of a more completely democratic regime than that which existed (Villalón 1994). However, both the 1993 and 1998 elections were a great disappointment, as no alternation of power took place, and abuses were alleged.20 Ironically, Senegalese citizens appeared to have a great deal of mistrust toward the entire political system (Villalón 1994; Kante 1994) at a time when the dominant party, the Parti Socialiste (PS), was liberalizing itself out of political power. The outcome of Senegal’s 2000 presidential election stunned international and national observers alike. In the second round of the Senegal’s presidential election, long-standing opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade defeated the incumbent Diouf. The victory of Wade in the presidential election of 2000 was a watershed in Senegal’s political history. After nearly 40 years of de facto one-party rule by the PS, this event seemed to catapult Senegal from semi-democratic to democratic status. Yet the story does not end here. Senegal’s levels of democracy and stability appear to have actually declined since around the start of the new millennium (see Mbow 2008), and the 2007 presidential election which returned Wade to power was far from inspirational. Given the fragility of democratic advances in Africa, distilling the factors that could facilitate or impede democratic processes in Senegal is critical. On a more micro-political level, Schaffer (2000) observes that the Senegalese (actually, the Wolof21) notion of democracy [in Wolof, demokaraasi] is associated with the values of mutuality, “consensus, solidarity, or evenhandedness” (85). According to Schaffer, “All identify demokarassi with a comprehensive form of community solidarity” (61). Because of this conception of democracy, Schaffer argues, the goals associated with participating in the electoral process are often very different

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for Wolof villagers than for Americans. Elections present an opportunity for demokaraasi to be either strengthened, when villagers all vote together for the same candidate, or undermined, when different political preferences among villagers result in social splintering. In order to avoid the splintering scenario, some villagers simply opt not to vote. The syndrome of behaviors and attitudes Schaffer observes are associated with nonliterate22 Wolof villagers. This study will allow us to see if and how different types of education transform villagers’ sets of political behaviors and attitudes. In the past, ethnicity has never provided a point of political mobilization in Senegal (Cruise O’Brien 1998; Villalón 1995; Gellar 2005).23 The spread of the Wolof language and identity has been able to proceed with little resistance. The emphasis on Wolof literacy, however, may reverse this trend. Cruise O’Brien (1998) suggests the literacy movements in African languages could inspire conflict along ethnic/linguistic lines. The literacy movement among Pulaar speakers,24 which really started in earnest in the 1980s, has been the most zealous of all of the literacy movements and has emerged largely as a response to the threat of “Wolofization,” that is the spread of the Wolof language and identity. The work of others and my own preliminaries studies have revealed a tendency of those in leadership positions in the Pulaar literacy movement to link Pulaar literacy to the elevation of Pulaar-speaking people. In the words of Cruise O’Brien (1998): The emergence of the Halpulaaren movement in the 1980s, defending the cause of the Pulaar language, working to unite the ethnic Peul and Toucouleur behind the Halpulaaren banner, on the other hand, is a possible indicator of a culturally conflictual future. (39) Fagerberg-Diallo (2001) makes a related point. According to her, efforts to make Wolof the official national language of Senegal have helped energize the Pulaar literacy movement. She notes, “This perception of ‘threat’ has given ‘cause’ to Pulaar literacy, in which becoming literate is a way of asserting cultural identity on a national scale” (160). It is not just Pulaar-speakers, however, who are concerned with the attempts to make Wolof the official language. Trudell (2008) notes that communities among the non-Wolof population “. . . appear to very concerned about the danger that Wolof language promotion could pose to their languages and culture” (401).

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Moreover, Senegal had its first brush with political ethnic mobilization in the 1998 legislative elections when the Union pour le Renouveau Démocratique (URD), a party splintered off from the PS, was able to obtain the majority of Pulaaraphones’ votes based on the founder’s (Djibo Ka) Peul (Fulbe) ethnicity.25 Vengroff and Creevey (1997) note that the mores that used to determine how members of Senegal’s different ethnic groups related to each other are in flux. Hence, the time is ripe to examine the relationship between nonformal literacy programs in African languages and ethnic awareness and pride. The Formal Educational System of Senegal The history of its educational system also renders Senegal a perfect case in which to examine the aforementioned issues. According to the UNESCO Institute of Education, “ . . . ‘education’ as an institution is recognized by the state [of Senegal] as a resource which must sustain all cultural advancement, technological progress, the raising of awareness among the masses, and the construction of a more just social edifice” (Badiane 1984, 120). Unfortunately, the formal educational system has hardly served as such a resource in Senegal. Indeed, although education is seen to be both a key to successful development and an objective of development, the results of the formal educational system have been disappointing. Having been under French influence for three centuries, many of the institutions of the small, coastal West African country resemble those of France. Since education is one the principal ways through which culture is transmitted, the French established an educational system in Senegal modeled after that in France. Formal education in Senegal continues to be conducted in French and resembles the French school system. However, much of the Senegalese population is incapable of using French as an effective means of communication. Dr. Fagerberg-Diallo notes that “. . . roughly 75 percent of the population in Senegal is not capable of using French as a language through which they have access to information, whether it be written or oral” (1993, 4). The study by D’Hondt and others (1980) study found that only 1.8 percent of the 896 secondary students in the sample spoke French at home. Even in Dakar, according to the this study, only 2.6 percent of the students spoke French at home. Bourgi’s (1979) study found that only 1 to 5 percent of the Senegalese population spoke French “correctly” (studies quoted

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in Vandeweille 1983:511). More recently, Trudell (2008) notes that large numbers of people in the six minority language communities she studied in Senegal are not fluent in French (or Wolof, for that matter) (396). Currently, six years of primary schooling is officially compulsory for children of seven to 13 years of age. In fact, according to the World Development Indicators, 58 percent of those in this age group were enrolled in primary school in 2001, while an impressive 72 percent were enrolled in 2007. The difference between primary and secondary school attendance rates is instructive, however. Secondary school, which students usually begin at age 13, is comprised of a four-year and three-year cycle. In 2007, only 22 percent of those in the eligible age group were enrolled in secondary school (World Development Indicators). Unfortunately, students leaving primary school may not have even fully developed and consolidated their literacy and numeracy skills (Minnis 2006, 126). While the formal education system has created a Senegalese elite, according to the World Development Indicators for 2006, nearly 58 percent of the population of Senegal does not possess basic literacy skills. Among women, 67 percent are not literate. As Nordtveit (2009) notes, the data indicate that Senegal has one of the lowest literacy rates in the world (14). Nonformal education programs have emerged to fill the gaps left by the formal education system. Most of these programs are administered by national or international nongovermental organizations, although the Senegalese government has become active in the nonformal education sector. Today, NFE reaches a large proportion of the Senegalese population and has become a significant force in other African countries, as well. Thus, it is critical to assess the effects of NFE on political behavior and attitudes. Hypotheses about the Effects of NFE on Political Attitudes and Behavior In her review of the literature on education, Moulton (1997) observes that numerous studies conducted across the globe have revealed a positive relationship between education and self-esteem/autonomy. Many of these studies found that self-esteem/autonomy mediated the effects of education on other behaviors and attitudes. Evidence suggests selfesteem/autonomy as one of the mechanisms through which NFE affects

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the political orientations26 of interest. Several mechanisms and processes underlie the relationship between NFE and the orientations of interest. First, NFE increases self-esteem. Many times, people interact regularly with people outside of the household for the first time in the NFE classes. This social experience gives them a new sense of self. In addition, they gain confidence because of the new skills they acquire.27 Second, NFE has strong network effects. NFE participants not only get to know those in the NFE classes, but also usually began to join other village associations. They also tend to be recruited into other development projects by NGOs. Third, their new reading and writing skills do allow NFE participants to obtain and exchange information in a way that they could not do in the past. That is, the literacy skills obtained from the classes matter as well. I, therefore, hypothesize that there is a positive relationship between participation in a NFE program and community participation. NFE increases people’s feelings of self-esteem and efficacy, and therefore they are more likely to take action with others to effect change on their environment than those with no education. NFE is largely seen as a way to promote community development, not just individual development. I do not expect to find such a relationship between formal education and community involvement, especially in rural settings. Those with high levels of formal education tend to leave their natal villages or tend to feel a distance between themselves and unschooled villagers. Minnis (2006) comments on the way education is viewed in Africa today: “. . . formal education is perceived mainly as a private good—as a means to achieve individual social mobility. The value and desirability of education is judged on the basis on what it can do for the individual consumer and nothing more” (127). I expect to find a positive relationship between both types of education and political participation. I hypothesize that those with NFE will be more likely to vote and engage in other forms of political participation, such as contacting officials, than their counterparts without NFE. Given their more active and engaged stance, I would expect those with NFE to feel more politically efficacious than those without NFE. The effects of both nonformal and formal education on tolerance and support for democratic values are likely to be somewhat contradictory given the findings of different studies on these subjects noted earlier. Nonetheless, I hypothesize that those with NFE will tend to be more supportive of democratic values and less authoritarian in orientation than those

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without NFE. The effect of NFE on social trust is likely to be complex. On the one hand, a sense of “we-ness” is usually created within NFE classes. On the other hand, the critical thinking skills introduced by NFE are likely to make people more aware of themselves and their own interests and question some the vertically imposed obligations to which they have been subject. In general, I would therefore expect both NFE and formal education to have a negative relationship with social trust.28 On the other hand, I expect both types of education to have a positive relationship with individualization. According to modernization theory, ethnic identity becomes “a relic of the past” once a society achieves a certain level of modernization. With modernization, the theory contends, people will have more cosmopolitan identities, that is they will identify with a wider community, such as the members of the “nation-state” and ultimately, perhaps, the global community. Formal education is a key dimension of modernization. I expect there to be a negative relationship between formal education and ethnic awareness and identity. On the other hand, I hypothesize that there is a positive relationship between NFE and ethnic consciousness and pride. NFE programs are conducted in national languages and attempt to valorize the culture of the participants. Many of the speakers of minority languages see the promotion of literacy in their languages as a way to establish the importance of their culture and language in Senegal. According to some, the spread of the Wolof language and identity, that is “Wolofization,” has proceeded with little resistance. Gellar observes, “Senegalese national identity has become more and more associated with speaking Wolof, while an Islamo-Wolof cultural model has become the dominant one in the country. Without being imposed, Wolof is becoming Senegal’s national language” (2005, 136). Pulaar-speakers have resented this process, however, and view the promotion of Pulaar literacy as a way to arrest it (Fagerberg-Diallo 2001). It is not just Pulaar-speakers who are concerned with “Wolofization.” According to Trudell, “. . . Wolof appears to be driving community members to contest its instrumental use by promoting the development of their own languages beyond simply marking identity” (2008, 402). Gellar (2005) also notes that the emergence of Wolof as the urban language has sparked interest among different groups, especially the Jola and Halpulaar, in their own language and culture (137).

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Predicting the effect of Koranic education on political behaviors and attitudes is not straightforward. Traditional Koranic schooling in the rural area of Senegal often encompasses children memorizing verses of the Koran. The Koran is in Arabic and the vast majority of Senegalese do not know Arabic. Most Koranic students of Senegal are, therefore, unable to extract substantive meaning from the verses they memorize. For the most part, students do not study long enough to reach the stage where they will learn the meaning of the memorized verses. Thus, although Koranic schooling is thought to foster a pro-social orientation among students/disciples, I would generally not expect Koranic schooling to have strong effects on political behaviors and attitudes in the context of rural Senegal. As will be demonstrated throughout the book, NFE does indeed stimulate community participation. Those with NFE are more likely than those without NFE to work with others to address community problems, belong to voluntary organizations, and participate in community meetings. Nonformal education also encourages political participation. Moreover, NFE influences attitudes. Nonformal education increases the likelihood that people will embrace tolerant, democratic attitudes in Senegal. Looking Ahead In order to fully appreciate the nature and implications of the results of the study, one must have some understanding of the context in which this study was conducted. Thus, Chapter 2 will present an overview of political life in Senegal. Since the focus of this book is on the effects of education on political behaviors and attitudes, Chapter 3 provides an overview of the history of the Senegalese educational system. Chapters 2 and 3 are intended to provide background information on Senegal. Thus, broad strokes are used to treat the aforementioned topics. The bibliography contains some excellent works on the subjects addressed in these chapters, for those who would like to learn more. The survey methodology is described in Chapter 4. (Supplemental information on the sampling, survey instrument and research protocol is in Appendix A.) The results of the survey are reported in Chapters 5 and 6. In Chapter 5, the results of the bivariate analysis are reported. The bivariate analyses allow us to see the degree to which those with NFE and those without NFE really differ in terms of political behavior and attitudes. The results

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of the multivariate analyses, which scrutinize the bivariate findings, are presented in the Chapter 6. In this chapter, the issues of rival hypotheses and threats to the internal validity of the study results will also be carefully treated. Moreover, author’s qualitative research will be used to help illuminate some of the quantitative findings. Finally, Chapter 7 will offer observations on the implications of this study’s findings and directions for future research.

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CHAPTER 2

The Politics of Senegal

T

hose familiar with Senegalese social and political life would probably agree that there is perhaps no better place to study the dynamics of political maneuvering and interest-seeking behavior than Senegal. Senegal has been known for its peace and stability. Despite the concentration of military coups in West Africa, no such event has ever interrupted civilian rule in Senegal. Senegal has had a long, rich history of electoral politics, extending back into the colonial period. The alternation of executive power achieved in the presidential election of 2000 seemed to bode well for the consolidation of democracy in Senegal, but alas this road was not taken. Senegal is at a critical point in its political life. After what seemed like years of torpidity, the Senegalese political sphere is in a state of rapid change and fluctuation. As a description of the Senegalese political context will make clear, evaluating the extent to which programs and policies foster citizen participation and democratic attitudes is of the utmost importance. This chapter is intended to provide readers with background information on the political context of Senegal. The overview uses broad strokes to paint a picture of Senegalese politics. The books and articles on Senegalese politics listed in the bibliography are excellent sources for those who would like to learn more about the politics of this fascinating country. The section of this chapter on the Senegalese presidential election of 2000 and its implications is based on the intensive fieldwork I conducted in 2000–2001 in Senegal. During the 2000 campaign season, I traveled

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with the Marche Bleu (the appellation given to the opposition campaign) on a few occasions, attended campaign rallies, collected party documents, read the daily papers, and conducted numerous interviews with party members, particularly those associated with the coalition of opposition parties called the Coalition pour l’Alternance 2000. I am very grateful such prominent figures as Abdoulaye Bathily, Landing Savané, and the current president of Senegal, His Excellency President Abdoulaye Wade, among many others, graciously allowed me to interview them. In addition, I conducted interviews in 1998 with party members and leaders. Background The small, coastal West African country of Senegal shares borders with Mauritania in the north, Mali in the east, and Guinea-Bissau and Guinea Conakry in the south. Senegal is one of the Sahelian countries. The Gambia, a very small country that is a former British colony, separates northern and southern Senegal. This division seems almost symbolic of and has probably contributed to some of the social, cultural, and political divisions between northern and southern Senegal. In fact, Herbst (2000) attributes the secessionist movement in the southern Casamance region to this geographic separation. The desert has encroached on what were largely grasslands in the north, while the south is verdant, receiving a substantially higher amount of rainfall than the north. The hybrid nature of Senegal’s culture is emphasized by Gellar (1995): “Senegal’s geography has brought its people into close contact with North Table 2.1 Ethnic composition of the population Ethnicity Wolof Serer Fulbe Halpulaar Jola Other ethnic groups Total

Percent of Population 43 15 14 9 5 14 100%

Source: Africa South of the Sahara 2009.

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Africa and the West and has made Senegal a crossroads where Black African, Islamic, and European civilizations have met, clashed, and blended” (1). The interplay of these different cultural forces renders Senegal a particularly compelling case to study. Although it is fair to call Senegal an ethnically, culturally, and linguistically diverse country, as can be seen in table 2.1, four or five main ethnic comprise some 86 percent of its population of about 12.5 million people.1 Johnson (1971) observes that the Wolof, Halpulaar, and Serer shared a great deal in terms of culture and “have maintained close ties” (7). That largely those of the Jola ethnic group comprise the movement for an independent Casamance is perhaps not so surprising, given the way in which the southern Casamançais have been excluded by the networks that connect the other ethnic groups (see Galvin 2001). Senegal is a poor country, with a GDP per capita at purchasing power parity of $1,666 (Human Development Report 2009). Around 58 percent of the Senegalese population lives in rural areas (World Development Indicators for 2007), and agriculture accounts for about 14.6 percent of the GDP (Synge 2009). Senegal ranks 166th out of 182 countries on the Human Development Index (HDI), a composite measure that takes into account income, educational attainments, and life expectancy. Senegal actually ranks higher on HDI than six of the nine other Sahelian countries. Indeed, Niger occupies that last rank on HDI. Although Senegal may be better off than many of the other Sahelian countries, when viewed from a global perspective, Senegal is far from being an affluent country. Around 95 percent of the Senegalese population is Muslim, and most Senegalese belong to either one of two Sufi orders2 —the Muridiyya or the Tijaniyya—which are headed by prominent marabouts. Marabouts are Sufi spiritual leaders or shaykhs. To some extent, these orders crosscut ethnic cleavages. The Wolof is the largest ethnic group in Senegal and the Pulaar-speakers, who include both the Fulbe and Halpulaar, constitute the second largest group. Cruise O’Brien (1975) observed that nearly all Pulaar-speakers are Tijanis but not all Tijanis are Pulaarspeakers. On the other hand, most Murids are Wolof, but not all of those of Wolof ethnicity are Murids. This distribution is reflected, to a degree, in the patterns of religious affiliation in my sample for this study. Seventy-one percent of the respondents reporting membership in the Murid Brotherhood are Wolof, while 62 percent of Wolof respondents report being members of

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the Murid Brotherhood, and 35 percent report being members of the Tijani Brotherhood. Sixty-five percent of those reporting membership in the Tijani Brotherhood are Pulaar, while 88 percent of Pulaarophones are Tijani. Only 5 percent of Pulaarophone respondents are Murids. The Murid Brotherhood has, however, made inroads among the Serer (Cruise O’Brien 1998), which is also reflected in the sample: 49 percent of the Muslim Serer respondents belong to the Murid Brotherhood, while 41 percent belong to the Tijani Brotherhood. The Formal Political Institutions of Senegal The Republic of Senegal has a multiparty, democratic regime. Senegal was under the influence of France for more than three centuries and became a formal colony of France in 1885. Senegal finally achieved full independence from France in 1960. Not surprisingly, therefore, many of Senegal’s political institutions resemble those of France, notwithstanding the many changes that have been made to these institutions during the postcolonial period.3 In fact, there has been a great deal of institutional manipulation and instability since Wade came to power in 2001. This issue will be discussed later in this chapter. Like France, Senegal has a semi-presidential system. In this system, the president is the chief of state and is unquestionably the most powerful actor in the political system. The presidential term is five years.4 In 2008, the National Assembly approved a constitutional amendment to increase the presidential term back to seven years. Senegal once again has a bicameral legislature (a subject which will be discussed later in this chapter). Deputies are elected to the National Assembly for five-year terms. Ninety of the 150 seats are allocated via the plurality formula in multimember districts ranging from one to five seats, and 60 seats are allocated via a proportional representation formula in a nationwide district. The Senate has 100 members, 65 of whom are appointed the president and 35 of whom are indirectly elected.

Neopatrimonialism and the Informal Institutions Bratton and van de Walle’s description of neopatrimonialism across African states in the postcolonial period captures many of the features of Senegalese politics. Bratton and van de Walle (1997) contend

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that neopatrimonialsm was the “institutional hallmark” of the pretransition political regimes in sub-Saharan African (61). They define neopatrimonial regimes as “those hybrid political systems in which the customs and patterns of patrimonialism co-exist with, and suffuse, rational-legal institutions” (62). According to Bratton and van Walle, three institutions support these neopatrimonial regimes: “presidentialism,” “clientelism,” and “state resources.” In these regimes, the right to rule is attributed to a person, not an office, notwithstanding the existence of a constitution. The political system is dominated by one figure who is “above the law.” The government, including the administration, is permeated by “relationships of dependence and loyalty” (62). Bureaucratic positions are occupied not with a view of performing public service but with a view of self-enrichment. The president and his most intimate entourage use state resources for “systematic patronage and clientelistic practices in order to maintain political order” (62). Bratton and van de Walle observe that “personal relationships constitute the foundation and superstructure of political institutions in Africa” (62). Neopatrimonialism is at the core of Senegalese politics. Neopatrimonialism in Senegal has its roots in both traditional Senegalese culture and the colonial experience. It is a robust institution that has survived liberalization and democratization in Senegal. Beck (2008) fleshes out the particular form neopatrimonialism takes in Senegal. She notes that while Bratton and van de Walle (1997) find that patterns of competition and participation determined the trajectory of the transitions to democracy in the 1990s, they fail to examine the subnational clientelist networks that influenced the institutions of competition and participation. In short, they do not, according to Beck (2008), examine how patron client relationships influence democratization. Beck explores how the socioeconomic power of four groups of local power brokers influences the clientelistic relationships these brokers have with the Senegalese state. The nature of these clientelistic relationships is then used to explain levels of political participation and competition. The Murid marabouts are especially powerful brokers. Beck argues that Senegal is a clientelist democracy. Although she argues that clientelism can be compatible with democracy, she notes the limitations of what can be achieved by such a democracy, an idea to which we will return later in the chapter.

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Senegalese Politics in Historical Perspective Early History Based on the written accounts of Arab and European travelers, Johnson contends that the area that now constitutes modern-day Senegal was a focal point of “organized political activity since AD 1000” (1971, 7). Therefore, although Johnson acknowledges that a direct connection cannot be made between traditional politics and the politics of more recent times (specifically, that of the communes), he does note that the “. . . the concept of the political process as one of a struggle for power was familiar to every African” (1971, 7). Most of the cultures in Senegal were characterized by rigid social stratification. People were divided into three basic categories: “freemen, servile artisan castes, and slaves” (Gellar 1995, 3). The Jola and other groups occupying the Casamance region tended to be more egalitarian than the Wolof and Halpulaar, for example (Gellar 1995, 4). The Sufi Brotherhoods and Leaders The significant political role played by the marabouts is one of Senegal’s most well-known characteristics. The leaders of these Sufi brotherhoods are known to have significant social and political influence in the country (see, inter alia, Gellar 2005; Villálon 1995; Mbow 2008; Wittman 2008; Cruise O’Brien 1975; Behrman 1970). In the past, marabouts even gave ndigels or commands on how their followers should vote at election time. The Islamic Sufi brotherhoods of Senegal are credited with rendering Senegal one of the most peaceful and stable countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Villálon 1995). The history of Islam’s emergence in Senegal provides us with some insight into the nature of religious attachments and ethnic politics. Having converted to Islam around the eleventh century, the Halpulaar were the first of Senegal’s principal ethnic groups to convert to Islam. Islam was not well established among the Wolof until the late nineteenth century. The prominent Halpulaar Muslim leader, Al Hajj Umar Tall, was responsible for establishing the Tijani Brotherhood in Senegal, after he himself was initiated into the Tijani Brotherhood when he made a pilgrimage to Mecca in 1820 (Gellar 1995, 5–6; Mbacké 2005; Johnson 1971). In contrast, the Murid Brotherhood is an “indigenous institution,” having emerged around the personality of Amadou Bamba at the time of colonial conquest in the late nineteenth century.

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According to some historical accounts, the Senegalese turned toward the emerging marabouts to offer some type of leadership and point of cultural reference in the face of the social disruption created by the French conquest. For example, according to Cruise O’Brien (1975), after the great Wolof “warlord,” Lat Dior, was killed in a battle against the French in 1886, many of his Wolof followers turned to the “saint,” Amadu Bamba, to provide them with leadership. In contrast, while recognizing the role of political and economic factors in driving the expansion of the Murid order, Babou stresses the cultural and religious factors behind this process (2007, 4). As demonstrated in Babou’s study (2007), Amadu Bamba played a key role in the expansion of the Murid Brotherhood. Although the French initially viewed the founder of Muridism, Amadu Bamba, and his religious movement as a potential menace to colonial authority, Robinson (1999) argues that, by the early twentieth century, Amadu Bamba and the Murids were collaborating with the French “in the economic development of the peanut basin” (193). Indeed, the marabouts were instrumental in the operation of the colonial cash crop economy based on the cultivation of peanuts (Robinson 2000; Cruise O’Brien 1975; Berhman 1970). According to Robinson, the French Administration’s relationships with the Murid leaders was especially important because of the Murids’ “cohesion and central location in the expanding peanut basin” (2000, 225). Babou (2007) notes that the daara tarbiyya, or “working school,” was created by the Murids (105). Disciples would work the fields of the Murid leader. With the rise of the cash crop economy, the cultivation of peanuts began to supplant the cultivation of other crops, such as millet. Often, the daara was eventually transformed into a Murid village with the relevant marabout at its head, and the steadfast disciples frequently were granted a plot of land (Babou 2007, 108). As Searing observes, “The major difficulty in the first years was conflict with the Fulbe over land” (2002, 245). Indeed, when the expansion of the activities of the Murid marabouts and their disciples brought them into conflict with the Fulbe pastoralists, the French ignored the Murids’ actions taken to expunge the Fulbe from the land (Cruise O’Brien 1975, 67). On occasion, marabouts were granted vast tracts of land to be exploited by their followers (Cruise O’Brien 1975, 65). After independence in 1960, the marabouts (especially the Murid marabouts) continued this relationship of collaboration with the government.

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Electoral Politics in the Pre-Independence Period Senegal’s experience with electoral politics under colonialism had a decisive impact on the politics of the postcolonial period (Schumacher 1975; Cruise O’Brien 1975). Senegal had a certain type of importance as far as the French West African colonies went, and it contained the capitol of French West Africa (AOF). With regard to colonial administration, the official policy of the French was “assimilation,” while the policy of the British was “indirect rule.” Many claim that although the French did not actually implement their policy of “assimilation,” to the extent that that they did, it was in the four communes of Senegal. All of the inhabitants of the communes of Dakar, Goree, Saint Louis, and Rufisique were considered French “citizens,” while those outside of the communes were considered “subjects.” Senegal had a territorial assembly and representation in the Chamber of Deputies in France, and those within the communes had a right to vote in the relevant elections (Gellar 1995; Schumacher 1975; Cruise O’Brien 1975). Although it took some time before the Senegalese in the communes mastered the foreign political apparatus, in 1914, Blaise Diagne surprised many by becoming the first Black African elected to the French National Assembly (Gellar 1995; Johnson 1971). Many of the political phenomena observed in recent years were already manifest during this early electoral period. “Negative campaigning” had its roots in the pre-independence elections (Cruise O’Brien 1975, 169). Cruise O’Brien observes that “. . . a survey of the Senegalese political press for the period 1914–40 reveals a remarkably low salience of broad policy issues” (1975, 170). When the franchise was extended to the rural areas after the Second World War, the nature of politics was somewhat transformed. Gellar (1995) notes the difference in the political leaders who arose in rural and urban areas: “In the communes, the prototype of the political leader was the urbane, Western-educated Senegalese intellectual; in the countryside, it was the marabout” (9). In the communes, politicians had to fulfill certain French cultural, educational, and language requisites (Gellar 1995), while such was not the case in rural areas. Although Lamine Gueye’s party had constructed a dense network of clan of ties, it lost its dominant positions to a splinter party. In 1948, Léopold Senghor and Mamadou Dia left the “Senegalese section of the French Socialist Party, the SFIO, headed by Lamine Gueye” and created the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais (BDS) (Schumacher 1975, 6).

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“[E]thnic arithmetic and geographic and factional critieria of representation” informed the construction of the BDS party lists and party positions, and by 1951, the BDS leadership had “managed to forge a heterogeneouos, territorywide pyramid of such clan alliances . . .” (Schumacher 1975, 11). According to Schumacher, the “foundations” for the former ruling party had been put in place by the mid–1950s (1975, 16). In 1958, Gueye and Senghor reconciled, and the merger party was renamed the Union Progressiste Sénégalaise (UPS) (Schumacher 1975). In addition, elections during the colonial period were characterized by irregularities and electoral tricks (Schumacher 1975) like those that became so renown in the postcolonial era. Politics in the Post-Independence Period Political life in the post-independence period exhibits much continuity with that of the preceding period. By about 1951, Léopold Senghor was the central figure in Senegalese political life (Cruise O’Brien 1975, 167) and he remained so until he resigned as president in 1980, to be replaced by his dauphin, Abdou Diouf, in 1981. Through the establishment and maintenance of a network of patron–client relationships involving the ruling party/government, marabouts, party barons, and Senegalese citizens, Senghor, the first president of Senegal, was able to consolidate his power (Boone 1990; Schumaker 1975). The marabouts were a critical part of the party machine and made significant contributions to the stability of political life both in the colonial and postcolonial state. Many observers have been highly critical of the “maraboutic system” because of its seeming blatant exploitation of the peasantry. Cruise O’Brien (1975), however, very aptly describes the rational nature of the master–disciple between marabouts and their followers (talibés). When it comes to candidate choice for an election, the more votes a marabout delivers, the greater his power. The greater the power of the marabout, the more effectively he can make demands on the state. Normally, the demands he makes on the state will involve policy outcomes or benefits for his respective locality. Thus, voters render marabouts powerful advocates on their behalf (176–77). Cruise O’Brien notes, “The hostility of the rural people to the state and its urban controllers is thus tempered by the hope that they may be the lucky ones if their local patron plays his cards right” (1975, 177). If a patron is unsuccessful in obtaining benefits and outcomes for his following on too many

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occasions, his followers will look for someone else to whom they can attach themselves (Cruise O’Brien 1975, 177). Thus, as Tiebout (1956) would say, they can “vote with their feet.” From the period spanning from 1964 to 1975, Senegal became essentially a one-party state (Gellar 1995, 22). Indeed, the UPS absorbed opposition parties (Cruise O’Brien 1975, 171). There was, however, intra-party competition among the party clans or tendances.5 In 1976, Senghor re-established limited multiparty politics: the constitution was amended to establish a three-party system. Essentially, one party was to be to the left of the ruling party and one party was to be to the right. The UPS changed its name to the Parti Socialist (PS) at this time, and Abdoulaye Wade’s Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS) was selected be the “liberal” party, while a nominally Marxist-Leninist party, Parti Africain de l’Indépendance (PAI), was chosen to be the party on the left (Gellar 1995). Since 1976, when multiparty politics, albeit limited, was re-established, Senegal has been slowly liberalizing and democratizing. President Senghor was the first African leader to give up power of his own accord (Gellar 1995). He did this in 1980 when he resigned from the presidency. His dauphin, Abdou Diouf, replaced him as president. The 1983 and 1988 presidential and legislative elections produced big victories for both Diouf and the PS. The 1988 elections elicited accusations of fraud and irregularities, as well as protest. Throughout the 1980s, Diouf refused to implement electoral reform. In the 1990s, Diouf skillfully deflated the opposition by inviting opposition members to join the government (and several, including Wade, did so) and agreeing to electoral reform (Gellar 1995). The coalition government constructed and implemented several important reforms. The new electoral code provided for the secret ballot, the right of each political party to be represented at voting centers, presence of international election observers, and equal access to state-controlled media among political parties (Vengroff and Creevey 1997). Diouf and the PS were successful in the 1993 presidential and legislative elections, but Diouf’s margin of victory fell. The opposition made vociferous accusations of electoral fraud and abuse against the PS, and these elections seem to be what sparked some of the more violent events in Senegal’s political history. The opposition also cried foul in the 1998 legislative elections although, by my own observations, they seemed relatively free and fair.

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From “Semi-Democracy” to Democracy? The Senegalese Presidential Election of 2000 and Its Consequences6 The alternation in executive power that was produced by Senegal’s 2000 presidential election was a watershed event in Senegal’s political history. In the second round of the presidential election, long-standing opposition leader, Abdoulaye Wade, defeated the incumbent Abdou Diouf. At the time of his defeat, Abdou Diouf had been president for 19 years, and his party, the PS, had been in power for 40. Following the 1993 elections, Villalón (1994) observed that Senegal had nearly all of the accoutrements of a democracy, except an alternation in power. Of course, as Villalón (1994) noted, power alternation is considered a critical requisite for full democratic status. Prior to the 2000 election, there was a notable bifurcation in the electoral predictions of Senegalese and international observers. While those in the international community almost unanimously opined that Diouf would win the election, Senegalese were much more likely to predict a victory for the opposition. From a distance, the level of “malaise” in Senegal did not seem much greater than it had been before past elections. Moreover, opposition parties did not seem to have improved their level of penetration into the various regions by any significant measure. Thus, while Dakar and some of the urban areas might fall to the opposition, those in the countryside, it seemed, would still vote for the PS. Although many Senegalese correctly diagnosed the PS’s enfeebled grip on power, envisioning the collapse of the great party machine was difficult, nonetheless. Through a combination of fraud and machine politics, many believed that the PS would secure yet another electoral victory in the presidential competition of 2000. What accounts for the unexpected outcome? Several factors explain Wade’s victory in the 2000 election. One important contributing factor to the electoral outcome was the high level of cooperation among the opposition parties. The winning coalition was a motley group comprising parties representing socialist, Marxist, and liberal orientations. There may have been little convergence on matters of policy among members of the coalition, but they did agree on the imperative to remove the obstruction to democracy, incarnated in former President Abdou Diouf. Although eight candidates ran for the presidency, the degree of cooperation manifested by members of the opposition in this election was higher than in any other since the commencement of full multipartyism in 1981.

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The Coalition pour l’Alternance 2000 (CA), which comprised eight parties, was formed before the first round of the presidential election. The leaders of the opposition parties in the coalition decided that the only criterion for deciding who the coalition candidate for the presidential election should be was vote share in the past elections. The selection of the candidate was then a straightforward process as the vote share of Abdoulaye Wade, who had already contested four presidential elections, was substantially higher than those of any of the other potential candidates. A second coalition, Front pour l’Alternance (FAL), of 21 parties formed before the second round of the election and included the parties of five of the six presidential contenders who were eliminated after the first round. Obtaining the support of the other first-round opposition candidates was crucial to Wade’s victory in the second round. For years, one of the greatest challenges for Wade and his supporters had been to translate Wade’s popularity in the streets into an electoral victory.7 The CA’s campaign strategy, called the Marche Bleu, was enormously successful in creating a great deal of enthusiasm and momentum around Wade’s candidature. In the Marche Bleu, Wade and some of the other CA political leaders and their entourage, traveled across the country, stopping to make campaign speeches and hold short campaign rallies in countless neighborhoods and communities. Music animated these dynamic rallies, and people were exhorted to obtain their voting cards and vote. In addition, these energetic meetings left people with the impression that Wade could actually win the election. Many have pointed to the change in the voting age from 21 to 18 as an important factor in Wade’s victory, as the overwhelming preference among youth was for an alternation in power. Although the voting age was lowered in 1992, the mobilization of young voters appeared to reach a new high in the 2000 election. The electoral reforms initiated in 1991 and 1992 under the coalition government, which included several members of the opposition, contributed significantly to the ability of the FAL candidate to achieve electoral victory (Vengroff and Magala 2001). The interaction of the blossoming private press and explosions in communication and information technology (e.g., the spread of cellular phones, telephone and fax centers, and internet access) contributed to the transparence and fairness of the election and, thus, to Wade’s victory.8 Perhaps the question can be reformulated to ask why Diouf lost. As others have noted (e.g., Galvin 2001; Vengroff and Magala 2001), one

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of the proximate and most obvious causes of Diouf ’s defeat was the defection of two highly ranked members of the PS and government. Diouf ’s former minister of interior, Djibo Ka, left the PS in 1997, taking several other high-ranking members of the PS with him, and set up a rival party. Diouf ’s former minister of foreign affairs, Moustapha Niasse, largely repeated this sequence of action in 1999. Diouf ’s campaign director observed three parties were sharing the same electorate in the first round of the election: Djibo Ka’s URD and Moustapha Niasse’s L’Alliance des Forces de Progrès (AFP) both drew from the same group of voters as the PS. The underlying causes of the defections were the noxious factionalism and clan politics that plagued the PS. Furthermore, as numerous commentators have noted, Diouf’s campaign strategies were wrong-headed, given the political climate of the country. Not only did the glossy billboards and large-scale political meetings that comprised Diouf’s campaign fail to generate enthusiasm and support among the public, but they seemed to indicate just how out of touch Diouf was with the majority of the population. Yet all of these reasons are ancillary to one: the economic stagnation and crisis brought about by distorted economic policy, corruption, and structural adjustment. The economic crisis that really seized Senegal in the 1980s depleted the government of the resources needed to fulfill the demands of the numerous state clients (Boone 1990). Moreover, the economic crisis resulted in a deterioration of the living standards of the Senegalese people and intensified their dissatisfaction with the government. Despite the support of the leaders of some of the leftist parties, Wade’s vote share was essentially unchanged between the election of 1993 and the first round of the presidential election of 2000. In 1993, Wade received 32 percent of the vote, while in 2000 he received 31.01, for a difference of 0.99 percent. What did change in the 2000 election was Diouf’s level of support, which fell by 17.1 percent since the previous election. In 1993, Diouf received 58.4 percent of the vote, while in the first round of the last election he received only 41.3 percent of the vote. A comparison between the first and second rounds of the presidential election is instructive. Wade obtained 31.01 percent of the vote, Diouf received 41.3 percent, while Ka and Niasse received 7.08 percent and 16.77 percent, respectively. However, while Diouf’s score increased by only .21 percent between the first and second rounds of the election, Wade’s increased by

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27.48 percentage points, implying that Wade received nearly all of the 27.69 percent of the vote that went to the other first-round opposition candidates.9 These electoral scores reflect the strong desire the people of Senegal had simply to have change. Despite his expressed anti-corruption stance, Diouf came to symbolize a political system driven by graft, corruption, inefficiency, and incompetence. At a certain point, popular opinion converged with the conviction among opposition leaders that in order for Senegal to move forward on many fronts, the de facto one-party rule by the PS had to come to an end. The high levels of voter turnout and engagement in the electoral processes of the day reflected this desire for change. At 62.23 percent, the voter turnout rate of the presidential election of 2000 compared favorably to elections in the recent past. The voter turnout rates in the presidential elections of 1983, 1988, and 1993 were 56.2 percent, 58.8 percent, and 51.5 percent, respectively, while only 44 percent of the registered voters voted in the 1996 local elections, and 39.28 percent of registered voters voted in the 1998 legislative elections. The high level of voter participation in the election of 2000 also indicated that people did have some confidence that change could occur via the ballot box. Wade and the Post-Alternation Era Senegal has been able to boost several characteristics thought favorable to democracy, and some of the events associated with the 2000 election gave rise to more optimism. The magnanimous behavior of both Wade and Diouf just after the 2000 elections reflected a general ethic of comity among Senegalese political elites and seemed to bode well for Senegal’s democratic future. Diouf made the first courteous move when he called Wade to congratulate him on his victory before the election results were even in. Some have speculated that Diouf’s call was intentionally made in order to forestall attempts by other PS members to deprive the opposition of its victory by means of a coup or other extra-electoral measures. Whatever the case, this action seemed to prompt a virtuous circle of noble acts and gestures on the part of the election winner and loser. Wade paid a brief visit to Diouf’s mother, who received her son’s replacement with the utmost of graciousness. Diouf demonstrated complete willingness to facilitate Wade’s task of taking over as head of state. Wade asked Diouf to represent Senegal at the first European-African Summit

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in Cairo. Finally, Wade granted Diouf and his entire family clemency for any wrongdoings committed during Diouf’s tenure in office. The alternation in power that was achieved in 2000 in many ways seemed like the final event needed for Senegal to be considered a democracy. To be sure, the outcome of the 2000 election injected new vitality and energy into a lethargic political system and public. The rise in energy and excitement was perceptible to all of those able to witness the pre– and post–election periods in Senegal. The Wade Government initially appeared energetic and communicative, and the public seemed appreciative of this government’s break with the past. The opposition also seemed reinvigorated. A tripartite coalition led by three of the poorest-performing candidates in the 2000 presidential election formed with the goal of promoting honesty, integrity, and transparency in government. This grouping seemed almost reminiscent of the progressive movement in the United States early in the twentieth century. Thus, both the Wade Government and the opposition seemed poised to push forward the democratic ethos that had emerged in Senegal. The power alternation did move Senegal from semi-democratic to democratic status in the eyes of many, such as the influential Freedom House organization. Freedom House 2003 rated Senegal as “free” based on its democratic performance during 2002. Senegal was able to maintain this status until the Freedom House 2009 report. Some of the initial steps taken by the Wade Government were consistent with the idea that the alternation had put Senegal on the path to the consolidation of democracy. Governing is no easy task, and one certainly could not expect perfection from the Wade Government. The Wade Government was forthcoming on its promises to hold new elections. Three elections were held the year after Wade came to power: (1) the referendum on the new draft of the Constitution in January 2001, (2) the legislative elections in April 2001, and (3) the municipal and local elections in 2001. The elections seemed relatively free and fair, but the outcomes led some to question the extent to which Senegal was progressing toward consolidation. The PDS and allied parties (Sopi Coalition) swept the legislative elections, winning nearly 50 percent of the vote and 74 percent of the seats. These results led some to wonder if Senegal was perhaps what van de Walle (2002) called a “dominant executive” regime. In this type of regime, an alternation in executive power has been achieved but there is not an effective opposition.

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If the results of the 2001 elections were cause to worry that Senegal was becoming a dominant executive regime, the 2007 presidential and legislative elections were cause for much more worry. The opposition seemed surprised that Wade won the presidential election in the first round of voting with 56 percent of the vote (Galvin 2009), although it is not altogether clear why this result was so unexpected. The turnout rate was an impressive 71 percent, which seemed to continue the upward trend in turnout that started in 2000. Particularly concerning were the results of the 2007 parliamentary elections. The Sopi 2007 Coalition comprising the PDS and some small parties won 69 percent of the vote and 87 percent of the seats of the National Assembly. The decision on the part of most of the opposition to boycott the legislative elections explains Sopi’s large vote and seat shares. Revising the voter registration lists has been a perennial opposition demand since well before the alternation of power. Because Wade refused to revise these lists and take other measures to improve the manner in which the legislative elections are to be conducted, all of the major opposition parties made a pact to boycott these elections. In all, 17 opposition parties boycotted the election (Galvin 2009; Murison 2009). The opposition’s decision to boycott reflects poorly on the quality of the opposition. One cannot blame electoral manipulation for the PDS domination of the National Assembly, but rather the ill-conceived strategies of the opposition. The opposition’s cries of foul after the 2007 presidential election did not appear to resonate strongly in Senegal (Galvin 2009) or abroad. Boycotting the election for the National Assembly made the opposition look afraid to face realities about the level of support it could really command. Still worse, it tended to diminish the credibility of the opposition when it boycotted the elections for the Senate, the selection for which is truly problematic. Were it not for the ruling party’s poor showing in the local elections of 2009, one might truly conclude that the opposition had been neutralized. Institutional Instability and the Rule of Man10 The constant changing of institutions under Wade is destabilizing to the political system. Wade initially brought to fruition many of the institutional changes for which he had militated when he was in the opposition. All of these changes have now been reversed. A basic principle of any constitutional system is that people must accept the outcomes produced

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by the fundamental rules of the polity. The institutions in place create incentives to which citizens and politicians respond through their behaviors. No one but the one changing the rules is able to participate effectively in such an unstable system. Wade’s actions have made it clear that many of the stances he held when he was part of what appeared to be the permanent opposition emanated from his interests at the time, not principle. His advocacy of fair play, transparency, and good governance appear to have been abandoned when it was no longer his ox being gored. When the Diouf Administration wanted to increase the National Assembly from 120 to 140 seats, Wade protested, based on the expense that would accompany such an increase (Murison 2009). In fact, the revised Constitution approved in 2001 changed the number of seats in the national assembly back to 120 seats. However, under Wade’s leadership, the National Assembly has now been increased to 150 seats. One pledge of the CA was the establishment of a parliamentary form of government. Yet, Wade quickly declared his intention to propose a semi-parliamentary form of government, and the executive in place is clearly a semi-presidential system like that which exists in France and other Francophone countries. Wade’s contempt for the rule of law, however, can best be seen in three other actions. Minor hypocrisy is human and certainly to be expected among politicians. It is also to be expected that the realities of governing would lead one to revise some of the notions one had while outside of Government. Reversing one’s position on important institutional rules for no other reason than a desire gain a firmer grasp on power and patronage resources demonstrates contempt for the rule of law. Wade campaigned to change the presidential term from seven years to five years, but claimed the change, which was approved in the 2001 referendum, only applied to those elected in elections subsequent to that of 2000. This change of position would fall into the category of minor hypocrisy. In 2008, however, the National Assembly approved a constitutional amendment to increase the presidential term back to seven years, effective 2012. Moreover, despite the two-term limit stipulated in the Constitution, Wade has expressed his intention to contest this election.11 At the very least, Wade will be violating the spirit of the constitution. By 2012, Wade will have been in power 12 years, which seems like a sufficiently long period for any political leader to hold the office of the presidency. President Wade is currently around 83 years of age. His stated intention to contest the 2012 presidential election, when he is 85 years of age, seems most unrealistic and has caused many to

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guess that Wade is grooming his son to carry on the torch of political leadership in Senegal. When his son, Karim Wade, lost the Dakar mayoral election, Karim Wade’s chances of winning the presidency in 2012 looked bleak. Some have guessed that Wade is declaring his intention to contest the election so that no one else in the ruling party will be able to emerge as a candidate, making way for Karim to enter the race.12 President Wade’s appointment of Karim to a key ministerial position has only intensified fears that Wade has visions of a dynasty. Reestablishing the Senate after it was eliminated also constitutes an egregious abuse of power. One of the basic parts of the program for the CA was the dissolution of the Senate. Only after a great deal of equivocating did this change become incorporated in the new constitution. Reestablishing the Senate in itself is in contradiction to Wade’s earlier stances. What is truly stunning is the method of selection of the senators. Thirty-five of the senators will be indirectly elected by other elected officials and 65 senators will be appointed by the president. In the words of Galvin (2009), “This is the most undemocratic institutional change in Senegal since President Senghor banned multi-party politics in 1966” (496). Not only does this move greatly expand Wade’s opportunity to make patronage appointments (496), but it severely undermines the independence of the legislative branch. Senegal slipped from its “free” status to its current status of “partly free” in the 2009 Freedom House report which examined democratic performance in 2008. A major reason for this decline in Senegal’s score was the Wade Government’s suppression of the media. Not only have members of the media been subject to judicial actions, but also to violent attacks.13 Members of all of the sectors that might serve to check the abuses of the president, such as civil society, the press, and opposition parties, have been subject to police and judicial action (Mbow 2008, 163). Many students of Senegalese politics have made note of Wade’s manner of personal rule. Longtime opposition member and one-time Wade ally, Abdoulaye Bathily, commented in an interview with Radio France Internationale, “Since he came, Abdoulaye Wade has managed Senegal like his own family. The resources of the country have been totally diverted for personal gain.” Not only has Wade elevated his family members to positions of importance (Mbow 2008), but he has also shown a misunderstanding of his role as a public servant. This misunderstanding

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is best illustrated in his handling of the huge statue (taller than the Statue of Liberty) called “African Renaissance” that he apparently designed and had built by North Koreans for around $27 million. Putting the other issues that have been raised about this statue aside, Wade has claimed that, as the designer, he should receive 35 percent of the earnings produced from tourist visits to the statue (Sy 2009). Wade’s achievements in expanding Senegal’s infrastructure, overseeing increases in agricultural output, increasing foreign direct investment, and promoting impressive levels of economic growth (until the global economic recession impinged on Senegal’s growth prospects) should not be ignored (Galvin 2009, 493; “Cherish that Democracy” 2007). Wade, however, is no Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s first prime minister who is credited with transforming Singapore from an undeveloped former British colony to an advanced industrialized country. The damage Wade has done to any sense of civic morality must be weighed against his development achievements.14 Unfortunately, despite Wade’s achievements, unemployment is high, prices for necessities have increased, and decent housing has become less and less affordable for the average Senegalese (Polgreen 2008). Ethnicity and Religion In the immediate post–alternation period, it seemed fair to say that primary identities were irrelevant to political action and organization in Senegal. In a continent rived by ethnic strife, as many have observed, Senegal has seen little mobilization along ethnic lines (Cruise O’Brien 1998; Villalon 1995; Gellar 2005). While Djibo Ka’s entrance onto the political scene in 1997 may have initially given rise to what appeared to be some ethnic voting, this tendency toward ethnic identification was not robust. Indeed, in the first round of the presidential elections, Djibo Ka, who is of Fulbe origin, failed to win majorities in numerous departments inhabited mainly by Pulaar-speaking peoples. The ethnic and regional arithmetic applied to choosing ministers appears to have remained constant across the Diouf and Wade governments. While the language may seem a bit disconcerting, the attention paid to representing different groups in the government may well be one of the reasons Senegal has been free from spontaneous and continuous ethnic strife. (As Beck [1996] notes, patronage is more important than ethnicity in Senegal.)

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In the election of 2000, religion seemed to decline in importance in the electoral process. One indicator of this decline was the reluctance marabouts exhibited in assigning ndigels or commands on how their followers should vote. This hesitancy was obvious in the 1988 elections, the last year the Khalife Général15 of the Murids issued such a command (Gellar 2005, 118), and then again in the elections of 1993. Perhaps more significantly, the marabouts’ respective disciples generally did not follow the commands that were given. In the 2000 election, Serigne Modou Kara lived to regret both his command to vote for Diouf and his prophecy of Diouf’s victory, and Cheikh Tidiane Sy would have done better to remain silent on issue of the candidate to be chosen, as well. In addition, in the presidential elections of 2000, those candidates with explicitly religious orientations and agendas, namely Cheikh Abdoulaye Dièye and Ousseynou Fall, captured only a miniscule proportion of the vote. These two candidates who presented religious platforms received a combined total of a mere 2.08 percent of the vote. On the other hand, Dièye and Fall are both marabouts. Notwithstanding their poor showing in the election, simply the fact that they ran for office could be cause for concern among those who value a secular state. Gellar (2005) sees their contestation of the 2000 election as an indication that Senegalese political life may be embarking on a new path (119). The line between between the civic sector and religious sector has become increasing blurred since Wade’s ascension to power (Mbow 2008, 160). Indeed, many events pertaining to the behavior of the current president, Abdoulaye Wade, have given rise to tensions surrounding the issues of the Sufi orders, state neutrality, and secularism. President Wade’s preoccupation with manifesting the full extent of his “Muridness” has been disconcerting to many Senegalese who are not in the Murid Brotherhood. Subsequent to his historic election in 2000, President Wade made several high profile trips to see “his marabout,” the Khalife Général of the Murids, and even knelt before him. On one occasion, he made a special trip to Touba to receive prayers before a trip to France, and said had his marabout told him that it was an inauspicious moment to go to France, he would not have gone. Such behaviors breached the former ruling party’s norm that “no preferential treatment would be accorded on confessional lines” (Villalón 2004, 66). The political public was probably much more comfortable with the very close relationship between Senegal’s first president, President Senghor, who was a Christian, and the late Murid

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Khalife Général Falilou Mbacke. The relationship between Senghor and Mbacke was clearly instrumental in nature, and so it did not seem threatening to those who were not Murid or who supported the secular state. Of concern to some are also the Islamic reformist groups who are critical of the “maraboutic model” of Islam or Sufism, as well as of the secular state. In her (re)assessment of the Muslim brotherhoods, Creevey finds that the state of affairs in the 1980s was a bit different from the preceding period (1985, 717). Creevey observes that different Arab countries are financing religious education, student scholarships, and mosque construction in Senegal (717). Religious families in Senegal have sent sons to be educated in North Africa and the Middle East who “come home vocally aware of the laxity of some Senegalese practices” (717). Villalón (1999) notes the challenges that are being made to “the maraboutic model” by an inchoate reformist movement. According to Villalón , this reformist movement is reflected in the striking increase in the number of female university students who are taking the veil. In 1990, only a negligible number of students were wearing the veil, but in 1999, up to 10 percent of female students were doing so (138). On the other hand, Loimeier contends that Islamic reform groups, which have existed in Senegal in some form since the 1950s, have become “essentially political opposition movements” (2000, 183) and, as such, do not “sell any more” (186). Villalón observes, however, that it seems that the economic and political troubles of the 1990s and the changes which took place after the 2000 alternation of executive power “have provided a more hospitable climate for the development of Islamist ideologies and the strengthening of such groups” (2007, 165). Moreover, the differences between the Sufi and the Islamist groups have eroded as many Sufi groups have incorporated the concerns of Islamists into their positions (Villalón 2007, 163). Loimeier offers a sanguine assessment of the state of religion and politics in Senegal: “. . . the case of Senegal illustrates that Islam reform and opposition movements can be integrated into the social and political structure of a society and thus develop in a rather peaceful way” (2000, 169). Others, such as Mbow, express concern about the ways in which the differences between religious groups and political parties have been obscured, and contend that secularism is critical for stability and democracy in Senegal (2008, 162). Serious issues are being raised about the state of religion and politics in Senegal. Some religious groups have even engaged in violence (Mbow 2008, 162). Wittman (2008) describes the powerful influence religious leaders have on the media in Senegal.

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Particularism, Neopatrimonialism, and Political Parties There are some other forces that could pose challenges to the establishment of a fully democratic system of governance. As noted at the beginning of the chapter, neopatrimonialism has proven to be a resilient organizational form in Senegal as it has managed to “reinvent” itself across different historical periods and circumstances. In Senegal, the notion of transaction is embedded into each political action and affair. Although the ethnic and regional arithmetic applied to political representation serves a desirable end, perhaps what is disconcerting is the language of reward woven into discussions of regional/ethnic representation. People speak of areas receiving only so many ministers, although Wade received a high proportion of the vote in that particular location. Indeed, members of groups that “delivered” a large number of votes to Wade feel that they deserve some type of recompense. Although the idea of exchange in politics is ubiquitous, the particularism, extreme self-interest, and short time horizons surrounding people’s expectations and demands are striking in the Senegalese context. Personal relationships of all kinds are pursued with the hopes that they will offer some type of material payoff and exemplify very nicely Hyden’s (2006) conceptualization of the “economy of affection.” The expansion and intensification of poverty due to the economic crisis has also probably served to inspire and reinforce the desire for immediate gratification among many Senegalese citizens. This individualistic and myopically instrumental behavior seems at odds with the solidarity and collective orientation so prevalent in Senegalese culture. Although in the past Senegalese may have been indeed very instrumental in their political behavior, such instrumentalism was not as short-term in nature as it seems today. Clients developed relationships with potential patrons with the hopes of obtaining payoffs in the long term. Thus, even in fundamentally unequal, hierarchical relationships, long-term reciprocity was the rule. The tendency to defer gratification generated some stability in the relationships and, therefore, voting behavior among people, especially in regions like the Fouta Tooro in northern Senegal. Those in the new generation appear to have much more of a short-term orientation than those of the preceding generations. The clash between individual interests and aspirations and party interests and aspirations has also been nearly ubiquitous across time and space. However, with the onslaught of this short-term orientation, the viability and meaningfulness of political parties in Senegal must be

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questioned. Defection from one party to another by party leaders, as well as by rank and file party members, has become commonplace. These defections almost never seem motivated by issues of ideology or policy, but rather by individual interest-maximizing calculations. Moreover, because most party attachments are based on personal relationships, as soon as a leader leaves a party, they take with them their base. As noted earlier, the defections of Niasse and Ka and the subsequent loss of support of their followers largely induced Diouf’s defeat. The PS experienced innumerable defections at all levels of the party after the defeat of Abdou Diouf. A number of highly placed PS leaders defected to the PDS after the 2000 election largely because they wanted to be affiliated with the party with access to state resources (Gellar 2005; Galvin 2001). In the 1998 election for the National Assembly, the PS received 50 percent of the popular vote. Three short years later, in 2001, the PS received only 17 percent of the vote. Thus, the PS vote share dropped by 33 percentage points. The PDS vote shares for those two elections are almost the exact reverse. In 1998, the PDS received 19 percent of the vote while in 2001 the PDS received 50 percent of the vote for an increase of 31 percentage points. I am aware of no significant changes in the PS’s platform to explain such a change. Clearly, even the general public appears to want to be aligned with the party controlling state resources. Party platforms appear to have very little salience. Although the profundity of party attachments in Senegal has perhaps never been great, in the past the vote shares captured by various parties remained fairly stable from one election to the other. However, as the political system has become more and more competitive, political behavior and attachments have become less stable. Clearly, in the past, party attachments did not manifest huge fluctuations from election to election. Party identification is now in flux among party militants as well as the general public. Of course, the rhetoric of the PS scarcely indicated that its party leaders had undergone any democratic maturation or learning due to the election that threw them out of power. Instead, their rhetoric after the 2000 election indicated that not only do they see power as an end itself, but also that they do not even perceive a need to pretend otherwise. The idea that the government should be working for the general public good does not seem to have penetrated the consciousness of most party officers. For example, although many would say that Tanor Dieng, the general secretary of the PS and director of the Diouf presidential campaign,

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was, in the words of one PDS officer, “the engine that drove Diouf’s defeat,” he refused to accept such responsibility. Demonstrating a complete lack of introspection, Dieng insisted that he did his share in the elections by delivering the majority of votes to Diouf in his “fief.” The approach of the PS more generally indicated a lack of reflection, as party leaders were occupied with no loftier a goal than identifying the strategic errors made in the 2000 campaign so that victory could be achieved in the next competition. The PS leadership refused to resign. Perhaps members of the PS leadership and Dieng, in particular, have reaped what they have sown in eschewing any need for introspection and change. Indeed, in 2007, Dieng received only 14 percent of the vote in his bid for the presidency on the PS ticket. The practice of power sharing has helped stimulate the proliferation of political parties. Political nobodies often establish a political party in the hope of becoming a representative or minister in the government. As opposed to generating cohesion, power-sharing, as practiced in Senegal, has given rise to party fragmentation and proliferation. Of course, the electoral system is also responsible for the high level of fragmentation and proliferation among parties. The phenomenon of personal rather than party attachments has also contributed to party fractionalization and splintering. As many others have remarked (e.g., Gellar 2005; Mbow 2008), party politics in Senegal today seem relatively unaffected by considerations of ideology and political conviction. Not surprisingly, many rank-and-file members of parties do not seem to have a deep comprehension of the platforms and policy orientations of the parties for which they militate. The perception a person has of the head of the party largely determines their affectation toward the particular party. Furthermore, the prevalence of personal attachments within parties has given rise to factions and clan politics. During the PS’s long tenure in power, receiving political rewards and payoffs was often not only dependent on whether one supported the PS, but also whether one had supported the correct political clan or tendance (Beck 1997). The issues of tendance not only continue to plague the PS, but have also been reborn in the AFP and the ruling PDS. Although the instrumentalism and particularism that seem to characterize people’s political orientations may pose problems for the consolidation of democracy on the one hand, on the other hand, these forces seem to help suppress mobilization along more emotionally laden identities, such as ethnicity. Thus, there may be some type of a trade-off between

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this individualized instrumentalism and the importance with which ethnic and religious identities are imbued. According to Cruise O’Brien (1975), Senegal’s communal harmony emanates from the existence of crosscutting cleavages (157) and “the framework of clan competition,” (181) and Schumacher (1975) largely echoes this point. In short, as others have noted (e.g., Cruise O’Brien 1975), the challenges and obstacles to the development of an orderly and viable nation-state Senegal has confronted have been considerable. During the 1990s, the world saw several sub-Saharan African states descend into anarchy and horrific violence. That Senegal emerged into the twenty-first century as nearly a full democracy with only one baleful communal conflict in the south was, indeed, no mean achievement. Prospects for the Future Senegal is at a critical point in its political life. The Senegalese political sphere is in a state of flux. According to Gellar (1995): Skillful political leadership, the support of Senegal’s Muslim leaders for the regime, the commitment to democratic values and traditions on the part of most of the Senegalese elite, the professionalism of the military, and a political culture that prefers to resolve conflicts through dialogue are all factors contributing to Senegal’s long-standing political stability. (21) Much has changed in Senegal since 1995. Senegal has gone from semidemocracy to full democracy, and then back to semi-democracy in just over a decade. The extent to which these forces are being reinforced or eroded is a critical question. This study sheds light on some of the forces that shape political culture. Like all complex phenomena, the state in which African countries find themselves can be attributed to many causes. One should not ignore the effects of colonialism and international factors on the politics and political outcomes of African countries. But domestic factors also clearly play a prominent role in generating political, social, and economic outcomes (Chazan et al. 1999). Much has been written about the rapacious autocrats who have monopolized political power and drained state resources in countries across sub-Saharan Africa (c.f. Bates 2008; Reno 1999; van de Walle 2001). Even the princely, well-intended, post-independence

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leaders usually have had to rely on clientelism to consolidate their power. In his description of the Senegalese political scene, Schumacher (1975) uses a quote from a one of President Senghor’s16 speeches before the UPS National Council to capture the predicament faced by the political leaders trapped in the system they have helped create: When I say “politics,” you guess it, it is not, alas, a question of the etymological meaning of the word. It is not a question of the art of governing the State for the public welfare in the general framework of laws and regulations. It is a question of politician politics: the struggles of clans—not even [ideological] tendencies—to place well oneself, one’s relatives and one’s clients in the cursus honorum, that is the race for preferments.17 What makes political reform so difficult is that it is not rational for any one party to repudiate clientelism when others continue to engage in it. In order for well-intended political leaders to be able to reform the political system in Senegal, citizens have to manifest a certain level of “civicness.” On the other hand, citizens would be even more severely exploited if they did not make forceful demands on political officials who were enriching themselves and their entourage with state resources. It seems that citizens and politicians are trapped in some sort of existential prisoner’s dilemma from which there is no exit. The public in general and the peasants in particular have been the big losers in the postcolonial state. Yet, does the citizenry, who, in many cases, has suffered greatly, not need to transform itself to some degree? Are people willing to accept a situation of “fair play,” where they have no possibility of getting ahead through social connections? Will they accept a political leader who does not make grandiose displays of generosity as well as opulence? Are they willing to allow members of their social networks to do their jobs, without pressuring them to deliver special benefits? Are people willing to do all that they can for themselves before relying on and fatiguing relatives and members of their social network? In short, are citizens any less attached to clientelism than politicians? The idea that leaders should be generous with their followers precedes colonialism and is thought to still influence the way some people view politics, and colonialism has certainly reinforced this view. When addressing the situations of countries like Senegal, it may seem perverse to look in any way toward the citizens, who have endured much and yet continue

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to show a strength of spirit that can only inspire admiration. However, in his political novel about the postcolonial West African state, Anthills of the Savannah, Chinua Achebe (1987) makes clear that any type of societal transformation requires change at the level of the individual citizen, and everyone must be accountable. As Diamond notes in his review essay, “If revolution is called for, Achebe is telling us, it must be a revolution in values, directed first at individuals and individual action” (1989, 442). Essentially, Achebe is exhorting the African public to manifest a more civic orientation. Beck (2001) offers an interesting interpretation of the Murid merchants’ refusal to pay taxes to develop the Murid’s holy city of Touba in 1997. According to Beck, this refusal shows the revival of the “civic,” since it shows citizens are trying to render the government accountable. An alternative interpretation is that this act shows a lack of civicness, since the “citizens” of Touba rejected their responsibility to contribute to the public goods and services of which they were to be beneficiaries. In any case, democracy requires that citizens manifest a degree of “civicness” in their political orientation. The truth is, Senegal is not as corrupt as many other African countries, based on assessments by Transparency International. Senegal ties with six other countries for the 99th position out of 180 countries on the Corruption Perceptions Index. Within Africa, Senegal shares the 14th rank with Madagascar and Zambia, out of the 47 countries for which there are data. Thus, 31 African countries are rated as more corrupt than Senegal by Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).18 This is rather cold comfort, however, given that Senegal’s score of 3 indicates that, according to Transparency International, “corruption is perceived as a serious challenge by country experts and businessmen.” Moreover, CPI scores across time indicate corruption is on the increase (Maguire 2010). Senegal has been able to claim many “firsts” and democratic achievements. In my experience, Senegalese have high standards for how they think government officials should behave. They are not satisfied with making favorable comparisons between Senegal and other countries in the region. In his forward to the report on quiet corruption, Ezekwesili (2010) notes that the most important tool in eradicating “quiet corruption” is increasing citizen participation. Achebe’s protagonist in Anthills of the Savannah probably speaks the truth when he observes, “Experience and intelligence warn us that man’s

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progress in freedom will be piecemeal, slow and undramatic” (1987, 90). By inspiring a more active civic orientation, NFE is thought to be one of the forces that help drive this slow and mundane progress and, thus, it is critical to begin to assess the effects NFE actually has on participants’ political behaviors and attitudes.

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CHAPTER 3

Historical Overview of the Senegalese Educational System

Formal education is more often than not responsible for the cultural dichotomy characteristic of these [African] countries, which have, on the one hand, a privileged, alienated, imitative culture and, on the other, the neglected, national, culture of the people. In most cases there is no contact between these two cultures, which take no notice of each other, although they live side by side. —Babacar Sine (1979, 30)

E

ducation has long been recognized as a requisite, if not the key, to elite status. Critical theorists, such as Bourdieu (1989), have dedicated manifold pages to explicating the social reproduction function of education, and social scientists of all disciplines have emphasized the important role education plays in the socialization/culturation1 process. Many of these scholars, however, have assumed that the educational system of interest is an outgrowth of that society in which it is embedded. How does the relationship between education and variables such as those just mentioned change when the educational system of interest did not spring from the society in which it actually operates? Such is the question one must ask when problematizing the colonial educational systems of French-speaking West Africa. The quote from Sine would have us to believe that the rupture created by the formal education system between the schooled and unschooled is absolute and irreparable. Yet such a stark

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depiction of formal education and its effects does not seem to comport well with the complex and ambiguous reality it is meant to describe. While the French prominently displayed their civilizing mission, many are extremely skeptical about the extent to which the French really set out to create “black Frenchmen.” Indeed, many would instead claim that the French intended for the formal educational system to produce loyal auxiliaries to implement the colonial imperative on the African masses. Still others would claim that the French colonialists were most interested in creating a productive work force. In short, identifying the goals of the French is a complex, ambiguous task. The “Civilizing Mission” Assimilation and Direct Rule The French policy of direct rule and assimilation has been the subject of much discourse on colonialism, especially as it was configured in French West Africa. Many have pointed out that the British, who were in theory committed to indirect rule, ended up practicing direct rule in some places, while the French found themselves ruling through power structures already in place in some of their colonies. However, Crowder makes the important point that whatever these colonial powers did in practice, their stated goals were different. The French claimed the cultural and political assimilation of those colonized as their objective, while the British maintained that their goal was to render those colonized ready for self-government (1962, 1). Indeed, Conklin notes that the French actually raised their self-articulated mission to civilize the indigenous people in their colonies to official imperial doctrine. Implicit in this doctrine were the underlying beliefs of the superior nature of French culture and “the perfectability of mankind.” Hence, while members of the colonized population were unable to govern themselves, they could be transformed (1989, 1). Creating an elite was seen as the first stage in the assimilation process (Mercier 1965, 167). In his 1970 article, Clignet critiques the idea of assimilation in African colonial education, noting that assimilation is one possible outcome of colonial education. He offers accommodation as the other likely response. According to Clignet, assimilation is “a process of generalisation, inward-oriented, incorporating new situations into a pre-existing framework or analysis of action” (1970, 426). According to Clignet,

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“[A]ccommodation involves a process of specification. As such it is outward-oriented, modifying pre-existing schemes of analysis and action in order to maximize their fitness to for a new situation” (1970, 427). These two concepts have important implications both for the Africans and the colonizers. Assimilationist strategies on the part of the colonizers imply essentially transplanting metropolitan structures and modes of operation from the metropole to the African scene. Accommodation on the part of the colonizer would mean adopting practices and structures which differ from those of the metropole. Clignet contends, “an ‘assimilationist’ policy carried out successfully by European powers involves accommodation by Africans, while an ‘accommodationalist’ policy allows African assimilation of European practices” (1970, 426). While we may not expect the configuration of European/African interaction to be as clear-cut as this, Clignet’s model does provide a useful lens through which we can view colonial/African interaction in education. Yet the above discussion applies mostly to questions of overt ideology held by the French colonialists. How, if at all, does the idea of “assimilation” apply to colonial educational policy? Goals of Colonial Education in A.O.F. Sabatier identifies two principal goals for the colonial education system in French West Africa: (1) to spread the French language and a basic education suited to the African milieu, and (2) to create “a carefully limited number of indigenous auxiliaries whose loyalty as well as competence would be beyond question” (1978, 247). It is this latter goal that was most successfully met by the French, according to Sabatier. On the other hand, Sabatier claims that underneath all of the “rhetoric” of assimilation and the black Frenchman: . . . the French never intended to create indigenous elites who might effectively compete with them, nor did they want Africans so Gallicized that they could not work effectively as mediators between French colonial civilization and their untutored compatriots. (1978, 248) Sabatier claims that whatever the rhetoric wrapped up in the “civilizing mission,” the primary goal of the French educational system was to supply the “manpower” needed for the operation of the colonial state

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as inexpensively and efficiently as possible (1977, 13). The ambiguity Sabatier identifies in the goals held by the French with respect to colonial education is reflected in ambiguous and conflicting educational policies. According to Clignet, French educational policy vacillated between being assimilationist and accomodationist in nature. Upon the failure of teaching methods imported from France, teachers tried to Africanize some of the curriculum (1970, 429). After the Second World War, however, in response to the objections raised by West African elites about the inferior nature of colonial schools, the French colonialists adhered fairly closely to an assimilationist policy so that education in the AOF paralleled closely that of France (Cignet 1970, 429). Yet this may still be too linear a depiction of French educational policy. Conklin takes the position that educational policies (among those of other domains) illustrate that the Government General did not see transforming Africans into Frenchmen as part of the civilizing mission (1989, 79). In fact, French ideology as manifested in education revealed a commitment to idea that Africans should evolve in African culture not French culture (81). I will examine key features and events in the evolution of colonial education in Senegal and the AOF below. The Roots of Public Education in Senegal Education in the nineteenth century was largely supplied by missionaries. Louis Faidherbe, who was appointed Governor of Senegal in 1854, was especially dedicated to spreading “French civilization.” While, ideally, he may have wanted religious conversion to be part of the planned cultural colonization, he perceived that, given the overwhelming adherence to Islam, that would not be possible (Crowder 1962, 12–13). Hence, he saw the French language as the primary median through which French civilization could be transmitted, particularly in the schools (de Lauture and Doria-Husser 1981, 31–2). He augmented the educational institutions in Senegal, creating a school for the sons of chiefs and secular schools (Crowder 1962, 12). 1841–1903:2 The Schools of the Ploermel Brothers and the Trading Post Schools Much of the teaching was confided to the Ploermel Brothers who opened Catholic schools in Goree and in St. Louis, Dakar, Rufisique,

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and Zinguinchor. Not until 1899, however, was the curriculum brought in line with those of France (Vandewiele 1983, 508). According to de Lauture and Doria-Husser, by 1903, the Ploermel Brothers had taught some 12,000 children in St. Louis and 9,000 children on Goree. Altogether, for the country as whole, they taught between 25,000 and 30,000 students by 1903 (1981, 31). Conklin points out that the schools of the four Senegalese communes (Goree, St. Louis, Dakar, and Rufisque) stand in stark contrast to the “poor educational record” held in the rest of French West Africa prior to 1903 (1989, 83). By 1903, the whole of the Christian population in the four communes had been educated (Conklin 1989, 84). The educational system was incorporated into a wider system that was for all of the French West African Federation and secularized at the start of the twentieth century. The need for post–primary schooling was recognized and several such institutions were subsequently created between 1903 and 1913: L’Ecole Faidherbe, L’Ecole Normale de St. Louis, L’Ecole Pinet-Laprade, and many other institutions (de Lauture and Doria-Husser 1981). Appointed as head of the federation in 1902, Ernest Roume, and those who came after him, stood in opposition to assimilationist policy. Curriculum was to mix Western technical know-how and French morality with African cultural references (Conklin 1989, 87). In the ten-year period from 1903 to 1913, some 200 new schools were created and the number of students jumped from 5,000 to between 11,000 and 12,000 (96). Figures from 1913–1914 indicate that Senegal benefited disproportionately from colonial educational efforts: it had 48 schools, 4,500 students, and 100 teachers (from a Gouverneur General report cited in Conklin 1989, 96–7). Conklin notes that most of those educated did not go on to be efficient farmers but rather found employment in the administration or engaged in commerce (1989, 97). The Period of Development: 1913–19603 According to Bouche, when Georges Hardy arrived in Dakar in 1912 as Inspector for French West African Education, he found “contested institutions which were struggling to get along” (1974, 7).4 Hardy wanted to invigorate the educational system. The governor at that time, William Ponty, redefined the objectives of public schools. According to him, the goal was not to create bureaucrats or workers, but to

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render one aware of the economic activities of the region (de Lauture and Doria-Husser 1981, 72). Thus, “village schools should transform without uprooting the inhabitants” (Ponty cited in de Lauture and Doria-Husser 1981, 72).5 Moreover, Hardy started a teaching bulletin, expanded the educational opportunities available to those in the interior of the country, and tried to make the curriculum relevant to the lives of the students (de Lauture and Doria-Husser 1981). His very attempts to render schooling more accessible and relevant led him to be criticized by African elites for creating “inferior” schools (de Lauture and Doria-Husser 1981, 74-75). Still, as Kelly points out, the vast majority of the population of West Africa did not have access to schooling. By 1938, in Senegal, only 9.5 out of every 1,000 potential students went to school (AOF Bulletin statistics cited in Kelly 1986, 172). In 1947, only 12.4 percent of school age children went to school in Senegal. However, this rate was much higher than those for Guinea and what was formally called Soudan, which were 1.3 and 5 percent, respectively (Crowder 1962, 4). Further, although the curriculum may have come to include more material on Africa, such material did not necessarily create an authentically African experience for the students. Kelly critically assesses the way in which African society and culture is depicted in the curriculum. She contends that although indigenous institutions were not disparaged, most institutions were simply not mentioned. African societies were portrayed as though they were “lacking in history, identity, and coherence” (1984, 535). In a later article, Kelly makes a stronger argument regarding the marginality schooling generates on the part of the learner. Based on her study of interwar French Africa, Kelly argues that students learned that they were neither like uneducated Africans nor like the French. Hence, they were in a school culture apart from all others to which they were linked. Through the school texts, they learned to see themselves and their cultures “through the eyes of an outsider” (1986, 173). Assessing the Results of Colonial Education Formal Education and Social Stratification According to Sabatier, under colonialism, Western education was the key to social mobility in the modern sphere of the AOF (1977, 6). Wallerstein

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echoes this point, “The great medium of advancement was the educational system and the great goal of advancement was administrative work” (1965, 3). Wallerstein notes that the centralized nature of the educational system augmented its coherence. In the immediate pre-independence period, Mercier observes a trend toward less social mobility (1965, 170). He notes that social groupings are tending to become more crystallized. This trend is reflected in the stabilization of employment across generations, and cites a survey implemented in urban Dakar that yielded results showing that of the respondents were largely in the same occupational categories as their fathers (171). Mercier notes the emergence of a new, relatively small intellectual elite that can be differentiated from the former colonial elite. This moreeducated elite possessed greater professional expertise and was able to occupy positions hitherto held only by Europeans. Western education, especially that of a nontechnical type, did in fact appear to drive social stratification in the modern sector. In the words of Mercier, “high prestige, more or less definitely acknowledged by the whole population, crystallizes around professions, functions or situations which are considered to be ‘intellectual’ –implying in fact a minimum of Westerntype learning” (1965, 168). Formal Education and Cultural Schisms The results of Sow’s 1966 study of 234 bureaucrats in the central administration of Senegal point to links between formal education, lifestyles and elite status. Sow also looks at the relationship between level of education and lifestyle, and finds that there is a positive relationship between level of education and adoption of European ways of life. For example, the percentage of administrators claiming to wear only European or European and African clothes as opposed to just African clothes increases quite steadily with educational level. While a full 45 percent of those with only primary education claim to wear African clothes only, none of those with doctorates claim to do so (1972, 187). The same type of relationship exists for the manner in which one eats. Sow notes that it is those with the highest level of education that are the most influenced by Western lifestyles. She also observes that level of instruction often corresponds to salary levels (1972, 188). Hence, Sow’s study indicates important relationships among education, lifestyle choices, and elite status.

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In fact, the formal educational system created a sort of hybrid social group that was composed neither of “black Frenchmen” nor those simply trying to imitate Frenchmen. It seems fairer to say that colonial schools introduced an extremely powerful means of social stratification onto the African scene. In retrospect, as others have alluded, the elite it created seems more like a semi-elite, always below the French in status. It seems as though embarking on the formal educational route was a socially and psychologically ambiguous experience. As part of her multifaceted study of Dakar high school students in 1962, Francoise Flis-Zonabend surveyed 314 high school students. Flis-Zonabend finds that the chances of pursuing secondary school have a clear correlation with the residence of the respondent, the occupation of the respective head-of-household, and whether or not one belongs to the majority ethnic group (1968, 149). Flis-Zonabend did find there to be major ruptures between the schooled and unschooled and the schooled and their respective families. As evidence for this rupture, she points to the fact that only 48.1 percent of students’ fathers and 9.2 percent of their mothers even spoke French. More striking still is that 89.5 percent of students would never address their fathers in French and 96.5 percent would never speak in French to their mothers (86). Mercier argues that because of the foreign nature of the colonial educational system, it did not promote the incorporation of an individual into “his group,” but rather created a rupture (1965, 167). According to him, the assimilationist policies of the French tended to widen the chasm between the indigenous elite and the “masses,” who were still very attached to their traditional culture (168). In his words, “The real problems are those of the true integration of education into a developing social environment, its adaptation to various local situations, and the adjustments which must be made in the Senegalese people’s conception of education” (169). Sabatier also notes that West African villagers tended to be indifferent or antagonistic to Western education or those associated with it through the mid–1940s (1977, 7). To this extent, it seems that those obtaining diplomas in the formal educational system were put on a different (and mistrusted) trajectory than were the vast majority of people. Did education disrupt or reinforce traditional hierarchies? Clignet claims that, initially, a number of schools drew their student body from generally marginalized groups and, therefore, altered the traditional

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hierarchies by according those with formal education with some type of a formal position of employment (1970, 441). He continues, “Further, although schooling did not necessarily destroy traditional networks, it changed both the direction and the content of obligations traditionally binding individuals to one another” (441). On the other hand, we know that the children of notables were also directed into educational institutions. The unsatisfactory and incomplete answer to this question at this stage appears to be that it did both. The Legacy of the Colonial Educational Institution: A “Limited” Elite In the words of Sylla, “At the time of the independence in 1960, Senegal inherited a modern educational system that had been in operation for a long time, and covered the entire national territory” (1993, 372). However, Sabatier’s assessment of the colonial educational system is condemning: . . . it can be argued that by limiting both the number and types of indigenous auxiliaries, as well as the work they were trained to do, the French also severely retarded the development of French West Africa, to the loss of the metropole as well as the colonies themselves. (1978, 255) The French’s fear of creating dangerous uprooted types (déracinés) led the French to create a sort of “era of limits” in the colonial educational system, accomplished by limiting the number of educational slots and limiting the substance of the education provided Africans (Sabatier 1978, 247). Sabatier identifies four critical limitations in the French educational system, “the numbers of students educated, in their curriculum and their diplomas, and in the careers that awaited graduates” (255). On the one hand, the French wanted the formal educational system to serve as one of the primary means of acculturation. On the other hand, the colonialists wanted the educational system to prepare Africans for the type of work that was seen as appropriate for them to do. Perhaps more importantly, the French did not truly want full assimilation to take place (Bouche 1975). The ambiguity of the goals of the French is reflected in the ambiguous effects generated by the French educational system.

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Conklin makes a similar point. She speculates that one of the reasons for the lack of clarity in the French educational policy is that the French held contradictory goals (1989, 98–99). Let’s examine the balance sheet for colonial education as it looked around the time of independence. What did the French do? They succeeded in creating a group of Senegalese semi-elites who could act as mediators vis-à-vis the African masses and fill administrative positions. What did the French not do? They did not succeed in fully acculturating those schooled. They did not succeed in internalizing in the Senegalese what was to be their inferior status in the colonial system. Finally, they did not succeed in providing an education that would render large numbers of Senegalese more efficient in the primary economic activities of the time. That is, formal education failed to contribute, to any significant degree, to the mis en valeur imperative of the time.6 The Current Educational System in Senegal Unfortunately, the performance of the postcolonial formal educational has also been disappointing. Formal education in Senegal continues to be conducted in French and resembles the French school system. For the large majority of the Senegalese population, however, French is not an effective means of communication. According to the 2006 World Development Indicators, Senegal’s literacy rate is only 42 percent. The literacy rate for women is 33 percent. Writing in 1997, Rideout and others observed that Senegal was confronting “a staggering educational problem” (5). Senegal had adopted the goal that 75 percent of school-aged children would be enrolled in school. With the number of school-aged children expanding, and Senegal unable to achieve that enrollment rate while allocating 35 percent of its budget to education, the goal seemed unattainable. In fact, after ten years, Senegal had nearly achieved that goal. The expansion of access to primary education has been impressive, with 72 percent of children in the eligible age group enrolled in primary school in 2007. The completion rate for primary school, however, is only 50 percent, and the percentage of children of eligible age enrolled in secondary schools is only 22 percent. Fagerberg-Diallo (2002) notes that the extremely high failure rate on the 7th grade entrance exam. Each year, 75 percent of those who take the exam fail it or are otherwise separated from the formal education system. Such is the case because

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the institutions of higher education are simply unable to accommodate them (1–2). In addition, Rideout and others (1997) identify many of the problems associated with the nature of formal education aside from enrollment levels: “the quality of the education provided,” “the internal efficiency,” “the external efficiency,” and “the value and relevance of schooling” (5). Such problems continue to afflict the formal educational system (Ndiaye 2006; Niane 2004). Many have criticized formal education in Africa for being overly academic and not teaching the skills and subjects needed for people to be productive participants in the economy (e.g., Griffiths 1994). These issues have been especially salient in Senegal. Across Africa, NFE is largely seen as an antidote to formal education’s failings (Rogers 2005). Nonformal education programs emerged in Senegal to fill the gaps left by the formal education system. These programs are conducted in African languages and are usually informed by the culture and exigencies of the target populations. In the 1950s, UNESCO began sponsoring mass literacy campaigns in Senegal (Fagerberg-Diallo 2002). The Senegalese government created the National Department of Literacy (DA) in 1971. This department became the Department of Literacy and Basic Education (DAEB) and began to promote the integration of literacy into different development projects (Fagerberg-Diallo 2001, 158). Still, until the 1990s, most programs were administered by national or international nongovermental organizations (NGOs). The Senegalese government began to become a more prominent actor in the NFE sector in the 1990s, partly as a result of international and national meetings and colloquia (Ndiaye 2006, 223; Sall and Diagne 2006, 5). The theme emanating from the 1990 Jomtien Conference in Thailand, “Education for All” (EFA), helped render salient the issues of education and literacy (Nidaye 2006, 223). Two colloquia in Senegal, that in Kolda in 1993 and that in St. Louis in 1995, gave rise to an NFE policy framework for Senegal (Sall and Daigne 2006, 5). As of 2001, some 1,322,381 Senegalese people had been touched by a literacy program.7 In other words, a reasonable estimate of the percentage of those 15 years of age and older who have had some type of NFE is about 24 percent. Based on estimates using the entire Senegalese population, around 13 percent of Senegalese have been involved with NFE.8 These figures are fairly consistent with those of Nordtveit (2008) who notes that the DAEB reported in 2003 that “over 1 million persons— or about 10 percent

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of the entire population in the country—had been enrolled in NGOmanaged literacy projects financed by the World Bank, the Senegalese government, and CIDA” (189). This 2003 DAEB figure does not incorporate those touched by programs such as the Programme Intégré de Podor (PIP) and Tostan. Thus, the percentage of Senegalese adults reached by NFE could be higher. Moreover, as will be discussed below, programs such as Tostan have expanded their operations tremendously over the past decade. In this book, I examine the relationship between formal education and political participation and attitudes in a context where the educational system of interest did not spring from the society in which it actually operates. I also explore whether more “authentic” forms of education (i.e., nonformal education conducted in national languages) affect civic/ political participation differently than formal education. The Four NFE Programs of Study The study focuses on four NFE programs, each of which is characterized by attributes that make it especially interesting for examination and comparison. PIP The Programme Intégré de Podor (PIP) is a project of the prominent Senegalese non-governmental organization (NGO) Union pour la Solidarité et Entraide (USE). PIP has had a strong presence in the Fouta Tooro in northern Senegal, where it was established in 1975 as a measure to help counter the negative effects of the Sahelian drought (Ruijter 1997). The PIP project is active in Podor and Matam, which were both departments in St. Louis at the time of the survey. Although PIP’s activities initially centered on ameliorating physical infrastructure and hydraulics, its scope of activity has expanded to include work in the areas of health, agro-forestry, savings and credit, environmental protection, and literacy (Ruijter 1997). In 1985, PIP decided to experiment with working in literacy, and employed teachers from the Association pour la Renaissance du Pulaar (ARP) to begin five literacy classes in northern Senegal. Founded in the 1960s, the ARP had decided at its 1982 congress that spreading literacy would be their main activity (Fagerberg-Diallo 2001). Between the time it began working in the area of literacy and 2001, PIP trained

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upward of 37,500 people. PIP has worked almost exclusively in the area of Pulaar literacy (classes are taught in Pulaar in 96 percent of its centers) and has had the benefit of having its work supported by a zealous and dynamic Pulaar literacy movement. The PIP methodology comprises three levels. In the first level, one masters writing, reading and very basic arithmetic. This part of the program lasts 240 hours. In the second level, one masters grammar, spelling and more advanced arithmetic. This phase is estimated to take 240 hours to complete. Most centers administer the first two phases of the program. In the third level, one engages in more advanced study of the subjects mentioned and begins the study of different topical areas such as health, the environment, community management, etc. (Ruijter 1997, 7). While some have claimed the PIP program can be completed in six months, the duration of most classes seems to be two years. Two NGOs that also work in the area of Pulaar literacy have served to strengthen PIP’s performance in the field. The Associates for Research and Education for Development (ARED) and the Centre d’Etudes pour la Recherche et la Formation en Langues Africaines (CERFLA) are two related NGOs that work in areas related the Pulaar language in Senegal. The PIP program uses the well-respected basic literacy curriculum developed by ARED, whose curriculum modules range from modules on basic literacy and math skills to those on subjects pertaining to leadership, health, legal, and environmental issues.9 Both ARED and now CERFLA have trained many of the PIP teachers. Part of this training covers how to use the participatory method of teaching. Aside from decreasing the illiteracy rates in the Fouta and transmitting reading, writing, and math skills, PIP has two rather interesting goals: (1) “reinforcing the cultural identity of the populations,” and (2) “opening a window to the world” (Ruijter 1997, 7).10 Tostan Tostan is a 501(c)(3) NGO that was created in 1991. Tostan means “breakthrough” in Wolof, a theme reflected in its educational program. Tostan’s success has been truly phenomenal. Tostan’s scope of activities and areas of operation have expanded significantly since the survey was conducted in 2000–2001. By the time of the survey, Tostan had trained more than 18,834 adult villagers in nine regions of Senegal. Tostan worked mostly

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in Wolof and Pulaar, and had a solid curriculum and pedagogy. Tostan has now worked in ten African countries, and more than 200,000 people have completed Tostan’s program (Tostan Our Community Partners).11 Tostan has become internationally known for its role in the movement to end female genital cutting (FGC). Not only has the geographical reach of Tostan’s program expanded significantly, but the nature of its program has evolved, as well. These changes can be perceived in the goals listed in some of Tostan’s documents. According to a mission statement posted a few years ago, Tostan is “focused on empowering villagers to take charge of their own development and participate fully in society.” A more recent document posted on Tostan’s current website states the mission is “to empower African communities to bring about sustainable development and positive social transformation based on respect for human rights.”12 Thus, Tostan now appears to emphasize the community even more than in the past. Since Tostan’s program is dynamic and changing, I focus my description on the program as it existed around the time of the survey. Tostan’s traditional program is organized around “community development” themes. The basic Tostan program comprises six modules, each of which represents a thematic area such as problem-solving, water, health, leadership, or financial management. Each module lasts two months, and, traditionally, the timeline for the basic program was 18 months.13 Tostan has also produced four continued education modules, including modules on human rights and democracy14. Tostan has promoted self-development through its curricular materials. The underlying themes of Tostan’s program include social transformation and mobilization. These themes are reflected in the program methodology. In Module 1, learners are introduced to problem-solving skills. A five-step problem-solving process is presented, beginning with “identifying and analyzing the problem” and ending with “implementing the solution” and “evaluating the results.” The problem-solving skills gleaned in Module 1 are reinforced throughout the remainder of the program, and it is fair to say that the “problem-solving” approach informs the entire program. In the program documents, the importance of allowing debate and deliberation in the literacy classes is emphasized. Tostan uses “social mobilization activities” to buttress that which is learned in the actual classes. Such activities include theater, poetry readings, and debates. Tostan is a vibrant program that has received international attention.15

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Those within Tostan villages are responsible for providing food and housing for the facilitator. Initially, facilitators came from within the village where they worked. As the program has grown in complexity, facilitators with more sophisticated skills have been recruited to serve in the Tostan villages (Easton, Monkman, and Miles 2003, 447). Classes usually comprise somewhere around 30 students. Tostan has attempted to provide follow-up income-generating activities in the villages which have adopted its educational program. In her qualitative study of Tostan, Barro (2005) finds that the Tostan educational experience empowers women. This study will allow us to see if there is quantitative evidence to support this conclusion. PAPA and PAPF Only since the 1990s has the Senegalese government become a notable force in the area of basic literacy and NFE. In 1993, the Senegalese government created a five-year action plan that included as one of its planks the reduction in the illiteracy rate by 5 percent each year. Two of the large-scale efforts initiated in the area of NFE included Projet d’Appui au Plan d’Action en matière d’ éducation non formelle (PAPA) and Projet Alphabétisation Priorité Femmes (PAPF). PAPA covered the regions of Zinguinchor, Kaolack, Tambacounda, Thies, and Saint Louis, while PAPF covered the remaining five regions: Diourbel, Fatick, Kolda, Louga, and Dakar. Both PAPA and PAPF adhered to the strategy faire faire. That is, instead of administering literacy classes themselves, PAPA and PAPF used local opérateurs or organizations to implement the classes in the field and thereby promote civil society. The model is essentially one of public–private partnerships. Funded by the World Bank, PAPF’s major objective was to train 135,000 people between 15 and 39 years of age, of whom 75 percent should be women (PAPA’s objective was to have classes of at least 65 percent women). PAPF offered models of ideal programs, but freedom was left to the local opérateur or provider to establish the timeline and content of the program. In general, according to the interviews and organizational documents, opérateurs have administered the program in 10 months, 12 months, or, at most, 18 months.16 Providers were supposed to establish about 20 classes, with around 30 participants in each class. The training was to be for 450 hours (Nordtveit 2005, 11). PAPF also had the goal of supplying post–literacy income–generating activities. However, only 8 percent of the

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participants in the literacy courses actually were able to engage in the post– literacy activities (Nordtveit 2005, 11). Nordtveit (2008; 2009) offers a very critical assessment of the faire faire or partnership approach. His analysis focuses on the PAPF, although he notes that the problems he identifies apply to other programs using the partnership model in Senegal (2009, 150). In fact, PAPF is considered one of the most successful partnership programs. The World Bank puts the number of learners who enrolled in courses through PAPF at about 200,000 and the number who actually attained literacy skills at about 87,000 (Nordtveit 2008, 189). Nordtveit’s assessment is much less sanguine. He found that around 180,000 people had enrolled in the program and only 44,000 of them “can be considered successful” (2008, 190). The reasons for the less-than-superior outcomes associated with this program probably emanate from the incentive system created by the program. Providers were allotted a certain amount of money to administer the literacy projects, but providers also wanted to maximize the money they were able to keep. Since the monitoring system was lacking, the providers cut costs on the critical ingredients of the program, such as textbooks and teacher training (Nordtveit 2009, 150). Not surprisingly, Nordtveit (2009) found that many teachers did not employ the methods thought to be appropriate for adult learning (83). Feedback on the operation and results of the program led to the reform of PAPF. It is now called the Integrated Adult Education Programme (PIEA). Responding to community needs and providing ample training are two of the concepts informing the new approach (UNESCO 2009). Others have also noted the problem with the partnership model. Kane (2000) calls the effects of the faire-faire model on literacy programs “devastating” (160). According to him, this model has increased “people’s appetite in such a way that there is now a new race of literacy entrepreneurs whose main aim is only to be eligible in the organization of literacy classes in order to be funded by on-going bilateral or multilateral literacy projects” (2000, 160). Many of the same dynamics which characterized PAPF applied to PAPA, as well. As noted, PAPF was actually considered one of the most successful partnership programs. PAPA was funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Between the time it begun to administer its programs in 1996 and the time of the survey, PAPA had trained more than 200,000 adults. Although PAPA developed a model curriculum, basically the local organizations had total freedom in choosing the curriculum and content for the classes they

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administered. PAPA’s program followed two different timelines. Some classes met five months a year for two years, while others met for only six months during one year. These four programs of study differ in some important ways. Nonetheless, these programs have all played significant roles in Senegal’s NFE sector. Assessing their effects is therefore of great importance.

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CHAPTER 4

Studying Political Behavior and Attitudes in Rural Senegal

A

s noted, NFE has become widespread in rural Senegal, where many adults never had an opportunity to attend a formal school. This book examines how NFE has affected the political behavior and attitudes of rural Senegalese. A probability sample of 1,484 Senegalese citizens was drawn in the regions of Thies, St. Louis,1 Diourbel, Louga, and Kaolack and interviews were conducted between the end of October 2000 and the beginning of April 2001. The design was intended to generate a sample that would allow one to assess the effects of the four different NFE programs in the rural areas of the five regions mentioned above. To minimize the selection effects of focusing on just one NFE program, or just villages and individuals who participated in them, the sample was designed to assure diversity of program experience across regions and ethnic groups. These five regions have a fairly high concentration of NFE programs. Senegalese citizens who were at least 18 years old and who lived in rural areas in the five regions of study constituted the target population. Sample Design2 A multi-stage, stratified, area cluster probability sample design was employed.

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Selection of primary sampling units The village constituted the primary sampling unit (PSU). Selection of PSUs was stratified by region and NFE program. Villages were selected with probability proportionate to size (PPS). In other words, the probability of selection associated with any particular village was exactly proportional to its share of the total population in the region. These villages included “treatment” villages (i.e., villages where NFE programs had been conducted) and control villages.3 Randomized selection techniques were employed at each stage of the sampling process. Respondents in the control group were selected in two ways. In each NFE village, four “control” households were also randomly selected. The respondent was then randomly selected at the household level. In the non-NFE villages, 16 households were randomly selected, and then respondents were randomly selected at the household level. This method of selection was chosen to minimize threats to the validity of the study. On the one hand, had all of those in the control group been chosen from the NFE villages, one could have argued that those who live in a village where there is an NFE program but did not participate in it are somehow different from those in the NFE program from the start. Hence, any differences between NFE and non-NFE respondents could be attributed to differences that preceded the NFE program. On the other hand, had all of our control respondents been chosen from non-NFE villages, one could claim that differences in villages were responsible for the observed differences between treatment and control groups. In fact, both types of control respondents are found in the sample. Moreover, I include a plethora of control variables in the analyses in order to minimize the possibility that some third variable correlated with participating in an NFE program is actually responsible for any observed relationships. The issue of “selection” is thoroughly addressed in Chapter 6. Six hundred and eighty four respondents are classified as not having had NFE and constitute the “comparison” group (48 percent of the sample), while 799 respondents are classified as having had NFE (52 percent of the sample) and constitute the treatment group. The mean years of NFE among those with NFE is 2.4 years, with a standard deviation of 1.6 years. The overall sample mean was 1.3 years, with a standard deviation of 1.7 years. The most NFE any respondent reported having is 10 years.4 (See Appendix A for additional information on the method and sample.)

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Conceptualization and Operationalization Formal Education versus Nonformal Education Although formal education and NFE should both affect political behavior and attitudes, I expected the effects of these two educational forms on participants to differ for several reasons. First, the social experiences associated with these two educational forms are very different, for the reasons enumerated. Second, a year of formal education entails more hours in school than does a year of NFE. Third, the age during which an individual has the relevant educational experience differs between NFE and formal education.5 I operationalize formal education as the years spent in a learning institution officially sponsored or recognized by the state. I operationalize NFE as having participated in one of the four NFE programs intended to impart basic literacy and numeracy skills to participants. The NFE variable is comprised of five levels. The first level of NFE is comprised of those who have had no NFE through one of the four programs at all. The second level of NFE is comprised of those who have had one year or less of NFE (but more than zero years). The third group contains those who have had no more than two years but more than one (in reality, all of those in this group have had two years of NFE). The fourth group contains those who have had no more than three years but more than two years. And, finally, the fifth group is comprised of those who have had more than three years of NFE. Years of formal education and level of NFE are not highly correlated (r = .12, p = 0.000). Only 33 percent of those with NFE have had any formal education. Koranic Education In his study of the Islamic schooling in Mali, Brenner characterizes traditional Koranic schooling as having “an esoteric episteme 6 in which layers of meaning are revealed gradually as an individual progresses through successive stages of learning. Young children learn to recite the sacred text of the Qur’an by rote and without being taught its meaning” (Brenner 2001, 19). In contrast, in médersas, “religious studies were being taught alongside secular subjects in accordance with the same pedagogical principles employed in state schools” (5). Brenner characterizes the médersas as having a “rationalistic” episteme.

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The Franco–Arab schools of Senegal are similar to the médersas and very much like formal schooling in nature (André and Demonsant 2009). Since those in the areas of our study had very little access to Franco–Arab schools and were quite likely to have Koranic education, this study focuses on traditional Koranic schooling. Traditional Koranic schooling in Senegal often involves children memorizing verses of the Koran. Since the Koran is in Arabic and the overwhelming majority of Senegalese do not know Arabic, the Koranic students of Senegal are usually unable to extract substantive meaning from the verses they memorize. Most students do not study long enough to reach the stage where they will learn the meaning of the memorized verses. In addition, the nature of Koranic schooling in Senegal renders it unlikely to encourage critical thinking skills. On the other hand, Koranic schooling also gives individuals an opportunity to enter milieus where they encounter people outside of their immediate families. Thus, they might be exposed to new ideas and, perhaps, become more likely to think independently. Since Koranic schooling involves a form of group participation and is thought to promote pro-social behaviour, it may encourage community participation. In this study, Koranic education is operationalized as whether or not one has had any Koranic schooling. A majority (57 percent) of the respondents in the sample have had at least some Koranic education. The mean number of years of Koranic education for the sample as a whole is 2.5 years, while that for only those who have had at least some Koranic education is 4.5 years. Koranic schooling is not correlated with either formal education or nonformal education. Koranic education is operationalized in this manner for a few reasons. Of the 845 respondents claiming to have Koranic education, 48 did not know how many years they had studied the Koran. Thus, more than 3 percent of the sample is dropped from the analysis when years of Koranic education is used in the equations. In addition, when years of Koranic education is used in the models, Koranic education is still found to have very little effect on the dependent variables of interest. Literacy versus Education Generally speaking, literacy refers to the ability to read and write, but it has been conceptualized in a variety of ways. Oxenham defines literacy as “a means of embodying language in visual form” (1980, 19). Many of

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the modernization theorists appear to have conflated the effect of literacy with that of schooling. Literacy is the building block of most types of education. However, based on their study of the effects of the three different literacies operative among the Vai of Liberia7 (n = 650), Scribner and Cole (1981) conclude that one cannot separate the effects of literacy from the manner in which it is used. They distinguish between schooled and nonschooled literacy. Scribner and Cole (1981), like Street (1995), point out that much more than simply reading and writing is learned in school. Hence, it is often difficult to distinguish between the effects of literacy and the particular social conditions associated with an educational experience, whether nonformal or formal. Scinto (1986) is not in agreement with the idea that one can sort out schooling and nonschooled literacy. He argues that, in the case of the “essayist” type of literacy, the profundity of one’s literacy skills corresponds very closely to the amount of schooling one has had. My purpose in this study is not to enter into this debate. I simply compare the effects of three different types of education on political behaviors and attitudes. Civic Participation Political participation is a multidimensional concept (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1971; Bahry and Silver 1990). Verba, Nie, and Kim (1971) identify four modes of political activity: campaign activity, communal activity, voting, and particularized contacts (contacting public officials regarding a personal problem). They then assess these different “modes” of political activity with reference to several dimensions, such as the scope of the outcome, initiative involved, and degree to which cooperation with others is necessary. This study comprises all of the modes of political participation (more specifically, community participation, community contacting, personal contacting, and voting) except campaign activity because it is too rare in rural Senegal to be of interest.8 The indicators for political participation include electoral participation and individual contacting (see Appendix B for a complete description of all of the variables used in this study). In order to measure electoral participation, I look at whether respondents voted in the second round of the presidential election, the outcome of which resulted in an alternation of executive power. One must recognize, however, that electoral participation and civic participation are not necessarily one and the same in Senegal. Machine politics dominate the political scene, and

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voting behavior is heavily influenced by patronage considerations and the mobilization efforts of political parties. Indeed, the lack of policy debate during electoral campaigns (Mbow 2008) reflects the sometimes personal interest-driven, myopic nature of the political sphere in Senegal. Nonetheless, since elections are considered the essential element of modern democracy, it is important to examine electoral participation. With reference to individual contacting, individuals were asked whether they had contacted nine different public figures in order to obtain help with regard to both community and personal problems. Although Verba, Nie, and Kim (1971) include contacting officials regarding a social problem (what I call “community contacting”) as part of communal activity, I do not, since this behavior does not involve interaction with others in the community. Both communal participation and community contacting involve a concern with the public good, which is reflected in their level of correlation (r = .37). Particularized contacting and community contacting are highly correlated (r = .55) because they are similar types of behavior requiring similar levels of initiative, but the scope of the goals associated with the activities is very different. The indicators for communal/community participation include whether one reports (1) cooperating with others to solve a community problem; (2) belonging to a community organization; (3) holding a leadership position within an organization; (4) speaking out at meetings at least occasionally; and (5) getting together with others to raise an issue. (For an explanation of why community participation should be considered a dependent variable as opposed to an independent variable, see Appendix B.) For each of these items, the value of the indicator is one if the respondent reported ever engaging in the relevant activity and zero otherwise. The values of these indicators were added to create the community participation index. Social and Political Attitudes Several social and political attitudes are of interest, as well. One might expect that, if authoritarian attitudes are widely held among the citizenry, it may be hard for democracy to fully take root. Thus, this study examines the effects of different types of education on authoritarianism/progressiveness. The indicators of authoritarianism measure the extent to which one thinks that a traditional authority figure should

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dictate political behavior and the extent to which one accepts the rights of women to engage in the political sphere in an independent manner. Tolerance and an appreciation of the political rights and civil liberties of others are also important values associated with democracy. Thus, the concept of support for democratic values is measured by indicators of the extent to which one is willing to extend the political right of voting and civil liberties such as free expression and association to others. Individualization encompasses the level of autonomy one has from others in terms of one’s thoughts and actions. This study focuses on an individual’s propensity to form opinions that differ from those in one’s solidarity group. Social trust, political efficacy, and ethnic pride are also examined. The operationalization of all of these concepts can be found in Appendix B. Qualitative Research In 1989–1990, I spent eight months in one of the 50 villages in the Region of Kolda participating in the Culture for African Development (CAD) NFE program, observing the program. During the summer of 1993, I conducted a survey of 11 out of 13 participants in one Pulaar NFE class in Guedewaye, a low-income suburb of Dakar. I also surveyed 32 PIP village literacy teachers who were being trained by ARED9 in the northern town of Ndioum. During the summer of 1996, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 24 PIP literacy teachers in northern Senegal. I also interviewed several of those involved in the coordination and administration of NFE literacy courses in St. Louis, Richard Toll, Dagana, and Ross Bethio. I observed numerous NFE classes in St. Louis at this time. In 1998, I visited NFE classes for all of the programs covered in the survey throughout the country of Senegal and interviewed NFE participants at each of these sites. I also interviewed the directors of all of the programs covered in the survey. Similarly, in 2000–2001, I conducted numerous qualitative interviews as well as administering the survey. Applicability to Other Contexts It is likely that many of the findings of this study could be generalized to Senegal as a whole and to other contexts, especially those in Africa. First, that part of the Senegalese population not included in the study

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resemble those in the study in many ways with regard to ethnicity, age, gender, and income, among other characteristics. Second, many of the patterns of relationships found in this study are very comprehensible and are likely to be applicable to other contexts. Third, education does appear to have some sort of universal effects. That is, the findings of this study are consistent with the findings of qualitative studies and other quantitative studies on the subject. Fourth, many of the forces affecting those in the study, such as traditional culture, extended family structures, a rural setting, and a low QOL are applicable in other settings. As noted earlier, a conservative estimate of the percentage of adults who have been involved with NFE in Senegal is 24 percent. Nonformal education is in no way unique to Senegal. Such programs are found in the majority of sub-Saharan African countries. The programs have been a significant force in countries across West Africa, and some attempts have been made to share information and strategies pertinent to NFE among practitioners in the different countries in this region. In addition, NFE programs are found all the way down to Africa’s southern-most tip. Although it is difficult to find any global estimates of the percentage of the population of people across sub-Saharan Africa who have been touched by NFE, some of the information on individual programs is instructive. In South Africa, the goal is for NFE to reach about 30 percent of adults who are not functionally literate (Walters 1999). Nonformal education or adult education programs are spread around the globe, and exist in significant numbers in the developing world and developed world alike. Rogers (2005) observes that programs with the appellation nonformal education are proliferating in many different countries (171). Directorates, departments and divisions involved in NFE are receiving more notice and support (Rogers 2005, 171). Because of the need to address low literacy rates in developing countries, NFE has gained a certain salience in such countries. Nonformal education has been a prominent force in Latin America since the 1970s (Liam 2001), and has also become a presence in Asia. Subasi and Kehrberg (1998) report that one NGO, the United Mission to Nepal (UMN), began a district-wide program in Jajarkot District (population 120,000) in 1991– 1992. Between the start of the program and 1996, women’s literacy rate increased from between 2 percent and 8 percent to between 12 percent and 23 percent. Men’s literacy rate went from between 12 percent to 32 percent to somewhere between 51 percent and 58 percent, according to

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Subasi and Kehrberg (1998). In short, the findings of this study have implications not only for the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, but for countries around the globe. As already noted, the issue of rival explanations (internal validity) will be thoroughly addressed in Chapter 6.

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CHAPTER 5

NFE and Political Attitudes and Behavior

I

n the qualitative interviews that I conducted, respondents enthusiastically described the ways in which NFE had transformed them and other villagers. They often described how they had become more efficacious and confident and, therefore, more active in the community as a result of the NFE experience. They also claimed that people’s demeanors had changed as a result of literacy training. According to interviews, the NFE experience renders participants more aware of themselves and of others. Those with NFE gained a sense of independence as well as more of an appreciation for the autonomy of others. Based on my qualitative research and the literature, it seemed possible that those with NFE would be more likely to participate politically than would those without NFE. And although NFE would promote engagement with others in the community, it would also promote the process of individualization, as those with NFE would gain the confidence to form opinions independently of others. Further, they would be generally more likely to embrace more democratic attitudes. Does NFE, in fact, have the effects it is claimed to have? Are those villagers with NFE more likely to be active in the community than villagers without NFE? Are those with NFE more likely to be politically active than those without NFE? Does NFE promote the adoption of democratic, progressive attitudes? Does NFE facilitate or hinder the development of interpersonal trust? This chapter examines and assesses the results of the bivariate analyses. The crosstabulations allow us to obtain

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an idea of the degree to which those with NFE and those without NFE really differ in terms of political behavior and attitudes. The results of the multivariate analyses, which rigorously interrogate the bivariate findings, are presented in the next chapter, in which the issues of rival hypotheses and threats to the internal validity of the study results will also be carefully treated. In these bivariate analyses, those who had NFE are compared with those who have not had NFE. The bivariate tests are actually quite conservative in some ways. Those with less than a year of NFE are still included in the “treatment” group. Moreover, those respondents with no more than a year of literacy training make up 29 percent of the treatment group.1 (Please consult Appendix B for the question wording of the indicators.) Civic Participation Community Participation It was hypothesized that those villagers in the regions of study with NFE would exhibit higher levels of community participation than their counterparts without NFE. This hypothesis is strongly supported by the results of the bivariate analyses. One indicator of community participation is whether people have ever cooperated with others to solve a community problem. Cooperation is a key variable, since it is through collective action that the general welfare of communities can be pursued, and cooperation is a core aspect of “social capital.” The chi square test of independence is used to determine whether relationships are statistically significant in these bivariate analyses.2 The percentage difference of those reporting to have cooperated to solve a community problem between those with NFE and those without is large and statistically significant (p = .000) (see table 5.1). Although only 38 percent of those without NFE report having cooperated to solve a community problem, 58 percent of those with NFE report having done so, for a difference of 20 percentage points. Thus, those with NFE are substantially more likely than those without NFE to work with others to address problems in their respective villages. This finding is consistent the testimonies of NFE participants who claim that NFE has led villagers to engage with each other in addressing the problems that confront the community. In addition, Kuenzi

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Table 5.1 Summary of findings regarding the relationship between having NFE and exhibiting certain civic behaviors and attitudes Those without Those with NFE NFE N

%

N

%

682 684 684 684

38 60 35 51

798 799 799 799

58* 86* 63* 70*

683

18

798

47*

684 706

51 38

798 790

58* 56*

680

52

788

63*

669

60

797

73*

673

33

796

44*

649

35

789

49*

666

52

794

60*

670

46

793

59*

Community Participation Ever cooperated to solve community problem. Belong to a community organization. Speak out at meetings at least on occasion. Gotten together with others to raise issue at least once. Hold at least one leadership position in an organization. Political Participation Voted in second round of presidential election. Ever contacted an official about community problem Ever contacted an official about personal problem Authoritarianism/ Progressiveness Percent choosing, “Every family member should be free to make up his or her own mind on political issues.” Percent choosing, “Everyone should decide for whom he or she is going to vote for him/ herself.” Percent choosing, “A woman should exercise her right to speak out about politics, even if her husband disagrees.” Traditionalism Percent choosing, “We may need to abandon some of the traditions that have blocked our development.” Percent choosing, “In this age of rapid change, the most important virtues for a child to learn are curiosity and open-mindedness.”

Continued

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Table 5.1 Continued Those without Those with NFE NFE N

%

N

%

Think those who are not literate should have the right to vote.

677

75

796

76

Percent choosing, “All people should be permitted to vote, even if they do not fully understand all the issues in an election.” DISAGREE or strongly disagree that if people want to form a community organization, they should affiliate with the ruling party. Percent choosing, “If people have different views than I do, they should be allowed to express them.”

673

43

797

53*

668

19

784

28*

654

74

792

77

675

81

793

75*

652

31

786

27

670

46

792

44

684

68

799

84*

684

67

799

79*

683

63

799

79*

684

63

798

77*

659

80

788

82

Support for Democratic Values

Interpersonal Trust Percent choosing, “For the most part, you can depend on people to help you out, when you are in a pinch.” Percent choosing, “Generally speaking, most people can be trusted.” Percent that thinks that “People are more inclined to help others than to look out for themselves.” Autonomy/Individualism At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of their relatives. At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of their friends. At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of other people in their village. At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of most other people in the country. Political Efficacy Percent choosing, “In discussions about politics with friends and neighbors, I can influence the opinion of others.”

Continued

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Table 5.1 Continued Those without Those with NFE NFE N Percent choosing, “I can usually understand the 659 way government works.” 657 Percent choosing, “As a community, we are generally able to make our elected representatives listen to our problems.” Percent choosing, “We can use our power as voters 668 to choose leaders who will help us improve our lives.”

%

N

%

49

791

45

70

792

70

79

789

79

624

71

745

83*

662

90

776

94*

Said they would choose [the ethnic identity group 661 of the respondent] as opposed to the identity of Senegalese if they had to choose between these two identities.

54

790

59

Ethnic Pride Agree or strongly agree that, of all groups in this country, [name of respondent’s ethnic group] are the best. Agree or strongly agree that they feel closer to [name of respondent’s ethnic group] than to other Senegalese.

*Difference in percentages between non-NFE and NFE respondents is statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance.

(1997) finds a strong, positive relationship between NFE and cooperating to solve a community problem among Pulaar-speakers in northern Senegal in a small pilot study. Skeptics of NFE might argue that people consider being involved in NFE as a way to confront the problem of illiteracy in the village and respond to the question with that in mind. Responses to a follow-up question reveal that this was not the case. Respondents who said that they had worked with others to address a problem were then asked to describe the nature of the problem they had addressed and were allowed to give up to three examples. In fact, the most commonly cited problem respondents reported cooperating to address was that pertaining to keeping the village clean. The second most commonly cited problem was addressing issues surrounding water

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(e.g., digging wells, etc.). In addition, respondents reported addressing problems related to development more generally by, for example, building a health hut, contributing to a group vegetable garden, and building mosques, among other activities. Out of the 725 respondents who report that they have cooperated with others to address a community problem, only 25 respondents report that they helped to address the problem of illiteracy, and only one respondent gave this as her sole example. Membership in a community organization is also an indicator of community participation. Since a flourishing civil society is an important requisite for a healthy democracy, I was interested in examining the relationship between NFE and membership in a community organization. Those respondents with NFE are more likely to be members of community organizations than are those without NFE. Indeed, there is a statistically significant relationship between having NFE and reporting that one is a member of a community organization (p = .000). Eighty-six percent of those with NFE report belonging to a community organization, while only 60 percent of those in the “control” group (i.e., those without NFE) do. Information was taken on up to three organizations in which the respondent reported being a member. With reference to the first organization (1,100 respondents report membership in at least one organization, compared to 395 and 113 reporting membership in two organizations and three organizations, respectively, so it seems reasonable to look at just the first set of responses) in which people claimed membership, the preponderance report membership in a village development association (31 percent). The second most popular type of organization is the woman’s credit circle (23 percent). From there, the membership is thinly spread across different types of organizations: youth groups, religious groups, Groupement d’Interet Economique (GIE), and official women’s groups that are associated with Federation Nationale des Groupements Feminins, among others. Although the testimonies of those involved in the NFE sector support the finding that NFE renders one more likely to be a member in a community organization, I wondered if people considered PIP or Tostan classes to be “village development organizations” and therefore responded yes to the membership question. This seems unlikely because, when asked about solving a community problem, only 25 respondents mentioned anything about NFE and only one respondent mentioned

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exclusively NFE. Still, I compare the distribution of responses between the NFE and non-NFE respondents who report associational membership. Among the NFE respondents claiming to be members of an organization, 32 percent say that they are in a village development organization. Among the non-NFE respondents reporting membership in an association, 29 percent claim to be in a village development organization. The “other” category could also be a repository of the responses of those thinking of NFE as a “community organization.” In fact, the difference in the percent of NFE respondents choosing the “Other” category and percent in the comparison group doing so is less than a percentage point. Thus, it seems clear that those with NFE were not thinking of their NFE classes when they responded that they were members of community organizations. In short, the relationship between NFE and group membership appears real. Finally, since Tostan attempts to create some type of incomegenerating activity as a follow-up to the NFE classes, one might claim that the relationship between cooperation and NFE is due to such follow-up activities. I also examined, however, the effects of the individual programs in bivariate analyses. In these bivariate analyses, I looked at specific subgroups and therefore physically “controlled” for ethnicity and region in many analyses. For the specific programs, the objective was to compare those who have participated in the program with those who reasonably could have, but did not. That is, I wanted to compare those who participated in the program with those who resembled them in terms of key characteristics. In all, I looked at six different sub-samples. Each NFE program was found to have a significant relationship with each

Table 5.2 Crosstabulation of number of community organizations in which one has membership and NFE Number of Organizations

Respondents without NFE

0 1 2 3 Totals

Respondents with NFE

39 46 11 3

14 48 26 12

(707) 100%

(773) 100%

Pearson chi2(3) = 176.0594 p= .000.

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indicator of community participation. Thus, Tostan’s follow-up activities are not responsible for the relationship we observe between NFE and community participation. The results of the bivariate relationships for the different sub-samples are not displayed in this book but are available upon request. Moreover, I examine the effects of the individual programs in the multivariate analyses in Chapter 6. A vibrant, diverse civil society is thought to nurture democracy. In addition, as noted in Chapter 3, the fact that Senegalese often have multiple affiliations that tie them to different people is thought to contribute to Senegal’s stability. I was interested in assessing the number of organizations to which people belonged. Respondents were asked about membership in up to three organizations. As can be seen in the cross tabulation (table 5.2), those with NFE are more likely to belong to multiple organizations than those without NFE. The relationship between number of organizations to which one belongs and NFE is statistically significant. Respondents were also asked about the frequency with which they speak out at meetings. There is a substantial difference between the proportion of NFE and non-NFE respondents who report that they never speak out. While only 35 percent of those without NFE report speaking out at meetings at least occasionally, 63 percent of those with NFE do. I was also interested in whether respondents had gotten together with others to raise issues. As can be seen in table 5.1, 70 percent of those with NFE report that they have gotten together with others to raise an issue, compared to 51 percent of those with no NFE. In addition, respondents were asked if they occupied a leadership position in the associations to which they belonged. As we see in table 5.1, while only 18 percent of those without NFE report that they occupy a leadership position, 47 percent of those with NFE report that they do. Electoral Participation The bivariate analyses offer support for the hypothesis that levels of political participation are higher among those with NFE than among those without. More specifically, the hypothesis that electoral participation would be higher among those with NFE than among those in the comparison group is supported by the results reported in table 5.1. While 58 percent of those with NFE voted in the second round of the monumental Senegalese presidential election of 2000, only 51 percent of those without NFE did so.

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Contacting Public Officials Individuals were asked whether they had contacted nine different public figures in order to obtain help with regard to both community and personal problems. As can be seen in table 5.1, those with NFE are much more likely to report having contacted an official about a community problem at least once than those without NFE. Although 56 percent of those with NFE report having contacted an official regarding a community matter, only 38 percent of those without NFE report having done so, for a difference of 18 percentage points. Those with NFE are also more likely to report having contacted an official regarding a personal problem then those without NFE. However, the difference is not as great as it is for community contacting, and a larger percentage of respondents appear to engage in particularized contacting. Fifty-two percent of those without NFE report having contacted an official about a personal problem, versus 63 percent of those with NFE. The results reported for contacting behavior seem to imply that NFE endows people with additional confidence to negotiate in the social world. In terms of democracy, it is more favorable to have people exhibiting a civic orientation by contacting officials about a community rather than personal problem. NFE seems to make more of a difference in community contacting than it does in personal contacting. Perhaps the group experience associated with NFE helps accentuate participants concern for the community and thus especially encourages participants to make requests related to the well-being of the community. Wolof respondents report soliciting the help of a marabout for help with personal problems with much greater frequency than they report soliciting the help of any other public official. In addition, the Wolof respondents report soliciting the help of a marabout more often than did the Pulaar respondents. These findings are consistent with the institutional trust findings reported in another work which finds that the Wolof are generally more trusting of the Muslim brotherhoods than are Pulaar speakers (Kuenzi 2007).

Social and Political Attitudes Authoritarianism/Progressiveness It was hypothesized that those respondents with NFE would be more progressive (or less authoritarian and less traditional) than their

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counterparts without NFE. This hypothesis is well supported by the bivariate results. Respondents were asked a set of questions that were intended to measure their level of progressiveness or authoritarianism. As noted in Chapter 4, these questions measure the extent to which one thinks that a traditional authority figure should dictate political behavior and the extent to which one accepts women’s independent exercise of their citizenship rights. For example, respondents were asked to choose between the declaration that all members of a family should hold the same political opinions and the declaration that all family members should be free to make up their own minds on political issues. Those with NFE are more likely to choose the declaration that family members should be free to make up their own minds than are those without NFE. Indeed, while 73 percent of those with NFE think family members should be free to make up their own minds, only 60 percent of those without NFE think they should be free to do so. This relationship is statistically significant. This finding suggests that, over time, NFE could lead rural citizens to make political choices in an independent manner and not simply vote in a block because of the directives of a political patron. The next indicator is based on another forced choice question. Respondents were asked to choose whether a married woman should vote the way her husband does or whether everyone should decide for him/herself for whom to vote. This indicator is related to NFE. Although a majority of respondents in both the treatment and comparison groups believe that a woman should vote the way her husband does, a significantly higher percentage of those with NFE believe that everyone should choose for themselves for whom to vote. While 33 percent of those without NFE opine that everyone should choose for themselves for whom to vote, 44 percent of those with NFE opine such. The third indicator of “progressiveness” again focuses on views toward women. Respondents were asked to choose between two declarations: 1) A woman’s place is in the home; women should not try to speak out about politics. 2) A woman should exercise her right to speak out about politics even if her husband disagrees.3

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Again, although a majority of respondents in both groups say a woman’s place is in the home, a much higher percentage of those with NFE (49 percent) than without NFE (35 percent) believe a woman should exercise her right to speak out about politics. The relationship is statistically significant. These results suggest that NFE increases the respect rural Senegalese have for the citizenship rights and autonomy of individuals, especially women. Women are key players in the rural development process. An increase in women’s ability to exercise their citizen rights could also improve their ability to push forward the development process.

Traditionalism Two indicators are intended to measure the extent to which people are open to change. Respondents were asked to select the statement with which they agreed most between the following two: 1) Our customs and ethnic heritage are things that have made us great, and certain people should be made to show greater respect for them. 2) We may need to abandon some of the traditions that have blocked our development. As can be seen in table 5.1, those with NFE are more likely to opt for the second declaration than are those in the comparison group. Although a majority of both groups feel that some traditions may have to be abandoned, 60 percent of those with NFE felt this way, compared to 52 percent in the comparison group. The relationship is statistically significant. The next indicator deals with the types of values to be nurtured in children: obedience and respect for authority or curiosity and open-mindedness (the latter option representing the progressive choice). Those with NFE are more likely to choose that curiosity and open-mindedness are the most important values to nurture in children than are those without NFE. The relationship is again statistically significant. These results suggest that those with NFE view culture as being more dynamic than their counterparts without NFE. Those with NFE also appear to have a greater appreciation for inquisitiveness.

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Support for Democratic Values It was hypothesized that those with NFE would, on average, be more supportive of democratic values than those who do not have NFE. Four indicators are used to measure support for democratic values. This hypothesis finds some support in the results of the bivariate analyses. Street (1995) observes that those who are not literate are being stigmatized and denigrated by the literacy campaigns in many developing countries. The first indicator is intended to assess the extent to which respondents respect the citizenship rights of others, particularly those who are not literate. Respondents were asked whether those who are not literate should have the right to vote. When we look at all respondents, the percent of NFE and non-NFE respondents who think that those who are not literate should have a right to vote is nearly identical. The second indicator is similar to the first, although it does not ask about literacy, per se. Respondents were asked to choose between the following declarations: 1) All people should be permitted to vote, even if they do not fully understand all the issues in an election. 2) Only those who are sufficiently well educated should vote. NFE is related to this indicator, with a larger percentage of NFE respondents choosing the first option than of non-NFE respondents. That is, those with NFE tend to opt for the declaration supporting the value of political equality with greater relative frequency than do those without NFE. Respondents were also asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement: “If people want to form a community organization, they should affiliate with the ruling party.” This question was intended to measure support for the right of association. Those who have NFE are more likely to disagree with this statement than those in the control group. The relationship between this indicator and NFE is statistically significant, with, only 19 percent of those in the non-NFE group disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with this statement, compared to 28 percent of those in the NFE group. The relationship is statistically significant. Overall, it appears that the majority of the sample does not fully appreciate the right to associate freely. The fourth indicator is also based on a forced-choice question (see Appendix B), which asked about peoples’ rights to express dissenting

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views. While the percentage of those with NFE who support the right to dissent is slightly higher than the percentage of those without NFE who do so, the relationship is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Interpersonal Trust As noted in Chapter 1, a sense of “we-ness” and solidarity are likely to emerge within NFE classes. The critical thinking skills introduced by NFE, however, are likely to make people more aware of themselves and their own interests and question some of the vertically imposed obligations to which they have been subject. Women, in particular, are subject to many different familial obligations. It was therefore hypothesized that interpersonal trust would decrease with NFE. This hypothesis finds only a little support in the results of the bivariate analyses. Again, forcedchoice questions were used to measure levels of trust. Respondents were asked whether they thought that nobody is going to care much about what happens to you or that you could depend on people to help you, when in a pinch. Those with NFE are less likely to opt for the more trusting response than those without NFE, and this relationship is statistically significant. Respondents were then asked if, generally speaking, most people can be trusted or if you can’t be too careful in dealing with people. Although a smaller percentage of those with NFE than those without NFE choose most people can be trusted, this second indicator does not register a significant relationship with NFE. Finally, respondents were asked whether people were more inclined to help others or to look out for themselves. Again, a slightly smaller percentage of those with NFE choose that people are more inclined to help others, but this indicator does not register a significant relationship with NFE. Autonomy/Individualism As noted in the introductory chapter, some scholars, such as Oxenham (1980) and Ong (1991), contend that literacy renders one more selfconscious and introspective. Oxenham (1980) also contends that, with literacy, people begin to think more for themselves and not just accept things on authority (51). Moreover, NFE is thought to foster feelings of autonomy among participants. It was therefore hypothesized that those who participated in NFE programs would exhibit higher levels of individualism than would those who have not participated in NFE

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programs. The respondents were therefore asked about the frequency with which they perceived that their opinions differed from (1) their relatives, (2) their friends, (3) other people in the village, and (4) other people in the country. In the bivariate analyses, I look specifically at those who feel like their opinions differ from the relevant group at least on occasion (i.e., those who did not choose “never”). Those with NFE are much more likely to report that their views differ at least occasionally from their relatives, friends, fellow villagers and fellow Senegalese than are the respondents in the control group (see table 5.1). All of these relationships are statistically significant. We see large differences between those with NFE and those without NFE. For example, 84 percent of those with NFE claim to at least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from relatives compared to only 68 percent of those without NFE, for a difference of 16 percentage points. The findings suggest that NFE does increase independent thinking among participants. The themes emanating from the qualitative interviews are consistent with these findings. Many respondents expressed the idea that literacy training had allowed them to explore and get to know themselves. They also spoke of being generally more aware and conscious than they had been previous to their literacy training. Interestingly, the metaphor of sleeping was frequently used by many when asked about the impact of literacy. In describing the effects of literacy on villagers, one respondent commented, “They are now more awake. They are able to document things, they are aware of everything that is happening in the world. The others [non-literates] are sleeping.” Another respondent referred to the individual responsibility required in the learning process in rather interesting terms: “Knowledge is not hereditary, you have to learn it. Also, you can’t borrow it.” Yet at the same time that the idea of getting to know oneself was stressed, respondents also strongly emphasized that they had become more social as a result of the literacy training. Political Efficacy It was hypothesized that those with NFE would tend to feel more politically efficacious than would those without NFE. The findings from the bivariate analyses do not offer support for this hypothesis. Paired statements were used to assess respondents’ feelings of efficacy.

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For example, respondents were asked to choose between these two statements: 1) In discussions about politics with friends and neighbors, I can influence the opinions of others. 2) As far as politics are concerned, friends and neighbors do not listen to me. Feeling capable of influencing the political opinions of others, as measured by this question, is not related to NFE. Respondents were also asked about the extent to which they were able to understand the way government operates. No relationship between feeling like one is generally able to understand the way government operates and NFE is found. Respondents were also asked about whether they felt that they could make elected representatives listen to them. Again, feeling capable of making elected representatives listen is not significantly related to NFE. Finally, respondents were asked to choose between: 1) No matter whom we vote for, things will not get any better in the future. 2) We can use our power as voters to choose leaders who will help us improve our lives. Opting for the second declaration is not related to NFE. NFE appears to increase personal efficacy, as evidenced in the qualitative interviews and the results showing that those with NFE were more likely to report speaking out in meetings and holding leadership positions in associations. However, NFE does not appear to have a strong effect on feelings of political efficacy. Thus, although individuals may feel efficacious in terms of those activities in their more immediate vicinity, they may not feel like they can affect those institutions that are distant from then, such as the National Assembly. Ethnic Pride As can be seen in table 5.1, the hypothesis that NFE is likely to inspire ethnic pride finds some support in the bivariate analysis. Although a significant majority of all respondents say their ethnic group is best,

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83 percent of those with NFE feel that their ethnic group is best compared to 71 percent of those without NFE. Similarly, although the vast majority, 92 percent, of the entire sample feels much stronger ties to the members of their ethnic group than other Senegalese, the percentage of those with NFE who feel stronger ties is still significantly higher than the percentage of those without NFE. Finally, respondents were asked if they would choose to identify themselves based on their ethnic group or as Senegalese if they were forced to make a choice. While a higher percentage of those with NFE (59 percent) than those without NFE (54 percent) opted for their ethnic identity, this relationship did not achieve significance at the .05 level. Although the relationship is not significant, it is interesting to see that the majority of respondents would choose to identify themselves based on their ethnic identity as opposed to their national identity. NFE’s positive relationship with ethnic pride is undoubtedly related to the fact that NFE is usually conducted in the participant’s maternal language. My interviews with Pulaar literacy teachers/facilitators and learners revealed the strong emphasis put on the Pulaar language itself. Many teachers and class participants alike said that they wanted to “push the Pulaar language forward” or develop the Pulaar language. Moreover, many respondents noted that they benefited from NFE because they were able to “master Pulaar” or “master their maternal language” through the training that they received. In fact, the idea of bettering oneself and further developing one’s language were intertwined for some. One respondent contended, “To respect yourself, you must respect your language; a language drives a culture. Therefore, when one doesn’t know one’s language, one is not cultivated.” One neo-literate man in the northern region of Senegal echoed this point of not being able to respect oneself without fully knowing one’s language (i.e., reading and writing as well as speaking a language), but added the point that when one does not respect oneself, one cannot respect another. Further, others expressed the notion that a country cannot advance unless the people know their own language. In addition, as noted in Chapter 1, the preservation of language and culture are goals explicitly associated with the Pulaar literacy movement, as well as the literacy movements for other groups. Since other factors, such as ethnicity and formal education, are likely to affect levels of ethnic pride, it is critical to examine these findings further in the multivariate

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analysis. Indeed, the bivariate relationships will be carefully scrutinized in multivariate analyses in the next chapter. Overall, the results of the bivariate results suggest that NFE does not simply have mobilization effects. The NFE experience appears to influence a number of attitudes. NFE does seem to change the way people see themselves and others in the ways described in the qualitative interviews. It seems to foster independence of thought. Those with NFE appear to have more of an appreciation of their own citizenship rights and those of others.

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CHAPTER 6

Explaining Political Attitudes and Behavior

I

n the last chapter, we examined the difference between the percentage of those with NFE engaging in a certain behavior or holding a certain attitude and the percentage of those in the comparison group doing so. The bivariate analyses support the hypotheses that NFE promotes civic participation, individualization, and the adoption of progressive, democratic attitudes. Yet many important questions remain unanswered. How do the effects of NFE compare to those of formal education and Koranic education with regard to our political orientations of interest? How much effect does each year of NFE or formal education have on the political orientation of interest? How might other factors affect the relationship between NFE and the political orientations of interest? The multivariate analyses allow us to address these questions. In this chapter, the hypotheses will be subjected to more rigorous statistical tests than in Chapter 5. Education and Civic Participation Community Participation and Leadership The bivariate analyses strongly support the hypothesis that NFE stimulates active participation in the community. Do formal education and Koranic education influence levels of community participation? The community participation index was created by adding all of the indicators for community participation listed in table 5.1 in Chapter 5. Thus,

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the indicators for communal/community participation include whether one reports (1) cooperating with others to solve a community problem, (2) belonging to a community organization, (3) holding a leadership position within an organization, (4) speaking out at meetings at least occasionally, and (5) getting together with others to raise an issue. For each of these items, the value of the indicator is one if the respondent reported ever engaging in the relevant activity and zero otherwise. The values of these indicators were added to create the community participation index. Because the community participation variable is qualitative and ordinal in nature, ordered logit is used to estimate the effects of the variables of interest on community participation. I control for potential confounding variables such as political engagement (three indicators), the frequency with which one reported getting news from the radio,1 efficacy (two indicators), age, gender, region, and ethnicity.2 The three indicators of political engagement are feeling close to a political party, level of political interest, and the frequency with which one discusses politics with others. For personal efficacy, one indicator is a measure of locus of control, based on a question in which respondents have to choose between whether accidental events or they themselves are primarily responsible for the way their lives have gone. The indicator of political efficacy is based on a question about the extent to which one feels as though they can influence the political opinions of others. (See Appendix B for the wording of the questions from which these variables were derived.) In addition, a dummy variable for whether the respondent came from an NFE village is included (NFE village). The goal of Tostan is actually to have village-wide effects. Participants in Tostan programs are instructed to share what they have learned in their classes with those who did not sign up for the Tostan program. This diffusion model appears to be successful. One study of Tostan’s female genital cutting mutilation/cutting program finds that “information from the program was diffused widely within the intervention villages” (Diop and Askew 2009, 307). Thus, including NFE village in the model renders the test more conservative. I do not include the number of organizational memberships in this model, since this variable is directly related to two of the indicators (membership in an organization and holding a leadership position in an organization) used to create the community participation index,3 although it is included in all of the other models. As can be seen in table 6.1, the hypothesis that NFE stimulates active participation in the community is supported by the results. Model 1 is

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Table 6.1 Determinants of different types of civic participation Estimation Method

Level of NFE Years of Formal Schooling Koranic Education Number organizational memberships Close to Political Party (1=yes) Political interest (2=very interested) Discuss politics (2=often) News from radio (5=every day) Locus of control (1=internal locus) Personal political efficacy (1 = efficacious) Income Age Gender Diourbel Thies Kaolack Louga

Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: Voted Community Community Personal in Presidential Participation Contacting Contacting Election Ordered Logit

Poisson Regression

Poisson Regression

Binary Logit

.474*** (.05)

.082*** (.013)

.073*** (.015)

.204*** (.061)

.0273* (.016) .165 (.108)

.518*** (.117) .201*** (.07) .325*** (.077) .123*** (.034) –.046 (.103) –.105 (.128)

–.014*** (.005) .102*** (.032) .286*** (.018) .596*** (.043) .136*** (.023) .188*** (.024) .056*** (.012) .114*** (.03) .082** (.042)

.005 (.005) .061* (.037) .192*** (.02) .468*** (.046) .047* (.025) .225*** (.027) 062*** (.013) .137*** (.034) .007 (.046)

.04** (.02) –.024 (.139) .417*** (.085) .57*** (.147) .107 (.089) .081 (.099) .018 (.043) –.039 (.133) .403** (.166)

.089*** (.034) .027*** (.004) –.22* (.124) –.028 (.203) .191 (.166) –.489*** (.199) .213 (.203)

.039*** (.009) .003** (.001) –.162*** (.035) .139** (.062) .140*** (.051) –.168*** (.066) .109* (.061)

.029*** (.01) .008*** (.001) –.307*** (.039) .277*** (.067) .152*** (.055) .045 (.07) .216*** (.067)

.11** (.046) .076*** (.006) .299* (.16) –.156 (.258) .421** (.212) .708*** (.252) .620** (.263) Continued

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Table 6.1 Continued Estimation Method

Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: Voted Community Community Personal in Presidential Participation Contacting Contacting Election Ordered Logit

Poisson Regression

Poisson Regression

Binary Logit

Pular

.062 (.165)

–.066 (.051)

.266*** (.056)

.277 (.212)

Wolof

–.224 (.146)

.094** (.042)

–.051 (.051)

.185 (.191)

.735*** (.141)

.199*** (.045)

.077 (.05)

.13 (.183)

–.691*** (.106)

–.715*** (.118)

– 4.846*** (.455)

1308 .15 1804.33 0.000

1305 .12 1009.69 0.000

1319 .20 357.16 0.000

NFE Village (1=NFE village) Constant Number of observations Pseudo R 2 LR chi2 Prob > chi2

1319 0.10 479.38 0.000

Notes: ***p < .01 for two tailed test; ** p < .05 for two tailed test; *p <0 .1 for two tailed test.

highly significant, and the estimated coefficient for level of NFE is positive and highly significant. Although the coefficient for years of formal education is significant and positive, it is only significant at the .10 level. Koranic education does not appear to influence community participation. The estimated coefficients for the control variables feeling close to a political party, expressing an interest in politics, discussing politics, getting news from the radio, income, age of respondent, and residency in a village that has an NFE program are all positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The coefficient for gender is negative and significant, indicating that women are less likely to participate in the community than are men. This finding is not surprising given that, in the societies under study, men tend to dominate the social and political structures. Residency in Kaolack is negative and highly significant, indicating those in Kaolack are less likely to participate in the community than are those of other regions of the country. The estimated coefficients for the ethnicity variables are not statistically significant. The coefficient

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for NFE village is positive and significant at the 0.01 level. This result is not surprising given that NFE is very likely to have “spillover” effects on those in the community. Nonformal education appears to stimulate a more vibrant community life in the villages where it is in place. Thus, those villagers without NFE also have more opportunities to participate in the community than would otherwise be the case. As noted, programs such as Tostan explicitly train program participants to share information gleaned in class with others in the village. In any case, level of NFE clearly has a separate effect on community participation. As can be seen in table 6.1, the relationship between years of NFE and community participation is highly statistically significant in the hypothesized direction, when the effects of other variables are controlled. Years of formal education, income, and age also have a positive impact on the likelihood of participating in the community. Thus, it appears that those with more resources, be they social or financial, are more likely to be involved in the community. The results fit nicely with the resource model of political participation, according to which those with the most resources, both social and financial, will be most likely to participate politically (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995). That age is associated with community involvement is not surprising, given the way prestige and responsibilities increase concomitantly with age in traditional culture. In order to assess the magnitude of the effect of NFE on political participation, I examine how the likelihood of having the highest level of community participation possible changes when the values for all of the explanatory variables but level of NFE are held constant.4 The sample means are used for all of the other explanatory variables. In table 6.2, the effect of NFE on the likelihood of having a high level of community participation is examined for Senegalese rural citizens. Since formal education is of interest, as well, changes in the likelihood of participating are also examined at different levels of formal education while the other variables, including NFE, are held constant. NFE is set equal to its mean. (Since Koranic education was found to have no effect on community participation, we obviously cannot examine the magnitude of its effect.) From table 6.2, it is evident that NFE increases the likelihood of having a very high level of community participation5 at an increasing rate. The likelihood of having a high level of community participation increases by only four percentage points with the first year of NFE, but increases by another six percentage points with an additional year of NFE. The likelihood of having a high level of

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Table 6.2 The effects of NFE on the likelihood of high community participation for rural Senegalese citizens Level of NFE

Likelihood 95% of High Confidence Community Interval for Participation NFE Level for NFE

0 years 0
Number of Years of Formal Education

Likelihood 95% of High Confidence Community Interval Participation for Formal Level for Education Formal Education

.07 .11 .17 .25 .35 * * * *

.06 to .09 .10 to .13 .15 to .19 .21 to .29 .28 to .41 * * * *

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 10 12

.12 .12 .13 .13 .13 .14 .14 .15 .16

.11 to .14 .11 to .14 .11 to .15 .11 to .15 .11 to .15 .12 to .16 .12 to .17 .12 to .20 .12 to .22

*

*

20

.20

.12 to .30

community participation increases another eight percentage points as one moves to the next level of NFE. At 24 percentage points, the difference between those at the lowest level of NFE (those with up to one year of NFE) and those at the highest level (those with more than three years of NFE) is substantial. The likelihood of having a very high level of community participation is 35 percent at the maximum level of NFE. We can also see that each year of NFE has a much larger effect on community participation than does formal education. Indeed, one year of formal education does not increase the likelihood of having a high level of community participation by even a full percentage point. Thus, while the relationship between formal education and community participation might be statistically significant, it does not appear substantively significant. This finding is consistent with the commonly held idea among NFE advocates that NFE is more based in the community than formal education and, therefore, tends to stimulate participation in activities that improve the community in ways that formal education does not.

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Community Contacting How does NFE affect the likelihood that one will contact a public official about a community problem? Respondents were asked how often, if ever, they had contacted nine different public figures in order to obtain help with regard to a community problem. The scores on each of the nine items were summed to create the community contacting index (again, see Appendix B for the question wording). Since community contacting is a count variable with a right skew, poisson regression is used to assess the effects of NFE, formal education and the control variables on community contacting. As table 6.1 reveals, Model 2 is significant, and the coefficient for years of NFE is positive and highly significant, as hypothesized. In contrast, the coefficient for years of formal education is negative and highly significant. This finding once again supports the idea that formal education does not stimulate concern for the community in the same way that NFE does. Having Koranic education significantly increases the likelihood of contacting an official about a community problem. Koranic education is intended to increase pro-social behavior, and it does appear to that Koranic education increases a person’s concern with the community. Koranic education may further embed individuals in social networks involving chiefs and marabouts and, therefore, increase their likelihood of consulting these people of authority when they have a concern about the community. The number of organizational memberships and all of the variables related to political engagement are positive and significant at the 0.01 level, as is getting news from the radio. The coefficient for locus of control is positive and significant, reflecting the fact that those who see themselves as responsible for their life situations are more likely to contact an official to improve the conditions of their communities. Personal political efficacy is also significant. Not surprisingly, those with higher levels of political efficacy have the confidence to ask a person of authority for help when they see problems in their community. The coefficients for income and age are both positive and significant. As in other areas of the world, such as the United States, those with more means are likely to be more politically active. As noted earlier, prestige and power increase with age in traditional society, so it is not surprising that those who are older are more likely to contact a public official. We would also expect those who are older to be community leaders who need to address community problems. The coefficient for

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gender is significant and negative. This result reflects the limitations put upon women’s mobility and interactions in the societies of study. On average, villagers living in some regions, such as Diourbel, Thies, and Louga, appear more likely to contact officials than in other regions, such as Kaolack. The coefficient for Wolof is also positive and significant, indicating that Wolof villagers are on average more likely to solicit help for the community from a prominent person than are villagers of other ethnic groups. Finally, the coefficient for NFE village is positive and significant at the 0.01 level, probably for some of the same reasons noted earlier with regard to community participation. Personal Contacting Respondents were asked how often, if ever, they had contacted nine different public figures in order to obtain help with regard to a personal problem. The scores on each of the nine items were summed to create the personal contacting index. Poisson regression is used again to assess the effects of NFE, formal education, and Koranic education on the likelihood of contacting a public figure regarding a personal problem. As we can see in table 6.1, Model 3 is significant and the coefficient for NFE is in the hypothesized direction and highly significant. This finding is consistent with the notion that NFE empowers participants, thereby rendering them more assertive in the social world. The coefficient for formal education is positive, although far from significant. The coefficient for Koranic education is positive and significant at the 0.10 level. Thus, having Koranic education increases the likelihood not only that one will seek help for the community from some type of official, but also for oneself. Once again, the coefficients for the number of organizational memberships and the variables associated with political engagement are positive and significant, although the coefficient for political interest is only significant at the 0.10 level. Having an internal locus of control is positively related to personal contacting, while the coefficient for personal political efficacy is not significant. This result makes intuitive sense since feeling like one is responsible for one’s life situation is likely to spur one to take action to better one’s situation. On the other hand, asking for a personal favor from an official would not necessarily be related to feeling as though one could influence the political opinions of others. The coefficients for age and gender are also significant, probably for the same reasons noted in the discussion of community contacting. Personal

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contacting appears to be more prevalent in some regions than in others. In addition, Pulaar-speakers appear more likely to ask personal favors of officials than would members of other ethnic groups. Interestingly, the coefficient for Pulaar is negative, although not significant in the model for community contacting. On other hand, as noted, the coefficient for Wolof is positive and significant in the model for community contacting and negative, although not significant, for personal contacting. Thus, it seems that the probability of engaging in certain forms of civic participation may vary across ethnic groups. Electoral Participation How does NFE affect electoral participation? Since the electoral participation variable is dichotomous, I use logit to assess the effects of NFE on this variable. My hypothesis that NFE has a positive effect on political participation is supported by the results. As shown in table 6.1, Model 4 is significant and the estimated coefficient for NFE is positive and significant at the 0.01 level. The coefficient for formal education is positive and significant at the 0.05 level. As noted, the link between education and voting has been documented in a plethora of studies, especially those on voting in the United States (e.g., Teixeira 1987; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Milligan, Moretti, and Oreopoulos 2004). The results of this study indicate that both nonformal and formal education increase the likelihood of voting in the context of rural Senegal. The coefficient for Koranic education is actually negative, although not significant. Thus, Koranic education has no influence on electoral participation. Those with a higher number of organizational memberships appear more likely to vote, as do those who report feeling close to a political party. The coefficients for the other political engagement variables are not significant. Indeed, neither discussing politics nor getting news from the radio is statistically significant, although they are positive and highly significant in all of the other estimated models of forms of civic behavior. These findings are consistent with the notion that voting is largely driven by patronage considerations or mobilization efforts on the part of political parties and politicians. Norris (2002) refers to voluntary organizations and political parties as “mobilizing agencies.” As we can see, the mobilizing agencies appear to play an important role in getting people to the polls in Senegal. As Bratton and others (2005) note, particularly in rural Africa, citizens often vote in a block and are heavily influenced by

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the instructions of village notables or group leaders. In such a context, the agents of mobilization may have a greater influence on who votes than on political interest. Based on Afrobarometer data for ten African countries, Kuenzi and Lambright (forthcoming) find that the mobilization agents, especially political parties, play a key role in turning out the vote. The coefficient for locus of control is negative, although not significant. On the other hand, personal political efficacy does appear to influence an individual’s propensity to vote. Income, age, gender, and the constant are statistically significant. Interestingly, women appear more likely to vote than men, which is just the opposite of the situation observed with the other forms of political participation. I also checked for an interaction effect between NFE and formal education. That is, I assessed whether the effect of NFE on the four forms of civic participation was greater at different levels of formal education and vice versa. An interaction term, level of NFE multiplied by years of formal education, was added to the models. Since adding the interaction term had very little effect on the results and the interaction term was insignificant in all but one case, these results are not displayed.6 Level of NFE, number of organizational memberships and feeling close to a political party are positive and significant across all of the models of the different types of civic participation.

Education and Attitudes Authoritarianism/Progressiveness The results of the bivariate analyses support the hypothesis that NFE promotes the acquisition of more non-authoritarian, progressive attitudes. The multivariate analysis will allow us to see if this relationship is robust when we control for the effects of other variables. We will also be able to see how formal schooling and Koranic education affect political attitudes, if at all. Because this variable is qualitative and ordinal in nature, ordered logit is used to estimate the effects of the independent variables of interest on authoritarianism/progressiveness. The authoritarianism/progressiveness index is created by adding all of the indicators for authoritarianism/progressiveness listed in table 5.1 in Chapter 5. I control for potentially confounding variables such as number of organizational memberships, the frequency with which one reported getting news from the radio, income, age, gender, region, ethnicity, and NFE village. From table 6.3, we can see that my

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Table 6.3 Determinants of political and social attitudes Estimation Method

Model 5: Model 6: Model 7: Model 8: Ethnic Authoritarianism/ Democratic Autonomy/ Pride Progressiveness Values Individualism Ordered Logit Ordered Logit

Level of NFE Years of Formal Schooling Koranic Number organizational memberships News from radio (5=every day) Income Age Gender Diourbel Thies Kaolack Louga Pulaar Wolof NFE Village (1=NFE village) Constant

OLS

Ordered Logit

.274*** (.048) .129*** (.017) .076 (.109) .184*** (.066)

.117*** (.048) .165*** (.017) -.051 (.109) .190*** (.066)

.079*** (.025) .017** (.008) -.079 (.058) -.037 (.034)

.003 (.053) -.108*** (.018) -.038 (.120) -.008 (.072)

.063** (.032)

.029 (.033)

.033* (.018)

-.066* (.038)

.041 (.034) .005 (.004) -.539*** (.124) .013 (.200) -.011 (.166) -.227 (.198) -.328 (.204) .356** (.167) .031 (.149) -.070 (.141)

.007 (.034) .014*** (.004) -.484*** (.124) -.558*** (.200) -.308* (.165) -.807*** (.200) -.541*** (.204) .019 (.166) -.114 (.147) -.033 (.140)

.082*** (.018) -.007*** (.002) -.226*** (.065) -.524*** (.107) -.297*** (.088) -.433*** (.107) -.445*** (.109) -.326*** (.088) -.197*** (.077) .097 (.074)

-.073** (.036) -.003 (.004) .377*** (.135) -.124 (.218) -.459** (.181) -.111 (.219) -.371* (.225) .370** (.184) -.489*** (.159) .379*** (.153)

1.861*** (.160) Continued

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Table 6.3 Continued Estimation Method

Model 5: Model 6: Model 7: Model 8: Ethnic Authoritarianism/ Democratic Autonomy/ Pride Progressiveness Values Individualism Ordered Logit Ordered Logit

Number of observations Pseudo R 2 LR chi2 Prob > chi2

OLS

Ordered Logit

1,336

1,328

1,391

1,251

.056 204.39 .000

.053 203.55 .000

.078 8.79 .000

.061 168.44 .000

Notes: ***p < .01 for two tailed test; ** p < .05 for two tailed test; *p <0 .1 for two tailed test.

hypothesis is supported by the results: NFE increases the likelihood that one will express non-authoritarian ideas.7 Indeed, the coefficient for NFE is positive and highly significant. The coefficient for formal education is also positive and highly significant indicating that, like NFE, formal education promotes progressive, non-authoritarian attitudes. Koranic education appears to have no influence on the acquisition of non-authoritarian, progressive values. The coefficient for the number of organizational memberships is positive and highly significant. Thus, enthusiastic “joiners” appear less likely to hold authoritarian values than do their more solitary counterparts. The estimated coefficient for getting news from the radio is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. This finding is intuitive; those who are exposed to more information are less likely to have authoritarian attitudes. That gender has a negative coefficient reflects the fact that the women in the sample tend to opt for responses that indicate a more authoritarian orientation with greater frequency than do men. The positive relationship for Pulaar reflects the fact that Pulaar respondents opted for responses that indicate a more progressive orientation with greater frequency than did Wolof and Serer respondents and those in other ethnic groups. In order to see the magnitude of the effects of NFE on the probability of having a progressive (non-authoritarian) orientation with greater clarity, the changes in the probability of scoring highly on the progressive/ authoritarian scale are examined at different levels of NFE, while the values for the other explanatory variables are held constant. The sample

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Table 6.4 The effects of NFE on the likelihood of having non-authoritarian/ progressive orientation in politics for rural Senegalese citizens Level of NFE

Likelihood 95% Number Likelihood of Having Confidence of Years of Having Progressive Interval for of Formal Progressive Orientation NFE Education Orientation for NFE for Formal Education

0 years 0
.14 .18 .23 .28 .33 * * * * *

.12 to .17 .16 to .20 .20 to .25 .24 to .32 .27 to .40 * * * * *

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 10 12 20

.16 .18 .20 .22 .24 .27 .29 .41 .47 .71

95% Confidence Interval for Formal Education .14 to .18 .16 to .20 .18 to .22 .20 to .24 .21 to .27 .23 to .30 .26 to .33 .34 to .48 .39 to .56 .58 to .82

means are used for all of the other explanatory variables. The same procedure is followed in order to assess the effects of formal education. (Again, the analysis reveals that Koranic education has no effect on the political attitudes, and thus the magnitude of Koranic education cannot be assessed.) From table 6.4, we can see that NFE has a substantial impact on the likelihood of having a progressive orientation. When one moves from having no NFE to having at most one year of NFE, the likelihood of having a non-authoritarian political orientation increases by around four percentage points. After a two year NFE program, the likelihood of having a more progressive political orientation increases by around five percentage points to 23 percent. By contrast, after two years of formal education, the likelihood would be around 20 percent. With each level of NFE, the probability of having the highest possible level of progressiveness increases by four or five percentage points. We can see that one year of NFE has a greater impact on the likelihood of having non-authoritarian values than does one year of formal education. One year of formal education increases this likelihood by about two percentage points.

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Support for Democratic Values It was hypothesized that those with NFE would tend to be more supportive of democratic values than those without NFE. Since the support for democratic values variable is ordinal and qualitative in nature, ordered logit is used to assess the effects of NFE on support for democratic values while controlling for other variables that may influence the support for democratic values. From table 6.3, it is evident that the hypothesis is supported by the results: the estimated coefficient for level of NFE is positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Similarly, the coefficient for formal education is positive and significant at the 0.01 level. Therefore, both NFE and formal schooling increase the likelihood that one will support democratic values. These findings and those just reported for authoritarianism are consistent with modernization theory, according to which education promotes the acquisition of democratic attitudes. In contrast, the coefficient for Koranic education is actually negative, although far from significant. Thus, Koranic education does not influence the likelihood one will embrace democratic values. Again, the coefficient for the number of organizational memberships is positive and highly significant. This finding supports the claims of civil society enthusiasts that civil society organizations can serve as schools of democracy where members absorb the values and behaviors associated with democracy. The significant negative coefficient for gender is consistent with the findings that women are, on average, more conservative than men (e.g., see Gibson et al. 1992; Finifter and Mickiewicz 1992), probably because women are more likely to be confined to the traditional sectors of society than are men. That the coefficient for age is positive and significant is surprising, given that most studies find a negative relationship between age and democratic values.8 These findings are interesting and merit greater examination in other research. It appears that the residents of St. Louis are more likely to be supportive of democratic values than are the residents of other regions, as the estimated coefficients for the regions included in the model are all negative and significant. In order to gain an idea of the substantive effect NFE has on the probability of supporting democratic values, the changes in the probability of supporting democratic values are examined at different levels of NFE while the other explanatory variables are held at their means. This procedure is repeated for formal education.

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Table 6.5 The effects of NFE on the likelihood of being highly supportive of democratic values for rural Senegalese citizens Level of NFE

Likelihood of 95% Number Supporting Confidence of Years Democratic Interval for of Formal Values For NFE Education NFE

0 years 0
.09 .10 .11 .12 .14 * * * * *

.07 to .11 .08 to .12 .09 to .13 .10 to .15 .10 to .17 * * * * *

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 10 12 20

Likelihood of Supporting Democratic Values For Formal Education

95% Confidence Interval for Formal Education

.08 .09 .11 .12 .14 .16 .19 .31 .38 .69

.07 to .09 .08 to .11 .09 to .12 .11 to .14 .12 to .16 .14 to .19 .16 to .22 .24 to .37 .29 to .46 .55 to .80

As we can see from table 6.5, when the values of all other variables are held constant, and the level of NFE is zero years, the probability of choosing the democratic response for all four of the indicators is only 9 percent. With each level of NFE, the probability of having the highest possible level of support for democratic values increases by between one and two percentage points. At three or more years of NFE, the probability of exhibiting a high level of support for democratic values is 14 percent. Formal education appears to have a stronger effect on the support for democratic attitudes than does NFE. Although there is little change in the probability of supporting democratic attitudes for the first few years of education, the “payoff” of each year of formal education starts to increase after about six years. This result makes a great deal of sense given that primary schooling lasts for six years. At the maximum number of years of education in the sample, 20 years of education, the likelihood of having the highest level of support for democratic values is 69 percent,

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which is 61 percentage points higher than the likelihood at zero years of formal education. Autonomy/Individualism Since NFE and formal education are likely to foster critical thinking skills, it was hypothesized that both of these types of education would have a positive relationship with individualization. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is used to asses the effects of the different types of education and other variables of interest on autonomy/individualism. The expectations are borne out by the results. The coefficient for NFE is positive and highly significant. Thus, those with NFE are more likely to exhibit independence in their opinions than do their counterparts without NFE. Formal education also promotes individualization. Those with formal education are more likely to have opinions that differ from members of their solidarity groups, such as family members, friends, fellow villagers, and even fellow Senegalese. Koranic education has no effect on individualism. The coefficient for radio news is positive and significant at the 0.1 level. Again, this result makes intuitive sense. People exposed to more information and points of view via the radio are going to be more likely to form their own independent opinions. Those with higher incomes are also more likely to form independent opinions than would their lower income counterparts. In fact, modernization theory is well supported by the results. All of the modernity variables, NFE, formal education, radio, and income, have significant positive effects on individualization. As can be seen in table 6.3, those who are older are less likely to report holding different opinions from those in their solidarity groups than do the young. The coefficient for gender is negative and significant, indicating that women are less likely to hold opinions that differ from those in their solidarity groups than are men. Again, according to cultural theorists, women are often confined to the more traditional sectors of society. In many ways, women form the core of village communities, whereas men are often mobile and spend time living and working elsewhere. Women’s response patterns reflect this tight connection to the community. Those living in the region of St. Louis appear to be more individualistic than the inhabitants of other regions, as the coeffiecients for all of the regional variables are all negative and significant. Finally, Pulaar and Wolof respondents are significantly less likely to have opinions that differ from those in their solidarity groups than would members of small minority groups.

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Ethnic Pride As noted earlier, the preservation and elevation of language and culture are goals explicitly associated with the Pulaar literacy movement. The members of many other groups in Senegal also see the promotion of literacy in their language as a way to improve the status of their culture and language (Trudell 2008). It was, therefore, hypothesized that NFE would have a positive effect on ethnic pride. The bivariate results generally support the hypothesis that those with NFE will be more likely to express ethnic pride than those without NFE. Ordered logit is used to assess the effects of NFE, formal education, and Koranic education on the likelihood of expressing ethnic pride. As we can see in table 6.3, the coefficient for NFE is positive but far from significant. Thus, this hypothesis is not supported by the results of the multivariate analysis. Undoubtedly, the inclusion of the control variables attenuated the relationship between NFE and ethnic pride. When the ethnicity variables and NFE village are dropped from the model, NFE achieves significance. NFE is conducted in the participant’s maternal language, and often a great deal of attention is paid to the language and even cultural traditions of the members of the village. Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that the coefficient for NFE village is positive and significant at the 0.01 level. Simply having an NFE program in one’s village appears to heighten ethnic pride. The “modernity variables,” formal education, radio news, and income, all have significant negative impacts on level of ethnic pride, just as modernization theory would predict. Formal education and radio news are both mechanisms through which individuals can connect to a community beyond their relatives, fellow villagers, and even co-ethnics. Modernization theory is strongly supported by the results reported in table 6.3. All of the coefficients for the regional variables are negative, and the coefficient for Thies and Louga reach significance, meaning that levels of ethnic pride are higher in St. Louis. In fact, Pulaar-speakers have significantly higher levels of pride than do members of other groups, a phenomenon that will be discussed. The vast majority of the survey respondents who reside in St. Louis are Pulaar-speakers (89 percent).9 Of course, residing in St. Louis appears to have a separate effect on ethnic pride. Thus, the results make intuitive sense, given that living in a region in which one’s co-ethnics are concentrated may tend to increase ethnic consciousness. As shown in table 6.3, Pulaar-speakers are significantly more likely to express ethnic pride than are the members of

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other ethnic groups. This result comports very well with the observations of many who study Senegal, as well as the author’s observations on the ground. Pulaar-speakers esteem their language and culture highly, which is obvious in the almost zealous manner some in the Pulaar literacy movement have pursued the promotion of the Pulaar language (see Fagerberg-Diallo 2001). Moreover, to some degree, they fear acculturation, so it is not surprising that they would assert their pride in being Pulaar when asked. With the exception of ethnic pride, NFE and formal education appear to influence the attitudinal variables in a very similar way. In contrast, Koranic education does not influence the acquisition of any of the attitudinal orientations of study. Once again, an interaction term—level of NFE multiplied by years of formal education—was added to the models of the attitudinal variables. Since adding the interaction term had very little effect on the results and the interaction term was insignificant in all of the models, these results are not displayed. Thus, it appears that the effect of NFE on both political behaviors and attitudes is relatively constant across different levels of formal education (and vice versa). The Effects of NFE by Program The principal purpose of this book is to test the hypothesis that NFE has a significant positive effect on civic participation and attitudes related to democracy. I wanted, however, to interrogate the results still further by examining whether some programs were more effective than others in instilling civic behaviors and democratic attitudes. Of course, comparison is risky, since many factors other than the nature of the respective programs can explain the differences that we may see among them. The results displayed in table 6.6 show that all of the NFE programs of study have positive effects on community participation. Given the strong link made between NFE and community participation in the qualitative interviews I conducted and the wider literature, this finding is not surprising. Tostan, PIP, and PAPF all have significant effects on contacting public figures in order to secure help addressing both community and personal problems. PAPA has no effect on these behaviors. All four of the programs have significant positive effects on the likelihood of voting, although the coefficients for PAPA and PAPF are significant only at the 0.10 level.

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Table 6.6 NFE programs and civic participation Estimation Method

Level of Tostan Level of PIP Level of PAPF Level of PAPA Years of Formal Schooling Koranic Number organizational memberships Close to Political Party (1=yes) Political interest (2=very interested) Discuss politics (2=often) News from radio (5=every day) Locus of control (1=internal locus) Personal political efficacy (1 = efficacious)

Model 9: Community Participation

Model 10: Community Contacting

Model 11: Personal Contacting

Model 12: Voted in Presidential Election

Ordered Logit

Poisson Regression

Poisson Regression

Binary Logit

.466*** (.057) .521*** (.072) .432*** (.090) .311*** (.097) .026 (.016) .154 (.109)

.094*** (.015) .063*** (.019) .112*** (.024) –.024 (.030) –.015*** (.005) .082*** (.033) .283*** (.018)

.038** (.018) .112*** (.020) .087*** (.029) .043 (.032) .004 (.005) .076** (.037) .194*** (.021)

.164** (.072) .178** (.088) .221* (.117) .244* (.128) .042** (.020) –.019 (.140) .425*** (.086)

.528*** (.117)

.596*** (.043)

.467*** (.046)

.571*** (.147)

.194*** (.070)

.140*** (.023)

.045* (.025)

.104 (.089)

.340*** (.077) .121*** (.033)

.196*** (.024) .053*** (.012)

.225*** (.027) .064*** (.013)

.076 (.099) .023 (.043)

–.026 (.103)

.108*** (.030)

.147*** (.034)

–.022 (.133)

–.105 (.129)

.073* (.042)

.012 (.046)

.403** (.166)

Continued

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Table 6.6 Continued Estimation Method

Model 9: Community Participation

Model 10: Community Contacting

Model 11: Personal Contacting

Model 12: Voted in Presidential Election

Ordered Logit

Poisson Regression

Poisson Regression

Binary Logit

.093*** (.034) .027*** (.004)

.041*** (.009) .003*** (.001)

.028*** (.010) .008*** (.001)

.107** (.046) .076*** (.006)

Gender

–.209* (.125)

–.160*** (.035)

–.292*** (.039)

.294* (.162)

Diourbel

–.011 (.218) .231 (.173) –.355* (.216) .257 (.241) .035 (.166) –.251* (.148) .808*** (.144)

1,320

.083 (.067) .124** (.054) –.077 (.073) .044 (.075) –.083* (.051) .055 (.043) .215*** (.046) –.652*** (.108) 1,309

.292*** (.073) .208*** (.059) .084 (.078) .201** (.083) .259*** (.056) –.046 (.052) .098** (.050) –.772*** (.120) 1,306

–.192 (.281) .403* (.222) .634** (.272) .545* (.315) .277 (.213) .207 (.193) .148 (.186) – 4.828*** (.464) 1,320

.103 480.400

.150 1826.97

.121 1018.94

.194 353.95

.000

.000

.000

.000

Income Age

Thies Kaolack Louga Pulaar Wolof NFE Village (1=NFE village) Constant Number of observations Pseudo R 2 LR chi2 Prob > chi2

Notes: ***p < .01 for two tailed test; ** p < .05 for two tailed test; *p <0 .1 for two tailed test.

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Table 6.7

NFE programs and democratic attitudes

Dependent Variables: authoritarianism; support for democratic values; Model Variable

Model 13: Authoritarianism

Model 14: Support for Democratic Values

Level of Tostan

.385*** (.059) .275*** (.072) .113 (.091) .042 (.102) .130*** (.017) .032 (.110) .171*** (.066) .059* (.032) .048 (.034) .005 (.004) –.530*** (.126) .121 (.217) –.016 (.174) .016 (.216) –.055 (.246) .338** (.168) –.050 (.151) .003 (.144)

.112** (.058) .160** (.072) .127 (.090) –.115 (.100) .163*** (.017) –.053 (.110) .193*** (.066) .031 (.033) .007 (.034) .015*** (.004) –.456*** (.125) –.552*** (.215) –.238 (.173) –.605*** (.217) –.537** (.241) –.021 (.167) –.173 (.150) .042 (.143)

1,337 .061 223.70 .000

1,328 .054 209.87 .000

Level of PIP Level of PAPF Level of PAPA Years of Formal Schooling Koranic Education Number organizational memberships Radio Income Age Gender Diourbel Thies Kaolack Louga Pulaar Wolof NFE Village (1=NFE village) Number of observations Pseudo R 2 LR chi2 Prob > chi2

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When I include the variables representing the levels of the individual programs instead of the general NFE variable into the equations for the attitudinal variables, we see in table 6.7 that two of the programs do indeed appear to be more effective than the other two in inspiring progressive, democratic values. With reference to authoritarianism, we see that the coefficients for Tostan and PIP are both positive and significant at the .01 level, while the coefficient for neither PAPF nor PAPA is significant. The coefficients for both level of Tostan and level of PIP are, once again, positive and significant in the model for democratic values, while those for PAPF and PAPA fail to reach significance. In fact, the coefficient for PAPA is negative. Thus, all four of the NFE programs appear to play at least some role in promoting civic participation, but, when it comes to attitudes related to democracy, Tostan and PIP are the only programs that are influential. Given the nature and reputation of the four programs, these results are actually not too surprising. Tostan’s stated goal is to promote selfdevelopment and participation in society. These goals are more than empty platitudes. Tostan has developed and implemented curriculum and methodology to achieve these goals. Debate and deliberation are emphasized. Problem-solving and critical-thinking skills are honed in Tostan’s program. The international awards and attention bestowed upon Tostan and its founder, Molly Melching, are testimony to their accomplishments.10 What is particularly interesting about the findings regarding authoritarianism and support for democratic values is that a program that does not explicitly attempt to impart social messages tends to have the same effects as one that does. Indeed, it would be hard to argue that PIP’s effects on attitudes are closely tied to the content (i.e., in terms of topics covered in the class) of the program, since PIP does not explicitly address these types of issues in its curriculum. However, PIP “facilitators,” like those of Tostan, have been trained in participatory methods. Perhaps there is something about having the experience of being part of a participatory learning environment that encourages a more progressive way of thinking. In addition, as noted in Chapter 3, PIP uses the well-respected curriculum developed by ARED, which also has a strong record in the area of literature in national languages, which means that those who have participated in the PIP program have material to read. The ARED program has published translations of great literary works, such as Ambiguous Adventure by Cheikh Hamidou Kane, and published novels and sets of traditional children’s stories already written in Pulaar. In the two-year period between June 1994 and June 1996, ARED sold 10,933 reading books in Pulaar and 1,784 books in national languages other than Pulaar. The reach of ARED has increased considerably since

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1996. The program now sells between 30,000 and 50,000 reading books (literature), most of which are in Senegalese languages, each year (Easton and Fagerberg-Diallo 2001). Thus, not only are organizations like ARED producing and publishing materials for those literate in Pulaar, but these materials are indeed being consumed, as indicated by the sales of written materials. In addition, without being directly asked about their reading habits, in the qualitative interviews, many respondents volunteered that they had consulted various books published and sold by ARED in the course of addressing problems or issues in their lives. As noted below, some of these books were work related, while others were related to health or legal rights.11 In contrast, both PAPA and PAPF adhered to the strategy faire faire, using numerous different local providers to administer the classes in the field. Although these programs have reached a large number of people, as noted in Chapter 3, Nordtveit (2008; 2009) has documented some of the serious problems associated with the faire faire approach. Although PAPA eventually developed a model curriculum, basically the local organizations had total freedom in choosing the curriculum and content for the classes they administered until the time of the survey. PAPF also offered models of ideal programs, but freedom was left to the local opérateur to establish the timeline and content of the program. PAPA’s program has had the reputation of being the most flexibly administered. Thus, these two programs have contributed to social and political mobilization and incorporation but not attitudinal change. Ruling out Rival Hypotheses In this section I rule out rival explanations of the effects attributed to NFE, first examining the rival hypotheses for the effects observed on political participation and then turning to the issue of democratic attitudes. The effect of NFE on political participation seems strong and consistent, but it could be the case that more politically active people tend to get involved in NFE. Under this scenario, those with NFE exhibited high levels of political participation prior to becoming involved in an NFE program. The inclusion of such control variables as efficacy and political engagement, among others, helps us rule out such a possibility. In order, however, to assess further the extent to which “selection” poses a threat to the findings, I examine the levels of the political participation variables at different levels of NFE.

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Table 6.8 Crosstabulation of highest level of community participation and level of NFE Reported Doing All Five Activities Yes Totals

0 years of 0
1
2
8%

14%

27%

31%

35%

(680)* 100

(227) 100

(301) 100

(124) 100

(144) 100

*Number in parentheses serves as the base from which the percentages are calculated.

The results displayed in table 6.8 do not support the idea that selection is responsible for the effect of NFE on community participation. Were selection responsible for the effects attributed to NFE, we would expect those in the first level of NFE to report having all five of the community participation attributes at the same rate as those with higher levels of NFE. As can be seen in the crosstabulation in table 6.8, there is a difference in the percentage of respondents with no NFE and the percentage of respondents who have had a year or less of NFE (six percentage points), but there is a much greater difference between those with at most one year and those with two years of NFE. Although only 14 percent of those with at most one year of NFE report having participated in all five of the community participation activities, 27 percent of those in the two-year category report doing so, for a difference of 13 percentage points. The percent increases to 31 percent in the three-year category, and to 35 percent for those with over three years of NFE. The percentage of those with over three years of NFE who report having all five of the community participation attributes exceeds those with no NFE by 27 percentage points. Two years of NFE appears to be a threshold. Of course, we would expect there to be some difference between the first two groups, since certain programs are designed to last for only one year or less than a year and are still intended to have an effect on participants. We would expect the immediate effect to be the strongest on certain dimensions, such as community participation. Based on personal interviews, on which I elaborate below, and past studies (e.g., Kuenzi 1997), the stimulation of social participation is perhaps one of the most salient effects of NFE. Thus, we would expect even a little NFE to have a

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positive effect on community participation. The biggest effect, however, seems to come with two years of NFE. Those writing on the effects of NFE in Latin America also claim that NFE stimulates community participation. Thus, the results of my qualitative research efforts, the qualitative studies of NFE in different regions of the world, and logic all point to a relationship between NFE and community participation. In this study, I test the hypothesis that NFE does stimulate community participation. After controlling for a plethora of other factors such as political engagement, feelings of personal and political efficacy, living in a village with an NFE program, level of formal education, and many other demographic variables, the results of my study still strongly support the hypothesis. Based on table 6.9, selection does not seem responsible for the relationship between NFE and electoral participation. In fact, a smaller percentage of those with a little NFE voted than did those with no NFE. Again, two years appears to be a threshold. The percentage of those who voted increases slightly after two years and then appears to level off. Thus, given the comparisons, “selection” or “endogeneity” seem unlikely as alternative explanations for the effects observed. Perhaps one could argue that in fact the effects could be caused by a combination of “selection and treatment,” so that those in the NFE programs would not appear different at first, but actually are more likely to be active among other things, and then NFE simply adds to this base. This explanation seems implausible. First, one would expect this difference to be observable initially. Second, the effects of NFE go together in a coherent way. It seems highly unlikely that these differences would preexist but be invisible prior to the start of the program. Third, NFE appears to affect people in a fairly linear fashion after a certain threshold is met. Table 6.9

Crosstabulation of electoral participation and level of NFE

Reported Voting in the Second Round Yes Totals

0 years of NFE

0
1
Over 3 years of NFE

51%

46%

60%

66%

65%

(684)* 100

(228) 100

(301) 100

(124) 100

(144) 100

*Number in parentheses serves as the base from which the percentages are calculated.

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Perhaps one could argue that those with the most perseverance stay in the program the longest and, therefore, have more years of NFE than the others. Again, this explanation involves some type of selection/ treatment combination effect. However, there is no reason to believe that those with more years of NFE have greater amounts of perseverance than others. Those with a year or less of NFE were not dropouts. I intended for the sample to include a certain number of people who were just beginning the program, specifically so that selection effects could be assessed. In addition, there is no reason to think that those with two or more years of NFE have more perseverance than those from the control villages who simply have not had a chance to participate in the program. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that those who had two years were more enthusiastic joiners than those who now just have six months. According to my interviews with those involved in administering NFE in Ross Bethio, many villages that wanted NFE programs did not have them because organizations such as PIP simply did not have the capacity to put programs in all villages immediately. Thus, it does not appear to be the case that certain villages or villagers were just more motivated and that is why they have NFE. Rather, NFE is spreading across villages in an incremental fashion. In numerous cases, classes were going to open in the “control” villages in the study. Thus, there do not seem to be many reasons to think that those in the control villages differed from those in the NFE villages in any fundamental way. Perhaps most importantly, the findings associated with the qualitative research I conducted in Senegal from 1989 to 2001 all strongly corroborate the results reported in this book. During this time, I conducted qualitative interviews with well over 100 people involved in NFE and visited countless villages with (and without) NFE programs. Respondents from all of the different categories repeated the observation that NFE engenders social mobilization in numerous ways. According to the late director and founder of ARED, one of the most salient changes brought about NFE is that those women who participated in the NFE programs are now getting involved in associations and taking on leadership positions in those associations. In an interview in 1996 with an agent of PIP who had conducted an internal evaluation of the program, I was told that those who had followed the PIP program had more of a sense of themselves. At the same time, there was more solidarity in the village. After participating in the PIP program, according to this agent, women

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were much more likely to attend village meetings and actively participate in these meetings. One of the NFE facilitators interviewed said that people’s demeanor en brousse12 had been completely changed by NFE. According to him, after having had NFE, women addressed the problem of credit by starting a women’s credit circle. In addition, different women’s groups began to emerge after the start of the NFE program. In a group interview of NFE facilitators in Kounkane in 1998, I was told that women who had had NFE were more likely to speak out at meetings because the class experience, which included working in groups, gave them confidence. I was also told that it was the women who had NFE who received leadership roles in organizations. Many of those who participated in NFE programs listed the new types of activities in which they are able to engage now that they have gained basic literacy skills. For example, the women involved in a group interview in 1996 in a small Fulbe village in Keur Momar Sarr noted that they were able to participate in tie-dying, animal husbandry, and sowing projects because of their newly acquired skills. Prior to having NFE, they said that they did not have the skills to manage projects. Finally, I lived and volunteered in a Fulbe village in southern Senegal in 1989, when an NFE program was first established in this village. I returned there in 1993 and 1998 and found that organizational life had blossomed. Thus, the results of my qualitative research efforts, the qualitative studies of NFE in different regions of the world, and the results of the quantitative analyses all point to a relationship between NFE and civic participation. In short, the preponderance of evidence supports the notion that NFE has an impact on civic participation. With regard to attitudes, the relationship between NFE and embracing non-authoritarian, democratic, and tolerant political values seems robust and consistent. It could be the case, however, that those who chose to participate in the NFE programs simply had more democratic attitudinal orientations before ever starting the program. In fact, there is no theoretical reason to think that someone more progressive and supportive of democratic values would be more likely to join an NFE program than those less supportive of democratic values. People often join NFE programs in the hope of improving their lot in life without knowing much about them. One theme that ran through the qualitative interviews was that becoming literate was critical for economic advancement. One respondent commented that to be successful in economic life, it is

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Table 6.10 Crosstabulation of highest score on the authoritarianism/progressiveness index and level of NFE “Non-authoritarian/ Progressive” Response for all 3 Questions Yes Totals

0 years 0
Over 3 years of NFE

15%

14%

25%

33%

44%

(637)* 100

(220) 100

(300) 100

(122) 100

(141) 100

*Number in parentheses serves as the base from which the percentages are calculated.

absolutely necessary to be literate. Hence, financial incentives were seen as motivating people to join literacy programs. For others, as noted, pursuing NFE functions as a way to contribute to the preservation of traditional culture. These goals are in no way connected to “liberalism,” “support for democratic values,” or openness to change (see Kuenzi 1996). Nonetheless, in order to assess the extent to which “selection” poses a threat to the findings, I examine the percentage of those with the highest level of authoritarianism/progressive at different levels of NFE. The results of the crosstabulation displayed in table 6.10 do not support the argument that it is selection, not NFE, that is responsible for the higher levels of progressiveness (i.e., lower levels of authoritarianism) associated with NFE. Were selection responsible for the effects attributed to NFE, we would expect those in the first level of NFE to report having the highest level of progressiveness at the same rate as those with higher levels of NFE. In fact, at 15 percent, the percentage of those with no NFE who opted for the “non-authoritarian” response on all four questions is nearly the same as the percentage of those with oneyear or less of NFE, and actually exceeds the percentage of those with one-year or less by one percentage point. On the other hand, 25 percent of those in the two-year category fell into the least authoritarian, or most progressive, category. Thus, once again, two years of NFE appears to be a threshold. The percentage opting for the “non-authoritarian” response for all four questions increases to 33 percent for those in the three-year category, and climbs another 11 percentage points to 44 percent for the category of respondents who had more than three years of NFE. Thus, the relationship between authoritarianism and level

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Table 6.11 Crosstabulation of highest level of support for democratic values and level of NFE “Democratic” Response for all 4 Questions Yes Totals

0 years of 0
10%

15%

18%

25%

(640)* 100

(219) 100

(293) 100

(121) 100

(138) 100

*Number in parentheses serves as the base from which the percentages are calculated.

of NFE appears to be strong and monotonic, with each dose of NFE having a substantial impact on people’s level of authoritarianism after a threshold is met. Once again, selection does not appear responsible for the effects on democratic values attributed to NFE (see table 6.11). Were selection responsible for the effects attributed to NFE, we would expect those in the first level of NFE to report having the highest level of support for democratic values at the same rate as those with higher levels of NFE. At 8 percent and 10 percent, respectively, the percentage of those with no NFE and those with at most one year of NFE are very close. At the next highest level of NFE, the percentage of those exhibiting a high level of support for democratic values increases five percentage points, to 15 percent. It increases another three percentage points as one moves to the next level of NFE, and then another seven percentage points as one moves to the highest level of NFE. The relationships between NFE and the variables of interest seem remarkably similar in form. For the most part, there is very little difference between those with no NFE and those with only a little NFE. The biggest effects seem to often come with two years of NFE, and two years seems like a threshold for many effects. Thus, given the comparisons, “selection” or “endogeneity” seems highly unlikely as an alternative explanation for the effects observed. As noted above, someone could argue that in fact the effect could be caused by a combination of “selection and treatment,” so that those in the NFE programs would not appear different at first, but actually are more likely to have a more democratic orientation among other things, and then

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NFE simply adds to this base. This explanation seems implausible. First, there is no reason to think this difference would not be observable initially. Second, there is no reason to think that those who are more liberal and democratic in orientation would be attracted to the NFE programs. As I noted, people often join NFE programs in the hope of attaining some economic advantage or improving the status of their language and ethnolinguistic group, goals not theoretically or empirically linked to progressive, democratic values. Third, the effects of NFE go together in a consistent, coherent way. The same pattern of change is observed across both support for democratic values and authoritarianism/progressiveness as well as the political participation variables. The idea that all of these differences would preexist but be indiscernible prior to the start of the program is extremely implausible. As noted above, there is no reason to believe that those with more years of NFE have greater amounts of perseverance than do others, for the reasons enumerated. Moreover, there is no reason to connect perseverance with democratic attitudes. Thus, this explanation also fails to explain the observed effects on democratic attitudes. In short, the contention that NFE affects political behaviors and attitudes is strongly supported by the quantitative and qualitative evidence as well as logic.

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CHAPTER 7

Implications and Conclusions

T

he findings of this study support the tenet that education is good for democracy. They also support the notion that education has a “universal transformatory effect,” as scholars like Lerner claimed. Both NFE and formal education could play important roles in the consolidation of democracy in Senegal. Nonformal education works much the same as formal education in instilling democratic attitudes, though the effects of NFE on civic participation are much stronger than those of formal education in rural Senegal.1 Overall, NFE seems to inspire more of a “civic” orientation than does formal education, while formal education might have a stronger positive impact on some of the values associated with classical liberalism. Civic Participation The effect of NFE on community participation is one of the notable findings; NFE is strongly related to every aspect of community participation. Those with NFE are more likely than those without NFE to report: (1) cooperating with others to solve a community problem, (2) belonging to a community organization, (3) holding a leadership position within an organization, (4) speaking out at meetings at least occasionally, and (5) getting together with others to raise an issue. Nonformal education is also positively related to the number of community organizations to which an individual belongs. The relationships involving NFE and community participation are strong and robust. Although formal education also has an impact on community participation, it is not as strong as that

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of NFE. Mondak and Gearing (1998) observe that “People who do not interact with one another may fail to develop an appreciation for any form of communal good, and thus they may be limited in their capacity to see politics in terms of general rather than purely personal interests” (616). Nonformal education encourages high levels of participation in the community and, thus, encourages individuals to interact with others, perhaps outside the immediate family. Such interactions should help to hone an appreciation of the public good. Moreover, the high level of communal participation on the part of those with NFE is evidence that NFE in itself hones an appreciation of the public good. The findings indicate that the NFE experience engenders something other than simple collectivism and togetherness. In fact, from the results of this study, it would seem that NFE does increase individual consciousness and autonomy. Those with NFE find that their views differ from those around them with greater frequency than do those in the comparison group. At the same time, NFE encourages higher levels of participation in the community and, thus, encourages interactions with others, perhaps outside the immediate family. The NFE program seems to promote an understanding that one can interact and have fruitful relationships with others without having to be identical with them in terms of outlook. In addition, this consciousness of individuality may lead one to respect the individual integrity of others to a greater degree. In fact, reporting that one has opinions that differ from others is positively related to reporting progressive and democratic values and community participation. Nonformal education has a positive impact on other dimensions of political participation and increases the probability that an individual will contact a public figure regarding both community and personal problems. This contacting behavior suggests that NFE inspires the self-assurance needed to interact with authority figures on behalf of themselves and their communities. The consolidation of democracy necessitates that people have some sense of the public good. It also necessitates that they manifest the correct balance between engaging with the state and self-reliance. Contacting officials about a community problem would seem to suggest a concern for the public good. Contacting an official about a personal problem reflects a narrower scope of concern. Nonetheless, NFE’s positive effect on both contacting behaviors suggests that NFE generally increases one’s engagement in the public realm.

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Nonformal education also increases the likelihood that individuals will vote. Ultimately, as many have noted, elections are the sine qua non of democracy. It is through elections and the principle “one person, one vote” that political equality comes the closest to being achieved in a polity. Thus, although elections and parties in Senegal may not fully reflect democratic ideals, NFE’s mobilization effects deserve attention. Progressive and Democratic Attitudes Those who have had NFE are likely to be less authoritarian and traditional than those who have not had NFE. These findings are striking. The communities covered by the survey are very conservative. Islam is deeply established in most of these communities, and the culture is highly patriarchal. That formal education would tend to mitigate the very conservative social and political values that characterize the milieu is not too surprising. However, NFE appears actually to have a positive impact on the likelihood that people will opine that, for example, women should be able to make their own political choices. Nonformal education also has a positive relationship with support for democratic values, although the relationship was not as strong as with authoritarianism. Formal education had a stronger effect on the likelihood of holding democratic values. This finding seems to make sense. The democratic values about which respondents were asked reflect classical liberal Western values. That these values would be more effectively instilled in a school setting inspired by the Western model is not too surprising. What is most striking is that NFE does have a positive effect on the likelihood of expressing such democratic values. The findings that NFE has significant effects on the values associated with democracy are of tremendous importance. Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992) observe: In general, cultural theories suggest that democratization will develop most rapidly in the nontraditional sectors of the nation—that is, among the young and better-educated; in the cities, rather in the rural areas; in the service, rather than the agricultural, sectors in the economy; and probably among men, as compared to women. (858) This study covers the most traditional sectors of Senegal. All of the respondents are from rural areas, the vast majority of respondents are

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women, and the vast majority of the male respondents are farmers. Among those women who did not report being a housewife as their primary occupation, the majority said they were farmers. In addition, all but 20 of the respondents are Muslim. Given the contingent nature of the effects produced by civic education and even formal education in Africa, NFE’s significant, positive effects on the values associated with democracy are noteworthy. The results of this study indicate that NFE and formal education tend to have similar effects on many political behaviors and attitudes. The effects of formal education and NFE on ethnic pride and salience differ. Formal education has a significant negative effect on the level of ethnic pride. On the other hand, although the multivariate analysis did not reveal a significant relationship between NFE and ethnic pride, simply being in an NFE village has a significant positive effect on ethnic pride. It is in this area that the effects of education appear to be contextual, as opposed to universal. The findings of this study are important for another reason. According to socialization theory, those experiences one has as a child serve as a filter for later experiences (Eckstein 1988). Stolle and Hooghe (2004) point out that youth experiences are very much related to the types of activities in which adults engage. They cite the political socialization literature, which finds that the political attitudes and behavior of adults are shaped by youth experiences. These attitudes and behavior then tend to stay fairly constant during adult life (2). Stolle and Hooghe’s (2004) results generally support the socialization school of thought. They contend that social capital research that focuses on youth promises to be especially fruitful. This study shows that the experiences of adulthood can have significant effects on political behavior and attitudes, and so it is, therefore, worthwhile to study the effects of adult experiences. Policy Implications From a policy-making standpoint, this study shows that interventions for adults can have significant positive effects and, thus, such interventions should be maintained and pursued. The record of literacy campaigns around the world is replete with failures when one considers only the extent to which literacy skills have been successfully diffused across a population (Elwert 2001, 54). One must take a wider view when assessing

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the effects of these programs, however. Moreover, the methods, curriculum, and follow-up measures associated with a program appear to influence the magnitude and type of impact a program will have. This study shows that NFE can have important impacts on behaviors and attitudes. Tostan’s strong influence on attitudes suggests that attitudinal effects could be enhanced with some attention to the curriculum. Overall, the findings indicate that NFE could be a potent force in the promotion of democratic behavior and attitudes. While the findings do seem to indicate that the content of a program matters vis-à-vis certain types of effects, they also indicate that simply participating in a NFE program has important effects. Two years appeared to be the threshold period for many of the important effects of literacy programs to take place. That is, an additional year of literacy training still generates desirable effects as does only a year of training, but two years seems to be key for certain effects (but not all) to manifest themselves. Although civic education classes may teach specific lessons on democratic behavior, NFE might potentially have a strong impact on democratic orientation without explicitly incorporating political lessons into its curriculum. Of course, were programs to include such lessons, perhaps the impacts would be even greater than those which we have seen in this study. The social experience associated with NFE appears to be responsible for many of the positive effects that were observed. Simply getting together with others in the pursuit of shared goals appears to affect peoples’ levels of self-esteem and feelings of self as well as group efficacy. One can also identify program characteristics that seem to produce positive effects. For example, using participatory methods appears to provide NFE participants with the opportunity to develop skills and speak in front of others. Hence, NFE seems to help generate a virtuous circle. Participants gain a variety of civic skills from NFE, which heightens their confidence. NFE participants then often embark on additional community activities and therefore add to their stocks of knowledge and experiences, as well as their levels of self-esteem. They are then more likely to initiate other activities to improve their own lives and their communities, and the positive cycle continues. Although this study did not set out to test modernization theory, the results reported in this book largely support the modernization thesis. Moreover, the results point to the potential benefits of expanding NFE programs, as well as continuing to expand mass education.

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The Efficiency of Learning in Maternal Languages What are some of the underlying reasons NFE seems to have a more potent effect on civic orientation than formal education and Koranic education? An examination of the responses about language proficiency sheds light on this situation. The claims of scholars and advocates of maternal language education such as Goody and Bennett (2001) and Fagerberg-Diallo about the efficiency of learning in maternal languages seem to be supported by these responses. Koranic education generally has little effect on civic behaviors and no effects on attitudes. Among respondents with Koranic education, only 11 percent claim to be able to speak Arabic, while 37 percent claim to be able to read Arabic, and 28 percent claim to be able to write Arabic. Thus, students who study the Koran appear to have a relatively low level of proficiency in Arabic and probably are not able to extract a great deal of meaning from their studies of the Koran. Among those with formal education, 65 percent claim to be able to speak, read, and write French. The percentage of those with NFE who claim a high level of proficiency in language use is impressive. Among Pulaar-speakers with NFE, 86 percent claim to able to speak, read, and write Pulaar. Similarly, among Wolof speakers, 83 percent claim to be able to speak, read, and write Wolof. These results are all the more striking when one considers mean years of education by education type. Among the sub-sample of respondents with Koranic education, the average number of years of Koranic education is 4.5 years. Among the sub-sample of respondents with formal education, the average number of years of formal education is 6.6 years. Finally, among the sub-sample of respondents with NFE, the average number of years of NFE is 2.3 years. Thus, people do seem to be able to glean much more in a short amount of time through NFE in maternal languages than they would through other types of education. My qualitative research corroborates these findings. When asked about the language in which they thought non-literate people should be taught, the overwhelmingly majority of Pulaar literacy teachers thought that literacy classes should be in Pulaar. One teacher noted, “In Pulaar, you can learn to do mathematical computations in six months but in another language you can study for three years and learn nothing.” Another particularly poignant quote came from a literacy teacher of fourteen years: “[in French] . . . they wouldn’t have even understood the letter A.” One teacher put it well: “[adult learners] do not know how to

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speak or write French. With Pulaar, at least they have 50%.” The “multiplier effects” associated with learning Pulaar were highlighted in one teacher’s story: “After one year [of studying Pulaar] I was able to teach, after four years, my students made rapid progress— I could not have done that in French.”2 In short, the results of this study indicate that incorporating maternal languages into the educational process could increase the efficiency of education. NFE Contributes to Women’s Empowerment Women are over represented in NFE programs partly because of their exclusion from formal education. Thus, NFE is in some ways a compensatory measure taken to help improve the situation of women. The results of this study indicate that NFE makes a significant contribution to the empowerment of women. NFE increases the probability that women will participate in the community and take on leadership positions. NFE also increases the likelihood that women will become politically active. As noted, participation in community organizations leads women to acquire civic skills and generally renders them more efficacious in the political realm. Hence, it is likely that the initial effects of NFE will be built upon by women’s experiences in community organizations and activities. In the qualitative interviews, many of the respondents’ replies to questions about their NFE experience pertained to issues of personal efficacy and independence. Numerous respondents noted that, after literacy training, they were able to read and write their own letters. Many respondents stressed that being able to do so allowed them to keep their secrets. While some might dismiss these oft-heard remarks as rather trivial in light of the magnitude of the problems facing villagers and their communities, one would be in error to do so. The sheer frequency with which respondents recounted this newfound ability indicates that it represents something important to people. Indeed, being able to read and write one’s own letters appears to be associated with the ideas of being able to protect one’s interests and keep one’s personal business to oneself, thereby maintaining control over self. Throughout all of the topics discussed with respondents who participated in a literacy program, the theme of no longer needing an intermediary was emphasized.

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The idea of guarding one’s interests was also reflected in many of the examples pertaining to economic transactions. One woman gave the example of keeping a record of what she owes to a shop owner. She notes that if she writes down what she has paid and what she owes, it is impossible to for the shop owner to make her pay more than she actually owes. The theme of gaining courage was also echoed by neo-literates. It seems reasonable to assume that not all of NFE’s effects are immediate or direct. An important consideration is the link between education, civil society, and democracy. NFE heightens participation in civil society both in terms of breadth (the number organizations to which one belongs) and depth (taking on leadership positions and actively participating in meetings). Participation in civil society should mediate and intensify other educational effects. Brady, Verba, and Schlozman (1995) find that education increases ones involvement in voluntary organizations and activities, which increases one’s civic skills, which in turn increases one’s level of political participation. In the long run, participation in the community is theorized to increase interpersonal trust and support for democratic values. Conclusion NFE walks a line between two forces: being an authentic manifestation of the local culture and serving as “a window to the world.” On the one hand, NFE can serve to affirm and valorize indigenous culture and language. In so doing, NFE can draw upon and reinforce local knowledge and capacities. At the same time, NFE programs can allow people to connect with forces outside of their families and villages, and thereby decrease the insularity of villages. Generally speaking, it does seem that people want to connect with something beyond their village and widen their horizons. NFE can allow people to make this connection and feel this dynamism in their own village. Many of those who have studied NFE programs have been unimpressed by testimonies that increased solidarity and mutual aide resulted from literacy programs. Since cooperation is at the heart of addressing community issues and self-governance, these effects have not received the attention they merit. Indeed, it is human beings’ inability to voluntarily cooperate to achieve coordinated action in the pursuit of the public good that necessitates government in the first place. What does seem clear from the results of the study is that NFE is about much more than

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acquiring literacy skills or learning about thematic areas of importance. NFE seems to contribute to the construction of what Putnam (1993) calls “civic community.” NFE constitutes a social experience that confers a type of social capital upon the learners and community alike. And it is social capital that Putnam claims is “the key to making democracy work” (1993, 185).

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APPENDIX A

Supplemental Information on the Survey Methodology

Sampling1 Target Population Senegalese citizens who were at least 18 years old and who lived in rural areas in the five regions of study constituted the target population. Sample Design A multistage, stratified area cluster probability sample design was employed. Selection of Primary Sampling Units The village constituted the primary sampling unit (PSU). Selection of PSUs was stratified by region and NFE program. Villages were selected with probability proportionate to size (PPS). In other words, the probability of selection associated with any particular village was exactly proportional to its share of the total population in its respective region. Selection of control sampling units was administered at four levels: 1. PSU: village 2. starting points 3. households 4. individuals

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Sampling Villages Between the end of October 2000 and the beginning of April 2001, some 1,484 questionnaires were administered in 94 villages randomly selected, with probability proportionate to size in St. Louis, Thies, Louga, Diourbel, and Kaolack. These villages included “treatment” villages (i.e., villages where NFE programs had been conducted) and control/comparison villages. Sampling Frame: Sampling Lists for NFE Villages by Region Several sampling lists were created. Sampling lists which contained all of the PAPA villages in the relevant region were created for the regions of Thies, St. Louis, and Kaolack. Sampling lists of all of the Tostan villages were created for St. Louis, Thies, and Diourbel. Sampling lists containing PAPF villages were created for Louga and Diourbel. Finally, a sampling list of PIP villages was created for the Region of St. Louis. From these sampling lists, a predetermined number of villages were selected, with probability proportionate to size. “Control” lists that contained all of the villages in a region were also created for the five regions covered in the study. The control villages were also selected with probability proportionate to size, that is, with reference to the population size of a particular region. The tables A.1 and A.2 show the distribution of the selected villages and respondents by region and NFE program. The PIP and Tostan programs were important foci of study. Both of these programs employ a respected curriculum and attend to the issue of pedagogy. On the other hand, the philosophies behind the approaches differ and, thus, useful comparisons can be drawn. I determined the number of villages to sample based on the concern of having enough respondents in different subgroups to be able to do effective subgroup Table A.1 Number of villages by region and program PAPA St. Louis Louga Kaolack Diourbel Thies

PAPF

4

Tostan

PIP

Control

10

15

6 5 5 5 9

35 11 10 11 27

15

30

94

6 5 4

2 12

10

23

6 15

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Table A.2 Number of respondents by region and program PAPA

St. Louis Louga Kaolack Diourbel Thies Totals

PAPF

48

Tostan

PIP

120

180

116 24 20 24 72

96 61 79 80 144

560 157 159 176 432

180

256

460

1484

72 60 48

24 144

120

288

72 180

Control in Control in Totals NFE Villages Non-NFE Villages

analysis. In the case of Tostan, the number of villages selected per region also reflects the weight of Tostan’s presence in the three regions. To be complete in my description of the sampling process, I should mention that compiling the sampling lists required several steps. Numerous visits were made to DAEB, PAPF, PAPA, and Tostan. Lists of all of the villages that had completed literacy programs with PIP, Tostan, PAPF, and PAPA were eventually obtained or constructed. Unfortunately, PAPA does not have a comprehensive list of the villages that have had the PAPA program. All of the Inspection Départementale de l’Education Nationale (IDEN) representatives in the regions of interest were contacted and asked for this information. A short trip was required to collect this information. Members of the research team and I were required to return to the majority of the offices at least once, or to use other follow-up measures. Moreover, we rarely simply received a list of villages, but instead were given numerous papers, letters, and memos, among other things, with short lists of villages that had to be organized and aggregated.2 Most of the lists associated with the other organizations required some organization, aggregation, and follow-up. In short, creating the sampling frame involved many steps, and, in a few cases, we could not be sure that our lists were completely exhaustive, although we took every step possible to ensure that they were as complete as possible. Starting Points The PIP guides accompanied us to the PIP villages and a Tostan guide accompanied us to the Tostan villages.3 In each NFE village, four “control” households were randomly selected through a

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walking pattern (pas de sondage). That is, a particular part of the village was selected randomly: north, south, east, west, or center. In this part of the village, the supervisor or primary researcher identified a mosque, water spigot, school, or other landmark that could be used as a starting point. At the starting point, the first interviewer walked in the direction of the sun, the second interviewer walked in the opposite direction, the third proceeded at a right angle from the first and the fourth interviewer walked in the direction opposite of the third. The interviewers selected every third household on their right. Households The respondent was then randomly selected at the household level. In the NFE villages, a list of all those who had participated in the relevant NFE program was taken with the aid of the person/people in charge of the class in that village or someone else knowledgeable about the program. Twelve of those who had participated in the program were randomly drawn from that list. In the non-NFE villages, 16 households were randomly selected in one of two ways. Households were either selected via the walking pattern or, when the village did not contain a large number of households, a list of households was created with the help of a knowledgeable villager, usually the chief of the village. Sixteen households were then randomly selected from the list. This method of selection was chosen to minimize threats to the validity of the study. On the one hand, had we chosen all of those in the “control” group from the NFE villages, one could have argued that those who live in a village where there is an NFE village but did not participate in it are somehow different than those in the NFE program from the start. Hence, any differences between NFE and non-NFE respondents could be attributed to differences that preceded the NFE program. On the other hand, had we chosen all of our respondents from non-NFE villages, one could claim that differences in villages were responsible for the observed differences between “treatment” and “control” groups. In fact, both types of control respondents are found in the sample. In addition, the threats just mentioned seem minimal. Those non-NFE respondents coming from NFE villages often had plans to participate in a literacy class in the near future or simply did not join the original class because they were not in the village at the time the class began. In addition, Tostan explicitly trains program participants to share information gleaned in class with others in

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the village. This diffusion of messages militates against finding differences when respondents come from NFE villages. In the case of the nonNFE villages, many of the villages had requested classes. In other cases, classes were to begin nearly at the time of the survey.

Substitutions Seven substitutions were made: Kaolack. Ida Mmbayene was selected as a control village in the region of Kaolack. Although it did not appear on any of the PAPA lists, upon arriving at Ida Mmbayene, the research team found that at least one member of nearly every household had participated in the PAPA literacy program. Dara Niassene was randomly selected as the substitution village. Thies. Although Ndiouffene was on the list for PAPA Thies, the research team found that no PAPA class had been established in this village. Diass (Ndiass) was randomly selected with (PPS) as the substitution village. St. Louis. Aere Lao was selected as a Tostan village. However, three days prior to that on which the research team was supposed to conduct work in Aere Lao, Tostan and the Senegalese government attempted to organize a discussion on female genital cutting (FGC) in that village. The discussion was not able to take place because several marabouts and their followers came to the discussion with weapons, waiting to attack should anyone who dared to raise the issue of FGC. Our Tostan guide and members of the research team feared a hostile and potentially violent reception from the inhabitants of this village, so Aere Lao was substituted by Aram. Senobowal had not had a PIP class and was, therefore, substituted by Thianaff. Diourbel Control. Tene was substituted by Mbadiane SAD Thiade and Kholkhotorane was substituted by Sessene. Although these villages were chosen as control villages, they both had actually been recipients of the PAPF program, and nearly every household contained a participant in the program. This situation arose because, despite all the work dedicated to assembling the sampling frame, the sampling lists were not exhaustive. Louga. Because the marabout refused the research team access to this village, Merina Ndiaye was substituted by Coki Dakhar.4

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Creating the Questionnaire Development of a Draft of the Questionnaire One of the first steps in this project was to develop a draft of the questionnaire that would be used to assess the relationship between education and civic participation and attitudes. This step in the research project involved intensive work in constructing questions and scales. Some of the questions were formulated based on my past experience with and knowledge of Senegal, while others were borrowed from questionnaires such as the Afrobarometer and World Values Survey. A few of the scales dealing with attitudes and dispositions were taken from Measures of Social-Psychological Attitudes. In all cases, I spent significant amounts of time modifying the questions so that they would be appropriate for the Senegalese context. I asked several survey experts to read the questionnaire and give me their feedback, and also solicited the advice of experts on Senegal. I then used mock interviews to see how the questionnaire flowed and modified it accordingly. Translation of the Questionnaire into Pulaar, Wolof, and French The questionnaire was translated into Pulaar, Wolof, and French. Many steps were taken to ensure the integrity, consistency, and validity of the research instrument. The questionnaire was first translated into French from English. Because this is a critical translation (all of the national language questionnaires were translated from this translation), the French translation was given to an editor who used the English version to edit and correct this translation. The French translation was then backtranslated into English. The English backstranslation and the original English questionnaire were then compared. Inconsistencies between these versions were identified, and the French translation was then corrected and modified once again. The questionnaire was then translated into Pulaar and Wolof. The Wolof and Pulaar questionnaires were then given to two other translators so that they could be backtranslated into French. Pretest The pretest was successfully conducted in the suburbs of Dakar and villages of Thies during September 2000. The 39 pretest returns were

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carefully scrutinized and then entered into a database. Based on the results of the pretest, the questionnaire was modified. The testing of these materials revealed that much of the language was overly sophisticated and inaccessible. Also, some of the vocabulary employed was region-specific. Numerous additional work sessions were scheduled with members of the research team so that the practical viability of these translations could be assessed and ameliorated. The translations of the questionnaires were edited and corrected with painstaking care. The research team received additional days of training after the pretest so that the lessons of the pretest could be disseminated among and assimilated by the members of the research team. The data generated by the pretest was analyzed. Variances were checked, and most of the questions with low variances were excluded on the final questionnaire. The validity of the questions was assessed. Factor analysis was employed to check dimensionality and Cronbach’s alphas were checked so that the internal reliability of the scales could be assessed. Certain questions were reformulated (i.e., categories were collapsed, question working was changed, etc.), as were some of the scales. The pretest also allowed us to close a couple of open-ended questions. Development of the Research Team and Research Protocol Eight interviewers were hired to administer the questionnaire. Altogether, the interviewers received seven days of training. Materials that would introduce the interviewers to the project and principles of survey research and instruct the interviewers on their role in the research process were developed and presented. Interviewers were trained on the use of acceptable probes and clarifications, and the list of standardized probes was translated into French, Wolof, and Pulaar for their use. The supervisor and interviewers learned how to draw a random sample of households at the village level and how to randomly select a respondent at the household level. Several measures were taken to minimize interviewer error. Either the supervisor or primary researcher accompanied each team of interviewers to the research location. Interviews were observed and all returns were examined. If there were any issues, I went over the returns and my notes from the interviewing process with the interviewers so that they would improve their performance with each round of interviews, and “debriefing” sessions were held every evening or every other evening.

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APPENDIX B

Question Wording and Operationalization

Dependent Variables Community Participation The Community participation index is an additive index comprised of five indicators. 1) Have you ever worked or cooperated with others in this village/ town to try to solve some of the problems of this village/town? 0=No, 1=Yes 2) Are you a member of any community association or organization? 0=No, 1=Yes 3) How often do you speak out in public at these meetings: always, often, sometimes, rarely, or never? 0=Never, Recoded 1=Rarely, Sometimes, Often or Always.1 4) Here is a list of things that people sometimes do as citizens. Please tell me how often you, personally, have done any of these things during the last five years: getting together with others to raise an issue? 0=Never, Recoded 1=Only Once, Sometimes, or Often 5) Which leadership position, if any, do you hold or did you hold in any of these organizations? Recoded 0=None, 1=President, VicePresident, Treasurer, Secretary, or Other, please specify______. Community Contacting During the last five years, how often have you contacted—that is gone to see or spoken to— any of the following leaders or government officials to obtain help in resolving a community problem?

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Response set: Never=0, only once=1, sometimes =2, often=3 A. a village chief B. a member of the rural council C. a National Assembly representative D. the governor E. an official of a government ministry F. a marabout G. the prefet H. the sous-prefet I. some other influential person, please specify Personal Contacting During the last five years, how often have you contacted—that is gone to see or spoken to— any of the following leaders or government officials to obtain help in resolving a personal problem? Response set: Never=0, only once=1, sometimes =2, often=3 A. a village chief B. a member of the rural council C. a National Assembly representative D. the governor E. an official of a government ministry F. a marabout G. the prefet H. the sous-prefet I. some other influential person, please specify Electoral Participation Understanding that some Senegalese choose not to vote, let me ask you: Did you vote in the second round of the Presidential election of February 2000? [0 = No; 1 = Yes] Note: This variable is electoral participation among the eligible population, not just those registered to vote. Thus, those who were not registered to vote at the time of the 2000 presidential election are coded as 0. Excluded is the very small number (n = 12) of respondents who reported being under age at the time of registration.

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Authoritarianism/Progressiveness The values for these three forced-choice questions were added to create the Authoritarianism/ Progressiveness index. The values on this variable are coded so that higher values correspond to lower levels of authoritarianism or higher levels of “progressiveness.” Now we will return to pairs of statements. Please tell me which one you agree with most. Choose Statement A or Statement B. A) All members of a family should hold the same political opinions. Recoded: 0= Agree Strongly, or Agree Somewhat with Statement A. B) Every family member should be free to make up his or her own mind on political issues. Recoded: 1= Agree Strongly or Agree Somewhat with Statement B. A) Everyone should decide for whom he or she is going to vote. Recoded: 1= Agree Strongly or Agree Somewhat with Statement A. B) A wife does better to vote the way her husband does, because he probably knows more about such things. Recoded: 0= Agree Strongly, or Agree Somewhat with Statement B. A) A woman’s place is in the home; women should not try to speak out about politics. Recoded: 0= Agree Strongly, or Agree Somewhat with Statement A. B) A woman should exercise her right to speak out about politics, even if her husband disagrees. Recoded: 1= Agree Strongly or Agree Somewhat with Statement B. Support for Democratic Values Support for democratic values is measured by two forced-choice questions, one question requiring a yes/no response, and one question measured on a Likert scale: Should those who are not literate have the right to vote? Coded: 0=No; 1=Yes. If people want to form a community organization, they should affiliate with the ruling party. Recoded: 0=Agree or Strongly Agree; 1=Disagree or Strongly Disagree Now we will return to pairs of statements. Please tell me which one you agree with most. Choose Statement A or Statement B.

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A: It is dangerous and confusing to allow the expression of too many different points of view. Recoded: 0= Agree Strongly, or Agree Somewhat with Statement A. B: If people have different views than I do, they should be allowed to express them. Recoded: 1= Agree Strongly or Agree Somewhat with Statement B. A: All people should be permitted to vote, even if they do not fully understand all the issues in an election. Recoded: 1= Agree Strongly or Agree Somewhat with Statement A. B: Only those who are sufficiently well educated should be allowed to vote. Recoded: 0= Agree Strongly, or Agree Somewhat with Statement B. The index of support for democratic values was created by adding the values of these indicators. Autonomy/Individualism Now, I am going ask you some questions about how frequently you have a certain feeling, and I would like you to tell me if you never, rarely, sometimes, usually, always feel that way. A. According to your general impression, how often do your ideas and opinions about important matters differ from those of your relatives? B. How often do your ideas and opinions differ from those of your friends? C. How often do your ideas and opinions differ from those of other people in your village? D. Those of most people in the country? 0=Never 1=Rarely 2=Sometimes 3=Usually 4=Always The values of each of these indicators were added to create the individualization index. Ethnic Pride Three questions, two of which are measured on a Likert scale, are used to measure ethnic pride. The ethnic group that the respondent identified as being her/his own was inserted into the blanks.

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Of all the groups in this country, ____ people are the best. Recoded: 0= Disagree or Strongly Disagree; 1= Agree or Strongly Agree You feel much stronger ties to ____ than to other Senegalese. Recoded: 0= Disagree or Strongly Disagree; 1= Agree or Strongly Agree If you had to choose between these two identities, [the ethnic identity group of the respondent] or Senegalese, which would you choose? Recoded: 0= Senegalese; 1= the ethnic identity group of the respondent The values of these indicators were added to create the ethnic pride index. Independent Variables NFE How many years of literacy training have you had? [Several questions about NFE preceded this one.] Formal Education How many years of formal education have you had? Koranic Education How many years of Koranic schooling have you had? Control Variables Number of Organizational Memberships Are you a member of any community association or organization? 0=No, 1=Yes [Respondents were asked about up to three organizational memberships.] Political Engagement Close to Political Party Do you feel close to a political party? 0 = No, 1 = Yes Political Interest How interested are you in politics and government? 0 = Not interested, 1 = Somewhat interested, 2 = Very interested Discuss Politics How often do you discuss politics and government with other people? 0 = Never, 1 = Sometimes, 2 = Often

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News from Radio How often do you get news from: the radio? 0=Never, 1=Less than once a month, 2=About once a month, 3=About once a week, 4=Several times a week, 5=Every day Efficacy Internal Locus of Control Now we will return to pairs of statements. Please tell me which one you agree with most. Choose Statement A or Statement B. A: To a great extent, my life is controlled by accidental happenings. Recoded: 0= Agree Strongly, or Agree Somewhat with Statement A. B: For the most part, I am responsible for what happens to me. Recoded: 1= Agree Strongly or Agree Somewhat with Statement B. Personal Political Efficacy I am now going to give you several pairs of statements. Please tell me which one you agree with most. Choose Statement A or Statement B. A: In discussions about politics with friends and neighbors, I can influence the opinions of others. Recoded: 1= Agree Strongly or Agree Somewhat with Statement A. B: As far as politics are concerned, friends and neighbors do not listen to me. Recoded: 0= Agree Strongly, or Agree Somewhat with Statement B. Demographic Variables Income What is your monthly income? [Response set: 0 = No income; 1 = Less than 10,000; 2 = Between 10,000 and 30,000; 3 = Between 31,000 and 50,000; 4 = Between 51,000 and 100,000; 5 = Between 101,000 and 150,000; 6 = Between 151,000 and 200,000; 7 = Between 201,000 and 300,000; 8 = Between 301,000 and 400,000; 9 = Between 401,000 and 500,000; 10 = Between 501,000 and 700,000; 11 = Between 701,000 and 900,000; 12 = Between 901,000 and 1,100,000; 13 = More than 1,100,000] Age How old were you on your last birthday? Value corresponds to actual age of respondent

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Gender Coded by interviewer [0 = male; 1 = female] Region Coded by interviewer Ethnicity What is your ethnicity? [Response set: 1 = HaalPulaar; 2 = Fulbe; 3 = Wolof; 4 = Sonninke; 5 = Bamabara; 6 = Majak; 7 = Serer; 8 = Other, please specify___] Other Variables Examined in the Bivariate Analyses Interpersonal Trust Now we will return to pairs of statements. Please tell me which one you agree with most. Choose Statement A or Statement B. A) No one is going to care much about what happens to you, when you get right down to it. B) For the most part, you can depend on people to help you out, when you are in a pinch. A) Generally speaking, most people can be trusted. B) Generally speaking, you can’t be too careful in dealing with people. Would you say that most people are more inclined to help others, or more inclined to look out for themselves? Political Efficacy I am now going to give you several pairs of statements. Please tell me which one you agree with most. Choose Statement A or Statement B. A: In discussions about politics with friends and neighbors, I can influence the opinions of others. B: As far as politics are concerned, friends and neighbors do not listen to me. A: The way the government operates sometimes seems so complicated that I cannot really understand what is going on.

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B: I can usually understand the way that government works. A: As a community, we are generally able to make our elected representatives listen to our problems. B: We are usually unable to make our elected representatives listen to us. A: No matter who we vote for, things will not get any better in the future. B: We can use our power as voters to choose leaders who will help us improve our lives.

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Notes

1 Introduction and Theory 1. In fact, the number of “free” countries in Africa declined from 11 in the 2008 Freedom House edition, to ten in the 2009 edition. Freedom House 2010 is now reporting that there are nine “free” countries in Africa. Data obtained from the Freedom House website: www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15 2. Bratton and van de Walle (1997) define the consolidation of democracy as: “the more or less total institutionalization of democratic practices, complete only when citizens and the political class alike come to accept democratic practices as the only way to resolve conflict. It requires that political actors so fully internalize the rules of the game that they can no longer imagine resorting to nonelectoral practices to obtain office” ( 235). 3. Italics are in the original. 4. In his description of civic engagement, Putnam (1993) refers to the “active partipation in public affairs” (87). Civic generally connotes concern with public affairs and the public welfare. 5. HDI is a composite index that incorporates measures of educational levels, life expectancy, and income. 6. As one reviewer, Arat (1999), notes, that which Vanhanen calls “resource distribution” is essentially what others call level of modernization. Indeed, he uses indicators such as percentage of the adult population that is literate, percentage of population that is urban, etc. 7. DiRenzo summarizes some of the character traits thought necessary for the establishment and maintenance of modern democracy: “ . . . belief in the efficacy of science and technology, control over nature, assertion of increasing independence from traditional authority figures, orientation to the future, aspirations for self and family, planning ahead, active citizenship in community affairs and local politics, secularism, tolerance for diversity, and an openness to new experience and social change” (1990, 40). In the literature, nearly all of these characteristics have been linked to literacy.

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8. The autonomous perspective views changes in attitudes and behavior as simply coming from being able to read and write without considering the context in which literacy skills are learned and used. 9. Almond and Verba (1965) find that the rate of participation in voluntary organizations, which boosts political competence, increases as “one moves up the educational ladder” (248). They also contend that the fact that citizens of countries such as the United States and Britain are characterized by high levels of interpersonal trust, which spills over into the political arena helps to promote the stability of the democratic political system (239–43). Such trust is seen by some as being fostered primarily in civil society (Putnam 1993). 10. Putnam defines social capital as “ . . . features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions . . . ” (1993, 167). 11. While this finding was based on only one item, it does suggest a potentially fruitful line of inquiry. 12. Vandewiele attributes the high level of anxiety experienced by students to the requirement that they learn in a second language. Of course, a rival explanation for the high level of anxiety among Senegalese secondary students could be the frequent use of corporal punishment in the school setting. 13. Clignet claims that initially a number of schools drew their student body from generally marginalized groups (1970). 14. In Spanish, communidades eclesiales de base. 15. The attention that has been dedicated to NFE has focused on the degree to which NFE programs transmit literacy and numeracy skills. Many in the development community consider NFE a failure in this regard. 16. For example, I interviewed one young woman in northern Senegal who said that before learning to read and write in Pulaar, she wore clothing that would be unacceptable in a traditional setting and went out dancing with her friends. However, now that she has participated in the program, she wears traditional clothing and does not engage in activities such as dancing. Hence, it seems that she was re-socialized into traditional Haalpulaar values via the Pulaar literacy-teacher training program. 17. I will adopt Linz and Stepan’s definition of civil society as “ . . . that arena of the polity where self-organizing and relatively autonomous groups, movements, and individuals attempt to articulate values, to create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests” (1996,17). 18. I define the literacy imperative as all of the discourse advocating the spread of literacy and eradication of “illiteracy,” as articulated in all of its manifestations, from official development doctrine, to conversations among those in anyway involved with the literacy issue.

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19. A marabout is a Sufi spiritual leader or shaykh. 20. In fact, Vengroff and Creevey (1997) argue that the 1993 elections were perhaps some of the cleanest in Africa, and my observations (like those of other international observers) found the 1998 elections to be relatively clean and transparent. However, perhaps the perceptions of opposition and general public are key with regard to this issue. 21. The Wolof ethnic group is the plurality ethnic group in Senegal. 22. The word “illiterate” is thought to be pejorative and, thus, I describe those who cannot read and write as nonliterate. 23. One ethnic group, the Jola, is, nonetheless, primarily involved in the secessionist movement in the south. 24. Official sources report that Pulaar-speakers comprise 26 percent of the population. According to Dr. Fagerberg-Diallo, across the Sahel, between 20 and 25 million people speak the language Pulaar (or Fulfude – often referred to as Fulani), and around one-third of the population of Senegal speaks Pulaar as a first language (1993, 1). 25. Fulbe is the correct appellation for the “Fulani,” “Peul,” or “Peuhl.” 26. I use the word orientation to refer to a person’s general attitudinal and behavioural disposition. 27. Sometimes this confidence appears inflated. For example, one woman who had completed an NFE program told me that prior to the NFE program, she had no confidence. However, now that she has completed the program, she is educated and her opinion should hold as much weight as those with university degrees. 28. Civic education’s effect on social trust appears variable. Finkel and others (2000) report a positive relationship between social trust and civic education in the Dominican Republic whereas Bratton and Alderfer (1999) find that civic education has a negative effect on social trust in Zambia.

2 The Politics of Senegal 1. Although the Fulbe and Halpulaar are often listed separately, they are related ethnic groups and the members of both groups often claim they are one ethnic group. Halpulaar is the correct term for “Tukulor” or “Toucouleur,” and it literally means “speaker of Pulaar.” Fulbe (the correct appellation for the “Fulani,” “Peul,” or “Peuhl”) also speak Pulaar. In this study, I refer to both the Fulbe and Halpulaar as “Pulaar-speakers” and include them in one group. At times, I just write “Pulaars,” although Pulaar technically refers to the language, as opposed to the people. 2. The Layéne order and the Qadiriyya are also present in Senegal, but these orders have a relatively small membership.

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3. For a treatment of all of the changes in electoral rules throughout Senegal’s postcolonial history, see Mozzafar and Vengroff 2002. A new constitution was approved by an overwhelming majority of the vote on January 7, 2001, which set forth still more institutional changes. 4. Until 2000, when the presidential term was changed to five years in a referendum, the presidential term in France was seven years, just as it was in Senegal. In Senegal, Wade campaigned to change the presidential term from seven years to five years, but claimed the change, which was approved in the 2001 referendum, only applied to those elected in elections subsequent to the election of 2000. Rather shockingly, in 2008, the National Assembly approved a constitutional amendment to increase the presidential term back to seven years. 5. In the words of Beck (1997, 28): “A political clan, or tendance (faction) as they are referred to today in Senegal, is composed of a diverse clientele who expects to benefit from their political support of a local politician in terms of access to state resources (see Schumacher 1975).” 6. Again, the observations in this chapter are based on the intensive fieldwork I conducted in 2000–2001 in Senegal. I interviewed party members and leaders, attended political rallies, collected party documents, and read the daily newspapers during this time. 7. Gellar (1995) observes with regard to the 1993 presidential election, “Although Senegalese youth came out in droves to attend opposition candidates’ campaign rallies, relatively few actually voted” (33). 8. Gellar (2005) describes how the emergence of the independent media in the 1990s contributed to democratization simply by providing Senegalese citizens with more unbiased information. 9. These data are all available at the Africa Elections Database website: http:// africanelections.tripod.com/sn.html. Galvin (2001) also includes a table, which nicely lays out the vote shares for parties in national elections from 1978 to 2001, including the two rounds of the 2000 election. 10. The rule of law is thought to connote predictability, consistency, and equality of treatment. In contrast, the rule of man connotes the capriciousness that accompanies personal rule. 11. Galvin notes that according to the 2001 rules, “if the incumbent were elected in 2007, he would begin his first of two possible five-year mandates” (2009, 493). 12. www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2010 13. www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&year=2009 14. Of course, Singapore is one of the least corrupt countries in the world. 15. That is, the Supreme Leader. 16. Jackson and Rosberg (1982) classify President Senghor as a prince within their classification scheme of personal rulers. The other categories of such rulers are autocrats, prophets, and tyrants.

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17. Originally quoted in Unité Africaine, May 11, 1967. 18. w w w.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/ regional_highlights

3 Historical Overview of the Senegalese Educational System 1. DiRenzo defines socialization as “the process by which biologically human organisms are transformed into functionally human beings” and culturation as “the transmission of the ‘way of life’ of the respective society” (1990, 26). 2. The designation of this time period is drawn from Vandewiele (1983), who identifies this period as that of “Missionary and Trading-Post Schools.” 3. The designation of this time period comes from de Lauture and DoriaHusser, 1981. 4. Translation is my own. 5. Translation from French to English is mine. 6. According to Conklin (1989), mis en valeur became the “new priority” of the colonial administration in French West Africa in 1895 (12). She notes that, at the time, this phrase connoted “the development of West African raw materials or cash crops for export to France, and the opening of the colonies to greater trade in cheap manufactured goods” (13). 7. This information was kindly provided by DAEB. PAPA also had recently put in place a program intended to reach young people who have dropped out or never been a part of the educational system in the hopes of reintegrating them into the educational system at about the time I gathered this information. It is not clear whether some of these younger people are included in the estimate to which I just referred. 8. According to the World Development Indicators, the population of Senegal in 2001 was 10,164,729, and about 55 percent of the population was 15 or older in 2001. 9. On the basis of the sales and testimonies in the field, it appears that ARED’s basic literacy modules have filled what was a glaring dearth of quality literacy and post–literacy materials in national languages. The vast majority of the 70 teachers I interviewed in 1993 and 1996 found ARED’s curriculum materials to be extraordinarily helpful. Moreover, most of the teachers I interviewed during the 1990s claimed that their students did not have a problem following and understanding the material found in these books. A few said that the grammar was a “a little dense.” In a two year period (1994–1996), ARED sold 19,550 basic literacy books in Pulaar. 10. Some of the information on PIP was gleaned from an assessment of Union pour la Solidarité et l’Entraide by Jose Ruijter (1997).

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11. Tostan/About Us/Our Community Partners <www.tostan.org/web/ page/655/sectionid/556/pagelevel/2/interior.asp> 12. w w w.tosta n.org /data /ima ges/tosta n%20brochure%28f ina l 2sept 2009%29%20low-res.pdf 13. Tostan now promotes a 30-month education program called the Community Empowerment Program (CEP). Two classes are normally established in a village, one for youth and one for adults. 14. In 2000, Tostan decided to start the curriculum with interactive sessions on democracy, human rights, and other themes. See www.tostan.org/data/ images/tostan%20brochure%28final2sept2009%29%20low-res.pdf 15. Much of this information is drawn from program reports and documents that have been posted on Tostan’s website, “Breakthrough in Senegal: The Process That Ended Female Genital Cutting in 31 Villages,” as well as from personal interviews and observations. 16. Nordtveit (2009) notes that, although the program was theoretically supposed to last 18 months, many times the classes lasted for a shorter period of time (95).

4

Studying Political Behavior and Attitudes in Rural Senegal

1. At the time of the survey, Matam was a department within the Region of St. Louis. 2. I attempted to apply the sampling principles laid out by the Afrobarometer (see www.afrobarometer.org/sampling.html), especially in my selection of the control/comparison group. The purpose of this study differs significantly from that of the Afrobarometer, and thus my sample design differs significantly from that employed by the Afrobarometer as well. 3. Although the term “control group” is usually used in experiments, I use the terms “control group” and “comparison group” interchangeably throughout the text to refer those who have not had any NFE. 4. Collecting precise data on the amount of time spent in class was not easy. Although respondents were asked about each increment of time spent in class (i.e., respondents were asked about the number of months a year, weeks a month, days a week, and hours a day), the most accurate information respondents gave seemed to be about the years in class. If a class met for nine months out of the year for two years, for most respondents, they have had two years of NFE. Indeed, most classes did not meet every month of the year. Moreover, across all of the programs, respondents seemed to inflate the amount of time spent in class. 5. NFE also differs from civic education. Civic education can be understood as “activities” that “are directed explicitly at promoting support for democratic norms and values among ordinary citizens” (Finkel et al. 2000, 1851).

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6.

7. 8.

9.

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The primary goal of the NFE programs of interest is to impart literacy and numeracy skills on adult learners. In fact, the effects of civic education in Africa appear to be very conditional in nature. In their study on the effects of civic education on political culture in Zambia, Bratton and Alderfer (1999) find “civic education has observable effects, but mainly among privileged elements in society . . .” (807). Similarly, in his study of the Dominican Republic and South Africa, Finkel (2002) finds that the impact of civic education on political participation depends partly on “the individual’s store of prior political and participatory resources” (994). According to Brenner, “an episteme is a kind of implicit world view or structure of thought which orders relationships among discursive practices . . .” (2001, 18). The three literacies are (1) Vai literacy based on the Vai script, (2) Arabic/ Qur’ranic literacy, and (3) English literacy learned in public schools. Political participation is a multidimensional concept. I, therefore, do not expect these forms of political participation to load highly onto one dimension, although all of these forms of participation are significantly correlated with each other. Indeed, electoral participation in Senegal has traditionally been driven by machine politics, and I would therefore not expect it to be tightly linked with other forms of civic participation. Below are the civic participation indicators with the rotated factor loadings beside them. My contention that, in Senegal, voting is different from other types of civic participation is reflected in the results of the factor analysis. Community participation: 0.47 Community contacting: 0.67 Personal Contacting: 0.65 Voting in the presidential election: 0.22 ARED is an American NGO that works in the area of education and research in national languages, particularly Pulaar.

5

NFE and Political Attitudes and Behavior

1. In this chapter, the differences between those with NFE and those without NFE are examined for all respondents. Since many programs target women, I also examined the effects of NFE on women specifically. When the analysis is restricted to only the sub-sample of women, the results are very similar to those reported for the sample as a whole. Since the results are nearly the same and the multivariate analyses control for gender and a plethora of other variables, for the sake of parsimony, these results are not included in the text. 2. The 0.05 level of significance will serve as the benchmark of significance.

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3. In the first 124 interviews, the part of the phrase “even if her husband disagrees” was left off of the questionnaire. This omission did appear to increase the likelihood of choosing the second response slightly. However, the relationship between NFE and this indicator is nearly exactly the same when these cases are excluded. When these cases are excluded, 34 percent of those without NFE opine that a should exercise her rights to speak about politics, while 47 percent of those with NFE do so. The relationship is still, of course, statistically significant.

6 Explaining Political Attitudes and Behavior 1. Listening to the radio is the most important indicator of media consumption in rural Senegal. Because of the low literacy rate and relatively high cost of newspapers, very few people in rural areas read the newspaper. Most of the villages where interviews were conducted did not have electricity, and TV ownership is rare. Gellar (2005) also notes that radio broadcasts not newspapers have been responsible for diffusing political information throughout Senegal (90). 2. In order to control for ethnolinguistic group in this model, dummy variables (i.e., variables that take on the value of 0 or 1, depending on whether they have the attribute of interest) were used for two out of the three major ethnolinguistic groups covered in the study (the other ethnic groups are grouped with Serer since they represented only 6 percent of the sample). Hence, two of the control variables in this model represent ethnic groups. One of the three variables representing ethnicity is, of course, always excluded from the model as including it would create a situation of perfect multicollinearity and estimation would be impossible. Region is controlled for in a similar manner. 3. When number of organizations is included in the model the size of the coefficient for NFE declines somewhat, although it is still large and highly significant. 4. CLARIFY was the software package used to calculate the marginal probabilities: Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King (1999). CLARIFY: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results. Version 1.2.1 Cambridge, MA: Havard University, June 1. http://gking. harvard.edu/ 5. A high level of community participation is operationalized as engaging in all five of the community behaviors described in the section on conceptualization and operation. 6. When the interaction term was added to the personal contacting model (Model 3), the coefficient for NFE decreased somewhat, although it was still positive and highly significant. The coefficient for formal education was

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7. 8.

9. 10. 11.

12.

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negative and significant at the 0.05 level, while the coefficient for the NFE/ formal education multiplicative term was positive and significant at the 0.01 level. Again, the values on this variable are coded so that higher values correspond to lower levels of authoritarianism. When I ran similar models with Afrobarometer data for rural Nigeria and Ghana, I also found that age had a significant positive association with democratic attitudes. Since the survey instruments used by Afrobarometer differed from that used in Senegal, for Nigeria and Ghana, I used two questions to measure democratic values. This survey was conducted when Matam was a department in the Region of St. Louis and not a separate region. See a list of these awards at www.tostan.org/web/page/578/sectionid/556/ pagelevel/2/interior.asp For example, in a group interview in Ross Bethio, much to the seeming embarrassment of some of the men in the group, one female respondent exuberantly volunteered the information that she had read a book about childbirth. She noted that she had explained everything she learned to several other women. That is, “in the bush.”

7 Implications and Conclusions 1. Of course, one must acknowledge that formal education is intended to last much longer than NFE. Moreover, the target populations for these two types of education are different. All of the NFE programs covered in this study target adults, but formal education obviously targets children. That is not to say that these organizations did not have components that worked with children. However, I was specifically interested in the programs centered on adults. 2. Many of the neo-literate repondents echoed these points. One observed, “If I were to start to read French now, I wouldn’t lose all of the time that those who start immediately with French lose.”

Appendix A: Supplemental Information on the Survey Methodology 1. I attempted to mimic the Afrobarometer sampling protocol as closely as possible. Since the goal of the Afrobaromter is to obtain a representative sample of the adult population of a country and my goal was to obtain a sample that would allow me to compare villagers with NFE to villagers without NFE, my sampling design obviously deviated

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from the Afrobarometer’s in some very important ways. I followed the Afrobarometer protocol most closely in my selection of the members of the control group, since sampling lists were employed at different stages of the selection of the NFE respondents. In particular, I employed the principle of probability proportionate to size, the four-stage design, and a similar walking pattern protocol to select the control households. Since my sampling design was modeled after that of the Afrobarometer, parts of my description of this process resemble parts of the Afrobarometer sampling description found on the website www.afrobarometer.org/sampling.html. 2. In one case, the IDEN official left us in his office to search through masses of dusty, disorganized papers on the floor and shelves. Nonetheless, by the end of our investigation, we appeared to have compiled a relatively complete list of the PAPA villages in the department. 3. Having Tostan and PIP guides with us facilitated our work by inspiring immediate cooperation and mobilization on the part of those in the village. They also helped us to locate some of the villages that were especially remote (it took us six hours to reach one village after we stayed over night in a town that we thought was very close to the relevant village). There is, however, no reason to believe that appearing with people from these organizations in anyway biased the responses to the questionnaire. The questions on the questionnaire in no way pertain to the NFE programs, and the initial presence of the guides would have in no way indicated that certain types of responses were more socially desirable than others. If anything, appearing with them seemed to create immediately an atmosphere of trust. Respondents appeared relaxed, and I would argue that having the guides only improved the quality of the interviewing process. 4. For the description of the characteristics of the sample, please contact the author.

Appendix B: Question Wording and Operationalization 1. The 170 respondents who said they never attended the meetings in the first place were coded as zeros. I ran the community participation model with these cases deleted, and the results were nearly the same as when they were included. The coefficient was nearly the same for NFE (.472 as opposed to .474) and also highly significant. The coefficient for formal education was significant at the 0.05 level when these cases were excluded.

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Index

Note: ‘N’ following a page number indicates an endnote; ‘t’ indicates a table. accommodation, defined, 57 Achebe, Chinua, 53–54 adult education, see education; NFE (nonformal education) AFP (L’Alliance des Forces de Progrès), 39 Africa Elections Database, 160n9 “African Renaissance” (sculpture), 45 Afrobarometer, 10–11, 162n2, 165–66n1, 165n8 Alderfer, Philip, 162–63n5 Almond, Gabriel, 7–8, 158n9 Ambiguous Adventure (Kane), 122 Anthills of the Savannah (Achebe), 53–54 anti-Semitism, 9 AOF, see French West Africa (AOF) ARED (Associates for Research and Education for Development), 67, 122–23, 161n9, 163n9 ARP (Association pour la Renaissance du Pulaar), 66 Askew, Ian, 102 assimilation, policy of, 56, 63 Associates for Research and Education for Development, see ARED association, right of, 94 Association pour la Renaissance du Pulaar (ARP), 66 attitudes, political, see political attitudes

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authoritarianism/progressiveness, 78–79, 85t, 91–93, 110–13, 133 autonomous model of literacy, 5–6 autonomy/individualism, 86t, 95–96, 116, 132 Babou, Cheikh Anta, 33 Badiane, Frederic, 20 Bamba, Amadou, 32, 33 Barro, Maimouna Abdoulaye, 69 Bathily, Abdoulaye, 44 BDS (Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais), 34–35 Beck, Linda J., 31, 53, 160n5 Benavot, Aaron, 6, 10 bivariate analyses of research findings, 83–99 Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais (BDS), 34–35 Boahen, Adu A., 11 Bouche, Denise, 59 Bourgi, A., 20–21 Brady, Henry E., 6, 15 Bratton, Michael, 1–2, 9–10, 17, 157n2, 162–63n5 CA, see Coalition pour l’Alternance 2000 Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), 70

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Index

Casamance, 28, 29, 32 Catholicism, 58–59 CEBs (Christian base communities), 12–13 Centre d’Etudes pour la Recherche et la Formation en Langues Africaines (CERFLA), 67 children, 93, 134 Christian base communities (CEBs), 12–13 CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency), 70 civic education, 162–63n5 civic morality, 45, 52–54 civil society and community organization membership, 88, 90 definition of, 158n17 and democratic values, 114 NFE’s effects on, 138 PAPA and PAPF as methods of promoting, 69 theorists on, 14–17 clientelism, 31, 52, 160n5 see also neopatrimonialism Clignet, Remi, 56–57, 58, 62–63, 158n13 Coalition pour l’Alternance 2000 (CA), 28, 38, 43, 44 Cole, Michael, 77 Coleman, James, 15 community contacting index, 107–8 community participation effects of NFE on, 84–85, 87–90, 101–6, 131–33 index, 78, 101–2 research methodology, 101–2 Conklin, Alice, 56, 58, 59, 64, 161n6 cooperative issue raising, 85t, 90 cooperative problem solving, 84, 85t, 87–88 Coppedge, Michael, 5 corruption 2007 parliamentary elections, 42

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and civic morality, 52–54 Diouf and, 40 increasing level of, 53 and rule of man, 160n10 Wade and, 43–45 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), 53 Costa Rica, 8 CPI (Corruption Perceptions Index), 53 Creevey, Lucy E., 20, 47 Crowder, Michael, 56 Cruise O’Brien, Donal B., 19, 29, 33, 34, 35–36 culturation, 161n1 DA (National Department of Literacy), see DAEB (Department of Literacy and Basic Education) daara tarbiyya, 33 DAEB (Department of Literacy and Basic Education), 65–66 democracy Bratton and van de Walle on consolidation of, 157n2 civil society and, 15–17 clientelism and, 31 DiRenzo on traits necessary for, 157n7 economic development and, 4–5 literacy as indicator of, 4 and media, 160n8 modernization theorists on education and, 3 and policy implications of NFE, 134–35 in Senegal, 18–20 stability of, in Africa, 1–2 see also Senegalese politics democratic values, 86t, 94–95, 114–16, 133 demokaraasi, 18–19 Department of Literacy and Basic Education (DAEB), 65–66 Deth, Jan W. van, 16 D’Hondt, W., 20

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Index Dia, Mamadou, 34 Diagne, Blaise, 34 Diamond, Larry, 1, 2, 4, 53 Dieng, Tanor, 49–50 Dièye, Cheikh Abdoulaye, 46 Diop, Nafissatou J., 102 Dior, Lat, 33 Diouf, Abdou, 18, 35–36, 37–41 DiRenzo, Gordon, 157n7, 161n1 Doria-Husser, Michèle, 59 economic development, 4–5 education effects on political participation, 6–7 influence on occupation, 7 vs. literacy, 76–77 modernization theorists on democracy and, 3 political attitudes and, 7–11 self-esteem/autonomy and, 21–22 social capital and, 7 and social trust, 159n28 see also NFE (nonformal education); Senegalese education education, formal effects of: on authoritarianism/ progressiveness, 112; on autonomy/individualism, 116; on democratic values, 114–16, 133; on ethnic pride, 134; on political participation, 6 effects of low vs. high levels of, 7, 8, 9–11 French literacy and, 136–37 Senegalese, 11, 20–21 education, Koranic Arabic literacy and, 136 effects of: on community participation, 104; on democratic values, 114; on electoral participation, 109; on interaction with public officials, 107–8; on political participation, 24 overview of, 75–76

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183

electoral participation, 85t, 90, 103–4t, 109–10, 133 see also political participation electoral reform, 36, 38 Epstein, David L., 5 ethnic pride/identity effects of formal education on, 134 effects of NFE on, 13, 87t, 97–99, 117–18, 134, 158n16 and maternal language education, 136–37 modernization and, 23 see also traditionalism ethnic violence, 16, 45 Evans, Geoffrey, 10–11 expression, right of, 94–95 Ezekwesili, Obiageli K., 53 Fagerberg-Diallo, Sonja, 20, 64 Faidherbe, Louis, 58 faire faire, 69–70, 123 FAL (Front pour l’Alternance), 38 Fall, Ousseynou, 46 Fatton, Robert, Jr., 16 female genital cutting, 68, 102, 145, 162n15 see also women findings, see research findings Finifter, Ada W., 9, 133 Fink, Marcy, 12 Finkel, Steven, 162–63n5 Flis-Zonabend, Francoise, 62 formal education, see education, formal Freedom House, 1, 41, 44, 157n1 French West Africa (AOF) and assimilation policy, 34, 56–57, 58 educational system of, 58–60 and Murid leaders, 33 Friere, Paulo, 12 Front pour l’Alternance (FAL), 38 Fukuyama, Francis, 15 Fulbe ethnic group, see Pulaar speakers

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Index

Galvin, Dennis, 44 Gearing, Adam, 132 Gellar, Sheldon on dominance of Wolof language, 23 on hybrid nature of Senegal culture, 28–29 on marabouts in 2000 presidential election, 46 on media, 160n8, 164n1 on political stability, 51 on rural vs. urban political leaders, 34 on social stratification, 32 Ghana, 10 Gibson, James L., 8–9 Goody, Jack, 15 Gueye, Lamine, 34–35 Hadenius, Axel, 3, 4 Halpulaar ethnic group, see Pulaar speakers Hardy, Georges, 59–60 HDI (Human Development Index), 4 Herbst, Jeffrey, 28 Hewitt, W. E., 12–13 homelessness, 9 Hooghe, Marc, 134 Huckfeldt, Robert, 7 Human Development Index (HDI), 4, 29, 157n5 Hyden, Goran, 48 information technology, 38 Inglehart, Ronald, 5 Integrated Adult Education Programme (PIEA), 70 interpersonal trust, see trust, interpersonal Islam, see education, Koranic; Muslims Johnson, G. Wesley, Jr., 29, 32 Jola ethnic group, 23, 29, 32 Ka, Djibo, 20, 39, 45

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Kane, Cheikh Hamidou, 70, 122 Kara, Serigne Modou, 46 Karpov, Vyacheslav, 9 Kehrberg, N., 80–81 Kelly, Gail, 60 Koranic education, see education, Koranic Kuenzi, Michelle, 84, 87 La Due Lake, Ronald, 7 L’Alliance des Forces de Progrès (AFP), 39 language, see maternal language education Latin America, 12 Lauter, Herve de, 59 leadership positions, 85t, 90 Lee Kuan Yew, 45 Lerner, Daniel, 3–4, 8, 131 Liatto-Katunda, Beatrice, 9–10 Liberia, 77 Limongi, Fernando, 5 Lindberg, S. I., 2 Linz, Juan, 158n17 Lipset, Seymour, 4 literacy 2006 rate of, 64 autonomous model of, 5–6, 158n8 vs. education, 76–77 failure of NFE to transmit, 158n15 imperative, 158n18 as indicator of democracy, 4 and metaphor of sleeping, 96 of Senegalese population, 21 social stratification and, 15–16 see also education; NFE (nonformal education) literacy movements, 19–20 Loimeier, Roman, 47 MacLean, Lauren Morris, 16–17 Magnus, John, 11 Malawi, 10–11 marabouts

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Index and 2000 presidential election, 46 definition of, 29, 158n19 emergence of, 33 in post-independence Senegal, 35–36 role in politics, 32–33 see also Muslims Marche Bleu, 28, 38 maternal language education, 13, 14, 20, 136–37 see also NFE (nonformal education); specific languages Mbacke, Falilou, 47 Mbow, Penda, 47 médersas, 75–76 media, 38, 44, 47, 160n8 see also radio listening meeting participation, 85t, 90 Melching, Molly, 122 Mercier, Paul, 61 methodology, see research methodology Mickiewicz, Ellen, 9, 133 Milligan, Kevin, 6 Minnis, John R., 22 modernization, 157n6 modernization theory challenges to, 5 economic development and democracy, 4–5 education and democracy, 3–4 ethnic pride/identity and, 23 and research findings, 114, 116, 117 support for, 135 Mondak, Jeffrey, 132 morality, civic, 45, 52–54 Moretti, Enrico, 6 Moulton, Jeanne, 21 Muller, Edward N., 8 multivariate analyses of research findings, 101–23 Murid Brotherhood, 29–30, 32–33 see also Muslims Murid merchants, 53 Muslims conservative, 46–47

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185

and French West Africa, 58 history of, in Senegal, 32–33 Murid Brotherhood, 29–30, 32–33 and Pulaar literacy movement, 14 Sufi Brotherhoods, 29, 47 Tijani Brotherhood, 30, 32 see also education, Koranic; marabouts National Department of Literacy (DA), see DAEB (Department of Literacy and Basic Education) ndigels, 46 neopatrimonialism definition of, 31 as “economy of affection,” 48 in post-independence Senegal, 35–36 in Senegalese politics, 30–31, 48–50, 52 Wade and, 44, 48 see also Senegalese politics New Democracies Barometer, 10 NFE (nonformal education) vs civic education, 162–63n5 and civil society, 69, 138 cultural relevance of, 13 in developing countries, 12 effects of: on authoritarianism/ progressiveness, 85t, 91–93, 110–13, 133; on autonomy/ individualism, 86t, 95–96, 116, 132; on community participation, 84–85, 87–90, 101–6, 131–33; on democratic values, 86t, 94–95, 114–16, 133; on electoral participation, 85t, 90, 103–4t, 109–10, 133; on ethnic pride, 13, 87t, 97–99, 117–18, 134, 158n16; ethnic pride/identity and, 13; on interaction with public officials, 85t, 91, 103–4t, 107–9, 132; on interpersonal trust, 86t, 95; on political efficacy, 86–87t, 96–97; on political participation, 3, 13;

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186

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Index

NFE (nonformal education)— Continued by program, 118–23; on self esteem, 22; on traditionalism, 85t, 93, 133; on women, 12, 69, 126– 27, 137–38; years of participation in, 105–6, 113 failure to transmit literacy and numeracy skills, 158n15 and maternal language education, 136–37 in Nepal, 80–81 PAPA (Projet d’Appui au Plan d’Action en matière d’ éducation non formelle), 69–71, 118–23 PAPF (Projet Alphabétisation Priorité Femmes), 69–71, 118–23 PIEA (Integrated Adult Education Programme), 70 PIP (Programme Intégré de Podor), 66–67, 118–22 policy implications of, 134–35 Senegalese history of, 64–66 skills attained in, 14 socialization theory and, 14 Tostan, 67–69, 89–90, 102, 118–22 use of term, 2 NGOs (nongovernmental organizations), 65, 66–67, 163n9 Niasse, Moustapha, 39 nonformal education (NFE), see NFE (nonformal education) nongovernmental organizations, see NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) Nordtveit, Bjorn Harald, 21, 65–66, 70 Norris, P., 109 Nunn, Clyde Z., 8 occupations, education’s influence on, 7 Ong, Walter J., 15, 95 Oreopoulos, Philip, 6 organizational membership, 85t, 88–90

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Oxenham, John, 5–6, 10, 14, 15, 76, 95 PAI (Parti Africain de l’Indépendance), 36 PAPA (Projet d’Appui au Plan d’Action en matière d’ éducation non formelle), 69–71, 118–23 PAPF (Projet Alphabétisation Priorité Femmes), 69–71, 118–23 Parti Africain de l’Indépendance (PAI), 36 participation, political, see political participation Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS), 36 Parti Socialiste (PS), see PS (Parti Socialiste) The Passing of Traditional Society (Lerner), 3 Patterson, Amy S., 16 Paul Lazarfeld Society, 10 PDS (Parti Démocratique Sénégalais), 36, 42 Phelan, Jo, 9 PIEA (Integrated Adult Education Programme), 70 PIP (Programme Intégré de Podor), 66–67, 118–22 Ploermel Brothers, 58–59 Poland, 9 policy implications of NFE, 134–35 political attitudes education and, 7–11 effects of NFE: on democratic values, 86t, 94–95, 114–16, 133; on political efficacy, 86–87t, 96–97 and effects of NFE on, 78–79 political institutions, 30 see also neopatrimonialism political participation 2000 presidential election, 40 effects of education on, 6–7

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Index effects of NFE: on community participation, 84–85, 87–90, 131–33; on electoral participation, 85t, 90, 103–4t, 109–10, 133; on interaction with public officials, 85t, 91, 103–4t, 107–9, 132 effects of NFE on, 3, 13 modes of, 77 multidimensionality of, 163n8 neopatrimonialism and, 48–50 see also community participation; NFE (nonformal education) Ponty, William, 59–60 Posner, Daniel N., 2 pretest, 146–47 Programme Intégré de Podor, see PIP Projet Alphabétisation Priorité Femmes, see PAPF Projet d’Appui au Plan d’Action en matière d’ éducation non formelle, see PAPA Przeworski, Adam, 5 PS (Parti Socialiste), 18, 36, 37 public official contacts, 85t, 91, 103–4t, 107–9, 132 Pulaar language and anti-Wolofization, 23 ethnic pride/identity and, 98 literacy for speakers of, 136–37 literacy movement, 13, 14, 19–20 literacy programs for, 66–69 publications in, 122–23, 161n9 Pulaar speakers composition of, 159n1 and ethnic pride, 117–18 Islam and, 32 as percentage of population, 159n24 as second largest population group, 29 Putnam, Robert, 15, 139, 157n4, 158n10 questionnaire, 146, 149–56

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187

radio listening and authoritarianism/ progressiveness, 112 and ethnic pride, 117 as indicator of media consumption, 164n1 and individualization, 116 reform, see electoral reform religion and 2000 presidential election, 46 Catholic schools, 58–59 and French West Africa, 58 rising importance in Senegal, 46–47 role of Islamic marabouts in Senegalese politics, 32–33 violence and, 47 see also Muslims research findings alternate hypotheses for, 123–30 bivariate analyses, 83–99 multivariate analyses, 101–23 research methodology and Afrobarometer, 162n2, 165–66n1, 165n8 applicability to other contexts, 79–81 community contacting index, 107–8 community participation index, 78 conceptualization and operationalization, 75–79 design of, 73–74 pretest, 146–47 probability sample, 73 qualititative research, 79, 126–27 questionnaire, 146, 149–56 research team/protocol, 147 sample design, 141–45 substitutions, 145 target population, 141 Rideout, William, 64–65 Robinson, David, 33 Rogers, Alan, 80 Rose, Richard, 10–11 Rosenstone, Steven J., 6, 7

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188

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Index

Roume, Ernest, 59 rule of law, 43–45, 160n10 Sabatier, Peggy Roark, 11, 57–58, 60, 62, 63 St. Peter, Louis, 8 sample design, 141–45 Schaffer, F. C., 18–19 Schlozman, Kay Lehman, 6 Schumacher, Edward J., 35, 52 Scinto, L. M., 77 Scribner, Sylvia, 77 Searing, James, 33 selection/treatment effect, 123–30 self-esteem/autonomy, 21–22 see also autonomy/individualism Seligson, Mitchell A., 8 Senegal competition between Wolof and Pulaar speakers over language, 19–20, 23 economic crisis, 39 ethnic composition of, 28t, 29 geography of, 28 literacy rates of population in, 21 poverty of, 29 regions included in research study, 142–43 see also Muslims; Pulaar language; Pulaar speakers; Wolof ethnic group; Wolof speakers Senegalese education 19th-century history of, 58–59 early 20th-century history of, 59–60 elites created by formal, 61–62 failures of colonial system, 64 formal, 11, 20–21 and French colonial assimilation policy, 57–58, 59, 62, 63 French colonialism and, 56–57 French language, 62, 64 postcolonial system, 64–65 social stratification as effect of, 60

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see also education, formal; French West Africa (AOF); NFE (nonformal education) Senegalese politics 2000 presidential election, 37–40 2007 presidential election, 42 democracy and, 18–20 early history of, 32–33 electoral reform, 36, 38 formal institutions in, 30 institutional instability, 42–43 modern history of, 18–20 neopatrimonialism in, 30–31, 48–50, 52 post-alternation period, 40–45 post-independence period, 35–36 pre-independence period, 34–35 religious marabouts role in, 32–33, 35–36, 46 secularism and, 46–47 see also neopatrimonialism; Wade, Abdoulaye Senghor, Léopold, 18, 34–36, 46–47 Serer ethnic group, 30 shaykh, see marabouts Sine, Babacar, 55 social attitudes effects of NFE: on authoritarianism/ progressiveness, 85t, 91–93, 110–13, 133; on autonomy/ individualism, 86t, 95–96, 116, 132; on ethnic pride, 87t, 97–99, 117–18, 134; on interpersonal trust, 86t, 95; on traditionalism, 85t, 93, 133 social capital, 7, 15–16, 139, 158n10 Socialist Party, see PS (Parti Socialiste) socialization, 161n1 socialization theory, 14 social stratification, 15–16, 60–63 society, civil, 15–17, 158n17 Sopi Coalition, 41–42 South Africa, 9 Soviet Union, 8–9

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Index Sow, Fatou, 61 Stepan, Alfred, 158n17 Stolle, Dietlind, 134 Stouffer, Samuel Adam, 8 Street, Brian V., 10, 15–16, 77, 94 study findings, see research findings study methodology, see research methodology Subasi, S., 80–81 Sufi Brotherhoods, see Muslims Sy, Cheikh Tidiane, 46 Sylla, Abdou, 63 Tall, Umar, Al Hajj, 32 target population, 141 tendance, 50 Tiebout, Charles, 36 Tijani Brotherhood, 30, 32 see also Muslims Tostan, 67–69, 89–90, 102, 118–22 Touba, 53 traditionalism, 85t, 93, 133 Transparency International, 53 Trudell, Barbara, 19, 21, 23 trust, interpersonal, 86t, 95, 158n9 trust, social, 159n28 Turan, Ilter, 8 Turkey, 8 UMN (United Mission to Nepal), 80–81 UNESCO Institute of Education, 20, 65 Union pour le Renouveau Démocratique, see URD (Union pour le Renouveau Démocratique) Union Progressiste Sénégalais, see UPS (Union Progressiste Sénégalais) United Mission to Nepal (UMN), 80–81 United States, 6, 8, 9 UPS (Union Progressiste Sénégalais), 35, 36 URD (Union pour le Renouveau Démocratique), 20, 39

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189

van der Westen, Monique, 12 van de Walle, Nicolas, 1, 2, 17, 41, 157n2 Vandewiele, Michel, 11, 158n12 Vanhanen, Tatu, 5 Vengroff, Richard, 20 Verba, Sidney, 6, 7–8, 158n9 village substitutions, 145 Villalón, Leonardo, 37, 47 violence ethnic, 16 on members of media, 44 political, 36 religious, 47 voting, see electoral participation Wade, Abdoulaye 2000 presidential election, 18 Murid Brotherhood membership, 46 and neopatrimonialism, 48 post-alternation corruption, 42–45 post-alternation reforms, 40–41 victory in 2000 presidential election, 37–40 Wade, Karim, 44 walking pattern, 143–44 Wallerstein, Immanuel, 60–61 Watt, Ian, 15 Weil, Frederick D., 9 Williams, J. Allen, Jr., 8 Wolfinger, Raymond E., 6, 7 Wolof ethnic group, 29–30, 32, 159n21 Wolof language, 18–19, 23, 67–69, 136 Wolof speakers, 136 women and autonomy/individualism, 116 and democratic values, 114 effects of NFE on, 12, 69, 126–27, 137–38 effects of NFE on views toward, 85t, 92–93 genital mutilation, 68, 102, 145, 162n15

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190

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Index

women—Continued Islamic reformist movements and, 47 literacy rates of Nepalese, 80 literacy rates of Senegalese, 21, 64 and voting, 110 Woods, Dwayne, 16 World Bank, 69

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World Development Indicators, 21, 64 Young, Daniel J., 2 Zakaria, Fareed, 1 Zambia, 9–10 Zmerli, Sonja, 16

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