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World of Exchanges Adapting to a New Environment
Edited by Shahin Shojai
E U R O M O N E Y
B O O K S
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World of Exchanges
Published by Euromoney Institutional Investor Plc Nestor House, Playhouse Yard London EC4V 5EX United Kingdom Tel: ⫹44 (0) 20 7779 8999 or USA ⫹1 800 437 9997 Fax: ⫹44 (0) 20 7779 8300 www.euromoneybooks.com E-mail:
[email protected] Copyright © 2007 Euromoney Institutional Investor Plc and the individual contributors ISBN: 978 1 84374 343 9 This publication is not included in the CLA Licence and must not be copied without the permission of the publisher. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or used in any form (graphic, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, taping or information storage and retrieval systems) without permission by the publisher. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information with regard to the subject matter covered. In the preparation of this book, every effort has been made to offer the most current, correct and clearly expressed information possible. The materials presented in this publication are for informational purposes only. They reflect the subjective views of authors and contributors and do not necessarily represent current or past practices or beliefs of any organisation. In this publication, none of the contributors, their past or present employers, the editor or the publisher is engaged in rendering accounting, business, financial, investment, legal, tax or other professional advice or services whatsoever and is not liable for any losses, financial or otherwise, associated with adopting any ideas, approaches or frameworks contained in this book. If investment advice or other expert assistance is required, the individual services of a competent professional should be sought.
Typeset by Florence Production Ltd, Stoodleigh, Devon Printed by TJ International, Padstow, Cornwall
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Dedicated to the most important man in my life, Ardeshir Shojai, who personifies everything that I wish I could be and without whom life would never have meant much, and Doctors Michael Powell, Nicholas Hirsch and Ramesh Chelvarajah, from the National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery, who gave him a new lease of life.
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Contents
Foreword by Andrew Hilton Author biographies 1
Exchanges: current challenges and future implications Shahin Shojai, Capco Introduction Contributions of this book Conclusion
Part I – Transformation of the industry 2
3
Cross-border mergers and alliances between exchanges: a global perspective Iftekhar Hasan, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Tina Hasenpusch, European Business School and Heiko Schmiedel, European Central Bank Introduction Networks, cross-border mergers and partnerships among exchanges Data and variables Evidence on cross-border mergers and alliances Future trends, options and implications for securities market infrastructures Conclusions References Annex Electronic trading: rival or replacement for traditional floor-based exchanges? Wayne H. Wagner, ITG Solutions Network and OM/NI Introduction Competition on commissions, then on spreads The exchange as a process Balancing varied interests
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27 28 30 32 36 38 39 41
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5
What can electronics bring? ‘Colour’ Governance Proliferation of alternatives Information-central
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The outlook for global derivatives market competition Jens Nystedt, Deutsche Bank Introduction Recent trends in exchange-traded derivatives markets Academic literature on derivatives market competition Competition between exchange-traded derivatives exchanges The relationship between ODE and OTC derivatives markets Recent trends in the OTC market The regulatory environment for OTC derivatives Competition and cooperation between ODE and OTC markets Conclusions and outlook References
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Electronic markets heat up; micro-exchanges arrive Eric Benhamou, Pricing Partners, Michel Everaert, GFI Group and Thomas Serval, Baracoda Introduction The internet bubble The future of trading technology A new player in electronic markets: micro-exchanges Conclusion References
Part II – Challenges confronting exchanges 6
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Market integration in the post-trade industry: lessons from Europe Daniela Russo and Simonetta Rosati, European Central Bank Introduction Functions and players in the securities market infrastructure Addressing risks in the securities post-trade industry The European landscape and its challenges Conclusions References
59 62 66 68 74 74 75 77 78 81 83
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97 97 99 103 107 119 121
Current challenges and future implications
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US securities regulation in a world of global exchanges Reena Aggarwal, Georgetown University, Allen Ferrell, Harvard Law School and Jonathan Katz, formerly of US Securities and Exchange Commission Introduction The competitive environment Governance of exchanges Regulation of global exchanges: the pending NYSE-Euronext merger Conclusions MiFID and its effect on exchanges Simon Bennett, Capco Introduction: genesis and background What is MiFID? MiFID impacts Responses – the exchange perspective Conclusions
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123 126 128 132 136 140 140 142 148 155 157
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Foreword This is an astonishing piece of work. Unless you are an epic masochist, it is not a book to read in one go. And it is certainly not light reading for a Caribbean beach holiday. But it is an extraordinarily successful attempt to bring together in one place authoritative articles on all the key issues that plague the exchange space today. This is no mean feat. The exchange landscape is changing so fast today that there is a serious danger that what one writes this week will be out of date next week – and that is an obvious risk. But it is a risk worth taking since exchanges are, essentially, the plumbing of capitalism – the unglamorous back end that makes possible those Wall Street/City mega-bonuses and the romanticisation of investment banking and fund management. I do not know of any comparable effort to take stock of what is going on – certainly not one that brings together a genuinely stellar mix of regulators, practitioners and academics as authors. Of course, there is a price. Although the quality of the contributions is uniformly high, the styles that writers have adopted vary wildly – from a breezy journalism to pretty heavy, footnote-laden academic analysis. But that is a price well worth paying. The structure of the book reflects a broad consensus as to the challenges that exchanges face. Paraphrasing slightly, I see six big challenges: • First is a trend, both within individual markets and on a cross-border basis, for exchanges to consolidate. For most observers, this is the dominant trend de nos jours. The emergence of Euronext in Continental Europe set the trend: now we have the New York Stock Exchange’s bid for Euronext, and Nasdaq’s (more contentious) attempt to buy the London Stock Exchange. But it is not just Europe: there is also consolidation in the US itself. The issues are what is driving this trend? And what are its implications likely to be? • The second challenge, an important sub-theme of this book, is that there is really no agreement yet on whether consolidation of liquidity into bigger and bigger pools is an unequivocally good thing – or whether a better answer may not lie in using technology to link separate liquidity pools. Consolidation may be inevitable, in that demutualisation of ownership puts shareholders in the driving seat – and what they want is to boost their share price. But the technological imperative offers what is essentially a network alternative. Advances in technology can make what the book calls micro-exchanges a viable alternative to megaexchanges as we know them. • Technology is really the third point covered in this book. Until astonishingly recently, exchanges were open outcry, often pits, and were based on person-to-person contact. Some still are – and this kind of trading still has its advocates, who believe that a degree of subjective judgement is still necessary if deeper, darker layers of hidden liquidity are to be tapped. That said, the tide is really running in the other direction. The relentless fall in the cost of technology and the (equally relentless) increase in what software can offer in the way of artificial
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intelligence means that the days of brightly coloured jackets, loud-mouthed floor trading and the buzz of open outcry are numbered. It is boring but true that an Indian software engineer can now build you an exchange-in-a-box that can do everything a conventional exchange can do at a tiny fraction of the price. • The fourth theme that runs through the book is again one that stems from technology – particularly the falling cost of technology, which makes it easy and inexpensive to develop new markets, often in the derivatives area. Given that the cost of building an exchange is no longer a limiting factor, the constraint on what can be traded is simply a function of the market. From futures to options, to options on futures, to gas, to oil, to weather derivatives, to credit default swaps – the possibilities are endless. Many of these will obviously be developed and traded under the umbrella of existing exchanges (not least because of their marketing skills and the value they add through information collection and dissemination), but the lowering of the cost barrier means new players can come – and go. • The fifth big issue is the clearing and settlement space – the plumbing behind the plumbing, if you like. The post-trade infrastructure – particularly in Europe – is inefficient, expensive and largely non-contestable. As we move away from vertical silos, contestability should increase, but common sense suggests that those who have been making super-normal profits out of the opacity of the system will not give up quietly. Still, there are many initiatives in this space – including the banks’ own Project Boat, which holds open the prospect of building an alternative channel for trading information, thereby breaking the hold that exchanges and C&S systems have over data flows. • The sixth challenge – and, unfortunately, far from the last – is the issue of regulation, and its ugly twin, compliance. There is no doubt that the regulatory burden has increased exponentially in recent years – not least because industry players are forced to respond to any regulatory initiative with a battery of lawyers. Obviously, the issue in the exchange area is not as bad as at the retail end of the market, but the cost of this regulation is far from negligible – which makes any effort at cross-border harmonisation so important. But, as this book demonstrates, do not assume that rationality will always prevail. From the US side, SarbanesOxley demonstrates just how easy it is to drive business away; from Europe, the dreaded MiFID illustrates just how little Continental European regulators understand about the finer points of capitalism. And, in both cases, we are going to have to face a raft of unintended consequences – some fairly benign, but some not. From SarbOx, for instance, comes the strong probability of an attempt by the US authorities to extend their extra-territorial jurisdiction. From MiFID comes Project Turquoise and a quite plausible threat to the entire structure of national stock exchanges as we know them. This canter through a complex subject is inevitably a caricature, and the value of this book is that it is not a caricature. It is a collection of considered contributions to one of the most complex issues of contemporary capitalism, and, if it defies an easy summary, that is much to its credit. Exchanges make the capitalist whirligig go round, and the more we understand about them, the better. Andrew Hilton Director CSFI
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Author biographies
About the Editor Shahin Shojai Shahin Shojai is the Director of Strategic Research at Capco, Director of the Capco Institute and the Editor of the Journal of Financial Transformation. In addition, Shahin is also a senior subject matter expert and a member of Capco’s Private Client/Asset Management practice. Prior to joining the company, Shahin was President and CEO of WRA Group, a syndicated research company providing research and advisory services to the treasurers and CFOs of Fortune 500 companies. Before that, Shahin was Director of the European Institute, a think-tank for CEOs of the 92 largest institutional asset management firms in Europe and North America. In addition, Shahin has held visiting or full professorial appointments at a number of academic institutions in Europe and North America, including London University, Boston University, Paris Graduate School of Management, Université Paris-Dauphine, Syracuse University, and the American University in London, where he was the Chairman of the finance faculty. Shahin holds a PhD in Finance and Economics from the University of Nottingham and an MBA in Finance from City University Business School.
About the contributors Reena Aggarwal Reena Aggarwal is the Stallkamp Fellow and Professor of Finance at the McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University. She has authored numerous articles on Sarbanes-Oxley regulations; valuation and international corporate governance; IPOs in the US, Switzerland, Brazil, Mexico and Chile; regulation of emerging markets in Asia and Latin America; and functioning of stock exchanges. She was a Visiting Research Scholar at the IMF and an Academic Fellow at the US SEC. Dr Aggarwal received her PhD in Finance from the University of Maryland and MMS from BITS, India. Eric Benhamou Eric Benhamou is one of the founders and head of all the quantitative developments at Pricing Partners. His team develops models and pricers for all derivatives including fixed income, credit, equity, foreign exchange, inflation and hybrid products. He has a senior experience of developing pricing and risk management tools and worked previously at Goldman Sachs and lately Ixis CIB. A former alumnus of the École Polytechnique and the French National School of Economics and Statistics (ENSAE), he holds a PhD from the London School of Economics and a DEA in Financial Mathematics. He is a regular speaker at professional conferences and has already published in numerous reviews. In addition to his extensive research on financial mathematics,
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Author biographies
he has always been keen to follow (and research on) the developments and trends in the electronic market and publish one of the early papers on electronic communication networks (ECNs). Simon Bennett Simon Bennett is a Partner at Capco, focused on delivering transformational change to top-tier clients, via both process re-engineering and strategic sourcing. At Capco he has a role that combines business development with client delivery – with an exclusive focus on the Institutional and Investment Banking segment. Prior to joining Capco he spent over 20 years in a variety of management roles in the City with experience on both the buy side and the sell side. Simon holds a prize-winning MBA from Henley. Michel Everaert Michel Everaert is Chief Information Officer-E-commerce at GFI. He joined the company in May 2000. Prior to joining GFI, he was Senior Sales Manager for Investment Banking Services at Logica PLC between November 1998 and April 2000. Prior to this, he held marketing and sales positions at Dow Jones Telerate and Reuters. Allen Ferrell Allen Ferrell is the Greenfield Professor of Securities Law at Harvard Law School. He is also a Research Associate at the European Corporate Governance Institute, on the Board of Economic Advisors to the NASD and a member of the Committee on Capital Markets, which is advising the Treasury Department on reform of US securities law. He received his PhD in Economics from MIT, JD from Harvard Law School and BA and MA from Brown University. He clerked for Judge Silberman on the DC Circuit Court of Appeals and Justice Kennedy on the Supreme Court. His research focuses on corporate governance, exchange regulation and disclosure requirements. Iftekhar Hasan Iftekhar Hasan is currently the Cary L. Wellington Professor of Finance at the Lally School of Management and Technology of the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and the Director of the Center for Financial Technology. Professor Hasan’s expertise is in the area of corporate finance, financial institutions and capital markets. He has held visiting faculty positions in several reputed European and American universities such as the University of Rome at Tor Vergata, Robert Schuman University at Strasbourg, Cheng Chi University at Taipei and Stern School of Business in New York. Professor Hasan is also a Research Fellow at the Berkley Center of the Stern School of Business; a Scientific Advisor at the Central Bank of Finland; and a visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. He has been a consultant of the World Bank, United Nations, Italian Deposit Insurance Corporation and several US corporations. He has over 150 publications in print, including nine books and edited volumes, and 80 peer-reviewed journal articles in reputed finance and economics journals. He also serves as an associate editor for a number of reputed journals. He has presented his research work at many professional meetings and institutions in 52 different countries. Tina Hasenpusch Tina Hasenpusch is currently completing her PhD at the European Business School in Germany. Her research focus and expertise are in the fields of capital markets and securities market
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infrastructure. Her dissertation analyses the future development of the clearing industry. Before commencing her doctoral studies, Ms Hasenpusch worked for the CEO of Eurex derivatives exchange and clearing house. Her responsibilities included, among others, the preparation of presentations, speeches and research material, as well as acting as interface between the Executive Board, operational departments and subsidiaries. Prior to her career at Eurex, Ms Hasenpusch graduated with distinction from the European Business School in Finance and Management Information Systems. In addition, she studied business administration in Argentina and in the US. Alongside her studies, Ms Hasenpusch gained substantial international work experience in the area of finance, marketing and consultancy. Jonathan Katz Jonathan Katz was an attorney for the Securities and Exchange Commission for 23 years, and served as the Commission’s Secretary for nearly 20 years. In that position he participated in virtually all aspects of the Commission’s regulatory and enforcement programmes. Prior to joining the SEC, he worked for seven years in the US Department of Justice. Mr Katz received a BA in Economics from Colgate University and a JD from the University of Pittsburgh. Jens Nystedt Jens Nystedt joined Deutsche Bank in 2004. Since February 2006, Jens has been the Chief US FX Strategist focusing in particular on G10, links with EM and the commodity currencies (especially the CAD). He initially joined as DB’s Chief Economist for EMEA and Head of Local Markets Strategy. Prior to DB, Jens worked for almost six years as an Economist at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) where he worked for the Research, Policy Development and International Capital Markets Departments. Jens also participated in the IMF’s efforts to resolve several sovereign debt restructurings and currency crises across emerging markets. Jens holds an MSc in International Finance from the Stockholm School of Economics and a PhD in International Economics and Finance from the same business school. His thesis topic focused on competition issues in international financial markets. Simonetta Rosati Simonetta Rosati has been Senior Market Infrastructure Expert in the Directorate General Payment Systems and Market Infrastructure at the European Central Bank (ECB) in Frankfurt (Oversight Division) since May 2001. Ms Rosati graduated in Economics at the University of Rome LUISS ‘Guido Carli’. She started her career at the Banca d’Italia, in the (former) Foreign Department (current Monetary Policy and Foreign Exchange Department) where she was involved in the preparatory work relating to payment systems in view of the European Economic and Monetary Union (Target Interlinking project). In February 1998 Ms Rosati joined the European Monetary Institute (precursor of the European Central Bank) and contributed to the launch of Target, the euro large-value payment system, in 1999. Between 1999 and 2001 she was Secretary of the Payment and Settlement Systems Committee (PSSC), an advisory committee to the ECB Governing Council in the field of payment and securities settlement systems. Since 2001 Ms Rosati has been working on policy and oversight issues concerning securities settlement systems. Ms Rosati has contributed to the analysis of the determinants of large-value crossborder payments, to the comparative analysis of prudential and oversight requirements for
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securities settlement and to the analysis of the securities custody industry, and currently participates in the Working Group of the CPSS on Systems Interdependencies. Daniela Russo Daniela Russo has been Deputy Director General of the Directorate General Payment Systems and Market Infrastructure at the European Central Bank, based in Frankfurt-am-Main, since June 2005. Ms Russo graduated in Political Sciences from the University of Catania (Italy), and has Masters qualifications in Economic Development and in Foreign Exchange Trade. She started her career at the Banca d’Italia where her responsibilities included payment systems, EMU and coordination with the G-10 central banks’ payment systems activities. In 1994, she worked at the European Monetary Institute (EMI) as Head of the Securities Settlement Systems Unit. She also held the post of rapporteur of the Working Group on EU Payment Systems (WGPS). In 1998 Ms Russo joined the ECB as Head of the former Securities and Settlement Systems Division (currently Market and Infrastructure Division) and was promoted in April 2005 to her current position as Deputy Director General Payment Systems and Market Infrastructure. She is also chairperson of some internal working groups of the Eurosystem. She is the ECB representative in the ESCB-CESR Working Group and has chaired one of its Task Forces. She has represented the ECB at the meetings of the ‘Giovannini groups’ and is currently member of the Clearing and Settlement Advisory and Monitoring Expert (CESAME) Group. She has contributed to the working group of the CPSS on Securities Lending and to the two working groups of CPSS and Iosco (Committee on Payments and Settlement Systems and the International Organization of Securities Commissions) on central counterparties (CCPs) and central securities depositories (CSDs). She has chaired the CPSS Working Group on cross-border collateral arrangements. Heiko Schmiedel Heiko Schmiedel is a policy expert in the Directorate General Payment Systems and Market Infrastructure at the European Central Bank. He conducts economic research and policy analysis in the field of securities trading, clearing and settlement systems, as well as payment systems. Before he joined the ECB in 2003, he served as an economist at the Hamburg Institute of International Economics. He was visiting research scholar at the Research Department at Central Bank of Finland, the Dutch Central Bank and Stern School of Business at the New York University. Dr Schmiedel received a PhD in International Finance from the University of Hamburg. He has published articles in applied econometrics and finance including monographs, book chapters, academic journals and reviews, such as the Journal of Banking and Finance, International Review of Financial Analysis and Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance. Thomas Serval Thomas Serval is President and CEO of Baracoda, a technology company located in Paris. He is a graduate from École Normale Supérieure and holds a Masters in Business Law and a degree in Engineering from the French National School of Economics and Statistics (ENSAE). He focuses his PhD work on internet economics and its impacts on stock exchanges. He was awarded an Arthur Sachs scholarship. He has published many articles on electronics communication networks (ECNs) and the future of exchanges, and is Vice President of the French Chapter of
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the Internet Society and a Director of Comité Richelieu Board (French Association of High Tech Companies). Wayne H. Wagner Wayne H. Wagner consults on issues relating to securities trading and exchanges. He co-founded Plexus Group, a Los Angeles-based firm that provided trading evaluation and advisory services to money managers, brokerage firms and pension plan sponsors. In 2006, Plexus Group became a part of ITG Solutions, Inc, for which Mr Wagner consults as Senior Advisor. He is a frequent writer and speaker on many trading and investment subjects and author, co-author and editor of different titles. Mr Wagner is a founding partner of Wilshire Associates and served as Chief Investment Officer of Wilshire Asset Management. Prior to that he participated in the design of the first index funds at Wells Fargo Bank. He holds an MS in Statistics/Management Science from Stanford University and BBA in Management Science/Finance from the University of Wisconsin.
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Chapter 1
Exchanges Current challenges and future implications Shahin Shojai Capco
Introduction The world of exchanges has gone through a number of transformations over the past 30 years or so. Our aim with this book, which coincides with the twentieth anniversary of the Big Bang in London, is to review some of these changes, assess what their implications have been and try to look into the future to see what lies ahead for the world’s major exchanges. When we first started considering publishing this book with our partners at Euromoney Books, we knew that we were embarking on a journey at a time of great change in the world of exchanges. The announcements of potential combinations and acquisitions were filling the front pages of major financial publications on a daily basis, and prognosticators were assessing their potential implications for the future. Since then, many of these combinations have been consummated and more are on the way. In addition, we knew that we would be writing about the industry at a time when it was facing a barrage of new regulations from both sides of the Atlantic, if not globally. It was, therefore, quite clear to us that many of the predictions that would be made within this book might be deemed old news or even inaccurate because of the events taking place subsequent to its publication. However, we believed that our objective was to partner with some of the leading minds in this subject to ensure that we published a book that provided a thorough assessment of the issues that are currently facing the world of exchanges, and an analysis of why the different events are taking place and how they could impact the future of the industry, as well as establishing the factor causalities. Despite the enormity of this challenge, we knew that, once we had the commitment of the remarkable list of authors in this book, we would be publishing a uniquely informative and practical source for those interested in this industry. Consequently, before we provide our review of the world of exchanges we would like to first and foremost thank each and every one of the authors for taking the time to help us create the most in-depth and comprehensive source of information about the world of exchanges to date.
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Current challenges and future implications
How did we end up here? Exchanges have a long history, with many agreeing that the first exchanges were established in the twelfth century in Bruges, Belgium, though forward contracts are believed to have existed as far back as 1700 BC. Over the years, and especially more recently, exchanges have become an integral part of our lives, helping us plan for our future and retirement. The establishment of the major exchanges in the world’s leading financial centres, such as Frankfurt, London, New York, Paris and Tokyo, further helped their integration within our societies. Looking back over the history of these institutions, it is not surprising to find that most of us are more familiar with the events, mostly crises, that have transpired on these exchanges, and have thus shaped our industry and to some extent our societies, than necessarily the actual dates when they were first established. The most famous of these events are perhaps the two wellknown market crashes, namely the Dutch Tulip crisis of 1637 – which resulted in a 3,000 per cent appreciation of the price of tulips between 1 December 1634 and 5 February 1637 – and the great Crash of 1929 in New York City, which led to the Great Depression. Perhaps 20 October 1987 and 20 March 2000 can be also added to this list. These events demonstrated how greed and lack of knowledge can create speculative bubbles that cannot be explained with any economic rationale. Yet, interestingly, many of those investors who were caught up in the midst of these bubbles were fully capable of finding patterns in data that could be used to explain why the markets had risen so much and why they would continue to do so. The problem, of course, is that, once these bubbles burst, their repercussions are not limited to only those who thought they understood the markets and their functioning. The damage is not limited to the professional investors. Sadly, it is not even limited to those who played their part in helping create the speculative bubble. When bubbles burst, most of the economy suffers, as was demonstrated by the Crash of 1929. That is why from my perspective the most important year in the history of exchanges, and perhaps finance in general, is 1973, when the Chicago Board Options Exchange was founded and the world came to learn about the works of Fischer Black, Myron Scholes and Robert Merton. This date marks the beginning of the use of complex asset pricing models to create and trade instruments with option-like behaviours. In my opinion, this is the first time that truly scientific methodologies were used to determine the value of different assets, which until then were based predominantly on a combination of gut feeling and mediocre valuation models. In many markets, current prices of assets are based on how their derivatives markets are behaving. The revolution that was the options pricing model made it possible for all of us to get a better understanding of how shares, bonds and the many assets that are derived from them should be valued and helped to create the most exciting period in the history of finance. The complexity and variety of the new products that were, and continue to be, introduced are truly magnificent. The world of finance owes a lot to these great thinkers of our time, whose work has ensured that many of the inefficiencies that had existed for centuries have been arbitraged away. Today’s hedge fund managers are the main benefactors of this remarkable development, and they are the people who are instituting the corrective measures required to create tomorrow’s even more informationally and analytically efficient markets.1
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Current challenges and future implications
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The Big Bang Perhaps the next major milestone in the history of exchanges is the Big Bang in London in 1986, which resulted in the removal of the trading pits and the introduction of electronic trading, elimination of minimum commissions and restrictions on the size and functions of member firms, and the establishment of the exchange as a private company. The implications of this transformation of the industry can still be felt today; the most important being the disappearance of some of the world’s most famous brokerage firms and the growing influence of the major US bulge bracket investment banking firms in London, one of the most important financial centres in the world. The Big Bang broke up the cosy world of broker partnerships and stock jobbers, where fees of around 2 per cent of trades were charged, and replaced it with one where overseas banking giants could take them over, trading hours were extended, electronic trading became the norm, trading costs were cut by 90 per cent (to 0.2 per cent), and where knowledge rather than relationships dictated the likelihood of success or failure. In addition, the market structure was changed from open outcry to electronic, screen-based trading. Within a year of the Big Bang, both the number of market-makers and the daily trading volume had tripled and London’s importance as a major financial centre was even more evident. The Big Bang not only brought down the cost of trading local equities, but SEAQ International, the quote-driven electronic market for international equities, attracted trades from other Continental European markets due to the lower costs of trade. Of course, some of these gains would be reversed over time, but the result of the Big Bang for London was to make it a dominant force in the world of equities. By the late 1980s, in addition to the growing power of the London Stock Exchange (LSE), London was also benefiting from the growing power of its derivatives exchanges as well. The London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (Liffe) was able to attract some of the biggest futures and options contracts to London and for some years retain control over the most important contract, the German Bund Futures, despite it being a German contract and trading on the Deutsche Termin Börse as well. However, Liffe’s inability to see the benefits of electronic trading, unlike its cash market peer, the LSE, meant that by 1997 the Bund market had returned to Germany, where the Deutsche Termin Börse had been using electronic trading for some years. By the end of 1997 Liffe’s share of the Bund futures contract had fallen to around 10 per cent. Liffe did later change its policy and introduce electronic trading, but it was too late to reverse the trend. Had someone been looking at the future of the world of exchanges in 1986 they would have certainly felt that the brightest star was shining in London. It was the most powerful equities and derivatives market in Europe, along with the world’s largest currency market. Of course, that was also the time when Japan was the envy of the world and its stock market was reaching melting point. By the 1990s, London was still a dominant force in the world of high finance, with many of the world’s leading investments banks establishing their international hubs in the City. Most, if not all, of the world’s leading global investment banks used London as the centre for their operations in Europe. And, despite Frankfurt’s huge efforts to replace London as the major financial centre in Europe, it simply did not succeed. The decision by Deutsche Bank to move
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Current challenges and future implications
most of its investment banking operations to London was the final proof that London had won the battle.
The internet bubble and its implications London also benefited from its long history of expertise in fund and asset management. When the internet bubble started to expand and most people wanted an avenue into the market, they chose the major global asset management companies based in London. In fact, many US asset management companies followed their investment banking brethren and took over some of the major London asset management companies in order to gain access to the market and the expertise that existed in the City.2 Consequently, the internet bubble helped London become the route of choice to the assets of the major European economies and maintain its leading global position. However, the same bubble was not as beneficial to the LSE as it was to the City of London. As Exhibit 1.1 illustrates, between 1986 and 2000, while the LSE experienced a dramatic increase in market capitalisation, by almost 400 per cent, its growth was dwarfed by its US and European counterparts, some of which increased the capitalisations of the stocks trading on them by magnitudes of around ten. Of course, despite being the slowest market in Europe, London still performed significantly better than Tokyo.3 The two major US markets were understandably the main benefactors of the bubble, with Nasdaq going from being almost half the size of the LSE in 1986 to being almost 40 per cent larger by 2000.4 These growth figures become more descriptive when one considers the change in the share of the global equity market capitalisations held by each market (see Exhibit 1.2). In those terms, both London and Tokyo experienced a reduction in the proportion of the global market capitalisations they held, with the latter experiencing a huge loss. On the other hand, we see that London’s two major regional competitors increased their contributions to the global equity market capitalisation, despite still remaining smaller than London. The two major US stock markets increased their dominance of the global equity markets by increasing their share from 32 per cent in 1986 to almost 50 per cent of the global market capitalisation by 2000.
Exhibit 1.1 Stock market capitalisations 1986 (US$bn)
2000 (US$bn)
% change
France
172
1,447
841
Germany
213
1,270
596
UK
681
2,577
378
Japan
2,803
3,157
113
NYSE
2,199
12,372
563
341
3,597
1,055
Nasdaq
Source: The Securities Industry Fact Book, Securities Industry Association
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Exhibit 1.2 Share of global equity market capitalisations 1986
2000
% change
France
2.20%
4.49%
204
Germany
2.72%
3.94%
145
UK
8.70%
7.99%
92
Japan
35.79%
9.79%
27
NYSE
28.08%
38.35%
137
4.35%
11.15%
256
Nasdaq
Source: The Securities Industry Fact Book, Securities Industry Association, Capco analysis
The tremendous appreciation in the values of stocks and trading volumes, combined with the advent of new technologies that were inexpensive and easily accessible, and the chance to circumvent limitations imposed on traditional financial institutions by the regulators, meant that a number of alternative trading venues were established to provide investors with cheaper access to the markets and greater liquidity.5 The most successful of these alternative trading systems (ATSs), Instinet, had at one stage controlled over 40 per cent of trading in Nasdaq-quoted stocks. As with all speculative bubbles, the stock market bubble of the 1990s also came to an end – quite abruptly. Most of us remember what happened in March 2000, when the global equity market bubble burst and certain stocks lost close to 99 per cent of their market capitalisations. Many of the world’s leading economies slowed down, with some entering recessions. New regulations were introduced to make sure that some of the excesses of the 1990s are not repeated and to ensure that the confidence of the investor community could be restored.
Demutualisations While discussions were being held at the highest levels of US government concerning the potential backlash caused by the likes of Enron and WorldCom and to introduce new legislation to ensure that such manipulations would not happen again, the world of national exchanges faced its next major milestone – the creation of Euronext. On 22 September 2000, the exchanges of Amsterdam, Brussels and Paris were merged to create a new powerhouse in the world of exchanges. The founders of this new group of exchanges knew that tomorrow’s world belongs to those who could offer the most technologically advanced and efficient exchanges. Through the combination of these three exchanges, Euronext hoped to introduce greater efficiencies and trading methodologies/technologies to the market. The idea was a great success; by 2002 the Portuguese stock exchange Bolsa de Valores de Lisboa e Porto had also joined the partnership. The year 2000 was also when all three of the major European exchanges – Deutsche Börse, Euronext and the LSE – demutualised6 in preparation for their public quotations and being traded on their respective exchanges in 2001. Nasdaq followed the example set by its European
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Current challenges and future implications
counterparts and also demutualised in 2000. By the middle of 20027 its shares were being traded on the over-the-counter Bulletin Board and it was quoted on the Nasdaq Stock Market itself in February 2005. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) also became a public company in 2006, subsequent to its acquisition of Archipelago Holdings, Inc (see Exhibit 1.3). Transformations in the ownership structures of the major exchanges, from being non-profit mutually/member-owned (typically by the major brokerage firms) organisations to having private individuals and institutional investors as the ultimate owners, were made possible by the advent of new technologies, which allowed the exchanges to provide access to a much wider group of users scattered across the globe. Steil8 suggests that as ‘the marginal cost of adding a new member to a trading network declines to zero, it becomes infeasible for an exchange to impose a fixed access cost, or “membership fee.” Rather, only transaction-based (ie variable cost) charging is sustainable.’ Subsequent to going public, the exchanges had to take into account the needs of another group of stakeholders, namely the shareholders, in addition to those they had historically dealt with – their users and the national regulators. What the users want is a low-cost and efficient exchange to trade on, with minimal friction, although Domowitz and Steil9 suggest that, due to the monopolistic nature of most traditional exchanges, the members could in extreme cases oppose enhancements to the quality of services provided if they are deemed to diminish their welfare, which basically means that demutualised stock exchanges should provide better-quality markets. On the other hand, what shareholders want is increased profitability for the firms they hold shares in. These two objectives cannot easily be reconciled within the world of listed exchanges; and the situation has become even worse ever since hedge funds, which in some cases look for quick returns, have become active investors in major stock exchanges. For example, in 2005, Fidelity Investments in combination with two hedge funds (TCI Fund Management and Atticus Capital LLC) prevented the planned takeover of the LSE by Deutsche Börse because they were worried that the bidder might overpay. Consequently, despite the fact that the transaction would have allowed Deutsche Börse to take over the jewel in the crown of the European equity markets, these active shareholders prevented it.
Exhibit 1.3 Market capitalisations, in billion euros, of the major Western exchanges (1 November 2006) LSE
4.18
Euronext
9.99
Deutsche Börse Nasdaq NYSE Source: Authors’ own
6
13.10 3.16 10.70
Current challenges and future implications
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What the regulators want, however, is to ensure that the change in the ownership structure does not in any way create a conflict of interest between the exchange’s role as a self-regulator and the objectives of its shareholders. Steil, who looked at the four major tasks undertaken by exchanges – listed company governance and disclosure, surveillance of traders, financial and operational compliance of member firms, and fair and equitable treatment of customers – believes that the national regulators do not need to worry about the self-regulatory obligations of the exchanges. He believes that ‘mutual exchanges appear no less prone to malpractice or commercial risk-taking, nor is there any logical reason why they should be’.10 Whatever one’s views are on the pros and cons of public ownership of national exchanges, one thing is clear, by going public exchanges are able to raise the necessary capital to be able to take over their peers. Of course, it also means that they could become takeover targets themselves. Between 2001 and 2006, the LSE was involved in a number of discussions to establish partnerships with other exchanges in Europe. Of course, as many are aware, it was also the target of a number of takeover attempts from its European peers during this period – despite being the largest exchange in Europe in terms of the market capitalisation of the stocks quoted on it – as well as receiving offers from Nasdaq and Macquarie Bank. What is surprising is that the LSE has not as yet made a hostile bid for any of its peers. Perhaps the LSE’s lack of ambition can explain why the largest European stock exchange has a market capitalisation that is less than 50 per cent of Euronext and around 30 per cent of Deutsche Börse. The LSE’s European counterparts used their new sources of capital well. Euronext aggressively competed with the LSE to take over Liffe, one of Europe’s major derivatives exchanges, and certainly London’s most important, to create Euronext-Liffe in 2001. Euronext had the belief that, with the growing demand for derivative instruments from hedge funds, it made perfect sense to take over one of the best in Europe. This was quite painful for the LSE, given its local proximity to Liffe. Deutsche Börse also took advantage of its new source of capital to take over Clearstream in 2002, to establish a more vertical operation. Through the acquisition of Clearstream, Deutsche Börse was now able to provide not only the venue for conducting the trades, but also the location for settling and clearing them, similar to the model operating at Bolsa y Mercado Españole (BME) and Borsa Italiana. It must be said that, during the takeover discussions between the exchanges, it became clear that should Deutsche Börse merge with another European exchange it would be hard for it to retain control of Clearstream, as this would mean that it would have dominance in terms of both the volume of trades and where they are cleared and settled. The combination of Deutsche Börse and Clearstream also raised another problem for regulators, concerning the governance issues associated with the combinations of exchanges with central securities depositories (CSDs) and central counterparties (CCPs). According to Russo and Papathanassiou,11 many are worried about ‘the extent to which vertical integration of stock exchanges with depositories and clearing houses that all belong to a vertical silo may impede horizontal integration of those service providers across national borders’. The national regulators are also concerned by ‘the extent to which governance is a tool for ensuring appropriate management of service providers that provide a wide range of services underpinned by very divergent risk profiles under the same legal entity’. These include international CSDs (ICSDs) ‘that offer security depository services as well as banking services assuming credit risk, CSDs
7
Current challenges and future implications
that also perform central counterparty services, and stock exchanges that also act as central securities depositories’. In order to alleviate such concerns, a code of conduct agreement was reached on 7 November 2006 between the European exchanges and clearing organisations and EU Commissioner Charlie McCreevy for improving transparency and reducing the costs of cross-border trading. The code establishes a phased timetable for implementation: by 31 December 2006, price transparency will be in place; by 30 June 2007, access and interoperability conditions will be established; and by 1 January 2008, service unbundling and accounting separation will be implemented. Over the years, the US market has also witnessed a number of domestic acquisitions, as mentioned above; the most newsworthy of which was the recent combination of two giants of the world of derivatives – the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the Chicago Board of Trade – which has created the world’s most extensive and diverse global derivatives exchange, with average daily trading volumes of around 9 million contracts per day. It would be interesting to see how the other derivatives exchanges around the world react to this news. It is quite plausible that this transaction has set in motion a series of other combinations in this space. Although these transactions make the headlines, what many fail to consider is whether these combinations, especially those involving two or more national exchanges, are undertaken for the benefit of the management of these institutions (this is to improve their own personal status),12 their shareholders or the market participants. There is no doubt that, when the exchange combinations were initially announced, all three stakeholders were deemed to benefit from the transaction. The win-win scenario would arise from the increasingly efficient operations of the combined group, generated through economies of scale and even perhaps scope, as a result of which trading costs would fall and the profitability of the exchange would increase. According to Malkamäki,13 merging two national exchanges would result in operational cost savings of around 40 per cent. Translating these savings into reductions in costs of trade has, however, been more difficult to achieve. Shojai and Wang14 compared the cost of trading on the major exchanges from 1999, the year prior to the establishment of Euronext, to the end of 2001 and found that the cost of trading French stocks in Paris has gone up by around 50 per cent,15 three times the average of the other major exchanges. In fact, the increase has been so pronounced that the cost of trading shares in Paris has gone from being around 30 per cent less than Frankfurt in 1998 to being 20 per cent more in 2001. This goes against the logic used to justify consolidation among exchanges. Unlike Paris, however, the Tokyo Stock Exchange seems to have become very efficient for investors. It has reduced costs of trading by over 20 per cent during this period.16 Some might argue that limiting the study to 2001 might be unfair as it would be too short a time period for the anticipated benefits of the merger to be crystallised, which is a fair comment. However, even after we extend the study to the end of 2005 (see Exhibit 1.4), we find that the Paris exchange is still the only exchange, in addition to UK-buys (not sells, which has fallen by 6 per cent) where the cost of trade has actually increased. Consequently, based on the data available, we can see that exchange combinations have not benefited market participants. If anything, they increase the explicit cost of trade.
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Exhibit 1.4 Overall cost of executing trades (basis points) % change (1999–2001)
2005
% change (1999–2005)
1999
2000
2001
Japan
25.17
22.06
19.92
79
19.55
Germany
28.73
29.28
30.67
107
22.38
78
US – NYSE
24.55
28.39
32.18
131
23.26
95
UK – sells
30.50
38.81
35.93
118
28.80
94
UK – buys
71.74
72.74
69.01
96
76.14
106
Switzerland
36.51
33.58
36.65
100
31.85
87 110
78
France
24.87
33.83
36.95
149
27.37
Italy
34.16
38.97
37.24
109
32.36
95
US – Nasdaq
33.28
36.34
38.60
116
30.32
91
Source: Elkins/McSherry
However, if our aim is to ascertain the potential benefits of exchange combinations, we should focus solely on the explicit costs, which are the costs that increased efficiency can reduce. Based purely on explicit costs, Tokyo was the cheapest market, where trades cost around 80 per cent of those of Paris. With regard to the impact of exchange combinations on liquidity, history tells us that, as the number of exchanges fall, the worse the liquidity becomes for the shares of the not-so-giant companies,17 especially if pan-European indices become the rule. Shares of companies that fall out of these indices will certainly have less trading activity than those that are included. For example, just imagine that there is one exchange in Europe, and the chosen index, which typically accompanies an exchange, is the Dow Jones Eurostoxx50, which has an active futures contract. It would not be hard to imagine how many household names actively traded today will sooner or later become nothing more than orphan stocks.18 The best examples are certain shares in Germany, such as Porsche AG, where liquidity is greater within some of the regional exchanges than in Frankfurt itself, because that is where the activity is greatest for these stocks. Creating a single European market will certainly lead to what many had anticipated back in 1999, when the euro became a currency, which was the creation of one or two dominant pan-European indices. Well, we all know that is not the case yet, and we should certainly be grateful for that. But having a single exchange will certainly speed up the process and kill the liquidity in those shares that are today part of the FTSE 100 or CAC 40 but fall off the radar in a pan-European index. The reality is that, even if exchanges are able to save 40 per cent on their operational costs, which Malkamäki19 finds to be the case, one would not expect that to have much of an impact on the overall costs of trade, as that does not amount to much, especially when one considers the number of trades that go through these institutions every day. However, were the organisations that provide regulatory oversight, clearing and settlement to merge, the savings could be huge.
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Current challenges and future implications
It is the after-trade costs that really need to be reduced, especially for pan-European trades, not the execution costs per se. However, it seems quite interesting that, while the exchanges are merging quite aggressively across borders, consolidation among settlement and clearing organisations has been quite rare in Europe, with LCH-Clearnet’s merger in 2003 being an important exception, although the benefits of this specific combination seem to be more elusive than initially anticipated. It is through greater cross-border efficiencies among these institutions that costs of trade, especially across Europe, which Hobson20 finds to be seven to ten times higher than costs for domestic trades in the US and which the European Union internal market commissioner Charlie McCreevy finds to be six times domestic European settlements, can be reduced. Even greater collaboration, by allowing users of a trading platform to choose their clearing and settlement providers, and interoperability would help. In the US, however, there seems to be a growing recognition of this fact. The announcement by the National Association of Dealers (NASD) and the NYSE in November of 2006 that they plan to merge their respective self-regulatory operations into a single watchdog, which ‘will be the private sector regulator for all securities brokers and dealers doing business with the public in the United States’ is a step in the right direction. The two partners stated that they ‘expected to reduce regulatory costs to the industry by millions per year once the operations are fully integrated’.
Repercussions of the bursting of the internet bubble Of course, with the crash of the stock market many started looking for people to blame for the fact that they had lost money. This was an unprecedented crash, even more severe than the Crash of 1929. The Crash of 1929 resulted in a loss of value equal to 50 per cent of the US GDP of the time and it took ten years for the markets to recover the losses. The markets still have a long way to go to fully recoup the losses incurred on the two major US exchanges subsequent to the crash of March 2000.21 The overall loss of value of the recent crash was equal to 70 per cent of the US GDP in 2000. The severity of the crash meant that people wanted an explanation about why it was not foreseen, even though Alan Greenspan, the world’s most respected market commentator, had in December 199622 accused the markets of irrational exuberance. Shojai and Wang suggest that [the] reason that few, if any, investors took his advice was because the people around them kept on telling them that it was still possible to make very easy money from the markets and that they would lose out on a great opportunity if they left the markets. Of course, our own personal greed also played an important part. And, to some extent we were all correct in our assertions. The markets continued to appreciate for a further four years. But, of course, reality set in and we all know what happened next.23 Nevertheless, soon after the hunt began, the discovery of a very interesting series of e-mails from Henry Blodget of Merrill Lynch gave those who had lost money the ammunition they needed to actively pursue those same investment bankers, whose advice they very much valued prior to the crash and whose relationships were treasured for getting access to highly profitable initial public offerings, to be compensated for their losses. The result was a number of record penalty payments by the biggest and the best of Wall Street and agreements with the New York
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State Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer, to separate research from investment banking. Four years have passed since that agreement was reached and as yet it has not been fully enforced. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) decision in July 2006 has made it less likely that separation of research and investment banking will be enforced, since it has left it to the banks and the asset managers to decide whether they wish to separate the two functions. As of January 2006, however, the UK’s Financial Services Authority requires that payments for research be separated from trading and other services and that investment managers disclose how much they have spent on various services to their investors.24 Another repercussion of the bursting of the internet bubble was the passing of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745; also known as the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002) by the US Congress on 30 July 2002, with the principal intention of making directors of corporations more accountable to their shareholders, although the Act also covers the issue of separation of research from investment banking. Formaini and Siems25 suggest that, while the intention of increasing transparency and accountability is a noble one, the actual execution of the overreaching Act is less than desirable, making it quite costly for companies to implement.26 The significantly increased cost of compliance with the Act has induced many firms to take their shares off the public markets and go private. Of course, this trend has coincided with the huge increase in the levels of liquidity available to private equity firms who wish to take over major public corporations. Nevertheless, despite the growing influence of private equity firms, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is believed by many to be responsible for the decision by many companies to take their shares off the US public markets. Aggarwal and Dahiya27 find that voluntary deregistrations by US firms increased from 14 in 2000 to 183 in 2003, the year after the Act was signed into legislation. The case for delisting is even stronger for foreign firms that also have cross-listings on US exchanges, where Section 302 of the Act is particularly onerous for their CEOs and CFOs. According to Pozen,28 the ‘uncertain civil and criminal liabilities implicated by these certifications are truly daunting to the top executives of foreign companies’. Grant and Moher29 estimate that the additional costs of compliance are approximately US$2m and that as a result audit fees have increased by between 30 and 40 per cent. As a result, many believe that not only will the number of new and cross-listings by foreign firms fall in the US, but that many companies that are already listed will consider delisting; the result of which is a decrease in revenues for the major US exchanges, which are more reliant on listings than their European peers, such as Euronext and Deutsche Börse (see Exhibit 1.5). According to Marosi and Massoud,30 the number of foreign firms with cross-listings in the US that have announced their intentions to delist went from fewer than ten throughout the 1990s to 31 in 2005. Aggarwal and Dahiya31 find that the number of new listings by foreign firms had also fallen dramatically, from 95 in 2000 to 29 in 2005, hitting a low of 13 in 2003. While the US exchanges are suffering from the new Act, their competitors in London and Luxembourg have become more attractive to those companies that wish to have foreign listings. According to Aggarwal and Dahiya, of the US$32.5bn raised in 2005, over half was raised in London and Luxembourg, as compared to 31 per cent over the preceding five years. There were 51 Global Depository Receipts issued in London and Luxembourg in 2005, more than twice the 2004 figure.
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Current challenges and future implications
Exhibit 1.5 Annual fees for different exchanges, 2005 Market capitalisation of £100m LSE Main Market LSE AIM
4,029
£500m 8,235
£10bn 34,515
4,180
4,180
n/a
19,110
19,110
273,000
16,653
24,297
40,950
11,466
11,466
n/a
Euronext
2,752
8,256
13,760
Deutsche Börse
5,160
5,160
5,160
NYSE Nasdaq National* Nasdaq Small Cap*
* The annual fee on NYSE, Nasdaq and Euronext is calculated with reference to the number of shares outstanding; for the purpose of this illustration, a median level of share prices observed on the NYSE (c. £14), Nasdaq (c. £7) and Euronext (c. £27) is assumed in order to allow estimation of annual fees. Source: Oxera calculations based on information available from the exchanges
One way that the US exchanges can overcome the hurdles created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and regain their market share of global listings would be to acquire exchanges based overseas, such as the recently announced combination of the NYSE and Euronext. According to the 15 June 2006 CIBC World Markets’ research report, CIBC expects ‘the transfer of the NYSE brand to Euronext to be one of the strongest revenue synergies of the deal. International companies would be able to list on the NYSE-Euronext exchange, trade in Europe, have the cachet of an NYSE listing and need not concern themselves with Sarbanes-Oxley regulations.’ Nasdaq is also trying to follow the NYSE by attempting to take over the LSE, in which it holds 25.1 per cent (as at November 2006). There is no doubt that the companies that list on the merged exchange can benefit from the cachet of being listed on NYSE-Euronext. However, it is highly unlikely that while Sarbanes-Oxley is in force there would be much of an economic benefit to the merger, as the two exchanges will not be able to operate on a single platform. Putting the two exchanges on a single platform might mean that the companies listed on the new exchange might fall under the auspices of the Act, something both exchanges vehemently wish to avoid. The major US exchanges were not the only major losers in the aftermath of the stock market crash. The ATSs, which were created by and as a result of the advent of those same new disruptive technologies that the speculative bubble was founded on, discovered that, when the tide was turned, their attraction to the investors had also waned. As demand for trading fell, due to increased competition and lower trading volumes overall, so did the power of these alternative trading venues.32 Finally, as a consequence of the tough market conditions for ATSs and the growing power of the two major exchanges, Nasdaq and the NYSE took over the last three major electronic communication networks (ECNs) – Brass utility, Archipelago and Instinet/Island.33
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Current challenges and future implications
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There are, of course, other ECNs – such as Tradebook (owned by Bloomberg), Attain (owned by Domestic Securities), Track ECN (owned by Track Data Corporation) and Nextrade – as well as a number of successful micro-exchanges, such as GFI and ICAP, which are still operating in the markets. However, they have found it hard to replicate the dominance experienced by their predecessors, who in combination used to control over 70 per cent of Nasdaq’s trading volume. The problems facing ECNs are not, however, limited to the falling trading volumes. Even though trading volumes have picked up quite dramatically in the last few years, the fortunes of ECNs have not been able to match that. The main issue facing ECNs is that the increasing trading volumes coincided with the adoption of the National Market System rules, Reg. NMS, in June 2005. Reg. NMS, which has four parts (trade-through rule, market data, market access and abolition of sub-penny quoting), has certainly introduced some advantages for ECNs, such as the ability to sell market data and to trade listed securities. This means that ECNs can now compete with the NYSE, which should help to increase revenues, although the NYSE’s hybrid market, which was created in combination with its new division, Archipelago, should make it harder for ECNs to take away liquidity from the Big Board. However, the disadvantages of Reg. NMS seem to be bigger than its advantages. First, access fees, the most important source of revenues for ECNs, will be cut, and quite dramatically; more than 60 per cent based on some estimates. Secondly, the abolition of sub-penny quotes will remove another advantage that ECNs have over established exchanges. Finally, the trade-through rule prohibits those who have access to the Intermarket Trading System (ITS) from executing an order at a price worse than that posted by another ITS participant. It would be interesting to see whether ECNs would be able to meet such best execution requirements. In addition to the changes introduced by Reg. NMS in the US, the European market is also undergoing a major transformation as a result of the introduction of the second pan-European financial services Directive, MiFID.
Implications of MiFID Coinciding with the changes introduced by Reg. NMS in the US was the introduction of MiFID in Europe. MiFID (Markets in Financial Instruments Directive), which is an essential part of the EU’s Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), designed to provide a legislative framework for creating a single European market for financial services, is believed by some to be ‘the largest shakeup of the financial markets since the Big Bang’.34 From an exchange perspective, the main features of the new Directive deal with where trades can be conducted and how they can be reported. In markets where concentration rules (that is legal requirements that investment firms route orders to the national exchanges exclusively) were not applied, such as the UK and Germany, national exchanges have for some years faced competition from what MiFID terms systematic internalisers, which are typically investment banks that regularly try to match client orders with securities that they are holding on their own books, rather than trading them on a recognised exchange. Of course, given that the trade occurs off-exchange means that it would be hard to ascertain whether best execution was achieved. Furthermore, if the trades go unreported, or the reporting is not immediate, there would be price discrepancy in the market, as information about all trades is not incorporated into the price provided by the exchange.
13
Current challenges and future implications
However, under MiFID’s transparency regime, these systemic internalisers are required to publish information about trades in over-the-counter (OTC) stocks to end-investors within three minutes of the transaction, to report trades in all instruments to the national regulator by close of business of the following day, and to provide information about all off-book activity to the primary exchange and a number of multilateral trading facilities (MTFs) and third parties. Despite these requirements, the Directive is now making it legal for these investment banks to compete directly with the national exchanges in markets where concentration rules were still in effect prior to MiFID – such as Euronext, Borsa Italiana and BME; the result is further dispersion of pools of liquidity. In response to these changes, a number of investment banks are considering establishing their own trading platforms and becoming MTFs or ATSs in their own right in order to benefit from different rules under the Directive. The announcement by a group of seven global investment banks – Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley and UBS – that they are establishing a new pan-European trading platform to compete with the regional exchanges (Project Turquoise) was of such concern that it was mentioned as one of the main reasons why Deutsche Börse had abandoned its plans to merge with Euronext. Reto Francioni, Deutsche Börse’s CEO, announced that he views the threat from the new ATSs as being very serious and that he would be focusing his attention on seeing how these changes impact the dynamics of the European exchange markets. The reason that the threat from the group of seven, which will certainly increase in the number of members soon, has to be taken very seriously is because, according to the Financial Times, they control over 50 per cent of existing order flows in Europe. However, Europe is not the only region where exchanges are facing serious threats from the establishment of internal crossing networks by investment banks. The aforementioned Reg. NMS also increased the level of competition facing exchanges and the established ECNs in the US. In 2006, an industry-wide initiative was established in the US to access dark liquidity pools, which are not available on major exchanges. Called BIDS (Block Interest Discovery Service), it was founded by UBS, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley. The main aim of these industry-wide initiatives is to reduce costs of trades by eliminating exchange transaction fees. Additionally, electronification of the system helps reduce costs for the brokers. A number of investment banks have also established their own independent internal crossing networks in the US, such as Goldman Sachs’ Sigma, Credit Suisse’s CrossFinder and Citigroup’s ACE, to ensure that they retain control over their order flows and prevent them from being lost to other ATSs. One of the attractions of these internal crossing networks, or any crossing network, for the buy-side community is the ability to conduct large trades without having much market impact. However, the buy-side firms are concerned that the proprietary desks of the brokerage firms that establish the ATS might also have access to this pool of liquidity and get access to information about their interests. That is why many still prefer to participate in independent crossing networks, such as ITG’s Posit (though it is now partnering with Merrill Lynch), Liquidnet, Pipeline Trading Systems and Nyfix Millennium. In order to alleviate the concerns of its clients, Goldman Sachs is not only providing access to internal and customer-to-customer crossings, it is also providing users of its Sigma X network access to a number of dark liquidity pools, including internal
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Current challenges and future implications
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liquidity from Goldman Sachs & Co, external crossing networks, electronic market-makers such as Automated Trading Desk, and Sigma ATS.35 More importantly, users can opt out of matching against all Goldman liquidity within Sigma X. In the future, Goldman Sachs is planning to allow its clients to place resting orders on its Sigma ATS, which means that they can provide, as well as extract, block liquidity from the system. Under the current system, passive orders are required to be held on the client’s blotter or placed on the public markets. In addition to taking away transaction fee revenues from the exchanges, some of these new MTFs or ATSs are also considering becoming financial data publishers, in direct competition with established exchanges. In early 2006, a group of nine investment banks – ABN Amro, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley and UBS – announced that they had plans to establish a pan-European platform for the collection and sale of trading data, in direct competition with European exchanges. They might even follow the example of Bats, an ECN, and offer real-time market data free in return for trading volumes. In that case, it would be much harder for the exchanges to continue charging for market data. As a result, the major exchanges are facing falling revenues from two of their most important sources – exchange transaction fees and market data provision.36 The major European exchanges are reacting to these developments and establishing their own in-house capabilities to allow banks and brokers to execute orders against their own books. Their aim is to entice the brokerage community to use the exchanges’ systems rather than create their own. For example, Deutsche Börse is introducing new reporting services to help clients comply with the pre- and post-trade reporting and transparency requirements of MiFID. Similarly, Euronext, despite being against the implications of the Directive on exchanges, is planning to develop a new transaction platform that will enable banks and brokers to internalise trades. Consequently, a combination of MiFID in Europe and Reg. NMS in the US will significantly change the landscape of the European exchanges and significantly increase the sources of competition they face.
Contributions of this book Reading through the previous sections of this chapter, it becomes quite clear that the world of exchanges has faced a number of challenges in its history, especially during the past decade. Our objective with this book is to delve deeper into the causes of these challenges and assess their implications for the future of this industry. Of course, as was mentioned earlier, the fact that new announcements are made about the transformation of the industry almost on a daily basis might mean that many of the assessments made in this book could prove to be old news and many of the predictions challenged by events taking place subsequent to publication. However, while the speed of change makes our task a daunting one, it is quite comforting to know that the team that has been put together to ascertain the implications of the challenges currently facing the industry is among the best in the business. So, what do our experts say about this fascinating industry?
Transformation of the industry We begin our journey in Chapter 2, the first chapter to tackle the issue of the transformation that the world of exchanges has been undergoing, in which Iftekhar Hasan, Tina Hasenpusch and
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Heiko Schmiedel undertake an empirical investigation into the types of non-organic expansion strategies pursued by exchanges across the globe. Using the largest sample of exchanges to date and analysing a number of initiatives available, they find that in most developed markets opportunities for organic growth have been exhausted. As corporations aim to broaden their shareholder base and raise capital beyond local markets and as investors wish to invest more globally, at ever lower costs, exchanges will be forced to consider some form of partnership or combination in order to meet the needs of their most important stakeholders. The analysis conducted in Chapter 2 demonstrates that exchanges based within the less developed economies are likely to over time follow in the footsteps of their US and European peers. Albeit not being a prerequisite, the implementation of sophisticated technologies seemed to prove to be a viable vehicle for exchanges to leverage their production and to become more efficient marketplaces. In addition to organically growing their core services, exchanges discovered other options and mechanisms available for growth in the form of network strategies, such as different forms of alliances, mergers and acquisitions. Whereas weak forms of cooperation are used to interlink exchanges across the globe, strong forms of cooperation, that is mergers, seem to follow a certain pattern. Once the domestic market has been consolidated, exchanges start considering combinations with peers across borders, but still within their own regions. Such combinations include partnerships with counterparts that offer similar assets – Euronext is a good example of that – or between partners offering alternative assets, such as derivatives (Euronext-Liffe), and/or providers of clearing and settlement services, such as Deutsche Börse’s combination with Cleastream. The final step seems to be cross-regional deals, such as NYSE-Euronext, where exchanges merge with peers based in other regions of the world. The authors believe that, once less developed exchanges reach the levels of excellence achieved by their US and European peers, they too can be suitable partners for strong forms of cross-regional cooperation. Of course, the findings of Chapter 2 are not so black and white, as they find that there are alternative steps available to exchanges that do not wish to take part in full-blown combination. In fact, they find that a large majority of transactions between exchanges involve contractual agreements whereby the systems are still operating separate technical platforms. No matter what form of alliance exchanges choose, what the authors find is that, in order to survive in tomorrow’s world, exchanges will have to partner with their peers in order to provide the kinds of services that tomorrow’s companies and investors will demand. No matter what method of growth is selected by a given exchange, one has to bear in mind that, unlike most other industries, in the world of exchanges growth is not pursued simply to increase revenues or profits, though that is certainly the most important objective for their shareholders. If executed correctly, size can also be accompanied with greater liquidity, something that all exchanges strive for and is the main determinant factor for long-term success. Consequently, exchanges try to grow in size in order to benefit from economies of scale in order to help reduce costs of trade, which hopefully leads to capturing a greater proportion of the liquidity present in the market. However, this relationship is not as clear-cut as it seems; hence the emphasis on the words ‘executed correctly’, because size, and the lower costs associated with it, and liquidity do not always go hand in hand. In Chapter 3, Wayne H. Wagner tackles this ageold issue of immediacy versus costs of trade from the perspective of the structure of the exchange. Wagner looks at the tools available to institutional traders who wish to trade blocks of stock. One common method applied now is the use of algorithms to chop large trades into retail-sized pieces
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that can be completed without human intervention and executed in a rapid-fire succession. However, this is not a complete solution to institutional trading needs. Wagner finds that, while there is not really a need for a physical central marketplace, such as the NYSE floor, matching large sell-orders of a stock with a large buy-order of the same stock would be difficult without human intervention. He finds that, while electronic exchanges are helpful for simple, liquid trades, even acting as price discovery mechanisms, executing large complex trades still requires human intervention. He suggests that, while the progress made by the electronic exchanges is very impressive, they have as yet not been able to tackle the issue of finding the other side for large complex trades, especially when there is a great need for immediacy. Consequently, he believes that, until electronic exchanges can satisfy the needs of both small and large investors, they will have a tough time completely replacing human intervention. Whether that human intervention is best provided on an exchange floor or over the telephone lines is a different matter. Wagner believes that ‘the sell-side is poised to capture this business by automating the handling of large institutional orders, internalising where possible, and intelligently routing to limit information leakage’. Wagner also believes that it would be hard to beat the prestige players, such as the NYSE, though they can certainly be challenged. Large chunks of their business can be routed elsewhere, but their reputations will help them survive in the long run. Their scale makes them natural monopolies, which helps attract liquidity, which in turn attracts more liquidity. Stock exchanges are not the only exchanges that are facing intense competition from incumbents and new technology-driven competitors. The world of derivatives exchanges is also extremely competitive and becoming even more so. However, studies of the competitive landscape of derivatives trading are quite rare and it seems this highly fascinating part of the world of finance is not receiving the necessary attention it deserves. That is why, in Chapter 4, Jens Nystedt provides an in-depth look at the world of derivatives exchanges and assesses what it takes to succeed. Chapter 4 begins with a look at the explosive growth experienced by traded derivatives, with total open interest of financial derivatives rising from US$87tn in 1998 to US$434tn by 2006, which Nystedt attributes to a number of factors, such as greater comfort level on the part of investors, harmonisation of regulations, increasing number of hedge funds, falling transactions costs as a result of a greater degree of competition and electronification, and proliferation of derivatives across the globe, with some emerging markets becoming the largest derivatives exchanges in the world in terms of volume. However, despite this tremendous growth, competition within this market is huge. The reasons are that there are significant economies of scale in operating a derivatives exchange and there is always the threat of commoditisation. Therefore, trying to corner liquidity is no easy task. Two very important contributions of this chapter are in the way it highlights how the relationship between the two competing markets, namely exchanges and OTC, might be misunderstood and also how competitors can actually take business away from each other. In terms of the relationship between exchanges and OTC, Nystedt suggests that the transparent nature of the instruments traded on the former does not bode well for innovation, hence the greater level of innovation is in the OTC market. However, despite this competitive disadvantage, in addition to the possible regulatory advantages in terms of oversight and compliance that the OTC market has (especially in offshore markets), exchanges can benefit from the existence of
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OTC competitors because they can in turn become clients of their clearing services, which are businesses that benefit from significant economies of scale. In addition, many of the contracts issued in the OTC market are hedged on the exchanges to reduce market risks, hence creating another source of revenue. With regard to taking business from competitors, Nystedt provides two fascinating examples of what it really takes to win. He finds that simply having an electronic advantage, which should help to reduce the costs of trading on that venue, is not enough and that you need to have a certain level of liquidity before you can challenge the incumbents, as Deutsche Termin Börse demonstrated with Liffe. However, you also need your established competitors to be asleep and for the regulators to not slow down the process of issuing regulatory approvals, as was the case in Eurex-US and the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT). When Eurex-US tried to take on CBOT, by providing cheaper and perhaps more efficient services, the latter reduced its cost of trading in advance, which made it very hard for the former to get the kind of liquidity needed to start challenging CBOT. However, the case of the International Stock Exchange (ISE) proves that reducing costs and improving efficiency can be successful if you stick to your strategy over the long term and provide a cheaper and more efficient service. As a bottom line, Nystedt believes that we have seen only the start of a more intense derivatives market competition and that efforts towards consolidation, towards bigger is better, and concerning how OTC derivatives markets are incorporated in a typical derivatives exchange’s strategy will determine who is left standing five years from now. In Chapter 5, Eric Benhamou, Michel Everaert and Thomas Serval focus specifically on the implications that the introduction of new technologies have had on the competitive landscape of the world of exchanges. They assess how new technologies have helped to break down the traditional financial services supply pyramids, have lowered barriers to entry and consequently levelled the playing field, and have helped blur the lines between the contributions made by market participants. They find that the most extreme application of new technologies to the world of exchanges has been the establishment of micro-exchanges, which take advantage of the network capabilities of the internet and cheaper technology development costs of offshore locations to established markets, sometimes staffed by only a few people, that combine electronic trading and auctions for the use of professional participants. Of course, established exchanges have also benefited greatly from the advancements made in technology. New technologies have allowed the major exchanges to significantly improve how they service their users; an issue that Chapter 5 looks into in great detail. But it is the application of new technologies to micro-exchanges that is most fascinating. The authors discuss how these exchanges, for which the primary objective is to bring together buyers and sellers in new ways at the lowest possible cost, have made it possible to create efficient markets in assets that were still using processes that were centuries old. For example, the South African Futures Exchange enabled South African farmers to sell their produce at a higher price by squeezing the margins of intermediaries and in turn reducing the subsidies that the farmers were receiving, as well as improving the efficiency with which the entire product provision process was managed. These micro-exchanges, while focusing predominantly on markets with pricing anomalies too small for traditional exchanges and where electronification of the process has not yet happened, have also taken on the big boys. For example, the OMX market in Sweden started life
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as a micro-exchange and is now a major global player (and at one time even wanted to take over the LSE). As our knowledge of the areas where technology can improve efficiencies increases, so will our familiarity with the phenomenon that is the micro-exchanges.
Challenges confronting exchanges In Chapter 6, the first chapter to tackle the ‘issues confronting exchanges’, Daniela Russo and Simonetta Rosati describe the European experience in overcoming the barriers to market integration in the post-trade industry and find that it is no easy task. They review the steps taken since the adoption of the euro in promoting further integration in the industry and find that progress has been hampered by ‘a number of concurrent causes, such as vested interests, and the presence of technical, legal and fiscal barriers, and that appropriate positive actions need to be taken to support an adequate pace of adaptation of the infrastructure environment for the needs of integrated financial markets’. They find that the European post-trade landscape is still fragmented, and note that there is a slow uptake in the use of the links between securities settlement systems to settle cross-border trades. Eighty per cent of the total cross-border collateral was transferred in monetary policy and central bank credit operations using the Correspondent Central Banking Model (CCBM), a temporary solution developed by central banks (the CCBM can be used only to deliver collateral to the eurosystem, not for transfers among market participants, and data on cross-border transfers among market participants are not available). Russo and Rosati also discuss some of the more recent initiatives undertaken by public authorities at the regulatory level, such as the adaptation by central banks and securities regulators of the CPSS-Iosco (Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and International Organization of Securities Commission) ‘Recommendations for securities clearing and settlement’ to the European Union context, in the form of a report adopted by the Governing Council of the European Central Bank and the Committee of European Securities Regulators in October 2004. The aim of this agreement was inter alia to design a coordination framework for the conduct of oversight by the different EU competent authorities, as well as at the operational level, such as the Target2-Securities project. While applauding these initiatives, the authors suggest that the solution to the integrated European post-trade landscape problem lies within a partnership between financial institutions and regulators, including coordination with initiatives supported by other authorities, and not a top-down regulatory approach in which solutions are imposed. Interestingly, they find that, while national governments are being slower than expected in removing legal and tax barriers, other public and private initiatives have been undertaken to accelerate progress on other fronts. For instance, the private sector agreement to abide by their own Code of Conduct for achieving the required transparency, interoperability and free access conditions in 2006 in response to the European Commission orientation to favour market solutions in a first instance, instead of proposing new legislation, receives special praise as an important step in the direction of resorting to modern forms of cooperation between public and private stakeholders in line with the principles of better regulation adopted by the European authorities, including the possibility of resorting to soft-law alternatives to regulation, as is also recognised in the 2003 Interinstitutional Agreement on better law-making. Regulators should certainly work hard to assist in removing the barriers that currently impede integration, while at the same time, of course, ensuring that there is an optimal balance between consolidation, which
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increases efficiency, and risk awareness and management, and protection of risk management practices from being sacrificed in the process of pursuing commercial objectives. Overall, from the perspective of technical infrastructure, Russo and Rosati find that, notwithstanding some consolidation progress, the current post-trade landscape is still highly fragmented with around 16 securities settlement systems in the 12 euro-area member states37 (so far, systems’ technical integration has not followed legal consolidation by the private sector). Currently, in the field of securities settlement there is still nothing comparable to the fully integrated infrastructure for payments. For this reason, the authors argue that an operational role by the central banks, as in the case of the Target2-Securities project, would support market efficiency and serve the post-trade industry by providing a single entry point for settlement of domestic and cross-border securities transactions in central bank money. Another challenge facing exchanges is the implication of demutualisation and the introduction of another set of stakeholders, namely shareholders. In Chapter 7, Reena Aggarwal, Allen Ferrell and Jonathan Katz look at the implications of exchange demutualisations for their dual role of being for-profit institutions and self-regulatory organisations (SROs) that oversee the activities of their members and the companies that list on them. The authors highlight the fact that the problem arises because exchanges, similarly to any other business, have to either reduce costs, which includes regulatory costs that their electronic peers, such as ATSs, do not face, or increase revenues, which can be achieved by increasing trading volume, through either adding new listings or by acquiring other exchanges or trading platforms, in order to keep growing their profits. Consequently, many are concerned that some exchanges may not be as inclined to enforce their market oversight tasks as they should be in order to attract investors and listings. In response to such concerns, the NYSE and Nasdaq have both established separate subsidiaries, with separate boards, to undertake the self-regulatory functions. The authors describe the exact functioning of these separate bodies and provide prescriptive advice on how to tackle the governance issues arising from exchange demutualisations. A very important contribution of Chapter 7, however, is its analysis of the implication of global exchanges for the governance of these institutions and how their corporate structures can influence how the companies listed on them are treated by regulations in effect within the different jurisdictions where the exchanges are located. For example, they highlight the concerns that some companies have raised about falling under the auspices of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act should the NYSE and Euronext merge. Aggarwal, Ferrell and Katz point to a number of situations where companies listed on Euronext need not worry about the merger and a situation that might be of concern. The options are as follows: firstly, if Euronext had to register as an exchange with the SEC, it would have to submit to the SEC its rules and rule changes for approval, ensure compliance by its members with the myriad provisions of the Exchange Act, comply with SRO governance requirements and Reg. NMS, which under the auspices of the trade-through rule prohibits trades that occur at prices inferior to quotations that are immediately accessible through automatic execution. Secondly, even if Euronext does not have to register, the companies quoted on it might have to register with the SEC ‘if there are more than 500 owners of record of the company’s equity securities worldwide, with 300 of those investors being in the United States, with the company having more than US$10m in assets’. Companies can use Rule 12g3–2(b) of the Exchange Act to be exempted if they had not listed on a registered exchange, had not made a
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public offering in the US and had fewer than 300 US resident investors at the time of application. More importantly, the authors suggest that the SEC has gone out of its way to assure companies listed on Euronext that they will not be forced to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley requirements should the two exchanges merge. However, while these exemption options are available, the important issue here is that, in order to be exempt, the two exchanges have to operate on separate trading platforms. Should they have merged the exchanges onto one platform, which is where the main economies of scale would have been derived from, then getting an exemption from Sarbanes-Oxley would be pretty much impossible. Another important motivation behind the merged group was to take advantage of economies of scope that could be derived from operating an equity market in conjunction with a derivatives market, such as the ability to offer investors the option of purchasing a covered call. The authors highlight that, should the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) change its softtouch approach of no-action exemptions from US regulation to foreign derivatives exchanges operating in the US, Euronext-Liffe might find itself being regulated by CFTC rather than the Financial Services Authority. The book concludes with Chapter 8, in which Simon Bennett provides an overview of the implications of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) for the European exchange landscape. The chapter starts off by looking at what MiFID is, what its aims are and how it impacts the major stakeholders, such as markets, products and investors. Subsequent to the introduction of the Directive, Bennett looks at how it might impact the world of exchanges. He finds that, given the large array of changes being introduced within the European landscape – such as the Single European Payments Area, the Market Abuse Directive, UCITS III, the EU Savings Directive, the Transparency Directive (Issuer Information) and Basel II, with the latter being very high on the executives’ agenda – MiFID is by no means the only game in town. Consequently, different markets within the European Union will choose to prioritise the issues they wish to implement, which could result in a situation where some markets implement MiFID earlier than others – what Bennett calls ‘asymmetric implementation’. As a result, larger multinational investment banks may try to take advantage of such differences and book business onto the balance sheet of those divisions that are based in the laggard economies, where they would be more lightly regulated. One of the most important implications of MiFID will be the abolishment of the concentration rules, which means that countries such as France and Spain will no longer be able to force client orders to be routed through a specific national exchange and that they will be forced to open their order flows to outside competition from other liquidity pools. Of course, while this means that there would be a more level playing field in the European exchange landscape, it might also result in a fragmentation of liquidity. With regard to the other potential implication of MiFID, namely consolidation among exchanges, Bennett believes that the influence of the Directive is somewhat exaggerated here, as most institutions were involved in some kind of merger talks long before MiFID was being introduced. Consequently, while MiFID might be of assistance here, it will not be the major cause for such activities. Similarly, in the post-trade environment, MiFID would be a secondary driver to consolidations, as a number of mergers are already consummated or in the advanced discussion stage.
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Overall, Bennett believes that, while MiFID’s objectives are beneficial, many of the changes that the industry is undergoing are caused by market factors other than the Directive. The Directive will certainly assist, but, given that its objectives keep on being modified, it is too early to state with any degree of certainty what its long-term implications would be over and above what the industry was experiencing prior to its introduction.
Conclusion Reading through the contributions made by the authors in this book, it becomes clear that we are living through some of the most exciting times in the history of exchanges. How the future pans out will not be an easy thing to predict. But predict we must, given the mandate imposed on us by the publishers of this book. So, where do I see the future of the industry going? Before I answer that question, I must admit that I was one of the first people to buy into the concept of using new technologies to pretty much disintermediate a number of activities conducted by financial institutions.38 But the reality turned out to be quite different. Not only did the disintermediation of financial advisers not take place, if anything the crash of March 2000 made investors more aware of their own shortcomings and they flooded back to the offices of their brokers and private bankers. Of course, maybe we can blame the crash for the fact that many of the predictions about the benefits of the internet did not come true, since subsequent to the crash most people were physically hurt by anything that sounded like e-business. But, despite that, the fact remains that advice became important once again and people realised that, unless the markets continuously go up, they would need advice in order to improve the performance of their investments, assuming of course that advice can in fact help, which I still do not believe to be the case. Nevertheless, if nothing else, losing money due to someone else’s advice is less painful as you now have someone to blame. Based on the same premise, I genuinely do not believe that new technologies will be able to fully disintermediate the major exchanges. I also do not believe that complex trading tools could remove the need for brokers for anything other than average-sized vanilla trades. Certainly the competition will help to reduce costs, but for large complex trades the involvement of brokers will be essential. As the use of derivatives increases in global portfolios – something that should have happened a long time ago – the value of the brokers will in fact increase in the eyes of the professional investment community. Add to that the blurring of the lines between traditional managers and hedge funds and it becomes clear that trades will continue to get larger and more complex, increasing the value of brokers. With regard to the exchanges, the same logic seems to hold true. While major brokerage firms will work on creating their own versions of MTFs, they will find it hard to replace the national exchanges, assuming of course that the exchanges do react effectively to the new threat of competition. The steps taken by Deutsche Börse, by introducing new reporting services to help clients comply with the pre- and post-trade reporting and transparency requirements of MiFID; Euronext, developing a new transaction platform that will enable banks and brokers to internalise trades; and the NYSE, such as its hybrid market, are good examples of the ways in which the exchanges are fighting back. I believe that the resulting fragmentation of liquidity and the lack of experience brokerage firms have in competing on trading technology with national exchanges and established ECNs will over time result in the markets returning to those same old pools of
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liquidity. Online trading in a number of financial assets has been quite successful, but in situations where the original market has reacted successfully they have been able to regain the market. The foreign exchange market is a good example of that. Even the equities markets have experienced losing volumes to ECNs, to later reclaim some of the lost business back. The combination of exchanges being the natural sources of liquidity and the increasing demand for liquidity in the future means that the future might even look brighter for those same national monopolies that many are writing off today. As for global exchanges, so long as the US is afflicted with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which makes creating a single global platform extremely unattractive to the companies that list on their overseas partners, such a scenario would be extremely unlikely. Of course, there might be two exchanges based in two different continents within the same holding group, but I would not call that a global exchange. I personally foresee a number of major regional exchanges in each major region, such as the US, Europe and Asia, with a number of unified regional exchanges in the smaller markets, such as the Middle East, Africa and South America. I also see a greater number of stock and derivatives exchanges combining to take advantage of economies of scope, which given the limitations imposed on global stock exchanges might have a greater chance of success. Finally, I hope that you will enjoy reading this book and that it helps provide you with a better understanding of the root causes of the major changes facing the world of exchanges and where the forces of change might take us in the future.
1 Stout, L. A. (2005), ‘Inefficient markets and the new finance’, Journal of Financial Transformation, 14: 95–105. 2 Shojai, S., P. Reyniers and Z. Berger (2001), ‘The London asset management market’, Journal of Financial Transformation, 2: 93–105. 3 We have used the year 2000 as the end date to demonstrate the impact of the bubble on each exchange, which burst in March 2000. 4 By the end of 1999, just prior to the crash, Nasdaq was almost 80 per cent larger than the LSE, in terms of market capitalisation. 5 Myers, D. (2002), ‘The rush to be the ultimate trading environment’, Journal of Financial Transformation, 5: 71–3. 6 OMX Group was the first exchange to demutualise and go public. It demutualised in 1983. 7 By 2002, the American Stock Exchange was part of Nasdaq. 8 Steil, B. (2002), ‘Changes in the ownership and governance of securities exchanges: causes and consequences’, Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services. 9 Domowitz, I. and B. Steil (1999), ‘Automation, trading costs, and the structure of the trading services industry’, Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services. 10 Steil (2002), op. cit. 11 Russo, D. and C. Papathanassiou (2006), ‘The governance of the securities clearing and settlement industry’, Journal of Financial Transformation, 17: 20–3. 12 Hughes, J. P., W. W. Lang and L. J. Mester (2002), ‘Do bankers sacrifice value to build empires? Managerial incentives, industry consolidation, and financial performance’, Working Paper No. 02-2, The Wharton Financial Institutions Center. 13 Malkamäki, M. (1999), ‘Are there economies of scale in stock exchanges activities’, Bank of Finland Discussion Papers No. 4/99. 14 Shojai, S. and S. Wang (2005), ‘The new wave of liquidity: impact of friction’, Journal of Financial Transformation, 14: 51–9. 15 Kindly note that these figures include both explicit, such as commissions and taxes, and implicit costs, such as market impact.
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16 Of course currency movements also impact these rates, but not in the case of Euronext, Italy and Deutsche Börse, which all use the Euro. 17 The market impact of trades on Euronext increased six-fold between 1999 and 2005. In most other markets it either remained the same or did in fact fall. On Nasdaq and Tokyo it fell by around 5 per cent. 18 This was a term devised by a former colleague, Michael Scotti, currently editor of Traders Magazine, to describe stocks that are part of a major national index, such as FTSE 100, but are not large enough to make it into a narrower pan-European index of the largest 50 firms. As a result trading in their shares falls because index-tracking institutions will no longer invest in them. In addition, studies have found that liquidity increases in shares that enter major indices, and vice versa; see Amihud, Y. and H. Mendelson (1986), ‘Asset pricing and the bid-ask spread’, Journal of Financial Economics, 17(2): 223–49. 19 Malkamäki (1999), op. cit. 20 Hobson, D. (2000), ‘Assertions versus arithmetic’, Global Custodian, Winter: 66–78. 21 Despite the fact that the Dow Jones Industrial Average is breaking records, the Nasdaq index was, as of November 2006, still around 50 per cent of what it was in March 2000. As a result, it would be unlikely that the two indices combined would be able to make up the losses incurred during the crash of 2000 by 2010, which matches the 10-year period it took the markets to recoup their losses after the Crash of 1929. 22 Greenspan, A. (1996), ‘The challenge of central banking in a democratic society’, Francis Boyer Lecture of The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, DC, December 5. 23 Shojai, S. and S. Wang (2003), ‘Transformation: the next wave’, Journal of Financial Transformation, 9 (December): 11–16. 24 Burton, M. and N. Hyde (2006), ‘Success for the sell-side in an unbundled world’, Journal of Financial Transformation, 18: 115–18. 25 Formaini, R. L. and T. F. Siems (2005), ‘Sarbanes-Oxley: corporate transparency or cost trap?’, Journal of Financial Transformation, 14: 128–32. 26 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is divided into 11 major areas, covering public company accounting oversight, auditor independence, corporate responsibility, enhanced financial disclosures, analyst conflicts of interest, commission resources and authority, studies and reports, corporate and criminal fraud accountability, white-collar crime penalty enhancements, corporate tax returns, and corporate fraud and accountability. 27 Aggarwal, R. and S. Dahiya (2006), ‘Demutualization and cross-country merger of exchanges’, Journal of Financial Transformation, 18: 143–50. 28 Pozen, R. C. (2004), ‘Can European companies escape US listings?’, Discussion Paper No. 464, John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, Harvard University. 29 Grant, P. and B. Moher (2004), ‘US delisting trickle set to become a flood’, Accountancy Age, 25 November. 30 Marosi, A. and N. Z. Massoud (2006), ‘“You can enter but cannot leave . . .” – US markets and foreign firms’, Working Paper, University of Alberta. 31 Aggarwal and Dahiya (2006), op. cit. 32 Decimalisation of shares also reduced the spread that ECNs could make on their trades. 33 As part of the deal, Nasdaq sold off Instinet’s Institutional Broker division to Silver Lake Partners, a private equity firm. 34 Jack, I. and M. O’Conor (2006), ‘The day of the MiFID: applying to all, different implications for each’, Journal of Financial Transformation, 17: 24–7. 35 UBS is also allowing its clients to access most external ATSs, ECNs and exchanges through its ATS. 36 ’The collection and distribution of market data accounted for 15.9 per cent of the NYSE’s total revenues, net of Section 31 fees, in 2005’ (NYSE Annual Report 2005). The recent decision by the SEC to allow the NYSE, and its electronic trading arm, Archipelago, to be able to charge US$5 a month per user for real-time data feeds makes the impact of such competitors even more pronounced. 37 As of January 2007 Slovenia has also become a member of the euro-area. 38 For a review of how many of my previous predictions on the implications of the internet on the world of finance had turned out please refer to Shojai, S. and S. Wang (2005), ‘The new wave of liquidity: impact of friction’, Journal of Financial Transformation, 14: 51–9.
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Part I
Transformation of the industry
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Chapter 2
Cross-border mergers and alliances between exchanges A global perspective1 Iftekhar Hasan Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Tina Hasenpusch European Business School Heiko Schmiedel European Central Bank
Introduction The securities exchange, clearing and settlement industry has been experiencing a decade of rapid transformation and restructuring. At the global level, there has been growing interest among institutional and individual investors to maximise the positive effects of international portfolio diversification, resulting in a rapid expansion of cross-border securities transactions. Technological innovations have stimulated these crucial changes, causing less dependency on physical market locations. As a result of this, market participants are increasingly exposed to a more competitive environment in the global arena. The marketplaces operated by exchanges have grown at an unprecedented pace, giving them a central role and responsibility in the global financial system. The continuing process of internationalisation of modern financial markets also determines the strategic behaviour and competition for market shares. Historically, the securities exchange industry has been fragmented along national lines, thereby leaving substantial room for operational inefficiencies and unexploited economies of scale and scope.2 Nowadays, many securities exchanges and clearing and settlement organisations operate on a global scale and have started to respond to this new and changing environment in two ways. First, many securities exchanges and clearing and settlement service providers have switched from a business structure based on a mutual membership association with inside ownership to for-profit, publicly listed companies accountable to shareholders.3 Secondly, securities exchanges and settlement companies seek to outperform their competitors by creating network strategies, alliances and business consolidation. Numerous cooperative agreements, mergers, joint ventures and other forms of link-ups have been announced and established.
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Part I: Transformation of the industry
Recent empirical evidence also suggests that the adoption of network strategies by stock exchanges creates additional value in the provision of trading services and fosters further market integration.4 In the field of derivatives clearing, Hasenpusch (2007) establishes that different network strategies help clearing houses realise economies of scale and scope, network effects, and thereby lower overall transaction costs. Russo and Rosati in Chapter 6 set out lessons that can be learnt from Europe in the field of securities clearing and settlement integration. Against this background, this chapter deals with a number of important issues that have emerged in the forefront of the debate on current developments in securities markets. Essentially, the way one may conceive the future of the securities trading industry will depend on empirical evidence related to its market structure, business and strategic behaviour. Our primary objective here is to introduce a comprehensive and balanced picture of the landscape of cross-border mergers and network cooperation among exchanges worldwide. We put forward the inherent perspectives and stylised facts associated with the significant evolution of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activities between securities exchanges. This chapter also seeks to identify the factors that are most relevant for a successful marketplace in the future. Moreover, it discusses the possible implications of increasing networked and interconnected marketplaces for future policy and market design. This study contributes to the literature on networks and cross-border cooperative arrangements in various ways. While there is a large body of literature in finance that introduces and describes the potential benefits of network arrangements in terms of increased participation, liquidity, efficiency and transaction costs, there is little scientific evidence available to help us get a better understanding of mergers and cooperation across exchanges.5 While there have been investigations into the motives and consequences of cross-border listings and cross-listed stocks,6 none of them has dealt with the issues associated with networks or implicit mergers. In this chapter, we attempt to fill this gap in the literature by analysing the most recent details of network cooperation among exchanges from a global perspective. This chapter provides evidence that the adoption of network and merger strategies has become popular not only among the world’s major stock exchanges, but also among exchanges all around the globe, albeit with different dynamics at play. Although geographical proximity has limited the scope of partnerships among exchanges in the past, M&A will increasingly take place on a cross-regional scale in the future. The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section introduces the concept of networks, cross-border mergers and alliances and is enriched with a brief literature review. This is followed by a description of the data, variables and classification schemes. ‘Evidence on cross-border mergers and alliances’ reports descriptive statistics and results. This is followed by a section outlining ‘Future trends, options and implications for securities market infrastructures’ and, finally, a section in which we present our conclusions.
Networks, cross-border mergers and partnerships among exchanges The concept of network externalities represents an important field in economics, as it applies to a variety of industries, such as telecommunications, airlines, railways, etc.7 In a typical network, any additional new consumer or network participant increases the value of the network for all
28
Cross-border mergers and alliances
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participants. In the context of securities markets, trading, clearing and settlement systems bear the characteristics of a network industry, as the benefit to one market participant transacting, clearing or settling on a given platform or system increases when another participant also chooses to do business in that network. Put differently, liquidity plays a pivotal role in financial exchange markets where order flow attracts order flow.8 Analysing market implications of alliances among stock exchanges, Shy and Tarkka (2001) establish that alliances are very likely to improve total welfare and increase profits for stock exchanges. Other recent research by Hasan and Schmiedel (2004, 2006) reveals that adopting a network strategy is significantly associated with higher liquidity, market capitalisation and lower transaction costs among stock exchanges. Based on evidence from the Euronext countries, Pagano and Padilla (2005) find that the integration of stock exchanges produces a number of significant efficiency gains, some of which are passed on by the exchanges to their users – that is intermediaries, investors and issuers – in the form of lower fees, and some of which accrue directly to users. Economides (1993), Hasan and Malkamäki (2001), Hagel III (1997) and Saloner and Shepard (1995) emphasise the role of critical mass and time dimensions in evaluating the true impact of network scope. The beginning of the new millennium has brought important changes in the exchange landscape, which has made the adoption of network strategies increasingly attractive and most likely indispensable to the future success of stock exchanges. The two most crucial drivers include the sophistication of technology and the changes in ownership and governance structures. Sophistication of technology has allowed for a reduction in costs, a more global distribution and higher liquidity, flexibility and reliability. The majority of today’s stock exchanges have shifted their traditional ownership and governance structures, such as non-profit, mutual or cooperative organisations, towards a for-profit orientation, being listed companies on their own markets. The increasing trend towards electronic trading and demutualisation of stock exchanges allowed for not only technical, but also financial room for manoeuvring, that is to engage in M&A deals. The changing nature of the securities industry has also complicated the interaction of various, sometimes vested, interests. These vested interests can be viewed from the perspective of the users, owners and management of the exchanges. For example, investors demand the deployment of the most sophisticated electronic trading system, reliability, liquidity and a low-cost environment; whereas issuers call for a preferable regulatory environment, access to global capital, and distribution. Moreover, in order to satisfy the demand of shareholders for an ever increasing value of shares and of dividend payments, stock exchanges are required to further leverage their technology and client base, integrate new products and geographies, and restructure to increase efficiency and responsiveness to market demand. The developments of the most recent merger deal negotiations between the world’s major exchanges – Deutsche Börse, Euronext, London Stock Exchange (LSE), Nasdaq and New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) – illustrate the dynamics and constraints of network deals among exchanges. In terms of objectives each party pursued cooperation initiatives with the goal of making their business grow, expanding their markets, providing cheaper and better quality service, and staying attractive for issuers. Moreover, the circumstances and constraints leading to the failure of some of these initiatives are exemplary for any cross-border network deal. Any form of cooperation requires the support of the different stakeholders as well as economic justification. The issues at stake are of immense importance to the interest groups, regulators,
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Part I: Transformation of the industry
politicians and financial centre interest groups. There are also national interest issues to be considered. And, of course, the transaction also has to satisfy the needs of employees and shareholders, many of whom increasingly tend to hold a portfolio of various exchanges. As mentioned before, one of the important objectives of this chapter is to highlight the fact that it is not only the world’s largest stock exchanges that are engaged in network deals, but that in fact exchanges all over the world are actively pursuing network strategies – albeit with slightly different dynamics at play. While some exchanges with a global reach tend to expand globally, others opt for increased regionalisation. This allows and supports the infrastructure development of regional capital markets through the help of network strategies. Those exchanges – mostly a lot smaller in size, with a domestic focus, serving investors and issuers regionally – use different forms of cooperation to further develop and strengthen their regional position. This in turn can make them an attractive partner for the largest exchanges wanting to gain a foothold in emerging markets and developing economies.
Data and variables To pursue our research objectives, data on cross-border mergers, alliances and link-ups among international securities exchanges were collected from a number of sources. The most important data source represents the publicly available, monthly newsletters and press releases from the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE, 2000–06) and the Federation of European Securities Exchanges (FESE, 2000–06). Additional data is taken from internet pages, press archives and ad hoc announcements of individual stock exchanges involved in network deals. This study also updates and expands the work of previous research by providing a comprehensive global perspective of the most recent exchange network deals.9 The data for the exchange sample covers the period from 2000 to 2006 (see Exhibit 2.1). The year 2000 was chosen as the start date in order to capture, to the greatest extent possible, most of the recent trends in the securities market infrastructure’s cross-border M&A activities. Overall, a consistent data set has been constructed, including 271 different deals worldwide, in which 149 exchanges have been involved. In order to examine network linkages, a set of variables has been constructed to reflect all mergers, strategic cooperation and market interconnections among securities exchanges worldwide. Tracing the development of each deal to its date of announcement, implementation and establishment yields the data on the experiences of the securities exchanges from 2000 to 2006.
Exhibit 2.1 Overview data sample
Number of observations Source: Authors’ own
30
Period
Deals
2000–06
271
Exchanges Countries
Regions
149
7
69
Cross-border mergers and alliances
12222 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 35 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 44222
As highlighted by Cybo-Ottone et al. (2000), classification of networks is not readily available and there is only limited access to information and details on announcements and implementation status of cooperation and linkages among exchanges. Accordingly, when gathering such information it should be noted that the underlying categorisation might differ from the official views stated by the exchanges themselves. However, the information available in this study provides a comprehensive view of the cross-border merger activities and link-ups in the securities exchange industry. Since the study takes an international approach, it provides a comparative assessment of the involvement of securities exchanges in different forms of network activities. Each deal in the data sample involves one or more exchanges or a clearing and settlement company. It should be noted that only regulated exchanges are included in the survey; deals between regulated exchanges and electronic communication networks are thus not part of the data set. These deals were grouped according to the following criteria.10 First, the deals can be classified according to the market focus of the networking entities: • • • • •
Cash–cash – a cooperation, merger or alliance takes place between cash exchanges. Cash–derivatives – the deal involves cash and derivatives exchanges. Cash–clearing and settlement – the transaction involves cash trading, clearing and settlement. Derivatives–derivatives – the transaction concerns only derivatives exchanges. Derivatives–clearing and settlement – the deal involves derivatives trading, clearing and settlement.
Secondly, the deals can be classified by the network form of cooperation or partnership: • Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) – full integration of both entities through a merger, but also comprising an acquisition of control or minority stakes. • Joint venture – all types of mixed integration using some form of common vehicle. • Contractual partnership – stipulation of long-term contracts for the supply of technology, cooperation in terms of information-sharing, product developments or other kinds of collaboration (Memorandum of Understanding (MoUs), Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) etc.). Thirdly, the deals were distinguished by the type of technological integration: • Outsourcing – outsourcing of IT or one exchange using another exchange’s trading technology for independently operating its own market. • Common access – common access to previously separate trading platforms. This often involves so-called cross-membership agreements – common front-end, but systems or partners continue to operate independently of one another. • Common systems – implementation of a jointly used system. Products are traded on this joint system, but the partners independently operate the system, that is processes such as risk control, market supervision, post-trade processes, etc. are handled separately by each of the partners. • Common operation – besides using a common system as a technical platform, partners also integrate the operation of the trading. For example, risk control, market supervision, etc. are integrated; only post-trade processes are handled separately.
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Part I: Transformation of the industry
• Complete system integration – complete integration of value chain, such as trading and posttrading. • Other types of integration – the cooperation agreement focuses on products, such as crosslistings, joint product developments and information-sharing, but does not include sophisticated forms of technical integration. Fourthly, the deals can be described by their international scope: • Cross-border – the partnering entities are located in different countries. • Domestic – the partnering entities operate in the same country. Finally, the deals are grouped into seven different regions: euro-area; outside the euro-area, but within Europe; North America; South America; Asia-Pacific and Central Asia; Africa; and Middle East. Exhibit 2.7 in the Annex (p. 41) provides an overview of the variables and classification. Overall, it should be noted that every effort has been made to ensure that the data used in this study is comprehensive, accurate and comparable. However, some cases required some subjective judgement to classify and determine the underlying merger and network deals of the partnering exchanges. Possible remaining shortcomings are due to data inconsistencies, errors or omissions borne by the reporting entities.
Evidence on cross-border mergers and alliances Exhibit 2.2, which provides frequency data on the number of M&A deals classified by market focus over the seven-year sample period, demonstrates that, while the total number of cooperation activities remains relatively stable and at a high level compared to earlier periods,11 a majority of the deals were of a horizontal nature. Horizontal cooperation involves M&A activities among exchanges at the trading level, that is exchanges providing similar services in different markets or jurisdictions, such as link-ups and integration efforts among the same products or even across different market segments. This M&A model appears to be the dominant and preferred method of integration pursued by the exchanges. Most of the network deals (185 out of 271) have been undertaken on the cash market side. In contrast to a horizontal cooperation, vertical mergers involve network deals of institutions providing different, but integrated services, such as integration of different activities that are processed along the securities transaction value chain within a single entity or group (that is deals that involve post-trade processes). Out of the full sample, vertical integration initiatives can only be observed in 8 derivatives and 22 cash market combinations. With respect to the form of the network and partnerships, M&A reflect the strongest and closest type of integration or cooperation. However, Exhibit 2.3 shows that only 20 per cent of transactions involve a true, wide-scale merger or acquisition between exchanges. Joint ventures represent about 15 per cent of transactions, while, more strikingly, 65 per cent prefer a weaker type of integration or partnership based on contractual arrangements. As mentioned above, most mergers or network partnerships among securities exchanges have been purely legal mergers or contractual arrangements, that is the systems are still operating separate technical platforms. This assessment is confirmed when we analyse the deals based on
32
Cross-border mergers and alliances
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Exhibit 2.2 Frequencies of the number of deals by market focus, 2000–06 Variables
Years
Focus
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
Cash–cash Cash–derivatives Cash–clearing and settlement Derivatives– derivatives Derivatives–clearing and settlement Total
39
22
21
26
16
32
29
185
4
3
1
3
2
5
2
20
1
3
6
7
0
2
3
22
1
8
6
10
4
5
2
36
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
8
46
37
35
47
23
46
37
271
Source: Authors’ own
Exhibit 2.3 Relative percentages of deals by type of cooperation among exchanges 20%
15% 65%
Mergers and acquisitions
Joint ventures
Contracts
Source: Authors’ own
the type of technology employed by the exchanges. As can be seen in Exhibit 2.4, about half of all cooperation agreements focus on product relationships, that is cross-listings, joint product development and information-sharing. These network initiatives do not include sophisticated forms of technical integration. Besides cooperation at the product level, the split according to common technology shows that exchanges are involved in the promotion, diffusion and sharing of securities trading, clearing and settlement services, technologies, and special mechanisms and schemes. Common technology – in the form of common access, common systems and common operation – accounts for about 24 per cent of all partnership deals. Complete integration along the value chain, such as trading and post-trading, represents 13 per cent of all exchange cooperation.
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Part I: Transformation of the industry
Exhibit 2.4 Relative percentages of deals by type of technology used by exchanges 13%
11% 9% 24%
8% 7%
52%
Other type of integration Outsourcing Common access
Complete system integration Common system Common operation
Source: Authors’ own
Contrary to the findings by Cybo-Ottone et al. (2000) for earlier periods, it is apparent that in more recent years the vast majority of the deals (235 deals out of the total of 271) took place across borders (see Exhibit 2.5). At the national level, many of the deals have been mergers of regional exchanges and between the cash and derivatives markets. This transformation at the domestic level seems to have paved the way for further cross-border mergers and alliances.
Exhibit 2.5 Frequencies of domestic versus cross-border deals among exchanges Focus Cash–cash Cash– derivatives Cash–clearing and settlement Derivatives– derivatives Derivatives– clearing and settlement Total Source: Authors’ own
34
Domestic Cross-border Total 11
174
185
7
13
20
6
16
22
8
28
36
4
4
8
36
235
271
Cross-border mergers and alliances
12222 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 35 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 44222
In addition, Exhibit 2.6 reveals that most partnership deals between exchanges are undertaken within the same region. Possibly due to factors related to cultural and geographical proximity, exchanges tend to prefer to merge or cooperate across borders with exchanges from the same region or neighbouring countries. Consequently, relatively little evidence on crossregional mergers can be found over the sample period. In particular, current American merger initiatives with European stock exchanges, such as the NYSE-Euronext and Nasdaq-LSE deals in 2006, have been undertaken only very recently. The Asia-Pacific region, the euro-area and the within Europe but non-euro-area have all experienced relatively high degrees of cross-border merger activities. Exchanges located in South America, Africa and the Middle East appear to be less active in cross-border merger and cooperation activities. In summary, different cross-border M&A projects between exchanges have been identified and classified in this section. Although some of the surveyed deals among stock exchanges have failed or were abandoned, it seems that regional differences exist in which stock exchanges are more active in pursuing strategic cooperation. Without advocating one particular model, the way towards further integration of securities markets seems to follow two paths. The first and most frequent way is by horizontal integration. Here, securities exchanges create horizontal alliances and link-ups in order to expand services to other products or regions. In other words, securities markets are likely to benefit from greater international integration and cooperation between the trading service providers. The second form, albeit one adopted less often, concerns vertical integration. This concept foresees closer cooperation and integration across the entire transaction value chain, that is involving securities trading, clearing, and settlement and custody services. Vertical cooperation seeks to explore synergies resulting from a diversified portfolio of transaction services. However, no evidence can be found that vertically integrated exchanges
Exhibit 2.6 Frequencies and geographical distribution matrix of mergers, alliances and cooperation among exchanges From
To Euroarea
Euro-area Europe North America South America Asia-Pacific and Central Asia Africa Middle East Total
Europe
North America
South America
Asia-Pacific and Central Africa Asia 12 1 9 2
29 4
31 39
4 4
3 2
8
4
14
0
20
1
0
1
2
1
2
1
0 1 44
0 0 76
0 0 24
Middle Total East 7 2
87 62
0
0
46
1
0
0
5
0
63
0
0
67
0 0 7
0 0 105
1 1 5
1
2 2 271
10
Source: Authors’ own
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Part I: Transformation of the industry
are more efficient.12 The final outcome of increased merger and partnership between exchanges remains to be seen, but it is likely that interconnected clusters and/or groups of systems with greater integration will emerge over time.
Future trends, options and implications for securities market infrastructures Organic growth and restructuring opportunities undertaken by traditional exchanges seem to have been largely exhausted. However, the adoption of network strategies is a viable and promising alternative, as the acquisition of a fast-growing target can support the growth of a bidder even more.13 Some exchanges wish to continue to emphasise their opportunities and potential for organic growth and their decision to remain independent. However, it will be increasingly difficult for them to justify this strategy to their shareholders if they lack access to the important growth areas of the future. Combined with the fact that some exchanges do not profit from revenues emanating from vertical integration of post-trade processes, such as clearing and settlement, the pressure to grow their businesses becomes even greater. Getting access to growth markets and new products seems to be difficult through organic growth, as liquidity is usually sticky. Most exchanges thus have chosen to pursue a network strategy instead of organic growth. Consistent with our findings at the national level, many of the deals have been mergers of regional exchanges and between the cash and derivatives markets. This shows the desire of exchanges to integrate future growth markets. Those exchanges that lost out on the integration of strong growth segments might be well advised to consider network deals in this context. The adoption of network strategies has evolved to become a key strategic element in the development of the world’s largest stock exchanges. In the 1990s, the focus of the strategic orientation of the top management of any of the world’s major stock exchanges was firmly on organic growth, by implementing sophisticated technologies. In today’s modern financial markets, this strategic perception has been increasingly compounded with external growth through some form of network activity. Whereas our findings suggest that from 2000 to 2006 strong forms of cooperation have largely been pursued with partners in geographical proximities, the developments described in this chapter show that in 2005–06 strong forms of integration, such as mergers, were no longer limited to regional counterparts. Already in the recent past, there have been some examples of transatlantic cooperation. Today, stock exchanges are even more determined to implement such cross-regional deals. In general, there is a clear and visible trend towards network deals in the world of exchanges. In the 1990s, the focus of network deals was domestic,14 resulting in consolidated and integrated trading and post-trading arrangements in the US and European markets on a local level. At that time, other regions, such as Asia and Africa, were only about to start to establish regulated exchange marketplaces. However, more recently, the picture has changed. Our research finds evidence that strong forms of cooperation (M&A) are now occurring mainly at the cross-border level, but within the same region in the established markets, such as the US and Europe. In other regions, such as Asia and Africa, strong forms of cooperation occur predominantly at the domestic level, and it seems that they are following in the footsteps of their larger peers in Europe and the US, and currently undergoing their own domestic integration phase.15
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Cross-border mergers and alliances
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In conclusion, the US and Europe have largely consolidated on a regional level. Other regions, such as Africa, Asia and South America, have started to consolidate at the domestic level, thus gaining momentum and attractiveness in terms of being potential partners for established markets.16 Not surprisingly, we observe that weaker forms of cooperation are the preferred form of network deals across regions. The most recent developments, as described in ‘Data and variables’ (p. 30), provide indications that the future trend will be towards cross-regional cooperation among exchanges and related financial market infrastructure entities. In the first phase, it is likely that this trend will mainly cover transatlantic alliances; but once Asia, South America, Africa and the Middle East have further consolidated regionally, they will become attractive targets for stronger forms of cooperation with their US and European counterparts, and even their peers in the other regions. Overall, one may conclude that once regional consolidation is exhausted, more cross-regional and stronger forms of cooperation will emerge. As seen in ‘Evidence on cross-border mergers and alliances’ (p. 32), merger and vertical integration activities between exchanges and clearing and settlement providers are relatively seldom. Most recent deals have taken place at the horizontal level between securities trading entities. Against this background, the consequences for clearing and settlement are relatively insignificant at this stage. Schmiedel and Schönenberger (2006) support this view. They show that there have been some changes in market infrastructure integration in the euro-area in recent years and these have pointed towards increased integration and consolidation among market infrastructure providers. However, despite the single currency, the euro-area securities infrastructure remains fragmented. The most relevant factors underlying the less advanced state of integration of the financial market infrastructures are likely to be not only persistent crossborder differences in tax regimes, procedures and laws, but also vested interests among users, owners and managers of the systems. The current fragmentation of the EU securities clearing and settlement infrastructure presents a major obstacle to the further integration of European securities markets. A closer integration and harmonisation of securities clearing and settlement systems will be crucial to lower the posttrading costs of cross-border securities transactions, to exploit the potential economies of scale and to establish a level playing field in Europe. Given the heterogeneous nature of the obstacles to integration, there are currently many initiatives under way, led by market participants and public authorities, in order to align the transformation of the market and the challenges to fostering integration. As Russo and Rosati emphasise in Chapter 6, it is of key importance that the mix of actions pursued by the public and private sectors are coordinated in order to fully exploit synergies and reinforce reciprocally their ability to achieve the desired objectives. Overall, stock exchanges and financial market infrastructure providers need to devise their strategies to meet the challenges of a globalising world. Although no specific picture exists of how the future trading and post-trading landscape will look, there are a number of findings that appear to have particular relevance and that can be used to extrapolate current trends for the possible future of the securities industry. Tomorrow’s securities markets will be characterised by ongoing integration and consolidation initiatives. In this process, stock exchanges and settlement providers will devise strategic responses in a number of directions in order to best meet investors’ demands of lower trading costs, improved liquidity and immediate access to international trading and settlement. Key in this development
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Part I: Transformation of the industry
will be economies of scale, efficiency gains and the adoption of network technologies encouraging competition and consolidation among securities trading service providers. Economic research suggests the existence of large potential efficiency gains across exchanges. Investments in standardisation and new technologies will pay off in productivity gains, and automated trading will overcome distance constraints and improve efficiency. Hence, the ongoing formation of alliances and networks compounded with enormous investments in new technologies and trading system upgrades will probably help to enhance efficiency, as exchanges take advantage of all aspects of increased scale economies. Over the past decade, in securities markets technology has been already sufficiently advanced and available at very modest costs to enable investors to trade via networks. Concerning the future shape of the modern global securities market infrastructure, one may anticipate continued and increased merger activities and alliances among exchanges and settlement institutions across regions. Consider, for example, recent European initiatives demonstrating some integration efforts pointing towards an increased networked and integrated securities landscape combined with efficient governance practices. In particular, transatlantic networks and mergers appear to become popular and valuable strategic options among exchanges.
Conclusions In today’s financial markets, securities exchanges operate on a global scale, in a dynamic and highly competitive environment. The globalisation and integration of all types of financial markets, along with technological changes and deregulation, have transformed the competitive norms and business targets of the trading service industry. As a result, securities exchanges behave increasingly like business firms and have responded to the new competitive environment. Many exchanges have been switching from a business structure, based on a mutual association of exchange members with inside ownership, to for-profit, publicly listed companies accountable to shareholders. Almost 70 per cent of the world’s total stock market capitalisation is now on publicly listed exchanges, totalling over US$45tn. Exchanges merge and create alliances and partnerships at a record rate in order to meet the increasing need of corporations to broaden their shareholder base and raise capital beyond local markets.17 Moreover, institutional and individual investors seek to maximise the positive effects of international portfolio diversification, resulting in the rapid growth of cross-border securities transactions. M&A among exchanges not only become popular and beneficial among issuers, as an alternative to multiple listings across markets, but are equally important to exchanges, allowing them to avoid direct competition from stronger markets and the fragmentation of liquidity. These types of arrangements are natural in the development of a competitive environment, where the most efficient exchanges will eventually win the confidence of investors, traders and companies.18 The emergence of these types of consolidation will bring common trading platforms among exchanges who are willing to open up to each other’s markets for cross-listing and trading purposes with ample freedom for brokers and traders to operate across markets. Network arrangements will help in gaining new demand for exchange products and are also likely to bring efficiency gains through economies of scale and scope. This chapter reports evidence that the adoption of network and merger strategies has become popular not only among the world’s major stock exchanges, but also among exchanges all around
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the globe, albeit with different dynamics at play. At the beginning of the new millennium, geographical proximity prevailed in determining partnerships and cooperation among exchanges. More recently, however, mergers and alliances are no longer limited to regional integration, but increasingly take place on a cross-regional scale. Concerning the future shape of the global securities exchange industry, it can be anticipated that any form of network, mergers and alliances, and partnerships among exchanges will become increasingly important for exchanges’ strategic decision-making process, performance and growth.
1 The usual disclaimer applies. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the European Central Bank. 2 Hasan and Malkamäki (2001); Hasan et al. (2003); and Schmiedel (2003). 3 Arnold et al. (1999); Pirrong (1999); Aggarwal and Dahiya (2006); Russo et al. (2004); and Serifsoy (2007). 4 Hasan and Schmiedel (2004, 2006). 5 Cybo-Ottone et al. (2000); Di Noia (2001); and Hasan and Schmiedel (2004, 2006). 6 Blass and Yafeh (2001); Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2000); Domowitz et al. (1998); Foerster and Karolyi (1998); Karolyi (1998); and Pagano et al. (2001, 2002). 7 Shy (2001). 8 Domowitz (1995); Domowitz and Steil (1999); Economides (1993); Economides and Siow (1988). 9 Cybo-Ottone et al. (2000); Domowitz (1995); Domowitz and Steil (1999); Lee (1998); and Licht (1998). 10 The classification adopted in this paper is largely consistent with previously proposed schemes by Cybo-Ottone et al. (2000) and Book (2001). 11 Cybo-Ottone et al. (2000). 12 Serifsoy (2007). 13 Beitel et al. (2004). 14 Cybo-Ottone et al. (2000). 15 Ibid. 16 Refer also to Russo and Rosati in Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion on the lessons to be learned from the European securities market infrastructure integration. 17 Domowitz et al. (1998); Steil (2001); and Pagano et al. (2001). 18 Cybo-Ottone et al. (2000).
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Domowitz, I., J. Glen and A. Madhavan (1998), ‘International cross-listing and order flow migration: evidence from an emerging market’, Journal of Finance, 53: 2001–27. Domowitz, I. and B. Steil (1999), ‘Automation, trading costs, and the structure of the trading services industry,’ Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services, 1–52. Economides, N. (1993), ‘Network economics with application to finance’, Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, 2(5): 89–97. Economides, N. and A. Siow (1988), ‘The division of markets is limited by the extent of liquidity (spatial competition with externalities)’, American Economic Review, 78(1): 108 – 21. FESE (European Federation of Securities Exchanges) (2000–06), Monthly Newsletter, Brussels. Foerster, S. and A. Karolyi (1998), ‘Multimarket trading and liquidity: a transaction data analysis of Canada–US interlistings’, Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 8: 393–412. Hagel III, A. G. (1997), Net Gain, Harvard Business School Press, Boston. Hasan, I. and M. Malkamäki (2001), ‘Are expansions cost effective for stock exchanges? A global perspective’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 25(12): 2339–66. Hasan, I. and H. Schmiedel (2004), ‘Networks and equity market integration: European evidence’, International Review of Financial Analysis, 13: 601–19. Hasan, I. and H. Schmiedel (2006), ‘Networks and stock market integration: empirical evidence’, in Bagella, M., L. Becchetti and I. Hasan (eds) Transparency, Governance, and Markets, Elsevier, pp. 395–417. Hasan, I., M. Malkamäki and H. Schmiedel (2003), ‘Technology, automation, and productivity of stock exchanges: international evidence’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 27: 1743–73. Hasenpusch, T. (2007), ‘Clearing services for global markets: a framework for the future development of the clearing industry’, European Business School, forthcoming. Karolyi, A. (1998), ‘Why do companies list shares abroad? A survey of the evidence and its managerial implications’, Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, 7(1): 1–60. Lee, R. (1998), What is an Exchange: The Automation, Management and Regulation of Financial Markets, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Licht, A. N. (1998) ‘Regional stock market integration in Europe’, Harvard Institute for International Development, Consulting Assistance on Economic Reform II Discussion Papers, No. 15. Pagano, M. and J. Pudilla (2005), ‘Efficiency gains from the integration of exchanges: lessons from the Euronext natural experiment’, Report for Euronext, May. Pagano, M., A. Röell and J. Zechner (2002), ‘The geography of equity listing: why do companies list abroad?’ Journal of Finance, 57(6): 2651–94. Pagano, M., O. Randl, A. Röell and J. Zechner (2001), ‘What makes stock exchanges succeed? Evidence from crosslisting decisions’, European Economic Review, 45: 770–82. Pirrong, C. (1999), ‘The organization of financial exchange markets: theory and evidence,’ Journal of Financial Markets, 2: 329–57. Russo, D., T. Hart, M. C. Malaguti and C. Papathanissiou (2004), ‘Governance of securities clearing and settlement systems’, European Central Bank Occasional Paper Series, European Central Bank, Frankfurt 21. Saloner, G. and A. Shepard (1995), ‘Adoption of technologies with network effects: an empirical examination of adoption of automated teller machines’, Rand Journal of Economics, 26: 479–501. Schmiedel, H. (2003), ‘Technological development and concentration of stock exchanges in Europe,’ Research in Banking and Finance, 3: 381–408. Schmiedel, H. and A. Schönenberger (2006), ‘Integration, regulation, and policy of securities market infrastructures in the euro area’, Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 14(4), 328–47. Serifsoy, B. (2007), ‘Stock exchanges business models and their operative performance’, Journal of Banking and Finance, forthcoming. Shy, O. (2001) The Economics of Network Industries, Cambridge University Press, New York. Shy, O. and J. Tarkka (2001), ‘Stock exchange alliances, access fees and competition’, Bank of Finland Discussion Paper Series, Bank of Finland, Helsinki 22/2001. Steil, B. (2002) ‘Changes in ownership and governance of securities exchanges: causing and consequences’, BrookingsWharton Papers in Financial Services, 61–96. WFE (World Federation of Exchanges) (2000–06), Monthly Newsletter, Paris.
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Cross-border mergers and alliances
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Annex Exhibit 2.7 Overview and classification of key variables Variables
Description
Additional information
Focus
Cash–cash
If deal is between cash and cash markets.
Cash–derivatives
If deal is between cash and derivatives markets.
Cash–clearing and settlement
If deal involves cash and clearing and settlement.
Derivatives–derivatives
If deal is between derivatives and derivatives markets.
Derivatives–clearing and settlement
If deal involves derivatives and clearing and settlement.
Mergers and acquisitions
Full integration of both entities with a merger or an acquisition of control or acquiring minority stakes.
Joint ventures
All types of mixed integration using some type of common vehicle.
Contracts
Stipulation of long-term contracts for the supply of technology or any kind of collaboration (MoUs, MoCs, etc.).
Outsourcing
Outsourcing of IT or one exchange uses another exchange's trading technology for independently operating its own market.
Common access
Common access to previously separate trading platforms. Often involves so-called crossmembership agreements, common front-end, but systems or partners continue to operate independently from one another.
Common system
Implementation of a jointly used system. Products are traded on this joint system, but the partners independently operate the system. For example, processes, such as risk control, market supervision, post-trade processes, etc., are handled separately by each of the partners.
Common operation
Besides using a common system as technical platform, partners also integrate the operation of the trading. For example, risk control, market supervision, etc. are integrated; only post-trade processes are handled separately.
Complete system integration
Complete integration of value chain, trading and post-trading.
Other type of integration
Cooperation agreement focuses on products, such as cross-listings, joint product development and information sharing, but does not include sophisticated forms of technical integration.
Network
Technology
Source: Authors’ own
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Chapter 3
Electronic trading Rival or replacement for traditional floor-based exchanges? Wayne H. Wagner ITG Solutions Network and OM/NI
Introduction More so than for most human endeavours, speed, information and reliability are valued in the exchange of securities. Thus advances in automation and communication of vital data clearly add liquidity value to investors, and exchanges have usually been among the first to embrace technological enhancements. Exchange automation began with the stringing of the first Atlantic telegraph cable in 1886, which reduced order-to-completion time cycles from six weeks to a matter of hours. Transaction latency reduced by a ratio of roughly 500:1. In recent years, we have seen increases in speed of the same 500:1 order of magnitude by switching from manual order submission to DOT (designated order turnaround), and similar speed enhancements as we move to fully electronic trading. Each of these innovations has reduced time delay (latency), decreased implementation costs and, by allowing investors to react to ever smaller nuggets of information, enhanced liquidity. The catchwords today are efficiency and effectiveness. The buy-side is trying to better coordinate strategy and execution to make the process more effective and efficient. Thus both the buy-side and the sell-side are driven by a continual search for higher productivity and lowercost alternatives. Monitoring effectiveness before, during and after the trade is becoming universal. The current debate rages over whether there remains any need for physical interaction at the centre of the exchange process, such as that which occurs on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the only one of the big stock exchanges that still operates a floor. At the end of 2006, news sources were filled with indications that the exchange and the floor community were hedging their bets: ‘Floor brokers look for lifeboats’; ‘Big Board specialists join forces to deal stocks on CBOE’; and, most impressively, ‘Big Board plans to close 20 per cent of trading floor’.1 Barron’s featured ‘Death of the floor’ as the cover story in its 20 November 2006 issue. Many believe that floors are obsolete, a premise the NYSE hotly disputes. They believe that the NYSE hybrid model represents the best of two worlds, and can do a better job than Nasdaq in trading less liquid stocks.2
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Electronic trading: rival or replacement?
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It seems too early to predict the demise of the physical trading floor, although the tide is clearly running against it. As Martin Sexton points out: The changes at NYSE and elsewhere show the way forward for all exchanges. Whether or not it follows the route of demutualising and listing, an exchange must be run as a business, not a club. Sentiment must be replaced by well thought through business plans that give customers – investors and traders – what they want. Technology must be used to enable buyers and sellers to come together in a regulatory environment that ensures honest dealing but doesn’t get in the way of growth. Exchanges that refuse to accept change must recognise that they have no right to exist and at best will end up as museums living off state subsidies – until the subsidies are removed.3 As Sexton suggests, demutualisation plays a key role in changing the adaptability of an exchange. The original exchanges were mutual societies dedicated to the interests of the limited number of participants. Naturally, voting power was retained by the members whose livelihood – even their own sense of self-worth – was tied to ‘the way things have always been done’. Seatholders would not choose to open the door that would lead to their own disintermediation and destroy their accumulated human capital. Thus the exchange was run by the inmates; and attempts to innovate invariably led to tedious arguments, compromised decisions and vicious power plays. A good term for the activity that used to predominate on the floor was ‘information-central’. When there was interest in a stock, floor brokers would gather around the specialist to work things out. The floor brokers were representing institutional orders, although they were usually bound to ‘best efforts’ rather than specific instructions. The institutions had very little direct control; they relied on the relationship with and clout over the brokerage firm. They may not even know the name of the person representing their order in the crowd. The old NYSE design granted the specialist an enormous advantage of seeing more than anyone else could see about order flow. But the specialist’s role was conflicted – representing public orders while at the same time being allowed to trade for their own account. This conflict was tightly constrained by Exchange rules, but history teaches us that the temptation to exploit loopholes never goes away. While actual cases of specialist malfeasance have been remarkably few, each has left a bad taste in the mouths of institutional traders and regulators. The operative phrase describing the floor negotiations was ‘nobody looks bad’. In other words, the price movements were controlled by the specialist so that everyone got a good enough deal, presentable to the investors. The floor brokers placed a lot of faith in this system, but to the investors it looked mighty suspicious. The floor was quaint, it was fun, the relationships were rich and rewarding, the sense of being part of ‘the greatest market in the world’ was intoxicating, and if you were any good you could make a handsome profit year after year. But to the customers it was opaque, slow, uncontrollable and prone to mischief. In a casino, the house always wins, and the nagging thought of institutional traders was that they were the suckers in this game. It is easy to understand the members’ desire to see the floor survive, in the same way it is easy to understand nostalgia for steam trains. Walking onto the floor is a magical experience that thrills all who experience it. The pulse of action, the camaraderie and the sense that something
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Part I: Transformation of the industry
immensely important is being conducted in a very clever manner cannot fail to impress. The problems of the exchange floor may be similar to those of the steam train: while peculiarly both quaint and impressive, it was too noisy, too dirty, too slow and, most importantly, technologically outdated. John Thain’s clever solution to this problem was to buy off the seatholders by buying them out. In a situation where seat prices had declined from $2.6m to under one million, seatholders were attracted to a premium that recognised the value of corporate control. Substituting a corporate culture for the mutual benefit society gave the exchange the flexibility to innovate. The quid pro quo to the former members was an attempt to retain a relevant functionality for the floor in the hybrid market. Many observers conclude that the floor-based exchanges are outmoded: aren’t all marketplaces going to be electronic in the near future? Assuredly, the floor was a vital institution for centuries, evolving with the changing needs of its customers. The pace of change is quickening, calling into question the floor’s very survival. This raises some important questions: does the floor still add value? Will it survive? Is the vaulted eye-to-eye interaction truly necessary? Or will the floor population find it more convenient to operate the same functions in a computer-filled floor booth, in an upstairs office or at home in their pyjamas? To answer these questions, we need to consider the value-added functions of any exchange, and discuss how they have been allocated to the floor. We will explore the steps that got us to where we are, then discuss what an ideal market might look like and conclude with how close to that ideal we are likely to come. In the process we will discuss whether a fully automated exchange is likely or desirable. By ‘fully automated exchange’ we mean one in which the computer performs, among other automated functions, the drawing of liquidity and price discovery.
Competition on commissions, then on spreads Some might date the beginning of the demise of the floor (if that is what it turns out to be) to the regulatory changes that instituted fully directed commissions on 1 May 1975. Everyone knew deep down that commission schedules based on retail-sized orders could not survive the rapidly growing domination of institutional trading, yet no one knew what the post-May Day world would bring. Commissions fell as expected, but the sky did not fall as many feared. The fortress was breached, and the focus of the exchange became far more customer-oriented. Changes in commission structure were gradual and evolutionary. Commissions fell quickly from roughly 40c/ per share to half that amount, then gradually slid to the 5–10c/ prevalent in the 1990s. Institutional investors were pleased, and responded to the lowered commissions by trading a whole lot more. The next big change forced on the exchanges came with decimalisation and the Order Handling Rules implemented in mid-2001. The preceding years had seen much electronic innovation both inside and surrounding the exchanges. The infrastructure was highly developed. The NYSE found ways to speed order introduction to the floor, Nasdaq operated happily without a floor and electronic communication networks (ECNs) found ways to compete for a portion of
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Electronic trading: rival or replacement?
the pie. But cutting the minimum spread changed the trading business profoundly. It became obvious that the spread, not the commission, facilitated and protected the previous business structure and incentives. When spreads fell to pennies, many long-standing broker practices became unprofitable. Nasdaq market-makers by the thousands sought new careers, even though institutional buy-side traders bewailed the silence on the other end of the phone line. Most importantly, the news was not depressing for investors. Institutional trading costs have declined precipitously since decimalisation. According to measurements from the Plexus Group4 universe of institutional trading, large cap trading costs fell from 1.57 per cent in the second quarter of 2001 to 0.55 per cent five years later, a decline of almost two-thirds. Small cap trading costs fell even more, from 2.54 to 0.79 per cent. Exhibit 3.1 shows that, despite decimalisation, total transaction costs remained high to the end of the frenzied internet market. They began to decline steeply in 2003 and have continued downward in recent quarters, even as the market returns have recovered. Clearly, investors benefited from the regulation-induced changes. The cause-and-effect runs something like this: the buy-side, eager to trade at lower cost, pressures regulators to modify the exchange rules. The regulators set rules that reduce spreads. As spreads collapse, the sell-side pulls capital and people from the now unprofitable marketmaking function, which makes it harder for the buy-side to complete big trades. Small investors celebrate lower costs, but traders at large investors confront communication gaps that make their job more difficult. How, then, are the big blocks previously assigned to institutional brokers for execution to be done? One popular solution for highly liquid issues is through the use of algorithms. The most popular algorithms chop large trades into retail-sized pieces that can be completed without human intervention, executed in such a rapid-fire succession that only a computer can provide the moment-to-moment responses. While algorithmic trading often gets the job done, it reduces
Exhibit 3.1 Cost of US institutional trading 250 200 Cost (bp)
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150 100 50 0 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Large Cap
Small Cap
Source: Author’s own
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Part I: Transformation of the industry
trade activity to tiny increments and stretches out execution time. A 2001 study performed by Plexus Group5 found that 46 per cent of manager orders, but 85 per cent of NYSE trades, were for fewer than 2,100 shares. On the other end of the scale, over 35 per cent of the dollars traded by managers were in trades of over 250,000 shares, while only 1.1 per cent of the dollars traded were in orders over 250,000 shares. Steil6 identifies the mismatch succinctly: The problem is that continuous electronic auction markets, as useful as they are, have flaws that are apparent to any institutional trader. They require institutional-sized orders to be chopped up into small bits, each often as little as 1 per cent of actual order size, and executed over days or weeks in order to avoid huge market impact costs. That’s why in every major US or European marketplace – New York, Nasdaq, London, Frankfurt, Paris – about 30 per cent of trading volume is executed in blocks, ‘upstairs’, away from these systems. More importantly, new electronic systems are expanding to make this block trading more efficient. Liquidnet is the most prominent example. By foreswearing limit-order display, or ‘pre-trade transparency’, in favour of a structure in which potential matches are revealed only to the relevant buyer and seller, institutions are encouraged to reveal their true order size to the system. Algorithmic trading appears to be more of a work-around than a work-through solution. Dicing the order slows down the trading, which increases adverse price movement risk before the trade is complete. Failure to execute quickly imposes a dangerous liquidity cost that can work against the portfolio manager’s objectives. Worse, it does not work well for imbalanced trading in illiquid names, the traditional providence of information-central.
The exchange as a process What is this thing called a market? The dictionaries’ definitions of a market or marketplace are not especially insightful. For example, describing a market as ‘a body of persons carrying on extensive transactions in a specified commodity’ might be technically correct but not very illuminating. We need to think of ‘exchange’ as a verb, not a noun. The standard economist’s model of an effective market describes a forum in which indications of trading interest are publicly displayed and are ranked by price and time of submission within price, and in which the execution of orders is strictly determined by this priority. In this model, all trades are interactions between visible limit orders and demands for immediacy in the form of market orders. Again, the focus is on the mechanics. This model works when all traders are roughly the same size and arrive frequently enough to offset buying and selling interest. That might be a nice description of a farmers’ market, but is deficient in describing today’s equity markets for several reasons. First, institutional players need to trade in amounts that dwarf the trading desires of individual investors. This imbalance creates most of the difficult problems confronting market designers. Secondly, these traders are often more interested in size than price; they may be willing to forgo better market prices at tiny volumes to get their enormous block done expeditiously. Thirdly, the traders are acutely aware that displaying their trading interests would only serve to motivate frontrunners and copycats to
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Electronic trading: rival or replacement?
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jump ahead while causing potential trading partners to withdraw or delay until a clearer picture (and likely an inferior price) develops. Finally, in a market where the best price may evaporate in a flash, certainty of trade completion might be more important than strict price priority. Martin Sexton7 defines the purpose: ‘[to] enable buyers and sellers to come together in a regulatory environment that ensures honest dealing but doesn’t get in the way of growth.’ Again, a focus on the mechanics. Picot et al.8 provide a better starting point: ‘a discovery and learning process which rewards the best informed participants with the greatest knowledge arbitrage profits.’ That is worth dissecting. It defines the purpose: parties that trade with the most knowledge use the exchange to secure the value of that knowledge. It recognises that the purpose of the exchange is to arbitrage out special information so that the prices of assets represent true economic value. Finally, by describing the exchange as a process, it focuses on the dynamics, not the floorboards. However, it misses the central reason for the existence of a securities market – the pricing of assets and investment risk, and thereby expected returns. A definition that includes this goal – and gets rid of that awkward ‘knowledge arbitrage profits’ phrase – would read as: ‘a discovery and learning process that prices assets and investment risks and rewards the best-informed participants with the greatest returns from research and risk-bearing.’ With that in mind, we can go back and consider some of the working parts that an exchange provides: • A forum; a place where buyers and sellers can come together. The forum may be physical or electronic. • A means for buyers and sellers to address that forum, either in person, through an agent or by self-representing electronic messages. • A means of discovering a price satisfactory to both buyer and seller. • A means of intermediating time so that buyer and seller who arrive at uncoordinated times can find each other. • Dissemination of information about (1) prices and quantities of available merchandise, and (2) records of executed trade prices and size. This is advertising, plain and simple. • Rules for orderly conduct so that transactors are not taken advantage of by unscrupulous exchange insiders or outside parties. Investor confidence is essential to any market competing for business. • Efficient payment and delivery systems; a guarantee that counterparties will perform or the exchange will step in as guarantor of the trade.
Balancing varied interests So far we have been concentrating on the problems of managing the interaction between a buyer and a seller. But running a successful exchange requires a delicate balancing of the dynamic tensions between multiple constituencies: • Buyer vs. seller – buyers want the lowest possible price, sellers want the highest. Both sides must be made equally unhappy but satisfied with what they perceive to be a fair deal.
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Part I: Transformation of the industry
• Institutional traders vs. retail traders – retail traders have little to fear about revealing their trading interests; institutions can easily lose research and risk-bearing profits by revealing their interests indiscriminately. • Market orders vs. limit orders – market orders are buyers of immediacy; limit orders are sellers of time. Limit orders offer valuable liquidity to the market, and are particularly valuable to an exchange because they display available inventory. • Sell-side vs. buy-side interests – a traditional member-controlled exchange extracts monopoly profits; the buy-side wishes to pay only for the value-added. • Floor operators vs. investors in the exchange itself – floor-operated exchanges were owned by the floor operators and were often non-profit organisations. The dynamics changed with demutualisation. • Listings vs. investors – companies which list on a market are vitally interested in seeing that their current and potential shareholders get a square deal from the exchange. • Regulators, media and the political class – all are anxious to preserve and protect investors against the power of the exchange.
What can electronics bring? Electronics have been part of the brokerage process for as long as computers have been commercially available. IT budgets have grown steadily among buy-side firms, sell-side brokers and exchanges. Information systems are well developed in the securities industry, applying order management systems, trading algorithms and routing systems using the widely accepted FIX protocol. Integration effects and connectivity to exchange systems are being rapidly enhanced. Matching of orders for liquid securities is easily handled, as is the direct connection of institutional buyers and sellers through the ECNs. Electronic clearing and settlement is well under way, although more rapid clearing is still around the corner. Electronic exchanges have proven their worth in matching small trades. Trading algorithms exploit that facility by turning large trades into small trades timed so they do not create a trading imbalance. But what about those institutional-sized trades that do not meet a flow of liquidity on the other side? In 2002 Plexus Group performed a study9 of market liquidity per stock by counting the number of trades per day. Only nine NYSE stocks traded more than 5,000 times a day; 68 per cent of stocks traded fewer than 500 trades a day – roughly once every 1.25 minutes; and 20 per cent of stocks traded fewer than 500 trades a day – once every four minutes on average. This study shows that for many stocks the ‘continuous’ auction concept breaks down due to an insufficient number of trades or depth. How can an electronic market deal with these infrequently traded issues? What happens when the number of shares offered by sellers far exceeds the number of shares demanded by buyers (or vice versa)? What is the electronic computation that times the sequences of prices that clears the market? What is the value of human interaction at this critical juncture? Is that human interaction best performed on a trading floor? And does this situation occur often enough to warrant the maintenance of a trading floor? Large trades cannot simply be presented to the market. Signalling by price trend – with a great deal of advertising – may fill the order over a long sequence of trades, but the risk is that
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Electronic trading: rival or replacement?
the pattern becomes readable. This opens up a plethora of unpleasant reactions: sellers withhold orders for fear of upsetting the market; buyers hold back in the hope of getting a better price; alarming signals are sent to the outside world about the state of the market, possibly provoking panic selling; market orders are executed at dissimilar prices; and one-sided markets generating very rapid price movements can easily create positive feedback and out-of-control price instability. Liquidity can be described as lying in layers.10 Strata near the surface are easily accessed but thin. Deeper layers can reveal much larger amounts of liquidity, but usually at higher transaction cost. Exhibit 3.2 illustrates the relationship between trade size, the cost of trading and the strata of liquidity required to fill orders of increasing size. Cheapest, easiest-to-reach liquidity is at the upper left. As we move down, the amount of available liquidity increases. We will show how it arrives and why it comes at a higher price.
Revealed liquidity The first step is to dip into the ebb and flow of the everyday liquidity stream. This is ‘natural liquidity’, where the trading counterparty arrives as a result of an independent exogenously determined decision process. In other words, trading motivation comes from outside the exchange, representing an external decision process.
Exhibit 3.2 Layers of liquidity Size of trade 25%
Higher cost of trading
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Percentage of daily volume
100%
Revealed Flow Hidden For hire
M or e hi liq gh ui er dit co y a st t
Last resort
Source: Author’s own
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Part I: Transformation of the industry
Trading in this most accessible layer is not as easy as it sounds. The trader must be careful not to trade in a noisy fashion that tips off market participants such as day traders, technical traders, short-term momentum traders and hedge funds. These traders feed off the flow of information that indicates potential trading interest. They know that institutions have an information edge and that institutional size will dominate the volume until it is satisfied. They hope to go along for the ride. And in today’s markets, these hungry sharks drastically outnumber the institutional whales. But where is the liquidity? In today’s fractionalised markets, the institutional traders need to systematically search all the uncoordinated venues. Traders may try low-cost (electronic) venues first, then trading floors. The undone portion of the trade often falls to the hands of a block broker to perform an ‘information-central’ role.
Flow liquidity Flow liquidity is like revealed liquidity, except that it has not arrived yet. The problem for the institutional trader is that he cannot anticipate when, or even whether, someone else will independently decide to sell what he wishes to purchase. If the order awaiting liquidity has a low information content, waiting may not be a problem. In contrast, if an information ‘edge’ underlies the order, delay might be costly as other investors become aware of the information. This leaves the trader with the fundamental trading decision: is the best strategy to wait for liquidity to arrive, or is it more effective to seek quicker – often more expensive – liquidity by other trading techniques? Since information or trading necessity underlies all the largest and most important institutional trades, most institutional traders tilt towards trading faster rather than awaiting natural flow liquidity. But when the stream of liquidity is inadequate, it is necessary to look deeper for pockets of liquidity.
Hidden liquidity Hidden liquidity lies a step below the revealed and flow liquidity. The commitment to trade has been made; the order is live. The order may be known only to the trader holding a large institutional order, or it may be revealed to his block broker (that is ‘participate, do not initiate’ orders). The buy-side trader may keep it in his pocket. Hidden liquidity can easily be larger than revealed liquidity. On the floor of the NYSE, the traditional information-central market-maker is aware of the liquidity but trusted to keep it secret. If the market-maker senses an opportunity to put together a buyer and a seller, the hidden liquidity can be revealed to both parties. If free-riding and front-running were rare events, we would not be talking about them here. To the contrary, these are all day/everyday occurrences. They are, for example, the raison d’être of the day traders and many hedge funds. They are a major concern to institutional traders. Thus large trading interest is seldom shown publicly in order to protect the proprietary value of the order. Information on the desire to trade will not be revealed without a suitable quid pro quo: the information will be traded either for an execution or for information – trading or fundamental – of perceived equal value. It will not be intentionally released to untrustworthy
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Electronic trading: rival or replacement?
12222 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 35 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 44222
parties who can gain from the knowledge at the expense of the initiator. A primary duty of an institutional trader is to protect the value of this information to secure the research and riskbearing profits for his clients. Active managers act from an information edge, particularly motivating the very largest orders. Trading is necessary to capture the knowledge profit, and size is a requisite for significant portfolio impact. But the initiator cannot act in the marketplace in size unless someone of size is willing to trade with him. The order cannot be completely hidden; it must be known to someone who (1) can be trusted to protect the information and (2) is situated to know when a counterparty arrives. If both buyer and seller notify a market-maker of potential trading interest, alias hidden liquidity, the market-maker can effect a trade.
For-hire liquidity Above we described trades occurring through the matching of exogenous trading decisions. But what happens when no ‘natural’ arrives to balance buying and selling interests? The last two categories of liquidity derive from market participants who respond to calls for liquidity. They will accommodate liquidity demand by buying at a discount or selling at a premium. In other words, they sell liquidity to any party anxious enough to pay for it. The information edge these traders work from is endogenously determined, inside-the-box information about the market. The order itself is the inside information. From the institution’s perspective, liquidity providers can be incentivised by giving up a portion of the potential alpha in order to coax out the desired liquidity. The trade will be profitable as long as the payment for liquidity does not exceed the potential alpha. There are many sources of endogenously determined liquidity. First, a market-maker might undertake this role. Secondly, the block trading desk or proprietary trading desk of a large brokerage firm can commit capital to accommodate good customers. Finally, aggressive nonbroker traders, such as hedge funds, may take a short-term position if they believe they can turn a profit. One of the roles of information-central is to alert these potential liquidity sources. At first glance, signalling these endogenous liquidity providers appears to breach the confidential nature of the order. While knowledge of the trade is a valuable proprietary asset of the initiator, it is also knowledge that the market-maker purveys as his stock in trade. The marketmaker aids his customer by transmitting information that attracts liquidity. The distinction is not clear-cut: no bright line distinction exists between ‘trying to find the other side’ and ‘tipping off his pals to front-running possibilities’. The market-maker cannot accelerate liquidity arrival without revealing trading interest. Nor is the institutional trader able to complete his order expeditiously without revealing at least a peek. The trader must balance the costs of revealing information against the cost of failing to find liquidity. It is tempting to call this false liquidity, since the accommodating sellers, who are not investors, will have to turn around and buy stock to clear their short position. This cat-and-mouse situation frustrates the institutional trader. They must trust their agents but cannot verify their fidelity. Potential conflicts of interest are rife among the parties he must deal through. Even worse, he has no ability to monitor the market-maker’s information dispersal. No paper trail exists, no phone records can be relied on; information could be passed on by a code, a blink, a hesitation or silence at the pregnant moment. It gets worse. As information moves
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Part I: Transformation of the industry
down the chain of trading, other parties with no connection or obligation to the customer tune in. A weak market-maker may have neither the capital to finance the trading nor the treasured relationship with the institution, and may ‘daisy chain’ the trading by laying off positions to other brokers or hedge funds. Liquidity providers can be drawn from a myriad of directions. The most innocent way to find potential sellers is to call up those who are known to own the security and those who have been recent sellers. This is clearly part of the information-central role. An options market-maker might find a way to profit from an arbitrage against the options. A hedge fund might sell stock and buy a mathematical hedge of other companies to control the exposure. If these are such effective methods of raising liquidity, why did the buy-side trader not try them himself? Mainly because he would prefer they did not know what he was doing. By calling them he might be giving away important information about his intentions. Furthermore, he does not have the time or the resources, and in particular the contacts, to do that. Ah, but the market-maker does have the contacts. It is the heart of his business. Maintaining this network of contacts is time-consuming and expensive. Only someone with an ongoing, everyday mission to be privy to everything knowable about a stock’s supply and demand can profit enough to cover the high cost of network maintenance.
Last-resort liquidity Suppose a company unexpectedly restates earnings, leading to a panic of intensely motivated sellers. Everyone, including the for-hire liquidity providers, hangs back until price reaches a bottom. In this situation there are no buyers at the current price, and stock for sale will overhang the market until the price reaches a level where last-resort liquidity comes into play. Who are these buyers of last resort? Deep contrarians who are motivated to trade by a deep, deep discount. Donald Keim11 has documented how one fund manager, Dimensional Fund Advisors (DFA), systematically adds value by standing as buyer of last resort. The lower line on Exhibit 3.3 shows that stock prices decline on average 10 per cent over 20 days prior to DFA block purchases, then bounce back and stabilise. This is the price pattern we would expect to see from a buyer of last resort. Value investors are constantly on the prowl for these situations and will likely uncover them without market-maker assistance. They will step in when the price falls further than their assessment of the fundamentals. The danger is the unknown information motivating the other side. Consequently, these are risky trades that demand big price concessions to offset the risks of buying too soon or buying fatally damaged goods.
‘Colour’ There are two ways to correct a buyer/seller imbalance: advertise the imbalance through an easily read pattern of consistent price movements and wait until investors react, or stimulate interest on the other side by signalling those parties that are likely to respond. Securities traders like to describe the latter with the word ‘colour’. Barclay et al.12 provide a definition for the treasuries market that is perfectly applicable to equity markets: ‘Market color can best be
52
Electronic trading: rival or replacement?
Exhibit 3.3 Buyers of last resort Buys only 1.02 1.00 All regular trades
0.98 Wealth ($)
12222 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 35 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 44222
0.96 Previous day’s close
0.94
Trade day’s close
0.92
All block trades
0.90 0.88 –21
Trade price –15
–10
–5
0
5
10
15
21
Days relative to trade date (TD) Source: www.dfafunds.com
described as non-payoff relevant information about short-lived variations in supply and demand that voice brokers collect from interactions with their customers.’ They further suggest that when a dealer calls a voice broker, the voice broker may collect more information than just the price and quantity to which the dealer is willing to commit. This additional qualitative information, which often is referred to as ‘market color,’ can be valuable to the voice broker’s customers because it allows the broker to match natural counterparties that otherwise would have difficulty finding each other. The better matching of customer orders compensates the dealers for the higher commissions charged by the voice brokers. This is information-central at work, in this case conducted without face-to-face contact. Electronic orders, in contrast, are anonymous and indistinguishable. Written in the stiff, stilted language of high-speed messaging, they are black and white – without discernible personality. Reading this torrent of electronic messages to interpret market conditions and reactions is problematic. Electronic exchanges have tried to replicate the function of the voice broker with limited success. For example, auto-refresh algorithms, reserve orders and dark pools of liquidity are all attempts to add at least a tint of colour to trader communication without granting or incurring a competitive disadvantage. Accessing dark liquidity is still shooting in the dark. Another way to safely provide colour is to filter the lines so that only selected individuals have access to it. Liquidnet and crossing networks like ITG’s Posit restrict membership to institutional traders; Pipeline sets a high threshold for minimum trade size. Both systems filter out most free riders and quote jumpers. The problem, as always, is that separate pools inhibit total liquidity. And illiquidity is not without cost.
53
Part I: Transformation of the industry
The prudent act for the seller might be to issue private notification to a highly selected list of potential counterparties. The public quote and transaction dissemination system is clearly not designed for private messages, for vetting information to assess its authenticity or for judging its relevance. Colour is not information, it is knowledge. Failure to distinguish the two leads to much confusion. For example, we speak loosely of ‘information technology’, which is little more than switching technology for routing a stream of bits we call a message. The ‘information’ passed makes no distinction between truth and falsehood, reality or fantasy. It is just bits – the technology has no means to assess the quality of the information being transferred. Using such a system requires tacit knowledge – understood without being openly expressed – and is subject to errors of interpretation. That is why we occasionally see a Corinthian College fiasco where the computer sees no difference between a ten share trade and a ten million share trade. The point is that the issue of the electronic provision of colour, necessary to almost any market, has as yet not been resolved. There may be no electronic solution. Colour is valuable, but it is costly to provide. It requires the continuing maintenance of a network of information. Those who provide colour expect to be compensated for their efforts. Colour can be provided on the floor of the exchange, but there is no monopoly. Institutional block desks and third-market brokers provide similar services.
Governance From negotiated commissions to decimalisation to the National Market System rules, Reg. NMS, we have seen that the will of the market regulators plays a role in defining future markets, second only to the role of technology. Most of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)’s efforts have resulted in substantial benefits to investors, although with significant unintended consequences along the way. The recommendations appear well researched and carefully thought out, but the possibility always exists for a major problem to crop up. Sarbanes-Oxley is one that comes to mind. The sustained plunge in average trade size is surely aided by the regulatory environment. As one observer said, ‘The SEC set up a market for retail-sized trades and then was surprised that all they got were retail-sized trades.’13 Larry Tabb14 has pointed out: The financial markets are highly regulated and the playing field is anything but level. While we as market participants believe we are in control of our own destiny, it is the regulators who own the ball, the field and make the rules. They may be wise or they may not, but they have the power. The regulatory solutions strive to consider the needs of all parties – buyers and sellers, retail and institutional, market orders and retail orders, giant trades and small trades, legislators and public opinion. (Each, of course, trying to make their own interests primary.) A ‘wise’ solution meets all those needs, but it is easy to mess up and end up with thorny unintended consequences. If the solution is not perfect, the buy-side and sell-side will collaborate on a less effective workaround (for example algorithmic trading) so that the essential trading can be completed. Alternatively, someone will set up another venue or ECN that provides an improved solution.
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Electronic trading: rival or replacement?
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Mandated changes can be very expensive to implement, and the value does not necessarily accrue to those who are required to pay for them. For example, the tsunami of messages let loose by the decimalisation rules – and in all likelihood the new Reg. NMS – forces all market participants, from the buy-side to the sell-side to the exchanges, to invest heavily in computer and communication equipment just to handle the messaging load. Needless to say, the investor ultimately foots the bill.
Proliferation of alternatives The NYSE hopes that its new Hybrid system will draw back volume that has been lost to the ECNs over the past decades. As hinted in the previous section, most are, or were initially, niche oriented: finding some subset of trading interests that is not well covered by the central markets. In recent years, the distance of the ECNs from the central market-making has decreased. There are clear disadvantages to this proliferation of venues. The first is congestion: under Reg. NMS each system must communicate with all others, sending and receiving messages and interpreting the implications for processing their own order book. Costly excess capacity and fail-safe backup systems must be in place and instantly available to handle storm-of-the-century message flows. Sounds expensive. More importantly, a market fractured into separate pools is inherently less liquid and slower. But liquidity is highly valued by investors; the implication is that prices are lower in illiquid markets. Lower prices in turn lean heavily on the cost of capital and the multiples at which new issues can be brought to market. On the other hand, the spunky little ECNs have scared the behemoths by stealing market share. Now is a time for experimentation, so the more the merrier; let a thousand flowers bloom. All but a few will ultimately wither or consolidate. Out of this adaptive and experimental process would come workable solutions that will provide the facilities that investors want now or will come to want in the future. Clem Chambers15 eloquently points out the centripetal forces drawing liquidity together. Chambers states: Stock exchanges are natural monopolies because their scale is a direct benefit to their customers. Liquidity is the advantage that traders value most and trading naturally flows to the largest player with the most liquidity. This is a self re-enforcing process. Liquidity is the fuel of any market and the lower the cost of trading the greater the liquidity. The greater the liquidity the lower costs can be, and the more liquidity will be created if the costs are optimal for the customer and the exchange. This loop is the factor that protects the customer from the monopoly and in practice this appears to be what happens . . . In the modern world liquidity is as vital as oxygen . . . Traders, brokers and exchanges themselves live or die by the availability of liquidity, because in the end the market is its liquidity and for once scale is on the side of ‘the angels’. The value of intermediaries lies in their ability to enable transactions that would not have occurred in a timely manner and anonymously. These intermediaries may be brokers who proactively
55
Part I: Transformation of the industry
search for counterparties, auctioneers who bring together large numbers of potential traders, or dealers who take positions in order to get transactions done. When costs of waiting are high, liquidity is valuable and exchange-provided services will demand a premium. However, they are not always needed, particularly in situations that are naturally highly liquid. Thus the sell-side is poised to capture this business by automating the handling of large institutional orders, internalising where possible, and intelligently routing to limit information leakage.
Information-central For the vast bulk of trading, the electronic solutions embedded in Reg. NMS are sufficient; frequently optimal. But Reg. NMS is a black-and-white solution for a world that also needs colour on very important and influential trades. Yet the sense is that the markets are still searching for a better solution to the size-meets-size problem. If the German experience is at all applicable, about half of all volume might be done off-exchange, according to Pagano et al.16 Recall that Benn Steil’s estimate was 30 per cent. Capturing a significant portion of that negotiated big-block trading is nirvana to the NYSE. Market data drives all the interconnectivity and automated trading. Without ultra-lowlatency access to (clean) market data, none of this electronic trading is feasible. And who controls the dissemination of quotes and trades? The exchanges. Thus we can expect that revenues from market feeds will become an increasingly important source of revenue for the exchanges. Companies that list on an exchange have to pay for the privilege and listing fees are an important source of exchange revenue. The NYSE trades off its prestige in setting listing fees, and needs to maintain the primacy of its market to continue its pricing power over listing fees. Reg. NMS is not likely to be the final solution to the problems of market microstructure. If our forward thinkers get some of the details wrong, traders who must complete their orders will figure out how to make it right. The need for market-makers is clear, but their role can be accomplished as well by phone as through physical contact, although the crowd concept will give way to one-on-one conversations.17 Under Reg. NMS, the trade has to go to the best price, wherever that price can be found. Thus all exchanges will be interconnected in real time, and all will have the opportunity to compete for the order on equal terms. If the NYSE wants to retain market share it must offer as good a price as anywhere else. To accomplish that, it must attract the liquidity and put that to use by the specialists in forming best prices. The old floor population of the NYSE used to tout that ‘this is the best market in the world’. Maybe, maybe not. But it is also a very expensive market to operate and the costs come out of investors’ pockets. They are not happy about it, and the regulators who represent their interests are determined to make the exchanges work to investors’ best advantage. As Picot et al.18 conclude: Complete replacement of human intermediaries will not take place. But it is likely that there will be an unbundling of the activities of intermediaries so that consultative [emphasis mine] and pure order handling activities are separated. Standard transactions will become more
56
Electronic trading: rival or replacement?
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and more automated, even their price discovery, as long as the orders are atomistic and one order has no significant impact on the price. Intricate transactions will still need human intermediaries but may be conducted with electronic support. Anyone who provides an electronic facility that proves Picot et al. wrong will make a fortune. So far, it has eluded the finest minds in the business. The NYSE thinks they have a handle with the Hybrid market, but this half of their solution is not truly electronic. As we suggested above, it may never be possible. Silicon-based systems complement rather than replace ‘carbon-based’ human solutions. Perhaps the floor will survive, but at this point the economics and history are working against it. Assuredly, what functions in the new world will be a pale shadow of the former hustle and bustle. From a practical perspective, it may matter little whether it survives or not. No doubt the NYSE will survive, with or without the floor. As Clem Chambers points out,19 it has all the advantages in the world in terms of reputation, depth and, with its new corporate structure, the flexibility to compete in the trenches. They will experiment with trading hours, trading stocks in other countries, trading bonds, options, futures and who knows what else. They will continue to earn revenue through listing fees and data access fees. Look for a change in name: from the New York Stock Exchange to the New York Securities Exchange. Investment advice? Go long NYS and short downtown NY real estate.
1 Chapman, P., Traders Magazine, 29 September 2006; Bresiger, G. Traders Magazine, 20 October 2006; Luchetti, A., Wall Street Journal, 31 October 2006. 2 Pagano, M. S. , R. A. Schwartz and P. Davis (2006), ‘Life after the Big Board goes electronic’, Financial Analysts Journal, 62(5): 14–20. 3 The Handbook of World Stock, Derivative and Commodity Exchanges, 2005 edition. Available at www.researchandmarkets.com/reports/300254/300254.htm#. 4 Now part of ITG Solutions Network, LLC. Schwartz, R. A., Byrne, J. A. and Colaninno, A. (2006) ‘Electronic vs. Floor Based Trading’, Springer US: 50. 5 Plexus Group (2001), Wagner, W. H., ‘The nature of institutional order flow’, presented at the Institute for Quantitative Research in Finance, Spring 2003. A summary can be found at www.q-group.org/summaries. 6 Steil, B. (2006), ‘The end of history and the last trading system: Fukuyama comes to Market Reg’, The Handbook of World Stock, Derivative and Commodity Exchanges, op. cit. 7 The Handbook of World Stock, Derivative and Commodity Exchanges, 2005 edition. Available at www.researchandmarkets.com/reports/300254/300254.htm#. 8 Picot, A., C. Bortenlanger and H. Roehrl (1995), ‘The automation of capital markets’, Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 1(3). 9 Plexus Group (2002), ‘How big is the strike zone?’, Plexus Group Commentary No. 72, September 2002. Available at www.waynewagner.com. 10 Wagner, W. H. (2004), ‘The market-maker in the age of the ECN’, Journal of Investment Management, 2(1): 14–25. 11 Keim, D. (1999), ‘An analysis of mutual fund design: the case for investing in small-cap stocks’, Journal of Financial Economics, 51: 173–94. 12 Barclay, M. J., T. Hendershott and K. Kotz (2006), ‘Automation versus intermediation: evidence from treasuries going off the run’, Journal of Finance, 61(5): 2395–414. 13 Tabb, L. (2006), ‘Global market consolidation: read the rules carefully’, Wall Street & Technology, 16 June. 14 Tabb, L. (2006), ‘Global market consolidation: read the rules carefully’, Wall Street & Technology, 16 June. 15 The Handbook of World Stock, Derivative and Commodity Exchanges, 2005 edition, op. cit.
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Part I: Transformation of the industry
16 Pagano et al. (2006), ‘Life after the Big Board goes electronic’, Financial Analysts Journal, 62(5): 14–20. 17 With all this talk of inexorable electronic advances driving market evolution, it might seem that all securities markets are destined to operate electronically. Andy Nybo of the Tabb Group (www.tabbgroup.com/in_the_news_dec.php, summorised in the subscriber-only section of www.FT.com.) points out that, despite significant investment in bond trading systems during the 1990s, bond trading remains in large part a voice-based marketplace with the bulk of activity dominated by large institutions and dealers. ‘The roles of the major participants have seen little change for more than a century,’ says Nybo. ‘The darker, less liquid sectors of the bond market still are traded in a traditional over-the-counter market whereby the sell-side is a “market-maker” and the buy-side is a “market-taker.”’ Why has automation failed to conquer the bond markets? Nybo points out that the biggest stakeholders are happy with the way things are. Dealers are so far able to retain control of the oligopoly, buy-side firms are satisfied with the status quo, and regulators are looking elsewhere; that is the equity markets. Stand pat is still the order of the day. The moral of the story is that, in the absence of organised customer dissatisfaction and regulatory complacency, nothing will change. Only under strong compulsion or outright market disaster will the insiders alter a lucrative franchise, kicking and screaming their way into the future. Unfortunately for the aficionados of the NYSE floor, their customers are vocal and organised and the regulators are on their side. 18 Picot, A. Bortenlanger, C. and Rohrl, H. http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol1/issue3/picot.html (1995). 19 The Handbook of World Stock, Derivative and Commodity Exchanges, 2005 edition, op. cit.
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Chapter 4
The outlook for global derivatives market competition1 Jens Nystedt Deutsche Bank
Introduction ‘Growth in the global derivatives industry is accelerating and new competitors are emerging in exchange, over-the-counter and other unregulated markets.’2 The growth in exchange-traded derivatives has been nothing short of impressive and far outstrips the growth (turnover) in, for example, the cash market (see Exhibit 4.1). Both exchangetraded derivatives and those traded OTC (over-the-counter) have seen spectacular and consistent growth rates.3 The total open interest of financial derivatives, according to the Bank for International Settlement (BIS), approached US$434tn by the end of June 2006. Eight years earlier, mid-1998, the open interest was a still an impressive US$87tn. Hence, over those eight years there was a cumulative growth rate of close to 400 per cent, which translates to an average annual growth rate of 22 per cent. Moreover, there is still no sign that this growth rate has slowed down or is about to reverse. In fact, during the year ending June 2006 total open interest grew by 31.5 per cent, the third highest annual growth rate over the previous eight years. The popularity of derivatives reflects a number of diverse factors and does not always increase. In fact, there have been instances when derivative use has actually shrunk (one has to, however, go back to the early 1990s to find such an episode) and hence the spectacular growth trend in derivatives cannot be taken for granted. Popular explanations for the growth in the use of derivatives reflect: • A general maturation of the instrument and increased comfort on the part of end-users – In an exchange-traded context, the first financial derivatives in modern times were launched in Chicago in 1973. Derivative usage has had its successes and spectacular failures. In general, the near-disastrous derivative experiences of Procter and Gamble, Orange County, Metallgesellschaft, Barings, LTCM, etc., have taught valuable lessons of ‘buyer beware’ and ‘know what you use’. While there invariably will be more misuses of derivatives in the future, the end-user base has expanded and grown more experienced with derivatives and has also created systems to handle and value them. By now derivative use is considered so ‘plainvanilla’ that even retail clients have ventured into the field and have the analytical firepower in the form of computer systems, etc. that were not even available to the top banks 10 years ago.
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Part I: Transformation of the industry
Exhibit 4.1 Derivatives turnover far outstrips that of the cash markets (in US$tn) 180
1,600
160
1,400
140
1,200
120
1,000
100 800 80 600
60
400
40
200
20 0 Dec-86
0 Dec-89
Dec-92
Dec-95
Dec-98
Dec-01
Dec-04
Turnover exchange-traded derivatives (equities – futures and options) Turnover cash equity market Turnover exchange-traded derivatives (non-equity, right scale)
Source: BIS and World Federation of Exchanges (WFE)
• The growth in demand for derivatives through the growth in institutionally managed assets and the broad-based expansion of hedge funds – One of the few variables that has expanded quicker than the 20+ per cent growth rate in derivatives has been the assets under management of the hedge fund community. Hedge Fund Research estimates that the average annual growth rate of these assets has been in the neighbourhood of 28 per cent4 and that they are rapidly approaching US$2tn. However, this is not only a hedge fund story; assets under management of traditional institutional investors, such as mutual funds, insurances companies and pension funds, have also increased significantly, as an ageing population is putting more of its savings into the financial markets. • Increased innovation, in the form of new financial derivatives, making the risks that can be hedged or speculated upon even more varied – Derivatives on equity indices or catastrophe derivatives, for example, have both, in their different ways, attracted end-user interest as they either made hedging particular risks cheaper or allowed the end-user to gain exposure to risks that are uncorrelated with the rest of his/her portfolio. • Much lower transaction costs due to technological developments – The gradual move away from open outcry towards electronic trading has led to a sharp decline in costs. • Regulatory changes and harmonisation have opened up derivatives to a broader group of potential clients – Regulation and supervision are increasingly being harmonised across the globe. Within the EU there has been a natural incentive to do so and the advent of the euro
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Global derivatives market competition
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sparked a huge shift away from using derivatives to hedge pure currency risks towards now hedging interest rate risks. • The emergence of new derivatives markets globally – With increasing macroeconomic stability among emerging markets, these countries have been able to experience some of the most spectacular growth rates in derivatives use (see Exhibit 4.2). The Korean derivatives market is now the world’s largest market in terms of equity derivatives turnover. Brazil’s stock exchange (the Bovespa) and futures and derivatives exchange (the BM&F) are both in the top ten. While the growth rate in the traditional industrialised country derivatives markets has been high, it pales in comparison to the growth rates seen in emerging markets. It is too early to say whether the spectacular growth rates in emerging market derivatives markets could be sustained. We will know more once we go through another global growth cycle (that is have a recession). A presumably important reason why derivatives usage has grown so large is partly cyclical, that is the abundance of global liquidity and the absence of large macroeconomic risks in the context of generally favourable world economic growth from 2002 to today. Given the rapid growth in derivatives use, why are there concerns about competition? There seems to be enough trading volume for almost any derivatives exchange. This is not necessarily true, especially in the more mature industrialised markets. There have been several episodes of both internal and cross-border competition in and between derivatives markets in the US and the EU. The potential for a competitive relationship with the OTC derivatives markets has also been frequently highlighted as both a concern5 and an opportunity.6 The competitive pressures from the technological revolution, regulatory changes, innovations and changing end-users have all created incentives for derivatives market consolidation both within a given country and crossborder. As has been commonly cited as a maxim, ‘liquidity goes where liquidity is’, that is there are clear network effects of creating ever-larger derivatives markets where participants can pool
Exhibit 4.2 Open interest in exchange-traded and OTC derivatives (in US$tn) 500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 Jun98
OTC derivatives
Jun99
Jun00
Exchange-traded derivatives
Jun01
Jun02
Jun03
Jun04
Jun05
Jun06
Source: BIS
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Part I: Transformation of the industry
and net their risks and thereby generate low-cost execution of their hedges or speculative positiontaking. In this chapter, I discuss in more detail the competitive pressures facing exchange-traded derivatives globally. I will start with an overview of the current landscape of organised derivatives exchanges and the type of derivatives traded on them (see Exhibit 4.3). Next, I will present what the academic literature can provide us with in terms of lessons and insights into how to gauge the trends we identified in the introduction. In the third section, I will discuss the drivers of competition in exchange-traded derivatives. Following that, I will discuss the competitive, and potentially symbiotic, relationship with the OTC derivatives markets. I will end the chapter with some conclusions and an outlook.
Recent trends in exchange-traded derivatives markets As noted in the introduction, the growth in derivatives, both in terms of open interest and turnover, has been impressive. However, since 2001 most of this growth has been driven by the increased popularity of options, especially equity options. Having been the poorer cousins of the world’s futures exchanges the open interest in options constituted 70 per cent of the total derivatives exchange-traded open interest (see Exhibit 4.4) by mid-2006. Together, open interest in exchange-traded options and futures approached US$84tn from only US$0.6tn in 1986. Regionally, the most rapid growth in the open interest of exchange-traded derivatives has been in North America. Since the beginning of the millennium open interest has increased 7.7 times, compared to 6.4 times for Europe and roughly two times for Asia-Pacific. In terms of their relative importance, 63.7 per cent of the open interest is found in North America, 30.3 per cent in Europe and a fairly small 5.4 per cent in the Asia-Pacific region (the highest share Asia-Pacific has seen during the 20 years of data that BIS provides was in September 1995, when its share of open interest approached 30 per cent (see Exhibit 4.5)). The recent spectacular growth in both open interest and trading volume in North America reflects the increased competition driving down transaction costs from sources, such as the launch of the International Securities Exchange in May 2000, which introduced electronic trading in US options. Many of the smaller derivatives exchanges in Europe, on the other hand, started off with electronic trading in the 1980s and have held a technological lead over their American counterparts ever since. Even those European exchanges, such as Marché à Terme International de France and eventually London International
Exhibit 4.3 Definitions of different derivatives markets Standardised Cleared, regulated Not cleared, self-regulated Source: Nystedt (2004)
62
Exchange-traded derivatives on markets (ODE) such as CBOE, CME/CBOT and Eurex International currency and swap market
Not standardised Tailor-made clearing Pure OTC derivatives
Global derivatives market competition
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Exhibit 4.4 Global open interest in exchange-traded derivatives 90
Options Futures
80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Dec-86
Dec-89
Dec-92
Dec-95
Dec-98
Dec-01
Dec-04
Source: BIS
Financial Futures and Options Exchange (Liffe), that had trading floors were somewhat quicker in adapting to the electronic trading realities than their American counterparts. The global market share held by European derivatives exchanges was steadily increasing until it flattened out and eventually declined, starting in mid-2004. Presumably, the large increase in the share of European markets from 2001 to 2004 partly reflects the fact that open interest is measured here in terms of US dollars, in a period during which the dollar weakened significantly. Since then the policy rate-hiking cycle of the US Federal Reserve (US Fed), starting in 2004, has had a significant impact on the attractiveness of using US interest rate derivatives to express views or hedge interest rate exposures. As a result, the market share of US derivatives has recovered much of its previously lost ground and is currently hovering at around two-thirds. In Asia, a number of significant obstacles have hampered the development of the derivatives exchanges in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, such as the Asian crisis and the poor economic performance of Japan. In general, trading volume on derivatives exchanges is clearly linked to the overall economic and stock market performance (in cases where the underlying security is a stock). Hence, during the economic turmoil that swept the region from mid-1997 the growth of exchange-traded derivatives trading slowed or reversed. Since 2003, however, Asia has caught up. The most heavily traded option contract is now in Korea (the Kospi 200 index option). To determine what types of exchange-traded derivatives have seen the most impressive growth we again look at the open interest calculations. According to the latest BIS data, limiting the sample to the post-1999 period, the largest growth in open interest was in interest rate derivatives (up 6.6 times), followed by equities (up 3.8 times) and currencies (up 3.2 times). In terms of the relative importance of the different segments, exchange-traded currency derivatives are almost negligible in terms of open interest (US$0.2tn in mid-2006, or 0.2 per cent)
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Part I: Transformation of the industry
Exhibit 4.5 Regional market share for exchange-traded derivatives 90%
90% 80%
80%
North America Asia-Pacific Europe
70%
70%
60%
60%
50%
50%
40%
40%
30%
30%
20%
20%
10%
10%
0% Dec-86
0% Dec-89
Dec-92
Dec-95
Dec-98
Dec-01
Dec-04
Source: BIS
compared to the size of the interest rate (US$76.7tn, or 91.4 per cent) and equities (US$7.1tn, or 8.4 per cent) derivatives markets. The growth outlook for currency-based derivatives is bright, however, in light of Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s (CME) joint venture with Reuters to launch spot foreign exchange trading through their market space initiative. The trends identified above are useful to have as a background when discussing the performance of individual derivatives markets and contracts. Looking at turnover statistics in terms of millions of contracts traded, we see that the Korea Exchange (the stock exchange merged with the futures exchange in 2005 and was named Korea Exchange or KRX) stands out because it has both the largest overall turnover and it lists the most actively traded options contract, the Kospi 200 equity index option (see Exhibits 4.6 and 4.7). The Kospi 200 index option has about ten times the turnover of the second most heavily traded option, the eurodollar options on the CME. The KRX has been at the top of such volume rankings since 2001.7 Looking at the top ten, another interesting finding is the increased role of emerging markets in terms of the size of their derivatives markets and their trading volumes. If we include Korea as part of the broad group of emerging markets, emerging derivatives markets take four out of the first ten spots and seven out of the first twenty spots (a relative newcomer is the Chinese Dalian Commodity Exchange, which comes in at number 17). Despite the increased importance of the new centres for derivatives trading, with the exception of the KRX, the rest of the top five come as no surprise. Eurex’s second place has already been taken over by the alliance of CME with the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) and together these two US derivatives exchanges can probably challenge Korea for the top spot in the next few years.
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Global derivatives market competition
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Exhibit 4.6 Top ten derivatives exchanges by volume
(Millions of contracts)
06 to Jan–Apr Jan–Apr 05 % 2005 2006 change
Korea Exchange
738
908
23.0
Eurex
416
497
19.4
CME
345
422
22.2
CBOT
234
250
6.7
Euronext-Liffe
260
242
-7.0
CBOE
145
205
41.3
ISE Mexican Derivative Exchange
143
193
35.2 69.3
56
95
Bovespa
94
88
-6.6
BM&F
60
86
43.3
Source: Futures Industry Association (FIA)
Exhibit 4.7 Top ten derivatives contracts by volume
(Millions of contracts)
06 to Jan–Apr Jan–Apr 05 % 2005 2006 change
Kospi 200 Options, KRX
720
887
23.2
Eurodollar Futures, CME
133
155
16.4
Euro-Bund Futures, Eurex
106
111
5.2
TIIE 28-day Futures, MexDer
53
91
71.3
Eurodollar Options, CME
64
88
37.0
10Y T-Note Futures, CBOT
74
78
5.8
E-mini S&P500 Futures, CME
67
74
11.4
Euribor Futures, EuronextLiffe
54
64
17.5
Euro-Bobl Futures, Eurex
55
60
9.7
Euro-Schatz Futures, Eurex
47
58
24.5
Source: FIA
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In terms of growth rates in 2006, derivatives markets in emerging markets posted the most impressive gains. Among the top ten, the Mexican derivatives market posted a year-to-date increase of nearly 70 per cent compared to the same period one year earlier. Looking outside the top ten, the National Stock Exchange of India posted a growth rate of 116 per cent. Among the industrialised country markets, the highest growth rate so far in 2006 has been observed at the Philadelphia Stock Exchange (PHLX), which saw its turnover increase by more than 80 per cent. A similar story can be told regarding the popularity ranking of individual contracts. Again, emerging markets do reasonably well, with Mexican interest rate futures posting the highest growth rate so far in 2006. Interestingly, not all derivatives exchanges posted growth rates; Euronext-Liffe actually saw a decline in turnover, but this reflects a decision to multiply the contract sizes by ten during the course of 2005, which biases the data. Meanwhile, equity options trading on the Bovespa declined, but that reflects some stabilisation after more than a 14 per cent growth rate in 2005. The growth rate seen in CBOT turnover was only a third of that of the CME during the first four months of 2006. Some of this sluggishness perhaps helps explain why, at the end of the day, the CBOT turned in favour of the merger with its cross-town rival in October 2006.
Academic literature on derivatives market competition Compared to the large market microstructure literature available about stock exchanges, competition within the world of derivatives markets has attracted limited interest from the academic community. While there are gradual signs that this is changing, since turnover is clearly increasing and the pace of growth is higher within exchange-traded derivatives than the cash market, there are still many topics that are left to explore. In terms of outright derivatives market competition and the role played by financial innovation, Duffie and Jackson (1989) represents one of the first and most useful attempts to address the issues of optimal financial innovations and transaction costs in an incomplete market setting. Innovations are used in this strand of literature as a term to reflect the best additional derivatives contract to launch by a derivatives exchange given previous contracts. Duffie and Jackson find that the optimal contract is the one that maximises turnover by addressing the demand to hedge a previously unhedgeable risk. Tashjian and Weissman (1995) used the Duffie and Jackson approach to analyse a futures exchange that can launch several contracts to see how it affected trading volumes. Clearly, the futures market will always design the next new contract in such a way that is likely to generate the highest additional revenue for the exchange, that is it will target those investors that have the highest unfilled demand for hedge weighed by their risk aversion. Their conclusion is that markets will always be incomplete as all risks are not economical to hedge or provide a hedge for (in the case of the exchange). More recent approaches to analysing multiple exchange competition have applied a variety of different modelling frameworks to the concepts of innovations, competition, etc. Rahi and Zigrand (2004) analyse the issue of market competition and financial innovation from the point of view of arbitrageurs/speculators. Rather than assuming, as is common in the earlier literature, that derivatives exchanges design the innovations/contracts, Rahi and Zigrand argue that profitseeking end-users that trade on the exchanges play an important role in the ultimate design of a financial contract. The authors assume that investors that are predominantly interested in hedging
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their endowments are limited to their ‘local’ exchange. By assuming trading restrictions for one class of end-users Rahi and Zigrand’s model helps explain why many of the financial innovations actually seen in the real world are in many cases redundant, that is they could have been created through a combination of previously existing assets or they already exist in other markets that are not accessible to all. The most recent attempt at analysing organised derivatives market competition looks at some of the implications on transactions costs of having nearly the same derivative listed on multiple exchanges. While at first blush it may appear that having multiple instances of similar contracts on different exchanges may be socially wasteful, it can, according to this strand of literature, actually enhance liquidity and market-making qualities across markets. Recent additions include Mayhew (2002), De Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) and Battalio et al. (2004).8 Mayhew started by investigating whether the bid/ask spreads on derivatives on multiple exchanges were in general lower than if the derivatives contract was only listed in one place. He finds that bid/ask spreads are clearly lower for multiply listed, and comparable, options contracts. However, for those contracts that see large trading volumes, the single listing effect on bid/ask spreads largely disappears, that is the role of inter-market competition is most pronounced for derivatives contracts that are not as actively traded but are multiply listed. Mayhew’s dataset did not cover the period during which multiple derivatives listings surged post mid-1999. De Fontnouvelle et al., however, studied directly the August 1999 decision by several equity derivatives exchanges to compete head-on and cross-list each other’s equity options. Within a month, 37 per cent of trading volumes had shifted from single- to multiple-exchange trading. Moreover, the authors note that there was on average a 35 per cent decline in bid/ask spreads for cross-listed derivatives, which was both nearly immediate and sustained. Interestingly, De Fontnouvelle et al. also record that trading volumes in total increased when the cross-listings took place (as could be expected from the lower transaction costs), but the higher trading volumes did not motivate through economies of scale arguments the large decline in trading costs. Hence, increased competition in the US equity derivatives market did have a rapid and sustained effect on costs. Battalio et al. found a more mixed picture, arguing that there is not yet an effective national market system for options. In fact, using a month of data from mid-2000, the authors concluded that multiple listings of stock options triggered an erosion of the market share of the dominant exchange, but that there were still plenty of transactions that were closed at noncompetitive levels. Hence, the first-mover advantages of the derivatives exchange was indeed significant as it managed to hold on to a dominant position despite the slip in market share. A national market system that provides ‘fair’ pricing was still considered somewhat distant given that Battalio et al. found that there were a number of transactions on US derivatives exchanges that were ‘executed at prices which appear to be economically inefficient’. Hence, they argue that there still exists some significant potential for further competitive gains in the quality of the execution and transaction costs in the organised US equity derivatives market. To explain the relationship between exchange-traded derivatives markets (or organised derivatives exchanges (ODEs)) and OTC markets, Nystedt (2004) extended the original Duffie and Jackson/Tashjian and Weissman models to include cross-market competition. At the time, ODEs were increasingly highlighting the competitive threat posed by OTC derivatives and noted, particularly in the US, that the regulatory playing field was not level. Hence, OTC derivatives, facing a much lower regulatory burden, had, in the view of US derivatives exchanges, an unfair
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competitive advantage. Nystedt, however, argued that, in a modelling context, as well as in reality, the ODE and OTC markets are interrelated and have to take into account each other’s financial innovations and transaction costs when considering their next optimal financial innovation. For the ODE market, the optimal contract is still of the classic Duffie and Jackson type, that is strictly geared towards hedging systematic risks. However, the ODE market’s optimal transaction cost now reflects a competition dimension, that is the best way for an ODE market to compete is through transaction costs. The OTC market selects to launch an OTC contract similar to the ODE market’s innovation, which does not, optimally, out-compete the ODE market. Hence, in equilibrium, both contracts, which compete regarding their ability to hedge, will face some demand and both play a useful role in maximising the transaction volume, lowering monopoly rents and increasing the degree of socially optimal hedging. Nystedt’s model also tries to capture a sense of OTC counterparty credit risk, stemming from the costs of customisation, which results in some additional interesting implications. Given the counterparty credit risk associated with OTC derivatives, the OTC market has an incentive to try to off-load whatever risk it can to the ODE market. Hence, it turns out that, in the context of counterparty risk and a risk-averse OTC market, one of the best clients of an ODE is the OTC market. Hence, Nystedt concludes that, in equilibrium, the ODE and OTC markets have both a competitive and a complementary relationship. It is actually in the ODE market’s interest to ensure that the OTC market provides as much tailor-made innovation as possible, since the ODE market will benefit from, in return, hedging some of the risks the OTC market incurs. This model implication is in line with the recent initiatives by several ODE markets to introduce tailor-made clearing services for some OTC contracts (Eurex, Euronext-Liffe, the OM Group and the CME all offer similar approaches for extending their clearing services). This means that the rapid growth of OTC markets does not need to be a threat to those ODE markets that are quick to adapt by providing clearing services. The more recent approaches have, as discussed above, shed more light on the various aspects of what new financial derivatives contracts a market may launch and how this might change in the presence of competition. Moreover, it seems clear that, at least in the US context, derivatives market competition brought about a very rapid decline in transaction costs. A decline that seems to have been subsequently sustained. There have been no attempts made to explore the impact of stepped-up derivatives market competition in Europe. However, there has been some work completed on how exchange-traded derivatives interrelate with OTC derivatives. This latter line of work suggests that, rather than being only competitors, dynamic hedging by OTC markets could be a very attractive business opportunity for ODE markets either directly or by the provision of clearing services.
Competition between exchange-traded derivatives exchanges The history of modern derivatives markets, especially options markets, starts in the US. The Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE) launched the first equity options in April 1973. The American Stock Exchange (Amex) and the PHLX became CBOE’s first competitors when they launched their own options in 1975. According to Mayhew (2002), the Pacific Exchange and Midwest Exchange followed in 1976. The most recent major addition was the International Stock Exchange (ISE) in 2000. Clearly, the electronic trading networks, such as Archipelago (and
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other electronic communication networks (ECNs)), have played an important role in recent years in helping create a more modern electronically based US financial market in both cash and derivatives trading. Large established stock exchanges, such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), responded by buying Archipelago in 2006. Archipelago in turn had bought the Pacific Exchange in 2005 and the Archipelago purchase has now allowed the NYSE to play a more attractive role in equity derivatives. Given that the growth in exchange-traded derivatives is far higher than cash trading, it is quite typical to see a stock exchange either having a separate derivatives entity or being owned by an ODE. Many European countries also followed in the footsteps of their US peers and established their own derivatives exchanges during the 1980s. However, due to the fragmented nature of European markets, the pace of consolidation was more pronounced. The factors that have been influential in driving competition within the exchange-traded derivatives market are: (1) regulatory changes that stifle or open up for competition, (2) technological innovation, (3) competition in launching the next successful contract, and (4) demutualisation of exchanges, which changes their organisational structure and profit motivations, as a result of which there has been a series of mergers across the industry.
Regulatory changes Changes in regulations or supervisory practices can have a major impact on the competitive landscape that derivatives markets face. While many examples stem from the US experience, attempts to harmonise and update financial sector regulations in the EU have also been very important. While analysis of the various legal changes and their implications for the derivatives markets are beyond the scope of this chapter, it is worthwhile to note that the best execution initiatives that have been introduced, such as the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) in the EU and Reg. NMS in the US, will have far-reaching implications for exchangetraded derivatives and the OTC markets in 2007. An analysis on both the negative and positive impacts of regulation on derivatives market competition is provided by Mayhew (2002). The author describes the regulatory process that triggered intense derivatives market competition in the US. Initially, in the 1970s, even though options were allowed to be listed on multiple exchanges only very few were. Starting in 1980, competition took a back seat as multiple listings were forbidden and a lottery system to determine where new options would trade was introduced. Starting in 1985 smaller stocks were allowed to have multiple listings and this was the state of play until 1990 when the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) opened up all stock options to be multiply listed subject to a transition rule for those stock options that were already listed. By 1994, the SEC’s transition rule had largely expired, although exchanges stuck to the old rule of not cross-listing each other’s stock options. However, this ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ eventually attracted allegations of anticompetitive behaviour and in August 1999 the then existing derivatives exchanges agreed to start cross-listing and eventually they reached a settlement agreement with the SEC. The impact on transaction costs, as noted in the literature overview, was almost immediate. However, regulatory triggers for competition, while important, may in the end not have made too much of a difference in the US case. As Mayhew points out, the ISE was just about to launch and change the competitive landscape for US equity derivatives significantly.
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The role of technological innovation It is not very often that a completely revolutionary technological advancement is introduced that can overturn the dominance of established derivatives exchanges. However, there is a handful of examples, of which we will mention two. Both of them are related to the impact of the electronic trading revolution on the open outcry market. The first one is the successful challenge by the Deutsche Termin Börse (DTB later Eurex)9 on Liffe’s dominance of the German Bund futures. The second is the rise of the ISE, which went from being a complete newcomer in equity options trading to being the US’s largest equity options market in terms of turnover value. During the second half of 1997, DTB launched an aggressive strategy of winning back trading in long-term German Treasury futures from Liffe (so called Bunds). The strategy had several components, but was of particular interest as it reflected one of the first instances where an electronic trading platform went up against an open outcry system trading the same set of instruments. Up until that point a debate had raged among academics and practitioners on what represented the better trading system and which one could deal with large surges in liquidity. Until 1997 DTB’s trading volume in German Bund futures had remained stable at roughly a third of the trading volume seen at Liffe. Moreover, Liffe had by the third quarter of 1997 overtaken its traditional Atlantic rival, the CME, to be the second largest derivatives exchange in the world. However, DTB’s aggressive strategy of electronic execution, lower transactions costs, installing trading terminals in other countries and lowering the reserve requirements on repos had almost immediate results. By the end of 1997 the two exchanges were tied regarding their market share in the Bunds contract and by the end of the first quarter of 1998 DTB had about 65 per cent of the market share. By the third quarter of 1998, nearly all trading in the longer-term Bunds futures had shifted to what was by then called Eurex Germany. The lesson from this episode is that it was nearly impossible for Liffe to respond to a new technology. Trading costs were so quickly lowered that Liffe could not keep up and given that, to start with, DTB already had a market share of about a third, liquidity was not much worse if a client decided to change the trading venue. The traditional main advantage of an incumbent is the pre-existing liquidity pool, but in the case of DTB the exchange had the benefit of not having to start from scratch when trying to attract liquidity. Moreover, the imminent launch of the euro was beneficial to the German derivatives exchange. At the time, there were signs of repatriation of German money back to the home market. In addition, the market turbulence of 1998 also helped to make German financial assets a safe haven. Hence, the timing of DTB’s aggressive push for market share was near perfect. However, the exchange did not have as much success with interest rate options as it had done with futures. Eventually though, once the liquidity centre had moved, option trading shifted to DTB/Eurex as well. In addition, it is interesting that DTB’s market share gains actually did not trigger a decline in trading volume for Liffe. In fact, for several quarters trading volumes remained steady, suggesting that DTB was successful in attracting new volumes in a rapidly growing market. By the end of 1998, Eurex Germany was the second largest derivatives market in the world in terms of turnover.10 The experience of ISE, which began operations in May 2000, is somewhat similar to what happened between DTB and Liffe. A new entrant sporting a new technology, that is electronic trading, took on the established US equity markets. However, ISE’s performance is even more remarkable considering that it started completely from scratch. Latest turnover data suggests that
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ISE’s market share had gone from 0 per cent in early 2000 to 33 per cent by the end of 2005 (see Exhibit 4.8). Part of ISE’s strategy was to offer lower transaction costs and attract trading volumes. According to Carrier et al. (2006), ISE continues to offer competitive transactions costs that are still lower than its main rivals. However, the competitive landscape for US derivatives markets is also clearly changing and the other equity derivatives markets have invested a significant amount in technology to catch up with ISE (much of the electronic platform offered by ISE was provided by the Nordic derivatives market OMX). Moreover, transaction fees across the major competitors have converged and in August 2006 NYSE/Arca-owned PHLX cut transaction fees dramatically to below those of ISE. However, transaction fees only represent one part of what market-makers and end-users find attractive in an exchange and, as Carrier et al. note, high quality markets, liquidity and other efficiencies can be more important. Are there only successful examples of using an edge in technology to compete in a new or existing market? No, there have been plenty of failures as well, but probably not because of the technology employed. Open outcry derivatives exchanges initially sought out initiatives, such as after-hours electronic trading and alliances with other derivatives markets or data providers such as Reuters, rather than moving to an electronic platform. Eurex-US represents a failed attempt at cross-border competition with CBOT.11 Eurex-US’s attempt to take its successful futures trading model across the Atlantic was made possible thanks to the regulatory changes introduced by the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000. Having launched with great media attention in 2004, the new Eurex-owned US derivatives exchange, which trades futures as getting regulatory approval for new options exchanges has proven difficult, failed to attract any significant following. In fact, in anticipation of the entry of Eurex-US, CBOT lowered its transaction costs significantly to pre-empt any minimum liquidity to shift to the new exchange. Hence, the larger derivatives market’s price concessions were sufficient to make it difficult for
Exhibit 4.8 US derivatives market share in 1999 and 2005 50% 45%
1999
2005
40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% CBOE
Amex
PCX
PHLX
BOX
ISE
Source: ISE
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Eurex-US to establish a sustainable threshold in the US. Having tried for almost a year, EurexUS gave up and sold the fledgling derivatives exchange to the UK’s Man group (a family of hedge funds). CBOT responded to the exit of Eurex-US by increasing transaction fees by at least three times. The lesson one can draw from the Liffe and Eurex-US experiences is that, in order for an incumbent to be seriously challenged and eventually lose, the challenger needs an edge in the form of technology and lower transaction costs, and also for the incumbent to be slow to react. Moreover, there is a need to establish some minimum amount of liquidity early on, perhaps by reaching agreements with key derivatives users before launch. In the case of CBOT, the exchange acted aggressively and pre-emptively and was given a substantial amount of extra time due to the delays in getting regulatory approval for Eurex-US.
Competing in financial innovations While it may be hard to successfully compete for market share in an already existing derivatives contract, new innovations have the potential for shifting the playing field in the direction of a new entrant. However, by their very nature the derivatives contracts launched on exchanges are fairly standardised and simple, that is they can be fairly rapidly copied. An interested end-user of a new financial derivative needs to know in quite some detail how the new derivatives contract is structured, which invariably means that eventually the innovation becomes common knowledge. This is in marked contrast to the OTC market, where the ability to tailor-make derivative solutions and to keep the entire process fairly discrete means that many of the innovations in derivatives start off in the OTC market and slowly migrate to the ODE world. One of the few ways around this, that is for a derivatives exchange to launch a proprietary product, is to license an index and build derivative products around that index. The most attractive index families are those that are household names such as Dow Jones, MSCI, Nasdaq, etc., and all of these have in turn been licensed. The growth of the exchange-traded fund (ETF) industry has also triggered a wave of innovation to provide options around popular ETFs, such as SPDRs, Diamonds, QQQ, etc. While innovation and product development is an important part of a derivatives exchange’s business plan, it is not always easy to tell whether the new innovation will be particularly successful. In fact, the innovative derivatives exchange can at best count on a few months’ head start for a new derivative product before its competitors launch similar products. For a true success, the lead provided by innovating must be enough to generate the firstmover advantage, which would make it difficult for another exchange to win over the liquidity in the new instrument. However, it is always possible that a new innovation is successfully launched by one exchange only to see it take off somewhere else where the liquidity or trading infrastructure was in general seen as better.
Demutualisation, consolidation and diversification The fairly slow response of key derivatives exchanges to the new realities of electronic trading showed some of the strains of the traditional mutual non-profit ownership structure of several US, UK and Continental European derivatives exchanges. In the example about Liffe above, the organisation’s slow response to the competitive threat posed by DTB was later attributed to the self-interest of floor traders, frequently owning an exchange seat, which played an important role
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in determining the future direction of the exchange. Nevertheless, Liffe was quick in demutualising and responding to the competitive threats and on 9 June 1998 demutualised (although it was by then too late for the Bund futures contract). The global trend towards demutualisation is still ongoing, but most of the major derivative and cash markets have changed their governance structures and become for-profit entities. As a result, decision-making has been speeded up and there has been a much more determined drive towards consolidation. In a business that is facing commoditisation of its main products and has large fixed costs but few variable costs, size matters. Carrier et al. note that the marginal profit for each dollar of new revenue for the ISE is about 70 per cent, that is most derivatives exchanges operate at very high margins; at least in the US.12 Given the move towards electronic trading and the cost of maintaining the infrastructure, successful consolidation attempts can generate significant synergy gains as one of the two trading systems is phased out (Carrier et al. (2006) estimate that synergy gains in the ISE could be around 30 per cent if it is taken over). There are, therefore, natural drivers to spark industry consolidations both in Europe and the US. The most recent, and potentially the largest example to date, is the 17 October 2006 announcement of a US$25bn merger between CME and CBOT. While the two historical rivals had already shared the CME clearing services since 2003, the announcement is a major step forward in derivatives market consolidation in the US and creates the largest, most diverse derivatives exchange in the world. In the press release announcing the merger the two exchanges made clear that competitive pressures drove the merger. CME’s CEO Craig Donohue reportedly said:13 Growth in the global derivatives industry is accelerating and new competitors are emerging in exchange, over-the-counter and other unregulated markets . . . As a combined company, we will be better positioned to capitalize on these trends and compete more effectively as our industry continues to transform. As the main strategic benefits of the transaction, CME/CBOT noted that they expect the merger to add to the bottom line in 12–18 months, that synergies would save around US$125m by year two, and eventually much more as the two trading floors would be merged into one, and that this would result in improvements in strategic position. There are, however, important market concentration issues surrounding the merger and it remains to be seen how easily it will be for the Chicago exchanges to receive regulatory approval. Given the favourable stance of the US regulatory authorities towards consolidation in recent years, one would think that the CME/CBOT merger will go through. Nevertheless, the exchanges announced in the beginning of December that they had received requests for additional information by the anti-trust division of the US Department of Justice and that they expect more such requests. Regulatory approval is nevertheless expected some time in 2007. Another source of consolidation, as was mentioned earlier, would be the cash markets seeking out higher growth areas. The NYSE and Nasdaq are both clearly observing that their markets’ growth rate has probably peaked. Hence, the two exchanges are both reportedly actively in talks with potential targets about buying derivatives or stock exchanges abroad. In the case of the NYSE the target is Euronext-Liffe, and for Nasdaq the immediate target seems to be the
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London Stock Exchange. It is indeed possible that, should either of these two stock exchanges’ most recent takeover attempts fail, they will seek out some other derivatives markets to continue their diversification of business lines. Of course, cross-border consolidations are always difficult and require, given the highly concentrated nature of the organised derivatives markets, regulatory approvals from both supervisors and competition authorities. This can be a very long process, but, in general, it seems that authorities are quite in favour of consolidation and recognise the significant amount of competition already present in the market. That is, the decision on whether to allow further mergers in Europe or the US among the derivatives markets has to take into account the costs for a US rival entering the European markets and vice versa. In addition, the competitive dimension provided by the OTC market should also keep competitive pressures high, even if we see another large wave of consolidation in the world’s derivatives markets. The topic to be discussed next is that of the OTC derivatives market.
The relationship between ODE and OTC derivatives markets OTC derivatives markets put even the impressive size of exchange-traded derivatives to shame. In terms of their open interest, OTC markets are roughly four times the size of the open interest in exchange-traded derivatives. There are entire sets of instruments that are largely traded only on OTC, such as foreign exchange. Moreover, as discussed above, OTC markets are a hotbed of innovation and many of the instruments that are now seen as staple products in the exchangetraded world started off only being available OTC. However, is it really correct to talk about one OTC market? Clearly not. The global OTC market is really a peer-to-peer loose affiliation of the world’s largest banks and increasingly hedge funds. These institutions engage daily in trillions of dollars of trading activity in the form of derivatives without a central clearing and settlement system to help them manage their credit risk. Instead, the risks are transferred to and concentrated at the largest banks in the system. Hence, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency estimated in 2004 that over 90 per cent of the OTC derivatives outstanding were being held by the top 10 banks in the US. This is nearly unavoidable as large in-house exposures of OTC derivatives allow for the netting of collateral. Moreover, the more standardised forms of OTC derivatives have become increasingly fungible across OTC participants, but still, once the OTC derivative becomes anything but standard the classical drawbacks of these contracts, such as counterparty credit risk, lack of transparency and in general an unregulated market, reappear.
Recent trends in the OTC market OTC derivatives are dominated by interest rate derivatives, such as plain-vanilla swaps. OTC derivatives linked to interest rates account for roughly 75 per cent of total outstanding interest. Currency derivatives come next with a share of open interest of around 11 per cent. Just like interest rate forwards and swaps, the vast majority of trading and open interest in OTC currency derivatives is of a highly standardised type. Equity and commodity-linked OTC derivatives account for roughly 2 per cent each, with the remainder accounted for by other OTC derivatives, such as credit default swaps, etc. In terms of growth, the fastest-growing area, since the end of 1999, has been OTC derivatives in the commodities space (up almost 11 times) (see Exhibit 4.9). Meanwhile, interest rate derivatives experienced growth of more than three times, while
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Exhibit 4.9 The composition of OTC derivatives (open interest in US$tn) 400 350 300 250 200
Other Commodity Equity-linked Currency Interest rate
150 100 50 0 Jun-98
Jun-00
Jun-02
Jun-04
Jun-06
Source: BIS
the remaining areas roughly doubled. Overall the open interest of global OTC derivatives has been estimated by the BIS at US$370tn by mid-2006, but if the actual gross market value is taken into account (capturing the replacement value and hence an indication of the actual credit risk in the system) the amount was a still significant, albeit much smaller, US$10tn. Given this spectacular growth, which is roughly of the same magnitude as the growth in exchange-traded derivatives, a reasonable question is what can be done to mitigate the potential systemic risk that OTC derivatives can pose to the global financial system? It is true that, given their size, OTC derivatives, if they are incorrectly used or managed, can have devastating effects and bring down not only the potential client that is in trouble but also the financial institutions involved. The collapse of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) represented one such instance when the OTC derivatives markets were severely tested. In the end, the markets withstood the test, but lessons have been learned from each OTC derivative debacle and large international banks have spent considerable resources upgrading their risk management systems, collateral management systems and overall infrastructures to handle the rapid growth in OTC derivatives.
The regulatory environment for OTC derivatives The shifting regulatory environment has also played a very important role in the development of the global, and initially largely US, OTC derivatives market. Moreover, the shifting attitude
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among regulators and supervisors towards the need to regulate OTC markets has also determined the size of the comparative advantage it has had, from a regulatory perspective, over exchangetraded derivatives. Regulatory agencies, such as the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), have generally been cognisant of the potential competitive and systemic threat posed by the OTC market and never felt comfortable about leaving the OTC market largely unregulated and unsupervised. For exchange-traded derivatives markets, the light regulatory touch facing OTC derivatives meant that the ODE markets were at a disadvantage, but regulators have in general also felt uncomfortable about deregulating the ODE markets. Hence, regulatory initiatives have in general dealt with tighter regulation and oversight of OTC markets. This has been especially true in the aftermath of some of the negative headline-grabbing events during which OTC derivatives were implicated. The state of regulation globally with respect to OTC swaps and derivatives has therefore been uncertain since the birth of the OTC market. The lack of clarity of the US regulation governing OTC markets was used at times by disgruntled investors, after losing substantial amounts of money due to an OTC transaction, to claim that the transaction was illegal to begin with, thereby potentially nullifying the transaction and recovering their losses. A further result of inadequate legislation occurred when US-based organised derivatives exchange markets, such as the CBOT and the CME, started to seriously feel the competitive pressure from the OTC market, and lobbied the CFTC to take action on OTC derivatives based on the Commodities Exchange Act.14 Regulatory uncertainty also eventually forced the OTC derivatives markets offshore.15 Other financial centres, most notably London, benefited and only significant pressure on the CFTC by the Treasury, the Federal Reserve and industry groups stabilised the situation in the US. The latest bout of uncertainty regarding the regulatory status of OTC derivatives occurred after the crash of LTCM in 1998. The CFTC issued a comment letter on a regulatory action and a concept release,16 which were widely interpreted as a move to increase regulation and CFTC supervision of the OTC market. This caused some concern because it would almost by necessity increase the transaction costs and perhaps cause the OTC market to again move offshore. Again the Treasury, the Federal Reserve and industry groups pushed back and convinced Congress to impose a stay on the CFTC. It was clear that the regulatory system on which many other countries were modelling their own OTC regulation failed to keep pace with the rapid market developments. OTC markets had developed fast, and old definitions and exemptions were no longer adequate. Furthermore, ODE markets were increasingly pressing the CFTC for their own regulatory relief and a level playing field. In the aftermath, Congress gave the key regulatory agencies, through the so-called President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, the task to present reforms that would address the OTC markets’ key concerns and take steps to reduce systemic risk. The regulatory agencies’ findings led quickly to the passing of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) by the end of 2000, which at least for now has increased the regulatory certainty of OTC derivatives in the US and is intended to stimulate inter-market competition. Interestingly, contrary to previous instances, most US ODE markets largely welcomed the initial report and the eventual passing of the CFMA law. However, ODE markets remained disappointed since the CFMA, in their view, leaves the non-level regulatory and supervisory playing field broadly intact. In fact, ODE markets have continued to support regulatory efforts to increase the disclosure requirements for OTC participants.
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Competition and cooperation between ODE and OTC markets Much of the concern among ODE markets regarding OTC derivative competition has receded over the last couple of years. Instead, ODE markets are increasingly realising that, while OTC markets represent a competitive threat, they also represent a tremendous opportunity given the size of their open interest and trading volume. In fact, in its 2004 outlook for the European derivatives exchanges,17 the Futures Industry Association said that the competitive relationship between ODE and OTC markets in Europe may actually flip in the ODE market’s favour. Van Steenis noted that there was substantial scope for the cannibalisation of OTC derivatives’ trading of equity-linked products in particular. In addition, the author argued that concerns about credit risk, capital usage and processing efficiency was increasing the attractiveness among end-users of exchange-traded derivatives. The scope for a symbiotic relationship was also emphasised, with the strategy of providing and leveraging the ODE market’s clearing services seen as critical to an ODE market’s success. A key incentive for OTC market participants to look more seriously at using the clearing services of the ODE market is related to the OTC derivatives market’s own success. In some cases, the main banks, being at the centre of the OTC derivatives market, are heading into capacity limits regarding their credit and counterparty risk exposures. The ongoing consolidation between banks in the US and Europe has further aggravated these constraints. Standardised OTC derivatives can now frequently be cleared through various initiatives by CME/CBOT, EuronextLiffe and Eurex. However, these wholesale clearing services are still in relative infancy and are not yet a core part of an ODE market’s revenue stream. Furthermore, cooperation among clearing houses and the still exemplary track record of most of them suggest that there is still plenty of potential for symbiotic growth. As Exhibit 4.10 shows, if anything, the market share of exchangetraded derivatives is increasing relative to that of OTC markets since 2000. This suggests that the world’s derivatives exchanges are handling the competitive pressures from the OTC market rather well. Exhibit 4.11 suggests that this performance is predominantly based on ODE markets winning back market share in equity-linked products, where their share recently exceeded 50 per cent. The ODE market share for exchange-traded interest rate derivatives has been relatively stable, while its market share in currencies is still negligible. In terms of what the end-users themselves think, the annual survey by Financial News on the views of European asset managers is quite telling. There seems to be an increased perception of the risks of using OTC derivatives in 2006 compared to 2005. At the top of these fund managers’ concerns is the lack of transparent pricing for OTC products. Next is the fear of banks mis-selling complex products to their clients. Rounding out the top three is the fund managers’ lack of understanding of the product. Concerns about systemic risks only come in as the fourth issue of concern. The survey suggests that ODEs have a significant lead over the more complex OTC products in terms of transparency and ease of use and that this is indeed appreciated among institutional investors. So why are OTC derivatives used if asset managers broadly share concerns about pricing and whether or not they are using the right product? Interestingly, the number one reason (53 per cent of respondents, down from 58 per cent the year before) for using OTC derivatives, according to the Financial News survey, is that the required product is not offered on an exchange. This would suggest that there is still tremendous potential for additional innovation among ODEs to meet their clients’ needs. The next reason for trading OTC was a measurable indirect cost benefit (12 per cent), and only in third place the discretion provided by
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Exhibit 4.10 Share of open interest by type of derivatives market 90%
20%
89%
19%
88%
18%
87%
17%
86%
16%
85%
15%
84%
14%
83%
13%
82%
12%
81%
11%
80% Jun-98
Jun-99
Jun-00
Jun-01
Jun-02
Jun-03
Jun-04
Jun-05
10% Jun-06
OTC derivatives Exchange-traded derivatives (right scale) Source: BIS
trading OTC (9 per cent, down from 16 per cent the year before). There is, of course, no reason why the clearing services that OTC derivatives markets find attractive have to be linked to an existing ODE. Existing ODE markets that have kept the clearing operation as part of their corporate structure are likely to benefit from both significant first-mover advantages and the fact that clearing is a business with large economies of scale. Hence, there seems to be significant, if increasingly tapped, potential for ODE derivatives markets to evolve into clearing specialists, off-loading and effectively managing the risks taken by OTC markets. From a supervisory perspective such a development should be rather welcome, since the authorities’ main concern has been the systemic stability of the OTC market as a whole and any concentration of credit risk in a particular financial institution.18
Conclusions and outlook ‘We have no issues with competition. We welcome the competition. We thrive on it. We have done it for 105 years. We will for another 105 years.’19 Global competition has become a fact of life for most derivatives exchanges. Having once benefited from significant first-mover advantages and been protected by borders and distances, the environment is changing to one where only the best and the largest derivatives exchanges survive. While there has been a clear pick-up in the frequency of consolidations in the industrialised countries, derivatives exchanges in emerging markets have yet to be subject to this
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trend. Trading volumes are still expanding so rapidly that there is yet little perceived need for consolidation. Overall, the competitive climate is intensifying while volume growth is still very strong and annual growth rates are in the neighbourhood of 20 per cent. Nevertheless, organised derivatives exchanges are in a business that can relatively easily be commoditised, and eventually will be. There is a clear trend towards ever lower transaction costs and hence there is a race to take advantage of economies of scales and innovation. So what are the risks associated with ever increasing derivative trading volumes and the ongoing reshaping of the traditional derivatives markets landscape due to competitive pressures? The first risk comes from regulation. In general, regulation is intended to foster competition, but the record has been mixed so far and further attempts would be needed to level the playing field and allow for a more aggressive challenge to the position of the large US derivatives exchanges. The CFMA, when enacted, took a step in the right direction towards encouraging cross-border competition, but as the example of Eurex-US shows (and there have been no real attempts after that), taking on the US derivatives exchanges directly has been difficult (and in fact there is ongoing litigation regarding Eurex-US and the CBOT). Moreover, the CBOT’s decision to increase transaction fees, once the Eurex-US challenge was overcome, suggests that increased direct competition could be beneficial to the clients of US derivatives exchanges. A second challenge to the unimpeded growth of exchange-traded derivatives will
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probably come from the large broker/dealers that are active in both OTC and ODE markets, rather than the OTC markets. There is a growing tendency by the large broker/dealers to try to match trades in-house before going to an exchange to trade. This is a natural response to save transaction costs, but does reduce the price discovery process of trading and in the end will slow volume growth. Moreover, large international banks are increasingly cooperating to set up rival trading venues in cyberspace where clients can trade. A recent initiative to trade equities in Europe by several of the world’s major banks by the end of 2007 is only a sign of things to come. With clearing services being separated from the exchanges themselves, tailor-made cash and derivatives exchanges can be created where the traditional exchange-based market develops into a service provider. Derivatives exchange consolidation is likely to continue to be a theme for the next couple of years. Note that it is only in the past few years, after exchanges demutualised, that this development has picked up speed. It would be natural to expect that, once consolidation has been completed in the US and Europe, it will spread to Asia-Pacific and Latin America. At the end of the day, the largest derivatives exchange is likely to be able to provide the most attractive terms for clients and, as long as derivatives exchanges generate most of their profits from maximising volumes, the consolidation trend will continue. This will mean not only that US cash and derivatives exchanges cross into Europe, but that there will be attempts by European derivatives exchanges to grow through acquisitions in Japan and Asia, which seems to be the most promising, relatively new, market. Regarding the outlook for the relationship between exchange-traded and OTC derivatives, it seems that the symbiotic relationship is taking hold. Eurex launched its wholesale clearing services at the end of 2005 and Euronext-Liffe recently decided to expand its OTC clearing services. Products, such as flex options and their clearing, mimic, to a large extent, the plainvanilla options (and eventually swaps) that OTC markets provide. The role for the regulator, therefore, is to continue to stimulate competition between the two types of markets. However, the regulator should try to also encourage the burgeoning growth in the symbiotic relationship between exchange-traded and OTC derivatives. The implications for better risk management would be significant.
1 The author wishes to thank colleagues at Deutsche Bank for helpful comments. Any remaining errors are those of the author. The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of Deutsche Bank. 2 Press release announcing the merger of CME and CBOT, available at www.cme.com/about/press/cn/06-148 CMEandCBOTMerger.html/. 3 In this chapter we will refer to exchange-traded derivatives (OTC) and organised derivative exchange (ODE)-traded instruments interchangeably. The reference to OTC derivatives is broadly meant, that is derivatives that are traded off-exchange and are frequently of a tailor-made nature. 4 Appleby and Hashemy (2006). 5 Melamed (2000). 6 Nystedt (2004). 7 WFE/IOMA (2006). 8 To the best of my knowledge, there are very few similar papers looking at European derivatives exchanges. One
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
attempt was the 2003 paper presented by Bartram and Fehle. They study the competition between Eurex and EuWax (a bank-issued options market) and investigate how different market structures impact the competition game. Deutsche Börse and the Swiss stock and derivatives exchanges agreed in July 1997 to create a joint subsidiary called Eurex to create pan-European stock indices to prepare for the launch of the euro. BIS (1998). For a good description of the initial Eurex strategy, see Mehta