[email protected] With more than 1,500,000 copies of our MCSE, MCSD, CompTIA, and Cisco study guides in print, we continue to look for ways we can better serve the information needs of our readers. One way we do that is by listening. Readers like yourself have been telling us they want an Internet-based service that would extend and enhance the value of our books. Based on reader feedback and our own strategic plan, we have created a Web site that we hope will exceed your expectations.
[email protected] is an interactive treasure trove of useful information focusing on our book topics and related technologies. The site offers the following features: ■ One-year warranty against content obsolescence due to vendor product upgrades. You can access online updates for any affected chapters. ■ “Ask the Author” customer query forms that enable you to post questions to our authors and editors. ■ Exclusive monthly mailings in which our experts provide answers to reader queries and clear explanations of complex material. ■ Regularly updated links to sites specially selected by our editors for readers desiring additional reliable information on key topics. Best of all, the book you’re now holding is your key to this amazing site. Just go to www.syngress.com/solutions, and keep this book handy when you register to verify your purchase. Thank you for giving us the opportunity to serve your needs. And be sure to let us know if there’s anything else we can do to help you get the maximum value from your investment. We’re listening.
www.syngress.com/solutions
Ultimate CD-ROM Collections Now Available!
Incredible Value for Only $99.99 each Receive the CD of your choice with seven books in PDF format. You would pay over $350 for these books in hard copy format. Ultimate Cisco CD Managing Cisco Network Security (List Price: $59.95) Building Cisco Networks for Windows 2000 (List Price: $59.95) Configuring Cisco AVVID (List Price: $59.95) Administering Cisco QoS for IP Networks (List Price: $59.95) Building Cisco Remote Access Networks (List Price: $49.95) Configuring Cisco Voice Over IP (List Price: $59.95) Cisco AVVID and IP Telephony Design & Implementation (List Price: $69.95)
Ultimate Windows 2000 CD Managing Active Directory for Windows 2000 Server (List Price: $49.95) Managing Windows 2000 Network Services (List Price: $49.95) Configuring Windows 2000 Server Security (List Price: $49.95) Windows 2000 Server System Administration Handbook (List Price: $49.95) Deploying Windows 2000 with Support Tools (List Price: $49.95) Windows 2000 Configuration Wizards (List Price: $39.95) Troubleshooting Windows 2000 TCP/IP (List Price: $49.95)
Ultimate .NET CD BizTalk Server 2000 Developer’s Guide for .NET (List Price: $49.95) XML .NET Developer’s Guide (List Price: $49.95) VB .NET Developer’s Guide (List Price: $49.95) ASP .NET Web Developer’s Guide (List Price: $49.95) C# .NET Web Developer’s Guide (List Price: $49.95) .NET Mobile Web Developer’s Guide (List Price: $49.95) Designing SQL Server 2000 Databases for .NET Enterprise Servers (List Price: $49.95)
Ultimate Network Security CD Hack Proofing Your Network (List Price: $49.95) Hack Proofing Windows 2000 Server (List Price: $49.95) Hack Proofing Linux: A Guide to Open Source Security (List Price: $49.95) Hack Proofing Sun Solaris (List Price: $49.95) Hack Proofing Your E-Commerce Site (List Price: $49.95) Hack Proofing Your Web Applications (List Price $49.95) Managing Cisco Network Security: Building Rock Solid Networks (List Price $59.95)
Visit www.syngress.com for details.
1 YEAR UPGRADE BUYER PROTECTION PLAN
Dr. Tom Shinder’s
ISA Server Beyond and
Real World Security Solutions for Microsoft Enterprise Networks
Thomas W. Shinder, M.D. Debra Littlejohn Shinder Martin Grasdal
Technical Editor
Syngress Publishing, Inc., the author(s), and any person or firm involved in the writing, editing, or production (collectively “Makers”) of this book (“the Work”) do not guarantee or warrant the results to be obtained from the Work. There is no guarantee of any kind, expressed or implied, regarding the Work or its contents.The Work is sold AS IS and WITHOUT WARRANTY. You may have other legal rights, which vary from state to state. In no event will Makers be liable to you for damages, including any loss of profits, lost savings, or other incidental or consequential damages arising out from the Work or its contents. Because some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages, the above limitation may not apply to you. You should always use reasonable care, including backup and other appropriate precautions, when working with computers, networks, data, and files. Syngress Media®, Syngress®,“Career Advancement Through Skill Enhancement®,” and “Ask the Author UPDATE®,” are registered trademarks of Syngress Publishing, Inc. “Mission Critical™,”“Hack Proofing®,” and “The Only Way to Stop a Hacker is to Think Like One™” are trademarks of Syngress Publishing, Inc. Brands and product names mentioned in this book are trademarks or service marks of their respective companies. KEY 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009 010
SERIAL NUMBER KQMCTFTRCA 522CSMBG22 A2CY67NGP9 NR57JKGLD8 T3GF6NV67S XDE4GHK7Z2 5T3BY7P88S W4CFD65T9G TFV89V6X5S HUN45F8AS4
PUBLISHED BY Syngress Publishing, Inc. 800 Hingham Street Rockland, MA 02370 Dr. Tom Shinder’s ISA Server and Beyond: Real World Security Solutions for Microsoft Enterprise Networks
Copyright © 2002 by Syngress Publishing, Inc. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act of 1976, no part of this publication may be reproduced or distributed in any form or by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the publisher, with the exception that the program listings may be entered, stored, and executed in a computer system, but they may not be reproduced for publication. Printed in the United States of America 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 ISBN: 1-931836-66-3 Technical Editor: Martin Grasdal Cover Designer: Michael Kavish Acquisitions Editor: Andrew Williams Page Layout and Art by: Shannon Tozier Developmental Editor: Jonathan Babcock Copy Editor: Mary Millhollon, Beth Robers CD Production: Michael Donovan Indexer: Rich Carlson Distributed by Publishers Group West in the United States and Jaguar Book Group in Canada.
Authors Thomas W. Shinder, M.D. (MCSE) is a computing industry veteran who has worked as a trainer, writer, and a consultant for Fortune 500 companies including FINA Oil, Lucent Technologies, and Sealand Container Corporation.Tom was Series Editor for the Syngress/Osborne series of Windows 2000 certification study guides and is author of the best selling book Configuring ISA Server 2000: Building Firewalls for Windows 2000 (Syngress Publishing, ISBN: 1-928994-29-6).Tom is the editor of the Brainbuzz.com Win2k News newsletter and is a regular contributor to TechProGuild. He is also a content editor, contributor, and moderator for the World’s leading site on ISA Server 2000, www.isaserver.org. Microsoft recognized Tom’s leadership in the ISA Server community and awarded him their Most Valued Professional (MVP) award for the first time in December of 2001. Debra Littlejohn Shinder (MCSE) is author of Scene of the Cybercrime: Computer Forensics Handbook (Syngress Publishing, ISBN: 1-931836-65-5), co-author of Configuring ISA Server 2000: Building Firewalls for Windows 2000 (Syngress Publishing, ISBN: 1-928994-29-6) and Troubleshooting Windows 2000 TCP/IP (Syngress Publishing, ISBN: 1-928994-11-3), as well as contributor to numerous other technical books. Along with her husband, Dr. Thomas W. Shinder, Deb does network consulting in the Dallas-Ft.Worth area, designs Web sites for businesses, municipalities and non-profit organizations, and teaches in the Dallas County Community College District’s technical training programs. As a former police officer and Police Academy instructor, she specializes in computer/network security and forensics. Deb has written hundreds of articles for Web and print publications such as TechRepublic, CNET, Swynk.com, BrainBuzz.com, and WinXP News. She has also written numerous online courses for DigitalThink, Inc. and prepared curricula for classroom instruction. She has contributed to Microsoft’s TechNet, and speaks at conferences such as the BlackHat security briefings and Certification Expo. She edits the A+ weekly newsletter for CramSession and writes a weekly feature for the Net Admin News. Deb has been writing since she finished her first (still unpublished) novel in ninth grade. She edited her high school and college newspapers and wrote and edited newsletters for city employees and police associations. Prior to v
entering the tech field, she had articles published in law enforcement and self-help psychology publications. She is a member of the IEEE’s IPv6 Working Group and has written and tech edited questions for various certification practice exams.
Contributor Mark Burnett is an independent security consultant and freelance writer who specializes in securing IIS. He is co-author of Maximum Windows Security and Special OPS: Host and Network Security for Microsoft, UNIX, and Oracle (Syngress Publishing, ISBN: 1-931836-69-8). Mark is a regular contributor to many security-related magazines, newsletters, and Web publications. As editor of www.iissecurity.net, Mark shares his own unique research as well as that from security researchers around the globe.
Technical Editor and Contributor Martin Grasdal (MCSE+I, MCSE/W2K, MCT, CISSP, CTT, A+), Director of Web Sites and CTO at Brainbuzz.com, has worked in the computer industry for over nine years. He has been an MCT since 1995 and an MCSE since 1996. His training and networking experience covers a broad range of products, including NetWare, Lotus Notes,Windows NT and 2000, Exchange Server, IIS, Proxy Server, and ISA Server. Martin also works actively as a consultant. His recent consulting experience includes contract work for Microsoft as a Technical Contributor to the MCP Program on projects related to server technologies. Martin has served as Technical Editor for several Syngress books, including Configuring ISA Server 2000: Building Firewalls for Windows 2000 (ISBN: 1-928994-29-6), and Configuring and Troubleshooting Windows XP Professional (ISBN: 1-928994-80-6). Martin lives in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada with his wife, Cathy, and their two sons. vi
Contents About the CD-ROM
xiv
Foreword and Acknowledgements
xv
Chapter 1 Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond Introduction ISA Server Overview The Increasing Importance of Security ISA Server Authentication Installing ISA Server Planning and Design Issues Installing ISA Server in a Stand-Alone Configuration Upgrading a Stand-Alone ISA Server to an Array Member Installing ISA Server on a Domain Controller Selecting the ISA Server Client Getting Started with ISA Server Installing Service Pack 1 What’s Included in SP1 Determining the Version of SP1 Installed Downloading and Installing the Service Pack on the ISA Server Upgrading Client Computers to SP1 Service Pack 1 Issues Supporting Network Design Using Application Center 2000 with ISA Server ISA Server and Windows .NET Third-Party Software Add-Ons for ISA Server ISA Server Certification Beyond ISA Server Summary, Defensive Tactics Fast Track, Frequently Asked Questions
1 2 3 3 11 15 15 30 37 41 42 46 51 52 53 54 56 56 57 58 58 59 60 61 63
Chapter 2 Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ Introduction Configuring a Trihomed DMZ The Network Layout ISA Router Configuring the ISA Server Ping Testing the Connections Publishing DMZ SMTP Servers Publishing a DMZ SMTP Mail Relay Server Publishing a Web Server Publishing an FTP Server on a Trihomed DMZ Segment
69 70 70 72 73 74 75 77 87 90 99 99 vii
viii
Contents
How FTP Works Using Packet Filters to Publish the PORT Mode FTP Server Using Packet Filters to Publish the PASV Mode FTP Server External Network Clients Cannot Use the DMZ Interface to Connect to the Internal Network Summary, Defensive Tactics Fast Track, Frequently Asked Questions
100 105 107
Chapter 3 Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ Introduction Configuring a Private Address Back-to-Back DMZ Allowing Inbound VPN Connections through a Back-to-Back ISA Server DMZ Configuring a Public Address Back-to-Back DMZ Outbound Access for Internal Network Clients through a Public Address DMZ Inbound VPN Access through the Public Address DMZ Publishing Servers on the Private Address DMZ on the External ISA Server Summary, Defensive Tactics Fast Track, Frequently Asked Questions
117 118 118
Chapter 4 Defense Plan 3: The Internal “Pseudo” DMZ Introduction Using TCP/IP Filtering (TCP/IP Security) Configuring TCP/IP Filtering Summary of TCP/IP Filtering Using Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS) Packet Filters Configuring RRAS Packet Filters Using IPSec Policies Elements of an IPSec Policy Creating IPSec Policies to Support Communications between the LATDMZ and the Internal Network Summary, Defensive Tactics Fast Track, Frequently Asked Questions
211 212 214 215 219 219 221 235 235
Chapter 5 Defense Plan 4: Advanced Server Publishing Introduction Disabling Socket Pooling Disabling Web and FTP Service Socket Pooling Disabling SMTP and NNTP Service Socket Pooling Disabling IIS Services on the ISA Server Server Publishing Publishing Terminal Services on the Internal Network Publishing Terminal Services on the ISA Server Publishing Terminal Services on Both the ISA Server and Internal Network Publishing TSAC Sites Publishing FTP Servers on the Internal Network Publishing FTP Servers Co-Located on the ISA Server Using Web Publishing Rules to Allow Secure FTP Access Publishing HTTP and HTTPS (SSL)
255 256 260 262 263 264 265 266 271
110 112
173 192 195 201 203 205
240 250
274 275 285 295 304
Contents
ix
Servers with Server Publishing Rules Publishing pcAnywhere on the Internal Network Web Publishing Incoming Web Request Listeners Destination Sets Public DNS Entries Private DNS Entries Terminating an SSL Connection at the ISA Server Bridging SSL Connections Secure FTP Connections Using SSL Publishing a Certificate Server Summary, Defensive Tactics Fast Track, Frequently Asked Questions
309 313 316 317 317 318 319 321 337 347 349 352
Chapter 6 Defense Plan 5: Protecting Mail Services Introduction Configuring Mail Services on the ISA Server Computer Publishing the IIS SMTP Service on the ISA Server Message Screener on the ISA Server Publishing Exchange Server on the ISA Server Publishing Outlook Web Access on the ISA Server Message Screener on the ISA Server and Exchange Server Configuring Mail Services on the Internal Network Publishing Exchange Server on the Internal Network Exchange RPC Publishing Publishing Outlook Web Access on the Internal Network Exchange Server Message Screener on the Internal Network Exchange Server GFI’s Mail Security and Mail Essentials for SMTP Servers MailSecurity Versions Installing MailSecurity for SMTP Gateways Configuring MailSecurity Summary, Defensive Tactics Fast Track, Frequently Asked Questions
357 358 359 360 367 371 401 411 417 417 420 428 429 433 434 434 437 443
Chapter 7 Understanding Windows Default Access Control Settings Introduction Overview of Security Groups and Access Control The Administrators Group The Users Group The Power Users Group Configuring Security during Windows 2000 Setup Default File System and Registry Permissions Default User Rights Default Group Membership Summary, Defensive Tactics Fast Track, Frequently Asked Questions
447 448 448 450 451 452 453 457 472 479 482
Chapter 8 Using the Security Configuration Tool Set Introduction Security Configuration Tool Set
487 488 488
x
Contents
Security Configuration Tool Set Components Security Configurations Security Configuration and Analysis Database Security Configuration and Analysis Areas Security Configuration Tool Set User Interfaces Configuring Security Account Policies Local Policies Event Log Restricted Groups Registry Security File System Security System Services Security Analyzing Security Account and Local Policies Restricted Group Management Registry Security File System Security System Services Security Group Policy Integration Security Configuration in Group Policy Objects Additional Security Policies Summary, Defensive Tactics Fast Track, Frequently Asked Questions
488 492 492 494 496 502 502 504 510 512 514 516 519 521 522 522 523 523 524 524 525 527 528
Chapter 9 Defending Your Data with the Encrypting File System 533 Introduction 534 The Role of EFS in a Network Security Plan 535 Using the Encrypting File System 536 Encryption Fundamentals 537 How EFS Works 539 User Operations 541 Encrypting a File or Folder 542 Accessing an Encrypted File 545 Copying an Encrypted File 546 Preventing Files from Being Encrypted on a Server 547 Moving or Renaming an Encrypted File 547 Sharing an Encrypted File (in Windows XP/.NET) 548 Decrypting a File 549 Using the Cipher Utility 550 Encrypting a Directory 552 Employing Recovery Operations 552 EFS Architecture 561 EFS Components 561 The Encryption Process 564 The EFS File Information 567 The Decryption Process 569 Summary, Defensive Tactics Fast Track, Frequently Asked Questions 571
Contents
xi
Chapter 10 Protecting Data in Transit with IP Security Introduction Network Encroachment Methodologies Snooping Spoofing Password Compromise Denial-of-Service Attacks Man-in-the-Middle Attacks Application-Directed Attacks Compromised Key Attacks IPSec Architecture Overview of IPSec Cryptographic Services IPSec Security Services Security Associations and IPSec Key Management Procedures Deploying Windows IP Security Evaluating Information Determining Required Security Levels Building Security Policies with Customized IPSec Consoles Flexible Security Policies Flexible Negotiation Policies Filters Creating a Security Policy Summary, Defensive Tactics Fast Track, Frequently Asked Questions
577 578 579 579 580 581 582 584 584 585 586 587 592 594 596 596 598 599 601 606 608 609 623
Chapter 11 Authenticating Users with Smart Cards Introduction Understanding Smart Card Technology “Under the Hood” of the Smart Card Understanding Smart Card Authentication Smart Card Interoperability ISO 7816, EMV, and GSM The PC/SC Workgroup GlobalPlatform Microsoft’s Smart Card Support Smart Card Components Service Providers Enhanced Solutions Client Authentication Public Key Interactive Logon Secure E-Mail Summary, Defensive Tactics Fast Track, Frequently Asked Questions
627 628 629 629 630 631 632 632 632 633 636 636 641 641 642 648 650
Chapter 12 Creating a Public Key Infrastructure with Certificate Services Introduction PKI Concepts Public Key Cryptography Public Key Functionality
655 656 657 657 659
xii
Contents
Protecting and Trusting Cryptographic Keys Windows 2000 PKI Components Certification Authorities Certificate Hierarchies Deploying an Enterprise CA Trust in Multiple CA Hierarchies Installing a Windows 2000 PKI Enabling Domain Clients Generating Keys Key Recovery Certificate Enrollment Renewal Using Keys and Certificates Roaming Revocation Trust Public Key Security Policy in Windows 2000 Trusted CA Roots Certificate Enrollment and Renewal Smart Card Logon Applications Overview Web Security Secure E-Mail Digitally Signed Content Encrypting File System Smart-Card Logon IP Security Preparing to Implement the Windows 2000 PKI Backing Up and Restoring Certificate Services Summary, Defensive Tactics Fast Track, Frequently Asked Questions Chapter 13 Keeping Your IIS Web Servers Safe Introduction Preparing the OS Adding and Removing Components Preparing the File System Installing IIS Locking Down COM and Database Access Hardening TCP/IP Securing the Internet Information Service Running the IIS Lockdown Wizard Securing IIS Global Settings Securing the Default and Administration Web Sites Disabling Internet Printing Disabling or Securing the FrontPage Server Extensions Configuring URLScan Securing Web Sites Building a Directory Structure
664 669 671 672 673 674 675 679 679 680 684 694 694 695 695 698 701 702 706 709 709 709 710 711 712 712 713 713 715 720 727 728 729 729 729 730 733 738 738 739 743 744 746 747 748 753 753
Contents
Setting Master WWW Properties Securing by Content Type Authenticating Users Using Anonymous Authentication Using Basic Authentication Using Digest Authentication Using Integrated Windows Authentication Using Client Certificate Mapping Summary, Defensive Tactics Fast Track, Frequently Asked Questions
xiii
754 760 765 766 766 767 768 769 770
Appendix A Defending Your 802.11 Wireless Network Introduction Understanding Wireless Networks Wireless Communication in a Wireless Network Wireless Local Area Networks 802.11 Wireless Network Topology and Services Understanding Wireless Security Performing a Security Analysis Common Exploits of Wireless Networks Using a Layered Approach Understanding and Configuring Service Set Identifiers Wired Equivalent Privacy Protocol (WEP) MAC Filtering and Authorization 802.1X RADIUS Authentication Additional Security Measures for Wireless Networks Summary
773 774 774 775 779 784 787 788 790 794 795 798 805 807 823 827
Index
829
About the CD-ROM The CD-ROM that accompanies this book contains: ■
Transcender’s Installing, Configuring, and Administering Microsoft ISA Server 2000 Exam, ISA-CERT Version 1.0.
■
30-day evaluation copy of VMware Workstation 3.2 for Windows. VMware Workstation 3.2 for Windows Copyright 1998-2002,VMware, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Software protected by U.S. patent No. 6,397,242 and patents pending.VMware is a trademark of VMware, Inc. Visit www.vmware.com to obtain your 30-day evaluation license and key. If you do not have Internet access, e-mail
[email protected] for your license and key.
■
E-book of Dr.Tom Shinder’s ISA Server and Beyond.
■
E-book of Hack Proofing Your Network First Edition.
xiv
Foreword and Acknowledgements We first came up with the idea of an ISA Server and Beyond book almost a year ago. Soon after the release of our best selling book Configuring ISA Server: Building Firewalls for Windows 2000, we realized that our work wasn’t complete.While we felt we did a good job of covering the basics of ISA Server and how to get it to work, there wasn’t enough material on the most sophisticated and complex configurations. The ISA Server community has grown enormously since we finished our first book on ISA Server. At the time of this writing, ISAServer.org has over 10,000 members and over 65,000 unique visitors per month generating over a million page views. Many visitors to the ISAServer.org site have read our first ISA Server book, and they want to learn more about how to perfect more advanced configurations. The first part of this book covers the least understood and most under documented ISA Server configurations.We discuss the details of how to configure various DMZ topologies, from the trihomed DMZ to the back to back DMZ to the completely undocumented LAT-based DMZ. DMZs are the cornerstone of a highly secure Internet publishing and internal network security scheme and the proper configuration of ISA Server DMZs can go a long way toward securing your internal network.We also cover advanced topics in Web and Server Publishing. Making servers located behind the ISA Server available to the Internet is one of the most popular ISA Server features. Unfortunately, we were not able to cover the intricacies of Web and Server Publishing in the first ISA Server book.This book fills that gap and provides you with detailed, and (until now) undocumented methods you can use to publish virtually any type of server to the Internet. Dozens of pages are dedicated to publishing Exchange Server services and Outlook Web Access. In no other location will you find the wealth of new and detailed information on ISA Server publishing that you’ll find in these pages. In the second half of this book, we take you beyond ISA Server and into the realm of general network and Windows 2000 security. Network security has become the bellwether of our age, and no book on firewall security can be worth its salt without some coverage of the services that the firewall is designed to secure.You’ll learn about default Windows 2000 permissions, IIS security, EFS, wireless security, and IPSec.When you pair the information contained in these chapters with what you learn about ISA Server, you’ll be assured that you have a powerful armamentarium to defend your network. You’ll notice that I make liberal use of VMware in the first part of this book.While I would have liked to show you the configuration details on any one of the number of production networks we’ve set up, it would not be wise from a security point of view to expose our customer’s network screenshots in such a widely distributed security book. VMware provides a perfect platform for testing a tremendous variety of ISA Server configuration scenarios. Most of the time we can use VMware to create routed virtual xv
xvi
Foreword
networks of ISA Servers,Web servers, mail servers, and clients to test our designs. I guarantee that the practice you gain while setting up your ISA Server scenarios in VMware will pay off handsomely by giving you valuable experience and insights that you would never otherwise have realized.We’ve included a demonstration version of VMware Workstation 3.2 for Windows on the CD that accompanies this book. I did not write this entire book alone, and without the help of many people, this book never would have seen the light of day. My lovely wife, Deb Shinder, wrote Chapter 1 and rewrote and made comprehensive revisions and enhancements to the material in Chapters 7, 9, 10, 11, and 12.This book would read like just another Windows security book if it weren’t for Debi’s prodigious talents. I could never have finished this book, or have done anything else of value in my life without her. I dedicate this book and its success to her. Extra special thanks go to Andrew Williams. Andrew kept pressing me to get this book done, and without his gentle cattle prodding, this book would have been finished sometime in the year 2005. Jon Babcock made sure that everything came out right, and that I submitted Visio files instead of .gifs! My dear friend Martin Grasdal wrote the seminal piece on Wireless networking in the second half of this book, as well as performing a technical edit on all chapters in this book. Martin is one of the most knowledgeable network engineers I’ve ever had the pleasure to know, and it has been our good luck to benefit from his knowledge and experience in both the first ISA Server book and this book. Mark Burnett wrote the chapter on IIS security. Mark is one of the stars of IIS security, and we are especially pleased to have his expert assistance and contributions to this book. IIS security is paramount for all of us who want to use ISA Server to publish our IIS Web sites. I think you’ll get quite a bit of useful information from his chapter. There are literally thousands of others who have contributed to this book. All the participants of the Microsoft newsgroups, ISAServer.org Web boards, and ISAServer.org mailing list have contributed to the ISA Server knowledge base. Key players on the ISA Server team at Microsoft have also contributed greatly to what we know about ISA Server today. It’s impossible to list them all by name, but there are a few who I must mention because of their enormous influence: Joern Wettern for his unique insight into ISA Server; Zach Gutt and Ari Fruchter for being the best Microsoft managers I’ve ever had the pleasure to work with; Ronald Beekelaar for being such a computer genius and ISA Server junkie; Steve Riley for reminding me of myself when I was a 20 year old long hair Berkeley undergraduate (and for being a penultimate ISA Server guru); Craig Nelson for being a really relaxed dude and “the VPN man”; Steven Pouseele for his tireless efforts at educating the masses (and me) at ISAServer.org; and most of all, Jim Harrison, for his limitless energy in supporting the ISA Server community and for his unusually good sense of humor. Special mention goes to the owner and master of ISAServer.org— Stephen Chetcuti.The ISA Server community would be a much smaller and much sadder place if not for his dedication and tireless commitment to ISAServer.org. —Thomas W. Shinder, M.D. www.isaserver.org/shinder
Chapter 1
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond
Defensive Tactics in this Chapter: ■
ISA Server Overview
■
Installing ISA Server
■
Getting Started with ISA Server
■
Installing Service Pack 1
■
Supporting Network Design
■
ISA Server Certification
■
Beyond ISA Server
; Summary ; Defensive Tactics Fast Track ; Frequently Asked Questions 1
2
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond
Introduction Our first ISA Server book, Configuring ISA Server 2000, was written while we were still struggling to master a completely new piece of software, one that was very different in features, functionality, and complexity from its predecessor, Microsoft Proxy Server 2.0. We were working with beta releases during much of the writing, and then revising the material to address changes in the final release. In the year and a half since that book came out, we’ve gotten to know ISA Server much more intimately.Through working with it on a daily basis on our network, assisting and supporting others in the “real world” and via ISA newsgroups, mailing lists, conferences, and the www.isaserver.org Web site, we’ve come to know its quirks, peculiarities, and limitations, and learned some tweaks and tricks that will make it work better. We have also come to understand, even more than before, that ISA or any other firewall solution is only one part (albeit an important one) of a comprehensive network security plan.The importance of multilayer security becomes more evident every day, as hackers and attackers work industriously to find ways through the barriers we set up. No single product can provide full protection for your network’s data and integrity, regardless of how good it is. This book is the natural follow-up to the first. Although it can stand on its own for those who have some experience using ISA Server, we recommend that anyone new to the product read Configuring ISA Server 2000 first, as this book will not cover in detail the basic issues that were addressed there.This book will delve into issues that did not exist when we wrote the first (such as ISA Service Pack 1 and using ISA with Windows .NET servers) and advanced configuration and network design issues (such as using ISA Server in different types of DMZs/perimeter networks, advanced server publishing techniques involving terminal server and Exchange server, and defending your mail services with ISA Server).
NOTE The material in the next three sections of this chapter—ISA Server Overview, Installing ISA Server, and Getting Started with ISA Server—contain material that is intended for new ISA users. This is the only area of information in this book that will overlap with that of the previous book. If you already have experience with ISA, you might want to skip ahead to the section entitled Installing and Using Service Pack 1, where the all-new material begins. The remainder of the book assumes that you already have a thorough understanding of ISA Server features and functions.
This book also goes beyond ISA Server, examining other parts of your multilayered security plan.We discuss how to use Windows security features (such as the Security www.syngress.com
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond • Chapter 1
Configuration Toolset, the Encrypting File System, IPSec, and IIS security) and how to implement smart card authentication and secure wireless networks. We hope this book will provide additional guidance to network professionals who are using ISA Server in complex network situations, until it’s time to take the next step beyond ISA Server 2000: the next generation of ISA, which is code named Stingray and is in beta testing at the time of this writing.
ISA Server Overview Microsoft’s Internet Security and Acceleration (ISA) Server replaced Microsoft Proxy Server 2.0, providing full-fledged firewall functionality for a much more robust security solution, along with improved caching/Web performance features. In the current security-conscious business climate (made more so by the events of September 11, 2001 and subsequent speculation that terrorists might be planning attacks on the cyberspace infrastructure), the security aspect has naturally drawn the most attention.
The Increasing Importance of Security As we progress into the twenty-first century, most companies and individuals who use computers have those systems connected to the global Internet at least part of the time. Even at the consumer level, 24/7 connectivity is becoming the norm as DSL, cable modem, and satellite technologies become more widely available and increasingly easier to set up and use.This gives computer users access to a tremendous wealth of information that they didn’t have before, and makes many of their jobs easier—but it also creates vulnerabilities. Logic dictates that if the users of your local network are able to access resources on computers all over the world, users of some of those computers might also be able to access yours.The connection is two way, and if you don’t take steps to protect your internal network from intruders, it will be easy for a moderately knowledgeable hacker to read the files stored on your network servers, copy confidential data, and even implant viruses or erase your hard disks. However, it’s not only confidentiality of information that is at stake. Some network administrators might not realize that security can be a concern even if the data on your network is not of a “top secret” nature.The integrity of your data is also crucial. A security solution focuses on keeping outsiders from accessing data that is private and ensuring that important data is not destroyed or changed. Security threats come in many “flavors,” but can be broadly divided into two categories: external threats and internal threats. For example, a Denial of Service (DoS) attack perpetuated by a hacker at a remote location is an external security threat. Accidental deletion of important files by a company employee onsite is an internal threat. At first glance, it might seem that ISA Server only protects you from external www.syngress.com
3
4
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond
threats—those that attempt to penetrate your LAN from the Internet. However, ISA also allows you to restrict outgoing network traffic, and in that way offers protection from some (although certainly not all) internal security threats as well.
The Firewall Solution ISA Server performs the functions of a full-featured dedicated firewall. A firewall provides a much higher level of security than a proxy server (which just “stands in” for the local computers, hiding them from view on the global network). Firewalls are specifically designed to control access, preventing unauthorized data from entering the network and restricting how and what type of data can be sent out. A network firewall acts as a barrier to prevent “bad data”—whether that be virus code or simply messages to or from unauthorized systems—from spreading from the outside network (usually the Internet) to the internal network, and also to prevent packets of a particular type or to or from a particular user or computer from spreading from the LAN to the outside network. Firewalls can be implemented in different ways.Vendors offer a wide variety of firewall software packages that run on your gateway computer. Many vendors provide hardware firewall solutions, in which a separate device incorporates a computer system that runs special proprietary firewall software. Either way, the firewall program (or set of programs) generally works in conjunction with a router program or a Network Address Translation (NAT) program.These programs forward packets to the appropriate destination once they have been authorized to enter or leave the network.The firewall must also work with a proxy, which makes requests for Internet data and services on behalf of the internal computers. ISA Server combines these components—proxy, NAT, and firewall—into one package.This makes it easier to deploy and administer than separate software programs and/or hardware devices.
ISA Server Features In addition to its multilayer firewall functionality (packet filtering, circuit filtering, and application filtering), ISA Server offers such security and performance features as: ■
Integrated virtual private networking (VPN) ISA Server can be used to set up either a remote access VPN between a client and gateway, or a multiple member VPN tunnel from server to server.
■
Integration with Active Directory ISA access policies and server configuration information are integrated with the Windows 2000 Active Directory for easier and more secure administration.
www.syngress.com
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond • Chapter 1 ■
Intrusion detection This exciting new feature can be set up to send you an alert if/when a particular type of attack is attempted against your network (for example, if an outsider attempts to scan your ports).
■
Support for Secure Network Address Translation (SecureNAT) The extensible NAT architecture that is implemented by ISA provides a secure connection for clients that don’t have the Firewall Client software installed, including Macintosh and UNIX clients and other non-Microsoft operating systems that are running TCP/IP.The SecureNAT configuration provides a true “transparent” firewall solution for your network.
■
Bandwidth allocation The percentage of bandwidth allocated to a specific user, communication, client, or destination can be controlled by Bandwidth Rules that an administrator creates, to optimize network traffic usage.
■
Secure server publishing Internal servers can be made accessible to specific clients, while the servers are protected from unauthorized access.
■
Enterprise management ISA, like Windows 2000, was designed for greater scalability and more focus on the enterprise market than previous Microsoft products. ISA allows you to set enterprise-level policies as well as array-level policies, and management of ISA arrays is easily centralized.
■
Monitoring and report generation ISA Server allows you to monitor its performance and create detailed security and access logs and graphical reports. Report generation can be scheduled, and remote administration lets administrators monitor the use and performance of the ISA server from an off-site location.
■
E-mail content screening ISA Server provides for screening of e-mail content by keywords, to allow administrators to implement and enforce strict security policies.
■
H.323 Gatekeeper functionality This feature allows for use of videoconferencing software, such as Microsoft NetMeeting, through the proxy, and NetMeeting directory functionality (replacing some of the functionality of ILS).
■
Enhanced software for use of streaming media This includes live stream splitting, and caching of Windows Media content (when using Windows Media Server).
■
Extensibility Microsoft has built into the software mechanisms to allow developers to write and implement their own security features, such as HTTP application filters that are implemented as “Web filters.” Non-Web Proxy packet inspection can be extended through the implementation of application filters. www.syngress.com
5
6
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond
In the previous book, we looked in detail at each of ISA’s feature categories, including firewall security,Web caching, Internet connection sharing, unified management, and extensible platform features. For more specific information about all of these, please see Configuring ISA Server 2000 (Syngress Publishing, Inc. ISBN 1-928994-29-6).
ISA Server’s Layered Filtering Firewall products support the filtering of messages to either allow data to pass through or prevent it from doing so according to specified criteria. ISA Server, when installed in firewall mode or integrated mode, can perform filtering at the packet layer, the circuit layer, or the application layer. Let’s look briefly at how each of these works.
Packet Filtering Packet filtering does most of its work at the network layer of the OSI networking model (equivalent to the internetwork layer of the DoD model), dealing with IP packets. Packet filters examine the information contained in the IP packet header of a message, and then either permit the data to cross the firewall or reject the packet based on that information. When IP packet filtering is enabled, the ISA server will intercept and evaluate packets before passing them on to a higher level in the firewall, or to an application filter. The information the packet filter uses to make its decision includes the IP address of the source and/or destination computer(s) and the TCP or UDP port number (the port numbers are in the transport layer header, so technically although packet filtering generally operates at the network layer, it also processes some higher-layer information). Packet filtering allows the data to proceed to the transport layer only if the packet filtering rules allow it to do so. Packet filtering lets you block packets that come from a particular Internet host, or those that are destined for a particular service on your network (for example, the Web server or SMTP server). Because ISA Server is designed as a security solution, by default enabling packet filtering causes all packets coming into the LAN from the external network interface (the interface connected to the Internet) to be excluded—unless a packet filter, access policy, or publishing rule exists that explicitly allows them. In fact, even if packet filtering is not enabled, ISA Server will not permit packets to enter the internal network unless you explicitly configure rules to permit access. ISA Server provides administrators with flexibility in configuring packet-filtering behavior.There are two types of static IP packet filters that can be configured: ■
Allow filters You specify the packet types that should be allowed to pass through the firewall (either incoming or outgoing traffic); all other packets will be prevented from crossing the firewall. For a service to listen on a particular port, you will need to configure a packet filter to allow traffic on that port (unless the port is opened dynamically by a policy or publishing rule).
www.syngress.com
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond • Chapter 1 ■
Block filters You configure filters to explicitly block specified ports. Block filters are used in conjunction with allow filters to give you more flexibility and granularity of control over exactly what traffic will be permitted through the firewall.
NOTE If block and allow filters conflict, the block filters will override, thus erring on the side of more security.
Dynamic packet filtering provides higher security because it opens the necessary port(s) only when required for communication to take place, and then closes the port immediately after the communication ends.
ISA SERVER ALERT Note that dynamic packet filtering works only when the packet filter is configured to use the external interface of the ISA server as the local adapter. Dynamic packet filtering does not work when you configure packet filters to allow access to servers on a trihomed DMZ segment.
Packet filters cannot perform filtering based on anything that is contained in the data field of the packet, nor can they use the state of the communication channel to aid in making the decision to accept or reject the packet. If you need filtering decisions made based on either of these, you will need to use filtering that operates at a different layer (circuit or application filtering).
Circuit Filtering While packet filtering is a widely used and understood concept for many network administrators, circuit filtering might be less familiar to you. Microsoft’s ISA Server documentation makes scant mention of it, and TechNet contains only a few references to it. In fact, circuit filtering seems to be “lumped in” with packet filtering in most discussions, as if the two were the same. In fact, there is an important difference, but there’s nothing mysterious or difficult to understand about it: circuit filters simply operate at a higher layer of the OSI model, the transport layer (host-to-host layer in the DoD model). Circuit filters restrict access based on host machines (not users) by processing the information found in the TCP and UDP packet headers.This allows you to create filters that would, for example, prohibit anyone using computer A from using FTP to access computer B. www.syngress.com
7
8
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond
When circuit filters are used, access control is based on TCP data streams or UDP datagrams. Circuit filters can act based on TCP and UDP status flags and sequencing information, in addition to source and destination addresses and port numbers. The ISA Firewall service works at the circuit level with most Internet applications and protocols, making them perform as if they were directly connected to the Internet. This is true both for clients that have the Firewall Client software installed, and for those that don’t (the latter being known as SecureNAT clients). If the Firewall client is installed, Internet applications communicate using WinSock. It works a little differently for SecureNAT clients. In this case, circuit-level filtering uses a SOCKS filter to forward requests from SOCKS 4.3 applications to the Firewall service. See the discussion of SOCKS and WinSock later in this chapter.
ISA SERVER ALERT SecureNAT clients running non-SOCKS-compliant software are not able to take advantage of the full range of features provided by the Firewall client software. The only exception to this rule is if there is an application filter to support the protocol in question. For example, SecureNAT clients cannot access FTP sites without the aid of an application filter. ISA Server provides the FTP Access Application Filter to support SecureNAT clients. Firewall clients do not need the help of the FTP Access Application Filter to access FTP sites.
Circuit-level filtering allows you to inspect sessions, rather than packets. A session is sometimes thought of as a connection, but actually, a session can be made up of more than one connection. Sessions are established only in response to a user request, which adds to security. Circuit filters don’t restrict access based on user information; they also cannot interpret the meanings of the packets.That is, they cannot distinguish between a GET command and a PUT command sent by an application program.To do this, you’ll have to use application filtering.
Application Filtering There are times when you might want to filter packets based on the information contained in the data itself. Packet filters and circuit filters don’t use the contents of the data stream in making filtering decisions, but you can do this with application filtering. An application filter operates at the top layer of the networking model, the (appropriately named) application layer. Application filters can use the packet header information, but are also able to allow or reject packets based on the data contents and the user information.
www.syngress.com
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond • Chapter 1
You can use application filtering to control access based on the identity of the user, and/or based on the particular task the user is attempting to perform.With application filters, criteria can be set based on commands issued by the application.This means, for example, that you could restrict a particular user from downloading files to a specified computer, using FTP. At the same time, you could allow that user to upload files via FTP to that same computer.This is possible because different commands are issued depending on whether the user is retrieving files from the server or depositing them there. Application gateways are considered by many firewall experts to be the most secure of the filtering technologies.This is because the criteria they use for filtering covers a broader span than the other methods. Sometimes hackers write malicious programs that use the port address of an authorized application, such as port 53, which is the DNS address. A packet or circuit filter would not be able to recognize that the packet is not a valid DNS request or response, and would allow it to pass through. An application filter, however, is able to examine the contents of the packet and determine that it should not be allowed. Application filtering sounds like the perfect solution to all your security concerns, but there are drawbacks.The biggest problem is that there must be a separate application layer gateway for every Internet service that you need to support.This makes for more configuration work; however, this weakness is also a strength that adds to the security of the firewall. Since a gateway for each service must be explicitly enabled, you won’t accidentally allow services that pose a threat to your network. ISA Server solves some of these problems through the implementation of “smart” application filters. Application filtering is the most sophisticated level of filtering performed by the Firewall service, and is especially useful in allowing you to protect your network against specific types of attacks such as malicious SMTP commands or attempts to penetrate your local DNS servers.
ISA Server Editions Microsoft offers ISA Server in two different editions. Either can be installed in one of three different installation modes.We’ll take a brief look at the differences between the two editions and the three modes in this section, to assist you in making the correct choices for your network.
ISA Standard Edition The ISA Server Standard Edition is appropriate for small business networks (or even sophisticated home networks), and for implementation on a departmental basis in larger organizations.This edition works well in a peer-to-peer (workgroup) environment; the Standard Edition is installed on a stand-alone Windows 2000 server or can be installed on a Windows 2000 Server that is a member of a Windows 2000 or Windows NT 4.0 www.syngress.com
9
10
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond
domain. ISA Server Standard Edition cannot store configuration information in the Active Directory, and it does not require Active Directory. Nonetheless, the Standard Edition offers the same firewall functionality,Web caching capability, performance, ease of management, and extensibility as the Enterprise Edition.The Standard Edition will support a server with multiprocessor capability as long as it has no more than four processors. Because it cannot be used as part of an array, the Standard Edition is more limited in terms of scalability. It supports hierarchical caching, as does the Enterprise Edition, but does not support distributed caching.The ISA Standard Edition cannot store policy information in the Microsoft Active Directory, as the Enterprise Edition does.
ISA Enterprise Edition The ISA Enterprise Edition is designed for maximum scalability to the largest, hightraffic enterprise networks. Fault tolerance, centralized management, and multiple level policy application are at the core of the Enterprise Edition’s feature set. Whereas the Standard Edition supports up to four processors, there is no limit on processor support in the Enterprise Edition. Perhaps more importantly, whereas the ISA Standard Edition is a stand-alone ISA Server only (although the stand-alone ISA Server can be installed on a member server in a Windows 2000 or Windows NT 4.0 domain), the Enterprise Edition allows you to group ISA servers together in arrays to provide fault tolerance and distributed caching, and spread the load of high network traffic across the group of machines. Response time for clients is improved, and if one server in the array goes down, you still maintain ISA functionality. The Enterprise Edition integrates fully with the Windows 2000 Active Directory, where its configuration and policy information are stored. Using Active Directory, enterprise-level policies can be defined and applied to one or multiple server arrays throughout the enterprise.This is referred to as tiered policy. Of course, increased functionality comes at a price.The Enterprise Edition is considerably more expensive than the Standard Edition (by several thousand dollars). In determining which edition of ISA Server is most appropriate for your network, you should consider your specific needs and cost/performance factors. If you have the Enterprise Edition of the software, ISA servers can be installed as members of a server array.The Enterprise Edition can also be installed as a stand-alone server, although it would be difficult to justify the much higher price of the software if you do not intend to use what is perhaps its most important additional feature. A big advantage of joining multiple ISA servers in an array is the ability to manage them as one entity. All the servers in an array share the same configuration; that is, you only have to configure the array itself—the configuration is then applied to all its members. Because arrays provide for distributed caching capability, performance is enhanced as well. www.syngress.com
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond • Chapter 1
Fault tolerance is the basis of server clustering.To a limited extent, an ISA Server array functions as a cluster of ISA servers—in the same way Windows 2000 clustering technology causes multiple Windows 2000 servers to act as one entity, so does the formation of an ISA array enable multiple ISA servers to do the same. Also similar to clustering, arrays allow for load balancing of Web Proxy client requests to spread server requests across the group of servers.
ISA Server Authentication In order to gain access to a resource on your network, users must be authenticated; that is, their credentials must be checked to determine that they have the appropriate rights and permissions to access that object. In addition to Windows 2000 authentication required for access, when the user is attempting to access the resource over the Internet, going through an ISA server in firewall or integrated mode that is protecting your network from outsiders, the user might also have to be authenticated by the ISA server. ISA provides different authentication options, depending on the type of client.The authentication methods available for each client type are as follows:. ■
Firewall clients Firewall client authentication is automatic; no configuration is required.The user credentials of the requesting user are used.
■
SecureNAT clients There is no user-based authentication for SecureNAT clients. Access can be granted or denied based on IP addresses contained in client address sets, but not based on user information.
■
Web Proxy clients Client authentication method can be configured. Client authentication is not required by default, but ISA can be configured to require that clients send authentication information. Authentication methods include basic, digest, integrated Windows authentication, or client certificate. It’s important to note that you can never use Kerberos to authenticate with the Web Proxy service.This is specific to Web Proxy service authentication and has no effect on the Firewall service authentication.
As you can see, there are four authentication methods to choose from when configuring settings for Web Proxy clients: ■
Basic authentication
■
Digest authentication
■
Integrated Windows authentication
■
Client certificate authentication (does not apply to browser-based Web Proxy clients, but is used in a Web Proxy chaining configuration)
www.syngress.com
11
12
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond
These methods will be familiar to many administrators as the same authentication methods that are used by Internet Information Server (IIS) 5.0, Microsoft’s Web server software that is included with Windows 2000.The authentication method(s) can be configured in the array’s Properties sheet. Let’s look at each of the authentication methods in a little more detail.
Basic Authentication When you select the basic authentication option for the Web Proxy client access, the user will be asked to provide a username and password before being allowed access.This will be checked to confirm that there is a matching user account on the ISA Server or in a trusted domain. Be aware that this information is sent in cleartext—no encryption is used to protect the integrity of the credentials. Although the data is a base 64 encoded text string that must be decoded to extract the password in intelligible form, anyone with knowledge of this can decode the information. Obviously, this method is more secure than requiring no authentication at all, but can present a serious security risk because the password is vulnerable to interception by a hacker using a packet sniffer, as it travels over the Internet.
NOTE Base 64 encoding techniques are explained in RFCs 1521 and 2045. This encoding technique uses 65 US-ASCII characters, with 6 bits representing each printable character and one extra character (the 65th) representing a processing function. It is a method of converting binary data for transmission in which each sequence of 3 bytes is converted to a sequence of 4 bytes. It is also used for encoding of Internet mail and in HTTP basic authentication.
The “up” side of basic authentication is that virtually all Web browsers support it, so compatibility isn’t an issue. Basic authentication is actually a component of the HTTP protocol that Web browser software uses to communicate with the Web server.
Digest Authentication Digest authentication goes a step further than basic authentication. Although the process is similar, the user credentials are hashed before being sent over the network. Hashing involves applying a mathematical calculation to the binary bits that make up the data being sent.This is a one-way process; that is, it is not possible to take the result of the calculation and reverse engineer it to come up with the original data (the username and password).This, of course, adds a great deal more security to the transaction.
www.syngress.com
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond • Chapter 1
NOTE To use digest authentication, all members participating in the transaction must be members of a Windows 2000 or .NET domain, and passwords must be saved with reversible encryption.
Integrated Windows Authentication ISA Server can be configured to use Windows 2000 authentication, which is especially secure because the username and password don’t have to be sent across the network. This eliminates the possibility of interception in transit.There are two protocols that can be used when integrated Windows authentication is selected: ■
Kerberos v5 The default protocol for Windows 2000 domains
■
Challenge/Response NT LAN Manager (NTLM) authentication
Kerberos Authentication Kerberos is a logon authentication protocol that is based on secret key (symmetric) cryptography. It usually uses the DES or Triple-DES (3DES) algorithm, although with the latest version, Kerberos v5, algorithms other than DES can be used. Kerberos uses a system of “tickets” to provide verification of identity to multiple servers throughout the network.This works a little like the payment system at some amusement parks and fairs where, instead of paying to ride each individual ride, customers must buy tickets at a central location and then use those to ride the rides. Similarly, with Kerberos a client who wants to access resources on network servers is not authenticated by each server; instead, all of the servers rely on “tickets” issued by a central server, called the Key Distribution Center (KDC). The client sends a request for a ticket (encrypted with the client’s key) to the KDC. The KDC issues a ticket called a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT), which is encrypted and submitted to the Ticket Granting Service (TGS).The TGS can be running on the same physical machine that is running the KDC.The TGS issues a session ticket to the client for accessing the particular network resource that was requested (which is usually on a different server).The session ticket is presented to the server that hosts the resource, and access is granted.The session key is valid only for that particular session and it is set to expire after a specific amount of time. Kerberos allows mutual authentication; that is, the identities of both the client and the server can be verified. For a more detailed explanation of how Kerberos works, see the Kerberos v5 Administrators Guide at www.lns.cornell.edu/public/COMP/krb5/admin/admin_2.html. www.syngress.com
13
14
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond
Remember: Kerberos authentication cannot be used by browser-based Web Proxy clients to communicate with the Web Proxy service. Browser-based Web Proxy clients can only use NTLM to communicate with the Web Proxy service. However, Kerberos can be used in a Hierarchical Web Caching configuration seen when you chain Web Proxy servers. In this case, the downstream ISA server can use Kerberos to authenticate with the upstream ISA server.
NTLM Authentication NTLM is a Microsoft logon authentication method, used by Windows NT domains and supported by Windows 2000/.NET in case “down level” client computers (those running NT or Windows 9x) want to log on to the network. NTLM v2 is the current version, and provides more security than NTLM v1.Version 2 is supported by Windows 2000 and NT 4.0 with SP4 or higher. If the Directory Services client software (which is available on the Windows 2000 Server CD-ROM) is installed on Windows 9x computers, NTLM v2 can be used (however, it is necessary to edit the Registry to enable it). Unlike Kerberos, when a client wants to access a server’s resources using NTLM, that server must contact the domain controller to have the client’s identity verified.The client doesn’t have credentials already issued (the session ticket in Kerberos) that the file or application server knows it can trust.
Client Certificate Authentication Finally, the Web Proxy client can use Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) for authentication. This involves the use of a client certificate and a server certificate.The server first sends, in response to a client request, a server certificate that provides authentication of the server. If the server requests that the client authenticate itself, the client sends a client certificate to the server.
ISA SERVER ALERT Its important to note that a browser-based Web Proxy client cannot establish a secure channel with its ISA Server’s Web Proxy service. Client certificate authentication is used in a Web Proxy chaining setup. The downstream Web Proxy service can present a client certificate to the upstream ISA Server’s Web Proxy service. This allows the downstream and upstream ISA servers to use a secure channel for Web Proxy chaining.
Certificates are digital “documents” that verify the identity of a client or server, and are issued by a trusted third party to which that identity has been satisfactorily proven. The trusted third party is called a certification authority (CA) and can be external (outside
www.syngress.com
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond • Chapter 1
the organization) or internal.Windows 2000 Server provides the ability for companies to set up their own CAs to issue certificates internally. Certificates contain identifying information about the certificate holder. If client certificate authentication is configured, the ISA server identifies itself as an SSL Web server to the client, by sending a certificate to the client.The ISA server then requires that the client send a valid certificate before access will be granted. The process of encrypting or decrypting client requests and then passing them on to the Web server to which they are addressed is called SSL bridging. This process is used by the ISA server when it initiates or ends an SSL connection. In the Web Proxy chaining configuration, you are actually bridging the HTTP request made by the browser client as an HTTPS connection between the downstream and upstream ISA Server servers. Moreover, if the original request is an HTTP request, the request is again bridged so that the HTTPS message between the ISA servers is bridged as an HTTP message that is sent to the Web server on the Internet. When a client Web browser requests an S-HTTP (Secure HTTP) object (by default on port 8080, although if you have upgraded to ISA Server from Proxy Server 2.0, it will be 80, and can be any port you want to assign) through the ISA server, a different process is used, called SSL tunneling. In this scenario, the client creates a tunnel through the ISA server directly to the Web server on which the requested object resides.
Installing ISA Server The actual process of installing ISA Server is usually pretty straightforward. However, it’s absolutely critical that you plan your ISA deployment beforehand.The amount of thought and analysis that you put into deployment planning, especially if you are designing an ISA Server solution for the enterprise, will optimize ISA Server’s performance and minimize the chance of making a critical error that will adversely affect your security or access schemes. In this section, we will discuss: ■
Planning and design issues
■
Installing ISA Server as a stand-alone
■
Upgrading a stand-alone ISA server to array membership
■
Installing ISA Server on a domain controller
Planning and Design Issues The ISA server is an integral part of your security configuration scheme, and you do not want to just install the server and hope that everything works out right. Carpenters have an old saying: “measure twice, cut once.” If you thoroughly map out your design, you’ll avoid potential problems in the future. www.syngress.com
15
16
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond
In this section, we’ll focus on planning and design issues as they are relevant to the installation of ISA Server.The primary issues of concern are: ■
Network and hardware specifications
■
The edition of ISA Server to be installed
■
The mode in which ISA Server will be installed
■
Stand-alone versus array configurations
■
Client configuration requirements
■
ISA Server Internet connectivity
You should make firm decisions about each of these ISA Server design issues before you begin your installation.The decisions you make at this point will determine your choices when it comes time to install ISA Server itself. Because ISA can be installed in several different ways for different functionality, there are a number of factors you must take into consideration before you start the installation process. In the following sections, we discuss each of these considerations in more detail.
Network and Hardware Requirements Before installing ISA Server, you will need to assess what hardware is required to meet the needs of your organization’s ISA Server deployment plan. An organization that has 50 network clients and only chooses to use the Web Proxy service will have very different requirements than an organization with 30,000 network clients that wants to avail itself of all the networking services ISA Server has to offer.
System Requirements Whether you choose to install one or one hundred ISA servers, each server must meet minimum hardware and software requirements.The minimum requirements for any ISA server—regardless of the role the machine might play on the network—are: ■
Windows 2000 Server Family operating system with Service Pack 1 or above installed
■
A Pentium II or K7 processor or above running at 300 MHz or faster
■
At least 128MB of RAM (Microsoft recommends 256MB of RAM minimum)
www.syngress.com
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond • Chapter 1
NOTE If you are “hardware challenged” and must use a minimal RAM configuration, you should dedicate the machine to only ISA and not use it for any other services. This includes file sharing and Web services. We recommend that you get as much RAM as your hardware budget allows. You will notice considerable Web cache improvement if the amount of RAM in the machine exceeds the size of your Web cache.
■
A minimum of 20MB of disk space for the program files
■
A minimum of 2GB of disk space for the Web cache
■
At least two network interfaces—one to the internal network and a second to an external network, such as the Internet or corporate backbone (the exception would be an internal server acting as a caching-only server)
■
Partitions formatted in NTFS to store the program, log, and cache files
■
A Windows 2000 domain if enterprise policies will be implemented
Processor Requirements The rate limiting factor when it comes to processor requirements can be boiled down to the number of rules per second that the ISA server needs to evaluate. An ISA server with a few rules, but high throughput, might have roughly the same requirements as a machine that has many rules but little throughput through its external interface. Therefore, you can use the speed of the external interface as a guideline for the level of processor support your ISA server requires. See Table 1.1 to assess your processor requirements. Table 1.1 Processor Requirements External Interface Data Rate Less than 10 Mb/second 10–50 Mb/second >50 Mb/second
Processor Requirement
Type of Connection
Pentium II or K6-3 300 MHz Pentium III or K7 500 MHz Pentium III or K7 500 MHz Add a processor for each increment of 50 Mb/second
ISDN, cable, or DSL T3 or comparable Real Fast
Remember that these recommendations are minimums. Many factors determine hardware needs in a particular environment. For example, one consideration in your disk www.syngress.com
17
18
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond
space plan is for the log files and reports that will be stored on your ISA server.The log files can grow very quickly, depending on the level of logging you have configured on your server. If you enable packet filtering and detailed Web Proxy service logging, even a small network can easily generate log files in the range of 5 to 10MB per day. If you are working on larger networks, you can expect your log files to expand at the rate of 50 to 100MB (or more) per day if you carry out detailed logging. It is a good idea to dedicate a partition of at least 1GB to your log files if you plan to carry out even a moderate amount of logging.You will need a month’s worth of log files to create many of the more interesting reports that ISA Server can generate. Moreover, you might want to create reports spanning multiple months, in which case you will need all of the log files available on disk.
ISA SERVER ALERT If you log to a database, make sure you have a large amount of disk space available. The database size will grow even faster than what you see when logging to text files on the local ISA server. You should make at least 10GB available to your ISA logging database.
Network Interface Configuration You should have at least two network interfaces if you plan to use the ISA server as a firewall. However, if you want to use the server as a Web-caching server only, you can use a computer with a single, internal network interface. If you configure multihomed computers, at least one of those interfaces will be directly connected to the Internet or to a network backbone. If you connect directly to the Internet, the interface can be an Ethernet connection (for example, to a DSL or cable modem), ISDN, or analog modem connection. For the internal network interface, you will likely use an Ethernet connection. If you plan to use a perimeter or DMZ network, that network can be connected to a third interface connected to the ISA server.That interface will be considered an external interface, and should be configured with public addresses. An ISA server that acts only as a Web-caching server can get by with a single internal network interface. Network clients will send their requests to the ISA server’s internal interface, and the ISA server will forward those requests to its gateway to the Internet. Responses from Internet servers will be returned from the Internet-connected machine to the single-homed Web-caching server, which in turn will return data to the ISA clients.
www.syngress.com
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond • Chapter 1
Installation Modes Before you install the ISA Server software, you should decide in which mode to install it.There are three choices: ■
Firewall mode
■
Cache mode
■
Integrated mode
In integrated mode, the firewall and caching modes are combined so that you get the benefits of both security and Web access acceleration in one package.When you choose to deploy ISA Server in only one mode or the other (firewall or cache), you should be aware that the feature set differs depending on the mode selected.Table 1.2 outlines which features are available in either or both modes. Table 1.2 Mode Choice Effect on Available Features Available in Firewall Mode
Available in Cache Mode
Available in Either Mode
Server publishing
Web-caching service
VPN Packet filtering Application filtering
N/A N/A N/A
Access policy (available only for HTTP in cache mode) Web publishing Real-time monitoring and alerts Report generation
Installing in Firewall Mode Firewall-mode ISA servers support virtually all ISA Server features, with the exception of the Web cache.The Web-caching feature is very memory and processor intensive; therefore, it makes sense to exclude this feature for a server whose primary purpose is to act as a firewall. A firewall should not run extra services to minimize the risk of exposure.
Installing in Cache Mode When you install the server in cache mode, you intend that server to work as a Web Proxy server only.The Web Proxy service supports the HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, and Gopher protocols. If you want to support only these protocols and take advantage of the Web-caching features, but don’t want to implement a full-fledged policy-based firewall, the Web cache option is a good one. A cache mode server is best placed on the internal network, in which case you can use a single interface. Be sure that you implement some type of firewall solution at the edge of your network to protect your internal computers from Internet intruders. www.syngress.com
19
20
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond
Installing in Integrated Mode The integrated mode ISA server allows you to take advantage of all the features ISA Server has to offer.The ISA server acts as both a firewall and caching/acceleration solution to provide security while enhancing Web performance.
Stand-Alone versus Array Configuration ISA Server Enterprise Edition can be installed as either an array member or as a standalone server.There are many advantages of installing the server as an array member, including: ■
The ability to implement enterprisewide array policies via Active Directory
■
The ability to implement a common configuration for multiple ISA server computers
■
The option to expand the scope of a single ISA server to multiple servers with a common configuration
■
Fault tolerance
For an ISA server computer to be installed as an array member, the Active Directory must first be prepared.The procedure for preparing the Active Directory is called enterprise initialization. This is accomplished via the Installation wizard included on the ISA Server CD.You can choose to manually run the ISA enterprise initialization and then install ISA Server a later time. If you choose to install ISA Server in an array configuration, the setup program will check to see if the schema has been properly modified before continuing. Once the array member is installed, a single enterprise array policy can be implemented on any array in your organization. All arrays are able to access configuration information because the settings are stored in the Active Directory.This is a nice faulttolerance method for your configuration because the Active Directory is replicated throughout the organization, and there will be multiple copies of your array policies distributed among all domain controllers.
NOTE If you have the Standard Edition of ISA Server, you won’t have the choice to deploy an array. The Standard Edition is a viable solution for small companies with relatively simple requirements, but is not designed to scale to the needs of complex enterprise networks.
www.syngress.com
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond • Chapter 1
ISA Client Configuration A critical aspect of your ISA Server design is the ISA Server client base you expect to support. Proxy Server 2.0 supported what were known as the Web Proxy client, WinSock Proxy client, and SOCKS Proxy client.The SOCKS service is no longer required, and the WinSock Proxy client has changed its name. The client types supported by ISA Server include: ■
The Firewall client
■
The Web Proxy client
■
The SecureNAT client
Each client type offers it own advantages and disadvantages. Let’s examine these features now and assess how they fit into an overall ISA design plan.
The Firewall Client Network clients configured as Firewall service clients are able to access all WinSock protocols.When applications on the Firewall client send TCP or UDP requests to the Internet, the Firewall Client software installed on the Firewall client will intercept the request and forward the request to the Firewall service on the ISA server. The primary advantage of configuring a machine as a Firewall client is that you can control access to protocols, sites, and content on a per-user or per-group basis.This allows you more granular control over your access policies than you have compared to the SecureNAT client.The SecureNAT client cannot control access via user authentication, only via IP address, in a manner similar to the SOCKS service in Proxy Server 2.0. The disadvantage of configuring a host as a Firewall client is that you must install the Firewall client software. Not all operating systems support the Firewall Client software.The only operating systems that support the Firewall Client software are: ■
Windows 95 OSR2
■
Windows 98
■
Windows ME
■
Windows NT 4.0
■
Windows 2000
■
Windows XP
This represents a departure from the support that was offered by the Firewall client’s older brother, the WinSock Proxy client.The WinSock Proxy client software provided with Proxy Server 2.0 supported Win 3.x machines using a 16-bit client software www.syngress.com
21
22
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond
installation.The Firewall Client software does not include a 16-bit client. Keep this in mind if you have the ill fortune of needing to support Windows 3.x machines. Another major advantage of using the Firewall client is that it will work with just about every application protocol, even those that will require multiple connections between the client and the server (these protocols are often referred to as “complex protocols”). NAT will not support complex protocols that require secondary connections unless there is an application filter to support the protocol.
ISA SERVER ALERT If you must support Win 3.x machines, one workaround is to use the WinSock client provided with Proxy Server 2.0. Of course, you must have a copy of Proxy Server 2.0 to implement this solution. You can do this because the Firewall client and the WinSock client are interchangeable. This means you do not need to install the Firewall client on your machines that already have the WinSock Proxy client installed. You can also use the Firewall Client software to connect to the WinSock Proxy service on a Proxy Server 2.0 server. While the Firewall service on the ISA Server works a bit differently than the WinSock Proxy service on Proxy Server 2.0, the client side essentially works the same. However, we recommend that you install the updated Firewall Client software on all machines that support it. This is especially important if you install ISA Server Service Pack 1. After installing ISA Server Service Pack 1, you should immediately update the Firewall Client software.
The Web Proxy Client The Web Proxy service provides access to a limited set of protocols, including: ■
HTTP
■
S-HTTP (SSL secured HTTP)
■
FTP
■
Gopher
While we can safely dismiss Gopher from our consideration, the other protocols represent the bulk of typical Internet connectivity requirements for the majority of organizations that might want to implement an ISA Server solution. If all you require are these protocols, a Web Proxy client/server configuration might be the best fit for your organization. Even if you need to install the Firewall Client software to take advantage of other WinSock applications, you might still want to configure your machines as Web Proxy clients because of the performance advantage you’ll gain for Web access via HTTP 1.1 CERN-compliant browsers. www.syngress.com
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond • Chapter 1
ISA SERVER DEFCON 1 For security reasons, you should completely disable Gopher access from your internal network. There is a security issue related to the Gopher protocol and ISA Server (http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;en-us;q323889). You can install the patch or create a protocol rule that blocks the Gopher protocol. Gopher uses TCP port 70.
The Web Proxy client has the advantage of not requiring installation of any dedicated client software. If your browser supports Proxy client configuration, as does Internet Explorer, you can take advantage of direct communication with the Web Proxy service.The Web Proxy service supports user authentication, which gives it an advantage over the SecureNAT client.
The SecureNAT Client SecureNAT clients require no client software or application configuration, which makes them the simplest client type in terms of setup and deployment.To become a SecureNAT client, all you need to do is: ■
Configure the client to use the ISA server as its default gateway, or
■
Point the SecureNAT client to a gateway that will be able to route Internet bound packets to an ISA server.
The SecureNAT client is able to take advantage of the Web cache when the HTTP Redirector Application Filter is enabled. However, even though the SecureNAT client is able to use the Web cache portion of the Web Proxy service, SecureNAT clients cannot be authenticated against the Active Directory,Windows NT 4.0’s SAM, or a server’s local security accounts database. Access controls for SecureNAT clients are implemented via IP address rather than user or group membership. Small organizations that do not have easy access to technical support assistance or those that do not want to install or configure client software will benefit most from the SecureNAT client.
Choosing the Best Client(s) for Your Network You are not limited to implementing a single ISA client configuration; you can take advantage of various combinations of clients. For example, you can configure an ISA client as a Web Proxy and Firewall client and take advantage of the features provided by both services, or you can configure a client to be a SecureNAT and a Web Proxy client and take advantage of authentication for Web protocols.
www.syngress.com
23
24
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond
The only mutually exclusive client configuration pair is the Firewall client and the SecureNAT client.That is because the Firewall client will always intercept all TCP and UDP communications.There is no way the SecureNAT client configuration will be able to service TCP and UDP requests when the computer is configured as both a SecureNAT and Firewall client. However, the machine configured as a SecureNAT and Firewall client will be able to access non-TCP/UDP protocols via its SecureNAT client configuration.
Internet Connectivity and DNS Considerations ISA Server supports just about any interface you want to use to connect to the Internet.Your external interface can be: ■
ISDN
■
Analog
■
DSL
■
Cable
■
T-Carrier
■
X.25
■
ATM
An important consideration is whether you want to implement a dedicated or a dial-up solution for Internet connectivity.The advantage of a dedicated connection is speed and reliability.The prime disadvantage of dedicated connections is cost. However, even the cost of dedicated connections is coming down. In areas that support cable and DSL connections, you can have a dedicated connection to the Internet for well under $100 US per month. It is vital that you consider the level of service you require before deciding on what type of connection to use on the external interface. Many businesses seem almost hypnotized by the low prices and potential for high-speed access that DSL and cable connections offer. However, those businesses are often left grinding their teeth and cursing their providers. Here’s the problem:You are not usually guaranteed bandwidth or level of service with these types of connections. Although you typically purchase a certain level of service based on the optimal down and up speeds provided by the interface, those numbers define upper limits of service more often than they guarantee a minimum level of service. Currently, both cable and DSL should not be considered reliable enough on which to base your corporate Internet solution.They are more “rich man’s hobbies,” to quote a well-heeled DSL engineer we know. www.syngress.com
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond • Chapter 1
If your business requires a reliable and dedicated connection to the Internet, in our experience you will be best served by using established technologies such as T-carrier and ISDN. Although the cost of these connections is much higher, you won’t have to worry about the connection being unavailable.
NOTE Some telephone companies and cable companies offer a “business level” of service that provides more guarantee of reliability than consumer service packages (and consequently costs more). However, from our experience, there is no significant improvement in reliability. The primary advantage of these types of packages is that you get a dedicated IP address. Dedicated IP addresses are mandatory if you want to implement server publishing scenarios. At the time of this writing, Microsoft is moving away from official support for server publishing on interfaces that do not have dedicated IP addresses.
Gathering Information for the Installation The installation process will proceed more smoothly if you gather the answers to the following questions before beginning to install ISA Server: ■
Where are the installation files that you will use to install ISA Server?
■
Do you have appropriate permissions to install ISA Server?
■
What is the CD key, and where is the product license?
■
Will the Active Directory schema need to be updated?
■
What server mode will you use?
■
Where will you store the program files, log files, and Web cache?
■
What are the network IDs for the hosts on your internal network?
■
What ISA features do you want to include in your installation?
■
Will you be creating or joining an array?
In the following sections, we will look more closely at each of these questions.
Installation Files You can access the installation files either from the product CD-ROM or from a network installation share point. If you are installing from a share point, make sure that the Share and NTFS permissions at the source allow you to install the program.
www.syngress.com
25
26
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond
Permissions You must be logged on with an account that has permission to install the program. If you are installing a stand-alone ISA server, you must at least be a member of the Administrators group for that machine. If you want to install an enterprise array, you must be a member of the Domain Administrators group. If you have a multiple forest environment, you should be a member of the Enterprise Admins group, and if you are responsible for initializing Active Directory, you also have to be a member of the Schema Admins group.
CD Key and Product License The 10-digit CD key is located on the CD case.You might also find it on the product packaging. Have the license readily available, photocopy or scan it, and then put it in a safe place.
NOTE Having multiple copies of your product licenses and storing them in a safe, centralized location is an important part of your fault tolerance plan. Doing this will save you a lot of grief if your company should become the subject of a software audit.
The number of processors determines how much you’ll pay for licensing ISA Server, because the licensing fees are based on the number of processors on the server. Since the costs can increment significantly for a multiprocessor machine, you might consider installing ISA Server on a system with a single processor, and then carrying out performance monitoring to aid you in making a cost/benefit analysis of a multiple processor solution. Table 1.3 contains the pricing structure for ISA Server production licenses at the time of this writing. Table 1.3 Production Licensing Structure for ISA Server ISA Server Version
License Price
ISA Standard ISA Enterprise
$1499.00 US per CPU $5999.00 US per CPU
www.syngress.com
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond • Chapter 1
NOTE Production licenses are required for ISA servers that will be part of a production network. Development licenses can be obtained through MSDN, and special pricing applies to Application Service Providers (ASPs). Call your Microsoft representative for more details on special pricing structures.
Active Directory Considerations If you plan to install an enterprise array, the machine onto which you are installing ISA must be a member of a domain.You will also need to be able to connect to a domain controller during the installation. Confirm network connectivity to a domain controller before beginning the installation. As mentioned earlier, when you perform an enterprise initialization, you will be altering the Active Directory so that it can store array configuration information. Remember that in a Windows 2000 domain, alteration to the schema is a one-way process, and you cannot go back and restore the schema to its previous state.
NOTE This situation is improved on Windows .NET domains. If you run a Windows .NET domain, you will be able to make changes to the schema and reverse them if you need to.
Server Mode Decide in advance what server mode you will assign to the ISA server—cache, firewall, or integrated.The decision should be arrived at after conferring with your security group and determining exactly what function(s) this ISA server will perform on your network.
Disk Location for ISA Server Files Determine where you want to install the ISA Server program files.These files will only require about 20MB of disk space and do not incur much read/write activity, so you will usually be safe installing them to the default location, which is in the Program Files folder on the boot partition. You will also need to decide during installation where you want to place your Web cache files. It is best to place these on a RAID array formatted as NTFS (if available). The RAID and NTFS configuration will ensure the best performance possible. www.syngress.com
27
28
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond
NOTE RAID 0 provides the highest performance. There’s no reason to use parity in your Web Caching file array since the information in the Web cache can be built up again in a short time. However, if you use a parity array, you can save some bandwidth by not requiring the cache to be built up again.
Although you will not need to decide where to put your log files during installation, you should have your server configured so that you can adjust the configuration to put the logs on their own partition if possible, and set it up so that the partition is a RAID 5 volume separate from the one on which you have the Web cache file located. By default, the log files are placed on the boot partition, but after installation is complete, you will be able to change the location via the ISA Administration console.
Internal Network IDs and the Local Address Table You will be asked to configure the Local Address Table (LAT) during the installation routine.To prepare the LAT correctly, you need to know what network IDs are in use inside your company.The LAT is used to determine if requests should be sent directly to an internal server, or if they should be subjected to ISA Server rules and policies. Never place the IP address of the external interface of the ISA server in the LAT.
ISA Server Features Installation A few services are treated as “add-in” services by the ISA Server installation routine. You will want to determine beforehand whether you need to install these services as part of your ISA Server deployment.These optional services are: ■
The H.323 Gatekeeper Service
■
The Message Screener
■
The H.323 Gatekeeper Administration Tool
The H.323 Gatekeeper allows multiple inbound and outbound calls using a program such as NetMeeting to conduct voice, video, and data sessions.The H.323 Administration tool allows you to administer the service.Thus, if you install the service, you should install the tool as well.
NOTE As part of the installation routine, the ISA Server setup will change the TCP/IP driver’s dynamic port range. It will be increased to 65,535 (the effect takes place when the computer is rebooted after installing).
www.syngress.com
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond • Chapter 1
The Message Screener is a tool you use together with secure Mail Server publishing.The Message Screener tool allows you to check incoming mail for a number of elements, such as keywords. If you plan to implement secure Mail Server publishing, you should install this tool.
Addressing Special Installation Issues For detailed guidance on planning and installing ISA Server with different network configurations, check out Microsoft’s Installation and Deployment Guide, which is available on the ISA Server installation CD. If you are migrating to ISA Server from Microsoft Proxy Server, you should first read the Migrating from Microsoft Proxy Server 2.0 document that is also included on the CD.
Designing & Planning… Pre-Installation Checklist Before starting the installation, you should perform the following tasks: 1. Ensure that Windows 2000 Server is installed on your ISA Server machine, including the most recent service pack. At a minimum, you must install W2K Service Pack 1 before you install ISA Server. 2. Configure the server that will be hosting the ISA Server installation. Check out the article on www.isaserver.org by Jim Harrison, Configuring ISA Server Interface Settings, which will walk you through the setup of your ISA Server machine’s network adapters. Detailed instructions for such security measures as disabling File and Print Sharing on the external interface are included in this article as well. 3. Figure out what your internal network will encompass, both presently and in the future, concerning IP addresses. If the addressing scheme is complex, write down the addresses. You will need this information again later. 4. If your internal network contains more than one range of IP addresses (for example, 192.168.x.y and 10.x.y.z), you need to create the routing table on the server that is to be the ISA server, via the command shell route command (if you only have one address range, Windows will do this for you). To prevent problems later, be sure to view the routing table before installing ISA Server to make sure it’s correct.
www.syngress.com
29
30
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond
For more guidance on planning the ISA Server setup, check out two articles on www.isaserver.org by Tom Shinder and Jim Harrison, Designing an ISA Server Solution on a Simple Network and Designing an ISA Server Solution on a Complex Network. Both of these articles can be found in the Learning Zone at www.isaserver.org.
Installing ISA Server in a Stand-Alone Configuration In this section, we will go through each step required to install ISA Server as a standalone server on a Windows 2000 Advanced Server computer. Later, we will perform the enterprise initialization and upgrade the stand-alone server to an array member. We begin the installation by placing the installation CD into the CD-ROM drive. The autorun begins and we are presented with the installation options screen, as shown in Figure 1.1. Figure 1.1 Setup Allows You to Choose the Option of Installing ISA Server
Note that you have six options: ■
Review Release Notes Select this option to read the latest information about ISA Server that did not make it into the help files.We highly recommend that you read this first. If you don’t want to read it right away, you should at least print it. It will contain important information that you must know before beginning the configuration phase of the ISA Server.
■
Read Installation Guide The installation guide is a pared-down version of the help file.This guide focuses on the concepts that are important to the planning, installation, and basic configuration of ISA Server.You should also print this and read it at your leisure.
■
Register ISA Server Use this link to register your server online.
www.syngress.com
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond • Chapter 1 ■
Run ISA Server Enterprise Initialization Use this link to prepare the Active Directory for configuring an ISA Server array.
■
Install ISA Server This option begins the installation of ISA Server.
■
Read About Migrating to ISA Server This link opens a document that provides information about how to upgrade from Proxy Server 2.0 and Windows NT 4.0 installations that have Proxy Server 2.0 installed on them.
The following steps walk you through the process of installing ISA Server: 1. Click on the Install ISA Server option.The “Welcome to the Microsoft Security and Acceleration Server 2000 installation program” dialog box will appear.The information screen informs you that you can only install the product on one server, if that’s the license you have. Be aware of the different licensing guidelines for ISA Server Standard Edition and Enterprise Edition. Click Continue. 2. Next, you will be prompted to enter your 10-digit CD key from the ISA Server CD case. Do so and click OK. 3. After entering the CD Key you will get your product ID number.This is the number that you must provide to Microsoft Product Support Services if you want to get any technical assistance from them.Take a screen shot of this dialog box, write down the product ID number, and put it in a safe place. Make multiple copies so that they’re always available. Click OK to move to the next step. 4. The next screen will show the End User License Agreement (EULA).You must click I Agree to continue the installation process. 5. Next, you must choose an installation option from the following: ■
Typical Installation Installs all the components on the boot partition and does not include the “add-on” products.The add-ons can be installed later if you choose not to install them at this time.
■
Full Installation Includes all the basic installation files and the add-on products, and will install them to the boot partition.
■
Custom Installation Allows you to choose which components you want to install in a granular fashion.
■
Change Folder Allows you to change the location of the core program files. If you do not want to install the program to the Program Files folder on the boot partition, click Change Folder and change the location of the core program files. For this walkthrough, we will click Custom Installation. www.syngress.com
31
32
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond
6. When you select the custom installation, a dialog box appears that allows you to choose the components to install.There are three options, as shown in Figure 1.2. ■
ISA Services
■
Add-in services
■
Administration tools
You must install the ISA Services. However, you can customize your selections for Add-in services and Administration tools. Figure 1.2 Selecting Which ISA Components to Install in a Custom Install
7. If you select Add-in services and click Change Option, the dialog box in Figure 1.3 appears. Make your selection(s) and click OK. Figure 1.3 Installing the H.323 Gatekeeper and/or the Message Screener as Add-In Services
www.syngress.com
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond • Chapter 1
8. The Administration Tools selection allows you to install the Administration Tools and/or the H.323 Gatekeeper Administration Tool as shown in Figure 1.4. If you are installing the full product on the server, you will want to install the Administration Tools.You can also choose to install just the Administrative Tools on a Windows 2000 Professional computer and administer any server or array in your organization. If you choose to install the H.323 Gatekeeper Administration Tool, it will place a node in your ISA Administration console that will allow you to configure the H.323 Gatekeeper service. Make your selection(s) and click OK. Figure 1.4 Selecting the Administration Tools
9. If this is the first ISA server to be installed in an array and you have not yet run the Enterprise initialization tool, you will now see a dialog box that informs you that the computer cannot join an array until it is part of a Windows 2000 network and the ISA Server schema is installed in Active Directory.You are notified that continuing the installation will install ISA Server as a stand-alone server. Click Yes to continue the installation in stand-alone mode. 10. The next dialog box asks you to choose the server mode: firewall, cache, or integrated.To use both the security and acceleration features of ISA Server, select the Integrated mode option and click Continue (you are also given an option to exit setup at this point, or to request help with selecting the appropriate mode). 11. A notification box will tell you that Setup is stopping the IIS Publishing service (W3SVC), and that after setup completes, you should uninstall IIS or reconfigure all IIS sites not to capture ports 80 and 8080.The service must be stopped to continue the installation, but will be restarted by the end of the installation. Click OK.
www.syngress.com
33
34
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond
Designing & Planning… Implications of Running IIS on an ISA Server Computer We recommend that you avoid running IIS services on the ISA Server computer at all costs. The reason for this is that each IIS service opens a potent portal of attack for Internet criminals to take advantage of. This is especially true for the IIS WWW service. The only time you should run the WWW service on the ISA server is if you are forced to do so by your employer. You should explain to the individual who insists that you run a Web server on the ISA server itself that this is a dangerous configuration and that if at all possible, the Web server should be removed from the firewall. If you must install a Web server on the ISA server, you should disable IIS socket pooling. IIS socket pooling is applied to all IIS services, and allows the IIS services to host multiple virtual servers and conserve system resources. However, socket pooling was not designed for multihomed machines running as firewalls. When socket pooling is enabled for a service, the service listens on all interfaces. This can create port contention issues when you try to publish services on the internal network. For more information on socket pooling and how to disable it, check out Tom Shinder’s article The Misery of IIS 5.0 Socket Pooling at www.isaserver.org/shinder.
12. The next step is to configure the Web cache settings, as shown in Figure 1.5. To enable the Web cache, you must place a check mark in the Enable caching check box.You are also presented with a list of drives that can support the Web cache.You must place the cache on an NTFS drive. FAT partitions or volumes will not appear on the list.The default setting is to create a 100MB Web cache file on the partition that has the most free disk space. After you enter the size of the cache, you must click Set. After you have made these settings, click OK. 13. The Local Address Table (LAT) configuration dialog box appears next, and provides you a chance to configure the LAT during setup, as shown in Figure 1.6. If you choose not to configure the LAT at this time, or if you change your mind regarding the configuration of the LAT, you can change the settings via the ISA Server Administration Console after the installation is complete. After configuring the LAT, click OK.
www.syngress.com
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond • Chapter 1
Figure 1.5 If You Enable Caching, You Must Set the Drive(s) and Maximum Size for Each Cache
Figure 1.6 Configuring the LAT During Setup
Configuring & Implementing… Configuring the LAT There are two ways that you can approach configuring the LAT. You can manually enter the start and end addresses in the Edit frame on the left side of the dialog box, or you can use the Table button. When manually entering the information, you can include the entire range of your network IDs. Note that we have entered an illegal address for the start address for the LAT. This is fine and will not impair the functionality of the LAT. If you choose to use the Table button, ISA Server will try to create the LAT for you based on the network ID of your internal interface. In addition to the network ID of your internal interface, it will also add the three private network ranges: Continued
www.syngress.com
35
36
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond
■
192.168.0.0/24
■
172.16.0.0/12
■
10.0.0.0/8
If you choose to let ISA Server construct the table for you, be sure to check it over very carefully. If you have a network with multiple logical IP segments, you will need to include all of these segment IDs in your LAT. Otherwise, requests for those internal network clients will be subjected to the rules created for requests for external network requests.
14. Next, you will be given the choice to launch the Getting Started wizard to configure array and enterprise policies. If this is your first time installing ISA Server, we recommend that you let the wizard walk you through the steps.To do so, ensure that Start the ISA Administrator Getting Started Wizard is checked, and click OK. 15. The Getting Started welcome screen, shown in Figure 1.7, is presented as the ISA Administration console is opened.You can use the wizard to help walk you through the steps of configuring the server. However, you should have a thorough understanding of ISA Server and all the implications of the settings you create before you work with the Getting Started wizard. Once you have a firm understanding of ISA Server, the wizard might help you configure your server in an orderly fashion. Figure 1.7 You Can Use the Getting Started Wizard to Configure the ISA Server
www.syngress.com
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond • Chapter 1
NOTE It is a best practice to use only the minimum required subnets in the LAT. Therefore, you should obtain the LAT configuration from the routing table of the internal interface.
The stand-alone ISA server is now installed. In the next section, we will show you how to upgrade your stand-alone server to an array member.
Upgrading a Stand-Alone ISA Server to an Array Member You must have a Windows 2000 domain deployed and available if you want to make the server a member of an enterprise array.The computer on which you want to perform the upgrade will need to be a member of the Windows 2000 domain.
NOTE If the machine is a member of a Windows NT 4.0 domain, the enterprise upgrade will not work because the Windows NT 4.0 domain controller does not have the Active Directory in which to store the enterprise array configuration information.
The first step, if you are creating a new array, is to initialize the enterprise.
Performing the Enterprise Initialization Before you promote your stand-alone server to an array member, you need to complete the enterprise initialization.This is the process of updating the Active Directory schema so that it will support the ISA Server array configuration information.There are two ways you can perform the initialization: ■
From the Startup Installation screen.
■
From the ISA Server installation files, in the i386 directory, run the msisaent.exe application.
The same steps are involved regardless of which method you choose. In the following walkthrough, we will start the initialization from the Startup Installation screen. 1. When you put the CD-ROM in the drive, the autorun feature will bring up the same dialog box you saw in Figure 1.1.You can also get it to run by www.syngress.com
37
38
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond
clicking on the isaautorun.exe file in the root of the installation files hierarchy.To run the enterprise initialization, click on the Run ISA Server Enterprise Initialization icon. 2. The next dialog box will inform you that the ISA Server schema is about to be installed to Active Directory, and warns you that the action is not reversible.You are asked if you want to continue. Click Yes to do so. 3. Next, you will be asked how you want to apply enterprise policy, as shown in Figure 1.8.When you choose to use Array Policy Only, an enterprise policy will be created, but it will not be automatically applied to the array.You will have the opportunity to manually assign an enterprise policy to the array after the initialization is completed by configuring it in the ISA Management console.When you choose Use this enterprise policy, a default policy is created with the name Enterprise Policy 1.You can change the name if you wish. If you select this option and do not select the Also allow array policy, any array policies will be replaced by the enterprise policy. If you are thinking of choosing this option, be sure to back up your existing array policy prior to the enterprise initialization in the event that you want to restore the existing array policy (stand-alone policy as well) on the server. If you choose the Also allow array policy option, both the enterprise policy and the array policies will be applied. However, array policies can only further limit the policies set for the enterprise.What this means is that an array policy cannot have any allow rules. The only allow rules will be those determined by the enterprise policy.The Also allow publishing rules to be created on the array option does exactly that. Publishing rules must be created on each server of an array separately, because the IP address(s) listening for requests for a published server will be different for each server. If you do not choose this option now, you can do so after the enterprise is initialized and you promote the stand-alone server to an array.The Use packet filtering on the array enforces packet filtering on the array(s) to which this policy is applied.This forces packet filtering and cannot be overridden by an array policy.
NOTE As indicated on the interface, the Also allow array policy option only allows you to create policies that are more restrictive than the Enterprise policy. The Use array policy only option allows you to create Web-caching arrays but avoid the use of enterprise policies. If you find enterprise policies difficult to work with, you can leverage the power of caching arrays while avoiding the somewhat cumbersome enterprise policy configuration issues.
www.syngress.com
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond • Chapter 1
Figure 1.8 Specifying How to Apply the Enterprise Policy at the Array Level
4. After you make your selections in the previous step and click OK, you will see a notification box telling you to wait while Setup installs the ISA Server classes and properties in Active Directory.When the process is finished, another box will appear, advising you that ISA Server enterprise initialization successfully imported the ISA schema into Active Directory and you can now install ISA Server as a member of a domain array. Click OK.
NOTE If there were problems with updating the Active Directory, you will receive an error dialog box and you will have to troubleshoot problems with Active Directory and perhaps connectivity. After updating the Active Directory to support your array, you can begin the process of promoting your stand-alone ISA server. Before promoting the server, confirm that you have connectivity with a domain controller in your Windows 2000 domain. You might also want to back up your configuration if you have not yet done so.
5. To promote the stand-alone ISA server to an array member, first open the ISA Server MMC. Right-click the array node in the left pane and select Promote…, as shown in Figure 1.9. 6. A notification box will inform you that you are about to promote the server to an array, and that the operation is not reversible, as shown in Figure 1.10. You will be asked if you want to continue. Click Yes to do so. 7. Now the promotion process will begin. Several things happen during the promotion, and you’ll be informed of these events in the Promoting array dialog box, shown in Figure 1.11.These steps include:
www.syngress.com
39
40
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond ■
Converting a stand-alone server to an array
■
Storing configuration in the Active Directory
■
Stopping all services
■
Committing changes
■
Restarting all services
■
Refreshing array list
Figure 1.9 Use the ISA Server MMC to Promote the Stand-Alone Server to an Array Member
Figure 1.10 You Will Be Informed that the Promotion to Array Is Not Reversible
Figure 1.11 The Dialog Box Will Change as the Promotion Process Advances
www.syngress.com
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond • Chapter 1
After the promotion process completes, the Array Properties dialog box will show the type as “Domain,” as shown in Figure 1.12. Before promotion, the type is shown as “Standalone.” Figure 1.12 The Array Properties Box Showing the Type as “Domain” After the Promotion
The Properties box will also have a new tab, Policies, that is used to configure how the array will use enterprise policies that you have configured.
Installing ISA Server on a Domain Controller A common problem that we’ve encountered while supporting ISA Server users is that of installing ISA Server on a domain controller. In general, it is not recommended that you install ISA Server on a domain controller; however, this is a common issue for those who use Small Business Server (SBS) and must run all the SBS servers on a single machine. Many of the problems that occur with this configuration are related to interface and DNS configuration. If you have only a single server, it will need to be configured as a DNS server in addition to the other Server services it is running, because an Active Directory DC needs a DNS server to add AD-related entries. Another problem is that the ISA Server must be multihomed. Multihomed domain controllers have a number of issues, including problems with NetBIOS and the Browser service. Despite the problems, many users have successfully installed and used ISA Server on a Windows 2000 domain controller. For detailed information on how to ensure that
www.syngress.com
41
42
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond
ISA and your domain controller can peacefully coexist, see the article titled Installing ISA Server on a Domain Controller by Tom Shinder at www.isaserver.org/pages/ articles.asp?art=17.We will expand on this information in Chapter 5, “Defense Plan 4: Advanced Server Publishing”. For detailed instructions on how to get Outlook Web Access to work with ISA using Small Business Server 2000, including a “how to” on disabling socket pooling, see the article entitled OWA and ISA Server by Martin Grasdal at http://infocenter.cramsession.com/techlibrary/gethtml.asp?ID=1107.
Selecting the ISA Server Client There are three types of clients supported by ISA Server: ■
Firewall clients Computers with the Firewall Client software installed and enabled.
■
SecureNAT clients Computers that are ISA server clients but do not have Firewall Client software installed.
■
Web Proxy clients Refers to client Web applications that are configured to use ISA Server.
By definition, a SecureNAT client cannot also be a Firewall client for TCP and UDP requests. On the other hand, both Firewall clients and SecureNAT clients can also be Web Proxy clients.Then, if the Web Proxy client configuration cannot handle a particular request, the Firewall and/or SecureNAT client configuration can step in.The Firewall client is the only client type that requires you to actually install client software on the client computer; however, you must configure the client machine’s Web browser to make it a Web Proxy client. See Table 1.4 for a comparison of the three client types. Table 1.4 Comparison Chart of ISA Client Types Firewall Client
SecureNAT Client
Web Proxy Client
Supports WinSock applications
Requires application filters for multiconnection protocols Works on all operating systems with TCP/IP installed
Supports the HTTP, S-HTTP, FTP, and gopher protocols
Does not support user-level authentication
Supports user-level authentication
Only works on Windows operating systems Supports user-level authentication
www.syngress.com
Works on all operating systems, via a Web browser
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond • Chapter 1
Firewall Client ISA Server’s Firewall client is equivalent to the WinSock Proxy client in Proxy Server 2.0; it is used for applications such as RealAudio,Windows Media, IRC,Telnet, and any other Internet service that is written to the WinSock application programming interface (API). The Firewall Client software can be installed on any 32-bit Windows operating system, including the following: ■
Windows 95 OSR2 (also known as Windows 95b)
■
Windows 98
■
Windows Millennium Edition (ME)
■
Windows NT 4.0
■
Windows 2000
■
Windows XP
These are the only operating systems in current release at the time of this writing that will run the ISA Firewall Client software.The Firewall client is automatically enabled when installation is completed. Installing the Firewall client writes a log file on the computer to which the software is installed.This file has setup information that includes such useful information as which services were running during installation and what client applications were installed.The log file is helpful in troubleshooting problems that you encounter during installation. Note that if you reinstall the Firewall Client software, the log file will be overwritten. The Firewall client uses a LAT, which is installed to the hard disk of the client computer (in Program Files\Microsoft Firewall Client).The LAT file is named Msplat.txt.The LAT is used to determine whether a request made by a WinSock application should be sent to the ISA server or directly to the computer on the internal network.The LAT defines addresses that are “trusted” by the ISA server. Communications between trusted hosts are not screened by the ISA server.When the Firewall client computer calls another computer on the LAT, the communications do not go through the ISA server. The primary advantage of the Firewall client is that it allows you to apply access policies to authenticated users, rather than just to computer IP addresses. Users who are authenticated via NTLM or Kerberos can have specific rules, such as bandwidth limitations, applied to their user accounts.This is the best reason for using the Firewall client instead of SecureNAT. Another compelling reason to use the Firewall client is that you can use a much wider range of protocols.The SecureNAT client is limited to simple www.syngress.com
43
44
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond
protocols, and those protocols must be listed in the Protocol Definitions node of the ISA Server Management console.The only exception to this SecureNAT client limitation is when there is an application filter in place to support the SecureNAT client’s access to complex protocols. Once installed, the Firewall client can be configured to automatically detect the ISA server, as shown in Figure 1.13. Figure 1.13 The Firewall Client Can Be Configured to Automatically Detect the ISA Server
SecureNAT Client Any computer configured with a default gateway capable of routing Internet bound requests through the internal interface of the ISA server is a SecureNAT client. Although these computers will not be able to benefit from all the features of ISA without the Firewall client software, they can still use most of its access control features. SecureNAT clients do not, however, support user level authentication or complex protocols (without an application filter). SecureNAT clients can ping external addresses (those on the other side of the ISA server), while computers configured only as Firewall clients cannot. You do not have to install any special software on the clients to make them SecureNAT clients. However, you do need to configure their TCP/IP settings. If your network setup is simple (that is, if there are no routers between the client computers and the ISA server), you should set the default gateway to be the IP address of your ISA Server machine.The default gateway is the “way out” of the internal network; it is the address to which packets are sent if their destination address is not on the local subnet.Thus, all Internet traffic will go to the ISA Server machine, which will then forward the requests out over the Internet (assuming the packets are not rejected because of ISA’s packet, circuit, or application filtering rules).
www.syngress.com
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond • Chapter 1
You can either configure the SecureNAT clients’TCP/IP settings manually or you can use the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) to assign the clients their IP addressing, subnet mask, and default gateway information. If you use DHCP, you must select the Obtain an IP address automatically check box on the TCP/IP Properties sheet. If your network is larger and more complex and there are routers between the SecureNAT clients and the ISA server, the default gateway settings on the clients will be configured with the IP address of the router on the local subnet. In this situation, the router must be configured to route Internet bound traffic to the ISA server. Other TCP/IP settings, such as the DNS server settings, depend on whether the clients will be requesting data from Internet servers only, or will also be requesting data from internal servers. If the former, you can use the IP addresses of DNS servers on the Internet; otherwise, a DNS server on the internal network, configured to resolve both internal and external IP addresses, should be used.
Web Proxy Client We mentioned earlier that a computer can be a Web Proxy client at the same time it is a Firewall client or a SecureNAT client.The requirements for a Web Proxy client are: ■
The client must have a CERN-compatible Web browser installed.
■
The Web browser must be configured to use the ISA server.
A request for Web objects sent from a Web Proxy client will be directed to the Web Proxy service on the ISA server.The Web Proxy service will determine whether the access is allowed, and might retrieve the requested object from cache (if it is there) or cache the object when it is returned from the Internet. There are two ways to configure the browser to use ISA Server’s Web Proxy service. If the Web Proxy client has the Firewall client software installed, the Web browser settings can be configured automatically during the setup of the Firewall client. If the client isn’t automatically configured, you can manually configure the browser settings to use the Web Proxy service. If you’re using Internet Explorer, this is done via the Tools | Internet Options | Connections setting. You only have to check a check box (Use a proxy server) in the LAN Settings property sheet, and enter the name of the ISA server or array and a valid port number (the default for ISA Server is 8080).The SecureNAT client will use the Web Proxy service regardless of whether you have configured the CERN-compliant settings in the browser (because the default HTTP Redirector settings forward requests to the Web Proxy service), so you might wonder if making these settings is unnecessary.We highly recommend that you configure your SecureNAT client’s browsers as Web Proxy clients.This will allow user/ group access controls for site and content rules.With user/group access controls for site www.syngress.com
45
46
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond
and content rules, you will be able to control what sites users and /or groups can access and what types of files users and/or groups can access via the Web Proxy service.
NOTE CERN stands for “Conseil Europeen pour le Recherche Nucleaire” in French, or the European Laboratory for Particle Physics. Although most of the laboratory’s work is devoted to research in nuclear physics, CERN played a pivotal role in developing the World Wide Web, and setting standards that resulted in the spectacular growth that made it the global forum it is today. The most popular Web browsers, including Microsoft Internet Explorer and Netscape Navigator/ Communicator, are compatible with the CERN standards.
Getting Started with ISA Server Microsoft has thoughtfully provided a Getting Started wizard to walk you through many of the ISA configuration processes.Tasks for which you can use the wizard include: ■
Creating client address sets
■
Configuring packet filters
■
Creating destination sets
■
Configuring protocol rules
■
Configuring site and content rules
■
Applying server security
■
Creating dial-up entries
■
Configuring firewall and Web routing rules
■
Configuring firewall and Web Proxy clients
■
Creating cache policy
The wizard is accessed by clicking the top node in the ISA MMC (named Internet Security and Acceleration Server) when in Taskpad view, as shown in Figure 1.14.
www.syngress.com
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond • Chapter 1
Figure 1.14 You Can Use the Getting Started Wizard to Make ISA Setup Less Painful
NOTE Most ISA administrators seem to find the Advanced view most useful for dayto-day ISA administration, so you might want to change from Taskpad to Advanced view after completing the wizard. To change the view, click the View menu at the top of the MMC and select the desired view.
You can make changes later to the settings that you make with the wizard.
Setting Up Open Access for Testing the ISA Installation In the following sections, we will address the most common issue that comes up when ISA users first deploy the product: how to set up “open access” in order to determine whether ISA is working, that is, whether you still have Internet connectivity after installing ISA.The tasks involved include opening all of the packet filters, sites and content, and protocols.
ISA SERVER ALERT The “open access” configuration is used for testing. Because all protocols, sites, and content are available to the network’s internal clients, this is not a secure configuration and should not be run on your production network, as it defeats the purpose of ISA Server. We recommend that during testing, the ISA server, along with one test client, be disconnected from the rest of the internal network. We also strongly recommend that you turn off IIS on the ISA server before opening access for testing.
www.syngress.com
47
48
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond
Disabling Packet Filtering Packet filtering is a powerful tool that you can use to protect your ISA Server computer from attack. However, packet filtering interferes with running applications and services on the ISA server itself. If you want to use applications on the ISA server (such as POP3 and SMTP applications), you need to create individual packet filters for them. This can be time consuming if you’re doing a simple proof-of-concept testing configuration.You can disable packet filtering and make all applications on the ISA server able to access the Internet. Follow these steps to open all packet filters and create an open access policy for all applications on the ISA server itself: 1. In the left pane of the ISA MMC, expand the Access Policy node. 2. Right-click the IP Packet Filters node and click Properties. 3. In the IP Packet Filters Properties dialog box, remove the check mark from the Enable packet filtering check box. 4. Click Apply. Allow ISA Server to restart the services. Click OK to leave the IP Packet Filters Properties dialog box.
NOTE Because this configuration opens the test network to attackers, make sure your ISA server and test client computer behind the ISA server are not connected to the production network. You should also ensure that IIS services are not enabled on the ISA Server computer.
Allowing All Sites and Content The next step in configuring ISA for open access is to create a rule that will allow access to all sites and all the content on those sites (if there isn’t one already).To do so, follow these steps: 1. In the left pane of the ISA MMC, right-click the Site and Content Rules node, select New, and then select Rule. This will invoke the New Site and Content Rule wizard. 2. The first page of the wizard asks you to name the rule. Again, choose a name that describes its function (such as “Allow All”). Click Next. 3. On the next page, you are asked to select the type of action the rule will perform. Click the Allow option. Click Next. www.syngress.com
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond • Chapter 1
4. On the next page, you are asked to specify whether the rule will apply to destinations, schedules, clients, or all three, or whether to create a custom configuration. Click the Custom option. Click Next. 5. On the next page, you must select destinations to which the rule will apply. Select All destinations in the drop-down box. Click Next. 6. On the next page, you must select a schedule for applying the rule. Select Always in the drop-down box. Click Next. 7. On the next page, you must specify the types of clients to which the rule will be applied. Click the Any request option. Click Next. 8. On the next page, you must select the types of content to which the rule will be applied. Select the Any content type option. Click Next. 9. The last page of the wizard summarizes your choices.Verify that they are correct and click Finish (or click Back to make changes). The new site and content rule will appear in the right pane of the MMC.
Opening All Protocols The third and last task you must perform to create your open access configuration is to create a protocol rule that will allow all protocols to pass through.
NOTE Creating a protocol rule will allow Firewall clients access to all allowed protocols, but SecureNAT clients will have access only to those protocols for which there is a protocol definition.
Follow these steps to create the new protocol rule: 1. In the left pane of the ISA MMC, right-click the Protocol Rules node, select New, and then select Rule. This invokes the New Protocol Rule wizard. 2. The first page asks you to give the new protocol rule a name.Type an appropriate name (such as “Allow All”). Click Next. 3. On the next page, you are asked to specify the rule action. Click the Allow option. Click Next. 4. On the next page, you are asked to select the protocols to which the rule will apply. Select All IP traffic in the drop-down box. Click Next.
www.syngress.com
49
50
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond
5. On the next page, you are asked to select a schedule for applying the rule. Select Always in the drop-down box. Click Next. 6. On the next page, you are asked to select the client types that will be allowed access to the protocols. Select Any request. Click Next. 7. The last page of the wizard will summarize your selections.Verify that they are correct and click Finish (or click Back to make changes). The new protocol rule will appear in the right pane of the MMC. Although not necessary, it’s a good idea to restart the Web Proxy and Firewall services after changing these configurations.To do so, follow these steps: 1. In the left pane of the ISA MMC, expand the Monitoring node. 2. Click the Services node under it. For each service, right-click the service name and select Stop. 3. After all services have been stopped, right-click each and click Start.
Configuring & Implementing… Using a Dial-Up Connection There are a few extra steps to take if you’re using a dial-up connection with your ISA server: 1. In the left pane of the MMC, expand the Network Configuration node. 2. Right-click the Network Configuration node and select Properties. 3. In the Properties dialog box, check the Use dial-up entry check box. Click OK. 4. Click the Routing node under Network Configuration in the left MMC pane. 5. Right-click the Last rule in the right pane, and select Properties. 6. In the Properties dialog box, click the check box for Use dial-up entry, and click OK.
www.syngress.com
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond • Chapter 1
NOTE You might want to be able to test connectivity directly from the Web browser on the ISA server. You can do this by making the Web browser a Web Proxy client or by accessing the Internet directly. Since packet filtering is disabled, the client will have access to all protocols. If you want to make the browser a Web Proxy client, you can configure it with the IP address you’re using for the Outgoing Web Requests listener or with 127.0.0.1.
Now you can use the open access configuration to test basic Internet functionality through the ISA server.With this configuration, you should be able to access any type of content and publish servers without problems. Once you’ve completed testing, you should disable all the open access entries (disabling them, rather than deleting them, provides you with a quick way to open all access again if you need to do so for testing purposes without having to go through this entire process again).
Installing Service Pack 1 Throughout the following chapters in this book, we take for granted that you have installed Service Pack 1 (SP1) on your ISA servers. SP1 includes several updates and fixes (in fact, SP1 itself has been updated; Microsoft recommends that customers who installed SP1 prior to January 24, 2002 should install the latest build over the previous one on all computers that run ISA Server).
NOTE You can download the latest version of SP1 from the Microsoft Web site at www.microsoft.com/isaserver/downloads/sp1.asp.
SP1 can be applied to both the Standard and Enterprise Editions of ISA Server. It works only with licensed versions and is not compatible with the 120-day evaluation version of ISA Server.You’ll need to have Windows 2000 SP2 installed on the Windows 2000 computer on which ISA is running before you install ISA SP1. If you installed the beta version of SP1, you can upgrade it to the release version.
NOTE SP1 is required to run ISA Server on Windows .NET Standard or Enterprise Server, beta 3 or higher.
www.syngress.com
51
52
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond
You’ll need a minimum of 36MB of free disk space to install the service pack, although it uses only 12MB after the computer is reset following installation.
What’s Included in SP1 If you’re a prudent (and typically paranoid) network administrator, you probably want to know what’s in SP1 before you install it on your machine(s). According to Microsoft, the service pack includes the following: ■
Hot fixes (all that have been released)
■
Fixes that address customer reports to Microsoft Product Support Services (PSS)
■
Code that increases the stability of the ISA services and admin tool
■
Fixes recommended by security experts outside of Microsoft
■
Code that makes it possible for ISA to work with .NET Standard and Enterprise Server operating systems
SP1 also gives you the ability to uninstall specific hot fixes that are installed after SP1, on an individual basis.
ISA SERVER ALERT The only way to uninstall hot fixes that were released/installed before you installed SP1 is to uninstall SP1 itself. This will uninstall all hot fixes included in SP1 (which includes all hot fixes released prior to its release). You cannot uninstall the fixes individually. If you installed later hot fixes after SP1, you must uninstall them individually before you can uninstall SP1. The most recently installed hot fix must be installed first. Use the Add/Remove Programs applet in Control Panel to uninstall SP1 and/or to uninstall individual fixes installed after SP1. Just select Microsoft ISA Server Service Pack 1 and Hot Fixes. To remove an individual hot fix installed after SP1, select it from the list and click Remove. To uninstall SP1, just click Remove. When you installed SP1, the files that are necessary to return ISA Server to its pre-service pack state are saved in a folder called $UNINSTALL_ISA_SP$ in binary form. Uninstalling SP1 will restore these files.
A detailed list of the individual fixes that are addressed by SP1 is available on the Microsoft Knowledge Base Web site. See KB Article Q313249 for this information.
www.syngress.com
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond • Chapter 1
Determining the Version of SP1 Installed Here’s how to find out which version of SP1 (if any) is installed on your ISA computer: 1. Click Start | Programs | Microsoft ISA Server | ISA Management. 2. In the ISA MMC, expand the Internet Security and Acceleration Server node in the left pane, and then expand Servers and Arrays. 3. Expand the ISA server name (ISABOX in Figure 1.15). Figure 1.15 Check the ISA Server’s Properties to Determine Which Service Pack (If Any) Is Installed
4. Click Computer. 5. Right-click the computer name in the right details pane, as shown in Figure 1.15, and select Properties. 6. In the Properties dialog box, note the number in the ISA Server version field. As of the writing of this book, the latest version of SP1 was 3.0.1200.166. If any number other than this appears in the Properties dialog box, you should install the current version.
NOTE You can check the Microsoft Web site (www.microsoft.com/isaserver) to determine whether newer service pack versions have been released.
Figure 1.16 shows the Properties dialog box on a machine with no service pack installed. www.syngress.com
53
54
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond
Figure 1.16 The ISA Server Version Field Indicates Whether a Service Pack Is Installed
Figure 1.17 shows a machine with the initial version of SP1 installed. Figure 1.17 If a Service Pack Is Installed, the ISA Server Version Field Shows the Version
Downloading and Installing the Service Pack on the ISA Server The first step in installing the service pack is to download it from the Microsoft Web site at www.microsoft.com/isaserver/downloads/sp1.asp.You can select from several language versions: English, French, German, Japanese, and Spanish.The file is named isasp1.exe and is 2.8MB in size. Note that the filename is the same for the original and
www.syngress.com
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond • Chapter 1
current versions of the service pack, so you cannot tell which version of the executable you have based on the filename.
NOTE If you have a slow connection or you’re unable to download SP1 over the Internet, you can order it on CD from Microsoft’s trial store for $9.95. The CD includes all the language versions except Japanese. TechNet subscribers receive the service packs on CD as part of their membership benefits.
After you’ve downloaded the service pack, run the isasp1.exe file from the local hard disk or network share (or if you have the CD, run it from the CD).You will first be prompted to accept the End User Licensing Agreement. Update files will be copied to the computer.When the update is complete, the dialog box shown in Figure 1.18 appears, prompting you to restart the computer. Figure 1.18 You Must Restart the Computer After the Installation of SP1
After the ISA Server computer reboots, check the Properties box again to ensure that the latest version of SP1 (3.0.1200.166) is indeed installed, as shown in Figure 1.19. Figure 1.19 When You Have the Proper Version of SP1 Installed, the Version Number Will Be 3.0.1200.166
www.syngress.com
55
56
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond
Upgrading Client Computers to SP1 Computers running the ISA Firewall Client should be updated with the client fixes that are included with SP1, as this increases stability.The SP1 upgrade addresses problems experienced by the Firewall client when it is under a high load and using WSPAD, conflicts with third-party layered service providers that cause connectivity problems, and problems with the Firewall client that might be experienced after upgrading the operating system to Windows XP. After SP1 has been installed on the ISA Server machine, you can upgrade the clients by connecting to the mspclnt share directory on the ISA server and running setup.exe.This starts the Firewall Client Installation wizard. Choose the Repair option, as shown in Figure 1.20. Figure 1.20 Updating the Firewall Client in the Firewall Client Installation Wizard
When the wizard completes the update process, you will be prompted to restart the client computer.
Service Pack 1 Issues An independent security evaluation of ISA Server Service Pack 1 was conducted by Foundstone, Inc. (www.foundstone.com) prior to the service pack’s release in February 2002.The Foundstone team uses extensive testing that includes custom hacking tools, known exploits, and other means to detect penetration and attack vulnerabilities. According to the white paper published by Foundstone (available on the Web at www.foundstone.com/pdf/isaserver_wp.pdf), the ISA Server development team at Microsoft resolved the concerns that were presented to them after testing, and Foundstone concluded that ISA Server with SP1 is an effective firewall solution for enterprise-level networks.
www.syngress.com
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond • Chapter 1
ISA SERVER ALERT Some ISA users have experienced problems with DNS queries following the installation of SP1. If you are using internal DNS servers to resolve DNS queries, you might find that DNS doesn’t work after you install the service, until you restart the ISA server a second time (following the automatic restart after the installation). This always seems to fix the DNS problem.
Supporting Network Design Because security and network performance—the two-pronged purpose of ISA Server—are so important in today’s interconnected world, ISA Server plays a vital role in your overall network design. Of course, exactly how and where ISA will be implemented depends on the particulars of your network (including size), your security needs, and the type of business you do. Possible scenarios include: ■
ISA Server as a stand-alone firewall server to protect your small to mediumsized network from Internet intrusion.
■
ISA Server as part of an e-commerce solution, to speed customer access to your Web site and provide security for financial transactions using X.509 certificates.
■
ISA Server as a Web-caching server, to provide faster Web access to knowledgebased workers on your LAN.
■
An ISA Server array, to distribute the load of client requests and provide fault tolerance.
■
ISA Server as an Internet connection sharing solution.
■
ISA Server as a secure publishing solution, to protect the Web servers on your local network.
■
ISA Server as part of a perimeter network (DMZ) solution.
There are a number of circumstances in which specific network design factors or special needs of the organization will require additional solutions for fully integrating ISA Server into the network. In the following sections, we discuss how you can use Application Center 2000 to provide centralized management of your ISA servers in a network where Active Directory has not been deployed, running ISA Server on the Windows .NET Server operating systems, and third party add-on software that can be installed on your ISA servers to provide added features and functions.
www.syngress.com
57
58
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond
Using Application Center 2000 with ISA Server The Enterprise Edition of ISA Server allows you to manage and configure the ISA servers on your network from a central location—but it is designed to work with Active Directory.What do you do if you haven’t deployed Active Directory on your network, but still want centralized control? There is a solution: use Microsoft’s Application Center 2000 in conjunction with ISA. Application Center 2000 is a Microsoft tool for managing Windows 2000 Web applications as part of a high availability Web services deployment plan. It allows you to automatically apply changes to a group of servers in a cluster.You can find out more about Application Center 2000 at www.microsoft.com/applicationcenter/default.asp. Application Center can also be used to manage multiple servers running the ISA Server Standard Edition, creating a “pseudo array.”This gives you the benefits of centralized administration without requiring that you deploy Active Directory.You need to install both products—ISA Server and Application Center—on each server that will be a member of the cluster.The array policy for all the ISA servers will be stored on the machine that acts as cluster controller for the Application Center cluster, and you make changes to the array members on the cluster controller.
NOTE Not all of the features of an enterprise array on an Active Directory network are available to the pseudo array that is created by using Application Center. Distributed Cache Array Protocol (CARP) and centralized security groups are not supported, and you cannot use tiered policies.
Using Application Center to manage your ISA servers offers many benefits, but imposes additional requirements (which might result in additional cost). For example, all the server hardware needs to be identical, and the software configurations on all the servers need to be the same. For more information about using ISA Server with Application Center on a nonAD network, along with detailed instructions on how to set up the network and servers, see the white paper on Microsoft’s Tech Net Web site at www.microsoft.com/ technet/treeview/default.asp?url=/technet/prodtechnol/acs/deploy/MgISA-AC.asp.
ISA Server and Windows .NET The next generation of the Microsoft server family,Windows .NET server, is available for customer preview (Release Candidate 1) at the time of this writing and is expected to be released in the last quarter of 2002 or first quarter of 2003.The .NET server family consists of four members: Standard Server, Enterprise Server, Datacenter Server, www.syngress.com
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond • Chapter 1
and Web Server.The .NET framework (which can also be added to and run on Windows 2000 Server) focuses on the use of XML and the products include improved performance, security, and reliability features. Many organizations that put off upgrading to Windows 2000 and are still running NT networks are expected to upgrade directly to .NET. ISA Server will run on Windows .NET Servers; however, there are some caveats. If you’re running ISA on a Windows 2000 Server and want to upgrade to .NET, you have to install the ISA SP1 first. If you want to install ISA on a server that’s already running .NET Server, you’ll get error messages during the installation process that say “ISA Server is not supported by this version of Windows,” because the packet filter extension driver can’t be loaded.You can go ahead and install despite the error messages, but then you must apply SP1 before ISA will work properly.The .NET Server should not be connected to the Internet until you have finished installing both ISA and SP1.
NOTE The 120-day evaluation version of ISA Server available at the time of this writing cannot be run on Windows .NET Server. If you’re running it on Windows 2000 Server, you must remove it before upgrading the server to Windows .NET.
You might encounter some issues after you get ISA and SP1 installed on your Windows .NET Server. For example, if the Internet Connection Firewall (ICF) is enabled, the ISA Firewall service won’t start.You need to disable ICF.
Third-Party Software Add-Ons for ISA Server Since ISA Server’s release and as it has grown in popularity, a number of third-party software vendors have developed add-on products to enhance ISA’s functionality. It’s inevitable with any piece of software such as ISA that as users learn what it will and won’t do, they develop “wish lists” of features they’d like to see added. Microsoft is generally good about listening to this type of feedback and incorporating many of these new features into future versions of their products. However, what does a company do if it really needs those features in the meantime? Moreover, what about features that aren’t needed or wanted by the majority of users, but are extremely useful to a subset of users? That’s where enterprising software developers come in. The number of add-ons offered for ISA Server is surprising, considering the fact that, at the time of this writing, it has only been available to the public for less than two years.We counted over 40 add-on products mentioned on the www.isaserver.org Web site alone.These products fall into several different categories, including: www.syngress.com
59
60
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond ■
Access Control
■
Content Security
■
Intrusion Detection
■
Networking Utilities
■
System Hardening
■
Anti Virus
■
Reporting Tools
■
Caching Enhancements
■
High Availability and Load Balancing Solutions
■
Monitoring and Administration add-ons
■
Security Services
Some of the ISA add-ons that we’ve tried and/or that are most often mentioned in the ISA Server user community include GFi’s DownloadSecurity for ISA Server, Rainfinity’s RAIN Connect, N2H2’s content filtering product, and the reporting tools from Burst Technology (btLogAnalyzer) and WebTrends Corporation.We have also heard good reports about Stonesoft’s Stonebeat Full Cluster for ISA Server, which provides high availability and dynamic load balancing.
ISA Server Certification Microsoft’s certification exam 70-227, Installing, Configuring and Administering Microsoft Internet Security and Acceleration (ISA) Server 2000, is destined to replace exam 70-088, Implementing and Supporting Microsoft Proxy Server 2.0, when the latter is retired (retirement is scheduled for June 30, 2003).The Proxy Server exam was a popular elective choice for the Microsoft Certified Systems Engineer (MCSE) track in the past, and many new MCSE candidates are choosing the ISA Server exam as one of the two required electives. Although this book is not designed specifically as an exam prep or study guide, we hope that, used in conjunction with Configuring ISA Server 2000, it will serve as a supplement to the training materials and study kits for those who are looking for more than just a surface understanding of how ISA works “under the hood.”We believe that knowledge will help to lay a foundation for persons contemplating taking exam 70-227, especially if our books are also used in conjunction with an objective-oriented study guide. The Microsoft exam objectives are a good starting point for anyone who aspires to master this complex product, as they cover installation (including upgrade from Proxy
www.syngress.com
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond • Chapter 1
Server 2.0 to ISA Server), configuring and troubleshooting the ISA Server services, configuring and managing policies and rules, setting up and administering the client computers, and monitoring and analyzing ISA Server use. All these topics are important not only to exam takers, but to working IT administrators who plan to deploy ISA Server on their networks.This book is intended for both audiences (realizing that those two audiences will overlap in many cases, as student/exam takers get jobs and must put their knowledge to work in the field, or experienced professionals who have been working with the products on production networks decide to test their knowledge and obtain official documentation of their skills). Microsoft has targeted ISA Server for the enterprise market, and that notion is reflected in their stated audience profile for the exam: candidates are expected to have at least a year of experience operating in a medium to very large networking environment (defined as 200 to 26,000+ users and multiple physical locations) where the Windows 2000 operating system is in use.We know that some of our readers fit this description and others don’t. Our goal in writing both of these books was to provide value both to those who are rolling out ISA Server in a large-scale network for mission-critical applications, and those who are deploying it on a small home network to familiarize themselves with the product as they study for the exam.
Beyond ISA Server Implementing the ISA Server firewall is an important step in protecting your network from intruders and attackers, as well as controlling the access of internal users to inappropriate or potentially dangerous Internet sites and services. However, there is much more that you must do as part of a comprehensive security plan. In addition to the chapters that deal with advanced configurations of ISA Server, this book will look at some other aspects of how to secure a Windows 2000 network, including: ■
Windows 2000 built-in security features Windows 2000 provides many built-in security features that can be used to protect your computers and network.These include the ability to change the default access control settings by refining the permissions that are granted by default to predefined security groups.
■
The security configuration toolset This is Microsoft’s response to a need expressed by systems administrators for a centralized, easy-to-use program that would allow them to set security for domains, organizational units, and local machines, rather than having to learn and use multiple tools for these tasks. Also included is the Security Configuration and Analysis MMC snap-in that
www.syngress.com
61
62
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond
makes it possible to quickly and easily analyze a computer’s current configuration and compare it to predefined or custom security templates and apply changes. ■
The Encrypting File System EFS provides Windows 2000 (and XP/.NET) users with a built-in mechanism for encrypting data on the disk, on a file-by-file or folder basis. File encryption is an important part of the security plan in an environment that includes sensitive data stored on the network (such as client records, personnel information, financial data, trade secrets, or any other data that should remain confidential).
Other security considerations are not specific to Windows-based networks, but many Windows sys admins are implementing these new methods of security and need guidance in integrating them into a Windows environment.These include: ■
Smart card authentication Windows 2000 supports the use of smart cards for logon authentication, and this gives administrators a way to increase the security of the logon process by requiring that a user provide not only something he or she knows (an account name and password) in order to log on to the network, but also something he or she has in possession: the physical card on which is embedded a chip that contains the user’s certificate and other information.
■
Wireless network security 802.11 wireless technologies have made it possible for laptop users to roam away from their desks and still stay connected to the company network without the inconvenience of cables. However, wireless networks have opened many new security holes that must be addressed; otherwise, there is a grave risk of comprising the security of the network. Out of the box, the default settings on most wireless equipment leave the network wide open to knowledgeable intruders, but there are many measures that can be implemented to provide better security and still enjoy the benefits of wireless communications.
■
Web server security Web servers represent a point of vulnerability for many corporate networks because they are accessible via the Internet. Microsoft’s Internet Information Services (IIS) Web server software, like other Web server software, has a number of security holes when using default settings and/or unpatched versions of the program.There are many things a savvy administrator can do to increase the security of the network’s IIS-based Web servers.
This book will address all of these issues.
www.syngress.com
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond • Chapter 1
Summary In this introductory chapter, we provided an overview/review of Microsoft ISA Server’s features and functionality, installation tips, and how to update the ISA Server and clients with Service Pack 1.We included new information about incorporating ISA Server into your network design, using Application Center 2000 to manage ISA Servers in a non-Active Directory network, running ISA Server on Windows .NET Server, and information about some of the many third-party software packages that can be added to ISA Server to enhance its functionality. We then went beyond ISA Server to discuss major network security issues that are often encountered by the administrators of Windows-based networks in the enterprise, including the use of Windows’ built-in security features such as the default access control settings, Security Configuration Toolset, and the Encrypting File System (EFS). Other security considerations we discussed include the use of smart cards to authenticate users on the network, securing 802.1 wireless networks, and providing better Web security when using IIS as your Web server. Network security is no longer a luxury that administrators can choose to ignore; our systems are vulnerable to a plethora of potential dangers.We need only read the newspapers to know that information warfare—the use of technology to disrupt the communications infrastructure on which companies and individuals increasingly depend—is not just an interesting idea; it’s already a reality. Major corporations have lost millions of dollars due to lost productivity, data loss or damage, and other consequences of both casual and calculated attacks.Whether the work of a sophisticated and skilled hacker or a clueless script kiddie, an attack on your organization’s network can be financially devastating. It is essential that network professionals have the proper tools available to protect their networks, and the documentation that will help them to get the most out of those tools. ISA Server, through its firewall functionality, provides one such tool. However, installing it on your network is not enough.There are many different ways in which ISA can be deployed, and many tricks to configuring it to perform exactly the functions you need in your own organization. In Chapters 2 through 6, we will delve into advanced configuration techniques that can be used to tailor your ISA Servers’ functionality to fit your individual needs.Then, in Chapters 7 through 15, we’ll go beyond ISA Server to look at other aspects of defending a Windows-based network.
www.syngress.com
63
64
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond
Defensive Tactics Fast Track ISA Server Overview ; Microsoft’s Internet Security and Acceleration (ISA) Server replaced Microsoft
Proxy Server 2.0, providing full-fledged firewall functionality for a much more robust security solution, along with improved caching/Web performance features. ; ISA Server performs the functions of a full-featured dedicated firewall. specifi-
cally designed to control access, preventing unauthorized data from entering the network and restricting how and what type of data can be sent out. ; ISA Server, when installed in firewall mode or integrated mode, can perform
filtering at the packet layer, the circuit layer, or the application layer.
Installing ISA Server ; You should make firm decisions about each ISA Server design issue before you
begin your installation.The decisions you make at this point will determine your choices when it comes time to install ISA Server itself. ; Minimum hardware requirements for any ISA server—regardless of the role
the machine might play on the network—include Windows 2000 Server with SP1 or above; PII or K7 processor at 300 MHz or faster; minimum of 128MB of RAM (256MB recommended); 20MB disk space for program files, 2GB disk space for Web cache, two network interfaces. ; ISA Server can be installed in one of three modes: firewall, cache, or integrated. ; ISA Server Enterprise Edition can be installed either as an array member or as
a stand-alone server. ; ISA Server supports three client types: Firewall,Web Proxy, and SecureNAT.
Installing Service Pack 1 ; SP1 can be applied to both the Standard and Enterprise Editions of ISA
Server. It works only with licensed versions and is not compatible with the 120-day evaluation version of ISA Server.
www.syngress.com
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond • Chapter 1
; SP1 can be downloaded from the Microsoft Web site at www.microsoft.com/
isaserver/downloads/sp1.asp.You can select from several language versions: English, French, German, Japanese, and Spanish.The file is named isasp1.exe and is 2.8MB in size. ; After SP1 has been installed on the ISA Server machine, you can upgrade the
Firewall clients by connecting to the mspclnt share directory on the ISA server and running setup.exe.
Supporting Network Design ; Application Center 2000 can be used to centrally manage ISA servers on the
network if you do not have Active Directory implemented. ; ISA Server will run on Windows .NET servers, but ISA SP1 must be installed
(either before upgrading from Windows 2000 to .NET, or after installing ISA on a .NET server).The .NET server should not be connected to the Internet until you have finished installing both ISA and SP1. ; There are dozens of third-party software add-ons available for ISA Server that
add more functionality and features, many of which are reviewed on the www.isaserver.org Web site.
ISA Server Certification ; Microsoft’s certification exam 70-227, Installing, Configuring and Administering
Microsoft Internet Security and Acceleration (ISA) Server 2000, is destined to replace exam 70-088, Implementing and Supporting Microsoft Proxy Server 2.0, when the latter is retired (retirement is scheduled for June 30, 2003). ; The Microsoft exam objectives are a good starting point for anyone who
aspires to master this complex product, as they cover installation (including upgrade from Proxy Server 2.0 to ISA Server), configuring and troubleshooting the ISA Server services, configuring and managing policies and rules, setting up and administering the client computers, and monitoring and analyzing ISA Server use. ; Microsoft has targeted ISA Server for the enterprise market, and that notion is
reflected in their stated audience profile for the exam: candidates are expected to have at least a year of experience operating in a medium to very large networking environment (defined as 200 to 26,000+ users and multiple physical locations) where the Windows 2000 operating system is in use. www.syngress.com
65
66
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond
Beyond ISA Server ; Windows 2000 provides many built-in security features that can be used to
protect your computers and network.These include the ability to change the default access control settings by refining the permissions that are granted by default to predefined security groups. ; The security configuration toolset is Microsoft’s response to a need expressed
by systems administrators for a centralized, easy-to-use program that would allow them to set security for domains, organizational units, and local machines, rather than having to learn and use multiple tools for these tasks. ; The Encrypting File System (EFS) provides Windows 2000 (and XP/.NET)
users with a built-in mechanism for encrypting data on the disk, on a file-byfile or folder basis. ; Other security considerations, including smart card authentication, wireless net-
work security, and Web server security, are not specific to Windows-based networks, but many Windows sys admins are implementing these new methods of security and need guidance in integrating them into a Windows environment.
Frequently Asked Questions The following Frequently Asked Questions, answered by the authors of this book, are designed to both measure your understanding of the concepts presented in this chapter and to assist you with real-life implementation of these concepts. To have your questions about this chapter answered by the author, browse to www.syngress.com/solutions and click on the “Ask the Author” form.
Q: Must I install the schema to Active Directory each time I install an ISA server on my enterprise network?
A: No.The ISA schema only has to be installed once for the entire enterprise, when you install the first ISA server.
Q: What are the advantages to installing a single ISA server as a lone member of an array, instead of installing it as a stand-alone server?
A: If you anticipate that you might want to extend the ISA deployment to an array in the future, it will be easier to do so if you have installed your ISA server as a sole member of an array.Then, all you have to do is add more servers to the array later. Arrays offer several advantages: all the servers in the array share a common configu-
www.syngress.com
Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond • Chapter 1
ration and can be managed together, saving on administrative time. Enterprise policies can be applied to all the servers in an array, and having an array distributes the load across the multiple servers, increasing performance and providing fault tolerance.
Q: Can ISA Server be installed in a Windows NT 4.0 domain? A: Yes. Although ISA Server can only be installed on a Windows 2000 Server machine, that machine can be a stand-alone server in a Windows NT 4.0 domain. ISA Server must be installed as a stand-alone server in this environment; you cannot configure an array, because the configuration information will be stored in the local Registry rather than in a centralized location (Active Directory).
Q: Can I use ISA Server to protect our network from viruses? A: ISA Server does not come with built-in virus detection.There are a number of third-party vendors who can supply application filters for ISA Server that can protect your network from viruses.Web filters can assess data moving through the Web Proxy service and scrub the data to remove the virus content. GFI Software’s “Internet Security for ISA Server” product is a Web filter that removes viruses from the Web Proxy service communications. Other filters can examine Instant Messenger, SMTP, and NNTP traffic.The built-in SMTP Message Screener can remove attachments from e-mail, but it does not screen for viruses.
Q: What’s the best type of DNS setup for ISA Server? Is there anything I should do to optimize my network before installing ISA Server?
A: There’s a good chance that you’re going to publish internal servers so users on the Internet can access their resources. It’s very common for both internal and external network clients to want to access the same servers.The problem that most organizations run into is that internal network clients should not use the ISA server to access internal network resources.The way you get around this problem is by creating a “split” DNS infrastructure. It’s called “split” because you need to split your DNS zone configuration so that internal and external network clients access different DNS servers for the same zone. For example, if you’re hosting resources for mydomain.com on the internal network that are accessible to external network hosts, you need to create one DNS zone that external network clients will use, and another zone that internal network clients will use. Although both zones will be authoritative for mydomain.com, the IP addresses in the resource records will be different.The public DNS zone will contain the IP addresses you use on the external interface to publish the servers on the internal network, and the private
www.syngress.com
67
68
Chapter 1 • Defending the Network with ISA Server—and Beyond
zone will contain the private IP addresses on the internal network that internal network hosts will use to connect to the servers.
Q: What client type should I use? All my systems run some version of an NT-based operating system.We have Windows NT 4.0,Windows 2000, and Windows XP systems.
A: You should configure your machines as both Firewall clients and Web Proxy clients. The combination of Firewall and Web Proxy clients will give you the best performance with the highest level of service and protection.The only machines that should be configured as SecureNAT clients are those you’re publishing to the Internet and domain controllers. It is generally a very bad idea to install the Firewall client on a domain controller.
www.syngress.com
Chapter 2
Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ
Defensive Tactics in this Chapter: ■
Configuring a Trihomed DMZ
■
Publishing DMZ SMTP Servers
■
Publishing a Web Server
■
Publishing an FTP Server on a Trihomed DMZ Segment
■
External Network Clients Cannot Use the DMZ Interface to Connect to the Internal Network
; Summary ; Defensive Tactic Fast Track ; Frequently Asked Questions 69
70
Chapter 2 • Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ
Introduction A demilitarized zone (DMZ) is a network segment that lies between the internal network and the Internet. Consider a DMZ segment as a type of “no man’s land” where anyone or anything unfortunate enough to find its way to that segment is considered free game for attack.You must assume that any network host placed on a DMZ segment will be attacked and compromised. Maybe not today, maybe not tomorrow, but some day. A DMZ segment can have public or private addresses. If you have two ISA Server computers, or an ISA server and another firewall, you can create a “back-to-back DMZ.”The back-to-back DMZ can have public or private network addresses.When you use public addresses, your DMZ segment becomes a direct extension of the Internet.The major difference between the Internet and your public address DMZ segment is that the hosts on the DMZ segment are under your administrative control. The private address DMZ segment isn’t considered a direct extension of the Internet, the reason being that a network address translator or proxy has to be interposed between the private address DMZ hosts and the Internet.The private address DMZ segment is more secure because there is no way to directly route packets to and from the Internet; the packets must traverse the NAT or proxy.
Configuring a Trihomed DMZ ISA Server supports the trihomed DMZ configuration in addition to the back-to-back DMZ setup.The trihomed DMZ has the following interfaces: ■
A public interface with a public network address
■
A DMZ interface with a public network address
■
An internal network interface with a private network address
The trihomed DMZ setup is less flexible than the back-to-back DMZ configuration because you don’t have the choice between public or private network addresses. The trihomed DMZ demands the use of public IP addresses.You cannot use private addresses on the DMZ segment of a trihomed ISA Server computer. The public addresses on the DMZ segment must consist of a subnet of the pubic address block assigned to you by your ISP. One of the most common errors we see when looking at problematic trihomed DMZ configurations is when the ISA Server administrator has configured the DMZ segment network ID to be on the same network ID as the external interface of the ISA server.The public interface and the DMZ interface must be on two different network IDs.
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ • Chapter 2
ISA SERVER ALERT You cannot use the ISA Server software to create a private address DMZ segment. However, ISA Server does support multiple internal network interfaces. These internal network interfaces are contained in the Local Address Table (LAT). There are methods you can employ to create a private address (LATbased) DMZ. We’ll talk about those in Chapter 4, “Defense Plan 3: The Internal ‘Pseudo’ DMZ”
The reason for having the public and DMZ segments on different network IDs is that packets moving from the external network to the DMZ segment are routed. Routers can only route packets between different network IDs. Routers will not route packets between two interfaces on the same network (moving packets between two interfaces on the same network ID would be considered “bridging”).When you configure the ISA server as a trihomed DMZ, you are creating a routed connection between the external interface and the DMZ segment. The fact that the ISA server acts as a mere packet filtering router between the external interface and the DMZ segment is something you should consider before implementing the trihomed DMZ.While a packet filtering router certainly has its place, you might want a bit more access control over what moves into and out of your DMZ than what a packet filtering router has to offer. The packets moving between the external interface of the ISA server and the DMZ segment are not subject to the Firewall or Web Proxy services’ access policies.You cannot control inbound or outbound access to and from the DMZ segment using user/group identification and destination sets. In addition, you can’t take advantage of the protection you would receive by NATing between the external interface and the DMZ segment. Access control into and out of the DMZ segment is based solely on: ■
Source IP address
■
Destination IP address
■
Source TCP or UDP port
■
Destination TCP or UDP port
■
ICMP type and code
■
IP Protocol number
The trihomed DMZ configuration introduces a single point of failure. If a network intruder is able to compromise the ISA Server computer configured for a trihomed www.syngress.com
71
72
Chapter 2 • Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ
DMZ, that attacker will have access to the DMZ segment and the internal network. In contrast, if you used a back-to-back DMZ configuration, the intruder would only compromise the external ISA server and have access to the DMZ segment. He would have to start all over again on the internal ISA server in order to access the internal network. If the trihomed DMZ still sounds like something you want to do, then continue reading as we describe how to configure a trihomed DMZ.There are several “gotcha’s” to the trihomed DMZ configuration. Pay close attention and you’ll get it done right the first time!
The Network Layout In our trihomed DMZ lab, we’ll configure the trihomed DMZ according the layout shown in Figure 2.1.There are three network segments: ■
The public network: 192.168.1.0/24
■
The DMZ segment: 192.168.1.0/26 (subnet ID 64)
■
The internal network: 10.0.0.0/24
Note that the DMZ segment hosts will be on a network ID different from the external interface of the ISA server. In this example, we are using a private network ID on the external interface and the DMZ interface. In a production environment, both the external and DMZ interfaces would be connected to public networks. Note that we’ve subnetted the external network ID so that we can represent the situation you’ll run into when subnetting your public address block. Let’s look at the server configuration more closely so that you can use these to configure your own trihomed DMZ test setup.
CLIENTDC Here is the server configuration for the CLIENTDC computer on the internal network. IP Address: 10.0.0.2/24 DG: 10.0.0.1 (the internal interface of the ISA Server) DNS: 10.0.0.2 WINS: 10.0.0.2 DNS Service installed and configured to resolve public host names WINS Service installed Active Directory installed Microsoft Exchange 2000 installed NetBIOS Name: CLIENTDC FQDN: CLIENTDC.internal.net
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ • Chapter 2
Figure 2.1 ISA Server with a Trihomed DMZ Configuration
10.1.1.2/24
10.1.1.1/24 192.168.1.199/24 192.168.1.0/24 192.168.1.33/24 192.168.1.67/24 192.168.1.0/26 192.168.1.69/24 10.0.0.1/24 SMTPDMZ
10.0.0.0/24 10.0.0.2/24 CLIENTDC
ISA Here is the configuration for the internal, external and DMZ interfaces on the ISA server.
Internal Interface IP Address: 10.0.0.1/24 Default Gateway: None DNS: 10.0.0.2 WINS: 10.0.0.2
External Interface IP Address: 192.168.1.33/24
www.syngress.com
73
74
Chapter 2 • Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ Default Gateway: 192.168.1.199 (the internal interface [LAN interface] of the router) DNS: NONE WINS: NONE
DMZ Interface IP Address: 192.168.1.67/26 Default Gateway: None DNS: NONE WINS: NONE DNS Service NOT installed WINS Service NOT installed Active Directory NOT installed NetBIOS Name: TRIHOMEISA FQDN: TRIHOMEISA.internal.net Member of the internal network domain.
DMZSMTPRELAY IP Address: 192.168.1.69/26 DG: 192.168.1.67 (the ISA Server's DMZ interface) DNS: NONE WINS: NONE No services installed except Internet Information Services NetBIOS Name: SMTPDMZ FQDN: SMTPDMZ.external.net
Router The router in this lab is a dual-homed Windows 2000 computer configured as a router using the Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS).
Interface #1 (the DMZ Interface) IP Address: 192.168.1.199/24 Default Gateway: NONE DNS: NONE WINS: NONE
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ • Chapter 2
Interface #2 (the Public Interface) IP Address: 10.1.1.1 Default Gateway: NONE DNS: NONE WINS: NONE NetBIOS name: ROUTER FQDN: N/A No services installed other than RRAS
Laptop (External Network Client) IP Address: 10.1.1.2/24 DG: 10.1.1.1 (the public interface of the router) DNS: 10.0.0.2 WINS: 10.0.0.2 No services installed NetBIOS name: EXTERNALCLNT FQDN: N/A
This configuration is pretty much the standard one we’ll been using throughout the book.The primary difference is that Exchange 2000 is installed on a domain controller on the internal network.We did this so we could test the SMTP relay server on the DMZ segment’s ability to forward SMTP messages to Exchange 2000 Server’s SMTP service on the internal network. Note the default gateway configuration on the DMZ host machine.The default gateway for all hosts on the DMZ segment is the IP address of the ISA Server interface connected to the DMZ segment. One of the more common errors we see is that ISA Server administrators configure the DMZ hosts to use the external interface (or even the internal interface) of the ISA server as the default gateway.
Configuring the ISA Server You should plan your ISA Server configuration in advance, and then configure the server accordingly.The reason for this is the ISA server doesn’t like you to add and remove interfaces after the ISA Server software is installed.This is not to say that you can’t add and remove interfaces, it’s just that you might run into unexpected and difficult to troubleshoot problems if you do. It’s a far superior decision to install and configure the interfaces on the ISA Server computer before you actually install the ISA Server software. www.syngress.com
75
76
Chapter 2 • Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ
There will be times when you need to add or remove an interface after installing the ISA Server software. One way to make sure that nothing expected happens is to uninstall ISA Server and then reinstall it after adding or removing the interface.The drawback of this approach is that you need to reconfigure the ISA server.You can use one of the available import/export scripts to do this, but these scripts don’t store the entire server configuration (such as the SMTP filter settings).
ISA SERVER ALERT You can’t use the ISA Server integrated backup file together with an ntbackup of ISA Server folder hierarchy and the system state because the system state is no longer valid after adding or removing an interface. The ISA Server integrated backup file is only useful for restoring a previous configuration on the same ISA Server installation. If you uninstall and reinstall, the integrated backup file will be of no use.
Use the following procedure to add or remove an interface: 1. Go into the Services applet in the Administrative Tools menu and set the startup type of the following services to disabled: ■
Microsoft Web Proxy
■
Microsoft Firewall
■
Microsoft ISA Server Control
■
Microsoft Schedule Content Download
■
Microsoft H.323 Gatekeeper
2. Shut down the ISA server and add the interface. 3. Start the ISA server and log in as an administrator. 4. After adding the new interface, configure the TCP/IP settings for that interface. If you removed an interface, there’s nothing more you need to do. 5. Go back into the Services applet in the Administrative Tools menu and set the startup type for each of the ISA Server services to automatic. 6. Restart the ISA server. All the services should start up normally. Confirm that the ISA Services started normally by checking the Application log in the Event Viewer. ISA Server also doesn’t appreciate it if you change the IP address on any of its interfaces while the ISA Server services are running.You might want to change IP
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ • Chapter 2
addressing information on the interfaces while working with your trihomed ISA Server setup, as it’s common to test out different subnetting configurations. If you want to change IP addressing information on the ISA Server computer’s interfaces after ISA Server is installed, perform the following procedure: 1. At the command prompt, type net stop mspfltex and press Enter to stop the services listed. 2. Next, type net stop gksvc and press Enter to stop the Gatekeeper service. 3. Now, type net stop IPNAT and press Enter to stop the NAT driver. 4. Change the IP addressing information on the interface of your choice. 5. After changing the IP addressing information, type net start mspfltex at the command prompt and press Enter. 6. Type net start IPNAT and press Enter to start the ISA Server NAT driver. 7. After starting the packet filter extensions and the NAT driver, type net start isactrl to start the ISA Server Control Service. 8. Start the Web Proxy and Firewall services by using net start “Microsoft Web Proxy” and net start “Microsoft Firewall” (the quotation marks are required). The ISA Server services should start up without problems and you won’t need to restart the ISA Server computer.
Ping Testing the Connections We agree that ping is one of the most useful tools in our network diagnostics armamentarium.This is especially true when testing connectivity between the computer interfaces participating in your trihomed DMZ configuration.This brings us our first challenge: the default settings on the ISA server do not allow us to ping any of the interfaces we need to test in our trihomed DMZ.
ISA SERVER ALERT Perform this testing only when the ISA server is not connected to the Internet. Although ISA Server is able to handle denial of service (DoS) exploits based on ping, allowing ping requests to the external interface is considered a security risk. Enable the ping filters during your testing while not connected to the Internet, and then disable the ping filters when testing is done and before you connect the server to the Internet.
www.syngress.com
77
78
Chapter 2 • Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ
There are several packet filters included in the default ISA Server configuration: ■
ICMP unreachable in
■
ICMP timeout in
■
ICMP source quench
■
ICMP ping response (in)
■
ICMP outbound
■
DNS filter
■
DHCP client
The ICMP unreachable in packet filter allows the ISA server to receive ICMP unreachable messages from routers on the Internet.The ICMP timeout in packet filter allows the ISA server to receive ICMP timeout messages from Internet routers.These ICMP timeout messages are critical to the functioning of tracert, so if you want to use tracert to test external network hosts, don’t delete that filter! The ICMP source quench filter allows the ISA server to receive ICMP source quench messages from upstream routers.The source quench message allows routers to tell the ISA server to slow down sending data because the router sending the message is too busy.The ICMP ping response (in) filter allows the ISA server to receive ICMP query responses to an outbound ping request. If the ISA server did not have this filter, it would be able to send outbound pings (ICMP query requests), but wouldn’t be able to accept the ping responses (ICMP query responses).
NOTE Many cable companies employ DHCP technologies that prevent the ISA server from rebinding the same IP address. When the ISA server tries to use a DHCP request message to rebind its IP address, it receives a NACK from the DHCP server and must go through the DHCP discover process. This keeps the ISA server acting as a DHCP client from keeping the same IP address across lease periods. The cable companies believe this will discourage users from setting up Internet servers (such as Web, FTP, and SMTP) on their connections. You can use Jim Harrison’s ISA_IP_Refresh.vbs tool to get around this problem. Just schedule this tool to run before 50 percent of your lease period runs out. Make sure to make this a recurring schedule. Download this tool at http://isatools.org.
The ICMP outbound filter allows all ICMP message types and codes outbound from the ISA server and from the internal network.The ISA Server computer will always be www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ • Chapter 2
able to use this filter, but on the internal network, only SecureNAT clients will be able to use this filter. If an internal network client is configured as only a Firewall and/or Web Proxy client, it won’t be able to use the ICMP outbound filter. Only the SecureNAT client configuration can use non-TCP/UDP protocols. The DNS filter allows the ISA server to send and receive DNS queries and perform its duties as proxy DNS server for Web Proxy and Firewall clients.The DHCP client filter allows the ISA server to use DHCP on the external interface.While this isn’t an optimal situation, the ISA server can support DHCP on its external interface.
Creating an Inbound ICMP Ping Query Packet Filter on the ISA Server External Interface We need packet filters to allow ping testing.The first interface we should test is the ISA server’s external interface. A packet filter to allow inbound ICMP Ping Query must be created in order to ping the external interface of the ISA server. Perform the following steps to create the inbound ICMP Ping Query packet filter: 1. In the ISA Management console, expand your server name and then expand the Access Policies node. Right-click on the IP Packet Filters node, point to New, and then click Filter. 2. Type the name of the filter on the first page of the IP Packet Filter Wizard (Figure 2.2). In this example, we’ll call it ICMP Ping Query (in) and click Next. Figure 2.2 The New IP Packet Filter Welcome Page
www.syngress.com
79
80
Chapter 2 • Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ
3. On the Filter Mode page (Figure 2.3), select Allow packet transmission and click Next. Figure 2.3 The Filter Mode Page
4. On the Filter Type page (Figure 2.4), select the Predefined option button and click the Down arrow in the drop-down list box. Select the ICMP ping query filter and click Next. Figure 2.4 The Filter Type Page
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ • Chapter 2
5. On the Local Computer page (Figure 2.5) select the IP address on which you want to receive the ICMP ping query messages. In this example, we have a single IP address bound to the external interface of the ISA server. Because there is a single IP address on the external interface, we can select the Default IP addresses for each external interface on the ISA Server computer. This allows 192.168.1.33 to accept ICMP ping query messages.What if we had multiple IP addresses bound to the external interface of the ISA server and we wanted to allow inbound ICMP ping query requests on each address? In that case, we need to create several inbound ICMP ping query packet filters; one for each IP address bound to the external interface of the ISA server. There is no way to create a single “global” inbound ICMP ping query packet filter. Select the default option and click Next. Figure 2.5 The Local Computer Page
6. On the Remote Computers page (Figure 2.6), select which remote computer will be able to send ICMP ping query messages. In this case, we want to allow all remote computers to send the query. Select All remote computers and click Next. 7. Review the settings on the last page of the wizard and click Finish. 8. From the external client computer (Laptop), open a command prompt and type ping 192.168.1.33.You will see replies to your ICMP ping queries.The reason for this is the ISA server has a packet filter allowing it to receive your ping query messages.The ISA server already had a pre-built packet filter that allowed it to respond, the ICMP outbound packet filter.
www.syngress.com
81
82
Chapter 2 • Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ
Figure 2.6 The Remote Computers Page
9. Go back to the client computer and type ping –t 192.168.1.33. Return to the ISA server and right-click on the ICMP ping query packet filter you just created and click the Disable command. Notice that it takes a few seconds for the packet filter to turn itself off. Once you see the ping queries time out, go back to the ISA Server computer and enable the inbound ICMP ping query packet filter.Watch how long it takes for the packets to be allowed.
Creating an Inbound ICMP Ping Query Packet Filter to the DMZ Host’s Interface Creating packet filters to allow access to the external interface of the ISA server is easy. You can use the built-in packet filter types when you run the wizard and get it right every time.Things aren’t quite so straightforward when you create packet filters to allow access to the hosts on the DMZ segment. Let’s create a packet filter that allows inbound ICMP query messages to the DMZ host at 192.168.1.69 (refer to Figure 2.1 to refresh your memory on the setup).The packet filter looks like what you see in Figures 2.7 and 2.8.This packet filter allows inbound ICMP query requests to the DMZ host computer. Notice in Figure 2.8 that we included the IP address of the specific DMZ host’s IP address. If you want to allow pings to all the hosts on the DMZ segment, you could select the These computers (on the perimeter network) option and enter the network ID and subnet mask for the DMZ segment.
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ • Chapter 2
Figure 2.7 The Filter Type Tab on the DMZ Ping Query Packet Filter
Figure 2.8 The Local Computer Tab on the DMZ Ping Query Packet Filter
ISA SERVER ALERT You don’t need a packet filter to allow ICMP queries to the external interface of the ISA server in order to allow the ISA server to pass through the ICMP query to the DMZ host. This means you can deny ICMP Query messages to the external interface of the ISA server and allow ICMP Query messages to a host on the DMZ segment.
www.syngress.com
83
84
Chapter 2 • Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ
Go to the external network client computer (Laptop) and ping 192.168.1.69 after you create the DMZ Ping Query (in) packet filter.What happened? It didn’t work! Why? The reason the ping request from the external network client didn’t work is that there wasn’t a packet filter allowing an outbound response to the incoming ICMP ping query packet.You might think that if you created a packet filter allowing incoming ICMP ping query packets that the ISA server would create a “dynamic packet filter” that would automatically open a filter for a response—it doesn’t. The packet filter allowing the DMZ host to reply to the incoming ICMP ping query looks like what you see in Figures 2.9 and 2.10. Figure 2.9 The Filter Type Tab for the DMZ ICMP Response Packet Filter
Figure 2.10 The Local Computer Tab on the DMZ Ping Response Packet Filter
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ • Chapter 2
ICMP Echo Reply (ping response) messages have a Type value of 0 and a Code value of 0. ICMP Echo Request (ping query) messages have a Type value of 8 and a Code value of 0.
NOTE The Internet Message Control Protocol (ICMP) is used for more than just ping and tracert diagnostic testing. For a good overview of ICMP, check out Microsoft’s KB article Q170292 “Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) Basics.”
Now with the two filters DMZ Ping Query (in) and DMZ Ping Response (out) the DMZ host computer will be able to accept the ping queries and send out ping responses. Go to the external client computer (Laptop) and ping the DMZ host at 192.168.1.69. Bingo! It works.
Pinging the ISA Server Interfaces from the DMZ Hosts The DMZ host needs to be able to communicate with its default gateway, which is the IP address of the ISA Server interface on the DMZ segment. It’s important to test connectivity with the DMZ interface, and ping is a good tool to test connectivity. There’s just one problem: you can’t ever ping the ISA Server interfaces from a DMZ host! It seems somewhat strange that a DMZ host can’t ping a local interface, especially when that interface is the DMZ host’s default gateway. It appears that it’s the responsibility of the ISA Server Control Service (isactrl) for blocking the ICMP echo requests from the DMZ host to the ISA Server’s DMZ interface. If you go to the command prompt and type net stop isactrl, it will stop a number of services.You’ll also notice that you can now ping the ISA Server DMZ interface from the DMZ host computer. If you type net start isactrl at the ISA Server computer, only the ISA Server Control Service will start; the Firewall service will not automatically start with it.Try pinging the ISA Server’s DMZ interface now. It doesn’t work! Since we can’t create any packet filter or set of packet filters to allow pinging any of the ISA Server interfaces from a DMZ host, we’ll have to find another method to test connectivity between the ISA server and the DMZ host.The best way to do this is to configure packet filters that allow external network clients to ping DMZ hosts.
Creating a Global ICMP Packet Filter for DMZ Hosts In the previous examples, we tried to be selective and created packet filters for very specific traffic. In actual practice you might find it better to create an “all purpose”
www.syngress.com
85
86
Chapter 2 • Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ
ICMP packet filter that will allow all hosts on the DMZ segment to use ICMP to ping external hosts and to be pinged by external hosts. Figures 2.11 and 2.12 describe this custom packet filter. Notice in this DMZ ICMP All (both) packet filter that traffic is allowed in both directions for all ICMP types and all ICMP codes. For the Local Computer, we include the entire IP subnet rather than a particular host on the subject.This makes it simple to ping any host on the DMZ segment from an external host, and to ping an external host from any DMZ host. Figure 2.11 The Filter Type Tab on the DMZ ICMP All Packet Filter
Figure 2.12 The Local Computer Tab on the DMZ ICMP All Packet Filter
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ • Chapter 2
Publishing DMZ SMTP Servers SMTP servers often find themselves on DMZ segments.The SMTP server is a good candidate for the DMZ segment because it must accept incoming SMTP messages from Internet-based SMTP servers.This direct contact with Internet servers makes the SMTP server computer vulnerable to attack, and thus a candidate for a DMZ segment. You can create a packet filter to allow incoming SMTP messages to the SMTP server on the DMZ.Your first thought might be that you can use the predefined SMTP server packet filter—wrong! The reason for this is the SMTP server needs to negotiate a series of instructions with the SMTP client machine. If you use the predefined SMTP server packet filter (when you run the Packet Filter Wizard), you won’t be able to receive SMTP mail on the DMZ SMTP server. Try this: Run the Packet Filter Wizard on the ISA server. On the Filter Type page, select the SMTP filter. Configure the filter to allow SMTP traffic to the DMZ host computer and allow all remote computers to use the filter. Figure 2.13 shows the predefined SMTP selected on the Filter Type page of the Packet Filter Wizard.This SMTP packet filter allows inbound access to TCP port 25. Figure 2.13 The Filter Type Page
After creating the SMTP filter, go to the external network client, open a command prompt, and try to telnet to the SMTP service on the DMZ host. Using our network diagram, you would go to the Laptop computer, open a command prompt, type telnet 192.168.1.69 25, and press Enter (Figure 2.14).
www.syngress.com
87
88
Chapter 2 • Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ
Figure 2.14 The Telnet Attempt Fails
As we discussed earlier, these predefined packet filters work just fine when the service you want to make available is listening on the external interface of the ISA server. For example, if you were running Exchange 2000 on the ISA server itself, you could create an SMTP packet filter using the predefined SMTP packet filter settings found in the Packet Filter Wizard and the packet filter would work great! However, as you’ve seen, the predefined packet filters don’t work very well for DMZ hosts. Since the predefined packet filter doesn’t work, you’ll need to create a custom SMTP packet filter. Use the Custom option in the Packet Filter Wizard. On the Filter Settings page, configure the options as shown in Figure 2.15.This is a bidirectional filter.This custom filter allows all TCP source ports to send messages to TCP port 25 on the DMZ host computer. Moreover, because the packet filter is bidirectional, the DMZ host computer can send messages to all ports from its own TCP port 25.This allows the SMTP client on the external network to send messages, and the SMTP server on the DMZ segment to receive responses (Figure 2.16). After creating your bidirectional SMTP server packet filter, go back to the external network client and try to telnet to the DMZ SMTP Server host computer again.You should see something like what appears in Figure 2.17.The successful telnet session indicates that the channel between the external client and the SMTP server on the DMZ segment is intact.
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ • Chapter 2
Figure 2.15 Creating a Custom Filter for SMTP Messages
Figure 2.16 Inbound and Outbound Packets Allowed by the Custom SMTP Packet Filter
Outbound packets: Source Port TCP 25 Destination Port ANY
Inbound packets: Source Port ANY Destination Port TCP 25
DMZ Host Internal network
www.syngress.com
89
90
Chapter 2 • Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ
Figure 2.17 Custom SMTP Packet Filter Allows a Successful Telnet Session
Publishing a DMZ SMTP Mail Relay Server In the last section, you saw how you can publish an SMTP server on a DMZ segment. Let’s now take this one step further and see how you publish an SMTP mail relay server on the DMZ segment. The DMZ host acting as an SMTP relay will relay mail to another SMTP server under your control. In our example network, the SMTP server on the DMZ segment is configured to relay mail to the Exchange server on the internal network.We need to fulfill the following requirements to make this scenario work: ■
A packet filter to allow incoming SMTP messages to the DMZ mail relay server.
■
Remote domains configured on the mail relay server to allow relay for mail domains under your administrative control.
■
A second packet filter to allow the SMTP mail relay server to send mail to the Exchange 2000 SMTP server on the internal network.
■
A server publishing rule that makes the internal network SMTP server available to the DMZ SMTP relay server.There are two ways you can do this: 1) configure the server publishing rule to allow connections on the external interface, and 2) configure the server publishing rule to allow connections from the DMZ interface.
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ • Chapter 2
Figure 2.18 shows our goals in terms of network traffic flow for the first scenario: 1. A packet filter allowing inbound TCP 25 from any port.This packet filter allows any Internet host to send SMTP messages to the mail relay server on the DMZ segment. 2. A second packet filter allows the DMZ SMTP relay server to send packets to the IP address on the external interface of the ISA server that is used to publish the internal network Exchange 2000 SMTP service.We need to create this packet filter to allow the DMZ SMTP server to have access to the server publishing rule. 3. A server publishing rule that allows the DMZ mail relay server to send packets to the internal network Exchange 2000 SMTP service. Figure 2.18 Publishing a DMZ Mail Relay Server 1
Packet filter allows inbound TCP 25 from external network hosts
2
Packet filter allows DMZ SMTP relay to send packets to the external IP address of the ISA Server used in the SMTP Server Publishing Rule
3
Server Publishing Rule allows the DMZ SMTP relay to send packets to the internal network Exchange 2000 SMTP service 2 3
1
DMZ Host Internal network
The packet filter you created to allow incoming SMTP messages to the DMZ mail relay server is the same as the one you created in the previous section (Figure 2.15). However, in the first scenario, you need a second packet filter to allow the SMTP mail www.syngress.com
91
92
Chapter 2 • Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ
relay to send mail to the internal network Exchange 2000 SMTP service (the DMZ mail relay server acts as an SMTP client in this circumstance). Figures 2.19 through 2.21 demonstrate the packet filter you need to create to allow the SMTP relay server to send SMTP messages to the published Exchange 2000 SMTP server when the Exchange 2000 SMTP service is published on the external interface. Figure 2.19 Packet Filter Allows Outbound TCP 25
Figure 2.20 Limiting the Packet Filter to a DMZ Host
Note this packet filter’s level of selectivity. On the Local Computer tab (Figure 2.20), you see that it applies only to the SMTP mail relay server. Only the SMTP mail relay www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ • Chapter 2
server will be able to use this filter to send out messages to TCP port 25.You can see on the Remote Computer tab (Figure 2.21) that this filter will only allow outgoing messages to TCP port 25 to be sent to 192.168.1.33.This is the IP address on the external interface of the ISA server on which we will publish the internal network Exchange server’s SMTP service. Figure 2.21 Setting the Remote Computer Limitation for the Packet Filter
ISA SERVER ALERT Remember that the DMZ segment and the external interface of the ISA server are on different network IDs. In Figures 2.19 through 2.21, notice that the DMZ host is IP address 192.168.1.69 and the external interface of the ISA server is at 192.168.1.33. These might appear to be on the same network ID if you’re used to working with classfull addressing. However, the DMZ segment uses 26 bits for its network ID and is on subnet ID 64, which puts the DMZ segment on a different network ID from the external interface.
You need to create remote domains on the SMTP mail relay server to prevent your DMZ SMTP server from becoming an open relay.The remote domains allow the SMTP mail relay server to receive mail for mail domains under your administrative control and reject incoming mail for all other mail domains.This prevents spammers from using your DMZ mail relay server as a gateway for their evil spamming deeds! Perform the following steps to create the remote domain, and configure the remote domain to relay to the published SMTP server:
www.syngress.com
93
94
Chapter 2 • Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ
1. Open the Internet Information Services console from the Administrative Tools menu. 2. Expand the server name and then expand the Default SMTP Virtual Server node. 3. Right-click the Domains node, point to New, and click Domain. 4. On the first page of the New SMTP Domain Wizard (Figure 2.22), select the Remote option and click Next. Figure 2.22 Specifying a Remote Domain
5. On the Select Domain Name page of the New SMTP Domain Wizard (Figure 2.23), type in the name of your mail domain. For example, if your Exchange server will be accepting mail for your users at external.net, type in external.net in the Name text box. Click Finish. 6. Double-click on the remote domain you created. Place a check mark in the Allow incoming mail to be relayed to this domain check box (Figure 2.24).This allows the SMTP service to forward mail sent to this mail domain. Select the Forward all mail to smart host option, and then type in the IP address of the external interface of the ISA server used in the server publishing rule to publish the internal network SMTP server.The reason why you put the external address of the ISA server is that the external interface is listening on behalf of the internal network’s SMTP server. It is important that you put the IP address in brackets. If you don’t, the SMTP server will treat it as an FQDN and try to resolve the IP address to an IP address! Click Apply, and then click OK.
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ • Chapter 2
Figure 2.23 The Select Domain Name Page
Figure 2.24 Configuring the Relay
ISA SERVER ALERT It’s extremely important that you use square brackets when you configure the IP address of the smart host. If you use parentheses, it will not work! If you find that messages are not being forwarded to your smart host, double check that you included the straight brackets ( [ ] ) in your smart host configuration.
www.syngress.com
95
96
Chapter 2 • Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ
The final step is to create the server publishing rule for the internal network SMTP server.The publishing rule includes a client address set that we’ll use to prevent any server except the one on the DMZ from sending mail to it. 1. Expand the Publishing node in the left pane of the ISA Management console, and right-click the Server Publishing Rules node. Point to New and click Rule. 2. Give the rule a name on the first page of the New Server Publishing Rule Wizard. In this example, we’ll name the rule Exchange SMTP Service. Click Next. 3. On the Address Mapping page (Figure 2.25), put in the internal IP address of the Exchange server and the IP address on the external interface of the ISA server on which you want to listen for incoming SMTP messages. Click Next. Figure 2.25 Creating the Address Mapping
4. On the Protocol Settings page, select the SMTP Server protocol. Click Next. 5. On the Client Type page, select the Specific computers (client address sets) option. 6. On the Client Sets page (Figure 2.26), click Add to add the client address set. In this example, we’ve already created a client address set named 69.The IP address 192.168.1.69 is included in this client address set.When we limit access using this client address set, only the computer with the source IP address 192.168.1.69 will be able to use this rule to send incoming SMTP
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ • Chapter 2
messages to the internal network Exchange server. Click Next after adding the client address set. Figure 2.26 Creating a Client Address Set
7. Review the settings on the last page of the wizard. If they are correct, click Finish. If you made a mistake, click Back to get to the place where you can fix it. That’s it! The only thing left is to add the address of your SMTP relay server to a public DNS server so that Internet hosts can access the MX records for your mail domain. External SMTP clients and servers will be able to send mail to the SMTP mail relay server on the DMZ.The SMTP mail relay server forwards the mail to the internal network Exchange server via the external IP address on the ISA server used in the SMTP server publishing rule. With this setup, no computer on the Internet can send mail directly to the internal network SMTP server via the server publishing rule, because the client address set in the SMTP server publishing rule limits access to the rule so that only the SMTP mail relay server on the DMZ segment can use it.You can test this yourself by trying to telnet into the internal network Exchange server from a host other than the one included in the client address set. It won’t work! The first scenario shows how you can use packet filters to allow the DMZ host to send traffic to the external interface of the ISA server to access the published Exchange 2000 server. Another way to allow only the SMTP mail relay server on the DMZ segment to access the Exchange 2000 SMTP service on the internal network is to use the DMZ interface IP address in the server publishing rule. In this case, the ISA server will
www.syngress.com
97
98
Chapter 2 • Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ
only listen for SMTP messages on the DMZ interface; it will not listen for SMTP messages on the external interface. In this case, you need to configure the following (Figure 2.27): ■
A packet filter allowing external network hosts to send SMTP messages to the DMZ mail relay server
■
Remote domains on the DMZ mail relay server
■
A server publishing rule that publishes the internal network Exchange 2000 SMTP service to the IP address on the DMZ interface of the ISA server
Figure 2.27 SMTP Server Publishing Rule on the DMZ Interface 1
Packet filter allows inbound SMTP messages to SMTP relay server
2
Smart host configuration causes SMTP relay to forward SMTP messages to DMZ interface used in Server Publishing Rule
3
Server Publishing Rule forwards SMTP messages to Exchange 2000 SMTP service
3
1
2 DMZ Host Internal network
This configuration limits connections to the Exchange 2000 SMTP server publishing rule to the IP address of the ISA server’s DMZ interface. In this case, you do not need to create a packet filter to allow the DMZ host access to the IP address of the ISA server’s DMZ interface because the DMZ interface is local to the SMTP relay server. The server publishing rule should be configured to allow only the DMZ mail relay server access to the server publishing rule.
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ • Chapter 2
Publishing a Web Server Publishing a Web server on the DMZ segment is easy. Create a packet filter that allows bidirectional traffic with the destination being TCP port 80, from any source port. Select the Custom option in the New Packet Filter Wizard, and then use the settings shown in Figure 2.28. Figure 2.28 HTTP Packet Filter
Although you don’t get all the frills, bells, and whistles you get when you publish a Web site using a Web publishing rule, publishing a site on a DMZ segment using a packet filter has one big advantage: you get the actual source IP address of the host making the request in the Web server’s log files (Figure 2.29).This is a limitation of Web publishing; you could also get the source IP address of the Internet host in the Web server’s log files by putting the Web server on the internal network and using a server publishing rule.
Publishing an FTP Server on a Trihomed DMZ Segment The File Transfer Protocol (FTP) is one of the most popular, but also the most misunderstood protocol.We get questions every day from router and firewall administrators asking why a particular FTP client or server configuration isn’t working. If these administrators understood how FTP works, they could easily solve their FTP problems. Once you understand FTP and how it affects your firewall or router configuration, you’ll be in much better shape to fix your FTP-related problems.
www.syngress.com
99
100
Chapter 2 • Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ
Figure 2.29 Log File Showing the IP Address of the Internet Host Computer
How FTP Works FTP is a messy protocol in that it requires multiple connections, sometimes in both directions. In the ISA Server world, we call protocols that require multiple connections “complex protocols.” How connections are made depend on the FTP protocol mode. There are two FTP modes: ■
Normal or PORT or Active
■
Passive or PASV
Normal or PORT or Active Mode FTP When an Active mode FTP client sends a request to an FTP server, the client opens two response ports.The first is used to send a request to the FTP server on the server’s TCP port 21.This creates the FTP command channel. FTP commands and responses are sent to and from the FTP server and client through the command channel.The second response port is used to accept data from the FTP server. When the FTP client establishes the command channel link, the FTP client sends over the command channel a request for data. Included in this request is a response port (the second port opened by the FTP client) to which the FTP server can send the data. The FTP server sends the data from the FTP server’s TCP port 20 to the response port indicated by the FTP client in the PORT command. For example, a PORT mode FTP client wants to obtain a file from an FTP server. The sequence of events would go like this: www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ • Chapter 2
101
1. FTP client opens response ports TCP 6000 and TCP 6001 (random ports in the high number range). 2. FTP client sends a request to open a command channel from its TCP port 6000 to the FTP server’s TCP port 21. 3. FTP server sends an “OK” from its TCP port 21 to the FTP client’s TCP port 6000 (the command channel link).The command channel is established at this point. 4. FTP client sends a data request (PORT command) to the FTP server over the command channel.The FTP client includes in the PORT command the data port number it opened to receive data. In this example, the FTP client opened TCP port 6001 to receive the data. 5. FTP server opens a new inbound connection to the FTP client on the port indicated by the FTP client in the PORT command.The FTP server’s source port is TCP port 20. In this example, the FTP server sends data from its own TCP port 20 to the FTP client’s TCP port 6001. Note in this conversation that two connections were established: an outbound connection initiated by the FTP client, and an inbound connection established by the FTP server. It’s also important to realize that the information contained in the PORT command (sent over the command channel) is stored in the data portion of the packet.
Passive or PASV Mode FTP Passive or PASV mode is the most popular implementation of FTP, the reason being that PASV mode is a bit more secure because it does not require you to allow new inbound connections. Most popular browsers default to PASV mode FTP when the browser is used to access FTP sites. One of the major advantages of PASV mode is that the FTP server does not need to create a new inbound connection when responding to the FTP client’s request for data. All new connections are outbound connections. As we’ll see later, this can make PASV FTP more firewall friendly. The PASV mode FTP client opens two response ports when it initiates a connection with the FTP server.This is similar to how the PORT mode FTP client behaves. The initial connection establishes the command channel.The FTP server accepts the command channel request on its own TCP port 21. After establishing the command channel, the FTP client sends to the FTP server a PASV command through the command channel.The PASV command tells the FTP server to open a port for the data channel.The FTP server opens a TCP port in the ephemeral port range (>1023) and tells the FTP client the port number opened via the command channel. Once the FTP client obtains the TCP port number for the data
www.syngress.com
102
Chapter 2 • Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ
channel, the FTP client initiates a new connection to the FTP server to establish the data channel. For example, a PASV mode FTP client wants to obtain data from an FTP server. The sequence of events would go like this: 1. FTP client opens response ports TCP 6000 and TCP 6001 (random ports in the ephemeral port range). 2. FTP client sends a request to open a command channel from its TCP port 6000 to the FTP server’s TCP port 21. 3. FTP server sends an “OK” from its TCP port 21 to the FTP client’s TCP port 6000.The command channel is now established. 4. FTP client sends a PASV command requesting that the FTP server open a port number that the FTP client can connect to establish the data channel. 5. FTP server sends over the command channel the TCP port number with which the FTP client can initiate a connection to establish the data channel. In this example, the FTP server opens port 7000. 6. FTP client opens a new connection from its own port TCP 6001 to the FTP server’s data channel 7000. Data transfer takes place through this channel.This represents a new outbound request made by the FTP client. Note that the PASV mode FTP client initiates all connections; the FTP server never needs to create a new connection back to the FTP client.This eliminates the need for the FTP server to create a “backchannel” or a new inbound secondary connection.
Challenges Created by the FTP Protocol Challenges the FTP protocol creates are different depending on whether you’re the client side or the server side firewall administrator. Let’s look at the FTP protocol from the following perspectives: ■
The PORT mode FTP client-side firewall
■
The PORT mode FTP server-side firewall
■
The PASV mode FTP client-side firewall
■
The PASV mode FTP server-side firewall
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ • Chapter 2
103
PORT Mode FTP Client-Side Firewall How do you handle PORT mode requests from your FTP clients? These are the ports you need to allow inbound and outbound to support PORT mode FTP client requests made from behind your firewall: ■
Outbound TCP port 21 (to support the control channel)
■
Inbound TCP ports 1024 and above (to support the data channel)
The packet filters required to support PORT mode FTP clients don’t lead to a very secure firewall/router configuration. Another significant problem is that you must allow new inbound connections (non-ACK packets) access to the internal network. Allowing new, unsolicited inbound connections to such as wide range of ports represents a definite security concern. One way of dealing with this problem is to allow inbound connections to the ephemeral ports from source port TCP 20. In this way, you limit access to what is assumed to be the FTP server data port.The problem is that there are a number of tools available allowing you to set your source port manually.You cannot be sure that incoming connections from TCP port 20 are actually sourcing from an FTP server.The reason for this is that packet filters do not examine the data portion of the request. You can improve on the situation somewhat by limiting inbound access to the high-number ports only from TCP port 20 and from a limited number of IP addresses of trusted FTP servers.The major drawback here is that you must be able to identify (in advance) the trusted FTP server addresses.You still have to be concerned with someone spoofing a source port and IP address.
PORT Mode FTP Server-Side Firewall What if you’re the firewall/router administrator who has to deal with an FTP server behind your firewall? In this case, you need to open the following ports: ■
Outbound TCP ports 1024 and above (to allow the FTP server to connect to the FTP client’s source port)
■
Inbound TCP port 21 (to allow the FTP client to establish the control channel)
This is less hazardous than the situation the FTP client-side firewall administrator has to handle. However, it’s still considered poor security practice to allow such a wide range of ports outbound access just to support a single server application. Any client on the internal network will have access to network services on the Internet that use the high-number TCP ports for a primary connection.
www.syngress.com
104
Chapter 2 • Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ
One way to improve the situation is to allow outbound access to the high-number ports only when the source port is TCP port 20. In this way, you can assume that only the FTP servers behind the firewall are able to connect to these high-number ports on the Internet.You could strengthen this even more by limiting access from TCP port 20 to the high-number ports to the IP addresses of the FTP servers on your internal network.You still have to deal with problems of spoofed IP addresses and manipulated port numbers.
PASV Mode FTP Client-Side Firewall If you’re the firewall administrator on the PASV mode FTP client side, you’ll need to open the following ports: ■
Outbound TCP port 21 and TCP ports 1025 and above (to allow the FTP client outbound access to the FTP server’s control channel and data ports)
■
Inbound TCP ports 1025 and above (to allow the FTP server to send data to the FTP client)
The port requirements aren’t that different from those required by the PORT mode FTP client, with the exception that the PASV mode FTP client requires outbound access to TCP ports 1025 and above.While this doesn’t seem like a big difference, it is in fact a tremendous difference. In order to allow the PASV mode FTP client outbound access to the FTP server, you must let these clients have outbound access to all high-number ports. Since you have no way of determining in advance what high-number port the FTP server will assign to the data channel, all the high-numbered ports must all be opened outbound.
ISA SERVER DEFON 1 Note in this discussion that we’re talking about nonstateful packet filters. In this case, you need to open ports to allow the FTP server to send packets to the high-number ports the FTP client software opens to send and receive data. With a stateful firewall, you will not need to open these ports for PASV connections, because the response sent by the FTP server is over a connection already established by the FTP client. ISA Server is a stateful firewall when using protocol rules and publishing rules, but it is not stateful when passing packets to hosts on a public address trihomed DMZ segment.
This might be okay if you had a way to ensure that only the FTP clients access FTP servers on these ports.The problem is you cannot easily control what applications access what ports. Even if you did limit just FTP clients to these ports, you would be blocking other applications access to the high-number ports—a less than ideal situation! www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ • Chapter 2
105
To add insult to injury, you must also allow inbound access to all high-number ports (assuming that your firewall is not stateful).The result is that you must allow inbound and outbound access to all high-number ports—an untenable security configuration. One way you can improve the packet-filtering situation is to limit access to outbound TCP 21 from certain clients. However, you still run into the spoofing problem. ISA Server solves this problem by using protocol rules, which can be applied to client address sets and/or users/groups.
PASV Mode FTP Server-Side Firewall These are the ports you need to open on the server side of the PASV mode connection: ■
Outbound TCP ports 1025 and above (so the FTP server behind the firewall can send responses to the FTP client)
■
Inbound TCP port 21 and TCP ports 1025 and above (so the FTP client can establish the command channel and the data channel)
This is the converse of the packet filter configuration required to support the FTP client.TCP ports 1024 and above must be opened for inbound and outbound access. You could get a modicum of control by limiting what IP addresses have access, but you run into the same problems as you do with the PASV clients.
Using Packet Filters to Publish the PORT Mode FTP Server Now that you understand FTP better, let’s get to the business of creating packet filters to support FTP servers in the DMZ. Let’s create packet filters to support the PORT mode FTP server. PORT mode requires that we allow inbound requests to TCP port 21 from any port, and outbound requests from TCP 20 to any port. Figure 2.30 shows the configuration for each of the packet filters. The first packet filter allows the inbound connection to TCP port 21 and establishes the control channel (Figure 2.31). It is set with the following parameters: ■
Filter name FTP 21 (in)
■
IP protocol TCP
■
Direction Both
■
Local port Fixed port
■
Local port number 21
■
Remote port All ports www.syngress.com
106
Chapter 2 • Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ
Figure 2.30 Creating Packet Filters to Support a PORT Mode FTP Server
1
Packet filter allows inbound TCP 21 from any IP address and any high port number
2
Packet filter allows outbound 1024 and above from the IP address of the FTP server at its TCP port 20
1
2
Internal network
DMZ FTP Server
Figure 2.31 Packet Filter to Allow Inbound TCP Port 21
The second packet filter allows the FTP server on the DMZ segment to send data out its TCP port 20 to the dynamic port opened by the FTP client computer (Figure 2.32). www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ • Chapter 2 ■
Filter name FTP 20 (out)
■
IP protocol TCP
■
Direction Both
■
Local port Fixed port
■
Local port number 20
■
Remote port All ports
107
Figure 2.32 Packet Filter to Allow the FTP Server to Respond from TCP Port 20
Using Packet Filters to Publish the PASV Mode FTP Server You can use packet filters to allow access to PASV mode FTP servers on your DMZ segment.The first packet filter allowing creation of the FTP control channel is the same as the one you created to allow PORT mode FTP connections.The second packet filter allows the FTP client on the external network to make the inbound connection request to the FTP server on a high port (Figure 2.33).These are the parameters for the packet filter to support the PASV mode FTP in the DMZ: ■
Filter name FTP PASV (in)
■
IP protocol TCP
■
Direction Both
■
Local port Dynamic
■
Remote port All ports www.syngress.com
108
Chapter 2 • Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ
Figure 2.33 Packet Filter to Allow Access to PASV Mode FTP Server
1
Packet filter allows inbound access to all high ports and outbound access to all high ports 1
Internal network
DMZ FTP Server
Notice that this isn’t the most secure packet filter.This filter allows all high source port connections to all dynamic port (ports 1024 through 5000) connections on the FTP server (Figure 2.34). Figure 2.34 Packet Filter for the PASV Mode FTP Server
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ • Chapter 2
109
Beware the “Allow All” Packet Filter Sometimes you just want to open all ports inbound and outbound to and from the DMZ segment for testing purposes.This “All Open” packet filter configuration is useful for “proof of concept” testing.You definitely don’t want to allow this filter to be active when the server is connected to the Internet. The “All Open” packet filter does not allow all traffic to move into and out of the DMZ segment. For traffic moving to and from the DMZ segment, you need to create “All Open” packet filters for ICMP,TCP, and UDP individually.The “All Open” packet filter requires at least three separate packet filters.
ISA SERVER ALERT Note that these three packet filters do not include an “All Open” IP protocol filter. If you need to allow access to particular IP protocols (such as IP protocol 47 for GRE), then you should create those packet filters separately.
For example, suppose you want to allow all TCP traffic inbound and outbound to and from the DMZ segment. Figure 2.35 shows the Filter Settings page in the New IP Packet Filter Wizard. If you wanted to create an “All Open” packet filter for UDP packets, just change the IP protocol to UDP. Figure 2.35 An “All Open” TCP Packet Filter
An ICMP “All Open” packet filter is shown in Figure 2.36.The IP protocol is set for ICMP.The direction is Both. The Type is All types, and the Code is All Codes.
www.syngress.com
110
Chapter 2 • Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ
Figure 2.36 An “All Open” ICMP Packet Filter
ISA SERVER DEFCON 1 Placing FTP servers in the DMZ segment requires that you open many ports to allow inbound and outbound access. You can get around this problem by placing your FTP servers on the internal network. You can take advantage of the FTP Access application filter when you use server publishing rules to publish FTP servers on the internal network. The FTP Access application filter will manage the ports for you. The FTP application filter will dynamically open the required ports, and then close them when the FTP session is complete. You can even place the FTP server in an internal network, LAT-based DMZ to improve security. We’ll discuss private address, LAT-based DMZ segments in Chapter 4. You’ll learn the inside information on FTP Server Publishing in Chapter 5, “Defense Plan 4: Advanced Server Publishing”.
External Network Clients Cannot Use the DMZ Interface to Connect to the Internal Network People have tried some unusual configurations with the trihomed DMZ setup. One of the most popular is trying to “loop through” the ISA server by publishing an internal network server via a server publishing rule so that the internal server is accessed through the DMZ interface by an external network client. As we covered earlier in our discussion on publishing the SMTP mail relay server, you can create a server publishing rule that listens only on the ISA server’s DMZ interface. www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ • Chapter 2
111
Publishing servers to the DMZ interface works great when the client is a DMZ host. However, publishing servers to the DMZ interface does not work at all if the client is on the external network.The ISA server will not allow external network clients to access the DMZ interface. If you create a server publishing rule that listens on the DMZ interface, only hosts on the DMZ segment will be able to access the internal network server via this server publishing rule. This a nice security benefit of the trihomed DMZ. For example, if you create an SMTP server publishing rule that listens on the DMZ interface, an SMTP mail relay server can forward packets to an internal network SMTP server via the server publishing rule. External network clients, no matter how hard they try, will not be able to access the internal network SMTP server via the server publishing rule because the ISA server will never pass packets from the external interface directly to the DMZ interface. ISA Server likes to be efficient. It makes no sense to loop through the DMZ if you need to communicate with servers on the internal network. If you want external network clients to communicate with servers on the internal network, create a Web or server publishing rule that listens on the external interface of the ISA server. Sure, you can get to the internal network indirectly by using an intermediary computer such as an SMTP mail relay server, but you cannot loop through the DMZ interface to access an internal network server (Figure 2.37). It’s impossible so don’t even try. Figure 2.37 External Network Client Attempting to Loop through the External Interface to the ISA Server DMZ Interface 1
External network client attempts to access the public address DMZ interface on the ISA Server by going directly through the external interface
2
Packet is blocked from accessing the the DMZ interface. External network clients cannot directly access the DMZ interface on the ISA Server
3
Hosts on the DMZ segment can directly access the DMZ interface on the ISA Server
1
2 3 Internal network
DMZ Host
www.syngress.com
112
Chapter 2 • Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ
Summary In this chapter, we covered principles of trihomed DMZ configuration. Packets moving from the external network to the trihomed DMZ segment are always routed. Network Address Translation (NAT) never applies to packets moving between the external network and the trihomed DMZ segment.The reason for this is the trihomed DMZ segment must always contain public addresses. In addition, these packets are not subject to same access policies that control inbound and outbound access through publishing and protocol rules.The ISA server acts as a packet-filtering router instead of providing fullfeatured firewall capabilities available when you use publishing and protocol rules. In the next chapter, we’ll look at how you can take advantage of ISA Server’s full firewall capabilities by creating a private address back-to-back DMZ segment.
Defensive Tactic Fast Track Configuring a Trihomed DMZ ; Trihomed DMZ segments must always use public addresses. ; Access control to and from a trihomed DMZ segment is done with packet
filters. ; “Dynamic” packet filtering is not available when creating packet filters to
allow access to and from the trihomed DMZ segment.You must create explicit packet filters for both inbound access and outbound responses. ; The trihomed DMZ configuration provides a single point of failure. If
possible, you should consider implementing a back-to-back DMZ if you require a non-LAT-based DMZ segment. ; The external interface and the DMZ interface must be on different network
IDs. If you put the external and DMZ interfaces on the same network IDs, you create a bridge.You need to route packets, not bridge them. ; You can install multiple DMZ segments.The “trihomed” DMZ is an example
of a single public-address DMZ segment.You can add more DMZ adapters and have multiple public-address DMZ segments. However, you will need to subnet your block appropriately. ; The predefined packet filters apply to packets arriving at the external interface
of the ISA server.You need to create custom packet filters to allow packets to and from DMZ hosts.
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ • Chapter 2
113
Publishing DMZ SMTP Servers ; SMTP relay servers work well on DMZ segments. ; SMTP relay servers can directly communicate with the DMZ interface. ; External network servers can never directly communicate with the DMZ
interface. ; The SMTP relay on the DMZ needs to be configured with remote domains.
The remote domains are those mail domains over which you have administrative control. ; The SMTP relay can forward packets to the external interface of the ISA
server or to the DMZ interface. ; The preferred security solution is to publish the internal network SMTP to
the DMZ interface, and then configure the SMTP relay on the DMZ to use the IP address of the DMZ interface as its smart host. ; You must configure custom packet filters to allow inbound access to the
SMTP relay; the predefined packet filters won’t do the job. ; Access controls should be placed on the server publishing rule that publishes
the internal network SMTP server so that only the DMZ mail relay can use the server publishing rule.
Publishing a Web Server ; Publishing a Web server on the DMZ segment requires a custom packet filter. ; You can configure a SQL server publishing rule to allow a Web server access
to an internal network SQL server. Like the SMTP relay, its best to use the DMZ interface IP address in the SQL server publishing rule.
Publishing an FTP Server on a Trihomed DMZ Segment ; The FTP protocol creates special challenges to firewall security; it definitely
was not designed with security in mind. ; PASV mode FTP provides more security on the client side because all
connection requests are outbound.This is in contrast to PORT mode, where the FTP server needs to be allowed to make a new inbound connection to send data to the FTP client.
www.syngress.com
114
Chapter 2 • Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ
; Running FTP servers in the trihomed, public-address DMZ creates security
issues because a large number of ports must be opened to support the protocol.You can temper some of the security issues by restricting access to the packet filters to special IP addresses and source ports. ; You will have a higher level of security for your FTP servers if you place them
on the internal network.The FTP application filter will manage connections for published FTP servers.This removes the requirement of opening a large number of ports into the DMZ.
External Network Clients Cannot Use the DMZ Interface to Connect to the Internal Network ; External network clients can never directly communicate with the DMZ
interface. ; DMZ hosts can directly communicate with the DMZ interface. ; External network clients can access internal network resources with the help
of an intermediary on the DMZ segment. For example, an external network SMTP server can send messages to an internal network SMTP server by going through the DMZ SMTP mail relay server.
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ • Chapter 2
115
Frequently Asked Questions The following Frequently Asked Questions, answered by the authors of this book, are designed to both measure your understanding of the concepts presented in this chapter and to assist you with real-life implementation of these concepts. To have your questions about this chapter answered by the author, browse to www.syngress.com/solutions and click on the “Ask the Author” form.
Q: Why would I create a trihomed DMZ? There seems to be many disadvantages to this configuration.
A: The trihomed DMZ configuration does have its share of disadvantages. First, you introduce a single point of failure. If someone compromises the ISA server, he has direct access to both the DMZ segment and the internal network. Second, you must use static packet filters to allow inbound and outbound to and from the DMZ segment.The trihomed DMZ configuration should be considered an “economy” solution for those administrators who don’t have the resources to put together a back-to-back DMZ configuration.
Q: We use Exchange 5.5 on our internal network. I would like to put an IIS server on the DMZ segment and allow users to access the internal network Exchange server from an OWA server on the DMZ. Can I do this? If so, how?
A: You can do this, but there’s a major problem with this type of configuration. In order for the OWA server to allow users to log in to OWA, you must make the server a member of the internal network domain.This creates a major security problem, as you’ve extended your private network’s security zone into the DMZ segment.This is especially problematic because the trihomed DMZ segment is a direct extension of the Internet and is protected only by static packet filters. However, the configuration is possible.You’ll need to allow intradomain communications through the ISA server.This is accomplished by creating a number of server publishing rules.
Q: I can’t connect to my DMZ! I’ve run Network Monitor on my servers on the DMZ segment, and no packets from external network clients are arriving to the servers on the DMZ.What could the problem be?
A: The most common reason for this is that you’ve put the external interface and the DMZ segment on the same network ID. Remember that the ISA server must be able to route packets between the external network and the DMZ segment. In order to route packets, the ISA server external and DMZ interfaces must be on different network IDs.
www.syngress.com
116
Chapter 2 • Defense Plan 1: The Trihomed DMZ
Q: I can’t ping the external interface from a DMZ host.Why not? A: Don’t worry, this is normal.There is no combination of packet filters that will allow you to ping the external interface of the ISA server. If you need to test connectivity, you should use telnet. If the services aren’t yet in place, you can use Jim Harrison’s very cool WinSock Tool.You can find the WinSock Tool at http://isatools.org.
Q: I have an ISA server with three NICs: LAN—192.168.1.0/24, DMZ— 192.168.2.0/24 and WAN—xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx. I want to create a trihomed DMZ. Will this work?
A: You can create a private address LAT-based DMZ, but the ISA server will not recognize it as a DMZ segment.The ISA server only recognizes DMZ segments that are not in the LAT.You could take the DMZ NIC out of the LAT, but then external network clients would not be able to reach it, because the ISA server routes packets from the external network to the DMZ. Routing won’t work when you use private addresses; you need a Network Address Translator (NAT) to do this. The problem is that ISA Server will never NAT between the external network and the DMZ segment.
Q: I want to put multiple Web servers on the DMZ segment. How should I configure my DNS to support these multiple Web servers?
A: You can put as many Web servers on the DMZ segment as you have IP addresses available.You will need to enter the addresses for these Web servers in your public DNS. Put the actual IP addresses of these servers in the DNS; do not put the IP address of the external interface of the ISA server into the DNS.The reason for this is that external network client connect directly to the servers on the DMZ. In contrast, when you publish internal network servers via a Web or server publishing rule, you enter the IP address on the external interface of the ISA server (used in the publishing rule) into the public DNS.
Q: I want to ping my internal network clients from the DMZ, but I can’t seem to get the right combination of packet filters.What do I need to do to allow DMZ hosts to ping internal network computers?
A: You can’t ping internal network clients from the DMZ.The reason for this is that DMZ hosts are considered part of the external network.The only way in which external network hosts can communicate with internal network hosts is through publishing rules. ISA Server supports publishing only TCP- and UDP-based protocols. Since ping uses ICMP instead of TCP/UDP, you cannot publish “ping servers.” www.syngress.com
Chapter 3
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
Defensive Tactics in this Chapter: ■
Configuring a Private Address Back-to-Back DMZ
■
Configuring a Public Address Back-to-Back DMZ
; Summary ; Defensive Tactics Fast Track ; Frequently Asked Questions
117
118
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
Introduction Most “in the know” ISA Server administrators consider the trihomed DMZ configuration a bit of a kludge, the reason being that the trihomed DMZ configuration represents a single point of failure. If someone is able to compromise the single ISA server hosting both the DMZ segment and the internal network, he will be able to access resources on both the DMZ and the internal network.While we should expect the resources on the DMZ to be compromised, we should not accept compromise of internal network resources. This might be overstating the case.There have been no reported incidents where someone has compromised a correctly configured ISA server.Therefore, it’s not entirely accurate to say that it would be easy to compromise the ISA server and access both the internal network and DMZ resources. However, mistakes do happen, and sometimes an Internet criminal gets lucky.That’s why we need firewall fault tolerance.The ideal firewall fault tolerance scheme is the back-to-back firewall configuration. It’s not the end of the world if the external firewall is compromised when using a back-to-back firewall configuration; the attacker will only be able to access resources on the DMZ.The intruder will have to compromise the internal firewall to access resources on the internal network.You’ll already be on the alert because you’ll know about the compromise of the external firewall and take countermeasures to prevent the attacker from taking down the internal firewall. You can use ISA Server to create two types of back-to-back DMZ segments: ■
The private address back-to-back DMZ
■
The public address back-to-back DMZ
Each has its advantages.The rest of this chapter is dedicated to looking at these back-to-back firewall configurations in more detail.
Configuring a Private Address Back-to-Back DMZ Private address back-to-back DMZs can be constructed with two ISA servers, or one ISA server and a third-party software or hardware firewall. If you choose to use a thirdparty firewall, that firewall should be placed on the Internet and the ISA server should be placed behind the third-party firewall.The third-party firewall has an interface on the Internet and the DMZ segment, and the ISA server has an interface on the internal network and the DMZ segment.
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
119
ISA SERVER DEFCON 1 The ISA server should be the internal firewall in the back-to-back DMZ setup because you want it to be a member of the internal network domain. When the ISA server is a member of the internal network domain, it can leverage the Active Directory or Windows NT 4.0 SAM to authenticate users and groups. There would be no way to allow the ISA server to leverage the account databases if it were the external firewall. To allow an external ISA server to access the account database, you would need to extend the internal network’s security zone into the DMZ. Doing so would violate the integrity of the internal network and simplify an intruder’s job of accessing internal network resources.
We are going to limit our discussion to configurations where there are two ISA servers in the private address back-to-back DMZ; there are just too many third-party firewalls, and all of them have different configuration features and interfaces.The same principles we discuss in this chapter as they apply to the external ISA server can be applied to the external third-party firewall. The private address back-to-back DMZ is the most secure DMZ configuration you can implement.This setup uses private IP addresses on the DMZ segment between the ISA servers.You can take advantage of many of the ISA server features that are not available when you use a trihomed DMZ (where you’re required to use public, untrusted IP addresses on the DMZ) because you are using private IP addresses and including the DMZ segment addresses on the external ISA server’s Local Address Table (LAT). Once you include the DMZ segment’s address in the LAT, you can use protocol rules, site and content rules,Web publishing rules, and server publishing rules to control inbound and outbound access to and from the DMZ segment.This is far more secure than using static packet filters. The back-to-back private address DMZ has the following features: ■
There are two ISA servers: an “internal” and an “external.”
■
The external ISA server has an interface on the Internet and one on the DMZ segment.
■
The internal ISA server has an interface on the DMZ segment and internal network.
■
The DMZ uses private IP addresses (RFC 1597).
■
The DMZ network is in the LAT of the external ISA server.
■
The DMZ network is not in the LAT of the internal ISA server.
www.syngress.com
120
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ ■
You can use Web and server publishing rules to control inbound access to the DMZ from external network hosts.
■
Outbound access control should focus on the internal ISA server; the external ISA server’s main duty is to protect the DMZ segment.
Figure 3.1 shows a back-to-back private address DMZ. Figure 3.1 A Back-to-Back DMZ Topology
Net ID: 192.168.2.0/24
Net ID: 222.222.222.0/24
Net ID: 192.168.1.0/24
Net ID: 192.168.2.0/24
Back-to-Back DMZ: Private Addresses on DMZ
External ISA Server Configuration The external (or edge) ISA server has an interface directly connected to the Internet and an interface on the DMZ segment.The DMZ segment IP addresses must be in the external ISA server’s LAT.You can control inbound access to the DMZ segment using Web and server publishing rules when you place the DMZ segment’s IP addresses in the LAT. Although the DMZ segment is considered a trusted network by the external ISA server, it is not trusted by the internal ISA server and it is not on the internal ISA server’s LAT.This allows you to protect the internal network from DMZ traffic while allowing you to leverage all of the features provided by the Firewall and Web Proxy services. The private address DMZ segment allows you to use Web and server publishing rules to control inbound access to the DMZ, and protocol rules to control outbound www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
121
access from the DMZ. Publishing rules and protocol rules provide much more flexibility than packet filters do. As you learned in our discussion of the trihomed DMZ in Chapter 2, “Defense Plan 1:The Trihomed DMZ,” packet filters don’t allow you to fine-tune your inbound and outbound access controls. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 describe the configuration of the external ISA server. The interface configuration on the external ISA server varies with the type of interface you use, but the following represents a good generic configuration. Table 3.1 External Interface Setting
Value
IP address Subnet mask Default gateway DNS WINS NetBIOS over TCP File and printer sharing
Assigned by ISP Assigned by ISP Assigned by ISP None None Disabled Disabled
Table 3.2 Internal Interface Setting
Value
IP address
Any IP address that is valid for your DMZ segment. We typically use the first valid IP address for the network ID. Any subnet mask that is valid for your DMZ segment. None None None Disabled Disabled
Subnet mask Default gateway DNS WINS NetBIOS over TCP File and printer sharing
The external ISA server doesn’t require DNS or WINS server addresses on any of its interfaces. Reasons for this include: ■
The external ISA server isn’t running any other services; it’s a firewall, not a “fire sale.”
■
The external ISA server won’t be performing proxy DNS. Neither DMZ hosts or hosts on the internal network will be configured as Firewall or Web Proxy www.syngress.com
122
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
clients of the external ISA server. Only Firewall and Web Proxy clients use the ISA server to perform proxy DNS. Firewall and Web Proxy clients on the internal network will use the DNS configuration on the internal ISA server. ■
WINS should not be used on a DMZ segment.WINS is used to support NetBIOS-dependent services, and the NetBIOS interface should be disabled on all servers on the DMZ segment. If you must use NetBIOS-dependent services on the DMZ segment, you should use an LMHOSTS file to resolve local names.
One situation in which you might consider DNS settings on the external ISA server’s interfaces is when you use Web publishing rules to publish HTTP, S-HTTP, and FTP services on the DMZ segment.Web publishing rules can use a DNS host name to decide where to forward packets accepts on the incoming Web requests listener (Figure 3.2). Figure 3.2 Using an FQDN in the Web Publishing Redirection
You could configure a DNS server address on the primary interface of the external ISA server that resolves names to the correct DMZ IP address for a Web published resource on the DMZ. However, since only the ISA server would be using this DNS server to resolve names included in a Web publishing rule, you’re better off using a HOSTS file and forgetting about configuring a DNS server for such a limited function. Another advantage is that HOSTS files are used first for name resolution. If you did use a DNS server setting on the external ISA server, and your public DNS was hosted by a third party, you wouldn’t run into problems with host headers.
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
123
ISA SERVER ALERT Name resolution on the external ISA server is not required. The only time you need name resolution is if you use FQDNs in your Web publishing rules. If you do use FQDNs in your Web publishing rules, you must make sure that the FQDN resolves to the IP address of the Web server on the DMZ segment. The FQDN must not resolve to the public IP address on the external interface of the ISA server. That situation would cause a loop, because the packet would arrive on the external interface of the ISA server, and then the Web publishing rule would forward the packet back to the external interface of the ISA server. Since your public DNS uses the external IP address of the external ISA server to point to your Web published DMZ servers, you must not depend on the public DNS for name resolution for your Web publishing rules. The best way around this is to use a HOSTS file. Since the HOSTS file is evaluated before a DNS query is sent, you could even configure an external DNS server on an external ISA server’s interface, and the names of your published Web servers would still resolve to the private IP address on the DMZ segment.
Suppose you want to put your public Web site on the DMZ segment. External users will use the URL www.dmzwebsite.net to access the site. If you configure the Web publishing rule to use the FQDN (as shown in Figure 3.3) for the redirection, you will avoid the dreaded 14120 error (http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid= kb;en-us;Q288396) and be able to use host headers on the Web server. Just add to your HOSTS file an entry for www.dmzwebsite.net and put in the private network address the site uses on the DMZ. Figure 3.3 Using an FQDN in a Web Publishing Rule to Prevent the Dreaded 14120 Error
www.syngress.com
124
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
ISA SERVER ALERT Microsoft KB article Q288396 indicates that this problem is seen only when internal network clients attempt to access resources on a Web published server. Although there is no documentation on this issue, you will find that if you do not use an FQDN and have that FQDN resolve to the internal IP address of the published server, your application log will be littered with 14120 errors. These errors will appear each time an external network client connects to a Web published server.
Internal ISA Server Configuration The internal ISA server has an interface on the private address DMZ segment and the other interface on the internal network. Only the internal network IP addresses are contained in the internal ISA server’s LAT.You do not put the DMZ addresses into the LAT. The private addresses on the DMZ segment are untrusted by the internal ISA server. Even though it contains private IP addresses, the DMZ segment is considered an untrusted network, and only trusted addresses are contained in the LAT. Segregate traffic on the DMZ away from the internal network by removing the DMZ IP addresses from the internal ISA server’s LAT. As far as the internal ISA server is concerned, the DMZ segment is as untrusted and unsafe as the Internet. When configuring your LAT, make sure you include only the internal IP address ranges.There is an option in the LAT configuration dialog box allowing you to configure the LAT to include all private network ID address ranges (Figure 3.4).That option automatically allows all private network IDs to be part of the LAT, regardless of whether you’re using these network IDs on your internal network.You don’t want to do that because the DMZ includes private IP addresses.Tables 3.3 and 3.4 list the settings and their values for the external and internal interfaces, respectively. Figure 3.4 Configuring the LAT
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
125
Table 3.3 External Interface Setting
Value
IP address Subnet mask Default gateway DNS WINS NetBIOS over TCP File and printer sharing
Assigned by ISP Assigned by ISP Assigned by ISP None None Disabled Disabled
Table 3.4 Internal Interface Setting
Value
IP address
Any IP address that is valid for your DMZ segment. We typically use the first valid IP address for the network ID. Any subnet mask that is valid for your DMZ segment. None None None Disabled Disabled
Subnet mask Default gateway DNS WINS NetBIOS over TCP File and printer sharing
Allowing DMZ Servers Access to the Internal Network If you need to make resources on the internal network available to a server on the DMZ, you can configure a publishing rule that allows a particular server on the DMZ to access the internal server.You might want to do this if you have a Web server on the DMZ that needs access to a SQL server on the internal network.You create a client address set that includes the Web server’s IP address and allow access to the server publishing rule to that client address set. One thing you definitely do not want to do is allow privileged private network communications to traverse the internal ISA server. For example, you do not want to allow any servers on the DMZ to be members of the internal network domain. If you require Active Directory support for services on the DMZ segment, you should create a domain dedicated to servicing the DMZ segment. It is critical that you do not extend your private network’s security zone into the DMZ.
www.syngress.com
126
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
With that said, an argument can be made for allowing intradomain communications across the internal ISA server when you use private address DMZ segments.The DMZ is secure because it’s protected by the external ISA server, and the private address DMZ segment has the same level of security as an internal network protected by a single ISA server. On the other hand, the whole reason for having a DMZ segment is to create a security zone that’s separate and distinct from the security zone defined for the internal network.There should be no common credentials or service dependencies between the DMZ and the internal network segment. From this point of view, the only difference between the DMZ segment and the “free range” Internet (public address) is that the DMZ segment is under your administrative control and the Internet is not. As with most things, there is a middle ground when considering the private address DMZ configuration.The private address DMZ isn’t really as unsecure as a public address DMZ. On the public address DMZ, you’re depending on the kindness of packet filters. The level of support provided by the full force of the Firewall and Web Proxy services provide you a large measure of confidence that your private address DMZ will not be compromised in the near future, and if it is, the scope of damage will be limited.
Allowing Outbound and Inbound Traffic to and from the Internal Network You need to consider how you want to implement access control on both the internal and the external ISA server in the back-to-back ISA server configuration.The internal ISA server should be used to control outbound access for your internal network users. The internal ISA server is a member of the internal network domain; therefore, it’s able to leverage the user database in the internal network’s NT or Windows 2000 domain for outbound access control.The external ISA server should not be used for outbound access control. It is not a member of the internal network domain and should not have access to internal network user accounts.The primary job of the external ISA server is to protect the DMZ segment and to control access between the Internet and the DMZ segment. Remember that the DMZ segment includes all the servers on the DMZ and the external interface of the internal ISA server.
ISA SERVER DEFCON 1 While you should not use the external ISA server as a primary means of access control for internal network users, you can still use user-based access controls on the external ISA server. As you’ll see later in this chapter during the discussions on Web Proxy and Firewall Service chaining, you can use user accountbased access controls to allow the downstream ISA server special access that is separate and distinct from outbound access allowed to servers on the DMZ.
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
127
You configure the policy elements and access policies used to control outbound access on the internal ISA server in the same way you would if you had a single ISA server on the network.The only difference is how you configure the internal ISA server to communicate with the upstream external ISA server. There are two ways you can configure the downstream, internal ISA server to communicate with the upstream, external ISA server: ■
Configure the downstream, internal ISA server to be a SecureNAT client of the upstream, external ISA server
■
Configure the downstream, internal ISA server to be a Firewall client of the upstream, external ISA server
The easiest configuration is to make the internal ISA server a SecureNAT client of the external ISA server. All you need to do is configure the default gateway on the external interface of the internal ISA server to use the internal interface of the external ISA server as its default gateway.You then create protocol rules on the external ISA server to allow what traffic can go outbound from the DMZ to the external network. You can create a client address set on the external ISA server computer that includes the IP address of the external interface of the internal ISA server computer.You can then use this client address set to control outbound access from the DMZ to the external network. For example, let’s say that you have a back-to-back ISA server configuration.You have configured site and content rules and protocol rules on the internal ISA server to control outbound access for your internal network users. On your external ISA server, you can create a site and content rule and a protocol rule that allows outbound access to all sites, content, and protocols to the internal ISA server’s external IP address.This is contained in a client address set (Figure 3.5). This type of outbound access control at the external ISA server is easy to set up because you don’t have to worry about micromanaging outbound access controls on the external ISA server.Your primary concern with the external ISA server is to control the nature of inbound access to the DMZ segment from the Internet. If someone does get into the DMZ and compromises one of the hosts on the DMZ segment, you want to make sure he can’t send outbound messages through the external ISA server. There are some limitations to this approach: ■
The internal ISA server is a SecureNAT client.Therefore, it won’t be able to take advantage of complex protocols (those requiring secondary connections) without the aid of application filters on the upstream ISA server.
www.syngress.com
128
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ ■
SecureNAT clients can only access protocols included in the Protocol Definitions node of the ISA server to which they connect; in this case, the SecureNAT internal ISA server can only access protocols.
■
As a SecureNAT client, the internal ISA server cannot send credentials to the external ISA server’s internal interface.
Figure 3.5 Controlling Access on the External ISA Server
Client address set configured on external ISA Server that includes IP address of internal ISA Server’s external primary interface
External ISA Server is configured with Protocol and Site and Content Rules that control outbound access from the external interface of the internal ISA Server External ISA Server Web
SMTP
Internal ISA Server
Internal ISA Server configured with Protocol and Site and Content Rules to control outbound access for internal network clients
Suppose an intruder was able to break into the DMZ network and take control of one of the DMZ host computers.There’s a good chance that the intruder will want to be able to connect to the Internet from the DMZ host to so he can download some hacking tools to will help him access the internal network.The attempt at outbound access should fail because your protocol and site and content rules on the external ISA server allow outbound access only to the IP address on the external interface of the internal ISA server. If the intruder were wise, he might know that you’ve configured such limitations to outbound access and might attempt to spoof the source address of his outgoing messages.The attacker would change the source address of the outbound packets to be the IP address of the external interface of the ISA server.The problem for the intruder is that when the packets return to the DMZ, they will be returned to the IP address of www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
129
the external interface of the internal ISA server. No problem, as there are ways around that issue, too. Because there are ways for the hacker to deal with this problem, a more secure solution is to require credentials to access resources on the external network.You accomplish this by requiring user-based access controls on your protocol and site and content rules.
ISA SERVER ALERT You might wonder how Web and server publishing fits into this equation. If you only allow user-based outbound access through the external ISA server, how will servers published on the DMZ segment be able to respond to incoming requests made to them via the Web and server publishing rules? No problem! The ISA server publishing rules take care of it. There is no need to create special rules to allow published servers outbound access; outbound access permission is assumed when you create the publishing rule. The only exception to this is PORT mode FTP. In this case, the FTP server needs to create a new outbound connection from its own TCP port 20. Since this outbound connection is a new connection and not in response to a connection made by the external network client, you will need to create a protocol and site and content rule that will allow this server outbound access. Moreover, that rule will have to apply to an IP address in a client address set because you do not want to install the Firewall client on published servers. This is yet another reason to avoid publishing FTP servers if you can help it, or at least allow just PASV mode connections. PASV mode will not require the FTP server to create a new outbound connection.
SecureNAT clients are able to access simple protocols only, which require only a single connection.This is in contrast to complex protocols that require secondary connections; for example, FTP, RPC, H.323 protocols, and most Internet games. The only time a SecureNAT client can access protocols requiring secondary connections is when there is an application filter to support the connection. Clients on the internal network will be able to use both PORT and PASV mode FTP to access resources on the external network when the internal ISA server is a SecureNAT client. The reason for this is that the FTP access application filter on the external ISA server supports the request coming from the SecureNAT internal ISA server. However, if there were an outgoing request for a complex protocol and no application filter were in place, the request would fail because the internal ISA server is a SecureNAT client. You can see that while configuring the internal ISA server as a SecureNAT client is easy, it might not be the best option. A better solution is to configure the internal ISA server to use the external ISA server as an upstream server in a chained configuration. You can configure both the Firewall service and the Web Proxy service to chain with
www.syngress.com
130
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
the external ISA server.The chained configuration allows you to configured user-based access controls and gives you a wider array of protocols that you can support for outbound access.
Configuring Firewall Chaining Firewall chaining allows the firewall service of the downstream ISA server to communicate directly with the Firewall service on the upstream ISA server.This makes the downstream ISA server a Firewall client to the upstream ISA server. Both your SecureNAT and Firewall clients on the internal network will be able to take advantage of the firewall chaining configuration. However, the firewall chaining configuration will not turn the SecureNAT client requests on the internal network into Firewall client requests. Firewall chaining does not add functionality to the internal network SecureNAT client. Perform the following steps on the downstream (internal) ISA server to configure firewall chaining in the back-to-back ISA server configuration: 1. Open the ISA Management console. Expand your server name, right-click the Network Configuration node, and select Properties. 2. The Network Configuration Properties dialog box has a single tab, the Firewall Chaining tab. Select the Chain to this computer option (Figure 3.6). Note the graphic on the Firewall Chaining tab, which shows a hierarchical arrangement of ISA Server in a firewall chaining configuration. Keep that graphic in mind when configuring firewall chaining in your organization. Figure 3.6 The Firewall Chaining Tab
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
131
3. In the Chain to this computer text box, type in the name of the upstream ISA server. Note that you must put a name here; if you put an IP address in this text box, the chaining will fail. 4. If you want to force the downstream ISA server to authenticate with the upstream ISA server, put a check mark in the Use this account check box. Click Set Account.This opens the Set Account dialog box (Figure 3.7). Enter an account that is valid on the external ISA server. Note that you must use the COMPUTERNAME\Username format when entering the account. Although Figure 3.7 shows that we’re using the Administrator account on the upstream server, you should not use the built-in Administrator account. Create an account on the upstream ISA server that is dedicated for use by the downstream ISA server.This account should have a long, unusual name and a very complex password of more than 15 characters. Click OK after adding the name and password. Figure 3.7 Configuring the Account to Use with the Upstream ISA Server
5. Be sure to check the Use dial-up entry check box if you use a dial-up connection for your external interface. It’s unlikely that your back-to-back DMZ is going to use a dial-up entry on the external interface, but anything is possible. Click Apply and then click OK in the Network Configuration Properties dialog box. 6. Go to <systemroot>\system32\drivers\etc and open the HOSTS file with Notepad. Add the name and IP address of the external ISA server to the HOSTS file.You need to create the HOSTS file entry because there is no DNS or WINS server that will resolve the name of the internal interface of the external ISA server. Adding this name to the HOSTS file is the simplest and most elegant way to handle resolving the name. There are advantages to firewall chaining that you might not have considered.Take a look at Figure 3.8. Did you know that when you configure a downstream ISA server to connect to an upstream ISA server, you’re not dependent on the routing infrastructure to support SecureNAT clients behind the downstream ISA server? It’s true! The ability to leave your routing infrastructure as is without having to change the default gateway settings on all interposed routers to route Internet bound requests to www.syngress.com
132
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
the internal interface of the ISA server will come as good news to many administrators. The downstream ISA servers will be able to access the Internet as long as your routing infrastructure has a route to the IP address of the internal interface of the upstream ISA server.You are not dependent on default-gateway or gateway-of-last-resort configurations on the network between the downstream and upstream ISA servers. Figure 3.8 Firewall Chaining Obviates the Need to Reconfigure Routers If downstream ISA Servers were configured as SecureNAT clients to the upstream, the entire routing infrastructure would have to be configured to support routing Internet bound requests to the internal interface of the ISA Server
When downstream ISA Servers are Firewall clients to the upstream (via Firewall chaining), no change in default gateway configuration is required; just a route to the network ID for the internal interface of the upstream ISA Server
Router
Router
Router
Router
Router Router
Firewall
ISA SERVER DEFCON 1 It’s critical that you use a computer name in the Firewall Chaining dialog box. We’ve spent many hours trying to figure out what the problem was with our Firewall Chaining configuration. It always came down to the fact that an IP address was used instead of a computer name, or the account name to use to authenticate with the upstream server was configured incorrectly.
Allowing the Remote WinSock Protocol (RWSP) on the External ISA Server We’ve assumed that the configuration on the external ISA server will be “All Open.” By that, we mean there is a protocol and site and content rule that allows the downstream, www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
133
internal ISA server access to all sites, all content, all protocols, at all times.This might not be the optimal configuration; you might want to lock down the outbound access controls on the external ISA server. For example, suppose you want to allow only outbound HTTP, FTP, SMTP, NNTP, and DNS from internal network clients. In order to allow these protocols outbound access to the Internet, you must first create a protocol rule on the internal ISA server that allows these protocols. The internal ISA server can be chained with the upstream, external ISA server.This essentially makes the internal ISA server a Firewall client to the external ISA server. When an internal network client sends an FTP request from the internal network to the internal ISA server, the internal ISA server’s Firewall service intercepts the request and forwards it as a Firewall client request directly to the Firewall service on the external ISA server.The downstream ISA server is a Firewall client to the upstream ISA server and it forwards the request from the internal network Firewall client. If you create a protocol rule that only includes protocol definitions for HTTP, FTP, SMTP, DNS, and NNTP, the request from the internal network client will fail.Why? Because the Firewall client must communicate with the Firewall service using either TCP or UDP port 1745. Look at the packet trace in Figure 3.9. Figure 3.9 RWSP Requests Arriving at the Internal Interface of the External ISA Server
www.syngress.com
134
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
The external interface of the internal ISA server has the IP address 10.0.1.2, and the name of the external ISA server is ISAEXT. Notice in the selected frame in Figure 3.9 that the internal ISA server is acting as a Firewall client to the external ISA server and is sending a proxy DNS request to the upstream ISA server via TCP 1745—the Remote WinSock Proxy (RWSP) port! That explains why you see www.msn.com in the ASCII for the frame. You must include both the TCP and UDP RWSP protocol definitions in your protocol rule on the external ISA server.You will be able to access the Internet using the other protocols in the protocol rule after you add the RWSP protocol definitions to the protocol rule.
ISA SERVER ALERT Because the external interface of the internal ISA server is on a trusted network, you would expect that the internal interface of the external ISA server would accept the RWSP requests from the internal ISA server without a protocol rule. However, from our experience with firewall chaining, it appears that this rule is required.
You might be thinking, “but I don’t have to create protocol definitions for the RWSP protocols and I don’t have to include those definitions in a protocol rule on the internal ISA server”—you’re right.Why? No one knows, or at least no one who does know is talking. Figure 3.10 shows the protocol rule on the external ISA server that would allow the DNS, FTP, HTTP, NNTP, SMTP, and RWSP protocols through. Figure 3.10 Limiting Protocol Access
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
135
NOTE You might have noticed in your ISA server reports that much of the traffic is attributed to an UNKNOWN protocol. ISA Server treats all protocols for which there is no protocol definition as “unknown.” You might be able to reduce the amount of UNKNOWN traffic appearing in the reports by adding the TCP and UDP RWSP protocols to your protocol definitions.
The Firewall Client, Firewall Chaining, and the HTTP Redirector Here’s an interesting problem you might run into that would take you hours to solve if you hadn’t read this book! Consider the following scenario: You have an internal and external ISA server in a back-to-back ISA server configuration.The internal ISA server is configured for firewall chaining with the external ISA server. Authentication is required for Firewall client requests at both in the internal and external ISA servers.The internal network client is running as a Firewall client only and is not configured as a Web Proxy client. Figure 3.11 illustrates this. Figure 3.11 Firewall Clients and the HTTP Redirector
Authentication required to access Protocol and Site and Content Rules on the upstream ISA Server; Outbound Web requests listener also forces authentication External ISA Server
Downstream ISA Server configured for Firewall chaining with upstream ISA Server Internal ISA Server
Internal network clients must authenticate with the internal ISA Server to access the Web Proxy and Firewall services - clients configured as Firewall clients
www.syngress.com
136
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
RESULT: All HTTP requests from internal network clients configured as Firewall clients are denied, but the Firewall client is able to successfully perform nslookup queries. Why would the HTTP requests from the Firewall clients on the internal network fail? Consider what happens when the HTTP Redirector filter is enabled.When the Firewall client sends an HTTP request to the internal ISA server, the request is intercepted by the HTTP Redirector.The default configuration of the HTTP Redirector is to forward all HTTP requests to the Web Proxy service. When requests from Firewall clients are forwarded to the Web Proxy service on the internal ISA server, the credentials sent to the ISA server by the Firewall client are not included.The Web Proxy service will ask the requesting host computer for credentials, but only the Web Proxy client understands this request. Since the Firewall client computer in this scenario is not configured as a Web Proxy client, the request fails. Let’s say that you configure the HTTP Redirector filter on the internal ISA server to forward requests directly to the Web server (Figure 3.12).This will allow the HTTP request from the internal Firewall client to be accepted by the Firewall service on the internal ISA server, and the request will be passed to the Firewall service on the external ISA server. Figure 3.12 Reconfiguring the HTTP Redirector
What happens when the request makes it to the Firewall service on the external ISA server? The same thing that happened on the internal ISA server! The HTTP request is intercepted by the HTTP Redirector on the external ISA server and passed to the Web Proxy service.The credentials the internal ISA server sent to the external ISA server’s Firewall service are not passed up to the Web Proxy service. Since the Web Proxy service on the external ISA server requires authentication, the request is denied.
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
137
The moral of this story is that if you’ve configured only firewall chaining between the upstream and downstream ISA servers and your internal network clients aren’t configured as Web Proxy clients, you have to make sure that the HTTP Redirector Filter is configured to pass requests directly to the external server on both the internal and external ISA server to prevent this type of failure in HTTP requests from internal network Firewall clients. The unifying principle here is that credentials passed to the Firewall service are not passed to the Web Proxy service. Only Web Proxy clients can pass credentials to the Web Proxy service. Configuring the browser on the internal network client, and configuring Web Proxy chaining would fix this problem, and you would not need to configure the HTTP Redirector to forward requests directly to the Web server.
NOTE If the internal network client were a SecureNAT client, it would not be able to get past the internal ISA server. However, if you did not request credentials to access HTTP on the internal ISA server, the SecureNAT client on the internal network would be able to access the Internet, despite the fact that credentials are required on the external ISA server. The reason for this is that the internal ISA server provides the required credentials to the external ISA server.
Configuring Hierarchical Web Caching (Web Proxy Chaining) You can configure the Web Proxy service to do something like firewall chaining.The primary differences is that you make the downstream ISA server a Web Proxy client of the upstream ISA server. You configure hierarchical Web Proxy caching by configuring Web routing rules.You configure the hierarchical Web caching configuration between the internal and external ISA server by performing the following steps on the internal ISA server computer: 1. In the ISA Management console, expand your server name and then expand the Network Configuration node. 2. Right-click on the Routing node, point to New, and click Rule. 3. Assign the rule a name on the first page of the wizard (Figure 3.13), and click Next. 4. On the Destination Sets page (Figure 3.14), select the All destinations option.This allows the internal ISA server’s Web Proxy service to forward all
www.syngress.com
138
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
requests it receives from internal network clients to the Web Proxy service on the upstream ISA server. Click Next. Figure 3.13 Welcome Page of the New Routing Rule Wizard
Figure 3.14 The Destination Sets Page
5. Select the Route to a specified upstream server option on the Request Action page (Figure 3.15).This allows you to configure the address of the upstream server on the following page. Click Next to continue. 6. Now we get to the real action: the Primary Routing page (Figure 3.16). In the Server or array text box, enter the name of the upstream ISA server.You can use an IP address instead of a name if you like (unlike the situation you saw with the firewall chaining configuration). Since you went out of your way to configure a HOSTS file entry to support the firewall chaining configuration, you might as well use the name for the upstream ISA server you placed in the HOSTS file.The Port and SSL Port text boxes accept the port numbers used www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
139
on the upstream ISA server’s Outgoing Web Requests listener for HTTP and HTTPS communications.Yes, you can secure the connection between the downstream and upstream ISA server using SSL.This is in contrast to the situation with browser-based Web Proxy clients, where you cannot configure the browser-based Web Proxy client to use a secure SSL connection with its ISA Server’s Web Proxy service. Put a check mark in the Use this account check box and click Set Account. Enter the username and password in the same way as you did with the firewall chaining configuration. Set the authentication type as Authenticated Windows to prevent the credentials from moving across the DMZ in cleartext (note that if you secure the channel using SSL between the downstream and upstream server, the credentials will not be available to sniffers). As with the firewall chaining example, make sure you create an account on the upstream server that’s dedicated for the downstream Web Proxy Service. Click Next to continue. Figure 3.15 The Request Action Page
Figure 3.16 The Primary Routing Page
www.syngress.com
140
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
7. You configure how you want the downstream Web Proxy service to handle requests when the upstream server is not available (Figure 3.17).The correct answer is Ignore requests in our back-to-back DMZ scenario.You might want to use a backup route, such as a modem connected to the downstream server, or another upstream ISA server if you have access to multiple upstream ISA servers. Click Next to continue.
Figure 3.17 The Backup Routing Page
8. You set how you want cached Web objects to be retrieved on the Cache Retrieval Configuration page (Figure 3.18).The most inclusive option is the A valid version of the object; if none exists, retrieve the request using the specified requested action, and is the one you should select in the back-to-back DMZ hierarchical Web caching situation. Click Next to continue. Figure 3.18 Cache Retrieval Configuration Page
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
141
9. You determine what general types of objects should be cached on the Cache Content Configuration page (Figure 3.19).The If source and request headers indicate to cache, then the content will be cached is the default selection, and is the one you should select in the back-to-back hierarchical Web caching scenario.This is the preferred selection, as it’s usually not a good policy to cache dynamic content. Click Next. Figure 3.19 The Cache Content Configuration Page
10. Review your selections and click Finish on the Completing the New Routing Rule Wizard page (Figure 3.20). Figure 3.20 The Final Page of the Wizard
Hierarchical Web caching has many of the same advantages you get with the firewall chaining configuration (and more): ■
The downstream ISA server becomes a Web Proxy client of the upstream ISA server. www.syngress.com
142
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ ■
The routing infrastructure of the internal network doesn’t need to be changed to support SecureNAT client configuration (requests are made to the IP address of the upstream ISA server’s Outgoing Web Requests listener).
■
You can use credentials to authenticate to the upstream Web Proxy service.
■
Web access is much faster and perceived performance much greater on the client side.
The downstream ISA server acts as a Web Proxy client to the upstream ISA server, which means that the downstream ISA server can send credentials to the upstream. If you didn’t configure Web Proxy chaining between the upstream and the downstream, the downstream would be only a SecureNAT client. SecureNAT clients can’t send any credentials to an ISA server, not even when that SecureNAT client is a downstream Web Proxy server The downstream ISA server doesn’t depend on the routing infrastructure to get the HTTP request to the upstream ISA server because the Web Proxy client (the downstream ISA server communicates directly with the Web Proxy service of the upstream ISA server. Had you configured the downstream ISA server to be a SecureNAT client, then you would have to change your routing infrastructure to make sure that Internet bound packets are forwarded to the internal interface of the upstream ISA server.With the hierarchical caching configuration, the only route required is a route to the network ID of the upstream ISA server’s Outgoing Web Requests listener. You can also clamp down on outbound access by using credentials.When the downstream ISA server is configured as a Web Proxy client to the upstream, the downstream ISA server can send credentials to the upstream ISA server’s Web Proxy service. This solves the problem we encountered with the firewall chaining configuration mentioned earlier.You can force authentication on the upstream ISA server’s Outgoing Web Requests listener and the downstream ISA server will be able to comply with that requirement because as a Web Proxy client, it can send credentials to the Web Proxy service on the upstream ISA server. Perhaps the best reason to configure Web Proxy chaining is that performance is much better. If you configure the downstream ISA server as a SecureNAT client instead of a Web Proxy client, the downstream requests will have to pass through the HTTP Redirector filter. Passing a request from the Firewall service to the Web Proxy service via the HTTP Redirector consumes processor cycles and time. Passing requests directly from the Web Proxy client to the Web Proxy service is more efficient and leads to better perceived performance for end users.
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
143
Web Proxy Chaining and Upstream Caching Arrays Performance will be even better if the upstream ISA servers participate in a caching array. After you create the routing rule that establishes the Web Proxy chain, double-click on the rule and then click on the Action tab. Click Settings to the right of where it says upstream server and you’ll see something like what appears in Figure 3.21. Figure 3.21 Configuring the Downstream to Poll the Upstream Array
Notice that the Automatically poll upstream server for array configuration is checked by default.This setting allows the downstream server to be a CARP client by downloading the upstream array’s configuration. Included in this array configuration is information that the Web Proxy client can use to determine, in advance, on what array member a particular Web object can be found based on the hash of the URL. If the downstream Web Proxy service didn’t perform this routing calculation itself, it would have to depend on the upstream array member (that the downstream ISA server is configured to use) to perform the routing function. Because the upstream array is likely busier than the downstream ISA server, waiting for the upstream array will result is lower performance. However, even if you require the upstream array member to do the CARP routing, it’s still faster than making the downstream ISA server a SecureNAT client.
NOTE CARP and the concepts of parallel (distributed) and hierarchical routing are quite interesting! If you have the time, check out my article on these subjects at http://itresources.brainbuzz.com/TechLibrary/GetHtml.asp?ID= 1225&CatID=230. You’ll be glad you did.
www.syngress.com
144
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
Performance Issues with Hierarchical Web Caching You might have problems with slow performance when you configure a Web Proxy chaining, the most likely reason being slow or failed name resolution.The name resolution problem seems to focus on the downstream ISA server. Both the upstream and the downstream ISA servers might attempt to resolve the FQDN requested by the Web Proxy client on the internal network.This won’t happen if you have configured the downstream ISA server to communicate with the upstream properly (as described in this chapter).You can easily diagnose the problem by running Network Monitor on both the downstream and upstream ISA servers. After starting Network Monitor, go to a Web Proxy client computer on the internal network and go to an obscure Web site that’s unlikely to be in the Web Proxy DNS cache.You should see only the upstream ISA server attempting to resolve the name. The reason why only the upstream ISA server resolves the name is that when Web Proxy chaining is configured, the downstream ISA server is a Web Proxy client of the upstream ISA server.Web Proxy clients allow the Web Proxy service to resolve DNS host names on their behalf.That’s why the downstream ISA server allows the upstream to resolve names on its behalf. These are our observations in the field using Network Monitor to confirm them. However, some users have reported a problem with slow name resolution when configuring Web Proxy chaining when the DNS infrastructure isn’t set up according to our specifications.The following circumstances must be extant to reproduce the problem: ■
The downstream ISA server must be configured as a Web Proxy client of the upstream ISA server.
■
The DNS server that the downstream ISA server uses cannot resolve Internet host names.
■
There is a site and content rule on the downstream ISA server that limits access to anything but “all destinations,” or a Web publishing rule that applies to any destination type other than “all destinations.”
The best solution is to configure the internal ISA server with the IP address of a DNS server that can resolve both internal and external host names. For example, you can have an internal network DNS server configured to perform recursion for internal network DNS clients (which includes the internal interface of the ISA server).That DNS server can resolve Internet host names for the ISA server.You could also disable recursion and configure the internal DNS server to use a forwarder, which is a more secure solution. Why does the internal ISA server even need to resolve host names? After all, it’s the external ISA server that needs to be able to resolve host names to IP addresses so www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
145
that the request can be forwarded to the appropriate server on the Internet; the internal ISA server just needs to forward requests from internal network clients to the external ISA server. The problem is that the internal ISA server does a little more than just forward requests to the external ISA server.The internal ISA server will perform name resolution to determine whether shrewd users are trying to get around site and content or Web publishing rules by using an IP address (to get around rules you’ve created based on FQDNs) or an FQDN (to get around rules you’ve created based on IP addresses). It slows things down quite a bit when the ISA server can’t do name resolution for these requests. Note that this only seems to occur when there are rules that prevent access to all sites and content.
ISA SERVER ALERT What’s interesting is that the requests are not denied. Apparently, the ISA server will wait until the reverse DNS query times out, and then just go ahead and forward the requests without this “extra” confirmation that the request is valid.
For example, suppose you created a site and content rule that denies access to www.hotmale.com. One of your problematic users knows that you’ve blocked the site, so she tries to access the site by typing its IP address http://216.205.191.201.The internal ISA server will attempt a reverse lookup on this address to determine whether the site should be blocked. If the DNS server used by the internal ISA server is not able to perform the reverse lookup, the ISA server will wait for the request to time out and then allow the request to go through anyway. However, it takes so long for the request to time out that the salacious user will probably have given up by that time. If you can’t set up the optimum DNS name resolution configuration, you can prevent name resolution on Web publishing rules and site and content rules (and routing rules) by adding the following Registry values (ISA Server SP1 must be installed): HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W3Proxy\Parameters\ SkipNameResolutionForPublishingRules : DWORD : 1 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W3Proxy\Parameters\ SkipNameResolutionForAccessAndRoutingRules : DWORD : 1
You should notice a profound improvement in internal network Web Proxy client performance after making the these changes. www.syngress.com
146
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
NOTE You might want to implement the first setting (SkipNameResolutionFor PublishingRules) even if you have an optimum DNS configuration because it prevents reverse lookups on inbound requests. The reason for this is that it prevents the ISA server from doing a lookup for nonqualified requests. Many worms will send requests for “www” or other nonqualified names. There is a risk that the ISA server will qualify the request by adding its own domain name to the request, and forward the request to a server name in that domain. For example, if the worm sends a request to “www” and the ISA server belongs to mycompany.com, the ISA server will try to qualify the request and send www.mycompany.com for resolution. If you’re publishing a server by that name, the request will be forwarded to the server and could potentially infect the internal server. Moreover, if the intruder sends the request to your IP address, and it resolves to a name you’ve included in a publishing rule, the worm will be able to get in.
Configuring a Secure Channel between the Downstream and Upstream ISA Server You can configure a secure SSL channel between the downstream and the upstream ISA server.You might want to do this if you don’t trust the network between the downstream and the upstream, especially for your SSL connection to the Internet.You can configure the Web Proxy chaining configuration so that allowed communications are sent between the two via an SSL tunnel. Do the following to create a secure channel between the downstream and upstream ISA servers: 1. Both the upstream and the downstream ISA servers need a machine certificate from a certificate authority (CA). 2. The upstream ISA server needs a server certificate.The downstream ISA server doesn’t necessarily need a server certificate, but it needs a certificate in its certificate store so that it trusts the same root authority that assigned the certificate to the upstream ISA server. 3. The outbound routing rule on the internal ISA server must be configured to support the upstream ISA server’s SSL port—by default, this is TCP 8443. Double-click on your routing rule that you use to forward all outbound requests, and click on the Action tab.You will see what appears in Figure 3.22.
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
147
Figure 3.22 The Action Tab on the All Requests Routing Rule
4. Click Settings. Make sure the SSL port is set for the same port you’ve configured on the upstream ISA server’s Outgoing Web Requests listener. The default setting is 8443 in the Upstream Server Setting dialog box (Figure 3.23). Figure 3.23 Configuring the Upstream SSL Port
5. Click on the Bridging tab on the downstream ISA server. In the Redirect HTTP requests as frame, change the option so that the SSL requests (establish a secure channel to the site) option is selected. Click Apply, and then click OK. 6. Go to the upstream ISA server, right-click on the server name in the ISA Management console, and select Properties.Then, click on the Outgoing Web Requests tab.
www.syngress.com
148
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
7. On the Outgoing Web Requests tab (Figure 3.24), make sure that the Enable SSL listeners check box is selected. Note that the default port is 8443.You can change this if you want to, just make sure that you also change the setting use for the SSL port on the downstream ISA server’s configuration. You should also select the Ask unauthenticated users to identification check box.This causes the Outgoing Web Requests listener to force authentication for outbound Web requests. Figure 3.24 Configuring the Upstream ISA Server’s Outgoing Web Requests Listener
8. Double-click on the listener entry. In this example, the same listener configuration is used for all internal IP addresses.Therefore, we could double-click on the ISAEXT entry as shown in Figure 3.25. 9. In the Add/Edit Listeners dialog box, put a check mark in the Use a server certificate to authenticate to web clients check box.The Integrated check box on this page indicates that the Outgoing Web Requests listener will accept integrated authentication to access protocol and site and content rules. Click Select. 10. In the Select Certificate dialog box (Figure 3.26), select the certificate you want the upstream ISA server to use to create the SSL channel with the downstream.This is a machine certificate that will appear in the machine’s certificate store. Select the certificate and click OK. www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
149
Figure 3.25 Editing the Properties of the Outgoing Web Requests Listener
Figure 3.26 What Appears in the Web Browser When a Proxy Chain Loop Occurs
11. Click OK again, and then click Apply in the server’s Properties dialog box. You’ll be asked if you want to restart the Web Proxy service. Select your preferred option, and click OK. When setting this up, make sure you restart the servers after installing the certificates and again after you complete the configuration.While we can’t give you a compelling reason for doing this, we can tell you that you’ll save yourself a lot of work and anxiety if you just restart the servers after making the changes. How do you know if your secure channel is working? You can use the netstat –na command or you can use Network Monitor. Go to an internal network client and start browsing the Web. Now go to the upstream ISA server after you’ve browsed a few sites. Open a command prompt and type netstat –na.You’ll see entries for the internal interface of your external ISA server showing an established connection on TCP port
www.syngress.com
150
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
8443 with the external interface of the internal ISA server.Three of these are shown in Figure 3.27. Notice that the TCP port 8080 is listening, but there are no connections to it. Figure 3.27 Using the netstat Command to Find the Secure Channel Connections
ISA SERVER ALERT If you want to find your connections to port 8443 more quickly, you can use the find command with the netstat command. Use the command netstat –na | find “:8443”. The result is that you will only see lines that have the string :8443. When you use the find command, you don’t have to wade through hundreds of links just to find the entry of interest.
You can also use Network Monitor to confirm that your secure channel is functional. Configure Network Monitor on the upstream ISA server to listen on its internal interface.When finished, start browsing the Web from an internal network client. Go back and stop Network Monitor and you’ll see communications between the upstream and downstream ISA servers over TCP port 8443.There won’t be anything going over TCP port 80 because the channel between the two servers is secure (Figure 3.28). Figure 3.28 Using Network Monitor to Capture the Secure Channel Connection
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
151
Publishing a Web Server on the Private Address DMZ Segment You publish servers on the private address DMZ segment the same as you would if your Web server were on the internal network.You can use either Web publishing or server publishing rules to allow external network users access to your Web server on the private address DMZ segment. We’ve noticed that people who have configured security for outbound access on the external ISA server (by making the downstream ISA server a Web Proxy and Firewall client of the upstream and then setting user-based access controls on the external ISA server for outbound access) will create protocol rules to allow the DMZ Web server outbound access.This is not required.The reason why is that the Web server doesn’t need to make any new outbound connections to the client making the request. The ISA server creates a “dynamic protocol rule” to allow the published server to respond to the external client’s request.
NOTE There is an exception to this situation. If you publish an FTP server on the DMZ segment and you do not create a site and content rule that allows the FTP server access to all sites and content, the FTP server publishing rule will fail. The reason for this is that the FTP server needs to create a new outbound connection when sending data over the data channel in PORT mode.
Be mindful of name resolution issues when you publish servers on the private DMZ segment. External network clients resolve the name of your public Web site to the IP address of the external interface of the external ISA server. Internal network clients could resolve the name of the Web site on the private address DMZ segment to either the public address on the external interface of the external ISA server or the actual private IP address the server uses on the DMZ segment. Our recommendation is that you configure your DNS infrastructure so that internal network clients access the Web servers on the DMZ segment via the Web server’s IP address on the DMZ, rather than by “looping back” through the external interface of the external ISA server computer (Figure 3.29). This presents an interesting challenge to your DNS zone designs. Should the DMZ servers’ private addresses be put in your internal zone database files, should you put the public addresses for the DMZ servers in zone files on your public DNS servers, or should you create a completely separate DNS zone just for the servers on the DMZ?
www.syngress.com
152
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
Figure 3.29 Looping Back through the External Interface of the External ISA Server in a Back-to-Back Private Network DMZ Configuration External ISA Server sends “looped” request back to the Web Server on DMZ
Internal ISA Server resolves name of DMZ Web server to IP address on external interface of the external ISA Server, “looping through” the external ISA Server’s external interface Client sends request to internal ISA Server
Workstation
Workstation
ISA SERVER DEFCON 1 If you want to loop back through the external interface of the external ISA server, you need to make sure that the internal network client is a Web Proxy client and the downstream ISA server needs to be a Web Proxy client of the upstream ISA server (Web Proxy chaining). You need the requests proxied by the Web Proxy service instead of just NAT’ed by the Firewall service. If the internal ISA server sends a request to the upstream as a plain SecureNAT client of the upstream ISA server, the request to the DMZ host through the external interface of the external ISA server might fail because of the “isotropic bounce” phenomenon. The ISA server that is a SecureNAT client sends the request to the external ISA server. The external ISA server dutifully forwards the request to the published server on the private address DMZ network. The published server receives the request forwarded by the external ISA server. The published server
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
153
receives the source IP address of the internal ISA server because the external ISA server included this information in the forwarded request. The published server on the DMZ directly answers the internal ISA server acting as a SecureNAT client. The problem is that the internal ISA server expects an answer from the external ISA server, not from the published server on the DMZ; therefore, the answer from the published server is ignored and dropped by the internal ISA server.
This presents an interesting challenge when designing your DNZ zones. How should the addresses for the servers in the DMZ segment be resolved? Should you put the private addresses the servers on the DMZ user into your private network’s DNS? Should you put the public addresses that are used in the server publishing rules to publish your DMZ servers into your private network’s DNS, or should you create a entirely separate zone for your internal network clients to use when accessing resources on the DMZ? We believe the best solution is to put the private addresses for the servers on the DMZ segment in your private network DNS servers. Since only your internal network clients have access to these DNS servers, no external user will ever be able to access the actual IP addressing scheme you use on the DMZ segment.The key concept here is that you keep the public and private DNS infrastructure separate. Speaking of name resolution, you’ll want to take care of a special problem that can crop up due to how name resolution works on the external ISA server.When an external client sends a request for a Web resource located on the DMZ segment, the request will be something like www.dmzhost.net. In the most common scenario, the external ISA server is configured to use a public DNS server. Because of this, the ISA server resolves the name www.dmzhost.net to the external interface of the ISA server. There’s nothing wrong with this, but it presents real problems if you want to optimize the data in your Web Proxy logs.To get the most meaningful data in your Web Proxy logs, you should configure your Web publishing rules to redirect to the published server using the same name the external client uses to access the resource on the DMZ segment. An example of this configuration appears in Figure 3.30. Can you see where you might run into a problem when you use a public DNS server on the external ISA server and configure the Web publishing rule in this way? You’ll end up with a loop condition, because the public DNS resolves the name to the external interface of the ISA server.The external ISA server will forward the request to the external interface of the ISA server, and when the external interface of the ISA server tries to forward the request again, it sends it back to the external interface of the ISA server! The solution is to create a HOSTS file entry for www.dmzhost.net.The entry in the HOSTS file is automatically placed in the DNS cache.The cache is always checked www.syngress.com
154
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
before a DNS server is queried.This allows you to enter the DMZ address of the published server into the HOSTS file. Now when the external ISA server receives the request for www.dmzhost.net, the request is forwarded to the DMZ Web server. Figure 3.30 Redirecting a Web Publishing Rule Using the Same Name the External Client Uses to Access the Published Resource
ISA SERVER ALERT Another benefit you’ll see when you use the HOSTS file is the disappearance of the dreaded 14120 error. You can create a Web publishing rule using the IP address of the DMZ host instead of an FQDN and you’ll avoid the loop. However, your Event Log will be littered with 14120 errors. One way to eliminate 14120 from your Event Viewer is to disable the alert for Resource Allocation Errors. However, the HOSTS file is a better solution because you won’t have to disable the alert (which can be a helpful troubleshooting tool).
Publishing Internal Network Web Sites in a Private Address Back-to-Back DMZ Publishing private address DMZ Web servers is a virtual no-brainer compared to publishing Web sites on the internal network through the back-to-back private address DMZ.The main reason for this is that we typically don’t think about Web routing pules. Most ISA servers we have had the pleasure to deal with are focused on allowing outbound access. In a back-to-back private address DMZ, we just configure the downstream ISA server to be a Web Proxy client of the upstream ISA server using a Web www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
155
routing rule that forwards all requests to the upstream ISA server.The Web routing rule uses the destination set All destinations (Figure 3.31) This usually works fine and all requests are routed to the upstream ISA server. Figure 3.31 What Appears in the Web Browser When a Proxy Chain Loop Occurs
While this setup works if all you’re concerned about is outbound access for internal network clients, this “default” routing rule on the internal ISA server can wreck havoc on your Web publishing rules. In our ideal back-to-back private address DMZ, you’ve configured the downstream ISA server to be both a Web Proxy and Firewall client to the upstream ISA server. As you saw earlier in this chapter, this type of setup works great and allows better security for outbound access through the external ISA server. You’ll run into problems with Web publishing if you use a default Web routing rule on the internal ISA server that forwards all requests going through the Web Proxy service to the upstream ISA server’s Web Proxy service.What you’ll end up with is a “proxy chain loop.” Figure 3.32 shows what the external client will see in the browser when such an error occurs. You’ll also see an error appear in the application log (Figure 3.33).What’s of interest here is that this entry is seen on the external ISA server.The Web routing error is actually on the internal ISA server, not the external ISA server! What causes this proxy chain loop? Let’s look at what happens when an external network client makes a request for www.internal.net (Figure 3.34).The server is located on the internal network behind the internal ISA server.
www.syngress.com
156
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
Figure 3.32 What Appears in the Web Browser When a Proxy Chain Loop Occurs
Figure 3.33 Proxy Chain Loop Error in the Application Log Seen on the Internal and External ISA Server Computers
1. The external network client sends the request for www.internal.net to the external interface of the external ISA server. 2. The external ISA server has a Web publishing rule that redirects the request to www.internal.net.There is a HOSTS file entry on the external ISA server that matches www.internal.net to the IP address on the external interface of the internal ISA server that is configured as the Incoming Web Requests listener for the site.This Web publishing rule is configured to send the original host header.The request is forwarded to the internal ISA server.
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
157
3. The request for www.internal.net is received by the external interface of the internal ISA server.The internal ISA server is a Web Proxy client of the external ISA server and has a Web routing rule configured to send all requests intercepted by the Web Proxy service to the upstream ISA server’s Web Proxy service.The internal ISA server’s Web Proxy service sends the request for www.internal.net to the external ISA server because of the Web routing rule. 4. The internal and external ISA servers detect the proxy chain loop.The external ISA server returns to the external client information about this error, and both the internal and external ISA servers register the error in their application logs. An alert also appears in the ISA Management console. Figure 3.34 A Proxy Chain Loop Due to a Configuration Error in the Web Routing Rules External client
www.internal.net Internal ISA External ISA www.internal.net
Web Server
www.internal.net www.internal.net A Proxy Chain Loop occurs when the Web Routing Rule on the internal ISA Server is configured to forward all requests to the upstream Web Proxy service
You can avoid this error by configuring a Web routing rule that forwards all requests for external destinations to the upstream ISA server’s Web Proxy service (Figure 3.35). Since the published server is on the internal network, and the name www.internal.net resolves to the internal IP address of the Web server (either because you have a HOSTS file entry on the internal ISA server, or you configured your internal DNS infrastructure in such a way as to resolve www.internal.net to its internal network IP address), the request is forwarded to the internal Web server based on the Web publishing rule configured on the internal ISA server. Notice that the Web routing rule that forwards requests to the upstream ISA server does not interfere with forwarding the inbound requests to the internal Web server.The Web routing rule only applies to external destinations, and since the server being published with the Web publishing rule is an internal destination, the Web routing rule doesn’t apply. What routing rule does apply to this request? The default Web routing rule. www.syngress.com
158
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
Figure 3.35 A Routing Rule Applied to All External Destinations
The default rule is always applied last.The action for the default rule is to process requests by retrieving them directly from the specified destination (Figure 3.36). Figure 3.36 The Default Routing Rule Is Configured to Obtain Objects from the Specified Destination
Let’s see if we can boil down the important configuration settings on the internal and external ISA server computers in the private address back-to-back DMZ configuration (Tables 3.5 and 3.6).This will help you replicate the optimum configuration for your private address back-to-back DMZ configuration on your own network.
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
159
Table 3.5 External ISA Server Configuration Setting
Value
Incoming Web Requests listener
The Configure listeners individually per IP address option is selected and an IP address bound to the external interface is dedicated to the listener. The Use the same listener configuration for all internal IP addresses option is selected. All IIS services are disabled. Autodiscovery information publishing is disabled. All Open User—all sites and content are available at all times to the user account created for the internal ISA server’s Web Proxy service to use for Web Proxy chaining. This account is created on the external ISA server and is used on the internal ISA server when configuring the downstream ISA server as a Web Proxy client (downstream Web chaining client). If you don’t want to use user based access controls (the most secure method), you can create a client address set and control access using the set. All Open User—all protocols are available at all times to the user account created for the internal ISA server’s Firewall service to use for firewall chaining. This account is created on the external ISA server and is used on the internal ISA server when configuring the downstream ISA server as a Web Proxy client (downstream Web chaining client). If you don’t want to use user-based authentication (the most secure option), you can use a client address set and allow access to the set. Packet filtering is enabled. IP routing is enabled. Enable intrusion detection is enabled. Enable filtering IP fragments is enabled. Enable filtering IP options is enabled. All attacks are selected on the Intrusion Detection tab. PPTP through ISA firewall is enabled. Web publishing rules are configured on the external ISA server using an FQDN that matches what the user sends to the HTTP request. (That is, the entry in the Destination Set and the entry in the Redirect the request to this internal Web server text box are the same.) A HOSTS file entry is created for each published server and it resolves to the IP address used on the internal ISA server’s Incoming Web Requests listener.
Outgoing Web Requests listener IIS services Autodiscovery Site and content rule
Protocol rules
IP packet filters
Web publishing rules
Continued
www.syngress.com
160
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
Table 3.5 External ISA Server Configuration Setting
Value
Server publishing rules
Server publishing rules are configured to listen on any of the external IP addresses on the external ISA server. The requests are redirected to any of the external IP addresses on the internal ISA server. Create destination sets to support Web publishing rules.
Policy elements: destination sets Policy elements: client address sets
Policy elements: protocol definitions
Caching configuration properties
Firewall and Web routing
www.syngress.com
Create client address sets to support outbound access control from the DMZ to the Internet through the external ISA server. Client address sets would only be required if you did not want to use user-based access controls for outbound access through the external ISA server. You should not need to create any special protocol definitions on the external ISA server. The reason for this is that the downstream ISA server is a Firewall client of the upstream and therefore does not suffer from the limitations of being a SecureNAT client. However, for complex protocols, you might need to configure the appropriate primary and secondary connections for the complex protocols so that the upstream ISA server knows how to handle the request. HTTP and FTP caching is enabled. Configure conservative caching policies on the external ISA server. You can finetune them on the internal ISA server (where the vast majority of requests originate). No firewall or Web routing configuration changes are required on the external ISA server to support communications with an upstream. However, if you have multiple ISA servers in a Firewall or Web Proxy chain, the upstream ISA server might be downstream to another ISA server. In that case, you will need to configure firewall and Web routing to make the ISA server a Firewall and Web Proxy client of the upstream. You might also want to configure Web routing rules to support requirements other than Web Proxy chaining.
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
161
Table 3.6 Internal ISA Server Configuration Setting
Value
Incoming Web Requests listener
The Configure listeners individually per IP address option is selected and an IP address bound to the external interface is dedicated to the listener. The Use the same listener configuration for all internal IP addresses option is selected. All IIS services are disabled. Autodiscovery information publishing is enabled. Site and content rules are configured to meet your outbound access requirements. Fine-tune your outbound access control on the internal ISA server, not on the external ISA server. The reason why you want to finetune your outbound access policy on the internal ISA server is that the internal ISA server is a member of the internal network domain. Because the internal ISA server is a member of the internal network domain, it will be able to control outbound access based on user/group membership. Protocol rules are configured to meet your outbound access requirements. Fine-tune your outbound access policy on the internal ISA server, not on the external ISA server. Packet filtering is enabled. IP routing is enabled. Enable intrusion detection is enabled. Enable filtering IP fragments is enabled. Enable filtering IP options is enabled. All attacks are selected on the Intrusion Detection tab. PPTP through ISA firewall is enabled. Web publishing rules are configured on the internal ISA server using an FQDN that matches what the upstream ISA server sends to the HTTP request. You should have configured the Web publishing rule on the upstream ISA server to include the original host header. (That is, the entry in the Destination Set and the entry in the Redirect the request to this internal Web server text box are the same.) A HOSTS file entry is created for each published server and it resolves to the IP address used by the server on the internal network. Server publishing rules are configured to listen on any of the external IP addresses on the internal ISA server. The requests are redirected to the IP address of the server on the internal network.
Outgoing Web Requests listener IIS services Autodiscovery Site and content rule
Protocol rules
IP packet filters
Web publishing rules
Server publishing rules
Continued
www.syngress.com
162
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
Table 3.6 Internal ISA Server Configuration Setting
Value
Policy elements: destination sets Policy elements: client address sets
Create destination sets to support Web publishing rules.
Policy elements: protocol definitions Caching configuration properties Firewall and Web routing
Create client address sets to support outbound access control out of the internal network through the internal ISA server. Create protocol rules as needed on the internal ISA server to allow access control for internal network client access to external networks. HTTP and FTP caching is enabled. Customize the caching policies on the internal ISA server. Configure firewall routing so that this computer is a Firewall client to the upstream ISA server. Be sure to enter the credentials correctly and use the name of the upstream server, not the IP address.
Publishing an SMTP Relay on the Private Address DMZ Segment A popular DMZ configuration is to put a one or more SMTP relay servers on the DMZ segment.The advantages of this include: ■
External SMTP servers never directly interact with internal network SMTP servers.
■
External miscreants can never directly interact with internal network SMTP servers.
■
Outbound mail can be sent to the SMTP relay servers and queued there in the event that the Internet connection becomes unavailable.
■
Multiple relay servers on the DMZ provide fault tolerance and load balancing for your SMTP messaging infrastructure.
■
You can offload the duty of spam filtering from your main mail server by placing the filtering software on one or more of the SMTP relay servers.
SMTP relay servers also make it easy for you to prevent an open relay configuration. Open relays accept mail from anyone sent to any domain. Spammers can take advantage of open relays and sent GBs of spam e-mail through a single well-connected open relay.You don’t want your organization’s mail servers blacklisted by allowing an open relay to be under your administrative control. www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
163
Publishing an SMTP relay on the DMZ segment requires that you do the following: ■
Create DNS records on a public DNS server so that MX queries for your mail domain resolve to the external interface of the external ISA server computer.You can create multiple MX records for a single domain and assign different weights to each MX record.
■
Create an SMTP server publishing rule on the external ISA server that redirects requests to the IP address of the SMTP relay on the DMZ segment.
■
Configure the SMTP relay with domains that are under your administrative control.These are the domains for which you receive mail.These domains are configured to relay to a smart most, which is the external interface of the internal ISA server.
■
Create a server publishing rule on the internal ISA server that redirects the SMTP messages to your internal SMTP server.
Figure 3.37 shows the basic configuration. Figure 3.37 SMTP Relay Server Configuration Internet SMTP Server
Internet
External VPN/ISA DMZ SMTP Relay 1
SMTP Relay 2
Internal VPN/ISA
www.syngress.com
164
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
Creating the Public DNS Records for Your Mail Domains Your have a number of options when it comes to adding the MX record. If your DNS records are hosted by your ISP, you can just call them or use the Web interface they provide to add MX records for your mail domain.You can also use the Windows 2000 or Windows .Net DNS server to host your own DNS records. Many organizations prefer to host their own DNS because it’s easier to manage and control their DNS records. If you use a Windows 2000 DNS server to host your own DNS, perform the following steps to create MX records for your mail domains: 1. Open the DNS console from the Administrative Tools menu. 2. Expand your Reverse Lookup Zones node in the left pane of the console. Make sure you have a reverse lookup zone for the network ID of the external interface on which the external ISA server is located. If not, create one. Just right-click on the Reverse Lookup Zones node, click on New Zone, and follow the instructions provided by the wizard. 3. Expand the Forward Lookup Zones node in the left pane of the console. Find your mail domain and click on it.You need to create a Host (A) record for the IP address on the external interface of the external ISA server. Right-click on the forward lookup zone and click the New Host command. Enter the Name of the server, the IP address that you’re using to publish the server, and create a pointer record, as shown in Figure 3.38. If you don’t plan to change your record frequently, you might consider changing the TTL to something longer than one hour. Figure 3.38 Creating a Host Record for the SMTP Server Publishing Rule
4. The MX record depends on the Host (A) record. Right-click on the domain name and click the New Mail Exchanger record. Click Browse to drill down to your domain name, and then double-click on the Host (A) record www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
165
you created (Figure 3.39). If you have more than one mail server, you can set a mail server priority so that one server is used preferentially over another. If you set them both at the same value, a mail server will be selected at random by the client SMTP server. As with the Host (A) record, we highly recommend that you increase the Time To Live (TTL) (unless you are using a dynamic address and DDNS). If you set the TTL for 24 hours or longer, you can survive periodic disruptions in your DNS publishing rules and still be able to receive mail. Figure 3.39 Creating the MX Record for Your Mail Domain
ISA SERVER ALERT We highly recommend that you create one or more MX records for your mail servers. Although MX records are not required (per RFC), many commercial mail servers might not want to work with your mail server if you don’t create an MX record. Another reason why you should create MX records is for fault tolerance. You can create two or more MX records and use these for load balancing and fault tolerance. If one of your DMZ SMTP relay servers becomes unavailable, external SMTP servers will be able to use the information in your MX records to forward mail to a secondary SMTP server in your domain.
Creating the SMTP Server Publishing Rule on the External ISA Server The next step is to create the SMTP server publishing rule on the external ISA server. Server publishing rules are relatively straightforward, as all you need to provide is: www.syngress.com
166
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ ■
The external IP address you want the rule to listen on
■
The TCP or UDP protocols you want the rule to listen for
■
The IP address you want the rule to forward the request to (in this case, on the DMZ segment)
The Firewall service uses the LAT to determine which addresses are internal and which are external.The Firewall service will use a server publishing rule to forward requests from the external network to a LAT network host.You can’t use server publishing rules to forward requests from a LAT segment to another LAT segment, and you can’t use them to forward requests from an external segment to another external segment. If you want to do these things, you can use DMZ segments or RRAS routing, respectively. Perform the following steps to create the SMTP server publishing rule on the external ISA server computer: 1. Make sure the IIS SMTP service has been disabled on the external computer. IIS is installed and enabled by default on Windows 2000 computers, but is not installed on Windows .Net servers. If the IIS SMTP service is enabled, it will compete for TCP port 25 on the external interface because of socket pooling issues.You can start creating the server publishing rule after the SMTP service is disabled. 2. Open the ISA Management console and expand your server or array name. Expand the Publishing node and right-click on the Server Publishing Rules node. Point to New, and click on Rule. 3. On the first page of the wizard, give the rule a name. In this example, we’ll call it SMTP Relay 1 (Figure 3.40). Click Next. Figure 3.40 Naming the New Server Publishing Rule
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
167
4. On the Address Mapping page, type in the IP address of internal server and External IP address on ISA Server (Figure 3.41).You might find it easier to click the Browse button when adding the external IP address that the rule will listen on, as this will show all the IP addresses bound to the external interface.We recommend that you do not use the Find button for the internal server, as we’ve found it to be of little use. Click Next. Figure 3.41 Entering the External IP Address and the DMZ SMTP Relay Server’s IP Address in the Address Mapping Page
5. On the Protocol Settings page (Figure 3.42), select the SMTP Server protocol. ISA Server defines “server” protocols as protocols with inbound primary connections. For example, if you want to create a protocol definition for an SMTP server, you would make the primary connection TCP port 25 inbound. That is how the built-in SMTP server protocol definition is defined. Click Next to continue. Figure 3.42 Selecting the Server Protocol in the Protocol Settings Page
www.syngress.com
168
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
6. Select the Any request option on the Client Type page.You want to allow any SMTP server to send mail to your DMZ SMTP relays, so the Any request option is appropriate.This won’t be the case on the internal ISA server, as you’ll see later. 7. On the last page of the wizard, review your settings, and click Finish.
Configuring the DMZ SMTP Relay Server The SMTP server in the private address DMZ segment should be thought of as a bastion host.The traditional definition of a bastion host is a computer with at least one interface directly connected to the Internet. An expanded interpretation of bastion host includes any computer allowing inbound communications from an Internet host. Note that in our private address DMZ that external network clients do not have direct communication with the SMTP server because the external client must go through the ISA server. This is an important distinction because ISA server isn’t just routing the requests from a public network host and the SMTP server on the DMZ segment. ISA Server has “smart” application filters that can help protect your servers from harm by Internet intruders. In the case of our SMTP relay server on the DMZ, the ISA server can use its SMTP application filter (Figure 3.43) to protect the DMZ SMTP server from buffer overflow attacks. Figure 3.43 The SMTP Command Tab
You can secure your DMZ host by applying a security template (security .inf file). Because this server should be used only for SMTP relay, you don’t need to support a slew of extraneous services. Applying security templates can seriously hamper, and often www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
169
disable, core networking services on a Windows 2000/Windows .Net server.This is actually a good effect of the security templates on DMZ hosts, because all you want to support is the SMTP service. None of the security templates will disable the SMTP service. See Chapter 10, “Protecting Data in Transit with IP Security,” for details on how to apply a security template. Make sure that you always thoroughly test a security template before deploying it in your product network.
ISA SERVER ALERT The SMTP application filter is very useful in blocking dangerous buffer overflow attacks. However, there is one drawback to the SMTP application filter: it does not support authentication. If you try to secure your SMTP server by requiring authentication, and then enable the SMTP application filter on the ISA server (located in front of the SMTP server), the authentication request to the SMTP server will fail. We recommend that you enable the SMTP application filter for security reasons, but realize that external users (including your traveling employees) will not be able to use these SMTP servers; your relay servers are to be used only by Internet SMTP servers that relay mail to your domains. External users should use their own ISP’s SMTP servers when sending mail via SMTP. This is somewhat problematic when using IMAP4, which requires the use of SMTP to send mail. The problem with this option is that often the external user doesn’t have access to another SMTP server. For example, you have an employee calling in from an hotel room fitted with a broadband connection. The road warrior has a connection, but no SMTP server. We’ll examine possible solutions to this problem in Chapter 6
Perform the following steps on the DMZ SMTP relay computer: 1. Before going to the SMTP relay, make sure that the SMTP application filter on the external ISA server is enabled. If not, enable the filter and restart the Firewall service. 2. At the SMTP relay server, open the Internet Services Manager from the Administrative Tools menu. 3. In the Internet Information Services console, click on each service except for the Default SMTP Virtual Server, and click the square “stop” button in the button bar.You want to stop all IIS services except for the SMTP service (Figure 3.44).This will stop the extra IIS services from running.To make sure that the services do not start up again after a restart, you should go to the Services applet in the Administrative Tools menu and set the startup type for the NNTP, FTP, and WWW services as Manual or Disabled.
www.syngress.com
170
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
Figure 3.44 Stopping the IIS Services in the Internet Information Services Console
4. Right-click on the Default SMTP Virtual Server node and click Properties. 5. On the General tab (Figure 3.45), change the IP address from All Unassigned to a specific IP address bound on the server’s interface.You should also enable logging so that you can track messages.This will be a great benefit when you need to trace down Internet criminals who try to use your SMTP servers to commit illegal acts. 6. Click on the Access tab.You don’t have to worry about Access control because you are not using authentication-based access control.The same goes for Secure communication and Connection control. Click Relay restrictions. 7. In the Relay Restrictions dialog box, make sure that the Only the list below option is selected and that the list is empty. Remove the check mark from the Allow all computers which successfully authenticate to relay, regardless of the list above check box (Figure 3.46).We never want any computer, authenticated or not, to relay through the virtual server.The only relay will be through specific remote domains we configure on this server. Click OK in the Relay Restrictions dialog box.
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
171
Figure 3.45 Changing the Listening IP Address for the SMTP Service
Figure 3.46 Disabling Relay on the Default SMTP Virtual Server
8. Click the Messages tab (Figure 3.47). Set message size, session size, number of message per connection, and number of recipients per message parameters here.These settings can be used to prevent the server from becoming overburdened, as well as enforcing network mail policy. Be sure to type in an e-mail address that non-delivery reports (NDRs) can be sent to in the Send copy of Non-Delivery report to text box. If you don’t want to apply any restrictions, just remove the check marks from the check boxes. Click Apply and then click OK. 9. Now we need to create the Remote Domain for each mail domain under our administrative control. Right-click on the Domains node, point to New, and click Domain. www.syngress.com
172
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
Figure 3.47 The Messages Tab in the SMTP Server Properties Dialog Box
10. On the Welcome page of the New Remote Domain Wizard, select the Remote option and click Next. 11. On the Select Domain Name page (Figure 3.48), type in your mail domain name. If you manage multiple subdomains, you might want to include an asterisk (*) wildcard character in the domain name, such as *.mymaildomain.com. If you do not manage any subdomains, you can forego the wildcard. Click Finish to create the remote domain. Figure 3.48 Entering Your E-Mail Domain on the Select Domain Name Page
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
173
12. You e-mail domain now appears in the right pane of the console. Doubleclick the domain name. Place a check mark in the Allow incoming mail to be relayed to this domain check box (Figure 3.49). Select the Forward all mail to smart host option and then enter the IP address of the external interface of the internal ISA server that you will use on the server publishing rule on the internal ISA server to publish your internal network SMTP server. Make sure the IP address is in brackets, or the server will try to resolve the IP address to an IP address (the server will think the IP address is an FQDN if you don’t use brackets). Click Apply and then click OK. Figure 3.49 Allowing Mail to Be Relayed to Your Internal ISA Server
Allowing Inbound VPN Connections through a Back-to-Back ISA Server DMZ Virtual private networking is a very hot topic—and for good reason.You can save a huge amount of money by replacing your existing dial-up remote access solution with a virtual private network (VPN) solution. Get rid of long distance bills and 800 numbers and replace the old infrastructure with a high-speed Internet connection. Fortunately for ISA Server administrators, ISA Server is up to the task of handling VPN network communications.The ISA Server VPN wizards make configuring a VPN server a virtual no-brainer.The wizard does the work of configuring ISA Server packet filters, and it also configures and starts the Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS). Just a couple of tweaks to RRAS might be required after the wizard is done. Once your custom tweaks are in place, you’re ready to roll.
www.syngress.com
174
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
ISA SERVER ALERT The ISA Server VPN Server wizard does a pretty good job at creating the proper packet filters and configuring and starting the RRAS. However, you might want to customize elements of the VPN server configuration to meet the special requirements of your network. For some quick hints and tips on VPN server configuration, check out www.isaserver.org/pages/articles.asp?art=56. For a comprehensive review of Microsoft VPN services, check out www.microsoft.com/vpn.
One VPN problem that seems to vex many ISA Server administrators is how to allow external network VPN clients access to an internal network in a back-to-back private address DMZ environment.The problem is that many admins might not have worked with tunneling VPN tunnels inside of other VPN tunnels.This configuration is often referred to as VPN passthrough because an initial tunnel is established to the external ISA server, and the second tunnel passes through the established connection to the external ISA server to access the internal ISA server. To make the configuration as easy as possible, we’ll look at the following issues: ■
Configuring the internal ISA server
■
Configuring the external ISA server
■
Configuring the VPN client computer
As you’ll see, allowing your external network VPN clients access to your internal network through a back-to-back ISA server configuration is quite easy—once you know how.
Configuring the Internal ISA Server In a back-to-back ISA server configuration, the ISA server with an interface in the DMZ and an interface on the internal corporate network is considered the internal ISA server.This ISA server will act as the end point for the final VPN link for external network VPN clients and allow them access to resources on the internal network. Interface configuration is straightforward, as shown in Tables 3.7 and 3.8. Table 3.7 Internal Interface Configuration Setting
Value
IP address
Address valid on the network segment to which the interface is connected. Mask appropriate for the network segment to which the interface is connected.
Subnet mask
Continued
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
175
Table 3.7 Internal Interface Configuration Setting
Value
Default gateway
No default gateway should ever be configured on the internal interface of an ISA server. Use static routing table entries or routing protocols to support routing on the internal network. Address of the DNS server on the internal network. Make sure that the internal interface is listed first on the adapters list seen in the Advanced dialog box in the Network and Dial-up Connections window. This adapter can be configured to dynamically register with a DDNS server on the internal network. Address of the WINS server on the internal network. NetBIOS over TCP/IP should be enabled.
DNS server
WINS server
Table 3.8 External Interface Configuration Setting
Value
IP address
Address valid on the network segment to which the interface is connected. Mask appropriate for the network segment to which the interface is connected. IP address of the internal interface of the external ISA server. Note that this will not break your Firewall and Web Proxy chaining configuration. A DNS server address is not required on the external interface. If you have your network infrastructure configured so that the internal DNS server can resolve Internet host names, no other DNS server will be required. This adapter should not be configured to dynamically register with a DDNS. No WINS server address is configured on the external interface of the ISA server. NetBIOS over TCP/IP should be disabled. File and printer services should be disabled.
Subnet mask Default gateway
DNS server
WINS server
While the interface configuration is simple, you have to prepare the network to support the VPN servers and clients.We recommend that you install one or more DNS servers on your internal network that can resolve Internet host names.You can do this by ensuring that the Root Hints file is primed on the DNS server, and that the ISA servers in the path to the Internet have access policies that allow the DNS server access to both TCP and UDP port 53 outbound. Create a protocol rule allowing the internal DNS servers outbound access to UDP and TCP port 53, and apply that rule to a client address set that includes the IP addresses of your internal network DNS servers.
www.syngress.com
176
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
ISA SERVER DEFCON 1 We recommend that you disable recursion on your internal network DNS servers, and configure the DNS servers to use your ISP’s DNS server as a forwarder. The reason for this is your ISP’s DNS servers have a much larger DNS cache than your DNS server can ever have. Using your ISP’s DNS server will significantly improve the performance of DNS queries, and when recursion is disabled, “host not found” messages are returned to the user much faster. You should also use separate DNS servers for internal network clients and external network clients. DNS servers used by internal network clients can be configured to use recursion or a forwarder to resolve Internet host names for internal network clients. DNS servers used by external network clients should never be configured to allow recursion. You do not want your external DNS servers to answers queries for any domain outside of those under your administrative control. That is to say, you do not want the DNS servers to answer queries for any domain except for those you’ve configured on that server. Allowing the DNS server to perform recursion opens the server up to wellknown DNS exploits, such as cache poisoning.
All of your published servers should be included in a client address set (or several client address sets, depending on your environment), so that you can apply the client address set to protocol and site and content rules on the ISA server.You need to control outbound access using a client address set because there is usually no one logged on to a published server. In fact, it’s good security policy to log all users off a server if no one is managing it. If someone is logged on to the server, an exploit could be carried out against it under the security context of the logged-on user. While many Windows 2000 texts state that you do not need a WINS server on your internal network, you’ll probably want to install one.Then, configure your VPN servers to be WINS clients if you want to support network browsing for your VPN clients. However, if you don’t need to support the dreaded browser service for your VPN clients, there is no compelling reason to install a WINS server (the exception being if you have NetBIOS-dependent applications or services). In the example we’re covering here, the internal ISA server is a member server on an internal network Windows 2000 domain.We will not cover issues involved with making the internal ISA server a domain controller (because it’s assumed that if you have taken the time and money to put together a back-to-back ISA server configuration, you don’t want to alter your configuration by making the internal ISA server a domain controller). If you want to know more about configuring the ISA server as a domain controller, check out this author’s article at www.isaserver.org/pages/articles .asp?art=17. www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
177
ISA SERVER ALERT VPN clients can see domain computers in their “My Network Places” or “Network Neighborhood” if those computers are domain members. If the client has never been a domain member, you might experience problems with domain browsing. Even if the browse list does not appear, the client will still be able to connect to network resources using a UNC path, as long as you have a WINS server in place and the VPN clients are configured to use it. The most reliable way to ensure that the client gets the browse list is to join the client to the domain. This will be problematic for home users who have their own private networks. In that case, you might have success by having the remote client configure itself to be a member of a workgroup that has the same name as the NetBIOS name of the domain containing the browse list they want. You might want to consider using NetSwitcher (www.netswitcher.com/) to help you with these configuration changes.
Our goal is to create two VPN servers; the first is on the external ISA server, and the second is on the internal ISA server. External network clients first connect to the external VPN server. After the external network client connects to the external VPN server, it creates a second tunnel inside the first tunnel that will connect the client to the internal VPN server. Figure 3.50 shows the VPN connections to the external and internal ISA/VPN servers. Figure 3.50 Private Address Back-to-Back DMZ Architecture for VPN Connections
Internet
VPN Tunnel 1
VPN Tunnel 2
External VPN/ISA
Internal VPN/ISA
www.syngress.com
178
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
Configuring the VPN Server ISA Server makes it easy to configure the VPN server. Just perform the following steps on both the internal and external ISA servers: 1. Open the ISA Management console and drill down to the Network Configuration node. 2. Right-click on the Network Configuration node, and click All VPN Client Connections. 3. The Welcome to the ISA Virtual Private Network Configuration Wizard appears (Figure 3.51). Click Next. Figure 3.51 Starting the VPN Server Wizard
4. On the Completing the ISA VPN Server Configuration Wizard page, click Details and read what the wizard will do to your machine. After reading the details, click Back.Then, click Finish. 5. If RRAS isn’t already started, the wizard will start the service for you. It will also configure packet filters to allow inbound PPTP and L2TP/IPSec connections. That’s it! The wizard quickly and painlessly configured both RRAS and ISA Server to allow inbound VPN calls. However, your work isn’t completely done from the VPN/RRAS viewpoint.While the wizard does an admirable job, it might not get everything right or the way you want it when it comes to configuring the VPN server. You should go to the RRAS console and check out your configuration. If you need some help, check out www.isaserver.org/pages/article.asp?id=232. Another important consideration is how you configure remote access permissions for your VPN server.Will access be controlled by policy or by account configuration? www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
179
You don’t have the choice to allow access by policy, and you must configure the individual accounts to have access if you have a mixed-mode Active Directory domain. If you have a native-mode domain, you can use RRAS policy to control access. Remember, the only reason to run in mixed mode is if you have a Windows NT 4.0 backup domain controller (BDC) in your domain. If you don’t, switch to native mode immediately!
Configuring the External ISA Server The ISA server interfacing with the untrusted network (the Internet) and the DMZ segment is the external ISA server.The external ISA server is the first point of attack for Internet intruders.This machine should be configured as either a stand-alone server in a workgroup, or as a member of a domain that is accessible from the DMZ segment. You want this machine to have nothing to do with the authentication environment for your internal network. Like the internal ISA server, interface configuration is straightforward on the external ISA server (Tables 3.9 and 3.10). Table 3.9 Internal Interface Configuration Setting
Value
IP address Subnet mask Default gateway
Address valid on the DMZ segment. Mask appropriate for the DMZ segment. Never put a default gateway on an ISA server internal interface. If you need to route to internal network segments, create static routing table entries or use a routing protocol. Variable. See explanation below. The interface should not register with a dynamic DNS server. Variable, but typically a WINS server is not used on a DMZ segment. If NetBIOS communications are not allowed on the DMZ (recommended), disable NetBIOS on the internal interface. If NetBIOS communications are not allowed on the DMZ (recommended), disable file and print sharing on the internal interface.
DNS server WINS server
Table 3.10 External Interface Configuration Setting
Value
IP address Subnet mask Default gateway
According to your ISP. According to your ISP. Either assigned by your ISP or the upstream router connected to the Internet. Continued
www.syngress.com
180
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
Table 3.10 External Interface Configuration Setting
Value
DNS server
Variable, but typically you only need a DNS server configured on the internal interface. None. NetBIOS should be disabled on the external interface. File and Print services disabled on the external interface.
WINS server
Notice that some of the settings on the internal interface of the external ISA server are variable.You might or might not have a dedicated name resolution scheme for your DMZ segment. If you have a public DNS server, there’s a good chance that you’re running a DNS server on the DMZ. If that’s the case, you might want to include that DNS server’s address on the internal interface of the ISA server. If you are hosting public DNS services on your internal network, enter the address of the external IP address on the internal ISA server, which is publishing your DNS server.The NetBIOS interface should generally be disabled on both of the external ISA server’s interfaces. However, if you require file and printer sharing and the Microsoft client on the internal interface, you’ll have to leave the NetBIOS interface enabled.We recommend turning it off to protect your external ISA server.
ISA SERVER DEFCON 1 Keep in mind that when a user establishes a VPN connection into the external ISA server, that user might be directly connected to your DMZ segment (which includes the external ISA server). You want to make sure that the user does not have permissions to access anything on the DMZ segment using the credentials supplied by the VPN client. Create a group on the external ISA server that has no permissions to access resources on the DMZ segment or the external ISA server itself. Put all accounts in this group. You can create a dedicated account that all users use to access the external ISA server, or you can synchronize domain accounts with the local account database stored on the stand-alone Windows 2000 server acting as the external ISA/VPN server.
VPN Server Configuration Issues There are a few VPN configuration issues worth noting before we proceed. First, make sure that you configure an IP address range the VPN clients can use when they connect to the external VPN server. It’s very unlikely there will be a DHCP server on the DMZ segment, so you’ll need to create a static address pool for the VPN clients.The internal ISA/VPN server can assign addresses obtained from a DHCP server on the internal network, or you can create a static address pool there, too. www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
181
You do have the option is letting the assign via DHCP option stay as it is. If you do not have a DHCP server on the DMZ segment, the VPN clients will be assigned Automatic Private IP Addressing (APIPA) addresses in the 169.254.0.0/16 range. However, this complicates the routing configuration.The VPN clients still need to be able to access the external interface of the internal ISA server, and their only route to the internal DMZ server is through the DMZ.We recommend that you do not depend on autonet addressing and that you create a static address pool that is on the same network ID as the DMZ segment. If you want to use L2TP/IPSec, all machines participating in the VPN links must have a machine certificate trusted by the client and server machines.The easiest way to do this is to have all machines belong to the same domain and configure a group policy that auto-enrolls domain members and assigns them a machine certificate. Unfortunately, you can’t do this on the external ISA server, because it is not a member of the internal network domain.You will have to manually install the certificate on the external ISA/VPN server. The exception to this is to use a preconfigured preshared key. In this case, you can allow your Windows XP L2TP/IPSec clients to access the VPN server. In addition, the new L2TP/IPSec client for Windows NT 4.0 and Win9x supports preshared keys. Windows .Net supports preshared keys right out of the box.You’ll have to perform a Registry hack to get Windows 2000 VPN servers to support preshared keys for L2TP/IPSec connections.We’ll cover this subject in more detail later in this chapter. If you have machines that are not domain members (such as laptops), they can be assigned machine certificates by using the Web browser interface to the Microsoft Certificate Server.When you install the Microsoft Certificate Server, make sure you install it as a standalone root server, or else you will not have the option to use the browser to assign machine certificates.
ISA SERVER ALERT PPTP VPN servers do not require certificates. For a high level of security, you should require EAP/TLS client certificate authentication. The primary weakness of the PPTP VPN protocol is that the level of security is dependent on password complexity. EAP-TLS user certificate authentication bypasses this weakness. PPTP had to be used to allow non-Windows 2000/Windows XP/Windows .Net clients access to the VPN. However, Microsoft has recently released a L2TP/IPSec VPN client for downlevel Windows clients; check it out at http://support.microsoft .com/default.aspx?scid=KB;EN-US;Q325032&. Finally, if you want to allow L2TP/IPSec connections to the ISA/VPN server, you must disable ISA Server fragment filtering. You can do this in the Properties dialog box for IP Packet Filters in the ISA Management console.
www.syngress.com
182
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
The simplest configuration is to create you own certificates using the Windows 2000 Certificate Server.You always have the option of using third-party client and server certificates.You can install the third-party certificates using the method described by the vendor, although the procedure is typically the same for all certificate types.
Configuring the Client Connections When you configure the VPN client, keep in mind what you’re trying to accomplish: to create a pass-through VPN link.The first connection is to the external ISA/VPN server, and the second connection passes through the first VPN connection to create the link to the internal VPN server.To accomplish this, you first establish a VPN connection with the external ISA server, and then establish a VPN connection with the internal ISA server. Go to the VPN client computer to create the first link (this example uses a Windows 2000 client). In this example, we’ll go over how to configure the VPN client on a Windows 2000 computer. 1. Right-click the My Network Places icon on the desktop, and click Properties. 2. In the Network and Dial-up Connections window, double-click on the Make New Connection icon. 3. Click Next on the Welcome to the Network Connection Wizard page. 4. On the Network Connection Type page (Figure 3.52), select the Connect to a private network through the Internet option. Click Next. Figure 3.52 The Network Connection Type Page
5. On the Public Network page, select the appropriate option for your environment. If the client uses an always-on, directly connected link to the Internet, www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
183
use the Do not dial the initial connection option. If the client needs to make a modem dial-up connection before initiating the first VPN connection, select the Automatically dial this initial connection option and select the ISP/modem DUN connectoid from the list. In this example, the client is directly connected to the Internet. Note that if you use a dial-up connection to connect to the Internet, you will not be able to use the first VPN link in the Automatically dial this initial connection for the second VPN link. Click Next. 6. On the Destination Address page (Figure 3.53), type in the FQDN or IP address of the external interface of the external ISA server. Click Next. (Note that in this example, we’re using a private address for demonstration purposes only.You will use a public address in your production environment.) If you use a dynamically assigned address on the external interface of the external ISA/VPN server, you can use a dynamic DNS service such as www.tzo.com. Your dynamically assigned IP address will be updated automatically for your domain, and you will be able to connect to the VPN server regardless of changing IP addresses. Figure 3.53 The Destination Address Page
7. On the Connection Availability page (Figure 3.54), select the option that best fits your security environment.We always select Only for myself for security reasons. Click Next. 8. On the Completing the Network Connection Wizard page (Figure 3.55), name the connection. In this example, we’ll call it VPNEXTERNAL.
www.syngress.com
184
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
Figure 3.54 The Connection Availability Page
Figure 3.55 The Completing the Network Connection Page
Now let’s configure the second VPN link that connects the client to the internal VPN server: 1. Right-click the My Network Places icon on the desktop and click Properties. 2. In the Network and Dial-up Connections window, double-click on the Make New Connection icon. 3. Click Next on the Welcome to the Network Connection Wizard page. 4. On the Network Connection Type page, select the Connect to a private network through the Internet option. Click Next. 5. On the Public Network page (Figure 3.56), select the Automatically dial this initial connection and select the name of the DUN connectoid used to www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
185
connect to the external ISA/VPN server. Note that you can only do this on a client with a dedicated Internet connection, or if you chose not to include the dial-up connection to automatically dial when initiating the first VPN link. Click Next. Figure 3.56 The Public Network Page
6. On the Destination Address page (Figure 3.57), type in the IP address of the external interface of the internal ISA server. Click Next. (Note that in this example, we’re using a private address because the DMZ is a private address DMZ segment.While you do have the option to create a public address DMZ segment in a back-to-back configuration, the procedure is a bit different with the public address DMZ configuration.You only need to route the VPN protocols through the external ISA server, and an external VPN server is not required in a public address DMZ segment.) Figure 3.57 The Destination Address Page
www.syngress.com
186
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
7. On the Connection Availability page, select the option that fits your security environment best.We always select Only for myself for security reasons. Click Next. 8. On the Completing the Network Connection Wizard page, name the connection. In this example, we’ll call it VPNINTERNAL. That’s all there is to it! You’ll see your links in the Network and Dial-up Connections window (Figure 3.58). Figure 3.58 The VPN Connectoids Appearing in the Network and Dial-Up Connections Window
Double-click on the VPNINTERNAL link (seen in Figure 3.58). In the Connect dialog box that appears, click Connect. After you establish the first connection, you will see the dialog box for the second VPN link. Enter the appropriate credentials and click Connect (Figure 3.59). After the second VPN link is established, you’ll be informed of your success (Figure 3.60). Note in the Network and Dial-up Connections window that both the VPNINTERNAL and VPNEXTERNAL links are active.The VPNEXTERNAL link dialed up automatically to allow the VPNINTERNAL link to complete. You can go to the RRAS consoles of both the ISA/VPN machines and see the connections (Figures 3.61 and Figure 3.62). Notice that we have L2TP/IPSec connections here. An IPSec certificate was installed on both the VPN server and on the VPN client.The VPN server always negotiates with the VPN client the type of VPN link to create. L2TP/IPSec is used preferentially, but if the client or server does not support L2TP/IPSec, PPTP will be used.
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
187
Figure 3.59 Starting Up the VPN Link to the Internal Network
Figure 3.60 The VPN Link to the Internal Network Is Successful
www.syngress.com
188
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
Figure 3.61 The VPNEXTERNAL Port Status Dialog Box
Figure 3.62 The VPNINTERNAL RRAS Console
In Windows 2000, you can do some very crude monitoring of your L2TP/IPSec connections using the ipsecmon console (Figure 3.63). From the Run command, type ipsecmon and click OK.You’ll see your connections appear in the console. Note that the policy used is the default L2TP/IPSec policy.This policy is created automatically and you cannot view it in the IPSec Policy MMC.
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
189
Figure 3.63 The IPSECMON Utility
ISA SERVER ALERT Windows 2000 creates a default IPSec policy that its applies to L2TP/IPSec VPN connections. This policy is not viewable in the IPSec Policy management console. You can find out what the exact parameters are for the default IPSec Policy used for L2TP connections at http://support.microsoft.com/default .aspx?scid=KB;EN-US;Q248750&. You can disable the default IPSec policy and apply a custom IPSec policy that you create in the IPSec console by following the recommendations at http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid= KB;EN-US;q258261&. You can also configure the Windows 2000 Server to support pre-shared keys for L2TP/IPSec connections. This is helpful if you want to support L2TP/IPSec connections with downlevel Windows clients (via the new L2TP/IPSec client for 9x and NT), as well as Windows XP and Windows .Net. Instructions for this configuration can be found at http://support.microsoft .com/default.aspx?scid=KB;EN-US;Q240262&. Note that these pre-shared keys are stored in the Registry, which exposes them to anyone with Administrator access to the VPN client or server.
Notes on VPN Client Configuration While configuring the VPN client connection is easy, there are some issues of which you should be aware.The biggest problem you’ll come up against is the dreaded www.syngress.com
190
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
browser service.This service allows users to browse for internal network resources by using the My Network Places applet.We touched on some of these issues earlier in this chapter. Your best chance at getting the browse list is to configure the client to be a member of the domain, or to configure the client to be a member of a workgroup that has the same name as the domain name that contains the resources the VPN client needs to access. Users should also select the Log on using dial-up connection option (Figure 3.64). Figure 3.64 Logging On via Dial-Up Networking
After they click OK, users need to select the link used to connect to the internal ISA/VPN server, the DUN connectoid that links to the internal VPN server (Figure 3.65). Figure 3.65 Selecting the Network Connection to the Internal VPN
The user will be asked for credentials. After entering the credentials, they click Connect.You can make this easier by having the machine remember the credentials on the initial connection.They will be asked a second or third time for credentials, depending on whether they need to establish a dial-up link to their ISP. Once the link to the internal ISA/VPN Server is established, they will be logged on. No matter how you cut it, accessing resources via the browser service is going to be slow. However, this isn’t all bad, because the frustration with the browser service might just lead you to disable it throughout your organization.The browser service can be a tremendous security risk, because it allows anyone to look around for “interesting stuff ” on your internal network. It’s best to disable the browser service if you can, and make users connect to resources using a UNC path. An even better solution is to create drive mappings for the resources to which the users need to connect. www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
191
Back-to-Back VPN Server Afterthoughts Setting up the back-to-back ISA/VPN server is relatively simple once you get all the steps down.The biggest problems are related to certificate assignments and the browser service.The certificate assignment problem can be solved, but there doesn’t appear to be any reliable fix for the performance problems with the browser service, other than implementing a WINS server (which is required for NetBIOS name resolution). As with any VPN rollout, make sure you have your name resolution and routing infrastructure,WINS and DNS configurations in place and working before you start configuring your VPNs. If you don’t, you will have many inexplicable problems that will be difficult to troubleshoot. Your Windows 2000/Windows XP/Windows .NET computers don’t have to rely on the NetBIOS for name resolution; they can use DNS to connect to resources on the internal network. However, most users will use unqualified requests to attach to internal network resources.This can create a problem if the client has no primary DNS suffix configured, and if the adapter hasn’t been configured with a domain suffix search list. Make life easier for yourself and configure the VPN server to assign the VPN clients a WINS server address.
Summing Up Back-to-Back Private Address DMZ Configuration To sum up the back-to-back private address DMZ configuration: 1. Two ISA servers—an internal and an external ISA server. 2. The external ISA server should have the DMZ segment IP addresses in its LAT. 3. The external ISA server uses private IP addresses on the DMZ segment. 4. Access control to servers on the DMZ is accomplished using publishing rules on the external ISA server. Do not use packet filters to control access to the DMZ. 5. The internal ISA server has the internal network IP address in the LAT; do not put the DMZ addresses in the internal ISA server’s LAT. 6. You can use publishing rules if you need a server on the DMZ to access a server on the internal network. 7. You should enable packet filtering on the internal and external ISA servers to optimize security.
www.syngress.com
192
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
Configure hierarchical Web caching and firewall chaining on the internal ISA server, and add the appropriate accounts to support this configuration on the external ISA server.
Configuring a Public Address Back-to-Back DMZ After going through the details and advantages of putting together a private address DMZ, you might think that we’re including information about how to put a public address DMZ segment here just to be complete.That’s almost true, but there are some real advantages to using a public address DMZ, as public address DMZ segments allow you to use some services that would otherwise be unavailable if you were using only a private address DMZ configuration. For example, suppose you wanted to use the H.323 Gatekeeper service and have all your internal network clients register with the internal ISA server’s H.323 Gatekeeper service.The clients would be able to register with the internal network Gatekeeper, but external network clients would never be able to call your internal network clients because the external ISA server is not able to publish the H.323 protocols and perform the dynamic connection management duties.There is no method that allows you to publish the H.323 protocols.You would need an H.323 protocol definition that supports H.323 publishing, and that protocol definition would need to be able to hook into an application filter that could manage the connections.While the H.323 Gatekeeper does do this to a certain extent, you would not be able to have the users register with both the internal and external H.323 Gatekeepers. Another example would be outbound access using standard (PORT) mode FTP. At this time, it’s impossible to use a PORT mode FTP client on the internal network in a private address back-to-back DMZ configuration when both of the firewalls are ISA Servers.The reasons for this are unclear, but it appears to be an issue with the FTP access. Its doesn’t matter if you’ve configured firewall chaining or not; PORT mode FTP clients on the internal network will not work in a back-to-back private address DMZ configuration. Probably the most important reason why you would want to consider a public address back-to-back DMZ configuration is to allow VPN connections directly to your internal ISA server.While you can use the “tunnel within a tunnel” (VPN passthrough) configuration and allow access to the internal network via VPN, some of your users might be challenged with the perceived complexity of making two connections to access the VPN.With a public address DMZ, there is no need for VPN passthrough. Figure 3.66 shows the public address DMZ setup with a VPN link reaching from the Internet to the internal network VPN server. www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
193
Figure 3.66 Public Address DMZ with VPN Tunnel Direct to the Internal ISA Server Private Address DMZ with VPN Tunnel to Internal Network
Public Address DMZ 222.222.222.0/24 Packet Filters for: PPTP Receive IKE L2TP allow VPN protocols to be routed through the external ISA Server to the internal ISA Server Private Network 10.0.0.0/8
The advantages of using a public address DMZ is that you can route packets through the ISA server into the DMZ (and to the internal ISA server if you want).The packets are unchanged, the headers are unmolested, and complex protocols can pass through almost as easily as simple protocols. All you need to do is create packet filters. ISA Server acts as a simple packet filtering router with this design. The celebrity challenge is to get the ISA server to route packets when there is no LAT segment. If you’ve ever tried to install ISA Server without a LAT interface, the setup routine will complain loudly! You must designate a LAT segment during setup, and that LAT segment must include one of the interfaces on the ISA server.You can trick it or cheat by calling out a false address range. However, if you have a dual-homed server and denote one interface as a LAT segment member, then you have a single internal and a single external interface. ISA Server will never route from an external interface to an internal interface. Packets moving from the external interface to a LAT segment will always be translated (a form for routing, but not “pure” routing).The only way you can route packets from the external interface to another interface is to have at least a trihomed server. One interface must be external, at least one must be internal (on the LAT), and at least one
www.syngress.com
194
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
must be on a DMZ segment.With just three interfaces, you have the classic “trihomed” DMZ configuration. However, we don’t want a trihomed DMZ! We just want two interfaces and route through from the external interface to the public address DMZ interface.You can do this, but you’ll have to trick the ISA server into thinking it has three interfaces, and that one of the interfaces is on the LAT.
ISA SERVER ALERT Note that while the external interface and the DMZ interfaces are public interfaces and are located on public address network IDs, they cannot be on the same network ID. The DMZ network ID must be different from the external interface network ID. How you assign the network IDs is specific to your configuration, but usually you’ll have a router in front of the external ISA server that has a WAN and a LAN interface. The WAN interface is assigned by the ISP. The ISP assigns you a block of IP addresses that you can subnet and assign to the segment in front of the external ISA server and the DMZ segment. Keep in mind that the more subnets you create, the more host IDs you’ll lose due to the subnetting.
This trick is accomplished by using the Microsoft Loopback Adapter.The loopback adapter looks like a physical adapter to the operating system and to ISA Server.You assign a private IP address to the loopback adapter, and then when you install ISA Server, you configure the LAT for the network ID to which you assigned the loopback adapter. Do the following to install the loopback adapter: 1. Perform this procedure while logged on as a local admin and before you install ISA Server. 2. Open the Control Panel and double-click on the Add/Remove Hardware icon. 3. Click Next on the Welcome to the Add/Remove Hardware Wizard page. 4. Select the Add/Troubleshoot a device option, and click Next. 5. Choose the Add a new device option on the Choose a Hardware Device page, and click Next. 6. Choose the No, I want to select the hardware from a list option on the Find New Hardware page, and click Next. 7. Choose the Network Adapters option on the Hardware Type page, and click Next. www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
195
8. On the Select Network Adapter page, select Microsoft from the list of Manufacturers. Click on the Microsoft Loopback Adapter in the right pane of the page. Click Next. 9. The wizard will install the device. Click Finish when the wizard completes. 10. Go into the Properties dialog box of the new interface and configure the interface with a private IP address. In fact, you don’t even have to use a private IP address; you can subnet your block to allow for a pubic address to be assigned to your dummy interface, but there’s no reason to waste good public addresses on a dummy interface. 11. Install ISA Server and configure the LAT to use the loopback adapter interface’s network ID as the LAT segment. At this point, you have a trihomed DMZ configuration.You configure packet filters to allow traffic through the DMZ the same way you do with the trihomed, as we discussed in the last chapter.You can put servers on the DMZ, or you can forward all traffic to the external interface of the internal ISA server.
Outbound Access for Internal Network Clients through a Public Address DMZ While you should take advantage of ISA Server’s packet-filtering capabilities and limit new inbound connections to only the traffic you want to let through, things are a bit different for outbound access.Your primary means of controlling outbound access from the internal network is by creating protocol and site and content rules on the internal ISA server.You configure the rules you need to control what internal users can access on the Internet or any other external network (including the public address DMZ segment). However, for outbound access through the external ISA server, you will have to use packet filters rather than protocol and site and content rules.The reason for this is that protocol and site and content rules apply only to hosts included in a LAT segment. Because the public addresses in the DMZ are not included in the external ISA server’s LAT, protocol and site and content rules can not be applied to the traffic traversing the DMZ and to the external ISA server. There are a couple of approaches you can take when configuring the outbound access packet filters on the external ISA server: ■
Create packet filters to allow all ICMP,TCP, UDP, and IP protocol traffic outbound access through the external ISA server
■
Create packet filters for only the protocols you want to have outbound access through the external ISA server
www.syngress.com
196
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
Allowing all outbound traffic through is your best bet when it comes to ease of use; you only need to configure four packet filters. Keep in mind that this provides you with no outbound access control at the external ISA server. Actually, the situation isn’t that dire, as you can configure the packet filters to apply only to the external IP address of the internal ISA server.This prevents these “all open” packet filters from being used by servers located on the DMZ segment. If you want to tighten up outbound access control on the external ISA server, you can create specific packet filters for only the protocols you want to allow outbound. For example, suppose you have protocol rules on the internal ISA server that allow outbound access for only HTTP and SMTP.You would create two packet filters on the external ISA server that look like Figures 3.67 and Figure 3.68. Figure 3.67 An Outbound SMTP Packet Filter
Table 3.11 lists the outbound SMTP packet filter’s characteristics. Table 3.11 Outbound SMTP Packet Filter Setting
Value
IP protocol Direction Local port Remote port Remote port number Local computer: this computer (on the perimeter network) Remote computer
TCP Outbound Dynamic Fixed port 25 External IP address of the internal ISA server
www.syngress.com
All remote computers
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
197
Figure 3.68 An Outbound SMTP Packet Filter
Table 3.12 lists the outbound HTTP packet filter’s characteristics. Table 3.12 The Outbound HTTP Packet Filter Setting
Value
IP protocol Direction Local port Remote port Remote port number Local computer: this computer (on the perimeter network) Remote computer
TCP Outbound Dynamic Fixed port 80 External IP address of the internal ISA server All remote computers
Note that in this example, we set the local computer on the perimeter network to be the external interface of the internal ISA server.This gives outbound access to the internal ISA server, but does not confer any outbound access capabilities to any other host you might place on the public address DMZ segment. If you wanted to create packet filters allowing outbound access for almost all Internet protocols, you would create five packet filters.Tables 3.13 through 3.17 list the five packet filters’ characteristics.
www.syngress.com
198
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
Table 3.13 The “All Open” IP Protocol Filter Setting
Value
IP protocol Direction Local computer: this computer (on the perimeter network) Remote computer
Any Both External IP address of the internal ISA server All remote computers
NOTE “All IP Protocols” appears to cover all protocols except ICMP, TCP, and UDP.
Table 3.14 All TCP Protocols Outbound Setting
Value
IP protocol Direction Local port Remote port Local computer: this computer (on the perimeter network) Remote computer
TCP Outbound All ports All ports External IP address of the internal ISA server All Remote Computers
NOTE TCP is a connection-oriented protocol; therefore, a packet filter is opened dynamically to allow the external server to respond to the client making the request. In our public address DMZ, the client making the request is the external interface of the internal ISA server.
Table 3.15 All UDP Protocols Outbound Setting
Value
IP protocol Direction
UDP Send/receive Continued
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
199
Table 3.15 All UDP Protocols Outbound Setting
Value
Local port Remote port Local computer: this computer (on the perimeter network) Remote computer
All ports All ports External IP address of the internal ISA server All remote computers
NOTE UDP is not a connection-oriented protocol; therefore, you must choose send/ receive rather than outbound. The internal ISA server is allowed to send a message, and the UDP server is allowed to send a response, but no session is established between the UDP client and server.
Table 3.16 All ICMP Protocols in Both Directions Setting
Value
IP protocol Direction Type Code Local computer: this computer (on the perimeter network) Remote computer
ICMP Both All types All codes External IP address of the internal ISA server All remote computers
NOTE You must allow ICMP in both directions, since the ICMP responses represent new inbound connections. For example, when you ping an external host, you send an ICMP Echo Request message. The machine that sends the response to the Echo Request sends back an ICMP Echo Response message, and this Echo Response represents a new inbound connection. Creating an All Types/Code outbound ICMP packet filter would not allow the Echo Response to reach the internal ISA server.
www.syngress.com
200
Chapter 3 • Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ
Table 3.17 PPTP Call Setting
Value
Predefined Direction Protocol number Code Local computer: this computer (on the perimeter network) Remote computer
PPTP Call Preset (both) Preset (47) All codes External IP address of the internal ISA server All remote computers
NOTE The PPTP Call packet filter is all you need to allow outbound VPN connections from your internal network, through the public address DMZ, and onto the Internet. There are no L2TP/IPSec filters to configure, since IPSec will not pass through the ISA server’s IPNAT service. There’s a lot hidden behind the scenes in this filter, because it hooks into an application filter that allows TCP 1723 as well. That’s why you do not need to create a separate packet filter for this.
While these packet filters support a great number of well-designed Internet protocols, they don’t support all protocols.There are protocols requiring the external server to make new inbound connections to the internal ISA server in response to an initial request made by a client behind the Internet ISA server. The best example of this is FTP. Are you saw in the trihomed DMZ chapter, FTP requires packet filters for both outbound and inbound access.The inbound access packet filters require that you open the entire range of high-number ports inbound. If you want to support PASV mode FTP, you have to open the entire range of ephemeral ports both inbound and outbound. Other complex protocols, such as RPC, have similar requirements. These examples of complex protocols demonstrate the weaknesses of traditional packet-filtering routers. If you do need to support new inbound requests for port ranges, you can use the all ports or dynamic ports entries in the packet filter configuration dialog box. Although the dynamic ports entry should represent 1024–5000, it doesn’t appear to work that way.The dynamic ports setting opens all ephemeral port numbers.
www.syngress.com
Defense Plan 2: The Back-to-Back DMZ • Chapter 3
201
ISA SERVER DEFCON 1 If you don’t want to fool with packet filters getting in the way of inbound or outbound access, you can use the packet filter rules described for outbound access, but change the direction for TCP communication to “both.”