Ducasse's Theory of Properties and Qualities Roderick M. Chisholm Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 13, No. 1. (Sep., 1952), pp. 42-56. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205%28195209%2913%3A1%3C42%3ADTOPAQ%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research is currently published by International Phenomenological Society.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/journals/ips.html. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.
JSTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact
[email protected].
http://www.jstor.org Mon Jun 4 08:38:49 2007
DUCASSE'S THEORY OF PROPERTIES AND QUALITIES Professor C. J. Ducasse's theory of properties and qualities constitutes, I believe, the correct answer to some of the most puzzling questions of epistemology. According to this theory, our perceptual judgments, as well as our moral and aesthetic judgments, are mediated by the experience of of sensible qualities; concerning the status of these qualities the theory is "idealistic," concerning perception it is "realistic," and concerning ethics and esthetics it is "relativistic." In the present paper, I shall discuss Ducasse's account of (I) the relation of sensible qualities to the perceptible properties of physical things, (11) the nature and significance of what might be called the moral and esthetic properties of physical things and situations, and (111) the relation of sensible and other qualities to our experiences of them. The following quotations from Ducasse's "On the Attributes of Material Things" will convey the principal features of his theory of the relation of sensible qualities or appearances to the perceptible properties of physical things.' "Such attributes of material things as 'being green,' 'being fragrant,' 'being noisy,' etc., are properties of things in exactly the same essentially causal sense as are, for instance, 'being abrasive,' or 'being corrosive,' etc." (p. 60).To say that a tree, for example, has the property of being green is to say that "the tree, whether or not it be at the moment looked at, is such that under the conditions of observation that are the standard ones for such an object, it would cause a sentient observer to see the color green," i.e., to sense the quality or appearance green. (Pp. 65-66.) Hence there is no paradox "in saying that a tree, which at the moment happens to be in the dark [or happens to be unobserved], nevertheless is green." (P. 63.) But, 'where sense qualities are concerned, Berkeley is right; and all realists are wrong who claim it is possible that such qualities should, independently of their being sensed (or imagined), have any existence at all." (P. 72.) "The color [quality] we see always depends, not only on the thing looked at, but also on the conditions under which it is being observed. . . . The true distinction between the 'real' and the '[merely] apparent' color of a thing is one between the color [quality] it causes us to see under what we consider standard conditions, and the colors it causes us to see under what we consider accidental or abnormal conditions." (P. 64.) 1 C. J. Ducasse, "On the Attributes of Material Things," Journal or Philosophy, Vol. XXXI (1934), pp. 57-72.
These passages suggest a general method of explicating those terms in ordinary language which are used to designate the perceptible characteristics of things.2 In what follows, I shall discuss this general method and attempt to indicate how such explications, if they were carried out, would show Ducasse's theory to be true. According to Ducasse, when the terms in question are applied to a material object, they designate certain causal properties or capacities of the object. These properties might also be described in the following type of statement: If,under -conditions, the object sensibly stimulates an observer of sort, the observer will sense a -appearance.'
-
If we use the term "observes" to designate the converse of the relation designated by "sensibly stimulates," an alternative formulation would be: If the object is observed under -conditions, by an observer of the observer will sense a -appearance.
-sort,
Such statements might be called ('psychophysical statements." The consequent would refer to a certain psychological event and the antecedent to the physical conditions under which a stimulus object would cause such an event to occur. For example, the antecedent might describe the lighting arrangements in a room and the visual capacity of an observer; the consequent would describe the visual appearance which he would sense under those conditions. (The distinction between the observer and the observation conditions must be drawn somewhat arbitrarily; e.g., s description of the observer's glasses could be regarded as part of the description either of the observer or the observation conditions.) After sufficient experimentation, we could supply for any object an indefinite number of these psychophysical statements. Experimentation would involve altering the observer and the observation conditions and ascertaining what psychological events would follow. Let us say that the psychophysical statements which we might thus confirm describe the psychophysical properties of the ~ b j e c t . ~ If now we consider any two objects, 01 and 0 2 , which could be said in ordinary language to have the same color, we will h d that they have many On the concept of philosophical explication, see Ducaese's Nature, Mind,and Death, Part I; also his Philosophy as a Science. Ducasse does not use the word "explication" in this connection, however, Cf. Carnap's Logical Foundations of probability, Ch. I. Strictly, the consequent of such a statement should also refer to the object; e.g., "the observer will sense aappearance of the object," or "the object will appear to the observer in a - manner." See part I11 below. Ducasse, however, would call these properties "physico-psychical." Cf. Nature, Mind,and Death, pp. 334-7,349.
psychophysical properties in common. We could obtain, for 01,a list of psychophysical statements wherein the consequent refers to a visual quality or appearance. And, for 0 2 , we could obtain a similar list, differing only in that 0 2 is mentioned instead of 01.By means of such facts as these we could explicate the meaning of color terms such as "green," "brown," "blue," and the like. The statement, "This object is blue," for example, as normally used, ascribes to the object a certain set of psychophysical properties; these could be said to constitute the property blue. Possibly, as Ducasse suggests, we might conclude: An object is blue if and only if i t is such that, when a normal observer observes it under normal conditions, he will sense a blue appearance.
(If we wanted an adequate explication, however, it would be necessary to replace the term "normal" by a more precise set of terms.) Similar remarks may be made concerning most of the terms which we use to designate the perceptible characteristics of things. But many of these terms have another, quite different, use in ordinary language. The term "blue," for instance, is used not only to designate a certain property, or set of psychophysical properties, but also to designate a certain type of sensible quality or appearance. Indeed, in suggesting how the property use of "blue" might be explicated, we used it in its quality sense; ". . . he will sense a blue appearance." When we say that the quality or appearance is blue, we do not intend to ascribe to the quality or appearance that set of psychophysical properties which we ascribe to an object when we say that it is blue; what we do mean will be touched upon in section I11 below. It happens, however, that the word we use for designating a set of psychophysical properties, such as a color, is very often the same as the word we use to designate a quality or appearance which a thing having those properties will cause to be sensed under 'normal' or 'standard' condition^.^ To avoid confusing these two uses, let us for the present adopt the prefixes "P" and "Q)'; when we use a word to designate a property we may prefix it by "P" (e.g., "P-blue") and when we use it to designate a quality or appearance, we may prefix it by "&" (e.g., "&-blue"). As Ducasse observes, there is, in addition to the property and quality 6 Similarly, the word used to designate the color quality which a thing will cause t o be sensed under certain abnormal conditions may be the same as the word used (i) to.designate a different color property and (ii) t o designate the color quality which objects having this different color property will cause to be sensed under normal conditions. This is the point which Ducasse expresses by saying: "the true distinction between the 'real' and the 'apparent' color of a thing is one between the color quality i t causes us t o see under what we consider standard conditions, and the colors it causes us to see under what we consider accidental or abnormal conditions." ("On the Attributes of Material Things," p. 64.)
uses of certain adjectives, a third use, which we might call their microscop'c or foundational use.6 Thus we learn from physics that no object is P-bluei.e., that no object has the psychophysical property blue-unless it is capable of reflecting light of a certain wave length. And we learn further that no object will reflect such light unless it has a certain type of microscopic structure. More generally, physics tells us, concerning any psychophysical property, what microscopic conditions an object must fulfill if it is to have that property. The microscopic property blue, then, or the microscopic foundation of the psychophysical property blue, may be defined in terms of the microscopic structure which an object must have if it is to have the psychophysical property blue. When our adjectives are used in this third sense, we could introduce theprefix "F"; hence we would have "Fblue" in addition to "P-blue" and "Q-blue." These considerations remind us, moreover, that there is still another use of these terms: the term "blue," for example, is sometimes used to describe light of a certain wave length, light which, in fact, is reflected by objects which are microscopically blue. Whereme "P-blue" and "F-blue" designate properties of the stimulus object, i.e., the source of the sensible stimulus, this fourth use of "blue," for which we might adopt the expression "S-blue," is intended to designate properties of the stimulus itself? The distinctions among these uses or interpretations may be clarified by contrasting several types of statement. Let us suppose the partial statements listed below have been properly completed. (1) If anything is P-blue, then: (i) if it is observed under A conditions, the observer will sense an appearance which is Q-blue; (ii) if it is observed under B conditions, the observer will sense an appearance which is Qbrown; (iii) if it is observed under C conditions, the observer will sense an appearance which is Q-purple; . . .
In ordinary language, possibly (i) would follow logically from the statement that the object has the property (P-) blue; possibly (iii) would not thus follow logically; and possibly, with respect to (ii), ordinary language is inexact or inconsistent in that (ii) would sometimes be used as a logical consequence and sometimes not. An adequate explication of "P-blue," however, would not contain this inexactness or inconsistency; presumably, therefore, this would be an occasion on which, according to Ducasse, the proper business of the philosopher is that of "ruling instead of analy~ing."~ Let us now compare the following type of statement: (2) An object is F-blue if and only if it has 6
-microscopic structure.
Zbid., pp. 61-2.
This distinction between "stimulus" and "stimulus object" is borrowed from Clark L. Hull's Principles of Behavior, pp. 32-3. 8 In the case of some terms in common use, "the philosopher's business is not to restrict or to expand arbitrarily either their application or their implication, but
When this statement is properly completed, the microscopic structure described is the one by reference to which we would define "F-blue"; hence (2) would be analytic. The following, however, is not analytic: (3) An object is F-blue if and only if it is P-blue.
Referring to our (hypothetical) definitions or explications, we can see that (3) is equivalent in meaning to a statement of this sort: (4) An object has -microscopic structure: if and only if: it is such that (i) if i t is observed under A conditions the observer will sense an appearance which is Q-blue, (ii) if it is observed under B conditions the observer will sense an appearance which is Q-brown, (iii) if i t is observed under C conditions, the observer will sense aa appearance which is Q-purple, . . .
The following statement, when completed, would, like (2), be analytic: (5) Light is S-blue if and only if i t is -wave length.
This statement may be supposed to describe the conditions by reference to which we would d e h e '(8-blue." The following statement, however, would be synthetic: (6) An object is F-blue if and only if, under -conditions, i t reflects light which is 5-blue.
Referring again to our (hypothetical) definitions or explications, we see that (6) would be equivalent in meaning to a statement of this sort: (7) An object has -microscopic structure if and only if, under ditions, i t reflects light of
-wave length.
-con-
And so on. Of these distinctions, the one most likely to be neglected is, as Ducmse emphasizes, that between terms designating psychophysical properties (e.g., "P-blue") and those designating sensible qualities or appearances (e.g., "&-blue"). This distinction may be further clarified if we contrast our partial statement (I), above, with (8) If anything is P-brown, then: (i) if it is observed under D conditions, the observer will sense an appearance which is Q-blue; (ii) if i t is observed first to classify the variety of instances in which they are actually employed, and then to discover analytically the intension which corresponds to each class of employments. Occasion for ruling instead of analyzing arises only a t the 'edges' of such classes, where ordinary language hesitates and where ruling therefore does not violate any established usage. That is, the philosopher's business, where such terms are concerned, is not to make over existing language, but only to perfect it-to purge it of defects, such as vagueness, ambiguity, or inconsistency, which it happens still to contain." Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 118. Cf. Carnap, op. cit., pp. 3-5.
under E conditions, the observer will sense an appearance which is Qbrown; (iii) if it is observed under F conditions, the observer will sense an appearance which is Q-purple; .
..
Statement (1) reminds us that, under certain conditions, an object which is P-blue will cause an observer to sense ah appearance which is Q-blue and that, under other conditions, it will cause quite different appearances to be sensed; statement (8) reminds us that, under other conditions, an object which is not P-blue will cause an observer to sense an appearance which is Q-blue; and so on. "The color [quality] we see," Ducasse notes, "always depends not only on the thing looked at, but also on the conditions under which it is observed."O Our psychophysical statements are conditionrds, telling us only what would be sensed if certain conditions were realized; hence, in calling an object P-blue, we need not commit ourselves with respect to the existence or occurrence of anything which is Q-blue. And, similarly, in saying that someone senses an appearance which is Q-blue, we do not commit ourselves with respect to the question whether the object (if any) which he observes is P-blue. Similar remarks apply to other "P" and "Q" terms. If, therefore, we should conclude, as Ducasse does, that appearances or sense qualities exist only when sensed, we may still maintain, as he does, a "realistic" theory of properties. For we may still hold that material things exist independently of observation and that, when not observed, they may retain the properties which at other times we perceive them to have. Occasionally, however, philosophers contend that such views would be inconsistent; they assume, for example, that if a thing is P-blue, there must exist independently of any observer the appearance or quality Q-blue (possibly, like paint, on the surface of the object). But there is nothing in the foregoing to indicate the need for such assumptions. Possibly the philosophers who make them confuse the uses of what we have called "P" and "Q" terms; or possibly they reason that, if an object is P-blue, it must also be Q-blue. Ducasse exhibits the error upon which this reasoning is apparently based by applying it to realms of sensation other than that of vision. When it is applied to kinesthetic sensations, for example, we "find ourselves required to say that the quality celled nausea, of which we obtain experience when we bring the substance ipecac in the appropriate relation to the relevant inner sense organs-that that very nausea-quality mqy without contradiction be supposed to be literally present in the ipecac when i t is still in the druggist's bottle. Indeed remorseless consistency would require us to go even farther, and to declare legitimate the supposition that that very nausea-quality is intrinsically present also in the waves of the sea, even when the semi-circular canals of some person subject to seasickness are 9
"On the Attributes of Material Things," p. 64.
not in the spatial relation to those waves necessary to procure him the experience of the nausea-quality."lO
Let us now ask whether analogous considerations apply to what might be called the moral and esthetic properties of things and events.
The experience of moral and esthetic feelings-e.g ., "emotions, moods, attitudes, as well as longings, impulses, dispositions, aspirations, inclinations, and aversion~"~~--is similar in important respects to the experiencing (sensing) of appearances. In applying the property-quality distinction to "nausea," Ducasse reminds us that the distinction may also be applied to terms designating moral and esthetic feelings. For sometimes, at least, our experience of these feelings is conditioned by sensible stimulation in essentially the same manner as is our experience (sensing) of appearances. Hence we could say that, among the psychophysical properties of physical things and events, are those of being able to cause, under certain conditions, the experience of moral and esthetic feelings. Among the psychophysical properties of a painting, for example, may be that of causing certain observers under certain circumstances to experience melancholy. Thus, if we knew enough about psychophysics, we could verify statements of this sort: .
If the painting is observed under -conditions, by an observer of the observer will experience a melancholy feeling.'$
-sort,
The adjectives used to designate moral and esthetic feelings, like those used to designate sensible qualities or appearances, may also be used in ordinary discourse to designate the psychophysical properties of things. William James remarked that we may speak of an "agreeable degree of heat" or of an "agreeable feeling" caused by the degree of heat. "Language would lose most of its esthetic and rhetorical value were we forbidden t o project words primarily connoting our affections upon the objects by which the affections are aroused. The man is really hateful; the action really mean; the situation really tragic-all in themselves and quite apart from our opinion. We even go so far as to talk of a weary road, a giddy height, l o h i d . , p. 67. Many other philosophers, of course, have argued similarly. E.g., Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, Bk. 11, Ch. VIII, 5 16; Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, I ; Reid, Inquiry into the Human Mind, Ch.
v, 5 8.
C. J. Ducasse, Art, the Critics, and You, p. 133. Once we have ascertained the esthetic andmoral properties of an object situation it would be an easy matter (if we were interested) to investigate their microscopic foundations, etc. l1 '2
a jocund morning or a sullen sky. larly ambiguous. "18
.. . All our adjectives of worth are simi-
Failure to distinguish the property and quality uses of these adjectives may be as confusing in esthetics and moral philosophy as it is in epistemology. Estheticians may ask whether the road is objectively weary, or the degree of heat objectively agreeable, or the sunset objectively beautiful. And the answers will depend in part upon whether the adjectives, "weary," "agreeable," and "beautiful," are to be interpreted in a property or in a quality sense. There are important respects, of course, in which moral and esthetic feelings differ from sensible qualities.'* Moreover, the presence of specific moral and esthetic properties in an object or situation is less easy to ascertain than is the presence of sensible properties. Esthetic and moral experiences are much more variable than are sensible experiences; many of the factors determining the former experiences do not seem to affect the latter. I t may be, for example, that an esthetic experience is more likely to depend upon one's prior attitude than is a sensible experience. Therefore, the psychophysical statements describing moral and esthetic properties may refer to many physiological and psychic conditions which are irrelevant to the experience of sensible qualities.16 But these complications do not point to any relevant theoretical difference between those psychophysical properties which are moral and esthetic and those which are merely sensible. What we have said about the "objectivity" of sensible properties, then, would seem to apply equally well to moral and esthetic properties. And therefore it is quite possible that many of the terms of esthetics and moral philosophy may be explicated in much the same manner as the terms designating other psychophysical properties. Thus, in Art, the Critics, and You, Ducasse defines the "beauty" of an object as one of its properties or capacities, via., its capacity to cause pleasure in an observer who contemplates it esthetically. If we think of the object's beauty as being its capacity to cause esthetic pleasure, and not as being the pleasure itself, then, Ducasse observes, the question whether beauty is objective or subjective becomes "parallel logically with the question whether poisonousness is objective or subjective."16 Hence he is ' 3 William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, pp. 142-3, 144-6. C f . E . B. Holt, The Concept of Consciousness, p. 110; C . I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, Chs. XI1 and XIII; Hans Reichenbach, "Dewey's Theory of Science," The Philosophy of John Dewey (Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. I). esp. pp. 177182. l4 C f . Lewis, op. cit., p. 401ff. l 6 C f . Lewis, op. cit., pp. 375, 418-9; C . S . Pierce, Collected Pape~.s, 5, pp. 292. l6 Art, the Critics, and You, p. 93.
able to say that his account "accords not only with the notorious variabilty of judgments of beauty and their relativity to the taste and mood of the judging individual, but also with the common-sense opinion that there is no paradox in supposing that something that one h d s beautiful is beautiful even when he no longer looks a t i t or when nobody looks a t it. For this is true in the same sense in which it is true that arsenic is poisonous even when nobody swallows it-arsenic being a t all times such that if one were to swallow i t in certain quantity, it would cause one to die. What is false is not that arsenic is a t all times poisonous, but that it is a t all times poisoning. Experiencing pleasure, like dying, is not a capacity but an event, which some things are capable of causing in some human beings. On the other hand, beauty, like poisonousness, is not an event or a quality, but a capacity-the capacity some things have of causing pleasure in some contemplative beholders of them. This capacity, however, is manifest-that is, beauty is experienced-only a t the times when one of these beholders contemplates an object that has it; just as the poisonousness of arsenic is manifest instead of latent only when i t is poisoning somebody, or the combustibility of paper is manifest only when it is burning."17
If a layman wants to know whether a certain liquid is poisonous, he can consult an expert who will have the answer for him; similarly, one might suppose, if he wants to know whether a certain painting is beautiful, or an action moral, he can consult another expert-this time an expert who has informed himself about the esthetic and moral properties of things. Yet one of the purposes of Art, the Critics, and You, according to Ducasse, is to provide esthetic laymen or amateurs "with the text of a declaration of independence in matters of taste in art, and to encourage them to cultivate their own taste through abundant and varied but always positive exercise thereof, rather than pawively by allowing it to be molded into the shape of the taste of some supposed authority."18 Thus he argues that "there is no such such thing as objective goodness or badness of taste, but only such a thing as my taste and your taste, the taste of this man and the taste of some other man, tastes shared by many or by few."19 In an early paper on ethics, he wrote, similarly, that the question of adopting an ultimate ethical standard is a "wholly arbitrary matter. In other words, it is purely a matter of the taste of each person, and is not something that is in any way arguable at If Ducasse's views are consistent, then, the implication would be that, although it is possible to settle questions about the presence of moral and esthetic voperties in a scientific and objective manner 17 Ibid.,
p. 91.
"Ibid., p. 10.
10 Ibid., p. 121.
80 C. J. Ducasse, "Liberalism in Ethics," International Journal of Ethics, Vol.
XXXV (1925),pp. 238-250. The quotation is on p. 248.
there are fundamental moral and esthetic disputes which cannot be settled in this manner.21To see that Ducasse's views on these points need not be inconsistent, let us consider a typically ethical dispute-a dispute about what ought to be done. A single example will suffice, both for ethics and estheti~s.~ We may suppose that two people, attempting to choose between alternative courses of action, A and B, are able to agree that (1) A is a better course of action than B.
A is a better course of action than B in the sense that the consequences of A would be of more value than those of B; the value of these consequences would be an objective property of them. Statement (1) is thus a "property statement." But our two people, although in agreement concerning the truth of (I), are yet unable to arrive at a mutual decision. For the one favors the adoption of A and the other favors that of B. Let us formulate the point on which they disagree as follows: (2) Anyone, compelled to choose between A and B, is morally obliged to choose A.
Statement (2), as we shall interpret it, is a practical statement. It formulates a reason for action in at least this respect: Anyone, accepting (2), would feel morally justified in choosing A. Moreover, we may say of any person who has decided to choose between A and B, but who is unable to make s decision, that acceptance of (2) would be a sufficient condition for his deciding in favor of A. Statement (2) is thus typical of the "normative" statements of ethics and esthetic^.^^ It is obvious that assertion of (1) does not commit us to (2) unless we have also asserted some such statement as (3) Anyone, compelled to choose between alternatives, one of which is better than the other, is morally obliged to choose the one which is better. 21 Cf. Lewis, op. cit., p. 564: "Valuation is always a matter of empirical knowledge. But what is right and what is just, can never be determined by empirical facts alone.'' It is doubtful, however, that Lewis would agree with the passage, quoted above, from Ducasse's "Liberalism in Ethics." 22 I am indebted to John Ladd for making me appreciate the problem here discussed. It must not be supposed he would agree with my treatment; his own views will be found in his forthcoming paper, "Reason and Practice." Cf. S. Toulmin, The Place of Reason in Ethics, p. 28 and passim; M. G. White, "Valuation and Obligation in Dewey and Lewis," Philosophical Review, Vol. LVIII (1949), pp. 321-329. 23 In describing the meaning of (2) we must refer to the effects which acceptance of (2) might have on an agent's decision. This fact may be a reason for saying that (2) has a "different kind of meaningJ1than does (1); it may also be a reason for saying that (2) should not be expressed in the indicative mood.
When Ducasse says that certain questions of ethics and esthetics can be decided only arbitrarily and are incapable of argument, he may be said to be speaking of statements such as (2) and (3). Possibly an "ideal ethical scienceH-a science of ethical or moral properties-could inform us about the truth of (1);but there is nothing in Ducasse's theory of properties to indicate that this science could supply grounds for accepting or rejecting a practical statement such as (2).24 To be sure, there is considerable justification for interpreting (3) in such a way that it is analytic and therefore, presumably, not in need of empirical justification. Thus one might argue that to say one action is "better" than another is the same as saying that an agent would be morally obliged (in the sense in which this term is used in (2)) to choose the one rather than the other. We might call this use of "better" the practical use and distinguish it from our property use. Or, on the other hand, one might use the term "morally obliged" in such a way that to say that an agent is "morally obliged" to choose one action rather than another is the same as saying that the one action is better than the other (in the sense in which "better" is used (1)).We might call this use of "morally obliged" the property use and distinguish it from our practical use. When we interpret (3) in such a way that it is analytic, either we are interpreting both "morally obliged" and "better" in their practical senses or we are interpreting both of them in their property senses. But if (3), taken with our property interpretation of (I), is to yield our practical interpretation of (2), then, in (3), "morally obliged" must be taken in its practical sense and "better" must be taken in its property sense. When (3) is so interpreted, it is not analytic. In order to settle a practical or normative dispute, then, we must have a method of establishing a statement such as (3). Although Ducasse's theory of properties may be said to imply that statements such as (1) can be established objectively and scientifically, it has no such implications with respect to statements such as (3). Hence his relativism is not inconsistent with realistic theory of properties.
Psychophysical properties, we have mid, might be described in statements of the following sort: If the object is observed under -conditions by an observer of -sort, the observer will sense a -appearance.
"
Possibly it could be shown that no one has the property of being rational or moral unless he accepts (3). But our problem then turns on the practical question whether one is morally obliged to be rational or moral. Cf. L. Garvin, "The New Rationalism in Ethics," Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XLVIII (1951), pp. 317-325.
Let us now consider the experiences described in the consequents of such statements. With rwpect to these experiences, according to Ducasse, "Berkeley is right" and "realists are wrong."26 The relevant philosophical questions may be indicated by considering alternative methods of describing the experiences. There are, I believe, four general modes of description, any one of which is adequate. I s h d $8tinguish these in terms of an example and then aak which of them is l e s t mi~leading.~~ We have been describing these experiences M follows: (1) The observer senses a bluish appearance of the object.
But we might have said instead: (2) The object appears to the observer in a bluish manner.
The expression, ,('in a bluish manner," in (2) could be replaced by the somewhat more awkward adverb, "blue-ly." Comparison of these statements immediately suggests two further possibilities. We might say (3) The object takes on a bluish appearance for the observer.
or we might say (4) The observer intuits in a bluish manner with reference to the object.
Again, the expression, "in a bluish manner," could be replaced by We may obtain variants of these forms by substituting a different terminology. For example, in place of '(senses" in (I), we might substitute-a, different verb, say "experiences" or "is aware of"; in place of "appearance" we might have a diierent noun, say "sensum" or "sense datum." Thus A. J. Ayer uses the word "senses" as it is used in (I), but in place of "appearance" he uses "sense datum" and, instead of saying that the sense datum is "of" the object, he says it "belongs to" the object." Some philosophers, using the third manner of speaking, replace the word "for" by a longer expression, saying, for example, that the object takes on an appearance "in its relation to" the observer. But, unless we question the mode of designating the observer and the object, we are not likely to want to describe the experience in a manner which cannot be subsumed under one of these four forms. lcOnthe Attributes of Material Things," p. 72. The significance of this type of approach is discussed by J. N . Findlay. "Recommendations Regarding the Language of Introspection," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. IX (194&9), pp. 212-236. 27 In these four expressions, we make explicit the reference to the object which was left implicit in Section I above. as Cf. A. J. Ayer, Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, p. 58. 26 26
There is a significant respect in which statement (1) differs from statement (2). Let us interpret the two statements in the way in which most statements of similar grammatical form would ordinarily be interpreted. From either statement, then, we may infer that there exists an observer, who is the subject of a certain process, and that there exists an object. But from (I), unlike (2)) we can infer that there also exists an appearance. For ordinarily, from a statement similar in form to (1)) we would countenance the inferenceof anexistential statement such as, "There exists a bluish appearance which the observer senses.'' Statement (2), however, would not warrant a similar inference. Instead of saying that there exists an appearance, (2) merely qualifies the process it mentions; it says that the process occurs in a certain manner. To be sure, we could resolve to interpret (2) in such a way that the inference to "There exists a bluish appearance . . ." is warranted, or to interpret (1) in such a way that the inference is not warranted. But, inasmuch as we are looking for a mode of description which is not misleading, these interpretations are to be avoided. Perhaps one may wonder how what, in (I), could be called a complex appearance-say a field of stripes of different colors and shapes, which are interrelated in various ways, and which are capable of being countedcould be treated, in (2), as merely a mode or manner of the process of sensing.29We may compare, however, a wheel which turns ten revolutions: the revolutions may be abrupt and speedy, they may be interrelated in various ways, and they are ten in number; but in describing these revolutions we are describing merely the way or manner in which the process of turning occurs. Similar observations may be made with respect to the distinction between statements (3) and (4). Statements (2) and (4)) therefore, have an advantage of economy or simplicity not shared by either (1) or (3). Hence, unless we have reason for supposing that there are appearances in addition to the process of appearing (or that of intuiting), application of Ockham's razor would eliminate (1)and (3).30But such information as we have concerning the existence of appearances seems to be derived from situations of just the sort we are trying to describe. Moreover, in discussing the status of psychophysical properties, we have noted the inadequacy of what is probably the principal ground for saying that appearances may exist independently of the process of sensing (or intuiting). In choosing among these types of statement, we may appeal to still t o C f . G . E . Moore, " A Reply t o M y Critics," The Philosophy of G . E. Moore (Library of Living Philosophers, V o l . IV), pp. 659-660; H. H. Price, Perception, p. 106. 80 C f . Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 275.
another consideration. There are, in addition to the psychological events involved in perception, other psychological events-we might call them non-perceptual-which are similar in important respects to those involved in perception. We have mentioned moral and esthetic feelings; in addition to these there are the experiencesinvolved in dreams, memory, imagination, and the like.s1If, of two ways of describing our perceptual events or experiences, one is also adequate for describing the non-perceptual events and the other is not, then the former has an advantage over the latter. And this advantage is, once again, one of economy or simplicity. We may illustrate this point by considering an instance of a nonperceptual psychological event. Of a man who has "spots before his eyes," for example, we could say, following (I), that he senses a spotty appearance. The spotty appearance, ex hypothed, is not functioning as a vehicle of perception. Hence we need not add, as we do in (I), that the appearance is of anything; indeed, to make explicit that the event is nonperceptual, we could add that the appearance is not of anything. We could also say, following (4), that the man intuits spottily or in a spotty manner. And, since the experience is not perceptual, we need not add, as we do in (4))that he intuits with reference to any object. But we cannot satisfactorily describe this nonperceptual experience in the manner either of (2) or of (3). If we tried to follow (2), we would have to say that there is something which appears to the observer in a spotty manner; if we tried to follow (3), we would have to say that there is something which takes on a spotty appearance for him. Either formulation leaves ua with the difficult problem of determining what the "something" in question might be. Similar observations may be made concerning the descriptions of other nonperceptual experiences. We could, of course, speak of upparing when we are discussing perceptual events and speak of intuiting when we are discussing nonperceptual events. But this would suggest, needlessly, that we are concerned with two different types of process rather than with simply one. These considerations provide ground for saying, therefore, that the fourth mode of description is the least misleading. Turning to Ducasse's views once again, we find that his conception of the experiences in question is most readily formulated by using our fourth mode of description. Ducasse sometimes uses the substantival expressions, "appearance," "sense datum," and "sensum," as they are used in statements (1) and (3)) but his interpretation of them may be seen from the following:
". . . a sense datum is essentially a cognizing, and more specifically, a cognizing of the kind .. . which I have proposed to call an 'intuiting.' That is, Findlay, op. cit., presents an excellent discussion of the similarities of these types of experience.
a sense datum is not an object of consciousness but a content of consciousness -a determinate modulation of consciousness itself; and more specifically, a determinate modulation of the s~eciesof consciousness called "sensinn." - Consider, for example, a certain one of the completely determinate blues--say, blue of precisely the hue, brightness, and saturation of the blue I intuit as I now look a t a certain spot on my tie; and let us agree to call that infirma species of blue, say, 'arral blue.' The sense datum I have as I look a t that spot is then a being-conscious sensingly, and further bluely, and still further arrally-bluely. A sense datum, thus, is a being-conscious, determinately ."ga adverbiated in a certain manner.
..
Where other philosophical views, then, leave us with difficult questions concerning the status both of appearances and intuiting (or sensing), Ducasse's view at this point leaves us only with the questions about sensing. The latter questions, I am convinced, are to be met with on any adequate epistemological theory; Professor Ducasse's treatment of them, moreover, constitutes still another significant contribution to philosophy. RODERICK M. CHISHOLM.
Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 287. Thus although Ducasse frequently uses our first mode of expression, he interprets it in the way in which we are interpreting our fourth. He justifies this mode of speaking by noting that frequently, in ordinary language, one countenances sentences such as "He danced a waltz," where the accusative expression, "a waltz," describes, not something which could conceivably exist independently of the dancing of it, but rather the mode or manner of the dancing itself. He refers, in this connection, to Samuel Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity, Vol I, p. 12. Cf. also: C. F. Stout, "Are Presentations Mental or Psyqhical?" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s. Vol. IX (1909), pp. 226-247; Thomas Reid. Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay I, Ch. I, 912, and Essay 11, Ch. XVI,
