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DEJAN DJOKIC editor
Yugoslavism Histories of a Failed Idea 1918-1992
HURST & COMPANY, LONDON
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DEJAN DJOKIC editor
Yugoslavism Histories of a Failed Idea 1918-1992
HURST & COMPANY, LONDON
First published in the United Kingdom by C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd,
38 King Street, London WC2E 8JZ © Dejan Djokic', 2003 All rights reserved. Printed by Bell & Bain Ltd., Glasgow
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
A Cataloguing-in-Publication Data record for this book is available from the British Library ISBNs 1-85065-662-2 casebound 1-85065-663-0 paperback
The idea for a book of this kind probably first occurred to me when I began teaching a course on Yugoslavia's history at School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES), University College London in 1998-9, together with Dr Peter Siani-Davies. It was thanks to the faith that Peter and Prof. David Kirby (Head of the Department of History at SSEES) showed in me that I became involved in the course as much more than an average teaching assistant. Lecturing on 'The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia' gave me the immense pleasure of working with several generations of talented and, most important, curious students. They have often asked me if in my opinion King Alexander was a genuine Yugoslav or a Greater Serbian in disguise, ifStjepan Radic was a separatist or a true Yugoslav, ifTito could have been both an internationalist and a Yugoslav nationalist, and ifSlobodan Milosevic was really a Serbian nationalist or just a conservative Communist apparatchik. Were Croats always anti-Yugoslav and Serbs pro-Yugoslav? Could Albanians ever be Yugoslavs? I realised that it was not always easy to answer these and similar questions, especially when there is not enough literature in English (or in any of the languages of the former Yugoslavia) that would help students and scholars alike to provide answers to them. But the opportunity to edit this book came somewhat unexpectedly. It was thanks to Michael Dwyer of Hurst & Co., the publishers, who was bold enough to approach a young and unknown historian, still in the process of writing his PhD dissertation, and offer him a contract pretty much on the basis of an article published in the Times Higher Education Supplement (my indirect thanks therefore to David Jobbins, who commissioned that article) in May 1999 during the NATO bombing ofYugoslavia. 1 1
Dejan Djokic, 'Individualism becomes the first casualty of war', Times Higher Education Supplement, 7 May 1999.
v
Priface and Acknowledgements
Priface and Acknowledgements
My thanks go to all the contributors to this volume for their hard work and for seriously considering all the suggestions and instructions from someone who is their junior not only in age but as a scholar and for more or less abiding by the timetable. But I thank especially Prof. Stevan K. Pavlowitch, who provided moral support and encouragement, and who read parts of the manuscript, including my own chapter, selflessly offering his expert advice and critical comments. I am also grateful to Dr Wendy Bracewell and Dr Peter Siani-Davies, my PhD mentors, who to my great amazement remain patient, supportive and, above all, good friends despite my work on this book taking too much of the time I should have devoted to writing the thesis. Peter's part has already been acknowledged, while Wendy's unparalleled understanding of Yugoslav national ideologies has helped and influenced me more over the last few years than she probably realises. My warmest thanks are also due to those authors who for various reasons could not take part in the writing of this book, but who encouraged me simply by considering their participation. They are, in alphabetical order: Prof. Ivo Banac, Mr Dusan Djordjevic, Prof. Marco Dogo, Dr James Gow, Dr Miroslav Hadzic Prof. Robert Hayden, Prof. Marko Ker5evan, Prof. Predrag Matvejevic, Prof. Paul Mojzes, Dr Branka Prpa, Prof. Zarko Puhovski, Prof. Paul Shoup, Dr Simon Trew, Prof. Stefan Troebst and Dr Mark Wheeler. I would also like to thank an anonymous reader for her/his expert comments. More authors in the book are from Serbia than from any other ex-Yugoslav region, but this is not because of editorial bias: before approaching potential contributors I had in mind themes, not names. Of course, it would be dishonest to claim that I did not try to have as many of the former Yugoslav nations represented in the volume as possible (although I hoped that the authors would write as scholars rather than as their nations' ambassadors). Another reason for this over-representation lies in the fact that there are more historians working on the history of the Yugoslav state in Serbia than anywhere else in the former Yugoslavia. My regret is that there are not more authors whose assessment of Yugoslavia and Yugoslavism could have been more critical. With them included, this book would undoubtedly have been more complete. I am grateful to Dr Ivan Vejvoda of the Belgrade office of the Open Society Institute for providing financial help which covered
the cost of translating some of the chapters into English. I should also express my sincere thanks to Dr Nebojsa Popov for allowing me to reproduce the two texts on UJDI, originally published in Republika (Belgrade), of which he is the editor, and to Dr Marko Ivanovic and Petar Ladjevic, who gave the permission for 'The Design for a Democratic Alternative: Final Text' to be reproduced. My greatest regret is that Vane Ivanovic (1913-99), a rare Yugoslav and a democrat, is no longer among us, for I would have been proud to show him this book, not only because discussions with him made me understand the idea of Yugoslav unity much better than most books I have read. If I had been the sole author of the present volume, it would have been dedicated to his memory. Thus, only those sections of the book I have personally written can be dedicated to this great man. The acknowledgement pages are usually a good place to thank those emotionally connected to the author/ editor. I therefore take this opportunity to thank my family, especially my mother, for their absolute support and encouragement. As for women, I should probably mention a certain C., because without the inspiration she provided many things would not have been the same, including this book (although without her the book would probably have been finished earlier). My final regret is that she is no longer my muse, but it is perhaps only fitting to acknowledge her in a book dealing with a 'failed idea'. While all those mentioned above by name, position, relation or initial, but above all the contributors, should be credited for the book's merits, I accept responsibility for its shortcomings.
Vl
London, November 2002
Vll
DEJAN DJOKIC
CONTENTS pagev
Preface and Acknowledgements
Introduction: Yugoslavism: Histories, Myths, Concepts Dejan Djokic
1
Part I. CONTEXT The Yugoslav Idea before Yugoslavia Dennison Rusinow The First World War and the Unification ofYugoslavia Kosta St. Pavlowitch The Yugoslav Question, the First World War and the Andrej Mitrovi{ Peace Conference, 1914-1920
11
27 42
Part II. NATIONS
Stevan K. Pavlowitch Serbia, Montenegro and Yugoslavia Tihomir Cipek The Croats and Yugoslavism Milja Velikonja Slovenia's Yugoslav Century Xavier Bougarel Bosnian Muslims and the Yugoslav Idea Hugh Poulton Macedonians and Albanians as Yugoslavs
57 71 84 100 115
Part III. LEADERS AND INSTITUTIONS (Dis)integrating Yugoslavia: King Alexander and Interwar Yugoslavism Dejan Djokic 136 Yugoslavism and Yugoslav Communism: From Tito to Dejan]ovi{ 157 Kardelj The Two Yugoslavias as Economic Unions: Promise and Problems John R. Lampe 182 Religion in a Multinational State: the Case ofYugoslavia Radmila Radic 196 The Military and Yugoslav Unity Mile Bjelajac 208 IX
Contents
X
Part IV INTELLECTUALS South Slav Intellectuals and the Creation ofYugoslavia Ljubinka Trgovcevi{ 222 Ivan Mestrovic, Ivo Andric and the Synthetic Yugoslav Culture of the Interwar Period Andrew B. Wachtel 238 Yugoslavism's Last Stand: a Utopia of Serb Intellectuals Aleksandar Pavkovi{ 252 Intellectuals and the collapse of Yugoslavia: the End of the Yugoslav Writers' Union ]asna Dragovic-Soso 268 Part V ALTERNATIVES The Democratic Alternative Desimir Tosi{ The Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative Branko Horvat Albanians in Yugoslavia: a Personal Essay Ramadan Marmullaku Funeral Oration for Yugoslavia: an Imaginary Dialogue with Western Friends Aleksa Djilas
317
Notes on Contributors
334
Index
339
286 298 304
MAPS
II
0
....
r-TERRITORYTO
fborders =tbetween States -fpost 1918 borders -lof Yugoslavia Austro-Hungarlan lands:- ] Hungary I I Austrian lands ~"~:_~. Croatia(associated with Hungary) Bosnia-Herzegovina {Austro-Hungarian COnidOnninium}
[2:j
ALBANIA
[§
BULGARIA
II
GERMANY
~ HUNGARY •
!DJITIJ
ITALY 100
11l0
2oomiles
The territory of Yugoslavia during the Second World War.
The Yugoslav lands on the eve of the First World War.
;
Hungary
,...·
boundaries of banovine 1929 Bllnovina of Croatia 1939
OL___ _ _ __;_10._0:__ _ _ _2::..:iOOmiles
The banovine of Yugoslavia, 1929, and the banovina of Croatia, 1939.
The federated units ofYugoslavia after 1945.
xu
Xlll
INTRODUCTION
YUGOSLAVISM: HISTORIES, MYTHS, CONCEPTS Dejan Djokic In all the former Yugoslav republics the year 2002 was the tenth anniversary either of their international recognition as independent states or of the beginning of the war and imposition of international sanctions, or. .. both. However, the present volume, though completed and published in the 'anniversary' year, is not meant to commemorate anything. This is not only because ten years ago began a period most former Yugoslavs would rather forget. Nor is it because '[s]cholarly research and anniversaries[ ... ] are not usually comfortable bedfellows', because it is 'in the nature of research that it rarely comes to fruition in time to be published on an appropriate anniversary', as the editor of another collection of essays written on a different but almost equally contentious subject observed. 1 This book is primarily concerned with Yugoslavia's life and not so much its tragic death, with what happened before rather than during the country's break-up and its aftermath, although the chapters by Aleksa Djilas,Jasna Dragovic-Soso, Ramadan Marmullaku and Aleksandar Pavkovic address Yugoslavia's disintegration, while most other chapters do so implicitly. After all, the volume's contributors have inevitably written through the spectacles of the present, with a safe 'knowledge' that they were writing not just about a 'failed idea' but also about a failed state. To say that literature dealing with the collapse of Yugoslavia is vast is not an overstatement. In English alone there are hundreds, if 1
Paul Preston, 'Introduction' in Paul Preston and Ann L. Mackenzie (eds), The Republic Besieged: Civil War in Spain, 1936-1939, Edinburgh University Press, 1996, p. v.
1
Introduction
Dejan Djokic
not thousands, of scholarly and less scholarly monographs, edited books, articles, travelogues, diaries, memoirs and all kinds of accounts of the Yugoslav 'Balkan' wars, written by academics and nonacademics alike (which is not to say that academics write 'academic' works per se and non-academics do not), by journalists-turnedhistorians and historians-turned-journalists, and by 'professional' and 'emotional' propagandists (the latter usually connected to exYugoslavia through a spouse, a lover or, less commonly, a friend)." Now that a united Yugoslavia has officially been consigned to history, together with its almost equally short-lived contemporary, the Twentieth Century, it seemed to the editor of this book that it was the right time for historians and other scholars to (re)visit it. The book's main aim is to explore the history of the Yugoslav idea, or Yugoslavism, during Yugoslavia's existence between its creation in 1918 and its dissolution in the early 1990s. It is a collection of twenty-one essays divided into five thematic sections: 'Context',
'Nations', 'Leaders and Institutions', 'Intellectuals' and 'Alternatives'. Written both by established and younger scholars from Western countries and the region, as well as fom1er and current politicians, Yugoslavism offers a unique perspective on Yugoslavia's political, social, diplomatic and economic history, and provides a background to the wars of the 1990s and (early?) 2000s. There were of course difficulties presented by a (relative) lack of temporal and emotional distance. As will become clear to the reader, not all contributors managed to distance themselves equally from their own prejudices. Perhaps this would have been inevitable even if nearly half the contributors had not personally experienced the disintegration ofYugoslavia and the consequent wars, and others had not also been closely involved, personally and/ or professionally, with the region, including the book's editor. In addition to being a secondary source of scholarly standard, this book thus might in time also provide a useful insight into the state of the academic community in the former Yugoslavia and the West only ten years after Yugoslavia's collapse. If the past, distant or recent, is the historian's 'Other', then the former-Yugoslavia represented the 'Other' to the contributors of the present volume. But the volume's title, Yugoslavism, is not meant merely to echo that of Edward Said's classic work3-it above all suggests that stereotypical conceptions about Yugoslavia cannot not be easily avoided, even in a volume of this kind. This book also does not venture much into the history ofYugoslavism before the creation ofYugoslavia in 1918, with the obvious and necessary exception of Dennison Rusinow's introductory chapter and Ljubinka TrgovceviC's contribution. Introductory sections of all chapters in Part II and Dejan Djokic's chapter in Part III also offer brief accounts of Yugoslavism before Yugoslavia. History of the Yugoslav idea before Yugoslavia's unification has been the subject of a number of works, the most useful of which are cited by Rusinow (although this is not to suggest that there is no need for further study of the origins ofYugoslavism). However, very few
2
2
John Lampe provides an excellent brief overview of the 1990s in 'Ethnic wars and successor states, 1991-1999', the last chapter in the second edition of his Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country, Cambridge University Press, 2000. Aleksandar Pavkovic's The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans, 2nd edn, London, 2000, is particularly good on the national ideologies and the way they were used by former-Yugoslav political and intellectual elites to legitimise the 'wars ofliberation'. Steven L. Burg and PaulS. Shoup's The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention, Armonk, NY, 1999, offers the best analysis ofBosnia's tragedy, and Tim Judah's Kosovo: War and Revenge, Yale University Press, 2000, does the same for Kosovo. Perhaps the two most thorough general accounts of the disintegration of Yugoslavia are Lenard J. Cohen's Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition, 2nd edn, Boulder, CO, 1995, and Susan L. Woodward's The Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution cifter the Cold War, Washington, DC, 1995, while Laura Silber and Alan Little's The Death of Yugoslavia, revised edn, London, 1997, is unrivalled for its documentary value, and Misha Glenny's The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War, 3rd edn, 1996, is the best account written by a journalist who was actually there. For detailed, useful and inevitably outdated reviews of the literature in English dealing with the break-up of Yugoslavia see James Gow, 'After the Flood: Literature on the Context, Causes and Course of the Yugoslav Wars-Reflections and Refractions', Slavonic and East European Revieu;, vol. 75, no. 3, 1997, pp. 446-84; Sarah Kent, 'Writing the Yugoslav Wars: English Language Books on Bosnia (1992-1996) and the Challenge of Analysing Contemporary History', American Historical Review, vol. 102, no. 4, 1997, pp. 1085-1114; and Gale Stokes,John Lampe and Dennison Rusinow, with Julie Mostov, 'Instant History: Understanding the Wars of Yugoslav Succession', Slavic Review, vol. 55, no. 1, 1996,pp. 136-60.
3
3
Edward Said, Oriental ism: Western Conceptions of the Orient, London, 1978. However, I am not suggesting that Yugoslavism was a product of cultural imperialism or that it was invented from outside, as in the case of Said's 'Orient'. Which is not to say that external stereotypes and misunderstandings of Yugoslavia and Yugoslavism have never existed-they have and they do, as is suggested by Aleksa Djilas in his chapter.
4
Introduction
Dejan Djokic
scholars have looked at Y ugoslavism during the entire existence of the Yugoslav state (1918-92)\ and it is here that this book aims to fill a significant gap. Its overall contention is that Yugoslavism was a fluid concept, understood differently at different times by different Yugoslav nations, leaders and social groups. There was no single definition of who and what was (or was not) 'Yugoslav', and this perhaps indirectly contributed to the ultimate failure of the Yugoslav idea and with it the Yugoslav state. The idea of Yugoslav unity, originally based on the notion of Serbo-Croat linguistic unity propounded by Croat 'Illyrianists' in the 1830s, was almost a century old when the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (in 1929 renamed Yugoslavia) was created in 1918. Dennison Rusin ow provides a concise overview of its history, arguing that before 1918 Yugoslavism was 'a more complex, convoluted, and as an ideological-political movement by itselfless important factor than in the portrait of an evolving but essentially singleminded idea ... that is painted in most Yugophil and Yugo-nostalgic historiography.' Yet, as Rusinow rightly points out, the Yugoslav idea, just like the Yugoslav state, was not an 'artificial' idea, as is now fashionably claimed-certainly it was not less 'natural' than other
national(ist) ideologies, including the Serbian and Croatian ones. By the time ofYugoslavia's crea~io~ ther~ emerged two strands of Yugoslavism: 'integral Yugoslavism, which recogmsed no differences between the Yugoslav 'tribes' (at that time Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) or superseded any differences between them which might have existed, and Yugoslavism which, in Rusinow's words, 'acknowledged and approved enduring separate nationhoods and sought federal and other devices for a multi-national state of related peoples with shared interests and aspirations.' Despite the strot;lg appeal of the Yugoslav idea(s) at the beginning of the twentieth century, not many Yugoslavs and non-Yugoslavs imagined that there would be a unified Yugoslav state by the end of the First World War, as is argued by both Kosta St. Pavlowitch and Ljubinka Trgovcevic. The Serbian wartime government and the Habsburg South Slav leaders both desired a unified state, but the two sides had (in the words of Kosta Pavlowitch) at times 'used Yugoslavism as an extension of their own aspirations, and both had expected to carry out unification on their own terms, within the framework of their own historical agendas'. Particularly illuminating, especially in the light of popular claims to the contrary, is Pavlowitch's contention that although Yugoslav unification had come somewhat unexpectedly to everyone, at the end it was the only option acceptable to all and there was no real alternative: neither a 'Greater Serbia' nor a mini, Croat-dominated 'Habsburg Yugoslavia' was really possible. Yet Yugoslavia was created by Yugoslavs themselves and not by the Great Powers, who had waited several months before recognising the act of unification of 1 December 1918, as Andrej Mitrovic reminds us in his chapter dealing with the Paris Peace Conference and international diplomacy vis-a-vis the Yugoslav question during the First World War and its immediate aftermath. Mitrovic dismantles popular myths related to the role of the then 'international community' in the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Unlike their political leaders, the South Slav intellectuals were not interested in a domination of one centre over another-the argument shared by Trgovcevic and Andrew B. Wachtel. Trgovcevic's chapter fills a hitherto existing gap in English literature regarding the attitude of Serbian intelligentsia towards the unification of Yugoslavia: as she clearly shows, there were several pro-Yugoslav
4
With the exception of Andrew B. Wachtel's study of cultural Yugoslavism in both inter-war and post-1945 Yugoslavia, 1\1aking a Nation, Breaking a Nation: Literature and Cultural Politics in Yugoslavia, Stanford, CA, 1998. Ivo Banac in The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics, 4th edn, Ithaca, NY, 1994, and Paul S. Shoup in Communism and the Yugoslav National Question, New York, 1968, deal with Yugoslavism in the formative years of the first and second Yugoslavias, respectively, while Aleksa Djilas provides an account of the Yugoslav Communists' changing attitudes to the national question in the inter-war, war and immediate post-war periods in his The Contested Country: Yugoslav Unity and the Communist Revolution, 1919-1953, 3rd edn, Cambridge, MA, 1996. In addition to the work ofBanac, Dimitrije DjordjeviC's edited volume The Creation of Yugoslavia, 1914-1918, Santa Barbara, CA, 1980, and IvoJ. Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference: A Study in Frontier-1\1aking, New Haven, CT, and London, 1963, also examine Yugoslavia's formation. Lampe's general history of Yugoslavia built on several well-known predecessors, most notably Stevan K. Pavlowitch's Yugoslavia, London, 1971, and The Improbable Survivor: Yugoslavia and its Problems, 1918-1988, London, 1988, Fred Singleton's A Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples, Cambridge University Press, 1985, and Wayne S. Vucinich (ed.), Contemporary Yugoslavia: Twenty Years of Socialist Experiment, Berkeley, CA, 1969. Two welcome recent additions to the existing literature on Yugoslavia's history have been John Allcock's all-encompassing Explaining Yugoslavia, London, 2000, and Leslie Benson's useful Yugoslavia: A Concise History, London, 2001.
5
6
Introduction
Dejan Djokic
groups among prominent Serb intellectuals, including the federalists and republicans-the two political concepts usually associated within the former-Yugoslav framework exclusively with Croats (and Slovenes). Wachtel's parallel examination of the Yugoslavism of the two great Bosnian- and Catholic-born Yugoslav 'prophets', the sculptor Ivan Mestrovic and writer Ivo Andric, is equally illuminating and offers a unique insight into (interwar) Yugoslavism. Different Yugoslav nations had different experiences in Yugoslavia and consequently different views of their life in it. Throughout the nineteenth century the Serbs showed little interest in the Yugoslav ideas of 'Illyrianists' and their successors, since they had their own 'liberation and unification' to carry out. The unification of Serbia and Montenegro, the only two South Slav states to achieve independence before the creation ofYugoslavia, was considered in Belgrade and Cetinje ahead of the unification of all Yugoslavs, even though the Montenegrin Prince Bishop and poet Peter II (better known as Njegos) in the 1840s and Serbian Prince Michael Obrenovic in the 1860s were among early advocates of a South Slav cooperation, as Stevan K. Pavlowitch shows in his chapter. The Serbs eventually came to accept the Yugoslav state, and played a major role in the creation ofboth Yugoslavias. Pavlowitch takes an overview of the modern history of Serbia, Montenegro, and Yugoslavia, tracing all the main developments in this complex interrelationship which remains relevant while Serbia and Montenegro constitute the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia-a union that faces a highly uncertain future. Although the development of Croatism and Yugoslavism cannot be easily separated since they went hand in hand, the Croats grew increasingly disillusioned with the Serb-dominated Yugoslav kingdom which, as Tihomir Cipek argues, stripped Croatia of state symbols it had managed to preserve during centuries of Hungarian and Austrian rule. The Croats had more reasons to accept the Communists' Yugoslavia, in which Croatia was one of the six socialist republics, but the renewed Serbian nationalism of Slobodan Milosevic, in Cipek's view, finally forced it to leave Yugoslavia and seek integration into West European institutions. The Slovenes, which besides the Serbs and Croats was the only Yugoslav group to have developed its national identity before Yugoslavia, accepted the Yugoslav unification as well as the unitarist
Yugoslavism with great enthusiasm, as Mi~a Velikonja shows. He argues that the modern identity of Slovenes cannot be understood without an analysis of Slovenia's 'Yugoslav century', and concludes that the Slovenes played an integral part in the creation, development and ultimate dissolution of the Yugoslav state. Although there is little evidence that Bosnian Muslims were interested in the Yugoslav idea, which was essentially the idea of Christian, Serb-Croat-Slovene unity, they became enthusiastic supporters of the common Yugoslav state once it had been created, as Xavier Bougarel convincingly argues. Throughout the period, the Muslim Slavs of Bosnia-Herzegovina accepted Yugoslavism and Yugoslavia as the best protection against both Serbian and Croatian nationalist claims-a trend abandoned only in the early 1990s by the Party ofDemocratic Action (SDA) led by Alija Izetbegovic, the first president of independent Bosnia. In Bougarel's view, the SDA decision to risk and even sacrifice Bosnia's territorial unity in exchange for independence for its Muslim community had tragic consequences for both the Muslims and Bosnia as a whole. Yugoslav Macedonians and Albanians were incorporated into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as part of the pre-existing independent Serbian kingdom. Macedonians were considered 'Southern Serbs' throughout the interwar period, and Albanians-predominantly Muslim non-Slavs-remained second-class citizens during much of Yugoslavia's existence. However, as Hugh Poulton shows, at the time of Yugoslavia's dissolution, the Macedonians reluctantly left and the Slovenians were held against their will in what remained of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), and in the newly independent Macedonia. Although both experienced 'national affirmation' in Tito's Yugoslavia, the Macedonians, as South Slavs, were given their own socialist republic, while the large Albanian minority in Serbia could not achieve more than a high degree of autonomy for Kosovo-and in Macedonia, where Albanians today form around one third of the population, not even that. Various versions of the 'integral' (unitarist-centralist) and anticentralist Yugoslavisms-the two main strands of Yugoslavism, which according to Rusinow had emerged even before the creation of Yugoslavia-would clash both in the 'first' and 'second' Yugoslavias, as the chapters by Dejan Djokic and Dejan Jovic respectively show. While Djokic examines the Yugoslavism of the
7
8
Introduction
interwar period, particularly the 'integral' Y ugoslavism of King Alexander, and Jovic concentrates on Tito and Kardelj's different concepts of 'socialist' Yugoslavism, they both argue that political contests in the two Y ugoslavias more often than not ignored ethnic boundaries. In other words, it would be too simplistic to reduce Yugoslavia's seemingly perennial crises to the Serbo-Croat or any other inter-ethnic conflict. Could more emphasis on an economic union have created a viable state-building rationale for Yugoslavia? Would economic integration have succeeded where attempts to impose from above ethnic and ideological unity in the Kingdom and the Socialist Republic, respectively, failed? John R. Lampe believes that despite numerous problems in integrating diverse and differently developed economies, after the destruction of the two World Wars, there was a genuine promise of economic integration which could have created a more viable Yugoslav state. Radmila Radic offers a valuable overview of the interrelationship of Yugoslavia's three main religious groups, Orthodox Christians, Roman Catholics and Sunni Muslims with each other and with the state. She argues that the three religious communities never established a genuine mutual cooperation during the existence ofYugoslavia, and suggests that this was perhaps an important factor behind the country's ultimate failure. If the religious groups were usually seen by Yugoslav governments as potentially destructive factors, the army ofboth Yugoslavias was regarded, on the other hand, as the best guarantor of the country's unity. Mile Bjelajac provides a detailed account of the attempts to make the army in both Yugoslavias truly Yugoslav. He also examines Draza MihailoviC's 'Yugoslav Army in the Homeland' (better known as the Cetniks), in fact a diverse guerrilla movement and a successor of the (royal) Yugoslav army. Yugoslavism, like all national ideologies, was created and ultimately also destroyed by intellectuals. The already mentioned contributions by Trgovcevic and Wachtel are complemented in Part IV of the book with chapters by Aleksandar Pavkovic and Jasna DragovicSoso. Pavkovic analyses three main variants of (utopian) Yugoslavism among Serb intellectuals in late- and post-socialist Yugoslavia, as exemplified by the writer Dobrica CosiC's 'Yugoslav federalism',
Dejan Djokic
9
Yugoslavism as 'a tommunity oflanguages' as once propagat.ed by the historian MiloracrEK:YneCic, and Yugoslavism as 'a federatwn of regions' as formulated by a group of pro-Yugosiav-1iite11ecttia1s gathered around a project led by Bo~s,Vukobrat in the early 1990s. J asna Dragovic-Soso analyses the deosive cnsis of t~e 1980s, particularly the Kosovo issue and the Serb-Slovene conflict, through the collapse of the Yugoslav Writers' Union. The end of the Writers' Union, which ceased to exist in 1989, was clearly linked to the end ofYugoslavia. It failed to create 'a genuine alternative to Yugoslavia's moribund communist system and negotiate a democratic, compromise solution to the country's complex "national ques~on"' thus, as Dragovic-Soso argues, setting 'a precedent for the dlSlntegration of the common state'. Not that there were no alternatives to the attempts to solve Yugoslavia's national question made in the post-1945 period. Desimir Tosic, himself a founding member of the Democratic Alternative, writes of the alternative Yugoslavism of this group of pro-Yugoslav emigre democrats, which was equally critical of the official Yugoslavism of the interwar period and of the Communists' national policies, as well as of the nationalist Serb and Croat diasporas. TosiC's introductory piece on the Democratic Alternative is followed by the text of the group's final proposal of 1982, 'The Design for a Democratic Alternative: Final Text'. If the Democratic Alternative offered an alternative from abroad, the Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (UJDI) founded in 1989 by former-Yugoslavia's anti-nationalist intellectual elite, did so from within the country. 'Introductory Remarks' by Branko Horvat, the President of the Council of the UJDI, as well as a 'Manifesto for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative', are published for the first time in English. The book ends with two personal essays. Ramadan Marmullaku offers an account of Kosovo Albanians' experience in Yugoslavia, which to some extent goes together with Hugh Poulton's contribution: he argues that despite being, for the most part, de facto second-class citizens, most Kosovo Albanians did accept the Yugoslav state during the short period in the 1970s and early 1980s when they enjoyed full political and cultural autonomy within Serbia and Yugoslavia. He also draws on his personal experience as a Yugoslav diplomat to offer some hitherto unknown or little-known details from Kosovo and Yugoslavia's post-1945 history.
10
Introduction
With his 'Funeral Oration for Yugoslavia' Aleksa Djilas provides erudite and thought-provoking afterword. He laments Yugoslavia and is not reluctant to state that his 'Yugonostalgia is improving all the time', yearning not so much for what Yugoslavia was 'but even more so for what it might have been.' Djilas is critical of the West's often hypocritical, biased or superficial attitudes to the former Yugoslavia and its successor states, but he does not free the Yugoslavs themselves of their responsibility for the destruction of the common state: Let us hope that the time is not far away when many 'former Yugoslavs' will realize that the civil war we fought was against ourselves and our future. Than we can transform the South Slav peace into something more than the absence of war: open borders for visitors and goods, economic cooperation, cultural exchanges, respect for differences and an end to denial of similarities, common search for historical truth, solidarity and common voice on regional and European issues. In this way we will both build a monument to Yugoslavia and raise it from the dead.
Part I. CONTEXT THE YUGOSLAV IDEA BEFORE YUGOSLAVIA 1 Dennison Rusinow Historians are almost as inclined as social scientists to interpretations based on the logic of post hoc, propter hoc: what happens has its causes, which can be discovered and analyzed, and becomes to some degree the 'inevitable' consequence of these causes. Thus there is a tendency in studies of and following the second death of Yugoslavia, and with it the second death of the Yugoslav idea, to regard these as the ultimately inevitable consequences of the 'artificiality' of the Yugoslav state and Yugoslavism (presumably in contrast to the 'naturalness' of a nation-state and nationalist ideologies?). Yugoslavia was a doomed creation-in the words of a kind of litany I heard frequently in Slovenia in 1989 and often in Croatia and Serbia by the following year, 'a seventy-year-old mistake that should finally be rectified.' 2 Conversely, historiography in the lifetime of both Yugoslavias correspondingly tended to view Yugoslavia as a viable (if always problematic) proposition, 3 Yugoslav unity as 'the best solution' and even 'the most natural possibility,'4 and the Yugoslav idea as a powerful 1
Portions of this introductory essay have been adapted from Dennison Rusinow, 'The Yugoslav Peoples' in Peter Sugar (ed.), Eastern European Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, Washington, DC, 1995, pp. 305-411. 2 Originally cited in Dennison Rusinow, 'To Be or Not to Be? Yugoslavia as Hamlet', Field Staff Reports, 1990-91/No. 18, p. 3. 3 Thus both the title and text ofStevan K. Pavlowitch's The Improbable SurvivorYugoslavia and Its Problems: 1918-1988, Columbus, OH, 1988, implicitly assumed that Yugoslavia would somehow and improbably continue to exist in some form. 4 Gale Stokes, 'Yugoslavism in the 1860s?' in Southeastern Europe, I, 2 (1974),p. 126, quoting Vasilije Krestic, Hrvatsko-ugarska nagodba 1868. godine, Belgrade, 1969, p. 334, to make the same point.
11
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The Yugoslav Idea bifore Yugoslavia
explanatory factor in its creation and maintenance that merits serious (and approving?) study for that reason. Yugoslavia happened (twice), the Yugoslav idea preceded it (as 'brotherhood and unity' on the second occasion), ergo . .. The Yugoslav idea, as 'Illyrianism' and then 'Yugoslavism', was indeed a century old when it was realized in the first Yugoslavia (which is how people even then usually referred to what was formally the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes until 1929). It was indeed also a significant factor (cause?) in the creation and maintenance of two Yugoslavias. However, recent and critical studies5 suggest that it was a more complex, convoluted, and as an ideological-political movement by itselfless important factor than in the portrait of an evolving but essentially single-minded idea, grabbing a widening circle of South Slav minds and energies, that is painted in most Yugophil and currently Yugo-nostalgic historiography. This does not mean that the Yugoslav idea does not merit the serious examination it has received and is again receiving in this volume-or that it and Yugoslavia were not a Good Idea and 'the best solution' to the problems raised by confrontation between the ethno-religious and linguistic mosaic and the national aspirations of the South Slavs in 'the age of nationalism'. Especially if this last may be a valid judgment, and arguably applicable to other parts of the world, why the Yugoslav idea 'failed' is an important question. The search for answers must logically begin with the history of 'Yugoslavism before Yugoslavia.' 6 The core Yugoslav idea, first formulated in the 1830s by the 'Illyrianist awakeners' (mostly Croats, with Ljudevit Gaj as their chief ideologist), held that the South (]ugo-) Slavs, having the same origin and speaking variants of basically the same language, are actually or potentially a single people or nation and consequently endowed with a 'natural right' to independence and unity in a state of their own. In the century before the creation of the first Yugoslavia this core idea would appear in a variety of forms, guises, and combinations with other state- and nation-building ideas in various times and places. In the end its most important contribution to the
eventual creation of a multi-national Yugoslav state was primarily and ironically the result of its appropriation and adaptation into originally and philosophically competitive national ideas and nationalist programs that happened to be more in tune with the times and with pre-existing 'popular proto-national' 7 Croat, Serb, and Slovene communal identities. In an influential study published in 1968, the Czech historian Miroslav Hroch identified three stages of modern national integration among eastern Europe's 'small' peoples. First a group of 'awakened' intellectuals (like the Illyrianists) starts studying their language, culture, and history as evidence of their historic credentials and worth as a distinct nation. Then these ideas are transmitted and propagated by 'patriots' (carriers of national ideologies) and the nationalist movements and parties they create. In the third stage these last become mass movements and parties. 8 As Ivo Banac notes, 'Hroch's sequence aptly sums up the course of national revivals among the South Slavs.' 9 This is certainly true of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. However, Yugoslavism in its 'pure' form-what I have called 'the core idea', from Illyrianism through and beyond its revival and elaboration by Josip Juraj Strossmayer and Franjo Racki-never progressed beyond a feeble approximation of the second stage. 10 Yugoslavism's active proponents, at least until the early twentieth century, were few in number and almost entirely Croats drawn from a very small social stratum. The Illyrianists of the 1830s and 1840s were exclusively members of'the intellectual class' (clergy, officials, soldiers, artists, and students), wealthier merchants, and members of the lower nobility. In the first Austrian census in 1857, when
12
5 6
Including mostly English-language sources cited and quoted in this essay. The subtitle of Lenard Cohen's concise and useful summary of the subject in his Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia, Boulder, CO, 1993, pp. 4-12.
7
13
The term and concept are from Eric Hobsbawm, Nations at1d Nationalism Since 1780, Cambridge, 1990, chapter 2, entitled 'Popular Proto-nationalism.' 8 Miroslav Hroch, Die Vorkaempfer der nationalen Bewegung bei den kleinen Voelkern Europas. Eine vergleichende Analyse zur ,'?esellschaftlichen Schichtung der patriotischen Gruppen, Prague, 1968, pp. 24-5. 9 Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia, Ithaca, NY, 1984, p. 29. 111 Dimitrije Djordjevic, 'Yugoslavism: Some Aspects and Comment', Southeastern Europe, I, 2 (1974), p. 14, speaks of Croatian, Serbian, Bulgarian, and other 'national movements' but calls Yugoslavism 'an ideology' and 'a rational solution based on ethnic similarities,' adding that '(t]he difference between the two phenomena is obvious.' (Italics added).
/"
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The Yugoslav Idea bifore Yugoslavia
Strossmayer and Racki's revival of Yugoslavism was appealing to the same groups, all of these together (including many or even a preponderance of Germans, Magyars, and Jews in most of them) constituted less than two percent of the population of Civil Croatia. By 1910 the 'intellectual classes', still the principal pool for the core Yugoslav idea's recruits and sympathizers, had grown to approximately 16,000 persons, but this was still barely one percent of Croatia-Slavonia' s total population. 11 Until they were well into Hroch's second stage, Serb, Croat, and Slovene nationalists (his 'awakened intellectuals' and 'patriots') and their programs were also reaching and recruiting from the same narrow social strata as their Yugoslavist competitors. However, and importantly, most Slavic members of these strata already knew that they were Serbs, Croats, or Slovenes. Moreover, a growing number of members of other classes, including peasants and workers, were learning-especially through expanding networks of primary schools-that they too were Serbs, Croats, or Slovenes. All of these were therefore already possessed or were acquiring an ethnoreligious or ethno-linguistic identity and 'proto-national' consciousness that distinguished 'we' from 'they.' Such people were or became (especially if they also became literate) readier recruits to a corresponding national consciousness and to movements or parties with national(ist) programs than to a broader and more abstract Yugoslav consciousness and program. This line of argument finds support in Arnold Suppan's explanation of how Ante Starcevic's Croatian-nationalist Party of Right could grow from so few adherents that it is better termed a 'sect' in the 1860s into a 'mass movement' (along with its proliferating and sometimes more nationalist-exclusivist offspring) by the end of the century. Unlike Strossmayer and Racki's People's Party, with its
dependence on 'the liberal bourgeoisie, the 'middle-class intelligentsia,' [and] the liberal Catholic clergy,' the Party ofRight was supported 'by the petite bourgeoisie, primarily by small-scale retailers and tradesmen.' Not only were this social stratum's size and growth rate larger than those of the People's Party's recruitment pool:
14
11
Arnold Suppan's numbers and analysis in his 'Comments,' in Austrian History Yearbook, vols 15-16 (1979-80),pp. 34-5, on Miijana Gross, 'Croatian NationalIntegrational Ideologies from the End ofillyrism to the Creation ofYugoslavia,' ibid., pp. 3-33. Cf. Banac's analysis of the 217 members [sic!] of Matica Ilirska (the Illyrianists' cultural and patriotic organization) at its apogee ca. 1840: approximately 27 per cent were administers and public servants, 22 per cent were clerics, 18 per cent belonged to the free professions (mostly lawyers), 14 per cent were craftsmen and merchants, 7 per cent were teachers, and 11 per cent identified themselves only by their noble titles; no students, peasants, or workers.
15
Moreover, after the 1890s the economic conditions of wider sections of merchants, tradesmen, and peasants who farmed on a large scale had improved substantially; consequently, the intellectuals who advocated integrationa! ideologies now were able to attract larger groups of supporters. However, this was also increasingly true of the ideologies that sought to push national integration 'from the bottom,' especially the ideologies of the Peasant Party formulated by Ante Radic and of the Social Democrats. In 1910 approximately 250,000 Croatian peasants and 350,000 family members, laborers, and domestic servants engaged in occupations in agriculture and forestry, as well as 100,000 Croatian workers, day laborers, and menials lived in Croatia-Slavonia. These figures alone indicate that ifboth of these classes increased their participation in political life the national integration of the Croats could be realized only if the peasants and the workers were included in the national movements. The relative social significance of the ideologies developed among the Croats during the last decade before the First World War (the 'new course,' Josip Frank's Party, Mile StarceviC's Party, etc.), therefore, ought to be reexamined from this perspective. 12 The circumstances confronting Miroslav Hroch's 'awakened' (protonationalist?) intellectuals among the Slovenes, and therefore their initial goals, were in important respects different and more difficult than those confronting their Croat and Serb counterparts. Until the second half of the 19th century the Slovenes were almost entirely a rural and illiterate peasantry speaking a number of mutually almost incomprehensible dialects and living in Habsburg-ruled lands where the literate upper and urban classes were German or Italian, or germanized and italianized, and the language of administration and education also was German or Italian. Moreover, these lands were several in number: Carniola, Gorizia, the Austrian Kustenland, parts of Styria and Carinthia (all quasi-autonomous in the decentralized Austrian system) and Hungarian Prekomurje. Although the 12
Ibid., pp. 35-6.
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The Yugoslav Idea bifore Yugoslavia
Slovenes lacked the 'state tradition' of Serbs and Croats, they did have a strong tradition of defending and cultivating their language and culture against a millennium of alien rule and assimilative pressures. In this combination of circumstances, the primary focus of several generations of Slovene 'awakeners' was first the development and dissemination of a standardized Slovene literary language and then its acceptance as a language of education and administration (and thereby a vehicle for rural-urban and upward social mobility) wherever Slovenes were a majority or significant minority. Their geopolitical fragmentation provided an increasingly important secondary focus expressed in demands or hopes for an administrative re-organization that would bring most of them under a single Austrian province based on their Carniola heartland and Ljubljana as its capital. As a cultural and later increasingly political movement on behalf of a small Slavic people living almost entirely in the Austrian half of what became the Dual Monarchy after 1867, Slovene protonationalists tended to feel a closer kinship and to seek support from Austria's other Slavs, in particular the Czechs, or even the Russians, rather than among their fellow South Slavs. Until very late in the day their political elites of all parties looked to Vienna for solutions and were Austro-Slav or at most 'Trialist' rather than Yugo-Slav in their orientation and goals. By then, and the principal accomplishment of their 'awakeners', the Slovenes were almost all literate and nationally conscious as Slovenes. 13 In Serbia the comparative advantages enjoyed by Serb national(ist) programs and parties included but went beyond those deriving from Serbian equivalents of the role of social structure, the spread ofliteracy, and other factors also in play in Croatia. The Serbians 14 possessed an expanding autonomous principality and later fully independent kingdom after the first quarter of the 19th century. Unlike the Croats, Slovenes, and Habsburg Serbs, their state and their 'national awakening' developed together. Both drew inspiration and
legitimacy from pre-existing 'popular proto-nationalism' vested in communal memories of and identification with medieval Serb statehood and grandeur, 15 transmitted to successive generations through epic poems and the institution, art, and liturgy of their sometimes autocephalous Serbian Orthodox Church. Enjoying the protection of a state of their own, which was a mono-ethnic Serb nation-state until the addition of Kosovo and large parts of Macedonia and the Sandzak in 1912-13, the Serbians had no reason to fear for their survival as a people, a culture, and a nation-again unlike the Croats, Slovenes, and Serb communities outside Serbia. On the other hand, they also had no experience of competitive co-existence in a multi-cultural environment. By seeking from the outset to include other Serbs (and putative Serbs) who remained outside their initially diminutive state, they were irredentists before the term was invented for an identical Italian national program (which Serbian political elites later saw as a model and legitimation for their own aspiration to unite all Serbs in a single state). In any case, Serbian nationalists and nationalism were basically outward-looking, expansionist, and self-confident. Until late in the day they tended to view the Yugoslav idea as basically irrelevant or, especially as espoused by Strossmayer and Racki (both Roman Catholic priests as well as Croatian patriots), as a disguise for Greater Croatian nationalism and a new variation on Roman Catholicism's historic Drang nach Osten into the schismatic Orthodox world. 16 The only exception in the nineteenth century was a brief period in the 1860s, when Strossmayer and Serbian Foreign Minister Ilija Garasanin agreed, in the context of Serbian Prince Michael ObrenoviC's plans for a coalition against the Ottoman Empire, to work for 'a Yugoslav state independent from both Austria and the Ottoman Empire.' 17 With the failure Michael's plans and his assassination, the agreement broke down in less than two years. Garasanin passed into history more famous for his Nacertanije (Proposal) of 1844, actually published only in 1906, which proposed a 'Greater Serbia' encompassing all regions with a large Serb population.
16
13
14
The standard and thoroughly researched work on the subject is Carol Rogel, 11ze Slovenes and Yugoslavism, 1890-1914,Boulder, CO, 1977. It is often and here particularly useful to distinguish between 'Serbians' (Srbijana), the Serbs of Serbia, and 'Serbs' (Srbz) for members of that nation or people more generally and wherever.
15
16 17
17
This much also applied to the Croats but not to the Slovenes, whose nationalists had a hard time finding an historically dubious Slovene state in their history. Rusin ow in Sugar, op. cit., p. 357. Stokes, op. cit., pp. 129-35.
18
Dennison Rusinow
The Yugoslav Idea bifore Yugoslavia
'Exclusivist' or 'integral nationalist' versions of Croat and Serb nationalist ideologies and programs thus tended to be more attractive to more politically and nationally conscious Croats and Serbians (but not necessarily Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia) than the core Yugoslav idea per se. At the same time, however, other considerations were pushing Croatian, Serbian, and also Slovene political elites toward cooperation, with implications for their attitudes to Yugoslavist ideas. As Dimitrije Djordjevic puts it:
(or perverted~ aspects of the Yug~slav id~a that su_rpor~ed t?eir interest in clamung the largest possible temtory for their nation. Others, like the significantly temporary cooperation between Strossmayer and Garasanin which Gale Stokes queries as 'Yugoslavism in the 1860s?', 20 sought to accommodate versions ofYugoslavism that envisioned the continued validity of separate 'tribal' or 'national' cultures. The language question, and how it was answered, enveloped all of these issues and interests for both Yugoslavist and integral nationalist ideologies. 21 All of them implicitly accepted nineteenth century definitions of the nation that focused on a distinctive language as the primary and even necessary criterion of nationhood. This was not a problem for the Slovenes. Almost everyone agreed with them that they had a language of their own, although initially in a variety of dialects that required 'standardization' to become a national literary language. It was a problem for Serbs, Croats, and later Slavic Muslims, all of whom (along with the Montenegrins) spoke dialects and wrote in variants of what could be considered a single language-although usually called 'Serbian' by Serbs and 'Croatian' by Croats. 22 The issue was complicated by the fact that those who felt in some measure that they were Croats spoke and wrote in three quite distinct dialects: eakavian, kajkavian, and stokavian, the last of which was also spoken by almost all Serbs. Nationalist ideologues could deal with this problem in one of two ways. If what these people spoke was in fact or could be developed into a single language, they were or should be one nation. If they (or their nationally conscious elites) 'knew' they were separate nations, then they must be speaking separate languages. 23
The appraisal of their national interests in different historic periods moved the Yugoslavs to accommodate their separate nationalisms to Yugoslavism but also pushed them to return to their specific national identities ... Historical experience showed the Slovenes and Croats, for example, that they needed the support of the Balkan South Slav-primarily Serbianhinterland in their respective confrontations with Vienna and Budapest to secure greater recognition of their own national and political individualities ... On the other hand, Serbian attempts to safeguard the Morava valley and to unite all the Serbs could be realized only through support obtained from the Habsburg Yugoslavs. The Serbs were [also] geographically so dispersed that their unification imposed the necessity of joining with other Yugoslavs. Only if they were bound together would the Serbs and Croats be able to secure their national territories: the Serbs in the Vojvodina, the Croats in Dalmatia, and both of them in Bosnia-Herzegovina.1 8 The response to these 'national interest' reasons and other pressures to 'accommodate' separate nationalisms to Yugoslavism varied over time and by party and place. The two most significant responses, measured in terms of the political and historic importance of the parties that espoused them, produced ideologies that flatly contradicted Strossmayer/Racki's and other Yugoslavists' insistence that the Yugoslav idea allowed for the continued existence and inclusion of separate Croat, Serb, Slovene, and other 'tribal' or even 'national' identities and interests. 19 But even these appropriated and adapted 18 19
Djordjevic, op. cit., p. 193. 'According to most Yugoslavist ideologues, the "spiritual" community of South Slavs could be achieved only by retaining the separate names of Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, and Bulgarians while at the same time harmoniously intermingling their traditions and respecting their respective equality and individuality by nurturing their "tribal" characteristics' (Gross, op. cit., p. 12, emphasis added).
2
n Stokes,
21
22 23
19
op. cit. Rusinow in Sugar, op. cit., pp. 363-4; cf. Banac, op. cit., Part I, passim. Or simply 'na5ki' ('ours') by all of the above, thus avoiding the issue! The issue carried over into the second Yugoslavia, when a regime-sponsored agreement, signed in Novi Sad in 1954 and defining a common language with two variants (Ser\:l.o.:::Croatian.{}r:. C.r:o;tt()::~erbian but also known as Serbian or Croatian) wast:;;-pudiated in a 'Declaration o~ the Croatian language' endorsed by all important Croatian cultural organizations in 1967. Serb intellectuals responded with a 'Proposal for Discussion' arguing that in this case Serb children in Croatia should be educated in their own Serb language. Paul Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question, New York, 1968, pp. 195 and 215, describes the incident and the uproar it produced.
20
Dennison Rusinow
Both Serb and Croat integral nationalists sought to cope with this problem in a variety o'tways:-one-was to define the other(s) out of existence. This could be done by asserting that a religious differ/, ence had been misconstrued as a national distinction. Accordingly, Croats were 'really' Roman Catholic Serbs, or Serbs were 'really' Orthodox Croats, and Slavic Muslims were either Islamicized Croats or Islamicized Serbs. Focusing on language, and asserting or devising a common language, produced similar but not identical conclusions. If that common language was 'Serbian,' in a variant (stokavian) also spoken by most Croats, that would re-define stokavian-speaking Croats as Serbs. This was the task the great Serb linguistic nationalist Vuk Karadzic set for himself. If the same supposedly common language was 'Croatian,' then Serbs were also Croats. If they were not wanted as Croats-the view at times of Starcevic and other Serbophobe members ofhis Party ofRight and its progenf 4-they were to be excluded from membership in what Starcevic called 'the Croatian political people' because they used another alphabet (Cyrillic), practiced another religion (Orthodox Christianity), or were culturally simply too different (primitive and violent). The Illyrianists had also argued that the South Slavs spoke variants of basically the same language, and that this as well as their supposed common descent from the ancient Illyrians made them actually or potentially a single people. In practicing what they preached, the Illyrianists' probably most lasting contribution came from their choice and successful promotion of the stokavian dialect, precisely because it was also spoken by almost all Serbs, as the Croatian literary language-although they called it Illyrian. (This choice represented a deliberate sacrifice to the cause of South Slav unity, as Gaj repeatedly pointed out, since he and most Illyrianists spoke and wrote in kajkavian, the dialect of the Croatian heartland around Zagreb and of a large and distinguished part of prior Croatian literature. Some of them urged the Slovenes, whose own language was close to kajkavian, to make the same sacrifice for the same reason by adopting stokavian as their literary language. 25 ) They thereby inadvertently (along with Vuk Karadzic quite deliberately for the Serbs)
The Yugoslav Idea bifore Yugoslavia
prepared the ground for those later language-based claims by Serb and Croat integral nationalists that Croats were Roman Catholic Serbs or Serbs were Orthodox Croats. But were all of these efforts to assert or devise a common language and thus a single people, whatever the intentions and goals of their advocates, in effect and simultaneously as much Yugoslavintegrational as Croat- and Serb-integrational? Were they thus as conducive to arousing and disseminating Yugoslav as Croat and Serb identity and consciousness? Mitjana Gross, whose research on South Slav ideologies extends over decades, thinks that they were, at least among the South Slavs of the Habsburg Empire and especially the Croats. She also thinks that these efforts became part of a pattern of ideological evolution that gradually intermingled and interconnected initially contradictory and competitive Yugoslavist and nationalist ideologies. 26 Surveying the pre-1914 history of both Yugoslavist and especially Croatian 'national-integrational' ideologies in the context of political and social developments in and beyond the Habsburg Empire that shaped and altered them, Gross finds that in the late nineteenth century both [Yugoslavist and Croatian national-integrational] ideologies underwent a fundamental metamorphosis and branched out into several ideological variants. Racki's ideology was no longer found adequate, but it inspired the concepts of the Progressive Youth, the 'new course,' and the Yugoslav nationalist [sic] youth, as well as those of the peasant and socialist workers' movements. The 'Frankist' ideology, named after Dr. Josip Frank, and subsequently its clerical variant, sprang from the ruins of StarceviC's and Kvaternik's ideology, and later StarceviC's tradition was reconstituted in a different form. 27
A number of considerations, including the political imperative of countering the appeal and propaganda of competing ideologies, explain these often bewildering mutations and permutations. Two seem to have been of particular importance. One was 'the appraisal of their national interests in different historic periods' noted by Dimitrije Djordjevic. The second arose from these movements'
24
At other times Starcevic and the Party of Right 'formulated the concept that the _ Slovenes and Serbs were actually Croats' (Gross, op. cit., p. 8, emphasis added). 20 Gross, op. cit., p. 10.
21
26
27
Ibid., passim. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
22
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The Yugoslav Idea bifore Yugoslavia
search for ways to achieve vertical and horizontal penetration beyond the narrow class spectrum and one or a few narrow geographic regions in which all were initially trapped (except late arrivals like the Radic brothers' Peasant Party and the social democrats). In the final analysis, according to Gross,
coexistence with members of other nationalities, and the challenge ofboth Croat nationalist and Yugoslavist ideologies and programs. The reactions of those whose views we know something about-as usual in that period meaning people with secondary or higher education-were varied, in contrast to the single-minded irredentism of Serbian nationalism until the First World War. All but the first of these reactions were more Yugoslavist than integral Serb nationalist. Many Habsburg Serbs were increasingly drawn toward Serbia as their 'Piedmont', but in two quite different understandings of what this meant. The first looked forward to a Greater Serbia in which all Serbs, but in principle only Serbs, would ultimately be included. This goal was identical to that of the dominant pre-war current in Serbian nationalism. It either ignored the existence of the Croats and others among whom the Habsburg Serbs lived, or it defined these others out of existence (in ways already discussed). The second looked to Serbia as the core, by virtue of population and its 'state-creating' role as well as Serb kinship, of a united state of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes as separate and in principle equal peoples. This was nearly identical to the Strossmayer-Racki variant ofYugoslavism and its successors. The only difference was in the special role and status these Serbs assigned to Serbia as the Yugoslav Piedmont, but a growing number of Yugoslavist Croats and Slovenes were adopting the same view by the early twentieth century. Including Serbia in a unified South Slav state implied either the dismemberment of the Habsburg Empire or Serbia's inclusion in it. Shying away from either of these prospects (and with the second usually even less attractive to Serbs than to most but not all Yugoslavist Croats and Slovenes), some Habsburg Serbs were attracted to either or both of two less radical, largely compatible, and generally Yugoslavist solutions. The first and more limited was binational Serbo-Croat political collaboration against common enemies (which could be partly different in different regions) and in pursuit of common interests. This tendency produced the Croat-Serb Coalition, founded by a group oflike-minded Croat and Serb political leaders in 1905 and the dominant party in Croatia for the next ten years. The second, which was also at times the most popular variant of the Yugoslav idea among Croats and Slovenes, was Yugoslavia as an autonomous South Slav entity within the Habsburg Empire ('trialism' in place of Austro-Hungarian 'dualism').
'Yugoslavism' and 'Croatianism' cannot be clearly delineated. There is a form of 'Croatianism' that excludes 'Yugoslavism.' I have used the not very auspicious term of'exclusive' to denote this type. With only a few exceptions, 'Yugoslavism,' however, included 'Croatianism,' because the Yugoslav ideology was a Croatian national integrational ideology. That is to say, it mobilized different social classes for political, cultural, and economic activities that furthered the integrational process in and the modernization of the Croatian nation. [At the same time, Yugoslavism was also supranational.] On the other hand, we can also say that 'Croatianism' included 'Yugoslavism,' e.g. [in some of its political activities and programs] ... Until the 1880s the boundary between 'exclusive Croatianism' and 'Yugoslavism' was clearly defined. After that parties with a 'Yugoslav' and a Party of Right tradition were able to coalesce or unite with each other and a larger number of persons could go over from 'exclusive Croatianism' to 'Yugoslavism' and vice versa. 28
It has already been noted, and is generally accepted, that the Yugoslav idea tended to encounter disinterest or opposition among Serbians and their political elites (except for that brief GarasaninStrossmayer courtship in the 1860s) until developments in the early twentieth century and during the First World War encouraged them to pay more serious attention to how it could further Serbian national and territorial goals. This was not the case with the more complex story of the Serbs of the Habsburg Empire (after 1878 de facto and after 1908 de jure including Bosnia-Herzegovina). These Serbs lived as dispersed rural and later also urban minorities, except where they constituted local majorities in the Habsburg Military Frontier (Vojna Krajina) and Vojvodina. In this multi-ethnic, multiconfessional environment the Habsburg Serbs, like their Croat and in Bosnia also Slavic Muslim neighbors, were experiencing Austrian and Hungarian variants of the empire's increasingly dominant national question, sometimes competitive and sometimes cooperative 28
Ibid., p. 43 (in Gross' response to Suppan's 'Comments' on her article).
23
25
Dennison Rusinow
The Yugoslav Idea bifore Yugoslavia
Many politically conscious and active Habsburg Serbs and the movements and parties they joined vacillated frenetically among several or all of these aims; others simply never decided or vaguely tried to combine them. One of these last was Young Bosnia (Mlada Bosna), whose adherents included Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. Whether Young Bosnia, and particularly Gavrilo Princip (a Bosnian Serb whose five co-conspirators in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914 'represented' Bosnia's Serbs, Croats, and Slavic Muslims), should be described as Yugoslavist or Greater Serbian in their motivation and goal is still a matter of dispute and may never be known with certainty-perhaps because they did not know. 29 The status of national consciousness, national(ist) projects, and attitudes to the Yugoslav idea among the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in the last years before the First World War can be roughly summarized as follows: 30 The Serbians possessed a widespread but not yet ubiquitous national consciousness armed with a clear and fundamentally irredentist national program in two substantively identical variants: Gre_;!terSerbianism and a Yugoslavism in which the concept of Yugoslavia was hardly distinguishable from the first variant's vision of Greater Serbia. (The principal differenc~_.\'Y.;:lS territorial: Serbian Yugoslavism included but Greate-rs-ertiianimruslially excluded Slovenia and kajkavian-speaking Croatia around Zagreb.) The Croats and diaspora Serbs of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina possessed a similarly widespread national consciousness, which was less prevalent in isolated and usually illiterate rural environments, and a greater variety of national programs and corresponding political parties than the Serbians. Some of these envisioned Croat-Serb cooperation in some kind of Habsburg or independent entity, sometimes limited to the 'triune kingdom' (Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia) plus Istria and sometimes including (with the Slovenes)
all Habsburg South Slavs. Others envisioned an exclusivist Greater Croatia or Greater Serbia. Still others, including most leaders of Croatian Peasant and Social-democratic parties and some youth movements, fully embraced the core Yugoslav idea in its currently prevalent form in Croatia and Slovenia: a federal South Slav state with their own federal units and full equality for Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes as separate nations, 'tribes' or 'names'. The Slovenes had achieved nearly universal literacy and national consciousness, except where the language and culture of primary education was not Slovene, as in Carinthia. However, until those last years the national aspirations of most Slovenes were still primarily ~ultural or culturo-political, and conceived in an (Austrian) Habsburg framework. This was now changing. By the eve of the First World War a growing number of primarily younger Slovenes, despairing of any hope of realizing their aims within the Habsburg Empire, were turning to Yugoslavism even in its own 'integralist' form, which demanded the melting of Slovene, Croat, and Serb identities into a single Yugoslav identity and nation. A manifesto issued by a group of young Slovene intellectuals in 1913 put it in classic 'integral Yugoslav' terms previously seldom encountered in Slovenia:
24
29
For the most persuasive argument that most of them were basically if often vaguely or confusedly Yugoslav nationalists, see Drago Ljubibratic, Gavrilo Princip, Sarajevo, 1959, and Vladimir Gafinovit, Sarajevo, 1961. 30 Rusin ow in Sugar, op. cit., pp. 270-1. The national and social programs of the other South Slavs who would also be included in Yugoslavia (Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Slavic Muslims) were still under construction, limited to few members of these groups, and usually ambivalent and/ or changeable. They are not considered here but are summarized in ibid., pp. 365-70.
As it is a fact that we Slovenes, Croats and Serbs constitute a compact linguistic and ethnic group with similar economic conditions, and so indissolubly linked by common fate on a common territory that no one of the three can aspire to a separate future, and in consideration of the fact that among the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, the Jugoslav thought is even today strongly developed, we have extended our national sentiments beyond our frontier to the Croats and Serbs ... By this we all become members of one united Jugo-slav nation. 31
By the early twentieth century, on the evidence and arguments briefly summarized here, Yugoslavism had been assimilated, adopted, and co-opted by a range of Serb, Croat, and even Slovene national ideologies and programs that were originally and philosophically its competitors and denials. It was also gaining some momentum of its 31
Edward Woodhouse, Italy and the Yugoslavs, Boston, 1920, p. 68, as cited by Cohen, op. cit., p. 10.
26
Dennison Rusinow
own in the last years before the war that incidentally created the conditions necessary for Yugoslavia's creation (especially international support and the collapse of the Habsburg Empire). In the end, but most importantly as a result of its incorporation into those other ideologies and programs (always to their own ends) Yugoslavism indeed became the focus and fulcrum around which both Yugoslavias were founded and sought their legitimacy. The central problem and weakness of Yugoslavism was that this pro~iferation and adaptation of the Yugoslav idea left as its legacy a vanety of fatefully contradictory comprehensions of Yugoslavism and Yugoslavia. For most Serbs the Yugoslav idea and Yugoslavia meant either Greater Serbia by another name or at least an expedient and effective way to include and protect all Serbs in a single state (but only if Serbs played a major or hegemonic role in that state?). For many Slovenes and Croats their primary meaning and function was protection against Italian, Austro-German, or Magyar domination and cultural challenges (but only if the identity and autonomy of each Yugoslav nation was protected by equality in managing their JOlllt state). Even Yugoslavists per se were of two minds and two kinds. The first, exemplified by the Slovene manifesto quoted above, has been called 'integral Yugoslavism' or 'Yugoslavist unitarism.' It either denied the separate nationhoods of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs alike, or sought to supersede these by positing the existence or potential (now called 'nation-building') of a single Yugoslav nation subdivided into historically formed 'tribes' or merely 'names.' The second acknowledged and approved enduring separate nationhoods and sought federal and other devices for a multi-national state of related peoples with shared interests and aspirations. The adherents of each of these conceptions tended to represent the respective national interests and prejudices and nationalist programs that had been articulated and developed by the movements and parties that had assimilated and adapted aspects of Yugoslavism to serve precisely those interests and prejudices. These were the rocks on which Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav idea eventually foundered.
THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND THE UNIFICATION OF YUGOSLAVIA Kosta St. Pavlowitch Few at the outbreak of the First World War would have imagined the manner of Yugoslav unification as it took place in the dying days of the conflict in 1918. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes proclaimed in Belgrade on 1 December 1918 was born of a breathless precipitation of events in the last weeks of the war, which left its participants scrambling around for solutions that would safeguard their interests in a shattered political landscape. Clearly the idea of unification did not come out of the blue in 1918. It had been laid down as a war aim by the Serbian government from 1914, its cause defended in Allied capitals with the help of emigres from Austria-Hungary. Until the very end, however, the balance of probability was against its realisation, and when it did take place it was driven by events in a way as unexpected as it would be decisive for the balance of power that would shape the first Yugoslavia. Yugoslavism-the idea of an overriding South Slav national unity that could encompass established political identities-has often been decried as a figment of ethnological imagination. The Croatian opposition politician Ivo Frank dismissed it in the summer of 1 1917 as a 'nebulous, mystical, insatiable hold-all concept', a response in part nourished by its supporters' use of arguments burdened with academic concepts of anthropological and linguistic unity. Yet if the concept had not also had some political grounding, both in the 1
Bogdan Krizman, Hrvatska u prvom svijetskom ratu. Hrvatsko-srpski politii:ki odnosi, Zagreb, 1989, p. 137. Frank belonged to the nationalist Croatian Party of Rights, a minority party in the Croatian diet, the Sabor.
27
28
The First World War and the Unification
Kosta St. Pavlowitch
Habsburg lands and in Serbia, it would not have developed into the reality that emerged at the end of the war. In fact, the language of unification was commonplace in the prewar politics ofboth Belgrade and Zagreb, with each seeing itself as a nucleus for national integration. Serbia had the advantage of its own independent state, recognised since 1878, and continuously expanding from its first insurrection against the Ottomans in 1804. That growth was driven both by the existence of many Serbs still living beyond Serbia's borders and by the sense that a small state would be weak and subject to preying larger neighbours. It also coincided with a growing awareness of the linguistic unity ofSouth Slav populations in Austria-Hungary. Whether these were seen in Belgrade as Slav Catholics who were basically Serb but did not know it, or in a more genuine Yugoslav vision, sympathy and aid for Southern Slav aspirations became a crucial element of Belgrade's policy towards the Dual Monarchy, where there were still large Serbian populations awaiting liberation. Within the Monarchy, however, it was Zagreb that saw itself as the centre of unification. Squeezed between Austria and Hungary, Croatia was divided into its historic core ofCroatia-Slavonia, which answered to Hungary, though with a considerable measure of executive autonomy, and Dalmatia, which was part of Austria. There was also an important Croat minority in Bosnia, annexed from the Ottoman Empire and under direct rule from Vienna in 1908. The theme of unification of historic Croatian lands was therefore a leitmotiv of Zagreb politics, in the hope that a unified Croatia would have the clout to stand up to Vienna and Budapest. To boost its case, however, Croatia needed to draw into this vision its fellow South Slavs, who could transform those historic territories into a homogeneous national whole from Bosnia all the way up to Slovenia. The fact that the concept of some kind of broader unity existed in bo'th Zagreb and Belgrade prepared the ground for the creation ofYugoslavia when the circumstances demanded it in 1918. However, both nationalisms had used Yugoslavism as an extension of their own aspirations, and both had expected to carry out unification on their own terms, within the framework of their own historical agendas. It was easy enough to note the similarities oflinguistic
of Yugoslavia
29
or ethnographical patterns, far more difficult to take stock of the implications of uniting two distinct political traditions, both of which expected to be the dominating factor in the process. From the outbreak of the First World War in July 1914, Serbia began to consider the possibility of territorial aggrandizement that would go beyond Serb-inhabited territories in Austria-Hungary. When a committee of experts was tasked with drawing up Serbian war aims, it came up with a programme for a Yugoslav state that would include Croatia-Slavonia, Slovenia, Vojvodina, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Dalmatia. From Nis in southern Serbia, where the government had withdrawn, the National Assembly in December officially proclaimed 'the struggle for the liberation and unification of all our 2 brothers, Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, who are still not free' . The war posed a threat to the very survival of the country. 'Serbia must die' was the clarion call among the hawks in Vienna. By staking a claim to all the South Slav lands in Austria-Hungary, the Serbian government of Nikola Pasic responded in kind. It was a bold 'winner-take-all' approach that sought to secure Serbia's future in the new order that would emerge after the war, while undermining South Slav loyalty to the Habsburg dynasty. That loyalty, however, remained firm. The assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand by a young South Slav revolutionary, Gavrilo Princip, in Sarajevo on 28 June, aroused genuine revulsion and antiSerb feelings across the Dual Monarchy, feelings the authorities did their best to fan. A session of the Croatian diet, the Sabor, called to adopt a statement of condolences, had to be suspended because of the relentless barrage against Serb deputies and their Croatian partners in the governing Croat-Serb Coalition. Attacks were reported against Serb properties across Croatia and especially in Bosnia, where military rule was imposed and often brutally enforced against the Serb population by Croat and Muslim volunteers recruited into 'defensive anti-bandit' units. The Serbs themselves, however, mostly kept a low profile and there was little sign of the insurrection that the authorities feared. Austria-Hungary's mobilisation proceeded smoothly, and the bulk of forces sent into action on the Serbian front was in fact drawn 2
Ferdo Sisic, Dokumenti o postanku Kraijevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca 1914-1919, Zagreb, 1920,p. 10.
30
Kosta St. Pavlowitch
from South Slav areas of the Habsburg Monarchy, with more than 50 per cent of some of its divisions made up of Croats and up to 25 per cent of Serbs. On the political front, life in Croatia-where the Croat-Serb Coalition remained in power-continued along well-trodden lines into the war, dominated as before by the quest for the affirmation of Croatian State rights and the desire to renegotiate the troubled relationship with Hungary. In fact, Croatia hoped that its loyal performance in the war would strengthen its hand in that struggle, its sacrifices perhaps rewarded by the national unification it had long sought. The war was after all going well for the Central Powers. After initial successes, Serbia had by 1915 been overwhelmed by a combined German-Austrian-Bulgarian offensive, its army and government only surviving by an epic winter retreat through Albania before finding safe haven on the Greek island of Corfu in early 1916. If there was any way that Yugoslavia was going to be achievedon Serbia's terms rather than as a confederal unit within a reorganised Habsburg empire-it was going to have to be with the help of the Entente. That was how Serbia had seen it from the beginning, and from 1914 it had set about trying to sell the idea in somewhat sceptical allied capitals. To this end, it enlisted the help of the Yugoslav Committee, a group of South Slav personalities from AustriaHungary (mostly from the Croat-Serb Coalition), who had gone abroad at the outbreak of war. 3 It would be an uphill task. Awareness of the Yugoslav issue was almost nil outside the Balkans, and, while the Entente was willing to reward its ally Serbia, it had little time for the aspirations of Croats and Slovenes fighting with its enemies. In April1915, a Serbian delegation to Petrograd received a blunt rebuff from Russian Foreign Minister Sergei' Sazonov when it sought to raise the South Slav issue: 'As for the Croats and the Slovenes, I have nothing to say. They are fighting against us. I would not give my approval for the Russian people to fight even half a day to free the Slovenes.04 3
4
The Yugoslav Committee operated from London between 1915 and 1918 under the chairmanship of the Croat Ante Trumbic, a lawyer from Split in Dalmatia. Michael Bora Petrovich, 'Russia's Role in the Creation of the Yugoslav State', in Dimitrije Djordjevic, The Creation of Yugoslavia 1914-1918, Santa Barbara, CA, and Oxford, 1980, pp. 73-94, p. 76.
The First World War and the Unification
of Yugoslavia
31
Indeed, far from committing themselves to the Yugoslav idea, the Entente Powers were busy promising South Slav territories in Austria-Hungary (and even Serbia) to potential allies. Thus in the spring of 1915 they sought, in _vain, to lure still ne~tral Bulgaria with Serbian land in Macedoma, wh1le the followmg year they romised Romania the Hungarian territory ofBanat, which Serbia for itself. Of greatest significance, however, were promises made to Italy in the Treaty of London, signed on 26 April 1915. In exchange for joining the war on the allied side, Italy extracted the promise of vast swathes of Austro-Hungarian territory in Slovenia and Dalmatia. Italy's claim to these lands was to tilt the already unbalanced relationship between Serbia and the (majority Dalmatian) Yugoslav Committee. As emigres from an enemy power, the members of the Committee stood little chance of convincing the allied powers that those lands should go to them rather than to fellow ally Italy. Without Serbia, their homeland ran the risk of simply switching from one foreign dominion to another. Above all, moreover, Yugoslav unification presupposed a dismantling of Austria-Hungary that the Allies were not willing to consider until the very end of the war. They preferred to see the Dual Monarchy maintained, shorn of the various territories promised to its neighbours, but remaining as a counterweight to Germany. Things were not looking good for the advocates of Sou.th Slav unification. The Serbian government had the restoratiOn of 1ts own state to think about, let alone the creation of a new one that might bring it into conflict with its Allies. As for the Yugoslav Committee, its position was precarious: it had no mandate to represent the South Slavs of Austria-Hungary, who continued to profess the1r loyalty to the Habsburg dynasty, its territorial aspirations were irreconcilable with those of allied Italy, and its relations with the Serbian government were fraught, the two sides differing in their vision of unification. By 1917, however, the balance began to tip: this was the year in which the United States joined the war and Russia, shaken by revolution, dropped out. Both Russia's new leaders and American President Woodrow Wilson spoke a new language, that of selfdetermination and national liberation, and both undermined the very foundations of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Within that
~vanted
32
Kosta St. Pavlowitch
monarchy, moreover, the accession to the throne of a new emperor, Charles I, after the death in November 1916 of Emperor Franz Josep?: seemed to provide the opportunity for a longoverdue political reorganisation. In fact, from early February 1917, the outspoken leader of the opposition Croatian People's Peasant Party, Stjepan Radic, berated the Habsburg authorities for not paying sufficient attention to the national problem. Pointing out that the Yugoslav Committee was active in promoting South Slav interests among the allies, Radic told the _Sabor 'It is in all our interests ... that the dynasty be aware of our feelmgs, our thoughts and our aspirations, at least to the same degree of awareness that exists among our enemies abroad.' 5 However, it was in Vienna, not Zagreb, that those aspirations would for the first time be formulated officially within the Monarc_hy. Reconvening after the lifting of emergency measures in force smce the outbreak of the war, Yugoslav deputies in the Austrian parl~ament, the Reichs:at, had organised themselves into a Yugoslav Parliamentary Group, followmg the example of their Polish and Czech colleagues. On 30 May, they demanded, 'on the basis of the principle of nationality and of the historical rights of the Croatian ~tate, the unification of all those territories in the Monarchy inhabIted_ by Croats, Slovenes and Serbs into an independent and democratic state, free from domination by any foreign nation, under the sceptre of the dynasty of Habsburg and Lorraine.' 7 The declaration had a tremendous impact: the following week in 8 the Sabor, ~nte Pavelic, the leader of Starcevic's Party of Right, 9 welcomed It m the warmest terms, citing the democratic spirit awak:ned across Europe by the 'great and enlightened Russia', and echomg Its appeal for unification into a separate state entity. 1u : 8 Fe~. 1917. Krizman, Hrvatska u prvom svijetskom ratu, op. cit., pp. 107-8. The Yugoslav Club' was made up of 23 Slovenes, 12 Croats and 2 Serbs, under ~he chairmanship of the Slovenian clerical leader Anton Korosec. 7 Sisic, op. cit., p. 94. 8 No relation to the Second World War Ustasa leader of the same name. 9 Starcevic's Party of Right was the second largest party in the Sabor. Defending a Croatian natiOnal agenda,_ It nevertheless evolved into one of the leading advocates of South Slav umty m Croatia. 10 5 June 1917. Krizman, Hrvatska u prvom svijetskom ratu, op. cit., p. 109.
The First World War and the Unification of Yugoslavia
33
The significance of the May Declaration, moreover, lay not only in the fact that it spelled out the demand for unification, but that it was inspired by Slovene deputies, calling into question a loyalty that had always been taken for granted in Vienna, and removing the issue of unification from the Croatian framework in which it had so far been formulated, taking it into a broader 'Yugoslav' domain. For the Serbian government in Corfu, however, it posed a dilemma: with the Entente exploring the possibility of a separate peace with Austria-Hungary and a coherent Yugoslav movement emerging within the Monarchy, there was a serious risk of a Habsburg solution to the South Slav question that would leave Serbia empty-handed. The Yugoslav Committee also found itself in a predicament: it claimed to speak for the South Slavs of AustriaHungary, yet here they were speaking quite openly for themselves. It therefore became essential for the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee to draw up a programme of complete unification that would regain the initiative. It took them more than a month to do so, gathered in Corfu from 15 June to 20 July 1917. For the first time, Serb and Croat politicians confronted their radically differing conceptions of unification in an attempt to reach consensus on the internal arrangements of a future state. Mostly, they spoke at cross-purposes, the Croats insisting on issues that were the bread and butter of Zagreb politics: local autonomies, legal institutions, federalism, and above all Croatian State Right-the continuity of state sovereignty surrendered to Hungary in 1102 yet in theory at least maintained till the present day. To the Serbs, these were arcane legalistic subterfuges-'remnants of the struggle against the enemy (Austria-Hungary) 011 -that would weaken the unified state. They could not understand their relevance in the face of what they saw as the simpler, modern concepts of universal suffrage and parliamentary democracy, concepts that for the Croats, however, would merely enshrine politically the numerical advantage of the Serbs in a unified state. The resulting Corfu Declaration glossed over the issue, referring constitutional arrangements to a Constituent Assembly that would adopt them by an unspecified qualified majority. It did, however, 11
Pasic, 26 June 1917. Djordje Stankovic, Nikola Pasic i jugoslovensko pitanje, Belgrade, 1985, vol. 1, p. 219.
34
The First World T+ar and the Unification of Yugoslavia
Kosta St. Pavlowitch
commit Serbia to an ali-or-nothing solution of the Yugoslav question: 'Our people lays down as an indivisible whole the issue of its liberation from Austria-Hungary and its unification with Serbia and Montenegro into a single state.>J 2 That state would be a constitutional, democratic and parliamentary monarchy under the reigning Serbian Karadjordjevic dynasty. In creating the new state, Serbia would abandon its flag and its name, and would guarantee the freedom and equality of worship and national symbols. At first sight, the May and Corfu declarations may have seemed mutually exclusive, the former insisting on Croatian state rights and pledging loyalty to the Habsburg dynasty, while the latter sought unification around the existing Serbian state under the Karadjordjevic dynasty. Yet both were born of the principle of self-determination and both accepted the dissolution of existing national identities into a broader South Slav state, whatever form it might take. They also ensured that the issue of unification was set firmly on the agenda, among the Allies and in Austria-Hungary itself, where both declarations received widespread press coverage. The Allies, however, were still not convinced, continuing to sound out Austria-Hungary with the offer of a separate peace, hoping to detach it from Germany rather than dismember it in favour of its constituent parts. Yet Austria-Hungary remained oblivious to the offers and paralysed in the face of its unfolding crisis; and while Russia's February Revolution had acted as a catalyst for democratic and national demands in the Dual Monarchy, its October Bolshevik Revolution would set an altogether more dangerous precedent. In February, a mutiny at the Kotor naval base in southern Dalmatia allied a call for immediate peace with social and national demands into an explosive mix. The mutiny was suppressed, but it sounded a warning. The peace of Brest-Litovsk, signed with the new Soviet authorities on 3 March, posed another problem, as up to half a million former prisoners of war began streaming back to AustriaHungary from Russia, not only war-weary, but inspired at first hand by the Bolshevik revolution. Large numbers simply dissolved into the countryside in armed bands, known as the 'green cadre'. In
Bosnia, many swelled the ranks of Serbian guerrilla groups; in Croatia their aims were less politically defined, but they still posed a mounting public order problem. With the disintegration of central authority, local authoritiesso-called 'National Councils'-sprang up to fill the vacuum, graduallv establishing a parallel administration. When their representati;es13 gathered in Zagreb in March to discuss ways of co-ordinating their action, they issued a declaration demanding unification that for the first time made no mention of the Habsburg Monarchy. The movement had gathered a momentum of its own. On 2 July, a 'National Organisation of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes of Dalmatia' was proclaimed in Split, soon followed by a similar body in !stria. A month later, the Yugoslav Club in Ljubljana proclaimed the National Council (Narodni Svet) for Slovenia, !stria and Dalmatia, declaring its intention of joining up with like-minded forces in Croatia-Slavonia to form a 'universal Yugoslav committee'. By the time the Habsburg authorities began to wake up to the problem it was too late. Austrian efforts to reform the structures of the Dual Monarchy came up against Hungarian resistance to any kind of change, making it impossible to reach any remotely acceptable solution. In a last ditch-effort to make the Hungarian understand how critical the situation was, the Emperor ordered the veteran Hungarian politician Count Istvan Tisza on a fact-finding mission to the south of the Monarchy. The mission was an unmitigated disaster: wherever Tisza went, he was confronted with hostility and pro-Yugoslav sentiments, and shocked at the disorder and erosion of loyalty. Yet his only reaction was a defiant retreat onto existing positions: 'Hungary remains strong and will deal with its enemies!' he told his host General Stjepan Sarkotic as he left Sarajevo on 23 September. 14 If there had been any lingering doubts among his various Yugoslav interlocutors, they now knew for certain they could expect nothing from Austria-Hungary. While Tisza was on his ill-fated mission, an allied offensive spearheaded by Serbian and French forces burst through the Macedonia They included parties from Slovenia, Is tria, Dalmatia and Bosnia (both Serb and Croat), as well as StarceviC's Party of Rights. The Croat-Serb Coalition kept away, as did Radic's Peasant Party. 14 Krizman, Hrvatska u prvom svijetskom ratu, op. cit., p. 261.
!3 12
During the negotiations, Pasic had pointedly reminded Trumbic that Serbia's first priority was to liberate the Serbs, 'then the Croats and the Slovenes'. Ibid. p. 224.
35
36
Kosta St. Pavlowitch
The First World War and the Unification of Yugoslavia
front, forcing Bulgaria out of the war and carving north through occupied Serbia. Austro-Hungarian defences crumbled, desertions increased and fleeing soldiers began heading back into Bosnia and Croatia, many joining the 'green cadre' and adding further to the sense of chronic insecurity. Galvanised by the pressure of circumstances, South Slav parliamentarians met again in Zagreb in early October. This time they were joined by the governing Croat-Serb Coalition, and on 8 October established the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs (Narodno Vije{;e SHS), a de facto government for all the Yugoslav lands of the Monarchy. The Council appointed the Slovene Anton Korosec as president, with Pavelic, a Croat, and Svetozar Pribicevic, the Serb leader of the Croat-Serb Coalition, as vice-presidents. Faced with the growing vacuum of power and reports of spiralling anarchy, the National Council realised the need for a formal assumption of power and dispatched the ban (governor) of Croatia to Vienna to sound out Emperor Charles I on how he might react to such a development. 'Do as you please,' was his reply. 15 Ban Antun Mihalovic duly summoned the Sabor, which on October 29 unanimously declared the dissolution of all links with the Habsburg Monarchy and proclaimed 'the sovereign national State of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs over the whole ethnographic territory of that nation.' 16 The celebrations that marked the event belied the precarious situation in which the new state found itself. On 3 November, the Entente signed an armistice with Austria-Hungary, allowing allied forces to occupy areas up to a line that coincided with the territories promised to Italy under the Treaty of London. The new 'Slovene-Croat-Serb State' was neither recognised by the Allies (and was therefore still strictly speaking enemy territory), nor did it have properly delineated frontiers. It was therefore essential to establish contact with the Serbian government as quickly as possible to work towards a unification that would save Yugoslav lands from Italian claims and give them a seat on the victors' side at the future peace conference.
Serbia suddenly found itself in an unexpected position: it had expected either to be granted Yugoslav lands as spoils of war at a peace conference or to liberate them during a military campaign. Now those lands had liberated themselves, almost by default, and Serbia found itself faced with interlocutors who had altogether more legitimacy than the emigres of the Yugoslav Committee. The two sides, led respectively by Pasic and Korosec and joined by the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian opposition, met in Geneva almost immediately, from 6 to 9 November, in an effort to thrash out a declaration of intent that they could present to the Allies ahead of formal unification. The resulting agreement proclaimed that intent, but it also delivered a stinging blow to Serbia's vision of unification. Under pressure not only from Korosec and Trumbic but also from his own opposition, Pasic backed down on his insistence that Serbia be the sole representative of Yugoslav interests until a peace conference, recognising the National Council as the legitimate government of the South Slav lands of the former Austro-Hungary. The accord also agreed to set up transitional dualistic arrangements very much along the Habsburg model favoured by the Croats and Slovenes, with existing institutions remaining in place until a Constituent Assembly, and a joint transitional government whose ministers would swear loyalty to their respective heads of state. The future form of the state was left open, without even a commitment to whether it would be a monarchy or a republic. The agreement, however, was stillborn. The Serbian government in Corfu, under acting premier Stojan Protic, refused to ratifY it and resigned, with the support of the Regent Alexander. In Zagreb too it was rejected, under pressure from the Croat-Serb Coalition, whose leader Pribicevic argued the delegation in Geneva had no mandate to carry out binding negotiations. Events in Geneva had given a misleading impression of the National Council's strength. In fact, the new state faced a threat of disintegration as real as that which had just dismembered AustriaHungary. To the West, Italian forces began taking over the lands that had been promised to them, entering Trieste and Rijeka (Fiume), before moving down the Dalmatian coast to Zadar, Pula and Sibenik. To the south and east, law and order were breaking down fast. A flood of reports began corning in to Zagreb from all over the
15 16
Ibid, p. 299. Sisic, op. cit., pp. 189-210.
37
38
country, suggesting the country was on the verge of anarchy. In Osijek, armed peasants were reported to be looting the town, while the mayor of one town in Slavonia told the authorities he could not set up a military tribunal to deal with the situation because it would have had to hang the whole locality. In Bosnia, Serbs turned on Muslims in a violent revolt that combined national and social revenge against Ottoman feudatories. The National Council's problem was that it had no armed force. Attempts to assemble one from soldiers of the old Austro-Hungarian army were a total failure, with most adding to the chaos rather than controlling it. Instead, the politicians had to turn to Serbian soldiers returning from captivity, who agreed to set up a force in Ljubljana as a deterrent to the approaching Italians, and dispatch another to Zagreb. It soon became clear that the Serbian army was the only force capable ofboth forestalling Italian ambitions and restoring order. In fact, some local authorities appealed directly to the Serbian high command for help. On 10 November the National Council in Sarajevo informed Zagreb that it had invited Serbian forces into Bosnia. To the northeast, local authorities in Zemun and Pancevo across the Danube from Belgrade, and Osijek in Slavonia, did likewise. In many ways, the leaders of the National Council in Zagreb were ill prepared for the task at hand. Many were lawyers steeped in the legalistic politics of life in the Dual Monarchy, elected by restricted suffrage and out of touch with the situation on the ground. Their insistence on proper legal frameworks and their belief that all would be sorted out on Wilsonian principles at a future Peace Conference appears na!ve compared to the hard-nosed realpolitik practised by Serbia's leaders, who had a fine-tuned understanding of allied power politics, and enjoyed active support within the National Council from pro-unification forces co-ordinated by Pribicevic. Thus when the National Council sent a delegation to the Serbian High Command on 8 November to ask Serbia to put forces at the Council's disposal as far as the Osijek-Samac line, Pribicevic took one of its members, Laza Popovic, aside and told him to insist the Serbian army should go as far west as possible. 'That means as far as Zagreb!' said Popovic. 'Of course: at least as far as Zagreb,' replied Pribicevic. 17 17
Krizman, Hrvatska u prvom svijetskom ratu, op. cit., p. 323.
39
The First World War and the Unification of Yi
Kosta St. Pavlowitch
Serbia understood that unification was going to take place on the ground, and worked the situation to _its ad:a?tage. On ~6 ~ovemMomi.'ilo NinCic, the first Serbian mmister back m hberated . . f b~ Belgrade, wrote to Pribicevic: 'It_ seems to me that the maJ_onty_ o c oats in Croatia will accept the Idea of an mseparable and mdiVISIbl: state of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes under the Karadjord~evic dynasty only if it is tangibly proved to them that, unless they qmck~y an d sincerely accept that idea, all the Serbs will go over..to Serbia without hesitation.' 18 To this end, the Serbian authontles were involved in direct negotiations with local National Councils to encourage them to bypass the National Council in Zagreb and pro19 claim instant unification with Serbia. . However, the pressure was not only coming from Serbia. In Dalmatia, the Italian threat provided a potent reminder of the mternational isolation of the new state. Dalmatia had always been at the forefront of the struggle for Yugoslavia, and showed increasing impatience with what it saw as the procrastinatio_n of the Za~r~b authorities. On 16 November, the Dalmatian Natwnal Council m Split submitted an ultimatum to Zagreb: decide on unification within five days, or we shall do it alone. Three days later, the National Council ofBosnia-Herzegovina announced it would do the same. The central committee of the National Council duly met on 23 November to decide its course of action, as events gathered momentum: on the next day, Srem declared its unification with Serbia; and on the day after, it was the turn of Novi Sad, Banat, Backa and Baranja; the following day it would be Montenegro. Finally the committee agreed a set of guidelines for i~s delegates to take to Belgrade, demanding the creation of a Council of State that would include representatives from the National Council, the Yugoslav Committee and the legislatures of Serbia and Montenegro. The Council would act as a provisional government pending the election of a Constituent Assembly, which would decide on the form of the unified state by a majority of two-thirds. 18
lvo Banac, The National Question in Yi
19
A similar process was going on in Montenegro, culmmatmg m a meetmg on 26 Nov. 1918 of the Grand National Assembly in Podgonca, wh1ch deposed the Petrovic' dynasty and proclaimed unification with Serbia.
1984,~
135.
.
.
.
.
40
The First World War and the Unification
Kosta St. Pavlowitch
The delegation arrived in Belgrade on 28 November and entered talks with Serbian government representatives. Within the next two days, dozens more localities were sending in announcements of unification with Serbia, while the Dalmatian authorities warned in ~ telegram tha~ alli~d commanders were insisting on the urgency of Immediate umficatwn as the only way to grant international status to the Yugoslavs of former Austria-Hungary. These were the circumstances in which the final address to the Regent ~a: drawn up. Th_e pressure was decisive, convincing a reluctant Pavel~c to abandon his msistence on the inviolability ofhistoric ?orders,_ nghts and autonomies, as well as on the two-thirds m;UorIty reqmred to ratifY the constitution. Pribicevic's line won the day, argumg that the act of unification was all that mattered while the details could be put off to a later date. The address read to ~he Regent on 1 December by Pavelic, in the name of the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, therefore professed an unconditional desire for unification, leaving further arrangements to the Constituent Assembly. In his reply, Prince Alexander proclaimed 'the unification ofSerbia with the lands of the independent State ofSlovenes Croats an~ Serbs into a united Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slov~nes.' 20 It could not have been otherwise,' one of the National Council's representatives, Mate Drinkovic, wrote the next day to Trumbic. 21 The combination of international and internal pressures left the Natwnal Council with no choice but to declare unconditional unification with Serbia. With _an ever-shrinking anarchic territory under Its control, the Council was hardly in a position to play hard to get with a Serbia that held the two trump cards-armed force and a victor's seat at the international conference table. . Th_e Serb~an government knew this was the case and played the ~Ituati?n to Its advantage, driven by a growing mistrust of Croatian mtentwns: :In ~elgrade, we increasingly have the impression that some Croatian orcles ha:e a _plan to separate Serbia and Montenegro from our other terntones m order to create, instead of a unified Yugoslavia in which they fear Serbian domination, a purely Austrian combination.' 22 Sisic, op. cit., pp. 280-3. ~~ Kriz:n~n, Raspa~ Au~tro- Ugarske i stvaranje jugoslovenske driave, Zagreb, 1977, p. 239. Nmcrc to Pnbrcevrc, 28 Nov. 1918. Mrlorad Ekmecic, Stvaranje jugoslavije 17901918, 2 vols, vol. 2, Belgrade, 1989, p. 811.
41
However, Serbia too had little choice but to seek an arrangement with the National Council. Had it set aside the Yugoslav option in favour of a Greater Serbia, it would have had difficulty justifYing to the allies the full extent of its territorial claims, thus leaving its national integration incomplete, with many Serbs still living as minorities in Italy, Hungary or a rump Croatia. Neither would it have altogether avoided the national problems that were to plague Yugoslavia, adding large Croatian, Muslim and Hungarian minorities to the Albanian and still nationally undefined Macedonian populations Serbia had taken on after the Balkan wars. By December 1918, most of the populations involved (inasmuch as they had any political consciousness) appeared to support the creation of some sort of Yugoslavia-though how they understood that common state varied wildly. Most ordinary Serbs would undoubtedly have backed it as an extension of Serbia, as the cuhnination of their national struggle. In the Yugoslav lands of Austria-Hungary, the perception was obviously different: nevertheless, the estimates available 23 suggest a majority in favour of unification, with a strong 'Yugo-sceptic' vein in the Croatian heartland. Of those in positions of influence, however, few realised that a unified state required them to sublimate existing national preoccupations if it was to have any chance of succeeding. Serbian politicians took it for granted that, while they had sacrificed flag and name to the common state, it would otherwise be pretty much business as usual. Most Croatian politicians, on the other hand, still hoped the relationship with Serbia would be an improved version of the autonomy they enjoyed within Austria-Hungary. Both were mistaken, yet what they did share in 1918 was a realisation that the only way their respective national programmes could be achieved was in co-operation with the other. The only other solutions were mutual elimination or exchanges of population, solutions that would be left to later generations.
23 20
if Yugoslavia
In August 1918, the governor of Bosnia, General Sarkotic, estimated that Dalmatia was 100 per cent behind unification, as were 60 per cent of the populations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia-Slavonia. This tallies with Serbian reports from Zagreb back to Belgrade in November, which nevertheless warned of a strong Republican and Croatian nationalist tendency in Croatia proper.
The Yugoslav Question, the Great War, and the Peace Conference 43
THE YUGOSLAV QUESTION, THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND THE PEACE CONFERENCE, 1914-20 Andrej Mitrovic Several weeks before the outbreak of hostilities, in an official AustroHungarian memorandum of 2 July 1914 submitted to the German gove_rnment, the assassination of the Habsburg archduke in Sarajevo ':as mterpreted as a result of the Serbian policy aimed at 'unificatiOn of all South Slavs under the Serbian flag'. 1 The ultimatum to Serbia of23 July 1914 contained the following phrase: 'a subversive movement aimed at detaching parts of the territory belonging to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy'. 2 The Joint Ministerial Council at its meeting of7 July, argued for 'a radical solution [of the 'Serbia~ question'] by military intervention'. 3 On 19 July it concluded that strategic border alterations, at Serbia's expense and in favour of 'other states', were necessary. 4 After receiv~ng the declaration of war from Vienna on 28 July 1914, the Serbun government responded by formulating the programme ofYugoslav unification. Perhaps because the unification of South Slavs in an independent state had to be carried out at the 1
'Auf die Vereinigung aller Siidslawen unter serbischer Plagge' in L. Bittner and H. Ueberberger (eds), Oesterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik (OeUAP), vol. VIII, Vienna, 1930, p. 251. 2 'Un mouvement subversif dont le but est de detacher de Ia Monarchie austrohong;oise certai?es parties de son territoire', ibid., pp. 515-17. Vladimir Dedijer and Z1vota Amc, (eds), Dokumenti o spoijnoj politici Kraijevine Srbije 1903-1914, vol. VII-2,Belgrade, 1980,pp. 628-31. 3 'Eine radikale Li:isung im Wege militarischen Eingreifens', in M. Komjathy (ed.) Protokolle des Gememsamen Mtmsterrates der Ostereich-ungarischen Monarchic 19141918 (hereafter Protokolle), ed. Budapest, 1966, pp. 141-50. 4 Ibid., pp. 150-4.
42
expense of Austria-Hungary, Belgrade waited for nearly four and a half months before it publicly declared the unification and liberation of all Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as its main war aim. However, already on 29 July, in a Manifest issued by Prince Regent Alexander of Serbia, the Habsburgs were criticized for their ungratefulness to both Serbs and Croats', for their 'sacrifices for the Empire'. In a speech given to the Serbian army on 4 August he talked about 'millions of our brothers ... from Bosnia and Herzegovina, from Banat and Backa, from Croatia, Slavonia, Srem, and from our coast [ ... ] Dalmatia', indicating that Serbia looked beyond its borders and beyond merely unifYing with just Serbs from outside Serbia. 5 Although there is no strong evidence in Serbian official documents that the Belgrade government was very Yugoslav-minded, according to a reliable source, Nikola Pasic, the then Serbian Prime Minister, stated in a private conversation that in the case of a favourable outcome of the war, north-western borders of a new state would run 'along the Klagenfurt-Marburg-Szeged line'. 6 According to what a representative of the Serbian Foreign Minister told the Russian envoy in Belgrade, Pasic said on 25 August 1914, 'this time it [the 'Yugoslav question'] should be solved[ ... ] by unification of all South Slavs', for 'if a lasting peace is to be achieved [ ... ] Serbs and Croats and Slovenes should be united to be one', in a strong state, which can 'only be Serbia with Croats and Slovenes' .7 Systematic and complex preparations for a 'Yugoslav Programme' were carried out between August and November and were revised in early December 1914. Serbia's leading politicians and intellectuals took part in these preparations. Serbian envoys with the Entente Powers received instructions from their government on 4 September 1914 that the future state should be composed of 'Serbia with Bosnia, Herzegovina, Vojvodina, Croatia, Is tria and Slovenia'. 8 On 22 September they were sent a set of'gudelines for action and conversation about [the Serbian government's] aspirations ... should the 5
Ferdo Sisic, Dokurnenti o postanku Kraijevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, 1914-1918, Zagreb, 1920,pp. 2-3,5-6. 6 Panta M. Draskic, Moji memoari, Belgrade, 1990, p. 87. 7 Arhiv Jugoslavije Belgrade (Archives of Yugoslavia, hereafter AJ), Papers of Jovan M. Jovanovic, 80-54-492-3, Diary ofJovan M. Jovanovic, minute of12/25 Aug. 1914. H Milorad EkmeCic, Ratni ciijevi Srbije 1914, Belgrade, 1973, p. 87.
44
issue [of its war aims) be raised'. Future borders were also mentioned: starting from the east, going westwards in a semicircle, the projected borders encompassed the towns of Bela Crkva, Vrsac, Timi~oara, Subotica, Baja, the region of Baranja and the city of Osijek; they ran along the Drava and Mura rivers all the way to Leibnitz, encompassing the Kranjska region and descending down to Istria. 9 Contacts with Croatian emigre leaders were soon established in Italy, where the first steps towards the establishment of the Yugoslav Committee were made. The Committee moved its headquarters to London in the spring of 1915 and remained there until the end of the war. Towards the end of 1914, the Serbian government finally publicly announced its 'Yugoslav' Declaration, which was presented to the National Assembly, convened inNis on 7 December. The Declaration stated that the government placed all its efforts 'into the service of the great cause of the Serbian state and the SerboCroatian and Slovenian tribe' and stressed that its 'only task is to ensure successful end of this great war which at the time when it started became also a fight for liberation and unification of all our unliberated brothers Serbs, Croats and Slovenes' .10
Just over four years later, in January 1919, representatives of a country named the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes [hereafter KSCS] appeared at the Peace Conference held in Paris. 11 Because officially the KSCS was not among the winners (nor among the losers, for that matter), as it was only just created, the question arose whether it should be entitled to take part in the Conference. To complicate things even further, the KSCS was not an entirely new 9 10 11
The Yugoslav Question, the Great War, and the Peace Conference 45
Andrej Mitrovic
AJ-80-7-441. Sisic, op. cit., p. 10. For the history of the Paris Peace Conference see H.WV Temperley, A History cif the Peace Conference cif Paris, 4 vols, London, 1920-4. For an account of the Yugoslav delegation at the Conference see Andrej Mitrovic, Jugoslavija na Konferenciji mira 1919-1920, Belgrade, 1969, and 'The 1919-1920 Peace Conference in Paris and the Yugoslav State: An Historical Evaluation' in Dimitrije Djordjevic (ed.), The Creation of Yugoslavia 1914-1918, Santa Barbara, CA, 1980, pp. 207-17. See also lvo J. Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Conference: a Study in Frontiermaking, New Haven, CT, 1963.
country, either. The KSCS delegation included representatives of two allied states. One was Serbia, the only country which took part in the war from its first to its last day (from 28 July 1914, when Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, until11 November 1918, the day of the final truce, when, following orders from the commander of the Allied Eastern Army, the Serbian Army blocked the remaining German troops in Romania). The other was Montenegro, whose army capitulated in 1916, but whose government did not sign a separate peace with Austria-Hungary. However, the KSCS delegation also included former citizens of Austria-Hungary, the defeated enemy. The Conference accepted the delegation, but only under its official name: 'The Delegation of the Kingdom of Serbia'. This did not prevent the KSCS delegates to argue for the right to selfdetermination of its 'people of three tribes and three names' and to insist on using the full name of the country (rather than just the Kingdom of Serbia) in both verbal and written communication. 12 Therefore, the delegation's first goal was to secure the recognition of its country by the Peace Conference (which then ammounted to international recognition), and then make sure to get as favourable borders as possible. A delicate issue of war reparations-with Serbia due to receive payments and former Austro-Hungarian provinces, now parts of the KSCS, expected to pay, was after a while entrusted to a special Reparations Commission. 13 Although the new Kingdom was not yet recognized, the presence of its delegation at the Peace Conference was tolerated. At the plenary session in the Hall of Mirrors of the Versailles Palace it had three representatives-less than Britain, France and the US, which had five representatives each, but more than any other country except Belgium, which also had three delegates. (This was in recognition of the contribution of Serbia and Belgium to the Allied victory). The Provisional Government in Belgrade and the Delegation at the Peace Conference were the two main political bodies of the young Yugoslav Kingdom. Both formed on 20 December 1918, 12
13
For instance, the delegation used for all correspondence paper headed 'The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes'. Mitrovic,Jugoslavija na Konferenciji mira, p. viii.
46
Andrej Mitrovii'
they were by their composition unquestionably representative of the new state's 'historical provinces', all three major religions (Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Sunni Muslim), and main political parties. The Government included the most prominent South Slav politicians, with the notable exception ofNikola Pasic, the Serbian wartime Prime Minister, whose nomination for Prime Minister was not accepted by Prince-Regent Alexander. Pasic was instead head of the seven-member delegation, which included three representatives from Serbia (in the autumn 1919, one of them was replaced by a representative of Montenegro, who was in the meantime the head of the Montenegrin Section within the Delegation) and four representatives of former Austro-Hungarian provinces: two Croats, including Ante Trumbic, the new country's Minister of Foreign Affairs and during the war the president of the Yugoslav Committee. Slovenes were separately organized within the Delegation and had their own Secretariat. Professional sections of the Delegation also had a mixed composition. 14 The 'mixed' composition of the KSCS delegation was not well received among all the Entente Powers, because some of its members were citizens of defeated enemy countries. The Italian delegation particularly objected to the participation of Ivan Zolger, a Minister without portfolio in the last Austrian government, but now a fourth ranked official of the Yugoslav delegation. The American delegation suggested that Zolger be withdrawn, but the KSCS delegates refused to do so, particularly as Slovenian ministers in the Provisional Government in Belgrade strongly objected to the 15 American proposal. Official Montenegro, which capitulated militarily, but did not sign a separate peace, looked for its place at the Conference in vain. 16
The Yugoslav Question, the Great War, and the Peace Conference 47 Although only the Serbs were unquestionably treated as an allied nation, the situation with them was not straightforward either. A number ofHabsburg Serbs fought for the Empire against the Entente countries, including Serbia. The Entente governments were a~are of this since early stages of the war. For instance, the French numster to Serbia reported in mid-October 1914 that 'many Slavs, [mcluding] Serbs and Croats' fought for the Habsburg Monarchy, while the Russian envoy in late January 1915 observed that Serbra wrll have the problem of unifYing with other Serbs, since the war separated Serbs of the Kingdom from those of the Dual Monarchy. 17 During the three years of Austro-Hungarian occupation ofSerbia (1915-18), the enemy troops, in addition to dominant Austrian and Hungarian, also included Bosnian, Croatian, Slovenian and Serb units. A gendarmerie battalion from Bosnia, mostly consisting of Musli_m Slavs, was brought on several occasions to crush the Serbran reSIStance, while major Austro-Hungarian 'cleansing' campaigns were undertaken under the command of a Croat and a Serb lieutenant colonels. 18 In the regions ofToplica,Jablanica and Kopaonik a spontaneous uprising broke out in late February 1917, but was crushed a month later, when according to Austro-Hungarian estimates some 25 000 Serbs were killed. 19 Serbian Austrophiles, although small in ndmber, offered to Vienna to make the new National Assembly, to overthrow the King and the government-in-exile and join the Dual Monarchy as a third unit. On the other hand, a number of Slovenes, Croats and particularly Serbs, joined Serbian and Russian armies, forming volunteer units. A complex pattern emerged throughout the territory of the future Yugoslav state, although in Croatia, both the ruling CroatSerb Coalition and the main opposition parties were pro-Yugoslav
14
The original seven members of the KSCS delegation were: Nikola Pasic (Serb), President of the Delegation; Ante Trumbic (Croat), Foreign Minister in the Provisional Governmen! and its sole representative in the Delegation; Milenko Vesnic (Serb); Ivan Zolger (Slovene); Mateja Boskovic (Serb); Josip Smodlaka (Croat); and Otokar Ribarz (Slovene). 15 Dittmar Dahlmann, 'Gewiner oder Verlierer? Die Bedeutung der Pariser Friedensvertrage fUr Jugoslawien und U ngarn' in Gerd Krumeich (ed.), Versailles 1919: Ziele- Wirkungen- Wahrnehmung, Cologne, 2001, pp. 193-201, p. 196. 16 For more on Montenegro in this period see Novica Rakocevic, Crna Cora u Prvom svjetskom ratu, 1914--1918, Cetinje, 1969; Gavro Perazic, Nestanak crnogorske
driave u Prvom svetskom ratu, Belgrade, 1988; and Dragoljub Zivojinovic, Crna Cora u borbi za opstanak 1914--1922, Belgrade, 1996. 17 Ministere des affaires etrangeres, Archives, Paris (MAE), Guerre 1914-1918, Serbie, vol. 370, p. 20, Nisch 14 oct. 1914, no. 20; Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v epokhu imperializma. Dokumenty iz arkhivov tsarskogo i vremennogo pravitelstv 18781917.gg.,Moscow, 1935,p. 112. . 18 See Andrej Mitrovic, Ustanicke borbe u Srbiji 1916-1918, Belgrade, 1987, pass1m and Srbija u Prvom svetskom ratu, Belgrade, 1984, pp. 390-93. 19 Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna (hereafter HHStA), PA I, K. 976, Nr. 11/P., Nish, 11 July 1917.
48
Andnj Mitrovic
and there v:as a similar situation in Slovenia. There the I d the Sloveman clericals Ivan S 't .. , , ea er of E . , us erne, supported the Hab b mpire, but his brother Admiral Vjekoslav Su't ,., . . s urg Y~goslav volunteers and was later a member oft~ e~I~, JOI~~ ~he Withm the KSCS delegation at the Peace Con:ere~c:a% p~ss:o~ The leadmg representative of the Sl . ns. p d . oveman youth moveme t relporo ova (Revivalists), Agostin Jenko, was killed as S b. n vo unteer at the batt! f h C a er Ian friend Vladislav Fabja:~c tw:s ;~~~~~tai~~~ Aug~t 1914, his volunteer, Dragotin GustinCic, was a pror:u:~t ~a;:~at:r o~lovene mg the Slovene language with the Serbo-Croat . mergMontenegrin Prince Mirko offered the strate ·c . Mean~hile, ~he
tohthe AustnF·ans and advised from Vienna his frh:,o~:::=I~~~:~:; w o was In ranee to cone! d , Whil ., u e a separate peace with the Em ire. 21 for. the National Unification operated inpe:xile I·nsi.deeMtheonCtommittee enegro guemll · , th A . . a resistance groups operated throughout e ustnan occupatiOn. 22
The politics
if secret treaties
Hardly an area of the future Yugoslav state remained outside num ous secret plans on the post-war division of the . erthe belligerent parties followed th . h regwn. In all cases, an ally and to win the war 23 Opeir s odrt-terhm goals-to acquire . . pose to t Is was the Se b. ;;~;;;:~:: ~asicafy identical to the subsequently presented rp;:: ugos av movement m Austria-Hungary) wh· h not a product of a d. I , Ic was Se b. ny secret Ip omacy, but stated the view of the r Ian government and its experts concerning the Serb-Croat-
The Yugoslav Question, the Great War, and the Peace Conference 49 Slovene territory: that this territory should be politically united in an independent state. The Entente Powers secured Italy's entry into the war on their side by the secret Treaty of London signed on 26 April 1915. Italy was promised Trieste, Gorizia, Gradisca, the whole of Istria and of the historic Dalmatia, with its capital Zara (Zadar). Serbia and Montenegro were to be awarded the coast south of the Italian Dalmatia, including Split and Dubrovnik, as well as parts of the present-day Montenegrin coast. To reassure Italy, this area was also to be demilitarized. Croatia would be left just with the Volosko bay and its coast. 24 In exchange for the territory in Dalmatia, as well as the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Srem, Backa and perhaps Slavonia, Serbia was expected to give up a considerable part of Vardar Macedonia, which was offered to Bulgaria, if the latter joined the Entente bloc. 25 The Slovenes, clearly out of the focus of European diplomacy, seemed destined to be left to Austria, although Serbia raised the question of their status throughout the war. When at the end of 1917 Vienna began, in secrecy, to negotiate a separate peace/ 6 the Entente Powers saw the possible agreement as an opportunity to weaken considerably Germany, compensate to some extent the loss of Russia (which, led by the Bolsheviks, opted for a separate peace) or at least undermine the internal confidence among the Central Powers. 27 The meeting between the AustroHungarian diplomat, Count Mensdortf, and Britain's General Smuts in December 1917 in Geneva was interpreted by the British side as an opportunity to eliminate 'new worries for the future ofEurope' by turning Austria-Hungary into a 'counter-balance to Germany 24
~anko
Pleterski, Dr. Ivan Susterlic 1863-1925 L. . SusterCic later became a supporter of the Yi , }ubljana, 1998, pp. 430-86. Ivan ander Karadjordjevic should become a T ugos av umon and argued that Alexwould also include Bulgaria For h. b shar of a large 'JCugoslav Empire which rot er Adm1ral Sust "·" M Jugos Iavija na Koriferenciji mira · PP 213IS 215 ' erne, see itrovic, 21 HHS A ' . ' · t" • P;"- I, K 964, 13 Dec. 1917 and 16 Jan. 1918 22 23 Rakocevic, op. Cit., esp. pp. 278-80,348-49,373-455. See Jacques de Launay Secrets di 1 · · WW Gottlieb, Studies fn Secret ~p~:attqu~ 1914-h 1918, Brussels, 1963; and 1957. macy unng t e Ftrst World War, London, 2o
25
26
27
See I documenti diplomatici italiani; Quinta serie, vol. III, Rome, 1985, pp. 369-73; Mario Toscano, II Patto di Londra, Rome, 1934; Milan Marjanovic, Londonski ugovor, Zagreb, 1960. Public Record Office (PRO),London, FO 371/2265/1814, The British Minister's Report from Nish, Confidential, 31 Aug. 1915. Prince Sixte de Bourbon, L'Offre de paix separee de l'Autriche (5 decembre 1916-12 octobre 1917), Paris, 1920; Ingeborg Meckling, Die Aussenpolitik des Grqfen Czernin, Munich, 1969; David Stevenson, The First World War and International Politics, Oxford, 1988. Stevenson, op. cit.; V:H. Rothwell, British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy 19141918, Oxford, 1971; Robert A. Kann, Die Sixtusaffiire und die geheimen Friedensverhandlungen Osterreich-Ungarns im Ersten Weltkrieg, Vienna, 1966.
50
Andrej Mitrovic
instead of Russia'. Smuts, who obviously focused on the rearrangement of the Monarchy by giving wide autonomies to its peoples, believed that Austria-Hungary would preserve its territorial integrity, and even become attractive for the neighbouring countries. It appears that this was a reference to Serbia, because Smuts saw it 'closely connected' with the Habsburg Monarchy after the war. Such a Serbia would include Bosnia-Herzegovina and possibly Montenegro, but would lose most of Macedonia to Bulgaria. The creation of a Yugoslav state, 'independent, but in lose alliance with the Monarchy', was not ruled out by the British either. 28 Serbia had little say in these calculations, and its plans and aims were often ignored. With the United States entering the war in April 1917 everything changed, not only in terms of military balance. The US proclaimed that it was fighting a war for democracy (instead of a war for territories) and publicly refused to recognize secret treaties. This complicated the situation within the Entente bloc, but strengthened the position of Serbia and the Habsburg South Slavs. Serbia did not pose so much an external as it posed an internal threat to Austria-Hungary. Soon after the war began, and increasingly after 1917, it was clear that the idea of Yugoslav unity had strong support within the Monarchy. This explains the creation of an 'internal front'-arrests and internment, persecution and pogroms of the Empire's South Slavs, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 29 There seemed to be no other solution for the Yugoslav question, but to incorporate Serbia and form a third, South Slav unit within the Empire. However, the trialistic solution was strongly rejected by the Hungarians, who already feared Slav predominance in what they regarded as historic Hungarian lands. Internal instability of the Empire, combined with its powerlessness in terms of foreign policy, where Germany was increasingly taking an upper hand, all contributed to Austria-Hungary's eventual collapse. 28
HHStA, P.A. I, K. 963, Materials of Mensdorff's Mission; PRO, FO 800/2864, Materials of the Smuts Mission with Report of General Smuts Mission, Geneva, 18-19 Dec. 1917; Andrej Mitrovic, 'Tajni razgovori Mensdorf-Smats i jugoslovensko pitanje', Istorijski /:asap is (Belgrade), vol. XXIV, 1977, pp. 235-61 . 29 Pero Slijepcevic et al. (eds), Napor Bosne i Hercegovine za oslobodjenje i ujedinjenje, SaraJevo, 1929, pp. 221-3; Ferdinand Hauptmann, Die Osterreichisch-ungarische Herrschaft in Bosnien und der Herzegovina 1878-1918, Graz, 1983.
The Yugoslav Question, the Great War, and the Peace Conference 51 As regards Serbia only one thing was certain in Vienna and Budapest: that it must be permanently destroyed. How to achieve this was not clear. Part of the solution was perhaps to offer Bulgana larae chunks of Serbian territory-indeed, this was the main provis~ of a secret treaty between the Central Powers and Bulgaria signed in Sofia in September 1915, by which the latter was prom30 ised 59 per cent of Serbia's territory if it joined the former. The Hungarian leadership was opposed to the annexation, although it had plans to incorporate Belgrade, parts of north-western Serbia, 31 and of eastern Serbia, an area rich in copper and silver. However, once Serbia was occupied, it was the German Empire which exploited most of its mineral_ resources. 32 In fact, Germ~ny's interes~s and aims were often drastically different from Austna-Hungarys, not only in relation to the Balkans. 33 Vienna's ultimate aim was 'the final supremacy in the Balkans ... by way of a permanent settlement of bord:rs', as well_ as by establishing a protectorate over Albania, to which terntones of Serbia and Montenegro with ethnic Albanian population would be annexed (and, if necessary, also by awarding Greece with smaller parts of southern Albania). 34 Rump Serbia, reduced to a relatively small mountainous region with the population of around 1,5 Andrej Mitrovic, 'Tajni ugovor izmedju Centralnih sila i Bugarske od 6. septembra 1915.', Medjunarodni problemi (Belgrade), no. 3-4, 1978, pp. 47-?5. 31 See for instance Fritz Fellner, 'Die Mission Hoyos', in Vasa Cubrilovic (ed.), Velike siZe i Srbija pred Prvi svetski rat, Belgrade, 1976, pp. 387-419; 'Zwischen Kriegsbegeisterung und Resignation (Jaener 1915)', Archiv der Universitaet Graz, Bd IV, pp. 153-62; Georg Schmid, 'Der Ballhausplatz 1848-1918' Osterreichische Osthefte, Jahrgang 23 (1981), pp. 18-33; Wolfdieter Bihl, 'Zu den osterrelchischungarischen Kriegszielen 1914' ,]ahrbucherfur Geschichte Osteuropas, Band 16 (1968), pp. 505-30; Andrej Mitrovic, 'Die BalkanpEine der BallhausplatzBiirokratie im Ersten Weltkrieg (1914-1916)' in Ferenc Glatz and Ralph Melville (eds), Gesellschaft, Politik und Verwaltun,R in der Habsburgermonarchie 183(}-1918, Stuttgart, 1987,pp. 343-71. 3 2 Andrej Mitrovic, 'Balkanski ratni cilj nemackog vojnog v~djstva i privredna bogatstva Srbije 1917-1918' in Glas SANU, Odeljenje istonJsbh nauka, vol. 8, Belgrade, 1993, pp. 171-207; Gary W Shanafelt, The Secret Enemy: AustnaHungary and the German Alliance 1914-1918, New York, 1985. 33 See Mitrovic, ibid. 34 As it was elaborated at a governmental meeting of 7 Jan. 1916, soon after the occupation of Serbia. Protokolle, p. 354. 3'1
52
Andrej Mitrovic
million would be politically and economically completely dependent on the Empire, which is why it was believed in Vienna that 'the Draconian measures must be used'. 35 As already indicated, because of its leading role among the South Slavs, Serbia represented both an internal and external threat to the survival of Austria-Hungary. In the aftermath of the May 1917 Declaration, issued by the political leadership of the Habsburg South Slavs, which called for unification of all South Slav lands as a separate unit within the Monarchy, the Habsburg government concluded that 'the development and solution of the Yugoslav question is the vital issue for the survival and future of the Monarchy.' 36 In the conditions of eroding power, an increasing number of military deserters (the so-called 'green cadre') and imminent revolutions inspired by nationalism, social democracy and communism, the number of proposals and hence of alternatives for dealing with the crisis grew in Vienna and Budapest. 37 Most plans envisaged Slovenia remaining part of Austria and emphasized the importance of making sure that Serbs do not constitute a majority in any of newlyfounded regions, although some plans provided for the unification of rump Serbia and Montenegro. 3R At the session of the Crown Council, held on 30 May 1918, the Yugoslav question, the only item on the agenda, was described by the Emperor as 'a matter of utmost importance' (von allergrijJter Wichtigkeit), and that urgent action was necessary to avoid exposure 'to gravest threats' (den iirgsten Gifahren). Opposing annexationist proposals of the military leadership and aware of the imperative to end the war, the Habsburg Foreign Minister warned that one must not 'wage war one day longer because of the annexation of Serbia and Montenegro', which 'must not be obstacles to peace'. 39
The Yugoslav Question, the Great War, and the Peace Conference 53 However, the victory of the Entente armies, the Serbian one among them, led to the collapse of the Empire and to the creat~on of a large South Slav state, with Serbia at its core. Pl~ns for anmhilation of Serbia and Montenegro, as well as those for mternal reorganization of Austria-Hungary, remained in archives.
The ciftermath The end of the war brought about the resolution of the Yugoslav question. Austria-Hungary disintegrated, its last En:peror .abdicated, and six new states were founded fully or partly on Its tern tory. One of them was the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, proclaimed on 1 December 1918. The most significant legacy of the Great War was that the right to national self-determination had won, at least in theory, over the principle of historic rights. Yet, the Entente powers never officially accepted Serbia's 'Nis Declaration' of December 1914. Only after the US entered the war did the Yugoslav liberation and unification come to be seen in a more positive light. 40 The legacy of secret treaties survived the war and affected the 41 relations between the winning powers at the Peace Conference. Italy, which had the status of a great power and accordingly a seat in the Supreme Council of the Conference, insisted that terms of the London Treaty be respected. 42 Great Britain and France looked for a compromise solution, while the US rejected secr.et treatie.s as undemocratic, promising instead just and more lastmg solutwns based on self-determination of the peoples. 43 What was the Yugoslav Delegation's position vis-a-vis the London Treaty? It clearly rejected it, claiming not only Serbia's share of eastern Adriatic, but Italian, too, as the population of northern Dalmatia, Istria and Trieste was predominantly South Slav. The
35
Ibid. Felix Hoeglinger, Ministarprdsident Heinrich Graf Clam Martine, Graz, 1964, pp. 210-13. 37 See Richard Georg Plaschka et al., Innere Front, vols I-II, Vienna, 1974;Bernard Stulli, 'Prilozi gradji za historiju jugoslavenskog pitanja 1918. godine', Arhivski vjesnik,no. 2,Zagreb, 1959,pp. 279-335;Mark Cornwall (ed.), The Last Years of Austria-Hungary, Exeter, 1990;Janusz Zaranowski, November 1918, Warsaw, 1982. JR 'Zapisnik zasjedanja', Sarajevo, 13-14 May 1918, in Stulli, op. cit., pp. 281-305; Protokolle, pp. 661-9. 39 Protokolle, pp. 661-9. 36
411
Bogdan Krizman, 'Predsjednik Wilson i jadransko pitanje do primirja s AustroUgarskom 1918', Anali]adranskog instituta]AZU, Zagreb, vol. 2, pp. 81-116; V Mamatey, The United States and East Central Europe 1914-1918, Prmceton, NJ, 1957. Ubavka Ostojic-Fejic, Sjedinjene Americke Drzave i Srbija 1914-1918,Belgrade, 1994. 41 Stevenson, op. cit., pp. 281-93. 4 2 Rene Albrecht Carrie, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, New York, 1938; Paolo Alatri, Nitti, D'Annunzio e Ia questione adriatica, Milan, 1959. 4 3 Lorens Gelfand, The Inquiry: American preparation for peace 1917-1919, Yale, 1963.
52
Andrej Mitrovit
million would be politically and economically completely dependent on the Empire, which is why it was believed in Vienna that 'the Draconian measures must be used'. 35 As already indicated, because of its leading role among the South Slavs, Serbia represented both an internal and external threat to the survival of Austria-Hungary. In the aftermath of the May 1917 Declaration, issued by the political leadership of the Habsburg South Slavs, which called for unification of all South Slav lands as a separate unit within the Monarchy, the Habsburg government concluded that 'the development and solution of the Yugoslav question is the vital issue for the survival and future of the Monarchy.' 3" In the conditions of eroding power, an increasing number of military deserters (the so-called 'green cadre') and imminent revolutions inspired by nationalism, social democracy and communism, the number of proposals and hence of alternatives for dealing with the crisis grew in Vienna and Budapest. 37 Most plans envisaged Slovenia remaining part of Austria and emphasized the importance of making sure that Serbs do not constitute a majority in any of newlyfounded regions, although some plans provided for the unification of rump Serbia and Montenegro. 38 At the session of the Crown Council, held on 30 May 1918, the Yugoslav question, the only item on the agenda, was described by the Emperor as 'a matter of utmost importance' (von allergrilj]ter Wichtigkeit), and that urgent action was necessary to avoid exposure 'to gravest threats' (den iirgsten Gifahren). Opposing annexationist proposals of the military leadership and aware of the imperative to end the war, the Habsburg Foreign Minister warned that one must not 'wage war one day longer because of the annexation of Serbia and Montenegro', which 'must not be obstacles to peace'. 39 35
Ibid. Felix Hoeglinger, Ministarprdsident Heinrich Graf Clam "Martine, Graz, 1964, pp. 210-13. 37 See Richard Georg Plaschka et a!., Inn ere Front, vols I-II, Vienna, 197 4; Bernard Stulli, 'Prilozi gradji za historiju jugoslavenskog pitanja 1918. godine', Arhivski vjesnik, no. 2, Zagreb, 1959, pp. 279-335; Mark Cornwall (ed.), The Last Years of Austria-Hungary, Exeter, 1990;Janusz Zaranowski, November 1918, Warsaw, 1982. 38 'Zapisnik zasjedanja', Sarajevo, 13-14 May 1918, in Stulli, op. cit., pp. 281-305; Protokolle, pp. 661-9. 39 Protokolle, pp. 661-9.
The Yugoslav Question, the Great War, and the Peace Conference 53
However, the victory of the Entente armies, the Serbian ~ne among them, led to the collapse of the Empire and to the creat~on of a large South Slav state, with Serbia at its core. Pl~ns for anmhilation of Serbia and Montenegro, as well as those for mtemal reorganization of Austria-Hungary, remained in archives.
The aftermath The end of the war brought about the resolution of the Yugoslav question. Austria-Hungary disintegrated, its last En:peror .abdicated, and six new states were founded fully or partly on Its terntory. One of them was the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, proclaimed on 1 December 1918. The most significant legacy of the Great War was that the right to national self-determination had won, at least in theory, over the principle of historic rights. Yet, the Entente powers never officially accepted Serbia's 'Nis Declaration' of D.ecem?er 1914. Only after the US entered the war did the Yugoslav liberatiOn and unification come to be seen in a more positive light. 40 The legacy of secret treaties survived the war and affected the relations between the winning powers at the Peace Conference. 41 Italy, which had the status of a great power and accordingly a seat in the Supreme Council of the Conference, insisted that terms of the London Treaty be respected. 42 Great Britain and France looked for a compromise solution, while the US rejected secr.et treatie.s as undemocratic, promising instead just and more lastmg solutiOns based on self-determination of the peoples. 43 What was the Yugoslav Delegation's position vis-a-vis the London Treaty? It clearly rejected it, claiming not only Serbia's share of eastern Adriatic, but Italian, too, as the population of northern Dalmatia, !stria and Trieste was predominantly South Slav. The
36
40
Bogdan Krizman, 'Predsjednik Wilson ijadransko pitanje do primirja s AustroUgarskom 1918', Anali]adranskog instituta]AZU, Zagreb, vol. 2, pp. 81-116; V. Mamatey, The United States and East Central Europe 1914--1918, Pnnceton, NJ, 1957. Ubavka Ostojic-Fejic, Sjedinjene Americke Driave i Srbija 1914--1918, Belgrade, 1994. 41 Stevenson, op. cit., pp. 281-93. 42 Rene Albrecht Carrie, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, New York, 1938; Paolo Alatri, Nitti, D'Annunzio e la questione adriatica, Milan, 1959. 43 Lorens Gelfand, The Inquiry: American preparation for peace 1917-1919, Yale, 1963.
54
Andrej Mitrovic
KSCS delegates argued that Serbia had fought bravely on the Entente side, sustaining enormous casualties. It had declared war on Germany on 6 August 1914, after Germany had declared war on Russia and France. And the delegation of the KSCS, appearing before the representatives of the Great Powers on 18 February 1919, used its strongest argument: that Serbia had fought for the rights to equality and self-determination of peoples. Its delegates argued convincingly that such a just struggle was above all treaties, whether they were secret or public. Since the US particularly disputed the London Treaty, the Yugoslav requests and resistance made the American interference possible. 44 France and Great Britain remained passive, while Italy, unwillingly, backed down and both directly and indirectly made contacts with the KSCS delegation after its official recognition, seeking a compromise solution. 45 All this made the Treaty of London unfeasible, and the problem of the Italian-Yugoslav border unsolvable for the Peace Conference. 46 It became clear that the recognition of the young Yugoslav state was not going to face major obstacles when an invitation to the 'Serbian delegation' for the first plenary session of the Peace Conference was answered with an information that the session would be attended by the representatives of 'The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes'. On this occasion, the Yugoslav Delegation subsequently explained that 'all members of this mission out of solidarity represent their common interests' (taus les membres de cette Mission representent solidairement les interets communs). 47 Greece was the first country to recognize the new state (26 January 1919), followed by Norway (29 January) and Switzerland (26 February). At the meeting of the representatives of France, the US, Great Britain and Italy
The Yugoslav Question, the Great War, and the Peace Conference 55 (which took place on 12 January 19~ ~), when Czechoslovakia and Poland were recognized, the recogmtwn of the Yugoslav state was postponed until the Peace Conference. Apart from the obvious explanation for the post~onement, the Italian resistance, there was another reason. The allies wanted to wait a little and see how stable the new country and its government would be. 48 A Serbian diplomat reported from London on 27 December 1918 that the British position depended on whether 'the presnt situation [in the KSCS] is going to be stabilized'. 49 French ~ocuments reveal that before recognizing it, France wanted to see if the new state could survive. 50 That is why a Yugoslav representative in Paris recommended to his government that it was necessary 'to work hard to maintain the new situation at home'. 51 Armed Albanian bands revolted against the Yugoslav authorities, there were armed clashes in Montenegro, between the supporters and opponents of the exiled King Nicholas, 52 and there was unrest in Croatia. But Washington believed that there was no reason to wait and on 7 February 1919 it officially recognized the Belgrade government as the first Great Power to do so. In March the Americans even attempted in vain to encourage their European allies to fo~o_w their example. 53 In the Supreme Council the question of recognitiOn was raised on 26 April and the decision to recognize le Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovenes was passed on 29 April by accepting the credentials of the Yugoslav delegates. 54 The arrival of the German delegation almost certainly speeded up the decision, as the Allies feared the Germans might try to dispute the credibility of some of
Arhiva Jugoslavenskog odbora, Ostavstina Ante Trumbica, Arhiv Historijskog instituta HAZU (Zagreb), no. 45/72. 49 Miladin Milosevic, 'Kraljevstvo Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca. Prvi naziv jugoslovenske dr:lave', Arhiv (Belgrade), vol. I, no. 1, 2000, pp. 97-111, pp. 102-3. 50 MAE, Conference de Ia Paix 1919-1920, vol. 30. 51 AJ, Parisko poslanstvo,f. 1, Izvestaj od 3/16.januara 1919. . 52 For two sides of the argument see Jovan Bojovic, Podgoricka skupstt11a 1918, Gornji Milanovac, 1989 and Dimitrije Dimo Vujovic, Podgoricka skupstina 1918, Zagreb, 1989. 53 Milosevic, op. cit., pp. 102-3. . 54 MAE, Conference de ia Paix 1919-1920, vol. 30., coded, to the representative missions in Belgrade, Rome and London, 1 May, 1919.
48 44
See Zapisnici sa sednica Delegacije Kraijevine SHS na Mirovnoj konferenciji u Parizu 1919-20, p. 53; Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference 1919, vol. IV, Washington, DC, 1943, pp. 44-53. 45 Andrej Mitrovic, 'Tajni kontakti Nitijeve vlade sajugoslovenskom delegacijom 1919. godine', Zbornik Filozofskog Fakulteta u Beogradu (Belgrade), vol. VIII-1, 1964,pp. 753-72. 46 The problem was solved by the treaties of Rapallo (13 Nov. 1920) and Rome (27 Jan. 1924). See Bogdan Krizman, Vanjska politika jugoslavenske driave 19181941,Zagreb, 1975,pp. 29,43. 47 MAE, Conference de Ia Paix 1919-1920, a letter of the Delegation dated 20 Feb. 1919.
56
Andrej Mitrovic
the participants at the Peace Conference. 55 Britain finally recognized the KSCS on 2 June 1919, and France did so three days later. That was the international debut of the new state, born from the hardships brought about by First World War. At the Peace Conference it asserted itself as a member of the democratic world. Out of four peace treaties it signed in the suburbs of Paris, the one in Versailles, signed on 28 June 1919, was considered the most important as it was the new country's first international treaty. The treaties of SaintGermain (10 September 1919), Neuilly (with Bulgaria on 27 November 1919) and Trianon (4 June 1920) settled most of its borders. Yugoslavia existed for some seventy years. Yet, after its collapse during the last decade of the last century, there still remain a number of myths about the nature of the Yugoslav unification, the role of international diplomacy and the Paris Peace Conference. The collapse of both Yugoslavias and the civil wars of the 1940s and 1990s have only fuelled speculations that Yugoslavia was an artificial creation, created by the Great Powers, imposed on non-Serbs by Serbs or vice versa. It is hoped that this chapter has contributed, at least in part, to the dismantling of such myths.
55
Les deliberations du conseil des quatre, I, Notes de I' officier interprete Paul Mantoux, Paris, 1955, pp. 385, 411.
Part II. NATIONS SERBIA, MONTENEGRO AND YUGOSLAVIA Stevan K. Pavlowitch Serbia had existed as an autonomous principality within the Ottoman Empire since 1830. Like all the young Ba.lkan .states, It had conceptualized nationality into a territory. Its nat10nahsm was born of opposition to imperial rule. Its rulers wanted to strengthen the state, so as to be able to expand and gather kindred populat~ons. They first envisaged the inclusion of B~s~ia, Herze~ovma and parts of Albania to secure the route to a mantime outlet, m ~rder to escape a takeover by other Powers when the Ottoman Empir~ collapsed. They hoped for unity with Montenegro, w~ose pr~nc~ bishops had, in their humble way, set up the first Serbian pohty m modern times. The greatest of them, the poet Peter II, even used to be regarded as a precursor of the Yugoslav idea. Montenegro was one of those areas where the Ottoman conquest was never co~ pleted; its inhabitants had come to believe they were the only survivors of medieval Serbia. It was in the Austrian Empire, however, that the revolutionary events of 1848 saw something like a popular South Slav movemefolt. Its promoters came from a youthful intellectu~l .elite .in Croatl.a. Their aim was to regroup the Habsburg dommwns mto ethmc units, and they needed a broader base to ~xtend Croatia's claims. They used the classical name of the Illynans (as Napoleon had done) before settling for 'Yugoslavs'-Southern Slavs. Althoug~ they had adherents among educated urban Habsburg Serb~, their movement did not really catch on among Serbs. The memones and, myths of medieval Serbia were too strong among the Habsburgs Orthodox South Slavs. In Belgrade there was little need for the Illyrian-Yugoslav vision, and a reluctance to give up a name upheld by Serbia's rising statehood.
57
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Stevan K. Pavlowitch
Serbia, Montenegro and Yugoslavia
When the 'Illyrian' General Jelacic was appointed ban or crown representative in Croatia by the Austrian emperor in 1848, he told the diet-'We are all one people; we have left behind both Serbs and Croats', and Peter II of Montenegro hailed him as the saviour of the South Slavs.JelaCiC's Serb and Croat soldiers fought together alongside imperial forces to crush Hungary's intransigent nationalist revolutionaries, after which centralized government from Vienna was restored over all alike. In the 1860s contacts between Prince Michael Obrenovic's government in Serbia and Croatian nationalists were frequent. Plans were made for a 'Yugoslav' union, federation or confederation around Serbia, to encompass one nation with three religious faiths. The area ranged from Carniola, southern Styria and Carinthia, to northern Albania, Bulgaria and Thrace. These were amateurish and unrealistic plans. Keeping up the mystique of South Slav unity inspired by the Italian Risorgimento as the ultimate outcome, interlocutors in Belgrade and Zagreb used it as an auxiliary to promote their nearer separate aims-that of uniting Serbian (primarily Ottoman) and Croatian (primarily Habsburg) lands respectively, as circumstances permitted. The reorganization of the Austrian empire in 186 7 and the death of Prince Michael in 1868 brought the scheming to an end. By transferring Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria-Hungary, the Treaty ofBerlin in 1878 put an end to the illusion that all Serbs could be united in an independent Serbia, or that Bosnia could be a bridge between Serbia and Croatia for a future Yugoslavia. Michael ObrenoviC's Serbia may have perceived itself as a potential Piedmont, but there was also Montenegro which had since been consolidated and secularized. Its last ruler, Prince, later King, Nicholas was supportive of the common Serbian cause, but nurtured his own dynastic and territorial objectives. Montenegro's increased sense of its historic identity did not lessen the feeling that it was the bastion of Serbdom. Since no dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy could be foreseen, the search for a Yugoslav unifYing framework could do no more than provide support for separate efforts. Questioned, challenged, revised and altered, the Yugoslav idea offered national rights based on ethnicity and language in lieu of acquired or historic rights. It was at the root of Austria-Hungary's distrust of Serbia.
Only in the decade preceding the First World War, under King Peter Karadjordjevic, did Serbia once again become attractive to Serbs and other Southern Slavs still under Ottoman and Habsburg rule. In Belgrade the attraction felt outside Serbia for the kingdom's modernization could easily be confused with a desire to unite with Serbia. The officers who had brought about the change of dynasty in 1903 had formed a secret society commonly known as the Black Hand, to organize nationalist propaganda boosted by the action of armed bands in the 'unredeemed Serbian provinces', listed as Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, 'Old Serbia' (Kosovo), Macedonia, Croatia, Slavonia, Srem, Vojvodina and Dalmatia. It was not until the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 that Serbia was strong enough, in conjunction with its Balkan partners, to defeat the Ottoman Empire. Its victories brought in the long neglected and disparate populations of Macedonia and Kosovo, many with no clear national consciousness, others inimically disposed. Yet the victories had not only enhanced the prestige of its military; they had inspired the Serbs in Austria-Hungary, and once again more Croats and Slovenes, to think of a new Yugoslav state as an alternative in the nearer rather than the remoter future. Serbia's Radical government and Prime Minister Pasic began to talk of a possible future union, and to explore ways of cooperating with the coalition of parties that controlled the diet of Croatia. In Montenegro's case enlargement proved an even greater strain that for Serbia. The small kingdom could not support its population. Expatriates and the educated youth viewed Serbia as superior in every aspect. When a common border was established, many demanded immediate unification. Negotiations were indeed opened with Belgrade, but the complete loss of identity was as difficult to envisage as the survival of a second and economically non-viable Serbian kingdom. The dilemma made the third option of a larger Yugoslavia attractive to sections of opinion. In Croatia the young in both the Croatian majority and the Serbian minority were demanding reforms, until the opposition parties and the Serbian ethnic parties merged into the Croat-Serb Coalition that won the elections to the diet of Croatia in 1906. Ethnic Serbs offered their willingness to respect Croatia's historic rights and to contribute to the struggle for the unification of Croatia's
59
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Stevan K. Pavlowitch
historic lands, in exchange for a full acknowledgement of their equal partnership. On the eve of the First World War, there was a strong feeling of South Slav solidarity within the Habsburg Monarchy, but the strongest political groupings worked within the constitution, and openly anti-Habsburg aspirations were limited to a fringe. In Serbia, there had been ambivalence between a narrowly Serbian identity, expressed in striving for a greater Serbia, and a hazier Yugoslav identity, with Serbia as the potential Piedmont of South Slav unification. In 1914 before the outbreak of war, there were no plans and no popular movement for the creation of a Yugoslav state in any near future. The government was preparing to go to the polls, to strengthen its hand in imposing control over an army whose influential Black Hand officers thought in the simpler terms of the Serbian question. When Austria-Hungary decided to go for a quick military operation to destroy Serbia, the Pasic government understood that the outcome of the war would bring great changes, for better or for worse, to the country's position. It decided to supersede the possible resolution through war of the 'Serbian question' by posing the 'Yugoslav question', albeit within the parameter of liberating kith and kin from foreign rule. The Nis Declaration ofDecember 1914 asserted that Serbia was fighting for the liberation and unification of all Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. In late 1915, however, Serbia was struck down by the full weight of a German-Austrian-Bulgarian offensive. Its territory was occupied. Its decimated army rescued by Allied shipping after retreating through Albania. Its exiled government survived on foreign soil. Montenegro was even worse off Negotiations on union had pointed to a German-type arrangement, with King Nicholas's kingdom retaining its identity. The Montenegrin monarch, who had expressed his solidarity in defence of' our Serbian nation', also went into exile, where he was increasingly sidelined, by Montenegrin exiles and by the Serbian government. Neither the Serbian government nor the leaders of the Habsburg Southern Slavs knew what was going to be the outcome of the war. Both sides aimed at ensuring what could be obtained, while keeping contact with and through the exiled South Slav personalities
Serbia, lvlontenegro and Yugoslavia
61
from Austria-Hungary gathered in the Yugoslav Committee who propagated the aim of a Yugoslav state. In total uncertain_ty ab~ut the future, the Serbian government concentrated on umon w1th Montenegro. As one after another of the leading Montenegrins in exile abandoned their king, a one-time prime minister formed a Committee for National Unification with the backing of the Serbian government. . Serbian politicians and members of the Yugoslav Comrmttee realized that it was essential to present a programme of unification at a time when the Allies were seriously thinking of a separate peace with Austria-Hungary. In Corfu in 1917, they issued a declaration which set out the basic principles on which the new state would be founded. It was a compromise that glossed over the differences. Over all the lands on which the Yugoslav nation of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes lived, there would be an independent state known as the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, under the Karadjordjevic dynasty. Its constitution would be drawn up by a constituent assembly elected after peace had been restored, and adopted by a 'qualified majority'. Nobody had anticipated the rapid collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy which started in September 1918. The spontaneous appearance of local autonomous forces compromised Serbia's role as liberator and unifier. A National Council of elected members of various representative bodies set up a State of the Slovenes, <:ro~ts and Serbs over the whole ethnographic territory of that nat1on m Austria-Hungary. The pace of the unification process with Serbia and Montenegro quickened. Various local councils pushed for immediate unification with a Serbian government that had just returned to liberated Belgrade. Token detachments of Serbian troops were asked to appear, to prevent the deterioration of order, or to anticipate the arrival of Italian troops. Meanwhile in liberated Montenegro, the Committee for National Unification took over. Amidst public demonstrations in favour of immediate unification, it organized elections for an assembly to decide on the future of the state. On 26 November, the gathering proclaimed the deposition of King Nicholas and his house, and union with Serbia in a wider fatherland of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The decision satisfied a majority, generally urban, more
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Stevan K. Pavlowitch
educated and young. It left a minority to nurse their wounded pride at the way in which Montenegro's role had been brushed aside. With Italian support, a rebellion was stirred up in the area around the capital which quickly collapsed as the partisans of total union set upon the autonomists. The day before the proclamation of Montenegro's union with Serbia, the National Council in Zagreb had taken the decision to unite the Yugoslav territories of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy with Serbia and Montenegro. A delegation was sent to Belgrade to invite Serbia's regent, Crown Prince Alexander, to proclaim the union and assume the regency of the new state, which he did on 1 December 1918.
In spite of pushes here and there, Serbia had not controlled the process of unification. Pasic wanted to ensure that Serbia retained the advantage of its status in bringing about unification; he was not out to impose Serbia's rule over a united Yugoslavia. The problem was that he, and many others in Serbia, did not really understand the difference between Serbia and Yugoslavia. Pre-war Serbia represented 35 per cent of the territory of Yugoslavia, and Serbs (half of them from the old Kingdom) 39-40 per cent of the population. The Belgrade government was confident that it could control the non-South-Slav minorities, such as Albanians, Germans and Magyars. Macedonians, deemed to be Serbs, would be assimilated, but there was no question of turning other South Slavs into Serbs. All that Serbian politicians wanted, those from Serbia and those from other provinces, was to ensure that all Serbs were gathered in one state, and they realized that this could only be done in a united state of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Serbia had come out of the Great War with huge losses, and great prestige. For many of the survivors, that alone seemed to justifY that its existing state structures should be the heart of the new Yugoslav body. The Constituent Assembly eventually adopted the constitutional draft presented by the government dominated by the two largest, and Serb-based, parties-the Radicals and the Democrats. The essentials of Serbia's 1903 constitution were kept, adapted and updated.
Serbia, Montenegro and Yugoslavia
63
Although voted by a majority of 223 out of the full total of 419 members, the Constitution of 1921 was unacceptable to, or disapproved by, many others, notably the Croat voters massed behind the Croatian Peasant Party. 161 deputies had stayed away. The boycotting Croatian bloc thought ofYugoslavia as an improved South Slav version of Austria-Hungary where Croatia would be Serbia's Hungary, while the government acted as if Yugoslavia was jus: an extended Serbia that took in Croats and Slovenes as well. Cabmets concentrated too much effort on surviving through unstable parliamentary coalitions, allowing the royal prerogative to be pushed well beyond the spirit of the Constitution. Formally monarch since the death ofKing Peter I in 1921, Alexander was an authoritarian. He had had excellent if ill-informed intentions towards the creation of a united state to which non-Serbs could feel as loyal as Serbs. He was still carried by a sincere if nebulous Yugoslavism when in 1929 he invalidated the constitution, and took it upon himself to organize institutions that would better correspond to the country's needs, at a moment when it seemed that parliamentary government had broken down. It was he who officially adopted the designation 'Kingdom of Yugoslavia'. A weary public opinion was initially willing to give King Alexander a chance, but different sections had differing expectations. His 'Yugoslavicizing' dictatorship was quickly perceived by most Croats as a more efficient way of implementing the Serbian style of centralism, if not hegemony. The king granted a new Constitution in 1931 which made him 'guardian of the unity of the nation and of the integrity of the state'. In 1934, he was assassinated by the Ustasas, a fascist-inspired separatist Croatian group, sheltered by Italy and Hungary. Alexander's Constitution survived under the regency of Prince Paul, exercised on behalf of the boy King Peter II. The ideology of one-nation Yugoslavism was tacitly abandoned. As the 1930s proceeded, the Serbian-based opposition parties and the Croatian Peasant Party came together to work out a transition to a new constitutional structure which would satisfY a majority within each of the three acknowledged national communities. The process was derailed by Prince Paul's determination to settle quickly with the Croats and formally within the Constitution of 1931. The
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Stevan K. Pavlowitch
'Agreement', as It Is generally referred to, reached between the regency and the Croatian Peasant Party leader Macek in 1939 set up a self-governing Province of Croatia within Yugoslavia, over Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia and additional districts from Bosnia and Hezegovina. It put an end to the united opposition. Serbian opinion felt frustrated. It had generally considered that the 'Serbian question'-that of their community's integration-had been solved by the mere fact that all Serbs were in Yugoslavia. There no longer was a Serbia, and it was no longer even clear in people's minds what Serbia was, geographically or historically. Montenegrins felt that they were Serbs even when they were dissatisfied with the complete loss of their separate political identity. Notwithstanding the Comintern's view of satisfied and hegemonic Serbs lording over Yugoslavia, there were dissatisfied Serbs by the late 1930s, and most of them were not Communists. Founded in 193 7 as a think tank to work for the integration of Serbian culture within Yugoslavia, the Serbian Cultural Club became the centre of opposition to the Agreement, a pressure group to define and defend Serbian interests in Yugoslavia, and the most vocal expression of the Serbian intelligentsia's loss of faith in pan-Yugoslav nationalism. The Comintern was right to the extent that Serbs had on the whole been satisfied with the general framework of the Yugoslav state. There had been no Serbian national or majority party, or mdeed any explicitly 'Serbian' political party. Divided into regions and parties, far from seeing themselves as a domineering element, they had rather fancied themselves to be the ultimate defenders of Yugoslavia, for which they had given up their identity When Hitler decided in 1941 to destroy the 'Versailles construct', Yugoslavia collapsed and was partitioned. King and government left for exile in London. The Serbs were singled out as the defeated enemy to be punished collectively. The Ustasas were allowed to proclaim their Independent State of Croatia over a territory that stretched across Bosnia and Herzegovina to the gates of Belgrade. They launched massive operations of ethnic cleansing to eradicate the 1. 9 million Serbs of their Croatian state. Not surprisingly, there were Serbs who turned against what they saw as the mistaken experiment that Yugoslavia had been.
Serbia, Montenegro and Yugoslavia
65
Paradoxically, it was pro-German collaborators who expressed the most extreme pan-Serbian vision. Resistance was on the whole Serb-based. General Mihailovic, elevated by the government in exile as head of the Yugoslav resistance, was a loyal officer who stressed the legitimist Yugoslav nature ofhis movement, which was in fact almost entirely Serbian, based in Serbia, with little or no attraction to non-Serbs. The Communist Party leader Tito, on the other hand, was a genuine internationalist. Both Mihailovic and Tito eventually wanted to restore Yugoslavia as a federation, but the Communists set up their programme on totally new foundations. They too were a Serb-based movement, but based on Serbs outside Serbia, and they were able to attract non-Serbs.
The outcome of the Second World War led again to a united Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Communist leaders had followed the twists and turns of the Co min tern, and endorsed a federation on the principle of nationality under centralized Party control. They had denounced 'greater-Serbian hegemony'. They did not want a Serbia that dwarfed the other federated units. Satisfaction had to be given to those who felt dominated or humiliated by Serbia. At the same time, they utilized a structure to acquire and hold on to power that was largely manned by the Serbs of Croatia and Bosnia. The Constitution of 1946 enshrined Yugoslavia's new structure as 'a community of nations equal in rights who, on the basis of the right of self-determination, including the right of secession, have expressed their will to live together in a federative state'. Montenegro recovered its historical identity, thus going against the age-old tendency for unification with Serbia. Its inhabitants were henceforth encouraged to think of themselves as Montenegrins. By the time of the first post-war census in 1948, when the rubric 'nationality' was introduced, 426,000 defined themselves as Montenegrins (of whom 342,000 in Montenegro). The Communists of Montenegro had won a particularly bitter civil war in their home territory. They had also contributed substantially to winning the multifaceted civil war throughout Yugoslavia. The status of republic was thus also a reward. Every republic and city ended up by having a town whose name was preceded by the predicate 'Tito's' (the Titoist Yugoslav counterpart to the English Regis), to mark some
~I, , ' . II
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Stevan K. Pavlowitch
Serbia, Montenegro and Yugoslavia
association with the leader; in Montenegro's case the very capital city of the republic was renamed Titograd. Macedonia was set up a separate republic for the Macedonian nation, ending the Serbian fiction of 'Southern Serbia' for the benefit of more ambitious Balkan plans. Two autonomous provinces were carved out of the Republic of Serbia, in border areas with mixed Yugoslav and non-Yugoslav populations-Vojvodina where Serbs were now in a majority, and Kosovo where Albanians were in a majority.
outside their respective republics. Communists and former Communists who had sacrificed their Serbian identity for the sake of socialist Yugoslavia, saw the regime's capitulation to particularist aspirations as a negation of the ideal they had fought for. Having once embraced Yugoslavism as a solution to the Serbian national question, they began confusedly to disentangle their Serbianism from their Y ugoslavism. The Serbian malaise was increased by the Constitution of 197 4. Yugoslavia was turned into an eight-unit confederation of partystates, with the provinces equal to the republics in all but name. Tito and the army were left as the ultimate guardians of the union. With Yugoslavia reduced to an ideological construct, whose contents had all but evaporated, Serbian nationalism began to resemble an opposition to the regime, as Croatian nationalism had done before the Second World War. Serbia's position was illogical in that its autonomous provinces could veto decisions at the level of the republic of which they were formally part, but that the republican authority in Belgrade could not do the same for Kosovo and Vojvodina. Serbia had effectively been reduced to 'inner Serbia'. The proposals put forward by Serbia's leadership after Tito's death in 1980, initially meant to avoid selective or incorrect interpretations of the Constitution, met with hostility from those who argued that they were a deviation from 'Tito's path'. They were also not in tune with a political discourse in Serbia itself that was turning to the nation rather than to the republic as the real political factor. Tendencies began to pull in opposite directions, as Serbia at one end tried to tighten up the federation again, and Slovenia at the other tried to loosen it even further. Serbia's leaders used the explosion of ethnic Albanian feeling in Kosovo in 1981 to bolster the need for changes in the constitutional relations between the republic and its provinces. They argued that a weak Serbia fuelled its nationalism, which was no good for Yugoslavia. A link had been established between Kosovo and Serbia's status. The problem of relations between the decreasing Serbian minority in the province, and its increasing Albanian majority turned into that of relations between Serbs and all the other nationalities. By 1985 there was a widespread sense in Yugoslavia that Communism had failed. Belgrade had benefited from the latitude accorded
The position of Serbs in the Communist federation was a complex one. The Bosnian Serbs had formed the core ofTito's partisan army. With the Serbs of Croatia and the partisans of Montenegro, they provided much of the executive and military personnel of the regime. Serbs made up over half the Party membership in the 19 50s (over 60 per cent if Montenegrins are included). At the same time Serbia felt in part conquered and occupied by western Serbs and Montenegrins who had come to Belgrade to man the administration, the army and the police. Serbia was the only republic to have autonomous provinces within its territory. Tito did not forget that his strongest opponents had been the somewhat disorganized, yet also anti-fascist, movement that looked up to Mihailovic and the pre-war political parties. When decentralization started to become more of a reality from ~he late 1950s, it was felt in Serbia that everything which expressed Its pnde and tradition had been clipped back, in order to satisfY others, but the republican apparatus was too close to the central power nucleus on which it modelled itself to provide real leadership. The only way that the leadership dealt with the problem of relations between nationalities was to draw more ideology out of Yugoslavia's peculiar position as a Communist country wedged between rival blocs. As co~tinued devolution encouraged association of nationality With terntory, there emerged a strand in Serbia's intellectual dissidence that began to criticize the Communist solution to the national question. Some of Serbia's Communists, worried that the unity of the Yugoslav working class was being undermined by bureaucratic republican nationalism, found common ground with those who feared increasing discrimination against Serbs and Montenegrins
67
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68
Stevan K. Pavlowitch
to non-conforming intellectuals by Serbia's leadership in search of a broader-~a~ed legitimacy. They were the vanguard of a panYugoslav civil rights movement, and they put forward political demands that amounted to a radical critique of the Communist system .. Fu_sing democracy and nationalism, they moved from protectmg mdividual human rights to lamenting the fate of their nation. . When Milosevic in 1987 began to assume control of Serbia's rulmg Party, he moved adroitly to the nationalist side. He defended the interests of s_e:bia, allowed an unprecedented degree of liberalizatiOn of Serbia s cultural scene, and most of the one-time critical intelligentsia put democracy on hold. MiloseviC's seduction of the intellectuals was o?e of his many ways oflegitimizing his authority. . He had somethmg to offer to most people. He had his supporters m Montenegro. Many of Serbia's Communists had come from there or, like Milosevic himself, been born in Serbia of Montenegro-bor~ parents. Elsewhere, leaders rather liked him, or did not seem to mind as he completed his assumption of control over Serbia. Having absorbed most o~ the opposition potential there, he spoke of the need to re-centralize authority, first in Serbia, then in the federation. In 1988 mass rallies organized through the Party apparatus laid the groundwork for replacing the faceless leaderships of the provinces and of the sister republic of Montenegro. . Milosevic's ambition to appear as a new Tito, not only in Serbia but m the whole ofYugoslavia, was impossible under existing arrangemen:s._ He needed a radical overhaul, which he attempted to do by obtamm? half the necessary votes in the federal presidency, then an extra~rdma~ Party congress. Through his control of the Party machmery m the whole of Serbia and in Montenegro, and with help from elsewhere, he could count on a sizeable majority at the Fou~teenth Congress that assembled in Belgrade in January 1990. His plans seemed to be working at the congress, until the Slovenes walked out, and the Croats obtained an adjournment. Thereafter y-ugoslavia disintegrated as the first competitive elections were held m all the republics. The threat of dissolution posed the question of Serbs outside Serbia. What rights to self-determination the constitution ack~owledged was vested in nations and not in republics. The possibility of secession by republics gave Serbian nationalists a basis for the claim to redraw borders. Milosevic's renamed Socialist
Serbia, Montenegro and Yugoslavia
69
(ex-Communist) Party of Serbia obtained a majority of seats on_ a minority of votes when multiparty elections were at last held_ m which Scrb ia , but not before a new constitution had been adopted . d drastically reduced the authority delegated to the provmces, an Kosovo's institutions had been suspended. Milosevic talked of Yugoslavia at the same time as he asserted 'Serbia's right to statehood' (the reunification of the provinces). The implication was that, if Yugoslavia c~uld _not be turned back to what it had been under Tito in earher times, he would fashiOn another one, perhaps one shorn of those who did not want to remain in it, but one that would continue to encompas~ all Ser~s. Other nationalisms had preceded the Serbian reactiOn, which, when it came, was destructive because it was not contained withi_n one republic, and because it was hysterical. In defending Yugoslavia as they saw it-the only state in which all Serbs wer~ gathered-~he leadership of Serbia under Milosevic and Serbian natiOnalists throughout Yugoslavia in fact gave the final blow to that st~te. Milosevic really wanted to exert power over as much tern_tory as he could-initially the whole of Yugoslavia, then as much of It as he could salvage. Eventually he could only create a new state with t~e two remaining republics. Montenegro had vote~ ~lmost unan_Imously to continue to live as a sovereign republic m Yug?slavia, equal to all the other republics who wished to do so. The Idea of unity between Serbia and Montenegro had run parallel to the broader Yugoslav idea, and the two states had actually umted a few days before the fuller unification with the. J-;Iabsburg South Slav territories. MiloseviC's new 'rump Yugoslavia was called the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, dropping the adjective 'sociali~t'.. . Montenegro had seen an increasingly bitter struggle Withm Its ruling party. By mid-1997, Milosevic's he~chmen t~ere, President Bulatovic and his prime minister Djukanovic, had spht over control of Party structures and sources of patronage. Whe~ they both stood for president, Djukanovic, who had acqmred the Image of a modernizer, just about managed to win on a second ballot. Th~ smaller republic thereafter was no longer co~sid~red a, mere _adJunct. to Milosevic's Serbia. It declared Its neutrality m the Atlantico-Serbian war' over Kosovo, and demanded a re-negotiation of the federation, if not outright separation, but it was dangerously divided 50-50.
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~inally, when in July 2000 Milosevic amended the federal constituti?n to ena~le the president and the upper house to be chosen b direct electiOns, Montenegro refused to recognize the changes an~ boycotted t_he September elections that finally toppled Milos;vic. Yugoslavia,_ South Slavia, was never the state of all of the Southern Slavs, for It n_ever encompassed the Bulgars. It now only has the Serbs ofSerbu ~mcluding some 800,000 refugees from elsewhere), the Montenegnns (are they still Serbs? are they still even Yugoslavs?) and the _mino~ities. Kosovo, although still formally under Yugoslav sov_ereignty, IS m fact under an international protectorate and occupatiOn, as much under Yugoslav sovereignty as BosniaHerze~ovma or Cyp:us remained Ottoman while they were ruled r~spectively by Austna-Hungary and Great Britain. After the secessiOn of all o_fYugoslavia's republics but two, and after four Yugoslav wars, what Is to become of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the rump of what was once the fuller Yugoslavia?
THE CROATS AND YUGOSLAVISM 1 Tihomir Cipek This chapter attempts to illustrate the ideology of Croatian political elites and their relation to the concept ofYugoslavism. I begin by looking at the construction of the Croat national identity, which went parallel with the development of the Yugoslav idea. The Croatian variant of Yugoslavism envisaged the fulfilment of Croats' quests for statehood within a wider South Slav framework. On the other hand, the ideology of the Croat Party of Right rejected any notion ofYugoslavia. I also look at the role of the Croats in the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918, as well as at the political system in the interwar Yugoslav state. I argue that the Croat experience in the first Yugoslavia influenced decisively Croats' perceptions of the common South Slav state. The fact that the political will was expressed at relatively free and democratic elections enables us to take a more reliable look at Croatian perceptions ofYugoslavia in the interwar period. In the final section of this chapter, I look at the Croat experience in Yugoslavia after the Second World War. Socialist Yugoslavia was a federation in which the Croats had their own federal unit, the Socialist Republic of Croatia. Since the post-1945 system did not allow an expression of political will at elections, it is more difficult to define Croat perceptions of second Yugoslavia. However, an attempt is made to trace main developments relating to history of Croatia within Yugoslavia during the period 1945-91. 1
This work was written while I was a visiting Humboldt scholar at Goettingen University (Germany). My deepest thanks therefore go to the Humboldt Foundation and Goettingen University for providing me with such a stimulating academic environment.
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The Yugoslav idea was initially developed by a group of Croat intellectuals in the 1830s. The Illyrians, as they were commonly known, used popular myths and legends in order to construct Croatian history, which they saw as an integral part of a wider South Slav history. They argued that Croats and Serbs (and sometimes also Slovenes and even Bulgarians) were in fact one, Illyrian nation. The word 'Illyrian' was used as a neutral term and was eventually replaced by another, more appropriate one: Yugoslav (South Slav). The Illynan movement was initially primarily a cultural movement, but eventually it grew into a political party. It had two dimensions: Croatiansm-integration of all Croatian provinces, divided within the Habsburg Empire-and Yugoslavism-gathering of all South ~lavs into o?e commonwealth, inside or outside the Empire. Both Ideas were msp1r~d ~y the need for unity in face of the growing threat of Magyanzatwn and Germanization. By 1948 the Illyrian movement achieved its first goal, i.e. the integration of the Croatian national identity, but it failed in its second, wider aim. One of the reasons for the failure was that it met with little response among non-C~oats,_ both Serbs and Slovenes, but also because for a Yugoslav umficatwn to be realised, both the Austrian and Ottoman Empires had to collapse first. Yugosla:rism as a political concept was developed in the 1860s by two Croatian <:;=a_tholic priests:Josip Juraj Strossmayer (1815-1905) and FranJO Rack1 (1828-94). Their Yugoslavism reflected the desire of the majority of the Croatian political elite to unite Croatian provinces within the Habsburg monarchy. It was also a consequence of ~he fear of the German Drang nach Osten. Strossmayer and Racki believed that Croats can only resist the Germanization, as well as Magyarization, if they united with other South Slav peoples, particularly the Serbs. Just like the Illyrianism, the ideology of Strossmayer and Racki's Yugoslavism was based on cultural and linguistic unity of Croats and Serbs. The Yugoslavists were also 'encouraged' by Herder's well known assertion that the Slavs were a 'nation of the future' whose mission would be to 'regenerate' the western world. Ra~ki the principal Yugoslav ideologist, believed in creating a unified education system which would develop a uniform national language, 'essenti~l for a spiritual bond' between the South Slavs. This 'spiritual bond between the Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, and Bulgarians was to
The Croats and Yugoslavism
73
be achieved by uniting their individual traditions, while respecting their particularities. The Serbo-Croat unity was to be at the heart of a future Yugoslavia. Racki based his theory on the thesis that the Serbs and Croats were, originally, one nation with two names, separated by different histories, state traditions and cultures. Yugoslavism, therefore, essentially aimed to integrate several identities into a new, single one. However, the Croatian 'Triune Kingdom' first needed to be united itself, and gain autonomy within the Habsburg Monarchy. Croatia would then gather all other South Slavs within the Monarchy. In the next stage, Croatia would join Serbia and other South Slavs in a (con)federative union. Strossmayer and Racki also hoped that the Yugoslav union would bring about a religious unification between the Catholic and Orthodox Church. They believed that there was no salvation of the humanity without the unification of all Christians. They hoped their Yugoslavist plans would be acceptable for Serbia as well, but that was not the case. The Serbian principality, which had by 1878 achieved full independence from the Ottoman Empire, had as its main priority the unification with other Serbs, still living under foreign rule. Strossmayer and Racki's Yugoslavist ideas, politically implemented by the People's Party (the new name for the old Illyrian Party), were accepted by the educated population and the clergy, but fell on deaf ears among the majority peasant population and a small bourgeoisie. Ante Starcevic and Eugen Kvaternik, leaders of the Croatian Party of [State] Right, strongly opposed Yugoslavism, favouring instead the idea of an independent Croatia. In their opinion, the Croats were the only 'political' nation on the territory of 'Greater Croatia', which would incorporate territories populated by Serbs and Slovenes, as well as the old Croatian Kingdom. Yet, the Yugoslav idea survived among Croats, and gradually became more accepted by Serbs, especially those living alongside Croats in the Habsburg Empire. The Croat-Serb Coalition won the elections for the Sabor in 1906 and remained the main political force until the Yugoslav unification in 1918.
Debates about the unification demonstrated that there existed significant differences between Serbs and Croats in understanding of
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Tihomir Cipek
the term Yugoslavism. Most Serbs favoured a centralist and unitarist government, while most Croats envisaged a (con)federation. Advocates of the Croatian variant of Yugoslavism had hoped that the political union would propel Croatia's economic and cultural development, and gradually, Croatia's political development, too. The Corfu Declaration ofJuly 1917, signed between the Yugoslav Committee (the representatives of pro-Yugoslav emigres from Austria-Hungary) and the government of the Kingdom of Serbia, was meant to ensure that all key decisions would be decided by the majority vote in a future constituent assembly. Croatian members of the Yugoslav Committee, led by Ante Trumbic, considered the Corfu Declaration the guarantee for a consensus about the government system. They could not have known that after the unification in December 1918, the Serbian political elite would ignore the Declaration, bribe some non-Serbs, and in 1921 enact a highly centralizing Constitution by only a relative majority. There were Croats who opposed the way the unification was carried out. Stjepan Radic, leader of the then still small Croatian People's Peasant Party viewed Yugoslavism as a harmony of separate national interests of Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, and Bulgarians. He believed that Croatia should enter the union only as a separate subject. Radic questioned the popular legitimacy of the members of the pro-unificationist Croatian elite. He called for a referendum so that 'ordinary' people could decide whether they wanted a union or not, and if yes, what kind of a union. Yet, Radic stayed in minority. Most Croat leaders wanted the unification with Serbia to take place as soon as possible, mainly because of the fear ofltaly's ambitions in Dalmatia and also because of the fear of social upheavals. They considered the union to be a Croatian national interest, especially as otherwise there was the danger of parts of Croatia joining in a Greater Serbia, and other parts going to Italy. The Croat leaders, however, saw the future union as a federation. Unfortunately, their ideas were not shared by the Serbian political elite, which, as already indicated, preferred a centralist and Serb-dominated state. By entering the new Yugoslav state, Croatia had lost all the state elements and symbols it had preserved for centuries while part of Austria-Hungary.
75
The leading role in the political life of the new state was taken by Prince Regent, later King, Alexander Karadjordjevic. He regarded the new state as essentially an expanded Serbia, not a union of equal components. He was given great powers by the Constitution, but in practice his powers were even greater. Every political party, esp~ cially the Serbian ones, had factions loyal to the Kmg, and he practically formed and dismissed governments. He also had a complete control over the army, gendarmerie, and the secret police. The main obstacle to creating a stable political system during the interwar period was the 'Croatian question'. Centralism and negation of Croats' national particularities provoked resistance of Cro2 atian public and the majority of Croatian elite. With the purpose of finding a solution to the Croatian national question, a number of political options were formed among the Croats during the formative period of the new Kingdom.
Federalist-minded Yugoslav unitarists. Croatian members of the CroatSerb Coalition and liberal intellectuals, who believed that the Yugoslav nation can be formed gradually, but only in a federation, which would allow 'tribal' differences. They played a major role in the unification process. They had gathered around the Croatian Union, a newly formed political party descending from the pro-Yugoslav wing of Starcevic' Party of Rights. . . The Croatian Union stood for liberal ideas, including Yugoslav1sm. However, disappointed by the King's policies, they eventually joined the opposition led by Stjepan Radic. They were_ part of the ~ro atian elite that accepted the political and econormc aspects ofhberalism. They emphasized individual interest and principally believed in the free market. However, it turned out that the idea of free market and liberal values did not bring them many votes. The Croat voters turned the Croatian Union into a minor party by overwhelmingly rejecting its ideas. Confederalists. They recognized the national particularities within the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, favoured Croatia's 2
See lvo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics, Ithaca, NY, and London, 1984.
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The Croats and Yugoslavism
independence, but approved of the union with other South Slavs. They gathered around the Croatian Republican Peasant Party (HRSS; later HSS), led by the charismatic Stjepan Radic. The HSS political program included both national and social issues, and it was by far the strongest Croatian interwar party. During the period, it grew into a national movement. The HSS ideology favoured a 'third way', a political system that was between capitalism and socialism. It was the so-called 'agrarianism'. Radic worshiped the peasantry as the supreme class. His party desired a confederative union between the South Slavs, whereby Croatia would play a prominent role. Following a brief spell in the government (1925-7), Radic joined forces with Svetozar Pribicevic, leader of the Serbs from the former Habsburg territories, to form the opposition Peasant-Democratic Coalition-in fact a united Serbo-Croat opposition bloc. His career and life came to a tragic end in the summer of 1928, when he was shot, together with another three HSS deputies, in the Belgrade parliament by a member of the [Serb] National Radical Party.
Following the Moscow anti-Versailles line, the Yugoslav Communists called for the dissolution of Yugoslavia soon after its unification, and for the establishment of a number of Soviet Socialist Republics on its territory. After they carried out the assassination of the Interior Minister, the Communists were banned in 1921, and almost disappeared by the mid-192()s. Only in the late 1930s will they be reorganised, under the leadership ofjosip Broz Tito, but by 3 this time their line would be once again pro-Yugoslav.
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Uncompromising Croatian nationalists-the Frankists. The Frankists favoured Croatia's independence outside the Yugoslav Kingdom They descended from the anti-Yugoslav wing ofStarceviC's old party, and were before the war led by Josip Frank (hence Frankists). Ante Pavelic, a leading Frankist, later formed the Ustasa organisation and was the leader of the Independent State of Croatia (1941-5). The True Right Party strayed from StarceviC's ideas ever since Josip Frank came to its head, and then turned to the corporative ideology of the Karl Lueger's Social Christians. However, the Frankists largely ignored Social Christian principles, turning instead to extreme nationalism. While loyalist to the Habsburg monarchy, after 1918 they called for Croatia's right to independence and breaking off all relations with the Belgrade regime. Lack of social program and _an extreme nationalist rhetoric did not bring them much populanty among the Croats, and the Frankists remained a rather marginal party. Along with these parties there was also the Communist Party. Initially, the Communists favoured the unification along the lines of centralism and unitarism, but soon began to argue for the recognition of national differences and federalization of the country.
The parliamentary system came to an end in January 1929, when King Alexander dissolved the parliament and banned all political parties. His measures were apparently designed to bring stability to the country following the crisis which culminated with RadiC's murder, but instead the royal dictatorship further radicalized the Croatian opinion. The Frankists, who up until 1929 participated in political life, went into exile and turned to terrorism. They found 'Ustasa-the Croatian Revolutionary Organisation', led by Ante Pavelic. The Ustasas argued that the violence of the regime must be met with violence, since the parliamentary opposition proved inefficient. The Ustasa organisation modelled itself on the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and cooperated with the Internal Macedanian Revolutionary Organisation (VMRO). The Ustasas blamed the regime for the assasination of Radic, whom they described as the 'Croatian Gandhi'. They argued that the murder ofRadic demonstrated the fallacy of a peaceful resistance, and that it was time to reach for weapons. They seemed to had forgotten that Radic had them thrown out of the opposition coalition back in 1922 for their radical nationalism. The Ustasa ideology, influenced by the Italian fascism and German Nazism, was based on anti-Serbianism, anti4 Communism, anti-Semitism and anti-Masonry. Before Germany and Italy brought them to power, the Ustasas did not have much popular support inside Croatia. Throughout the 1930s they organised several terrorist actions, but apart from the assassination of King Alexander in 1934, Ustasa activities did not 3
See Gordana VlajCic,]ugoslavenska revolucija i nacionalno pitanje 1919-1927, Zagreb,
4
1984. Bogdan Krizman, Pavelic i ustase, Zagreb, 1978, p. 118.
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pose serious threat to the Yugoslav interwar state. However the overall disappointment with the Yugoslav experience made ~an Croats welcome an independent Croatia. Even the creation of a~ autonomous Croatia in August 1939, which was negotiated between Vladko Macek, Radic's successor as the HSS leader, and the Yugoslav government and the Crown, could not immediately erase memones of years of Croat disatisfaction with Yugoslavia. The 1939 A~eement w_as perhaps the first step towards solving the Yugoslav natwnal questwn. Many Serbs, but also Slovenes and Bosnia's Muslims dem~nded their own banovinas. The federalisation of y ugoslavu, which seemed inevitable after 1939, was interrupted by the Second World War.
'legitimacy' of the new system was based on the fact that freedom was replaced by security. The Communists abolished private ownership and other liberal freedoms, but provided 'safety' in return. People were not obliged to take personal responsibilities. The state, or the Communist Party, was to take care of everything. 5 Post-1945 Yugoslavia was a federation of six republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. However, the country was a strongly centralized, one-party state. All decisions were made by Tito and his Party leadership, based in the state capital, Belgrade. A new type of community was being created-the Communist community of 'new people'. The slogan 'brotherhood and unity' was most convenient for this purpose. The 'brotherhood' referred to the community of nations living in the socialist Yugoslavia. It certainly encouraged tolerance between the peoples. The 'unity' referred to the unity of the working class. The country's unity was to be ensured by the Communist Party. Furthermore, the Communists used the slogan 'Factories to the workers, land to the peasants', thus appealing to egalitarian ideas already rooted in people's minds. The Communist centralism suited the Serbs, who believed it was the best way of protecting their own interests. The state unitarism prompted the resistance of the majority among the Croatian cultural elite. Croatian-minded intellectuals opposed the Novi Sad Agreement of 1954, whereby Serb and Croat linguists re-confirmed that Croatian and Serbian was a single language, called SerboCroatian or Croato-Serbian. The language had two variants, Serbian and Croatian, and both were declared equal. But in the central state institutions the Serbian variant was more frequently used, so the Serbian seemed to have been 'more equal'. Those who opposed the cultural unitarism, decided to speak in public. The Matica Hrvatska and the Croatian Society of Authors, two respectable institutions headed by leading Croat intellectuals, issued in 1967 a 'Declaration on the Name and Importance of the Croatian Standard Language'. The Declaration was supported by sixteen academic and cultural institutions in Croatia. It claimed that the Croatian language was
In April 1941 Yugoslavia was occupied and partitioned between Germany, Italy and their allies from within and outside the country. Croatia, expanded to include whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina and parts ofVojvodina, was proclaimed an independent state under the government of Ante PaveliC's Ustasas. Many Croats, however, soon turned against the new regime, which committed mass crimes against the Serbs,Jews, Roma, and left-wing Croats. The m~ority, however, offered only a passive resistance, including Macek. The HSS leader spent the war in house arrest (and was even sent briefly to the Jasenovac concentration camp). With the HSS virtually neutralised, an~ the Ustasas increasingly unpopular, Croats came to support the resi~tance move~ent organized by the Communist Party ofYugoslavia and led by Its General Secretary,Josip Broz Tito. . The Communist victory resulted in liberation of Yugoslavia and ~ts re-establishment in 1945. Croatia, now including formerly ItalIan parts ?f Dalmatia and Is tria, became a socialist republic of the Commumst-governed Yugoslav federation. Since many Croats took pa~t m the Communist resistance movement, the new political union enJoyed a far greater legitimacy among them than the Karadjordjevic monarchy. Surviving Ustasas, including Pavelic, who found refuge abroad, as well as members of their families who remained in the country, opposed T ito's regime, but they never posed a serious threat to the country's unity. _It seer_ned as if the Communists had found a recipe for dealing With natiOnal disputes and for creating social equality. However, the
5
79
Ivan Prpic, 'Kriza legitimnosti komunistickih poredaka', Politii:ka misao (Zagreb), vol. XXVIII, no. 3, 1991,pp. 153-69.
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placed in an unequal position because the government apparatus used Serbian as the 'language of the state'. They demanded 'respect' of the Croatian language, and equality ofJour standard languages: Croatian, Serbian, Slovene, and Macedonian. 6 The line between culture and politics in the former Yugoslavia was a very thin one. The Declaration talked of the Croatian sovereignty achieved in the Second World War and of 'inalienable right of every people to name their language after themselves.' The Declaration was denounced by the Communist Party, but its ideas were accepted by most Croats. The protest against cultural unitarism coincied with the Croatian Communist leadership's calls for reforms within the federation. The Croat reform-minded Communists argued for the introduction of some elements of marketoriented economy, and for more freedom in public life in general. After the break-up of the conservative centralist faction in the Communist Party, led by Aleksandar Rankovic, in the mid-1960s, there was a general tendency for reforms throughout Yugoslavia. Major opponents of reforms were centralist hardliners in the federal government, but also some members the League of Communists of Croatia (SKH). The centralists and anti-reformists accused the reformers of nationalism and separatism. At its 1Oth Session in 1970, the Central Committee of the SKH (CK SKH), stated that unitarist and centralist forces were the main obstacle to the reforms, but that the CK SKH would continue to carry them out regardless. The conclusions made at the Session received support of the Croatian public, but encouraged the dogmatics to attack again. Tito initially sided with the reformists, appointing a Constitutional commission to reform the federation. The Commission, presided over by Edvard Kardelj, suggested that the federation should be in charge of foreign affairs, common defense and market, while preserving unity of the political system. The sovereignty was to be transferred to the republics, which were styled as 'states', while Serbia's provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo were to gain much greater autonomy. The proposal for the parity-representation of the republics in the federal institutions (the assembly, federal government, presidency) was welcomed by the Croatian Communists and by 6
Dusan Bilandzic, Hrvatska moderna povijest, Zagreb, 1999, p. 516.
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Croatian public in general. They believed that it satisfied Croatia's ambitions for a greater autonomy within the federation. After all, that was the essence of the Croats' Yugoslavism. In the late 1960s and early 1970s the Croats' national enthusiasm had grown, and the Croat public now expected Croatia's position within the federation to change to its advantage. The debate brought out into light the old ideological divisions within the Croatian elite. Radical nationalists and Ustasa nostalgists, talked about Croatian historic rights, but were still in a small minority. Majority of Croats supported a looser Yugoslav federation, and a 'softer' variant of socialism. The opposition to the party-because it could not exist outside the party-was formed within it. The non-party opposition which favoured liberal and democratic values was completely marginalized. The 'Mass movement' (Maspok), initiated by the CK SKH and 2'v!atica Hrvatska, and also known as the 'Croatian Spring', was supported by students, too. Student leaders wanted everything, and they wanted it right now. Their most radical demand was an independent Croatia, outside of Yugoslavia. Students' actions and demands gave Tito a good excuse to dismis the Croat Party 'liberal' leadership, led by Savka Dabcevic-Kuear and Miko Tripalo, and to take reprisals against student leaders and intellectuals in the Matica
Hrvatska. Tito and a number of party officials loyal to him initially supported reforms, but when they realized these posed a threat to their power and to the government system, decided against them. To make things even more absurd, after carrying out purges in all six republics, the Yugoslav Communist leadership returned to the reformist line. The result was a new Constitution of February 197 4. The Constitution made Yugoslavia a de facto confederation. The republics were described as states which had volutarily entered the union, while the two Serbian provinces became virtually equal to the republics. The new Constitution and a relatively high standard of living reduced tensions in Croatia, although there were still some who saw Yugoslavia as the 'Croatian people's prison'. However, it were now the Serbs who began to question their position within the common
Tihomir Cipek
The Croats and Yugoslavism
state. They argued that the 197 4 Constitution fragmented Serbia because the provinces of V ojvodina and Kosovo de facto became republics within a republic. Already in the late 1970s the Serbian Communists argued for the revision of the Constitution. Leaderships of the two provinces resisted these attempts. The conflict was temporarily halted by Tito, who disapproved of any changes to the Constitution. But after Tito's death in 1980, the conflict erupted again, this time in a more violent form. In the 1980s Yugoslavia was struck by its most serious crisis thus far. Serbian nationalist intellectuals, who in the mid-1980s drew a Memorandum (of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences), heavily criticised Communist Yugoslavia, accusing it of anti-Serbian bias. They blamed the Communists of conspiring with the Vatican to break-up Serbia and Yugoslavia. They wished Yugoslavia to be re-centralised, and possibly to be once again dominated by Serbs. The Kosovo Albanian nationalism, which demanded the status of a republic for Kosovo and thus its separation from Serbia, (more radical Albanians wanted Kosovo to leave Yugoslavia altogether and join Albania) fuelled Serbian nationalism. A state of emergency was declared in Kosovo in 1981 and the Albanian movement neutralised, but only for the time being. The Yugoslav system's identity crisis was enhanced by an economic crisis. Yugoslavia's foreign debt rose to US$ 20 billion in 1980, while inflation reached 45 per cent in 1981. Short supplies of many products increased the country's inability to pay for necessary imports, above all oil, technical equipment and raw-materials. There was a shortage of consumer goods, such as coffee, sugar, cooking oil, washing detergents, and there were electricity cuts. To save on petrol, the government ordered that private cars could only be driven every other day. The government introduced the so-called 'stabilization programme', which brought in long ques, but no ultimate answer to the crisis-Yugoslavia's ailing economy could not be easily revitalised. In the midst of this overall crisis, Slobodan Milosevic came to power in Serbia. He used the Greater-Serbian propaganda, under the cover ofYugoslavism, and manipulatively won the support of a majority of Serbs accross Yugoslavia. The more the Serbian public favoured a return to centralism, the more the Croats turned to the
idea of an independent Croatia. The political elites and the peoples of Slovenia and Croatia stood against MiloseviC's policies of centralism and Serb domination. The Croats, whose Y ugoslavism based on equality clearly failed, gradually turned to complete independence from Yugoslavia and integration into Western European institutions.
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Slovenia's Yugoslav Century
SLOVENIA'S YUGOSLAV CENTURY Mitja Velikonja 'If they did not know yet, they should now realize that we are not only Slovenes, still less only Austrians, but a limb of a great family living from the Julian Alps to the Aegean.' (Ivan Cankar, 1913)
The modern Slovenian identity cannot be understood without an analysis of Slovenia's 'Yugoslav century'. Slovenes, together with Serbs and Croats, the three 'tribes' of one, Yugoslav nation, formed the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (in 1929 renamed Yugoslavia) after the First World War. In the aftermath of the Cold War, as Yugoslavia was disintegrating, the Slovenes emerged as a separate nation, with their own state. In this chapter I trace this evolution, but first I provide a historical background to the development of the Slovene national ideology before the creation of Yugoslavia in 1918.
Slovenes' national ideologies bifore 1918 The first Slovene national programme, the so-called 'United Slovenia', inspired by the events of 1848, called for a political and administrative unification of all Slovene lands within the Habsburg Empire and for the right of public use of Slovene language in schools and administration. During the next few decades, as a reaction to the threat of Germanization, the idea of collaboration and even political unification of South Slavs living under Habsburgs-Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs-slowly began to emerge among the Slovene intellectual elite. The Illyrian idea-an idea of South Slav ethnic and lingustic unity-had reached the Slovene lands in the 1830s, soon after it was 84
85
first formulated by a group of Croat intellectuals led by Ljudevit Gaj. Because Illyrianism denied a separate Slovene (as well as any other South Slav) identity, it was accepted only by a small number of Slovene intellectuals, such as Stanko Vraz and Matija MajarZiljski, but was rejected by many others, including the greatest Slovene poet France Prderen. Ideas of complete cultural and linguistic unification of South Slavs reappeared in the late nineteenth century in the form of neo-Illyrianism. According to some intellectuals-for instance, the theologian Ales USenicnik, Liberal Fran Ilesic and Social-Democrat Etbin Kristan-the Slovenes should, during the process of political and national unification with other South Slavs, adopt the Serbo-Croat language. The Slovene neoIllyrianists believed that linguistic and cultural unification was inseparable from political unification. But this view was opposed by other leading Slovene intellectuals, including Henrik Tuma, Ivan Cankar and Bishop Anton BonaventuraJeglic, who advocated a political unification with Serbs and Croats which would preserve separate Slovene language and culture. Faced with a harsh choice ofbecoming 'either Russians or Prussians'1, the Slovenes turned to the idea of Austro-Slavism. All three Slovene political groupings-the Clericals (full name: the Slovene People's Party-SLS), Liberals and Social-Democrats, saw Slovenia politically and/ or culturally united with other South Slavs within the borders of a reformed Habsburg Monarchy. 2 Advocates of political unification preferred trialistic reorganization (even federalization) and democratization of the Empire, as was favoured by the heir to the Habsburg throne, Archduke Francis Ferdinand. In the 1890s, both the Liberals and Clericals argued for the unification of the Slovene lands with Croat and other Habsburg South Slav lands in a separate state, but under the Habsburg dynasty. 3 The 1
Ivan Prijatelj, Slovenska kulturnopolitii:na in slovstvena zgodovina 1848-1895, vol. 4, Ljubljana, 1961,p. 94. 2 Ervin Dolenc, 'The Slovene Question: A Change of View on the Yugoslav Community', paper presented at the workshop 'Ideology and Historiography: The Making of Identity in Yugoslav Historiography', Florence, 8-9 May 2000, pp. 1-2. 3 Predominantly on the basis of the Croat historic state right idea. See Janko Pleterski, 'Slovenacke politicke stranke u prvom svetskom ratu i jugoslovensko pitanje', Sveske Treteg programa, Belgrade, 1973, pp. 129-47, p. 132.
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Slovenia's Yugoslav Century
Social-Democrats also believed that the Empire had a future only as a federation of its emancipated nationalities. They urged the unification, within the Empire, of all South Slavs, whom they regarded as one nation artifically partitioned by different cultures, languages, religions and states. Although loyal to the Habsburg state, the SocialDemocrats supported the idea of a Balkan (con)federation, consisting of all four South Slav nations: Slovenes, Croats, Serbs and Bulgarians. The only group that was openly anti-Austrian (and therefore operated semi-illegally) prior to the First World War was the Preporod (Revival), formed in 1912 by a group of young proYugoslav revolutionaries. The Revivalists established close links with other similar Yugoslav revolutionary groups, notably the Young Bosnia, and called for the unification of all South Slavs into an independent state. Some of them fought as volunteers in the Serbian army during the First World War. Serbia's growing prestige following the May coup of 1903, prompted Janez Krek, a pro-Yugoslav SLS leader and a Catholic priest, to brand the Serbs 'our Neapolitans', making a clear and then common parallel between the Italian and Yugoslav unificationist movements. 4 Yet, even the most pro-Yugoslav among the Slovenes were aware of differences which existed between the South Slavs. In his famous lecture, 'The Slovenes and Yugoslavs', given in Ljubljana in April 1913, the poet Ivan Cankar, while calling for a South Slav unification, noted cultural differences between the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. 5 During the war, several Slovene emigres joined the Yugoslav Committee, initiated in late 1914 by a group of exiled Habsburg South Slav intellectuals and politicians. Those who stayed behind remained loyal the Empire, in spite (or because?) of an increasingly autocratic Austrian war regime. Croat, Serb and Slovene deputies in the Vienna parliament formed a parliamentary group, the 'Yugoslav Club', under the leadership of Anton Korosec, also the SLS leader. The 'Yugoslav Club' issued a declaration in May 1917, calling for the unification of all Habsburg South Slav territories into an autonomous unit, but within the Empire.
The Slovene political parties began to prepare for the eventual collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy by establishing the National Council of Slovenia (Narodni svet) in August 1918. On 6 October 1918, the National Council (Narodno vijece) of Habsburg South Slavs was formed in Zagreb (headed by Korosec) and on 29 October the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs was proclaimed. The unification between the Habsburg South Slavs and Serbia, which had just united with Montenegro, was proclaimed in Belgrade on 1 December 1918.
86
Slovenes in the Kingdom of the South Slavs 'In His wise providence, God gathered us within one body in a truly miraculous way. The great day has begun, and in the heavens a sign appeared with the inscription S.H.S. [Serbs, Croats, Slovenes]. My people, you will conquer in that sign. Croats, Serbs, Slovenes! It is God's will that you remain indissolubly united forever. Providence has assigned to you a great purpose. Your salvation and your future is only in your unity.' (Bishop Anton Mahnic, November 19206)
Despite the 'degradation' to a 'tribe' of a larger, Yugoslav nation, and although many Slovenes remained outside the borders of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes-in Austria and Italy-the Slovenes enthusiastically supported the creation of the new state. There were three main reasons for this. Firstly, the Yugoslav state offered guarantees against Italy and Austria, and possibilities for national emancipation and cultural and economic development. Secondly, many Slovenes saw Yugoslavia as the fulfilment of a century old idea of unification with other South Slavs. Thirdly, the oppressive Habsburg war regime made sure that hardly anybody felt sorry for the dissolution of the Monarchy. The Slovene enthusiasm for Yugoslavia was somewhat marred by the fact that a large number ofSlovenes (as well as Croats) remained outside the borders of the new state. The Rapallo Treaty of November 1920 settled the border dispute between Italy and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, but it left some 350,000 Slovenes and Croats to Italy. 7 6
4
Slovenska kronika XX stoletja, vol. 1, Ljubljana, 1996, p. 131.
5
The lecture earned him a huge applause from the audience, but also a trouble with authorities and a week in prison.
87
7
Cited in Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics, 4th edn, Ithaca, NY, 1994, p. 411. Pro-Yugoslav Slovene and Croatian nationalists from Italy created in 1924 an illegal organization TIGR (acronym for Trieste, !stria, Gorizia, Rijeka), which
88
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Well organized and coherent, under Korosec's pragmatic and charismatic leadership, the Clericals were the strongest Slovene interwar party. Except in the 1920 elections, when it received a relative majority, the SLS always won with an absolute majority in Slovene-populated areas of the Kingdom. 8 Korosec was the leading interwar Yugoslav politician; member of several cabinets in the 1920s and 1930s, he was also the only non-Serb prime minister during the interwar period. His party initially stood for a federal Yugoslavia, in which the Slovenes would gain sufficient political autonomy, but eventually the SLS would officially accept the state centralism. The SLS was the only political party which officially supported King Alexander's dictatorship introduced in 1929. Although Korosec fell out with the King in 1931 and issued the famous 'Ljubljana points' in 1932, demanding greater autonomy for Slovenes within Yugoslavia and the country's democratisation, he was, alongside Milan Stojadinovic, leader of the largest faction of the [Serbian] National Radical Party and Mehmed Spaho, the Bosnian Muslim leader, one of the founders of the governing Yugoslav Radical Union (JRZ) in 1935. While his supporters argue that Korosec's political shifts benefited the Slovenes, his critics tend to emphasize his political opportunism, pragmatism and close links with the Roman Catholic Church in Slovenia (which, by the way, was overall pro-Yugoslav). What seems clear, however, is that to Korosec even the worst Yugoslavia was for Slovenes a far better solution than no Yugoslavia at all. 9 The Slovene Liberals (divided into several smaller parties and fractions) enthusiastically advocated national unitarism and werewith a few exceptions-against federalism. Some of their leaders argued for a full linguistic and cultural synthesis with Serbs and Croats, which is why their critics often accused them of being anti-Slovene. In Slovene-populated parts of the new Kingdom the
Liberals commanded between almost 30 per cent of the vote (in the 1920 elections) and 14-15 per cent (in 1923 and in 1925; 21 per cent in 1927), but neither the party nor its most eminent leaders, such as Albert Kramer, exerted anywhere near as much influence on interwar Yugoslav politics as did Korosec and the SLS. 10 The Social Democrats-from December 1921 divided into several factions-advocated unitarism and centralism, while defending workers' rights and principles of social democracy. One of the factions, led by Zvonimir Bernat, opted for federalism. The Communists initially called for a Soviet-type Slovene republic of peasants and workers and for the dissolution ofYugoslavia, in their view an artificial product of the Versailles treaty. Although the third largest Yugoslav party in the 1920 elections, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) almost disappeared by the mid-1920s. The Communist Party ofSlovenia was formed as a branch of the KPJ in April 193 7, but by this time the party line was pro-Yugoslav. The Slovene Party aimed at solving the Slovene national question by revolution, within the borders ofYugoslavia. The Slovenes generally rejected integral Yugoslavism11 , but neither the major Slovene political parties nor Slovene intellectuals were anti-Yugoslav. The Slovenes accepted the new state, and were at the same time eager to preserve their distinct language and culture. This was, for instance, the argument of an important and controversial essay by the literary critic Josip Vidmar, published in Ljubljana in 1932. 12 In the new state the Slovenes were indeed able to set up their own education and cultural institutions: the Ljubljana University was founded as early as July 1919 13 , the Slovene radio in 1928, and the Slovene Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1938. 14
fought for the annexation to Yugoslavia of South Slav populated Italian territories. TIGR had contacts with Yugoslavia's nationalist organizations, especially with ORJUNA. 8 In the last interwar elections of Dec. 1938, the SLS, as part of the Yugoslav Radical Union (JRZ), won as much as 78.7 per cent ofSlovene votes. 9 Ruda Jurcec, Skozi luci in sence, III, Buenos Aires, 1969, p. 293.
° For more
1
89
on the Slovene Libarals see Jurij Perovsek, Liberalizem in vprasanje slovenstva-Nacionalna politika liberalnega tabora v letih 1918-1929, Ljubljana, 1996. 11 Notable exceptions were the Liberals and intellectuals such as the poet Oton ZupanCic, who argued for linguistic unitarism. 12 Josip Vidmar, Kulturni problem slovens tva, Ljubljana, 1932. 13 The first Slovene secondary school was allowed by Austrian authorities only in 1904. It was a private school. . 14 Literacy in Slovene lands was 91.1 per cent, while in rest of the country Jt was just over 40 per cent in 1921. Ten years later it reached 95 per cent, while m the rest of the country the level ofliteracy grew to 47 per cent.
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The Slovene economic development in the interwar period was also significant. Slovenia (like most of Croatia and Vojvodina) was among economically less developed regions of the Habsburg Empire. However, after 1918 it became economically the most developed part of the new state. Yugoslavia offered excellent market opportunities for Slovene products. Despite a centralised economic policy and the loss of direct connection with the port of Trieste (which went to Italy), the level of industrialization in Slovenia grew rapidly. For instance, while in 1918 there were 270 industrial and mining plants employing 40,000 workers, in 1941 the number grew to 520 plants with over 100,000 workers. The Slovenes, only 8 per cent of the Yugoslav population, contributed 26 per cent of whole industrial production of the state in the late 1930s. 15 Slovene peasants were protected by well organized net of cooperatives. Although Slovenia, like the rest of Yugoslavia and Europe, was hit by the world economic crisis in the 1930s, it may be argued that overall, the Slovene economy did quite well during the interwar years.
divided between Germany (the central part), Italy (the Ljubljana province) and Hungary (Prekmmje). The ultimate aim of the occupiers was a complete annihilation of Slovenes as a nation, although life under the Italian occupation was more bearable. The SLS was left without the leadership. Fran Kulovec-another priest, who took over the party following Korosec's death in 1940-was killed on the first day of the war, in the German bombardment of Belgrade, while the SLS ministers in the government fled to London, with the King and rest of the government. The main Slovene resistance group, the Liberation Front ( Osvobodilnafronta-OF), was established already on 26 April1941, as a coalition of four major groups-the Communists, the Christian Socialists, members of the Sokol athletic organisation and liberal intelligentsia. 17 The OF fought for the right of the Slovene nation to self-determination, liberation and unification, who would then form a unit in a post-war federal Yugoslavia. Its activities extended from propaganda, collecting of information, material and arms to sabotages, liquidations and guerrilla fighting. The OF enjoyed the support of a majority of Slovenes. 18 The Communists took complete control over the OF only in March 1943, and the parallel process of Socialist revolution in liberated areas-which was until then implicit-became obvious. Other Slovene political parties and groups issued statements and programmes similar to that of the OF, foreseeing united Slovenia as part of a federal Yugoslav monarchy, but they did not form any efficient resistance to the occupiers-some even collaborated with them. 19 Some politicians and members of the Catholic clergy
Between Hitler, Mussolini, Horthy and Tito: Slovenes in the Second World TVclr 'The nation will write its sentence by itsel£1' (Popular Slovene Partisan slogan 16) The Belgrade coup d'etat of27 March 1941, which brought down the government that signed the Tripartite Pact two days previously, was welcomed in Slovenia, where demonstrations against the former government had been held in Ljubljana and Celje. After Yugoslavia's defeat in the short April war, the Slovene territory was 15
16
Slovenia was particularly highly represented in paper industry (43 per cent of the whole Yugoslav production), metalurgy and textile industry (both 38 per cent of the Yugoslav total), machine industry (32 per cent), electrical and timber industry (both 30 per cent). On the eve of the Second World War the national income per capita in the Dravska banovina was 4,000 dinars, while an average income in Yugoslavia as a whole was 2,800 dinars. Zgodovina Slovencev, Ljubljana, 1979, p. 705,pp. 694-6. The slogan was borrowed from Cankar's drama 'The Servants' (1910).
17
91
The Communists were led by Boris Kidric and Edvard Kardelj; the Christian Socialists by Edvard Kocbek and Tone Fajfar, while the most notable member of the intelligenstia to join the OF was Josip Vidmar. ts James Gow and Cathie Carmichael, Slovenia and the Slovenes, London, 2000, p. 44. 19 The most important were: 'National-political programme' ofleaders ofSLS and Liberals Natlacen and Kramer of Sept. 1941; the emigre Yugoslav minister Miha Krek's 'National programme', London, Oct. 1942; 'The London Points' issued by Slovene emigre politicians of the London-based Yugoslav government-inexile, London, Nov. 1941; Memorandum issued by the Slovenska zaveza, the Ljubljana Province, Spring 1942; The 'National Proclamation' by the National
92
Mitja Velikonja
(headed by the conservative bishop Gregorij Rozman) in the Province of Ljubljana accepted integration of that part of Slovenia into the Italian Kingdom. Because of their pro-Fascist inclinations and fears of a Communist revolution, they helped form in 1942 'The Voluntary Anti-Communist Militia', which was placed under the Italian military command. The Militia was completely defeated by the Partisans after the Italian capitulation in September 1943. The tragic fratricidal bloodshed thus began. 'The Home Guards' (Domobrana) fought against the Partisans from Autumn 1943 to May 1945. While its pro-Nazi leadership saw Slovenia as part of Hitler's New Europe, most of the ranks enlisted because of their antiCommunism; they believed in the Allied victory in the war. Anyhow, the Domobranci remained loyal to Germany until the end of the war, despite Tito declaring amnesty for collaborators twice in 1944 (in August and November). There was also a small number of Slovenian Cetniks under Draza MihailoviC's command. Slovenia was liberated by well organized and equipped Slovene partisans, with the help of partisan units from other parts ofYugoslavia.20 Total civilian and military losses among the Slovenes are estimated at around 70,000-80,000-including the victims of the victorious Partisans in the war's immediate aftermath. 21 Like in the rest ofYugoslavia, non-Communist opposition was supressed, often brutally. Victory in the Second World War brought the Slovene Littoral to Yugoslavia, although parts of Slovene ethnic territory remained in Italy. Borders with Hungary and Austria-despite the fact that Partisans liberated also parts of Carinthia-remained the same. 22 Committee for Slovenia, consisting of Clericals and Liberals, Oct. 1944; a memorandum issued by the self-proclaimed 'Slovene Parliament', in the Germanoccupied Ljubljana, 3 May 1945. For details see Bojan Godesa, 'Slovenci in jugoslovanska skupnost v letih 1941 do 1945' in Bozo Repe, Dusan Necak, Joze PrinCic (eds), Slovenci in Makedonci v ]ugoslaviji, Ljubljana and Skopje, 1999, pp. 71-85. 20 And only in some eastern parts of Slovenia by the Red Army. 21 Ilustrirana zgodovina Slovencev, Ljubljana, 1999, p. 347. 22 Estimates of the number of Slovenes living outside Slovenia today are as follows: 60,000-80,000 in Italy, 20,000-40,000 in Austria, 22,000 in Croatia (according to the 1991 census) and 4,500 in Hungary.
Slovenia's Yugoslav Century
93
Second Attempt: The Slovenes in Socialist Yugoslavia 'Slovenia-the land of my dreams, Slovenia-the promised land ... ' (Buldoier, the Slovene rock band23 )
Even if we take into account the sarcasm of the authors of the above lyrics, Slovenia-now one of six Yugoslav Socialist Republics, with its own constitution, legislative parliament, government, police and with the constitutionally guaranteed right to self-determination and secession-was seen by many Slovenes and non-Slovenes as a promised land within the post-war Yugoslavia. The economic development of Slovenia continued, and it was gradually turning from a predominantly agrarian into a predominantly industrial society. 24 It remained the most developed Yugoslav republic, with large employment opportunities and relatively high standard of living. In 1958, the GDP per capita in Slovenia was $400, while Yugoslavia's average was $220. 25 But the growth of Slovene economy was not as rapid as it could have been, because of the economic centralization, substantial (and often non-productively used) financial help to underdeveloped parts of Yugoslavia, orientation of Tito's Yugoslavia toward the Third World (instead the West), adaptation to the economies ofless developed Yugoslav republics and high federal taxes. 26 On the other 23
'Slovenija', LP Nevino srce ('Innocent heart', 1983; lyrics in Serbo-Croat). The share of rural population in 1900 was 73.2 per cent, in 1921 66 per cent, in 1940 55 per cent, in 1953 41 per cent, in 1961 31 per cent, in 1981 9.4 per cent and in 1991 only 6 per cent. 25 Zgodovina, op. cit., p. 905. From the 1960s we can speak of further 'liberalization' of Slovene economy which had beneficial effects on all aspects of socul hfe. By the mid-1960s, the GDP in Slovenia reached $1,000 per capita (Slovenska kronika XX stoletja, II, Ljubljana, 1996, p. 275). In 1960, Slovenia's GDP was 80 per cent higher than the Yugoslav average, and in 1989 100 per cent higher (Ilustrirana zgodovina, op. cit., p. 387). 26 For example with only 8.3 per cent of the population, Slovenia contributed in the late 1970s with 16.5 per cent of the Yugoslav GDP and 20 per cent of total Yugoslav exports. Joze Pirjevec,Jugoslavija 1918-1992, Koper, 1995, pp. 355-6. See also Viktor Meier, Zakaj je razpadla ]ugoslavija, Ljubljana, 1996, p. 92. Slovene economy covered between 17 and 20 per cent of federal costs, Piljevec, op. cit., p. 292. Slovenia contributed substantial part of its GDP to federal funds: eg. 54 per cent only between 1947 and 1952. Slovenska kronika XX stoletja, II, 1996,p. 145. 2
4
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Mitja Velikonja
Slovenia's Yugoslav Century
hand, these h~ndicaps were compensated by a large Yugoslav market, ~nexpensive raw materials and cheap labour, which all assured consi?erable pro~ts. for S~ovene enterprises. Slovene politicians, ~speCially Bons Kidnc (until his early death in 19 53), Boris Kraigher m the 1960s and Sergej Kraigher in the early 1980s, were among creators _of necessary, but ultimately not very effective economic reforms m Yugoslavia. Slovene Communists were unquestionably pro-Yugoslav, although they often represented Slovene national interests within the federal state. They rejected 'integ_ral' or 'assimilative' Yugoslavism, which would lead to the formatiOn of a single Yugoslav nation. 27 The pre~erred Yugosla_vism which would guarantee that every Yugosla~ natiOn p_reserves Its national identity in a voluntary union. 28 Two almost d_i:metrically opposed models were advocated by Aleksandar Rankov~: on the one side and by Edvard Kardelj on the other. Ran~o-;Ic and Karde~, a Serb and a Slovene, respectively, were two ofT It~ s closest allies (the third, Milovan Djilas, had been purged in the ~d-19?0s, for his criticism of the Communist 'New Class'). Their conflict ':"as perceived as a Serb-Slovene conflict, with the former_ a~vocatmg a continued centralisation, and the latter decentralisatiOn. The conflict spilled out of the top Party leadership in t~e early_ 1960s, and was epitomised by the debate between the Serb~a? wnter Dobri~a _Cosic and the Slovene philosopher Dusan PilJevec,_ although It IS possible that Serbia's and Slovenia's party leaderships were behind the debate. 29 The 'Slovene argument' prevailed, as the highly de-centralised 197~ Constitution_ demonstrated. But, the fall ofStane Kavcic's 'liberal g?vernm~nt m 1972 _(which coincided with purges in other republics, partiCularly Serbia and Croatia) was a lost chance for the
liberalization of Slovene (and Yugoslav) society. 30 The Slovenes also complained of being underrepresented in key federal institutions, particularly the army. In 1970, they made up 5 per cent of the Yugoslav officer corps (6 per cent army generals were Slovenes), but in 1990 only 2 per cent of the Yugoslav army officers were Slovenes. 31
Towards independence 'Burek3 2 ? Nein Danke!' (graffito in Ljubljana, late 1980s)
In the 1980s Slovenia had a more liberal Communist leadership than other Yugoslav republics, but in spite (or because?) of this first elements of an opposition movement began to emerge. The youth branch of the party and independent-minded intellectuals started to openly criticise the regime. A number of alternative groups-the 'punks', 'ecologists', 'pacifists', 'feminists', 'homosexuals' -and media (Radio Student, the journals 1\1ladina and Nova revija) were tolerated by an increasingly reform-minded faction within the Slovene Party. The population at large responded well to the growth of the opposition to the regime (which was slowly turning into opposition to Yugoslavia), and it did not help that there was also a widespread belief that Slovenia was being economically exploited by other, less rich, republics. 33 Aspirations for the democratisation of Slovenia in the late 1980s were coupled, under threats of a renewed centralisation, with aspirations for a complete national emancipation. At first it was believed 30
27 28
See for example Kardelj's new introduction to the 1957 edition ofhis The Development of the Slovene National Question, Ljubljana, pp. L-LXVI. Dunng the ~hole P,os,twar pe;i?d, Slovene critics of Yugoslav integralism were cntiCised as egoists, traitors, separatists', 'destroyers of Socialist Yugoslavia'
&~
31 32
'
29
Ales Gabr:c, Socia!is;itna kulturna revolucija, Ljubljana, 1995, pp. 345-53; ]elena Milojkovic-DJunc: Approaches to NatiOnal Identities: CosiC's and Piljevec's Debate on Ideological and Literary Issues', East European Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 1, sprmg 1996, PP· 63-73; D1rmtrlj Rupel, Slovenski intelektualci Liubliana 1989 , " " ' ' pp. 98-116.
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33
It followed two other conflicts which concerned two important issues: relationship between the republics and federation (the so-called 'Road Affair' of the summer 1969) and between 'liberals' and 'conservatives' within the League of Communists of Slovenia ('The Affair of the 25 delegates' of May 1971). Piljevec, op. cit., p. 336. Burek is a pastry containing cheese, minced meat or spinach, popular throughout the Balkans, and is associated with the region's Ottoman heritage. In this context the rejection of burek was meant to symbolise the rejection of Yugoslavia, emphasising Slovenia's differentiation from the other Yugoslav republics, in particular Serbia and Bosnia. In the late 1980s, Slovenia, with 8 per cent of the whole population, produced 22 per cent of Yugoslavia's public revenues, 30 per cent of the export to countries with hard currencies, and 25 per cent of Yugoslavia's export in general. Meier, op. cit., p. 171.
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Mitja Velikonja
Slovenia's Yugoslav Century
these were possible within a Yugoslav confederation or an asymmetrical federation, but calls for a complete independence soon prevailed. The civil society's democratic initiative was taken over by new political forces that were oriented also towards the national independence. In my opinion this was the turning point: instead of becoming the avantgarde for political democratization ofYugoslavia as a whole, leading political forces in Slovenia decided to build their own democratic nation-state. Intellectuals around the Nova revija magazine published in February 1987 a special issue under the title 'Contributions to the Slovene national programme'. It critically discussed the situation ofSlovenia in Yugoslavia, demanding a higher level of sovereignty for the northern republic. The group around the Nova revija came under attack from authorities in both Slovenia and other republics. Loss of legitimacy of the Communists in the late 1980s coincided with the rise of nationalism in Slobodan MiloseviC's Serbia. Tensions between the federal army and Slovenia grew, as was illustrated by the 'Trial of the Four' in the Spring of 1988. 34 Slovenia's Communists-led since May 1986 by the moderate Milan Kucan-approved gradual changes of the political system, under the slogan 'descent from the power'. The 1989 'May Declaration' of opposition parties demanded independence for Slovenia, but Kuean's Communists still insisted on the preservation ofYugoslavia, although they called for fundamental transformation of the federation. As for the public, it still seemed relatively divided in 1989: according to a public opinion survey, 46.7 per cent of Slovenes were for a debate on whether Slovenia should secede from Yugoslavia and 28 per cent were against any debate on the issue. 35 But it seemed already too late to save Yugoslavia. A verbal war between Serbian and pro-Yugoslav media on one side and Slovene on the other culminated when Slovenia supported Albanian claims in Kosovo. The clearest signs of the collapse of the federation came in September 1989 when the Slovene Assembly adopted constitutional amendments according to which the federal legislation is not
valid in Slovenia if it is contrary to its Constitution. On 1 December 1989 (the birthday of the first Yugoslavia), Slovene authorities banned the so-called 'Meeting of the Truth' in Ljubljana, which was to be held by Kosovo Serbs, and supported by Milosevic. Serbia responded by introducing an economic blockade on Slovenian goods. Yugoslavia seemed finished inJanuary 1990, when the Slovene delegation walked out of the Fourteenth and the last Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The first post-war democratic elections in Slovenia were held in April 1990. The Democratic Opposition of Slovenia (DEMOS) coalition won with 55 per cent of the vote, enough to enable it to create a government. Kuean, however, remained the president of the republic. The new Slovene government accelerated preparations for Slovenia's independence, by now supported by an overwhelming majority of Slovenes. At a referendum held in December 1990, 88.2 per cent voted for independence (the turnout was 93.2 per cent). Slovenia formally declared independence on 25 June 1991. The 'ten-day war' between the Yugoslav army and Slovene troops of June-July 1991, was followed by an internationally brokered agreement which effectively sealed Slovenia's independence. The federal army left by October 1991 and a new Slovene Constitution was promulgated in December the same year. International recognition followed, and on 22 May 1992 Slovenia became a member of the UN.
34
Trial at Military Court in Ljubljana provoked mass demonstration of Slovenes. A public opinion survey showed that 86.2 per cent of respondents perceived the trial, conducted in Serbo-Croat, as 'a restriction of Slovenia's sovereignry'.Janko _ Prunk, Slovenski narodni programi, Ljubljana, 1986, p. 331. 3 " Ibid.
Epilogue: Contemporary Slovene views
of the
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'Yugoslav century'
'Slovenia to Slovenes!' (Slogan of the extreme right-wing Slovene National Party [1992]) 'If you don't realize what you've lost, then you've lost nothing.' (Ales Debeljak, the Slovenian writer36 )
Slovenia is today a stable democracy and, relatively, a fast developing country. In 1999 its GDP was $20.01 billion (1999), or $10,802 per capita, while the inflation rate was 8 per cent. 37 Average monthly salaries reached over 1,000 DEM in September 2000. The ambitious economic re-direction towards western markets succeeded (although, 36 37
Ales Debeljak, Twilight of the Idols, New York, 1994, p. 54. In 1989 it was $10.92 billion or $5,463 per capita ($3,336 in 1985).
'f\ 99
Mitja Velikonja
Slovenia 5 Yugoslav Century
it was helped by the fact that already in the early 1980s one third of all Yugoslav export goods that went to the West were from Slovenia). Today, Slovenia exports two thirds of its products to the EU countries, and only about 15 per cent to the other formerYugoslav republics. Slovenia is rapidly approaching the inclusion in the EU and NAT0. 38 Transition--social, political and economichas been relatively smooth and non-traumatic thus far, although the country faces several serious problems such as the unemployment and the decline of industrial production, 3 ~ restructuring of the economy, deepening of social differences, rise of manifested and 'hidden' national exclusiveness and complex State-Church relations. Before and in the aftermath of the independence, anti-Yugoslavism and even radical Slovene nationalism emerged. The Slovene nationalism is essentially based on the nation's linguistic and cultural uniqueness vis-a-vis other South Slavs, rather than on myths of a glorious past and lost mediaeval kingdoms. Extreme nationalists argue that Slovenes are superior to other Yugoslavs, who are often depicted as 'Byzantine', 'barbarian', 'southerners' and 'Balkanites'. To them, Yugoslavia was a result either of the 'Karadjordjevic or Tito conspiracy', 'Great-Serbian expansionism', or the 'Communist terror'. 40 Theories about Slovenes' non-South Slav origins also appeared in the 1980s and 1990s. According to them, Slovenes descend from the ancient Wends-allegedly a proto-Slavonic tribe which inhabited Central Europe in the twelfth century BC, eventually spreading across Europe. Therefore, the Slovenes are not only an autochthonous Central European nation, but are not related to Serbs and Croats, either, who settled in the Balkans in the sixth and seventh centuries AD. 41
After a decade of independence, however, the Slovenes are coming to more balanced view(s) of their Y~goslav experience. Public opinion surveys show moderate views m regard to t~e formerYugoslavia. In 1998 4 7.8 per cent of Slovenes had illlXed (both positive and negative) memories of the former state~ 36.9 per ~e~; mostly positive and only 5.4 per cent had mostly ne~~ve m~mo.nes. Most Slovenes see Yugoslavia as a 'finished chapter m their history, but 'Yugo-nostalgia', mostly cultural, is very common. In my view, both Yugoslavias played a key role in the de.vel?pment and formation of the modern Slovenian national identity,JUSt like the Slovenes played an important part in history ofYugoslavism(s) and Yugoslav state(s). As the authors of a recent western study on Slovenia argue, 'Slovene self-governance within that South Slav framework was therefore vital to the existence of the common state. Ironically, the Yugoslav framework was also vital for the growth ~f 43 Slovene statehood and ultimate self-governance: Whether Slovema would be better or worse off without its 'Yugoslav century' are mere speculations. Yugoslavia was neither a 'fate'~ no~ the 'best' or the 'worst' solution-it was a result of complex histoncal processes in which the Slovenes played an integral part.
98
38
A public opinion survey carried out in 1988 showed that 84.9 per cent of respondents were completely or mostly for inclusion of Yugoslavia in the EC (Prunk, op. cit., p. 345); ten years later, in the independent Slovenia, only 56.2 per cent said they supported Slovenia joining the EU. Niko Tos (ed.), Vrednote v prehodu, vol. 2, Ljubljana, 1999, p. 858. 39 The unemployment in Aug. 2000 was 11.7 per cent. The industrial production in 2000 was still 20 per cent below the production rate in 1986. 40 See for example an analysis of hate-speech in newspaper columns in TonCi Kuzmanic, Hate-Speech in Slovenia, Ljubljana, 1999. Other Yogoslavs' stereotypes about Slovenes include: 'cold', 'selfish', 'stingy', 'Austrian lackeys and even 'homosexuals'. 41 See Matej Bor,Jozko Savli and Ivan Tomazic, Veneti, nasi davni predniki, Vienna and Maribor, 1989; and Jozko Savli, Slovenska driava Karantanija, Koper and Vienna, 1990.
In 1995, the figures were 50.4 per cent, 34.1 per cent and 6.8 per cent, respectively Vrednote, op. cit., pp. 871, 565. Interestingly, Tito's historical role was judged as positive and very positive by as many as 83.6 per cent of respondents m 1995 and 84.3 per cent in 1998, while that ofKardelJ was seen as a poslt!ve one only by 45.1 per cent in 1995 and 47.8 per cent in 1998, Vrednote, op. cit., pp. 563, 564, 870, 871. Surprisingly perhaps, in 1998 as many as 88.2 per cent of respondents said that the quality of life in Yugoslavia was good or very good (88.1 per cent in 1995), and only 5.5 per cent and 7 per cent, respectively, as bad and very bad, Vrednote, op. cit., pp. 565, 872. 43 Gow and Carmichael, op. cit., pp. 25-6.
42
Bosnian Muslims and the Yugoslav Idea
BOSNIAN MUSLIMS AND THE YUGOSLAV IDEA
101
important to take a closer look at the stance of the SD A leaders during the dissolution of the Yugoslav state, in order to establish whether they were for or against the preservation of Yugoslavia, and whether their actions represented continuity or discontinuity in relation to the Bosnian Muslim elites of the interwar and communist periods.
First Yugoslavia: a rifuge or a threat for the Bosnian Muslims? Xavier Bougarel Perhaps ~ot unus~ally for Bosnia-Herzegovina, relationship between the Bosma~ Mushm~ and Yugoslavism can be summarized by a~ _a_dox;,Bosman Mushms hardly contributed to the formulation of the Yugoslav idea, but they had probably been the last among the Yugoslav nations who sincerely held onto it. In 1990, this belated Y~goslav~sm of the Bosnian Muslim community led the Yugoslav Pnme Mmister Ante Markovic to launch his pro-Yugoslav Alliance of the Reformist Forces of Yugoslavia in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in a ~ast attempt to oppose the growing nationalism with a Yugoslav proJect. Yet, despite opinion polls predicting a victory for the Reformists, the nationalist parties won the Bosnian general elections of 18 November 1990, and about 70 per cent ofBosnian Muslims voted for the Party of Democratic Action (SDA). At that time, the position o~ the SDA leaders vis-a-vis the Yugoslav idea was still ambiguous, :Vlth the party president Alija Izetbegovic declaring that 'Yugoslavia IS not our love, but it is in our interest'. 1 Attitude ofBosnian Muslims towards the Yugoslav idea has often .eee!l misunderstood, and their motives sometimes reduced by outside observers to simple political opportunism. Beyond tactical manoeuvring, it is nevertheless possible to discern some genuine identity cleavages and strategic dilemmas, some slow changes and violent ruptures. In or?er to identifY such phenomena, it is first necessary to analyze the attitude of the Bosnian Muslim community and its main representatives towards the first and the second Yugoslavia. It is then 1
Statement made at a SDA meeting in Bihac on 10 Feb. 1991. See Oslobodjenje, SaraJevo, 12 Feb. 1991.
100
Before the First World War, the Bosnian Muslims did not seem to be attracted by the Yugoslav idea. Only a few individuals, often belonging to the nascent Muslim intelligentsia or educated youth, participated in movements that can be considered as pro-Yugoslav, such as the secret organisation Young Bosnia (Mlada Bosna). 2 After the Congress of Berlin of 1878, Bosnian Muslim leaders had very quickly pledged allegiance to the new Austro-Hungarian authorities, concentrating on defending the religious identity and institutions of their community and, to this end, entering into shifting tactical alliances with both Serb and Croat political groups. This structuring of the Bosnian Muslim community into a kind of a post-Ottoman Muslim millet, a non-sovereign religious community renouncing any nationalist project of its own, is illustrated by the emergence of the community name 'Muslims' at the end of the nineteenth century, and by the achievement of the religious and cultural autonomy in 1909. 3 At the same time, the strong desire of the tiny Muslim intelligentsia to be integrated into European political and cultural modernity, and its rejection of religious divisions inherited from the Ottoman Empire, led it to support the idea of bosnjastvo (Bosnianism) launched by the Habsburg Governor Benjamin Kallay. 4 The Muslim secular intelligentsia was divided into pro-Croat and pro-Serb factions, which both equally rejected the 2
For more on the Young Bosnia see Vladimir Dedijer, The Road to Sarajevo, London, 1966. 3 See Nusret Sehic, Autonomni pokret Muslimana za vrijeme austrougarske uprave u Bosni i Hercegovini, Sarajevo, 1980; Robert Donia, Islam under the Double Eagle: The Muslims if Bosnia and Herzegovina 1878-1914, New York, 1981. 4 See Tomislav Kraljacic, Kallajev reiim u Bosni i Hercegovini (1882-1903), Sarajevo, 1987.
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Xavier Bougarel
name 'Muslims', preferring to declare themselves Croats or Serbs 'oflslamic faith'. 5 The absence ofBosnian Muslims from the Yugoslav Committee, or t?elr small number within the provisional institutions set up followmg the Yugoslav unification in 1918, can be explained as much by their own attitude as by the scant attention paid to them by other South Slavs. The hardships of the immediate post-war period (the land reform, anti-Muslim riots and resumption of emigration to r:urkey) led the Bosnian Muslim elites to reproduce political strategles elaborated during the Austro-Hungarian period. In June 1921, the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation (JMO) exchanged its support for the centralising Constitution of the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, for the preservation of old Bosnian borders within the new administrative division of the country, the maintenance of the autonomy oflslamic religious institutions, and guarantees of financial compensation for properties affected by the land reform. Thereafter, the JM 0 oscillated between governments led by the National Radical Party (NRS) or by the Democratic Party (DS)-the two Serb-dominated parties-and opposition coalitions led by the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS). 6 Allegiance to central power and frequent shifting between Serb and Croat political parties remained central to the Bosnian Muslim strategies during the interwar years. But, situated within different a institutional framework to the ones existing in the former Ottoman and Habsburg Empires, these could only lead to unprecedented constructions of identity. As its name indicate~i:ne]MO supported ;he Yugo:Iav i.dea, and declared in its program that it regarded Yugoslav1sm [jugoslovenstvo] as the most appropriate path towards rapprochement and unification [of the South Slavs]' 7 • The JMO's Yugoslavism did not only correspond to its strategic choices, but also its need to escape rassimilating pressures of both Serbs and ~soats. Yugoslavism of the JMO therefore represented a convenient refuge ra~~er than a genuine politic~! choice. Already il:l f92o,--the JMO 'leaders- proposed to change the name of the Kingdom of :See Alija Isakovic, 0 'nacionaliziranju' Muslimana, Zagreb, 1990. See At1f Punvatra, ]ugoslovenska Muslimanska Organizacija u polititkom iivotu Kraijevme Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, Sarajevo, 197 4. 7 'Program Jugoslovenske Muslimanske Organizacije (1920)', reproduced in ibid., pp. 596-7.
Bosnian Muslims and the Yugoslav Idea
103
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes into the Kingdom ofYugoslavia. At the same time, however, they denounced the 'Yugoslav nationalism' of the Democrats allying themselves with the Radicals, who showed more respect for their communitarian practices. Tactical Yugoslav~ ism and a lack of national determination were thus perceived as \ complementary for the preservation of a Bosnian Muslim identity l 8 still constituted in a pre-national way. --~ The escalation of the Serbo-Croat political conflict directly affected Bosnia's Muslims. Already in the mid-1920s, the divisions between the pro-Croat and pro-Serb Muslim intellectuals grew deeper, as was demonstrated by the existence of two rival Muslim cultural societies: Gajret (The Effort) and Narodna uzdanica (The People's Hope). 9 i929, the transformation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes into the Kingdom of Yugoslavia took place in parallel with the division ofBosnia-Herzegovina into four different banovinas, and the suppression of the religious autonomy obtained twenty years before 10 • The JMO leaders first joined the protests of the united opposition, but agreed in 1935 to enter ~he government and to dissolve itself within the Yugoslav Rad1cal Union (JRZ), in exchange for the restoration of some autonomy 11 for the Islamic Religious Community (Islamska vjerska zajednica) .
fn
s Scholars have noted that some JMO leaders declared themselves Serbs or Croats, questioning their reasons for doing so. None of them seems to have paid attention to the fact that Muslim leaders, whether they declared themselves as 'Serbs' or as 'Croats', by conviction or by tactic, never called upon all Bosnian Muslims to follow them and do the same. 9 See Ibrahim Kemura, Uloga 'Gajreta' u drustvenom iivotu Muslimana, Sarajevo, 1986; Ismail Hadziahmetovic, 'Narodna uzdanica' u kulturnome i drustvenome iivotu Muslimana Bosne i Hercegovine, Tuzla, 1998. 10 At the same time, the different Islamic religious institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro were unified under one single Islamic Religious Community (IVZ) which covered the whole Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and was dominated by the Bosnian ulemas. The Yugoslav authorities unsuccessfully tried to use them to assimilate the non-Slav Muslim populations of Kosovo and Macedonia. See Aleksandar Popovic, L'islam balkanique. Les musulmans du sud-est europeen dans Ia periode post-ottamane, Berlin-Wiesbaden, 1986, pp. 318-9; Ismail Ahmeti, 'Institucionet e kultit islamik ne Ken;:ove gjate viteve 1939-1950' in Masar Kodra (ed.), Shqiptaret e Maqedonise, Skopje, 1994, pp. 457-64. 11 The JRZ was formed by fusion of the JMO, a majority faction of the Radical Party and the Slovene People's Party (SLS). Its president was Milan Stojadinovic,
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Xavier Bougarel
Three years later, they suffered an unexpected electoral defeat against the candidates of the Muslim Organisation (Muslimanska organizaci:fa), a small political party linked to the HSS. 12 · . From a refuge, Yugoslavia increasingly turned during the 1930s mto a threat for the Bosnian Muslim community. It is therefore not surprising that its political representatives tended more and more to reject it. United in their opposition to the Cvetkovic-Macek Agreement of August 1939, which granted Croat-populated regions of Bosnia to the newly-formed banovina of Croatia, the Muslim elites founded a Movement for the Autonomy ofBosnia-Herzegovina, which constituted the first organised manifestation of a nascent Muslim nationalism. 13 Some intellectuals, denying their previous pro-Croat or pro-Serb loyalties, promoted a neo-bosnjastvo, which applied the national name 'Bosniak' (Bosnjak) only to the Bosnian 14 Muslims. Meanwhile, the educated Muslim youth was divided between various pan-Islamist groups, which dreamed of uniting all Balkan Muslims into one large state 15 , and the League of Communist Youth of Yugoslavia, which called for a new, Soviet Yugoslavia.16 The JMO, however, remained in the government. This political evolution of the Bosnian Muslims explains why in April 1941 they did not really mourn the collapse of the first Yugoslavia. Whilst some of their leaders joined the government of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH), many continued to seek the Yugoslav Prime Minister, and vice-presidents Mehmed Spaho and Anton Korosec, leaders of the JMO and SLS, respectively. See Dana Begic, 'Akcije muslimanskih gradjanskih politicara poslije skupstinskih izbora 1935. godine', Godisnjak drustva istoricara Bosne i Hercegovine, Sarajevo, vol. XVI, 1965,pp. 173-89. 13 See Dana Begic, 'Pokret za autonorniju Bosne i Hercegovine u uslovima sporazuma Cvetkovic-Macek', Prilozi instituta za historiju radnitkog pokreta, Sarajevo, vol. IV, no. 4, 1968, pp. 177-91. 14 See Muhamed Hadiijahic, Od tradicije do identiteta. Geneza nacionalnog pitanja bosanskih Muslimana, Sarajevo, 1974. 15 See Sead Trhulj, Mladi Muslimani, Zagreb, 1990; Xavier Bougarel, 'From "Young Muslims" to the Party of Democratic Action: The Emergence of a Panislarnist Trend in Bosnia-Herzegovina', Islamic Studies, Islamabad, vol. XXXVI, no. 2-3 (Summer-Autumn 1997), pp. 533-49. 16 See Dubravka Skarica, 'Napredna srednjoskolska omladina Bosne i Hercegovine u revolucronarno-demokratskom pokretu 1937-1941. god.', Prilozi instituta za historiju radnitkog pokreta, Sarajevo, vol. IV, no. 4, 1968, pp. 593-617.
12
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105
autonomy for Bosnia. During the Second World War, however, the Autonomy Movement ran into some fatal contradictions. Hostile to the integration of Bosnia-Herzegovina into the NDH, it offered to collabor~te with the Third Reich in exchange for the creation oTii.autonomol1s Bosnia t.inde'r direct German tutelage. Despite the fact it had been created in opposition to the project of partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was ready to offer, in exchange for autonomy, Western Herzegovina to the NDH, and Eastern Herzegovina to Montenegro. 17 But the NDH remained the closest ally of the Axis powers in the Western Balkans, and this proposal never came to fru