WILLIAM JAMES IN RUSSIAN CULTURE
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WILLIAM JAMES IN RUSSIAN CULTURE
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W I L L I A M J A M E S IN RUSSIAN CULTURE
Edited by Joan Delaney Grossman and Ruth Rischin
- Boulder - New York - Oxford
LEXINGTON BOOKS Lanham
LEXINGTON BOOKS Published in the United States of America by Lexington Books A Member of the Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 PO Box 317 Oxford OX2 9RU, UK Copyright 0 2003 by Lexington Books AZl rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data William James in Russian culture / edited by Joan Delaney Grossman and Ruth Rischin. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7391-0526-4 (alk. paper) - ISBN 0-7391-0527-2 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Russia-Intellectual life-1801-1917. 2. Russia (Federation)-Intellectual life1991- 3. James,William, 1842-1910-Influence. I. Grossman, Joan Delaney. 11. Rischin, Ruth, 1932DK189.2.W547 2003 1 9 1 d c 21 2002015280 Printed in the United States of America
WMThe paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences-Permanence Materials,ANSIlNISO 239.48-1992.
of Paper for Printed Library
Contents
Acknowledgments
vii
A Note on Transliteration, Translation, and Bibliographies
xi
Introduction Joan Delaney Grossman and Ruth Rischin William James: The European Connection Linda Simon Adventures in Time and Space: Dostoevsky, William James, and the Perilous Journey to Conversion Robin Feuer Miller What Men Live By: Belief and the Individual in Leo Tolstoy and William James Donna Tussing Orwin “The Moral Equivalent of War”: Violence in the Later Fiction of Leo Tolstoy Andrew Wachtel Philosophers, Decadents, and Mystics: James’s Russian Readers in the 1890s Joan Delaney Grossman James and Viacheslav Ivanov at the “Threshold of Consciousness” Gennady Obatnin
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15 33 59 81 93 113
vi
Contents
7 William James in the Moscow Psychological Society: Pragmatism, Pluralism, Personalism Randall A. Poole 8 Lev Shestov’s James: “A Knight of Free Creativity” Brian Horowitz 9 James and Konovalov: The Varieties of Religious Experience and Russian Theology between Revolutions Alexander Etkind 10 Gorky and God-Building Barry P Scherr 11 James and Vocabularies of Post-Soviet Russian Spirituality Edith W Clowes
131 159 169 189 21 1
Afterword: William James in Contexts, Plural David Joravsky
225
William James Bibliography
243
Index
247
About the Contributors
257
Acknowledgments
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owe many debts of gratitude, accumulated as the work progressed-so many that not all can now be mentioned individually. However, we wish here to express special appreciation to the following: Serena Leigh Krombach, editorial director of Lexington Books, for her ready assistance and guidance in bringing this enterprise to fruition; to Susan Harris, for her generous encouragement and aid in difficult times; to our friends and colleagues Hugh McLean and Robert P. Hughes, who not only graciously translated from Russian the essays by Alexander Etkind and Gennady Obatnin, but gave us steadfast support throughout this whole endeavor; to Linda Simon, the Americanist who brought her tlan and expert knowledge of William James and his world to this volume, as well as offering warm encouragement to Ruth Rischin, who conceptualized the project. Finally, we express profound gratitude to our contributors for their unflagging enthusiasm and cooperation in bringing the project to a satisfactory completion. We thank also the Committee on Research of the University of California, Berkeley, for generously supporting this work. HE EDITORS OF THIS VOLUME
Grateful acknowledgment for permission to cite is made as follows. Passages from The Correspondence of William James,vols. 5-6, are reprinted with permission of the University Press of Virginia. Citations from the diaries of William James appear by permission of the Houghton Library, Harvard University. Permission to quote from the poems of Viacheslav Ivanov, Collected Works 1971-1987 was granted by the publisher, Foyer Oriental Chretien. -v11-
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Permission to quote from Selected Letters of Maksim Gorky (eds. Barry P. Scherr and Andrew Barratt) was granted by the editors. Portions of “Adventures in Time and Space: Dostoevsky, William James, and the Perilous Journey to Conversion” by Robin Feuer Miller appeared in American Contributions to the Twelfth International Congress of Slavists (eds. Robert A. Maguire and Alan Timberlake). Copyright belongs to the author. “James and Konovalov: The Varieties of Religious Experience and Russian Theology Between Revolutions” by Alexander Etkind appeared, with modifications, in Russian in Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie (No. 31) 1998. For citations from The Works of William James we thank Harvard University Press. Reprinted by permission of the publisher from The Works of William James: Essays, Comments, and Reviews, Frederick Burkhardt, General Editor, and Fredson Bowers, Textual Editor, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright 0 1987 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College (400 WORDS). Reprinted by permission of the publisher from The Works of William James: Essays in Philosophy, Frederick Burkhardt, General Editor, and Fredson Bowers, Textual Editor, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright 0 1978 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College (100 WORDS). Reprinted by permission of the publisher from The Works of William James: Essays in Psychical Research, Frederick Burkhardt, General Editor, and Fredson Bowers, Textual Editor, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright 0 1986 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College (200 WORDS). Reprinted by permission of the publisher from The Works of William James: Essays in Psychology, Frederick Burkhardt, General Editor, and Fredson Bowers, Textual Editor, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright 0 1983 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College (150 WORDS). Reprinted by permission of the publisher from The Works of William James: Essays in Religion and Morality, Frederick Burkhardt, General Editor, and Fredson Bowers, Textual Editor, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright 0 1982 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College (150 WORDS). Reprinted by permission of the publisher from The Works of William James: The Meaning of Truth, Frederick Burkhardt, General Editor, and Fredson Bowers, Textual Editor, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright 0 1975 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College (50 WORDS). Reprinted by permission of the publisher from The Works of William James: Pragmatism, Frederick Burkhardt, General Editor, and Fredson Bowers, Textual Editor, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright 0 1979 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College (1,200 WORDS).
Acknowledgments
ix
Reprinted by permission of the publisher from The Works of William James: Principles of Psychology-Volumes Z-IZZ, Frederick Burkhardt, General Editor, and Fredson Bowers, Textual Editor, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright 0 1981 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College (400 WORDS). Reprinted by permission of the publisher from The Works of William James: Psychology: Briefer Course, Frederick Burkhardt, General Editor, and Fredson Bowers, Textual Editor, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright 0 1984 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College (250 WORDS). Reprinted by permission of the publisher from The Works of William James: A Pluralistic Universe, Frederick Burkhardt, General Editor, and Fredson Bowers, Textual Editor, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright 0 1977 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College (100 WORDS). Reprinted by permission of the publisher from The Works of William James: Talks to Teachers on Psychology-and to Students on Some of Li$e’s Ideals, Frederick Burkhardt, General Editor, and Fredson Bowers, Textual Editor, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright 0 1983 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College (200 WORDS). Reprinted by permission of the publisher from The Works of William James: Varieties of Religious Experience, Frederick Burkhardt, General Editor, and Fredson Bowers, Textual Editor, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright 0 1985 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College (1,000 WORDS). Reprinted by permission of the publisher from The Works of William James: The Will to Believe, Frederick Burkhardt, General Editor, and Fredson Bowers, Textual Editor, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright 0 1979 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College (200 WORDS).
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A Note on Transliteration, Translation, and Bibliographies
R
USSIAN NAMES AND OTHER WORDS appear in
anglicized form in the text and notes. In the bibliographies they are given in Library of Congress transliteration. Russian titles are translated into English in text and notes but appear in Russian, with translation, in the bibliographies following each chapter. A bibliography of William James’s works, with standard abbreviations used in references throughout the text, appears on pp. 243-44.
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Introduction Joan Delaney Grossman and Ruth Rischin
A
about him,” wrote William James in A Pluralistic Universe(1909).James’s own vision constantly evolved as he wrestled with problems that also profoundly stirred his contemporaries at the turn of the twentieth century. He continues to energize a varied audience now, at the start of the twenty-first. Russian readers, too, from the 1890sto the present day, have found in the work of America’s preeminent philosopher and psychologist much to ponder, admire, and debate. Unquestionably, if the course of Russian affairs has been dynamic and unpredictable since the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, its vision of itself has undergone drastic change. To many observers, the flux of Russia’s’recent spiritual history has proven a fascinating spectacle,punctuated as it has been by energetic efforts to reclaim the cultural and intellectual riches of its pre-Soviet past. In this process, some intriguing Russian-Western connections have come to light, begging to be explored: among them the early Russian attraction to William James. To our retrospective gaze William James stands out among thinkers of his time as a man strikingly at home in our day. “Unlike many other nineteenthcentury intellectuals, buttoned into their stiff white collars, calcified in our collective memory, James strides easily, inquisitively, into our own time, urging us to notice him”: so his biographer Linda Simon pictures him in her recent work Genuine Reality (p. xviii). Yet, as Simon also shows in the opening essay of this volume, James was very much of his own time and place, an American intellectual of the pre-World War I era who brought his ideas and his fresh approach to European contemporaries, eager for exchange but always his own man.
u
MAN’S VISION IS THE GREAT thing
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Introduction
James believed that “each part of the world is in some way connected, in some other ways not connected with its other parts” (PU,p. 41). The present work examines the intriguing question: What happens when ideas of a thinker like James, who, despite his originality, was deeply rooted in his own traditions, are refracted through a culture that draws in large part on a heritage profoundly different from his own? It includes studies of reception and interpretation of James’s major writings, along with analyses of their impact on certain Russian writers and thinkers. It also reveals some striking parallels and convergences (and divergences) between his thought and that of Russian writers who, at different times, grappled with similar intellectual and spiritual issues. Aided by a few lucky finds and some determined digging, our authors reached a collective assurance that James and Russian culture have something to say to each other. If this dialogue has often enough been at cross purposes, the confrontation is revealing of both parties and may help us know both of them better. Arising at the turn of the century, Russian interest in James burgeoned in the early 1900s, peaked, and then was largely forced underground with the rise of Stalin. During much of the Soviet period James was unacceptable, denounced in the official press as a mere puppet of American capitalism and lampooned as the “Wall Street Pragmatist.” The Gorbachev years opened new perspectives, and the breakup of the Soviet empire made the change in cultural climate irreversible. Now that Russia is free to explore its past, James emerges as a fresh and penetrating voice that commands attention among thoughtful readers concerned with shaping a new identity for their country and uncovering treasures long hidden from sight. “William James is a figure who simply won’t go away,” remarked Hilary Putnam in his elegant little book Pragmatism (p. 5). The James revival in Russia in the post-Soviet 1990s shows this to be true for Russians as well. The Varieties of Religious Experience, The Will to Believe, and Pragmatism have reappeared, and some shorter pieces have been translated for the first time. After the distorted and disfigured James of Soviet times, readers are rediscovering his “heuristic wealth of ideas” (Pavlova et al., p. 401). Moreover, as Edith Clowes demonstrates in her essay, there are important currents in contemporary Russian spiritual thinking to which James’sideas and insights offer strong support. The reason for his renewed appeal in present circumstances, in Russia and elsewhere, may have been pinpointed by Hilary Putnam: the fact that “for James, as for Socrates, the central philosophical question is how to live” (p. 22). James arrived in Russia originally at a propitious moment. The social and political turmoil of the 1890s and early 1900s was matched by ferment in the country’s intellectual, artistic, and spiritual life. It is hardly news by now that the period 1890-1910 was a time of brilliant cultural productivity there. It was
Introduction
3
also an era of renewed activity in philosophy, when resurgent idealism energetically challenged the positivist cult of scientific facts. The first of James’s works to appear in Russia was Psychology, the shorter, textbook version of The Principles ofpsychology. Aiming as it did to transform the “science of the soul” into an exact science (with loopholes left for metaphysics), James’spsychology went against the grain for some, while others saw its author as the pioneer of a third way between positivism and idealism. And still others-like the poets and mystics treated in the Grossman and Obatnin essays below-found support in James’s text for altogether different lines of thought. For all his European travels, William James, unlike John Dewey, his successor as the veritable embodiment of American thought, never visited Russia in person. However, he did have professional contacts with Russians as his international career was gathering momentum. At the Congress of Physiological Psychology in Paris in August 1889, James was named America’s representative to the group’s permanent Committee of Organization, set up to facilitate contacts between psychologists in different countries engaged in similar research (EPs, pp. 245-246). Among members of the committee he mentions “Grot of Moscow.” Head of the Moscow Psychological Society and editor of its journal Questions ofPhilosophy and Psychology, Nikolai Grot was part of the relatively large Russian delegation at the congress. In their respective reports on the congress he and James each noted the other’s active participation in the proceedings. Returning from Paris, Grot tried to interest Russian colleagues in the American’s work. However, apparently no further contacts between the two developed: James’s exposure to a wider circle of Russian readers took place by other means. The fact that The Principles of Psychology was never translated into Russian may tell something about the contemporary state in Russia of what David Joravsky calls “the ‘problematic science’ of psychology, divided into warring camps from its earliest beginnings” (Joravsky,p. 95). James’scollaboration on what would become the James-Lange theory of emotion was later of great interest to the psychologist and literary historian D. N. Ovsianiko-Kulikovsky in his writings on memory and feelings in the 1890s.’ However, at the time of its first appearance in Russia, Psychology carried a distinctive message to various and diverse audiences. It also established its author in Russia as a voice to be heeded. A few more James writings were translated in the next several years, including The Will to Believe (19041, which engaged the interest of the Russian writer Maxim Gorky. (Meeting James during his American visit in 1906, Gorky described him as “a wonderful old man.”) Barry Scherr’s account of “Gorky and God-Building’’ follows the parallels between the idiosyncratic and individual faith-states recorded and celebrated by James, and
4
Introduction
the “people-power’’ envisioned by Gorky in his novel A Confession and elsewhere as a phase in the communal transformation of society. However, James’s religious philosophy had its real Russian introduction with the 1910 translation of The Varieties of Religious Experience, the appeal of which may have been enhanced by the contemporary revival of religious thought and feeling and the increasingly intense interest in the religious thinking of the novelist Dostoevsky. Robin Feuer Miller’s essay explores the loss of inner faith and the consequent quest for unification that sets Dostoevsky’s heroes and James’s “gnawing, carking, questioning” souls, the narrators of his The Varieties of Religious Experience, on “journeys to conversion.” Along the way, as Miller demonstrates, Dostoevsky’s crisis-ridden heroes test homeopathic medicine and various mind-cures, illuminating a hitherto unexamined affinity between the author of The Brothers Karamazov and the subjects of the case studies compiled by James, himself no stranger to alternative medicine. If James never indicated acquaintance with Dostoevsky‘s writings, the same was not true of the “other” great Russian writer, Leo Tolstoy, whom James regarded as the world’s consummate novelist. Tolstoy’s greatest novels, War and Peace and Anna Karenina, appeared long before The Principles of Psychology. Indeed, Donna Orwin remarks in her essay that James had little to offer Tolstoy about the workings of the human psyche. “James’s wildly appreciative 1896 reaction to these novels as perfectly representative of life-i.e., the dynamics of human psychology-,” she writes, “suggests that he saw in them a prescient imaging of his own ideas.” Moreover, Orwin finds much to probe in their common concern about “what men live by.” Andrew Wachtel in his essay weighs the extent to which Tolstoy attempted to overcome an irrepressible glorification of war that informs his later fiction, most notably Hadji Murat, during the very years when he was writing the impassioned pacifist tracts that align the great novelist with William James. It was in 1910,the year of James’s and Tolstoy’s deaths, that William James’s fame in Russia reached its high point. Not only The Varieties of Religious Experience but Pragmatism appeared in Russian translation that year, initiating intense debate and discussion among intellectuals, religious figures, philosophers, and scientists. Randall Poole’s essay in this volume features the Moscow Psychological Society (of which James was an honorary member) as a forum for these exchanges. Its journal, Questions of Philosophy and Psychology, was a leading vehicle for comment from many perspectives. One of those perspectives proceeded from what could be called the religious “left”for its insistent demand for renewal in Russian Orthodoxy and its sometimes drastic reinterpretation of traditional religious thinking. A major feature of the “Russian religious renaissance” that began after 1905, this movement as-
Introduction
5
sured a receptive readership for Varieties. One of the group’s leaders, the philosopher and “God-seeker” Nikolai Berdyayev, greeted it exuberantly: “Reading James’s book, one feels that a stream of fresh air is entering the stuffy atmosphere of rationalist culture. . . . The unconscious ‘I,’ the life of will and feeling, experience, widened into the mystical and religious sphere-there lie the riches released from under the yoke of rationalist experience” (“On the Broadening of Experience,” p. 381). Semyon Frank, another prominent thinker whose intellectual and spiritual path took him from marxism to “Godseeking,” took a similarly enthusiastic view. For Frank the appearance of The Varieties of Religious Experience marked an epoch, embodying as it did “the deep need being felt everywhere for the renewal of religious life.’’ Moreover, its author was “a scholar of world renown [who] openly and categorically gave scientific sanction to this need” (“James’sPhilosophy of Religion,” pp. 155-156). Among James’s more restrained admirers was the religious philosopher Lev Shestov, who sought in James, as Brian Horowitz points out, “a knight of free creativity,”but found instead a thinker unable to overcome rationalism. That conservative churchmen took a radically divergent view from any of these philosophers is borne out in Alexander Etkind’s account of a dramatic theological clash that involved James’s psychological theories as well. When it appeared in Russia, Pragmatism elicited a particularly heated response from critics and commentators who offered widely varying interpretations. Among them was a group of thinkers identified in these years with neopositivist orientations in philosophy and eclectic marxism in political theory. Their thought had been prepared in the early 1900s, first, by concepts from Einsteinian physics that called into question all philosophical systems relying on absolute certainties, and, second, by the epistemologies of Ernst Mach and Richard Avenarius. Mach and Avenarius held that knowledge of the world comes through immediate experience consisting of “neutral elements,”and that science therefore does not deal with the uncovering of abstract truths, but with the construction of hypotheses that are accessible to continuous refinement. The response to James on the part of a Russian thinker little known in the West, Pave1 Yushkevich (1872-1945), is of particular interest. Yushkevich‘s theory of empirio-symbolism won him, as did James’s Pragmatism itself, the damnation of Lenin, for whom all eclectic theories of truth, from Berkeley to Kant to Mach and company, opened the door to the idiosyncratic and the religious. Among all of James’s Russian interpreters, it was Yushkevich who came closest to exposing the performative or skaz element in the Pragmatism text as, more than a mediation between schools of thought, an outright game with the reader. One of the chief serious journals, Russian Thought, devoted a large part of its May 1910 issue to an article by Semyon Frank, “Pragmatism as a Philosophical Doctrine,” followed by “A Debate about Pragmatism,” the transcript
6
Introduction
of an extended discussion of Frank‘s article in a prestigious Moscow philosophical circle. Most of the speakers, who represented a significant range of positions, found fault with Frank‘s severely critical analysis. Nor did James go unchallenged, though most spoke in highly respectful tones of him as a thinker. Some, however, urged the importance of considering James’s pragmatism in the total context of his work. The acquaintance with James’s work and with modern Western thought shown by many participants in the pragmatism debate points up an important fact. Interest in James developed at a moment of special openness among Russia’s educated classes to Western cultural trends and ideas. More generally, this was a time of redefinition on many levels-a process where encounter with outside forces and ideas tended to generate lively, even acrimonious, debate or worse. (A cold front advancing against a pool of warm stationary air may produce a similar turbulence.) Russia had been through this before. Arising simultaneously with these periodic spasms has been one of the perennial “vexed questions” of Russian history: her position vis-a-vis the West, or, put otherwise, Russian identity. First raised long before the reign of Peter the Great, that question crystallized in the mid-nineteenth century in the debate, at first gentlemanly, later less so, between Slavophiles and Westernizers. Early in the twentieth century the discussion centered around notions framed in the expression “the Russian idea.” A term with an illustrious genealogy going back to a lecture so titled by the philosopher Vladimir Solovyov in 1888 (published in 191I), it was the subject of an important 1909 essay by poet and thinker Vyacheslav Ivanov, “On the Russian Idea.” Much later, Nikolai Berdyayev elaborated the notion in his book The Russian Idea, the goal of which, he told his readers, is, through meditation on Russia’s history, to arrive at “the thought of the Creator about Russia” (p. 1). Once again, since 1991 and the fall of Communism, the process of redefinition proceeds apace on all levels of society, with the question of Russia’s relation to the West playing a prominent role. Among serious-minded readers efforts to pick up threads of past thought has led to reexamination and revival of the long-standing Slavophile-Westernizer debate. Not surprising in this context is the appearance of a book entitled The Rebirth of the Russian Idea (1991). This volume advances what James Scanlan, a leading specialist on Russian philosophy, called “an ill-concealed conviction of, not simply the value and uniqueness, but the superiority of ‘Holy Russia’ over Western society and culture” (“Slavophilism,”p. 45). Commenting on this revival of national self-examination, the British historian Aileen Kelly recently formulated the “Russian idea” as follows: “This is the belief, first promoted by the czarist state in collaboration with Orthodox theologians, that Russia’s distinctive religion and culture leave it destined to follow a path separate from the materialistic West and spiritually superior to it” ( N Y T p. 11). However, in
Introduction
7
her 1999 book Viewsfrorn the Other Shore, Kelly finds the post-Soviet intelligentsia deeply split on the question of “self-image and values,” with debate centering on “the past and future role of the messianic tendency commonly known as the Russian Idea” (p. 217). The reception of William James throughout the entire Soviet period was closely linked with tectonic shifts in Soviet cultural politics. Thus, in the early 1920%in the relative freedom of cultural expression that characterized the years of the New Economic Policy, some of Russia’s most searching thinkers and writers hearkened to the promise and optimism of James’s writings. Among them was the literary critic L. V. Pumpiansky (1891-1940), author of Dostoevsky and Antiquity (1922), who in 1924-1925, during his association with the Nevel-Vitebsk group around his good friend Mikhail Bakhtin, brought into their conversations his earnest commentaries on the American philosopher.* Within a few years that openness was stifled. In the making was what might be called a “revisionist”version of the “Russian idea.” Elimination of the religious element from this idea+r the substitution of dialectical materialism and the Communist regime-produced a curious parody, with emphasis on Western-specifically American-moral inferiority. Interestingly, here again William James played a role. The first major article on James after the 1917 Revolution appeared before the ideological tightening that marked Stalin’s consolidation of power. The July-August 1927 number of the authoritative journal Under the Banner of Marxism carried an article by V. F. Asmus entitled “The Alogism of William James.” Linking him closely with Bergson, Asmus took James to task at length for “anti-intellectualism,” irrationalism, and the general prizing of intuition over logic. Valentin Asmus was a prominent professor of philosophy at Moscow State Uni~ersity.~ His arguments here are those of a professional philosopher, defending the intellectualist position attacked by James and Bergson; some of these arguments resemble criticisms by James’s contemporaries. Then, taking up a more distinctive stance, Asmus drew a straight line from Schopenhauer, “first in the parade of philosophical decadents,” to James (along with Bergson, the names of Maeterlinck and Rudolf Steiner occur) (pp. 78, 81-82). However, in his view James exceeded any of these by putting philosophy directly at the service of religion. Here, while writing from the Marxist standpoint, Asmus found himself in the paradoxical position of contrasting favorably the medieval scholastics constructing rational arguments for the existence of God with the anti-intellectualist bourgeois thinkers James and Bergson. Medieval clerics, standing at the feudal stage of development, showed that “they understood far better than James the meaning of proof” (p. 83). Asmus concluded “James’sphilosophy will long stand as a sad memorial of the decline of bourgeois theoretical thought” (p. 84).
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Introduction
After the late twenties, any sign of intellectual argument disappeared from treatments of James (as of many others), and propaganda took over. During most of the Soviet period, as we know, names of past or present writers construed as incompatible with Marxism-Leninism were often expunged from the public record, and their works became generally inaccessible. Even John Dewey, who, in his “Impressions of Russia” (1928), extolled what he perceived as a native spirituality sustaining the Soviet educators whom he met during his visit, was subsequently subjected to the standard anti-American cant.4 Some foreign writers were targeted as examples of decadent bourgeois culture, their works sequestered, their ideas and their careers shamelessly distorted. Both Dewey and James fell into this category. Since politically correct information often reached the general public through publications like the multitome Great Soviet Encyclopedia, the GSE in its successive editions served as official barometer of James’s fortunes in the Soviet Union. The first edition (1926-1947) contained unsigned articles on “William James,” (vol. 21,1931) and “Pragmatism” (vol. 46, 1940). The James article, while not totally negative, is critical. The article on “Pragmatism,” in a volume published nine years later, is much cruder and shorter. By 1940 portrayal of pragmatism simply as antiscientific and pro-religion was standard. When D. Kvitko’s Sketches of ContemporaryAnglo-American Philosophy appeared in 1936, the Stalinist party line was firmly in place and anti-American sentiment in full flower. From the time of its first publication Pragmatism was seen by many in Europe and America as a peculiarly American philosophy. If James’s personal “Americanism” was a neutral, or even a positive, feature for Asmus, America’s bourgeois stage of development obviously was not. Now, in this work in the 1930s, the standard Marxist interpretation of pragmatism is on its way to the formulaic phrases of subsequent writers. Incidentally, Kvitko’s fourteen-year residence in the United States ( 1913-1927) presumably gave him authority based on firsthand experience. The Great Soviet Encyclopedia’s second edition, spanning the 1950s,bristled with anti-American Cold War fervor. The article on William James, capped by a quotation from Lenin, is a masterful collation of the abusive clichts routinely applied to thinkers from capitalist countries, especially the United States. “American reactionary philosopher and psychologist, ideologue of the imperialist bourgeoisie, one of the founders of the anti-scientific philosophy pragmatism, defender of religion. . . . James fully justified the expansionist plans of the American bourgeoisie, its fight against Socialism and the workers’ movement” (14: 219). Throughout the Stalin and Cold War years James routinely served as an exemplar of negative Western values, his works known to Soviet readers only second- and thirdhand, if at all, from encyclopedia articles and philosophy
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handbooks. The question occurs: why were his name and ideas not simply “repressed,”as were those of many others? The answer surely lies in the inviting target he made. The quintessential American reactionary capitalist bourgeois ideologue with a fondness for religion: Once the template was fashioned, James’s alleged popularity and influence in his native land served to characterize the decadence of American character and values. Two books issuing from the Department of Philosophy at Moscow State University in 1957 and 1964, respectively, show James as he appeared in the days when, the Khrushchev thaw notwithstanding, the old stereotypes still served. The first, American Pragmatism, was originally a course of lectures by philosophy professor Yuri K. Melvil. The chapter on James opens with a question showing a strikingly personalized approach: “What was the social persona of James, the ideologue of early American imperialism?” Citing cardinal points on which Jamesian notions clashed with Soviet orthodoxy, the author freely misquotes, quotes out of context, and otherwise misconstrues (the text being unavailable to the general readership). The resultant “James”was easily linked to Nietzsche, and from there it was only a step to making him (in Soviet terms) the favorite of Nazism and fascism. Lest the point be missed, the author summarizes: “Such are several views held by James, marking him as a racist and convinced enemy of the human masses. Such is the man who advances the philosophy of pragmatism” (p. 30). More nuanced, less vehement, but still carrying the obligatory ideological baggage was A. S. Bogomolov’s Anglo-American Bourgeois Philosophy in the Epoch of Imperialism ( 1964). Again one reads of James’s“defense of the religious world view, and, through it, of the social structure that uses religion as its ideological weapon” (p. 125). The third edition of the GSE (1969-1981) carried a signed article on James (vol. 8, 1972). Thoroughly revised in style and tone, it yet repeats the chief “objectionable” points found in the American philosopher: tendency toward individualism, mysticism, defense of religion from the standpoint of pragmatism. Reading through the books and articles on James and pragmatism published in the Soviet Union from the thirties through the seventies and even into the eighties is a dreary task, yet no surprise to anyone acquainted with the history of that time. Post-Soviet accounts throw light on a dark time, deploring especially “the monstrous dearth of theory and information” of that era (Sadovsky, p. 62). Meanwhile, as we then suspected and now know, cracks developed after Stalin, in philosophy as in many other areas. The atmosphere lightened perceptibly between 1960 and 1970 as successive volumes of the five-volume Philosophical Encyclopedia appeared. Finally, a change in the political climate and a 1988 Communist Party Politburo decision led to a full-scale effort to reclaim the Russian philosophical tradition. Volume followed volume as hitherto proscribed
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works by Russian thinkers were reissued. James Scanlan observes:“What seemed moribund had in fact merely been dormant, or in a state of suspended animation, and given the opportunity Russians returned to their philosophical heritage with alacrity” (“Overview,”p. 6). How did all this affect James? The name of an American thinker, subject of controversy among prerevolutionary Russian intellectuals and of obloquy in Stalinist times, might pique the curiosity of independent thinkers, but it would hardly lay first claim to attention under those difficult circumstances. Yet James’s name and ideas obviously were diffused by one means and another through several generations of actual or potential Russian readers. As the debates over pragmatism that roiled the intellectual and religious scenes in 1910 and beyond resurface in the writings of Berdyaev,,Frank, Peter Struve, Pave1 Yushkevich, and others, James has again becbme a presence to reckon with. Significantly, as James Scanlan reminds us, the early-twentieth-century thinkers being so enthusiastically welcomed by present-day Russian readers were in large part “of a religious, Russian Orthodox cast of mind, and as such they have found a sympathetic audience in a society that is not only newly freed of restraints on religion but positively drawn toward it” (“Overview,” p. 8). Nonetheless, in 1910 James’s unconventional approach to religion attracted Frank and Berdyaev by its freshness and openness to all human experience. The same qualities may contribute to its attraction today. The first James work to be republished in toto in post-Soviet times was The Varieties of Religious Experience, which appeared in several formats in 1992 and 1993. This event came, Edith Clowes writes, ,as “a welcome relief after decades of singleminded (Soviet) scientific thinkiog.” Moreover, in the current interest in mysticism Clowes sees “a continuing theme among leading Russian thinkers and writers concerned with questions of spirituality in a secular, scientific world.” This concern has led to intense-and highly justifiedinterest in Russia’s own religious-philosophical heritage, particularly from the turn of the last century. Some voices have urged an even more inclusive view. In his afterword to the 1993 republication of Varieties, P. S. Gurevich hailed Russians’ re-exposure to William James’s thought as a chance for them to reconnect with world mystical experience after decades of cultural isolation. Four years later, in 1997, a volume edited by Gurevich offered The Will to Believe and Pragmatism (originally published in Russian in, respectively, 1904 and 1910).5In addition, it includes four articles, three of which appear in Russian translation for the first time: “The Energies of Men,” “The Pragmatic Account of Truth and Its Misunderstanders,” and “A World of Pure Experience.” (The fourth, “Does Consciousness Exist?’’ first appeared in Russian in 1913.) As has been seen, of all James’s works the one most continuously linked with
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his name in Russia is Pragmatism. And the aspect of that work most consistently singled out for attention, though to different effect in different eras, has been pragmatism’s connection with religion. The earlier (1993) reprinting of the chapter “What Pragmatism Means” in a serial publication of Moscow University’s Department of Philosophy was apparently intended to rehabilitate and redefine a term that for decades appeared only as a term of contempt.6 As may be remembered, the last third of that chapter deals with pragmatism’s potential “usefulness”in the area of religion. As James sums it up, “In short, she widens the field of search for God” (p. 44). The cover and title page of the 1997 volume where Pragmatism appears mention only The Will to Believe. However, the afterword is entitled “The Good News (Blagovestie) of Pragmatism”-a title that bears, in Russian even more than in English, the distinct suggestion of “religious message.” Given the sinister alliance of pragmatism with religion stressed throughout the Soviet era, this is a deliberately bold reversal of values. James held no brief for formal religion, any more than he did for academic philosophy. Yet he wanted to bring philosophy close to living experience, which included religious faith. And he was concerned with the possibility of faith and religion coexisting in a world that has relegated them to a sphere apart from everyday affairs. As the afterword’s authors note: “[In] the debate over the existence of God pragmatism advances no readymade credo; it merely makes clear what is the practical sense of believing in God” (p. 404). Finally they conclude: “The pragmatic point of view, which orients the individual toward achieving life success and purposeful behavior, paradoxically leads to the recognition of mystical experience which, in [James’s] opinion, focuses the grumblings of the soul and assures the vitality (zhiznestoikost’) of religion itself” (p. 408). These authors are careful to point out one particularly significant historical allusion that might otherwise pass unnoticed by many readers: the 1910 “Debate over Pragmatism.” As they shrewdly observe, that debate showed that pragmatism “touched a tender spot in the tradition of Russian thought” (p. 394). Moreover, they are at some pains also to underline parallels between the time when pragmatism emerged, which they characterize as a period of transition and clash of ideas, and the present. Invoking the names of modern Western pragmatists (“R. Rorty and others”), they assert that “pragmatism has caught an essential philosophical tendency that will surely strengthen with time-namely, the tendency to break with stereotypes, absolutes, ‘the spirit of solemnity’ and unbending righteousness” (p. 399). A major part of the message James’s pragmatism brought to Russian thinkers in 1910 and, by implication, to their present-day heirs, is a message about philosophy itself. “James saw the chief fault of philosophy as it hitherto
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existed in its separation from life, in its failure to understand human beings” (p. 395). He wished to bring philosophy back to its human context. Or as one prominent participant in the 1910 debate Lev Lopatin put it: “Pragmatism returned thought to its proper channel. . . ,proposing an extremely simple attitude toward the eternal questions about the meaning of life, the moral order, and others” (quoted, “Good News,” p. 397). Now, at a time when, after long years of Communism, freedom of thought and belief has become an actuality, rediscovering the heritage of Russian thought, particularly the religious philosophers of the beginning of the twentieth century, has become a major enterprise. Moreover, the long-closed gates to Western ideas and modes of thinking are open, and the East-West relationship is again being energetically debated in Russia. In this context, William James speaks with particular poignancy to the post-atheist society of the former Soviet Union, to the culturologist Mikhail Epstein’s “poor believers,” whose “‘minimal belief’. . .appears to be as indivisible as spirit itself” (p. 363). We may ask is philosophical thought itself destined to receive a new lease on life? Is contact with the “other,” that well-known definer of positions, to function actively in this new environment? Some commentators would say that William James is at his active best in such situations. As Richard J. Bernstein writes in the introduction to A Pluralistic Universe: “James has the rare gift of transcending local restrictions of time and place and speaking directly and intimately to our own present philosophic situation” (p. xiii). The test of course comes when he addresses readers in a philosophic ambience and tradition very different from his own. David Joravsky in this volume’s concluding chapter calls attention to “the paradoxes that animate James’s writing, keeping it alive with different meanings for different audiences during a century of intellectual fragmentation, of frustration for seekers of coherent vision.” Clifford Geertz may be speaking for all James readers, Russian and others, when he says: “We need the sort of inquiry he pioneered, the sort of talents he possessed, and the sort of openness to the foreign and unfamiliar . . . he displayed” (p. 12). Notes 1. “Scientists have argued greatly as to whether or not there is such a thing as the memory of a feeling,” he wrote, in “The Psychology of Thought and Feeling” (1909), in D. N. Ovsianiko-Kulikovskii, Literaturno-kriticheskie raboty v 2-x tomakh, vol. 1 (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1989), p. 37. 2. Information to Ruth Rischin from Caryl Emerson, 2 September 1999. See also M. M. Bakhtin kakfilosof; ed. L. A. Gogotshivili and P. S. Gurevich (Moscow: Nauka, 1992); Caryl Emerson, The First Hundred Years of Mikhail Bakhtin (Princeton, N.J.:
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Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 234; Besedy K D. Duvakina s M. M. Bakhtinym (Moscow: Izdatel’skaia gruppa, Progress, 1996), p. 284. 3. Asmus is remembered variously. For a positive view, see N. V. Motroshilova, “In Memory of a Professor,” Soviet Studies in Philosophy, 28, no. 2 (fall 1989): 59-65. Another writer notes that “even one of the best professors” (i. e., Asmus) became tainted by the regime under which he worked (Sadovsky, p. 69). 4. Addressing a meeting of the Transnational Institute in Moscow in March 1993, Caryl Emerson perceptively analyzed the reception of American pragmatism in Russia. In her paper Emerson wrote: “In good American fashion, Dewey treats his impressions as well as his projections as empirical-and the Russian people themselves as inspired pragmatists” (“American Philosophers, Bakhtinian Perspectives: William James, George Herbert Mead, John Dewey, and Mikhail Bakhtin on a Philosophy of the Act,” unpublished paper, p. 8, n. 2). 5. The Will to Believe was published in 1904 in the translation of S. I. Tsereteli, and Pragmatism in 1910 in that of P. S. Yushkevich. 6. Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta, Series 7 (Philosophy), 1993, No. 3, pp. 82-9 1.
Works Cited Asmus, V. “Alogizm U. Dzhemsa (W. James’s Alogism).” Pod znamenem marksizma nos. 7-8 (July-August, 1927): 53-84. Berdiaev, Nikolai. “0rasshirenii opyta (On the Widening of Experience).” Voprosy filosofii ipsikhologii 103 (1910): 380-383. . (Berdyaev). The Russian Idea. New York: Macmillan, 1948. Bernstein, Richard J. “Introduction.” In A Pluralistic Universe,by William James. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977, pp. xi-nix. Bogomolov, A. S. Anglo-amerikanskaia burzhuaznaia filosofiia epokhi imperializma (Anglo-American Bourgeois Philosophy of the Epokh of Imperialism). Moscow: “Mysl,” 1964. Bol’shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia (Great Soviet Encyclopedia), 1st ed. Bol’shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 2d ed. Bol’shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 3d ed. Epstein, Mikhail N. “Response: ‘Post’ and ‘Beyond.”’ Slavic and East European Journal 39, no. 3 (1995): 357-366. Frank, Semen. “Filosofiia religii V. Dzhemsa” (W. James’s Philosophy of Religion). Russkaia mysl’2 (1910): 155-164. . “Pragmatizm kak filosofskoe uchenie” (Pragmatism as a Philsophical Doctrine). Russkaia mysI’ 5 (1910): 90-120. Frank, Semen et al. “Spor o pragmatizme” (Debate about Pragmatism). Russkaia mysl’ 5 (1910): 121-156. Geertz, Clifford. “‘The Pinch of Destiny’: Religion as Experience, Meaning, Identity, Power.” Harvard Divinity Bulletin 27, no. 4 (1998): 7-12. Gurevich, P. S. “Roptanie dushi i misticheskii opyt: Fenomenologiia religii U. Dzheimsa” (Grumblings of the Soul and Mystical Experience). In Mnogoobrazie
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religioznogo opyta (Varieties of Religious Experience), by William James, pp. 41 1 4 2 4 .
Joravsky, David. Russian Psychology: A Critical History. Cambridge, U.K.: Blackwell, 1989.
Kelly, Aileen. “When Russians Look Inward.” New York Times, Sept. 6, 1998, p. E l 1. . Viewsfrom the Other Shore. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999. Kvitko, D. Iu. Ocherki sovremennoi anglo-amerikanskoi filosofii (Essays in Contemporary Anglo-American Philosophy). Moscow-Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoe izdanie, 1936 Lenin, V. V. Win. Materialism and Empirio-Criticism. Critical Comment on a Reactionary Philosophy. Trans. A Fineberg, London, 1949. Mel’vil’, Iu. K. Amerikanskii prugmatizm (American Pragmatism). Moscow: Izd. Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1957. Pavlova, L. E., P. S. Gurevich, and M. L. Khor’kov. “Filosofskoe blagovestie pragmatizma” (The Philosophical Good News of Pragmatism). In Volia k vere i drugie ocherki populiarnoi filosofii (The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy), by William James. Putnam, Hilary. Pragmatism. Cambridge, U.K.: Blackwell, 1995. Sadovskii,V. N. “Philosophy in Moscow in the Fifties and Sixties,” Soviet Studies in Philosophy 33, no. 2 (fall 1994): 46-72 Scanlan, James P. “Interpretations and Uses of Slavophilism in Recent Russian Thought” and “Overview” (pp. 31-61, 3-10). In James P. Scanlan, ed., Russian Thought after Communism. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1994. Simon, Linda. Genuine Reality: A Life of William James. New York Harcourt Brace, 1998.
.“Spor o pragmatizme” (A Debate about Pragmatism). Russkaia Mysl’ 5 (1910):
12 1-156.
1 William James: The European Connection Linda Simon
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5, 1880, William James boarded the Britannic, bound for Liverpool, where he embarked upon a stay of nearly three months in Europe. At the age of thirty-eight, James was a veteran of European sojourns, but this trip was different: his purpose was not, as it usually was, to restore his physical and mental health, but to find intellectual affirmation and camaraderie. An assistant professor of philosophy at Harvard, where he had taught since 1872, James had just begun to publish professional articles and therefore to come to the attention of European philosophers. He wanted to meet some of these men, to widen his professional circle beyond Cambridge, Massachusetts, and, most important, to position himself intellectually among them. The trip in 1880 was the first of many: he traveled in Europe again in 1882-1883, attended an important conference on psychology in 1889, spent a sabbatical year abroad in 1892-1893, delivered the Gifford lectures in Edinburgh in 1901 (this trip, from 1899 to 1901, was prolonged because of his ill health), completed the Gifford lectures in 1902,vacationed in Europe in 1905, delivered the Hibbert lectures at Oxford University in 1908, and made his last trip in 1910. During each of these trips, James established new relationships, solidified some friendships, discussed his work with colleagues and discovered their responses to his ideas more directly than he could through publications or correspondence. By focusing.on a few of James’s more significant trips, we can map the trajectory of his reputation among European philosophers and consider their interest in and responses to his psychological and philosophical assertions. N JUNE
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First Principles: 1880 By 1880, James had made considerable progress in shaping his identity as a philosopher. Without the European training shared by many of his colleagues, James had created for himself a personal curriculum in philosophy that can be seen as a reaction, in part, to the philosophical context in which he was raised: that is, to the teachings of his father, Henry James Sr., and the questions of authority and free will inherent in those teachings. Henry himself was self-taught, undergoing brief training at the Princeton Theological Seminary, and then, rejecting the intellectual narrowness that he found there, setting out on his own to find thinkers who could help liberate him from the Calvinism of his upbringing and from a deep conviction of his own worthlessness. For a while, he was infatuated with the Scottish theologian Robert Sandeman, a fierce protester against clerical authority; then, with the French social reformer Charles Fourier, who envisioned communities where an individual’s work, rather than merely serving the marketplace, would reflect his or her true nature. Yet these thinkers failed to provide Henry with the intellectual sustenance that he needed to affirm his own sense of authority and identity. After suffering a nervous breakdown in 1844, he finally found that thinker, Emanuel Swedenborg, who offered what he so fervently desired-an image of a personal and approving God, validation of his authority to understand and interpret biblical texts, and proof of his essential goodness. All men were good, Swedenborg asserted, because a divine spirit permeated them and shone through them. In a monistic universe, guided by a benign Creator, it became one’s duty and obligation to give oneself up to that divine spirit, to refuse to celebrate one’s individuality and assert one’s own identity. Extinction of egotism became Henry’s vocational goal, and he recommended it to, in fact demanded it from, his children as well. Selfextinction, though, was no easy task for his eldest son, William, who by nature was competitive, very bright, and, even as a child, eager for public acclaim. Yet Henry tried to convince William that the very qualities that society would applaud in him were qualities to be despised. Personal achievements did not impress Henry. Instead, he believed that each individual must find an outlet for the divine goodness within; this outlet-for him, was writing philosophical tracts and occasionally lecturing-would result in the individual’s living with moral integrity, in fulfilling what he called the “moral business.” In Jamesian terms, this “moral business” only partly referred to behaving ethically; more significantly, it meant behaving consistently with one’s true, divine nature. While his father demanded that his children simply “be,” William saw around him other young men who were busily engaged in becoming: physi-
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cians, lawyers, scientists. He was, predictably, uneasy, and, after a protracted vocational crisis during which William toyed with the idea of becoming a civil engineer, like one of his boyhood friends, he lit upon art as a career, largely because Henry, in his writings, had so exalted the idea of the artist-an ideal, non-practicing, theoretical artist, to be sure. But Henry protested violently: if William became a practicing artist, he would have to pander to popular taste; so William turned to science, which his father also championed, as long as a scientist did not do anything practical and so run the risk of becoming merely a technician. What was William to do? According to Henry, William could do no better than to emulate his own life’s work, writing abstract, theoretical, quasi-theological philosophy. In the 1860s, as he struggled to understand his identity, to make sense of his father’s demands, and to envision his future, James was drawn to thinkers who could help him to rebel against his father’s philosophy: Goethe and Carlyle, for example (and Wordsworth and Browning) who exalted the capabilities of the individual and the potential of genius. He read Alexander Bain and John Stuart Mill, who taught him that empiricism was a credible counter to his father’s monism. None of these thinkers, however, sustained him sufficiently against his father’s vigorous demand that he engage in the “moral business.” In 1870, James’s struggle over this moral business led to what he called “a great dorsal collapse”: “Today I about touched bottom,” he wrote in his diary, “and perceive plainly that I must face the choice with open eyes: shall I frankly throw the moral business overboard, as one unsuited to my innate aptitudes, or shall I follow it, and it alone, making everything else merely stuff for it?” He decided to follow it, hoping that the “moral interest” that he had never yet felt might become developed. “Hitherto,” he wrote, I have tried to fire myself with the moral interest, as an aid in the accomplishing of certain utilitarian ends of attaining certain difficult but salutary habits. I tried to associate the feeling of moral degradation with failure, and add it to that of the loss of the wished for sensible good end-and the reverse of success. But in all this I was cultivating the moral interest only as a means & more or less humbugging my self. Now I must regard these useful ends only as occasions for my moral life to become active.’
Then, on April 30, 1870, he entered in his diary a statement that appeared to signal an enormous change: I think that yesterday was a crisis in my life. I finished the first part of Renouvier’s 2nd Essay, and saw no reason why his definition of free will-sustaining of a thought because I choose to when I might have other thoughts-need be the definition of an illusion. At any rate I will assume for the present-until next
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year-that
it is no illusion. My first act of free will shall be to believe in free will.
(Houghton)
Inspired by Charles Renouvier, James vowed to cultivate a new habit: a sense of moral freedom, an abdication of the watchfulness and self-criticism in which he formerly engaged. He would will himself to refrain from brooding upon the defects of his personality and make sure that he read nothing that would compromise his new direction. Renouvier offered James something more than the British positivists: “The knowable universe is for him, as for the school of Mill and Bain,” James wrote, “a system of phenomena, and metaphysic is an analysis or inventory of the elements. But among these elements he finds the possibility, which British empiricism denies, of absolute beginnings, or, in other words, of free-will’’(ECR, p. 266). Absolute beginnings, for James, meant that he was not bound to a self inherited from his parents, determined by his physiology, or prescribed by society; he could create and define a new and potentially liberating self. Renouvier, as important as he was in James’s life, did not end James’svocational crisis. In 1869, he had earned a medical degree at Harvard, but decided that he would not practice. Although he stumbled into a teaching position at Harvard (his friend Henry Bowditch suggested that he take over a class in anatomy), he did not see teaching as his future. Yet Harvard expanded his social circle: he began to meet men who shared his concerns and who helped him discover new philosophical directions. In the early 1870s, for example, James joined a small philosophical club whose members included mathematician Charles Peirce, and the lawyers Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., John Fiske, and Nicholas St. John Greene. These men, all in their late twenties or early thirties, shared the anxiety of many intellectuals about the possibility of religious faith in a scientific age. Faced with mounting evidence of the plurality, randomness, and spontaneity of the universe, they sought a philosophy that embraced science, preserved their desire to believe in God, and offered a system to guide their moral and ethical decisions. Scorning abstraction and idealism, they called their group, ironically, the Metaphysical Club. James participated enthusiastically in their vigorous debates about Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer. Teaching, moreover, proved more satisfying than he had anticipated; and because of his success, Harvard’s president Charles William Eliot offered James more challenging courses, including psychology, then taught in the philosophy department. By 1878, he had gained enough prestige in the Harvard community so that the publisher Henry Holt, wanting to add a psychology textbook to his list, asked James to write that text. James promised that it would be completed in a year or two; it took twelve, but during those twelve years James published much of
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The Principles of Psychology as articles, mainly in three journals: the American Journal of Speculative Philosophy, edited by the Hegelian William Torrey Harris; the French Critique Philosophique, edited by Charles Renouvier, whose works James championed in America; and the British journal Mind, established by Alexander Bain and edited by George Croom Robertson. Robertson, familiar with James’swork in Critique Philosophique and the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, looked to James both to explain Renouvier to British readers and to inform those readers about American philosophical interests. “From what you know of the state of things in America,” Robertson asked James, “do you think it possible for any one to give us in England, in one article, a fair notion of what is being done in the way of philosophical study & work among your people?” (Corr. V 7). James, at the time, was more intent on arguing against the Spencerians and Hegelians among his “people” and in conveying his own ideas: his early essays introduced material he would include, often with little revision, in The Principles of Psychology and also served as preface to his later works on belief, pragmatism, and pluralism. These intellectual threads converged in his first signed article, “Remarks on Spencer’s Definition of Mind as Correspondence,” which appeared in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy in January 1878. James’s initial enthusiasm for Spencer-he had assigned Spencer’s Principles of Psychology in his courses-had quickly waned. Spencer’s assertion that survival was the only motivation for an individual’s behavior seemed to him dangerously simplistic. He explained his position to his publisher Henry Holt: I think you have somewhat misapprehended the scope of my criticism of Spencer. . . . So far am I from leaving out the environment, that I shall call my text-book “Psychology, as a Natural Science,” and have already in the introduction explained that the constitution of our mind is incomprehensible without reference to the external circumstances in the midst of which it grew up. My quarrel with Spencer is not that he makes much of the environment, but that he makes nothing of the glaring and patent fact of subjective interests which cooperate with the environment in moulding intelligence. These interests form a true spontaneity and justify the refusal of a priori schools to admit that mind was pure, passive receptivity.” (C0rr.V: 24-25, November 22 [ 18781)
For James, survival was only one of many competing interests that influenced thought and behavior. Other interests included “social affections, all the various forms of play, the thrilling intimations of art, the delights of philosophic contemplation, the rest of religious emotion, the joy of moral self-approbation, the charm of fancy and of wit . . .” (Corr. V 12-13, to H.H.). These interests, for James, were “an all-essential factor which no writer pretending to give an account of mental evolution has a right to neglect” (Corr.V 1In, to H.H). Prior
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to his 1880 trip to Europe, James also published “Are We Automata?”in Mind, which expressed ideas similar to those in his piece on Spencer; “The Spatial Quale” in Journal of Speculative Philosophy, and “The Sentiment of Rationality” in Mind. In “The Sentiment of Rationality,” James asked philosophers to question their own motivation for and interest in constructing one philosophical system over another. In short, he asked philosophers to articulate what they saw as the consequences, for themselves as human beings, of their philosophical interests and affinities. Locating philosophy in individual interests and needs was, for James, a way to resolve what he saw as the current crisis in philosophy: Now our Science tells our Faith that she is shameful, and our Hopes that they are dupes; our Reverence for truth leads to conclusions that make all reverence a falsehood; our new Good, survival of our tribe, is the one thing certain to perish with our planet; our Freedom annuls our opportunities for lofty deeds; our Equality with our brethren quenches all tendency to be proud of their brotherhood; our Art, instead of intimating divine secrets, becomes an intellectual sensuality, revealing no secrets but those of our nervous systems; our craving for personal recognition at the heart of things is flatly contradicted by our persuasion that we none of us possess any independent personality at all. (ECR 357-358)
James expressed his concern about this crisis to his European colleagues and discovered that many-many more than he anticipated-shared his impatience with Spencer, his sense of the inadequacy of psychological research that began and ended in the laboratory, and his respect for Renouvier. The most fertile relationship that James established during this trip was with Shadworth Hodgson, with whom James had been corresponding. Like several other eminent thinkers whom James met (including Bain and Spencer), he had expected Hodgson to be both physically and intellectually intimidating. What he found was far different. Writing to his wife Alice, James described Hodgson as “that bashful & amiable philosopher charming in the extreme . . .[and] very modest about his opinions.” The two men discussed their current work, with James clarifying for Hodgson the ideas about effort and will that he expounded upon in “The Feeling of Effort.” James was delighted to learn that, even though Hodgson claimed to reject Renouvier’s tenets about the finiteness of the world and free will, still he believed Renouvier “the most important philosophical writer of our time-you can’t think how it pleaseth me,” James wrote to Alice, “to have this evidence that I have not been a fool in sticking so to R” (C0rr.V 108-109, June 27,1880). James returned home at the end of August 1880, energized and affirmed in his philosophical inclinations. Hardly a fool, as he apparently feared he would be considered, he was respected and applauded by his European colleagues.
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British Circles: 1882-1883
The trip that James began on September 1, 1882, had a single important purpose: to enable him to make significant progress on his Principles ofPsychology, then several years overdue. To prepare for what he saw as intense work, he spent the first part of his trip relaxing in Germany and Austria. In November, he arrived in Prague to confer with colleagues, among them Ewald Hering, who taught physiology in Leipzig, and the Austrian physicist Ernst Mach, with whom James spent four hours walking and dining. “I don’t think any one ever gave me so strong an impression of pure intellectual genius,” he wrote to his wife. “He apparently has read everything & thought about everything, and has an absolute simplicity of manner and winningness of smile when his face lights up that are charming” (Corr.V. 285-286, November 2,1882). Despite his warm feelings toward Mach, it was German psychologist Carl Stumpf with whom James spent most of his time, and with whom, he said, he was likely to keep up a correspondence. Despite James’s initial feeling of awe toward his European colleagues, he came away from long hours of conversations with them feeling self-affirmed: “I found that I had a more cosmopolitan knowledge of modern philosophic literature than any of them, and shall on the whole feel much less intimidated by the thought of their like than hitherto,” he wrote to Alice (Corr. V: 286). He immediately asked Alice to forward to him copies of “The Feeling of Effort”; “The Sentiment of Rationality”; “Great Men, Great Thoughts and the Environment,” which he had published in the Atlantic Monthly and “Reflex Action and Theism,” which had appeared in the Unitarian Review. “Swapping one’s articles is the great way to get things early & surely from other men,” he told Alice. It was also the great way to get one’s ideas disseminated. Of the articles he sent for, “The Feeling of Effort” was especially important to James and to his European readers; Renouvier, for one, called the article “un petit chef d’oeuvre” (Corr.V 315, to AHJ, December 3 [ 18821). In this essay, James asserted that the feeling of effort was not limited to muscular exertion but applied as well to attention and will. The effort felt by one making a decision, he said, was identical to the effort felt by one executing a motor task, such as lifting an object or walking across a room. The feeling of volition, according to James, need not have any resultant movement in order to be felt as effort. Here, he gave the example of an amputee who testified to the intense feeling of effort felt by trying to lift the lost limb, even though no result could possibly be effected by this effort. Besides serving as one of James’searliest expositions on the will, the essay helped James to position himself among psychologists who looked primarily to laboratory results to understand the workings of the mind. As he wrote later in “On Some Omissions of Introspective
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Psychology” ( 1884), there were, in his estimation, “immense tracts of our inner life . . . habitually overlooked and falsified by our most approved psychological authorities” (EPs, p. 248). In December 1882, James was invited to attend a meeting of the Scratch Eight, a monthly convocation of eight British intellectuals, including George Croom Robertson, Shadworth Hodgson, Edmund Gurney, and Leslie Stephen. While he found the circle stimulating, he also regretted the time he had to spend in reading the members’ works, the better to participate in their conversations. Moreover, he felt little affinity to some of the members, notably Leslie Stephen. Robertson and Hodgson continued to be his closest British colleagues, and he exulted, too, in Edmund Gurney, “one of the first rate minds of the time . . . with an extremely handsome face, voice, & general air of distinction about him, altogether the exact opposite of the classical idea of a philosopher” (Corr. V: 332, to AHJ, December 16, 1882). Gurney served as bridge to another important group of intellectuals who took James up in the 1880s: the London Society for Psychical Research, newly established, and boasting a roster of eminent members, including some prominent academics (Henry Sidgwick, professor of moral philosophy at Cambridge, and physicist William Barrett, for example) and political figures, including Arthur Balfour, whose administrative experience as vice president perhaps served him later as prime minister of Britain. The Society for Psychical Research sought to bring to experiments in psychical research the same rigorous control that others brought to experiments currently underway in psychology laboratories throughout Europe. James needed no persuasion to support their efforts. In fact, after William Barrett staged a successful tour of America in 1884, James became one of the founding members of the American Society for Psychical Research. “Anyone will renovate his science who will steadily look after the irregular phenomena,” he wrote in “The Hidden Self” (EP5,p. 248). Such irregular phenomena included mediums, especially one Leonora Piper, who came to his attention in 1885; cabinet skances; demonstrations by hypnotists, and his own experiments in hypnotism conducted on willing students and colleagues; experiments in automatic writing, some of which were conducted in his own laboratory; and examinations of patients exhibiting mental pathologies. James published the results of his investigations in several articles in the Proceedings of the American Society for Psychical Research: reports on hypnotism and mediumistic phenomena ( 1886);“Reaction-Time in Hypnotic Trace” (1887), “The Consciousness of Lost Limbs” (1887), “Notes on Automatic Writing” (l889),and “A Record of Observations of Certain Phenomena of Trance,” chronicling his sessions with Piper (1890) (all found in EPR). Although this interest in psychical research later became a source of
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contention for James in America, he found continued support among British, French, and Swiss colleagues. Doing Philosophy: 1889
By the spring of 1889, when James left home to attend the first International Congress of Physiological Psychology in Paris, he still had not completed his Principles, but he had published many of his most significant discussions from the manuscript. His readers, therefore, were familiar with his notion of the stream of thought, his consideration of instinct and habit, and even his odd theory of the emotions: “we are sorry because we cry, angry because we strike etc, instead of vice versa” (Corr. V: 475, to Thomas Davidson, December 20, 1883). Although in The Principles James gave due attention to the work of laboratory psychologists,by 1889 his readers also were aware of his doubts about scientific objectivity. In “On the Function of Cognition,”a talk James gave before the Aristotelian Society late in 1884 and published in Mind in 1885, James pointed to the limits of generalizing from laboratory data. For James, the complex emotional and intellectual context of each individual, including the scientist, was a crucial factor in shaping perception. An individual’s necessarily subjective perceptions served as the basis for inferences about the perceptions of others. “We see each other looking at the same objects, pointing to them and turning them over in various ways,” he explained, “and thereupon we hope and trust that all of our several feelings resemble the reality and each other. But,” he added, “this is a thing of which we are never theoretically sure” ( M T ,p. 24). Between external reality and one’s perception of that reality lies the interference of both subjective experiences and language. Yet communication about reality is possible, James argued, because “we believe our PERCEPTS are possessed by us in common. And we believe this because the percepts of each one of us seem to be changed in consequence of changes in the percepts of someone else” ( M T ,p. 30). In “What the Will Effects,” published in Scribner’s Magazine in 1888, translated for Renouvier’s Critique Philosophique the same year and incorporated into The Principles, James again underscored his dissatisfaction with the methodology and focus of “the new Psychology”: “To know how to handle a chronograph or a Bunsen cell, and to dissect out a frog’s sciatic nerve, even if not a dog’s, are beginning to be held as important requisites in a professor of mental science,”he noted (EP5, p. 216). They were not important requisites in his estimation. If in 1878 he enthusiastically had embraced the field of psychology, a decade later he confessed that he preferred a more philosophical context for asking psychological questions. The International Congress drew many philosophers who shared his predilection.
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Despite its proclaimed focus on physiological psychology, the meeting had a broader agenda. Psychical matters proved to be an important focus, as members of the congress considered hypnotic phenomena, telepathy, and hallucination. As in his earlier trip, James found the conference especially important because it enabled him to meet philosophers and psychologists with whom he felt a kindred intellectual bond; foremost among these men were Swiss psychologist Theodore Flournoy and the young German researcher Hugo Munsterberg. Flournoy, who taught psychology at the University of Geneva, shared James’s complaints about experimental psychology and also his interest in psychical research. He became a lifelong friend and correspondent of James’s, disseminating, defending, and publicizing his work. Unlike Flournoy, twenty-six-year-old Munsterberg was committed to experimental psychology. Although he had followed a career path similar to James’s-medical studies, physiological psychology, and philosophy-he was so enthusiastic about the potential for experimental psychology that, for want of university facilities, he set up a laboratory in his home. A few years after their meeting, James convinced Harvard’s president Eliot to recruit Miinsterberg to oversee the college’s psychology laboratory, a task that James found burdensome and irrelevant to his own interests. As Harvard’s first professor of psychology, James maintained that his goal was to “do philosophy all the same” (Corr.VI: 1283, to AHJ, November 3, 1889). Doing philosophy, for James, meant turning his attention to religious and moral questions-those questions that had so unwaveringly occupied his father. “It is a curious thing this matter of God!” James wrote to his friend Thomas Davidson. I can sympathize perfectly with the most rabid hater of him and the idea of him, when I think of the use that has been made of him in history and philosophy as a starting point, or premiss for grounding deductions. But as an Ideal to attain and make probable, I find myself less and less able to do without him.
For James, however, such an Ideal need not be the Creator of a monistic uni-
verse, such as his father had posited.
All I mean is that there must be some subjective unity in the Universe which has purposes commensurable with my own and which is at the same time large enough to be, among all the powers that may be there, the strongest. I simply refuse to accept the notion of there being no purpose in the objective world. . . . In saying “God exists” alI I imply is that my purposes are cared for by a mind so powerful as on the whole to control the drift of the Universe. This is as much polytheism as monotheism. (Corr. V 194-195, January 1,1882)
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This “matter of God” and its implications for knowledge, reality, and morality had for many years been subjects of intense discussions between James and his Harvard colleague Josiah Royce. Royce acknowledged these conversations in his introduction to The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, a book that James praised effusively in letters to friends and in an enthusiastic review in the Atlantic Monthly (1885). Royce’s questions, after all, were James’s as well: Does our thought of something represent the thing itself? Can two knowers know the same thing? Does reality exist apart from one’s thought of reality? And, most pressingly, does some transcendent Thought exist in the universe? In response to those questions, Royce posited the idea of one infinite, all-encompassing Thought that knows all truth. Although James easily rejected idealisms posited by other philosophers, Royce’s struck him as “suggestive of springtime” in its originality (ECR, p. 387). According to James, Royce offered a “new argument for monistic idealism, an argument based on the possibility of truth and error in knowledge.” An argument, James added, that was “one of the few big original suggestions of recent philosophical writing. I have vainly tried to escape from it. I still suspect it of inconclusiveness, but I frankly confess that I am unable to overthrow it” (Letters I: 265, to Carl Stumpf, February 6, 1887). James eventually would escape from Royce’s idealism, but his enthusiasm in 1885 points to his abiding concern over the threat of science to the faith that he deeply wanted to revive within himself. Religious Experiences: 1901 An invitation to deliver the prestigious Gifford Lectures at the University of Edinburgh in 1901 gave James the chance to expand upon the arguments he presented in his essay “The Will to Believe” and to reflect, once again, on the relationship between faith and pragmatism. His audiences grew from lecture to lecture, until he was speaking before some three hundred scholars and students, far more than he had expected. Although James felt that the audience brought considerable “Christian prejudices” to his talks, he found his listeners generally interested and appreciative (VRE, p. 544, quoting letter to Charles Eliot Norton, June 26, 1901). Those lectures, published in 1902 as The Varieties of Religious Experience, reflected James’s goal of providing a compendium of material to support his assertion that the expression of faith is widely diverse; that faith can be experienced idiosyncratically, outside of an institutional community of organized religion; that some individuals, because of a subliminal openness, were more receptive than others to mystical experiences; and that the defining criteria for
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whether or not an experience was religious was its effect on the psychological or emotional well-being of the individual. As in his other works, James mined his own life and experiences for anecdotes and conclusions; supplementing this material, he drew upon a huge cache of data amassed by one of his students, who, for a research project of his own, had circulated throughout the Harvard community a questionnaire about religious practices. The sheer weight of these sources gave the book an appearance of scientific objectivity. James’s goal, however, was not to defend religion by scientific proof but to argue against naturalists, on the one hand, and philosophers whom James called (‘refined supernaturalists:’ on the other. James created for himself a special position as a “piecemeal supernaturalist” who felt no intellectual contradiction in accepting the reality of mystical or supernatural occurrences (VRE, p. 410). For James, any path to the subconscious offered a possible opportunity for the generation of faith. Mind cure movements, for example, incorporated “traces of Christian mysticism, of transcendental idealism, of vedantism, and of the modern psychology of the subliminal self” to persuade adherents of their “inlet to the divine” (VRE, pp. 88,93). In both the (‘healthy-minded and in what James called the congenitally pessimistic “sick soul:’ mind cure practitioners drew upon religious rhetoric and practices to change their clients’ perception of self, world, and possibility. The first step in transcending fear, pessimism, and worry was self-surrender: Surrender, that is, to the idea that there existed a higher consciousness able to infiltrate and influence subliminal mental states, resulting in meliorism-the conviction that life would and must get better-and, consequently, in physical well-being. To some readers, it seemed that James was willing to call any intense personal revelation a religious experience and to embrace the abnormal or the paranormal within his definition of religion. Such readers were offended by the sheer exuberance of James’s stance; but for many others-the readers who bought ten thousand copies of the book in its first year of publication-James offered a liberating definition of religion and faith. Abroad, James received warm assessments of his book from many of his colleagues, including Carl Stumpf and, not surprisingly, from Flournoy, who arranged for its translation into French. L’Expkrience religieuse: Essai de psychologie descriptive, translated by Frank Abauzit, was published in Paris in 1906. A Danish translation followed later in 1906, a German translation in 1908, and a Russian one in 1910. The Problem of Pragmatism: 1908
Pragmatism, James said, was nothing more than a new name for old ways of thinking, ways of thinking that preceded the separation of science from its
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origins in philosophy. This attempt to ensure the status of philosophy by drawing it closer to its scientific origins was shared by other philosophers, notably Charles Peirce, who, according to James, coined the term pragmatism as early as the 1870s. Philosophy and science, these men saw, essentially rely on the same methods: observing, comparing, classifymg, and formulating hypotheses. But philosophy, for at least three hundred years, had been focused on developing systems of thought that increasingly divorced it from the exigencies of real life. This inapplicability of philosophy to the many social and political problems of late-nineteenth-century America seemed to James regrettable. Pragmatism holds that the truth of an idea is inextricably connected to the consequences of that idea; that the personality and context of a thinker is inextricably connected to what is thought; and that transcendent abstractions do not suffice in describing reality. For James, the consequences of an idea meant the practical effects of holding that idea, the consequences for the individual in terms of a feeling of well-being or satisfaction, or the consequences for community in terms of cohesiveness and stability. Pragmatism invested each individual with the authority to determine truths; privileged what James called percepts over abstract concepts; and linked philosophical decisions to moral actions. James first used the term pragmatism rather late in his career, in a talk he delivered at the Philosophical Union in Berkeley, California, in 1898. In “Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results,” James made two important points: first, that philosophical affinity was influenced by an individual’s temperament: a person’s needs and interests inspired attention to one philosophical question, or to one theory, rather than another. That personal impetus gave philosophy an immediate connection to an individual‘s everyday life. Second, one’s philosophy determined how one made ethical decisions and affirmed a sense of authority to take action, or not, in the face of moral dilemmas. Beliefs must make a difference and have perceptible consequences, or they are not worth arguing over. Although James called for “civic courage” in the face of concrete social problems, pragmatism, as he saw it, also could help one consider the most compelling unresolved philosophical problem: God’s existence first of all, and the question of whether God were One or Many. James suggested that individuals consider their personal stake in the answer to that question: what difference would it make if God were one Absolute? How would one’s daily life, behavior, and sense of well-being change? As he considered this issue in his works, notably Pragmatism and The Meaning of Truth,James proposed a distinction between tough-minded and tender-minded thinkers, the tough-minded being empiricist and pluralistic, but pessimistic and fatalistic; and the tender-minded being rationalistic
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and idealistic, yet optimistic and “free-willist.”James posited pragmatism as a method of justifying religious belief no matter which perspective one took. The ideas presented in “Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results” were elaborated upon and extended in 1906, when James delivered a series of Lowell lectures in Boston, talks that he repeated at Columbia University the following year. Even as he worked on his Lowell lectures, James knew that among his colleagues in America and abroad, considerable doubts had surfaced about pragmatism as a theory of truth and as a justification of religious belief. One cause of objection was the term pragmatism itself, too easily confused with practicality or mere expediency. But when his fellow pragmatist, Oxonian Ferdinand Canning Schiller, suggested the more widely accepted humanism, James balked. That term, he believed, was too historically embedded in theological discussions and did not imply, as much as James wanted to, a focus on concrete consequences. Still, as much as they debated about the impact of pragmatism versus humanism, James and Schiller believed themselves allies in a war against intellectualism. In the last decades of James’s life, Schiller served as his most reliable and zealous supporter. As James worked to clarify his own ideas on pragmatism, pluralism, and radical empiricism, Schiller served as sympathetic respondent, urging James to push forward, despite criticism from his colleagues. Schiller understood that critics were upset that their own authority as philosophers, the elite status that they conferred upon themselves, was threatened by James. By insisting that any individual, and every individual, had the authority to recognize reality and identify truth, James undermined the very profession of philosophy. Besides Schiller, James found few wholehearted supporters, and he became discouraged by what he considered a persistent misunderstanding of his work. He was tired, he once admitted to Schiller, “of being treated as 1/2 idiot, 1/2 scoundrel” by such critics as Arthur 0. Lovejoy, John McTaggart, and George Moore (Scott 465 [January 1, 19081).James received a welcome boost during a three-month‘s trip to Europe in the spring of 1905. At the end of April, in Rome for the Fifth International Congress of Psychology, he went to the conference hall to register, “and when I gave my name,” he told Alice, “the lady who was taking them almost fainted, saying that all Italy loved me, or words to that effect.” His effusive admirer called in one of the officers of the congress, who, just as impressed, implored James to give a talk at one of the general meetings (Houghton, April 25, 1905). For his talk, he condensed-and speedily translated into French-his recently published “Does ‘Consciousness’ Exist?”’ Responding to the prevalent
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notions of mind-body dualism that he had questioned in The Principles, James argued that consciousness “as it is commonly represented, either as an entity, or as pure activity, but in any case as being fluid, unextended, diaphanous, devoid of content of its own, but directly self-knowing-spiritual, in short” was nothing more than “pure fancy.” What did exist, according to James, were “pure experiences” of objects, events, or people, that “succeed one another; they enter into infinitely varied relations; and these relations are themselves essential parts of the web of experiences.” That consciousness of experience is shaped by each individual’s past experiences, interests, memories, needs. Distinguishing between “subject” and “object,” “thing” and “thought,” therefore, was not philosophically useful. The knower and the known were inseparable components of any e~perience.~ “In my view,” James said, “self-transcendency is everywhere denied. Instead of it, and performing the same function, we have the continuity of adjacents. It is clear that too much attention cannot be brought to bear upon this n ~ t i o n . ” ~ James found many of his European listeners as puzzled by such assertions as his American audience. But one small contingent seemed to understand him fully-and not only to understand, to hail and herald: a group of Italian philosophers, led by twenty-four-year-old Giovanni Papini, called James their mentor. The group published a monthly journal, Leonardo, with writing that James found so clear and accessible that he wished American philosophers could use it as a model. Papini’s literary skill, especially his talent with adjectives and metaphors, seemed to James just what was needed to communicate his own ideas. He thought especially fruitful Papini’s definition of pragmatism as “a collection of attitudes and methods” that took a position of “armed neutrality in the midst of doctrines. It is like a corridor in a hotel, from which a hundred doors open into a hundred chambers. In one you may see a man on his knees praying to regain his faith; in another a desk at which sits some one eager to destroy all metaphysics; in a third a laboratory with an investigator looking for new footholds by which to advance upon the future. But the corridor belongs to all, and all must pass there. Pragmatism, in short, is a great corridor-theory” (EPh, p.46). In Papini, James recognized an iconoclast who believed, as he did, that philosophy should liberate the imagination. Papini and his compatriots had succeeded in countering James’s despondency about his potential contribution to philosophy. James spent the rest of his European holiday in Greece, Switzerland, England, and France, where he met with other men who encouraged his ideas: Schiller, Flournoy, and Henri Bergson. Yet as much as he was energized by conversations with these philosophers, James believed that he could and must clarify his ideas for a larger audience. When he returned home, therefore, he set to work on explaining the
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principles of pragmatism, pluralism, and radical empiricism that so thwarted his readers’ understanding. Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking was published in 1907; A Pluralistic Universe (containing lectures that James delivered at Manchester College, Oxford in 1908-1909) was published in 1909; The Meaning of Truth reprinted articles from James’s career that helped to define and explain pragmatism and radical empiricism; and Some Problems of Philosophy, James’s last philosophical effort, was published posthumously in 1911. In 1882, James wrote to Renouvier, reflecting on the questions of free will, authority, and morality that occupied so much of their ongoing conversation. The excerpt seems an appropriate last word for this introduction to James’s thought: James’s poignant, somewhat wistful, statement of what he consistently willed to believe as his essential precepts: I believe more and more that free will, if accepted at all, must be accepted as a postulate in justification of our moral judgment that certain things already done might have been better done. This implies that something different was possible in their place. The determinist, who calls this judgment false, cannot consistently mean that so far as it actually was rendered, a truer judgment could have been in its place. Both falsity & evil are for him, in what concerns the past, entirely separated from that mental connexion with “what might have been” in which (to our ordinary consciousness,) lies the essence of their meaning. The only way in which he can save the rationality of the world to his own mind is by taking refuge in an absolute optimistic faith which says, the work as a whole is the richer and better for having had that error, that evil, in it at that particular place and time. Hence an absolute justification of all past fact, and consequently an absolute indifferentism to all future fact. For as long as languages contain a future-perfect tense, it will be possible for men in looking towards the future, to think of it as something that shall have been, and that consequently may be treated according to the law of the past. . . . It is in fact the religious view, and I feel strongly the attractiveness of it myself. Religion and morality, when radically treated, seem essentially opposed, in fact. But it seems to me that History decides sufficiently clearly between the two: Quietistic fatalistic optimism leads to antinomianism of one sort or an other and some sink of corruption always lies practically at the end. So, for entirely practical reasons, I hold that we are justified in believing that both falsehood and evil to some degree need not have been.-I wish you would examine more closely than you have done the relations of deterministic rationality with optimism, and the enervating practical fruits of every absolute, (as distinguished from limited or moral) optimism. (Corr.V 260, September 28,1882)
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Notes 1. William James, Diary, February 1, 1870, Houghton Library (MS Am 1092.9 [4550]), Harvard University. Hereafter designated in the text as “Houghton.” 2. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods (September 1, 1904):
477491. 3. “La Notion de Conscience.”:Translation; ERE, pp. 261-271. 4. Manuscript Lectures: p. 320.
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2 Adventures in Time and Space: Dostoevsky, William James, and the Perilous Journey to Conversion Robin Feuer Miller
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counter conversions, deconversions abound in Dostoevsky‘s fiction. Virtually all of them partake, in some way, of the motif of the journey. The road, the crossroads, the short cut, the bridge, the back alley, the detour, the threshold, the public square-these are the common locales of the Dostoevskian conversion. The road maps for these thoroughfares and byways have been charted by at least five generations of critics; Dostoevsky criticism now constitutes a combination atlas and guidebook, in which the travels and the stopping points of Dostoevsky‘s travelers have been logged, from Petersburg’s Izmaylovsky Bridge to the Siberian steppe, from the Crystal Palace to the damp, spider-ridden bathhouse. In “The Sick Soul,” the sixth and seventh of the Gifford lectures (1901-1902), James writes eloquently and at length of Tolstoy’s account in A Confession (1884) of the loss and recovery of personal faith that assailed the great Russian writer in the last decades of his life. He never mentions Dostoevsky, yet The Varieties of Religious Experience offers a means of understanding the Dostoevskian journey to conversion even more profoundly than it does the Tolstoyan one, for “Dostoevsky” (that self, semi-autobiographical, semi-fictional hero who appears in the story “Peasant Marei”) and his characters undergo experiences that resemble those of many of the mystics in James’s case studies. Some of Dostoevsky‘s characters (most notably Zosima and Alyosha) at their journey’s end eventually take on the qualities of saints, as described by James. Throughout Dostoevsky‘s fiction the experience of conversion is a frighteningly perilous one, for in it the movement toward God threatens, at virtually ONVERSIONS, PARTIAL CONVERSIONS,
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every moment, to change direction,to collapse into its opposite. Conversion hovers at the edge of perversion, while perversion may, by an infinitesimal shift of the kaleidoscope, by a minute rearrangement of identical elements, become conversion. For Dostoevsky the conversion experience includes another dimension as well. It is by now a commonplace to discern in Dostoevsky‘s work frequent moments of the fantastic-the fantastic as defined by Tzvetan Todorov-which the reader (and the character) experience temporally as a period of hesitation before exiting into an interpretation of the text as realistic or marvelous. Not surprisingly, then, the experience of conversion embodies a metaphysical apprehension of the fantastic, a fleeting but unforgettable sensation of “contact with other worlds.” By 1880, when he wrote The Brothers Kararnazov,this theme of “contact with other worlds” no longer resonated covertly, but instead was a full-bodied presence that announced itself repeatedly and with many variations. But reader and character alike can become fruitlessly enmeshed in the attempt to decide whether “what happened” was real or hallucinatory, and moreover, if they focus solely on trying to name, to classify, their experience, its essence, its authenticity, may begin to elude them. The brush with the essential, which occurs during a conversion, eludes classification. It is from this perspective that the ridiculous man speaks when he proclaims, “The consciousness of life is higher than life, the knowledge of happiness is higher than happiness-that is what we have to fight against” (“The Dream of a Ridiculous Man,” p. 738). In these pages I shall be examining Dostoevsky’s ongoing fascination with those inward conversion journeys in which the paradigmatic and necessary shift of the locus of being from the head to the heart is effected by a process of transformation which, in one form or another, partakes of an uncanny journey through time and space. This journey may be simultaneously a journey from the known to the unknown and from the unknown to the known. A character’s journey to conversion may result in a genuine spiritual awakening. I use here William James’s definition of conversion as “the process, gradual or sudden, by which a self hitherto divided, and consciously wrong, inferior and unhappy, becomes unified and consciously right, superior and happy, in consequence of its firmer hold upon religious realities” (VRE, p. 157). But the journey to conversion may result in a perversion of such experience. Rather than the polarity between conversion and perversion that one might expect to find, there exists a troubling mutuality or symbiosis between them-a homeopathic rather than an allopathic relationship, if you will-that is, a relationship of like to like rather than one based on difference. X can resemble nothing so much as XI,but XI,is toxic, while X is life-giving. (For example, Dostoevsky’s ongoing exploration of the dreadful tension between God-man and Man-god-the Shatov/Kirillov dichotomy-embodies a homeopathic rather than an allopathic relationship.)
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The four key journeys to conversion in Dostoevsky‘s work that I consider here are accounts ranging from autobiography transmitted through the lens of fiction to fiction passed on through the lens of autobiography. As early as 1868, in The Idiot, Dostoevsky had demonstrated a sustained interest in representing the experience of conversion as a fantastic journey, but such conversion journeys become particularly prevalent in his work from 1876 on. My texts are “Peasant Marei,” “The Dream of a Ridiculous Man,” Ivan Karamazov’s nightmare encounter with the devil, and Alyosha Karamazov’s vision of Cana of Galilee. “Peasant Marei” (TheDiary o f a Writer, February 1876) offers a paradigm for the experience of conversion in Dostoevsky.l Whether we follow Joseph Frank and see in this work a profound visionary expression of Dostoevsky‘s turning to the people, or whether we follow Robert Louis Jackson and see a three-tiered recollection of a recollection expressing a religious profession de foi, we encounter in this work a quintessential example of conversion literature. Frank explicates Dostoevsky’s conversion experience and finds present in it the three key ingredients of the archetypal conversion, as defined by William James in his “still unsurpassed” (according to Frank) The Varieties of Religious Experience: “The sense that all is well with one. . . even though the outer conditions should remain the same . . . ;the sense of perceiving truths not known before . . . [and] an appearance of newness [that] beautifies every object” (Frank, p. 116).*These conditions prevail just as neatly in “The Dream of a Ridiculous Man” and in Alyosha’s vision of Cana of Galilee, whereas their presence is, at best, experienced only fleetingly and partially by Ivan. In James’s first lecture in Varieties, “Religion and Neurology,” a title worthy of Rakitin or of Ivan Karamazov, he enumerates the qualities of a typical “religious leader” before he has undergone a conversion. James’s description reads like Dostoevsky’s notebook sketches for his heroes and anti-heroes alike: Even more perhaps than other kinds of geniuses, religious leaders have been subject to abnormal psychical visitations. Invariably they have been creatures of an exalted emotional sensibility. Often they have led a discordant inner life, and [have] had melancholy during a part of their career. They have known no measure, been liable to obsessions and fured ideas, and frequently they have fallen into trances, heard voices, seen visions, and presented all sorts of peculiarities which are ordinarily classed as pathological. ( VRE, p. 15)
Indeed, in James’s view the “two main phenomena of religion are melancholy and conversion,” and the successful conversion in Dostoevsky’s scheme also involves a journey from one state to the other. Subsequently, in discussing Tolstoy’s Confession, James breaks down the notion of melancholy into two key components that characterize the preconversion state. The attack of melancholy that can lead to religious
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conversion, states James, consists, first of all, of anhedoniaa passive loss of appetite for life’s values. Second, this melancholy casts the world in “an altered and estranged aspect” which eventually, in the desire for “philosophic relief,” stimulates a “gnawing, carking questioning” ( VRE, p. 126).3Interestingly enough, Dostoevsky‘s characters often exhibit a Jamesian anhedonia. The frequent tag phrase, that marker of existential despair, “nothing makes any difference,” uttered by Raskolnikov, Ippolit, Stavrogin, the ridiculous man, and Ivan, reflects nothing so much as an acute “loss of appetite for life’s values.” The sense of estrangement and the “gnawing questioning” of the Dostoevskian hero find expression (and relief) in the otherworldly journey to conversion, a journey brought about by melancholy and the desire to cast it off. This journey defamiliarizes the known. In all of Dostoevsky’s conversion scenes, memory-both that which is consciously remembered and that which is subliminal, literally beneath the threshold of memory-plays a key role. James observes that “the memory of an insult may make us angrier than the insult did when we received it”-that is, the power of ‘remoter’facts, often exerts greater force on our actions and beliefs than do actual, present material sensations (VRE, p. 51).4James points out that these subliminal memories are far closer to the conscious mind than the material present in the unconscious. Here, he seems to prefigure Bakhtinian ideas and even language when he observes, “Recent psychology has found great use for the word ‘threshold’ as a symbolic designation for the point at which one state of mind passes into another” (VRE, p. 115). That moment of crisis, in which the process of conversion may seem so rapid as to be instantaneous, is really the result, in James’s view, of lysis, an event composed of subliminal material. Writes James: “The older medicine used to speak of two ways, lysis and crisis, one gradual, the other abrupt, from which one might recover from a bodily disease. In the spiritual realm there are also two ways, one gradual, the other sudden, in which inner unification may occur” (VRE, pp. 152-153). He then classes Tolstoy and Bunyan as examples of “the gradual way.” Dostoevsky‘s characters, on the other hand, tend to experience conversion through crisis. Those memories, however, that reveal “whole systems of underground life . ..which lead a parasitic existence,” irrupt into consciousness with “hallucinations, pains, convulsions” (p. 191). Dostoevsky, to designate that threshold point of spiritual conversion where subliminal memory intersects with present despair, puts his characters into supernatural, fantastic, and mystical relations with time and space, that is, he uses the motif of the journey. The crucial element in James’s understanding of religious conversion is the fact that evil is not destroyed, undone, or rendered impotent, but it is incorporated, miraculously,into a sense of divine harmony. Indeed, at its very heart, the experience of conversion, in James’s view, exists as a paradoxical response
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to the problem of evil. “When disillusionment has gone as far as this, there is seldom a restitio ad integrum. One has tasted of the fruit of the tree, and the happiness of Eden never comes again. The happiness that comes, when any does come . . . is not the simple ignorance of ill, but something vastly more complex, including natural evil as one of its elements, but finding natural evil no such stumbling block and terror because it now sees it swallowed up in supernatural good. The process is one of redemption, not of mere reversion to natural health, and the sufferer, when saved, is saved by what seems to him a second birth, a deeper kind of conscious being than he could enjoy before” (VRE, p. 131). James carefully underscores the perilousness of this processthat “happiness” may not come; the sufferer is not always “saved.” In fact, the process can work the other way: “The normal process of life contains moments as bad as any of those which insane melancholy is filled with. The lunatic’s visions of horror are all drawn from the material of daily fact,” he writes. This mental state accords with an example of counter conversion or perversion that James claims to have translated from the French but which is, in fact, a moving account of a devastating experience that took him unawares in April 1870. One evening “without any warning” he experienced “a horrible fear of [his] own existence.” Suddenly, “simultaneously” he remembers (ital. mine) a terrifymg, motionless epileptic he had seen in an asylum. “This image and my fear entered into a species of combination with each other. That shape am I, I felt, potentially. . . .I became a mass of quivering fear. After this the universe was changed for me altogether. . . .It was like a revelation” (VRE, p. 134). James’s own work, given this veiled autobiographical account, itself expresses a profoundly moving longing for the kind of positive religious experience he describes in others. Like Ivan Karamazov, James experiences a demonic negative revelation, the minus instead of the plus.5 “Peasant Marei” With this Jamesian model for conversion in mind, let us return to “Peasant Marei.” In his compelling analysis of this work, Jackson makes three observations that can offer rich veins for the exploration of other moments of conversion in Dostoevsky‘s fiction. By finding in “Peasant Marei” a three-tiered structure of experience, vision, and recollection of a recollection, Jackson calls attention to three crucial matters: one about memory, one about conversion itself, one about the stunning economy of the power of dream language. Dostoevsky‘s visionary work is chiseled out of memory in all its formsconscious, liminal, subliminal, and above all, artistically transformed. Dostoevsky describes how, as a convict “[he] used to analyze these impressions,
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adding new touches to things long ago outlived, and-what is more important-[he] used to correct, continually correct them” (Diary of a Writer, p. 207). As he recalls, the “convict Dostoevsky” enters a trance-like state (like that described by James) where present misery is unexpectedly overtaken by memory. He journeys to a newly remembered, long-forgotten past. The “child Dostoevsky”journeys out of the ravine and into the bushes and hears a cry of “wolf!” The “convict Dostoevsky” is in the midst of his painful Siberian sojourn. The “great writer Dostoevsky” (the voice narrating the 1876 account) mentally journeys back to both times at once. Time becomes double time: a bright day at the end of August 1830 coalesces with the second day of Easter week in 1850. The glaring concrete present time of 1850 imperceptibly assumes the shimmer of the fantastic by containing within it a day from childhood in 1830: “This intoxicated, shaven and branded peasant.. . why, he may be the very same Marei” (p. 210). Jackson goes on to ask a crucial question, “When did the miracle take place?” In the summer of 1830, at the time of the childhood hallucination; in Easter week of 1850, when “without any effort of my will . . . [the memory of the wolf and the peasant Marei] came to my mind at the needed time” or in 1876,when Dostoevsky “recollected the recollection” (Jackson, p. 25). Indeed, this question of “precisely when” becomes a central one for the ridiculous man, for Ivan, and for Alyosha as well. It is a question which touches upon a constant paradox of conversion, one which James illustrates through a quotation of the words of the American philosopher Xenos Clark, who observed, “The truth is that we travel on a journey that was accomplished before we set out” (VRE, p. 30911). Although a conversion experience tends to be regarded as a discrete event after which one’s life is changed, the closer one tries to look at it, the hazier the borders of this event become. We cannot locate with certainty the actual moment of conversion for Dostoevsky, for the ridiculous man, for Ivan, or for Alyosha; we can only witness their journeys and watch their subsequent efforts to transmit their experience to others. The convict Dostoevsky‘s memory welled up in response to his horror of his fellow convicts. The child Dostoevsky ran in terror from the imaginary wolf to the motherly arms of the peasant Marei. Jackson discovers a compelling link between the two, one that is fully consonant with Freudian dream interpretation, in the fact that the Russian word for wolf, volk, is the German word, Volk,for “the people” (Jackson, p. 28). Dostoevsky‘s profession of faith, his intimate account of his turning to the people, thus hinges upon a radical semantic conversion: the terrifying “volk” somehow is reincarnated into the redeemed “ Volk.” Nothing in everyday reality changes, but Dostoevsky felt that “by some miracle, all the hatred and anger completely vanished from my heart” (p. 210). Curiously, as early as 1918, the Freudian psychoanalyst Alfred
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Adler had stumbled upon the psychological importance of this elusive wolf and had lectured on his findings. “This reminiscence is generally interpreted as if it characterized Dostoevsky’s bond with the peasantry. However, the important thing here is the wolf, the wolf that drives the writer back to man” (Adler, p. 287).6 But that wolf that drives Dostoevsky back to man exists within all men, even within Marei himself, the figure of safety toward whom the terrified child runs. This is the typical terror of the nightmare into which any ecstatic dream can instantaneously collapse. James Rice, following the lead of the Soviet scholar L. M. Rozenblium, discovers that immediately below the surface of the tender, motherly Marei himself lurks “peasant brutality and the potential for abrupt violence.” Rozenblium cites a manuscript passage for “Peasant Marei” that clearly derives from Raskolnikov’s dream of the horse in Crime and Punishment. “He has moments of inward impatience, and the Tatar within him bursts forth, and he starts beating his little mare, his ‘nurse and provider,’ across her eyes with his knout when she is stuck in the mud with the cart” (Zilbershtein and Rozenblium, p. 416; Rice, p. 258). In these manuscript pages, that terrifying yolk lurks within the iconic one-within Marei himself. The child Dostoevsky does not rush from the imaginary wolf to the welcoming embrace of the peasant. He rushes instead into the arms of a figure who himself embodies both polarities. Marei himself becomes a disturbingly liminal figure. The proximity, the mutuality, of good and evil is endlessly problematic. Did Dostoevsky remove this passage because he believed his readers would reject his profession de foi if it were included? Or does this excerpt offer us the very crux of the matter? Before leaving “Peasant Marei,” I would like to suggest certain nodules in the text which seem to possess a tangle of meaning that Dostoevsky would continue to rework, transpose, and p ~ n d e r First, . ~ in Dostoevsky‘s presentation of it, the journey to conversion, at whatever locale in time or space one decides to say it occurred, is located within a frame, a rhyme of sorts. The despairing convict Dostoevsky rushes out of his cell, his heart filled with anger and loathing of the peasant brutality around him. He then hears the words of the Polish convict, “Je hays ces brigands.” The story ends with Dostoevsky’s second encounter with the Pole and a repetition of the French phrase, but now, of course, all is changed. This framing recurs, with variations, for the ridiculous man, Ivan, and Alyosha at their critical moments as well. Second, at the core of “Peasant Marei” one finds a frightened child, the nine-year-old Dostoevsky. The suffering of a child also poses fundamental questions for the ridiculous man, Ivan, and Alyosha. Third, the convict Dostoevsky’s visions “used to begin with some speck.” We have here a suggestion of the trance-like state, most prominent in Stavrogin, of course, but evident too in the ridiculous
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man, Ivan, and even Alyosha. Fourth, Dostoevsky carefully gives the precise time of year when these important events occurred: the time of the auditory childhood hallucination is August, the end of summer, “a dry and clear day, though somewhat chilly and windy” (p. 207). Marei for an instant almost believes the frightened child; then he comforts him with assurances that it has been a dream, then gently reenters the world of delusion and assures him that “I shall not surrender thee to the wolf?” (p. 209). The memory remains hidden in Dostoevsky‘s soul, and then, without any intellectual effort, comes to the fore “at the needed time” during Easter week. The frame, the needy child, the trance, the precise description of the day on which the conversion occurs, the subliminal memories which re-surface “at the needed time”-all these elements function as mysterious talismans that, in one form or another, resurface in subsequent conversion scenes, almost as if Dostoevsky‘s individual stories and novels were themselves separate worlds, making mysterious contact with one another. The Ridiculous Man and DeQuincey’s Opium-Eater “The Dream of a Ridiculous Man,” a short story that impressed Mikhail Bakhtin by virtue of its “maximal universality,” “maximal terseness,” and its remarkable “artistic and philosophical laconism,” is a stunning and vexing tale-stunning, in that despite its laconism, it teems with sources, yet hauntingly original and vexing, in that it provokes strong disagreement among its readers over the question of whether the ridiculous man’s experience was one of conversion or of perversion. Bakhtin links this story to “the dream satire” and to “fantastic journeys” containing a utopian element (Bakhtin, p. 147): In the eighteenth-century French tradition, utopian works were most frequently called rtves (dreams), codes, robinsonades (Crusoe stories), or voyages imaginaires. In fact, one nineteenth-century French dictionary actually defined utopie as chimtre (Manuel, p. 6 ) .Thus, Dostoevsky knew full well that the title would immediately carry these utopian associations to any of his educated contemporary readers. Yet Dostoevsky‘s title and its utopian or dystopian connotations can easily deflect the reader from the story’s most authentic genealogical tie, for “The Dream’s’’ most intimate kinship lies with the conversion tale or the tale of visionary experience. Its structure and thematics particularly duplicate A Christmas Carol by Charles Dickens, although we can find echoes of some of Poe’s stories in “The Dream” as well. In “Peasant Marei” the words of the Polish convict, “Je hays ces brigands:’ framed the tale, and, by the different meaning they took on at the end, high-
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lighted the Jamesian concept that after a conversion, although outward circumstances may remain the same, such features are invested with new and radiant meaning. In “The Dream” the narrator’s knowledge of his own ridiculousness functions as a partial frame to the story. He knows that others find him ridiculous both before and after his conversion journey. Before his dream journey, the realization that he has “always cut a ridiculous figure,” along with his solipsistic belief that nothing makes any difference,brings him to the brink of suicide. His anhedonia (to use James’s term for “the sick soul”) is acute. After his conversion journey, however, this ridiculousness has become precious to him: “They still regard me as being as ridiculous as ever. But that does not make me angry any more. They are all dear to me now” (p. 717). Central to Dostoevsky‘s conversion accounts is the fear, suffering, death, or violation of a child. If in “Peasant Marei” Dostoevsky, through the agency of memory, journeyed back and forth through space and time so that he could exist in the story simultaneously as the child, vulnerable to injury, and the adult, capable of reconciliation, in “The Dream,” the child acts as the second key part of the frame for the ridiculous man’s journey through space and time. The ridiculous man rejects her plea for help at the beginning; he assures us that he has found her at the end. At the beginning, his unwilled pity for her-his discovery that he still, despite his melancholy and solipsism, has the capacity to feel-inspires his dream journey. His encounter with the little girl and his subsequent musings before falling asleep also underscore the difficulty of determining the precise moment when his conversion occurs. But the little girl, as the ridiculous man himself knows well, figures at the heart of the matter and at the center of his subsequent j ~ u r n e y . ~ This frame of the little girl, lost and then found, which punctuates the ridiculous man’s journey through time and space, calls to mind another visionary work that Dostoevsky knew well, De Quincey’s Confessions of an English Opium Eater. At the outset of his account, the ridiculous man tells how he did not help the child, but “the little girl, in fact had saved me” (p. 723). De Quincey’s experience with the child prostitute, Ann, is not dissimilar. “Then it was, at this crisis of my fate, that my poor orphan companion . . .stretched out a saving hand to me” (p. 51). He then loses her in the dreary expanse of London, and during the succeeding years searches repeatedly for her, wishing desperately to send her “an authentic message of peace and forgiveness. . . .Often, when I walk at this time in Oxford Street by dreamy lamp-light ...I shed tears. . . .But to this hour, I have never heard a syllable about her. This, amongst such troubles as most men meet in this life, has been my heaviest affliction” (pp. 52-53,64). Likewise, the gaslight afflicts the heart of the ridiculous man, but he finds the child (“And I did find that little girl,” [p. 7231) who has, for De Quincey, disappeared forever.
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In between these encounters with a child, each man’s flight through time and space occurs. For both men this passage of time, this journey is impossible to describe clearly. Expanse exists, but time cannot be the indicator of its measure. De Quincey describes the effects of opium: “I sometimes seemed to have lived for seventy or one hundred years in one night; nay, sometimes had feelings representative of a millennium passed in that time” (p. 103). His experiences are “wholly incommunicable by words. . . . The sense of space, and in the end, the sense of time, were both powerfully affected” (p. 103). The ridiculous man describes how certain details in dreams appear with “uncanny vividness . . . while others you leap across as though entirely unaware of, for instance, space and time. Dreams seem to be induced not by reason but by desire, not by the head but by the heart” (p. 724). The ridiculous man dreams that he dies and is buried. He then flies with an unknown being on a flight whose stopping points are charted by desire. “I cannot remember how long we were flying, nor can I give you reason of the time; it all happened as it always does in dreams, when you leap over space and time and the laws of nature and reason and only pause at the points which are especially dear to your heart” (p. 726). He travels to that other earth, that prelapsarian repetition of our own, where he admires, loves, and eventually corrupts the innocent inhabitants of that other Greek archipelago. He longs for martyrdom and is expelled. They plant in him the seed of love and redemption, even as he is the cause of their Fall. “Like a horrible trichina, like the germ of the plague infecting whole kingdoms, so did I infect with myself all that happy earth” (p. 733). De Quincey’s Confessions ofan Opium Eater prefigure this burial, this journey through space and time, and, most important, De Quincey, too, becomes both the would-be deity and the victim on his visionary travels. “I was the idol; I was the priest; I was worshipped; I was sacrificed. I fled from the wrath of Brama through all the forests of Asia. . . . I came suddenly upon Isis and Osiris: I had done a deed, they said, which the ibis and the crocodile trembled at. I was kissed with cancerous kisses, by crocodiles. . . . Over every form. . . brooded a sense of eternity and infinity that drove me into an oppression of madness” (p. 109). He then dreams of the lost Ann; her lost image-for a moment recovered in the dream-hovers at the end of his confession. Like the little girl whom the ridiculous man meets, Ann becomes an icon of redemption illuminated, not by a religious candle, but by a dreary urban lamplight: He remembers a time “seventeen years ago, when the lamplight fell upon her face,” and in his dream he is once more “by lamp-light in Oxford Street, walking again with Ann” (p. 112). In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the mystical experiences produced by opium and anesthetics seemed to some to offer a legitimate and
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productive avenue for investigation of transrational experience. In his chapter on “Mysticism”in Varieties James cites numerous reports that reached him of such experiences. One of these bears a particularly striking resemblance to the ridiculous man’s dream: A great Being or Power was traveling through the sky, his foot was on a kind of lightning, as a wheel is on a rail, it was his pathway. The lightning was made entirely of the spirits of innumerable people . . . and I was one of them. He moved in a straight line. . . . Then I saw that what he had been trying to do with all his might was to change his course, to bend the line of lightning. . . . He bended me, hurting me more than I had ever been hurt . . . and at the acutest point of this . . . I saw. I understood for a moment things I have now forgotten. . . . The angle was an obtuse angle. . . . In that moment the whole of my life passed before me, including each little meaningless piece of distress, and I understood them . . . on waking, my first feeling was, and it came with tears, ‘‘Domine non sum digna.” (p. 31In)
The ridiculous man’s journey through time and space is drug free, yet its closest analogues lie in the visionary experiences of those, like De Quincey, who have made their spatial and temporal boundary crossings with the help of opium and ether. In fact, the preoccupation with the angles and pathways in space in James’s source also resembles Ivan’s interest in such details. Even as the ridiculous man conveys to us the miraculous leaping through time and space that is his dream, he is, at the same time, extremely careful, as is Dostoevsky in “Peasant Marei,” to locate his dream at a particular point in time: “I learnt the truth last November, on the third of November, to be precise” (“The Dream of a Ridiculous Man,” p. 718).1° Indeed, Dostoevsky, throughout the entire span of his literary career, was always careful to locate that experience of a journey that occurs outside of everyday time and beyond the boundaries of known space within precise temporal and spatial markers. The result-an uncanny intersection between time and timelessness,between a specific place and a known but unreachable place-generates Dostoevsky‘s idiosyncratic mode of the fantastic, and is present in as early a work as The Double. Golyadkin, like the ridiculous man, wanders in Petersburg near the Fontanka on another November night. Both nights are wet, dismal, and cold; the ridiculous man remembers “a rain with a distinct animosity towards people” (p. 719); Golyadkin likewise is abroad on “a dreadful night, a real November night, dank, misty, rainy, and snowy. . . . It was raining and snowing all in one.” The dreadful weather “[cuts] into him from all sides . . . and [draws] him off his path and out of his mind” ( pp. 38-39). He enters a trancelike state and begins to stare fixedly into the canal’s black waters. It is in this atmosphere that he encounters his double. l 1
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The Brothers Karamazov and the Journey to Conversion The intersection of time with timelessness fittingly envelopes the uncanny aspects of the journey to conversion for Dostoevsky in “Peasant Marei“ and for the ridiculous man on his excursion. In The Brothers Karamazov, it figures importantly for Ivan in his encounter with the devil, and for Alyosha in his vision. Each man encounters something that is simultaneously familiar and unknown. Dostoevsky “remembers” a long-forgotten occurrence at the “needed time.” The ridiculous man visits a replica of our unfallen earth. Ivan encounters long-forgotten fragments of his own past thoughts; the gloomy night dredges up a doubling of his own ideas in a physical form that is alien and other: a devil. Alyosha’s vision combines recent events and memories with a personal experience of the biblical past. Ivan’s uncompleted journey to conversion-the night on which he makes his third and final visit to Smerdyakov and on which we witness his encounter with the devil-occurs, the narrator chronicler tells us precisely, at “the beginning of November. There had been a hard frost,” and “a dry and sharp wind was lifting and blowing the bits of snow about” (p. 486).’* This day has extended through books X and XI, and in chapter VIII, as Ivan approaches Smerdyakov’s house, the narrator refers to the morning weather which he had described a hundred pages previously, “the keen dry wind that had been blowing early that morning rose again, and a fine, thick dry snow began falling heavily. It did not lie on the ground, but was whirled about by the wind” (p. 486). The date and the weather thus strongly recall the night on which the ridiculous man had had his dream. In “The Dream” it is impossible to say whether or not the ridiculous man’s actual conversion occurred after his journey through space and time, during it, or before it, when he felt the first stab of pity for the little girl. In Ivan’s case, we cannot speak of a full-blown conversion or of a sharply defined journey, but he does, like the ridiculous man, sometime in the course of that windy, wet night at the beginning of November, undergo a profound, irrevocable change. He, too, has an encounter with a being outside of everyday space and time. Moreover, Dostoevsky once again demarcates a character’s spiritual change through the use of a frame, as he had done earlier in “Peasant Marei” and in “The Dream of a Ridiculous Man.” But now this frame is more curiously displaced, although it bears a strong resemblance both to the Polish convict who utters “Je hays ces brigands” and to the little girl, who each appear twice in their respective stories. Ivan had earlier told Alyosha that he wished to send back his “entrance ticket” because he had rejected any universal system founded upon the unjustified tears of a child. Like the ridiculous man, he possesses a theory that al-
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lows him to reject God. But to underscore the change that is about to occurhis partial new acceptance of his membership in precisely such a universe where good and evil are mysteriously entwined-Dostoevsky does not have him meet a child on that cold November night. Instead, Dostoevsky offers up a kind of worst case scenario: Ivan encounters a disgusting, drunken little peasant, a figure much closer to Dostoevsky‘s fellow convicts in his repulsiveness. Like the Dostoevsky of “Peasant Marei,” Ivan feels a dreadful loathing and hatred for the peasant whom he meets on the way to his third and final interview with Smerdyakov. When the peasant lurches against Ivan, after having just sung his uncanny ditty, Ivan pushes him down on the frozen ground and thinks to himself, “He will freeze” (p. 588). When he leaves Smerdyakov, after the latter’s confession of murder, a spiritual regeneration has, at some indefinable point, already occurred for Ivan. “Something like joy was springing up in his heart” (p. 600). He then stumbles again against the freezing peasant. Although exterior circumstances remain the same, in a pattern typical of the conversion experience, their essence has changed for Ivan. He saves the peasant. The frame is familiar-a repeated meeting, whether with a Pole, a child, or a drunken peasant, encapsulates a religious transformation-but the use to which Dostoevsky will put it is vastly different. Ivan himself thinks he recognizes in his altruistic “frame” act a symbol of his regeneration, yet he simultaneously puts off going to the prosecutor to give him the money and to confess his role and Smerdyakov’s. He goes home instead, and “strange to say, almost all his gladness and self-satisfaction passed in one instant” (p. 601). Thus, instead of demarcating the boundaries in which, somewhere, sometime, a full conversion has occurred, this little frame tale of the drunken peasant underscores a failed conversion, a counter conversion, a perversion of sorts. He returns home; his eyes fasten “on one point,” and the devil appears (p. 601). In his interview with the devil, Ivan’s mysterious relations with time and space manifest themselves most strikingly. Liza Knapp, who has explored the scientific aspects of this relationship, hypothesizes that “Ivan was unable to accept the harmony of God’s universe because he understands the mystery of time-time being the ‘fourth dimension’ from which his three-dimension Euclidean mind barred him” (Knapp, p. 108).13Knapp shows convincingly that we may “crack the riddle” of Ivan through taking into account Dostoevsky’s excellent knowledge of mathematics and physics and his understanding of current theories about the potential relativity of time. My interest in Ivan’s relation to time and space is less scientific and more linked to the many possible “varieties of religious experience” as explored by William James. Certainly, Dostoevsky‘s use of time through his literary career has been consistently problematic. Dostoevsky, even as he has almost obsessively portrayed
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particular moments in time, has, as Jacques Catteau aptly observed, evinced an “allergy toward epic time.” Instead, he “sees and thinks about the world primarily in space rather than in time” (Catteau, p. 52; Knapp, p. 100). Nevertheless, his characters tend to experience their key moments of spiritual epiphany in terms of journeys-journeys to Siberia, to Europe and back, and, most markedly in the later stages of Dostoevsky‘sliterary career, in journeys through space and time, especially to the past. And these journeys do come to possess a kind of epic quality, for upon their completion, the traveler becomes an epic hero of sorts, ready to transmit an emblematic message to his people. Bakhtin has remarked upon Dostoevsky‘s avoidance of the more usual forms of chronotope. “In his works Dostoevsky makes almost no use of relatively uninterrupted historical or biographical time, that is, of strictly epic time [. . .but] concentrates action on points of crisis . ..when the inner significance of a moment is equal to a ‘billion years,’ that is, when the moment loses its temporal restrictiveness. In essence he leaps over space as well” (p. 149). Yet, as we have seen, Dostoevsky tends to demarcate these spatial and temporal leaps into the beyond by the use of frames that are strictly, rigidly rooted in the very time and space that are then briefly transcended. The point of departure and point of return to more limited apprehensions of time and space are as crucial to Dostoevsky‘s overall vision as are the uncanny journeys away. The devil’s appearance before Ivan necessarily forces the reader, along with Ivan, to try to classify the nature of this experience. The devil may simply be a hallucination, the product of Ivan’s deepening symptoms of brain fever.I4 If so, he reiterates an old concern of Dostoevsky‘s. In The Idiot, Myshkin wondered whether visionary experience that was the result of illness could still “count,”whether its lessons, its momentary glimpses of some higher harmony could be accepted, if they were merely the results of illness. Even earlier, in Crime and Punishment, Svidrigaylov similarly had mused about ghosts. James also had considered this question, but he dismissed it with the conclusion that all that matters is the unshakeable sense one has of having undergone an authentic experience. James, in fact, is close to Svidrigaylov in suggesting that perhaps illness brings with it a broader awareness of other realms.I5 Ivan himself makes no journey through space and time, but his devil does; he even catches cold along the way. Most important, the devil tells to Ivan Ivan’s own “legend about Paradise,” the story of the philosopher, who having rejected everything, after his death was sentenced to walk a quadrillion kilometers “in the dark.” Once this trek was completed, so the story goes, the Gates of Heaven were to open to him. This journey fable offers a prophetic key to the fact and the ultimate results of Ivan’s own visionary experience. The devil’s telling of Ivan’s own story also brings Ivan into intimate contact with the nu-
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minous.16 The numinous is most readily expressed in literature by images of darkness, silence, and empty distance. The philosopher’s quadrillion-kilometer walk in the dark thus becomes a nearly perfect expression of the numinous. “Empty distance,” writes Rudolf Otto, “remote vacancy is, as it were, the sublime of the horizontal” (Varnado, pp. 62-63).17 The point of the devil’s narrative and of Ivan’s long-forgotten anecdote is that, after lying there almost (ital. mine) a thousand years, the philosopher gets up and starts to walk. In reply to the devil, Ivan, desperately embracing the framework of Euclidean time, observes that the philosopher’s decision to embark upon this journey is irrelevant, for it would take a billion years to travel such a distance. The devil replies, “Much more than that, I haven’t got a pencil and paper, or I could work it out. But he got there long ago and that’s where the story begins” (p. 611). The story somehow has leapt over an infinity of time and space, and its real beginning occurs only after this cosmic leap. The devil slyly urges Ivan toward an irrational acceptance of this other kind of time. Ivan suddenly recalls that he himself had made up this anecdote at the age of seventeen. By discovering the devil’s plagiarism, he thus tries to reduce him to the status of a hallucination. But the devil is a mysterious practitioner of homeopathy. Ivan insists to the devil that he has not the “hundredth part of a grain of faith in [him].” “But,” replies the devil, “you have a thousandth of a grain. Homeopathic doses perhaps are the strongest. Confess that you have faith even to the ten-thousandth of a grain” (p. 612). It is here that we come up against a question more fundamental, more difficult, and more important to answer than whether or not the devil is a hallucination. Instead, Dostoevsky invites us to consider whether or not the devil is working to bring about Ivan’s salvation or his damnation. Throughout Dostoevsky‘s writings, there is a curious mutuality between the ways in which good and evil work in the world. Dostoevsky describes the power, the modus operandi, of each in disturbingly similar terms. This mutuality is expressed earlier on in The Idiot by Ippolit. He describes how one can plant the “seed of a good deed,” and “all the seeds planted by you, which you perhaps have forgotten, will take root and grow” (p. 424). This idea is congruent with the central motif governing The Brothers Karamazov. From its epigraph from John, to Zosima’s exhortations, to Alyosha’s actions throughout, to Iliusha’s death, to Dr. Herzenstube’s pound of nuts, this novel is about the way in which goodness and grace journey through the world. But, unfortunately, evil travels in the same way. In The Idiot, “the seed” of Ippolit’s last conviction-the desire to commit suicide-also takes hardy root, and while Zosima in The Brothers Kuramazov, can optimistically echo the novel’s epigraph and himself cite John xii, verse 24, he has a vision, equally powerful, of
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how evil seeds can also bear fruit. He warns of the effect of a passing, spiteful word on a child. “[Ylou may have sown an evil seed in him and it may grow” (p. 298). Thus, when Zosima goes on to say that “God took seeds from different worlds and sowed them on this earth . . .but what grows lives and is alive only through the feelings of its contact with other mysterious worlds”(p. 299), he may be referring, albeit indirectly, to evil seeds as well as to good.ls As James has observed, the mystical, saintly view includes evil in its overview; it cannot reduce or banish it. Thus, when the devil makes use of seed imagery for his own purpose, whether to convert or to subvert, he intensifies this disturbing symbiosis between good and evil. He wants to sow in Ivan a “tiny grain of faith” that “will grow into an oak tree” (p. 612). For what purpose, we ask. The devil, true to our view of him as wily and full of sophistry, lays out both possibilities. On the one hand, he would gain, by believing Ivan’s eventual fall, a greater trophy than a mere atheist (“we have our arithmetic” [p. 6131). On the other hand, the devil suggests that he might be a variation of Faust’s Mephistopheles, one who, by sowing a grain of faith in Ivan, claims to work in the service of God’s greater good. “Mephistopheles declared to Faust that he desired evil, but did only good. Well, he can say what he likes, it’s quite the opposite with me. I am perhaps the one man in all creation who loves the truth and genuinely desires good . . . I know that at the end of all things I shall be recovered. I, too, shall walk my quadrillion” (p. 614). Both possibilities exist. What is perhaps most interesting is that the devil claims to practice metaphysical homeopathy. Homeopathy is directly opposed to mainstream medicine, which is “allopathic.”Allopathic medicine makes use of remedies that produce effects different from those of the disease being treated. The science of homeopathy, both popular and discredited in the nineteenth century, maintained that illness was best cured by giving medicines that mimicked rather than masked the symptoms of disease. Its motto was: “Similiu similibus curentur (Let likes be cured with likes)” (Cummings and Ullman, p. 8). The symptoms of illness should be stimulated, according to homeopathic wisdom, for they are not part of the disease itself, but rather evidence of the body’s attempt to cure itself. Thus the devil’s practice of homeopathy upon Ivan may be understood as an attempt to “cure” his disease of atheism. Can we call his approach the devil’s variety of religious experience?“Knowing that you are inclined to believe in me, I administered some disbelief by telling you that anecdote. I lead you to belief and disbelief by turns, and I have my motive in it. It’s the new method, sir” (p. 612). The devil, whether he is a hallucinatory or a truly demonic double, homeopathically duplicates the symptoms of Ivan’s disease; he mimics and mocks Ivan’s own words, ideas, doubts. Thus, Ivan by recoiling from this toxic doubling of himself, might, according to the principles of homeopathy, begin to heal himself.
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The most controversial aspect of homeopathy is its fundamental belief that the most minute dosesralled the higher potencies, which are, in fact the must diluted-are the most powerful, the most capable of curing. “Most scientists believe that no medicine diluted to more than a 12c potency would have any biochemical effect, since it is improbable that any molecules of the original substance remain” (Cummings and Ullman, p. 17). Yet it is precisely these miniscule doses that homeopathy claims are most effective. It is, moreover, just such a miniscule dose of faith that the devil seeks to administer to Ivan by imitating Ivan’s own “symptoms” of disbelief. The question is, does it work? According to the predictions of the science of homeopathy, we would probably have to argue yes, although by the end of the novel Ivan’s “cure” as yet is not finished, but is, rather, still in progress. A homeopathic cure takes time; all the initial physical symptoms greatly worsen before they improve. In fact, their very worsening is supposed to be a sign of improvement, for the homeopathic cure works from the inside out. The internal parts improve first, while the exterior parts are supposed to worsen temporarily. This may be the case with Ivan; certainly by the end of the novel, he lies unconscious, the symptoms of that “brain fever” which had been encroaching for so long, since his homeopathic encounter with the devil, are now worse than ever. Yet, he had briefly, after his third meeting with Smerdyakov, felt a transient surge of healing joy. Has the devil’s small dose of highly toxic words stimulated the beginning of a more permanent healing process? Does Ivan’s confession in the courtroom indicate that he has already, like his philosopher, gotten up “from the road” and begun, in the dark, the journey toward belief? Certainly Ivan’s statement to the court possessed the most telling earmarks of an authentic Dostoevskian confession: Ivan utters his words publicly, and no one takes them at their face value. Dostoevsky himself had, as a patient, a firsthand experience with homeopathy. In 1837, just before he set off to engineering school, and a few months after his mother’s death, he had contracted a throat ailment that reduced his voice to a whisper. Dostoevsky‘s father had tried conventional remedies upon him; when they failed, he practiced, “against his own strictly allopathic professional convictions” a popular homeopathic technique on him (Rice, p. 50). In fact, Rice points out that this was “the only known therapeutic exchange” between Dr. Dostoevsky and his son. Although the homeopathic remedy he used was a popular one, it was also controversial, for it involved administering a slight dose of a toxic substance, “probably belladonna.” The treatment failed and “Dostoevsky never recovered the normal use of his voice” (Rice, p. 50). Shortly after this episode, in October 1838, a report presented to the Society of Russian Physicians concluded that homeopathy was unsound. Nevertheless, it continued to remain a popular form of treatment. Dostoevsky‘s
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early personal experience with homeopathy may well have informed this critical scene from the end of his literary career. If so, it could be an indication to us that the devil’s treatment won’t work. In fact, the notebook pages outlining the early plans for Ivan’s encounter with the devil are more peculiarly crammed with references to the devil’s medical problems than is the final text. Dostoevsky makes repeated reference to the devil’s wart, to his cough, to his catarrh of the respiratory canal. He also mentions sulfuric hydrogen gas, Hoffmann’s malt liquor, and honey with salt. In Dostoevsky’s jottings, the devil repeats several times that he has been vaccinated twice (Notebooks, pp. 2 19-225). Vaccinations could certainly be considered to be equivalent to homeopathic provings, for they innoculate against a particular disease by dosing the patient with a small amount of it. A miniscule toxic dose is thus used for curative purposes. Moreover, these notes suggest that Dostoevsky may have planned for the devil to innoculate Ivan through his words against atheism, or, what to my mind is less likely, to innoculate Ivan against belief. “You believe a small drop. Homeopathic. A little seed-oak. An oak grows up . . . Ivan. That’s to convert me” (Notebooks, p. 222). “The knife cuts both ways,” and it is left for the reader to decide whether the devil’s rendition of Ivan’s “legend about Paradise” operates to bring Ivan to belief or to drag him away from it. Could the devil be giving Ivan an onion?19At any rate, in the notes Ivan emphasizes the devil’s resemblance to him. “He’s terribly stupid. He is stupid like me. Exactly like me . . . I am looking at my portrait.” Thus, like is treated with like, according to homeopathic wisdom. There is also the curiously homeopathic statement: “Alyosha believed a little drop” (Notebooks, p. 222). In the text of the novel, Dostoevsky reduces the number of medical references, although they continue to play a role consonant with homeopathy. Ivan accuses the devil of being “myself, myself only with a different mug.” The devil agrees that he, like Ivan “suffers from the fantastic, and so I love the realism of earth” (p. 605). For him, this realism is epitomized in the pleasures of superstition and of “being doctored.” He tells Ivan how he has been vaccinated for smallpox, and how he suffers from rheumatism. He then offers up a striking misquotation from Terence. Ivan realizes that he himself has never thought of this misquotation before, and for a moment, Ivan believes in the devil. Seeing this, the devil immediately bursts out with a cynical dismissal of visionary experience: “Listen, in dreams and especially in nightmares, from indigestion or anything, a man sometimes sees such artistic visions, such complex and real actuality, such events, even a whole world of events, woven into such a plot, with such unexpected details from the most exalted matters to the last button on a cuff, as I swear Leo Tolstoy could not create . . . I am only your nightmare, nothing more” (p. 606). Ivan quickly realizes that the devil is dragging him
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back and forth between belief and disbelief. In reply, the devil promises to explain later the “special method” he has adopted “for today.” That special method is homeopathy. The devil thus ridicules the kind of visionary journey that the ridiculous man took in “The Dream of a Ridiculous Man.” He chalks these “artistic visions” up to indigestion. But the devil shares the ridiculous man’s belief that our earth can be, in some unfathomable way, repeated elsewhere in time and space. “[0] ur present earth may have been repeated a billion times. Why, it’s become extinct, been frozen; cracked, broken to bits, disintegrated into its elements, again ‘the water above the firmament’; then again a comet, again a sun, again from the sun it becomes earth-and the same sequence may have been repeated endlessly” (611).Victor Terras suspects that this idea of “eternal palingenesis,” may have been one of Dostoevsky‘s preoccupations (Terras, p. 392).20Certainly, it offers us a further link between the visionary experience of Ivan and the ridiculous man. Indeed, in his efforts to cure the cold he caught flying through space in an evening suit, the devil practically tells us that he himself has resorted to homeopathic medicine, which had long been in disrepute in Russia, but had nevertheless remained so popular. He lambasts the establishment Russian doctors-“I’ve tried all the medical faculty; they can diagnose beautifully. . .but they’ve no idea how to cure you.” He makes fun of fancy European specialists-the one in Paris “who can only cure your right nostril,” the one in Vienna who “will cure your left nostril. What are you to do? I fell back on popular remedies” (p. 608). On the advice of a German doctor he rubs himself with honey and salt, and when that fails to cure him, he resorts to what seems to be homeopathy. He writes to Count Mattei in Milan. “He sent me a book and some drops, bless him, and only fancy, Hoff‘s malt extract cured me! I bought it by accident, drank a bottle and a half of it, and I was ready to dance; it took it away completely. I made up my mind to write to the papers to thank him” (p. 608). The devil’s gleeful foray outside accepted medical practice into the realm of popular remedies and drops from a Count in Milan suggest an antiestablishment resort to homeopathic practices. The devil’s experimentation in homeopathic medicine has an interesting parallel in the alternative medical procedures that William James continued to seek in curing his own ailments. As Linda Simon, William James’srecent biographer recounts, James, in his own efforts to cure himself of depression and numerous physical ailments, not only sought out the services of a “mind-cure ‘doctress,”’but tried hallucinatory drugs, galvanism, various kinds of folk healing and alternative medicine. To treat his bad heart, Simon reminds us, James had himself injected with a compound prepared from the organs of a goatlymph from the thoracic ducts, together with extracts from the lymphatic
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glands and brains (Simon, p. 21 1). James in his derision of establishment medicine and his attraction to what might be called crackpots and those who ventured into hallucinating states via drugs shares the irreverence of Dostoevsky‘s devil for conventional medicine and its fancy practitioners.21 I shall close with a brief look at Alyosha Karamazov’s moment of crisis and the fantastic journey which embodies his conversion-his vision of Cana of Galilee. Some of the conversion rhythms of “Peasant Marei” recapitulate here in a major key. The frame of the Polish convict and his ‘‘Je hays ces brigands” finds an echo in Alyosha’s conversations with Rakitin. In despair, Alyosha leaves the body of the decaying elder Zosima. Like the convict Dostoevsky, he rushes outside for relief. In his grief and doubt he lies “face downwards on the ground under a tree” (p. 319). Rakitin, the moral equivalent of the Polish convict, appears. Alyosha then goes with Rakitin to Grushenka, where he and Grushenka enact their mutual “onion-giving.’’ The meeting between Alyosha and Grushenka possesses the same suggestion of preconversion conversion that occurs in “The Dream of a Ridiculous Man,” where the main protagonist is somehow saved by the little girl even before he undertakes his fantastic conversion journey. Alyosha returns to Zosima’s cell where he will find himself on a visionary journey to the biblical past, but the actual moment of his conversion is impossible to locate. Later in the novel, as we have seen, Ivan’s lowest point-his third visit to Smerdyakov-had ended with his feeling “something like joy.” In all three cases, but particularly in Alyosha’s, it is possible that the fundamental shift to conversion has taken place even before the “conversion journey” through time and space begins. Rakitin taunts Alyosha as they return to the monastery. “So you see the miracles you were looking out for just now have come to pass!” (p. 336), but Alyosha, like the convict Dostoevsky with the Pole at the end of “Peasant Marei,” finds himself no longer vulnerable to Rakitin’s cynicism and hatred. Something has already taken place. He reenters Zosima’s cell and is overwhelmed by joy. He finds himself with Christ at Cana of Galilee. Zosima is there, too. Zosima, who calls him “dear one,” “my kind boy,” “gentle one,” treats him with a motherly affection reminiscent of Marei (p. 339). He raises Alyosha by the hand. Alyosha, like the child Dostoevsky in “Peasant Marei,” expresses his fear, and Zosima comforts him. Alyosha awakens and rushes outside to water the earth with his tears. “Something firm and unshakable” had entered his soul; he never forgets that moment. “‘Someone visited my soul in that hour,’ he used to say afterwards” (p. 341). This event, llke the nine-year-old Dostoevsky‘s encounter with Marei, occurs toward the end of August, at the close of a bright day. Alyosha lies on the earth amidst “the gorgeous autumn flowers” (p. 349). Again, Dostoevsky has carefully located a conversion-which involved a journey out of everyday
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time to a precious, living past-within a definite frame of setting and time: a monk’s cell and a garden at nine o’clock on an evening in late August. As in “Peasant Marei,”“The Dream of a Ridiculous Man,” and Ivan’s encounter with the devil, recent events and memories converge with time long past; the subliminal becomes immanent; conversion occurs. The Dostoevsky of 1876 who wrote “Peasant Marei,” the ridiculous man who loses the knack for words but becomes a preacher anyway, and Alyosha who rises up from the earth “a resolute champion” have each completed a journey of conversion, from which they emerge with tears of joy to embrace an unchanged, but newly beautiful world. Their journeys now change direction. Instead of journeying inwardly through time and space to an infinitely precious, fully living past, they must each now travel on the road of everyday reality. They now transmit their message to others, knowing full well they will probably not be believed. To some degree, each has taken on the qualities of a saint. This is not to say they have become emblems or stock characters, or that they lose their individuality. Indeed, argues James, the saint is, above all, the champion of the individual. “ [W] ith their extravagance of human tenderness, [they] are the great torch bearers of [the belief in the essential sacredness of every person], the tip of the wedge, the cleavers of the darkness” (VRE, p. 285).” At the end of The Brothers Karamazov, Ivan is still writhing under the effects-potentially lethal, potentially redemptive-of the devil’s homeopathic experiment. When we last see him he remains in that uncloven darkness that Dostoevsky and James knew so well. Whether Ivan journeys to conversion or to perversion remains a mystery. Or can we assume that perhaps, like his philosopher, “he got there long ago”? Notes 1. For extended analyses, see Joseph Frank, pp. 116-127; Robert Louis Jackson, pp. 20-33; James Rice, pp. 46-49, and Robin Feuer Miller, “Dostoevsky,the Peasants and Problems of Representation.” 2. Frank has made an extraordinarily happy choice in the discovery of James’s Varieties as a model for describing the hallmarks of Dostoevsky‘s conversion experience, as he portrayed it in “Peasant Marei.” 3. Note James’s use of the word, “estranged,”as applied to Tolstoy in 1902,long before it was used by the Russian Formalists. See VRE,pp. 128-131 and 153-156, for James’s discussion of Tolstoy’s spiritual crisis. 4. Some years earlier Thomas De Quincey, another student of religious and mystical experience (and a writer, moreover, whose work Dostoevsky knew), asserted “of this, at least, I feel assured, that there is no such thing asforgettingpossibleto the mind; a thousand accidents may, and will, interpose a veil between our present consciousness
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and the secret inscriptions on the mind; accidents of the same sort will also rend away this veil; but alike, whether veiled or unveiled, the inscription remains forever” (De Quincey, p. 104). 5. Compare Ivan’s refusal of a civilization founded upon the unjustified tears of a child to the James citation above. Like Ivan, as well, James refers to the “geological cataclysm.” He states: “To believe in the carnivorous reptiles of geologic times is hard for our imagination.. . .Yet there is no tooth in any of those museum-skulls that did not . . . hold fast to the body struggling in despair of some fated living victim” (p. 137). 6. Adler also makes an observation that could have come verbatim from the pen of Bakhtin, “There is no image so often occurring in his work as that of a boundary” (Adler, p. 283). Adler’s essay teems with insights. I am grateful to Lewis S. Feuer for bringing this obscure article to my attention. 7. For an analysis of the close structural connection between “Peasant Marei” and a section of The Idiot,written earlier, see Robin Feuer Miller, “Dostoevsky, the Peasants and Problems of Representation.” 8. Bakhtin connects this work to Cyrano de Bergerac’s Histoire comique des ttats et empires de la Lune (1647-1650); to the menippea of Grimmelshausen, Derfliegende Wandersmann nach dem Monde; and to that of Voltaire’s Micromegas. We can also discover in this work ties to Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels and to Rousseau’s Discourse on Inequality. See Robin Feuer Miller, “Dostoevsky‘s‘Dream of a Ridiculous Man’: Unsealing the Generic Envelope.” 9. We know of Dostoevsky‘s ongoing obsession with Rousseau’s Confessions. Rousseau asserted that the fundamental occasion for hi5 confession was the harm he had caused years earlier to a young girl. 10. James describes one Stephen H. Bradley who underwent a similar experience on November 2, 1829, after which, like the ridiculous man, he rushed to tell others of his vision: “--After breakfast I went round to converse with my neighbors on religion, which I could not have been hired to have done before this . . . and I now defy all the Deists and Atheists in the world to shake my faith in Christ” (VRE, p. 160). 11. The Idiot, the novel of Dostoevsky which is perhaps most preoccupied with the meaning of visionary experience, also curiously, opens on a wet, foggy morning, late in November, as the two main characters approach Petersburg by train. 12. Dostoevsky obscures the reference to the date by giving it much earlier, at the beginning of Book X, “The Boys.” Nevertheless, the same use of a precise location in time and place to encapsulate its opposite prevails. 13. Knapp has tackled with great success perhaps the most difficult moment in time to be found anywhere in Dostoevsky‘s canon. 14. It is well known that to prepare the description of Ivan’s encounter with the devil, Dostoevsky consulted with a doctor about the details of hallucinations and of brain fever. Hence, the narrator chronicler’s near-clinical description: “And so he was sitting almost conscious himself of his delirium, and as I have said already, looking persistently at some object on the sofa against the opposite wall” (p. 602). Yet, one cannot help but think the consultation with a doctor perhaps was superfluous, given Dostoevsky’s account of how as a convict his reveries used to begin with “some speck.” Golyadkin, as early as 1846, stares fixedly into the black water;
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Stavrogin can spend a sleepless night, “his eyes fixed on a point in the corner by the chest of drawers” ( T h e Possessed, p. 405), or he can describe how he lost count of the time while “looking at a tiny red spider on the leaf of a geranium” ( T h e Possessed, pp. 424-425). But time reenters with a jolt, “Suddenly I whipped out my watch,” he says. Twenty minutes pass; he waits another fifteen minutes, to give Matryosha more time to complete her dreadful act. It seems there is little a doctor could tell Dostoevsky about hallucinations and trances. See also, Miller, “Dostoevsky and the Homeopathic Dose” for an earlier version of this discussion about The Brothers Karamazov. 15. James discusses this very point in “Religion and Neurology,” the opening chapter of Varieties (pp. 11-29). This view tends to be echoed by those who want to engage serious discussion of visionary journeys and unearthly beings. Thus can the critic Jack Sullivan write that whether or not a ghost exists is unimportant, “what counts is the authenticity of the experience” (See Jack Sullivan, ‘“Green Tea’: The Archetypal Ghost Story,” in Messent [pp. 121-1241). Or, M. R. James, using an oddly Bakhtinian turn of phrase, can observe in 1927, “It is not amiss sometimes to leave a loophole for natural explanation, but I would say, let the loophole be so narrow as not to be quite practicable.” See M. R. James, “Introduction,” in Messent (p. vi.) As readers, we repeatedly return to the fantastic journey, the ghostly, and the otherworldly. For the duration of our reading we may become jelly in the hands of the poet, novelist, and critic alike. Even as we seek to name, to categorize, or to dismiss such fantastic material we may sheepishly crave “contact with other worlds.” 16. This word was coined by Rudolf Otto in The Idea of the Holy, first published in 1917. The term “numinous” describes a feeling that is closely connected to the intellect, a nonrational sense of supernatural fear, wonder and delight (Varnado, p. 52). 17. Quoting Rudolf Otto The Idea ofthe Holy, trans. John W. Harvey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 68-69. For Varnado, the words of Coleridge’sAncient Mariner, “Alone, alone, all, all, alone,” crystallize the feeling of the numinous. 18. Czeslaw Milosz points out that Dostoevsky‘s use of seed imagery, particularly the notion of God taking seeds from different gardens, may show the influence of Emanuel Swedenborg, whose works Dostoevsky read in the translations of A. N. Aksakov (see Milosz, pp. 129-144). Indeed, Milosz shows that Dostoevsky‘s ideas about ghosts, the fascination with that state between dreaming and wakefulness and particularly his interest in visionary travels to other worlds could all have been reinforced by his reading of Swedenborg. It is here that an interesting triangulation of Dostoevsky, Swedenborg, and, not William, but Henry James Sr., an avid Swedenborgian explicator, might be explored. See William James, “Introduction to ‘The Literary Remains of the Late Henry James,”’ in E M , pp. 3-63. 19. The reference, of course, is to the episode in the novel where Grushenka tells Alyosha the story of a wicked woman who is almost admitted to heaven because she once gave an onion from her garden to an old beggar woman. However, a display of selfishness at the last moment cancels the good deed. For a fuller discussion see Miller, The Brothers Karamazov: Worlds of the Novel, pp. 84-86. 20. Terras also points out that many echoes of this idea of palingenesis occur in the Notebooks for ‘2Raw Youth.”
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21. Writes James in 1885: “Words cannot express my contempt for much of the medical legislation that is current, based as it is on a theoretic surmise, grafted on an insufficiently observed fact, generalised by pedantry, promulgated by love of dominion, and adopted by credulity as the rule of life” (quoted in Simon, p. 21 1). 22. James goes on to link the figure of the saint to the nineteenth-century utopian socialist. “In this respect the Utopian dreams of social justice in which many contemporary socialists and anarchists indulge are . . .analogous to the saint’s belief in an existent kingdom of heaven. They help to break the edge of the general reign of hardness and are slow leavens of a better order” (VRE, p. 287). Dostoevsky, too, was fascinated by that borderline generated between the saint and the utopian dreamer.
Works Cited Adler, Alfred. “Dostoevsky.” Lecture delivered in Zurich Town Hall, 1918, in The Practice and Theory of Individual Psychology. Translated by P. Radin. London, 1923. Bakhtin, Mikhail. Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics. Edited and translated by Caryl Emerson. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984. Catteau, Jacques. “Prostranstvo i vremia v romanakh Dostoevskogo.” In Dostoevskii: Materialy issledovaniia, edited by G. M. Fridlender. Vol. 3. Leningrad Nauka, 1978. DeQuincey, Thomas. Confessions of an English Opium Eater. Edited by Alethea Hayter. Middlesex, England Penguin Books, 1979. Dostoevsky, F. M. The Brothers Karamazov. Translated by Constance Garnett. Edited by Ralph E. Matlaw. New York W. W. Norton, 1976. . The Diary o f a Writer. Translated by Boris Brasol. Introduction by Joseph Frank. Salt Lake City: Gibbs M. Smith, 1985. .“The Double.” Translated by George Bird. In Great Short Works of Fyodor Dostoevsky. New York Harper & Row, 1968. Pp. 1-144. . “The Dream of a Ridiculous Man.” Translated by David Magarshack. In Great Short Works of Fyodor Dostoevsky. Pp. 715-738. . The Idiot. Translated by Henry and Olga Carlisle. New York New American Library, 1969. . The Notebooks for The Brothers Karamazov. Translated and edited by Edward Wasiolek. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971. . The Possessed. Translated by Andrew R. MacAndrew. New York New American Library, 1962. Frank, Joseph. Dostoevsky: The Years of Ordeal, 1850-1859. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983. Jackson, Robert Louis. “The Triple Vision: The Peasant Marei.” In The Art of Dostoevsky: Deliriums and Nocturnes. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981. Knapp, Liza. “The Fourth Dimension of the Non-Euclidean Mind Time in The Brothers Karamazov, or Why Ivan Karamazov’s Devil Does Not Carry a Watch.” Dostoevsky Studies 8 (1987).
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Manuel, Frank E. and Fritzie P. Utopian Thought in the Western World. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979. Messent, Peter B., ed. Literature of the Occult:A Collection of Critical Essays. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 198 1. Miller, Robin Feuer. “Dostoevsky, the Peasants and Problems of Representation.” In Celebrating Creativity:Essays in Honour of JosteinBortnes. Eds. Knut Andreas Grimstad and Ingunn Lund. Bergen: University of Bergen Press, 1997. . “Dostoevsky and the Homeopathic Dose.” In American Contributions to the 12th International Congress of Slavists: Literature, Linguistics, Poetics, edited by Robert A. Maguire and Alan Timberlake. Bloomington, Ind: Slavica Publishers, 1998. . The Brothers Karamazov: Worlds of the Novel. New York: Twayne Masterworks, 1992. .“Dostoevsky‘s‘Dream of a Ridiculous Man’: Unsealing the Generic Envelope.” In Freedom and Responsibility in Russian Literature, edited by Elizabeth Cheresh M e n and Gary Saul Morson. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1995. Pp. 86-104. Milosz, Czeslaw. “Dostoevsky and Swedenborg.”In Emperor of the Earth: Modes of Eccentricvision. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. Pp. 120-144. Rice, James. Dostoevsky and the Healing Art: An Essay in Literary and Medical History. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Ardis, 1985. Simon, Linda. Genuine Reality: A Life of William James. New York Harcourt Brace, 1998. Sullivan, Jack. Literature of the Occult:A Collection of Critical Essays. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1981. Terras, Victor. A Karamazov Companion: Commentary on the Genesis, Language and Styleof Dostoevsky’s Narrative. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981. Varnado, S. L. “The Idea of the Numinous in Gothic Literature.” In Literature of the Occult. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1981. Zil’bershtein, I. S., and M. Rozenblium, eds. “Neizdannyi Dostoevskii. Zapisnye knizhki i tetradi 1860-1881.” Literaturnoe nasledstvo 83 (1971).
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3 What Men Live By: Belief and the Individual in Leo Tolstoy and William James Donna Tussing Orwin
W
HEN WILLIAM JAMES READ WARAND PEACEand Anna Karenina in the
summer of 1896, he declared them to be “perfection in the representation of human life” (Letters, 2: 48). Tolstoy subsequently became one of James’s favorite authors (Myers, p. 42), both as a novelist and as a religious thinker cited extensively in The Varieties of Religious Experience. Tolstoy, by contrast, showed little overt interest in James. True, as L. Kuzina and K. Tiunkin (p. 82) plausibly argue, the famous passage at the end of part I of Resurrection comparing individuals to rivers may refer to James’s idea (first expressed in The Principles of Psychology) of a stream of consciousness. Tolstoy, who closely followed debates about psychology in the journal Questions of Philosophy and Psychology in the 1890s, could not have been unaware of James, while Psychology: Briefer Course (the one-volume abridgement of The Principles ofPsychology) itself was published in Russian in 1896.Tolstoy’s borrowing, however, if it is that, may be polemical (Kuzina, Tiunkin, pp. 73-88).’ In any case, the author of War and Peace and Anna Karenina had little to learn from James about the way consciousness flows, changes, and affects our perceptions of reality. James’s wildly appreciative 1896 reaction to these novels as perfectly representative of lifethat is, the dynamics of human psychology-suggests that he saw in them a prescient imaging of his own ideas. And in fact, as I shall argue in this chapter, James’sand Tolstoy’s psychology have common roots in transcendental philosophy as it affected both American and Russian culture. Age alone does not explain the enthusiasm of the younger man and the seeming indifference of the older one. Tolstoy viewed James as too intellectual, too “scientific.”The only two references to James in Tolstoy’s diary refer acidly -59-
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to James’s depiction of Tolstoy in The Varieties of Religious Experience2 and then to Tolstoy’s impression of the book “An inaccurate relation to the subject [i.e., religion]-scientific [ nauchnoe] .Oh, is it ever scientific!” (December 14, 1909; PSS, 57:188). James’s father, Swedenborgian and idealist Henry James Sr., whom Tolstoy read in March 1891,evoked a much more positive re~ponse.~ Tolstoy preferred the father’s religious disposition to the son’s science. Ironically, then, it was partly Tolstoy’s religiosity that drew William to him. In Tolstoy James found psychologizing as rigorous as his own, a yearning for belief as perfervid, and a capacity for mystical experience that he himself lacked. James confesses this failing at the beginning of his lectures on “mysticalstates” in The Varieties of Religious Experience: “[Mly own constitution shuts me out from their enjoyment almost entirely, and I can speak of them only at second hand” (p. 301). Yet James believes that religion is essential, and it is Tolstoy whom he quotes (from the title of a story written in 1881)as saying that “faith .. . is that by which men live” (VRE, p. 336). “Mystical states,”which James identifies in Varieties as “twice-bornness and supernaturality and pantheism,” are “absolutely authoritative over the individuals to whom they come.” Although others need not accept them uncritically, they cannot simply be discounted either. [Mystical states] break down the authority of the non-mystical or rationalistic consciousness, based upon the understanding and the senses alone. They show it to be only one kind of consciousness. They open out the possibility of other orders of truth, in which, so far as anything in us vitally responds to them, we may freely continue to have faith. (p. 335)
Both Tolstoy and Jameswere psychologists and moralists, who, analyzing individual consciousness, concluded that human beings rely for moral guidance on beliefs that cannot be justified rationally. Today, when many scientists question the authority of “rationalisticconsciousness,”and the religion of progress through science has many fewer adherents than in the nineteenth century? the arguments of James and Tolstoy about the necessity of religious faith deserve a fresh look. So, too, do their agreements and disagreements. In what follows, I will discuss the role of belief in the writings of the two men, enlarge upon the significance of Tolstoy for James, and offer a comparison of the two. The Necessity of Belief in Tolstoy Tolstoy first explores the psychology of belief in otvochestvo (Boyhood 1853). The philosophizing adolescent arrives at a “skepticism”so complete that “be-
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sides myself I imagined no one and nothing existed in the whole world.. . . In a word, I concurred with Schelling in the conviction that not objects, but my relation to them exists” (PSS 2:57). Nikolenka doubts the objective existence not only of the physical, but of the moral world. He gives up old beliefs“which for the happiness of my life I ought never have dared to touch”-for new philosophic theories. If, as Tolstoy believed, philosophizing should always be directed toward good practices, then skepticism is unsustainable because it destroys the possibility of any practice. Extreme subjectivism is the intellectual expression of the self-centered world of adolescence. Tolstoy calls it “skepticism” because in the process of analyzing the world the overactive logical mind of his adolescent dismantles it until nothing is left, not even reason itself: “mind left reason behind [ urn za razurn zakhodill.” The Russian proverb neatly captures Tolstoy’s distinction between inadequate human reason-the “pitiful, meager spring of moral activity. . . the mind of man”-and divine Reason as the organizing principle of an external reality the existence of which he, like James, never seriously doubted. Boris Eikhenbaum distinguished the “moral instincts” by which Tolstoy lived from the “convictions” [ ubezhdeniia] which he despised (Lev Tolstoy, p. 216). These instincts are moral ideas that are thought as well as felt. This passage from Youth is typical: Those virtuous ideas that I would work over in conversations with my adored friend Dmitrii . . .were still pleasing only to my mind, but not to feeling. But the time came when these thoughts with such fresh power of moral discovery came into my mind that I would panic, thinking of how much time I had lost to no purpose; and immediately, that very same second, I wanted to apply these thoughts to life, with a firm resolve never to betray them (PSS 2: 79). (Emphasis mine)
The difference between moral ideas and the “convictions” that Tolstoy despised lies in their origins. Convictions are products of individual minds, and as such are both subjective and superficial; while moral ideas guide our actions even though our minds may not wholly grasp them. “How did I dare to think that one could know the ways of Providence. It is the source of reason, and reason wants to comprehend it . . . The mind loses itself in these abysses of wisdom.”: thus did Tolstoy as a young soldier in the Caucasus in 1851 formulate his relation to higher reason embodied in Providence (PSS 46: 61). In Youth moral ideas do not actually take hold in Nikolenka’s mind until they “come into” it with “fresh power of moral discovery”: the grammatical construction expresses the passivity of the individual in relation to these formative ideas. They are both feelings and ideas at the same time. In Youth, Christian tradition remains a repository of moral belief, but nature is more
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compelling. Chapter 32 (“Youth”) returns Nikolenka to his boyhood home Petrovskoe and especially to its garden, a metaphor for Eden. There Nikolenka communes with sources of belief not directly available to the mind. The rest of Youth chronicles the struggle in Nikolenka’s soul over conflicting impulses, and ends, significantly, with another “moral surge” and a promise to the reader to depict its consequences “in the next, happier half of youth.” The structure of Youth, with its peak of lyric intensity before the end (at “Youth”), and lesser peaks and valleys throughout, is meant to imitate the psychological process more closely than traditional novels built on linear plots.5 In War and Peace Tolstoy took a different approach.6 There the cycle of belief-action based on belief, crisis, then renewed belief and renewed action-became the “plot” around which he built the novel.7 Pierre Bezukhov, for instance, begins as an enthusiastic advocate of assassination if it is for the sake of “the rights of man, emancipation from prejudices, and equality of citizenship.” These conventional ideals crumble after Pierre actually wounds Dolokhov in an afaire d’honneur. Pierre is immobilized by the ensuing crisis of belief: he is obsessed with political injustices that his previous beliefs had rationalized. The mason Bazdeev revivifies Pierre by supplying him with a new set of ideas which will guide him until they too fail the test of reality. Each major character in the novel follows this pattern. Nikolai Rostov’s failure to get charges against his beloved Denisov dismissed, for instance, undermines his faith in the justice of the government. No intellectual, Nikolai elects to “do [his] duty, to fight and not to think” (book 5, chapter IS), but he will later resign his commission to take up the life of a gentleman farmer. War and Peace is a bildungsrornan with a difference, however. The education that characters undergo is cyclical, not linear, so that Pierre and Nikolai are poised at the end of the novel to slip out of their peaceful equilibrium into warlike states which will resurrect old passions in them. To this extent, Tolstoy retains the more “open” form of Youth which critics have praised as more lifelike and blamed as less artistically satisfying. In both works, belief in but not wholly of the mind, is “what men live by.” The Necessity of Belief in James James praised Tolstoy as a “[witness] testifymg to the worth of life as revealed to an emancipated sympathy”(Perry, 2: 273). By this he meant that Tolstoy’s writing lends credence to the essential assumptions of the individual about himself. Tolstoy and James, the one in art, the other in science, defended the ultimate worth of the individual against rational abstractions that devalued particularity. In Psychology: Briefer Course, James insists that “no psychology
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. ..can question the existence of personal selves. Thoughts connected as we feel them to be connected are what we mean by personal selves. The worst a psychology can do is so to interpret the nature of these selves as to rob them of their worth” (p. 141). For James, as for Tolstoy, this worth depended first and foremost on our understanding of ourselves as moral beings and both agreed that science, including the science of psychology, could not by itself validate this understanding8 For James, as earlier for Tolstoy,“emancipated sympathy” therefore led beyond science to metaphysics. Our sense of our “connectedness” and our worth depends upon freedom of the will. We cannot take ourselves seriously if we believe ourselves to be slaves either to impulse or to predetermined ideas. Will, according to James, “relates solely to the amount of effort of attention which we can at any time p u t forth” (PBC, p. 391). If this is determined solely by internal instinct or by the object under consideration (rather than by a self capable of choice), we are not free. Psychology cannot measure the extent of our freedom, and in any case, as a science, psychology can assume determinism. Free will, like the existence of the self, is a subject for philosophy, not science. If Tolstoy and James seem modern in their advocacy of individuality and freedom, they seem old-fashioned in their insistence on the existence of moral will and a moral order. They defined free will accordingly. In early philosophical jottings from the late 1840s, Tolstoy wrote of the “reasonable will”(razumnaia volia) as free (svobodnaia),unlike the lower wills of body and feeling9 In Psychology: Briefer Course, James calls for education to create habits and routines that will free “our higher powers of mind . . .for their own proper work.” To do this, one has to have a strong will; and he quotes J. S. Mill that “a character is a completely fashioned will,” that is, in James’s formulation “an aggregate of tendencies to act in a firm and prompt and definite way upon all the principal emergencies of life” (p. 136). For both writers, free will means specifically the “higher,” or “reasonable” will. As Tolstoy affirms in the Second Epilogue of War and Peace, furthermore, ethics requires something more than just freedom: “Man’s actions proceed from his innate character and the motives acting upon him. What is conscience and the perception of right and wrong in actions that follows from the consciousness of freedom? That is a question for ethics.”1° There has to be a good to choose, and science cannot supply this good any more than freedom can. James argues that in restricting itself to “facts that are actually tangible,” science cannot provide its own raison d’etre, let alone rules to govern human conduct. Science strives instead to be neutral, a posture which, James retorts, is “unrealizable,”because doubt as well as belief is a living attitude, which as such “involve[s] conduct on our part.” It is therefore absurd to hold dogmatically that “our inner interests [namely, our desire to be
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worthy by being good] can have no real connection with the forces that the hidden world may contain.” Even science has advanced due to “an imperious inner demand on our part for ideal logical and mathematical harmonies” (“Is Life Worth Living?” WB, pp. 50-51), which imply the existence of an ideal world to which science has no access. In the nineteenth century, James explains elsewhere, the chief criterion for saintliness is “social righteousness.” “Since belief is measured by action, he who forbids us to believe religion to be true, necessarily also forbids us to act as we should if we did believe it to be true.” The “religious hypothesis” would be a “superfluity” if it were without consequences for action; but since belief alone makes morality possible, it must be defended (“The Will to Believe,” WB, p. 32, n. 4). Good deeds, as James explains in The Varieties of Religious Experience, depend upon ideas without sense-content and hence inaccessible to the very mind that embraces them. These include not only the Kantian “Ideas of pure Reason,” but moral ideas of “abstract and essential goodness, beauty, strength, significance, justice. . ..Such ideas, and others equally abstract, form the background for all our facts, the fountain-head of all the possibilities we conceive of. They give its ‘nature,’ as we call it, to every special thing. Everything we know is ‘what’ it is by sharing in the nature of one of these abstractions. We can never look directly at them, for they are bodiless and featureless and footless, but we grasp all other things by their means, and in handling the real world we should be stricken with helplessness in just so far forth as we might lose these mental objects, these adjectives and adverbs and predicates and heads of classification and conception (VRE, pp. 53-54). Our most important moral ideas-including the existence of the self and free will, and our sense of the moral significance of life-dwell within us as beliefs. These James equates with personal religion as the necessary preconditions of conscience or morality. Tolstoy’s Place in James’s Thought
Whether or not he was acquainted with Tolstoy’s writings before he read War and Peace and Anna Karenina in the summer of 1896, James did not emphasize their importance for him until then. His actual allusions to Tolstoy’s writings are infrequent. To appreciate the significance of these allusions, it is necessary to move beyond them to the larger Jamesian drama in which they play a small but important role. Along with certain other thinkers, Tolstoy was useful in James’s attempt to reconcile the need for religious belief with the imperatives of science as he understood it. Tolstoy’s fictional representation of the psychological role of belief
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strikingly anticipates James’s theories. What differentiates Tolstoy’s style from James’s is Tolstoy’s seeming moral certainty, reflected in what Morson has called his “absolute language”(Hidden in Plain View, chapter 1).Tolstoy’s narrator will often speak from the perspective of unconditional truth. By contrast, James’s language is conciliatory: He writes in the tone of a man who knows that he can never achieve absolute certainty on even the most pressing metaphysical questions. According to his friend Theodore Flournoy, as a young man James rejected the two monisms dominant in his time: “the evolutionary naturalism of Herbert Spencer, and pantheistic idealism, brilliantly represented on the one hand by the Hegelian or absolutist school of Oxford (Green, the Cairds, Bradley), and on the other hand by Royce and others in the United States” (pp. 39-40). James’s tone may reflect his ambivalence toward philosophical justifications of the individual. If science threatens the individual by denying the existence of a self, so too the “intangible ideas” that confirm selfhood and morality may threaten him by impinging upon his freedom. In this way metaphysical idealism can be as deterministic as materialism and just as deadening. On this issue, James argues that no philosophy that is simply fatalistic can satisfy man, because “to take life strivingly is indestructible in the race. . . . Man needs a rule for his will, and will invent one if one be not given him” (“The Psychology of Belief,” p. 1053). James therefore questions Tolstoyan “fatalism” even as he embraces the “infallible veracity” of his prose (letter to Th. Flournoy, August 30, 1896; Letters, p. 48). Instead of fatalism he adopts pluralism as a metaphysical theory that allows for the existence of chance, and therefore moral choice, within an ordered universe. Given his emphasis on free choice, James’s avowed belief in universal order, and even in “Providence,” is striking-he combines the two openly in “The Dilemma of Determinism” (WB, pp. 138-141)-and leaves him open to charges of philosophic inconsistency. Tolstoy’s brand of fatalism based on moral “instinct” may have appealed to him as less deterministic than most. A letter to Benjamin Paul Blood, an important figure in James’s life, suggests a reason for James’s attraction to Tolstoyan certainty as he understood it. Have you read Tolstoy’s “War and Peace”? I am just about finishing it. It is undoubtedlythe greatest novel ever written-also insipid with veracity. The man is infallible-and the anaesthetic revelation plays a part as in no writer. You have very likely read it. If you haven’t, sell all you have and buy the book, for I know it will speak to your very gizzard. (Letters, p. 40)
It is no coincidence that James recommended Tolstoy specifically to Blood, nor are the terms of his recommendation arbitrary. James recognized a kinship between Blood and Tolstoy and, as we shall see, both of them contributed to his defense of belief against atheistic science and philosophy.
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The term “anaesthetic revelation” refers to Blood’s theory, first aired in the pamphlet The Anaesthetic Revelation and the Gist of Philosophy that, by taking nitrous oxide, one can gain access to metaphysical truths unavailable to the mind. In 1874, reviewing The Anaesthetic Revelation in The Atlantic Monthly, James praises it both for its explanation of the insufficiency of philosophy “to comprehend or in any way state the All,” and for its positive suggestion that the “secret of Being . . . is not in the dark immensity beyond knowledge, but at home, this side, beneath the feet, and overlooked by knowledge” (ECR, pp. 287-288). James corresponded with Blood for the rest of his life, and he visited him in 1895. His final essay for publication, “A Pluralistic Mystic,” is “actually a collage of Blood’s writings, interspersed with some passing commentary by James” (John J. McDermott, ECR, pp. xxxiv). Blood may have overestimated his influence on James when he claimed that his “anaesthetic revelation” contained “the secret of the world,” from which James’s “unlucky heart” barred him; but James himself, in a passage ultimately omitted from “A Pluralistic Mystic,” once called Blood’s pamphlet “one of the cornerstones or landmarks of my own subsequent thinking” (ECR,pp. 228-229). Unwilling to neglect any possible avenue to metaphysical truth, James himself inhaled nitrous gas. In his review of The Anaesthetic Revelation, however, he hedges his praise with reservations. He contrasts “laughing-gas intoxication” which “blunts the mind and weakens the will” with “the faith that comes of willing, the intoxication of moral volition” which possesses “a million times better credentials” (ECR, p. 287). The reference to will is of course significant. Beginning in the early 1860s, after his failure to become an artist and before he started to teach at Harvard, James underwent a lengthy crisis of passage. Afflicted with various mental and physical ailments, he flirted with suicide. He attributed his depression to a pessimism that could be avoided only “if one’s moral interests are real rather than illusory; but they cannot be real if there is no free will, because there is no sense in holding that we ought to do what we cannot do.” Thus does Gerald Myers summarize James’s understanding of his predicament at the time. Although he continued to suffer from nervous complaints, James stepped back from suicide in 1870 with the help of the essays of the French philosopher Charles Renouvier. Myers quotes from James’s diary of April 30, 1870: I think that yesterday was a crisis in my life. I finished the first part of Renouvier’s second Essais and see no reason why his definition of free will-“the sustaining of a thought because I choose to when I might have other thoughts”need be the definition of an illusion. At any rate, I will assume for the present-until next year-that it is no illusion. My first act of free w ill shall be to believe in free will.”
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In Renouvier, James found a philosophical explanation of free will understood as intrinsically moral and connected to the reason. Renouvierian free will “consists, not of following our sentiments or our desires, but of controlling them through the use of our reason. The will is a regulating rather than a generating force for Renouvier; presented with choices, it can decide which to adopt. Far from yielding to the strongest motives, it decides which are the strongest” (Logue, p. 95). James, following Renouvier, began to fashion a silk purse out of a sow’s ear by treating the self-imposed narrow epistemological limits of positivism as a license to go beyond them in search of a new morality. If, as positivism asserts, we cannot know any ultimate truths, why not choose, at least provisionally, to embrace the ones that lend dignity-worthto human life? When James writes of the “faith that comes of willing, the intoxication of moral volition,” in his review of The Anaesthetic Revelation four years later, he is referring to the effect on him of Renouvier’s definition of free will as moral choice. Blood‘s discovery, according to James, opens a window on Nirwana, which “whether called by that name or not, has been conceived and represented as the consummation of life too often not to have some meaning” (“The Anaesthetic Revelation,” ECR, p. 287). The spelling Nirwana alerts the reader that James, along with the rest of the educated public, was reading the works of Arthur Schopenhauer (in German, in James’s case); and indeed, less than a year after the review of Blood’s pamphlet appeared in The Atlantic Monthly (November 1874), James explicitly associated the concept of nirvana with Schopenhauer. l 2 James first encountered Schopenhauer in the winter of 1858-1859, but apparently without contracting a case of angst (Allen, p. 53). In 1868, he acquired The World as Will and Idea in a Parisian bookstore (Perry 1:721). In 1870, as his youthful crisis neared a crescendo, he resolved in his New Year’s diary to read Schopenhauer along with many other writers (Allen, p. 162). Schopenhauer would have appealed to the young James because of both his emphasis on the will as the essence of each human being and his concern with compassion. l 3 For Schopenhauer, however, compassion and individual will, to which the young James was clinging for dear life, contradict one another. Schopenhauer rejects any possibility of a moral will such as that found in Renouvier. As individuals, we are slaves to our own desires, which will, being itself an irrational force, fuels rather than controls. Only with the death of desire can the compassion stemming from our common origin in one universal soul come into its own. This rejection of the personal self could not have sat well with James, though in his vulnerable state it may have troubled him. It was around this time, perhaps under the influence of Schopenhauer, that James experienced a panic attack, a “horrible fear of my own existence” that
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he recalled thirty years later in a disguised autobiographical passage of TheVarieties of Religious Experien~e.’~ By 1873 he was attacking pessimism as not “logically legitimate,” as “fatalism,”because it asserts that “there is no good upshot to the whole, that the good empirically existing is accidental and desultory, and not part of a system: and that it is useless to try to fix it or develop it” (Perry 1: 722). James eventually came to hate Schopenhauer so much that in 1883 he refused to contribute money for a memorial to the German philosopher: “I really must decline to stir a finger for the glory of one who studiously lived for no other purpose than to spit upon the lives of the like of me and all those I care But for all that he never simply turned his back on Schopenhauerian pessimism. Even in the letter just cited, he admitted that there was “a kernel of truth in Schopenhauer’s system”; and in Some Problems of Philosophy, published only posthumously, he lauded Schopenhauer as the first philosopher to tell “the concrete truth about the ills of life” (quoted in Perry 1:721). Indeed James came to think that “no man is educated who has never dallied with the thought of suicide.” These words, significantly enough, were written to Benjamin Paul Blood, in a letter from 1896 in which James recalls his suicidal despair in 1870. As a young man trying to find his own path, suspecting alike the idealism of his father’s generation and the “monisms” of his own time, James found himself bereft of the moral certainties needed to live a meaningful life. He thankfully seized upon Renouvier but kept on looking for sturdier shelter against the moral chaos of life as envisaged by modern science and such doctrines as Spencer’s materialism and Schopenhauer’s pessimism. While never rejecting free will, he saw that the freedom to be moral could not by itself make life worth living. Ideals were necessary as well (“What Makes a Life Significant?” TT, pp. 163-164). In search of something more substantial than free choice, he came in 1874 upon Blood’s physiological road back to metaphysical idealism “at home, this side, beneath the feet, and overlooked by knowledge” (“The Anaesthetic Revelation” ECR, p. 288). In his final appreciation of Blood James sees him as teetering between Hegelian monism, according to which “‘each is all, in God. . . . The one remains, the many change and pass; and every one of us is the One that remains’”; and pluralism such as James himself came to advocate. The first alternative James associates with transcendental idealism, so much so that he comments that Blood’s prose echoes that of Emerson. With more assurance than James’s “unlucky heart” can muster, however, Blood’s pluralistic side yields truth and reason, but only as mysticallyrealized, as lived in experience. Up from the breast of man, up to his tongue and brain, comes a free and strong determination, and he cries, originally, and in spite of his whole nature and environ-
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ment, “I will.” This is the Jovian fiat, the pure cause. This is reason; this or nothing shall explain the world for him. For how shall he entertain a reason bigger than himself? . . . Let a man stand fast, then, as an axis of the earth; the obsequious meridians will bow to him, and gracious latitudes will measure from his feet. (Blood, quoted in ‘A Pluralistic Mystic,” EPh, p. 185) As James seems to have sensed, the biological coloring of Blood’s thought, as well as its irrational rationalism, links it to Tolstoy, whom historian of Russian philosophy V. V. Zenkovsky has called at once an empiricist and a mystic of the mind (“The Problem,” p. 30). The anaesthetic (and reasonable!) revelation wells up from the body, “up from the breast of man, up to his tongue and brain.” James may be alluding to the physiological cast of Blood’s inspiration when he wrote him that War and Peace“wil1speak to your very gizzard.” James himself “was always prepared to oppose sensing to thinking and to champion the former as the source of the profoundest insights into the differences between appearance and reality” (Myers, p. 86). In yet another striking coincidence between Tolstoy and James, Pierre-like Benjamin Paul Blood in James’s review of his pamphlet-is said therefore to have found the truth and significance of life “at his very feet” (book 15, chapter 5). Both Tolstoy and James trusted sensing more than thinking because the senses were less susceptible to error than the mind. Even more important, metaphysical idealism accessible through feeling and experience rather than the mind avoided the systematizing that both men abhorred as destructive of freedom. In “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings,” James wove War and Peace into the strands of his life and thought that I have picked out here. (The essay was written after he first read War and Peace in June 1896, and published in The Atlantic Monthly in 1899.) As an example of someone who “felt the human crowd . . . as an overwhelmingly significant presence” he quotes Walt Whitman from On Crossing Brooklyn Ferry. He then contrasts Whitman’s celebration of ordinary life with the ennui of Schopenhauer.
The eternal recurrence of the common order, which so fills Whitman with mystic satisfaction,is to a Schopenhauer,with the emotional anaesthesia,the feeling of “awful inner emptiness”from out of which he views it all, the chief ingredient of the tedium it instills.What is life on the largest scale, he asks, but the same recurrent inanities, the same dog barking, the same fly buzzing forevermore?Yet of the same kind of fibre of which such inanities consist is the material woven of all the excitements, joys and meanings that ever were, or ever shall be, in this world.16 To refute Schopenhauer, James turns to Tolstoy. One can escape Schopenhauerian ennui through a sense of the “unfathomable significance and importance” of the world, but this comes only from direct experience,“in mysteriously
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unexpected ways.” Tolstoy is “the great understander of these mysterious ebbs and flows. . . . They throb all through his novels.” As a n example James adduces the captivity of Pierre Bezukhov in War and Peace. H e recounts Pierre’s experience, from his initial recovery of pleasure in satisfying the basic needs of the body to his subsequent ecstatic identification with nature. When at daybreak, on the morrow of his imprisonment, he saw [I abridge here Tolstoi’s description] the mountains with their wooded slopes disappearing in the grayish mist; when he felt the cool breeze caress him; when he saw the light drive away the vapors, and the sun rise majestically behind the clouds and cupolas, and the crosses, the dew, the distance, the river, sparkle in the splendid, cheerful rays; his heart overflowed with emotion. This emotion kept continually with him, and increased a hundred-fold as the difficulties of his situation grew graver. . . . He learnt that a man is meant for happiness, and that this happiness is in him, in the satisfaction of the daily needs of existence, and that unhappiness is the fatal result, not of our need, but of our abundance. . . . #en calm reigned in the camp, and the embers paled and little by little went out, the full moon had reached the zenith. The woods and the fields roundabout lay clearly visible; and beyond the inundation of light which filled them, the view plunged into the limitless horizon. Then Peter cast his eyes upon the firmament, filled at that hour with myriads of stars. “All that is mine,” he thought. “All that is in me, is me! And that is what they think they have taken prisoner! That is what they have shut up in a cabin!”-So he smiled and turned in to sleep among his comrades.
To this extract James appends the testimony of Emerson: The occasion and the experience, then, are nothing. It all depends on the capacity of the soul to be grasped, to have its life-currents absorbed by what is given. “Crossing a bare common,” says Emerson, “in snow puddles, at twilight, under a clouded sky, without having in my thoughts any occurrence of special good fortune, I have enjoyed a perfect exhilaration. I am glad to the brink of fear.” Life is always worth living [James comments] if one have such responsive sensibilities. (“On a Certain Blindness,” TT, pp. 145-146) Note that James does not say that Emerson created his own exhilaration. Rather Emerson’s state of soul allows what James earlier in the passage calls “the real a n d the ideal” in nature to enter a n d occupy him. For Pierre also, the return to “the real scale of life’s values” opens him to the real significance of everyday occurrences. James, Emerson, a n d Tolstoy all subscribe to a “prosaics,” a celebration of everyday life, which ultimately depends upon a n idealist interpretation of reality. They peer into the Goethean “reason behind everything that live^."'^
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Differences between Tolstoy and James The similarities in the thought of Tolstoy and James reflect convergences between Russian and American nineteenth-century culture. When Russians first read Psychology in the 1890s, they recognized in James a kindred spirit who shared their understanding of reality and human nature as broader than either philosophy or science could comprehend apart from the other.18 By the same token, James found Russian writers, including Tolstoy, congenial. As a beginning writer Tolstoy took the side of the so-called men of the ’40s against the militantly empiricist men of the ’50s in debates about the nature of consciousness. His own unique mix of idealism and biologism developed from his exposure in the mid-1850s to the metaphysical idealism of the 1830s and 184Os.l9 He may even have read the most important American transcendentalist, Ralph Waldo Emerson, during these formative years.20In the 1860s and 1870s,while writing War and Peace and Anna Karenina, Tolstoy joined Dostoevsky and Strakhov in a rearguard offensive against left-wing determinism. This was at the same time that the young William James was struggling to harmonize the transcendentalism that he had learned in his father’s house with positivistic science. For both men, Schopenhauer represented a dangerous challenge to their belief in a morality based on rational will. At the same time, Tolstoy responded to similar influences and situations differently from James. In “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings,” James used Pierre’s experiences as a prisoner of war to illustrate the connection between ordinary events and the metaphysical currents underlying each human life. It is therefore ironic that Tolstoy himself at exactly the same time as James, while he was finishing War and Peace in the late 1860s, began an encounter with Schopenhauer that unsettled his belief in the direct access of the individual to those currents. Prince Andrei’s awakening at death from the sleep of life already reflects the influence of Schopenhauer.21Like James, Tolstoy eventually repudiated Schopenhauer, at least in part. The way he did it, however, and what he retained from the encounter, suggest the difference between Jamesian pragmatism and Tolstoyan mysticism of the mind. Tolstoy’s correspondence with his friend the critic N. N. Strakhov reveals his complicated response to Schopenhauer. On January 8, 1873, Strakhov asked Tolstoy to explain his contention (from a previous letter) that the essence of life was the good. In claiming this, wrote Strakhov, Tolstoy proved himself an optimist, unlike the pessimistic Schopenhauer, whose thought “conduce[d] to the rejection of everything firm in morality” (Perepiska, p. 21). In a later exchange from 1876, Strakhov suggested that Tolstoy’s thought, if developed, would be “pantheism, the basis of which would be love, as in Schopenhauer it is will, and in Hegel-thought’’ (Perepiska, p. 87). In Anna
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Karenina, Levin provisionally adopts a Schopenhauerian metaphysics based on love rather than will, only to reject the result as too artificial,“a muslin garment without warmth.” At around the same time, however, Tolstoy in another letter to Strakhov credited Schopenhauer (along with Plato) with practicing the right philosophic method that included “everything that everything living knows about itself” (1 1/30/1875; PSS 62: 223). Perhaps most significantly, in 1877Tolstoy criticized the young philosopher Vladimir Solovyov for his attack on Schopenhauer. Then, how inaccurate and trivial is his [ Solovyov’s] attempt to refute Schopenhauer, [to suggest] that while pitying we promote the spectral false life of those whom we pity. Schopenhauer says that, giving ourselves to pity, we destroy the lie of isolation and give ourselves to the law of the essence of things, to unityand whatever comes out of that doesn’t matter. His ethics concur therefore with metaphysical principle [ nachalo].What more can one ask? **
Tolstoy’s reaction to Schopenhauer differed from James’s in two ways. Whereas James pitted antideterministic pragmatism against Schopenhauerian metaphysics, Tolstoy eventually countered it with determinist metaphysics of his own. Perhaps even more significantly, after reading Schopenhauer, Tolstoy, unlike James, partly turned against the celebration of individual life that James so admired in his earlier fiction. After a decade-long struggle to respond philosophically to Schopenhauer (during which he produced Anna Karenina), Tolstoy became, in James’s terminology in The Varieties of Religious Experience, the “morbid-minded’’ religious mystic of A C o n f e ~ s i o nJames, . ~ ~ by contrast, despite an ongoing struggle with depression, hoped to the end of his days that “our subjective natures, feelings, emotions, and propensities exist as they do because something in reality harmonizes with them; insofar as they are yearnings and longings, reality will ultimately fulfill them.”24 The later Tolstoy would not have sanctioned Jamesian optimism on this score any more than he could have approved of the “immortality of the substantial self” championed by the neo-idealists of the Moscow Psychological Society who voted James an honorary member.25In “The Problem of Immortality in L. N. Tolstoy” (1912), V. V. Zenkovsky castigates Tolstoy for his denial of personal immortality, and especially for his claim that Christ had denied it as well (33-35).26 The personal immortality for which Tolstoy had yearned his whole life he sadly rejected in his old age.27In War and Peace, one symptom of Sonia’s inferiority is her inability to join Natasha in imagining life before birth. The soul of Prince Andrei leaves his body before death; and despite her family happiness and her frequent pregnancies, Princess Maria’s face occasionally expresses “the lofty, secret suffering of a soul burdened by the body.” The characters of Anna Karenina are already more earthbound. The death of
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Levin’s brother Nikolai is “an unexplained mystery.” Already in the 1870s,Tolstoy made fun in Anna Karenina of the spiritualism that increasingly fascinated William James.28In Tolstoy’s late story Hadzhi-Murat, the soul inhabits the body until physical death occurs, and the narrator can tell us nothing about the consciousness of Hadzhi-Murat thereafter. Yet Tolstoy did not become less an individualist in his old age. On the contrary, he still perceived all morality and therefore all moral progress as originating in individual souls. To get to their own moral core, however, individuals had to reject their bodies and all bodily pleasure. They could do this by heeding “reasonable consciousness ( razumnoe soznanie),” which became the mechanism by which we control our lower, animal selves. Tolstoy himself saw Schopenhauer as his kinsman in this asceticism. Reading Schopenhauer’s Aphorisms in November, 1895, Tolstoy wrote in his diary that one would only have to substitute “service to G o d for “knowledge of the vanities of the world” for him to agree completely with Schopenhauer (PSS 53: 51). For Tolstoy in his old age, the way to morality led beyond the individual to God, from the many to the one. Tolstoy continued to defend free will. In The Kingdom of God Is within You (1894), for instance, he reasons in a way that strikingly resembles James. Everything that one does is in accordance with some truth that one recognizes, or because it is a habit derived from some previous recognition of a truth. So one may not be free with regard to one’s acts, which have a previous cause, but one is free in “the motive of one’s acts.” One can change one’s view of things and therefore change future acts that arise from that view. Some truths are accepted as faith through education and tradition, others are too vague for the individual really to grasp. But some are clear enough to require a choice, and it is in regard to these truths that one is free (pp. 351-352). In Psychology: Briefer Course, James makes similar arguments about the role of habit and belief. In the “stream of consciousness” chapter he too locates the possibility of freedom in a change of habit which will affect future behavior. He frames this argument, moreover, as Tolstoy might have done, as a response to Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer, who enforces his determinism by the argument that with a given fixed character only one reaction is possible under given circumstances, forgets that, in these critical ethical moments, what consciously seems to be in question is the complexion of the character itself. The problem with the man is less what act he shall now resolve to do than what being he shall now choose to become. (P. 158)
The difference between Tolstoy and James appears from the use to which each puts freedom of the will. Whereas in Psychology: Briefer Course James was
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concerned to defend the possibility of human freedom, in The Kingdom of God Is within You Tolstoy went further to name the purpose of freedom and thereby to limit it. The liberty of man does not consist in the power of acting independently of the progress of life and the influences arising from it, but in the capacity for recognizing and acknowledging the truth revealed to him, and becoming the free and joyful participator in the eternal and infinite work of God, the life of the world; or on the other hand for refusing to recognize the truth, and so being a miserable and reluctant slave dragged whither he has no desire to go. (pp. 354-355)
James is suspicious of revealed truths. In “Is Life Worth Living?” for instance, he explicitly rejects pantheism, or the religion of nature, as a justification for morality. “Visible nature is all plasticity and indifference, a moral multiverse, as one might call it, and not a moral universe” (WB, p. 43). In the same essay, however, he insists all the same on his “right to supplement it [the physical order] by an unseen spiritual order that we assume on trust, if only thereby life may seem to us better worth living again” (P. 49). As psychologists Tolstoy and James each challenged the assumptions about human nature of determinist science and philosophy. As thinkers they were unwilling to give up either of the ingredients-ideals and the freedom to pursue them-necessary for a meaningful life. Both reflect the commitment of their respective countries to the value and rights of the individual on the one hand, and the moral duties of that same individual on the other. Russian culture has been more prone to compromise the prerogatives of the individual in defense of social order and morality, while American culture has tended toward greater individualism at the expense of morality. The idealists and social activists who introduced James into Russia did so as part of their project to provide a theoretical foundation for individual dignity and rights that had never been part of Russian political culture; they needed to defend the individual against modern positivist and materialist scientific thought on the one hand, and political absolutism on the other (Poole, pp. 59-66). For his part, as a bridge between American transcendentalism and the rationalist thought that succeeded it, James saw Tolstoy as an ally in his battle to save the “two kingpins of Americanism, morality and individualism” (Bjork, p. 173). Tolstoy’s robust belief in an “unseen spiritual order” alarmed James and attracted him at the same time. It was both the source of the “fatalism” that James disliked in Russian writers, and a justification for the “emancipated sympathy’’that he so loved in Tolstoy.
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Notes 1. If this is so, however, the polemics do not revolve, as Kuzina and Tiun’kin maintain, around Tolstoy’s social determinism versus James’s belief in inner freedom. On the contrary, as I shall argue, James is drawn to Tolstoy in large part because of the latter’s demonstration in his fiction of the existence of inner freedom. James and Tolstoy ultimately part ways because of Tolstoy’s metaphysical determinism, something that Kuzina and Tiun’kin do not acknowledge. They do not, therefore, address the issue of what exactly constitutes the part of the soul that stays the same in Tolstoy’s opinion. Tolstoy himself, in 0 zhizni (About Life) (1888), explains that each individual‘s “character” is transcendental, originating outside of time and space. Only this, he says, can explain why people react differently to exactly the same circumstances (PSS 26: 401-406). 2. “[James says] that I’m a melancholic, close to mental illness” (December 13, 1909; PSS, 57:187). AU translations from Tolstoy, unless otherwise indicated, are mine. 3. PSS, 52:282. Tolstoy read the elder James in a posthumous edition prepared out
of filial piety by William (The Literary Remains ofthe Late Henry James). 4. For various implications, literary and otherwise, of the death of the idea of progress, see Morson’s Narrative and Freedom. Morson is a great admirer of William James. 5. See Gustafson (pp. 34-38) for a compelling discussion of Nikolenka’s “paradigmatic” return to Petrovskoe. In 1856, before the publication of Youth, Chernyshevsky (p. 423) praised Tolstoy as a writer who depicted the psychological process itself. Boris Eikhenbaum in The Young ToZstoy began the modern exploration of the “open form” that grew out of this concentration on the details of psychological life. 6. The deliberately undramatic structure of Youth made it unpopular with readers, who criticized it for being long-winded and too detailed. In a letter to V. P. Botkin, for instance, Tolstoy agreed with his astute friend that the work was “petty” (melko) (Gusev, p. 153). 7. It is suggestive that Tolstoy himself passed through several major crises of belief in the course of his life and career. See Eikhenbaum, “0 krizisakh Tolstogo” (On Tolstoy’s Crises). 8. Tolstoyan “pan-moralism”was typical of Russian thought as a whole, according to V. V. Zenkovsky (History, pp. 5-6). 9. “Otryvok bez zaglaviia” (Fragment without Title) (1847), PSS 1:233-236, esp. pp. 235-236. 10. The translation is by Aylmer Maude as corrected by George Gibian in the Norton edition of War and Peace. 11. Myers, p. 46. See also pp. 387-390. Myers considers Renouvier to have been the most important intellectual influence on James’s life after his father. Myers acknowledges, of course, that James’s crisis was not merely intellectual, nor was it resolved by intellectual means. 12. In a review of Edmund Pfleiderer’s Der moderne Pessimismus published in The Nation (October 7,1875). See Essays, Comments, and Reviews, p. 311.
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13. In his 1875 review of Pfleiderer, James may be referring to his own first impression of Schopenhauer (whom he calls “one of the greatest of writers”) when he says of Schopenhauerian compassion that it “will of course exert a spell over persons in the unwholesome sentimental moulting-time of y o u t h (ECR,p. 3 12). 14. Allen, pp. 165-166. According to Allen, James’s son put the date of this crisis as 1870. 15. Allen, pp. 268-269. Renouvier with his defense of free will helped James escape the moral collapse to which Schopenhauer may have contributed, so that it is not surprising that in 1893 James highly praised Renouvier’s own subsequent attack on “the badness of the will to live” in Schopenhauer (ECR,pp. 455-456). 16. TT, p. 144. James borrowed his characterization of Schopenhauer almost verbatim from his 1893 review of Renouvier’s essay. 17. The term “prosaics” is that of Gary Saul Morson, who developed it originally from his studies of the Russian thinker Mikhail Bakhtin and has applied it to his interpretations of Tolstoy. See especially Hidden in Plain View, pp. 126-128,218-223. I am suggesting here that nineteenth-century prosaics, although a reaction against abstract philosophical systems, rests on metaphysical presuppositions that infuse the ordinary with meaning. Goethe was one of the creators of prosaics in this sense. On the influence of Goethe on Tolstoy see my T01stoyi Art and Thought, where I use the phrase “reason behind everything that lives” to describe the Goethean blend of realism and idealism. James and Emerson were also great admirers of Goethe, as, of course, was Herzen, whose Letters on the Study of Nature, much influenced by Goethe, helped shape realism in its Russian form. 18. James’s refusal to remain within the boundaries of either science or philosophy did not shock contemporary Russian readers. In Russia, Nikolai Grot’s 1890 review of The Principles of Psychology in Questions of Philosophy and Psychology identified James as a positivist who recognized the limitations of knowledge imposed by that philosophy even as he vowed to remain within them (Voprosyfilosofii i psikhologii, 21, book 5 [ 1890],90).A second, more extensive review of the book, by E. Chelpanov in 1892, picked up approvingly on James’s personal commitment to “spiritualism” (3:11, 72, 74, 76). When, eighteen years later, Chelpanov wrote James’s obituary for Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii and an article called “James as a Psychologist” (21:4 [ 19101, bk. 104,v-viii, 437-456), he stressed James’s breadth, his commitment to both science and philosophy, to both facts and the theories that make sense of them. 19. On this subject, see Orwin, TOlStOYk Art and Thought, especially chap. 3. Metaphysical idealism, according to Maurice Mandelbaum (6), “holds that within natural human experience one can find the clue to an understanding of the ultimate nature of reality, and this clue is revealed in those traits which distinguish man as a spiritual being” . . . in sum, the metaphysics of idealism finds man’s own spiritual nature to be the fullest expression of that which is to be taken as basic in reality.” 20. It has long been recognized that Tolstoy’s “absolute language” first made its appearance in his Sevastopol stories (Eikhenbaum, The Young Tolstoy, 102-105). Not coincidentally, the first outburst of the preacher in the first story is followed, in the third one, by the first infusion into Tolstoyan prose of Carlylian idealism. In Carlyle, Tolstoy discovered a justification for patriotism that carried him through War and Peace
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(Orwin, “Tolstoy and Patriotism”). He eventually left Carlylian metaphysics behind, but from 1884, when he read the essay Self-Reliance, he ardently admired Emerson, Carlyle’s disciple in America. Emerson became one of those sages whom Tolstoy quoted again and again in his tracts and his daily readers. Tolstoy may have read Emerson earlier (see Orwin, “Tolstoy and Patriotism,” 69n39; and Islamova, “Leo Tolstoy and Emerson” [Lev Tolstoi i Emerson]).Islamova argues that Emerson was more concerned with ideas and theories, while Tolstoy cared more for reality and action. This brings Tolstoy close to James, who shared a similar relation to Emerson; but whether from his youth he shared this direct link to transcendentalism with James, his education paralleled that of James in ways significant for this discussion. 21. On the relation of Tolstoy and Schopenhauer, see Eikhenbaum, Lev Tolstoi: Semidesiatye gody, pp. 95-97; McLaughlin; and Orwin, Tolstoy’s Art and Thought, pp. 150-1 64. 22. 12/17-18/1877; PSS 62:360. Solovyov’s Kritika otvlechennykh nachal ( A Critique of Abstract Principles) was published in Russkii vestnik (The Russian Herald) nos. 11, 12, 1877. 23. James quoted extensively from Tolstoy’s A Confession in the chapter called “The Divided Self” in The Varieties of Religious Experience, and, although he did not comment on other works of the older Tolstoy, he presumably read at least some of them. His writing occasionally echoed them, especially when Tolstoy was his subject. In a letter of 1908 to H. G. Wells, for instance, he compared Wells to Tolstoy as a practitioner of “contagious speech.” This peculiar turn of speech may well come from Tolstoy’s What is Art?, in which successful art is said to be “contagious”: the recipient catches the artist’s mood (Letters, 2: 316). It is important to observe too that James read the earlier Tolstoy only in 1896. This may help explain why, in the midst of his enthusiasm for Tolstoyan “veracity,” he was nonetheless struck by Tolstoy’s “fatalism and semi-pessimism’’ (Letters, 2: 45): these qualities, present but relatively subdued in Anna Karenina and even more subdued in War and Peace, would have leapt out at readers used to the grimmer fare served up by Tolstoy in his old age. James made his comment on August 4,1896, in a letter to Charles Renouvier, who, he could be sure, would oppose any kind of “fatalism” caused by metaphysical determinism. 24. Myers, p. 461. Myers goes on to comment that “no philosopher has ever proposed a more outrageous premise for faith than this. Because we want the world to be a certain way, our desire actually makes it so.” 25. See Poole, below. James himself did not seem that concerned about personal immortality, but he does make a very attentuated argument for it in his preface to the second edition of “Human Immortality: Two Supposed Objections to the Doctrine.” See Essays in Religion and Morality, pp. 75-76. 26. In the same publication, see also the article by Berdiaev, in which he claims that Tolstoy, unlike Dostoevsky in this regard, rejects individual souls for a World Soul, and therefore emphasizes law and the Old Testament over freedom and the New Testament. 27. Compare the diary entry from June 29,1852, when, just having read the Profession de foi du Vicaire Savoyard (from Rousseau’s Emile), Tolstoy joyfully proclaims that “the one thing I have extracted from it is a belief in the immortality of the soul” (PSS
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46:128) with numerous admissions in the diary of the 1890s that the individual personality (lichnost’) is not immortal and does not even remain the same in the course of one lifetime. See, for instance, entries for January 15,1890 (5l:lO-11); February 15, 1890 (51:19); March 13, 1890 (51:28); July25, 1890 (51:66-67), in which he explicitly distinguishes his own particular consciousness and character from the immortal part of his soul; May 27, 1891 (52:35); July 22, 1891 (52:45), in which he speculates that reincarnation is theoretically possible because time is infinite, and therefore the same combination of traits may reform to duplicate a personality; October 24, 1895 (53:62-63). 28. Kuzina and Tiun’kin point out that Tolstoy’s favorite psychologist from the pages of Questions of Philosophy and Psychology was the Dane Harald Hoffding, who, like Tolstoy, and in opposition to James, was an opponent of spiritualism and denied that the individual soul was substantial (pp. 74-75).
Works Cited Allen, Gay. William James: A Biography. New York Viking Press, 1967. Berdiaev, Nikolai. “Vetkhii i Novyi Zavet v religioznom soznanii L. Tolstogo” (The Old and New Testaments in the religious consciousness of L. Tolstoy). In 0 Religii L’va Tolstogo: Sbornik statei (On Tolstoy’s Religion: Articles), pp. 172-195. 1912. Reprint. Paris: YMCA Press, 1978. Bjork, Daniel. The Compromised Scientist. New York Columbia University Press, 1983. Blood, Benjamin Paul. The Anaesthetic Revelation and the Gist of Philosophy. Amsterdam, N.Y., 1874. Chelpanov, E. Nekrolog (Obituary [of William James]). Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii (VPF), 2:4, book 104 (1910), pp. vi-vii. -. Review of James’s Principles ofPsychology. VPF, 3:11, book 2 (1892), pp. 69-76. Chernyshevskii, Nikolai [Chernyshevsky].“Detstvo i otrochestvo. Soch. gr. L. N. Tolstogo Spb. 1856. Voennye rasskazy gr. L. N. Tolstogo.” (Childhood and Boyhood. The Works of Count L. N. Tolstoi). St. Petersburg, 1856. The war stories of Count L. N. Tolstoi. St. Petersburg, 1856). In Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 3: 421-431. Moscow: Goslitizdat, 1939-53. Eikhenbaum, Boris. Lev Tolstoi.Vol. 1.1928. Reprint, Munich Wilhelm FinkVerlag, 1968. -. Lev Tolstoi: semidesiatye gody (Leo Tolstoy. The Seventies). Leningrad: Izdatel’stvo “Khudozhestvennaia literatura,” 1974. . “0 krizisakh Tolstogo” (About Tolstoy’s Crises). In Skvoz’ literatury: Sbornik statei, pp. 67-72. 1924. Reprint. The Hague: Mouton, 1962. -. The Young ToZstoy. Translated and edited by Gary Kern. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Ardis, 1972. Flournoy, Theodore. T h e Philosophy of William James. 1917. Reprint. Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Librairies Press, 1969. Grot, Nikolai. [Review of James’s Principles ofPsychology]. VPF2:1, book 5 (1890),89-90. Gusev, N.N. Lev Nikolaevich Tolstoy: Materialy k biografii s 1855 PO 1869god (Materials for a Biography, 1855-1869). Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1957.
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Gustafson, Richard. Leo Tolstoy, Resident and Stranger. A Study in Fiction and Theology New York Columbia University Press, 1986. Islamova, A. K. “Lev Tolstoi i Emerson: 0 sviazi esteticheskikhsistem” (Leo Tolstoy and Emerson: On a connection of aesthetics systems). Russkaia literatura 1 (1989): 44-60. Kuzina, L, K. Tiun’kin. “Voskresenie” L. N. Tolstogo (Tolstoy’s “Resurrection”). Moscow: “Khudozhestvennaia literatura,” 1978. Logue, William. Charles Renouvier, Philosopher of Liberty. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1993. Mandelbaum, Maurice. History, Man e+ Reason. A Study in Nineteenth-Century Thought. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971. McLaughlin, Sigrid.“Some Aspects of Tolstoy’s Intellectual Development: Tolstoy and Schopenhauer.” California Slavic Studies 5 ( 1970): 187-245. Morson, Gary Saul. Hidden in Plain View. Narrative and Creative Potentials in “War and Peace.” Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1987. . Narrative and Freedom: The Shadows of Time. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994. Myers, Gerald E. William James, His Life and Thought. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1986. Orwin, Donna. “Tolstoy and Patriotism.” In Lev Tolstoy and the Concept of Brotherhood. Edited by Andrew Donskov and John Woodsworth. Ottawa: Legas, 1996. Pp. 51-70.
. Tolstoy’sArt and Thought, 1847 to 1880. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993. Perepiska L.N. Tolstogo s N.N. Strakhovym: 1870-1894 (The Correspondence of L. N. Tolstoy with N. N. Strakhov: 1870-1894). Tolstovskii Muzei. Vol. 2. St. Petersburg: Izdanie obshchestva tolstovskovo muzeia, 1914. Perry, Ralph Barton. The Thought and Character of William James. 2 vols. Boston: Little, Brown, 1935. Poole, Randall. “Neo-ldealist Philosophy in the Russian Liberation Movement: The Moscow Psychological Society and Its Symposium, ‘Problems of Idealism.”’ A later 1995 version of a Kennan Institute Occasional Paper delivered in 1993. Tolstoy, Lev. Polnoe sobranie sochinenii (CollectedWorks [PSS]).90 vols. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo“Khudozhestvennaia literatura,” 1928-1 958. . The Kingdom of God Is within You: Christianity Not as a Mystic Religion but as a New Theory of Life. Translated by Constance Garnett. 1894. Reprint. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984. . War and Peace. Translated by Aylmer Maude, edited by George Gibian. 2d ed. New York Norton Critical Editions, 1996. Zenkovsky, V. V. A History of Russian Philosophy. Vol. 1. New York Columbia University Press, 1953. . [Zenkovskii].“Problema bessmertiia u L. N. Tolstogo” (The Problem of Immortality in L. N. Tolstoy). In 0 religii L’va Tolstogo: Sbornik statei, 27-58. 1912. Reprint. Paris: YMCA Press, 1978.
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“The Moral Equivalent of War”: Violence in the Later Fiction of LeoTolstoy Andrew Wachtel
I
N HIS FAMOUS ESSAY, “The Moral Equivalent of War,” William James makes
the claim that no calls for the elimination of war will ever succeed unless they take into account the historical, ethical, and aesthetic reasons for its existence. While agreeing with the justice of the pacifists’ cause, James accuses them of a lack of imagination, an unwillingness or inability to understand their opponents’ point of view. “So long as the anti-militarists propose no substitutes for the disciplinary function of war, no moral equivalent of war, analogous, as one might say, to the mechanical equivalent of heat, so long they fail to realize the full inwardness of the situation. . . . The duties, penalties and sanctions pictured in the utopias they paint are all too weak and tame to touch the military-minded.” As the only exception to this rule, James cites Leo Tolstoy, whose pacifism “makes the fear of the Lord furnish the moral spur provided elsewhere by the fear of the enemy”(ERM,p. 169). James does not mention which of Tolstoy’s works in particular he has in mind when referring to Tolstoy’s militant pacifism. We know that he was a great admirer of both War and Peace and Anna Karenina, but these two works, written before Tolstoy’s conversion of the late 1870s, do not contain a pacifist message. To be sure, some of Tolstoy’s early writings, The Sebastopol Stories and War and Peace in particular, contain some of the most pitiless and effective battle scenes in world literature. Indeed, in those literary works one precisely finds expressed both the horror of war as well as its attractive qualities (attractive to the defenders of war as a necessary human institution, anyway). And it is no accident that their author was ultimately capable of creating a sufficiently crusading pacifism to attract military types. After all, Tolstoy had - 81 -
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himself been a soldier in his youth, and he understood the military passion in far more than an abstract way. But, we repeat, it is not to these then and now well-known fictional works that James is referring in his essay. Rather, he has in mind the writings of the postconversion “sage of Yasnaia Poliana,” works like “Letter on Non-Resistance” or “The Kingdom of God Is within You.” That James should have focused on these tracts may come as something of a surprise. For by now, although one can still find occasional publications and discussions of Tolstoy’s religious philosophy, his literary works, including “The Death of Ivan Ilich,” “The Kreutzer Sonata,” “Father Sergius,” The Living Corpse, Hadji-Murat, and Resurrection, are considered the major contributions of the author’s later period. Such was emphatically not the case at the turn of the century. Indeed, it was widely felt that after Anna Karenina Tolstoy had essentially stopped producing imaginative literature, and his worldwide reputation (he was admired in this period by such diverse thinkers as Gandhi, Lenin, and Bergson, in addition to James) was based on his position as a social and religious thinker rather than as a fiction writer. The 1910 Encyclopaedia Britannica entry on Tolstoy can be considered representative of contemporary views. The entry stretches to seventeen columns of small print, of which only one is devoted to Tolstoy the writer.’ By contrast, his religious views are given three full columns. But James was not attracted to Tolstoy the moral and religious thinker only because this work was available and famous. The two men seemed to be in substantial agreement, both in terms of their opinions and their positions in society. In particular, both were avowed pacifists whose reputation in part rested on their ability to denounce the bellicosity of their respective governments. And their pacifism was derived from the same source, the single Gospel passage which they took to be the key to all Christian conduct properly understood: “But I say unto you, Love your enemies” (Matthew, V: 43). Their glosses on this passage could have been written by the same hand: It is this recognition of the law of love as the highest law of human life, and the clearly expressed guidance for conduct that follows from the Christian teaching on love, applied equally to enemies and those who hate, offend and curse us, that constitutes the peculiarity of Christ’s teaching. The precise and definite meaning given to the doctrine of love and the guidance resultingfrom it inevitably involves a complete transformation of the established structure of 1;fe ([Emphasis mine. AW] Tolstoy, “The Law of Love and the Law of Violence,” A Confession,p. 174). Psychologically and in principle, the precept “Love your enemies” is not self-contradictory. It is merely the extreme limit of a kind of magnanimity with which, in the shape of pitying tolerance of our oppressors, we are fairly familiar. Yet if radically followed, it would involve such a breach with our instinctive springs of action as a whole, and the present world’s arrangements, that a critical
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point would practically be passed, and we should be born into another kingdom of being. (emphasis mine, [AW]; VRE, p. 229)
What is more, basic philosophical premises did not exist as abstract categories for Tolstoy and James. Rather, as public intellectuals, both men were willing to castigate their respective societies for breaking basic moral principles, even when doing so flew in the teeth of public opinion. This, for example, is how Tolstoy greeted the announcement of the Russo-Japanese War in his article “Stop and Think” ( 1904): War again. Again completely unnecessary, completely uncalled-for sufferings, again lies, again general hypnosis, and human beastliness. People, separated from each other by thousands of miles, hundreds of thousands of such people-on the one side Buddhists, whose religion forbids not only the killing of humans but even of animals, on the other, Christians who profess a creed of brotherhood and love-will search each other out, on land and on sea, in order to kill, torture and maim in the cruelest of fashions2 James, for his part, thundered in similar fashion against such American militaristic actions as the 1898 war in the Philippines, as in this letter to the editor of The Transcript “[Wle have all been swept away by the overmastering flood. And now what it has swept us into is an adventure that in sober seriousness and definite English speech must be described as literally piratical” (ECR,p. 155). More recent students of Tolstoy have, if they have written about this topic at all, tended to agree with James’s assessment of the Russian author’s views on violence in his later work. For example, based on a reading of twenty-five titles written by Tolstoy post-1880 as well as “the wealth of comment in the letters, diaries, notebooks, and in accounts of Tolstoy’s remarks in conversation,”Gary R. Jahn has concluded that the “distinctive feature of Tolstoy’s later views on war and related subjects was their theoretical rigidity and his absolute refusal to acknowledge the validity of any special case or the desirability of making occasional qualifications” (p. 118). This is said to be in marked contradistinction to Tolstoy’s earlier views according to which “war was madness and murder, but particular wars might be unjust or just depending on whether they were fought for aggression or defense” (p. 112). Although such claims do appear to hold true for Tolstoy’s post-1880 nonliterary work, a closer examination of his sporadic but nevertheless fairly extensive literary output from the same period yields a far more complex picture of Count Leo’s own struggles to express a moral equivalent of war. These works, including “The Kreutzer Sonata,” “The Devil,” The Power of Darkness, “Father Sergius,” and the novella Hadji-Murat, were for the most part unavailable to James (“The Kreutzer Sonata,” and The Power of Darkness had
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been published in Russian and in translation, but the others remained unpublished in any language during Tolstoy’s lifetime). They present violence in ways that, as we will see, directly contradict the principles Tolstoy laid out in his essayistic writing of the same period, ultimately calling into question the claim that the postconversion Tolstoy was always the militant pacifist whom James (and, following James, later scholars) took him to be. To be sure, one can find literary works in which the antiwar and antimilitaristic prescriptions of the essays are embodied directly. Such is the play And the Light Shineth in Darkness, for example. Here Nikolai Ivanovich Saryntsev (one of Tolstoy’s more autobiographical heroes overall) employs typically late-Tolstoyan logic to convince his daughter’s fiance to refuse the pledge of fealty to the tsar required of military officers. Buoyed by Saryntsev’s moral support, the young man goes to prison rather than take part in the state’s militarist structures, eventually ruining his life but presumably saving his soul. Even the heartrending pleas of the young man’s mother and the recognition that he will most likely die because of his refusal do not shake Saryntsev’s convictions. But works such as these alternate with others that display a far more ambiguous attitude to violence in general and war in particular. The first thing to be said is that for the literary oeuvre of an avowed pacifist, Tolstoy’s later fiction and drama contain a surprising number of scenes in which cruelty and violence play central roles. And in at least one work, the novella Hadji-Murat, one can say without exaggeration that war itself is glorified. Why this should be so and what it means will be the subject of the following short essay, but at the very least it is clear that for the later Tolstoy “do not do violence” did not mean “do not write violence.” As it happens, in most of the late works violence is related not to war but rather to sex: in this category one finds “The Kreutzer Sonata” (the narrator’s murder of his wife and her putative lover), “The Devil” (the narrator’s suicide, or his murder of his lover in the other variant), The Power of Darkness (Nikita’s murder of his illegitimate child), “Father Sergius” (Sergius’s selfmutilation). Although the murder in “The Kreutzer Sonata” has taken place in the past and is presented only in retrospective narration (which has the effect of diminishing its raw emotional power and allowing it to serve more as object lesson than as object), in the latter three works the act of violence happens in the narrative present. A scene from “Father Sergius” is perhaps the best place to begin our investigation of how scenes of aestheticized violence-by which I mean scenes in which a violent act is depicted in such a way as to encourage the reader to focus on the physical, visual, and aural particularity of the violent act as such, rather than on its moral or spiritual implications-function in Tolstoy’s later fictional work. Father Sergius has been living as a hermit for many years when,
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on a bet, a woman named Makovkina undertakes to seduce him. She arrives at his solitary cabin on a snowy night, forces him to admit her and then attempts to work her magic. Sergius, for whom life as a hermit is a long attempt to prove to himself and others that he is indeed a holy man, is obviously attracted to the woman. But his pride (rather than any true holiness) forces him to prove his sainthood to himself. So when she calls to him again he thinks: “I will go to her, but I will go like that holy father who put one hand on the harlot and the other in the fire. But there is no fire here”(PSS 31: 25). Sergius looks around for an acceptable substitute and then Tolstoy provides the following chilling scene: “I’ll come right now,” he said and, opening the door, without looking at her he walked by her to the door to the little room where he chopped wood. There he groped for the stump on which he chopped wood and the ax which was leaning up against the wall. “In a moment,”he said, and taking the ax in his right hand he placed the index finger of his left hand on the stump, raised the ax and struck himself just below the second joint. The finger flew up more briskly than would a piece of wood of the same thickness, flipped over, landed on the edge of the stump and then on the floor. He heard the sound before he felt any pain. But before he could be amazed that there was no pain, he felt a searing pain and the warmth of his flowing blood. He quickly picked up the severed finger with the hem of his robe, and pressing it to his thigh went back into the room. Having stopped in front of the woman and having lowered his eyes he asked quietly: “What do you want?”(PSS 31: 25)
What is immediately striking about this paragraph is the cold and clinical detail with which the amputation is presented. Although movies had not yet been invented, the impression of the description is cinematic, allowing us to see the finger coming off in close-up and in slow motion. In particular, the description of the flight of the severed finger itself is terrifying, because the analogy of live flesh with dead wood, perhaps a natural one for an uninvolved but experienced woodcutter, appears horribly detached from the thoughts we might expect Sergius to be having. Of course, the scene serves in the story to make a number of important points: it illustrates the distinction between right thinking and right action, shows in a graphic way that Sergius acts from pride and not true sainthood, and it serves as the starting point for Makovkina’s own conversion. But, and this is of central importance, in order to get these messages across, Tolstoy did not necessarily have to depict the scene so graphically, even if he had wanted to make the finger/phallus connection that is obvious here. The choice to present it narratively, and in such grisly detail,
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is precisely a choice, one that undoubtedly add