Women's Rights in Democratizing States: Just Debate and Gender Justice in the Public Sphere

Women’s Rights in Democratizing States Just Debate and Gender Justice in the Public Sphere This study offers a new explanation for why advances in women’s rights rarely occur in democratizing states. Drawing on deliberative theory, Denise M. Walsh argues that the leading institutions in the public sphere are highly gendered, meaning women’s ability to shape the content of public debate and put pressure on the state to advance their rights is limited. She tests this claim by measuring the openness and inclusiveness of debate conditions in the public sphere during select time periods in Poland, Chile, and South Africa. Through a series of structured, focused comparisons, the book confirms the importance of just debate for advancing gender justice. The comparisons also reveal that counterpublics in the leading institutions in the public sphere are crucial for improving debate conditions. The book concludes with an analysis of counterpublics and suggests an active role for the state in the public sphere. Denise M. Walsh is Assistant Professor of Politics and Studies in Women and Gender at the University of Virginia. From 2008 to 2009, she was a Fellow at the Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College. Professor Walsh was the recipient of the Best Dissertation Prize for the Women in Politics Research section of the American Political Science Association in 2007 and was a co-winner of the Journal of Southern African Studies Best Article Prize in 2006. She served as a co-editor of the Journal of Southern African Studies special issue, Women and the Politics of Gender in Southern Africa, and has published articles and a book chapter on gender politics in South Africa. She received her Ph.D. from the New School for Social Research in 2006, where she received the Hannah Arendt Award in Politics.

Women’s Rights in Democratizing States Just Debate and Gender Justice in the Public Sphere

DENISE M. WALSH University of Virginia

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo, Mexico City Cambridge University Press 32 Avenue of the Americas, New York, ny 10013-2473, usa www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107001916 © Denise M. Walsh 2011 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2011 Printed in the United States of America A catalog record for this publication is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication data Walsh, Denise M. Women’s rights in democratizing states : just debate and gender justice in the public sphere / Denise M. Walsh. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 978-1-107-00191-6 1. Women’s rights. 2. Women – Political activity. 3. Democratization. 4. New democracies. I. Title. hq1236.w36 2010 323.3′4–dc22 2010031688 isbn 978-1-107-00191-6 Hardback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party Internet Web sites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such Web sites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

For Gerald

Contents

List of Figures and Tables Acknowledgments Abbreviations PART I JUST DEBATE 1. Democratization and Just Debate 2. Just Debate in the Public Sphere 3. Probing and Testing Just Debate

page ix xi xv

3 29 55

PART II JUST DEBATE IN DEMOCRATIZING STATES 4. Just Debate Denied: Socialist and Post-socialist Poland 5. Just Debate Diverges: Regime Breakdown in Chile and South Africa 6. Just Debate Prevails: The Liberal Moment in South Africa 7. Just Debate Declines: Consolidation in South Africa

118 157 185

PART III GENDER JUSTICE 8. Pursuing Just Debate

219

Bibliography Index

233 273

79

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Figures and Tables

Figures 1.1. 1.2. 1.3. 2.1.

The just debate hypothesis Measuring debate conditions Measuring state responsiveness on gender justice Identifying and locating the public sphere

page 9 14 20 31

Tables 4.1. 4.2. 5.1. 5.2. 6.1. 6.2. 7.1. 7.2.

Debate conditions in socialist and post-socialist Poland Responsiveness on women’s rights in socialist and post-socialist Poland Debate conditions in authoritarian Chile and South Africa Responsiveness on women’s rights in authoritarian Chile and South Africa Debate conditions during the liberal moment Responsiveness on women’s rights during the liberal moment Debate conditions during consolidation Responsiveness on women’s rights during consolidation

97 113 138 151 168 183 192 209

ix

Acknowledgments

This book began as an intellectual adventure and became a homecoming. If I found work and family to be maddeningly at odds, I have also discovered that the two can be mutually enriching. I am grateful to everyone I met in South Africa for their insights and energy, and for their inspiration. Despite the legacy of apartheid and the high price they paid in the struggle, the South Africans I met were focused on the future, realistic about the problems, yet determined to persevere. The completion of this project is in large measure due to their example. As is true of most adventures, I am indebted to many institutions and individuals I met along the way. The boundless graciousness and stellar efficiency of my editor, Eric Crahan, made my dealings with Cambridge a genuine pleasure. Anonymous reviewers offered valuable commentary and read the manuscript with impressive care. I owe them an enormous debt. The Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College provided a welcoming environment and the peace every writer craves when the end of a project is finally in sight. My colleagues at the Dickey Center, especially Maria Koinova, offered their unfailing friendship and insightful critique. The University of Virginia provided me with a series of summer grants that funded my research. Robert Fatton, John Echeverri-Gent, Jeff Legro, Sid Milkis, Michael Smith, and Stephen White listened with care to my questions, giving generously of their time and wisdom. Lawrie Balfour, Michele Claibourn, Carol Mershon, Jennifer Rubenstein, Lynn Sanders, and Vesla Weaver offered their time, wisdom, and political solidarity. The Studies in Women and Gender Program, and especially Farzaneh Milani and Rina Williams, provided sanctuary and the deep joy that friendship born of a shared commitment brings. Diann xi

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Acknowledgments

Bailey, Katie Kavulich, Claire Timperley, and Liz Walsh were outstanding research and administrative assistants, and Charles O’Toole provided precise copyediting advice. Silke Steinhilber read the chapter on Poland with care and expertise. Allen Lynch read the entire manuscript with lightening speed and provided spot-on suggestions for improvements. I also owe many thanks to colleagues at professional conferences who offered comments on my work, and especially to Elizabeth Arkush, Gwen Ottinger, and Allison Pugh, who offered constructive criticism on many draft chapters. Kent Place School provided financial support when I needed it most. I am grateful to my colleagues there, who created a sense of community in the best sense of that word, and especially to Gail Jacobus and Elaine Schwartz, who shared with me their joy for life and for teaching. The New School for Social Research proved to be the intellectual home for which I had long been searching, treated me as family, and funded my studies. Its Transregional Center for Democratic Studies (TCDS) was a gateway to graduate study in Cracow and provided me with institutional support in Cape Town, introducing me to South African scholars, activists, and graduate students. It was through TCDS that I met Shireen Hassim, who sponsored my affiliation at the University of the Witswatersrand in Johannesburg. Shireen also provided me with intellectual guidance, friendship, and family comforts during my field research in South Africa. Julie Ballington was an energetic and resourceful field research companion in 2003, offering logistical support, contacts, and enthusiasm. Georgina Waylen, whose field research that year overlapped with mine, was another valued research companion. A number of South African non-governmental organizations, research institutions, and libraries, including the Gender Advocacy Project, Institute for Democracy in South Africa, Community Agency for Social Enquiry, Commission on Gender Equality, International IDEA, and the Centre for Applied Legal Studies at the University of the Witswatersrand, generously provided me with access to their resources; knowledgeable staff members shared experience and contacts. My doctoral committee was ideal. Nancy Fraser took my intellectual imagination by storm and sent me on this journey. Shireen Hassim provided extraordinary South African expertise and theoretical critique. Mala Htun’s indomitable spirit and laser-beam insights were crucial as I formulated the core questions of the book. David Plotke has been much more than an unwavering supporter and trenchant critic. He has been the heart and soul of my homecoming, intuitively understanding the complex

Acknowledgments

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relationship between academic work and family life, demanding excellence while helping me bend without breaking. All have improved this book immeasurably. Its faults remain my own. Family, friends, students, and colleagues rarely saw me without a book or a keyboard in my hands over the past few years. They forgave me, loved me when I despaired, and are still teaching me how to enjoy the journey. My father’s increasing interest in academia has given me much pride. My sister’s unflagging energy and cheer sustained me through the hard times. My brother shared his adventures, proving with his pictures that this book was possible. My mother’s unconditional love and support continue to make the impossible possible. Liz and Jerry, earlier versions of this book hold treasured memories of our life together. Both of you are on every page. Gerald, you told me I could do it and insisted I should. Your love and support have meant more than words can ever say.

Abbreviations

General CEDAW CEE GBV GMMP EU MP NEC NGO PR UN

Convention for Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women Central and Eastern Europe Gender-based Violence Global Media Monitoring Project European Union Member of Parliament National Executive Council Non-governmental Organization Proportional Representation United Nations

Chile CEBs CMD CNS DF MEMCH83 MF MOMUPO MPLV

Ecclesiastic Base Communities Coalition of Women for Democracy National Union Coordinator Women’s Department Movement for the Emancipation of the Chilean Woman Feminist Movement Movement of Shantytown Women Women for Life

xv

Abbreviations

xvi

Poland AWS GW OPZZ SLD WPK

Solidarity Electoral Action Gazeta Wyborcza All-Poland Trade Union Alliance Democratic Left Alliance Women’s Parliamentary Group

South Africa AEC ANC ANCWL BEE CA CASE CBO CBPWP CGE CODESA COSATU DVA EEA GAP GEAR GL GNU HSRC IBA ID IFP JMC LRA M&G MPNP NALEDI NOW NP NPWP

Anti-eviction Campaign African National Congress ANC Women’s League Black Economic Empowerment Constitutional Assembly Community Agency for Social Enquiry Community-based Organization Community-based Public Works Programme Commission on Gender Equality Convention for a Democratic South Africa Congress of South African Trade Unions Domestic Violence Act Employment Equality Act Gender Advocacy Programme Growth, Employment and Redistribution Gender Links Government of National Unity Human Sciences Research Council Independent Broadcasting Authority Independent Democrats Inkatha Freedom Party Joint Monitoring Committee on the Improvement of the Quality of Life and Status of Women Labour Relations Act Mail & Guardian Multi-party Negotiating Process National Labour and Economic Institute Natal Organization for Women National Party National Public Works Programme

Abbreviations NWM OSW PAC PPP PWG RDP RSA RWM SABC SANEF TAC UDF UWO WEU WNC

xvii

New Women’s Movement Office on the Status of Women Pan-Africanist Congress Public Participation Programme Parliamentary Women’s Group Reconstruction and Development Programme Republic of South Africa Rural Women’s Movement South African Broadcasting System South African National Editor’s Forum Treatment Action Campaign United Democratic Front United Women’s Organization Women’s Empowerment Unit Women’s National Coalition

part I JUST DEBATE

1 Democratization and Just Debate

“Democracy is not enough. We want gender justice.” Banner at the Beijing Plus Five United Nations Conference, New York, 2000

Introduction In a rare consensus, gender scholars now agree that democratization is not associated with significant advances in women’s rights (e.g., Jaquette and Wolchik 1998; Tripp, Casimiro, Kwesiga, and Mungwa 2009; Waylen 2007). Why not? In this book, I argue that advances in women’s rights occur when the quality of democracy is good, meaning debate conditions are open and inclusive. Under conditions of fully open and inclusive debate, everyone who wishes to exchange ideas about issues of common concern has the opportunity to do so. Those discussions shape public opinion and influence state policy making. I refer to these ideal conditions as just debate. Although no democratizing state fulfills these ideals, debate conditions in democratizing states can vary significantly across countries and across time within countries, from quite limited to remarkably open and inclusive. Through a series of paired comparisons of select time periods in democratizing Poland, Chile, and South Africa, I find that when debate conditions are more open and inclusive, state support for gender justice is greater. The reason is simple. Better debate conditions mean a more diverse range of women have the opportunity to speak about their interests and be heard. As a result, more demands for women’s rights enter public debate. Because politicians facing elections aim to demonstrate responsiveness to public 3

Just Debate

4

debate they increasingly support policies and legislation advancing women’s rights. This is precisely what happened in South Africa during the 1990s, when open and inclusive debate conditions were associated with impressive policy change and legislation promoting gender justice.1 This outcome is rare because the quality of democracy is rarely good.

The Puzzle Recent democratic transitions in Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe have afforded gender scholars the unpleasant opportunity of making careers examining the roadblocks to women’s rights. Nowhere is this more evident than in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). In this region, women’s social and economic rights – such as the right to abortion, extended maternity leave benefits, and state-supported day care – eroded precipitously with the transition to democracy. This was particularly true for countries where democratization was the smoothest and most successful: Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland. The latter is notorious among advocates of women’s rights, as it also rescinded legalized abortion and made divorce more difficult (Nowicka 2008; Siemienska 1998). If outcomes in the CEE region were unusually limited, women’s rights in most democratizing countries advanced incrementally. This was the case in Latin America. During the 1990s, several countries in the region transitioned to stable democracies, including Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.2 In Chile, where the women’s movement was exceptionally strong, advocates of women’s rights won a gender ministry in the state that helped promote a handful of laws advancing the rights of women. Although abortion remained illegal, the new government eventually passed legislation on violence against women, adopted family law reforms, and increased maternity leave and aid to poor women (Franceschet 2005; Waylen 2000). In 1999, the government guaranteed gender equality; in 2004, it legalized divorce; and in 2005, it strengthened its legislation on violence against women. Unlike in Eastern and Central Europe, moderate advances in women’s rights occurred in Latin America. 1

2

This book refers to women’s rights and gender justice interchangeably. I refer to women not to name a preconstituted group with shared interests, but to refer to people who identify as or who are identified as women, and as a result are placed into unequal relations of power. In this book, gender refers to how individual behaviors, institutions, and structures create, reproduce, and challenge those unequal relations of power (Beckwith 2005a; Hawkesworth 2005; Htun 2005). A stable democratic regime requires contested elections, full suffrage, limited fraud, and effective guarantees of civil liberties (Collier and Levitsky 1997).

Democratization and Just Debate

5

In contrast to both the CEE region and Latin America, significant advances in women’s rights swept across Africa during the past fifteen years (Fallon 2008; Tripp et al. 2009). Countries like Rwanda, Uganda, and Mozambique now have some of the highest proportions of women legislators in the world, and these countries have also adopted extensive constitutional and legal reforms advancing women’s rights. However, few of these post-conflict countries are “free.” In short, advances in women’s rights in Africa have not been associated with democratic regimes. A notable exception is one of the region’s most celebrated democracies, South Africa. In addition to removing discriminatory legislation, the government approved an equality clause in the new constitution and passed the South African Citizenship Act of 1995, the Labour Relations Act of 1995, the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act of 1996, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997, the Maintenance Act of 1998, the Domestic Violence Act of 1998, the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act of 1998, and the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act of 2000. South Africa is a stunning exception to patterns elsewhere, suggesting that democratization and women’s rights can advance in tandem. However, advances in women’s rights eventually stalled in South Africa. Although the government did not rescind recent legislation, few laws were effectively implemented. More tellingly, policy and legislative reform after 1999 slowed dramatically. For example, the South African government delayed passing the Sexual Offences Act for five years and limited the scope of that legislation. In 2004, the South African parliament unanimously passed a Communal Land Rights Bill that threatened rural women’s access to land. It thus appears that democratization during the “third wave” has rarely been associated with significant, steady advances in women’s rights.3 Why? Gender scholars argue that as the space for public debate expands in democratizing states, opportunities open not only for advocates, but also for opponents of gender justice (Htun 2003; Htun and Weldon 2010; Tripp et al. 2009). Democratization means competing visions of women’s proper role and status will have to be argued out in public. Moreover, even when public opinion supports women’s rights, if women’s movements are

3

Samuel Huntington coined the phrase third wave to refer to the third historical surge of democratization, the first beginning in the nineteenth century with Jacksonian democracy, the second occurring in the post–World War II era, and the third occurring from the mid-1970s to the 1990s (Huntington 1993).

6

Just Debate

weak, or if powerful conservative groups opposed to women’s rights have high institutional capacities and significant political influence, advances are unlikely (Baldez 2002; Htun 2003).4 Indeed, gender scholars have found that women’s movements tend to fragment or get co-opted by the new government soon after elections, undermining the ability of women’s rights advocates to hold political elites accountable (Baldez 2002; Friedman 1998; Tripp 2000). As democratization advances, political opportunities shift away from activists and movements in the streets, and back to formal political actors (O’Donnell 1999; Waylen 1994). Those actors are likely to be establishment elites with limited commitments to gender reform. To be sure, some politicians interested in gender justice did enter politics during the third wave; most were women. Yet unlike the single-party states in post-conflict Africa, in most democratizing states, women’s presence in politics remains disproportionately low and the work required to achieve even that low presence inordinately high (Beckwith 2005b, 587). Marginalized as politicians and with their movement dissipated, women’s political influence declines, and support for gender justice dissolves (Jaquette 2001; Waylen 1994). Although these explanations for the slow advance of women’s rights in democratizing states are compelling, I find they cannot explain the divergence in women’s rights outcomes in several cases. The literature on democratization offers a broader diagnosis for why outcomes in democratizing states have failed to fulfill popular expectations. Although mainstream analysts of democratization do not focus on women’s rights, they do ask why outcomes in democratizing states have not been as beneficial to marginalized populations as expected. To answer this question, they target several dimensions of democratic quality, such as the rule of law, accountability, and political competition (Diamond and Morlino 2005; O’Donnell, Cullell, and Iazzetta 2004). For example, Bingham Powell Jr. proposes a causal chain that argues inequality, along with limits on the rule of law, participation, competition, vertical and horizontal accountability, and freedom, disrupts the link between citizens and their representatives, impeding state responsiveness (Powell 2005). Powell’s causal chain suggests the feminization

4

While many groups are conservative on women’s rights, gender scholars have found that those whose core principles oppose select women’s rights, such as tribes in North Africa or the church in Latin America, are critical in shaping outcomes on women’s rights (Charrad 2001; Htun 2003).

Democratization and Just Debate

7

of poverty and women’s cultural subordination, as well as political corruption, an apathetic citizenry, oligarchic political parties, and governments that avoid state oversight, compromise judicial independence or intimidate the political opposition, can impede the democratic state’s advancement of women’s rights. Although low-quality democracy may explain the limited outcomes on women’s rights in democratizing states, models like the one Powell offers are complex. As Powell points out, the key concepts are difficult to define, the model involves an extended chain of causal mechanisms, comparative empirical data are lacking, and it raises contentious normative and theoretical claims about democratic values and appropriate policy outcomes (Powell 2005, 72). This list of obstacles presents gender scholars with a daunting task if they wish to evaluate the relationship between democratic quality and women’s rights. I address this problem by drawing on deliberative theory, which provides a straightforward rationale for linking the quality of democracy to outcomes on women’s rights.

The Just Debate Claim Unlike liberal approaches that conceptualize politics as the aggregation of self-interests limited by individual civil and political rights, or republican approaches that conceptualize political agreements on the common good as derived from a shared ethos among citizens, deliberative approaches conceptualize politics as communication. According to deliberative theorists, political communication can involve anyone who shares an interest in discussing issues of common concern. These conversations occur in the public sphere that consists of “spaces,” such as mass media or community meetings, where citizens deliberate. Ideally, participants in the public sphere become knowledgeable about the points of view and perspectives of others and take them into account as they formulate opinions and make judgments. Negotiation and compromise then lead to political agreements that have high levels of legitimacy because everyone has the opportunity to speak her or his mind and participate in formulating decisions. Although deliberative theorists subscribe to this communicative form of political decision making, they do not all share the same goals. The field can be divided into two (not mutually exclusive) groups. The first, dominated by theorists like Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (1996), Jane Mansbridge (1992), and Cass Sunstein (1988), hope to invigorate

8

Just Debate

the contemporary liberal state. They aim to increase political participation without diluting the quality of decision making. Liberal deliberative theorists believe that deliberation can redress contemporary problems such as apathy, underinformed citizens, low legitimacy ratings for government, and inept decision making by producing more responsive and responsible public policy. In contrast, critical deliberative theorists such as Seyla Benhabib (1996), Nancy Fraser (1996), and John Dryzek (2000) aim to “theorize the limits of democracy” (Fraser 1996, 109). This group directs its energies toward strengthening the capacity of the public sphere as a space for contestation. Critical deliberative theorists argue that debate conditions – who speaks about what, when, and how – shape the content of public debate in the public sphere. They endorse a wide range of ideas and participants, claiming open and inclusive deliberation will challenge established norms and values and increase support for social justice (Ackerly 2000, 34; Dryzek 2000, 20–30). A number of liberal deliberative theorists have found that specialization, expertise, and constraints on publicity improve the quality of reasoned and rational debate, whereas inclusiveness (such as greater publicity, participation by nonspecialists, and greater numbers of people) can increase conflict and undermine the ability of groups to come to a consensus (Elster 1998; Page 1995). This points to serious limitations for liberal deliberative theory. Critical deliberative theorists point to additional problems with this approach, arguing that liberal deliberative norms prevent discourse from addressing power and inequality by denying status inequalities exist. Critical deliberative theorists insist that disadvantaged groups are marginalized in the public sphere, which constrains their ability to speak and be heard (Dryzek 2000; Fraser 1996; Young 2000). In short, liberal deliberation reinforces the power of elites at the expense of the marginalized. As an alternative, critical deliberative theorists argue that “the best of democratic norms” are not reasonableness, rationality, and consensus, but openness and inclusiveness that embrace contestation. They argue that debate content must be wide-ranging, should include the ideas of groups at the margins of society (Benhabib 1992; Deveaux 2005; Fraser 1991; Young 1990), as well as a variety of forms of speech and logic (Mansbridge 1999; Sanders 1997; Tully 1995; Young 1996), and must move beyond the confines of liberal individualism (Dryzek 2000; Fraser 1995; Mouffe 1995). If debate conditions are open and inclusive, then critical theorists believe subordination will be unmasked, and “greed, naked power, or the cynical pursuit of self-interest” will be exposed (Young 2000, 35).

Democratization and Just Debate

Improved debate conditions

More expansive public debate supporting women’s rights

9 State policies advancing women’s rights

figure 1.1. The just debate hypothesis.

Openness and inclusiveness mean that new arguments, styles of communication, and queries about what is right will enter the public sphere, challenging conventional assumptions. As the content of public debate broadens and new ideas are exchanged, public support for social justice will increase, putting pressure on the state to respond. As illustrated in Figure 1.1, this argument can also apply to gender justice. I understand the public sphere to be composed of institutions, such as the legislature, political parties, social movements, trade unions, and the media. My framework, which I call the just debate approach, focuses on debate conditions in these institutions. As illustrated in Figure 1.1, I hypothesize that when debate conditions become more open and inclusive – meaning a diverse range of women are increasingly members and leaders in the institutions of the public sphere, where they can speak out, be heard, and challenge institutional norms and procedures – those institutions will increasingly advocate gender justice, altering the content of public debate. Politicians who wish to appear responsive to public opinion and want to avoid being labeled sexist will support policies and legislation advancing women’s rights. Empirical evidence in Part II and the logic of democratic politics support the causal direction of this claim. In all of my cases, changes in debate conditions preceded changes in policy reform. To be sure, legislation and political support for women’s rights can facilitate changes in debate conditions – for example, by encouraging women to enter the leading institutions in the public sphere – however, the logic of democratic politics and existing research indicates this is a feedback effect (Kittilson, 2010). The first requirement is an expansion in debate conditions that increases public support for gender justice to trigger the cycle.

Why Women? Gender decisively shapes who participates in public life and how, providing a logical basis for tracing the limits of debate conditions during democratization. Indeed, gender is constitutive of both the public and private spheres. In much of the premodern world, women were integrated

10

Just Debate

into public life and politics through kinship ties, such as inherited monarchical structures of political rule and through dual-sex systems like those found on the African continent (Landes 1988; McDonagh 2002; Van Allen 1972). However, liberal democracy aimed to end the rule of the absolutist “father” and kinship politics that included women, and in its stead established a fraternal brotherhood of men that expelled women not only from politics, but from public life altogether (Davidoff 1998; Landes 1988; Ryan 1990). Women’s exclusion was only an ideal (slave, servant, working-class, and minority women remained on the streets; elite women continued to be important political allies). Nevertheless, women’s proper role in the public sphere became highly restricted (Arneil 2001; Landes 1988; Porter 2003; Ryan 1990).5 The ideological separation of public and private, coupled with a capitalist wage labor system that moved work out of the household, made liberalism’s restrictions on women’s roles in public exceptionally extensive, decisive, and visible. In short, sex marked the boundaries of the public and the private spheres. Those women who failed to attend to this binary faced intense discrimination, persecution, and even death (Arneil 2001; Porter 2003). Liberal democrats embraced separate spheres as natural and, simultaneously, as signifiers of civilization and modernity. Europeans then spread this “social imaginary” across the globe (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992; Davidoff 1998; Stoler 2002; Taylor 2004). As Maria Mies explains in her discussion of housewifization, European colonizers avidly endorsed the expulsion of colonized women from public life to increase their dependence on local men. Europeans argued that only when the “native” woman was made the mistress of the private sphere and protected in public by European men would colonial peoples progress (Mies 1998). Although important local differences in the public-private dichotomy emerged, and precolonial values and practices persisted, the European ideal became a global phenomenon. As a result, women mark the boundaries of the public and private spheres in most democratizing states. By focusing on women to assess debate conditions in democratizing states, I do not mean to suggest that women are the only group whose marginalization in the public sphere matters, or that only women can advance gender justice. In theory, all women could be fully integrated into the public sphere, yet debate conditions could still be exclusionary and 5

Women were not the only group excluded from the public sphere. Justifications for exclusion were made on the basis of numerous traits, including race, ethnicity, and poverty, as elite men claimed all these deviations from the ideal signaled the incapacity to reason.

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narrow if other groups remained marginalized. However, this is unlikely, because sex constitutes the public-private binary, making women the most marginalized group in public life. Women also are the majority of the population. Hence they are a significant social group not only by standards of exclusion but also by their sheer numbers. If debate conditions are going to be even modestly open and inclusive women will have to be included. Women’s inclusion in the public sphere is not the only way to shift debate content toward gender justice. Many men can and do promote gender justice. Moreover, not all women advocate women’s rights, and not all women are feminists.6 Indeed, women have divergent interests, in part because they are situated in multiple and at times cross-cutting social locations. A range of factors – including class, race, motherhood, and ideological commitments – not only contribute toward divergent interests, but also ensure some women are marginalized in the public sphere more than others. This often leads to fragmentation and disagreement among women over gender justice, as well as over other types of justice claims. Nonetheless, improvements in debate conditions in the leading institutions of the public sphere are likely to alter public debate over gender justice. The reason is simple. Discourse legitimizing gender injustice prevails in public debate in most democratizing states. An improvement in debate conditions brings women who are the most marginalized and rarely heard into the public sphere; this includes women who have ideological commitments that deviate from dominant gender norms. Increasing all women’s access, voice, and capacity for contestation will ensure that women who wish to advocate for gender justice will have the opportunity to do so. This means more expansive claims for gender justice will enter public debate. As Nancy Fraser explains, “assumptions that were previously exempt from contestation will have to be publicly argued out” (Fraser 1996, 124). Those broader arguments and debates will shift the content of public debate and put pressure on the democratizing state to respond with policies and legislation advancing women’s rights.7 The 6

7

Feminists are a diverse group with a wide range of views. I use the term to refer to those who believe that women are subordinated to men and are committed to ending this subordination. More open and inclusive debate conditions mean greater “contestation” will occur on a wide range of issues, some of which may be in conflict with one another. This does not refute my argument that the content of public debate on gender justice will broaden, but it does suggest that multiple gender justice claims will have to compete with one another and with other compelling justice claims. Critical deliberative theorists argue that this wider range of contestation is precisely the point, and is the means through which new, deeper forms of social justice, including gender justice, can be imagined, articulated, and pursued.

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nature of the public-private binary, women’s majority status, the reality that women are the greatest advocates of gender justice, and that feminist arguments are marginalized in public debate, suggest that a focus on women will convey the boundaries of debate conditions and capture the probability that public debate will address gender justice.

Debate Conditions After the transition to democracy states declare women’s right to participate in public life but just debate requires more. As critical deliberative theorists argue, permission for all citizens to participate in politics is insufficient, because informal exclusions continue to sustain dominant group control over public communication. In assessing the boundaries of women’s participation, I offer a framework that draws upon my previous work on South Africa and includes both formal and informal exclusions (Walsh 2006, 2009). My assessment of debate conditions uses three criteria; the first is access. Access is distinct from presence, a term closely identified with the women in politics literature. As detailed in Chapter 2, women’s presence in politics has been carefully theorized and its effects on legislative outcomes extensively analyzed. Most commonly, the term presence refers to women’s physical attendance in the legislature, sometimes to their rank, and occasionally to their diversity. I use the term access to emphasize the distinctiveness of the just debate approach. While access does include women’s numbers, I treat the diversity of women as equally important. Access also refers to the rank of women, as an indicator not of individual power, but of their institutional integration. A diverse array of women occupying the full range of available positions indicates they are not ghettoized. Finally, I use access to apply not only to legislatures, but also to civil society and the media. Even though the following chapters make it clear that access is not sufficient for securing gender justice, it is a critical first step in judging the openness and inclusiveness of public debate; without it, few women can have voice or the capacity for contestation, my two additional criteria. Voice means that all women in the public sphere have the opportunity to speak out and be heard. Contrary to the exclusively verbal, sober, rational debate idealized by liberal deliberative theorists, the just debate approach includes voice that varies not only in substance but also in style, meaning that it can include dance and chants, as well as the occupation

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of public spaces.8 Voice also includes receptivity by others to listen with respect. When women speak in a variety of styles on a wide array of topics and receive thoughtful responses, they have voice. Together, access and voice mean a broad scope of participants with a wide range of communicative styles are also willing listeners, learning from one another. In contrast, when a small number of women from one sector of society are segregated in low-ranking positions and only repeat, reflect, and endorse conventional wisdom using mainstream styles of speech, then women’s access and voice are limited. The third criterion in the just debate approach, the capacity for contestation, means women in the leading institutions in the public sphere can challenge the rules of the game. As I am assessing debate conditions in institutions, I focus on challenges to the institutional rules of the game, which include the questioning of standards and procedures that profess “neutrality,” such as hiring or electoral procedures, committee structures, voting rules, or project assignments (Acker 1990; Steinberg 1992). Common challenges to the status quo include demands for quotas, the creation of gender forums, women’s conferences, and institutional surveys of gender relations. Common obstacles to women’s access, voice, and capacity for contestation include the sexist attitudes of individual men and women, racial and class prejudices, women’s lack of skills and confidence, and overt as well as subtle forms of intimidation. Institutional norms that ignore the sexual division of labor, which require women to do the majority of care work, represent an informal obstacle that limits women’s ability to enter and remain in the public sphere. Violence, sexual harassment, and gender norms that expect women to be compliant, reserved, or an audience to men also limit debate conditions. This list of obstacles indicates that whereas all women face hurdles, some are marginalized more than others. Class, race, geographic location, sexuality, motherhood, and feminist commitments intensify the barriers women face in the public sphere. I attempt to capture differences among women by integrating the most salient and measurable forms of diversity into the analysis. In Part II, I disaggregate Chilean women by class. For the South African cases, I disaggregate women by race, class, and geographic location. Differences among Polish women were less acute, but where the data permit, I disaggregate by age as well as by urban and rural location.

8

Young suggests a wide range of speech, from articulate speechmaking to passionate disruption and dissent, to storytelling, ceremony, and public acknowledgment (2000).

Just Debate

14 Public Arenas

Criteria

Rating Just

The Legislature

Access Good

Civil Society The Media

+

Voice Moderate Contestation Limited

figure 1.2. Measuring debate conditions.

Although the obstacles to women’s access, voice, and capacity for contestation are extensive, the means to improve debate conditions are few. Quotas are one popular approach; skills training, education, and gender mainstreaming are also common strategies. In the chapters that follow, I find that women’s counterpublics, or groups where women can discover and articulate their common concerns and experiences, debate their collective goals, hone their organizational and public speaking skills, make alliances across their differences, and develop strategies for advancing their interests, are crucial for improving debate conditions (Fraser 1996). Counterpublics can emerge within any institution in the public sphere. The left side of Figure 1.2 illustrates my model for assessing debate conditions in democratizing states. It lists the three leading public arenas that constitute the public sphere during periods of democratization, discussed in more detail in the next chapter. The center box highlights my three criteria: access, voice, and contestation. The spectrum on the right rates the justness of debate conditions, which range from limited to just. Limited debate conditions indicate that some women are present, but the majority is audience to the proceedings. Under limited debate conditions, most women’s presence is symbolic, and segregation is common. Women express their ideas and interests indirectly, discreetly. Institutional norms and procedures are sustained, and little, if any, contestation occurs. Moderate levels of just debate indicate some women are regularly present and speak when it is their turn. Most assimilate. Because their speech usually conforms to discursive norms and procedures, they are heard. They challenge the status quo in time-honored fashion, following the rules of the game. Those challenges are tolerated because they are not regarded as feasible threats to institutional practices or priorities. On occasion, a procedural reform may occur that adjusts but does not shift the status quo. As these challenges are infrequent, women will be able to recall them in significant detail. When debate conditions are good, a diverse group of women no longer conforms to expectations but openly confronts established norms and

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values. They object forcefully and creatively to procedures that threaten their discursive freedom. Those challenges are not brushed aside, politely tolerated, or quickly forgotten; they are heard. Under these conditions, women can offer numerous examples of how their challenges shaped important decisions and altered institutional norms. Finally, fully just debate means a diverse range of women are present at all levels, speaking and acting with a variety of communicative styles, freely expressing their interests, and challenging established norms and practices as they see fit. Those challenges often succeed. Like any strategy, pursuit of just debate entails risks. The costs are considerable if institutional elites formally endorse access, voice, and contestation but informal obstacles that are difficult to expose continue to sustain exclusion. For example, a diverse array of women may gain access to a full range of positions in the legislature where they appear to be active participants, conveying substantial integration. Yet, as discussed in Chapter 2, unreformed institutional norms and procedures may continue to deny these women the ability to speak freely about their interests and can limit their capacity for contestation. In cases like these, the inability of women to advance gender justice appears to be a result of their personal failing rather than an attribute of institutional marginalization.9 An additional cost occurs when elite women are the only ones who gain access and voice to the legislature, because this limits the range and types of challenges they are likely to make. It also can deepen divisions among women and may have serious repercussions for women’s organizing beyond that institution. Rhetorical claims or mechanisms that promote women’s participation cannot be taken at face value, and the numbers of women in public positions of power or the frequency of their participation in public debate are not sufficient indicators of openness and inclusiveness.

Public Debate and Gender Justice The just debate approach emphasizes the openness and inclusiveness of debate conditions. Public debate over gender justice is also a crucial component, as it shapes public opinion, the causal mechanism that triggers state responsiveness. I do not assess public opinion through individuallevel data. Instead, I am interested in the norms that a society values; the beliefs professed in the public sphere that signal the standards people 9

Distinguishing between the two requires an analysis of debate conditions and critical actors, as explained in Chapter 2 and illustrated in Chapter 7.

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expect one another to live by. Politicians in democratizing states must be attentive to these standards and beliefs, because public opinion involves judgment and critique directed toward public individuals, society, and the state. Public opinion on gender norms is diverse and often divided. Nonetheless, all societies have a body of gender norms individuals, institutions, and structures aim to fulfill, challenge, ignore, or reject, confirming that public standards exist. Gender norms come into sharp focus when public persons – such as politicians, sports stars, or entertainment figures – transgress them. For example, when a politician is accused of rape or sexual harassment, gender norms are debated in the public sphere and public attitudes come into sharp focus. To identify public opinion toward gender norms and track how they vary across my cases, I investigate what the leading institutions of the public sphere said about gender justice. I begin by noting the discursive frames that dominated public debate over gender in each case, because this provides initial insight into public opinion on gender norms and a contextual basis for analyzing institutional positions. I also take into account the relative power of public institutions, because the ability of institutions to shape public opinion and put pressure on the state varies over time or space and across issues. For example, during the liberal moment in South Africa, the legislature had significant influence in public debate, but that influence waned as ANC governing elites centralized power in the executive branch. In both Polish cases, the Catholic Church had a remarkable amount of power in the public sphere and used it in ways that definitively shaped debate content and state policy over abortion, but the church did less to shape debate content and state policy on women’s work status. In my analysis of public debate, I discuss women in parliament and women’s organizations first because debate conditions here were usually best; women in these institutions strongly advocated gender justice. They often aimed to craft the language and create public events to increase popular support for women’s rights. Their efforts included slogans, campaign rhetoric, and protests. From women in parliament and women’s organizations in civil society I turn to the remaining institutions in the public sphere, investigating how trade union federations, political parties, the church in Poland, and the media addressed gender justice. As critical deliberative theorists focus their attention on social justice, they provide useful guidelines for conceptualizing and operationalizing gender justice. Iris Marion Young defines social justice as the degree to which institutions are free from domination, meet needs, and provide

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conditions of emancipation (1990, 35). Domination means individuals must follow rules they do not participate in making; exploitation means one’s labor is undervalued and material needs are unmet; oppression means limits on individual autonomy constrain self-development (37–38). I apply her definition to gender justice, which I use to refer to the absence of domination, exploitation, and oppression on the basis of sex.10 When applied to gender justice and the just debate approach, Young’s three categories of social justice offer a testable theory that clearly distinguishes the independent and dependent variables of my causal claim. I hypothesize that debate conditions improve when domination in the leading institutions of the public sphere declines. As women gain access, voice, and the capacity for contestation and domination declines, debate over women’s exploitation and oppression increases. As a result, the leading institutions in the public sphere will increasingly challenge limits to women’s autonomy and advocate policies to improve their well-being, putting pressure on the state to respond. This formulation makes it clear that domination is associated with the independent variable, debate conditions; oppression and exploitation are associated with the dependent variable, gender justice. I identify four levels of gender justice that correspond to my four levels of debate conditions. A conservative, or limited, level of gender justice refers to state policies and gender legislation that aim to address women’s gender interests by sustaining inequalities of power. For example, conservative forms of gender justice recommend women avoid venturing into public spaces without male protection to minimize gender-based violence. While the goal is to enhance women’s safety, the means entrench women’s subordination by limiting their autonomy. A formal, or moderate, level of gender justice refers to equality of opportunity through legal rights – for example, by eliminating discriminatory labor laws that permit employers to fire women who are pregnant. A substantive, or good, level of gender justice refers to equality of results. For example, a state may eliminate maternity leave and pass parental leave policies; or it may implement comparable pay for comparable work. The former would increase women’s autonomy, the latter would improve their material well-being. A radical, or excellent, level of gender justice refers to the transformation of structures, institutions, and individual behaviors that produce and reproduce unequal relations of power. For example, a state 10

Sex refers to a social construct that places bodies into unequal relations of power through the binary categories “man” and “woman.”

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may reorganize the paid labor sector to ensure everyone participates in caregiving, so that all might reap the benefits of this task while sharing the costs it incurs in a modern economy. To operationalize gender justice, which comprises women’s material interests and autonomy, I choose one gender issue from each category. These issues must fulfill several criteria. First, the women who lived in the periods analyzed must identify the issues as relevant.11 To ensure comparability of the issues across cases, they must have similar meanings, and the leading opponents to women’s rights must have similar levels of opposition toward them. As detailed in Chapter 3, for both Polish cases I analyze abortion to assess women’s oppression and women’s work status to assess their exploitation; in the remaining cases, I analyze violence against women to assess women’s oppression and women’s work status to assess their exploitation.

State Responsiveness Critical deliberative theorists argue the purpose of public debate is twofold: to increase contestation and change popular opinion and to “make possible the move from thinking to committed action” (Young 2000, 69). Critical deliberative theorists claim that if debate conditions are open and inclusive, the content of public debate will include more demands for social justice, and the state will respond accordingly. I use a disaggregated, feminist-informed definition of the state. I conceptualize the state as a composite of institutions, networks, relationships, and actors that are not unified but that are gendered (Brown 1992; Manicom 1992; Waylen 1996). Disaggregating the state means attending to different actors within the state, such as career civil servants, administrative appointees, and leaders elected to political office, who have different interests because of the different ways they attain and retain their positions, the institutional demands of their offices, and their own personal commitments. State actors, institutions, networks, and relationships usually have masculinist norms and values that elite men believe they best embody: rationality, hierarchy, neutrality, and objectivity (Brown 1992; Stivers 1993; Young 2000). Although the state is composed of multiple actors and institutions and needs to be disaggregated, the necessary data for socialist Poland and the authoritarian periods in Chile and South 11

This ensures that gender issues are contextually rooted instead of being defined a priori by international documents, specialists, or a “western” feminist.

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Africa are not available. In these cases, I refer to the state and the regime interchangeably. I do disaggregate the state for post-socialist Poland and the two cases in post-apartheid South Africa. I refer to the government or administration, as well as governing elites, and wherever the data allows, I identify specific bureaucratic agencies and individual actors. State responsiveness to public demands for gender justice is not synonymous with the achievement of gender justice. Laurel Weldon makes this distinction clear with an example from U.S. legislation on violence against women. Weldon explains that women’s groups in the United States lobbied for mandatory arrest policies to force reluctant police officers to jail men who battered women. The intention was to increase women’s safety, but the police arrested both women and men, claiming uncertainty about who was the aggressor. As a result, battered women called the police less often. The law had the perverse effect of decreasing women’s safety (Weldon 2002b, 8). In this case, “committed action” toward gender justice increased, yet women’s oppression deepened. Although this means state responsiveness intended to advance gender justice may not always succeed, without state responsiveness it is unlikely gender injustice will end. Governments not only pursue different types of gender justice, they do so with varying degrees of commitment. Whereas it is relatively straightforward to assess whether a policy or legislation endorses conservative, formal, substantive, or radical levels of gender justice, appraising the strength of that commitment requires additional analytical tools. It is not enough to describe a policy statement or the passage of legislation to accurately assess the level of state responsiveness, because policy and legislation may be marred by a lack of will or limited state capacity. Inspired by Weldon’s criteria for evaluating state responsiveness to violence against women, I assess state policies and legislation for speed, scope, and specifics to capture state responsiveness.12 Figure 1.3 illustrates my approach. To assess speed, I focus on the timing of policies and legislation and compare them to global trends. Scope captures the breadth of the response by asking whether gender policies and legislation address multiple facets of the problem or address only one or two. I also investigate specifics. Specifics signal conceptual clarity and precision in public policy and legislation which are crucial for successful implementation.

12

Weldon ranks government responsiveness by scope and timing. Her analysis of scope has seven indicators. Timing involves a ranking of each country by how soon it took action in relation to thirty-five other democratic countries (Weldon 2002b). My model is less detailed in its analysis of scope but includes a third indicator: specifics.

Just Debate

20 State Policy & Legislation

Criteria Speed

+

Scope Specifics

Rating Excellent Good Moderate Limited

GBV/Abortion Work

figure 1.3. Measuring state responsiveness on gender justice.

Speed, scope, and specifics should not be maximized with disregard for context. Instead, the practical achievement of these three criteria is optimal. For example, legislation passed in haste may prevent appropriate attentiveness to specifics. That illustrates why the maximization of one of these three criteria without consideration for the other two is likely to be counterproductive. With this caveat, the greater the speed, scope, and specifics of state policies and legislation, the more state policies and legislation convey support for gender justice. In the next section of this book, I examine several cases of democratization where the public sphere was highly dynamic. I find debate conditions shaped outcomes on women’s rights in these cases. Whether a similar relationship exists between just debate and women’s rights beyond democratizing states during the third wave cannot be determined by this study; it can only be ascertained by additional comparative research. Certainly the just debate framework presented in this chapter could be modified to test outcomes on social justice or assess debate conditions beyond democratizing states. It could also be useful for analyzing debate conditions in institutions outside the public sphere that aspire to or might benefit from more democratic practices. In short, the findings detailed in the following chapters apply only to a narrow subclass of cases, but the framework offered in this chapter is adaptable and can have additional applications.

Methods To apply the just debate approach to periods of democratization during the third wave, I use qualitative and comparative methods. In this section,

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I explain my application of qualitative methods and in Chapter 3, I detail the research design and operationalization of my variables. This chapter and the next draw upon critical deliberative theory to develop a new approach for assessing the quality of democracy and for explaining outcomes on women’s rights. The second section of the book presents a series of structured, focused comparisons that test the “usefulness” of the just debate claim in “widely different contexts” (Huber 2003, 1). The first structured, focused comparison analyzes debate conditions during the 1980s in Poland and the decade immediately following to investigate whether the just debate claim is viable, because women’s rights in Poland appear to have regressed with the transition to democracy. The chapter on authoritarian Chile and apartheid South Africa tests the just debate claim in a cross-regional setting. The comparison of the liberal moment in South Africa (1994–1999) with the consolidation period (1999–2004) tests the just debate claim in one country over time, holding a number of factors constant.13 Both tests analyze cases where outcomes on women’s rights ranged from moderate to excellent. This small set of paired comparisons enables “contextualized comparison” that the just debate framework demands, and at the same time provides full range on the dependent variable (Locke and Thelen 1998, 11; Sil 2009; Tarrow 2010). As explained in Chapter 2, the public sphere comprises multiple institutions. Several scholars have argued that investigating gender and its intersections with race and class in institutional settings requires carefully chosen, intensive case studies to uncover systemic patterns of social behavior (Acker 1992; Cockburn 1991; Hawkesworth 2003; Steinberg 1992, 580). Social behaviors identified in this literature include “[s]ilencing, excluding, marginalizing, segregating, discrediting, dismissing, discounting, insulting, stereotyping, and patronizing (Cockburn 1991; Duerst-Lahti 1998; Gertzog 1995; Hawkesworth 2003, 531; Kenny 1996). Qualitative data and analysis offer tools for identifying these types of informal exclusions. 13

Comparative politics scholars use several terms to designate the stages of democratization. Liberalization occurs when political activism increases and government oppression of those activities eases. As resistance against the government mounts, the process of regime breakdown begins (O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986). Transition refers to the period of democratic negotiations and culminates with elections. Consolidation refers to the period after the transition when democracy is established as “the only game in town” (Diamond 1999a; Linz and Stepan 1996). Debate conditions and outcomes on women’s rights varied significantly in South Africa during the first ten years after democratic elections. I refer to the first half of that period as the liberal moment, and to the second half as the consolidation period.

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My qualitative data sources include autobiographies, letters, minutes from meetings, press releases, government studies and statistics, speeches, parliamentary records, policy documents, government reports, and print media. I collected these sources from domestic, regional, and international non-governmental organizations, South African archives and libraries, and from newspapers and online media. I also draw upon an array of expert secondary sources, many of which include interview data. As the majority of my cases are from South Africa, I also conducted forty formal interviews in that country between 2001 and 2006. Using a snowball sampling technique, I met with politicians and academics, activists in non-governmental organizations, and trade unionists and journalists. I aimed for saturation rather than maximizing sample size.14 Interviews were semi-structured, aimed to develop trust with the respondent, and began by inviting participants to discuss their personal experiences and highlight the issues they deemed most important. All were invited to offer examples to illustrate their claims. To increase accuracy and gain additional insights, I also used respondent validation during interviews, asking participants to comment on my interpretations of their accounts; others were invited to provide written comments on memos and draft text that drew extensively upon their interviews. Tape recording and detailed note taking enhanced confirmability and completeness. A number of interviews were conducted with a South African colleague; several were conducted with two or three colleagues. Post-interview discussions and analysis followed these collaborations. I used a number of interpretive tools to collect and analyze the data. I began with coding and memoing (Miles and Huberman 1994). For example, I labeled and categorized the data for indicators of access, such as the number of women in parliament, their rank, class, race, and ideological position. To ensure adequacy, scope, and consistency of the data, I used cross-checking, searching for similarities and differences, as well as for different modes of evidence. For example, although women representatives in South Africa overwhelmingly come from the African National Congress, this does not mean they lack ideological 14

Saturation in qualitative methods aims for redundancy, targeting sources that are most likely to have expertise on the topic (Morse et al. 2002). A number of people I interviewed had experience in several different institutions in the public sphere, whereas a handful of others were involved at a secondary level as support staff or were engaged in the production of public culture. The latter group helped ensure interview sampling was not too narrow, whereas the former offered valuable comparative insights.

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diversity. On the contrary, records of parliamentary debates and reports by women legislators from the first parliament establish that withinparty ideological diversity was significant. To increase trustworthiness and transparency of my cross-checks, I extensively cite secondary and primary sources, including page numbers and online links. I only cite newspaper articles for their factual information, not for their analytical claims. Primary documents are cited with careful attention to their context (Moravcsik 2010). My first-level analysis prompted the writing of memos that contained ideas, thought experiments, and concept maps that became the basis for draft text with tables and diagrams (Maxwell 2005). Those drafts contained dense description and revealed new gaps and questions, prompting a return to my sources, adjustments to the differentiation of variables, and in some cases adjustments to my interview and research plans. This iterative process produced grounded specification and variance for the independent and dependent variables. As coding and memoing advanced, I fine-tuned the “general questions” that I ask of each case (George and Bennett 2005, 67).15 For the independent variable, I ask: Who was present in the leading institutions of the public sphere? What was their rank and how diverse were they? Did women in these institutions speak out and were they heard with respect? Did they openly question institutional norms and procedures? Did any of these challenges succeed? To assess state responsiveness on gender justice, I ask: How did public policy and legislation respond to these two gender problems? How did the response compare to global standards? Did the policy and legislation focus on only one aspect of the problem, or did it tackle most facets? Did legislation and policy reform provide sufficient funding and clear administrative directives to initiate implementation, signaling intended effectiveness? As the type of data indicators available tend to vary in qualitative analysis, I closely adhered to these questions and sought to balance the weighting of my data across comparisons. For example, I balance a discussion of debate conditions in the alternative media in authoritarian Chile with a similarly formatted discussion of debate conditions in the alternative media in apartheid 15

The questions are general because they need to apply to more than one case, and because sometimes “data requirements are missing altogether or inadequately formulated.” In these instances, researcher resourcefulness and interpretive skills are required, because “a mechanical use of the method of structured, focused comparison will not yield good results” (George and Bennett 2005, 86).

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South Africa. I was careful not to apply this technique mechanically, however. For example, I devote particular attention to Solidarity in late socialist Poland, but I do not lavish the same degree of attention on Solidarity in post-1989 Poland because during this period its importance waned considerably. To sharpen my coding and theoretical analysis further, I also used constant comparison. To explore whether some types of institutions favored better debate conditions than others, for example, I compared coded data from political parties across my cases. To learn why some institutions, regardless of type, had more open and inclusive debate conditions than others, I compared institutions by level of debate conditions. That prompted me to return to the coded data, my sources, and deliberative theory. One result of this process was an integration of counterpublics into the analysis.16 For my causal mechanism, public debate, I collected qualitative data on what the leading institutions in the public sphere said about each of my gender justice issues. To code their positions on gender justice, I analyzed word choices, particularly analogies and metaphors, looking closely for contradictions and silences. Although I focused on words and phrases like “poverty alleviation” or “vulnerability,” I did not use words to produce numerical data. Instead, I used thematic analysis to identify narrative framing patterns that shaped normative positions (Ginger 2006; Roe 1994), which I scored following the spectrum of conservative to radical. For example, during the 1990s in Poland, the church adapted the deeply resonant, patriotic phrase Matka Polka (Polish Mother) to encourage women to remain in the domestic sphere and reject consumer capitalism. That discourse justified gendered unemployment rates by drawing upon nationalist sentiment, and confirmed that the Polish Church remained deeply conservative on women’s work status during the height of “shock therapy.” To score the strength of the state’s response on gender justice, the dependent variable, I used coding and memoing, and followed the iterative process described for debate conditions. Indicators for strength – speed, scope, and specifics – included dates when legislation and policy reform were passed, the number and type of problem areas targeted, and funding for new programs. To analyze state rhetoric, I drew upon the narrative techniques described for the causal mechanism. 16

Feedback from colleagues also provided invaluable insights and critiques that furthered these iterations.

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To better evaluate the meaning of my sources, I continuously asked who was the intended audience and what was the purpose of the source. To increase my critical leverage, I drew upon personal experience (Corbin and Strauss 2008, 80; Maxwell 2005). For example, by returning to my reflexive notes from field research that focused on class, race, and gender bias, I considered the ways my being a white woman from the United States may have influenced interviewee responses (Lincoln and Guba 1985). Finally, although I focused on the national level and sliced countries into time periods, I investigated debate conditions and state responsiveness at regional and local levels, and researched the entire period of democratization (from liberalization to the present) in all three countries to ensure contextually rooted analyses that are sensitive to variation across space and time, and that do not overgeneralize.

Contributions This book offers important insights for deliberative theorists, gender scholars, and analysts of democratization. Although applications of deliberative theory to the real world have been extensive, ranging from international relations to public policy, sexual harassment, and deliberative experiments, no one has evaluated how the openness and inclusiveness of debate conditions affect state policy. This book does just that. I offer a framework for testing whether more open and inclusive debate conditions are associated with state policies and legislation that advance women’s rights. I then apply my framework to a series of structured, focused comparisons drawn from states that democratized during the third wave, when debate conditions were dynamic and outcomes on women’s rights varied. In addition to confirming the just debate hypothesis, the book offers some caveats to critical deliberative theorists about the role of the state in the public sphere, and to gender scholars about their focus on the state and feminist civil society (women’s movements and organizations). It also underscores the importance of counterpublics for improving debate conditions, provides a new model for evaluating the quality of democracy, and offers a new explanation for outcomes on women’s rights. Whereas the state can undermine public debate as critical deliberative theorists fear, I find it also can expand the public sphere and improve debate conditions. Indeed, during the liberal moment in South Africa, the new Government of National Unity worked to open state institutions

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to citizens, the vast majority of whom were its supporters.17 Those new opportunities created a basis for a diverse array of women to influence public debate. In fact, the arena with the most open and inclusive debate conditions in South Africa during this period was parliament. That suggests that deliberative theorists have under theorized the complex relationship between the state and the public sphere. It also suggests that feminist assumptions about the “friendliness” of civil society (Phillips 2002) must be moderated. Gender quotas and women’s caucuses are now common in legislatures, gender bureaucracies have proliferated in many states, international monitoring of state compliance with women’s rights is routine, and the gender policies of most states are widely debated not only in legislatures and ministries, but also in United Nations (UN) forums. Yet trade unions, political parties, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the media usually resist these reforms. Hence it cannot be assumed that civil society is more welcoming to women than the state. To be sure, mechanisms like quotas and women’s caucuses do not guarantee open and inclusive debate conditions. However, sometimes these mechanisms provide an important foothold for women in public arenas to pry open debate conditions. Quotas, for example, can bring a significant number of women into a legislature and can provide the basis for forming a women’s caucus. A caucus can be a crucial institutional innovation if it becomes a counterpublic, because counterpublics provide a foundation for talented women leaders to emerge and offer them an important base of support. Although counterpublics do not guarantee open and inclusive debate conditions, no institution analyzed in this book achieved notable progress in debate conditions without one. Counterpublics can emerge out of highly unlikely places, like the women’s wing of a political party long confined to providing social services. Several marginalized women who refuse to be tokens in an eliterun women’s organization can also establish a counterpublic; so too can groups of desperately impoverished women who discover they share common problems and are determined to demand change. Although not all women’s groups become counterpublics, this diverse array of origins suggests that many can. By tracing the openness and inclusiveness of 17

The Government of National Unity (GNU) was a multiparty government mandated by the interim constitution and consisted of seven political parties that were voted into power in the first nonracial elections. The GNU included cabinet positions for all parties that won at least 5 percent of the vote and executive power sharing for the second largest electoral winner. The ANC dominated the GNU as it was just short of a two-thirds electoral majority.

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debate conditions in several democratizing states, I uncover how, when, and why successful counterpublics emerge. The book also offers an innovative approach to evaluating the quality of democracy. Drawing upon critical deliberative theory, my framework overcomes a number of problems cited in the quality of democratization literature. First, a rich body of normative and theoretical claims informs my framework. Critical deliberative theory does not resolve the debates about what quality democracy should look like or what its goals should be, but it is firmly grounded in a dense set of normative goals, and sets out these goals quite clearly at the outset. Second, the just debate approach focuses on institutional levels of political inequality that can be documented, meaning my framework can be operationalized across cases. Third, unlike other approaches for assessing the quality of democracy that posit a complex causal chain that includes many dimensions of democratic quality – like the rule of law, accountability, and political competition – my framework focuses on debate conditions and their relationship to rights outcomes. I streamline the causal analysis: Other dimensions of democratic quality come into view only when they affect debate conditions. My framework thus offers a parsimonious causal logic for evaluating state responsiveness that can be tested. Finally, my framework offers and tests a new approach for explaining outcomes on women’s rights in several cases where existing explanations fall short, as discussed in Chapter 3. Although liberal democracies are often celebrated for their openness and inclusiveness, this book exposes the institutional norms and practices that severely circumscribe demands for women’s rights in the public sphere, breaking the link between the democratizing state and the majority of its citizens. My findings suggest that the epigraph to the chapter needs to be changed. It should read: Democracy is not enough for gender justice. We need just debate.

Chapter Overview Before turning to the empirical data, Chapter 2 explains how I conceptualize the role of the legislature, civil society, and the media in the public sphere. Chapter 3 explains my case selections, choice of gender justice issues, and details the limits of alternative accounts for explaining outcomes on women’s rights. The second section of the book applies the just debate approach to a series of structured, focused comparisons. Chapter 4 explores whether unusually limited outcomes on women’s

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rights in post-socialist Poland invalidate the just debate claim. It details precisely what happened to debate conditions during the decade prior to and immediately after the 1989 elections. A comparison of these two periods exposes the extraordinarily repressive actions of the Catholic Church as it avidly pursued an end to legal abortion in Poland. Chapter 5 tests the just debate claim by comparing the openness and inclusiveness of public debate and outcomes on women’s rights during the decade prior to the first democratic elections in Chile and South Africa. It explains why outcomes in the South African case were significantly better. Chapters 6 and 7 test the just debate claim during two five-year periods in postapartheid South Africa. This last comparison reveals the rapid rise and then sudden decline in debate conditions in post-apartheid South Africa, and the central role ANC governing elites played in that trajectory. The final chapter analyzes the key factors that shaped the openness and inclusiveness of public debate in my cases, and concludes by discussing when and how debate conditions improve in democratizing states.

2 Just Debate in the Public Sphere

“Ignoring someone is a very effective way of censoring them.” Emily Mitchell

Introduction The just debate approach argues that as debate conditions in the public sphere become more open and inclusive, the content of public debate will include more demands for gender justice. As public pressure for women’s rights increases, democratically elected political leaders who do not wish to appear sexist will respond by passing women’s rights legislation. In democratizing states, the most influential arenas in the public sphere are legislatures, civil society, and the media. Legislatures pass binding collective decisions, whereas civil society and the media are weaker public arenas that play a significant role in shaping public opinion. In each of these arenas, public discussion over issues of common concern occurs, meaning in principle the discussions are open to all. Politicians in the state and activists in civil society make speeches, engage in debates, and invite citizens to meetings; the media publicize these deliberations. In this chapter, I explain the theoretical underpinnings for my approach to the public sphere. I begin by defining the public sphere and the specific institutions within each of the arenas that are critical for an analysis of debate conditions in democratizing states. Next, I detail the unique purpose, functions, and gendered contours of these institutions. To do so, I draw upon scholarship that discusses political representation, the boundaries of civil society, and the role of the media in liberal

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democracies, as well as feminist work that investigates how these three public arenas are gendered. This book focuses on women in parliament, political associations in civil society, and the press to ascertain debate conditions in the public sphere. Despite disagreement among scholars over the extent to which women legislators advance women’s interests, I argue that by virtue of their institutional location, women in the legislature have the opportunity to shape the content of public debate. To be sure, analysts offer sobering insights about the depth of institutional sexism in legislatures and have found that increasing the number of women in politics does not have a comparable effect on the passage of women’s rights legislation (Childs and Krook 2006; Dahlerup 2006; Dodson 2006). However, the just debate approach does not claim that more women in parliament results in more gender legislation being passed, but instead hypothesizes that more open and inclusive debate in the legislature provides opportunities for women representatives to shape public debate. If the legislature is a prominent institution in the public sphere, and debate conditions there are open and inclusive, women representatives can put demands for gender justice on the public agenda and pressure the state to adopt legislation advancing women’s rights. Civil society is commonly identified with the public sphere. In this chapter, I define civil society and explain why I conceptualize it as one among three arenas in the public sphere. These tasks are complex, because analysts of civil society disagree about the definition of civil society, as well as its purpose and function, and few have investigated how it is gendered. Theorists generally agree that civil society includes voluntary associations, organizations, and social movements (Chambers and Kymlicka 2002). However, sharp disagreement exists over whether the economy and family ought to be included. In the analysis that follows, I explain why my definition is relatively narrow, yet extends beyond the approach of most gender scholarship that focuses on women’s organizations and women’s movements. The media are often included in definitions of civil society, particularly when civil society is used interchangeably with the public sphere. In this chapter, I argue that the media are not coterminous with civil society because they are profit seeking. Media conglomerates are distinct from the institutions that constitute civil society and the legislature. Yet media employees, particularly those who work in the newsrooms of a country’s most influential print media, are meaning makers because they shape the content of public debate.

Just Debate in the Public Sphere Basic Rights

Public Arenas

Political Private Civil

Political Institutions

+

Social Institutions Communication Networks

31 Public Sphere A “space” for public debate

figure 2.1. Identifying and locating the public sphere.

Much like the women in politics literature, a growing number of feminist media scholars have investigated women’s employment and rank in the media industry, revealing the depths of institutional sexism (Byerly 2004; Gallagher 1985, 1995 and 2001a; Ziamou 2000). Feminist media scholars often endorse higher positions for women in the media, arguing they should not be denied advancement simply because they are women (Byerly 1995; Gallagher 1995; Ross 2002; Ziamou 2000). Despite the widely recognized importance of the media in contemporary democracies, little analysis exists on whether the media promote demands for women’s rights during democratization, or if women in positions of power within the media are likely to do so. Given the centrality of the media for public debate in democratizing states, this is unfortunate. My approach offers a framework for addressing this important question by targeting debate conditions within the industry.

Defining the Public Sphere To test the just debate claim, I define the public sphere and map its locations, as illustrated in Figure 2.1. A fully functioning public sphere requires basic liberal rights, such as the formal opportunity to engage in rational-critical debate (e.g., freedom of the press), political participation (e.g., the right to vote), individual freedom (e.g., security of persons in their homes), and secure “transactions” for property owners (e.g., the doctrine of private property) (Habermas 1989, 83). The public sphere usually expands with democratization. Whereas it is true that basic liberal rights are not formally secure for the majority of citizens until after the first democratic elections, during liberalization and regime breakdown, political parties, trade unions, community organizations, social movements, and the alternative media revive. This creates a space for public critique to flourish. In this book, I analyze three arenas of action and argument in the public sphere that are significant during democratization: the legislature, civil

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society, and the media.1 Each arena comprises institutions that have structures, functions, and rules that shape public debate (March and Olsen 1989).2 The legislature (and sometimes transition negotiating forums) is not only an important site of deliberation, but also makes legally binding resolutions. The second arena, civil society, is commonly understood to be the space between public authority on the one hand and the family and market on the other. However, I use a narrower definition. I focus on institutions and organizations that orient members toward common concerns with the aim of shaping public opinion and state policy. Civil society thus includes political parties, unions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and social movements. The third public arena is the media industry, which in my cases was dominated either by the state or for-profit conglomerates. The public sphere encompasses both strong and weak publics.3 Whereas “strong” publics like legislatures have power in the public sphere and state, informal or “weak” publics such as social movements and trade unions only have power in the public sphere. Although it is true that discourse in “weak publics” does not produce binding collective decisions, “weak publics” can alter the terms of debate and engage in public opinion formation, influencing state action. Weak publics “exercise public functions within the political order,” that is, they have crucial functions that transform societal power into political power (Habermas 1989, 209–210). Moreover, the decisions of “strong” publics in democratizing states are often less binding than a strong-weak dichotomy allows, because the capacity of democratizing states may be lacking whereas groups in civil society can wield significant power. Finally, “strong publics” are not always influential bodies in the public sphere and may have a limited role in decision making. Therefore, I do not assume strong publics have greater capacity to shape public debate and policy making than weak publics, neither do I assume that one institution or public arena will have equal prominence in the public sphere across all cases, or even across time within cases. As the 1

2

3

Public culture also can be a site for debate in the public sphere. However, during democratic transitions the political agenda of public culture dissipates as parliament, civil society, and the media revive. As public culture has a declining influence in shaping public debate and state policy, whereas the influence of the other three arenas increases, I do not integrate public culture into the analysis. These arenas are ideal-types and function as heuristic guidelines. In reality, there is much overlap and interaction among them. Nancy Fraser defines strong publics as “publics whose discourse encompasses both opinion formation and decision making, and weak publics as “publics whose deliberative practice consists exclusively in opinion formation” (1996, 134).

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influence and relations among institutions in the public sphere can shift, I assess power relations among institutions while evaluating debate conditions. I also point out where one institution dominates the public sphere or shapes debate conditions in other institutions.

The Legislature The just debate approach argues that women representatives interested in promoting women’s rights are able to do so when debate conditions in the legislature are open and inclusive. Although this claim has not been tested, an extensive body of scholarly literature has examined what women representatives say and do and offers important insights about the purpose and function of women in politics, as well as the gendered nature of legislatures. I highlight the findings of that literature to explain why women representatives are important for the just debate approach. The legislature is an institution within the state where public opinion can influence policy making. Unlike other state institutions, such as the president’s cabinet or the courts, the legislature is a “site for the discursive authorization of the use of state power” (Fraser 1996, 134). This means parliamentary debates – as well as public deliberations in caucuses, hearings, and committee meetings – engage in public opinion representation, formation, and decision making.4 As legislatures are “strong publics,” it is vital that debate conditions in this institution be open and inclusive. Although women’s integration in the legislature may appear commonsensical given the significant democratic functions of this institution, this common sense is a recent development. Indeed, in the 1960s, Hanna Pitkin famously categorized representation and reiterated a long-standing liberal argument that representatives are important for the ideas they hold and for what they do, not for who they are (Pitkin 1967). This classic approach to representation, however, ignores the reality that people have different experiences as a result of their varied social locations. Advocates of political equality have argued that the bodies and life experiences of representatives matter: Elite politicians cannot speak for marginalized groups (Mansbridge 1992; Phillips 1995, 8–9; Williams 1998). Instead, the subaltern must speak.

4

Legislators do more than advocate for constituent interests. Representation also includes mediation among legislators, as well as between legislators and their constituents. Representatives are also important actors in articulating and aggregating constituent interests (Williams 1998).

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Over the past fifteen years, the principle of women’s descriptive representation has gained considerable traction, and women’s access to legislatures has increased.5 The third wave of democratization that began in the early 1990s helped spark this trend, because activists and scholars insisted upon a strong link between the democratic principle of political equality and women’s descriptive representation (Htun 2004, 444–45). Nearly all proponents of democracy now endorse political equality and assume every citizen should have the opportunity to participate in formal politics. As a result, women’s participation is advocated not only by women’s movements in a wide range of countries, but also by many regional and international organizations. This has led to an influx in the number of women in legislatures, often via quotas, raising the world average to 19 percent in 2010 (IPU 2010; Krook 2009). Symbolic and Political Benefits Whereas advocates of democracy have become convinced that women’s presence in the legislature conveys political equality and enhances the legitimacy of democratic politics, gender scholars have investigated whether women’s increased presence in politics brings symbolic, political, and substantive benefits to women. Their findings are relevant for the just debate approach because symbolic and political benefits may increase women’s participation in the public sphere, and substantive representation shapes debate content in the legislature and the laws it passes. Women’s presence in legislatures offers significant symbolic and political benefits that inspire more women to enter public life. This is important for the just debate approach, because more women in public life is one of several conditions hypothesized to lead to greater demands for gender justice. Analysts of women in politics have argued that descriptive representation can establish gender as a relevant category of analysis, confirm that women’s absence from governing bodies is not natural, and prove women are “capable of ruling” (Goodin as cited in Phillips 1995, 79; Htun 2005; Mansbridge 2005). Women’s presence can signal that they are the political equals of men, and can offer psychological and emotional inspiration to individual women (Krook 2006a). Scholars also have found that women candidates and politicians increase women’s engagement in politics by providing new role models, 5

I use the politics of presence and descriptive representation interchangeably to refer to women representatives.

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prompting women to be more engaged constituents (Reingold 1992; Reingold and Harrell 2010). Women representatives may also deepen democratic practices by encouraging more women to run for office (Brown et al. 2002; Sawer 2000). Those who become candidates gain political skills, experience, and more expansive social networks, preparing them for leadership roles in public life. These symbolic and political benefits suggest women’s increasing numbers in the legislature encourage more women to enter the public sphere, confirming that the just debate approach is right to target women in the legislature as one indicator of the openness and inclusiveness of debate conditions. Substantive Representation The primary aim of the women in politics literature has been to learn whether increasing women’s presence in politics advances women’s interests, providing them with substantive representation. Recently, a scholarly consensus has emerged that increasing the number of women in the legislature does not produce a comparable increase in legislation advancing women’s rights (Dahlerup 2006; Dodson 2006; Htun and Jones 2002; Htun and Power 2006; Weldon 2002a). Yet the work of these scholars does suggest that women in the legislature can have important effects on legislative debate, that women representatives play a key role in advancing a select set of gender legislation, and that a small group of women representatives are pivotal actors in advancing the most contentious of women’s rights. One group of analysts, whom I refer to as presence scholars, focuses on what women representatives do in the legislature. They have found women representatives are likely to advance legislation on issues like childcare, education, and family welfare because of gendered processes, like the sexual division of labor, which assign them the role of primary caretaker. Maxine Molyneux refers to these types of concerns as practical gender interests (Childs 2002; Molyneux 2001, 44–45; Schwindt-Bayer 2006; Swers 2002). Scholars have found even conservative women legislators are likely to promote these practical gender interests because they help women fulfill their gender obligations. For example, women legislators introduce and sponsor more bills on issues such as elder care and have voted for them more frequently than men (Carroll and Jenkins 2001; Childs 2002; Gouws and Kotze 2007; Little, Dunn and Deen 2001; Schwindt-Bayer 2006; Swers 2002; Wangnerud 2000; Welch 2001).

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This research suggests women legislators provide substantive representation, shaping outcomes on women’s rights. However, increasing women’s presence does not directly lead to legislation advancing what Molyneux refers to as strategic gender interests. Strategic gender interests attack women’s subordination and include issues like reproductive rights and women’s employment rights (Molyneux 2001, 45). These types of rights undermine gendered processes and are much more controversial than issues associated with practical gender interests. Gender policy scholars, in contrast to presence scholars, tend to focus on strategic gender interests.6 They argue that increasing the number of women representatives does not produce legislation advancing strategic gender interests (e.g., Htun and Power 2006). Gender policy scholars set the bar quite high, because the passage of a bill is far more difficult to achieve than sponsoring or debating a bill in the legislature, and the passage of a bill advancing strategic gender interests is more difficult to achieve than the passage of a bill advancing practical gender interests. It is not surprising that gender policy scholars find women’s descriptive representation rarely produces substantive representation (Htun 2003; Weldon 2002a). However, analysts have found that a core group of women legislators, or “critical actors,” spearhead strategic gender issues, suggesting substantive representation on these issues does occur, although it may not result in the passage of legislation (Childs and Krook 2006, 527). The literature on women representatives thus confirms that women’s numbers in the legislature are important for putting practical gender interests on the legislative agenda, whereas a select core of women in the legislature play a key role in promoting strategic gender interests. The passage of gender legislation, however, appears to require more than getting women into politics. Although the just debate approach draws on the insights of the women and politics literature, it differs from that literature in several ways. First, instead of focusing on women’s presence, the just debate approach focuses on women’s access, voice, and capacity for contestation. The just debate approach thus targets the quality of democracy within the legislature. Second, instead of focusing exclusively on the legislature, the just debate approach focuses on the relative influence of the legislature among other institutions in the public sphere. I do not assume that legislators have the clout to pass legislation as they see fit. Third, instead of using Molyneux’s 6

These two groups of scholars should not be mistaken for binaries as a range of positions exist.

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framework of practical and strategic gender interests to assess gender outcomes, the just debate approach uses Iris Marion Young’s definition of social justice, which targets domination, oppression, and exploitation. As explained in Chapter 1, the just debate approach hypothesizes that as debate conditions improve domination diminishes, leading to a broadening of debate content that includes demands for gender justice. Those demands pressure the state to respond with legislation aimed at ending women’s oppression and exploitation. The differences between substantive representation and the just debate approach highlight how my analysis of women in politics is distinct from the work of presence and gender policy scholars. However, important intersections exist. Most notably, like presence scholars, I focus on what women representatives do in the legislature, and like gender policy scholars, I focus on the passage of legislation. The scholarship on women in politics adds credence to the just debate claim in several ways. First, it suggests that women’s descriptive representation is likely to encourage other women to enter the public sphere. Second, it finds that women legislators broaden the content of public debate by promoting what Molyneux calls practical gender interests. Third, this literature confirms that critical actors who enter the legislature help pass contentious women’s rights claims. This body of work indicates it is appropriate for the just debate approach to include women’s access to the legislature as one among several indicators in an assessment of debate conditions. This remains the case even though gender scholars have also found that legislatures are quite sexist. Gendered Legislatures Countering the benefits of women’s descriptive representation is the reality that legislatures have sexist norms and practices (Cockburn 1991; Duerst-Lahti and Kelly 1995; Steinberg 1992). Early work on institutional sexism revealed the ways in which male legislators marginalized women representatives in committees and legislative debates (Kathlene 1995; Norton 1995). Presence scholars have continued this research, documenting a number of obstacles that limit the effectiveness of women representatives, such as an aggressive parliamentary culture that celebrates confrontational debating tactics or that thrives on networking over poker games at the local pub (Paxton and Hughes 2007). Mary Hawkesworth finds that the U.S. Congress creates obstacles to women’s participation that are both raced and gendered, and that legislators use

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exclusionary tactics such as “silencing, stereotyping and enforced invisibility” to marginalize black women representatives (2003, 546). While women’s descriptive representation has been associated with changes in legislative culture in some countries, those changes have been relatively minor and short-lived (Paxton and Hughes 2007). In fact, women legislators interested in transforming institutional norms find their ability to do so highly compromised, as their continued professional success requires they tolerate exclusionary standards; many assimilate (Childs 2002; Rosenthal 1998 and 2002). This persists even when women gain office through voluntary party quotas, as most parties aim to “introduce new players to the political arena but make them play according to old rules” (Baldez 2006, 106). Recognizing the limitations women representatives face, a number of presence scholars urge women politicians to become “strategic politicians” by being ambitious, honing their political skills, and becoming fully integrated into the existing political system so they might gain powerful positions (Dodson et al. 1995; Gertzog 1995; Paxton and Hughes 2007; Swers 2002). However, even powerful women representatives are likely to face steep hurdles when attempting to represent women’s interests. To become powerful, women politicians may internalize conventional legislative norms. After gaining high-ranking positions, their concerns and interests are likely to diverge from the majority of women in the legislature, as well as those outside it (Duerst-Lahti 2002; Gertzog 1995; Swers 2002). While Irwin Gertzog notes that exceptional women like U.S. Congressperson Bella Abzug sometimes challenge parliamentary culture and make demands for women’s rights, the institutional incentives identified by feminist scholars on leadership and gender power explains why representatives like Abzug are rare (Duerst-Lahti 2002; Kenney 1996; Rosenthal 1998). Women representatives, regardless of their legislative agenda, must cope with legislatures that are highly sexist. The just debate approach not only investigates whether the deliberative inequities women face in legislatures prevent them from making demands for gender justice, but if an expansion in debate conditions in the legislature make a difference.

Civil Society The definition, purpose, and function of civil society are all highly contested, and theories of gender and civil society are underdeveloped. These problems raise serious challenges for the just debate approach, which

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aims to assess debate conditions in civil society. In this section, I offer a definition of civil society useful for my approach. I begin by drawing on critical and feminist theory to define the purpose and boundaries of civil society, as well as to identify the different types of associations in this public arena. I then explain why I use the term civil society to describe one arena within the public sphere, and pinpoint its key institutions. Most theorists of civil society emphasize the division between state and civil society (Chambers and Kymlicka 2002). When used in opposition to the state, civil society refers to all the categories in the private realm: the public sphere, the family, and the market. In this binary form, civil society continues to have tremendous cachet. Yet most political theorists aim for a more precise, philosophically grounded usage of the term. This has led to debate over how to define civil society. While many analysts agree that it includes associations, organizations, and social movements independent from public authority, they argue about whether civil society includes the economy and family (Chambers and Kymlicka 2002). For example, liberal egalitarians are likely to include the economy as part of civil society, but exclude the family (Walzer 2002). Not surprisingly, feminist theorists object to this formulation because it reinforces the public-private binary, which devalues the family and women’s gender roles while celebrating sites dominated by men (Arneil 2006; Davidoff 1998; Pateman 1988). Some feminist theorists question whether civil society is even a valid category of analysis when studying women (Phillips 2002). Indeed, most empirical analyses of women in civil society have neglected male-dominated institutions, focusing almost exclusively on women’s movements and organizations. The circumstances that prompt women to organize, the factors that shape women’s demands, and the reasons for the occasional success of women’s movements have all been carefully analyzed by gender scholars (e.g., Baldez 2003; Molyneux 1998; Tripp 2000).7 They have found that when women’s movements emerge, success is greatest if the movement is cohesive and autonomous, and if feminist groups have a strong leadership role in the movement and close connections with political elites that help them pursue political goals. The just debate approach has a slightly different emphasis because it focuses on the openness and inclusiveness of the leading institutions in civil society, including women’s movements. 7

The literature on women’s movements and women’s organizing is vast. For an introduction, see Basu (1995).

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As detailed in Chapter 1, two of the three criteria for open and inclusive debate conditions are voice and the capacity for contestation. These two criteria are closely related to autonomy. When a women’s movement lacks autonomy, or the independence that enables it to be self-governing and to set its own goals, then women’s voice and capacity for contestation within the movement are limited: Women members will not be able to speak out to challenge the status quo within the organization; they will not be able to shape the movement’s agenda.8 The just debate approach has components that capture some crucial aspects of autonomy, but it does not focus on movement cohesiveness. Instead, it stresses inclusiveness, or the importance of the participation of diverse women. An institution that is top-down, hierarchical, and run by experts may be cohesive and autonomous, but following the logic of the just debate approach, it is less likely to advance broad-based gender justice claims than a women’s movement that is open and inclusive.9 To be sure, many women’s groups are informal, fluid, and highly participatory, suggesting cohesiveness is their core challenge, not exclusiveness. However, privileged, white, bourgeois women can dominate women’s organizations, as a number of feminist scholars have pointed out (Collins 1990; Hooks 1990; Mohanty 1988).10 Debate conditions in women’s movements cannot be assumed to be open and inclusive, and it is worth investigating whether or not diversity and deliberation in national women’s movements can enhance their ability to promote gender justice. The just debate approach does more than assess debate conditions in women’s organizations, however, as that is insufficient for capturing debate conditions throughout civil society. Although feminists are correct in noting that men typically dominate public life, the extent and depth of that domination can vary. To assess that variation, civil society must be defined and its leading institutions identified and analyzed. One way to gain traction in defining civil society is to identify its purpose. Scholars of democratization like Larry Diamond emphasize that an important purpose of civil society is to enhance democratic legitimacy. Diamond,

8

9

10

Maxine Molyneux offers these criteria as a basis for assessing the autonomy of women’s movements (1998). See Weldon (2006) for a discussion of how inclusiveness facilitated the emergence of a transnational women’s movement on violence against women. Feminism has also been strongly criticized as a white, bourgeois women’s movement. For an overview of women’s movements in Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin America, and their contentious relationship with feminism, see Tripp et al. (2009); Einhorn (1993a), and Jaquette (1994).

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among others, argues that associations, organizations, and social movements offer citizens the opportunity to contribute to the collective life of the community by building social capital, developing social trust, and enhancing state accountability (Dawisha and Parrott 1997; Diamond 1999b; Diamond and Morlino 2004). Although critical theorists and feminists recognize the importance of state accountability, they do not believe the purpose of civil society is to generate social cohesion and democratic stability. Instead, critical theorists argue civil society is a key site of public activism and critique, as it is here that citizens can discover, define, and express their interests, discuss what ought to be done, publicly criticize existing practices and institutions, and influence public opinion and state policy (Young 2000, 164). In a similar vein, feminists value civil society because it is relatively accessible to women and enables them to organize and challenge sexism (Phillips 2002). For both feminists and critical theorists, the purpose of civil society is to provide a space for contestation. This common ground provides a basis for defining the just debate approach to civil society. What Is Civil Society? As the just debate approach is rooted in critical theory and investigates how institutions in public arenas are gendered, I begin by drawing upon critical and feminist theory to define civil society.11 Like most analysts of civil society, Simone Chambers and Anne Phillips agree that at a minimum, civil society includes voluntary associations and organizations such as universities, churches, unions, and clubs, as well as social movements (2002). They also share a close affinity on the boundaries of civil society, agreeing that the family should be included. However, their usage of civil society is much broader than what an analysis of debate conditions requires because both theorists conceptualize civil society as extending beyond the public sphere. Critical theorists who follow Habermas have an expansive definition of civil society that includes the public sphere as well as “the lifeworld as it is expressed in institutions” (Chambers 2002, 93). The lifeworld in his work refers to “the background against which all social interaction takes

11

Critical theorists can be feminists. Moreover, a variety of feminist approaches to civil society are possible. Nevertheless, the feminist approach to civil society is distinct from that of critical theory. Simone Chambers and Anne Phillips represent these two traditions in the essays discussed here.

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place … [it] is made up of meanings … [that are] transmitted, altered, and reproduced via communication” (Chambers 2002, 92). This conception is far too broad for an institutional analysis of debate conditions in the public sphere. Critical theorists nevertheless make several important arguments that can be useful for developing the just debate approach to civil society. The lifeworld, although vast, does not include the state or economy. The logic behind this boundary drawing is simple: Critical theorists value egalitarian talk that resolves disputes through persuasion. They believe talk coordinates action in civil society, but not in the state or market (Chambers 2002). In the state, coercive power intervenes; in the market, concerns for efficiency and the maximization of profit overwhelm the open exchange of ideas. As Iris Marion Young succinctly explains, “in the associations of civil society people co-ordinate their actions by discussing and working things out, rather than by checking prices or looking up the rules” (2000, 159). As critical theorists aim to shield deliberation in civil society from the political or economic power that distorts decision making, they insist that institutions included in civil society should prioritize communication, not power or money (Chambers 2002). Not only do they exclude the state from civil society, they exclude economic institutions like corporations as well. Moreover, because the family is “a sphere of identity formation, social integration, and cultural reproduction” where discussion more than prices or written rules coordinate people’s action, critical theorists argue civil society includes the family (Chambers 2002, 91).12 Feminists also have an expansive approach to civil society that includes much more than the public sphere. Like the approach of critical theorists, it is too broad for my purposes. However, the feminist critique of civil society offers several useful insights for the just debate approach. First, it lends credence to the just debate assumption that the leading institutions in the public sphere systematically marginalize women. Second, the critique warns against rigid boundary drawing among categories because this often legitimizes gender inequalities. Unlike critical theorists, feminists do not worry about the hierarchy and coercion of the state or the market’s colonization of the lifeworld. Instead, they analyze how the public-private binary is a form of embodied corporatism, deployed to diminish the social fragmentation of individualism, bureaucratization, 12

This is an idealized vision of the family. Unwritten rules in the form of tradition and men’s better access to financial resources both significantly infect how action is coordinated in this institution.

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and capitalism while sustaining fraternity and women’s subordination in public life. Indeed, feminist theorists argue analysts have historically defined civil society by women’s absence. Women, morality, particularism, the body, and reproductive labor define the private sphere, whereas analysts idealize the public (which includes civil society, the economy, and the state) as a realm of reason, productivity, and law run by elite men (Davidoff 1998; Landes 1988; Pateman 1988). In feminist theory, civil society becomes nearly as vast as the lifeworld and includes “virtually everything that is not located in the domestic sphere” (Phillips 2002, 74). Finally, to challenge the public-private binary, feminists argue that the family ought to be included in the public sphere because it is “inextricably intertwined with the way people organize and relate in the wider society” (Phillips 2002, 75). Although the feminist position on civil society is far too broad for the just debate approach, the feminist critique of the public-private binary is nevertheless relevant, warning against boundary drawing that makes gendered processes invisible. This presents a challenge to the just debate approach: Why focus on women’s role in public life? Instead, why not challenge the public-private binary? The answer is simple. In liberal democracies, the public realm is where the personal gets politicized. It is the place where collective problems can be identified, where people can speak out and address oppression that has been hidden, ignored, and denied, publicizing it. As Mary Ryan notes, “In public, men speak for and act upon the community as a whole, including women. A reciprocal power does not accrue to women by virtue of their stature in the private realm. Similarly, the public can often incorporate or overrule private interests, but not vice versa” (1990, 8). Because the power of social change is located in the public sphere, women need to enter the public sphere if they are going to successfully challenge the public-private binary. The lessons of feminist theorizing on civil society nonetheless need to be retained. Hence my empirical analyses of civil society are attuned to the ways the public-private binary reinforces gender inequalities and how gendered processes in the private sphere limit debate conditions. Although critical and feminist theories of civil society are too expansive for the just debate approach, both aim for a more open and inclusive civil society and agree it can be a vital site for public contestation. I build on these valuable insights but do not use the expansive definitions of civil society offered by these two theoretical traditions. My definition of civil society is much narrower and refers to one distinct arena of the public sphere.

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Political Associations To analyze the openness and inclusiveness of public debate in civil society, I focus on associations, organizations, and social movements that aim to shape public opinion and public policy about issues of common concern (Walsh 2009). Associations and organizations that are not engaged in public debate are not included in my definition of civil society. Note the distinction I am making is not based on the interests organizations pursue. In other words, I am not distinguishing between “good” (democratic and egalitarian) and “bad” (antidemocratic and patriarchal) civil society (Chambers and Kymlicka 2002). Nor am I distinguishing between organizations that pursue an emancipatory agenda as opposed to those that pursue material needs. A social movement that demands cheaper food and engages in action to shape public opinion and public policy is part of civil society as I am defining it, whereas a radical feminist collective that runs a bookshop but refrains from engaging in public debate is not. The objectives of the organization are not the crucial distinction. Instead, the group’s engagement in public debate over issues of common concern is key. To develop this distinction further, I draw on the work of Iris Marion Young (2000). Young aims to distinguish among different groups commonly associated with civil society by analyzing their functions. On this basis, she identifies three types of associations: private, civic, and political. Private associations are groups that address “basic matters of life, death, need, and pleasure”; civic associations are groups directed toward the local community; and political associations are focused on “what is to be done” (2000, 160–163).13 The first category, private associations, include organizations like savings groups that are composed of private individuals who expand their social networks by joining an organization to advance their shared interests collectively. These groups do not form with the intention of engaging in public debate. Neighborhood associations are an example of Young’s second category. Much like private associations, civic associations bring individuals together and expand social networks, but civic associations have the potential for a more inclusive membership. Most importantly, their primary purpose is to enhance community life. That larger aim not only expands the diversity of their

13

An exception to Young’s typology is the family in kinship regimes, which by definition extends across all three of Young’s categories and is also the primary unit of economic production.

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potential membership base, it sometimes draws civic associations into public debate. Young’s third category, political associations, refers to organizations like political parties. As in her first two categories, political associations enhance social networks because they bring people together in common pursuit of shared interests. Political associations also can interact with civic associations. Their primary purpose, however, is to engage in debate about the common good, shaping opinion and public policy. Political parties, unions, social movements, and many NGOs offer far greater, direct opportunities for engagement in public debate than a savings group or neighborhood association. Young suggests that participating in political associations is the most direct means of influencing public opinion and public policy, with civic membership offering those opportunities only occasionally, and private associations potentially undermining civic engagement.14 Contrary to Young’s disparagement of private associations, analysts of feminist civil society have found that poor women’s private associations often facilitate or even become political associations during political and economic crises (Baldez 2002; Fallon 2008; Rowbotham and Linkogle 2001). Those that do so are included in my analysis. Young’s typology offers a framework for analyzing civil society that is broader than most feminist scholarship, which focuses on women’s organizations and social movements, yet can be readily adapted to fit within the framework of the just debate approach. In this book, civil society refers to associations, organizations, and social movements that engage in public debate, such as unions, political parties, and women’s movements, and are also separate from the state and economy. As the legislature is part of the state, it is a separate arena from civil society. Similarly, as media conglomerates coordinate action according to the profit motive, they constitute a third public arena.

The Media Scholars rarely discuss the influence of the media on women’s rights in democratizing states. This is rather surprising, considering that the 14

Young argues private associations can be “depoliticizing or brazenly self-regarding” (2000, 162). However, individual women may gain public stature and prestige through membership in some types of private associations. Weldon also sees positive potential in private associations, such as solidarity and consciousness-raising. Nevertheless, her analysis of feminist civil society in the United States confirms that civic and political associations have a “greater direct effect on policy processes than more inwardly-oriented activities” (Weldon 2005, 204, italics in the original).

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importance of the media in the public sphere is widely acknowledged, the freedom of the press is a standard indicator of democratic quality, and feminists have devoted much energy to analyzing women’s representation in the mass media.15 In this section, I define the purpose and function of the media in liberal democracies and explain why the just debate approach distinguishes the mass media from civil society yet includes it in the analysis. In all of the cases evaluated in this book, analysts agree that the press was the most influential sector of the mass media, even if television and radio had larger audiences (Curry 2005; Hudson 1994; Jacobs 1999). Thus I focus primarily on the press within the media industry. Despite the importance of the press and other mass media for public debate, the democratization literature overlooks the actual purpose and functions of the media. Transition scholars occasionally acknowledge the importance of the media for democratizing states, but their analyses focus on how the media can contribute toward democratic consolidation and neglect specifying the role of the industry in public debate. Similarly, only a handful of scholars who study gender and democratization discuss the media, and usually only to note in passing media bias toward women or their usefulness for conveying information about the women’s movement and women’s rights (Fitzsimmons 2000; Jaquette 2001; Tripp 2001).16 As a result, I rely on media scholars (both with and without feminist agendas) and theorists of deliberative democracy to help me define the purpose and function of the media in liberal democracies, to explain why the just debate approach distinguishes between civil society and the mass media, and to help me explain why a focus on women employees in this industry is critical for an analysis of just debate. Following media scholarship, I argue that the mass media not only represent public opinion, but also shape it (Curran 1978; McQuail 1969). To understand gender within the media industry, I turn to feminist media scholars who have exposed how institutional imperatives shape and reproduce women’s workplace segregation in the mass media, limiting their rank while perpetuating the misrepresentation and exploitation of women (Gallagher 1995, 2005; van Zoonen 1994; Ziamou 15

16

A wide range of works on the media and the public sphere now exist, from Dale Eickelman and Jon Anderson’s anthology on media in the Muslim public sphere (2003) to Marie Miranda’s ethnography on Chicana girls in gangs in Oakland, California (2003). Feminist analyses of women’s representation in the media are extensive. For recent work, see Douglas and Michaels (2004), Gill (2007), and Poran (2006). For one exception, see Einhorn (1993a).

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2000).17 That research supports the key claim motivating the just debate approach: that women are systematically marginalized in the leading institutions in the public sphere. Unfortunately, feminist media scholarship has done little to investigate the role of the media in advancing women’s rights. After explaining the purpose and functions of a profitoriented media and the limits of women’s presence in the industry, I conclude by explaining why an investigation of debate conditions in the media in democratizing states is needed. Producing Public Opinion Scholars of democratization have not focused much attention on the media in democratizing states, although they do emphasize that all adult citizens should have the ability “to vote,” and “to organize, to assemble, to protest and to lobby for their interests” (Anderson and Lawrence 2005; Diamond and Morlino 2004, 23; Kurtz 2004).18 Mass media facilitates this citizen activism because they can enhance the quality of democratic politics not only by encouraging governmental transparency and accountability, but also by orienting citizens toward shared interests, and committing them to “larger, common, ‘civic’ ends” (Diamond 1999a, 221). Yet scholars of democratic transitions rarely analyze how the economic interests of the media affect their public duties.19 I find that scholars undertheorize the commodification of the media and do not accurately assess the capacity of the mass media to promote citizen support for democratic institutions.20 In short, from the perspective of the just debate approach, they do not fully investigate what it is that the media actually do and have been more concerned with democratic consolidation than the quality of democracy. 17

18 19

20

Feminist theorists of critical deliberative democracy have not investigated the role of women in the media industry. This is odd, as these theorists draw extensively on the early work of Habermas, who argues mass media, along with other civic and political institutions, need to be made more transparent and democratic (1989, 209). For the exceptions I am aware of, see Sakr(2004) and McLaughlin (1993). For an alternative view, see Armony (2004). Transition scholars emphasize the threat of state censorship to a free press but say little about the threat of market censorship. Media scholars analyzing democratization rarely make this mistake. See, for example, Hackett and Zhao (2001). State-dominated media are not part of civil society but an arm of the state. Pippa Norris offers several improvements on this thin analysis of the media in democratizing states, arguing that mass media independence from both state influence and oligopoly ownership, and most crucially, its availability to the poorest of citizens, are critical to fulfill the functions transition scholars envision (2004).

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However, a number of scholars have evaluated how the media might improve the quality of democracy and have analyzed the ways the industry falls short of this ideal. According to classic liberal theory, the media should be impartial and avidly pursue the truth.21 The media are entrusted with the task of exposing state corruption and are believed to contribute toward democratic legitimacy by providing a high level of state transparency and accountability. Mass media can also enhance democratic politics by publicizing the opinion of experts, elites, and citizens. Further, they provide citizens with crucial information about issues of common concern, such as legal reform and important political events. Mass media can also discuss and publicize the platforms of political parties to guide voters and can provide the space for experts, such as professional analysts and public servants, to debate issues of common concern. These ideals shape the conventional liberal norms of journalism: high professional standards for credible sources, factual accuracy, objectivity, and balance. These norms are intended to ensure responsible government and informed citizens. Deliberative theorists like Jurgen Habermas (1989) and Benjamin Barber (1984) believe the media are important for additional reasons.22 They argue the media should not only facilitate information exchange between experts, citizens, and government, but also should provide the space for citizens to exchange ideas and shape the formation of public policy. Deliberative theorists argue that in principle, all citizens should be able to engage in public debate in the media because this is one of the few sites in mass society where they can “meet” to discuss issues of common concern. This approach requires the media to be more than a “watchdog” over the state and a “civic forum” for the exchange of elite ideas (Norris 2000, 23). These theorists also believe the media ought to provide citizens with a site for plurality and action (Ferree, Gamson, Gerhars and Rucht 2002). They view individual or group exclusion from the media as disabling, signifying not only a demoted status, but also a retreat from public life that undermines the promise of democratic participation. Feminist media scholars have a different vision of the media. Because it is an industry, liberal feminists argue women and men should be hired and treated equally by media corporations. Moreover, because the media

21

22

For a detailed overview of the historical evolution of the classic liberal position toward the media, see Keane 1991. See Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, and Rucht (2002) for an overview of the various schools of deliberative theory and a discussion of the ideal role of the media for each.

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can influence public opinion, they contend that it should promote equality and respect for all human beings (Tuchman 1978; van Zoonen 1994). Many feminists argue misogynistic expressions and images that entrench women’s subordination should end, and they expose the way multiple inequalities, such as race, language, and class differences, contribute toward women’s misrepresentation (e.g., Daniel 2000; Moorti 2002). Although these scholarly traditions have different emphases, most of their proponents would agree all these aims are worth pursuing: that the media should facilitate government transparency and accountability, provide a space for citizens to engage in public debate, and promote equality. Most would agree that the media should enhance the quality of democracy, and so share much in common with the just debate approach. Most are also aware that the mass media in democratic states rarely meet these standards (Curran 1978; Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards and Rucht 2002; van Zoonen 1994).23 Mass media are not sites where intrepid journalists are tasked with conveying “truth to power,” nor is the industry a place where “purely human” citizens engage in rational critical debate. They are not equal opportunity employers aiming to promote equality through their publications and programs. Nevertheless, the media remain a central arena for public debate and public opinion formation, making the industry crucial for an analysis of debate conditions. The mass media do not simply report ideas and events, but actively influence how people make sense of their world, their place in it, and what they expect from it (McQuail 1969; Curran 1978; Louw 2001). The most respected mass media usually project a neutral stance, but are active meaning makers and mediators between citizen-consumers and political performers. For a story to be told, the media produce and assemble “texts.” These texts are then filtered through institutional and professional norms before being presented to audiences (Gal 2003).24 The media designate what is negotiable, what should be consensual, and who should speak when about what (Lemish 2004, 42).25 Because the mass media help shape public opinion, media employees have political influence. 23

24

25

See Norris (2001) for a more positive evaluation of the media in fulfilling its role as a civic forum. The dissemination of texts can occur in a number of ways, by migrants and tourists for example. But mass media reach the largest audiences. Audience interpretation of this mediated reality varies and is affected by a number of factors including historical context, race, class, and gender (Newton 2006; van Zoonen 1994).

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Although the media are engaged in public opinion formation, they are also a for-profit industry, and that shapes what media employees aim to convey in the public sphere.26 Bureaucratized, corporate conglomerates dominate the media industry in democratizing states, and their purpose is to generate profits for shareholders. To maximize their audience share, mass media limit the public agenda by conveying and sustaining mainstream identities, norms, values, and fears (Byerly 2004; Coombs 1997; Louw 2001). The most successful texts generate a moderate range of shallow cultural meanings that produce a constrained, repetitive public agenda (Louw 2001).27 Because the mass media are commodified, capital availability, ownership, and market context drive this industry much more than the institutions in civil society (Berger 2002; Louw 2001; Weaver 1997). Nevertheless, mass media continue to engage in public debate and shape public opinion. As a result, media employees driven by the profit motive are also critical actors in the public sphere. The Gendered Media Industry If the media play a central role in public opinion formation, then women’s inclusion in this industry is essential. Yet women in the industry are quite segregated (Gallagher 1985, 1995 and 2001a). To remediate this segregation, feminist media scholars have recommended advancing women up the ranks with the hope that they will challenge sexism in the industry (e.g., Byerly 1995; Gallagher 2001a; van Zoonen 1994). Feminist media scholars have not linked their empirical findings to the claims of deliberative theory, however, nor have they recognized that more open and inclusive debate conditions within the media industry are an important attribute of quality democracy. Since the early 1980s, feminist media scholars have investigated women’s employment and representation in the industry (Gallagher 1980, 1985, 1995, and 2001b). Although women’s status varies by place 26

27

Following the analysis detailed in this chapter, the non-profit alternative media are part of civil society. In Part II, I distinguish the alternative media from mass media and discuss them both in the same section to facilitate a comparison of debate conditions across these two types. Some of the most noted forms of constraint are the media’s narrowing of contestation to fit within conventional norms, a focus on noncontroversial trivia and prominent people to avoid offense and maximize audience numbers, and institutional requirements such as deadlines (Byerly 2004; Coombs 1997; Leff 1997; Louw 2001). While texts can have multiple, contradictory meanings, conventional or hegemonic norms dominate the “preferred reading or meaning” (Hall et al. 1980, 135).

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and sector, analysts have discerned a number of patterns. Feminist scholarship confirms that the mass media are thematically and vertically segregated and sexist. Public relations companies and advertising firms in places as diverse as the United States and Uganda employ large numbers of women, but men dominate the most important and influential site for shaping issues of common concern, the newsroom in the print media (Byerly 2004, 114; Nassanga 2002). Globally, the topic with the highest coverage is politics and government. Men report and present on this topic significantly more than women (GMMP 2010). In Africa and in Europe, women rarely rise above junior or middle-level status in the newsroom (Gallagher 1995; Rutashobya 1996). In fact, women are ghettoized, placed in “soft” news departments in most media sectors (Ziamou 2000), even though the men hired are less educationally qualified than their female counterparts (Gallagher 1995, 5). Women’s job share in the media falls short of their presence in the total labor force, and their employment is likely to be part-time and temporary (Gallagher 1995, 15). Women are not only denied promotions, but also receive lower pay than men and experience greater age discrimination (Byerly 2004, 124; Gallagher 1995). Even though overt sexual harassment is usually outlawed, feminist scholars note organizational routines, old boys’ networks, and the sexist attitudes of peers and decision makers all create roadblocks to women’s advancement (Gallagher 1995; Tamale 1999; van Zoonen 1994, 51–52; Ziamou 2000, 27–32).28 Feminist scholarship from India to South Africa has found that women continue to bear the majority of family responsibilities at home, yet are expected to perform as “honorary men” at work, a significant liability in an industry with extended and erratic hours requiring a high degree of mobility (Jaffer 2002; Joseph 2004, 137). The mass media are overwhelmingly male-owned and vertically segregated, with women constituting the majority of support staff (Gallagher 2005; Spears, Sydegart and Gallagher 2000; Lewis and Boswell 2002; Ziamou 2000). When women manage to move into decision-making positions in the industry, that advancement often produces institutional assimilation, limiting the likelihood they will challenge the status quo (Byerly 2004, 119; Joseph 2004 139; van Zoonen 1994).29 Women’s more visible presence in 28

29

Vertical sex segregation varies by industry sector and does not necessarily decrease over time. For instance, the number of women journalists in the United States was stable during the early 1990s, whereas in television broadcasting, the number of women journalists decreased from the early 1980s to the early 1990s (Weaver 1997, 36). For an alternative point of view, see Mills 1997.

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a sector may also contribute to its loss of status, a decline in salaries, or imply that inequalities have been redressed (van Zoonen 1994). Proposed solutions include better education, mentoring, and networking of women media employees, the creation of family-friendly workplaces, sensitivity training, transparent employee hiring, and raising union awareness to increase women’s leadership in the industry (Joseph 2004, 149 and 151–153; Ziamou 2000). However, it is not reasonable to expect that a handful of women media employees in higher-ranking positions will significantly alter industry standards. Even talented women leaders must uphold institutional and professional norms (Mohanty 1988, 148; van Zoonen 1994). In addition to assimilation pressures, feminist media scholarship confirms sexism and other structural inequalities differentially affect a diverse range of women (van Zoonen 1994). This means women media workers will not all share a commitment to challenging the status quo; those that do share this commitment may not have the same priorities.30 Few women in top positions will be able to impose, direct, or advocate radical transformations while maintaining their professional status. An emphasis on breaking through the glass ceiling also can be counterproductive, even antidemocratic. Individual women media employees are not representatives of or for their sex. Advocacy is likely to be tenuous, dependent on individual personalities, institutional incentives, and social context. Moreover, focusing on moving women up the ranks directs limited resources toward advancing an elite group into the upper echelons of a for-profit corporation accountable to stock holders and advertisers, not to citizens or even other employees. Women’s presence and promotion up the ranks nevertheless may have some important benefits. As the women in politics literature suggests, women’s advancement could be a source of inspiration for others. Moreover, their higher profile and greater numbers may help change some institutional norms and practices, for example by limiting sexual harassment in the workplace or prompting more flextime for employees.

30

In fact, early research on women hired in the U.S. media found that those women held traditional views (Merrit and Gross 1978, as cited in van Zoonen 1994, 55). More recently, a wider range of values has been reported in the United States and elsewhere (Byerly 2004; Mills 1997). When differences are found, researchers report that women rely less often on stereotypes, use a broader range of sources, have a tendency to write more “positive” stories that win women readers, challenge gender stereotypes more often, and that the climate of the workplace becomes less sexist (GMMP 2010; Mills 1997; Rogers and Thorson 2003).

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Promoting diversity training and increasing women’s presence and leadership in the industry is unlikely to lead the media to change institutional practices and content, although demands for “gender parity” within the industry could make media institutions more women-friendly (GMMP 2010). Moreover, none of these approaches exposes how media employees are also political actors, and why the limitations facing women in the industry undermine the quality of democracy. Both are integrated into the just debate approach, which assesses debate conditions in this third public arena.

Conclusion The just debate approach analyzes three crucial arenas of the public sphere in democratizing states: the legislature, civil society, and the media. Institutions in each of these public arenas engage in public opinion formation, meaning they shape debate content in the public sphere. Although the legislature is in the state, it is also part of the public sphere. Its political functions are widely recognized, and women’s presence in this arena is now advocated and promoted. Women representatives can also inspire other women to enter the public sphere and often help expand debate content by raising practical gender interests. Nevertheless, scholars have found that increasing the number of women representatives is insufficient for passing legislation that advances strategic gender interests, and that most legislatures are sexist. The just debate approach builds upon these insights and investigates whether shifts in debate conditions in the legislature can help advance policies and legislation that attack women’s oppression and exploitation. Just as the legislature is gendered, so too is civil society. To circumvent sexism in civil society women often organize separately. Sometimes that organizing leads to the formation of women’s movements that demand improvements in women’s rights. Gender scholars have avidly studied these movements and found that women’s organizations and social movements have had notable success in publicizing their demands, and sometimes have secured important victories. However, these movements and organizations are only one small sector of civil society. The just debate approach to civil society is broader and targets political associations engaged in public debate, including political parties, trade unions, and social movements. Whereas legislatures and much of civil society are often unfriendly to women, the media are worse. Dominated by the profit motive, they

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nevertheless perform crucial political functions that make them an influential arena of the public sphere. Although that political function is widely celebrated by advocates of liberal democracy, the economic impetus of the industry means that the accountability of the media to citizens is quite low. A just debate approach to the media insists that debate conditions in the media matter. The next chapter details how I evaluate debate conditions in these three arenas in democratizing states.

3 Probing and Testing Just Debate

“It is often simply naïve to think that the best of democratic norms will always produce good outcomes.” James Bohman

Introduction This book focuses on debate conditions in the leading institutions in the public sphere. I argue that as the openness and inclusiveness of debate conditions increase, the content of public debate will broaden to include greater demands for gender justice, putting pressure on the state to respond and promote women’s rights. A sophisticated body of deliberative theory underpins the just debate approach. However, its validity is not self-evident. Transitions to democracy produce a more expansive public sphere that enables greater public participation, yet democratizing states have rarely offered significant advances in women’s rights. Does this mean the just debate approach promises more than it can deliver? To answer this question, I explore the plausibility of the just debate approach through a comparison of socialist and post-socialist Poland, and then test it through two paired comparisons: first in authoritarian Chile and South Africa, and second during two time-periods in post-apartheid South Africa. The just debate approach is derived from critical deliberative theory, which is intent on exposing the limits of liberal democracy. Yet I apply the just debate claim during late socialist rule in Poland and in authoritarian Chile and South Africa, when these regimes openly aimed to limit debate in the public sphere. While that may appear odd given the agenda of deliberative theorists, applying the just debate approach 55

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to authoritarian periods of liberalization, regime breakdown, and democratic transition is appropriate because during these periods the public sphere expands remarkably. Citizens increasingly make public demands for political reform, mobilization intensifies, and the alternative press flourishes. Women’s movements often emerge and demand reform from the regime and from leading opposition groups during these periods. As democratic elections approach, political elites in both the state and opposition movement become receptive to these demands. Thus before democratic elections, authoritarian states frequently have a highly mobilized citizenry engaged in public debate in a rapidly expanding public sphere. That means the openness and inclusiveness of debate condition matters. Indeed, these political “openings” are crucial for women’s rights advocates, providing them with the opportunity to organize and influence the rules of the game in the new democratic regime (Baldez 2003; Friedman 2000; Waylen 1994). I argue that the just debate approach is relevant not only in established liberal democracies, but also during periods prior to democratic elections. In this book my cases are time periods within countries rather than the countries themselves to maximize the number of observations that can be feasibly assessed given the in-depth analysis demanded by the just debate approach. This strategy follows the advice of Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba (1994), who argue that relying on countries as cases limits the number of valid observations and thus the robustness of the findings. Alternatively, King, Keohane, and Verba urge analysts to increase the number of their observations by comparing across countries, time periods, and regions within countries. As my purpose is to test the just debate hypothesis, the book does not attempt to offer equally indepth assessments of debate conditions, public debate, and gender justice in all three countries, but rather to offer equally in-depth assessments in the paired comparisons. To ensure the validity of my findings, I aim to demonstrate causality by controlling for alternative explanations and to maximize the range of outcomes on the dependent variable. Existing explanations in the literature provide satisfactory accounts for the unusually limited gender outcomes that occurred in Central and Eastern Europe after the transition to democracy, including Poland. Hence I cannot test the causal force of the just debate approach in these cases. However, King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) urge analysts to maximize the range of the dependent variable. Thus I include Poland in my analysis as a plausibility probe. I compare the decade before the transition to democracy with the first decade after

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the 1989 transition to determine whether the just debate approach is plausible in Poland, where democratization was associated with regressive policies on women’s rights. I next turn to cases where I can test the causality of the just debate claim while simultaneously extending the range of the dependent variable. Existing explanations in the literature cannot account for the divergent outcomes in women’s rights prior to the first democratic elections in Chile and South Africa. Nor can they explain the varied outcomes in gender justice that occurred after the first nonracial democratic elections in South Africa. Outcomes on women’s rights in these cases ranged from moderate to good. The first pair of observations crosses regions; the second pair compares time periods within one country. These two tests, as well as my plausibility probe in Poland, are structured, focused comparisons that divide the cases into equivalent time periods. I ask the general questions enumerated in Chapter 1 to keep the analysis targeted and ensure standardized data collection (George and Bennett 2005, 67). In the first half of this chapter, I discuss the logic underpinning my paired comparisons and the alternative explanations comparative gender scholars offer for the outcomes in each pair, beginning with the two Polish cases. The second half of the chapter explains my choice of gender justice issues for each paired comparison.

The Plausibility of the Just Debate Claim in Poland While the logic of critical deliberative theorists may be straightforward, empirical evidence from democratizing states casts strong doubt on the just debate hypothesis. Indeed, Poland poses a dilemma for those who believe democracy and gender justice are linked. The democratic transition increased the civil and political rights of all citizens, yet a number of women’s rights regressed. This is surprising from a just debate perspective, as Poles have a reputation for protest and activism, and women made up half the leading opposition movement, Solidarity. If women were active participants in the public sphere during the transition to democracy, how can the just debate approach explain the unusually limited outcomes on women’s rights? Poland appears to disprove the just debate hypothesis, or at the very least to narrow the range of its applicability. One feasible explanation would be that debate conditions did not improve despite the fact that the public sphere expanded. That is a counterintuitive proposition. Moreover, it is not the explanation gender scholars offer, making the post-1989 outcomes in Poland an imposing challenge to my theory.

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Alternative Explanations for Democratizing Poland Analyzing women’s rights across a wide range of countries and regions, gender scholars have cobbled together an array of factors that they believe promote advances in women’s rights after the transition to democracy. Many of these factors were absent in Poland. Leading indicators include a pacted transition and pro-democracy opposition determined to wrest reform (Tripp et al. 2009; Waylen 1994). This pacted transition should be slow enough to provide an opportunity for women to organize autonomously and create a cohesive movement that has strong links to prominent political organizations and demands feminist political reform (Baldez 2003; Waylen 1994 and 2007). Those demands should include a proportional representation system and guarantees of a substantial presence for women in the new government (often through a quota), as well as capacitated gender institutions in the state and the constitutional right to gender equality (Baldez 2002; Chappell 2002; Stetson and Mazur 1995).1 Multiple factors assist women’s movements in achieving these aims. They include a united Left opposition, because a divided opposition creates hurdles to women’s movements, and Leftist organizations tend to be sympathetic toward women’s rights (Baldez 2002; Waylen 2007). Even more important is a united Left that emphasizes individual rights over nationalism, as the latter essentializes women as mothers of the nation (Yuval-Davis 1997). Furthermore, the pro-democracy movement should be opposed to, rather than aligned with, powerful forces adamantly against women’s rights, such as the Roman Catholic Church (Charrad 2001; Htun 2003). Finally, scholars have pointed out that international factors, such as a vibrant international women’s movement and a global economic system favoring state expenditures on social and economic rights, can increase advances in women’s rights (Misra and King 2005; Molyneux 1994; Tripp et al. 2009; Weldon 2006). In Poland, the majority of these factors were aligned against advances in women’s rights. Polish women’s organizing as women was extremely low, and the opposition movement was not sympathetic to women’s claims (Matynia 1995).2 In fact, Solidarity was allied with the highly 1

2

Proportional representation electoral systems (PR) that assign seats by party according to the percentage of votes won are widely associated with an increase in the number of women in legislatures and facilitate the adoption of quotas. During the 1980s and 1990s, Polish women were relatively homogenous because Poland lacked significant ethnic, racial, linguistic, religious, or class diversity. This was a legacy of World War II and Soviet rule. During the war, the Nazis exterminated the minority Jewish population and much of the Roma population. After the war, the Soviet Union integrated

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conservative Roman Catholic Church and embraced a nationalistreligious identity that celebrated Polish motherhood. Not only was Solidarity a movement with Right-wing sympathies, after the democratic transition, it fragmented into multiple political parties. Furthermore, the power of the conservative Polish episcopate increased as it won significant concessions at the Round Table Talks, helping it promote a highly conservative social agenda. Although the state established a women’s bureaucracy, this new ministry immediately became a site of political contestation and had trouble functioning. Finally, early post-1989 Polish governments vigorously pursued economic neoliberalism that did not favor state expenditures on women’s rights.3 Only a handful of factors countered these trends. The pacted transition to democracy was relatively slow. Poland had a large proportion of highly educated, skilled women, many of whom had actively supported Solidarity, and the new government established a proportional electoral system that should have aided women in their quest for political office. When the discredited socialist parliament proposed draconian and unpopular anti-abortion legislation in 1989, some women began to organize in civil society.4 Feminist issue-networks in civil society and the legislature eventually emerged. In 1997, the government confirmed women’s right to constitutional equality. The international women’s movement was also quite strong as the Polish transition unfolded and entry to the European Union required formal equality on numerous gender issues. Clearly, the potential for positive outcomes was not foreclosed. However, the prevalence of obstacles, particularly the absence of women’s organizing prior to the first election in 1989, suggests the enabling factors were too little, too late. Existing explanations accurately predict the limited advances in women’s rights in Poland after 1989. Because a number of factors already explain the limited outcomes in post-socialist Poland, it is impossible to test the causal salience of the just debate approach here. However, as these results pose an exceptional

3

4

Ukrainians and Russians into Soviet Russia and implemented a program of forced settlement for the remaining Roma. Socialism narrowed class differences considerably. Polish women were divided by education, age, and geographic location. Few details about these differences are available in the literature. Unless otherwise stated, in this book, “Polish women” refers to young and middle-aged urban and educated women. Neoliberalism refers to a combination of economic policies, including reduction of state social spending and incentives for entrepreneurial activities that are intended to spur economic growth and efficiency. Following a convention adopted by Eva Fodor, I refer to the regime dominating Poland prior to the Round Table Talks in 1989 as socialist, and to the ideology guiding that regime as communist (2005, 2 fn.2).

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challenge to my theory, I explore whether Poland can expose its limits.5 To do so, I compare debate conditions, public debate, and women’s rights in Poland during the decade prior to the elections of 1989 with the decade afterward, to assess variations in debate conditions and public debate. This comparison reveals that although the Polish public sphere expanded significantly in the post-1989 period, debate conditions improved only incrementally. In Chapter 4, I argue that this incremental improvement dovetails with outcomes on women’s work status, because state policies and legislation ended a number of discriminatory workplace practices by the end of the decade. The same cannot be said for abortion. Instead, Chapter 4 exposes the extraordinary efforts of the Roman Catholic Church to undermine the civil and political rights of Poles. In this instance, the church was a confounding variable, demonstrating how an institution in civil society can break the link between the public sphere and the state. My analysis of debate conditions and public debate over abortion reveals that during the 1990s, Poland was an incomplete democracy.

Testing the Just Debate Claim In Authoritarian Chile and South Africa I test the just debate claim during the decade prior to the first democratic elections in Chile (1980–1989) and South Africa (1985–1994), as these two cases diverged in their results on women’s rights, yet are comparable on the leading indicators used to explain those results. By holding these other factors constant, this comparison investigates the causal weight of the just debate approach. Despite obvious differences between the two cases, such as the prominent role of the Roman Catholic Church in Chile and extensive racial oppression in South Africa, these two cases shared a number of similarities. Both were “semi-peripheral, middle income countries” with authoritarian regimes and influential business classes that shaped policy making, and mid-decade both were in severe economic crisis (Waylen 2007, 42).6 Both regimes were virulently anti-communist and highly conservative on women’s rights. Although popular pressure for a clear break from the authoritarian past was strong in each, the outgoing 5

6

This comparison is not a “toughest” case. As George and Bennett note, a toughest case must not only be least likely for the new theory and most likely for existing theory, the new theory must also accurately predict “an outcome very different from” that of other, existing theories (2005, 121). During the decade prior to elections, Chilean GDP varied between $1,300 and $2,900; South African GDP varied between $2,100 and $3,600 (NationMaster 2009).

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regime was powerful enough to secure nondemocratic institutions in the democratic state (Waylen 2007, 44). Further, both regimes used the military to repress the public sphere, yet opposition forces found ways to engage in public debate. In 1973 Augusto Pinochet led a US-backed coup and then imposed a military dictatorship that severely curtailed the public sphere. The pro-democracy opposition was bitterly divided and unable to prevent the militarization of the state. Indeed, the junta broadened military jurisdiction over citizens, terrorizing the population with murders, torture, and over 3,000 disappearances (Loveman 1991). Chileans nevertheless took to the streets during the early 1980s. They were able to do so with assistance from the Roman Catholic Church. The church provided resources, leadership, and an enabling human rights frame. Clergy subscribing to liberation theology facilitated consciousness-raising against the dictatorship.7 Although the military fiercely repressed the protests, the overall level of violence in the country declined, and the public sphere expanded as political parties and labor unions re-emerged (Heinz and Fruhling 1999). Even though class and ideological divisions in Chile were extensive, Chileans from all walks of life had the opportunity to organize and demand democracy. In South Africa the Afrikaner National Party imposed apartheid in 1948, enforcing racial categories and denying blacks citizenship while establishing separate homelands for black ethnic groups.8 In addition to the class and ideological divisions that plagued the Chilean opposition, racial and ethnic divisions afflicted the South African liberation movement.9 In 1960 the regime banned the African National Congress and the public sphere narrowed significantly. However, black South Africans had a valuable resource in the South African Council of Churches (SACC), which joined the liberation struggle, promoted an indigenous form of liberation theology, and in 1987 declared the regime illegitimate (Borer 1998). During the mid-1980s the National Party militarized the state, increased the presence 7

8

9

The extent to which liberation theology influenced the clergy in Chile is contested, but it did shape protests and women’s organizing (Adams 2003; Drogus and Stewart-Gambino 2005). The apartheid regime categorized people by racial categories: black (African or “bantuspeaking”), colored (mixed race), Indian (southern Asian descent), and white (European descent). I use the term black to refer to the first three groups. Approximately 86 percent of the South African population was black during the 1980s and 1990s. In Chile in 1989 the gini coefficient was .57, whereas just after the 1994 elections in South Africa it was .59 (UNU-WIDER 2008). Ethnic and regional differences were limited in Chile. Indigenous peoples constituted less than 5 percent of the population and 85 percent of Chileans lived in urban areas (Silva 2009). Approximately 75 percent of the population was Catholic.

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of armed forces in black areas, and detained over 30,000 persons. At the same time it legalized trade unions, creating an opening in the public sphere that facilitated mass resistance (Borer 1998). In authoritarian Chile and South Africa fierce repression of political resistance was eventually accompanied by an opening in the public sphere that opposition groups strategically exploited. In both, religious institutions played pivotal if distinct roles in facilitating that opening, but in South Africa the opposition was divided by race as well as class. Although the differences are important, they point to remarkable obstacles in the public sphere that activists in both cases successfully defied. Both cases also shared similarities on the leading variables gender scholars identify as critical for explaining outcomes on women’s rights. Alternative Explanations for Authoritarian Chile and South Africa In contrast to Poland, advances in women’s rights occurred in authoritarian Chile and South Africa. Although the advances in South Africa outstripped those of Chile, the two cases shared similarities on the factors that gender scholars believe shape outcomes on women’s rights after a transition to democracy.10 In both cases the opposition movement faced daunting internal divisions. In Chile, opposition parties were numerous, highly competitive, and for much of the period at odds with one another (Garreton 1995). Most became legal in 1987. In 1988, the Left and Center parties formed the Concertacion de Partidos por la Democracia, a coalition of seventeen political parties that excluded communists but included the Socialist Party, the Social Democratic Radical Party, and the Christian Democrats (CD). The latter was the leading party in the coalition. In this case, advocates of women’s rights faced a fiercely competitive, ideologically polarized political landscape that posed significant obstacles to building a strong movement (Baldez 2002). Those obstacles declined in 1988 as the Concertacion became increasingly cohesive and disciplined (Garreton 1995). In South Africa, the ANC dominated the opposition movement. Yet the ANC was not a unified political party, but rather a dispersed political movement that had been in exile for thirty years. This meant that when the ANC returned to South Africa in 1990, it faced the daunting challenge of integrating domestic opposition groups into an organization 10

Gender scholars have neglected outcomes on women’s rights just prior to democratic elections when the public sphere is expansive and political elites face elections. I adopt post-transition explanations to this highly mobilized period.

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that had different experiences, strategies, and expectations.11 Moreover, a number of opposition groups competed with the ANC, including the Pan-Africanist Conference (PAC) and the Azanian People’s Organization (AZAPO). Apartheid security forces also carried out a “dirty tricks” campaign that fomented violence between the ANC and its leading competitor, the Inkatha Freedom Movement. Violence frequently reached civil war proportions that at times threatened to derail the transition negotiations (Ebrahim 1998).12 Despite the pre-eminence of the ANC, South African women’s advocates faced severe political divisions, and these problems persisted throughout the period (Hassim 2006, 137). Just as the Concertacion and the ANC both faced serious political divisions, they also shared similar ideological terrain, including a commitment to human rights and liberal democracy. Both were also allied with powerful traditional organizations. In Chile, the dominant Christian Democrats held a Centrist position influenced by global neoliberalism and the Roman Catholic Church. Their ties to Catholic religious dogma did not bode well for securing legalized abortion or divorce. In South Africa, the ANC was a Left-of-Center movement with a strong socialist wing, but it was not a Left-wing organization. As Professor Kader Asmal, a highly influential party strategist, notes, the ANC emerged from petite bourgeois roots that dominated the movement’s agenda, meaning leftists were “foot soldiers,” not party leaders (Russell 2009, 72). The demise of the Soviet Union and the rise of neoliberalism prompted the ANC leadership to embrace its liberal Center (Lodge 2002a; Marais 2001). Moreover, although the ANC was not encumbered by a commitment to Catholic dogma, it was aligned with powerful chiefs committed to customary law who could direct millions of votes and incite violence (Meer and Campbell 2007; Van Kessel and Oomen 1999). Customary law denied women equal legal status and the right to own land. The nature of the opposition movements in these two cases were different in important ways, but those differences do not suggest outcomes in gender justice should have diverged dramatically, except on select women’s rights issues like abortion and property ownership. In addition to similar ideological terrain, both cases faced a similar international environment. During the 1980s in Chile, liberation theology, international human rights NGOs, the UN Decade for Women (1975–1985), 11

12

Divisions between domestic and exiled activists were acute. For example, internal activists were much more committed to deliberation than exiles. Activist, writer, and Commissioner of the CGE Gertrude Fester, interview, Cape Town July 21, 2003; Speaker for the Western Cape Provincial Parliament, Lynne Brown, interview, Cape Town July 24, 2003. Between 1989 and 1990, political deaths more than doubled, from 1,403 to 3,699 (Ebrahim 1998, 63).

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and international funds for domestic feminist organizations facilitated women’s organizing (Schild 1998; Waylen 2007, 60). Four regional meetings held in Latin America during the 1980s, the Encuentros Feministas, strengthened the feminist orientation of Chilean women’s organizations emerging under Pinochet and lent them international clout (Frohmann and Valdes 1995, 283). Similarly, in apartheid South Africa international donor support facilitated women’s organizing. Here too, an important sector of church leaders influenced by human rights norms, as well as regional influences and UN events, were notable catalysts. South African women learned from the experiences of other African postliberation societies that liberation did little to end women’s subordination, alerting them to organize early and separately as women. The 1985 Nairobi Conference was particularly pivotal, providing women in the African National Congress with the opportunity to demonstrate to their male comrades the importance of linking women’s liberation to the national struggle (Hassim 2006, 107–108). Whereas elections were held in 1989 in Chile, they occurred five years later in South Africa, just prior to the celebrated international women’s movement conference in Beijing. The influence of the women’s international movement was notable during both moments, although it was arguably stronger at the moment of South Africa’s transition. However, the trend in global economic factors was the reverse. The heyday of neoliberalism dawned after 1989, with the fall of the Soviet Union. This international economic realignment put severe pressure on the ANC to limit social spending. Although international factors did influence domestic politics during South Africa’s transition, they did not favor markedly better outcomes on women’s rights than in Chile. Both cases also had strong feminist women’s movements.13 Chilean women were deeply divided by class and ideologically fractured by party politics, but a national women’s movement emerged early, had extensive roots, and a history of dramatic activism. In South Africa, divisions among women ran deeper, as class and geographic differences were mapped onto race. Initially, women’s organizations were disparate and weak, with few resources or mobilizing capacity. However, as the transition gained momentum, a national South African women’s movement emerged. In both cases, leading women’s organizations were strong at the moment of transition, in part because the transition was relatively slow. In Chile, the Coalition of Women for Democracy (CMD) wrote a gender program 13

A women’s movement is composed of women who mobilize as women to pursue their common interests. While I refer to a women’s movement, in both cases these movements comprised heterogeneous groups with multiple and sometimes conflicting interests.

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to influence the policies of the opposition coalition and campaigned for the Concertacion presidential candidate, Patricio Aylwin. Although the Concertacion siphoned some CMD resources, the coalition remained selfgoverning, devised its own goals, and avidly pressed political leaders for commitments to women’s rights (Baldez 2002, 177; Chuchryk 1994, 86). In apartheid South Africa, the Women’s National Coalition (WNC) wrote a charter to influence the transition negotiations. Although WNC leaders were also members of the ANC, it nevertheless remained self-governing, devised its own goals, and like the CMD, avidly pressed political leaders for commitments to women’s rights (Hassim 2006). The transition time frame was four years in South Africa from the unbanning of the ANC in 1990 to the first non-racial election in 1994. It was less than two years in Chile, from the plebiscite to the first democratic election. However, the longer South African period enabled advocates of women’s rights to build a movement comparable to the one in Chile. One notable divergence between the two cases did occur. Although both had pacted transitions, in South Africa the transition negotiations broadened to include the leading political organizations in the country in assemblies where they debated and wrote an interim constitution. This institutional innovation expanded the public sphere in South Africa, and women successfully contested debate conditions in the last transition assembly. If the just debate approach is correct, advances in debate conditions in this location should have provided them with a greater opportunity to advance women’s rights than in Chile. However, writing an interim constitution favored constitutional recognition of women’s rights in South Africa that were impossible in Chile. Hence, to maximize comparability between the two cases, I do not include South African women’s constitutional victories in my assessment of gender outcomes. Instead, I assess campaign promises made by the opposition movement in both cases and policy initiatives and legislation passed by the two authoritarian states. Yet, even with this adjustment, outcomes in Chile were quite modest whereas in South Africa they were extensive. Unlike the plausibility probe for Poland, this paired comparison holds alternative explanations constant and thus offers the opportunity to test the causal traction of the just debate approach.

Testing the Just Debate Claim in Post-Apartheid South Africa After testing the just debate claim through a cross-regional comparison of authoritarian Chile and South Africa, I slice the first decade of postapartheid South Africa into two equal time periods and compare the two

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cases to test the just debate claim in one country.14 This comparison holds a number of important factors constant, such as culture, political history, and political goals. Although in April 1999 the revered Nelson Mandela stepped aside and his deputy president, the intellectual technocrat Thabo Mbeki, took the helm, Mbeki’s presidency signaled continuity (Iheduru 2004).15 Most of the changes in the state and economy that occurred over the decade favored a steady advance in women’s rights. For example, the profoundly conservative apartheid National Party resigned from the Government of National Unity (GNU) in 1996 and eventually disbanded, and the upward trajectory of economic growth in 1994–2004 meant money was available to fund women’s rights (Padayachee 2005). Yet women’s rights did not advance; they stalled. This challenges existing explanations of women’s rights outcomes. It also challenges the just debate approach, as the public sphere is likely to expand as violence declines, the state stabilizes, and democratic politics becomes routine. Alternative Explanations for Post-Apartheid South Africa What can explain the rise and stall of gender justice in post-apartheid South Africa? Gender scholars have identified multiple factors they believe advance women’s rights after a transition to democracy, most of which are crucial during the transition phase as well. They include a strong women’s movement, public discourse emphasizing individual rights over nationalism, a PR system and quota that help put a significant percentage of women into political office, effective gender machinery, constitutional guarantees of gender equality, a unified Leftist political party aligned against powerful organizations opposed to women’s rights, a vibrant international women’s movement, and economic growth in a global economy that favors social spending (e.g., Baldez 2002; Chappell 2002; Misra and King 2005; Waylen 2007). The majority of these factors were constant in both South African periods and thus cannot account for the rise and stall in women’s rights. The South African women’s movement collapsed in 1994 and did not revive. Public discourse emphasizing individual rights persisted throughout both 14

15

This periodization allows for the comparison of two different parliaments as well as time periods of equal duration. I refer to the first period as the liberal moment. While democratic consolidation extended beyond 2004, for the sake of simplicity I refer to 1999 to 2004 as the consolidation period. Adam Habib and Roger Southall, “Different Men, Same Mission,” Financial Mail, May 7, 2004.

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periods. As the country prepared for its first nonracial elections in 1994, a PR electoral system was implemented that facilitated the ANC’s adoption of a 30-percent voluntary quota for women. As a result, women’s numbers in parliament reached 25 percent in the first period and increased to nearly 30 percent in the second. Extensive gender machinery was adopted in 1994, and although it was slow to be implemented, overextended, depoliticized, and never adequately funded or autonomous, it was put into place during the liberal moment and persisted during consolidation (Gouws 2005; Seidman 2003). In 1996, the government finalized the progressive South African constitution guaranteeing gender equality. The Center-Left ANC dominated politics during both periods and had an antagonistic relationship with the chiefs throughout.16 Global neoliberal economic pressures were stable. Although the zenith of the international women’s movement passed during the consolidation phase, international leverage on women’s rights in Africa increased (Tripp et al. 2009). Other factors shaped the varied gender outcomes in these two South African cases. Alternative Explanations in the South African Literature Analysts of gender politics in South Africa have avidly analyzed the stall in gender justice. Their explanations tend to fall into two categories: critiques of the women’s movement and flaws in the electoral system. In the first category, analysts have noted a lack of coordination among women’s organizations, as well as tensions between women in civil society and the state (Britton 2005; Hassim 2006). Several scholars point out that the women’s movement eagerly pursued inclusion in the state but did not attack sexism in the private sphere (Albertyn 2003; Hassim 2006, 5). Others have argued that the women’s movement relied too heavily on rights talk, which limited the potential for women’s advocates to secure more than formal equality (Gouws 2005; Manicom 2005). Analysts have also pointed to flaws in the South African electoral system. While the PR electoral system and the quota enhanced women’s presence in parliament, they enabled political parties to increase the number of professional women MPs in the second parliament who were distanced from grassroots women’s organizations. The same mechanisms 16

Chiefs previously aligned with the ANC shifted their allegiance to the Inkatha Freedom Party in 1994 to advance their quest for greater government recognition (Meer and Campbell 2007).

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enabled ANC disciplining of outspoken women politicians (Britton 2005; Gouws 2005; Hassim 2006). The proportional electoral system and quota also encouraged politicians to heed party bosses instead of constituents, limiting the influence of women’s organizations in civil society (Goetz and Hassim 2003; Gouws 2008a and 2008b). Analysts of democratic quality could offer an additional explanation, as they have long warned that dominant-party systems can be a threat to democracy (Huntington 1968; Przeworski 1991). In post-apartheid South Africa, the prospect of an electoral turnover of the ANC was slim, limiting pressure on the government to be responsive to popular demands. All of these explanations offer compelling insights about South African politics, yet most of these problems existed before 1994 or from 1994 onward. Few can add to our understanding of why the most celebrated of South African women’s rights outcomes occurred between 1994 and 1999, and then abruptly halted. Although coordination among women’s organizations was initially low, women’s issue-based organizations grew in strength, and networking between women in parliament and civil society improved. Women’s organizations were state-focused over both periods, and rights talk remained an important discursive frame throughout both periods as well. Although the PR system and quota did disconnect women MPs from their constituencies and ensured women politicians were attentive to party leaders, both were constant, as was ANC electoral dominance (Alence 2004; Butler 2007; Giliomee 1998). The only factors that did increase in the expected direction were the professionalization of women MPs in parliament and ANC disciplining of outspoken MPs. Both offer important clues as to why gender outcomes in South Africa stalled during consolidation. I argue these two factors are linked to a broader pattern of ANC centralization that was evident by 1997 and had become unmistakable by 1999. Although the ANC initially used its electoral dominance, the PR system, the quota, and new participatory mechanisms in the state to establish a deliberating public sphere, by the consolidation period ANC elites used these tools to centralize their control and co-opt the public sphere.17 This constrained public debate and took pressure off the state to advance women’s rights.

17

Elisabeth Jay Friedman and Kathryn Hochstetler (2002) use the terms deliberative and co-optive to describe different types of representational regimes, and focus specifically on civil society organizations. Co-optive democracy refers to “high levels of state control coupled with high levels of institutionalized participation” (23). I apply the latter term to the public sphere in South Africa during consolidation.

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Gender Justice Issues in Socialist and post-socialist Poland To test whether the just debate approach is a viable explanation for outcomes on women’s rights, I evaluate debate conditions, public debate, and gender justice during select time periods in democratizing Poland, Chile, and South Africa. In Chapter 1, I detailed a framework for assessing debate conditions. In this section, I explain my choice of gender justice issues for each of my paired comparisons. To assess state responsiveness to gender justice, I choose one gender justice issue for oppression and another for exploitation. Choosing a gender issue is difficult because its meaning can vary by context, and sometimes this variation in meaning can shape state support for gender justice independently of debate conditions. For example, abortion in socialist and post-socialist Poland was the primary means of birth control. During the late socialist era, analysts estimate that the average woman had from fourteen to twenty abortions (Einhorn 1993a, 93).18 Most had multiple abortions in state hospitals, where overworked doctors conducted abortions in assembly line fashion as dilation and curettage (D&C), often without anesthetic and under unsanitary conditions (Einhorn 1993a). The result was a high number of deaths. Although the number of abortions decreased after the transition to democracy, other forms of reliable birth control were not readily available until the end of the 1990s. Abortion was legal in socialist Poland and subsidized by the state but medical conditions were appalling and alternative forms of birth control few.19 These conditions severely compromised women’s autonomy. 18

19

Statistics on abortion in both socialist and post-socialist democratizing Poland are notoriously incomplete. During the 1980s, statistics on abortions performed in hospitals and clinics were required, but the data do not match research of the period that confirm abortion was the primary means of birth control. For example, although the state reported 136,000 abortions in 1985, analysts estimate the total to have been between 400,000 and 620,000 (Titkow 1999, 168–171). During the 1990s, abortion remained the primary means of birth control even though for much of the period it was illegal. Official abortion rates record a steady decline from a peak of 138,000 to fewer than 500 by 2000, but that data does not include abortions that were privately performed, clandestine, or purchased abroad through gynecological travel agencies (Heinen and Portet 2002, 156). Experts estimate the actual rate was five times the official rate (Einhorn 1993a, 88; Heinen and Portet 2002, 156; Zielinska 2000, 43 and 49). Birth control pills were not consistently available (hence not an option), condoms were of poor quality, spermicides did not have high rates of effectiveness, and sterilization was nonexistent. During the 1990s, people lacked accurate information about the safety of contraceptives and did not know how to use them. Contraceptives were also expensive

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In the early 1990s in Poland, the situation was worse: Abortion became illegal, state subsidies ended, medical conditions deteriorated further, and alternative forms of birth control were unavailable. This extraordinary situation affected the meaning of abortion in both periods, making it dangerous yet necessary for many women. Although comparing abortion across these two periods in Poland is feasible, comparisons with cases where abortion was not the leading form of birth control would involve a significant degree of conceptual stretching, because abortion is rarely used as the only form of reliable birth control. Moreover, because few reliable forms of birth control were available in these two cases, it is probable that political actors were predisposed to support legalized abortion more than political actors in other cases where alternative, reliable birth control was available. Although comparing abortion across these two cases is feasible, comparing abortion in either of these cases with cases where it was not a primary form of birth control is not. Differences among opponents of women’s rights also can affect the comparability of gender issues. In apartheid South Africa, powerful chiefs opposed a number of women’s rights. One of the issues they opposed most was rural women’s right to own property because this would threaten the basis of their rule.20 Although this right would not have ended rural women’s exploitation, it could have alleviated it significantly. However, for the chiefs, compromise on women’s property rights was not an option. In contrast, in Chile, the “absolutist” issues for the Roman Catholic Church were not women’s right to own property but abortion and divorce (Blofield 2006; Htun 2003, 5).21 This meant state support for women’s property rights was likely to be higher in Chile than in South Africa, and state support for divorce and abortion was likely to be higher in South Africa than in Chile. The divergence illustrates why it is important to choose gender issues that powerful opponents treat with similar levels of disdain when comparing across cases.

20

21

and difficult to find (particularly in rural areas). Church clergy and allies like Pharmacists for Life worsened the problem by “raiding” pharmacies, confiscating IUDs and birth control pills (Standish 1998, 124 & 125). The use of artificial contraception is estimated to have been between 4 and 11 percent throughout the decade (Einhorn 1993a, 88; Nowicka 1997b, 48; Nowicka, Pochec and Buchowska 2007, 4; Zielinska 2000, 49). For an analysis of South African chiefs and women’s property rights see Rangan and Gilmartin 2002 and Walker 1990 and 2005. Htun uses the term “absolutist” to signal intense and ideologically polarizing issues (2003, 5).

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Following these guidelines, for the two cases in Poland, I examine abortion to assess women’s oppression, and women’s work status to assess their exploitation. In both periods, these two issues were pressing concerns for Polish women (Long 1996; Reading 1992; Regulska 1998; Zielinska 2000). The meaning of abortion in both cases was similar. Moreover, it was a critical issue for the church in both periods (Einhorn 1993a; Nowicka 1997b; Zielinska 2000). To assess state responsiveness on women’s oppression, I analyze the speed, scope, and specifics of public policy and legislation. To assess speed, I compare state policy and legislation on abortion to global trends. To assess scope, I focus on state subsidies for abortion, medical conditions, and policies on contraception. For specifics, I assess state funding and administrative guidelines. Like abortion, women’s work status was comparable across the two periods in Poland. Women’s work refers to paid employment as well as domestic labor. Issues related to women’s work include the sexual division of labor in the household, as well as equal employment legislation and public benefits that allow parents to care for their children, particularly family allowances, maternity leave, and childcare.22 To assess state responsiveness on women’s exploitation, I first compare state policy and legislation on women’s work with global trends. To assess scope, I focus on women’s equality in the workplace and state subsidized family benefits, such as maternity leave and childcare. For specifics, I investigate state funding and administrative guidelines. Although the shift from a command economy in socialist Poland to a market economy might have changed the meaning of women’s work, its meaning remained relatively stable. In both periods, Polish women reported prioritizing their families but found it necessary to seek work in the paid labor sector. In socialist Poland, women valued motherhood and the right to stay home, where they could offer their families domestic comforts and escape the oppressive socialist state with its excessive communalism (Bystydzienski 1995; Marody and Giza-Poleszczuk 2000; Matynia 1995). The emergence of a market economy in the 1990s meant work was no longer a socialist duty, but an activity that brought the promise of financial independence (Heinen 2000; 124–125; Nowakoska and Swedrowska 2000; Titkow 1998, 29). However, women continued 22

Feminist analysts of the welfare state argue a package of benefits, rather than any single benefit, is optimal. They focus on family allowances, maternity leave, and childcare, because these benefits enable families to meet household expenses and help parents move back into the labor market when a child is born or adopted (Pribble 2005; Steinhilber 2006, 69).

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to value their role as mothers; home was a place where they could offer their family domestic comforts and escape the capitalist market with its excessive individualism (Graff 2008; Marody and Giza-Poleszcuk 2000, 172–173). Moreover, in both cases, women’s income and career mobility remained relatively stable, as did their occupational segregation, proportion in the paid labor force, and the gender gap in wages (Heinen and Portet 2002; Titkow 1998, 24).23 Despite the transition from a command to a capitalist economy, women’s role in the workforce and their domestic work did not vary significantly. Finally, in both time periods, church opposition toward women’s work was constant: Although the episcopate emphasized the importance of women’s role in the home, it never regarded women’s work in the paid labor force as a threat to Catholic dogma.

Gender Justice Issues in Authoritarian Chile and South Africa I test the just debate approach through a comparison of authoritarian Chile and South Africa. For this paired comparison, I analyze gender-based violence (GBV) to assess women’s oppression and women’s work status to assess their exploitation. Gender-based violence includes psychological, financial, and emotional abuse, as well as physical violence. I focus on physical violence, as data on the other aspects are rare. Physical violence refers to a range of actions, from threats of violence to slapping, hitting with a stick, beating with fists, rape, stabbing, and femicide.24 It often involves intimate partners and frequently occurs within the home or away from public view. Debate over gender-based violence involves the status of women in the family; questions about men’s marital power are raised in debates over GBV. To assess state responsiveness on women’s oppression, I first compare the speed and scope of state policy and legislation 23

24

Unemployment did not officially exist in socialist Poland. During the 1990s, unemployment was higher for women than men and ranged from 14 to 17 percent (U.S. Department of Commerce 1995, 6). Women accounted for more than half the unemployed in 1995; in some industrial sectors, women’s unemployment rates were double that of men (Matynia 1995, 401). Gender-based violence can occur between women and men, and between men and between women. The way gender is taken up as an identity and maps unequal relations of power is what makes violence gender-based. Although I prefer the term gender-based violence because it makes explicit that the violence is a result of unequal power relations, I also use the terms used by the people I study, which include violence against women and domestic violence.

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on violence against women with global trends. To assess scope, I focus on the legal definition of violence against women and state subsidies for shelters, training, and education. For specifics, I investigate state funding and administrative guidelines. Women in both cases identified GBV and work as important issues (Fisher 1993; Gonzalez 1992; Meintjes 2003). Contextual factors that might affect the meaning of gender-based violence were similar in authoritarian Chile and South Africa. In both, women experienced exceptionally high levels of violence, political as well as “domestic.”25 Forced resettlements, overcrowding, and housing crises in both cases created inordinately high levels of stress for many households (Bonin 2000; Bozzoli 2004; Fisher 1993; Meintjes 1998; Paley 2001). These difficulties did not alter significantly over time in either case, although the economy in both improved modestly and forced resettlement ended (Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell 2003; Petras and Leiva 1994). Comparability is also strong for the issue of women’s work. Although more women in the South African case were in the labor force, in both countries, women were concentrated in the informal and secondary labor markets, and men were regarded as the primary wage earners; yet women’s informal and secondary paid work was often a necessity for survival (Montecinos 1994; O’Regan and Thompson 1993).26 In both cases, serious economic crises occurred that raised unemployment levels significantly, to over 30 percent in Chile and to nearly 40 percent in South Africa (Meller 1992, 64; Schoeman and Blaauw 2005, 10).27 The leading opposition groups to women’s rights in both apartheid South Africa and authoritarian Chile shared similar attitudes toward GBV and women’s work, ensuring comparability. Neither the church nor the chiefs regarded violence against women or women’s work as a threat to

25

26

27

Political violence and violence against women were not commonly regarded as similar phenomena during these time periods, although some women activists in both cases sought to make that connection. Statistics of domestic violence in Chile and South Africa during the 1980s are scarce. Just prior to the democratic elections, a 1988 Chilean survey of 122 urban women found that 82 had experienced violence in their homes (Larrain and Rodriguez 1993, 186). Just prior to the democratic elections in South Africa, a pilot study of women living in an urban area, Gauteng province, found that at least 60 percent of women were in abusive relationships (Baden et al. 1998, 32). The studies confirmed that violence against women was quite high. During the mid-point of these two periods, South African women’s labor force participation was 42 percent; in Chile, it was 33 percent (World Bank 2009). To my knowledge, unemployment rates disaggregated by sex and by race in South Africa are not available for the decade prior to democratic elections.

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their power or core ideological commitments. Neither addressed violence as a problem stemming from unequal relations of power. Both regarded marriage as the foundation of society, treated men as the heads of household, and believed women’s primary role was in the private sphere. Because these two cases involve two different countries, I also take care to ensure that the level of state support for these two gender issues was similar at the outset of each time period. In both cases, pregnant women could be fired from their jobs, childcare was extremely limited, and family allowances were extended only to the most impoverished of women.28 Discriminatory employment practices such as “protective” legislation limited women’s job opportunities (and justified inferior work conditions for men). In both cases, the state lacked policies or legislation addressing violence against women.

Gender Issues in Post-Apartheid South Africa In Chapters 6 and 7, I test the just debate claim through a structured, focused comparison of the liberal moment and consolidation periods in South Africa. Once again, to assess women’s oppression and exploitation, I focus on GBV and women’s work status. Women in both periods identified these issues as important (CGE 2005; Kola et al. 1999). As the rates of violence in both periods were exceptionally high, this issue is also comparable across the two cases.29 Women’s work was comparable as well. Its meaning remained the same given the dire economic situation of the majority of the population: Women’s work was necessary for survival even as male-headed households remained the ideal. Unemployment was a serious problem in both periods, with the unemployment rate for black women ranging from 50 to 55 percent (Hames et al. 2006, 9). Women’s absolute unemployment increased incrementally over time, whereas the unemployment gender gap modestly decreased. As these changes were relatively small, they did not affect the meaning of women’s paid labor across the two periods. Finally, organized opposition from the chiefs on 28

29

In South Africa, race also shaped the distribution of family allowances (Naidoo and Bozalek 1997). Official rape rates indicate a decline from 115.3 to 113.7 per 100,000 from 1994 to 2003/04, but rape activists challenged their accuracy. Brian Carnell, “Mbeki: Complaints about Rape Rate are Racist,” EquityFeminism October 6, 2004 http:// www.equityfeminism.com/articles/2004/mbeki-complaints-about-rape-rate-are-racist/ Accessed September 1, 2009. Regardless, South Africa had the highest rape rate in the world for a country not at war.

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the two issues was rare during both periods, as they did not view either as a threat to their power or their core ideological commitments.

Conclusion The just debate claim argues that more open and inclusive debate conditions can alter the content of public debate, increasing demands for gender justice that pressure the state to respond. To test this claim in democratizing states during the third wave, I assess debate conditions, public debate, and state responsiveness on gender justice during select time periods in Poland, Chile, and South Africa. These cases provide a wide range of outcomes on the dependent variable. For my plausibility probe of Poland, I investigate state responsiveness on abortion and women’s work status; the remaining cases investigate violence against women and women’s work status. The comparisons of pre-democratic Chile and South Africa, and of the liberal moment and consolidation periods in South Africa, offer significant control for alternative explanations. Part II begins with a plausibility probe of the just debate hypothesis, comparing debate conditions in socialist and post-socialist Poland.

part II JUST DEBATE IN DEMOCRATIZING STATES

4 Just Debate Denied Socialist and Post-socialist Poland

“There are equal, and more equal.” Polish proverb

Introduction Democratic transitions in Central and Eastern Europe have been associated with limited advances in gender justice. Although scholars do not deny women’s valuable gains in civil and political rights in this region, most agree that the price women paid for those rights was high (e.g., Fodor 2009; Heinen and Portet 2002; Titkow 1998). This high price has been evident even in countries where the democratic transition was the smoothest and most successful: Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland. Analysts agree that women’s rights eroded precipitously with the transition to democracy in Poland, pointing to an immediate decline in the number of women in politics, dramatically high unemployment rates, decreases in women’s family benefits, and an end to legalized abortion (Hardy, Kozek, and Stenning 2008; Heinen and Portet 2002; Simienska 1998). Democratization in Poland appears to have been accompanied by a backlash against women’s rights. As discussed in Chapter 3, scholars have offered several persuasive explanations for this retrenchment, including a lack of women’s organizing and an alliance between Solidarity and the conservative Polish Roman Catholic Church. That means an analysis of just debate in Poland cannot prove the causal salience of my hypothesis, as it must compete on an equal footing with these alternative arguments. However, an analysis of debate conditions in Poland can reveal whether the just debate approach 79

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is plausible when democratization and such poor outcomes on women’s rights occur in tandem. The just debate approach argues that more open and inclusive debate conditions across the public sphere will lead to greater demands for women’s rights, putting pressure on politicians to respond with policies and legislation advancing gender justice. Because democratization is associated with an expansion of the public sphere, countries making the transition to democracy during the third wave should have exemplified this claim. Common sense suggests debate conditions – or women’s access, voice, and capacity for contestation in the leading institutions in the public sphere – will improve as a country liberalizes and the public sphere expands. Common sense also suggests debate conditions will be more open and inclusive after democratic elections, when basic liberal rights are established, and political participation becomes routine. Following the logic of the just debate approach, this expansion in debate conditions should facilitate an increase in public debate over gender justice, leading to greater state support for women’s rights. Yet women’s rights in Poland after the transition to democracy did not advance. Does that mean Poland disproves the just debate claim? Through a structured, focused comparison of debate conditions in the late socialist era (1980–1989) with the early consolidation period (1990–1999), the chapter investigates this question.1 To assess the openness and inclusiveness of debate conditions during these two periods, I analyze women’s access, voice, and capacity for contestation in the three most salient arenas of the public sphere: the legislature, civil society, and the media. As outlined in Chapter 3, I then discuss public debate on two women’s rights issues: abortion and women’s work. Finally, I assess state responsiveness on these two women’s rights issues. The chapter offers several important findings. First, the openness and inclusiveness of debate conditions were limited in both cases. During the 1980s, the Catholic Church and Solidarity dominated the emerging public sphere. Neither facilitated women’s access, voice, or capacity for contestation. Not surprisingly, with debate conditions limited in these leading institutions, public debate over gender justice contained few demands for 1

I analyze periods of equal duration that capture the most crucial phases of Polish democratization. I begin with Solidarity’s rise in 1980, which includes the liberalization and regime breakdown periods. The second period begins after the elections of 1989 and includes the early years of consolidation when the government approved the new constitution and Lech Walesa, the famed leader of Solidarity, became president and then lost political power to Alexsander Kwasniewski.

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women’s rights. Instead, at moments of political crisis, the socialist state responded to the demands of the church and Solidarity by undermining women’s access to abortion and intensifying their secondary status in the command economy. In the post-1989 period, an expansion in debate conditions occurred in parliament and one sector of civil society. Although women’s numbers in parliament declined with the transition to democracy, their voice and capacity for contestation increased modestly with the emergence of a women’s counterpublic in the legislature and the support of new women’s organizations in civil society. During this period, demands for women’s rights increased in public debate. This suggests small advances in women’s right to abortion and women’s work status should have been forthcoming. However, this was not the case for abortion. Instead, the church used its substantial resources to dominate public debate and short-circuit the responsiveness of the state. As the church undermined basic liberal democratic rights in the debate over abortion, Poland exhibited characteristics of an “incomplete” democracy (Collier and Levitsky 1997). This explains why outcomes on abortion after 1989 worsened in spite of the small improvements in debate conditions.2 Although the Catholic Church ensured a regressive state policy on abortion, it did not apply comparable pressure to state policy toward women’s work status. Church repression of public debate thus cannot explain state actions on this issue. Yet here, too, state action has been characterized as regressive. Do the policies and legislation of the post-socialist Polish state toward women’s work disprove the just debate claim? On the contrary, state actions toward women’s work confirm it. Although the neoliberal state significantly reduced women’s family benefits, in doing so it sustained their secondary status in the labor market and their role as primary caretakers. During the 1980s, the socialist state structured family benefits to ensure men would be the primary breadwinners and women would be their “non-productive” support staff and caretakers (Grzymala-Moszczynska 1991; Kenney 1999; Robinson 1995). With the transition to capitalism, the state maintained this gendered hierarchy. Even though state benefits declined, the lack of state support for

2

Although Poland was not a theocracy, state concessions to the Church discussed later in this chapter indicate it was not a religious democracy either. I suggest it was a theological democracy: A democracy where religious dogma limited political and civil rights. This classification of post-1989 Poland as a subtype of democracy draws on the arguments of Collier and Levitsky (1997).

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gender justice toward women’s work status remained steady. The Polish state continued to value women as caretakers first and as workers second. Concessions to women’s formal equality that did occur at the end of the period coincided closely with the slight expansion in debate conditions. Probing the plausibility of the just debate claim through a comparison of these two periods in Poland reveals that an expanding public sphere may not significantly increase the openness and inclusiveness of debate conditions, and that powerful nonstate actors can undermine the link between public debate and the state. Where advocates of women’s rights are prevented from shaping public debate because a leading institution in the public sphere attacks basic liberal rights, the state is unlikely to take concerted action to increase its commitment to gender justice.

The Public and Private in Socialist Poland Before analyzing debate conditions in late socialist Poland, I briefly discuss why women are an appropriate group to evaluate when assessing the openness and inclusiveness of debate conditions during the socialist period in Poland. The socialist state attempted to collapse the division between the public and the private, bringing much of Polish life under state control. This effort did not emancipate women from the private sphere, although it did invert the conventional value of public and private space for many Poles. The state-dominated public realm included parliament, the Communist Party, unions, women’s organizations, official media, and the command economy. The state included Polish women in these institutions to prove it had overturned the gendered foundations of the public-private binary, bringing everyone socialist equality. However, most Poles did not value these institutions, hence women’s inclusion undermined their legitimacy as public actors (Kenney 1999; Long 1996; Robinson 1995). Many Polish women rejected the official public realm not only because it was state-dominated, but also because it placed too many demands on their time. In addition to participating in state-dominated institutions and the command economy, they were also expected to fulfill traditional child caring and domestic chores in a society that did not adequately produce necessary material goods. This made household management extremely difficult (Kenney 1999; Robinson 1995, 216–217). Women’s roles as comrade, worker, and mother created an exhausting “triple burden” that led many Poles to believe women were overemancipated (Havelkova 1993). Consequently, some women aimed to exit the despised official public realm by remaining at home for extended maternity leaves

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(Bystydzienski 1989; Einhorn 1993a; Heinen 2000). Those opposed to the socialist regime believed men suffered most under state socialism, because it was more difficult for men to escape the grasp of the state by retreating to the home (Havelkova 1993). The desire to flee the paid labor force did not mean that Polish women were complicit in their own subordination. On the contrary, it signaled not only their awareness of the propaganda function of their paid labor and the pressures of the triple burden, but also an understanding that socialist promises of equality in the workplace were a lie. Not only was public life dominated by the state, it favored men by relegating most women to low-status jobs. State domination of public life and the triple burden increased women’s attachment to motherhood and caretaking. This contributed to women’s marginalization not only in official public life, but also in the emerging, underground public sphere. Many men also valued the private realm. Indeed, the opposition movement viewed the private as a site of resistance and freedom. Insisting upon the autonomy of the family from the state, daily domestic activities could become acts of political resistance. Moreover, state domination of public life meant political contestation was forced underground and into the private. This suggests that women were integrated into opposition politics: The meetings of underground counterpublics within the cramped apartments of the urban working classes meant the home became the physical site of political resistance (Matynia 2003). However, this comingling of public and private activities in one space did not eliminate the sexual division of labor and its gendered inequalities. On the contrary, men in the underground regarded women as primary caretakers, tasked with raising Polish citizens to defend the nation (Long 1996; Kenney 1999). Many of the underground and “antipolitics” groups were “hostile to women” (Einhorn and Sever 2003, 169). Although women participated, it was generally as support staff, making “sandwiches while men made politics” (Kenney 2002, 67). As democratization advanced and the resistance no longer needed the protection of women, men moved the underground out of the private and into public space. The home quickly lost its political cachet, restoring the conventional public-private binary. Although state socialism confounded the conventional values and practices associated with public and private space, gender continued to be central in shaping the activities of women and men, ensuring women were subordinate support staff to heroic male leaders. In late socialist Poland, women marked the division between public and private activities in the resistance and constituted its largest

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marginalized group. Tracing the access, voice, and capacity for contestation of women in the leading institutions of the public sphere in socialist Poland reveals the limits of debate conditions.

Debate Conditions in Socialist Poland The two leading institutions in the underground public sphere of this period were the Catholic Church and Solidarity. Neither had open or inclusive debate conditions. The church was the only legal institution opposed to the Communist Party. It had considerable autonomy, including freedom of worship, distribution of print media, and access to radio and television (Eberts 1998, 820; Reading 2003, 394). As the decade progressed, the church offered sanctuary to opposition leaders, engaged in public debate, and acted as an intermediary between the state and Solidarity (Goban-Klas 1997, 34). During this period, Solidarity also became a formidable challenge to the regime, organizing protests and strikes. Despite martial law (1981–1983), the trade union survived by relying upon an ever-expanding, more visible samizdat (dissident) press to spread its message and denounce state socialism.3 However, even as the public sphere expanded, debate conditions did not improve. The limitations on debate conditions in the opposition were in part a reaction against the socialist state’s inclusion of women in official public life. Women’s presence in socialist institutions not only delegitimized them as public actors; it rarely afforded them more than a token presence. As a group, they paid the price of public affiliation with the hated socialist regime and reaped few benefits. This meant debate conditions in both the underground and official public sphere were extremely limited. The Legislature Until the regime declared martial law in 1981, the central committee of the Communist Party was the real site of state decision making; after 1981, it shifted to General Jaruzelski and the military. The central committee of the Communist Party and military leaders, both composed solely of men, dominated the socialist legislature. Debate conditions here 3

The number of samizdat publications exceeded 2,000, more numerous than any other socialist country and far greater than the official publications produced by the state (Curry 2005, 145; Skilling 1989, 13; Sparks 2007, 10). The underground included a vast array of groups, some oriented toward public debate, although most practiced “antipolitics.” I focus on Solidarity because it was the leader of the political opposition.

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were neither open nor inclusive. To be sure, an unofficial quota system ensured women’s presence in the legislature, but their diversity and rank were limited and they rarely had voice or the capacity for contestation. In the early 1980s, the number of women politicians peaked at 23 percent (Fuszara 2000, 20). Most were young, inexperienced, held low-level positions, and faced numerous stereotypes and gender bias (Fodor 2009; Heinen and Portet 2002, 159; Siemienska 1994 and 1998). Men openly expressed sexist views (Siemienska 2003, 218). Women legislators were “fillers”: Expected to be passive, they were included because they represented several key social groups. Their inclusion ensured “more positions for people who played an active role in political life” (Matynia 1995, 385; Siemienska 1994, 614). Women’s presence signaled that even the least likely of political actors could be politicians (Einhorn 1993b; Matynia 1995, 383). That tokenism was particularly evident whenever the political clout of the legislature increased: At those moments, women’s numbers declined (Fuszara 1998; Heinen and Portet 2002; Regulska 1998, 37). Women representatives may have been present in the legislature, but they displayed an equality they did not experience. Worse, this superficial presence linked women’s political participation in political life with the despised regime. Civil Society Although women’s organizations, political parties, and unions existed in late socialist Poland, the Communist Party dominated most of these groups. Official institutions did not engage citizens in public debate over issues of common concern with the aim of directing state policy (Fodor 2009; Kenney 1999). The socialist state organized Polish women into three large groups: the Women’s League, Rural Women’s Circles, and the Association of Women and Cooperatives. All claimed large memberships. However, the organizations were not participatory or self-directed, nor were they popular (Fodor 2009; Siemienska 1994, 614). These organizations segregated women from mainstream political institutions, emphasizing their difference from male political actors, and then held workshops, distributed publications, and fostered self-help groups to advance the state’s agenda (Fodor 2009; Kenney 1999; Robinson 1995, 211). For example, the state-funded Women’s League offered a range of courses on being effective homemakers and socialist workers (Reading 1992, 169). The state used women’s organizations as its handmaidens. The opposition responded by viewing these organizations as divisive and

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“unnatural” (Einhorn 1993b, 57; Long 1996). To be sure, a handful of independent women’s groups, including feminist groups, did emerge at the end of this period. Although they were committed to internally open and inclusive debate, membership was small, mainly comprising elite academics, and almost all were confined to urban areas (Matynia 1995). Members were few and efforts to expand unsuccessful (Siemienska 1994, 618). The Communist Party and official trade union followed the pattern set in parliament. Women’s membership, as well as their leadership positions in these state institutions, was low; few women aspired to leadership positions (Siemienska 1985; Labuda 2003). Only 20 to 25 percent of Polish women were Communist Party members, and women held leadership positions at approximately half that level. Women constituted 39 percent of the state-dominated trade union, the All-Poland Trade Union Alliance (OPZZ), but only held 8.3 percent of the seats in its executive committee (Regulska 1998, 37; Siemienska 1985, 336 and 1994, 614). In 1981, the Polish United Workers’ Party named its first woman office bearer. This did not spark a new trend in women’s leadership or membership, however, and women’s rank in official organizations declined during the 1980s with the rise of Solidarity (Siemienska 1985). Indeed, many union members left the OPZZ for Solidarity, which afforded them more opportunities to express their interests. In 1980, the state legalized Solidarity, the first and only free trade union in Central and Eastern Europe. One year into its official existence, the organization was nearly ten million strong; half its members were women (Fodor 2009). Although women were valued supporters, they were confined to the rank and file. Women’s “roles were subordinate and ‘invisible’” even though they were critical to sustaining the movement (Brown 2003; Graham and Regulska 2006, 125; Titkow 1998). Millions of women participated in a wide array of Solidarity activities, including strikes, work stoppages in the textile and clothing industries, hunger marches and protests, yet only two of eighteen members on the strike committee were women, only 7 percent of the first National Solidarity Congress were women, and only one woman was elected to the Solidarity National Executive Committee (Fodor 2009, 114; Kenney 1999; Reading 1992, 65 and 1995, 184–185; Wolchik and Meyer 1985, 178). Few men and women in Solidarity viewed women as workers or political actors (Kenney 1999; Labuda 2003; Long 1996; Reading 1992). When martial law was imposed and thousands of men in the movement were imprisoned, women members rose to the challenge and

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sustained Solidarity. They provided prisoners and their families with material and emotional support, coordinated and participated in work stoppages, demonstrations, and strikes, produced and distributed underground literature, and sheltered political activists (Kenney 1999; Penn 2005; Regulska 1992, 185). Although women rarely had access to the upper ranks in Solidarity prior to martial law, during this crisis, a handful of urban women activists moved into leadership positions. Taking tremendous personal risks to keep Solidarity alive, Helena Luczywo directed an editorial team of six women who tenaciously wrote, produced, and disseminated a weekly Solidarity newspaper that became the core of the movement (Penn 2005; Stokes 1993, 106). The paper linked the underground leadership to its supporters, offered hope in a moment of national crisis, and was the epicenter of the many underground organizations that emerged during this era (Penn 2005). As journalist Anna Husarska notes, “The media and especially the print media were Solidarity … civil society in Poland was built through the underground press” (as qtd. in Penn, 11–12). Solidarity activist and future MP Barbara Labuda describes the women behind the newsletter as “chiefs” who “rebuilt the communication channels, organized secret meetings, arranged for the transfers of money, found contacts at Western embassies, spoke to the press and developed relations with clergy” (as qtd. in Penn 2005, 12). This small group of women became the voice of the movement. Although these seven women seized the leadership reins and heroically sustained Solidarity, their tiny number and the repressive conditions of martial law meant they did not use their new positions to challenge the status quo in Solidarity. Instead, they worked assiduously to keep their leadership roles a secret, attributing their words and deeds to men.4 As one of these “chiefs” later explained, “women can only wield power as long as we pretend not to have any power. We were invisible” (as qtd. in Penn 1994, 64). Their efforts at anonymity were successful: between 1980 and 1987, the Index on Censorship credited only a handful of Polish women writers (Reading 1992, 59). However, their anonymity persisted more than a dozen years after martial law had ended, pointing not only to underground survival instincts but a persistent impulse to keep women’s role in politics hidden from public view, maintaining the illusion of a uniformly male leadership heroically liberating the Polish nation. 4

One woman reportedly adopted the outward appearance of a man (Long 1996, 62). For details on how their anonymity was finally broken, see Penn 2005.

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The most powerful institution in civil society, the Roman Catholic Church, reinforced this trend in women’s invisibility.5 The church was much more than a private religious association. It was a profoundly hierarchical and patriarchal political association and a favored state partner, receiving critical benefits from the communist generals who actively sought the support of the Polish episcopate to staunch their own decline (Goban-Klas 1997, 34). During this period, the church not only had autonomy from the state, but was also exempted from tax and custom payments. The state guaranteed payment of social insurance for clergy (Eberts 1998, 820). From the 1950s onward, the state permitted the church to publish and distribute its own newspapers, and it attracted quality journalists (Sparks 2007, 10). Poles enjoyed freedom of worship and religious belief, and after the regime declared martial law, it gave the church access to radio and television in hopes the episcopate would mollify and contain the opposition (Reading 2003, 394). As approximately 94 percent of Poles were Roman Catholic during the late 1980s, the vast majority of Polish women were Catholic (Matynia 1995, 378). In addition to being parishioners, Catholic women supported the faith in their roles as administrators, educators, volunteers, and nuns, conforming to the familiar sexual division of labor. Unlike the rules and regulations in other institutions in civil society, however, Catholic doctrine rejected women in formal decision-making roles. Insulated by the Iron Curtain from Leftist religious trends and closely attentive to the profoundly conservative Polish Pope John Paul II, the Polish Church remained centralized and hierarchical, minimizing the opportunities for women and men parishioners to influence church policy (Downing 2001, 371; Millard 1999; Taras 2003). Certainly the church provided critical space and resources for dissidents to organize, endorsed political pluralism, and actively intervened in the political crises of the decade. At least one analyst characterized the church as the “major public spokesman for Polish civil society” (Morawska 1987, 228). However, the church encouraged Polish women, through organizations like the Association of Ordinary Polish Women, to focus on domestic and material needs as opposed to public life (Hauser, Heyns, and Mansbridge 1993). With debate conditions limited in Solidarity, the 5

The Polish Church was not a unitary body; the interests of the episcopate often deviated from those of local parish priests. During the 1980s, different levels of clergy resistance and compliance with the socialist regime existed. In the 1990s, the episcopate found it difficult to control many parish priests who supported the extreme right wing rallied by Radio Maryja (Mishtal 2006; Taras 2003).

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state monopolizing much of the space where independent women’s organizations might otherwise have developed, and debate conditions in the powerful Catholic Church limited, women had few opportunities to use the institutions in civil society to shape public debate. The Media By the 1980s Poland had a well-established official mass media dedicated to manipulating an increasingly urban, literate, and skeptical audience (Curry 2005, 140; Downing 2001, 369; Jakubowicz 1991). Statedominated media included women employees who displayed the socialist commitment to women as workers and socialist citizens, although in practice debate conditions were limited. In 1980, 35 percent of journalists were female, and the majority of women were concentrated in administrative staff in both the print and broadcasting sectors; only a handful held editorial positions, and men were routinely promoted over women (Siemienska 1985, 336). Women’s low rank ensured their lower earnings (Reading 2003, 391). Women media workers were aware of their limited access to upper-level positions, but male colleagues constrained their ability to alter the situation. For example, when women in the Polish state-owned television sector asked their union to back them in demanding more equitable working conditions, union leaders refused (Reading 1995, 186). Women’s presence in the media displayed equality and associated them with the socialist regime, but they were not equal. Their numbers in the industry were not proportionally commensurate, they were ghettoized in rank, and state-dominated unions rejected demands for advancement, thwarting their ability to challenge the status quo. The Polish public sphere may have been expanding as the opposition movement gained strength, but women’s access, voice, and capacity for contestation across its leading institutions remained limited. This suggests the content of public debate over gender justice would be limited as well.

Public Debate in Socialist Poland Throughout the 1980s, the socialist state aimed to control and manipulate public debate. Nevertheless, as opposition increased, state control over public debate eroded. The church and Solidarity used their growing public leverage to pressure the state during political crises (Robinson 1995), meaning what was said in public debate did matter for state policy. Not surprisingly, given the limited debate conditions within the church and

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Solidarity, debate content over women’s rights was extremely conservative. The church and Solidarity strongly condemned abortion, praised women as mothers, and supported the traditional male breadwinner model. The church drew on the self-sacrificing Matka Polka and the cult of the Virgin Mary to direct women toward family, church, and nation. The church was adamant that a woman’s proper place was in the home, but it focused most forcefully on ending abortion while preaching the perils of contraception. It did so largely unopposed (Millard 1999, 132; Titkow 1999). The church introduced religious classes that warned Poles about the physical dangers and ethical violations of abortion and contraception. It also established the Movement for the Protection of Conceived Life and the Society for Responsible Parenthood. By 1980, demands to overturn the 1956 Abortion Act began appearing in the media (Titkow 1999, 173). At the end of the decade, discourse had become increasingly strident: Anyone who defended the Act was tainted as “harboring procommunist sentiment and branded a potential murderer” (Titkow 1999, 174). Church’s insistence on legislative action to end legalized abortion incited tremendous controversy, including protests, petitions, and media opposition to church policies (Siemienska 1994, 620). Solidarity focused less on abortion and more on women’s work status, addressing women as caretakers and dependents. Although a woman crane operator, Anna Walentynowicz, initiated the strike in Gdansk in protest against increases in food prices, graffiti on the walls of the shipyards denied women’s roles as workers and political actors, reading: “Women, do not disturb. We are fighting for Poland” (Heinen and Portet 2002, 166). During demonstrations and protests, women appeared as representatives of the nation and Polish families, not as workers (Kenney 2002, 67–68; 71–73). When Solidarity made its twenty-one demands to the socialist state during the strikes, those demands included a policy to bolster the patriarchal family: an expansion of the unpaid three-year child-raising leave to a three-year paid leave (Wolchik and Meyer 1985, 178). The paid leaves were intended to open positions for men in the workforce during a period of economic decline and to return women to their proper sphere. Baldly stating these aims, a 1981 editorial in Solidarity’s weekly newspaper reminded readers that women would “gladly” return to the home to “make way for men redundant due to economic reforms” (Siemienska 1986, 30; as qtd. in Reading 1992, 67). Constructing women as homemakers, Solidarity, like most unions of the period, did not address women’s low pay, did not demand reform of a wage system that favored industries dominated by men, and did not

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challenge discrimination against women in the workplace (Graham and Regulska 2006, 125; Hardy, Kozek, and Stenning 2008, 102; Long 1996; Siemienska 1994, 614; Titkow 1998).6 Similarly, the samizdat press depicted women as mothers, support staff, and victims. In Solidarity’s newspaper, women spoke as mothers and providers of food, and expressed concern about spiritual and health matters (Reading 1992, 66–67). Underground films, press, books, and Solidarity memorabilia celebrated men as heroic proletarians while ignoring women’s activism. Samizdat media referred to women as someone’s wife, derided women activists as “a bunch of girls” on strike, depicted them as victims waiting for male salvation, or lauded mothers for keeping the memory of male resistance alive by transmitting it to the next generation (Long 1996, 77; Reading 1992). Limited debate conditions ensured that public debate over abortion and women’s work status was conservative. Instead of challenging the triple burden or the appalling lack of contraception and medically safe abortion, Solidarity, the church, and the samizdat press encouraged women to devote themselves to motherhood while ignoring its costs. Public debate romanticized women’s oppression and exploitation, so few pressures on the socialist state to advance women’s rights existed.

Gender Justice in Socialist Poland Limited debate conditions and the dominance of conservative public discourse on women’s rights meant socialist state support for gender justice during the 1980s was limited and eroded as the decade proceeded. As birth rates among the urban Polish population fell in the 1970s, the state adopted a pro-natalist policy (Titkow 1999). This policy was successful but the predicted labor shortages did not materialize. Instead, severe economic crises straining the employment capacity of the command economy punctuated the following decade (Siemienska 1994, 615). Although domestic indicators as well as global trends on women’s reproductive rights suggest that the socialist state ought to have pursued increasingly permissive policies toward abortion and sex education to limit the birth rate and alleviate the pressure on the labor market, this did not happen. With the onset of martial law, the Polish Minister of Health and Social Welfare introduced reforms to tighten administrative control over state-subsidized abortion, cut the funding of the family-planning agency, 6

For an alternative interpretation of Solidarity’s stance on women’s rights, see Baldez 2003.

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and renamed it the Society of Family Development (Mazur 1981, 197; Siemienska 1994; Zielinska 2000, 26). In 1988, the state ended subsidies to the Society of Family Development, sex education “disappeared” from schools, and the state ended a program on family planning funded by the World Health Organization (WHO), the UN, and the International Planned Parenthood Federation (Einhorn 1993a, 89). Although these policy changes did not significantly limit women’s access to abortion or alter its legal status, they did not ease demographic pressures on the economy either. Instead, the policies conveyed state sensitivity to church priorities during moments of intense political crisis (Jankowska 1991, 175; Kulczycki 1995, 481). State support for church demands on abortion increased just prior to the democratic elections and prompted intense controversy. Church loyalists introduced a bill commissioned by the episcopate and written by their Expert Commission on the Family that would overturn the 1956 Abortion Act (Aulette 1999, 233; Einhorn 1993a, 99; Millard 1999, 132; Zielinska 2000, 26). The scope of the bill was broad: It proposed to curtail sex education, prohibit the use of several contraceptives, and ban abortion.7 It also called for a three-year prison sentence for offending doctors and a two-year sentence for aborting women (Aulette 1999, 233). The legislation would have made Poland’s birth control policies one of the most restrictive in the world. Although the legislature deferred the bill until after the elections, with its introduction, abortion became difficult to obtain at state hospitals (Standish 1998). The socialist state also took action to reinforce women’s secondary role in the command economy during the 1980s. Those changes dovetailed with the conservative agenda of the Catholic Church and Solidarity. In the post-World War II era, Polish women had gained significant opportunities for schooling and employment and then entered the workforce in large numbers (Siemienska 1994). However, during the 1980s, the majority of women workers held low-status, low-paying jobs (Petrusewicz 1989, 47). The gender gap in wages in Poland during this decade was similar to or greater than that in most liberal democracies (Brainerd 2000; van der Lippe and Fodor 1998, 145). In 1988, Polish women’s labor-force participation was lower than in the United States, they worked far fewer hours than Polish men, and their status in the workforce had not improved in over twenty years (Einhorn 1993a, 113; Fong and Paull 1993; Robinson 7

The bill assumed that life began with conception and permitted abortion only when the mother’s life was threatened. Inter-uterine devices (IUDs) and some forms of birth control pills were also forbidden, characterized as “early abortives” (Nowicka 1997a, 44 and 45).

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1995, 216). In all occupational categories, except the professions, “gender influenced earnings more significantly than education, occupational position, age, job tenure, or membership in the Communist Party” (Einhorn 1993a, 122; Marody and Giza-Polescuzuk 2000, 155). The state ensured this outcome. After the post-war boom, the Communist Party insisted that the well-being of the family did not lie with the regime but with women, who were encouraged to be modest in their work ambitions and to prioritize their families (Marody and Giza-Poleszczuk 2000). By the 1980s, women were uniformly depicted in state-approved magazines, films, and television as mothers who produced loyal citizens first and were productive workers second (Kenney 1999; Marody and Giza-Poleszczuk 2000; Reading 1995, 184). When many liberal democracies were ending workplace discrimination, the Polish state barred women from over ninety job occupations, including driving tractors, and required jobs to be advertised by sex (Watson 1996, 227). Like most non-socialist countries, protective legislation provided justification for additional employment restrictions. Women in nontraditional sectors like mining worked in overstaffed offices as low-paid clerks, typists, and secretaries (Einhorn 1993a, 121). Feminized sectors, like the medical profession and financial and insurance services, declined in status and pay, whereas the regime heralded work in classic proletarian professions where men predominated (Einhorn 1993a, 125). The command economy denied women important posts in prominent industries as well as in female-dominated sectors and the bureaucracy (Einhorn 1993a, 124; Malinowska 1995, 37). State policies required women to retire five years earlier than men to facilitate their caretaking of grandchildren (Heinen and Wator 2006, 194).8 Indeed, the regime enforced women’s secondary role in the workplace to ensure their availability for reproductive labor (Heinen and Portet 2002). It provided a child-rearing allowance and family payments for women: Men were not allowed to claim most of these benefits (Steinhilber 2006, 70). The number of state-subsidized daycare and kindergartens, already at a low level, declined markedly during the 1980s, encouraging mothers of young children to stay at home (Bystydzienski 1989; Petrusewicz 1989, 47).9 As a result of its negotiations with Solidarity, the Communist Party approved a means-tested child-raising allowance for a 8 9

Women widely supported this policy. Silke Steinhilber, personal communication. In 1985, only 5 percent of young children could be accommodated in state-subsidized daycare, and kindergarten spaces were available for only 50 percent of eligible children (Ciechocinska 1993, 317; Einhorn 1993b, 51).

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maximum of three years starting the day after maternity leave, in effect offering some women a three-year paid maternity leave that included a job guarantee (Bystydzienski 1995, 97; Heinen and Portet 2002, 153; Max Planck Institute 2006).10 This extended paid leave helped more women stay out of the labor force; nearly 90 percent of eligible women took the leave (Heinen and Wator 2006, 196; Robinson 1995, 216). Even after the state declared martial law and broke many of its agreements with Solidarity, the three-year paid leave persisted (Robinson 1995, 215). Although socialism promised women wages and benefits comparable to men, this did not happen. Instead, state rhetoric, legal codes, and administrative policies undermined women’s rights by reducing support for abortion and women’s role in the paid workforce. In propagating these values, the state confirmed the influence of the Church and Solidarity and demonstrated limited support for women’s rights. Given the limited level of debate conditions, state rhetoric and policies on women’s rights were not surprising. More surprisingly, after the transition to democracy, debate conditions did not improve significantly.

Debate Conditions in Post-socialist Poland The semicompetitive elections held in 1989 brought 62.1 percent of the population to the polls and swept Solidarity into power (Millard 2004, 75).11 The unanticipated landslide victory paved the way for a new government, bringing an end to state socialism. In 1990 Poles elected Lech Walesa, the famed leader of Solidarity, president. The Little Constitution of 1992 formalized the basic rights promised to Poles at the Round Table Talks and the belated final constitution of 1997 secured them.12 During 10

11

12

Remuneration was 25 percent of basic pay in 1989 (Max Planck Institute, 2006). Solidarity’s interest in protecting women and moving them out of the labor force was also evident at the Round Table Agreements. Although the Agreements said very little about women, they did ensure a minimum family allowance and increased protective labor standards for women by, for example, ending their night shift work (Text of Round table Agreements 1989). Per the Round Table Talks, Solidarity could only compete for 35 percent of the seats in the Sejm, the powerful lower house. It won all 161 seats for which it competed, as well as 99 of the 100 seats in the Senate (Siemienska 1994, 611). Throughout the 1990s, women and men voted in nearly equal proportions (Siemienska 1998, 135). The Round Table Talks were not open to the public and so were not a site for public deliberation. Only one of the sixty participants at the talks was a woman, Grazyna Staniszewska (Penn 2005, 276–7; Siemienska 1994, 616). Solidarity was the only organization to have any women on its negotiating subteams (Regulska 1992, 186). As a result, “women played almost no active role” in the negotiations (Siemienska 1994, 614).

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the first post-socialist decade, the post-socialist Polish public sphere acquired its defining characteristics. The new government uncoupled state-dominated institutions from the state and those that survived underwent extensive reform. The public sphere expanded to include nearly 150 political parties, a mushrooming nongovernmental sector, a commodified mass media, and a deliberating legislature alternately dominated by the Right and then the Left with every election cycle. A significantly empowered Catholic Church overshadowed all these institutions. These dramatic changes mean the analysis of just debate that follows is distinctly different from the preceding discussion. Instead of investigating official state-dominated institutions and debate conditions in the church, Solidarity, and the media, I turn to a diversified and fragmented public sphere. Not only does this period require a more extensive analysis, it also requires a deeper discussion of debate conditions as women made modest gains in the legislature and within the NGO sector. The Legislature After Solidarity’s dramatic sweep of the 1989 elections, parliament no longer acted as a rubber stamp for the Communist Party, but instead became a deliberating, sovereign body. Although women’s numbers declined significantly when compared to the preceding period, their voice and capacity for contestation increased. Women constituted 9 percent of the representatives in the first democratic parliament, and throughout the 1990s, their numbers hovered near 12 percent.13 Women’s rank in the legislature remained limited, with the exception of the brief tenure of Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka (Fodor 2009, 117). Women’s diversity remained limited but in ways that confirmed they were not tokens: Women legislators had more education and years of experience than their male colleagues, signaling high barriers for women’s entry into the legislature but greater competence than their socialist predecessors (Fodor 2009; Fuszara 2000, 260; Siemienska 2003, 224).14

13

14

Poland adopted an open-list proportional representation system, with multimember districts for the lower house. In local politics, the situation was similar. Women’s numbers were increasing but remained well under 20 percent (Fodor 2009, 117; Simienska 2004, 5). Most were highly educated yet were limited to low-level positions, particularly in county parliaments. Women did better in rural area town councils, in part because at that level, everyone’s party involvement was less, and women with experience in neighborhood and civic associations had a better chance of becoming candidates (Platek 2004; Regulska 1998).

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Despite women’s low numbers and limited rank and diversity, several women MPs were increasingly able to speak out and challenge the status quo. True, sexism was persistent and men often used it to silence women. They were known to shout down women speakers by yelling, “Talk less and make more children!” (Heinen and Portet 2002, 160). However, the new parliament not only brought in more qualified women who were not tokens, it also offered greater opportunities for women to organize counterpublics. Initial attempts to found a women’s counterpublic within parliament failed, because party leaders discouraged cross-party alliances and Solidarity women did not want to join a women’s group (Labuda 2003; Reading 1992, 142; Siemienska 1994, 619). In 1991, Barbara Labuda launched a Women’s Parliamentary Group (WPK) with a handful of members. The WPK quickly came to be dominated by women from the Left dedicated to advancing women’s rights (Fuszara 2000; Labuda 2003; Siemienska 2003). This constrained their effectiveness as a cross-party organization, but the WPK nevertheless provided a platform for a small group of women MPs to challenge the legislative status quo. Through the WPK, women representatives developed relationships with women’s organizations, journalists, and researchers, lobbied for quotas, demanded improvements to the embattled women’s ministry, and endorsed greater leadership positions for women (Fodor 2009; Siemienska 1998).15 Few of these demands succeeded during the 1990s, but their efforts would bear fruit later as women MPs and women in civil society pressured parties on the Left and the Center to adopt quotas, and parties on the Right placed more women on their party lists (Renc-Roe 2003). Although debate conditions in the new parliament did not become open and inclusive, as Table 4.1 illustrates, debate conditions in this institution moved into the moderate range, a clear improvement from the socialist legislatures of the past. Civil Society In contrast to the socialist era when the state dominated women’s organizations, during the 1990s, women in civil society created their own 15

Although the new government established a women’s bureaucracy, the Plenipotentiary for Women and Family, it was wracked with controversy and its minister fired for her controversial support of abortion. Between 1992 and 1995, the head post was vacant. After the 1997 elections, the government renamed the agency the Plenipotentiary for Family Affairs; after the 2001 elections, the government established a Plenipotentiary for the Equal Status of Women and Men; after 2005 the Right abolished it and created the Department for Women, Family and Prevention of Discrimination.

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table 4.1. Debate Conditions in Socialist and post-socialist Poland Institution

Socialist Debate Conditions

Post-socialist Debate Conditions

Legislature

Limited

Moderate

Women’s Organizations

Limited

Moderate

Solidarity

Limited

Limited

Political Parties

Limited

Limited

Catholic Church

Limited

Limited

Media

Limited

Limited

organizations; many had open and inclusive debate conditions. As illustrated in Table 4.1, elsewhere in civil society, debate conditions remained limited. Independent NGOs and women’s organizations developed slowly but steadily in urban areas in this period. Political associations tended to cluster in Warsaw, with private associations centered in Krakow (Matynia 1995). Many achieved modest levels of access, voice, and contestation. Between 1989 and 1993, a broad range of NGOs emerged, from self-help groups to professional organizations and social movements. As women were frequently staff members in these organizations, and women’s groups were particularly prominent among them, these organizations offered women a foothold in the public sphere (Kubiak 2000, 61). By 1992, the Bureau for Women’s Affairs reported twenty-one women’s associations (including private and civic), located primarily in urban areas and with membership figures ranging from a handful to as many as 200 (Regulska 1992, 189). Early organizations were not only small and concentrated in urban areas, they had erratic memberships and limited finances (Siemienska 1994, 619). From that modest beginning, women’s organizations grew over the decade to over 250 among an estimated 30,000-plus associations, foundations, self-help organizations, and committees.16 Although this increase suggests substantial gains, most women’s organizations distanced themselves from public debate and contentious political issues, continued to be limited to urban areas, and lacked a mass base (Aulette 16

This was impressive given the contracting economy, a lack of previous women’s organizations, and no institutional legacy of support. Although international donors seeded a number of women’s groups in the region, Poland was unique in this sector’s substantial growth (Mendelson and Glenn 2000).

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1999; Graham and Regulska 1997; Mendelson and Glenn 2000, 6; SawaCzajka 1996; Siemienska 1998). Whereas some women’s groups were dedicated to openness and inclusiveness, others restricted membership to an elite few (Aulette 1999; Fuszara 2000, 282; Matynia 1995). Some were closely affiliated with the hierarchical Catholic Church, providing conservative women with a foothold in the public sphere (Chimiak 2003, 15–16). Although women’s civil society remained fragile throughout the period, in contrast to the late socialist period, the number, diversity, and energy of women’s organizations did increase, with a few groups offering their members a basis for participating in public debate. Even though improvements in debate conditions occurred in parliament and in the NGO sector, debate conditions in political parties remained limited. The 1989 elections brought an explosion of political parties to Poland. Electoral reforms winnowed down the number of parties competing for legislative seats to ten, but membership rates were low, party fragmentation remained chronic, and parties lacked institutional capacity and were unpopular (Millard 2004).17 Few women helped form any of these male dominated, top-down, elite organizations (Kunovich 2003, 275). Women’s sections were the place for women supporters (Chimiak 2003, 15–16). Indeed, women’s leadership positions in party structures remained limited throughout the period (Heinen and Portet 2002, 160–161; Kunovich 2003; Szczerbiak 2001b, 32). The majority of political parties in 1992 had no women activists or just one. The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) had the largest number of women in its structures in 1998 – thirty-one (Gilarek 2000). Not surprisingly, analysts characterized parties as hostile toward women (e.g., Heinen and Portet 2002, 160; Renc-Roe 2003). Party procedures for recruitment, candidate selection, and placement on the party lists illustrate this hostility, as the procedures were rarely public, making it difficult for women who did not hold official positions in the party to be nominated. In most parties, mid-level structures exercised substantial influence over leadership and candidate selection and remained the domain of men. In 1997, women constituted 16 percent of party candidates for the lower house, and women were located at the bottom of party lists (Heinen and Portet 2002, 160–161; RencRoe 2003). Two parties offered an exception to this negative picture. The minor Labor Union party adopted quotas in 1994 but did not win any 17

The most prominent or persistent parties were the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), Polish Peasant Party (PSL), Freedom Union (UW), Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) and, somewhat later, Civic Platform (PO).

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seats in 1997. In 1999, the SLD’s Women’s Platform challenged women’s exclusion from candidate selection, and despite dissent from within the ranks, the leadership adopted a 30-percent quota for women on its candidate lists and for all elected party structures (Renc-Roe 2003).18 With the exception of these two parties, women’s access to party leadership positions remained limited. Although state socialist control over politics had ended, few opportunities for women to use political parties as a vehicle for promoting their interests emerged during the post-transition decade. The situation in Solidarity was worse. When Solidarity women challenged the limited debate conditions in the organization the leadership became openly hostile.19 Instead of taking steps to increase women’s rank and integrate them better into the organization, Solidarity’s leaders silenced women members. In contrast to the late socialist era when women joined Solidarity in equal numbers with men, in the early 1990s, women’s membership declined. They composed approximately 28 percent of the membership (Titkow 1998, 26). Women’s rank was limited. In 1990, out of ninety-six members in the National Solidarity Committee, only four were women (Reading 1992, 195; Penn 2005, 287). Although women’s numbers had declined, a significant number were determined to increase their leverage within the organization. Women’s groups within Solidarity emerged in several cities at the end of the 1980s and became vibrant counterpublics (Aulette 1999; Penn 2005, 284; Reading 1992, 194–195). By 1990, the Women’s Section had nearly 10,000 members and had groups in seventeen out of thirty-eight regions (Aulette 1999, 221). Elzbieta Oledzka, an active member, recalled: “They used to educate women about social rights and do consciousness raising and have lectures with professionals like lawyers and doctors on women’s issues between 1989 and 1992” (Aulettee 1999, 221). This growing membership and nascent feminism encouraged the Women’s Section to speak out and make demands of the union leadership. To increase women’s rank within the union, they requested a quota. The Section also made the fateful error of challenging Solidarity’s anti-abortion stance. The response was swift and unequivocal. The union leadership not only rejected women’s requests; they publicly disparaged the Women’s Section 18 19

However, the SLD did not successfully fulfill the latter quota (Renc-Roe 2003, 15). Solidarity’s structures and functions changed dramatically during this period as its political tasks were transferred to new political parties and the union became institutionalized (Long 1996). Its membership also declined precipitously, and by 2002 had shrunk to 1.2 million (Hardy Kozek and Stenning 2008, 112). The decline of unions and the rise of neo-liberalism meant the leverage of working-class men in the public sphere declined.

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president, forced her to resign, and eliminated the Section’s funding (Aulette 1999, 221, Penn 2005, 289). Elzbieta Gasiorowska, Secretary of the Women’s League, fumed: “Millions were invested in the education of women and now their knowledge is not being used. They [Solidarity] just don’t do anything for women” (Reading 1992, 171). A few years later, in 1995, Solidarity decided to organize women members and established a National Commission for Women’s Affairs, with sub-branches at regional and local levels.20 Officially, the Commission promoted women’s advancement within Solidarity. To achieve that goal, the Commission offered negotiating training for women members (Hardy, Kozek and Stenning 2008, 105). However, women’s progress within Solidarity continued to be slow, feeding suspicions that the Commission operated as a shell organization dedicated to improving the image of the trade union without impinging upon male control (Long 1996, 171). Confirming the lack of institutional receptivity to women, workers, nurses, midwives, and teachers founded their own trade unions and then joined Solidarity affiliates later (Hardy, Kozek, and Stenning 2008). As noted in Table 4.1, debate conditions in Solidarity remained limited, leaving working-class women without an institutional basis for making demands in the public sphere. As in late socialist Poland, Catholic dogma formally denied women access to church decision-making structures, and the Polish clergy remained resolutely hierarchical (Millard 1998). Furthermore, the Catholic Church increased its political influence during this period. Implicitly challenging Vatican II’s agreement to a separation between church and state, in the 1990s, the episcopate insisted upon its constitutional right to be the moral conscience of the Polish nation. Cashing in on its prestige as an avid supporter of Solidarity and using its advantages won at the Round Table Talks (including an exemption from the usual requirements for obtaining a broadcasting license), the church fought for and won a series of concessions from the new state (Downing 1996; Goban-Klas 1997).21 In 1993, the media became legally bound to respect Christian values and promote the family (Article 21 of the Polish Broadcasting Act). The state also guaranteed the church sole control over religious instructors, content, and prayer in all Polish schools. The church won a legal commitment that

20

21

Women’s numbers in leadership positions were low in other trade union associations as well (Hardy, Kozek, and Stenning 2008, 104). The OPZZ created a similar institution (Hardy, Kozek, and Stenning 2008, 106). The church had more than 100 radio stations in 1993 (Goban-Klas 1997, 35).

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Polish schools would uphold “Christian values” (Eberts 1998, 821 and 833). After a protracted battle, the 1997 constitution guaranteed church and state “cooperation,” recognizing the church as the preeminent “social and cultural” representative of the nation (Byrnes 2003, 34, italics in original; Polish Constitution Article 18 Section 2).22 This ensured church independence from the state and guaranteed its role as moral arbiter of the nation. During the socialist era, the communist generals had often turned to the church during crises and granted it unusual advantages in public life; during the 1990s, the church secured its privileged position, winning not only favorable legislation but also constitutional recognition. Although the episcopate did not have the power to impose its will on the state unilaterally, analysts often remark that the Catholic Church is the strongest institution in Poland, and that “nobody wins in Poland if the Roman Catholic Church is against them” (Eberts 1998; Matynia 1995; Zielinska 2000, 36). That preeminence and its limited debate conditions meant women, who already faced formidable obstacles in other institutions in the public sphere, would be hard pressed to be heard if their demands conflicted with church dogma. Even though civil society undoubtedly expanded during the 1990s, and debate conditions in the NGO sector improved, as Table 4.1 indicates, women had few opportunities to shape public debate. The Media Although the media industry was radically transformed with the end of socialism, it did not offer Polish women any respite from this bleak picture of church dominance and limited debate conditions. Early in the decade, the media industry was in chaos with the introduction of a capitalist market that drove state media and samizdat publications out of business. Foreign investment provided the funds for new, profit-oriented publications that offered bad news, sensationalism, and much muckraking (Goban-Klas 1997; Millard 1998). The church and politicians criticized this sensationalistic media content, sought and found allies in the industry, and vied for control over the National Broadcasting Council (Goban-Klas 1997; Millard 1998). As political factions battled for favorable broadcast coverage, they became implicated in numerous 22

The state formally recognized church law, but the church did not reciprocate. For example, the church did not recognize civil marriages although the state recognized church marriages.

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scandals. Not to be outdone, the church established a Catholic journalists’ association and schools and offered endorsements for favored media professionals (Goban-Klas 1997, 36). Although mass media were uncoupled from the state, by mid-decade, they were profit-driven and deeply politicized. During the early 1990s, new recruits flooded the media industry, and women’s access increased accordingly. The diversity of new journalists was unique, even if it was not praised. As one analyst wryly notes, “They came from all walks of life and with a wide range of academic and nonacademic preparation” (Gross 2002, 102). During the 1990s, women dominated journalism studies and were employed in increasingly larger numbers (General Assembly WOM/1591; Press Research Centre 2002). Nevertheless, women journalists continued to be concentrated in junior positions in the print media. As Dobrochna Kedzierska-Trusuzyska, ViceChair of the Committee for Culture and Media in 1990, bluntly put it, “When the boss has a choice between a very good woman employee and three worse men, he will choose a man – because women take leave to care for children and on top of that, her place is in the kitchen” (as quoted in Reading 1995, 188). Indeed, few women advanced up the ranks in any mass media conglomerates (Reading 2003, 400). In 2000, women constituted only 16 percent of the directors of public radio, 33 percent of the members of the Polish Radio Programming Council, and were only 25 percent of the directors of national public TV channels (Martynowicz 2000, 24). Not a single member of the Council of the Polish Broadcasting Corporation was a woman, and the same was true of the Supervisory Board and Management Board of Public TV, and the Polish Radio Supervisory Commission. As in late socialist Poland, Helena Luczywo was a notable exception. Renowned among her friends as a brilliant political strategist, Luczywo transferred those skills to the chaotic, newly emerging corporate Polish media sector and helped found Gazeta Wyborcza (GW), the country’s most influential daily newspaper. With her childhood friend Wanda Rapaczynski, Luczywo established Agora S.A., a parent company for the paper. Under their leadership, Agora expanded to become an $800 million media conglomerate, and Luczywo became one of the wealthiest and most powerful women in Poland (Simpson 2001, 80). Luczywo’s business success was extraordinary not only for its profitability, but for a woman in the print media. Indeed, women’s access to high-ranking positions in the media was limited, as the top echelons of Agora attest (Agora Annual Report 2006; Agora 2008; Simpson 2001, 80). Elsewhere,

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the top editors of Polish magazines and newspapers continued to be men (Fiszer, Plakwicz and Siwek 1999). Women managed only 14 percent of the country’s daily print publications (Martynowicz 2000, 24). Their limited advances up the ranks despite greater numbers and formal education indicate systematic ghettoization. That dovetailed with their inability to speak out and challenge the industry status quo, confirmed by the media’s continued lack of training programs for women or gender policies (Reading 2003, 400). Given the dominance of the church in public life and limited debate conditions in most institutions in civil society and the media, public debate was unlikely to generate much pressure on the state to increase its support for gender justice. Nevertheless, unlike the socialist period, the 1990s did offer a handful of highly qualified women parliamentarians the space to organize in a small counterpublic, and women’s organizations in civil society increased during the period as well. This suggests that public debate should have included some demands for greater reproductive rights and advances in women’s work status as the decade progressed.

Public Debate in POST-SOCIALIST Poland Given the small increases in debate conditions during the 1990s in the NGO sector and in parliament, demands for gender justice in the public sphere should have been increasing slightly over time. Although this pattern was evident, the church took extraordinary steps to stifle opposition views on abortion, deliberately attacking the link between public opinion and state responsiveness. This explains why the outcomes on abortion during this period regressed. Abortion As a result of extraordinary church action, the abortion debate that burst onto the public agenda was not only about sex, pregnancy, the family, and women’s reproductive rights; it also was a battle for political power that aimed to define the boundaries of the new democracy (Einhorn and Server 2003; Kramer 2009; Titkow 1999). The discredited ex-communists used the anti-abortion legislation to challenge Solidarity politicians, whereas the Right (including Solidarity) attacked opponents of the anti-abortion legislation as “communists” (Kulczycki 1999; Tarasiewicz 1991, 183). This polarization ensured abortion became the most controversial issue of the period.

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Unlike the socialist era, during the 1990s, activists made demands for women’s reproductive rights. Not surprisingly, the Women’s Parliamentary Group and a small number of new women’s organizations in civil society, many founded specifically to oppose the anti-abortion legislation, most insistently promoted legalized abortion. The WPK persistently advocated legal abortion, proposed national referendums on the issue, made complaints to the state commissioner about the anti-abortion legislation, proposed its own liberal bill on abortion, and produced petitions demanding legal reform once the 1993 anti-abortion bill passed (Fuszara and Zielinska 2006; Titkow 1999, 177; Zielinska 2000, 30). Although their actions ensured demands for legalized, state-funded abortion were present in public debate, the WPK did not defend abortion as a woman’s right. WPK Chairperson Barbara Labuda argued such an approach would appear “vulgar” and “selfish” given the political climate, and instead promoted legalized abortion as an economic and health issue (Kulczycki 1999, 132). Although parliamentary debate over abortion occurred, it did not include explicit demands for state recognition of women’s reproductive rights (Graff 2003, 111). Some grassroots women’s groups introduced demands for women’s reproductive rights and bodily autonomy into public discourse, but their claims had less clout than those of their opponents. Activists founded thirty-plus women’s organizations at the time of the 1989 elections to counter the anti-abortion legislation (Einhorn and Sever 2003). These groups used time-honored liberal democratic strategies to publicize their views. They organized demonstrations and marches, produced letters and leaflets, and advocated a referendum on abortion. They presented MPs with a petition against the anti-abortion legislation signed by one million people (Penn 2005, 282). Women’s organizations demanded “Fewer Churches – More Nurseries” while asserting “My uterus belongs to me” and “God save us from the Church” (Aulette 1999; Einhorn and Sever 2003; Graff 2003, 109; Kulczycki 1999; Long 1996, 178; Penn 2005, 280; Siemienska 1994, 618 and 621). The largest women’s organization in the country, the former Women’s League, also opposed the anti-abortion legislation, insisting: “we do not agree that our civil rights and personal freedom should be offered as a ‘gift’ to Church authorities” (Einhorn 1993a, 195). The ill-fated Solidarity Women’s Section demanded the trade union reconsider its support for the anti-abortion legislation. The Women’s Section leader Malgorzata Tarasiewicz recalls, “We argued that, most of all, women should be the ones to make the decision” (as qtd. in Penn 2005, 289). Later in the decade, as women’s organizations

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increased, the Federation for Women and Family Planning widely publicized the negative effects of the anti-abortion law on women’s health and strongly advocated women’s reproductive rights (Nowicka 1997c). Initially, however, few of these groups were able to make women’s reproductive rights a central issue in public debate. Most had limited capacity: They were new and had no political experience, lacked institutional or material resources, were small, and located exclusively in urban areas. One exception was the Women’s League, but its association with the socialist regime tainted its reputation (Githens 1996, 61–62; Kulczycki 1999; Penn 2005). Most significantly, church intimidation overwhelmed the efforts of women’s organizations and the WPK to be fully heard in public debate. Exploiting its increased power in the public sphere during the 1990s, the church framed the debate over abortion as a holy war for life, which increased pressure on the state to reject legalized abortion. The highly respected Polish Pope John Paul II unequivocally denounced abortion in Poland, arguing, “A nation that kills its children is a nation without a future” (as qtd. in Kulczycki 1999, 137). Widely publicized statements like these had impact. Public commentators increasingly referred to the fetus as “the conceived child,” “the baby,” “the unborn child,” or “the child in the mother’s womb,” and described pregnant women simply as “mothers” (Holc 2004; Matuchniak-Krasuska 1995 as qtd. in Titkow 1999, 174). Opponents of abortion demanded that Poland establish a “culture of life” that recognized the “special dignity of women” (Graff 2003, 111). As political discourse became increasingly polarized, some opponents of abortion used “epithets such as child killer, pimp, Bolshevik and Communist Jew” to discredit proponents of legalized abortion (Githens 1996, 63). This discourse co-opted popular concern for women’s well-being, put the opposition on the defensive, and helped increase pressure on the state to pass anti-abortion legislation. In its quest to dominate public discourse, the church attacked the opposition, at times undermining Polish civil and political liberties. The legislature proposed several drafts of an anti-abortion bill from 1989 to 1993. This should have provided an opportunity for representatives, the media, and advocacy groups to learn about the legislation and debate it. However, to avoid public controversy, only representatives from the church were permitted to attend a Senate special commission review of the bill in 1990 (Githens 1996, 60; Siemienska 1994, 620). In 1991, Sejm leaders allied with the church refused to allow debate of the Senate draft (Siemienska 1994, 621). While lively parliamentary debate did

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occur on abortion (Fuszara 1993), on critical occasions anti-abortion forces pre-empted it. The church co-opted political parties and intimidated politicians to constrain opposition in civil society as well. Many parties adopted the word “Christian” in their names and made a promise to support the life of the “unborn” to win church support and financial backing (Jankowska 1993, 292; Kulczycki 1999, 134). Once dependent upon church funds, few parties opposed it directly (Fuszara 1993; Jankowska 1993, 292; Tarasiewicz 1991, 183). Church influence extended to independent-minded politicians: One senator with a reputation for political independence admitted to GW that he did not “dare” disagree with the church for fear of retaliation (Penn 2005, 283). Opposition politicians who did “dare” to speak out against the church had to contend with direct attacks on their reputations and property. In the early 1990s, when Barbara Labuda challenged the increasing influence of the church, her own party silenced her (Labuda 2003, 18). Labuda argued she was advocating party policy: “[I]t seemed obvious to me that I should speak about the matter, that I would defend my point of view, and that I would defend the free and liberal law … and it caused me a lot of trouble and difficulties in my political group. I was considered a traitor to Solidarity ideals” (Labuda 2003, 18). Her party accused Labuda of “disloyalty, self-aggrandizement, and hysteria” and they punished her dissent with suspension and then expulsion (Penn 2005, 291). As Labuda pointedly noted, “There was no room left there for independent views” (292). Other opposition politicians received threatening letters and hostile phone calls; vandals painted houses and cars red (Standish 1998, 124; Nowicka 2001, 245). Priests denounced opposition politicians by name from the pulpit (Titkow 1999, 177; Zielinska 2000). These scare tactics undermined the ability of Poles to openly oppose anti-abortion legislation and helped the church dominate public debate. The church also targeted the media in its campaign to end legalized abortion, undermining the ability of the press to address the issue. In the early 1990s, most media news outlets questioned the anti-abortion policies proposed by the church. Although few of these stories treated feminist concerns with respect, and many openly mocked them, journalists did discuss abortion tourism, underground abortion, sex education, and birth control (Molyneux 1994, 303; Olczyk and Twardowska 1998, 263). However, journalist investigations into abortion and sexuality diminished markedly as the church relentlessly attacked the media for their lack of “Christian values” (Jankowska 1991, 1780; Zielinska 2000, 38).

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Anti-abortion organizations employed a variety of methods to curb media content, from blanketing offices with propaganda to attacks on the credentials of journalists and threats of legal action (Nowicka 2001, 244). The chairperson of the Polish Journalist’s Association, Maciej Ilowiecki, acknowledged church tactics limited media content (Reading 2003, 402). Even soap operas avoided discussions about sex (Olczyk and Twardowska 1998, 262). Ryszard Grabowski, Vice-Director of Gdansk television, remarked, “Television picture is a safe picture. We haven’t even tried to make anything on such controversial topics” (as qtd. in Reading 2003, 402). As journalists altered their subject matter to avoid church wrath, the mass media produced an eerie silence on abortion (Reading 1995, 188; Nowicka 2001, 243). That confirmed the church had successfully discouraged public debate on abortion. The church also used its considerable power to badger parishioners and limit their freedom of speech. This disabled state responsiveness to citizens. Pope John Paul II passionately supported the new legislation, warning he would postpone his visit to Poland if parliament did not pass it (Eberts 1998, 824; Standish 1998, 120; Zielinska 2000, 36).23 Priests passed out cards during mass, insisting parishioners pledge their support for the anti-abortion bill then and there, threatening to withhold church burial rites if parishioners did not sign (Einhorn 1993a, 100; Hauser, Heyns, and Mansbridge 1993, 264). Parishioner cards and petitions signed under duress were sent to parliament as proof of popular sentiment against abortion and contraception. These efforts deliberately fabricated popular support for church dogma. Unlike the socialist period, when the communist generals turned to the church as a potential ally for stabilizing the country during political crises, during the post-1989 period, the church dominated the public sphere. Nevertheless, as reliable contraception remained scarce, the majority of Poles continued to support legalized abortion (Jelen and Wilcox 2005; Kulczycki 1995). This prompted the church to take extraordinary measures, intimidating political parties, politicians, the media, and its parishioners to secure anti-abortion legislation. Although the public sphere undoubtedly expanded with the transition to democracy in Poland, the church avidly worked to repress public support for legalized abortion. As a result, abortion became a battleground over the role of the church in post-socialist Poland. This suggests that state action on women’s 23

The anti-abortion bill was widely viewed as a “gift” to the Pope (Eberts 1998, 824; Jankowska 1991, 178).

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reproductive rights would be contentious and strongly influenced by church dogma. Women’s Work In contrast to abortion, the church did not intensely repress public debate over women’s work status. Following the logic of the just debate approach women’s work rights should have advanced later in the decade. This was indeed the case. Unlike the socialist era when state-dominated women’s organizations tutored women to be better homemakers and workers, by the early 1990s, women in parliament and a handful of women’s organizations aimed to improve women’s formal equality in the waged economy. The WPK promoted a bill on the equal status of women along with the establishment of a Commission for Equal Status that parliament debated and amended intermittently from 1992 to 1999 (Steinhilber 2006, 80). Women’s organizations, such as the Democratic Union of Women and the Center for the Advancement of Women provided retraining programs while advocating part-time and flextime jobs for women. “Women for Women” advocated formal gender equality in the workplace (Aulette 1999, 222; Einhorn 1993a, 194; Matynia 1995, 402). These groups used the expanded public sphere to make demands for formal equality and promoted new initiatives to enable women to be successful in the workplace. Over time, political parties on the Left also endorsed women’s formal economic equality. They deplored the feminization of poverty, promoted equal unemployment benefits for women and men, condemned discrimination and sex segregation in the workforce, and promised “the creation of a safety net that would provide assistance to mothers and children, especially single mothers” (Fuszara 2000, 278; Szczerbiak 2001b, 124). The latter captures the ways in which political parties on the Left appealed to motherhood, not women’s autonomy, to popularize their appeals. Moreover, no debate about fatherhood or the sexual division of labor entered public discourse during this period (Steinhilber 2006, 79). Formal equality was advanced within a conservative framework, suggesting legislative reform would be modest in scope. Much like the socialist period, Solidarity, Right-wing parties, and the church continued to insist upon women’s proper place in the home. The church renewed its appeal to the Matka Polka, relentlessly characterizing women as “vessels of the nation” who belonged in the private sphere, urging them to leave the public realm to men (Marody and Poleszczuk

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2000, 166). These highly resonant appeals deployed national sentiment to justify the gendered unemployment rate while prodding mothers to save the nation from decadent consumer culture (Hardy, Kozek, and Stenning 2008, 103; Titkow 1998, 28). The Right-wing Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) advocated pro-natalism while emphasizing “the importance of child-bearing, the need to protect the poorest families, and the dangers of feminism” (Millard 1999, 140). AWS MPs decried equal rights for women and celebrated traditional gender roles (Malinowska 1995, 40). Their trade union partner, Solidarity, demanded a reintroduction of the “family wage” for all those with spouses and children (Einhorn 1993a, 136). All of these institutions invoked familial sentiments to justify women’s exploitation in the economy and dependency at home. The mainstream media eventually deviated from this pattern, reflecting their new profit-based status. Initially the media embraced Rightwing values. Early in the decade, the media promoted women’s roles as full-time mothers and encouraged them to return to the private sphere, declaring them unfit “citizen-entrepreneurs” (Olczyk and Twardowska 1998, 266; Rukszto 1997, 106; Steinhilber 2006, 77). However, media copy soon began celebrating the sexy businesswoman/supermom who had disposable income and high consumption patterns, promoting a lifestyle that attracted advertisers (Marody and Giza-Poleszczuk 2000; Molyneux 1994, 294; Olczyk and Twardowska 1998, 265). The sexy businesswoman/supermom promoted women’s role as producers and consumers and did not raise questions about inequalities in the labor market or at home (Rukszto 1997, 107). Indeed, it denied both, signaling the media’s position as advocates of formal equality as long as that equality did not disrupt conventional inequalities in the private sphere. Although demands for women’s formal equality in the workplace increased during the posttransition period, conservative positions on women’s work reminiscent of the socialist period persisted and framed the debate. This suggests state policies and legislation would advance women’s formal equality in the workplace, but would be unlikely to challenge traditional gender norms.

Gender Justice in POST-SOCIALIST Poland Unlike the socialist period, when the state made minor adjustments to its abortion policy, after 1989, its action toward abortion became complex, contradictory, and significantly compromised women’s already limited reproductive rights. State policy toward women’s work, however, was straightforward: Much as the state had secured a gendered command

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economy under state socialism, it now secured a gendered market economy under neoliberalism, and offered women formal equality in the second half of the decade. The latter trajectory confirms the just debate claim whereas the former confirms the relentless battle of the Catholic Church to repress Polish civil liberties and constrain public debate on abortion. Abortion State responsiveness on abortion was complex, but it severely limited women’s reproductive rights even more than during the socialist era. Abortion became an explosive issue as agencies, branches, and bureaucrats overturned one another’s decisions with alarming alacrity. In the early 1990s the Commissioner for Civic Rights challenged the efforts of the executive branch to restrict abortion (Zielinska 2000). The Ministry of Education promoted Catholic teachings and refused to cooperate with the Ministry of Health (Nowicka 1997b, 50).24 In 1990 and 1992 two anti-abortion bills were proposed in the legislature but failed. In 1993, anti-abortion legislation passed. It was remarkable in scope and went against both regional and global trends (Jelen and Wilcox 2005, 298; Standish 1998, 116). The 1993 Law on Family Planning, Legal Protection of the Fetus and the Conditions of Permissibility of Abortion included a two-year prison sentence for physicians who performed abortion and permitted abortion only in the cases of rape, fetal abnormality, or if the life of the woman was in danger. As an olive branch to the opposition, it also promised better access to contraception and sex education in the schools. Although the speed and scope of the legislation were regressive, a careful analysis reveals some state ambivalence, or at the very least, incompetence. The Act was far from a model of legislative clarity: It lacked crucial details, such as enforcement mechanisms, and did not sufficiently fund the welfare policies it promised low-income pregnant women (Titkow 1999, 174). Politicians admitted the Act was poorly written and would not eliminate abortion in Poland nor ensure women’s access to contraception (Crossette 2007; Nowakowska and Korzeniewska 2000, 238–240; Standish 1998, 127; Zielinska 2000, 48). Marek Balicki, 24

Even before the 1993 legislation passed, the Minister of Health ruled that physicians were not required to perform abortions. This facilitated church-sponsored activism in the medical community that prompted physicians to alter their code of ethics and refuse abortion except in cases of rape and to save the woman’s life (Long 1996, 170; Titkow 1999, 174).

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Deputy Chairperson of the Parliamentary Health Commission, told Parliament: “The Law restricting abortions turned out to be unfeasible. None of the ministries charged with carrying out the law has implemented a thing” (Standish 1998, 127). Of course Polish women no longer had state-financed or state-administered abortions, and the official abortion rate did decline, but Polish women continued to have abortions, the state did little to stop them, state administrators refused to promote sex education in the schools, and access to contraception remained poor (Millard 1999, 133; Nowicka 1997a, 45). Although the draconian scope of the Act worsened women’s reproductive rights, its lack of specifics signal passage, not implementation, was the primary concern of legislators in 1993. After the bill’s passage, state agencies continued to debate the issue, reflecting continued widespread popular support for legalized abortion and intense church opposition. In 1994, the legislature passed an amendment easing anti-abortion restrictions; President Lech Walesa denounced and vetoed the amendment. In 1995, the next president, Alexsander Kwasniewski, vetoed legislation intended to further restrict sex education (Millard 1999, 140). In 1996, the legislature passed a new set of amendments permitting abortion for personal or financial reasons, and included a provision for improving knowledge about and affordability of contraceptives that Kwasniewski signed.25 A year later and one day before the Pope’s visit, the 1997 Constitutional Tribunal rejected the amendments, arguing they denied the fetus the right to life – a right not explicitly guaranteed to any Pole. The court argued this right to life for the fetus “could be drawn from the general principle that Poland is a democratic state that abides by the rule of law” (Millard 1999; Titkow 1999; Zielinska 2000, 33). The newly installed Right-wing government promptly accepted this decision and subsequently reduced government insurance subsidies for several types of birth control pills (Nowakowska and Korzeniewska 2000, 238 and 240; Penn 2005, 299). The Left responded by requesting a referendum on abortion, which the government refused (Zielinska 2000, 334). This chaos within the state over women’s reproductive rights graphically demonstrates that the 1993 legislation did not reflect a popular consensus on abortion but instead reflected the remarkable efforts of the church to dominate public debate and influence state policy. 25

The amendments also required that the abortion be performed during the first trimester and only if women attended counseling and a three-day waiting period. The Ministry of Health and Provisional Governors were so slow in offering guidelines for the new amendments that when the Constitutional Tribunal overturned them in 1997, little had changed in the interim (Nowakowska and Korzeniewska 2000, 228).

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Women’s Work Some analysts have argued that just as the state reversed its stance on legalized abortion in the 1990s, it also eroded Polish women’s social and economic rights (e.g., Heinen and Portet 2002; Steinhilber 2006). As the church did not avidly intervene to ensure this outcome, that would suggest state support for this issue was lower than what the just debate approach anticipates. However, neoliberal state policies did not represent a notable decline in state support for women’s equitable employment, nor did state initiatives convey a new commitment to the sexual division of labor. In fact, socialist state action in Poland had already deepened women’s exploitation in the paid labor sector and at home by the 1980s, as Table 4.2 highlights (Heinen and Portet 2002, 150; Steinhilber 2006). During this period, the socialist state supported extended maternity leave and paid leave to care for a sick child because these benefits were less expensive than providing the caretaking services necessary to support women’s waged employment, and less expensive than maintaining women on the payroll (Einhorn 1993a). Neoliberal changes to family policies did little to alter the gendered economy established by the socialist state. The most significant changes were to the three-year maternity leave. The government rescinded job guarantees, tightened eligibility requirements, and reduced allowances for paid leaves. The changes significantly decreased transfer payments to mothers (Heinen and Portet 2002; Steinhilber 2006). However, retaining state payments to mothers would have contributed toward a strong familial welfare state in a market economy. The extended leaves were not benefits but liabilities, because they significantly reduced women’s labor market competitiveness sustaining the gendered economy. Indeed, women’s employment lagged behind men’s throughout the decade. Employers demanded women certify they were not pregnant, would not become pregnant, and pressured women not to claim family benefits; many complied (Heinen and Wator 2006, 197; Malinowska 1995, 40; Nowakowska and Swedrowska 2000, 60). If lowering extended maternity leave benefits did not alleviate gender inequalities in the new market economy, it did not deepen them either. Instead, the changes maintained women’s secondary status in the labor market while saving the state money. More frequently, the neoliberal state simply sustained socialist practices that put women at a disadvantage in the new market economy. It retained the sixteen-week mandatory maternity leave that was extremely unpopular with employers and contributed to women’s

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table 4.2. Responsiveness on Women’s Rights in Socialist and postsocialist Poland

Abortion

Socialist Poland

Post-socialist Poland

1956 Abortion Act

1993 Law on Family Planning, Legal Protection of the Fetus and the Conditions of Permissibility of Abortion Vetoed liberalization amendment in 1994 Signed liberalization amendment in 1996 Overruled liberalization amendment in 1997

Cut family planning funding Ended sex education

Work

60 days paid sick-child leave 16 week paid maternity leave 3 year unpaid child-raising leave with job guarantee 3 year means-tested childraising allowance with job guarantee Reduced state-subsidized childcare

60 days paid sick-child leave 16 week paid maternity leave 3 year unpaid child-raising leave with no job guarantee 3 year low-ceiling means-tested child-raising allowance with no job guarantee, lower payout Reduced state-subsidized childcare Adopted parental leave in 1996 Adopted family sick-child leave in 1997 Amended Labor Code in 1996

hiring woes (Bystydzienski 1995, 97; Nowakowska and Swedrowska 2000).26 It continued to encourage women to care for their young children at home full-time (Fong and Paull 1993, 239; Heinen and Portet 2002; Nowakowska and Swedrowska 2000, 47; Steinhilber 2006, 77). It reduced the woefully inadequate state-supported daycare and kindergartens by 50 percent (Einhorn 1993a, 128; Heinen 2000, 121; Titkow 1999, 185). In 1991, the government rescinded the socialist requirement that jobs be advertised by sex, but did not outlaw the practice until 1996, when revisions to the Labor Code eliminated the list of prohibited occupations. However, an executive order that same year prohibited women from being employed in a number of professions including those involving heavy manual labor and work underground or at high 26

Between 1999 and 2001, the length of maternity leave fluctuated but ultimately returned to the mandatory sixteen-week period.

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altitudes, contrary to international law and European Union standards (Nowakowska and Swedrowska 2000, 46). It retained women’s earlier retirement age (Heinen and Portet 2002, 151; Titkow 1999, 185). Just like the socialist state, the neoliberal state aimed to maintain the sexual division of labor and ease the strain on the overburdened labor market by encouraging women to leave it. This ensured women’s secondary status in the work force while securing a free labor supply in the home. Much as the just debate approach predicts, state responsiveness on this issue was conservative, not regressive. By the end of the decade, the state did improve women’s formal equality in the labor market. In 1996, the government amended the Labor Code and ratified a number of international treaties and conventions, such as CEDAW and the European Social Charter. Men were given the option of taking parental leave in 1996, and in 1997, men were offered sixty-day family leave to care for a sick child, indicating a broadening in the scope of state action (Heinen and Portet 2002; Nowakowska and Swedrowska 2000, 48–49). The 1997 constitution guaranteed women’s formal equality in the labor market. However, parental and family leave laws still contained highly gendered language that stressed the importance of mothers as caretakers and discouraged men from claiming these benefits (Heinen and Portet 2002, 152; Nowakowska and Swedrowska 2000). The constitutional guarantee to equality was difficult to apply, because no tradition of invoking constitutional protections existed, judges were reluctant to establish new precedent, and awareness of constitutional rights was limited (Nowakowska and Swedrowska 2000, 45). Labor law did not include sanctions for violations, and no clear elaboration of equal pay for equal work existed in the Labor Code (Heinen and Portet 2002; Zielineska 2005, 45). Although women’s formal legal rights advanced at the end of the period, most of the changes were narrow in scope and lacked details that would ensure compliance. New state policies and legislation on women’s work status brought Polish law closer to European standards, but a close analysis suggests those reforms had important limits. Compared to the late socialist period, during the 1990s, state support for legalized abortion regressed. State policies toward women’s work, however, sustained a gendered economy, with some advances for women workers as the decade progressed. This outcome was not surprising, because the Catholic Church significantly constrained public debate over abortion, and debate conditions across the public sphere were limited, improving only slightly over time.

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Conclusion The transition to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe is widely associated with a retrenchment in women’s rights. This is true even for the most successful democracies in the region, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Poland is a notable example of this pattern given its gendered employment policies and post-1989 prohibition on abortion. The CEE, and Poland in particular, appear to pose a serious challenge to the just debate claim, which predicts advances in gender justice as debate conditions improve. However, a comparison of late socialist Poland with post-1989 Poland reveals that even as democratization advanced and the public sphere expanded, debate conditions remained limited in the second period. In these two cases, the dominant institutions in the public sphere systematically marginalized more than half the population. As a result, the content of public debate over women’s rights contained few demands for improvements in gender justice, minimizing the likelihood that the state would advance gender reform. Although new democratic institutions and the legalization of the public sphere in post-socialist Poland did open a few opportunities for women to speak out and be heard, the Catholic Church drowned out their voices. The church rejected just debate, prioritized religious dogma, and threatened the quality of democratic politics when debating abortion. The church used its extraordinary advantages in the public sphere not only to broadcast its message far and wide, but engaged in extra-democratic tactics that silenced many of its critics, breaking the link between citizens and the state. The church outmaneuvered women’s modest advances in civil society, flooded the public sphere with a torrent of Catholic doctrine, and thwarted the civil and political liberties of Poles. In contrast, debate conditions accurately predict outcomes on women’s work, which advanced modestly at the end of the 1990s. Outcomes on women’s rights in Poland do not disprove the plausibility of the just debate claim. In fact, a just debate analysis reveals the quality of democracy in Poland was poor, and that the Polish transition to democracy was incomplete. The pattern of church domination on abortion persists in Poland. To be sure, debate conditions continued to improve in parliament and in women’s organizations at the turn of the century. In parliament, the WPK joined with a number of women’s organizations to advocate an increase in women’s presence in parliament (McMahon 2002, 33). In the

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2001 elections, the leading parties on the Left implemented a 30-percent quota for women on their candidate lists, and women’s presence in parliament increased to 20 percent. Those numbers persisted even when the Right and Center-Right swept into power in 2005 (Fuszara and Zielinska 2006, 55; IPU 2010). Although women MPs continued to report a lack of respect for their contributions in parliament (Jaruga-Nowacka 2006), they did finally win permission to establish a parliamentary committee on the equal status of women and men in 2005. Debate conditions also modestly improved among women’s organizations as their official numbers increased to over 300 and more became political associations (Lohmann 2005, 3). Several created a women’s political lobby to accomplish common goals (Lohmann 2005; Renc-Roe 2003, 26). Elsewhere, however, debate conditions remained limited. Although women in the trade union sector did make some notable gains at the local level, becoming heads of committees, branch representatives, and shop stewards in new economic sectors like hypermarkets, they made little progress in national union structures (Hardy, Kozek, and Stenning 2008). Similarly, although women’s numbers slowly advanced in political parties and the media, their institutional ghettoization persisted; counterpublics were rare (Pochec and Nowicka 2006; Reading 2003; Szczerbiak 2001a). As debate conditions improved slightly over time in parliament and among women’s organizations, the content of public debate broadened as activists demanded women’s rights more often in public debate. This was true even for abortion. To promote women’s reproductive rights, feminist NGOs held seminars, monitored and reported on state policies, worked with women in parliament and with the transnational feminist movement (Chimiak 2003, 15–16; Girard and Nowicka 2002, 28; PFWFP 2009). Increasing public interest in women’s rights created new opportunities in the media for advocates of legalized abortion to publicly express their ideas (Einhorn and Sever 2003, 177; Fodor 2009; Fuszara 1993, 251; Graff 2003; Penn 2005, 314–315). Recently advocates of legalized abortion successfully challenged incendiary language used by Catholic priests to denounce abortion.27 However, church resistance continues to overshadow public debate supporting legalized abortion. Determined to prevent its anti-abortion 27

Patrick B. Craine, “Polish Priest Fined for Comparing Abortion to Holocaust, Saying Abortion Is ‘Killing.’” LifeSiteNews.com September 25, 2009. http://www.lifesitenews. com/ldn/2009/sep/09092508.html, accessed March 30, 2010.

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legislation from being overturned, in 2001, the church began a campaign against Polish membership to the European Union, a priority for the newly elected government. The episcopate then privately approached the Left coalition and promised to support EU membership in exchange for inaction on anti-abortion legislation (Penn 2005, 317). Prominent women and feminist organizations exposed this backroom deal, printing a strongly worded letter of condemnation in several prominent Polish newspapers (Mishtal 2006, 151; Penn 2005, 317). However, this did little to alter the terms of the deal, to undermine church domination of the public sphere, or to end anti-abortion legislation. State support for women’s access to birth control in Poland continues to be limited, abortion is still illegal, and given the preeminence of the church in public life, this trend is likely to persist. Poland continues to exhibit the characteristics of an incomplete democracy.

5 Just Debate Diverges Regime Breakdown in Chile and South Africa

“It is a sad fact that one of the few profoundly non-racial institutions in South Africa is patriarchy.” Albie Sachs, Member of the Constitutional Committee and the National Executive of the ANC, 1990 “Imagine, if Pinochet is overthrown men are going to go on deciding everything.” Chilean woman activist

Introduction The just debate approach claims that the openness and inclusiveness of public debate is a critical measure of democratic quality and a key factor in the advancement of women’s rights. When public debate is open and inclusive, women, who are usually the largest marginalized group in public life, have access, voice, and the capacity for contestation in the institutions that compose the arenas of the public sphere. During democratization, the most important arenas are legislatures, civil society, and the media. Debate conditions in these three public arenas shape the content of public debate. As debate conditions improve, more demands for gender justice enter public debate and shape public opinion. Political actors who wish to be elected and avoid being labeled sexist will respond to those demands. Although the just debate claim stems from a rich body of political theory, it has not been tested. In the previous chapter, I examined whether democratizing Poland disproved the just debate claim, because advances in women’s rights were slight in the 1990s as the public sphere expanded. 118

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My analysis reveals that even as democratization advanced and the public sphere expanded, debate conditions remained limited. It also reveals the extraordinary efforts of the Catholic Church to subvert the functions of the public sphere. The combination of repressive church action and limited debate conditions ensured state policy on abortion was regressive. On women’s work status, state responsiveness was less threatening but remained quite conservative. My analysis of democratizing Poland does suggest that the just debate claim is plausible, but it does not prove whether the claim has causal traction, because a number of equally compelling explanations for the limited advances in women’s rights during these two periods already exist. In this chapter, I test the just debate claim through a comparison of two cases where I can control for a number of rival hypotheses. Several countries in Latin America, including Chile, made successful transitions to democracy during the third wave and produced stable governments. Since its transition to democracy, Freedom House has ranked Chile as one of Latin America’s freest societies (Freedom House 2010). Although the third wave also swept across Africa a few years later, democratic transitions on this continent were not as successful; most were thwarted quite quickly (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). South Africa was among a handful of exceptions and has been consistently ranked free (Freedom House 2010).1 The transitions to democracy in Chile and South Africa were different in significant ways. Most obviously, the role of the Catholic Church in Chile was not replicated in South Africa, where apartheid was the defining factor shaping people’s lives. Yet, as detailed in Chapter 3, during the decade prior to the first democratic elections, a number of important similarities existed: Both were middle-income countries with a similar geopolitical status, both had authoritarian regimes with powerful business classes, and both were quite conservative on gender issues. Although popular pressures for a break from the past were strong, both authoritarian regimes secured nondemocratic institutions in the future state. During the decade prior to democratic elections, the key factors identified by scholars as critical for positive gender outcomes also were similar. Both cases shared relatively slow, pacted transitions, and vibrant women’s movements that drew strength from international trends and demanded an increase in women’s rights. In both cases, advocates of women’s rights 1

In 2010, Freedom House downgraded the ranking of the South African press from “free” to “partly free” (Freedom House 2010).

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had to contend with strong conservative groups allied with the opposition movement. The Center-Left opposition leaders in both cases nevertheless endorsed a human rights agenda and over time became sympathetic to women’s rights claims. As noted in Chapter 3, subtle differences between the two cases on some of these factors do exist but do not suggest outcomes on women’s rights should have diverged significantly. Yet, at the moment of democratic elections, outcomes on gender justice in apartheid South Africa were good and in Pinochet’s Chile they were moderate. Why? I find debate conditions can account for this variation, because they were more open and inclusive in apartheid South Africa than in authoritarian Chile. During the decade prior to elections, Chilean women struggled to improve debate conditions within the political parties that dominated the public sphere but made only moderate progress. In contrast, a diverse group of women in South Africa were able to significantly improve debate conditions within the ANC, and built on that success to create a national women’s coalition whose debate conditions were also good. South African women activists, politicians, and academics then pried open debate conditions at the transition negotiations. Demands for advances in gender justice entered public debate from multiple locations in the public sphere, putting pressure on the ANC and apartheid regime to support reform and to win votes. A comparison of these two cases indicates the just debate claim has causal force even prior to democratic elections.

Debate Conditions in Authoritarian Chile During the 1970s, Augusto Pinochet’s military regime committed massive violations of human rights, banned political parties, cracked down on labor unions, put the church under surveillance, censored the media, and closed parliament. A state of emergency existed throughout the decade, lifted only in 1988. Repression targeted workers’ organizations and especially male activists and politicians. That left women to organize and protest. They soon established human rights groups. In response to a serious economic crisis that hit in 1981, a diverse range of Chilean women created their own organizations to meet their material needs.2 Those organizations multiplied rapidly; many became politicized and

2

Where the data allow, I disaggregate Chilean women by class. Otherwise, when I refer to the women who were at the forefront of public debate, I am referring to urban, educated elites.

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mounted protests against the regime (Baldez 2002; Franceschet 2005; Noonan 1995). In May 1983, the “days of protest” exploded onto the streets, as one day each month for five months, Chileans from all classes, banged pots and pans, blared their car horns, and marched against the regime. In December of the same year, women’s organizations staged a huge demonstration of 10,000 (Baldez 2002, 156; Noonan 1995). By mid-decade, highly competitive and divided political parties reemerged, labor unions revived, women’s coalitions engaged in public debate, a Catholic opposition press published intermittently, a handful of alternative radio stations operated, and some of the clandestine print media published legally (Bresnahan 2003; Hudson 1994; Tironi and Sunkel 2000; Winn 2004). In the months leading up to the 1988 plebiscite vote that rejected the military dictatorship, the opposition rallied behind a new Center-Left coalition, the Concertacion, ushering in a period of pacted transition and constitutional reform. The 1989 democratic elections brought the Concertacion to power. The Chilean public sphere expanded throughout the decade, although the government did not guarantee civil and political rights until its end. The openness and inclusiveness of debate conditions followed a different trajectory. Civil Society Because the Chilean legislature was closed during the 1980s and the transition negotiations were private, involving a dozen elite men, neither was a site for public debate. However, public debate emerged early in the 1980s in civil society. The banning of political parties and repression of trade unions meant conventional institutions had few opportunities to shape public debate (e.g., Baldez 2002; Noonan 1995; Waylen 1994; Winn 2004). This created both the need and space for women to organize and demand change. Chilean women from across the country and across classes seized this opportunity. They were aided by the Chilean Catholic Church, which advocated the development of political consciousness and facilitated their mobilization.3 Much of the clergy not only opposed the Pinochet regime, many were influenced by liberation theology, committed to social justice, and created ecclesiastic base communities (CEBs) led by lay people 3

Class as well as political ideology divided the clergy (Drake and Jaksic 1995, 10; Dandavati 2005). The government closely monitored men’s activism in the church, but women’s survivalist groups escaped surveillance (Noonan 1995, fn 13).

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(Drogus and Stewart-Gambino 2005, 40; Safa 1990; Tinsman 2000).4 These institutional innovations drew the church closer to community groups and human rights organizations dominated by women (Htun 2003, 82–83; Schild 1998). As a nurse who participated in church institutions during this period recalls, “We cannot deny the fundamental role that the church played as a site where our feminist reflection began … What is clear is that professionals involved in those activities [women’s NGOs] had at one time or another worked with the solidarity teams of the Church” (as qtd. in Schild 1994, 66). To be sure, CEBs and church support for women’s groups did not alter the limited debate conditions within the upper echelons of the church hierarchy, but they did encourage more participation among lay people in community-level church activities and facilitated the women’s movement (Dandavati 2005, 50–52; Tinsman 2000, 176).5 The women’s movement emerged in the early 1980s and its founding groups were open and inclusive: They included a diverse range of members, were internally participatory, and informally run (Franceschet 2005, 68; Frohmann and Valdes, 1995, 285; Schild 1998). Many women joined these groups precisely because men in most groups ignored them. As Marina Valdez, the founder of the Popular Women’s Movement, explained, “only the most politicized members were listened to, and they were almost always men … [women] would refrain from making proposals out of fear of not being taken seriously. And soon they would quit.”6 Most urban and rural poor women’s organizations were small and supportive. By 1985, these groups numbered over 1,125 in Santiago alone and were soon engaged in self-education and consciousness raising (Noonan 1995, 100). Quickly expanding their activities beyond soup kitchens, collective shopping, and handicraft production, these groups held “workshops on sexuality, family relations, and personal development” as well as human rights causes (Franceschet 2005, 66).7 As one shantytown woman explained: “[A]s you begin to get into a group of women you begin to free yourself … You come to be a person, you feel

4

5

6 7

For discussions of the Leftist orientation of church employees who worked with women’s organizations, see Adams 2003, and Drogus and Stewart-Gambino 2005. Susana Kuncar, “Chile: Women’s Movement Born of Economic Need, Repression.” Latinamerica Press March 21, 1985. This support declined precipitously in 1987 after the Pope’s visit to the country spurred a shift in church politics toward the Right (Schild 1998, 239). As quoted in Kuncar, “Chile: Women’s Movement.” Kuncar, “Chile: Women’s Movement.”

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you are a person, you take up your rights” (as qtd. in Adams 2003, 308). By mid-decade, these groups had become political associations, with members attending talks, distributing leaflets, protesting, and helping survivors of regime violence (Chuchryk 1994, 69; Fisher 1993, Frohmann and Valdes 1995, 281; Tinsman 2000). Another woman who participated in a shantytown group in Santiago pointedly recalled, “Everything we did was against Pinochet, because we wanted to get rid of the dictatorship” (as qtd. in Adams 2003, 297). Women from the urban middle and professional classes, including academics, politicians, and professionals, also organized in small groups. From the start, organizations like the influential Women’s Studies Circle and the cross-party coalition Women for Life (MPLV) were political associations where women discovered and articulated their interests as women and debated political strategies. Through slogans like “Feminism Is Liberty, Socialism and Much More,” these women began to link feminism to the class struggle and the struggle for democracy (Chuchryk 1994; Tobar 2003b, 131). Their increasing radicalism led to an abrupt end of church support (Baldez 2002, 151). Other middle-class women’s groups did not pursue socialism along with women’s issues. Women’s groups that aimed to pursue cultural change but avoided political parties were known as feministas autonomas, as opposed to their militant feminist sisters in political parties, the feministas politicas. Grassroots organizing across the country meant many Chilean women with diverse ideological commitments, interests, and class backgrounds could join a wide array of open and inclusive organizations that were increasingly engaged in public debate over women’s rights. In the early 1980s, these diverse groups began working together. Women activists established a wide range of federations, from The Committee for the Defense of Women’s Rights (CODEM) to the Movement of Shantytown Women (MOMUPO). MOMUPO included party militants as well as working-class housewives who clashed not only over tactics but also over goals (Baldez 2002, 139). Although political disagreements within these coalitions were pervasive, activists overcame them sufficiently to work together against the regime and for women’s rights (Baldez 2002; Dandavati 2005, 75–76; Valenzuela 1995, 173). Together, they pursued a different way of doing politics that was highly participatory. Communist Party leader Fanny Pollarolo of MPLV recalls, “[W]e put a lot of value in trust, in terms of transparency in our relations with one another and rejection of the things that we women have criticized so much, the men’s way of doing politics, the manipulation, the machinations” (as qtd. in

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Baldez 2002, 157). Given the absence of conventional institutions in the public sphere, women’s new way of doing politics quickly moved to the forefront of public debate during the days of protest. However, that prominence did not last. As political parties and trade unions revived with liberalization middecade, partisan tensions within women’s coalitions increased. That fragmented the openness and inclusiveness they had painstakingly nurtured, as the ability of grassroots members to speak out about their interests and run their own organizations declined.8 As one activist notes, “[T]hey [the political parties] exerted pressure on us as a social organization so that we would do those things that they wanted as a party” (as qtd. in Gaviola, Largo, and Palestro 1994, 155). By mid-decade, political parties demanded women’s partisan loyalty. This prompted coalitions to be reconstructed along party lines, narrowing the ideological diversity of their membership. For example, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Chilean Woman (MEMCH83), a women’s umbrella group that at its peak comprised twenty-four women’s organizations, shed a number of affiliates only a year after its founding, and by the second half of the decade had lost nearly twothirds of its members (Franceschet 2005, 75; Valenzuela 1995, 173). MPLV, which was closely associated with the political parties, became “paralyzed by partisan conflict and tensions” (Chuchryk 1994, 84; Franceschet 2005, 750). In 1988, it split along party lines over whether to campaign against Pinochet in the plebiscite (Baldez 2001 and 2002, 158). As the plebiscite approached, some parties forbid women activists to support or participate in activities sponsored by nonpartisan women’s groups (Baldez 2003, 173; Dandavati 2005, 87–88). Although Chilean women had successfully created coalitions with open and inclusive debate conditions, the political parties undermined those conditions, threatening the ability of women’s coalitions to survive. The political parties did not offer women party militants open and inclusive debate conditions in exchange for this loss. Even though women composed half the rank and file of political parties, they held only 12 to 14 percent of national party offices (Chuchryk 1994, fn 122; Dandavati 2005; Safa 1990, 359; Valenzuela 1995). By the second half of the decade, dedicated middle-class activists from the women’s movement

8

Political parties on the Left and Center formed two separate alliances in 1983 that persisted until 1988. The Christian Democrats and moderates in the Socialist Party led the Democratic Alliance; the Popular Democratic Movement included the Communist Party and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left.

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joined party structures with the intent of increasing women’s numbers and shaping party agendas. But political parties were reluctant to cede high-ranking positions to women (Franceschet 2005; Valenzuela 1995, 178–179; Waylen 2007, 102). Women party militants did take some steps to gain more voice within the political parties and challenge the status quo. They worked assiduously to establish counterpublics within several, rejecting ghettoized women’s fronts that acted as support staff to men (Frohmann and Valdes 1995, 284; Waylen 2007, 10). Women in the Christian Democrats founded a Technical Department, and women in the Socialist Party formed a women’s federation. The Technical Committee explicitly demanded “greater access to and equality in political parties,” but like the women’s federation in the Socialist Party, it was small and quite weak (Franceschet 2005, 78; Molina 1989 as cited in Franceschet 2004, 523; Waylen 1998, 157). Although women militants in the Socialist Party and the Party for Democracy did win quotas in the party structures by the end of the decade, these parties did not consistently implement them (Dandavati 2005, 92; Waylen 1998, 157). Women party militants from all parties expressed high levels of dissatisfaction with their modest progress in gaining access to leadership positions and their inability to shape party policy (Frohmann and Valdes 1995, 289; Valenzuela 1995, fn 39). Given the dominance of political parties in public life, that did not bode well for women’s influence in public debate. When the leading political parties managed to cease the worst of their partisan squabbling and unite in 1988 under the Concertacion, women party militants followed their lead and formed a new coalition as well. The Coalition of Women for Democracy campaigned for the Concertacion and worked to promote women’s participation in formal politics and shape the agenda of the new government. Although the coalition included women from the leading Chilean political parties, the CMD did not include women’s organizations from the far Left or Right; organizers excluded many poor women’s organizations (Chuchryk 1994, 85; Dandavati 2005, 90 and 92; Frohmann and Valdes 1995, 286; Schild 1998, 100). In response, a number of poor women organized separately in the Coordination of Women’s Social Organizations. Right-wing women organized separately as well, under the leadership of first lady Lucia Hiriart de Pinochet, in the Women’s Movement for Chile; others revived Feminine Power, the women’s movement that had helped overthrow Pinochet’s predecessor, the ill-fated Salvador Allende (Baldez 2002, 171; Valenzuela 1995, 176). By dedicating themselves to the election of the Concertacion and remaining an organization of educated, middle-class

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experts, the CMD did not represent the full diversity of Chilean women. It offered moderate levels of access.9 CMD partisanship also put some limits on members’ voices. More than 100 women worked in small teams to research the status of Chilean women, and they wrote a detailed gender policy program for the Concertacion as it prepared for the 1989 elections (Dandavati 2005, 90). Camaraderie among these women was high, in part because they were determined to maintain unity to ensure the success of their efforts (Baldez 2002, 179; Chuchryk 1994, 86; Franceschet 2005, 79). This pragmatism meant party competition continued to constrain the range of CMD demands. Nonetheless, the CDM did challenge some status quo assumptions about women’s access to the future government. The group lobbied the Concertacion for a 30-percent quota in government posts, drew up a list of women candidates from across the entire political spectrum for the 1989 election, and proposed a women’s ministry in the new state (Baldez 2002, 176; Chuchryk 1994, 85–86; Okeke-Ihejirika and Franceschet 2002, 446). Although the CMD won support for a women’s ministry, party leaders were “infuriated” by its intervention in candidate selection and rejected the 30-percent quota (Baldez 2002, 176; Franceschet 2005, 79). This response powerfully conveyed the intention of party leaders to control women’s access to the state. Stymied by the parties, the CMD had trouble securing commitments to improve debate conditions in the future. Whereas debate conditions improved incrementally in political parties over the course of the decade, improvement in the trade unions were even slower.10 Like the political parties, Chilean unions were not interested in improving debate conditions; they were interested in gaining supporters. Nevertheless, this aim created a small opening for women to make headway in the trade union movement. As part of its resistance strategy, the National Union Coordinator (CNS), a trade union umbrella organization, established a Women’s Department (DF) in 1976, composed of women workers and workers’ wives. Its purpose was to mobilize women against the regime and to provide a support arm to the organization (Chuchryk 1989, 159; Galvez and Todaro 1990, 128).11 9

10

11

As Marcela Rios Tobar points out, this is not the “official story” of the CMD, which has an origins myth of extensive inclusivity internalized by many Chilean activists involved in politics during the 1980s (2003a, 265). Although the trade unions were active during mid-decade protesting against the regime, union power ebbed significantly under Pinochet and membership was quite low. In 1988, 10.5 percent of the Chilean labor force was unionized (Winn 2004, 48). To my knowledge, figures on women’s membership in the trade unions during the 1980s are not available (Pribble 2005).

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The DF increased women’s membership in the trade union movement. Because at least half the women in the labor force were concentrated in sectors without unions, the DF offered women workers, as well as women who were not employed, a unique opportunity to enter the public sphere. The union positions women accessed during the 1980s were not at the decision-making level, however, but were offices like secretary or treasurer (Galvez and Todaro 1990; Trebilcock 1991, 413). This meant women leaders in the trade unions were not trusted with much responsibility. As one woman noted, “I’m the chairperson but I make the coffee, serve it, wash-up, of course you do everything … you’re a woman” (Galvez and Todaro 1990, 132). Another noted, “Because you feel a bit like everyone’s mother you look after everyone else’s well-being” (132). Given these attitudes, it is not surprising that most women union members reported being silent in general meetings (Galvez and Todaro 1990). The DF did help women marginally improve debate conditions in the trade union movement by providing a space for them to voice their complaints. At DF meetings, women commiserated over the chauvinism of men and the obstacles that the sexual division of labor posed to their union participation. They resolved to improve training for women within the unions and insisted that women had the “right to work without any discrimination whatsoever”; they also demanded “rights to child and maternity protection” and an end to “traditions and opinions about our inferiority which are firmly rooted in men” (as qtd. in Galvez and Todaro 1990, 129). However, they rarely projected these expressions of dissent beyond the DF. In 1985, the First Conference of Women Workers produced a set of fifty-four resolutions, few of which addressed women’s work issues or conditions within the union, although they did include a complaint about the lack of women leaders in the National Workers Congress (Galvez and Todaro 1990, 130). It was not until the end of the decade, after the 1988 plebiscite proved women voters were a key demographic in the democratic elections, that the DF pursued an increase in women’s leadership and decision-making roles (Galvez and Todaro 1990; Stephen 1997, 265; Valenzuela 1995, 181). Although the DF gave Chilean working class women a forum to discover and articulate their interests, it made few challenges to the status quo within the trade union movement.12 Debate conditions in the trade union movement throughout the decade remained limited. 12

The unionization of rural women workers in the rapidly expanding agricultural sector followed a similar trajectory. See Barrientos et al. 1999, Lago 1987, and Tinsman 2000.

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The Media Debate conditions in the media were even worse than in trade unions and political parties, although potential for expansion was evident in the alternative media sector. The regime censored all mass media, and the dominant press of the period, El Mecurio, supported the dictatorship (Hudson 1994). This meant that the mainstream mass media were a restricted site for public debate until the plebiscite in 1988. Even after the plebiscite, debate conditions in the mass media remained quite limited. To be sure, women’s access to the mainstream media increased over the course of the decade as more of them became journalists, but their diversity was narrow and few moved up the ranks. Most women journalists came from elite families (Montgomery 1996). Although a few became mid-level editors, the vast majority of managers and editors were men (Castellon and Guillier 1993; Santa Cruz 1995). Women’s limited rank ensured they remained ghettoized; male editors directed women writers toward feminine topics and assigned men to “hard” news (Castellon and Guillier 1993). Women journalists complained that men made all the decisions and ignored them (Montgomery 1996). The media publicly praised their women workers as good mothers and professionals who managed to retain their femininity in a male-dominated workplace, making the industry a “socially acceptable opening into the professions for women” (Castellon and Guillier 1993, 237). Instead of being pressured to assimilate, industry leaders embraced women’s difference to justify their marginalization. The alternative feminist media had more open and inclusive debate conditions but were extremely small and limited in scope. Between 1981 and 1985, feminists published the magazine Furiaf (Chuchryk 1989, 165), and La Morada, a feminist women’s center that produced books and pamphlets written by women, began plans for establishing an allwomen radio station in 1987. However, Radio Tierra did not become operational until 1991, and only after its founders located a man willing to teach them technical skills. Until then, “there were no women trained to take the jobs” (Santa Cruz 1995, 51–54; Hopkinson 1992, 20; Schild, 1994, 100). Women did manage to get heard on radio programs occasionally. For example, for two years, the Methodist Church’s Radio Umbral regularly featured illegal tapes recorded by jailed female political prisoners (Bresnahan 2002, 171). However, women were not the meaning makers setting the agenda in either the alternative or mainstream press. With women’s skills limited and alternative outlets available for

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producing their own media rare, they had few opportunities to use the media to broaden debate content. Women in civil society created their own open and inclusive organizations early in the decade, enabling them to shape public debate. Their efforts peaked as political parties reemerged and undermined the openness and inclusiveness of debate conditions in women’s coalitions, without offering them compensation within the parties. In trade unions and in the mass media, debate conditions lagged. Although women’s organizations persisted throughout the decade, and a number of women were party militants, debate conditions at the moment of transition were moderate at best.

Public Debate in Authoritarian Chile Moderate debate conditions in women’s organizations and political parties led to moderate demands on two key women’s rights issues: violence against women and women’s work status. In the early 1980s, women’s organizations relied upon a maternal, caretaking frame to marshal Chilean women against the military’s human rights violations. As the “days of protest” rocked the regime amidst chants for “Democracy Now,” the Feminist Movement (MF) publicized a manifesto that demanded better jobs for women and an end to violence (Franceschet 2005, 73; Matear 1996, 249). Most notably, they called for “democracy in the country and in the home.” Adriana Sepulveda, a prominent activist, explained the meaning of this slogan: “These 11 years of authoritarianism have matured us. They have enabled us to understand that we have been living under authoritarian structures all our lives, whether it be at home, at work, or under the dictatorship. We want to change all this.”13 The MF slogan quickly became a powerful rallying cry for the Chilean women’s movement. Middle-class Chilean feminists were not the only ones to make the connection between authoritarianism and patriarchy. By mid-decade, poor women’s groups were demanding an end to the military regime and promoting women’s rights as well. Local groups began criticizing sexual harassment and violence against women, along with inequalities in women’s work status (Fisher 1993; Noonan 1995, 98; Tinsman 1997, 287). Women who denounced the sexual abuse they experienced at the hands of the military began to condemn violence at home (Baldez 2002, 13

As quoted in Kuncar, “Chile: Women’s Movement.”

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163–164; Bunster-Burotto 1986; Noonan 1995, 102).14 Work rights were also at the forefront of poor women’s demands, including full employment and greater economic recognition for women’s reproductive labor (Franceschet and MacDonald 2004, 9). Coalitions like MOMUPO brought attention to inequitable work conditions and the structural problems contributing to women’s unemployment (Baldez 2002; Fisher 1993, 36 and 190; Tinsman 2000, 177).15 In 1986, MPLV represented the women’s movement at the prestigious Civil Assembly and specifically addressed poor quality jobs and unemployment, and demanded more equality in the family (Franceschet 2004, 518). Together, women’s organizations during the first half of the decade put women’s status in the workplace and patriarchy in the home on the public agenda. Although women activists made demands for gender justice early in the decade, over time they prioritized the aims of the political parties. For example, during the 1988 plebiscite campaign, a number of new women’s organizations formed, such as Women United for “No,” Women’s Command for “No,” and Women United for Free Elections (Dandavati 2005, 89–90).16 These organizations promoted human rights, peace, and life; the linkage between authoritarianism and patriarchy slipped from view (Frohmann and Valdes 1995, 286). This was not accidental. Indeed, when intense partisan discord and regime opposition threatened plans for celebrating International Women’s Day in 1988, the Concertacion warned women activists “to subordinate their gender-specific demands to other concerns and to participate in broader movements” (Baldez 2002, 173). More than a thousand women did participate in the event, but many women’s groups did not (Baldez 2002, 174; Chuchryk 1989, 174). Even though women remained crucial actors in public debate, party pressures dissipated demands for their rights. One exception to this pattern was the Feminist Movement, which had long avoided close ties to political parties and aimed to keep gender justice at the forefront of the women’s movement (Valenzuela 1995, 173). Three months prior to the plebiscite, MF, along with MOMUPO and several other fiercely independent organizations, publicized “Women’s Demands to Democracy” in a prominent newspaper (Chuchryk, 1994, 84; Valenzuela 1995, 174). The Demands pointedly addressed women’s 14

15 16

The military used sexual forms of violence against women and accused them of acting outside the boundaries of appropriate gender norms (Bunster-Burotto 1986). Kuncar, “Chile: Women’s Movement.” The plebiscite gave voters two choices: “yes” for Pinochet, or “no” for an end to the dictatorship.

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bodily integrity, attacked inequalities in the family, and included requests for expanded labor rights, dignified work, greater appreciation for women’s domestic labor, and a constitutional guarantee of women’s equality (Safa 1990, 364; Valenzuela 1998, 54). Not surprisingly, the pro-democracy parties denounced these demands, arguing they were divisive when coalition unity was essential (Franceschet 2005, 79). However, the results of the 1988 plebiscite offered an opportunity for advocates of women’s rights to broaden debate content at a crucial moment. Women’s turnout rate for the vote was high (97.3 percent), and the majority of women (51.1 percent) voted against Pinochet (Lewis 2004, 726). The 1988 vote demonstrated that women were not stalwart conservatives as had been assumed, but were a key electoral group that could decide the 1989 election (Baldez 2002, 175; Valenzuela 1995, 177).17 That meant political parties became willing to allow women’s demands for gender justice to be heard in the public sphere along with their demands for democracy (Baldez 2002, 175). No longer regarded as a divisive distraction from the struggle against dictatorship, at this moment women’s interests in gender justice enhanced the aims of opposition party leaders. The women’s movement regained some of its influence in the public sphere. The most prominent organization at this juncture was the CMD. Although the CMD took inspiration from the “Women’s Demands of Democracy” presented by the MF, it did not include the most radical of those demands in its policy recommendations (Franceschet 2005, 80). Instead, CMD experts wrote a program that addressed women’s “discrimination and inequality” in eleven thematic areas, including “family” and “work,” advocated the ratification of CEDAW, and called for a number of legal reforms, including a domestic violence bill and the elimination of workplace discrimination against women (Chuchryk 1994, 85–86). The CMD publicized its recommendations through networking, workshops, press releases, and discussion groups. These efforts climaxed at a huge convocation for the pro-democracy presidential candidate, Patricio Aylwin, where he gave a speech to 5,000 women accepting their endorsement for the presidency (Baldez 2002, 176; Dandavati 2005, 91). Working for the pro-democracy parties, women partisans affiliated with the Concertacion used the opportunity offered by the 1988 plebiscite to advance demands for women’s legal equality in public debate. As the 17

Valenzuela argues that women’s increasing participation in the workforce shifted them toward this Centrist position (1995, 177).

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most prominent demands endorsed formal levels of gender equality, the opposition coalition and the authoritarian state responded with moderate policy proposals and legislation.

Gender Justice in Authoritarian Chile Prior to the democratic elections, state actions toward women’s role in the family and paid workforce did little to address either violence against women or women’s inequitable work status. Indeed, during much of the 1980s, the regime relentlessly reinforced patriarchal relations in the home, stressing traditional gender stereotypes of femininity and masculinity while emphasizing the importance of the family as the foundation of society (Baldez 2002, 126–127; Montecinos 1994, 172). In one of his typical disquisitions on motherhood, Pinochet declared, “… women silently work looking after what is most precious to the Nation, the care of children, the future hope of the Fatherland … we believe that it is necessary to deepen the consciousness of woman in herself and of society in the task that is hers” (as qtd. in Noonan 1995, 97). The regime helped women “deepen” their maternal consciousness and encouraged them to bear more children through its National Secretariat for Women and more than 10,000 Mothers’ Centers directed by Pinochet’s wife (Stephen 1993, 38). Intent upon increasing the birth rate, the regime restricted access to birth control, celebrated motherhood, and encouraged women’s dependence on men (Moenne and Webb 2005). Entrenching patriarchy, the state enabled inequitable power relations in the home that underpinned gender-based violence, while actively perpetuating violence against opposition women through its repressive political tactics (Bunster-Burotto 1986). In addition to endorsing women’s subordination in the household, the military dictatorship undermined the ability of poor women to provide for their families. Chile had a well-established welfare state prior to the dictatorship, but Pinochet gutted it. The cuts hit working-class women particularly hard, as the sexual division of labor meant they were now responsible for providing services previously supplied by the state (Schild 1998). Moreover, neoliberal policies made it difficult for many women to be competitive in the labor market, as employers now administered pregnancy tests and dismissed pregnant workers; at the same time, state-mandated daycare requirements ended (Chuchryk 1989, 153). As the economic crisis of the early 1980s forced poor women to seek employment, state policies ensured they moved into the secondary labor sector and marginal

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microenterprises (Montecinos 1994, 167–169; Tinsman 2000). State policies on women’s work and violence against women were regressive. However, as women’s demands gained prominence in public debate and elections loomed, political actors in the state seeking to enhance their public reputation took action on women’s status in the family and women’s work. In 1989, the regime belatedly passed amendments to the Civil Code improving married women’s rights. It granted married women full civil rights and formally ended men’s marital power over their wives. Women no longer required their spouse’s consent to enter into contracts, pay debts, accept inheritance, or acquire deeds. However, as husbands retained the right to administer community property and continued to be recognized as the head of the household, neither the speed nor scope of the bill signaled much support for formal levels of gender equality. Indeed, even many on the right regarded it as insufficient (Baldez 2002, 171; Valenzuela 1995, 171). Nevertheless, the regime had finally taken action. Moreover, just prior to the 1989 elections, Pinochet signed CEDAW, which mandated the monitoring of violence against women and an end to discriminatory employment practices. In explaining why he was now ratifying the protocol, Pinochet spouted a new view about women’s role in society. “Women’s true vocation,” he asserted, “does not have to be restricted to the family sphere, especially when she becomes aware of her immense capabilities and responsibility for contributing to the development of the nation” (as qtd. in Baldez 2002, 178). That rhetoric reversed his long-standing pronouncements about self-sacrificing mothers, and was a clear response to women’s demands. The regime had reversed course, officially recognizing women’s rights. The opposition coalition was more responsive than the dictatorship. This was a significant deviation from the pro-democracy parties’ long history of conservatism on women’s rights. From the 1950s through the 1980s, opposition political parties addressed women as mothers who could lend their caretaking skills to the nation. Indeed, Leftist parties not only emphasized class over gender and treated feminism “as a divisive bourgeois issue,” they also claimed that the Left had long been a “champion of the proletarian family” (Chuchryk 1989, 170; Noonan 1995, 90). Despite dramatic differences with Pinochet, opposition political parties agreed women should be self-sacrificing mothers. Nonetheless, in 1989, the Concertacion recognized women as a political constituency and promised to “fully enforce women’s rights considering the new role of women in society, overcoming any form of discrimination” (as qtd. in Waylen 2007, 76). Aylwin vowed to improve women’s

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rights in the family, admitted that parenting was also a man’s job, and promised to pass domestic violence legislation and to end employment discrimination against women (Baldez 2002, 178; Dandavati 2005, 94; Franceschet 2004, 524). When the CMD formally endorsed Aylwin, he adopted the women’s movement slogan, “democracy in the country and in the home,” as his own (Chuchryk 1994, fn 79). The Concertacion endorsed many of the policies recommended by the CMD. Most of the policy recommendations on violence against women and women’s work were commitments to formal equality common in liberal democracies, and would bring Chile into line with global standards. The coalition rejected the more radical demands promoted by the MF. For example, although Aylwin noted men’s responsibility to care for their children, the Concertacion emphatically rejected “equal sharing of domestic work among women and men” (Franceschet 2005, 79). Moreover, even as the Concertacion promised to advance women’s equality in the workplace and redress their subordination in the home, the platform also pledged to “enforce the measures required to adequately protect the family” (as qtd. in Valenzuela 1998, 56). This suggested the Concertacion’s commitment was not as broad as the women’s movement slogan. Although a greater percentage of men than women supported Aylwin, the Concertacion’s appeal to women’s rights helped it secure 51.6 percent of women voters in the 1989 elections (Lewis 2004, 728). The Concertacion responded to moderate debate conditions and a broadened public agenda by enthusiastically endorsing women’s formal equality in the workplace and legal reform to end violence in the home. The regime responded to moderate debate conditions and a broadened public agenda by reforming the civil code and by endorsing women’s formal equality with its ratification of CEDAW. The situation in South Africa during the democratic transition was quite different and demonstrates that when debate conditions are more open and inclusive in several institutions in the public sphere, responsiveness is more extensive. The difference in debate conditions between Chile and South Africa explain their divergent outcomes on women’s rights.

Debate Conditions in Apartheid South Africa Repression permeated the life of blacks in apartheid South Africa. The state banned the ANC, relegating it to exile; soldiers moved into townships where urban blacks lived, contributing to violence that verged on civil war.18 The 18

Until the mid-1980s, blacks were not permitted to live in urban areas without a government-issued pass. During the period of this case study, many blacks flooded into urban areas and crowded into townships.

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regime declared three states of emergency in rapid succession during this ten-year period and routinely detained leaders of opposition organizations. State censorship made reporting on the violence difficult and dangerous. Despite these obstacles, a space for public debate in apartheid South Africa did exist. Foreign-funded alternative media flourished, and a sector of the mainstream English press criticized the regime. In the 1980s, trade union workers founded the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and activists against apartheid founded the United Democratic Front (UDF). The latter included nearly 400 organizations. As the UDF and COSATU called for mass civil disobedience and international pressures on the apartheid regime intensified at the end of the 1980s, the apartheid National Party and the ANC agreed to negotiate. In 1990, F.W. de Klerk announced the unbanning of opposition parties and the release of political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela.19 His stunning speech radically transformed South African politics. From that moment on, the ANC began the process of transforming itself from a dispersed movement in exile to a political party that could lead the country. The UDF and many other organizations in civil society folded, deferring to the ANC. In 1991, multiparty talks began, bringing the government and opposition parties together in formal negotiations. Those talks culminated in the famed first nonracial South African elections of 1994, in which 86 percent of the electorate voted the ANC into power. South Africans gave the ANC 62.65 percent of the vote, marking the peaceful end of apartheid (EISA 1994). As in Chile, the birth of democracy was not only tumultuous; it offered women from across the country opportunities to enter the public sphere. Unlike in Chile, however, debate conditions in South Africa improved significantly during this period. Although those changes were not uniform in scope, women’s gains extended far beyond their own organizations. The Legislature Unlike Pinochet’s Chile, in apartheid South Africa, the legislature remained open, offering whites a space for deliberation. However, debate conditions here were limited. Indeed, during the 1980s, women’s access was highly restricted, with no more than six white women ever present 19

The apartheid government banned the ANC in 1960. During the period prior to the unbanning, I refer to the ANC as a liberation movement, and after 1990 I refer to the ANC as a political party, although the transition from one to the other was drawn out and uneven.

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(Ballington 2002). Few white women MPs had the ability to speak out and challenge the status quo as few male MPs listened to their women colleagues with respect. Instead, men frequently reminded women that their place was “in the kitchen,” and commented on the appearance of women MPs when they delivered a speech; men in the National Party referred to women politicians as “our roses.”20 Despite women’s extremely low numbers and the masculine culture of parliament, one woman MP did speak out against the regime. Afrikaner respect for parliamentary procedures ensured that Helen Suzman had the space to challenge apartheid policies; however, that was contingent upon her willingness to play by the institutional rules of the game. Capitalizing on the space afforded her in the whites-only parliament, Suzman became internationally renowned for her exposure of the injustices of apartheid. To be able to do so, she exploited the parliamentary rules of the game but did not challenge them.21 Although the apartheid parliament provided the space for at least one remarkable white woman to question regime policies, its racial limitations, low numbers of women representatives, pervasive sexist culture, and lack of contestation over institutional procedures confirmed debate conditions here were limited. Civil Society Civil society offered South African women of all races, classes, and geographic locations significantly more opportunities than the legislature. South African civil society was highly mobilized during the mid-1980s and women were an important part of most organizations, struggling to advance within powerful institutions while also founding their own local groups and regional coalitions. A diverse array of women established political organizations and then affiliated with the UDF. However, much like the political parties in Chile, the UDF did not welcome open and inclusive debate conditions. The UDF was a multiracial, cross-class, male-dominated organization dedicated to ending apartheid. One of its four leading principles was nonsexism. Yet women’s access was limited by rank: They only constituted 12 percent of the UDF’s executive council. Moreover, the 20

21

Former Progressive Federal Party MP Helen Suzman, interview, Johannesburg, July 9, 2003; Democratic Party MP Sheila Camerer, interview, Johannesburg, July 30, 2003. Suzman was a strong advocate of existing parliamentary procedures (interview). In 1994, she argued against ANC women’s challenges to parliamentary culture, insisting they should not demand “special privileges” (as qtd. in Cock 1997, 325).

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organization treated women’s interests as coterminous with political liberation. Frustrated by their marginalization and the UDF’s inattention to women’s interests, in 1987, UDF women activists formed a Women’s Congress, spoke out against the UDF’s performance on gender issues, and criticized it for limiting women’s leadership roles, for the lack of confidence of women UDF members, and for women’s inability to speak out and be heard by male leaders. They resolved to train women, eradicate sexism, and increase women’s leadership roles (Govender 1987). UDF leaders received these demands politely but did not take them seriously (Fester 2005; Hassim 2006, 74). Stymied, the Women’s Congress collapsed (Hassim 2006, 75). Debate conditions in the women’s organizations affiliated with the UDF were much different. Like women’s organizations in Chile, they were open and inclusive. State human rights abuses and dire economic straits prevented many black women from meeting their families’ most basic material needs and prompted women to organize. As in Chile, these women challenged the authoritarian regime, patriarchy in the home, and exploitation at work (Beall et al. 1989; Meer 1998; Seidman 1993). As they became politicized, women’s organizations formed a number of remarkably multiracial and cross-class regional federations, such as the United Women’s Organization (UWO), Natal Organization for Women (NOW), and the Federation of Transvaal Women (FEDTRAW). Women in rural areas organized as well, most notably through the Rural Women’s Movement (RWM). Following the same pattern as Chile, women’s coalitions created a space for all members to speak and be heard. They ensured organizational practices served member interests and aimed to project women’s voices in the public sphere. Members in the branches and in local organizations debated internal rules, policies, and decisions; and regional leadership responded to their demands (Beall et al. 1989; Geisler 2004; Hassim 2006).22 Although women in these organizations professed an interest in gender issues, and activists often referred to women’s triple oppression (race, class, and gender), race dominated most discussions. The focus on apartheid made it difficult for many activists to grasp how sexism might operate independently of race and class (Fester 2005; Geisler 2004, 70–71; Hassim 1991). Although debate conditions in women’s organizations were good, the apartheid struggle trumped activist discussions about women’s interests. 22

This varied somewhat by organization. See Hassim 2006, 63 and 65 for details.

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table 5.1. Debate Conditions in Authoritarian Chile and South Africa Institution

Debate Conditions Chile

Debate Conditions South Africa

Legislature

NA

Limited

Women’s Organizations

Moderate

Good

Leading Opposition Parties

Moderate

Good

Trade Union Federation

Limited

Moderate

Transition Negotiations

NA

Good

Media

Limited

Limited

That problem deepened considerably as the UDF eroded debate conditions in women’s organizations during the second half of the 1980s. The ANC and UDF supported the establishment of regional women’s organizations in hopes that a national women’s movement would emerge, but their motivation for doing so was instrumental: to build support for the liberation struggle (Beall et al. 1987; Hassim 2006, 61). In a situation that again was similar to Chile, the UDF and the ANC urged women’s organizations to neglect “divisive” gender interests and directed women’s energies solely toward nonracism. As a result, grassroots women lost their interest and enthusiasm for their own organizations, which became increasingly hierarchical and unresponsive. Attrition was rapid and mobilizing capacity plummeted (Albertyn et al. 1999, 7; Fester 2005; Geisler 2004; Hassim 2006, 69–70). The relationship between women’s organizations and the leading opposition movement were quite similar in Chile and South Africa. In both cases, debate conditions within women’s organizations were initially good but declined in the middle of the period to moderate levels, because male-led opposition groups undercut their ability to speak about their interests. However, in contrast to Chile, South African women made a number of advances during the second half of the decade, as reflected in Table 5.1. Progress in the trade unions was an important advantage, because the large membership and popularity of COSATU offered women a significant basis for shaping public debate. At the end of the 1980s, women trade unionists held their own national conferences where they debated strategies for improving their access and voice within the trade union federation (Pandy 1992). Male leaders initially resisted women’s concerns, labeling their demands “community issues” as opposed to labor issues, and refused endorsement (Seidman 1993, 307). Women trade unionists

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persisted. Many were both ANC activists and feminists determined to advance women’s interests within the union federation.23 Eventually, they gained the backing of a few men who viewed women’s participation as important for the struggle against apartheid. As a result, COSATU put women’s participation, rank, and leadership on the union agenda (Orr, Daphne, and Horton 1997b).24 In 1991, only five COSATU affiliates had women in any leadership positions, and only 14 percent of shop stewards were women (Barrett 1993; Orr 1999, 11; Orr et al. 1997b). With few exceptions, men dominated affiliates in the 1980s.25 Women’s low numbers in the upper ranks prompted some unions to advocate women’s advancement (Barrett 1993; NUMSA 1987; O’Regan and Thompson 1993, 14–16). During the early 1990s, COSATU began discussing the possibility of a quota; in 1993, Connie September became the first woman to be elected as a COSATU National Office Bearer, and in 1994, the organization resolved to increase the number of women in leadership positions (Daniels 1991, 47; Van Driel 1992). Women’s challenges to the status quo within COSATU went beyond numbers. Unlike in Chile, women in COSATU heatedly debated their marginalization in the federation and the value of gender forums. At union conferences during the second half of the 1980s, union members began discussing the possibility of creating women’s structures. Because women rarely spoke at union meetings, and the handful of women organizers reported male colleagues gave them little respect (taking more notice of their physical appearance than their qualifications), it was hoped that sex-segregated structures would encourage women to participate, gain confidence, and develop leadership skills (Klugman 1989a, 17; O’Regan and Thompson 1993, 26; Telela 1994, 14; Tshosedi 1999, 84). By the end of the 1980s, women trade unionists had established several gender forums, and by the early 1990s, COSATU had a women’s coordinator and gender forums in a few cities and several regions. Analysts noted increasing solidarity among women members (Dlamini 2004). However, the forums did not meet the larger aims of their advocates. Few of the new institutions attracted senior women with the clout to ensure union

23 24

25

Liesel Orr, interview, Johannesburg, August 1, 2003. In 1993, COSATU membership was estimated at 1.2 million, making it the largest trade union federation in South Africa. By 2001 its membership had increased, and included 40 percent of the waged labor force (Lodge 2001a, 170). The majority of women in COSATU were black and faced substantial pay and occupational discrimination. This was the case even in affiliates composed largely of women, like the Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers’ Union (Daniels 1991, 47).

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leaders would value their input (Barrett 1993). Coordination between regions was poor, women leaders in the forums overextended, and men in the regions attacked the forums as divisive; some men attended and dominated meetings (Telela 1994, 15). Although male resistance and institutional isolation stymied the potential of women’s forums to become fully effective counterpublics, women trade unionists had succeeded in putting gender on COSATU’s agenda. Another notable divergence in debate conditions between Chile and South Africa occurred across the leading opposition parties, as noted in Table 5.1. Defying the trends in the UDF and gaining significantly more ground than in COSATU, ANC women pried open debate conditions in the most powerful institution in the anti-apartheid movement. Early in the 1980s, women’s activism in the ANC broadened, and they became political activists and soldiers. Their greater access to rank-and-file positions, however, did not translate into gains in ANC leadership. At the end of the 1980s, out of thirty-five members on the ANC National Executive Council, only three were women (Hassim 2006, 110). Denied greater leadership access, ANC women transformed the Women’s Section into a dynamic counterpublic. During the 1980s, the Women’s Section set up branches in seventeen countries for women in exile, and by 1983, it had won a spot within the NEC and was avidly pressing for more political power. In the mid-1980s, the Section demanded leadership positions for women cadres, and at ANC conferences, seminars, and within the NEC they repeatedly challenged women’s marginalization (Hassim 2004). ANC leaders initially dismissed the demands of the Section as divisive, denying a problem existed. The Women’s Section persisted. Slowly their voices began to be heard and they won converts, most notably ANC President Oliver Tambo (Hassim 2006). In 1985, Tambo promised more leadership roles for women, but little changed. The Women’s Section responded by demanding a quota. In May 1990, as COSATU was adopting gender forums, the ANC endorsed a quota and agreed to the formation of an independent national women’s movement (ANC Statement on the Emancipation of the Women 1990). However, it did not implement the quota.26 Upon their return to South Africa in 1990, Women’s Section leaders joined with women leaders in the country to relaunch the ANC Women’s League (ANCWL). The ANCWL quickly moved to advance women in 26

Colleen Ryan, “Is the ANC’s Hierarchy Swamped with MCPs?” Saturday Star October 27, 1990.

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leadership positions within the party. Following the precedent set by the Women’s Section, the ANCWL secured a seat in the ANC’s decision-making forums, and in 1991, its representatives attended the party’s Consultative Conference (Erlank 2005, 207). At that conference, the ANCWL proposed a highly divisive and ultimately unsuccessful demand for a 30-percent quota in the NEC (Hassim 2006, 252; Josselowsky 1993, 7). After this bitter defeat, leadership divisions engulfed the ANCWL and its institutional capacity declined. Despite this costly loss, key women leaders in the ANC doggedly persisted in their efforts. As a consolation prize over the quota defeat, in 1992 the ANC established a Commission on the Emancipation of Women, led by Oliver Tambo and the feminist ANC insider Frene Ginwala (Hassim 2006, 128). Later that year, the ANC agreed that at least one woman would be included on every ANC committee, and it also agreed to a 30-percent quota for women on its candidate lists for the first nonracial election (Seidman 1999). In 1994, the Commission recommended representation of women activists in all positions and rank in the new government.27 Working through the Women’s Section, the ANCWL, and the Commission, women party militants slowly but successfully pried open debate conditions within the party. The independent Women’s National Coalition (WNC), which eventually included more than ninety women’s organizations from across the country and political spectrum, helped them in the struggle to improve debate conditions. From the outset, the WNC sought openness and inclusiveness, ensuring a wide array of South African women had access to its ranks. In 1990, women activists, academics, and politicians met in a series of conferences where they strategized how to advance their common interests.28 In April 1992, they joined together under Frene Ginwala’s direction and crossed racial, class, and ideological differences to launch the WNC. Their purpose was to write a women’s charter and influence the transition negotiations. Although the WNC was led by middle-class ANC loyalists, unlike the CMD in Chile, that group of women did not define its agenda or membership. Remarkably, WNC affiliates included the conservative Inkatha Freedom Movement Women’s Brigade, the women’s caucus from the apartheid National Party, the South African Domestic Workers Union, 27 28

“ANC Must Emancipate Women, Says Commission,” The Citizen February 21, 1994. For a discussion of these conferences, see Albertyn 1994, 47–49, Bazilli 1991, 2–3, and Govender 1994, 12–13.

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and eventually COSATU’s Women’s Forum.29 This diverse affiliate membership meant women from racial, ethnic, and political groups killing one another in the streets worked together in the WNC to advance their common interests. Class, racial, ideological, and strategic divisions threatened to tear the coalition apart, yet it survived. WNC leaders dealt with the extraordinary challenges their diversity posed by stressing deliberation and consensus building, avoiding majority voting that would have ensured ANC hegemony (Cock 1997, 316–317). In addition to offering significant voice and capacity for contestation to its affiliates, the WNC mounted a consciousness-raising campaign that engaged two million South African women in all regions of the country in a conversation about their rights.30 This diverse, grassroots participation at a moment of tremendous political uncertainty and heightened violence increased the influence of the WNC in the public sphere. The successes of the WNC, along with women’s progress within the ANC and COSATU, meant women academics, activists, and politicians now had multiple sites from which to speak out and demand change at a key moment of political transformation. Drawing upon their connections to political parties, their increased collaboration in COSATU, and most notably the growing clout of the WNC, a diverse array of South African women went to battle, demanding more open and inclusive debate conditions at the transition negotiations. Transition Negotiations As in Chile, a small group of elite leaders negotiated the future political system. However, South Africans also had a series of assemblies devoted to negotiating an interim constitution. Two Conventions for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) brought together nineteen political organizations in an assembly of over 400 delegates (Ebrahim 1998). Both conventions dissolved without a resolution. A smaller assembly, the Multi-Party 29

30

Limits to the inclusiveness of the WNC nevertheless existed. For example, the Women’s Forum from COSATU did not initially participate in the WNC, in part because some women trade unionists were dubious that a cross-class coalition of any kind was useful, and also because some in the coalition were concerned that trade union women would dominate the organization (Hassim 2006, 136). While efforts were made to involve all the regions, security concerns, funding problems, and lack of transport hindered that effort, particularly in the violent Natal region (WNC 1994a, 7–8). Nevertheless, Rashida Manjoo reports she did have some success in the region (Former CGE Commissioner Rashida Manjoo, interview, Charlottesville, Virginia, February 4, 2010). Pregs Govender insists that she went to all the regions and interacted with hundreds of women. (Interview conducted by Shireen Hassim, Cape Town, January 19, 2001).

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Negotiating Process (MPNP), convened in 1993 and paved the way for democratic elections. Initially, women’s access, voice, and capacity for contestation at the MPNP were quite limited, but that soon changed. The tiny number of women at CODESA prompted a number of women’s organizations to join the WNC and they fought for political inclusion. After contentious debate, negotiators at the MPNP realized women’s exclusion was becoming politically embarrassing and agreed to a quota: Delegations expanded to include one woman negotiator with full voting rights and one woman advisor. A diverse group of women had won access to the talks. Limits to their voice and capacity for contestation nevertheless remained. The climate toward women delegates at the negotiations was initially quite hostile. As one delegate, Sheila Camerer, put it, men understood the quota to mean “one leader and one woman.”31 Some parties deliberately appointed women with little experience; others rotated women through the process, minimizing their ability to master the issues and responsibilities of the position; some delegations excluded women from high-level meetings (Albertyn 1994; WNC Reports 1993). In addition, a number of women delegates intimidated by the newness of the experience rarely spoke. This was understandable, because the influential Technical Committees required a level of legal expertise that few women possessed (Albertyn 1994; Wessels, 1993). Providing the façade of inclusivity, the quota was proving disempowering. To successfully exploit their hard-won access, the Women’s National Coalition became a counterpublic for women delegates and helped improve debate conditions at the negotiations. The WNC monitored the talks, publicized issues of importance to women delegates, and provided a space for women to meet, discover their common interests, and plan cross-party action at the negotiating forum. As women delegates accessed expert advice and began working across party lines, they lobbied for their interests in tandem and skillfully played delegations against one another.32 As indicated in Table 5.1, the transition negotiations became yet another space where women activists, politicians, and academics achieved relatively good debate conditions. The Media Whereas women’s advances in civil society and the transition negotiations were exceptional during this period, debate conditions remained 31 32

Camerer interview. Camerer interview.

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limited in the South African media, much as in Chile. Under the apartheid regime, censored, for-profit corporate conglomerates dominated the print media in South Africa. As the political crisis intensified, the government limited news reports to a series of daily bulletins (Heard 1992). Although the alternative media proliferated at the local and regional levels, the regime harassed these journalists even more than those in the mainstream press (Louw and Tomaselli 1991).33 Given the long-standing control of the apartheid regime over the mass media, a high priority of the ANC after the unbanning was to uncouple the industry from the state. The ANC also strongly advocated media reform, arguing freedom of the press was essential for political pluralism and for forging a new national identity (Berger 1999, 86; de Beer 1997; Horowitz 2001, 175). One result was the establishment of an Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) charged with ending state control of the SABC and increasing accessibility and diversity in the media (Hadland and Thorne 2004).34 In 1993, the ANC gender activist Dr. Ivy Matsepe-Casaburri became the first black and woman to be chairperson of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). The board of the SABC was subsequently restructured and the racial composition of the agency altered. Just prior to Matasepe-Casaburri’s promotion, black women composed 6 percent of the Media Workers Association of South Africa (Celile, Anderson, and Njanana 1989). Few black women reporters held positions of rank; this was true even in the black commercial press (Celile, Anderson, and Njanana 1989). Although Matasepe-Casaburri’s high-profile promotion jolted a media industry long accustomed to white male control, her promotion did not generate advances in black women’s rank industrywide. In fact, the quota established for blacks did not target women. Black women continued to fill the lower ranks and to work in segregated positions (Gender Links 2000, 24). White women entered journalism in larger numbers during this period, but like black women, few became subeditors or editors (Celile, Anderson, and Njanana 1989). Women journalists also had difficulty being heard within the media industry. Although camaraderie among most journalists under apartheid was high, the old boys’ club tested the mettle of women

33

34

Nonetheless, alternative media flourished at the end of the apartheid era. For a full discussion, see Switzer 2000; Tomaselli and Louw 1990. Despite its broad mandate, the competing political interests of the political parties at the transition negotiations limited the authority of the IBA (Horwitz 2001).

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and their ability to handle the “macho” newsroom culture assumed to be part of the job (Celile, Anderson, and Njanana1989).35 This meant that although the print media offered tremendous opportunities for ambitious, talented reporters, women had to fight to win the respect of their colleagues. Moreover, some beats remained off-limits to women. As one editor told a white woman reporter, only half in jest: “[G]irls don’t do mining.”36 Operating in an environment that celebrated reportorial toughness and grit while devaluing femininity, debate conditions in the industry remained limited. Whereas the mainstream media limited all women’s access, voice, and capacity for contestation, the alternative media did offer women journalists some opportunities to participate in public debate. A handful of print media run by women in the opposition, such as the feminist journal Agenda, or the official publication of the women’s organization Black Sash, offered open and inclusive debate conditions.37 Functioning as media counterpublics, the feminist alternative press occasionally addressed the mainstream media, challenging women’s marginalization in the industry. Moreover, the transition negotiations opened several new sites of communication for diverse groups of women. For example, in the early 1990s, the government monopoly on the electronic media ended and community radio stations with leadership roles for marginalized groups, including women, were established. Although most stations quickly devolved into male hands, in a few impoverished communities black women managed to run the radio station and use it to speak about their interests (Reagon 1994). These alternative media sites were exceptional, however, and black women did not replicate these experiences in the mainstream media industry. Women’s gains in South Africa were uneven across public arenas. Whereas white and black women journalists in the mainstream media made few advances, women politicians, activists, trade unionists, and academics built several strong counterpublics, including the ANC Women’s Section and the WNC. Drawing on advances in these institutions, women leaders won access to the transition negotiations and improved debate conditions there as well. These substantial gains meant demands for substantive gender justice entered public debate as the country prepared for elections.

35 36 37

Confirmed in interviews of women journalists in July 2006. Freelance journalist Marcia Klein, interview, Johannesburg, July 17, 2006. Former President of Black Sash, Mary Burton, interview, Cape Town, July 16, 2003; former editor of Agenda, Kristen Palitza, phone interview, July 19, 2006.

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Public Debate in Apartheid South Africa By the eve of the 1994 elections, demands for women’s substantive equality were pervasive. The WNC, as well as the ANCWL and trade unions made these demands. Parliament even debated women’s formal equality. Women’s organizations were the most ardent advocates of gender justice, and as early as the 1980s they drew upon a South African tradition of charters and rights claims, as well as the familiar trope of “motherism,” to promote the equality of all women at work and in the family (Albertyn 1994; Fester 2005).38 Often both frames were prevalent in the same organization, helping bridge racial, class, and ideological divides by calling upon South African women as equals and as mothers to unite against apartheid (Fester 2005). Although women’s organizations made demands for women’s rights, during much of the decade, they subordinated those demands to the agenda of the UDF and ANC. This was particularly true for issues related to violence against women, which even regional women’s groups like NOW dismissed as apolitical distractions. As Phumelele NtombelalNzimand recalls, “They [NOW members] said people should speak about the state of emergency, not about wife battering” (Fester 2005, 211; as qtd. in Hassim 2006, 58). Elaine Salo recalls that in one branch of the United Women’s Congress (UWCO), “there was constant tension between spending time on gender consciousness raising, such as talking about our experiences in relationships with men [or about] sexual assaults against women, and meeting the needs of national struggles, such as the occupation of white beaches or the protest against detentions” (as qtd. in Kemp et al. 1995, 140). These “tensions” meant local opposition organizations and small groups of women trade union activists struggled to put violence against women on the public agenda. The most successful groups advocating this issue were white women’s organizations like Cape Town Rape Crisis (Hassim 2006; Meintjes 2003). They protested egregious procedures by the courts and actively lobbied the state, demanding greater provider services for survivors of violence and legislation to make violence against women illegal (Meintjes 2003). In contrast to gender-based violence, women’s work issues appeared on the public agenda fairly early. Regional women’s organizations like the UWO, as well as the UDF and ANC, were much more interested in 38

Motherism refers to women’s caretaking role in the family and its extension to the political realm (Bonin 2000; Fester 2005; McClintock 1993). Charters in South Africa are associated with participatory politics and substantive rights claims.

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denouncing apartheid and economic exploitation than fighting genderbased violence. Women’s organizations linked their interests to those of the opposition movement, with groups like NOW offering slogans like “The nation is not free if women are not free” (Kemp et al. 1995, 139). The UWO proclaimed at its founding that women had the right to equality at work and at home. However, both organizations frequently deferred to UDF priorities. Slogans like “Bread for people and not for profits” dovetailed with the national liberation struggle more than they highlighted women’s inequitable status in the workplace (Fester 2005, 206). Women in the trade unions, however, were able to get COSATU to put their work interests on the public agenda. COSATU called for equal pay for equal work, childcare, paid maternity leave, and a living wage; affiliates with large numbers of women demanded these rights through petitions and protests to employers (Dove 1993; NUMSA 1987; van Driel 2002). In 1988, the first COSATU women’s conference broadened that agenda, demanding training on gender-based violence, an end to sexual harassment, and changes to the sexual division of labor in the household (Seidman 1993, 308). At the July 1989 COSATU Congress, women members strongly supported a resolution condemning sexual harassment; it was heatedly debated but not endorsed (Klugman 1989b). Although women’s rights were not yet viewed as coterminous with national liberation, women in COSATU helped put violence against women and women’s work issues on the public agenda. As debate conditions became significantly more open and inclusive in the early 1990s, demands for violence against women entered the public sphere more frequently, increasing pressure upon the state and ANC to respond. The unbanning of the ANC helped shift the dominant discursive frame from national liberation toward rights talk that emphasized equal citizenship. Women in the ANC drew upon this frame to make claims as rights bearers. In 1991, ANCWL members railed against gender inequalities, not only in the workforce but also in the home, targeting sexual harassment (Seidman 1993, 312).39 Underscoring the intense passion building around this issue, ANCWL national organizer Nosiviwe Maphisa went so far as to insist that if the ANC did not denounce violence against women, opposition women would “look for another party to vote for in the election …”40 Her threat was underscored by dramatic action in the streets. Women’s organizations held Take Back the Night 39

40

“Give Sexes Equality in Workplace,” The Citizen May 2, 1992; Khangale Makhado, “ANCWL Out to Empower Women,” Sowetan April 29, 1997. As quoted in Lakela Kaunda, “Women’s League Cautions ANC about Demands,” Natal Witness August 8, 1993.

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marches involving thousands. In a remarkable show of solidarity against sexual violence and rape, protests and work “stayaways” cut across racial, class, and ideological divisions, bringing together trade unionists, militant students, and middle-class white women (Fester 2005; Hassim 2006, 135; Meintjes 2003; Seidman 1993, 303). Even the apartheid parliament debated gender-based violence, with Suzman and several other MPs pressing for recognition of rape in marriage (Meintjes 2003, 151; Suzman 1993, 254–255). The Women’s Charter forcefully addressed violence against women and women’s work. It not only called for equality in the family, but also attacked “similar treatment” and included demands for substantive gender justice. The WNC insisted on better legal protection, special facilities for reporting GBV, shelters, counseling, and education for all administrators (WNC 1994b, Article 10). The Charter also deplored women’s difficulty in obtaining formal sector work and recommended “accident and disability insurance, group housing schemes, sick leave and maternity benefits” (WNC 1994b, Article 3). These demands raised the profile of gender-based violence and women’s work status. By the end of the period, COSATU reinforced these demands for substantive equality. The trade union federation insisted that affirmative action should include women of all races and endorsed a package of family rights for women workers, such as job security for pregnant women and paid maternity leave (Dove 1993, 22; Work in Progress 1992). Women members launched an annual National Childcare Day Campaign in 1990 and published a book detailing their concerns (Isaacs 1992). Along with several universities, COSATU backed women’s demands for an end to gender-based violence and endorsed support services for survivors (see “Back Matter” in Agenda in the early 1990s). As the decade advanced, public debate over women’s rights intensified just as debate conditions improved. Demands for formal and substantive equality put pressure on the ANC and the apartheid regime to respond.

Gender Justice in Apartheid South Africa As debate conditions became more open and inclusive in South Africa and democratic elections loomed, political elites intent on winning votes increased their support for women’s rights. The authoritarian state demonstrated moderate levels of support, whereas the ANC embraced substantive equality. As in Chile, this outcome was surprising, as both the apartheid regime and the ANC had long been conservative on women’s rights. Indeed, the apartheid government was notorious for its conservatism on

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gender. Since the Boer War at the end of the nineteenth century, Afrikaners had glorified women’s roles in the private sphere. They continued to celebrate the Afrikaner woman as “volksmoeder,” or suffering mother of the Afrikaner nation, who kept Afrikaner culture alive (McClintock 1993). Despite this conservative cultural legacy, as debate conditions improved and elections loomed, the apartheid state took action against genderbased violence and women’s discrimination in the workforce. Early in the period, government support was limited and affected few women. In 1984, the regime approved a Matrimonial Property Bill that abolished marital power in community of property, providing white married women with some assets, modestly undermining the degree of unequal power relations in the home (Suzman 1993, 250–251). In 1988, the law was extended to the few black civil law marriages. In 1989, the regime established a Family Advocate’s Office to address family violence. In the early 1990s, it initiated an Attorney General’s Task Group on Rape in the Western Cape to evaluate administrative sensitivity to rape survivors (Suzman 1991, 250). These changes were important but narrow in scope and did not bring South Africa up to international standards. Moreover, state violence against opposition women persisted, as the regime detained over 3,000 women, routinely practicing gendered forms of violence and torture (Meintjes 1998, 100–101). In many respects, Afrikaner policies toward women and gender-based violence were similar to those of the Pinochet regime. However, in the early 1990s, the apartheid state acted decisively on a number of fronts to redress violence against women. The Attorney General’s task group established a sexual offences court in Cape Town, along with a number of changes to police and hospital policies (Murray et al. 1998, 311). The government also introduced a draft Prevention of Family Violence Bill and passed an amended version of the bill in 1993 (Sadie and van Aardt 1995, 80–83).41 Although the new law failed to provide a clear definition of gender-based violence, assaults, or threats, it made domestic violence a crime for the first time and put an end to some egregious practices, such as the denial of marital rape (Albertyn et al. 1999, 122; Meintjes 2003, 150). For its time, the legislation was broad in scope, and what it did outlaw was clearly detailed. In one fell swoop, the government brought the country into line with global standards.42

41

42

Carmel Rickard, “SA’s Women Should Not Only be Seen, But Heard,” Sunday Times March 14, 1993. As Laurel Weldon points out in her cross-national comparison of policy responses on violence against women in thirty-six democratic countries, only fifteen had taken any action on the issue by 1984, but nearly all had done so by 1994 (2002b, 30).

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A similar pattern is evident for the second gender justice issue – women’s work. The apartheid regime had long intervened in the economy to ensure growth and a social safety net for whites. In the early 1980s, it adopted neoliberal policies that intensified women’s marginalization in the workforce, particularly black women. For example, it reduced child support, making it available to only a tiny sector of poor women (Habib and Padayachee 2000; Hassim 2006, 112–113; Naidoo and Bozalek 1997).43 Similar to Chile under Pinochet, the government did not mandate daycare or paid maternity leave, and employers often dismissed pregnant women from their jobs. However, as debate conditions became more open and inclusive in the early 1990s, the government addressed women as workers and significantly augmented their legal rights. The regime proposed a Promotion of Equal Opportunities Bill and Abolition of Discrimination Against Women Bill. Although the Promotion of Equal Opportunities Bill was intended to eliminate sex discrimination in the workplace and also addressed sexual harassment, women’s organizations opposed it because they were not consulted in its formulation, it was technically complex, and had a simplistic approach to gender equality (Kaganas and Murray 1994; Suzman 1993). In its stead, the 1993 General Law Fourth Amendment Act removed a number of egregious discriminatory workplace practices, such as the dismissal of women employees upon marriage and “protective” labor legislation (Baden, Hassim, and Meintjes 1998, 30). Although the Act did not offer skills training or address structural inequalities in the labor force (Kaganas and Murray 1994, 31), this was not unusual for this neoliberal era. In 1993 the government also extended the 1983 Basic Conditions of Employment Act to domestic and agricultural workers, demonstrating a willingness to address women’s work status in some of the most marginalized economic sectors (Baden et al. 1998, 30). Finally, in 1993, the government signed CEDAW. Although it is true that Pinochet ratified CEDAW whereas the South African regime only signed it, in every other respect the apartheid government exceeded Chilean state responsiveness, as can be seen in Table 5.2. During this period, the apartheid regime took significant action to establish a minimal

43

Some women in the unionized sector did have maternity leave as a result of negotiations with employers. For a listing of several unions that won these benefits, and of sources detailing how they were won, see Labour Research Service, “Women at Work, ” http://www.lrs.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=31&Itemid=5 2, accessed June 24, 2010.

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table 5.2. Responsiveness on Women’s Rights in Authoritarian Chile and South Africa Chile

South Africa

Government

Amended Civil Code in 1989 Ratified CEDAW in 1989

1993 Prevention of Family Violence Act 1993 General Law Fourth Amendment Act 1983 Basic Conditions of Employment Act extended to domestic and farm workers in 1993 Signed CEDAW in 1993

Opposition

Endorsed violence against women legislation Endorsed anti-discrimination legislation

Endorsed cutting-edge violence against women legislation, safe houses and education Endorsed affirmative action, job creation, training, and daycare

floor of formal equality for women in the paid labor force and took definitive action on violence against women. Much as the just debate approach anticipates, the ANC also significantly increased its opposition to gender-based violence and promoted reforms in women’s work status as elections approached. As in Chile, the opposition movement offered higher levels of support than the regime. In this case, the opposition endorsed substantive levels of gender justice. Given the history of the apartheid struggle, this high-level support was surprising. The National Party had worked assiduously to break down the African family as migratory labor and pass laws tied women to rural communities and separated spouses (Walker 1982 and 1990). As a result, black households lost their privacy and autonomy, and family domesticity and motherhood became cherished political values. Indeed, the resistance movement revered mothers and celebrated African women who mobilized against the regime as “mothers of revolution” who should “save the nation for their children” (McClintock 1993, 75). That legitimized women’s resistance while constraining it, placing them firmly within the boundaries of the patriarchal family. During the 1980s, the ANC did not have a progressive position on gender-based violence or women’s work. In fact, the ANC was unresponsive to women’s complaints about sexual harassment, refusing to release reports written by ANC women that exposed the problem in the

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movement (Kadalie 2005). Instead, the leadership addressed violence against women by controlling women’s sexuality. For example, they forbid women soldiers to become pregnant and required all ANC women recruits in exile to have IUDs (Hassim 2004 and 2005, 52 and 92). However, as debate conditions became more open and inclusive, the ANC leadership proclaimed a new commitment to equal rights for women in “private life” (ANC 1988). In 1990, the ANC publicly acknowledged the source of gender inequalities, pointedly noting, “[p]atriarchal rights, especially but not only with regard to family, land and the economy need serious reexamination so that they are not entrenched or reinforced” (ANC Statement on the Emancipation of Women, 1990). The party also condemned “patriarchal controls” and promised to end GBV, insisting upon women’s “empowerment and equality with men in all spheres of life, private and public” (as qtd. in Meintjes 1998, 106). In addition to these supportive pronouncements, the party organized a “think tank” tasked with making recommendations on violence against women, and its Commission on the Emancipation of Women recommended education and training on violence against women in schools, the police, and the army, and it proposed shelters for women (Albertyn et al. 1999, 120; Meintjes 1998, 106 and 2003, 148). ANC statements and actions made it clear that the leadership would no longer deny the seriousness of violence against women, and that it understood the problem required significant changes in the family, culture, and the economy. This attentiveness to the multifaceted nature of violence against women and the ANC’s willingness to endorse substantive forms of remediation signaled an unusually strong commitment matched by few long-standing democracies. In contrast to the formal levels of gender justice supported by the opposition in authoritarian Chile, ANC support extended to substantive levels. The level of ANC support for advances in women’s work status was similar to its position on gender-based violence. ANC constitutional promises included a commitment to “special steps to remove the barriers to women participating fully in economic life.”44 Those “specials steps” included affirmative action for women in the workplace, as well as job creation, training, and state-funded daycare (Agenda 1990; Budlender 1993).45 The ANC also promised to recognize women’s reproductive 44 45

“Our Plan: 5. Improving the Lives of Women,” Sunday Times March 8, 1994. “Give Sexes Equality in Workplace,” The Citizen May 2, 1992; Khangale Makhado, “ANCWL Out to Empower Women,” Sowetan April 29, 1997.

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labor (Budlender 1993, 32–33). The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), an ANC election policy platform, formalized these commitments. The RDP promised women land redistribution, entrepreneurial skills, better access to credit, and public works programs – in short, equality of opportunity and results. However, the RDP discussion on implementation was quite vague, with few policy directives (ANC 1994). Moreover, RDP attention to women’s work, although extensive, revealed a thin understanding of the multiple forms of inequalities the country’s diverse women faced. Ignoring critical differences among women and between women and other marginalized groups, the RDP referred to “women and workers,” “black people and women,” and most frequently “women and youth” (ANC 1994). Although the ANC bucked the neoliberal trend of the era by making significant gender commitments on an array of women’s work issues, those commitments lacked a sophisticated gender analysis as well as details on critical funding and administrative specifics. This undermined the strength of ANC commitments. Nevertheless, the ANC made it clear that gender justice was no longer secondary to the antiapartheid movement, and took a number of steps to advance that cause. Ultimately, both the apartheid regime and the ANC responded to public debate much as the just debate approach anticipates, and to a greater extent than either the authoritarian regime or pro-democracy movement in Chile.

Conclusion The just debate approach argues that as openness and inclusiveness in the leading institutions of the public sphere improve, debate over gender justice will broaden, pressuring political elites to respond by offering greater support for women’s rights. A comparison of the period prior to democratic elections in Chile and South Africa indicates this claim has causal force because alternative explanations cannot account for the variations in gender outcomes in these two cases. Significantly, both cases indicate that more open and inclusive debate conditions were not dependent on the revival of leading political institutions in the public sphere, but on whether women were able to form effective counterpublics in those institutions. During the early 1980s, pro-democracy forces forged a political opening in Chile. Women’s organizations were central to that political shift, quickly multiplied, and formed open and inclusive coalitions that

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promoted women’s rights. However, by mid-decade, Chilean political parties re-emerged and had gained the upper hand, undercutting debate conditions in and among women’s organizations. The political parties subordinated demands for women’s rights to party agendas. When the 1988 plebiscite vote indicated women were a key electoral constituency, the political parties allowed moderate demands for women’s rights to enter public debate. Both the regime and the political opposition supported those demands in their quest to appear responsive to public opinion. Debate conditions in South Africa at the end of the period diverged from this pattern. Initially, the ANC, UDF, and trade unions were not open and inclusive. In a pattern similar to Chile, the UDF and ANC undermined debate conditions in women’s organizations, subsuming women’s political activism within the national struggle for liberation. However, South African women trade unionists won several important changes in COSATU, and the Women’s Section in the ANC persistently pursued open and inclusive debate. Working with the WNC, women activists, academics, trade unionists, and politicians helped pry open debate conditions at the transition negotiations. In contrast to Chile, South African women used multiple sites to broaden debate content and make demands for formal and substantive gender justice. Political elites responded to their demands with commensurate commitments and legislative reform. A comparison of these two cases suggests that the openness and inclusiveness of debate conditions can vary significantly even in authoritarian states during the period prior to democratic elections. In Chile, women won only moderate access, voice, and the capacity for contestation, whereas in South Africa women made notable advances in several institutions in the public sphere. The comparison demonstrates that those differences played a significant role in shaping outcomes on women’s rights. Moderate debate conditions persisted in Chile after the 1989 election, when the Concertacion moved into power. Intent on holding the coalition together, the Concertacion promoted a politics of consensus to maintain coalition unity and secure its political gains (Haas 2006; Hipsher 1996; Olavarria 2003; Paley 2004). That containment strategy created obstacles to women in the leading institutions of the public sphere. Limited debate conditions have characterized the legislature despite the recent presidency of Michelle Bachelet. Although Bachelet won the presidency in 2006 with 53.5 percent of the women’s vote, women’s numbers in congress increased slowly; they only composed 14.2 percent of the legislature in 2010 (IUP 2010; Tobar 2008). A handful of women legislators proposed quota legislation and a bill to limit male

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dominance in political parties in the mid-1990s and in 2003, challenging debate conditions in both political parties and congress. None of these proposals succeeded (Franceschet 2001 and 2005). The situation in civil society was a bit better. Issue-based women’s organizations continued to work together to project women’s demands into public debate. However, class divisions among women activists deepened after the transition, and many women’s groups became depoliticized (Drogus and StewartGambino 2005; Schild 1998, 238; Tobar 2003a, 268). Moreover, the church withdrew its support from women’s civic and political organizations, and instead worked to ensure that the majority of women activists were “pushed out” of church associations and parish life (Drogus and Stewart-Gambino 2005, 121; Fisher 1993, 40). As trade union organizations continued to lose power they reached out to women as a way to expand their eroding membership base, but leadership reinforced women’s roles as mothers and did little to advance women within their ranks (Del Mar Serna Calvo 1996, 54–55; Stephen 1997). Rural and indigenous women formed their own organizations and networks, and a few women became union leaders, but in mixed worker’s organizations male-domination persisted (Oxfam 2008).46 Political parties, which have continued to be the preeminent institutions in Chilean public life, also remained male dominated and continued to marginalize women members. Even as parties endorsed an increase in the number of women in party structures, women’s presence in most party structures hovered near 20 percent (Gray 2003, 66–67; Waylen 2000, 784–785). Women party militants reported they “hardly had the right to ask to speak at party meetings” (as qtd in Franceschet 2001, 213). This pattern persisted over time, as competitive styles of speech continued to favor men and intimidate many women; the recurrent theme was a feeling of being “invisible” (Franceschet 2001 and 2005, 92). Just as women activists and politicians struggled to sustain moderate debate conditions, so too they struggled to shape public debate over gender justice. Indeed, consensus politics initially directed the efforts of activists away from public debate. For example, early in the 1990s, women’s organizations advocated new domestic violence legislation, but the executive branch quickly overtook and directed their efforts. Working within the political culture of consensus, the women’s ministry helped 46

Daniela Estrada, “Chile: Women Trade Unionists Find their Own Voices,” Inter Press Service News Agency November 25, 2008, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=44831, accessed June 24, 2010.

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pass a bill that promoted family values. The 1994 Intra-Family Violence Act required couples to submit to reconciliation counseling, insisting women take the position of defending their marriage over their own lives (Haas 2006, 215; Macaulay 2006). After congress passed the highly conservative 1994 Act, women’s advocacy coalitions like the Chilean Network against Domestic and Sexual Violence decided to work independently of the executive branch and turned to the public sphere. They generated widespread public support for reform through campaigns like “Protect women’s lives: no more deaths” (Nazarit 2007). Feminists in congress drew upon this public support to propose legislative reform. Continued advocacy by women’s coalitions and a series of femicide cases maintained public attention on gender-based violence. Greater public debate over GBV produced results. In 2005, congress passed a series of legal reforms on gender-based violence that culminated in the Domestic Violence Act. The Act ended mandatory counseling, established family courts and victim protection units, and criminalized domestic violence (Franceschet 2008; Haas 2006; Macaulay 2006 and 2009; UN 2006). A Center for Preventative Measures within the family courts now exists, the government has funded more women’s shelters, and a number of widely supported reform initiatives are currently on the legislative agenda (Franceschet in press; Nazarit 2007; US Department of State 2008). By forming coalitions in civil society and generating public debate over women’s vulnerability to violence, advocates of GBV legislation in civil society and in congress successfully put pressure on the state to pass moderate-level reforms. In contrast to Chile, where women struggled to secure moderate debate conditions after the transition to democracy, debate conditions in South Africa continued to improve for several years. In the next two chapters, I compare the five-year period after the first nonracial elections in South Africa with the consolidation period to analyze the continued advancement of women’s rights during the 1990s and their abrupt stall at the end of the century.

6 Just Debate Prevails The Liberal Moment in South Africa

“… freedom cannot be achieved unless women have been emancipated from all forms of oppression.” Nelson Mandela

Introduction South Africa has become a paradigmatic site for investigating how and why advances in women’s rights occur in democratizing states. As discussed in the previous chapter, during the years immediately prior to the first nonracial election, advocates won important commitments to women’s rights from the ANC, as well as new legislation from the apartheid regime. Surprisingly, after the 1994 elections, these advances continued. The government ratified CEDAW in 1995. It addressed women’s inequitable employment in the 1995 Labour Relations Act, 1997 Basic Conditions of Employment Act, the 1998 Employment Equity Act, and the 2000 Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act. In 1996, abortion was legalized. In 1998, the legislature passed a remarkable domestic violence bill and reformed the maintenance law and customary marriage. However, this triumphal story did not last. This series of gender reforms sputtered to an end despite continued pressing need for action. Some legislation in the new century even threatened women’s gains. What accounts for this rise and stall in gender reform? This is an unusual question for gender scholars who study democratic transitions, as advances in women’s rights like those in South Africa are rare. The stall, on the other hand, is not surprising. In the end, South Africa appears to confirm what gender scholars have already 157

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established: Democratization is not associated with significant advances in women’s rights. Indeed, existing explanations for the rise and stall of gender justice in South Africa underscore the limits of democratic politics for women’s rights. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, none can explain why legislation advanced gender justice during the liberal moment (1994–1999) and then stalled during consolidation (1999–2004). In this chapter and the next, I test the just debate approach through a structured focused comparison of debate conditions and gender justice during the liberal moment and consolidation period in South Africa. The comparison reveals that debate conditions shifted significantly over time as ANC elites used a number of mechanisms as its disposal to expand and then coopt the public sphere, with serious consequences for debate conditions. After the 1994 elections, an atmosphere of excitement and partnership pervaded much of the country.1 The Government of National Unity embraced political inclusivity, accessibility, and transparency and created a number of mechanisms to increase the ability of ordinary South Africans to participate in public debate (Ebrahim 1998, 179–180). The GNU’s commitment was a pragmatic political decision, because the secretive process of policy making and exclusion of blacks from formal politics during apartheid meant the state needed to increase public participation to foster legitimacy. Moreover, a highly mobilized population supported the dominant partner in the GNU, the ANC. Hence the ANC used the PR electoral system and quota, their electoral dominance, and new participatory mechanisms to pack parliament with their most talented adherents, increase the influence of parliamentary committees, build linkages between civil society and the state, and transform the media. In this case, the ANC facilitated an expansion of debate conditions in parliament and civil society. Talented ANC women MPs created counterpublics and challenged the informal obstacles that hindered their ability to speak out and be heard. Likewise, women activists in civil society created new issue-based organizations and coalitions, and used new participatory mechanisms to increase their leverage in the public sphere. As a result, both women MPs and women activists had the ability to influence the content of public debate and put pressure on the state to advance women’s rights. The outcome was exceptional gender reform. 1

Burton interview; Hassim interview; Gender Coordinator for the National Land Commission; Michelle Festus, interview, Johannesburg, July 29, 2003. Also see Bazilli 1991, 12–17.

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However, over time it became obvious that ANC government elites did not value spirited contestation over their policies.2 Instead, top government leaders insisted criticism of the ANC was racist and threatened their efforts to build a new South Africa. Denying the ANC was merely a political party, ANC elites argued they had a direct relationship with the people that enabled them to determine the “national” interest (Johnston 2005, 19). For ANC leaders, the function of parliament, civil society, and the media was not as government watchdogs or conveyors of the public interest, but as supporters and service providers. By the consolidation period, ANC governing elites assiduously took action to ensure this outcome. They used the PR system, quota, their electoral dominance, and participatory mechanisms to centralize power in the executive branch, strangle internal party debate, rein in independent MPs, and stymie critique in civil society and the media. Their efforts undermined debate conditions in several locations. These effects were not immediately visible to gender scholars because women activists, politicians, and academics remained prominent actors throughout civil society and in the state. Indeed, governing elites avidly supported women’s access to institutions across the public sphere. However, as the ANC used the PR system and quota to discipline talented women MPs and assiduously undermine their counterpublics, debate conditions in the legislature declined. Similarly, the ANC used state funding and its extensive political influence to restrict the agenda of women’s organizations; it also hollowed out the functions of participatory mechanisms. As debate conditions contracted in these two sites, the content of public debate on gender justice narrowed, and by the consolidation period state action on women’s rights had stalled.

Debate Conditions during the Liberal Moment The celebrated first South African nonracial elections brought a triumphant ANC to power in a Government of National Unity, a constitutionally mandated multiparty government with seven political parties. In 1996, the Constitutional Assembly, composed of MPs in the first 2

The most influential leaders in the ANC during the liberal moment and consolidation periods were in the executive branch, especially the cabinet (Butler 2005; Calland 2006). During the transition, Mandela’s advisors and staff were few in number and included the increasingly powerful Deputy President Thabo Mbeki. For a discussion of governing elites during the consolidation era, see Chapter 7.

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nonracial legislature, passed a final constitution securing liberal rights for all South Africans. The ANC-dominated government also deliberately expanded the public sphere. It transformed the policy-making process, making it more transparent and participatory by opening committee meetings to the public. It institutionalized a process for stakeholders in civil society to offer written submissions on legislation, and held public hearings on issues of pressing public concern. The ANC also pursued media reform to open the industry to black South Africans. This was the heyday of the public sphere. The Legislature The most important public arena during the liberal moment was parliament, and debate conditions here became relatively good. Although the ANC named an extraordinary and high-profile group of opposition leaders to its candidate lists, the chaos of the transition ensured that ANC selection of both women and men candidates in 1994 was “haphazard” (Feinstein 2009, 24). Moreover, few candidates had formal government experience. MPs faced significant challenges as they struggled to adapt to their new responsibilities. For example, ANC party whips unfamiliar with parliamentary procedures and overwhelmed with mundane tasks like providing housing and parking for new MPs struggled to do their jobs (Jacobs 1997). Nevertheless, MPs had considerable power during this period. From 1994 to 1996, they wrote the final constitution.3 The ANC also worked to increase the power of committees in parliament because it was forced to work with opposition parties in the executive branch (Gordhan 1997). Throughout this period, parliament was a site of vibrant political debate even on issues that were embarrassing to the ANC, such as corruption and HIV/AIDS (Feinstein 2009, 64). Before the first nonracial election in 1994, ANC women activists, politicians, and academics had secured their access to parliament by winning a 30-percent voluntary quota on the ANC candidate list. The multimember, closed-list PR system facilitated the quota. ANC electoral dominance also facilitated the entry of ninety ANC women to parliament: Most women were at the bottom of the party lists, so they gained their seats in parliament because the ANC swept the election. In the first 3

MPs drew upon extensive legal expertise, including feminist academics and lawyers. Once the final constitution was completed, the ANC sent a number of MPs to other sectors in government, reinforcing the institutional fluidity of this early period.

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nonracial parliament, ANC women MPs included the powerful insider Frene Ginwala, ardent trade union organizer Pregs Govender, and rural activist Lydia Kompe. Other South African parties also promoted women candidates in their ranks, although none adopted a quota. As a result, 111 South African women entered parliament in 1994. Their large numbers provided a basis for improving debate conditions. In addition to their large numbers and diverse professional backgrounds, women MPs came from a wide range of class, racial, and ideological backgrounds (Britton 2005; Geisler 2004).4 Women MPs also gained important political positions in the new parliament. Frene Ginwala and Baleka Mbete were speaker and deputy speaker, respectively, ten women were chairpersons in the thirty-five powerful portfolio committees, and women were the majority in a number of committees, including welfare and communications (Hassim 2003b, 89; Myakayaka-Manzini 1998, 175).5 Women’s impressive access did not mean debate conditions in the legislature were open and inclusive, however. On the contrary, they battled to speak out and be heard. Many women MPs had honed their political skills in the streets, where they had mastered mass action and resistance, but they lacked educational and leadership experience that inspired the confidence of their peers (Geisler 2004, 181). Their alternative speaking styles were not respected. For example, as The Cape Times reported, the singer, “Jennifer Ferguson, ANC MP, still smarting after her ‘poems to music’ were declared inappropriate to Parliament while all around her ‘fighting games’ were being played out, suggested that women’s broad goal ought to be to correct the imbalances in society.”6 Attuned to gendered differences, women MPs complained about the “cut-throat” culture of parliament and likened it to “a boys’ high school debating club” (Serote et al. 1996, 69). Women MPs with less education and other structural disadvantages were the most disempowered. Mahau Phekoe of the Women’s National Coalition noted, “At the last budget speech, three women commented on the budget. One read a speech written in English. She struggled with what she had to say … Comments were made on her bad delivery. The other two had done no research. This discredited these

4 5

6

No statistics on women in parliament by race exist. Women’s parliamentary committee membership reflected typical gender patterns (Hassim 1999, 206–207). “Women Stake Their Claim to a Fairer Place in New South Africa,” The Cape Times March 10, 1995.

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women” (Meer 1998, 163). ANC MP Lydia Kompe, the charismatic leader of the Rural Women’s Movement, admitted, “I cannot see myself making any input never mind impact here” (as qtd. in Mtintso 1999, 41).7 Some men MPs deliberately obstructed women’s ability to speak out and be heard in parliament. ANC MP Naledi Pandor remarked, “I have noticed sometimes that, when women put up their hands to speak, the male chairperson will look at them as if a bolt of lightning has struck.”8 Indeed, women reported men ignored them when they asked to speak; some men left the room, some blocked women’s entry to meeting rooms (Britton 2005, 75). Men MPs also commented on women’s appearance as they were making a speech; women reported this made them feel like window dressing (Vincent 1999, 32). Sexual harassment in the first year was pervasive (Geisler 2000, 618 and 2004, 175).9 Women also were on the periphery of parliamentary social life because they lacked informal forums like the all-male rugby team that helped male MPs develop working relationships and mutual respect. Nevertheless, debate conditions in parliament did improve as women leaders established their own organizations.10 In 1994, women MPs, backed by Ginwala and Mbete, formed the cross-party Parliamentary Women’s Group (PWG) with the aim of making parliament more hospitable to women. Many women MPs had young children, so the PWG helped change the parliamentary calendar to match the school schedule; meetings ended before the dinner hour.11 Although the PWG succeeded in making parliament more women-friendly, parliament did not return the favor. It did not officially recognize the PWG; the group did not have a budget, and had difficulty scheduling meeting times. Although the PWG won some important victories, its momentum declined as women’s shared interests gave way to party ideology. Additional counterpublics soon emerged. Young black ANC women established the ANC Women’s Caucus that, like the PWG, lacked government funding and party recognition. Ginwala secured international funds for a Women’s Empowerment Unit (WEU) that offered skills training. The ANC Women’s Caucus lobbied for the establishment of the Commission 7 8

9 10 11

Nevertheless, Kompe became a skilled MP. As quoted in Susan Segar, “Still Largely a Male Domain,” The Natal Witness, July 5, 1998. Camerer interview. For a profile of women leaders, see Britton 2006, chapter 4. Additional changes included a more relaxed dress code, gender-sensitive language in legislation, more toilets for women MPs, and women’s showers in the gym.

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on Gender Equality (CGE), using public admonishment and workshops and training to win support. Women MPs from other parties supported this agenda.12 Other challenges to the parliamentary status quo succeeded by building on these victories. Ginwala used the resources of her office, a position she won through the efforts of the ANC Women’s Caucus, to set up the Joint Standing Committee on the Improvement of the Quality of Life and Status of Women (JMC) (Britton 2007, 73). This committee promoted a Women’s Budget Initiative to expose gendered fiscal policy. Of all these institutions, the JMC was the most dynamic, even though it operated without a budget of its own, did not have a full-time administrator, and was initially an ad hoc committee. Although not all the counterpublics established by women MPs during this period were successful or long lasting, these organizations helped women legislators speak out on a variety of issues and win the respect of their colleagues. ANC MPs like Brigitte Mabandla and Mavivi Manzini claimed that men became more receptive to women, and that their contributions in committees and parliamentary debate were increasingly valued (Geisler 2000, 618 and 621; Mtintso 1999). By 1997 and 1998, women MPs reported greater assertiveness and comfort (Mtintso 1999). Working through organizations like the ANC Women’s Caucus and the JMC, women MPs had pried open debate conditions in parliament. Civil Society Parliament dominated the public sphere during the liberal moment. In part, this was because civil society was in a state of turmoil. The new government drew its ranks from civil society, draining it of leadership and experience. Moreover, the role of civil society had shifted radically with the 1994 nonracial elections: Instead of pursuing ungovernability, organizations needed to become partners in transformation. Many groups were overwhelmed with these challenges. Government stepped in to fill the gap. To secure its legitimacy and strengthen its capacity to reach ordinary South Africans, the GNU established a number of mechanisms to enhance public participation.13 However, by the end of the liberal moment, 12

13

“Where Is the Gender Equality Commission?” Mail & Guardian, May 5, 1995. The CGE is a constitutionally mandated body charged with monitoring and investigating gender equality. The most unique of these mechanisms were the Public Participation Programmes (PPPs), created by parliament to educate citizens about the purpose of a constitution and to solicit their views. The PPPs targeted women, rural women in particular. Thousands of

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government enthusiasm for public participation waned. Nelson Mandela characterized the independent activism of civil society as a threat to the leadership of the ANC, and insisted the relationship between government and civil society should be a “patriotic partnership for development and transformation” led by the ANC (ANC 1996; Mandela 1997). Although this stance threatened to limit the functions of civil society, during the liberal moment much of civil society was fractured and disorganized. Women’s organizations were an exception: They multiplied, created coalitions, and used the new participatory mechanisms heralded by the GNU to gain power in the public sphere. Women’s Organizations Prior to the first nonracial elections, women activists, politicians, and academics created the Women’s National Coalition. As discussed in Chapter 5, the WNC achieved good levels of openness and inclusiveness by bringing a remarkably diverse and large number of women’s organizations together to influence the transition negotiations and engage two million women in its consciousness-raising campaign. However, this success was short-lived. In 1994, the Coalition broke its link to political parties by ruling that women MPs could not hold an official position in the organization. This cut the organization off from its most talented leaders. The rapid decline of the WNC left a political vacuum: No new national organization emerged to promote women’s rights. Nevertheless, women activists increased their organizing and quickly became the most dynamic sector in civil society (Habib 2005). The relative weakness of much of civil society enabled new, issue-based women’s organizations to attract members. Analysts estimate that 2,000 women’s organizations (including private and civic associations) emerged during this period. Gender workshops, conferences, training and empowerment courses, seminars, and centers also multiplied (Baden et al. 1998, 110).14

14

Constitutional Public Meetings were held on weekends in rural areas and places where media access was limited. The CA also provided transportation to and from meetings, and translation was available in multiple languages. The government offered a Constitutional Education Programme in conjunction with the meetings to inform people of the purpose and nature of a constitution. Government outreach programs and meetings involved approximately 95,000 South Africans from across the country (Ebrahim 1998; Everatt et al. 1996). Women’s activism filled the pages of Agenda and appeared in numerous newspaper stories. For example, see Betsy Spratt, “Giving the People a Platform for Action,” Sowetan December 14, 1995; Sharon Hendricks, “Fighting an Agenda of Sexism,” The Star November 28, 1994.

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Although women’s groups struggled with racial, class, and regional divisions, urban South African women’s access, voice, and contestation within these groups was good.15 In established organizations debate conditions improved. For example, gender-based violence groups gained black women members. White women had long dominated leadership positions in these organizations, and during this period of political transformation and organizational restructuring, GBV organizations faced pressures to increase their efficiency by becoming more professionalized and hierarchical.16 Black women regarded white women’s leadership and restructuring as threats to their voice and capacity for contestation, and charged racism (Britton 2006; Moolman 2009). In response, Rape Crisis held workshops on racism and developed an affirmative action policy (Moolman 2009). Elite women’s policy NGOs focusing on research and data collection also struggled with internal diversity, but grassroots women’s organizing and government participatory mechanisms helped overcome these limitations. Women academics had forged strong bonds with MPs during the transition negotiations that facilitated their ability to provide feedback and research on issue papers and early draft legislation (Albertyn et al.1999; Meintjes 2003). This meant they had influence in the public sphere. However, their ability to include the voices and interests of a broad array of South African women in their work required effective linkages with activist women NGOs and women’s community-based organizations (CBOs). Although close relationships with the latter did not emerge, research-based NGOs consulted local communities when making policy recommendations (Albertyn et al. 1999).17 Moreover, women’s CBOs were able to work with a number of organizations in civil society and through government participatory structures to speak for themselves and be heard. Indeed, they sometimes challenged policy recommendations made by elite feminists (Albertyn et al. 1999; Hassim 2003a). New opportunities for ordinary citizens to participate in politics included workshops, written submissions to parliament, petitions, visits to parliamentary offices, attendance at parliamentary debates, and open hearings where citizens could lobby, attend, and testify.18 A number of 15

16 17 18

Few rural women participated in these types of organizations and most remained isolated from urban activists. Chantel Cooper, Director, Rape Crisis, interview, Cape Town, July 12, 2006. Gender Research Project analyst Likhpaha Mbatha, interview, Johannesburg, July 9, 2003. A variety of participatory mechanisms also were adopted at the municipal level. The GNU established consensual decision-making forums throughout the country for service

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women’s CBOs capitalized upon these opportunities. For example, in 1996, women in Cape Town established the New Women’s Movement (NWM). The NWM brought together diverse working-class women’s political and religious organizations in a coalition to address cost of living issues. The group was open and inclusive from the start: Public consultations included hundreds of local women who defined the purpose, agenda, and tactics of the umbrella organization (Edwards 1997, 35). To project their voices throughout civil society, the NWM worked with the ANCWL, COSATU, and other high-profile political groups (Edwards 1997, 36). The NWM also went to parliament. Rita Edwards, a founding member, recalls: “[A] great number of the women entered Parliament, many for the first time, to participate in a public hearing. Here grassroots women directed questions to the Minister and the Welfare portfolio committee, turning the hearings into what was more like an open dialogue” (Edwards 1997, 36). Not only did women from CBOs speak in the legislature, analysts report that grassroots women extracted powerful emotional responses from MPs at public hearings (Klugman 1997). Grassroots women spoke and they were heard. As women’s organizations multiplied, they founded networks to increase their leverage in the public sphere. The GBV sector organized quite early. Others soon followed. For example, twenty-seven women’s organizations formed the Reproductive Rights Alliance in 1995, and in 1997, women’s groups had a new networking tool, Women’sNet, to facilitate online communication among elite women’s NGOs and women with internet access.19 Although the latter did not include grassroots activists, internet access did provide a basis for cross-regional and transnational organizing. Chat rooms like those on Women’sNet and a growing number of blogs afforded a small group of women the opportunity to form virtual communities. The National Network on Violence Against Women was more open and inclusive in its membership base. It invited all organizations working on GBV to join, including a number of government departments and several groups in rural areas (Ramagoshi 1997, 42).20 Their conferences proved to be contentious, providing a space to air complaints about

19

20

provisions from RDP public projects (Lodge 2001b, 19–20). It also established education and media programs to educate citizens about democracy. Janine Hicks, “Long, Hard Road for Women in KZN,” The Independent on Saturday December 12, 1998 and Tsepiso Matela, “Gender Equality is a Universal Right for All.” City Press March 8, 1998. “The Constitution … the Best Thing to Happen for South African Women,” Sowetan August 8, 1997.

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the inequitable distribution of resources, and opportunities to strategize solutions and criticize government (Ramagoshi 1997). Women’s NGOs and networks also forged relationships with women in the state. Although initially tense, by the end of the period, collaborative linkages between activists, politicians, and bureaucrats had developed.21 For example, women’s NGOs interested in increasing women’s participation in the state formed partnerships with the Commission on Gender Equality, holding workshops and conferences, writing action plans, and making submissions to parliament (CASE 1998; Shifman, Madlala-Routledge, and Smith 1997; Van Donk and Maceba 1999).22 In a remarkable contrast to much of South African civil society, women’s organizations in urban areas multiplied, lobbied the state, and laid the foundations for coalitions dedicated to internal participatory politics, ensuring debate conditions in this sector of civil society were good, as noted in Table 6.1. COSATU and the ANC While debate conditions in women’s organizations and coalitions were dynamic and improving, the same cannot be said for COSATU or the ANC. COSATU could have been an important venue for black working-class South African women to shape public debate, particularly as COSATU entered into a governing alliance with the ANC in 1994.23 However, at its annual congress in 1994, COSATU admitted that despite its earlier resolutions to advance women within the trade unions, little had changed. A pattern of incremental advances emerged. The average proportion of women in leadership positions in regional COSATU affiliates was 9 percent in 1994; in 1996, the percentage doubled to 15 percent.24 However, women’s advancement at the national level was much slower. In 1995 and 21

22

23

24

Institutional and cultural barriers between women in civil society and parliament obstructed communication and created mistrust. Women MPs reported having difficulty seeing themselves as politicians and expressed a sense of alienation both from the state and civil society (Kathree et al. 1995). Women in civil society argued women MPs did not consult them (Hassim 2003a). Charity Bhengu, “Women Look to Equal Say in Polls,” Sowetan November 18, 1998; Pamela Dube, “SA Women ‘Not Treated Equally,’” Sowetan October 23, 1998. The “tripartite alliance” of the ANC, COSATU, and the South African Communist Party (SACP) provides COSATU and SACP leaders with positions in the ANC. The ANC dominates the alliance. COSATU maintained autonomy from the ANC and continued to function as a trade union federation, so I include it as a separate institution in my analysis of civil society. Women constituted approximately 29 percent of trade union affiliates during this period (SAIRR 2001, 309).

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table 6.1. Debate Conditions during the Liberal Moment Institution

Debate Conditions

Legislature

Good

Women’s Organizations

Good

COSATU

Moderate

ANC

Moderate

Media

Limited

1996, it was stagnant at 6 percent; in 1997, it increased to 8 percent (Orr, Daphne, and Horton 1997a). Contrary to union policy, women members were strongly discouraged from applying for positions like union organizer, and most women in COSATU remained concentrated in dead-end administrative positions (Buhlungu 1997; Tshoaedi 1999). As one female union member dryly remarked, “A democratic union gives all members a right to a say in the way a union works, yet the higher up the union you go the less women you will find taking part in decision making.”25 Women’s access to trade union leadership remained stymied. In addition to having their advancement up the ranks stalled, institutional practices continued to block the voices of women workers. Women trade unionists reported having difficulty participating in union meetings, which were often held in the evenings when transportation was unsafe and domestic duties pressing. Few women spoke out and expressed their interests at meetings; those who did speak out reported men ignored their contributions (Tshosedi 1999, 84 and 88).26 As one gender coordinator explains: “Before when we would raise issues, as soon as we would start saying ‘We women’, people would laugh. Now they’ll be against your position but they’ll listen, they’ll give you a platform to talk even if they don’t take notice … now as women we keep on talking, before we would get ashamed and sit down” (as quoted in Orr 1999, 14 italics added). Although women occasionally spoke in meetings, they still were not heard. This hindered their ability to challenge the status quo. Gender forums established to enable women to speak their minds and shape union policy did not provide a basis for challenging their limited access or voice. Meeting agendas were often vapid, focusing on research, annual events, or minutes from previous meetings.27 Few had adequate 25 26 27

As quoted in M. Naidoo, “Union Women Adopt ‘Charter,”’ The Teaser September 29, 1995. Orr interview. Orr interview.

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funding (Orr 1999). Women hired to be union support staff doubled as gender coordinators, meaning they were reluctant to take initiative on controversial issues; men frequently dominated discussions.28 When gender coordinators introduced gender issues in general union meetings or reports, men consistently disparaged their input (Orr 1999). With women’s advancement in COSATU leadership positions advancing slowly and gender forums stymied, women trade unionists met at conferences and demanded change. The National Conference for Trade Union Women held in Durban produced a charter challenging COSATU’s internal committee structure by calling for greater female participation in negotiating teams, industrial councils, pension funds, and tripartite institutions (Benjamin 1997, 65).29 In response, John Gomomo, the president of COSATU, announced that the organization would sponsor gender sensitivity programs.30 This was not what women trade unionists had requested, but signaled they were not being ignored. Contestation to the status quo also came from the top of the trade union federation. Noting that COSATU’s support for affirmative action “applies to everyone except Cosatu,” in 1997, the organization’s only female national officer, Connie September, challenged conventional hiring and promotion procedures by recommending a 50-percent quota by 2000 (Report to the September Commission 1997).31 Although the African National Congress Women’s League, the South African Communist Party, and the COSATU General Secretary all supported the quota, COSATU unions rejected it. In consolation, the federation offered a gender training program and declaration of union solidarity (Orr et al. 1997a, 25 and 26). As noted in Table 6.1, debate conditions in COSATU remained moderate. Debate conditions in ANC party structures were stymied as well, but the ANC was savvier about how it achieved these results. It increased women’s access while limiting their voice and contestation. In 1994, ANC elites elected Frene Ginwala to sit on the National Executive Committee. This signaled party commitment to women’s leadership. In contrast to the early 1990s, when ANC women leaders had been bitterly disappointed by the

28 29 30

31

COSATU Gender Coordinator Mommy Jaffa, interview, Johannesburg, July 30, 2003. Naidoo, “Union Women” Naidoo, “Union Women.” Judy Mulqueeny insists gender consciousness within the trade unions was stalling as early as 1996, noting that although some men within the unions “are very advanced in gender theory … practically they don’t implement it.” Former South African Communist Party Central Committee Member Judy Mulqueeny, telephone interview, July 27, 2003. Reneé Grawitzky, “Men’s Club is Alive and Well in Cosatu,” Business Day August 25, 1997.

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rejection of a 30-percent NEC quota, in 1997, the ANC wrote a 30-percent quota into its constitution, and by 1999, women constituted 30 percent of ANC NEC members (ANC Constitution 1997). However, the voice and capacity for contestation of women party militants became constrained. Indeed, as ANC leaders brought women into the NEC, they also disciplined ANC women who were either too stridently feminist or too independent (Erlank 2005). For example, party leaders downgraded the tremendously talented Cheryl Carolus, at one point appointing her ANC deputy secretary general, a position that soon gained a reputation as the party’s “burial ground” for outspoken feminists (Hassim 2006, 196). These “redeployments” functioned as latent threats to other ANC women, encouraging self-censorship. To be sure, the ANC placed many talented women advocates of women’s rights in government positions. One consequence of their advancement in the state, however, was that it left them with less time to challenge debate conditions within the party. Exposing the shallowness of the women’s movement within the ANC, few newcomers arrived to fill their shoes (Erlank 2005, 209). Moreover, the ANCWL remained sidelined as institutional weaknesses crippled the organization and its controversial leader, Winnie Madikizela-Mandela, used the League as her personal power base (Hassim 2006, 127). An overreliance on a few feminist leaders who the party quickly disciplined or kept busy elsewhere, along with the demise of the ANCWL, meant women’s voice and contestation within the party declined. Usually the return to formal politics after a democratic transition brings a demobilization of civil society and shifts political action from the streets to the state, where men dominate and women are marginalized. Although many groups in South African civil society demobilized, women’s organizations quickly rebounded and made remarkable gains. Moreover, even as debate conditions declined in the ANC and stalled in COSATU, the government took innovative steps to ensure that South African women of all races were able to engage in public debate, and provided many with the means to do so for the first time. The Media In post-apartheid South Africa, the stature of the print media and their role as an agenda setter were high (Johnston 2005, 26).32 As journalist 32

South African print media were numerous and targeted different class, racial, geographic, and political markets. The Mail & Guardian, Business Day, The Star, Cape Times, and the

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Marcia Klein put it, “people look at us as purveyors of intelligence. Why else is my editor on the radio?”33 However, access to mass media was shockingly low and media content highly skewed toward affluent whites during this period. Although South Africa is a moderate income-level country, its extreme inequalities in wealth mean 20 percent of the population (approximately seven million people, heavily composed of poor, rural, black women) lacked access to any form of mass media at all as late as 2005 (Berger 2004; Johnston 2005).34 South African newspaper readership per capita was among the lowest in the world, and during the liberal moment, whites dominated the media industry. The ANC was determined to end white media dominance, but their task was exacerbated by neoliberalism. For-profit mass media targeted those with disposable incomes and ignored the urban and rural poor. Alternative publications targeting the black working class quickly folded (Baker 2001; Horwitz 2001; Jacobs 1999; Nyamnjoh 2005).35 Condemning the racial media gap that neoliberal reform had intensified, ANC leaders depicted the industry as racist and urged blacks in mass media to spearhead a developmental orientation supporting ANC policies (Mbeki 1996 as cited in Horwitz 2001, 289–291). Many leaders in the ANC argued that a critical press no longer was necessary as the government shared its democratic goals (Berger 1999, 86). ANC action was contradictory: While it threatened state censorship, the party also exposed white corporate control and bias. The former directly threatened the political functions of the media in the public sphere whereas the second was crucial for expanding them. As the ANC battle with the media raged, few paid any attention to women’s status in the industry. Indeed, ANC demands for racial diversification ensured the promotion of black men; black women remained invisible.

33 34

35

Natal Witness appealed to white readers, while Sowetan and City Press had a predominantly black readership. Several presses, like the Evening Post and Sunday Independent, appealed to black and white readers but were not national papers. Many papers were liberal or had a leftist slant, some, like Citizen and Die Berger, were conservative. For a full discussion of newspaper profiles, see Jacobs 1999. Klein interview. The most popular forms of media among the poor were radio and television, with television quickly outpacing radio (Tolmay 2006, 33). Unlike the rest of the African continent, the majority of South Africans receive their media from for-profit enterprises (see Aginam 2005, Fombad 2002, and Windrich 2006 on the African media). Even the South African public broadcaster was dependent on the market to cover the majority of its costs, and so neglected marginalized communities (Duncan 2003, 3).

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Debate conditions in the women’s alternative media declined, and in the mainstream media they did not improve. After the 1994 elections, donor funding shifted toward the state, and several alternative women’s publications folded, including Sash. Agenda was one of the few that managed to stay in business. According to Agenda editor Anne Marian, the key task of publication in the post-apartheid era was to add “women’s voices to the crucial debate to shape South Africa’s transition to democracy by creating a dialogue between feminist academic research and debates within women’s organizations.”36 Agenda also strove to maximize its number of black women writers and hosted numerous workshops and conferences, publicizing the proceedings. During the late 1990s, however, the journal became increasingly academic and professionalized. This change, and the loss of other women’s alternative print media, meant black working-class women had fewer venues for participating in the print media, increasing the importance of debate conditions in the mainstream media. Although both black and white women’s presence in the mainstream media increased modestly during the liberal moment, that did little to enhance their ability to use the media to shape public debate. From 1995 to 2000, the total number of women in the mass media increased by 15 percent (Lowe Morna 2007, 3). Employment opportunities varied by race, gender, and media sector, with the fewest changes in print media (GMMP 2005).37 Phumla Mthala, a researcher at the Media Monitoring Project notes that, “there was a lot of debate, a lot of whining about affirmative action … lots of negative reaction about promoting [black] women,” yet relatively few black women were employed in the industry, and their numerical advances were quite small.38 For example, the employment of black women in junior management increased by 9 percent and in skilled labor positions by 11 percent (Goga 2001). The most notable advances for women were in television and radio. More than half of the state-supported broadcasting staff was composed of women in 1995, although only six out of 872 people in middle 36

37

38

Percy Makhara-Medza, “Marian’s Agenda Uses the Might of the Pen,” City Press July 12, 1998. Conditions across the media varied in numerable ways – for example, by number of employees and company legacy. The data nevertheless indicate that despite this diversity, women’s limited access was common. Women dominated a few media sectors, such as women’s magazines. These sectors adhered to gender norms of femininity, which translated into lower status and pay scales. Media Monitoring Project researcher Phumla Mthala, interview, Cape Town, January 23, 2001.

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management were women.39 By the end of this period, women journalists were the source of 15 percent of SABC’s news stories; at e-tv, women fared a bit better at 18 percent.40 A few women became radio executives, and more frequently worked on news desks.41 The new government mandated local radio stations, including community radio stations in rural areas where black women were the majority. However, as formal structures evolved, men dominated programming and managerial positions in community radio (Taylor and Berger, as cited in Milne and Taylor 2006, 66).42 One analyst noted that in the mid-1990s, out of the approximately eighty newly licensed local radio stations, “only a handful can claim to have women in decision-making roles.”43 In 1999, the ratio of women to men for community and commercial radio were equally unequal: twenty women for every eighty men. Inequality in numbers, diversity, and rank matched women’s limited voice and contestation. Discussions about race were difficult, but discussions about gender were rare, limiting the scope of what women could say. This was especially true for black women. As industry analyst Phumla Mthala noted, “Whites argued that blacks don’t speak in meetings,” but “for [black] women that was even harder, and so they don’t speak.”44 Industry hostility toward gender issues made it difficult for white women to speak about their interests as well. For example, Journalist Jeanne Viall recalls that with a few colleagues, she drew up a list of suggestions for reform that included gender-neutral language. Not only did the editor reject their suggestions, her group “became a joke … we became the feminazis.”45 The Star’s news editor Paula Fray bristled at male control over meaning making during this period, and in an editorial goaded 39

40

41

42

43

44 45

Ijeoma Ross, “After Apartheid: The Struggle for Gender Equality,” The Toronto Star June 18, 1995. Phumla Mthala, “Women: the ‘Missing Story’ on News Pages and in Bulletins,” City Press May 23, 1999. Approximately one in every seven voices on the commercial airwaves was female in 1999. The local radio statistics were only marginally better, with one-quarter of the voices female. Charl Blignaut, “Women Are Turning Up the Volume … Slowly,” Mail & Guardian June 11–17, 1999. Fiona Lloyd, “NGOs Discover ‘Gender,’” Weekly Mail & Guardian September 26, 1996. Lloyd, “NGOs Discover.” One early success was the radio station in rural Moutse. However, by 1999, Tracey Naughten notes that the Moutse Community Radio station had “experienced a gradual slippage … to a male-dominated culture” (Lowe-Morna and Lene Overland 2003, 81). Mthala interview. Journalist Jeanne Viall, phone interview, July 27, 2006.

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her paper to, “reassess its own biases. Who are its sources? Who are its contacts? What does it regard as news? Who does it regard as news worthy? Whose experiences does it reflect? How does it reflect those experiences?”46 No public response was forthcoming. New gender and media institutions mandated by the government that might have lobbied for change within the industry failed to become sites of support for women media workers. The handful of black women officers at the IBA reported being disempowered because their words fell on deaf ears. IBA Councilor Lyndall Shope-Mofole explained, “There is no common understanding of the issues that affect women. We have heated debates in the IBA Council … yet they (the men) don’t see the issue the same way. On all the other questions we can concur, but … we feel powerless to shape the more difficult gender questions” (Shope-Mofole et al., 1996, 26). The Commission on Gender Equality ran into the same brick wall as it attempted to challenge women’s low numbers in upper-level media positions. In 1997, it issued a report to highlight male dominance in the industry and held a symposium on “Gender and Media.” Although the report revealed extensive inequalities, “no columns of outrage, no calling for a national commission of inquiry into the media, nor a spotlight on the role of the editors or owners of the paper whose columns are so overwhelmingly devoted to male opinions and experiences” appeared.47 In 1998, the CGE sponsored a conference on “Gender and Communication Policy.” Political parties and the industry ignored the conference.48 Exposing inequalities did not prompt resolutions or initiatives for reform, and women in the industry remained stymied. Debate conditions in the for-profit media remained quite limited, the situation was better in civil society, particularly in women’s organizations. Debate conditions also improved significantly in parliament, the most powerful institution in the public sphere. That suggests demands for women’s substantive rights would persist during the liberal moment.

Public Debate during the Liberal Moment Demands for substantive reform on violence against women and women’s work status were prominent in the public sphere during the liberal moment in South Africa, much as the just debate approach anticipates. 46 47 48

Paula Fray, “Media Must be Gender Sensitive,” The Star October 1, 1997. Fray, “Media Must.” Lindsay Barnes, “African Media Give Women a Raw Deal,” Cape Argus June 11, 1998.

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Women MPs and women’s organizations were the strongest advocates of women’s rights, but other institutions in civil society, including COSATU and the media, also helped focus public debate on these issues. As discussed in Chapter 5, South Africans often characterize feminism as a white, bourgeois, Western import with limited relevance for black South African women.49 This made it difficult for most anti-apartheid activists to appreciate the significance of issues like gender-based violence and hobbled the emergence of a locally relevant feminism. However, black as well as white feminists continued to successfully draw upon rights talk to advance an agenda far more extensive than the aims associated with liberal, white, bourgeois feminism. Their demands for substantive equality prominently addressed both gender-based violence and women’s work. Gender-Based Violence After the 1994 elections, women MPs and women’s organizations capitalized on improving debate conditions and their growing influence in the public sphere to make gender-based violence an issue of common concern, arguing it violated women’s rights. Women’s groups put substantive demands for gender-based violence on the agenda by offering training programs, prevention awareness projects, discussion documents, and workshops that exposed the limits of state law and the justice system (Ramagoshi 1997).50 Drawing on reports of International Human Rights Watch observers to help them publicize their cause, activists denounced state institutions and administrators for their appalling treatment of women survivors.51 At the grassroots level, GBV organizations extended their outreach, spreading the message. For example, in the Cape Town townships, women’s organizations worked with religious ministers, held workshops in rural areas, and began involving men in their work (Monakali 1997). They urged professional help for survivors, such as counseling, and more attention to GBV by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. By 1997, violence against women was firmly on the public agenda (Erlank 2005, 49

50

51

For discussions of feminism in South Africa, see Agenda n. 62, 2004 and n. 63, 2005. For a brief historical overview, see Hassim 2005. “ANCWL’s New Move to Fight Gender Violence,” The Citizen December 3, 1998, Tsepiso Matela, “Gender Equality is a Universal Right for All,” City Press March 8, 1998. The report excoriated the hostility of the police, inadequate training of prosecutors, the sexism of judges and magistrates, and the regressive criminal justice system (Nowrojee and Manby 1995; Olckers 1997).

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204). Men joined women’s organizations in fighting gender-based violence. Their activism included a 3,000-strong march, support groups, professional therapy centers, and challenges to gender stereotypes.52 As HIV/ AIDS rates skyrocketed, reaching nearly 23 percent by 1998, women’s organizations emphasized the link between gender-based violence and HIV/AIDS and demanded government provide a range of drugs to rape survivors to reduce the risk of infection (Pendry 1998). Women MPs used National Women’s Day debates over the Human Rights Commission, educational spending, and pornography to highlight GBV (e.g., Hansard 1994 and 1995). In 1995, 3,000 people gathered at a National Women’s Day celebration where women MPs decried violence against women and urged South African women to participate in public debate and claim their rights.53 By 1998, National Women’s Day had become an important occasion for mobilizing women and demanding change. Activists organized gatherings of thousands in Johannesburg, as well as marches, speeches, discussion groups, festivals, and seminars.54 The majority of commentators challenged men to change their ways and goaded the government to take action on violence against women.55 By the end of the period, women’s organizations were working with women MPs to put pressure directly on legislators. They came together through a number of networks, including the Joint Civil Society-ANC Parliamentary Women’s Caucus Campaign to End Violence Against Women and Children, to demand higher rape conviction rates and services for survivors of GBV. They organized a march on parliament, educated constituencies, and blanketed parliament with reports, fact sheets, and violence-against-women campaign buttons (Shifman, Madlala-Routledge, and Smith 1997). The JMC prioritized the issue. The Second Women’s Budget highlighted violence against women, arguing it should be treated as a “national crime priority,” and strategized on ways to fund shelters, 52

53

54

55

Heather Dugmore, “Determined Warrior Takes on the Gender War,” The Sunday Independent August 2, 1998. “SA Men are Grappling with the New Order,” Network News July 6, 2001. Norman Chandler, Karin Schimke, Tamsen de Beer, and SAPA, “SA Salutes its Women,” The Star August 10, 1995. Commission on Gender Equality, “Women’s Week: Thinking Locally, Acting Globally,” CGE Communications Office, August 16, 1998; Colleen Lowe Morna, “Next Week … and Every Week,” Sowetan July 30, 1998; Christina Stucky, “A Jam-Packed Celebration of SA’s Women,” The Sunday Independent August 2, 1998. Moeti Kgamanyane, “Time to Reverse Gender Inequality,” Sowetan August 10, 1998; Peta Krost, “We Are the Women,” Saturday Star August 7, 1987; Paul Sefsetse, “National Women’s Day Has Important Role,” Sowetan August 4, 1999 and Stucky, “A Jam-Packed Celebration.”

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extensive survivor aid, training of personnel, and specialized GBV units (Budlender 1997, 137). JMC chairperson Pregs Govender led the charge for reform, winning the backing of key ANC government leaders for new legislation that would significantly expand the definition of violence against women and commit the government to respond across a wide number of issue areas (Baden et al. 1998, 33; Budlender 1997; Govender 2008; Meintjes 2003, 155). These efforts were echoed elsewhere in the public sphere. COSATU and the media joined the public outcry. The trade union federation now agreed that gender-based violence was an urgent issue of common concern, but most of its demands were aimed at formal levels of equality. In March 1995, COSATU denounced sexual harassment and adopted a code of conduct to prevent it. COSATU also insisted employers adopt a sexual harassment code (Nyman 1997, 14; Tshosedi 1999).56 COSATU affiliates campaigned against sexual harassment in marches and worked with activists during special events like International Women’s Day (Agenda 1997). The media also chimed in, increasing their reports on gender-based violence. Journalist Jeanne Viall recalls that in the mid-1990s, stories about rape were still “unheard of” and regarded as “odd.” Writing an article about an abused woman became a “sexist education” for her, as it “didn’t go over very big.”57 As women’s activism on the issue increased, media reporting changed. The CGE notes stories on violence against women, particularly rape, increased over the period (CGE 1999, 4). The majority continued to suggest women “‘invited’ their fate” or were victims in need of protection, expressing conservative views on the issue. But NGOs and the CGE criticized this point of view and urged the industry to treat gender-based violence as a human rights violation, using greater media coverage as an opportunity to publicize their agenda (CGE 1999, 4; Media Mask 1998b, 2). Although COSATU and the media endorsed formal equality as a solution to gender-based violence, the most dynamic sector of civil society and the most powerful institution in the public sphere – women’s organizations and parliament – prominently advocated substantive gender justice. 56

57

This does not mean that COSATU had a better track record on sexual harassment than other employers. On the contrary, COSATU’s record was quite poor (Tshoaedi 1999, 86). As COSATU gender coordinator Mommy Jaffa notes, although men in COSATU understand that sexual harassment is wrong, they “defend their own behavior as ‘an appreciation for a woman.’” Jaffa interview. Viall interview.

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Women’s Work Women MPs and women’s organizations also ardently fought for advances in women’ work status during this period and demanded substantive equality. Building on the improving debate conditions in parliament, women MPs campaigned for maternity and breast-feeding provisions in new labor legislation. The JMC investigated the effects of women’s poverty programs and pushed for better monitoring systems; the Third Women’s Budget published these evaluations. The Third Women’s Budget also urged paid maternity leave for all women workers, including domestic workers, better targeting of women in affirmative action programs, and an increased budget for women in public works projects (Budlender 1998; Vincent 1999, 32). Parliament held “Speak Out on Poverty” hearings, and ANC women MPs, once again working through the JMC, campaigned for the integration of gender into labor legislation so women would be targeted for affirmative action policies and work projects (Britton 2007, 71; Hassim 2006, 199; Hassim and Gouws 1998, 70). Women’s organizations in civil society demanded substantive levels of reform as well. The New Women’s Movement (NWM) insisted the government promote women’s employment and blasted the minister of welfare Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi and women MPs for failing to secure more generous family allowances when they revamped the maintenance law (Edwards 1997; Hassim 2003a, 518). A broad array of organizations in civil society, including Black Sash and COSATU, presented submissions supporting the NWM and recommended a significant increase in family allowances (Calland 1999). Community-based organizations also pressured government for policies that would increase the quality and number of jobs available to South Africans. Their demands included sustainable paid work for women in the informal sector, as well as childcare (Samson 1999, 10–11). Women in a number of professions made formal demands for advances in women’s work status, documenting and challenging discriminatory hiring policies.58 As women’s organizations and women in parliament called attention to inequalities in women’s work status, COSATU and its affiliates expanded their public profile on the issue, promoting both formal equality and substantive gender justice. COSATU affiliates had been early advocates of paid maternity benefits for women, childcare, and an end to employment discrimination, and members conveyed their support through protests 58

“The LRA Ushers in New Era,” The Star August 8, 1996.

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and rallies.59 COSATU advocated a compulsory six-month maternity leave with full pay that would include farm and domestic workers.60 It also endorsed twelve days parental leave to care for children, the building of childcare centers, and better integration of women in job creation programs (Moolman 1997; Nyman 1997; SALB 1998). At the Presidential Jobs Summit in 1998, the trade union federation called for quality job creation and education programs for women, public works and training programs that would undermine sex segregation in the workplace, and changes in the sexual division of labor in the home (Samson 1999, 11). These claims targeted the gendered inequalities of paid labor and attacked women’s economic exploitation. The media also endorsed formal equality in racial and gender hiring practices, and profiled women who became managers or entered unconventional fields.61 Research on women and the media was relatively new during this period, but at least one study found that women in business and industry constituted 10 percent of television and radio coverage on women, more than either politics or education (Media Watch 1995, Chart 2). The media regularly featured women in the upper echelons of business (Moahloli 1997, 31).62 That coverage of corporate women helped the media appeal to an important advertising demographic, but it also endorsed women’s advancement in the workplace as a significant accomplishment in the rainbow nation’s quest for equality. During this period, women’s organizations, women in parliament, and COSATU demanded advances in women’s formal equality in the workplace and made demands for substantive reform. The media did not take the lead in making these demands, but joined the growing chorus, increasing pressure on the state to respond. An analysis of debate conditions and public debate on GBV and women’s work status suggests the state’s response would significantly advance women’s formal equality and bring some advances in substantive equality as well. 59

60

61

62

Gumisai Mutume, “Labour Roars Some More,” Institute for Global Communications August 26, 1997. A compulsory six-month leave would have a negative effect on women’s competitiveness in the labor market, but no evidence exists to suggest that this was the intention of labor leaders. For example, see “Don’t Gloat,” The Star October 23, 1995; Farhana Ismail, “She’s All Revved Up,” Sunday Tribune, August 6, 1995; “Ending the Belittling of the Little Woman,” The Argus January 17, 1996; “No Rationale for Ignoring Women,” The Cape Times May 8, 1996; Ravin Maharaj, “Game Appoints Women to Top Posts,” The Star January 7, 1997. This trend was particularly evident in television, less so in the print media. See Media Mask 1998a.

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Gender Justice during the Liberal Moment As debate conditions improved and public debate included more demands for formal and substantive gender justice, the new government responded and made notable strides on both GBV and women’s work. This effort was fraught with obstacles, however, as the ANC struggled with the technicalities of administration and grappled with the enormous challenges of transforming the state. ANC leadership assumed bureaucracies could carry out legal reform without detailed directives and often failed to provide sufficient funds for its programs. In short, it overestimated state capacity. These errors were understandable given the pervasiveness of state coercion under apartheid. As shortfalls in directives and funds signaled governmental misconception of state power and did not necessarily signal a lack of government commitment (Albertyn 2003, 605), I integrate this steep learning curve into my evaluation of state responsiveness, which begins with an assessment of action on violence against women. Gender-Based Violence The new government responded quickly and on many fronts to popular demands for action on violence against women. In its Women’s Empowerment Programme draft document, the ANC insisted violence against women should be treated as a serious crime and advocated establishing counseling centers, shelters, and services, proposing dramatic expansion of existing state efforts.63 The Department of Welfare promised funds for shelters and other support services (Murray et al. 1998). In 1996, the Deputy Minister of Justice launched a public education campaign on violence against women that included workshops, posters, leaflets, a hotline, and a manual for state administrators (Meintjes 2003, 154).64 Sexual violence training for police forces began; reforms to the Criminal Procedure Act brought closed-circuit television testimony for rape survivors (Murray et al. 1998, 321). The newly ratified constitution of 1996 included a clause promising everyone the right “to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources” (Constitution of RSA 1996, Section 12(1)(c)). This right clearly included freedom from gender-based violence. 63 64

Jill Gowans, “Still Far to Go,” Sunday Tribune August 6, 1995. “Aim Is to Alter Conditions That Trap Women in Poverty,” The Star August 8, 1997.

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Three years after the first nonracial elections, the ANC began developing new legislation on violence against women that endorsed substantive levels of support for gender justice. Deputy President Mbeki urged a broad understanding of GBV, arguing, “The struggle for the prevention of violence against women should also be pursued within a wider struggle for the attainment of the political, economic, cultural and social emancipation of women.”65 Indeed, the Domestic Violence Act (DVA) of 1998 was hailed as groundbreaking in scope. It significantly expanded the definition of domestic relationships, the types of violence included (e.g., psychological, emotional, and economic), and facilitated police action by permitting arrest of abusers without a warrant. It also included legal directives, instructions to bureaucratic administrators, and provided monitoring indicators. Minister of Justice Dullah Omar, cognizant of upcoming elections and the ANC’s need for tangible proof of responsiveness on gender issues, fast-tracked the bill through parliament over the objections of feminists drafting the legislation, who argued that it was not yet complete.66 One cost of quick passage was a lack of detail on funding or specific roles for administrative agencies. As is evident in Table 6.2, the ANC was nevertheless decisive in its response: In a few short years, it had unequivocally rejected violence against women, taken action in a broad array of crucial policy areas, and fast-tracked a seminal bill through parliament. By the end of the liberal moment, the speed, scope, and specifics of the South African government’s response matched or exceeded the best performing, long-standing democracies.67 ANC support for substantive levels of gender justice was also evident for the second gender issue – women’s work. Women’s Work Acting swiftly and against neoliberal global trends, the government set out to prove it could transform the dire economic situation of its citizens with a five-year program to increase labor rights and employment opportunities for all South Africans. Initiatives that included women were numerous, as well as ambitious in speed and scope, addressing not only formal but several substantive issues of gender justice in the

65

66 67

As quoted in Tsepiso Matela, “’Gender Equality Is a Universal Right for All,’” City Press March 8, 1998. Manjoo interview. See Weldon 2002b for policies in liberal democracies during this period.

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workplace. Most programs had goals that exceeded global standards. However, given the ANC’s overestimation of state capacity, these programs often lacked details on funding and administration essential for their full implementation. Government initiatives spanned a wide array of programs, from the Labour Relations Act (LRA) of 1995, which made the country a global leader in its protection of farm and domestic workers, to the Employment Equity Act (EEA) of 1998, which aimed to increase the hiring of disadvantaged groups (including black women). The latter became the cornerstone of affirmative action policy in South Africa. In 1996, GEAR, or the Growth, Employment and Redistribution program, summarily replaced the ANC’s earlier needs-based goals of the Reconstruction and Development Programme. GEAR was a market-driven policy that never mentioned gender at all. Instead, it recommended public sector cutbacks and diminished government services. Those policies intensified women’s caretaking responsibilities, ensuring many remained in informal, survivalist, and part-time work (Orr 2001). As noted in Table 6.2, despite its adoption of GEAR, the government continued to pursue substantive gender justice through a number of RDP programs like Adult Basic Education and Training (ABET), the National Public Works Programme (NPWP), and the Black Economic Empowerment Strategy and Community-Based Public Works Programme (CBPWP). These initiatives offered education, training, and skills. Some legislation, like the 1996 Employment and Occupational Equity Bill and the 1998 Jobs Summit Final Declaration, specifically aimed to increase women’s employment. Other programs and legislation advanced substantive equality by addressing pregnancy, maternity leave, childcare, and family benefits. For example, the LRA outlawed the dismissal of pregnant employees, and the government reformed family maintenance benefits by establishing a child support grant that expanded eligibility (Goldblatt 2005; Moolman 1997). The scope of government reform was extensive, but administrative details reveal that state support for substantive gender justice had limits. A few programs and legislation contained clearly specified goals, administrative duties, and funding, like the Employment Equity Act (Kongolo and Bojuwoye 2006; Msimang 2001; Naidoo and Kongolo 2004, 131).68 But most did not. For example, the LRA did not include an educational component to inform workers and employers of their new rights and 68

Mzwahkhe Hlangani, “Plan to Empower Women at Work,” Sowetan September 5, 2000.

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table 6.2. Responsiveness on Women’s Rights During the Liberal Moment Gender-based Violence

Women’s Work

Public Education Campaign Police Training Reforms to the Criminal Procedures Act Constitutional Clause on Violence 1998 Domestic Violence Act

Numerous RDP Work Programs 1995 Labour Relations Act 1998 Maintenance Act 1998 Employment Equity Act

obligations (Nyman 1997). The reformed family benefits package was cumbersome, preventing all the funds from being distributed to a larger pool of eligible women (Goldblatt 2005; Hassim 2003a, 520–521). The NPWP did not specify skills training requirements, and hired women to do the most menial, short-term tasks (Gwagwa 1996). CGE commissioner Joyce Piliso-Seroke blasted work programs like the NPWP, arguing “[g]iving women the jobs of clearing drains and picking up litter is hardly what is meant by ‘women’s empowerment.’”69 Moreover, analysts found budgets were not realistic and failed to meet program needs (Budlender 1997; Newton et al. 1999; Sadie and Loots 1998). The lack of policy specifics in many programs indicated a critical weakness, yet some of these shortcomings can be attributed to the steep learning curve facing the new government as it aimed to transform South African society. Certainly the state response to women’s severe employment problems was speedy and ambitious, defying the global trend of neoliberalism even as it switched to GEAR. Coupled with its dramatic efforts on violence against women, state responsiveness to demands for advances in gender justice was substantial, proving it was determined to transform the country. The lack of adequate funding and specifics, however, suggests that the commitment to fighting gender-based violence and promoting women’s employment would require continued vigilance and advocacy in the future.

Conclusion The liberal moment in South Africa began with a remarkable commitment to participatory politics that permeated public life. The ANC endorsed this commitment and used the electoral system, the quota, its 69

“Lip Service to Gender Equality,” The Sunday Independent April 18, 1999.

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electoral dominance, and new participatory mechanisms to expand the public sphere. Women activists and politicians seized upon this opportunity and improved debate conditions. Women MPs established an array of counterpublics that helped them successfully challenge the status quo, enabling them to speak out and be heard. They created new organizations and coalitions and used new participatory structures to increase their leverage in the public sphere at a time when much of civil society was in disarray. These improvements provided women politicians and activists with the opportunity to influence public debate. Debate conditions in COSATU, the ANC, and the media did not follow the same trajectory. These institutions lacked effective counterpublics where women could gather, speak freely about their interests, and demand change. Debate conditions remained moderate in COSATU because its gender forums depoliticized women’s demands and women’s leadership remained limited. In the ANC, women moved up the party ranks and won a quota in the NEC, but the ANCWL reverted back to its traditional function as an auxiliary to the party, and party discipline of independent ANC women increased. Finally, although women’s numbers in the media industry grew, they were not organized and their union was in decline. Clearly, popular and government commitment to participatory politics alone could not secure open and inclusive debate conditions across the South African public sphere. However, the success of women MPs and the dynamism of women’s organizations in civil society proved sufficient during the liberal moment to infuse public debate with demands for formal and substantive gender justice. Confirming the just debate hypothesis, the ANC responded by passing innovative legislation on gender-based violence and women’s work that made it a global leader on women’s rights. This considerable momentum stalled during consolidation as ANC governing elites used the PR electoral system and quota, their electoral dominance, and new participatory mechanisms to co-opt the public sphere. This had significant consequences for debate conditions, the content of public debate, and state action on gender justice.

7 Just Debate Declines Consolidation in South Africa

“Instead of empowerment, we have a sophisticated process of disempowerment.” Vivienne Taylor, CGE Commissioner, 1999 “An unthinking, uncritical, kowtowing party-line toeing is fatal to a vibrant democracy.” Archbishop Desmond Tutu, 2004

Introduction Feminists have widely celebrated South African successes. In 1994, more than 19 million South Africans went to the ballot box and ended an apartheid regime that also was deeply conservative on women’s rights.1 The Government of National Unity, which was committed to non-racism and non-sexism, took its place. That new government brought 111 diverse women into parliament. A core group of talented women MPs working with an array of women’s organizations in civil society helped pass a remarkable series of laws that included a gender equality clause in the final constitution, the right to abortion, domestic violence legislation, affirmative action programs that targeted black women, a new

1

No gender gap in voting behavior was reported for the first three nonracial elections discussed in this book (Gouws 2004). I am not aware of any research disconfirming that pattern for the 2009 election. Women registered in larger numbers than men for the 1999, 2004, and 2009 elections (Gouws 2004; Kotze 2009; Lowe Morna et al. 2009). No data on the number of women who voted in comparison to men is available for these elections.

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maintenance act, and customary marriage reform. State support for gender justice on the scale that occurred in South Africa is quite rare in democratizing states. Instead, outcomes tend to be moderate as in Latin America, or limited as in Central and Eastern Europe. Although South Africa was an exception to this trend, its exceptionalism did not last. At the beginning of the twenty-first century these advances stopped. Why? As discussed in Chapter 3, gender scholars have offered a number of explanations for this outcome. Scholars of South African gender politics point to weaknesses among women’s organizing as well as problems with the electoral system. They have cited a lack of coordination among women’s groups in civil society and tense relations between women in parliament and civil society. They have criticized the women’s movement for focusing on the state while neglecting the private sphere (Albertyn 2003; Britton 2005; Hassim 2006). Scholars have also noted that opponents co-opted the rights talk of the women’s movement (Gouws 2005; Hassim 2006; Manicom 2005). Pointing to the electoral system, they note that the proportional representation system and quota it facilitates limit the accountability of MPs to their constituents, enable political parties to demote outspoken women leaders, and give parties control over candidate selection. In South Africa, this enabled political parties to place professional women in parliament who were willing to tow the party line (Britton 2005; Hassim 2006). In a similar vein, analysts of democratization warn that dominant parties like the ANC are a threat not only to democratic consolidation (Huntington 1993; Przeworski 1991), but also to democratic accountability and responsiveness (Alence 2004; Butler 2007; Giliomee 1998). As I pointed out in Chapter 3, these problems cannot explain the rise and stall of gender justice in South Africa. Coordination among women’s groups and relations among women in the state and civil society improved over time. All the other factors, with the exception of the increasing professionalization of women MPs and ANC disciplining of MPs, remained constant. Intensifying ANC centralization accounts for the latter two problems. In this chapter, I argue ANC governing elites avidly pursued party centralization and worked to co-opt the public sphere. That undermined debate conditions, constrained debate content, and produced a stall in gender justice. In contrast to the liberal moment, during the consolidation era, ANC leaders avidly centralized their power in the executive branch and sought collaborators in the public sphere. They rewarded loyal politicians in parliament and compliant partners in civil society and the media to ensure

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public debate would dovetail with their policy agenda. To secure these goals, they used the electoral system, quota, their electoral dominance, and participatory mechanisms established during the liberal moment to co-opt rather than broaden deliberation in the public sphere. Women politicians and activists had limited capacity to resist these pressures. Although a talented and dynamic group of women leaders remained in the second parliament, and women’s issue-based organizations persisted throughout civil society, no strong women’s counterpublic emerged in the ANC, COSATU, or the media to support them. Moreover, women in parliament and civil society had substantial weaknesses. In the legislature, those weaknesses included a loss of parliamentary influence to the executive, which also controlled candidate selection and political positions in the government. ANC women MPs were doubly disciplined. In civil society, a plethora of problems emerged. Although not all were a result of ANC centralization, they facilitated ANC co-optation. First, as international funding declined, women’s NGOs became increasingly dependent upon state funds for survival. Second, the ANC managed citizen participation. Government officials became adept at reducing participatory engagement with citizens to education and information sharing, blocking claims making from the grassroots. Finally, although elite women’s policy NGOs retained leverage in the public sphere, they had minimal interaction with women at the grassroots, leaving them open to charges of promoting an elite feminist agenda. As a result, debate conditions declined.

Debate Conditions during Consolidation In 1999, the ANC increased its electoral majority as 16 million South Africans went to the polls. The ANC, with Thabo Mbeki at its helm, won 66.36 percent of the vote (Lodge 2002b). Mbeki’s presidency signaled policy continuity and ANC dominance. Mbeki quickly established a unified and disciplined administration that came under fire for its authoritarian tendencies (Butler 2005; Gumede 2005; Lodge 2002a).2 The administration weakened the vibrant parliament of the liberal moment until it became “an empty vessel” (Feinstein 2009, 211; Nijzink and

2

Members of Mbeki’s inner circle included Trevor Manuel, Tito Mboweni, Essop Pahad, Mojanku Gumbi, Frank Chikane, Titus Mafolo, Cunningham Ngcukana, Wiseman Nkuhlu, and Joel Netshitenzhe (Calland 2006, 41). For an overview of institutions and advisors who formulated policy under Mbeki, see Southall 2007, 3–4.

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Piombo 2005). It also pressured NGOs to provide service delivery, tamed labor unions, and demanded loyalty from ANC party structures and the media. As one scathing critic put it, ANC governing elites wanted only to be “accountable to themselves” (Good 1997). As that tendency intensified during consolidation, debate content narrowed. The one public arena that most assiduously resisted ANC discipline was the independent mass media.3 Acrimony between the government and the press intensified as ANC governing elites denounced media critics and accused them of racism, and the independent press tenaciously defended its watchdog role as protector of the public interest. This selfrighteous clash between a centralizing ANC and profit-driven media did little to clarify the role of either in shaping public debate, but did confirm the influence of the press in the public sphere. This influence did not extend to women in the industry, however. Debate conditions in the public sphere deteriorated during the consolidation period. The Legislature The power of the second parliament ebbed and debate conditions declined under Mbeki. These trends undercut the influence of women MPs in public debate and their ability to shape the parliamentary agenda. Mbeki’s centralized leadership style meant power flowed from the top down. Intent on holding the ANC together during a period of tremendous challenge, the president centralized power among his loyal advisors and disciplined parliament. Mbeki’s cabinet set the policies, and as president of the ANC, Mbeki controlled the parliamentary committee system (ANC MPs chaired all but two). ANC elites expected committees to endorse the president’s policies. This undermined parliamentary accountability and executive oversight (Gumede 2005; Harvey 2002). Dependent upon superiors for their jobs and deeply loyal to the party, few ANC MPs challenged Mbeki. Chief Whip Tony Yengeni became a “centre of discipline and the dispenser of patronage”; Speaker Frene Ginwala complied with executive authority to the point of “intentionally obstructing parliamentary processes on behalf of the executive;” and ANC MPs desisted from criticizing the executive or his loyal advisors, preferring

3

Not all media were independent. The ANC interfered in SABC hiring and board membership, and applied pressure to ensure favorable content (Harvey 2002; Russell 2009, 72). Group Online Editor at Johncom Media Juliette Saunders, interview, Johannesburg, 21 July 2006.

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instead to caucus, stall, and exonerate questionable activities (COSATU 2006b, 4–5; Feinstein 2009, 76 and 179; Harvey 2002). In contrast to the first parliament when MPs debated the most controversial of executive policies, under Mbeki, parliament avoided contentious issues like the $4.8 billion arms deal.4 It also complied with his notorious insistence that the global campaign against HIV/AIDS in Africa was racist. It did not challenge Mbeki’s insistence that HIV did not cause AIDS, nor did it challenge his refusal to distribute antiretroviral therapy in South Africa on the grounds that profit-seeking pharmaceutical companies promoted the dangerous drugs (Mbeki 2000).5 Loyalty to the president ran so deep that some ANC politicians refused to take antiretrovirals and died from the disease (Govender 2008). In April 1999, these political problems were not yet perils, and women MPs were optimistic they could build on recent gains. In contrast to the first parliament, where rules and procedures were foreign to most and the learning curve steep, the second parliament brought experienced, prepared women to government. As IFP MP Suzanne Vos explained, “I didn’t come into politics naturally … the first time was daunting … But we did get used to it and those of us who have come back are confident. Many of us have specialized, and this time we are not groping our way.”6 This advantage, however, could not counter the debilitating decline in parliamentary power and erosion in debate conditions. Even as women’s numbers and rank in parliament remained significant, important institutional changes occurred that undermined their voice and capacity for contestation. In contrast to the fluid candidate selection process of the liberal moment, during the second nonracial elections, ANC governing elites controlled the final decisions for the party lists and competed to ensure positions for their favored candidates 4

5

6

This arms purchase became infamous for its corruption, which allegedly involved both Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma. The Mbeki administration went to great lengths to prevent its exposure (see Feinstein 2009 for a detailed discussion). Rachel L. Swarns, “Mbeki Details Quest to Grasp South Africa’s AIDS Disaster,” The New York Times May 7, 2000; Howard Barrell, “Mbeki Fingers CIA in AIDS Conspiracy,” Mail & Guardian October 6, 2000, http://www.virusmyth.com/aids/news/mbekicia.htm, accessed September 1, 2009. The Treatment Action Campaign conservatively estimates HIV/AIDS claimed at least 600,000 lives from 1998 to 2003, http://www.virusmyth. com/aids/news/nytmbeki3.htm, accessed September 1, 2009. This total is projected to be 3.3 million by 2010 (Geffen 2006). Approximately 10 percent of the South African population was infected with HIV/AIDS in 2009, the highest infection rate in the world (Noble 2009). Leanine Dickerson, “Women MPs Get Out of Grey Suits,” The Sunday Independent August 8, 1999.

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(Feinstein 2009, 73). As elite control increased, women MPs moved up the candidate lists: In 1999, they occupied every third slot and composed 38 percent of the total candidate list.7 In 1999, 119 women entered parliament, reaching nearly 30 percent; the ANC sent ninety-five women to parliament (Ballington 2002; Lowe Morna 2004, 61). Frene Ginwala and Baleka Mbete continued as speaker and deputy speaker through 2004, and women headed thirteen committees (26 percent), including Defense.8 However, the ANC began using the tools at its disposal to centralize control. Even as more women were distributed throughout the party list and several garnered top spots, outspoken feminists like Pregs Govender and Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge (Chair of the ANC Women’s Caucus) were not rewarded with rankings commensurate with their talents. This sent a clear signal that the careers of women politicians would be jeopardized if they persisted in advancing a feminist agenda (Coetzee 1999). Additionally, the class, regional, and ideological diversity of women MPs narrowed, because 34 percent of the women from the first parliament did not return. The poorest black women were most likely to leave. They were accomplished organizers but did not have the professional skills essential for parliamentary work. Their replacements were quite different: More likely to speak and read English, more affluent, younger, and with fewer children, they had backgrounds in fields like law and business; few had been grassroots activists (Britton 2006, 77; Geisler 2000; Hassim 2006). This group was less interested in transformation than professional advancement (Britton 2005). A third set of women MPs were mocked for their lack of merit and strong party loyalty. Rightly or not, poor rural black women MPs were identified with this group (Noseweek 2002).9 In the second parliament, women’s professionalism trumped grassroots experience, which in turn was trumped by blind party loyalty; maligned class and racial identities were mapped onto the latter. Both characteristics – heightened party loyalty and careerism – made it more difficult for key women leaders to rally women MPs in common cause.10 At the same time, parliamentary culture increased pressure on women to assimilate. Women who persisted in using different speaking styles continued to be impatiently rebuffed. When Pregs Govender asked listeners “to close their eyes and focus on the power of love and courage within 7

8

9 10

Julie Ballington, as cited in “Moving Slowly Up the Gender Ladder,” The Star, May 14, 1999. Women MPs continued to predominate on “soft” committees. Andile Noganta and Vusi Mona, “Loading the Dice in This Man’s Game,” City Press, April 25, 1999. Inkatha Freedom Party MP Suzanne Vos, interview, Cape Town, July 23, 2003. Vos interview.

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their hearts,” or invited them to take part in a “game” to illustrate the key point of a speech, colleagues took her to task (Govender 2008, 206). Yet men’s style of speech did not conform to conventional standards of professionalism. Some male MPs made catcalls in parliament and told sexist jokes, displaying a lack of respect for their women colleagues. Despite Ginwala’s successful attacks on sexual harassment in the first parliament, it became a serious problem once again (Govender 2008; Noseweek 2002). ANC women MPs denied these problems, signaling the extent to which party discipline was curtailing their voices. Denials came from previously outspoken feminist leaders like Deputy Speaker Baleka Mbete, who had become a “fervent Mbeki loyalist” (Gumede 2005, 292). She insisted gender problems in the ANC and parliament had disappeared.11 In contrast, women MPs in opposition parties were quick to acknowledge the problems that remained. As IFP MP Suzanne Vos insists, women MPs were insecure and “predatory … because we have a patriarchal society women depend on men for patronage in terms of their places, because … the men are the bosses of the parties.”12 Women MPs from the PAC and the Democratic Alliance stated for the record they were being denied important decision-making roles and their effectiveness was circumscribed, confirming institutional sexism (Noseweek 2002).13 If ANC women MPs expressed their discontent, most did so anonymously. Counterpublics founded during the first parliament with the intent of institutionalizing women’s capacity for contestation also floundered. Limited funding and persistent marginalization meant these groups continued to have trouble functioning. The PWG remained moribund; the WEU limited its work to skills assessment. The CGE continued to be severely hobbled by infighting, government cooptation, and limited funding (Manjoo 2005). The ANC women’s caucus often worked with the JMC, but ANC elites assiduously undermined this counterpublic. It was the last committee to reconvene in the second parliament, its budget was significantly reduced in 2001, and attacks on the chair’s credibility intensified as she spoke out against the arms deal and Mbeki’s HIV/AIDS policy.14 After being stalked and having her car dismantled, Govender 11 12 13

14

ANC Deputy Speaker Baleka Mbete, interview, Cape Town, July 24, 2003. Vos interview. After the 1999 elections, the New National Party (NNP) joined with the Democratic Party and the Federal Alliance to form the Democratic Alliance (DA). The NNP withdrew from the DA in 2001 and disbanded in 2004. “Government Slammed for Prioritising Defence Over Gender Equity,” Mail & Guardian August 14, 2001.

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table 7.1. Debate Conditions during Consolidation Institution

Debate Conditions

Legislature

Moderate

Women’s Organizations

Moderate

COSATU

Moderate

ANC

Moderate

Media

Limited

resigned from parliament in 2002 (Govender 2008, 169 and 207). The JMC quickly lost its momentum after her departure, and the ANC gutted its most innovative program, the Women’s Budget Initiative (Govender 2008, 186 and 188). With ANC party discipline increasing, several talented women in parliament indicated they were thinking of leaving. This included Speaker Frene Ginwala, who threatened to resign numerous times because the ANC-dominated Rules Committee assiduously attacked her power base.15 She finally left abruptly in April 2004, admonishing party leaders: “We [the ANC] need to reopen the dialogue we had in the eighties and the early nineties instead of going into our laagers and defending our ideas” (as qtd. in Gumede 2005, 297). Rejecting ANC discipline and redeployment, Ginwala’s exit underscores how centralization and eroding debate conditions taxed party loyalty and undermined even the most talented and powerful of women MPs.16 With class diversity narrowing, women’s professionalism increasing, a masculinist parliamentary culture reviving, and women’s counterpublics deteriorating, women’s voices and ability to challenge the status quo in parliament dwindled, as noted in Table 7.1. Coupled with the marked 15

16

Jeremy Michaels, “‘Too Powerful’ Frene Replaced as Speaker,” The Star April 23, 2004, http://www.thestar.co.za/index.php?fArticleId=412938 accessed June 29, 2010. Intensified ANC disciplinary treatment was not limited to women in parliament and persisted into Mbeki’s next term. For example, Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge, Deputy Minister of Health under Mbeki and a prominent women’s rights advocate and outspoken critic of his HIV/AIDS policies, was dismissed in 2007. Madlala-Routledge revealed that because she had questioned the ANC’s controversial “nutrition approach” to HIV/ AIDS, her staff had been harassed by “faceless people” via electronic messages and phone calls, and that she was prevented from consulting with senior health officials. See Feinstein 2009, 135–137 and Anso Thom, “Fired for ‘doing my job’ – MadlalaRoutledge,” Health-e News Service August 13, 2007, http://www.csa.za.org/article/ articleview/447/1/1/, accessed May 6, 2009.

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decline of parliamentary power, these changes seriously undermined the ability of women MPs to shape public debate. Civil Society Just as governing ANC elites hollowed out parliamentary power and limited the ability of ANC women MPs to speak out and challenge the status quo, so too it reached into civil society, blunting the openness and inclusiveness of women’s organizations and coalitions. Interference triggered resistance: COSATU challenged state policies, and new social movements emerged. However, debate conditions in these sites were limited to moderate. Moreover, debate conditions in the ANC continued to deteriorate as Mbeki centralized his control over the party. As a result, civil society offered few opportunities for women activists to shape public debate. Women’s Organizations Women’s NGOs continued to be important sites for diverse urban South African women to access the public sphere, and during this period, debate conditions within these organizations continued to be good. Racial diversity in these organizations remained a contentious issue but improved. For example, in the gender-based violence sector, black women activists spoke out and persistently pressed for change. As a result, Rape Crisis began holding meetings in the townships that had previously been “no-go areas” for the organization. Black women also challenged the programming agenda of Rape Crisis and won the battle to include men in their work (Britton 2006; Moolman 2009). The most pressing threats to debate conditions during this period were not internal but external, because ANC governing elites used their dominance in the state to ensure civil society pursued party interests. That strained debate conditions in women’s NGOs by limiting what members could say and do. The likelihood that activist women’s NGOs would pressure the government and demand higher levels of support for gender justice waned as they faced a dilemma: How to be public watchdogs while working as service providers dependent on state funds for survival? A few organizations run by women with formal educations and access to funding networks could rely upon international donors, but many NGOs needed state money, and during consolidation, the ANC increased requirements for the disbursement of those funds (Britton 2006). Chantel Cooper described relations between women’s organizations and government as “strained,” with women’s organizations intensely skeptical about

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the will of the government to listen to constructive criticism and take action.17 Some activists suspected bureaucratic red tape was being used to block money for organizations that were critical of ANC policies, or that governing elites deemed too radical. As activist Michelle Festus bluntly put it, NGO programming and members on the board of directors were “driven by ANC politics,” and NGOs had to “be in line with government policy to get funding.”18 That meant opposing ANC gender policy too energetically entailed substantial risks. From the perspective of opposition parties, it meant civil society had become an extension of the ruling party. Remarking on the ANC pipeline of funds and policy prescriptions for civil society, Democratic Party MP Sandra Botha quipped that the entire NGO sector was “an ANC jamboree.”19 This sector was also a pipeline of talent into the ANC-dominated state, as civil society continued to experience a “brain drain.”20 This career ladder helped strengthen ANC influence. Government funding also deepened divisions among women’s organizations. In the GBV sector, the most institutionalized and long-lived organizations that had educated, professional women leaders tended to secure the most government support (Britton 2006). To be sure, women’s NGOs continued to build linkages with one another. They also engaged in debate through innovative projects like Women’sNet, the online discussion and information website. Still, elite research NGOs remained disconnected from women’s CBOs (Hassim 2005), and few connections between activist NGOs and other sectors of civil society, such as CBOs and the burgeoning new social movements, existed (Albertyn 2003). A government intent on blunting critique easily undermined women’s NGOs that lacked a grassroots base and alternative sources of funding. During consolidation, ANC governing elites depoliticized participatory mechanisms women’s CBOs had exploited earlier. Researchers for CASE argued that in practice, the ANC regarded popular participation “as a way of bolstering the role of the state under ANC leadership, rather than as (potentially) contradicting, challenging, or forcing it to re-think its policies” (CASE 1998, 4). Activist Michelle Festus concurs, arguing that “rules and protocol are preventing people from participating” and CGE Commissioner Sheila Meintjes notes, “the state is

17 18 19 20

Cooper interview. Festus interview. Botha interview. Advocate for Contact Trust, Alison Bullen, interview, Cape Town, July 21, 2003.

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engineering democracy.”21 Women’s groups in Kwa-Zulu Natal experienced these problems firsthand. They found it difficult to learn about how and where to participate in government-citizen forums, and once there, they were uncertain how to get an issue onto the agenda: They complained that unequal relations of power at these events prevented them from being heard (Hicks 2009).22 Women in this group insisted that “meaningful, participatory spaces are closing up – the really consultative processes or spaces where decisions are made are not in the public arena” (as qtd. in Hicks 2009, 250). Access, voice, and capacity for contestation were limited at these sites, and these women knew it. In contrast to the liberal moment when the NWM marched into the halls of parliament to debate ministers, during the consolidation period, mechanisms for citizen engagement became superficial and produced alienation. As participatory forums became ineffective, citizens looked for alternative venues. Poor and working-class urban women joined movements such as the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee and Anti-Privatization Forum of Gauteng. However, debate conditions in the majority of these movements were also limited. “Grannies” typically dominated the membership but men ran the meetings (Buhlungu 2006; Eagan and Wafer 2006; Greenberg 2006).23 As Gertrude Square, a social movement activist in the racially diverse, militant Anti-Eviction Campaign (AEC) movement, explained, “I can really tell you, it is the ladies that are doing all the work, the men are doing all the talking and the flying. Going with the airplane to this place, to that place, representing the Campaign, it’s just men” (as quoted in Miraftab 2006, 202). Women’s exclusion from leadership in the AEC led some to challenge debate conditions. Their timing was propitious, as a number of institutional problems had become pressing, and the immediacy of emergency evictions had lessened (Miraftab 2006). However, debate conditions remained limited in most social movements, and women activists had just begun to challenge their exclusions in the AEC. Elsewhere in civil society, debate conditions were moderate at best. 21 22

23

Festus interview and Meintjes interview. Also see the discussion in Harvey 2002. Cathi Albertyn notes that the receptiveness of the state to women’s organizations varied by sector and issue, with relative openness characterizing the Department of Justice (2002). This was most common for research NGOs, not for CBOs. Women activists led both the Concerned Citizens Forum and Bayview Flat Residents Associations, but this was unusual (Benjamin 2007; Dwyer 2006).

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COSATU and the ANC During the consolidation period, COSATU increasingly challenged ANC governing elites, but debate conditions in COSATU remained stymied.24 COSATU became an increasingly disconsolate critic of ANC neoliberalism, HIV/AIDS policies, and Mbeki’s support for Zimbabwe president Robert Mugabe. The trade union federation also chafed under Mbeki’s centralization, which limited its role in the tripartite alliance to electioneering (COSATU 2006b). To express its dissent, COSATU successfully mounted protests, marches, and strikes (Pilay 2006). However, persistent limits on women’s access, voice, and capacity for contestation within the trade union federation curbed the ability of women trade unionists to use COSATU to shape debate content. Women’s access to leadership positions continued to be limited. To be sure, formal commitments to women’s inclusion in union leadership persisted during this period, and more women workers organized and became union members (Orr 2003a). COSATU also consolidated its gender policy in 2000, once again promising to advance women within union structures and develop women’s leadership (Orr 2000b). But COSATU rejected quotas for women trade unionists at all levels, and strategies to provide them with access to union positions remained voluntary. Joyce Pekane summed up the obvious: “[T]he men who don’t want the quota still maintain the status quo” (Meer 2002, 7). Mommy Jaffa explains, “[A]ffirmative action will threaten the leadership positions of men … participation of women, yes, but not leadership.”25 In 2000, women trade union employees were the lowest-paid workers yet continued to be excluded from educational opportunities as well as most management positions; women constituted 94 percent of the administrative staff and only 12 percent of organizers (The Shopsteward 2000). Men in the rank and file insisted they would not follow a woman leader, and when a woman trade unionist did move into a decision-making position, her male colleagues frequently refused to include her in committee meetings (Orr 2003a). In 2003, the General Secretary of COSATU, Zwelinzima Vavi, admitted, “The main decision makers are still almost all men … almost all our affiliates have elected women in national positions; but almost all of the positions are deputy presidents, or treasurers” (as qtd. in Orr 2003a, 1). 24

25

During the 1990s, membership in COSATU grew impressively, and in 2001, it won the right to strike. Throughout the consolidation period, it retained significant capacity to mobilize its members, although membership declined during consolidation (Gumede 2005, 257–258). Jaffa interview. Liesel Orr expressed a similar sentiment (interview).

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Women’s voice and capacity for contestation in COSATU remained as modest as their access. Union culture continued to be unwelcoming to women members: Child care at meetings was rare, most meetings continued to be held in the evenings, and men tended to use Marxist jargon that intimidated many women (Orr 2003a). Researchers found women almost never spoke at union meetings, even when they constituted 80 percent of attendees (van Driel 2002, 14 and 17).26 At the 2000 COSATU Congress, the number of women delegates and speakers increased over previous years, but “men still dominated the debates” (Orr 2000b, 73). The potential for gender forums to become counterpublics remained unfulfilled as they continued to be run by administrators, lacked adequate resources, focused on rote procedure, and men often dominated meetings (Orr 2003a and 2003b; Van Driel 2002, 15). At the end of the consolidation period, one survey found women’s participation in union activities was declining (NALEDI 2006, 32). Although COSATU’s increasing willingness to challenge the ANC at the end of the period meant it could have been a valuable base for women trade unionists, moderate debate conditions checked women’s ability to take advantage of that opportunity. ANC party structures were even less accommodating, because the party increasingly rejected internal debate of any kind. As the ANC pursued a highly unpopular neoliberal economic policy, Mbeki tightened his control to ensure compliance and prevent party fragmentation (Feinstein 2009, 60–61). This decline in party democracy had begun during the latter half of the 1990s, but the trend intensified with consolidation. As one sharp-tongued critic noted, “by 2001 … the ANC would no longer permit even internal debate about its lack of internal debate” (Butler 2005, 732). Retribution against dissenters was swift. Elite leaders strongly discouraged competition, lobbying, and even campaigning for NEC positions, and goaded members to rely upon ANC leadership structures for guidance (Butler 2005). Ranking ANC party members complained the NEC had become a “rubber stamp” packed with Mbeki loyalists, giving the executive free reign to shape budgets and legislation (Gumede 2005, 295; Harvey 2002). As former ANC MP Andrew Feinstein describes it, by 2000, the ANC had become “a party fearful of its leader, conscious of his power to make or break careers, conscious of his demand for loyalty, for conformity of thinking” (2009, 111). 26

Two exceptions to this pattern were the National Education, Health and Allied Workers Union, where women constituted 69 percent of the leadership, and the Democratic Nursing Organization of South Africa, which was almost entirely composed of women (Van Driel 2002).

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ANC women were no exception to this rule. Their greater presence did not mean they could escape Mbeki’s centralization of the party or its narrowing space for contestation. This was doubly true as women in the ANC lacked an effective internal counterpublic that could support them. The ANC Women’s League put little energy into organizing women at the grassroots or providing them with leadership opportunities, and continued to be disorganized at the top (Erlank 2005, 208). When new leadership took the helm of the ANCWL in 2003, feminist analysts hoped the organization might become a greater source of support, but it remained a women’s auxiliary (Hassim 2006, 198). During the consolidation period, ANC governing elites undermined the openness and inclusiveness of debate within their own party and undermined debate conditions within civil society, thwarting the influence of women’s organizations in the public sphere. While COSATU might have offered women trade unionists a venue for critique, debate conditions here remained stymied. Debate conditions in the new social movements were worse. As debate conditions dipped to moderate levels across most of civil society, the ability of women activists to shape public debate declined.

The Media During the 1990s, the ANC promoted reform to make the mainstream media more accessible to all South Africans. ANC elites also relentlessly urged the mass media to support their developmental agenda, intensifying the battle between the party and the independent press.27 The press, especially the prestigious Mail & Guardian (M&G), responded by embracing its role as Fourth Estate with urgency, in part because a mediated relationship with the ANC would raise its profile and profits (Johnston 2005).28 As this battle raged, little attention was paid to women’s status

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ANC elites attacked the press as racist, but state agencies promoted three distinct positions. The Department of Finance and media owners endorsed the neoliberal approach that guided most media reform, the Department of Communication preferred a statist approach, and the Media Development and Diversity Agency and the Government Communication and Information System advocated an independent, public service mass media (Berger 2004). By 2003, there were thirty-four print media (most in English) and more than 100 broadcast media (Lowe Morna et al. 2003, 9 and 17). Tabloids entered the South African market at the end of the consolidation period and were popular among the black urban working class.

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in the media industry. Although small gains occurred at the end of the period, debate conditions remained limited. The internet facilitated one of the small gains. In contrast to the liberal moment when independent feminist media presses shut down because of financial constraints, during the consolidation period, a vibrant online feminist community could now draw upon the insights of scholarly research through the online journal Feminist Africa, founded in 2002. A second small gain was a continued increase in women’s access in the mainstream media. The number of women and men journalists became nearly equal by 2005 (Steyn et al. 2005, 29). Black women, who accounted for only 6 percent of media employees in newsrooms in 2003, also made gains, and by 2007 constituted 18 percent of those employees (Lowe Morna et al. 2003, 13; Lowe Morna 2007, 8). These figures represented real change. However, it is important to note that black women composed 45 percent of the population, and that black men made much greater advances, quickly becoming the largest group in the industry (Goga 2002; Lowe Morna 2007, 8). Although black men were newcomers to many newsrooms, the number of black men in senior positions nearly matched those of white women (Lowe Morna 2007, 11). Black women continued to be limited to lower-level positions, with white women overrepresented in the lower ranks.29 A few promotions of women at the top of the industry were a third small advance, signaling change was possible. By 2002, two high profile editorial positions went to women: Ferial Haffajee became editor of the Mail & Guardian, and Pippa Green became head of Radio News at SABC. Their appointments helped draw attention to the media glass ceiling, and several women in a variety of media houses began moving up the ranks.30 This progress suggested nearly a dozen editors would eventually be women, perhaps a quarter of them black (Lowe Morna 2007, 13; SANEF 2006).31 Although women’s numbers, rank, and diversity in the industry remained limited, small advances provided a basis for future advances. New women editors and more women in the business did bring some changes to the cultural climate of media houses, but the changes were too small to create a space for women media workers to speak out and challenge industry standards and practices. Sometimes women moving 29

30 31

Community media did not have much success diversifying women’s participation either (Taylor and Berger, 2006 as cited in Milne and Taylor 2006, 66). Also see Lloyd, “NGOs Discover.” Marianne Thamm, phone interview, July 24, 2006. Ferial Haffajee, “Glass Ceiling Cracking?” Mail & Guardian May 24, 2007.

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up into management could bring a friendlier, less cutthroat attitude to the business.32 However, journalists reported the need to control their voices to be successful. Some career women in the industry studied, mastered, and reproduced sexist norms that prioritized “masculinity,” literally changing their voices. Billed as survival skills, ambitious women in the industry studied different styles of writing, learned how to deepen the pitch of their voices to avoid “shrieking,” to stop performing, start fighting, to avoid “girl-talk” and “fluff,” so they could “cut to the chase.”33 Instead of speaking out and challenging industry norms, ambitious women in the media found it necessary to assimilate to male norms. Nevertheless, they continued to be assigned stereotypical assignments, and many reported they were “not taken seriously when they discussed politics and wanted to explore stories in that field” (Goga 2002, 224). Sexual harassment existed but was not addressed.34 Women journalists reported that their ability to challenge the status quo in the media industry remained limited during consolidation. Many expressed serious concern about market pressures that fed self-censorship and caution.35 Although government required guidelines and policies on gender in the industry by this period, not all standard boards ensured compliance (Seseane 2004, 184–185). Few editors took gender policies seriously, or worse, were even aware of them, prompting exasperation from one reporter: “So where does this leave us? Issues of media and other issues within newsrooms are not being addressed and of course the gender agenda is totally missing…There is simply silence although journalists talk and moan” (Orderson 2004, 228; SANEF 2006, 14). Juliette Saunders, Group Online Editor at Johncom Media, underscores this gloomy picture, noting: “Gender issues are so below the radar it’s not funny … in our newsroom it’s not debated … there’s a silence on women’s issues and gender issues.”36 32

33

34

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This claim is based on interviews with journalists at the Mail & Guardian in 2006. Several noted that the addition of black men also helped alter corporate industry culture. Journalist, radio, and television personality Lesley-Ann Aupiais, interview, Cape Town, July 13, 2006. Also see http://www.lesaupiais.co.za A number of journalists I interviewed spoke about sexual harassment and provided details, but all requested their comments be kept off the record. This claim is based on interviews of journalists as well as participant observation at the HSRC conference, “At the End of the Rainbow: Power, Politics and Identity in Postapartheid South African Media,” Stellenbosch, South Africa, July 6 and 7, 2006. Saunders interview. Journalists noted debate over HIV/AIDS was similarly restricted, although in 2006, Colleen Lowe Morna insisted the situation was improving. Gender Links Director Colleen Lowe Morna, interview, Johannesburg, July 14, 2006.

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At the Mail & Guardian, a paper that had a strong commitment to diversity and embraced post-apartheid values, women spoke out but contestation over the rules of the game remained limited. A number of journalists at the M&G spoke highly of the newsroom atmosphere, noting a cultural shift since Ferial Haffajee’s arrival. As Fiona MacLeod succinctly put it, “women have to fight for respect, but they get it.”37 Other journalists at the M&G confirmed her appraisal, noting they had vigorous debates over politics and race. However, no debate over sexual harassment, maternity leave, or childcare occurred. Expected to be honorary men, women journalists assimilated as best they could, courted the support of senior men in the business, tried their best to avoid sexual harassers, and altered their career plans or private lives accordingly. The possibility of a shift in debate conditions appeared at the very end of the period, because women in the industry began working with women’s media NGOs to develop a counterpublic. In 2003, Gender Links, under the direction of Colleen Lowe Morna, presented statistics on women’s marginal employment status in the industry to the South African National Editors’ Forum (SANEF). Disbelief was the immediate reaction.38 Building on this research, the Media Monitoring Project, Gender Links (GL), Gender and Media Southern Africa, and Media Institute of Southern Africa won grudging acknowledgement that the industry needed to be more attentive to women employees (Kobue 2004, 62–63 and 65; Milne and Taylor 2006, 87; SANEF 2006, 11). By the end of the consolidation period, they had established a counterpublic capable of challenging the status quo. This was a rare advancement during the consolidation period. ANC centralization accounts for the decline in debate conditions in parliament and civil society from the liberal moment to consolidation. Governing elites used the PR electoral system, quota, and their electoral dominance to diminish the influence of parliament in the public sphere, to pressure women MPs to tow the party line or resign, and to undercut parliamentary counterpublics. The ANC also used its dominance in the state to award funding to organizations in civil society that worked closely with its agenda, and to depoliticize participatory mechanisms

37 38

M&G journalist Fiona MacLeod, interview, Johannesburg, July 27, 2006. Lowe Morna interview. Lowe Morna had been the first CEO of the CGE. When the ANC “redeployed” the energetic and efficient commissioner Thenjiwe Mtintso, Lowe Morna took her place. Internal tensions boiled over and led to a prolonged court case to remove her from office. Lowe Morna then established Gender Links.

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established to provide ordinary South Africans with public influence. ANC government elites also centralized control within the party, limiting internal debate in ANC structures. As the ANCWL remained a women’s wing, and debate conditions in the new social movements and COSATU ranged from low to moderate, women’s ability to shape public debate during the consolidation period declined.

Public Debate during Consolidation Limited or moderate debate conditions across much of the public sphere stifled demands for substantive gender justice. In fact, the state dominated gender discourse. During the transition period, women activists, academics, and politicians drew upon a human rights framework to construct women as citizens and justify their high-level demands for substantive gender justice. As debate conditions contracted during consolidation, those demands diminished. Instead, public debate framed women as vulnerable victims and promoted a developmental agenda focused on needs rather than interests (Fraser 1989). Gender-Based Violence Analysts agree that public debate over gender-based violence increased in South Africa during the consolidation period (Erlank 2005; Posel 2005). However, as debate conditions in the public sphere eroded, debate content over gender justice shifted away from substantive demands for women’s autonomy toward conservative remediation that focused on protecting and controlling “vulnerable” women. At the beginning of the consolidation period, women in parliament and civil society worked together to shape public debate on gender-based violence, much as they had during the liberal moment. For example, the CGE and JMC joined NGOs in criticizing government delays in setting a date for the implementation of the Domestic Violence Act (DVA) (Meintjes 2003, 157; Usdin et al. 2000). To assess its effectiveness, the JMC, working with the CGE and civil society, held public hearings in 1999 and 2002 and took investigative trips throughout the country (Manjoo 2005). In 1999, in response to the epidemic levels of violence against women, South African activists declared Women’s Day a “time for mourning,” underscoring the failure of the government to effectively address GBV. Women’s NGOs and the CGE worked together to make the holiday a vehicle for public discussion about rape and the limitations of state

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responsiveness. They launched the campaign “Women Demand Dignity, Women Down Tools,” asking women across the country to stop work for one hour on International Women’s Day Against Violence. Women’s organizations sponsored hundreds of events dedicated to ending GBV throughout the month, mobilized women as political actors, and generated contestation over gender-based violence (Agenda 1999).39 The following year, statistics on violence against women increased, but the CGE lacked the capacity to coordinate the Women’s Day celebration. Indeed, for the remainder of the consolidation period, the CGE was in disarray, in part because the ANC blatantly undermined its leadership and funding (Manjoo 2005; Meintjes 2009). The popular vitality of National Women’s Day quickly drained away. Depoliticized, internationally inspired campaigns that involved government support supplanted the local activism of the 1999 campaign. The new programs couched their demands in the language of vulnerability and need. From 1997 to 2001, a successful White Ribbon campaign raised the public profile of violence against women; afterwards, the 16 Days of Activism Campaign became the most prominent program (Moolman 2006, 46; NISAA 2001). These campaigns did not mobilize women to claim their right to autonomy, but instead aimed to spread information about how GBV harms “vulnerable groups” like “women and children” (Concept Document for 16 Days of Activism 2008, 2). Depoliticization and depiction of women as victims became so extensive that the media widely criticized the 16 Days of Activism Campaign for being “sentimental” and without influence (Moolman 2006, 46). Although not all programs were this vapid, demands for shelters, changes in criminal procedures, and legal advice – all hallmarks of substantive levels of gender justice that put the onus on the state to secure the conditions that would enable women to be autonomous citizens – “dissipated” as consolidation advanced (Artz and Smythe 2005, 202). As demands for substantive gender justice declined, men’s activism on gender-based violence grew. This activism rarely pressured the state to increase its support for gender justice. In fact, a few prominent men’s organizations publicly condoned patriarchy. A handful of men’s groups, like the tiny Agisanang Domestic Abuse Prevention and Training (ADAPT), offered gender sensitivity training as they promoted community awareness of GBV. Other men’s organizations that had higher international 39

Joyce Piliso-Seroke, “Imagine what We Could Achieve with a United Will,” Saturday Star August 7, 1999.

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profiles and more extensive outreach, like Engender Health, aimed to reduce HIV/AIDS by protecting “powerless” women from sexual violence (EngenderHealth nd). Although this second type of organization raised the profile of gender-based violence and questioned gender norms, they framed women as victims rather than as autonomous political agents. Other men’s groups, like the Moral Regeneration Movement (MRM), embraced women’s subordination as a solution to the spiraling and mutually reinforcing rates of GBV and HIV/AIDS.40 The MRM was a joint venture between government and religious organizations begun in 1997 and endorsed abstinence and the sexual control of women, spreading its message through rallies, conferences, workshops, and Days of Prayer (Hames 2006). Its popularity increased during the consolidation period when Deputy President Jacob Zuma led the organization and annual conferences spread its message. The Men’s Movement followed a similar trend, gaining members as it drew on religious prescriptions to address the twin crises of GBV and HIV/AIDS. During marches, Men’s Movement members carried placards reading “Hands Off Our Women.” The Anglican Archbishop, who led a group of marchers, insisted, “real men don’t rape women and children … we want our women, our wives, sisters and daughters to walk freely in our streets” (as qtd. in Moffett 2006, 143, italics added). Some rural areas adopted virginity testing of young girls in an effort to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS. These responses bolstered men’s paternalistic role as protectors while policing women’s sexuality; both undermined women’s autonomy. Other institutions in civil society promoted formal levels of gender justice. COSATU continued to denounce sexual harassment and other forms of gender-based violence, but it did little to ensure the prominence of that message. To be sure, COSATU encouraged its affiliates to address GBV, and some training and education occurred among COSATU members. However, trade unionists at the 2003 National Gender Conference openly criticized the organization for not giving GBV a high enough profile 40

Mutually reinforcing because violent sex was more likely to spread the disease and because some men believed that sex with a virgin would cure them of HIV/AIDS motivating rape. Nearly one-quarter of South Africans were infected with HIV/AIDS by 2000. Young black women had the highest rates and were often blamed for the spread of the disease. Their higher rates were attributable to their poverty, social inequality, and lack of bodily autonomy. Migratory labor patterns requiring men to live away from their rural homes for months at a time led to urban and rural cohabitation, increasing the risk for married African women. Finally the death of male partners from the disease threatened African women’s survival, increasing the likelihood that they would turn to transactional sex (Albertyn 2003).

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(Gender Coordinators Report 2003). Although the media had a contentious relationship with the ANC, they did not clash over government policies on gender-based violence. As violence against women increased in frequency and ferocity during consolidation, the media reported on the issue. Most coverage, however, disseminated highly sexist information: It continued to reinforce gender stereotypes, publicized the names of rape survivors, and focused on the character and appearance of survivors rather than investigating perpetrators (Harries and Bird 2005; Lowe Morna 2006, 25; Naidoo 2007).41 When the media did address perpetrators, they pathologized individuals (an inadequate depiction given the pervasiveness of rape) (Posel 2005), or depicted them as victims of false accusations.42 Both reinforced the perception that women needed to be protected and controlled, spurning claims to autonomy. Public debate over gender-based violence during consolidation deviated significantly from public debate during the liberal moment. Earlier, women activists, trade unionists, politicians, and academics had championed women’s autonomy by claiming a wide array of formal and substantive rights, from changes to the criminal justice system to the provision of survivor services. In the later period, as GBV and HIV/AIDS rates exploded, campaigns emphasized women’s vulnerability and male protection and control. Pressure on the state to provide substantive levels of gender justice declined significantly. Women’s Work A similar pattern existed for the second gender justice issue, women’s work. Women’s employment situation remained dire in South Africa during the consolidation period, suggesting women’s work status would continue to be a key concern for women MPs, women’s organizations, and COSATU, and that it would be an important story for the media. However, unlike the liberal moment, when women’s organizations partnered with women in the state to promote gender-friendly labor policies and CBOs stormed into parliament demanding more generous government allowances, during the consolidation period, demands for equality of results declined. Instead, public debate followed the government’s 41

42

Cooper notes that a handful of radio stations avoided sensationalizing the crime, and that some media were responsive to feminist concerns when picketed. She characterizes television as “hopeless” and the new tabloids as particularly “sensationalist” (interview). Cooper noted this phenomenon for a number of high-profile rape cases during this period (interview).

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lead, aiming for poverty alleviation that did little to challenge women’s exploitation. Activism on women’s work evaporated. Although parliament addressed women’s role in the workplace through policy discussions over the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Bill women in civil society and women MPs did not demand it. Instead, the South African constitution mandated it. Only two CBOs offered input on the bill, and neither of them were women’s CBOs (Gutto 2001). This was not surprising, because few CBOs devoted to advancing women’s social and economic rights could effectively utilize participatory mechanisms, and the NWM did not reprise its public policy intervention of the earlier period (Gouws 2008a; Hassim 2008, 113). A handful of elite women’s policy research organizations, such as the Women’s Legal Centre, commented on the bill (Gutto 2001). These groups had the unenviable position of advocating substantive gender justice with little evidence of popular support from grassroots women. Indeed, many women’s NGOs promoted development goals that emphasized self-reliance and empowerment through microenterprises that avoided references to gender exploitation altogether. For example, Agenda profiled a development project that provided solar cookers for rural women and defined women’s empowerment as “the release of women from physically tiring, time intensive activity and unhealthy practices” (Green 2002, 65). Activists worried about this constrained poverty alleviation discourse that focused on women’s needs rather than their economic emancipation, but they were uncertain about how to demand more. As Samantha Hargreaves remarked, “The question is, should we as gender activists be talking about transformation, rather than accommodation? And how feasible would that be?” (1999, 47). The declining debate conditions of this period suggest gender activists did not have the ability to demand an end to women’s exploitation, much as Hargreaves feared. Declining debate conditions did not prevent COSATU from endorsing a range of gender policies in the workforce, including nondiscrimination, reproductive rights, parental leave, and childcare. However, COSATU did not prioritize these goals. No plan of action for advancing them existed (Gender Coordinators Report 2003, 7). As the Gender Coordinator’s Report noted, “COSATU’s record in the struggle for gender equality has been marred by significant resistance and a lack of political seriousness and will” (12). This was evident during negotiations with employers, as COSATU continued to offer maternity leave as its first concession

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(Orr 2000a). COSATU’s lip service to substantive levels of gender justice had become blatantly evident. The media maintained their support for women’s formal equality in the workplace and exposed the conservative policies of South African business. For example, the media publicized the government’s gender-disaggregated statistics and gave substantial coverage to the 1999 CGE survey “Gender and the Private Sector,” which chided business for preferring men to women employees. Media support for formal equality, however, did not extend to depictions of women workers. The media usually presented women as passive, sexualized objects. White women dominated almost all social roles (Media Monitoring Project 1999, 28–29). Black women rarely appeared in the news, except as victims of “underdevelopment, oppressive traditions, high illiteracy, rural and urban poverty, religious fanaticism, overpopulation, disasters (burning of shacks) and violence against women” (7). Although the media had a combative relationship with the ANC, they supported formal levels of gender justice and depicted women in sexist and racially discriminatory ways. Overall, during the consolidation period, demands for gender justice in public debate became more conservative. Advocates of women’s rights made substantive claims for gender justice during the liberal moment, but by the turn of the century, those demands had largely disappeared. With debate conditions contracting and ANC political elites striving to co-opt the public sphere, public debate presented women as vulnerable victims in need of protection and as targets of development programs that aimed to marginally alleviate their material misery. Thus it is no surprise that state support for gender justice declined during consolidation.

Gender Justice during Consolidation Having successfully constrained demands for gender justice in the public sphere, the government offered only moderate levels of support for gender justice during the consolidation period. At the same time, it denied this downgrade by arguing women’s greater presence in politics was proof of its success in advancing gender justice. The government conflated women’s representation with gender equality and displaced debate over women’s interests (Erlank 2005, 199). Indeed, ANC policy directly stated that women’s representation ensured “men’s interests” would not trump “women’s needs” (as qtd. in Gouws 2005, 77). The politics of needs dovetailed perfectly with the ANC’s policy agenda, which aimed to promote women’s protection while alleviating their poverty. In addition

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to this depoliticized approach to gender equality, Mbeki called for an “African Renaissance” that played upon racial identities and celebrated a heritage of male privilege. Gender-Based Violence Government policies toward gender-based violence deflected public debate over patriarchy in the private sphere and increasingly conveyed a disregard for survivors. In a remarkable contrast to the liberal moment when thenDeputy President Mbeki endorsed extensive policy reform on GBV, during consolidation, Mbeki challenged press use of South African rape statistics and publicly disparaged the famed rape survivor Charlene Smith. Drawing upon the logic underpinning the African Renaissance, Mbeki argued that the press and Smith had fomented a racist debate over rape; he blamed apartheid, not black men. Commissioner of Police Jackie Selebi spoke more directly than the president about women’s culpability. He appeared on ABC’s 20/20 asserting, “Most South African women who report rape are lying” (as cited in Smith 2001, 302). When Rape Crisis challenged the rape rates reported by the South African Police Services (SAPS) in 2000, the government ended that debate by placing a moratorium on crime statistics that lasted a full year. A number of South African analysts have noted that these comments and actions shifted public debate away from male power and women’s subordination, and toward condemnations of apartheid and women’s character (e.g., Erlank 2005; Moffet 2006). Government policy on legislation related to gender-based violence followed a similar pattern. The Commissioner of Police reported that he had no funding to enforce the DVA (Mattes 2002, 28). Eventually the government provided additional but insufficient funding. Analysts continued to criticize the government for its lack of itemization on costing, targets, training, and interdepartmental jurisdiction, missing from the DVA because it had been fast-tracked (Moolman and Tolmay 2005, 69). The government did not address these problems and the promise of the DVA remained unfulfilled (Meintjes 2003, 157; Usdin et al. 2000; Vetten 2005). In contrast to government support and passage of the DVA in 1998, during the consolidation period, government legislation on GBV stalled. The law continued to define rape narrowly, requiring proof that a man had illegally and deliberately had sexual intercourse with a woman without her consent. The law only addressed vaginal-penile penetration and rape was not applicable to men or between people of the same sex. South Africa’s outdated definition of rape and the criminal justice system’s

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table 7.2. Responsiveness on Women’s Rights During Consolidation Gender-Based Violence

Women’s Work

Moratorium on crime statistics 2000–2001 Marginal increase in DVA funding Dilution of Sexual Offences Bill

2000 Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act

inconsistent treatment of rape survivors meant the country lagged behind international standards. In 1998, the Minister of Justice approved a review of sexual assault law, and in January 2003, parliament tabled a Sexual Offences Bill that had significant input from feminist activists and lawyers. The bill broadened the definition of rape, had a number of provisions intended to limit secondary victimization of survivors, promised comprehensive medical treatment that included treatment for HIV/AIDS, and included provisions for increasing the responsiveness of the criminal justice system. It would have made the country an international leader in rape law (Artz and Smythe 2008).43 However, the Cabinet and Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development rejected a number of these innovations, eliminating provisions to prevent secondary victimization, changes to the criminal justice system, and comprehensive medical treatment, all of which it deemed too expensive. The Committee also introduced a clause requiring complainants prove the sexual offense was not consensual (Artz and Smythe 2008). The government then shuttled the bill between departments and committees for the remainder of the second parliament, wearing down advocates of reform (Artz and Smythe 2008). Throughout this process, the JMC did not make a single recommendation on the bill.44 In stark contrast to the fast-tracked Domestic Violence Act of 1998, during consolidation, the government stalled passage and eliminated the most progressive elements in the Sexual Offences Bill, underscoring its declining support for gender justice. Women’s Work The second gender justice issue also received moderate state support. To be sure, the ANC did address women’s employment problems during 43 44

For a cross-national analysis of rape law standards, see Caringella 2009. Christi van der Westhuizen, “Fix the Gender Machine,” Mail & Guardian, May 25, 2009, http://www.boell.org.za/web/104–370.html, accessed January 10, 2010 and “Zuma Case Reveals SA Rape Problem,” BBC News, February 15, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ africa/4713172.stm, accessed January 10, 2010.

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the consolidation period. For example, in 2000, the government passed the constitutionally mandated Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex and directly targeted exploitative practices in rural areas. The Act also aimed to provide substantive equality by increasing access of disadvantaged groups, including black women, to paid jobs through a variety of mechanisms such as affirmative action. This commitment to substantive equality was unusual because it went against the neoliberal economic trends of the period. Moreover, the legislation applied to the informal, public, and private sectors and trumped other statutes. But it required substantial administrative and financial resources to be successfully implemented; neither was forthcoming, exposing limited government support for this initiative (Samuel 2001; Goldblatt 2009). In 2004, the highly influential Finance Minister Trevor Manuel signaled the government was finally ready to make a commitment toward a more distributive, “pro-poor” economic strategy that would presumably include black women. However, as First Lady Zanele Mbeki, a diligent and unassuming advocate for rural women, scathingly noted to much public attention a year later, the promised shift was neither immediate nor directed toward women.45 In contrast to the liberal moment when the South African government had created a veritable alphabet soup of work, training, and affirmative action programs, during the consolidation period, it failed to offer more than formal levels of support for women’s work status. This confirms the just debate hypothesis.

Conclusion After the triumphant election in 1994, it is unlikely that the leaders of the African National Congress imagined public debate deviating far from their own policy objectives. Indeed, during the heady days of the liberal moment, few activists could imagine conflict between themselves and the ANC.46 Their comrades now occupied the fearsome Afrikaner state, and many assumed transformation would be swift. By 1997, the exhilaration of the liberal moment was fading; by 1999, consolidation was in full swing.

45

46

“First Lady, State Has Failed the Poor,” Sunday Times December 11, 2005, http://www. genderlinks.org.za/article/first-lady-state-has-failed-the-poor---sunday-times-2005– 12–11, accessed September 1, 2009. Burton interview.

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During consolidation, ANC governing elites avidly directed public debate, using the PR system, quota, and their electoral dominance to advance centralization while hollowing out popular participatory mechanisms. As Sheila Meintjes pointedly notes, “The problem is they [ANC elites] haven’t yet developed an understanding of what democracy is… there’s a need to understand what opposition means, loyal opposition, but the ANC doesn’t have this kind of view of opposition.”47 Indeed, the ANC aimed to limit opposition by centralizing power in the executive and co-opting the public sphere. Doing so undermined debate conditions, with profound effects for the content of public debate and state support for gender justice. Although the ANC endorsed women’s representation in a number of high profile areas, and some women held high-ranking positions in government, executive centralization undermined women’s diversity and ability to speak out and challenge the status quo. During consolidation, women remained divided by unequal access to resources that mapped onto racial, class, and regional divisions inherited from the apartheid era. ANC actions exacerbated those divisions. Governing elites ensured privileged, professional women with career ambitions populated parliament, eroding the inclusiveness of women MPs. At the same time, they disciplined independent and outspoken MPs, undermining the openness of debate conditions. Government funding and parliamentary procedures favored elite women’s NGOs. This selectiveness, coupled with service provisioning, blunted critique and undermined the openness and inclusiveness of debate conditions. The simultaneous hollowing out of participatory mechanisms exposed the divisions among women’s organizations, leaving poor women with few avenues for participating in public debate. The ANC thus fractured and contained the two sectors that had been crucial for women’s rights during the liberal moment. This enabled governing elites to dominate the gender agenda during the consolidation period. They avidly conflated women’s presence in politics with gender equality, and framed women as vulnerable victims in need of protection and poverty alleviation. As a result, demands for substantive equality decreased and the ANC reduced its support for gender justice accordingly. Although ANC centralization has recently declined, the party continues to pursue co-optation of the public sphere. In 2004, South Africans 47

Commissioner for the Commission for Gender Equality Sheila Meintjes, interview, Johannesburg, July 30, 2003.

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elected Mbeki for a second term, and the ANC captured a remarkable 66 percent of the vote (Friedman 2009). Although the thrill of electoral politics had declined, and voter turnout dropped nearly 13 percent from the previous election, black rural women continued to be the backbone of ANC supporters, and women continued to register to vote in larger numbers than men (Gouws 2004; Piper 2005). Divisions within the ANC sorely tested this loyalty, however, and brought dramatic changes in the leadership. Corruption scandals and infighting prompted Mbeki to sack his deputy president, Jacob Zuma, in 2005.48 Growing divisions within the ANC led to Zuma’s election as ANC president in 2007. The party then removed Mbeki from the presidency in 2008. In 2009, Zuma handily won the election for president of South Africa. During his presidency, party centralization eroded and factionalism increased, but party elites continued to use the PR electoral system, quota, and their electoral dominance to co-opt the public sphere.49 Under Zuma, parliament continued to lack independence (Feinstein 2009, 235), and debate conditions remained stymied. Although women’s presence in parliament increased, numbers alone could not improve debate conditions. In 2009, women constituted 43 percent of parliament and half of all ANC candidates. Women alternated with men on the party lists (Lowe Morna, Rama, and Mtonga 2009). However, women’s highranking positions in parliament declined. The speaker, all of the party whips, and party leaders in the fourth parliament were men; Deputy Speaker Nomaindia Mfeketo was the sole exception (Lowe Morna et al. 2009).50 Women’s counterpublics established during the first nonracial

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He named a woman, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, to the post in 2005. The splinter party, Congress of the People (COPE), siphoned some ANC support in 2009, claiming 7.4 percent of the vote. By early 2010, Zuma’s scandalous sexual behavior and indecisiveness had weakened his authority, and ANC power had shifted from governing elites to party elites. See Richard Calland, “Can a Lame Duck Waddle Off?” Mail & Guardian February 19, 2010 http://www.mg.co.za/article/2010–02–19-can-alame-duck-waddle-off, accessed February 19, 2010 and Mark Gevisser, “The Politics Behind Zuma’s Polygamy,” guardian.co.uk March 4, 2010 http://www.guardian.co.uk/ commentisfree/2010/mar/04/zuma-polygamy-south-africa, accessed March 6, 2010. Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge resigned in protest at being named ANC Caucus Leader instead of Speaker. Carrien du Plessis and Gaye Davis, “Madlala-Routledge Quits,” Pretoria News May 6, 2009. http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=3086&art_ id=vn20090506063722958C558919. A few days later a similar drama unfolded when Mbete refused to be sworn into parliament, signaling her disappointment at not being named deputy president. Political Bureau, “Mbete’s Actions Stun ANC,” The Star May 7, 2009. http://www. iol.co.za/index.php?click_id=3086&set_id=1&art_id=vn20090507060941266C557974, both accessed August 1, 2009.

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parliament also fared poorly. The ANC Women’s Caucus took infrequent action to prevent debate conditions in parliament from becoming abusive.51 Disorganization and depoliticization in the CGE deepened as corruption increased.52 The JMC failed to meet regularly during the third parliament and was defunct by 2009.53 The Ministry of Women, Youth, Children and Disability, established in 2009, suffered from “departmental chaos”; it was incapable of running the 16 Days of Activism Campaign, which the administration turned over to the Ministry of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs.54 Debate conditions also remained moderate in civil society. Racial and class divisions among women’s organizations had intensified with the Mbeki-Zuma rivalry. Mbeki championed women’s presence in public life, whereas his populist nemesis celebrated African cultural traditions, including polygamy and male sexual prowess. Elite, educated women favored Mbeki over Zuma; poor rural black women favored Zuma (Hassim 2009b). The new Progressive Women’s Movement of South Africa, founded in 2006, did little to ameliorate this rift because it was established upon the insistence of Mbeki (Mama 2007).55 Public participation forums continued to be sites for “manipulation” where government administrators handpicked “people’s representatives.” They did not fully inform citizens about the issues to be debated, and used citizen input selectively to advance a predetermined agenda (Kimemia 2007, 3).56 Although multiple social movements emerged after 2004, they continued to marginalize women members (Hassim 2009b; Salo 2008).

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One exception was a demand for the immediate suspension of Chief Whip Mbulelo Goniwe when he was accused of sexual harassment in 2006. See Mpumelelo Mkhabela, “ANC Boss in Sex Scandal,” City Press November 11, 2006, http://amadlandawonye. wikispaces.com/ANC+chief+whip+innuendoed,+Mpumelelo+Mkhabela,+City+Press, accessed August 1, 2009. Manjoo interview; Nonboniso Gasa, “Mr. President, I Stand Accused,” Mail & Guardian June 15, 2010, http://www.mg.co.za/article/2010–06–15-mr-president-i-stand-accused accessed June 17, 2010. Chrisit van der Westhuizen, “Fix the Gender Machine,” Mail & Guardian, May 25, 2009, http://www.boell.org.za/web/104–370.html, accessed January 10, 2009. Manjoo interview; “2000 Report Card: Muddling Along in the C Class,” Mail & Guardian, December 23, 2009, http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009–12–23–2009-reportcard-muddling-along-in-the-c-class, accessed January 10, 2009. It remains a subsidiary of the ANCWL and lacks a separate website or physical address. In contrast to ANC machinations, the Constitutional Court, in Doctors for Life v. Speaker of the National Assembly, demanded the ANC enhance participatory mechanisms promised by the constitution. For an analysis of the case, see Czapinskiy and Manjoo 2007.

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Moderate debate conditions persisted elsewhere in civil society as well. COSATU continued to be a site for contestation over government policy during this period, but debate conditions remained stymied.57 Even though women constituted 40 percent of National Office Bearers by 2006, they continued to be limited to support positions such as deputy president and treasurer (COSATU 2006b). COSATU leaders acknowledged the weaknesses of gender forums; in fact, many no longer exist, and several affiliates refuse to establish them. Analysts insist gender policy remains peripheral to union practice (NALEDI 2006, 45). Debate conditions continued to erode in the ANC. Under Mbeki, the ANC Women’s League demanded an increase in the quota for the candidate list and NEC to 50 percent, and in 2009, the party fulfilled both.58 However, party leaders used the quota strategically: They selected women for political positions in the provinces and local elections to thwart the ambitions of less pliable politicians and to avoid fractious infighting (COSATU 2006b; Hassim 2009b). The ANCWL had become part of the political machine. Not surprisingly, more women in party leadership did not inspire confidence that the ANC would return to its roots of internal debate. As Raymond Suttner colorfully notes: “The Zumafied ANC is fundamentally a coalition founded on greed and lust for power and thirst for loot” (2009, 16).59 ANC women have gained access to patronage politics in equal numbers with men. 57

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For examples of COSATU challenges to the ANC, see Malala, 2009 and Peroshni Govender and Alison Raymond, “UPDATE 5- SAfrica’s Zuma Says to Ease Economic Inequalities,” Interactive Investor International September 21, 2009. http://www.silobreaker.com/update5safricas-zuma-says-to-ease-economic-inequalities-5_2262613601812480025, accessed October 1, 2009 and “Moves Afoot to Oust Zuma?” Mail & Guardian March 5, 2010 http://www.mg.co.za/article/2010–03–05-moves-afoot-to-oust-zuma, accessed March 5, 2010. The extent to which COSATU was capable of confronting the ANC was increasingly debated in 2010, as concerns about leadership corruption within COSATU intensified. See Sakhela Buhlungu, “Cosatu: More Members but Less Power,” Mail & Guardian, http:// www.mg.co.za/article/2010–06–04-cosatu-more-members-but-less-power, accessed June 4, 2010 and Imraan Buccus, “What are the Prospects of Real political Realignment in South Africa?” Mail & Guardian June 4, 2010 http://www.mg.co.za/article/2010–06–04-whatare-the-prospects-of-real-political-realignment-in-south-africa, both accessed June 4, 2010. Stephanie Nieuwoudt, “Politics-South Africa: A Trying Passage for Women in the Ruling Party,” IPS December 31, 2007. http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=40646, accessed August 1, 2009. That “thirst” is well documented. For example, at the 2007 ANC conference, the party resolved to disband the Scorpions (the Directorate of Special Operations) that had pursued corruption allegations against Zuma, and ANC leaders attacked the independence of the judiciary (Gevisser 2009). Recently reports have surfaced of shootings of local officials by rival ANC members competing for patronage spoils. Barry Bearak, “Seats for 46,000, but Inequities for Many More,” New York Times March 13, 2010.

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The only exception to this pattern of stymied debate conditions was the mass media, where a tiny women’s counterpublic persisted. In 2006, a small group of women, working under the auspices of the South African National Editors’ Forum (SANEF), undertook a survey of editors that conveyed a clear message of sexism, racism, and denial about both.60 In 2009, they demanded 50 percent representation for women in decision-making positions and ownership, as well as the adoption and implementation of gender policies.61 Persistent ANC attacks on media independence, however, threaten the ability of this sector to fulfill its political functions (Freedom House 2010). Given the low to moderate range of debate conditions in the public sphere, demands for substantive gender justice have not been prominent in South African public debate. Discourse over gender-based violence has continued to regress. During the 2006 rape trial of former Deputy President Jacob Zuma, his supporters avidly celebrated patriarchal norms, threatened his accuser with death, burned her picture in public, and regularly joined Zuma in raucous renditions of the anti-apartheid song “Bring Me My Machine Gun.” The court put the complainant on trial and acquitted Zuma, ruling the sex was consensual.62 Events like the 16 Days of Activism Campaign remained depoliticized, discouraging even avid supporters.63 COSATU and the media continued to focus on women as vulnerable victims.64 Discussion over women’s work followed the pattern established during the consolidation period and promoted developmental goals. COSATU advocated paid maternity leave and job security for pregnant women, but to justify these policies, leaders 60

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“Women in Media Still Hitting Glass Ceiling,” Mail & Guardian September 15, 2009. http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009–09–15-women-in-media-still-hitting-glass-ceiling, accessed October 25, 2009. Colleen Lowe Morna and Pat Made, “Women Still Missing from Top Media Posts,” BizCommunity.com August 20, 2009. http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/416/15/39071. html, accessed October 25, 2009. Cooper of Rape Crisis notes that although the trial brought a dramatic rise in sexist discourse into public debate, it also exposed the tremendous problems with the court system and South African rape law (interview). Butjwana Seokoma, “Stop Violence Against Women and Children,” Sagonet November 26, 2008. http://www.ngopulse.org/article/stop-violence-against-women-and-children, accessed September 1, 2009. On COSATU’s position, see Zwelinzima Vavi, “COSATU Views Misrepresented, Letters,” Business Day Johannesburg, February 21, 2006. http://amadlandawonye.wikispaces.com/COSATU+views+misrepresented,+Vavi,+Letters,+Business+Day, accessed September 1, 2009. On the media, see Tanya Owen, “Women? What women?! – Media Contributes to the Disempowerment of Women,” MediaMonitoring Africa Research Reports April 14, 2009. http://www.mediamonitoringafrica.org, accessed September 1, 2009.

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appealed to women’s vulnerability and their special gender roles.65 Although the media continued to publicize women’s business success, its coverage of women’s poverty was extremely low, even during the 2009 elections.66 State support for gender justice adhered closely to this pattern of moderate debate conditions and moderate demands for gender justice. In 2007, the government finally passed the Sexual Offences Act. It was an important improvement on existing legislation and brought the country up to date with global standards, but unlike the DVA of 1998, it did not signal international leadership in this area. Government support on women’s work status was similar. The ANC launched the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA) in 2006, committing government to cutting unemployment and poverty in half by 2014. However, it did not target the secondary labor sector and survivalist economy where black women are concentrated (Turok 2008; Women’sNet 2009). In keeping with its moderate approach to gender justice, the government gradually expanded the child support grant, which reached more than 8 million children by 2007 (Lund 2008). Although a small payment, it went directly to primary caregivers, the vast majority of whom were women. These modest government reforms should not be underestimated. However, when compared to the liberal moment, they confirm that South Africa’s swift rise in gender justice was indeed short-lived. 65

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For example, see “COSATU Statement for Women’s Day,” August 7, 2009. http:// www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?include =docs/pr/2009/pr0807.html&ID=2103 &cat=Media%20Centre, accessed September 1, 2009. Tanya Owen, “’No big deal’ Poverty, Service Delivery and Election Coverage: Election Report for week ending 3 Apr,” Media Monitoring Project Research Reports April 6, 2009. http://www.mediamonitoringafrica.org, accessed September 1, 2009 and Luphert Chilwane, “Media ‘neglecting plight of women’” Business Day April 20, 2009. http:// www.businessday.co.za/Articles/Content.aspx?id=69957, accessed September 1, 2009; Albert van Houten and Sandra Roberts. “Women’s Day 2007: Prominent Women Dominate Newspapers,” Media Monitoring Project Research Reports September 21, 2007. http://www.mediamonitoringafrica.org, accessed September 1, 2009.

Part III GENDER JUSTICE

8 Pursuing Just Debate

“Democratization remains an empty promise unless it pushes on to address power relations between rich and poor, white and black, women and men.” Anne Phillips

Introduction In popular opinion, liberal democracy is associated with women’s rights. However, gender scholars have found that this association is not strong in democratizing states. Outcomes on women’s rights have usually been moderate, as in Chile and much of Latin America. Sometimes, outcomes on women’s rights have been severely limited, as in Central and Eastern Europe. One exception is South Africa, a democratizing state with an outstanding record on women’s rights legislation. Scholars have offered a number of explanations for these varied outcomes, but on closer inspection, their explanations prove insufficient. This book offers a new approach for explaining outcomes on women’s rights in democratizing states by focusing on one facet of democratic quality: debate conditions. The just debate approach claims an increase in women’s access, voice, and capacity for contestation in the leading institutions of the public sphere facilitate an increase in demands for women’s rights. As public opinion shifts, governments facing elections in democratizing states will respond with policies and legislation advancing gender justice. The preceding chapters indicate that this claim has traction. They also offer important insights for deliberative theorists, feminist scholars, and scholars of democratization who analyze the quality of democracy. 219

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After highlighting these contributions, this chapter discusses how and why debate conditions improve in democratizing states. This discussion begins with counterpublics, which are groups where women can discover and articulate their common concerns and experiences, debate their collective goals, hone their organizational and public speaking skills, make alliances across their differences, and develop strategies for advancing their interests. Drawing on the evidence from Part II, I outline the obstacles that women faced when building counterpublics and account for those that succeeded. I then detail the factors beyond these specific institutional dynamics that shaped debate conditions. Next, I discuss why ebbs and flows in institutional power across public arenas and institutions are a challenge for advocates of women’s rights. I conclude with some suggestions of how the state might improve debate conditions.

The Lessons of Just Debate This book is indebted to deliberative theorists, gender scholars, and analysts of democratization, and offers several contributions to these literatures. My research introduces a twist on deliberative assumptions about the role of the state and civil society in the public sphere. The just debate approach exposes the ways in which associations in civil society, such as the Catholic Church in Poland, can do extensive damage to the public sphere in democratizing states. Whereas critical theorists acknowledge that “bad” civil society can threaten deliberation through antidemocratic procedures (Chambers 2002), my analysis of debate conditions and public debate over abortion in post-socialist Poland reveals how considerable this harm can be and how easily it can be overlooked. State threats to debate conditions and public debate are also formidable, as an analysis of the consolidation period in South Africa makes clear. However, critical theorists overlook the ways in which the state can expand the public sphere and improve debate conditions. Indeed, the Government of National Unity during the liberal moment established participatory mechanisms attentive to informal obstacles limiting debate conditions for marginalized populations, and educated and encouraged South Africans to become citizens. Although deliberative theorists argue state interference in the public sphere can infect deliberation, much of the population in post-apartheid South Africa had little experience or knowledge of what it meant to be a citizen. In this case, the GNU took productive action to create citizens and provided linkages between citizens and the state to enhance its legitimacy and capacity. Post-apartheid South Africa

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highlights the ways in which state actions are not persistently negative, but varied. A finding of positive as well as negative state action will not be a surprise to gender scholars, who frequently argue state intervention is crucial for advancing women’s rights. However, if deliberative theorists tend to demonize the state, gender scholars have not fully appreciated the extent of state action on women’s rights. Advocates of women’s rights have been targeting the state for several decades, demanding an increase in women’s representation, gender machinery, Women’s Budget Initiatives, and UN monitoring of women’s rights. The case studies in this book indicate those efforts often produce modest gains. Indeed, an analysis of debate conditions in the public sphere in democratizing states suggests it is no longer appropriate to assume civil society’s wide-ranging, diffuse array of political associations are more accessible, contestable, and transformable than the contained, hierarchical, and rule-bound state. Instead, the preceding chapters bring to the fore the persistent resistance of mainstream institutions in civil society to just debate, and indicate gender scholars studying democratizing states need to broaden their research agenda to systematically integrate an array of mainstream institutions such as social movements, trade unions, and the media, where friendliness is routinely lacking. The just debate approach also offers a direct, feasible method for assessing the quality of democracy that can be applied to democratizing states. By focusing on one indicator of democratic quality – political inequality – just debate goes to the heart of the democratic enterprise, which is about public deliberation. In targeting women – the ultimate political outsiders – I offer three indicators for assessing the boundaries of public debate in the leading institutions in the public sphere: women’s access, voice, and capacity for contestation. This framework does not ignore other dimensions of democratic quality, such as the rule of law, competition, and political accountability. However, they only come into focus when they shape the opportunities and roadblocks that make it possible for women in the public sphere to establish counterpublics and pry open debate conditions. By focusing on debate conditions, I have explained why democratization can advance on a number of fronts yet still exclude the majority of the population. Democratization enables the leading institutions in the public sphere, which are profoundly gendered, to flourish. Sometimes one of these institutions can dominate the public sphere and undermine debate conditions. This was the case during the transition to democracy

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in Chile. Initially, Pinochet’s contraction of the public sphere, achieved through the repression of its leading institutions, prompted women to organize. They not only revived the public sphere, they established good levels of openness and inclusiveness in their own organizations. However, as the public sphere expanded, political parties revived and dominated women’s organizations. As a result, debate conditions in women’s organizations contracted and the influence of these organizations in the public sphere declined. In Chile, an inverse relationship between debate conditions and the expansion of the public sphere existed. More unusually, as the public sphere expanded during the transition and liberal moment in South Africa, so too did debate conditions. This improvement was not automatic. Indeed, at the outset of the transition and liberal moment, women did not have the ability to shape the content of public debate and had to fight a series of battles to improve debate conditions within the leading institutions of the public sphere. It was a fight that they lost during consolidation because the ANC began to coopt the leading institutions in the public sphere and debate conditions declined. These findings indicate a complex relationship between debate conditions and the public sphere. The many institutions discussed in this book offer the opportunity to analyze how and why debate conditions become more open and inclusive. In the early 1980s, women’s organizations and coalitions in Chile became a dynamic force demanding the end of the dictatorship, but the political parties soon compromised debate conditions in these organizations and their influence in the public sphere declined. After the plebiscite, the CMD recouped some of the earlier influence of the women’s movement and won several important victories. During the South African transition negotiations, the Women’s National Coalition, women in the ANC and in COSATU improved debate conditions significantly and altered the content of public debate. During the liberal moment in South Africa, women MPs pried open debate conditions in parliament and then promoted a remarkable series of gender legislation. Among the many institutions analyzed in the preceding chapters, women in these groups had the most open and inclusive debate conditions and the most leverage in the public sphere. How did they do it?

Counterpublics Although critical theorists of deliberative democracy have much to say about the criteria that signal open and inclusive debate conditions, they

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do not offer many details on how to advance this agenda. Throughout this book, I have traced how women in democratizing states coped with and struggled against debate conditions that were neither open nor inclusive, and have presented a wealth of empirical evidence about how and why debate conditions improved. This evidence suggests women’s counterpublics are critical for advancing just debate. In this section, I discuss the factors that facilitated the emergence of effective counterpublics. Wherever improvements in debate conditions occurred, women led the charge for reform. Although it is true that not all women in the public sphere challenged limited debate conditions, in almost every institution, evidence of their resistance exists. Indeed, it is not women’s resistance that requires explanation, but its absence, particularly when opportunities for resistance were not seized. Limited resistance to inequitable debate conditions were evident in two sites: in the profit-driven media sector and across the public sphere in socialist Poland. In the media industry, opportunities to demand change were quite low, in part because women media workers were dependent on the industry for their livelihood. Women’s role as dependent workers and the industry’s low rate of unionization were no doubt factors limiting their drive to create more open and inclusive debate conditions. Indeed, where the media were closely linked to civil society debate conditions were better, as in women’s alternative media in authoritarian Chile, and in all three cases in South Africa. The situation in socialist Poland was quite different, because state feminism became a critical stumbling block that convinced many women the public and private required gendered boundary drawing if the regime was to be overthrown. The imposition of martial law in December 1981 sent many Solidarity men to prison, threatening to derail the opposition movement. In response, a tiny group of extraordinary women rallied together to lead and sustain the pro-democracy movement. Although this created an opportunity for them to improve debate conditions within the organization, that issue was not on their agenda. The new chiefs of Solidarity did not create a women’s counterpublic where they could articulate their interests as women, develop their own agenda, and promote their interests. This is not surprising, as the survival of Solidarity was at stake, and socialist propaganda left little ideological space for Polish women to organize and address their interests as women. Unlike pre-democratic Chile and South Africa, women in Poland in the 1980s did not combine their opposition to the regime with demands for gender reform. In this book, that lack of resistance was an anomaly. Far more often, women located across the public sphere not only recognized

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the exclusionary nature of debate conditions, they also took action to challenge their marginalization. The degree of their success varied. Some women’s counterpublics became ineffectual and were little more than window dressing, offering women a depoliticized space to execute administrative duties while falsely displaying institutional attentiveness to gender justice. However, some women’s groups did become counterpublics and offered members an important basis for challenging inequitable debate conditions. In post-socialist Poland, women’s counterpublics not only included the ill-fated Solidarity Women’s Section, but the more successful Women’s Parliamentary Group; in pre-democratic Chile, women politicians created counterpublics within several political parties, and the trade union sector established the DF, which became a counterpublic. In South Africa, activists, academics, and politicians built exceptionally strong women’s counterpublics within the ANC during the crucial transition years, as well as at the transition negotiations and in the first parliament. When are women’s counterpublics most likely to become strong and succeed? Evidence in this book suggests successful counterpublics must allow members to speak freely about their interests, work with a diverse array of women, and have talented leaders with a strong support base moving up the ranks. The most successful counterpublics worked across institutions, drawing upon the expertise and skills of supporters from other sectors of society. They also needed an exquisite sense of timing. The minimum condition for the emergence of an effective counterpublic is the ability of women in the group to speak freely about their ideas and interests. Women’s gender forums in COSATU demonstrate this point because these forums were often dominated by men or tasked with a depoliticized service agenda. This limited women’s ability to discover their common interests and spearhead change. In contrast, one of the most successful counterpublics in this book, the Women’s National Coalition in South Africa, illustrates that when women are able to create an open and inclusive organization, they can thrive even under extremely challenging conditions. Women’s diversity in the WNC was in many ways one of these challenges, but that diversity also contributed significantly to its political clout in the public sphere. Although women’s organizations, coalitions, networks, and movements benefited from diversity, in parliament, women’s ideological differences proved to be a greater challenge. In an institution organized by party, ideological diversity fractured counterpublics like the WPK in post-socialist Poland and the PWG in South Africa during the liberal

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moment. To cope with institutional partisanship, women politicians in South Africa created multiple counterpublics with a range of ideological inclusivity so that gender interests could be pursued along party lines and across them. In Poland, where women’s numbers were much lower, the WPK participated in coalitions and partnerships with women’s groups in civil society, finding allies by working across sectors. Most counterpublics were underfunded, understaffed, and institutionally marginalized; sometimes their members lacked high-level skills that male colleagues had acquired over a lifetime of service. Even though these limitations presented serious obstacles, some counterpublics lacking these advantages nevertheless succeeded. They did so by drawing on the strengths of women’s counterpublics in other sectors. Women’s counterpublics like the WNC and CMD drew upon the expertise of women academics and legal professionals, as well as their membership base for support. Women in the South African press found the support of media NGOs like Gender Links invaluable. The WPK in Poland worked with new women’s organizations in civil society to put a parliamentary quota on the public agenda. Women’s counterpublics also thrived when they had talented leaders dedicated to challenging the status quo. Barbara Labuda and Frene Ginwala were just two of the outstanding women who strategized change and established counterpublics. Their leadership underscores the importance of mentoring women so that they move up within the ranks and gain the necessary skills to drive reform. This rarely happened in the counterpublics examined in this book. Instead, when women in one counterpublic moved into another institution in the public sphere, a leadership vacuum occurred that brought swift decline. The Women’s National Coalition and the ANC Women’s League both suffered this fate during the liberal moment in South Africa. In short, women’s leadership base was thin. Success also required time, or a keen sense of timing. Time to develop leadership and partnerships, and time to wrest a positive response from elites. The Women’s Section in the ANC is a case in point. Working doggedly within the ANC for over a decade, the Women’s Section shifted from a women’s auxiliary to a dynamic women’s counterpublic that persistently exposed gender injustice within the ANC-in-exile, and demanded the movement do more to integrate women at the highest ranks. Even with these long-term efforts, talented leadership, and the support of the ANC president, significant institutional change remained elusive until the tremendous opportunities of the transition brought South African women together in a national movement.

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The example of the Women’s Section suggests that timing, or propitious events, are crucial. Dramatic political transitions of the kind that facilitated the advances of the ANC’s Women’s Section are rare. However, they are not the only kind of opportunity that women’s counterpublics can seize. Other opportune events in this book included the influx of new members into an institution, who bring with them different expectations about rules and procedures, as happened in parliament during the liberal moment in South Africa and in the women’s organization Rape Crisis. Other events included an institutional reassessment with the passing of an immediate crisis, as happened with the Anti-Eviction Campaign during the consolidation period in South Africa. Highly visible changes in debate conditions occurring in one sector of the public sphere can legitimize demands for change elsewhere, as happened when a tiny women’s media counterpublic formed in South Africa and convinced industry leaders the media was shockingly behind other sectors in its advancement of women. This wide range of events suggests opportunities do occur, but that women’s counterpublics need to be vigilant and prepared to act. That can be a tall order given the organizational challenges already facing women’s counterpublics, and the toll that prolonged resistance inevitably takes. When women’s counterpublics do succeed sufficiently to make demands, the cases in this book suggest they usually ask for an increase in women’s numerical presence in leadership positions, skills training, and gender institutions. Women’s counterpublics often target the state. In every case except socialist Poland, women’s counterpublics demanded an increase in the number of women in politics. Many, such as the Women’s Parliamentary Group in Poland and the ANC Women’s Section in apartheid South Africa, favored quotas. The CMD in Chile provided party leaders with a list of women candidates for the 1989 elections, and demanded a gender ministry in the state. Women trade unionists promoted quotas during the transition in South Africa, and in Chile the DF recommended skills training and then quota adoption. Most recently, women’s media NGOs in South Africa recommended quotas for the media industry. In all three South African cases, institutions complied, most notably at the transition negotiations and in parliament. However, women politicians soon found their larger numbers were insufficient if they wanted to speak out, be heard, and challenge the status quo. At the transition negotiations and in the first parliament, South African women politicians still needed to work through a range of counterpublics, from the WNC to the PWG, to challenge informal roadblocks and ensure their presence had meaning.

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Public Debate Even when a counterpublic was successful and improved debate conditions in one institution in the public sphere, women often faced serious obstacles from other leading institutions. This was particularly true when a counterpublic succeeded in improving debate conditions in a site that was relatively weak, whereas debate conditions in the dominant institution remained limited. This was the case in South Africa during the second half of the 1980s, as the powerful UDF easily restrained debate conditions in weak women’s organizations and directed their demands away from women’s emancipation and toward the liberation goals articulated by the male leadership. As a result, debate content addressing women’s interests diminished. Sometimes counterpublics succeeded in improving debate conditions within an influential institution, but still faced serious obstacles in their efforts to shape public debate. Once again, this happened when debate conditions in a dominant institution remained limited. During the 1980s in Chile, for example, women’s organizations developed a number of prominent, open, and inclusive coalitions that had influence on the content of public debate, but they had difficulty sustaining this power as political parties re-emerged. With debate conditions in the parties barely moderate, but party influence in the public sphere high, the influence of women’s organizations over the content of public debate quickly eroded. Parties became gatekeepers, filtering the demands of once-powerful women’s organizations to fit their political agenda, and demands for gender justice receded from public debate. In the unusual case where women succeeded in improving debate conditions in multiple and powerful institutions in the public sphere, they were able to significantly expand public debate content. This was the case in South Africa during the transition, as the ANC Women’s Section managed to improve debate conditions within the ANC, the WNC gained prominence in the public sphere, and women in COSATU made advances as well. Together, they challenged debate conditions at the transition negotiations and helped advance substantive claims for gender justice. These examples underscore the significance of unequal power relations among institutions in the public sphere for shaping debate content. Depending on the specific context, trade unions, political parties, social movements, the legislature, or the media may become the dominant institution in the public sphere. For example, in socialist Poland, the trade union movement Solidarity was one of the most influential institutions,

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but in authoritarian Chile, political parties were the most important. During the liberal moment in South Africa, parliament was the most influential; but by the consolidation period, the executive branch dominated. This variation in the ability of institutions in the public sphere to shape public debate suggests that building a counterpublic in just one institutional location is unlikely to yield significant and persistent change in debate content. Instead, advocates of women’s rights must be prepared to act in multiple arenas at once. That challenge is all the more daunting when other dimensions of democratic quality are poor and constrain the public sphere. If a dominant institution not only spurns just debate for its members, but avidly attacks civil and political rights, the likelihood that women’s counterpublics will be able to shape debate content is low. This was precisely what happened in post-socialist Poland, as the church aimed to end legal abortion. The church not only rejected open and inclusive debate internally, it aimed to limit debate content in the public sphere by violating the basic liberal rights of its opponents. Women’s counterpublics committed to keeping abortion legal not only faced a formidable foe and challenging institutional constraints across the public sphere, all Poles found it exceptionally risky to speak out against the church on abortion. The result was severely constrained debate content on women’s reproductive rights. The church does not always take such a draconian stance toward public debate over gender justice. In authoritarian Chile, where many dimensions of democratic quality were poor, the church not only provided political space for groups opposed to the regime and embraced basic liberal rights, but also sustained women’s organizations and often supported their political activism. In the 1980s, those Chilean clergy favoring liberation theology fostered an emancipatory consciousness among women and encouraged them to participate in political associations. The reasons for the dramatically divergent roles of the church in authoritarian Chile and socialist Poland can be explained by regional variations, as the rise of evangelical Protestantism in Latin America put pressure on the Roman Catholic Church to become more responsive to parishioners, whereas in Poland, the Cold War ensured church insulation from Protestant pressures and religious trends in Catholicism unfolding elsewhere. In contrast to the conservative Catholic Church in democratizing Poland, in all three South African cases, leading conservative opponents to women’s rights were on the defensive and rarely mounted high-level

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resistance to women’s rights.1 Even during the consolidation period, the ANC rarely attacked the basic liberal rights of its citizens to participate in public debate. However, ANC governing elites did use the PR system, quota, their electoral dominance, and control over participatory mechanisms to severely limit internal debate within their own organization. They also dominated parliament and aimed to constrain debate conditions in women’s organizations. The consolidation period in South Africa confirms the coercive power of the state and underscores how an increasingly co-opted public sphere limits debate content even when women have made significant advances in leading institutions.

Democratic Quality and Gender Justice in Democratizing States Although it is true that guarantees of basic liberal rights expand the public sphere, they are not sufficient if the most marginalized are going to be included in public debate. Indeed, many gender scholars have found democratization disappointing. They have established that democratizing states offer powerful opposition groups as well as those uninterested in gender reform significant opportunities to undermine women’s rights, ignore them, or trade them away. Moreover, evidence suggests nondemocratic regimes are sometimes more reliable allies, as authoritarian regimes in several Latin American countries pushed through gender reforms on issues like abortion and divorce despite the resistance of the Roman Catholic Church, and post-conflict regimes in Africa with one-party rule also have remarkably high percentages of women in politics and gender equality legislation (Htun 2003; Tripp et al. 2009). The South African transition and liberal moment are important exceptions to this pattern because they demonstrate democratization can be associated with impressive advances in gender justice. However, these successes are rare. Given the continued value attached to democratic politics and the extensive obstacles to participation in public debate that women face in democratizing states, it is worth considering how the state might help pry open debate conditions in the public sphere. Why would any democratizing state be willing to promote or sustain just debate? State actors may profess participatory ideals, but it is 1

The most notable exception was the battle over the equality clause in the interim constitution at the transition negotiations. See Kaganas and Murray 1994.

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rarely in the interest of ruling elites to fulfill them. Yet liberal democracies already require the state to promote public debate in ways that are contrary to many elite interests. Individual civil and political rights are protected through a variety of means, including constitutional law and institutional designs intended to disperse state power. During the liberal moment, the newly minted South African government did an adequate job of upholding formal civil and political rights. Asking a democratizing state to promote public debate is thus neither theoretically innovative nor unrealistic, although it does require public vigilance, careful institutional design, and popular commitment. Vigilance means being attentive to the ways the state and other institutions can undermine debate conditions in the public sphere and exposing those tactics as attacks on the quality of democracy. Careful institutional design means prioritizing democratic procedures and counterpublics throughout the public sphere. Without widespread concern for democratic quality, vigilance and institutional design are unlikely to produce their intended results. How might the state play a role in advancing this agenda? Not all state action to improve debate conditions need be contentious or difficult. Sometimes it can be straightforward. States might provide, for example, free, safe, and reliable transportation to public meetings and translation services where needed. The rules and procedures of public meetings could also be altered, so that the voices of those who are rarely heard are prioritized. Other innovations may be more difficult to achieve, but not all are controversial. Ensuring everyone has the basic skills to express their interests in public debate by guaranteeing all citizens education, literacy, and access to the media are examples of how the state can help promote open and inclusive debate. Insisting upon the development of these skills would not be controversial in most democratizing states, although securing results would require significant state capacity and expenditure. A more controversial agenda would be to target privileged citizens, schooling them in how to listen with respect to denigrated speakers and styles of communication, or to create civic education programs that include lessons and experiences in building counterpublics. It is difficult to imagine the ANC agreeing to the latter agenda during the consolidation era, when it characterized new social movements as criminal. Other state actions that could advance just debate are both controversial and expensive. For example, requiring the media industry to adopt quotas and gender policies, to facilitate counterpublics, and to agree to external monitoring to ensure compliance prioritizes the public

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responsibilities of the industry over profit making. No doubt opponents would object to these actions by arguing they would be a significant step toward state censorship. Nevertheless, a number of democratizing states subsidize the media, and many already have adopted these mechanisms in parliament and the bureaucracy. State action to improve debate conditions in the media is not politically impossible, but it does require high levels of public vigilance, careful institutional design, and popular commitment to be successful. Suggesting the state promote and help sustain just debate does not invent a new category of rights, but instead extends existing political rights to ensure their promise is fulfilled. Framed this way, asking the state to help improve debate conditions could have deep popular resonance in democratizing states. In South Africa, action by women’s advocates, and by a government in search of a more participatory democracy, yielded important advances in just debate and gender justice, proving that success is possible. This combination is relatively rare and difficult to sustain. Instead, reform is unlikely to be embraced by those in power and will have to be fought for under conditions of limited democratic quality, building on the legitimacy of deliberative democracy while working within the confines of existing debate conditions. Thus we should not expect the quality of democracy to be good in democratizing states, nor should we expect democratization to significantly advance gender justice.

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Index

Abortion rights example of oppression, 18, 71 Poland, 16, 28, 60, 69–70, 71, 81, 103–108, 107n, 110–111, 115, 116, 220, 228 socialist Poland, 90, 91, 92n South Africa, 157 state responsiveness to, 71, 119 Abzug, Bella, 38 Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa, 216 Access, 12, 14, 15, 17, 26 Adult Basic Education and Training (ABET; South Africa), 182 Advocacy of women, 52, 224, 228. See also Women’s movement; Women’s organizations Africa. See also specific countries advances in women’s rights in, 5, 229 African National Congress (ANC) apartheid regime, 134, 135n consolidation period, 196–198, 229 constraining factor on public debate and gender justice, 68, 186, 194, 197–198, 201–202, 207, 211, 222, 229 disciplining of outspoken feminists in, 68, 159, 170, 192n domination of South African politics, 62–63, 67, 68, 135, 159, 189–190, 212 focus on liberation, not gender issues, 146, 147

liberal moment, 159, 160–161, 167–170 media relations, 144, 171–172, 188, 198n Nairobi Conference (1985), 64 National Executive Council (NEC), 140, 141, 169–170 organizing of women’s movement, 64, 138, 140–141, 146, 159, 167–170 overestimation of state capacity to deal with legal reform, 180, 182 quota for women in ANC, 141, 169–170 quota for women in parliament, 67, 141, 160–161, 226, 231 Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), 153, 165n, 182 Women’s Caucus, 162, 176, 191–192, 213, 222 Women’s Section, 140, 141, 145, 225, 226, 227 work status of women, 151–153, 209 African Renaissance, Mbeki calling for, 208 Agenda (South African feminist journal), 145, 164n, 172, 206 Agisanang Domestic Abuse Prevention and Training (South Africa), 203 AIDS. See HIV/AIDS Albertyn, Cathi, 195n All-Poland Trade Union Alliance (OPZZ), 86, 100n ANC. See African National Congress ANC Women’s League (ANCWL), 140–141, 146, 147, 166, 169, 170, 198, 202, 214, 225

273

274 Anonymity of women in Polish resistance movement, 87n, 87–88 Anti-Eviction Campaign (South Africa), 195 Anti-Privatisation Forum of Gauteng (South Africa), 195 Apartheid regime in South Africa conservative attitude on gender, 148 election ending, 135 gender-based violence, 149 repressive policies of, 61n, 134, 135n work status of women, 150–151 Argentina, 4 Arms deal and corruption of Mbeki government, 189n Asmal, Kader, 63 Association of Ordinary Polish Women, 88 Association of Women and Cooperatives (Poland), 85 Attorney-General’s Task Group on Rape in the Western Cape (South Africa), 149 Authoritarian Chile. See Chile Autonomy of women, 40, 205 Aylwin, Patricio, 65, 131, 133–134 Azanian People’s Organization (AZAPO), 63 Bachelet, Michelle, 154 Balicki, Marek, 110 Barber, Benjamin, 48 Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1983 (South Africa), 150 Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997 (South Africa), 5, 157 Benhabib, Seyla, 8 Bennett, Andrew, 60n Birth control in Poland, 69n, 69–70, 90, 92, 110, 111 Black, defined, 61n Black Economic Empowerment Strategy (South Africa), 182 Black Sash (South African women’s publication), 145, 172, 178 Botha, Sandra, 194 Brazil, 4 Bureau for Women’s Affairs (Poland), 97 Camerer, Sheila, 143 Capacity for contestation, 11n, 13, 14, 15, 17, 40 Catholic Church

Index Chile, 63, 121, 155, 228 comparison of Chile and Poland, 228 media in Poland, 101–102, 106 Poland, 16, 24, 28, 70n, 72, 80–81, 98, 100–101, 111, 115, 116–117, 119, 228 socialist Poland, 84, 88n, 88–89 Solidarity’s alliance with, 58–59 CBOs. See Community-based organizations CEDAW (Convention for Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women), 114, 131, 133, 150, 157 Censorship, 135, 144, 230–231 Center for the Advancement of Women (Poland), 108 Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), women’s social and economic rights in, 4, 79, 115, 219 CGE. See Commission on Gender Equality (South Africa) Chambers, Simone, 4141n Chiefs in South Africa ANC relationship with, 63, 67 gender-based violence, 73 opposition to women’s property rights, 70 work status of women, 73 Child daycare Poland (post-socialist), 113 socialist Poland, 93n South Africa, 178–179 Chile, 28, 62 Catholic Church in, 63, 121, 155, 228 Civil Code amendments of 1989, 133 civil society in, 121–127 compared with South Africa, 62, 72–74, 119, 120, 134, 135, 138, 153 debate conditions in authoritarian Chile, 120–129, 222 gender-based violence in, 72–74, 156 gender justice in authoritarian Chile, 132–134 legislative representation of women, 154–155 married women’s rights in, 133 media in, 128–129, 223 methodology of study in, 21 political parties in, 124, 124n, 227, 228 selection as case study, 57 trade unions in, 126n, 155, 226 transition to democracy, 119, 222

Index unemployment in, 73 women by class, 13, 120n women’s movement in, 4, 64, 122, 219 women’s organizations in, 228 women’s organizations’ influence in, 64–65, 120–121, 123–124, 130, 155, 222, 227 work status of women in, 72–74 Chilean Network against Domestic and Sexual Violence, 156 Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act of 1996 (South Africa), 5 Christian Democrats (Chile), 124n, 125 Church. See Catholic Church Civic associations, 44–45 Civil society, 38–45 Chile, 121–127 critical theorists on, 41–42, 220 defined, 32, 39, 41–43 feminist theory on, 39, 41, 42–43 media distinguished from, 30–31 political and civic associations in terms of public debate in, 44–45 post-socialist Poland, 96–101 role in public sphere, 30 sexist attitude of, 53 socialist Poland, 85–89 South Africa, 136–142, 163–167, 170, 193–198, 230 state distinguished from, 39 Classic liberal theorists on media’s role, 47–48 Class prejudice, 13 Coalition of Women for Democracy (CMD; Chile), 64, 125–126, 126n, 131, 133–134, 222, 225, 226 Commission for Civic Rights (Poland), 110 Commission on Gender Equality (CGE; South Africa), 162–163, 167, 174, 177, 191–192, 202, 213 Committee for the Defense of Women’s Rights (CODEM; Chile), 123 Communal Land Rights Bill (South Africa), 5 Communist Party (Poland), 84, 85, 86, 93 Community-based organizations (CBOs), 165, 194, 206 Community-Based Public Works Programme (CBPWP; South Africa), 182 Comparative politics scholars, 21n

275 Concertacion (Concertacion de Partidos por la Democracia; Chile), 62, 63, 65, 121, 124, 125, 130, 131, 133, 134, 154 Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) affiliated with NWM, 166 affiliated with WNC, 142 apartheid, 135 debate conditions, 167–170, 193, 196–198, 206–207, 214 founding of, 135 gender-based violence, 204 gender forums in, 224 membership of, 139n public debate, 138–140 women’s advancement and rights platform in, 135, 227 Conservative level of gender justice, 17, 19, 60, 74, 90, 91, 120, 185 Consolidation. See also Poland; South Africa’s consolidation as stage in democratization, 21n Constitutional Tribunal (Poland), 111n Constitutions. See specific countries Contestation. See Capacity for contestation Contraception. See Birth control in Poland Convention for a Democratic South Africa, 142–143 Convention for Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women. See CEDAW Cooper, Chantel, 193, 205n, 215n Coordination of Women’s Social Organizations (Chile), 125 Corruption of South African government, 189n, 212, 214n COSATU. See Congress of South African Trade Unions Council of the Polish Broadcasting Corporation, 102 Counterpublics Chile, 224 debate conditions, 227 expertise of women academics and professionals in, 225 leadership of, 225 opportune events, 226 Poland, 83 post-socialist Poland, 96, 223–224 role of, 14, 26–27, 220, 222–226

276 Counterpublics (cont.) South Africa, 145, 162, 191–192, 201, 212, 215, 222, 224 Crime statistics in South Africa, 208 Criminal Procedure Act reforms (South Africa), 180 Critical deliberative theorists/theory cautions to, 25 civil society, 41–42, 220 feminists, 41n just debate approach, 55 limits of democracy, 8 media, 48 methodology drawing upon, 21 political communication, 7, 8, 12, 26 public debate’s purpose, 18 social justice, 16 Cultural norms, 13 media, 50n, 199 public culture’s role in public sphere, 32 Czech Republic, 4 Data. See Methods and data Daycare for children. See Child daycare Debate conditions, 8, 9, 12–15, 118. See also Public debate access, 12, 14, 15, 17, 26 assessment of, in democratizing states, 14–15, 21, 25, 27, 80, 221 broader arguments and likelihood of advancing women’s rights, 11, 80 capacity for contestation, 13, 14, 15, 17, 40 domination, 17 means to expand, 14, 17, 37, 56–62, 227, 230–231 obstacles to, 13, 227 Pinochet’s Chile, 120–129, 222 Poland, 81, 94–103, 116, 222 socialist Poland, 84–89 South Africa’s apartheid regime, 134–145 South Africa’s consolidation period, 194, 201–202, 220 South Africa’s liberal moment, 159–174, 222, 227 voice, 12–13, 14, 15, 17, 40 women’s rights, 10 deKlerk, F.W., 135 Deliberative theorists. See Critical deliberative theorists/theory; Liberal deliberative theorists

Index Democratic Left Alliance (SLD; Poland), 98n Democratic Union of Women (Poland), 108 Democratization advances in women’s rights, 66, 219 dominant-party system’s effect on quality of, 68, 229 legislatures, 29 liberal democracy’s treatment of women, 10 marginalized populations, 6, 8, 11 means of protecting, 230 media, 47–48 opposition to women’s rights, 5 public sphere, 31, 221–222 relationship between democratic quality and women’s rights, 5, 7, 27, 221, 228, 229–231 stages of, 21n Diamond, Larry, 40–41 Disaggregated state, 18 Division among women on women’s right, 11, 15 Domestic Violence Act of 1998 (DVA; South Africa), 5, 181, 202, 208 Domestic Violence Act of 2005 (Chile), 156 Domination. See also African National Congress (ANC) debate conditions, 17 defined, 17 effect of decline in, 17 Dryzek, John, 8 Education Adult Basic Education and Training (South Africa), 182 gender-based violence, 180 job training for women in South Africa, 179 means to expand debate conditions, 14, 230 religious classes in Poland, 90 sex education in Poland, 92, 110 Edwards, Rita, 166 Elder care, 35–36 Elites. See Political elites El Mecurio (Chile press), 128 Employment and Occupational Equity Bill (South Africa, 1996), 182

Index Employment discrimination, 74, 108, 178–179. See also Work status of women Employment Equity Act of 1998 (South Africa), 157, 182 Empowerment, 206 Encuentros Feministas (Chile), 64 Engender Health (South Africa), 204 European democracy and women’s role, 10 European Social Charter, 114 Exclusion from public sphere, 10n, 21, 26 Expanding debate conditions, 14, 17, 37, 56–62, 227, 230–231 Expert Commission on the Family (socialist Poland), 92 Exploitation. See also Work status of women debate over, 17 gender justice, 17, 69–70 Family Advocate’s Office (South Africa), 149 Family benefits, 71, 113, 182 Federation of Transvaal Women (FEDTRAW; South Africa), 137 Feminist Africa (online research journal), 199 Feminist Movement (MF; Chile), 129, 130–131, 134 Feminist theorists/theory civil society, 39, 41, 42–43 critical theory, 41n defined, 11n domination of white bourgeois women, 40n leadership and gender power, 38 media, 31, 39, 46–47, 48–49, 50, 51 Ferguson, Jennifer, 161 Festus, Michelle, 194 First Conference of Women Workers (Chile), 127 Forced resettlements, 73 Formal level of gender justice, 17, 19 Fraser, Nancy, 8, 11, 32n Fraser-Moleketi, Geraldine, 178 Fray, Paula, 173 Freedom House, 119 Furia (feminist magazine; Chile), 128 Gasiorowska, Elzbieta, 100 GEAR (Growth, Employment and

277 Redistribution) program (South Africa), 182, 183 Gender as a process, 4n, 9–12 Gender-based violence (GBV), 13, 18 Chile, 72–74, 156 comparison of Chile and South Africa, 72–74 comparison of South Africa’s liberal moment and consolidation period, 74 defined, 72n, 208 education on, in South Africa, 180 men’s activism on, 203 police arrests of batterers, 19 South Africa, 72–74, 146, 147–148, 149–150, 175–177, 180–181, 202–205, 208–209 state responsiveness to, 72–73 Gender forums, 13, 14, 26 Gender justice Chile, 72–73, 132–134, 155–156 comparison of issues, 18 defined, 4n exploitation, 17 inability of women in legislatures to advance, 15 levels of, 17–18, 19 Poland (post-socialist), 109–114 public debate over, 15–16, 37 socialist Poland, 91–94 South Africa, 148–153, 180–183, 207–210, 216 state responsiveness to, 18–20 women legislators, 16 Gender Links, 201, 225 Gender mainstreaming, 14 Gender norms and public opinion, 16 Gender policy scholars, 36, 37 Gender scholars advances in women’s rights after democratization, 66, 221 conservative groups opposed to women’s rights, 6n South African stall in gender justice, 67–68, 186 state and feminist civil society, 25 General Law Fourth Amendment Act (South Africa, 1993), 150 George, Alexander L., 60n Gertzog, Irwin, 38

278 Ginwala, Frene ANC commission on emancipation of women, 141 ANC’s NEC, 169 JMC, 163 leadership of, 225 Mbeki government, 188 PWG, 162 resignation from parliament, 192 sexual harassment, 191 South African parliament, 160–161, 190 WEU, 162 WNC, 141 Glass ceiling, 52 GNU. See Government of National Unity (South Africa) Gomomo, John, 169 Goniwe, Mbulelo, 213n Govender, Pregs, 160–161, 177, 190, 191 Government funding in South Africa for women-related issues and groups, 194 Government of National Unity (GNU; South Africa), 25, 26n, 66, 158, 163, 165n, 185, 220 Grabowski, Ryszard, 107 Green, Pippa, 199 Gutmann, Amy, 7 Habermas, Jurgen, 41, 47n, 48 Haffajee, Ferial, 199, 201 Hargreaves, Samantha, 206 Hawkesworth, Mary, 37–38 HIV/AIDS, 176, 189, 189n, 192n, 200n, 204, 204n, 205 Housewifization, 10 Human rights violations, 177. See also Gender-based violence (GBV) Hungary, 4 Huntington, Samuel, 5n Husarska, Anna, 87 Ilowiecki, Maciej, 107 Inclusiveness, 9, 25, 40 Poland, 80, 98 Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA; South Africa), 144n, 174 Index on Censorship and invisibility of Polish women writers, 87 Inkatha Freedom Party (South Africa), 63, 67n, 141 International Human Rights Watch, 175

Index International support for women’s organizations Chile, 64 South Africa, 64 International Women’s Day Against Violence, 203 Internet connections among women activists (South Africa), 166, 199 Intimidation, 13 Intra-Family Violence Act (Chile, 1994), 156 Jaffa, Mommy, 177n, 196 JMC. See Joint Standing Committee on the Improvement of the Quality of Life and Status of Women (South Africa) Jobs Summit Final Declaration (South Africa, 1998), 182 John Paul II (pope), 88, 105, 107n Joint Civil Society-ANC Parliamentary Women’s Caucus Campaign to End Violence Against Women and Children, 176 Joint Standing Committee on the Improvement of the Quality of Life and Status of Women (JMC; South Africa), 163, 176, 178, 192, 202, 209, 213, 222 Just debate approach, 9, 15, 29, 219–231. See also Debate conditions; Public debate autonomy, 40 defining of public sphere, 31–33 legislatures with women representatives, increased debate due to, 30, 33, 34, 36, 38 lessons of, 220–222 media, 230–231 methodology applying, 20 Polish situation, 59–60, 79–80 South African situation, 65–66 state action to promote and sustain, 230–231 states during democratic transitions, 60–62 women’s increased debate role, 17 Kedzierska-Trusuzyska, Dobrochna, 102 Keohane, Robert O., 56 King, Gary, 56 Klein, Marcia, 171

Index Kompe, Lydia, 160–161, 162 Kwasniewski, Alexsander, 80n, 111 Labor Code (Poland), 114 Labor Union party (Poland), 98 Labour Relations Act of 1995 (South Africa), 5, 157, 182 Labuda, Barbara, 87, 96, 104, 106, 225 La Morada (feminist women’s center; Chile), 128 Land ownership by women in South Africa, 63, 149 Latin America. See also specific countries democratization in, 119 Protestantism in, 228 women’s social and economic rights in, 4, 219, 229 Law on Family Planning, Legal Protection of the Fetus and the Conditions of Permissibility of Abortion (Poland, 1993), 110 Leadership of counterpublics, 225 Leftist organizations, 58–59 Legislatures. See also Legislatures, women in Communist Party’s control in socialist Poland, 84, 86 democratization, 29 role in public sphere, 31, 32, 33n post-socialist Poland, 95n95–96 sexist nature of, 18, 37, 38 South Africa’s apartheid regime, 135–136 South Africa’s liberal moment, 160–163 Legislatures, women in, 15, 16, 30, 33–38, 53 caucuses of, 26 Chile, 154–155 gender justice, 16 how men limit effectiveness of, 37 increased debate due to women’s participation, 30, 33, 34, 36, 38 parliamentary culture exerting pressure on, 190–191 passage of women’s rights legislation, 30, 35, 36 post-socialist Poland, 95–96, 116 quotas for, 26 socialist Poland, 85 South Africa, 135–136, 158–159, 160–161, 185, 189, 212

279 substantive representation of, 34, 35–37 symbolic and political benefits of, 34–35 weakness of, as factor in deteriorating women’s rights in South Africa, 187 Liberal deliberative theorists, 8 Liberalization as stage in democratization, 21n Liberal moment in South Africa. See South Africa’s liberal moment Liberal rights in public sphere, 31 Lifeworld of Habermas, 41–42 Lowe-Morna, Colleen, 200n, 201n Luczywo, Helena, 87, 102 Mabandla, Brigitte, 163 MacLeod, Fiona, 201 Madikizela-Mandela, Winnie, 170 Madlala-Routledge, Nozizwe, 190, 192n, 212n Mail & Guardian (M&G; South Africa), 198, 201 Maintenance Act of 1998 (South Africa), 5 Mandela, Nelson, 66, 135, 157, 159, 164 Manjoo, Rashida, 142n Mansbridge, Jane, 7 Manuel, Trevor, 210 Manzini, Mavivi, 163 Maphisa, Nosiviwe, 147 Marginalized populations and democratization, 6, 8, 11 Married women’s rights, 133 Maternity leave benefits, 93, 112, 178–179, 215 Matka Polka (Polish Mother), 24, 90, 108 Matrimonial Property Bill (South Africa, 1984), 149 Matsepe-Casaburri, Ivy, 144 Mbatha, Likhpaha, 165 Mbeki, Thabo African Renaissance, 208 arms deal of, 189n centralized power of, 188, 193 election for second term, 212 gender-based violence, 181, 208 HIV/AIDS, 189, 189n infighting with Zuma, 212, 213 inner circle of, 187n Mandela deputy, 159n South African president, 66, 187 Mbeki, Zanele, 210

280 Mbete, Baleka, 161, 162, 190, 191, 212n Media, 45–54. See also Censorship advocacy role of women working in, 52 Catholic Church’s influence on, 101–102, 106 celebration of successful businesswoman, 109, 216 Chile, 128–129, 223 classic liberal theorists on, 47–48 critical deliberative theorists on, 48 cultural norms, 50n, 199 distinguished from civil society, 30–31 feminist alternative press in South Africa, 145, 172, 223 feminist theorists on, 48–49, 50, 51 gender-based violence, reporting on, 205 influence on public opinion, 48–49 just debate, 230–231 male domination of, 51 post-socialist Poland, 101–103 press as most influential sector of, 46 profit motive of, 47–50 promotion of women’s rights by, 31 quotas for women in, 226 racial and class composition of access in South Africa, 170n, 170–171, 171n role in public sphere, 32, 47n samizdat press in socialist Poland, 84n, 89, 91 Solidarity newspaper, 87 South Africa, 143–145, 170–174, 188n, 198–202 state-dominated media, 47n transition theorists on, 47n women working in, 31, 46–47, 50–53, 102–103, 128, 144–145, 179, 199 work issues of women, reporting on, 207 Media Workers Association of South Africa, 144 Meintjes, Sheila, 194, 211 Men activism in GBV campaigns, 203 domination of media jobs by, 51 domination of public life by, 40 masculinist values of elite men, 18 parental leave for, 114 promotion of gender justice by, 11 Men’s Movement, 204 Methods and data, 20–25 analysis tools, 22–24 case selections, 55–56

Index data sources, 22 personal bias of author, 25 public debate, 24 state responsiveness, 24–25 MF. See Feminist Movement (Chile) Mfeketo, Nomaindia, 212 Mies, Maria, 10 Ministry of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (South Africa), 213 Ministry of Women, Youth, Children and Disability (South Africa), 213 Mlambo-Ngcuka, Phumzile, 212 Molyneux, Maxine, 35, 36, 40n MOMUPO. See Movement of Shantytown Women (Chile) Moral Regeneration Movement (South Africa), 204 Morna, Colleen Lowe, 201 Motherhood, 13, 24 Motherism, 146, 146n Movement for the Emancipation of the Chilean Woman, 124 Movement for the Protection of Conceived Life (Poland), 90 Movement of Shantytown Women (MOMUPO; Chile), 123, 130 Mozambique, advances in women’s rights in, 5 Mthala, Phumla, 172, 173 Mulqueeny, Judy, 169n Natal Organization for Women (NOW; South Africa), 137, 147 National Broadcasting Council (Poland), 101 National Childcare Day Campaign (South Africa), 148 National Commission for Women’s Affairs (Solidarity), 100 National Conference for Trade Union Women (Durban, South Africa), 169 National Gender Conference (South Africa, 2003), 204 National Network on Violence Against Women (South Africa), 166 National Party (South Africa), 66, 135, 141, 151 National Public Works Programme (NPWP; South Africa), 182, 183 National Solidarity Committee (Poland), 99

Index National Solidarity Congress (Poland), 86 National Union Coordinator (Chile), 126 National Women’s Day (South Africa), 176, 202 National Workers Congress (Chile), 127 Naughten, Tracey, 173n Negotiating forums. See Transition negotiating forums in democratizing states Neighborhood associations, 44 Neoliberalism, 59n, 110, 112 New Women’s Movement (NWM), 166, 178, 195 NGOs, women’s. See Women’s organizations Norris, Pippa, 47n NPWP. See National Public Works Programme (South Africa) Ntombelal-Nzimand, Phumelele, 146 Obstacles to debate conditions, 13 Oledzka, Elzbieta, 99 Omar, Dullah, 181 Openness, 9, 25 Oppression. See also Gender-based violence (GBV) abortion as example of, 71 defined, 17 selection of gender justice issue for, 69–70 OPZZ. See All-Poland Trade Union Alliance Pan-Africanist Conference (PAC), 63 Pandor, Naledi, 162 Parliamentary Women’s Group (PWG; South Africa), 162, 191–192, 224 Parliaments. See Legislatures, women in Party for Democracy (Chile), 125 Paternalism, 204 Patronage politics in South Africa, 214n Pekane, Joyce, 196 Personal bias of author, 25 Pharmacists for Life (Poland), 70n Phekoe, Mahau, 161 Phillips, Anne, 41, 41n219 Physical violence. See Gender-based violence (GBV) Physicians and abortions in Poland, 110n Piliso-Seroke, Joyce, 183 Pinochet, Augusto, 132, 133. See also Chile

281 Pinochet, Lucia Hiriart de, 125 Pitkin, Hanna, 33 Plenipotentiary for Family Affairs (Poland), 96n Plenipotentiary for the Equal Status of Women and Men (Poland), 96n Plenipotentiary for Women and Family (Poland), 96n Poland, 4, 27–28, 57–60, 69–72. See also Socialist Poland abortion rights in, 16, 28, 60, 69–70, 71, 81, 103–108, 107n110–111, 115, 116, 220, 228 Catholic Church’s power in, 16, 24, 28, 58–59, 80–81, 100–101, 116–117, 228 civil society in post-socialist Poland, 96–101 comparison of late socialist era with early consolidation period, 18, 21, 56–57, 69–70, 80, 114 constitution of 1997, 94, 101, 114 debate conditions in, 81, 94–103, 116 democratization and undermining of women’s rights in, 57, 79, 80, 228 factors favoring promotion of women’s rights in, 59 factors missing that would have promoted women’s rights in, 58–59 gender justice in post-socialist Poland, 109–114 homogeneous nature of population in, 58n just debate approach, application in, 59–60, 79–80 legislature in post-socialist Poland, 95n95–96 Little Constitution of 1992, 94 media in post-socialist Poland, 101–103 methodology of comparisons in, 21, 69–70 political parties, expansion of, 98n post-socialist democratization changes in, 94–117 public debate in, 103–109 selection as case study, 56–57 unemployment in, 72n women’s organizations in post-socialist Poland, 96–97, 116 work status of women in, 18, 71, 108–109, 112–114

282 Police arrests of domestic batterers, 19 Polish Radio Programming Council, 102 Polish United Workers’ Party, 86 Political and civic associations, 44–45 Political communication, 7 Political elites agenda of, 6, 16 disaggregated from government, 19 men as, 18 open debate, 159, 198 power of, in South Africa, 188, 189–190 women as, 15, 165 Political parties. See also specific political parties Chile, 124, 124n, 131, 227, 228 Poland, expansion of political parties in, 98n women in, 6, 15, 98–99 Political violence, 73n Pollarolo, Fanny, 123 Powell, Bingham, Jr., 6 Practical gender interests, 35–36 Presence scholars, 35, 37, 38 Presidential Jobs Summit (South Africa, 1998), 179 Prevention of Family Violence Bill (South Africa, 1993), 149 Private associations, 44 Private sphere in socialist Poland, 82–84 Professional advancement as focus of women legislators, 38, 190 Progressive Women’s Movement of South Africa, 213 Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act of 2000 (South Africa), 5, 157, 206, 210 Promotion of Equal Opportunities Bill (South Africa, proposed), 150 Proportional representation electoral systems, 58n Protestantism in Latin America, 228 Public culture’s role in public sphere, 32 Public debate, 227–229. See also Debate conditions authoritarian Chile, 129–132 demands for social justice in, 18 methodology of study on, 24 gender justice, 15–16 political parties, 227 post-socialist Poland, 103–109 socialist Poland, 89–91

Index South Africa, 146–148, 174–179, 202–207, 229 state action to promote and sustain, 230–231 Public institutions, 16, 21, 227 Public opinion, 15–16, 47–50, 219 media’s influence on, 48–49 Public Participation Programmes, 163n Public sphere, 31–33 civil society within, 30, 32 legislature’s role in, 31, 32, 33–38 media’s role in, 32 socialist Poland’s treatment of, 82–84 strong vs. weak publics in, 32–33 PWG. See Parliamentary Women’s Group (South Africa) Quotas challenge institutionalism, 13, 14 counterpublics favoring, 226 legislatures, 26, 34, 38 post-socialist Polish legislature, 116 socialist Polish legislature, 85 Solidarity, 99 South African employment, 169 South African parliament, 67, 141, 160–161, 214 South African political parties, 141, 143, 169–170, 214 South African trade unions, 196 Racial prejudice, 13. See also Apartheid regime in South Africa Radical level of gender justice, 17, 19 Radio stations. See Media Radio Tierra (Chile), 128 Radio Umbral of Methodist Church (Chile), 128 Rapaczynski, Wanda, 102 Rape Crisis (South Africa), 146, 165, 193, 208, 226 Rape. See Gender-based violence (GBV) RDP (Reconstruction and Development Programme). See African National Congress (ANC) Recognition of Customary Marriages Act of 1998 (South Africa), 5 Regime breakdown as stage in democratization, 21n Religious organizations in South Africa, 204

Index Reproductive Rights Alliance (South Africa), 166 Retirement age of women, 114 Roman Catholic Church. See Catholic Church Round Table Agreements (Poland), 59, 94n, 100 Rural Women’s Circles (Poland), 85 Rural Women’s Movement (South Africa), 137 Rwanda, advances in women’s rights in, 5 Ryan, Mary, 43 Salo, Elaine, 146 Saturation in qualitative methods, 22n Saunders, Juliette, 200 Scope of state responsiveness, 19, 20 The Second Women’s Budget, 176 Selebi, Jackie, 208 September, Connie, 139, 169 Sepulveda, Adriana, 129 Sexist attitudes, 13, 51, 53 Sexual harassment cultural norms, 13, 51 South Africa, 147, 150, 151, 162, 177n, 191, 200n women media employees, 52 Sexual Offences Act of 2007 (South Africa), 5, 209, 216 Shope-Mofole, Lyndall, 174 Sixteen Days of Activism Campaign, 203, 213, 215 SLD. See Democratic Left Alliance (Poland) Smith, Charlene, 208 Social behaviors that create exclusion, 21, 26 U.S. Congress engaging in, 37–38 Socialist Party (Chile), 124n, 125 Socialist Poland, 58n, 59n, 81, 82–94. See also Poland abortion rights in, 90, 91, 92n Catholic Church in, 84, 228 civil society in, 85–89 comparison of late socialist era with early consolidation period, 18, 21, 56–57, 69–70, 80, 114 counterpublics in, 223–224 debate conditions in, 84–89 gender justice in, 91–94 legislature, women in, 85 media in, 89

283 public debate in, 89–91 public vs. private sphere in, 82–84 smizdat press in, 84n, 91 women’s organizations in, 85–86 work status of women in, 82–84, 90, 92–94, 112 Social justice defined, 16, 37 public debate demanding, 18 Society for Responsible Parenthood (Poland), 90 Society of Family Development (socialist Poland), 92 Solidarity (Polish opposition movement) alliance with Catholic Church, 58–59, 80–81 coming to power, 94n influence of, 84, 227 restructuring of, 99n traditional view of women’s roles, 90–91 women active in, 57, 86, 99–100, 100n, 223 Women’s Section, 99–100, 104–105, 224 Solidarity Electoral Action, 109 South Africa. See also African National Congress (ANC); Apartheid regime in South Africa; South Africa’s consolidation; South Africa’s liberal moment abortion rights in, 157 civil society in, 136–142, 163–167, 170, 193–198, 230 compared with Chile, 62, 72–74, 119, 120, 134, 135, 138, 153 constitution of, 5, 65, 67, 160n, 180, 206, 229n data sources from, 22 debate conditions in, 134–145, 227 democratization process in, 62, 65, 119, 229 electoral system flaws in, 67–68 gender-based violence in, 72–74, 146, 148, 149–150, 175–177, 180–181, 202–205, 208–209 gender justice in, 148–153, 180–183, 207–210 Government of National Unity (GNU), 25, 26n, 66, 158, 163, 165n, 185, 220 just debate approach in, 65–66 land ownership by women in, 63, 149

284 South Africa (cont.) media in, 143–145, 170–174, 188, 198–202 methodology of study in, 21, 65–66 Multi-Party Negotiating Process (MPNP), 143 organizing of women’s movement in, 62–63, 64, 68, 136–142 parliament and women’s rights, 5, 16, 26, 68 parliament (generally) in, 135–136, 228 parliament, women representatives in, 67, 135–136, 141, 158–159, 185, 189, 212, 214 public debate in, 146–148, 174–179, 202–207, 229 selection as case study, 57 trade unions in, 138–140, 146, 147, 150n, 167–170, 196, 226 transition negotiations in, 65, 142–143 unemployment in, 73n, 74 women in terms of race and class, 13, 137, 165, 190 women’s movement, rise and collapse of, 28, 66–68, 157–158, 184 women’s organizations in, 137–138, 146, 193–195 women’s rights, recognition of, 5, 25, 231 work status of women in, 72–74, 178– 179, 181–183, 205–207, 209–210 South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), 144, 173, 188n, 199 South African Citizenship Act of 1995, 5 South African Communist Party (SACP), 167n, 169 South African National Editors’ Forum (SANEF), 201, 215 South Africa’s consolidation, 185–216 ANC and COSATU role, 196–198 civil society in, 193–198 compared to liberal moment, 21, 65–66, 66n, 74–75, 158, 220, 228 debate conditions in, 194, 201–202, 220 factors in deteriorating women’s rights in South Africa, 186, 187, 229 gender-based violence in, 202–205, 208–209 gender justice in, 207–210 legislation proposed, 209 media in, 198–202

Index parliament, women representatives in, 189 parliament’s influence in, 228 public debate in, 202–207 trade unions in, 196–198 work status of women in, 205–207, 209–210 South Africa’s liberal moment, 157–184 ANC and COSATU role, 167–170 civil society in, 163–167, 170, 230 compared to consolidation period, 21, 65–66, 66n, 74–75, 158, 220, 228 debate conditions in, 159–174, 222 gender-based violence in, 175–177, 180–181 gender justice in, 180–183 legislation enacted, 157 media in, 170–174 parliament, women in, 160–161, 185, 222 parliament’s influence in, 228 public debate in, 174–179 women’s movement, rise and collapse of, 157–158, 184, 229 women’s organizations in, 164–167 work status of women in, 178–179, 181–183 Soviet Poland. See Socialist Poland Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee, 195 Speed of state responsiveness, 19, 20 Square, Gertrude, 195 State defined, 18 distinguished from civil society, 39 State responsiveness to gender justice, 18–20, 37. See also Gender justice abortion rights in Poland, 71 gender-based violence in Chile and South Africa, 72–73. See also Genderbased violence (GBV) methodology of study on, 24–25 scope of, 19, 20 specifics of, 19, 20 speed of, 19, 20 women’s work status and violence against women in Chile, 72–73, 134 women’s work status and violence against women in South Africa, 153 women’s work status in Poland, 71, 81–82 Strategic gender interests, 36

Index Substantive gender justice, 17, 19 Substantive representation of women in legislatures, 34, 35–37 Suchocka, Hanna, 95 Sunstein, Cass, 7 Surveys of institutional gender relations, 13 Suttner, Raymond, 214 Suzman, Helen, 136n, 148 Symbolic benefits of women’s presence in legislatures, 34–35 Take Back the Night marches (South Africa), 147–148 Tambo, Oliver, 140, 141 Tarasiewicz, Malgorzata, 104 The Third Women’s Budget, 178 Third wave of democratization, 5, 6, 20, 34, 80 Thompson, Dennis, 7 Tobar, Marcela Rios, 126n Trade unions. See also Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU); Solidarity (Polish opposition movement) Chile, 126n, 155, 226 post-socialist Poland, 116 quotas, 226 socialist Poland, 86 South Africa, 138–140, 146, 147, 150n, 167–170, 196, 226 Training programs. See Education Transition as stage in democratization, 21n media’s importance in, 46 scholars on media role, 47n Transition negotiating forums in democratizing states, 29, 32 South Africa, 65, 142–143 Treatment Action Campaign, 189n Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 175 UDF. See United Democratic Front (South Africa) Uganda, advances in women’s rights in, 5 Underground realm in socialist Poland, 82–84 Unemployment Chile and South Africa, 73n, 74 Poland, 72n Unions. See Trade unions United Democratic Front (UDF; South Africa), 135, 136–137, 146, 227

285 United Nations, 26, 221 UN Decade for Women (1975–1985), 63–64 United States Congress creating obstacles to women’s participation, 37–38 media jobs held by women in, 51n United Women’s Congress (UWCO; South Africa), 146 United Women’s Organization (UWO; South Africa), 137, 146 Vatican II, 100 Vavi, Zwelinzima, 196 Verba, Sidney, 56 Viall, Jeanne, 173, 177 Violence against women. See Gender-based violence (GBV) Voice, 12–13, 14, 15, 17, 40 Vos, Suzanne, 189, 191 Wages. See also Work status of women family wage for workers with spouse and children, 109 gender-based gap, 92–93 Walentynowicz, Anna, 90 Walesa, Lech, 80n, 94, 111 Weldon, Laurel, 19, 19n, 45n, 149n WEU. See Women’s Empowerment Unit (South Africa) White Ribbon campaign (South Africa), 203 WNC. See Women’s National Coalition (South Africa) Women defined, 4n liberal democracy, 10 majority of population, 11 politics, 6, 15 Women for Life (MPLV; Chile), 123, 124, 130 Women for Women (Poland), 108 Women’s Budget Initiative (South Africa), 192 Women’s caucuses, 26, 162 Women’s Charter (South Africa), 148 Women’s conferences, 13, 141, 147, 164, 166, 174 Women’s Congress (Chile), 137 “Women’s Demands to Democracy” (Chile), 130

Index

286 Women’s Department (Chile), 126–127 Women’s Empowerment Programme (South Africa), 180 Women’s Empowerment Unit (WEU; South Africa), 162, 191–192 Women’s Forum (South Africa), 142n Women’s League (Poland), 85, 104 Women’s Legal Centre, 206 Women’s movement, 39–40. See also Women’s organizations authoritarian Chile, 129 autonomy in, 40 Chile, 4, 64, 122, 155 defined, 64n Women’s National Coalition (WNC; South Africa), 65, 141–142, 142n, 143, 145, 146, 148, 164, 222, 225, 227 Women’s Net (South Africa), 166, 194 Women’s organizations. See also specific organizations by name Chile, 64–65, 120–121, 123–124, 130, 155, 222, 227, 228 debate conditions, 16 feministas autonomas vs. feministas politicas, 123 gender scholars on, 25, 39–40 inclusiveness of, 40 post-socialist Poland, 96–97 socialist Poland, 85–86

South Africa, 64–65, 137–138, 146, 164–167, 193–195 United States, 19 Women’s Parliamentary Group (WPK; Poland), 96, 104, 105, 108, 224, 226 Women’s rights, defined, 4n Women’s Studies Circle (Chile), 123 Work status of women, 18 authoritarian Chile, 129–130 comparison of Chile and South Africa, 73 definition of women’s work in Poland, 71 example of exploitation, 71 Polish Church view of, 24, 72 post-socialist Poland, 108–109, 112–114 socialist Poland, 82–84, 90, 92–94, 112 South Africa, 150–151, 178–179, 181–183, 205–207, 209–210 state responsiveness to, in Chile, 134 state responsiveness to, in Poland, 71, 81–82, 114 WPK. See Women’s Parliamentary Group (Poland) Yengeni, Tony, 188 Young, Iris Marion, 13n, 16–17, 37, 42, 44n, 44–45, 45n Zuma, Jacob, 189, 204, 212, 212n, 213, 214n, 215