Education After Dewey PA U L FA I R F I E L D
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Education After Dewey PA U L FA I R F I E L D
Continuum International Publishing Group The Tower Building, 11 York Road, London SE1 7NX 80 Maiden Lane, Suite 704, New York, NY 10038 www.continuumbooks.com © Paul Fairfield 2009 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Paul Fairfield has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: 978-1-4411-4586-4 (hardcover) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Fairfield, Paul, 1966Education After Dewey / Paul Fairfield. p. cm. ISBN 978-1-4411-4586-4 (hardcover) 1. Education--Philosophy. 2. Education--Aims and objectives. 3. Education, Humanistic. 4. Dewey, John, 1859-1952. I. Title. LB14.7.F33 2009 370.1--dc22 2009012059
Typeset by Kenneth Burnley, Wirral, Cheshire Printed and bound in Great Britain by . . .
Chapter 1
Contents
A Note about References Introduction: An Enigmatic Transition
vii 1
Part 1: The Educative Process 1 2 3
Beyond Progressivism and Conservatism Dewey’s Copernican Revolution What Is Called Thinking?
13 52 101
Part 2: Education in the Human Sciences 4 5 6 7 8 9
Teaching Philosophy: The Scholastic and the Thinker Teaching Religion: Spiritual Training or Indoctrination? Teaching Ethics: From Moralism to Experimentalism Teaching Politics: Training for Democratic Citizenship Teaching History: The Past and the Present Teaching Literature: Life and Narrative
149 183 210 233 257 280
Index
305
For Gwyneth Fairfield
Chapter 1
A Note about References
All references to John Dewey’s texts are from The Collected Works, 1882– 1953, edited by Jo Ann Boydston and published by Southern Illinois University Press. In the endnotes, EW refers to The Early Works, 1882– 1898 (5 volumes), MW refers to The Middle Works, 1899–1924 (15 volumes), and LW refers to The Later Works, 1925–1953 (17 volumes).
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Introduction
An Enigmatic Transition
The crucial matter in education is the transition from relative ignorance to a condition as difficult to attain as to describe theoretically: intellectual agency, maturity, emancipation, or, more modestly, being informed are a few possibilities. Education is the name for this transition or transformation, the ambiguity of which has long been a topic of theoretical reflection. In describing the learning process, Plato first emphasized the difficulty of leading the mind from the world of illusion that is its original abode to enlightenment. His account of this process was couched in epistemological and metaphysical terms that no longer warrant belief even as the story of the cave itself and the prisoners’ gradual introduction to the world above retains a special relevance, as a metaphor at least. This should not surprise us; metaphorical interpretations often shed light in a way that literal and theoretical propositions do not, particularly when what we would describe is as ambiguous as the nature of the educative process and the aims that guide it. Our goal in this study is to understand this process. It is a project that will not succeed if we overlook this ambiguity or insist on reducing it to zero, for the ambiguity of education directly reflects that of human experience in general. It is a quality that we must cope with and endeavor to clarify, but gaining clarity has its limits when the thing itself is no mere technical puzzle but belongs fundamentally to our experience of the world. Several possibilities suggest themselves, some more metaphorical than others, in speaking of this transition: from bondage to liberation, illusion to enlightenment, ignorance to the truth, nature to culture, immaturity to maturity, possessing less information or skills to more, and so on. Each succeeds in some measure in illuminating the phenomena of teaching and learning. In thinking about education we are often tempted to select one such phrase and set it up as a model to which everything can be reduced, but if the object of inquiry is itself multidimensional, so as well must be our account of it. It is here that reductionist theories run aground: deeming clarity and simplicity cardinal virtues of theorizing in general, they reduce all richness and complexity to artificial simplicity and so misunderstand the object. This remains a common failing of educational theories. On the side of the individual, education represents a transformation of perspective that 1
2
Introduction
in one fashion or another raises the mind to a condition of some higher kind, or kinds. It informs and transforms in about equal measure, depending on the subject matter, the stage of the learning process, and a variety of other factors. On the side of the social, education initiates the young into a tradition; it produces acculturation and makes it possible for the younger generation to participate in the ways of an historical community. The individual and the social dimensions of education are themselves inseparable, adding further to its complexity. This practice also has an unmistakable political dimension, is often difficult to distinguish from indoctrination, draws upon an underdeveloped and often reductive understanding of human psychology, and has long been the playground of social engineers and enthusiasts of every possible kind, all of whom maintain that the solution to our problems is to mold the young in accordance with whatever opinions they hold dear. No practice is as vulnerable as education to political or scientific fashion, its practitioners continually pulled this way and that by the latest findings in the social sciences as well as by economic imperatives and societal trends that have little to do with the cultivation of intellectual maturity. Educational meddling by an endless array of the well meaning but misinformed remains as commonplace in our times as in any other, the effect of which is not only, and not primarily, to educate the mind but to produce a certain form of subjectivity: workers, consumers, or believers of one kind or another. A consequence of scientific and philosophical theorizing, social forces and economic pressures, as well as the complexities already inherent to the learning process, is a certain lack of orientation on the part of educators, or an orientation beset by contradictions. Educators are charged with delivering a curriculum they have little or no part in selecting, preparing students for standardized tests produced by ostensible experts, training a workforce, preserving traditions, managing behavior, instilling values, acting as role models and therapists, applying techniques and research findings while raising standards as governments understand or misunderstand the phrase. Education today can be likened to a soup over-rich in ingredients: every new cook in the kitchen adds a pinch of this and a dash of that until at last the concoction has everything in it but flavor. Cooks, to push the metaphor a bit, typically do not see their customers, while those responsible for serving up the tasteless brew know very well how it is going over, yet neither server nor customer has any say as to its composition. By the time the reviews reach the kitchen, the recipe has changed yet again along with the cook. The situation is different for university professors, of course, who have long and jealously guarded their autonomy in the classroom, but teachers at the primary and secondary levels have found their status as professionals severely compromised as the scope for independent judgment diminishes. Teachers faced with these conditions may be forgiven for being bewildered, caught as they
An Enigmatic Transition
3
are in the maelstrom of empirical studies and social realities, politics and religion, philosophy and other philosophies, psychology and other psychologies, and lacking the autonomy proper to any professional to form and act on their own judgment. The real world of education is a miscellany of often irreconcilable aims, imperatives, and fashions, many of which are extraneous to the practice and simply imposed from without, and all of which individual educators must square in some precarious way with the realities of the classroom. To get our bearings we must gain a more explicit understanding of the transition noted above and the principles that belong to it. There is, as I shall argue, a logic that is always already inherent to the educative process. The philosopher’s task is to render this logic or dynamic explicit and to identify its implications. It is also to critique approaches to education that effectively undermine this logic either by pursuing means that negate the practice’s own aims or by substituting extraneous ends, a common occurrence at present if it is not indeed a universal phenomenon. Like any social practice, education contains its own immanent conditions and ends which can be undermined when pursued by improper means or when conflicting aims supplant them. The temptation toward the latter is great and certainly not limited to our own time and place. The classroom will remain the playground of politicians and social engineers, religionists and enthusiasts, social scientists and philosophers, sometimes for the better and sometimes not. When they are for the better, such efforts recognize a kind of integrity – an integration of principles – inherent to the learning process, principles that must be identified and implemented if the practice is to succeed. When for the worse, these efforts reduce education to a mere means to an end, usually an end defined in terms of economics, politics, or religion. Whatever education is at the most fundamental level of analysis, it is not merely a means to an end. While it has always been known that a good education prepares one for a career and for later life in general – whether directly or indirectly, by intention or by accident – its meaning is not limited to this. In particular, it is not limited to economic utility. There is a higher purpose that education serves, as Plato taught us to see even while misdescribing this purpose or construing it in crude, metaphysical terms. To understand the nature and purpose of education we must view it in the larger context of human experience. The philosophical concept of experience provides the most appropriate point of view from which to interpret our theme for the reason that the transition that education essentially is is a transition in our experience of ourselves and our world. Beyond having acquired a certain amount of information, the educated mind possesses a capacity for experience that is richer and more expansive than its less
4
Introduction
educated counterpart. The transition that it undertakes is from an experience that is narrow and superficial to one that is broad and profound. When it achieves its purpose, education leads the mind from the world of the familiar and narrowly practical to the unfamiliar and abstract; it teaches us how to see beneath surfaces and beyond the false certainties with which our culture provides us as a talisman against thinking. Above all, the educated mind is open, and radically so, to new experiences and ideas that require critical reflection and, if adopted, a rearrangement of our prior opinions. It is inclined to ask questions, to seek justifications for ideas, and to have its experience of the world transformed. Education requires a venturing beyond oneself to what is foreign and unexpected and a consequent alteration of the conversation that is our culture while cultivating a range of capacities and intellectual virtues necessary to that end. What education is not is a world unto itself, something divorced from experience outside the classroom or a realm of ideas disconnected from life. At its worst this is precisely what education becomes: a cloister of other-worldly concerns or intellectual gymnastics that connect in no way with the ordinary search for understanding of which our experience consists. The relation of formal education to experience, as I shall argue in this study, is that of species to genus. Understanding education requires that we investigate this connection and see how the former, when it is successful, originates in the latter and also returns to it. It is the nature of human experience to encounter situations that upset our expectations and that are in some manner or other problematic. Everyday life brings us into contact not only with that which confirms our knowledge and anticipations but especially with that which disconfirms them. This happens most often on a small scale, but occasionally on a larger one: our assumptions about the world come up against competing views, our beliefs are called into question in the encounter with texts or persons not of like mind, or our self-certainty is challenged by a sense of contingency. If experience is our point of departure, and if it is of the nature of experience to be beset with problems to be resolved and questions to be answered, then education consists in the search for solutions and answers or in a series of investigations. The concept of inquiry is fundamental here and is importantly different and places students in a different role than older conceptions of students as essentially passive receptacles of a curriculum consisting entirely of predigested information. Students are better regarded as participants in investigation and fellow discussants – perhaps discussants in training – in the conversation that is their culture. The accent on experience, participation, and inquiry requires us to take seriously contemporary notions of dialogue, thinking or ‘critical thinking’, and to inquire into their meanings. Education, as all can agree, crucially bears on a student’s ability to think
An Enigmatic Transition
5
intelligently, whatever this means exactly for students at different stages of the learning process and in different fields of study. Is thinking one or many? Is there a theoretical model that can capture everything properly describable as thought? For that matter, can thinking be taught, and if so, then by what means? Intelligent thought is what the educated mind is ostensibly capable of and what experience culminates in, yet in what does it consist? These are philosophical questions all, and they are neither straightforward nor avoidable if we are to get a handle on what education is. Thinking undoubtedly has to do with the search for understanding that is central to education, but beyond the preliminaries and slogans, in exactly what does it consist? The concepts of experience and thinking are fundamentally connected, but what is the nature of this connection and what are its educational consequences? What educational success ultimately looks like is a mind that is both well informed and capable of intelligent reflection. It is also what our times, rather desperately in my view, call for: the ability to exercise judgment and to engage in intelligent discussion about ideas and worldly events, to think outside of narrow specialties and rules and to be able to justify with some semblance of rationality whatever beliefs that we hold. Our educational institutions appear to be of two minds on the question of thinking, and it is an ambivalence that directly reflects an ambivalence of our age: we speak of the imperative to think outside the box, of the need for creativity and innovation that would match the innovation of technology and the progress of scientific knowledge, yet at the same time we are troubled by unconventionality of values, by the concept of judgment, and by ideas that cause more than small modifications in our understanding of the world. The concept of judgment, for instance, appears to many to be inseparable from intolerance or even fanaticism unless it is practiced by a body of specially trained experts. To judge is to be judgmental, we commonly hear, thus to commit a certain intellectual or moral failing. Yet the capacity for judgment is indispensable both in education and in our experience in general. Like common sense and imagination, what is called good judgment – practical, political, ethical, aesthetic, and so on – is fundamental to intellectual agency. Limiting this to experts is an abdication of reason, of ordinary capacities of thought and intelligence that largely define what it means to be a human being. Judgment in these forms does not permit of expertise, however it can be trained through habitual use. The same can be said of thinking in general, in its higher reaches: while it sometimes works with formal methods and techniques, often there are neither rules to be followed nor expertise to be gained, and one must undertake a more creative act of cognition than the concepts of technique and expertise suggest. Whether there are rules to be followed or not depends on the object of investigation and the questions we are asking about it. In an age in which science is regarded as more or less
6
Introduction
synonymous with rational thought in general, it seems to many dangerously subjectivist to speak of a reflection that is unscientific and not governed by rules of some objective kind. If it is the nature of human thought, experience, and education that we are investigating, then there are indeed empirical questions to be asked, yet there are also properly philosophical ones for which scientific methods will not help us. In particular, there is something called the art of thinking – of imagining and judging, justifying and criticizing, interpreting and questioning, narrating and metaphorizing, understanding and self-understanding, speculating and wondering – which is highly resistant to scientific explanation and which requires philosophical and phenomenological investigation. I regard this as an urgent matter both in view of the ambivalence regarding thinking just noted and because the art of thinking, whatever we take this to mean in specific terms, appears in many ways to be out of step with the times. A variety of historical conditions, from the scientific and technological to the philosophical and epistemological, the economic and political, and so on, has had the effect not only of reducing thought to a technique but of gradually reducing opportunities for its exercise. Increasingly thought is the preserve of expertise, something that ordinary persons need not and perhaps ought not engage in; instead we must defer and adapt to what the experts determine, and in a society that offers up experts on just about everything there is. Even the well educated now have information and opinions but not knowledge – not the genuine article, that is. For this they must look elsewhere, to persons with specialized qualifications, even if only a short time ago the item of knowledge in question was considered a matter of ordinary common sense. If what is called thinking were one day to disappear from the face of the earth, it would be due not to any breakdown in societal structures or to the ‘school failures’ about which we hear so much, but to simple irrelevance. When there is no need any longer for educated professionals to make ethical judgments in the workplace due to the availability of specialized ‘ethicists’, when citizens of a democracy need only defer to the political and economic expertise of television pundits, when we are unable even to take care of ourselves in ordinary matters of mind and body but must defer to an endless proliferation of caring professionals, we have indeed become an unthinking society. Whether, as Allan Bloom has asserted, the American mind has been closed, I do not know, and not only because I am not American.1 I suspect it has not, or not in the way that he suggests. It may be closer to the truth to say with Martin Heidegger that ‘we are still not thinking’, that our conceptual framework has become excessively beholden to technology and dangerously one- or perhaps two-dimensional.2 His worry, and the worry of numerous existential and phenomenological thinkers following him, was that by the twentieth century thinking had become thoroughly assimilated into
An Enigmatic Transition
7
the machinery of technological civilization and that genuinely novel ways of seeing the world had become a veritable impossibility. The new credulity toward science and technology spells trouble for any ideas that wish to announce themselves in an unscientific vocabulary. Were I to devise a blueprint for making an unreflective culture still less reflective, I would do the following: reduce knowledge or thinking to a single form, reduce that form to so many bits of useable information, organize education around the possession of information in the largest possible quantity, and standardize the information that is taught and learned in educational institutions. The result would be a pretty good assurance that nothing new would be said and that mainstream culture would become even more hegemonic. There are many today who see education precisely in this light, who warn of the dangers of a young generation unprepared to enter the workforce and compete in the global economy. I am not in the least sympathetic to their cause and instead regard the central business of education at all levels as the cultivation of intellectual agency, something that necessitates acquiring a good deal of information and scientific knowledge but that also surpasses this. In advancing this argument my primary interlocutor will be John Dewey. In spite of the vast educational literature that has emerged in recent decades from a variety of disciplines and theoretical approaches, I believe that none has surpassed Dewey if what we are after is a principled account of the educative process. No more contemporary philosopher in this area has rendered his thought outdated, nor in my view has the philosophy of education that he advanced been convincingly refuted. It has been clarified and refined, interpreted and very often misinterpreted, used and abused, but refuted or surpassed it has not. As so often happens in the history of ideas, the conversation has moved on since Dewey’s time, yet a change in direction is not always an indication of progress. Like several other aspects of Dewey’s philosophy, his theory of education is no longer the fashion, if indeed it ever was. Students of education and teachers in training typically know a certain amount about Dewey – that he was associated with the progressive movement, for instance, and that his texts do not make for light reading – but they do not usually read his work. Nor, it would seem, do many of his critics, past and present, or not with the care that is usual in scholarly discourse. For all their ostensible influence and fame, most especially Democracy and Education of 1916, his writings in this field have been so misread, by so many and for so long, that it remains necessary for scholars to correct the misunderstandings that greeted his work from the beginning. Dewey’s own efforts to repeat and clarify his position did little to dispel the caricatures. His theory of education is neither positivistic nor an excuse for lowering academic standards; it is neither unclear nor to be understood in isolation from his philosophy as a whole. Indeed his educational thought is highly
8
Introduction
integrated with his contributions to epistemology, psychology, philosophy of science, politics, ethics, and even aesthetics. A model of experimental knowing underlies his philosophy in general and must be understood if we are to assess the relevance of his philosophy of education a century after its original formulation. Additional reasons for returning to Dewey are that he explicitly grounded education in a theory of human experience that continues to warrant our attention. Understanding the nature of the learning process requires that we view it in the larger context of experimental and intellectual maturation, of the gradual formation and transformation of the self, and in terms that recognize the individual’s thorough embeddedness in culture. As Dewey often pointed out, what takes place in the classroom is, or ought to be, continuous with life outside it. Questions regarding curriculum, techniques of instruction, and so on must not be approached as if the mind of the student were an ahistorical mechanism of some kind, a computer to be programmed or a producer-consumer in training. Nor should the question of development be approached in quasi-objective fashion, apart from phenomenological description of our lived experience. The transition that education brings about is a rising up to humanity, a cultivation of the self as an intellectual agent and active participant in the life of its society. It does not merely prepare the young for later life but transforms their perspective on the world and puts them in the role of questioners, inquirers, and participants in dialogue. While these are contemporary themes, they were also familiar to Dewey and to many of his predecessors, including G. W. F. Hegel and the Bildung tradition in German philosophy. Examining these themes obliges us to reconsider Dewey’s educational thought, where this means both elucidating its meaning and examining its contemporary relevance. Dewey’s educational philosophy, minus the misinterpretations to which it has long been subject, continues to demand our attention. Yet its appropriation, or perhaps its rehabilitation, must be a critical one. It is a philosophy whose basic outline was formulated well prior to the publication of Democracy and Education in 1916, in the final decade of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth, and which not surprisingly bears the traces of that era. I shall be treating Dewey as an interlocutor in the chapters that follow, thus neither as a villain to be castigated for whatever failings we believe our educational institutions suffer from, nor as a Master Thinker whose views may be wholeheartedly assented to once suitably understood. An interlocutor is not one whose views meet with an unqualified yes or no. While I find myself in substantial agreement with his writings on education and on some other matters as well, the title of this book is not Education According to Dewey. The significance of the ‘After’ is that I shall be bringing his views into contact with some more contemporary philosophical developments, including
An Enigmatic Transition
9
figures and themes following his time and in some cases figures who belong to a tradition that interested Dewey very little. This is the tradition, or traditions, of continental European philosophy that includes, among many other figures, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Hannah Arendt, HansGeorg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur, Michel Foucault, Paulo Freire, and John Caputo, all of whom will be interlocutors as well in the study that follows. My question is how well Dewey’s position stands up today, in view of what we may consider to be developments in the field. Do Heidegger’s statements on the nature of thinking, for instance, add anything of importance to Dewey’s view or compel a re-examination? Does Gadamer’s philosophy of experience advance beyond Dewey’s experimental model? How does a Deweyan view of moral or political education look in light of Arendt’s theory of judgment or Freire’s theory of dialogical education? Does Ricoeur’s narrative theory of the self supplement a Deweyan view of literary education, and does Foucault’s genealogical conception of history complement or undermine Dewey’s notion of an historical education? These are the questions that orient the following studies. In addressing them I have endeavored to bring Dewey’s thought into contact with ideas not radically unlike his own or, at any rate, that are sufficiently commensurable with it to make productive dialogue possible. Conversation across philosophical traditions is always difficult but rarely impossible, and while it is clear that Dewey was not well disposed to continental philosophy much after Hegel, or especially knowledgeable of it, deep affinities do exist between Dewey and several strains in the continental thought of the twentieth century. Some of these affinities are traceable to his profound and lifelong indebtedness to Hegel while other similarities will be due to factors less readily identifiable. Dewey was a profoundly American philosopher, one for whom the works of his European contemporaries for the most part held little or no interest, in spite of his deeply phenomenological sensibility and the important similarities between his work and much of what was happening in French and (especially) German philosophy during his lifetime. While in 1930 Dewey would describe how his ‘acquaintance with Hegel has left a permanent deposit in my thinking’, the same cannot be said of the continental thought of his day.3 Indeed, even his knowledge of such key figures as Nietzsche, Husserl, and Heidegger was surprisingly scant, with no or very few references to their works appearing in Dewey’s writings, and none demonstrating a proper understanding of their significance or affinity to his own thought. My own views on education will emerge in the confrontations between Dewey and the above-mentioned theorists. Part 1 looks at Dewey in connection with two of the most important figures in twentieth-century phenomenology and hermeneutics: Heidegger and Gadamer. After examining in some detail Dewey’s conceptions of experience and thinking, I shall place
10
Introduction
these views in relation to Gadamer’s conception of experience (Chapter 2) and Heidegger’s notion of thinking (Chapter 3). I also return in Part 1 (Chapter 1) to an old distinction in the philosophy of education between progressivism and conservatism, the contemporary relevance of which is plain to see. Conservatism remains alive and well in some influential circles, although its recent incarnations differ in some ways from the forms of traditional instruction that Dewey sharply criticized. This distinction still emerges into the foreground of current debates, although more often it operates in the background. I return to it in order to situate and clarify Dewey’s position as well as to enframe the argument of this book. Part 2 applies the principled framework developed in Part 1 to the teaching of several disciplines of the human sciences. The disciplines are philosophy (Chapter 4), religion (Chapter 5), ethics (Chapter 6), politics (Chapter 7), history (Chapter 8), and literature (Chapter 9), and our interlocutors in the same order are Nietzsche, Caputo, Arendt, Freire, Foucault, and Ricoeur. The list of disciplines is clearly non-exhaustive and is based in part on Dewey’s interests, in part on my own, and in part on the need to avoid undue repetition in the argument. The chapters in Part 2 are arranged in no particular order. Their guiding questions concern the aims that fundamentally orient teaching and learning in these fields and what the marks of success of an historical, literary, or moral education might be. While this book is an inquiry in the philosophy of education, I hope it will be found relevant not only to philosophers but to those in the various branches of the human sciences who have a serious interest in education, and not only at the university level. These reflections pertain most directly to university education, but they apply as well to teachers in secondary institutions who are charged with teaching literature, history, and related subjects. If there is still such a thing as an educated reading public, as I believe there is, hopefully this book will not be irrelevant to them as well.
Notes 1. 2. 3.
Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987). Martin Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, trans. J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 4. Dewey, ‘From Absolutism to Experimentalism’ (1930). LW 5: 154.
PA RT 1
The Educative Process
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Chapter 1
Beyond Progressivism and Conservatism
Progressivism as a movement in the philosophy of education is associated in historical terms primarily with the early and middle decades of the twentieth century in North America and Europe, and with the writings of such figures as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Herbert Spencer, Jean Piaget, John Dewey, William Heard Kilpatrick, and Clarence Kingsley. Its basic principles were formulated in reaction against traditional methods of direct and whole-class instruction, memorization and learning by rote, standardized subject matters and standardized tests, emphasis on grades and competition, and a traditional curriculum of information and skills considered useful in later life. Advocates of progressive education reacted strongly against the conservatism of traditional educational institutions, favoring not only new methods of teaching and learning but as their political accompaniment a far more liberal ethos for which individual activity and the development of autonomy supplanted older values of conservation and socio-cultural transmission. Progressives favored more active, collaborative, and experiential modes of learning, greater choice of educational goals and subject matters, and the placing of educational policy more generally on a politically liberal and scientifically secure basis. New theories of psychological and cognitive development seemed to undermine many of the methods of traditional education and to entail new, ‘developmentally appropriate’ approaches to pedagogy and curriculum. Progressivism would have a radical effect on education in the twentieth century, and while the term itself is dated and perhaps passé, its legacy remains very much with us. Several of its principles have become something of an orthodoxy in current educational research and teaching colleges even while being transformed in a great many ways, often to the point of unrecognizability. Progressivism has become a part of the common knowledge that educational theorists and practitioners largely share, even as the writings of its classical theorists remain largely unread by those in the business of applying them. Presently, advocates and critics of progressivism alike often demonstrate a surprising lack of familiarity with its history, including the writings of its foremost philosophical representative. John Dewey’s philosophy of education is presently in the odd position of constituting an 13
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The Educative Process
important part of the current thinking that prevails among most theorists and practitioners of education while the texts themselves are often forgotten, caricatured, or misread. Conservative and other critics of progressive education are often similarly inclined toward misinterpretation of Dewey in particular, often faulting him for good reason or bad for what they consider the failings of our educational institutions.1 While we continue to hear of the enduring legacy of progressive education and the pre-eminent status of Dewey in that movement, progressivism can also appear to be a merely historical phenomenon which recent advances in educational research have consigned to the past along with its conservative antithesis. A vital question becomes whether the old dispute between progressives and conservatives has lost its relevance in light of findings in the philosophical and especially the scientific dimension of education. Philosophical debates often appear to have been superseded by developments in learning theory and developmental psychology in particular, raising the hope in many minds that the essential business of education might finally transcend the contested realm of politics and philosophy and be placed on a scientific foundation. The prospect of education becoming a purely scientific, technical, or otherwise non-philosophical field of research is one that should give us pause. While the dichotomy of progressive or conservative education may well need to be replaced it must first be worked through in dialectical fashion. If this opposition is to be superseded, this will occur not on a scientific or technical basis alone but on philosophical grounds. The ultimate questions of education have always been and will remain philosophical, despite the efforts of many to transform them into purely technical issues. In one sense this old binary opposition is of merely historical interest as the conversation moves on and different issues come to the fore, yet in a deeper sense the dichotomy, or at least the distinction, remains very much with us. New forms of educational conservatism and of what might still be characterized as progressivism, however loosely, have many defenders at the present time both in theoretical discourse and at the policy level, obliging us to revisit some of the questions that Dewey was engaged with a century ago, albeit in altered form. As two commentators have recently pointed out, ‘It might be argued that classical progressivist approaches and methods, at least in some school systems, have become the new orthodoxy.’2 It is undoubtedly not an orthodoxy that Dewey envisioned, but it retains at least a family resemblance with his philosophy of education and with other classical progressive views which claimed to be influenced by him. The continuing relevance of this distinction is also apparent in recent defenses of educational conservatism from such writers as R. S. Peters, Allan Bloom, and E. D. Hirsch, the latter two of whose views I shall examine in this chapter. The purchase that conservative views have gained, particularly
Beyond Progressivism and Conservatism
15
among policy-makers, politicians, and the general public, makes them impossible to ignore, even as we may be tempted to do so. They serve as a reminder that while the theoretical discourse has in many ways moved on from the progressive/conservative debate, the real world of education remains fundamentally oriented by this distinction. Our present vocabularies remain oriented around notions of conservation and ‘cultural literacy’, the efficient transmission and retention of information, vocational and professional values, as well as by student- versus curriculum-centeredness, individual autonomy and development, students’ experience and nature, discovery learning, critical thinking, and so on. These vocabularies continue to generate heated political debate between liberals and conservatives, of course, and are prominent in the culture wars that continue to loom large in public debate. While ‘it is tempting’, as David Carr writes, ‘to suppose that the weary centuries-old debates between traditionalists and progressivists might once and for all be settled by value-neutral scientific method’, efforts by educational theorists and researchers to transcend these debates typically remain within their orbit, often by endeavoring to subject these views to empirical or quasi-empirical examination. The opposition of progressive or conservative education is, as Carr correctly observes, ‘a real and persisting one’ and ‘is alive and well in almost every contemporary public debate about educational policy’.3 Perhaps the most basic hypothesis of progressivism is that education must be tailored to the students’ nature and experience, and where this nature is understood on a developmental model. Enlisting empirical psychology, this basic hypothesis has given rise to ambitious investigation into early development and learning theory as well as into the psycho-social dimension of education. As educational discourse assumed an increasingly scientific and psychological guise throughout the course of the twentieth century, the imperative to legitimate teaching methods and the curriculum with reference to the latest findings of developmental psychology has become paramount. The conventional wisdom, and no longer among progressives alone, is that educational matters can and must be scientifically grounded. The necessity of making it scientific is so widely felt at present that even many conservatives and other antiprogressives increasingly attempt to turn the discourse of empirical psychology to their advantage. ‘Research shows’ has become a singularly ubiquitous phrase in departments of education which are anxiously seeking to establish their scientific credentials within the university. When conservatives are not questioning the empirical basis of progressivism, they are frequently given to holding this philosophy in particular responsible for the failings of contemporary education. The criticisms here are many, and include the charge that an over-concentration on or simple
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The Educative Process
misunderstanding of students’ nature and experience has eclipsed the matter of their acquiring information that is important for reasons of both cultural transmission and practical life. Graduates of institutions at all levels, we now regularly hear, possess too little knowledge in terms of the Western canon in general and also in terms of practically useful information, a development attributable, its critics allege, to the influence of progressivism in general and often of Dewey in particular.4 The criticism is often couched in economic terms: either an individual graduate’s or an entire generation’s lack of knowledge causes an unpreparedness for productive work and in turn a loss of national competitiveness with foreign economies. The global competition for prosperity will be won, we so often hear, by economies whose workforces possess the most useful and up-to-date information available, especially as this pertains to mathematics and science in an increasingly technological world. Progressivism’s de-emphasis on practical information is the cause of our falling behind our national competitors in the quest for wealth. Another argument decries the loss of culture among younger generations due to the displacement of the traditional Western canon, as important fields of study are either postponed for later grades or removed from the curriculum altogether on grounds of developmental appropriateness. Lack of acquaintance with traditional subject matters causes students to become culturally adrift, their minds and characters being deprived of proper nourishment. Progressive methods, it is alleged, have diminished the importance of knowledge itself, particularly informational knowledge about traditional fields of study such as history, literature, and language, rendering students ignorant of their own cultural traditions in efforts to emphasize problemsolving and critical thinking skills of which traditionalists are often skeptical. Especially intriguing are critiques of progressivism that single out Dewey as the source of our current educational woes. The charge has been made for a few decades now that Dewey, being the pre-eminent theorist of progressivism, bears ultimate responsibility for the movement’s excesses and failures, whatever these are said to be. Thus Allan Bloom, for one, alleges that Dewey is the source of American students’ present lack of historical knowledge; Dewey, he writes, ‘saw the past as radically imperfect and regarded our history as irrelevant or as a hindrance to rational analysis of our present’.5 Another critic claims that Dewey’s ‘concept of reconstruction in education, which includes problem solving and critical thinking, represents a narrow, technical application of reason’, while a couple of other recent critics’ views may be gleaned from the titles of their books: John Dewey and the Decline of American Education (Henry Edmondson) and Getting It Wrong From the Beginning: Our Progressivist Inheritance from Herbert Spencer, John Dewey, and Jean Piaget (Kieran Egan).6 Perhaps the most general complaint against Dewey in this regard is that his views have led to a deterioration in academic
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standards at all educational levels due to his ostensible de-emphasis on traditional subject matter and overemphasis on the students’ nature and experience. His defense of active learning rendered old-fashioned learning from books passé, thereby discouraging students from gaining an adequate appreciation of the canon or sufficient knowledge for later life. What makes such critiques intriguing is that Dewey himself addressed them and as far back as 1938 leveled strikingly similar criticisms at progressives who had claimed to be following his lead. Experience and Education is an important text in that Dewey here clarified and refined the argument of Democracy and Education (1916) and numerous other works in light of the impact that progressive ideas were beginning to have and the misinterpretations of his views which were becoming, and unfortunately remain, commonplace. In this clearly written and brief text Dewey reminded both progressive and conservative educators of the need to reject the false oppositions that both camps had accepted uncritically and which he himself had rejected from the beginning. Student- or curriculum-centeredness, critical reflection or conservation, active or passive learning, interest or discipline and other dichotomies that divided early progressives and traditionalists, and indeed dichotomous thinking in general, Dewey categorically rejected, and not only in his educational writings. Dewey’s style of thought on all subjects was invariably dialectical and suspicious of the tendency toward binary oppositions that has been prevalent since the beginning of the Western philosophical tradition. The still prevalent misinterpretation of Dewey as a defender of child-centered education was one he was already trying to dispel in 1902: [Let us] get rid of the prejudicial notion that there is some gap in kind (as distinct from degree) between the child’s experience and the various forms of subject-matter that make up the course of study. From the side of the child it is a question of seeing how his experience already contains within itself elements – facts and truths – of just the same sort as those entering into the formulated study; and what is of more importance, how it contains within itself the attitudes, the motives and the interests which have operated in developing and organizing the subject-matter to the plane which it now occupies.7 The persistence of such misinterpretation was a frequent source of frustration for Dewey and by the 1938 text had moved him to undertake a largerscale clarification of views he had already expressed numerous times in the past. The argument of Experience and Education takes particular aim at Dewey’s would-be follower William Heard Kilpatrick, whose book of 1925, Foundations of Method, had exerted wide influence on the development of progressive ideas. As Robert Westbrook writes,
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The Educative Process Though Dewey rarely named names in his criticisms of progressive reform, one of his principal targets was William H. Kilpatrick, his colleague at Columbia University, whose ‘project method’ was perhaps the single most influential practical curriculum reform to emerge from childcentered progressivism. The Teachers College Record distributed some sixty thousand reprints of the 1918 article in which Kilpatrick first described the project method, and by the twenties Kilpatrick was the dominant figure at the leading school of education in the country. . . . Kilpatrick thought of himself as Dewey’s disciple. . . . But [Dewey] insisted that projects must have as one of their goals the child’s mastery of organized subjects. . . . [M]uch of what critics then (and now) attacked as aimless, contentless ‘Deweyism’ was in fact aimless, contentless ‘Kilpatrickism’.8
The disparagement of subject matter which came to be associated with progressivism had nothing whatever to do with Dewey’s texts or with the socalled Laboratory School at the University of Chicago which was modeled on these texts and overseen by Dewey himself. Rather, it was Kilpatrick and other early progressives, many of whom claimed Dewey as an influence while misreading or neglecting his texts, who formulated the new philosophy in simple oppositional terms to the older practice, creating a new set of dichotomies which Dewey emphatically rejected, and the legacy of which is with us still. As Dewey would write in this text, There is always the danger in a new movement that in rejecting the aims and methods of that which it would supplant, it may develop its principles negatively rather than positively and constructively. Then it takes its clew in practice from that which is rejected instead of from the constructive development of its own philosophy. This was the fundamental mistake of the progressive movement, he maintained, and a grievous one since the new doctrine was being formulated in undialectical, reactionary terms. Thus experience was placed in false opposition to tradition, active to passive learning, interest to discipline, and so on, with the predictable consequence that the latter value in each of these pairings was replaced by the former, and with unfortunate consequences. As he observed in the same context: [M]any of the newer schools tend to make little or nothing of organized subject-matter of study; to proceed as if any form of direction and guidance by adults were an invasion of individual freedom, and as if the idea of education should be concerned with the present and future meant
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that acquaintance with the past has little or no role to play in education. Without pressing these defects to the point of exaggeration, they at least illustrate what is meant by a theory and practice of education which proceeds negatively or by reaction against what has been current in education rather than by a positive and constructive development of purposes, methods, and subject-matter on the foundation of a theory of experience and its educational potentialities.9 Far from being diminished in importance, organized subject matter and book learning were to be regarded as instruments within a larger investigative process, with the student in the role of researcher in an intellectually rigorous sense of the word. Education as Dewey envisioned it is a demanding affair in which traditional skills of reading, writing, and so on are pressed into service within larger fields of experience, not placed in false opposition to experience and divested of importance thereby. Similarly, Dewey made much of the concept of interest as a source of students’ motivation, yet without creating a dichotomy between interest and discipline, as many other progressives would and inevitably at the expense of the latter. The students’ existing interests, he argued, are neither to be ignored nor fetishized but guided along properly educative channels and brought into contact with an organized curriculum. ‘[T]he danger of the “new education”’, he would write in The Child and the Curriculum, is ‘that it regards the child’s present powers and interests as something finally significant in themselves’, a tendency formulated in reaction to the older practice. The newer tendency to regard interests as sacrosanct, or to allow students simply to do as they please, would ‘inevitably . . . result in indulgence and spoiling’. ‘Any power,’ he further argued, ‘whether of child or adult, is indulged when it is taken on its given and present level in consciousness. Its genuine meaning is in the propulsion it affords toward a higher level.’10 It was the vital connection of an organized curriculum to the students’ interests and lived experience that Dewey constantly emphasized, an idea that in no way entailed the neglect of subject matter. Unfortunately, the movement that Dewey had helped to inspire lacked the dialectical nuance and flexibility of Dewey’s own views, leaving these views to be caricatured for decades by critics and ostensible followers alike. Determining the actual influence that Dewey has had on the practice of education, or indeed on the theory, is a rather difficult matter in view of the widespread misunderstanding that originally greeted his works and which continues to do so. For a few generations now educators at all levels know of the importance of John Dewey as an early figure in the progressive movement and frequently acquire a little knowledge about his views, usually from second-hand sources or textbook descriptions. They will often hear
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about the ambiguity and difficulty of his texts, and perhaps for this reason (or for reasons of their datedness or the fact that they may not be required reading in educational faculties and teaching colleges) do not read them. Yet the idea persists that Dewey has had an all-pervasive influence on both the theory and practice of education. One recent and rather vociferous critic, for example, alleges that Dewey has had a disastrous effect on American education in particular while also noting (apparently without noticing the contradiction) that ‘[i]t is impossible to determine exactly how much influence Dewey has had on American education’. The same critic writes: Unfortunately, despite his iconic status, Dewey is rarely read and his work is poorly understood in public schools and in colleges of education. Future teachers often learn a little bit ‘about’ Dewey the man and educator, but they are never given the opportunity to assess critically the Deweyan ideas that underlie their classes and permeate their professional organizations.11 Even the assertion that ‘Deweyan ideas’ in some form or other have had a profound impact on education is difficult to assess precisely for the reason that the texts themselves are seldom read by educators and are badly caricatured. Speaking of Dewey’s early influence, Sidney Hook noted in 1939 that [a]s important as that influence has been – and no recent theoretical influence has been more important – it has been limited. Limited by the way it has been interpreted, limited by the way it has been applied, limited by the absence of certain social conditions whose existence its ideals presupposed – and limited, above all, in comparison with the tremendous possibilities of educational reconstruction which would follow from a nationwide experiment in carrying out its basic principles.12 Of course, this large-scale experiment was never effected, educators and administrators being in the main far more concerned with practical realities than philosophical ideas. Perhaps the most accurate statement we can make in this regard is that a highly distorted rendering of Dewey’s philosophy of education – essentially ‘Kilpatrickism’, as Westbrook calls it – has indeed exercised a large influence on the conventional wisdom within teaching colleges and university departments of education, and in a way that has never translated into the kind of classroom practice that Dewey, and perhaps even Kilpatrick, envisioned. Recent decades have seen a new influence emerge which increasingly dominates the official thinking within educational departments and teaching colleges as well as the actual practices of teaching and learning, an
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influence that bears less and less resemblance to Dewey’s views. While still showing signs of continuity with progressivism, the more recent trend has taken a decided turn toward the scientific, the technical, and the managerial. The matter of how students learn – different categories of students at different stages of development – has become the dominant issue in the discourse of education. Dewey as well posed the general question of ‘how we think’ (not least in his 1910 book of that title, published again in revised form in 1933), yet while his approach to this question can be best described as phenomenological, the current thinking is framed strictly within a vocabulary of empirical and developmental psychology, a non-phenomenological and ostensibly apolitical methodology. Education, according to this new orthodoxy, is essentially a scientific matter and its central question is one of technique: how (not why or whether) to bring about certain predetermined educational ‘outcomes’. These outcomes are often described in vaguely progressive terms, to be sure. The language of individual growth and autonomy, of creativity and critical thinking, now enjoys very broad appeal and is coupled with a more political terminology of empowerment and democratic equality. To all appearances the spirit of progressive education lives on, yet on closer inspection it appears closer to the truth to say that certain Deweyan themes have been thoroughly transformed and perhaps co-opted to lend legitimacy to a philosophy that Dewey would have rejected. The broad outlines of this trend are as follows. It includes a decided emphasis on technology, particularly the use of computers in an ever more pervasive way, an exhortation toward managerial efficiency and costeffectiveness, the concept of the student as customer and the educator as resource, service provider, or facilitator of a kind, student-centeredness, an emphasis on ‘learning outcomes’ conceived as tangible and measurable results of one kind or another, general skills of problem-solving and critical thinking, the acquisition of useful information, particularly in the areas of mathematics and science, cognitive and psycho-social development, the various and growing number of learning styles, individual autonomy, education as a commodity, and so on. Increasingly it is the language not only of science and technology but of the marketplace that dominates the discourse of education (I would not say the philosophy of education in view of the resolutely un- or indeed antiphilosophical nature of so much of this discussion). A general mindset of technology and of scientific and economic rationality is now so entrenched, and its basic orientation so contrary to Dewey’s stance, that its connection with progressive education is increasingly difficult to see. Perhaps the most accurate description of the current thinking in education remains one put forward in 1979 by Jean-François Lyotard in his wellknown book The Postmodern Condition, in which he pronounced a diagnosis of the state of education, research, and knowledge in general in the second
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half of the twentieth century. To be educated, he wrote, now means to have mastered all the various bits of informational knowledge that are necessary for the maintenance of efficiency and for the optimizing of technological and economic use-value. According to the new standard of ‘performativity’, The question (overt or implied) now asked by the professionalist student, the state, or institutions of higher education is no longer ‘Is it true?’ but ‘What use is it?’ In the context of the mercantilization of knowledge, more often than not this question is equivalent to: ‘Is it saleable?’ And in the context of power-growth: ‘Is it efficient?’ Knowledge in postmodernity, on this influential account, has been reduced to the status of a commodity, and along with it the whole business of education, particularly at the post-secondary level which is the focus of Lyotard’s analysis. Values of experimentation, inventiveness, and judgment become subordinated within a new ethos that is at once positivistic and corporate. It is the performativity and efficiency of the economic system that drives the entire process, while ‘[t]he old principle that the acquisition of knowledge is indissociable from the training (Bildung) of minds, or even of individuals, is becoming obsolete and will become ever more so’. As education and research are absorbed within a logic of the marketplace, ‘[k]nowledge is and will be produced in order to be sold, it is and will be consumed in order to be valorized in a new production: in both cases, the goal is exchange’.13 The essential business of educational institutions, accordingly, is the production and consumption of information which must itself be ‘useful’ in an economic sense. Its utility consists in the credentials with which it supplies students intent on entering the workforce and making a living. Knowledge and education cease to be ends in themselves or essential ingredients of the good life but are reduced to their functionality. Lyotard pronounced this diagnosis in 1979 and the trend that he was describing at that time has continued to gain momentum in the present ‘information age’, as the economy becomes increasingly oriented toward technology and informational knowledge and as social and political institutions become ever more beholden to technological rationality. He, of course, is not alone in his diagnosis. It has been a frequent observation among philosophers in the continental European traditions for a century that scientific and technological rationality has assumed an altogether dominant presence in the conduct of social life no less than in the science of nature. Hans-Georg Gadamer, for instance, remarked upon this phenomenon in 1965 in the following terms, and in a manner reminiscent of his teacher, Martin Heidegger:
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What appears to me to characterize our epoch is not the surprising control of nature we have achieved, but the development of scientific methods to guide the life of society. Only with this achievement has the victorious course of modern science, beginning in the nineteenth century, become a dominant social factor. The scientific tendencies of thought underlying our civilization have in our time pervaded all aspects of social praxis. Scientific market research, scientific warfare, scientific diplomacy, scientific rearing of the younger generation, scientific leadership of the people – the application of science to all these fields gives expertise a commanding position in the economy of society.14 Max Weber’s description of the ‘iron cage of rationality’, Martin Heidegger’s analysis of ‘science-technology’, and Michel Foucault’s ‘regimes of truth’ all have relevance here. What all depict is the hegemony of scientific and technological ways of thinking within social reality and the consequent delegitimation of ways of thinking and knowing that do not fit this model. It is not surprising, then, that the practice of education and the ways of thinking that have come to assume a dominant position within it are no exception. Here as well, a kind of managerial or corporate scientism has largely displaced progressivism, even as the language of progressive education continues to have a place in the current thinking. If Dewey’s influence on the progressive movement was limited, his impact at the present time is slight indeed. Let us use the expression ‘corporate scientism’ to refer to the general phenomenon that Lyotard and many other educational theorists have called to our attention. The first principle of this new positivism is that education should be scientific. Why this should be so is a question seldom answered and seldom asked. As a branch of social science, educational research must be strictly empirical and draw upon the latest findings of empirical psychology, cognitive science, sociology, and any other field of inquiry that will support its claim to constitute a legitimate form of scientific knowledge and an independent discipline within the university. Educational research must above all strive to be rigorously methodological and concerned with means far more than ends. If it cannot be entirely apolitical or value-free, as the older philosophical positivism urged (together with the requirement to dismiss metaphysical and evaluative questions as nonsense), it must approach evaluative matters in as empirical and technical a manner as the topic will permit. Whenever possible, quantitative methods are employed, and if it cannot be denied that qualitative ‘methods’ have a place, one suspects the concession is somewhat grudging, the positivist dichotomy of fact and value still having considerable purchase.15 The managerial or corporate dimension of the current thinking is sufficiently evident, I trust, to require little demonstration. The marketing
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material of educational departments and teaching colleges alone is unambiguous in its descriptions of the research conducted therein and the decided emphasis on professional credentials. The vocabulary of economics is blended with one of technical rationality. As one group of observers notes, The new theoretical emphases are on statistics and the countable, on observation and testing, on the useful and on ‘what works’. Its new watchwords are skills, competences and techniques, flexibility, independence, targets and performance indicators, qualifications and credentials, learning outcomes. Profound objections, from both theoretical and practical perspectives, to established shibboleths are angrily dismissed as idle or self-indulgent diversions from brute educational necessities. . . . The standard under which this movement marches is itself that of ‘raising standards’.16 Two other theorists writing in the same volume similarly lament this new ‘rhetoric of the marketplace’: Headteachers’ conference bars rang to the sound of ‘marketing strategies’, ‘mission statements’ and ‘business plans’, ‘performance measures’ and ‘performance-related pay’; parents became ‘customers’ or ‘clients’; heads of department were constituted into ‘senior management teams’ and became ‘line managers’. Schools ‘delivered’ ‘products’ in the most ‘cost-effective’ ways they could invent.17 Surely no one could stand opposed to raising standards or evidence-based learning outcomes, but the gloss that is put on these terms is increasingly and crudely economic. The aim is to produce a certain kind of subject and a certain kind of worker: one that is efficient, informed, technically competent, and skilled in the execution of tasks spelled out in advance, perhaps not especially creative or reflective unless this can be disciplined by technique and turned to profitable use. In the end, one must have a product. It matters only as a secondary issue whether this be a good or a service, a trade or a profession, but one must have the necessary preparation and credentials to enter the workforce, and education is ultimately a means to this end. Students themselves are consumers of a service, but it is as future producers that they are trained. This new corporatism is encouraged by governments that continually warn of impending economic crisis if education is permitted to go its own way or underemphasize science and mathematics. Anxiety regarding economic preparedness is instilled in students’ consciousness, and in such a way that even the fashionable political language of empowerment becomes
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translated in many minds into issues of competitive advantage and the relative speed at which one is likely to ascend the corporate ladder. The values of autonomy and freedom shrink down to the freedom to consume and the secure knowledge that this will not be easily jeopardized in the event of economic downturn. Perhaps the most fundamental problem with this managerial and positivist mindset is its tendency to regard education in general as a mere means to an end. When this view prevails, it is perfectly irrelevant what end education is thought a means of achieving, whether it be economic success, preservation of tradition, or what have you. Whatever the ultimate ends of the educative process are, they are nothing outside of that process itself, as I shall argue throughout this study. What we need to be reminded of is that while education does surely serve, and has always served, as a means of attaining practical and economic ends, it is also, at a more fundamental level of interpretation, an end in itself. The meaning and implications of this thesis will be our focus in the chapters that follow. So as well will be our untimely claim that education is and will always remain an art. While it undoubtedly benefits from empirical investigation into human psychology and cognition, the essence of education remains the search for understanding and selfunderstanding that occurs between educators, students, and the subject matter. The imperative to ‘make it scientific’, whether it be for purposes of disciplinary legitimation or simply because in an age of science the imperative has become something of an axiom, will not succeed in transforming what is by its nature an art and a practice into a science or technique. Regarding this art on the behaviorist model of stimulus and response, for instance, or as any kind of closed causal system in which learning is construed as a certain kind of effect and teaching a certain cause or technology, constitutes a profound misunderstanding of this practice and an overestimation of science. The present enthusiasm for technique and instrumental rationality must be reminded of its limits and be regarded within a larger context of education as a cultural practice and art. A major difficulty of the new corporate scientism that I have described is that it leaves little room for genuine agency on the part of students and indeed their educators. The cognitive development and learning outcomes about which we hear a great deal presuppose a level of personal and intellectual agency together with the conditions that make such agency possible. The educated mind is fundamentally one with a capacity for free thinking, an inventive and self-directing agent. It is the human being who is able and vitally concerned to participate in the conversation that is its culture, who is therefore learned in the great texts and ideas that make up that conversation and, no less important, capable of taking it further and relating it to one’s own existence. Education at a more fundamental level of analysis is not an
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outcome or a science but a life process that has no end beyond itself. Educational institutions no more approximate corporations than students are human capital in the making or laboratory rats in a behaviorist’s maze. Their purpose far exceeds instilling virtues of adaptation and efficiency, but includes such economically useless qualities as inquisitiveness, wonder, originality, and self-understanding. There is still a place for such values in a scientific age, and if these and similar intellectual virtues are being deemphasized and consequently unlearned in the rage to make it scientific, then it is not only our educational institutions that are in trouble. What students must ultimately learn is the art of thinking, yet this is precisely what defies measurable outcomes, standardization, and formal calculation. While I shall not urge that the vocabulary of performativity and educational science be rejected in its entirety – a proposition that is surely absurd – my focus in this study will be the limits of this vocabulary and its subordinate place within a roughly Deweyan philosophy of education. What must not be lost sight of, as Dewey himself never did, are the limits of science. There is no doubt that knowledge derived from psychology, cognitive science, sociology, and other branches of social science have profitably informed our understanding of the educative process, particularly regarding issues of means: how students of different descriptions and at different maturational levels successfully integrate new knowledge into an established conceptual framework and how our pedagogical practices may be adjusted in this light. Enormous quantities of empirical study have devoted themselves to this purpose for some decades now; however what too much of this research overlooks is that the question of how learning takes place is not only an empirical matter but a properly philosophical one, and that as a philosophical question it calls upon the resources of phenomenology, hermeneutics, and perhaps epistemology. This again is an issue of which Dewey was well aware and that educational researchers today often are not. Furthermore, empirical questions regarding the means, or the how, of education remain subordinate to the matter of its ends, or its why. Here again we are faced with a philosophical question for which science will not help us, as Dewey also knew. Empirical investigation will never disclose what the ultimate aims of education are, or what the whole enterprise is for. It cannot account for which ‘learning outcomes’ we ought to seek and why, which subject matters are of importance and why, or any other question pertaining to ends. Like politics, education is a matter about which we may certainly ask scientific questions, but a science itself it is not. Treating it as one narrows rather than deepens our understanding of it and causes us to overlook the often tenuous connection between empirical – particularly psychological – research and the actual practices of teaching and learning. Inferences drawn from the realm of empirical study to what actually takes place in classrooms are often
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less than obvious, and educators obliged to bridge these worlds are often and quite understandably at a loss as to how to do this. The confusion itself is instructive, I would suggest, and affects very little whether education succeeds or fails. Educational success depends to a great extent on the intangibles and unquantifiables of the classroom, precisely on that which no method can teach. There is no technique for instilling a fascination with history, a capacity for inventive interpretation, or a sense of justice. It is on this last point that Lyotard placed his emphasis. The heart and soul of education, on his account, is the students’ own capacity for novelty in fashioning ideas and in questioning received bodies of knowledge. Research and education are likewise centered on dissension rather than consensus. Success occurs when we are able to invent novel moves within settled language games or, better still, to invent new language games and thus ‘disturb the order of “reason”’.18 The truest indicator of educational success is that for which there is no science and no method: the power of the imagination to destabilize what presently passes for knowledge and to invent new ways of seeing the world. The conditions that would make this possible, of course, are not present when imperatives of scientificity and performativity gain a dominant position, effectively creating a world that is ever more an object of calculation and administration and of means over ends. Corporate scientism has little use for the intangibles of education or for that which cannot be brought within an ethos of scientific and economic rationality. The arts and humanities in particular are regularly, and quite inevitably, deemed unnecessary luxuries in comparison with the sciences and mathematics and the utilitarian benefits that these disciplines provide. Those champions of the arts and humanities who are obligated to plead their case within a vocabulary that is foreign, if not antithetical, to them are engaged in a losing cause indeed. No cost–benefit analysis redeems the study of music or philosophy. The problem here is not that we are unable to provide such an accounting – without resorting to clever but inauthentic marketing – but that we are required to do so.
The conservatism of Allan Bloom The new managerial positivism that I have been describing can be alternately described as the latest form, perhaps the dead end, of progressivism or as an attempt by means of objective science to transcend the progressive/conservative opposition altogether. A case can be made for either interpretation, however if by progressivism we have in mind a philosophy stemming directly from Dewey’s writings, then the former reading would be misleading. A positivist in any sense Dewey most certainly was not.19 His faith in what he would often call ‘scientific intelligence’ bears little relation to the scientism that we
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presently see and would never lead him to overlook the limits of scientific knowledge or to regard education itself as a science. Fundamentally, Dewey’s project was never to issue a prescription proclaiming under the banner of science what education should be but to describe what it is. It is, he argued, a process that is continuous with human experience more generally, not something that can be sharply distinguished from the ordinary life of students and not merely a means to an end of whatever kind. The educative process has ends internal to itself, and it is these ends that provide the whole business of teaching and learning with their basic orientation. This idea has been lost sight of by progressives and positivists alike. If there are grounds in Dewey’s philosophy, as there undoubtedly are, on which to critique the corporate scientism of the present, there are other, more conservative, grounds on which to do so as well. Surprisingly perhaps, some of these arguments Dewey himself advanced, yet their contemporary proponents most often call not for a critical appropriation of Dewey’s thought but for an unDeweyan return of sorts to traditional education. Allan Bloom and E. D. Hirsch are particularly interesting cases in point. Their views warrant attention here for reasons of both the considerable influence they have had since the nearly simultaneous publication in 1987 of Bloom’s bestseller, The Closing of the American Mind and Hirsch’s bestseller, Cultural Literacy, as well as the evidence they provide of the continuing relevance of the progressive/conservative distinction and the inherent merits of at least some of their arguments. Bloom’s version of educational conservatism begins with a broad-ranging critique of education in American universities or of particular trends within them, the primary sources of which, Bloom asserts, are the thought not of Dewey or Kilpatrick but of Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger.20 While I cannot do justice here to the scope of Bloom’s harsh and wide-ranging critique, the main thrust of it concerns the lack of knowledge of and reverence for the canon which has become commonplace among the university students of today – or of 1987, although this has hardly changed in more recent years. As Bloom writes, ‘Today’s select students know so much less, are so much more cut off from the tradition, are so much slacker intellectually, that they make their predecessors look like prodigies of culture.’ Speaking of the students whom Bloom taught during the latter part of his career in comparison with those he encountered at the beginning, he laments: The loss of the books [the great canonical texts of the Western tradition] has made them narrower and flatter. Narrower because they lack what is most necessary, a real basis for discontent with the present and awareness that there are alternatives to it. They are both more contented with what is and despairing of ever escaping from it. The longing for the beyond has
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been attenuated. The very models of admiration and contempt have vanished. Flatter, because without interpretations of things, without the poetry or the imagination’s activity, their souls are like mirrors, not of nature, but of what is around. The refinement of the mind’s eye that permits it to see the delicate distinctions among men, among their deeds and their motives, and constitutes real taste, is impossible without the assistance of literature in the grand style.21 The kind of ignorance about which Bloom worries is far less a lack of practical, informational knowledge which students of prior generations possessed in greater quantity but a lack of acquaintance with and deep appreciation for the great works of literature, art, philosophy, and so on which, for Bloom, still constitutes the heart and soul of education. The humanities in particular have fallen into disarray since ‘[w]ith the “information explosion”, tradition has become superfluous’. Rather than being a source of edification or inspiration, tradition has become merely the dead weight of the past if not an oppressive force or a cause of boredom. No longer do students believe that the canon is where they may expect to find truths more profound than in popular culture or the mass media. As reverence for the canon erodes, so too do students’ capacities for depth of feeling and aesthetic appreciation, for separating what is important from what is trivial, and for gravity or seriousness of purpose. The love of reading and expectation of personal improvement through reading the classics are disappearing and being replaced by more immediate forms of entertainment. Education and students’ characters themselves have become shallow and unimaginative as the more ultimate matters of life disappear from view and as utilitarian values and ‘careerism [become] the centerpiece of the university’.22 Books and ideas no longer change the lives of the young but, when they are attended to at all, provide a pleasing diversion from the business of acquiring professional credentials. The very raison d’être of the university is in question, Bloom maintains, when students are no longer expected to know the tradition in which they stand and to gain a proper appreciation of its canonical texts. Students who do not read fail to understand themselves and become more alike in their thinking and actions due to a lack of awareness that what is might be otherwise. As Bloom expresses this rather important point, ‘the failure to read good books both enfeebles the vision and strengthens our most fatal tendency – the belief that the here and now is all there is’.23 It is literature in particular that educates the imagination and instills both the means and the desire to understand human existence differently. It is, then, no lack of funding or underattention to the basics that is the source of educational failure but a forgetfulness of the university’s proper mission and the consequent neglect of the arts and humanities.
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If this is the cause of what ails the contemporary university, then the remedy is not far to seek: Of course, the only serious solution is the one that is almost universally rejected: the good old Great Books approach, in which a liberal education means reading certain generally recognized classic texts, just reading them, letting them dictate what the questions are and the method of approaching them – not forcing them into categories we make up, not treating them as historical products, but trying to read them as their authors wished them to be read. Tradition, accordingly, is the very essence of good education, and it is its preservation, not its critique or disruption, and not its contribution to resolving the problems of the present, that is the appropriate goal of a university education. On the question of how students and their educators should approach the great texts of the past, he remarks: There is an enormous difference between saying, as teachers once did, ‘You must learn to see the world as Homer or Shakespeare did’, and saying, as teachers now do, ‘Homer and Shakespeare had some of the same concerns you do and can enrich your vision of the world.’ In the former approach students are challenged to discover new experiences and reassess old; in the latter, they are free to use the books in any way they please. Beyond Bloom’s call for a return to the canon he offers little or nothing by way of recommendations for educational reform. As he puts it, ‘One cannot and should not hope for a general reform. The hope is that the embers do not die out.’24 One keeps tradition alive as it were by placing it carefully under glass and urging students to study its features, to transport themselves into the past without any apparent concern for transforming the present and without any genuine critique. This in a phrase is the nature and goal of educational conservatism: the point is to conserve. It is also to encounter texts in the manner in which their authors would have wished: with an attitude of receptivity and indeed reverence. The point is not to take issue with the texts or with tradition itself but rather to preserve it in essentially unaltered form. Bloom’s traditionalism, like all forms of this doctrine, represents a misunderstanding of the very nature of tradition and the way in which it reproduces itself. When culture or tradition is a living phenomenon rather than merely the dead weight of the past, which Bloom fears it has become in the hands of today’s students, it is appropriated selectively, critically, and with an eye to how it may in one way or another serve the needs of the present. We
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become slaves to the past when we encounter it in the reverential and passive manner that Bloom recommends. While we may have a certain sympathy – indeed a great deal – for his lament for the erosion of the canon, the failure to instill in students a passion for reading, and the narrowing of perspective and slackening of thought that this causes, the remedy does not lie in an uncritical conservatism. Nor does the respect for tradition entail any manner of traditionalism, if by this term we mean the insistence on preserving the past in unaltered form. What distinguishes a living from a moribund tradition is precisely that the former is appropriated in the way in which one joins a conversation that began long ago: by listening and learning, to be sure, but equally, and perhaps more essentially, by participating in it. To participate in tradition, or to take it up authentically, always means to carry it forward, to apply it to present circumstances, and more than occasionally to critique and transform it, sometimes radically. Where tradition is not a source of dogmatism and intellectual conformity it is a conversation which students and all members of a culture are called upon to take up and creatively transform. Keeping tradition alive therefore does not consist in merely preserving the embers or in any museum tour through the canon. It amounts not to a simple repetition of the past but to a task of critical appropriation, and it is the critical dimension that traditionalists like Bloom either underemphasize, ignore, or deny. The slackness and narrowing of intellect about which he rightfully worries is not remedied by having students adopt quite as passive and unresisting a stance toward tradition as Bloom recommends. If he is correct in his view that the ‘most fatal tendency’ to which students can succumb is ‘the belief that the here and now is all there is’, it is incorrect to assert that the only or best alternative to the present is the past. Dissolving the common assumption that how matters currently stand is either axiomatic, natural, or ahistorically given is indeed fundamental to education and to wisdom itself. (This is not, incidentally, an original insight of Bloom’s, and was a major theme in the writings of both Nietzsche and Heidegger, the ostensible sources of the ills Bloom describes.) What is, will not always be, nor has it always been so; there are alternatives to the present arrangement of things, whether we are speaking of social institutions, worldviews, or what have you. When this lesson is not imparted, one goes through life overly contented with what is and unable to imagine that things could be otherwise. Undoubtedly the commonness of this phenomenon represents an important educational failure, however it is eminently doubtful both that there was a time in the past (Bloom’s youth perhaps) when this failure or this assumption was less prevalent and that the remedy to it lies in a traditionalism that is equally dogmatic. Bloom’s conservatism should not be dismissed outright, as many have done (understandably, given the harsh and often cantankerous tone of his
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critique), but viewed within a larger context. Conservation of tradition is about equally fundamental to education as its critique and application to the present. One learns not merely about the past but also from it, and where the latter signifies more than that one is able to see the world as Homer did (important as that is) but that one is able to apply what one has learned – the lessons of history, for example – in one’s critical understanding of the present. This does not mean that in reading the classics students ‘are free to use the books in any way they please’, but very nearly the opposite: they are free, and indeed obliged, to turn what lessons they learn from such texts to constructive use in their present ways of thinking and experience of life. Nor is this a formula for disconnection from tradition but a precondition of its authentic appropriation.
The conservatism of E. D. Hirsch Similar difficulties arise in other forms of educational conservatism, including the influential formulation defended for the last two decades by E. D. Hirsch. Like Bloom, Hirsch laments the general decline in standards that progressive and student-centered approaches have purportedly brought about in what has come to be called, owing to his well-known book of that title, ‘cultural literacy’. Evidence of decline Hirsch finds less in students’ relative lack of knowledge and appreciation of canonical texts than in the deficit in informational knowledge that is demonstrated by standardized test scores. Citing as evidence the test scores of students attending institutions implementing ostensibly progressive policies relative to both nations that have never implemented such policies and the same institutions prior to their introduction, Hirsch and many other conservatives speak of an alarming and prevalent decline in knowledge among students at all stages of the learning process. What has declined in particular, according to Hirsch, is culturally shared information which traditional pedagogical methods accentuate as a means of cultural reproduction. The consciousness of the student Hirsch conceives in quasi-empiricist terms as a kind of mental container empty at the beginning of the learning process and awaiting to be filled by subject matters which constitute the ‘intellectual capital’ necessary for later reflection, a conception that counsels a return to direct and whole-class instruction, a standardized curriculum, standardized testing, memory work, and so on.25 According to Hirsch, it is the nature of education and the duty of educators to impart to students large quantities of information that is deemed to be of cultural significance. The aim of teaching and learning at all levels is the amassing of ‘factual knowledge’ in ‘the traditional disciplines’ by means of ‘drill and practice, memorization, whole-class instruction’, and other traditional pedagogical techniques.26 If we are to take seriously the crisis in
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education which progressivism in particular has brought about and which is proven by low scores by international standards on standardized tests – tests that Hirsch regards as wholly objective indicators of educational success or failure – then we must rehabilitate the techniques of traditional education which Dewey and the progressives rejected. Hirsch’s ‘core knowledge movement’, accordingly, represents ‘a countervailing theory of education that once again stresses the importance of specific information in early and late schooling’. He continues, in a vein that purports to be scientific: The corrective theory might be described as an anthropological theory of education, because it is based on the anthropological observation that all human communities are founded upon specific shared information. Americans are different from Germans, who in turn are different from Japanese, because each group possesses specifically different cultural knowledge. In an anthropological perspective, the basic goal of education in a human community is acculturation, the transmission to children of the specific information shared by the adults of the group or polis. Deploying the same rhetoric of science that he decries, often heatedly, among progressives and other contemporary educational theorists, Hirsch appeals to the science of anthropology and the contention made by some (certainly not all) in that field that the pre-eminent aim of education in human communities universally is the transmission of information between generations as a means of cultural reproduction. In the passing down of information, students acquire not only the received wisdom of their tradition but, in an argument directed squarely at progressivism, also the cognitive skills that progressives prize over information in the traditional disciplines. On the question of whether ‘facts’ ought to receive priority over ‘skills’ among the aims of education, Hirsch defends the former option on the grounds that the amassing of large quantities of information is both a necessary and sufficient condition of the development of the higher cognitive capacities. The acquisition of such skills, he asserts, follows automatically upon the acquisition of factual information. Hirsch expresses this intriguing claim as follows: Once the general knowledge has been acquired, the skill follows. General programs contrived to teach general skills are ineffective. AI research shows that experts perform better than novices not because they have more powerful and better oiled intellectual machinery but because they have more relevant and quickly available information. What distinguishes good readers from poor ones is simply the possession of a lot of diverse, task-specific information.27
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Hirsch is advancing three claims in this passage and it is important that they be distinguished: the first concerns the futility of teaching general thinking skills in a curricular vacuum; second, possessing information in large quantities is a necessary condition of higher-order thinking; and third, it is a sufficient condition as well. It is the third claim that is especially important, and also peculiar when we consider that its author is not himself a cognitive psychologist or researcher in artificial intelligence but a professor of English literature – a field in which skilled readers are customarily distinguished from unskilled ones on grounds that far exceed the quantity of factual information at their disposal (something that a detailed plot summary could provide), and include capacities of aesthetic appreciation, interpretation, and critical discernment, the ability to articulate questions and to see what is questionable, to be appropriately receptive or resistant to the message of a text depending on what emerges in the reading of it, to negotiate one’s way about the hermeneutic circle, to search for coherence, detect tensions and contradictions, and so on. I shall return to this later. Essential, Hirsch also maintains, to the rehabilitation of traditional education is not only the return to traditional pedagogical techniques but a standardized curriculum, standardized testing, and a renewed accent on particular ethical and religious values, specifically those of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Shifting with perfect equanimity from the language of science to the language of religious politics, Hirsch defends the notion of an ‘American civil religion’ that was bequeathed by the founders and that remains foundational to American society. Against ‘secularist-Americans’ – who, Hirsch tells us, are ‘just another species of hyphenated Americans’ – he insists on returning to a religious ethics in the classroom at both elementary and advanced levels.28 ‘Consensus values’ such as Christian altruism, the golden rule, civic duty, patriotism, and loyalty, along with a reverence for national symbols and belief in God, are to be directly instilled by educators in the minds of the young.29 This form of conservatism spells trouble for plurality and indeed for intellectual freedom itself. Despite occasional protestations to the contrary, the concept of education that Hirsch espouses directly entails both cultural and intellectual homogeneity. Evidence of this is plentiful throughout Hirsch’s educational writings. In addition to the ‘consensus values’ that purportedly constitute the ‘American civil religion’, Hirsch speaks in highly dismissive terms of bilingualism and multiculturalism in the schools on the grounds of the ‘cultural fragmentation, civil antagonism, illiteracy, and economictechnological ineffectualness’ that such policies cause both in parts of the United States and in nations such as Canada and Belgium in which they are applied on a larger scale. The latter two nations are singled out in particular as examples that, as he puts it, ‘are not encouraging’. Cultural monoliteracy
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being already in steep decline, he reasons, the prospect of multiliteracy is dim indeed. For Hirsch, values of ‘civil peace and national effectiveness’ could not withstand the challenge that bilingualism and multiculturalism pose to mainstream America and its institutions of learning.30 A culture of homogeneity, the nostalgic yearning for which is evident throughout Hirsch’s writings, is directly entailed by a philosophy of education that conscripts students into a way of life and a way of thinking in which it is their lot to conform. This love of sameness is carried to the point where Hirsch is sharply critical of curricular guidelines that allow any flexibility whatever in their applications or professional judgment on the part of educators. Guidelines that call, for instance, for the teaching of national symbols or historical events in the primary grades must be specific and standardized, leaving no room for the educator’s discretion or for students’ interests. Such guidelines must specify which symbols or events are to be taught in which grades, for otherwise ‘the children are learning quite different things’.31 Why it is problematic if some students learn about the Statue of Liberty while others learn about the Washington Monument is not plain to see, but for Hirsch’s warnings about dire economic and social consequences if students do not absorb exactly the same information at the same time and in the same manner. What is plain to see is that curricular guidelines, in Hirsch’s view, are not to be guidelines at all but hard-and-fast rules. What is equally clear is that the culture in ‘cultural literacy’ means ‘mainstream culture’ or ‘the basic culture of the nation’, in contrast to ‘some local, regional, or ethnic culture’, to any sub- or counter-culture, and especially to cultural plurality. The culture that Hirsch designates as mainstream is what others call dominant, of course, and while he is aware of the objection, he is untroubled by it. It is wholly inevitable that a culture be ‘fundamentally conservative’ and that ‘its core contents change very slowly’, if indeed at all. ‘Changes at its core must occur with glacial slowness if it is to accommodate all the people and serve as our universal medium of communication.’32 Culture is a unitary monolith of information, highly resistant to change but for periodic additions and few if any subtractions. It is to be received by students as an altogether given and prepackaged body of material to be committed to memory without troubling themselves to think, apart from purely mechanical acts of memorization. This, Hirsch believes, constitutes the true meaning of acculturation: not to become initiated into a conversation that is ongoing but the veritable antithesis – to conform to the cultural mainstream and its ‘consensus values’. It is to become normalized, not especially critical, and intellectually docile. Hirsch’s account wholly assumes that it is the nature of human cultures to be discrete, homogeneous, and fixed. The (quasi-) anthropological, objectivistic notion of culture on which he relies – one constituted by ‘information’ and ‘factual knowledge’ rather than a
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lifeworld of shared practices, understandings, and language – may well entail a conception of education as exclusively occupied with the transmission of material that is ready made, complete, and unassailable, yet this is a thoroughly naive view of what culture itself is, and hence education as well. Neither culture nor tradition nor knowledge has the homogeneous, monolithic character that educational conservatives commonly attribute to them. Anthropologists are far from agreeing upon a proper definition of culture, a fact that Hirsch does not appear to be aware of as he confidently proffers his reified, informational theory of culture as the ‘anthropological perspective’. Far more nuanced and sophisticated conceptions of culture have been proposed by anthropologists and philosophers, of course, including phenomenological, hermeneutical, and poststructuralist views in which culture is described in terms of meaning, texts, interpretation, language, and social practices of various kinds rather than in terms of simple information. Clifford Geertz, for one, has defended a semiotic or hermeneutical theory of culture for which the basic condition of the human being as an acculturated agent is to be ‘suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun’ or to live according to a set of meanings that precede one but in which one is nonetheless a participant in a rich and critical sense of the word.33 Without becoming embroiled in this debate, it suffices to say that whatever culture is, it is far more complex than Hirsch supposes. His account of culture as a body of information is anything but uncontrovertible scientific fact; nor is it such a fact that education is by nature and universally a simple means to an end, whether it be the conservation of tradition or anything else. An observation of Alfred North Whitehead is relevant in this connection: It must never be forgotten that education is not a process of packing articles in a trunk. Such a simile is entirely inapplicable. It is, of course, a process completely of its own peculiar genus. Its nearest analogue is the assimilation of food by a living organism: and we all know how necessary to health is palatable food under suitable conditions.34 The merit of Whitehead’s remarks will be evident to any who attend closely to the practices of teaching and learning as they are actually experienced. The process succeeds, we say, not when a prepackaged collection of data is stored away in the inner recesses of a student’s mental warehouse, where it is placed neatly on a shelf and preserved for future use, but when a degree of insight or self-understanding is gained by means of the subject matter that is appropriated. Such appropriation is no merely superficial absorption of information but a more profound process in which an active intellect integrates deeply and critically transforms a given subject matter in a way that is consistent with any learning experience undergone in the course of
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ordinary life. A learning experience, or indeed any experience that is worthy of the name, leaves its subject in an important respect changed, and in a sense utterly unlike the storing away of articles in a trunk. So as well does acculturation change, indeed constitute, the subject; it fashions one as a particular being-in-the-world or existing individual, in the language of existential phenomenology. Becoming initiated into a culture does undoubtedly involve absorbing information of particular kinds, and a great deal of it, but that it involves something far more and far deeper than this is wholly missed by Hirsch’s account. Both everyday acculturation and formal education involve a reciprocal process in which new items of knowledge are integrated into an existing orientation or conceptual framework while altering that framework in significant ways. Learning allows one not only to preserve existing facts but to do so in a spirit of intelligent criticism, to enlarge one’s horizon while adding coherence, depth, and meaning to experience, and to make oneself at home in the world by this means. Becoming literate in one’s culture involves but also far exceeds gaining familiarity with a catalog of truths more or less familiar to a population; it involves becoming a certain kind of subject, one constituted by a lifeworld of shared meanings and practices, language, tradition, and common sense. It is to adopt a particular way of being-in-the-world, an historically contingent understanding of the world and self-understanding, and to participate in a conversation that precedes one. A culture is a fundamentally dynamic enterprise into which the individual is taken up and that sets in motion the full range of human capacities. Hirsch’s conservatism, then, errs in its simplistic notions of culture, learning, and experience as essentially informational matters and of reflective capacity as an inevitable and happy by-product of the mere accumulation of facts. Cultural literacy stands or falls on an understanding of culture as a reified and given body of facts, initiation into which consists in the simple reception of data and the acceptance of values presented in the guise of ‘consensus’. It presupposes a view of tradition as a kind of absolute that students are obliged to take up in unrevised form rather than a conversation in which they freely participate, something that is unitary, homogeneous, and highly resistant to change. It presupposes as well a folksy and unphilosophical view of the educated mind as something that is easily measured and quantified by means of standardized testing which examines only the amount of information that has been committed to memory and which lacks any means of testing the quality of understanding that has been gained. Finally, it presupposes a naive view of reflective capacity or thinking as a skill that follows automatically upon the accumulation of information. While such knowledge is obviously a necessary condition of abstract reflection – one must, needless to say, have something to think about – it is hardly sufficient. Hirsch provides no account of the higher reaches of thought but for
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the insistence that those who are capable of it are also well informed, an observation that is true but uninformative. Learning to think, however this is accomplished, is far more complex a matter than Hirsch’s account allows. One point, however, on which educational conservatives do not err is their worry regarding the kind and amount of knowledge that students are currently gaining. Whether it be higher capacities of reflection and inventiveness that we are speaking of, Hirsch’s informational knowledge, or Bloom’s beloved canon, students who pass successfully through the various stages of education today are not, let us say, and without putting too fine a point on it, overburdened with knowledge. Educators are well aware of what their students know and care about and what they do not know and care about, and while the matter may be less dire than some conservatives believe, nor is it a cause for celebration that universities are now obliged to provide remedial education in writing or mathematics, that students’ knowledge of language and grammar is often lamentable, and that the love of reading or of knowledge as an end in itself has seen better days. Conservatives are right to worry about this, but tempting as it may be to hark back to a time in the past when students ostensibly knew more, in whatever sense of this phrase that one prefers, such a stance is nostalgic and foolish. It is no simple return to tradition that is called for, or to progressivism for that matter, but a new thinking that gets us beyond the dichotomies that Dewey was already urging us to reject a century ago and that continue to orient so much of the discourse of education. Hackneyed oppositions of student-centered or curriculum-centered education, critical thinking or factual knowledge, active or passive learning, and so on must be overcome, and in a fashion more convincing than what I have called corporate scientism has managed. It should be obvious, for instance, that there is no genuine dichotomy between the possession of informational knowledge – which conservatives like Hirsch dwell upon to the point of excluding other, equally important educational aims – and the development of critical thinking skills – which progressives have sometimes overemphasized, misunderstood, or presumed can be imparted apart from subject matter. One does not think critically in a curricular vacuum, nor does one appropriate a heritage by accepting it as an unquestionable given. Understanding education requires that we orient the discussion no longer around oppositions that a growing number of theorists are correctly urging us to abandon, and that we attend less to theoretical -isms that mistake a part of the educative process for the whole, and focus our attention instead on that process itself and the conditions that make it possible. Learning experiences that happen in institutions are not different in kind from learning experiences that happen in ordinary life. We would do well, then, to ask what the nature and conditions of such experience are.
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The educative process It was Dewey who urged educational theorists to take this process itself as their point of departure and to identify its own immanent ends and conditions rather than import ends from other areas of life in ways that effectively distort the educative process. This important methodological move was central both to his critique of conservatism and to his own positive views, but was adopted only in a limited way by progressives such as Kilpatrick and Kingsley. Progressive theorists concurred with Dewey in regarding traditional curriculum-centered, if not teacher-centered, approaches as unduly regimented and divorced from the actual course of human experience and from the practice of learning itself. In severing theory and abstract subject matters from practice – the vital process of experience and learning – traditional education was compelled to seat students in orderly rows, their attention centered on the figure standing imposingly at the front of the room, diligently absorbing their lessons on pain of physical and moral censure, and submitting to a regime of institutional power. What is needed, Dewey and the progressives argued, is the replacement of such regimentation, along with the separation of theory and practice that made it possible and necessary, with a new accent on the learning process as it actually unfolds within the intellectual life of the student. This new phenomenological concentration on ‘how we think’ – the basic manner in which human beings negotiate their experience of the world – and on the stages of development that students pass through on the way to intellectual maturity, entails a shift in accent from the educator and the curriculum to the students and the conditions that foster development. Progressives taken by Dewey’s account amplified this relative shift in emphasis into a full-blown dichotomy and a categorical elevation of students, their cognitive development and indeed their social and emotional wellbeing, above the curriculum itself, giving new life to the very dichotomies that Dewey had urged us to leave behind. From Dewey’s point of view, the reforms that progressives were calling for amounted to a mere swing of the pendulum from one side of the old binary oppositions to the other rather than the more radical stance for which he called, a pendulum swing that had the effect of sacrificing the curriculum in a way that he himself had never intended. Dewey’s educational writings had never advocated any sacrifice in knowledge to whatever is identified as the students’ needs, whether they be cognitive, psychological, or social, but that the curriculum should complement students’ experience outside of the classroom and be taught and learned in ways that are conducive to higher capacities of thought. That these capacities could not be educated in the absence of a challenging, indeed tough-minded, curriculum seemed to go without saying for Dewey,
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and it was only when this seemingly obvious proposition was overlooked by progressive educators that he was compelled to point this out explicitly. Yet point it out he did, and in a way that left no doubt of his ambivalence for the movement he had ostensibly inspired. If it is a common mistake to identify Dewey as the originator of the dichotomies that continue to orient much educational theory as well as the principal cause of progressivism’s more unfortunate consequences – including especially the sacrifice of a rigorous curriculum to the supposed conditions of students’ well-being – it remains that much of progressive education did arise directly or indirectly from Dewey’s writings, including especially its critique of traditional, schoolmasterish pedagogy. This critique, as applicable to contemporary as to older forms of conservatism, maintains that while it is among the principal aims of education to transmit traditional subject matters, it is essential that this be carried out in the spirit of research and critical inquiry rather than simply ingested for the purpose of conservation. Dewey’s reasons for rejecting the notion of education as either a simple repetition of the past or a preparation for later life – or, as for Hirsch, a combination of the two – were at once political and philosophical. While the political objection concerned the kinds of democratic citizens which the older education was designed to produce, the philosophical objection concerned the nature of knowledge and experience. It is the nature of human knowledge, Dewey the pragmatic experimentalist maintained, not simply to accommodate the present to the past but to appropriate traditional ideas in the spirit of intelligent criticism and with an eye to their enhancement and transformation. Received knowledge is not merely bestowed on groups of students as a fait accompli but taken up into an inquiry which learns about and from the past while identifying the errors that have also been handed down in tradition. As Dewey expressed it, Education has accordingly not only to safeguard an individual against the besetting erroneous tendencies of his own mind – its rashness, presumption, and preference of what chimes with self-interest to objective evidence – but also to undermine and destroy the accumulated and self-perpetuating prejudices of long ages.35 We err equally in regarding knowledge as a mass of previously assembled information and in regarding education as a simple piling up of such data in the largest possible quantity. Knowledge is not a static value but a fundamentally dynamic one that is properly gained in the course of inquiry. The mark of knowledge having been acquired is less the ability to retrieve information for the purpose of inspection – although this is involved – than habits of reflective attention, curiosity and originality, and an appetite for contin-
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ued learning. Informational knowledge acquired through rote learning typically fails to reach the desired depth and can become an obstacle to thought when ‘it swamps thinking’ by cluttering the mind with a mass of data the large majority of which remains at a surface level of consciousness. That knowledge is not a monolithic edifice to be passively beheld but something to be pressed into service – ‘vital energy seeking opportunity for effective exercise’ – is fundamental both to Dewey’s critique of traditional education and to his own positive conception.36 In keeping with his general philosophical view of the theory–practice relation, Dewey’s philosophy of education refuses all external impositions on the practices of teaching and learning, recognizing no higher authority than the learning process itself and the conditions that it requires. On this essentially practice-immanent account, education unfolds according to a logic of its own and is distorted when ends extraneous to that process are imposed on it from without. This logic is always already present and at least vaguely understood by educators and students alike; rendering it explicit is the task of the theorist. Dewey articulated this important methodological point as follows: A true aim is thus opposed at every point to an aim which is imposed upon a process of action from without. The latter is fixed and rigid; it is not a stimulus to intelligence in the given situation, but is an externally dictated order to do such and such things. Instead of connecting directly with present activities, it is remote, divorced from the means by which it is to be reached. Instead of suggesting a freer and better balanced activity, it is a limit set to activity. In education, the currency of these externally imposed aims is responsible for the emphasis put upon the notion of preparation for a remote future and for rendering the work of both teacher and pupil mechanical and slavish.37 Dewey would often express this view in his educational writings.38 The learning process must receive its basic orientation from knowledge itself and the manner in which it is acquired in human experience. Educational aims are ‘an outgrowth of existing conditions’ and are ‘based upon a consideration of what is already going on’, where ‘what is already going on’ is everyday experience and the search for understanding.39 Herein lies the principal failing of traditional (also some less traditional) education and the one from which many others stem: in articulating educational aims in the abstract (preparation for later life, the requirements of economic prosperity, performativity) and importing these into the learning process as an external imposition, the process itself is distorted by extraneous values inflexibly held and inserted into a practice that by its own constitution expressly forbids
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them. Inevitably the imposition of aims from without reduces education to a means to an end and supplants what it always already aims to achieve. When we reflect upon our experience of the learning process, be it as educators or students, we find that when the process is successful a certain ethos or spirit prevails, one that is intangible and eludes easy description but that gets us to the heart of what education truly is. This is an ethos that is shared, that is in the air, as it were, and which belongs to everyone and no one. It is a common reality that is sustained by educators and students alike and which is dominated by none. It is a process into which all are taken up, in the manner of a conversation in which one participates but that one does not control. An intersubjective phenomenon, the spirit or the logic of education, like a good conversation, is dominated by none of the participants, including the educator, but is conducted in dialogical fashion. Hans-Georg Gadamer provided a fitting phenomenological description of this process, albeit without applying it to education: We say that we ‘conduct’ a conversation, but the more genuine a conversation is, the less its conduct lies within the will of either partner. Thus a genuine conversation is never the one that we wanted to conduct. Rather, it is generally more correct to say that we fall into conversation, or even that we become involved in it. The way one word follows another, with the conversation taking its own twists and reaching its own conclusion, may well be conducted in some way, but the partners conversing are less the leaders of it than the led. No one knows in advance what will ‘come out’ of a conversation. Understanding or its failure is like an event that happens to us. Thus we say that something was a good conversation or that it was ill fated. All this shows that a conversation has a spirit of its own, and that the language in which it is conducted bears its own truth within it – i.e., that it allows something to ‘emerge’ which henceforth exits.40 Gadamer’s description readily applies to the educational setting. Here as well what takes place in the classroom ‘has a spirit of its own’; it is ‘like an event that happens to us’, one in which we are ‘less the leaders of it than the led’, with ‘the conversation taking its own twists and reaching its own conclusion’ – a conclusion that ‘allows something to emerge’. When successful, education involves a voluntary relinquishing of control comparable to the at once active and passive nature of conversation, oriented as it is toward a critical examination of the subject matter and not a merely expertocratic bestowing of knowledge on docile minds. Dewey reminded us that educators ‘conduct’ the conversation in the limited sense of providing clarification, posing questions, inviting observations, and so on rather than presiding over it dogmatically. Their task, in his words, ‘is to protect the spirit of inquiry, to
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keep it from becoming blasé from overexcitement, wooden from routine, fossilized through dogmatic instruction, or dissipated by random exercise upon trivial things’.41 The educator, accordingly, is not the one who knows but a participant in the investigative process – one, to be sure, with a different role in inquiry than the students, but a participant nonetheless. Education is misunderstood when regarded in isolation from the larger extracurricular process of inquiry and experience to which it is related as species to genus. As Dewey took great pains to demonstrate, learning experiences that take place in classrooms, while more formally arranged and structured, are not different in kind from the learning experiences of ordinary life. Education is entirely consistent with the basic human practice of making ourselves at home in the world through understanding. Far from a simple amassing of information, it opens the mind, broadens horizons and interests, connects disparate fields of experience, arranges traditional subject matters into meaningful configurations, and cultivates habits of contemplation and inventiveness. It draws upon existing curiosities while directing these along lines that are less narrow or parochial and that open up a larger field of vision. The acculturation that it surely involves extends beyond gaining factual knowledge or learning how to see the world as Homer did, and includes extending students’ acquaintance with a lifeworld and deepening their understanding of themselves. It is the nature of human experience, Dewey held, to search for a resolution to the perplexities with which we are daily confronted. A given line of inquiry begins with an experienced confusion or difficulty through the observation of relevant phenomena, formulating a hypothesis to resolve the difficulty, refining and testing the hypothesis through application and observation of its consequences, and inferring a conclusion. This is an experiential as well as a social undertaking, drawing each of us into common participation with our fellow inquirers rather than proceeding in the fashion of a Cartesian meditator. For Dewey, this account of experience and inquiry is not an a priori prescription governing how we ought to think but is a phenomenological description of the structure of thought itself. It is the nature of thought to arise from experience and at the end of the day to return to it in order to provide illumination and to clear up the perplexities that it continually generates. The subject matter of education, then, must connect with experience and lead toward new experiences of a properly educative kind. While simple curiosity carries a certain authority here, this is not to be understood as mere self-indulgence, but is governed by a dynamic of its own. Except in its trivial forms, curiosity does not terminate as soon as a new bit of information has been acquired, but initiates a process of opening up further avenues of inquiry. One thing, as we say, leads to another; curiosity is a prospective value
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that leads us from an existing interest toward a more expansive set of these, interests that are more abstract and theoretical than the original curiosity. A common, and potentially misleading, way of stating this is that the curriculum must ‘be relevant’ or ‘engage students’ interests’ in a sense that is contrasted with the traditional separation of students’ experiences inside and outside the classroom. This does not mean that educators should indulge whatever interests students happen to have or, what is worse, restrict their experience to the merely enjoyable. Education makes demands on us, just as human experience in general does, and requires all who take it seriously to engage in a process that is taxing, rigorous, and seldom entertaining. While not always pleasurable, education as Dewey described it is nonetheless an end in itself in the sense that its aims are immanent to a learning process that is itself continuous with the broader course of human experience. If its beneficiaries are not mere cogs in the economic machinery but beings who, as Aristotle told us, ‘by nature desire to know’ then even as education serves to prepare students to earn a livelihood it always aims beyond this to instill higher capacities of thought, including especially the capacity for learning itself. As Dewey remarked, The best thing that can be said about any special process of education, like that of the formal school period, is that it renders its subject capable of further education: more sensitive to conditions of growth and more able to take advantage of them. Acquisition of skill, possession of knowledge, attainment of culture are not ends: they are marks of growth and means to its continuing.42 To speak of ‘ends’ here in no way signifies a termination of inquiry or any finally realizable end-state (professional credentials, economic preparedness, cultural literacy, performativity), but habits of mind that in a larger sense yield an understanding of the world and of oneself. While it is rooted in the concept of experience, then, Dewey’s philosophy of education must not be confused with those student-centered approaches that regard the critique of traditional pedagogy as entailing a de-emphasis on the curriculum or any lessening of intellectual standards in the name of the students’ ostensible well-being. Dewey harshly criticized progressive schools that claimed to accentuate cognitive skills, along with psychological and social skills, over the subject matter, insisting that such skills do not develop apart from a challenging curriculum and that the dichotomy of skills versus knowledge is spurious. Intelligent reflection is not learned apart from something to reflect upon, an abstract skill cultivated in courses specially designated ‘critical thinking’, as if this were separable from subject
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matter or even a curriculum unto itself comprised of inferential rules which if scrupulously followed directly produce the ability to think. One does not learn to think by being supplied with a method and told to venture forth in applying it. One learns to think by thinking, which always means thinking about this or that subject matter in some depth and in the most rigorous way possible. Emphasizing the continuity between education and the larger course of human experience is not unique to Dewey but has deep roots in Western philosophy and an obvious affinity to hermeneutics and the Bildung tradition in particular. The paradox of Meno might serve as an origin point: how does one learn about a given object, Meno asked, unless one already possesses a prior knowledge of it, for otherwise the process of inquiry cannot begin? Plato’s solution came in the form of the doctrine of recollection, while in modern times a less metaphysical answer is provided by hermeneutics: understanding invariably takes place within a circular process in which a particular item of knowledge is related to a larger context or universal, while the universal itself is understood only in relation to particulars. Inquiry is thus a movement back and forth between universal and particular, between a context of background knowledge, experience, or prereflective understandings comprising one’s cultural heritage on one hand and on the other an inquiry into what is not yet understood. One acquires new items of knowledge by absorbing them within a prior framework of language and experience, a framework that is in turn modified by the addition. Since the conceptual framework that defines one’s point of view is an historical inheritance, education is inseparable from acculturation and may be understood on the model of joining a conversation. If we imagine culture to be a living conversation, then to become educated is to gain the capacity to participate – to listen and to learn as a necessary prelude to finding a voice that is properly one’s own. A hermeneutical approach to education would share Dewey’s view of the curriculum as inseparable in principle from students’ experience and the ‘problematic situations’ and curiosities that arise within it.43 The process of formal education is a species of the larger genus that is the search for understanding and self-understanding, these two being themselves ultimately inseparable, as Gadamer in particular has taught us to see.44 Education belongs as well to a larger movement of Bildung or the gradual formation of the individual in the transition from nature to culture. While Dewey himself did not make explicit reference to the Bildung tradition which extends from medieval mysticism through German idealism and into the twentieth century, his affinity to this tradition is plain to see.45 As Hegel spoke of this concept in his Phenomenology of Spirit, Bildung involves a never-ending process of cultivating one’s natural capacities and finding one’s way toward the
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universal. This cultivation of the self is its own end and involves the simultaneous formation of an object – a work – and oneself. As Gadamer wrote, In forming the object – that is, in being selflessly active and concerned with a universal – working consciousness raises itself above the immediacy of its existence to universality; or, as Hegel puts it, by forming the thing it forms itself. What he means is that in inquiring a ‘capacity’, a skill, man gains the sense of himself. The work of education forms and transforms the self, calls it into question and requires a ‘distancing from the immediacy of desire, of personal need and private interest, and the exacting demand of a universal’.46 In similar terms, Dewey would speak of the formation of the individual student as a competent citizen of a democracy, one with cultivated faculties and sympathies which incline the individual toward constructive forms of social engagement. The transition from childhood to maturity expressed in the notion of Bildung is at once a matter of individual formation and acculturation; one gains a sense of oneself in forms of social participation, by risking oneself and one’s judgments in the conversation that one’s culture essentially is. Education requires an openness to what is other and a dialectical movement back and forth between a venturing beyond oneself into the unfamiliar and having one’s point of view and one’s being transformed in the process. Here at last we get to the heart of the matter: education fundamentally is an unending process of fashioning and refashioning the self by rising to the universal, as Hegel would say. In Deweyan terms it is the cultivation of habits and capacities which make us competent democratic citizens and fully rational beings. While education inevitably informs students and prepares them to take their place in the workforce, such aims are subordinate to the formation of the self as a reflective agent. In only the loosest sense of the term may we speak of education as a science; while it is informed by various kinds of empirical inquiry, education itself is an art by virtue of that with which it is ultimately concerned: human understanding and the formation of persons as cultural participants. The model for this art remains Socrates engaged in conversation with the citizens of Athens, an informal and undogmatic mode of inquiry in which all are participants and no one, including the educator, is above the fray of dialogue. From the educator this art requires the skilful guidance of inquiry from a given set of interests toward a broader horizon, a guidance that draws upon a variety of methods – from direct instruction and lecturing to informal discussion, posing questions, hazarding opinions, interpreting texts, and provoking thought in any way one is able. The common tendency in educational research to treat this practice as an application of empirically discoverable laws of learning is
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scientistic idolatry in its most crude form, as William James already noted in his Talks to Teachers on Psychology of 1899: . . . you make a great, a very great mistake, if you think that psychology, being the science of the mind’s laws, is something from which you can deduce definite programmes and schemes and methods of instruction for immediate classroom use. Psychology is a science and teaching is an art; and sciences never generate arts directly out of themselves. An intermediary inventive mind must make the application by using its originality.47 Nor necessarily is this art even an indirect application of scientific psychology. We are all familiar with highly competent educators who know nothing of this science yet who bring to their profession a depth of knowledge and passion for the subject matter, a care for what their students are getting from their education, and an experience and professional judgment of which science knows nothing. Such teachers are not technicians or mere custodians of information but educators in the truest sense, professionals who rely upon their judgment in selecting or tailoring the curriculum to particular groups of students and in training minds using whatever approaches prove effective. Proponents of standardization, again in the rage to be scientific, effectively reduce educators to functionaries with no scope for professional judgment and who must be strictly monitored to ensure that outcomes prescribed by external authority are achieved. Such teachers are not properly speaking educators at all, but a certain variety of technician, facilitators not of cultural literacy but of intellectual homogeneity. The current emphasis on ‘accountability’ in the teaching profession is in large part a veneer beneath which lies the corporate scientism discussed above – a philosophy for which standardization and rule-following are seemingly ends in themselves or objective requirements of scientific rationality – together with a thoroughly conservative political program. Beneath such phrases as accountability, teacher evaluation, professionalization, learning outcomes, and so on are underlying imperatives that make it increasingly unlikely that the graduates of our educational institutions will have either the ability or the inclination to think anything that is genuinely new and unanticipated by educational authorities. It is no small irony that at a time when ‘dialogue’ and ‘thinking outside the box’ have become popular slogans the institutions whose business is to train these capacities have rendered their attainment a singular improbability owing to trends toward scientism, curriculum standardization, and an overemphasis on informational knowledge at the expense of the higher reaches of thought. As educational conservatives lament a diminishing reverence for the canon and the loss of practically useful information, what
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they do not lament, but ought to, is an unlearning of an altogether different kind, and one that is far more worrisome. This is a diminution of capacities and intellectual virtues that yield no tangible utilities but on which the fate of our culture depends: habits of contemplation and critical questioning, imagination and inventiveness, the love of reading and writing for their own sake, the art of conversation and listening, the hospitality to new ideas and the refusal of false self-certainty, and capacities of judgment, prolonged concentration, and unhurried deliberation. The kind of unlearning I have in mind was already pointed out some decades ago by Karl Jaspers in the following terms: We see, also, the loss of the capacity for meditation, for solitude, for sustained thinking that can concentrate only on one thing at a time, not on an infinite number. Are the pessimists right in claiming that the actual rule of mediocrity calls for drill in place of a free intellectual life, that it requires existence to be divided into an empty bustle of work and no less empty pleasures? Or is it possible to give another chance to a free life – one that would be spiritually intensive rather than just scholastically extensive?48 The relevance of Jaspers’ remarks is plain to see, as is Nicholas Burbules’ more recent observations along similar lines: When teacher–student interchange becomes primarily a matter of telling, or a matter of asking extremely narrow, one-way questions, the capacities of both participants to listen, think, question, and consider alternatives atrophy. When instruction is geared toward ‘correct answers’, the inclination toward discussions that pertain more to investigation and divergent points of view is suppressed. When student–student dialogue is actively discouraged, or relegated only to very specific limited domains . . . particular communicative skills and dispositions are certainly deterred. But more than this, a tacit message is expressed that these dialogical skills and dispositions are not themselves educationally (or socially, or politically) significant; because, clearly, if they were significant, the curriculum would acknowledge them.49 Educational theorists who worry about a diminution in knowledge among the students of today must avoid overstating their case and becoming nostalgic, as Bloom, Hirsch, and other conservatives are especially inclined to do. At no time in the past did younger generations as a whole stand head and shoulders above the youth of today in terms of either the possession of factual knowledge, an appreciation of the canon, or the intellectual virtues
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to which Jaspers and Burbules allude. Short of nostalgia and exaggeration, however, it is perfectly appropriate to worry about all of the above: the kind and amount of information that students now possess relative to prior generations (certainly different information and likely less overall), a knowledge and appreciation of the great works of the Western tradition (again, likely less), and intellectual habits of reflection. No method or standardized test allows us to gain an accurate measurement here, but there can be little doubt that we have cause for concern about all of these matters, and particularly for the intellectual capacities that produce no immediate payoff in terms of performativity, professional credentials, or what now passes for cultural literacy. When the cultivation of the self as an informed but also critical, contemplative, and moderately inventive participant in the life of its society is consigned to the margins in the rage to place education on the secure path of a science or to prepare students to attain a high grade on a standardized test at the expense of other educational aims, those aims will go by the wayside, leaving new generations too well adapted to the economictechnological apparatus and unable to see beyond it. The argument of this chapter is best developed in relation to specific disciplines, where our guiding question concerns the aims of education in different fields of study. Our basic hypothesis may be stated in general terms, the details of which I shall examine in the following two chapters, while its relevance to specific fields is the focus of the chapters in Part 2. That hypothesis is that we must look to the fundamental conditions and requirements of the learning process itself, its own immanent dynamic and ends, rather than to educational aims articulated outside of that process in fashioning policies. The philosopher’s task is to articulate the aims that are always already in play in the educative process and identify distorting influences caused by impositions from without. I shall undertake this task in relation to several disciplines in the human sciences, especially at the secondary and postsecondary levels where these questions take on increasing urgency.
Notes 1. A few unfortunate examples of this in the contemporary literature are Henry Edmondson’s John Dewey and the Decline of American Education (Wilmington: ISI Books, 2006), Kieran Egan’s Getting It Wrong From the Beginning: Our Progressivist Inheritance from Herbert Spencer, John Dewey, and Jean Piaget (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), and E. D. Hirsch’s Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know (New York: Vintage, 1988) and The Schools We Need and Why We Don’t Have Them (New York: Doubleday, 1996). 2. John Darling and Sven Erik Nordenbo, ‘Progressivism’ in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Education, eds N. Blake, P. Smeyers, R. Smith and P. Standish (Malden: Blackwell, 2003), 288. The same authors also raise ‘the delicate question of whether such approaches and methods still merit the term “progressivism”’ (Ibid., 288).
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3. David Carr, Making Sense of Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy and Theory of Education and Teaching (New York: Routledge Falmer, 2003), 215–16, 214. 4. See for instance Edmondson, John Dewey and the Decline of American Education, 4; Egan, Getting It Wrong From the Beginning, 5; Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 3; and Hirsch, Cultural Literacy, 8, 9. 5. Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind, 56. 6. Shaun Gallagher, Hermeneutics and Education (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 185. 7. Dewey, The Child and the Curriculum (1903). MW 2: 277–8. 8. Robert B. Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 504–5. 9. Dewey, Experience and Education (1938). LW 13: 9. 10. Dewey, The Child and the Curriculum (1903). MW 2: 280–1. 11. Edmondson, John Dewey and the Decline of American Education, 110, 4. 12. Sidney Hook, John Dewey: An Intellectual Portrait (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1995), 177. 13. Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 51, 4. 14. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hans-Georg Gadamer on Education, Poetry, and History: Applied Hermeneutics, trans. Lawrence Schmidt and Monica Reuss, eds Dieter Misgeld and Graeme Nicholson (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 165. 15. Derek Briton observes regarding adult education in particular: ‘The commonsense assumption that the modern practice of adult education is a disinterested, scientific endeavor that need not, indeed, should not concern itself with moral and political questions has become all but impossible to question because the field’s normative base can no longer be addressed within its narrowly defined, depoliticized, dehistoricized, technicist, professional discourse.’ Derek Briton, The Modern Practice of Adult Education: A Postmodern Critique (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 9. 16. N. Blake, P. Smeyers, R. Smith and P. Standish, ‘Introduction’ to The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Education, 8. 17. David Bridges and Ruth Jonathon, ‘Education and the Market’ in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Education, 29. 18. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 61. 19. The mistaken but still common reading of Dewey as a positivist of sorts is convincingly critiqued by James Scott Johnston in his excellent study, Inquiry and Education: John Dewey and the Quest for Democracy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006). 20. As Bloom puts it, ‘Our stars are singing a song they do not understand, translated from a German original and having a huge popular success with unknown but wideranging consequences, as something of the original message touches something in American souls. But behind it all, the master lyricists are Nietzsche and Heidegger.’ Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind, 152. Careful readers of Nietzsche and Heidegger – which Bloom clearly is not – will appreciate just how preposterous this claim is. 21. Ibid., 51, 61. 22. Ibid., 58, 340. 23. Ibid., 64. 24. Ibid., 374, 380. 25. Hirsch, The Schools We Need, 19. 26. Ibid., 176. 27. Hirsch, Cultural Literacy, xv–xvi, 61. 28. Ibid., 99.
Beyond Progressivism and Conservatism 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45.
46. 47. 48. 49.
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Hirsch, The Schools We Need, 236. Hirsch, Cultural Literacy, 92. Hirsch, The Schools We Need, 28. Hirsch, Cultural Literacy, 22, 102, 107. Throughout this book, italics in quoted material are in the original. Clifford Geertz, ‘Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture’ in The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 5. Alfred North Whitehead, The Aims of Education and Other Essays (New York: The Free Press, 1967), 33. Dewey, How We Think (1910). MW 6: 201. Dewey, Democracy and Education (1916). MW 9: 165, 77. Ibid., 117. See, for example, MW 9: 107, 111; LW 8: 222–3; and LW 13: 6. Dewey, Democracy and Education (1916). MW 9: 111. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum, 1989), 383. Dewey, How We Think (1910). MW 6: 207. Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920). MW 12: 185. See Shaun Gallagher, Hermeneutics and Education. See Gadamer, Truth and Method. James A. Good provides a thorough account of this in his exemplary study, A Search for Unity in Diversity: The ‘Permanent Hegelian Deposit’ in the Philosophy of John Dewey (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006). Gadamer, Truth and Method, 13. William James, Talks to Teachers on Psychology (New York: W. W. Norton, 1958), 24. Karl Jaspers, Philosophy and the World: Selected Essays, trans. E. B. Ashton (Washington: Gateway Editions, 1963), 28. Nicholas C. Burbules, Dialogue in Teaching: Theory and Practice (New York: Teachers College Press, 1993), 152.
Chapter 2
Dewey’s Copernican Revolution
Dewey was an unlikely revolutionary. Seldom given to impassioned prose, provocation, or literary excess, Dewey’s writings throughout his long and remarkably prolific career are marked by an unusual sobriety of analysis and a common sense seldom associated with a revolutionary purpose. Yet such a purpose unmistakably characterized his educational writings throughout his career. When Dewey spoke of his aim in the philosophy of education as to affect a revolution of Copernican proportions, this is to be understood not as an uncharacteristic rhetorical flight but as an altogether accurate statement of his goal.1 That goal begins with a shift in the ‘center of gravity in education, one that would often be misunderstood by progressivists and others who began to insist on a student-centered conception of education’. Whereas traditional views had identified the subject matter – conceived as a ready-made body of knowledge – as the center around which the educational process properly revolves, progressive educators placed the student at the center, citing Dewey as their authority. Dewey’s considered position, however, differs considerably from many of those who would claim him as their inspiration. It is, for Dewey, not the student him- or herself but the student’s experience that constitutes this new center of gravity. Recognizing this, he argued, requires a radical transformation in both the theory and practice of education. For Dewey, the educative process contains an immanent logic which it is the theorist’s task to render explicit. The aims of the practice of education, as we have seen, are internal to the practice itself. The theorist’s primary task, accordingly, is descriptive rather than prescriptive; it is to describe in explicit terms what aims and purposes always already belong to the learning process and thus to refrain from pronouncing upon what such aims ought to be in the traditional manner. Fundamentally, Dewey’s intention was not to prescribe in the usual fashion ‘what education should be’, in the sense that the theorist reflecting a priori would ‘set up ideals and norms for it’ from a point of view external to the educative process, but rather to describe in a phenomenological manner ‘what actually takes place when education really occurs’.2 This seemingly modest aim would represent an important methodological departure from traditional views for which education’s purpose and 52
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center of gravity are determined by considerations unrelated to students’ experience and to the integrity of the learning process itself, by a body of knowledge that educators must instill by whatever pedagogical methods prove most effective and which students must learn in the sense of receive, comprehend, and remember. The principal aim in the philosophy of education is neither to prescribe the most efficient techniques by which a given curriculum may be deposited into students’ minds nor to judge which items of knowledge or belief are most important from the standpoint of cultural transmission or practical necessity. Without rejecting these aims, Dewey insisted on their subordination to experience, a consideration that for Dewey represents the Alpha and Omega of education. If the Copernican revolution that Dewey set out to effect shifts the locus of education to experience, the questions this move raises for the philosophy of education include what the nature of experience itself is, what this move entails, and why it is necessary. My focus in this chapter is on the first question, yet before turning to this it is important to recall the argument Dewey provided for why such a revolution is called for and what defects he identified in traditional educational approaches. Without repeating the argument of Chapter 1, let us recall the original impetus that prompted Dewey to reject more conservative views. Dewey provided an early summary of his critique in the following terms: Upon the whole, I believe that the crying evil in instruction today is that the subject-matter of the curriculum, both as a whole and in its various stages, is selected and determined on the objective or logical basis instead of upon the psychological. The humble pedagogue stands with his mouth and his hands wide open, waiting to receive from the abstract scientific writers the complete system which the latter, after centuries of experience and toilsome reflection, have elaborated. Receiving in this trustful way the ready-made ‘subject’, he proceeds to hand it over in an equally readymade way to the pupil. The intervening medium of communication is simply certain external attachments in the way of devices and tricks called ‘method’, and certain sugar-coatings in the way of extrinsic inducements termed ‘arousing of interest’.3 Dewey never tired of criticizing, often in the harshest terms, the conservative approaches that were the norm in his day and which he himself endured as a youth in the public school system of Vermont, an educational system likely no worse than the norm of that time but nonetheless lamentable. To appreciate Dewey’s critique here, it is necessary to understand first the manner in which he typically engaged in criticism of views that he rejected. Unlike so many philosophers of his time and our own, Dewey was an uncommonly
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gentle critic. Slow to criticize at all, invariably measured, dispassionate, and charitable when he did, and never prone to exaggeration, nonetheless when his topic was the educational practices on which he himself was raised and the theory that underlies them, he was uncharacteristically severe. His critique focused on the nearly total eclipse of students’ experience that occurs within the traditional paradigm in which students stand to the curriculum as subject to object while the essential business of learning involves impressing information on students’ minds in the largest possible quantity and in the most efficient way possible, in so doing overcoming the resistance to learning that (ostensibly) naturally characterizes the young. A curriculum at once abstract and formal, disconnected from experience, the significance of which will become apparent to the students only in a remote future, is presented and received as a deliverance from on high, perhaps as the dead weight of the past, and in any event as a body of knowledge that is ‘essentially static . . . a finished product, with little regard either to the ways in which it was originally built up or to changes that will surely occur in the future’.4 Such a regime produces an atmosphere that discourages learning precisely by denying the ground from which it emerges – the students’ experience. It is ‘an atmosphere of timidity’,5 lack of interest, ‘docility, receptivity, and obedience’.6 The ‘average traditional school’, he wrote, is marked by ‘wooden routine’ and ‘deadly conventionality’, an atmosphere completely removed from the students’ lives outside of the classroom.7 Lacking motivation to learn under such conditions, students must be given artificial inducements ‘so that the mind may swallow the repulsive dose unaware’, inducements such as a teacher’s approval, high grades, or entertaining pedagogy combined with an array of disincentives for failure.8 Even when education succeeds by these standards, it typically produces students who are themselves disconnected from life, ‘academic’ in the colloquial sense, unduly bookish, and above all conventional in their thinking. Having succeeded in amassing great quantities of information, they tend to remain deficient in the capacity for original and critical thought. While Dewey’s judgment of traditional education was harsh, he stopped short of embracing its logical antithesis, as the progressive movement he inspired often did and for which he faulted them as well, particularly in his short monograph of 1938, Experience and Education. A dialectical thinker, Dewey almost invariably refused to think in terms of binary oppositions and was no less skeptical of philosophical dichotomies than his German predecessor (with whose works it appears he had only a passing acquaintance), Friedrich Nietzsche. The dichotomy of progressive or student-centered versus traditional, curriculum-centered education which it had appeared Dewey himself presupposed he instead rejected. The progressive movement had begun contrasting in starkly dichotomous terms discipline and freedom,
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effort and interest, imposition from on high and expression from experience, preparation for the future and present life, and so on, in each case replacing the former with the latter. Dewey would not follow them in this – more accurately, he would rebuke them for not following him – insisting instead that it is the dichotomy of progressivism and conservatism itself that must be rejected in favor of a more nuanced position whose point of departure is the students’ experience but that endeavors to develop this in a direction and manner that is determined by the logic of experience itself. To accomplish this, Dewey would insist that educators seek not merely to ‘hammer in’ or ‘plaster on’ the curriculum into students’ minds by the traditional pedagogical means of memorization, drill, recitation, and so on, but to create an environment of a kind that is instrumental in ‘calling out certain responses’. If we think of education on the model of organic growth and of life itself, it becomes ‘a fostering, a nurturing, a cultivating, process’, all of which concepts represent ‘conditions of growth’.9 Supplying these conditions expresses a conception of education as in a sense intermediate between the progressive idea of ‘development from within’ and the conservative ‘formation from without’, although as with so many issues Dewey remained closer to the former.10 One of the criticisms Dewey would most often level against traditional education precisely concerns the environment in which it occurs – typically one that stifles intellectual growth rather than promotes it. An educational environment is properly regulated with a view to its effects on such development and is produced by creating ‘experienced situations’ that ‘call out thinking’ or spontaneously elicit reflection ‘in the way in which . . . out-of-school situations do’. Thinking, if it occurs at all in academic settings, does so when certain conditions are in place; when they are not, thought typically stops in its tracks, if it arises at all. If it is characteristic of thinking in general that it ‘arises out of a directly experienced situation’ rather than out of an entirely predigested curriculum, or perhaps ‘out of nothing’, it becomes the business of the educator to provide and draw upon experienced situations, directing them in the course of the learning process along particular lines.11 Dewey’s accent on experience was not intended, as so many of his critics and even his supporters often took him to mean, to devalue the curriculum or knowledge itself but to insist on its connection with the experiential. When this connection is not apparent, as so often it is not, the consequence is not the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake but its veritable opposite: the unmotivated mind confronting information ‘simply as information to be retained for its own sake’, knowledge that ‘tends to stratify over vital experience’ rather than shed meaning on it.12 This motivation deficit has long been one of the chief ills of education at all levels, yet rather than view this in the traditional way as a sign of intellectual laziness on the part of the young,
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Dewey regarded it as a symptom of pedagogical failure. Even as abstract a subject matter as mathematics, Dewey argued, can be presented to students in ways that accentuate rather than ignore its roots in human experience. If at the elementary level in particular ‘the study of number suffers from . . . lack of motivation’, what causes this is nothing in the nature of students’ minds or which is perhaps inherent to mathematics itself, as if the subject were inherently uninteresting, but ‘the radical mistake of treating number as if it were an end in itself, instead of the means of accomplishing some end. Let the child get a consciousness of what is the use of number, of what it really is for, and half the battle is won.’13 A motivation deficit is a predictable consequence when an answer to the student’s perennial question, ‘Why are we studying this?’ is far to seek. For Dewey, this is a question that educators at every level must take more seriously than they traditionally have and answer in terms not wholly discontinuous with students’ extracurricular experience. As Dewey noted, it is characteristic of young minds in particular to have a nearly inexhaustible appetite for knowledge regarding nearly everything with which life brings them into contact – provided that it is life or vital experience from which knowledge derives: A little child, when awake, is always busy. If we analyze this tendency we shall find that the mind, acting through the medium of the body, is all the time seeking for something. For instance, the child seems always hungry for physical food. In that respect he is certainly not a blank piece of paper. On the contrary, his hunger is an active thing, so active that it causes him to search eagerly for food. Now the child’s eyes, his ears, his fingers, his nose are just as hungry as his stomach. Children naturally hunger for what gives health, for what makes up life; for form, for color, for sound, and especially for holding things and doing something with them.14 Dewey was hardly the first to note the natural inclination of the mind to seek knowledge. Aristotle, in one of the most frequently cited remarks in the history of Western thought, opened the Metaphysics with the observation that ‘All men by nature desire to know’, an observation with which few would disagree, yet as every educator knows, it is a desire that can become remarkably attenuated in academic settings.15 Why is it, Dewey asked, that the imperative to understand that is so pronounced and ubiquitous in ordinary experience is so often replaced with indifference in the classroom? His answer was that students in traditional institutions are presented with information in ways so removed from ordinary life that students begin to perceive the world of knowledge as an altogether remote and ‘strange world’ that ‘overlies’ rather than connects with ‘the world of personal acquaintance’.
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To the students’ way of thinking, academic knowledge becomes a wholly separate affair from the more vital knowledge to which Aristotle alluded, the value and purpose of which can be utterly mysterious apart from authoritative commands. As Dewey continued: The sole problem of the student is to learn, for school purposes, for purposes of recitations and promotions, the constituent parts of this strange world. Probably the most conspicuous connotation of the word knowledge for most persons to-day is just the body of facts and truths ascertained by others; the material found in the rows and rows of atlases, cyclopedias, histories, biographies, books of travel, scientific treatises, on the shelves of libraries.16 The traditional reply to this is that the purpose of education can be confidently expected to become apparent to students later in life and consists essentially in preparing them for that life, a matter that the immature mind cannot be expected to comprehend. Dewey countered that while the notion of education as a preparation for the future is not wholly without merit, it faces insurmountable difficulties, beginning with the fact that the disconnection between the subject matter of education and present life undermines the motivation to learn, distorts students’ conception of knowledge, and fosters attitudes of intellectual docility and conventionality. Additionally, the doctrine of preparation undermines itself by overlooking the very factors that make a genuine preparation for the future possible. As he argued, ‘only by extracting at each present time the full meaning of each present experience are we prepared for doing the same thing in the future’.17 Supplying students with knowledge that in the educator’s estimation they will some day need creates a sizeable problem regarding retention, as is apparent when we reflect on our own years of schooling and how much of the information presented to us we have managed to retain.18 When we compare this with the capacity to absorb and retain information that vitally connects with students’ experience, the contrast is remarkable. It is commonplace for a child or young adult to possess little capacity to retain their lessons in mathematics or literature while having an encyclopedic knowledge of sports or music that can remain with them for decades.19 It is nothing inherent to sports, music, or the youthful mind that explains this contrast but the connection of the former to the lived experience of the young. When educators are able to draw genuinely upon students’ experience outside the classroom the situation is dramatically different. Unless we wish to assert that students do not learn outside of institutions, or that what they learn there does not constitute education, we must explain why it so often happens that one and the same mind can be lackluster and indifferent to learning in an academic setting yet
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intensely inquisitive outside it. The ‘indirect education’, as Dewey referred to it, that we receive through experience provides a model by which to conceive education in the academic connotation of the term.20 It is a model in which activities of the kind that once took place in the home are reproduced in the classroom. In elementary school, for instance, such as the one that Dewey himself instituted at the University of Chicago (the so-called ‘Laboratory School’ of 1896–1903, created as an experimental attempt to put Dewey’s philosophy of education into practice), academic subject matters are organized around such activities as woodworking and carpentry, nature study, domestic farming, cooking, and similar practices which in former times belonged to the ordinary experience of childhood in rural areas or small cities. The ‘ideal home’ prior to modern urbanization and technological mechanization included ‘a workshop where the child could work out his constructive instincts’ as well as ‘a miniature laboratory in which his inquiries could be directed’. Additionally, ‘[t]he life of the child would extend out of doors to the garden, surrounding fields, and forests. He would have his excursions, his walks and talks, in which the larger world out of doors would open to him.’21 The school that Dewey envisioned is larger in scale, more explicitly social or public, more carefully structured and directed in its activities than domestic life, yet in its essentials is modeled on the ideal home as he conceived of it. The ultimate justification of this idea lies in the nature of the educative process itself: knowledge acquisition must be rooted directly in human experience since the latter is the ground from which knowledge emerges and is that upon which knowledge ultimately bears. If one senses a hint of nostalgia in Dewey’s conception of the ideal home one would not be wholly mistaken. During his long lifetime (1859–1952) Dewey witnessed first-hand the profound changes that modernization was bringing about and viewed them with a mixture of optimism and lamentation. While his general outlook was by no means conservative, Dewey did view with regret the exodus into large cities and suburbs that was occurring during the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as well as some of the changes in childhood experience that this was bringing about. With his characteristic even-handedness, Dewey lamented the disconnection from nature that urban life causes together with the narrowing of experience and loss of practical knowledge that children raised in rural settings traditionally acquire, and the loss of the small scale of life in which Dewey himself grew up, yet without becoming backward-looking or overlooking the merits of modern life. As Dewey wrote in 1899: But it is useless to bemoan the departure of the good old days of children’s modesty, reverence, and implicit obedience, if we expect merely by bemoaning and by exhortation to bring them back. It is radical
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conditions which have changed, and only an equally radical change in education suffices. We must recognize our compensations – the increase in toleration, in breadth of social judgment, the larger acquaintance with human nature, the sharpened alertness in reading signs of character and interpreting social situations, greater accuracy of adaptation to differing personalities, contact with greater commercial activities. These considerations mean much to the city-bred child of today.22 If modernity is in so many respects a mixed blessing, exacting a heavy price for the myriad practical and cultural advantages that it ushers in and which we would be loath to give up, the question for education is how to ensure that the learning process is rooted in the only ground from which it can spring. If experience, in an expansive sense of the term, constitutes this ground, how can educators prevent the disconnection of knowledge and experience from becoming still more pronounced or, more optimistically, reverse it? For Dewey, the answer must come in the form of a curriculum that arises directly from activities and situations of real life which he encapsulated in the term experience, a concept that he would seek to elucidate over the course of several decades. If the root of the problem with traditional education is its neglect of the experiential dimension of life, Dewey’s task was to make the implications of his Copernican revolution explicit – to spell out which kinds of experience he held to be educative, how they are to be directed along properly educational lines, and of course what his conception of experience itself is. This old term, which has its roots in ancient Greek philosophy and later underwent profound transformation during the modern Enlightenment period in the thought of the British empiricists and others, Dewey would endeavor to overhaul in radical terms while also demonstrating its far-reaching implications in several areas of philosophical concern. It is to this question of experience itself and the conditions under which it is properly educative that I now turn.
Experience as experimental inquiry The long history of the concept of experience in the Western philosophical tradition is, of course, a topic to which I cannot do justice here; however in order to orient matters let us take a very brief excursion into epistemology and the more orthodox conceptions of experience that have come down to us from the Greeks and from modern empiricism, rationalism, and idealism, since it is these views that Dewey’s notion of experience seeks to overcome. The concept of experience as experimental inquiry is fundamental not only to Dewey’s theory of education but to his entire philosophical outlook, from
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his pragmatic epistemology to logic, psychology, aesthetics, ethics, politics, and other areas of investigation. It is an idea that has played a central role as well in the epistemology of the ancients and in the great age of Enlightenment, yet as Dewey often had occasion to remark, it continues into the twentieth century to be plagued by ancient associations that invite us to regard it in a rather dim light. The general disparagement of experience began in Greek philosophy, particularly in the writings of Plato and Aristotle, and belongs to a broader critique of such items as practice, rhetoric, opinion, and appearance, among others, all of which were asserted in one fashion or another to belong to a subaltern realm in the order of knowledge and being. The most eminent of Greek philosophers instituted a series of hierarchically ordered dichotomies that would fundamentally structure Western thought into the modern age. Binary oppositions ranging from reality/appearance to knowledge/opinion, theory/practice, reason/desire, dialectic/rhetoric, human/animal, man/woman, public/private, virtue/vice, and so on and so forth lent the several branches of philosophical investigation their basic trajectory, in each case the former possessing a status of categorical superiority over the latter. Classical philosophy would speak of experience as well in dichotomous and hierarchical terms. The realm of experience and the empirical belonged to a decidedly lower order of cognition than the rational – the faculty that constitutes our human essence, elevates us above the brutes, and enables us to know the true nature of being. Experience became associated in the Greek mind with the sum of opinions and practices that custom had authorized and hence with the past. Empirical knowledge or belief was limited in scope to the world of contingency, probability, and change, and lacked the necessity and certainty of the knowledge that is founded on the secure basis of reason. If reality in its ultimate dimension transcended the order of mere appearances it could not be known by empirical means but required a categorically higher order of cognition, one capable of grasping the forms, essences, first causes, and what have you. Mathematics and logic, for instance, were quite beyond the reach of experience while constituting the purest forms of knowledge available to human beings. Their very purity was precisely a result of their being unmixed with the merely empirical, with the senses or the reliance on opinions accumulated from the past. For the Greeks, the higher reaches of knowledge bear less on what a thing is than why it is, its underlying reason or cause. The ultimate aim of science is not to gain empirical knowledge about a given object but to comprehend it rationally, where this means explaining its causes. During the Enlightenment the concept of experience would undergo transformation in the thought of the rationalists, idealists, and of course the empiricists of the British school while in many ways continuing along the
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trajectory set by classical philosophy. What remained firmly in place within rationalism and idealism is the ancient depreciation of the empirical and the insistence on the unreliability of the senses without the tutelage of rational categories. Descartes’ Meditations famously outlined the case against empirical observation unaided by clear and distinct ideas, concepts whose guarantor can only be of a divine, not an empirical, order. The concepts of reason for rationalists and German idealists alike are located above experience and possess a self-sufficiency with respect to the empirical such that the latter can neither confirm nor negate such concepts. Whereas experience can never rise above the order of particularity, probability, and contingency, the categories of rational thought enable us to grasp universal and necessary laws, principles, and a priori certainties which form the true basis of knowledge. For Kant, it is the categories of pure reason that impose intelligibility on an experience that unto itself is chaotic and unknowable. While Kant would attempt to demonstrate the limits of the reason that is divorced from experience, what is decisive in Dewey’s reading of Kant is the ‘dogmatic rigidity’ that still clings to the latter’s critical project: [B]ecause he taught that the understanding employs fixed, a priori, concepts, in order to introduce connection into experience and thereby make known objects possible (stable, regular relationships of qualities), he developed in German thought a curious contempt for the living variety of experience and a curious overestimate of the value of system, order, regularity for their own sakes. Dewey faulted Kant in particular for introducing into German philosophy a ‘system of absolutism’ that looks away from worldly realities in favor of a transcendent order, and whose characteristic stance is both polarizing and conservative: ‘a resolution of experience into atomic elements that afford no support to stable organization or a clamping down of all experience by fixed categories and necessary concepts’. The political implications of this are dangerously apologetic if we are compelled to choose between ‘complete radicalism neglecting and attacking the historic past as trivial and harmful, or complete conservatism idealizing institutions as embodiments of eternal reason’.23 Continental rationalism and idealism were not alone in separating reason from experience, even if British empiricism would take a far less disparaging view of experience itself than these other schools. If the empiricism of Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and so on would insist that it is the evidence of the senses rather than abstract reason that constitutes the foundation of knowledge, it would nonetheless employ a conception of experience that Dewey would later reject. Orthodox empiricism defined experience as an essentially
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passive beholding of nature or what modern epistemology often refers to as the ‘external world’. The knowing subject, which Hobbes articulated as a system of matter in motion, confronts its environment in a fundamentally passive manner, the reliability of its ‘simple ideas’ resting precisely on their coerciveness. Sensations impose themselves forcefully on our awareness, giving observation an inescapable quality that affords a guarantee of validity superior to that provided by ostensibly rational ideas, all of which, empiricists insisted, have their origin not a priori but rather in the simple ideas of experience. If there is nothing in the mind that was not once in the senses then it is empirical observation alone that supplies the content of human knowledge. The concept of experience itself would be characterized in orthodox empiricism as an atomistic matter rather than one marked by continuity in time and space. Consciousness receives impressions as discrete deliverances of sense (red, spherical, firm, sweet) rather than holistically (apple), leaving it with the problem of how to string these ideas together without resorting to speculation or in a manner that is accurate and empirically grounded. The foundation of knowledge is accordingly first-hand, direct observation of material objects or their qualities, an experience that provides the ingredients that give rise to more complex ideas and operations of thought. What experience does not supply, empiricists insisted, is any perception of relations such as causality, contiguity, or necessity. Hume, for instance, would provide the classical empirical analysis of causality, arguing that nowhere in human experience does one perceive a necessary connection between events rather than their constant conjunction. It is habit alone that accustoms consciousness to expect one event to follow another, not a direct beholding of causal necessity or any other unseen powers operative behind the back of sense. The marks of knowledge, then, in classical empiricism are a passive awareness, a well-functioning sensory apparatus, strict refusal to embrace beliefs not traceable to simple ideas, and a method by which such ideas can be strung together to form inferences. Any concepts that we deem ‘rational’ are inventions of the mind and are known only on the basis of empirical observation. In the beginning, the mind is a blank slate upon which experience inscribes all that we can genuinely know, there being neither innate nor a priori concepts that structure our awareness or constitute a foundation of knowledge. Toward the end of the nineteenth century empiricism in the United States would take a ‘radical’ – one might also say phenomenological – turn in the writings first of William James and subsequently of Dewey. James’ work in both philosophy and psychology during this period profoundly influenced Dewey’s entire outlook, helping (along with Darwinian biology and his reading of Hegel) to reorient his thought from an earlier allegiance to a
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form of British idealism indebted in the main to Hegel and T. H. Green (an allegiance that Dewey never abandoned entirely, or, at any rate, not to Hegel24) and toward a Jamesian psychology and ‘radical empiricism’ modeled rather directly on biology. Where earlier epistemologies had failed, radical empiricists now maintained, is in the basic notion of mind as confronting the world from an external perspective, as an essentially worldless subjectivity standing to the ‘external world’ as if on one side of an ontological abyss, in the world in one manner or another but not of it. The epistemological problematic of knowing the world meant escaping by some reliable method the inner confines of subjectivity and ascertaining whether objects in the world resemble in their true being the ideas of them that are immediately before the mind. The empiricism that James and Dewey put forward rejects this model in its entirety and replaces it with a naturalistic and biological model of experience. Human experience is fundamentally bound up with, is indeed ultimately inseparable from, the world – an idea that the phenomenological movement, following Edmund Husserl, would speak of as the intentionality of consciousness. Conscious experience, radical empiricism and phenomenology likewise maintained, has an intentional structure and is always already directed toward, bound up with, and ultimately inseparable from its object. The subject–object dichotomy represents a distortion of how we experience both objects in the natural world and social phenomena belonging to what Husserl would now call the lifeworld. Experience does not occur in a vacuum, these thinkers now asserted and elaborated in vocabularies rather different both from each other and from the earlier epistemologies of empiricism, rationalism, and idealism. While it is highly regrettable that radical empiricism and phenomenology would develop as entirely separate traditions of thought, barely on speaking terms with each other, with phenomenology emerging in Germany and France and radical empiricism remaining an American phenomenon, the basic premises they share include a general skepticism of Enlightenment foundationalism, the primacy of practice and lived experience, the intentionality of consciousness, and some related ideas. For James in particular, conceiving of experience in a non-atomistic way meant affirming what the earlier empiricism had expressly denied: that we do indeed experience connections or relations between different objects of sense rather than wholly discrete and disconnected events. As James articulated the basic point of radical empiricism: To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is directly experienced. For such a philosophy, the relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as ‘real’ as anything else in the system.25
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Such relations as conjunction and disjunction, causality, contiguity, and resistance, for example, are proper objects of human experience, and where experience itself is conceived as a ‘stream of thought’ or consciousness (to use James’ term26) rather than a succession of discrete perceptions. The problem that the older empiricism faced of how to link together an array of experiential atoms in a fashion that is non-speculative and empirically sound, for James and Dewey alike, is a pseudo-problem that is premised on a phenomenologically inadequate and altogether artificial conception of how human beings encounter their world. Dewey outlined his conception of empiricism, or what in one of his very earliest works from 1886 he termed ‘the psychological standpoint’, as follows: We are not to determine the nature of reality or of any object of philosophical inquiry by examining it as it is in itself, but only as it is an element in our knowledge, in our experience, only as it is related to our mind, or is an ‘idea’. . . . [T]he nature of all objects of philosophical inquiry is to be fixed by finding out what experience says about them.27 Dewey would never waver in his commitment to radical empiricism and to Jamesian psychology, and would return to the general theme of experience and its implications for philosophy throughout his career, repeating as late as 1949 the basic point that ‘my philosophical view, or theory, of experience does not include any existence beyond the reach of experience’.28 The proper objects of awareness, that is, what our experience ultimately is an experience of, are not observations or what the British empiricists had called ‘ideas’, but things, relations, and the ‘dynamic continuities’ between objects. As a thing of this world, experience is no crossing of an ontological divide but is ‘bound up with the movement of things by most intimate and pervasive bonds’, and ‘is of necessity a matter of ties and connexions, of bearings and uses’.29 The world as it is disclosed in our lived experience is very different from the particularistic or atomistic world of the earlier empiricism and closer, if not altogether identical, to the lifeworld of phenomenology – a world of connections, continuities, and meaningful relations of a myriad kinds. The empiricism of James and Dewey rejected both the age-old depreciation of experience and the separation of the rational from the experiential, preferring to speak of the latter in terms variously describable as phenomenological, naturalistic, or holistic. Human experience is most aptly spoken of in its verbal connotation as a doing as well as an undergoing, a continual process of acting and reacting, synthesizing and transforming an environment rather than merely suffering or passively registering sense impressions. Reason is not an extra-empirical faculty or method but is rather inherent to
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the interaction of the human organism and its world, a part of the process by which human life sustains itself and negotiates its way about an environment on a model that is at once biological and social. The concepts of rational thought are neither Descartes’ clear and distinct ideas nor Kant’s a priori categories nor innate ideas; instead they are historical and linguistic constructions that fundamentally structure our experience. Dewey anticipated in some ways the new accent on language that would prevail in phenomenological, hermeneutical, and other philosophical traditions throughout the twentieth century in drawing attention to the linguistic and interpretive dimension of human thought. Thus in Reconstruction in Philosophy, Dewey wrote: The conceptions that are socially current and important become the child’s principles of interpretation and estimation long before he attains to personal and deliberate control of conduct. Things come to him clothed in language, not in physical nakedness, and this garb of communication makes him a sharer in the beliefs of those about him. These beliefs coming to him as so many facts form his mind; they furnish the centers about which his own personal expeditions and perceptions are ordered. Here we have ‘categories’ of connection and unification as important as those of Kant, but empirical not mythological.30 This important passage – which owes as much to James as to Hegel – not only anticipates a great deal of later twentieth-century philosophy but puts in question the orthodox empiricism of Hobbes, Locke, and Hume. The empirical is now to be theorized in terms of James’ ‘stream of thought’ or consciousness, as an organic and synthetic process by which human beings find their way about the world. The rationality that, for Dewey, is immanent to human experience is what he termed ‘experimental intelligence’, a rather expansive concept which I shall analyze in more detail in Chapter 3. If the older empiricism erred in its conception of mind as a passive and prelinguistic receptacle of sensory data, the new empiricism would accentuate the active and synthetic dimension of experience that Dewey articulated in his concept of the experimental. It is the nature of experience to be at once passive and active, not merely to receive sensory input but actively to interpret, categorize, and transform it in the manner of an experiment directed toward a pragmatic end. Particular sensations are not self-enclosed units but rather ‘points of adjustment’ by which consciousness is organized in an organic and dialectical fashion into a larger flow of perceptions all of which are ultimately subservient to, or indeed are, the life of the organism. Experience in this sense is life itself, the growth or being-in-motion of a worldly subjectivity.31 It is an experience that
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is temporal and adaptive, that adjusts itself to objects in the world while simultaneously transforming them to suit its own purposes, and that is continually growing and expanding. Experience is ‘an affair of the intercourse of a living being with its physical and social environment’.32 Such ‘intercourse’, to use one of Dewey’s favorite expressions, is to be understood not solely in biological or evolutionary terms but in social and cultural terms as well. The human being is a social animal in every facet of its being, and is by no means the worldless atom of Hobbesian lore (a theme that Dewey frequently discussed in his ethical and political writings33). The experimental model of experience and rationality finds its highest expression in scientific investigation wherein inquiry is both a social practice of co-operative experimentation and dialogical reciprocity as well as an empirical inquiry into the constitution of our environment. While the experimental attitude seeks knowledge regarding the way the world is, it is not limited to this but aims as well at achieving a high degree of control. If experience, as Dewey put it, ‘is a matter of simultaneous doings and sufferings’, and thus includes both an active and a passive dimension, its active side consists of interaction with an environment that is, again, conceived on the model of biological life.34 Experience has a vitality about it that impels the subject of experience to take action in pursuit of its ends rather than merely to receive impressions or perhaps adapt to the world as it is encountered. Every living creature, while it is awake, is in constant interaction with its surroundings. It is engaged in a process of give and take, of doing something to objects around it and receiving back something from them – impressions, stimuli. This process of interacting constitutes the framework of experience.35 The successful negotiation of experience issues in a kind of growth in which one stage leads into the next or prepares the conditions for future experiences. An intelligent agent uses its experiences from the past to transform conditions in which future experiences will occur, thus establishing partial control over the direction its future will take. Scientific experimentation is the most explicit instance of a rationality implicit in all intelligently directed awareness, one in which a particular set of observations and conclusions generates a hypothesis that in turn directs the course of future inquiry, and that opens up new paths of experience while closing off others. Dewey also spoke of experience in a more emphatic connotation, most notably in his writings on art and aesthetics.36 These are experiences that we speak of in ordinary language in their singularity; we speak of ‘an experience’ in an emphatic and particular sense to set it apart from the ordinary course of events and to give it a special significance. This may be a learning
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experience or some other culmination of a larger experiential process. If it is the nature of experience to include a certain orientation and purposiveness then it may either fulfil its course or fail to do so. The project that we take up may fail in its purpose or lead toward a dead end; it may become misdirected, lose its bearings, or otherwise fail to lead anywhere that we would wish to go. Alternatively, a course of experience may reach an important culmination – a purpose realized, a destination reached, a lesson learned. It is the latter that Dewey spoke of as ‘an experience’ in a singular and emphatic connotation and which, he maintained, has special relevance in the interpretation of art and aesthetic experience. Returning now to education, if it is the students’ experience that affords the appropriate point of departure for educational practice rather than a curriculum that is altogether ready made and imposed from on high, then the notion of interest assumes a special importance. The learning process as it takes shape within an institutional setting properly begins from the same starting point from which learning occurs in ordinary life: the existing, vital interests of the young. While Dewey qualified this statement in important ways, he was adamant in rejecting the customary view according to which it is effort rather than interest that is of optimal importance in education. On traditional views, effort and self-discipline in a rather advanced degree are urgent requirements of education since these qualities produce a vigorous and resolute temperament whereas education that is organized around students’ interests molds character in the opposite direction, toward egoism, self-indulgence, and indolence. Children’s interests in particular are superficial, non-educative, and fleeting, conventional views have it. Students must cultivate habits that will be useful in later life, and if left to pursue their natural impulses this will occur only by chance. The purpose of education, conventional wisdom maintains, is very nearly the opposite of cultivating the given interests of students (unless they be at a post-secondary level, although even this is strongly qualified): it is to train the mind to be capable of exerting effort to complete tasks that it may not find particularly interesting or enjoyable. Intellectual maturity requires the cultivation of such dispositions no less than the acquisition of information. In his typically dialectical way, Dewey rejected not the traditional concentration on effort altogether but the dichotomy of effort versus interest to which conservatives and progressives both subscribed. The process of formal education must begin somewhere, whether we are speaking of a young child entering elementary school or an adult entering the university. At whatever stage of maturity they may be, students enter upon the educative process with a formidable baggage of experience, interests, and capacities, and never as a Lockean tabula rasa upon which the educator can simply set to work impressing information, likely with the admixture of whatever degree of
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discipline is necessary to ensure attention and behavioral decorum. If attention and the will to learn are necessary conditions of education, these conditions are not met by externally imposed discipline alone or when students are compelled to ingest information almost against their will. Where it is present, a genuine will to learn arises on the basis of lived experience and the interests that it incorporates. The failure of the older view, Dewey held, is visible not only theoretically but practically as well, in the motivation deficit noted above and in the manner in which knowledge is so often illdigested and quickly forgotten after the examination period ends. The motivation to seek and retain knowledge is present only when it acquires a grounding in the ‘existing natural interests’ of students, and while it is undoubtedly the case that some such interests will be fleeting and superficial – most obviously at the elementary level – it remains that ‘they are all there is, so to speak, to the child; they are all the teacher has to appeal to; they are the starting points, the initiatives, the working machinery’.37 As with so many of Dewey’s hypotheses, this one was promptly misunderstood by critics and progressives alike to entail that educators are to regard such interests as sacrosanct, as desires to be appeased for their own sake rather than directed along properly educative lines. The purpose of education, Dewey was well aware, is not to entertain or amuse but to learn. The question is what conditions make such learning possible, and the answer must include enlisting existing interests into forms of inquiry that lead from old interests to new and more sophisticated ones. Interests are pursued not for their own sake or for the sake of any pleasure that may attend them but for that to which they lead if appropriately interpreted and harnessed. The widespread misunderstanding of Dewey’s position on this matter is surprising given how explicitly and how often he articulated the point from his earlier to his later writings. In 1896, for instance, he wrote: ‘And the teacher who always utilizes interest will never merely indulge it. Interest in its reality is a moving thing, a thing of growth, of richer experience, and fuller power. Just how to use interest to secure growth in knowledge and in efficiency is what defines the master teacher.’38 One senses a clear note of exasperation on Dewey’s part when in 1938 he was compelled to reiterate the point yet again: In an educational scheme, the occurrence of a desire and impulse is not the final end. It is an occasion and a demand for the formation of a plan and method of activity. Such a plan, to repeat, can be formed only by study of conditions and by securing all relevant information.39 It should have gone without saying, although for many of Dewey’s casual readers it did not, that no little effort is an inevitable part of the learning
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process, that discipline and rigor are fundamental to the pedagogical practice of directing interests within certain channels in view of the educator’s knowledge. Interest is the starting point of education, but in order for the process to advance it must lead into lines of inquiry that require concentration, perseverance, and intellectual discipline. Where traditional views had erred was not in prizing effort or the disciplined mind but in misconceiving the conditions that make this possible. A worthy goal may be undermined by the means used to pursue it, as is the case when the older practice of emphasizing drill and rote learning creates a docile and unimaginative mind. As Dewey was well aware from his own experience as a student, children educated in the traditional manner can be remarkably adept at giving the appearance of effort and attention while the mind wanders the moment the teacher’s gaze is no longer fixed upon them. The only guarantee of attention is when students see for themselves the relevance of the subject matter to life and to that in which they take an unforced interest. Without this condition in place, we fashion not the virile character so prized by the conservative philosophy but ‘a character dull, mechanical, unalert, because the vital juice of spontaneous interest has been squeezed out’ or ‘the narrow, bigoted man who is obstinate and irresponsible save in the line of his own preconceived aims and beliefs’.40 For Dewey, it is a mystifying proposition that discipline should be effectively gained only when the mind studies a subject matter more or less against its will rather than on the basis of intelligent interest. If conservatives would sometimes concede the need to ‘make it interesting’ by identifying pedagogical techniques that make the curriculum more palatable to young minds, it remained for Dewey that in the absence of a vital connection between the subject matter and students’ interests such techniques can only serve as the sugar coating on a bitter pill. Having identified the point of departure of the educative process as the experience and interests that students bring with them into the classroom, everything in education then depends upon that to which such interests lead. It is here that the educator’s role is vital in directing or redirecting these interests along properly educative lines. If the traditional practice had trained the young to imitate prematurely ‘the fixed pattern of adult habits of thought and affection’, Dewey’s proposal was that schools not regard children as little adults but instead concentrate on guiding their experience by centering an interest on a particular end.41 It is in the nature of experience and interest alike that one thing, as we say, leads to another; when appropriately directed, a relatively narrow and pedestrian interest can lead into an organized activity or inquiry that broadens the scope of that interest and introduces an intelligent ordering of experiences. In an important passage from a short book of 1912, Interest and Effort in Education, Dewey
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asked his readers to recall how their present intellectual interests originally took shape. What occurs is that an interest, usually limited in scope, leads beyond itself into a larger sequence of activities, a project or investigation into the whys and wherefores surrounding it. Questions arise as to an object’s composition, history, or implications in one direction or another, and an organized subject matter arises. What we find, as Dewey put it, is that wherever his activities have grown in extent and range of meaning (instead of becoming petrified and fossilized) . . . narrower and simpler types of interest (requiring a shorter time for their realization) have been expanding to cover a longer time. With this change they have become richer and fuller.42 A given interest can grow well beyond its original context as new questions are formed and inquiries undertaken. With the passage of time the original interest is outgrown and replaced with a series of other, more sophisticated ones. A subject matter that had been regarded with indifference when viewed solely as an abstract matter can take on urgency when it is shown to arise out of a series of activities and interests that already engage the student, while immature interests are superseded. Thus a child’s interest in his or her home and neighborhood can lead into an interest in the larger town, into the town’s history or geography, and subsequently into the history or geography of the native country, continent, and so on. In time, the child’s interest in history may develop into one in larger historical patterns, the history of other civilizations, or intellectual history. A child’s interest in the parents’ hardware store may grow into a larger curiosity about economics, accounting, or political economy; a childish interest in paint, for instance, may develop into an interest in its physical or chemical composition, and in time into dimensions of chemistry or physics far afield from paint. An attachment to an old article of furniture may grow into an interest in antiques or the history of furniture or architectural styles, into the trade of cabinetmaking or woodworking, and so on.43 The examples may be easily multiplied, and the point that they illustrate is the interconnectedness of human activities and, due to this, the organic nature in which interests develop from relative immaturity to progressive sophistication. Outside of an academic setting, interests may develop quite spontaneously on the basis of lived experience alone and occurrences that may be entirely happenstance. However, within these settings it is the business of educators to guide intellectual development by redirecting interests and not, as some progressives took Dewey to imply, by leaving students at complete liberty to do as they will. While it is a mistake for a teacher to dominate the course of inquiry by directing students’ interests along lines that suit only the purpose
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of the teacher rather than the students, the mistake is not remedied by a swing to the opposite extreme in which the teacher takes no active part in the process. In his later years Dewey would criticize many progressives for falling into the second error while traditionalists had committed the first: Sometimes teachers seem to be afraid even to make suggestions to the members of a group as to what they should do. I have heard of cases in which children are surrounded with objects and materials and then left entirely to themselves, the teacher being loath to suggest even what might be done with the materials lest freedom be impinged upon.44 While freedom to choose activities and lines of inquiry is an important part of the learning process, this gives rise not to a laissez-faire policy but, on the contrary, to a specific conception of the educator’s role in the classroom: as a leader or director of inquiry rather than dictator or passive onlooker (an issue to which I shall return). Since the educator has a larger scope of knowledge and breadth of experience than the students, it falls to him or her to introduce an intelligent order or plan of activity that will lead a given interest in the direction of an inquiry that is likely to bear fruit in the form of a discovery, the acquisition of knowledge, or the enlarging of horizons. Most often the direction such inquiry takes is from the narrow to the broad, from the concrete to the abstract, from the particular to the universal, and from the practical to the theoretical. If a student’s immediate interest pertains more often to the former in each of these pairings, the educator’s role is to lead it in the direction of the latter or toward any experience that is properly educative. In the course of intellectual development the latter may gain an importance to the students that is quite remote from the original, childish interest that had first occasioned reflection. This, for Dewey, is the nature or general pattern of maturation. One does not take an interest in theoretical matters at any stage of intellectual development unless the ground has been prepared in the practical and experiential. Whether it is elementary mathematics or university-level philosophy, a new interest takes hold when it is rooted firmly in an existing one and cannot be plastered on by clever pedagogy. Educators are well familiar with the phenomenon of the student whose mind appears utterly impervious to a new theoretical subject matter. What difference does it make, the student will unfailingly ask, whether we are rationalists or empiricists, realists or antirealists, foundationalists or antifoundationalists, interactionists or epiphenomenalists? For the professor the question is pedestrian and perhaps insulting; the answer is selfevident, he or she will declare. For the student, of course, it is anything but, and the issue has every appearance of perfect irrelevance. The chasm that can separate the educator from the student on such matters most often
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pertains not to a simple difference in intelligence level, as the former is often inclined to suppose, but to the fact that the professor has long since stopped asking the question, having perceived its experiential ramifications and become convinced over the course of time that it is not only an important question but indeed the question on which all else turns, perhaps even the only important question that remains for theorists in the field (a phenomenon with which, I trust, we are all familiar). A theoretical interest may become an end in itself (and indeed can deteriorate into scholasticism), yet its origin remains pragmatic and experiential, a principle that Dewey again conceived on the model of organic growth. ‘There is no difference’, he maintained, ‘between the growth of a plant and the prosperous development of an experience’, where such development proceeds from the practical to the theoretical and from the concrete to the abstract.45 This conception of growth or of intellectual development as growth is one example of a larger principle of continuity which together with the principle of interaction constitute Dewey’s criteria for an experience to qualify as educative. Not all experiences have educational value, he insisted, but only those that meet certain conditions. Here again is an issue on which Dewey’s critics and disciples alike would often misread him, taking him to intend that any experience, no matter how trivial, may be appropriately pursued in the classroom so long as students find it interesting. Dewey, of course, never countenanced this view – which he regarded as self-evidently silly – and with evident consternation set about to correct yet another misinterpretation in Experience and Education. There he repeated that the direction in which the educator ought to guide the students is toward experiential continuity or toward a continuing and habitual process of intellectual growth. ‘[T]he principle of continuity of experience’, he wrote, ‘means that every experience both takes up something from those which have gone before and modifies in some way the quality of those which come after.’ Educative experience takes an existing interest as its point of departure, but it must lead somewhere, in the direction of new questions and discoveries. The students’ future must be uppermost in the mind of the educator, yet not in the sense that what they are presently learning is solely a preparation for what will some day prove useful but that what is currently being taught and learned will generate a momentum that will continue in the future course of intellectual maturation. With this in mind the teacher arranges for experiences and lines of inquiry that can be anticipated to lead to further learning. It is the very nature of experience to lead beyond itself and to orient one toward what is to follow. Since ‘every experience lives on in further experiences’, rather than being a disconnected happening, ‘the central problem of an education based upon experience is to select the kind of present experiences that live fruitfully and creatively in subsequent experiences’.46
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Of special importance in this connection is the cultivation of habits of thought and conduct that will ensure an enduring interest in a field of knowledge and a capacity to develop new interests. The idea of education as crucially involving habit formation, of course, has clear roots in the educational thought of Plato and Aristotle and is repeated with great regularity throughout the history of the philosophy of education. Dewey is no exception in this regard, arguing that the habit of thought itself and the abiding curiosity that sustains it are among the marks of an educated mind. It is not uncommon for students to say of a certain subject matter that they have ‘taken it’, with the implication that the matter is over and done with. University students, for instance, who have received credit for an introductory course surveying Western intellectual history from ancient Greece to yesterday often report that they ‘have taken’ Plato, Descartes, or Freud – likely for a class or two each coupled with a textbook introduction to their thought and perhaps a handful of selected passages from the thinker him- or herself – and that since the important information has been registered and retained long enough to pass an examination, the subject is behind them. No interest in further inquiry remains, nor even a sense of why this might be desirable. For Dewey, it is an indication of educational failure when ‘a student does not take into subsequent life an enduring concern for some field of knowledge and art, lying outside his immediate profession preoccupations’, and irrespective of ‘how good a “student”’ he or she was or how successful the examination.47 This is counted as a failure because of the habits both instilled – in this case of regarding ideas as soundbites and great texts as capable of being distilled into small doses or flattened out entirely into textbook descriptions – and not instilled – an enduring sense of the importance of ideas and the continuing relevance of classic texts. So much of mental life is governed by habit that it is difficult to overestimate its importance in the learning process. Habits of thought formed in childhood can control the life of the mind – from its fundamental orientation to its capacity for attention, its tastes and sense of what is important – throughout life and can be remarkably resistant to change at later stages of intellectual development. The habits of mind that take shape at a relatively early developmental level, as Dewey noted, ‘are usually deepest and most unget-at-able just where critical thought is most needed – in morals, religion and politics’ – a point to which I shall return in later chapters.48 The survival of habits associated with the immature mind into adulthood severely limits the individual’s capacity for new experiences and most often results in a permanent arrest in intellectual growth. An early plasticity and openness of mind settles into a defined set of inclinations which actively seek occasions for expression and have a controlling influence on later experience.49 This is exemplified in the will to learn itself, which may be urgent and enduring
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throughout life or entirely lifeless, but in either case is an habitual matter. If continuity marks the first criterion of educative experience, Dewey’s second criterion is what he referred to as the principle of interaction, where this signifies the integration or the hanging together of different experiences in a coherent configuration. It is the nature of mature experience to display not only continuity from one course of inquiry or activity to the next but also an interaction between conditions both external and internal to the individual which comprise a given situation. ‘Any normal experience’, as Dewey expressed it, ‘is an interplay of these two sets of conditions’, that is, of the ‘objective’ conditions that belong to an educational situation and the conditions that are ‘internal’ to the mental life of the inquirer.50 If traditional educational methods erred in ignoring the importance of conditions internal to the individual student, or ‘what he is at a given time’, progressives made the opposite error of ignoring objective conditions.51 The two principles of continuity and interaction are not altogether separate in meaning and still less so in their applications since both refer to the essential connectedness of human experience and speak against the experiential atomism of orthodox empiricism. If experience is experimental then there is a flexible give and take between the inquirers themselves and the situation that is to be inquired into, and it is the combination of these two principles that marks an experience as properly educative. By the same token, then, a miseducative experience is one that fails to promote the continued development of students’ minds. It is the experience that leads nowhere, either to a dead end or, what is worse, to the promotion of mental habits that block the path of future learning. Examples of the former include undertakings that students find ‘interesting’ merely in the sense of being entertaining without broadening horizons or culminating in anything beyond immediate enjoyment, while the latter includes a broad range of classroom experiences the net effect of which is the narrow and dulled state of mind that Dewey associated with traditional education. While the traditional methods undoubtedly give rise to experiences, they are too often miseducative both in the sense that they fail to connect with extracurricular experience and that they ‘deaden and stupefy’ the mental life of the young in ways that often become habitual and irreversible.52 The mind that is inattentive and indifferent to matters that are not immediately rewarding, that is incurious, unimaginative, or uncritically obedient to authority is the usual outcome of conservative educational methods, Dewey and the progressives maintained. Yet while other progressives were asserting that experiences of most any kind simply are not had in traditional schools, Dewey’s critique was that they are indeed had but that they are of the wrong kind. As he wrote, in a passage hardly less relevant today than in 1938:
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How many students, for example, were rendered callous to ideas, and how many lost the impetus to learn because of the ways in which learning was experienced by them? How many acquired special skills by means of automatic drill so that their power of judgment and capacity to act intelligently in new situations was limited? How many came to associate the learning process with ennui and boredom? How many found what they did learn so foreign to the situations of life outside the school as to give them no power of control over the latter? How many came to associate books with dull drudgery, so that they were ‘conditioned’ to all but flashy reading matter?53 The distinction, then, between the educative and the non- or miseducative turns upon the relation of a given experience to further experience, including both what is prior to it and that to which it leads. The role of the educator, accordingly, is not to be the passive bystander in the classroom that many progressives mistakenly took Dewey to be recommending, nor to be the classic authoritarian of the traditional philosophy, but to take up an intermediate position or perhaps a higher synthesis of the two extremes. Whether in the elementary school or the university, the educator is a leader of inquiry and director of the kind of activities that he or she can anticipate will lead in a direction that is worth pursuing, whether for the knowledge that is to be gained, the intellectual habits it will instill, or the capacities it will develop. In many ways, then, the educator’s role is far more difficult than has traditionally been thought, and extends beyond mastering the subject matter or knowing effective pedagogical techniques and perhaps disciplinary methods to include a knowledge of the students themselves, of their psychology and life experience, of the various avenues toward which a given curriculum may lead, and in general of the larger trajectory of which the present inquiry is a part. It extends as well to knowing the obstacles in a student’s psychology or social background that can adversely affect their ability to learn, the different styles of learning, and related issues that traditional methods had overlooked. The ultimate concern of the educator as Dewey conceived of it thus accords fully with the etymology of the word ‘education’ itself, a term that connotes both ‘a drawing out’ and ‘a leading forth’.54 Human intelligence is drawn out precisely by a leading forth of the student from what they have experienced to what they might yet experience. This process of intellectual development or growth may unfold outside of the classroom environment, but the true business of the teacher and professor is to carry the process forward in a way that is not dependent on chance occurrences in the students’ out-of-school environment and to lead them toward any experience or knowledge that enhances the capacity to learn after the period of formal education ends.
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Intellectual virtues and vices What the educative process ultimately aims to achieve has traditionally been viewed as something external to that process itself: a sum of knowledge and habits that will be instrumental in later life, particularly in the individual’s efforts to gain a livelihood, to achieve social respectability, or to carry on a tradition. Education so conceived is a means to ends variously pertaining to career, class, or creed, and in no important sense is to be considered an end in itself. When stated plainly, this view might be associated more with the past than the present, yet evidence of its persistence is easily found, from the university student majoring in a discipline within the arts or humanities who is compelled to admit with embarrassment that they do not know what they are going to ‘do’ with their degree, to the politician who is continually warning of the economic perils that await if test scores in mathematics and the sciences are permitted to fall behind other nations. Even that last bastion of the ‘useless degree’, the department of philosophy, is now regularly compelled to include in its marketing material and its website dubious information regarding the practical advantages of a degree in this field and the glorious careers that their graduates have gone on to achieve. The view, in short, that a university degree is essentially a means to an end – which may also, as a secondary matter, yield less tangible benefits or even be inherently rewarding for a few eccentric characters – remains widespread if it is not indeed the majority belief. The plausibility of this view is evident enough: formal education is indeed instrumentally valuable in any number of respects, particularly as it concerns earning qualifications necessary for certain careers. The question, however, is whether the aims of education are limited to the order of instrumental values or whether there is something more to it than this, a higher purpose that is inherent to the educative process itself and to which its utilitarian value is ultimately subordinate. I wish to defend the latter view in a manner that is roughly consistent with Dewey if it is not in the end altogether identical. I shall argue that there is a conception of experience and of ‘being experienced’ that is still more expansive than Dewey’s experimental view as well as a conception of the intellectual virtues that accords with the spirit of Dewey’s thought while hopefully advancing a step beyond its letter. The ‘something more’ to education that transcends its practical utility may be conceived as a set of intellectual virtues, dispositions, and habits that are indispensable ingredients of the educated mind. In broad terms this is the position that Dewey defended as well, in opposition to the more conventional views alluded to above – that formal education is essentially an instrumentally valuable training for later life. Dewey’s Copernican revolution reorients the practices of teaching and learning to
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students’ experience and the conditions of its further development, yet even revolutions gain their orientation from the ancien régime to which they are a response and typically remain in the latter’s orbit long after the revolution has taken place. If this is observable in political history it is equally evident in the fashioning of philosophical positions which inevitably retain traces of that in opposition to which they were originally formulated. Dewey’s radical reformulation of the philosophy of education is no exception to this, although I would urge this point not as a critique of Dewey’s position but as a reminder of the manner in which we ought to interpret and ultimately come to terms with it. How, then, did Dewey reply to the question regarding the ‘something more’ that the educative process properly aims to achieve beyond the obvious practical benefits associated with career preparation and perhaps social respectability – in the conventional sense of ascending to a higher rung on the socio-economic ladder? His answer turned upon his notion of intellectual growth or what in different contexts he referred to as the ‘spirit of inquiry’, the ‘spirit of curiosity’, and ‘the quality of mental process’ that he distinguished from ‘the production of correct answers’.55 Education aims at producing minds that are not merely capable of entering the workforce or respectable society, or that have amassed a certain body of information, but that possess the capacity and inclination to learn more in the course of future experience. The educated mind is characterized by particular intellectual virtues and by the absence of corresponding vices. What exactly these virtues and vices are is the question to which I now turn. Throughout his writings on education and on some related issues, Dewey made frequent reference to a fundamental attitude of mind or intellectual posture that is the mark of educational success as well as to its antithesis. The following passages are representative: A person who has gained the power of reflective attention, the power to hold problems, questions, before the mind, is in so far, intellectually speaking, educated. He has mental discipline – power of the mind and for the mind. Without this the mind remains at the mercy of custom and external suggestions.56 The best thing that can be said about any special process of education, like that of the formal school period, is that it renders its subject capable of further education: more sensitive to conditions of growth and more able to take advantage of them. Acquisition of skill, possession of knowledge, attainment of culture are not ends: they are marks of growth and means to its continuing.57
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The conception of the educated mind that emerges in Dewey’s writings remained consistent throughout his long career and is in many ways an outgrowth of his instrumentalist or pragmatic theory of knowledge. Flexibility, open-mindedness, originality, persistence, and an active curiosity are some of the principal Deweyan virtues. In both his conception of educational success and in his philosophical outlook more broadly, Dewey prized the intellectual disposition that is forward-looking, hospitable to new ideas, undogmatic, and in particular that is given more to constructive problem-solving than to critique in the negative sense of fault finding. Beyond this, the educated mind is reflective in the sense that it is capable of ‘turning a subject over in the mind and giving it serious and consecutive consideration’.59 It is unhurried, contemplative, and would sooner examine a matter in depth than arrive at conclusions quickly and superficially. It is careful, attentive, able to maintain concentration, and self-controlled. It possesses the capacity for good judgment in the sense not only that one is able to follow procedures laid out in advance but that one has a sense of the problem or question before one, an understanding of its larger significance, and is able to ‘grasp the scene or situation before him, ignoring what is irrelevant, or what for the time being is unimportant, who can seize upon the factors which demand attention, and grade them according to their respective claims’.60 The judicious mind is able to estimate degrees of importance and is neither indifferent to what is weighty nor preoccupied by trivia. Additionally, Dewey spoke of the educated mind as capable of ‘reconstructing’ its experiences in the sense of reorganizing and reinterpreting it in ways that infuse it with meaning. To reconstruct one’s experience is to be capable of learning from it and integrating whatever insight one is able to gain from past experience for the future. Having integrated the lessons of the past, be it one’s personal past or the larger lessons of history or previous inquiry, one is able to apply this knowledge in imposing direction and a degree of control over the future rather than remain at the mercy of events. One is capable of anticipating what is to come, planning, fending off disaster, or generally applying what one has learned for the enrichment of the future.
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Successful education fashions a mind that is not overly specialized or narrow in its horizons, that is passionate in its interests and not overly discriminating in the matters in which it takes an interest. Dewey cited with full approval a remark by John Stuart Mill that ‘the cultivated mind . . . finds sources of inexhaustible interest in all that surrounds it; in the objects of nature, the achievements of art, the imaginations of poetry, the incidents of history, the ways of mankind, past, present and their prospects in the future’.61 There is a certain restlessness of mind and passion for questioning that Dewey held in particularly high esteem and certainly displayed himself in his voluminous writings on just about every philosophical subdiscipline and every political issue that he ever encountered. He both prized and exhibited in himself an enthusiasm for ideas in a great many domains and a capacity to develop new interests, whether they be of a narrowly academic or non-academic nature. The matter of desire was of such importance to Dewey that he would speak of its communication from educator to student as ‘the one thing most needful’ in education since it is the passion for ideas themselves, far more than the instilling of information or beliefs, that is the driving force behind the students’ continuing intellectual development beyond their years at the university.62 The virtues of mind that represent, for Dewey, the highest achievement of the educative process also go beyond the narrowly intellectual to include the emotional and, still more, the social. Good judgment and the passion for inquiry itself are at once intellectual, emotional, and social virtues; they are habits of mind that lead one into co-operative discussion with others rather than lock the self within its own inner confines. Curiosity, for instance, draws the self into forms of intellectual exchange that challenge one’s convictions and reveal the nature of ideas as hypotheses rather than dogmatic certainties. We are challenged toward self-reflection and inventiveness precisely through co-operative inquiry and participation in shared undertakings of various kinds and by having our own ideas challenged in conversation.63 By the same token, good judgment is no merely logical operation of thought but includes a certain ‘emotional responsiveness’ that informs our ethical knowledge and ensures the capacity to put into operation whatever judgments we form regarding the good or the true.64 Democracy and the democratic character are terms that Dewey employed with great frequency to express the social dimension of education, where they signify less a political creed than an ethos of co-operative discussion, respect for differences of opinion, and other social virtues associated with democratic citizenship. Democracy and Education, as well as being the title of one of his most important educational works, are completely intertwined notions as they pertain both to the political and to the educational in the narrower, institutional sense of the term – a topic to which I shall return in Chapter 7.
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The intellectual vices that for Dewey are the marks of educational failure go well beyond the inability to retain information or understand difficult concepts to include inflexibility of mind, dogmatism, narrowness of horizon, parochialism, inattention, conventionality, and apathy, among others. The over-reliance on custom and deference to authority which the old education had instilled produce a docility of mind that leaves one at the mercy of intellectual fashion and ill-equipped to challenge the orthodoxy of the times. It was a serious worry of Dewey’s that the general populations of America and Europe had become too unresisting to political propaganda in particular, and it is less the politicians than the educational institutions that are the culprit. Rather than instilling the spirit of inquiry, educators in most any field teach the art of acceptance – of received wisdom, information, or the educator’s beliefs – and an unquestioning attitude toward ideas that are presented to students in the guise of facts rather than hypotheses and instruments of analysis. The resulting disposition is one to which it does not occur that there is any need for questioning, one that lacks a capacity to discern what is questionable and what is not. If the ‘natural tendency of man is not to press home a doubt, but to cut inquiry as short as possible’, this tendency is aided and abetted by educational practices that breed intellectual laziness and passive acceptance of controversial hypotheses as orthodox fact.65 Another intellectual failing upon which Dewey frequently remarked is the tendency toward overspecialization and the academic scholasticism and narrowing of perspective that inevitably follow from this. A certain thoughtlessness accompanies the trend that increasingly conscripts students, educators, professionals, and workers alike into narrow specialties beyond which the individual will often know remarkably little. The important matter of the connections between separate fields of inquiry or the relations between different experiential domains is increasingly unlearned, and not only within the sciences in which this may be thought an inevitable consequence of the advancement of knowledge but within the humanities and the arts no less. Dewey was particularly concerned about the trend toward excessive specialization in his own discipline of philosophy and – as I shall discuss in Chapter 4 – the high price that this and any other field of investigation pays when those within it become uncognizant of all that lies outside a narrow field of expertise. A related phenomenon is the remoteness and disconnection of the university from the broader culture and the irrelevance of so much of what takes place there. As Dewey remarked, ‘it would sometimes seem that only athletic exhibitions form a direct line of connection between the college and the average community life’ – an observation hardly less accurate today than in 1901 when Dewey wrote these words.66 The increasingly blinkered nature of research and subject matter in post-secondary institutions
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renders professors and students alike dangerously indifferent to the larger implications of the inquiries they undertake. Related intellectual vices include the doctrinaire turn of mind that holds its opinions in ridiculously high esteem, that is unmoveable and inflexible regarding whatever orthodoxy it holds dear. The ‘cultivation of openness and flexibility of mind’ was of such importance to Dewey that, as he wrote in one of his very earliest essays, ‘If I were asked what is the chief intellectual defect found in pupils, I should answer, judging from my own experience, lack of flexibility, lack of ability to turn the mind towards new ideas, or look at old ones in new lights.’67 The mind that is self-satisfied and self-certain is as much a symptom of educational failure as the one that is indifferent to ideas, apathetic, thoughtless, or whose thoughts are limited to simple formulas and fashionable sentiments. Were the educative process to be rooted in human experience and unfold in an appropriate environment, Dewey fervently believed, these and other intellectual failings which render the life of the mind impoverished and underdeveloped would be replaced by the open and experimental turn of mind that is the mark of intellectual maturity.
From Erlebnis to Erfahrung The logic of education – the basic ground and orientation that, phenomenologically speaking, always already characterizes the learning process – is the logic of experience. This, in short, is the Copernican revolution that Dewey sought to effect. Education rooted not in students’ lived experience but in notions of preparation for later life, economic or technological efficiency, cultural literacy, or indoctrination into particular beliefs distorts the learning process by displacing its own immanent ends with values imported from outside the process itself. The tendency to distort the learning process in this way, essentially by reducing education to a means of manufacturing subjects of a particular kind (those who believe, value, and act as educational authorities wish), is, I would suggest, the principal failing of a great deal of educational theory and practice and is the root of a myriad more specific failings. The temptation to overlook education’s immanent logic in the zeal to import extraneous ends of one kind or another may well be a universal phenomenon, one resisted as seldom by educational liberals as conservatives. Yet resist it is what must be done if we wish to provide education with a proper grounding. Experience is the starting point of thought; it is what arouses curiosity, gives rise to questioning and interpretation, and motivates minds whether young or old to understand what confronts them in some vital way. Education begins with experience ultimately because it must. A parallel may be found in Heidegger’s answer to the question why interpretation properly operates within the contextual, back-and-forth
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structure of the hermeneutic circle. One does not decide to enter the hermeneutic circle; phenomenologically, one is always already thinking within it. The choice to be made is not whether to enter this circle but how to negotiate one’s way within it, how to reconcile part with whole and whole with part in a way that brings about coherence and meaning.68 By the same token, students in educational settings have no choice but to bring their experience into the classroom and to learn on this basis. This is the context in which learning takes place, not any purely rational or ‘academic’ (non-) context of information and blackboard exercises. Were students not beingsin-the-world but computers or perhaps gods, no appeal to experience would be necessary. Yet we must take students as we find them, with a point of view that is at once intellectual, psychological, cultural, and existential, and which is summarized in the notion of experience. A question we must ask in coming to critical terms with Dewey’s philosophy of education is how well his experimental conception of experience stands up today. We may well accept his case for a shift in the ‘center of gravity’ of education while having some reservations about his conception of experience itself. While the conception that Dewey articulated is commendably rich and expansive, particularly in comparison with earlier forms of empiricism, I wish to argue for a still more expansive view, the general contours of which roughly accord with Dewey’s position yet without its somewhat reductionist and scientistic tendencies. Dewey was never inclined toward positivism or any uncritical idolatry of science (despite what certain of his critics alleged), yet he did regard scientific experimentation as the paradigm case of intelligently directed experience.69 We may wish to ask, however, why science should hold so central a place in our understanding of experience rather than, say, the encounter with art or literature or history. Is an educational encounter with literature properly understood in terms of scientific inquiry? If we are so enamored with science that we would wish to answer this question in the affirmative, it would seem to me that we are making the phenomenon fit the theory. A work of literature is an object to be experienced, to be sure, but is it to be inquired into in quite the sense that a physicist inquires into the atom or an astronomer investigates black holes? A negative answer need not prompt us to reject Dewey’s account, but it does raise the question of the limits of experience as experimental intelligence and cause us to inquire further into the concept of experience itself. There may be more to the concept than what Dewey has given us. There may indeed be far more, as becomes evident when we examine the history of the concept of experience in more detail than the cursory overview above. Fortunately we find a guide to this in Martin Jay’s Songs of Experience, in which he endeavors to show that philosophical theories of experience both ancient and modern are ‘as much “songs” of passion as sober analyses’.
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Rather than defending any theoretical account as an altogether accurate description of what experience actually is, Jay makes the interesting suggestion that experience ‘is a signifier that unleashes remarkable emotion in many [including Dewey] who put special emphasis on it in their thought’, and more closely approximates ‘lyrical panegyrics’, ‘elegiac laments’, and ‘bitter denunciations’ than philosophical theories in the usual sense. It is certainly questionable whether experience as conceived of by philosophers constitutes a ‘song’ in Wordsworth’s sense of the word, or any other; however Jay may well be correct in his assertion that ‘because of the term’s ubiquity . . . no totalizing account can hope to do justice to its multiple denotations and connotations over time and in different contexts’.70 Experience is not only a technical term in philosophy but a word in everyday language, and theoretical efforts to explain its meaning must do justice to this fact and to the concept’s interpretive richness rather than reduce it to a single dimension which is purported to be essential. It is highly unlikely that experience has an essence of which we could provide an exhaustive theoretical analysis. What we can expect of philosophy is not this but a more modest interpretation of its significance in certain more important respects, an interpretation that makes no claim to exhaustiveness or finality. Whether Dewey proffered his theory of experience in this spirit or in the more usual, reductionist way is a debatable matter; textual support may be found for either reading. Of more importance for our purposes is whether Dewey’s account, attractive as it is, is sufficient. Hans-Georg Gadamer has noted that ‘the concept of experience seems to me one of the most obscure we have’, an observation with which it is difficult to disagree. In making the word into a technical term, modern epistemology ‘truncates its original meaning’, orienting it too exclusively toward the scientific at the expense of the historical. As Gadamer further noted, In its methodology modern science thus simply proceeds further toward a goal that experience has always striven after. Experience is valid only if it is confirmed; hence its dignity depends on its being in principle repeatable. But this means that by its very nature, experience abolishes its history and thus itself.71 This critique would appear to apply to Dewey as well, although Gadamer himself did not so apply it – presumably for the reason that, like so many other continental philosophers of the twentieth century, he did not read Dewey or the other American pragmatists. Be that as it may, the truncating of the concept of experience that we witness in modern epistemology is a serious matter, and not one that we ought to perpetuate yet again by offering an analysis that purports to separate the concept’s essential from its merely
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apparent meaning. Ambiguity cannot always be reduced to zero, nor ought philosophers be quite so anxious to dismiss a concept that cannot be so ‘clarified’ as hopelessly vague. Part of the word’s ineliminable ambiguity is due to the variety of concepts to which it has long been contrasted; reason, theoretical knowledge, naivety, and hope are just a few, and they do not appear to have much in common to which a single concept could stand in opposition. Another complicating factor is of course the history of the word, and not only as it functions within philosophical discourse or for that matter in the English language. The German language includes a rather important distinction between two senses of experience – a distinction, curiously, that never attracted Dewey’s attention. German philosophy of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, increasingly dissatisfied with the reduction of experience to an epistemological matter excessively beholden to natural science, began to speak of experience in terms of the distinction between Erlebnis and Erfahrung, where the former connotes a ‘lived experience’ that is pretheoretical and immediate while the latter signifies a larger integration of perceptions and judgments over time. Erlebnis must be understood in terms of its connection with life (Leben); it is an experience of the world that is vital, conceptually undifferentiated, personal, and more than occasionally emotional. Often associated with the sensational and unique, Erlebnis is typically spoken of in its singularity as it arises in the course of everyday life or as an interruption of that life and of the larger projects and habits that comprise it. Experience in this sense is a discrete and intimate possession of the self, an individual occurrence that often leads to no larger configuration of meaning or to any social realities beyond the interiority of consciousness. Gadamer has noted a distinction between two senses of this ambiguous word. Erlebnis, he observed, refers at once to the act of experiencing as well as its object or content: This content is like a yield or result that achieves permanence, weight, and significance from out of the transience of experiencing. Both meanings obviously lie behind the coinage Erlebnis: both the immediacy, which precedes all interpretation, reworking, and communication, and merely offers a starting point for interpretation – material to be shaped – and its discovered yield, its lasting result.72 Experience in this sense, then, must be understood in connection with life rather than in solely epistemological terms. It is an episodic occurrence which, while arising from life, lacks the larger significance and temporal frame that characterizes experience in the second connotation of the word. This is experience as Erfahrung, in the sense that German thinkers such as
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Heidegger and Gadamer would speak of it in twentieth-century phenomenology. Another ambiguous expression, experience in this sense refers to the larger configurations of meaning and temporal duration that Erlebnis is without. Often associated in epistemological terms with perceptions and judgments, Erfahrung took on a less empirical or scientific connotation and a more historical one. It is less concerned with individual happenings than with the larger course of human experience in terms of which those happenings take on meaning. As Jay writes, Erfahrung ‘came to mean a more temporally elongated notion of experience based on a learning process, an integration of discrete moments of experience into a narrative whole or an adventure’.73 The notion of adventure itself exhibits an interesting ambiguity. Gadamer noted: An adventure is by no means just an episode. Episodes are a succession of details which have no inner coherence and for that very reason have no permanent significance. An adventure, however, interrupts the customary course of events, but is positively and significantly related to the context which it interrupts. Thus an adventure lets life be felt as a whole, in its breadth and in its strength. Here lies the fascination of an adventure. It removes the conditions and obligations of everyday life. It ventures out into the uncertain. But at the same time it knows that, as an adventure, it is exceptional and thus remains related to the return of the everyday, into which the adventure cannot be taken. Thus the adventure is ‘undergone’, like a test or trial from which one emerges enriched and more mature. Experience in this sense has a dialectical quality: it exhibits a continual movement back and forth between the particular occurrence and the general context to which that occurrence may be related as either a departure or a continuation but from which it derives whatever meaning is possible for it. Like the dialectical movement of the hermeneutic circle and the basic structure of an adventure as a venturing forth and subsequent return to the everyday, it is from the particular to the universal and vice versa that human experience is played out and understood. Citing Gadamer once more, ‘Every experience is taken out of the continuity of life and at the same time related to the whole of one’s life. . . . Because it is itself within the whole of life, the whole of life is present in it too.’74 Until an individual episode is integrated within a context or larger sequence of experience, it either defies understanding or is intelligible only in an immediate and generally onedimensional way. Experience in the sense of Erfahrung, then, exhibits the temporal continuity and at times progress that individual occurrences do not. It often assumes a larger social significance as well as a narrative structure, incorporating an
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ever-increasing number of episodes, social practices, persons, and lessons learned to form a kind of story, albeit one that is likely to be shot through with discordance and contradiction. Insofar as it is understood, experience in this sense resembles a narrative, with a more or less coherent thread of meaning running through it over time and rendering particular happenings significant in view of their contribution to the story. Hermeneutical phenomenologists after Heidegger would often characterize both experience and the human being itself as either having a narrative structure or, more pointedly, as being a narrative. As one understands one’s experience by arranging it into narrative form, or telling a story about it rather than regarding it in its isolated particularity, many in this tradition would also speak of the self as a personal history rather than a stable substance of some kind, be it describable in scientific or metaphysical terms.75 Erfahrung would also be described in this tradition as a transformative experience, in contrast to one that merely is what it is, as it were, or that one undergoes without being in any significant way changed. Experience in this sense is fundamentally a learning experience. It causes a modification in our self-understanding or our understanding of the world in some important respect, transforming old patterns of thinking rather than always confirming them. Gadamer would even maintain that Erfahrung, or experience ‘in the genuine sense’, ‘is initially always experience of negation: something is not what we supposed it to be’.76 Experience either conforms to our expectations or it defies them. In the latter case we are brought up short and compelled to revise whatever anticipations we had brought with us into a given experience, transforming our point of view in large ways or small and causing a reconsideration of what we thought we knew. The negativity of such experience is accordingly productive; it makes possible a more comprehensive knowledge than what we previously had, corrects mistakes, or otherwise makes learning a genuine possibility. Experience that does no more than confirm our anticipations – the perception of the sun rising again this morning, for instance – is not a learning experience, if indeed it is an experience at all. The encounter with art, by contrast, leaves us transformed. It forces a modification in our perceptions, confronts us with what is unexpected or strange, and carries us along in a process that changes us. Here at last we get to the heart of the matter: experience ‘in the genuine sense’, as Gadamer aptly put it, is indeed experimental yet not only in Dewey’s scientific understanding of the word – as investigative, rationally ordered, and solution oriented – but in the sense that it is profoundly transformative. Ultimately it is oneself and one’s point of view that experience transforms, in the sense not only that one has resolved a problematic situation but that one has become changed in one’s being. ‘I am not the person I was’, we say at the conclusion of an experience that is worthy of the name.
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One emerges from it with new insights and a richer understanding or selfunderstanding; one has learned – and not only where this means gaining information or successfully concluding a course of inquiry, but in the sense that one’s stance toward the world has been altered. Gadamer would speak of experience (Erfahrung) and of ‘being experienced’ in terms that accord roughly with Dewey’s view while in a way going beyond it. ‘The truth of experience’, as he wrote, ‘always implies an orientation toward new experience.’ It is neither simply an outcome of a certain kind – the condition of having amassed a tidy sum of facts and observations – nor a method but a posture toward the future. As a result of what one has learned, one is oriented toward future experience with a disposition of openness and curiosity. That is why a person who is called experienced has become so not only through experiences but is also open to new experiences. The consummation of his experience, the perfection that we call ‘being experienced’, does not consist in the fact that someone already knows everything and knows better than anyone else. Rather, the experienced person proves to be, on the contrary, someone who is radically undogmatic; who, because of the many experiences he has had and the knowledge he has drawn from them, is particularly well equipped to have new experiences and to learn from them. The dialectic of experience has its proper fulfilment not in definitive knowledge but in the openness to experience that is made possible by experience itself.77 One certainly hears echoes of Dewey here. He as well spoke of educative experience as disposing one toward future learning, as opening up new pathways for inquiry and arousing curiosities and decidedly not as a process that reaches a final conclusion. The habits of mind that education properly instills dispose us against intellectual self-satisfaction and self-certainty, Dewey always insisted. Because it is the nature of experience that it ‘lives on in further experiences’ rather than being an altogether discrete happening, the decisive matter for educators is ‘to select the kind of present experiences that live fruitfully and creatively in subsequent experiences’.78 What is essential with respect to experience is that to which it leads: further experience, yet in a sense not of more of the same but more of what is different. While the conceptions of experience that these two philosophers defended are hardly identical, it remains that the intellectual virtues that Dewey prized include the phenomenon of which Gadamer spoke, albeit less explicitly. Gadamer’s accent on openness to experience and the transformation of one’s point of view is more pronounced than in Dewey’s writings and occurs in a context quite different from philosophy of education. Gadamer
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would also emphasize the dialectical nature of experience in a more Hegelian way than Dewey, the two being profoundly Hegelian thinkers yet in very different ways. As well, Gadamer would always place considerable emphasis on the most un-Deweyan theme of the limits of methodological, and especially scientific, thinking. To say that experience has an experimental and in some ways dialectical quality means for Dewey that it follows a method, one that is broadly applicable and repeatable in principle by any rational agent. While it connotes a process that is open-ended, its essence, as it were, is its methodology. For Gadamer, one of the principal features of experience, or of ‘being experienced’, is precisely a sense of the limits of technique as well as an understanding of human finitude more generally – a theme that did not escape Dewey’s notice but that never made it to the forefront of his thought. That it belongs in the forefront is Gadamer’s point. Exaggerating only slightly, and to good effect, Gadamer remarked: ‘Thus experience is experience of human finitude. The truly experienced person is one who has taken this to heart, who knows that he is master neither of time nor the future. The experienced man knows that all foresight is limited and all plans uncertain.’79 If experience and education alike can be said to culminate in anything, as for both Dewey and Gadamer they can, they culminate for the latter less in the acquisition of methods or solutions to problems than in a knowledge of the limits of human understanding. Above all, they culminate in what Gadamer would call ‘historically effected consciousness’; this is a consciousness that is at once an effect of history – that is constituted by language, beliefs, evaluations, and prereflective understandings that are passed down to us in tradition – and aware of itself as so effected. The person with historically effected consciousness realizes the contingency of the ground on which he or she stands and thus the limits of human reason. It is an awareness of this kind, more than any possession of factual information or even abstract cognitive skills or methods of inquiry, that makes it optimally possible for us to have new experiences. The realization that what is seemingly natural or self-evident is an historical construction – that our moral sense, for instance, disposes us this way and that not because it has grasped some deep truth about morality but owing to centuries of received judgments and popular conceptions, most of them inspired by religion – makes it possible to ask new questions about how what is might be otherwise and to undertake in a creative way the very kind of experimental inquiry that Dewey recommended. A more radical kind of inquiry thus becomes possible, one that regards as problematic situations that had appeared altogether unproblematic and unquestionable, which assumes less and questions more, and more deeply, than was hitherto possible. At the same time one’s capacity for having new experiences is enhanced. It becomes possible to have experi-
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ences that were hitherto impossible because unthinkable. What Gadamer called one’s horizon, in the sense of what is perceivable and thinkable from a finite point of view, is modified and broadened in the course of experience, in the process opening up new possibilities of what can become an experience. What the process culminates in, then, is an explicit awareness of one’s own historicity, or of the extent to which one’s perspective and one’s very being are an historical artifact and accordingly might have been otherwise. To be experienced in this sense – still in the sense of Erfahrung – means to stand to tradition in a certain way: neither to accept everything that is passed down to us unquestioningly nor to reject it in its entirety as the dead weight of the past, but to adopt a disposition that is in a sense intermediate between the two. What Gadamer referred to as ‘the inner historicity of experience’ – precisely that which the reduction to epistemology and science overlooks – causes us to ‘belong’ to tradition in the sense of to participate in it. Being open to experience means being open to the claims that our historical tradition makes upon us and replying to such claims with an intelligent yes or no. Historically effected consciousness keeps itself open to such claims and allows tradition to address one as a Thou – which is to say, as an interlocutor with which one may agree or disagree but which may not be ignored. ‘Openness to the other’, Gadamer continued, . . . involves recognizing that I myself must accept some things that are against me, even though no one else forces me to do so. . . . I must allow tradition’s claim to validity, not in the sense of simply acknowledging the past in its otherness, but in such a way that it has something to say to me. This too calls for a fundamental sort of openness.80 It is an openness or disposition of selective appropriation and critical engagement that directly parallels the open-endedness of experience. In both instances the one who is experienced is equally far removed from the dogmatic closed-mindedness that knows all and so has nothing to learn and from the naive conformity that believes everything it is told. Insofar as experience leads to or culminates in anything, in Gadamer’s view, it ‘culminates not in methodological sureness of itself, but in the same readiness for experience that distinguishes the experienced man from the man captivated by dogma’.81 Dewey would also speak of experience as having a consummatory dimension, albeit in very different terms. In Art as Experience Dewey would speak of experience as culminating in the aesthetic while in an educational context he would always characterize the experiential process essentially as an affair of leading: an existing interest, when properly explored, leads to another one, usually one that is more sophisticated,
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abstract, or theoretical than the original. It is largely in virtue of that to which an interest or experience can be anticipated to lead that we judge it educational or non-educational, Dewey would always maintain. Like Gadamer, Dewey placed some emphasis on the continuity of experience as well, albeit in less historical and more scientific terms. As Jay has noted, Dewey’s conception of experience is of ‘an open-ended process of cumulative realization’, adding: ‘In the vocabulary of experience that was not his own, aesthetic experience was thus closer to a dialectical, historically maturing Erfahrung than to an unmediated, instantaneous Erlebnis.’82 The same can be said of educative experience. Here as well we may speak of a ‘process of cumulative realization’ and of ‘historically maturing Erfahrung’, to speak a somewhat more continental language than Dewey preferred. But where Gadamer’s position can be regarded as an advance over Dewey’s is in bringing to the forefront both the distinction between Erlebnis and Erfahrung and interpreting the latter as (or as culminating in) historically effected consciousness. The latter idea, it is interesting to note, is indeed one we find important glimpses of in Dewey’s writings, although it would never become a major theme for him in the way that it would for some of his European counterparts. Much the same can be said of Bildung, a concept classically defined by Johann Gottfried Herder as ‘a process of rising up to humanity through culture’. While Dewey never employed the word, the concept of Bildung can be said to be present in nascent form in many of his writings, although certainly not in the prominent way that it is in Gadamer’s work. It is an idea with roots in the Middle Ages and that came into philosophical prominence in the Hegelian tradition which itself had such a profound effect on Dewey in various aspects of his thought. Bildung is closely related to both culture and form, or the gradual process of formation and self-formation which philosophers such as Hegel and Wilhelm von Humboldt would identify as central to both experience and education. It refers to a process of gradual cultivation from within and to the results of this process, a character that has realized its humanity and come into its own by overcoming those elements of its nature that are immediate or merely given. Be it in formal educational settings or ordinary life, ‘every individual’, in Gadamer’s words, ‘is always engaged in the process of Bildung and in getting beyond his naturalness’. This is accomplished by distancing oneself from the immediacy of desire and the particular and finding one’s way toward the universal. The ‘rising to the universal’ of which philosophers in the Bildung tradition speak is no simple negation of nature, practice, or desire in favor of wholly abstract notions of culture, theory, or reason, however the general orientation of this process is in the direction of the latter.83 Bildung is of the nature of a task or project, and a universal one for human beings. It is the task of rising above one’s immediate nature or circumstances for the sake of a higher purpose, one
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that transcends the self while simultaneously forming or transforming it in the image of the universal. An illustration of this is found in the nature of work. As Hegel described it in The Phenomenology of Spirit, ‘working consciousness’ is no mere means toward economic ends but in an important respect is an end in itself. The essence of work is to lend form and meaning to an object: to take something out of its naturalness and transform it with a view to the universal. Otherwise put, In forming the object – that is, in being selflessly active and concerned with a universal – working consciousness raises itself above the immediacy of its existence to universality; or, as Hegel puts it, by forming the thing it forms itself. What he means is that in acquiring a ‘capacity’, a skill, man gains the sense of himself.84 One works not only, and not essentially, to consume the object of one’s labor but to form it and oneself thereby. One comes into one’s own or fashions oneself precisely by putting oneself aside or, at any rate, those aspects of one’s being that are immediately given and unformed. Following Hegel, Gadamer would also speak of the universal as exacting a demand; one’s commitment to knowledge or justice acts as a restraint on desire and the grosser forms of self-interest, thus imposing a kind of training and order on the self that is difficult and ennobling. This process of inner cultivation – which is to say the process of human experience in general – does not end and has no goals outside of itself. But as much as Bildung refers to the experiential process, it equally refers to its results. The person who is formed in this way has a sense about it: a sense of what is proportionate and important, of what is beautiful or right. Thus the cultivated person has a sense of tact or of the aesthetic which is very different from a technique. One is able to make judgments without following rules and may be quite unable to produce formal arguments to ground them, even as one’s judgments are correct. As Gadamer rather eloquently described the sense of tact, for instance: By ‘tact’ we understand a special sensitivity and sensitiveness to situations and how to behave in them, for which knowledge from general principles does not suffice. Hence an essential part of tact is that it is tacit and unformulable. One can say something tactfully; but that will always mean that one passes over something tactfully and leaves it unsaid, and it is tactless to express what one can only pass over. But to pass over something does not mean to avert one’s gaze from it, but to keep an eye on it in such a way that, rather than knock into it, one slips by it. Thus tact helps one to
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Much the same can be said of the sense of memory. Here too one develops, or fails to develop, a sense of what is memorable. What a good memory is not is an indiscriminate piling up of past experiences in the mind or ability to retrieve them on command. It is a sense of what is worthy of remembrance and a selective retention of this and only this, not of anything and everything. Bildung, then, is marked by the possession of this sense, or senses, and is simultaneously a cultivation of the self and an orientation toward the universal. Experience must therefore be understood dialectically, or in terms of a structural reversal of consciousness. One recognizes oneself – one becomes oneself – in venturing beyond one’s private immediacy and encountering what is other. It is in this encounter that one recognizes oneself, and precisely not by withdrawing into some private sanctum of interiority. One ventures forth in experience and returns a changed being; one has learned, become experienced, and become open to future venturings. Although one has amassed information in the process, this is not what is essential. What is is the transition from one state of being to another. The encounter with what is other transforms one from one’s ‘natural being’ to a state of cultivation and higher sensibility, or as Gadamer, in a Hegelian mood, expressed it, ‘To recognize one’s own in the alien, to become at home in it, is the basic movement of spirit, whose being consists only in returning to itself from what is other.’ If experience, or consciousness, is dialectically structured, and if ‘keeping oneself open to what is other’ is thus ‘the general characteristic of Bildung’, such an openness is as much a necessary condition of experience as its culmination.86 An openness to what is novel and unknown is the very lifeblood of experience. ‘[G]etting beyond his naturalness’ may also describe the transition from the transient immediacy of Erlebnis to the more reflective mode of experience that is Erfahrung.87 If for Dewey the educator’s task in essence is to guide students from an experience that is immature to one that is intellectually differentiated and sophisticated, this process may well be articulated as the transition from Erlebnis to Erfahrung – a characterization that he might well have accepted had the distinction been part of his philosophical vocabulary. Where he spoke of the learning process as proceeding typically from the concrete to the abstract, from the particular to the universal, and from the practical to the theoretical, he might also – and better – have spoken of the transition from the unformed to the formed, from the narrow and parochial to the expansive and open, and from nature to culture, and where these values are not conceived in abstract opposition. The experienced
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person no less than the educated has been cultivated in such a way that they are hospitable to new ideas, curious and restless of mind. They possess the intellectual virtues and the experiential continuity and interaction of which Dewey spoke while also exhibiting qualities of which he did not speak but might have, that is, which are consistent with the spirit of his philosophy of experience and education but not altogether with its letter. The concepts of Bildung and Erfahrung both suggest an experience that is continuous in Dewey’s sense while showing a dialectical and also a narrative quality that is better articulated in phenomenological and hermeneutical philosophy than in radical empiricism and pragmatism. Experience in what Gadamer called ‘the genuine sense’ is temporally elongated, integrated, meaningful, and transformative. Its significance is understood in terms of a story that unfolds over time and decidedly not as a mere succession of happenings disconnected from each other. The experiential continuity that largely distinguishes radical from British empiricism is a narrative continuity since it is this form of interpretation that renders meaningful, or understandable, human experience in general. It is precisely by fitting our experiences together into a followable story that they gain the continuity and interactivity that Dewey identified as the criteria of genuinely educative experience. I wish to add by way of a conclusion a remark or two, to which I shall return in later chapters, regarding Erfahrung and Bildung as they bear upon certain conditions of modern life. It does not appear to me that the present times are well suited to the kind of experience and cultivation that these concepts evoke, whether we are speaking of the realities of education or more generally of the state of modern life as a whole. The realities of the classroom, which directly reflect the condition of social life in general, are such that appeals to theoretical notions such as these can appear hopelessly academic when pressures to get through the material, prepare students for examinations, deal with administrative inanities, and cope with behavioral problems can make ideals of this or any kind seem like castles in the air. Indeed, one may get the impression that a great deal of educational theory is yet another scholasticism whose debates are contemporary equivalents of consubstantiation versus transubstantiation. One may even be right about this, in cases, but in the present case it is worth asking whether the ideals of experiential integration, narrative continuity, and personal cultivation of which I have been speaking are genuine possibilities for educational practices that are beset by conditions of the kind just noted. Educators charged with preparing students for standardized examinations and who have little or no freedom to select the curriculum will find it difficult, to say the least, to identify natural continuities between the